American Journal of Ancient History (Vol 10.1) 9781463206802, 1463206801

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American Journal of Ancient History

American Journal of Ancient History

10.1

The American Journal of Ancient History is a peer-reviewed academic journal covering ancient history and classical studies. It was established in 1976 and edited by Ernst Badian until 2001. It is continued by the American Journal of Ancient History: New Series, edited by T. Corey Brennan.

American Journal of Ancient History

Volume 10.1 Edited by

Ernst Badian

gp 2017

Gorgias Press LLC, 954 River Road, Piscataway, NJ, 08854, USA www.gorgiaspress.com Copyright © 2017 by Gorgias Press LLC Originally published in 1985 All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning or otherwise without the prior written permission of Gorgias Press LLC. ‫ܐ‬

1

2017

ISBN 978-1-4632-0680-2

Printed in the United States of America

TABLE OF CONTENTS

BlaiseNagy:TheArgciPuzzle

'

Charles W. Fornara: The Order of Events in Ammianus Marcellinus 23.5.4-25 ..................................................................................

1 28

VincentJ.Rosivach: ManningtheAthenianFleet, 433-426 BC

.................................................................................................

41

BarryS. Strauss: Ritual,SocialDramaandPoliticsin Classical Athens ...........................................................................................

67

Stephen Ruzicka:A NoteonPhilip'sPersian War ............................................... 84

TABLE OF CONTENTS

BlaiseNagy:TheArgciPuzzle

'

Charles W. Fornara: The Order of Events in Ammianus Marcellinus 23.5.4-25 ..................................................................................

1 28

VincentJ.Rosivach: ManningtheAthenianFleet, 433-426 BC

.................................................................................................

41

BarryS. Strauss: Ritual,SocialDramaandPoliticsin Classical Athens ...........................................................................................

67

Stephen Ruzicka:A NoteonPhilip'sPersian War ............................................... 84

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I. Introduction

All over•thelandscapeof Romanreligion, thereexistsan array of interesting and perplexing rituals. The "running" of the Lupercalia, the "moving shields"of the Salii, foxes on fire in the Circus, the sacrifice of the OctoberHorse--theseand many otheraspectsof Romancult have both fascinatedand challengedstudentsof Roman religion throughoutthe history of scholarship.But no ceremony, it seems, has bestirredmore interestor causedmore controversythan the one which took place at the old Pans Sublicius, that of the so-called Argei. In the words of H.J. Rose, "The rite... hasperhapsgiven rise to more differenceof opinion

thananything elseinthewholeRoman calendar. "• EverywriteronRoman religion, it would appear,has at one time tackledthe subject,and some,

like W. WardeFowler,werefirstdrawnintothefieldby theArgei.2 Althoughtheoriesand explanationshave accumulatedover the years, no real consensushas ever emerged,and the rite of the Argei continuesto

be whatit wasfor Wissawa,"einKreuzderAltertumsfarscher". 3 This is not to say, however, that there has been no progressat all in the unravelingof the Argei. In fact, there have been gains, thanksin large part to thoserecent studieswhich try to find a kind of coherence in thefasti and which assessthe significanceof the Argei in the context

of theceremonies whichclusteraroundtherite.4 The worksof J. Bayet, L.A. Holland, and D.P. Harmon come particularlyto mind: all three have shown new and interestingpossibilitiesby examining the Argei

alongsidecertainother ritualsfrom the first half of May.5 Bayet and Harmon, on the one hand, see the Argei as a responseto the earlier feast of the Lemuria (May 9, 11, 13) and regard the ceremonyat the Pans Subliciusas one of purification. Holland, on the other hand, wants to interpretthe Argei in the contextof an agriculturalritual from early May, during which the Vestal Virgins prepareda batch of sacredspelt. The presentpaper, althoughit takes a similar approach,attemptsat the same time to connectboth the Vestals' spelt preparationand the

Lemuriawith therite of the Argei.6 In so doing,it hopesto showhow

¸

1992byE. Badian.All rightsreserved.

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a seriesof ritualsfrom the monthof May were coordinatedto bring about the appeasement of the ancestraldead and the purificationof the city.

II. Ancientaccounts of the Argeiceremony 7 The most complete descriptionof the ritual at the Bridge is that of Dionysiusof Halicarnassus(Ant. Rom. 1.38), who, as a residentin Rome duringthe secondhalf of the first centuryBc, may havebeenan eyewitness to it. Accordingto Dionysius,every year on the Ides of May (the 15th), pontifices, Vestals, praetors, and whoever of the citizenry was legally allowed to be present,throw thirty effigies called Argeioi from the Pons Subliciusinto the Tiber, specifically,into the rheumaof the river. It is perhapssignificantthat Dionysiusremarkshow the effigies were dressed to look like humans,and impliesthat they were tied up "hand and foot". Ovid's accountof the Bridgeceremony(Fasti 5.603 ff.), while brief, is noteworthyfor the eminent role that it gives to the Vestal(s) in the conductof the ritual. It is the virgo, accordingto Ovid, who throws the simulacra of "men of old" into the Tiber. Until recently, the most controversialfeatureof the passagehad been the date that it seemedto assign to the Bridgeceremony,namely, the 14thof May. D.P. Harmon, however, has shown that Ovid's description,when read carefully, places the rite

on the sameday asthe account in Dionysius. 8 As for thematerialof the effigies, Ovid indicatesit consistedof scirpus("rush"), a detail we find also in our other sources(cf. Varro, Ling. Lat. 7.44).

As might be expected,the ceremonyat the Bridgehasovershadowed the lessdramatic,but perhapsequallyimportantpreliminaries.Varro is our main source on the latter. In Book 5 of de Lingua Latina (45 if.), the antiquariandescribesthe itinerary for a processionin which twentyseven sacella are visited. These shrines--Varro

also calls them sacraria•

are referred to as sacellaArgeorum. Fourteenof these Argei shrinesare specificallylocatedby Varro in terms of buildingsand landmarksalong which a processionseemsto have made its way. Varro describeshis sourceof informationas "Sacra Argeorum", a priestly manual that ap-

parentlywasno olderthanthethirdcenturyBc.9 In thisguide,theArgei shrinesare groupedaccordingto the four regionesof ServiusTullius. Moreover, as the absenceof any shrines from the Capitoline and the Aventine would seem to indicate, their locations may have coincided

with the limitsof thepomeriumfrom an earlydate.•0 In a laterpassage of de Lingua Latina (7.44), Varro notes that the effigies of the Bridge

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ceremonywere calledArgei andthat therewere as many of these(twentyseven) as there were sacella Argeorum. Vano saysnothingspecificallyaboutthe purposeof the Argei shrines or a processionthat may have been directed to them. Livy, however, suppliesus with this information:multa alia sacrificia locaque sacris faciendis, quae Argeos pontifices vocant, dedicavit [Numa] (1.21.5). It is clear from this passage--aswell as from the title of Varro's source book--that sacrificeswere carriedout at the Argei stations,and we may be reasonablycertainthat thesewere conductedprior to the Bridge ceremony (cf. Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 1.38.3). Argei, therefore,designatedboth placesand effigies, and there was an equal number of both. And while Livy assignsthe founding of the Argei shrinesto Numa, Ennius (quoted in Varro, Ling. Lat. 7.44) gives credit to the sameking for institutingthe Argei effigies. Plutarchofferstwo possibleexplanationsfor the origin(s)of the Argei rite, but has only this to say about its purpose:the ritual of the Argei, he claims, was the "greatestceremonyof purification"in all of Roman religion (Quaest. Rom. 86, p. 285). And then there is Ovid, again. This time, in Fasti 3.792-934, he writes:

itur ad Argeos (qui sint, sua pagina dicet) hac, si commemini,praeteritaque die.

The days in question--andOvid claimsnot to be sureaboutthem--are the 16thand the 17thof March. The promisedpagina nevermaterializes, and we can only speculateabout this "visit to the Argei". Since the expressionire ad Argeos recurs in a passagefrom Gellius (10.15.30), wherehe describeshow the Flaminicaof Jupiterneithercombsnor dresses her hair "when she goes to the Argei" (cum it ad Argeos), it may be that this was the ritual term for the processionin March. On the other hand, Plutarch (1.c.) indicatesthat the Flaminica practicedthis kind of self-denial--she

would

neither bathe nor adorn herself--at

the time of

the Bridge ceremony(in May), because,as he explains, she was in a state of mourning. In sum, our primary sourcestell us of perhapsan earlier rite of March 16/17, and a concludingrite of May 15. Argei designateseffigies and places,and therewere twenty-sevenof each(or thirty, if we accept the accountof Dionysius).Severalofficials were presentat the Bridge

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ceremony, but the Vestals seem to have played a leading role. And effigies were thrown into the Tiber. What did all this mean? III. Ancient aetiologies In general, our ancientsourcesexplainedthe Argei as a substitutionrite. Prior to his accountof the actual Bridge ceremony,Dionysius(Ant. Rorn. 1.38.2) tells how it all beganin the earliestof times with humansacrifices to Saturn. Herculesput a stop to these, so the story goes, by teaching the "ancients"to use effigy-victims instead. Ovid (Fasti 5.621 ff.) reportsa similarlegend,exceptthat it specifies only two human victims in the "original" sacrifice.The author of the Fasti, however, dismissesthis story (as well as another) and asks the River to explain the true originsof the rite (5.635 if.). The Tiber supposedly respondsand tells the story of how Herculeshad begun the practiceby throwing an effigy of one of his fallen companionsinto the River, thereby fulfilling in a symbolic way his desire to be sent home. Macrobius' version of this tale is not materially different, other than for making Herculesthrow more than one effigy into the Tiber as memorials to his deceasedcompanions(Sat. 1.11.47). Although the text is only poorly preserved,an aetiology in Festus (p. 450 L) seemsto trace the origin of the Argei rite to an "Argive ambassador" who had been killed and cremated in Rome, and whose

effigy was then thrown into the Tiber, presumablyfor passageto Greece. Plutarch, in one of his two explanationsfor the Bridge ceremony (both in Quaest. Rorn. 32, p. 272), theorizesthat, in the olden days, "barbarians"would throw any Greeks that they could find into the River, until Herculescame along and supposedlytaught them to use effigies. In another, he connectsthe Argei rite with Evander, who is said to have institutedthe rite for the purposeof keeping Arcadian-Argiveenmity alive throughthe tossingof Argive effigies into the Tiber. On the subjectof the Argei shrines, another explanationin Paulus ex Festo(Festusp. 18 L) is that they were so namedafter "certainfamous men of Argos" (quidam Argivorurninlustresviri) who had been buried there, presumablyat some time in the distantpast. Van'o, on the other hand, reports a tradition that the shrineswere called "Argei" after the principesin Hercules' Argive company,who had settledin Ausonia(Ling. Lat. 5.45).

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Perhapsthe most sensationalof the aetiologiesis a story, reported in Festus(p. 452 L), which attemptsto link the origins of the Argei chapels with events from the early fourth century •½. It tells about a pious son who, after the Gallic siege, hid his father and kept him from suffering the ignominiousfate of the depontani, or sexagenarii de ponte, men sixty and older who were being tossedde ponte becauseof the burdenthey had becometo the impoverishedcity. Later on, to memorialize the deedsof this piousson, the city is said to have transformedthe hiding placesquibus arcuerit seneminto shrinescalled "Arcaea". Ovid presentsa variant to the sexagenarianstory (Fasti 5.633-34; 623-24). In this version, the old men were originally thrown from bridges becausethe youngercrowd wantedto keepthe sexagenarians from voting. With appropriateindignation, Ovid excoriatesthis story and proclaims (5.623-24):

corpora post deciessenosqui credidit annos missa neci, sceleris crimine damnat avos.

Despite Ovid's protest, and despite Varro's explanationthat the pontes in question were actually the voting bridges of the popular assemblies (ap. Nonius, p. 842 L), it seems as if the expressionsdepontani and sexagenariide ponte were indeedassociatedin antiquity with the Argei ceremony. Cicero himself takes advantageof this popular conception when he states--apparentlysarcastically--thatthe murderof an old man by throwing him into the Tiber had been renderedeven more heinousby the fact that the victim had not yet reachedthe age of sixty at the time of his death (Rosc. Am. 100).•l On balance, however, most of our ancientsourcesexplain the Argei ceremonyas a substitutionrite, but one where effigies were perhapsused from the beginning instead of the real objects they represented.These objectsappearto be, for the most part, the corpsesof foreigners;and in these instances,the bodies are thought to be, without exception, those of Greeksor Argives. As Varro putsit, Argei ab Argis (Ling. Lat. 7.44). IV. Some recent explanations of the Argei ceremony Scholarly interest in the Argei has not been found wanting in the last

thirtyyears.•2 And as wasnotedinitially, the mostsuccessful attempts to explain the Argei have been those in which the ceremonyis studied

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not in isolation,but within the contextof other Roman rites from early in May. For J. Bayet, the Argei ceremonyconsistedof a "procession lustrale" which purified the area within the pomerium, i.e. within the circuit of the Argei shrines.This lustratio,accordingto Bayet, was a direct sequel to the Lemuria, a rite which had been held earlier in the month, on the

9th, 1lth, and 13th, "troisjours hant6spar les spectres".Bayet, however, does not go much further with this idea and leaves it to othersto see if

indeedtherewasanyconnection between theArgeiandtheLemuria. •3 A recentstudyby D.P. Harmon claimsto have found sucha link. It comparesthe Lemuresthat "haunt" the neighborhoods of Rome with the raksasesof ancientVedic religion. Both typesof "demons",according to Harmon,threatenthe powersof fertility and can alsospoilthe efficacy of sacrifices.While in Vedic ritual it is Agni, the god of fire, who is askedto drive out the malevolentspirits, in Rome this becomesthe task of the Vestals. Here is Harmon's conclusion:"In a rite of sympathetic magic, effigiesresemblingcorpseswere castinto the Tiber; andapparently hostile spirits were thoughtto be expelled from the shrinesand carded

awaywith the shackled effigies."•4 Apartfrom whetheror not Harmon's conclusionsare correct, his work has merit since it proposesa link, whateverits precisenature, betweenthe Argei and the Lemuria, and, in so doing, invitesfurther analysis. L.A. Holland's approachto the subjectis similar, except that she positsa connectionbetweenthe Argei and a ritual spelt harvestby the Vestal Virgins from the first half of May. Like R.E.A. Palmer, who concludedthat the Argei effigies were the by-productsfrom the old

thatchingof the auguralhuts,•5 Hollandalsostresses the importance of the material which may have been used in the constructionof the Argei effigies. Shetheorizesthat the Argei shrineswere actuallysmall, symbolic fields which were distributedover the city. The Vestal Virgins, she claims, gathereda specialharvestof spelt from these locationsfor the purposeof making "first-fruit" offeringsto the godsand therebyinsuring a prosperousharvest.Furthermore,Holland arguesthat the Vestals, after having harvestedand preparedthe long-stalkedspelt, collectedthe leftover stalks in bundlesthat were tied once or twice with rope. These remnantsof the speltharvest,accordingto Holland, are what the Vestals threw into the Tiber during the rite of the Argei. The whole affair at the Bridge was but a "natural sequel"to the earlier farming duties of the Vestals. 16

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Certain problemscall into questionHolland's interpretationof the Argei, but leaveintacttheimportantnotionof linkagebetweenthe Vestals'

speltpreparation andthe Bridgeceremony. 17The presentpaperbuilds on this notion, as well as the ones formulatedby Bayet and Harmon, and proposesan explanationof the Argei which connectsthe rite with both the Lemuria and the Vestals' activities.This proposedintegration of all three rituals from the first half of May calls for a closerlook, first at the preparationof the spelt, and then at the Lemuria, in order to test the linkage theoriesof Bayet, Harmon, and Holland, and also to see wheretheremay be additionalpointsof coordinationbetweentheserituals and the Argei itself. V. The Vestals' preparation of spelt Our point of departureis a note in Servius(Auctus),ad E. 8.82: Virgines Vestalestres maximaeex nonisMaiis ad pridie idusMaias alternis diebusspicasadoreas in corbibusmessuariisponunt easque spicas ipsae virgines torrent, pinsunt, molunt atque ita molitum condunt.Ex eo farre virgines ter in anno molamfaciunt, Lupercalibus, Vestalibus,idibus septembribus,adiecto sale cocto et sale duro.

We see from this text that the three leadingVestal Virgins were busy in early May with the preparationof far, or spelt, a primitivetype of grain which was, apparently,the Romans'oldestcereal(Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 2.25.2). By Servius'account,the taskof preparingthefar was performed by the Vestals on alternatedays, from the completionof May 7 (ex nonis) to May 14 (ad pridie idus). If alternis diebusis to be understood in the senseof "every other day", then we see the Vestalsworking on the 8th, 10th, 12th, and 14th of the month. The Vestals' chore, it would

appear,consistedof severalprocesses.The first of thesewas the actual harvest,as is the clear implicationof the words in corbibusmessuariis ponunt.After the gatheringof the crop, the Vestalsare thensaidto roast, pound,andgrindthe spelt,beforestoringit away. Subsequently, according to Servius, at specifictimes of the year, the Vestals add two types of salt to the spelt that they had put away; and the saltedversionof the spelt (probablymade into somekind of a cake or a loaf) is now called mola (salsa).

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As mentionedearlier, Holland argued that the far describedin the Serviusnote was procuredby the Vestals not only for future use as one of the ingredientsin mola salsa, but also as "first-fruit" offerings from early May. What happenedat the Bridge was, by her account,merely a practicalconclusionto this earlier ritual, wherebythe residueof the far was deposited into the river. This reconstruction,however, does not appear likely. For how could a "simple act of housecleaning",or even one that had become"formalized and overlaid with interpretationsremote from its practical beginnings",have attractedthe kind of assemblage

whichwaspresentat the PonsSublicius? 18As we haveseen,not only were the Vestals in attendanceat the Bridge, but also the pontifices, praetors,perhapsthe Flaminica,andwhoeverof the citizenrywas entitled. By way of contrast, we may note that on the 15th of June, the day specified for the removal of purgamina from the aedes Vestae to the Porta Stercoraria, public businesshad to be suspendedand the streets cleared, so that this awkward task could be carded out with the least

exposure. 19And yet, as Hollandwouldhaveit, thepurgaminafrom the spelt harvestwere disposedof in public view and in the presenceof the major dignitariesof Roman religion. A differentreconstruction of the eventsof early May may be sought in the importantfact that the Vestals, by Servius' account,preparedthe

speltin early May.2øNow accordingto Varro (RR 1.32), the normal harvestdate for spelt is immediatelyfollowing the summersolstice,after June 24. Even if we allow for an earlier harvest in Latium, one around

June 13, there still would be a month's discrepancybetweenthat date

andthe Vestals'speltharvestin earlyMay.21The speltgathered by the Vestals, therefore,was prematureby at least a month, and perhapsby even more during the years before the synchronizationof the religious calendarwith the agriculturalcycle throughthe Julian reforms. In the glosswe have been considering,Serviusignoresthe fact that the Vestals could have gatheredonly unripe spelt this early in the year. In severalother ways also, his descriptionof this ritual is incomplete: he saysnothingabout how the Vestals divided their labor over the four days of their activities, about the methodof distributionfor the mola salsa, or even aboutits purpose.Althoughhe seemsto indicatethat the speltfrom early May was simplyplacedin storage,his informationhere may alsobe incomplete(asHolland,supra,contended).Giventheten-year training period which the Vestals had to undergo,as well as the near obsessionwith precisionwhich we find throughoutRomanreligion, we shouldexpect that the Vestals' spelt harvestwas early not becauseof

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chanceor whimsy,but becauseit had to be early.22In otherwords,it may be argued that the spelt was gatheredearly in May becauseit had a more immediate purpose besidesits subsequentuse as one of the ingredientsof mola salsa. Our task, then, is to discoverwhat this prior

purposemay havebeen.23 It has already been noted thatfar was regardedby the ancientsas the oldestagriculturalcrop of Italy. Perhapsfor this very reason,far is also commonlyassociatedin our sourceswith religioussacrifices.As Holland observed, "Ritual conservatism accounted for its survival in ritual

after more nutritiousgrainhad all but supplanted it in humanuse."24 Accordingto Dionysius(Ant. Rom. 2.25.2), every sacrificebegan with an offering of far, probablyof the mola salsa. Althoughmodem writers cannot agree over the purposeof such sacrifices,our ancienttestimonia indicate that, as a rule, cerealswere a suitableoffering in connection with rituals for the spirits of the dead. A passagefrom Horace, for example, recommendsthat the angry Penates,a term which is used in Horaceinterchangeably with Lares and which seemshere to be referring to the ancestraldead, be pacified with farre pio et salientemica (Odes

3.23.19-20).25And although Ovid doesnotspecifysaltedgrain,he does list sparsaefruges in his list of the most appropriateofferingsto the disgruntleddead during the Parentalia(Fasti 2.535 if.). A further point needs to be made here. A certain symbolismor implied narrativecan often be detectedwithin a wide rangeof ceremonies

in Romanreligion,but especiallyin ritualsconcerning the dead.26For example, the customof burying, and not burning, infant corpsesreveals a belief in the importanceof the earth receiving back, and perhaps

returning to life, thosewhodieat a veryyoungage.27 As another example, thereis the practicewherebya torchis quicklypassedbeneaththe corpses of thedescendants of triumphatores in the Forumas a way of symbolizing

theirrightto burialthere.28 And perhapswe can alsolook for somekind of symbolismor implied narrativein the Vestals'preparationof spelt.We needto askwhatpossible significancetheremay have beento the fact that the crop beingharvested was spelt, a cereal which under most circumstances was an appropriate offering to the dead? Moreover, what did it mean when this type of cereal was harvested

a month before its time? And was it a mere coin-

cidencethat the days of the Vestals' spelt preparationencompassed the days of the Lemuria?

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The Lemuria

Ancient testimonyconcerningthe Lemuria, a feast celebratedon the 9th, 11th, and 13th of May is limited, and we have, in fact, only one detailed descriptionof the so-called"rite of thepaterfamilias", Ovid, Fasti 5.42944:

nox ubi iam media est somnoquesilentia praebet, et canis et variae conticuistis aves,

ille memor veteris ritus timidusquedeorum surgit (habent gemini vincula nulla pedes) signaquedat digitis medio cumpollice iunctis, occurrat

tacito ne levis umbra sibi.

cumquemanuspuras fontana perluit unda, vertitur et nigras accipit ante fabas aversusqueiacit; sed dum iacit, "haec ego mitto, his", inquit, "redimo mequemeosquefabis." hoc novies dicit nec respicit: umbra putatur colligere et nullo terga vidente sequi. rursus aquam tangit Temesaeaqueconcrepat aera et rogat ut tectis exeat umbra suis. cum dixit novies "manes exite paterni",

respicitet pure sacraperactaputat.29 Before examining Ovid's narrative, it would be useful first to see what we can find out about these Lemures who come in the middle of

the night. Ovid follows his tale of the paterfamilias with an attemptto arrive at an etymologyfor Lemuria/Lemures.While we can discounthis suggestionthat Lemuria was originally "Remuria" (line 479), we may at the sametime be open to his explanationthat the ghostsof the Lemuria, that is, the Lemures(line 483), were thoughtto be a specialbreed of spectreswho, like Remus, had been separatedfrom their bodies in a violent and untimely way. This is broughtout vividly in the story Ovid tells (lines 451 if.) about the bloodied ghost of Remus, the original Lemur, complainingabout his early demise and asking that Faustulus and Acca establisha specialday of remembrancefor him. Porphyrion'sdefinitionof Lemures(ad Hor. Epist. 2.2.209), umbras vaganteshominumante diem mortuorumet ideo metuendas,corresponds well with Ovid's explanation.Moreover, it helpsus appreciatethe anxiety

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of the paterfamilias who performsthe rites in the middle of the night. Precisionin word and actionmust have been especiallyimportantin the observanceof such critical rites, as the very lives of the celebrant and his family were thoughtto depend on their correctperformance. As F. Cumont has shownin his surveyof Roman attitudestowards death, the yet-to-be expendedenergy of those who had died violently was indeedbelievedto be capableof harmingthe living, but especially

thosewho causedtheir wrongfuldeaths. 3øEvidencefor this kind of a belief is abundantin literature. The shadeof Verginia, for example, is said to go from houseto houseand finds no restuntil sheobtainsrevenge (Livy 3.58). Then there is Dido, who perishesnecfato merita nec morte (Verg. Aen. 4.696), but ante diem subitoque (4.697). omnibus umbra locis adero, she threatensAeneas;dabis improbepoenas (4.386). We can also observethis sinisternotion concerningthe powers of the untimely dead in the defixionum tabellae, cursesthat were buried in the groundin the expectationthat the deadmight carry out the inscribed orders. As Audollent has shown, the untimely dead were most often called upon in these tabellae, since they were thought to be the most

likely to get the taskdone.3• In casesof prematuredeath on the battlefield or away from home-and these must have constituteda good portion of untimely deathsin archaic society--funeral rites would have been hard to come by. This posed a problem, of course, for the deceased;but the family too was affected.Unlessadequatefuneral rites were conducted,the family of the deceasedremainedfunesta (cf. Varro, Ling. Lat. 5.23). Cicero (Leg. 2.22) citesthe specialregulationsof P. Mucius Scaevolaon what a family had to do after the lossof a memberqui in nave necatusdeindein mare

proiectusesset. 32In somecircumstances, the bestthat couldbe hoped for would be a symbolicfuneral, suchas the rite of the membrumabscidi, whereby a single finger, detachedfrom the corpse,was returnedhome for burial (cf. Paulus ex Festo, Festus p. 135 L). When even a finger was hard to come by, the erection of a cenotaphiumwould have to do (cf. Verg. Aen. 6.505-6). This much seemsto be clear: from the perspectiveof the ancient Romans,the Lemureswere the kinds of ghostswho would have inspired fear (metuendae).They were, after all, the restless(vagantes)soulsof thosewho had diedprematurely(ante die?n)and who, consequently, may still have been in need of the necessaryfuneralrites. And thesewere the very spectresthat the paterfamilias of Ovid's story had to reckon with duringhis nocturnalrite. No wonder, therefore,that the purposeof the

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rite was to disinvite the Lemures, especiallysince they would seem to have been capableeven of harming the man and his family. As H.J. Rose has commented,the words and actions of the paterfamilias are intendedto dismissthese"undesirableguests",but with as little offence

to theirfeelingsas possible. 33 To describe,however,thisdomesticritual asmerelya rite of expulsion would be to ignore an importantaspectof Ovid's narrative.The very fact that this encounterwith the dead is occurringinside the home, and not in the fields or in public areas, stronglysuggeststhat the ghostsare wherethey arebecausetheyhavecomehome. Moreover,Ovid emphasizes the familial nature of the Lemuria when, in his introduction to the rite

of the paterfamilias,he calls it a day when grandsons pay their respects to their grandfathers(5.426). The languagethat Ovid employs in the actual narrative of the rite also makes it clear that the Lemures are indeed

domesticghosts,since the paterfamilias refers to them as manespaterni (5.443). Admittedly, there is somethingobviously paradoxicalabout a rite which welcomesGrandfather'sghost,while at the sametime expecting

to sendit on its way as soonas possible. TMThat Lemurescanalsobe manes paterni, however, is in keeping with the Roman ambivalence toward the dead, which can be observed in other funeral rites, like the

conclamatio, where an attempt is made to bring a corpseback to life, while its feet are purposelypointedtoward the door in order to ensure an eventualdeparture(cf. Pliny, NH 7.46, 173). Given that the Lemures were manespaterni or "ancestralghosts", why then were they thought to be "coming home" on the Lemuria? Perhapsthe answer to this may be sought in Ovid's accountof the Lemuria. Still in his introductionto the rite of the paterfamilias, Ovid says that the feast of the Lemuria is a day when offeringsare made to the silent shades, inferias tacitis manibus ilia dabunt (5.422). In the setting of the domesticrite of the paterfamilias, these inferiae turn out to be the fabae nigrae that the celebrantscattersfor the Lemures and whichwin him andhis family redemption(5.438). As studieshaveshown, beans, sometimesin combinationwith spelt, constitutean appropriate

offeringto the dead,in Romanreligionandelsewhere. 35But was this all that the Lemuresrequired?Given their menacingnature and their putativezeal for vengeance,would more inferiaehave to be offeredto them once the rite of the paterfamilias was over? All of which brings us back to the spelt which the Vestal Virgins had preparedon the very daysthat privateghostswere becomingpublic ones. The times of the Vestal ritual and the Lemuria

would seem to have

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been deliberatelycoordinatedin order that state cult could appeasethe Lemurial ghostswith a spelt offering at the very times of their release into the public domain. Moreover, we may further postulatethat the Vestal spelt was a fitting gift to the Lemures, not only becauseof the general appropriateness of far as an offering to the dead, but, just as importantly,becauseof the unripestateof the grainitself. In otherwords, in a ritual act repletewith symbolism,prematuregrain would have been

offeredto the prematurely dead.36 There is, in addition, evidencethat certainbaked goodswhich were madefromfar may have constitutedthesevery offerings.Festus(p. 114 L), citing Aelius Stilo, describesa custom where cakes of far, called maniae, were molded into grotesquehuman shapes.Furthermore,we are told that manias . . . esselarvas, id est manesdeos deasque,quod aut ab inferis ad superosemanant,aut Mania est eorumavia materve. While no special day is given by Festus for this custom, there is reason to believe that it took place on May 11, a day which is notedon the Fasti AntiatesMaiores as belongingto Ma[niae], an underworlddivinity whose name is obviously connectedwith the manes. May 11, it should be recalled, is the secondof the three days of the Lemuria, and follows the secondday of the Vestal speltritual. Given sucha convergence,it may be that the spelt harvestedby the Vestals had been used to make the

maniae,andthatthesecakeswerethenleft asofferings for theLemures? Additional circumstances recommendthis proposedlink betweenthe Vestals and the Lemuria.

It must be remembered

that the Vestals con-

stitutedthemajorexceptionto theprohibitionagainstintra-pomerial burial. Even those Vestals who had violated

their vows and were condemned

to

deathcouldbe interredin the CampusSceleratus, intra urbem.38Given this specialstatusof the Vestals, it follows that they would have a built-in interestin the maintenanceof a kind of psychicpeace within their very own "force field", and that they would assumea major role in the appeasement of ghoststhat were roamingthroughoutthe city. Moreover, the Vestal Virgins, as guardiansof the generalwell-beingand agricultural prosperityof Rome, would likely have been concernedwith placating potentially dangerousLemures and staving off any harm to the city. Finally, the Vestal(s)can be seenperformingthis very samekind of task at the Parentaliain February.Accordingto a notationon the Calendar of Filocalusfor February13, the Virgo Vesta(lis) is said to be appeasing

thesoulsof thedead(parentaO, thoughin waysthatarenotspecified. 39

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VII. The Argei: a sequel to the Lemuria

As we saw earlier, both Bayet and Harmon describedthe rite of the Argei as a kind of processionallustrationafter the phantomvisits of the

Lemures. 4øAnd doubtless, this notionof the Argei as a sequelto the Lemuria has several advantages.First of all, it correspondswell with one of the major testimoniaon the Argei, Plutarch, Quaest. Rom. 86, p. 285, wherethe feastof the Argei is called the "greatestrite of purification" in the city of Rome. Moreover, it tallies with the fact that the same prohibitionagainstmarriagethat appliedduringthe Lemuriawasextended

to the day of the Argei.4• Finally,it makessense,giventhe thesisthat the Vestals' preparationof speltwas an adjunctto the Lemuria, andgiven the fact that the same Vestals were presentat the Pons Subliciuswhen the Argei were thrown into the Tiber. Even if we allow for theseadvantages,however, the notion of a link betweenthe Lemuria and the Argei needsto be amendedbefore it can receive further validation. Most importantly, we have to look again at the Lemuresthemselves.Granted,they were a fearsomegroup, capable of doing harm even to the innocent,and especiallyto thoseresponsible for their untimely deaths. But as we have also seen, the Lemures were the manespaterni, who were owed inferiae in the private rite of the paterfamilias, and who may have been the recipientsof offerings of immaturegrain once they enteredthe public domain. The reason for such reverential treatment, of course, was that the

ancestraldead, no matter what their specificpedigree,were regardedas

gods. 42 As we look againat the rite of the paterfamiliasduringthe Lemuria, we can seethat the very conductof the celebrantindicatesthat he is in the presenceof gods. For example, Ovid says that the paterfamilias, timidus . . . deorum (5.431), does not look back while he intonesthe formulafor redeeminghimselfand the membersof his family, a gesturethat is appropriatefor dealingwith gods.Elsewhere,in Ovid's descriptionof the Parentalia,anotherceremonyfor the dead(Fasti 2.53536), we read that the manes of deceasedancestorsare in fact di and are

due worship.And like the ghostsof the Lemuria, thoseof the Parentalia can also inspire fear. Ovid showsthis in his story of what happened whenthe di parenteswere not paid honors.The consequences of ignoring divine ancestorswere horrible indeed, and the di parenteswere trans-

formed,according to Ovid, into howlingghosts(2.553 f.).43 We can see, therefore,that spiritsof the dead, even the di parentes, were capable of mischief. But the typical attitude towardsthem was

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supplicatory,and not confrontational (cf. Pliny, NH praef. 31: cum mortuis non nisi larvas luctari). To securethe departureof ghosts,one was better off presentingthem with sacrificialgifts insteadof attemptingto captureand destroythem. Accordingly,it doesnot seemat all likely that the manespaterni of the Lemuria, once they had been disinvitedfrom their ancestralhomes, would have been the subjectsof a "searchand destroy"mission.Nor is it conceivablethat the Argei effigies, which endedup beingtossedinto the Tiber, couldhaverepresented the expelled

Lemures,as Bayet and Harmonhad wanted. 44 To continue,we may recall that the Argei shrineswere distributedthroughoutthe city of the Four Regionsand were presumablyconfinedto the area within the pomerium. If, as hasbeenargued,the Vestals'speltwasintendedas offerings to the Lemures who had been released out into the streets, then the

twenty-seven sacraria (literally, "places where sacra have been deposited"),which blanketedthe city, and where, accordingto Livy (1.21.5), "sacrificeswere to be made", wouldhavebeenlogicaldistribution centersfor thesesacrifices.Besides,wanderingghostswould have beenregardedas lessmenacingif they couldbe confinedto the specific Argei shrines, locationsthat might have even served the purposeof providingthe Lemureswith symbolic"tombs".The placement,therefore, of offeringsin the Argei shrines,suchas the unripefar, mighthavebeen one of the ceremonieswhich cameunderthe headingof sacraArgeorum. In that sense,at least, the Argei rite might be seenas a sequelto the Lemuria.

Were thereadditionalcorrespondences? The rite of thepaterfamilias may providea clue. As we have alreadyseen,the celebrant,throughhis scatteringof thefabae nigrae, madea kind of redemptiveofferingto the Lemures.That is, by intoningthe words, redimo mequemeosquefabis (Fasti 5.438), the paterfamilias could expectthat he had won the safety of himselfand his family throughthe offeringof the black beans.Is it possible,therefore,that this redemptiveofferinghad its counterpart in a more public ritual? The rituals of the Compitalia,a festival which was celebratedsoon afterthe Saturnalia,may be instructivehere. From what we can gather, the Lares Compitalesor "ghostsof the crossroads", in a mannertypical of theworldof spirits,wereconsidered to beeitherbeneficent or dangerous to the living. Accordingto Dionysius(Ant. Rom. 4.14.3), chapels(xct•.L66•g), built duringthe time of ServiusTullius, were distributedat

crossroads throughout thecity.'•5Insidethesechapels, onthenightbefore the Compitalia,offeringsof 7re)•ct¾ol, a porridge-type concoction,were

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placed as girls to the Lares. On the outside, there were left hanginga numberof wooleneffigies, one for everyfree memberof the region,and a numberof woolen balls, one for every slave. "The Lares who were propitiatedat the crossroads", explainsFrazer, "were regardedas dangerous spiritswho might be inducedto acceptthe wooleneffigies . . . and

let the livingpeoplealone."46 At least in terms of their basic features, we can see some instructive

correspondences betweentheCompitaliaandtheeventsfromMay.47On both occasions,spiritsare on the prowl and pose a threat to the living. In neither situationis an attempt made either to captureor destroythe menacingspirits;instead,the purposein both is to avert any possible threatsthroughacts of propitiation.To continue,both ritual eventscall for the placementof shrinesor chapelsin strategicallylocated places throughoutthe city. Insidethe chapelsat the crossroads, sacrificialmeals of cooked grain were left behind. We have seen that inside the Argei shrinesthe Vestal spelt, perhapsin the form of maniae, may have been left as offeringsto the Lemures. In addition,ashasbeennotedalready,wooleneffigieswerepositioned in front of the Compitaliachapelsas offeringsto the Lares. And perhaps this is also what took place at the Argei shrines.In other words, like their counterparts from the Compitalia,the Argei shrinesmay havebeen repositoriesfor effigies that had been left there as redemptiveofferings

for wandering shades. 48 Admittedly, this argumentby analogycannot,by itself, prove that the Argei effigies were indeed meant as offeringsfor the Lemures. Nevertheless,in view of the extraordinarysimilaritiesbetweenthe Argei and the Compitalia, it would seem rash to dismisssuch an argument altogether.If nothingelse, it can at least servethe purposeof demonstrating,once again, that the Argei effigies could not have represented the Lemures,just as the wooleneffigiesof the Compitaliacouldnot have represented theLares,sincebothtypesof effigiesweremeantasofferings. What remainsnow is to addressthe questionsof what the Argei effigiesreally stoodfor and why they may haveseemedto be particularly appropriateofferingsto the Lemures. VIII.

The Etruscan background

With the exceptionof Festus(p. 452 L), who positsarcereas the possible root of Argei (after the storyof the virtuoussonwho hid his father after

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the Gallic Sack), all the ancientwriters who try to explain the word take it to mean"of Argos", "Argives","Greeks".Or, asVarro statessuccinctly,

Argei ab Argis (Ling. Lat. 7.44).49We havealso seenthat mostof the ancient aetiologiesfor the celebrationof the Argei proceedfrom this understandingof the word, so that the Bridge ceremonyand the Argei shrineswere explained as being commemorativein some way of the deaths of Greeks.

Given the preponderance of this view in our ancientsources,it would not seem unreasonableto supposethat there may have been something more to this notion than mere "folk etymologies".Mention has already been made (see note 2) of the fact that G. Wissowa wanted to explain the Argei as a ceremonywhich commemoratedthe death-by-drowning of twenty-sevenGreek captives from the time between the First and the SecondPunic Wars. Many writers have sinceshownthe impossibilityof this theory, both becauseof the silenceof Varro and of Livy's epitomizers concerningthis hypotheticalevent, and also becauseof the general high

regardin whichGreekswereheldin thateraof a growingphilhellenism. 50 But what if the origins of the Argei were to be soughtin a much earlier period, when Greeks were viewed with suspicionand perhapseven as mortalenemies?In otherwords, would the sacrificeof Wissowa's"captive Greeks"make more senseif placedin a more distantera, when Romans may have died in battlesagainstGreeks and when a sacrificeof Greeks would

have constituted

a retribution

for such deaths?

The earliestopportunitiesfor Romansto form any kind of considered opinion concerningGreeks probably came during the sixth century}•c, a time when Rome was becoming '% grande Roma dei Tarquinii" and when, throughEtruscanmediation,therewas a significantinflux of Greek

culture. 5• It wasalsoduringthisperiodthatRome,underEtruscan overlords, came into increasingpolitical and military contactwith the Greeks of Magna Graecia. What follows, then, is an outline of two accountsof clashesbetweenthe Etruscanempire and the Greek world, along with an examinationof the influence such events may have had on Romans and their developmentof a certain attitude towardsGreeks. By the middle of the sixth century, a pattern emerges where a Phocaeanthalassocracy inhibitsEtruscanmovementin the westernMediterranean,or conversely,where Etruscansbar Phocaeansfrom establishing permanentbasesin Sardinia and Corsicaand from accessto their existingcoloniesin southernFranceand Spain. Also in the sixth century, Etruscanexpansioninto Campania,begunalreadyin the previouscentury, becomesmore deliberateand takes on the characteristicsof a military

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invasion. 52 A brief look at two episodes,one from eachof thesetwo areas of conflict, can show the extent and intensity of these hostilities. Etruscanand Greek frequently fought over control of Corsica and Sardinia during the sixth century. In at least one instance, the conflict was not only massive,but it involved the large-scaleexecutionof Greek captivesby their Etruscancaptors.Accordingto Herodotus(1.163 if.), for a period of five years before the outbreakof war, Phocaeanshad harassedandplunderedall their neighbors,includingthe Etruscans.When war finally erupted(in c. 535), sixty Phocaeanvesselsand a combined fleet of one hundredand twenty Etruscanand Carthaginianshipsengaged in a major sea battle off the coastof Alalia. The Phocaeans,we are told, won only a "Cadmean"victory and left behindthe survivorsof the forty shipsthey had lost. Herodotusadds that most of these captivesfell into the handsof Etruscansfrom Caere, who took their prisonersashoreand promptly stonedthem to death. To atone for thesemurders,concludes Herodotus, the Caeretansinstitutedannual funeral rites and games. As for the other area of conflict, Dionysiusof Halicarnassus(7.3.1) tells of a large Etruscaninvasionof Campania,probablyof c. 524 Together with their Daunian and Umbrian allies, an Etruscanarmy of supposedlyhalf a million--Dionysius does not name the specificcities that sent troops--attackedthe Greeks of Cumae, only to be repulsedby the braveryof 4,500 Cumaeansand their leaderAristodemus.Aside from some of its details, Dionysius' accounthas been shown to be reliable, especiallysinceits ultimatesourceseemsto have beena Cumaeanchron-

icle, andnot the distortion-prone annalistic tradition. 53For us, it simply servesthe purposeof demonstrating the magnitudeof the wars between Etruscansand the cities of Magna Graecia. During the years of theseconflictsbetweenGreeks and Etruscans,

the city of Rome, as is generallyacknowledged,was within the political,

military,andculturalsphereof the Etruscans. 54Whetheras oneof the lead players, or in a supportingrole, EtruscanRome could thus be expectedto have taken part in the wars againstthe Greeks of Magna Graecia and the western Mediterranean. Massive battles, such as the ones

at Cumae or Alalia, must have producedmany casualties,as well as long-livedattitudes.EtruscanRome, asa participantin extensivehostilities with Greeks,would naturallyhave cometo perceivethem asthe "enemy". Could this notionconcerningGreekshave found its way into the religion of Etruscan

Rome?

A working assumptionhere is that the Etruscans,a peopleante omnes alias... deditareligionibus(Livy 5.1.6), had transmittedto Rome many

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of their religious ceremoniesand attitudes.Moreover, a review of some of the more obviousEtruscancontributionsto Roman religion (e.g., the conceptof a mundus, an opening through which the dead return to the realm of the living; the cessationof burialsin the Forum;the representation of ancestorsin funeralprocessions) revealsa patternwherebyan especially pronouncedEtruscan influence can be seen in those Roman ceremonies

andreligiousattitudes whichconcerned the deadandthe afterlife.55 Given this significantEtruscaninfluenceon Roman ceremoniesinvolving the dead, we can proceedto examine some events in Roman history which may offer us a refractedview of an originally Etruscan practice. Our first comesfrom 224 Be, and it showsRomanspracticing humansacrifice.Accordingto Plutarch(Marc. 3.3), uponthe instructions of the Sibylline Books, a pair of Greeks and a pair of Gauls were buried alive in the Forum Boarium. The secondritual again involved human sacrifice. Livy (22.57.6) says that, after the disaster at Cannae, two Greeksand two Gauls, the samenumberand type of victims as before, were entombedat the same site, the Forum Boarium. Plutarch (Quaest. Rom. 83, pp. 283-284), our source for the third ritual, tells about the sacrificialdeathsof anothertwo pairs of Greeksand Gauls. The occasion for thisthird ritualkilling wasa scandalwhichinvolvedthe VestalVirgins and which appearsto have taken place towards the end of the second

centuryBC.56 Some pointsneed to be made here. AlthoughLivy claims (22.57.6) that humansacrificeswere alien to the Romanmentality(minime Romano sacro),we seethatthe gladiatorialludi, whichlikely originatedin Etruscan funeral"games"involvinghumansacrifice,ultimatelyreflectthe Etruscan

notionthathumanvictimsareappropriate sacrifices to thedead.37Another point is that the site of the executionsin two of the three episodesof human sacrifice in Rome was the Forum Boarium, a location that had

Etruscanassociations,since it was there that the first gladiatorialludi were held at the funeral

of D.

Brutus Pera in the middle

of the third

century (Valerius Maximus 2.4.7). A third point is that the reportsof humansacrificewhich have been cited are obviouslynot first-hand. This is to be expected,since, as A. Henrichshas shown, "No authenticeyewitnessreport of humansacrifice or ritual murderexistsin all of Greek andLatin literature.-58Nevertheless, as Henrichs goes on to explain, in a kind of psychologyof human sacrifice, even an imaginedhuman sacrifice"... can tell us as much, or even more, about human habits as a real one."

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Accordingly, the selectionof Greek and Gallic victims in all three of the instances of human sacrifice

from the third and second centuries

ought to tell us somethingabout Roman attitudestowards Greeks and Gauls. In regard to the Gallic victims, their selectionmay be explained as a result of Rome's many wars against the Gauls and the ensuing

perception thatGauls,as an enemynation,wereappropriate victims. 59 But as far as the Greek victims of these sacrifices are concerned,

Romans were not fighting Greeks during the periodsin questions,but instead were being "captured"by the civilization of Greece. A likely explanationfor the choiceof Greek victims, therefore,would be to regard

the practiceas part of Rome'sEtruscanlegacy. 6øIn otherwords,the killing of Greeks in humansacrifice,real or imagined,may have been originally an Etruscanrite in which the selectionof Greek victims had once seemedappropriatebecauseof the perception--longsinceforgotten by Roman practitionersof the ritual--that Greeks were the enemy and that their deaths could atone for the deaths that they themselveshad caused.

In view of the discussionjust concluded,it would appear that a ceremony,where "captive Greeks"-•they were tied "hand and foot" weregatheredtogetherandthenbroughtto thePonsSubliciusfor disposal, may have alsohad its originsin EtruscanRome of the sixthcentury.For just as with the sacrificesfrom the third and secondcenturies,the choice of Greek victims at the Argei ceremonymakessenseonly if the custom can be traced back to an era when Greeks were an enemy nation. IX.

A reconstruction

We have, it would appear, from the first half of May a complex of religious observanceswhich, becauseof their commonpurpose,can be seenas the different stagesto a ceremonyof aversionand propitiation. The Lemuria, held on the 9th, 1lth, and 13th of May, is at the core of this complexof rites. Originally, it may havebeen simply a privateritual during which the ancestraldead "come home". But even domesticrites, and especiallythosewhich concernthe dead, suchas the Lemuria, had to be performedin a timely way. And so it is that we find the Lemuria

markedin large,capitalletterson thefasti.61 As a ritual for the dead, the Lemuria was doubtlesspart of what

A.K. Michelscalls"the oldeststratum"in the religionof Rome.62But like other festivalsfrom this ancient layer, the Lemuria too was likely

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to have been changedor modified duringthe new circumstances of the sixth century.Whereasin a pre-EtruscanRome, the rite of the paterfamilias would have renderedthe Lemuresharmlessuntil the following year, in the new setting of an EtruscanRome, the expulsionof the Lemuresinto the neighborhoods of the city might have poseda problem

which could not be ignored. 63 Given the pronounced concernof the Etruscansover placatingthe soulsof the dead, additionalmeasuresnow had to be taken on behalf of the community. Vestal Virgins, as representativesof statecult, were instructedto prepareon the 8th, 10th, 12th, and 14th of May, four days which encapsulate the Lemuria, a harvest of spelt. Becauseof its antiquity,far was a suitableofferingto ghosts even from the remotepast. The Vestal harvest,however,was a month early, and deliberatelyso, sincethe intent of the ritual was to make a symbolicallyappropriateoffering of prematuregrain for the prematurely dead. With the Vestal Virgins in charge,the unripe speltwas fashioned into suitableofferings,perhapsthe so-calledrnaniae.In keepingwith the Etruscanpenchantfor precisionin ritual, the wanderingLemureswere expectedto collecttheir giftsof prematuregrainat twenty-seven specially designatedshrines,all within the sacredboundaryof the porneriurn. But besidessuch gifts of food, still another practice came to be graftedon to the LemuriaduringRome'sEtruscanphase."Human"sacrificial victims, in the form of straw effigies, were kept for the Lemures in the same twenty-sevenshrines,possiblysince a processionback in March had put themthere. The effigies, and the shrinesafter them, were called "Argei" or "Greeks", since they representedat the time of the institutionof this practicea peoplewho, becauseof their wars against Etruscansin the sixth century, were perceivedin EtruscanRome as the "enemy nation", and who, as a result, were thoughtto be suitableredemptiveofferingsto the Lemures,manyof whom may havedied at the hands of Greeks.

Following the days of the Lemuria, ministersof statecult gathered the Argei effigiesfrom the shrines,wherethey had been"visited"by the Lemures, and broughtthem, throughthe Forum Boarium, to the Pons Sublicius. Here, the "captive" Argei were thrown into the Tiber. The Bridgeceremonyof the 15thof May wasthusthe final actof the Lemuria. To conclude,this reconstruction is proposedas one which seemsto fit best the available evidence. Moreover, it has the advantageof integratingthe Lemuria for the first time with both the Vestals' preparation of spelt and the Bridge ceremony.In the resultingsynthesis,we see native Roman and Etruscanrites working togetherto avert and appease

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the dead that have "come home". It is hoped that, throughthis kind of analysis,at least some of the piecesof the Argei puzzle•nly one of many that this religion without a mythology has left behind-•can be better identified

and understood.

Blaise Nagy

College of the Holy Cross

NOTES

1. H.J. Rose, The Roman Questionsof Plutarch (1924) 98. 2. For a list of works on the Argei up to 1953, see J. Le Gall, Recherches sur le culte du Tibre (1953) 83-87. Perhapsthe three most noteworthyof the earliereffortsto solvethe Argei riddle are thoseof G. Wissowa,s.v. Argei, RE II (1896), cols. 689-700 ( = GesammelteAbhandlungen(1904) 211 if.); W. Warde Fowler, The religiousexperienceof theRomanpeople(1922) 321-23 andpassim; and J.G. Frazer, The Fasti of Ovid IV (1929) 74 if. Briefly, Wissowa argued thatthe SibyllineOracle,from the time betweenthe First andSecondPunicWars, had called for the death-by-drowning of twenty-sevenGreek captives,and that the Argei ceremonywas meantto commemorate yearlythis allegedevent. Warde Fowler counteredthat the ritual drowningof effigies•only simulacrawere ever used--was a symbolicdramatizationof Nature'syearly eliminationof deadmatter and the substitutionof new life. As for Frazer, he maintainedthat the Argei ceremonywasoriginallyan attemptto appeasethenewly-bridgedTiber by offering to its waters effigies in place of the human victims to which the river had previouslybeen entitled. See also his Loeb editionof the Fasti (1931) 425 if. (cf. n. 44 infra). 3. Wissowa, 1.c.

4. Several festivals seem to lend themselvesto this kind of analysis. For

example,as G. Dum6zil (ArchaicRomanreligion (1970) 380) has shown,the Fordicidia(April 15) and the Cerialia(April 19) are bestunderstood if they are seenas being in a close alliance, both becauseof the proximityof their dates, and alsobecauseof the interdependence of the gods(Tellus and Pales)to whom they are addressed.Dum6zil, and others,alsotry to showechoesand resonances betweenfestivalsthat are, in someinstances,separatedby severalmonths.Such alliances, of course, are harder to demonstrate.For a generaldiscussion,see A. Degrassi,InscriptionesItaliae XIII 2, 366 f.

5. J.Bayet, LaReligion romaine: Histoire politique etpsychologique 2(1969)

97-98; L.A. Holland, Janusand the bridge (1961) 313-31; D.P. Harmon, "The publicfestivalsof Rome",ANRW II 16.2 (1978) 1446-59. See alsoM. Torelli, Lavinio e Roma (1984) 102-3, 121, where the argumentis madethat the Argei

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event in March was coordinatedwith the festivalof Anna Perenna,the Agonium, and the Liberalia of March 15-17, and that the May 15 ceremonyof the Argei was connectedwith Maia, Volcanus, and the May Agonium. 6. The idea of linking all three ritualswas suggested to me by ProfessorL. Richardson,Jr. I alsowish to acknowledgethe helpfulcriticismsof Dr. T. Sellers, who gave a responseto an earlier versionof this paper at a meetingof the New England Ancient History Colloquium, and of the anonymousReadersand the Editor

of this Journal.

7. Collectedin G. Lugli, Fontes ad topographiamveterisurbisRomae pertinentes I (1952) 75-78. 8. Harmon (cit. n. 5) 1448-49.

9. Cf. H. Jordan, Topographieder Stadt Rom II (1871) 237 if.; M. Van Doren, "Les sacraria,cat•gorie m•connued'edifices sacr•s",AC 27 (1958) 74.

10.Cf. I.A. Richmond andJ. North, OCD 2 (1970)856,s.v.pomerium. 11. Cf. J.P. N•raudau, "Sexagenariide ponte", REL 56 (1978) 159-74. O. Nicholson,"Herculesat the Milvian Bridge",Latomus43 (1984) 133-42, explains how Lactantius,Divine Institutes1.21.6-9, took advantageof thispopularnotion by claimingthat the EmperorMaximian had in fact thrownsomeelderlyinto the Tiber, not from the SublicianBridge--Lactantiusmay have forgottensome of the detailsof the story--but from the Milvian. 12. R. Schillinggives a bibliographyof works from 1950 to 1970 in ANRW I 2 (1972) 317 if. For more recent writings on the Argei, see the article by Harmon(cit. n. 5) 1446-59. Someof the importantattemptsduringthe lastforty yearsto explainthe Argei include:K. Latte, Rgimische Religionsgeschichte (1960) 412-14 (the Argei ceremonyis a ritual of atonementandpurification);G. Dum•zil (cit. n. 4) 448-50 (the Argei ceremonywas a scape-goatritual); J. Hallett, "Over troubledwaters", TAPA 101 (1970) 219-27 (the Argei ceremonyis connected with the cult of the Tiber); R.E.A. Palmer, The archaic communityof the Romans (1970) 84-97 (the Argei effigieswere the remnantsof the thatchingmaterialfor auguralhuts);G. Maddoli, "I1 rito degli Argei", PP 138 (1971) 153-66 (the Argei ceremony was part of an early Hera cult); D. Porte, "La noyade rituelle des hommesde jonc", in R. Altheim-Stiehl and M. Rosenbach(eds.), Festschrift Gerhard Radke (1986) 193-211 (the Argei were clay mannequins(Argei from argilla) which were thrown into the Tiber as offeringsto those who had died from drowning, in a parentatio per imitationemmortis). 13. Bayer (cit. n. 5) 31-32, 97-98. 14. Harmon (cit. n. 5) 1455-59. 15. cit. n. 12.

16. Holland (cit. n. 5) 313-31. 17. See the criticismsby Harmon (cit. n. 5) 1451-52. 18. Holland (cit. n. 5) 322. 19. Cf. Plutarch, Numa 14.1. 20. The speltis referredto as spicae, i.e. immatureearsof grain (cf. Servius, ad G. 1.314), in Servius' descriptionof the Vestal harvest.

24

BLAISE

NAGY

21. See A.L. Broughton,."The Menologia Rustica", CP 31 (1936) 353-56. 22. On the rigorsof the Vestals'training,seePlutarch,Numa 10.1; Dionysius, Ant.

Rom.

2.67.2.

23. Anotherexampleof sacrificialmaterialshavingboth an immediateand a more distantpurposecan be seenin the activitiesof the Vestalsduringthe feast of the October Horse and the Parilia of April 19. The sacrificeof a race horse in October, whoseseveredtail, drippingwith blood, was broughtto the Regia, had as its immediatepurposethe blessingof the crops (cf. Paulusex Festo, Festusp. 246 L). Several months later, at the Parilia, the Vestals, who had preservedsome of the dried blood, made it available for use as one of the suffimenta for that feast (Ovid, Fasti 4.731-34). In addition, there is reasonto believe that the ashesof unborncalves, which the Vestalsmadeready duringthe Fordicidiaof April 15, were usedas a suffimennot only duringthe Parilia, but at othertimesduringthe year as well: cf. W. Warde Fowler, The Romanfestivals (1925) 83. 24. Holland (cit. n. 5) 318.

25. Horace may, in fact, have in mind here the domesticritualsof the Parentalia. Cf. S. Eitrem, Opferritusund Voropfer(1914/15) 261 ff., and E. Samter, Familienfesteder Griechen und Rrmer (1901) 1 if., where it is arguedthat the sprinkling of grain is an offering to Earth and to the dead, or to the Lares familiares in the context of the home. Latte (cit. n. 12) 387, disagrees. 26. Cf. F. Cumont,After life in Romanpaganism(1923) 49, 52; Latte 98-103. 27. Cf. Juv. 15.139: Pliny, NH 7.72. See Latte 100 n. 3. 28. Plutarch,Quaest.Rom. 79, p. 283. 29. Loeb text (J.G. Frazer, ed.). 30. Cumont (cit. n. 26) 128-47.

31. A. Audollent, Defixionum tabellae (1904) 40. 32. Cf. J. Annequin,Recherchessur l'action magique et ses reprdsentations (1973) 159. Concernover improperburials,an anxietythat may well be part of the human condition, is often expressedin our sourcesfor ancientRome. Formulationsof thisfear are especiallynumerousin theAeneidof Vergil, who seems to exhibit a keen sensitivityin regard to the thoroughand correctperformance of funeralrites. Cf. the storiesof Polydorus(3.22 if.), Palinurus(5.835 if.), and Misenus (6.156 if.). 33. AncientRoman religion (1948) 34. 34. Latte (cit. n. 12) 99 and F. Brmer, Ovid, die Fasten II (1958) 319 regard the phrasemanespaterni as a mistakeor euphemismof Ovid, or of his source. Dum•zil (cit. n. 4) 367 n. 13, seesno reasonfor questioningOvid's accuracy here.

35. Cf. C. Lrvi-Strauss,"Pythagorasin America", in Fantasy and symbol, ed. R. Hook (1979) 33-39.

36. The useof speltin offeringsto the Lemuresmay haveprecededits more generaluse as one of the primaryingredientsin mola salsa. In any case,once the two types of salt had been added and a secondtoastinghad taken place

THE ARGEI PUZZI.E

25

(passuraque farre bis ignem, saysOvid, Fasti 1.693), the speltwould have been transformedinto a substantiallydifferentoffering. 37. Degrassi(cit. n. 4) 456, endorsesthe restorationand a connectionwith the Lemuria.

38. Servius, ad. Aen. 11.206.

39. Cf. Degrassi(cit. n. 4) 408. 40. Supra, p. 6. 41. Cf. Porte (cit. n. 12) 200.

42. Cf. F. B6mer, Ahnenkultund Ahnenglaubeim alten Rom (1943) 34 if. That the ancestraldead were to be regardedas gods is statedin an injunction from the XII Tables, which Cicero cites in Leg. 2.9.22. 43. Aside from the fact that the Lemureswere thoughtof primarily as the manesof the prematurelydead, any otherdistinctionbetweenthemandthe manes of the Parentalia seemscontrived. But cf. B6mer (cit. n. 34) 315. 44. Frazer briefly entertainedthe notion of a link betweenthe Lemufia and the Argei, beforedismissingit in favor of his "fiver-worship"theory (Fasti of Ovid IV, pp. 90-91). On the basisof his first hypothesis,Frazer had surmised that the "goblin crew" of the Lemures, under the guise of rush puppets,had to be trackeddown and taken to the Tiber for disposal.In the Loeb edition of the Fasti (1931), Frazer seemsmore open to this explanation,but still opts for the "fiver-worship"theory (pp. 425-29). 45. See also Paulus ex Festo, Festusp. 108 L; Macrobius, Sat. 1.7.34. 46. Frazer, Fasti of Ovid II, p. 455. 47. L.R. Taylor, The voting districtsof the Roman Republic (1960) 76, allows that the cult of the LaresCompitalesmay have been"relatedto the Argei". Latte (cit. n. 12) 414 sees a parallel betweenthe Argei effigies and those from the Compitalia. 48. Latte 412, following earlierviews (seeJ. Marquardt,R6mischeStaatsverwaltung III (1885) 192), thoughtthe effigies were placedin the Argei shrineson March

16/17.

49. Cf. Ennius,Ann. 114, p. 79 Skutsch,with commentaryon pp. 267-68. In spite of the statementin Varro and Dionysius'translationof the Latin Argei as Argeioi, Latte 413 questionsthe connectionof Argei with Argi, -orum, and puts the name into that large group of Roman cultic words "deren Etymologie wir nichtkennen".See alsoHolland (cit. n. 5) 313, and L. Clerici, "Die Argei", Hermes77 (1942) 90. There is at leastthe possibilitythat Argei becamepart of the languageof Romanreligion at the very time whenthere was a greatdeal of interminglingbetweenLatin and Etruscanin the religiousvocabularyof Rome. Cf. L.R. Taylor, Local cults in Etruria (1923) 8; W. Schulze,Zur Geschichte lateinischerEigennamen (1904) 126. 50. Cf. Warde Fowler (cit. n. 2) 321. 51. The phrasecomesfrom G. Pasquali,La Nuova Antologia (1936) 405 if.

Cf. Bayet, Herculeromain(1926); R. Schilling,"La religionromainede V6nus", BEFAR 178 (1954) 76 if.

26

BLAISE

NAGY

52. Cf. J.-P. Morel, "L'expansionphocrenneen occident",BCH 99 (1975) 853-96; M. Frederiksen,"The Etruscansin Campania",and J. and L. Jehasse, "The Etruscansand Corsica", in D. Ridgway and F.R. Ridgway (eds.), Italy before the Romans(1979), chapters11 and 12 respectively. 53. For an analysisof Dionysius' sources,see A. Alfrldi, Early Rome and the Latins (1965) 56 ff. Cf. U. Cozzoli, "Aristodemo Malaco", Miscellanea Greca e Romana (1965) 5-30.

54. Cf. L. Homo, L'ltalie primitive (1925) 162: "Les Etrusquesavaient fait de Rome la base de leur domination

dans le Latium

et la ville avait exerc6 h ce

titre une vrritable hrgrmonie au seindu payslatin." For a morerecentassessment

ofEtruscan Rome, seeT.J.Cornell, "Rome andLatium to390B.C.",CAHVII2

2 (1989) 243-57. 55. See Latte (cit. n. 12) 155-57; L. Banti, "II culto dei morti nella Roma antichissima",SIFC 7 (1929) 171-98. On the more generalsubjectof the relationship betweenthe religionsof Etruria and Rome, see Dumrzil (cit. n. 4) 625 if. As M. Pallottinohas observed(The Etruscans(1955) 139), "Religion was that portionof the Etruscanlegacywhich Rome acknowledgedwith the leastreserve." 56. See A.M. Eckstein, "Human sacrifice and fear of military disasterin RepublicanRome", AJAH 7 (1982) 69-95. 57. Cf. Latte (cit. n. 12) 155-56; Bayet (cit. n. 5) 75. Accordingto Suetonius (DJ 26.2), Caesar stagedgladiatorialshowson the occasionof his daughter's death.

58. A. Henrichs, "Human sacrifice in Greek religion", Le sacrifice dans l'Antiquitd. FondationHardt, Entretiens27 (1980) 197 if. 59. This is Dumrzil's explanation(cit. n. 4) 449 n. 9. 60. Rose (cit. n. 1) 203 thinks, "The whole affair was Etruscan."Cf. Eckstein (cit. n. 56) 81, with nn. 55 and 56. 61. For a historyof the controversy surrounding the meaningof the large-letter entries,seeA.K. Michels, The calendarof the RomanRepublic(1967), Appendix 4. Michels herself argued (p. 133) that the large letters signify "... not the oldestbut the most importantelementsin the calendar". Numerousexplanationshavebeenofferedfor the total absenceof any references to the Argei from the extantfasti. Latte (cit. n. 12) 414 thinks that the Argei ceremonywas one of the feriae conceptivae("movablefeasts")which, because of their variable dates--they usually vary only a few days--were not always enteredin the fasti. Harmon (cit. n. 5) 1448, 1459, cites a passagein Festus (284 L), where a distinction is made between sacra publica, which were pro populo, and thosewhich were pro montibus,pagis, curiis, sacellis. The Argei, accordingto Harmon,were sacrapublicapro sacellis,and would not have been mentionedin the calendars,whichlist only sacrapublicapro populo. Cf. Degrassi (cit. n. 4) 458, wherea similarreasonis given.Michels' explanation(pp. 133-34) may have the greatestmerit: "The feriale doesnot includedayson which were celebratedcertainrites which have no specificnames, suchas thoseon which the munduswas open, the ancilia were moved, or the Vestalswent to the Argei."

THE ARGEI

PUZZI E

27

Finally, if the thesisof the presentpaperis correct,that the Argei ceremonywas simply an enlargementof the Lemuria, then this too might accountfor its absence from

the calendars.

62. Michels

137-38.

63. Cf. Michels 139: "The tendencytowardsformalization in the religion of the state . . . would result inevitably from the growing complexityof the state .... "Cf. p. 140: "A richer society. . . [and] one with more leisurewill invent more prolongedrites .... "

IN

THE ORDER OF EVENTS AMMIANUS MARCELLINUS 23.5.4-25

Elucidationof Ammianus' accountof the emperorJulian'smarch in April 363 from Circesiumto Zaitha and thenceto Dura-Europoshas for more thana centurybeenanimatedby the convictionthat the text is problematic. The difficulty arisesfrom Ammianus' attributionof a speechto Julian in what appearsto be the wrongplaceandtime. AmmianusplacesJulian's hortatoryaddressto his men after Julian'sdeparturefrom Circesiumand while en route from Zaitha to Dura (23.5.15-25). Zosimus (3.13.3), on the other hand, locateswhat is assuredlythe same speechat Circeslum, where it seemsmore suitable. For it was from this farthestoutpostof the Roman Empire that Julian launchedhis attack on Persia, and an

exhortation at thatpointin theline of marchhasobviousverisimilitude. • Conversely, Ammianus' location of the addresswithin the bordersof Persianterritory runs counter to the conventionalprocedurewe expect from Roman generals,who outlinetheir goalsbeforeinvasion,not after it. Hence closescrutinyof Ammianus'text to mitigate, if possible,the disagreementbetweenhim and Zosimus, and the significanceextracted from Ammianus' double mention of Dura, once in 23.5.8 and again in 24.1.5. For it has been widely held that the first notice (togetherwith the referenceto Zaitha) is an anticipation,whetherby mistakeor otherwise, of 24.1.5, whereasthe addressgiven in 23.5.15 if. was intended

by Ammianus to connect directlywithJulian'sdeparture fromCirceslum. 2 E.A. Thompsonassumedthat 23.5.7 f. is a "doublet" of 24.1.5, an editorialmistakecommittedby Ammianusby his insertionof the reference

to ZaithaandDurain the wrongplace.3 Otherscholars suggest instead that Ammianus'

reference to Zaitha

and Dura occurs in the midst of a

digression whichdeparts fromstrictchronology. 4On thisview,Ammianus pursueda discussionof the unfavorableomensJulianmet with en route from Circeslumto Dura, and returnedto his startingpoint and Circeslum

ASSYRI

A

o Hatra

VEL

MESOPOTAMIA ;ium

Zautha. Zaitha 35

DuraEuropos Phathousas&natha Thiluta

•uphrate•. SCALE

Achaia•:hal• 1 O0 km

Route of Julian's march from Circesium

to Dura and southeast from Dura

30

CHARLES

W. FORNARA

in 23.5.15, when and where the addresswas given. Still other scholars accept the apparent sequencein Ammianus but concludethat he has intentionallypervertedthe correctorder, arbitrarilydecidingto place the

speechnearZaitha.s As I arguehere, the notorious"doublet"whichin one way or anotheris allegedto mar or complicateAmmianus' narration of this first stageof Julian'sinvasionof Persianterritory(23.5.7-14 with 24.1.1-5) is not only imaginary,but the order of eventspresentedby him, though impugned,is in all probabilitycorrect. That the stagesand eventsof Julian'smarchfrom Circesiumto Dura as given by Ammianus proceedin a sequencethat is intrinsically unobjectionable (different though it is from the parallel accountgiven by

Zosimusin 3.13.2-14.2)6 can be established by a cursoryreview.We begin at Circesium, where Julian lingeredas he awaited the passageof his army southof the city over a bridge of boats spanningthe Abora(s) (23.5.4). Ammianusinformsus that a letterreachedhim duringthat time from his prefect Sallustiusurging him to abandonthe invasion.Julian disdainedthe advice and hastenedforward by orderingthe bridge to be dismantledimmediatelyafter his crossing,thus eradicatingany vestige of a hopein his men that a returnwas possible:posthabitotamensuasore cautissimofidentius ultra tendebat, quoniamnulla vis humana vel virtus meruisse unquampotuit, ut quod praescripseratfatalis ordo non fiat. statimquetransgressus pontem avelli praecepit, ne qui militum ab agminibuspropriis revertendifiducia remaneret(23.5.5). The army, as it passedfrom Circesium, viewed an ominoussight

(23.5.6), andproceeded, with Ammianuspresent, ? to Zaitha,nearwhere Julianmadesacrificeat the cenotaphof GordianIII. 8 Ammianusthus describesthe next stageof the journey (23.5.8): ubi cum ingenitapierate consecratoprincipi parentassetpergeretque ad Duram, desertumoppidum,procul militarem cuneumconspicatus stetitimmobiliseiquedubitanti,quidferrent, offerturab eis immanissimi corporis leo, cum aciem peteret multiplici telorum iactu confossus.

It follows from cumpergeret ad Duram that Julian was on the march to Dura, having left Zaitha, when he was interruptedby the cuneus.The gift of the lion presentedby this detachmentprecipitateda discussion betweenpessimisticharuspicesandoptimisticphilosophiaboutthe omen's

AMMIANUS

MARCELLINUS

23.5.4-25

31

meaning(23.5.10-11), a controversyrenewedthe next day, 7 April, on the appearanceof still other signs. Somewhere between Zaitha and Dura, Julian made the decision to

addresshis men. Ammianusimplies that the controversyof the last two days contributedto this decision; we are reminded of the connection betweenJulian'srejectionof Sallustius'adviceand his spiritedcommand to removethe bridge. The formal explanationprovidedby Ammianusis, however, somethingelse again--a backwardreferenceto the removalof the bridge over the Abora togetherwith the observationthat all his men were now gatheredon this side of it (23.5.15):

fracto, igitur, ut ante dictumest, ponte cunctisquetransgressisimperator antiquissimumomniurn ratus est militem alloqui sui rectorisquefiducia properantemintrepide. fracto MommsenPraetor¾E perfectoEm2 (in marg.) peractoGelenius cunctisqueE Geleniuscunctiquae¾ cunctisMommsen The motivation ascribed to Julian seems forced, better suited to a

speechdeliverednearCircesium,immediatelyafterpassage of the Abora. However, thoughwe may doubt the cogencyof Ammianus' explanation for Julian's decision to address his men and even accuse him of careless

reasoning, 9 theactualsequence of events(asopposed to hisexplanation of their logical nexus)is lockedby him into an uncompromising frame-

work.l0 Ammianus unquestionably believedthatthespeech wasdelivered after Julian and the soldiers had seen Gordian's

tomb.

The fact is not

only emphasized in the speechitself(23.5.17),l• but is corroborated by an importantphrasein the very sentencewe are considering:militem ... properantemintrepide.properareis the properword for a swiftly moving

army(see,e.g., 14.2.20, 17.12.9,26.7.3), andwiththisverb•2Ammianus guaranteesthat in his conceptionof the order of eventsthe army has traversedsome distancewith rapidity. Hence also the presenceof the adverb intrepide, for the notion of "fearlessness" is accommodatedto the presenceof the army in enemy territory, not on its margins. We must therefore take the sentenceas we find it, and not succumbto the needless

and methodologicallyimpropertemptationto scramblethe order of a cogentseriesmerely becausewe take againstan explanatoryinference adducedby the authorof this history. A sequenceof events, if it is explicit and corroborated by interlocking detail (23.5.17), takes

32

CHARLES

W. FORNARA

precedenceover our acceptanceor rejectionof the explanationsdevised by a historianto link togetherdiscreteepisodes. After the conclusion of the address,joyfully receivedby the soldiery (23.5.24-5), forwardmovementin thenarrativeis suspended while Ammianus presentsthe descriptiogentiurnconcludingBook 23. Book 24 resumesthe narrativedirectly from 23.5.25. Ammianus'referenceto the psychologicalstateof the soldiersin 24.1.1 echoes23.5.24 and orients the reader preciselyin time and place. Julian gives the commandto

advance intoAssyrianterritory(Assyriosfines, 24.1.1),13placesthearmy in defensiveposture(1.2-4) and bringshis men to Dura after a two-day journey: ernensaitaque itinere bidui prope civitatern venirnusDurarn desertammarginibusamnis impositam. Sinceour review of Ammianus'narrativediscoversthat his sequence of eventsis self-consistent, it is time to considerandassess the complaints that have been raised againstit. But first we must mention the older

critics,namely,Sudhaus, Mendelssohn, Klein andKlotz,14for although their theoriesaboutAmmianus'relianceon otherwritersno longerinspire

generalcredence, •5theirdiagnosis of Ammianus' textoutlasts thetheories it was intendedto promote. These older views united in the conviction that Ammianus' text containeda doublet, real or apparent,consistingin

Julian'sadvancetwiceto Dura, oncein 23.5.8, and againin 24.1.5.•6 That conclusionfollowed from an unnecessaryand even perverseinterpretationof pergeretquead Durarn (23.5.8), as if the phraseimplied that Julian had now reachedDura. It was unnecessary becausepergeretad Duram is merely indicativeof direction. This imperfectsubjunctiveis preciselyequivalentto the imperfectindicativeof 16.2.6 (ad Tricasinos tendebat)and the presentparticipleof 27.8.7 (tendensad Londiniurn) where in both casesthe journey was interruptedand uncompleted.As the contextmakes abundantlyclear, pergeretquead Durarn, like these

examples, expresses progress towardsa goal,notits attainment,•7 for an interruptionis indicated(the omensobservedon the march from Zaitha and the speechdeliverednear that town) and Dura is not said to have been reacheduntil Book 24. Furthermore,the argumentis perversebecausethis interpretationgoes out of its way to make nonsenseof a narrative which, with pergeret interpretedin accordancewith normal usage, makes perfect sense.Mendelssohnand his followers, however, espousedthe problematicalinterpretationbecausethe complicationthus introducedwas welcome. The prior convictionthat Ammianusconsulted written historiescould be supportedby the identificationof a doublet testifying to his inept combinationof diverse sources.

AMMIANUS

MARCELLINUS

23.5.4-25

33

Subsequentdisenchantmentwith the practice of such mechanical Quellenkritikshouldhavesufficedto removeso laboredan interpretation, especiallysinceMommsenhimselfrejectedthe ideaperemptorily. •8 But E.A. Thompson,who in 1947 wouldconcedelittle to the separatists, •9 concededthe doublet, acceptingit as self-evidentand finding its "obvious explanation"in the surmise"that Ammianushere becameconfusedin his notes, which must have been taken in the midst of the business and

turmoil of the march, and that in revisinghis work he failed to notice

therepetition". 20This admission of despairby Thompson seemsto have ratifiedthe doctrinethatthe text requiresdrasticmeasures, for subsequent writersrepeatedlyattemptto solvethe perceiveddifficulty by conducting a tortuousreinterpretationof the text reminiscentof Sudhaus',though less drastic. The general opinion is that Ammianusdesignedlymoved forward in time at 23.5.7 if. and then resumedhis properchronologyat 23.5.15 in orderto finish up his accountof the eventswhich took place at Circeslum. According to Dillemann, "Ammien est alors revenu sciem-

menten arfi•re (XXIII,v,15), fracto ut antedictumestponte",2• a view repeatedby Rosen:

allerdingssetztdie WiederholungschonXXIII 5,15 ein .... Ammian sagt also ausdriicklich(sic), dasser zwei Etappenzuriickgreiftund die Rede an der zugeh6rigenStelle einordnet.Hier kann man nicht yon einem Versehen reden, dahinter steht eine besondere Absicht ...:

Ammian unterstreichtdurch die Teilung den H6hepunkt der

Prodigienkette in demZwischenabschnitt. 22 If, asis alleged,Ammianusanticipatedeventsin 25.5.7-14, intending to resumehis narrativeonce againfrom his startingpoint (Circesium)in 23.5.15, it was incumbenton him to signify this intentionat the point of departure(23.4.7). What he wrote insteadis profecti exinde Zaithan venimus locum, ordinary languageindicativeof purely sequentialprogression.Furthermore,if he anticipatedhis narrativein the manneralleged, he must also have made some allusion at the conclusionof this "extension" to his "return" to strict relative order. It is clear, however,

that ut ante dictumest cannotbear this weight; the phrase(ut dictum est) simply recalls to the reader's mind a fact which had earlier been registered, as in 14.8.7, 17.13.8 f., 18.7.6, 18.8.4, 19.11.4, 20.3.9, 22.15.11, 25.1.19, 25.10.4, 29.1.25, 29.2.9, 30.2.12, 30.4.20.23ut ante

dictumest bearsno similaritywhateverto the formulacustomarilyused

34

CHARLES

W. FORNARA

by Ammianuswhen he revertsto historicalorder after departingfrom it in a digression.The type of formula he employsto reofient the reader after a departurefrom the rerum seriesappearsfrequentlyenoughin his work, e.g., hactenusde instrumentis muralibus.... nuncad rerumordinem revertamur (23.4.15). ut ante dictum est cannot be treated as if it were

the logical equivalentof, e.g., hactenusde signiscaelestibusquibusper ea loca minitantibusobtemperarenolebatlulianus. nuncad rerum ordines revertamur. lulianus, cum exiret Cercusio, ponte fracto, ut ante dictum

est..... 24And if all this were not enough,thereremainsthe fact that the speechpresupposes the prior observation of Gordian'stombby Julian and his army. The real objectionto readingAmmianus'narrativein a straightforward way is the fact that the sequencehe thus providesis contradictedby Zosimus (3.13.1-14.2), who places at Circesium both Julian's speech and the organizationof the army in defensiveposture,thereaftermoving the army to Zautha (Zaitha) and D(o)ura (where he locatesthe tomb of Gordian III). For modems, from Gibbon onward, have universallyconcludedthat Zosimuswas correct.But why, consideringthe real limits of our positive knowledge, a derivative writer should be preferredto a contemporarywitnessis difficult to see, especiallysincethe versionin Zosimuslooks suspiciously like the simplificationof a more complicated (and less rhetoricallyeffective) tradition. For Ammianusstaggeredthe

eventsultimatelyconsolidated at Circesium by Zosimus or his source. 25 The eventsAmmianusplacedat Circesiumarelimitedto the brief mention of Sallustius' letter and the removal of the bridge; insteadof massing eventsat that city, he has dispersedthem, makingthe rendezvousof the fleet occur at statio quaedamnorth of the city (23.3.8-9), and placing the speecha little to Circesium'ssouth. It was left to anotherwriter,

Zosimus'source,Eunapius, 26to attempta moregrandiose description centering on thiscity andthefiver bounding it.27Thereis a full review of the fleet, Julian sailsin the Euphratesand, after the address,he places

himself,toutcourt,onforeignsoil:•/lv •ox•II•@octg•[o[•ok/Iv•oxotf}oct•o

(3.13.3). Buttheapparent neatness of thisdemarcation maybe illusory. 28 Libanius(18.219) placedthe boundaryof "Assyria"farther south,after Thilut(h)a (&•xexct[ xqg 'Aov@itovyqg), not far from the apparently undisturbedcenotaphof Gordianand in the vicinity of the desertedcity of Dura.

It is possible,therefore,that eventswere eithergroupedfor dramatic effect by Eunapiusor were arrangedby him or by Zosimuswith a view to economicalnarrativedescription.If so, the procedureof writers less

AMMJANUS

MARCELLINUS

23.5.4-25

35

meticulousthan Ammianus has unjustifiably prejudicedour assessment of Ammianus' fidelity to the truth. On this hypothesis,Zosimus' source found it expedientand dramatically appropriateto locate an omnibusof events at Circesium, that last outpostof Roman territory famous for its

positionto the time of Justinian. 29The question,then, is to determine whether it is more likely that Eunapius-Zosimustelescopedevents by concentratingthem at Circesium or whether Ammianus violated the sequenceby allocatingthem to separatestagesof the journey. One can easily see how Zosimus' tradition could have arisen a generationor so after the campaign, when technicalaccuracycould be compromisedby the urge to presenta vivid and significantpictureof the fateful moment.

It is harderto motivatea gratuitous falsification in Ammianus. 3ø We may well ask ourselveswhat was the motive promptinga liberty which would havemadehim ridiculousin the eyesof thosecontemporaries, somein high places,like Victor, who knew the eventsonly too well. Ammianus is not an obviouscandidatefor the wanton perversionof the celsitudinesnegotiorum(26 ad init.), which include imperial addresses. Mommsen, who has been authoritative in his condemnation of Ammianus'

allegedhistoricalirresponsibility,beatsAmmianuswith the stickhe perhaps shouldhave reservedfor Zosimus' Dies ist kein Versehen Ammians, sondern rhetorischeMache, veran-

lasst durch seine Liebhabereifiir AnbringunghistorischerReminiscenzen. Das Grab des Kaisers Gordian, das in der julianischen Allocution erscheint(23,5,17), befand sich jenseitsvon Circesium unweit Dura (Zosimus3,14,2), und um diesin der Redeanzubringen, mussteder Standortverschobenwerden.31 It is an uneconomichypothesis.Ammianus could have indulged his penchantfor historicalallusionswithout so unnecessarily pervertingthe historicalrecord. He did not need to move the army to Zaitha in order to alludeto Gordian'stomb:Gordian'stombcouldmoreeasilyhavebeen broughtto Circesium,for Julian need only have pointedto the horizon from thatcity in the directionof Zaitha andthenhavestressed its presence

as a symbolof Romansuccess againstPersia. 32Thesethingsare easily managed;it is Mommsen, not Ammianus, who is guilty of inversion. Theory and reality do not alwaysmeshperfectly. Circesiumwas the outpostclosestto thefines Assyrii but Zaitha fell into its orbit, while the vicinity of Zaitha, Dura included,apparentlylay in no-man'sland. Where

36

CHARLES

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FORNARA

Julian would besthave deliveredhis addresscannotbe solvedby a glance at the map or by a referenceto Zosimus. Everything dependson the actualcharacterof the landscapeand Julian'spsychology.But sincethese are unknown to us, we must seek the answer not in a preconceived opinion about the formally correct time and place for such an oration, but in a judgmentof the competingstrengths,weaknessesand genesis of the traditionsrepresentedby Ammianusand Zosimus. On this basis,

the choicebeforeus hardlyadmitsof doubt. 33 Charles

Brown University

W.

Fornara

NOTES

1. Cf. F. Paschoud, Zosime, Histoire Nouvelle II 1 (LivreIII) (1979)110n. 34.

2. For the older literature see below n. 14; more recent writers include E.A.

Thompson,The historical work of AmmianusMarcellinus (1947) 29 f.; W.R. Chalmers, RhM 102 (1959) 183-9; M.F.A. Brok, De perzischeExpeditie van Keizer Julianus volgensAmmianusMarcellinus (Diss. Groningen 1959) 80; L. Dillemann, Syria 38 (1961) 133-5; K. Rosen,Studienzur Darstellungskraftund Glaubwiirdigkeit desAmmianusMarcellinus(Diss. Heidelberg1968, publ. Bonn 1970) 153-5; W. Seyfarth,AmmianusMarcellinus,R6mischeGeschichte(1970)

III 225n. 65, 236n. 4; J. Fontaine, Ammien Marcellin IV2 (LivresXII-XXV,

Commentaire)(1977) nn. 107,296; G. Sabbah,La mdthoded'AmmienMarcellin (1978) 490-2; Paschoud 115-19 n. 36; J. Matthews, The Roman Empire of Ammianus (1989) 130-1, 178-9. 3. Thompson29. 4. Those names in n. 2, with the exceptionof Chalmers and Thompson. Chalmers' explanationis rightly rejected by Paschoud(above n. 1) 117 and Matthews (above n. 2) 497 n. 3. 5. Mommsen, GesammelteSchriften(1909) VII 427, J. Bidez, La vie de l'empereurJulien(1930) 332 with n. 21. Bidez offersno discussion; Mommsen,

too (in this posthumously editednote), simplystatedhis opinion.Mommsenis quotedp. 33 and nn. 18, 31. 6. Seepp. 34 f. 7. The ruling assumptionsince Ensslin, Klio Beiheft 16 (1923) 5, is that Ammianus'use of the first personplural, profecti exindeZaithan venimuslocum (23.5.7), signifiesthathe hasonly nowjoinedthe expedition,andvariousscholars have accordinglywoven that assumption into their biographicalreconstructions. But althoughvenimusprobablyreflectsAmmianus'desireto inform the reader

AMMiANUS

MARCELLINUS

23.5.4-25

37

(without fanfare) that he participatedin the expedition, the ellipse alleged by Ensslinis too pregnantmerely to be inferred by comparisonwith previousreferencesin which the first personplural doesnot appear.If Ammianusintended to communicate so much as this, he was bound to have told us a little bit more.

8. For the locationof the cenotaphsee below n. 32. 9. Mommsen'sdeletion of que (1.c. above n. 5), thoughunnecessary (see Chalmers,aboven. 2, 187) and paleographically unjustified,yieldsa goodand more compactsense,placing strongemphasison the fact that the men, placed as they were in the positionof no return, finally neededto be addressedby the emperorin recognitionof the alteredcircumstances affectingthem. 10. Matthews(aboven. 2) 131 prefersthe reverseinterpretation,arguingthat the "implications"of the sentencequoted above indicate that Julian "actually deliveredhis speechimmediatelyafter crossingthe Khabur" (= Abora). Tacitly concedingthe absenceof clarity in a text thus interpreted,Matthews (498 n. 4) concludesthat in his serviceof higher ends, Ammianus committeda "deliberate narrative deformation"which he assumedwould ultimately be clarified by his repeatedreferenceto Dura in 24.1.1-5. In that case,however,Zaitha shouldalso havebeenmentionedin 24.1.1-5. More basically,the assumption thatAmmianus indulgedin the intentionalmystificationof his audiencewould be an unacceptable solutionto a problematical text evenif the text wereotherwisebeyondredemption. The historicalmethodof the ancientswas rathermore pedestrianthan someof the modem techniqueswhich have been generatedto expoundit. 11. sedut a vetustatediscedam,haec, quaetradiditrecensmemoria,replicabo. Traianus et Verus, Severushinc sunt digressi victores et tropaeati redissetque pari splendoreiunior Gordianus, cuius monumenturnnunc vidimushonorate ... ni factione Philippi praefecti praetorio scelesteiuvantibuspaucis in hoc, ubi sepultusest, loco vulnere impio cecidisset. 12. One may usefullycompareAmmianus18.8.1, nosdisposuimus properare (when Ursicinusand Ammianus were still in Amida and neededto reachSamosata

quickly). 13. Fontaine(above n. 2) 286 discussesAmmianus' conceptof "Assyria"; Paschoud(aboven. 1) 116 n. 36 usefullycomments on the statusof the territory extendingsouth from the Abora to the desert:"a narrow band, irrigated, still dependenton the Roman Empire and constitutinga kind of glacis." Since it is impossibleto determinewhetherZaitha was within this strip or outsideof it, "la donn•econcernantlefranchissement de la fronti•re n' estgu•re utilepour trancher le point de savoir si le discours de Julien a gtd prononc• d Circdsion ou d Zaitha-Zautha

."

14. H. Sudhaus,De ratione quae intercedatinter Zosirni et Ammiani de bello a Iuliano imperatorecure Persis gesto relationes(Diss. Bonn 1870), L. Mendelssohn,in the prefaceof his edition of Zosimus(1887), especiallyp. xlv and at 3.14.2, R. Klein, Klio Beiheft 13 (1914), A. Klotz, RhM 71 (1916) 243-65.

38

CHARLES

W. FORNARA

15. Paschoudxviii, following Sudhaus,continuesto believe that Ammianus madeuse of a copy of Oribasius'memoirs,while otherscholars(cited below n. 26) now postulatethe use of Eunapiusby Ammianus. 16. Sudhaus(18 if.), however,soughtto obviatethe doubletby arguingthat the text shouldbe transposed.He assumedthat Ammianus carelesslydeparted from his source(Oribasius)in order to present,on his own account,the material aboutthe omens,returningto Oribasiusin 23.5.14, where Sudhausreadperacto (ponte). He also removed23.5.17 from the text, arguingthat it was the gratuitous additionof a scribe(p. 22). Mendelssohnand the othersacceptedthe doublet(as they judged it) in proof of Ammianus'inept redactionof his sources. 17. Cf. Sabbah (above n. 2) 490 n. 110. 18. Mommsen (above n. 5): "Die Erzfihlungist aber insofem verwirrt (wie

dies nachAndernSudhausp. 19 fg. richtig hervorgehoben hat, mit Unrechtaber den Text verdfichtigend),als c.5, 15-25 sich an c.5, 5 anschliesstund stehen sollte vor c.5, 6-14, dem Aufbruch yon Circesium nach Zaitha sowie dem Ab-

marschnebstden dazu geh6rigenAnekdotenund Wundergeschichten." 19. He has more recentlymodified his views: seeLatin Historians,ed. T.A. Dorey (1966) 152 if., whereThompsonacceptsthe useof Eunapiusby Ammianus. 20. Thompson(above n. 2) 29. 21. Dillemann (above n. 2) 134. 22. Rosen (above n. 2) 155. This is essentiallythe positionof those listed above in n. 2 (exceptfor Thompsonand Chalmers),thoughthey differ in their interpretations of the motivesimpellingAmmianusto breakwith historicalorder. For instance,Dillemann 133-5 believesthat Ammianusdid not wish to interrupt his discussionof the omens, which were thematicallyimportant;he explainsthe phrasecuius monumenturn nunc vidirnusas a "rhetoricalartifice" facilitatedby Ammianus'locationof the cenotaphnearZaitha insteadof Dura--so that it would have been visible from Circesiumas Juliandeliveredhis speech.Rosen(p. 155), along the same lines, considersthe passageabout omens an integral part of a carefully consideredtreatmentintendedto evoke Julian'simage as a tragic hero. Fontaine(above n. 2) 51 n. 116 regardsAmmianus'break with routineorder as the result of a "deliberateliterary intention":"assurerferrnernentla suture du r•cit rnalgr• les digressionssuccessives, et rnettreen valeur les presagesd'une part, de l'autre le discoursde Julien." Paschoud(above n. 1) 117 n. 36 inclines to the opinionsexpressedby Dillemannand Fontaine,but cautions"that the last word may eludeus becausethe informationis insufficient".All of theseexplanationsbecomeirrelevantif Ammianusproceededchronologically,as arguedhere.

23. In one respect,however,the phrasein 5.15 is almostunique:it is additionallyqualifiedby the word ante (like 16.9.2, ut ante dixirnusand 25.8.1, ut dixirnuspaulo ante). It is almostas if Ammianusanticipated,andtried to prevent, uncertaintyaboutthe when and wheretheseeventsoccurred:ante remindsus of a previousactionandseparates it explicitlyfromthecontextin whichthebackward referenceis embedded.For examples,with the verb refero, see22.3.8, 23.6.24, 26.9.3, 31.3.4.

AMMIANUS

MARCELLINUS

23.5.4-25

39

24. Similarly, Ammianusmakes the starting-pointof a digressionclear and explicit.Keepingwith theexampleusedabove,he beginsin 23.4.1 (afterspeaking of Julian's fleet, replete with weaponsof war) as follows: re ipsa admoneor breviter, quantum mediocrepotest ingenium, haec instrumentorumgenera ignorantibuscircumscriptemonstrare. 25. It is perhapssignificantthat Libaniushas nothingto tell us either of Circesiumor of the Abora in the Funeral Oration (18.214-18), but brings the army southfrom Carrhaeto Anathanwithout comment.It suggeststhat Libanius was unawareof the centralityof Circesiumas the epicenterit becamein Zosimus. 26. Photiusvouchesfor this, Bibl. Cod. 98 p. 84b. For recentdiscussionssee Chalmers, CQ 54 (1960) 152-60, T.D. Barnes, The sources of the Historia Augusta.CollectionLatomus115 (1978) 114 if., R.C. Blockley, Thefragmentary classicisinghistoriansof the later Roman Empire (1981) II vii. 27. It is, however, also conceivablethat Zosimus,not Eunapius,was responsible for compressingtheseeventsinto the sameplace for the sakeof economy. 28. See above n. 13.

29. Procop.de bello Persico2.5.1-3; de aedific.2.6.1-5. Magnusof Carrhae may have initiatedthe trend. He noted that Julianreinforcedthe city with 4000 men (FGrHist 225 F 1, 3). He mentions the Abora but not the removal of the

bridge (also unnoticedby Zosimus), and (like Zosimus)appearsto associatethe naval review and the hortatoryspeechwith Julian'sdeparturefrom the city (225 F 1, 4-5). But we must allow for the possibilitythat Malalas' synopsisdoes not adequatelyreflect the conjunctionof separateevents as given by Magnus. If Magnushad takenJuliana few miles south(like Ammianus)beforereportinghis speech, Malalas would probably have ignored the technicality. Note that he subsumes PirisaboraandMaiozamalchawith a barereferenceto the "manyPersian outpostslying besidethe Euphratesand betweenthe two rivers"(6). 30. I assumethat Ammianuspublishedhis historyprior to the appearance of the "first installment"of Eunapius'history.But it would be improperto entangle the present questionin that thorny controversy.The point made here is that Zosimusand Ammianusoffer a differentsequencefor the eventswhichoccurred on Julian's march from Circesiumto Dura. How this may affect the various theoriesof literary affiliation currentlyin vogueis a questionthat can be left for another time.

31. Mommsen(aboven. 5). Mommsencontinues:"Dadurchist die Ansprache Julians, die auch bei Zosimus 3,13,3

erw•ihnt wird,

also schon in der

gemeinschaftlichen Quelle stand, und die nothwendigbei dem Eintritt in das Feindesland(24,1,1) gehaltensein muss,verschoben,w'fihrendsie sich an den

0bergang fiberdenAboras anschliessen unddannderBericht23,5,8mit 24,1,5 zusammenschliessen

sollte."

32. The preciselocation of Gordian's cenotaphis uncertain. See Paschoud's discussion(above n. 1) 116 f., 122. But a solutionto the problem cannot be soughtby speculationabout whether the tomb was relatively near or relatively far from Circesium--unless,perhaps,it couldbe shownthat the tombwas visible

40

CHARLES

W. FORNARA

from Circesium and not from Zaitha. Even then, however, the most we could

legitimatelyassumeis that Ammianusmisremembered the locationof the tomb, not that the speechin his versionwas given elsewherethan southof Zaitha. In any case, since Ammianusplacesthe cenotaphnear Zaitha and Zosimusputs it farther south still, at Dura, we have no warrant to undercut both accountsin what

would still be an unavailingattemptto reconcilethe two writersin one particular (the speech)by rejectingthem altogetherin another(the generallocationof the tomb).

33. I gratefullyrecordmy profoundthanksand appreciation to the JohnSimon GuggenheimMemorial Foundationfor a grantthat hasenabledme to devotethe entire academicyear of 1988-1989 to researchwhile on leave from Brown University.I also wish to expressmy debt to the anonymousReadersof this Journaland, especially,to its Editor, for their painstakingcriticism.The map is an enlargedreproduction,with minor modification,of a portionof Map 2 in F. Paschoud(ed.), Zosirne, Histoire Nouvelle II 1 (Book 3) (1979). Grateful ac-

knowledgment is dueto Soci6t6 d'l•dition "LesBellesLettres", Paris,andto ProfessorPaschoudfor permissionto use this map.

MANNING THE ATHENIAN FLEET, 433-426 BC• The Athenianfleet, while subjectto certainconstantconstraints,notably

thoseof weather?wasalsosubject to demands thatvariedovertheyears, requiringit to spendmore or less time at sea as political circumstances changedand financial circumstancesallowed. Further, becausethe fleet

wasusuallymannedby volunteers, 3 bothits sizeandthe lengthof time it was at sea also dependedupon the availability of volunteerswilling and able to man it. In the presentpaper I will examinethe patternof major Athenian naval activitiesreconstructiblefrom our sourcesfor the period from 433 through426 to see what this patterncan tell us about the men who mannedthe fleet during this period. While the specific resultsof this studywill be valid only for the period in question,the period coveredis itself lengthyand complexenoughto suggesta more generalconsideration,that in additionto financialresourcesand political demandswe shouldalso take into accountthe size and compositionof the availablemanpowerpool in assessing what at any point the Athenian fleet could or could not do.

To avoid confusionin what followsit is importantto distinguishbetween

thesailingseason, 4 whenshipscouldbe at sea,andthetimethatAthenian squadrons wereactuallyin commission. 5 As to the former,thereis ,substantial evidencethat for the Greeks the settingof the Pleiades, which occurredin the closingdaysof October,conventionallymarkedthe onset

of the stormywinterseasonwhensailingwas all but impossible. 6 By contrast,thereis surprisinglylittle evidencefor whenthe Greeksthought winter endedand sailingagainbecamepossible.Hesiodallowed sailing

in late April andthe startof May at the earliest, 7 but he mayhavebeen overcautious.At a much later date, but under essentiallythe same

42

VINCENT

J. ROSIVACH

climatologicalconditions,Vegetius(Mil. 4.39) saysthat sailingis possible for the eight monthsfrom March 10 throughNovember 10, after which the seas are closed (maria clauduntur) by adverse weather conditions until the following spring. Similarly, for our period Thucydides(6.21.2) has Nicias say that not even messengerships could get through easily betweenSicily and Athensduringthe four winter months,implying that the sea was at least passableduring the remaining eight months; an eight-monthsailing seasonwhich ended with the settingof the Pleiades at the end of Octoberbeganin early March. The view that sailingwas normallypossibleonly duringthe eight monthsfrom early March to late October or early November is at least consistent,as we shall see, with the patternof naval movementswhich we can reconstruct for our period. While sailing was possibleover eight monthsof the year, part of this eight-monthperiod was better for sailing than the rest. Hesiod, for example, divided the year into four periods, a winter seasonin which sailingwas impossible,a summerseasonwhen sailingwas preferred,and

two transitional periodswhensailingwaspossiblebut dangerous. 8 Like Hesiod, Vegetius(Mil. 4.39) also divided his sailing seasoninto menses aptissimi, mensesdubii, and mensesclassibusintractabiles,clearly distinguishingbetweenthe period of secura navigatio, the periodsduring which incerta navigatioest et discriminipropior becauseof increasingly adverseweather and periculosemaria temptantur, and the winter season when maria

clauduntur.

The following table comparesthe dateswhich Hesiodand Vegetius give for the startof each of theseseasons: Hesiod

Vegetius

Winter (seasclosed/nosailing)

end of October

November

Spring(sailingpossiblebut

late April/ early May

March 10

dangerous) Summer(preferredsailing season) Fall (sailingpossiblebut dangerous)

10

June22

May279

August 11

September13

Speaking of the spring seasonwhen periculosemaria temptantur, Vegetius adds: non quo negotiatorurncessetindustria, sed quia maior adhibenda cautela est quando exercitus navigat cum liburnis quam cum privatarum merciurnfestinat audacia. In other words, for Vegetius the military sailing seasonbegan only in

mid-to lateMay, substantially laterthanthecommercial sailingseason. •0 Vegetiuswas of coursespeakingof Roman, not Athenian, fleets, but the

MANNING

THE ATHENIAN

FLEET

43

sequenceof eventsin the late springof 425 suggeststhat his judgement was sharedby the Athenians,viz. that the period from March through early May was not part of the normalnaval campaigningseason.In 425

the Peloponnesians invadedAtticasomewhat earlierthanusual(J•@•v

o•ov •v &x[t,q•[vczt,4.2.1; ax@',c0 ... xcz••o• o•ov •t 6wo•, 4.6.1-•early to mid-May"),andthe Athenians sent40 shipsto sail round the Peloponneseto Corcyra, and then to continueon to Sicily (4.2.2). The departureof this squadronfollowsthe invasionin Thucydides' narrative, and so should have occurred after, not before, the start of the

invasion. Since news that the squadronhad fortified Pylos causedthe Spartansto break off the invasionafter only 15 days (cf. 4.6.1-2), the departureof the squadronmust have closely followed the start of the invasion,i.e. the principalnavalexpeditionof 425 left Athensin roughly mid-May. Now this mid-May departuredate is significantsincewe know that in this casethe expeditionhad alreadybeendecidedupon,its generals designatedand the size of the squadrondetermined,all in the previous year; indeed, one of its generalshad alreadybeen sent on aheadwith a few ships, and had reachedRhegiumbefore the seaswere closedby the worst winter weather(cf. 3.115.2-5). Furthermore,IG I s 369.9-12 indicatestwo substantialloans from the treasuryof Athena Polias to the Athenianstatein the springof 425, one of 44.5 talentson Pryt. VIII 5 (c. March 18) and a secondof 100 talentson Pryt. VIII 10 (c. March

23), the firstsincetheprevious fall.•2 The purpose of theseloansis not given in the inscription,but it is not unreasonable to see at least one,

andprobablyboth, as destinedto pay for thisyear'smajorsquadron. In otherwords, at leastfor this expeditionpreparations had gottenunder way well in advance of its departure, and we may conclude that its departurewas planned to take place more or less when it did. Further, given its ambitiousagenda, we would expect this expeditionto sail as early as was practical. It would thus appearthat mid-May was more or lessthe earliestpracticaldateat whichmajorexpeditionscouldbe expected to sail from Athens.

As to the end of the Athenianfleet's normal sailing season,it is noteworthythat in 413, at somepoint beforeAugust27, the date of the famous eclipse, Demosthenescounseledan immediatedeparturefrom

Sicily,according to Thucydides, whiletheseawasstillpassable (•c0g ß6 Jr•.cz¾og o[6v •e Jre@ct[o•o0ctt, 7.47.3). Sincethis adviceto leave immediatelywas given in Augustit is clear that Demosthenesmust have been thinkingnot of the definitive closingof the seasin November, but of somethingthat would occur sooner, presumablythe onset of worseningweatherin mid-September.

VINCENT

J. ROSIVACH

If we may judge from the events of 425 and from Demosthenes' advicein 413, it would appear,then, that the AthenianssharedVegetius' view that late May to mid-Septemberwas the preferredsailing season, andthat the transitionalperiodsbothbeforeand after this preferredseason were unsuitablefor large expeditions.In the next sectionof this paper I will briefly examine major Athenian naval activity in the years 433 to 426 as this activity is reconstructiblefrom documentaryevidence,from

the text of Thucydides, •4 and from the generalconsiderations on the lengthof the sailingseasongiven here. This review will show, I believe, that during our period the larger expeditionsin fact sailed only during the shorterpreferredsailingseasonwhile secondaryexpeditionsoperated, particularlyin distantwaters,duringthe late-yeartransitionalperiodbefore beinghauledfrom the waterto passthe deadof winterawayfrom Athens. In the final sectionof this paperI will considerwhat this patternof naval activity can tell us about the staffing of the Athenian fleet during the period under study.

433 is the earliestyear for which we have evidencedatingAtheniannaval

movements to specifictimesof the year.On Pryt. I 13 (c. July 1015)of this year the Treasurersof Athenatransferredfundsfor the first squadron

of 10 shipssailingto Corcyra(IG 13364.7-12; cf. Thuc. 1.45.1), and the shipswill havesailedsometimethereafter. 16On the lastday of the sameprytany l? (c. August3) additionalfundswere transferred for 20 moreshipsto reinforcethefirst 10 (IG 13364.18-23;cf. Thuc. 1.50.5). This secondsquadronsailed some time thereafter, reachingCorcyrean watersshortly after the battle of Sybota, which most historiansdate to late Augustor early September.The Corinthians,now sensingthemselves at a disadvantage, withdrewand, with the threatto Corcyrathusremoved, the Atheniansin their turn departedfor Athens. It is impossibleto say when the Athenian shipsreturnedto Athens, but Thucydides'narrative leaves the impressionthat their stay at Corcyra after the battle was measuredin days, not weeks. We may estimate 75 days (mid-July to late September)as the total time the first 10 ships were away from

Athens,and50 days(earlyAugustto late September) for theother20.•8 If there were any other major naval movementsduring433, evidence for them has been lost.

In 432 the first Athenian squadronof 30 ships and 1,000 hoplites sent to Macedonia

under Archestratus sailed before the Athenians learned

of the defectionof Potidaea,but when the squadronarrived in northern waters it found Potidaeaand other cities in the region already in revolt

MANNING

THE

ATHENIAN

FLEET

45

(1.59.1). Meanwhile word of the revolt was broughtto Athens, possibly even before the first squadronarrived in the north, and the Athenians decidedto senda secondsquadronof 40 shipsand 1,000 hoplitesunder Callias (1.61.1). The first squadron,eventuallyjoined by the second, conductedoperationsin Macedoniafor an uncertainlengthof time before the combined forces moved on to Potidaea where they defeated the Potidaeansin battle and beganto besiegetheir city (1.61-64). Finally, sometime later, the Athenianssentout an additional1,600 hoplitesunder

Phormion to complete the siegeworksaroundPotidaea. 19The onlyevent in this narrativewhich can be assigneda relatively fixed date is the battle

of Potidaeain earlyto mid-September. 2øSincethe Athenians no longer neededa very large numberof triremesonce their investmentof Potidaea was complete,they probablybroughtthe bulk of their shipshome, leaving

only a few behindto blockadePotidaeafrom the sea.2• We haveno evidenceon how long the Athenianstook to completetheir investment of Potidaeaafter the battle in early September,but the shipsthat were brought back to Athens should have returnedin October at the latest, before the seasbecame too dangerousfor sailing. As to when Archestratus'and Callias' squadronsleft Athens at the startof the campaign,all we can say is that both must have been funded

beforethe startof thenewconciliaryearon or aboutJuly2,22sincetheir generals' names do not appear on the new year's financial accountsin

IG 13365.23The dateof lateApril/earlyMay given,e.g., by Kolbeand Gomme for the first expeditionis based on nothing more than the as~ sumptionthat with the threat of revolt in the air (cf. 1.56.2), the first

squadronwould have sailedas early in the year as practical. 24 The assumptionmay be valid, but the date is questionable.There is no other evidenceof large squadronssailing as early as late April/early May, and certainly there is nothing in the historicalrecord of 432 which would preclude a departure date as late as, e.g., late May/early June for Archestratus'squadron,if it was impracticalto sail before then, with an

evenlatersailingdatefor Callias'.25 As we shall see, major naval squadronsduring the Archidamianwar

sailedfrom Athensin late May/earlyJuneat the earliest.Assumingthat Archestratus'squadronlikewisesailedno earlierthanlate May/earlyJune, that Callias' squadronsailed two to three weeks later, and that both squadronsreturnedhome in early to mid-October, we may estimatea maximumof 135 days as the total time Archestratus'squadronwas away

from Athens,anda maximumof 120 daysfor Callias'squadron. 26 With the outbreakof the war in 431, the first navalactivitymentioned by Thucydidesis an Athenian expeditionof 100 ships sent round the

Peloponnese, 27 which sailedonly after the Peloponnesian invasionof

46

VINCENT

J. ROSIVACH

Atticawaswell underway.28(ThePeloponnesian invasion thisyeardid notbeginbeforetheendof May.29)IG 13365.30-40records thetransfer of fundsfor this expeditionin four installmentsduringthe last eight days of Pryt. IX and the first days of Pryt. X (i.e. from c. May 20 to May 31); at least the May 20 paymentshouldprecedethe departureof the fleet, and the closenessto eachother of all four paymentsis difficult to

explainunlesstheywereall madewhilethefleetwasstillin port.3øThe fleet's returnto Athensis datedby the fact that it was almosthomewhen it learned, on Aegina, of the Athenian invasionof the Megarid then in progress;accordingto Thucydides(2.31.1), this invasionoccurredtre@[ ... t6 q00[v6trto@ov to6 0•@ovgtoftov, whichGommedates"not ... muchbeforethe end of September". 3' Theseshipswouldthushavebeen

away fromAthens fora maximum ofabout 120da,ys.

At aboutthe sametime (6tr6 fir xbv ct6xbvZpovovxo6xov)thatthis fleet was operatingoff the Peloponnesethe Athenianssenta squadron of 30 shipsunderCleopompus to the watersoff LocrisandEuboea(2.26). Since Cleopompusseemsto have been generalonly in 421/0, the expedition under his commandcould have begunonly after he assumedhis

officeon Hekatombaion 1 (= July5).32Neartheendof thesummer0:o6 O•@ovg•ro6•rov•re)•emr&wrog) the Athenians fortifiedAtalante,an island off the coastof Locris,presumablyas part of this sameoperation(2.32). The garrisonof Atalante later includedtwo triremes(cf. 3.89.3), which may have been left there now for the first time. We are not told when the rest of the squadronreturnedto Athens, but dates near the end of the preferredsailingseasonin mid-Septemberor aboutthe time the fleet sentroundthe Peloponnese returnedin late Septemberarebothreasonable. The squadronwould thus have been at sea for a maximumof about75 days. In 430, the first naval movementmentionedby Thucydideswas an expeditionof 100 shipsfrom Athens and 50 from Chios and Lesbos, with 4,000 hoplites and 300 cavalry commandedby Pericles, directed againstvariousstateson the northeastern shoreof the Peloponnese (2.56). The Peloponnesian invasionof Attica startedthis yearaboutthe beginning

of May.33The Athenians werestillpreparing theirfleetwhentheinvasion began, and they did not sail until it was well under way (2.56.1, 3). This year's invasionlastedalmost40 days (2.57). The Athenianfleet returnedhomeafterthe Peloponnesians had left, but therewouldbe little

point to Thucydides' statementthat •:o6g 6• II•.osrovv•lo•ovg o6x•'r•xct'r•)m•oviv •,q'A•'r•x,q6vmg, &k)•'&vctxeXcO@,lx6mg (2.56.6) unlesstheyreturnedonly shortlyafterthe Peloponnesians' departure.We may concludethat the Athenianfleet sailedin mid- to late May, returned in mid- to late June,and was away from Athensfor a maximumof about

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40 days. These same forceswere then taken over by Hagnon who campaignedagainstChalcidiceand Potidaeafor about 40 more days before returningagain to Athens (2.58). Allowing for a few days' stopoverin

Athens 34 before headingnorth, this expeditionwill have returnedto Athensagainin late August. 35This fleet wasthusin commission for a maximum of perhaps85 days, includingboth campaignsand the intervening stopoverin Athens. In the fall of 43036 the Athenians sent Phormion out with a smaller

force of 20 shipsto establishhimself at Naupactus,whence he could prevent enemy ships from entering or leaving the Corinthian Gulf. It seemslikely that these ships remained on shore at Naupactusfor the most part during the dead of winter, only settingsail when the weather was favorable both for themselvesand the blockade-runnersthey were meant to stop. Indeed, quite possiblythe Atheniansmerely intendedto have these shipsin place when the spring sailing seasonbegan;at all events,we hear nothingfurtherof them until then (2.80.4). This squadron remained in the Corinthian Gulf throughout429, campaigningactively

late into the year,37winteringagainat Naupactus--presumably because the weatherpreventedit from going all the way to Athensat the time--

andreturning home&•tct•@L(probably in earlyMarch 38)in 428, to be availablewhenthe next regularcampaigning seasonbegan(2.103.1). For the summerof 429, the only navalactivitiesmentionedby Thucydides are the operation of Phormion's squadronbased in Naupactus, includingthe battles of Patrai and Naupactus,and the dispatchof 20

moreshipsasreinforcements for thisfleet.39Sincetheseshipsweresent in responseto the developingPeloponnesian threatin the northwest,they musthave left Athenswell into the summer,in July or perhapseven in

earlyAugustri ø The reinforcements wentfirstto Crete,wheretheywere detainedo/Jx 6X•¾ov•@6vovby adversewinds(2.85.5-6), joiningPhormiononly at the endof summer, 4• i.e. in mid-September, at the endof the preferred sailing season. As noted earlier, these reinforcements operatedwith Phormionin the fall, winteredat Naupactus,and returned to Athensin the springof 428. It is noteworthythat when Phormionhad requested theAtheniansto sendhim vot•g6x[ •xk•oxctgasreinforcements, the Athenianssent him 20 ships;20 shipswould thus appearto be the maximum

additional

forces that could be mustered at this time to winter

away from Athens. Somewhat later, however, the Athenians still had enough men available to man the ships needed to beat off a surprise attack on Salamis at the start of the winter (2.93-94), but for somereason they were unableto sendany of thesemen to Phormionearlier when he had askedfor them. The reasonmay have been that the Athenianscould not afford to send more than 20 shipsto Phormion,but it may also be

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that they were unable to find more men willing or able to spend the winter away from home. In 428, shortly after the start of this year's Peloponnesianinvasion

of Attica42 aboutthe middle of May,43 the cities of Lesbos,except Methymna, secededfrom the League. After a brief delay the Athenians respondedby sendingagainstMytilene 40 shipswhich they had prepared to send around the Peloponnese(3.3.1-2). The Athenian expeditionary

force,laterreinforced by 1,000 hoplites,**completed the investment of

Mytilene•x ¾flgxtx••x 0txk6OOVlg justaswinterbegan (xct•6 •(•t[ttbv q@•(eTo ¾•¾veo0ctt, 3.18.5), i.e. in November.The originalforceof 40 shipsas well as the 1,000 reinforcements presumablywinteredon Lesbos. It may be notedthatthe crewsof the40 shipshadoriginallybeenrecruited to sail aroundthe Peloponnese,and would have wintered in Naupactus anyway.

After the first squadronhad been sent to Lesbos,the Atheniansgot ready a secondforce of 30 ships which they then sent around the

Peloponnese to Naupactus, probably in earlyJuly; 45of these30 ships18 returned to Athens, presumablyin mid-Septemberat the end of the preferred sailing season,and 12 wintered at Naupactus(3.7.1-3). The 18 shipsthat returnedto Athenswould have been away for perhaps75 days. The 12 shipsthat remainedat Naupactuswere substantiallyfewer than the forces which had wintered there in previousyears; the reduced numbermay reflecteconomicconstraints, with 40 othershipsplus 1,000 hopliteswinteringon Lesbos,but it may also be that, again, therewere no more men available willing and able to spendthe winter away from home.

Late in this same summer the Athenians

manned an additional

100

ships for an expedition against the Peloponneseto discouragethe Peloponnesians from invadingAttica for a secondtime this year (3.16); whenthe Peloponnesians abandoned theirpreparations andreturnedhome, the Athenian fleet did likewise. This fleet of 100 shipscould not have

sailedbeforelate Augustat the earliest, 46andit wasunlikelyto stayat seafor very long, certainlynot pastthe endof the preferredsailingseason in mid-September. The hundredshipswouldhavebeenat seafor perhaps

a maximumof 25 daysfrom late Augustto mid-September. 47 In 427 at the startof the campaigningseasonthe Atheniansthushad a substantialforce besiegingMytilene, and a smallersquadronbasedat Naupactus.The Peloponnesians senta fleet to relieve Mytilene, coordinatingits departurewith their annualinvasionof Attica to pressurethe Atheniansagainstsendingfurther reinforcementsto Mytilene (3.26.1). Assumingthat this invasionoccurredat the samepoint in the agricultural

year as previousones(viz. zo• oi'cov&xlxdt•ov'cog), we canplacethe

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departureof the Peloponnesian fleet in mid-May at the earliest.This fleet took so long gettingto easternwatersthat the Peloponnesians who had invadedAttica were forced to returnhome when they ran out of supplies while waiting for word of the fleet's success(3.26.4). SinceThucydides tells us (3.26.3) that this invasion, becauseof its length, was the worst the Athenianssuffered,exceptfor that in 430 which lasted40 days (cf. 2.57.1), we may assumethat this invasionlastedperhaps30 to 35 days, i.e. to mid- or late June. Since the Peloponnesians left Attica because their suppliesran out, not becausethey had learnedthat Mytilene had surrendered, the surrender must have occurred (or at least word of the surrendermust have reached the mainland) after the invaders left Attica

in mid- to late June, which we may take as the terminuspost quem of the surrender.After Mytilene's surrenderthe Atheniansfirst spent some time chasingthe Peloponnesianfleet out of the Aegean, and then intervening at Notium (3.33.2-34.4) before returningto Lesboswhere they suppressed the revolt in the other cities on the island (3.35.1). At this point the bulk of the Athenianforceswere sentback to Athens,but some were left behindto supportPaches,their general, in arrangingaffairs on Lesbos(3.35.2). The Athenian activitiesfollowing Mytilene's surrender would take a week or two at the least,placingwell into July the dismissal

of the bulk of the expedition's forcesil s Meanwhile the Peloponnesianfleet which had been chasedout of the Aegean after the fall of Mytilene eventuallymade its way to Cyllene in Elis where it was reinforcedby someadditionalshipsand directedto intervenein Corcyra where stasishad broken out (3.69). The Athenians at this point had only 12 ships at Naupactus(3.69.2), but when the Atheniansat home learnedof the eventsin Corcyra and of the movements of the Peloponnesianfleet they sent a fresh fleet of their own, 60 ships under Eurymedon, to the northwest (3.80.2). We may assumethat in manningtheseshipsthe Atheniansdrew heavily on the forcesthat had

returnedat the endof the Lesbiancampaign. 49Sincetheseforcesseem to have returnedto Athens sometimeduring the month of July, we may date the departureof these60 shipseven later, in mid- to late July. At the arrival of theseshipsin the northwestthe Peloponnesian fleet abandoned its campaign. The 60 shipsremainedat Corcyra for seven days (3.81.4) and then returnedto Athens. Since the trip to Corcyra could

takefour or five daysri ø we may allowsome15 to 17 daysfor the fleet to sail to Corcyra, remain therefor a week, and return to Athens, perhaps in early August. The 12 shipsoriginally stationedat Naupactusappear

to havereturnedto Athenswith Eurymedon. 51 Neartheendof thesummer('[o(•ct•'ro(•O•@o•'[•.•'r•0v'ro•), i.e. probablyin early September,beforethe endof the preferredsailingseason

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but after the return of the fleet from Corcyra, the Athenianssent out a squadronof 20 shipsto intervenein Sicily; the squadronestablished itself at Rhegium(3.86) whereit winteredover, resumingactivitieswith a raid

on the Lipari islandsas winterended. 52Againit seemslikely thatmost of the manpowerfor these20 shipswas drawn from the crewsof the 60 shipsthat had returnedfrom Corcyra. Two pointsmay be noted about the campaignsof 427. First, there was no raidingexpeditiondirectedagainstthe coastof the Peloponnese, suchas we find in mostotheryears.The reasonfor this may be financial, but it may also be that Athenianmanpowerwas alreadyfully committed elsewhere,notably in reinforcingthe squadronat Naupactus.Second, since the Corcyreanexpedition sailed after the bulk of the forces had returnedfrom Lesbos,and the Rhegiumsquadronsailedafter the return of the Corcyreanexpedition,it is possible--andto my mind likely--that a substantialnumber of sailors was away from Athens more or less throughoutthe year, transferringfrom one expedition to the next. The Rhegiumsquadron,it may alsobe noted,remainedin thewest,apparently until the summer of 424.

In 426 the Peloponnesians gatheredagain to invade Attica, but were deterredby earthquakeswhen they had reachedthe Isthmus (3.89.1). ThucydidesmentionsAthens' two major expeditionsof the new year, that of 60 shipswith 2,000 hoplitesto Melos and that of 30 shipsaround the Peloponnese(3.91.1), after his account of the abortive invasion. Thucydidessays rather impreciselythat the abortive invasion occurred

'co• •$•tyLyvo•t•ov0•@ovg,but if it followedthe patternof previous invasionsit would have begunin mid- or late May. Thucydidesdoesnot link theseexpeditionschronologicallywith the invasionof Attica, as he linked otherexpeditionswith the annualinvasionin previousyears.Still, if Thucydideshas narratedtheseeventsin their properorder, as we may assumehe has, the new year's expeditionswould not have set sail before

late May or early June,and they may well havebeenevenlater.53 The expeditionto Melos spentsometime ravagingMelian territory, but when the Melians would not submit, the expedition withdrew to Oropus where the hoplites operatedagainst Tanagra for two days in concertwith infantry who had marchedup from Athens. The hoplites then withdrew to their ships which continuedto Lochs, ravaged the coastaldistrictsthere, and thenreturnedto Athens(3.91.3-6). It is difficult to say how long all this took, but we may be confidentthat the Athenians returnedhome long before the end of the preferredsailing seasonin mid-September. The fleet sentroundthe Peloponnese was initially successfulin some seaborneraids. Demosthenes,the expedition'scommander,then detached

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his marines to campaignon land with Athens' local allies againstthe Aetolians. These forces were badly mauled, however, and after making their way backto Naupactus,the Atheniansurvivorswere transported by the fleet back to Athens (3.98.5). It is unclear whether the Athenians

hadoriginallyplannedfor this squadronto returnat the endof the summer or to passthe winter at Naupactus.In all events,the Atheniansdid send out a smaller squadronof 20 shipsquite late in the year to winter over

in Naupactus. 54 Finally, late in the sameyear55 the Atheniansdecidedto makea greatereffort in the west, and to that end they sent out Pythodoruswith a few shipswhile it was still possibleto sail, anticipatingsendinga much larger fleet in the spring(3.115.3-5). III

It shouldbe clear from the foregoingchronologythat during the period under review the Athenianssent out two quite different sortsof expeditions. In expeditionsof the first sort the triremescarded extra hoplites in addition to their regular complementof epibatai, and their principal functionwas to transportthesetroops,usuallyto ravageenemyterritory. Includedin this first categoryare the expeditionsto Potidaeain 432, that around the Peloponnesein 431, that againstthe northeastPeloponnese,

thento Potidaeain 430, thataroundthe Peloponnese in 428,56andthat to Melos, etc. in 426. By contrast,in expeditionsof the secondsort the triremescardedonly their normalcomplementof epibatai, and were thus more preparedto engagethe enemyat sea, and they typically had a more strictly naval mission, to project Athenian military presencein a remote area, to interceptenemy ships,etc. Includedin this secondcategoryare the expeditionto Corcyra in 433, that to Lochs and Euboea in 431, that

to Naupactus in 430 anditsreinforcement in 429, thatto Lesbosin 428,57 that around the Peloponnesein 428, that to Corcyra in 427, that to Rhegiumin 427, and thosearoundthe Peloponnese in 426. The first sort of expedition involved large numbersof ships and men who were in service for relatively short periods of time, returningto Athens at the end of the preferredsailing season;the secondinvolved fewer shipsand men who were typically away for much longer periodsof time, often at sea during the less favorable sailing seasons,eventuallywintering over away from Athens, and sometimesremaining on continuousduty for a year or more. The shorterexpeditionsof the first sortrangedin size from the first 30 ships sent to Potidaeain 432 to the great fleets of 100 or more shipssentagainstthe Peloponnesein 431,430, and428. Expeditions of this first sortwere sometimesat seafor as long as threeto four months,

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but they could also be as shortas a few weeks(e.g. the fleet sentagainst the Peloponnesein 428). The longer expeditionsof our secondsort, on the other hand, kept a minimum of 20 shipson extendedduty throughout our studyperiod, the figure risingas high as 58 in 428-27, with 40 ships engagedin the siege of Mytilene and another 18 on stationthroughthe winter at Naupactus.Finally, on the evidenceof Thucydides,only ex-

peditionsof the secondsortfoughtagainstenemynavalforces. 58 To staff thesetwo sortsof expeditionsAthens neededtwo different pools of manpower, a large seasonalpool of less skilled sailors who rowed the big summerfleets and a smallerpermanentpool of morehighly skilled sailors who, from late 430 onwards, rowed year-roundon both winter and summerexpeditionsor on expeditionswhich lastedfor a year or longer. The two differentpools,the one year-round,the otherseasonal, were likely to containtwo different sortsof men, not leastfor economic reasons.There seemsto be a generalconsensusthat an unmarriedman in our period required, at a minimum, annual wages of roughly 120

drachmas for livingexpenses (primarilyfood,clothingandshelter); 59for a family of four (husband,wife, and two children) the figure increases

proportionately to perhaps280 drachmas per year.rø Now our sources give two differentfigures, three obolsand one drachma,as the daily rate

of pay for sailorsduringthe Peloponnesian war.6• At eitherrate, one drachmaor threeobolsper day, the seasonalsailor who rowed for three or four months at most in the large summer fleets had to have some other sourceof income to supporthimself and his family when he was not rowing. The year-round rower, on the other hand, could support himself, though not a family, on a daily allowanceof three obols; and at a daily rate of one drachmathe year-roundrower could either support a family or amassa handsomenest-eggfor himself. Pritchettsaw three obols as the normal rate of daily pay and one drachma as a special "hardship"rate for sailors who were away from Athens on protracted overseascampaigns,an extra allowancebeing addedto compensatefor

thedifficultyin procuring provisions abroad. 62In identifying onedrachma as a special "hardship"rate Pritchett is probably correct, but for the wrongreason.In normal(i.e. hoplite)militaryservice,whichwastypically

seasonal,soldierswere given only o[•l@•O[OV(also called •@oc•l), a daily allowanceto covertheir personalexpensesfor food while on campaign, and it was assumedthat they wouldprovidefor their familiesby the work they did during the rest of the year when they were not on military service.Naval servicemay be conceivedof in a similar fashion. The threeobolsmentioned by oursources wouldbe thenormalot•rl@•otov for seasonalsailorswho had other sourcesof income, while the higher

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one-drachmarate was for year-roundsailorswho had no time for other occupations,to compensatethem for the loss of other income. The year-roundrowers were thus in a real sense "professionals" whoseeconomicrelationto their rowing was substantiallydifferent from that of the seasonalrowers. We may also assumethat they were more skillful as rowers, since they went to sea in the marginal seasonsof springand fall, and they were alsothe oneswho foughtthe naval battles. One would further speculatethat they developedclosersocialbondswith their fellow rowers with whom they were away from home on extended campaigns.The prospectof long-term employmentand the apparently high rate of pay were also more likely to attract foreignersto these extendedexpeditionsthan to the shorter summer ones. Finally, these sailorswho were away on extendedexpeditionswere often absentfrom Athens and unableto participatein the political decisionsaffectingtheir activities, including the annual electionsof their generalswhich could take place as early as the seventh prytany (Adstot. AP 44.4, roughly early February to mid-March). Comparedwith these"professional"sailors,the seasonalrowerswho served only on the summer expeditionswere more likely to be Attic

residents,citizensand metics, 63 sinceexpeditions whichpromisedless money becauseof their shorterduration shouldhave been less attractive to foreigners.We may also supposethat the rowersin this pool typically had less experience,and less of the skill that comeswith practice,than thosein the year-roundpool, and so were used only during the summer months,when the seaswere calmer and less challengingthan in the fall and spring, on expeditionsthat were not expectedto involve real naval

combat. 64And, mostimportantly frombothan economic anda psychological point of view, for thesepart-time seasonalrowers, rowing was not their occupation,as it was for the year-roundsailors,but something which they did in additionto (or insteadof) what they normally did. But what did they normallydo?I wouldlike to considerthe possibility

that many of thesepart-timesailorswere in fact full-timefarmers. 65 Ancient Greek farmersharvestedtheir grain in mid- to late May, before the preferredsailingseason;they pickedtheir grapesin September,about the time the preferredsailing seasonended;and they sowednext year's grain in late Octoberand early November, at the end of the fall marginal

sailingseason. 66As we haveseen,thereis no evidencethatthe summer fleetssailedoutsidethe preferredsailingseason,and thereis considerable evidencethat they sailedwithin it. The seasonat which theselarge fleets were at sea would thus coincidewith the slack part of the agricultural

year,whentherewerelargenumbersof farmersavailableto row them?

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For farmers, rowing was also economicallyadvantageous,even at three obols a day, in a way that it was not advantageousfor non-agriculturalworkers.Farmersrowed when they would not havebeenworking anyway, and rowing thus provided supplementalincome beyond what they would otherwisehave made in the courseof a year throughtheir

normalactivities. 68By contrast, for non-agricultural workers(craftsmen, merchants,etc.) money from rowing at best replacedmoney they would have earned from their normal occupationsif they did not row. Indeed there would have been little incentivebeyondpatriotismfor non-agricultural workers to serve in the navy at three obols a day if their normal daily earningswere substantiallymore, as it appearsfrom the Erechtheum

accounts (IG 13475-76) thattheywere. Finally, the numberof part-time sailorswas often very large. At 170 sailorsper trireme, Athensrequiredsome 17,000 seasonalsailorsto man the hundred ships sent againstthe Peloponnesein 431, 430, and 428, and 10,400 to man the 60 ships sent againstMelos in 426. If most of thesesailorswere residentsof Attica, as we have arguedthey were, and if all or most were normally employedyear-roundin other occupations, their withdrawalfrom the labor market would produceseriouseconomic dislocationsin the years when they rowed and/or their remainingin the labor market would produceoppositedislocationsin the yearswhen they did not. There is, however, no evidencefor any suchdislocationsin our sources.The absenceof such dislocations,despitethe large number of rowers involved and the unevennessof their use from year to year, both in total numbersand in length of service, arguesthat the bulk of the rowers were seasonallyunemployed,and only farmerswould appearto have been seasonallyunemployedin sufficientnumbersto man the large summer

fleets.

The farmerswho I believe rowed in the fleet would have been part of Athens' agriculturalpoor, (1) men who worked someoneelse's land, either for cash payment or as sharecroppers; (2) men who owned some land, but not enoughto meet the minimum requirementsof the zeugite class;and perhaps(3) some of the poorer membersof the zeugite class who would be attractedto rowing by the moneyto be earned, as described above, despitethe superiorsocial standingof serviceas a hoplite. As to this last group, the zeugite class, note that in 428 the Atheniansdrew heavily upon the zeugitai to man the fleet of 100 shipssentagainstthe Peloponnese (3.16.1). To row effectively, thesezeugiterowers, like the thousandhopliteswho later that sameyear rowed themselvesto Mytilene (3.18.3-4), must have had considerabletraining, training which, as far

as we know, cameonly fromactualservicein the fleet.69The Athenians could man their shipswith hoplitesin 428, it would appear, becausea

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significantnumberof hopliteshad had previousexperiencerowing in the fleet. TM

The annual summer fleets continued in their way a pattern which

hadbegunbeforethewar, aswe knowfromtheevidence of IG 13364-65. This patterndevelopedin no small measure,I would argue, both because sailing conditionswere most favorable during the summer months, and becausea sufficientlylarge pool of potentialrowers was available only during the summer. These same circumstancescontinued into the war, with farmers

at least from the considerable

areas of Attica

not touched

by thePeloponnesian invasions stillonlyseasonally available forrowing. TM As for the farmers who were mined by the invasions,they became, I would suggest,a major sourceof the crews of the longer expeditions which wintered away from Attica during the late-year planting season. These late-year expeditions,it will be recalled, began only during the courseof the war, after the Peloponnesians had twice invadedAttica. To returnbriefly to the summernaval expeditions,it hasbeen argued here that serviceon theseexpeditionswas uniquely attractiveto farmers. It is unlikely that the fleet, asa socialinstitutionrecruitedfrom volunteers, wouldhaveevolvedin a way whichmadeit uniquelyattractiveto farmers unless it did in fact attract a larger number of them. According to democracy'scritics, the fleet was, like other institutionsproviding state pay, a way for the Athenian democracyto transferwealth to her citizen

poor.TMIt is oftenassumed that the poorwho benefitedby democracy were predominantlyresidentsof the city, but we should rememberthat not all poor peoplelived in the city, any more than all thosewho lived in the country were hoplites.The argumentdevelopedhere indicatesthat in fact a significantproportionof Athens'poorearnedtheirbasiclivelihood from farming. The size of the fleet, as we said at the start of this paper, depended in large measureon the politicaldemandsplaceduponit, and on Athens' financial ability to pay her sailors. But the fleet was also a social institution, and one which usually relied on volunteers,and becauseof this the way in which the fleet was manned was also a function, rather basically, of the pool of men willing to man it. Indeed, the nature of that pool also affected to some degreethe choice of missionsassigned to the fleet, as we have seen in the connection between the effects of

the Peloponnesianinvasionson the rural populationof Attica and the introductionof extendednaval expeditions.The compositionof the pool of potential sailors and the patternsof fleet staffing at the time of the Sicilianexpeditionand of the Spartanoccupationof Deceleialie outside the scopeof this paper, and we will only notethat a comparisonof those

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patternswith the patternsstudiedhere will show in one more way how

differentthelateryearsof thePeloponnesian warwerefromitsbeginning. 73 Vincent

Fairfield University

J. Rosivach

NOTES

1. The following abbreviationsare used in this paper:AFD = B.D. Meritt, Athenianfinancial documentsof thefifth century(1932); HCT= A.W. Gomme, A historicalcommentaryon Thucydides1 (1945), 2-3 (1956); 4 (by Gomme, A. Andrewes, K.J. Dover, 1970); 5 (by Gomme, Andrewes, Dover, 1981). Equivalent dates are those given by Gomme in HCT, except when otherwise indicated.For Gomme'sseasonalequivalents,seeHCT 3.699-715; on his Julian equivalentsof prytanydatesseebelow, n. 12. Julianequivalentsshouldalways be consideredapproximatewithin -+ two or three days. All text citationsare of Thucydidesunlessotherwisenoted. 2. Shipscouldbe kept in the wateryear-roundif this was necessary,but they were normally drawn up on shoreduring the depthsof winter both to protect them from stormy conditionson the water and to improve their subsequent performanceby drying out and servicingtheir hulls; on this secondpoint cf. 7.12.3-5 and see further J.S. Morrison and J.F. Coates, The Athenian trireme (1986) 230-33.

3. All evidencewe haveindicatesthatduringthe Peloponnesian War Athenian rowers were volunteers,not conscripts.The earliest of this evidenceis Thuc. 6.31.3 describingthe preparationsfor the Sicilian expedition, at which time trierarchswere apparentlyresponsiblefor recruitingrowers (in contrastto the

deck-officers (6•x•!@•o(•ct) whoweresuppliedby the state;seefurtherHCT 4.29394 ad loc.). Recruitmentof rowers by trierarchscontinueddown into the later yearsof the war (Lys. 21.10), and indeedwell into the fourthcentury,beforeit wasreplacedby conscription aboutthe middleof the century(Dem. 21.154-155). If Athens relied upon her trierarchsto recruit rowersin the darker days later in the war, it is a fortiori likely that sheusedthe samesystemof recruitmentearlier in the war when rowers would be easierto come by. Recruitmentof volunteers ratherthan conscriptionwould alsobettersuit a navy which depended,as Athens' did in the fifth century, on both native and foreign rowers(the latter necessarily volunteers).Note alsothat unlikemembersof the hopliteclassand above,all of

whomwerepotentiallyhoplites,not all th•teswerepotentiallysailors(HCT 2.42 on Thuc. 2.13.8), a factorwhichwouldfurthercomplicateconscription andmake the alternativeof recruitingvolunteerspreferableas long as therewas a sufficient pool of potentialrecruitsand sufficientpay to attractthem. On the introduction of conscriptionas a consequenceof Athens' uncertainmilitary financesin the fourthcenturyseeM. Amit, Athensand the sea. A studyin Atheniansea-power (1965) 48-49. The "ThemistoclesDecree" speaksof conscription,but this may be explainedeitherasa fourth-century anachronism or by the specialcircumstances before Salamis (cf. the somewhat similar circumstancesat Thuc. 3.16.1, where

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hopliteswere usedto crew an emergencyfleet to deter a Peloponnesian attack on the Piraeus).Accordingto B. Jordan, The Athenian navy in the Classical period (1972) 102, even in the fifth centuryhopliteswere regularlydraftedto row when there was an insufficientnumber of thgtesand foreignerswilling to volunteer;but his argumentis basedon a misunderstanding of AP 26.1, which mentionsconscription •x xo• xotxot•.6¾ov (the referenceis actuallyto landforces: see P.J. Rhodes, A commentaryon the Aristotelian AthenaionPoliteia (1981) 327 ad loc.), and on the unwarrantedassumptionthat the large fleets of the Peloponnesian war could not be mannedwithoutrecourseto conscription. 4. This studythuscoversthe sameperiodas Thucydides'first threebooks. It alsoexaminesonly the majorexpeditionsduringthis periodandby-passes for the most part the routinenaval activitiesnecessaryfor the maintenance of the League(patrollingagainstpiracy,collectingthephoros,etc.). Sincetheseroutine activities would have been a feature of the League before the outbreakof the war and would havecontinuedunabatedthroughoutour period,this studyassumes the manpowerdemandsof these routine activitiesas a constant,and focuses insteadon the additionaldemandsmadeby the large military expeditionsduring the period under study. It shouldbe kept in mind, however, that since these routineactivitiesinvolvedperhaps20 to 30 shipsoperatingannuallyin the Aegean, theyrepresented a substantial initial demandon thepoolof availablerowerswhich had to be met before the crews for the major expeditionscould be recruited.It must also be admittedthat we know very little abouttheseroutineactivities, sinceThucydidesrarely mentionsthem, and usuallyonly when somethingwent wrong(e.g. whenMelesandrus andsomeof histroopswereslainwhileon routine guardand revenueduty with six shipsin Caria and Lycia (2.69.1-2), or when Thucydideshimself, as generalin the Thracewarddistrict,was unablewith his sevenshipsto preventBrasidasfrom gainingcontrol of Amphipolis(4.104.4106.3)).

5. This is a distinctionwhich Plutarch (or his source)apparentlyfailed to make at Per. 11.4 wherehe saysthat underPericlesthe Athenianskept 60 ships at sea for eight monthseachyear (i.e. for the entiresailingseason)to provide pay for the city's poor. Plutarch'smistakeis repeatedby (e.g.) Amit (above,n. 3) 28; S.K. Eddy, "Athens' peacetimenavy in the age of Pericles",GRBS 9 (1968) 141-56; Jordan (above, n. 3) 112.

6. For the Pleiades'settingas a signof weatherunfit for sailingseethe texts cited by M.L. West, Hesiod: Worksand days (1978) 314 on 619 if.; for the date of the Pleiades'settingsee ibid. 256 on 383-84 (end). Modem statements to the effect that sailingwas possibleduringthe winter are usuallybasedon the "winter" voyagesmentionedby Thucydides,but the numberand extentof these voyagesshow that Thucydides'"winter" includedmore than the four months during which our other sourcestell us the sea was usually closed;see further below, n. 14.

7. For the startof the sailingseason,see Hes. Op. 678-84; for the Julian calendarequivalent(late April-earlyMay) seethe scholionin Vat. gr. 38 quoted by West 325 on Op. 678 ff.

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8. For the preferredseason,seeHes. Op. 663-72, on which seeWest 322-23 on 678 if.; for the dangerof sailing before the solstice,Hes. Op. 679-84; for the dangerof fall sailing, Hes. Op. 673-77. 9. There is a slight inconsistencybetweenVegetius' date for the end of the springperiod of dangeroussailing(usquein idus Maias) and the start of the periodof securanavigatio(a die VI kal. Iunias), but the two weeks' difference is relatively unimportantfor our purposeshere. 10. March may evenbe too early for the startof the regularcommercialsailing seasonin Athens. We know from [Dem.] 33.23 that specialarrangements were made for handlingiS(•x(xt•[tyco@tx(x(• in the periodfrom Boedromion(September/October) to Mounichion (April/May) according to the MSS, or from Mounichion to Boedromion if we emend the MSS (see U.E. Paoli, "Zur Gerichtszeitder iS/•x(xt •[tyco@tx(xi im attischenRecht",ZRG 49 (1929) 473-77). In either case this suggeststhat the period from Boedromionto Mounichion inclusive was outsidethe normal commercialsailing season. 11. HCT 3.437 on 4.2.1. Normallythe grainripenedandwasreadyfor harvest in the last days of May (HCT 2.70 on 2.19.1; for ancientevidencefor the date of the harvest see below, n. 66).

12. The Julian equivalentsto the prytany datesare thoseof Gomme in HCT 2.435. Gomme basedhis Julian equivalentson the conciliar year table in AFD 176, exceptfor 433/2 (not coveredin AFD), which is basedon the table in B.D. Meritt, The Atheniancalendar in thefifth century(1928) 118. Althoughthe two tablesdo not totally agree with each other, the discrepancies are a matterof a few days,smallenoughto be ignoredfor our purposes.W.K. Pritchett,"Calendars of Athensagain",BCH 81 (1957) 293-301, hascriticizedGomme'suseof Meritt's Julian equivalents, but the practical differences between Pritchett and Meritt/Gomme are again small enoughto be ignored here. It shouldbe noted, however, that Gomme's dates differ, often substantially,from those given by Busolt in his chronologicaltable (G. Busolt, GriechischeGeschichtebis zur Schlachtbei ChaeroneiaIII 2 (1904) xxv-xxxv), and by thosewho follow Busolt. Most often the differencesdependon the dating of the conciliaryear, Gomme followingMeritt and Busoltfollowingthe earlierwork of B. Keil, "Das System des KleisthenischenStaatskalenders",Hermes 29 (1894) 358, Tabelle IV. Busolt paid a great deal of attention,particularlyin his notes,to the micro-chronology of events.I have not indicatedevery point at which my chronologydiffers from his, but where thereare differences,I believeI havegiven a sufficientexplanation for the dates I have chosen.

13. Cf. pp. 45-46 on the multiplepaymentsbeforethe departureof the fleetsent round the Peloponnesein 431. 14. As is well known, Thucydidesdivided his narrativeinto "summers"and "winters".I would arguethat Thucydidesat least viewed the sailing year much as Hesiodand Vegetiusdid, dividedratherlooselyinto a preferredsailingseason bracketedby two less preferredones, and dead winter; further, I would argue that Thucydides'"summer"corresponded to the preferredsailingseason,the one (accordingto Vegetius)appropriatefor military activity, while his "winter" includedboth the more dangeroustransitionalperiods,when navigationwas still

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possible, and the deep winter monthswhen shipswere usually hauled from the water. The only navalmovementsmentionedby Thucydideswhich canbe securely dated to the depthsof winter are the emergencydispatchof Eurymedonto Sicily with 10 shipsin late December414 (7.16.2) and the sailingof 27 Peloponnesian shipsto Ionia underAntisthenesin late December412 (8.39.1). Given the limitation of our sources,it is rather difficult to speakof a commonancientview on this matter, but it is not unreasonableto assumethat Hesiod, Thucydides and Vegetiusall reflect what was in fact a widely held point of view. There is an extensiveliterature, which cannot be reviewed here, on Thucydides' use of the terms"summer"and "winter" (for a convenientbibliographyof recentdiscussions see A. Andrewes in HCT 5.148). Gomme himself (HCT 2.706-9) believed that Thucydides'summerended, and his winter began,with the settingof the Pleiades,

but the amountof sailingwhichThucydides placedin the winter showsthat his "winter" began somewhatearlier than Gomme allows. Cf. above, n. 6.

15. HCT

1.196.

16. Fundingdatesrepresentonly terminipost quos, and we have no way of knowinghow much time elapsedbetweenthe fleet's fundingand its departure.

AsGomme points out(HCT1.196note1),'TG. I.2 30263-5 seems toshow that it was possiblethat as many as 17 days might elapse between payment and sailing."

17.Thenumber (andtribe)of theprytany arerestored in IG 13364.21-22, but the restorationsare all but certain; see HCT 1.196-97, and more briefly R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, A selectionof Greek historical inscriptionsto the end of the fifth century B.C. (1969) 168. 18. Despite their wide margin of possibleerror, estimatesof this sort are still a useful way of illustratingordersof magnitude(e.g. 2 1/2 monthsrather than 6), and they are so usedhere. 19. Since Thucydides,who is usually very careful about suchmatters,does not mention any shipshere, we may concludethat Phormion'stroopswent by land to Potidaea;once there, they would have been ferded aroundto the south of the town by the Athenian shipsalreadypresent. 20. The battle was some six months before the attack on Plataea which

can

be dated almost certainly to March 6-9, 431 (for the dating see J. Classen-J. Steup, Thukydides, vol. 2 (1914) 292-93). 21. Cf. 1.64.3. They also left behind Phormionand his 1,600 hopliteswho operatedagainstChalcidice and Bottice (1.65.3) and were still in the field the following spring (cf. 2.29.6), returningto Athens in that summer(cf. 2.58.3). 3.17.2 seemsto imply that they left the entire fleet at Potidaea,but the passage

is probablyan interpolation;seebelow, n. 47. 22. For the date, see AFD 176.

23.Bothsquadrons arealsoabsent fromIG 13364which onlycontains the Corcyreanaccountsfor 433/2. Sincethe first fundedexpeditionin the new year

wascommanded byEucrates (IG13365.5)it hasoften been argued thatEucrates was a colleagueof eitherArchestratus or Callias, i.e. that oneor bothexpeditions

mentioned byThucydides appear inIG 13365though under a different general's

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name (thus IG 13restores Callias' name afterEucrates' in thelatterpartof line 5). If Eucrateswere in fact a colleagueof either Archestratusor Callias it would help the argumentof this paperby movingone or bothof theseexpeditionseven later in the year, but it is hard to imagine why Thucydideswould designateas

prime commander a general different fromtheonesodesignated inIG 13365. Ratherthan shoehorning theseexpeditionsinto 432/1, it is probablybestto assume that both were funded at the end of 433/2, and that their accounts were inscribed on a secondstone, now lost, separatefrom the Corcyrean accounts(cf. Gomme,

CR 55 (1941) 64 note 1). For a convenientolder bibliographyon the discussion see J. Alexander, Potidaea: Its history and remains (1963) 113 note 16. See further below, n. 26. 24. W. Kolbe, Thukydides im Lichte der Urkunden (1930) 33-35; Gomme,

HCT 1.223 ("at the latest"). Gomme also gives datesof mid-April (ib}d. 1.425) ß 2[ and early April ("as soonas was reasonable":A.W. Gomme, "I.G. •. 296 and the datesof '•6t Ilo'•eUSetr•txdt",CR 55 (1941) 59-67, at 64-65). 25. Callias' squadroncouldhavesailedevenafterthe startof the new conciliar year on July 2; cf. above, n. 23.

26.Because it issofragmentary, IG 13365,containing financial accounts for 432/1, is of little help in reconstructing the chronologyof this northernexpedition. All we can say with certaintyis that one paymentwas made in Pryt. II (c. August

8-September12) to Eucratesfor the forcessentto Macedonia(•õ Mtt]xe•5ovictv

E•)x@6x.[•t, line 5) thata separately numbered seriesof ninepayments was made to the hell•notamiaibeginningin Pryt. III (c. September12-October 19), and that the eighthpaymentto the hell•notamiaiwas for an army which was at

least by then operatingat Potidaea('r•t Iloxe[tfct(,ctv.... line 25). W.E. Tho_mpson, "The chronologyof 432/1" Hermes96 (1968) 230-31, followedby

IG Ij, sees boththepayment toEucrates andtheninepayments tothehelldnotamiai going to fund the force sent north to reinforceArchestratus.Thompson,again

followed byIG 13,makes Callias andEucrates co-commanders ofthisforce, thus reconcilingThucydides'statement(1.161.1) that Callias was in commandof the

second forcewithIG 13365.5,whichputsEucrates in command of theforce receiving payment in Pryt. II. There is, however, no compellingreason why

Callias'nameshould berestored asco-commander withEucrates inIG 13365.5,

and there are indeedgood groundsfor rejectingsucha restoration(see above, n. 23). By my reading of the evidence, the paymentto Eucratesin Pryt. II was for Archestratus'squadronwhich had alreadyleft Athens in the previousconciliar year (see above, n. 23) and which operated in Macedonia at least as late as August, on the evidenceof this inscription,before moving on to Potidaea;the paymentsto the hell•notamiaiwould also have beenfor this force or perhapsfor the combined

forces of Archestratus

and Callias.

I assume that for some reason

Eucrateshad replacedArchestratus as the principalgeneralof the first squadron sendnorth.One possibilityis that Archestratus was not reelectedto the stratggia for 432/1, and thatEucratessuperseded him whenhe took office on Hekatombaion 1 (=July 15 (AFD 177)). Eucrateswould have still been in Athens in Pryt. II

to receivethe paymentfor the force •õ Mct]x•fov•ctv(line 5) whichhe took with him when headednorth to replaceArchestratusas commanderof this force;

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the remainingpaymentswere made to the hell•notamiai who would have seen to their delivery to the forcesin the north.

IG 13365hasalsobeen edited byMeritt, AFD71-81andplate I. TheJulian equivalentsgiven above for the prytanies are from Meritt as cited by D.M. Robinsonand P.A. Clement, Excavationsat Olynthus,part 9 (1938) 145 note 114.

27. The militarypurposeof theexpeditionsaroundthe Peloponnese is discussed by H.D. Westlake, "Seaborneraids in Pericleanstrategy",CQ 39 (1945) 75-84. 28.2.17.4,

2.23.2, 2.25.1. The duration and cost of Athens' various naval

expeditions duringthe Peloponnesian war arediscussed by G. D6pel, Die attische Flotte im Peloponnesischen Kriege (1937) 3-18. UnfortunatelyD6pel's account is incomplete,and he doesnot alwaysexplainthe basisof his dating, widely at variancewith, e.g., that in HCT, which is principally followed here (cf. above, n. 12).

29. 0•@ou;xct[ 'ro• o0rov &x[t6•oYrog (2.19.1), datedby HCT 2.70, ad loc., as the end of May; the invasionwasalso80 daysafterthe attackon Plataea, between March 6 and 9 (loc. cit.).

30. HCT 2.79-80, on 2.23.2, with Meritt's widely acceptedrestorationdating

thefirstofthese payments toPryt.IX.IG13prints Thompson' stentative restoration 3 placing the first paymentin Pryt. VIII (IG I 365.31; Thompson(above, n. 26) 230 with note 2). Given the conditionof the inscription,it is impossibleto prove that Meritt's ratherthanThompson'srestorationis the correctone, butThompson's reasonfor rejectingit, viz. to avoid having three installmentspaid within eight days in Pryt. IX, is hardly persuasive,sinceeven with his restorationthere are still three paymentsgroupedin Pryt. IX and the startof Pryt. X. 31. HCT 2.91, ad loc.

32. For thefirstyearof Cleopompus' termas generalseeR. Develin,Athenian officials 684-32! B.C. (1987) 117.

33. 'ro• 0•@ov• •)0/)• &@Xo[t•¾ov (2.47.2), on whichseeHCT 2.145, ad loc.

34. But only a few days lest the expeditionaryforce lose its cohesion. 35. Thucydides'narrative(2.58.2-3) leavesthe strongimpressionthat Hagnon broke off campaigningearly when the plaguebroke out amonghis troops.

36. 'ro• t•Jrtytyvo[t•vov g•t[t(7ovog (2.69.1), probablysometime duringthe unfavorablesailingseasonin late Septemberand October,but clearlynot during the "closed" season of November and later. Cf. also above, nn. 6 and 14.

37. 'to6 ct6'ro6X•t[t&vog(2.102.1);on the meaning of thisexpression see above, nn. 6 and 14. 38. Cf. HCT

3.709.

39. 2.85.4-5. During the summerof 429 a force of 2,000 hoplitesand 200 cavalry also operatedin Thrace against the Chalcidiansand Bottiaeans(2.79), but there is no evidence that any naval forces were also involved; the troops probablymarchedto Thrace. Cf. above, n. 19. 40. For the date, note that Thucydidesbeginshis narrativeof eventsin the northwest"not much after" the Athenianscampaignedin Thrace (cf. above, n.

39) &x[t6•ov'ro•'ro• o(:rov(2.79.1). The datefor grainripeningwouldbe the

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end of May if ThucydidesmeansAttic grain, but Thraciangrain ripenssome three weekslater (HCT 2.213 ad !oc.; thoughGomme doubtsthat the reference is to the northerncrops, note that in the next sentenceThucydidesdescribesthe Atheniansdestroying grainin BottiaeanSpartolus).Thucydides'narrativeincludes the outfittingand dispatchof the Peloponnesian fleet, the collectionof troopsfor a land campaign,a land battle and a naval battle, all before Phormionsent word to Athens that the Peloponnesians were preparingfor a secondnaval battle and that he neededreinforcements (2.85.4). All this activity would havetakenat least the monthof June and perhapspart or all of July. The dateswill be even later if the startingpointof the chronology,&x[td;gov'rog 'to0 o(:rov,refersto Thracian and not Attic crops. 41. For the date, note that the arrival of the shipsat Naupactusis the last

eventin Thucydides'summer,followedby the notexctl,'r6 0•@og•'reke6'rct (2.92.7). Note also that the shipswere preventedfrom leaving Crete earlier by the etesianwinds (C. Neumann and J. Partsch,PhysikalischeGeographieyon Griechenland(1885) 98 note 1). Since thesestrongwinds blowing constantly down the Aegeanfrom the northtoward Crete could make it impossibleto sail north from the island toward the mainland, and it would even be difficult to row

triremes north into the wind, once the etesiansset in there was little the ships could do exceptwait for a break in the winds. Since the etesiansblew in late July and August, this detail would supportthe chronologygiven above. On the etesians,see Neumann-Partsch95-100; A. Rehm, RE 6 (1907) coil. 713 ff.; R. B6ker, RE 23 (1957) coil. 96 if. (s.v. Prodromoi).

42. [tœ'r& x/Iv •o[5okilVœ606g(3.2.1); Gomme(HCT 2.252, ad !oc.) takes this to meanafter the invasionwas over and the Peloponnesians had withdrawn

(i.e. aboutmid-June), butThucydides wouldprobably haveused&vctxcb@rlO[g insteadof t•o[5okq if thiswaswhathe meant(cf. 2.32.2).

43. &[tct'r0 o(:r.cpdoc[td•ov'rt (3.1.1), on whichseeHCT 2.252,ad !oc. 44. No regularrowerswererequiredto transportthesehoplitessincetheyrowed themselves (ct6'cœ@•'m[, 3.18.4). 45. I.e. afterthe new generalstook office on Hekatombaion1 (= July 1 (AFD 177)). The expeditionwas underthe commandof Phormion'ssonAsopius,who was generalonly in 428/7 (Develin (above, n. 32) 123, citing C.W. Fornara, The Athenian board of generalsfrom 501 to 404 (1971) 56). 46. This expeditionwas a responseto the Peloponnesian preparations,which were themselvesa responseto the Mytileneanplea addressedto the Spartansand their allies at the Olympic games(3.8). The Olympics of 428 took place on

August11-15, according to A. Mommsen, Oberdie Zeit der Olyrnpien (1891) 54-60; similarlyS.G. Miller, "The dateof Olympicfestivals",MDAI(A) 90 (1975) 215-31.

47. Thucydides'narrativeof theseeventsis interruptedby a paragraph(3.17) givingthe total numberof shipsat seaandthe expenses involved.The paragraph must be an interpolation,however, and is thus of no use for reconstructing the eventsof 428. For the problemswith the paragraph,mostnotablyits mentionof an otherwiseunattestedhome fleet of 100 ships,see most convenientlyJ. Steup in J. Classen-J.Steup,Thukydides,vol. 3 (1892) 244-49; for a surveyof views

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on the authenticityof the paragraph,see HCT 2.272-73 (Gomme himself (HCT 2.274) inclinestoward the ingenioussolutionof F.E. Adcock, "On Thucydides III, 17", CHJ 1 (1923-25) 319-22, that the passagerefers to the stateof affairs in 430, and is to be inserted between 2.56 and 2.57, but Gomme is still unable

to explainthe 100-shiphomefleet). 48. This same summer"after the captureof Lesbos"(p,e'c&'t/IV A/•o13ov 6•)•tornv,3.51.1) -- andpresumably afterthebulkof theforcestherehadreturned to Athensand were now availablefor otherpurposes-- an Athenianforce seized Minoa off the coast of Megara, fortified it and left a garrisonbehind to keep watch on the port of Megara (3.51). We are not told the size of the force, but given its objective, it was probably relatively small; Thucydides does tell us (3.51.4) that it completedthe fortificationon the island•v/Ip,/•0ctt• 6•.•¾ctt•and returned

to Athens.

49. Sinceonly 40 shipsin the Lesbiancampaignhad beenmannedby ordinary sailors (and some of these are likely to have been among the elementsthat remained behind to support Paches), the Athenians also had to recruit a large numberof additionalrowers to man all 60 ships. 50. Morrison and Coates(above, n. 2) 105, give four days for a fleet sailing from the Piraeus to Corcyra; Busolt (above, n. 12) III 1044 note 3, gives five days for a single ship. Bad weather should not have been a serious problem duringthe summer,but note that the Peloponnesian fleet, which was earliertrying to sail acrossopen water to avoid the Athenians,was dispersedin a storm off Crete (3.69.1).

51. They are not mentioned in connectionwith next year's events in this theater, and so are unlikely to have wintered at Naupactus. 52. 3.88. In Thucydides'narrativethe Lipari Islandraid immediatelyprecedes

thenotex(x•6 X•t[ttbv •.•5•(x

(3.88.4).

53. SinceThucydideslinksthe Melian expedition,commanded by Nicias, with that to the northwestcommandedby Demosthenes,we may assumethat both set out about the same time. In the courseof the summer Nicias' troopsjoined in an attack on Tanagra, an attack which we know from Athenaeus(218b) took place in the archon-year426/5. It is thereforetemptingto place the departureof both expeditionsafter the startof the new archon-yearon July 9 (AFD 177). The

problem is thatDemosthenes appears notasgeneral butas•&tb'•rlq in thespring of 425 (4.2.4). It is "easiestto supposethat he was in fact deposedin winter 426/425 [in consequenceof the Aetolian debacle], reelected for 425/424 and received his commissionof iv 2.4 as strategos-elect"(D.M. Lewis, "Double representationin the strategia", JHS 81 (1961) 120). Whatever the resolutionof this problem, clearly the later the two fleets sailed,the lesstime they could have been at sea before the end of the preferredsailing season. 54. 3.114.2. It was alreadypastthe regularcampaigning season('coilctr'[oi

Xet½&vog, 3.105.1)by the time theseshipswereoff the Ambracian Gulf (cf. 3.107.1). Contraryto his usualpractice,Thucydidessaysnothingof the departure of this fleet from Athens, but first mentionsit, and only incidentally,when it is alreadyon its way aroundthe Peloponnese(3.105.3).

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55. Pythodorusarrived in Rhegiumwhile the fleet stationedthere was away

raidingHimera;thisraid tookplacexo• ct6xo•Xetgt•vog(3.115.1) as thereplacementfleet was sentto Naupactus.Pythodorus'departurewas at leasta week earlier (for the sailingtime to Rhegium,see Morrisonand Coates(above, n. 2) 105, thoughPythodorus'small squadronwould have made somewhatbettertime

thanthefleetdescribed by Morrison andCoates). IG 13369.6-9records two loans from the treasuryof Athena Poliasto the Athenianstateon Pryt. II 31 and IV 5 (c. September9 and October26), the first of 50 talentsand the secondof 29 (the dates are those of HCT 2.435). Since there are no further transactions

recorded inIG 13369untilthefollowing spring, it istempting to seein oneor the other of the loansmade in the fall the fundingboth for Pythodorus'few ships and for the fleet whosecommandhe wasto assumeat Rhegium.The identification, incidentally, lends support to our argument (above, n. 14) that Thucydides' "winter" alsoincludedthe marginalsailingseasonin late-September and October. 56. Thucydidesdoes not mention extra hopliteson this expedition;rather, many of the rowerswere themselves hoplites(cf. 3.16.1) who wouldbe available for operationson land as well. 57. Note that thesenaval forceswere originally assembledto sail aroundthe Peloponnese(i.e. to Naupactus)but were divertedto Lesboswhen revolt broke out there. The fleet was inadequatefor siege operations,as the Atheniansdiscovered,and it had to be supplemented by 1,000 additionalhoplitessentout later from Athens (3.18.3). 58. 433 430

expeditionto Corcyra expeditionto Naupactus

428

expeditionto Lesbos

427

expeditionto Corcyra

battle of Sybota institutesnaval blockade (430) battlesof Patrai and Naupactus(429) naval skirmishingin Mytilene harbor (428) chasesPeloponnesian fleet from Aegean (427) frightensaway Peloponnesian fleet without a battle (427)

59.S,o 3,though differing in detail, A. Boeckh, DieStaatshaushaltung der

Athener I (1886) 141-42; G. Glotz, Le travail dans la Grace ancienne (1920) 341-42; M.N. Tod, CAd-/ 5.20-22. 60. The figure of 280 drachmasper year is Glotz' (above, n. 59); cf. the

figureof 272 drachmasfor a family of threegivenby P. Guiraud,La main-d'oeuvre industrielledans l'ancienne Grace (1900) 191-92, based on Aristoph. Vesp. 300-1. Boeckhgivesa figure of 360 drachmasas the annualexpensesof a family of four adults,but a family of four adultswould not be normal. Tod gives 180 drachmasasthe annualexpensesof a man andwife with no children.H. Francotte, L'industrie dans la Grace ancienne(1900) 327-43, followed by V. Ehrenberg,

Thepeople ofAristophanes 2 (1951)231,gives c. 360drachmas asneeded to supporta family of four or five; Francotte'sbasesare the one drachmaper day

paidworkers intheErechtheum accounts of409/8and408/7(IG13475-76) and the methodological assumption thattheseworkersworked360 daysper year(since

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the workers were only paid for the days they worked), but Francotte himself recognizes(327) that the figuresmust be too high, sincethe workerscould not have worked virtually every day of the year. (See further Glotz 328; on the Erechtheum accounts, see R.H. Randall, Jr., "The Erechtheum workmen", AJA

57 (1953) 199-210 at 208, Table 7, for representative ratesof pay.) 61. The ancientsourcesand modern interpretations are discussedby W.K. Pritchett, The Greek state at war 1 (1971) 14-42.

62. Pritchett 23-24, who cites as examplesthe sailors going to Syracuse (6.31.3) and thoseat Potidaea(3.17, which may, however,be an interpolation; see above, n. 47).

63. But almostcertainlynot slaves,at leastduringthe periodwith which we are concerned;seethe discussions in Amit (above, n. 3) 31-37, and more briefly in J.S. Morrison and R.T. Williams, Greek oared ships: 900-322 B.C. (1968) 257-58; see also below, n. 72.

64. In practicethese less experiencedcrews were probably stiffened with experiencedsailorsdrawn from the year-roundpool. 65. If the thoughtof farmersrowing shipsseemsodd, note Aristotle'sstate-

ment,•x•.•10ovg • 6•x&@Xovxog •x•@toi•xcov xct•xtbvX?lV Xcb@ctv y•co@yo6vxcov, &q•0ov/•av &va¾xa[ov e[vatxa[ vavxtbv(Pol.1327b13-15), though theillustrative examplehe cites is fourth-centuryHeraclea,not fifth-centuryAthens. 66. Cf. the table on p. 42 above. Hesioddatesthe fall sowingby the setting of the Pleiades(which also markedthe end of all sailingfor the winter), of the Hyadesand of Orion (Op. 383-84, 614-17; cf. Thphr. HP 8.1.2 citing Hesiod, xct[ o9(•6v ol yrke[crrot; Orion setslast, aboutNovember4). Hesioddatesthe springharvestby therisingof thePleiadesin mid-May(Op. 383-84); Theophrastus (HP 8.2.7) saysthat barley and wheat are harvestedin the seventhand eighth monthsafter planting, i.e. in May and June. Hesiod dates the vintage by the rising of Arcturnsabout September8 (Op. 609-11). (The calendarequivalents are those of West (above, n. 6) ad locc.)

67. For men availablefor militaryserviceduringthe slackperiodbetweenthe early summerharvestand the fall plantingseeR. Osborne,Classicallandscape with figures. The ancient Greek city and its countryside(1987) 13-14, though Osborneis thinkingmainly of hoplites.(Osborne'sdate for the harvest(late May to early July) is accuratefor Greeceas a whole includingthe coolernorthern regions,but it is too long for the Athenianharvest,on which see last note.) 68. Of coursethesefarmerswouldspendthemoneytheyreceivedfromrowing, or most of it, directly on provisions,but by consumingtheseprovisionsthey would leave more in their own storewhich they could later sell (or reducethe amountthey would eventuallyhave to buy to supplementtheir store). 69. On rowers'trainingsee Jordan(above,n. 3) 103-5, and Amit (above,n. 3) 49-50. Also notethat rowinga triremeis not the sameas rowinga becalmed commercialvessel,despite[Xen.] AP 1.19-20. 70. In contrastto the Peloponnesians who are y•co@yo•xct• 06 0ctX6ootot (1.142.7, supposedly quotingPericles)at least someAthenianhopliteswere also

0ctXdootot,as theirrowingskilldemonstrated. Pericles'statement, asquotedby Thucydides,is a rhetoricalexaggerationand, in light of the evidenceof hoplites

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rowing, cannotbe usedas proof that Athenianfarmersdid not regularlyserve part-timein the fleet. For thatmatter,in 415 Alcibiades,accordingto Thucydides (6.91.4), envisageda pool of Peloponnesian hopliteswho couldrow themselves (Ot/)Te@•TOtL) tO Sicily. 71. Evidencefor theextentandlimitsof the devastation causedby thePeloponnesianinvasionsis discussed by V.D. Hanson,Warfare and agriculturein Classical Greece (1983) 112-27, expandingupon W.G. Hardy, "The Hellenica Oxyrhynchia and the devastationof Attica", CP 21 (1926) 346-55; see also P.A. Brunt, "Spartanpolicy and strategyin the Archidamianwar", Phoenix 19 (1965) 265-67. A leasefrom the secondhalf of the fourth century(publishedby E. Vanderpool,J.R. McCredieand A. Steinberg,"Koroni: A Ptolemaiccamp on the east coastof Attica", Hesperia31 (1962) 54-55) providesthat if enemies

invadeAttica and destroythe crops(•totq)0•@•ot Tbv xot@zc6v), half of what remains(x6t/l•ffoeot xfovketq)0•vxov)will belongto thelesseeandhalf to the lessor;the provisionsuggeststhat when enemiesravagedthe fields, destruction was typically far from total, and enoughof the cropswere left to make their divisionbetweenthe two partiesmeaningful. 72. The claim thatrowingprovidedmoneyfor the city's poor is alsoevidence that a significantnumberof rowers were citizens, as we have arguedabove. Note, however, that even if most of the rowers in the seasonalfleets were not

residentsof Attica, they would still be likely to be farmers,given the seasonal availabilityof farmersand the specialeconomicadvantagefarmerswould derive from rowing. 73. Researchfor this studywas supportedby a SummerStipendfrom the Fairfield University Faculty ResearchCommittee.

RITUAL, SOCIAL DRAMA AND POLITICS IN CLASSICAL

ATHENS

It may still be controversialto suggestthat ancient historiansought to read anthropology,but it is certainly not novel. In recent years, more than a few studiesof Greco-Romanantiquity have made a provocative and stimulatinguse of anthropologicalscholarship•and not only studies

of ancient literature or religion,butof ancient historyaswell.• Nevertheless,anthropologyhas probablymade lessof an impact on the study of ancient politics than on other subjects,perhapspartly becauseits relevanceto religion, say, is more immediatelyobvious,perhapspartly becausehistory,as Arjun Appaduriwrites,is "a scarceresource":it might seemto somethat anthropologycompeteswith and challengestraditional

historiography. 2 A moreoptimistic viewis thatthetwoarecomplementary, andthat if politicsis thejewel in the historian'scrown, anthropology can reveal some importantfacets. The purposeof this paper thus is to suggestsome ways in which anthropologycan clarify the ritual and performativedimensionof ancientpolitics, and also to suggestthe possibilitythat the ancienthistoriancanbringfreshperspectives to anthropol-

ogy.3 Thefocusis onclassical Athens, specifically of thelatefifthand the fourth centuries Bc.

By anthropology,I meanin particularthreerecentstrandsof thought, with significantoverlap as well as differencesamong them. The first, which comprisesscholarsmany of whom call themselvespolitical anthropologists,conceivesof politicsas systemand structure,and putsmore emphasison theoryand paradigmthan on narrative.Political anthropology notes that politics is not inseparablytied to institutions,and also that many symbols and processesnot overtly political are often of great

politicalsignificance. 4 The secondstrandof thoughtis symbolic anthropology,particularly as practicedby CliffordGeertzandVictorTurner.5 Symbolicanthropologyconceivesof cultureas a systemof meaningsand symbols.Geertz, for instance,in a well-known work, examinesthe meaning of the Balinese cockfight, and sees it as a "paradigmatichuman event" that spells out both the ethos of the observer's culture and his

ownprivatesensibility. 6Turner'sworkis typifiedby thenotionof "social drama", the idea that political conflicts, like dramas,passthroughritualizedstageswhich areimplicit in the mindsof the actors.Turnersuggests

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that political actors,especiallyin times of crisis, adhereto "deeplyengravedtendencies"to act and speakin ways corresponding to their education in a given culture's "central myth of the death or victory of a

heroor heroes". ? The third strandis the practice-oriented anthropology of Pierre Bourdieu and sociologyof Anthony Giddens. These writers emphasizethe interrelationshipof individual practice and the dominant cultureor socialstructure,at timesfocusingon the constraints of structure on the individual, at times highlightingthe ways in which individual practicecreatesstructure.They would studynot only a society'slaws or

formalinstitutions, but alsothe daily life of its individualactors. 8 One of the most revealingof all practicesis ritual, which bringsus back to this essay'sfocus. It is importantto be clear aboutthe definition from the outset. Following David Kertzer, ritual is defined here as a standardizedhuman activity that is repeatedand, above all, primarily symbolicin character(otherwisethe activity is betterthoughtof as habit or custom). Accordingly, a ritual need not be religiousin nature and it neednot be spectacular: ritual includesmassralliesas well as high mass, but also blowing out the candleson the birthday cake or an awards

ceremony at a small-town banquet. 9 So defined, ritual is an importantpart of politics. As Leach says, ritual is a "symbolicstatementaboutthe socialorder", a way of saying in poeticlanguagewhatan anthropologist-•or a historian--saysin precise language.Ortner aptly calls ritual a "sort of two-way transformer"that both reflects a culture and contributesto it, creating meaning for the participants.Kertzer outlines five basic contributionsof ritual to the political process,useful thoughcertainlynot canonicalcategories.They are: binding togetheror symbolizingan organization,providing legitimacy, providing for solidarity without consensus,inspiring people to

action,andfostering a particular world-view. •0 To take stock, much of recentanthropologyconceivesof politics as part of the wider culture,andconceivesof cultureas a systemof meanings and symbolsboth constructedout of and in turn organizingindividual and collectivepractice. Becauseof its dramaticintensity,its evocation of the sacred,and its symbolicpower, ritual is one of the best ways of attaininginsight into a culture. Let us considernow the potentialrichnessof theseargumentsfor the study of classicalAthenian politics. Two case studiesof political ritual will be examined:the first, an extraordinaryoccurrencethat made use of familiar ritual themes,the second,a regular and ordinary event.

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I. Thrasybulus and the Restoration of Democracy

On 12 Boedromion in the archonshipof Eucleides (October 403) Thrasybulusand the victoriousdemocratsreturnedto Athensto repossess it from the failed oligarchs. If ever a seriesof political events can be describedas a drama, then the rise and fall of the Athenianoligarchyof the Thirty from its installationin September404 can. In his discussion of the notionof socialdrama,Turnerspecifiesfour mainphasesof action: breach, crisis, redressiveaction, and reintegrationor recognitionof irreparable schism. In the case of the Athenian oligarchy, these phases might correspondto the installationof the Thirty (September404), the adoption--afteran initial periodof reform-•of suchaggressivetacticsas exile, judicial murder and property confiscation(roughly, late autumn 404), the guerilla war begunby Thrasybulusat Phyle (roughly, January 403), and the restorationof democracy(October403). Ratherthanpursue this suggestedschemain greater detail, here I will deal only with the

final phase,reintegration. • After a Spartan-sponsored agreementbetweenthe oligarchs(i.e., the men of the city) and the democrats(i.e., the men of the Piraeus)that guaranteedpeace,reconciliationand amnesty,the democratsmarkedtheir

returnwith a ceremony andan assembly. •2 Let usconsiderthe ceremony first. Xenophonwrites (Hell. 2.4.39): When thesethingshad beenaccomplished,Pausaniasdisbandedhis army and the men from Piraeuswent up to the Acropolisunder arms and offered sacrificeto Athena. When they had come down,

the generals convened an assembly. •3 Lysias is more specific (Ag. Agoratus 80-81): When they had reached their mutual agreement, and the Piraeus

party madetheir procession[•o½•x•I] to the citadel [•6•.Lg, i.e., the Acropolis], they were led by Aesimus;but there too this man [i.e., Agoratus] showed similar audacity. For he followed along under arms, joining in the processionwith the heavy-armedmen

to the city [&oxv]. But when they were closeto the gates, and restedarmsbeforeenteringthe city [&o'cv],Aesimusperceivedhim and went up to him, seizedhis shield, and flung it away, with the

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order: "Now, you go to hell! A murdererlike you must not join in the processionto Athene." This was the way in which he was driven off by Aesimus;and I will producewitnessesto the truth

of my statement.•4 The democratsthus solemnizedtheir returnwith a ritual, a complex

andmultivalent symbol. •5 The marchservedseveralsymbolic purposes. By marching,the democratsrecapitulatedtheir journey--and journey it had been, from Athensto exile abroadto Phyle to the Piraeusand finally back to Athens. By proceedingto Athenstogether,ratherthan separately, the marchersreaffirmed their solidarity: they may have amountedto several thousandmen. By carrying their weaponsthey remindedthemselvesandtheirformerenemiesof theirmilitaryachievement.By climbing the Acropolis, control of which symbolizedcontrol of the polis (see, e.g., Lysistrata), they acted out the reversal of roles: the previously humblewere now high, the former rulershad been broughtlow. There was a nice symmetrybetweenthe Acropolisand that other high place with which the democratswere associated,the hill of Phyle, from which

the Acropolisis visible,about17 kilometersaway.•6 Prima facie, the expulsionof Agoratusstrikesa discordantnote in the theme of reintegration,but in fact it clarifies the natureof the ceremony. In symbolicterms, the expulsionof Agoratuswas a purification ritual, and might have called to mind the expulsionof the pharmakos. The expulsion also suggests,generically, a separationritual (the first stagein rites of passage)in which, beforecrossinga symbolicthreshold, the subjectprepareshimself by purification.On a functionallevel, the expulsionof Agoratus,like that of the pharmakos,may be considered to be ultimately integrative,becauseit redirectedgeneralizedhostility (and in 403 there was plenty of hostility to go around) at a surrogate victim. Thus, beforereenteringthe city of Athens,the democratspurged their corporatebody of impurity and preparedthemselvesfor a rite of

incorporation, a rite of passage from civil war to peaceandunity.•7 A march toward the Acropolis to heal the woundsof civil strife-might this not have reminded some of the last sceneof the Oresteia? Perhaps,especiallysince referencesto tragedywere not uncommonin politicalrhetoric.It is probablysaferto note, nevertheless, that the march of the democratswasreminiscentof one of the mostcelebratedintegrative rituals of the polis: the annual Panathenaicprocession,which also proceededthroughthe city to the Acropolisin orderto sacrificeto Athena, and in which armed men also took part. The Panathenaicprocession

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furnishedsignificantsymbolsof the Atheniansasa group,sothe democrats and their causeonly benefitedfrom the association with the festival. The Panathenaiastrucknotesof festivity, amity, pride in the city, and subordination to Athena, all appropriateto the theme of the democrats' march. •8

More obliquely,the democrats'marchmighthaverecalledthe annual procession to Eleusisduringthe Mysteries,one of the holiestdaysin the Atheniancalendar.Of course,in spatialtermsthe two processions of the Mysteries and of the democratswere opposite, since the celebrantsof

the Mysteriesmarchedaway from AthenstowardEleusis. •9 In termsof time, however, the processionspractically coincided, since the great Eleusinianprocessiontook place on 19 Boedromion,a week after the democrats'procession.Hence, the democrats'marchmight have aroused thoughtsof Eleusisa well as of the Panathenaia.20 In Boedromion403, thoughtsof Eleusiswere probablybitter ones, sincethe Thirty had massacred Eleusiniansseveralmonthspreviouslyand now many supportersof the oligarchy were about to move to Eleusis wherethey lived underSpartanprotection.In fact, the emigrationperiod (thirty days after taking the oathsof reconciliation)seemsto have been timed to coincideroughly with the annualEleusiniantruce. According to one ancient interpretation,a word from which the name of the month Boedromionis derivedmay mean "run to help in responseto a shout". Hencethe monthrecalledthe legendof a war betweenAthensandEleusis, whichsurelyresonated undercurrentcircumstances. More generally,Eleusisandthe Mysteriessymbolizedmanyof Athens'woesover the previous decadeor so. The allegedprofanationof the Mysterieswas one of the chargesthat led to Alcibiades'exile in 415. During the Peloponnesian occupationof Decelea(413-404), Athenshadbeencompelledto conduct the annualprocessionto Eleusisby sea. Upon his return to Athensin 407, Alcibiadesmadehis peacewith the Mysteriesby personallyleading the processionto Eleusison land underarmedguard(anotherindication, by the way, of the political significanceof ritual). But Alcibiades' reconciliationwas short-livedandunlucky,leadingrapidlyto a secondexile, so his Eleusinianprocession was a troubledsymbol.The Thirty gained a reputationfor impiety. They exiled one of the high officials of the cult of the Mysteries,Cleocritusthe Keryx who, after their defeatat Piraeus in spring403, had managedto addressthe men of the city and to make a plea for peace;it went unheard.By engagingin a procession so close to 19 Boedromion, therefore, the democrats availed themselves of the

opportunityof reconsecrating the problematicsymbolof Eleusis.A final,

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ironic note on the democrats'procession:when the propertyof the Thirty was confiscatedshortlyafterwards,it was made into processionalimplements.2!

The heightof the democrats'ritual wasthe sacrificeon the Acropolis to Athena. When the men came down, the generalscalled an assembly, their authority(which, underthe circumstances,was not to be taken for granted)having just been legitimizedby Athena. Like the procession, the assemblyipsofacto is striking,becauseit signaledthe revival of the Atheniandgrnosasa corporateentity. Xenophon'sversionof Thrasybulus' speechbeforethe assemblyis equallystriking.Like the prophetTeiresias in tragedy,Thrasybuluscastigates his formeropponentsfor their arrogance and pretensions.His advice that they now learn to "know themselves" is a tacit invocationof Apollo of Delphi, and hence anotherattemptto associatethe divine with the democraticcause. Thrasybulus' final ad-

vice-that his former opponentsbe loyal to their oaths(efio@xo0and pious(6otot)•also putsThrasybulus squarelyon the sideof traditional moralityandreligion. 22Cloch6deducedfromthismentionof oathsthat the formal oathsof reconciliationbetweenthe City and the Piraeuswere administeredat this assembly.It is an attractivesuggestion.The oaths were a major part of the ritual reintegrationof the polis after civil war, and it would have been fully appropriatefor them to come in the first

meetingof therestored assembly, justaftertheprocession andsacrifice. 23 To sum up, the events of 12 Boedromionin the archonshipof Eucleidescreatedan effective and multivalentritual of reintegration.The ritual attemptedto demarcatethe prior period of conflict by celebrating the power of the victors, by giving them symbolic control of the state religion, and by addressinga symbolof lingeringdivision and weakness (Eleusis). The democratsappealedto basicAtheniannotions-•"rootparadigms"--suchas unity, piety, military prowess,the people's assembly, and the expulsionof evil. The ritual was both shapedby Athenianculture and, in modestbut significantways, reshapedthe cultureto its own ends: it constructeda tangible symbol of a democraticpolis reborn. Finally, as Durkheim might have put it, the ritual sacralizedthe political community. The democrats' march was extraordinary,but their need for supportivesymbolswasalsoextraordinary."Poweris sacralized",Georges Balandierwrites, "becauseevery societyaffirms its will for eternity and fears the return of chaos as the realization of its own death. "24 In Athens

in 403, chaos was all too recent a memory.

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II. A Sessionof the Assembly

The Athenianassembly(ekkldsia),as is well known, aired, debatedand decidedthe centralpolitical issuesfacing the polis. In other words, it took care of serious businessand sober, material interests. What is less

often recognizedis that a meetingof the assemblyalso had significant ritual and performativeelementsthat servedbothto legitimatethe body's decisionsand to foster a senseof group solidarity. In this context, it is worth noting such categoriesas (1) Turner's "structure",i.e., formal social bonds, and "anti-structure" or "communitas", i.e., the desire for

liberationand egalitarianism;or (2) Georg Simmel's distinctionbetween "sociation", i.e., the formation of society out of concreteinterestsand purposes,and "sociability",i.e., a feelingof satisfactionfrom membership in that society.Both setsof conceptsrefer to the two polesof political experience,the businesslikeand the affective. The Athenian assembly

movedbetweenthe two.25In symbolicterms,one mightalsosay that political assembliesnot only do, they are; simply by meeting,a session of the assembly(by suchcriteriaas who is and is not permittedto attend and who is and is not permittedto speak)constructsa senseof community

and an imageof the polity.26 In this section, I shall consider some of the ways in which the Athenian assemblyreproducedand ritualized an image of the Athenian polis. I will proceedby consideringsomeof the more notabledetailsof a typical assemblymeeting in the fourth century On an assemblyday the meetingplace on the Pnyx was fencedoff while the citizensgatheredin the early morning;a signal(preciselywhat kind, we do not know) announcedthat the assemblywould be in session

that day.27Womenand childrenwere excluded,of course;meticsand foreigners,unlessinvited into the auditoriumby the prytaneis, had to watch from a separatearea. Each assembly-goerwas provided with a physicaltoken(symbolon),both an indicationof his privilegedstatusand an assurancethat he would receive ecclesiasticpay after the session.So the assemblywas physicallyand symbolicallymarkedoff from outsiders. There were still considerabledifferenceswithin the privilegedcircle, but as Ober has cogently demonstrated,rhetoric played an importantideological role in mediatinginequalitieswithin the assemblyand in thereby

helpingto establish democracy. •8

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Ritual likewise played a mediating role in the assembly.Consider the role of the herald. A professional,elected by the assembly,and among those honored with maintenancein the prytaneum, he was a virtuoso (of a pedestriansort), being distinguishedfor his loud voice in this arena of oratory. The herald announcedthe opening and closing of an assemblysession;he readout the itemson the agenda,andcommanded silence when necessary.He was also marked by a certain association with the sacred, since heralds were traditionally sacred, and in the assembly, the herald began the sessionby reciting a standardprayer and curse. But what may be the most interestingthing about this loud and quasi-sacredfigure is the questionwhich the herald would ask at the beginningof debate:"Who wishesto speak?"In theory, any citizen could speak, and no doubt many ordinaryAtheniansdid speak. But given the premiumput on oratoricalexcellenceand the needto hear from experts, Athens' quasi-professional politicians,the politeuomenoi,probablypredominatedon the speaker'splatform, especiallywhen it was a matterof controversial issues.29

The herald's questionwas no mere formality, however. As often noted, beginning in antiquity, the questionsymbolizedthe theoretical equalityin speech(is•goria) of all citizens.What is to be emphasized here is that the ritual quality of the questionstrengthened rather than weakenedits force. Few Athenianswould in fact speak, but the standardized, repeated,and symbolicnatureof the herald's question,as well as the herald's quasi-sacredstatus,fostereda particular world-view (to use Kertzer's category), i.e., the egalitarian ideology of Athenian

democracy. 3ø To return to the order of events: after the amval

of the citizens

and

presiding officials, an assemblysessionbegan with a set of religious rituals. First came the purificationsacrifice.Officials known as the peristiarchoi ("around-the-hearthleaders") camed a piglet (or piglets: the sourcesdisagree)aroundthe auditorium,killed it, and sprinkledits blood over the seats.Burkert classifiesthis purificationas an act of encirclement, a type attestedalso outsideAthens. It is generallythoughtthat the ritual originatedin the purificationof the domestichearth;the blood of the victim was thoughtto purify the assemblyspace.As Parker notes, the rite demarcatedthe assemblymeeting-placeso clearly that Aristophanes

invitestheprospective assembly-goers to come"withinthepurification". 3• Next, the heraldread out a prayer and curse, while at the sametime offeringswere madeto variousdeities, with the resultsannouncedto the assembly.Rhodes has reconstructedthe gist of the prayer and curse,

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basedmainlyon Aristophanes, Thesmophoriazusae 295-311, 331-9,34751:

Let us pray to (variousdeities)that this meetingin the ekkldsia may go as well as possible,to the benefitof the city of Athensand individually of ourselves,and that whoever acts and speaksin the bestinterestsof Athensmay prevail. Let us pray to the Olympian Gods, the Pythian, the Delian, and all the other gods,that if anyone devisesevil againstthe ddmosof Athens,or negotiateswith the Mede with a view to harmingAthens, or plans to set up a tyranny, or to bring the tyrant back, or deceives the boul• and d•mos of Athens,or betraysthe city, or takesbribesto speakagainstthe interestsof Athens,or debasesthe coinage,he and his housemay cometo a miserableend.

Butontherestof usmaythegodspourmanyblessings. 32 Theseopening ceremonies--sacrifice, prayer,curse,offerings--sacral•zecl the proceedings, fosteringseriousness andrespectbothon thepartof the audience and of absent citizens (who would have to abide by the

assembly'sdecisions)and weavinga connectionof meaningbetween

politicsandthe divine.33 Havingbegun,the assembly proceeded first to theprocheirotonia, a seriesof initial votes (by show of hands) on whetherto acceptthe preliminarydecreesof thecouncil.Then, whenit wasclearwhichdecrees would requirefurtherdiscussionand votes, debatewould begin. Both voting and debatehad their ritual aspects,a matterthat may become clearerafter pursuinga few of the considerable correspondences--in physical,rhetorical,cultural,andsymbolicterms--between an assembly meetingand Atheniandrama.Many of thesecorrespondences haveoften been noted, but the ritual similaritieshave not been fully recognized.

Tragedyand comedywereproducedduringreligiousfestivalsdedicatedto Dionysus.Burkerthasarguedplausiblythattheoriginsof tragedy are to be found in goat sacrifice,and many scholarshave noted the prominence of themesof ritual and sacrificein tragedy.If an Athenian drewa comparison betweentheassembly anddrama,therefore,he would be remindednot only that politicswas a kind of performance,and that it had intensityand drama,but alsothat, in somedegree,it partookof thesacred.Oneritualof greatprominence in bothdramaandtheassembly is the ag6n, the contestof actorsor speakers.The Greeksthrivedon such contests,so the complaintof Thucydides'Cleon that Athenians behavedbadly in assemblybecausethey were carriedaway by contests of rhetoricis likely to have fallen on deaf ears--and besides,it is dis-

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ingenuous, givenhisown skill at rhetoricaltests.Ag6neswereoftenfun, but they had their rootsin seriousbusiness: in ritualsof burial (funeral games),initiation(at festivals),andsacrifice(performedby victors).Like funeral games,like festival contests,like competitionsbetweenprotagonistsor betweenplaywrights,rhetoricalface-offsin the assemblyhad ritual connotations.Debate settled something,in part becauseag6nes were sacred. Likewise, the voters who raised their hands to choose

betweenvariousspeakerswere doingthe work of the godsas muchas

thejudgesat Olympiaor at theDionysiawere.34 After debate had been concluded and decisions taken, the herald

would announcethe end of the meeting,generallyaroundmidday. The signalof an assembly in session wasremoved,the audience left the Pnyx andturnedin theirtokensfor pay. The assembly-goers hadmadeconcrete,

tangible,andprosaicdecisions, but theyhadalsoengagedin a seriesof politicalrituals,ritualswhichnot only cardedout the functionscitedby Kertzer,but alsocreateda structureof meaning.The assemblybothstood for theAthenianpolisandit wastheAthenianpolis,thepolisthatengaged in the ag6n of political rhetoric. It is not for nothingthat the terms assembly(ekkl•sia)andpeople(d•mos)wereoftenusedinterchangeably in Athens. 35 III.

Conclusion

In both a standardsessionof the Athenianassemblyin the fourth century

and in the extraordinary eventsof 12 Boedromionin the archonship of Eucleides,the natureof the Athenianstatewasexpressed throughrituals-standardized, repeated eventsof symboliccharacter. Theseritualsacquired their forcethroughthe evocationof the gods,of sacredfestivals,drama, athleticgames,of religiousritual proper(e.g., blood sacrifice),and of institutions, places,andpersonages hallowedby tradition(e.g., theherald, thepharmakos).Suchevocation intensified andlegitimizedthepowerof the rulinggroup,be it the menof the Piraeusor the dgmosin assembly. As Connor has noted in a discussion of Pisistratus, however, it is

necessary to resistthe temptationof reducingpoliticalritual to manipulation by politicians.Effectivepoliticalritual "evokespatternsdeeply

rootedwithintheculture". 36Ritualmaybe aninstrument for manipulating others, but ritual also shapesthose who use it. There is no reasonto doubt,for example,thatThrasybulus too felt movedby the marchto the

Acropolisor that the leadingoratorswere sweptup by the dramaof a

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stirringcontestin the assembly.To reiteratea relatedpoint, ritual is a symbolic statement.For example, the democrats'processionstatedthat unity was the watchwordof the day, but also that it would be backed up by forceand by the expulsionof potentialtroublemakers (e.g., Agoratus). It "stated"this in poetic and symbolicterms, but it statedit nonetheless.

Hence ritual was an importantpart of politics in Athens. So were the symbolsthat ritual evokedand the "socialdramas"of which it was a constituentpart. Needlessto say, ritual was not the only nor the most importantpart of politics, a distinctionthat, in my opinion, still must be awardedto rhetoricand actionproper, in their non-symbolicdimensions. Ritual was, however, a very significantpart. This paper representsonly a small step on a road carved out by others, but perhapsit will help stimulatefurther anthropologicallyinformed study of the manifold symbolic, ritual, and performativedimensionsof Athenianpolitics. For example, suchmattersof style as dress and gesture,suchdramaticor melodramaticleadersas Alcibiades,Cleon or the orator Demosthenes,such institutionswith notablesymbolicdimensionsasostracism,are amongthe manysubjectsto be studied.Perhaps the central questionto be addressed,after suitablepreparation,is the interrelationshipof politics, theater, and religion in constructingthe Atheniandemocraticconstitutionin its practicalreality. Both the importance of Athens in our own democraticheritageand the Athenianorigin of tragedyand comedyunderscorethe importanceof the question. Finally, if anthropologyhas much to offer the historianof ancient politics, it is no magicwand. It doesnot obviatethe needfor traditional narrativehistory, which remainsthe historian'sprimary meansof discussingaction.Usedcautiously,however,anthropology hasalreadybegun to producea rich, cross-disciplinary harvestin worksof ancientand other periodsof history. The historian'sjob is to castthe net widely, to try to choosethe best from every field; in Isaiah Berlin's term, to be foxes

ratherthanhedgehogs. 37 Cornell University

Barry S. Strauss NOTES

1. A point made by W.R. Connor in "Ancient history and anthropology",a paperdeliveredat the AmericanPhilologicalAssociationannualmeetingin Boston,

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December28, 1989. In a seriesof importantarticlesin recentyears,Connorhas greatly advancedthe studyof symbolicpoliticsin Athens. See, inter alia, "The razingof the housein Greeksociety",TAPA 115 (1985) 79-102; "Tribes,festivals and processions.Civic ceremonialin archaicAthens", JHS 107 (1987) 40-50; "Seized by the nymphs. Nympholepsyand symbolic expressionin Classical Greece", Classical Antiquity 7 (1988) 155-89; "City Dionysia and Athenian democracy",CI&Med 40 (1989) 7-32. Works on ancientliteratureand religion that have been influencedby anthropologyare too numerousto cite, but surely the worksof J.-P. Vernantand his followersare amongthe mostimportant.Some recentstudiesthat apply anthropologyto ancientpoliticsare (in a non-exhaustive list): Paul Cartledge,Agesilaos(1987); S.C. Humphreys,Anthropologyand the Greeks (1978) and The family, women and death (1981); Gabriel Herman, Ritualisedfriendship and the Greek city (1987); Nicole Loraux, The invention of Athens. The funeral oration in the Classicalcity, translatedSheridan(1986); ChristianMeier, Introductiond l'anthropologiepolitique de l'antiquitdclassique, translatedBlanchaud (1984); P. Brook Manville, The origins of citizenshipin Athens (1990); Simon Price, Rituals and power. The Roman Imperial cult in Asia Minor (1984); and my own Athens after the PeloponnesianWar. Class, faction, and policy 403-386 B.C. (1986). Valuable summary articles include Humphreys,"Anthropologyand the Classics",Anthropologyand the Greeks1730; BrentD. Shaw, "Socialscienceandancienthistory.Keith Hopkinsin partibus infidelium",Helios 9 (1982) 17-57; Oswyn Murray, "Cities of reason",European Journal of Sociology28 (1987) 325-46. 2. Arjun Appaduri, "The past as a scarceresource",Man n.s. 16 (1981) 201-19.

3. For a recentexampleof how ancienthistorymight contributeto a debate within anthropology,see Ian Morris, "Gift and commodityin archaicGreece", Man n.s. 21 (1986) 1-17.

4. For an introduction to politicalanthropology seeTed C. Lewellen,Political anthropology. An introduction (1983), followed by Georges Balandier, Anthropologiepolitique (1967); translatedSheridanSmithasPoliticalanthropology (1970); Marc Swartz, Victor Turner, Arthur Tuden, eds., Political anthropology (1966); S. Lee Seaton and Henri J.M. Claessen,eds., Political anthropology. The state of the art (1979). Myron J. Aronoff is editing a multi-volumeseries of essaysentitled Political anthropology,of which several volumeshave now appeared.For an introductionto the studyof politicsin societieswith minimal institutionssee I.M. Lewis, Social anthropologyin perspective.The relevance

of socialanthropology 2 (1985)112, 321-59.On the efficacyof non-overtly politicalsymbols,seeAbnerCohen,Two-dimensional man (1974) 53, and David I. Kertzer, "The role of ritual in political change", in Myron J. Aronoff, ed.,

Political, anthropology 2. Culture andpoliticalchange (1983),esp.54-5. 5. For an introductionto symbolic anthropologyand a recent overview of anthropologymore generally, see Sherry B. Ortner, "Theory in anthropology sincethe sixties",ComparativeStudiesin Societyand History 26 (1984) 126-66.

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79

See also Herbert Applebaum,ed., Perspectivesin cultural anthropology(1987) 488-524.

6. Clifford Geertz, "Deepplay. Noteson the Balinesecockfight",in Geertz, The interpretationof cultures (1973) 450. Also see the other essaysin The interpretation of cultures, as well as Geertz, Negara. The theatre state in nineteenth-century Bali (1980) andLocal knowledge.Further essaysin interpretive anthropology(1983). On the relevanceof Geertz to ancient history, see also W.R. Connor, "The new Classical humanitiesand the old", CJ 81 (1985/86) 337-47; JosiahOber and Barry S. Strauss,"Drama, political rhetoric, and the discourseof Atheniandemocracy",in JohnJ. Winkler and FromaI. Zeitlin, eds., Nothing to do with Dionysos?The social meaningsof Athenian drama (1990) 237-70. Among more generalevaluationsof Geertz's work, see R.G. Walters, "Signsof the times:Clifford Geertzand historians",SocialResearch47 (1980) 537-56; W. Roseberry,"Balinesecockfightsand the seductionof anthropology", Social Research 49 (1982) 1013-28; P. Shankman, "The thick and the thin. On

the interpretivetheoreticalprogramof Clifford Geertz", CurrentAnthropology25 (1984) 261-79.

7. Victor Turner, Dramas, fields and metaphors.Symbolicaction in human society(1974) 123. On the socialdrama, seealsoTurner's Schismand continuity in an African society(1957); The drums of affliction (1968); The ritual process. Structureand anti-structure(1969); Robin Erica Wagner-Pacifici, The Moro morality play. Terrorism as social drama (1986) 7-13. On Turner's relevance for ancienthistory, see also Ober-Strauss,"Drama, political rhetoric" (cited last note) 245. 8. Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a theory of practice, translatedNice (1977); Anthony Giddens, The constitutionof society. Introduction to the theory of structuration(1984); cf. Ivan Karp, "Agency and social theory. A review of AnthonyGiddens",AmericanEthnologist(1986) 131-7. In this context,the work on performanceby Erving Goffman and RichardBauman, amongothers,is very relevant; see for example Goffman, The presentationof self in everydaylife (1959) and RichardBauman,Verbal art as performance(1977). Michael Herzfeld

offers a fruitful combinationof Turner'sand Goffman'sinsightsin The poetics of manhood.Contestand identity in a Cretan mountainvillage (1985). 9. David I. Kertzer, Ritual, politics, and power (1988) 8-9. 10. E.R. Leach, Political systemsof Highland Burma. A study of Kachin socialstructure(1964 [= 1954]) 14, 86; SherryB. Ortner, Sherpasthroughtheir rituals (1978) 5; David I. Kertzer, "The role of ritual" (cit. n. 4 above) 53-74. On ritual and politics, see also Bruce Lincoln, Discourseand the constructionof society.Comparativestudiesof myth, ritual and classification(1989), esp. 53130.

11. Date of restoration:Arist. AthPol 39.1; Plut. Mor. 349 f. See Peter Krentz, The Thirty at Athens(1982) 151-2; P.J. Rhodes,A commentaryon the Aristotelian AthenaionPoliteia(1981) 462; ThomasClark Loening,The reconciliationagreement of 403/402 in Athens.Its contentand application,Hermes Einzelschrift53

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(1987) 21-2. Socialdrama:Turner, Dramas (cit. n. 7 above)37-42. Chronology: Krentz, Thirty 147-53. 12. Krentz, Thirty 102-8; Loening,Reconciliation23-8. 13. Translationfrom the Loeb ClassicalLibrary edition.

14. Loeb ClassicalLibrary translation,with "groundedarms" (•0ewo x& 6J•ktt)changedto "restedarms".On this translation,seeRhodes,Commentary 157-8; RaphaelSealey, "How citizenshipand the city beganin Athens",AJAH 8 (1983) 101-2 with n. 8. I am in agreementwith Sealeyexceptfor his rejection of the translation "rested arms" as an alternative to "stacked arms". Here, "rested

arms" is preferable:as the Xenophonpassageshows,thesedemocratsrestedand thencontinuedwith their armsto the Acropolis.Note on the sources:Lysiashere playsup the dramaof the eventsdescribed.He and Xenophonmay have embellishedthe dramaticandritualisticaspectsof the eventsof 12 Boedromion.Unless they fabricatedtheir accounts,however, these aspectswere already present,in large part, in the eventsthemselves. 15. It may be objectedthat sincethe democrats'procession was neitherstandardizednor repeated,it shouldnot be considered a ritual. I would argue,on the otherhand,thattheceremonywasmodeledonfamiliarrituals,i.e., thePanathenaic and Eleusinianprocessions (seepp. 70-72), and may thereforebe consideredan imitativeritual. On thesymbolicsignificance of processions in Athens,seeConnor, "Tribes" (cit. n. 1 above) and also Simon Goldhill, "The Great Dionysia and civic ideology",JHS 107 (1987) 58-76. 16. Size of procession:for some indicationof the numberof the men of Piraeus, see Xen. Hell. 2.4.5, 10, 25; Diod. 14.33.1, 4; Arist. AthPol 38.3; Cf. Krentz, Thirty (cit. n. 11 above) 83-4, 90-1, 94, 111-12; Krentz, "Foreigners

against theThirty. IG 22.10 again", Phoenix 34(1980) 298-306. Distance: Krentz, Thirty 72. 17. Purification:Walter Burkert, Greekreligion,translatedRaftan (1985) 75-7. Pharmakos:the mostrelevant ancientevidencefor Athensis Lys. 6.53, Aristoph.

Knights1415,Frogs733; Harp. s.v. pharmakos;Helladius,Chrestomathy--Phot. Bibl. 279; cf. Hipponax Fr. 5-11 (West). For modern accountssee, inter alia, Burkert,Greekreligion82-4; JanBremmer,"Scapegoat ritualsin AncientGreece", HSCP 87 (1983) 299-320; also Ren6 Girard, The scapegoat,translatedFreccero (1986). Separation ritual:Arnoldvan Gennep,Les ritesde passage(1909), translated (Vizedom and Caffee) as The rites of passage(1960) 10, 21. Integrarive purpose:see Max Gluckman'sclassicdiscussion of ritual rebellionin his Order and rebellion in tribal Africa (1963). Surrogatevictim: Ren6 Girard, Violence andthesacred,translated Gregory(1977) 85-7, 103-10. Hostility:Strauss,Athens (cit. n. 1 above)89-120. 18. Panathenaicprocession: Ludwig Deubner,AttischeFeste (1932) 22-35; H.W. Parke,Festivalsof theAthenians(1977) 22, 33-50; Erika Simon,Festivals of Attica. An archaeologicalcommentary(1983) 55-72. Integrativeritual: the sourcesnote the participationof the communityas a whole in the procession (e.g., Thuc. 6.56.2) and the importanceof the Panathenaiaas a symbolof Attic

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AND POLITICS

81

unification(Plut. Theseus24.3). On the integrativesignificance of thePanathenaic processionas representedon the Parthenonfrieze, see Denys Haynes, Greek art and the idea of freedom(1981) 66. On pompai more generally:Burkert,Greek religion 99-101. Political rhetoric:see Ober-Strauss,"Drama" (cit. n. 6 above) 250-7. On the Panathenaiaas a model for political drama, see Connor, "Tribes" (cit. n. 1 above)46.

19. The processionto Eleusis on 19 Boedromion proceededfrom the Eleusinion,a buildingon the PanathenaicWay, just northof the Acropolis.See R.E. Wychedy, The stonesof Athens(1978) 71-2. 20. On the Eleusinianprocession,see George E. Mylonas, Eleusisand the Eleusinian mysteries(1961) 252-8; Deubner, Feste (cit. n. 18 above) 69-92; Parke, Festivals (cit. n. 18 above) 67-9; Simon, Festivals (cit. n. 18 above) 24-35.

21. Thirty and Eleusis:Xen. Hell. 2.4.8-10, 24, 29, 38, 43; Diod. 14.32.4, 33.6; Arist. AthPol 39. Registrationand truce: Loening,Reconciliation(cit. n. 11 above) 39. Boedromion: Philochorus, FGrH 328 F 13; Parke, Festivals 53.

Profanation:Thuc. 6.28-9, 53, 60-1; Plut. Alc. 18-23; Andoc. 1 passim. Alcibiades' return and second exile: Xen. Hell. 1.4.8-5.17;

Plut. Alc. 32-6.

Cleocritusthe Keryx: Xen. Hell. 2.4.20-2. Processional implements:Philochorus, FGrH 328 F 181; Krentz, Thirty (cit. n. 11 above) 123. 22. Thrasybulus'speech:Xen. Hell. 2.4.40-3. Teiresias:see,e.g., Sophocles, Antigone or King Oedipus. 23. Oaths: Xen. Hell. 2.4.42; Isoc. 18.3; Arist. AthPol 39; Andoc. 1.81;

Dionys. Halic. Lys. 32; Justin 5.10.11; Diod. 14.32-3. Cf. Paul Cloch6, La restaurationd•mocratiqued Ath•nes en 403 avant J.-C. (1915) 248; Loening, Reconciliation 29; Krentz, Thirty 102-4.

24.Balandier, Anthropologie politique (cit.n.4 above) 119(mytranslation)5

For Durkheim's views, see his Les formes dl•mentairesde la vie religieuse

(1937),translated (Swain) asTheelementary formsof thereligious life2 (1976) 235-45. Root paradigms:Wagner-Pacifici,Moro (cit. n. 7 above) 164-204. 25. Turner: see his Dramas (cit. n. 7 above) 46-7, 274. Simmel: Kurt H. Wolff, ed. and translated,The sociologyof Georg Simmel (1950) 42-8, cited anddiscussed in JohnJ. MacAloon,"Sociationandsociabilityin politicalcelebrations", in Victor Turner, ed., Celebrations.Studiesin festivity and ritual (1982) 263-4.

26. For comparativepurposes,considerthe example of the Pintupi, an Australianaboriginalpeoplewho have an assemblythat neitherairs conflictsnor makesdecisions.What it nevertheless accomplishes is to demonstrate theexistence of the Pintupi as a group and the supremacyof male elderswithin that group (sincewomenand youngmen rarely speakin the Pintupiassembly)."The meeting", writes Myers, "is political not as a form of coercionas much as for the part it plays in reproducingthe structuresthat make dominationpossible--the differentiationof older and youngermen and the existenceof men as a corporate

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body." See Fred R. Myers, "Reflectionson a meeting. Structure,language,and the polity in a small-scalesociety",AmericanEthnologist(1986) 441. 27. I base the following discussionon the excellent accountof a sessionof the assemblyin Mogens H. Hansen, The Athenian assemblyin the age of Demosthenes (1987) 88-93, which is basedon detailedargumentation in a series of articles.My discussion is meantto be suggestive ratherthanexhaustive.Fenced off: Dem. 18.169, 59.89-90; Hansen,Assembly168 n. 547. Signal: Aristoph. Thesin. 277-8 with schol.=Suda s.v. oq•t•ov; Andoc. 1.36.

28.Metics andforeigners: Andoc. 1.12;IG II2 226.14-17; Aesch. 3.224, Dem. 59.60; Aristoph. Eccl. 243-4; Hansen,Assembly169 n. 561. Symbolon:

IG II2 1749.76 (=Agora XV 38.79); Aristoph. Eccl.296;Hansen, Assembly 169 n. 557. See JosiahOber, Mass and elite in democraticAthens.Rhetoric, ideology and the power of the people (1989) 304-14.

29. "Who wishesto speak?(xi•g[3o6•x0tt &yopœ6œtv;)" See Aesch.1.27; Dem. 18.170; Eur. Suppl. 438-40; Aristoph.Thesin.379. Herald:seeJ. Oehler, RE 11 (1922) cols. 349-57 s.v. Keryx; Hansen,Assembly91, 170 n. 571; P.J. Rhodes, The Athenian Boule (1972) 36, 84-5, 89-90, 122 n. 1, 132, 140-1. Predominance of quasi-professional speakers:Ober, Mass and elite 78-9. 30. Ancient testimony:Aesch. 1.27; cf. Eur. Suppl. 438-41. Modern comments: For example, see Kurt Raaflaub, "Des freien BiirgersRecht der freien Rede", in W. Eck et al., eds., Studien zur antiken Sozialgeschichte.Festschrifi ... Vittinghoff(1980) 11-17, 43; Ober, Mass and elite 296. 31. Sources:Aesch. 1.23 with scholia;Aristoph.Ach. 44 with scholia;Eccl. 128-9 with scholia;Istros,FGrH 334 F 16 (= Phot.andSudas.v. Harp. s.v. xtz0d@otov;Hesych. s.vv. x60(z@•ttz,yc•@tox•0t@Xog, ycœ@•oxtov; Plut. Mot. 814V; Poll. 8.104. Cf. Burkert, Greek religion (cit. n. 17 above) 81-2; S. Eitrem, Opferritusund Voropferder Griechenund Riimer (1915) 177, 249; Hansen,Assembly90; Jacoby,Comm. ad FGrH 334 F 16; Martin Nilsson,

Geschichte dergriechischen Religion 13(1967)105;Robert Parker, Miasma. Pollution and purification in early Greek thought(1983) 21-2; K. Hahell, RE 19 (1937) 859 s.v. Peristiarchos.Cf. W. SiiB, RE 8 (1913) 1280-1 s.v. Hestia, K. Biirchner,RE secondseries3 (1929) 1673-4 s.v. YOp•t¾i•t. Dem. 54.39 states (accordingto a sensibleand widely acceptedemendation)that the testiclesof the slaughteredpiglets were left out at the crossroads for Hecate. The rest of the carcasswas probablyburied(cf. the encirclementritual at Methana,Paus. 2.34.2; RE s.v. Et00•yf0t(cit.). 32. Translationin Rhodes, Boule (cit. n. 29 above) 37; Hansen, Assembly 90-1. Other evidencefor prayer and curse:Aesch. 1.23; Din. 2.14, 16; Dem.

19.70,23.97.Offerings to otherdeities: IG II2 674.5-7;Dem.Prooem. 54; Theophr. Char. 21.11. 33. As Hansen,Assembly91, pointsout, one sacralizingdevice was notably absentfrom the assembly:the oath. By contrast,the oath was employedin the council, the magistraciesand the courts.See Dem. 24.78, Lycurg. 1.79.

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34. Procheirotonia:Aesch. 1.23; Arist. AthPol 43.6; Dem. 24.11; Harp. s.v. •@oget@o'cov(•ot; Hansen,Assembly171 n. 579. Voting: Hansen,Assembly92, 171 n. 590. Often noted: see, for example, Ober-Strauss,"Drama" (cit. n. 6 above). Origins of tragedy:Burkert, "Greek tragedyand sacrificialritual", GRBS 7 (1966) 87-121. For another,and very rich, view of the ritual originsof tragedy, seeJohnJ. Winkler, "The ephebes'song. Trag•idia and polis", Representations 11 (1985) 26-62. Ritual and tragedy:a good introductionto the vast literature, which alsomakesuseof anthropology,is SimonGoldhill, ReadingGreek tragedy (1986). Cleon: Thuc. 3.38.4-6. AgOn: Burkert, Greek religion (cit. n. 17 above) 105-7.

35. End of meeting:Arist. AthPol 44.3; Andoc. 1.36; Aristoph. Eccl. 296. Interchangeableterms: Hansen, Assembly 89, 92-3; The Athenian ecclesia. A collectionof articles 1976-83 (1983) 142-3 = "Demos, ecclesia, and dicasterion in Classical Athens", GRBS 19 (1978) 130-1. Ober, Mass and elite (cit. n. 28 above) 33, 137-8, 337, makesfruitful use of Anderson'sterm "imaginedcommunity" in referenceto the Athenianpeoplein assembly.See BenedictAnderson, Imagined communities.Reflections on the origins and spread of nationalism (1983). 36. Connor, "Tribes" (cit. n. 1 above) 46.

37. Isaiah Berlin, The hedgehogand thefox. An essayon Tolstoy's view of history (1966). The author would like to thank E. Badian, Mogens H. Hansen, Michael Herzfeld, Virginia Hunter, Marcia Mogelonsky, Ian Morris, Carol Thomas, and the Readersof AJAH for their very helpful comments,criticisms, and suggestions.

A NOTE

ON

PHILIP'S

PERSIAN

WAR

Early in 337 Bc Philip II of Macedonannouncedhis bold plan to wage war againstthe PersianEmpire. It is easy enoughto note the descriptions of imperial disarrayand military weaknesswhich Isocratespresentedin his Addressto Philip in 346 and to surmisethat Philip's awarenessof

progressive imperialdeclineencouraged himto anticipate success. 1Philip certainlyknew all aboutthe episodesof satrapalrevolt in the 360s and 350s and the seriesof Persianfailuresin Egypt--rebelliouslyindependent after 404•in the fourth century. But in 343/2 he had seen a Persian force led by ArtaxerxesIII reconquerEgypt, and within the next year or so he had seen the Rhodian Mentor (whom Artaxerxeshad appointed "satrapof the coastof Asia" and strategosautokratorfor "the war against the rebels") field a large army in northwesternAnatolia and quickly restoredirect imperial authoritythere, suppressingHermias of Atarneus

andotherindependent dynasts. 2 Philiphimselfhadbeencheckedin 340 whenArtaxerxesdirectedAnatoliansatrapsto aid PerinthusduringPhilip's

siegeof the city,3 and this certainlyapprised him of Persianvigilance anddeterminationto preventevenhis approachto the northwestern frontier of the Empire. What groundswere there in 337, then, for believingthat an attack of any kind on the PersianEmpire was a reasonableenterprise? Circumstanceshad in fact changedsubstantiallybetween the late 340s and 337. There was, first of all, no longerany big army in western Anatolia nor, most likely, the makings of one. Once Mentor's force, assembledfor the war againstHermias and others, had done its job• perhapsas early as late 341--there was no reasonto continueincurring the expenseinvolvedin maintainingsucha force, andMentor hadprobably disbandedor severely reduced it. (This may have occurredby the time Philip beganhis siegeof Perinthusin mid-340•had Mentor's army still been intact, Artaxerxescould presumablysimply have orderedit shifted to the defense of Perinthusrather than having to order all his western

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Anatolianofficialsto use all their resources in supportof Perinthus. 4) There may have been an ample supply of mercenariesstill in western Anatolia and available for hire by Persian officials in late 340, but probably not for long after this. Artaxerxesneededtroops in the east, apparentlyfor a war againstthe Cadusians(the perenniallyrebelliousfolk southwestof the Caspian Sea) which he seemsto have initiated soon after the reconquestof Egypt. Mentor reportedlygatheredmercenaries from Greecefor Artaxerxes,and it may be inferredfrom this that he and otherofficials senteastwardsimilartroopsfrom Anatolia aswell, including

manyof thosewho hadrecentlyservedunderMentor.5 Thus,therewas probably no large pool of unemployedmercenariesin western Anatolia in the early 330s whom Persianofficials could hire on short notice in the event of Macedonian

attack.

Moreover, Mentor, Artaxerxes' skilled and resourcefulstrategosautokrator, had probably died by 337. He disappearscompletely from the sourcesafter Diodorus' report of his dispatchof Greek mercenariesto Artaxerxes.While his brotherMemnonperhapsinheritedcontrolover the region administeredby Mentor in his capacityas "satrapof the coastof Asia", there is no indicationthat Memnon or anyoneelse took over the suprememilitary positionMentor had held. It was an extraordinaryoffice createdfor a specific purpose,"the war againstthe rebels", and since Mentor had dealt successfullywith "the rebels"--Hermias and others-there was no reasonto passon this positionafter Mentor died. Mentor's death thus meant that westernAnatolia was without any unified military organizationat the time Philip probablyturnedhis attentionto Anatolian matters. 6

The military situation in western Anatolia in the early 330s notwithstanding,it was most likely the death of ArtaxerxesIII in late 338 and developmentsconnectedwith this which first alerted Philip to the possibilityof a successful campaignagainstthe PersianEmpire. The murderof Artaxerxes, and with him all his sonsbut the youngest(Arses), by the chiliarch Bagoas removed the capable, aggressivemonarch who had overseenthe restorationof imperial unity over the last twenty years and gave the Empire in the personof Arses, now installedas King by

Bagoas,an untestedmaster. 7 While the sources reportonly the fatesof immediatemembersof the royal family in 338, it is probablethat Bagoas' coupentailedalsothe executionor displacement of numeroushigh-ranking court officials.

About this time--probablynot coincidentally--Egyptslippedentirely out of Persiancontrol once again and into full-scale revolt under a native

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king,Chabbash.8 In lightof Persianpolicythroughout thefourthcentury, contemporaryobserverssuch as Philip could reasonablypredict that renewed revolt in Egypt would mean Persianpreoccupationwith the recovery of Egypt, and with this the diversionof much manpowerand navalresources to an Egyptiancampaign.Philip may well haveanticipated that if he launched an attack on western Anatolia, he would have to face,

at least initially, only the Persianofficials in the region and the limited forcesthey had at their disposal. In late 338 andearly 337, asPhilipconsidered the situationin western Anatolia, he musthavegrownincreasinglyconfidentof success.In northwesternAnatolia--the first region a Macedonianforce moving into Anatolia via the Hellespontwould enter--lay the lands of Memnon, brother of the recently deceasedMentor. Memnon's precise statusin 338/7 is unattested,but he may have been responsiblefor a substantialportionof northwestern Anatolia. When ArtaxerxesIII appointedMemnon'sbrother Mentor strategosautokratorin ca. 342 for "the war againstthe rebels" (Hermiasof Atarneusand others),he made him also "satrapof the coast

of Asia".9Thiswasnotoneof theregularhighofficesin western Anatolia (there being normally no such satrapyas "the coastof Asia") but rather an ad hoc governorshipof the sort previouslybestowedon Struthas(in the late 390s) and Orontes(in the late 360s). Most likely, the military exigenciesof the momentdeterminedthe geographicscopeof suchextraordinarysatrapies--thereis no reason,in other words, to assumethat

Mentor'ssatrapy"of the coast"centeredaroundIonia as Struthas'had.•0 Since the suppression of Hermias of Atarneuswas evidently a leading objectivein Mentor's "war againstthe rebels", it may be inferred that Mentor's satrapyof "the coast"comprisedat least the realm of Hermias, which extended from the region around Assos in the southernTroad

perhapsto Erythraein the south, • andindeed,Mentor'sappointment of officials (following his captureof Hermias) to take chargeof cities previously controlledby Hermias revealsMentor performingsatrapalfunc-

tionsin just thisregion.•2 While the otherfiguresagainstwhomMentor campaignedare not named,they were mostlikely locatedin northwesternmost Anatolia, where confusedconditionsresultingfrom the revolts of Ariobarzanesand Artabazus,successive satrapsof HellespontinePhrygia, had probably permitted local dynastsor mercenarygeneralsto seize independentcontrol of variousdistricts.(Charidemusand Iphiadeshad

donejust this in the late 360s.•3) If so, Mentor'sauthoritymay have covered much or all of the Troad north of Hermias'

realm in addition to

Hermias' realm itself. PerhapsMemnon's did also. In 335, somemonths

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after Philip's advanceforce began campaigningin Anatolia, Darius III sentreinforcementsto Memnon and instructedhim to take the field against the Macedonian force. Possibly, Darius chose Memnon rather than, say,

Arsites (satrapof HellespontinePhrygia) becauseit was in Memnon's territorythat the Macedonianforce was operating.Memnon'ssubsequent campaignsagainst Cyzicus in the north and Pitane and Magnesia on Sipylusin the southmay then give someidea of the extentof Memnon's archd.• Stretching from the Troad down to just east of Erythrae, Memnon's operationscover the territory includedin Mentor's probable satrapy.PerhapsMemnon had simply followed Mentor as "satrapof the coastof Asia". ArtaxerxesIII clearly valuedMentor very highly, and if Mentor predeceased the king, Memnon's kinship with Mentor and his recent service with him may have recommendedhim to Artaxerxes as Mentor's

natural successor.

Memnon was certainly well known to Philip. He had resided in Macedonia for about a decade (ca. 352-ca. 342) after he fled Anatolia

with his brother-in-lawArtabazus,satrapof HellespontinePhrygiain the late 360s and 350s, when Artabazus' revolt againstArtaxerxes III collapsed.Memnon and Artabazushad returnedto Anatolia only after Mentor, brother of Memnon and brother-in-law of Artabazus, having distinguishedhimself in Artaxerxes' service in the reconquestof Egypt (343/2), was appointed"satrapof the coastof Asia" and suprememilitary commanderfor "the war againstthe rebels" and was able to persuade

Artaxerxes to pardonArtabazus. •5 ThoughMemnonhadleft Macedonia, he undoubtedlyowed a great debt of gratitudeto Philip, and Philip may haveanticipatedthatMemnonwouldstandasidein the faceof Macedonian invasion, especiallyif Philip suspectedthat Artaxerxes' death and the establishmentof a new regime at courtjeopardizedMemnon's position. While there is no record of any diplomatic approachesmade by Philip to Memnon, it may be conjecturedthat, as Philip was beginningto think about a Persian war, he soundedout his old guest in some way and perhapsconveyedpromisesof an equally high position for him in Macedonian-held

Anatolia.

At Sardis to the south of Memnon's lands and at Dascylium to the east were the Persiansatrapsof Lydia and HellespontinePhrygiarespectively. They may not have concernedPhilip greatly. Spithridates,satrap of Lydia, was the son of Rhosaces,a very distinguishedPersian(as a descendantof one of "the Seven"), who had been satrapof Lydia up to the mid-340swhenhe went off to participatein ArtaxerxesIII's invasion

of Egypt.•6 The fact that, despiteRhosaces'lineageand experience,

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Mentor rather than he subsequentlybecamesupremecommanderin western Anatolia makesit likely that Rhosacesdid not return to his satrapy after the Egyptiancampaign.Possiblyhe perishedduringthe war; alternatively,Artaxerxesmay havekept Rhosaces with him afterthe Egyptian war for serviceelsewhere,perhapsagainstthe Cadusians.Rhosaces'son

Spithridates, thoughfirstmentioned assatrapof Lydiaonlyin 334,•7had probablysucceeded his fatherin the mid-340s,perhapsat the sametime ArtaxerxesappointedMentor satrapof the coastof Asia and stratggos autokrator.There is no hint of any other figure holdingthe satrapyof Lydia betweenthe mid-340s and 334, and since the satrapywas surely not left vacantduringthis period, it is mostplausibleto assumethat the samefamily known to have held the Lydian satrapyin ca. 344 and 334 held it in the interval. Artaxerxes'failure to assignSpithridatesthe great military commandwhich went to Mentor suggeststhat Spithridatesmay have been too youthful and inexperiencedat the time to hold such a position.If so, Spithridateshad gained no military experiencein the interveningyears--yearsof continuous peacein westernAnatolia(at least after Mentor's brief war against"the rebels").Presumablyawareof this, Philip had no reasonto view Spithridatesas a dangerousopponent. Arsites,thesatrapof Hellespontine Phrygia,may havebeena different sort.He hadat leastshownhimselfenergeticin assembling anddispatching men and materiel in supportof Perinthusin 340, and in 334 he would

be an advocate of directconfrontation with Alexander. 18However,Philip may have suspected that at a time whenthe Persiancourtwas in turmoil, neither Spithridatesnor Arsites, whatevertheir capabilities,would dare to make any attemptto levy troopsextensivelyon their own, for fear of appearingto make preparations for rebellionand therebyinvitingretaliation by Bagoasandhis supporters. Revoltsby officialsin westernAnatolia in responseto developmentsat court had been a recurrentfeature of imperial historyfrom the time of Pissuthnesin the 420s throughCyrus in the late fifth century and Ariobarzanesand others in the 360s and 350s.19 In the aftermathof ArtaxerxesIII's assassination, the near-extinctionof thedirectroyalline, andtheprobabledisplacement of important courtofficials,Bagoasandhissupporters wouldlikely view anysubstantial military preparations by figuressuchas Arsitesand Spithridates,bothof whom owed their appointmentsto ArtaxerxesIII and one of whom (Spithridates),descended from one of "the Seven",camefrom one of the families most closelyassociatedwith ArtaxerxesIII, as potentially treasonous even if Macedonian attack was imminent. 2ø

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South of Lydia, in the southwestemcomer of Anatolia, was Caria with its native satrap Pixodarus, scion of the Hecatomnid dynasty. Isocrates'characterization of Pixodarus'predecessor Idrieusin theAddress to Philip (346) as "the most prosperousof those in Asia" points to contemporaryperception--at least in the early 340s-•of Hecatomnid

wealthand (presumably) power.2• Fromthe time of Maussollus (satrap 377/6-353/2) the Hecatomnidshad maintained a sizable fleet and a stand-

ing armydistributed in garrisons in Caria.22By the early330s,however, Hecatomnid strength was likely much diminished. Dutifully obeying ArtaxerxesIII's order to see to the recoveryof rebelliousCypriotecities in 345, Idrieus (satrap351/0-344/3) had sent off forty shipsand 8000

troopsfromCariato Cyprus.23 Mostof theseprobablyneverretumedto Caria. Artaxerxes,intent on fielding as large a force as possiblein the

attackon Egyptwhichbeganin 343, wasscouring Greecefor troops, 24 and he undoubtedlykept Idrieus' Cypriote force in the eastemMediterranean after it completedoperationson Cyprus, and probably also the shipswhichhadcarriedit to Cyprus.Artaxerxesmay thenhavedispatched these troops to northwestemAnatolia to form part of the large army Mentor commandedthere after the Egyptiancampaign.From there many of them may have goneeastwardwhen Mentor senttroopsto Artaxerxes, probablysometime after 341. Unlike Maussollusor Idrieus(at leastuntil 345), Pixodarusmay thus have been much like typical Persiansatrapsin termsof military resources4ependentprimarily on rathermeagerlocal levies and whatever mercenaries

could be hired.

Altogetherthen, in light of the larger political circumstances in the PersianEmpire and the particularconditionsin westernAnatolia, Philip must have viewed westem Anatolia as extremely vulnerable in late 338 or early 337. Here were officials without substantialforcesat hand and, given the Persiancentralgovemment'sprobableconcemwith the reconquest of Egypt as well as with the trustworthinessof satrapssuch as Arsitesand Spithridates,little likelihoodof gettingany big reinforcements in the immediatefuture. Wary of the political risks of raisingforceson their own, Anatolian officials would probably shrink from undertaking any extensive military build-up by themselvesto counter Macedonian attack.

Viewing mattersas they stoodin 337, Philip could perhapsforesee, at least in the early stagesof Macedonianoperations,a repriseof the Spartanexperienceof the 390s. With Memnon as a benign opponent, Philip, in northwestemAnatolia, would have a ready baseof operations, like that the Spartanshad found at Ephesus,from which his troopscould

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move easily along the coast, probablyfight up to and even into Caria. The satrapsbasedfarther inland--Arsites and Spithridates--wouldmost likely respondvery slowly, if at all, and probably, like Phamabazusand Tissaphernes,their counterpartsin the 390s, offer negotiationsand truces in the hope of gaining time to get direction and aid from the Persian King. No wonder, then, that Philip startedhis great war with an advance force probably no larger than the armies the Spartanshad deployedin their Anatoliancampaignsbetween400 and 395 and gave over its command to subordinates,while he himself, normally in the forefrontin any campaigning, stayed home to prepare and celebrate his daughter's

marfiage. 25 SincePhilip did not surviveto take the field with the full Macedonian army, his ultimate plans must remain uncertain.He may not even have formulateda grandstrategyby the time of his death.But if Philip's plans were predicatedon the assumption of the easyconquestof westernAnatolia, it is a plausible inferencethat Philip intendedto use the full Macedonianarmy for more extensiveoperationsfarthereast. In the question which Philip reportedlyposedto the Delphic oraclein 336•"whether

he would conquerthe King of the Persians "26 there may well be an indicationthat he actuallyanticipatedmeetingthe PersianKing in battle soon and that he at least entertainedthe possibilityof accomplishing nothingless than the conquestof the PersianEmpire. Events would confirm Philip's confidence.Dispatchedat the head of an advanceforce probablytotalling a little more than 10000 men, Parmeniocrossedthe Hellespontinto northwestern Anatoliain spring336 without oppositionand, leaving a detachmentin the Troad under Calas,

advancedsouthward in subsequent monthsinto Ionia.27 The sources, interestedenoughin Persianoperationsagainstthe Macedonianadvance

forcein 335,28have nothingto say aboutany suchoperations in 336. Memnon and other Persianofficials evidently remainedinactive as Parmenlo's troopsmoved throughwesternAnatolia in 336. Pixodams, satrap of Caria, in fact now sought an alliance with Philip and proposedto marry his daughterto Philip's son Arrhidaeus--a good indicationthat Pixodamsdespairedof any substantialPersianresponsewhich might halt

Macedonian progress. 29 Philip died by assassination in (probably)October336, but Parmenio continuedhis advancewithoutdifficulty, andPhilip's successor Alexander certainlyhad no hesitationin authorizingcontinuedoperationsin western Anatolia and in envisioningoperationsby the full Macedonianarmy

farthereast.3øBut aboutthe sametimePhilipdied,a newPersianKing--

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DariusIII--recently established on the thronein placeof Arsesby Bagoas, took effective control of court affairs by compelling Bagoas to drink

poisonintended for Dariushimself. 31Onceon hisown,Dariusseemsto have acted with a decisivenessreminiscentof ArtaxerxesIII. Egypt was under Persiancontrol again by early 335: Darius had evidently quickly mountedan expedition,probably attackingEgypt after the end of the

floodseason latein 336.32Earlyin 335, DariussentMemnona mercenary force (this perhapsmarked the return to Anatolia of many of the mercenariespreviouslydraftedfor servicein the eastby ArtaxerxesIII) and

ordersto undertake a counter-offensive. 33Memnon(withPhilipnowdead) complied and during 335 succeededin pushingParmenioand all but a

detachment of theadvance forceoutof Anatolia. 34Suchsignsof initiative on the part of the Persiancentralgovernmentprobablylay behind Pixodarus' decision to stake his future on renewed

Persian connections.

Ac-

cording to Strabo (14.2.17, p. 657), Pixodarus,having "persianized", sent for a Persiansatrapto sharerule with him. Darius sentoff Orontobates,who marriedthe daughterof Pixodaruspreviouslyofferedto Philip's

son Arrhidaeus. 35 The presenceof numerousroyal relatives in Dascylium--Darius'son-in-lawMithridates,hisbrother-in-lawPharnaces,

andhis cousinArbupales,a grandson of Artaxerxes II36--earlyin 334 pointsto Darius' dispatchof additionalofficialsfrom his courtto western Anatolia perhapslate in 335, and atteststhat the Macedonianthreat to

Anatoliahadbecomethe King'sprimaryconcern. 37 Thus the situation on the eve of Alexander's

Persian war was much

different from what it had been on the eve of Philip's Persianwar. In the person of Darius III, there was a strong monarch on the Persian throne who, thanksto the removal of Bagoasand the recent recovery of Egypt, was not preoccupiedwith courtpoliticsor with Egyptianmatters. A seasonedforce was in the field in westernAnatolia, operatingunder Memnon, and various newly arrived, high-rankingPersianofficials directly linked to the King himself had joined Arsites and Spithridatesto organizePersiandefensesin westernAnatolia. As a result, when Alexander finally crossedthe Hellespontin early 334 to begin his Persian war, he had first to fight in westernAnatolia--as Philip would not have had to--before pursuingthe larger goal possiblyoriginally conceivedby Philip. University of North Carolina Greensboro

StephenRuzicka

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NOTES

1. Isoc. 5.101-4; cf. A.B. Bosworth, Conquestand empire: The reign of Alexander the Great (1988) 18-19. 2. Diod.

16.44.1-52.6.

3. Diod. 16.74.2-75.2;

Paus. 1.29.7; Arr. 2.14.5.

4. Diodorusemphasizes the swiftnesswith whichMentordealtwith Hermias and others(16.52.7-8). Hermiaswas probablycapturedearly in 341 (N.G.L. Hammond and G.T. Griffith, A history of Macedonia 2 (1979) 521 n. 1) and the otherhegemones were subduedwithin a few monthsafterthis. Diod. 16.75.1-2 reportsArtaxerxes'ordersto aid Perinthusand the ensuingsatrapalactions. 5. If the futurePersianKing DariusIII's defeatof a heroicopponentin single combatduringa Cadusianwar gainedhim suchrenownthat he was subsequently deemedworthy of kingship(Diod. 17.6.1-2), it is likely that this exploit was not too far removed in time from Darius III's accessionas King in 336. The Cadusianwar during which Dadus' exploit occurredis thereforeprobablythe war for which Artaxerxesrequiredthe mercenadessent by Memnon while he was serving as stratggosautokrator in the late 340s and (possibly)early 330s (Diod. 16.50.7). 6. Cf. H. Berve, Das Alexanderreichauf prosopographischer Grundlage2 (1926) no. 497. 7. Diod.

17.5.3.

8. The chronologyof Chabbash'sreign--and thusthat of the final Egyptian revolt--is problematic.The Apis Sarcophagus dedicationfrom Memphis, dated to the third month of the second(regnal) year of Chabbash(B. Gunn, "Two inscribedsarcophagi in theSerapeum",Annalesdu ServicedesAntiquitdsd'Egypte 26 (1926) 86-87), indicatesa reign of more than a year. The reign must fall

between342 andearly335 (F.K. Kienitz,Die politische Geschichte 2igyptens vom 7. bis zum 4. Jahrhundertvor der Zeitwende(1953) 185-87). Thinking it

improbablethatEgyptcouldrevoltwhile the powerfulArtaxerxesIII still lived, Kienitz datesthe beginningof Chabbash'sreign to winter 338/7--i.e., soonafter Artaxerxes'death(Kienitz 187-88). But A. Spalinger'snew readingof the Satrap Stela, a recordof PtolemyI's benefactions to the templeof Edj6 in Buto which reportsalsoChabbash's earlierdealingswith the temple,revealsthat Chabbash was probablyrecognizedas king, at least in the Delta, before ArtaxerxesIII's

death("ThereignofKingChabbash: Aninterpretation", Zeitschrifi fiir ,•gyptische SpracheundAltertumskunde 105 (1978) 147-52). Possibly,Chabbash'sinsurrectional kingship, perhapslimited initially to the Delta, began only in 338, not long before Artaxerxes'death (cf. Kienitz 188 n. 1, noting the assumptionof Persiancontrolof Egypt in 339 in Isoc. 12.159) and was extendedto all of Egypt

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(as indicatedby the use of Chabbash'sregnal year in documentsfrom Thebes (PapyrusLibbey: see Spalinger143) in Upper Egypt as well as from Memphis in Lower Egypt) only after Artaxerxes'death, when confusionat the Persian court will have preventedany quick responseto revolt in Egypt. 9. Diod.

16.52.2.

10. On Struthasas "satrapof Ionia" with responsibilityfor "the coast", see M.N. Tod, Greekhistoricalinscriptions 2 (1948) no. 113, line 42 andXen. Hell. 4.8.17. On Orontesas satrapof "all the coast",seeDiod. 15.91.1. 11. See H. Berve, Die Tyrannis bei den Griechen 1 (1967) 333-34. 12. Diod.

16.52.6-7.

13. Dem. 23.154; Aen. Tact. Pol. 28.6; /Mist. Pol. 1306a30.

14. Diod. 17.7.9; Polyaen.5.44.4. For the identificationof Polyaenus'Magnesia as Magnesiaon Sipylus, see E. Badian, "Alexanderand the Greeks of Asia", in Ancient societyand institutions.Studiespresentedto Victor Ehrenberg (1966) 63 n. 20. 15. Diod.

16.52.3.

16. Diod. 16.47.1-2. On Spithridatesas sonratherthanbrotherof Rhosaces,

seeK.J.Beloch, Griechische Geschichte III2 2 (1923)136-37;A.B.Bosworth, A historical commentaryon Arrian's History of Alexander 1 (1980) 111-12; contra Berve (cit. n. 6 above) no. 687; J.R. Hamilton, Plutarch. Alexander. A commentary(1969) 40. 17. Arr. 1.12.8, 16.3; cf. Diod. 17.19.4, 20.1. 18. Paus. 1.29.7; Arr. 1.12.8-10.

19. The circumstances behindCyrus' revolt are well known. Pissuthnes'revolt (Ctes. FGrHist 688 F15.53) was probablyconnectedwith the strugglesover the successionafter the death of AriaxerxesI (Ctes. F15.47-52) and likely reflects oppositionto the accession of Ochus,Artaxerxes'sonby a Babylonianconcubine, as Darius II (see D.M. Lewis, Sparta and Persia (1977) 70-81). Ariobarzanes' revolt in the early 360s (Nep. Dat. 5.6; Xen. Hell. 7.1.27; Diod. 15.70.2; Dem. 23.141; Xen. Ages. 2.26; Nep. Timoth. 1.3) was probably spurredby fear that ArtaxerxesII was aboutto replacehim with Artabazus,Artaxerxes'own grandson (see K.J. Beloch, "Artabazus", Janus 1 (1921) 8-12; J. Buckler, The Theban hegemony,371-362 B.C. (1980) 102-4). Orontes,who emergedas leaderof the great satraps'revolt of the late 360s (Diod. 15.91.1), may have rebelledafter ArtaxerxesII's designationof his son Darius as coregentgave Orontes' old political enemy Tiribazus, who was now Darius' closestadvisor,great influence (Plut. Artox. 26.1-2, 28.1; Diod. 15.8.2-9, 10.1-11.2). The revolt of Artabazus

while satrap of HellespontinePhrygia in the 350s was likely causedby the accession of Ariaxerxes

III

and Ariaxerxes'

wholesale

murder of numerous male

and female relatives (Diod. 16.22.1-2, 34.1-2, 52.3; Curt. 10.5.23; Beloch 11). 20. Arsites, first attestedas satrapof HellespontinePhrygia in 340 (Paus. 1.29.7), probably acquiredthis office following Artabazus'flight from Anatolia to Macedonia in ca. 352 (Diod. 16.52.3). 21.

Isoc. 5.103.

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22. Xen. Ages. 2.26; [Arist.] Oec. 1348a25-28. 23.

Diod.

16.42.6-7.

24. Diod. 16.44.1-4; Philoch. FGrHist 328 F157.

25. Thibron reportedlybrought 5000 troops to Anatolia in 400 and added 2000 from AnatolianGreek cities and 5000 more from the mercenaryforce which had returnedto Anatolia after Cyrus' death at Cunaxa (Diod. 14.36.1-2; Xen. Hell. 3.1.5), giving him a total of 12000. Agesilaustook 8000 troopsto Anatolia in 396 (Xen. Hell. 3.4.2; cf. Diod. 14.79.1 which gives the numberas 6000 but probablyomits the 2000 emancipated helotsincludedin Xenophon'sfigure) and enrolled4000 more at Ephesus(Diod. 14.79.2), giving him a campaigningarmy of 12000. Polyaen. 5.44.4 providesthe only informationaboutthe size of the Macedonianadvanceforce, placing 100013men under Parmenioand Attalus at Magnesiain 335. This doesnot includethe contingentoperatingseparatelyunder Calas in the Troad (Diod. 17.7.10). The size of the force detachedto Calas is unknown,but sincehe evidentlybolsteredit with mercenaries(Diod. 17.7.10), it was probablyoriginallynot very large. Thus, the total numberof troopsPhilip sent off in 336 was likely not greaterthan 12000. 26.

Diod.

16.91.2.

27. Diod. 16.91.2; J.R. Ellis, Philip II and Macedonian imperialism (1976) 221-22. The Cyzicenes' belief that it was Calas (rather than Parmenio)who was coming to help them in 335 when they actually saw Memnon (who had put on Macedoniangarb in the hope of deceivingthe Cyzicenes)approachingthe city (Polyaen. 5.44.5) indicatesthat Calas had been operatingindependentlyof Parmenio in the Troad. (Parmeniowas attackingGryneiumand Pitane well to the southat the time of Memnon's attempton Cyzicus:Diod. 17.7.9.) Parmeniohad probably left Calas behind shortly after reachingAnatolia in order to ensure Philip's safe crossing. 28. Diod. 17.7.2-10; Polyaen. 5.44.4-5. 29. Plut. Alex. 10.1-3. (See Berve (cit. n. 6 above) no. 640.) On the date and circumstances,see A.T. Olmstead, History of the Persian Empire (1948) 490; J.R. Ellis, "The assassination of Philip II", in AncientMacedonianstudies in honor of CharlesEdson, ed. H.J. Dell (1981) 135-36; M.B. Hatzopoulos,"A reconsiderationof the Pixodarus affair", in Macedonia and Greece in late Classical

and Hellenistictimes,ed. B. Barr-Sharrarand E.N. Borza, Studiesin the History of Art 10 (1982) 59-66. 30. Arr. 1.1.1-3; Diod. 17.2.2-6. On the date of Philip's death, see M.B. Hatzopoulos,"The Oleveni inscriptionand the dates of Philip IFs reign", in Philip H, Alexanderthe Great and the Macedonianheritage, ed. W.L. Adams and E.N. Borza (1982) 30-42; Bosworth (cit. n. 16 above) 45-46. 31. Diod. 17.5.5-6, 6.2; cf. Bosworth 347, placing Darius' accessionin summer

336.

32. Kienitz (cit. n. 8 above) 110, 185; Bosworth 137; id. (cit. n. 1 above) 34. The relatively brief time apparentlyneededfor this operationmay indicate that Persianpreparations for the recoveryof Egypthadbegunbeforethe accession

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of Darius and that, perhapsbecauseof lossessufferedduring the 343/2 war, Chabbashwas unable to mount an effective resistancein the face of large-scale invasion. 33.

Diod.

17.7.2.

34. Diod. 17.7.2-9; Polyaen. 5.44.4; Badian (cit. n. 14 above) 40-41. No sourcerecordsParmenio'swithdrawal, but it may be inferred from his presence in Macedonia before the beginning of Alexander's campaign in 334 (Diod. 17.16.2). Possibly the fleet which had brought the advance force acrossthe Hellespont(cf. Just.9.5.8) accompanied Parmenioby seaashe marchedsouthward in westernAnatolia in 336-335 and was thus able to evacuatehim, perhapsfrom pro-MacedonianEphesus(Arr. 1.17.11). 35. Cf. Arr. 1.23.8. (The "King" concernedis not actuallyidentifiedas Darius in the sources.)Aman saysnothingaboutPixodarus'solicitationof a Persianto sharerule with him, notingonly that "when Pixodarusdied, Orontobates,having been sentby the king, held [or kept] the arche of the Carians,beinga son-in-law of Pixodarus".Possibly,it was Darius who initiated the power-sharingarrangement. (StraboevidentlybelievesPixodarusa heretoforefully independent dynast-he seems ignorant of the satrapal status of members of the Hecatomnid dynasty--and may have assumedthat in the absenceof any report of a Persian takeoverof Caria the presenceof Orontobates(on whom, see Berve (cit. n. 6 above)no. 594) as satrapcouldbe explainedonly by the assumption thatPixodarus had sent for a Persian to share rule with him.) But even if this was the case, Pixodarus'evident acquiescence suggeststhat he no longer anticipatedimminent Macedonianvictory in Anatolia. 36. Arr. 1.16.3. (On thesefigures, see Berve nos. 525, 767, 106.) 37. The proliferationof high-rankingPersiansin westernAnatoliaand Darius' apparentdecisionnot to appointany stratdgosautokratormay reflect Darius' hesitation(for political reasons)to concentratetoo muchpower in the handsof any singlePersianofficial. I am gratefulto ProfessorBadian for this observation and for many other valuable suggestions.