American Journal of Ancient History (Vol 5.1) 9781463206703, 1463206704

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American Journal of Ancient History

American Journal of Ancient History

5.1

The American Journal of Ancient History is a peer-reviewed academic journal covering ancient history and classical studies. It was established in 1976 and edited by Ernst Badian until 2001. It is continued by the American Journal of Ancient History: New Series, edited by T. Corey Brennan.

American Journal of Ancient History

Volume 5.1 Edited by

Ernst Badian

gp 2017

Gorgias Press LLC, 954 River Road, Piscataway, NJ, 08854, USA www.gorgiaspress.com Copyright © 2017 by Gorgias Press LLC Originally published in 1980 All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning or otherwise without the prior written permission of Gorgias Press LLC. ‫ܐ‬

1

2017

ISBN 978-1-4632-0670-3

Printed in the United States of America

TABLE

OF CONTENTS

StanleyM. Burstein:The Aftermath of the Peaceof Apamea ............

1

Edward Champlin: The Volcei Land-Register(CIL X 407) ..............

13

John K. Evans: PlebsRustica.The Peasantryof ClassicalItaly ..........

19

(To be continued)

Allen M. Ward: The Conferenceof Luca: Did it Happen?..............

48

Noel D. Robertson:The True Nature of the "Delian League" . .......... (To be continued)

64

TABLE

OF CONTENTS

StanleyM. Burstein:The Aftermath of the Peaceof Apamea ............

1

Edward Champlin: The Volcei Land-Register(CIL X 407) ..............

13

John K. Evans: PlebsRustica.The Peasantryof ClassicalItaly ..........

19

(To be continued)

Allen M. Ward: The Conferenceof Luca: Did it Happen?..............

48

Noel D. Robertson:The True Nature of the "Delian League" . .......... (To be continued)

64

THE

AFTERMATH Rome

OF THE

PEACE

and the Pontic

OF APAMEA*

War

The signingof the Peaceof Apameain 188BCmarksthe beginningof a new era in the history of Anatolia. Almost a centuryof Seleucidinfluencein the affairs of the peninsulahad been ended by Roman power. Henceforth no Seleucid force was to enter an area north of the Taurus Mountains

and west

of the Halys River. Roman power had expelled the Seleucidsfrom the peninsula;Roman diplomacyin 188 aimed at preventingtheir return. In the absenceof a permanentRoman military presenceeastof the Aegean, responsibilityfor upholding the terms of the Peace of Apamea fell to Rome'schiefalliesin the war againstAntiochusIII, Rhodesand especially EumenesII, the king of Pergamum. To that end Rome transformed Pergamum into a major power, awarding her(in addition to the bulk of the former Seleucid holdings in western Anatolia) Hellespontine Phrygia, Phrygia Epictetus and Galatia. Alliances with Ariarathes IV of Cappadocia and Mithridates, perhaps one of Antiochus III's rebel satrapsin Armenia, extendedEumenes'influenceacrossthe Halys River into central and eastern Anatolia.

•

Although intended to stabilize the new order in Anatolia, the aggrandisementof Pergamumhad exactlythe oppositeeffect.Eumenes'gainshad beenat the expenseof Bithyniaand Pontus,and two warsinvolvingalmost a decadeof fighting were requiredbeforethey acceptedthe settlementof 188. The first, which broke out soon after 188 and lasted until 183, pitted Eumenesagainst Prusias I of Bithynia and his ally, the Galatian dynast Ortiagon.2 Its course and significancehave recently been clarified by Christian

Habicht

in two studies. 3 At the root of the war was Prusias'

refusal to accept the decision of Cn. Manlius Vulso awarding Phrygia Epictetusto Eumenes,in defianceof promisesmadeto him by the Scipios in 190in order to gain hisneutralityin the war againstAntiochusIII. The war ended in 183 with Prusias'acceptanceof the settlementof 188, as a resultof a combinationof Pergamenemilitary victoriesand strongRoman diplomatic pressureexertedin the form of an embassyto Bithyniaheaded by T. Quinctius Flamininus. Much, however, remains unclear about its sequel,the Pontic War, about Rome'srole in bringingit to an end and especiallyabout its implicationsfor Roman relationswith Eumenesof Pergamum in the late 180s.

¸ 1981 by E. Badian. All rights reserved.

2

STANLEY

M.

BURSTEIN

I. The Pontic

War

Prior to the winter of 183/2 Roman contact with Pontus was limited. Despite a marital alliance with the Seleucids,Pontus had avoided direct involvement in the campaign of 190, and this, combined with the king-

dom's remote location, probablyaccountsfor its being unaffectedby the Peaceof Apamea.4 The Senate,therefore,can hardlyhaveanticipatedthe arrival in Rome in the winter of 183/2 of three separateembassiesfrom Rhodes, Eumenes, and Pharnaces I of Pontus, all seeking Senatorial intervention

in Pontic

affairs.•

The Rhodianshad cometo Rome at the behestof the citizensof Sinope. Annexation of the Greek citiesof the Paphlagoniancoasthad beena goal of the Pontic kingssinceachievingfull independencein 281. Amastrisand Amisushad been occupiedin the third century,but the great prize was Sinope.6 An earlier attack on the city by Mithridates II in 220 had been foiled by Rhodian intervention,7and now againthe Sinopeanshad turned to Rhodes for aid, when Pharnacestook advantageof the distractionof the Bithynian War and its aftermath to seizethe city in 183.8 While the nature of the Rhodian complaintagainstPharnacesis clear, the opposite is true of the embassiesfrom Eumenes and Pharnaces. Polybius (23.9.3) only refers to "matters in dispute between the kings" without specifyingexactly what questionsthe kingshad agreedto submit to the Senate for judgement. In view, however, of the prominenceof Galatia in the Pontic War and in the treaty of 179 ending it, and of the possibilitythat Pharnaceshad hereditaryclaimsin the area,9 it is possible that the points at issue were conflicting territorial claims in Galatia resultingfrom Eumenes'successful extensionof Pergameneauthority over the region in 183. Be that as it may, the Senateinformed the embassiesthat a commissionof inquiry•ø would visit the area to examine the Sinopean problem and the issuesin dispute betweenthe kings. The commissioners' mission, however, was unsuccessful, since serious

fighting had already broken out in Cappadociaevenbeforetheir arrival on the scene in the spring of 182.• Equally unsuccessfulwas a second commissionof inquiry dispatched--inresponseto new embassies in the winter of 182/1 from Eumenes,Ariarathes and Pharnaces--with instructions to investigatethe matter more thoroughly: fighting in 181 spread from Cappadocia into Galatia, where Pharnacessucceededin detaching two Galatian dynasts, Cassignatusand Gaizatorigus, from Eumenes.A truce between Eumenes and Pharnacesfor the purpose of requesting decisiveaction by the Senate to end the war likewise had no effect, as a Pontic offensivein the winter of 180extendedthe war deeperinto Galatia and Paphlagonia, where Pharnaces' general Leocritus seized from

PEACE

OF APAMEA

3

Eumenesthe coastal city of Tium. 12The winter of 180, however, marked the peak of Pharnaces'success.A Pergamenecounter-offensivein the springof 180, whichregainedfor Eumenesthe territory lostin Galatia the year before, was followed by a joint invasionof Pontusitselfby the forces of Eumenes and Ariarathes. Only the urging of the new Roman commissionersthat nothing be done to prejudicetheir attemptsat a negotiated settlementpreventedthe alliesfrom forcing a decisivemilitary confrontation on Pharnaces. When the Pontic ambassadorsrejected the terms offered to their master at a Roman-sponsoredpeaceconferenceat Pergamum in 180, however, fighting resumed. An attempt to deprive Pharnaces of supplies by closing the Hellespont to navigation failed becauseof Rhodianopposition,but a new Pergamenedriveinto Pontusin the springof 179,supportedby both PrusiasII of Bithyniaand Ariarathes, forcedthe now-isolatedPontic king to suefor peace,•3a peacewhichwas concludedby a treaty whosetext is preservedby Polybius.TM With hisenemiesencampedin Pontus,Pharnaceshad little choicebut to accepttermswhichreflectedthe decisiveness of Eumenes'victory. Basically the treaty required a restoration of the status quo ante at Pharnaces' expense,in effect,a recognitionby him of the Peaceof Apameaand the concessionof all questionsin disputebetweenhim and œumenes.All his gains in the interior of Paphlagoniaand Cappadociawere to be surrendered in the condition in which he found them, and he was to withdraw

from Galatia, severall existingrelationswith Galatian dynastsand desist from any future activity in the region. He was to bear the costsof the war and give hostagesas a pledgeof hisintentionto abideby the treaty. Of all his once-considerableconquests,his victors allowed Pharnacesto retain only Sinopeand probably her two coloniesof Cerasusand Cotyora;•5but then the fate of that unfortunatecity had been the particular interestof Rhodes,and after herbreak with Eumenesin 180,it is not surprisingif he in turn abandonedher ally. Otherwise,however,Pharnacesemergedfrom the war strippedof the bulk of his gains and financially embarrassed. •6

II. Roman Diplomacy in the Pontic War Rome's role in the Pontic war, it would seem,was singularlyinglorious, with the dispatch of three commissionsof inquiry, each with more comprehensive instructionsand goalsthan its predecessor andeachtotally ineffective.j?Only decisiveaction by Eumenesbrought the warto an end,a fact whichwould at first glanceseemto justify RogerMcShane'semphasis on the success of Pergamenemilitary and diplomaticactionindependentof Rome as the most significantaspectof the entire episode.•8 In truth the apparentineptness of Romanactionin thiswar issurprising,

4

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M. BURSTEIN

especiallysincethe list of combatantsindicatesthat theprolongationof the conflict led to the involvementin it of participantsfrom the whole of the Anatolian peninsula,while the inclusionin the treaty of 179of adscript#9 from Armenia

and the north and west coasts of the Black Sea 20indicates a

concern for its settlementthroughout the Black Sea basin. Clearly, continuationof the war carriedwith it the potentialof disruptingthe new regime in Anatolia established by the Peace of Apamea. In these circumstancesit is understandablethat scholarshave seen,in the seeming lack of effectiveRoman supportfor Eumenes,evidenceof a fundamental changein the Senate'sattitude toward the Pergamenemonarch. F.W. Walbank2• has observedthat "the Senate let the war drag on for four years...; perhapstheywerenot averseto seeingEumeneschecked";while

]•douardWill• has goneevenfurtherand suggested that the Senate actually welcomedthe expansionof Pontus as a counter-balanceto the power of Pergamum. As confirmation of their interpretation of the duplicitous character of Roman diplomacy in the Pontic War, both Walbank and Will point to IOSPE 1• 402, an inscriptionfrom Chersonesus Taurica publishedby R. Loeperin 1908and datedby him to thelatespring of 179:

[... but we shallattemptto preservehiski]ngd[omto thebestof our ability so long as he remainsin friendship]with us and preserves friendship[with theRom]ansanddoes[nothin]gagainstthem.May all bewellwith usif wedo not violateour oathandtheoppositeif we do. This oathwasswornon thefifteenthdayof themonthHerakleios whenApollodorussonof Herogeitonwaskingand Herodotussonof Herodotus secretary. The oath which king Pharnacessworewhen Matris and Heracleius went on embassyto him. I swear by Zeus, Ge, Helius and all the Olympian godsand goddesses. I will be a friend to the Chersonesites

for all time.If theneighboring barbariansmarchagainstChersonesus or the territoryruledby Chersonesus or injuretheChersonesites and theysummonme, I will cometo theiraid if I can,and I will not plot againstthe Chersonesites nor will I do anythingagainstthe Chersonesites whichmightharm the Chersonesites, but I will attemptto preservethe democracyto the best of my ability so long as they remainin friendshipwith me and swearthe sameoathand preserve friendshipwith theRomansanddo nothingagainstthem.May all be well with me if I do not violatemy oathand the oppositeif I do. This oath wasswornin the one hundredfifty-seventhyear, in the month Daisios, on king Pharnaces'year-count.

PEACE

OF APAMEA

5

IOSPE 12 402 contains the oaths exchanged by Chersonesusand Pharnacesin ratifyingan epimachiaor defensivealliance.Eachpledgesaid to the other in caseof attack, providedthey havemaintainedphilia not only between themselvesbut also with Rome, and, most significantly, have committed no acts prejudicial to Roman interests.The referencetophilia with Rome and the emphasison the primacy of Roman interestsin the oath formulae clearly point to both Chersonesus' and Pharnaces'being Roman clientsat the time of the treaty'snegotiation? a fact whichis of particular interest, since it is likely that both Chersonesusand her metropolis, HeracleaPontica--both adscriptito the treaty of 179and the latter an ally of Rome's as wel124--weresympatheticto Pharnacesand not to Eumenes during the Pontic War. 25 In 179, it would seem, Rome effected a reconciliationwith Pharnacesand approvedof military cooperationin the future betweenhim and one of the statesfriendly to him during the Pontic War. This, together with the lack of apparent oppositionto his continued occupation of Sinope and her colonies, and the blunting of Eumenes' offensivein 180 by the Senate'scommissioners, would appear to provide strong support for the theory that Rome's dilatory diplomacy reflecteda Roman "tilt" toward Pharnacesasa resultof a "cooling",to useWalbank's phrase? of the relationsbetweenthe Senateand Eumenes. Despitethe attractivenessof this interpretation,particularlyin the light of the worseningof relationsbetweenRome and Pergamumin the 160s,27it is both unlikely and unsupportedby the evidence.Polybiusand Justin28 togetherallow no doubt that Roman diplomatic support for Pergamum during the Pontic War was both strongand consistent.The report of the first commissionof inquiry was wholly supportiveof Eumenes'position and condemned Pharnaces' aggressivebehavior? The embassy of Eumenes'brother Attalus in the winter of 181/0 was well receivedby the Senate,30and the refusalof Pharnaces'ambassadorsto acceptthe terms offeredby the Roman commissioners at the peaceconferenceat Pergamum in 180,after their master'sexplicitpromiseto do so, is explicableonly on the assumption that they were perceived as being too favorable to Eumenes--as indeed they are likely to have been, sincethe treaty of 179, which presumably reflects them, favors Pergamum and its allies on all significantpointsin contentionin Anatolia savethe fate of Sinope.3•Most importantly, however,IOSPE 12402, the one supposedlycontemporary documentassumedto reflect Roman partiality toward Pharnaces,actually points to the oppositeconclusion. The interpretation of IOSPE 12 402 as indicating Roman sympathy toward Pharnacesis basedsolelyon the beliefthat it is datedaccordingto an otherwise unattested Pontic era beginning with the accessionof

6

STANLEY

M. BURSTEIN

Mithridates of Cius in 336, so that Daisios of year 157would fall in the late spring of 179. This dating was proposedby the inscription'sfirst editor, R. Loeper? and accepted by subsequentscholars,33 becausea dating accordingto the more familiar Pontic era beginningin 29734was impossiblesincePharnaceswasdead by year 157 of that era. Although generally accepted,Loeper'sinterpretationwasseriouslyflawedfrom the beginning: first, becauseit assumedthat the accessionof Mithridates of Cius was an epochal event in Pontic history, when Pontic tradition ignored him and traced the fortunes of the dynastyto the establishmentof Mithridates I Ctistes as ruler in northern Cappadocia in 30235;and second,becauseit seriouslydistorted the evidence of Diodorus on the chronology of the rulers of Cius. Loeper's dating implies that Mithridates became ruler of Ciusin 336/5, whileDiodorusclearlyplaceshisaccession in the year337/6, which would result in a date of spring, 18036(not spring, 179) for the Chersonesustreaty. This is a manifest improbability since the treaty suggests friendly relationsbetweenPharnacesand Rome, while spring, 180 is preciselythe period of the strongestand most open Roman supportof Pharnaces' enemy Eumenes. Evasion of this difficulty by redating Mithridates' accessionto 336/5, however, is difficult, as Diodorus' dates for the dynasty of Cius are internally consistent,so that alteration of that for Mithridates of Cius would be justified only if there were strong evidence,which there is not, that Diodorus systematicallyantedatedby one year the reignsof all the rulersof that dynasty? Clearly, an interpretation which does not require suchgrossdistortionsof the sourcesis desirable, and evidencepointing to one exists. In 1902 Loeper also published an inscription of Pharnaces' son Mithridates V, found at Ineboli (ancient Abonuteichos)in Paphlagonia and dated to 1 Dios of year 161of an era whichwasnaturallyassumedto be the known Pontic era beginningin 297 BC,or, in other words, to the fall of the year 137/6 BC.38Despiteits paradoxicalimplicationthat year 161, in the reign of Mithridates V, was not four but forty-two yearslater than year 157, still in the reignof hisfather Pharnaces,publicationof IOSPE 12402 did not lead to a seriousreconsiderationof Loeper'sdating of the Ineboli inscription. Nevertheless,it has long been clear that an alternative dating of the Ineboli inscription by the Seleucidera of 312/11 was possible.39On that assumptionit would date from fall, 152 BC,a date that is fully compatible with the known fact that in 149 Mithridates V had already been king of Pontusfor an unknown period of time.4øBy the samesystemIOSPE 12402 would date to spring, 155, thus eliminating both the historical and the sourceproblemsposedby the accepteddating of this inscription,and the

PEACE

OF APAMEA

7

puzzlingforty-two year gap betweenyear 157in the reignof Pharnacesand year 161 in the reign of his son Mithridates V. Is this solution possible?Oppositionhas relied on two assumptions, which are now known to be erroneous:namely, that Pharnacesdied in 1707 and that Polybius 33.12.1 indicated that his successor,Mithridates IV, wasalreadyking in the winter of 156/5.42In fact Polybius33.12.1refers to eventsof winter, 155/4,43and hencedoesnot precludePharnaces'still being king in the spring of 155, while OGIS 771 revealsPharnacesas still alive in the springof 15944and, moreover,givesa plausiblereasonfor his adopting the Seleucidera, sinceit refersto hisrecentrenewalof the marital alliancebetweenhishouseand the Seleucidsthroughhismarriageto Nysa, the daughter or granddaughter of Antiochus Ill. 45 For these reasons, therefore, the dating of IOSPE 12 402 to the spring of 179 should be abandoned,and with it Loeper'shypothetical Pontic era of 336 Be. The inscriptionshouldbe redatedaccordingto the Seleucidera to the springof 155, twenty-four years later. The theorythat the apparentineffectiveness of Roman diplomacyin the PonticWar reflectedRomandispleasure with Eumenesand sympathyfor Pharnacesrestedultimately on the belief that IOSPE 12402 proved the existenceof closerelationsbetweenRome and Pharnaceswhenthe treaty of 179wassigned.Dating of thisinscriptionto the springof 155--that is, to a period known to be marked by good relations between Rome and Pergamum46--materiallyalters its significance.It doesattestto the establishmentofphilia betweenRome and Pharnacessometimebetweenthe end of the Pontic War and 155,47but that by itself is neither surprisingnor indicativeof a changein relationsbetweenRomeandPergamumin thelate

180s,sinceby signingthetreatyof 179Pharnaces signaled hisacceptance of the termsof the Peaceof Apamea,and in sodoingremovedthe principal. obstacleto friendshipwith Rome. What is striking,however,is that when Pharnacesand Chersonesus did negotiate,in 155,an alliancetheybelieved acceptableto Rome, it took the limited form of a defensivealliance valid only so long as both sidesmaintainedphilia with Rome, and henceuseless in the event Pharnacesshouldattempt to attack Pergamumor her allies. IOSPE 12402 thusprovidesno evidenceof a "cooling"of Roman relations

with Eumenesduringthe PonticWar. Quite the contrary.In the treatyof 179 Eumenesconsolidatedthe gainshe had madein the Peaceof Apamea by forcing Pharnacesto acceptthe bordersof the variousAnatolian states asdefinedby Manlius Vulsoand hiscolleagues in 188,48and IOSPE 12402 reveals that twenty-four years later Pharnaces' freedom of action in northern Anatolia was still restrictedby the terms of the treaty of 179. Viewed in this light, Roman diplomacy in the Pontic War was neither

8

STANLEY

M. BURSTEIN

notably inept nor hostile to the interests of Pergamum. There was, moreover, no reasonfor the Senateto be displeasedwith its results:Rome avoided direct military involvementin the conflict, while Eumenes,the principal championof her settlementof Anatolia, enforcedrecognitionof the Peace of Apamea on Pontus, the one power not includedin it, and therebystabilizedrelationsin northern Anatolia for much of the next halfcentury.49The price was recognitionof Pharnaces'annexation of Sinope and her colonies,but so long as he abided by the terms of the treaty of 179, Rome raised no objectionto that or to his other activitiesin the Black Sea basin.so Roman tolerance, however, was not unlimited. Thus, while she

ignoredthe annexation of the Crimean citiesby Mithridates VI later in the century?• war and ultimately the destruction of his kingdom followed Mithridates' refusalto adhereto the restraintsimposedby the treaty of 179 on Pontic activity in central and northern Anatolia.52 Stanley M. Burstein

California State University Los Angeles NOTES

*This study was originally prepared as my contribution to a National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Seminar on the topic of"Roman Imperialism", conductedby ProfessorWilliam V. Harrisat ColumbiaUniversityin the summerof 1979. A revisedversionof it wasdeliveredto the 1980 meetingof the Pacific Coast Branchof the American Historical Association,held at the University of Southern California in Los Angeles.I shouldlike to expressmy thanks to ProfessorHarris, and to Professors R. Melior, E. Gruen and Chr. Habicht for their comments on earlier drafts, and, in particular, to the editor and readers of AJAH and to ProfessorRobert K. Sherk for their suggestions,which were of great value in the preparation of the final text. All dates in this article are BC.

I. For a detailed analysis see Th6r•se Liebmann-Frankfort, La frontibre orientaledansla politique extdrieurede la Rdpubliqueromaine(Brussels1969)4175. For the reading Halys at Livy 38.38 see Liebmann-Frankfort 50-64. 2. Trogus (Prologue 32) includesPharnacesI of Pontus among the allies of Prusias. This has been denied, most recently by F.W. Walbank, A historical commentaryon Polybius3 (Oxford 1979)254 ad24.1.2; but stronglydefendedby JoachimHopp, Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der letztenAttaliden. Vestigia25 (Munich 1977) 41, n. 37.

3. ChristianHabicht,"Oberdie Kriegezwischen Pergamonund Bithynien", Hermes84 (1956) 90-100; and "PrusiasI" RE23.1 (1957) 1098-1103. 4. Eduard Meyer, Geschichtedes K6nigreichs Pontos (Leipzig 1879) 71; Th6odore Reinach, Mithridates Eupator K6nig yon Pontos, trans. A. Goetze (Leipzig 1895) 34. For marital relations betweenPontus and the Seleucidssee

PEACE

OF APAMEA

9

Jakob Seibert, HistorischeBeitrtigezu den dynastischenVerbindungenin hellenistischer Zeit. Historia Einzelschriften l0 (Wiesbaden 1967) 118-119. 5. Polybius23.9.1-3; Livy 40.2.6, 40.2.8. For the date seeWalbank (supra n. 2) 254 ad 24.1.2.

6. Memnon, FGrH 3B, 434 F 9.4 for Amastris and F 16.2 for Amisus. 7. Polybius 4.56.

8. Strabo 23.3.11, p. 546. For the date seeWalbank (supra n. 2) 227 ad 23.9.2. 9. Suggestedby Hopp (supra n. 2) 45 and Felix Staehelin,Geschichteder kleinasiatischenGalater bis zur Errichtung der r6mischen Provinz Asia, 2nd ed. (Leipzig 1907) 63, n. 3, on the basisof Justin 38.5.3. Cf. Polybius25.2.3-4. 10. Only the praenomen of its leader, Marcus, is known (Polybius 24.1.2; cf. Walbank (supra n. 2) 254 ad 24.1.2). 11. The main sourcesfor the war are' Polybius24.1.1-3, 5.1-8, 14-15;25.1.1-15; 27.7.5; and Diodorus 29.22-24. For reconstructionsof it seeMeyer (supra n. 4) 7180; Hopp (supran. 2)44-48; and Eckart Olshausen,"Pontos",RESupp. 15(1978) 410-414.

12. Diodorus 29.23. For the date seeWalbank (supra n. 2) 267 ad 24.14.1 and Meyer (supra n. 4) 74. 'Axo(%½v0•. in Polybius25.2.7 can only meanthat Pharnaces seized Tium from Eumenes (cf. Ernst Meyer, Die Grenzen der hellenistischen Staaten in Kleinasien (ZEtrich 1925) 149-151). 13. Pharnacesdid unsuccessfully attempt, with an offer of a 500-talentpayment, to induce SeleucusIV to come to hisaid (Diodorus 29.24; Polybius F96 (BW), with Walbank (supra n. 2) 274 ad 25.2.14). For the date see Meyer (supra n. 4) 79. Scholars often ascribe Seleucus'refusal to direct Roman intervention (cf., e.g.,

Liebmann-Frankfort (supran. 1) 77; •douardWill, Histoirepolitique du monde helldnistique323-30 av. J.-C. 2 (Nancy 1967) 143;and David Magie, Roman rule in Asia Minor (Princeton 1950) 1.192);but this is unlikely, sinceDiodorus mentions no embassy,but onlyascribeshisaction to reflectionon the consequences (• X0•13t3v ) of hisbreakingthePeaceof Apamea,consequences thatarelikelyto have been pointed out to him in 183 when Flamininusvisited him (Polybius 23.5.1). 14. Polybius 25.2.3-14. 15. Pharnaces'retention of Sinope is implied by Strabo 13.3.11, p. 545. His possessionof Cerasus and Cotyora is indicated by their synoecisminto his eponymouscity of Pharnakeia(cf. Albert Herrmann,"Pharnakeia",RE 19(1938) 1848 for full references). 16. For Pharnaces'financial problemsin the decadesafter the Pontic War see OGIS 771. 16-20 with Dittenberger'snote ad loc. 17. Cf. Hopp (supra n. 2) 46, who characterizesthem as "symbolisch".The weaknessof the commissionsas diplomatic tools in general is noted by A.N. Sherwin-White,"Roman involvementin Anatolia, 167-88B.C.", JRS 67 (1977) 66, who, however, also points to the Senate'swillingnessto interveneto preservethe status quo in Anatolian affairs. 18. Roger B. McShane,Theforeignpolicy of theAttalids of Pergamum(Urbana 1964) 163. 19. For adscriptias interestednon-belligerents seeEliasBickermann,"Rom und Lampsakos",Philologus87 (1932)278-283.The sourcesfor the PonticWar provide

10

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BURSTEIN

no supportfor Werner Dahlheim'sthesis(Struktur und Entwicklungdesri•mischen Vdilkerrechts im dritten und zweitenJahrhundertv. Chr. Vestigia8 (Munich 1968) 209-217) that theyare secondarybelligerentswith whom peacehasto be madefor a war to be completely ended. 20. As adscriptiPolybius(25.2.12-14) listsin Asia Artaxias, the ruler of most of Armenia, and Acusilochus,and in Europethe Sarmatian Gatalus;as well asthe free citiesof HeracleaPontica•Chersonesus Taurica, Mesembriaand Cyzicus. 21. Walbank (supra n. 2) 227.ad 23.9.3. 22. Will (supra n. 13) 243-244. 23. Clearly the traditional picture of Pharnacesas consistentlyintransigentin dealingwith Rome (cf., e.g., E. Badian,Foreign Clientelae264-70Bc(Oxford 1958) 99; and Sherwin-White (supra n. 17) 64, n. 15) must be revisedto take accountof IOSPE 12 402 (cf. Olshausen (supra n. l 1) 414). 24. Memnon, FGrH 3B, 434 F 18.10; for the circumstancessee Manfred Janke, Historische Untersuchungenzu Memnon yon Herakleia Kap. 18-40, FgrHist. Nr. 434 (Diss. Wt•rzburg 1963)30-31.

25. ScholarsusuallyassigntheGreekadscriptito Eumenesand the non-Greekto Pharnaces(cf., e.g., Will (supran. 13) 243; Liebmann-Frankfort(supran. l)81-82; and Dahlheim (supra n. 19) 215, n. 85). In the caseof Chersonesusthis has been basedon the arbitrary belief that the allusionto attacksby neighboringbarbarians in IOSPE 12402.14-16refersto attacksby Gatalusmadeat the behestof Pharnaces, instead of to the well-documentedthreat to the city posedby her Scythian and Taurian neighbors(IOSPE 12401.12;343.14;352passim;353;cf. Hopp (supran. 2) 47, n. 71 and Walbank (supra n. 2) 273 ad25.2.13). RelationsbetweenChersonesus and her metropolisHeracleaPontica,however,wereclosethroughouther history (Jakob Seibert, Metropolis und Apoikie: historischeBeitriigezur Geschichteihrer gegenseitigen Beziehungen(Diss.Wt•rzburg1963)160-188);and two itemsstrongly point to Heraclea's hostility toward Eumenesduring the Pontic War: Eumenes' attemptto closethe Hellespontto navigation(whichwouldcertainlyhurt Heraclea) and his return of Tium to Prusias II after the war (Polybius 25.2.7), which would enable him to threaten the city from both the east and the west, as had his father Prusias I (cf. Memnon, FGrH 3B, 434 F 19.1; Gaetano De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani 4.1 (Turin 1923) 264). 26. Walbank (supra n. 2) 257 ad 24.5.1, and cf. his remarks at 254 ad 24.1.3. 27. Cf. Hopp (supran. 2) 57-58 and McShane(supran. 18) 182-186for details. 28. Justin 38.6.2: Sic et avum suum Pharnacen per cognitionurn arbitria succidaneumregi PergamenoEumenidatum. For the interpretationof thistext see BenedictusNiese, Geschichteder griechischenund makedonischenStaatenseitder Schlacht bei Chaeronea3 (Gotha 1903) 74, n. 5. 29. Polybius 24.1.2-3. 30. Diodorus

29.22.

31. Polybius 24.15.11. 32. Loeper'sargumentationis known to me only through its summaryby Erich Diel, "Pharnakes", RE 19 (1938) 1850-1851;and M. Rostovtzeff, "Pontus and its Neighbours:The First Mithridatic War", CAH 9 (Cambridge 1932) 217-218.

PEACE

OF APAMEA

11

33. The literature on IOSPE 12402 is summarizedby G. Peri, "Zur Chronologie der KiSnigreicheBithynia, Pontos und Bosporos",Studien zur Geschichteund Philosophie des Altertums, ed. J. Harmatta (Amsterdam 1968) 301, n. 10. 34. For the Pontic era see Peri 300-305.

35. Plutarch, Demetrius,4.4; Appian, Mith. 9. The significanceof thispoint was broughtto my attentionby Mr. Brian McGing of the Departmentof Classicsof the University of Dublin. The attempt by Rostovtzeff(supra n. 32) 218 to strengthen the theory by assigningone of the five royal tombs at Amasia (cf. Reinach, Mithridates (supran. 4) 288) to Mithridates of Ciusisunconvincing;more likely the five tombs are for Mithridates I, Ariobarzanes, Mithridates II and Pharnaces I,

with the fifth ruler being Mithridates III, whosereign shouldbe insertedbetween thoseof Mithridates II and Pharnaces(Meyer (supra n. 4) 54-56; Magie (supra n. 13) 2.1088, n. 39). 36. The alternativesare clearly stated by Walbank (supra n. 2) 20. 37. As assumedby Perl (supran. 33) 306, n.33. The key passages are Diodorus 15.90.3, 16.90.2and 20.111.4;for their interpretationseeMeyer (supran. 4) 34-38. 38. Cited according to the edition of Th6odore Reinach, "A Stele from Abonuteichos",NC 4 5 (1905) 114-115.It is clearfrom Reinach'sremark (118) that "the date 161 must certainlybe reckonedaccordingto the royal 'Pontic era'" that this was only an unconfirmedassumption.In fact, the "royal Pontic era" is not attestedbefore the 90s }5c(cf. Peri (supra n. 33) 300-301). 39. Cf. Rostovtzeff(supra n. 32) 217. 40. Appian, Mith. 10. Perl (supra n. 33) 301, n. 10, erroneouslydates his accession to 149.

41. The beliefthat Pharnacesdiedin 170restedontheassumptionthat Polybius 27.17 was part of the obituary noticeon him (cf. Meyer (supran. 4) 81; Reinach, Mithridates (supra n. 4) 27, n. 4). 42. E.g. Reinach, Mithridates (supra n. 4) 36; Rostovtzeff (supra n. 32) 218; Magie (supran. 13) 2, 1090,n. 46. 43. Cf. Habicht, "Kriege" (supra n. 3) 107 and Walbank (supra n. 2) 555 ad 33.12.1.

44. For the dating of the archonshipof Tychandrosto 160/59 and henceof OGIS 771 to that year, seeWilliam Scott Ferguson,Athenian Tribal Cyclesin the HellenisticAge (Cambridge, Mass. 1932) 145; and Walbank (supra n. 2) 318 ad 27.17.

45. OGIS 771.28-29. Daughter: Walbank (supra n. 2) 318 ad 27.17. Granddaughter:Otto Morkholm, AntiochusIVofSyria (Copenhagen1966)54; Seibert, Verbindungen(supran. 4) 69. The appearanceof monthsDios and Daisiosin the Abonuteichossteleand IOSPE 12402 indicatesadoption of the Seleucidcalendar by the kings of Pontus (cf. Reinach, "Stele" (supra n. 38) 119). 46. For detailsseeMcShane (supran. 18) 186-192;and Sherwin-White(supran. 17) 62-63. 47. Appian, Mith. 10, it is true, claims that Mithridates V was the first Pontic king to be a philos of Rome, but he is clearly mistaken,sinceMithridates IV was already a philos of Rome, as Ronald Mellor ("The dedicationson the Capitoline hill", Chiron 8 (1978) 326-327) showed.

12

STANLEY

M. BURSTEIN

48. Pointed out by Liebmann-Frankfort(supra n. 1) 80. 49. Brokenonly by the Bithyno-Pergamene war of the mid-150son whichsee now Habicht, "Kriege" (supra n. 3) 101-110. 50. For evidenceof Pharnaces'diplomatic activity on thewestcoastof the Black Sea,seeIGBR 1240 with G. Mihailov'scommentsad loc. (p. 89). 51. Strabo 7.4.3, p. 309; IOSPE 12352. 52. For the backgroundto the First Mithridatic War seenow Sherwin-White (supran. 17)70-75and DennisG. Glew,"MithridatesEupatorand Rome:A study of the backgroundof the First Mithridatic War", Athenaeum65 (1977)380-404. Accordingto Appian(Mith. 43) SullaignoredNicomedes IV's chargethat Pontic expansionin the Crimea violatedthe Peaceof Apamea (cf. Paolo Desideri, "Posidonioe la guerramitridatica",Athenaeum51 (1973)3, n. 3) andconfirmed

Mithridates'possession of thoseterritoriesin the Peaceof Dardanus(Appian, Mith. 55 with 58 and 64).

THE VOLCEI LAND-REGISTER

(CIL X 407)

Of the handful of important non-literary documentsfor Italian rural history, easily the most enigmatic is the land-registerfrom Volcei in Lucaniawhichbearsthe consulardatefor AD323.• The preamblerunning acrossthe top of the stone(whichisbrokenoff on the otherthreesides)has beenrestoredby the most recenteditor, "non sinealiqua dubitatione'; to read as follows:2 [Ex princi]pio sacro[d]d. nn. ConstantiniMaxim[i]

vener[andiet LicinianiLicini Augg.]I [nobilis]simorumque Caesarum Vulceianaeci[vitatispagisqui infra sunt]I [Acilio Se]veroet [Vettio R]ufinoconnss.per Turci[um--- adscriptae (seuadtributae)sunt]I [millenae] MMDCCCCXC[I] In columnsbeneaththis preambleis a list of properties,suchas(2.5 if.) f(undus) Maceriatus,f Marcellianus,f Micerianus,f Casinianus,k(asa) Oppiana, etc.; and after eachpropertyis found the letter m and a number, asinf Curianusm. xviii. The listis presentedin five survivingcolumns,of whichthe first existsonly as a partially obliteratedseriesof numbers,and on any reasonablerestorationof the preamblethere mustalsohavebeena sixth column on the right, which is now lost.The columnsare punctuated at intervals by headingsin larger letters, suchas (3.13) Pago Narano rn. CLXXXIII. Clearly, then, the propertiesare groupedby pagi and their individualfiguresare tallied up to givea total for thepagus.In turn, the sum for all the pagi is presumablythe figure given in the last line of the preamble.If wetakethefundusnameswhollyor partlypreserved(some47) and estimate the contents of the missing columns, no fewer than 70 propertiesand sevenpagi can be involved,and the total may in fact be much greater,dependingupon how much of the stonehasbeenlost at the bottom.

The inscriptionseemsto be a censusdocumentin someway connected with Diocletian's tax reforms.3 The nature of the unit rn was satisfactorily

resolvedby A. D616age,who pointedto the term millena next found as a land measureabout a centurylater and subsequentlyusedwith referenceto southern Italy by Justinian.4 Beyond this, the document offers more problemsthan can readilybe resolved,in largepart becausethe stoneis in severalways unique. Against severalelaborate,but more or lesssimilar, recordsfrom the Aegean,Asia Minor and Egypt, it standsasthe only such document from the Latin West. Many of the abbreviationswhich it 13

14

EDWARD

CHAMPLIN

employsare unparalleled,and efforts to expand them are quite unsure. And all of the fundi are recorded with astonishingvagueness:nothing beyond name and pagus, no indication of owner or neighbours,as would be required by the forma censualis. • An equally puzzling aspect of the inscriptionlies in the namesthemselvesof the great majority of the estates which, following custom,preservethe gentilicia of former owners.A study of Lucanian genteshas made three singular observations:that severalof the greater landowningfamilies of previousgenerationsare quite unrepresentedin the estatenamesof 323;that only sixgentilicia(one or two more might be added) preservedin thefundi namesare otherwisefound in the region; and that no fewer than 23 are otherwiseunattested,not only at Volcei but throughoutLucania.6The perplexingconclusionwasof a sharp break in landowningsocietyin the third century,a demographicdepression followed by a renewal of the population. The main problem is simplythe absenceof the ownersin the document. First, all but one of the similar registersfrom Asia and the islandsare indeed organized owner by owner, each rubric setting out that particular owner'svarious holdingsin the area.? Sincehe or shewould ultimately be responsiblefor the taxes,the owner'spublic identificationwould seemto be essential for such a document. Second, the owner's name has a vital

topographicalvalueas well. Thus, evenwith theirpagi noted,suchitemsas the little field (2.16), the upper little field (3.8), the camp field (4.6), the chick-pea field (4.16), the walled field (2.5), et al., are hardly adequate identification, whereasthe addition of the owner'sname (for example, the chick-peafield of Julius Caesarin thepagus Naranus) providesa precise and verifiable reference.In short, at first sight, the text does not look as thoughit had an official function,in whichcasewe haveno ideajust what it is.

The problem recedes,however, if we correct one optical illusion, by seeing •n the Turcius of the preamble not a governor but a landed proprietor. Three points should be made. First, as just suggested,the name of at leastone owner is requiredif the documentis what it appearsto be, and "Turcius" is the only name on the stone.Disregardingfor the momentany restorationof the document,there is strong reasonto suspectthat he is the necessaryowner. Second, the natural assumption has been that Turcius was the local governorin 323, that is, correctorLucaniaeet Bruttiorum,and he hasbeen identified (surely rightly) with the L. Turcius Apronianus who was subsequentlyprefectof the city of Rome in 339 and whoisknownto havedied by 350.8 However, attention should be paid to the line lengths in the preamble. Braccosuggestedsomethingover 20 lettersmissingfrom the right end of the first three, and his tentative restorationsof letters and

THE VOLCEI LAND-REGISTER (CIL X 407)

15

interpunctsin the first two lines run to 28 and 28. In the crucial third line, the suggestedletters and interpunctsrun to 18 spaces,leaving room for only about 10 more, a gap more or lessneatly filled by Turcius' presumed cognomen"Apronianus". It is thusimmediatelyevidentthat, whateverthis inscription may be, it does not name a governor,for there is simply no room for the inevitable

titles v.c. corrector

Lucaniae

et Bruttiorum

or for

any attested(or indeedany reasonable)abbreviations.9Turcius,therefore, was not corrector.•ø

Third, if he is not governorwe may regardhim as a privatecitizen,and the originsof the gens Turcia becomerelevant.Though it was one of the great senatorialfamilies of the later Empire, its history before a pair of suffectconsulsin the later third and early fourth centuriesis remarkably obscure.The name itself isexceptionallyrare:not to be found in the indices to the Latin inscriptionsof Africa or Spain or Gaul or evenCisalpina,it is steadfastlyconfinedto Italy proper. And if we setasidethe attestationsof the senatorialfamily at Rome or elsewherein official guise,there is very little in the way even of Italian appearances.Pointingto the recurrencein a private capacity at Aufidena of the third-century consul L. Turcius FaesasiusApronianus,the earliestknown memberof the family, Groag suggestedan origo in northern Samnium. • However, that area was the home of the obscureFaesasii;it need tell us nothing about the Turcii.•2 Apart from this, there is the isolatedfamily of an early praetoriansoldier Turcius Rufus at Auximum in Regio V, and a Turcius Crescensof no standingat Puteoli in Regio I (compare the lady Turcia Marcella c.f. at Capua).•3 Much more interesting are the only other attested Turcii, residents of Lucanian

Grumentum

to the south of Volcei.

L. Turcius

Dafnus, an Augustalis,and his wife Turcia Attica wereclearlyfreedmen. Slightly superior was C. Turcius C.f. Pom. Nebrus, a decurion of Grumentum who held all of its higher magistracies.•4But, as his Greek cognomenmight indicate, he too was but one generationremoved from slavery,for hismotherwasan Allidia C. lib. From thesepeoplewecaninfer at leastthe existenceof slave-owningTurcii in the area, and the marriage betweendependentsof the Turcii and the Allidii is suggestive.The gens Allidia recurs only once elsewherein Lucania, at Volcei and its environs, and there in such numbers that Volcei was surely its home.•5 Thus, if a senatorialTurcius with no official functionappearson an inscriptionat Volcei, thereis amplereasonto suspectthat he ownedland in that regionof Lucania.•6If that inscriptionlistslanded property, shouldit not be his? The vast landed wealth of the great senatorial families of Rome in the later Empire is well recorded.•7The Turcii Aproniani and Secundinicely reflectthevariousconcomitantsof suchriches:a later ApronianusAsterius was able to govern Rome strictly and well as prefect of the city under

16

EDWARD

CHAMPLIN

Julian; a Secunduslavishly patronized the arts, if the elaborate treasure from the domus Turciorurnon the Esquilineis any indication;and a much later ApronianusAsteriusfound the leisureto producea correctedversion of Vergil. •8 The large estatesnecessaryto supportsuchactivitiesmay well have been spread throughout Italy and the provinces,but their centre can now be identified as Lucania.•9 And the Volcei land-register(in better conformancewith its easterncounterparts)becomesthe topographically arranged notitia fundorurn of one local owner, in this case of one proprietor on a large scale. If this is so, two observationsmay be made, onerelevantto the Volcei of 323, and oneto its past.First, if oneman owned70 or morepropertiesin a singleregion, it must follow that some, if not all, of theseestateswere neighhoursand thereforeperhapsevenjoined together.It would then be necessaryto presumethat propertieswerebroken down for bureaucratic reasonsas far as possibleinto their constituentelements,with a disregard for any fluctuating mergersof parcels.Indeed, the documentitself offers support for this suspicion,which would account not merely for the appearanceof such items as the chick-peafield and the walled field, but particularly for the sequence(3.8 ff.)f. Furianus rn. xl, agellussup. rn. x, agellusinf. c. nob. rn. x. And it would alsoaccountfor the fact that in a list of 70 propertiesor more thereis not a singlecompoundestatename of the type common in other Italian inscriptions and particularly in the alimentary tables from Veleia in Liguria and Ligures Baebiani in Samnium, suchnamesbeing the reflectionsof earlier consolidationsor of successive former owners.In short, the landsregisteredhere can be seenas the original parcelswhich werejoined togetherto make up a latifundium, or perhapsrather severallatifundia. Second,historically,we would be looking at a completelyfragmented mosaic which, if it could be put back together properly, might reveal a pictureof centuriesof marriage,inheritanceand purchaseresultingin the conglomerationof estatesin the hands of Turcius Apronianus in 323.TM One thing shouldbe clear, that the namesof somefarms could easilydate back to the days of Augustusand even much earlier, that is, they may record an owner or a family long vanished.2• This has one pleasing consequence:the historical depth of place-names,combined with the general paucity of Lucanian inscriptions (scarcely 500 in CIL), would account for the number of unusualgentilicia on the stone considerably better than doesthe hypothesisof a bizarreand unattestedrapid depopulation in the later third century. The great senatoriallatifundia of the later Empire representcenturiesof accumulation. Princeton University

Edward Champlin

THE VOLCEI LAND-REGISTER

(CIL X 407)

17

NOTES

1. CIL X 407=Inscr. It. III 3.1.17, edited by V. Bracco (1974), with full bibliography and good photographs. 2. Bracco 15-16. (I add brackets omitted or misplacedin lines I and 3, and correct the transcriptionof conriss.:compare the photographsand B's initial transcriptionat p. 15.) 3. A. D•l•age, La capitation du Bas-Empire (1945) 219-224, remains the standard

modern

discussion.

4. D•l•age 220-221, supplementedby A.H.M. Jones, The Roman economy (1974) 287. OthershavegenerallyfollowedJones,with theexceptionof W. Goffart, Caput and colonate(1974) 113-114, 137-138;his objectionsare rightly rejectedby R.P. Duncan-Jones,in M.I. Finley (ed.), Studiesin Romanproperty (1974) 172; and seein general DuncanOones'sreview of Goffart at JRS 67 (1977) 202-204. 5. Which commences:Nornenfundi cuiusque:et in qua civitateet in quo pago sit: et quos duos vicinosproxirnos habeat (Dig. 50.15.4). The clearestexamplesof the form occur in the obligationespraediorurn to Trajan's alimentary schemesat Veleia and Ligures Baebiani (CIL XI 1147, IX 1455). 6. V. Bracco, RAL 21 (1966) 116-139. 7. Such is patently the caseof the documentsfrom Hypaepa (D•l•age 164), Thera (173), Lesbos(177), Tralles (188), and Astypalaea(191); thosefrom Mylasa (170), Chios (183), and Cos(186) are too fragmentaryto warrant certainty,but they betrayno signof not conformingto the pattern.The singleexceptionis the register from Magnesia (194), which simply liststhe propertiesin the area alphabetically, but (be it noted) with the name of the owner appended to each. 8. PLRE l: Apronianus 9. 9. CorrectoresLucaniae et Bruttiorurn are attestedepigraphicallyas follows: CIL VI 1699, X 4, 212, 213, 468, 517, 519; AE 1913.227, 1916.102, 1923.61, 1969/70.21, 1975.261a. All but two of thesegive someversion of the full title, the

shortestabbreviationbeingcorr. Luc. et Brit. (X 212), and the remainingtwo drop the provincesbut spell the title in full, corrector(X 468, AE 1923.61).Be that as it may, even the unattestedcorr. (by itself) would be too long. 10. I would be inclined to restore the line somethingas follows:per Turci[urn Apronianurn adscriptae (seu adtributae seu descriptae)sunt]. If another letter could be squeezedin, perscriptaemight be preferred,from a verb usedparticularly of publicdocumentsandconsonantwithper Turciurn;noteparticularlyCJ I0.32.9, in albo decurionumperscriptis,and CTh 12.6.23=CJ 10.72.10,modum iugationis possessorurn... perscribant.The absenceof the mark of rank v.c. needcauseno alarm (cf. ILS 1259, 1267, 1273);indeedit may be turnedto advantage.It haslong been recognizedthat the alimentary table from Ligures Baebiani (CIL IX 1455) recordsseveralsenatorsas ownersor neighhourswithout givingany indicationof their rank: on their identificationsseemy remarksin Chiron 11(forthcoming).The forrna censualismay have had no room for inessentialdetail. 11. RE Turcius 3, relying on CIL IX 2801 and 6078.165,cf. 164. 12. A Faesasiusat Furfo (IX 3523); cf. IX 3477 (Peltuinum). 13. CIL IX 5844; X 2945, cf. 3862 (to which4022, alsofrom Capua, is relevant).

18

EDWARD

CHAMPLIN

14. CIL X 232, 227. 15. lnscr. It. III 3.1.10, 27, 84, 114a, 179.

16. Note also the Julio-Claudian senator L. Aquillius C.f. Pom. Florus Turcianus Gallus (PIR 2 A 993): the Pomptina was the tribe of Volcei and Grumentum.

17. A.H.M. Jones,The later Roman Empire (1964) 554-557and 782-784,offers the classic introduction.

18. PLRE 1: Apronianus 10, Secundus4; PLRE 2: Asterius 11. 19. There the family doubtlesssucceededto the interestsof another great clan, the Bruttii Praesentes.They too were from Volcei (lnscr. It. III 3.1.18, 32, 33, 78, 116)and their actores,who shouldimply family estatesin the area, are recordedat Volcei (31,32) and at Grumentum (CIL X 238). And there may be a marriage connectionwith the Turcii: ILS 1280 (Mutina), an inscriptionwhoseevery word raisesproblems,mentionsan Asteria, mother of a Bruttia Aureliana c.f 20. For the method involved whereevidenceactually exists,I refer to my paper in Chiron 11(forthcoming),whereI attempt to draw from estatenamesjust sucha history of a regionallanded society. 21. For illustrationsfrom other areasof the point madehere,see(e.g.) the paper referred to in n. 20 above, or R.E.A. Palmer, RSA 4 (1974) 146 if. This is not the placefor a disquisitionon the antiquity of place-names, a subjectwhich(with the aid of mediaevalcartulariesand modern toponymy) I intend to developelsewhere. This paper owesan enormousdebt to the patienceand kind criticismof the Editor, Professor Badian.

PLEBS

RUSTICA.

THE

PEASANTRY

OF CLASSICAL

ITALY

Introduction

Despite their incontestablecontribution to the growth of the imperium Romanurn, the peasantryof classicalItaly have long managedto elude historical inquiry.• The neglect,while grievous,is at leastunderstandable: quantitativedata are non-existent,and the few relevantliterary sources, which invariably reflect the prejudicesof an urbanisedupper class,are more often than not nostalgicor anecdotal.2Confrontedwith suchintractable materials, scholarsfor the most part have been content to fill the lacunae with a convenient array of inherited assumptionsand catch phrases(e.g. latifundia perdidere Baliam, whatever that may mean). The recentappearanceof severalworks devotedto the subject,however,makes it clear that the plebs rustica are at last becomingthe object of serious investigation.3 Building upon the foundation which thesestudiesprovide, it should now be possibleto addressthree separate,but related, topics which promise a better understandingof this elusive class.Part I of the presenteffort (the first of threeparts)will deal exclusivelywith the first of thesequestions,the treatment of the peasantryin modernscholarship.It will focusin particularon the popular view, first articulatedby Belochand lately reiteratedin suchexhaustingdetail by Toynbeeand Brunt (seenn. 4 and 6), that beginning in the second century BC the majority of the peasantrywere gradually but irremediablydisplacedby a landed aristocracy which choseto rely instead on imported slavelabour. This thesis,it will emerge, is methodologicallyindefensible,and cannot be sustainedin its presentformat. Considerationwill then shift to the rusticithemselves,and an attempt be made to reconstructthe social and economicenvironment in which they lived. The peasanteconomy will be the subject of Part II, which will inventoryboth the resourcesat their disposal(these,it turnsout, werefar more extensivethan hitherto realised)and the hazardswhich placedtheir continuingsurvivalin greatestjeopardy. Finally, we shall turn our attention to the structureof the peasanthousehold,and evaluateits ability to adapt to changingeconomiccircumstances (Part III). Thesetwo contributions,it is hoped,will clarify both the difficultieswhichbesetthe peasantry and their resiliency in the face of adversity, and enhance thereby our 19

20

JOHN

K. EVANS

understanding of the socialand economicdevelopmentof Italy duringthat periodof approximatelyfour centurieswhichseparates the Hannibalicwar from the multiple crisesof the third century.

I. The Peasantryin Modem Scholarship:A MethodologicalCritique 1. The Current

Consensus

At the inceptionof the Augustanprincipate,soBelochfirst maintained,the free-born population of peninsularItaly (including Rome) was probably no more numerous than it had been two centuries earlier, on the eve of the

Second Punic War, and may have experienceda slight decline.4 The appearanceof stagnation,however,beliesa dramaticchangein the ethnic character of the peninsula, and particularly of Rome itself. Steadily depletedby the unceasingdemandsof some two centuriesof conquest, further thinned in the sanguinarycivil strifewhich compassedthe dissolution of the Republic, the native Italian stock gradually relinquishedits place to thousandsof servileimmigrantsand their descendants,to whom manumissionbrought not only freedom, but the Roman franchiseas well. 'Iam pridem Syrus in Tiberim defluxit Orontes', so the satirist Juvenal (3.62) scornfully remarked.5 Although occasionalprotestshave beenregistered,Beloch'ssoberinterpretation of the demographicconsequences of Roman imperialism has been repeatedlyendorsed,and is now very much a part of the received tradition of Roman history.6 The attendant impact of Rome's wars of conqueston the peasantryas a class,however,is generallybelievedto have beenno lessprofound.While thereis considerabledisagreementon points of detail, and severalscholarshave even expressedmisgivingsabout the validity of the synthesis asa whole,?it still seemsto be the generalopinion that the SecondPunic War immersedthe Italian peasantryin a crisiswhich ultimately was to culminate in the eviction of most of their number from the land. For more than a decade, so the argument initially proceeds, Hannibal and the Senate alike prosecuteda strategyof attrition which inflicted incalculabledamage on southernItaly, the principal theatre of military operations.The devastationof fieldsand orchards,the slaughter or dispersalof livestock,the destructionof buildingsand equipment-thesewere the preferredmethodsof warfare, implementedwith exacting thoroughness.Some have even gone so far as to claim that the ruin was irreversible.8 The assiduibeyond the immediate war-zone, however, suffered comparablehardship.There is a consensusthat in 214-203 BCRome neverfielded lessthan eighteenlegionseach year.9 According to the most recentestimates,the soldieryabsorbedsome75,000 casualtiesduring this

PLEBS

RUSTICA

I

21

period alone, perhapsanother45,000 in the first four yearsof the conflict.•0 Lossesof this magnitude, we are told, crippled the classof smallholders, and prolonged terms of service,which relegatedadditional thousandsto farmsteads ruined by neglect,compounded their distress.• No district of peninsularItaly could claim to have escapedthe ravagesof the war. If the peasantrywere to transcendthe trauma of the SecondPunic War, it isaffirmed,both capitaland a respitefrom further warfarewererequisite. Neither, in the event,wasto be forthcoming.In thedevastatedsouthof the peninsula,harshreprisalsawaitedperfidiousallies,consistentamongthem the expropriation of land. The existing ager publicuspopuli Romani is thought to have swelleddramatically, and the rustici to have beenprominent among the dispossessed. •2 The policiesof the respublica were not, however, more beneficialto her own smallholders.An impoverishedtreasury could not satisfy its creditors with money in 200 BC(and certainly could not, therefore, offer loans to the peasantry), but it was able to compensatethe more important amongthemwith grantsof public land in the environs of Rome, the so-called trientabula (Livy 31.13.5-9). The possessores, in their eagerness quickly to developtheseaccretionsto their landedproperty, bitterly competedfor whateverprivatecapital wasavailable. This triggereda financial crisisin 193(Livy 35.7),•3but the resultant transformation of the Italian landscape which these transactionsalso initiated was to provea more enduringphenomenon.It wasat thismoment that subsistenceagriculture began its remorselessretreat before the large estate or latifundium. TM The signal enlargementof the Roman dominion in the first half of the secondcentury BChastenedthe transition. The irruption of capital into a societywhich had always deemed land the preferred medium of investment, and of a largeand cheaply-acquiredservilelabourforce,providedto the aristocracyboth the meansfor further concentrationof land and the instrumentswith which profitably to exploit largerholdings.•5Demand for property intensified accordingly; and conveniently, conquest abroad brought more and more land into the marketplaceat home.Nothing, it has been repeatedly stressed,so encouragedthe decay of the assidui as continuousconscriptionfor serviceoverseas.Declining productivitywas the inevitable concomitant, total desolation a grim possibility (here it is customaryto cite Livy 5.10.9), even when the absenceof the assiduusdid not invite the violent expulsion of his family by covetousand more powerful neighbours(Sall. lug. 41.7-8; Livy 2.24.6; App. BCiv. 1.7).•6It was in this climate, it is often remarked,that the triumph of the latifundia was forged, and the Gracchan reform movement notwithstanding, the formal transformation ofpossessiointo agerprivatus in the still nameless measureof 111 BC(CIL 12.585)enshrinedthat triumph in law.•7Nor wasit

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to be overturnedin the ensuinganarchyof civil war; the wholesaleconfiscations effected by various imperatores, as may be explicitly noted at Praeneste(Cic. Leg. Agr. 2.78), proved without lastingeffect?8and in the waningyearsof the Republicthe number of slavesin the countrysidehad becomesoalarmingthat Caesarfound it necessary to formulatea measure ordering 'ne ... ii, qui pecuariamfacerent, minus tertia parte puberum ingenuoruminter pastoreshaberent'(Suet. Iul. 42.1). At the inceptionof the principate,many scholarshavethus concluded,the largeestate,rooted in slave labour, was the dominant economic structure throughout the peninsula.19 The primacy of Augustusinauguratedtwo centuriesof almost uninterrupted internal peace.This welcomealteration of circumstance,it might be presumed,would at least check further deterioration of an already unhealthy environment,but the now canonicalportrait of imperial Italy is, if anything, even gloomier than its republicancounterpart. Penuria iuventutis and solitudo Italiae, it is pointed out, are recurrent motifs in the literature of the Augustanprincipate,whosemelancholyaspectthe elder Pliny hassoconciselyremarked.20Despiterepeatedattemptsto encourage marriageand procreation? Augustuswascompelledon two occasionsto conscriptslavesand freedmeninto the legions.22Tiberiusalsobewailedthe alarming deficiencyof Italian recruits(Tac. Ann. 4.4), and the provincialization of the army proceededwith such rapidity that by AD 69 it could be describedas militem peregrinum et externum (Tac. Hist. 2.21). All of this is again regularly taken as evidencefor the continuingdecline of the peasantry,23 which is also supposedlymirrored in the increasinglyfrequent allusions to latifundia in the literary sources.'Nunc coniungereage#is Siciliam volo, ut cum Africam libuerit ire, per meosfines navigem', so Trimalchio is made to announce in Petronius' burlesquecaricature of the aspirationsof the well-to-do libertini (Sat. 48). It is the satiriccounterpart to Pliny's notorious latifundia perdidere Italiam (HN 18.35), and the two passagesderive further reinforcement,it is stipulated,from the pagesof both Seneca and Juvenal. 24

Nero, Vespasianand Nerva, we are assured,resumedthe venerable policyof colonisationin a deliberate,albeitvain, attemptto stimulatethe peasanteconomy. 25Domitian,with similarintent,conceded formaltitleto thepossessores of subseciva, and furtherdraftedprotectivelegislationto insulate Italian agriculturefrom provincial competition.26The alimenta, whetherregardedas a sophisticated attemptto spura falteringeconomy with low-interestagriculturalloans27 or as a programmedesignedto encourage a higherbirth-rate,28werefullycompatiblewiththeseinitiatives, and with the youngerPliny'swell-publicised lamentconcerningthepenuria colonorumet communitemporisiniquitate (Ep. 3.19.7)--itself an augury

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of a still bleakerfuture. The depopulationof Italy wasnow sofar advanced, it has been opined, that Marcus Aurelius was persuadedto adopt the desperateexpedient of settling captive Marcomanni on the agri deserti (Dio Cass.71.11.4;HA, M. Ant. 22.2).29A few yearslater, Pertinax opted to surrenderlegaltitle to neglectedarableland throughoutItaly to any who were willing to bring it under cultivation(Hdn. 2.4.6), while the Historia Augustaattributesto Aurelian an ambitiousschemeto settleprisonersof war and their families in the Etrurian countryside,so that its extensive wastelandmight be convertedinto a vineyardsufficientto supplythe needs of theplebs urbana(Aurel. 48.2). Thesetwo passages, it hasbeenargued, constitutea final statementon the desolationof rural Italy.30 2. A Critique of the Argument

Such, in brief, is the currentconsensus, a portrait of Italian agrarian and demographicruin which isat oncecoherentand persuasive,and which long ago penetratedthe more generalliterature on Roman history.3• Nor is it completelywithout merit. No one could deny, for example,that in some parts of Italy the peasantryweredislodgedfrom the land in largenumbers during the late Republic, nor that some very large estatesdevelopedin consequence. Ciceroallegesthat C. QuinctiusValgusownedthe wholeager Hirpinus (Leg. Agr. 3.3.8) in addition to extensivepropertiesaround Casinum (3.3.14), while the holdings of L. Domitius Ahenobarbusmust havebeenimmenseindeedif he couldcrediblypromiseforty iugeraapiece to the soldiersunder his command(Caes. BCiv. 1.17.3), even if the bribe wasdirectedonly at his originalforce of 4,000 men(App. BCiv. 2.32, 38).32 It shouldbe remarked,however,that all of thetruly vastestatesof thistype for which we have evidencepostdatethe Sullan confiscations,and further that many of them seemto have disappearedas suddenlyas they arose. Thus we know that theterritory of Beneventum,in the heartof Valgus'ager Hirpinus, harboured numeroussmall holdingsa centuryand a half later• duringthereignof Trajan.33We arethusforcefullyremindedof thedangers associatedwith demographicand economic arguments which are not specificas to time and place;but it is preciselyin the form of generalstatementsthat the communisopinio rehearsedaboveis most often expressed. A host of objectionsto thisformulationaccordinglysuggest themselves at once,directedvariouslyat conceptualisation,logicand method,and their considerationis long overdue. With regardto conceptualisation,the ambiguitywhich hasconsistently hauntedacademicdebate on the latifundium, given the paramountrole which it playsin this reconstruction,deservesespecialemphasis.The term seemsto connotetoday, in the minds of mostscholars,a vast,slave-staffed

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estatedevotedto transhumantpastoralismor mixed farming, managedby a slave overseer(vilicus) for an absenteeproprietor who may visit the property no more than onceor twice a year.34As soonas one attemptsto sharpenthisimage,however,its inconsistencies becomereadilyapparent.35 There is first of all the notorious conundrum of size:how large must a property be beforeit can properlybe considereda latifundium?Tenney Frank once describedCato's model vineyard of 100 iugera as a 'large plantation';36V.A. Sirago,in contrast,reservedthe termfor estatesof 1,000 iugeraor more, remarkingthat 'al di sottodi quelgradobisognaparlaredi media e piccolaproprieth'.37More recently,H. Dohr has classifiedholdings of 10-80 iugera as 'Kleinbetriebe', those of 80-500 iugera as 'mittelgrosse Betriebe', and properties in excess of 500 iugera as 'GrossgOter'. 38Dohr's framework has beenadoptedin somequartersand rejectedin others? and for good reason.While it seemswell-suitedto the generationof Cato and the mode of agriculturalorganisationwhich he considereddesirable, this arrangement simultaneouslyappears quite arbitrary when applied to Varro's handbook, and becomesstill less workable if one attemptsto extend it to Columella's(which, in fairness, Dohr doesnot do). Circumstances,that is to say,changedover the course of time--a hurdle upon whicheveryrigid scalemustfounder.This point will become still more obvious if we consider the twin problems of contiguityand the relativity of size. ' Tutius videtur incertaf ortunaepossessionurn varietatibusexperiri ', the youngerPliny observedin a famouspassage (Ep. 3.19.4),and thepersistent

penchantamongthe well-to-doof the late Republicand early Empirefor landed investmentsscatteredthe lengthand breadth of the peninsulais a commonplace. 40 If one adopts Dohr's schema,which was not really designed to dealwiththisphenomenon, thenclearlywecannotcharacterise the man who, for example,ownsten widelydispersedfundiof 200 iugera eachas a latifondista;thereare, however,scholarswho wouldvehemently insistthat this was preciselywhat he was!41A passagein SiculusFlaccus, one of the gromatici, statesunequivocallythat a holding of 400 iugera would constitutea latifundiumif it consistedof two intactand contiguous centuries, 42and this pronouncementwould seemto resolvethe issueonce and for all. It has,however,to date beensignallyignoredby studentsof the

question,and perhapsrightly, for this definitionbroachesstill another insuperabledifficulty. Sincenotionssuchas 'large' and 'small' are always relative, are we entitled to assumethat the concept of the 'large estate' remainedunchangedthroughoutthe four centuriesunder consideration here--indeed,that sucha phrasenecessarilymeantthe samething to any two membersof the Roman aristocracyin a givengeneration?ThusSeneca (Ep. 88.10, 89.20) and Pliny the Elder (HN 18.35), who are the first to

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employ the term, both decry the perniciousinfluenceof the latifundia; nevertheless,it cannotbe claimedwith any assurancethat the word had the samemeaning in the minds of both men, much lessthat their usageof it would conform

to that of Siculus Flaccus.

In order to evade this thicket, the focus has sometimesbeen shifted from

size to function, the intensivelyfarmed villae rusticae of the type encountered in the pages of Cato (De agri cult. 1.7, 3.5, 10.1, 11.1) and the

environsof Pompeii, which specialisedin the productionof wine or oil, being sharply differentiatedfrom ranchessuchas that of CaeciliusIsidorus,with its 250,000 head of sheep(Pliny, HN 33.135), and mixed farms on the model of those owned by Mamurra in Picenum (Catull. 114-115) and the younger Pliny in Etruria (Ep. 5.6).43This division, however,also losesmuch of its appeal when examinedclosely.As Martin has properly maintained, the difference between the villa rustica and the mixed farm is in

fact one of scalerather than kind: most, if not all, of the Pompeian villae had economiesas diversifiedas that operativeon Pliny's Etrurian estate, but their remainsdo not conveythe impressionof vast size which one obtains(perhapserroneously)from Pliny'svery comprehensive account.44 Martin plausibly contendsthat the large but carefully supervisedmixed farm shouldbe groupedwith the villa rustica,for both are capital-intensive modesof exploitation, and in thisregardmay be clearlydistinguishedfrom the pastoral estate.45 Martin's approach,with its emphasisupon the structuralcharacteristics of the different systemsof agriculturalorganisation,certainlyrepresentsa significantadvancein conceptualisation,but it is not without deficiencies of its own. These becomereadily apparent when one surveysthe various types of organisationfrom the point of view of labour. Both the villae rusticaeand the large ranches,it seemsclear, relied exclusively(or almost so) upon slavelabour, but estateownerssuchas Pliny typicallyemployed not only slavesbut alsofree-borntenantsin largenumbersto cultivatetheir lands (see n. 47). Thus the villa rustica can still be meaningfully distinguishedfrom the mixed farm and paired with the large ranch. Even those who have steadfastlydefendedthe uniquenessof the villae rusticae might, therefore,havejustly queriedthe appropriatenessof the traditional conceptualisationof the latifundia, sinceit lodgesboth pastoral estates manned by slavesand diversifiedfarms worked with slaveand free labour alike within the samerubric. Henceforth,it is to be hoped,it will be recognised that although each of these three forms of landed estate shares featureswith the others,theymustnevertheless be treated,for purposesof historicalanalysis,as distinct entities.46

The dictatesof logicare no lessdamaging.Rostovtzeffprotestedlong ago that tenantry,seeminglyso commonplace in the early principate,

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defiedexplanation,if theagresteshad beenwidelysupplantedin the second century BC.47 In the same vein, it might be asked how the gentesItaliae could have indulged in the so-called Social War if the peasantry, both Roman and allied, had already sufferedsignificantexpropriation. Here it may be noted that P.A. Brunt, who has vigorouslyendorsedthe canonical interpretation, apportions some 300,000 men among the combatants in 89 Be, a figure far in excessof the roughly 176,500whom he estimatesto have servedin the period 214-203. Both efforts, it is neverthelessclaimed, taxed the peninsula'shuman resourcesto the utmost.48 Equally to the point, it must be concededthat the censusreturn for 28 BC, the crux of Beloch'scontention that the indigenouscives Romani were largely displacedby enfranchisedlibertini, cannot sustainthe argumentsbasedupon it. Despite all pleas to the contrary, the evidence at our disposal is insufficient to determine whether this censusenumerated men of military age alone or included women and children as well (and if the latter, the minimum age for registration),much lessthe degreeto which it may have been defective.49 Without such refinement, both Beloch's belief that in

28 BCItaly's free-bornpopulationnumberedapproximately4,000,000and Frank's counter-argumentfor a figure of 10,000,000(cf. nn. 4 and 6) are relegated to the realm of mere conjecture. The most vital admission of all, however, is that the reconstruction sketchedabove really representsan uneasymarriage of two fundamentally incompatible theses.Those scholarswho have trained their attention on the Republic--notably Tibiletti, Toynbee and Brunt--have claimed that the decline of the peasantryand the ascendancyof the latifundia had been fully realisedbeforethe adventof the principate.Studentsof the Empire, in contrast, tend to be no less adamant in their conviction that the d•nouement for these two phenomena should be lodged in the first or secondcentury AD.5øThe unusuallydetailed property registerscompiled during the reignof Trajan at LiguresBaebiani,in the Hirpine district(CIL 9.1455), and in the Aemilian community of Veleia (11.1147), have been frequently cited in defenseof this supposition.In both townships,it is stipulated,the primacy of the smallholderat the end of the Republicwas unchallenged;at the closeof the first century AD, particularly in the pagi Veleiates,the peasantryhad everywhereretreatedbefore the onslaughtof the latifundia.s• It need hardly be stressedthat if this view is both correct (the point will be resumedbelow) and possesses the more generalhistorical utility which has sometimesbeen claimed for it, then the dictum that the latifondistihad alreadyin largepart dispossessed the rusticibeforetheend of the Republic, whatever the difficulties intrinsic to the notion of the large estate, standsin urgent need of revision. The entire edifice, it has to be added, is also firmly grounded in a

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complex array of methodological errors. The use of literary sources without due regardfor their context, anecdotalmethod, the indefensible assumptionthat historicaldevelopmentis invariably linear, circular argument and outright omissionof evidence--eachis, unfortunately, on prominent display.Two itemspreviouslyintroduced,the conscriptionof slaves and freedmen in AD 9 (see n. 22) and Tacitus' comment that the soldiery couldalreadybe describedin AD69 asperegrinumet externum(Hist. 2.2 l), neatly illustrate the first heading. Both have been invoked to buttressthe propositionthat Italy in the first centuryAD no longerpossessed sufficient manpower to dischargeher traditional role as defenderof the imperium; neither can withstand close inspection. It was the clades Variana which prompted Augustusto enlist the vernacularnultitudo for military service. 'Habiti itaquedilectus,revocatiundiqueet ornnesveterani,virifeminaeque ex censu libertinum coactae dare milltern', writes Velleius Paterculus, a

witnessto the event, who then adds that 'audita in senatu voxprincipis, decimodie, ni caveretur,possehostemin urbis Romae yenireconspectum' (2.111.1). The two points are inseparable:similar emergencies at various momentsin the history of the Republic, it shouldbe recalled,provided Augustuswith suitableprecedents. 52 The account of Dio Cassius,which is cited far more often, is equally illuminating. Like Velleius, he pairs the recruitment of libertini with the musterof evocati? but he stresses that Augustusalsofruitlesslyattempted to obtain volunteersamongthe free-born.54It wastheir reluctanceto serve, Dio suggests,rather than a lack of numberswhich posedsucha dilemma for the princeps, and the observationshouldhardly occasionsurprise.In the past, tumultuary levieshad been dismissedonce the danger was over; Augustus, however, had recently regularised the term of servicefor the legionsat twentyyears(Dio Cass.55.23.1),and five yearsafter theeventthe conscriptsof AD 9 were still in the ranks.55Evenif disciplinehad beenless harsh and dischargenot so often postponed,this prospectwould have manifestlydeterredall but the most unwitting, patriotic or economically desperatefrom submitting their names.S6 The measurestaken by Augustusin AD 9, howeverdramatic, thusdo not requirea demographicexplanation.Slavesweredestinedto seeoccasional servicein the future as well, but only in momentsof crisis? they were regularlyliable to capital punishmentif detectedin the legions,and under Trajan at least, the prohibition was taken seriously.•8 Nor should Tacitus' tersecharacterisation of the militarlyestablishment in AD69 longdetainus. The remark is situatedin indirectdiscourse,an abusivedescriptionof the Vitellian forcesbesiegingPlacentiaby its Othonian defenders,whom the Vitellians picture in turn as segnemet desidemet circo ac theatris corrupturn militem. Such innuendo has a certain value as historical evidence,

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but unlesswe are willing to concedethat the garrisonof Placentiawas as slothful and corrupt as it is depicted, then on strictly methodological groundsit must also be admitted that the ethnic portrait of the Vitellian army is devoid of significance.In any event, it plainly contradictssuch other evidenceascanbe broughtto bear. It isnowherehinted,after all, that Nero encountereddifficultiesin recruitingthe legio Iltalica (Suet. Ner. 19; Dio Cass. 55.24.2); the data assembledby Forni are flagrantly contradictory;and Tacitushimselflabelsthe Rhine legionspillagingthe Cisalpina as milites regionum gnari (Hist. 2.56).59 This disregard of sources,however, is a failing which surfacesin many guises.The indiscriminateapplicationto the entire classstructureof source material which relatesto a singlestratum only, and the quantumleapfrom urbs Roma to tota Italia, are the most insidious. Dio Cassius' celebrated

narrative of the Augustan lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus(18 BC),to whichBeloch'spartisanshavesooftenappealedin defenseof hisanalysisof the censusreturn for 28 BC,furnishesan engaginginstanceof the former blunder:

He imposedheavierpenaltieson unmarriedmen and women,and in turn offered prizesfor marriageand the procreationof children.And sincethere were far more malesthan femalesamongthe aristocracy

(-ro••6¾•o•), he evenpermittedthosewhosodesired,exceptingthe senators,to marry freedwomen, and decreed their progeny to be legitimate (54.16.1-2).60

The law, as both the referenceto ordinesin its title and this passageso clearlyintimate,wasdirectedpreciselyat theordinesequesteret senatorius ('to5 •6¾•,06•): what penalitiescould Augustuseffectivelyhave imposed upon the plebs rustica or urbana?As an indicator of demographictrends amongthe Italian populaceat largeit is accordinglyvalueless,a qualification which has been variouslyand .regrettablycircumvented.Brunt, for example, has simply translatedDio's -ro• •6¾•0• as the 'ingenuous', 6• while amongthosewho concedethat the legislationaffectedthe aristocracy alone,it is generallyand quitearbitrarily protestedthat the poor wouldin any casehave emulated their peers.62There is, however, not a shred of evidenceto supportthis proposition. 63 Indifferenceto the necessarydistinctionbetweenRome and Italy has producedno lessinfelicitousconclusions, oneof whichstrikesto thecoreof the edifice. The premisethat servileimmigrants,manumittedand enfranchised, largely supplantedthe indigenousItalian stock in the last two centuriesof the Republic is, we have seen,intrinsicto the formulation of Beloch and his adherents.The incidenceof manumissionin the city of

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Rome itself certainlyseemsto havebeenvery high, at leastduringthe late Republic and the first two centuriesof the Principate,64but Rome is not synonymouswith Italy; is anyone today seriouslypreparedto argue that manumission

affected

the lives of more than a minute

fraction

of the

agriculturalslavesin thisperiod? Hencetherelurksin Beloch'sinterpretation of the censusfiguresa doubleimplication, probably unintendedand quite unsupportable--first, that the manumissionand enfranchisementof urban servi broadly compensatedfor the heavy casualtieswhich war and economicdislocationare thought to have inflicted upon the assidui,and further that population growth in Italy's urban centresapproximately counterbalancedthese severelosses,which every district is presumedto have experienced. The misconceptionsperpetuatedby the very notion of tota Italia are equally profound. This and like phrases occur here and there in our sources,but the contextis invariablypolitical (Caes.BCiv. 1.2;Cic. Deiot. 4.11). Nevertheless,the congenialbeliefhaslongprevailedthat, Campania and the Cisalpinaaside,Italy wasno lessuniform in the demographicand economicsense.This permits,of course,trendsin regionsfor whichthereis no adequate archaeologicalor historical record to be reconstructedfrom thosein districtswhichare betterdocumented.Thus, althoughthe corpus of literary references to solitudoltaliae is focussedpreciselyon the Roman Campagna,65with a scatteringof noticesdirectedto conditionsin Apulia and Magna Graecia,66there is a persistenttendencyamong scholarsto assumethat the unfortunate history of the Campagna was duplicated throughoutmost of the peninsula? Obviouslythis will not do, especially sinceboth this suppositionand the underlyingpremisefounderat onceon the ineluctablepoint that not evena literary portrait ascoherentasthat for the Campagnacan be taken at facevalue.Most of the passages in question, it turnsout, concernthetownsalone,and thepresumptionthat an urbsand its surroundingcountrysidepursuedthe samecourseof historicaldevelopmentis demonstrablyspurious. 68While, for example,the surveyof theager Eretanusconductedby the BritishSchoolhasconfirmedthe predominance here of the large estate, before whose advance Ereturn itself succumbed duringthe early Principate,69similarsurveysin the nearbyager Veientanus have unearthedquite disparateresults.Like Ereturn, Veii also gradually declinedduring the first centuryAD, but it wasapparentlythe victim of the pax Romana, not of the concentration of land. Its decline coincidedwith and seemsdirectlyto haveresultedfrom the maturingprosperityof its own hinterland, as peoplemoved out from the town to settleon the land: 'Here, for everytwo sitesalreadyoccupiedunderthe Republic,a third cameinto beingduringthe 150-oddyearsfollowingtheaccession of Augustus.'70 Nor shouldit be at onceassumedthat thesenew foundationswere invariably

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slave-staffedvillae rusticae.On the contrary, most appear to have been of quite modestsize,and situatedon marginal land well-removedfrom the main arteriesof commerceand communication.TMThe population of the ager Veientanus,then,approachedthe saturationpoint at the verymoment when Veil itself was dying, decisiveproof that the demiseof a community does not necessarilyimply depopulation or economicdepressionin its hinterland--indeed, it may imply preciselythe opposite.72 The congenialpostulatethat our literary sources,or at leastthe more reliable among them, may be taken at their word introducesthe exceptionally delicate question of what has been characterised as anecdotal method. This is the ingrainedhabit of 'founding an analysison individual passagesor occurrences,as if every statementin oneof the "better" ancient authorsis both factually accurateand universallyvalid unlessthe contrary can be proved, which is rarely the case'.73Given the relative paucity of materialsat his disposal,the Roman historian'sdesireto extract meaning from everyremark in his sourcesis understandable,but this temptationis continuallysubjectto abusepreciselybecauseopportunitiesfor corroboration are so rare. Columella's casual statement

that uncultivated

Italian

land suitable for

viticulture cost HS 1,000 per iugerum (RR 3.3.8) offers a notorious example of the methodand its dangers,and onethat is regrettablygermane to the presentdiscussion.It shouldbe concededat oncethat it isdifficult to define a context in which this figure has meaning.It can hardly be taken literally,for to arguethat a iugerumof landin Liguriahadthe samemarket value as a plot of equivalentsizein the ager Campanuswould be patently absurd. Nor can it be invoked as the mean value of Italian arable land, for

we cannot establishwith any precisionthe rangeof land pricesoperativein the peninsulaat a given moment.We can in fact demonstratelittle more than the existenceof a market for land, and its sensitivityto political and economic forces.TMDespite these formidable objections,however, and seeminglyfor lack of other data, in much of Roman scholarshipthis has becomethe fixed pricefor arablesoil in Italy. 75Thus TenneyFrank, when he turned his attention to the coloniesestablishedby Nerva, could pinpoint the number of familiesdispatchedwithout difficulty, althoughDio Cassius merely informs us (68.2) that the programmecost HS 60,000,000:'If fair arable land cost 1,000 sestercesthe iugerum and each man receivedten iugera,this sum would hardly take care of more than 6,000 men.'76Still worse, the primacy of the latifundia, the already discredited central componentof the communisopinio,isalsorootedin suchinelasticcalculations. The registersof property at Veleia and Ligures Baebiani, to which referencehas already been made, are the crux of the argument. The two documents,which recordthe detailsof 52 and 66 mortgagesrespectively,

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derive from communities widely separatedfrom one another, both of

whichlie outsidethe confinesof the Campagna.If, therefore,it couldbe demonstratedfrom thesedata that in both localitieslarge estateshad advanced at the expense of the peasantry, the generalisationthat the latifundia had beenthe ruination of Italy would be far more persuasive. Unfortunately, neither text gives any indication of the actual size of the holdingsat issue.Nevertheless,both Kromayer and Frank havebeenable to conjureup their dimensionsby the simpleexpedientof dividing each entry by HS 2,000, a crudeaverageof Columella'spricefor raw arableland suitedto the vine (HS 1,000),and for land alreadysoworked(HS 3,000).77 Although this inflexible approach, which neglectsthe impact on land valuesof suchvariablesastopography,climate,soilcharacteristics, access to markets and patterns of land use, has been vigorouslyassailed, 78its influencehasneverbeencompletelyextirpated.V.A. Sirago,for example, hasdeclaredthe senatorialcensusof HS 1,000,000to be synonymous with a property of 1,000 iugera.79 Obviously, none of this will do, but we neverthelessconfront here the principal method by which the triumph of the latifundia throughout Italy has been detailed. If, however,anecdotalmethod has yieldedthe only statisticalmechanismfor gaugingthe scaleandubiquityof thelatifundia,theno lessspecious assumptionthat historicaldevelopmentconstitutesa form of linear progressionunderliesthe popular explanation of how thesevast holdings evolved.It was Mommsen,seizingupon the fact that the 52 mortgagorsat Veleia registered323 farms amongthem, who articulatedthe basicfeatures of the argument. Each of these323 propertiesbearseither the name of a particular family, which Mommsen believedto be that of the landownerat the moment of the original surveyand assignedto the domain in perpetuity,80 or a seriesof such names, those of the fundi which had been absorbedinto thislargerholdingbeforethelatterwasswallowedin turn by one of the estatescitedin the inscription.8• Hencein thecenturyor sowhich had intervenedsincethe initial survey,543 farmshad coalescedinto a mere 52--irrefutable proof, so Mommsen concluded,that at Veleia the concentration of landedpropertyproceededwithoutinterruptionduringtheearly Principate.82 Evenif oneshouldendorsethischainof reasoning(the concession would be generousindeed), it does not follow that Veleia would serveas a model for the rest of Italy, and Mommsen, noting that the concentrationof land was far lessapparentat LiguresBaebiani,wascarefulto avoid the generalisation. 83The point is, however,irrelevant,for two presuppositions crucial to Mommsen's logic, it has beendemonstrated,are untenable, and with that the entire superstructurecollapsesat once. First, the curious premisethat it wasnormallyentirefarmsratherthanparcelsthereofwhich

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changed hands. There were undoubtedly occasionson which would-be latifondisti managedto securetitle to an intact property, and a few such seemto be reflectedin the inscription,84but in most instances,as Pachtere observed long ago, it is scarcelyconceivablethat the new owner had acquiredmore than a fraction of the original holding, becausethe aggregate value of the conglomerateswhich appear in the text is typically quite modest? A case in point: the fundus Munatianus PraestanusVibianus Vaculeianusin mortgageno. 2, which is assessed at only HS 14,000.86Such inferencesare, however, unnecessary,for this document yields numerous examplesoffundi which werebroken up into two or more plots. One may remark thefundus Mucianus Clousterand thefundus AntonianusSevonianus Tullare in thepagusAlbertsis,both mortgagedby L. Annius Rufinus (no. 17)for the sumof HS 18,000.Thesedomainsadjoinedlandsbelonging to Q. Accaeus Aebutius Saturninus and C. Coelius Rufus, and the latter also pledged in this samepagus (with Rufinus and Saturninus as neighbouts) a fundus Mucianus Clouster Tullare and a fundus Antonianus SevonianusTullare for HS 31,000 (no. 16). Afundus Mammuleianus in the pagus Domitius offers another variation: P. Antonius Sabinus registers two separatefarms of this name, a fundus Mammuleianusand afundus Virianus Vicanianus Mammuleianus (no. 20), and his kinsman Cn. Antonius Priscus a third, the fundus Vicirianus Mammuleianus (no. 28). Sabinus cites Priscusas his neighbout, and both men so list P. Afranius Apthorus. Further instancesof the pattern could be multiplied,87but the point should now be clear: at Veleia, the dynamic seemsto have been redistributionrather than concentrationof property. A landholdingmight fragment and be dispersedamong severalother farms, only to surfacea century later in the hands of one or two proprietors. Still, it might legitimately be protested that if thirty such domains eventuallymergedinto two or threeestatesthe net resultwould be the same as if they had beentransferredintact, and that at Veleia therewasa marked tendency for the original fundi gradually to coalesce, in precisely this manner, into fewer and larger holdings.This interpretationof the text is essentiallystatic, however,for it impliesa movementof property in only one direction.

With

this we confront

at last the second and more critical

flaw in Mommsen's analysis--one inherent, it may be added, in the very concept of concentration--for with the conspicuousexception of the imperial domains in Italy, this assumptionis demonstrablyuntrue. At Veleia, as Pachtereacutelyrealised,thereis ampleevidencethat the major landowningfamilies were not only vulnerableto testamentarydispersion of their estatesbut also surrendered land, in some instanceselements of their original holdingsin a pagus, to the very rivalsfrom whom they were simultaneouslyacquiringit.88

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The history of two families in the pagus Albensis, the Calidii and the Antonii, may be injectedhere to illustratethe point. Four membersof the Calidii are cited in the document:C. Calidius Proculus,who obligated twelve propertieswith a cumulative value of HS 233,530 (no. 21), and Caldius Priscus,Calidius Verus and Calidius Vibius, who appear only as neighbours.Of the five fundi Calidiani which were put up as security, however,only one was still to be countedamongthe domainsof the family, the other four being pledged by M. Antonius Priscus and P. Antonius Sabinus.Priscusmortgagednineteenproperties(no. 5) and Sabinusseven (no. 20), worth HS 233,080 and 132,450 respectively,but three of their kinsfolk also owned land in thepagus--Antonia Sabina, mentionedas a neighbour;Antonia Vera, who offered two farms with an assessed value of HS 210,866(no. 25); and Cn. AntoniusPriscus,whosefourteenproperties were worth in excessof HS 351,633 (no. 28). At first glance, therefore,it would seemthat the Calidii weresteadilylosinggroundin thepagusto the Antonii, but considerablecaution is requiredhere.Thirteenfundi Antoniani are locatedby the text in thepagusAlbertsis,but onceagainit turnsout that only a fraction (eight) were still in the handsof the family. Q. Accaeus Aebutius Saturninus,whom we havealready encounteredin the courseof this discussion,had come into possessionof two (no. 41), L. Annius Rufinus (no. 17) and C. Coelius Verus (no. 16) of one each--and likewise C. Calidius Proculus(no. 21)! One can hardly speakin this settingof the concentrationof landedproperty. We are confrontedwith an ebband flow, the impulsesfor whichwe cannotentirelygrasp,and it would be exceedinglydifficult (if not impossible)to determinein sucha labyrinthwhethera family'sholdingswereexpanding,or merelybeingreshuffled,perhapsinto more compactand contiguousarrangements? It might be best to admit, then, that there wasperhapssometendencyforfundi in the Veleiandistrict to coalesce,but that the larger holdingswhich resultedwere themselves always susceptibleto dispersion. Indissolubly linked to the concept of tota Italia, rooted in anecdotal method and a staticperceptionof historicaldevelopment,the primacy of the latifundia, it thus emerges,ultimately restson the uncertainfoundation of its broad acceptancewithin the fraternity of Roman historians.Regrettably, however,this misconceptionhas extendedits perniciousinfluence acrossa broad rangeof historicalinquiry, generatingin particularnumerous instancesof circularargument.Two itemsfrom the reignof Domitian will serveto illustrate. Suetonius,it will be recalled,twice makesreference to an edict issuedby the princepswhich prohibited the planting of new vineyardsin Italy and orderedat leasthalf of the vinesundercultivationin the provincesto be cut down (Dom. 7.2, 14.2). Thesepassages might be greetedwith disbelief,werethey not confirmedby Statius,Philostratusand

34

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Eusebius, the latter of whom dates the measure to AD 92.90As it is, since

Suetoniusexplicitlynotesthat the emperorwasdeeplyconcernedbecause a scarcityof grain had coincidedwith a bountiful vintage,we are not even left in doubt as to his motives? This has not, however, deterred either Frank or Rostovtzeff, both of whom adhere to the belief that Italian

agricultureby this date languishedin deepdecay,from arguingthat this legislationwas designedto rescuehard-pressedItalian wine-growersfrom provincialcompetition!92Clearly, it wasnot Suetonius'text whichinspired this unwarrantedassumption,but the commonplacepresumptionthat Italy's economiccondition was desperate,and required desperateremedies.The measure,thus transformedinto a palliative, is now of course regularly recited in the litany of evidencefor the peninsula'seconomic decline .93

Domitian'sresolutionof the thorny problemswhichstemmedfrom the extralegaloccupationof Italian subseciva,thoseparcelsof land in Roman coloniaewhich remainedunassignedafter centuriation, hasbeen similarly mishandled. Subsecivaseem typically to have fallen into one of two categories--land which lay between the limits of centuriation and the boundaryof thecolony,and land within thecenturieswhichwasunsuitable for cultivation.94Vespasian,in his effort to rescuethefiscus from bankruptcy, had reassertedhis title to these plots and sold some of them,95 leaving the remainingpossessores at his death in considerabledoubt as to the future of their holdings.Indeed, his actionsmay havereopenedsome old wounds, for in the first months of his rule Domitian and his consilium

were forced to arbitrate an ancientjurisdictionaldisputeover subseciva lying between Firmum Picenum and Falerio.96 This emperor, we are informed by both Suetoniusand the gromatici, subsequentlyresolvedthe crisisby issuinga generaledictwhichlegallyrelinquishedthe subsecivato their possessores? There is not a hint in all of thisthat Domitian'saim wasto strengthenthe position of a peasantrywhich was gradually losingits ceaseless struggle againstthe encroachmentsof the latifondisti; that, however, is the notion whichRostovtzeffhaspopularised.98 His is the imageof haplesssquatters eking out a bare existenceon poor and unclaimedsoil, a monismwhich wholly disregards,for example,the possibilitythat the local gentryhad occupieda portion of this land and convertedit into ager compascuus. 99 Even if one acceptsRostovtzeff'simprudentgeneralisation,however,the question immediately arises:in what demographiccontext should we expectmarginalland to be settledand cultivated?In Ireland suchwasteland was widely reclaimedduring the late eighteenthand early nineteenth centuries--when the population was increasingfrom some 4,753,000 (1791) to 8,175,000(1841).•øøThis was to be anticipated,and there are tantalizing hints in our sourcesthat the first century AD was likewise a

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period of taxing demographicgrowth in Italy. There is first a vaguebut intriguing passagein AggeniusUrbicus'commentaryon the De controversiisagrorum of Sex. Iulius Frontinus. Urbicus remarks that competition for land was now so pronouncedthat evensacredground was being sequestered. •0• Secondly, the censusreturn for AD 48, so strangely neglectedin recent discussionsof Italian demography.In AD 14 Augustus enumerated4,937,000 citizens(RG 8); thirty-four yearslater, in AD48, that figure had increasedto 5,984,072 (Tac. Ann. 11.25). Since it is generally concededthat the overwhelmingmajority of the civesRomani still resided in Italy? 2 one can scarcelydisputeBeloch'sconclusionthat at leasthalf of this increasewasregisteredhere.•03Rostovtzeff'sblunt assertion,then, that it was Domitian's intent to assistthe smallholders,like his underlying assumptionthat their numbers were steadily diminishing, proves illconceived. Nevertheless,this unfounded speculation also continues to enjoy a respectablepositionin the gloomy recitationof Italy's decay. 3. Methodological Findings The lamentable neglect of such pertinent literary sourcesas the agrimensores,the indifferent receptionaccorded the censusof AD 48, the reluctance to assimilate archaeologicalfindings into the synthesis(one thinks at onceof the startlingconclusionsproducedby the Britishsurveys of southeasternEtruria, so briefly alluded to above)--these introduce the final methodologicalerror in our catalogue, the omissionof evidence. Further examplescould be accumulatedwithout difficulty, but it would amount to pointlessrepetition of a theme already well-rehearsed,and would do little to alter the final result.The traditional portrait ofsolitudo Italiae, it shouldnow be unmistakablyclear, is really nothing more than a pleasantfiction, for the array of assumptionsupon which it restscannot withstandskepticalinquiry. While it may be descriptiveto somedegreeof conditionsin the Roman Campagnaand, at variousmoments,in scattered pocketsof territory in otherareas,asa guideto economicand demographic conditionsin the peninsulaat largein the four centurieswhichfollowed the Second Punic War it is of no value whatsoever. In fact, once we set this

misconceptionaside and addressthe evidencewithout prejudice, it becomesimmediatelyclear that the peasantrycouldand did survivethroughout Italy in this period.Smallholdings and exceptionaldensityof population, we have earlier remarked, characterisedmuch of the ager Veientanus during the first generationsof the Principate?04and this combination is still more convincinglydisplayedat nearby Sutrium and Capena.•0•The rusticialsopersistedno lessstubbornlyaround the Apulian communityof Larinum, •ø6and in many of the pagi Veleiates,in Aemilia. •07

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Etruria, Apulia and Aemilia are widely divergentregions,and with that we approachthe heartof the issue.Giventhe physicaland culturaldiversity of Italy, the porousand often questionablequality of the sourcesat our disposal,and the hazardsto which encyclopaedicconclusionsare accordingly exposed, it should hardly occasion surprise that this elaborate synthesiswould crumble upon inspection.On the contrary, it might be arguedthat at presentthe most sensiblecoursewould be to abandonour efforts to formulate general statementsand concentrate our energies insteadon regionalstudies,relyingaboveall on archaeologyto provideus with new evidence.Archaeologicalinvestigationof the Italian countryside, however, is still in an embryonic state, and in any event we have by no meansexhaustedthose avenuesof inquiry which might elicit significant findingswith broad applicationfrom the materialsalreadyextant.A study of the peasanteconomyon the onehand,and of the structureof the peasant householdon the other, with especialregardto the formativeinfluenceof inheritancecustomsand regulations,aretwo obviousexamplesof topicsin this vein. Each is deservingof immediate attention, for they promise a better generalunderstandingof both the peasantry'sresidualstrengthsand the threats to their continuing survival in this critical 400-year span of Roman history. It is accordinglythe peasanteconomywhich will be the subjectof the next chapter of this study,with considerationof the peasant household

reserved for a later occasion. 10s John K. Evans

University of Minnesota/ University of Heidelberg (To be continued) NOTES

1. With the exceptionsnoted below, the systemof citation employedin this paperconforms,for classicalsources,with that of the Oxford classicaldictionary2 (1970) ix-xxii, and for periodicalswith the index of the relevantvolumeof L'annde philologique. HAHR = Hispanic American Historical Review Z. Soc.wiss. = Zeitschriftfi•r Socialwissenschaft The following abbreviationswill also be used: Abbott-Johnson = F.F. Abbott and A.C. Johnson, Municipal administrationin the Roman Empire (1926) ANR W = H. Temporini(ed.), Aufstiegund Niedergang der r•imischen Welt (1972-

Bourne(1960)

=

)

F.C. Bourne,'TheRomanalimentaryprogram

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37

and Italian agriculture', TAPhA 91 (1960) 47-75

Brunt, IM Frank, ESAR

P.A. Brunt, Italian manpower 225 B.C.A.D. 14 (1971) T. Frank (ed.), An economicsurveyof ancient Rome, 6 vols (1933-1940)

Heitland Helm

Kromayer (1914)

W.E. HeRland, Agricola (1921) R. Helm, Eusebius' Werke. VII: Die Chronik des Hieronymus (1956) J. Kromayer,'Die wirtschaftlicheEntwicklung Iraliens im II. und I. Jahrhundert vor Chr.',

Lachmann

NJA 33 (1914) 145-169 F. Blume, K. Lachmann and A. Rudorff, Die Schriften der rOmischenFeldmesser,2 vols. (1848-1852)

McCrum-Woodhead

M. McCrum and A.G. Woodhead, Select doc-

Riccobono, FIRA

merits of the principatesof the FlayJanemperors A.D. 68-96 (1966) S. Riccobono, J. Baviera and V. ArangioRuiz (eds.), Fontes Iuris Romani Anteiustiniani, I2-Ill (1940-1943)

Rostovtzeff, SEHRE 2

Salmon

Tibiletti (1955)

M. Rostovtzeff, The social and economic history of the Roman Empire2 (rev. P.M. Fraser, 1957) P. Salmon, Population et ddpopulationdans l'empire romain (1974) G. Tibiletti, 'Lo sviluppodel latifondoin Italia dall' epocagraccanaal principiodell' impero', Relazioni del X CongressoInternazionaledi Scienze Storiche, Roma 4-11 Settembre 1955

II (1955) 235-292 A.J. Toynbee,Hannibal• legacy,2 vols.(1965) C.A. Yeo, 'The developmentof the Roman plantation and marketing of farm products', Finanzarchiv n.s. 13 (1951) 321-342 In the hopethat thispapermayproveof someinterestto readersunfamiliarwith the classicallanguages,translations have been provided by the author for those passages cited in extenso.A conversionfactor of one iugerum:.62acreshasalso beenemployedthroughout. 2. The historian of classicalGreece or Italy can only regard with envy, for example,the censusreturnsfrom BelgradeCountyfor AD 1528and 1530which E.A. Hammel,'The Zadrugaas process', in P. LaslettandR. Wall (eds.),Householdand family in past time (1972) 335-373, has employedwith suchdexterity to recover household structure among the Vlachs. For a succinctsummary of the problems inherent to a study of the Roman peasantry,seenow R. MacMullen, 'Peasants, during the Principate', ANRW II 1 (1974)253-261. 3. Cf. J. Frayn, Subsistence farming in Roman Italy (1979); P. Garnsey, Toynbee Yeo (1951)

38

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'Where did peasantslive?',PCPhS 25 (1979) 1-25;J.K. Evans,'Wheat production and its social consequences in the Roman world', CQ n.s. 31 (1981) 421-442. 4. K.J. Beloch, Die BevOlkerungder griechisch-r6mischenWelt (1886) 413, 435-436; 'Die Bev•lkerung im Alterrum', Z. Soc.wiss. 2 (1899) 510-512; 'Die Bev•lkerung Iraliens im Altertum', Klio 3 (1903)489-490. 5. On the ethnicchangein the Roman populace,cf. Beloch,Klio 3 (1903)490; Brunt, IM 4, 121, 155; Salmon 30-31. 6. His hypothesishasbeenmosteffectivelychallengedby Tenney Frank, who maintainedthat the ingenuouselementincreasedfrom about four to ten million in

this period;cf. 'Roman censusstatisticsfrom 225 Bcto 28 Bc', CPh 19 (1924) 340341; and ESAR I 58-59, 314-315; V 1. Although Frank's position still obtains adherents--forexample,T.P. Wiseman,'The censusin the firstcentury•c', JRS 59 (1969) 69-75--Beloch has found powerful advocatesin Toynbee I 450-453; and Brunt, IM 3-13, 121, 155 et passim, whoseargumentshave now been garbed in statisticsby K. Hopkins, Conquerorsandslaves(1978) 68. The debatepivotson the interpretationof Polyb. 2.24 (225 •c), Phlegon 12.6 (FGrHist no. 257), Livy, Per. 98 (70/69 •c) and Augustus,RG 8.2 (28 •c); no amount of argument,however,can conceal the exiguous nature of such data.

7. Cf. Ph. Salomon,'Essaisur lesstructuresagrairesde l'Italie centraleau IIe sibcleavant J6sus-Christ',in Ph. Salomon, G. Fr•che and J. Boucher(eds.), Recherchesd'histoiree'conomique (1964) 57; and especiallythe penetratingdiscussion of the problem in E. Badian, 'Tiberius Gracchusand the beginningof the Roman revolution', ANRW I 1 (1972) 670-673. D.C. Earl, Tiberius Gracchus,a studyin politics(1963) 23-30, althoughin error on severalpointsof detail, hasalso found it necessarysignificantlyto modify the communisopinio. 8. Cf., inter alia, R. Scalais,'La politiqueagrairede Rome depuislesguerres puniquesj usqu'auxGracques',MB 34 ( 1930-1932)196-201;Earl, Ti. Gracchus2425; Toynbee II 10-35, the latter with comprehensivereferences.The notion that ancient warfare was capableof suchsystemicdamagehas,however,beenrightly challengedby H. Last, CAH IX 4; Yeo (1951) 323-324; Brunt, IM 269-277. 9. Cf. G. De Sanctis,Storia dei Romani III 2 (1917) 632-633;A. Klotz, 'Die r•mische Wehrmacht im 2. punischenKriege', Philologusn.s. 42 (1933) 68-84; Toynbee II 647; Brunt, IM 418. 10. Brunt, IM 422 (cf. 713-714). His assessment isworth quotingin full: 'On my estimates ... it is likely that between 214 and 203 some 75,000 men died in the legions.The total mortalityin the army from 218to 203 wouldthenhavebeenabout 120,000. After Cannae there were few military disasters,but diseasemust have taken a steadytoll. In 203 214,000citizensregistered.The correspondingfigure of citizens, excluding 34,000 Campanians, who would have registeredin 218, was probably about 265,000. The net lossimputableto the war wasthusabout 50,000or almost 20 percent of adult male citizens. In other words, some70,000 of the war casualtieswould in any eventhavediedin theseyears.I presumethat the loyal allies sufferedin proportion, and the rebelsprobably worse;they probablylostfewermen in battles,but more as a result of faminesand consequentepidemicsresultingfrom the devastation

of their land.'

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11. For terms of servicein the Hannibalic War and their supposedimpact on peasantcultivation, cf. Toynbee II 72-75; and Brunt, IM 403-404. In an article rightly salutedfor its brilliance, but whoseimplicationshave not alwaysbeenfully appreciated,G. Tibiletti, 'Ricerchedi storiaagraria', Athenaeum n.s.28 (1950) 183266, demolishedthe fashionabletheory that the Second Punic War had permanently ruined many of the veterani. He appropriatelyemphasisesthe complete absencein our sourcesof evidencefor public debateon the issueof land reform in the aftermath of the war, and pointsto the coloniesfoundedboth in the Cisalpina and in the south of Italy as outlets for those who had been dislocated. 12. For the extensionof the agerpublicusand its putativerole in theeconomic transformation of Italy, cf. Scalais, MB 34 (1930-1932) 201-209; C.A. Yeo, 'The overgrazingof ranch-landsin ancient Italy', TAPhA 79 (1948) 280-289;Tibiletti (1955) 242-251; Toynbee II 117-121,228-252; Brunt, IM 278-284. 13. On the scarcity of capital as a factor contributing to the demise of the assidui, cf. Kromayer (1914) 149-150; Heitland 144; Scalais, MB 34 (1930-1932) 209-212; Yeo (1951) 323. 14. It is to be hopedthat the readerwill find the useof suchtermsas'latifundia' and 'large estates'in this and the succeedingparagraphssomewhatvague.Their usagehereis meantto mirror theimprecisionwhichhaslongcharacterised the more generaldescriptionsof Italy's rural economyin the four centuriesfollowing the Hannibalicinvasion.The sketchof Cato'sDe agri cultura a popular sourcebook,N. Lewis and M. Reinhold, Roman civilization I (1951) 11, is representative:'Cato wrote this guide to serve the needs of the increasinglynumerous owners of latifundiawho wereas yet inexperiencedin the operationof theselargeestatesthat were developing in the transformation of Italian agriculture from subsistence farmingto oneof the mostimportantsourcesof incomefor the Roman rulingclass.' 15. Cf. R. Scalais,'Les revenusque lesRomainsattendaientde l'agriculture', MB 31 (1927) 93; Yeo ( 1951)325; Tibiletti (1955) 242-251;ToynbeeII 167-177;and the review of Toynbee by E. Gabba, RFIC 96 (1968) 72:Esercito e societhnella tarda repubblicaromana (1973) 560; Hopkins, Conquerorsand slaves2-5, 9, 12-13, 48.

16. The oppressiveburdenof military serviceupon the Italian peasantryin the secondcenturyBChasbecomean academicarticle of faith; cf., interalia, Kromayer (1914) 152-154;Yeo (1951) 323; G. Steiner, 'The fortunate farmer: life on the small farm in ancientItaly', CJ51 (1955) 58; Earl, Ti. Gracchus33-34;ToynbeeII 165et passim;Gabba, RFIC 96 (1968) 71- Esercitoe societh558-559; Brunt, IM 398,642643 et passim;Hopkins, Conquerorsand slaves4, 30. 17. Further discussionof the agrarianreformspassedinto law by Ti. Gracchus, and their demographiccontext, has beenreservedfor Part III of this paper. 18. See esp. Kromayer (1914) 159-166;Tibiletti (1955) 281-287. 19. The generalisationis frequentlyencounteredin modernscholarship;cf., inter alia, M. Weber, 'Die sozialenGrande des Untergangsder antiken Kultur', GesammelteAufs•itzezur Social- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte (1924) 295; Heitland 154; Tibiletti (1955) 287-292; Bourne(1960) 49-50; Toynbee II 102. 20. HN 7.149:'iuncta deindetot mala, inopiastipendi,rebellioIllyrici, servi-

40

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tiorum delectus,iuventutispenuria, pestilentia urbis,fames Italiae . . . '; cf., inter alia, Livy 6.12, 7.25.8-9. 21. Dio Cass. 54.16.1-2, 56.1-9; cf. Hor. Carm. Saec. 17-20; Pliny, HN 7.60; Tac. Ann. 3.25; Suet. Aug. 34; and for the juridical sources,S. Riccobonoet al., Acta Divi Augusti I (1945) 166-198. 22. Pliny, HN 7.149; Vell. Pat. 2.111.1; Tac. Ann. 1.31; Suet. Aug. 25.2; Dio Cass. 56.23.3.

23. The finding may be exhumedfrom, inter alia, Heitland 156; A. Landry, 'Quelquesaper•usconcernantla d6populationdansl'antiquit6gr6co-romaine',RH 177 (1936) 12-13; E.T. Salmon, 'The Roman army and the disintegrationof the Roman Empire', Transact.of the Royal Soc. of Canada s.3, 52 sec.2 (1958)52; Bourne (1960)49 n. 1; K.D. White, Roman farming (1970) 366. 24. Sen. Ben. 7.10.5; Ep. 87.7, 89.20, 90.39; Juv. 14.140-151. The last two notices, together with an important entry in Siculus Flaccus(see n. 42 below), shouldbe appendedto the highly usefulcatalogueof referencesto largeestatesin K.D. White, 'Latifundia', BICS 14 (1967) 62-79. 25. Nero: Tac. Ann. 13.31 (Capua, Nuceria), 14.27 (Antiurn, Tarentum); Vespasian:CIL 9.2564 (Bovianum), 10.4735(Sinuessa),16.12-13, 15-16 (Paestum); Nerva: Pliny, Ep. 7.31.4; Dio Cass.68.2.1; Dig. 47.21.3.1; CIL 6.1548=ILS 1019. 26. Suet. Dom. 9.3; Lachmann I 133; CIL 9.5420=Bruns, FIR 7 82=Riccobono,

FIRA I 75=McCrum-Woodhead462 (subseciva);Dom. 7.2, 14.2(protectivelegislation). For the orthodox interpretationof the Flavian evidence,cf. Heitland 272 and n. 3; Frank, ESAR V 31; Rostovtzeff, SEHRE 2 198-199,202-203, 358-359; Bourne (1960) 51-52. 27. Cf. recently Rostovtzeff, SEttRE 2 199, 359; Bourne (1960) 68-72; G.B.

Ford, 'The lettersof Pliny the Youngeras evidenceof agrarian conditionsin the principateof Trajan', Helikon 5 (1965) 386-387. 28. Cf. P. Veyne, 'La table desLiguresBaebianiet l'institutionalimentairede Trajan', MEFR 70 (1958) 228; 'Les "Alimenta" de Trajan', in A. Piganiol and H. Terrasse(eds.), Les empereursromains d'Espagne(1965) 169-170; R. DuncanJones,'The purposeand organisationof the alimenta', PBSR n.s. 19 (1964) 127, 130;Theeconomyof the Roman Empire(1974)295;P. Garnsey,'Trajan'salimenta: someproblems',ttistoria 17 (1968) 381; Brunt, IM5; Salmon 57; M.I. Finley, The ancient economy(1973) 40. 29. On this point, cf. O. Seeck,Geschichtedes Untergangsder antiken Welt4 I (1921) 344; Heitland 273; A.E.R. Boak, Manpower shortageand thefall of the Roman Empire in the west (1955) 18. Contra, Salmon 138-139;C.R. Whittaker, 'Agri deserti',in M.I. Finley (ed.), Studiesin Roman property (1976) 141-42. 30. See esp. Boak, Manpower shortage28; Bourne (1960) 70. Contra, Whittaker, Stud. Rom. property 140-141, 148. The passagein the HA nevertheless continuesto be taken at face value;see,for example, R.E.A. Palmer, 'Customson market goodsimported into the city of Rome', MAAR 36 (1980) 220. 31. Cf., inter alia, E. Albertini, L'empire romain3 (1938) 129, 304; H.H. Scullard, From the Gracchi to Nero (1959) 19-22; F.B. Marsh, A history of the Roman worM from 146 to 30 B.C.3 (rev. H.H. Scullard, 1963) 5-11; M. Cary, A history of Rome3 (rev. H.H. Scullard, 1975) 186-188;A. Heuss, R6mische Geschichte4 (1976) 140-143.

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32. For the thorny problem which both the name and the identity of Valgus pose, see P.B. Harvey, 'Socer Valgus, Valgii, and C. QuinctiusValgus', in E.N. Borza and R. Carrubba (eds.), Classicsand the classicaltradition:essayspresented to Robert E. Dengleron the occasionof his eightiethbirthday (1973) 79-94. As for Ahenobarbus'pledge,P.A. Brunt hasvariouslyestimatedit to haveconcerned1013,000 men! Cf. Social conflicts in the Roman Republic (1971) 34; 'Two great Roman landowners', Latomus 34 (1975) 619-624. 33. See CIL 9.1455:ILS 6509=Bruns, FIR ? 145b:Riccobono, FIRA III 117, and the commentsthereonof Th. Mommsen, 'Die italischeBodentheilungund die Alimentartafeln', Hermes 19 (1884)401=Ges. Schr. V (1908) 131.

34. The well-established applicationof theterm to two quitedifferenteconomic structures,the ranch and the mixed farm, is to be stressedhere. One may note, to cite but one recentexample, Hopkins, Conquerorsand slaves3. 35. A point already anticipatedand rightly emphasisedby White, BICS 14 (1967) 63, 76. 36. CAH

XI 336-341.

37. L'Italia agraria sotto Traiano (1958) 81. 38. Die italischenGutsh6fenach den Schriften Catos und Varros (1965) ii. 39. It has been endorsed,for example, by White, BICS 14 (1967) 64, 76; and D. BrendanNagle, 'Towards a sociologyof southeasternEtruria', Athenaeum n.s. 57 (1979) 412 n. 6; contra, J.E. Skydsgaard,'Nuove ricerchesulla villa rustica Romanafino all' epocadi Traiano',AnalectaInst. Rom. Danici5 (1969)32;andN. Brockmeyer,'Die Villa Rusticaals Wirtschaftsformund die Ideologisierungder Landwirtschaft', AncSoc 6 (1975) 213. 40. The Vettii, one of the most prominent Pompeian families, ownedat least one propertyat Formiaein Latium (CIL 4.5577). SextusRosciusownedthirteen separatefundiin theTiber valley(Cic. Rosc.Am. 20); Varro hadestatesin Apulia, at Reate, Tusculumand in the neighbourhoodof Vesuvius(RR. 1.15,2praef 6, 3.3.8, 13.1);Columella'spropertieswerelocatedat Alba, Ardeaand Carseoli(RR 3.9.2). Pliny himselfhad farmsat Laurenturn,Tifernum and Comum(Ep. 3.19, 4.6).

41. The entry for 'latifundia'in the index of Brunt,IM745, begins'oftenconsist of scatteredholdings';cf. Salomon, Recherchesd'hist. gcon. 58: 'il y a de grands domaines,maispasencore,du fait de leur morcellement,ce que l'on qualifiede latifundia'. 42. 'Aliquando integrasplenasque centurias binas pluresve continuas uni nomini redditasinvenimus;ex quo intelligitur "redditumsuum,lati fundi".' hi per continuationeraservantur centuriis.'(Lachmann I 157) 43. On the Pompeianvillae rusticae,cf. still R.C. Cartington,'Studiesin the Campanian"villaerusticae"',JRS 21 (1931) 110-130;and J. Day, 'Agriculturein the life of Pompeii', YCS 3 (1932) 165-208. 44. R. Martin, Recherchessur les agronomeslatins et leur conceptionsgconomiqueset sociales(1971) 351. For the range of economicactivity evidenced amongthe Pompeianvillae, seeagain Day, YCS 3 (1932) 172-176. 45. R. Martin, 'Pline le Jeune et les problbmes6conomiquesde son temps', REA 69 (1967)62-97;Recherches surlesagronomeslatins343-373,esp.343-353;cf. M. Mazza, 'Terra e forme di dipendenzanell' impero romano', in Terreetpaysans dgpendantsdans les socigtgsantiques(1979) 441-493, esp. 448-451. While the

42

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K. EVANS

analysesof Martin and Mazza havebroughtusno closerto understandingwhat the Romansmeant by the term 'latifundia', they shouldat leastmake it possiblefor us to define in future what we mean by it! 46. It shouldbe evident,for example,that tenantry could be usedpermanently to relieve a peasanthouseholdof surpluslabour, whereasthe villae rusticaewould normally require supplementarylabour only at selecttimes of the year, and the pastoralestateperhapsnot at all. The socialrepercussions of each systemmight, then, be radically different. Nor is it always easy to determine the historical impulseswhich stimulatea particularform of landed estate.The genesisof the hacienda in seventeenth-century Mexico offers an instructiveexample; see M. M6rner, 'The SpanishAmericanhacienda:a surveyof recentresearchand debate', HAHR 53 (1973) 183-216, and the literature cited therein. 47. SEHRE: 204. The availability of coloniis taken for grantedin Columella, RR 1.7.3,4 and 6, and we shouldnot be misledby the recurrentcomplaintsto the contrary in Pliny, Ep. 3.19.6-7, 6.30.3-5, 7.30.3 and 9.37. As Martin, REA 69 (1967) 62-97, hassensiblypointedout, suchgrumblingmay be nothingmore than a social affectation,in the samevein as Pliny'sequallyfrequentprotestations of poverty. The institution is not without republicanantecedents;cf. Cic. Caecin. 57, 94; Caes. BCiv. 1.34.2, 56.3; and the juristic sourcesconvenientlycited in P.A. Brunt, 'The army and the land in the Roman revolution', JRS 52 (1962) 71 n. 31. The heavy demandfor day-labourers(operariOin the mid-secondcenturyBC,which onemay infer from Cato, De agri cult. 4, 5.4, 144.3-4, 145.1 and 146.3, seemsto have persistedin the late Republic and Principate, particularly during the harvest season.The key passageis Suet. Vesp.1.4,but cf. Varro, RR 1.17.2-3,53; and Pliny, gp. 8.2. 48. IM 422, 438-439, 713-714. Even if one subtractsthe 130,000 men whom he

allotsto the rebelalliancein 89 BCfrom the total forceof 300,000to compensate for Rome's inability to draw upon the manpowerof military age in the secessionist communitiesduring the Hannibalic war, the disparitybetweenthe resultantfigures remains too meagre to warrant discussion. 49. G. Pieri, L'histoire du censjusqu'h latin de la rdpubliqueromaine(1968) 187-188,is the only recentstudentof the evidencewho hassensiblyoptedto remain aloof from the controversy.For the nuancesof disagreementamong thosewho believethat the censusof 28 BCcomprisedmen, womenand children,cf. Beloch,Z. Soc.wiss. 2 (1899) 615; Brunt, IM 116, 120; and W. den Boer, 'Demography in Roman history: facts and impressions',Mnemosyne s.4, 26 (1973) 42. 50. Cf. Rostovtzeff,SEHRE 2 198-199,and esp.Boak, Manpowershortage15: 'It is a view very generally acceptedthat the population of the Roman world increasedmateriallyunderthe favorableconditionsof thepax Romanaestablished by Augustusand maintainedby his successors into the third century of our era. There is, however,somedisagreement as to the time whenthis risein population cameto an end, and a decline,or at leasta stateof stagnation,setin. Somemaintain that the accretioncontinueduntil the end of the Severandynastyin 235, othersthat a declinebeganunderthe $everibetween193and 235, and still othersthat this declinehadalreadybegunby thetimeof MarcusAurelius(161-180).I find myselfin agreementwith those who support the last of theseviews.'

PLEBS RUSTICA

I

43

51. The argument has been developedat length by Mommsen, Hermes 19 (1884) 400-401,406-408=Ges. Schr. V 130-131,136-138; and Kromayer (1914) 165166.

52. Cf. Livy 10.21.4 (296 Bc); 22.11.8 (217); 22.57.11-12 (216): Per 74, App. BCiv. 1.49 (89 Bc). 53. Dio Cass. 56.23.3: 'Having chosenby lot as many as he could from those who had already finishedtheir term of service(•r&, •azpo•zz•z•,co,) and from the

freedmen(•r&, •zXz,•pco,), he conscripted them,and instantlydispatchedthem in haste with Tiberius to Germany.' 54. Dio Cass.56.23.2-3:'... and when no one among thoseof the ageelegible for military serviceproved willing to be enrolled, he drew lots among them, and taking everyfifth man of thosenot yet 35 yearsof age,and everytenth man of those who wereolder,he confiscatedtheir propertyand disfranchisedthem. Finally, asa great many even then did not pay attention to him, he put some to death.' The detailedcharacterof this passageshould not concealits essentialambiguity;it is quite unclearhow extensivethe groupaffectedmay havebeen,althoughit mightbe cautiouslyinferredfrom the lack ofcorroborative testimonyin other sourcesthat it must have been insignificant. 55. While the men summoned

to arms in the tumultus of 181 BC were dismissed

within a few months (Livy 40.26.6-28.10), Tacitus could characterisePercennius, the ringleaderof the mutinyamongthe Pannonianlegions,asdux olim theatralium operarum(Ann. 1.16),and similarly the rebelliouselementin the Rhine garrisonas vernacula multitudo, nuper acto in urbe dilectu (Ann. 1.31). 56. For the frequent postponementof the dischargeof time-expiredveterans and the resentmentwhich this engendered,seeesp. Tac. Ann. 17.2, 35.2; for the severityof military routine, and the hatred incurredby the centurionsin particular, Ann. 1.17.4, 20, 31.4-32.

57. Cf. Suet. Net. 44 (^D 68); HA, M. Ant. 21.6 (bellurn Marcomannicum). 58. Dig. 49.16.11: 'Ab omni militia servi prohibentur: alioquin capite puniuntur'; cf. Pliny, Ep. 10.29-30. 59. G. Forni, II reclutamentodelle legioni da Augusto a Diocleziano (1953) 169-176.Five and possiblysix new legionswereformed in Italy during the period ^D 161-235; see J.C. Mann, 'The raising of new legionsduring the Principate', Hermes 91 (1963) 483-489. The methodologicalwarnings pronounced on this questionby G.E.F. Chilver, Cisalpine Gaul (1941) 120, are to the point. 60. Cf. Dio Cass.56.7.2,whichagainemphasises that all savesenatorswouldbe allowed to marry libertinae. 61. IM 104, 558-562.

62. Cf. Landry, RH 177 (1936) 12-13; J. Bordon, 'Le monde antique s'est-il d•peupl•?', Journal de la Socidtdde Statistiquede Paris 89 (1948) 117; Salmon4950, 130.

63. Indeed, if there is anything of historicalsubstancein the speeches of Dio Cassius, then one segment of the censoriouslecture (56.4-9) to an assemblyof equestrianswhich he ascribesto Augustus in AD 9 furnishes evidence to the contrary: 'For what seedof mankind would be left if everyoneelse observedyour practises?Since you have become their leaders,you would reasonablybear the

44

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K. EVANS

blame for the universal destruction. As it is, even if no others emulate you, you would reasonablybe hated for this very reason,that you overlook what no oneelse would overlook and neglectwhat no oneelsewould neglect,and introducecustoms and practiseswhich if imitated would causeeveryoneto perish,and if despised causeyou to be condemned'(56.4.4-5). 64. For the late Republic• see S. Treggiari, Roman freedmen during the late Republic(1969) 31-36. The detailed epigraphicstudy of B. Rawson, 'Family life among the lower classesat Rome in the first two centuriesof the Empire', CPh 61 (1966) 71-83, puts on a more crediblebasisthe similar conclusionsfor the early Principateto be found in sucholder works as A.M. Duff, Freedmenin the early Roman Empire (rev. ed. 1958) 199-200. 65. Alba (Luc. 7.394); Antemnae (Strab. 5.3.2); Aricia (Cic. Leg. Agr. 2.96); Bovillae (Cic. Planc. 23); Caere (Strab. 5.2.3); Collatia (Cic. Leg. Agr. 2.96; Strab. 5.3.2); Cora (Luc. 7.392); Fidenae(Cic. Leg. Agr. 2.96; Hor. Epist. 1.11.8; Strab. 5.3.2); Gabii (Cic. Planc. 23; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 4.53.1; Hor. Epist. 1.11.7;Luc. 7.392); Labicum (Cic. Planc. 23); Lanuvium (Cic. Leg. Agr. 2.96); Laurentum (Luc. 7.394); Tusculum (Cic. Planc. 21; Leg. Agr. 2.96); Veii (Prop. 4.10.29-30; Luc. 7.392). Add, for central Italy, Fregellae (Strab. 5.3.10) and Volaterrae (Strab. 5.2.6). 66. Cic. Att. 8.3.4; Strab. 6.3.9; Sen. Ep. 87.7 (Apulia); Cic. Amic. 13.2;Strab. 6.1; Dio Chrys. Or. 33.25 (Magna Graecia). Sen. Tranq. 2.13, often cited in this context, is wholly inadmissible. 67. Cf., for example, Heitland 156, 184; White, Romanfarming 366. 68. This methodologicalperil hasrecentlybeenstressedby Nagle, Athenaeum n.s. 57 (1979) 411 n. 2, an invaluable synthesisof the variousreportsissuedby the British School on southeastern

Etruria.

69. See R.M. Ogilvie, 'Eretum', PBSR n.s. 20 (1965) 75-80. 70. A. Kahane, L.M. Threipland and J.B. Ward-Perkins, 'The Ager Veientanus, north and east of Rome,' PBSR n.s. 23 (1968) 149; cf. P. Hemphill, 'The Cassia-Clodiasurvey',PBSR n.s. 30 (1975) 157. 71. Cf. J.B. Ward-Perkins, 'Notes on southern Etruria and the Ager Veientanus', PBSR n.s. 10 (1955) 57; Kahane, Threipland and Ward-Perkins, PBSR n.s. 23 (1968) 149-150;Hemphill, PBSR n.s. 30 (1975) 157. 72. Veil is by no meansuniquein thisrespect;cf. G.D.B. Jones,'Capenaand the Ager Capenas', PBSR n.s. 17 (1962) 141 (Capena); and esp. U. Kahrstedt, Die wirtschaftlicheLage Grossgriechenlands in der Kaiserzeit(1960) 3-15 (Paestum), 21-23 (Buxentum), 24-26 (Lavinium), 28-32 (Tempsa), 58-66 (Locri) and 66-68 (Caulonia). 73. M.I. Finley, Stud. Rom. property 2. 74. The younger Pliny registerstwo properties whose market value had declinedowing to poor management(Ep. 3.19, 6.3), and intervenesto help Suetonius obtain a farm in the environsof Rome whichwill be idealfor hispurposes,'simodo adriseritpretium' (1.24). Columella(RR 3.3.8) citesHS 3,000 per iugerumas the pricewhichonecouldexpectto pay (in the neighbourhoodof his estate?)for soil already under the vine, but Pliny the Elder mentionsa vineyardof sixty lugera

PLEBS

RUSTICA

I

45

whichsoldfor HS 400,000,anda propertypurchased for HS 600,000and soldsome ten yearslater for four timesthat figure(HN 14.48-51).Thesetwo examplesare obviously anecdotal, but they do point up the danger in generalisingfrom Columella'stext. For someof the forcesaffectingthe land market in Italy, cf. Suet. Aug. 41.1; Tac. Ann. 6.16-17; and Pliny, Ep. 6.19. 75. Cf., inter alia, Chilver, Cisalpine Gaul 151; Sirago, L'Italia agraria sotto Trainrio30, 48, 81; Martin, REA 69 (1967) 68-69; White, BICS 14 (1967)76-77. 76. ESAR

V 62.

77. Kromayer (1914) 146 n. 3, 165-166;Frank, ESAR V 173-174. 78. Cf. F.G. de Pachtere, La table hypothdcaire de Veleia (1920) 22-23; M. Besnier,'A proposde la tablehypoth6cairede Veleia',REA 24 (1922) 118-122; and M.I. Finley, Stud. Roman property 3. 79. L'Italia agraria sotto Traiano 81. 80. Mommsen, Hermes 19 (1894) 394=Ges.$chr. V 124:'Der Name desersten Besitzersbleibt dem Grundsti•ck fi•r alle Zeiten, wie auch der Besitz wechselt, weil er in der statt Grundbuch dienenden Urkunde stand, und beherrscht auch den

gemeinenSpachgebrauchinsofern,als der betreffendeGeschlechtsname mit der Endung -anus versehender Regel nach zum Individualnamen des Grundsti•cks wird.' Hence thefundus Antonianusof mortgageno. 25, part of the estateof Antonia Vera, originallybelongedeither to a memberof thisfamily or to one of the same

name.

81. Hermes 19 (1894) 395-396=Ges.$chr. V 126:'Zusammenlegungmehrerer Grundsti•ckezu dauernderVerbindungfindet ihren nati•rlichenAusdruckin der Combination der Einzelnamenzu einer Einheit, und yon BeispielendieserArt sind unsereDocumenteerfi•llt. Sprachlichdri•ckt sichdieseCombinationdarin aus, dass die Einzelobjecteohne Copula zusammengefasst werdenund der so entstandeneComplex dann als Einheit singularischbehandeltwird .... ' Thefundus Calidianus$arvellianusPapirianus,one of nineteenfundicataloguedin mortgage no. 5, wouldthusbe an amalgamof farmsformerlyin the possession of the Calidii, Sarvellii and Papirii. To pursuethis example, it was Mommsen'scontentionthat the mortgagor,M. AntoniusPriscus,had securedownershipof nineteenproperties, which themselvesconsistedof thirty-five farms in existenceat the time of the cadastral survey. 82. The year in which this surveywasconductedremainsuncertain,but it must

havefollowedupontheenfranchisement of thecommunityin thetriumviralperiod, and a triumviral or Augustan date is thus most likely; cf. Mommsen, Hermes 19 (1894) 402=Ges. $chr. V 132; Frank, ESAR V 174; G. Radke, 'Veleia' no. 2, RE 8A (1955) 622. 83. Hermes 19 (1894)401-402=Ges. $chr. V 131. 84. For example,the fundus Arsuniacuscum casisin the pagus Iunonius,

eleventwelfthsof whichwerepledgedby M. ViriusNeposat an assessed valueof HS 84,333 (no. 2). 85. La table hypothdcairede Veleia 62-68. This extraordinary work has regrettablynever receivedthe attention which it deserves.

86. Other examples,chosenat random, are thefundi GeminianiPisuniacus offered as securityby C. Vibius Proculusfor HS 12,700(no. 12), and thefundi

46

JOHN

K. EVANS

Caesiani Naeviani Firmiani Arraniani Carigenus and fundus Atilianus Arruntianus Innielius, pledgedby L. Granius Priscusfor HS 37,000 (no. 19). 87. Cf. thefundusOlympianusin thepagusAmbitrebius(mortgagesno. 13and 18), and thefundus Glitianus Roudelius in Albensis (nos. 16 and 17). 88. La table hypoth•caire de Veleia 80-87. 89. The advantagesand disadvantagesof centralisationwere not lost on the Romans;for someof the advantages,seePliny, Ep. 3.19. 90. Stat. Silv. 4.3.11-12;Philostr. VA 6.42, VS 1.520;Helm 191.There mayalso be ellipticalreferencesto the decreein HA, Prob. 18;Eutrop. 9.17.2;and Aur. Vict. Caes. 37.2.

91. Dom. 7.2: 'ad summamquondamubertatemvinLfrumenti vero inopiam, existimansnimio vinearumstudio neglegiarva, edixit, ne quis in Italia novellaret utque in provinciis vineta succiderentur,relicta ubi plurimum dimidia parte .... ' We haveevidenceof a severeshortageof wheatat PisidianAntiochwhichmayhave occurredpreciselyin the winter of ^D 91/ 92 and couldthereforebe the incidentin question;seeAbbott-Johnson65a=McCrum-Woodhead464. The text falls within the tenure of L. Antistius Rusticusas governor of Cappadocia-Galatia; for his dates, see W. Eck, Senatoren von Vespasianbis Hadrian (1970) 142 n. 124. 92. Frank, ESAR V 297; Rostovtzeff, SEHRE 2 202-203, 358. 93. Cf., inter alia, Bourne (1960) 51-52.

94. 'Subsicivorum autem genera duo; unum quod extremis adsignatorum agrorum finibus centuriam non explet, aliud etiam integris centuriis intervenit' (Lachmann 181); 'subsicivaautemea dicuntur, quaeadsignarinonpotuerunt, id est cum sit ager centuriatus, aliqua inculta loca, quae in(tra> centurias erant, non sunt assignata'(Lachmann I 132). Cf. ibid. 162-163. 95. Cf. Lachmann I 54, 133. 96. CIL 9.5420=Bruns, FIR 7 82=Riccobono, FIRA 1.75=McCrum-Woodhead

462. Cf. St. Gsell, Essai sur le rbgne de l•mpereur Domitien (1894) 131-134; P. Bonvicini, 'La centuriazionedel territorio Faleronesesotto Augusto', Studia Picena 26 (1958) 135-143; O.A.W. Dilke, The Roman land surveyors(1971) 94. 97. 'Subsiciva,quaedivisisper veteranosagriscarptim superfuerunt, veteribus possessoribusut usu capta concessit'(Dom. 9.3); 'praestantissimus postea Domitianus ad hoc beneficiumprocurrit et uno edicto totius Italiae meturn liberavit' (Lachmann I 54); cf. ibid. 133, 163,284. 98. SEHRE 2 198; cf., inter alia, H.W. Pleket, 'Domitian, the Senate and the provinces',Mnemosyne s. 4, 14 (1961) 306 n. 4. 99. Brunt, IM 710.

100. SeeK.H. Connell, Population of Ireland, 1750-1845(1950), and 'Land and population in Ireland 1780-1845', in D.V. Glass and D.E.C. œversley(eds.), Population in history (1965) 423-433. 101. 'In Italia... densitaspossessorurnmultum improbefacit et lucossacros occupat, quorum solurn indubitatep. R. est, etiam si in finibus coloniarum ac municipiorum' (Lachmann I 87). 102. Brunt, IM 264-265, estimates,for example, that some 1,870,000 citizens were domiciled abroad in ^D 14. Since, however, he rightly regardsAugustus'

PLEBS

RUSTICA

I

47

censuses as defective,and conjecturesthe entire citizen populationto have ranged between5,924,000and 6,171,000(p. 116), this amountsto only 30-32% of the total. 103. Beloch,Bev•ilkerung437; Z. Soc.wiss.2 (1899) 511. 104. Cf., again,Ward-Perkins,PBSR n.s. 10(1955)57; Kahane,Threiplandand Ward-Perkins, PBSR n.s. 23 (1968) 149; Hemphill, PBSR n.s. 30 (1975) 157. 105. Cf. G. Duncan, 'Sutri', PBSR n.s. 13 (1958) 96-97•and Jones,PBSR n.s. 17 (1962) 133, 147.

106. G. Barker,J. Lloydand D. Webley,'A classical landscape in Molise',PBSR n.s. 33 (1978) 48.

107. Pachtere,La table hypothFcairede [/eleia31. 108. All of the research,and muchof the writingfor thispaper,wereundertaken in the congenialenvironmentof the Seminarfur Alte Geschichteder Universit•it Heidelberg,and I shouldlike to expressmy gratitudeto the faculty, and particularlyto ProfessorG•za Alfibldy,for theirunfailinghospitality.I shouldalsolike to thank my colleaguesat the Universityof Minnesota,ThomasKellyand Bernard Bachrach,andtheeditor,ProfessorBadian,whosecriticismsand suggestions have savedme from numerouserrorsand materiallystrengthened the argument.I am most profoundly indebted, however, to ProfessorD. Brendan Nagle of the Universityof SouthernCalifornia, without whosegenerousadviceand constant encouragement this paper could neverhave beenwritten. None, perhaps,would agreewith all that it contains,but we sharea commonhopethat it will stimulate further discussionof an important topic.

THE

CONFERENCE

OF LUCA:

DID

IT HAPPEN?

Accordingto standardmodernaccounts,in mid-April of 56 BCCaesarmet with Pompeyand Crassusat Luca. So many other important peoplehad also gatheredthere that 120 lictorsand more than 200 senatorswere also counted. Meanwhile, the three dynastsrenewedthe so-called"First Triumvirate" with the following agreements:Pompey and Crassuswere to securea joint consulshipfor 55; after that, Pompeywasto be governorof the two Spainsand Crassusof Syria for five years;a secondfive-yearterm wasto be addedto Caesar'sproconsulship;and a grant from the treasury was to be obtainedto pay the legionsrecruitedby him.• This pictureis reconstructed from the accountsof Appian (BC 2.3.17), Plutarch (Pomp. 51.3-4, Crass.14.5-6, Caes.21.2-3, Cat. Min. 41.1), and Suetonius(Iul. 24.1). All threeauthorsnameCrassusasbeingpresentwith Caesarand Pompey. Although Appian does not mention Luca by name and describesthe meeting of Pompey, Crassus,and Caesar only in connectionwith Caesar'swinter activitiesin CisalpineGaul in the vicinity of the Po, it is clear that he is referring to the meetinglocated at Luca by Plutarch and Suetonius.In fact, Appian'sgeneralgeographicreferenceis very closeto the passagein Plutarch'sCaesar(21.1) that saysthat Caesar spentthe winter in the regionsaround the Po. Unlike Appian, however, Plutarch goeson to nameLuca asthe specificsitewhereCaesarmet many important Romans, includingPompey and Crassus(ibid. 21.1). Doubt about the traditionalpictureof this meetingis raisedby the only two relevantpassages in the extant worksof Cicero(Fam. 1.9.9, Q.Fr. 2.6.5 [Watt]) and by the absenceof any referenceto a conferenceat Luca in sourcesother than Appian, Plutarch, and Suetonius.Cicero, a valuable contemporarywitness,while mentioning a previous meeting of Crassus and Caesar at Ravenna, saysonly that Pompey met Caesarat Luca (Fam. 1.9.9). Moreover, on the dawn of Pompey'sdeparturefrom Rome in the direction of Luca, Cicero givesno hint that anything unusualwas afoot (Q. Fr. 2.6.5 [Watt]), althoughhe might reasonablybe expectedto have beensuspicious that somethingportentouswashappeningif, asis usually assumed,120lictorsand morethan 200 senatorswerealsoin the processof leaving. Therefore, some scholarshave questionedthe historicity of a conferenceat Luca as usually describedand have argued insteadthat the 48

THE

CONFERENCE

OF LUCA

49

resultscommonlyascribedto a spectacular, trilateralmeetingat Lucawere producedby two separate,bilateral meetingsthat havebeenconfusedand exaggeratedin the later sources,namely, a meetingbetweenCaesarand Crassusat Ravenna and a subsequentone betweenCaesar and Pompey at Luca.: A careful review of the sources,however, will demonstrate that the problemsare not so great as they at first appearand that it is necessaryto eliminateonly onepart of the traditional pictureof the Conferenceof Luca.

One shouldbeginby looking closelyat the first four sentences of Appian, BC 2.3.17. (I quote Viereck's text.)

First, in describingCaesar'sactivitiesin CisalpineGaul in the winter of 57/56, Appian mentionsmeetingsbetweenCaesarand variouspoliticians. On thoseoccasions,accordingto him, so many important peoplecameto Caesarthat at one point there were presentwith him 120fascesand more than 200 senators.Appian then commentsupon Caesar'sstrongpolitical position.Only after that, in the fourth sentence, doeshego on to mentiona meeting between Caesar and his two partners, without referenceto a particular location, numbers of people gathered,or other individuals. Clearly, Appian has condensedseveral weeks' activity in the winter of 57/56 into thesefour sentences,and their order of presentationindicates that Appian intendedto place the occasionwhen there were present120 lictorsand morethan 200 senatorsbeforethetime Caesarmet Pompeyand Crassus,who are mentionedlast only after an interveningcomment. This conclusionisstrengthened by Appian'schoiceof words.Despitethe textualproblemthat all editorsseesurrounding xot•o[ •XXo• •:•potvz• in the secondsentence,there shouldbe no doubt that in this passageAppian indicatesthat at one particular point during the generaltime mentioned 120lictorsand morethan 200 senatorswerepresentat Caesar'scamp.The crucialword isr•o•:[,whichmakesno sensein itssentence exceptas"at one point" and comesafter tx6vand is followed by 8' alone, words which indicatethat the lictorsandsenatorsarebeingdiscussed in a singlecontext.

50

ALLEN

M.

WARD

If Appian had beenreferringto two different incidentssignalizedby the number of lictors presenton the one hand and senatorson the other, he would have written •ro-r[ y.6v... •ro-r• 86. Finally, the fourth sentenceunder considerationdoesnot tie Pompey and Crassusto the time and place at which great numbersof lictorsand other senatorscould be seenat Caesar'sheadquarters.The 8' that links this sentenceto the precedingthree simplyindicatesthat Appian is still talking in generalabout Caesar'sactivitiesin CisalpineGaul in the winter of57/56,

and whetherthe firstx