American Journal of Ancient History (Vol 8.2) 9781463206772, 1463206771

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American Journal of Ancient History

American Journal of Ancient History

8.2

The American Journal of Ancient History is a peer-reviewed academic journal covering ancient history and classical studies. It was established in 1976 and edited by Ernst Badian until 2001. It is continued by the American Journal of Ancient History: New Series, edited by T. Corey Brennan.

American Journal of Ancient History

Volume 8.2 Edited by

Ernst Badian

gp 2017

Gorgias Press LLC, 954 River Road, Piscataway, NJ, 08854, USA www.gorgiaspress.com Copyright © 2017 by Gorgias Press LLC Originally published in 1983 All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning or otherwise without the prior written permission of Gorgias Press LLC. ‫ܐ‬

1

2017

ISBN 978-1-4632-0677-2

Printed in the United States of America

TABLE

OF CONTENTS

RaphaelSealey:How Citizenshipandthe City Beganin Athens .................................................................... IsraelShatzman:The Beginningof the RomanDefensive Systemin Judaea .................................................................

97

130

Thomas R. Martin: QuintusCurtius' Presentationof

Philip ArrhidaeusandJosephus' Accounts of the Accession of Claudius ...................................................

D. R. ShackletonBailey: Brothersor Cousins?..................................

161

191

TABLE

OF CONTENTS

RaphaelSealey:How Citizenshipandthe City Beganin Athens .................................................................... IsraelShatzman:The Beginningof the RomanDefensive Systemin Judaea .................................................................

97

130

Thomas R. Martin: QuintusCurtius' Presentationof

Philip ArrhidaeusandJosephus' Accounts of the Accession of Claudius ...................................................

D. R. ShackletonBailey: Brothersor Cousins?..................................

161

191

HOW

CITIZENSHIP

AND

THE

CITY

BEGAN

IN ATHENS

Besides,I say that no one in the city should be atimos

....

Let us desist

from our anger and take all men, whoeveris willing to join us in naval defense,as our kinsmenand epitimoi and citizens.

Aristophanes,Frogs 692-702

In the studyof Atheniancitizenshiptwo questionscan be asked. One is the questionof "extent": it asks, who had citizenship?It includes questionsabout the bearing of marriage on the statusof children in Athens, about the relationshipof politeia to anchisteia,about admissionto thephratryandto thedeme,andaboutenfranchisement of aliens. Many studieshavebeendevotedto this groupof questions.The other questionis that of "content": what rights, privileges, capacitiesand material advantagesconstitutedcitizenship?U. Kahrstedtincludeda valuablesectionon "Inhalt des B/.irgerrechts"in his Staatsgebietund StaatsangehOrige in Athen (1934) 129-199. He was more concernedto expoundthe contentof citizenship,as it was in the fully developedconditions of the late fifth century and the fourth, than to trace its early growth. It is evidentthatcitizenshipgrew in content,as publicadministration becamemoreelaborate.When, for example,theCouncilof Five Hundred was created,citizenshipacquiredthe additionalcapacityof eligibility for membershipin that Council. If one were to trace the history of Atheniancitizenshipfrom the fourthcenturybackwards,onemighthope to discovera conditionin whichthe contentof citizenshipwas minimal. It is legitimateto askwhethera conditioncanbe discerned whenAthenian citizenshiphadyet to comeinto being. Was therea time whenthe law distinguishedbetweenfree men and slaves, but not betweencitizens and aliens?

Therehavebeenrelativelyfew studiesof theearly historicaldevelopmentof the contentof citizenship.At least, however,a beginninghas

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¸ 1987 by E. Badian. All rightsreserved.

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beenmaderecentlyby P.B. Manville,• whohastracedhow citizenship emergedfrom a multitudeof olderassociations andgrew in content(not his term) as time passed.Questionsaboutphratriesand other groupings have been treatedadequatelyby Manville and his predecessors; theyneednotbe re-opened here.Acknowledging thevalueof hisinsights, the presentinquiry will nonethe lessfollow a differentpath, not that of the socialhistorianbut that of the historicaljurist. It will studythe natureanddevelopment of somelegalideascurrentamongtheAthenians. Its centralthesiswill concernthe temporalrelationshipbetweentwo distinctions,that betweencitizen and alien and that betweenepitimos and atimos. Section 1 will deal with atimia.

Section 2 will consider Solon's law

on immigrationand its antecedents.Section3 will draw inferencesand claim to find them reflectedin the thoughtof Aischylos.Section4 will summarize

conclusions.

Divisions

and subdivisions

of sections are

numberedfor clarity. Somepreliminaryobservations canbe madeabouttheterms"citizen" and "alien". "Citizen" will be usedas the equivalentof rco)•iZ•lqor 'A0qvctio•. The wordsno)•izq• and 6tox6• do not occurin the extant fragmentsof Solon's laws but they were current already when the Homericpoemswere composed.If citizenshipis foundto haveemerged at a relativelylate date, this doesnot meanthat the wordsdid not yet exist,but onlythatthedistinctions whichtheyindicatewerenot known to the law. At a stagebefore law is reducedto writing, a distinction is not knownto the law if it is not recognizedby publicorgansexercising authority. "Mien" will be usedof anyonewho is freebutnota citizen.It approximatesin tneaningto •vog, but it is more comprehensive. For •vot arefriendlyaliensasdistinctfromno)•!•tot or •Z0poi. Onemaywonder why citizens were called 'A0qvctiot, not 'AzztKoi; whence the Panathenaia derived its name; and whether the remark of Themistokles

at Herodotus8.125.1 is ambiguous.Thesequestions are legitimate,but no attempt will be made to answer them here. 1. Solon'slaw of amnesty 2 declaredthat,exceptfor personscondemned by statedcourtson statedcharges,all who wereatimoibeforethearchonshipof Solonwere to be epitimoi.It is to be notedthat the law did not speakof "citizenship" or "citizens" (politeia, politai); the operative words were atimoi and epitimoi.

Somewhat similarlanguageis usedin latergrantsof amnesty.Andokidessaysthat,whena Persianinvasionwasexpected,theAthenians

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"decided to restore theexilesandmaketheatimoiepitimoi". 3 He distinguisheshere betweenexiles and atimoi, but does not make clear whetherthey were mutuallyexclusiveor overlappingcategories.Andokidesalsomentionsthe decreeof amnestypassedon the proposalof Patrokleidesin 405/4 and saysthat by it the Atheniansresolved"to makethe atimoi epitimoi"(1.73). He hasthe decreereadout (1.77-79). It alludesto the amnestypassedduringthe PersianWars and provides for destroyingrecordsdetrimentalto "atimoi or debtors"(1.78). Andokides(1.73) associatedpublicdebtorswith atimoi, becausea citizen who failed to pay a debt due to the stateby the ninth prytanybecame atimos;correspondingly textsdistinguishing typesof atimoimostoften

dividethemintopublicdebtors andotheratimoi. 4Thedecree ofPatrokleidesexemptsfrom its benefitspersonscondemnedby statedcourts on statedcharges,and althoughat other pointsdivergencein wording betweenthis decreeand the amnestyof Solon may be significant,the exceptionsare much the same. There is a high level of resemblanceamong the three grants of amnesty.This suggeststhat to a large extentatimia was the samein nature in 405/4 as in the time of Solon. None of the three passages speaksof politai or politeia. This needcauseno surprise;atimia was the word in which Athenian law stateddiminutionof citizenship.But it does not necessarilyfollow that epitimoswas identicallyequivalent to polit•s. I. 1. In spiteof the recognizablecontinuityin the conceptof atimia, its force underwentsome change. Indeed the Solonian law assumes that the atimoi are in exile, but Andokides(1.80) saysthat Patrokleides did not restoreexiles. Two textsconfirmthat a changecame about. (i) Arguingbeforetheassemblyin 342/1, Demosthenes citesa decree declaringArthmiosof Zeleia andhis descendants enemies"andatimoi". In explanationhe adds(9.44): This doesnot meanthe atimia of whichonewouldspeakordinarily. For what differencedid it maketo a man of Zeleia, if he was not to take part in the commonthingsof the Athenians?But in the laws on homicide, in referenceto actsfor which no judicial hearingis grantedbut one may kill the culprit without incurring guilt, it is written: "And let him be killed atimos."This means that anyonewho kills one of thoseculpritsis pure.

The decreeagainstArthmiosof Zeleiamaybea forgeryof themid-fourth

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century;evenif it incorporates genuinematerial,no secureinference

canbedrawnfromitswording. 5 ButthereisnoneedtodoubtDemosthenes'scitationof the laws on homicide. He distinguishesan earlier sense of atimia from the milder sense current in his own time. The

more severesensewas preservedin the laws on homicideand meant thatthe atimoscouldbe killed with impunity.Atimia in its earliersense wasequivalentto the Englishword "outlawry". (ii) Aristotle (AP 16.10) wrote:

The laws of the Atheniansconcerningtyrantswere mild in those days, especiallythe law which had the mostbearingon setting up a tyranny.For they had the followinglaw: "Theseare the establishedand ancestrallaws of the Athenians. If any people rise up with a view to tyrannyor join in settingup a tyranny,let the offender, both himself and his descendants,be atimos."

Aristotle'ssurprisecanbestbe explainedas dueto misunderstanding. He attributed to atimia the milder sense current in his own time, but

the archaiclaw had intendedit in the more severesenseof outlawry.

The fact that atimia changedfrom a more severeto a milder sense was discoveredby H. Swoboda.He maintainedthat the word had acquiredthemildersenseby thetimeof Solon.His reasonwasthelaw

attributed to SolonatAP 8.5. Thatpassage callsforattention. 6 1.2.

At AP 8.5 Aristotle saysof Solon: He saw that the city often experiencedinternal strife and that someof thecitizens,reluctantto bestirthemselves,acceptedwhatever happened.So in referenceto suchpeoplehe madea peculiar law, that anyonewho failed to stackarmswith either sideduring

internalstrifeshouldbe atimosandhaveno partin the city

This putative law penalizedneutrality in civil strife. If atimia in this law hadmeantoutlawry,thelaw wouldhaveimposedthesamedisability on neutralsaswas likely to befall the vanquished.Sincethatis improbable, the law againstneutrality, if authentic,providessomereasonto believethat atimia had acquiredits milder senseby the time of Solon. (This argumentwas offeredby Swobodaand Manville; seen. 6.) The questionof theauthenticityof thelaw hashadfrequentdiscussion

CITIZENSHIP

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1Ol

lately.7 Two arguments will be presented here.Onearisesfromthe apparentmetaphorin the wording of the law, and the other from its supposedconflictwith a speechof Lysias.

1.2.1. The phrase'ff0eo0ott'[& 6Jz•,otoccurstwice in a passageof Thucydides(8.93.1) aboutthe mutineersin the Peiraieusin 411. They wentintothetheaterof Dionysosat Mounichia"and,0•[tevot they formedthemselvesinto an assembly".They took a decisionand

in consequence "they marchedon the city and •0ewo, againin the Anakeion,z& 6xX•t". In thelightof thispassage therecanbe no doubt that the phrasemeant an action whereby men relieved themselvesof

theburden of theirspears andshields butkeptthese readilyavailable.8 Accordingly the phrase means very much the same as the modem expression"to stackarms"(seeWebster'sNew InternationalDictionary,

s.v.;British"topilearms"(OxfordEnglish Dictionary, s.v. pile, v.2 lb), German "(die) Gewehre zusammensetzen"(Der neue Muret-San-

ders, s.v. Gewehr)), that is "to place musketsor rifles (usuallythree) in a positionin which their buttsrest on the groundand their muzzles cometogether,so as to form a pyramidalfigure: a modeof disposing of themsoasto bereadilyavailablewhenwanted,practisedby soldiers, etc., while restingduring a march or other military operation"(OED, 1oc.cit.). One doesnot lay a rifle flat on the ground,becausemoisture might get into the barrelandcauserest. Similarconsiderations applied to spearsand shieldsin antiquity.

By stackingarmsmenindicatethatthey are not aboutto engagein immediateconflict.Thereforethe phrasecan acquirea metaphorical sense,meaningto awaitthe outcomeof currenteventsbeforetaking action."The statesmenof our own countryhadpiled armswith a view

of seeinghowliberalinstitutions wouldsucceed in America"(T. Hughes in The MorningStar, December5, 1865, quotedin OED, loc. cit.). Butin AtticGreekthemetaphorical development is markedlydifferent. Therethephraseis not"to stackarms"but"to stackarmswithsomeone",

andit means"to takesideswith someone", "tojoin someone's sidein strife". ThusDemosthenes (21.145) saysof Alkibiades: By stackingarms with the demostwice in Samosand a third time

in thecity itselfhe demonstrated hispatriotism,notwith money nor with words,but with his person.

A tellingillustrationof the metaphorical usageis providedby Plato (Republic4.440e):

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We reachthe oppositeconclusionaboutthe spiritedelementthan we reachedrecently. For then we thoughtthat it was something akin to desire,but now we sayon the contrarythatin the internal strife (stasis) of the mind it stacks its arms on the side of the rational

element.

Other illustrativepassagesare noted by Develin (cited n. 7). Plato's remarkis suggestive,sincehe associates stackingarmswith stasis.So one may well supposethat the metaphoricalusagedevelopedfrom a phrasesimilar to Solon'sallegedlaw againstneutrality. How, then, did a phrasewhichrefersliterally to temporaryabstention from conflict come to mean taking sides in a conflict? Surely the followingshouldbe imagined.Two powerfulmen, eachcommanding a bandof armedfollowers,have a dispute.They bring their men to a placewheretheycandecidetheissueby fighting.But insteadof fighting they beginto talk, and while they negotiate,their followersstackarms on eithersideof the placeof meeting.Bystanders,who had not previouslycommittedthemselves,can declaretheir preferencefor one party or the other by stackingarmswith the one groupof followersor with theother.It may comeaboutthatonesideassembles far moresupporters thanthe other, andso the two principalsmay be willing to abstainfrom fightingpermanentlyandlet theevidentnumericalsuperioritydetermine the issue.

A development of thekindoutlinedhasbeenreconstructed conjecturally to explainwhyGreekassemblies werein thehabitof takingdeci-

sions byvote.9If it isrighttothinkonthese lines,therearetwopossible waysof understanding theSolonJan lawagainst neutrality incivilstrife. (i) On the one interpretation the phrase•:i0eo0ctL•:& firth. orshould be understood literallyin thislaw. The law thenenvisages a condition of stasis, a condition, that is, where armed strife is imminent or has

alreadybrokenout,butwithinthiscondition thelawrecognizes a stage whenthe partiesare not immediatelyengagedin fightingbut have stackedtheirarms.The law seeksto ensurethatat thisstagepeople whohavenotpreviously committed themselves mustshowtheirpreferencefor one sideor the otherby stackingtheir spearsand shieldsin the appropriate place.Evidentlya parleyis in progress andthe stage envisaged isindistinguishable fromameeting of thepublicassembly. This interpretation of the law is onlylikelyon the assumption that as late as the time of SolonAthenianshabituallyborearmsto attend

meetings of theAssembly. Thatassumption is unlikely.Admittedly at Tegeatracesof gatheringwith weapons for a meetingof the primary

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assemblyare attestedas late as 369 (Xenophon, Hellenica 6.5.6-9), and admittedlythe hostwhichentrustedthe siegeof Kylon andhis men to the nine archonswas a gatheringin arms (Thucydides 1. 126.7-8), but the latter occurrencewas a revolutionarycrisisand showsnothing aboutregularpractice.Nothingin the attestedprocedureof theAthenian ekkl•sia bears witnessto its (conjectural)origin in an assemblageof armed men. There

is a marked

contrast with the fossilized

traces of

militaryoriginpreservedin thecomitiacenturiataof theLate Republic. If men bore arms to the Athenianassemblyin the time of Solon, one wouldexpectsomesuchtracesto surviveintothefully historicalperiod. (ii) Alternatively, in the law againstneutrality,the phrasemay have been intended in its metaphoricalsense. But this is unlikely, both becausein the interestsof clarity Athenian and other laws eschew metaphors,and becausein a law referringto stasisany weaponsmentionedare more likely to be real than metaphorical.

Thus scrutinyof the phrase•:(,0•o0ctt•:6t6xkct in the allegedlaw againstneutralitysuggests thatthatlaw is notauthentic.One canescape the difficulties by supposingthat the text preservedis a paraphrase, somewhatremovedfrom the law itself, and that the paraphrasehas obscuredthe original meaning,perhapsthroughfailure of understanding. But this solutioncomescloseto sayingthat the law, thoughauthentic, had a tenor which cannot be recovered.

1.2.2. The other argumentagainstthe authenticityof the Solonian law aboutneutralitydependson the speechAgainstPhilon (Lysias31), which was delivered

some little time after 403. Philon had been chosen

to the councilof the comingyear but waschallengedat his dokimasia. The speakercomplainedthat in the troublesof 404/3 Philon, so far fromjoining the goodcauseof the men of the Peiraieus,hadwithdrawn beyondthe bordersof Attica and settledas a residentalien in Oropos. The speakermet a possibleanswerthus (31.27-28):

I understand that he will say that, if it were a crime not to be presentat thattime of crisis,therewouldbe a law in forcedealing with thematterexplicitly,just astherearelawsaboutothercrimes. Evidently he supposesthat you will not know that preciselybecauseof the enormityof the crime no law hasbeenwrittenabout it. What statesman ever imagined,whatlawgivereveranticipated that any of the citizenswould commit so heinousan offense?It cannotbe that a law was made recognizinga major crime, if someonedesertshispostwhenthecity, thoughnotitselfin danger,

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puts the other side into danger, and yet no law was made if someonedesertsthe city itself when the city itself is in danger. In thesesentencesthe speakerappearsto grant that there was no law of thetenorof Soloh'ssupposed law againstneutralityin internalstrife. Some scholars(Goldstein, Behrs, cit. n. 7), seekingto escapethis inference, have arguedthat the speakerof Lysias 31 had reasonto avoid mentioningthe law of Solon. The treaty which had broughtthe troubles of 403 to an end had provided amnesty in the form of a prohibitionof recrimination(AP 39.6). Thereforeit wouldbe imprudent in a prosecutorto allegea violationof Solonianlaw, if the violation was committedbefore the amnestywas agreedupon. Again, as the speakeracknowledges (31.10), someof his audiencemightfor compelling private reasonshave avoidedparticipatingin the dangersof 403, and so, it is suggested,the speakerwould be wise to refrain from remindingthemof the Solonianlaw againstneutrality.Theseconsiderationsmightbe cogent,if the speakerhadrefrainedfrom any allusion to the supposed law of Solon.But he doesnot refrainfrom alludingto a law of that tenor;insteadhe saysexplicitly, in the sentences quoted above, that there was no such law.

One might alternatively try to defend the authenticityof Soloh's supposedlaw againstneutrality by suggestingthat it had fallen into desuetudeduring the conditionsof internal peaceprevailing in much of the fifth century. The Atheniansadmittedlydid not recognizeany meansby which a law could becomeobsolete,but their provisionsfor legal memory were imperfect. On this view the speakerof Lysias 31 would err in sayingthat no law had ever been written aboutthe crime becauseof its enormity. But it is not likely that a law of Solon, remembered when AP 8.5 was composed,was forgottenat the time when Lysias 31 was delivered. For in 403/2 the decreeof Teisamenos(Andokides1.83-84) requiredthe Atheniansto observethe laws of Solon and Drakon, pendingrevisionof the laws. Again, it might be maintainedthat the argumentof Lysias31.27-28 hasno bearingon the supposedlaw of Solon, sincein that passagethe speakerdoes not mention stasisbut inventsan offenseof "deserting the city in danger".But his audiencemusthaveknownthat the troubles of 404/3

constituted

stasis.

The argumentfrom Lysias 31.27-28 againstthe authenticityof the supposedlaw of Solon cannotbe fully conclusive,sinceit dependson estimatingthe groundsof persuasionavailableto a pleadersoonafter 403. Even so, that argument,like the attemptto interpretthe phrase

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•:(•0•o0ctt•:6t6Jr•.ct,suggests thatthe law attributedto Solonat AP 8.5 is not authentic.The origin of the spuriouslaw shouldbe soughtin that featureof the Hellenic geniuswhich has made the most lasting andwidespread contribution to modernoutlooks,whilecreatingincidentally many obstaclesfor historians:the delightin a goodstory. 1.3. If thesupposed Solonianlaw againstneutralitywasnotauthentic, it doesnot indicatewhen atimia changedfrom its more severeto its milder sense.The changemay havecomeaboutin eitherof two ways: by deliberateenactment,or by changeof custom.A theoryattributing the changeto deliberateenactmenthas been proposedby Hansen (Apagoge78-79). He arguesthat the changehad come aboutbefore the time of the decree againstArthmios of Zeleia, for that decree declaredArthmios"an enemy" (•:x,O@6•)and atimos (Demosthenes 9.44; cf. above, 1.1); that is, the term atimia no longer sufficed for outlawry. Again, accordingto Andokides(1. 107; cf. above,section1) the amnestyissuedduringthe PersianWarsprovidedfor restoringexiles and making the atimoi epitimoi. Hanseninfers that atimia was fully distinctfrom exile by the time of that amnesty.So he suggests that the changein the forceof atimia wascarriedout in thereformsof the years followingcloselyon the expulsionof the Peisistratidai. Thesetwo particularargumentsare not decisive.Even if the decree againstArthmioscontainsgenuinematerial,its wordingmaybe fourthcenturyparaphrase. Andokidesdoesnotquotetheamnestyissuedduring the PersianWars verbatim;his brief summaryof it leavesthe possibility openthat exile andatimia were not mutuallyexclusivecategories.As the Athenians increasedtheir authority in the Delian League, they providedin some casesat least that lawsuitsarisingin allied cities shouldbe referredto Athensfor trial, if the penalty was exile or death

or atimia.TM The association of the threepenaltiesshowsthatatimia couldhavesevereforceaslate asthe secondhalf of thefifth century. Indeed an importantobservationmade by Hansen(Apagoge55-58; cf. Manville, "Solon's Law") tells againstthe view that the changein the force of atimia came about with the precisionunavoidablein an enactment. Namely, even in the fourth century, the atimos was in a

highly precariouscondition.Plato (Gorgias486b-c, 508c-d) remarks that one could subjectthe atimos to physical abuse, deprive him of propertyand even kill him without fear of consequences. Some men went into exile becausethey had beendeclaredatimoi. Above all, the atimos(exceptin the obscurecaseof "partialatimia"; but seebelow, 1.3.1) couldnot sue. Thereforeeven if the law concededsomerights

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to the atimos, it concededthem only in an insignificantsense,for a

rightis worthless unless thereisa procedure touphold it.•2Indeed, as manydecreesillustrate,the classicalAthenianswereconstantly alive to the importance of procedural safeguards for the provisions which they voted.Therefore,sincethe atimoscouldnot sue,it is likely that classicallaw did not in any senserecognizethat he hadrights. The incapacityof the atimosto sue did not extendto his relatives. It is a tenableview (propoundedby Hansen,Apagoge58) that, if an atimos was killed, his relatives could bring an action for homicide againstthe killer. But there is no evidencefor or againstthis view and the alternativeis equally tenable.Perhapsthe relativescould not bring an action for homicide againstone who killed an atimos. If an enactmenthad been passedrestrictingthe force of atimia, it could scarcelyhave avoidedstatingthe rightsof the atimosor limiting his disabilities,in howeverbrief and implicit a manner.Sinceclassical law revealsno hint of legal protection,evento the slightestdegree,for the atimos, it is likely that no suchenactmenthad beenpassed.None the less there was a changein the actualeffect of atimia, as pointed out in 1.1 above.The alternativeto an hypothesis of enactmentis one of changein custom;but before the latter hypothesiscan be pursued, a subsidiaryquestioncalls for note.

1.3.I. Manyhistorians havedrawna distinction fortheclassical period between"totalatimia"and"partialatimia". Thedisabilitiesconstituting "totalatimia" and the evidenceattestingthem havebeenclassifiedby Hansen(Apagoge61-63). Within the list one may distinguishbetween an earlier and a later stratum. To the earlier stratum belonged the exclusionfrom sanctuaries andfrom the agora.There wereperirranteria

at the entrancesto the agoraand the atimoswas not allowed to pass

beyondthem.13So his exclusion fromthe agorawastotal.The later stratumconsistedof disabilitiesthat were "political"in a more sophis-

ticatedway. In relationto the ekkldsiathe at#noswas forbiddento proposedecrees,to speak,or to takeanypartin theassembly.He was not allowedto hold a magistracyor priesthood,or to be a memberof the Council or of an embassy.In relation to the courtshe was not allowed to serveas a dikastgs,to sue in a public or private action, or

to giveevidence.These"political"disabilities arealludedto specifically by the orators.They were impliedvariouslyin the disabilitiesof the earlier stratum. Since the Council-chamberand the offices of many

magistracies were in the agora,exclusionfrom the agoradisqualified the atimos from candidature.The Assembly originally met in the

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agora. 14Again,theephetic courts metinsanctuaries, perhaps because originallyan accused fugitivesoughtrefugein them,andsoexclusion

fromsanctuaries prevented theatimos fromtakingpartintheprocedures of thosecourts.Accordinglyevenin the age of the oratorsexclusion from sanctuaries and the agorawas equivalentto "total atimia".15 Scrutinyof the distinctionbetweenthe earlier and later strataof atimia

discovers morecontinuitythanchange.The disabilityremainedthe same,but societychanged frompreoccupation with thephysicalcircumstances of protection to specifyingabstractcapacities. "Partial atimia" is known from a passageof Andokides (1.73-76). He is about to cite the decree of amnestycarried in 405/4, and in preparationhe askswho theatimoiwere. In replyhe distinguishes three classes.The first consistedof publicdebtors:if they failed to pay their debtsby the ninth prytany, thesewere doubledin amountand their property was confiscated.The secondcategory was people whose s6matawerearimabuttheyretainedpossession of theirproperty.Within thiscategoryAndokidesmentionspeoplecondemnedfor crimeswhich he specifies.The disabilitywhichthesepeopleincurredis what modem writers have called "total atimia". In saying that their s6mata were arima, Andokidesdoes not specify anythingpositive by s6ma. He makes his point in the secondpart of his sentence:namely, unlike public debtors,such people remainedin fact in possession of their property.

The third categorydistinguished by Andokidesconsistedof people

who were atimoi xcr[dtrr@oo'[•tg. As a first examplethe orator mentionssoldierswho had stayedin the city underthe role of the Four Hundred:"They had all the othercapacitiesof othercitizens,but they were not allowedto speakin the Assemblyor to serveas councillors" (1.75). He notes other illustrations:some people were forbiddento initiate a graphg, othersto initiate an endeixis; some were forbidden to sail to the Hellespont,othersto Ionia, andyet otherswere forbidden

to entertheagora.Manyhistorians havetakenAndokides' swordsxcr[dt rr@oo'[6•tg in a restrictivesense.They havesupposed thatpeopleof statedtypesweredeprivedof specificcapacities but retainedtheirother rights. Thus they have supposedthat thesepeople suffered"partial atimia". It must be admittedthat Andokides'slanguageinvites this interpretation,whenhe says:"They had all the othercapacitiesof other citizens." But his illustrativelist does not professto be completeor precise. The last disability he mentions, exclusion from the agora, suggests"total atimia". If Athenianlaw distinguished between"total atimia" and "partial

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atimia", it is surprisingthatthedistinctionis not mentionedmoreoften by the orators.They alludeto atimia frequently,but the distinctionis drawn explicitly only in the impreciseremarksof Andokidesnoted

above.Hansen 16hastriedto showfromtwospeeches of Demosthenes that the distinctionwas observedin the mid-fourthcentury.Speech57 wasdeliveredfor the defenseagainstEuboulides,who hadbeenchosen by his deme along with othersto prosecutethe speaker.On an earlier occasionEuboulideshad initiated a public action for impiety but had failed to win a fifth of the votes (57.8). It would seem to follow that, becauseof his failure in the earlier trial, Euboulidesincurred"partial atimia", whichprecludedhim from initiatinganotheractionof the same kind but left him able to serveas prosecutorin the actionfor which he was chosenby his deme. Again, speech21 mentionsthat Euktemon had sufferedatimia throughfailing to follow up a public action for desertion,which he had initiated (21. 103); but the speechassertsthat Euktemon and others continue to give evidence in return for pay (21.139). ApparentlyEuktemonhad beendisqualifiedfrom initiating a public actionbut not from giving evidence. The inferencedrawn from thesetwo speeches is not inevitable.The allegations of speech21 shouldbe regardedwith somedoubt;theywere not tested, for Demosthenessettledhis disputewith Meidias out of

court.17Moreover,theassertions of bothspeeches arecompatible with a hypothesis whichrecognizesonly "totalatimia". Enforcementof the disabilitiesof anat#nosdepended on theprivateinitiativeof a voluntary prosecutor (6 [3ovX61xevog). Sucha personcouldinitiatetheprocedures of apagogeand endeixisagainstthe at#noswho tried to behaveas epitimos.But a voluntaryprosecutor was not likely to be forthcoming in all circumstances. If the atimoswasa politicalfigureandhad made enemies,a voluntaryprosecutor couldeasilybefound,andthisexplains why someatimoi withdrewinto exile. Even if the atimoswas not a politician,he was likely to haveto face a prosecutor, if he repeated the type of activityfor whichhe had incurredatimia,'that is why the oratorsoften allude to a specificdisability,suchas prohibitionfrom initiatinga publicaction,whenthey mentionan at#nos.On the other handsomeallowancemustbe madefor the prudenceof litigants.Let it be supposed, for example,thatJohnDoe as voluntaryprosecutor in a publicactionwinshiscaseagainstRichardRoeandRoeconsequently incursatimia. Then Roe no longerenjoysthe protectionof the law, and so thereis no legal obstacleto preventDoe from performingacts of arbitraryviolenceagainstRoe. But if Doe performssuchacts, he may therebyarousesympathyfor Roe, and Roe's sympathizersmay

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retaliateby seekingout chargesto bring againstDoe. Since Doe has servedas a voluntaryprosecutor,there is a goodchancethat he is a public figure, and in Athenspublic figureswere often vulnerable. To returnto Andokides.When he saysthatsomepeoplewereatimoi

xot'cdt Jz@oo'cdt•[g, his wordsshouldnot necessarily be taken in a restrictivesense.They may mean"with additionalspecifications". That is, shortlybefore405 somemenweredeclaredatimoi and"totalatimia" wasmeant,sincethatwasthe only typeof atimia recognized,but since voluntaryprosecutors might not be forthcoming,thejudgmentsor decreesaddedparticularprohibitionsexplicitly:"JohnDoe is to be atimos andin particularhe is not to initiatean endeixis."Sucha rulingwould be designedto encourage the voluntaryprosecutor, if the atimoscontravenedthe additionalspecification.It shouldbe bornein mind that

the atimoixot'c6t Jz@oo'cdt•tg are attestedonly in the passage of Andokidesandhe speaksof themin the pasttense.Perhapsthe practice of addingparticularprohibitionsto judgmentsor decreesof atimia did not last long. 1.4. The above arguments(1.3.1) indicatethat no statusof "partial atimia" was recognizedin classicallaw, but sucha conditionarosein fact from the relativenegligenceof voluntaryprosecutors. If, for example, a man prosecutedin a public action and failed to win a fifth of

the votes,he incurreda fine of 1,000 drachmas andatimia.18This was "total atimia", the only type of atimia recognizedby law. If the same man later tried to initiate anotherpublic action, he was very likely to suffer apag6gd or endeixis. But if he refrained from doing so, and if he did not have energeticenemies,he might behavein many ways as if he still possessed his rights. Similar considerations, aboveall the relativereluctanceof voluntary prosecutors,explainwhy atimia changedfrom meaningoutlawryat an early date to the milder sensecurrentin the time of Demosthenesand Aristotle (1.1). At the early stageatimia deprivedthe condemnedman of public protection.It took away all his rights, to use a perhaps anachronisticphrase,and exposedhim to indiscriminateill-treatment. It was imposedonly for a few offenses,suchas attemptedtyranny(AP 16.10) and in somecircumstanceshomicide (Demosthenes9.44). These

offensesarousedwidespreadindignation,and so the atimoswas likely to be killed, unlesshe escapedinto exile. By the fourthcenturyconditions were more settled.Peoplehad learnedto rely ratherlesson their neighborsandfriendsandrathermoreon publicauthorityfor protection in life and property(cf. below, 3.4.2). In the Orestesof Euripides,

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Tyndareusinsiststhat one oughtnot to kill a murdererbut bring him to trial (lines 491-517). For someoffensesapagOggand the related summaryprocedures beforethe Elevenhadreplacedprivateexecution. Numerouslawshadimposedatirniafor numerousshortcomings, including failureto meetfiscalobligations.Probablyno enactmenthadbeen madeto diminishthe forceof atirnia, but in consequence of a change in customthe atimosmightsometimes continuein actualenjoymentof his property.It may not be feasibleto call out the hueandcry against

a manwhohasmerelyfailedto payhistaxes.19 1.4.1. A view of the abovekind on the origin and developmentof atirniais moredefensible,if onesupposes thatpublicauthorityin early Athens was too weak to inflict positive penalties.Such a view has indeedbeendevelopedon the assumption that at an early stagepublic authority, so far from inflicting positivepenalties,could do nothing more than utter a curse and deprive the convictedcriminal of public protection,the latter sentencebeing atimia (see note 19). But the assumptionthattheearlyAthenianstatecouldnotinflictpositivepenalties

hasbeenchallenged. 2ø There is archaeologicalevidence.Excavationof a cemeteryat Old Phaleronin 1915 discovereda grave containingseventeenskeletons. Each of the victims had been fastened with irons at the neck, the hands

and the feet to a plank and exposed.After deaththe corpseshad been inhumed.Finds of pottery indicateda date before the time of Solon andprobablyin the seventhcentury.Gemetreviewedpossibleexplanations of the find. He arguedthat the victims were not slaves,who happenedto die undertorture;for deathwas intended.He considered andrejecteda secondpossibility:"IIne s'agitpasnonplusd'innocents qui auraient6t6 victimesde la cruaut6raffin6ede brigandsanalogues • nos 'chauffeurs':c'est un romanqui a contrelui les vraisemblances et m6meles possibilit6s"(op. cit. (n. 20) 262). He concludedin favor of capitalexecution.He recognizedin the modeof executionan early form of apotyrnpanisrnos and hencehe was able to clarify the nature and applicabilityof that punishmentin archaicandclassicalAthens. The value of Gemet'sstudyof apotympanismos is beyonddispute, but excavationcannotdiscoverthe eventsleadingto the deathsof the seventeenunfortunates. The surprisingfact aboutthe discoveryat Old Phaleronis that the corpseswere inhumedafter deathand inhumed with their fetters. There does not seem to be evidence from the classical

period about disposalof the corpseafter apotympanismos, but after someonehas been executedby crucifixion or other impalement,the

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obviousthing to do with the corpseis to leave it exposeduntil it rots or is eaten by animals. Continuedexposureof the crucifiedcorpseis

essential to thestoryof theWidowof Ephesos. 2• Thecagesin which the Anabaptistswere exposedat Mtinster are still hangingfrom the

towerof thechurchof St. Lambert. 22Occasionally a publicofficer may allow therelativesor friendsto takeawaythecorpseof a condemned man for burial, but this seemsless likely when there are as many as

seventeen. 23At leastthe comparisons suggest thatthe peoplewho buriedthe seventeencorpsesat Old Phaleronwereprobablynotidentical with the peoplewho had carriedout the execution. It is reasonable to suppose thatAthenianjusticedeveloped from uncontrolled self-helpto controlledself-help.24The incidentattestedat Old Phaleronmay belongto the earlieststageof thisdevelopment.That is, onegroupof people,A, believedthattheyhada just grievanceagainst anothergroup,B. So they raidedGroupB, carriedoff seventeen of their numberand executedtheseby impalingthemon planks.Somedaysor weekslater groupB retaliated,carriedoff the corpseswithoutstopping to detachthemfrom theplanks,andgavethemdueburial.Again, seventeen men of groupB may have begunthe conflictby a sea-borneraid on group A. But the raid was not successful;group A overcamethe piratesandimpaledthem.Sometime laterfurthermenof groupB sailed againstthe land of group A and recoveredthe corpses.Sucha thing couldeasilyhappenin the early hostilitiesbetweenAthensandAigina (Herodotus5.82-88). Any explanationof the grave discoveredat Old Phaleronmust be to someextent conjectural.At leastthat discovery does not prove that judicial litigation had already supersededuncontrolled self-help in the seventhcentury. 2. Plutarch (Solon24.4 = Solon F 75) mentionsa law of Solon about immigration:

•rctp•zst 8' 6rrop(ctv •ccti 6 'r•0v 8rl•torrot•lrCOV v6goq, 78v•oOat xo•/•aq o• 6/6mot x•qv •o•q •867oootv The law aboutnaturalizedcitizensgivesriseto a problemof interpretation.It doesnot allow peopleto becomecitizensunlessthey were in permanentexile from their nativeland or settledin Athens with their wholehouseholds for the purposeof practicinga craft.

2.1. The questionmustbe asked,whetherthelaw is anauthenticitem from the Soloniancode.This hasbeenmaintainedon the groundsthat

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•r•tv•oztot is uniquein Plutarch'swritings.2sIt shouldbe addedthat the law is not a provisioncurrentin the classicalperiodand retrojected erroneously ontoSolon.For in classicalAthenspeopleof the typeswhom this law admittedhad a prospectof becomingmetics,but not citizens.

2.2. Althoughthe law is thuslikely to be authentic,andalthoughthe wordx•tv•oztot mayhavebeendrawnfromtheoriginaltext, Plutarch's summaryis not verbatim.The few verbatimquotationsfrom Solon's laws are recognizablyarchaicin wording. This is true, for example, of the exceptionsin the law of amnesty,F 70.26Sothereis no guarantee that xoMzrlq wasthe operativeword in the originaltext. Otherwords

may be morein tunewith sixth-century usage.•;•tizt•oq springsto mind.27 Another possibilityis zorloz6q; which occurredin a sixthcentury treaty betweenLakedaimonand Tegea. F. Jacobyexplained it as similar in force to the later usageof "citizen" and paraphrased it as "employable in the political sense" (his italics).28 Plutarch'sparaphrase, then,probablygivesa justaccountof a genuine law from the codeof Solon, but one cannotbe confidentof recovering thewording.Whetherthelaw wasan innovationby Solonor thecodification of earlier customis a questionwhich neednot be raisedhere; the law will be called "SolonJan" without implying a view on that question. Since the law admitted two different classes of settlers, it had

probablygone throughat least two stagesof development.

2.3. Approachedfrom the standpointof classicalAthens,the law is surprising,becauseit offerscitizenshipto peoplewho wouldlaterhave becomemetics.The law is lesssurprising,if approachedin the light of earlier conditions,attestedin the Homeric poemsand elsewhere. Thefugitiveis a commonfigureof Greekfolk-lore.He hascommitted an outragein his nativeland; so he fleesabroadand seeksthe protectionof a powerfulman. Patroklos,for example,playeda gameof dice in his native land, quarrelledwith his panner and killed him. So his fatherescortedhim out of his nativeland to the palaceof Peleus.The latteracceptedPatroklosandmadehim companion (therap•Sn) to Achilles (Iliad 23.83-92). Patrokloshad not intendedto kill his partner at the game, and accordinglyhis father'scare in taking him to the palaceof Peleusmay providea pointof contactwith Athenianpractice.In Athens a manfoundto havekilledinvoluntarilywasrequiredto leavethecountry withina statedtime by a statedroute.This provisionhasbeenexplained as a safe conduct to the border. 29 Thus some of the ideas assumed in

the storyof Patroklosappearto haveoperatedin early Athenianlaw.

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Examplesof the fugitiveare not restrictedto the Homericpoems. Herodotus(1.35) tells the story of Adrastos,a son of the king of Phrygia.Adrastoskilled his brotherinadvertently.So his fatherdrove him away and deprivedhim of everything.Adrastosfled to Sardeis. Kroisospurifiedhim, let him live in the palaceandsaidthathe should want for nothing.

The outragewhichcausesthefugitiveto flee is notalwayshomicide. Incitedby his mother,Phoinixseducedhis father'sconcubine.So his father cursed him. Phoinix decided to leave home. His relatives held

him back for nine nights,but on the tenthnight he escapedand made his way to Phthia.Peleuswelcomedhim and entrustedhim with care of Achillesas an infantandas a grownbut inexperienced warrior(Iliad 9.432-495).

In the conditionsreflected in the Homeric poemsthe strangerwas totally vulnerable. When Odysseusfirst approachedNausikaa in Phaiakia, she called to mind that all strangersand beggarscome from Zeus (Odyssey6.207-208). They had no humanprotector.Later in his travelsOdysseusreachedIthaka, which he did not recognize,and appealedto Athena,who had disguisedherself.He told her that he was a Cretan and had committed homicide in his native land (Odyssey 13.256-286). Thus the fugitive makeshis appealto a prospectiveprotectormoreeffectiveby drawingattentionto theenormityof theoutrage which he has committed.In consequence he has no hopeof returning ever to his native land but will be totally dependenton his protector. When a powerful man extendedprotectionto a fugitive, both parties benefited. The protectorgained a follower, who might have various talentsandbe employedin variousways. Above all the fugitivebecame totally loyal to his protector. In the Homericpoemsprotectedfugitivescommonlyappearas"companions"(therapontes)to their mastersor protectors.The "companion" may attendhis masterand receivehis guests;he may carveand serve meatand bread;he may pourwine and assistat sacrifices;he may drive his master'schariot, fight at his side, and even serveas his second-in-

command. 3øHe can be givenany taskwhichhis protectorcaresto entrustto him; there is nothingfrom which he is excluded.He is fully "employablein thepoliticalsense".It is nottruein Homericconditions, as it was later in classicalAthens, that the protectedalien has rights andprivilegesdifferingfrom thoseof natives(citizens).On thecontrary, oncethe fugitivehas receivedthe protectionof a powerfulman, he is fully securein his placein the community,in his standingor value, in a word in his timg. He is epitimos.

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In the light of stories about the fugitive the Solonian law about immigrationbecomesintelligible and important. That law substitutes the statefor the powerfulman as the prospectivepatronof the fugitive. It statesthe conditionson which the fugitive will be acceptedand protected.It marksa significantgrowthin publicauthority.The question has sometimesbeenasked,whetherthe Solonianlaw soughtto restrict immigration, by excluding all but the two stated exceptions,or to encourageimmigrationby peopleof thosetwo categories.Possiblythe law was not designedfor eitherof thesepurposes.Its purposewas to tell the Athenianswhat to do about prospectiveimmigrants,and by implicationit tookthepowerof decisionawayfromindividualpatrons. One might considerthe hypothesis,suggestedby a reader of this paper, that beforethe Solonianlaw cameinto force native-bornAthenians were politai, and fugitives, if they gained the protectionof a powerful patron, had rights which were large but inferior to thoseof citizens. Such fugitives would be epitimoi without being politai. On this view the Solonian law, whether authoredby Solon or at some earlier time, would put an end to the inferior, thoughprotected,status of the two kindsof immigrantswhich it welcomedand it would grant them civitas optimoiure. This hypothesisis unlikely for two reasons. First the Solonianlaw markssomegrowth in public authority.Growth in public authoritymay easilybring abouta changeamongthe subjects from lesserto greater diversificationof status.That is, as the state grows more powerful, it may draw more juridical distinctionsamong its subjects,but as long as it is weak, the subjectsare likely to be juridically undifferentiated,however much they may vary in social condition, since the state is too weak to impose distinctions.The suggestedhypothesis,on the other hand, implies that the increasein publicauthoritymarkedby the Solonianlaw on immigrationeradicated a juridical distinctionwhich was previouslyrecognized.Second, as remarkedabove, the Solonianlaw denied by implicationthe right of individualpatronsto decidewhichimmigrantsshouldbe accepted.That was a bold step,likely to arouseresentmentamongmen of power. To raisefugitivesfrom a protectedbut inferiorstatusto that of citizenship with full rightswould be a furtherbold stepand wouldarouseadditional resentment.A legislatorwho took both stepsat once would invite the reversal of his work.

The Solonianlaw grantedprotectionto aliensof two kinds. Plutarch chosethe word polit•s to paraphrasetheir condition. Whatever the

operativewordin thelaw mayhavebeen,Plutarch's paraphrase implies thatthefavoredaliensdidnotbecome,asin theclassical period,metics,

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that is, residentaliens who were protected,but excludedfrom the privilegesof citizens.The Solonianlaw, like the storiesof the fugitive, distinguishedbetweenpersonsof two kinds, namelyprotectedpersons

andoutlaws,thatis to say,epitimoiandatimoi.31 3. Readersof this paperhave objected,in the wordsof one of them, to the "contentionthat there was originally no positivecontentto the definitionof community:merely a differencebetweenthosewho were andthosewho were not protected.Surelyone mustassume,as far back as one can see, a Kultgemeinschaft that definedthosewho belongedas againstthosewho did not: thephratoreswho comprisedtheAthenaioi were different from xenoi and had existedas long as anyonecould remember(they were, in fact, 'autochthones'),long beforepoliteia as suchwas ever thoughtof."

Asfarbackasonecansee.Everyone agrees_[h_at thecityof Athens, in the senseof a body of citizens,existedin 350 BCbut did not yet exist in 2350 BC. Moreover, somewould admit that the changewhich broughtthe city in this senseinto beingwas not a one-timeeventbut a protractedprocess,which may not have moved uniformly in one direction.Difficultiesarisein the attemptto discernstepsof theprocess which took placein the periodwell calledthe dark age, the periodin which one can perhapssee, but not very well. Yet somefeaturesof that periodcan be discerned.The namesof the four traditionalphylai of the Atheniansare attestedasnamesofphylai in othercities.Therefore the phylai were in all probabilityinheritedfrom the age of migration

andwereolderthanthecity of Athens.Again,althoughtheIndo-European root of the word phratOris palpable,strongreasonshave been presentedfor believingthat the Athenianphratriesdevelopedas organizedstructures andfocusesof loyaltyin thelateninthor earlyeighth

century. 32Perhaps theywereat firstlessuniformthantheyappearin themostlyfourth-century evidence.Manyof themmaywellhaveexisted as Kultgemeinschaften (and in other capacities)before the city of the Atheniansdid. In the ninth and eighthcenturiesit is likely that the free inhabitants of Attica constituted numerous associations,including phylai, phratriesand gend and perhapsothers;there may have been little or no recognitionof membershipin an Atheniancity embracing

all suchassociations. 33In thisconditionthe securityof eachperson dependedon the actualprotectionavailableto him. At first protection was providedmainly by strongfamilies (approximatelygend)and the bodiesof dependents which arosearoundthem (approximatelyphratries). In this condition an outsideris better describedaspolemios than

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as xenos. By the classicalperiod the city had taken over the function of extendingor denyingprotectionto outsiders.The Solonianlaw on immigrationattestsa stage, indeed a somewhatearly stage, in the transition.

From the considerationspresentedabove it follows that Athenian law learnedto distinguishbetweenepitimoiand atimoi long beforeit learnedto distinguishbetweencitizensand aliens. By the time of the oratorsthe latter distinctionwas the primary distinctionbetweenfree persons.It was safeguardedby the graphdxenias. It was recognized in revisionsof the list of citizens, the bestattestedrevisionbeing that

of 346/5.34Buttheearlierdistinction, thatbetweenepitimoiandatimoi, had neither been wholly suppressednor wholly adjustedto the new distinction.It lived on in the practiceof imposingatimia. Deprivation of citizen-rightsin classicalAthens did not make a man a xenos; it made him atimos. 35

It also follows that Athenianlaw had not yet formulatedthe classical distinctionbetweencitizensandaliensat the time whenSolondrew up hiscode.For thedistinctionassumedin the Solonianlaw on immigration was the earlier one betweenprotectedpersonsand outlaws.This conclusionis valid, even if, as seemsunlikely, the operativeword in that SolonJanlaw was politds. For if so, politds in that measurehad a meaningmarkedlydifferentfrom the meaningit borein classicalAthenian law, sincethe Solonianlaw on immigrationfailed to distinguish between the citizen and the metic.36

As noted above, the negativeeffect of the Solonian law was to deprivepowerfulmenof authorityto determinewhichstrangers should be protected. But when Anakreon of Teos, Lasos of Hermione and

Simonidesof Keos sojournedat the court of the Peisistratidai,they probablyowed their protectionto the tyrants.If so, it is not unlikely thatevenaftertheSolonianlaw hadbeenmadeleadersof otherpowerful familiesat timesprotectedstrangers effectivelyandtherebydisregarded the exclusiveclaim which that law tried to assertfor public authority. But thatpossibilityscarcelydiminishes thesignificance of thisSolonian law for the developmentof the bodypolitic. 3.1.

When, then, did Athenian law formulate the later distinction,

that betweencitizens and aliens?The emergenceof the term "metic" may provide a clue. Since Solonianlaw admittedfavored aliensto full privileges,it is likely that the Atheniansbeganto distinguishbetween citizensand alienswhenthey decidedto admitfavoredaliensto some-

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thing lessthan full privileges.Citizenshipand metic statusmay have developedtogether.

The wordmetoikos is first attestedin the worksof Aischylos. 37 Furtherconsiderations supportthe conjecturethatAthenianlaw formulated the conceptof citizen in the periodof that poet's activity. On the one hand that conceptbecamecurrentnot later than 451/0, when on the proposalof Periklesthe Atheniansrestrictedcitizenshipto persons whose parentswere both citizens (AP 26.4). On the other hand it is likely that Kleisthenesin introducingthe new phylai soughtto include all availableman-power.A remarkof Aristotle(Politics3.1275636-37), to the effect that Kleisthenesincludedmany aliens and slavesin the phylai, is admittedlycorruptand, thoughmuchdiscussed, defiessecure interpretation.But at leastthe defeatsinflictedby the Athenianson the BoiotiansandtheChalkidianspromptlyafterthereformsof Kleisthenes (Herodotus5.77) suggestthat the reformerhad tappedlarger reserves of man-powerthanhis enemieshadreckonedwith. Thereis no obstacle to the view that the demes,trittyesandphylai of Kleisthenescomprised all free men available

in Attica.

3.2. Attentionmust, however,be given to the questionof a possible revisionof the list of citizenspromptlyafter the expulsionof Hippias. Aristotle(AP 13.5) saysthat after the fall of the tyrantsthe Athenians carriedout a revisionin the belief that manypeoplewere enjoyingthe

privileges of citizenship withoutbeingentitledto them.Jacoby 38drew attention to this and to the statement of Aristotle (above, 3.1) about

the measureof Kleisthenesenfranchisingaliensand slaves.He rejected the combinedtraditionfor two reasons.First, Herodotusreportsthe expulsionof thoseinheritingthe Kyloniancurseduringthe adventures of Kleisthenes(5.70), but he knowsnothingof the allegedrevisionof the list of citizens or act of enfranchisement.Second, he noted that in

the Politics Aristotle mentionsonly the act of enfranchisement but in the Constitutionof the Athenianshe mentionsonly the revisionof the list. Jacobysuggested that the two measureswere "politicalinvention and counterinventionof the closing fifth century and of the fourth"; the allegationof enfranchisement comesfrom oligarchicspeechesand pamphletsand appearsin Aristotle's earlier work; the revisionof the list wasinventedasa retortto thatallegation,probablyaftertherevision of 346/5, and its authormay be Androtion. The silenceof Herodotuson the supposed revisionof the list should carry someweight. Aristotledrew on Herodotusfor muchof his narra-

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tive accountof the tyrantsand of Kleisthenes;it is difficult to seehow

goodinformation aboutthesupposed revisioncouldsurvive,if it escaped record in Herodotus'swork. It is somewhatsuspiciousthat Aristotle mentionsthe revision,not in connectionwith eventsfollowing the expulsionof Hippias,but in an attemptto guesswho supported Peisis-

tratosin hisearlycareer. 39If therevisionis nothistorical, anyexplanationof the fiction mustbe somewhatconjectural.But on any view it is importantthatthe allegedrevisionof ca. 509 is only recordedin a work composedafter the revision of 346/5. Even if some measure bearingon politicalprivilegesin Athenswas taken ca. 509, it is eminentlylikely thatthatmeasurehasbeenmisinterpreted, tendentiously or otherwise,in the light of the revisionof 346/5, and thereforethe tenorof the putativemeasureof ca. 509 cannotbe recovered. 3.3. Studyof the extantplaysof Aischyloscan lend somesupportto the thesisthat Atheniancitizenship--andthereforethe city as a fully organizedcommunitywith an overrridingclaim on the loyalty of its members•ame into being betweenthe measuresof Kleisthenesand 451/0. Many readershave been struckby the recurrenceof political preoccupations in thoseplays. Some have tried to classifyAischylos

as the supporter of oneor anothercausein contemporary politics. © Theseattemptsare not successful; Aischyloshasnotchosento saywhat side,if any, he took, andextantinformationon Athenianinternalaffairs in his lifetime leavesmuchof the political sceneopaque.It is better to recognizethat an Aischyleanplay can be political without being

propagandist. 41 The politicalaspectof Aischylean thoughtis a largesubject, 42and for presentpurposesa brief and even dogmaticstatementwill suffice. Aischylosis preoccupiedwith the contrastbetweenthe oikos(household, family) and the polis; he expoundsthe natureof the polis by contrastingit with the oikos. In the Oresteiaconflictarisesin the oikos of Atreus and within that framework it is insoluble; a solution is achieved

when the issueis placedin the larger frameworkof the city of Athens. The Persians, the other work preservedin full, presentsthe conflict and contrastbetweenthe Atheniansand an entity which modem historiansreasonablycall "thePersianEmpire". Aischylosprefersto specify it by giving long listsof namesof Persiangrandees(lines21-52, 302328,957-999). In hisview thePersianEmpireis nota properlyorganized communityof citizensbut an enormousoikos. Among the Athenians, on the other hand, Aischylos does not name any single person, not even the "Greek gentlemanfrom the force of the Athenians"(line 355)

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who broughta messageto Xerxeson the eve of the battleof Salamis. The Athenianswere a city, not an agglomeration. Readershave sometimesclaimedto discernin the Suppliantsa sympathetic concernwith democracyor the rule of the ddmos.When the fifty daughtersof Danaosflee to Argos and appeal to the king for protection,he insistson referringthequestionto theassemblyof Argive citizens.When Danaosreturnsto hisdaughterswith newsof thedecision of the assembly,the daughtersask him what "the ruling hand of the

people"(iS/l•tovx@ct•oOoct X•(•@, line604) hasdetermined. It isclaimed that the play givesa sympatheticpresentation of democraticprocedure

andcomes closeto uttering thewordd•mokratia. 43Butwordscurrent in political dispute, such as d•mokratia, derive their force from the terms with which they are contrasted.In the time of Thucydidesand Pseudo-Xenophondemocraticand oligarchicsloganswere employed frequentlyto stateor obscureissues.The sameterms were not necessarily employedin that way later or in the precedinggeneration.In the Suppliantsthe procedureon which the king of Argos insistsis not contrastedwith oligarchia or aristokratia or tyrannis. On the contrary, the dichotomypresentedis that betweenthe values of the oikos, on whichthedaughters of Danaosinsist,andthoseof thepolis, represented by the king of Argos. On first approachingthe king the daughtersof Danaosexpoundtheir Argive descentas groundsfor seekingasylum in Argos (lines 274-326). In responsethe king saysthat they are not suppliantsat his private house;their appealmay bring harm to the city (polis), and he must refer the questionto the whole body of citizens (astoi, lines 365-369). The daughtersof Danaoscannotcomprehend this: "you are the city", they say, "you are the public power" (line 370). Shortlyafterwardsthe king presentsthe supposition thatthe sons of Aigyptosas next of kin may claim the daughtersof Danaos"by the law of the polis" (line 388). The Suppliantsis the first play of a trilogy and the othertwo plays have been lost. Interpretationof the work mustbe tentative. If one had to hazard a guess,one might supposethat the conflict betweenthe daughtersof Danaosand the sonsof Aigyptoswas resolvedwhen the oikos of Danaosbecameintegratedinto the polis of the Argives. At least enough has been said to show that the contrastdrawn in the Suppliantsis not betweendPmokratiaand someother form of government but betweenhouseholdand city. That contrastaccordswith the attentionwhich Aischylosgives to the natureof the city in his other extantplays. This political focusof his attentionis not surprising,if his life spannedthe time when the city as an organizationdefinedby

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citizenshipcame into being. It is misleadingto say that the Athenians in the time of Aischyloswere creatingdemocracy;they were creating somethingmore fundamental. 3.4.

In 409/8

a document

called "the law of Drakon

on homicide"

wasinscribed anew.It included thefollowing clause: 44 6[v •tv].•0.[otp6vov •c'r•vœt • ai'rtoq •t ½6vo, •op•lq

•o

pi[a]q•[a]i [60kov•ai hmp6v'Ap•t•xvovt•6v, h6on•px6v 'A0evlaiov •

[r•vaJy[ra, •v roiqaOroiq •v•x•o0at6taytyv•o•v6• r6q] Providedthat the androphonosstaysaway from frontier-markets and from Amphictyonicgamesand rites, if anyonekills him, let the killer sufferthe sameconsequences asfor killing an Athenian, but let the ephetaipassjudgment.

The questionneednot be askedhere, whetherthe androphonosof this law was the personconvictedof homicide or the personaccusedof homicide.The clausealludesto theconsequences of killing an Athenian citizen.Thusit assumes that Atheniancitizensare recognizablydistinct from otherpersons,and it suggests a difference,whetherin procedure or penalties,betweenthe consequences of killing a citizen and those of killing a non-citizen. There are two possibleapproachesto interpretingthis clause. 3.4.1.

The first approachsupposes that the clauseis an integralpart

of the Drakonian

laws issued before the time of Solon.

Then at that

early periodtherewasalreadya distinction,recognizedin law andsufficientlyclearto be observed,betweencitizensandaliens.Publicauthority was alreadysufficientlypowerfulto upholdthis distinction.It was sufficiently ambitious to entertain some hope of protecting the androphonosevenbeyondthe bordersof Attica, providedthat he kept awayfrom frontier-markets andAmphictyonicgatherings.Possiblythe protectionenvisagedwas androl•psia,the practiceof seizingmen of the killer's party until the killer(s) submittedto trial.45 On thisview all thearguments of thispaperare mistaken,andin particular it is groundlessto supposethat the distinctionbetweencitizen

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121

and alien gainedlegal recognitionat a later stagethan that between epitimoi and atimoi. On theotherhandit shouldbe recognizedthatthe inscriptionof 409/8 is a documentof 409/8, not a documentof the seventhcentury.Admittedly the officerswho had the inscriptionmadeprocureda text of the law of Drakon from the king-archon,and archaismsof languageconfirm thebelief thatthe provisionshadoriginatedlongbefore409/8. But the text, extendingover at least two axones,gave not one provision

but a long list of provisionsbearingon homicide.Even thoughmuch of the inscriptionhasbeenlost, severalof the differentmatterstreated in thetextcanbediscerned.They include,for example,unpremeditated homicide,aidesis,the proclamationagainstthe killer, andthe kinsmen authorizedto join in the prosecution.It is likely thatthedifferenttopics cameto requirelegislativeregulationon differentoccasions.Therefore it is unlikely that all the provisionsreproducedin 409/8 had originated at the same time. 46

3.4.2. The other approachstartsfrom the differentconsequences of killing a citizenandkilling an alien in classicalAthenianlaw. Several decreeshonoringspecificaliensprovidethatanyonekilling the honorand shall suffer the same consequences as for killing an Athenian citizen.47Thesedecreesbegin in the middleof the fifth centuryand continueinto the fourth. In classicallaw the forum differedaccording to the statusof the victim. The chargeof killing an Atheniancitizen intentionallywith one's own handswas heardby the Areopagos,but the chargeof killing an alienor a slave,alongwith someothercharges, was heard by the ephetai at the Palladion(AP 57.3). Many historians have supposedthat the Areopagoswas the oldest court for homicide andthat the epheticcourtsarosewhenthe Areopagosdelegatedsome of its competenceto them. Others have defendedthe converseview, that the ephetaiwere the earliestcourt, originally trying homicideof all kinds,anda later reformempoweredtheAreopagosto try thecharge of killing an Atheniancitizenintentionallywith one'sown hands.48The latterview is preferable,becausePlutarch(Solon19.3) saysthatDrakon did not mentionthe Areopagosin his laws on homicide.On this view the competenceof the Areopagosin casesof homicidearose from a measurecarriedappreciablylater thanthe original laws of Drakon and carried presumablyamong stepswhich the statetook to increasethe protectionwhichit affordedto its citizens.The samemeasuremay have includedotherprovisions,whichhaveescapedrecord.Possiblythose

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provisionsincludedthe introduction of a publicexecutioner to kill the convictedmurderer;the prosecutor hadthe right to be presentat the execution(Demosthenes 23.69), andthatrightwassurelya relic of an earlier stagewhen the prosecutorcarried out the execution. If this approachto interpretingthe clauseaboutthe androphonosin thedocumentof 409/8 is right, it followsthatthatclausewasa relatively late additionto the law on homicide.Indeed, if legal recognitionof citizens as distinctfrom aliens began after the work of Kleisthenes, that clauseoriginatedin the fifth century. In the fifth century, but perhapsnotbefore,theAthenianstatewaspowerfulenoughto entertain hopeof protectingthe androphonos evenbeyondthe bordersof Attica. On this interpretationthe clauseextendsto the androphonosthe same protectionas to Atheniancitizens,exceptthat his killer is to be tried by the ephetai, not by the Areopagos. 4. The thesishere propoundedis that the administrationof justicein Athenslearnedto distinguish betweenepitirnoiandatimoilongbefore it recognizedthe distinctionbetweencitizensand aliens. The first of these distinctionsarose from the political and social importanceof actualprotectionearly in the archaicperiod.As long as self-helpwas wholly free from publiccontrol,a man dependedon a powerfulpatron for protectionor, if he washimselfpowerful,hedepended onhis ability to retainthe loyaltyof hisfollowers.A man lackingprotectionof either kind wastotallyvulnerable.Whenthe statebeganto put modestcontrol on self-help•a processin which the first stepmay well have beenthe institutionof courtsto judge allegationsof offensesto life and limb (phonos)--publicauthorityrecognizedprotectedpersonsas epitimoi. If the court found that the allegationagainstthe defendantwas valid, it could declarethat the aggrievedpersonsor the generalcommunity were entitledto continuean act of self-helpagainsthim. In so doing the court withdrew protectionfrom the unsuccessful defendant;it declared him at#nos.

The distinctionbetween citizens and aliens crystallized some time after the reforms of Kleisthenesand it may have been promptedin somesenseby thosereforms. It was accompaniedby the creationof metic status.This does not mean that acknowledgement of the new distinctionwascausedby thereformsof Kleisthenesor by the introduction of metic status.The causewas the complexevolutionof Athenian

societysincethe seventhcentury. 49But citizenship andthe city--in the senseof an organizedcommunitywith a sovereignclaim on the allegianceof its members-•emergedas the final productof thatevolu-

CITIZENSHIP

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CITY

tion. The distinctionbetweencitizen and alien was superimposed on

that betweenepitimosand atimos. 5øThe olderdistinction,however, was not obliterated,and consequently in classicalAthenianlaw atimia

wasthenearestapproach to deprivinga citizenof hiscitizenship. 51 University of California Berkeley

RaphaelSealey NOTES

1. Theevolutionof Atheniancitizenship: Individualandsocietyin thearchaic age (Diss. Yale 1979); "Solon's law of stasisandatimia in archaicAthens", TAPA 110 (1980) 213-221. I shallrefer to theseas "Manville, Evolution" and "Manville,

'Solon's law' "; to Kahrstedt's book, cited in the text, as

"Kahrstedt, Staatsgebiet"; and to M.H. Hansen, Apagoge, endeixis and ephegesis againstkakourgoi,atimoiandpheugontes. A studyin theAthenian administrationof justice in the fourth centuryB.C. (= OdenseUniversity ClassicalStudies8, 1976) as "Hansen, Apagoge". As will be evident, I am muchindebtedto Hansen'swork, eventhoughI shallhaveoccasionto diverge from someof hisconclusions. I shallcitethe fragmentsof Solon'slawsaccording

to the numbersassignedby E. Ruschenbusch, Y.OA•NOY. NOMOI. Die

Fragmente dessolonischen Gesetzeswerkes miteinerText-undOberlieferungsgeschichte(= Historia Einzelschriften9, 1966). 2. F 70 apudPlut. Sol. 19.4. Plutarch'sstatement of thelaw lacksrhetorical symmetry(cf. E. Ruschenbusch, "•ONOE. Zum RechtDrakonsundseiner Bedeutung ftir dasWerdendesathenischen Staates", Historia9 (1960) 129-154 at 132-135); thereforethe text given by Plutarchis probablyarchaic.None of thepurportedfragmentsof Solon'slawscanbestrictlyprovedto be a verbatim quotation,but the probabilityfor this law is higherthan for most. 3.

1.107-108.

It is not clear whether Andokides

means the invasion of 480

or (as maintainedby Hansen, Apagoge 78-79) that of 490. 4. E.g. Dem. 24.45; 25.30; AP 63.3; see Hansen,Apagoge67-70. 5. C. Habicht, "Falsche Urkunden zur Geschichte Athens im Zeitalter der

Perserkriege",Hermes 89 (1961) 1-35. 6. Swobodadevelopedhisview fully in Beitr•igezurgriechischen Rechtsgeschichte (1905) 1-42. (He had first indicated it in "Arthmios von Zeleia",

Archiiol.-epigraph. Mitteilungen ausOsterreich-Ungarn XVI (1893)49 if., whichhasnot beenaccessible to me.) He discusses AP 8.5 on page5. As he

recognized,&'rt[to• T•0v6'rc0(Dem. 9.44) was originallyequivalentto vBtrotw[ Tt0v6'rc0.A man'swergildwasa consequence of histime.The law statedin AP 8.5 is mentionedin later sources;they are readilyaccessible as SolonF 38a-g.Forthemildersenseof atimiaSwobodaintroduced thephrases "btirgerlicheZufficksetzung",capitis deminutio.His inferencefrom Solon F 38 has recentlybeen endorsedby Manville, Evolution 184.

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7. C. Hignett,A historyof theAthenianconstitution(1952) 26-27 (against authenticity); J.A. Goldstein,"Solon'slaw for an activistcitizenry",Historia 21 (1972) 538-545(for authenticity); Hansen,Apagoge78 (against);V. Behrs, "Solon'slaw forbiddingneutralityandLysias31", Historia24 (1975) 493-498 (for); K. v. Fritz, "Nochmalsdas solonische GesetzgegenNeutralit//tim Biirgerzwist",Historia 26 (1977) 245-247 (against,thoughwith reservations); R. Develin, "Solon'slaw onstasis",Historia 26 (1977) 507-508 (for); Manville, "Solon's law" (for).

8. The burdensome partof the hoplite'sequipmentwasthe shield(cf. J.K. Anderson, "The statue of Chabrias", AJA 67 (1963) 411-413 at 412). The shield was of wood, but it had a bronze arm-band, a rim faced with bronze, and sometimesa bronze facing (A.M. Snodgrass,Arms and armour of the

Greeks(1967) 53). The literal senseof '[10eo0ott'[6t6sr•.ctis illustratedby Plat.Laws753b(wherethereisnosuggestion of takingsides); SIG3346.37-39;

IG II 2666.9-12.Xenophon (Anab.1.5.13-14)distinguishes between standing at ease,with the shieldrestingonthe groundandagainstthe knee,andstacking arms(cf. Anderson,above)."To restarms",suggested by Liddell-Scott-Jones for someoccurrences of the phrase,is not a technicalterm for any military activity. 9. R. Sealey, "Probouleusisandthe sovereignassembly",CSCA 2 (1968) 247-269, especially262-265. This explanationof thesovereigntyof the assembly has beenrejectedby P. Cartledge(JHS 97 (1977) 27 n. 109), but he fails to considerthe judicial sceneon the Shield of Achilles (Iliad 18.497-508). Sealey'sviews on the developmentof jurisdictionneedto be correctedin the light of H.J. Wolff, "The origin of judicial litigation among the Greeks", Traditio 4 (1946) 31-87, and M.H. Hansen, "The Athenian heliaia from Solon to Aristotle", C&M 33 (1981-82) 9-47.

10. One may call to mind the way in whichPeisistratos allegedlydisarmed the Athenians(AP 15.4-5; Polyain. 1.21.2) and the storythat Solonin old age carriedout his weaponsto incite oppositionto Peisistratos(Plut. Sol. 30.5).

11. IG 1340=R. MeiggsandD. Lewis,Greekhistoricalinscriptions (1969) 52.70-76; Ant. 5.47; cf. G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, "Notes on jurisdictionin the

Athenian empire",CQ2 11(1961)94-112and268-280.Thelogicalrelationship betweenatimia, exile and death as penaltiesemergesclearly from the works of Ruschenbusch

cited in notes 2 above and 19 below.

12. On the importanceof the proceduralsanctionI have to acknowledgea large intellectualdebt to J. Gaudemet,Institutionsde l'Antiquitd (1967) 395, 574-575.

It is sometimes said that in Athenian

law women could not sue. This

is inaccurate,thoughnot misleading.In the disputeleadingto Isaios3, Phile and the speaker'smothereach initiatedactions.A womancouldnot pleadher own case but was representedby her kyrios. 13. Aischin.3.176. For theperirranteriaseePoll. 1.8; Lucian,desacrificiis 13; cf. R.E. Wycherley,The Athenianagora IlI (1957) 218. 14. F. Kolb, Agora und Theater (1981) 23-24, 92. 15. The disabilityimposedon Andokidesfor impiety was exclusionfrom

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CITY

125

the agoraand the sanctuaries(Lys. 6.9 and 24; cf. Andok. 1.71); an attempt at political activity in the Assembly,the courtsand the Council would have contravenedthis (Lys. 6.33), but for an amnesty.Cf. Hansen,Apagoge63. 16. Apagoge63-65. His argumentis directedagainstKahrstedt,whodenied that there was "partial atimia" (Staatsgebiet109-110). 17. Aischin. 3.52; Plut. Dem. 12.

18. J.H. Lipsius,Das attischeRechtundRechtsverfahren (1905-1915) 245246.

19. A view of a rathersimilar kind hasbeendevelopedin greaterdetail by E. Ruschenbusch,Untersuchungen zur GeschichtedesathenischenStrafrechts (1968) 11-12.

20. Hansen, Apagoge 113-118; cf. L. Gernet, "Sur l'ex•cution capitale", REG 37 (1924) 261-293. Besidesarguingfrom the find at Old Phaleron, Hansen notes that some argumentsfor supposeddevelopmentin Athenian criminal law are less than conclusive,and he complainsthat scholarshave basedtheoriesof developmenton a supposed"indogermanische Rechtsgeschichte".Withoutinquiringinto the validityof that supposition, the present paper assumesmerely that public authorityin the seventhcenturywas very weak. See also n. 24.

21. Petronius,Satyricon 111-112. 22. BrockhausEnzyklopiidieXIII (1971) 67. 23. Gospelaccordingto St. Mark 15.43-45; to St. Luke 23.50-53; to St. John 19.38.

24. H.J. Wolff (above n. 9) 82-87 ("judicial litigationcame about . . . throughthe substitution of controlledself-helpfor uncontrolledself-help",82). Hansen(Apagoge114) notesthe circumstances in whichself-helpwasallowed in the fourth centuryand observesthat there is no evidencethat it was allowed also againstother types of criminal in archaictimes. But the treatmentof adulteryprovidesan illustrationof the growthof restrictions on self-help:the law quotedat Dem. 23.53 is likely, in view of its archaicfeatures,to be older than the public action for seizingsomeoneunjustlyas an adulterer([Dem.] 59.66); cf. Ruschenbusch, "Der UrsprungdesgerichtlichenRechtsstreits bei den Griechen", Symposium1977 (1982) 1-8 at 5-7.

25. J.K. Davies,"Atheniancitizenship: the descentgroupand the alternati,•es", CJ 73 (1977-78) 105-121 at 115.

26. On F 70 seeaboven. 2. Archaiclanguage is alsoapparent in FF 15b, 23d, 41, 61, 67, 90. A readerof thispaperobjected: "Butthe presence of J•ctv•o•to•in thesamepassage strongly suggests verbatim reporting. Hence it seemsto me that this law is evidenceof a concernwith beinga politgsat somepoint prior to Cleisthenes."Sed non sequitur.If Plutarch'saccountof the Solonianlaw borrowedonewordfromtheoriginaltext, it doesnotfollow that his accountborrowedany otherword from that text.

27. A readerof thispaperobjected: "I suspect thatepitimos in a political senseis logicallyposterior to atimos:youbecomeatimosif youaresomeone who wouldnaturallyhaverightsbut are deprivedof yourrights;you then

126

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becomeepitimosif you get your rightsback again." It is betterto recognize epitimosand atimos as correlatives,whatevertheir linguistichistory. 28. Plut. Mor. 292b. F. Jacoby,"XPHZTOYY. FIOIEIN (Aristotlefr. 592R)", CQ 38 (1944) 15-16=Abhandlungenzur griechischenGeschichtschreibung(1956) 342-343. 29. Dem. 23.72; Ruschenbusch(above n. 2).

30. Cf. P.A.L. Greenhalgh,"The Homerictheraponand opaonand their historicalimplications",BICS 29 (1982) 81-90. 31. E. Grace, "Status distinctions in the Draconian law", Eirene 11 (1973)

5-30, especially21-25, hasarguedthatnon-citizensallegedto havecommitted homicidewere not coveredby Draconianlaw and were thereforenot entitled to trial until a muchlater period,probablylater than the time of Antiphon. Gracebelievesalso(16-21) that Athenianlaw first providedtrial for killing a non-citizenat a period later than Drakon by a measureassigningsuchcases to the Palladion.Graceappearsto assumethat asearly asDrakona distinction betweencitizensandalienswaslegallyrecognizable,andoverlooksthefugitive who gainsprotectionand hencebecomesfully "employablein the political sense".

32. A. Andrewes, "Phratries in Homer", Hermes 89 (1961) 129-140.

33. Cf. Manville, Evolution 7-32 (17: "Eighth-centuryAthens had no citizenshipbut only a hierarchyof statuseswithin the larger membershipof the tribes,phratries,gene."). 34. See especiallyDem. 57; the issueis whetherthe speaker'sancestors were citizens or xenoi. The revision of the list is known also from Aischin.

1.77-78, 86; 2.182; Androt. FGrHist IlI B 324 F 52; Philoch. III B 328 F 52.

35. A readerof this paperobjected:"You couldn't make a man a xenos, beinga xenoswas a matterof descentaswell asof politicalstatus."If a slave wasfreed, he becamea metic, meticsbeinga sub-class ofxenoi. Manumission madea man a xenos.Beinga xenoswasonly a matterof descentin a negative sense.If a putativechild of Athenianparentagewas found by a court at his dokimasianot to be entitledto registrationin thedeme, he wassoldinto slavery (AP 42.1). If he werefortunate,he mightlaterbe manumittedandthusbecome a metic. Sucha child was not deniedcitizenshipbecausehis non-citizenparent had been identified but because it had been found that he was not the child of

a citizen. The stepbetween"finding someoneto be a xenos"and "making someonea xenos" is small in practice, however importantotherwise. The Atheniansdid not take that stepfor inflicting diminutionof civic rights;they preferredto keep atimia. 36. A readerof this papercommented:"The Solonianlaw did not 'fail to distinguishbetweenthe citizen and the metic': it acceptedas citizenspeople who in later Athens would have been metics, which is not the same thing." Thisobjectiononlyhasforce,if underSolonianlaw therewerefreenon-citizens who enjoyedsecuritywithin Athens,althoughthey did not belongto eitherof the two groupswelcomedby the Solonianlaw on immigration.There is no

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127

evidencethat suchpeopleexisted,and Plutarch'saccountof the Solonianlaw on immigrationscarcelyleavesroom for them. 37. Pers. 319; Seven548; Supp.994; Agam. 57; Cho. 971; otherderivatives

of thesamerootoccuratSupp.609andEum.1018.Cf. IG 13244C.8(decree of Skambonidaica. 460). D. Whitehead(The ideologyof theAthenianmetic, PCPhS SupplementaryVolume 4 (1977) 140-147) reviews evidenceon the beginningsof metic statusand argueseffectivelyagainsta Solonianorigin. ConsideringKleisthenes,he finds (145) that "the circumstantial evidencethat a legally recognized... statusof metoikoswas conceivedat aboutthis time is strong.... I believeSchenklwasjustifiedin his claimthatit wasClisthenes who, to meet the need for defining the positionof thosenot enfranchised, createdthe metoikia.... It would be naive, surely, to imaginethe metoikia springingfully-formedfrom Clisthenes'head.... It seemsto me moreprobable that Clisthenes'action was the essentiallyneutral one of recognition .... " The view defendedhere is closeto that of Whitehead,but divergesfrom it by decliningto assumecitizenshipas a known datum. 38. FGrHist III b (Supplement)I (1954) 158-161;followedby J. Day and M. Chambers,Aristotle's history of Athenian democracy(1962) 118. For a defenseof the historicityof the revision see P.J. Rhodes,A commentaryon the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia (1981) 188 with references. Manville,

Evolution149-151, triesto supportthe historicityof the revisionfrom Andok. 1.106 and to reconstructthe procedure. 39. A readerof this paper commented:"Sad to see the reappearance of Hignett's view that the publicationof Herodotus'history must immediately have killed all authentictraditionsnot includedby Herodotus."It would be sadderto supposethat an authentictradition, which had not been noticedby Herodotus, survived to be reproducedaccuratelyby Aristotle, after it had escapeddistortionamid the speculations of Hellanikos,Kleidemos,Androtion and the peoplewith whom they discussed their studies.

40. E.g.W.G. Forrest, "Themistokles andArgos",CQ2 10(1960)221-241, especially235-240; A.J. Podlecki, The political backgroundof Aeschylean tragedy (1966), especially80-100, 123-129. A reader of this paper kindly drew my attentionto C.W. MacLeod, "Politics and the Oresteia", JHS 102 (1982) 124-144.It isto behopedthatMacLeod'sthoroughdiscussion ( 124-133) will put an end to attemptsto explain the trilogy by supposedallusionsto contemporaryissues.That muchcanbe recognizedwithoutadoptinga position on MacLeod's positive theses.

41. E.R. Dodds,"MoralsandpoliticsintheOresteia", reprinted fromPCPhS 186 (1960) 19-31,in Theancientconceptof progressand otheressays on Greekliteratureandbelief(1973)45-63; seeespecially 48. K.J. Dover,"The political aspectof Aeschylus'sEumenides",JHS 77 (1957) 230-237, drew attentionto insistentlypoliticallanguagein the Eumenides.The mostrecent bookon Aischylos(T.G. Rosenmeyer, Theart of Aeschylus (1982)) refrains

frompayingattention to theplaywright's politicalpreoccupations; thatmay

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be the reasonwhy the authorfindstheEumenides in parts"closeto comic opera" (361).

42. I plantopursue it elsewhere. Theapproach indicated in thisparagraph canbeextended to theSevenagainstThebes: theoikosof Laios,disrupted by irreconcilable strife,perishes in thepersons of thetwobrothers, butthepolis of Thebes, represented bythechorus, survives. Theimportance of thecontrast in claimsbetweenthecity andthehousehold wasimpressed on students of Greektragedyby B.M.W. Knox,Theheroictemper:studiesin Sophoclean tragedy(1964)76-90.No attention is paidto thecityin thePrometheus Bound.

Aischylean authorship of thatplayhasbeendefended by some,notablyC.J. Herington, Theauthorof thePrometheus Bound(1970),andchallenged by others,notablyM. Griffith, Theauthentici.,ty of Prometheus Bound(1977). For

a recentdefense of authenticity seeG. Zuntz,A[ox6•,ovH@og•10•6g, Hermes 111 (1983) 498-499.

43. The classicstatement of this view is V. Ehrenberg, "The originof democracy", Historia1 (1950)515-548.It hasbeenrestated brieflyby P.J. Rhodes,"TheAthenian revolution. II. Thereformof theAreopagus", CambridgeAncientHistoryV2 (forthcoming).

44. IG 13104.26-29; restored fromDem.23.37-43.Forcommentary see R.S. Stroud,Drakon's law on homicide(1968) 53-54.

45. Dem. 23.82; Poll. 8.50-51; Harpok., Bekker Anec., Suda, s.v. androlgpsia. The lexicographers assignthepracticeto relationsbetweenstates, butthelawpreserved atDem.23.82doesnotnecessarily implythatrestriction. 46. Extantwritersfromlateantiquityagreedin assigning thelegislation of

Drakonto 621/0(Stroud(aboven. 44) 66-70).ButAristotle(AP4.1) assigned it to the archonship of Aristaichmos withoutsayinghowmanyyearselapsed betweenthatyearandthe archonship of Solon.For thepossible implications of thatomission seeR. SeaIcy,"ZumDatumdersolonischen Gesetzgebung", Historia 28 (1979) 238-241.

47. IG 13 156.13-17;II 2 32.9-14;226.34-40;SEG X 23.7-13;52.13-16; 83.20-22; 88.9-12; 98.10-!3; 99.3-6; 108.13-20; Dem. 23.88-89. For discus-

sionseeKahrstedt,Staatsgebiet160; Ste. Croix (aboven. 11) 275. 48. For a fuller expositionsee R. SeaIcy, "The Atheniancourtsfor

homicide",CP 78 (1983) 275-296;indebtedness is gladlyacknowledged to Ruschenbusch (aboven. 2) and to M. Gagarin,Drakonand earlyAthenian homicidelaw (1981) 22-26 and 135-! 37. 49. This is the theme of Manville, Evolution.

50. Thisformulation differsfromtheviewof Manville,"Solon'slaw" (that atimia becamemoredefinedas the evolutionof citizenship broughtgradual codificationof privileges).

51. My thinkinghasbeenstimulated by F.J. Frost,"Tribalpoliticsandthe civic state",AJAH(1976)66-73, whichapproaches relatedproblems froma differentpointof view.Anotherpossible lineof investigation wouldstudythe consolidation of the bordersof Atticaduringthe sixthcentury,butevidence on this is scantyand probablylittle can be addedto the observations of

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129

Kahrstedt,Staatsgebiet346-362. I have been encouragedby the suggestive remarkof J. Martin ("Von Kleistheneszu Ephialtes",Chiron4 (1974) 5-42, at 12):"Die Staatlichkeit Athensbliebtrotzder solonischen Reformenprek•ir." I am happyto thankD.J. Cohen,C. HabichtandR.S. Stroudfor helpingme in importantways. This shouldnot be takento indicatetheir view of any of the questionsdiscussed.

THE

BEGINNING

OF THE

ROMAN

DEFENSIVE

SYSTEM

IN JUDAEA*

More than fifty yearsago, A. Alt publishedan article in which he argued that a defensivesystemof forts and fortlets, mannedby adequateforces and connectedby a road, wasestablished by the RomansbetweenRaphia (on the MediterraneanSea) and the Dead Sea in the periodfollowingthe quelling of the First Jewish Revolt and before the annexationof the

Nabataean Kingdomin 106½E.l In anarticlepublished in 1958,M. AviYonah, who had earlier acceptedAlt's dating of this system,questioned thatdatingandput forwardarguments for a Diocletianicdatefor its begin-

ning.2 Fouryearslater,someof Avi-Yonah'spointswereanswered by Sh. Applebaum,who triedto supportAlt's dating.He concludedhisarticle with the observationthat "thereis a limit to what a discussionof the literary sourcesand a topographicalanalysisas well as analogieswith otherprovinces can contributetowardsthe clarification of the point at issue;only

theshovel cangivea definiteanswer tothequestion of date". 3Sincethen, M. Gichon[ = Gih.on] hasbeenpublishingvariousstudiesin whichhe has triedto presentarchaeological supportfor thedatingof thelimesPalaestinae

to theFlavianperiod. 4 Hisaccount of theworking of thesystem hasbeen acceptedby G. Webster in what is probably the best text-book on the Roman army in English, and it partly helped E. Luttwak to reconstruct

thenewstrategy allegedly introduced by theFlavians. 5 Somedoubts have been expressedas to the date, and G.W. Bowersockeven claimed that the

Palestinelimesexistedonly in the southernpartof theHashemiteKingdom of Jordan, contestingthe applicationof the term to describewhat in his

viewwasmerelya fortifiedroadacross thenorthern Negev. 6 No serious attempt,however,has been made to discussthe problemin detail. The implicationsof the operationof sucha defensivesystemin this area,and of its existenceat the datesadvocated by Alt, ApplebaumandGichon,for the understanding of the developmentof Romanstrategyaswell as for the historyof Judaeain the imperialperiodjustify a detailedpresentation of a dissentingview.

It will be usefulto briefly recapitulatethe politicalhistoryof the region 130

I. Palestinein the late Roman Empire

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ß

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132

ISRAEL

SHATZMAN

in question.The Negevsouthof Beersheba andtheSinaipeninsulabelonged to the NabataeanKingdom, thoughthe exactdemarcationline betweenit and the HerodianKingdom, and later the Romanprovinceof Judaea,is

not sufficiently clear and agreedupon. 7 After the annexation of the NabataeanKingdom in 106 ½E, which was a peacefulaction, the Negev

andSinaiwereincluded in theRoman province of Arabia. 8UnderDiocletian a territorialreorganizationtookplace, asa resultof whichthe southern part of the provinceArabia--namely, the Sinai and the Negev sections, as well as the areasouthof the Zeredandeastof the •Arabavalley--were

addedto theprovince SyriaPalaestina. 9 Fromca. 358thesepartsof the old Nabataean Kingdom were organized as the province Palaestina Salutaris,which becamePalaestinaTertia with the organizationof three

Palestinian provinces shortlyafter400.l0 Thisorganization lastedto the end of Byzantinerule in Palestine. I shall first presentthe written sourcesrelated to the above-mentioned Romandefensivesystem.The termlimesPalaestinaeappearsin a Christian Greek inscription,probablyof the 6th century,whoseexactprovenance is unknown, but is said to have been in southernPalestine.I I The two versesof the inscriptionrecordthat "when Dorotheosleft the divine land

of the limesPalaestinae,he did not losethe honoursgivenby the king" (my translation).The deceasedDorotheos,as suggestedby Abel and Alt, probablyheld somepositionassociatedwith the administrationof the limes

Palaestinae, butnotmuchmorecanbeinferred fromtheinscription. 12Be that as it may, the inscriptiondoes testify to the existenceof a limes somewherein the Negev, unlesswe assumethat Dorotheosserved far

awayfromtheplacewherehewasburied,whichis unlikely. 13However, no clear understanding of the geographical limits and military functions of this limes can be deduced from such evidence.

The Palestinelimesis mentionedin an edictof the emperorAnastasius I, knownto us from fragmentsof an inscriptionfoundat Qas. r el-H.allfibfit

in Transjordan. •4I quotetherelevant passage because of itsimportance to our discussion:

THE ROMAN

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133

Accordingto the editors, the edict is of the samegeneraltype as the

edictof the sameemperor foundat Ptolemais in Cyrenaica. •5 Still, a difference is to be noted in that the latter edict is probably confined to

Cyrenaica. 16At anyrate,thepresent edict'sregulations applyto Roman officialsin generalandnot only to thoseof theprovinceArabia, andindeed

it seems thattherearefragments of copies of theedictfromothersites. •7 Thus the fact that this copy of the edict was found in Qa.srel-Hall•b•t in Transjordanhasno bearingon the meaningof thePalestinelimesmentioned in it; as the contentshows, it is only the variation of fines in different administrativedistrictsthat occasionedthe specificmentioningof the Euphratesand Palestinelimites.Furthermore,the omissionof Arabia in this connectionmeans that this variation has nothing to do with the eastern frontier as a whole. On the other hand, the referenceto Klysma, a town that was situatedon the northernpointof theGulf of Suezandis mentioned as belongingto Palestinein the openingsentencesof the edict, led the editorsof the inscriptionto concludethat the frontier extendedfrom that

fortress "alongtheeastern shoreof theRedSea".•8 In thusequatingthe limes, in this edict, with a narrow,specificstripof land, the editorsseemto missthe real importance(from our point of view) of this text, which in other respectsthey do not fail to notice in their commentaryon fragments15-19: "The praesidesand their officia are thus renderedliable to the paymentof penaltiesin casethey fail to settlecases accordingto statutoryprescriptions,or neglectto submitto the ducesthose questionswhich fall properlyunderthe jurisdictionof the military gover-

nor."19SincetheduxPalaestinae wasresponsible forthePalestine limes, it follows

that in this context the limes Palaestinae

is not a fortified

zone

alongthe border,but that territorywhereinthe dux Palaestinaehasjurisdictionovercertaincases.We shallpresentlyseeanothertextwhichimplies

thiswiderterritorial meaning. 20 A third sourceis a passagein Rufinus' Historia Ecclesiastica,written in the early 5th century: "Mavia Sarracenorumgentis regina, vehementi bello Palaestiniet Arabici limitis oppidaatqueurbesquatere,vicinasque

simulvastare provincias coepit."2• It isnoteasytoidentify thegeographical locationof the Palestinelimesin thispassage.The Saracenswere originally a nomadtribe of the Sinai peninsula,attestedin the 2nd centuryCEby the geographerPtolemy, but the name was also employedto designatethe

tribesof northArabiaandtheSyriandesert. 22It followsthatMaviacould haveinvadedthe Palestineprovincefrom the south,i.e. from Sinai, which implies a limes in the Negev, or from the east, which meansthat the referenceis to a limeseastof the •Araba. The fact that Mavia negotiated with theRomanauthorities in Egypt,includingLuciusthebishopof Alexan-

134

ISRAEL

SHATZMAN

dria, to receivethe hermit Moses as a bishopfor her tribe, and that this Moseslived on the borderbetweenEgyptandPalestine,may indicatethat

herbasewasin theSinaipeninsula. 23Ontheotherhand,thealleged range of themilitaryoperations,whichnecessitated theinterventionof themagister militiae pedestriset equestrisin oriente, suggeststhat the incursions spreadover largepartsof the provinces,andhenceRufinusmay havehad

in mindboththeNegevandtheTransjordan sections of Palestine. 24On balance,the noticeseemsto refer to a limes in the Negev, but one cannot be sureof the geographicalimplication. M. Avi-Yonah thoughtthat thereis a referenceto the limesPalaestinae in the Chronicon Paschale.

The reference is to a defensive measure taken

againstthe Saracensby the emperorDecius,who sentlionsand lionesses •[g '[6 M[tt'[ov&vct'[o•./lg &Jr6'A@ct[5(•ctg >tatHct•.ctto'[(•vqg {•o•g'[o6 Kt@xqo(•ov

x6o;@o•. 2sStrictlyspeaking, thistextdoesnotmention thePalestine limes, only an orientis limes, but it does imply a defensivepolicy along the easternfrontierof the provincesArabiaandPalestine,whichin thiscontext does not seem to refer to the Negev. An importanttext for our problem, whichI shallonlybrieflydiscusshere,is a letterof HonoriusandTheodosius II of 23 March 409: "Limitanei militis et possessorurn utilitateconspecta, per primam, secundam,et tertiamPalaestinam,huiuscemodi normaprocessitut, pretiorumcertataxationedepensa,specierumintermittaturexactio; sed ducianum

officium

sub Versamini

et Maenaeni

castri riomine salutaria

statuta conatur evertere. "26Theletterspecifically dealswiththelimitanei associatedwith the forts of Birsama and Menois, which means that a limes

systemdid existin thispartof theNegev.Buttheopeningsentence indicates that such soldierscould also be found in other parts of Palestine,for otherwisethere is no point in mentioningPalaestinaPrima and Secunda. This is an interestingpiece of evidencebecauseit seemsto showthat the Palestinelimesis notto be understood asmerelya lineardefensivesystem, but asa militarysystemto whichvariousforceswereattached,regardless

of their positionsin the country.Finally, mentionshouldbe madeof a letterof Jerome,of the year 411, which may or may not refer to a limes

in theNegev. 27 Severalwrittensources recordthe presence of Romanarmyunitsin the Negev in the late Romanperiodand Byzantinetimes. A Romanunit was alreadystationedin Nessanain the mid-Sthcenturyand wasstill therein

the6thcentury, according topapyrifoundthere. 28TheNotitiaDignitatum recordsRomanunitsin sixplaces,whichmayhavebelongedto a defensive systemestablished alonga line betweenthe Dead SeaandRaphia:Zoara, Moleatha, Berosaba, Birsama and Menois, with Chermula some distance

in therear.29It alsomentions moreunitsin otherplaces, some(butnot

THE ROMAN

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135

all) of which may be identified, and at any rate not all of which can be

partof thesamelineof defence. 3øFinally,theOnomasticon of Eusebius of the early 4th centuryand its Latin versionby Jeromementiongarrisons in Carmel (Chermula), Beersheba(Berosaba),Zoara, Thaiman, Thamara,

Adomim,Mephaath andAila.31Onlythe firstthreemaybelongto the same line of defence.

The discussion so far showsthat, contraryto Bowersock'sopinion,the term limesPalaestinaewas appliednot only to the southernpart of the HashemiteKingdomof Jordan--thatis, of the old NabataeanKingdom turnedinto a Roman provinceunderTrajan--but also to a part of the Negev,whoseexactgeographical locationcannotbe accuratelyascertained on the basis of the written sources. As none of the above-mentioned sources

is earlierthantheearly4th century,thosewhowantto datetheestablishment of the defensivesystem,whateverthis may havebeen,priorto thereforms of Diocletianare facedwith somedifficulty. Followingan observationof Alt, however,Applebaumarguedthatthe list of the Idumaeantownsgiven by PtolemyindicatesthatIdumaeawasorganizedasa specialmilitaryzone

aftertheFirstJewish Revolt. 32Butthesupport sought fromPtolemy cannot sustaincloserexamination.Ptolemydoesnot seemto have describedcon-

temporaryadministrativeconditions,as Philadelphiaand Gerasaare in-

cluded inSyriainhisaccount, whereas inhisdaytheybelonged toArabia. 33 That he used an earlier source follows from his remark about Jerusalem,

"whichis nowcalledAeliaCapitolina". TM But Ptolemy'saccountpresentssomedifficulties. He dividesPalestine into four regions:Galilee, Samaria,JudaeaandIdumaea,a divisionwhich

is notattested in anyothersource. 35Neapolis is included in Samaria, but Sebastebelongsto Judaea,an arrangement which is notrecordedelsewhere

andwhichis highlyiraplausible. 36Thamarais ascribed to Judaeaand Maliatha (Moleatha)to Arabia, a very complicatedterritorialdisposition

if the lastplaceis to be identifiedwithTel el-Milh.(seebelow).37Beit Gubrin (Eleutheropolis)is in Judaeaand not in Idumaea,but the quite unknown Gemmaruris is enumeratd as one of the towns of Idumaea, al-

thoughit wasin the territoryof BeitGubrin. 38Finally,let us givethe complete list of the Idumaean towns accordingto Ptolemy: Birsama,

Kaparorsa, Gemmaruris, ElusaandMampsis. 39Thereis no doubtthat Elusa and Mampsiswere Nabataeantowns, and henceit is inconceivable

thattheywereannexed totheRomanEmpirebefore106.40Butgeographically, Ptolemy's accountnow becomesvery difficult, even impossible. A glanceat the map showsthat if Thamara, Mampsisand Elusa belong to the provinceSyria Palaestina,Maliatha must be an enclavewithin this province:Nabataean,if this list is supposedto reflect conditionsprior to

136

ISRAEL

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theannexationof 106, or partof anotherRomanprovinceaftertheformation of Arabia. In either case, sucha territorial arrangementstrainscredulity and is due to someconfusion.One may escapethe difficulty by accepting Ptolemy'slocationof Maliatha furtherto the south,but if so, it is the only record of such a town in Arabia.

Now, we do not know how Ptolemy compiledhis list. He may have

usedthemapof Marinus of Tyre,aswasoncesuggested, 4• butobviously with additionsor changesbasedon othersourcesor informationaboutlater conditions.Clearly his accountcannotbe taken as a descriptionof the administrativereorganization of Judaeaunderthe Flavianemperors.And thereis anotherpoint. Contraryto Applebaum'ssuggestion,it seemsthat there is nothingin Ptolemy'saccountto suggestthat it has any military significance.He first gives a list of the eight Palestinianports. Then he enumerates the provincialtowns:four in Galilee, two in Samaria,twenty in Judaea west of the Jordan, five in Judaea east of the Jordan, and five

in Idumaea.Many of thesetownswere naturallysituatedalongroadsand can be shown to have had Roman garrisonsfor some time, but in this

respect nothing differentiates ldumaea fromtheotherthreeregions. 42It appears,then, that Ptolemy'saccountdoesnot help in understanding the Romanmilitary deploymentin the Negev.

Now the archaeologicalevidence. Alt's article was associatedwith an archaeological surveycarriedout by F. Frankin 1932-1934 andpublished

in 1934.43Oneof Avi-Yonah's arguments is that,in so far as Roman fortresseswere examinedin the •Araba and west of the Dead Sea, they show characteristicsshared with fortressesof Diocletianic times, or even

of a later period, to be found in Syria and the northernpart of the limes

Arabiae. 44Applebaum did notcontest thisargument, butexpressed his hope that further archaeologicalexcavationswould bring forward new evidence. In the meantime, B. Rothenbergcarried out a prolongedarchaeologicalsurveyof the •Araba,on the basisof which he concludedthat there was never a second,or even a third, line of defence, from north to

south,alongthe•Araba,asassumed byAlt andaccepted byAvi-Yonah. 45 The supposed existenceof sucha line of defenceis outsidethe scopeof the presentdiscussion,but this stateof affairs may serve as a warning abouttheuncertaintyof conclusions basedonfindsobservedin archaeological surveys.

M. Gichonhasnot so far publishedthe long-awaitedcompletepresentationof his archaeologicalstudyof the fortificationsandthe structuresof

II. South Judaea and Arabia

ioq•rabl

.

.

Roman r•d

Presumed cour•ol

Roman roadorancient route

As regardsroads,thismapis basedon thatof B. Isaacin RomanFrontier Studies1979, ed. W.S. Hansenand L.J.F. Keppie (1980) 890-1, who mainlyfollowsthe Romanroad-system preparedby I. Roll of the Israeli MilestonesCommittee. It shouldbe noted that accordingto these maps

thesescholarsdo not presumethe existenceof a roadconnecting Raphia with the Dead Sea alongthe forts of the Negev (contraGichon(1980) 851, 853). It is also well to bear in mind that the existenceof an ancient roadthroughthe 'Arabato Aila is deniedby Rothenberg211 if.

138

ISRAEL

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the Palestinelimes. Yet one of his articlesis detailedenoughto allow a

closeanalysis oftheevidence athisdisposal andthemethods ofhiswork.46 He claims that he has identified 161 sites as belongingto the Palestine limes, of which thosesouthof the line Oboda-Moyet•Awad as well asthe

settlements nearElusaareexcluded fromthediscussion. 47Theremaining 114 are classifiedaccordingto functionalcriteria:a) castella--major forts; b) castellaparva--forts; c) burgi (•6@¾ot)--fortlets;d) turres--towers; e) mansiones,mutationes, stationes--various servicing buildings along roads. The correspondingtablesgive variousdetailsincludingthe periods of occupationof eachsite and the evidenceon which the datingis based. There are fifteen castella, fourteen castella parva, forty-eight burgi, twenty-six turres and eleven mansiones.Of these, 68 sites are dated on the basisof potteryfinds, I 1 on the basisof potteryfinds and coins, 5 on the basisof potteryand architecturaldesigns,I on the basisof potteryand excavationsand7 on the basisof excavations.2 sitesaresurprisinglydated without any supportingevidence. 20 sites are not dated, and one may

wonderwhether theybelongto thesubject underconsideration. 48When one tries to checkand understandthe dating system,one getsinto trouble, as the nomenclatureusedis hopelesslyconfused.Some25 sitesare dated as "from the Roman period to the Byzantineperiod" (or "to the Moslem conquest"),which seemsto suggestcontinuedoccupationfrom the 1st centuryto the 7th century. But when it is noticedthat more than a dozen sitesare dated "from the Flavian period (or "from the l st-2nd century") to the Byzantine period" (or "to the Moslem conquest")one comes to suspectthat thereare no firm criteriaor evidencefor datingthe beginning of the Roman occupationof thesesites. One can also ask why a fort that is datedto the "Nabataeanperiod"is includedin the list. Thesedatingnoticesbetraythe weaknessof the datingsystemwhich is overwhelminglybasedon potsherdsdiscoveredin an archaeologicalsur-

vey.49Thatsucha datingis oftenunreliable maybe illustrated by the following examples.As early as Alt, Tel Masos (Khirbet el-Meshfish), located some 12km east of Tel Beersheba, was considered as a Roman

fort of the Flavian period, and the dating andclassificationof the site were

commonly accepted. 5øThesitewasexcavated in threeseasons of work, 1972, 1974 and 1975. The account of the first season of excavations at

the sitereportsthe following discovery:"It was ascertainedthat the Roman fort was merely a private structureof the Roman period, evidently an unfortifiedvilla. Fragmentsof measuringcups and remainsof Herodian

stonetablessuggest a lst-century CEdatefor itsconstruction. "5 During the excavationsof the sameareain the secondseasonsurprisingremains were discovered,showing,at last definitely, that what had first beencon-

THE ROMAN

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139

sidereda Roman fort and then a villa of the 1st centuryCE was in fact a Nestorianmonastery,built in the 7th or 8th centuryCE. It is worth while quotingthe explanationgiven for the new dating: The identificationof the buildingas a Romanvilla in the first season was reachedby the excavatedpartsof rooms601 and602 and a few pieces of Roman pottery. The terminuspost quem given by this potteryled to an incorrectdatingthat had to be correctedin the light of the potteryfound in situ andof the Syrianinscriptionsin a datable typeof script.The Romanpotteryof the secondseasonis very scanty, whichpointsto periodicpresenceon the tel ratherthana permanent settlement. No architecturalactivity in this period can as yet be

attested, probably thetelhadnotbeensettled intheRoman period. 52 No further commentsare needed.53 Beershebais consideredone of the major fortressesof the Palestine

limes, of which, accordingto Gichon, there were three more (Menois,

Birsamaand Moleatha)in the Flavianperiod. 54 The site of ancient Beersheba has been identified with Tel Beersheba, some 5km east of

modern Beersheba.Annual, systematicexcavationsof this site startedin

1969underthedirection of Y. Aharoni. 5sThespecific siteof theRoman fortressobservedon the tel was later assignedto V. Fritz, who published

a detailed preliminary reportin 1973.56 Fritzstates thatthepottery remains found in the excavationsare too few and fragmentaryto allow datingof thefort, besidesbeingoutof context.Severalcoinsallowsomeconjectures. A coin of 94/95 cE is rejectedas significantfor datingthe fort to the 1st centuryCE, apparentlyas beingout of context.A Trajaniccoin of the year 112, found within an inner wall, is takento showthe terminuspost quem for the construction of the fort. A silvercoin of Neapolisof 251-253 cE indicatesa terminuspost quem for the destructionof the fort, and three coinsof the 4th century,found outsidethe fort, make it probablethat the

fortstillexisted then. 57Fritz'scaution andhesitation in precisely dating the fort are noteworthy.He apparentlydoesnot considerthe architectural designand buildingmaterialas datableindications.He statesthat pottery that doesnot comefrom clearcontextsis of no help in datingthe fortress. In contrast,Gichon assertsthat an earlier buildingwas constructed on the site underthe Flavians, when the limeswas allegedlyestablished,and that

theTrajaniccoinslipped intoit. Clearlythesearemerespeculations. 58 According to Aharoni, the excavationshave shown that the Roman fortresswasbuiltontopof a Hellenisticbath-house belongingto a Herodian

fortress, whichpreceded theRomanone.59Asfordating,Aharoni atone

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time took the Trajanic coin as "indicatingthat the fortresswas constructed

afterthesecond century", 6øandat another wrotethatthefortress wasbuilt in thesecond halfof thesecond centuryat theearliest. 6• At anyrate,to anyonewithout a prejudicedapproach,it is now clear that the Roman fort of Tel Beershebacannotbe dated to the Flavian period, or to the early secondcenturyCE, on the basisof the archaeologicalevidence.Finally, it shouldbe notedthat Tel Beershebamay perhapsnot be identicalwith the late Berosabaof the Notitia Dignitatum. The fort on the tel is too small to accommodatea Roman cohort, and is consideredby Fritz as an intermediatefort betweenBerosabaandMoleatha;the first of theseis supposed

to havebeensituated in theoldquarterof modernBeersheba. 62 *Ira is one of the sites consideredto be "excellent examplesof the continuityof border-defencefrom biblical times to the Roman occupation of Judaea.... RomanandByzantinepotteryatteststo •Ira's incorporation

intheLimesdefence system."63 ThusGichonin 1967.A rescue excavation of the site beganin March 1979, concentratingon two areasin the northwesternpart of Tel •Ira. The finds discoveredshow that the site was occupiedin the Israelite, Herodianand Byzantineperiods.In one area (M), part of a tower and the city wall was unearthed;the uppercourses, belongingto the Byzantineperiod, were built on remainsof the Israelite period. Someremainsindicatethat the Israelitecity wall wasre-used,with someadditions,in the Herodianand Byzantineperiods.The samepicture emergesfrom the finds of the secondarea (L) excavated.The Byzantine uppercourseof the wall was built on top of the Israelite wall and them are also architecturalremainsof the Herodianperiod. No remainsof the Roman period are reported, even among the relatively large number of vessels.64 Two more seasonsof excavations, in which work was carried out in the

easternand southernparts of the site, have revealedbasicallythe same results.The fortificationson the easternextremityof the mound,belonging to the Israeliteperiod, were destroyedat the end of the 7th centuryBCE. In the same area, ruins of structures were found and dated as Roman and

Byzantineon the basisof the sherdscollectedin their vicinity. When they beganto unearththe main structure,however,the excavatorsrealizedthat it was a Byzantinemonasteryof the late fourth or early fifth century. A chapelwas excavatedabovethe gate of the Israelitetown. The houses uncoveredin thesouthern partof thetel aredatedto theIsraelite,Hellenistic andByzantineperiods.Finally, a largestructurewas uncoveredon the hill nearestto Tel •Ira. In surveysof the 1950s it was consideredto be a Hellenistic fortress, but the excavation has now shown it to be a civilian

building of theByzantine period,probably ofthe5thcenturyil sThusthree

THE ROMAN

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141

seasons of archaeological excavations havedisproved theassumption that Tel •Ira was occupiedby the Romansafter the First JewishRevolt, and thereis no evidenceof militarypresence at thesiteduringtheRomanand Byzantineperiods. I have discussed thesethreeexamples(Tel Masos,Tel Beershebaand Tel •Ira) at lengthto demonstrate that a datingsystemmainly basedon an archaeologicalsurvey and pottery collectedfrom the surfacemay prove wrongin many of the sites,oncethey are excavated.It shouldbe stressed that there are not a few uncertaintiesin the chronologyof the pottery remains.Sincethe life spanof many of the potterytypesis of two, three, four andevenmore centuries,one shouldproceedwith the utmostcaution

in tryingtodefineperiods of occupation. 66Andthereis another problem. As we have seen,remainsof structuressupposedto be part of fortifications on the basisof archaeological surveysmay turn out to be civilian buildings after they havebeenunearthed.Obviouslythis neednot be the caseevery time, but it may be quiteoften. Hence, the merepresenceof pottery--be it Herodian, Nabataean,Roman or Byzantine--is no proof of the military character of a site.

Let us now examine the evidence for the fortificationsof the alleged Flavianlimesin theNegev. In 1967theyweregroupedby Gichonaccording to the following classification:a) main forts: Menois, Birsama, Berosaba and Malh.ata (Moleatha); b) smallerfortifications:Mesad Sharuh. en, Khasif,

Abu .Sukhban,Molada, Tel Masos, Rujm Zohar and Mesad Hatrurim; c)

fortsinherited fromearlierperiods: •Uza,•Ira, •Aradand•En-Gedi. 67 Of group(a), the Romanoccupationof Tel Beershebahasbeenproven to be of post-Flaviandate, aswe haveseen,andthereis nocleararchaeological or otherevidencefor the stationingof a Romanunit at Tel Beersheba prior to Diocletian. The exact site of Menois (Marin or Khirbet Matan) has not been located.

The remains of a civilian

settlement indicate a late

date, not earlier than the 4th century, and it is admittedthat there are no

archaeological grounds fordatingthefortearlier. 68Thelocation of Birsama is in doubt. Alt at first soughtto identify it with Tel Faffah (Beit Pelet),

excavated by SirFlinders Petrie. 69He realized,however, thattheRoman fort on the north hill of this tel is too old and too small to be identified

with Birsama;actually,the coin evidenceindicatesthat the fort was aban-

donedshortly after58/59CE.TMHe thenproposed toidentifyBirsama with .Hirbetel-Far, some7km southeast of Tel Faffah.TMHere were noticed remains of a civilian

settlement

and a fort. The first was dated to the

Roman-Byzantine periodby Alt on thebasisof potsherds, buthe proposed

nodateforthelater.TM Gichon dates thefortasoccupied "fromtheFlavians to theMoslemconquest", citingcoinsandpotteryasevidence?

142

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Moleatha,longagoidentifiedwith Tel el-Milh., wasdatedto the RomanByzantineperiodby Alt; accordingto Gichonit was occupied"from the

Flavians totheMoslem conquest", againonthebasis ofcoinsandpottery. 74 Earlier, Woolley had been able to find only "Semitic" and Byzantine potteryat the siteboth on the surfaceand in a hole dug nearthe wall, and the only questionfor him was whetherthe fort was Byzantineor dated from the 2nd millennium BeE.75But in the meantimeM. Kochavi excavated

the tel, includingthe fort, for two seasons. More recently,severalsalvage excavationshave been carried out at the site, one of them by Gichon himself.Unfortunatelythe resultsseemto be inconclusivefor the pointat issue.While acceptingthe theorythat the fort at Tel el-Milh. was part of the limessystem,M. Kochavihasnot beenable to suggesta moreprecise

datethan"Romanperiod". 76Gichonexcavated thecivil settlement at the tel, but he reports surface finds only. He writes that they "cover the

Hellenistic-Herodian andearly-to-late Roman period". 77Ontheotherhand, the other excavators,concentratingtheir work on the west side of the tel and to the southof it, have uncoveredlate Roman and Byzantinefinds

only,including buildings, graves, pottery anda coin.78Obviously thefinds of thesesalvageexcavations do notnecessarily affectthedatingof thefort. Thus of the four major forts adducedby Gichon for a Flavian limes, one (Tel Beersheba)is post-Flavian,one (Menois) offersno archaeological supportfor a Flavian date, and two (Birsama and Moleatha) offer only doubtful archaeologicalsupport for possible occupationin the Flavian period. Of group(b), Tel Masos,aswe haveseen,hasto be eliminated.Sharu.hen is datedby Gichon"from the Flaviansto the Severanperiod"on the basis of excavations(claiming it to be of Herodianorigin), with a referenceto Petrie'sBeth-Pelet.This is unacceptable,sincethe evidenceindicatesthat the fort (= Tel Faffah) was abandonedsoon after 58/59 ½E;therefore the

sitehasto be excludedfromthe list.TMMoladaandMesadH.atrurimare datedby Gichon himself, in his 1975 article, "from the Severanperiod to

theMoslemconquest".sø Theruinsof RujmZoharareadmitted byGichon to date from the 4th century, but he assumes,on the basisof early Roman potsherds,thatearlierfortificationshadexisted.Clearlythereis little ground

for keepingthissiteonthelist.8• Of theremaining two, oneis datedon the basisof pottery alone and the other, Khasif, on the basisof pottery and coins.82

Of group (c), •Ira now has to be excluded.The case of Tel farad is very doubtful. No Byzantinepotterywas found, "only Roman sherdsof approximatelythe first century½E",to quotethe official report.According to Aharoni, who wasthe directorof the excavations,the fort wasprobably

THE ROMAN

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constructed beforethe annexationof theNabataeankingdomandabandoned

in thesecond century. 83Thisis nota necessary conclusion, for sincethe sherdsare the only evidence,it is equallypossiblethat the fort was abandonedin the first century. But it is quite surprisingto find that Gichon, who was responsiblefor the excavationof the Roman fort in Tel •Arad, admitsthat the fort may be datedeither to the Herodian or to the Flavian period. Under the spell of the Flavian limes theory, he postulatesthat it

wasreoccupied undertheFlavians. 84Thereis nota shredof evidence for such a reoccupation.The simple truth is that what is called "the Roman fort" at Tel •Arad cannotbe dated. It may have been constructedat any time from the late 1stcenturyBCEto the 2nd centurycœ,and it may have been abandoned soon after 70 cœ, or after the annexation of the Nabataean

kingdom,or after the Bar Kochbawar. For whateverreasons,the excava-

tionsat theforthavenotclarifiedthedatingproblem. 85 Next, •En-Gedi. The settlement there suffered destruction in the First

JewishRevolt, but it was economicallytoo importantto be left deserted. There is amplearchaeological evidencethat it was soonreoccupied.However, there is no evidencefor Flavian fortifications,althoughthe site has

beenextensively excavated. 86The presence of a centurion of thecohors I Thracummilliaria and of a military garrisonis attestedat *En-Gediby

a papyrus document of theyear124cE.87Yet it hasrecently beenshown that it was only a detachmentof this unit that was stationedat •En-Gedi, and that the camp of the main force of the cohort shouldbe located at

.Hebron. 88 Finally, •Uza; thiswas datedon thebasisof surfacesherdsalone.Recent excavationsshowthat the fort was indeedoccupiedin the Romanperiod,

although theevidence doesnotallowustoestablish amoreprecise date.89 It appears,then, that there is at presentno clear, soundarchaeological evidencefor the military occupationof any of thesesitesin the Flavian period. The archaeologicalevidencesuggeststhat at leasttwo of the sites of the first group, five of the secondgroup and two of the third group were not garrisonedin the Flavian period; and it is no more than possible that the remainingsix were at that time garrisoned.A further observation with regard to the archaeologicalevidenceis apposite.Of the numerous sitesallegedlyassociated with the limessystem,only eightare saidto have been dated on the basis of excavations.

Gichon himself dates three of these

topost-Flavian periods. 90Theassignment oftwooftheotherfive(Sharu .hen and Tel Beersheba)to the Flavian period shouldbe rejected, as we have seen. The case of one other, Tel *Arad, is inconclusive. The seventh is

.Hatseva(FAin .Hussub),identifiedby Alt with Eiseba, by Aharoni with

Thamara. 9• Following Alt, Gichonidentifies Thamara withMesadTamar

ISRAEL

144

SHATZMAN

(Qa.srel-Juheiniye)and claims that "recent excavationsat Hatseva have provedthe completeabsenceof the Byzantineperiod,whichis a condicio

sinequanonforitsidentification withTamar". 92Nowtheexcavator, R. Cohen, has publisheda brief communiqu6of theseexcavations,which were conducted on two sites. One is southwest of the fort, in which were

found thirty coins from the 1st to the 4th centurycE, and the other is the southwesttower of the fort, whereno remainsof any archaeologicalsignificancearereportedto havebeenfound.And yet variousByzantineremains

havebeenreported at Hatseva on several occasions. 93Thisevidence is obviouslynot enoughto corroborateAharoni'sproposal,but it is sufficient to questionGichon'sinferenceaboutHatseva.At any rate, Hatsevawas in Nabataeanterritoryand its supposed military occupationdoesnot affect the discussionof the alleged Flavian limes. The same holds true of the last site excavated.94 However, to Gichon's list should now be added the excavationsat Tel Masos, Tel el-Milh., Tel •Ira and •Uza. Mention should also be made of the excavations at Tel •Aroer, situated some 18km southeast of Tel

Beersheba.The fortresshere, a 38 x 30m building,constructed apparently in the 1st centuryBCE,suffereddestructionprobablyin the First Jewish

Revolt.No laterremainshavebeenfound.95Thus,in sofar asexcavations havebeencarriedout, they haveonly underminedthe theoryof a Flavian limes.

A glanceat the map showsthat, withoutTel •Ira, Tel Masos,Tel Beersheba, Tel Faffahand Menoisalone,not to mentionothersites,the

defensive system ascribed totheFlavianperiodcouldnotpossibly operate,

evenif afewsites wereindeed garrisoned inthisrelatively earlyperiod. 96 If Romanforceswerestationed in Idumaeain severalplacesin theFlavian

period,theexplanation should besought in another direction, asI shall presently argue,andisnotto belinkedtotheframework of animaginary limes. III

A passage ofJosephus hasattimesbeencitedin support ofthetheory that Vespasian andTitusrealized thattherewasneedto establish a defensive

system against theNabataean Kingdom onthesouthern frontier ofJudaea. 97

Asthepassage is important fortheunderstanding of thewholeproblem, I give it in full:

Havingreduced theneighbourhood of theprovince of Thamna, he movedto LyddaandJamnia; boththesedistricts beingalreadysub-

THE ROMAN

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SYSTEM

IN JUDAEA

145

dued, he quartereduponthem an adequatenumberof residentsfrom thosewho hadsurrendered,andpassedto Ammaus.Having occupied the approachesto the capital of this province, he fortified a camp and, leaving the fifth legion there, advancedwith the rest of his forcesto the provinceof Bethleptenpha. After devastatingwith fire this and the neighbouringdistrict and the outskirtsof Idumaea, he built fortressesin suitablesituations;finally, havingtaken two villagesright in the heartof Idumaea, Betabrisand Caphartoba,he put upwardsof ten thousandof the inhabitantsto death,madeprisoners of over a thousand,expelled the remainderand stationedin the districta largedivisionof hisown troops,whooverrananddevastated the whole of the hill country. He then returnedwith the rest of his forces to Ammaus.98

To begin with, it must be said that Applebaum-Gichon'sapproachto thistext is erroneousandrevealsmisunderstanding of Vespasian'smission in Judaea,which was, as all readersof Josephus know, to crushthe Jewish revolt. The suggestionthat Vespasian,while the war was still going on, would have startedfortifying the southernborderof Judaeato protectits Jewishpopulationagainstincursionsby the Nabataeans,who were at that

timeserving in hisarmyagainst therebellious Jews,should berejected. 99 What Vespasiandid in Idumaea was part of his strategy,namely, tight, continuouscontrolof the Jewishpopulationby the establishment of garrisonsin regionsalreadysubdued.This securitypolicy startedfrom the very beginning, as can be inferred from the dispatchof a Roman force to

Sepphoris andthegarrisoning of Samaria. løøWe haveevidence for the garrisoningof Japha,Jamniaand Ashdodalong the coast, and the same

wasdonein Gischala. •o•Campswerestationed at Ammaus, Jericho and Adida,aspartof thesystematic encircling of Jerusalem onall sides; lø"-in 69 BethelandEphraimweregarrisoned. lø3Josephus clearlydoesnot enumerateall the sitesgarrisonedby Vespasian,as can be inferredfrom

theincidental mention of thegarrison at Gophna. 1o4Of Vespasian's work in the winter of 67/68 Josephuswrites:"He employedhimselfin securing with garrisonsthe villages and smaller towns which had been reduced, postingdecurionsin thevillagesandcenturions in thetowns;he alsorebuilt

manyplacesthathadbeendevastated. "1ø5 Vespasian'sgarrisoningof Idumaeaclearlyhadnothingto do with threats of incursionsinto Judaeafrom the Nabataeanterritory in the Negev. The garrisonswere there, as in other parts of the country, to secureRoman controlof the rebelliousJewishpopulation.This also pointsto the right interpretationof the presenceof Roman garrisonsin Judaeain the period

146

ISRAEL

SHATZMAN

betweenthe First JewishRevolt and the Bar KochbaWar, and probably even later. The legionX Fretensiswas transferredfrom Syria to Jerusalem as a result of the First Revolt to secure future Roman control over the

Jews. A Roman unit was stationedat Masada after its captureby Silva, not to block Nabataeanincursions,but to preventits falling into Jewish

hands. 106 Thecohors I Thracum milliariawasstationed atHebrontoensure tight control over the nearbyJewishpopulation,as did its detachmentat

•En-Gedi. •ø7Romangarrisons maybe attested at a few moresites,but surely our knowledge of the deploymentof the Roman army is incom-

plete.•08Andonemoreaspect of theperiodshould be mentioned here. The Roman victory broughtextensiveconfiscationof Jewishterritory by Vespasian,colonizationof veteransoldiers,the distributionof muchland to Flavian supportersand other Romans, and the uprootingof a large sectionof the Jewishpopulation.As a result, the Judaeancountrysidedid not remain at rest, and the Roman administration had much work to execute

andwassensitiveto signsof rebellioustendenciesin theJewishpopulation. This is no morethanthe backgroundto the problemsthatrequiredconstant

militaryattention andprecautions in theFlavianperiod. •09 A furtherargumentof ApplebaumandGichonhasnowto beconsidered: Both authorsof this brief surveyhave maintainedthat solely on the groundsof the peculiar social and demographicconditionson the desertfringes, the immediatetaking over of the Herodian border defencesby the Flavianswas a condiciosine qua non for the maintenanceof the Pax Romana within the confines of Judaea.•0

Withoutdenyingthat a problemof defenceof a settledareaagainstdesert nomadsdid sometimesexist, the presentwriter questionsthe validity of the argument.Various systemscould have been developedto defendthe settledpopulationof Judaeaagainstnomadincursions,and the needfor defencewill have varied accordingto the nature of the threatsand the political conditionson both sidesof the border. Were the dictum right, the limesshouldhavebeenconstructed earlier, followingtheestablishment of theprovinceof Judaeain 6 CE.True, Josephus reportsborderskirmishes between the Nabataeans and Herod, but the bone of contention was the

Trachonitis,whoselocal brigandswere given supportand shelterby the NabataeanSyllaeus;the Negevregionis nevermentioned.At any rate, no

incursions wererecorded afterJudaea became a province. Ill Applebaum's attempts tofindanallusion tosuchanoccurrence isa complete failure. •2 Apparentlythe Nabataeansknew the differencebetweenthe territoryof a

THE ROMAN

DEFENSIVE

SYSTEM

IN JUDAEA

147

clientking andthat of a Romanprovince.Therewasno changein this respectafter 70 CE. IV

The conclusionsreachedin this article may be summarizedas follows: 1. The extant written

sources indicate

that in the 4th to 7th centuries CE

thereexisteda defensivesystemin the Negev, with which was associated somekind of economicand administrativeorganization. 2. Someelementsof the limessystemprobablystartedearlierthanDiocletian's period, but the institutionalcharacterof the systemas a whole, comprehending interrelatedmilitary, administrative, juridicalandeconomic institutions,is a phenomenonof the later Roman Empire, viz. from the late 3rd centuryonward. 3. Historical considerations(namely, the relations between the Roman Governmentand the Jews as well as the NabataeanKingdom) and the archaeologicalevidenceshow that in the secondhalf of the first century CEit wastheproblemof internalsecuritythatattractedthemilitary attention of the Romanauthoritiesof Judaeaandnotthreatsfrom foreignincursions. This state of affairs lasted at least to the war of Bar Kochba.

4. The developmentof the Palestinelimes was naturallylinked with the history of that part of the Negev which until 106 CE belongedto the NabataeanKingdom, from then on to the provinceof Arabia, and from ca. 300 to Palestine.There is still a controversyaboutwhat happenedin

thisarea,113 butasthemainlineoftheRoman garrisons attested inEusebius, and especiallyin the Notitia Dignitatum, is to the north of the Nabataean regionin the Negev, theredoesnot seemto havebeena directconnection betweenthelatersystemandwhatmayhaveexistedin thesecondcentury. 5. Recentarchaeological surveysandexcavationshaverevealednumerous sitesdated to the Nabataean,Roman and Byzantineperiods.Once the accumulatedevidenceis properlyassessed and more reliable distribution mapsof the inhabitedsites,chronologicallyarranged,are arrivedat, the dutiesand functionsof the Roman army in the Negev, as well as in the wholeof Palestine,may be betterunderstood. However,evenat thisstage it can be assertedthat the idea of the limesas a defensiveline to protect a civilian populationfrom outwardincursionscannotbe upheld,as this line would cut acrossan inhabitedarea that extendedfar away in all directions. 114 6. Since several of the sites attributed to the limes Palaestinae

can no

longerbe consideredmilitary posts,and sincethe military characterof

148

ISRAEL

SHATZMAN

many more sitesmay be doubted,the idea of the limesas a zoneof defence

in depthis morethanquestionable. It appearsthata reconsideration of the

functions of, andthe meansemployed by, theRomanmilitarysystemin the Negev is needed.

The Hebrew Universityof Jerusalem

Israel Shatzman

NOTES

*The following works are cited in the Notes in abbreviatedform: Aharoni

Alt

(1930)

Air

(1931)

Ait

(1935)

Applebaum (1962)

Applebaum (1977)

Y. Aharoni, "Tamar and the roads to Elath", EretzIsrael 5 (1958) 129-134 (in Hebrew, with an English summaryon page91*) A. Alt, "Limes Palaestinae", Paliistinajahrbuch 26 (1930) 43-82 A. Alt, "Limes Palaestinae", Paliistinajahrbuch 27 ( 1931) 75-84 A. Alt, "Aus der •Araba", ZPaIV 58 (1935) 1-78 Sh. Applebaum,"The initial dateof the Limes Palaestinae", Zion 27 (1962) 1-10 (in Hebrew, with an Englishsummaryon page 1) Sh. Applebaum, "Judaeaas a Roman province. The

countryside asa politicalandeconomicfactor",ANRW Applebaum-Gichon Avi-Yonah

(1958)

Avi-Yonah

(1962)

Avi-Yonah

(1966)

Avi-Yonah

(1976)

II 8 (1977) 355-396 Sh. Applebaum and M. Gichon, Israel and her viciniO'in theRomanandByzantineperiods(1967) 35-64 M. Avi-Yonah, "The date of the 'Limes Palaestinae' ", Eretz-lsrael 5 (1958) 135-137 (in Hebrew, with English summaryonpage91*) M. Avi-Yonah, Historical geographyof the land of

lsrael3 (1962)(inHebrew)

Bowersock (1976)

M. Avi-Yonah, The Holy Land,from the Persian to the Arab conquests536 B.C. to A.D. 640) (1966) M. Avi-Yonah (ed.), Encyclopaediaof archaeological excavationsin theHoly Land ( 1976-1978) G.W. Bowersock, "LimesArabicus", HSCP 80 (1976) 219-229

Brfinnow-Domaszewski

Gichon

(1967)

R.E. Brfinnowand A. v. Domaszewski,Die provincia Arabia 3 (1909) M. Gichon,"The originof the LimesPalaestinaeandthe

major phasesin its development",in Studienzu den MilitiirgrenzenRoms.BonnerJahrbiicher,Beihefte19 (1967) 175-193

THE ROMAN

Gichon

(1968)

Gichon (1975)

DEFENSIVE

SYSTEM

IN JUDAEA

149

M. Gichon, "Das Verteidigungssystem und die Verteidiger des flavischenLimes in Jud/ia", in Provincialia. Festschriftfiir R. Laur-Belart (1968) 317-334 M. Gichon, "The sites of the Limes in the Negev", Eretz-lsrael

12 (1975)

149-166

(in Hebrew, with

Englishsummaryon pages123*- 124*) Gichon

(1980)

M. Gichon, "Research on the Limes Palaestinae: a

stocktaking",in RomanFrontier Studies1979, ed. W.S. Hansonand L.J.F. Keppie (1980) 843-864 Gutwein Musil

K.C. Gutwein, Third Palestine (1982) A. Musil, Arabia Petraea ( 1907-1908)

Negev

A. Negev, "The Nabateansand the ProvinciaArabia", ANRW I! 8 (1977) 520-686

Rothenberg

B. Rothenberg,"The tArabahin RomanandByzantine times in the light of new research",in RomanFrontier Studies 1967, ed. Sh. Applebaum (1971)211-223

I am gratefulto the anonymousreadersof the EditorialCommitteeand especially to Prof. E. BadJan,whosecommentshave helpedme to avoid errorsof fact and expression.! am indebtedto Dr. A. Kempinskiof Tel Aviv Universitywho gave me valuableadviceon the archaeologicalevidence.They are not responsiblefor the views expressedhere or for any errorsthat remain. [The Editorregretsthat unusualdifficultiesin checkingthe referencesin thisarticle and in communications have delayedpublication.] 1. Alt (1930); for the dating see 60-64. 2. Avi-Yonah ( 1958); (1960) 118-121; for his earlier opinionseeAvi-Yonah (1962) 69-70. 3. Applebaum(1962) 10 (in Hebrew, my translation). 4. M. Gichon, The limes in the Negevfrom its establishmentto Diocletian. Diss. Jerusalem1966 (in Hebrew); also(1967); Applebaum-Gichon35-64; (1968); (1975); "The Military significanceof certainaspectsof the Limes Palaestinae",in RomanFrontier Studies1967, ed. Sh. Applebaum(1971) 191-200; "Towers on the Limes Palaestinae", in Actes du IX e congr•s international d'•tudes sur les fronti•res romaines,ed. D.M. Pippidi (1974) 513-544; etc.

5. G. Webster,TheRomanimperialarmy2 (1979)64: E.N. Luttwak,The grand strategyof theRomanEmpirefrom thefirst centuryA.D. to the third (1976) 78 andn. 67. Luttwak'saccountof Romantacticsin the Flavianperiod(ib. 61-67) accords with Gichon's

views.

6. Webster (l.c.) thinks that there is no "soundevidence"for ascribingthe systemto the Flavian period. For argumentsagainstthe applicationof the term "Palestinelimes"to the northernNegev zone seeBowersock(1976); id., "Old and new in the history of Judaea":Review of E. Schfirer, The histoo' of the Jewish people in the age of JesusChrist (175 B.C.-A.D. 135) I, rev. and ed. by G.

150

ISRAEL

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VermesandF. Millar(1973),JRS65 (1975)183.A confused concept of thenature of thelimesis presented by Gutwein309-311.He seems to accept Bowersock's negation of a limesin thecentralNegevzone,andyetheignores hisdemonstration thattherewasnoarrangement of innerandouterdefensive zones.B. Rothenberg mainlyaccepts Avi-Yonah's datingof thePalestine limes,butsuggests thatthe firstworksof defence wereconstructed asearlyasHadrian.SeehisNegev.Archaeology in theNegevandthe•Araba(1967) 166-167(in Hebrew).A Diocletianic dateis alsoaccepted by Y. Tsafrir,"Theprovinces of EretzIsrael",in EretzIsrael fromthedestruction of theSecond Templeto theMuslimConquest, ed. Z. Baras et alii (1982) 365-369 (in Hebrew).Somearguments againsta Flaviandatefor thePalestine limesarepresented by D. Gerain hisunpublished M.A. thesis,The Romangovernment andarmyin JudaeaAD 70-132 (1977) 47-49 (in Hebrew), to which I am indebted.

7. Compare,for instance,the map in Avi-Yonah(1962) 103 with that in Negev 550.

8. See G.W. Bowersock,"A reporton ArabiaProvincia",JRS 61 (1971) 219-242; Negev640-645, witha mapof theprovinceon p. 641, whichshould be corrected to includenorthwest SaudiArabia,asarguedby G.W. Bowersock, "The Greek-Nabataean bilingualinscriptionat Ruwwfifa,SaudiArabia", in Le mondegrec. Hommagesd CI. Prdaux,ed. G. Cambieret alii (1975) 513-522. 9. For thisreorganizationanditsdateseeBriinnow-Domaszewski 273-276.

10. For Palaestina SalutarisseeLibanius,Ep. 337;P. Rohden,De Palaestina et Arabia provinciisRomanisquaestiones selectae(1885) 22-29. For Palaestina Tertia seeCod. Theod.7.4.30; 16.8.29;Not. Dig. Or. XXII; BriinnowDomaszewski 277-280;Avi-Yonah(1962) 121, with a mapon p. 125;id., RE Supplb. 13, 417-418.

11. Theinscription wasfirstpublished by F.-M. Abel,"l•pigraphie duSud palestinien",RBi 29 (1920) 120-122 no. 13. See also A. Alt, ZPaIV 46 (1923) 64 no. 19. Abel includedthis inscriptionin the section"Autres inscriptionsdu Negeb";all theseinscriptions camefrom the ruinedcities of this region,though the preciseplacesof origin could not be ascertained.

12. o661••.tx&v)•t{,lt'ro[o Yla)•ato'r(•vvlg) X06va6iav Ao•@60tog yt@6to•v xi•.tv &•t•to@og ix fiao[t]•.flog. See Abel, art. cit.; Air (1930) 43-44. 13. Bowersock(1976) 229 arguesthat the Palestinelimes meansthe fortified

part of the PalaestinaTertia from 'Aqaba into Syria. He cites this inscription,but doesnot explainhow a personburiedin the Negevcanbe associated with a fortified zone some 100k away. 14. B. Littmann, D. Magie, D.R. Stuart,Publicationsof thePrincetonUniversity archaeologicalexpeditionsto Syria, in 1904-1905 and 1909. III. Greek and Latin inscriptionsin Syria. 2. Southern.Hauran(1910) no. 20, pp. 24-41. A few years ago severalnew fragmentsof the inscriptionwere discoveredduring two differentexplorations of thefort site.The newadditionsto theinscription,however, do not bearuponthe readingof thispassage.SeeJ. Marcillet-Jaubert,"Recherches

THE ROMAN

DEFENSIVE

SYSTEM

IN JUDAEA

1$1

au Qasr el Hallabat", ADAJ 24 (1980) 121-124; D.L. Kennedy, Archaeological explorationsof the Romanfrontier in north-eastJordan (1982) 43- 47. 15. For this edict see W.H. Waddington,Inscriptionsgrecqueset latinesde !a Syrie (1870) no. 1906a (=SEG 9 (1938) nos. 346 and 414). Cf. Magie and Stuart, op. cit. 24. 16. See Waddington'scommentary(op. cit. 457) to lines 1-3 of the edict. 17. See Waddington, op. cit. no. 1906 (Bos.ra) and no. 2033 (lmtfin) and cf. Magie and Stuart, op. cit. 24. 18. Magie and Stuart, op. cit. 30-31. In fact, Klysma is supplemented from the other copies(Waddington,op. cit. nos. 1906 and 2033). They rightly reject the suppositionof Kirchhoff and Waddingtonthat the phrase•v M•oo•om½i.u &•6 ToOK•.6o½ct•og. x•.. refersto a limesthat extendedfrom Mesopotamiato the Red Sea. Still, there is somedifficulty in their interpretationof lines 3-7 of the inscription,but this goes beyond the presentdiscussion.For Klysma see Ptol. Geog. 4.5.14; Lucian, Alexandros44; Moritz, RE 21,881. 19. Magie and Stuart, op. cit. 33. 20. This wider meaningmay be comparedto that of the limesAegyptiwhose military units were deployedthroughoutEgypt, and whosecomes'authorityextendedall over this territory. See Not. Dig. Or. XXVII, and for a discussionand a map, R.M. Price, "The limes of Lower Egypt", in Aspectsof the Notitia Dignitatum, ed. R. Goodbum and Ph. Bartholomew (1976) 147-9, 155. 21. Rufinus, HE 2.6.

22. Ptol. Geog. 5.17.3. See Moritz, RE I1 2,2388-9. For recentdiscussions of the term "Saracen"see D. Graf and M. O'Connor, "The origin of the term Saracenandthe Ruwwfifainscription",ByzantineStudies4 (1977) 52-66; D. Graf, "The Saracensandthe defenseof the Arabian frontier", BASOR 229 (1978) 14-15. 23. Rufinus, HE 2.6; Socrates,HE 4.36; Sozomenos,HE 6.38; Theodoretus, HE 4.20. That Mavia's incursionsreachedthe confinesof Egypt is explicitly said by Sozomenos.For the installingof Lucius in Egypt after Athanasius'death in 373 see A.H.M. Jones,The later RomanEmpire ! (1964) 152. Jonesapparently thoughtthat Mavia reignedover a tribe in the Syriandesert(942), but he did not arguethe case. 24. Bowersock(1976) 223, 226 arguedat first that there was a connection betweenworksof fortificationsin Transjordan ca. 367-375 andtherevoltof Mavia. But suchworkswerecarriedoutat thesametimeat 'En Boqeqin theNegev/Judaean zone (see infra n. 90). ! may also add that a chain of forts with observationposts along a road on the easternridge of Mount Hebron has recentlybeen observed. Trial excavationsat severalsitessuggestthat this defensiveline was constructed at the end of the 4th or the beginningof the 5th century. See Y. Hirschfeld,"A line of Byzantinefortsalongthe easternhighwayof the Hebronhills", Qadmoniot 12 (1979) 78-84 (in Hebrew). However, in a recentarticle Bowersockhascorrected the date of Mavia's revolt to 378: see G.W. Bowersock, "Mavia, Queen of the Saracens",in Studienzur antikenSozialgeschichte. FestschriftFriedrich Vittinghoff (1980)477-495, esp.485-7. Consequently theworksof fortificationinTransjordan

152

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SHATZMAN

are irrelevantto Mavia's area of operations.At any rate Bowersock(1976) 229 (cf. Studien,cit., 484) is notawareof thedifficultiesinvolvedin thepassage when he assertsthat Rufinusmeansthe frontierterritoryfrom •Aqabainto Syria. His conclusionis in fact basedon his assumption that therewas not a limesin the Negev-•clearly a petitio principii. Moreover, Graf's interpretationof the term "Saracens"(seen. 22) has no bearingon the whereabouts of thesetribes;hence Bowersock'sconjecture(Studien484) that Mavia was a successor of Imru'l-qais findsno supportin thisinterpretation. A sceptical approach to theaccounts concerning Mavia is advocatedby Ph. Mayerson,"Mauia, Queen of the Saracens--a cautionarynote", IEJ 30 (1980) 123-131. He has no conclusionto offer for the geographical locationof thebaseof Mavia. On MaviaseealsoEnsslin,RE 28,2330. 25.

Chronicon

26.

Cod. Theod. 7.4.30.

Paschale

504.

27. Hieronymus,EP 126.2: "Hoc autem anno cum tres explicassemlibros, subitusimpetusbarbarorum, dequibustuusdicitVirgilius,latequevagantes Barcaei et sanctaScripturade Ismahel,contrafaciem omniurn fratrum suorumhabitabit, sic Aegypti limitem, Palaestinae,Phoenicis,Syriae percurritad instartorrentis cunctasecumtrahens,ut vix manuseorummisericordiaChristi potuerimusevadere."

28. The presenceof a Roman unit in a camp at Nessanais known from a numberof papyri, 17 of which are regardedas "the soldiers'archive";seeC.J. Kraemer, Excavations at Nessana 3: Non-literary papyri (1958) 5, 19-23. The unit was the humerusTheodosiacusestablishedat Nessanabefore450 (ib. 41-45;

seealsonos. 36-37 (pp. 111-117)). 29. Not. Dig. Or. XXXIV 18-20; 22; 26; 45. The locationof Thamara, i.e. Tarba (accordingto O. Seeckad Not. Dig. Or. XXXIV 40), is disputed.Aharoni 129-134 proposed to identifyit with 'Ain Hussub,some30km southof the Dead Sea. But even if any of the other proposalsis accepted(see Alt (1935) 33-35; Rothenberg215), they all indicateplacessouthof the line of defencesuggested. 30. For suggestions seeAlt (1935), esp. 19-29. But seealsoAharoni 129-134. At anyrate,theunitsseemto havebeenstationedalongtheroadsto Elath(Aila). 31. Eusebius,Onomasticon(ed. E. Klostermann(1904)), Carmel: 118-119; Beersheba:50-51; Zoara: 42-43; Thaiman: 96-97; Thamara: 8-9; Ad.ommim:

24-25; Mephaath:128-129; Aila: 6-7. Three more forts are mentionedby Eusebius,but they are all in Transjordan: Arnona:10-11; Carcarla:116-117• Roboth:

142-143.

32. Alt (1930)60-62; Applebaum (1962)6-8. Alt (1930)63 n. 1, however, is puzzledby Ptolemy's inclusion of Elusain Idumaeabefore106,asthistown waspartof the NabataeanKingdom. 33. Ptol. Geog. 5.14.18. See Briinnow-Domaszewski 250. 34. Ptol. Geog. 5.15.5.

35. Ptol. Geog. 5.15.3. The only divisionthat comescloseto it is the one ascribed by Avi-Yonah((1962)63-64; (1966)98-99) to theHerodian administration, which includedGalilee, Samaria,Judaea,Peraeaand Idumaea.But seethe objections of A. Schalit,K6nigHerodes(1969) 214 n. 252.

THE ROMAN DEFENSIVE

SYSTEM IN JUDAEA

153

36. Ptol. Geog. 5.15.5. 37. Ptol. Geog. 5.15.5; 16.4. Applebauminsistson this identification,which is also suggestedby C. Miiller in his edition (with commentary)of Ptolemy's Geography.

38. Ptol. Geog. 5.15.5. For Gemmarurissee A. Saarisalo,"Topographical researches in the Shephelah",Journalof the PalestineOrientalSociety11 (1931) 100-101.

39. Ptol. 5.15.7. Caparorsamay be identifiedwith 'O@•o,e,the suggested readingof Joseph.AJ 14.361, insteadof the MSS ©@qo.e. For MampsisandElusa seeNegev 631-635; id. "Mampsis,eine Stadtim Negev", Antike Welt 3 (1972) 13-28; "Survey and trial excavationsat .Haluza(Elusa), 1973", 1EJ 26 (1976) 89-96. He suggests thatElusawasthemostimportantNabataeantownin theNegev. 40. Cf. supra n. 32. Applebaum(1962) 7-9 takesthis as an indicationthat the Romangovernmentestablished a specialmilitary zone after the First Jewish Revolt. But this is obviouslypureguesswork,and it is implausiblethat Vespasian turnedagainstthe Nabataeanswho had helpedhim in the JewishWar. One could counterthis by arguingthat Vespasiandid indeedannexCommagene(Joseph.BJ 7.219-243), whose king had supportedhim (ib. 3.68) and his son Titus (ib. 5.460-465). In this case, however, Josephus'silenceis telling. He exceedsthe limits of his subjectto reporteventsin Commagene,in Gaul (ib. 7.75-88), in the Danubianprovinces(ib. 7.89-95), the invasionof Media by theAlani (ib. 7.244251), andthe RomanmeasurestakenagainstJewsin EgyptandCyrene(ib. 7.443446). He would not have failed to reportthe annexationof sucha territoryas envisagedby Applebaum. 41. Briinnow-Domaszewski250. It shouldbe noted that Marinus probably composedhis work after the Trajanic annexationof the NabataeanKingdom. See Honigmann,RE 28,1767-7. 42. Contra Alt (1930) 60 n. 1. A. Schulten,"Eine neueR6merspurin Westfalen", BJ 124 (1917) 89-103 (esp. 91-93), referredto by Alt, showsthat in his accountof GermanyPtolemyreportsthe Romancampsdistinguished in the wars underAugustusand Tiberius,which is altogethera differentcase. 43. F. Frank, "Aus der •Araba I.", ZPaIV 57 (1934) 191-280. For an earlier descriptionof the samearea seeMusil; for the Roman remainsseehis index s.vv. R6mischeBauten,R6merstrasse. There are no suggestions of a defensivesystem and no precisedatingof the remainsin thesesurveys. 44. Avi-Yonah (1958) 136. 45. Rothenberg, esp.214 and220;contraAir ( 1935);Avi-Yonah(1966) 119.

46. Gichon(1975).Although thisarticleis listedin hisbibliography, Gutwein 321-336doesnottakeits dataintoconsideration in his account of the military role of Palaestina Tertia.

47. This is rathercurious,as it may imply that somefortifications were well

insidetheSinaipeninsula, unless thereference "southof Oboda-Moyet •Awad"is to suchsitesas Ad DianamandAlia. For Moyet •Awad, identifiedwith Moa, see now R. Cohen,"NegevEmergencySurvey",1EJ 32 (1982) 164-165. 48. No evidenceisgivenforthedatingof thefortletBeerBorto theNabataean

154

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SHATZMAN

period(Gichon (1975) 159) and of the tower Khirbet Ma'aravim "from the Roman periodto the Byzantineperiod"(Gichon (1975) 163). 49. The uncertaintyof Gichon is reflectedin the many questionmarks and variationshe addsto his datingnoticesaswell asin noticeslike "from the Nabataean period(2ndcentury)","fromtheNabataeanperiodto Hadrian'stime(theByzantine period)" (sic!), etc. 50. Alt (1931) 81; Avi-Yonah(1962) 169;Gichon(1967) 177, 185,187 (maps); Applebaum-Gichon 44: "Todayonlyvery few vestigesare left of H.asif andZuh.ban, whereasat Molada and Mashoshthe outlineof the buildingsis clearlydiscernible, one to two coursesof masonrybeing aboveground." 51. Y. Aharoni, V. Fritz andA. Kempinski,"Excavationsat Tel Masos(Khirbet E1-Meshfish). Preliminaryreporton the first season,1972", Tel Aviv I (1974) 64-74 (esp. 7 l); "Vorberichttiberdie Ausgrabungen auf der Hitbet el-Mgfig(T(•I Mfi•6•), I. Kampagne 1972", ZPaIV 89 (1973) 197-210. 52. Y. Aharoni,V. Fritz andA. Kempinski,"Excavationsat Tel Masos(KhirbetEI-Meshfish).Preliminaryreporton thesecondseason,1974",TelAviv2 (1975) 97-113 (esp. 110-112). SeealsoA. KempinskiandV. Fritz, "Excavationsat Tel Masos(Khirbet EI-Meshfish).Preliminaryreportof the third season,1975", Tel Aviv 4 (1977) 136-158 (esp. 154-156). 53. Gichon (1975) does not include this tel in his lists of the sites of the

Palestinelimes,butthe fort (or fortlet)still appearsin thethreemapsaccompanying the article.

54. Applebaum-Gichon39: "No surfaceremainsbeyonda few blocksof flint and ashlar,and a large amountof pottery,testifyto the existenceof a fortresson the talus of Birsama. On the mounds of Beersheba and Malhata, on the other hand,

the outlinesof the forts can still clearlybe madeout, their curtainsprojectingone courseabove ground-level."See also Alt (1930) 50-51. 55. For the first report see1EJ 19 (1969) 245-247. 56. V. Fritz, "Vorberichtfiberdie Ausgrabungdesr/Smischen Kastellsauf dem Tell es-Seba'", ZPaIV 89 (1973) 54-65; "The Roman fortress", in Y. Aharoni, Beer-Sheba I (1973) 83-89. 57. lb. 60 and apud Aharoni 86-87.

58. Gichon(1975) 152 n. 21. On p. 153 n. 24 he suggests that the Herodian fortresswasinheritedby the Romansin theFlavianperiod,whichis notcompatible with his contentionfor a Flavianconstruction.He wronglyreportsthatFritz found a Hadrianic coin. In his recent article ((1980) 845), Gichon doesnot repeat these suggestions.But there he wrongly arguesthat "numismaticevidencefrom within the castellumprovesits existencein A.D. 112". The Trajaniccoin of 112 proves that the building was constructednot earlier than that year; it could have been constructedin that year, in the next generationor even later. Gichon's attemptto dissociatethe inner walls of the fortressfrom the outer walls is not cogent. 59. Aharoni, 1EJ 19 (1969) 246; 1EJ 22 (1972) 170. 60. 1EJ22 (1972) 170. Gichon(1975) 153 (with n. 24) is misleadingin giving

this referenceas authorityfor his datingof Tel Beershebato the Flavianperiod. 61. Y. Aharoni, "Tel Beersheba", Qadmoniot 6 (1973) 75-84 (in Hebrew),

THE ROMAN

DEFENSIVE

SYSTEM

IN JUDAEA

155

esp. p. 78. See also Y. Aharoniin Avi-Yonah (1976) 1,88; id., "Excavationsat Tel Beer-Sheba',PreliminaryReportof the fourthseason,1972", TelAviv 1 (1974) 42; id., Beer-Sheba 1 (1973) 7-8.

62. SeeV. Fritz, art. cit. (n. 56) 63 with n. 18, whorejectsGichon'sassumption ((1968) 321; (1980) 845) that the Roman command was first centred in Tel Beershebaand only in the 4th centurywas transferredto Berosaba(= old quarter of modem Beersheba). See also Gutwein 329-330. 63. Applebaum-Gichon45. 64. A. Biran and R. Cohen, "Tel •Ira", IEJ 29 (1979) 124-125. 65. I. Beit-Arieh, "Tel •Ira 1980", IEJ 31 (1981) 243-245. 66. In his article "Migdal Tsafit, a burgusin the Negev (Israel)", SaalburgJahrbuch 31 (1974) 16-40, Gichon admits the uncertaintyinvolving the pottery remains.He claimsthat"thepotteryanalysis(of thefindsat Tsafit)providesfurther proofof the Romancharacterof manywaresand formsthatcontinuedthe former local tradition and were apt to misleadinvestigatorsas to the period of their production"(p. 24). He may be right in saying"that any insightgainedwill be applicablenot only to the ceramichistoryof the Roman Negev, but to that of the entire ProvinciaPalaestina"(p. 32), but one may becomescepticalwhen one reads that "the overwhelmingmajority of our finds is not from the stratifiedlayers in the tower, but from the surroundingsurfacefinds and the slopesof Tsafit hill" (p. 35). His discussion and attemptat reachinga chronology(pp. 34-38) shouldbe comparedwith the detailed descriptionof the stratified sherds(pp. 25-30). See also the reservationsexpressedby D.L. Kennedy, op. cit. (n. 14) 313 and 325 aboutthe datingof ceramicson the limesArabicus. 67. Applebaum-Gichon 39-45; Gichon(1968) with the mapon p. 318. A few moresitesare apparentlyassignedto the Flavianperiodin Gichon(1975), but the confusingnomenclaturedebarsme from taking them into account. 68. For an accountof the remains see Musil 1,223-224. Cf. A!t (1931) 53-54; Applebaum-Gichon 40-41. Musil doesnot designatethe remains"Roman", contrary to what Gichon ascribesto him. At any rate, Gichon admits there is no archaeologicalevidencefor datingMenois to the Flavian period. 69. See Sir FlindersPetrie, Beth-PeletI (1930) 20-21, and for a preliminary report, Ancient Egypt (1929) 8. See also A. Alt, "Birsama", ZPaIV 52 (1929) 110-115 ( =Kleine Schriften3 (1959) 468-472); Alt (1930) 55-56. 70. Alt( 1931) 82-83, with a rejectionof hisotherproposalto identifyBirsama with E-Shellale. Petrie,Beth-Pelet120-21, cameto a wrongconclusionin asserting the Vespasianicdate of this fort. The threecoin hoardsfound in the debrisof the fort, containingcoinsnot later than58/59 ½E,indicatethat the site was abandoned shortly after this date and had been constructedat an earlier period. The absence of any later remainscorroboratesthis inference.The "Roman" houseson the main hill are civilian and, accordingto Petrie, contemporarywith the fort. 71. Alt (1931) 83-84, acceptedby F.-M. Abel, Gdographiede la Palestine2 (1938) 51, 180; and Avi-Yonah (1962) 108, but with some doubt in Avi-Yonah (1966) 163.

72. Alt (1931) 83. Accordingto Musil 2,63, the ruinsof Khirbetel-Far spread

156

ISRAEL SHATZMAN

over an area of about400x 150m. The fort was a squarewith a side of 65m, accordingto Alt. 73. Gichon (1975) 153. 74. Alt (1930) 48-50; (1931) 80; Gichon (1975) 153.

75. C.L. Woolley and T.E. Lawrence, "The wildernessof Zin", Palestine ExplorationFund Annual 3 (1914-1915) 50-51. 76. M. Kokhavi [= Kochavi], "Tel Malh.ata", IEJ 17 (1967) 272-273; RBi 75 (1968) 392-395. His reportin Qadmoniot3 (1970) 22-24 (in Hebrew) addsnothing on this point andthe reportin .HadashotArcheologiot40 (1971) 34-36 (in Hebrew) does not mention the Roman fort at all (cf. RB 79 (1972) 593-6). Kochavi's final report is in Avi-Yonah (1976) 3, 771-775. I may singleout two points. First, Kochavi was the only one who excavatedthe fort itself. Secondly,there is no mentionof Hellenisticfinds, let aloneof Hellenisticbuildingactivity, in Kochavi's final report, thoughthe first reportdid mention"two Hellenisticbuildingphases" (not fortifications). 77. Gichon(1980) 847. I mustpointout thatKochavi(seepreviousnote)never reported"the existenceof a Hellenisticfortificationbeneaththe Roman site", as Gichon(ib.) asserts.For Gichon'swork in the civil settlement,seealsohis report in .HadashotArcheologiot69-71 (1979) 10-12 (in Hebrew). There he admitsthat "althoughpre-Byzantinepottery has been found in all the areasthat have been examined,we cannotascribeany remainsin theseareasto a pre-Byzantineperiod" (my translation). 78. I. Eldar and D. Na.hlieli, "Tel Malh.ata", .HadashotArcheologiot80-81 (1982) 39 - 41 (in Hebrew);J. Baumgarten,"Mal.hata",.Hadashot Archeologiot8081 (1982) 41-42 (in Hebrew). 79. Gichon (1975) 155 with n. 1. See nn. 69 and 70 (above), with text. M. Gichon, "Idumaea and the Herodian limes", IEJ 17 (1967) 36-37, discussesTel

Sharu.hen,without suggestingthat the fort was occupieduntil the Severanperiod. But he is mistakenin statingthat the latest coins found in the three coin hoards are of Agrippa I. Petrie, Beth-PeletI (n. 69) 21 explicitly writes: "The latestof these [coins] was of the Vth year of Nero, A.D. 58-59." 80. Gichon (1975) 155. 81. Applebaum-Gichon43. 82. Applebaum-Gichon43. A short accountof Khasif and Abu S.ukhban is given by Musil 2,64. Both siteshave been destroyed.Rujm Zohar is datedby Gichon on the basisof pottery, but with a questionmark. 83. Y. Aharoni, "Excavationsat Tel Arad. Preliminaryreport on the second season",IEJ 17 (1967) 242-243. At the time of this report the Roman fort "was almostcompletelycleared".See alsoAharoniin Avi-Yonah (1975) 1,88. 84. Applebaum-Gichon46. Obviouslythe datingof •Arad "from the Flavian period to the Moslem conquest"in Gichon (1975) 153 (with n. 25) is in open contradictionwith this conclusion, but both are based on the same evidence. 85.

The distinction between finds and inferences seems clear in Aharoni's

final

account(Avi-Yonah (1976) 1,88): "Stratum III is a Roman fort .... On the basis of the scantymaterial found on its floor, includinga Greek ostracon,it has been

THE ROMAN

DEFENSIVE

SYSTEM

IN JUDAEA

157

datedto approximately the first centuryA.D. It thusappearsto havebelongedto a networkof fortifications of the limesPalaestinaeandto havegoneout of use completely withtheannexation by Trajanof theNabataean kingdomin A.D. 106." Yet in his Arad Inscriptions(1981) 8, Aharoniwritesthat in StratumIII "Almost no material was found which could be ascribed to the stratum within the fortress.

Materialfromthe first andsecondcenturies C.E. wasfoundmainlyat the footof the tell andin thegarbagedumps--apparently from thetime of the citadel."The only two Greekostracaof FArad,publishedby B. LifshitzapudAharoni,ib. 177, do not offer any chronologicalclue. 86. For the destructionseeJoseph.BJ 4.402-404; Plin. NH 5.15. For the excavationssee B. Mazar, T. Dothan, I. Dunayevsky,En-Gedi. The first and secondseasonsof excavations1961 and 1962, •Atiqot, Englishseries5 (1966) 1-100; B. Mazar and I. Dunayevsky,"En-Gedi. Third seasonof excavations", IEJ 14 (1964) 121-130 (esp. 129-130 for remainsof the periodca. 80-120 CE); B. Mazar andI. Dunayevsky,"En-Gedi.Fourthandfifth seasons of excavations", IEJ 17 (1967) 133-143 (esp. 142-143). 87. H.J. Polotsky,"The Greek papyri from the Cave of the Letters",IEJ 12 (1962) 259.

88. M.P. Speidel,"A tile stampof CohorsI ThracumMilliaria from HebronPalestine", ZPE 35 (1979) 170-172.

89. Gichon (1975) 153; cf. Applebaum-Gichon 45. See now I. Belt Arieh, "Horvat •Uza, 1982", IEJ 32 (1982) 262-263; id., "H.orvat •Uza, 1983", IEJ 33 (1983) 271-272. The fort had originallybeenbuilt in the Israeliteperiodand part

of it wasusedagainin Hellenistictimes.In hisrecentexcavations Belt Ariehfound remainsof the Romanperiodin theHellenisticareaof the fort andnoticedchanges madein the rooms.He kindly informedme that in the 1985 seasonof excavations remains of constructions outside the fort were revealed.

These seem to him to

indicateoccupationby the Romanarmy. I am gratefulto ProfessorBeit Arieh for this information.

90. See M. Gichon, "Das Kastell En Boqeq. Die Ergebnisseder erstenKampagne 1968 (Vorbericht)",BJ 171 (1971) 386-400•the fort was constructed in thethirdquarterof the4th century;id., "Excavations at Mezad-Tamar,1973-1974", IEJ 26 (1976) 188-194•the fort here was built during the last quarterof the 3rd century;id., "Migdal Tsafit, a Burgusin the Negev(Israel)",Saalburg-Jahrbuch 31 (1974) 16-40•the buildingof the tower is datedto the Trajanic period. 91. A. Alt, Die griechischenInschriftender PalaestinaTertia westlichder *Araba (1921) 10; (1935) 31; Aharoni 129-134. 92. M. Gichon (1975) 154 n. 29; id., "Excavationsat Mezad Tamar-"Tamara"

1973-1975, preliminaryreport", Saalburg-Jahrbuch23 (1976) 80-81. 93. R. Cohen,.HadashotArcheologiot44 (1972) 36-37 (in Hebrew). But see Rothenberg216-217; .HadashotArcheologiot45 (1973) 41; 67/68 (1978) 63. Gichon ignoresthesereportsin his recentarticle ((1980) 850). 94. For Matale Mih.mal seenow R. Cohen, "Negev EmergencyProject",IEJ 34 (1984) 203 (with referencesto earlier work). The datingis basedon potsherds found during the excavation.

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SHATZMAN

95. A. BiranandR. Cohen,IEJ 26 (1976) 139-140;27 (1977)250-252; 28

(1978)197;Qadmoniot 41 (1978)20-24(inHebrew). Though Gichon accepts the excavators' conclusion thatthe fortresswasdestroyed in theFirstJewishRevolt,

he includes it in hismapof theFlavianlimes!(SeeGichon(1980)844 and849.) If this impliesthathe suggests the fortresswasrebuilt,it mustbe statedthatthere

is noarchaeological support for sucha suggestion. Thereis nothing in therecent excavations, whichhaveaddedmuchto theevidence ontheHerodian building activity at this site, to indicatethat the fortresswas rebuilt. See A. Biran and R.

Cohen,"•Aroer,1981",.Hadashot Archeologiot 80-81(1982)42-45 (inHebrew); A. Biran, "Aroer, 1981", IEJ 32 (1982) 161-163.

96. Seethemapin Gichon(1968)325 andnotetheimportance of •Ira:its "chiefmeritlay in itsskilfullychosen position,whichenabledvisualcontactwith

nearlyall themoreimportant Limessites,andalsowitha number of themajor forwardobservation postsandwith signalstations linkedwithChermelaandother near bases"(Applebaum-Gichon45). 97. Applebaum(1962) 8-9; Gichon(1967) 183 n. 36: "Applebaum. . . has drawn attentionthat [sic] the passages 446-8 of Josephus,Wars IV, alludeto the take-overof the borderdefencesby the Romans,immediatelyafter the conquest of Idumaea"; Gichon (1968) 328-333.

98. Joseph.BJ 4.444-449 (H.St.J. Thackeray'stranslationin the Loeb edition). Gichon(1968) 328- 9 interprets thispassage asif Vespasian quarteredSamaritansin LyddaandJamniaaspartof a policyof securingthe frontierwith the help of this faithfulpopulation.This shouldbe rejected.True, Samaritans expandedto otherregionsof Palestinein the Romanperiod,but this expansion,includingthe settlementin Jamnia,startedin the 2nd centurycE. In this lastrespect,Gichon's reference to S. Klein, Eretz Yehuda (1939) 175, 198-190, 199 (in Hebrew) and G. Alon, History of the Jews in the period of the Mishna and Talmud 2 (1955)

248-251 (in Hebrew)is misleading.Thereis noevidencethattheSamaritanexpansion was in any way supportedby the Roman government,and it is wrong to describethe Jamnia-Lyddaareaas the hinterlandof the limes. Vespasianhad no reasonto trust the Samaritans,and actually sent Cerialis to subduea Samaritan gatheringon Mt. Gerizim (Joseph.BJ 3.307-315). Besides,Jo.hanan ben Zakkai, the Jewishsagewho left Jerusalemwhen he realizedthat it was doomed,would not havedevelopedJamniaas a nationalcentreof learningandreligiousadministrationfor the Jewishpopulation(and he got Vespasian'spermission to go there), had it becomea Samaritantown. It is interestingto notethat Applebaum(1977) 385-386 interpretsJoseph.BJ 4.444 asa referenceto "Jewishcollaborators concentratedat Jamniaand Lydda" by Vespasian. 99. Joseph.BJ 3.68; 5.42 and290. For Applebaum'sandGichon'sinterpretation see n. 97.

100. Sepphoris:Joseph.BJ 3.31-34; Vita 394; Samaria:BJ 3.309. 101. Japha:Joseph.BJ 3.428-431; Jamniaand Ashdod:BJ 4.130; Gischala: BJ 4.120.

102. Joseph.BJ 4.445.

THE ROMAN

DEFENSIVE

SYSTEM

IN JUDAEA

159

103. Joseph. BJ 4.551. Them is a chronologicaldifficulty here; basically I acceptW. Weber, Josephusund Vespasian(1921) 155-157, who datesthe event to 69 CE.

104. Joseph.BJ 5.50; for its conquestby Vespasian,seeBJ 4.551. 105. Joseph.BJ 4.442 (H.St.J. Thackeray'stranslation). 106. Joseph.BJ 7.407. For the Roman occupationof Masada after 73 see Y. Yadin, "Masada and the Limes", IEJ 17 (1967) 44-45.

107. See Speidel,op. cit. (n. 81). 108. SeeSh. Applebaum,Prolegomenato thestudyof theSecondJewishRevolt (A.D. 132-135) (1976) 28-31. That the garrisoningof Jewish settlementswas commonis impliedin Joseph.BJ 7.163; 252. It may perhapsbe inferredfrom the following Jewishsource:"(They) stationcastra in the townletsto torturebrides, so that no man seeksto wed a wife becauseof them" (Megilat Tahnit 6). The historicalsettingof this account,however, is obscureand we cannotconfidently apply it to the late 1stor early 2rid centuryCE. See H. Lichtenstein,"Die Fastenrolle", Hebrew Union College Annual 8-9 (1931-1932) 304-305. 109. See A. Biichler, The economicconditionsof Judaea after the destruction of the SecondTemple( 1912); Applebaum(1977) 379-395. 110. Applebaum-Gichon37. 111. Joseph.AJ 16.271-299. Later, a war startedbetweenAretasIV andHerod Antipas,who divorcedhis wife, the daughterof the Nabataeanking. The territorial disputeassociated with the war concernedGabala, in Transjordanand not in the Negev. See Joseph.AJ 18.112-125. For a defenceof the readingin A.! 18.113 and hencethe view that the invasionwas of the territoryof Philip, and not of that of Herod Antipas, see G.W. Bowersock,RomanArabia (1983) 65-68. This of coursedoesnot affect my argument.That Herodesestablisheda limesin southern Judaeais arguedby Applebaum((1962) 3) andGichon,"Idumaeaandthe Herodian Limes", IEJ 17 (1967) 27-42. I have tried to show that this theory should be rejected.See "Herodes' army and securityproblems",in Studiesin Judaism,ed. I. Gilat (1983) 96-97 (in Hebrew).

112. Applebaum(1962) 8 interpretsJoseph.AJ 20.5 as if Romanforceshadto stay in Nabataeanterritory, during CuspiusFadus' governorship,as part of a military operationagainstthe brigandPtolemy.This is given as evidencefor the suggestionthat the allegedunstableconditionsthat necessitated the deploymentof Roman forces along the Raphia-Dead Sea line, againstthe Nabataeanterritory, hadexistedevenbefore70 CE.However,Josephus leaveslittle doubtthatPtolemy's base was in Judaea(cf. Applebaum(1977) 385 n. 163). The securityproblem arose from internal

conditions

in Judaea and hence the case does not show the

need to protect Judaeaagainst incursionsfrom acrossthe border. Applebaum's secondsuggestion ((1962) 8), thatthe SyriangovernorCassiusLonginusincreased the garrisonforce in Judaeabecauseof the unstableconditionsin the south, is likewisea misinterpretation of his text, Joseph.AJ 20.7. The governorcamewith a strongarmy to Jerusalem,fearing that the demandof Fadus to store the High Priests'vestmentsin theAntoniamightprovoketheJewsto riseagainsttheRomans.

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It was a temporarymeasure,irrelevantto conditionson the southernfrontier. 113. For the problem see G.W. Bowersock,"A report on Arabia Provincia", JRS 61 (1971) 225. See, however, Negev 620-635; 647-660.

QUINTUS CURTIUS' PRESENTATION ARRHIDAEUS OF THE

AND JOSEPHUS' ACCESSION

OF PHILIP

ACCOUNTS

OF CLAUDIUS

QuintusCurtiusoffers his readersa noticeablyswift accountof eventsat Babylonin 323 Bc after the deathof Alexanderthe Great. Even while he makeseventsin thisconcludingsectionof his historyof Alexander(Book 10.5-10) moverapidlyandoftenin a compressed style,hisreaderscannot helpbutnoticethe specialcarehe takesto delineatetherole in theseevents of PhilipArrhidaeus,Alexander'speculiarandotherwiseinsignificant halfbrother. Since Curtius has Arrhidaeusoccupy a prominentplace in his historyof the first stageof the contentionamongthe Macedonianleaders

atBabylon totakeoverAlexander's kingdom, • heclearlymeans hisreaders to noticeArrhidaeus.For thisreason,Curtiusaffordsusanexcellentopportunity here to examinehis techniquesas a writer and as a historian.As we shallsee,Curtius'presentation of Arrhidaeusmustfigurein the discussion of suchquestionsas how much sophistication Curtiusdisplaysin the handlingof themesand whetherhe ever embellisheshis historywith com-

pletelyfictionalmaterial. 2 Thesequestions sofundamental to theunderstandingof Curtius'historiographical stancehavealreadyprovokedlively disagreementamong scholarsinterestedin Curtius and deservefurther attention.3

In the first part of this paper, therefore,we shall examinethe way in which Curtius gradually unfolds for his readersthe full dimensionsof Arrhidaeus' abilities, limitations, and character,as fast-movingevents abruptly force this previouslyinsignificantmember of the Macedonian royal houseto try to find a way to ensurehis own survivalin the midst of violent, ambitious,and vastly more powerfulmen who now after the prematuredeathof his brotherseekto exploithim in their own interests. In the secondpart of the paperwe shallexaminesomecurioussimilarities betweenCurtius' descriptionof the accessionof Arrhidaeuson the one hand and Josephus'accountsof the accessionof Claudiuson the other, for thelighttheyshedonthenatureof Curtius'presentation of Arrhidaeus.

161

162

THOMAS

R. MARTIN

In orderto appreciatewhat Curtiusdoesin his presentation of Arrhidaeus and how he goesaboutdoingit, we mustexaminethe pointsat which CurtiusmentionsArrhidaeus or actuallyhashim appearin the narrative of theconfused firstdaysin BabylonafterAlexander haddied.To judge from what we haveof Curtius' work beforethe deathof Alexander,Curtius completelyignoresArrhidaeusin his earlier narrativeof Alexander'scam-

paignsin Asia, eventhoughthedescription of him as Alexander'sconsors attributedto an ignotusin a directspeechat 10.7.2 (to be discussed below) impliesthatCurtiusmeansusto thinkof Arrhidaeus ashavingbeenpresent at least part of the time duringAlexander'scampaigns.Once Curtius reachesthe storyof the strugglefor the succession at the end of Book 10, however,he can naturallyno longerleave Arrhidaeusout. Curtiusfirst bringsArrhidaeus to thereader'sattentionin thisstorywith a deft touch. As if Arrhidaeus werea dramaticcharacter still off stage,we hearabout him before we see him. The first reference to Arrhidaeus comes at 10.7.2

in the dramatic climax of the long meeting (10.6.1-7.7) during which wranglingover the succession to Alexanderhas broughtthe army to the vergeof violentdiscordand division(10.7.1). At this crucialmomentthe troopsstop shortof violencewhich would amountto civil war, because an unnamed common soldier from the ranks (ignotus ex infima plebe) suddenlyrises to rebuke his fellow soldiersand commandersfor having overlooked

the absent Arrhidaeus

as the natural successor to Alexander

(10.7.1-2). This ignotusremindsthe meetingthatArrhidaeushadformerly beenAlexander'ssacrorumcaerimoniarumqueconsorsandwasnuncsolus heres. It would be unfair and contraryto the commonlaw of nations,the ignotusinsists,to passover Arrhidaeusfor the succession.The ignotus' argumentin favor of Arrhidaeushas as its climax the assertionthat he is the only candidatefor the throne whom they can regard as Alexandro proximus,presumablya referenceto Arrhidaeus'statusas a sonof Philip II, the first thing the ignotushad said about Arrhidaeusafter the initial mentionof hisname(10.7.2). This entiredescriptionof Alexander'sbrother has a clearly negativetone to it, with a strongconnotationof faute de mieux, becausethe ignotusbaldly tells everyonethat they will not get anotherman like Alexanderno matterwho theirchoicemay be. His fellow soldiersinitially reactto his wordswith an apparentlystunnedsilence,but then, despite the decidedly downbeat tone of the recommendationfor Arrhidaeuswhich they havejust heard, they eruptin a clamor, demanding that he be summonedand shoutingthat those who had held a meeting without

him merit death.

QUINTUS CURTIUS AND JOSEPHUS

163

This is an extraordinaryscene, to put it mildly. If we were to accept Curtius' versionof this meetingas historicallyaccurate,we would have to believe, first of all, that none of the Macedonian leaders had said a

word aboutArrhidaeusin what Curtiuspresentsas protractedand public discussionsabout the succession.We can well believe that, as Curtius has

it, the leadershad originally intendedto discussthe succession in private (10.6.1-2) andwould havedealtwith Arrhidaeusasthey sawfit in camera. Oncethe armyhadbrokeninto the meetingandturnedit into a mob scene (10.6.3 if.), however, it is inconceivablethat, in historicalfact, the Macedo-

nian leaderscouldhaveavoidedany mentionof the only representative on the spot of the royal houseof Philip, to which the soldiersfelt such devotion.Moreover, regardlessof what onethinksaboutthe reputedfreedom of speechof the Macedoniancommonereven in the presenceof

royalty,4 it ishardto imagine howa common soldier fromthelowestrank couldhave commandedthe attentionof sucha large groupof angrymen so closeto riotingandthen, by the powerof his wordsalone,completely redirected

their intentions.

To have claimed

the rostrum before such an

unruly mob would have been no easy feat even for a commanderof the higheststatureandprestige.NeitherDiodorusin his brief accountof this meeting(18.2) nor Justinin his more detailedversion(13.2.1-4.4) makes mentionof any ignotus. We mustconcludethat the occurrenceof the ignotusin Curtius' account cannotbe historicallyaccurate.Curtiushasintroducedthe ignotusinto the storyof Arrhidaeus'accession.We wouldperhapsnotgo toofar in suspecting that Curtiusintroducesthe motif of the ignotusin orderto give his narrativean added measureof surpriseand drama in the serviceof his anti-democraticview that nothingis so unsteadyas the passionsof the multitudewhen they enjoy unbridledfreedom(see his commentto this effect at 10.7.11). In part II of thispaperwe shallconsiderthepossibility that the historyof the accessionof Claudiusgave Curtiusthe inspiration to embellishhis storyof Arrhidaeus'accessionwith the fictive addition of a catalyticignotus,but for the momentwe needonly recognizethat the introductionof the motif of the ignotus in Curtius' story servesto make Curtius' Arrhidaeusan extraordinarysuccessor.He is the son of a king who will himself becomea king thanksto the nominationof a nobody from the army who has nothingto say about any personalqualitiesof Arrhidaeus

himself

as a man or commander.

His obscure nominator

can

only marshalthe recommendationbestowedby Arrhidaeus'royal blood and the acceptedpracticeof mankind.Curtiusat this point avoidsgiving usmaterialfor anyclearimpressionof themandestinedto takeAlexander's place on the Macedonianthrone. In fact Curtiushas so far told us little

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about Arrhidaeusat all and nothing positive about his qualities or capabilitiesas an individual. He will soontell us more, however. What Curtiuspresentsnext in his narrativerepresentsthe first stepin improvinghis readers'perceptionof Arrhidaeus'uncomfortablesituation. In 10.7.4-5 a Macedonian leader named Pithon (whom Curtius does not

specificallyidentifyhere)triesto persuadetheassemblyto rejectArrhidaeus as a candidatefor the succession by launchinga directand scabrousattack

on him.5 Curtius conspicuously failsto tellusexactlywhatPithonsays. This detailof omissionclearlybetraysCurtius'specialcarewith the figure of Arrhidaeus.Since Curtiusexplicitly tells us that Pithon'sremarksare unambiguous andnasty,it is bafflingandunsatisfying to be left completely in the dark aboutthe specificsof thesereportedlyplain-spokencharges. Other sources of course inform us that Arrhidaeus suffered from some sort

of mentalimpairment. 6 Butreaders withonlyCurtius'account asa guide have no way to know that Pithon could have attackedthe choice of Arrhidaeus as Alexander's

successor on the basis of what would have been

eminentlyreasonabledoubtsabouthis mentalcapacityto serveas king at the headof an armyon campaignin hostileterritoryfar from home.Curtius handlesthe matterof Arrhidaeus'conditionwith suchextremedelicacy that readersignorantof the truth would be unableeven to guesswhat sort of alleged shortcomingwas at issue. Pithon'seffort at persuasion fails miserably,however.Insteadof underminingthe favor of the troopstowardAlexander'sbrother,Pithon'sverbal assaulton Arrhidaeusproducesthe oppositeeffect to what he intended. His insultsinspirethe soldiersto pity for Arrhidaeus,and they begin to clamor for him to be broughtbefore them, insistingthat they will only

acceptasking"onewhohasbeenbornto thishope"(10.7.6).7 As Curtius depictsthe scene, then, the undescribedcharacteristicof Arrhidaeus'characterthatprovokesPithon'scondemnation ironicallyends up makingArrhidaeusmore appealingto the troops.In a kind of dramatic reversal,themysteriousbutapparentlynegativecharacteristic of Arrhidaeus deploredby Pithonunexpectedlyfunctionsas somethingwhich somehow increases Arrhidaeus'appealby its abilityto arousefeelingsof pity among rough-hewnsoldiers.By showingthe pitiful convertedto the appealing, CurtiusdescribesArrhidaeus'weaknesstransformedinto a strength.Not only doesCurtiusavoidany directreferenceto Arrhidaeus'impairmentin this episode,he showsus that the troopsat least could display some attachmentto Arrhidaeus.To them, anyway,Arrhidaeusis a sympathetic figure. We shall see as the story unfoldsthat this episoderepresentsthe first stagein Curtius' preparationof his readersto recognizethe qualities

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Arrhidaeusdoespossess despitethe limitationsand failure that Curtius will in the end make vividly clear. The successive stagesof Curtius'presentation of Arrhidaeusin a more complexlight thanthehistoricaltraditionusuallyshedson thisunfortunate sonof Philipareanythingbutabrupt.ThenextstagecomeswhenMeleager, a Macedonianphalanxcommander,respondsto the criesof the troopsby bringingArrhidaeusbeforethem. They promptlyhail him asking (10.7.7). Curtiushasnow givenArrhidaeushis first appearance on the scene,and throughthe mere fact of his presenceArrhidaeusimmediatelyplays an

importantrole: he servesas the catalystfor a peacefulresolutionof the tensionsin the army whichhad beenaboutto precipitatethe outbreakof civil war. Arrhidaeus'

involvement

in events averts seditio and discordia.

We shouldnotice,however,thatCurtiuspresentsArrhidaeus'involvement at this point as entirelypassive.Meleagerhasto leadArrhidaeusinto the meeting,andthe prospective king neitherdoesnor saysanything.At this juncturein the storyArrhidaeusappearsmerely as a royal artifact, as it were, whoenjoysthepityingfavorof thetroops,little morethana dummy with the properpedigreewho happensto be madeking. The choiceof the troopsdoesnot sit well with their leaders,and in 10.7.8-9 theseleadersconcocta schemeto put power in the handsof Perdiccasand Leonnatusas guardiansof the son(and thereforeking-to-be by direct inheritance)expectedfrom the pregnantRoxane. In 10.7.10 Curtiusrevealsthat Meleagerhad left the meetingin an understandable fright abouthis own safety (haud iniuria metu supplicii territus). He had apparentlytakenArrhidaeuswith him becausehe now reappearsbefore the assembledarmy draggingArrhidaeusalong.Curtiusthereforescarcely givesArrhidaeusa glorioussecondentrance,beinghauledin like so much baggage, but, as in the case of Pithon's attack, a bad beginningwill unexpectedlyhave a goodissue.For the first time in the narrativeCurtius reportsthe substance of a recommendation of Arrhidaeusasan individual. Meleager shoutsto the troopsthat, in additionto his kinshipwith Philip and Alexander, Arrhidaeus has robur aetatis to recommend him. The

soldiersshould,Meleager urges,judge for themselvesaboutArrhidaeus. Meleager'sremarks,unlikePithon'sinsults,haveclearlypositiveimplications for our still nascentimpressionof Arrhidaeus'character:the new king in the vigor of his youthwill not be foundwantingif put to the test. Sincethisclaimcomesfrom a self-interested supporter of Arrhidaeuswho playsthe role of the fiery demagogue,Curtius'readerswill naturallyview it with suspicion,but at leastherefor the first time Curtiushasraisedfor his readersthe possibilitythat Arrhidaeusmight be more than a cipher

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after all. The questionremainsopen, however, whetherArrhidaeuscan, as Meleager claims, rise to the occasionwhen eventswarrant. Against this backgroundwe cannotregard it as accidentalthat at Arrhidaeus'next appearancehe acts for the first time in Curtius' narrative. This episode,like thosejust described,alsoshowstracesof Curtius' authorial handat work to highlightthe unexpected.After treatingus in 10.7.1112 to a descriptionof the fickle indecisionof the mob, which finally reaffirms its supportfor Arrhidaeus,Curtiusthen tells us in 10.7.13 what he had omitted to tell us at the chronologicallyappropriatepoint in the narrative:Arrhidaeushad left the meetingterrifiedby the authorityof the

leaders.Now he is recalled. 8 We cansuspect thatCurtius'tendency to disruptour expectationsby turninga sow's ear into a silk purseexplains the postponement of this particularbit of informationuntil this later point in the narrative. That is, Curtius here first reintroduces Arrhidaeus in a

lessthanflatteringway by describinghim asearlierhavingbeenextremely

frightened (conterritus). 9 Curtiushasthereforeinitiallyprepared us in 10.7.13 to expecta coweringperformanceupon Arrhidaeus're-entrance, but this is preciselywhat we do not get. Curtiusgoeson to describethe scenesuccinctly:itaque revocatus[Arrhidaeus]vestemfratris, eam ipsam,

quaein sellapositafuerat,induitur(10.7.13).•øAccording to Curtius, Arrhidaeushereactsby himselfin donningthe regaliaof Alexanderwhich hadbeenprominentlydrapedoverthethronein themiddleof theassembled multitude.In otherwords,Curtiusat 10.7.13 presentsArrhidaeusin action for the first time in the story. Arrhidaeus, as the temporarycenter of attentionin the narrative,putson the apparelappropriateto the new course of actionon which he is aboutto embark. By gettingdressedin the king's garmentArrhidaeusperformsthe act which signifieshis taking up a new role asAlexander'ssuccessor. As Curtiusdescribesthe scene,no onehelps Arrhidaeusto get dressed,and no one promptshim, not even Meleager. We seethereforethat in thisshortepisodeCurtiushasfocusedour attention on Arrhidaeusin isolationand highlightedhis importanceas a figure in the story. Moreover, Curtiusdoesnot describeArrhidaeusas Meleager's puppet in this action. This structuringof the story surely comesat the expenseof historicalaccuracy,becausewe can surmisefrom what the othersourcestell usof the natureof Arrhidaeus'impairmentthat Meleager at this point still loomedlarge as the force motivatingArrhidaeusand had in reality put him up to donningAlexander'sgarments.Curtiushas here distortedthe facts by omissionin order to make a subtlepoint about the Arrhidaeus

of his account.

Curtiusmakesthe changein Arrhidaeus'statureas a figure in the story unmistakableby what he relates immediately following. Earlier, as we

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have seen, Arrhidaeusfollowed in Meleager's footstepswhen the latter draggedthe former into the meeting of the army (10.7.10). This time Meleager follows Arrhidaeus' lead by putting on new attire himself in orderto symbolizeArrhidaeus'newroyalstatusandMeleager'sownspecial attachmentas a subordinateto Arrhidaeusin his new position:et Meleager

thoracesumpto capitarma,noviregissatelles(10.7.14).•l Although he has not yet said anything, as Curtius presentshim, Arrhidaeushas now apparentlyconqueredthe fear that was naturalfor a neophyteruler faced with powerfulopposition,andhis actionin puttingon Alexander'sregalia motivatesMeleager's imitationof his superior'ssymbolicact of dressing. With the narrationof this fast-pacedepisodeCurtiushascontinuedto lay the groundworkfor the presentationof Arrhidaeusas a man who can take action on his own initiative and not only as the tool of Meleager, who is nevertheless still very much in the picture at this stage. Curtius addsto the picture of Arrhidaeusas a man capableof action, in contrastto the entirely passiveArrhidaeusof his first appearancesat the beginningof the story, in a sceneof great violence which follows immediatelyafter the troopsclamorouslydisplay their approvalof Arrhidaeus'donningof Alexander'sclothesin 10.7.14-15. In 10.7.16-19, a viciousbattle breaksout betweenPerdiccasand his supportersand the other troopsaroundthe corpseof Alexander. According to Curtius, Arrhidaeusrushesinto thethick of thefray, surrounded by a bandof followers who are headedby Meleager. This is a situationof greatdangerin which Arrhidaeusis decidedlyat risk. Curtiusdepictshim as accompaniedand protectedby Meleager and his followers, as was only naturalfor a king, and others dominate

the scene after Arrhidaeus

has entered the scene of

the fight. But we mustrecognizethatCurtiuspresentsArrhidaeusasheading directly into the danger.Earlier in the narrativehe had run away in terror of the leaders; now, he runs into the middle of a battle with them. With

this limited actionwe continueto seethe developmentof Arrhidaeusas a functionalbeing as Curtius' tale unfolds. Curtius has shown us that Arrhidaeuscan act the part of a man not afraid of a fight, at least in the companyof his principalsupporter,Meleager. He hasbeencloselylinked to Meleager in every episodeso far, however, and he has yet to speak. We know that Arrhidaeuscan act, but we do not yet know for certainif he canthinkfor himselfin hisown bestinterestsandseparatethoseinterests from the interestsof Meleager. Curtius' next mentionof Arrhidaeusin 10.8.1-2 adroitly puts before his readers an Arrhidaeus

who indeed seems able to calculate

his own

advantagein a periloussituationwhere he lacks any real powerto act. In 10.8.1 CurtiusmakesMeleagerinsistentlypressthe new king for authori-

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zation to kill Perdiccason the groundsthat only his murderwould secure Arrhidaeus'crown from the designsof that ambitiouscommander.As we have seen,Curtiushas not yet reportedanythingthat Arrhidaeussays.It fits with Curtius'procedureof invertingour expectations in his storyabout Arrhidaeusthat now the first referenceto Arrhidaeus'ability to speakwill showhiscapacityto holdhistongue.As Curtiusdescribes him, Arrhidaeus keepssilentin the face of Meleager'spersistentdemandfor authorization

of themurderof Perdiccas. 12Why?Curtiusdoesnotexplainthereasons for Arrhidaeus' silenceor offer any thoughtson his motivation. (He will do so on the occasionof Arrhidaeus'final appearance in the narrative,as we shall see.) Since Curtius has already in 10.7.13 implicitly shownus Arrhidaeus'ability to dealwith his fear, we cannotconcludethatArrhidaeus fails to speakas a resultof sheerterror at being confrontedwith sucha dangerouspropositionas trying to kill a powerfulrival who is backedby experiencedforces.Curtiusratherseemsto imply that Arrhidaeusrefuses to speakon purpose.His purpose,we candeduce,wouldbe to try to hedge his bet by keepinga formal distancefrom Meleager'sproposalwithout rejectingit outright.That is, the hedgewouldbe his hopethat despitehis utterlack of any military powerof his own he couldnevertheless survive, no matterwho endedup beingkilled in the conflictbetweenMeleagerand Perdiccas.On theonehand,if Meleagersucceeded in eliminatingPerdiccas, Arrhidaeuscouldexpectto continuehisrelationshipwith Meleagerbecause he could presenthimself as havinggone along with Meleager'sidea by not forbiddingthe murder. On the otherhand, if Perdiccaskilled Meleager instead,Arrhidaeuscouldclaim that he had nevergiven explicit approval for an attemptonPerdiccas'life andborenoresponsibility for theunauthorized actionof a subordinate.Curtiusin 10.8.2 presentsan Arrhidaeuswho in a desperatesituationtakesthe only prudentcourseopento him in the interestof his own survival:he refusesto speak.That Arrhidaeustakes sucha courseimpliesthat he can think andthat he is morethana brainless extensionof Meleager's will. So far in the story, however, Arrhidaeushas demonstrated no concernfor any issuebeyondthat of how to enhancehis own chancesof stayingalive. Curtiusnext proceedsto showus Arrhidaeusspeakingfor the first time, butonly in indirectspeechandonlyin response to a questionfrom Meleager. (As we shall see when we come to discussionof 10.8.16-19, a crescendo is building.)In 10.8.2 CurtiusreportsthatMeleagertakestheking'ssilence as tantamount to an order and sends men to arrest Perdiccas in the name

of the king and to kill him if he resists.Perdiccasis neitherarrestednor slain, however,becausehis staunchdefiancesoterrifiesMeleager'shenchmen that they flee in confusion(10.8.3). This fiascoproducesan outcome

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Arrhidaeus'purposefulsilencehad not allowed for, and subsequentdevelopmentsput him on the spotagain.The day after the bungledmission to arrestPerdiccas,the soldiershold an apparentlyimpromptumeetingin which they decideto punishMeleager for the attemptedviolenceon Per-

diccas. 13In aneffortto savehimselffromthewrathof thetroops,whose resolutionto try to punishhim he hasforeseen,MeleagerasksArrhidaeus in a private audience(see n. 13) if he, the king, had orderedPerdiccasto be arrested(10.8.6). This questionputsArrhidaeusin a very ticklishpredicament,as a moment'sreflectionwill show. The hostilityof the soldiers towardMeleagerhad suddenlymadeit painfullyclear that Meleagerhad lost his power completelyfor all practicalpurposes,becausethe troops now hostileto him andshowingtheir respectfor Perdiccasweretheinfantry, who had up until now supportedMeleager, and thereforeArrhidaeus, againstthe Macedonianleadersand the cavalry. Arrhidaeus'chancesfor survival would be slim if they continuedto dependon the strengthof Meleager's remainingfaction in the army, now reducedto the small core of hisfollowerstoocloselyimplicatedwith himto backawaywith impunity. How couldArrhidaeusimprovehis chances? If Arrhidaeuswasto survive,

he wouldeitherhaveto find a way to restoreMeleagerto a positionof authorityin the army, not a likely prospectat the moment,or he would have to forsakeMeleagerand forge a new alliancewith the otherside because he hadno powerbaseof hisown, neverhavingledtroopshimself andlackinga personal followingof anysizein thearmy.He hadto secure an ally with power.The problemwashow to do this. The situationwas far from simple,with MeleagerpresentandpressingArrhidaeus with an explosivequestionwhoseanswerwouldsoonhaveto be relayedto an angrymobof troopsnolongerunderthespellof Meleager's demagoguery. Perdiccas on the otherhandhadalreadyfled the city in thecompanyof the cavalry(10.8.4; cf. 10.8.11) and wasthereforeunavailable for any immediatenegotiations aboutthe situation.Arrhidaeuswouldneedtime as well as distancefrom Meleager if he decidedto make contactwith Perdiccas in the hopeof avertinga violentcrisis.In anycase,Arrhidaeus couldnotsimplythrowoverMeleageronthespotwithouthavingpreviously workedout a suitablearrangementwith Perdiccas.Perdiccasmight be unwillingto makea deal, andMeleagerwasa desperate man.Therewas no tellingwhathe mightdo if theking abruptlyandopenlytriedto throw him to the wolves. For all Arrhidaeuscould know, Meleager might try to

takethekingdownwithhim, for exampleby suborning witnesses to testify thatthe king hadapprovedthe arrest,or, perhapsmorelikely, by trying to assassinate him out of sheervengefulanger.SinceMeleagerif spumed could still harm Arrhidaeus,this essentiallypowerlessnew king would

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have been in immediate danger if he told the strict truth in answer to

Meleager's questibn. Thatis, in hisowninterest Arrhidaeus couldnotsay, in replyto Meleager'squestion,thathehadcertainlynotorderedPerdiccas' arrestbecausehe had in reality said nothingat all on that occasionwhen Meleager askedfor suchan order. Curtius shows us an Arrhidaeus

with a head on his shoulders when he

gives us the king's answerto Meleager. Arrhidaeussaysthat he ordered the arrestat the promptingof Meleager but that the soldiersshouldnot make a disturbancebecausePerdiccaswas still alive (10.8.6). Curtius does

not make it clear how the king's answerwas made known to the troops, but Arrhidaeus'verdict producesthe desiredresults.The troopsare dismissedwithoutfurtherincident(10.8.7), evidentlyunwilling (asArrhidaeus evidentlyhad to gamblethey would be) to take any hostileactionagainst the king theyhadthemselves chosenandnow foundthemselves stuckwith out of necessity.Unfortunatelyfor them, the split with the cavalry made regicideand the tumult which would inevitablyfollow a more dangerous optionthan the obviouslyunhappyprospectof facing the cavalry under the leadershipof an untestednew king who had apparentlysanctioned the arrestof oneof their mostrespectedleaders.As for Meleager,Arrhidaeus' answergives him no groundsfor thinking that he has lost the allegiance of the king. Arrhidaeushimself, while acceptingresponsibilityfor the arrestorder, lays the blame for its instigationsquarelyon Meleager, a positionthatwouldallow theking to tell Perdiccasthattheattemptedarrest reflected not his own true feelings but rather only the overly trusting relianceof an inexperienced ruleron the adviceof a pernicioussubordinate, whose counsel will be shunnedfrom now on. We must recognize the craftinessbehindthis reply even if we are reluctantto seeany nobilityin what will in the end becomethe betrayalof a supporter,as we shall see. For Arrhidaeussurvivalis at issue,not loyalty. Curtiushas shownus that Arrhidaeuscan be shrewd when his life is at stake. He has the ability to bring aboutthe peacefulresolutionof an explosivesituationin the army, againpreventingseditio,while operatingas far morethan merely a passive appendageto Meleager. At 10.7.1 the passivepresenceof Arrhidaeushad avertedseditio. This time, by contrast,Arrhidaeus,acting in the interests of his own survival,contrivesa solutionto preventthe outbreakof internal violencein the army. The next stagein Curtius' graduatedpresentation of Arrhidaeuswill showus the king finally devotinghimselfwholeheartedly to the causeof preservingthe unity of the army even at the risk of his own safety. Curtiusbeginsthe next episodein his presentation of Arrhidaeuson the now familiar model:at the beginninghe offers us somethingdetrimental

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to our impressionof the new king which he will in the end transforminto a devicefor improvingthis impressionfrom worseto better.In 10.8.8-10 Curtiustells us that the court of the new king looked much the sameas that of Alexanderhad but that thosein attendancelongedfor the dead Alexanderwhentheycompared Arrhidaeus to him. Thisstrikingdescription of the psychologicalstate of the membersof Arrhidaeus'court sounds suspiciously like the embellishment of an authorwith a pointto make, and thenotionof a comparison with Alexanderprovidesthecluewhichjustifies thissuspicion,becausethisideaof comparison will reappearat theclimax of this episodeas the device for making us think betterof Arrhidaeus. Immediatelyafterthereportof thestateof mindof thosearoundArrhidaeus, Curtiusdescribes in 10.8.11-14 theconcernof thetroopsin Babylonabout the unsettlingeffectson the populationof the blockadeof shipmentsof food into the city which Perdiccasand the cavalry,encampedoutsidethe walls, hadput into force. A decisionis made,apparentlyat the initiative

of thetroops, 14to sendenvoys tothecavalry aboutending thesplitin the army and avoidinghostilities.Curtiusdoesnot mentionMeleagerhere, and he reportsthe king as dispatchingthe envoyscarryinghis mandata, whosecontentsCurtiusdoesnot report. The cavalryreply that they will not lay down their armsunlessthe king givesup the discordiaeauctores (10.8.15).

So far in this episodeCurtiushas againpresentedan Arrhidaeuswho seemsconsiderablylessthan heroic. He arouseslongingin his followers for the king they had lost insteadof admirationfor the king they had appointed,and he reactsto the soldiers'concernat the dire turn of events in Babylonratherthaninitiatingactionto resolvethecrisis.Whathappens nextin 10.8.16-22 astheclimaxto thisepisodeis centralto an assessment of Curtius'presentation of Arrhidaeus.Whenthe reply from the cavalry is received,thetroopsin thecityspontaneously takeuparmsin preparation foropencivil war. Onceagainseditioseemsimminent.Throughout Curtius' narrativeof the strugglefor the succession this conditionhas led to the involvement of Arrhidaeus, and this occasion is no different. But the

mannerof his involvement thistime is something new. The uproarasthe troopsarm themselves for battlerousesthe king from his quarters,andhe appears on the scenealone.He thenspeaksin directspeechfor the first

timein Curtius'account (10.8.16-19).Thisorationrepresents theculminationof thecrescendo Curtiushasorchestrated in hisdepiction of Arrhidaeus' abilityto speak.It alsoshowsa leaderwhocanrecognize a situationin whichhis poweris so limitedthatrebukesanddirectorders

arelikelytobelesseffective thantactics ofpersuasion. Instead ofrebuking thetroopsfor theirfailureto awaithisordersandthenordering themto

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put away their weapons,the king pointsout the foolhardiness of seditio and the advantagesof trying once more to find a peacefulsolution.He suggests a seconddispatchof envoysto the cavalry,invokingthe memory of Alexander as a reason to seek reconciliation between the hostile factions.

He closeshis speechwith a dramaticoffer: if his abdicationis the only way to restoreharmony, he beseechesthe troopsto find a better man. With thesewords he tearfully removeshis crown and holds it out for anyoneto take who would claim to be more worthy (10.8.20). Curtius perhapsintendsus at thisjunctureto rememberthat Perdiccashad made a similargestureof placingthe decisionaboutAlexander'ssuccessor in the handsof the army. After puttingthe ring whichAlexanderhad given him on the thronein front of the assembledtroops,Perdiccas,like Arrhidaeus,madea little speech(10.6.4-9). But on thatoccasionthe troops had reactedwith confusionand dissensioncappedby Meleager's violent outburstagainstPerdiccas'alleged ulterior motives (10.6.20-23). Arrhidaeusperformsmuchmoreeffectively.Curtiusreportsin 10.8.21 that his speecharousesgreat hope for his innateability, which Alexander's fame had hithertoobscured:ingentemspemindolisante eum diemfratris claritate suppressae tam moderataexcitavitoratio. The soldiersunanimouslyurgehim to put his planfor a secondembassyinto execution. We cannowfully appreciate theeffectof thecomparison with Alexander which appearedso conspicuously in the narrativeat 10.8.9. Curtiushas Arrhidaeushimselfraisetheissueof an implicitcomparison with Alexander beforethe troops,by havingArrhidaeusrefer in his speech(10.8.18) to their commonobligationto providea properfuneralfor the still unburied body of the former king (with the referenceto Alexander as a corpse perhapsservingas a reminderthat he was after all gone for good). But Arrhidaeusranks much higher in the soldiers' esteemthis time because theyall wanthim to continueaskingandto taketheinitiativein attempting to headoff civil war. He promptlydoesso by sendingthe sameenvoys as before (10.8.22), and Curtiusthis time (in contrastto 10.8.15) appends to the report of the dispatchof the embassya revelationof what the ambassadorswere instructedto ask for: the cavalry are asked to accept

Meleager astertiusdux.•5SinceCurtius hasnotmentioned Meleager up tothispointin thisepisodeandhascertainlynotpresented himascontrolling or evenadvisingArrhidaeus,theimplicationisthatthissuggestion concerning Meleageremanatesfrom Arrhidaeus.In otherwords,Curtiusconveys the impressionthat Arrhidaeuson his own thinksup a compromise to preventbloodshedand, it seems,to servehis own advantage.That is, if Meleagerwere in fact to be madea third dux, he wouldbe restoredto his defacto positionasspokesman andleaderof thenowapparentlyleaderless

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infantry. Under these circumstances Arrhidaeuscould expect to find Meleagermore supportivethan ever, at least for as long as his support seemeduseful and desirable.Perdiccasimmediatelyacceptsthe king's suggestion because,Curtiusexplains,he wantsto separate Meleagerfrom the king and believesthat Meleagerwill be unableto sustainhis position in thenewarrangement (10.8.22-23). Theinfantryandthecavalrytherefore reunitein expectationof lastingunity and peace(10.8.23). In 10.8.16-22 Curtiushas shownus Arrhidaeusat the pinnacleof his limitedpowers:Arrhidaeusactson his own, he givesan emotionallypowerful speech,and he managesto raisehis estimationin the eyesof the troopsevenin thecontextof theirmemoryof thenowlonged-forAlexander. Above all CurtiuspresentsArrhidaeusas trying to preventcivil war even if by steppingdownhe mustput himselfat risk to do so. And abdication wouldcertainlyhaveputhimatrisk.Bereftof hisstatureasking,Arrhidaeus would havehad absolutelynothingto protecthim from thosewho would preferto havePhilip'ssonremovedfromthepathof theirown ambitions. For this brief moment Curtius'

Arrhidaeus

achieves some measure of no-

bility throughhisown initiative.Peoplehadmistakentheirman, asCurtius tells us the soldiersrecognized(10.8.21). Arrhidaeushad someabilities and character,regardlessof what peoplelike Pithon said abouthim. But even as Curtiusdescribesthe peacefulreunionof the Macedonian army thanksto Arrhidaeus'intervention,he simultaneously and proleptica!!y makesit clearthat Arrhidaeus'temporarilysuccessful effortsto avert civil war will end in utter failure (10.8.23-9.2):

utrumqueagmenmutuasalutatione factacolt, in perpetuum,ut arbitrabantur,concordiaet pace firmata. sed iam fatis admovebantur Macedonurngenti bella civilia; nam et insociabileest regnum, eta pluribusexpetebatur.primurnergo conliserevires;deindedisperserunt; et cure pluribus corpus, quam capiebat, onerassent,cetera membradeficerecoeperunt;quodqueimperiumsubuno starepotuisset, duma pluribussustinetur,ruit. With these words Curtius informs his readers in advance that Arrhidaeus'

initiativeandhisnobility,suchastheyare,will provecompletelyinadequate to thetaskof preventingthedismemberment of thebodyof a greatempire. Curtius makes this prolepticpoint about Arrhidaeus'failure in order to draw an explicit contrastwith the successof the contemporaryRoman princepsin preventingcivil war and in preservingthe unity of the Roman empire. Immediatelyafter havingdescribedin 10.9.1-2 the civil war that will tear apartAlexander'skingdom,Curtiusinsertshis famousdigression

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on theglorioussuccess of theprincepsin avertingviolentdiscordiaat the crucialmoment andensuring theintegrityof theRomanempire(10.9.3-6). In thisdigression Curtiusdrawsanexplicitcontrast betweenthesoon-to-bedividedcorpusof Alexander's kingdomunderhismultiplesuccessors and the unitedcorpusof the Romanempireunderthe rule of one man as a

resultof theintervention of theprinceps. •6 Both the imageryand the placementof this digressionthereforeserve to reinforce

the unmistakable

contrast

Curtius

wishes

to draw

between

Arrhidaeusthe king of the Macedoniansandthe unnamedRomanprinceps whomhepraisesin 10.9.3-6: Arrhidaeusfailedto preventthefragmentation of the Macedoniankingdom;theprincepssucceeded in reunitingandpreservingthe Romanstate.Placedin a similarsituationto thatof Arrhidaeus, with the statereadyto be torn apartby violencein civil war, the princeps came off infinitely better. In other words, by contrastingthe genuine restorationof peaceand prosperitywhich the princepsachievedwith the

hollowandtemporaryconcordachievedby Arrhidaeus,Curtiushighlights the magnitudeof the princeps' success.The parallel Curtius identifies betweenArrhidaeusand the princepsallows him to pay a complimentto the Romanruler, a point to which we shallreturnin part II of this paper when we considerthe possibilitythat Claudiusis the princepsin question. Curtius shows us that there really is no equating Arrhidaeus with the princeps,despitethe parallelbetweentheir situations.The Romanruler far surpasses his inferior Macedoniancounterparteven in comparisonto the latter at the height of his ability (which, as we have seen, Arrhidaeus demonstratedin 10.8.16-22).

WhenafterthedigressionCurtiusnextmentionsArrhidaeus,heimplicitly emphasizes Arrhidaeus'ultimateinferiority.Curtiuscloseshispresentation of Arrhidaeuswith a description of his ingloriousrole in the shampurificationof the army outsideBabylon (10.9.13). At the startof the ceremony Arrhidaeusis positionedwith the cavalryand the elephantsoppositethe infantryled by Meleager.Curtiusmakesit plain thatthe infantryexpected there might be trouble on this occasion,even thoughthe split with the cavalry had supposedlybeen repaired(10.9.14), but Meleager and the phalanxhad no reasonto be additionallyalarmedat this point merelyon the basisof the king's positionalongsidethe cavalry, becauseMacedonian traditionin this ritual apparentlycalled for the king to line up with the

cavalrymen whoformedhisroyalbodyguard. 17Astheopposing ranksof infantryand cavalryare aboutto cometogether,however,Arrhidaeusat the headof a contingentof cavalry suddenlyridesup to the infantryand demandsthe surrender for punishment of thediscordiaeauctores(10.9.1516), the sameterms which the cavalry had demandedin responseto the

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first embassyfrom Babylon(10.8.15). Arrhidaeus threatens to lead the restof the armyagainstthe infantryif theyrefuseto complywith his demand(10.9.16-17). Meleagerandtheinfantrytroopsarecaughtcompletelyby surprise,apparently because the ceremonyhadappeared to be proceeding in the normalfashionuntilArrhidaeus had suddenly broken ranksandconfronted thephalanx.The footsoldiersin theirstupefaction can do nothingbut await their fate. Perdiccasthereuponseparates Meleager'sfollowersfromtheparalyzed infantryandimmediately hasthe elephants tramplethemto death(10.9.18). Curtiusaddsthat the king neitherforbadenorauthorized thisslaughter, commenting in 10.9.19that it wasplainthatArrhidaeus wouldclaimresponsibility onlyfor thatwhich the outcome of eventscommended (adparebatque id modopro suovindicaturum,quodadprobasseteventus). What are we to make of this episode?Curtiustells us (10.9.16) that Arrhidaeusmade his demand at the instigationof Perdiccas(instinctu Perdiccae)and thatthe king wasactingagainstthosewho wereostensibly under his protection(quos tueri ipse debebat). Does this mean Curtius intendsus to concludethat Arrhidaeushas simply been transferredas an unwittingpawnfrom the clutchesof one exploitativeguardian(Meleager) to thoseof another(Perdiccas)? Sincewe havejust beenshownin 10.8.1622 an Arrhidaeuswho can act and speakon his own, it makesmore sense in the contextof Curtius' storyto concludethat Arrhidaeusmade his own choice to switch his alliance from a weak to a strong ally. The king's action againstMeleager and his supportersin the infantry was the sordid price of a bargainwith Perdiccasand the cavalry. In other words, Curtius implies that Arrhidaeuson his own threw over his erstwhilechampion Meleager and cast his lot with Perdiccas. Curtius' epigrammaticsummationof the characterof the new king in 10.9.19 (quotedabove)concludeshis presentation of Arrhidaeusthe man. As at eachearliermomentof crisisin the storywhenthe troopswere about to erupt in violenceagainsteach other, Arrhidaeusmanagesto prevent open civil war temporarily,althoughthis time the sacrificeof a smaller groupis requiredin orderto preservehimselfandthe largerwhole. Curtius promptly tells us, however, that "this" (presumably the murder of Meleager'sfollowers)was an omenand the beginningof civil war for the Macedonians(10.9.19). Meleager, we are thentold, was killed soonafter the purification(10.9.20-21). Curtius reportsthat Meleager realized his enemieswere destroyinghim in the name of the man he had made king. Once again, Curtiusmakescertainto point out that the tableshad been turned, that the unexpectedironically came to pass. Meleager, the clever demagogue,unexpectedlyfalls victim to the plot of Perdiccasand Ar-

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rhidaeus,not unlike Sejanusdone in by the wiles of Tiberius (Tacitus, Ann. 4.1.2). But civil war will soonengulf the Macedonians,as Curtius has now told us on two occasions(10.9.1-2 and 10.9.19). Arrhidaeus will

fail in the end, Curtius implies, becausehe lacks the requisitecharisma and force of character,as his shabbyrole in the slaughterof Meleager's supportersindicates.Curtius' final mentionof Arrhidaeusshowsthe continuinguncertaintyof his position:Perdiccaswill accompanythe king and commandthe troopswho are to follow him (10.10.4). Curtiuspresentsan Arrhidaeus who tried his best to survive and, in the interest of his own

survival, even managedto keep the army unitedfor a brief time. But his bestwas far from goodenough. Curtius' presentationof Arrhidaeusas capableof independent,if not necessarilynoble, action is uniquein the extantsources.Nowhere else do we find an interpretationof the king as a man whoseability to think, act, and speakhad been underestimated beforehe was thrustinto the limelight at Babylon. But with the parallel to the princepsof his own time Curtius showsusjust how far shortof greatnessArrhidaeusfell. An understanding of the natureof Curtius'presentation of someonewhomour sourcesotherwise presentas a severelyhandicappedand colorlessfigure in early Hellenistichistorycan contributeto an estimationof Curtius' techniquesas an author. In the storyof ArrhidaeusCurtiustendsto narrateeventsso as to

surprisethe readerwith the unexpected, carefullystructures his narrative so as to build to a dramatic crescendo in the revelation of Arrhidaeus' full

abilitiesasactorandspeaker,andaboveall, revealsa willingness to rework and even distort the historical tradition, as we saw most clearly in his

compositional fiction of the ignotus.It is this last point that providesa suitabletransitionto the secondpart of this paper.

Josephus describes the accession of the emperorClaudiusboth in the Bellum Judaicum 2.9.1-5 (204-217) and in the AntiquitatesJudaicae 19.2.1-5.1 (162-277). He providesa muchlongeraccountin theAntiquitares than in the Bellum, and in the two accountshe gives somewhat

differentversions of certaineventsmentioned in both.18Forthepurposes of thispaperwe shallconcentrate on the similaritiesin thesetwo accounts of Claudius'accession to descriptions of eventsin Curtius'accountof the accession of Arrhidaeus.

Thereare two scenesin therelevantpartof theBellumwhichwe should notice. In BJ 2,204 Claudiusis said to be carriedoff (6tqrtd•mt) by troops

to their campin orderto be madeemperor,a scenewhichcorresponds to

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Arrhidaeus' being draggedbefore the assembledMacedonianarmy by Meleagerin orderto be hailed as king (10.7.10). A secondand especially striking similarity occursin BJ 2,211-212. In BJ 2,205-212, Josephus describesthe meeting of the Roman Senate to deliberate concerning Claudius'threatto begincivil war againstthe Senatorsandthe troopswho had remainedwith them in oppositionto the troopswho had draggedoff Claudiusto their camp. While the Senatorsare ponderingthe optionsopen to them, an unnamedand apparentlyordinarysoldierfrom the troopswho are presentwith the Senatesuddenlyrisesto addresshis fellow soldiers. He asksthem why they shouldengagein a civil war with their comrades in arms who supportClaudiuswhen they have an emperorwith whom no blame can be foundand are so closelylinked to thosewhom they are about to fight. The anonymousspeakerthen rushesout throughthe middle of theSenatewith theothertroopsfollowinghim. NeitherSuetonius (Claudius 10) nor Dio (60.1.1-4) mentionsthischarismaticignotusin the description of theseevents, althoughSuetoniususesthe anonymousdescriptiongregarius miles to refer to the Gratusnamed by Josephusas the soldier who had discoveredClaudiusin hiding and hailed him as emperor(AJ 19,217). Josephushimself, in his acountin AJ 19,259 of this critical momentwhen the soldiersabandonthe Senate,simplydescribesthe soldiersdesertingto Claudiusas an anonymousmass. But the dramaticdirect speechof the ignotusin BJ 2,211-212 vividly bringsto mind the episodeof the ignotusin Curtius' account(10.7.1-2), wherewe alsofind in a situationof greatuncertaintyananonymous common soldierwho can with only a lukewarmcommendation of his choicefor the throne sway the feelingsof his fellow soldiersin the presenceof their superiorsand therebypreventthe outbreakof civil war. Curtius' ignotus openshis speechin 10.7.1 with a questionto his fellow soldiers:"What need is there of weaponsand civil war when you have the king you seek?"The phrasewe shouldnotice here is habentibusregem because Josephus'anonymoussoldier in BJ 2,211 usesthis same idea that the troops already have a ruler to persuadehis fellow soldiersto support Claudius.He, too, addresses them with a question,as we have seen,and he makesthe sameargument:they shouldnot engagein civil war because they alreadyhave a monarch:•XovTeg•v cu)Tox@fitxo@ct. We shouldalso recall herethe scenein Curtius' accountimmediatelyprecedingthe speech of the ignotus,in which Meleager after an exhortationto the assembled troopsstartsto rushout of the meetingfollowedby his supporters (10.6.247.1), much like Josephus'soldierat the head of his companionsrushing out of the Senate.

Althoughno singleresemblanceto Curtius' accountof Arrhidaeusin

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theAntiquitatesis asstrikingasthe appearance of the ignotusin theBellurn, thereare numerouspointsto consider.In AJ 19,162-165 we learnthat the soldiershold a meeting after the murder of Gaius to discusswhat they shoulddo. (In BJ Josephusomits this meetingprecedingthe seizureof Claudius, and his later narrativeof this same episodein AJ 19,214-226 suggestsa more complicatedsequenceof events.) In the courseof their discussions the soldiersrejectdemocracyas a viable systemof government anddecidethatin theirown interesttheyshouldhavea handin establishing the emperor.They prefer Claudiusbecausehe hasroyal blood, excelsin erudition,andcan be expectedto rewardthem financially.They therefore drag him off to be madeemperor.SinceJosephus providesno detailson speakers or individualspeeches in hissketchydescription of thisimpromptu meeting,it hasonly a generalsimilarityto the impromptumeetingof the army in Curtius 10.6.1 if., where discussionalso centerson what sort of governmentshouldbe establishedfor the time being in the absenceof a legitimateheir to Alexander.Josephus makesno mentionof an ignotusin the contextof this meetingbeforethe seizureof Claudius,but the citation of Claudius' royal blood as a principalpoint in his favor doesresemble therecommendation Curtius'ignotusmakesfor Arrhidaeus.Unlike Curtius' ignotus,however, the soldiersin Josephus'Antiquitateswho decideto seize Claudius do mention two aspectsof the personalityof their choice which recommendhim for the throne, his devotionto learningand his likely readinessto bribethem. On the otherhand,althoughstrictlyspeaking no one raisesthe questionof democracyas a replacementfor monarchy at the contio describedby Curtius, not even to reject it as the troopsdo in AJ 19,162-165, Perdiccas'comments in 10.6.9-10 andPtolemy'sspeech in 10.6.13-15 imply that an arrangementotherthan the normalmonarchy would be desirableunder the presentcircumstances.Their argumentsin favorof somesortof joint leadershipto be sharedby Alexander'scommandersseemanalogousto the sentimentsin favor of "freedom"(a synonym in this casefor a governmentdominatedby the Senate)which Saturninus expressesin a long speechdeliveredat a meetingof the Senatewhich Josephusdescribesin AJ 19,166-186 immediatelyfollowing the meeting of the soldiers in AJ 19,162-165. (Josephusomits this meeting of the Senate in his account in BJ.)

We can quicklyenumeratefurthersimilarities.(1) Both Claudiusand Arrhidaeusfear for their lives. In AJ 19,216-220 Josephusdescribes Claudiusas fearingfor his own safetywhenthe soldiersdraghim off to

their camp,similarin his stateof alarmto Arrhidaeusin terrorof the Macedonianleadersafter Meleagerdragshim into the contio(10.7.13). (2) In AJ 19,227Josephus makesa transitionfrom a reportof thesoldiers'

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supportfor Claudiusto a reportof theopposition of theSenate:6teLox/lxeoav 6/• •x[yvtb•t•xL •o• 6/l•tov x•x••tbv /•x •/Ig [3ovX/Ig.In 10.7.8 Curtius effects an exactlyparalleltransitionbetweenhis reportof the soldier'spreference for Arrhidaeusand a report of the opposingplans of the Macedonian leaders.He phrasesthe transitionin thesewords:ceterumhaec vulgi erat vox, principum alia sententia. The correspondence between these two sentencesis reinforcedby the observationthat in AJ 19,158 and 189 6/l•tog

as the equivalentof populusrefersto the peopleof Rome, who are said to supportthe Senate,but that the contextin 19,221-226 clearly shows that in 19,227 6/l•togrefersto the soldierswho were supportingClaudius. 6/l•toghere is the preciseequivalentof vulgusin Curtius, which refersto the soldierswho supportArrhidaeus. (3) Both Claudius and Arrhidaeus almostreachthe point of abdicatingtheir new position.Josephustells us in AJ 19,238 thatClaudiushadbeencontemplating abdicationuntil Agrippa dissuadeshim, while Arrhidaeus' offer to standdown (10.8.19) is refused

by the troops. (4) Both accessionsinvolve fickle mobsof soldiers.The troopswho at first backthe Senatein oppositionto monarchy(AJ 19,188) abruptlyswitchto vociferoussupportfor imperialgovernment(19,249 and 254) and then desert to Claudius (19,259). The Macedonian soldiers in

the contio waver back and forth between supportfor Perdiccasor for Arrhidaeusbefore making their definitive choice(10.7.11-12). (5) Both accessions alsoinvolvefaileddemagogues. Chaerea,who ledthesuccessful conspiracyagainstGaiuswhich (althoughthiswasobviouslynot Chaerea's intention)made it possiblefor Claudiusto becomeemperor,at first enjoys the supportof the troopsfavoring the Senateand of the people of Rome (AJ 19,188-189). At the climacticmoment,however, Chaereautterlyfails to persuadethesesametroopsto give up their demandfor an emperorand to preventthem from runningoff to join the other side (19,254-259). In hisfutilespeechto thetroops,Chaereaarguesagainstthechoiceof Claudius by accusinghim of •rct@ct(p@oo6v•l (AJ 19, 258), an insultwhichcorresponds to the lessexplicitprobra attributedto Pithonin his speechdirectedagainst Arrhidaeus(10.7.5). Meleageralsoloseshis positionof influencewith the infantrythanksto hisattackon Perdiccasandis reducedto utterhelplessness (10.8.5-7). (6) Both accountsrelate the execution with the sanctionof the new ruler of the man who made it possible(albeit in different ways in the two cases)for the new monarchto come to the throne:Chaereais put to death in AJ 19,268-271, Meleager in 10.9.20-21. (7) The final item in the list is the purgeof the army in both instances(AJ 19,274 and Curtius 10.9.16-19). It goeswithout sayingthat we must be very circumspectin relying on similarities,ratherthandifferences,in examiningthe possibilityof a con-

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nectionbetweentheworksof differentauthors.Sincemanyeventsdescribed by both authors,suchas the unruly but decisivemeetings,the executions of Chaerea and Meleager, and the purgesof the armies, are certainly historical,pure coincidenceexplainsthe occurrenceof thesesimilarities. As for theverbalcorrespondence betweenJosephus, AJ 19,227andCurtius 10.7.8, on the other hand, we can explain this similarity as a literary coincidenceoccasionedby the desireof bothauthorsto setup a stylistically

effectiveantithesis of opposing pointsof view.19Butwe cannotexplain the occurrenceof analogousignotusepisodesin both authorsas the result of the coincidence of historical events because, as we have seen, Curtius'

accountof the interventionof an ignotuscannotbe historicallyaccurate. Can literary coincidenceexplain the appearancein both Curtius and Josephusof an ignotusas the catalystfor the promotionto the throneof obviouslyparallel figuressuchas Arrhidaeusand Claudius?I believe we would strainthe limits of probabilityintolerablyif we were to assumethat Curtius just happenedcoincidentallyto introducea charismaticignotus into the storyof Arrhidaeus'accession,as an independentinventionof his own which bore no relation to the ignotusepisodein the accessionof Claudiuswhich Josephusreports.The occurrenceof the ignotusepisode in Curtius and Josephusabove all requiresan explanationbeyondmere coincidence.

As we shall see, the cumulativeforce of the evidencepoints to one explanationas the most probable. Since, however, the limited scopeof our knowledgeof the sourcesof Curtius and Josephusmeansthat strictly speakingwe cannotabsolutelyrule out other explanations,in the interest of fairnesswe must at least briefly enumeratetheseother possibilities,if onlyto showwhy we shoulddiscountthem.(1) If CurtiushadreadJosephus' Be!ium Judaicum,he could have derived inspirationfrom it for the introduction of the ignotusepisodeinto his version of the accessionof Ar-

rhidaeus. 2øIf we wereto assume thatCurtiushadactuallyreadtheBJ, we would of coursehave to postulatea date for his historylater than the publicationof the BJ (no earlier than ^r>75-79), and datesfor Curtius'

workwhichallowthischronology havebeensuggested. 2• Butwe should reject the possibilitythat CurtiususedJosephusfor two reasons.First, no paganauthorotherwiseseemsto haveusedJosephus until Porphyryin the

thirdcentury ^r>.22 Second, intheoneinstance whereCurtius andJosephus refer to the sameevents,namelyAlexanderthe Great's dealingswith the

Samaritans, theydiffersignfficantly. 23(2) As an alternative explanation we might assumethat Josephustook inspirationfor the introductionof an ignotusinto his accountof the accessionof Claudiusfrom readingCurtius'

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versionof Arrhidaeus'accession.The Claudiandatesuggested for Curtius' work would accommodatethis hypothesison chronologicalgroundsany-

way.24Butwecanalsorejectthispossibility thatJosephus hadreadCurtius, both becauseCurtius and Josephusdisagree about Alexander and the Samaritansand becausewe have goodreasonto suspectJosephus'knowl-

edgeof Latinandtherefore hisuseof Romanhistorians. 25(3) Thisdoubt about Josephus'ability to use Latin sourcesalso presentsone reasonto dismissthe moreremotepossibilitythatJosephus hadreada Romanhistorian on Claudius who had himself read Curtius and found inspirationin Curtius' accountof the ignotus'role in the accessionof Arrhidaeusfor his accountof the accessionof Claudius. A second,even more significant point againstthis possibilitycomesfrom Josephus'own testimonythat ratherthana writtensourcehe reliedprincipallyon an oral sourcefor his

historyof Claudius' accession. 26(4) Whenwecanvass thepossibility of positinga commonsourceto explainthe appearance of an ignotusin both Curtius and Josephus,similar difficulties arise. We could, for example, in theory imagine that Curtius and Josephusboth knew the samesource on the history of events in Babylon in 323 Bc, a sourcewhich Curtius employedfor his narrativeof the accessionof Arrhidaeusandfrom which Josephusderived literary inspirationin writing about the accessionof

Claudius. 27Again,however, sincethereports of Curtius andJosephus on the subjectof the Samaritansseemto indicatethat they did not use the same tradition on the history of Alexander, we shouldnot assumethat they consulteda commonsourcefor the historyof the eventsimmediately following his death. If, on the other hand, we were to imaginethat both authors knew a common source on the accession of Claudius, we would

have to assumeagainstprobabilitythat Josephususeda Latin sourcefor the accessionof Claudius insteadof the oral sourcehe cites.28 Although, as we have just seen, the imperfectstateof our knowledge preventsus from regardingany of theseexplanationsascompletelyimpossible, no explanationwhich requiresus to postulatea connectionbetween Curtiusand Josephusseemssatisfactory.In my opinionwe mustexplain the occurrenceof the ignotusin both authorson separateand independent grounds.Josephus for hispartapparentlyreliedon thetestimonyof Agrippa II, who hadhis informationfrom his father, AgrippaI. AgrippaI hadbeen an eyewitnessto theeventsin theRomanSenatein ^D 41 when,according to Josephus, the ignotusinducedhis fellow soldiersto join theircomrades in supportingClaudius. (See BJ 2,210 and 213 for Agrippa's presence.) RememberingThucydides'warning(1.22.3) aboutthe inaccuracyof even eyewitnesstestimony, we must acknowledgethat eyewitnessescan give

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distortedand inaccuratereportsof eventsthey have witnessed,but we wouldnevertheless be wrongto minimizetheprobabilitythatJosephus in

BJ 2,211-212hasgivenusan essentially accurate versionof thetroops'

desertion of theSenate. 29As Josephus describes thescene, theignotus addresses onlyhisfellowtroops,nottheSenators, andhisremarksmerely inducethe troopsto desertthe Senateto join their morenumerousfellow soldiers in thepraetorian camp,notto takeawaytheconduct of themeeting from their superiors,the Senators.This seriesof actionsmakes sensein the context,in contrastto the improbablestoryof the ignotusin Curtius

who risesto addressleadersand soldiersalike and inspiresthe latterto assumecontrolof the meetingof the Macedonianarmy. In otherwords, we do havesufficientreasonto believethatanordinarysoldierplayedthe roleof a catalystto Claudius'advantage at a criticalpointin thetumultuous events which culminated in the accession of Claudius in ^r> 41. In his

versionof the desertionof the Senatein the BJ Josephusincludedthis historical ignotus, but omitted him in his treatmentof this samedesertion in the AJ (19,254-259), wherehe emphasizesthe counterproductive effect on the troopsof Chaerea's speechto them. So much for Josephusand the ignotus. What of Curtius?How did he come to introducethe motif of an ignotusinto his accountof the accession of Arrhidaeus?We could of coursesimply assumethat Curtiusinvented the ignotuswithout referenceto any actualhistoricalevents.But I think we havereasonto rejectthis assumption.Above all we mustexplainwhy Curtiusexpendedsuchcare on the figure of Arrhidaeusin his accountof the eventsat Babylon in 323 •c. No one else whoseaccounthas survived suggeststhat Arrhidaeusplayed a role in theseeventssignificantenough to meritthe attentionCurtiuspaidArrhidaeusin hisaccountof theaccession of a new Macedonianking. If, however, Curtiuswrote his historyduring the reign of Claudius, as mostrecentlyJ.E. Atkinsonhas arguedhe did, we can easily explain why Curtiusgave suchcareful attentionto his pre-

sentation of thisunfortunate king.3øWritinga historywhichClaudius as a fellow historianmightwell read, Curtiuscouldhardlyignorethe painfully obviousand potentiallyembarrassingparallel betweenthe accessions of ArrhidaeusandClaudius:bothhadbeenallegedlyfeeble-mindedmembers of the royal family whom their relativeshad relegatedto obscuritybut the army had unexpectedlyraisedto the throne at a time of near civil war. Critics of a Claudiandate for Curtius' work have in fact arguedthat this historicalparallel implies Curtius was not writing under Claudius. If he hadbeen,the argumentgoes,Curtius'Arrhidaeus,appearingasan "echo" or "reflection"of Claudiushimself, would haveplacedCurtiusin an awk-

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wardposition vis-d-vis Claudius, thecontemporary emperor. 3• Butthe point we shouldfocus on in consideringthis argumentis that Curtius emphaticallydoesnot equatetheprincepsof 10.9.3-6 with Arrhidaeus. On the contrary,Curtiusis at painsto draw a contrastbetweentheprinceps andArrhidaeus.As we haveseen,Curtiuscarefullyandprolepticallypoints out the hollownessof Arrhidaeus'temporarysuccessas reunifierof the Macedonianarmyto contrastit with therealityof theprinceps'accomplishment in preservingthe unity of the Romanstate.We cannotmistakethe thrustof Curtius' presentation of Arrhidaeuswhenseenagainstthe backgroundof the historyof Claudius'accession: yes, Curtiusimpliesin his digressionon the contemporary princeps,we can draw a parallelbetween Arrhidaeusand Claudiusin the obscurityof the first partsof their lives andin their suddenriseto prominence,butwe mustrecognizethatClaudius comesout a clear winner in any comparisonof the two monarchs. A Claudiandatefor Curtius'worknotonly offersa plausibleexplanation for the specialcareCurtiusgave to the presentation of Arrhidaeusat the end of Book 10, it would also explain why Curtius so oddly suppresses anydirectmentionof Arrhidaeus'mentalimpairment.Thisparticularaspect of the parallelwith Claudiuswassimplytoo delicateto mentionexplicitly. It was one thing to adumbratethe previousobscurityof the monarchand to reportthatmembersof the leadership hadbitterlyopposedhisaccession. But intellectualincapacityrepresentedtoo explosivean issueto raise. Curtius therefore

skated around it.

If CurtiuswroteunderClaudius,he couldhavehadfirst-handknowledge of the eventsof the Senatemeetingin AD 41 at which a soldiereffected the desertionof the Senate'stroopsto Claudius.If Curtiuswas himself a memberof the Senateat this time, asAtkinsonargues,he couldhavebeen

present at themeeting. 32Theunexpected turnof eventsat thismeeting, we can surmise,gave Curtius the inspirationto introducea surprising interventionof an ignotusinto the carefully crafted and highly dramatic version he wrote of anothermuch earlier accession,whose similarity to the accessionof Claudiusno contemporarycould overlook. In conclusionI would arguethat we shouldnot explainthe similarities betweenCurtius and Josephusas the result of any influence, direct or indirect, of one author on the other. As we saw, we can explain the occurrence of many, if not most,of the similaritiesasarisingindependently from the coincidenceof literary devicesor from the coincidenceof similar historicalevents.But the occurrenceof similar ignotusepisodesin both authorsdemandsa differentsortof explanation,and I believethat explanationrequiresus to postulatea Curtiuswho wrote duringthe reign of

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Claudiuswith first-handknowledgeof the eventsof Claudius' accession. But apart from any relevanceto the vexed questionof Curtius' date, the nature of Curtius' presentationof Arrhidaeushas much to tell us about how Curtius went aboutthe businessof writing history. As his insertion into his history of the ignotusepisodedemonstratesabove all, Curtius, like mostwritersof historyin Greco-Romanantiquity,found it perfectly appropriateto supplement history"wie eseigentlichgewesen"with embel-

lishments thatwentbeyond thepurelyrhetorical. 33 Thomas R. Martin

PomonaCollege

NOTES

1. For the sources on Arrhidaeus and the succession to Alexander, see Helmut

Berve, Das AlexanderreichaufprosopographischerGrundlageII (1926), no. 781;

l•douard Will, Histoirepolitiquedu mondehelldnistique (323-30av. J.-C.) 1 (1979) 21; JakobSeibert,Das Zeitalter der Diadochen (1983) 218-219. Quotations

fromCurtiusin thispaperaretakenfromtheBud6editionof Bardon(1947-1948). 2. J.E. Atkinsonhasalsorightly pointedout the significanceof Curtius'treatmentof Arrhidaeusfor the questionof Curtius'datein his indispensable study,A commentaryon Q. CurtiusRufus'HistoriaeAlexandriMagni Books3 and 4 (1980) [hereafterAtkinson] 36-37. Identifying "similaritiesbetweenClaudiusand Arrhidaeus",he arguesthat thesecorrespondences provide additionalevidencefor believingthat Curtiuswrote later thanthe reign of Tiberiusand indeedprecisely in the reign of Claudius(38-39, 49-50). We shall returnto this questionlater in this paper(nn. 30 if. and text). 3. As A.B. Bosworth,"History and rhetoricin Curtius Rufus", CP 78 (1983) 150, hasput it in his review articleon Atkinson,"Recentwork on Curtius[i.e., before Atkinson] has not been illuminating, largely concentratingon the dating problemto the exclusionof more crucial issues,namely the author'shistorical methodsandrhetoricaltechniques."Bosworthlater (p. 158) takesissuewith Atkinsonby denyingthat Curtiusconsciously inventedmaterialor manipulatedthemes in as sophisticated a manneras Atkinson'sanalysissuggests.W. Rutz, "Zur Erz/ihlungskunstdes Q. Curtius Rufus. Die Belagerungyon Tyrus", Hermes 93 (1965) 370-382, givessupportto Atkinson'spositionwith his demonstration that Curtiusrearrangedmaterial,ignoredchronology,and even sacrificedplausibility for effect, in his accountof Alexander'ssiegeof Tyre. 4. On this topic, see Polybius5.27.6; N.G.L. Hammondand G.T. Griffith, A historyof Macedonia. II. 550-336 B.C. (1979) 161 (Hammond) and 392 (Griffith).

5. Otto Eichert, Vo!lstiindigesWOrterbuchzu demGeschichtswerke desQuintus Curtius Rufus (1893), s.v. Pithon 2, and Berve, Das AlexanderreichII, no. 621

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n. 5, identify this Pithonas the sonof Crateuaswho servedwith Alexander.As we shall see in part II of this paper, Josephus'accountof Claudius'accession offers a parallel to Pithon's insultswhich makesit legitimateto wonderwhether Curtiusmay be responsible for introducing the aptlynamedPithonat thispointin the storyand puttingtheprobra into his mouth. 6. Thereare no groundsfor doubtingthe realityof Arrhidaeus'disability.See E. Badian, Studiesin Greek and Roman History (1968) 263-264. 7. The inaccuratedescriptionof Arrhidaeusas qui ad hancspemgenitusesset (10.7.6) perhapsalso reflectsCurtius' readinessto embellishhis account. 8. It is perhapsnotentirelyclearwhetherCurtiusmeansusto link thisdeparture

and return with the departureof Meleager and his return draggingArrhidaeus describedat 10.7.10. Since Meleagerreturnsto the contiodraggingArrhidaeus with him in 10.7.10, Arrhidaeushad to have left the meeting earlier at some unspecifiedpoint. The obviousoccasionfor his departurewouldhavebeenwhen Meleagerleft in fear for his own safety(mentionedat 10.7.10). Sincewe are told in 10.7.13 that Arrhidaeushad left the meetingin fear, it would make senseto identifythe departurementionedtherewith the departureimpliedby 10.7.10 when Meleagerleft cum suis (amongwhom Arrhidaeuswould have been numbered). The return in 10.7.13

would then be the same as the one mentioned

in 10.7.10.

In other words, Arrhidaeusand Meleager left togetherwhen both were frightened, and theyreturnedtogether.One difficulty, however,is perhapsthe wordrevocatus itself, which seemsan odd way to describeArrhidaeusbeing "dragged"back to the assemblyby Meleager(10.7.10). 9. This descriptionshould not make us think that Curtius is presentingArrhidaeusasan uttercoward,however,becausehe alsodescribesMeleager(10.7.10, 10.8.7) andPerdiccas (10.7.16, 10.9.9) asalarmedwhenthecircumstances require, much like a Homeric hero in a moment of tear (cf. Hector in Iliad 16.656 if. and 720 if.). 10. For this use of induitur in a middle sensewith the accusativeof the thing put on, seeTLL s.v. induoIIB 2 a. (Cf. OLD s.v. induo2 b.) This usageis poetic. See, for example, Virgil, Aen. 7.639-640: clipeumqueauroquetrilicem/loricam induiturfidoque accingiturense;Ovid, Met. 4.481-484: Tisiphonemadefactam sanguinesumit/importunafacem, fiuidoque cruore rubentem/induiturpallam, tortoqueincingiturangue/egrediturque domo. Curtiusperhapsusedthis poeticismto highlightArrhidaeus'actionin dressinghimself in Alexander'sclothes. 11. AlexanderLyncestes didthesameto acknowledge theaccession of Alexander in 336 Bc (Arrian 1.25.2). Cf. N.G.L. Hammond," 'Philip's tomb' in historical context", GRBS 19 (1978) 340.

12. rex patiebaturmagisquamassentiebatur.itaqueMeleagersilentiumpro imperio habuit .... (10.8.2) 13. The notionof reachinga decisionby votingexpressedby the useof decreverant in 10.8.5 showsthat the soldiersheld a meeting. It is difficult to make out preciselywhat sequenceof eventsCurtiusintendsusto visualizeasoccurringnext, and a lacunahas beenpostulatedat differing pointsin the passage.The text as it

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standsimpliesthat Meleagersaw Arrhidaeusprivately when he got wind of the movementto punishhim (10.8.6: seditioneprovisa) in orderto try to cobbleup a defensefor himselfby gettingthe king to assumeat leastpartialresponsibility for the attackon Perdiccas.Arrhidaeusapparentlygives his answerinitially to Meleager in this private audience,not beforea gatheringof the troops.We are then left to assumethat this answerwas somehowpassedon to the troopsin a contio, perhaps,for example,in an interrogationof the king by Meleagerstaged in the presenceof the troopsin sucha way as to seemspontaneous. The conrio brokeup after the king's wordshad beenmadeknown(10.8.7: contionedimissa). Stangl(1902) positsa lacunafollowingcurein 10.8.6; Hedicke(1908), Bardon (1947-48), and Giacone (1977) following decreverantin 10.8.5; Mtiller (1954) followingprovisa in 10.8.6. 14. See the contextof placebat in 10.8.14. 15. Meleageris apparentlyto be "thirdcommander"in conjunctionwith Perdiccas and Leonnatus,who togethercommandthe cavalry (10.7.20, 10.8.4). This oddphraseleavesunspecified the detailsof Meleager'scompetency andhis "rank" vis-d-visthe other two duces. We later learn, however, that it is regardedas tantamountto seditioto say that Meleagerhad beenmade"equal"to Perdiccas (10.9.9). This certainlyimpliesthat Meleager'spositionas tertiusdux wasmeant to be a subordinateone, presumablyconfinedto leadershipof the phalanx. 16. CompareTacitus' use of the metaphorof the body in the contextof the accessionof a new emperor at a time of great uncertaintyin Ann. 1.12.4 and 1.13.4. This choice of metaphorfits particularlywell in this story in which the fate of Alexander'scorpseis a centralissueand indeedappearsasthe final episode in Curtius' work (10.10.9-20). Arrhidaeus,as we have seen, makesprominent mentionof the corpusof Alexanderin his direct speech(10.8.18) immediately beforethe digression. 17. For the positionof the king in the purificationritual, we havethe evidence of Livy 40.6.2-3 on the protocolof the occasion:praeferunturprimo agminiarma insigniaomniurnab ultima origine Macedoniaeregum, deinderex ipsecureliberis sequitur, proxima est regia cohors custodesquecorpotis, postremumagmen Macedonurn

cetera multitudo claudit.

18. For comparisonof thesepassages, seeF.A.C. Schemann,Die Quellendes FlaviusJosephusin der jiidischenArchdiologie BuchXVIII-XX = Polemos11,cap. VII-XIV.3 (Diss. Marburg 1887) 45-48; G. H61scher,Die Quellen des Josephus fiir die Zeit vom Exil his zumjiidischen Kriege (1904) 66; D. Timpe, "R6mische Geschichtebei FlaviusJosephus",Historia 9 (1960) 501-502. 19. Similarly,it isprobablyonlya coincidence thatbothCurtius( 10.9.5:exstinxit faces) and Josephus (AJ 19,184: oxdo•cog /•:xave@@/sxtoav) employthe notionof fire whenreferringto the actionsof leaders in thecontextof civil war. Cf. ResGestae34.1: postquambellacivilia exstinxeram. 20. The only sourcesto whichCurtiusexplicitlyrefersare all Greek:Ptolemy, Cleitarchus,and Timagenes.See Atkinson58. 21. For the datesof publicationof thesetwo works, seeE. Schtirer,The history

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of the Jewishpeople in the age of JesusChrist (175 B.C.-A.D. 135), Eng. ed. revisedby G. Vermes, F. Millar, and M. Black, 1 (1973) 47-48; ShayeJ.D. Cohen, Josephusin Galilee and Rome. His vita and developmentas a historian (1979) 87; Louis H. Feldman, Josephusand modern scholarship(1937-1980) (1984) 379. Proposeddatesfor Curtius'work run as late as the fourthcentury SeeAtkinson19-57. Responding to Atkinson'sargumentfor datingthecompletion of Curtius' work in the reignof Claudius(38-39, 49-50), A.B. Bosworth,CP 78 (1983) 151-154, hasrecentlystatedthe casefor a datein the earlyTrajanicperiod at the turn of the first centuryor the beginningof the secondand for regarding Trajan as the emperorfor whoseline Curtius wishesa long run in 10.9.6 at the end of the digressionon the princeps. 22. SeeFeldman,Josephusand modernscholarship839-845. Not evenTacitus in his famoustreatmentof the Jewsin Histories5 usedJosephus.Cf. Menahem Stern, Greek and Latin authors on Jews and Judaism 2 (1980) 3. Heinz Schrecken-

berg, Die Flavius-Josephus-Tradition in Antike und Mittelalter (1972) 68-171, lists the citations from ancient and medieval writers who referred to Josephus directlyor indirectly. 23. AlthoughJosephus'referenceto theseeventscomesin theAntiquitates,not in theBeilum,thisdiscrepancy with Curtiusprovidescircumstantial evidenceagainst the assumptionthat Curtiusknew Josephus'work. The discrepancyarisesbecause Josephus' description of Alexander'sdealingswith theSamaritans in AJ 11.7.2-8.7 (302-347) lacks any referenceto Alexander'spunishmentof the Samaritansfor their rebellion and the murder of Andromachusrelatedby Curtius in 4.8.9-11. Curtiusthereforecouldnot have usedJosephus as his sourcefor this information. M. Stern, Greek and Latin authors on Jews and Judaism I (1976) 447, remarks, however, that Curtius' "informationon the Samaritanrevolt and its repressionby Alexanderis somewhatparalleledby the Jewishtraditionas reflectedin Josephus' Antiquitatesand in talmudicliterature."The parallelbetweenCurtiusandJosephus is difficult to see. On Josephusand the Samaritans,see R. Marcus, Josephus, Loeb ClassicalLibrary vol. 6 (1966) 498-511: Appendix B, "Josephuson the SamaritanSchism." On Josephusand Alexander, see A. Biichler, "La relationde Jos•pheconcernantAlexandreie Grand",REJ 36 (1898) 1-26; I. Spak,DerBericht desJosephusiiber Alexanderden Grossen(Diss. K6nigsberg1911); Marcus 512-

532: AppendixC, "Alexanderthe Great and the Jews";ArnaidoMomigliano, "FlaviusJosephusand Alexander'svisit to Jerusalem",Athenaeum57 (1979) 442448; ShayeJ.D. Cohen,"Alexanderthe GreatandJaddustheHigh Priestaccording to Josephus",Associationfor Jewish StudiesReview 7-8 (1982-83) 41-68; Feldman,Josephusand modernscholarship207-8. 24. For this date, see n. 21 above.

25. SinceJosephus in AJ 11.7.2-8.7 (302-347) wantedto showthat Alexander favoredthe Jewsover the Samaritans,he shouldhavereportedAlexander'sharsh treatmentof them as describedby Curtiusin 4.8.9-11 if he had knownCurtius' account.The omissionof thisdetailwhichwouldhavestrengthened Josphus'case certainlymilitatesagainstthe assumption that Josephus read Curtius.Againstthe

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notionthat Josephus couldhaveusedLatin sources,seeFeldman821, 836, 842. For the hypothesis that Josephus relied on a Latin source,see T. Mommsen, "CorneliusTacitusund CluviusRufus",Hermes4 (1870) 322; Schemann,Die

Quellen(n. 18)53-54;H61scher, Die Quellen (n. 18)67;A. Momigliano, "Osservazionisullefontiper la storiadi Caligola,Claudio,Nerone",RAL 8 (1932) 305; M.P. Charlesworth, "ThetraditionaboutCaligula",CHJ4 (1933)116;L. Feldman, "The sources of Josephus' Antiquities, Book 19", Latomus21 (1962) 320-332; Timpe, Historia 9 (1960) 500-502. 26. His sourcewas Agrippa II. See Josephus, Life 366; Feldman,Josephusand modernscholarship329. On AgrippaII, seeSchfirer,Historyof theJewishpeople 1 (n. 21)471-483.

27. There are numerouspossiblecandidatesfor sucha source,but the only relevantsourcewhich both authorsmentionby name is Timagenes.See Curtius 9.5.21 and Josephus,AJ 13.11.3 (319), 13.12.5 (344). Stem, Greek and Latin authorson Jews and Judaism1, 224, suggeststhat Josephusknew Timagenes throughStrabo.SeeJacoby,FGrH 88 for theexiguousremainsof Timagenes.On TimagenesandHellenistichistory,seeJ. Kaerst,"Untersuchungen fiberTimagenes yon Alexandria", Philologus 56 (1897) 625-641. For discussionof some other (thoughby no meansall) relevantsources,seeAtkinson,58-67; J. Hornblower, Hieronymusof Cardia (1981)90-91, 93-94, 96-97; N.G.L. Hammond, Three historiansof Alexanderthe Great (1983) 160-169. Josephus, AJ 12.1.1 (5), refers to Agatharchides as an authoron the historyof the Diadochi, but it is unclearto whatextentJosephus knewanythingmoreof Agatharchides' workthanhismaterial on the Jews. See Vs. Apion. 1.205-212. Josephusalso knows that Hieronymus wrote on the Diadochi and that his work had nothingon the Jews(Vs. Apion. 1.213-214). 28. Again the list of possiblecandidatesis long and made up of authorswhose

works we do not have. Mommsen,Hermes 4 (1870) 322, long ago suggested Cluvius Rufusas Josephus'sourcefor the historyof Claudius,but RonaldSyme, Tacitus(1958) 287-289, haspointedout thatAufidiusBassus,ServiliusNonianus, and the elder Pliny also mustbe considered.Timpe, Historia 9 (1960) 474-502, has arguedthe casefor FabiusRusticus,and we cannotforgetthat Claudiuspublishedan autobiographical accountin eightbooks(Suetonius,Claudius41.3). As Feldman,Latomus21 (1962) 330-331, pointsout, the elder Senecadied too early to have includedthe accessionof Claudiusin his historicalwork. Syme, in his Tacitus, discusseswhat we know aboutthe publicationdatesof theseauthorsas follows: Cluvius, Fabius, and Pliny pp. 293-294; Aufidius pp. 288, 698-699; Serviliuspp. 274-277,288 n. 1. Atkinson43 considersthe possibilitythat Curtius read Aufidius. For a review of views on Josephus'accountof GaiusandClaudius, seeFeldman,Josephusand modernscholarship326-331. For a discussion of the attitudeof the sourcestoward Claudius, see Helmut Jung, "Die Thronerhebung des Claudius", Chiron 2 (1972) 367-386.

29. On AgrippaI, seeSchfirer,History of theJewishpeople 1 (n. 21) 442-454. Naturally we cannotexcludethe possibilitythat either Agrippa I or Agrippa II

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introducedthe ignotusas a fictionalembellishmentinto the historyof Claudius' accession.SincebothAgrippashad goodreasonto be gratefulto Claudius,they would presumablyhave intendedany embellishmentthey madeeither to redound to Claudius'credit or to magnify the importanceof Agrippa I in having aided Claudiusin a time of danger. The inventionof an ignotus,however, would not seemto have servedeitherof thesepurposesespeciallywell. We obviouslyalso lack themeansto excludethe possibilitythatJosephus himselfinventedthe ignotus. Cohen,Josephusin Galilee (n. 21) 47, concludes,however,that "on the whole Josephus wasfaithfulto hissources: he neitherinventednewepisodes nordistorted the essentialcontentof thosepreviouslynarrated".He did, Cohen states,insert "dramaticand explicativedetails". 30. Atkinson38-39, 49-50. It is worthwhileto quoteAtkinsonhere from his sectionentitled "Internal evidencefor the date of compositionof the Historiae"' "There

were similarities

between Claudius

and Arrhidaeus:

both members of the

dynasty,neitherregardedas naturallysuitedto rule, both acceptingmonarchyof necessityratherthan from desire,both owing their accessionto popularpressure (7.3 sq.), bothshowinginitiativeas peace-makers (on Arrhidaeus'initiative,8.16 sq.). The digression linkingcontemporary andhistoricaleventsbreaksthenarrative at a point beforeArrhidaeusabandonsthe initiativeand emergesas the mere tool of Perdiccas(9.16 sq.). Clearly a suggestionthat Claudiuswas like Arrhidaeus could not have been diplomaticallymade at a later stage in Curtius' narrative (Errington51 n. 23 notestheproblemwhichCurtiusfacedin discussing Arrhidaeus in Claudius'reign)." [For Errington,seen. 31.] As we have seen,Curtiuswas in fact suggestingthat the princepswas not like Arrhidaeus. 31. R.M. Errington,"From Babylonto Triparadeisos:323-320 B.C.," JHS 90 (1970) 51 n. 23, in responseto G.V. Sumner'sargumentsfor a Clandiandatefor Curtiusin AUMLA 15 (1961) 30-39, suggestedthat if Curtius' work belongedto the reign of Claudius,Curtius "might have been embarrassed to seemto echo in his book-•which the historianemperormight well read-•contemporaryrumours of Claudius'incapacity(cf. Suet. Claudius3-4), aswell asthe notoriouslysimilar way in which he becameemperor". Bosworth, CP 78 (1983) 153, addressing Atkinson's arguments(quotedn. 30) about Curtius' Arrhidaeusand a Claudian date for Curtius' work, arguesthat "Curtius'saberrantpicture of a rational and conciliatoryArrhidaeus(10.8.16-21) may be modeleduponClaudius'behaviorin ^.D. 41, but it would be a very dubiouscomplimentto an emperorrepeatedly lampoonedfor his stupidityto cast him in the role of an acknowledgedmental defective. If Claudiuswas to be reflectedin a historyof Alexander, there were rathermore tactful ways of presentinghim." 32. Atkinson 56. He refers to "the echoesof Senatemeetingsin A.D. 14 in Curtius' descriptionof eventsin Babylonin 323". In this contextwe shouldrecall that Curtius' presentationof Perdiccas'dissimulatio(10.6.18, 10.9.8) appearsto reflect his knowledgeof the behaviorof Tiberiusafter the deathof Augustus.See Badian, Studies (n. 6) 262-263.

33. I owe thanksto numerouspeoplefor help in improvingthis paper:to the

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members of a seminar on the sources for the Successors of Alexander the Great

at HarvardUniversityduringwhichI first becameinterestedin this topic;to John Atkinsonfor commenting on an early draft;to Albert Henrichsfor commenting on a later one; to the anonymousreadersfor AJAH; and, aboveall, to the Editor of AJAH for hishelpfromstartto finish.Noneof themmustbe seenasresponsible for anyshortcomings thatremain,nornecessarily asin agreement withmy argument.

BROTHERS

OR COUSINS?

A note underthis title in AJAH 2 (1977) 148 f. essayedto prove among otherthingsthat Pompey'sthird wife Mucia was half-sisterto the three Claudii Pulchri brothers. Wiseman (CQ 21 (1971) 181) had raised the

objectionthat "there is no hint that Mucia was the sisterof the younger Appius, Clodius, and the Clodiae". If the statementis correct,it doesnot prove anything;but is it correct? In his speechDe haruspicumresponsis(45) Cicerorefersto Pompeyas being Clodius' affinis et sodalisin the year 60. The connectionimplied by affinis is generallyattributedto the marriagebetweenPompey'seldest son and Clodius' niece, which is first heard of in 54 and, accordingto M•inzer (RE Claudia 388), took place "ungef•hr in diesemJahre". Cn.

Pompeius Magnus juniorwasbornin 79 atearliest (probably 78J),which makes marriageas early as 60 improbable,though not impossible.But PompeydivorcedMucia at the end of 62, thusoffendingher half-brother Q. Metellus Celer (Dio 37.49.3) and presumablythe Claudii Pulchri. His son'smarriageto Claudia would thus needto be put back at leastas far as 62, when Pompeywas in the East. Far moreprobablythe affinitasin questionwasthroughMucia. Pompey was no longer married to her in 60, but even if the divorce cancelled affinitas(a point on which I shouldnot like to be dogmatic),Cicero in 56 could well have overlookedor convenientlyignoredit. If so, Har. resp. providesthe hint which Wisemanhad not found. Harvard University

D.R. ShackletonBailey NOTE

1. SeeRE Pompeius32; A.M. Ward, Phoenix24 (1970) 126 n. 37.

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