American Journal of Ancient History (Vol 6.1) 9781463206727, 1463206720

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American Journal of Ancient History

American Journal of Ancient History

6.1

The American Journal of Ancient History is a peer-reviewed academic journal covering ancient history and classical studies. It was established in 1976 and edited by Ernst Badian until 2001. It is continued by the American Journal of Ancient History: New Series, edited by T. Corey Brennan.

American Journal of Ancient History

Volume 6.1 Edited by

Ernst Badian

gp 2017

Gorgias Press LLC, 954 River Road, Piscataway, NJ, 08854, USA www.gorgiaspress.com Copyright © 2017 by Gorgias Press LLC Originally published in 1981 All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning or otherwise without the prior written permission of Gorgias Press LLC. ‫ܐ‬

1

2017

ISBN 978-1-4632-0672-7

Printed in the United States of America

TABLE

OF CONTENTS

V.M. Warrior: Livy, Book 42: Structure and Chronology ................ Judith R. Ginsburg:Nero's ConsularPolicy ...........................

1 51

R.M. Errington: Review-Discussion:

Four Interpretationsof Philip II ................................. D. Fishwick: A Gold Bust of Titus at Emerita

.........................

69 89

TABLE

OF CONTENTS

V.M. Warrior: Livy, Book 42: Structure and Chronology ................ Judith R. Ginsburg:Nero's ConsularPolicy ...........................

1 51

R.M. Errington: Review-Discussion:

Four Interpretationsof Philip II ................................. D. Fishwick: A Gold Bust of Titus at Emerita

.........................

69 89

LIVY, BOOK 42: STRUCTURE AND CHRONOLOGY*

In book 42, Livy's imperfectconflationof his sourcesand the dramatic structure of the book have resultedin an obscuringof the chronological sequenceof eventsand in the repetitionof someinformation.• The book beginswith the allotment of the provincesto the magistratesof 173 and concludeswith the end of the first campaigningseasonof the Third Macedonian War in 171.2 Livy usesthree basic types of chronological expression:datesaccordingto the Roman calendar,whichare considered to derive from annalistic sources;seasonalnotations, which are probably

from Polybius;andimprecisetemporalexpressions, whichseemto indicate Livy's ignoranceof the preciseand/or the relative chronologyof the particulareventdescribed.3 The chronologicalproblemsare further complicatedby a seeminglyinsolublecontroversyover how far in advanceof the seasonsthe Roman calendar was at this time. 4 However, since Livy

givesa numberof precisecalendardatesfor certainevents,the methodof this article will be first to review the sequenceof theseeventsand then, by seekingpossiblesynchronisms, to attemptto relateto thisframeworkother recorded events--those events which are denoted by seasonalreferences

and thosefor which the only possibletemporalindicationis their relative position in Livy's narrative. I. Events Which Can Be Dated by, or Related to, Roman Calendar Dates

The only eventsof 172-171which are specificallydated are: the scheduling of the completion of Sicinius' muster for 13 February 171; the elections held on ! 8 February 171, and the Feriae Latinae celebratedon ! June 171.5 To thesedatescan be added 15 March, which wasat this periodthe date for the inauguration of the new consuls.Livy's accountof the activitiesof the Popillii yields further chronological information. The consuls of 172 delayed the passingof the Senate'sdecreeconcerningM. Popillius (cos. 173) and did not depart for their province until some considerabletime after the Feriae Latinae--maybe evenafter I August 172.M. Popilliuswas ordered to return to Rome by 13November 172,but hisfourth hearingwas postponed until 15 March 171, when the praetor, C. Licinius, would no longer be in office.6 The war-vote is said to have been passedin a

¸ 1982 by E. Badian. All rights reserved.

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conditionalform on the first possibledate after the inaugurationof the new consulsin March 171.7C. Lucretius,the praetor, left Rome for his naval commandafter the completionof the Feriae Latinae on 1 June 171 and, accordingto the annalistictradition, Perseus'ambassadors were received and dismissedbefore the consulsdeparted for their provinces.8 Among the other major events of 172-171 related by Livy are the embassiesto and from Rome, which set the scenefor the beginningof the war with Macedon. Sincethe embassyof Eumenesto Rome and hisspeech denouncingPerseusof Macedon are narrated immediatelyafter a brief account of the beginning of consular 172, the continued defiance of the Senateby the Popillii, and the allocation of the provinces,there seemsno reason to doubt that Eumenes did appear before the Senate at the beginningof the new consularyear, which was the regular time for the receptionof embassies.However, it is more difficult to determineat what point in the year the Senateactually decidedon war with Macedon.9The attempted assassinationof Eumenesat Delphi, on his return from Rome, and the revelations of Rammius of Brundisium, who went to Rome with

the Roman ambassadorC. Valerius and Praxo of Delphi, are said by I•ivy to have hastenedthe declarationthat Perseuswas an enemy.l0 Although it is impossible to estimate the length of time which elapsed between Eumenes'

audience

with the Senate in the latter

half of March

and the

arrival in Rome of Valerius with Praxo and Rammius, Livy's statement (belli administratio ad novos consulesreiecta est) indicatesthat the decision to take action was made late in consular 172, at a time when the

electionswere a subjectfor consideration.• Furthermore, it seemslikely that the decisionto go to war precededthe Senate'sdecisionto summon one of the consuls back to Rome to conduct the elections. This decision,

which called for electionsat the earliestpossibledate, was probably made in the latter half of December, which allows time for travel to and from

I•iguria and for the period of a trinundinumafter the proclamationof the elections. •2

The notice that, in praesentia, the Senate decreedthat Cn. Siciniuswas to enlist troops at Brundisium and transport them to Apollonia as a garrison, to securepoints of disembarkationfor the consulcuiprovincia Macedonia obvenisset,is a probablefurther indicationthat sections2 and

3 of chapter! 8 areto bedatedlate in consular172.The apparentdoubletof thesetwo sectionsgivesthe additional information that the muster was to be completed by 13 February and that Sicinius' irnperiurn was to be

prorogued.It alsosuppliesdetailsof the muster.•3The numbersof infantry and cavalry given in this passageseemexcessivelyhigh for a preliminary expedition;they conflict with the numbersgiven in a later passage(36.8), and there is a question concerningthe official position of A. Atilius

LIVY

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3

Serranus,who is saidto have beenorderedto receivetroopsat Brundisium and send them to Macedon; yet these are not necessarilygroundsfor questioningthe date of 13 Februaryfor the muster.14Regardless of when the actual decisionto go to war with Macedon wasmade,it isclearthat the decisiveactionbeganwhenthe Senatedecreedthat $iciniusshouldequipa forceand lead it to Apollonia in preparationfor a full-scalewar in consular 171;and it is likely that the musterwasorderedsometimein late December or early January and wascompletedby the scheduleddate of 13 February 171.15

Following his statementthat the Senate summonedone of the consuls back to Rome to conduct the elections,and prior to his account of the arrangementsfor the muster, Livy gives a brief statement of further diplomaticactivity.16The Romanssentan embassyto Illyria, sinceIssaean envoyshad complainedabout pro-Macedonianactivitiesby Gentius of Illyria and the chargeshad been rebutted by lllyrian envoys.•7Although thereis no indicationof the date of this embassybeyondthe locationof the account,it is possiblethat this diplomaticexchangemay havebeenoneof the reasons for the Senate's decision to send Sicinius to this area. The other two embassies mentioned in this context involve further

problems. Livy reports the return of Roman envoysfrom Asia and the arrival of envoys from Rhodes. The former embassyis probably that recordedin 42.19.7-8 as consistingof Ti. ClaudiusNero and M. Decimius. However, this embassymay be a repetition of that mentioned in 42.45.1, wherethe namesare givenasTi. Claudius,Sp. Postumiusand M. Junius.ms The receptionof the embassyfrom the Rhodians,if it is to be acceptedas authentic, was deferred until the new consuls took office. •9

The pre-electionperiod at Rome was perhapsmore contentiousthan usual.The war againstMacedonwasundoubtedlya predominantissueand this would have beenhighlightedby Sicinius'departurefor the fleet, which probably took place around 8 February. 20 There was apparently an attempt to delay the elections, since Livy relates that C. Popillius, the consul who was to conduct the elections for 171, returned to Rome

considerably later than the Senate had stipulated, although the elections were neverthelessheld on the appointedday of 18 February.2l Livy reports that M. Popillius (cos. 173), who presumablyhad returnedto Rome by 13 November, as ordered, stood trial, and that after three hearingshe was ordered to appear again after 15 March 171, which enabledhim to avoid condemnation;it thereforeseemslikely that C. Popillius, by delayinghis return to Rome and thusthreateningthe holding of the elections,was able to bargain with the Senate to securehis brother's escapefrom justice.2• Although it cannot be establishedwith certainty that the trinundinum wasin useat thistime and it is impossibleto determinethe precisedate of C.

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Popillius'return, this incidentraisesthe questionof whetherthe presiding magistrate'spresencein Rome was obligatoryat the time of the announcement of the electionsand/or whenaprofessiowasmade.23The fact that a late arrival on the part of the presidingmagistrateis alsorecordedfor the electionsfor 187 may indicatethat the consul'spresencebefore the actual electionday wasmerelycustomaryand not obligatory,that formalprofessio was not tied to the trinundinum,and thatprofessiowasnot madeuntil the day of the electionitself.24However this may be, it seemslikely that C. Popillius' late arrival poseda threat to the Senate'sdesire to have early electionsin order to know the namesof the magistratesfor 171as soonas possible.25 After his accountof the inaugurationof the consulsfor 171,P. Licinius Crassusand C. Cassius,Livy statesthat the Senateorderedthem to put the war-vote

to the Cornitia

Centuriata

in a conditional

form on the first

possibleday.26Whether or not the trinundinumwasnecessary in thecaseof a war-vote, the order of the Senateto the consulsto put sucha motion to the People, together with the recentdeparture of Siciniusfor Apollonia and the allocation of Macedonia as a province,would have made it very clear at the beginningof consular171 that preparationsagainstMacedon for the coming campaigningseasonwere already well under way.27 However, Livy's accountof the passingof a conditionalwar-vote raisesa number of questions.Firstly, why had not the war-vote been proposed earlier, since,as has been shown, the decisionto go to war had probably already been made and Sicinius'force was in Apollonia? Secondly•why was the vote made conditional, since the despatch of Sicinius, whose province was Macedonia, signified Rome's commitment to war with Perseus? 28Furthermore,thereis no referencein Livy's narrativeto the warvote as being passedin an unconditional form after the dismissalof Perseus'ambassadors, or beforethe departureof C. Lucretiusor that of the consul P. Licinius

for Macedon.

Not only is Livy's accountproblematical, but other sourcesposesome further questions.The Polybian excerptor, in the context of the dismissal of Perseus' ambassadors, refers to an earlier decision for war, which probably relates to the Senate'sinformal secretdecisionat the time of Eumenes' visit in early 172.29 Diodorus and Appian, however, give an account of the Senate'sdeciding on war at the time that Perseus'envoys were dismissed. 30 It is possiblethat Diodorus and Appian derive from Polybius, whose original text, in addition to a referenceto the earlier decision,may have mentioneda specificSenatedecision,at the time of the dismissalof the ambassadors,to proceedwith arrangementsto despatchC. Lucretiusand P. Licinius.3• In emphasizingthe rejectionof Perseus'peace move, Diodorus and Appian appear to have overlookedthe constitutional

LIVY

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5

detailsof the Roman procedureof declaringwar. Polybiusalso seemsto have omitted reference to the war-vote by the Cornitia Centuriata-referenceto which has survivedonly in the annalistictradition, albeit in a controversial

form.

It is possiblethat a war-vote was passedat this time by the People and that it was the normal practice to propose such a motion only at the beginningof the consularyear, although,as hasalreadybeenseenin this instance,action had already beenstarted.32A similar situation had occurred when, in 192, the praetor M. Baebiushad beensentto Apollonia with an advanceforceand hisirnperiurnhad beenprorogued.33The decisionto sendhim had beenex senatusconsultoandthe votehadnot beenput to the Peopleuntil the beginningof consular19I. 34This military action,too, had occurredat a time whenthe Roman calendarwasconsiderablyin advance of the seasons and thustherewasneedfor the prorogationof the praetor's power to cover the long period beforethe new consulscould reachtheir provincesand take the field.35Thus therewasa precedentfor the despatch of a minor force before a war-vote had been put to the People. It is interesting to note that Atilius Serranus is mentioned in connectionwith the preliminary expeditionsof both 192 and 172.36 It is, however, necessaryto questionthe conditional clauseof the warvote, despitethe fact that it is mentionedthreetimes.37There hasbeenan attemptto explainthe conditionalnatureof thisvote on the groundthat it was insertedin the motion becausenewshad reachedRome concerningthe meeting of Q. Marcius Philippus with Perseusand the granting of indutiae.38However, sinceLivy statesthat Philippusarrived in Corcyra a few daysafter Sicinius,whichwould make it impossiblefor Philippusto have met with Perseusand for newsto have reachedRome by 15 March, this hypothesisdepends on establishingthe relative chronology of Philippus'embassyand on the resolutionof the problem of the indutiae which Philippus is said to have offered to Perseus. 39Another possible explanation is that the Senate, after its problems with the recalcitrant magistrates,particularly the Popillii, was not yet fully committed to engagingin war with Perseusand was awaiting the resultsof its various embassies. 40The Roman military failuresin the first two yearsof the war might seemto justifyany reservations whichthe Senatemay havefelt at the beginningof consular171.4•However, sincethesetwo hypotheses are but speculation,it is difficult to acceptthe conditionalclauseas authentic. It seemsmore likely that the conditional clauseas well as the references to Rome'sreluctanceto go to war and to her lack of preparationsare later insertionsintendedto coverup heraggression againstPerseusand her early defeats. The concept of a conditional war-vote is itself curious and unprecedented.Sucha vote at this time is questionablebecause,at the time

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when it is alleged to have been passed, Sicinius had already been despatchedand was seizingfortresses(L. 42.36.9). Moreover, in a passage which probablyderivesfrom an annalisticsource,Livy impliesthat, at the time of the reception of Perseus'ambassadors,an unconditional state of war existed, since he states that the ambassadors were not received into the

city, curn iarn bellurn regi eorurn et Macedonibus et senatusdecressetet populus iussisset(L. 42.36.1). What is more, in a sectionwhich derivesfrom Polybius, Livy refersto the indutiae which had beengrantedby Philippus to Perseusand underwhich Perseussentenvoysto Rome. The grantingof a truce implies that a state of war existed at the time of the meeting of Philippus and Perseusat the Peneus.Scholarshave attemptedelaborate explanationsof the indutiae, and the authenticityof Philippus' embassy has even beencalled into questionon the groundthat a trucecould not be granted in a time of peace.4• However, rather than questionthe authenticityof the Polybian tradition concerningPhilippus' embassyand the truce, it seemsmore logical to questionthe existenceof a stateof peace,sincea truce can only be g•anted in a time of war. The testimony of Livy and Polybius to a truce granted by Philippusand Livy's referenceto a stateof war at the time of the reception of Perseus'ambassadorsseemto outweigh the referencesto a conditional war-vote at the beginningof consular171. Moreover, the presenceof 1000 troops with Philippusand the giving of hostagesby Perseusat the time of the meeting with Philippus indicate not only that this was no ordinary embassy,but also that a state of war must have existed.43But although it seemslikely that the conditional clauseof the war-vote shouldbe rejected, it is possiblethat the Peopledid not vote for war until the beginningof the new consular year, as had been the case in 192/1. Furthermore, if it is

acceptedthat Philippus'embassyset out after Sicinius'expedition,it is likely that the war-vote had alreadybeenpassedby the Peopleat the time of the meeting of Philippus and Perseus.44 Although the sourcesdo not tell ushow or whenthe formalitiesof fetial procedurewereperformedat this period,the precedentof Baebiusin 192 and the evidencecitedabovesuggestthat procedureshad beenadoptedand adaptedto deal with the problemof declaringwar, whenpreparationsand expeditionshad to be madewell in advanceof the newconsularyearand its campaigningseason. 45Furthermore,it seemslikely that, after the experienceof the People'sinitial rejectionof the proposalfor war with Macedon in 200, the Senatewould havedoneits utmostto ensurethat, by the time the vote for war with Antiochuswas put to the People,the Cornitia Centuriata would be sanctioninga fait accornpli.46If it is acceptedthat an unconditional vote for war wasput to the Peopleat the beginningof consular17l, the passingof this vote by the CornitiaCenturiatawould be a similarpost facturn ratification.

LIVY

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7

There are further problemsconcerningthe eventsat the end of consular 172andthe beginningof consular171.Livy followshisaccountof thelevy with a detaileddescriptionof the allocationof the provincesand a dispute overthe rank to be heldby former centurions. 47After the resolutionof the problemof the centurions,he statesthat the FeriaeLatinaewereheld on 1 June in order that the magistratesmight setout soonerfor their provinces (L. 42.35.1). However,he only recordsthat C. Lucretius,the praetor,left after the ceremonyfor the fleet at Brundisium(35.3) and, after givingan accountof the receptionof Perseus'ambassadors by the Senateandtheir dismissalfrom Italy, he concludesthis sectionwith the words:haecRomae acta nondumprofectis in provinciam consulibus(36.8). He then proceeds to give a brief accountof Sicinius'activitiesin Apollonia (36.8-9) and a retrospective account(37-47) of the embassyof Q. MarciusPhilippusto Greece. 48

The departureof the consulP. Liciniusfor his provinceof Macedoniais relatedin chapter49.1 and isintroducedby the wordsperhosdies.Chapter 48, which follows the conclusionof the flashback,givesno clue as to the date of Licinius'departure.It merelyrepeatssomeof the informationgiven in chapter 35 about the dismissal of Perseus' ambassadorsand C. Lucretius'departure,and givesadditional details, someof which are at variancewith those in the annalisticaccountof chapters35 and 36. The Polybian account of 48.3 statesthat Perseus'ambassadorswere to depart immediately from the walls of Rome and within thirty days from Italy, whereasthe annalisticaccount saysthat they were given elevendays in which to depart from Italy. C. Lucretius is said to have departed for Brundisium(35.3), whereasin the Polybian accounthe issaidto havegone to Naples and to have sailed via the Straits of Messina to Cephallenia (48.9). 49 A more important problem lies in the relative sequenceof theseevents, since it is not clear at what point Perseus'envoys were receivedand

dismissed.The order of eventsin the annalisticaccountimpliesthat this happenedafter the departureof C. Lucretius.However,sincethe annalistic account merely statesthat the envoysarrived per idem ternpus(36.1), it is possiblethat Livy, not knowingthe Roman dateof the arrival, hasnot only failed to examinethe chronologicalrelationto the Feriae Latinae, but has

also failed to notice the different order of eventsgiven in the Polybian account.The Polybian order of eventsseemsmore logical:the reception and dismissalof the ambassadorsis followed by the order to the consul Licinius to assemblethe army and by the departureof Lucretiusfor the fleet. If this assumptionis correct, it follows that the ambassadorswere received and dismissed before the Feriae Latinae

on I June. 50

We may now summarizethe conclusionsof this examination of the eventsof 172-171whichcan be datedby, or relatedto, the Roman calendar.

8

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On 15 March 172 the consulsentered office. Shortly after this, Eumenes appearedbeforethe Senateand probably a secretdecisionto make war on Macedon wasmade. The consulsmay not havedepartedfor their province until after I August, which was the date by which an investigationwasto beginif the Statellateshad not beenfreed. M. Popillius(cos. 173)presumably had returnedto Rome by 13 November,as ordered,and hisinvestigation began. In late December or early January, the Senate, having been confirmedin its earlierdecisionby the attemptedassassination of Eumenes and the reportsof Praxo and Rammius,summonedone of the consulsback to Rome to conductthe electionsand then decreedSicinius'expedition. (Theseactionsmay havebeenprecededby a diplomaticexchangewith the Illyrians.) The musterbeganand Siciniusleft Rome around 8 February, despiteattemptsto delay them by the presidingmagistrate,C. Popillius. The arrival of Siciniusin Apollonia sometimein mid-February indicates that war with Macedon, if it had not yet begun,was at leastimminent. Q. Marcius Philippusand four other ambassadorsarrived in Corcyra shortly after the arrival of Siciniusin Apollonia. 5•On 15 March 17I, the consulsP. Licinius Crassusand C. CassiusLonginusenteredoffice, and a war-vote wasput to the People,probablyin an unconditionalform, soonafter their inauguration. Perseus'ambassadorswerereceivedand dismissedsometime between 15 March and 1 June, probably fairly closeto the latter date.

On I June, the Feriae Latinae were held, and immediatelyafterwards C. Lucretiusleft Romefor hisnavalexpedition.The consulP. Licinius,to whom Macedon had been assigned,left sometimelater, perhapsbecause there had been problemswith the levy. II. EventsReferred to by SeasonalNotation: the Embassyof Q. Marcius Philippus

Livy's duplicatedaccountsof Perseus'embassyand the beginningof the war are separatedby the flashbackto eventsin Greeceduring late 172and early 171. There is considerablecontroversyover the point at which Livy changessourcesand the flashbackbegins.52However, a closeexamination of the text showsthat the flashbackbeginswith the wordsiam Cn. Sicinius ... in agro Apolloniati castra babebat. The use of the pluperfect praemissuserat and of the imperfectbabebatindicatesthat the ordersgiven in chapters 18.2-3 and 27.5-6 had been carried out and that Livy is now proceedingto describeSicinius'activitiesin taking fortresses(36.9). The passagethusservesasa backgroundand transitionto the majorsubjectsof the flashback:the embassyof Philippus,hisreturn to Rome, the report to the Senate and the consequentnova sapientiadebate. Moreover, the fact that the numbersof Sicinius'troops conflict with thosein 27.5 probably

LIVY

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9

indicates that Livy has changed his source from an annalist to Polybius. Yet, although the source of 36.8-9 is probably Polybius, it cannot be assumed

that sections 8 and 9 are a word-for-word

translation

of the

Polybian original. The imprecisetemporal referenceJamis probably Livy's own, and somewhatdesperate,attempt to give a chronologicalindication at the point of the changeof sourcesand subjectmatter, and sections8 and 9 may be an adaptation of Polybius' information concerningSicinius' action in Apollonia. There are two temporal referencesto the beginningof Philippus'mission to Greece:it is said to have arrived at Corcyra a 'a few days later (paucis post diebus37.1: the point of referenceisthe precedingaccountof Sicinius' activitiesin Apollonia): and the terminusante quem for the departureis given by the notice that the Lentuli were sentto Cephalleniaand were to visit the westerncoastalareasante hiemere(37.3). Thus there is a possible, though imprecise,synchronismwith Sicinius'departure,which was dated, accordingto the Roman calendar, sometimein mid-February. The date of the return of the embassyis problematical, since Livy's testimonythat Philippusand $erranusare saidto havereturnedto Rome principio hiemis(44.8) conflictswith the excerpt of Polybius which states that Philippus, Atilius and P. Lentulus returned to Rome after taking certain actions among the Greeks during the winter. 53It seemshazardous, if not impossible,to resolvetheseproblemsby attempting to estimatethe length of time that the activitiesattributed to Philippus and his fellow ambassadorswould havetaken, especiallysincethe terminusante quem is so imprecise.Nor--in view of the problem of the number of intercalations at this time and the lack of precisionof the term hiems,which involvesthe question of when this seasonwas throught to begin--is it feasibleto adopt the method of attempting chronologicalequivalents. 54 A preferable method seemsto be to examine the validity of the synchronism,i.e. the arrival of Philippus in Illyria a few daysafter the activitiesof Sicinius,and then, if this can be established,to try to relate this to the terminus ante quem, i.e. the completionof the missionof the Lentuli ante hiemem.55 Acceptanceof kivy's statementthat Philippus arrived after Sicinius dependson threearguments:(i) that whichhasalreadybeenmade,that the transitionfrom annalisticto Polybian sourcesis in the middleof 36.8; (ii) that Livy's temporal referencecannot be dismissedas a 'loose copula without chronological significance'; (iii) that the annalistic testimony concerning Serranus' activities at the time of the muster at Brundisium (27.4) is accepted,since,accordingto Livy (P.) 42.37.1, Serranuswent to Corcyra with Philippusafter the departureof Sicinius.56The third argument, as seenin the earlier discussion,is dependentupon establishingthe second.

10

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Examination of the temporal expressionswhich Livy usesin Book 42 (see Appendix I) revealsthat only two expressionsindicate relative chronology: ambassadorsfrom Perseusare said to have had an audience with the Senatepost paucos dies (14.2), which apparently indicatesthat this audiencewas subsequent to that grantedto Eumenes;Philippus'arrival is said to have been paucis post diebus, i.e. with referenceto Sicinius' activitiesat Apollonia. Sinceall the othertemporalexpressions avoid any suggestionof relative chronologicalsequence,it seemslikely that Livy found something in his sources which warranted his assertion that Philippus' arrival was subsequentto that of Sicinius. It is, of course, possiblethat Livy assertedthis becausehe was aware that the annalistic source(27.4) stated that Serranus had been involved in the despatchof Sicinius'troops. However, rejection of the wordspaucispost diebusand the acceptanceof Walbank's hypothesisthat Philippus'embassypreceded Sicinius'expeditionnot only seemsan unnecessarydistortion of Livy's testimony,but also impliesthat Livy deliberatelyreversedthe sequence of events;whereas•as can be seen,hissparinguseof termsthat denoterelative chronologicalsequenceprobably indicateshis desireto avoid any possible chronologicalinaccuracieswhen he could not ascertainthe sequenceof events from his different sources.Moreover, such a hypothesiscreates more difficulties than it solves,since, if Philippus left in September/ OctoberbeforeSicinius,the problem of grantinga truce in a time of peace becomesmore acute;whereas,ashasbeenshownabove,it is possiblethat a state of war existed, if not when Sicinius left Italy• at least by the time Philippus met with Perseus.•7 The acceptanceof Livy's testimonywithout emendationyieldsa logical sequenceof the eventsthat precededthe despatchto Macedon of the main consular force under P. Licinius in consular 171. Late in consular 172, probably in late December or early January, the Senate had ordered the

preparationof Sicinius'expeditionby mid-February171.Serfanus,probably becauseof hispreviousexperiencein similar circumstances in 192,was ordered to receive troops at Brundisium and despatch them to Macedonia. •s Probably at the sametime as the decisionto sendSiciniusto Apollonia, the Senate decided that Q. Marcius Philippus, A. Atilius Serranus,P. and Ser. Cornelii Lentuli and L. Decimiusshouldgo to Greece as ambassadors, probably with imperium• in the wake of Sicinius' expedition.•9 Serranusconductedthe muster in Brundisium;Siciniusleft Rome around 8 Februaryand Brundisiumon or shortlyafter 13February. Serranusremainedin Brundisium,where he wasjoined by Philippusand the other three ambassadors.Togetherthey went to Corcyra, arriving there soonafter Siciniushad establishedhimselfin Apollonia. The Lentuli went on their naval missionin order to completetheir assignmentante hiemere.

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11

Philippus,having receiveda despatchfrom Perseusupon his arrival in Corcyra, left for mainland Greece and met with Perseusat the Peneus, probably after the war-vote had beenpassedby the Comitia Centuriata.6o Thus, the acceptanceof Livy's chronologicaltestimonyin its entirety resolvessomeof the problemswhich have baffled modern scholars,who haveraisedquestionsaboutpartsof Livy'stestimonywithoutexaminingit as a chronologicalwhole.61

If Livy'stemporalreferences areacceptedasauthenticandPhilippusdid leaveafter Sicinius•the terminusante quemfor hisdepartureantehiemem (37.3) thereforeyieldsan approximatesynchronismwith the departureof Siciniusin mid-February. Of the three possibleJulian equivalentsof 13 February,perhapsc. 29 Octoberis mostconsonantwith the completionof the navalassignment of the Lentuliantehiemem,althoughonecannotrule out the possibilityof c. 21 November.62Thus, if the abovereconstructionof the sequenceof eventsis correct and if ante hiememis a direct translation from Polybius' original text, then Walbank's assertionthat Philippus departed at somepoint in Septemberis mistaken, and P6dech'sassertion that Polybius'winterbeganaround7 Novemberappearsunlikely,sinceit is impossiblethat the Lentulicouldhaveleft Italy and completedtheir naval assignmentby c. 7 November.63From the above evidenceit seemsmore likely that, in 172, winter was consideredto have begun sometimein December.

64

It is impossibleto date preciselyany of the activitiesattributed to the embassy,or to estimatethe length of time that the various actionswould have taken, especiallythe Roman presencein Boeotiaduring the revolu-

tion. The problemisfurthercomplicatedby thefactthat Polybius'account of the embassy's actionsonly survivesin an excerptconcerningthe events in Boeotiaand at Argos,and in the statementthat the ambassadors were activein Greeceduringthe winter. Livy, however,givesan accountof the visit of Philippusand Atilius to Epirusand Aetolia, a detaileddescription of their meetingwith Perseusand the grantingof indutiae,followedby an accountof the disruptionof the BoeotianLeagueand a meetingwith the Achaean League at Argos.65

After statingthat the ambassadors returnedto Romeprincipio hiemis, Livy digressesfor two chapterson other ambassadorialactivity, and he thengivesan accountof Philippus'reportto theSenateandthesubsequent nova sapientia debate.66 There is, however, no referenceto the new consularyear, although the accountof the debate is followed by a brief referenceto the reception of Perseus'ambassadors,their dismissalfrom Italy, and the Senate'sorder to P. Licinius, the consulto whom Macedon had beenallotted (48.4), to appoint the first possibleday for the assembly of the army. This chapter ends with the departure of the praetor C.

12

V.M.

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Lucretius. It has already been seenthat, with the exceptionof Lucretius' departure, these events preceded I June.67The question therefore is: at what point in the sequenceof eventswas the nova sapientiadebate?There are no clearindicationsin Livy on this question,and so it is possibleeither that Livy simply did not know or, sincethere is no extant accountof the debate in Polybius and since the moralizing sentimentsexpressedare similar to those attributed to the hostile Greeks in 146, that Livy has elaboratedPhilippus' return into a moralizingset-piecewhich servesas a dramatic prologueto the Third Macedonian War. It is clear,however,that the words attributed to the contestantsin the debate and the alleged division of opinion in the Senateare of questionableauthenticity.68 It remainsto considerthe date of the embassy'sreturn, and to attempt to resolve the conflict between Livy's statement, that the ambassadorsreturnedto Romeprincipiohiemis(44.8), and that of the Polybianexcerptor, that they were active in Greeceduring the winter (27.2.12). It has been suggestedthat Livy'sprincipio hiemis is a translation of a lost Polybian original and that this original has beendistortedby the excerptor.69This suggestionis basedon the assumptionsthat the embassyleft in September or October beforeSicinius;that Polybius'winter beganc. 7November;and that the phraseprincipio hiemis derives from a hypothetical Polybian original which, according to P•dech, applies to the period between the morning settingof the Pleiadesand the winter solstice.70However, it has already been shown that, on the basisof the approximate synchronismof the departureof Siciniusand Philippusc. mid-Februaryand a consideration of the possibleequivalentsin an extrapolatedJulian calendar,it is unlikely that Philippus departed before November. This would make it impossiblefor the embassyto havecompletedall the activitiesattributed to it and to have returned to Rome by 22 December.TM On the other hand, if the Polybian statementabout the embassy'sactions'during the winter' is acceptedas Polybius' original wording and thereforepreferableto Livy's principio hiemisas beingthe better source,it is possibleto explain Livy's words as a distortion: Livy, influencedby his earlier statementthat the Lentuli were to completetheir missionante hiemem,may haveconcluded his accountof the embassy'sactionsin Greecewith a referenceto its return. Therefore it is likely that the Polybian 'during the winter' is to be

preferredto Livy's principio hiemis;and this impliesa return of the embassysometimein January or February.72A return on31 Januarygives three possibleRoman calendar equivalents:c. 20 May, c. 20 April, c. 5 April. This would indicatethat the embassydid not return to Rome until after the beginningof consular 171 and thus, in all probability, after the passingof the war-vote by the People, and certainly before the Feriae Latinae on I June.73 Even if one choosesto disregard the possible

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chronologicalequivalentsof the seasonalapproximationswith the Roman calendar, the indicationsthat Philippus departed after Siciniusin midFebruary, and the approximatesynchronismwith ante hiemem,neverthelessthe abovediscussion indicatesthat the Polybian'duringthe winter' is preferableto Livy'sprincipio hiemis.The acceptanceof the additional evidenceof the synchronismand the chronologicalequivalentsfurther supportsthe suggestion thatprincipiohiemisisprobablyan error on Livy's part. However,the synchronism andtheconsiderationof the chronological equivalentsalso indicate what can otherwise only be inferred from the location of the referencesin Livy's imperfectlyconflatedaccount,i.e. that Philippus returned after the beginning of consular 171 and sometime before the Feriae

Latinae.

74

It is now necessarybriefly to discussPhilippus'embassyperse. Accordingto Livy, Q. MarciusPhilippus,A. AtiliusSerranus,P. andSer.Cornelii Lentuli and L. Decimius arrived in Corcyra a few days after Sicinius' arrival and initial activitiesat Apollonia. They were accompaniedby 1000 infantry, which they divided among themselvesbefore they departed for their variousassignments:Decimiusto Illyria; the Lentuli to Cephallenia, the westerncoastalareasand the Peloponnese;Philippusand $erranusto Epirus, Aetolia, Thessaly, Boeotia, Euboea and thence to the Peloponnese.75 It is significant that no mention is made at this point of an assignmentto visit Perseus,and that it later emergesthat the meetingwas at Perseus'request.76As has been stated above, the presenceof troops and Sicinius' activities in Apollonia indicate that decisive action against Macedon had begun;moreover,it is likely that the Peoplehad passedthe war-vote by the time Philippusmet with Perseus.77 Further indicationsof the existence of a state of war are Livy's report of Perseus'letter to Philippusat Corcyra, the giving of hostagesby Perseusat the time of the meeting with Philippus, and the granting of the truce.TMMoreover, these factors strongly suggestthat Philippus and his fellow envoys had imperiurn. The effect of the presenceof the Roman ambassadorswith troops is probably to be seenin the electionof a pro-Roman assuffectstrategosin Aetolia, the coming of embassiesfrom the Acarnaniansand the Boeotian exiles, Perseus'request for a meeting, and the revolution in Boeotia.TM Although only the meetingwith Perseusand the revolutionin Boeotiaare describedin detail in our extant sources,there can be little doubt that the activities of all five ambassadorswould have had an impact on Greek politicsand relationswith Macedon. Philippus'allegedwordsin hisreport to the Senate on his return, although perhaps not authentic, imply neverthelessthat the purposeof the embassywas to securebaseswhich might otherwisehave been taken by Perseus.The direct statementsin Polybius and Livy that the disruption of the BoeotianLeaguewaswhat the Romans

14

V.M.

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mostdesiredare further confirmationthat the objectiveof the missionwas

to make everypossiblepreparationfor the campaigning seasonof 171.80 Thus,on the basisof the aboveexamination,it is nowpossibleto setout the sequenceof eventsin 172-171in tabular form: 15 March

172

late March

Consuls enter office.

Eumenesappearsbeforethe Senateand a possible secret decision to make war on Macedon is made.

I August

13 November

An investigationto begin if the Statellateshad not

beenfreed; the consulsmay not have departed for their provincesuntil after this date. M. Popillius(cos.173)hasby thisdatepresumably returned to Rome as ordered and his investiga-

tion has begun. late December 172 Possible diplomatic exchangewith Issaeansand or early Illyrians; the Senatesummonsone of the consuls January 171 back to Rome to conduct the elections,decrees Sicinius'expeditionand appointsPhilippus,Serranus and three othersas ambassadorsto Greece,

probablywith imperium;the musterbeginswhen Serranus

is in Brundisium.

c. 8 February

Sicinius leavesRome for Brundisium.

c. 13 February

Siciniussailsfrom Brundisiumfor Apollonia,followedby Philippus'embassywhichgoesto Cor-

18 February

Elections in Rome.

15 March

Consulsenteroffice,followedshortlyby war-vote (probably unconditional) by People. Meetingof Philippusand Perseus;despatchofambassadorsto Rome by Perseuson his return to Macedon; Philippus completesmissionand re-

cyra.

c. 15 Marchc. 1 June

turns to Rome; nova sapientia debate; Perseus' ambassadors

1 June

Lucretius

late June?

received and dismissed.

Feriae Latinae, followed by the departure of C. for the fleet.

Departure of P. Licinius with army.

IlI. EmbassiesWhich Can Only Be Dated by PossibleReferenceto Their

Position

in Livv's Narrative

Although this involvesduplicationof someearlier arguments,it is neces-

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15

sary, in order to attempt to set all the recordeddiplomaticexchangesof 172-171in a chronologicalframework, to discussthe embassieswhich Livy recordswithout any referenceto chronologicalsequence. Threeembassies were probably receivedby the Senate at the beginningof consular 172: Eumeneshimself, envoysfrom Perseusand envoysfrom the Rhodians.81 The Macedonian embassyreceivedscantattention from the Senate,which had perhapsalready secretlydecidedon war. 82The Rhodians delivereda bitter attack on Eumenes for stirring up the Lycians and for acting oppressivelyin Asia. This attack on Eumenes, however, only servedto increasethe Senate'sfavour towards Eumenesand to bring disfavour on the Rhodians.83After his account of thesethree embassies,Livy proceeds

to relate the attempt on Eumenes'life at Delphi, and the return of C. Valeriusfrom Greeceand Macedonwith Praxo of Delphi and Rammiusof Brundisium.

84

As has been shown, Livy then usesa flashback to relate other events, including references to ambassadors from Ariarathes and from the Thracians,and to the despatchof Ti. ClaudiusNero and M. Decimius,who were to investigateaffairs in Asia and the islands,especiallyRhodesand Crete.85It is not impossiblethat theseforeign embassieswere receivedand the Roman one despatchedat the time of the regular transaction of diplomaticbusinessat the beginningof the new consularyear. Thus the despatchof Ti. ClaudiusNero and M. Decimiusmay havebeena response to the embassiesof Eumenesand of the Rhodians, which Livy delayed recountingbecauseof his continuousaccountconcerningEumenes.There is, however, another account of an embassyto the same area which is mentionedby Livy and Polybius: a Ti. Claudius is named as a member of eachembassy,but the embassiesseemto belongto different years.86Livy apparently was unsure of the precisedate of this embassy(sub idem ternpus),and the questionis further complicatedby the fact that he has placed the account of this embassybetween the account of Philippus' return to Rome principio hiemis and that of the nova sapientia debate. However, to judge from the excerpt of Polybius, it seemsto date to early 171, and it may have been sent after the People had voted for war with Macedon. Although it is not impossiblethat the embassiesrelated in chapters19and 45 are oneand the same,nevertheless it is quite feasiblethat the Romans

sent two embassies to the same area in the East: one immedi-

ately after Eumenes'visit and before the final decisionto make war on Perseus,and another at the beginning of the following year, after that decisionhad been passedby the Comitia Centuriata. Moreover, it is possiblethat Livy, although he himself may have been unawareof it, givesa coherentand consistentaccount,from both a logical and a chronologicalpoint of view, of the diplomatic exchangesbetween

16

V.M.

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Rome, Rhodes and other powers in the Near East in 172-171. It seems likely that the unnamedembassywhich returnedfrom Asia, havingvisited Eumenesin Aegina, Antiochus in Syria, Ptolemy in Alexandria, and the Rhodians, is the one whosedespatchis related in 19.7-8.87The return of this embassyis related among other reports of diplomatic activity which probably belongto the last months of 172, sinceLivy hasearlier recorded the Senate's decision to recall one of the consuls to Rome to conduct the

elections.88It therefore seemslikely that the missionof Ti. Claudius Nero and M. Decimius left Rome in the early part of 172, returned in the latter part of the year, and made its report to the Senate at the time when the questionof beginningwar with Macedon was being consideredby the Senate.89 The arrival of another embassyfrom Rhodes at the end of consular 172 is perhapsnot as questionableas two recent scholarshave consideredit, sinceit was possiblymotivated by knowledgeof the imminence of a decision to make war on Perseus. 90 Thus there does not seem

to be any justification for questioningor rejectingany oneof the embassies to the East whichare reportedby Livy in thesechapters:eitherall shouldbe acceptedas authentic or all should be rejectedas a consistentannalistic fiction.

As hasbeenseen,it is difficult, if not impossible,to date the return from Greeceof C. Valerius, who brought with him Praxo and Rammius.9• The fact that he brought Praxo, in whose house at Delphi the would-be assassinsof Eumenes had stayed, suggeststhat, since the assassination attempt, there had been a considerablelapse of time for investigation, during which Valerius had beeninformedand had arrangedto bring Praxo to Rome.92However, although the Senate is said to have decidedto take action againstPerseusas a resultof the revelationsof Rammius, it doesnot follow that Valerius' arrival in Rome immediately precededthe Senate's order to equip Sicinius'expedition.93 Having related the Senate'sproblems with the Popillii, Livy returns to the theme of diplomatic exchanges,introducing an account of the reception in Rome of an embassyfrom Carthage with the words eo tempore (23.1). There is a similar lack of chronologicalprecisionin thenoticeof the return sub idern ternpusof a hitherto unmentioned Roman embassyto Macedon (25.1).94 Thus it is virtually impossible to relate these two embassiesto the chronologyof the eventswhich havejust beendiscussed. However, sincethe position of the accountsof theseembassiesseemsto be determined more by the structure of the book and by theme than by chronologicalconsiderations,it is possiblethat the dispute in the Senate betweenthe Carthaginian embassyand Gulussaof Numidia occurredat the time of the regular reception of embassiesat the beginning of the consularyear 172. The authenticityof this Roman embassyto Macedon, which is said to have been sent ad res repetendas... renuntiandarnque

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arnicitiarn(25.1), is questionedby modern scholars.95Despitethe seeming historicityof the namesof the ambassadors,the apparentimpossibilityof relating eventsdescribedin chapter 25 to the other accountsof RomanMacedonian relationsat this time perhapsconfirmsthat this embassyis to be rejectedas an annalisticfiction. For if this embassyand the detailsof its report given in chapter 25 were genuine, one would expect some correspondingreferenceto this missionin the accountof Philippus'meeting with Perseus.Moreover, in the latter accountPerseusis portrayedasbeing anxious to do all he could to avoid war, whereas in the former he is shown

as being far from conciliatory.96 Livy follows his accountof the report of this embassywith a brief notice of the receptionof ambassadors from the Thessaliansand the Aetolians.97 Since Livy usesthe imprecisedeinde, it is likely that he did not know the relative chronology of these embassiesand those previously described. However, since, without using any temporal link, he follows this brief notice with the statement

that the Senate decided

to summon

one of the

consulsback to Rome to conduct the elections,it is possiblethat the two notices derive from the same source and that the two events were close in

time. This would meanthat thesetwo embassiesprobablyarrived in Rome sometimein December 172.Although there is no referencein this annalistic sectionto the despatchof the embassyof Philippus, nevertheless,if, as has been argued above, the decisionto despatchPhilippus was made at the same time as the decisions to summon one of the consuls back to Rome and

to equipSicinius'expedition,it ispossiblethat theThessalianand Aetolian embassiesrelated in chapter 25.14 had some influence on Philippus' subsequent visit to thoseareas,and it is evenpossiblethat theseembassies to Rome may have causedthe Senate to send Philippus to Greece.98 Livy's statement that the Senate summoned one of the consuls to conduct the elections is followed by an account of further diplomatic activity: the reception of embassiesfrom the Issaeans,who complained about the depredationsof Gentiusof Illyria; the despatchof three Roman envoysto Gentius;the return of the Roman ambassadorsfrom Asia; and the arrival of an embassyfrom Rhodes.• Such activity is consistentwith the Senate's decision to despatch a consular force to Macedon by the beginning of the campaigning season in consular 171. Moreover, the embassyto Gentius may also have been connectedwith the impending expeditionof Sicinius,whichwasto secureadvancebasesfor the landingof a consular army in 171.200Before the annalistic account of the arrival of Perseus'ambassadorsper idern ternpus, Livy mentions two further embassies:envoyswere sentto Massinissaand to the Carthaginiansto askfor cavalry and elephants,and to Crete to ask for archers.•0• The location of the accountof thesemissionsseemsto indicatethat they were sentat the beginningof consular 171.

18

V.M. IV.

WARRIOR Conclusion

This surveyof the eventsof 172-171and the attempt to reconstructtheir chronologicalsequenceindicatesthat I•ivy has presentedan elaborately structuredand dramatic account of the eventswhich precededthe departure of the consul P. I•icinius for Macedon--an account which, with the

possibleexception of his use of principio hiemis (44.8), maintainschronological accuracydespite the lack of chronologicalsequence.From a closeexamination of thesevariouschronologicalreferences,it is possible to reconstructa consistentpictureof the eventsof 172-171,which would only involvethe questioningof the referencetoprincipio hiemis;andthis is probably an error causedby I•ivy's earlier referenceto ante hiemem, the terminusante quem for the completion of part of the mission.Moreover, the considerationof all the possiblechronologicalreferencesin the context of the structure of Book 42 has resulted in the presentation of new interpretationsof the processof declaringand beginningwar at thisperiod, and in the possibleresolution of the problem which some scholarshave seenin Philippus' granting of a truce to Perseus.The examination of the account of the electionsfor 171 showsthe manipulation of the electoral systemby the presidingmagistrate C. Popillius in order to securehis brother'sescapefrom justice,and it raisessomeinterestingquestionsabout the trinundinumandprofessioat this time. Book 42, thoughat first sightit is somewhatdauntingto a historian seekingthe chronologicalsequenceof events,illustratesI•ivy's powersof combininghis skillsas a literary artist and as a historian.

Cambridge, Mass.

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APPENDIX

II

Livy 42.27.1-5

In supportof his suggestionthat the date of the musteron 13 February is too late, Rich questionsnot only the numbersof troopsgiven(seebelow, n. 14), but also the authenticity of the notice concerning Serranus: hunc militem qui Brundisi acciperetatque in Macedoniam mitteret, ,4. ,4tilius Serranus,qui priore anno praetor ruerat, deligitur (27.4). He raisesthe questionof what official positionSerranusheld in orderto perform these dutiesand suggests(96 n. 113) that he wasto take (cf. mitteret) the forcesto Macedonia 'presumablyas a legate of Sicinius rather than as a privatus cum imperio'. (On the designationof Macedonia, seenn. 28 and 58.) Rich also rejectsSerranus'ordersas 'demonstrablyfalse',although he doesnot argue this case. The question of Serranus' official position is a minor consideration. However, he had been praetor in 173 and may have had his imperium prorogued. It is more significant that, as praetor in 192, he had been involvedwith M. BaebiusTamphilusin a similartaskof navalpreparations at Brundisiumfor the transportationof forcesto Greece(L. 35.20.9-14, on which seen. 33 and text). Moreover, after completinghis presentassignment, he wasto go on an embassywith Q. Marcius Philippusto Greece.If Livy's assertionthat Philippus'embassyarrived in Greecea few daysafter Sicinius'arrival in Apollonia is correct(37.1), it is possiblethat Serranus, becauseof his previousexperiencein 192,did participatein somecapacity in the preparationof Sicinius'expeditionand that, after the expeditionhad sailed, he went with Philippus to Corcyra. Furthermore, it is likely that Philippusheld imperium (on this, seen. 77 and text). If this is so,it is not impossiblethat Serranushad a similar grant of imperium, especiallysince the ambassadorsdivided between them the troops they had taken to Corcyra (37.1).

On the questionof the sequence of the departureof Siciniusandthat of Philippus,seen. 55 and text. Rich'sargumentfor suggesting that Sicinius left before 13 February is dubious, since 18.2-3 doesnot certainlyderive from Polybius(Rich himselfcitesthe controversyin hisn. 134).Thusthese two sectionscannot be said with certainty to belongto O1. 151.4. Moreover, the referenceto new consulsseemsindicative ofannalistic rather than of Polybian origin. Rich's argument that the news of Flaccus'sonscould not have reachedRome from Illyricum within a month is implausible:a minimum of two weeksis a more likely estimate.

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23

III

Paucispost diebus: L. 42.37.1

Paucispost diebusQ. Marciuset A. Atilius et P. et Ser. CorneliiLentuli et L. Decimius, legati in Graeciammissi, Corcyrampeditum mille secure advexerunt

Kahrstedt (Klio 11 (1911) 415) and Walbank (JRS 31 (1941) 82) reject paucispostdiebusasan indicationof time, arguingthat the troopsreferred to in Perseus'letter to Philippusat Corcyra(priusquamdigrederentura Corcyra, litterae a Perseo adlatae sunt, quibus quaerebatquae causa Romanisaut in Graeciamtraiciendiaut urbesoccupandiesset,37.5; quas [sc. litteras] Corcyram misistœin quibus quaeris quid ita legati cure militibus venerimuset praesidiain singulasurbesdimittamus,40.1) were the 1000 troops with the ambassadors.However, thesepassagesare not conclusive.The referencesto the troops could be either to Sicinius'troops (if we assumethat he had precededPhilippus)or to the 1000troopswith the embassy.Admittedly, there is a possibleproblemin the first personplural venerimus and the referenceto legati (40.1), but since the context is a speech,the evidenceis not decisive.The referenceto the seizingof cities could relate either to Sicinius'force (if we assumethat the transition of sourcesis at 36.8 and paucispost diebus is acceptedas havingtemporal significance)or to the 1000 troops (only on the assumptionthat Perseus had anticipatedthe Roman intentionsregardingthesetroops).The further argumentsof Kahrstedt and Walbank which cite 43.3 and 47.2 (nihil enim satisparatum ad bellurnin praesentiahabebantRomani, non exercitum, non ducem. . . ; nullaparata re, ut omnia opportuna1ocapraeoccupari ante ab eo [sc. Perseo]potuerint quam exercitusin Graeciamtraiceretur) could be ex postfacto Roman propaganda,and, sincethe contextof 47.2 is indirect speechattributed to Philippusand Atilius at the nova sapientia debate,it doesnot constitutedefinite proof. For two differentrefutations (both valid) of Kahrstedt'sarguments,seeRich 96 n. 132 and Marchetti, BCH 100 (1976) 408-416. The latter, in addition to discussingthe relative sequenceof Sicinius'expeditionand Philippus'embassy,analysesin some detail the terms of Perseus'letter to Philippusand the Roman'sreply.

24

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APPENDIX

Seasonal

IV

Notations

Although P6dech'shypothesis(461) that Polybius'Xzr.[zd)•began c. 7 November with the cosmical setting of the Pleiades has been accepted, albeit with qualification, by severalscholars(Briscoe, Historia 26 (1977) 248-250, Derow 351 n. 17, Marchetti, BCH 100 (1976) 401-423, Rich 94), the examinationof the chronologicalreferences in Livy Book42 hasraised doubts about P6dech'shypothesiswhich go beyond mere qualification. Becauseof the questionsthat have emerged and becauseof the general acceptanceof P6dech'shypothesis,it seemsnecessaryto question the assumptionthat Polybius'two seasonsof 'summer'and 'winter' eachbegan at some imprecisepoint within an unspecifiedrange of one fixed date, determinedby the rising and settingof the Pleiades.It should be recalled

that the termXz,•[zoS• wasoriginallyusedin a militarycontextto denotethe non-campaigning seasonascontrastedwith Polybius'otherseason, 0zpet0t or 0•po½,andthat it wasalsoappliedin thecivilsphere,i.e. in thecontextof political assemblies,elections,etc. In the context of ancient warfare, the time of the cessationof the summer campaignswould have dependedon two major factors:(I) whether and when the objectivesof the campaign had been achieved;(2) the weather conditions in a particular autumn. It follows that the beginning of the seasonwould, in actual practice,vary from year to year and that it cannot be equated,evenwithin an approximate range,with any onefixed calendar date determined by the settingof a constellation.It shouldalso be noted that under some circumstanceswithdrawal into winter quarters would have been a gradual process,whereasin other years it would have been a complete,suddenor evenearly withdrawal of forces.It is alsoimportant to recall that, for the yearsunder reviewin this paper, Polybiushimself,even if he had not personallytaken part in a particularcampaign,wasin contact

with men who had taken the field and who would probablyreckontheir activities with reference to their military service in a particular year. Moreover, with the probableexceptionof referencesto politicalassemblies in Rome, those seasonalreferenceswhich Polybius gives are usually in connectionwith military campaigns. An examination from Mauersberger(Polybios-Lexikon) of the occurrencesof 0epet0t and 0•poc.in Polybiusshowsthat, of thirty references, the majority are to military activity, especiallyto the despatchof forcesby sea at the beginningof 'summer'.There is one referenceto an election(5.30.7) and oneto assumptionof officeby Aratus (4.47.3); both relateto the purely civil sphere.There are eight referencesto embassies: sevento foreign

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25

embassiesto Rome, and one to the arrival of a Roman embassyat Ephesus (21.41.6). However, since only one of these six referencesis to the actual receptionof the foreign ambassadorsby the Senate, no clear conclusions can be drawn from this testimonyabout the use of the term 'summer'in a purelycivil sense.Moreover, althoughit wascustomaryfor embassies to be receivedat the beginningof the new consularyear, which would give a possible synchronismwith the Ides of March and a seasonalreference, examinationof the testimonyconcerningthe embassyfrom the Lyciansin 178 (P. 25.4.1, L. 41.6.8-12) and that of the Rhodians in 169(P. 28.2.1, L. 44.14.5) indicates that this practice was not always followed. (See Appendix V and Walbank, HCP 3.279 and 327, for a detailed discussionof thesepassages,where it is shownthat the seasonalreferences,in addition to their individual imprecision,also lack a precisepoint of referenceto the embassiesrelated in that context.) Thus, from the extant occurrencesin

Polybiusof Ozpz•'ot and 0•?0½,thereis no clearpoint of referenceto the Roman civil year that can with certainty be relatedto a specificdate in the Roman

calendar.

Moreover, it is clearly hazardous to attempt to press an equation betweenan eventdenotedby a seasonalreferenceand a specificdate in the Roman calendar:equationsare not possible,and eventhe synchronisms are imprecise and hypothetical. It is conspicuousthat P•dech's brief discussion(461-464) does not fully analyse Polybius' use of seasonal references,sincehe doesnot discussPolybius'useof qualifying adverbsin suchphrasesas •vr rr?6vo5Xsr[z•)vog (32.1.1),•vr xav&Xs•[z•)va(29.23.1; 33.1.1, 12.1), •8•q v•g 0spsta; X•q¾o6(•q; (25.4.1; 28.2.1). Such a fine distinction,however,is probably lost in translationinto Latin. The interpretation of ante hiemem(L. 42.37.3) is of particular importancebecauseit involves a possible approximate synchronismwith the arrival of Cn. Sicinius in Epirus in mid-February 171 (see n. 62 with text). Moreover, with the exceptionof preciseastronomicalsynchronismssuchas thoseof 190 and 168, the possiblesynchronismof ante hiemem with mid-February is probably one of the more precisesynchronisms that can be made,since the presence of Serranus at the despatch of Sicinius' forces, and his subsequentdeparture for Corcyra with Q. Marcius Philippus, probably indicates a date not more than seven to ten days after the scheduled departureof Siciniuson 13 February. However, giveneventhis degreeof accuracy, this synchronismdoes not yield any definite indication of the number of intercalations between 170 and 168. (See n. 62 with text, and Appendix lb.) In examiningthe meaningof hiemsin the contextof Philippus'embassy, the seasonof the mare clausumis probably not relevant either to Sicinius'

expeditionor to the missionof the Lentuli. The former wasnot a major

26

V.M.

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expedition;it merely involvedthe shortdistancebetweenBrundisiumand Apollonia which could, if necessary,have beenmade by a shuttleservice whenever the weather was favourable.

The mission of the Lentuli

involved

evenshorterdistancesfrom port to port and therewasno needto losesight of land. Everyonewho has beento Greeceat the right time will be aware that, throughout most of the winter, regular scheduledservicesin quite small boatsare kept running from the mainland to the variousislandsand that fishingboatsgo out mostof the time. Sinceit isextremelyunlikelythat in antiquity all travel by seawassuspendedduring the winter months,small craft would probably have been available to the Romans in the Adriatic and in westernGreece throughout what we call autumn and winter. (See also E.N. Borza, Ancient Macedonia 2 (1977) 299 f.) Therefore, on the basisof this approximate synchronismand the precise astronomicalsynchronismof 168, it is unlikely that Q. Marcius Philippus and the Lentuli arrived in Corcyra beforethe beginningof November 172 (seen. 63 with text, and Appendix Ib). Thus it is possiblethat the phrase ante hiemem could, on occasion,extend into early December and maybe even to the winter solstice.However, it should be noted that L. 42.37.3 does

not statethat the missionof the Lentuli was actually accomplishedante hiemere: thesewere the instructions,and they may mean not much more than 'as soon as possible, since the winter is closing in and weather conditions

are bound

to deteriorate'.

Thisbriefdiscussion of references to Xz•ta¾andOef•e•0t/O•f•o• indicates that thesetermscan neither be referredto a rangeon either sideof a fixed calendardate nor, strictly speaking,be translatedby the one-wordequivalents 'winter'

or 'summer'.

APPENDIX

V •ø3

P. Marchetti, 'La marchedu calendrierromain et la chronologieh l'6poque de la bataille de Pydna', BCH 100 (1976) 402426

M.'s article aims at proving that the long-acceptedequationbasedon the astronomicalsynchronismof the lunar eclipse,3 September168:21 June 168, is to be rejected.His methodis to setup synchronismsbetweenthe Ides of March and events(related with referenceto a seasonalnotation) which can also be shownto have taken placeat the turn of the Roman civil year. However, sinceeclipseequationsare usually regardedas basicand since they form, as it were, the cornerstonesof any considerationof chronological equivalents in an extrapolated Julian calendar, M.'s arguments

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deserveindividual scrutinyin order to determinewhether he haspresented a watertightcasefor rejectionof the astronomicalsynchronism.The three synchronisms for 178/177, 160/159 and 158/159, whichform the first basis for M.'s hypotheticalrejectionof thetraditional date of the battle of Pydna and which were earlier put forward by Pddech(461-464), have recently beenrejectedby Walbank (HCP ad locc.).Furthermore,the acceptance of M.'s hypothesescallsinto questionthe chronologicalequivalentssetforth by Derow (Phoenix 27 (1973) 345-356), which were basedon the acceptance of the astronomical synchronismsof 190 and 168. (M. makes no referenceto Derow'sarticle.)Therefore,sincethe questionof the validity of M.'s hypothesesis clearlyof paramountimportancenot onlyto studentsof the early secondcentury,but also,becauseof the methodemployed,to the general questionof chronologicalequivalentsin an extrapolatedJulian calendar, it is necessaryto examine M.'s hypothesesindividually. First, however,his argumentsin each instancemust be summarised. M. discusses the referenceof P. 25.4.1 and Livy 41.6.8-12 to the presence of Lycian ambassadors in Rome.104By relatingthe expression?,•z& •r•o•roX•,• to the temporal indication 3•8Y•:• O•p•{cx•XY•¾o6cr•,he considersthat a terminusante quem for the presenceof the ambassadors can be established,sincehe accepts(403 n. 19) P•dech's theory that for Polybiussummerendedat the beginningof November(for a discussionof P6dech'shypothesis,see Appendix IV). However, before examiningthe synchronismof 15 March 177 with the end of October 178, M. discusses what he terms a secondaryproblem:the discrepancies,which he considers more apparentthan real, betweenthe accountsof Polybiusand Livy (404, citing L. XLIII 6.8-12 in error for Book 41). He notesthat Livy, following the annalistictradition, recordsthe arrival of the Lycian embassysubanno 178, whereasPolybiusnotestheir receptionby the Senatesubanno 177. He considersthat Livy has failed to distinguishthe arrival from the reception and that, in the interestsof the economyof writing, he has, in advance, informedthe readerof the resultsof the embassy.M. seesno problemswith the Polybianaccount.He is aware of the questionof the lengthof time that may have elapsedbetweenthe entry into office of the consulsand their •rcoozoXqand heconsiders that therewasprobablyno lessthanone-and-ahalf to two months'delay, which would mean that the Ides of March fell at the earliestin August/September.He thereforesuggests that may refer not to the departureof the consulsbut rather to the allotment of their commands;and he supportsthis suggestionby pointingout that it is unlikelythat the Lycianambassadors would havehad to wait solongafter the Ides of March for their receptionby the Senate.M.'s conclusionisthat 15 March

177 fell at the latest at the end of October

178.

On the basisof the synchronismestablishedby the eclipseof 190and the

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fact that consular 190 is known to have been intercalary, M. calculates (from the equation 15 March 188--20November 189) that, giventhe strict applicationof a four-yearcycleconsistingof a total of 1465days, 15March 177 would have fallen on 20 November 178. However, this date, M. notes, doesnot accordwith the testimonyof P. 25.4. But if, between190and 177, one or two intercalationshad been omitted, the chronologicalequivalent would be either c. 29-30 October or c. 6-7 October

178. He considers that

the hypothesisof the omissionof intercalation better accordswith the testimony of Polybius 25.4. M. briefly discusses two passages, P. 32.1.4 and 10.I. •05In the former passageit is statedthat the Senatedismissedambassadors from Ariarathes while it was not yet winter (•z• r•p6•o• Xz•&•o•) and, after this, when Attalus was presentand the consulshad already taken office, the Senate heard and dismissedchargesagainstAttalus. The secondpassagerelates that Ariarathes waspresentin Rome while it wasstill summerand that then (•6zz 8•), when the consulshad taken office, he occupiedhimself with private interviews. M. interprets these passagesas indicationsthat the consulsof 159 and 157 enteredoffice at the latest by the end of October. Thus he concludes that from

180 to 154 the Ides of March

fell in late

October or maybe even earlier. However, sincethe astronomicalsynchronism of 168 would yield the equation 15 March 168=4January 168 and, allowing for intercalation, it can then be calculatedthat 15 March 159 cannot have been earlier than 10 December

160--a

result which conflicts

with his interpretation of P. 25.4.1--M. considersthat the equation based on the Livian date for the battle of Pydna is erroneousand the calendar reconstructionsbased on the equation 3 September 168=21 June 168 should

be abandoned.

M. then proceedsto examine Livy's testimonyconcerningthe embassy of Q. Marcius Philippus,the departureof Siciniusin 172and the despatch of Cn. Octavius and C. Popillius as legatesto Greecein 170. M. acceptsthe order of events as given by Livy 42.36.6-37.1, that Sicinius' arrival in Greecewasfollowedby that of Philippus.He alsoacceptsLivy'stestimony that Sicinius'forcewasto be at Brundisiumby the Idesof February 171.On the basis of the astronomical synchronismof 168 and allowing for the various possibilitiesof intercalation,he calculatesthat the Ides of March 171 cannot have been earlier than the end of November 172, which would

lead to the conclusionsthat Siciniuscouldnot havelandedin Epirusbefore November and that Philippus' arrival is to be dated in that month at the earliest. These conclusions,he considers,are at variance with the statement

of Livy (P.) that the Lentuli were to completetheir missionante hiemere (37.3). M. rejects(409 and n. 40) the explanationgivenby somemodern historians,most notably Kahrstedt and Walbank, who would resolvethe

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problem of the chronological equivalents raised by ante hiemere by postulatingthat the order of eventsas given by Livy shouldbe reversed, and that it shouldbe assumedthat Philippus left in September,sometime before Sicinius. M. suggeststhat the sequenceof Sicinius' departure followed by that of Philippus,and the consequentproblemof reconciling the referenceto ante hiemere with the Julian equivalentsbased on the astronomicalsynchronismof 168,castfurther doubt on the validity of that synchronism.He therefore considersit necessaryto examine the sources usedby Livy and to analysethe letterfrom Perseusto Philippusat Corcyra and the latter's reply. He discusses Livy 36.8-37.1 in detail and concludesthat Livy changesto Polybiusas a sourceat the wordsiam Cn. Sicinius.... He regardspaucis post diebusasa chronologicalindication which servesasan introduction to the account of Philippus' embassy. The earlier referencesto Sicinius' expedition (18.6 and 27.5) he considersderivedfrom annalisticsources.He then examinesthe details of Perseus'letter and Philippus' responseon meetingPerseus.This discussionis a further refutationof the argumentsof thosemodernhistorianswho seekto reversethe chronologicalsequenceof Sicinius'expedition and Philippus' embassy.M. is aware of the problems presentedby the ancienthistorian'smethodof reportingconversations and of the fact that Philippus was exploiting his meetingwith Perseusin order to reinforce the Roman position. However, his conclusionsare that the complaintsof Perseusin his letter (37.5) refer to the presenceof Siciniusin Greecebefore that of Philippus and that there is no way of justifying the reversalof the sequenceof their arrivals in Greece. His final conclusionis

that Livy's ante hiememand Polybius'x0t-,:& X•[z&,•o•(27.2.12)indicate that the embassyof Philippus lastedfrom October to January/February and that this is another instancewhich indicatesthat the synchronismof 21 June 168=3 September 168 is erroneous. M. next examinesthe testimonyconcerningthe embassyof C. Popillius

and Cn. Octaviusin P. 28.3.1, 5.6, L. 43.17.9 and a decreefrom Argos (BCH 81 (1957) 194-196).•06Polybiusrefersto A. HostiliusMancinus(cos. 170)as&•zmzpSz•¾o•di• x•[ r•p•Xz•&•to,• at the time of the despatchof theembassy,as&•06r•0•-roq at the time of itsreturn,whereasLivy (P.) refers to him asproconsulat the time of the returnand the Argosdecreerefersto the despatchof the ambassadorsby the consul (6rc0•voq)Aulus. M. interpretsthe evidenceof Polybius'useof &vv•rr.p&r.•¾oq asan indication that the Roman civil year had endedat the time of the despatchof the ambassadors, and he considersthat theembassywasdespatched beforethe Achaeanelectionsat thebeginningof November,and probablyevenbefore the entry into office of the new Aetolian strategosaround the autumn equinox. He then concludes that the status of A. Hostilius as

30

V.M.

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dt,'r[a-rp&r•¾oq in Septemberis incompatiblewith the Livian date for the battle of Pydna, since,if one acceptsthe 168 astronomicalsynchronism, this would mean that Hostilius' consulshipwould not have ended until after the beginningof winter or evennot before the end of December.M. considersand rejectsthe possibilityof &,ztt•'r.p•z•yo•beingan error on the part of the excerptor--an hypothesiswhich would suggestthat the change of office had not occurredat the time of the despatchof the ambassadors. M. then proceeds to examine the Argos decree which states that the ambassadorswere sentby the consulAulus. Although Charneux (BCH81 (1957) 194-196)had concludedthat this was clear evidencethat Hostilius was consul at the time of the despatch, M. rejectsthis conclusionand returns to Holleaux's argumentsthat this is a generalusageof the term 6

6rr0•vo••zpo•v•¾6•, citing a referenceto Flamininusin 195 or 194 as •zp0•z•¾6•6rr0•zo•(SIG 3.278). M. pointsout that the word orderof the decree,'r,o•6rr0•zov •rp0•z•¾o3,is contraryto the epigraphicusageof this period; and he suggests that 6rr0•vo•is here usedadjectivallyand doesnot necessarilyindicate that Hostilius was consulat the time of the embassy's despatch. The only source which clearly indicates Hostilius' official positionat the time of the despatchis Polybius.This leadsM. to conclude that the embassywas despatchedin September at the latest, which is a further indication that in 170 the Roman civil year ended in August/ Septeraher. Thus, M. has given five instancesof chronological evidence from Polybiusor from sourcesderivingfrom Polybiuswhich call into question the synchronism21 June 168=3 September168,sincehe hasshownthat the Ides of March fell at the latest in October during the years 180-154, and even in August/September around 168. M. therefore examines the testimony concerning the eclipseand the battle of Pydna (L. 44.37.8; 45.1.6 and 11).1ø7He suggeststhat Livy calculated the date of Pydna a posterJori from accounts given by the annalistsof the arrival of the newsof Pydna during the celebrationof the ludi Roman& and that Livy erroneouslytook the date of the gamesin Augustantimesasthe basisof hiscalculation.Suchan error would account for the date of 4 September,which is out of alignmentwith M.'s interpretation of the chronologicalevidencefor the period 180-154.M. points out that in a number of instancesin the third and fourth decadesof Livy, the Roman gamesare mentionedafter the electionof the magistratesand that three passagesreferringto the gamesof 216, 208 and 197leaveno doubt that the gameswere held at the end of the civil year (L. 23.30.13 and 16; 27.33.6, 35.1; 33.24.3,25.1). Thus M. concludesthat at this time the games were held not in September,but on a variabledate at the end of the civil year. M. thencalculatesthat the victorywasannouncedat thebeginningof

LIVY

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31

July, which would mean that the end of the civil year fell in August/September. This would bring the Livian chronology into alignment with M.'s interpretation of the Polybian indications. Such an interpretation also resolvesthe problems concerningthe date of the embassiesof Philippusin 172/171 and of C. Popilliusand Cn. Octaviusin 170/169. The major result of the article, however, is to propose the rejection of the Livian date of Pydna and of the continuouscelebration (since 366) of the ludi Romani in September. M.'s method of making a synchronismbetweenthe beginningof the Roman civil year on the Ides of March and eventswhich can be related to that date is good in theory; nevertheless,in practice,it doesnot giveprecise results,sincethe seasonalnotationsas given in the extant text of Polybius cover too wide a temporal range to be equated with a specificdate in the Roman calendar(seeAppendix IV). Moreover, evenwithin the context of the Polybian quotationsas we havethem, the relation of a specificeventto the seasonalnotation cannot always be clearly discerned.In addition to thesegeneralbut basicproblems,M.'s five examples,whichhe interpretsas indicationsthat the Ides of March fell in October,dependentirely on the acceptance of P•dech'sassertionthat Polybius'Xz,.•.ob• beganc. 7 November. M. does not examine this hypothesisand merely refers to it in a footnote(403 n. 19). This arbitrary and hypotheticaldatethusbecomesthe basisfor the calculation of all M.'s synchronisms(see Appendix IV for some questionsabout P•dech'shypothesis).M.'s proposedsynchronisms for 178/177, 160/159 and 158/157aretoo smalla selectionfrom a periodof twenty-five yearsto warrant his drawing, as it were on a graph, a straight line connecting three points and then extrapolating it. It also seems extremely unlikely that in Augustantimesthere was no written accountof the date of suchan important battle as Pydna, and that Livy himselfwas forcedto make the elaboratecalculationfrom the date of the receptionin Rome of the newsof the victory, which M. suggests. These, however, are general considerations.It is necessaryto examine M.'s individual arguments.

The basicproblemwith M.'s discussion of theLycianembassy (403-405)

is thattheseasonal notation•8• •:• Ozf•z•.o• X•¾o6o•(P. 25.4.1)doesnot yielda sufficiently precise temporalreference eitherto the0•r•or•zoX/l ofthe consulsor to thereceptionof theLycianambassadors to warrantsettingup a synchronismwith the Ides of March 177. Although M. is awareof the

question of thetimethatmayhaveelapsed between the0•r•o½•:oX/l andthe receptionof theambassadors, heneitheradmitsthelackof precision in the notation•8• 'r•q•Ozf•z•.o• X•¾o6o• nor doesheexaminethe feasibilityof accuratelyrelatingthis phraseto the dtr•o½•:oX/l or to the receptionof the embassy: he acceptsthe excerptedtext withoutquestionand,throughout

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the paper, he tendsto userhetoricrather than to givea detailed,objective examination and proof. Moreover, he fails to take account of all the discrepancies presentedby the testimonyof Polybiusand Livy (he merely regardsthem as'un problbmesecondaire',403) althoughthe problemshad been thoroughly examined by Derow in Phoenix 27 (1973) 350-354. Derow's discussion,even if one does not acceptall of his conclusions,is sufficientto raiseseriousdoubtsabout usingthe Polybiantestimonyasthe basis for any hypothesisabout the dates of the activities of the Lycian embassyand for making a synchronismwith the Ides of March. M.'s suggestion that &rcoazoX•refersto the allocationof the consuls' commandsrather than to their actualdeparturefails to examineeither the usage of the term or the historical context. These points are amply discussed by Derow, who notesthat &rcoa-r. oX• is'an oddwayto referto the profectiones of the consuls of 177' (353 n. 22, with reference to Mauersberger, Polybios-Lexikon). Derow had earlier noted that the acceptanceof summer/autumn 178 as the date of the Lycian embassy(a point which he, unlike M., examinesin detail) raisesa questionabout the identity of the consulsnamed in the Polybian excerpt as Tiberius and Claudius. He plausibly suggeststhat the excerptor may have insertedthe names of the consulsof 177 in error for those of 178. This hypothesisis supportedby hisexaminationof theusageof &rco•zoX•andby thefactthat the consulsof 177 departed from Rome at different times for different provinces,whereasthoseof 178are both known to haveoperatedin Istria (cf. Walbank, HCP 3.277, who seemsunnecessarilycautiousabout accepting Derow's hypothesis).Derow also discusses the problemof the identification of the Agrioi--a questionwhich M. overlooks,but onewhichcasts further doubt on the validity of the excerptas a basisfor hishypothetical reconstruction. Derow suggests(353 n. 24) that, since these people are unlikely to be the Ethiopian Agrioi mentionedby Strabo (16.4.10) and are probably not the Agraei mentioned by Polybius (18.5.8), this term is probably an error introducedby a copyist(seealso Walbank, HCP 3.278279). Thus M., in hiseagerness to make a synchronism,hasnot beencomprehensivein his considerationof the ancienttestimonyand consequentlyhis synchronismcannot be accepted. It should also be noted that Walbank, in

his recentcommentaryon this passage,specificallyrejectsP•dech'ssynchronism of the Ides of March with the end of October and considers that

the Lycian embassywas receivedby the Senate 'about September178' (279). He notes,with referenceto evidencefor 169, that 'to hear envoysin late summer(rather than at the beginningof the consularyear) is unusual, but not unparalleled'. M.'s very brief discussionof P.32.1.4 and 10.1similarlyfailsto take note

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of the problems caused by the lack of temporal precision and by the possibilityof compressionon the part of either Polybiushimself or the excerptor. In P. 32.1.4, it is not clear how much time elapsedbetweenthe dismissalof Ariarathes'envoys•-:.•r•p• zo• Xz•&,•o• and Attalus'presence

in Rome 3]8• z•)¾ 6n0[-:,co¾ ,&½ •px&½ztX•q06,to¾. P•dech'sproposed synchronism of 15March=Eztnp6zo6Xzt•t&¾oq wasquestioned by Briscoe (Historia 26 (1977) 249) and it hasrecentlybeenrejectedby Walbank (HCP 3.519). Sinceit is clear that his phrasecan only be referredto the dismissal of Ariarathes'envoys,M.'s assertion(405) that it showsthat the consulsof 159enteredofficeat the endof October160isunacceptable.If thedateof c. 7 November is acceptedfor the beginningof winter, it follows only that the consulshad not yet enteredoffice shortly before that date. Thus, the sole conclusionthat can be drawn from this passageis that Ariarathes'envoys weredismissedsometimein early November,or perhapslate October.This is another example of ambassadorsbeing receivedby the Senateat a time other than the beginningof the civil year (see Walbank, HCP 3.519, who dates the reception to 'perhaps October-November'). M.'s interpretation of P. 32.10.1 is similarly unacceptable,sincethe

phraseEvt0zpz•0•q o6•

appliesonly to the arrival of Ariarathesin Rome.

Again there is no clear or preciseindication of the possibletime lapse betwen Ariarathes' arrival and the consuls'assumptionof office. The words z6zz 8• are the sole indication of time and do not justify M.'s statement (406), with reference to Ariarathes' arrival: 'les consuls6tant alors dEjhen charge'.Although he doesnot stateit specifically,M. implies that this passageindicatesthat the consulsof 157enteredofficein October 158. However, the Polybian excerpt merely indicates that Ariarathes arrived in Rome probably in October and there is no indication of the precise time at which the consulsentered office. These two passages(P. 32.1.4 and 10.1) were briefly discussedby Derow (Phoenix 27 (1973) 355356), who refuted PEdech'sproposedsynchronisms, and Derow's conclusionsare acceptedby Walbank in hiscommentaryon thesepassages (HCP 3.519). From his misinterpretationof thesethree passages,M. wrongly concludes(406) that during c. 180-154the Ides of March fell in late October, or perhapsearlier, of the previouscalendaryear. However,sucha statement lacksprecision,especiallyasa basisfor further hypotheses.This isthe point at which M. makes the tacit but erroneousassumptionthat any result which is out of alignment with his equation (that 15 March can be synchronizedwith some (vague) point in October or even earlier in the previouscalendaryear) is an indicationthat theastronomicalsynchronism of 168 is at fault. In addition to the falsity of this equation(seeabove), M. fails to enquire whether there could be any other possiblereasonfor the

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WARRIOR

lack of alignmentwith histhreeresults,suchasthe falsityof the assumption of c. ? Novemberasthe beginningof winter (seen. 63, text, and Appendix IV). M. proceedsto questionthe synchronismof 168, sincehe calculates (correctly) that this basiswould lead to the conclusionthat 15 March 159 cannot have been earlier than 10 December--a finding that is in conflict with his interpretationof P. 32.1.4 to excludea date as late as December 160 for the entry into the office of the consulsof 159. M.'s discussionof the testimonyof Livy concerningthe expeditionof Sicinius and the embassyof Q. Marcius Philippus (408-416) is a clear exposition of the problems which have baffled scholarsfor more than seventyyears. He is correct in his statement(409) that the Ides of March 171 cannot have been earlier than the end of November 172, which would

mean that Sicinius'arrival in Greececannothaveprecededthe beginningof November(seeAppendix Ib). However, sincehe assumesthat the Polybian winter began c. 7 November, he finds a problem in reconcilingSicinius' a.rrival before or at the beginningof November with Livy's testimony, deriving from Polybius, that the Lentuli were to completetheir mission ante hiemem. He gives a convincing refutation of the hypothesis of Kahrstedt and Walbank that the sequenceof the arrivals should be reversed,but he then concludesthat, sinceit wasimpossiblefor the Lentuli to have arrived after Sicinius and to have completedtheir missionante hiemem, the basisfor the calculation of the Julian equivalents,i.e. the astronomical synchronismof 168, is at fault. This, however, does not necessarilyfollow; first the question of when winter began should be examined.

If the arbitrary date of c. ? November is disregarded,and calculationis made from the astronomicalsynchronismof 168, there is no problem with Livy's testimony and a synchronismin mid-February: Siciniusand his troopsarrivedsometime in early November,Philippus'embassyfollowed, and• even if the Lentuli weredespatchedas late as the end of November, it would have been possiblefor them to completetheir missionbefore midDecember, or at least by the winter solstice.This reconstructionis a powerful, though not a conclusive,argumentfor acceptingintercalations in 170, 169 and 168 (see n. 62, text, and Appendix lb). Moreover, the plausibilityof this sequenceof eventswhich Livy givesmay be taken as a strongindication that it is P6dech'shypothesisthat is at fault, rather than the astronomicalsynchronism.M., however, does not questionP6dech's assertion;instead, he too readily adds L. 42.37.3 to his three previous examples as another indication that the astronomical synchronismis erroneous(seeAppendix IV for a discussionof the seasonalnotation ante hiemem). In his discussionof the embassyof C. Popillius and Cn. Octavius(416-

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419), M. is again zealousin his attempt to refute testimonythat is not immediatelycompatiblewith that of Polybius,and heisover-relianton the presumedaccuracyof the Polybianexcerptorand/or Polybiushimself.M. assumes throughouthisdiscussion that dt,z,.ozpdtz•¾o• is theequivalentof proconsuland he assertsthis meaning,althoughthe moreusualequivalent is &,06r•roq (see Mauersberger,Polybios-Lexikon s.vv. and Walbank, HCP 3.329). M. acceptsthe argumentsof Charneux and Meloni that the embassydepartedbeforethe Achaeanelections,and probablyalsobefore the entry into office of the new Aetolian strategosaround the autumn

equinox,withoutexaminingor citingtheancienttestimony:hemerelycites the referenceto the modernsourcesin a footnote(n. 57). Furthermore, apparently without realizing it, M. involveshimself in a contradiction of hisearlierassumptionthat winterbeganc. 7 November,whenheconcludes

that0[v-rtt•-rp0t-r•qToq &vx0d. rr0tp0tX•tpt0t•tov refersto September, whichby his earlier argumentsshouldbe regardedas well within summer.The ancient testimony supporting the departure of the ambassadorsin September shouldbe setforth and thoroughlydiscussed beforethe conclusionthat the embassyleft in Septemberis usedasa reasonfor rejectingthe astronomical synchronismof 168.However,examinationof P. 28.3.7-4.1 indicatesthat thereare no firm groundsfor assumingthat Popilliusand Octaviusvisited either Achaea or Aetolia beforethe elections:it is more likely, as Walbank suggests (HCP3.331), that specialmeetingswereconvenedto meetwith the Roman ambassadors.Moreover, although M. merely suggests(417)that the ambassadorswere probably in Aetolia before the elections,neverthelessthis later becomesan acceptedfact in hisarguments,when he seeksto explain the meaning of (3rr0t':, o• in the Argos decreein order to uphold the

authenticityof Polybius' The validity of the use of ci,•-r, tt•-r, pci-r'q¾oq shouldbe carefullyweighed against Livy's testimonyand that of the Argos decree,sinceit could be the work of the excerptor, rather than of Polybiushimself, in an attempt to condensethe detailsof the changeof official positionwhich may havebeen similarto thoserecordedin L. 38.37.l •08M., however,briefly returns(417) to a considerationof P. 28.3. l, although he is not specificin his references or discussion.He arbitrarily dismissesas typical 'hypothEses ingEnieuses' an observationby de Sanctis,who suggestedthat either Polybiuswas not concernedwith the precisemoment at which H0stilius becameproconsul or (alternatively) did not say anything on this point, or that he made a similar statementto Livy's (38.37.1) about Cn. Manlius in the winter of 189/188, which the excerptor has changedto his own, imprecise,words. M., moreover,doescite the Polybian reference(21.40.l) from which Livy 38.37.1probablyderives.It is difficult to seeM.'s purposein quotingfrom de Sanctis,becausePolybius21.40.1 refersto Cn. Manlius Vulso(cos. 189)

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V.M. WARRIOR

as ½zpaz•y6½and makes no mention of the prorogation of his office, whereasthe changeof official positionis preciselythe point of citationof the Livy passage.This testimonyis probablythe bestevidencethat can be cited for suggesting that •¾v•½zpd•yo½(P. 28.3.1) is probablynot the Polybianoriginal(cf. Walbank, HCP 3.329with bibliography,whothinks 'the probabilityis that d¾•p0tv•yo½ stoodin Polybius',but who considersthat title erroneous).M., however,havingdismissed thishypothesis, makesa strongassertionthat Polybiusis unlikely to havebeensocareless, sincehe himselfhad participatedin the eventshe describes. M.'s examinationof the wordingof the decreeof Argos,and hisattempt to refute

Charneux's

thesis that

Hostilius

was consul at the time of the

despatchof the ambassadors,is interestingand ingenious,but it is not conclusiveproof that 6rr0t•o•is usedin a generalsense,nor that Hostilius was proconsul at the time when he despatchedthe ambassadors.M.'s arguments could be accepted as supporting evidence, if he had first successfully establishedhiscase.In short, M.'s discussionof the embassyof Cn. Octaviusand C. Popilliusfailsto examineall thetestimonyobjectively: he begins with a thesis in view and consequentlyis selectivein his presentationof both ancient and modern sources.The testimony of the Argos decreeand of Livy indicatesthat it is more likely that Hostiliuswas still consulwhen he despatchedthe envoys,but wasproconsulby the time of their return. This probability, when compared with the testimonyof

Polybius21.40.1and Livy 38.37.1,stronglysuggests that &¾ztt•zp0t-:,•¾o; is to be rejectedas an error on the part of the excerptor. In his discussion(420-423) of the testimony concerningthe battle of Pydna and the lunar eclipse,M. omits to discussthe statementsof Livy 44.236.1, ternpusanni post circurnacturnsolstitiurnerat, and of Plutarch, Aem. 16.5,0•pou y&p•,• o3p•x q00&•oYzo•, althoughhementionsthelatterin a footnote (n. 69). However, these statementsmust be examined and relatedto the otherchronologicalevidencefor the dateof Pydna,sincethey are essentialfor the acceptanceor rejectionof the astronomicalsynchronism. Moreover, there is a clearconflict of evidence,sinceLivy 44.37.8-10 indicatesthat the eclipsewhich precededthe day of the battle occurredon the night of 21 June, whereasthe summersolsticecanbe calculatedto have occurred on 26 June (seethe table in W. Kubitschek, Grundrissder antiken

Zeitrechnung(1928) 109).The differentdatescanprobablybeexplainedon the grounds that Livy's seasonal reference derives from Polybius (as Walbank, HCP 3.386, suggests),and the date according to the Roman calendaris from annalisticsources.Plutarch'sreferenceto 'waningsummer' is probablyexplicableas an inaccuratetranslationof a lost Polybian

original, such as ?,zv&•X•ou 'r,porr0t½, which Livy has more accurately renderedas post circurnacturnsolstitiurn.However, the discrepancybe-

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37

tween the date of 22 dune and a date after 26 dune requiresfurther examination.The differenceof at leastfour dayscannotbeexplainedasan error of calculation in the observation of the solstice,sinceit is reasonable

to assumethat by the time of Polybiusthe precisedate of the solsticewas predictable.Moreover, sincethe solsticewasa cardinal point in the ancient calendar,as Pliny (NH 18.264)later attests,•09it is likely that the tradition that the battle took placeafter thesolsticeiscorrect,especiallyif the source is Polybius. Therefore, since the battle date of 22 dune is mentioned in conjunctionwith the eclipse,it is likely that this date is to be rejectedas a falsification

which was made in the annalistic

tradition

in the interests of

creatinga fictitious coincidencebetweenthe battle and the eclipse. An Athenian inscription (L. Moretti, Iscrizioni storiche ellenistiche I (1967) 35) only confirmsthat the battle took placein the first part of the summer and does not provide a definitive solution to the conflict in testimony(cf. Walbank, HC? 3.386,who states'that the battlewasfought on 22 duneisconfirmedby an Athenianinscription...'). In thisinscription it is statedthat, on the last day of the archonshipof Eunikos,the Council and the People honoured Kalliphanes,an Athenian citizen, who, having foughtat Pydna,broughtthe newsof the Romanvictoryto Athens.Sinceit is likely that the decreewaspassedat the sametime as,or veryshortlyafter, Kalliphanes' announcement,it is possible to propose a synchronism betweenthe date of the battle as given in Livy and that of the Athenian decree.However, there are problemsin equatingthe Athenian civil year with a precisedate in an extrapolatedJuliancalendar,and theseproblems have been debatedby scholarsover the last twenty years.Two questions create problems in making a synchronism between either the seasonal referencesto Pydna or the precisedate of 22 dune and the referencein the Athenian inscription:when did the Athenian civil year begin, i.e. can Plato'sstatement(Laws 6.767C),•0 that the newyear beganwhen the first new moon after the summer solsticebecamevisible, be applied to the Athenian civil year; and was the Athenian year 170/169 intercalary? On the former question,Bickerman(Chronology of the ancient worm (1968) 37) considersthat a fixed relationshipbetweenthe beginningof the Athenian civil year and the summer solsticemoon is still unproven, whereasPritchett (The Choiseulmarble (1970) 40 n. 6) considersthat a reference to the twelfth month being sacred to Pluto (Laws 8.828D) indicates that Plato's calendar was not identical with the Athenian calen-

dar. However, although in this passagea new name for one of the months of Plato's proposedcalendaris mentioned,it follows neitherthat the new yearreferredto at 767C is not the Athenianyearnor that Plato'sproposed calendarbegan at a different time from that of the Athenian civil year.

Moreover,Plato'suseof the wordsrr$•0%8• z&• &•X0•,•Xot)•

and

38

V.M.

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•pXovv•qis an indicationthat he wasconsidering a civil calendarwhich may have been similar to that of the Athenian civil year, which was reckoned by referenceto an archon. Therefore, in the absenceof any evidenceto thecontrary,it seemsreasonableto assumethat, providedthere was no intercalationin 170/169, the Atheniancivil year 168/167beganat the first visibilityof the first newmoonfollowingthe summersolstice.This would meanthat the lastday of the archonshipof Eunikoswasc. 6 July 168 (seetables in Bickerman, Chronology 125). Meritt acceptsthat the Athenian year beganat the first new moon after the summersolstice,but, in TheAthenian Year(196 l) 219-220,hechanged his earlier opinion(as statedin Hesperia 3 (1934) 19-21and 5 (1936)429430) that thedecreein honourof Kalliphaneswaspassedin earlyJuly, since he calculated, on the basis of the numismatic evidenceof M. Thompson (who positedintercalationsin 171/ 170and 170/169), that the year 168/167 beganwith the new moon that wasfirst visibleon 7 August. Thus hedated the decreeto 6 August and, sincethis date indicatedan interval of more than six weeks between the annalistic date for Pydna and the decree,he consideredthat the seasonaldating given in Livy and Plutarch was to be preferred to the date of 22 June. Pritchett (Marble 66) rejects Meritt's dating of the decree to 6 August, although he does not propose an alternative date. In addition to asserting (64) that 'the dates of Miss Thompson'stwo intercalary years (sc. 171/170 and 170/169) are not... crucial to the argument', he makesthe generalstatement(66) that according to the tables of Dinsmoor and Meritt 'there are at least three, and possiblyfour, new moonsfor the beginningof any Attic year'. However, sincePritchett is apparentlyrelying on hisearlier hypothesis(40 n. 6) that Plato (Laws 767C) is not applicableto the Atheniancalendar,and sincehe doesnot explore the problem of the date of Pydna further, hisconcluding reassertionof his claim that there is no fixed relationship between l Hekatombaion and the summer solsticeremainsunproven. Moreover, he has failed to show that the Athenian year 168/167 did not begin in the month after the summersolstice.Meritt, however,has again changedhis position on the date of the decree:in Historia 26 (1977) 166 and 182 he considersthat the intercalation of 170/169 lacks the numismaticsupport on which his 1961 hypothesishad depended(seeMattingly, Historia 20 (197l) 39 and 46, for a redatingof the coinissueindicatingan intercalation which Miss Thompson had dated to 170/169). Therefore, if Mattingly's redatingof the coin issueis correct,as is now widelyaccepted,and if it isassumedthat Plato, Laws767C,isapplicableto the Athenian archon year, it follows that the decree in honour of Kalliphaneswas passedc. 6 July 168. Unfortunately,this doesnot give an equation with the date of Pydna, but merely a general synchronism.

LIVY

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39

However, this dating of the decree lends some support to the above argument that the seasonalreferenceto Pydna is preferable, since it producesa shorter interval betweenthe battle and the decreethan the date 22 June. Thus the battle of Pydna was probably fought sometime after 26 June and before the end of the first week of July 168. It remainsbriefly to considerM.'s argumentsabout the ludi Romaniand the date of Pydna. It has already been stated that it seemsextremely unlikely that in Augustantimesthere was no record of the date of Pydna per se in the annalisticliteratureand that Livy had to resortto calculating the date by referenceto the recordsof the ludi Romani. M.'s attempt to establishthat in the middle Republic the gameswere regularly held at the end of the civil year is open to seriousquestion. His argument depends primarily on his interpretationof referencesin Livy to the celebrationof the gamesin 216, 208 and 197; he considersthat thesereferencesindicate that in theseyearsthe gameswereheld exitu anni. However, of thesethree instances,only Livy 27.33.6-8isa probableindicationthat thegamesof 208 wereheld at the end of the year. It is possiblethat the gamesof 216 werealso held at this time, sinceone of the aedilesis referred to asconsuldesignatus at the time of the celebrationof the games(L. 23.30.16). However, there is no clear indication of the time at which the games of 197 were held; althoughthe gamesare the last eventmentionedsubanno 197(L. 33.25.1), M.'s argument is dependenton an earlier reference(L. 33.24.3) to events exituferme anni (cf. Wissowa,RKR 2 453 n. 5, who briefly rejected,as a misinterpretationof the evidence,the suggestionthat Livy 23.30and 33.25 indicated that the games of 216 and 197 were held at the end of the civil year). M. then proceedsto arguethat sincein severalother instancesthe account of the holding of the gamesis subsequentto the report of the annual elections,it followsthat the gameswereregularlyheld at the end of the civil year. However, location of the referenceto the celebrationof the games is not necessarilyan indication of the relative time sequence,nor doesthe fact that on one, or possiblytwo, occasionsthe gameswere held exitu anni mean that this was the regularpractice.Thus M.'s entire method in this section is questionable, since his interdependenthypothesesare individually dubious. There is, therefore, no foundation for M.'s suggestion that Livy erroneouslytook the Augustan date of the ludi Romani as the basisfor the calculation of the date of Pydna. Throughout this paper M. tendsto rely excessivelyon the cumulativeeffect of hypotheseswhich have been shown to be individually weak or even indefensible.Thus, until more convincingevidenceis adduced,the eclipse equation 3 September 168=21June 168 should stand.

40

V.M.

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*Throughout this article the conventionof italicizing Julian dateswill be adopted. All datesare BC.The following works will be cited by author'snameor nameand abbreviated title only: Briscoe,J., 'Q. Marcius Philippusand the nova sapientia; JRS 54 (1964) 66-77 Derow, P.S., 'The Roman calendar, 190-168 BC', Phoenix 27 (1973) 345-356 Kahrstedt, U., 'Zum Ausbruch des3ten makedonischenKrieges', Klio 11 (191 l) 415-430

Luce, T.J., Livy. The composition of his history (1977) Meloni, P., Perseoe la fine della monarchia macedone(1953) Nissen, H., Kritische Untersuchungen•iber die Ouellen der vierten undfiinften Dekade des Livius (1863) P6dech, P., œa mdthode historique de Polybe (1964) Rich, J.W., Declaring war in the Roman Republicin theperiod of transmarine expansion (1976) Walbank, F.W., 'A note on the embassyof Q. Marcius Philippus',JRS 31 (1941) 82-93 [=Walbank, JRS] Walbank, F.W., A historical commentary on Polybius III (1979) [:Walbank, HCP] 1. For the structureof Book 42, seeespeciallyNissen243-249, Luce 124-126. Luce hasre-emphasizedthat Livy'saccountof the embassyof Q. Marcius Philippus to Greeceis a flashbackto eventsof late 172, which beginsat 36.8 with the words iam Cn. Sicinius.... He briefly reviewsthe structureof Book 42, but doesnot examine the implicationsof his analysisfor the relativechronologicalsequenceof the events of 172-171. In the first part of Book 42, the dramatic treatment of Eumenes'visit to Rome resultsin the lossof chronologicalsequencein theaccount of the eventsin 172 prior to the Senate'sdecisionto recall one of the consulsto conduct the elections(25.14). This necessitates a flashbackwhich beginsat 18.6. This sectionis further complicatedby Livy'simperfectconflation of hissourcesand the lack of precisechronologicalinformation. Repetition of information, which is sometimesreferred to as a doublet, occursin connectionwith the equippingand despatch of Cn. Sicinius' force to Apollonia (18.2-4, 27.5-7, 36.1-8) and the receptionand dismissalof Perseus'ambassadors (36.1-8, 48.1-3). There isa possible duplication concerningan embassyto Asia and the islandsat 19.7-8, 45.1-7, cf. 26.7-9: see nn. 18, 85, 86 and text.

2. The year 173is reviewedvery briefly (1.1-10.8), the major incidentdescribed beingthe enslavementof the Statellatesby the consulM.. Popillius.Chapters10.928.13 deal with eventsof 172,and 29.1-36.8with eventsat the beginningof consular 171. The flashbackto eventsin Greeceduring 172-171beginsat 36.8 (seen. 52 and text) and ends with the return of Philippus and Serranus and the nova sapientia debateon their embassy(47.12). The flashbackisinterruptedby chapters45 and 46, which describean embassyto Asia and the islands,and Perseus'activitiesafter his meetingwith Philippus.Chapters48.1 to the end of the book relateeventsfrom the dismissalof Perseus'ambassadorsto the conclusionof the first campaigningseason in Greece.This brief summaryindicatesthe artisticallyproportionedstructureof the book.

LIVY

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41

3. SeeAppendixIa for a listof theexamples of thevariouskindsof temporal expressionusedin Book 42. 4. Derow 345-356,usingthe knownastronomical synchronisms of 190and

168astermini(11Quinctilis (consular) 190istheequivalent of 14March190,and3 September 168is theequivalent of 21 June168),Romandatesin Livyandthe triumphalFasti,and the seasonal notations in Polybius, produced a tableof equivalents between thedatesin thepre-Julian calendar andin theextrapolated Juliancalendar.(He madea slighterroroverleapyears:cf. Walbank,HCP vi.) Rich93 hasa goodsummary of theproblemof equivalents, whichhinges onthe number of intercalationsmade between170and 168. He showsthat if, in addition

to theintercalationfor 169(L. 43.11.13),therewereintercalations in 170and 168,

theJulianequivalent of 15March171wouldbe28November-1 December 172;if therewasonlyoneintercalation, it wouldbe21-23December 172whereas, in the case of no intercalation in either 170 or 168, it would be 13-14 January 171 (see

Appendix Ib for thepossible equivalents of otherkeydatesin 172-171). Although Rich(93n. 116)admits thatDerow's hypothesis oftwointercalations inaddition to thatof 169is'certainlythesimplest hypothesis', henotes:'In viewof thescantiness of ourevidence allsuchspeculations mustberegarded ashazardous.' SeeAppendix V for a detailedrefutationof Marchetti'sthesis(BCH 100(1976)401-426) that the astronomicalsynchronism of 168 is to be rejected. 5. L. 42.27.5, 28.4, 35.3 6. L. 42.22.1-8

7. L. 42.30.10-11.On the questionof the authenticityof the conditionalclause• see nn. 37-41

and text.

8. L. 42.35.3-4, 36.1-8. Cf. the repetition, which probably derives from Polybiusas a source,after the flashbackat 48.1 and 5. 9. On Eumenes'visit, Livy (P.) 42.14.l statesthat the detailsof what was said in the curia werekept secretuntil after the war, whenthey leakedout. Cf. App. Mac. I 1.3, who statesthat the Senateactually decidedat this time to make war but kept the decisionsecret.The decisionwas made public after the dismissalof Perseus' ambassadors(Mac. 11.9) On the date of this seen. 50 and text. Although the Senate is saidto have refusedto allot Macedon as a provinceto the consulsof 172because of its anger over their support of M. Popillius (L. 42.10.11-12), this does not necessarilyindicate that the Senate had already decided on war at the end of consular 173. (See Walbank, HCP 300 and cf. below n. 16.) 10. L. 42.18.l: haecad ea quaeab Eumenedelataerantaccessere, quomaturius hostis Perseus iudicaretur ....

11. L. 42.18.2-3:belli administratioad novosconsulesreiectaest:inpraesentia tamen Cn. Siciniumpraetorem.... scriberemilitesplacuit, qui Brundisiumducti primo quoque tempore Apolloniam in Epirum traicerentur ad occupandas maritimas urbes,ubi consulcuiprovincia Macedoniaobvenisset,classemappellere tuto et copiasper commodumexponereposset.Walbank, HCP 300, seesthisnotice asthe 'final decisionfor war', althoughhedoesnot discuss thequestionof whenthe Peoplevoted for war. The above passageis probably, as Rich 97 n. 134 suggests, a combination of Polybian and annalistic sources. 12. L. 42.25.14: senatui, ut scirent quam primurn quibus ducibususura res

42

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publica esset,litteras mitti consulibusplacuit, ut uter eorum possetRomam ad magistratuscreandosveniret..... Cf. 28.1:cui[sc.senatut]primoquoquetempore magistratuscreari, cure tanturn bellurn immineret, e re pub#ca visum erat. By the early second century a trinundinum after the announcement of the date of magisterialelectionshad probably becomecustomary,but wasnot yet obligatory; see A. Astin, Historia 11 (1962) 252-255; D.C. Earl, Historia 14 (1965) 330-332; L.R. Taylor, Roman voting assemblies(1966) 144-145;E.S. Staveley,Greek and Roman votingelections(1972) 144-148.Thereisa furtherproblem,however,on the questionof whethera trinundinum was obligatoryfor theprofessioof a candidate; seenn. 23• 24 and text. On the questionof the possiblelength of the trinundinum, seeA.W. Lintott, CQ 15 (1965) 281-285. 13. L. 42.27.5-6: Cn. Sicinius praetor ut exercitum paratum ad traiciendum haberet, C. Popilio consuliex auctoritate senatusC. Liciniuspraetor scribit ut et legionem secundam... et ex sociis Latini nominis quattuor milia peditum, ducentos equites idibus Februariis Brundisii adesseiuberet. Hac classeet hoc exercitu Cn. Sicinius provinciam Macedoniam obtinere donec successorveniret iussusprorogato in annum imperio.This sectionon the musterisintroducedby the words: belli apparatum non differendurecensuerunt(L. 42.27.1), which connects ratherwith the subjectmatter of chapter18.1-6than with that of chapter26. 14. Rich 96-97citesthe unreliablecontextassupportfor hishypothesis that the time of the mustershouldbe advancedto someunspecifieddate. He considersthat the number of troops is too high. The total number to be assignedto Siciniusis given as 12,000infantry and 600 cavalry in 27.3 and 5, whereasat 36.8 he is saidto be present in Apollonia with 5,000 infantry and 300 cavalry. This probably indicates different sourcesof information, and not--as P.A. Brunt, Italian manpower 225 B.C.-A. D. 14 (1971) 659, suggests--thatthe orderswereonly carriedout in part. The noticeat 36.8 probablyderivesfrom Polybius:on the changeof source at 36.8, seen. 52 and text. Thus, the numbersgiven in 27.3 and 5 are probably an annalisticexaggeration.See further Appendix II and, on Serranus'official position, n. 79 and text.

15. L. 42.27.7:ea omniaquaesenatuscensuitimpigrefacta sunt;27.8:ad omnia praeparata Cn. Siciniuspraetor, paludatus ex urbe profectus, Brundisium venit.

An intervalof six to eightweeksbetweenthe orderand itscompletiongivesample time for travel of the troops from Liguria (27.5) and the notificationfor the preparationof shipsfrom Sicilyand the executionof that order(27.2 and 7). It is also noteworthythat Siciniuswas apparentlystill in office at the time of his departurefrom Romeand that hisimperiumwasprorogued(27.6),whichindicates that this occurred before the end of consular

172.

16. L. 42.26.1-9. This chapterbeginswith a brief referenceto the consuls,which connectswith the previous statementabout the elections,and then turns to the

accountof theembassies with the words:cumMacedonicum bellurnexpectaretur (26.2). Chapter 27 beginswith the words: belli apparatumnon d•fferendum censuerunt.Cf. anotherreferenceto the war, whichis a connectingphrase(18.6: cureMacedonicumbellurnin annumdilatumesset)usedby Livy to transferfrom eventsin late 172(the orderingof Sicinius'expedition)backto eventsin 171,after the praetorshad setout for theirprovinces.Sucha reference to thepostponing of

LIVY

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43

the Macedonian War for a year cannot be taken literally (seen. 9). It is probablyan expostfacto term of referencewhichLivy himselfmayhavecoined.However,if the referenceto deferring the reception of the Rhodian ambassadorsuntil the new consulstook officeis acceptedas authentic(seenn. 19and 90), thisshowsthat Livy is observantof chronologicalsequenceas well as concernedwith thematicunity. 17. L. 42.26.2-7.

18. SeeMRR ! 412-413and Walbank, HCP295, on the possibleidentifications of the ambassadors.

19. L. 42.26.7-9. Briscoe69 n. 33 and E.S. Gruen, CQ 25 (1975) 69 n. 2, reject the whole account of this embassy.However, the referenceto novi consulesis a possibleargument for its essentialauthenticity. 20. L. 42.27.8, 36.8. See also n. 15. 21. L. 42.28.1: exitu prope anni C. Popillius consul Romam redit aliquanto serius quam senatus censuerat, cui primo quoque tempore magistratus creari . . . e

republica visumerat. 28.4:comitiaconsulariain quamedictaerantdiem,antediem duodecimum kal. Martias, sunt habita.

22. L. 42.22.2-7. Note especially:tertio praetor, gratia consulisabsentiset Popiliaefamiliae precibus victus . . . (22.7). It is unfortunatethat M. Popillius' court appearancescannot be preciselydated. They were probably betweenthe Ides of Novemberand C. Popillius' return. 23. On the question of the requirementof the trinundinum, seen. 12. On the questionof theprofessio,seeAstin, Historia 11(1962) 252-255,who, on the basisof the testimony of Livy 39.39.1-14 on the abortive election of 184, and of Cicero, de or. 2.260, on the electionof 179, attemptsto prove that professiowas probably obligatory. Earl, however,Historia 14 (1965) 330-332, refutesAstin'stestimonyon professioand considersthat neither the trinundinum norprofessiowas obligatory at this time. Earl (252) doesnot think that the trinundinum was obligatorybefore 98, and Staveley, Greek and Roman voting elections 145, considersit 'extremely unlikely' that professiotook place beforeelectionday. None of the above scholars discusses the elections for 171.

24. L.38.42.1-2: theseelectionswere also held on 18 February. It is noteworthy that for the elections for 191 and 168 the Senate authorized

the late arrival of the

presidingmagistrateand allowed the date of the electionsto be announcedby a letter from the magistratewho was to preside(L. 35.24.1-3, 44.17.3). There is no suchevidencefor the electionsconductedby C. Popillius. 25. Cf. L. 42.25.14.

26. L. 42.30.10-11:patres. .. centuriatiscomitiisprimo quoquedieferre ad populum consulesiusseruntut quod Perseus... [variouscharges]nisi de ils rebus satisfecisset,bellurn cure eo iniretur. 27. On the questionof a trinundinum beforea war-vote, Rich 29-30 states:'for what it is worth, thereis no hint of any suchdelayin Livy'saccountfor 200, 191and 171.'

28. The designationof Macedonia as a provincewas made in 211 beforewar war formally declared(L. 24.44.5) and wasalsocontemplatedin 172(L. 42.10.1l). Sucha designation,therefore,cannot be regardedas any more than an implication that war with Macedon was being considered.

44

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WARRIOR

29. P. 27.6.3: rc0•X0t• rcpoS•z•X•qq>6zzq 6rc• •,o6rcoXz[zzr¾. See Walbank, HCP 300, who refers this to L. 42.18.2.

30. Diodorus30.1 statesthat the Senatevotedfor war (•½•qq>•.a0t-r,o). App. Mac. 11.9saysthat thesenators broughtthewar intotheopen(z•,• •x6½ou¾). This probablyrefersto the publicationof the secretdecisionmadeafter Eumenes'visit (Mac. 11.3, L. 42.11.1-14.1) at the beginningof consular 172. 31. Rich (92 and n. 111) considersthat Appian and Diodorus derive from Polybius. See also below n. 38. However, the similarity between the speech attributed to Perseus'ambassadorsin Rome (Mac. 11.5-8) and that attributed by Livy to Perseus'himself at the meeting with Philippus at Tempe (42.41.1-42.9), whichwasnotedby Nissen284, indicatesa particularproblemin the attribution of sourceswhere speechesare involved. Cf. n. 68. 32. Rich 22 concludesthat it was the normal practiceto put the war-voteto the Peopleat the beginningof the consularyear. 33. L. 35.20.9-14, 23.5, 24.7. The context of thesechaptersmakes it clearthat thesearrangementswere madewith the possibilityof war with Antiochusin mind. 34.

L. 36.1.7

and 5.

35. On the calendar problems, see n. 4. 36. Rich 22-25 discussesthe beginningof the Syrian War, but he does not exploreit asa precedentfor the beginningof the Third MacedonianWar. However, he mentions(24 n. 19) the possibleearlier precedentimplied by Livy's testimony that M. Valeflus Laevinuswas sentto Macedonia with imperiumpro praetore and a fleet in 201 (L. 31.3.2-6, 5.5). 37. L. 42.30.11, 31.1, 36.6. This last passageis in the context of the indirect speech attributed to the Senate in reply to Perseus' ambassadors.All three referencesmay well be part of a consistentannalisticfiction. 38. Rich 92. However,heconsidersthat Livy may haveomittedtheaccountof a war-vote

at the time of the dismissal

of Perseus' ambassadors

because it was

incompatible with his earlier (annalistic) account. It is not likely, however, that Polybius mentioneda war-vote at the time of the dismissalof Perseus'ambassadors (seen. 30 and text). Rich acceptsthat Appian and Diodorusderivefrom Polybius, but he considersthat the absenceof any mention of sucha vote in the Polybian excerptsis 'not an insuperabledifficulty'. He suggests that if the Senatehad learned of the Tempe agreementbeforethe consulstook office,theyperhapspostponedthe togario for war until the Macedonian embassyhad beenheard. This, however,fails to take into account the testimony of L. 42.36.1 (cum Jam bellurn regi eorum et Macedonibus et senatusdecressetet populus iussisset)and of P. 27.6.2, which would have to be explained as a distortion on the part of the excerptor. 39. L. 42.37.1: paucis post diebus Q. Marcius [and others] ... Corcyram peditum mille secumadvexerunt. Rich 95 acceptswithout questionthe arguments of Kahrstedt 415-430 and Walbank, JRS 82-86, rejectingpaucispost diebus in favour of the explanationthat Philippusleft beforeSicinius.For a refutationof the argumentsof Kahrstedt and Walbank, seen. 52 with text and Appendix III. 40. L. 42.10.11-12, 25.14, 28.1. On the recalcitrant magistrates, see H.H. Scullard, Roman Politics, 220-150 B.C. 2 (1973) 191-202, Briscoe 74. 41. On the alleged Roman lack of preparations,see L. 42.43.3, 47.2.

LIVY BOOK 42

45

42. The indutiae granted to Perseusare referredto six times by Livy: 42.43.2 and 4, 46.10, 47.1, 3 and 10. It was on the strengthof this truce that Perseussent ambassadorsto Rome (42.43.4) and becauseof it that he refrained from intervention in Boeotia(P. 27.5.8:$[&-:,&•0[voX•). Walbank,JRS86 n. 35, pointedout that

indutiaeis Livy'stranslationof Polybius'0•vo7.0tt andconsidered that it wasdifficult to see what other 'words could have been used. He interprets the term as 'a postponementof hostilities'(JRS 86 n. 35 and HCP 290). E. Bikerman, REG 66 (1953) 497, assumessimilar complexitiesand suggests that Livy in his patriotism has mistranslated the term. He writes: 'Tite-Live transforme le r•pit en trove gracieusementaccord•e au roi par le Romain.' However, A. Mauersberger, Polybios-Lexikon(1956) s.v. d,voXat, makesthe meaningperfectlyclear when he givesit as Waffenstillstand.T. Frank, CP 5 (1910) 359, recognizedthe anomaly of granting a truce at a time when war had not been declaredand questionedthe authenticity of Livy's account. 43. L. 42.37.1 on the troops and 39.7 on the hostages.See also nn. 76-80 and text on the likelihood that the ambassadorshad imperium and on the probable impact of the embassy. 44. See n. 26 and text concerning the passingof the war-vote after the new consuls had entered office.

45. See Rich 18-28for a generaldiscussionof the timing of war and 58-64 on the diplomatic preliminariesof war in the middle Republic. 46. L. 31.6.3 on the initial rejection of the war-vote by the People in 200. 47. L. 42.31.1-36.8.This sectionincludesthe speechof Sp. Ligustinuswhichis probably a Livian compositiondesignedto set the scenefor the beginningof the first major war sincethat with Antiochus. 48. L. 42.36.8. It is probablyat this point that Livy changesto Polybiusashis source with the words iam Cn. Sicinius

....

On this see n. 52 and text.

49. Rich 91 does not question the order of Livy's annalistic account. He apparentlyhasfailed to seethe discrepancyconcerningLucretius'departure,since he assertsthat the embassyarrived in Rome after I June. 50. L. 42.36.8, 49.1.

51. L. 42.37.1:paucispost diebus.On the questionof whetherto acceptthis evidence, see n. 52 and text. 52. Nissen 246-250; Meloni 181n. 3; P. Jal, Tite-Live, Histoire romaine, Vol. 31

LivresXLI-XLII (1971) 198n. 9; Rich 95-96 and n. 130:Luce 125, 128-129•put the transitionof sourcesin the middle of section8 of chapter36. However, Walbank, JRS 82-93, following Kahrstedt, consideredthat the changewas at 37.1 at the wordspaucispost diebus. Luce unfortunatelydoesnot examine the chronological implications of putting the changeat 36.8. G.W. Houston, in a recent review of Luce (CP 75 (1980) 75), confusesthe issue. He agreeswith Luce that 42.36.8-9 derives from Polybius rather than an annalistic sourceand he considersthat Sicinius'departureprecededthat of Philippus,but he is 'inclinedto agreewith the historical arguments'of Walbank, JRS and of Briscoe.For a refutation of these arguments,seeAppendix III. 53. P. 27.2.12:o•ot •t•v•0t•-:, 0t8•0trcp0[•0tv-:,•c• •v ':,o•c"EXx•½tx0t-:, &Z•z&v0t...

0•rc•rcXeo¾ e[½-,qv'Pc6F.•v. Rich94-95n. 125acutelypointsoutthatx0t:&ZetF.&v0•

46

V.M.

WARRIOR

qualifies8to•r•po•o•re•rather than the main verb dtr•Er•Xeo,•, but he regardsit as a possibleindication of distortion on the part of the excerptor. 54. The chronologicalequivalentswill be consideredlater, as a possibletestof the validity of the approximatesynchronismbetweenthedeparturesof Siciniusand Philippus:seen. 62 and text. P•dech 461-464 assertsthat for Polybius began around 7 November with the cosmical setting of the Pleiades. P6dech's hypothesisis acceptedby Walbank, HCP 291, but not examinedin connectionwith the chronology of these events. Derow 351 n. 17 acceptsP•dech as 'essentially valid', but cautions against pressingcalendar equations for seasonaldates. See Appendix IV for a detailedexamination of Polybius'use of seasonalnotations. 55. Walbank, JRS 82-93, putting the transition of sourcesat 37.1, dismissed paucis post diebus as a 'loose copula without chronologicalsignificance':he believed that the embassyof Philippus left in Septemberand that it therefore precededthe expedition of Sicinius,becausethe Roman calendarwas, he believed, some three and half months in advance of the seasons at this time. He reaffirms this

without further discussion,but with the addition of a reference to P•dech 461-464,

in HCP 290-291. Walbank's conclusionswere acceptedby Briscoe68. 56. For a discussionof the evidence concerning Serranus' activities, see Appendix II. 57. See n. 46 and text on the proposal of the war-vote to the People at the beginningof the consularyear. 58. The referenceto Macedonia is not to be taken literally. Cf. its useas a provincia, L. 42.10.11, 27.6, and see n. 28. 59. See nn.

76-78

and

text

on the

likelihood

that

the ambassadors

had

imperium.

60. Perseuswas probably well informed about the musterat Brundisium,the impending expedition of Sicinius and the embassyof Philippus. His letter to Corcyra may even have anticipatedPhilippus'arrival. 61. E.g. Frank, CP5 (1910) 359; Walbank, JRS 82-93, HCP 290-291;and, most recently, Luce 123 n. 21. 62. See n. 4 and Appendix Ib on the questionof the three possibleJulian equivalents. Becauseof the short distance involved between Brundisium and Apollonia, it does not seemnecessaryor relevant to considerthe questionof the seasonof the mare clausurnin attemptingto determinewhenSiciniusleft Italy. (See also Appendix IV.) 63. Walbank, JRS 82-93, HCP 290-291; P•dech 462-464. Rich 94 considers that the embassy'crossedto Greeceafter the autumnequinoxand not later than the beginningof November 172'. He does not, however, considerthe approximate synchronismwith Sicinius' expedition. He cites Livy's evidenceconcerningthe envoys'presenceat the suffectelectionsin Aetolia (42.38.1-2) as an indication that the envoys probably did not crossbefore the autumn equinox, since Polybius (4.37.2) atteststhat the regular Aetolian electionswere held at that time. 64. See Appendix IV for a more detailed discussion. 65. P. 27.1.1-2.12; L. 42.38.1-44.8. 66. L. 42.45.1-47.10. 67. See n. 49 and text.

LIVY

BOOK

42

47

68. Walbank, JRS 55 (1965) 2 and Polybe (Entretienssur l'Antiquit• classique 20, 1974) 175,pointsout the similarityof P. 36.9.9and L. 42.47.5. In HCP666, on P. 36.9.9, he statesthat he considersL. 42.47.5 Polybian. However,a referenceto the debatein Diodorus30.7.1 probablyindicatesthat Polybiusgavesomeaccount of a debatein the Senateafter Philippus'return. On the moralizingthemein Livy, seeLuce250-275. On the useof model speechesby the ancient historians,compare Appian'suseof Livy'sspeechof Perseusat Tempeas a modelfor the speechhe attributesto Perseus'ambassadors (L. 42.41.1-42.9--cf. App. Mac. 11.5-8,and see n. 31). 69. Rich 91-95. He is clearlyin favour of this solutionand of the rejectionof

Polybius'&o•rcp•o•vzz•... xo•z&Xzt[z•v0tas a distortionon the part of the excerptor. 70.

P•dech

463.

71. See n. 62 and text.

72. Since Polybius uses two phrases to denote the winter season--x0•z&

X•&v0• (27.2.12) and •'r• x0•'r&Xz•&v0• (24.14.1;29.23.1;33.1, 12.1)--it seems likely that the ambassadorsreturned sometimebefore mid-February at the latest, rather than that they remainedin Greecefor the full extent of the winter. 73. On possiblecalendarequivalents,seeAppendix lb. 74. Rich 97 suggeststhat it is possiblethat the Senateknew of the Tempe agreementby 15 March and that Philippuscouldevenhavereturnedby thisdate. He also tentativelysuggests that, sincePhilippusis saidto havemadehis report in Capitolio (L. 42.47.1), the nova sapientia debate occurredat the time of the inaugurationof the consulsof 171. However, thesehypothesesrest on the hypothesis that Philippus left in September/Octoberand on the rejection of the

approximatesynchronism of the departuresof Siciniusand Philippus. 75.

L. 42.37.1-4.

76. L. 42.38.8.

77. See nn. 13, 57 and text.

78. SeeL. 42.37.5-6, on the letter; 39.7, on the hostages;and n. 42 on the truce. 79. Theseeventsare recordedin P. 27.1-2. Moreover, Livy statesexplicitlythat the Lentuli exhorted the peoplesof the Peloponneseto aid the Romanswith the samegood will and loyalty which they had shownin the war againstPhilip and Antiochus (L. 42.37.7-8). 80. L. 42.47.2: ut omnia opportuna locapraeoccupariante ab eo [sc. Perseo] potuerint quam exercitusin Graeciamtraiceretur.The intention to break up the Leagueisattestedin Philippus'allegedwords,47.3, and directlyin 44.6; cf. P. 27.1.3 and 2.7. Philippus'allegedboastthat he had deceivedPerseusperindutiaset spem pacis (47.1), if acceptedas authentic,is probablya rhetoricalexaggeration.Cf. L. Raditsa,ANRW l 1,583: 'Why did Perseusallow himselfto be fooled?'The above discussionindicatesthat Perseushad no option but to acceptthe proposedtruce and to hopethat the Romanswould not sendout a consularforce in spring171:it was not a questionof beingfooled, but rather of clutchingat straws. 81. Eumenes'embassy:L. 42.11.1-14.1; Perseus'ambassadorswere received postpaucosdies(sc.after Eumenes'reception):14.2-4;the Rhodian embassy:14.69.

48

V.M.

WARRIOR

82. See n. 9 and text.

83. L. 42.14.6-9;App. Mac. 11.3.Gruen,CQ 25(1975)68,doesnotthinkthat Livy givesan accuratereflectionof Rhodianattitudesor Romanpolicytowards Rhodesin 172.He doesnot questionthe inclusionof thisincidentat thispointin Livy'snarrative, although hesomewhat cursorily (p.69n.2)rejects theaccount ofa later embassy(26.9) as 'fabricatedand valueless'. 84. See n. 10 and text.

85. See n. 1 on the flashback at 18.6. L. 42.19.7-8: sed ut in Asia quoque et

insulisexplorataomniaessent,Ti. ClaudiumNerohemM. Decimiumlegatos miserunt. Adire eos Cretam et Rhodum iusserunt,simul renovareamicitiam, simul

speculari,hum sollicitatianimi sociorumab regePerseoessent. 86. L. 42.45.1-8:indelegatiosubidemternpusin Asiamet circuminsulasmissa. Treserantlegati,Ti. Claudius,Sp. Postumius, M. Iunius.... Cf. P. 27.3.1-5,App.

Mac. 11.4.Onthepossible identification of theseambassadors, seeMRR 1412-413 and Walbank, HCP 295. The latter concludes: 'The coincidence in the nameTi. Claudiusmay suggesta tendentiousdoublet.' 87. L. 42.26.7-8:ex Asia qui circasociosregesmissierantredieruntlegati,qui rettuleruntEumenemAeginae,Antiochurnin Syria,PtolemaeumAlexandriaesese

convenisse .... Rhodios fluctuantes et imbutosPerseiconsiliis invenisse. Unfortunately,it is not possible to drawanyconclusions aboutchronological sequence fromthispassage, althoughEumenes isknownto haveremained for treatment in Aeginafor sometime (18.5). However,if the meetingwith Eumenes wasat the beginningof the embassy,it followsthat Nero and Decimiusleft Romesome considerable timeafterthebeginningof theconsularyear.Theymayhavebeenthe ambassadors who congratulated œumenes on his escapefrom death(18.5). 88. L. 42.25.14, and see n. 12.

89. Cf. L. 42.27.1:belli apparatumnon differendumcensuerunt. 90. L. 42.26.9:venerantRhodii legati ad purgandaea quaevolgo iactaride civitate sciebant; ceterum senatum iis non prius dari quam novi consules

magistratum inissentplacuit. This embassyis rejectedwithoutdiscussion by Briscoe69 n. 33andGruen,CQ25(1975)69n. 2. However,asindicatedin n. 19,the referenceto novi consulesis a goodargumentfor its authenticity. 91. L. 42.17.1:sub idem ternpusC. Valerius...• seealso n. 10 and text. 92. L. 42.18.5 recordsan embassysentfrom Rome to Eumenesin Aegina, congratulating him on his escape.Cf. n. 87. 93. L. 42.18.1.

94. L. 42.23.1-24.10:the embassyfrom Carthageconcerninga boundary

dispute withNumidia; 25.1-13: thereturnandreportoftheembassy ofCn.Servilius Caepio,Ap. ClaudiusCenthoand T. AnniusLuscus. 95. It is questioned by Nissen246-247;Kahrstedt421;Walbank,JRS 90 n. 60; Meloni 177-179;Bikerman,REG 66 (1955)506 n. 5. Broughton,MRR I 415 n. 8, seemsto hesitateon thequestion,sinceheconsiders that thegrantingof indutiae

impliesthata formaldeclaration of warhadbeenmade.However, hepresumably considers that Philippusleft in September,sincein connection with Philippus' embassyhe citesKahrstedtand Walbank. 96. As Rich 89-90 points out.

LIVY 97.

BOOK

42

49

L. 42.25.14.

98. Philippus and Serranus were specificallyassignedto visit Thessaly and Aetolia: L. 42.37.4. While they were in Aetolia, a pro-Roman was electedsuffect strategos(38.2), and while they were in Thessaly,a councilof the Thessalianswas held at Larisa (38.6). 99. On the Issaean envoys and the despatch of A. Terentius Varro, C. Plaetoriusand C. Cicereiusto Illyria, seeL. 42.26.2-7,and cf. n. 17with text. On the return of the Roman envoys and the arrival of Rhodian ambassadors,see L. 42.26.7-9, and cf. nn. 19, 90 and text. It shouldalsobe noted that Livy's accountof theseembassiesis introduced by the formulaic phrasecure Macedonicum bellurn expectaretur (26.2), which showsthat he is trying to fabricate a link where none existedin his sources.Cf. similar phrasesat 18.6, 19.3,20.1,27.1. On the useof such phrasesfor connection,seen. 16. 100. L. 42.18.2, 27.6. 101. L. 42.35.6-7.

102. I am most grateful to ProfessorE. Badian for his discussionof the various chronologicalproblemspresentedby the sources,both ancientand modern,and for his detailed and constructive

criticism of an earlier draft. 1 would like to thank Dr.

P.S. Derow for his comments,and also colleagueswho attendeda discussionof the major part of this paper at the meetingof the BostonArea Colloquium in Ancient History at Wheaton College in November 1980. 103. For the convenienceof the reader, nn. 104-110quote the principal source passagesreferred to in Appendix V.

104. P. 25.4.1:V,•'r&

L. 41.6.8-12: aeque miserabilislegatio Lyciorum, qui crudefitatemRhodiorum ... querebantur. . . motus his senatusfitteras Lyciis ad Rhodios dedit....

105. P. 32.1.4:,o•,ou• •kv o•v (sc. Ariarathes'envoys)•[ •,q•

•,• xp6 sou

P. 32.10.1:6 •,[X•bq 'Ap[•pE0•q

106. P. 28.3.1: ASXoq P. 28.5.6:&xqp•v L. 43.17.9:Lar•samad Hostifiumproconsulem--abeo enimmissierant--legati redierunt.

BCH 81 (1957) 183-184, 196; line 5:

(Cn. Octavius) - - - &xo,•X,•q $k xd• xO,,•,u•&q[•,,&] F•[•]ou'½x•[A]•Xou ,05 •,ou

•,p•,•yoU

107. L. 44.37.8: nocte quam pridie nonas Septembresinsecutaest dies, edita hora luna cum defecisset ....

50

V.M.

WARRIOR

L. 45.1.6: ante diem quinturn decimum kalendas Octobres, ludorum Romanorum

secundo die, C. Licinio consuli ...

laureatas litteras reddidisse

dicitur.

L. 45.6.11: tertius decimusdies erat ab eo, quo in Macedonia pugnatum erat. 108. L. 38.37.1: hieme ea qua haec Romae gesta, ad Cn. Manlium consulem primurn, dein pro consule,hibernantemin Asia, legationes. . . conveniebant. 109. solstitiumperagi in octavaparte cancriet viii Kal. Iul. diximus.magnushic anni cardo, magna res mundi. 110. Plato, Laws 6.767 C: krcz•S&• •XX.'q¾•o½ •¾L0turb½ •z'r& Ozt•¾&½ 'rt•or•&½ 'r•

NERO'S

CONSULAR

POLICY

Until AD 62, accordingto Tacitus, relationsbetweenNero and the senate were harmonious.At the beginningof the reign,the emperorhad promised cooperationbetweenprincepsand senate,and he had honoredthat pledge. In his early years,under the guidanceof his advisersSenecaand Burrus, Nero allowed the senatesomesemblanceof independentactivity;various measureswere taken to increasethe dignity of the senatorialorder and its individual members;aboveall, there were no political trials for treason.In 62, however, a changefor the worse began:first, the revival of the rnaiestas law; then, the death of Burrus. As a consequence,Seneca'spower was broken, and Nero ad deterlores inclinabat (Ann. 14.52).• It is in the context of Tacitus' turning-point for the reignthat the change in Nero's consularpolicy, first evident on the consularfasti for 61, has usually been interpreted. Seen in the context of Nero's dependenceon deteriores,that changehasbeenvariouslydescribedasindicativeof Nero's cowardiceand carelessness of forms, as revealing"an active policy of antagonism"towards the patriciate and as evidenceof Nero's debasement of the consulship.2The "crisisof 62", however,is not the correctcontext for understanding the change of consular policy under Nero; a different interpretation of the emperor'spolicy can be advanced.As the following studyof the consularfastifor the reignwill demonstrate, in appointingmen to the consulship,Nero was operating very much in the tradition of his predecessors, and it is to his credit that, unlike them, he rewardedmen of merit even when he was not compelledto do so.3

The consularfasti for the early yearsof Nero's reign confirm what Tacitus tellsus about Nero's concernto establishgoodrelationswith the senatorial order. The nameson thefasti indicatea desireto advertisecooperation with the senateand to emphasizethat suchcooperationwas to include, aboveall, the senatorialaristocracy.The consulesordinarii for the years 55-60 were all sonsof imperial consulars;severalcould boastmembership in the patriciateand in the old, Republicannobilityaswell.4It wasfrom the last group, in fact, that Nero chosethreeof hisfour consularcolleagues:L. Calpurnius Piso in 57, M. Valerius Messalia Corvinus in 58 and Cossus Cornelius

Lentulus

in 60. 5 51

52

JUDITH

R. GINSBURG

The family history of two of Nero's consular colleaguessuggestsyet another design of the consular policy of the early years. Not only L. CalpurniusPiso and CossusCorneliusLentulusbut severalother consuls of 55-60, both ordinarii and suffecti,were men whosefamilieshad (rightly or wrongly) suffered under Nero's predecessors;these men might be expectedto harbor resentmentagainst the dynasty. (1) M. lunius Silanus(suffect54 or 55): his grandfather,C. Iunius Silanus (PIR 2 I 824), cos. 10, had been chargedwith extortion and maiestasand had beenrelegatedto the islandCythnusin 22.6 His father, C. Appius Iunius Silanus (PIR 2 I 822), cos. 28, escapeda charge of maiestasin 32 only to be executedunder Claudius (in 42) on a charge trumped up by Messalina and Narcissus.

(2) Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Gaetulicus(suffect 55): his father, Cn. CorneliusLentulusGaetulicus(PIR 2 C 1390), cos.26, the popular legate of Upper Germany for ten years (30-39) who had, despitehis friendship with Sejanus,managedto remain in the high favor of Tiberius, met his end in 39 as a result of an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow Gaius. (3) P. Clodius Thrasea Paetus (suffect 56): his father-in-law, CaecinaPaetus(PIR 2 C 103), in whosehonor Thraseaassumed his cognomen,had beenparty to Camillus Scribonianus'rebellion againstClaudiusin 42. Caecinaand hiswife,theelderArria, committed

suicide.

(4) P. SulpiciusScriboniusProculusand (5) SulpiciusScriboniusRufus (suffectsbefore 56): they are probably the sons, or adoptive sons, of Scribonius Proculus(PIR S 215), a senatorexecutedin 40 for oppositionto Gaius. 7

(6) L. CalpurniusPiso (cos. ord. 57): Piso's father-in-lawwas M. Licinius CrassusFrugi (PIR 2 L 190) who, togetherwith his wife and son, was executed by Claudius c. 46. (7) CossusCornelius Lentulus (cos. ord. 60): his uncle was Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Gaetulicus,the conspiratoragainstGaius (see no. 2 above). The presenceof these nameson the fasti revealsa concertedeffort to conciliatefavor for the dynastyamong membersof the senatorialopposition. Earlier Claudiushad attemptedto achievethe sameendby betrothing oneof hisdaughtersto a descendant of Augustusand by marryingthe other to a descendantof Pompey.8 To what extentwereBurrusand Senecaaloneresponsiblefor thispolicy? Evidenceof their patronageis clearly discernibleon the consularfastifor the years 55-60.9 In 55 Seneca'selder brother L. Iunius Gallio held the

NERO'S

CONSULAR

POLICY

53

suffectconsulship.A year later Senecahimselfwas suffectconsulalong with M. Trebellius Maximus; he, if not Seneca's own choice, was, like

Burrus,a Narbonensian.Another suffectin the yearof Seneca'sconsulship was L. Duvius Avitus, a novus homo of Burrus' home town, Vasio. More

than likely, he owed his positionas legateof Aquitania, late in Claudius' reign or early in Nero's, to Burrus;in 57 he succeededSeneca'sbrother-inlaw PompeiusPaulinus as legateof Lower Germany.•0 How far the patronageof Senecaand Burrus extendedbeyondfamily and friends,however,is not certain.The tendencyto attributethe advancement of provincialsfrom Spain and Narbonensisto the two advisersof the emperoris an understandableone, but the proceduremay not be legitimate.TMGriffin is quite right to proposethat we look to othersbesides Senecato accountfor the fact that Spaniardsseemto fare particularlywell under Nero; the Spaniard PedaniusSecundus,an early Claudian consul and prefect of the city 56-61, was also an influential man. •2The advancementof provincialsenators,moreover,beganwell beforetheascendancyof Senecaand Burrus, and the emergenceof new adviserslater did not retard this process. •3 Nor shouldwe ignorethe possibilitythat Agrippina influencedthe appointmentof the men whosenamesappear on the consular fasti for the years55-60 or the possibilitythat the recommendationsand patronage of older senators played a role in such decisions.Tacitus explicitlycreditsAgrippinawith four nominationsto politicalpositionsin the year 55 (Ann. 13.22); she may have been responsiblefor the suffect consulships of ThraseaPaetus(56) and SextiusAfricanus(59) as well.14 Among the older senatorswho may havehad the emperor'sear, Pedanius Secundusis not the only prospect.An anecdoterelatedby Tacitusindicates that Nero held P. Memmius Regulusin high regard.• Even granting that Senecaand Burrus, whateverthe limitations of their personalpatronage,were to someextent responsiblefor the formation of overall consularpolicy, brief referenceto the later careersof the consules ordinarii of 55-60 is necessarylestwe misunderstandwhat thefasti imply about Nero's relationshipto the senatorialorder. Of the consulesordinarii of theseyears,two are attestedas proconsulsof Africa and Asia later in the reign. Thesewere "the two provincesof highestdignity in the senatorial career", and they were awarded by lot each year to the two senior consulars.•6The greatestpower, however,lay in the seniorimperial provinces,and the men to govern them were appointed by the emperor himself. It is significant,then, that with the exceptionof L. Antistius Vetus, Nero's colleaguein 55, who enjoyeda brief tenure of lessthan a year as legate of Upper Germany, none of the consulesordinarii in questionis attestedas servinglater as consularlegatein an imperial province.•7By contrast,severalsuffectconsulsof this period are found later in just such positions:

54

JUDITH

R. GINSBURG

A. Ducennius Geminus (PIR 2 D 201): Dalmatia 63-67 •8 T. Curtilius Mancia (PIR 2 C 1605): Upper Germany 56-58 M. Trebellius Maximus (PIR T 234): Britain 63-67 L. Duvius Avitus (PIR 2 D 210): Lower Germany 57-58 P. SulpiciusScriboniusProculus(PIR S 217): Upper Germany 59-67 Sulpicius ScriboniusRufus (PIR S 219): Lower Germany 59-67 •9 The absenceof the consulesordinarii of 55-60 in the consular imperial provincesis in keepingwith the practiceof Nero's predecessors. As Syme has demonstrated,distrust of the old governingclass,already evident under Augustus,persistedunder his successors and led to the exclusionof the nobdesfrom the military provinces.20It is not surprising,then, that Nero, who in the interest of neutralizing and conciliating those traditionally opposed to the principate was prepared to allow patricians, particularlythosefrom the old families,to dominatetheconsularfasti,had no intention of grantingsuchmen a full sharein the administrationof the empire. The policy of conciliationhad its limits. II

After the year 60, the ordinaryconsulshipwasno longerthe preserveof the old nobility and the patriciate.The two consulesordinarii of 61 wereto set the tone for the rest of Nero'sreign:one(P. PetroniusTurpilianus)wasthe son of a Tiberian consul, the other (L. CaesenniusPaetus) was the first novushomo to reachthe ordinaryconsulshipsinceQ. Veraniusin 49. Only one representativeof the old nobility and the patriciate, M. Licinius CrassusFrugi in 64, attainedthe honor of consulordinarius.2•Five sonsof imperial consulsand eight novi hominesround out the register.22

Table

I

Compositionof the Ordinary Consulateunder Nero Republicannobility

New nobility

Novi homines

AD 55-60

4

4

-

AD 61-68

1

6

9

NERO'S

CONSULAR

POLICY

55

Who was responsiblefor the new policy? The change corresponds roughly with the time which Tacitus designatesas the turning-pointin Nero's reign, the year 62, when mors Burri infregit Senecaepotentiam (,'inn. 14.52);indeed,Syme hasadducedthe consularfastiof the years61 and 62 as evidencefor the emergenceof the menwho wereto be powerful influenceson the emperor: the Vitellii and the Flavii. 23 Let us briefly summarizehisargument.In 61 L. PedaniusSecundus,thepraefectusurbi, was murdered; his successorwas T. Flavius Sabinus, the elder brother of

the future emperor. The Flavii owed advancement to the Vitellii. The consulesordinarii of the same year, P. Petronius Turpilianus and L. CaesenniusPaetus,are to be seenas part of the samenexus.The Petronii were allied to the Vitellii through the marriage of A. Vitellius and a Petronia; Caesennius Paetus was the son-in-law of T. Flavius Sabinus. Further, Q. Vibius Crispus(suffectc. 62) and T. ClodiusEpriusMarcellus (suffect62) profited later from the favor of Vespasian. Griffin goes one step further and explicitly associatesthe changein consular policy with the deterioration in Nero's reign. P. Petronius Turpilianus, even though the son of a consul,came late to the consulship himself,as a result,it is argued,of Seneca'senmity for Petronius'relation A. Vitellius. Moreover, Petronius reachedthe consulshipin 61, "a year when the policiesof Nero's early reign were beingreversedin Britain, in Armenia, and at homein thematterof ordinaryconsulships". 24Elsewhere,

the new policy in Armenia is "the work of Nero and deteriores". •5 Other evidence adduced by Griffin, however, leads to a different conclusion,namely that the correspondencebetweenthe changeof policy with regardto the ordinaryconsulshipand Tacitus'schemefor the turningpoint of Nero's reign is illusory. This evidencesuggests that the death of Agrippina, rather than that of Burrus,was the precipitatingfactor in the changeof consularpolicy. In 61 T. Flavius Sabinus,after servingas legate of Moesia from 53 to 60, succeededto the praefecturaurbis;his brother Vespasian,however,eventhoughhe had distinguishedhimselfin Claudius' British campaign and had reached the consulship in 51, remained unemployeduntil hewent out asproconsulof Africa in 61 or 62. Vespasian, it is asserted,wasthe victim of Agrippina'sdispleasure. Otherssufferedthe samefate. Ser. SulpiciusGalba, after a distinguishedcareerunderTiberius, Gaius and Claudius, remained in retirement from 48 until 60 when he was

appointedlegateof HispaniaTarraconensis.The emergenceofTi. Plautius Silvanus Aelianus as legate of Moesia in 60, his first military command since his consulshipin 45, points also to "the baneful influence of Agrippina".26 The changein consularpolicy, the new policy in Britain and Armenia and the emergenceof men whose careershad earlier been retarded by

56

JUDITH

R. GINSBURG

Agrippinaall coincided.The coincidence exposes themethodological error of those who would link Seneca and Burrus or the Vitellii and the Flavii to

the initiation of certain policies,merely becausesuchchangesof policy seem to occur more or less around the time when these people became prominent.In the presentcase,sinceit is in 60, with the appointmentsof Galba and PlautiusSilvanus,that thesechangesin policyare first evident, it cannot have been the Vitellii

and the Flavii who master-minded

them.

The succession of Flavius Sabinusto the praefecturaurbis in 61 and the emergence,still later, of the Vitellii as proconsulsof Africa indicatethat these men were the beneficiaries, rather than the initiators, of the new

policies.27 The new consularpolicy neednot, then, be associatedwith the deteriores at all. To what extent Nero himself,to what extent others(not necessarily excudingSeneca,in the beginning),wereresponsiblefor the new policyis not clear. But we are free now to seewhat emergesfrom a studyof the men who held the ordinary consulshipunder Nero in the yearsfollowing 60 and to do so in the light of the removal of Agrippina in 59. Even with the paucity of evidenceat our disposal(unfortunately, full senatorialcareersare not availablefor all the consulsof this period), it is possibleto delineatewhat factors,otherthan a marriageconnectionwith a Flavius, a Vitellius or a Plautius, recommendeda man for the ordinary consulship.In the yearsafter 60, those whoseloyalty to the dynastyhad neverprovedquestionable,thosewho had servedthe emperorwell, could look to the ordinary consulshipas their reward. Above all, a family noted for friendship, service and loyalty to the

dynasty.Three of the six imperialnobilesto serveasconsules ordinariiin 61-68 came from such families.28The father of P. Petronius Turpilianus (61), P. Petronius, had an active careerunder Tiberius and Gaius (proconsulof Asiafor sixyearsunderTiberius,legateof Syria39-41)and, in his old age, remainedfaithful to Claudius till the end; in the •lpocolocyntosis he is vetus convictor eius, homo Claudiana lingua disertus(14.2). 29Of P.

MemmiusReguluswehavealreadyspoken,asa manheldin highregardby Nero. He died iu 61 after he had servedthree of Nero's predecessors: cos. surf.31 and oneof Tiberius'agentsin Sejanus'demise;legateof Moesia3544; proconsulof Asia c. 47. Tacitusrecordsthat Nero regardedMemmius as a man worthy of the throne and addshis own assessment: auctoritate constantiafama... clarus(•lnn. 14.47).30His son becameconsulin 63. Finally, there is SuetoniusPaulinus, cos.surf. c. 42, who emergedfrom retirement to win military laurels in Britain.3• Among the novi homines, Nero's friend M. Iulius VestinusAtticus (•lnn. 15.68),the consulof 65, was the son of L. Iulius Vestinus,praefectus •legypti 59-62. The father was Claudius'specialfriend, singledout on the Lyon Tablet asequestrisordinis ornamenturn. 3• The consul of 68, P. Galerius Trachalus, related to A.

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Vitellius through the latter's wife Galeria Fundana, was also descended from Seneca'suncle, C. Galerius,praefectusAegypti under Tiberius.33 Military experiencecounted, too. Although we have no record of previous military servicefor the four Neronian consulesordinarii who served later in the reign as consular legatesin imperial provinces,such positionswould not have beenentrustedto men without that experience.34 It would be particularly surprisingif P. Petronius Turpilianus and L. CaesenniusPaetus, men chosen to initiate new policies in Britain and Armenia, had not alreadyseenservicein the provinces.Among the suffect consulsof the period (for someof whom we have more information than for their counterpartsin the ordinaryconsulship)werethreemen who had servedas legati legionurnunder Corbulo: C. Licinius Mucianus (63 or 64), M. Vettius Bolanus (66), L. Verulanus Severus(66 or 67). Mucianus also saw serviceas praetorian legate of Lycia.35Like him, T. Clodius Eprius Marcellus (suffect 62) is attested both as a legatus legionis and as praetorianlegateof Lycia.36The suffectof 66 or 67, M. Annius Afrinus, had servedas praetorianlegateof Galatia underClaudius.37Thesemenin the emperor's service, for that is what their positionsin the imperial provincesimply, would be tied more closelyto the emperor than their counterpartsin strictly senatorialcareers,sincethey were entirely dependent on the emperor for advancement.38 Efficient administrationof a provincemay also haveservedas a recommendation for the consulship.T. Petronius Niger (suffect 62), the same man as the elegantiae arbiter, despite his reputation as a voluptuary (Tacitus says)demonstratedcapacityas governorof Bithynia and later as consul.39Petronius governedBithynia in 60/61 or 61/62. 40The consul ordinarius of 63, L. Verginius Rufus, may have governedBithynia in the sameperiod.41Both succeededM. TarquitiusPriscus,an unsavorycharacter who had earlierbeenexpelledfrom the senate(Ann. 12.59);hisactivities as governor of Bithynia (59/60) resultedin prosecutionand condemnation for extortion (Ann. 14.46). His successors,one of whom is explicitly commendedfor efficient administration, both came to the consulship almost immediatelyafter their servicein Bithynia. III

Nero'spredecessors, from the veryinceptionof the principate,had sought waysof creatinga newrulingclassfreefrom thepretensions andprejudices of the old one and with loyaltiesto the emperorhimself.The effort can be discernedin the numberof novi homineson the consularfasti of earlier reigns,a steadyprogressionfrom Augustusonwards.42The reignof Nero standsas the culminationof this development. Nero, of course,went one stepfurther by awardingnot only the suffect

58

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but the•ordinaryconsulshipto novi homines.Eventhis step,however,was not unprecedented.The last years of Tiberius witnesseda change in the compositionof the consulatenot unlike that under Nero. In the years3237, of the twenty-one men attestedas consuls(excludingthe suffectsof 37 who were appointedafter Tiberius' death), nine were nobilesand twelve novi homines.Of the consulesordinarii, oneof the consularpair for eachof the years35 and 36 was a novushomo, and both ordinary consulsfor 37 were new men. 43

There was, however, an important difference between Nero and his predecessors. Under the latter the risein the number of novi homineson the consularfasti occurredat periods of insecurityand distrust.44The high proportion of novi hominesin Tiberius'lastyears,it hasbeenconvincingly argued, is to be explained in the light of the events of 31. Tiberius, distrustful of his fellow nobilesand determinedto diminish their influence, reactedby advancingmen whoseloyaltieswould be to him personally.45 Under Nero the pattern wasreversed.At first, to conciliateand to procure the cooperation of the disaffected, the claims of the old nobility were advanced.Once the regime was secure,the claims and expectationsof others could be considered.

We shouldnot allow Tacitus'emphasison the year62 asa turning-point in the reignto blind usto what Agrippina'sremovalin 59 meantfor Nero's senseof security.For it was not only that the threat posedby Agrippina herself,who in her desperationfor power had gonesofar asto advancethe claimsof Britannicus(Ann. 13.14), had beeneliminated.DespiteNero's fears,the matricideproducedno immediateopposition.Tacitus'portrait of the emperor enteringthe city as triumphator (14.13) may be both exaggeratedand ironic, but it reflectsthe exhilaration Nero musthavefelt when he discovereda receptionbeyond his wildest expectations.In fact, no major threat to the regimewas to occuruntil the conspiracyof 65.

It is in the context of the securityof Nero's reign after Agrippina's removal, rather than in the allegeddeteriorationafter the death of Burrus, that the changein consularpolicytook place.What motivatedtheemperor and the advisersresponsiblefor the new policy was not cowardice,not a determination to destroy the old order, not a desire to reward friends, howeverundeserving,by grantingthem the consulship(this, I take it, is what McAlindon 46 means when he speaksof Nero's debasementof the consulship),but rather a recognitionthat thosewho had servedthe dynasty well had as gooda claim on the honor of an ordinary consulshipasothers. In order to make as many positionsas possibleavailable,Nero himself, after he had held the consulshipfour times in his first six years, refrained from holding the chief magistracyfrom 61 until the crisisof 68. In openingthe ordinary consulshipto men of merit and provenloyalty,

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regardlessof their birth, Nero was no lessself-servingthan his predecessors,but his solutionto the problem, if not new, was a more honestone. Sincethe time of Augustus,personalloyalty and serviceto thedynastyhad earned novi homines the suffect consulship.By granting such men the greaterhonor of the ordinary consulate,Nero wasat last rewardingthem with the positionto whichtheymusthavelongfelt entitled.Had it not been for the emperor'spersonalfailings, he might have succeededwhere his predecessorshad not.47 Cornell University

Judith R. Ginsburg

60

JUDITH R, GINSBURG

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62

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Appendix II

The Compositionof the Ordinary Consulate under

Nero's

Predecessors

The statisticsfor the reign of Augustusare from P.A. Brunt, "Lex Valeria Cornelia",JRS 51 (1961)75, but here,asin my owncalculations for the periodsof Tiberius,Gaiusand Claudius,I omit consulships heldby membersof the imperial family. The followingabbreviationsare used:RN = RepublicanNobility, NN -New Nobility, NH = Novi Homines.

Augustus

RN

NN

NH

22-6 Bc

20

2-3

8-9

5 BC-AD 5

10

4

AD 6-15 Tiberius AD 16-23 AD 24-31 ^D 32-37

l0 RN 7 7 5

7 NN 4 6 2

Gaius

RN

NN

AD 38-41 Claudius AD 42-54

0 RN 4

2 NN 12

3

1 NH 1 2 5 NH 2 NH 5

NOTES

The following specialabbreviationsare usedthroughout theseNotes: Griffin, Seneca= M.T. Griffin, Seneca:a philosopherin politics (1976) Syme, Tacitus = R. Syme, Tacitus.2 vols. (1958) All dates are AD unless otherwise

indicated.

1. For discussions of the relationshipbetweenNero andthesenateupto 62, see B. Grenzheuser,Kaiser und Senat in der Zeit yon Nero bis Nerva (Diss. Mt•nster, 1964) 24-34; B.H. Warmington, Nero: reality and legend(1969) 34-42; Griffin, Seneca 103-128.

2. Griffin, Seneca 122; M.W. Hoffman Lewis, The officialpriests of Rome under the Julio-Claudians(1955) 165; D. McAlindon, Review of Hoffman Lewis, Latomus 17 (1958) 385. 3. The consularfasti for the reign of Nero are given in Appendix I. For the purposesof thispaper,theconsulsof 54, designatedby Claudius,and the suffectsof 68, who were designatedafter Nero's death, are not includedin the discussion. 4. Throughoutthe text and notes,I usethe classificationand termsemployedin P.A. Brunt, "Lex Valeria Cornelia", JRS 51 (1961) 71-83. Republican nobility refersto families descendedfrom Republicanconsuls;imperial or new nobility, to thosedescended from consulsafter 49 BE.I usethe term novushomoto designatea

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man of non-consulardescent;this categorywill thus comprisenot only men who became the first senatorsof their family but also those from senatorial, even praetorian,familieswhich had not yet attainedthe consulship. Six of the eight consulesordinarii (excluding Nero) of 55-60 are of families belongingto the Republicannobility, the patriciate or both. Republicannobility:P. Cornelius(Lentulus?)Scipio(PIR 2C 1439),L. Calpurnius Piso (PIR 2 C 294), M. Valerius MessaliaCorvinus(PIR V 91), CossusCornelius Lentulus (PIR • C 1382). Patricians:in addition to the foregoing,L. Antistius Vetus (PIR • A 776) and Q. VolusiusSaturninus(PIR V 664). For the familyofC. VipstanusApronianus(PIR V 465), consular since 18, see R. Syme, Some ,4rval Brethren (1980) 35 and "Missing personsIII", Historia 11 (1962) 150-151.On Q. VolusiusSaturninusas a ClaudJanpatrician, seeEck (RE Suppl. XIV, Volusius20). 5. R. Rowland, "Nero's consularcolleagues:a note", ,4J,4H 1 (1976) 190-191, hasarguedthat Nero'sfirst four consularcolleagues werechosennot onlyto foster a goodrelationshipwith the senatebut to advertisethe emperor'spromiseto ruleex ,4ugustipraescripto(Suet. Nero 10): AntistiusVetus (incorrectlyidentifiedas a member of the old nobility) and Valerius Messalia had associationswith the Augustan past in that the namesof their forebearscould be found on the consular fasti for the years31,30 and29 l•C.Unlesswebelieve,however(with Rowland),that a speechdeliveredat the inaugurationof the consulspointedout the link with the past, it is difficult to seehow suchan associationwas to be madeeffective.In any case,as the Editor hasremindedme, the yearsbefore28 l•Cwerehardlythe sortof respectable periodto whichNero and his adviserswould want to lay claim. 6. On the fate of the brothers of this Silanus, seePIR • 1826 and 832 and, with a different stemma,D. McAlindon, "Senatorial oppositionto Claudius and Nero", ,4JP 72 (1956) 119-120. 7. G.E.F. Chilver, ,4 historical commentary on Tacitus' Histories I and H (1979)5, followingGroag(RE IIA, Scribonius25), suggests the brothershada link

through the gens Scriboniawith other opponentsof the dynasty:Camillus Scribonianusand the husbandof Scribonia,Licinius CrassusFrugi, cos.27. 8. See Syme, Tacitus385-386. 9. For what follows,seeSyme, Tacitus591;Warmington,Nero(above, n. 1)4041; Griffin, Seneca 80-92.

10. The date of the consulshipof Seneca'sfriend Caesennius(or Caesonius) Maximus is not certain: seeAppendix I. 11. The procedureis rightly questionedby Griffin, Seneca252-255.It is on the basisof their origin, for example, that Senecanpatronageis proposedfor the suffecti M. Manilius Vopiscus (60) and M. Aponius Saturninus (c. 55): see Warmington, Nero (above, n. 1)41 and Syme, Some/trval Brethren(above, n. 4) 67-68. For a list of Neronian consulsfrom Spain and Narbonensis,seeGriffin, Seneca252 nn. 3 and 4 and Syme, Tacitus786-787. 12. Seneca255. On PedaniusSecundus,seeSyme, Tacitus591 n. 9: heisthe first verifiable SpanishconsulsinceCorneliusBalbus. 13. Syme, Tacitus591-592. 14. For T. SextiusAfricanus,seeGriffin, Seneca99: "T. SextiusAfricanusmay haveowedhis consulshipin 59 to Agrippina"--basedpresumablyon the relation-

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shipbetweenAgrippina and Africanusreportedin Ann. 13.19;for ThraseaPaetus, ibid. 101:his Patavineoriginsand the progressof his son-in-lawHelvidiusPriscus in the last yearsof Claudius suggestthe favor of Agrippina (contra Syme, Tacitus 559 n. 7, who suggestsSenecanpatronagefor Thrasea). 15. Ann. 14.47: oncewhen Nero was gravely ill and the flatterersaround him were sayingthat his death would be the end of the empire, he repliedthat the state still had a resourcein Memmius Regulus. Although Syme questionsthe authenticity of this anecdote(Tacitus 743-744), it nevertheless "atteststhe esteemNero professedfor the sagacityof Memmius Regulus,the consulwho helpedto suppress Seianus"(ibid. 387). On Regulus'career,seeL. Petersen,"P. Memmius Regulus", AArchSlov 28 (1977) 288-291; for his Narbonensianorigin: E. Badian, Foreign clientelae(1958) 317-318; Syme, Tacitus 787. 16. L. Antistius Vetus: proconsul Asiae 64/5, C. Vipstanus ApronJanus: proconsulAfricae 68/9. The quotationis from Syme, Tacitus72. 17. For the length of Antistius Vetus' tenure, seeGriffin, Seneca120 n. 2. 18. For the date of his tenure of Dalmatia: A. Jagenteufel,Die Statthaher der rOmischenProvinz Dalmatia yon Augustus bis Diokletian (1959) 28-29; J.J. Wilkes, Dalmatia (1969) 444. 19. Groag (RE IIA, Scribonius26, 27) assignsProculusto Upper Germany and Rufus to Lower Germany. 20. The Roman revolution (1939) 502-503: "In the first decade of his constitutionalrule, Augustusemployednot a singlenobills amongthe legateswho commandedthe armiesin hisprovincia, and only three men of consularstanding." For the serviceof patricianconsularsin military provincesunderAugustusand his successors, see H.-H. Pistor, Prinzepsund Patriziat in der Zeit yon Augustusbis Cornmodus(Diss. Freiburg 1965) 98-113. 21. The family enteredthe patriciateunder Augustus:Hoffman Lewis, Official priests(above, n. 2) 32 No. 28. 22. Imperial riobiles:C. Memmius Regulus(PIR M 341), C. LaecaniusBassus (PIR 2 L 31), A. LiciniusNerva Silianus(PIR 2L 225), C. SuetoniusPaulinus(seen. 31 below), Fonteius Capito (PIR 2 F 467,468). Novi homines:P. Marius (RE Suppl. XIV, No. 25a), L. Afinius Gallus (PIR 2 A 437), L. VerginiusRufus (PIR V 284), M. lulius VestinusAtticus(PIR 2 1624), C. LucciusTelesinus(PIR 2L 366), L. Iulius Rufus (PIR 21532), P. GaleriusTrachalus (PIR 2 G 30), Ti. Catius AsconiusSilius Italicus (PIR C 474). Of the novi homines, only GaleriusTrachalus,VerginiusRufus and VestinusAtticusare known to be of non-senatorial

families.

23. Some Arval Brethren (above, n. 4) 73-75. See also Tacitus 386, 743; "The enigmaticSospes",JRS 67 (1977)45. For the dateof Vibius Crispus'consulship,see n. 53.

24. Seneca 454. 25. Ibid. 233. 26. Ibid. 241-245.

27. For the dates of the Vitellian proconsulates:ibid. 452-453. As for the consulshipof PetroniusTurpilianus in 61, we may put that down as muchto the influence of the now emergent Ti. Plautius Silvanus Aelianus as to that of the Vitellii. The Plautii, no lessthan the Vitellii, had marriage connectionswith the

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Tiberian consul P. Petronius; the alliance goesback to the time of Augustus:see Syme, Tacitus386 n. 5 and "Domitius Corbulo", JRS 60 (1970) 38. 28. Of the career of C. Laecanius Bassus(PIR 2 L 30), father of the cos. ord. 64 (PIR • L 31), nothing beyondhis praetorshipin 32 and suffectconsulshipin 40 is known. The paternity of A. Licinius Nerva Silianus (cos. ord. 65) and Fonteius Capito (cos.ord. 67) is not certain.The former may be the grandsonof A. Licinius Nerva Silianus (PIR • L 224), cos.7: so Petersen(PIR • L 225) and K.T. Schneider, Zusammensetzungdes r6mischen Senates yon Tiberius his Nero (Diss. Zurich 1942) 139, No. 477; S.J. de Laet, De samenstellingvan den romeinschenSenaat (1941) 195, No. 1450,suggests he is the sonof P. SiliusNerva (PIR S 513), cos.28. As for FonteiusCapito, Groag(PIR • F 467, 468) doubtsthat hecanbe thesonof C. Fonteius Capito (PIR • F 470), cos. 12, since the interval betweentheir two consulshipsseemstoo great. 29. See PIR

P 198.

30. See above, n. 15.

31. I follow A.R. Birley, "The Roman governorsof Britain", Epigraphische Studien4 (1967) 66, and M.T. Griffin, "Nero's recall of SuetoniusPaullinus", SCI 3 (1976/77) 147 n. 41, in differentiatingthe cos.suff. c. 42 from his son,the cos.ord.

66. The factthat thenameof thecos.ord.66 appearsin thefastiwithoutan iteration numbersuggeststhat the consulsof 42 and 66 are to be distinguished: seeMiltner, RE IVA, Suetonius3 (contra:A. Degrassi,I fasti consolaridell'Impero Romano dal 30 avanti Cristo al 613 dopo Cristo (1952) 12, and P.A. 6aliivan, "Some commentson the Fasti for the reign of Nero", CQ n.s. 24 (1974) 292 n. 2). Nero seemsto haveabandonedhispredecessor's policyof grantingiteratedconsulships. For the father, see PIR S 694. 32. See PIR • I 624 and 622.

33. PIR • G 30 and 25. On the marriageconnectionwith Vitellius:Griffin, Seneca 94n.

5.

34. P. PetroniusTurpilianus (61): legate of Britain 61-63 (PIR P 233; Birley, "Roman governors"(above, n. 31) 66); L. CaesenniusPaetus (61): legate of Cappadocia61-62(PIR • C 173);L. VerginiusRufus(63):legateof UpperGermany 67/68 (PIR V 284);FonteiusCapito(67): legateof LowerGermany68 (PIR 2F 467, 468). 35. Vettius Bolanus: PIR V 323, REVIIIA

Vettius 25; Verulanus Severus: PIR

V 288, RE Suppl. XIV Verulanus1; Mucianus:PIR2 L 216, Syme,"The March of Mucianus", Antichthon 11 (1977) 92. 36. PIR • E 84 and K.R. Bradley,"Thecareerof Titus ClodiusEpriusMarcellus, Cos. II ^.D. 74: some possibilities",SO 53 (1978) 171-181. 37. PIR • A 630.

38. For the distinction between "imperial" and "senatorial" careers, see E. Birley'sclassicarticle:"Senatorsin theemperor'sservice",PBA 39 (1953) 197-214. 39. /inn. 16.18.For the identificationof T. PetroniusNiger with the elegantiae arbiter, seeSyme, Tacitus387 n. 6, and K. Rose,"The author of the Satyricon", Latomus 20 (1961) 821-825. 40. D. Magie, Roman rule in Asia Minor, 2 vols.(1950) 1591,puts Petronius' proconsulateafter that of Tarquitius Priscusin 59/60. Since Petronius is now attestedas suffectconsulin 62 (see n. 50), his proconsulatemustfall in 60/61 or 61/62.

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41. See Schuster, RE VIIIA, Verginius 27. 42. Hoffman Lewis, Officialpriests (above, n. 2) 173, providesthe following figures:of the consuls(both ordinary and suffect)attestedunder Augustus,35% were novi homines; under Tiberius, 42%; under Gaius, 50%; under Claudius, 53%; under Nero, 64%.

43. SeeR. Sealey,"The politicalattachmentsof L. AeliusSeianus",Phoenix15 (1961) 110. For the compositionof the ordinaryconsulshipunderNero'spredecessors, seeAppendix II. 44. For the pheomenonunderAugustus,seeSyme,Roman revolution(above, n. 20) 372-373. Brunt, however, "Lex Valeria Cornelia" (above, n. 4), attributes the high proportionof novi homineswho held the ordinaryconsulshipin 23-17 BCto lesscompetitionfrom the nobiles. 45. See Sealey,"Political attachments"111, and H.W. Bird, "L. Aelius Seianus and his political significance",Latomus 28 (1969) 97-98. 46. See above, n. 2.

47. I am most grateful to ProfessorE. Badian and the anonymousrefereesfor their generousand helpful commentson an earlier draft of this article. 48. The following works are cited by author's name in nn. 49-56: Bosworth = A.D. Bosworth, "Vespasianand the provinces:someproblems of the early 70's A.D.", Athenaeum 51 (1973) 49-78 Eck (1) = W. Eck, "Erg•inzungenzu den Fasti Consularesdes I. u. 2. Jh. Eck(2)

n. Chr.", Historia 24 (1975) 324-344 --W. Eck, "Miscellanea Prosopographica", ZPE 42 (1981) 227-256

Gallivan = P.A. Gallivan, "Some commentson the Fasti for the reign of Nero", CQ n.s. 24 (1974) 290-311. 49. The full name of the consul ordinarius of 62 is P. Marius P.f., not P. Marius

Celsusas it is usuallygiven.SeeG.W. Houston,"P. Marius P.f., cos.ord. A.D.62", ZPE 16 (1975) 33-35. 50. For the evidencedating the consularpair Q. Manlius Tarquitius Saturninus and T. Petronius Niger to the year 62, seeEck (2) 227-228. In the Fasti above I follow Eck's reconstructionof the lengthsof tenure of the consularpairs in this year.

51. Gallivan (305-306) thinks a Claudian date is more likely than a Neronian one. So, too, J. D'Arms, "Tacitus, Histories 4.13 and the municipal origins of Hordeonius Flaccus", Historia 23 (1974) 502 n. 25. 52. Gallivan (308) dates the consulshipbetween63 and 66. This reckoning is basedon a date of c. 73/4 for Aponius Saturninus'proconsulateof Asia. R. Syme, Some Arval Brethren (above, n. 4) 68-69, arguesconvincinglyfor 67/8 as the date of the proconsulate,c. 55 as that for the consulship. 53. His full name is know known as L. Iunius Vibius Crispus:AE 1968, 6. Bosworth (70-73) arguespersuasivelyfor a Neronian, rather than a Vespasianic, datefor Crispus'proconsulship of Africa and suggests, thus,a consulship in the50s. Sincethe listsfor 56-59 are complete,the consulshipmust be before56. Others:'63 or 64' (Gallivan 306-307), 'before 56 or 61' (Eck (1) 343-344), 'c. 61' (U. VogelWeidemann, "Q. Vibius Crispus Proconsul, Eine Notiz zu Plin. Nat. Hist. 19.4", AC 18 (1975) 149-153). Syme's 'c. 62' (Tacitus 387 n. 6), once rejected on the groundsthat therewasno room for Crispusin that year, is no longerimpossiblein

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the most recent reconstructionof the consulsof 62 and their dates of tenure (see above, n. 50). 54. For the date, seeEck (2) 228-229. 55. Gallivan (302-303, 305) and Eck (1) (336-337) assignedthe suffectpair C.

LiciniusMucianusand Q. FabiusBarbarusAntoniusMacer to 64 on the assumption that the pair Q. Manlius TarquitiusSaturninusand T. PetroniusNiger already occupied63. Sincethe latter pair is now attestedfor 62, the former couldbelongto either 63 or 64.

56. Both suffect pairs fit equally well under 66 and 67, despite Gallivan's assignation(303,304-305) of AppiusAnniusGallusand L. VerulanusSeverusto 66 and of M. Annius Afrinus

and C. Paccius Africanus

to 67.

REVIEW-DISCUSSION:

FOUR OF PHILIP

INTERPRETATIONS II

J.R. Ellis, Philip H and Macedonian Imperialism. Thamesand Hudson, London

1976

GeorgeCawkwe!l,Philip of Macedon. Faber and Faber, London/Boston 1978

G.T. Griffith, in N.G.L. Hammond and G.T. Griffith, A History of Macedonia, vol. 2. Oxford University Press, Oxford 1979 Miltiades B. Hatzopoulos and Louisa D. Loukopoulos(edd.), Philip of Macedon. Ekdotike Athenon S.S., Athens 1980

It is a remarkableexample of academicanti-cyclicalactivity that within five years no less than four books about Philip I! of Macedonia have appeared,after more than a generationwithout one. Moreover, only oneis a productof the growth of internationalinterestin Philip stimulatedby the magnificent Macedonian tombs found by Manolis Andronikos at Verghina: three were independentlyconceivedand written before the new finds were made. The shortestis George Cawkwell's. Cawkwell usesjust over two hundred pages (including notes) to present his lively account. J.R. Ellis usesthree hundred pagesfor a similarlystructuredwork (though Re has an advantageover Cawkwell in that his publisherhasallowed him more notesthan Cawkwell's:Cawkwell givesonly the sourcesand discusses no modern work at all). In both casesthe notesare printed at the back of the book. Thesemonographsseemof very modestproportionswhencompared with G.T. Griffith's account of Philip.l Here some470 pageswith copiousfootnotes(this time doingjustice to the name by beingprinted at the foot of the page)are requiredto presentthe author'sviews.The fourth volumeisa differentkind of book. It comprisesa seriesof thirteenessaysby ten well-known scholars(including Cawkwell, Ellis and Griffith), written for the general public after the mostrecentfinds at Verghina. I am surethat the contributors

will not be offended when I maintain

that the interest and

usefulnessof the text of the volumeis outweighedby the fine collectionof excellentcoloured photographswhich illustrate the text. One point of contrast is immediately clear. A book the chief function of whichis to introduceto a wide public someof the magnificentmonuments of Macedonia and to provide a respectabletext to put them into their 69

70

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historicalcontexthasan inevitableadvantagewhenwe comparethe four booksfrom the point of view of modernillustrativetechniques.But even hereweaknesses are present.I am concernedin thefirst instancewith maps, sincethe useof mapsis the only area wherea legitimatecomparisoncanbe made.2 Each of the books prints some maps, which suggeststhat the authorsare aware of their importanceand haveconvincedtheir publishers of it. This is correct, since in the three 'academic' books the narrative and

discussion havea greatdealto do with thedetailsof areasand placeswhich will not be immediately familiar to every reader. It should therefore be possibleto understandthe narrative from the mapsprinted in the books (why else are they there?)without having to rush off to an atlas (which merelyraisesanotherproblem!).This is perhapsregularlypossibleonly in one case,that of Cawkwell. We are constantlybeingtold about the critical importanceof mountainsand passes,but it is rare that theseare adequately drawn. In Ellis, for instance,not only are no mountainsadequatelyindicated,but eventhe seais not alwaysclearlydistinguishablefrom the land: here the maps are quite inadequate.But at least someattempt has been made and the sketches,for what they are worth, include Thessalyand Central Greece(though the useof the sketchesis hinderedby the lack of a list of maps);missingis Thrace, despiteits major importancein the text, exceptfor a two-pagespread(22-3) whichincludesthewholeof Greeceand WesternAsia Minor: why the latter is includedwhenthefew Asiaticplaces which are mentionedin the text--Sardis, Ephesos,Magnesia,Atarneus, Assos,etc.--are not evenindicatedleavesthe reviewerboggling. Whetherthisis betterthan no detailedmap at all, the readermaydecide who takes Griffith in the hand. The volumehasas endpapersa coloured map 1:1.500.000of Northern Greece,which is fine as far as it goes.But it doesnot go far enough.It is a masterpieceof compression, but for detailed work far too small. It raises hopes, however, which are quickly disappointed when we discoverthat to illustrate470 pagesof detaileddiscussion of Philip's activities two maps (one a two-page spread, without contouring, of the Aegeanbasinand the Balkans,the other of the battle of Chaeronea)are deemedadequate.By comparisonCawkwell is refreshing. The simple line drawings are, with two exceptions,reasonablyclear. Particularly helpful are the maps of Thrace (70) and of Central Greece (139), both of which indicate schematicallythe main physical features which play a part in the narrative. Hatzopoulos-Loukopoulos also have three nicelydrawn maps:a usefulcolouredmap of the Macedonianheartland and two schematicmapsto illustrateMacedoniaunder AlexanderI and in 336. It is, however, regrettablethat there are not more--and more detailed--maps and (more serious)that not all the place-nameswhich occurin the text are indicatedon the maps.This is particularlynoticeable

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in the essayson 'Philip and Macedonia's Northern Neighbouts' by Harry J. Dell and on 'Philip and the AmphictyonicLeague'by George Cawkwell. In view of the wide public at which the book aims and the relative unfamiliarity of this public with many of the areasand peoples which are described,this can only be regardedas a seriousfailing. The three 'academic'

books are different

in kind from the volume edited

by Hatzopoulos-Loukopoulos,and not merelyin their lack of illustration. Hatzopoulos-Loukopoulosgive as their modestaim, to present'to the public the latest verdicts of scholarshipon the history of Philip, son of Amyntas, king of the Macedonians',an aim in which they have largely succeeded.The book consistsof thirteenessays('chapters')by ten scholars, each of whom was invited to expresshis own views. The editing and planningis on the wholegood.The editorsclaim that 'everyattempthas beenmade... to guard againstthe dangersof contradictionsand overlap and to ensurethat no significantaspectof the historyof Philip hasbeenleft untreated'.Despitethis, overlapsinevitablyoccurand with themdivergent interpretations.This is particularly apparent in the chaptersby George Cawkwell on 'Philip and Athens' and by M.B. Sakellariou on 'Philip and the Southern Greeks', and occurs elsewhere also; but on the whole such

overlaps are unimportant. The contributions vary in scope, originality and documentation. The openingessayof the volume is an abbreviatedrevisionof a well-known article by Charles Edson on 'Early Macedonia' with extensivefootnotes (buit without consideringHammond-Griffith, on which Edson'sviews would have been interesting);Harry Dell's useful essayon 'Philip and Macedonia'sNorthern Neighhours',on the other hand, is in thisform new, thoughit offersno footnotesat all (wherethey would be very helpful), but is satisfiedwith a list of books and articles. Here the editors might have made more use of their editorial authority to achieve some kind of uniformity. N.G.L. Hammond offersan oddlygullibleaccountof thedeath

of Philip, in whichhiseccentricview of the natureof the Macedonianstate as an orderedconstitutionalmonarchyleadshim to acceptthe truth of the 'official version' of the murder, which he calls'the findings of the Macedonian assembly'(for my viewson the Macedonianstateand somecriticismof Hammond's seeChiron 8 (1978); CR n.s.30(1980)). This versionheld that the murderer Pausanias was in league with the sons of Aeropos, that Attalos was involved, and that 'quite separatelythey found Amyntas, son of Perdikkas II and probably othersunnamedin our sourcesguilty of conspiringagainstAlexander.They carriedout the unwrittenlaw that the family of thoseguilty of treasonwereexecuted,thusincludingKleopatra and her infant child'. These'findings',we are told, 'have the first claim on our credence';which is more than one can say of Hammond's essay.

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It is useful to have a summary statementby GeorgesLe Rider of his revolutionaryviewson Philip'sgold and silvercoinagein 'The Coinageof Philip and the Pangaion Mines', and the accountby Manolis Andronikos of his well-publicised,but not unchallenged,interpretationof his findsat Verghina in 'The Royal Tombs at Aigai (Verghina)'. (Seenow L. Adams in The Ancient World 3 (1980) 67 if. and A.M. PrestianniGiallombardo and B. Tripodi, ASNP 3 10 (1980) 989 if., for reasonablestatementsof an alternativeview.) The remainingessayscompetentlycovercentralground, where some overlapping is inevitable: J.R. Ellis on 'The Unification of Macedonia' and 'Macedonia under Philip', GeorgeCawkwell on 'Philip and the AmphictyonicLeague'and 'Philip and Athens',M.B. Sakellariou on 'Philip and the Southern Greeks' and (rather long-windedly)'Panhellenism: from Concept to Policy'. Only Pierre L•vEque on 'Philip's Personality' coversa subjectwhere the material hardly sufficesfor an independentessay.This has led him to offer a brief r•sum• of Philip's achievements,much of which is containedin other essays,and he endsby confessingthat Philip's personalityis in itself no adequatesubjectfor the historian:'In fact, the real problem for the historian is a much greater one than simplythat of Philip'spersonality.It is the problemof the newbalance of power that wasintroducedasa resultof the newlyacquireddynamismof Macedonia and the disintegrationof the poleis.' It is a pity that L•v•que was not giventhe opportunityof sketchingthis structuralproblem,which would have satisfied him and the reader more than his present contribution.

The book of Hatzopoulos-Loukopoulos cannotbe directlycompared with the other three books, on which I shall concentrate in what follows

and each of which is a scholarlycontribution to the developmentof thinking about the periodof Philip. I havetried, however,to indicatethat it is a seriousand largelysuccessful attemptto presentMacedoniaandabove all Philip II to a wide public, whoseinteresthas beenstimulatedby the recentarchaeological discoveries. Anyonerequiringa readableintroduction to the main problemssurroundingPhilip coulddo very muchworse than read this book. The text is complemented by a seriesof excellently reproducedphotographs--oneof the book'smain strengthsand oneof its aims--and hereonemaybegratefulto theeditorsfor makingavailableto a wide public not only individual objects,includinga selectionof the contentsof theVerghinatombs,butalsoa seriesof landscape photographs, whichdo morethan manya pageof finelyformulatedgeographical prose to conveythe nature of the country in which Philip and his Macedonians lived and achieved.

Beforegoinginto detailaboutthe otherthreebooksit is perhapsworth while pointingout an odd featureof two of them. Cawkwell,and to a lesser

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but still appreciableextentEllis, thoughwritingbooksaboutMacedonia, give us an excessivelylarge quantity of detail about Athenian internal history. Now it is true that our main sourcesfor the 340s are largely Athenian--Demosthenes and other speechesand documents in the Demostheniccorpus,Aeschinesand Isocrates--whichmakessomediscussion unavoidable;but is it really necessaryin booksabout Philip to discuss in detail the Athenian politics which led up to the Peaceof Philocrates,the whole political atmospherein Athens in the 340s, including the trials of Philocratesand Aeschines,which contribute only marginally to our understandingof what Philip was doing and why? My point hereis notjust that materialonlymarginallyrelevanthasbeen included.It is more serious:that the largely Athenian sourcesseemto have led Cawkwell and Ellis--even when their assessments of (e.g.) Demosthenesand his effectivenessare distinctly non-traditional--into inflating the importanceof Athens.While consciouslytrying to avoid Demosthenes' hostilebias, they nevertheless seemat timesto fall into the trap of at least partially acceptingthe central role for Athens in the development,which Demosthenesclaimedfor her. Griffith and Hatzopoulos-Loukopoulos,by resistingthe temptation to relate everythingAthenian 'becauseit is there', have largely avoided this dangerand neverlosesightof their Macedonian viewpoint. If I detectsomeAthenian overemphasisin two of the books,thisdoesnot mean that I wish to deny that Athenshad a certainimportancefor Philip. How importanteachof our authorsassesses thisrelationshipto be iseasiest to discussin connectionwith a concretedetail: a centralpoint, the alliance (symmachia) between Athens and Philip in 346) The sourcestell us nothing about why the alliance was made. Only one indication of its contentis preserved,that the partnerssworeto help each other in caseof attack by a third party.4 Essentialpre-condition for sucha clausewas an undertaking not to attack each other or each other'spossessions, which is in effect subsumedunder the general clauseof the peacegoverningthe mutual recognitionof the possessions of each party at the time of the swearing of the oaths. How, then, do our authors seethis defensive alliance? Griffith is here, as

often, the most modest.He doesnot evendirectlyask the questionof the purposeof the alliance, although he interpretsan ambiguouspassageof Aeschines,in the usual way, as meaning that on 19th Elaphebolion, 346, Antipater 'made it clear that peacewithout alliancewasnot acceptableto Philip'.5 This meansthat Griffith thinks that the alliance must have been very important to Philip. Griffith however is then content, with our sources,merely to record the fact as he seesit and not to speculateabout intentions.Ellis hasat leasttheadvantagethat heasksthe question,though his answer,a re-hashof Markle's complicatedand implausiblehypothesis

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of Philip's employing a double strategy against Thebes during these negotiations, is no more convincing in Ellis' developed form than in Markle's original.6 Ellis assumesthat 'what did constitutea most serious threat to Macedonia was the possibilityof a combinationof both Athens and Thebes',which 'in the negotiations... and in the Peaceof Philokrates itself ... is clearly the foremostfactor' (101). He seemsto envisagethis threat in purely military terms, in what he describesas 'a combined Athenian/Theban assaulton Macedonia'(126). Having onceconjuredup this 'most seriousthreat', Ellis, following Markle, goeson to argue that Philip thereforeneededalliance with Athens so that he could afford to offendand weakenThebes,whichwashisrealaim all along;and onlywhen the Atheniansdid not sendtroopsto Thermopylaein Skirophorion346did Philip give up this plan (Markle's 'Plan A') and carry through the settlement which we know. History without fantasyis indeeddull stuff,but this kind of Glasperlenspiel is better left to the conjurors.The recenthistoryof relationsbetweenThebesand Athens during the SacredWar and the fact that evenin thecrisisof 339 Demostheneswasonly ableto persuadeThebes to resist Philip by making enormous Athenian concessionsshould be enoughto breachthis myth of Philip'sperceivingthe possiblethreat of'a combined Athenian/Theban assaulton Macedonia' in 347 when, it seems, he first mentioned

the alliance. ?

Cawkwell also rightly finds no joy in Markle's theory. He draws attention to the importanceof the Thessaliansin Philip'sdecision-making about central Greeceand to the 'absurdity... that Philip with the Macedonians and Thessaliansunder his command needed Athenian help to defeatthe Thebans'.8His ownview howeverhasequallylittle supportin the sources.To the question why Philip wanted alliance Cawkwell writes: 'There can be only one answer.Philip wantedalliancewith Athensbecause he had already decidedto attack Persia. For that the Athenian navy was indispensable' (111). He then continueswith a discussionof the development of the plan to attack Persia, which we shall examine later. This interpretation of the alliance seemsto me impossible.There are two reasons.When Philip finally launchedhis exploratory attack on Asia Minor in 336 the Athenian navy seemsto have played no part, though Athenswasa founder-memberof the CorinthianLeague.The few eventsof which we hear are all consistent with an expedition which crossedthe Dardanellesand operatedbasically on land from there; and even Alexander, for his own reasons,managedadequatelywithout much Athenian naval support.This is merelysuggestive, but the secondreasonis decisive. Our knowledgeof the Peaceof Philocratesand the termsof the allianceis admittedlydefective;but the only activeco-operationwhich seemsto have been foreseenwas in the context of the Sacred War and in combatting

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piracy. Now the co-operationwhich Philip demandedin the SacredWar dependedon a specificclause,which Philocrateshad introducedinto the treaty only on 16th Skirophorion,to the effectthat if the Phociansdid not hand overthetempleto the Amphictyonsthe Athenianswouldhelpagainst those who preventedthem.9 This was the clauseunder which Philip then asked for Athenian support. If the alliance had foreseengeneralmilitary co-operationbetweenAthensand Philip, thisspecialclausewould not have been necessary;nor is there any mentionin the copiouslater referencesto the treaty to sucha general alliance (which the Athenians could scarcely have found acceptable).The only clause which is mentioned is the customary clauseguaranteeingsupport by the partner in caseof attack by a third party.•ø Such a 'defensive'clause could not be extended, by any stretch of the imagination, to cover support in an attack on Persia--or anybody. Cawkwell's interpretation will therefore not do either (and this quite regardlessof whether Philip had already formed concreteplans to attack Persia or not). All our three authors assert, with more or lessvehemence, that it was above all Philip's interestto make the alliance. So Cawkwell: we must 'inquire why Philip insistedon having alliance with Athens as well as peace,as he did from the very first moment the questionof negotiations was raised--which was in 347 with the actor Aristodemus'(111). Aeschines

is our sourcefor thisfirst mention. He saysthat Aristodemusreportedthat Philip 'wishedto becomean ally of the Athenians'.• It is not my point to deny this, that Philip indeed 'wished'to have Athens thoroughlyneutralised through a defensivealliance as well as a peacetreaty, that for this reasonand in this sensehe 'wishedto becomean ally of the Athenians'.But Cawkwell, by intensifying Philip's reported wish through translating Aeschines' words with the much more intense 'insisted on' (SOED s.v. 'insist': 'to make a demand with persistenturgency') suggeststhat the alliance was one of the central factors in Philip's thinking. This is not supported by the sources. The second piece of evidence is from Demosthenes.In 343 he had an extract from a letter from Philip, dating from the first embassy,read in court, in which Philip allegedlymade general statementsof goodwill, whichhe agreedto makemoreconcreteif hegot thealliance.•2The pointis interestingthat Demosthenes--doubtlessby clever quoting of the document-wishes to give the impressionthat Philip was virtually trying to bribe the Athenians to make the alliance. But if the alliance werereally as important to him as Demosthenessuggests, and moreoverhad the honourable purposewhich Cawkwell attributes to it, why did he not immediately make clear that he wanted Athens to help him against Persia?But no. Everythingwas left imprecise,at the level of generalexpressionsof good-

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will. This raises seriousdoubts about the genuinenessof what Demos-

thenes implies about Philip's attitude in 3,•6, since we know how Demosthenesin 343 tried to disavow his own attitude in 347/6: and the

partial citation of documentsisa classicwayof achievingsucha result.The passageis thereforeonly verydubiousevidencefor Philip'sactualattitude in 346.

A greatdealthereforedepends on thethirdpieceof evidence, Aeschines' account of Demosthenes'attitude on 19th E!aphebolion, 346. the second

day of the Athenian debateon the peace.•3 Accordingto Aeschinesit was Demostheneswho insistedon the allianceas well as the peace(though the previousday'sdebatehad endedwith theexpressionof the allies'hopesof obtaining a koine eirene). He said that there was no point in discussing thingsthat Philip'senvoyscould not agreeto; that he, Demosthenes, could not conceiveof peacewithoutalliance;that they(the Athenians)shouldnot separatethe two thingsnor shouldthey wait for thedecisionsof the other Greeks:either the Atheniansmustfightaloneor makepeaceseparately.He then called Antipater and asked him a question (Aeschinesassertsthat both questionand answerwere pre-arranged)which he doesnot specifyin detail, but which he allegesproved decisive.All our authors, following a tradition at. least as old as Schaefer,assumethat the questionwas whether

Philip would accept peace without alliance or not. But this is quite uncertain. The choice. I contend, was betweentwo separate'packets'of proposals:the first, that negotiatedwith Philip over the last monthsand which Demosthenessupported,consistedof peaceand alliance between Athens and Philip immediately: the second was the proposal of the previous day. peace immediately and Icoineeirene later. Demosthenes' question to Antipater can scarcelyhave been concernedwith 'packet since he supported both aspectsof it. It can therefore only have been concerned with 'packet 2', and here a decisive rejection by Antipater impliedtheacceptanceof'packet ! ', whichduly occurred.In 343 it was,of course,in Demosthenes'interestto lay the responsibilityfor the unloved

allianceon Philip,thoughit wasclearlypartof thenegotiated packetwhich he had pleadedfor on 19th E!aphebolion,346. My conclusionis thereforethat, while Philip showedan interestin winningAthensover with hisoffer of a defensivealliance,Athensalsohad a livelyinterestin the alliance,whichwasvoicedby Demosthenes. In 343 howeverhe choseto cover up his tracks by pretendingthat Philip had hoodwinkedthe Atheniansby making vaguepromises.It is thus not necessary to seekdeepand far-reachingmotivesfor Philip'soriginaloffer: theallianceeffectivelyneutralised theAthenianfleetandcouldpossibly be interpreted(undercertaincircumstances, e.g.a Thracianattackon Mace-

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donia) as committing Athens to help. Athens' gain was, however, the greater (it seems),which explains Demosthenes'attitude: for Athenian supportof Phocishad raisedthe spectreof an Amphictyonicwar against Athens.With Philip committedto supportAthensin caseof attack, threats from the central Greek neighboutswould be much lessserious.The whole questionof the importanceof the alliancefor Philip thuseffectivelystems from accepting the implication of Demosthenes'assertion in 343 that Philip laid great importanceon it and from interpretingother sources, aboveall Aeschin.3.7!-2, in thislight. If weassess our threeauthorson this question,we must concludethat, in a way, Griffith's view is the most satisfactory,sincehe doesnot discussthe matter at all, still lessmake it (like Ellis) a turning-pointof the whole negotiations.But Cawkwell also seems to havebeenmisledby the debateinto overvaluingtheallianceand forcing himselfto producean answerwhich, throughaskingthe wrong question (whydid Philipinsistonthealliance?[ He did not!I) inevitablyproducesthe wrong

answer.

The secondaspectwhichI shallexamineisthedevelopmentof the ideaof a MacedoniancampaignagainstPersiaand the associated questionof the nature of Philip's contactswith Hermeias of Atarneus.All three authors seethis as a relativelyearly development:Ellis placesit earliest,'at some time before346 and probablybeforehis Chalkidiancampaignbeganin 349'; eventsbetween348 and 346 are then interpretedas an 'attemptto createa settlementof Greekaffairsthat wouldgivehimtheco-operationof the Atheniansin hisventureand the stability of the Greek mainland behind his back'(92). The origin of the idea Ellisseemsto traceto the presenceof Artabazosand Memnonat Pella; by placingthisearly(353 or 352) he can adopt Chroust'simaginative but improbable hypothesisthat Aristotle acted as Philip'sagent when he went to his patron Hermeiasca. 348. In Ellis' version, 'he probably negotiated at this time an entente between

Philip and Hermeias,both of whom saw profit in an arrangementthat promisedfor the former an Anatolian bridgeheadand for the latter a stronger guarantee of independence from the clutches of Artaxerxes Ochus'(98). Ellisthusseesthe Persianplansashavingtakenconcreteshape already in 348. The Greek settlement,of whichthe Peaceof Philocrateswas a part,'wouldallowhim to turn with hisnewallyandanenthusiastic army towards the much greener pasturesacrossthe Aegean'. Ellis then has no trouble with Isocrates'Philippus. Isocrates'doubtlessknew of the Persian refugeesharbouredin Pella for severalyears.just ashe knewof theactivities

of Aristotle':Isocrates therefore'decidedto sowtheseeds of hisencouragement on what already appeared to be fertile ground'(130).

This mightall seemto havea certainsuperficialplausibilityuntil we considerthe following points: I. We do not know v,'henArtabazos and Memnon a.rr•vedat Pella, or•ly that it was somet;mebetweenca. 352 and

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343 (Griffith cautiously,but not unreasonably,says'by 344').•42. Aristotle as secretagentin 348 is at bestan amusinghypothesis,at worsta scurrilous fiction, which has no adequatesourcesupport.3. Philip'sdesirefor peace in Greececan be explained quite adequatelyif we recall Philip's actual activitiesin the years after 346, all of which were eminentlyforeseeablein 348:•5it doesnot requirethe hypothesisof Asiaticplansjust waiting to be put into action. 4. Isocrates'Philippusgivesno clue that he is sowingon what he knows to be fertile ground. Indeed, he admits•6 that it was the making of peacein 346 that broughthim to the idea at all of exercising his old hobby-horse:he had intendedto write a pieceabout Amphipolis, and cannot resist giving a pr•cis of it in the first few sectionsof the Philippus. If we stick to what the sourcessay, the Philippusis the first mentionof Philip's name in connectionwith an Asian expedition.i? Isocratesknows nothing of existingplans;if and whenPhilip readthat long-windedpieceis quite unknown. When Artabazosand Memnon were at Pella they doubtlessgavePhilip information--but their ownexperienceasfailed rebelswas hardly suited to encourage Philip to support them (and he did not), wheneverthey may have arrived at Pella. Nor, as Griffith points out, is the term 'bridgehead',which Ellis usesin the context of Hermeias, suitable. Strategically,as Cawkwell makesclear, Hermeias'area was of relatively little importance--this was doubtlessthe reasonwhy he was toleratedso long by the Persians.Ellis' versionthen, critically examined,doesnot hold water.

Cawkwellbeginsbetter,by admittingthat the originsof the Persianplan are unclear. He finds, however, as we have already seen,that the 'only' explanation of Philip's 'insistence'on alliance with Athens can be the existenceof suchplans;andhefindsa specious supportin Isocrates'second letter to Philip, written by the 98-year-oldin 338. Isocrates'replyto friends who ask him whether he was responsiblefor the idea of the Asiatic campaignor whetherPhilip had thoughtof it for himselfis that he doesnot know, but rather thinks that Philip had thought of it and that he himself merely fell in with Philip'swishes.It is scarelylegitimateto concludefrom this gentle politeness(assumingthat the letter is authentic) that 'by 338 Isocrates recognisedthat the plan to attack Persia had been formed in Philip's mind, before Isocratesbeganto addresshim, beforethe Peaceof Philocrates'(112). What elsecould Isocrateshavesaidin a letter to Philip in 338?that he and not Philip wastheprimum mobileof the comingAsiatic expedition?Indeed,onemightevenarguefrom the politelydiplomatic'do not know but... ' that Isocrates,at leastamong his friends,did claim to havehad the ideafirst. But I do not wishto pressthis.The point is that the passage is not effectiveevidenceevenfor Isocrates'havinglaterrecognised

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that Philip's plan already existedin 346. In Cawkwell'sview then, as in Ellis', somesort of 'plan' to attack Persiais the driving force for the Peace of Philocrates, existed therefore already before 346. Further Cawkwell does not go.'no cloak-and-daggerwork for Aristotle here. Griffith's is by far the subtlestand mostsensitiveversion.He is the only one of our authors who tries to assessin what sensea 'plan' can already haveexistedin 346. 'That Philip allowed hismind to dwell on thesethingsis somethingthat can be thought of as a certainty. All that is in doubt is, how definitewere his plansin 346' (460). Griffith's reasonwhy therecanbe no doubt, however,is hardly convincing:'If thereis any king in historywho lessneededpromptingon how and where he might expandhis rule, one doesnot know of him. To expand was the function of any Macedonian king in this generation,and Philip, we have seen,was indefatigablein it. What makes it certain that Persia must have attracted hisnotice isjust that nowhere else offered so great a certainty of reward that would really be worth while' (ib.). Griffith goes on to calculate the profits that might be expectedfrom Persia and then interpretsthe motivesfor the peaceand alliancewith Athensas Cawkwell (and in somerespectsasEllis also),in the light of theseaims. Griffith, after carefullyexaminingall the sourcesand finding them wanting, thus supportshis 'certainty'in the last resortwith a referenceto the power dynamicsof Macedonianneedsand Philip's character. Nothing of coursepreventsa king from day-dreaming,or a historian from day-dreaming about a king's day-dreams;but it is not helpful to pretend that in this way we can reach certainty.

Philip had quite enoughto do, all of whichwasalreadyforeseeable in 348, whenhe first openednegotiationswith Athens:the settlementof the Chalcidice;the ending of the SacredWar, which his Thessaliancommitments above all made necessary;Illyria and Epirus; Thessalyitself; but above all Thrace, where he had only comparativelyrecentlybegunto deal systematically with a major borderproblemwhichhadalwayshadexistential importancefor Macedonia.It is thusa severeexaggerationto suggest that Persia was an inevitableobjectivefor Macedonia, that only Persian dreamscan explain Philip's willingnessto make peace,evento concludea defensivealliance, with Athens in the yearsafter 348. Philip had enoughto do, and what he could foreseeexplains his attitude, dreamsor no dreams. The only whisperof plansagainstPersiaevenin the followingyearsis from 341, if the Fourth Philippic, as modern historicalopinion seemsto prefer,is a genuine(if bad!) speechof Demosthenesfrom thisyear.•8Nor would Philip'sother knownactivitieslead usto think that he had any such plans,despitethefact that Isocratestwice,in thePhilippusandin theletter of (probably)345, had urgedhim to unitethe GreeksagainstPersia,as he had earlier urgedothers.But after nearlyforty yearsof unrealisticpreach-

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ing of this theme it is difficult to believethat Isocrateshad suddenlyhad a practicalinsightinto the future. The first part of hisscheme,the unity of the major Greek states,was quite illusory in 346: there is no good reasonwhy the other part should have been more realistic or have been regardedby Philip as such.The Fourth Philippicisa remarkablyinconsequential piece: it hasthe contentof a generaldiatribeagainstPhilip, hismachinationsand bandwaggoneers,but seemsto have no concreteraisond'•tre and certainly follows no concretepolicy--in these last respects,being quite different from Demosthenes'other contemporaryspeeches,the Third Philippic and the speechOn the Chersonnese. Within this amorphousstructureoccur two passages whichare of interestfor us.The first, in which'Demosthenes' interpretsPhilip'sactivitiesin Thrace as beingdirectedagainstAthens,isa direct verbal extract from the speechOn the Chersonnese. •9 It suggestse silentiothat Philip'spreparationsfor a PersianWar werenot knownor at least not likely to gain support in Athens, since all his activities are interpreted as being directed against Athens. Of Persia here not a word. The secondpassage 2øimplies that it had been decidedto send2• ambassadors to Persia, since the state needed money, which 'Demosthenes' regardsas a desirablething (the Third Philippic had recommendedit)• he explainsthat the circumstances arefavourable:(a) sincethe Thracianshate Philip•(b) 'sincetheagentwhokneweverythingthat Philip plannedagainst the king has been capturedand the king will hear about all theseactivities not through our accusations,which he might regard as biasedin our own interest, but from the agent and organiserhimself... ' (my translation). The scholiastexplains that Hermeias of Atarneus is meant here. In the context of an Athenian embassyto Persia asking for help, and in the knowledgethat Demosthenesat this time designatedall public men with whom he waspoliticallyout of sympathyand who had any kind of contact with Philip as Philip's agents,then even if the speechshouldhave been written and deliveredby Demosthenesin 341, it is highlydubiouswhether we can relyon it asa sourcefor Philip'shavinghadany suchconcreteplans, still lessfor their being generally known. Sinceall our threeauthors,for one or other not very good reason,place the formulationof 'Persianplans'beforethe openingof peacenegotiations with Athensin 348, they seeno reasonto look criticallyat the othersources. Cawkwell is perhapsmost extreme. In a tour de force he collectsthree further passages whichdo not seemto haveanythingto do with Persiaand interpretsthem ex eventu as referring to Persian plans. In the first, the referencein the speechOn the Chersonnese to Philip's having become fearful for all Greeks and barbarians? • it is evident from the context that

the barbarians are Thracians•this is also true, in my view, of Cawkwell's secondpassage,the famous assertionin the Third Philippic that neither

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Greece nor the barbarian world can contain Philip's expansionistambitions.23This passagesummarisesa long seriesof examples,two of which are Thracian, the restGreek. Cawkwell'sinterpretationof the third passage is also forced. The speechOn Halonnesosrefers to Philip's unfulfilled promisesto Athens,thencontinues: TM 'But the benefitswill bethese:hewill not give you back your own possessions, sincehe claimsthey are his, nor will the giftsbe in the world that we know? so that hisreputationwith the Greeksdoesnot suffer,but someotherland, someotherplace,it seems,will emerge where your gifts will be granted.' The point seemsclear, that Hegesippus is not reallysuggesting that the Athenianswill begivenlandsin Persia(as Cawkwell) but that he is sarcasticallysayingthat the Athenians shouldnot believethat Philip intendsto give them anything at all (i.e. only in Cloudcuckooland).Cawkwell thus,by hisforcedinterpretationsof these passagesand uncritical acceptanceof what 'Demosthenes'assertsabout Hermeias in the Fourth Philippic, bolstershis view that Philip's plan was not only firm but well-known, at least in certain Athenian quarters. Griffith is onceagainmorecareful,fully recognisingthefeebleness of the sources,thoughhe also doesnot view critically the passagein the Fourth Philippic. 'It seems certain that there was no publicity of any kind emanating from Philip earlier than Chaeroneia on the subject of the Persian War. It is not the fact but the reasons for it that call for discussion'

(461). The reasonsGriffith seesin the lack of stabilityin Greece.But thisis no more than a kind of academicAunt Sally. Only if one believes(what no crediblesourcesays)that Philip planneda Persianexpeditionalreadyin 348 is there anything to discussat all! It is certainlyeasierand consonantwith thesourcesto abandontheghost of the Persian expedition which hauntsthe history of the 340sin thesethree books and simply to accept that the concreteidea of planning suchan expeditionindeedemergednot very long beforeChaeroneia.After rejecting the views of our three authors it is perhaps reasonablethat I sketch briefly how I seethe development.I can seeno concreteinterestthat one might designatewith the word 'plans'as existingfor a Persianwar before Philip had won control of Thrace. Even then he seemsto have beenmore interestedin Europe, as his Scythiancampaignin 339 indicates.This does not of coursemean that he knew nothing about Persianterritoriesand had no contacts there: just as, e.g., from north-west Greece or from the Peloponnese,he will doubtlesshaveacceptedapproachesalsofrom Asiatic Greek cities or dynasts:in this categorywe may place Hermeiasand Pixodarus, perhaps Ephesus,but also Artabazos and Memnon. But, as Griffith in connectionwith the last two rightly remarks,'thesethingswere neither here nor there.'26 Isocrates had coupled the unity of the major Greek powerswith his recommendationof war with Persia;but nothing

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suggeststhat Greek unity was Philip's aim in 348 and afterwards. The purposeof the Peaceof Philocrateswas to enablehim to end the Phocian War (this, above all, a Thessalianinterest)and to settlehis problemsin Thrace without the irritation of the AthenianWar. He wasevenprepared to accepta defensivealliancewhichcommittedhim to protectingAthens. But a koine eirene,which mightconceivably(as in 338) haveprovidedthe basisfor a co-operativeunity, he rejectedwithout discussion,becauseit would have preventedhim from satisfyingThessalianinterestsin central Greece,which was his first priority. Modern writers,and our three are no exception,tend to regardPhilip's conquestsas the result of an almost inevitableexpansion:pleonexia, as Demosthenescalled it. There is perhapsa sensein which this view can be justified;but the areasinto which Philip's Macedoniaexpanded,the states against which he fought and at whoseexpensehe achievedcontrol of new areas,wereall areasor stateswhichhad beeneithertraditionallyor recently hostileto Macedoniaor to Philip personallyor both,and thisisjust astrue for the 340sas for the 350s.The SacredWar was merelyan appendageto his Thessalianinterests.Theseconquestshad all in the first instancehad as objectivesthe establishmentof Macedonian security.That this fully comprehensiblesecuritydrive resultedin an Empire in the North Aegeanand Balkan area was in the circumstancesprobably inevitable: doubtlessthe MacedoniansregardedPhilip's turning Thrace into a provinceasthe only way of securingMacedonia in the long term. But Persia?Persia was no enemy in this sense,may indeedeven have been a friend at some time? in the 340s Persia certainly producedsome unfriendly actions--sendinghelp to Perinthus(evenif unofficial), money to Athens, brutally eradicatingPhilip's contact Hermeiasof Atarneusare incidentsthat we happento hearabout. Eachwasno morethan a pin-prick, quite insufficientto provokea major war, thoughnobodylikespin-pricks. But other factors came together:first, that by 340 Thrace, Thessalyand other borderareaswerereasonablypacifiedand Philip, apart from the new war with Athens, had some breathing space. We may also notice that Philip's activities in Thessaly and in Central Greece, particularly his contact with Delphi and the AmphictyonicCouncil, will have led to his graduallyassociatinghimselfmore with Greek traditionsthan any of his predecessors had beenable to do. Perhapsmore significantin this respect than has hitherto been noticed is that Jason of Pherae was known to have

toyedwith plansfor an expeditionagainstPersia:28for Philip a Thessalian tradition might well have had more influencethan an Athenian academic essay.

But I suggestthat paradoxicallyit wasthe war with Athensand Thebes which was the decisivefactor in bringing Philip to formulate plans to campaignagainst Persia, becausethis war showedPhilip that without

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somedramatic 'Greek' gesturehe could neverhopefor eventhe neutrality of severalmajor centralGreekstates.Other circumstances wereat thetime also favourable, and Persia had recently helped his enemiesand hurt at least one of his friends. Thus the Persian War was not that which Isocrates

had wished for: a Persian war which became possibleonce a certain measureof Greek unity had beenestablished;but rather a Persianwar, the function of which it was to reconcile the major Greek states to the beneficentexistenceof Macedonian power and divert them from their interferinghostility.The PersianWar was,on thisview,a verylate development in Philip's plansand resultedin the last resortfrom the failure of his diplomacy in central Greece rather than from his innate expansionist nature.

I am of courseawarethat thisexplanationalsohasno positivesupportin the sources.But it has severaladvantages:it accountsfor the absenceof mention of suchplansin the sources(exceptfor Diodorus'anachronism under 346 and the dubiouscaseof the Fourth Philippic) and placesthe developmentin the immediatehistoricalcontext where it occursin the sources.It destroysthe image of Philip the graspingdreamer,but alsothat of Philip the would-be conquerorof the Persians,frustrated for ten years by the unreliabilityof the Greek states.In the lastresortjudgementwill rest on the view whichistakenof Philip, hischaracterand hisaims,and wemay now turn to the views of our three authors on thesemore generalissues. Griffith, for all his 470 pages,doesnot offer a succinctsummaryof his pictureof Philip. Particularlyin thecontextof a History of Macedoniathis must be regardedas a seriousfailing. Is it really necessarythat the reader who approachesthis standard work as a handbook, and (legitimately) seeksstatementsof the author'sviewson major issues,be forcedto read the whole work to discoverthem?The absenceof a summary,however,is in a way characteristicof Griffith's approach,in that he prefersto analysewhat the sourcessay in relation to the details of specificeventsand incidents without alwaysattendingto wider questions.One resultof thisapproachis that Griffith's Philip is not presentedto the reader, but rather 'emerges' gradually from the narrative. He is, if I may summarisemy impressions,a Philip who was born to lead Macedonian expansionand conquest;who, like Griffith, seeminglyregardedboth as so obviousthat questionsdid not needto beasked:the king ascompetitor,out to win, but also,astheethosof Olympia (and Cambridge!)prescribed,to do it well and conspicuously. So, in the nearestto an overall assessment that Griffith offers, Philip is 'a good and interestinggeneraland a marvelloussoldierin the field, and aboveall in the heightand heat of action. Yet prouder to win by "politics"than by war. A temperamentlike this shouldhavebeenborn poor, to showwhat it could really do... ' (696). Cawkwell's Philip is more complex, though also rather difficult to

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detach from the text. On the one hand he acceptsArrian's judgement on Philip's importancefor Macedonia, which his Alexander speaksto the mutineersat Opis. Cawkwell'sbook 'is largely an extendedglosson this speech'(18). On the other hand, a few paragraphslater the concentration on Macedonia seemsforgotten: 'It is the theme of this book that Philip transformed the ancient world, confronting the city-statesof Greecewith the national state of Macedon, that he was therefore a serious menace to

the liberty of Greece,but that the policiesof Demostheneswere almost entirelymisconceived and causedPhilip to be opposedlesseffectivelythan he might have been' (19). Thus from the beginning a dichotomy in objectives,in views of Philip, is made clear: on the one hand Philip the Macedonian, on the other a traditional 'Greek history' emphasis on Demosthenesand Athensand Philip's threat to the rather artificial question of 'Greek liberty'.The two aspectsare of coursenot incompatible;but Philip the threatenerof the Greeksdoesin the last resorttend to dominate and leadsCawkwell to the overemphasison Demosthenesand Athenian internal politicswhich I havealready noticed(though his assessments are refreshingin detail). A third aspectbelongsto Cawkwell'spicture of Philip. Cawkwell, who spendsrelatively more spacethan either of his competitorson discussing Philip'scharacter,devotesa wholeshortchapterto what I may call 'Philip the culture-vulture'.'There is no doubt that Philip wasa warm admirer of Greek culture and so inevitably to someextent of Athens' (50, cf. 56). In this context Cawkwell introducesPhilip's enjoyment of the theatre and musicand hiscontactswith variousAcademicswho found Philip'scourta congenial place. 'Thoroughly Greek', was Demosthenes' version of Aeschines'descriptionof Philip in 346, 'a very powerful speakerand very friendly towards Athens.'29This last phraseCawkweUmistranslatesas 'a very greatadmirer of Athens',whichhethengoeson to interpretculturally, which is certainly not what Demostheneshad in mind. If however we acceptwith Cawkwell and the overwhelmingcurrent orthodoxy that the Macedonianswere Greeks(a questionwhich, however, in Athens at least must have been in somedoubt at this time, if Aeschinesfelt it necessaryto tell the Athenians that Philip was 'thoroughly Greek'), then Macedonian culture was also part of 'Greek culture', which Philip did not so much

admire as live: strictly speakingonly an outsider,a non-participant, admires.But this questionis perhapsnot asimportantastheamount of ink which has been spent on it leadsto believe.What about Athens?Neither Euphraeus,Plato'spupil who wasat the court during Perdiccas'reign,nor Aristotle, thetwo main philosophersconcerned(thoughEuphraeusdid not experiencePhilip's rule and Aristotle was confined to Mieza), was an Athenian; and Euripides, the tragic poet whose versesindeed crop up

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frequentlyenoughin Macedoniancontexts,had in the end livedand died in Macedonia. That Philip asan educatedGreek (as Cawkwell claimshim to be) also had someinterestin somephilosophicalproblemsis not unreasonable; that theseinterestsled to an 'admiration' of Athens is however neither necessarynor convincing,nor is it what Aeschines,for all his friendliness towards Philip, allegedly said. We neednot pursuethis further. Cultural admiration of Athenscannot be establishedwith the sourceswe possess.But Philip, as an itelligent Macedonianking, was of coursenot cut off from the intellectualdevelopments of his time (why should he have been?).Cawkwell hasbrought this out adequately, as a contrast to the 'barbarian' accusationsof Demosthenes.'How deepit all went',isa questionwhichCawkwellthenasks,only to answer that 'Philip deserved Aeschines'description of thoroughly Greek'. But if we acceptCawkwell'sassumptionthat the Macedonians were Greeks, the statementis merely tautological--Aeschines,it seems, was answeringaccusationsor implicationsof barbarismwhichfor Cawkwell do not exist. But it is not the presenceor absenceof 'depth' which is historically interesting--nobody could expect Philip to be a Plato or a Euripides;the function of the developedcultural interestsis important. Functionallythey found expressionin the educationalsphere(Euphraeus and Aristotle) and in the entertainment/religioussphere--games,festivals, theatres,processions--thoughin neither to the exclusionof lessdeveloped and lessluxuriouslocal traditionsand practices.They madeit possiblefor the kingand thosemembersof hisentouragewhichsharedtheseintereststo converse with, to exert 'charm' on, visitors from other Greek states with

differing social and institutional structuresand traditions. But there it seemsto have stopped.It is thusnot that Philip 'admired'thoseaspectsof 'Greek culture' (including Athens!) which the humanistic tradition has chosento regard as admirable: he was part of Greek culture and therefore--as

with all other statesmen in the Greek world--did

not allow

his

cultural intereststo affect his political actions.If Philip did not hate and wish to destroy Athens, he had his reasons,which howevercertainly lay in his political conceptionand not in cultural admiration. Cultural unity in the Greek world had neverhad much influenceon political will in actions among the Greek states. Cawkwell'sPhilip thuscomprisesthreefacets:the Macedonianmonarch who achievesthe unity and securityof hisland (Arrian); the threat to Greek liberty (though the conceptas suchis neverdiscussed); and the witty and charming king with philosophicalinterestswho preferred to treat Athens leniently becausehe admired her cultural achievementsand her role as cultural

centre.

Ellis' views are lessromantic, less'personal', than either Griffith's or

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Cawkwell's.He seesPhilip as in a sensea prisonerof the military machine which he had created:in a severelymodernisingview, he regardsPhilip as directingthe pressurefor conquestwhichcamefrom below.This pressure emergedfrom the simpleexistenceof the new army: if you havean army you mustdo somethingwith it, the army itselfdemandsit, istheargument. Further conquest(or defeat and disaster)was therefore an almost automatic consequence of Philip'sinitial successes: the pressures could not be resistedby the king, but couldbedirected.Theremaybea kernelof truth in this contention. But Ellis, in developinghis view, seemsto forget that the Macedonians never stoppedbeing land-holdersand farmers. Philip rewarded his soldiers and hetairoi above all with land-allotments

in Greater

Macedonia. To possessland was the primary aim of each Macedonian; land possession was the backboneof Macedoniansociety.Philip's army was thus, however professionalin appearanceand in comparisonwith other contemporary armies, in the last resort an army of Macedonian farmers and their sons,as it had always been. Moreover, Philip's campaigns were usually relatively short and not very far from home, facts which allowed most of the troops most of the time to return homefor the winter. This is not to denythat the Macedonianarmy underPhilip showed a readinessto campaign which the average Greek city state could not compete with; but to assert that irresistiblepressuresfor ever-further conquestcamefrom the agriculturalbasisof Macedoniansocietyseemsto ignore its fundamentalconservatism. With thistheoryEllishasof courseno difficultyin explainingthe Persian plans as resulting from pressurefrom the basis(but before 348?). The questionthenarises,asfor Cawkwell,of whetherPhilip hadconcreteplans in Asia: would he have been another Alexander?That such speculation about might-have-beensoccursin two otherwiseserioushistorical works makes it seemalmost respectable;but Griffith was right to desist.What passesas argumentturnsout to be unreal, the discussions meaningless; the suggestedor argued limitation in aims and attitudes of Philip as against Alexander which both authors offer may seemreasonableto those who think they haveestablished the pictureof a rationalplanningPhilip--but who could have said in 334 that Alexander

would march to India?

Enough has been said to characterisethe three 'academic'books which have been the main subjectof this essay.All are serious,worthy studies, which contain far more than I have been able to discuss here. All are based

on the sources,though they inevitably differ in detail, but they offer interestingcontrastsin approach.Griffith remainsin the last resortclosest to the events, which he relates in great detail with copious,at times excessive, discussion and neverforgetshisMacedonianviewpoint.Here he isat homeandhasproduceda narrativehandbookof events.That hisviews

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about Philip, exceptin detail, are difficult to detachfrom hislengthytext and then, whendetached,turn out to be conventionaland not really satisfying, is perhapsnot the misfortuneit might havebeenin a lessadequately researchedvolume. More seriousis a fault which will severelylimit the book's usefulnessin practice (that is, in those universities,collegesand schools,particularly outside England, where suchsubjectsare still taken seriously):it is uncommonlydifficult to read. A fundamentallyponderous style is spiced with common-room jargon and other 'in' phrases and metaphorswhich, at its bestdifficult to follow, at timesbecomesincomprehensible.It would be interestingto know how many readers,even in England(othersclearly have no hope),can fully understandwhat Griffith meansin hislast pagesof text, 696-698.The rewardsfor thosewho struggle through this book are in detail rich; but the disproportionateefforts

requiredto enjoy the apple of Griffith'swisdomwill inevitablycondemn many potential readersto remain unenlightened.Which is a pity. Ellis also likes events,though his tendencyto moderniseand to accept the latestnew theory, regardlessof its plausibility,and then to assertrather than to argue, makes his book less'reliable'. But for the practisedreader there is much of value. Onceagain, however,the at timesextremelyturgid style makes reading a difficult and slow businessand will not help to convincethe uninitiatedthat thisperiodof Greekhistoryisasexcitingasit really is. Cawkwell's,despitemany differencesof opinionin detail that I have expressed,despitehis perhapsunconsciousobeisanceto the humanistic tradition that put Athens at the centre of the cultural universe,and despitethe concludingromancing,is perhapsthe most satisfactoryand certainly,thanksto a directand livelystyle,the mostreadableof thesethree new works.

Philipps-Universitat Marburg

R.M. Errington

NOTES

I. See also my review, largely of Hammond's chapters,in CR n.s. 30 (1980). 2. Neither Cawkwellnor Ellisillustratesthe coinageat all, thoughtheymention its importanceand the impactit made.Griffith speculates in a lengthyjeud•sprit (697-8) about the significanceof changingcoin types:but if one searchesone can here find pale illustrationsof a meretwo tetradrachmson Plate II (the samenumber are illustrated of the Derrones, the Letaei, Orescii and Damastini; Alexander I

receivesthree illustrations:is this an indication of the relative importancethe authors attribute to their illustrations?).The reader who doesnot have Le Rider's corpus to hand will be bewildered by Griffith's comments. 3. Sourcesconveniently collected in Staatsvertriigedes Altertums II no. 329.

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Oddly, this alliance is not even mentioned by Cawkwell in his short chapter on Philip and Athensin Hatzopoulos-Loukopoulos,thoughin his own book it plays an important role! 4. Dem.

19.143.

5. Aeschin.2.72; Griffith 341. So, already A. Schaefer,Demosthenesundseine Zeit 2 II 230.

6. M.M. Markle IlI, 'The strategyof Philip in 346', CQ n.s. 24 (1974) 253-68. J.B. Bury, History of Greece3710 ff., whoseviewsMarkle claimsasbeingnearestto his(ib. 254 n. 1) and to whom hisinterpretationclearlyowesa debt,formulatedhis discussionmuch more cautiously. Ellis had also read Markle's unpublishedPhD thesis on the subject, which I have not seen. 7. Aeschin.2.17. I cannotdeal in detail with Markle's argumentshere:sufficeit to say that in my view none of the passageswhich he citesrequireshis extravagant hypothesisas explanation. 8. Cawkwell 110; cf. also Griffith 345 n. 1, in the same sense. 9. Dem. 10. Dem.

19.49. 19.143.

11. Aeschin. 2.17: •3o,5Xovro. 12. Dem. 19.40-41. 13. Aeschin. 3.71-2.

14. Griffith 484 n. 5. Diodorus' date (350) at 16.52.3 is wrong here; seealso Momigliano, Filippo il Macedone (1934) 123 n. 1. 15. See below, p. 000. 16. Philippus 7. 17. None of our authors (rightly) makesuse of the clearly anachronisticDiod. 16.60.5, though Griffith (459) toys with the possibility. 18. A selection of historian-believers:A. Momigliano, Filippo 150 n. 1; F.R. WQst, Philipp II. yon Makedonien und Griechenland121-2;D.E.W. Wormell in YCS (1935) 58• A.W. Pickard-Cambridgein CAH V 254; F. Kiechle in Kleine Pauly s.v. 'Demosthenes';P. Cloch•, Ddmosthkne 163 if. The list could easily be extended. The philologistsare, in my view rightly, less sure: see (e.g.) Maurice Croiset'scarefulexpos• in his introductionto the Bud• Ddmosthkne,HaranguesI. 19. IV Phil. (Dem. 10) 14 ff.:Chers. (Dem. 8) 42 ff. 20.

IV Phil.

31 if.

21. It is not, as Cawkwell (161) asserts,a recommendationto sendenvoys. 22. Dem. 8.67: q•o•pS• •5.mv"XX•I• xod,•o•p•po•.

23. Dem. 9.27:oG0'• 'EXX&•0,50'• •dp•o•po••:•lv•X•ov•.0•v Xcop••:d:v0pdmou. 24.

Dem.

7.35.

25. &vr,• 26.

Griffith

460.

27. This dependson the view one takes of the 'alliance'betweenPhilip and ArtaxerxesOchuswhich Arrian (2.14) mentions.Its authenticityis often doubted, and is indeed rejected by all three authors. 28. Xen. Hell. 6.1.12; Isocr. Philippus 119-120.

29. Dem. 19.308:

A GOLD

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OF TITUS

AT EMERITA

T. CaesariAug.f. / Vespasiano pontif. / imp. XII trib. pote. VII/cos. VI /provincia Lusitania/ C. Arruntio Catellio/ Celereleg.Aug.pro pr. / L. Iunio Latrone / Conimbricese fiamine /provinciae Lusitaniae /ex auri p. V. (CIL 2,5264=ILS 261) A small marble tablet or basefrom Emerita, the seatof the provincialcult of Lusitania, recordsthat the province(i.e., the provincialconcilium)has dedicateda gold object of five pounds'weight to Titus, son of Vespasian. Mention of the seventhgrant of tribuniciapotestasand the sixth consulshipof Titus pointsto the year AD 77/78; but, if thegovernorof Lusitania, C. Arruntius Catellius Celer, took up his consulshipin Rome on 1st October,AD 77 (CIL 10,8038),• a more precisedatingbetweenI stJuly and 30th September, AD 77, would be indicated.2 What kind of piece was originallyinsertedinto the top of the baseis not immediatelyapparent.One might think of a statuette, but comparative evidenceelsewherestrongly supportsH•ibner'ssuggestionof a bust(imago), whichgenerallyweighed betweenone and six pounds,occasionallyrather more.3Evidentlythe bust was connectedwith the ruler cult, as the flamen provinciae Lusitaniae, electedhead of the council,is associatedwith the propraetorianlegatein the act of dedication;there is no parallel in the West to suggestthat the provincial priesthoodcould have been mentioned simply as a dating device, for example.4 The link with the provincial worship is further strengthenedby the circumstancethat the bust was of gold. In the secular spherean emperoror indeedany individual can be honouredwith a statue of gold or silveror more frequentlyof gilded or silveredbronze?but in the contextof a cult it seemsthat the useof preciousmetalwasconceivedasa divine honour.6 The bust must thereforebe consideredin the light of what little we know of the role of similar objectswithin the ceremonialof the cult of the Roman emperor.7 Evidencefrom the Latin West is meagrein the extreme. That statuesand busts played a part in the provincial worship of Gallia Narbonensisis confirmedby a clauseof the Lex Narbonensisprovidingthat fundsoriginally sacrisdestinata(restoredbut probable)shallbe expendedonstatu]/ as imaginesveimperatorisCaes[aris. . . ( CIL 12,6038[=ILS 6964] 26 f.). This regulationis of particularrelevanceto the presentdiscussion, sinceth•

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law can be attributedwith greatprobabilityto the Flavian period.s As the career of Q. Trebellius Rufus of Tolosa makes clear,9 his term as first

flamen of Narbonensis •øwas servedat the closeof his municipalcareer, mostlikely underVespasian,whosenamemustthereforebe restoredin line 27; cf. line 13.• If the basefrom Emeritaiscorrectlyinterpreted,it would provide evidenceat the provincialcentreof Lusitania for just the kind of bust that seemsenvisagedin the contemporarylaw of Narbonensis.No other Flavian evidenceis adducibleelsewherein the Spains,but one may comparethe Antoninecommissionof Cn. NumisiusModestus,high-priest of Tarraconensis,who waselectedby thecouncilof the provinceadstatuas aurandas/divi Hadriani ( CIL 2,4230=Alfibldy,RIT 294); here again the reference seems to be to the same sort of statues as are mentioned at Narbo

in the provincialcharter. Regrettablynone of thesetestimoniagivesany hint asto the purposeof suchimages,whichon theevidenceof the Western provincesalone would remain obscure;but if we turn to the Greek East, where tracesare more plentiful, the picture becomesmuch clearer. A convenientstartingpointis Gytheum,whereon eachof thefivedaysof the Kaisareiapaintedeikonesof Divus Augustus,Livia, and Tiberiuswere escortedfrom the temple of Asklepios and Hygieia to the Caesareum (where they were doubtlesskept•2)and thencevia the agora to the theatre; after sacrificehad been performed before them, the busts remained on displayfor the rest of the day, whichwasgivenoverto a thymeliccontest.•3 At Athens we have a reference in Pausanias to an eikon of Hadrian

in the

Parthenon(1,24,7) and to four stoneeikonesof Hadrian placedbeforethe entranceto the sanctuaryof Olympian Zeus (1,18,6; cf. 10,8,6); but the clearestdetail on the functionof imperiallikenesses is providedby a letter of Marcus Aurelius and Cornmodusto the Athenian gerousia:•'• Then in regard to the imageswhich you have wanted to make of ourselvesand of our consorts in gold or silver, or best of all, if understandingfrom our own proposal, you are willing to content yourselveswith imagesof bronze,it is clearthat you will make statues suchasthe manymorecommonlycall rcf•o-rop,0•i (busts),andyouwill executethem on a moderatescale,the four of equalsize,sothat it will be easy on your holidays at every gathering to transport them wherever you may wish on every occasion,as for example to the popularassemblies. And asfor thebases,we permitthe placingof our namesupon thesebecauseof your goodwill toward us,for we gladly accept such honors, but on all occasionswe avoid the divine and thosewhichseemto provokeenvy.Therefore,alsonowwegratefully instruct you to make only bronze images,that this would be more pleasingto us.

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Similarly at Ephesus,wherethe imperial cult is grafted on to that of Artemis, one of the inscriptionsrelating to the donation of Gaius Vibius

Salutaris •5revealsthatimperialeikoneswerehousedwiththetype-statues of the city-goddess in thepronaosof Artemis,16from whereon assembly and otherspecialdaysthey weretransportedto the theatreby way of the Magnesian and CoressianGates.•7

Onefactwhichclearlyemerges isthatimagesof theemperoror hishouse weremeantto be carried.At Ephesusthis wasthe task of special"goldbearers",but at othercentres,for exampleAthensandTanagra,wehearof sebastophoroi--bearers of theimperialbusts.18In Egypt,a fourth-century papyrusrefersto the officeof K6mast•s,"bearerof thedivine(=imperial) bustsand of the Nik• that precedes them".•9By thistime the Komasiahad developedinto a festiveprocession that greeteda high official or members of theimperialfamilyonarrivalat someplace;itsdistinguishing characteristicwasthat it includedimagestransportedby bearers. 20What seems also clear is that the carryingof statuesor bustswas a feature of ceremonies markingimportantdays--assemblydays,local festivals, 2• aboveall imperial occasions suchas the Kaisareiaat Gytheum.22At Alexandria,for example,oneof thefew honoursacceptedby Claudiusin AD41 wasthat a goldstatueof himshouldbebornein procession oneponymous days.23The high point of the year'sfestivalswas the celebrationof the reigning emperor'sbirthday,24detailsof whichare preservedin the officialdaybook of the local governor(strategos)of Elephantine. 25While the text is much restored, it seems that on 1st October, AD 232, the natalis of AlexanderSeveruswasmarkedinteralia by a Komasiain whichthestatues

of AlexanderSeverusand Julia Mamaea,previouslywreathedby the strategos,will have beenborne in procession. What this brief surveysuggests, then,is that the bustsor statuesattested at Narbo weremeantto becarriedby bearerson principalfeastdaysof the calendar26and, when not in use, will have been lodgedin the temple; presumablythe procession will havemadeits way to the adjacentamphitheatre? We have no comparableevidencefrom Lugdunum,but at Tarraco the task entrustedto Cn. NumisiusModestusmay mean that bronzestatuesof Hadrian carriedin his lifetimewerenow to be gilded

followinghisconsecration; here,too,onewouldsuppose processions from the provincial temple to the amphitheatre.We owe to Tacitus a notice of

theoriginalembassy oftheSpaniards, whichin ^D 15requested permission from Tiberiusto erecta templeto Augustusat the colonyof Tarraco.28 Therecanbe no doubtthat thiswasintendedasa provincialratherthanas

a municipaltemple,for whichpermission wouldnothavebeenrequired-or that in practiceit wasbuilt to DivusAugustus,alreadyconsecrated on 17th September,^D 14; the point is confirmedby a seriesof dupondii,

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struck locally under Tiberius? which portray an octostyletemple and leaveno doubt of its associationwith the deified Augustus? As archaeological exploration has established, 3• the temple was completedby the reign of Vespasian,if not earlier,and stoodon the uppermostlevelof the upper Roman city, whereasthe amphitheatre,itself of Flavian construction, waslocatedon a lower slopeto the south-east? Whether sacrificewas madebeforethe images,oncethe processionhad wounditsway down to its destination,can hardly be said;but at the endof theday'sproceedingsthey must have been escortedback to the temple for safe-keeping,just as at Gytheum or Ephesus. The gold bust of Titus at Emerita fits nicelyinto thisreconstruction.The temple where it was presumably kept is well attested by coins, likewise struck under Tiberius.33These correspond,in designand legends? 4 remarkablycloselywith the dupondiiof Tarraco, the mainitem of difference being that the temple at Emerita is representedwith four columns,not eight. Evidently this was modelled on the edifice at Tarraco, in striking confirmation of Tacitus' comment, datumque in omnesprovincias exemplum, and there seemsno reasonto doubt the communisopinio35that it was designedas the nub of the provincialcult of Lusitania.36Archaeological remainsof the temple have not yet been identified, so its site remains unknown; but the amphitheatreof Emerita, in contrast,has long been excavated? Despitethe limitationsof simpleanalogy,comparisonwith other centresstronglysuggests that at Emerita also the bust will havebeen carried in processionfrom the provincial temple to the amphitheatreand back; in which casethe provincialtemplemusthavebeensituatedsomewhere in the vicinity--therefore on the edgeof the town? a schemewhich would correspondwith that at Narbo or Tarraco. In any eventthe trace we possessclearly makesan important contribution to our knowledgeof the ceremonialof the imperial cult in its Western idiom. But there is a further conclusion

to be drawn.

As the bust was dedicated

to Titus duringthe periodof hisvirtual co-regency,it mustsurelyreflecthis presence(and therefore that of Vespasianalso) within the provincial worship--just as the inclusionof Vespasianduring his lifetime within the cult of Narbonensisseemsto be reflectedin statu]asimaginesveCaesaris.If so, the inscribedbaseprovidescrucialevidencefor the developmentof the provincialworshipof Lusitania,whichunderClaudiushad beenrestricted to the cult of the deifiedAugustusand Livia, asinscriptionsattest.39Once again there is a closecorrespondencewith Tarraconensis,where inscriptionsshowthat from thetime of Vespasiantheprovincialworshipincluded the livingemperorand Roma alongwith thedeifieddead? Thereisno sign of Roma at the provinciallevel in Lusitania, not that lack of evidenceis conclusivefor her absenceper se,but on the aboveinterpretationthe bust

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of Titus with its inscribedbase must surely point to the inclusion of the living emperor within the official cult of this provincealso. D. Fishwick

University of Alberta NOTES

1. A. Degrassi,lfasti consolaridell' lmpero Romano (Rome 1952) 22. 2. S. Lambrino, "C. Arruntius Catellius Celer, gouverneurde Lusitanie sous Vespasien",Revistada FaculdadedeLettrasdeLisboa21 (1955) 171-177;cf. AEpig 1957, no. 251. 3. Weights of statuesand bustsin Italy are listed by R. Duncan-Jones,The economy of the Roman Empire (Cambridge 1974) 163-166; see further CIL 6,30998=ILS 4386; CIL 8,9797; CIL 6,3756--ILS 5160; CIL 11,364,ILS 5471a. For bustsof MarcusAureliusand LuciusVerusseeH. von Hesberg,"Archiiologische Denkm•iler zum riSmischenKaiserkult", ANRW 2,16,2 (Berlin 1978) 940 fl. See further J. Ch. Balty, "Le pr6tendu Marc-Auri:le d'Avenches",in R.A. Stucky and I. Jucker (edd.), Eikones. Studien zum griechischen und rOmischen Bildnis (Festschrift Hans Jucker) (Bern 1980) 57-63. 4. For the practiceof dating by priesthoodsseeD. Ladage,StiidtischePriesterund Kultiimter im Lateinischen Westendes lmperium Romanurn zur Kaiserzeit (Cologne 1971) 55 (with n. 3). 5. S. Eitrem, "Zur Apotheose",SO 15/16 (1936) 122 f.; Th. Pek,Sry,"Goldene Statuen der Kaiserzeit", MDAI(R) 75 (1968) 144-148;P. Hermann, MDAI(1) 15 (1965) 87 n. 49a. 6. K. Scott, "The significanceof statuesin preciousmetalsin emperor worship", TAPA 62 (1931) 101-123;cf. S. Weinstock,Divus Julius(Oxford 1971)56. As a result,constitutionalrulers generallyrefusedgold and silver likenessesas an objectionableform of adulatio: H.G. Niemeyer, Studien zur statuarischenDarstellung der r6mischen Kaiser (Monumenta Artis Romanae 7, Berlin 1968) 19. 7. For detailed discussionsee"Liturgy and Ceremonial", in D. Fishwick, The Imperial cult in the Latin West[cited ICL W], Vol. 3 (Leiden, forthcoming). 8. See most recentlyH.-G. Pflaum, Lesfastesde la provincede Narbonnaise (Gallia Suppl. 30, Paris 1978) 103-105,no. 2 with bibl.; Fishwick,"The provincial cult of Gallia Narbonensis:three templesat Narbo", in ICL W(above, n. 7), Vol. 2. 9. IG 22,4193 + AEpig 1947, no. 69. 10. Pflaum (above, n. 8) suggeststhe possibilitythat Trebelliuswasnot "first of all" but rather"first of hisco-citizensof Toulouse"tobeprovincialhigh-priest.But the phrase"our first high-priest"occursin a letter addressedby the Narbonese council to the Athenian Boul• AEpig 1947, no. 69, line 14. 11. Cf. A.L. Abaecherli,"The dating of the Lex Narbonensis",TAPA 63 (1932) 256-68, showingthat the namesof Augustus,Tiberius,or Vespasianwill all fit the break at the ends of lines 13, 27. 12. A.D. Nock, "SynnaosTheos", HSCP41 (1930) 57, n. 2 [=Essayson religion and the ancient worM, ed. Zeph Stewart (Cambridge, Mass. 1972) 1,247 n. 246].

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13. V. Ehrenberg and A.H.M. Jones, Documents illustrating the reigns of Augustus and Tiberius2 (Oxford 1955), no. 102; M. Rostovtzeff,"L'Empereur Tib•re et le culteimp6rial",RH 163(1930) 1-26;S. Eitrem,"Zur Apotheose",SO 10 (1932) 43-48;Nilsson,GGR3 2,387 f. Rostovtzeffinterpretsthe ceremonyin terms of a lectisternium.

14. J.H. Oliver, ThesacredGerousia(Hesperia,Suppl.6 ( 1941)),no. 24, lines31 if.; pp. 108-120 at 116. 15. Oliver, o.c. no. 3, pp. 55-85. 16. Ibid. lines419-425.Note Augustus'discretionin allowinga statueof himself as a recognisableman (andrias) only in the pronaos of the Pantheon; i.e. in a subordinatepositionin the temple(Dio 53,27,3);cf. Pliny'spraiseof Trajan: itaque tuam statuam in vestibulo Iovis Optimi Maximi unam alteramve et hanc aeream cernimus( Paneg. 52,3). 17. That imagescould be subjectto wear and tear through usageis shownby a letter of MarcusAureliusand LuciusVerusto Ulpius Eurycles,the logistesof the Ephesiangerousia,who had enquiredabout old imagesstoredin the synhedrion; someof thesehad becomesobatteredasto be unrecognisable: Oliver, o.c. (above, n. 14), no. 11; pp. 93-96. 18. L. Robert, "Hellenica",RPh 13 (1939) 122-128;id.,"Inscriptiond'Ath•nes", REA 62 (1960) 316-324 at 323 nn. 6 f. with refs. 19. P Oxy. 1265;cf. P Oxy. 1449(^D 213-217);POslo 3, no. 94 (2nd-3rdcentury ^D); cf. Nock (above, n. 12) 18[=216]. 20. I. Kalavrezou-Maxeiner, "The Imperial chamberat Luxor", DOP 29 (1975) 227-251, especially242 f. 21. Oliver (above, n. 15), lines 202-214; pp. 60, 73. 22. Above, n. 13.

23. E.M. Smallwood,Documentsillustratingtheprincipatesof Gaius,Claudius and Nero (Cambridge 1967),no. 370, col. 3, lines38 f. H.I. Bell, Jewsand Christians in Egypt (Westport, Connecticut1924) 6, 32 acceptsMilne's suggestionthat the statue was of Messalina, not of Claudius. 24. At Arsinoehired workerscarriedthe imageof JupiterCapitolinusroundthe theatre in honour of Caracalla'sbirthday: U. Wilcken, "ArsinoitischeTempelrechnungenaus dem J. 215 n. Chr.", Hermes 20 (1885)430-476=BGU 2, no. 362: pag. 10, 1, 18. 25. P Paris 69=Wilcken, Chrestomathie 1, 2, no. 41, col. 3, lines 10-15. 26. For the festival list see P. Herz, Untersuchungenzum Festkalenderder r6mischen Kaiserzeit nach datierten Weih- und Ehreninschriften(Diss. Mainz 1975);id., "Kaiserfesteder Prinzipatszeit",ANR W 2,16,2,1135-1200.For the view

that in the Latin provincesboth municipal and provincial ruler cult will have followed a calendar of anniversariescorrespondingto that found at Tebtunis (P Oslo 3, no. 77) or Oxyrhynchus(P Oxy. 2553), see Fishwick, "Liturgy and Ceremonial" (above, n. 7). 27. M. Gayraud, "Temple municipal et temple provincial du culte imp6rial h Narbonne", RSL 35 (1969) 304-316, especially308-12.

28. Templum ut in colonia Tarraconensi strueretur Augusto petentibus

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Hispanispermissum,datumquein omnesprovinciasexemplum(Ann.1,78). See Fishwick,"Divus Augustus",in ICLW (above, n. 7), Vol. 1. 29. A. Vives y Escudero,La monedahispdnica(Madrid 1924)4, p. 131,nos.9, 12, 13; cf. p. 132, no. 16; A. Beltrfin, Curso de numismdtica.I. Numismdtica antigua, cldsicay de Espaga (Cartagena 1950) 353; O. Gil Farr6s, La moneda hispdnicaen la edad antigua (Madrid 1966) 438 with fig. 121; F.A. Burgos, Catdlogogeneral de la moneda hispdnicadesdesus origineshasta el siglo V (Madrid 1979)nos. 1737f., 1743, 1746.Seefurther A. Beltran,"Los monumentos romanosen las monedashispano-romanas",AEA 26 (1953) 39-66 at 61-63. 30. The obversesof theseissuesrepresenteither the radiate head of Augustus with DIVVS AVGVSTVS PATER (Vives, pl. CLXX,3) or a seatedfigure of Augustuswith DEO AVGVSTO (Vives, pl. CLXX,6; CLXXI, 1); the reversesbear an octostyletemplewith the legendAETERNITATIS AVGVSTAE and C(olonia) [Iulia] V(rbs) T(riumphalis)T(arraco).Presumablythe possessive genitivemeans that the temple wastechnicallydedicatedto AugustanEternity, that is (surely)the Eternity of Augustushimself(as a result of deification). 31. Th. Hauschild, "Ri•mische Konstruktionen auf der oberen Stadtterrassedes antiken Tarraco", AEA 45/47 (1972/74) 3-44; cf. id., "Tarraco en la •poca Augustea", in Syrnposionde ciudades,4ugusteasI, Universidad de Zaragoza, Departamentode Prehistoriay Arqueologia(Zaragoza 1976) 213-218. 32. G. Alfoldy, "Tarraco", RE Suppl. 15(1978)570 ff. at 608. For entertainment

at the amphitheatreseeibid. 637 f. 33. Vives(above, n. 29) 4, p. 66, no. 59, cfi 60; p. 68, no. 80, cf. 81; cf. alsop. 67, no. 77; Burgos(above,n. 29) nos. 1569fi, 1583f. For discussionseeR. Etienne,Le culte impdrial dans la p•ninsule ibdrique d'Auguste?tDiocldtien (BEFAR 191, Paris 1958)414 f.; Beltrfin(above, n. 29) (1953) 54 f.; id., "Las monedasromanasde M6rida: su interpretaci6nhist6rica", in Augusta Emerita (Actas del bimilenariode Mdrida, Madrid 1976) 93-105, especially102 f. 34. The obversesshow the radiate headof Augustuswith DIVVS AVGVSTVS PATER (Vives (above, n. 29), pl. CXLIV,9, 10) or the head of Tiberius laureate with TI. CAESAR AVG. PONT. MAX. IMP. (Vives, pl. CXLVI,9, 10); on the reverse AETERNITATIS AVGVSTAE appears on the outer edge around a tetrastyle temple with C(olonia) A(ugusta) E(merita) below. Various points of detail also correspond,in particular the useof decorativeitemssuchas acroteria and a phalera on the pediment. 35. See n. 33.

36. Sincethe templeand provincialcult of Lusitaniawereevidentlymodelledon that of Hither Spain, it becomespossibleto infer the characterof the pre-Flavian worship of Tarraconensisfrom that of Lusitania, which is comparativelywell attestedby inscriptions;cf. AEpig 1966,no. 177;CIL2, 473. Theseconfirmthat the worship focusedon deified membersof the imperial houseto the exclusionof the living; see D. Fishwick, "The development of provincial ruler worship in the WesternRoman Empire", ANRW 2, 16,2,1213ff. 37. See in general M. Almagro Basch, Mdrida, gula de la ciudad y de sus monumentos (M•rida 1957); /d., "La topografia de Augusta Emerita" in Sym-

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posion de ciudades,4ugusteas(above, n. 31) 189-212with fig. 1, especially200 f. For a plan of the Roman city see,4ugustaEmerita(above,n. 33), fig. 2, facingp. 112.

38. The provincialtemplemustbe distinguished from what is believedto be the municipaltempleof the imperialcult(wronglycalled"the templeof Diana"), which stood by the municipal forum; cf. Etienne (above, n. 33) 220 f.; Almagro Basch (above, n. 36) 203 f. 39. See n. 36.

40. D. Fishwick,"Flamen ,4ugustorum",HSCP 74 (1970) 299-312;G. Alfbldy, Flamines ProvinciaeHispaniae Citerioris. Anejosde Arqueologia6 (Madrid 1973) 46-49;/d., "Tarraco" (above, n. 32) 619.