Warriors and Peacemakers: How Third Parties Shape Violence 9780814723678

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Warriors an d Peacemaker s

Warriors an d Peacemakers How Third Parties Shape Violence

Mark Coone y

NEW YOR K UNIVERSIT Y PRES S New York and London

NEW YOR K UNIVERSIT Y PRES New York and London

S

Copyright © 199 8 b y New Yor k Universit y All rights reserve d Grateful acknowledgmen t i s given to Richar d B . Lee and Cambridg e University Pres s for permissio n t o quot e fro m Th e !Kun g San : Men , Women, an d Wor k i n a Foraging Society , 1979 . Library o f Congres s Cataloging-in-Publicatio n Dat a Cooney, Mark, 1955 Warriors an d peacemaker s : how thir d partie s shap e violenc e / Mark Coone y p. cm . Includes bibliographica l reference s an d index . ISBN 0-8147-1514- 1 (clothboun d : acid-free paper) . ISBN 0-8147-1567-2 (paperbac k : acid-free paper ) 1. Violence. 2 . Interpersonal conflict . 3 . Homicide. 4 . Thir d parties (Law ) I . Title. HM291.W315 199 8 303.6—dc2i 97-45 3 50 CIP New Yor k Universit y Pres s book s ar e printed o n acid-fre e paper , and thei r bindin g material s ar e chose n fo r strengt h an d durability . Manufactured i n the United State s o f Americ a 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

To my mother and father

Contents Preface ix i Introductio

ni

Violence a s Morality 3 Third Partie s 5 Black' s Theoretical Paradig m 8 Four Foc i 1 4 2 Th

e U - C u r v e o f Violenc e 1 2 Status Pattern s i n Crimina l Homicid e 2 Elite Violence 3 1 Third-Party Socia l Statu s 3 7

3 Th

e U - C u r v e o f Violenc e 2 4

2 3

5

Violence i n Stateles s Societie s 4 7 Informal Settlemen t 5 9 4 Configuration

s o f Wa r an d Peac e 6

7

Black's Theor y o f Partisanshi p 6 9 Feuding without End : Clos e an d Distan t Group Tie s 7 3 Homicide withou t Feuding : Clos e an d Distant Individua l Tie s 8 3 The Dilemma o f Violence : Cross-Cutting Tie s 8 9 vii

viii I Contents

Peaceful Indifference : Distant Individua l Tie s yy 5 Foundation

s o f H o n o r 10

7

Classical Hono r 10 8 Modern Hono r 11 3 Tie Stability 11 9 Statelessness 12 2 6 Conclusio

n 13

3

Researching Violenc e 13 4 Reducing Violenc e 14 0 Explaining Violenc e 15 0 Appendix A : Moralisti c Homicid e 15

5

Appendix B : Th e Virgini a Stud y 15

8

Appendix C : Th e Cross-Cultura l Stud y 16

1

Notes 165 References 173 Author Index 197 Subject Index 201 About the Author 210

Preface

The social study of violence made enormous progress in the latter half o f the twentieth century . We know vastly more abou t virtually al l facet s o f violenc e tha n ou r predecessor s di d in , say , 1950. A n impressiv e bod y o f reliabl e informatio n no w exist s o n who kill s whom, when an d wher e killing s take place, the nature o f gang and tribal feuding, the interactional dynamic s of violence, and the macrostructural predictor s o f rates of violence, as well as many other topics . Even so , we kno w fa r les s than w e could , fo r ther e remai n sev eral underdevelope d line s o f inquiry . One , perhap s surprisingly , i s the role played b y people othe r tha n th e principal parties who hav e or ar e likel y to hav e informatio n abou t th e conflict—thir d parties , such as relatives, friends, neighbors , workmates, strangers, or lega l officials. A moment's reflection reveal s that third parties must ofte n exert a powerfu l influenc e o n th e cours e dispute s take . The y ma y be a forc e fo r violenc e o r fo r peace , actin g a s warriors, peacemak ers, or somethin g i n between . The central intellectua l issu e is when thir d partie s will wage wa r and whe n the y wil l mak e peace . I argu e i n thi s boo k tha t th e ex planation i s to be found i n the social status and ties of third parties . Of critica l importanc e i s whether thir d partie s ar e clos e t o o r dis tant fro m th e principals , an d whethe r the y ar e above , below , o r o f the sam e status . Som e combination s o f third-part y tie s an d statu s promote an d intensif y th e violen t handlin g o f conflicts , transform ing apparentl y mino r grievance s int o long-standin g an d bitte r feuds; other s attrac t effort s t o find a peaceful resolutio n o f th e dis agreement, whethe r i n th e for m o f authoritativ e lega l pronounce IX

x I Preface

ments b y a judg e o r th e amicabl e exhortation s o f a perso n caugh t between tw o friend s quarreling . These idea s dra w heavil y o n th e pioneerin g wor k o f Donal d Black. Black has formulated a body o f extremely wide ranging theory tha t predict s an d explain s ho w peopl e handl e conflict — whether the y will execute, boycott , o r imprison ; banish , negotiate , or sue ; seek therapy , threaten , o r deman d payment—i n ever y soci ety, a t al l times . M y ow n work , thoug h considerabl y mor e nar rowly focused , similarl y incorporate s dat a fro m anthropology , criminology, sociology , history , an d othe r disciplines , a s wel l a s from tw o studie s I conducted myself . Although primaril y designe d t o orde r som e o f th e know n fact s of violence, the theoretical propositions I present i n this book hav e practical applications , suggestin g a strateg y fo r reducin g violenc e centered aroun d tw o corp s o f third parties . In addition , I hope th e propositions wil l encourag e student s o f violenc e t o explor e third party effect s i n greate r detail . Indeed , shoul d the y d o that , I wil l judge m y effort s successful , eve n i f the idea s prove t o b e misstate d or, in the worst case , false . For all the help, intellectual and otherwise, he has given me over the years, includin g comment s o n a draf t o f thi s book , I would lik e t o thank Donal d Black . Othe r colleague s an d friend s wh o hav e bee n especially supportiv e i n a variet y o f way s durin g th e gestatio n pe riod o f thi s boo k ar e M . P . Baumgartner, Jame s Dowd , Joh n Her rmann, Ala n Horwitz, Calvi n Morrill , Jeff Mullis , Barry Schwartz , Roberta Senecha l d e la Roche, an d James Tucker . I have presente d portions o f thi s wor k a t severa l conference s an d receive d valuabl e feedback fro m man y people, including Kit Carson, Russell Dobash , Richard Felson , Peter Grabosky , Richar d Leo , Peter Manning, an d Joachim Savelsberg . Leonor a an d Car l O'Sulliva n rea d an d re sponded t o a n earl y draft . Conni e Kenned y helpe d wit h editing . Scott Phillip s an d Kerr i Smit h provide d comment s o n th e manu script and help in preparing the references an d tables. None of these individuals wil l agree with everythin g thi s book contains , bu t eac h has my gratitude fo r contributin g t o it s evolution .

Freface I

x i

I wish t o expres s m y appreciatio n o f th e Departmen t o f Sociol ogy at the University of Georgia for providin g me with a hospitabl e environment i n which to write this book. Earlier, I received suppor t from th e University o f Virginia an d th e Cente r fo r Crimina l Justic e at Harvard La w School . To both institutions , I am grateful . At a persona l level , my greates t deb t i s to m y friend , lover , an d spouse, Mary Kelly . She and ou r tw o children , Nicolas Tenda i an d Zara, hav e provide d m e wit h mor e happines s an d suppor t tha n anybody deserves . Finally, in acknowledgment o f al l that they hav e done, and continu e t o do , for m e and m y circle of intimates , I dedicate this boo k t o m y parents .

Introduction I 3

17-18). Amon g member s o f stree t gangs , homicide loom s eve n larger, with mortality sometimes running a t more than two hun dred times the national average (Decker and Van Winkle, 1996). Rates o f homicid e fluctuat e eve n mor e widel y acros s th e structurally simpl e societie s studie d b y anthropologists . Th e Mbuti Pygmie s o f Zaire , fo r example , hav e virtuall y n o homi cide at all . They lea d a peaceful, cooperativ e existenc e huntin g and gathering in the Ituri forest with little violent conflict o f any type (Turnbull , 1965) . Amon g th e Gebus i o f Ne w Guinea , o n the othe r hand , tw o ou t o f ever y thre e me n ove r th e ag e o f thirty-five hav e killed somebody (Knauft , 1985 : 132). Homicide rates may also differ dramaticall y in the same society over time. Medieval Iceland, for instance, was rife with feud s between rival families (Miller , 1990). Although its homicide rate is not known, it must surely have been high to generate that impressive but bloodthirsty bod y of literature known a s the sagas. Modern Iceland , b y contrast , i s extremely peaceful , annuall y recording one of the lowest rates of homicide in the world (see , e.g., United Nations, 1996 : 500). What explains this variation? Why are some human settings remarkably peaceful an d other s strikingly violent? Why in one society are people virtually free from th e risk of violence and in another expose d t o it every day of their lives ? The answer t o these questions begins with a paradox: Violence is a type of morality.

Violence as Morality Violence, many people believe , is the antithesi s o f morality, th e very embodimen t o f evil . But , a s th e sociologis t Donal d Blac k (1983) ha s pointe d out , i n realit y violenc e i s not usuall y com mitted for gain , monetary or sexual, or for th e pleasure of hurt ing someone. It occurs , instead, a s in Tom's case , in the cours e of arguments or altercations, fights or feuds. In the typical act of violence somebod y seek s to manag e o r prosecut e a conflict, t o

4 I Introduction

right a wrong. The wrong might be an insult, an unpaid debt, an act o f sexua l infidelity , o r a physical assault . Whateve r for m i t takes, i t is a violation o f standard s o f acceptabl e behavio r tha t is punished b y the violenc e (se e also Levi , 1980 ; Felson, 1984 ; Katz, 1988 : chap. 1). To accep t tha t mos t violenc e i s a n ac t o f moralit y i s no t t o imply that violence is morally right. Social science, as social science, cannot judge the rights and wrongs of people's actions. But it can say that, a s an empirical matter, acts of violence are typically moralisti c act s tha t originat e i n dispute s ove r righ t an d wrong. It i s eas y t o overloo k thi s point . Newspapers , crim e novels , films, magazines, an d othe r organ s o f popula r cultur e ten d t o concentrate no t o n cases like Tom's but o n those in which people us e violenc e t o enric h o r gratif y themselves . Example s ar e homicides committe d t o facilitat e a robbery o r rape , and seria l killings (see Dietz, 1983). These are not moralistic but predatory acts. The following case , again from Virginia , provides an illustration. Th e defendant , a twenty-one-year-ol d whit e man , de scribes what happened : One da y fou r o f u s were hangin g out , lookin g fo r somethin g t o do . Somebody suggeste d w e ro b th e convenienc e stor e whic h wa s onl y about a five minute walk away . We talked abou t i t and decide d to go do it . I knew the n I wanted t o kil l th e stor e keepe r bu t I didn' t tel l the others . I took a knife wit h me , everybody els e was unarmed . When w e wen t i n the stor e keepe r wa s alone , dow n a t th e back . Two o f u s grabbed hi m an d th e othe r tw o wen t t o th e cash register . The othe r gu y wit h m e hel d th e stor e keepe r an d I stabbe d him , many times . When h e fell, we al l just ran out . Why did I do it? I don't know. Just something to do, I guess. I had shot people befor e an d enjoye d i t but hadn' t stabbe d nobody . It wa s fun.

Most homicide s ar e either predatory, lik e this, or moralistic . A smal l minorit y ar e neither . Infanticide , fo r instance , i s typi cally a form o f after-the-fac t birt h contro l committe d b y young women i n desperat e circumstances . An d som e manslaughter s

Introduction I

5

are negligent act s for whic h the killer is held legally responsible (e.g., killing s b y drun k drivers) . Bu t moralisti c an d predator y homicides are by far th e most common types. They ar e ver y different . Predator y violenc e i s a kin d o f op portunistic behavior, unrelated to any prior conflict betwee n the parties. Predatory violence falls within the same category of behavior a s white-collar crime , piracy, and shoplifting ; moralisti c violence belongs with litigation, punishment, and mediation. Increasingly, scholar s recogniz e tha t althoug h th e wor d "vio lence" is commonly used to refer to both types, they are, in fact , so differen t a s t o requir e separat e theorie s (e.g. , Bloc k an d Christakos, 1995) . We d o no t ye t kno w ho w muc h violenc e i s moralisti c an d how much predatory, but we do know that the great majority of homicides ar e moralistic. In the United State s the percentage i s between 6 0 an d 80 . I n othe r moder n societies , th e percentag e may wel l b e eve n larger . Likewise , mos t homicide s i n simple r and earlier societies arose out of conflict, a s the anthropologica l and historica l evidenc e make s clea r (se e Appendi x A) . Unles s otherwise stated , I therefor e us e th e term s "violence " an d "homicide" i n the following page s to refer jus t to moralistic violence and homicide, regardless of the society being discussed.

Third Parties Violence i s only on e wa y peopl e handl e conflict . Whe n doe s i t occur? When will people like George and Billy resort to it rather than talkin g ou t thei r differences , ignorin g thei r adversaries , bringing the m t o court , o r dealin g wit h th e proble m i n som e other peaceful way ? One possible answe r lie s in the nature o f the conflict. Peopl e are likel y t o us e violence whe n th e stake s ge t higher , whe n th e underlying issue s are more serious . In fact, on e o f th e od d fea tures of violence is that it is not necessarily triggered by conflicts that other people would regar d a s especially serious. Even for a

Introduction I

5

are negligent act s for whic h the killer is held legally responsible (e.g., killing s b y drun k drivers) . Bu t moralisti c an d predator y homicides are by far th e most common types. They ar e ver y different . Predator y violenc e i s a kin d o f op portunistic behavior, unrelated to any prior conflict betwee n the parties. Predatory violence falls within the same category of behavior a s white-collar crime , piracy, and shoplifting ; moralisti c violence belongs with litigation, punishment, and mediation. Increasingly, scholar s recogniz e tha t althoug h th e wor d "vio lence" is commonly used to refer to both types, they are, in fact , so differen t a s t o requir e separat e theorie s (e.g. , Bloc k an d Christakos, 1995) . We d o no t ye t kno w ho w muc h violenc e i s moralisti c an d how much predatory, but we do know that the great majority of homicides ar e moralistic. In the United State s the percentage i s between 6 0 an d 80 . I n othe r moder n societies , th e percentag e may wel l b e eve n larger . Likewise , mos t homicide s i n simple r and earlier societies arose out of conflict, a s the anthropologica l and historica l evidenc e make s clea r (se e Appendi x A) . Unles s otherwise stated , I therefor e us e th e term s "violence " an d "homicide" i n the following page s to refer jus t to moralistic violence and homicide, regardless of the society being discussed.

Third Parties Violence i s only on e wa y peopl e handl e conflict . Whe n doe s i t occur? When will people like George and Billy resort to it rather than talkin g ou t thei r differences , ignorin g thei r adversaries , bringing the m t o court , o r dealin g wit h th e proble m i n som e other peaceful way ? One possible answe r lie s in the nature o f the conflict. Peopl e are likel y t o us e violence whe n th e stake s ge t higher , whe n th e underlying issue s are more serious . In fact, on e o f th e od d fea tures of violence is that it is not necessarily triggered by conflicts that other people would regar d a s especially serious. Even for a

6 I Introduction

young ma n wit h littl e money , a stole n bicycl e i s hardl y wort h dying for. In that respect Tom's case is quite typical. Underlying many act s o f violenc e ar e wha t t o outsider s appea r t o b e rela tively trivia l disagreement s an d insult s ( a poin t discusse d a t length in chapter 5) . Scholars therefor e loo k t o othe r place s fo r answer s t o thei r questions abou t violence . One is the characteristics o f the prin cipal partie s t o conflict—th e age , sex , race , educationa l level , employment status, and so forth o f people like George and Billy. A secon d i s th e characteristic s o f th e environmen t i n whic h George an d Bill y find themselves . Criminologist s hav e found , for example , tha t th e percentag e o f one-paren t familie s o r th e percentage o f divorced male s ar e goo d predictor s o f rate s o f homicide (see , e.g., Land, McCall, and Cohen , 1990) . Important a s these foci are , there is another se t of influence s at work i n many cases of violence that hav e received much less attention: othe r peopl e wh o kno w o r migh t kno w o f th e con flict. In Tom's case these people include not just Tom himself an d the young men on the other side but the bystanders and even the police, who m nobod y summoned . Ha d an y o f thes e group s acted differently , event s coul d wel l hav e take n anothe r course . By their action s an d inaction s alik e thes e peopl e shape d wha t happened tha t Saturda y afternoon . Thei r technica l nam e i s "third parties " an d this book i s about the role they play in violence. Varieties of Third Partie s Third parties are all those who have knowledge o f a conflict , actual or potential (se e Black, 1993b : 126) . People have poten tial knowledg e when , althoug h the y d o no t kno w abou t thi s particular conflict , the y ofte n learn , b y virtue o f thei r statu s o r position, o f simila r conflicts . Lega l officials ar e the primary ex ample. Thir d parties , therefore , ca n includ e famil y members , friends, neighbors , coworkers , bystanders , polic e officers , an d judges.

Introduction I 7

Third parties shape conflict in different ways . Sometimes, they promote th e us e o f violenc e b y urging th e parties t o fight (per haps calling them cowards if they do not), or by providing moral support or weaponry, or even by joining the fray themselves (see, e.g., Hepburn , 1973 ; Luckenbill, 1977 ; Felso n an d Steadman , 1983; Felson et al., 1984). In Tom's case, for instance, the groups of friends o n both sides backed each other up, thereby enlarging the conflict . Tha t ver y fac t ca n increas e violence . I f i t happen s often enough , it can elevate the homicide rate significantly. Con sider an example from Israel. In the 1950s and early 1960s, rates of homicide among Arabs were more than si x times higher tha n those among Jews (Landau and Drapkin, 1968 : 90). One reason is that Arabs, unlike Jews, were organized into large family unit s known i n Arabi c a s "hamulas, " th e member s o f whic h hav e a duty to provide partisan support to one another in conflicts wit h other clans . Becaus e o f this , " a trivia l altercatio n betwee n tw o members o f differen t Hamula s ma y develo p int o a prolonge d and bitte r conflic t betwee n th e respective Hamulas leadin g t o a vicious cycle of homicides and bloo d feuds" (Landa u an d Drapkin, 1968 : 55). Th e sam e poin t coul d b e mad e abou t urba n gangs i n th e Unite d States : b y thei r willingnes s t o len d mutua l support, gan g member s escalat e conflict , distribut e violenc e more widely, and drive up the rate of homicide. But thir d partie s sometime s ac t a s peacemaker s instea d o f warriors. Indeed, the very same people who intensify conflic t i n one cas e ca n dampe n i t i n another . Third-part y peacemakin g takes man y forms , includin g encouragin g th e principal s t o ru n away, to talk instea d o f fight, to go to the police o r som e othe r group fo r help ; championing a peacefu l resolutio n o f th e con flict; distracting the parties from thei r grievances; or intervenin g to mediat e o r arbitrat e th e conflict . Informa l peacemakin g o f this type is found i n virtually ever y human grou p an d i s one of the principal mechanisms b y which violence is curtailed o r prevented. Formal peacemaking is also important. Lega l officials ar e the primary exampl e i n modern societ y of people charged wit h th e

8 I Introduction

duty o f settling conflicts nonviolently . Bu t the effect o f legal of ficials on violence i s not a s straightforward a s it might initiall y appear. Law undoubtedly provides a peaceful outle t for the passions aroused b y certain disputes . But disputants sometime s reject the authorit y o f th e la w an d it s officials an d i n the proces s develop a cultur e o f defianc e tha t create s mor e violenc e tha n there migh t otherwis e be . Law an d violenc e relat e i n comple x ways. Third parties , in short, ca n ac t a s warriors, peacemakers, o r something in between. The difficult par t is to specify whe n they will be one rather than the other. Fortunately, there exists a body of theory that addresses that issue, allowing us to predict the behavior an d effect s o f third parties .

Black's Theoretical Paradigm Third parties are an essential component i n the innovative sociology o f Donal d Black . Blac k i s probabl y bes t know n fo r hi s theory of law (1976), but in fact he has developed a body of theoretical work tha t extends beyond la w to cover the entire range of ways that people handle their conflicts (1993b) . Indeed, Black has created a general theoretical paradigm—known variousl y as "structuralism," "behaviora l sociology," or "pur e sociology" — that, in principle, can be applied to explain any type of social behavior (se e Black, 1995) . This book applies Black's paradigm a s well a s man y o f hi s theoretica l idea s o n conflic t managemen t and thir d partie s t o th e proble m o f interpersona l violence , an d so it seems useful t o describe both in some detail. Pure Sociolog y Perhaps th e centra l concep t i n Black' s theoretica l syste m o r paradigm i s the ide a o f a multidimensional socia l space . Ever y actor—person, organization , institution , society , an d s o on — has a locatio n (o r status ) i n eac h o f five dimension s o f socia l

8 I Introduction

duty o f settling conflicts nonviolently . Bu t the effect o f legal of ficials on violence i s not a s straightforward a s it might initiall y appear. Law undoubtedly provides a peaceful outle t for the passions aroused b y certain disputes . But disputants sometime s reject the authorit y o f th e la w an d it s officials an d i n the proces s develop a cultur e o f defianc e tha t create s mor e violenc e tha n there migh t otherwis e be . Law an d violenc e relat e i n comple x ways. Third parties , in short, ca n ac t a s warriors, peacemakers, o r something in between. The difficult par t is to specify whe n they will be one rather than the other. Fortunately, there exists a body of theory that addresses that issue, allowing us to predict the behavior an d effect s o f third parties .

Black's Theoretical Paradigm Third parties are an essential component i n the innovative sociology o f Donal d Black . Blac k i s probabl y bes t know n fo r hi s theory of law (1976), but in fact he has developed a body of theoretical work tha t extends beyond la w to cover the entire range of ways that people handle their conflicts (1993b) . Indeed, Black has created a general theoretical paradigm—known variousl y as "structuralism," "behaviora l sociology," or "pur e sociology" — that, in principle, can be applied to explain any type of social behavior (se e Black, 1995) . This book applies Black's paradigm a s well a s man y o f hi s theoretica l idea s o n conflic t managemen t and thir d partie s t o th e proble m o f interpersona l violence , an d so it seems useful t o describe both in some detail. Pure Sociolog y Perhaps th e centra l concep t i n Black' s theoretica l syste m o r paradigm i s the ide a o f a multidimensional socia l space . Ever y actor—person, organization , institution , society , an d s o on — has a locatio n (o r status ) i n eac h o f five dimension s o f socia l

Introduction I

9

space. A wealthy individual , for example , has a n elevated loca tion i n vertical space , a prisoner a n inferio r locatio n i n norma tive space . Every actio n has , in addition , a direction an d a distance. The firing of an employee by a company has a downward direction i n organizationa l space ; a conversatio n betwee n strangers from differen t countrie s takes place over considerabl e distance in horizontal an d cultura l space . A key assumption of the paradigm is that social life is orderly. Particular type s of behavior ar e associated with particular loca tions, directions, and distances, or more concretely, with particular social statuses and ties. The task o f the theorist is to isolate the connection s betwee n behavio r an d socia l space , preferabl y in the form o f testable propositions . Take law , fo r example . On e o f Black' s (1976 : 21 ) proposi tions states: Downward la w is greater than upward law. Among the wide array o f facts thi s proposition predict s i s that wealth y people in every society are more likely to take legal action, civil or criminal , and t o b e more successfu l i n those actions , agains t poor peopl e tha n th e othe r wa y around . Th e propositio n re ceived stron g confirmatio n fro m researc h conducte d i n th e 1980s showing that in the United States , blacks (who are generally poorer tha n whites ) accuse d o f killing whites ar e consider ably mor e likel y t o b e sentenced t o deat h tha n white s wh o kil l blacks (Baldu s et al., 1990) . The ke y to socia l behavior , then , lie s in the statuse s an d tie s of al l th e participant s i n a n event—it s "socia l structure. " Whether a grievance wil l resul t i n a lawsuit o r wh o wil l win a lawsuit depends , then , o n th e socia l structur e o f th e case , o n whether th e principal s (th e litigants ) an d thir d partie s (attor neys, witnesses, judges, and jurors) ar e rich or poor (vertica l dimension), intimate s o r stranger s (horizonta l dimension) , orga nizations o r individual s (organizationa l dimension) , bohemia n or conventional in lifestyle (cultura l dimension), have a criminal record o r no t (normativ e dimension) , an d s o forth . Together , these an d othe r variable s predict , i n conjunction wit h thei r as sociated propositio n (e.g. , downwar d la w i s greate r tha n up -

io I Introduction

ward law) , the probabilit y an d outcom e o f a suit . Thus , som e case structures ar e more likely to result in lawsuits than others . And i f on e city , state , o r countr y ha s mor e litigatio n tha n an other, i t i s becaus e i t ha s mor e conflict s wit h litigatio n struc tures. There ar e severa l unusua l feature s o f thi s paradig m (Black , 1995; se e als o Horwitz , 1983 ; Cooney , 1986) . First , i t i s no t subjective. All variables are conceptualized a t a purely sociological level. None require s th e analys t t o inquir e int o the stat e of someone's mind . Consequently , th e paradig m i s easil y teste d against the facts, a desirable feature i n a scientific theory . Second, the paradigm synthesize s many previous sociologica l approaches. Eac h dimensio n o f socia l spac e represents a majo r strand o f theory an d researc h withi n sociology . The vertical dimension, for instance , is the province of Marxian theory as well as empirica l investigation s o f socia l class , race , an d othe r as pects of stratification. Similarly , the horizontal dimension incor porates much o f Durkheim's work an d networ k theory . Black' s paradigm bring s thes e an d othe r tradition s togethe r withi n a single, powerful explanator y system . Third, the paradigm is highly general. The propositions apply regardless of space or time, incorporating a large body of crosscultural an d historica l materials . A t a tim e whe n sociologist s have largely retreated into the present (Elias , 1987), Black's paradigm i s unusua l i n allowing , indee d inviting , theorist s t o de velop ideas that apply to the entire range of human societies , to the Stone Age and electronic age alike. Third Partie s an d th e Management o f Conflic t People handle conflict i n a myriad o f ways. At various times, they fight, talk , ru n away , see k advice , ignor e th e problem , shame their adversary, spread gossip, go to a mediator or judge, seize a hostage , o r tak e thei r ow n lives . Despit e conflict-man agement behavior' s apparen t diversity , Blac k (1993a ) argue s that it reduces to five "elementary forms": (1 ) self-help (aggres -

Introduction I 1 1

sion), (2) avoidance (the curtailment or elimination of violence), (3) negotiation (join t decisio n making) , (4 ) settlement (nonpar tisan third-part y intervention) , an d (5 ) toleratio n (inactio n i n circumstances where action is sometimes taken). This scheme maps the universe of conflict management , placing bot h peac e an d violenc e i n perspective . Peace , o r nonvio lence, embraces four separat e categories and covers a wide spectrum of tactics ranging from benig n toleration, on the one hand, to persistent , hostil e litigation , o n th e other . Violence—whic h falls unde r self-help—i s therefor e jus t on e o f severa l type s o f conflict-management behavior . I n som e settings , violence i s defined as a crime, but it remains at heart a moralistic response t o wrongdoing. Importantly, Black (1993a; 1995 : 855 n. 130 ) also specifies th e principa l condition s unde r whic h eac h o f th e five major form s is found a t its most extreme. Criminal violence, for example, tends to occur among groups beyond the protection of the la w (Black , 1983) , an argumen t take n u p an d expande d i n chapter 2 . Even more central t o th e present analysi s is Black's work o n third parties . Black , alon g wit h M . P . Baumgartner, bega n b y distinguishing between settlemen t agent s (e.g. , mediators , judges) an d partisan s (e.g. , allies , advocates ) an d developin g a typology o f eac h (Blac k an d Baumgartner , 1983) . I n tw o late r papers he takes matters further. "Takin g Sides" (1993b: chap. 7) develops a theory of the conditions under which people provide partisan support to others and sketches several models of the ef fects o f partisanshi p o n conflict . Thi s wor k provide s th e theo retical framewor k fo r chapte r 4 . "Makin g Enemies " (1993b : chap. 8 ) focuses, amon g othe r things , o n th e condition s unde r which third parties are more or less coercive, decisive, formalistic, and punitive toward the disputants. Chapters 2 and 3 are indebted t o some of its ideas. It might be noted that in addition to their settlement and partisanship roles discusse d b y Black, third partie s ca n shap e con flict mor e indirectl y b y affecting th e moral cultur e o f a setting . When rooted i n the one place, when they have stable ties to the

12 I Introduction

principals an d t o on e another , thir d partie s creat e a n environ ment i n which publi c opinio n exert s a stron g hol d o n people' s actions. Everybod y know s everybod y else' s business . Unde r these conditions, developing a reputation fo r hono r o r fearless ness can sometime s becom e extremel y importan t t o people . As many writer s hav e com e increasingl y t o emphasize , hono r an d violence ar e closel y linked . Chapte r 5 describe s th e principa l components of the concept of honor an d explores some of their origins in third-party characteristics .

Violence Black's wor k i s increasingl y influentia l (see , e.g. , Horwitz , 1990). Severa l scholar s hav e applie d an d extende d i t to a variety of conflict managemen t topics . These include collective violence (Senechal de la Roche, 1996), international discord (Borg , 1992), avoidance and nonconfrontation i n suburbia (Baumgart ner, 1988) , disputin g amon g corporat e executive s (Morrill , 1995), cross-cultural pattern s o f domesti c violenc e (Baumgart ner, 1993) , the treatment of mental illness (Horwitz, 1982) , and the handlin g o f grievance s i n nonhierarchica l corporation s (Tucker, 1998) . Several of these studies will also feature i n later pages. One bod y o f literatur e t o whic h Black' s paradig m ha s no t been thoroughly applied , however, is aggression betwee n indi viduals an d smal l groups . This i s interpersonal violenc e o r violence fo r short . I n seekin g t o buil d tha t bridg e betwee n Black's paradig m an d idea s o n thir d partie s an d th e researc h on interpersona l violence , th e followin g chapter s d o not , therefore, analyz e violence at larger structura l levels . Violence by o r agains t th e state , suc h a s war , rebellion , execution , o r genocide, fo r instance , falls outsid e th e boundarie s o f th e dis cussion (thoug h ther e i s a partia l exceptio n i n chapte r 2) . So does collectiv e violenc e o r nonreciproca l violenc e b y groups , such a s rioting, vigilantism, terrorism , an d lynchin g (Senecha l

Introduction I

1 3

de la Roche, 1996) . Note, though, that sinc e my conception of interpersonal violenc e allow s fo r som e violenc e betwee n groups, th e distinctio n betwee n i t an d collectiv e violenc e i s clearly a fine one . But ultimatel y al l form s o f violen t conflict , as Blac k (1993a ) make s clear , belon g t o a singl e category . Hence, i f ther e i s som e overla p a t th e borders , i t shoul d no t matter, theoretically . Most o f th e material discusse d i n this boo k relate s to sever e interpersonal violence , to homicide. Nonetheless, I have chosen to formulate the propositions more broadly, in terms of violence generally. Violence comes in varying degrees of severity: pushing and shovin g lie s at th e minima l en d o f th e spectrum ; homicid e accompanied b y torture a t th e maximal. Hence, the condition s that produc e homicid e should , whe n presen t i n les s intens e form, resul t in assault (se e Black, 1993a) . That may not alway s be true; there ar e setting s tha t hav e a lot o f letha l bu t virtuall y no nonletha l violenc e (Knauft , 1985) . I f the y tur n ou t t o b e common becaus e lethal violence is qualitatively an d no t merel y quantitatively differen t fro m nonletha l violence , m y proposi tions wil l hav e t o b e recas t solel y i n term s o f homicide . Onl y time will tell, but in the absence of hard evidence, homicide does not see m to b e a good candidat e fo r a separate socia l scientifi c theory (a s distinct from , say , a policy analysis) . Whether some body die s as a result o f a conflict i s often a matter o f chance — the angle at which the bullet struck, the proximity o f an ambu lance, or th e skil l o f th e docto r treatin g a gun wound . Empiri cally, lethal and nonlethal violenc e shade into each other . There i s a pragmati c reaso n a s wel l fo r focusin g heavil y o n homicide i n a boo k o n violence : homicide i s the best-reporte d and best-studied type of interpersonal violence. While studies of assault, especially outside the home, are scarce, the literature on lethal assault i s both abundan t an d o f high quality. A homicide is hard t o conceal, so there is not a large "dar k shadow " o f unreported incidents. Consequently, the official (police , prosecutorial, and judicial) records are more complete than fo r an y othe r type o f crime . Thus , eve n thoug h homicid e i s a comparativel y

14 I Introduction

rare form o f violence in most societies, it provides the best window onto violence in general. This book, then, uses materials on homicide as a vehicle for analyzing the impact of third parties on interpersonal violence. Since the focu s i s on thir d partie s only , it doe s not presen t a compre hensive theory of violence. Rather, it advances a segment of a theory in the form o f severa l propositions tha t explai n violen t con flict with the structure or shape of third-party involvement. Moreover, the propositions represent a kind of second-order theorizing in that they extend or elaborate ideas formulated b y Black to explain self-help , partisanship , an d settlement . Nonetheless , th e propositions no t onl y provide a series of hypotheses tha t ca n b e tested empirically but, in addition, order a large body of findings in the existing scholarship on homicide.

Four Foci The socia l scienc e literatur e o n homicide , larg e an d divers e though i t is , can b e divide d int o fou r mai n categories . Scholar s have focused o n homicide patterns, rates, purposes, and conflicts. The categories created by these foci can, and do, overlap in practice (see, e.g., Bernard, 1990). Nonetheless, they represent real differences in research and theory on lethal violence. Some of the categories devote more attention to third parties than do others, but none provide s a comprehensive treatmen t o f third-part y effects . To that extent , research o n third partie s constitutes a significan t hole in our understanding of violence. Patterns The first category of scholarship seeks to describe patterns of homicide: who commit s it , who ar e its victims, when an d ho w it occurs, and what is the role of guns, drugs, and alcohol. Modern research of this type begins with Wolfgang's (1958 ) analysi s of police and court documents relating to all homicide cases that

14 I Introduction

rare form o f violence in most societies, it provides the best window onto violence in general. This book, then, uses materials on homicide as a vehicle for analyzing the impact of third parties on interpersonal violence. Since the focu s i s on thir d partie s only , it doe s not presen t a compre hensive theory of violence. Rather, it advances a segment of a theory in the form o f severa l propositions tha t explai n violen t con flict with the structure or shape of third-party involvement. Moreover, the propositions represent a kind of second-order theorizing in that they extend or elaborate ideas formulated b y Black to explain self-help , partisanship , an d settlement . Nonetheless , th e propositions no t onl y provide a series of hypotheses tha t ca n b e tested empirically but, in addition, order a large body of findings in the existing scholarship on homicide.

Four Foci The socia l scienc e literatur e o n homicide , larg e an d divers e though i t is , can b e divide d int o fou r mai n categories . Scholar s have focused o n homicide patterns, rates, purposes, and conflicts. The categories created by these foci can, and do, overlap in practice (see, e.g., Bernard, 1990). Nonetheless, they represent real differences in research and theory on lethal violence. Some of the categories devote more attention to third parties than do others, but none provide s a comprehensive treatmen t o f third-part y effects . To that extent , research o n third partie s constitutes a significan t hole in our understanding of violence. Patterns The first category of scholarship seeks to describe patterns of homicide: who commit s it , who ar e its victims, when an d ho w it occurs, and what is the role of guns, drugs, and alcohol. Modern research of this type begins with Wolfgang's (1958 ) analysi s of police and court documents relating to all homicide cases that

Introduction I

1 5

came t o th e notic e o f th e Philadelphi a polic e i n th e year s 1948-1952. Notabl e studie s employin g th e sam e o r a simila r method have been conducted, for example , in Houston (Lunds gaarde, 1977) , Miam i (Wilbanks , 1984) , Detroi t (Goetting , 1995), St. Louis (Decker , 1993) , for femal e homicid e offender s in six U.S. cities (Mann , 1996) , in Israel (Landa u an d Drapkin , 1968), Ne w Sout h Wales , Australi a (Wallace , 1986) , an d Canada (Silverma n and Kennedy, 1993) . The historica l an d cross-cultura l literature s o n violenc e pro vide mor e examples . Thus , Give n (1977 ) ha s painte d a vivi d portrait o f th e socia l characteristic s an d action s o f thirteenth century English homicide killers and victims using court records of the period. Bohannan (1960a ) an d severa l other anthropolo gists carried ou t a Wolfgang-style analysi s for seve n African so cieties, using official record s to describe the characteristics of the killers, victims, and killings. Although this work has taught us a great deal about violenc e it has largely neglecte d th e role o f thir d parties , most probabl y because dat a ar e harde r t o obtai n i n tha t th e involvemen t o f third partie s i s rarel y documente d i n detai l i n th e polic e an d court records on which it usually relies. Third parties, however, explain some of the best-documented patterns of criminal homicide. Fo r example , scholar s hav e discovere d tha t n o matte r where one looks in the modern world—the United States, Israel, Canada, Australia—criminal homicid e i s strongly concentrate d among socially disadvantaged people. But that is not true of earlier and structurally simpler societies, where homicide was ofte n found a t all levels of the social hierarchy. The reason, chapter 2 argues, is that there has been an important shift in the social status of third parties, especially legal officials, across the centuries. Rates A second category of scholarship analyze s homicide in the aggregate, typicall y i n term s o f a rat e pe r uni t o f population . Ha s homicide increase d o r decrease d ove r the years, decades, or cen -

16 I Introduction

turies? What explain s the rise and fal l o f homicide rates in cities, provinces, or countries (see, e.g., Brearly, 1932)? Influential exam ples include Henry an d Short' s (1954 ) theoretical analysi s on the relationship betwee n the business cycle and homicide; Judith an d Peter Blau's (1982) investigation of the role of income inequality in metropolitan homicide rates; Land et al.'s (1990) meta-analysis of economic an d demographi c predictors ; Richar d Block' s (1977 ) and Carolyn Block's (1986) studies of Chicago homicide from th e mid-1960s onwards ; and Williams an d Flewelling' s (1988 ) wor k on the United States as a whole, 1980-1984 . On the historical side, Gurr (1981) has traced a long-term decline i n homicid e rate s i n Europ e an d Nort h America . Bohan nan's (1960a ) boo k o n homicid e amon g certai n Africa n tribe s also includes som e information o n homicide rates , an issu e ad dressed b y a numbe r o f othe r anthropologist s a s well , mos t comprehensively Knauf t (1987) . Scholars analyzing homicide rates have also largely neglected third parties , agai n probabl y becaus e o f th e absenc e o f data . That i s unfortunate becaus e som e of the effects documente d b y aggregate-level researc h appea r t o b e third-part y effects . Con sider the well-documented finding that homicid e increases wit h income inequalit y (e.g. , Bla u an d Blau , 1982 ; Unnithan e t al. , 1994: chap. 7). As chapter 2 argues, inequality affects th e thirdparty structure of conflicts. By widening the status gap betwee n legal officials an d low-status citizens, income inequality reduce s the likelihood that disputants at the bottom of the status hierarchy will use the legal system to resolve their difference s an d in creases the probability tha t the y will resort t o violenc e instead . Furthermore, the absence or unavailability of law has the effect , chapter 5 explains, of fostering a n ethic of honor characterize d by an aggressive sensitivity to insult . Purposes A third category of homicide scholarship analyzes the express or implie d purpose s o f peopl e wh o kill . On e tributar y o f thi s

Introduction I 1 7

stream o f though t i s social-psychologica l an d focuse s o n th e subjectivity o f actor s involve d i n letha l encounters . Influentia l examples of this type of work includ e the ideas that coercio n is a form o f social influence b y which one actor decide s to impose harm or compliance on another (Tedesch i and Felson, 1994 ; see also Felson, 1978 , 1982, 1984) ; that homicide typically evolve s through a serie s o f interactiona l stage s i n whic h protagonist s seek to maintain honor in the face of insult or aggression (Luck enbill, 1977; see also Levi, 1980); and that killing is typically an act o f "righteou s slaughter " accompanie d b y humiliatio n an d rage (Katz, 1988: chap. 1). A second tributary derives from Dar win, and explain s patterns o f homicide i n terms of competitio n between me n fo r acces s t o an d contro l ove r th e sexualit y o f women (Dal y and Wilson, 1988 ; see also, e.g., Wilson and Daly, 1993; see further Polk , 1994) . Unlike the previous two categories, work o n the purposes of homicide has analyzed third parties. Particular attentio n has focused o n th e rol e audience s pla y i n sustainin g o r defusin g at tacks o n identity (Tedesch i and Felson , 1994) . Scholars such a s Luckenbill (1977 ) an d Felso n (1982 ; Felso n an d Steadman , 1983; Felson et al., 1984 ; Felson and Russo, 1988 ) have shown that th e cours e o f confrontation s ca n b e dramaticall y affecte d by the action s o f third-part y audiences . Third partie s ca n pro vide the principals with face-saving alternative s to violence, but they can also , by their words, deeds, or mere presence, encour age th e principa l protagonist s t o b e violen t (se e als o Oliver , 1994). Valuabl e thoug h thi s wor k i s (an d late r chapter s dra w upon i t a t severa l points), it doe s not provid e a systematic the ory specifying when third parties will adopt one role rather than the other . Conflicts The final category of scholarship is the most compatible with the Blackian theoretica l paradig m becaus e i t treats homicid e i n the context of conflict. While conflict may be a theme of the pre-

18 I Introduction

vious categories, (especiall y th e third), it is the centra l focu s o f the information provide d o n homicide by both branche s of this fourth category . The first branch consists of field studies of gang violence in , fo r example , Chicag o (Thrasher , 1927 ; Horowitz , 1983), Los Angeles (Klein , 1971 ; Moore e t al., 1978) , Milwaukee (Hagedorn , 1988) , and St . Louis (Decke r an d Va n Winkle, 1996). The second branc h o f conflict-related homicid e scholar ship use s biograph y t o she d ligh t o n th e socia l context s o f th e low-income neighborhoods an d social groups in which most violence today tends to be concentrated. Example s of this impor tant ne w genr e includ e account s o f lif e i n a Lo s Angele s gan g (Shakur, 1993) , growin g u p i n a toug h par t o f Ne w Yor k (Canada, 1995) , an d th e transmissio n o f violenc e acros s th e generations within a n American family (Butterfield , 1995) . Historians, too , hav e no t neglecte d letha l conflict . Stone' s (1965) influentia l wor k o n th e Tudo r an d earl y Stuar t Englis h aristocracy include s som e fascinatin g informatio n o n violence . Dueling has attracted th e interest o f several scholars, both wit h respect to its European (Kiernan , 1988 ; Kelly, 1995) an d Nort h American varietie s (Wyatt-Brown , 1982 ; Williams, 1980) . Less formal types of nineteenth-century American violence have been discussed b y McGrath (1984 ) in his study of gunfighting i n two western minin g town s an d b y Ayer s (1984 ) i n hi s overvie w o f southern crim e and justice. Anthropologists, similarly , hav e writte n extensivel y o n vio lent conflict among , for instance, the Nuer of the Sudan (EvansPritchard, 1940) , the Yanomamo of Venezuela-Brazil (Chagnon , 1977), th e Tausu g o f th e Philippine s (Kiefer , 1972) , an d th e Ju/'hoansi o f Botswan a (Lee , 1979 , 1993) , to nam e bu t a few . Many Ne w Guine a ethnographer s hav e presente d importan t data an d insight s o n violenc e (see , e.g., Koch , 1974 ; Hallpike , 1977; Knauft, 1985) . Boehm (1984) and Black-Michaud (1975 ) have publishe d informativ e specialize d studie s o f feuding . An d Pitt-Rivers (1966 ) ha s writte n insightfull y an d influentiall y o n the role of honor i n violence. Scholarship tha t treat s homicid e a s conflict doe s discus s th e

Introduction I 1 9

effect o f third partie s on, for example , gang violence, preindustrial feuding, an d honor . For the most part, however, these discussions of third parties are unsystematic. Scattered through the conflict literature—especiall y cross-cultura l work—ar e refer ences, anecdotes , findings, examples , comments , an d sugges tions relating to a wide range of third-party behavior . Althoug h these sources do not provide answers to all the major questions , they do constitute a substantial initia l bod y of data . My Dat a In organizin g th e literatur e o n thir d parties , I als o dra w o n two studie s I conducted o f homicide . The first is a series o f in terviews with sixty-three men and twelve women imprisoned fo r murder an d manslaughte r i n Virgini a durin g 1988 . The inter views focused on , among othe r things , the backgroun d o f eac h killing, it s histor y an d genesis . I n addition , I interviewed , b y telephone, whenever the prisoner agree d and I could make contact, a membe r o f th e prisoner' s family , usuall y hi s o r he r mother. To corroborate the information obtained , I read, where available, the prisoner's Pre-sentenc e Investigatio n Repor t use d by the court in passing sentence (Cooney , 1991) . Because seventy-five homicide s is a relatively smal l sample, I use these interviews not for th e purposes o f making generaliza tions but to provide illustrative cases. Their purpose is to enrich and enliven the narrative, to bring home to the reader the social reality o f homicide . Wher e ther e i s a discrepanc y betwee n th e prisoner's an d th e officia l versio n o f th e facts , I not e i t i n th e text. (Fo r further detail s of the study, see Appendix B.) My second study analyzed the social control or the typical response t o homicid e i n te n relationship s (e.g. , husband-wife , male neighbors ) acros s thirt y preindustria l societie s (Cooney , 1988). Of the three hundred possible relationships, informatio n was available on ninety. In some of the relationships, third par ties wil l aveng e th e killing ; i n other s the y wil l respon d peace fully. Thei r behavio r ca n thu s thro w ligh t o n th e socia l condi -

2o I Introduction

tions underlying third-party peac e and violenc e for roughl y th e same initia l offense . (Appendi x C describe s thi s stud y i n mor e detail.) I n discussing this study an d th e cross-cultural literatur e more generally, I will typically use the convention know n a s the "ethnographic presen t tense " t o refe r t o thes e societies , eve n though most , perhaps all , no longer exis t in the form describe d by anthropologists. In summary, althoug h violenc e i s foun d virtuall y everywher e human being s congregate i n any numbers, it varies enormousl y in frequency . Som e setting s generat e virtuall y n o violenc e a t all—the occasional sla p or push, perhaps, but no dangerous assaults or killings. Others produce enormou s amounts—no t jus t pushing and slapping but kicking, beating, biting, gouging, stabbing, an d shootin g ar e regula r occurrences , everywher e i n evidence. To explain thi s variation, i t is necessary to look more widely than th e principals bu t mor e narrowl y tha n th e macroenviron ment, at third parties. Third parties shape conflict i n two senses: they affec t th e behavio r o f thos e involved , directl y an d indi rectly, and they alter the structure of the conflict i n social space. Tom's case , fo r example , canno t b e understoo d b y focusin g just o n Georg e an d Billy . Any o f th e othe r me n involve d coul d equally wel l hav e bee n kille d o r carrie d ou t th e killing . More over, the bystanders and police were unwilling or unable to stop the violenc e an d henc e the y to o ar e centra l t o th e event s tha t took plac e that Septembe r Saturday . Tom's case is not an exception. Third parties can be warriors or peacemakers, a force fo r violent retaliation o r for on e of several form s o f peace . Th e nex t thre e chapter s adop t Donal d Black's theoretical strategy and some of his ideas to present several propositions tha t lin k variatio n i n the shape s thir d partie s bring to conflicts an d their outcome. The propositions ar e theoretical, predicting and explaining a large body of empirical findings i n moder n an d premoder n societie s alike . Bu t the y hav e

Introduction I 2 1

other use s a s well . The y sugges t severa l line s o f empirica l in quiry fo r th e futur e a s well a strategy fo r reducin g violence , issues tha t ar e addresse d i n th e final chapter . Th e chapter s tha t follow, then, may be of interest to those concerned with violence from a variety of perspectives.

The U-Curve of Violence i I 2 3

less of the exact details, Stephanie admits she killed Chuck in the course of a dispute. Every homicide is a mixture of the unique and the typical. One of th e typica l feature s o f thi s cas e i s th e disadvantage d back ground o f Stephanie and Chuck . In all modern societie s that we know about , violence , especially intens e violence like homicide, is largel y confine d t o peopl e o f lo w socia l status . Curiously , though, this was not so in earlier times where violent conflict was found a t all levels of the social hierarchy, including the top. Why is this? Why is violence today concentrated a t the lower end of the status hierarchy? Why has elite violence virtually disappeared? The answer to these questions can be found i n the social status of third parties. Third parties who are high above the principal partie s i n status—a s lega l official s toda y ar e wit h re spect to low-status citizens—ten d t o b e repressive an d unpopu lar wit h disputant s wh o rejec t thei r authorit y (Black , 1993b : chap. 8) . And without thir d partie s t o hel p settl e disputes , violence becomes more likely. But violence also occurs when third parties are not above the status o f th e principal s a t all . Third partie s wh o ar e n o highe r than th e principal s i n status—a s lega l official s i n earl y state s were wit h respec t t o elites—ar e unlikel y t o hav e thei r service s sought ou t b y disputants (Blac k an d Baumgartner , 1983 : 113). It is between these extremes that th e probability o f violence declines. Third parties who are of moderately high status—as legal officials toda y ar e with respec t t o middle - and upper-clas s people—are generall y popula r wit h disputants , effective i n settlin g their conflicts peacefully, an d helpful i n creating an ethic of nonviolence. Overall , then , ther e appear s t o b e a U-curve d rela tionship betwee n third-party statu s an d violence. 1

Status Patterns in Criminal Homicide "Social status" is a person's or group's position i n the social hierarchy. In Black's theoretical paradigm, social status or advan -

24 I The U-Curve of Violence i

tage o r privileg e ( I use these terms interchangeabl y throughou t this book) i s a composite concept, made up of five kinds of status, each located i n a dimension o f social space: (i) vertical , (2) radial, (3) cultural, (4) normative, and (5) organizational (Black , 1976). Peopl e wh o kil l an d ar e kille d ten d t o b e o f lo w socia l status on some or all of these dimensions, not just in the United States but in other countrie s a s well.2 Wealth Stephanie and Chuck are poor, relying on welfare and the odd job to suppor t themselve s an d he r fou r childre n (tw o o f who m are also Chuck's) . They rent rathe r tha n ow n thei r apartments . In this they are representative o f the great majority o f the principals involved in homicide cases. Whether measured by income or accumulated wealth (Black , 1976: 16), killers and victims are usually o f lo w vertical , o r economic , status . Marvi n Wolfgan g (1958: 37) , for instance , foun d tha t "90-9 5 percen t o f th e of fenders o f eithe r race " arreste d b y th e polic e fo r homicid e i n Philadelphia 1948-195 2 were "i n the lower en d of the occupa tional scale , o r fro m th e categor y o f skille d worker s dow n through th e unemployed. " Elsewhere , i t i s th e same . Afte r re viewing studie s fro m Denmark , England , Finland , Italy , Mex ico, Sout h Africa , Sr i Lanka , an d th e Unite d States , Wolfgan g and a colleagu e conclud e tha t "th e overwhelmin g majorit y o f homicides and other assaultive crimes are committed by persons from th e lowes t stratu m o f a socia l organization " (Wolfgan g and Ferracuti , 1967 : 261). This conclusion remain s valid , con firmed b y mor e recen t studie s in , fo r instance , Canada , Aus tralia, and the United States (Silverman and Kennedy, 1993 : 10; Polk, 1994 ; Goetting, 1995) . Although they have not attracted a s much research attention , homicide victim s ten d t o b e similaril y economicall y disadvan taged (see , e.g. , Kposow a e t al. , 1994) . I n Australia , fo r in stance, while unskille d worker s constitut e abou t 1 5 percent o f the labor forc e (i.e. , the population age d fifteen and over) , they

The U-Curve of Violence i I 2 5

represent abou t 42 percent of homicide victims (an d 5 6 percent of offenders ) i n Ne w Sout h Wales , th e mos t populou s state . Conversely, in the same state only 1 percent of victims (an d less than hal f o f 1 percent o f offenders ) ar e professional s o r man agers, though those groups make up about 2 5 percent of the national labor force (Wallace , 1986: 38; Australian Burea u o f Statistics, 1996 : 132). There seem s to b e only one study o f homicide committed b y higher-status individual s (Gree n an d Wakefield, 1979) . Because the authors had trouble finding cases, they had to rely on reports published i n th e New York Times i n whic h th e offende r wa s middle o r uppe r clas s (i.e. , belonge d t o on e o f eigh t occupa tional categorie s [professionals , managers , etc.]) . Reasonin g that Times coverage was likely to be most complete for the New York metropolita n area , th e author s counte d ho w man y case s the newspaper reporte d wit h middle - and upper-clas s offender s and then compared that number to the thirteen thousand homi cide arrests the police made in the area durin g the study perio d 1955-1975. The number the y found? Twenty . The author s themselve s acknowledg e tha t thei r number s ar e only approximations . Th e Times ma y hav e misse d som e cases, although since high-status people usually kill high-status victims and thei r death s ar e th e kin d tha t generall y ge t reported , i t probably include s mos t high-statu s killings . Moreover , ther e would have to be an enormous amount of underreporting in the newspaper t o eras e th e underlyin g differences . Hence , whil e their results are estimates, they probably reflect th e true state of affairs: "Fewe r tha n 1 % o f th e homicide s wer e committe d b y that portio n o f th e populatio n comprisin g 60 % o f th e labo r force an d member s o f thei r immediat e familie s (upper-clas s members), whil e mor e tha n 99 % wer e committe d b y th e re mainder o f the population" (1979 : 175). If homicid e i s linked t o lo w economi c status , i t follow s tha t the number o f people occupying low-economic-status position s should predic t th e amoun t o f homicid e a group o r societ y has . It does. In the United States, as the wealth of ethnic groups such

z6 I The U-Curve of Violence i

as Jews, Irish, Italians, an d Pole s has increased , thei r homicid e rates have decreased (see , e.g., Lane, 1997) . Economic depriva tion (i.e. , poverty an d inequalit y combined ) i s on e o f th e bes t predictors o f ho w muc h homicid e cities , metropolita n areas , and states will have (Land et al., 1990). 3 Internationally too, the countries wit h th e highest homicid e rate s have the greatest ga p between rich and poor (see , e.g., Unnithan et al., 1994: chap. 7). As one reviewer o f th e evidenc e puts it : "Aroun d th e world, a t every leve l o f economi c development , increasin g equalit y goe s hand i n hand with lower risks of homicide" (James , 1995 : 65). Integration Integration (radia l status) refers to the degree to which a person o r grou p participate s i n socia l activity , ho w integrate d o r marginal the y ar e (Black , 1976 : 48). A common measur e o f integration is employment. Killers and their victims are commonly unemployed. Stephani e an d Chuck , for example , are. In Canada i n 1991 , for instance , people accused o f homicid e were fou r time s (4 2 percent) , an d thei r victim s almos t thre e times (27 percent), more likely to be unemployed than member s of the adul t population a s a whole (1 0 percent) (Wright , 1992 : 15, 12 ; Internationa l Labo r Office , 1992 : 602) . I n Australia , during 1991-1992 , abou t two-third s o f offender s an d one-hal f of victims whose employment statu s could b e tracked were outside the paid work force compared to less than one-half (4 3 percent) o f th e populatio n age d fifteen an d ove r (Strang , 1993 : 29-30, 25 ; Australian Burea u o f Statistics , 1994 : 173 ; see als o Wallace, 1986 : 39)/* Marriage is a second type of social integration, the absence of which predict s involvemen t i n homicide . Thus , i n th e Unite d States, singl e men , me n wh o ar e divorced/separate d o r wid owed, an d me n who liv e alone ar e all more likely to b e victims of homicide (thoug h the pattern fo r women may be the reverse) (Kposowa e t al. , 1994) . Throughout U.S . history, setting s wit h large population s o f unmarrie d men , suc h a s frontiers, minin g

The U-Curve of Violence i I 2 7 towns, cattl e towns , an d inner-cit y minorit y enclaves , hav e ex perienced hig h rate s o f letha l conflic t (Courtwright , 1996) . Age i s a n indirec t indicato r o f marginalit y i n moder n soci eties. Teenagers an d peopl e i n thei r earl y twentie s ar e les s likel y to b e consumed b y a career-type jo b o r burdene d wit h famil y re sponsibilities than olde r people, and les s strongly integrated int o their nata l familie s tha n younge r people . Youn g adult s als o typ ically hav e th e highes t probabilit y o f killin g an d bein g kille d (Landau an d Drapkin , 1968 : 42 ; Strang , 1993 : 30 , 22 ; Federa l Bureau o f Investigation, 1996 : 16) . Furthermore, U.S. cities tha t have highe r rate s o f unattache d blac k teenager s (i.e. , not i n th e labor forc e o r i n school ) hav e highe r rate s o f blac k homicid e (Shihadeh an d Flynn , 1996) . Cultural Statu s Cultural statu s ca n b e gauge d i n severa l ways , includin g th e amount o f educatio n peopl e receiv e an d thei r participatio n i n the cultur e o f th e majorit y (conventionality ) (Black , 1976 : 64 , 67-68). Regardles s o f ho w i t i s measured , homicid e offender s and victim s tend t o b e of lo w cultura l status . Thus, they ar e typ ically a t th e botto m o f th e educationa l hierarch y i n term s o f th e number o f year s o f forma l schoolin g the y hav e attained . Th e fact tha t neithe r Stephani e nor Chuc k finished hig h school there fore doe s no t mak e the m exceptional . I n Detroit , fo r example , individuals arreste d fo r homicid e an d thei r victim s ar e less likely to hav e complete d hig h schoo l tha n member s o f th e populatio n as a whole (Goetting , 1995) . In Canada , thre e quarter s (7 3 per cent) o f murde r suspect s i n the perio d 1961-199 0 ha d les s tha n a grade-1 1 educatio n (Silverma n an d Kennedy , 1993 : 12) . B y contrast, i n 1978-197 9 (approximatel y halfwa y throug h th e study period) , onl y 4 0 percen t o f th e populatio n age d eightee n and ove r ha d no t complete d grad e 1 2 (Statistic s Canada , 1992 : I45)- 5 The principal s i n homicid e case s ar e als o disproportionatel y members o f cultura l minorities . I n Australia , Aborigine s ar e

28 I The U-Curve of Violence i

many time s mor e likel y t o commi t an d b e victims o f homicid e than th e rest o f th e population, thirtee n an d nin e times respectively i n 1991-1992 , fo r exampl e (Strang , 1993 : 39-40) . I n Canada, i t ha s bee n foun d tha t "whil e Nativ e peopl e mak e u p approximately 3 % o f th e tota l population , the y accounte d fo r 19% o f suspect s an d 15 % o f victim s i n al l homicid e offense s over the 1974-198 7 period" (Anonymous , 1989 : 2; see also Silverman an d Kennedy, 1993 : chap. 8) . Compared t o native Ger mans, Turkish migrant s wer e mor e tha n 3. 5 time s mor e likely , and Italian migrants one-thir d mor e likely, to commit homicid e in German y i n the 1960 s (Zimmermann , 196 6 cited i n Nettler , 1982: 49). In Israel 1950-1964, rates of homicide offending an d victimization were more than six times greater among non-Jews (mostly Arabs ) tha n amon g th e majorit y Jewis h populatio n (Landau an d Drapkin , 1968 : 9-10). An d in Sweden, citizens of foreign countrie s mak e u p 5 percent o f th e populatio n bu t 2 9 percent of convicted homicide offenders an d 2 0 percent of their victims (Hofer , 1990 : 33-34). The same pattern is found i n the United States: African Amer icans, like Chuck and Stephanie, are about five times more likely than member s o f th e majorit y whit e populatio n t o b e arreste d for, o r b e a victim of , homicid e (Reis s and Roth , 1993 : 70-72). Native Americans are about twice as likely as whites to be homicide suspects or victims (Bachman, 1992 : 12). (Latino probabilities ar e mor e difficul t t o estimate , bu t the y appea r t o li e somewhere betwee n thos e o f Africa n American s an d Nativ e Ameri cans [Martinez , 1996]. ) Moreover , th e siz e o f th e blac k population strongl y predicts homicide rates in cities, metropolitan areas, and states (see, e.g., Land et al., 1990: 928-930). Large Latino and Native American populations also appear to result in elevated rates of homicide (Kposow a an d Breault, 1993) . Respectability Respectability (normativ e status) is the degree to which a person o r grou p ha s bee n fre e o f socia l control i n the past (Black ,

The U-Curve of Violence i I 2 9

1976: 111). Populations of homicide offenders an d victims rank low on this dimension of status as well, and usually have higherthan-average rate s o f arres t an d convictio n fo r a variety o f of fenses. Stephanie, for example, has been arrested four times and convicted twice , onc e fo r dru g possessio n an d onc e fo r disor derly conduct. ( I have no information o n whether Chuc k ha d a criminal record. ) I n th e Unite d State s generally , th e Nationa l Criminal Justic e Commissio n estimate s tha t abou t 3 0 millio n people hav e a n arres t recor d (Donziger , 1996 : 36) . That repre sents approximatel y 1 5 percent o f th e populatio n ove r sixtee n years o f ag e (calculate d fro m Burea u o f th e Census , 1996 : 15). Homicide studie s reveal , however , tha t typicall y abou t 7 0 per cent o f offender s hav e bee n arreste d i n th e pas t (usuall y mor e than once : Wolfgang , 1958 : 177 ) an d abou t 5 0 percen t hav e been convicted of an offense (se e Kleck and Bordua, 1983 : 293). In Sweden , approximatel y 6 0 percen t o f peopl e convicte d o f homicide hav e a prior crimina l recor d fo r a serious crim e (i.e. , one resulting in more than a fine) compared to 2.5 percent of the general population (Hofer , 1990 : 32, 40-41). In other countries, such a s Australi a an d Canada , homicid e offender s hav e simi larly high arrest rates (Strang , 1993 : 33; Wallace, 1986 : 44-46; Wright, 1992) . Less is known abou t th e crimina l recor d o f victims , bu t th e same pattern is evident. In Wolfgang's (1958 : 175,180) stud y of 1948-1952 Philadelphi a crimina l homicide , almos t hal f o f th e victims had a history o f arrest . In Australia, abou t one-thir d o f victims have a criminal history (Strang, 1993:27); in Canada, almost one-hal f d o (Wright , 1992). 6 Organizational Statu s Because there is very little information o n the organizationa l affiliations o f killers and victims , the fifth type of status—orga nizational statu s (Black , 1976 : 92)—can b e dealt wit h quickly . Like Stephani e an d Chuck , mos t peopl e toda y participat e i n homicide a s individual s rathe r tha n a s member s o f organize d

30 I The U-Curve of Violence i groups. Bu t i f th e principal s ac t a s member s o f organize d groups, the y usuall y d o s o a s member s o f low-statu s groups , such a s stree t o r priso n gangs , rathe r tha n high-statu s groups , such a s busines s corporations . S o it to o fits th e pattern . Can W e Trus t th e Statistics ? Although th e statistic s ar e consistent , the y ma y b e wrong . They ar e base d primaril y o n arrest s mad e b y police, an d experi ence has show n tha t whe n studie s move awa y fro m polic e arres t data an d dra w instea d o n survey s i n whic h peopl e provid e anonymous report s o f thei r ow n crimina l behavio r (know n a s "self-report studies") , the correlatio n betwee n lo w socia l statu s and crime/delinquenc y attenuate s an d sometime s eve n disap pears (Tittl e e t al. , 1978 ; Tittl e an d Meier , 1990). 7 Perhaps , then, mor e complet e informatio n woul d revea l tha t th e reaso n that low-statu s people, like Stephanie an d Chuck , sho w up mor e often i n the police statistics is not becaus e they kill and ar e kille d more frequentl y bu t becaus e th e polic e monito r thei r action s more closely. After all , about on e homicide in three in the Unite d States currentl y doe s no t resul t i n a n arres t (Federa l Burea u o f Investigation, 1996 : 22) . Maybe th e elit e ar e gettin g awa y wit h murder. That i s extremel y unlikely . I t i s virtuall y certai n tha t th e un solved homicide s ar e no t committe d mainl y b y high-statu s peo ple. Lik e othe r offenders , higher-statu s peopl e ten d t o kil l vic tims fro m th e sam e socia l stratu m a s themselves (se e Gree n an d Wakefield, 1979) . Th e killin g o f a high-statu s person— a wealthy businessman , fo r example—typicall y finds th e polic e going t o grea t length s t o locat e th e kille r (se e Cooney , 1994) . Cases wit h low-status , no t high-status , victim s ar e therefor e more likel y to b e unsolved . Furthermore , high-statu s peopl e ar e unlikely t o b e departin g fro m th e nor m b y killin g peopl e lowe r in status than themselve s with an y frequency fo r severa l reasons . First, the United State s ha s a considerable amoun t o f residentia l segregation b y class: the rich live with th e rich an d th e poor wit h

The U-Curve of Violence i I 3 1

the poor. Yet homicide generally occur s among people who live in proximity t o on e anothe r (see , e.g., Cooney , 1998) . Second , to balanc e th e know n tren d fo r homicid e t o b e committed pri marily b y lower-statu s individuals , higher-statu s peopl e woul d have t o b e killin g lower-statu s victim s i n suc h larg e number s that community activists, reporters, scholars, or even police—all of whom coul d have something to gain b y uncovering a signifi cant hidde n pattern—woul d almos t certainly hav e documente d it b y now. Third, higher-statu s peopl e d o no t hav e t o resor t t o homicide becaus e they have other outlets—mos t notabl y law — for redressin g grievances against those below them in the statu s hierarchy, a point develope d shortly . None o f thi s mean s tha t higher-statu s peopl e ar e neve r in volved in lethal conflict. They are. Occasionally, a privileged citizen kills a spouse o r sibling , a police office r kill s a suspect, a n outwardly respectabl e busines s perso n involve d i n organize d crime kills a rival o r enemy . Additionally, men—th e higher-sta tus gender—kil l mor e tha n wome n (Dal y an d Wilson , 1988 : chaps. 6-7). Bu t these deviations only qualify an d do not negate the general pattern . Stephanie and Chuck' s position in the lower echelons of society, then, makes them typical of most modern homicid e offend ers and victims. Although b y no means all low-status people are involved i n homicide , the grea t majorit y o f thos e wh o kil l an d are killed today ar e of low social status.

Elite Violence The fact tha t violenc e tends to b e largely confined t o people a t the botto m o f th e socia l pyramid i s one o f th e most consisten t findings in criminology, confirmed b y numerous studies not just in the United States, but in all modern societie s for whic h ther e is information. Ye t it does not represen t a n iro n la w of huma n behavior. Homicid e i s largel y confine d t o low-statu s peopl e only under particula r socia l conditions. In earlier an d i n struc-

The U-Curve of Violence i I 3 1

the poor. Yet homicide generally occur s among people who live in proximity t o on e anothe r (see , e.g., Cooney , 1998) . Second , to balanc e th e know n tren d fo r homicid e t o b e committed pri marily b y lower-statu s individuals , higher-statu s peopl e woul d have t o b e killin g lower-statu s victim s i n suc h larg e number s that community activists, reporters, scholars, or even police—all of whom coul d have something to gain b y uncovering a signifi cant hidde n pattern—woul d almos t certainly hav e documente d it b y now. Third, higher-statu s peopl e d o no t hav e t o resor t t o homicide becaus e they have other outlets—mos t notabl y law — for redressin g grievances against those below them in the statu s hierarchy, a point develope d shortly . None o f thi s mean s tha t higher-statu s peopl e ar e neve r in volved in lethal conflict. They are. Occasionally, a privileged citizen kills a spouse o r sibling , a police office r kill s a suspect, a n outwardly respectabl e busines s perso n involve d i n organize d crime kills a rival o r enemy . Additionally, men—th e higher-sta tus gender—kil l mor e tha n wome n (Dal y an d Wilson , 1988 : chaps. 6-7). Bu t these deviations only qualify an d do not negate the general pattern . Stephanie and Chuck' s position in the lower echelons of society, then, makes them typical of most modern homicid e offend ers and victims. Although b y no means all low-status people are involved i n homicide , the grea t majorit y o f thos e wh o kil l an d are killed today ar e of low social status.

Elite Violence The fact tha t violenc e tends to b e largely confined t o people a t the botto m o f th e socia l pyramid i s one o f th e most consisten t findings in criminology, confirmed b y numerous studies not just in the United States, but in all modern societie s for whic h ther e is information. Ye t it does not represen t a n iro n la w of huma n behavior. Homicid e i s largel y confine d t o low-statu s peopl e only under particula r socia l conditions. In earlier an d i n struc-

32 I The U-Curve of Violence i

turally simple r societies , lethal interpersona l dispute s coul d b e found a t all status levels, including the very top. Several exam ples follow . Feuding Stateless societie s ar e comparativel y egalitaria n (see , e.g. , Fried, 1967) . Ther e ar e fe w statu s difference s amon g people , and those that d o exist are not sharp an d pronounced. Eve n so, there are sometimes individuals who have more wealth o r influ ence tha n others . Althoug h th e advantage s enjoye d b y thes e people are comparatively small, they nonetheless allow us to observe elite conflict behavio r i n inchoate form . The leadin g individual s an d familie s i n stateless societie s ar e often no t sh y abou t pursuin g thei r conflict s violently . O n th e contrary, they are, if anything more involved in violent conflict , especially reciproca l violenc e o r feuding , tha n thos e beneat h them in the social hierarchy. 8 In highland Albania, for instance , where high-statu s kinshi p groups woul d typicall y see k to exac t lethal vengeanc e followin g th e killing o f on e o f their members , "low-class familie s woul d accep t bloo d money " (Hasluck , 1954: 239) . And i n norther n Pakistan , a region sufficientl y re mote t o b e largel y beyon d th e state' s effectiv e jurisdiction , a murder disput e between less powerful lineage s will often b e settled by the payment of compensation, but "among elite Pukhtun who hav e a clai m t o loca l leadership , a feu d mus t b e carrie d through to its bitter conclusion, which usually entails the ruin of all the participants" (Lindholm , 1982 : 74-75). Whether high-statu s people ar e more likely to perpetrate th e killings tha t giv e ris e t o th e feu d i n th e first plac e i s unclear . There are hints here and there that that is the case. For example, among the Tauade of Papua New Guinea, chiefs were especially likely t o kil l thos e wh o insulte d o r attacke d the m (Hallpike , 1977: 199; see also Barton, 1938: 282). What is clear is that several anthropologists, working in different part s of the globe, report tha t sociall y prominen t peopl e i n stateles s societie s ar e

The U-Curve of Violence i I 3 3

more assertiv e tha n mos t i n usin g letha l violenc e t o aveng e in sults, injuries, an d killings. As the authority of the state develops, inequality generally increases an d feudin g declines . Bu t feudin g doe s no t disappea r overnight. In early or developing states reciprocal violence ofte n overlaps with legal conflict. Unde r these circumstances, feudin g is commonly foun d a t or toward th e top o f the social hierarch y (see, e.g., Wallace-Hadrill, 1959) . Even as late as the nineteenthcentury, fo r example , i t wa s ofte n th e leadin g individual s an d families wh o wer e mos t deepl y involve d i n Appalachia n feud s (Blee and Billings, 1996). Brawling Although feuding betwee n noble families eventually declined, other form s o f elit e violenc e remaine d commo n fo r lon g after ward. Elites came to renounce violent conflict onl y gradually, as late-medieval Englan d illustrates . Englis h aristocrat s o f th e period rarel y sho w up as defendants i n court records , unlike, say, their Venetia n counterpart s (Ruggiero , 1980 : chap . 5) . Bu t a s James Give n (1977 : 22) notes in his study o f thirteenth-centur y English homicid e tha t "i f an y grou p wa s abl e t o avoi d bein g named as accused of homicide . .. i t was this one." Given (1977: 34) quotes one medieval historian o f the period who wrote tha t "few self-respecting gentleme n passed through the hot season of youth withou t havin g perpetrate d a homicid e o r two " (Tout , 1920: 5) . Even allowin g fo r som e exaggeration , i t i s undoubt edly true that elite individuals often resorted to force in their disputes with on e another. As late as the sixteenth century , for ex ample, althoug h feudin g ha d largel y disappeare d fro m al l bu t some outlyin g regions , nonetheles s " a gentlema n carrie d a weapon at all times, and did not hesitate to use it" (Stone , 1965: 224). On e eminen t historia n argue s tha t i n th e sixteent h an d seventeenth centurie s "becaus e o f the habit o f wearing swords , homicide was as common among the upper classes as among the lower" (Stone , 1983 : 25) . Whether i t wa s a s commo n o r not ,

34 I The U-Curve of Violence i

elites were certainly impulsive and rash, quick to anger and take offense. Furthermore , their violence was not hidden and privat e but ope n an d public . Often , i t involve d groups . In Elizabetha n England, brawls between gangs of rival aristocrats and their retinues wer e a no t uncommo n sigh t i n th e street s o f th e majo r cities: In Londo n itsel f th e fields about th e Cit y an d eve n th e main arteria l roads wer e continue d scene s o f upper-clas s violence . Bloody brawl s and eve n pitched battle s occurre d i n Fleet Street an d th e Strand . . . . It was i n Fleet Stree t tha t ther e too k plac e i n 155 8 th e arme d affra y between Si r John Perro t an d Willia m Phelippes , supporte d b y thei r retainers; in Fleet Stree t that John Fortescu e wa s beate n u p b y Lor d Grey and his men in 1573 ; in Fleet Street that Edward Windham an d Lord Ric h carrie d o n thei r repeate d skirmishe s i n 1578 ; i n Flee t Street that Lor d Cromwel l got mixed u p in an armed affra y i n 1596 ; in the Stran d tha t Lor d Gre y and hi s attendants attacke d th e Earl of Southampton an d hi s boy in 1600 ; in the Stran d tha t Edwar d Cecil , future Viscoun t Wimbledon , la y i n wai t wit h te n soldier s t o catc h Auditor Povey . (Stone , 1965 : 231-232 )

Over time, public brawling of this kind disappeared. Eschewin g collective affrays, elite s began to adopt a more formal an d individualistic type of violence: the duel. Dueling The due l emerge d i n Ital y i n th e fifteenth century , sprea d t o France, was practiced b y the elite all across Europe by 1700, and died out in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Notable for its formality, stric t rules regarding, for instance , the use of weapon s (first th e rapier, later the epee, and later stil l the pistol) governe d the practice . Thei r purpos e wa s t o giv e bot h partie s a n equa l chance of prevailing. To ensure that the proper procedure was followed, the principals appointe d thir d partie s know n a s seconds, themselves typically gentlemen of some standing (Kiernan, 1988). The lis t o f high-statu s individual s know n t o hav e fough t duels is impressive: when the British prime minister, the duke of

The U-Curve of Violence i I 3 5

Wellington, duele d a t the ag e of sixt y i n 182 9 h e was the sixt h holder of that office i n the previous one hundred years to do so; the Russian writers Pushkin (i n 1837) and Lermontov (i n 1841 ) both los t thei r live s t o dueling ; th e compose r Hande l almos t killed a conductor in an impromptu sword fight in 1704; and arguably th e mos t influentia l Iris h leade r o f th e earl y nineteent h century, Daniel O'Connell , kille d a political opponen t i n a duel in 181 5 (Kiernan , 1988) . O'Connell i s wort h dwellin g o n briefl y becaus e hi s caree r nicely illustrates how easily a prominent public figure could become the regular target of dueling challenges. Born in 177 5 to a well-to-do landowning family in the remote southwest corner of Ireland, O'Connel l wa s no t a member o f th e Protestant Anglo Irish establishment , wel l known fo r it s enthusiastic embrac e of the dueling ethos . ( A group o f Anglo-Irish gentry , for example , authored an influential code of dueling known as the Twenty-six Commandments [Kiernan , 1988 : 145]. ) Bu t hi s ris e t o promi nence as a high-earning London lawye r coupled with his public leadership o f the Irish people (whic h included holdin g a seat in the Britis h parliament ) fo r mor e tha n twent y year s pu t hi m among th e elit e o f bot h Iris h an d Englis h socia l circles . "Th e Liberator," as he came to be known, had a sharp tongue that angered his enemies and brought him to the brink of a duel on several occasions . Perhap s t o quel l th e whisper s o f cowardice , h e eventually too k th e field, having bee n challenge d b y a membe r of Dubli n Corporatio n fo r callin g th e Corporatio n "beggarly " (Trench, 1984) . After mortall y woundin g hi s challenger, h e became oppose d t o th e practice . Hi s adversarie s wer e no t im pressed b y his new mora l stand : "I t galle d man y o f thos e wh o suffered th e lash of his lacerating tongue that they could not redeem thei r injure d reputation s i n time-honoure d fashio n b y means o f a duel " (Kelly , 1995 : 263) . Politica l opponents , in cluding the future prim e minister Benjami n Disraeli , continue d to tr y to cal l him ou t (Kiernan , 1988 : 212). On mor e tha n on e occasion, O'Connell was forced int o the delicate task of arguing his wa y ou t o f conflict s whil e stil l tryin g t o maintai n hi s ow n

36 I The U-Curve of Violence i

honor an d tha t o f th e movemen t h e represented . Fa r fro m hi s status repellin g duelin g challenges , O'Connell' s positio n a s a prominent, combative , an d controversia l politica l leade r at tracted the m at a steady rate over the course of his entire career (Kelly, 1995: 242-247, 261-263) . As dueling became less frequent, i t also became less lethal. But how many people died dueling and what percentage those deaths were of all homicides are questions that have never been answered and perhaps never will be (but see, e.g., Kelly, 1995). Because of the elevated ran k o f the participants, dueling probably attracte d considerably more attention than violence among low-status people. For every aristocrat kille d in a duel, it is likely that a significant number o f commoners perished in brawls, vendettas, feuds, and argument s tha t hav e lef t fe w documentar y traces . Wha t i s certain, however , i s tha t becaus e o f dueling , letha l violenc e loomed large r in the social existence of the elite of early moder n Europe than it does in the everyday life of better-off peopl e today. One o f th e las t outpost s o f duelin g cultur e wa s th e nine teenth-century antebellu m America n South . Her e again , onl y the socia l elit e participate d i n forma l duel s (see , e.g. , Wyatt Brown, 1982 : 368). Perhaps the most renowned high-statu s du elist wa s Andre w Jackson , wh o fough t numerou s time s i n th e course of a life in which he held the office o f judge, general, and president o f th e Unite d State s (Williams , 1980 : 18-19) . Othe r notable Southerner s wh o duele d wer e Confederat e State s VicePresident Alexander Stephens , Mississippi governor and territorial delegat e Georg e Poindexter , an d Senator s Thoma s Har t Benton an d Henr y Cla y (Williams , 1980 : 11-12) . But "dozen s of congressmen , severa l stat e governors , numerou s newspape r editors an d publishers , an d a hos t o f prominen t planter s wer e duelists" (Williams , 1980 : 11). Lynching After th e Civil War dueling died out, but the participation o f high-status southerners, albeit not of the same stature as before,

The U-Curve of Violence i I 3 7

in homicide did not. Lethal conflict now primarily took the form of lynchin g i n whic h groups—usuall y white—kille d individu als—usually black (although, as mentioned, there was also some feuding between elit e whit e familie s i n Appalachi a [Waller , 1988; Blee and Billings, 1996]). Lynching is something of a marginal case because although local elites assumed leadership roles throughout the South, helping to organize and lead the lynching parties, they did no t necessaril y d o the actual killing. Nonetheless, local southern elite s undoubtedly playe d a part, sometime s a larg e one , i n man y lynching s (see , e.g. , Brundage , 1993 : 37-38; Tolna y an d Beck , 1995 : 15) . Fo r instance , i n Cadd o Parish, Louisiana , on e o f th e mos t violen t communitie s i n th e postbellum South , th e thre e mos t commo n occupationa l cate gories involve d i n lynchin g fro m 186 5 t o 187 6 wer e th e com paratively high status ones of "planter, " "farmer, " an d "profes sional" (Vandal , 1991) . This review of elite homicide is not intended to be exhaustive; the cross-cultural and historical literatures may well contain ad ditional instances . However , i n account s o f violenc e sinc e th e demise o f lynchin g example s o f higher-statu s homicid e ar e in creasingly sparse . Th e onl y consisten t exception s ar e thos e noted earlier . Th e participatio n o f higher-statu s peopl e i n offi cial, domestic, and organized crime killing can therefore b e seen as atavistic remnants o f a pattern onc e vastly more common. 9

Third-Party Social Status Why, then, is there is so little high-status interpersonal homicid e now compare d t o earlie r an d simple r societies ? On e thin g i s clear: the fact that modern middle- and upper-class people rarely kill on e anothe r i s not becaus e the y lac k conflict . Doctor s an d lawyers, entrepreneurs an d accountants , civil servants an d pro fessors d o no t lea d live s of tota l harmony . Conflic t i s part an d parcel o f th e huma n experience , an d hig h socia l standin g doe s not insulat e peopl e fro m experiencin g thei r shar e o f disagree -

The U-Curve of Violence i I 3 7

in homicide did not. Lethal conflict now primarily took the form of lynchin g i n whic h groups—usuall y white—kille d individu als—usually black (although, as mentioned, there was also some feuding between elit e whit e familie s i n Appalachi a [Waller , 1988; Blee and Billings, 1996]). Lynching is something of a marginal case because although local elites assumed leadership roles throughout the South, helping to organize and lead the lynching parties, they did no t necessaril y d o the actual killing. Nonetheless, local southern elite s undoubtedly playe d a part, sometime s a larg e one , i n man y lynching s (see , e.g. , Brundage , 1993 : 37-38; Tolna y an d Beck , 1995 : 15) . Fo r instance , i n Cadd o Parish, Louisiana , on e o f th e mos t violen t communitie s i n th e postbellum South , th e thre e mos t commo n occupationa l cate gories involve d i n lynchin g fro m 186 5 t o 187 6 wer e th e com paratively high status ones of "planter, " "farmer, " an d "profes sional" (Vandal , 1991) . This review of elite homicide is not intended to be exhaustive; the cross-cultural and historical literatures may well contain ad ditional instances . However , i n account s o f violenc e sinc e th e demise o f lynchin g example s o f higher-statu s homicid e ar e in creasingly sparse . Th e onl y consisten t exception s ar e thos e noted earlier . Th e participatio n o f higher-statu s peopl e i n offi cial, domestic, and organized crime killing can therefore b e seen as atavistic remnants o f a pattern onc e vastly more common. 9

Third-Party Social Status Why, then, is there is so little high-status interpersonal homicid e now compare d t o earlie r an d simple r societies ? On e thin g i s clear: the fact that modern middle- and upper-class people rarely kill on e anothe r i s not becaus e the y lac k conflict . Doctor s an d lawyers, entrepreneurs an d accountants , civil servants an d pro fessors d o no t lea d live s of tota l harmony . Conflic t i s part an d parcel o f th e huma n experience , an d hig h socia l standin g doe s not insulat e peopl e fro m experiencin g thei r shar e o f disagree -

38 I The U-Curve of Violence 1 ments an d disputes . No r ar e th e privilege d toda y slo w t o asser t themselves i n matter s o f conflict . I n fact , high-statu s peopl e ar e more likel y to pres s thei r claim s tha n ar e sociall y disadvantage d people. Wher e a poo r o r uneducate d perso n migh t b e slo w t o pursue a grievance against a corporation, fo r example , his or he r wealthier o r mor e educate d counterpar t i s mor e likel y t o tak e legal actio n (Black , 1976 : 24-28) . The answe r ca n b e found instea d i n the abstract ide a o f third party socia l status . Thir d partie s ca n b e o f higher , lower , o r th e same statu s a s th e principals . Violenc e i s least likel y whe n thir d parties, suc h a s lega l officials , ar e neithe r to o hig h no r to o lo w in statu s relativ e t o th e principals . Expresse d i n propositiona l terms, m y argumen t i s The relationship between violence and third-party status superiority is U-curved. This proposition predict s tha t th e probability o f violenc e wil l be hig h whe n thir d partie s ar e eithe r considerabl y superio r t o the principal s i n statu s o r inferio r t o the m i n status . Betwee n these extremes—whe n th e thir d part y i s moderately superio r i n status—the likelihoo d o f violenc e declines . High-Status Thir d Partie s Black (1993b : chap. 8 ) argues tha t a s third partie s increas e i n status, thei r behavio r change s alon g fou r dimensions . Th e higher th e statu s o f thir d parties—th e greate r thei r statu s supe riority—the mor e decisive (i.e. , likely to declar e a n outright win ner rathe r tha n forg e a compromis e decision) ; formalistic (i.e. , more oriente d t o explici t rule s an d les s concerne d wit h th e eq uities o f th e case) ; coercive (i.e. , willing t o us e forc e rathe r tha n persuasion); an d punitive (i.e. , a propensit y t o punish ) the y ar e toward th e disputants . Thus , whil e thir d partie s wh o ar e onl y slightly abov e th e principal s i n statu s ar e likel y t o mediat e a n agreement betwee n th e disputants , thir d partie s wh o ar e con -

The U-Curve of Violence i I 3 9

siderably superior in status are prone to adjudicate case s in a severe and unsympathetic, or, in Black's terms, moralistic, manner. Disputants do not like moralistic third parties (Black , 1993b : 148). Given a choice, disputants prefer thir d partie s who give a little to bot h sides , who respon d no t jus t t o technica l rule s bu t to the equities of the case, who rely on the power of persuasion, and who do not seek to punish the losing party. If only moralistic third partie s ar e available, disputants will often handl e con flict on their own and eschew outside intervention. Third parties who ar e high abov e the parties i n social status, then, ofte n find their authorit y conteste d b y low-status disputants . The ensuin g struggle increase s the likelihood tha t th e disputant s wil l use violence fo r tw o reasons . First, sinc e third-party settlemen t i s ef fectively unavailable , th e disputant s hav e fewe r mean s o f re solving their dispute peacefully. Settlemen t is not necessary for a peaceful outcome—th e partie s ca n negotiat e a n agreement , avoid one another, or tolerate their grievances—but i t helps (see Horwitz, 1990 : 128-131). Second, and more indirectly but perhaps eve n more importantly , wit h n o third partie s t o settl e disputes, disputant s ten d t o develo p a mora l syste m tha t empha sizes self-reliance, toughness , an d sensitivit y t o insult . Student s of violence call this moral syste m hono r an d i t is closely linke d to high rates o f lethal conflict. Chapte r 5 analyzes honor i n detail; here the emphasis is on the first, more direct effect o f thirdparty statu s superiority . To see the practical importance of third-party status, consider legal officials. Police officers, prosecutors, and judges largely derive thei r statu s fro m th e state. 10 I n moder n society , th e grea t wealth, integration , organization , conventionality , an d re spectability of the state make it the quintessential high-status institution. Lega l official s ar e therefore close r i n status—les s sta tus superior—to high-statu s citizens than to low-status citizens. Consequently, la w tend s t o b e nonrepressiv e an d broadl y ac ceptable t o thos e wh o ar e wealthy , employed , married , edu cated, an d withou t crimina l records . Whe n thes e group s hav e disputes, they ca n acces s lawyers an d lega l official s an d expec t

40 I The U-Curve of Violence i

to b e treated i n a nonmoralistic fashio n b y receiving a n impar tial an d professiona l analysi s o f the issues dividing them. Low status people, by contrast, consistently attract a sharper edg e of the law—surveillance , arrest , prosecution , an d punishment — causing many to turn awa y from th e legal system and to substitute thei r ow n mean s o f resolvin g disputes . La w i s effectivel y unavailable t o thes e sociall y disadvantage d groups , wh o mus t exist largely without th e protection o f the state. More than three hundred years ago, Thomas Hobbes ([1651 ] 1909: 97) argue d tha t i n the absenc e o f th e state , violence wil l pervade socia l existence ; life wil l be , to cit e his famous phrase , "nasty, brutish, and short." Whether Hobbe s was right in arguing tha t th e developmen t o f th e stat e reduce s violenc e i s dis cussed in the next chapter. But Hobbes's idea helps to explain violence withi n stat e societies . In a paper entitle d "Crim e a s Social Control, " Blac k (1983 ) gav e Hobbesianis m a ne w twist , proposing tha t som e groups ca n b e effectively stateles s thoug h they nominally live under the jurisdiction of a state. Drawing on his earlier theory of law, Black (1976) argued that the state's system o f socia l control—law—flourishe s amon g th e wealthy , th e integrated, th e conventional , an d th e respectable , a s wel l a s among members of ethnic and racial majorities. Conversely , the poor, marginals, unconventionals, the unrespectable, and mem bers o f ethni c an d racia l minoritie s occup y wha t h e terme d stateless location s withi n moder n stat e societie s an d henc e ar e more likely to use aggressive tactics—fighting, burning , seizing, killing, an d s o forth—to resolv e thei r conflicts . (T o distinguis h such societie s fro m actua l stateles s societies , the y migh t b e called "virtua l stateless " locations. ) A s we have seen , these ar e exactly the groups that generate the homicide statistics. 11 Stephanie provide s a tangibl e exampl e o f ho w statu s inferi ority to the law results in virtual statelessness. Stephanie is adept at survivin g i n the harsh realit y o f poverty, unemployment, ad diction, an d violenc e i n whic h sh e finds herself . (He r forme r husband, fo r example , killed a man in a robbery an d received a seventy-six-year priso n sentence. ) He r skill s ar e no t muc h val -

The U-Curve of Violence i I

4 1

ued i n th e conventiona l world . Whe n sh e leave s prison , Stephanie hopes to get " a goo d sui t job, and a car." Bu t like so many others from disadvantage d backgrounds , Stephanie's lack of credentials—educationa l an d social—mak e thes e modes t middle-class goal s difficul t t o attai n (Bourgois , 1995 : chap. 4). She does not belong to the world o f those who hand ou t jobs in business, government , an d elsewhere , an d thi s affect s th e wa y she has to dea l with Chuck . While in theory th e police an d th e courts ar e ther e fo r he r protection , sh e know s tha t i n practic e their action s ar e unpredictabl e and , often , counterproductive . She doe s no t spea k th e languag e o f th e law , se e th e poin t o f many o f it s rules , o r respec t it s involvemen t i n he r affair s o r those o f he r community . Becaus e o f he r low-statu s characteris tics, sh e is , to th e police , jus t anothe r pett y crimina l fro m th e ghetto. Why shoul d the y protec t her ? The y ar e reluctant t o in tervene i n dispute s between intimate s anywa y (Black , 1976 : 40-48). I f the y tak e an y action , i t wil l probabl y b e t o arres t Chuck. But that is just likely to make him angry with Stephanie. Far from bein g "scared straight," unemploye d men, like Chuck, often becom e more domestically violent after bein g arrested fo r it (Sherman , 1992) . Hence , i f Stephani e doe s invok e th e la w against Chuck, she may well find that doing so backfires o n her. She is unlikely to try it again. Distant a s they are, legal official s cannot b e trusted. Sh e is on her own. She must protect herself. Low-Status Third Partie s But just a s people wil l resis t thir d partie s wh o ar e to o supe rior in status, so too they will reject third parties who are not superior enough. People tend to look onl y to those above them in the statu s hierarch y t o settl e dispute s (Blac k an d Baumgartner , 1983: 113) . M. P. Baumgartner ha s put the point well: Where socia l stratificatio n exists , there i s generally a n upwar d drif t of disputes in which higher-status people are called upon to settle the affairs o f those beneath t h e m . . .. Submittin g a conflict to third-part y intervention (especiall y in its more coercive forms suc h as arbitratio n

42 I The U-Curve of Violence i and adjudication ) entail s a compromise o f autonom y an d a kin d o f subordination o f th e disputant s t o th e outsid e part y o r partie s in volved. For this reason, high-status people often limi t third-party in volvement excep t unde r certai n conditions . . . . For a n individua l t o submit a . . . conflict . . . t o a third part y wh o i s of n o highe r socia l standing tha n himsel f o r hersel f i s a n ac t o f deferenc e a t odd s wit h social realities . (Baumgartner , 1988 : 68-69 )

Third partie s wh o ar e no t a t leas t a s high i n socia l statu s a s the principals will, therefore, tend to be ignored (se e also Baumgartner, 1992 : 23-25) . Peopl e wil l no t brin g thei r dispute s before the m an d wil l see k alternativ e way s o f settlin g thei r con flicts. Wit h third-part y settlemen t onc e agai n effectivel y un available, dispute s ar e mor e likel y t o attrac t violenc e fo r th e same tw o reason s mentione d earlier : th e principal s hav e fewe r peaceful option s an d ar e mor e likel y t o develo p a n ethi c o f honor. The lo w relativ e statu s o f thir d partie s explain s th e pattern s of elit e violenc e discusse d earlier . Whe n n o stat e exist s a t all , homicide is found throughou t the social hierarchy because there are no stat e official s t o whom peopl e ca n b e status inferior . In deed, homicide is most likely at the highest status levels because when orde r i s uncertain, socia l statu s depend s i n part o n bein g able t o protec t one' s sel f an d one' s famil y fro m enemie s an d predators: one cannot rely on the state to do it. As the state develops, it only gradually begin s to establish it s position an d t o outran k higher-statu s individuals . I n medieva l and earl y modern Europe , few individual s o r institutions coul d match th e aristocrac y i n status . Aristocrat s owne d th e wealth , made all important communit y decisions , and se t the standard s for moral , aesthetic , religious , an d othe r form s o f cultura l ex pression; they were lords of the earth. But the very elevation of their social position meant that they had few status superiors t o whom they could present their interpersonal conflicts. The state, after all , wa s o f variabl e an d uncertai n statu s (see , e.g. , Elia s [1939] 1982) . B y modern standards , it s resource s wer e spars e and its ability to engage in collective action limited. In addition ,

The U-Curve of Violence i I

4 3

its officers wer e few and its institutions, especially in the hinterland, weak . Aristocrat s wer e unlikel y t o humbl e themselve s b y bringing thei r interpersona l dispute s befor e a mer e publi c ser vant, such as a local magistrate (Stone , 1965 : 229-231). Only a s th e stat e acquire d mor e wealt h an d organizationa l capacity did its officers com e to represent a body of undeniabl y high statur e an d elite s com e t o accep t tha t recours e t o a cour t was compatible with their personal dignity . That took time ; the state came up in the world gradually, slowly increasing its number o f officer s an d institutions , extendin g it s reach t o th e mos t remote corner s o f it s territory , an d securin g enoug h wealt h t o fund a n elaborate, permanent bureaucracy . A single variable will rarely explain a complex pattern, how ever. A further reaso n that lynching is important is because it reveals the explanatory limitation s o f third-party statu s superior ity. Afte r th e Civi l War , th e souther n lande d gentr y suffere d a significant declin e i n relative status . Conversely , while lega l in stitutions an d official s wer e initiall y fe w an d fa r betwee n i n mountainous an d remot e regions , b y the en d o f th e nineteent h century, th e lega l syste m ha d a strong presence virtuall y every where (see, e.g., Ayers, 1984). Moreover, in a significant numbe r of cases , th e lynchin g grou p seize d th e allege d crim e suspec t from polic e custod y befor e killin g him . La w wa s clearl y avail able in these cases (Senechal de la Roche, 1996 : 105). Even so , third-part y statu s superiorit y explain s th e broa d trend by which elite violence gradually became less frequent. Fur thermore, the U-curve d propositio n provide s an explanation of several other patterns of homicide, as the next chapter reveals. To recapitulate: One of the concomitants o f low social status in the modern world i s increased exposur e to violence, whether a s offender o r victim . Most homicid e toda y occur s amon g th e socially disadvantaged: th e poor, the young, the unemployed, th e less educated , thos e wit h crimina l records , an d member s o f racial an d ethni c minorities. The privileged ar e largely immun e to serious violence, rarely killing or bein g killed.

44 I The U-Curve of Violence i

It was not always so. In earlier and simpler societies, violence occurred a t all levels of status, among elites and nonelites alike. Perhaps th e bes t know n instanc e o f elit e violenc e i s dueling , which flourishe d amon g aristocrat s i n Europ e an d thei r coun terparts in America for severa l centuries. But dueling is far fro m being th e onl y exampl e o f violen t conflic t amon g th e sociall y privileged. The explanation of these patterns lies with the social status of third parties relative to that of the principals—their statu s superiority. Th e overal l relationshi p between violenc e an d third party statu s superiority seem s to b e U-shaped. Violenc e occur s when third parties are either too high in status (a s legal official s are fo r sociall y disadvantage d disputant s today ) o r no t hig h enough i n status (a s legal officials wer e for elite s in earlier soci eties). Betwee n thes e poles—whe n thir d partie s ar e o f moder ately superio r statu s (a s lega l official s ar e fo r middle - an d higher-status people today)—violence typically becomes less frequent. Violence an d peacefulness , i t follows , ar e no t writte n int o people's genes but are products o f their socia l conditions. Elites are not intrinsically peaceful i n the prosecution of their conflicts; they are so only under the conditions prevailing within moder n state societies. Remove third-party settlement—by, for example , making high-statu s peopl e virtuall y o r actuall y stateless—an d violence wil l clim b the socia l hierarchy . Conversely , low-statu s people are not inherently violent. Find ways of reducing the status gap betwee n the m an d third partie s an d their live s ought t o become more peaceful .

The U-Curve of Violence 2 I 4 7

levels o f violenc e t o begi n wit h an d s o th e additio n o f a stat e will not serve to decrease violent conflict an d may even increase it. Moreover, i f the stat e is accompanied b y pronounced statu s inequality, an ethic of oppositional hono r (discusse d in chapter 5) ma y aris e tha t elevate s rate s o f violence . Th e presenc e o f third partie s o f moderately superio r socia l status , not th e stat e as such, appears to b e the crucial variable in securing low rates of violent conflict. 1

Violence in Stateless Societies Cross-cultural anthropologist s defin e a societ y i n linguisti c terms: " A society is a more les s continuously distribute d popu lation tha t speak s a commo n language " (Embe r an d Ember , 1994: 621). (Because states often incorporat e more than one society, many modern countries have more than one society or culture i n thi s sense. ) A state ma y b e define d a s "a n autonomou s political unit, encompassing many communities within its territory and having a centralized government with the power to collect taxes , draf t me n fo r wor k o r war , an d decre e an d enforc e laws" (Carneiro , 1970 : 733). Do state societies have more homicide than societies in which people are actually stateless ? I n the absence o f a state, are societies alway s internall y violent ? Scholar s hav e lon g pondere d these questions, often comin g to conflicting conclusions . The Amount o f Homicid e Hobbes provide d a n earl y an d eloquen t statemen t o f th e ar gument that without th e state, life is unbearably violent : [I]t i s manifes t tha t durin g th e tim e me n liv e withou t a commo n power t o kee p the m al l i n awe , the y ar e i n tha t conditio n whic h i s called Warre ; an d suc h a warre , a s i s o f ever y man , agains t ever y man. ([1651 ] 1909 : 96)

48 I The U-Curve of Violence 2

The consequences o f warre ar e continuall feare , an d dange r o f violen t death ; An d th e lif e o f man , solitary, poore, nasty, brutish , an d short . ([1651 ] 1909 : 97)

The solutio n i s sovereign powe r "a s great, a s possibly me n ca n be imagined t o make it" ([1651 ] 1909 : 160). Not everybod y agree s wit h Hobbes . Som e argue , fo r exam ple, that the state has no impact on the incidence of violence one way o r th e other . Th e anarchis t theoris t Pete r Kropotki n ex pressed on e version o f this idea as follows : [T]he severity of punishment doe s not diminish the amount o f crime. Hang, an d i f yo u like , quarte r murderers , an d th e numbe r o f mur ders will not decrease by one. On the other hand, abolish the penalt y of death, and there will not b e one murder more ; there will be fewer . Statistics prov e it . Bu t i f th e harves t i s good , an d brea d cheap , th e weather fine, th e numbe r o f murder s immediatel y decreases . Thi s again i s proved b y statistics. The amoun t o f crim e alway s augment s and diminishe s in proportion t o the price of provisions an d the stat e of th e weather." 2 ([1886 ] 1975:42 )

Although Hobbes's view is the dominant one, the question of whether h e i s righ t ha s neve r bee n full y resolved . Not e tha t Hobbes state s his case very strongly, so that eve n a single stateless society with a low rate of violence would refut e it . Is there, then, a properl y documente d exampl e o f a stateles s societ y i n which people rarely o r never kill one another ? The "properl y documented " qualificatio n i s necessar y because experience has shown that reports that societies are peaceful canno t alway s b e take n a t fac e value . Preindustria l peopl e may be reluctant to discuss the subject o f killing, with the result that eve n careful ethnographer s ca n fail t o find any evidence of it. Richar d Le e (1979 : 382 ) recount s tha t h e was i n the field a full fourtee n month s among the Ju/'hoansi befor e the y told hi m anything about their lethal conflict. His interest aroused, he pursued the subject, learning , over the next two years, of a total of twenty-two homicides committed betwee n 192 0 and 1970 . In a population o f jus t fifteen hundred peopl e tha t represent s a sig-

The U-Curve of Violence 2 I 4 9

nificant amoun t of lethal conflict, certainly enough to contradict reports by previous anthropologists that the Ju/'hoansi are nonviolent. Even takin g thi s cautio n int o account , however , th e stron g version of Hobbes is wrong. There are several examples of nonviolent stateles s people (see , e.g., Turnbull , 1961 , 1965, 1978) . One well-documented cas e is the Semai, a group o f abou t thir teen thousand people who live deep within the rain forest o f the central Mala y Peninsul a i n smal l band s rarel y exceedin g on e hundred peopl e (Dentan , 1978 , 1979, 1988 ; Robarchek, 1977 ; Robarchek an d Dentan, 1987) . Although nominall y part o f the Malayan state , the geographical isolatio n o f the Sema i (a t least at th e tim e the y wer e studied ) mean s tha t the y ar e politicall y self-governing. Each band has its own well-defined territor y and a headma n whos e authorit y i s base d o n persuasion , no t coer cion. T o survive , th e Sema i carv e garden s ou t o f th e forest , planting rice and manioc. They supplement thei r crop diet with game that they hunt wit h blowpipes , poisoned darts , and a variety o f smal l snares . Every fe w year s a s the soi l an d gam e ar e depleted, the y abando n thei r ol d garden s an d creat e ne w ones . Theirs is a simple existence, and a peaceful on e too. As one summary put s it , "[P]hysica l violenc e o f an y sor t i s extremel y un common; adults do not fight, husbands d o not bea t their wive s nor parent s thei r children , an d homicid e i s so rare a s to b e virtually nonexistent" (Robarche k an d Robarchek, 1992 : 192). A second example is the Cheyenne Indians of the Great Plains of Nort h America . Fo r mos t o f th e nineteent h century , th e Cheyenne wer e equin e hunter s an d gatherers . Althoug h the y counted among their numbers many hot-headed young warriors who regularly raided and battled other tribes, the Cheyenne succeeded i n keepin g intratriba l homicid e withi n reasonabl e boundaries. Over a forty-five-year perio d (183 5-1879) the y had some sixteen homicides, giving them a n annua l rate of approx imately 10 per 100,000 , about the same rate as the United States today (Llewelly n and Hoebel, 1941 : 132). While this might initially see m quit e high , remembe r tha t i t come s fro m a societ y

50 I The U-Curve of Violence 2 lacking th e benefi t o f moder n emergenc y medica l car e s o tha t many wound s tha t toda y coul d b e treate d woul d the n hav e proved fatal . (I n general , becaus e o f difference s i n weaponr y and medica l knowledge , car e shoul d b e exercise d i n comparin g homicide rate s acros s societie s a t differen t stage s o f technologi cal and scientifi c development . Numbers an d rate s should no t b e given to o muc h weight. ) The reason s fo r th e absenc e o f violence amon g th e Sema i an d the lo w leve l amon g th e Cheyenn e wil l b e considere d a littl e later. Th e poin t fo r no w i s that th e Cheyenn e clearl y contradic t the ide a tha t stateles s societie s ar e alway s mor e violen t tha n modern stat e societies , whil e th e Sema i sho w tha t the y can , i n fact, b e extremel y peacefu l (se e als o Howel l an d Willis , 1989) . Cross-Cultural Studie s But while stateles s societie s ar e no t alway s violent , i t is possible tha t the y usuall y are . S o althoug h Hobbesianis m canno t b e supported i n it s strongest form , i t may b e that a weaker versio n is more defensible . I n this weaker version , the state would b e bu t one facto r tha t affect s violence . I f correct , i t woul d mea n tha t homicide rates , fo r instance , i n stateles s societie s ar e highe r o n average tha n i n stat e societies , eve n thoug h particula r stateles s societies ma y hav e ver y littl e killing . Hobbes himsel f give s som e support t o thi s weake r versio n o f hi s thesis : "I t ma y peradven ture b e thought, tha t ther e wa s neve r suc h a time, nor conditio n of warr e a s this; and I believe i t was neve r generall y so , over al l the world " ([1651 ] 1909 : JJ). To a moder n socia l scientist , thi s weake r versio n i s consider ably mor e plausibl e becaus e one-variabl e explanation s o f com plex phenomena suc h a s violence almos t neve r work. Moreover , it seem s reasonabl e t o sugges t tha t lega l institution s settl e som e conflicts tha t woul d otherwis e b e pursue d wit h violence . How ever, t o tes t th e weake r versio n adequatel y w e woul d nee d t o know ho w hig h homicide rates are in general in stateless as com pared t o stat e societies . W e lac k tha t information . Ou r knowl -

The U-Curve of Violence 2 I 5 1 edge i s especiall y incomplet e fo r societie s tha t d o no t hav e a state. Valuabl e thoug h th e cross-cultura l recor d is , anthropolo gists hav e bee n abl e t o stud y onl y a tin y percentag e o f al l th e stateless societie s tha t hav e eve r existe d (an d thos e unde r less than-pristine conditions) . Moreover , eve n whe n the y hav e bee n able t o wor k wit h stateles s groups , th e informatio n the y hav e obtained o n violenc e i s often tantalizingl y incomplete . Cross-cultural studie s usin g larg e sample s (usuall y o f a t leas t thirty societies ) ar e therefor e o f les s assistanc e tha n on e migh t suppose. In general, however, thes e studie s suppor t th e idea tha t the stat e or , mor e generally , judicia l an d politica l development , lowers rate s o f violence . On e study , fo r instance , foun d tha t so cieties with greate r politica l centralizatio n hav e les s dyadic con flict managemen t tha n societie s with les s political centralizatio n (Koch an d Sodergen , 1976) . Becaus e dyadi c conflic t manage ment i n th e societie s sample d nearl y alway s consist s o f violen t self-help (1976 : 452) , th e analysi s i n effec t show s tha t th e pres ence o f mor e centralize d politica l institution s reduce s violence . Another stud y report s tha t mor e develope d judicia l and , espe cially, politica l authorit y result s i n les s sociall y unapprove d homicide (Rosenfel d an d Messner , 1991) . An d a thir d stud y found, mos t directly , tha t rate s o f letha l violenc e ar e negativel y correlated wit h third-part y arbitratio n an d adjudicatio n (Ma sumura, 1977) . Other studie s provid e mor e equivoca l support . Analyse s o f feuding an d interna l wa r (i.e. , violenc e betwee n politica l com munities withi n th e sam e society ) foun d tha t politica l central ization reduce s bot h form s o f violenc e onl y unde r certai n con ditions (Otterbei n an d Otterbein , 1965 ; Otterbein , 1968) . Fo r example, mor e centralize d societie s hav e les s feudin g onl y i f they ar e involve d i n externa l warfare . A final stud y report s tha t conflict interna l t o societies , includin g violence , i s negatively , though weakly , relate d t o th e concentratio n o f politica l powe r (Ross, 1993 : 98). All o f thes e studie s hav e limitations , however. 3 Th e analysi s of dyadi c conflict , fo r example , assume d tha t eac h societ y ha s a

52 I The U-Curve of Violence 2 dominant mod e o f conflict management , a n assumptio n tha t th e authors acknowledg e i s empiricall y suspec t i n ligh t o f th e fac t that peopl e i n al l societie s handl e thei r dispute s i n a variet y o f ways. Mos t important , th e anthropologica l literatur e doe s no t yield good measure s o f the amoun t o f violence fo r larg e sample s of societies . Hence, cross-cultural studie s mus t rel y o n relativel y broad an d imprecis e categories . I n th e feudin g study , fo r in stance, feudin g wa s deeme d t o b e "frequent " i f th e victim' s ki n were expecte d t o tak e vengeanc e fo r a killing . Bu t peopl e ofte n fail to do what i s expected o f them, especially when th e expecte d behavior i s personally risky . Moreover , a s som e evidenc e (t o b e discussed shortly ) show s ver y clearly , th e stat e ma y reduc e vio lence considerabl y ye t rate s o f violenc e remai n "frequent. " The Adven t o f th e Stat e One o f th e difficultie s o f comparin g stat e an d nonstat e soci eties i s that th e stat e i s only on e o f man y difference s tha t migh t affect th e incidenc e o f violence . Thi s i s especially tru e whe n th e comparison i s between stateles s preindustria l an d moder n stat e societies (see , e.g., Ember e t al., 1992) . While modern state s gen erally hav e lo w rate s o f homicid e (see , e.g. , Reis s an d Roth , 1993), thos e rate s migh t b e lo w becaus e o f factor s suc h a s in creased interdependenc e betwee n peopl e (Durkheim , 1893 : bk . 1; Elias, [1939 ] 1982 ; Black , 1993a : 47) . Perhap s moder n soci eties hav e comparativel y littl e violen t conflic t fo r reason s tha t have nothin g t o d o wit h th e state . A differen t kin d o f comparison—o f th e sam e societ y befor e and afte r th e adven t o f th e state—suggests , however , tha t som e portion o f th e reduce d rate s o f violenc e experience d b y societie s today shoul d b e credite d t o th e stat e (se e also , e.g. , Tilly , 1990 : 68-70). I n man y region s o f th e world , th e first contac t peopl e had wit h a stat e wa s throug h colonialism . Colonia l state s sys tematically an d vigorousl y suppresse d indigenou s violenc e (see , e.g., Middleton , 1965 : 48; Sorenson, 1972 ; Harner, 1972 : 210 ; Hart an d Pilling , 1979 : 8 3 n . 3 ; Pilling , 1968 ; Rodma n an d

The U-Curve of Violence z I

5 3

Cooper, 1979 ; Boehm , 1984 : 6-7; Chagnon , 1988 ; Heider , 1991: 96, 160). 4 By and large, suppression was effective an d violence declined in those colonial territories that had experienced much o f it . Fo r example , afte r th e adven t o f th e colonia l Aus tralian administration , th e For e o f highlan d Ne w Guine a in creasingly brough t thei r conflict s befor e patro l officer s fo r set tlement, an d a new "antifightin g ethi c quickl y sprea d through out the region" (Sorenson , 1972 : 362). Once again , thi s evidenc e mus t b e interprete d cautiously . When a stateless society comes under the jurisdiction o f a state, it ofte n experience s a serie s o f othe r change s a s well , change s that migh t b e more responsibl e fo r th e reductio n i n letha l violence (e.g. , acces s t o Wester n medicine) . Her e th e cas e o f th e Gebusi o f Ne w Guine a i s particularly valuabl e becaus e i t pre sents a n unusuall y pur e cas e o f stat e imposition . Excep t fo r a brief period of wage labor, virtually the only contact the Gebus i have ha d wit h Wester n cultur e ha s bee n wit h governmen t pa trols. A t th e tim e Knauf t conducte d hi s researc h i n th e earl y 1980s, thei r subsistence , settlement , an d cultura l pattern s re mained largel y unchange d b y contact: the y ha d n o leadership , specialization, stores , missions, or clinics; spoke only their ow n language; an d di d no t migrat e fro m thei r communitie s t o see k employment (1985: 12-16). The experience of the Gebusi therefore represent s somethin g o f a natura l experimen t o n th e rela tionship betwee n th e stat e an d homicide , fo r th e Gebus i di d have a considerable amoun t o f homicide , most o f i t the killin g of peopl e reveale d throug h supernatura l mean s t o have , them selves, killed others through sorcery. Killings were carried out by a grou p o f peopl e le d b y th e decease d person' s closes t kin . Knauft (1985 : 116) summarizes the impact o f the arrival of the state on this form o f lethal conflict : The rat e o f homicid e ha s decrease d graduall y sinc e contact , fro m a high o f 39. 0 percen t (97/249 ) o f al l adul t death s i n th e pre-contac t era (c . 1940-1962 ) t o 23. 3 percen t (24/103 ) durin g th e perio d o f Australian administratio n (1963-1975) , an d t o 19. 0 percen t (8/42 ) under th e nationa l administratio n o f Papu a Ne w Guine a (1975 -

54 I The U-Curve of Violence 2 1982). Th e possibilit y o f a five- t o ten-yea r priso n ter m fo r willfu l murder i s clearl y recognize d b y Gebus i a s a caus e o f thi s decline , though the beliefs and motives that underlie homicide are unaffecte d by outside cultura l influences . ( r 9 8 5: 11 6)

Note tha t th e stat e di d no t jus t reduc e Gebus i homicid e i n th e short-term bu t did so for a t least twenty years (i.e., until Knauf t finished his field work in 1982). Note further tha t despite the introduction o f th e state , Gebus i homicid e rate s remaine d ex tremely high , thereb y supportin g th e ide a tha t th e stat e i s bu t one factor influencin g violen t conflict . The Gebusi case, along with othe r anthropologica l evidence , suggests, then, that Hobbe s put hi s finger on somethin g impor tant: when violenc e i s common, th e adven t o f th e stat e ca n re duce violence . Even so , that statemen t i s subject t o severa l significant qualifications . On e is that change s that accompan y th e advent o f a modern stat e may increase violence. These changes might b e called contact effects . Contact Effect s Coming int o contac t wit h a state societ y i s not necessaril y a benign experience . Fa r fro m it . Contac t wit h stat e power s ha s sometimes ha d catastrophi c effect s o n stateles s people , effect s that includ e outrigh t slaughte r (see , e.g. , Kroeber , 1961) . Al l over th e globe , preindustria l group s hav e bee n attacke d an d even eliminated following contact with technologically more developed societie s (Bodley , 1990 : chap. 3) . In the usual scenario, the stateles s peopl e ow n lan d o r resource s value d b y outsider s who enjo y th e protectio n o f a stat e (see , e.g. , Beckerma n an d Lizarralde, 1995) . Th e struggl e tha t ensue s i s blood y but , i n view of the disparity o f sheer force, ultimately one-sided . Although the devastation of this process can scarcely be overstated, the effect o f coming into contact with a state society must be distinguished fro m th e narrowe r effec t o f comin g unde r th e jurisdiction o f a state. The lethal violence stateless people expe-

The U-Curve of Violence 2 I 5 5

rience in these circumstances i s usually attributabl e t o th e con flict followin g contac t ove r land , minerals , o r othe r resource s rather tha n th e arriva l o f stat e jurisdiction . Onc e th e issu e o f asset ownership is settled, the state typically exerts its authorit y by prohibiting violenc e i f onl y bette r t o exploi t th e indigenou s people. Contac t wit h a new socia l world , a world tha t ma y b e extremely harsh and expropriative, not the advent of the state as such, appears to be the cause of the violence. There ar e othe r way s i n which contac t effect s ca n stimulat e violence short of outright slaughter. A stateless society discussed earlier—the Ju/'hoansi—provides a good illustration. Traditionally, th e Ju/'hoans i (o r !Kun g San , a s the y use d t o b e known ) hunted an d gathere d i n the remote Kalahar i deser t o f souther n Africa. Althoug h the y nominall y fel l unde r th e jurisdictio n o f the state of Botswana, their remoteness and isolation made them effectively sovereign . Livin g i n small , highl y equal , nomadi c bands, they had no political leaders and no settlement agents— no chief s o r elder s befor e who m the y brough t disputes . The y were no t a n especiall y violen t people , but , a s w e hav e seen , homicide was by no means unknown amon g them either . In 1946 , a Ju/'hoansi ma n kille d a member o f a neighborin g farming group . Th e governmen t responde d b y appointin g a headman t o hea r dispute s i n the region. After that , th e numbe r of homicides declined : Since Isa k becam e headman , !Kun g hav e preferre d t o brin g seriou s conflicts t o hi m fo r adjudicatio n rathe r tha n allo w the m cros s th e threshold o f violence . Th e kgotla ("court" ) ha s prove d extremel y popular wit h th e !Kung . . . . The reaso n fo r th e court's popularity i s not har d t o find: i t offer s th e !Kun g a lega l umbrell a an d relieve s them of the heavy responsibility o f resolving serious internal conflic t under th e threat o f retaliation . (Lee, 1979: 396; see also Draper, 1978 : 48-49)

To this point, then, the Ju/'hoansi are similar to the Gebusi in that th e arrival o f the state reduced homicid e amon g them. But the story does not en d there. Further contac t with Western cul-

56 I The U-Curve ofViolence 2

ture increase d Ju/'hoans i homicid e again . Elizabet h Marshal l Thomas (1994) , anothe r anthropologist , recorde d onl y si x homicides amon g th e Ju/'hoansi grou p sh e studied durin g thei r hunting-gathering period . Bu t when sh e returne d twent y year s later, th e Ju/'hoans i ha d give n u p thei r nomadi c existence , at tached themselve s t o th e fringe s o f villages an d towns , and ex perienced considerabl y mor e violent conflict. A t least twenty of the two hundred peopl e she had known hav e become victims of the letha l violenc e o f othe r Ju/'hoansi , usuall y inflicte d i n th e course of drunken arguments . Several factor s appea r t o b e responsibl e fo r th e increas e i n homicide, but one of the most important is that since contact the Ju/'hoansi hav e bee n proletarianized , the y hav e becom e "th e poorest o f th e poor, " dependen t o n other s fo r thei r surviva l (Thomas, 1994 : 79). The Ju/'hoansi ar e now a dependent, low status, minority grou p withi n a larger stat e society , a structura l position that, as we have seen, is commonly associate d with elevated rates of homicide. 5 The Ju/'hoansi cas e shows , then, ho w contac t wit h Wester n society may increase lethal conflict eve n as contact with a Western state reduces it. Although the state itself ma y lower rates of homicide, th e stat e ca n b e par t o f a large r packag e o f contac t changes that has the aggregate effect o f raising them. The net result may b e more rather tha n les s homicide afte r th e adven t of the state. 6 Violence b y and agains t th e Stat e A second qualificatio n t o th e idea tha t th e stat e reduces violence is that, unde r certai n conditions , the stat e itsel f i s violent or attract s violence. As the status gap between th e stat e an d it s citizens grows wider, lethal violence b y (execution ) an d agains t (rebellion) th e stat e become s frequen t (Black , 1993b : chap . 8 ; see also Durkheim, [1899-1900 ] 1969 ; Wittfogel, 1957 ; Rummel, 1995) . Execution an d rebellio n ar e not "homicide " a s defined in these pages, but they must be addressed, at least briefly ,

The U-Curve of Violence 2 I 5 7

if a distorted picture of the relationship between the state and violence is not to b e presented. In noncentralize d regimes , lik e moder n democracies , th e state is clearly superio r t o eve n the highest-status individua l i n status. But the status gap between the state and the citizen body is generally moderate , if only becaus e the citizenry ha s consid erable influenc e ove r stat e decision s through elections , judicial action, an d othe r mechanisms . I n somewha t mor e centralize d regimes, the statu s ga p increases a s states concentrate decisio n making in a few hands an d exer t stron g control ove r the activ ities of the populace. The status superiority o f the state reaches its apogee in highly centralized states , such as empires and dictatorships. Controllin g virtuall y al l o f th e wealth i n their soci eties, thes e state s ar e organizationall y vast , dominat e ever y major social institutio n (e.g. , family , economy , education , workplace), dictat e cultura l life , an d activel y promot e thei r own reputatio n fo r goo d conduc t i n slogan s an d pronounce ments. Political violence generally increases with the status superior ity o f the state . Noncentralized regimes , like modern democra cies, have very little political killin g (Rummel , 1995) . Semicentralized regimes , however , ten d t o experienc e a considerabl e amount o f politica l rebellio n (see , e.g. , Muller , 1985 ; Boswel l and Dixon, 1990) . Highly centralized states have relatively little rebellion (o r homicide ) bu t a lo t o f execution . Compare d t o their noncentralize d counterparts , fo r instance , centralize d preindustrial politie s hav e a longe r lis t o f offense s fo r whic h people can b e executed (Otterbein , 1986) . The highl y centralize d state s o f th e twentiet h centur y kille d enormous numbers of people. In a series of publications, the political scientist R. J. Rummel (1990 , 1991 , 1992, 1994 ) has undertaken th e difficul t tas k o f estimatin g th e numbe r o f peopl e killed b y governments i n the perio d fro m 190 0 t o 1987 . Rum mel calculates that the German state killed more than 20 million European citizens during 1939-19 4 5. This translates into an annual rat e o f 1,00 8 pe r 100,00 0 (i.e. , about on e hundre d time s

58 I The U-Curve of Violence 2

greater than the homicide rate of the United States in the 1990s). During th e Japanes e occupatio n o f China , Korea , Indonesia , Burma, an d elsewher e i n Asia i n the years 19 3 7-194 5, he estimates, almos t 6 million peopl e wer e killed , yieldin g a n annua l rate o f 999 pe r 100,00 0 (1992 : 20-21) . Fo r Cambodi a unde r the Khmer Rouge regime of 1975-1979, his estimate is 2 million or 8,16 0 pe r 100,00 0 (1994 : 194). 7 These rate s ar e calculate d over a short perio d o f time an d henc e ar e inflated. Bu t his estimate for communis t Chin a o f 12 0 per 100,00 0 (3 5 million victims in total) i s based o n thirty-eight years (1949-1987 ) (1991 : chap. 8) . And, most strikin g of all, is his estimate for th e Soviet Union o f 450 per 100,000 , based o n seventy-one years (6 2 million) (1917-1987 ) (1990 : chap, i). 8 The central facto r i n explaining thi s killing, Rummel (1994 ) argues, is the degree of unrestrained power, or centralization, of the state. The more centralized the state, the higher its rate of execution, even after othe r relevant factors ar e controlled (e.g. , social diversity , culture , an d socioeconomi c development ) (Rum mel, 1995) . Thus, large-scal e executio n i s rare i n democracies , frequent i n semicentralize d regimes , and extremely commo n i n centralized states . There i s more. Centralize d state s als o lose a greater numbe r of peopl e i n wa r wit h othe r state s tha n thei r les s centralize d counterparts. Rummel (1994 : 15) reports that the percentage of the populatio n kille d i n twentieth-centur y war s i s mor e tha n twice a s hig h i n centralized , a s compare d t o democratic , regimes. To summarize : Hobbe s argue d tha t th e stat e reduce s homi cide. Hi s argumen t i n it s stronges t for m i s fals e becaus e som e stateless societies have little or no homicide to begin with. However, ther e i s som e evidenc e t o sugges t tha t th e adven t o f th e state reduce s homicide , a t leas t whe n homicid e rate s ar e high . But even this weaker versio n i s subject t o som e important pro visos: ver y stron g o r centralize d state s ar e extremel y violen t (even thoug h the y d o no t hav e muc h homicid e betwee n citi zens), an d contac t wit h a stat e societ y ma y brin g change s tha t

The U-Curve of Violence 2 I 5 9

result i n increase d homicid e rate s fo r som e groups . Moreover , the next section documents a further qualification .

Informal Settlement Recall that the state's system of social control—law—is just one type of third-party settlement . Settlement can be much more informal, conducte d b y famil y members , friends , neighbors , o r community leaders . Informal settlemen t usuall y take s th e for m of mediatio n i n whic h th e thir d part y facilitate s a n agreemen t between th e principals , o r arbitratio n i n whic h th e thir d part y devises a solution t o the conflict bu t lack s the power t o enforc e it (se e Blac k an d Baumgartner , 1983) . Whateve r for m i t as sumes, informal settlemen t ha s much the same effect a s law, reducing the likelihood o f violence among the principals. Law has always attracte d muc h mor e scholarl y attention , bu t it s peaceenhancing properties ar e not unique . Societies with an d without Settlemen t To see the effect o f the presence or absence of informal third party settlement , conside r thre e stateles s societie s tha t anthro pologists hav e studie d a t first hand . Th e first two—th e Sema i and th e Cheyenne—hav e alread y bee n describe d earlie r a s ex amples of societies with low levels of violence. Although the Semai are largely equal among themselves, they do have a position o f authority . Eac h hamlet ha s its own head man, one of whose duties is to provide a forum fo r hearin g disputes, know n a s a bcaraa'. Hel d a t th e headman' s house , a bcaraa9 is attended b y the principals, all their relatives, and anybody else who is interested. The principals an d their supporter s argue thei r cas e i n detail , givin g thei r versio n o f th e facts , re counting the history o f the dispute, and raising every issue they think ha s any bearin g o n the dispute. Everybody ha s his or he r say. Finally, when all concerned are simply too exhausted to add

The U-Curve of Violence 2 I 5 9

result i n increase d homicid e rate s fo r som e groups . Moreover , the next section documents a further qualification .

Informal Settlement Recall that the state's system of social control—law—is just one type of third-party settlement . Settlement can be much more informal, conducte d b y famil y members , friends , neighbors , o r community leaders . Informal settlemen t usuall y take s th e for m of mediatio n i n whic h th e thir d part y facilitate s a n agreemen t between th e principals , o r arbitratio n i n whic h th e thir d part y devises a solution t o the conflict bu t lack s the power t o enforc e it (se e Blac k an d Baumgartner , 1983) . Whateve r for m i t as sumes, informal settlemen t ha s much the same effect a s law, reducing the likelihood o f violence among the principals. Law has always attracte d muc h mor e scholarl y attention , bu t it s peaceenhancing properties ar e not unique . Societies with an d without Settlemen t To see the effect o f the presence or absence of informal third party settlement , conside r thre e stateles s societie s tha t anthro pologists hav e studie d a t first hand . Th e first two—th e Sema i and th e Cheyenne—hav e alread y bee n describe d earlie r a s ex amples of societies with low levels of violence. Although the Semai are largely equal among themselves, they do have a position o f authority . Eac h hamlet ha s its own head man, one of whose duties is to provide a forum fo r hearin g disputes, know n a s a bcaraa'. Hel d a t th e headman' s house , a bcaraa9 is attended b y the principals, all their relatives, and anybody else who is interested. The principals an d their supporter s argue thei r cas e i n detail , givin g thei r versio n o f th e facts , re counting the history o f the dispute, and raising every issue they think ha s any bearin g o n the dispute. Everybody ha s his or he r say. Finally, when all concerned are simply too exhausted to add

6o I The U-Curve of Violence 2

anything more—often thi s is two or three days later—the head man articulates the consensus that has emerged about the rights and wrongs of the affair. Th e bcaraa 3 usually concludes with the headman's imposin g a small fine, and wit h admonition s b y the headman and elders of the two kin groups about the necessity of avoiding the undesirable behavior in the future an d the need fo r group harmon y (Robarchek , 1977) . Th e Semai , i t wil l b e re called, are one of the most peaceful societie s ever observed . The succes s o f th e Cheyenn e i n restricting violen t conflic t i n a societ y bristlin g wit h warrior s provide s a secon d instructiv e example. Eac h Cheyenn e extende d famil y ha d a headman . Above the headmen was the Council of Forty-four peac e chiefs. Chiefs wer e me n o f hig h standing : the y wer e comfortabl y off , participated i n the affair s o f the community, an d ha d a reputa tion for integrity . Chiefs served for a period of ten years and appointed thei r ow n successors. The y wer e expecte d t o conduc t themselves according to the strictest moral standards because in them was vested the supreme legislative, executive, and judicia l authority o f the tribe. The chiefs made policy, established rules , and settled cases. While their decisions could be penal in nature, they usually had a conciliatory dimensio n a s well. For instance, if somebod y di d kil l a fello w Cheyenne , th e Counci l expelle d him from th e tribe, but not permanently; the Council reinstate d the killer after a period o f some years. Overall, the Council was remarkably adep t a t providing guidance an d resolvin g dispute s in a manne r tha t promote d harmoniou s cooperatio n amon g a people accustome d t o regula r warfar e (Llewelly n an d Hoebel , 1941).

The Waoran i If the Semai and Cheyenne illustrate the power of third-part y settlement without law, the Waorani demonstrate what can happen when a society lacks all forms of settlement (Robarchek an d Robarchek, 1992) . The Waorani wer e traditionall y a group o f swidden gardener s an d farmer s thinl y sprea d throug h a larg e

The U-Curve of Violence 2 I 6 1

section o f th e remot e equatoria l rai n fores t o f th e Ecuadoria n Amazon. Highly egalitarian, the Waorani had no significant sta tus distinction s o f an y kind . The y als o ha d on e o f th e highest percentages o f mortality fro m violenc e ever recorded. Drawin g on extensiv e genealogica l investigation , James Yos t (1981 ) cal culated tha t i n th e previou s five generations almos t hal f o f al l adult deaths (44 percent) were the result of internal violence. To put this in perspective: in the United States, which has considerably more criminal homicide than most industrialized countries, only about one death in one hundred is caused by homicide (calculated fro m Burea u o f the Census 1996 : 94). The Waoran i d o no t see m t o hav e enjoye d thei r violen t lif e very much . The y mad e repeate d attempt s t o sto p i t bu t failed ; their division s were too dee p and grudge s too intense for peac e treaties t o endure . A majo r stumblin g bloc k wa s tha t the y lacked third-part y settlement : Nobod y ha d th e standin g o r au thority t o brin g warrin g partie s togethe r an d t o propos e an d monitor peacefu l resolution s o f conflict . Waorani violence ended on a large scale only after th e arrival of externa l thir d parties . In the lat e 1950s , a group o f mission aries contacted th e Waorani an d made the cessation o f violence their highest priority . The y fle w ove r Waoran i settlement s an d dropped food , clothes , an d othe r gift s t o th e peopl e below . Then, using loudspeakers, they had Waorani from othe r group s talk t o th e groups o n the ground an d promis e a n en d t o feuds . Eventually, th e missionarie s woul d lan d an d establis h contact . Escape from th e cycle of lethal vengeance soon followed . The missionaries did not so much mediate particular conflict s as seek to end the violence altogether. They provided th e necessary bridge between feudin g factions , allowin g them t o giv e up violence without fea r o f bein g annihilated. Violenc e stil l occur s among th e Waorani , bu t a t nothin g lik e it s forme r level . Not e that thi s shar p reductio n wa s achieve d withou t an y hel p fro m the state. The missionaries' peacemaking owed nothing to coercion and everything to persuasion . There ar e severa l reason s tha t th e Waoran i di d no t hav e in -

6z I The U-Curve of Violence 2 digenous settlemen t an d th e Sema i an d othe r group s did , som e of whic h ar e explore d i n th e nex t chapter . Bu t on e facto r i s tha t the Waoran i di d no t hav e an y position s o f authoritativ e leader ship, wherea s th e Sema i ha d th e positio n o f headma n (Ro barchek an d Robarchek , 1992 : 196 , 193) . Sema i headme n ar e only slightl y highe r i n statu s tha n thei r fello w villagers , bu t th e difference i s enough t o gran t the m th e mora l authorit y t o inter vene i n an d hel p settl e th e dispute s o f others , an d mor e indi rectly, t o creat e a n etho s o f nonviolence . I t doe s no t tak e muc h status superiorit y t o foste r settlemen t an d t o inhibi t violence . Comparing Lega l an d Informa l Settlemen t The argument , then , i s tha t eithe r informa l o r state-base d third-party settlemen t ca n reduc e violence . Bu t whic h i s mor e important? I s a stateles s societ y wit h well-develope d informa l settlement goin g to experienc e les s or mor e violenc e than a stat e society wit h fe w o r n o informa l settlemen t mechanisms ? As alway s whe n dealin g wit h th e imperfec t anthropologica l record, definitiv e answer s t o thes e question s ar e har d t o com e by. Nevertheless , i t i s possibl e t o isolat e som e o f th e principa l advantages (fro m th e perspectiv e o f reducin g violence ) o f eac h system. States probabl y hav e a n edg e ove r thei r informa l counter parts whe n i t come s t o dealin g wit h tha t smal l minorit y o f in tractably violen t people (lik e the incorrigible /Twi in the case described a t the beginnin g o f the chapter) wh o cro p u p a t on e tim e or anothe r i n virtually ever y society . Because state s can summo n greater force , the y can mor e easil y overwhel m an d contai n indi viduals wh o persistentl y endange r th e live s o f thos e aroun d them. Th e importanc e o f thi s factor , however , wil l var y wit h number o f trul y dangerou s peopl e i n th e population . The coercivenes s o f th e stat e als o affect s th e wa y i t handle s conflicts betwee n ordinar y peopl e no t especiall y pron e t o vio lence. Th e stat e ca n compe l thes e disputant s t o appea r befor e judges an d magistrate s wh o wil l adjudicat e th e lega l merit s o f

The U-Curve of Violence 2 I 6 3

their case. If necessary, the state will force the parties to comply with it s ruling , eve n i f the y bot h disagre e strongl y wit h it . By contrast, th e greate r equalit y tha t generall y underlie s informa l settlement render s i t les s coerciv e an d it s succes s mor e depen dent on the consent of the principals. When people are comparatively equal, third parties lack the authority either to interven e in disputes agains t the wishes of the principals o r to mandate a settlement no t desire d b y them. If the principals ar e determine d to fight there is not much outsider s can d o to stop them. The greate r coercivenes s o f stat e settlemen t ma y not , how ever, actually contain violenc e more successfully . Stat e coercio n can alienat e people , makin g the m resentfu l o f stat e authorit y and determined to resist it. Moreover, while informal settlemen t may be noncoercive, it is often backe d by the moral authority of the communit y (e.g. , th e Sema i bcaraa'). Disputant s ma y wel l find i t harde r t o disobe y th e consensu s o f informa l tribunal s than the mandates o f judges and police officers . A mor e consisten t advantag e enjoye d b y state s i s tha t the y typically have broader jurisdiction than informal system s of settlement. Informa l socia l contro l i s usuall y quit e localized ; i t tends t o appl y t o relativel y smal l territorie s an d restricte d groups o f people , an d ofte n doe s no t encompas s a whole soci ety. Within it s jurisdiction , settlemen t operates , bu t outsid e it , people mus t handl e conflict s i n othe r ways . Consequently , a comparatively smal l number o f individuals can benefit fro m th e peace-promoting activitie s o f th e third-part y settlement . Law , on the other hand , i s capable o f affectin g a much wider variet y and numbe r o f group s locate d i n man y mor e areas . The larg e bureaucratic structur e o f the state allows it to distribute its offi cers an d institution s throughou t a broa d territor y an d brin g a large population withi n th e same system of social control. Despite it s extensiv e jurisdiction , th e stat e ha s som e limita tions a s a violence-reducing mechanism . A s we sa w in the pre vious chapter, when statu s inequalit y grows , people a t the bot tom o f th e socia l hierarch y becom e distan t fro m th e state , de velop a hostil e relationshi p wit h it , an d ofte n rejec t stat e

64 I The U-Curve of Violence 2

intervention i n their affairs . Moreover , relianc e o n th e stat e t o settle conflic t ma y caus e indigenou s form s o f conflic t manage ment (includin g informa l settlement ) t o atroph y (Blac k an d Baumgartner, 1980 ; Black, 1989: chap. 5). For both reasons, the state may actually stimulate violence. In informal systems , the status gap between third parties an d principals is usually not that great. This, it may be recalled, ha s two effects, one direct, the other indirect. The direct effect i s that people ar e quicker t o turn t o the system o f informa l settlemen t to resolve disputes they might otherwise prosecute violently. The indirect effect i s that third-party settlemen t is not highly moralistic and so people do not develop a culture of honor i n opposition to it. Together, the two effects serv e to curtail the incidence of violent conflict . In sum, theoretical argument s d o not yield a decisive answe r to th e questio n o f whethe r th e stat e o r informa l settlemen t i s more effectiv e i n reducin g violence , an d i n th e absenc e o f em pirical data , th e issu e mus t remai n open . What doe s appea r t o be true is that setting s that lac k either a state or informal settle ment ar e prone to violence, often o n a considerable scale . Conversely, settings that hav e bot h th e extensive jurisdiction o f th e state an d th e relativ e equalit y o f informa l settlemen t ar e likel y to enjoy a considerable degre e of peace. Informal Settlemen t Toda y Informal settlemen t has by no means died out. Today, famil y members, friends , neighbors , supervisors , an d other s ma y b e called o n to settl e disputes . But some groups may have little o r no informal third-part y settlement , an d tha t ca n elevat e thei r rate of violent conflict . Low-income, urban , African-America n communitie s ar e a n example. Informal settlemen t appear s t o hav e decline d i n these communities a t th e sam e tim e tha t polic e dat a sho w tha t rate s of homicid e hav e increase d withi n the m (see , e.g. , Hawkins , 1986). Elijah Anderson (1990 ) has described the loss of author -

The U-Curve of Violence 2 I 6 5

ity in urban blac k communities o f the traditional "ol d head, " a man o r woman integrate d int o famil y an d wor k lif e wh o com manded respec t locally . Althoug h rarel y ric h o r famous , ol d heads enjoyed statu s on a number o f dimensions: they were employed, o f comfortabl e means , married , an d involve d i n thei r communities. Traditionally , the y dispense d advic e t o younge r people, encourage d the m t o find employment , an d serve d a s models of the life attainable b y hard work and law-abidingness . Although Anderson does not address their settlement role in any detail, he (1990: 69) does mention that old heads "preached an ticrime and antitrouble messages," suggesting that informal dis pute settlement was one service they routinely provided. If they did, they d o so no longer. As manufacturing job s have decline d in number an d stability , old heads have lost much o f their prestige. The mode l the y provid e i s outmoded an d the y themselve s are either retired, unemployed, or "hangin g on to residual manufacturing jobs " (1990 : 242) . Thei r much-reduce d statu s ha s left a void, fo r withou t the m younge r peopl e hav e availabl e t o them one less nonviolent mean s of settling their conflicts. 9 Mention o f low-income African-American communitie s lead s back, once again, to Stephanie's case, described a t the beginnin g of chapter 2 . Apart fro m bein g virtually stateles s becaus e of th e status superiority of the law, Stephanie did not have any informal system o f settlemen t availabl e t o he r either . Sh e could, perhaps , have gone to a marriage counselor to try to resolve her problems with her partner, bu t that would hav e probably meant revealin g her an d Chuck' s heroi n habit . Sh e could hav e looked fo r some one i n the communit y t o mediat e thei r persisten t conflicts , but , as Anderson reports, there are few suitable "ol d heads" or other people who have the stature to intervene in other people's affairs . No, she had to deal with her violent partner herself . Stephanie's case, then, illustrates bot h parts of the U-shape d relationship. Fo r her , lega l official s ar e to o verticall y superio r and informa l thir d partie s ar e no t verticall y superio r enough . She and Chuc k hav e t o ge t b y o n thei r ow n th e bes t the y can ; their fights and his death ar e the result .

66 I The U-Curve of Violence 2

In summary, social theorists have long discussed the Hobbesia n question: Doe s th e stat e mak e lif e withi n huma n communitie s less violent? The anthropological evidenc e reveals that the stat e is not, i n fact, necessar y t o achiev e lo w rate s o f violence . Societies tha t hav e extensiv e informa l third-part y settlemen t ar e largely peaceful , eve n withou t a lega l system . Moreover , th e state can itself be extremely violent. On the other hand, societies that lack a developed system of informal settlemen t may experience a lot of violent conflict tha t the advent o f a state (o r infor mal settlement) can reduce. In short, contrary to Hobbesian theory, the critica l facto r i s not th e for m o f third-part y settlemen t but the presence or absence of third parties of moderately supe rior status . The stat e an d informa l settlemen t eac h hav e distinctiv e ad vantages an d disadvantage s i n curtailin g violen t conflict . Th e state increase s th e numbe r o f peopl e subjec t t o th e sam e juris diction. Bu t th e fac t tha t th e stat e i s a bureaucrac y tha t cater s primarily t o th e wishe s o f th e rich an d powerfu l mean s tha t i t can alienat e low-statu s group s an d increas e violenc e amon g them. Informal settlemen t is the opposite, being highly localized but close r i n status t o th e principals. These twin feature s mak e it less repressive toward, an d more popular with , disputants . In ligh t o f th e fragmentar y natur e o f th e availabl e informa tion o n violenc e i n stat e and , especially , stateles s societies , al l conclusions are necessarily tentative. My argument derives fro m a theoretical propositio n tha t clearl y requires further investiga tion and testing. Assuming that it is broadly correct, however, it implies that from th e point of view of reducing violence, the optimal socia l syste m would combin e th e moderate statu s superi ority o f informa l settlemen t wit h th e extensiv e jurisdictio n o f the state.

Configurations of War and Peace I 69

configurations o f third-part y tie s wil l promot e violenc e an d which will facilitate peace. 2

Black's Theory of Partisanship The purpose of Black's theory of partisanship is to predict when third parties will intervene to support others, how much support they wil l give , an d th e effec t thei r suppor t wil l hav e o n th e course the conflict takes . Black's theory explains a large body of findings from moder n an d premoder n societie s alike . Modifie d and extended , it explains even more. Relational Distanc e Partisanship is a matter of degree, measurable b y the amoun t of suppor t a third-part y provide s an d th e persona l cost s an d risks th e suppor t entail s (Blac k an d Baumgartner , 1983 : 98) . Treating partisanship as a form of "social gravitation" by which one person is attracted to another, Black (1993b: 126) proposes that "partisanshi p i s a joint functio n o f socia l closenes s t o on e side and social distance from th e other. " For these purposes, "social distance" has two dimensions: relational an d cultura l (Black , 1993b : 126) . Relational distance , or intimacy, is the "degree to which people participate in one another's life" an d can be measured b y "the scope, frequency, an d length o f interactio n betwee n people , the ag e o f thei r relation ship, and the nature and number o f links between them in a social network" (Black , 1976 : 40-41). Although people have a tendency to side with their intimates, they d o no t alway s d o so . They ca n remai n neutral , as , for ex ample, a child might when its parents quarrel. In Black's theory what predict s partisa n behavio r i s th e intimac y o f th e thir d party's tie s t o both sides . ("Sides " includ e th e principal s an d third parties ; t o simplif y descriptio n o f th e theor y I will refe r

jo I

Configurations of War and Feace

only to thir d party-principa l ties. ) Partisanshi p intensifie s wit h the inequality o f third-party intimacy , with the degree to whic h the third part y i s relationally clos e or intimat e with on e principal an d distan t fro m th e other . Conversely , partisanshi p weak ens a s thir d partie s becom e equall y intimat e o r distan t fro m both principals. Figure 4-1 illustrates the theory: Pi P T p i T p i Tp3Tp

2 3 Tp2Tp

2

Tp4Tp4 Fig. 4-1. Relational Closenes s and Distance of Third-Party Ties. KEY: Pi, P2 = Principals; Tp = Third Party ; White space = Relational Distance .

In figure 4-1, people i n th e positio n o f Tp i ar e clos e to on e principal (Pi ) an d distan t fro m th e othe r (P2 ) an d ar e likely t o be strongly partisan towar d Pi . Likewise , all Tp2s ar e likely to be strongl y partisa n towar d P2 . A s th e differenc e i n closenes s declines, thir d partie s becom e les s partisan. Thir d partie s wh o are equall y clos e o r equall y distan t fro m bot h principal s (Tp 3 and Tp4 ) ar e expecte d t o b e neutra l o r nonpartisan . Equall y close third partie s (Tp3 ) will tend t o engag e in "war m nonpar tisanship" b y seekin g a n en d t o th e hostilities . However , thir d parties wh o ar e equall y distan t fro m bot h principal s (Tp4 ) ar e prone to be aloof an d indifferent t o the fate o f the principals, to exhibit "col d nonpartisanship." (Black , 1993b : chap, j) 3 Black (1993b: 131-137) further argue s that different partisa n structures resul t i n differen t type s o f conflic t behavior . Thus , strong partisanship , o n bot h sides , tends t o resul t i n sustaine d and reciprocal conflict. Triba l feuding an d gang warfare ar e examples. A s partisanshi p weakens , s o to o doe s th e intensit y o f disputing. War m nonpartisanshi p result s i n peacemaking , an d cold nonpartisanship tend s to elicit minimalistic conflict .

Configurations of War and Peace I 7 1

Black's theor y o f partisanshi p therefor e yield s th e followin g proposition abou t third-party behavior : Violence increases with the relational closeness of thirdparty ties to one side and their distance from the other. The second component of social distance specified b y Black is cultural distance, or the degree to which people are separated by differences o f a symboli c nature , suc h a s ethnicity , religion , o r language. Blac k (1993b : 126 ) contend s tha t cultura l distanc e has the same effect o n partisanship and conflict as relational distance. Thus, people are more likely to support a member of their own culture than a member o f a different culture . Since most interpersona l violenc e tend s t o tak e plac e withi n rather than across cultural groups, we have little information o n the effec t o f cultura l distance . However , a thir d typ e o f socia l distance is clearly important in partisanship and violent conflict : organizational distance . Organizational Distanc e Some partisans act as lone individuals, others act as members of groups t o which on e or bot h o f th e principals belong . Thus, partisans ma y be more or less distant fro m th e principals i n organizational spac e (Black , 1976 : 93). 4 Organizationa l distanc e is minimal when two people belong to the same group and maximal when people belong to different groups . (Between these extremes lie the situations when bot h ar e nonmembers an d on e is and on e is not a member, respectively. ) Third-party organizational distanc e seems to predict partisan behavior. Even without a tie of intimacy, the fact tha t two people ar e bot h member s o f th e sam e organizatio n make s the m more likely to support each other. For example, in prison, a gang member i s likel y t o alig n wit h thos e wh o belon g t o th e sam e gang or gang alliance as he himself does , though h e has little or no prio r persona l knowledg e o f the m (Shakur , 1993) . Bu t a s

72 I Configurations of War and Peace

with relationa l distance , wha t bes t predict s partisanshi p an d conflict i s the thir d party' s organizationa l closenes s t o an d dis tance fro m bot h principals . Partisanship an d enmitie s ar e mos t intense acros s organizationa l boundaries , betwee n member s o f different groups . The most sever e and sustaine d violen t conflic t consequently occurs between organized groups, such as modern gangs, and premodern lineages , clans, and villages. Assuming tha t organizationa l distanc e ha s the sam e effect a s relational distance, we can predict that when third parties are organizationally close to one of the principals (i.e., are members of the sam e organization ) an d organizationall y distan t fro m th e other (i.e., are members of different organizations) , they will give strong support . Thir d partie s wh o ar e equall y clos e organiza tionally (i.e., are members of an organization to which both principals belong) are likely to be warmly nonpartisan in trying to resolve the conflict. Thir d partie s who belon g to a different orga nization tha n th e organization s belonge d t o b y both principals , and, especially , thir d partie s wh o belon g t o n o organizatio n a t all, can be expected to remain aloof, to be coldly nonpartisan . Existing theor y suggest s tha t th e presenc e o f organize d parti sans increases the likelihood of reciprocal violence (Black, 199 3 a: 75-78; 1995 : 855 n. 130) . So does empirical evidence. Consider , for example, prison gangs. The emergence of gangs in many American prisons in the 1970s and 1980s represents something of a natural experiment o n the effects o f organized groups becaus e othe r factors tha t might have affected th e amount of violence remained relatively constant. Thus, the same kind of people—the poor, marginal, unconventional, deviant, and minorities—were locked up in the prison s throughou t th e period . Despit e this , prison s experi enced a rapid increase in violence, including homicide (see, e.g., Jacobs, 1977: chap . 6; Irwin, 1980:186-206; Porter, 1982; EklandOlson, 1986) . In Texas, for instance , onc e "gangs , largely orga nized along racial lines," practicing " a feudlike syste m of justice" emerged in the prison system, the number o f homicides increased eleven-fold i n just a few years (fro m fou r i n 1976-197 8 t o forty six in 1982-1984 ) (Ekland-Olson , 1986 : 398, 413). Gang mem-

Configurations of War and Feace I 7 3

bers probably never constituted more than 3 percent of the Texas inmate population , ye t the y wer e "clearl y implicated " i n mor e than 60 percent (and suspected of involvement in another 1 0 percent) o f th e fifty-two prison homicide s committe d durin g 1984 1985 (calculate d from Ekland-Olson, 1986 : 412, including n. 7). Note, however, that not all organized groups are prone to violence. Moder n busines s corporation s an d religiou s organiza tions, for example , rarely, if ever, engage in violent conflict. Or ganizations clearl y superio r o r inferio r i n statu s t o third-part y settlement agents are the most likely to pursue conflict violently . Hence, th e presen t discussio n shoul d b e rea d i n conjunctio n with that i n the previous two chapters. Given that qualification, there appears to be a general principle: Violence increases with the organizational closeness and distance of third-party ties. Configurations Two dimension s o f third-part y ties , then, ar e especiall y im portant in explaining the course conflict takes: relational and organizational distance. Both are matters of degree. Together, they produce a large number o f empirical combinations. In practice, however, som e combination s appea r mor e ofte n an d hav e greater impac t o n violenc e tha n others . Hence , th e followin g discussion concentrate s o n severa l commo n combination s o r configurations wit h a vie w t o illustratin g th e powerfu l effec t third-party tie s have o n conflict. Th e closer actua l conflict s ap proximate thes e configurations , th e mor e likel y they shoul d b e to produce the associated effects .

Feuding without End: Close and Distant Group Ties The first configuration—close an d distan t groups—arise s whe n third partie s ar e connecte d b y grou p an d intimat e tie s t o on e

74 I Configurations of War and Peace principal an d separate d b y grou p boundarie s an d distan t tie s from th e other . I f bot h set s of thir d partie s hav e thes e character istics, th e resul t i s tw o opposin g group s o f organize d intimate s who ar e stranger s t o on e anothe r (figur e 4-2 ; not e tha t a soli d line indicate s a n organization) .

Fig. 4-2. Clos e and Distant Grou p Ties Black's amende d theor y o f partisanshi p predict s tha t clos e and distan t grou p tie s will elici t th e stronges t partisa n behavio r as th e thir d partie s o n eac h sid e commi t wholeheartedl y t o th e cause o f thei r principal . Th e theor y furthe r predict s tha t con flicts with thi s configuration ar e apt t o b e protracted, reciprocal , and ofte n letha l regardles s o f whethe r the y occu r i n a remot e tribal villag e o r o n th e street s o f a moder n metropoli s (se e als o Black, 1993a : 75-78 ; 1995 : 85 5 n . 130) . Evidence suggest s tha t the theor y i s largely correct . Conside r stree t gang s first. Street Warrior s We ca n defin e stree t gang s a s age-grade d group s tha t hav e a t least minima l organization , som e permanence , an d distinctiv e symbolic representation s o f membership , an d ar e no t forme d with th e primar y purpos e o f furtherin g conventiona l (e.g. , sporting, artistic , educational ) goals. 5 Gang s ar e ofte n viewe d by the public an d academic s alik e as packs o f lawless youngster s running wild , inflictin g mayhe m o n on e another , innocen t by standers, an d entir e neighborhood s withou t regar d fo r lif e o r property. Gangs , fro m thi s perspective , ar e degenerate , de praved, an d disorderly .

Configurations of War and Peace I 7 5

A close r loo k reveals , however , tha t gang s ar e no t chaoti c groups beyon d al l mora l boundaries . I n fact , gang s inhabi t a highly moral universe where issues of right and wrong with far reaching consequence s ar e ofte n a t th e forefron t o f everyda y life. Th e moralit y o f gang s is , t o b e sure , differen t fro m tha t found i n other sector s of modern society . For on e thing, it is an older moralit y grounde d i n warrio r value s suc h a s loyalty , honor, and vengeance. Moreover, it is a contentious rather tha n a harmoniou s morality . Gangs ar e pron e t o quarrel , struggle , and fight. Conflict i s at the very heart o f their existence . Much gan g conflic t arise s fro m dispute s abou t territory . Thus, Frederi c Thrasher' s (1927 : 6) colorfu l descriptio n o f Chicago stree t gang s is as true toda y a s when i t was written i n the 1920s . The hang-ou t o f th e gan g i s its castle an d th e cente r o f a feuda l es tate whic h i t guard s mos t jealously . Gan g leader s hol d swa y lik e barons o f old , watchful o f invader s an d read y t o swoo p dow n upo n the land s o f rivals and carr y of f boot y o r t o inflict punishmen t upo n their enemies .

Regardless o f whethe r i t concern s territory , respect , protec tion o f love d ones , or som e othe r issue , conflict betwee n gang s has several features more typical of warrior societies. One is that gang conflic t i s not jus t violen t bu t feudlik e a s each sid e reciprocates i n a tit-for-tat fashio n fo r th e injurie s don e t o it s members. A shooting of a gang member will commonly evoke a payback shooting , which , i n turn , wil l evok e a payback , paybac k shooting, an d s o o n unti l peac e i s made o r th e group s disinte grate. A second is that gang conflict typicall y exhibits collectiv e liability unde r whic h an y membe r o f th e gan g (sometime s to gether wit h whateve r bystander s happe n t o b e presen t a t th e time) can be held responsible for the injury cause d by one of the members (see, e.g., Black, 1983). In gang homicides, the killer is therefore les s likel y t o hav e ha d prio r contac t wit h th e victi m and mor e likel y t o injur e additiona l peopl e tha n i n nongan g homicides (Klein , 1995 : 115).

j 6 I Configurations of War and Feace

Both the reciprocal nature of gang feuding an d collective liability ar e illustrate d b y the followin g cas e from Lo s Angeles in which a leading member o f a gang was sho t b y a rival set . The following night his brother and six others stole a van, and armed themselves wit h a n arra y o f powerfu l guns . Th e shootin g vic tim's brother recall s what happene d next : "We drov e fro m Secon d Avenu e t o Elevent h Avenue—mos t o f th e enemy was inside their houses. They knew there was gonna b e retaliation, but , lik e idiots , som e o f 'e m wer e ou t tha t nigh t an d w e caught 'em . And w e murdered 'em . . . . There wa s a party goin ' on . We pulled the van up to the end of the street, got out real slow, careful no t t o talk o r make a sound, an d we slipped u p o n 'em . Then w e started shooting . Everybod y wh o wa s standin ' i n fron t o f th e hous e got hit . I remember ther e wa s on e girl , sh e ha d o n a blac k bombe r jacket wit h whit e fu r o n th e collar. Sh e was th e first t o ge t hit, an d I remember tha t fu r jus t goin ' red—bam—jus t lik e that . Looke d lik e red flower s comin ' ou t al l over th e white. " (Quoted i n Bing, r 9 9 i: 252-253 )

Just ho w muc h homicid e gang s commit i s not eas y to deter mine (Maxso n an d Klein , 1990) . But inheren t bellicosity , cou pled wit h collectiv e liability , ensure s tha t gang s generat e mor e than thei r fai r shar e o f assaults , lethal an d otherwis e (see , e.g., Moore e t al. , 1978 : chap . 3 ; Horowitz , 1983 : chap . 5 ; Vigil, 1988: 129-137 ; Klei n an d Maxson , 1989 : 218 ; Toy , 1992 ; Sanders, 1994). Biographies of gang members, for example, emphasize the continual state of gang feuding (Bing , 1991; Shakur, 1993). Bu t becaus e thos e account s naturall y focu s o n th e dra matic and memorable aspect s of gang membership, it is hard t o gauge fro m the m jus t ho w deadl y gan g lif e actuall y is . Fortu nately, a recent field stud y sheds some light on the matter . For th e study , a research tea m interviewed , ove r a period o f two and one-hal f years , ninety-nine gang members active in the city of St. Louis. A small sample from a single setting like this is not representativ e o f al l gan g member s i n th e country . More over, violenc e amon g gan g member s fluctuate s considerabl y i n amount ove r time . Nonetheless , i n th e absenc e o f mor e com -

Configurations of War and Feace I JJ

plete information , th e result s ar e clearl y wort h attendin g to . Five years afte r th e interview s began , eleve n o f th e ninety-nin e gang member s interviewe d ha d bee n killed . Fo r th e intervie w group, then, the annual homicid e rate per 100,00 0 fo r th e fiveyear perio d wa s 2,222—som e 23 0 time s highe r tha n th e na tional rate (Decke r an d Van Winkle, 1996 : 173) . Or, to put th e point slightl y differently , durin g th e stud y perio d a member o f this group of St. Louis gang members was more than two thousand times mor e likel y t o b e kille d tha n th e averag e citize n o f countries suc h a s England , Japan , France , o r Singapor e (se e Reiss and Roth , 1993 : 52). Gang Ties What makes gang conflict s o violent? Is it guns? Gangs today possess plenty o f weapons, some highly sophisticate d (see , e.g., Hagedorn, 1988 : 143-144 ; Decke r an d Va n Winkle , 1996 : 175-176). Guns make it easier for gan g members to kill people at lon g range ; fe w peopl e di e fro m drive-b y stabbings . O n th e other hand, the fact tha t everybody knows gangs have plenty of guns ca n als o dete r other s fro m launchin g a n attac k agains t them. Overall , thes e effect s ma y cance l eac h othe r ou t (Kleck , 1991). Eve n i f the y d o not , an d gun s enhanc e th e lethalit y o f gang conflict, ther e are reasons why gangs arm themselves with guns in the first place. People whose lives are safe do not engage in a n arm s race . Weapon s flouris h wher e ther e alread y i s violence (see , e.g. , Horowitz , 1983 ; Shele y an d Wright , 1995) . Guns, and indee d weapons generally, are part o f what need s t o be explained. Much th e sam e i s tru e o f drugs , includin g alcohol . Gan g members probably inges t more drug s an d imbib e more alcoho l than man y o f thei r peer s (see , e.g., Hagedorn , 1988 : 141-142 ; Decker an d Va n Winkle , 1996 : 134-139 , bu t se e Shele y an d Wright, 1995 : chap. 5) . But that alone cannot explain their violence. Colleg e student s to o hav e lon g bee n heav y drinker s an d consumers of illegal drugs without being given to lethal conflict .

j 8 I Configurations of War and Feace If drug s an d alcoho l fue l violenc e amon g gan g members , i t i s only becaus e gang members ar e already predisposed t o violence . Once again , th e tas k i s to locat e th e socia l foundation s o f gan g violence. Central t o gan g violenc e i s th e structur e o f third-part y ties , their closeness an d distance , relational a s well as organizational . Consider th e relationa l elemen t first. Mos t gan g membershi p grows ou t of , an d build s on , preexistin g neighborhoo d friend ships. Thrashe r (1927 : 28 , 30 ) observe d tha t "th e majorit y o f gangs develo p fro m th e spontaneou s play-group " an d tha t "th e gang ha s it s beginnin g i n acquaintanceshi p an d intimat e rela tions whic h hav e alread y develope d o n th e basi s o f commo n in terests." Onc e gang s begi n t o form , member s typicall y interac t with on e anothe r intensively . Gan g member s spen d a lot o f tim e simply "hangin g out " together . The y watc h television , g o t o movies, drin k beer , smok e marijuana , pla y sports , cruis e i n au tomobiles, shop , loo k fo r member s o f th e opposit e sex , an d th e like (Decke r an d Va n Winkle , 1996 : 119) . Belongin g t o a gan g is no t alway s a harmoniou s experience ; member s ma y hav e ri valries, tensions , an d eve n fights amon g themselve s (Horowitz , 1983: 100-101) . Bu t th e man y hour s the y spen d togethe r help s to buil d th e intimac y o n whic h gan g partisanshi p thrives . Lengthy interactio n simultaneousl y promote s relationa l dis tance fro m other s b y reducing members ' involvemen t wit h peo ple an d group s outsid e th e gang . I n th e St . Loui s study , three quarters o f thos e wh o ha d bee n involve d i n lega l group s (e.g. , churches) droppe d ou t afte r joinin g th e gan g (Decke r an d Va n Winkle, 1996 : 142) . Gangs are , in addition , group s wit h a n identit y (e.g. , a name ) and organizationa l structur e (e.g. , designate d leaders , regula r meetings) o f thei r own . Gang s largel y defin e themselve s i n op position t o on e another . The y maintai n stron g boundaries , wit h clear division s betwee n member s an d nonmembers , insider s an d outsiders, friend s an d enemies . Thei r solidarit y i s typicall y re flected i n an d reinforce d b y a variet y o f symbols : "distinctiv e handshakes, hairstyles , stances , walks , battl e scars , tur f wars ,

Configurations of War and Peace I yy

hand signals , language , an d nicknames " (Major s an d Billson , 1992: 51) . Their central demand i s that members provide partisan support . Bein g organized, gang s exert a strong hol d o n th e individuals wh o compos e them . On e forme r membe r o f a Lo s Angeles gang , fo r example , ha s spoke n o f th e "stron g gravita tional pull " o f th e gan g an d compare d membershi p t o belong ing to a religion (Shakur , 1993 : 103 , 70). Echoing th e analog y to religion , two othe r student s o f gang s remark tha t "standin g up for your friends an d fellow members is almost a sacred duty" (Decker and Van Winkle, 1996 : 180). The flip side of loyalty i s opposition. I f gang partisanship is , ideally, automatic , s o to o i s enmity . Member s o f riva l gang s should b e resisted , com e wha t may . Th e right s an d wrong s o f their action s ar e irrelevant. As a Los Angeles gang member pu t it, "Yo u gott a understand—enem y go t t o pa y jus t fo r bein ' alive" (quote d i n Bing, 1991: 43). Gangs, then, bring together camaraderi e an d loyalty to one' s own group an d rivalry and hostility to others. When these conditions combine strongly, it is little wonder that conflict become s so lethal. Preindustrial Feudin g The cross-cultural literature contains even more concentrated examples o f close and distan t grou p ties. In preindustrial, especially agricultural , societie s kinshi p i s ofte n extremel y stron g and highly organized. Ties of kinship dominate social existence, obligating people to support their relatives at all times (see, e.g., Daly and Wilson, 1982 : 374-375). As with modern gangs , kinbased partisanshi p ha s a quasi-religiou s intensity . T o cit e jus t one example , th e Lugbar a o f Uganda , hol d tha t "on e o f th e most sacred duties of kinship is support for a fellow kinsma n in his troubles" (Middleton , 1965 : 46). As well as having strong ties within groups, agricultural societies often hav e strong divisions between them. Kinship identity tends to b e clear, language difference s an d othe r cultura l mark -

8o I Configurations of War and Peace

ers pronounced , an d th e lon g chain s o f economi c interdepen dency tha t bin d peopl e togethe r i n industria l societ y absent . Sharp boundarie s demarcat e lineages , villages, clans, tribes, o r other groups one from th e other . This combinatio n o f closenes s an d distance—organizationa l and relational—create s th e perfect condition s fo r reciproca l violence or feuding. Closenes s means that people rush to the support o f on e anothe r s o tha t conflict s betwee n individual s ar e soon transforme d int o conflict s between groups . Distanc e means that committe d warrior s can inflict maximu m miser y o n the othe r side, unhindere d b y th e restraint s tha t com e fro m shared ties. One scholar has written of the interminable, eternal nature of feuding (Black-Michaud , 1975) . Whether tha t i s strictly true o r not, preindustria l feud s ca n an d sometime s d o endur e acros s several generations (Boehm , 1984) . Behind most feud s li e committed an d determine d thir d partie s wh o ar e slo w t o bur y th e hatchet. Whe n somebod y i s killed , th e victims ' relative s an d friends nurs e the grievance, keeping it alive into the next gener ation and beyond. In Albania, for example, if a boy's father wa s murdered, "th e child's mother and the neighbors told him of the crime as he grew up and urged him, failing anothe r avenger , not to rest till he had done his duty" (Hasluck , 1954 : 220). Another farming people , the Swa t Pukhtun o f Pakistan, have a proverb: "A Pukhtun waits for a century to take revenge and says, 'I took it quickly'" (Lindholm , 1982 : 76). This is no idle boast. In on e case, " A man was killed i n a fight in the early 1950s . . . . After nearly thirt y years , the so n o f th e murdere d ma n kille d hi s fa ther's killer while the old man was lying, helpless and immobile, in a hospital bed. This act. . . was much praised by the Pukhtun men" (Lindholm , 1982 : y6-yj). Apart fro m Albani a an d th e Swa t Pukhtun , ther e ar e man y examples of feuding societie s in the cross-cultural literature: the Jale an d Ma e Eng a o f Ne w Guine a (Koch , 1974 ; Meggitt , 1977); the Jivaro of South America (Harner , 1972) ; nineteenthcentury southeastern Chinese (see, e.g., Freedman, 1958: 81-86,

Configurations of War and Feace I 8 1

136-138); th e Ifugao , Tausug , an d Ilongo t o f th e Philippine s (Barton, 1919 , 1938 ; Kiefer , 1972 ; Rosaldo , 1980) ; an d th e highlanders o f Montenegro (Boehm , 1984). 6 Theories o f Feudin g To explain why people feud, anthropologist s hav e develope d two complementar y theories , eac h o f whic h emphasize s on e characteristic of close and distant group ties. The first, known as fraternal interes t group theory, stresses the role of intimate par tisans boun d togethe r i n organized group s (Thode n va n Velzen and va n Wetering , i960 ; Otterbei n an d Otterbein , 1965 ; se e also Thoden va n Velze n an d va n Wetering , 1987 ; compare Er icksen and Horton, 1992) . Backed up by a considerable amoun t of cross-cultura l evidence , the theory propose s tha t societie s in which male relatives reside in the same community are more violent tha n thos e i n whic h the y ar e disperse d acros s differen t communities.7 Related me n who liv e in the same place can an d do suppor t on e anothe r i n dispute s wit h outsiders . The y thu s form a series of strong warrior group s who ar e quick t o use violence in the pursuit of grievances and to reciprocate for act s of violence against their members (se e also Otterbein, 1968 ; Ross, 1986; Black, 1993a) . The secon d theor y emphasize s th e discretenes s o f organize d groups or the social distance between them. The British anthro pologist E. L. Peters was a proponent o f this view. Reflecting o n the Bedouin o f Cyrenaica, a group among whom he spent time, Peters (1975 : xxxvi) pointe d t o th e territorial , economic , sym bolic, and marital discreteness of each Bedouin kinship group in promoting violen t exchanges . Whe n conflic t erupts , "discrete ness means it is possible to dispens e with compromise : it is the basis fo r decisiv e action. " B y contrast, whe n differen t group s have tie s tha t lin k the m together , "th e pursui t o f feu d wil l b e thwarted." Although valid, both theories are incomplete and work bette r together rathe r tha n separatel y (see , e.g., Ross , 1993 : 35-47) .

82 I Configurations of War and Feace Fraternal interes t group theory doe s not pay enough attentio n t o the relationshi p betwee n organize d groups . Conversely , dis creteness theor y give s insufficien t emphasi s t o th e tie s withi n groups. I t i s the combinatio n o f bot h factor s tha t elicit s th e rec iprocal homicid e tha t define s th e feud . Violence a s a Caus e o f Clos e an d Distan t Grou p Tie s Not onl y d o clos e an d distan t grou p tie s attrac t violenc e bu t violence tend s t o creat e clos e an d distan t grou p ties . Violenc e has th e effec t o f intensifyin g th e ver y condition s tha t produc e it , thereby makin g i t difficul t t o control . Consider stree t gangs. One o f the principal reason s that peopl e join and stay in gangs is to protect themselves from dange r (Decke r and Van Winkle, 1996 : 64-66,73-74). Belonging to a gang mean s that th e membe r doe s no t hav e t o fac e th e ris k o f injur y o r deat h alone. Hence, a common effec t o f gan g violence i s that mor e peo ple seek refuge i n gangs and existin g gangs becom e mor e cohesiv e (see, e.g. , Klein , 1971 ; Hagedorn, 1988) . However , stron g gang s are ap t t o engag e i n longe r an d mor e letha l conflict , thereb y in creasing th e gan g member' s overal l ris k o f injur y o r death . A cir cular, self-perpetuating proces s is set in motion. Violence brings together peopl e wh o see k protectio n an d intensifie s thei r partisa n solidarity, bu t partisa n solidarit y intensifie s gan g violence , elimi nates man y gan g members , an d increase s th e dange r fro m whic h people see k refug e i n th e first plac e (Decke r an d Va n Winkle , 1996). In short , violence breed s gangs an d gang s bree d violence . If thi s argumen t i s correct , the n decline s i n level s o f violenc e should reduc e th e closenes s an d distance , relationa l an d organi zational, tha t underli e grou p violence . Her e som e Ne w Guine a evidence i s instructive. Th e Ma e Eng a ar e a grou p o f farmer s i n the Ne w Guine a highlands . Befor e colonization , the y experi enced muc h violen t conflic t betwee n kinshi p group s organize d along territoria l lines . I n th e 1940 s th e Australia n governmen t began t o exten d it s jurisdiction ove r Eng a territory . Th e govern ment establishe d court s fo r th e settlemen t o f dispute s an d wa s

Configurations of War and Feace I 8 3

largely successfu l i n eliminatin g intercla n violence . By the tim e Mervyn Meggitt , a n anthropologist , visite d th e Eng a i n 1955 , large-scale fighting had ceased for severa l years. Meggitt (1977 : 153-154) foun d tha t th e peace had ha d perceptibl e impact s o n Enga social ties, loosening the bonds of solidarity and broaden ing the range of personal networks. Instead of just living in protective isolatio n wit h thei r ow n kin , peopl e starte d t o trave l more t o othe r localitie s fo r busines s an d pleasure . The y als o began to build their houses closer to the borders of neighborin g groups. Men ceased living with other men in warrior houses and moved into smaller family dwellings . Thus, the coming of peace weakened the system of close and distant group ties that had fa cilitated th e traditional syste m of feuding . In the 1960s , however, fighting broke ou t onc e more amon g the Enga. With the violence came a strengthening of the old pattern of social ties. People started t o travel out of their home territory les s often an d t o relocate thei r house s awa y fro m borde r zones, and men moved back into single-sex residences (Meggitt , 1977: 163) . Onc e more , peopl e bega n t o huddl e togethe r i n close-knit, mutuall y hostil e groups . The renewe d violenc e revitalized the social ties fostering th e violence.

Homicide without Feuding: Close and Distant Individual Ties The secon d configuration—clos e an d distan t individua l ties — occurs when thir d partie s (1 ) ar e individuals rathe r tha n mem bers of organize d group s bu t ar e nonetheless (2 ) more intimat e with on e principal tha n the other (figur e 4-3) . Pi P lplplplp lplplpl Fig. 4-3. Clos e and Distant Individual Ties

Z

p

Configurations of War and Feace I 8 3

largely successfu l i n eliminatin g intercla n violence . By the tim e Mervyn Meggitt , a n anthropologist , visite d th e Eng a i n 1955 , large-scale fighting had ceased for severa l years. Meggitt (1977 : 153-154) foun d tha t th e peace had ha d perceptibl e impact s o n Enga social ties, loosening the bonds of solidarity and broaden ing the range of personal networks. Instead of just living in protective isolatio n wit h thei r ow n kin , peopl e starte d t o trave l more t o othe r localitie s fo r busines s an d pleasure . The y als o began to build their houses closer to the borders of neighborin g groups. Men ceased living with other men in warrior houses and moved into smaller family dwellings . Thus, the coming of peace weakened the system of close and distant group ties that had fa cilitated th e traditional syste m of feuding . In the 1960s , however, fighting broke ou t onc e more amon g the Enga. With the violence came a strengthening of the old pattern of social ties. People started t o travel out of their home territory les s often an d t o relocate thei r house s awa y fro m borde r zones, and men moved back into single-sex residences (Meggitt , 1977: 163) . Onc e more , peopl e bega n t o huddl e togethe r i n close-knit, mutuall y hostil e groups . The renewe d violenc e revitalized the social ties fostering th e violence.

Homicide without Feuding: Close and Distant Individual Ties The secon d configuration—clos e an d distan t individua l ties — occurs when thir d partie s (1 ) ar e individuals rathe r tha n mem bers of organize d group s bu t ar e nonetheless (2 ) more intimat e with on e principal tha n the other (figur e 4-3) . Pi P lplplplp lplplpl Fig. 4-3. Clos e and Distant Individual Ties

Z

p

84 I Configurations of War and Feace

Close an d distan t individua l tie s ar e associate d wit h les s ar dent partisanshi p (Black , 1993b : 132-134) . Thir d partie s stil l pitch in and help, but their partisan support is usually not as extreme as when they are members of organized groups. This configuration i s also associate d wit h intermediat e amount s o f violent behavior: violence is not as frequent o r protracted a s under close an d distan t grou p ties , bu t neithe r i s i t a s infrequen t a s under equa l tie s (se e also Black , 1993a : 75-78) . Severa l exam ples illustrate the effects o f close and distant individual ties. The first comes from m y Virginia study . Virginia Homicid e Gang homicide receives a great deal of publicity, bu t it is by no means typical. Los Angeles County has , at the time of writ ing, the greatest number o f gangs in the United States, but even there les s tha n one-hal f o f th e homicide s ar e committe d b y gangs (Klein, 1995: 114-115). Moreover, not every young man in socially disadvantage d neighborhood s belong s t o a gang. A common alternativ e i s for friend s an d brother s t o spen d a lo t of tim e together an d for m smal l tight-knit clique s that ar e no t organizationally demarcate d on e from th e other . Members ex pect partisan support from on e another; when one of the clique gets into trouble the others are required t o join in to help thei r buddy. Though weaker than tha t found amon g gangs, this system o f partisa n suppor t stil l promote s violen t confrontations . It was well described b y several of the young men I interviewed as the y serve d tim e i n Virgini a prison s fo r murde r o r man slaughter. Paul an d Mikey' s cas e discusse d a t th e beginnin g o f thi s chapter provide s on e exampl e becaus e withou t th e interven tion o f friend s an d comrade s o n bot h side s (non e o f who m were gang members), the conflict woul d not , in all probability, have escalate d int o a homicid e i n th e firs t place . No r i s thi s case a n anomaly . O f th e forty-tw o intentional , conflict-base d

Configurations of War and Feace I 8 5

homicides admitte d b y th e Virgini a defendants , fiftee n (i.e. , about on e i n three ) involve d partisans . O f these , twelv e wer e cases in which third parties engaged in physical violence on behalf o f anothe r person . I n three othe r cases , third partie s pro vided verba l suppor t fo r thos e i n conflict . I n tw o o f these , third-party onlooker s encourage d th e us e o f violence ; i n th e other, the killer was verbally attacked b y a group, one of whom he killed. Some o f thes e othe r homicide s wer e simila r t o Pau l an d Mikey's cas e i n that tw o group s o f youn g me n confronte d an d fought on e another. But there were other situations a s well: one woman, fo r instance , stabbed a man wh o ha d slappe d he r son . In thre e cases , me n cam e t o th e defens e o f women . Thus , a boyfriend kille d th e ma n wh o ha d attempte d t o rap e hi s girl friend; tw o me n kidnappe d an d kille d a ma n wh o ha d beate n one of their former girlfriends ; an d a man was paid b y his sister and he r frien d t o kil l th e friend' s boyfriend , wh o wa s persis tently violent toward thei r children .

The Curiou s Absence of Vengeanc e The Virgini a case s hav e tw o additiona l feature s o f interest : (1) no t a singl e on e wa s itsel f a retaliator y killin g fo r a prio r homicide, an d (2 ) no r wer e an y themselve s avenge d wit h a killing. Seventee n o f th e seventy-fiv e prisoner s interviewe d (2 3 percent) reporte d tha t som e kin d o f threa t o n thei r live s ha d been mad e followin g th e homicide , bu t non e cam e unde r gun fire or were in danger of losing their lives. Most of the threats issued against them o r their familie s see m to have bee n made fo r the sak e o f appearances ; th e victim' s mal e relative s wen t through th e preliminar y motion s o f exactin g vengeance . Eve n where thei r threat s wer e mor e meaningfu l an d the y too k step s to kill the killer, the conflict di d not persist for very long. The sequel t o th e cas e describe d i n chapte r 1 (in which Paul' s friend ,

86 I Configurations of War and Feace

George, killed a man in a public park i n a dispute over a stolen bicycle) provides a representative example : The da y Billy died two ca r load s of guys rolled b y my Mom's house . One of them got out an d aske d fo r me . My siste r answered th e door . When sh e sai d I wasn' t there , th e gu y pulle d bac k hi s coa t an d showed he r a big gun. He told her he was Billy's brother an d sh e was to tel l m e h e wa s lookin g fo r me . Th e followin g nigh t the y cam e around again . Whe n Georg e an d I heard abou t it , we got ou r hard ware [i.e. , guns] an d wen t t o thei r neighborhoo d lookin g fo r them . We didn't find them . That wa s th e en d o f it .

This i s no t untypical : On e o f th e prisoner s interviewed , fo r example, had me t hi s victim's brothe r whe n h e went t o prison , yet they had talked without seriou s disagreement. Likewise, another prisone r ha d spen t tim e i n the sam e prison wit h th e ma n who killed his brother. He too took n o action . Why did these men not carry through thei r threats and exac t vengeance? The y certainl y di d no t lac k motivation ; the y wer e part of an honor culture that commends and confers prestige on those wh o retaliat e violentl y (a n issu e discusse d i n th e nex t chapter). Som e o f the m live d i n a cit y (Richmond ) tha t a t th e time had one of the ten highest rates of homicide in the countr y (Richmond Times-Dispatch, Jul y 22, 1990, 1) . Many were well used to violence, having grown up and lived surrounded b y it all their lives. One man, for instance—still only in his middle twenties—said tha t h e had probabl y witnesse d anywher e fro m "fiv e to eight " homicide s i n hi s life . T o survive i n this environment , the me n ha d t o lear n t o becom e violen t themselves . The y ac cepted that the proper way of dealing with a homicide is for th e victim's mal e supporters—hi s brother s o r clos e friends—to kil l the killer . They distruste d lega l officials , considerin g the m cor rupt an d cooperatio n wit h th e legal system inappropriate, eve n wrong. The y had , i n short , al l th e motivatio n the y neede d t o exact vengeance. Nor di d the men lack the means to kill. Many people in their communities carrie d gun s o r kep t gun s i n thei r homes . Thos e

Configurations of War and Peace I 8 7 who di d no t coul d easil y obtai n one . On e o f th e me n trade d i n stolen gun s an d state d tha t h e neve r ha d an y shortag e o f cus tomers, eve n thoug h mos t o f hi s stoc k consiste d o f large-calibr e weapons, suc h a s .41 s an d .44s . The answe r t o the riddle lies in third-party ties . Individual tie s are no t conduciv e t o long-term , reciproca l conflict . Th e inter viewees wer e agree d tha t ther e wer e n o gang s i n thei r commu nities. Instead , ther e wa s th e loose r syste m o f alliance s centere d on friendshi p ties , described earlier . Individuals hun g together i n small clique s that , howeve r tight , wer e no t organized . Th e cliques ha d n o distinc t organizationa l symbol s an d n o identit y apart fro m tha t o f thei r curren t members . As a result, the y wer e fragile. Howeve r determine d thei r member s ma y hav e bee n t o stand b y on e another , th e disappearanc e o f on e o r mor e o f them—whether throug h residentia l migration , imprisonment , or death—undermine d th e clique' s existence . Th e cliqu e de pended o n th e presenc e o f th e curren t member s an d withou t them commonl y fel l apart . I n sum , thes e individua l clos e an d distant tie s resulte d i n partisanshi p tha t wa s stron g enoug h t o trigger initia l act s of homicide bu t no t stron g enoug h t o elici t retaliatory killings . Truncated Vengeanc e What i s tru e o f moder n societie s i s als o tru e o f triba l soci eties. Virtuall y al l preindustria l peopl e hav e stron g tie s o f inti macy, bu t no t al l hav e organize d kinshi p groups . M y cross-cul tural stud y show s tha t homicide s i n whic h th e principal s ar e not member s o f organize d suppor t group s ar e less likely to gen erate a vengeanc e homicid e tha n thos e i n whic h the y ar e mem bers. Tabl e 4- 1 divide s th e respons e t o homicid e int o case s i n which vengeanc e i s typically exacte d an d thos e i n whic h some thing shor t o f vengeanc e (e.g. , banishment , compensation ) i s the norm . Organize d third-part y tie s ar e eithe r presen t o r ab sent.

88 I Configurations of War and Peace TABLE 4 . 1 .

Vengeance as a Response to Homicide in Selected Preindustrial Societies, by Presence of Organized Third-Party Ties Organized Third-Part y Tie s Absent

Present

10 90 [20]

81 19 [16]

(%)

Vengeance No vengeanc e N

27 , 157-15%)-

Foundations of Honor I 13 1

To b e sure, lies may b e told i n an y case . The partie s t o cor porate litigation , fo r example , ca n b e extremel y proficien t a t covering u p fact s an d misleadin g lega l officials . Additionally , corporations ar e often abl e to attract exper t witnesses to testif y in their favor . Litigatio n betwee n peopl e involved i n honor dis putes therefore ha s no monopoly o n presenting radically differ ent versions of the facts. Nonetheless, in legal disputes involving the honorabl e (e.g. , gan g members ) th e factua l claim s mad e often appea r t o b e unusually divergent , th e tellin g o f lie s mor e direct, and the manipulation o f the legal system for private ends less subtle. Overall, then, the relationship betwee n th e law and hono r i s complex. Pure honor disdain s the law. But honor may be mixed with dignity , an d th e la w ma y b e highl y developed . Conse quently, th e stat e ma y intrud e int o hono r disputes . Whe n i t does, the honorabl e ma y us e the la w aggressivel y an d eve n en thusiastically t o haras s thei r enemies . Despite thei r natura l an tipathy t o th e whol e lega l process , peopl e involve d i n violen t disputes abou t hono r may , unde r som e conditions , actuall y b e the most frequent user s of the courts (see, e.g., Blee and Billings, 1996).8 Much violence , then, in modern an d premodern societie s arise s out o f a cultur e o f hono r o r respect . Hono r i s a warrio r ethi c quite distinct from the morality of dignity that prevails in the of fice towers , shopping malls, and suburba n home s populated b y the middl e an d uppe r classes . Ye t hono r live s o n amon g th e young, th e poor , th e unconventional , an d th e disreputable . Honor ha s moved dow n bu t no t ou t o f the status hierarchy. As in day s gon e by , the principa l feature s o f hono r ar e tha t i t i s a (1) a rule-bound mora l syste m tha t (2 ) value s a public reputa tion fo r (3 ) braver y (4 ) int o whic h childre n ar e socialize d an d under whic h peopl e ar e (5 ) sensitiv e t o insult , (6 ) verball y ag gressive, and (7 ) quick to retaliate for (8 ) provocations tha t ar e often objectivel y minor ; a system that generate s (9 ) hostility t o law and, sometimes , (10) a willingness to manipulate lega l offi -

132 I Foundations of Honor

cials and institutions to further privat e disputes. Although som e systems of honor hav e more an d som e fewer, thes e characteris tics for m th e cor e o f hono r system s everywhere . The y res t o n several social foundations, tw o of which are third-party effects : relational stabilit y and statelessness .

134 I Conclusion

ingly central in the study of violence. There are at least three sets of reason s tha t thir d partie s deserv e mor e attentio n tha n the y have generall y received : thei r implication s fo r researching , re ducing, and explainin g violence.

Researching Violence Third-party research is still in its early stages. Previous chapter s have documented a variety of ways in which the actions and inactions o f famil y members , friends , neighbors , onlookers , an d legal official s ca n promot e violen t o r nonviolen t outcome s t o conflict, but , clearly, there is considerably more to b e learned. Additional Third-Part y Effect s Consider, for example , the U-curve d ide a presented i n chapter 2 . That proposition predicts that violence is high when third parties are high above or lower than the principals in social status. Amon g th e findings tha t woul d falsif y th e propositio n ar e (i) setting s in which third parties are considerably higher in status tha n disputant s d o no t hav e mor e violenc e tha n setting s i n which thir d partie s ar e onl y moderatel y highe r i n status ; (2 ) when thir d partie s ar e outranked i n status b y some disputants , violence is no more common than when third parties outrank all disputants; (3) in modern societies, low-status people are not involved i n violence , a s offender s an d victims , mor e ofte n tha n their number s i n th e populatio n predict ; an d (4 ) i n earlie r an d simpler societies , high-statu s peopl e kille d an d wer e kille d i n conflict n o more frequentl y tha n the y ar e today. Moreover, th e proposition raises several other research questions. For instance, in medieval and earl y modern Europ e were elites more, less, or about a s violent a s those a t th e botto m o f th e socia l pyramid ? The U-curve d propositio n doe s no t provid e a definit e predic tion: Becaus e elite s wer e abov e th e la w an d th e poo r an d dis possessed were outside the law, both ends of the curve could b e

Conclusion I 13 5

found withi n th e sam e society, and i t is not clea r which shoul d produce the greater violence . The tie configurations discusse d i n chapter 4 provide furthe r research opportunities. Of all the configurations tha t are empirically possible , dat a ar e availabl e o n relativel y few . Wha t hap pens, fo r example , whe n thir d partie s ar e relationall y clos e t o one side and distan t fro m th e other sid e but ar e members o f a n organized grou p t o whic h bot h principal s belong ? O r whe n third partie s ar e relationally distan t fro m bot h side s but, again , are members of an organized group to which both principals belong? Althoug h ther e ar e n o dat a o n these possibilities, Black' s theory o f partisanshi p allow s u s t o mak e som e prediction s about these hybrid cases. But the theory runs out in other cases. For instance, how likely is violence when one set of third partie s is organized bu t the other i s not? Then ther e ar e othe r third-part y variables . Blac k (1993b : 126) argue s tha t cultura l distanc e ha s effect s o n partisanshi p similar t o those o f relational distance . Hence, all else the same , third partie s shoul d suppor t principal s who belon g to the sam e ethnicity, race , religion , o r linguisti c grou p a s themselve s an d tend t o oppos e thos e wh o belon g t o differen t cultura l groups . Though plausible , systemati c evidenc e fo r thi s propositio n i s lacking. Another aspect of the theory of partisanship focuses on social status. Black (1993b: 127) proposes that "partisanshi p is a joint function o f the social superiority of one side and the social inferiority of the other." This proposition predict s that third partie s will gravitat e towar d th e higher-statu s principa l an d tha t th e higher the status o f the principal relative to the other principal , the more support the third party will provide. In terms of partisanship, then , th e rich ge t riche r an d poo r ge t poorer . Again , though plausibl e o n it s fac e an d consisten t wit h th e wa y othe r spheres of social life operate (Merton, 1968) , there is, as yet, not much empirical evidence to support thi s idea. Moreover, the ef fect o f status partisanship o n violence has not bee n explored. 1 There i s also scop e fo r mor e macrosociologica l research . As

136 I Conclusion

discussed i n chapter 4 , close and distan t grou p ties tend to produce reciproca l violence , an d clos e an d distan t individua l tie s tend t o produc e unreciprocate d violence . Bu t wher e d o thes e configurations o f ties themselves come from? A t one level, they might b e seen simply a s naturally occurrin g phenomena, a s the product o f haphazard historica l development. But that does not explain why these configurations ar e concentrated i n low-status neighborhoods today. Conflict configuration s ar e not randoml y distributed throughout the social hierarchy. Ultimately, then, the origins o f th e network s fro m whic h conflic t configuration s spring must b e documented an d explained . Finally, while this book argues that the status and ties of third parties explai n interpersona l violenc e i n general , th e dat a o n which the argument draws mainly relate to lethal violence. Outside the domestic sphere there are few studies of violent conflic t that do not result in death. The third-party propositions provide a se t o f hypothese s fo r predictin g th e condition s unde r whic h nonlethal violence occurs. If they are correct, and if nonlethal violence is simply a less extreme form o f violence, third-party sta tus an d tie s associate d wit h letha l violenc e shoul d b e found i n less intense form whe n the violence is nonlethal. 2 Conflict Black's (1983) insight that violence is a form o f morality contains severa l underexplore d empirica l implications . On e i s t o turn attention awa y from crim e to conflict. Instead of being seen as a type o f socia l pathology, violenc e is , for thi s perspective, a means of handling conflict foun d unde r certai n socia l structura l conditions. Hence , i n plac e o f lookin g a t wha t violenc e ha s i n common with , say , shoplifting, th e researcher seek s to situat e i t in th e contex t o f othe r way s i n whic h peopl e handl e conflict . Some conflic t behavio r i s criminal , bu t mos t i s not . A conflic t perspective therefore changes the landscape of violence; it creates a new set of comparisons an d contrasts (Black , 1998) .

Conclusion I 13 7

Consider, for instance , the role of parents i n the violent con flicts of their children. Criminological theory holds that children who are close to their parents will be less likely to turn to crime than thos e wh o ar e distan t fro m thei r parent s (Hirschi , 1969) . While th e theor y work s quit e wel l fo r man y crimes , suc h a s theft, robbery , burglary , dru g taking , an d prostitutio n (Krohn , 1995)1 ^ m a Y n o t hol d fo r assaul t an d homicide . A s w e hav e seen, in honor cultures—including virtually stateless locations in modern societies—parent s mus t ofte n trai n thei r childre n to hi t back. Man y parent s d o thi s reluctantly ; the y neithe r lik e vio lence no r wan t t o se e their childre n gettin g int o fights an d in curring th e risk o f injur y o r death . (Thus , parental suppor t fo r their children' s violen t act s may no t sho w u p o n a survey.) Bu t without a genera l climat e o f peace , parent s canno t affor d t o teach their children a consistent ethic of nonviolence. As long as honor remains a strong concern, most parents will recognize the reality tha t violen t retaliatio n i s not optiona l bu t mandator y i f the chil d i s to flouris h rathe r tha n merel y survive . Under thes e conditions, then, close ties to parents ar e likely to b e consistent with certai n type s o f violence , thoug h no t wit h othe r type s o f crime. Viewing violence i n terms o f conflict s ove r righ t an d wron g inevitably lead s the researche r beyon d thir d parties . In Black' s theoretical paradigm, the status and ties of the principal parties are jus t a s crucial a component a s those o f thir d parties . Con sider, fo r example , th e rol e o f relationa l distance . A consider able proportion o f violence occurs between intimate principals, especially whe n rate s o f violenc e ar e lo w (Dal y an d Wilson , 1988). Yet there is also reason to believe that, all else the same, violence is more likely to be lethal when it occurs between non intimates. The ratio of lethal to nonlethal violence in marital relationships, for instance , is vastly lower than amon g more relationally distan t peopl e (Zimring , Mukherjee, an d Va n Winkle, 1983: 924-925). These opposing effects warran t furthe r inves tigation.

138 I Conclusion

Beyond Officia l Dat a Much criminologica l researc h o n violenc e employ s officia l data gathere d b y th e polic e o r othe r crimina l justic e agencies . These data have proved to be extremely useful, an d a great deal has been learned fro m them . But official dat a hav e their limita tions; understandably so : criminal justice agencies gather infor mation primaril y t o catc h an d convic t criminals , not t o under stand violenc e a s a natura l phenomenon . Hence , officia l files often contai n littl e informatio n o n issue s tha t d o no t bea r di rectly o n guil t o r innocenc e bu t tha t ar e nonetheless sociologi cally relevant . Muc h third-part y behavior , fo r example , re ceives little officia l coverag e becaus e i t contribute s t o th e evo lution o f lethal violence without necessarily involving any legal culpability. To expand ou r understandin g o f violence, it is necessary t o make mor e us e o f othe r source s o f information . Lookin g be yond officia l dat a allow s th e researche r t o trac e th e origin s and developmen t o f conflic t i n greate r detail . Her e ther e i s much t o lear n fro m th e anthropologists , wh o hav e lon g ob tained high-qualit y informatio n o n violen t incidents . Onl y rarely hav e anthropologist s bee n i n a positio n t o observ e homicides o r feud s fo r themselves , but with th e help of infor mants they have carefully reconstructe d th e unfolding o f con flicts an d th e rol e playe d b y th e variou s dramati s personae . The result s ar e in-dept h cas e historie s rarel y foun d i n studie s of modern violence . When i t comes to nuance an d richnes s of detail, more , strangely , i s know n abou t preindustria l tha n modern violence . In developing richer accounts of violent conflicts, surveys can be helpful ; s o to o ca n controlle d experiments , whethe r con ducted i n th e laborator y o r th e field. But th e mos t vali d infor mation is likely to come from ethnographi c work. Ethnograph y allows th e studen t o f violenc e t o recor d o r reconstruc t th e sta tus and ties of the principals an d third parties in the kind of detail that is required to understand case s fully .

Conclusion I 13 9

Comparative Studie s More comparativ e studie s woul d undoubtedl y increas e ou r understanding o f violence . On e kin d o f stud y woul d compar e settings wit h hig h an d lo w level s o f violence . I n th e previou s chapters I have o n severa l occasion s contraste d Baumgartner' s (1988) suburba n stud y wit h dat a o n inner-cit y violence . Valu able though this contrast is, more studies are needed. The problem i s tha t ther e ar e fe w systemati c investigation s o f conflic t among nonviolen t group s (bu t see , e.g., Ellickson , 1991 ; Morrill, 1995) . Consider universit y students , for example . By some indicators, students ought to have a lot of violent conflict. The y are at a peak ag e for violence , free o f parental control , an d ar e loosely integrate d int o famil y an d wor k life . Ye t there appear s to be comparatively littl e violence and certainly little lethal violence among them. A study of conflict managemen t amon g stu dents tha t allowe d comparison s t o b e draw n wit h thei r same age peers i n inner-cit y neighborhood s would , i n al l likelihood , add considerably to our knowledge . Comparisons o f low-statu s communitie s themselve s provid e another possibl e line of inquiry. Some low-income setting s generate hig h level s of violen t conflict ; other s d o not. Thus, homicide rates vary significantly acros s low-income ethnic and racia l minority group s i n America . Latinos , fo r instance , generall y have les s violent conflic t tha n Africa n Americans . Why i s this? Why d o som e disadvantage d group s an d setting s manag e t o limit violenc e mor e successfull y tha n others ? D o thir d partie s play a significant role ? Cross-cultural an d cross-national studie s also have consider able research potential. But these need to go beyond analyses of the macrostructural feature s o f different societie s (e.g. , how unequally income is distributed). After all , societies are not violent; particular people and groups within societies are. Of especial interest, then, would b e detailed comparisons o f conflict manage ment amon g th e mos t violence-pron e groups—low-statu s peo ple—in societie s wit h hig h an d lo w rate s o f violence . Why, fo r

140 I Conclusion

instance, d o youn g me n fro m impoverishe d background s i n urban Americ a hav e s o muc h mor e letha l violenc e tha n thei r counterparts i n Englan d o r Japan ? Wha t exactl y i s differen t about th e socia l context s o f thei r conflicts ? Ho w d o thir d par ties figure int o those differences ?

Reducing Violence The goals of this book ar e primarily programmatic—to encour age greater scholarly interest in third parties—and theoretical — to explai n findings i n th e researc h literature . Nevertheless , th e study o f third partie s has implications fo r anothe r issue : the reduction o f violence . In this sectio n I briefly conside r ho w thir d parties migh t b e deployed t o promot e mor e peacefu l outcome s to conflict . Some third-party conflic t structure s ar e easier t o manipulat e for peacefu l end s tha n others . Th e third-part y configuration s discussed i n chapte r 4 , fo r instance , ar e product s o f th e close ness and distanc e foun d i n naturally occurrin g socia l network s and groups . The y typicall y involv e a whol e serie s o f people : family members , friends, acquaintances , enemies. Complex an d subtle, they do not easily lend themselves to external change. Settlement offer s mor e promise, however. Settlement i s ofte n effected b y a single person or small group. While it may emerge from everyda y relationships , i t i s ofte n created , altered , an d eliminated b y conscious design from abov e or outside. As such, it appear s t o b e mor e easil y manipulate d t o achiev e desire d ends. Theoretical Repris e If third parties are to promote the peaceful settlemen t of conflict, they shoul d neithe r b e too low nor to o high in status rela tive to the principals. Third partie s who ar e too low—lowe r i n status than the principals—will not command the respect of dis-

Conclusion I

14 1

putants (Blac k an d Baumgartner , 1983 : 113) . The y wil l no t b e sought ou t i n times o f strif e and , i f they are , their words wil l no t be heeded . Peopl e wan t settlemen t agent s who m the y admire ; they wan t t o loo k u p t o thos e t o who m the y submi t thei r dis putes. Whe n settlemen t agent s ar e no t a t leas t thei r socia l equals, the y will , lik e th e aristocrat s o f old , rejec t th e thir d party's jurisdictio n an d handl e conflic t themselves . Violence wil l increase. But disputant s d o no t wan t thir d partie s wh o ar e to o hig h i n relative statu s either . A s (Black , 1993b : chap. 8 ) observes , verti cally distan t thir d partie s hav e a stron g tendenc y t o b e moralis tic. The y esche w consultation , compromise , an d conciliatio n i n favor o f control , commands , an d coercion . Disputant s d o no t like to b e treated i n this unforgiving manner , an d the y will rejec t settlement agent s wh o belon g t o a distan t high-statu s world . Without settlemen t agents , the y ar e likel y t o develo p a n hono r culture tha t emphasize s toughnes s an d sensitivit y t o insult . Many sociall y disadvantage d peopl e toda y find themselve s i n precisely thi s position : the y hav e a hostil e relationshi p wit h th e legal system and it s officials tha t render s the m virtuall y stateless . As a result , the y sometime s tur n t o violenc e t o settl e thei r dif ferences. Relational distanc e ha s a simila r effect . Thir d partie s wh o ar e equally relationall y distan t fro m th e principal s ten d t o b e eithe r indifferent o r coerciv e towar d th e disputants . Thei r natura l in clination i s no t t o ge t involved , t o remai n aloo f (Black , 1993b : 134). Bu t i f the y d o interven e (e.g. , becaus e i t i s their jo b t o so ) they typicall y d o no t exhibi t muc h sympath y fo r o r understand ing of th e principal s (Black , 1993b : chap. 8) . They relat e t o con flict i n term s o f abstrac t rule s an d declar e absolut e winner s an d losers. The y d o no t investigat e th e cause s o f th e conflic t i n an y real depth , an d thei r ruling s ar e commonl y hars h an d punitive . They to o ar e ofte n rejecte d b y disputants , agai n fosterin g a con cern with honor an d rendering violent resolutions more frequent . To promot e peace , then , settlemen t agent s mus t hav e rela tively specific characteristics . They must b e slightly higher i n sta -

142 I Conclusion

tus and relatively intimate with the principals. Settlement agents who answer these requirements ought to command bot h the approval and respect of disputants, regardless of whether they are state officials, privat e individuals, or a hybrid o f both . Socially clos e thir d partie s ar e a n increasingl y familia r phe nomenon in many countries, and it should therefore b e possible to create a corps o f third partie s with these specific violence-in hibiting characteristics. In the remainder o f the section I outline the contour s o f a syste m o f popula r justic e buil t aroun d tw o types o f a sociall y clos e thir d party : "elders " an d "peacemak ers." Because the system is primarily designed to reduce violence among the urban poor , I call it "stree t justice." The system ca n be implemented in different way s by different communities , and hence it makes little sense to try to legislate all its detailed workings. What follows, then, is a sketch of the principal features o f street justice. These features dra w o n several models alread y in existence, as well as on more general proposals fo r decentraliz ing la w an d crimina l justic e (fo r th e latter , see , e.g. , Danzig , 1973; Black and Baumgartner , 1980 ; Black, 1989 : chap. 5). Elders The role of community elders would b e to establish an d staf f tribunals dedicated to settling disputes in a consultative manner. Elders woul d b e a ne w typ e o f "ol d head, " me n an d wome n from the same or a similar community who understand the rules prevailing ther e an d work ou t a solution consisten t wit h i t an d the wishes o f the principals. As their nam e implies , they woul d have som e seniority, bu t the y would no t constitut e a gerontocracy. Exceptional peopl e i n their twentie s migh t becom e elder s if they commanded enoug h respect from thos e in their midst . Elders would b e invested with wide discretionary power s bu t would hav e n o jurisdictio n t o imprison . The y could , fo r exam ple, arrange restitutio n eithe r to the victim personally (e.g. , in a robbery case) or to the community as a whole (e.g., in a gunfight that endangere d children) . Paymen t coul d tak e th e for m o f

Conclusion I

14 3

money, o r work , o r both . The y coul d brin g th e principal s to gether, trying to get to the root of the disagreement, encouragin g apology an d mutua l recognitio n o f wrongdoing , wher e appro priate. For people involved in long-term relationships, they could arrange counselin g o r othe r therapeuti c services . For othe r dis putants, they might even recommend controlled violence as a solution. I n som e conflict s betwee n belligeren t teenagers , fo r ex ample, the elders might conclude that the best prospect for longterm peac e lie s i n havin g th e antagonist s bo x o r wrestl e unde r supervision a t a gymnasium . I f the y did , an d th e disputant s agreed, the parties could in effect due l their way to an honorable but minimally dangerous outcome . The general point is that th e rulings o f elders ' courts woul d emphasiz e consensua l solutions , flexibly tailored to suit the demands of particular cases. Use of elders' tribunals would b e optional, bu t failure t o use them would brin g the parties into the regular court system. The courts might even provide incentives for disputants to use the elders' tribunals by, for example, increasing the penalties for those who could have but did not invoke the elders. Something simila r t o elder s tribunal s alread y exists . Perhap s the closest analogy is the community mediation centers that have sprung u p i n th e Unite d State s an d elsewher e sinc e th e 1970 s (see, e.g. , Merr y an d Milner , 1993) . I n communit y mediation , members o f th e public provide a n alternativ e t o court s b y serving as mediators for disputant s in their community who wish to reach consensua l settlements . Experienc e ha s show n tha t com munity mediation is generally liked by disputants once they try it (see, e.g., Merry and Silbey, 1984; Pearson and Thoennes, 1985). However, few disputants use it voluntarily, with the result that it usually depend s o n court s fo r cas e referrals (see , e.g., Harring ton, 1984,1985; Morrill and McKee, 1993). Moreover, from th e point of view of reducing violence, community mediation suffer s from a second limitation: it happens too late. Violence, by its nature, i s often quic k an d impulsive , an d it s prevention therefor e requires on-the-spot intervention . Similar strengths and weaknesses attach to another form of de-

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centralized dispute settlement that has been implemented in many countries i n recen t years : restorativ e justic e (see , e.g. , Wright , 1982; Wright and Galaway, 1989; Cragg, 1992). Restorative justice—also know n a s reconciliation (see , e.g., Umbreit , 1985 ) o r peacemaking (see , e.g., Pepinsk y an d Quinney , 1991)—seek s t o return conflict s t o th e partie s themselve s b y bringin g offender s and victims together (Christie , 1977) . That goal can be achieved through a variet y o f format s (Launa y an d Murray , 1989) . On e common mode l employs the services of a mediator who encourages the principals to express their feelings about the crime and to achieve som e measure o f reconciliatio n throug h th e completion of restitution , eithe r monetar y o r nonmonetar y (see , e.g. , Um breit, 1989) . A n alternativ e mode l i s the accountabilit y confer ence held when the perpetrator of a criminal offense admit s his or her guilt (Braithwait e an d Pettit, 1994) . The offender an d victim are both assisted by friends an d family members. There is no mediator, just a facilitator. The conference takes the form o f a problem-solving dialogue, focusing on the ways in which the offende r can remedy the harm he or she caused the victim. Restorative justice appears to result in high rates of offende r compliance wit h restitutio n agreement s an d t o b e well received by the general public (see , e.g., the essays in Messmer and Otto , 1992). Elders ' tribunal s woul d d o wel l t o lear n fro m it . How ever, restorativ e justic e i s no t suitabl e fo r ongoin g dispute s i n which the parties do not admit fault. It is also powerless to deal with most violence before i t is committed. In short , ther e ar e model s alread y i n existenc e o n whic h el ders' tribunals could draw. But experience with these new form s of decentralized settlement suggests that, by themselves, they are of limited us e in reducing violence. Hence, the need for th e second corps of third parties: peacemakers. Peacemakers Peacemakers woul d b e member s o f th e loca l communit y trained to intervene quickly in disputes in order to prevent them

Conclusion I 14 5

from escalatin g int o violence . Peacemaker s tak e th e currentl y popular idea of community policing (see, e.g., Greene and Mastrofski, 1988 ) a step further b y making communities, at least to some degree, self-policing. A pilot progra m o f thi s kind ha s already bee n implemente d amon g youn g peopl e i n th e Harle m section o f Ne w Yor k City , apparentl y wit h som e succes s (Canada, 1995 : 158 , 160-161) . On e o f it s creators—Geoffre y Canada—suggests expandin g th e idea nationwide . The follow ing discussio n draw s o n Canada' s proposa l bu t goe s beyon d i t in not confining i t to youth violence . Peacemakers ar e essentia l because , a s we hav e seen , violen t conflicts commonl y have short life spans, evolving quickly fro m confrontation t o assault . Successfu l peacemakin g i s therefor e frequently a rough-and-ready business, often consistin g of nothing more elaborat e tha n thir d partie s steppin g between peopl e about to come to blows or pulling them apart after the y have already done so. Simple though i t is, this third-party interventio n interrupts the escalation process. Today, the diminution of close ties means that peacemaking of this kind is less common than it once was. Increasingly, the public expects the police to preven t and break up fights. But the police are not very effective i n doing so. They typically arrive too late, after th e injury or death has already been inflicted. The problem is not so much that the police are sluggish i n responding t o calls for hel p bu t tha t citizen s ar e slow to cal l them whe n fights break ou t (Caplan , 1976 , as discussed in Manning, 1977 : 215-216). The lack o f trust that residents o f poor an d minorit y communitie s hav e in the law ofte n means tha t eve n whe n altercation s tak e plac e i n publi c befor e many witnesses nobody is prepared to summon the police. Confrontations ca n the n escalat e unde r thei r ow n momentum , fre e of externa l restrain t o r persuasion , u p t o an d eve n beyon d th e point o f lethal violence. The essenc e o f th e peacemaker s proposal , then , i s t o mak e available t o th e urba n poo r th e service s o f trustworth y thir d parties who can intervene speedil y in conflicts. Unlike most police, peacemakers would b e members of the community (o r one

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similar t o it ) an d b e familia r wit h loca l customs . O f differen t ages, they migh t b e community organizers , forme r gan g mem bers, forme r convicts , o r loca l sport s stars . The onl y qualifica tions they need ar e to b e able to command th e personal respec t of those around the m and to be committed t o resolving conflic t nonviolently. A crimina l recor d o r a violen t histor y nee d no t preclude a person's becoming a peacemaker. In fact, i t might be an advantage. Gang members, for instance, may listen to people who have never bee n in a gang, but they may well not. Peacemakers could b e advocates for nonviolence , participat ing i n community - an d school-base d violenc e preventio n pro grams (se e Unite d State s Departmen t o f Justice , 1994) . Bu t their centra l tas k woul d b e t o circulat e i n thei r communities , keeping a n ey e ou t fo r disputes . To perform tha t difficul t an d sometimes dangerou s task , peacemaker s woul d b e traine d i n how t o defus e an d mediat e conflict . The y would no t b e arme d and woul d hav e n o jurisdictio n t o imprison , punish , o r coerc e anybody (othe r tha n physicall y restrainin g hi m o r her fro m at tacking anothe r person) . They coul d wor k alon e o r i n groups , as circumstances dictate. They would patrol the community, actively seeking out conflicts likel y to explode into violence. They would han g ou t wit h gang s wh o hav e bee n attacked , fo r in stance, seekin g t o dissuad e the m fro m exactin g vengeance . Adult officer s coul d tal k t o couple s wit h domesti c problems . They would tr y to settle the dispute themselves or persuade th e principals t o appea r befor e a n elders ' cour t fo r a mor e thor ough airin g of the grievances. No doub t ther e would b e cases where the peacemakers wer e not called, where they would arriv e too late to prevent a violent altercation, o r wher e thei r attempt s t o settl e woul d fail . Bu t there woul d als o surel y b e instance s wher e thei r interventio n would make all the difference betwee n peace and violence, even between lif e an d death . Moreover, they would no t stan d alone . They would b e the first, bu t not the last, line of defense agains t violent conflict . The y woul d b e assiste d b y th e communit y el ders, for who m they would provid e a source of cases.

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Additional Issue s Many additiona l issue s would hav e to b e worked ou t befor e a system of street justice could b e implemented. On e is the relationship between stree t an d crimina l justice . There i s a contin uum o f possibilities. At one extreme, street justice could simpl y supplement th e law . Fo r example , peacemaker s migh t accom pany police on patrol, helping them do their job more effectivel y by actin g a s go-between s i n police-citizen s interaction . A t th e other extreme , street justice could replac e the law altogether s o that legal officials an d institutions would have no jurisdiction in certain communities unles s invited to do so. All solution s hav e thei r drawbacks . Th e supplementar y model run s th e ris k tha t sinc e i t change s nothing , nothin g wil l change. Street justice would, in all likelihood, be looked upon as a public relations exercis e on the part o f the police, rather tha n as a serious attempt t o put communitie s i n charge of their ow n affairs. However , th e replacemen t mode l run s th e ris k tha t th e withdrawal o f th e law—especiall y i f sudden—amon g peopl e long accustomed t o i t could increas e violent conflic t befor e th e new system established itsel f (se e Baumgartner, 1992 : 29-31). Additionally, without lega l oversight the system of street justice coul d b e ope n t o abus e o f variou s kinds . Bu t limitin g th e role o f th e la w i s no eas y task ; onc e involved , lawyer s ten d t o take ove r things. The challenge would b e to give the law a part without lettin g it dominate. How that balanc e is to be achieved is bes t worke d ou t i n practice , with differen t communitie s ex perimenting with differen t formats. 3 The sam e poin t applie s t o severa l othe r issue s (e.g. , ho w many elders should hea r cases; how conflicts between member s of different stree t justice communities should be decided). These could an d indee d shoul d b e determine d o n a trial-and-erro r basis. What works in America migh t not work in , say, Nigeria. Flexibility also extends to terminology. The terms "stree t justice," "peacemakers," "elders, " and "elders' tribunals" may not be acceptabl e t o th e peopl e fo r who m th e strateg y i s intended .

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The term s ar e jus t initia l suggestions , ope n t o revisio n an d re placement. Th e bes t peopl e t o giv e label s t o stree t official s an d institutions ar e th e peopl e affecte d an d employe d b y them . Street justic e i s not a panacea . N o matte r ho w wel l i t works , it i s likel y t o experienc e a n endurin g tensio n betwee n th e nee d to settl e case s informall y whil e stil l respectin g th e forma l right s of citizens . Moreover , imperfection s an d breakdown s are , a s i n every syste m o f justice , inevitable . Bu t goo d communicatio n among system s o f stree t justic e woul d hel p t o maximiz e succes s and minimiz e failur e ove r time . Street justic e woul d requir e money . Building s woul d hav e t o be rented , equipmen t purchased , an d salarie s paid . Thi s i s no t the plac e t o addres s th e practica l questio n o f ho w t o mee t thes e expenses. Bu t presen t arrangement s ar e themselve s costly . Vio lence deepen s division s betwee n people , creates fear , deter s pro ductive an d sociabl e activity , an d devour s larg e chunk s o f med ical an d crimina l justic e resources . B y moving fund s t o violenc e prevention, stree t justic e could , quit e conceivably , resul t i n overall savings . After all , preventing a n evi l i s typically cheape r than curin g it. Why shoul d violenc e b e any different ? Moreover , the strategy ough t t o have severa l other benefit s tha t would hav e to b e kep t i n min d i n weighin g it s desirability : • Stree t justice provides a nonrepressive means of controlling violence. Some people argu e that t o reduce violence, it is necessary t o ge t toug h o n it : hire mor e polic e officers , reduc e pro cedural protection s fo r individual s accuse d o f crime , impos e longer sentences , buil d mor e prisons , mak e parol e harde r t o obtain. These solution s rarel y work . Th e mos t sever e punishmen t of all—th e deat h penalty—ha s n o deterren t effect , a t leas t a s currently administere d (see , e.g., Paternoster , 1991 : chap. 7) . Punishing domesticall y violen t me n wit h shor t spell s i n jai l deters some from hittin g their wives, but it makes others eve n more violen t (Sherman , 1992) . Thi s i s no t t o sa y tha t mea sures take n b y polic e an d othe r crimina l justic e agencie s ar e

Conclusion I 14 9 always ineffectiv e (see , e.g. , Meare s an d Kahan , 1997) . Bu t repressive measure s ar e ultimatel y o f limite d use . As we hav e seen, muc h violenc e arise s becaus e o f hostilit y towar d th e legal system . Increasin g punishment—th e burde n o f whic h will invariabl y fal l o n th e sociall y disadvantaged—i s likel y only t o enhanc e resentmen t o f th e la w an d al l tha t i t repre sents. The outcom e ma y wel l b e more violence , not less . • Stree t justice encourages lower-status people and communitie s to find thei r own , loca l solution s t o violence . I t represent s a bottom-up rathe r tha n a top-down solution . Lik e th e ide a o f community mediation , i t shoul d appea l broadl y t o peopl e o f different politica l persuasion s (see , e.g. , Harringto n an d Merry, 1988) . • Stree t justic e create s job s i n disadvantage d neighborhoods . Moreover, th e job s i t woul d provid e ar e sociall y useful : dis pute settlemen t i s a highly valued functio n i n al l human soci eties. • Stree t justice doe s not requir e Utopia n change, be it sociologi cal (redistributin g societa l wealth ) o r psychologica l (alterin g violent personalities) . Becaus e i t draw s o n decentralizin g trends alread y i n motion, i t should b e workable . Summary Sociologists, a s sociologists , hav e n o busines s tellin g peopl e what mora l o r politica l position s the y shoul d take . Hence , thi s discussion doe s no t advocate , an d shoul d no t b e taken t o advo cate, th e implementatio n o f a syste m o f stree t justice . Ye t soci ologists wil l readil y acknowledg e tha t man y peopl e espous e th e goal o f reducin g violence . Stree t justic e i s a mean s o f realizin g that goal . Settlement decline s an d violenc e flourishes whe n thir d partie s are to o hig h o r lo w i n relativ e socia l statu s an d to o distan t rela tionally. A s thing s no w stand , man y low-statu s group s toda y correctly vie w polic e officer s an d judge s a s th e agent s o f a dis tant an d hostil e elite . A syste m o f stree t justic e woul d mak e

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available tw o type s o f thir d part y wh o ar e verticall y an d rela tionally close to disputants, and who belong to the same world. Peacemakers and elders would alte r the third-party structur e of disputes, increasing th e probabilit y o f honorabl e ye t peacefu l resolutions o f conflict . Stree t justic e woul d dra w o n existin g trends in criminal justice, bringing several developments already under wa y within a single program. Fo r that reason , stree t justice appear s t o b e a realisti c approac h t o th e proble m o f vio lence.

Explaining Violence Regardless o f whether stree t justice were to b e implemented o r effective, thir d partie s hav e implications , finally, for explainin g violence. Black' s theoretica l paradig m provide s th e mos t inte grated an d comprehensiv e treatmen t o f th e role s thir d partie s play in conflict. As we have seen, a core feature o f the paradigm is the emphasis i t places on viewing phenomena i n their wides t possible perspective. Third parties reveal why cross-cultural an d historical material s ar e not just an exotic appendage bu t a vital component o f the scientific understandin g o f violence. The Virtues of Generalit y The centra l reaso n fo r takin g cross-cultura l an d historica l data seriousl y is that the y are indispensable t o the constructio n of general theories. General theory is the ultimate goal of scientific thinking . A s Blac k (1995 : 833 ) put s it , "[S]cienc e crave s generality." Thus , biologists , a s a group, try t o understan d th e evolution o f al l living things, not jus t huma n evolution . Astro physicists address variation i n all celestial bodies, not just those in the vicinity o f th e earth . Why shoul d theorie s o f violence b e confined t o on e typ e o f society , b e they modern , historical , o r tribal? No t tha t ever y stud y o f violenc e ha s t o b e explicitl y cross-cultural. There will always be a need for detaile d analyse s

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of singl e settings . But i f the stud y o f violenc e i s to b e truly sci entific, empirical investigations must feed into a body of general theory tha t seek s to explai n violenc e wherever an d whenever i t occurs. Material fro m earlie r an d structurall y simple r societie s ha s the further advantag e o f revealing the limitations o f som e popular explanation s o f violence. Guns and media violence , for in stance, ar e wholl y absen t fro m som e societie s tha t hav e ver y high rates of violence (e.g. , the Gebusi). Similarly, the decline of religion an d th e growth o f urba n anonymit y canno t b e consid ered fundamental cause s in light of the sharp dro p in Europea n rates of violence since medieval times. Finally, ther e i s a third , mor e subtle , reaso n tha t cross-cul tural and historical data are important: without them, empirical and theoretica l scholarshi p ma y present a misleading, even distorted, picture of violence. As things now stand, the social study of violence is split into severa l strongl y demarcate d disciplines . Each disciplin e ha s it s ow n traditions , methodologies , skills , seminal works, theories, and findings. But what most defines the disciplines is that the y study violence in a particular kin d o f society. Anthropolog y concentrate s o n structurall y simpl e soci eties, histor y o n th e societie s o f th e past , sociolog y an d crimi nology o n moder n societies . Th e proble m i s tha t th e pattern s discovered b y eac h o f thes e disciplines , n o matte r ho w strong , are not necessarily found i n the other types of society. Conside r inequality, for example . Inequality is a strong predictor o f modern violence , an d i s routinely invoke d b y criminologists t o ex plain variatio n i n homicid e rates . Bu t i t doe s no t predic t vio lence in simple, preindustrial societie s (Rosenfel d an d Messner , 1991). The dynamics of inequality and violence differ i n the two types of society. The same may well be true of other factors tha t explain moder n homicide . Onl y throug h cross-cultura l inquir y can w e lear n whic h criminologica l pattern s ar e product s o f modernity an d which ar e of more general validity. If patterns o f violenc e var y acros s differen t type s o f society , then theories o f violence that ar e not cross-cultura l an d histor -

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ical i n scop e ar e likel y t o b e o f limited , thoug h unknown , ap plicability. The material discussed in chapter 2 provides a good example. Becaus e th e grea t bul k o f moder n violenc e occur s among the socially disadvantaged, most criminological theorie s are designed to explain a tight connection between violence and low social status, at least as they are currently formulate d (Tit tle, 1983) . As a result, those theories are not well positioned t o explain th e historica l an d cross-cultura l fac t o f elit e violenc e and it s gradual declin e over time. Anomie theory, for example , explains violenc e wit h a cultur e o f normlessnes s (Merton , 1940; Messne r an d Rosenfeld , 1994) . Bu t elit e violenc e ofte n enforced genera l socia l norms , an d sometime s wa s itsel f gov erned b y explicit norm s (e.g. , dueling). Strai n theor y propose s that violenc e is a response to the frustration o f blocke d oppor tunity o r othe r negativ e social-psychologica l experience s (Henry an d Short , 1954 ; Blau an d Blau , 1982 ; Agnew, 1992) . But aristocrats were not blocke d fro m gettin g ahead, an d thei r conflicts wer e negative enough to result in violence only at on e time an d no t later . Subcultura l theor y hold s tha t values pro moting th e us e of violenc e hel d b y particular (usuall y low-sta tus) group s explai n violenc e (e.g. , Miller, 1958 ; Wolfgang an d Ferracuti, 1967) . Bu t i n earlie r an d simple r societie s violenc e was found amon g all groups. Why, then, did it later become restricted to particular subcultures? Social disorganization theor y contends that violenc e is found i n communities tha t lac k inter nal solidarity as a result of poverty, heterogeneity, and mobilit y (Shaw an d McKay , 1969 ; Sampso n an d Groves , 1989) . Bu t feuding communitie s ar e typicall y culturall y homogenou s an d stable. Contro l theor y assert s tha t violenc e i s a product o f th e weak control exerted b y the self and other s when social ties attenuate (Hirschi , 1969 ; Gottfredso n an d Hirschi , 1990) . Bu t elites who feude d i n stateless agricultura l societie s belonge d t o exceptionally stron g families an d communities. Differential as sociation theor y (Sutherland , 1947 ) an d socia l learnin g theor y (see, e.g., Akers, 1985) locate the explanation o f violence in attitudes and behavio r acquire d fro m others . But they do not ex-

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plain wh y elite s n o longe r exhibi t attitude s an d behavio r con ducive to lethal violence. Few o f thes e anomalie s ar e necessaril y insurmountable . Some, perhaps all, of the theories could be modified o r extended in orde r t o explai n th e declin e o f violenc e amon g socia l elites . However, were they to do so, they would b e significantly differ ent. They would n o longer b e just theories of criminal violence. They would b e theories of violence in general. General theories are surely the way of the future. Theoretica l studies of violence other tha n Black' s have begun to addres s a n increasingly broa d rang e o f socia l contexts . Dal y an d Wilson' s (1988) evolutionar y psycholog y theory , fo r instance , draw s widely o n cross-cultura l an d historica l data . Tedesch i an d Fel son's (1994 ) social-psychologica l theor y o f aggressio n likewis e incorporates references t o material from earlie r and structurall y simpler societie s (se e als o Felso n an d Tedeschi , 1993) . I n th e years to come, this trend seem s likely to intensify . Transcending Crim e an d Devianc e General theorie s requir e genera l concepts . Becaus e th e con cept o f crime is limited t o stat e societies , it impedes the formu lation o f general theory . Realizing this, scholars hav e occasion ally sough t t o mak e criminolog y mor e universa l b y expandin g the concept of crime (see, e.g., Schwendinger and Schwendinger , 1970). Bu t thei r laudabl e effort s hav e typicall y ru n int o th e problem o f relyin g o n mora l judgement s a s to wha t shoul d b e considered crime (Lynch and Groves, 1989: 32-33). Perhaps the time ha s come , a s Blac k (1994 , 1998 ) argues , t o abando n th e concept of crime as a theoretical category altogether. (Becaus e it makes the modernist assumption that violence is not the socially approved mean s o f respondin g t o insul t o r injury , th e broade r concept o f deviance is not entirely satisfactory either. ) Not onl y is it to o narrow , i t i s also to o broad , includin g a miscellany o f behaviors tha t ar e ver y differen t fro m on e another . Crimina l homicide, for instance , encompasses actions as diverse as infan -

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ticide, lethal barroom altercations, serial slaying, killing through drunk driving , and gang feuding . Crime is , afte r all , a lega l an d administrativ e category . I t should no t b e expected t o provide a sound basi s for a scientifi c discipline. As the world come s closer togethe r an d deman d fo r global theory increases , a future generatio n o f scholar s is likely to find i t increasingl y restrictive . Th e Blackia n concep t o f con flict provide s a n alternativ e tha t bot h reflect s th e underlyin g ethnographic realities o f behavio r th e stat e define s a s crimina l and that facilitate s analysi s transcending spac e and time. If this and other general concepts are adopted, the boundaries between criminology, anthropology , history , an d othe r discipline s wil l likely withe r away , bu t th e science(s ) tha t replace s the m wil l yield a more accurate picture of the world an d a fuller explana tion o f the human experience .

Appendix A Moralistic Homicide

What percentag e o f murder s i s moralistic an d wha t percentage i s predatory? Sinc e no records ar e kept precisel y o n the point, there is no definitive answer . However, a considerable body of evidence, from America and elsewhere, indicates that in all societies for whic h we have information mos t homicides ar e moralistic. America Two larg e dat a set s sugges t tha t between 60 an d 8 0 percen t of homicide s i n th e Unite d State s ar e o f th e moralisti c variety . The first i s Maxfield' s (1989 ) analysi s o f th e circumstance s o f homicide described in the Supplementary Homicide Reports fo r 1976-1985. Th e Report s ar e produce d b y the FB I from infor mation supplie d b y loca l la w enforcemen t agencie s acros s th e nation. Maxfield calculate s that approximately 6 0 percent of all homicides ar e conflic t homicide s an d 4 0 percen t instrumenta l or, i n ou r terms , predatory . However , i t i s likel y tha t th e per centage of homicides that are moralistic in the sense used here is higher tha n 60 percen t fo r thre e reasons . First , a s Maxfiel d (1989: 691) acknowledges, there is evidence that some of the 13 percent of homicides classified b y the FBI as predatory "felony " homicides actuall y originat e i n conflict becaus e while the kille r steals fro m th e victim , he o r sh e doe s s o after, an d incidentall y to, th e killing . Second , althoug h Maxfiel d (1989 : 679) treat s 155

156 I Appendix A: Moralistic Homicide

both the 2 percent o f gang and 1 percent o f drug-related homi cides as predatory, most of these have a characteristic shared by other form s o f moralistic homicide: they ar e primarily commit ted between peopl e wit h a prio r relationshi p (se e 1989 : 678 , table 3) . Third, while Maxfield i s probably correct that most of the "unknown " (1 7 percent ) an d "othe r felony " ( 7 percent ) homicides are predatory, almost 20 percent of both are committed between people with a prior relationship, and hence at least some are likely to be moralistic. 1 The secon d sourc e o f informatio n i s th e Chicag o Homicid e Dataset. Th e datase t provide s informatio n o n al l homicides reported t o th e polic e i n tha t cit y fro m 196 5 t o th e present ; through 1993 , ther e wer e mor e tha n 22,00 0 included . Th e dataset classifie s homicide s a s instrumenta l (i.e. , committed t o acquire mone y o r property ) o r expressiv e (i.e. , committe d t o perpetrate violenc e itself) , a distinctio n tha t correspond s ap proximately t o th e predatory-moralisti c dichotomy . Th e grea t majority o f Chicag o homicide s ar e expressive . Fro m 196 5 t o 1990, onl y 1 9 percen t o f homicide s wer e instrumental . No t enough is known about an additional 1 7 percent to permit a categorization (Bloc k an d Christakos , 1995) . However, eve n if al l the unknow n homicide s wer e predatory , tha t woul d stil l mea n that 6 4 percen t (i.e. , about tw o ou t o f ever y three) o f Chicag o homicides are moralistic. Other Societie s In othe r societies , th e percentag e o f moralisti c homicid e i s usually highe r tha n i n th e Unite d States . I n Canada , o f th e 12,828 murder s know n t o polic e i n th e year s 1961-1990 , ap proximately 7 5 aros e out o f conflicts ( a percentage, it might b e noted, tha t woul d probabl y b e even highe r ha d manslaughter s been counted ) (Silverma n an d Kennedy , 1993 : 9 , 55) . Polk' s (1994) stud y o f al l homicide s committe d ove r five year s (19 8 5-19 89) i n th e Australia n stat e o f Victori a reveal s tha t about 3 ou t o f ever y 4 ar e moralisti c (calculate d fro m 1994 :

Appendix A: Moralistic Homicide I 15 7

23).2 Bohanna n (1960b : 249 ) classifie d th e motive s fo r killing , as revealed by legal records, for a sample of 10 0 homicides fro m each of two Ugandan tribes, the Gisu and the Soga, using Wolfgang's (1958 ) motiv e categories . Althoug h thes e categorie s ar e far fro m perfec t (Dal y and Wilson, 1988 : 170-174), it is significant that for the Gisu, none of the cases were clearly predatory, and fo r th e Soga , onl y 3 percent were . Studie s o f India n triba l groups find simila r patterns . Categorizin g th e motive s i n 10 0 cases tha t resulte d i n a convictio n fo r homicid e amon g th e Maria Gond , Elwin (1950 : 51) found tha t 5 arose out o f insan ity and 8 out of robbery o r robbery accusations . The remainin g 87 al l appea r t o hav e bee n moralisti c killings . A stud y o f th e Munda an d Orao n tribe s an d othe r caste s an d communitie s i n the Ranch i distric t o f Indi a report s tha t whil e th e motiv e fo r murder wa s obscur e in 1 1 percent o f the 59 8 cases, only 3 percent were clearl y predator y ( 1 percent o f case s were homicide s committed fo r gain , and a further 2 percent wer e human sacri fices) (Saran , 1974 : 70). Qualitative ethnographic evidence supports these results. The vast majority o f killings described by anthropologists aris e ou t o f dispute s ove r honor , sexua l fidelity, prior homicide s an d th e lik e (see , e.g. , Hasluck , 1954 ; Barth , 1959; Kiefer, 1972 ; Koch, 1974 ; Rosaldo, 1980 ; Boehm, 1984 ; Ginat, 1987) . Moralistic homicid e als o appear s t o hav e dominate d i n ear lier societies . Give n (1977 : 106) , i n a stud y base d o n cour t records, found tha t i n thirteenth-century Englan d o f 2,43 4 vic tims, only 9 percent were killed in robbery-murders. Analyzin g coroner's records from a century later, Hanawalt (1979 : 171) reports that 2 0 percent of all 459 homicides in Northamptonshir e and London in the years 1300-141 5 wer e robbery-murders; the remaining 8 0 percent were moralistic. Whatever th e setting, then, homicide appear s to be predominately a moralistic act .

Appendix B The Virginia Study

In 1989-199 0 I interviewed 75 people—63 me n an d 12 women—incarcerate d fo r homicid e i n th e Virgini a priso n system. The prisoners wer e servin g sentence s ranging fro m five years to death . After receivin g permission to conduct the interviews, the Department o f Correction s supplie d m e with a roster o f all people admitted t o th e syste m fo r homicid e i n 1988 , listed b y inmat e number. From the list of 20 8 numbers, I randomly dre w a sample o f 50 . When I required mor e interviews , I sampled th e re maining number s i n the sam e manner. Th e number s wer e the n grouped accordin g t o location , an d visit s t o th e site s arrange d with th e warden o f eac h facility. Eventuall y I conducted 8 3 in terviews a t fifteen sites . Eigh t o f th e interviews—typicall y among th e earlie r an d les s informativ e ones—wer e discarded , leaving a final sample of 75. At eac h correctiona l institution , I interviewed eac h o f th e prisoners i n a room, alone , typically i n th e "treatmen t center " where th e office s o f staf f psychologist s an d counselor s ar e lo cated. Twenty-two prisoner s decline d t o b e interviewed. As the study progressed , I realize d tha t man y o f th e prisoner s won dered why he or she, and not somebody else, had bee n selected . Consequently, I amended my opening statement to include a remark tha t hi s o r he r numbe r ha d bee n "draw n ou t o f a hat. " After that , fewer prisoner s refused t o participate. During th e interview , I tried t o se t the prisoner a t ease . I of 158

Appendix B: The Virginia Study I 15 9

fered cigarette s to those who smoked . I did not tape-record th e interviews becaus e I felt tha t this would inhibi t a group o f people already suspicious of outsiders. Instead, I wrote down the interviewee's response s t o a detaile d questionnaire , whil e stil l maintaining a s much ey e contact a s possible. I encouraged th e interviewee t o spea k full y abou t th e issue s raised . Lik e mos t such instruments, the questionnair e wa s designed t o ge t the interviewee accustome d t o speaking , startin g off , fo r example , with a serie s o f innocuou s question s abou t th e prisoner' s per sonal an d famil y background . Whil e a fe w interviewee s re mained suspiciou s an d reticent , the great majority wer e helpfu l and forthcoming . Th e most successfu l interview s wer e those in which th e interviewee appeare d t o relat e t o th e interview a s he or sh e would t o a counseling session . Sinc e many o f the m ha d had counselin g i n prison , the y wer e accustome d t o speakin g about thei r case s an d thei r ow n action s a t length . Interview s ranged i n duration fro m on e and a quarter hour s to more tha n four hours , with a typical interview lasting about two hours. The intervie w embrace d fou r mai n topics : (1 ) th e prisoner' s personal an d famil y background , (2 ) th e histor y an d circum stances o f th e homicide , (3 ) th e informa l respons e t o th e pris oner and the prisoner's family, and (4 ) the legal dimension of the case. At th e en d o f th e interview , I asked eac h whethe r h e o r sh e would agree to my contacting a family member to get his or her perspective o n the issues discussed i n the interview. Fift y o f th e 75 defendants i n the sample agreed. Of these, it was possible t o contact 4 0 by telephone. In two of those cases I conducted sep arate interview s wit h tw o famil y members , bringin g th e tota l number o f telephone interview s to 42. The shortest o f these interviews wa s fifteen minutes ; th e longes t wa s tw o an d a hal f hours. To roun d ou t m y information , I als o conducte d in-depth , open-ended interview s wit h thre e homicid e detective s an d a homicide prosecutor i n Richmond, the state capital. The final phase of the research consisted of reading each pris-

160 I Appendix B: The Virginia Study

oner's Pre-Sentence Investigation Report. The report is typically compiled b y a probation office r an d i s part o f th e documenta tion use d in sentencing. I was able to obtain the reports o n fifty of th e prisoners . I n th e grea t majorit y o f cases , the repor t cor roborated th e prisoner' s accoun t o f th e killing , althoug h ther e were several instances where it differed .

Appendix C

The Cross-Cultural Study

My cross-cultura l stud y explore d th e respons e t o homicide i n thirt y societies . Anthropologist s specializin g i n cross-cultural studie s hav e devise d severa l standar d sample s o f societies for us e by researchers. One o f these is the Human Re lations Are a File s Qualit y Contro l Sampl e (QCS) . The QC S is based o n th e sixt y cultura l group s distinguishe d b y Georg e P. Murdock, th e founder o f the Human Relation s Area Files, a set of dat a files containin g informatio n fro m a larg e numbe r o f preindustrial societies , arrange d b y topic . Th e cultura l group ings cover the entire world and are primarily based on linguistic criteria (se e Naroll, 1967 ; Human Relation s Area Files , 1967). Shortly befor e I undertook m y study (fo r a doctoral degree) , Donald Blac k an d M . P . Baumgartner ha d explore d th e possi bility o f conductin g a worl d surve y o f socia l control . T o tha t end, they had draw n a sample of sixty societies by adapting th e QCS. Blac k an d Baumgartne r selecte d fro m eac h o f th e sixt y cultural groups the society that had the best information o n social control. On the advice of Black (wh o supervised m y dissertation), I decided to select every second societ y in the Black an d Baumgartner sample , beginnin g wit h a rando m start . Wher e I encountered a societ y fo r whic h th e informatio n o n th e socia l control o f homicide was insufficient, I substituted anothe r soci ety fro m th e sam e cultura l group . I f n o societ y i n tha t grou p yielded goo d information , I selected a society fro m a neighbor ing cultural group. (Th e societies are listed below. ) 161

162 I Appendix C: The Cross-Cultural Study

Unlike mos t cross-cultura l studies , Blac k an d Baumgartner' s did no t propos e simpl y t o compar e on e societ y t o another . Because the response to any act of deviance often varies significantl y within the same society, the study sought information o n the handling o f case s withi n te n relationship s withi n eac h society . I adopted th e sam e principl e fo r m y study . Th e te n relationship s were child-parent , parent-child , husband-wife , wife-husband , male acquaintances , femal e acquaintances , master-subordinate , subordinate-master, brothers, strangers, and local-alien. Thus, the study focused on variation at the case, as well as the societal, level. For eac h societ y I rea d th e origina l ethnographi c material . Using primaril y nomina l an d ordinal-leve l variables , I coded a considerable amount of information o n a variety of subjects, including aspect s o f th e society' s socia l structur e (e.g. , typ e o f economy, populatio n density , family form , homicid e rate) , an d for eac h of the ten relationships, the characteristics o f the killer and victi m an d th e relationshi p betwee n them , th e circum stances of the killing, third parties and their status and relation ship vis-a-vis the principals, and th e behaviora l respons e to th e killing. The object was to code the typical response to a typical homicide in the relationship concerned . I obtained adequat e informatio n o n ninety o f the three hun dred possibl e case s (thirt y societie s b y te n relationships) . Th e smallest number of cases yielded by any one society was one and the greates t wa s eight . Th e mos t commo n relationshi p code d was a killing between male acquaintances, in part because I used this relationship (typicall y the one that in most societies attract s the mos t homicide ) a s the defaul t relationshi p whe n non e wa s specified b y the writer. For thre e societie s (Tiv , Maria Gond , an d thirteenth-centur y England) th e dat a wer e derive d fro m archiva l studie s o f cour t records of homicide cases. Since only some homicides result in a court case , the informatio n fo r thes e societie s i s necessarily in complete. However , becaus e th e cour t record s ofte n provid e a good dea l o f informatio n abou t th e killing , thes e studie s ar e valuable in shedding light on homicide in the three societies.

Appendix C: The Cross-Cultural Study I 16 3

For th e remainin g societies , th e informatio n cam e fro m ethnographic investigation s conducte d b y anthropologist s an d some others (e.g. , missionaries). As with al l cross-cultural stud ies, the informatio n obtaine d i s of variabl e quality . In som e instances, th e anthropologis t carefull y compile s informatio n o n all homicides committed, discusse s their outcom e in detail, an d generally provides much high-quality information (see , e.g., Lee, 1979). At the other extreme, the information consist s primaril y of rule statements abou t wha t shoul d happe n whe n a homicide occurs. Sinc e rule s an d behavio r d o no t necessaril y match , in formation o f thi s kin d i s o f uncertai n validit y (fo r a thoroug h discussion o f thes e issues , see Ember e t al. , 1991) . Most o f th e information obtaine d fell between these extremes. It was neither as rich and detailed as one would hope nor as incomplete as one might fear . Societies Ju/'hoansi Plateau Tong a Lugbara Ashanti Tallensi Tiv Nuer Somalia Bedouin England Albania Turkey Manchu Chin a (wit h particular referenc e to Kwantung an d Fukien ) Korea 190 Tibet 193

Approximate Time Period 1935-1970 1940 1900 1900 1910

1950 1935 1955 1950 1200-1300 1900

1950 1890

0

0

164 I Appendix C: The Cross-Cultural Study

Albania Turkey Maria Gon d Ifugao Murngin

Jale

Yapese Samoa Eskimos Tlingit Cheyenne Chiapas, Mexico Jivaro Qolla Ona Shavante Yanomamao

1900 1950 1930 1910 1930 1955-1965 1880 1925 1955 1880 1840-1860 i960 1970 1970 1870 i960 1970

Notes

NOTES T O CHAPTE R I

i. I n th e interes t o f confidentiality , name s o f th e participant s i n al l o f the case s narrate d i n th e first-person singula r i n thi s boo k hav e bee n changed.

NOTES T O CHAPTE R 2

i. A n earlie r versio n o f thi s chapter appeare d i n Coone y (1997b) . 2. Som e scholar s argu e tha t elite s toda y d o perpetrat e homicide , bu t because o f thei r socia l status , it i s not define d an d treate d a s "homicide. " An example woul d b e the deat h an d injur y resultin g fro m industria l activ ities (e.g., unsafe working conditions). However, while industrial death an d injury i s a n importan t phenomeno n worth y o f seriou s study , i t i s suffi ciently differen t fro m deat h an d injur y arisin g fro m interpersona l violenc e as t o deman d separat e treatment . I t i s no t "violence " i n th e sens e o f ag gression, an d thi s boo k doe s no t addres s i t further . 3. Whethe r incom e inequality o r poverty bette r predicts homicide rate s is a questio n muc h addresse d i n th e researc h literature . Bu t th e questio n may not warrant th e effort pu t into it. First, focusing o n income diverts at tention awa y fro m wealth , which , o f th e two , i s usuall y mor e unequall y distributed (see , e.g., Wolff, 1995 : 27) and henc e may well b e a better pre dictor o f homicid e tha n eithe r incom e inequalit y o r poverty . Second , in come inequalit y an d povert y ar e har d t o disentangle . Fo r on e thing , the y are ofte n to o highl y correlate d t o b e statisticall y separate d (Lan d e t al. , 1990). More fundamentally, povert y is nearly always a relative rather tha n an absolut e concept . Fo r instance , moder n definition s o f poverty—typi cally base d o n governmenta l criteria—ar e founde d o n people' s inabilit y t o

165

166 I Notes to Chapter 2 attain a n incom e leve l enjoyed b y some . "Poverty " i n thi s sens e is really a more diffus e kin d o f inequality . 4. A t th e aggregat e level , th e percentag e o f th e populatio n tha t i s un employed often prove s to be statistically insignificant i n multivariate analy ses (Land et al., 1990: 928-930). However, the unemployed ar e usually defined a s members o f the labor forc e seekin g work, a definition tha t usuall y excludes thos e who hav e given u p seekin g work an d thu s hav e the longes t history o f joblessness , precisel y th e mos t theoreticall y relevan t group . Using the alternative measur e o f the proportion o f individual s age d fifteen to sixty-fou r wh o ar e employed , Shihade h an d Flyn n (1996 ) foun d tha t black unemploymen t i s negatively relate d t o blac k urba n homicide . Residential segregatio n i s another aggregat e measur e o f marginality . I n the United States , the residentia l isolatio n o f black s fro m white s increase s rates o f blac k homicid e (Shihade h an d Flynn , 1996 ; se e als o Parke r an d McCall, 1997 ; Peterson an d Krivo , 1993) . 5. Landa u an d Drapki n (1968 : 76 ) foun d tha t 7 0 percen t o f person s accused o f homicid e i n Israel , 1 9 50-1964, ha d no t complete d primar y school. However , the y d o no t repor t th e educationa l leve l o f th e genera l population. 6. Not e tha t i f predator y killing s coul d b e exclude d fro m th e calcula tions, the percentage of offenders wit h criminal records would probabl y b e lower an d th e percentage o f victim s would probabl y b e higher . 7. Brownfiel d (1986 ) finds tha t i n two self-repor t studie s o f nonlethal , juvenile violence , lower-statu s youth s ar e mor e violen t onl y unde r som e measures o f statu s (e.g. , unemploye d father , parent s receivin g welfare) . Note, though , tha t becaus e virtuall y al l youth s hav e on e o f th e attribute s of low status—marginality—a weake r lin k betwee n violence and th e othe r characteristics o f low status is to be expected fo r teenager s than fo r adults . 8. I n th e stateles s internationa l realm , th e highest-statu s nation s ar e most heavil y involve d i n warfare (Singe r an d Small , 1972 : 287) . 9. Anothe r differenc e betwee n homicide in modern state s and other societies may lie in what Blac k (1976 ; 1995 ) would cal l its vertical direction . In premoder n societies , downwar d homicid e (i.e. , committe d b y higher status peopl e agains t lower-statu s people ) seem s t o hav e bee n mor e com mon than upwar d homicide . In modern society , by contrast, upward homi cide appear s t o b e more frequent . Conside r th e United States , where non Latino whites are, in general, of higher status than Latin o whites or blacks . Block (1986 : 60), for example , reports that in Chicago, 1965-1982 , black white assaul t (i.e. , conflict-related ) homicid e wa s thre e time s mor e com -

Notes to Chapter 3 I 16 7 mon tha n white-blac k assaul t homicide . Similarly , Latino-whit e assaul t homicide occurre d twic e a s frequentl y a s white-Latin o assaul t homicid e (1986: 60) . 10. Th e statu s o f lega l official s doe s no t deriv e wholl y fro m th e state , however. Police officers an d judges also brin g their ow n statu s characteris tics t o thei r office . Thus , moder n elite s ma y b e highe r i n persona l statu s than loca l police and judges and henc e slow to brin g cases to them (Baum gartner, 1985) . But other lega l avenues typically remain ope n to them, an d consequently the y d o not rejec t lega l authority . 11. Elia s ([1939 ] 1978 , [1939 ] 1982 ) provide s anothe r possibl e expla nation o f why elite s today reac t t o conflic t les s violently tha n thos e befor e them, arguing that sinc e medieval times the growth o f the state and the development o f longe r chain s o f interdependenc e hav e increase d self-con straint and reduced violence. This long-term process begins among the elite and fro m ther e filters dow n t o th e rest o f th e population . Elias's theor y explain s th e gradua l descen t o f homicid e dow n throug h the socia l hierarchy . However , i t doe s not , a t leas t withou t furthe r elabo ration, explai n severa l o f th e pattern s (e.g. , th e clos e lin k betwee n homi cide rate s an d th e fou r dimension s o f statu s inequality) . Moreover , i t re quires evidence on self-constraint , evidenc e that is difficult t o obtai n a t th e best o f times , but especiall y difficul t fo r earlie r societies .

NOTES T O CHAPTE R 3

i. Som e materia l fro m thi s chapte r wa s previousl y publishe d i n Cooney (1997a) . 2. Othe r scholar s hav e argue d tha t althoug h th e stat e ma y reduc e homicide interna l t o a society , i t increase s th e scal e o f externa l warfare , with th e overal l resul t tha t peopl e ar e mor e likel y t o di e violently unde r a state tha n i n it s absenc e (see , e.g. , Lee , 1979 : 397-399) . Thi s argumen t raises issues beyon d th e scope of the present book . I t appears, however, t o be inconsistent wit h th e evidenc e (Cooney , 1997a) . 3. A criticism onc e mad e o f th e dat a o n whic h thes e studie s ar e base d is that the y rarel y consis t o f firsthand evidenc e an d henc e reflec t mor e th e widespread fea r o f violence i n preindustrial societie s than it s actual occur rence (Gluckman , 1969 : chap . 1 ; Hoebel , 1971 ; Moore , 1972 ; Colson , 1974: 40-43) . However , mor e recen t an d rigorou s evidence , suc h a s vio lent-mortality statistic s an d pe r capit a rate s o f letha l violence , indicate s

168 I Notes to Chapter 3 that violenc e occurs , sometime s a t extremel y hig h levels , in a t leas t som e stateless societie s (see , e.g., Lee , 1979 ; Yost, 1981 ; Knauft, 1985) . 4. Som e o f th e letha l violenc e reduce d b y colonia l state s wa s no t "homicide" a s define d her e bu t warfar e betwee n independen t communi ties. 5. A secon d facto r i s sedentarizatio n (see , e.g. , Furer-Haimendorf , 1967: 22). Sedentarization i s fateful becaus e it undermines on e of the prin cipal peacekeepin g mechanism s i n hunter-gathere r society , namely , avoid ance o r th e abilit y o f peopl e t o mov e awa y fro m on e anothe r i n time s o f conflict (Black , 1993a : 82-83) . 6. A relate d poin t i s that preindustria l peopl e wh o com e int o contac t with, bu t d o no t fal l unde r th e jurisdictio n of , stat e societie s ma y experi ence increased interna l violenc e caused b y resource depletio n an d inequal ity base d o n unequa l acces s t o ne w good s (Bennet t Ross , 1984 ; Ferguso n and Whitehead , 1992 ; Ferguson, 1995) . 7. Not e tha t unlik e th e compariso n betwee n stateles s an d noncentral ized state societies, the comparison betwee n noncentralized an d centralize d states is not strongl y affecte d b y differences i n medical resources. In highly centralized regimes , medical care, and adequat e food, clothing , and shelte r are ofte n deliberatel y withhel d fro m group s deeme d t o b e enemie s o f th e state. For example, in Cambodia unde r th e Khmer Roug e government, fo r a docto r t o practic e medicin e amon g th e genera l populatio n o r eve n t o admit tha t h e o r sh e ha d don e s o unde r th e previou s regim e wa s t o invit e almost certai n death , mos t likel y afte r prolonge d tortur e (see , e.g., Ngor , 1987). Indeed , i n som e cases , th e bes t know n o f whic h i s the Naz i geno cide of th e Jews, centralized state s have employed medica l knowledg e an d personnel t o facilitat e thei r mas s killin g (see , e.g. , Lifton , 1986) . Th e ab sence o f medica l car e fo r victim s o f homicid e unde r moder n centralize d regimes should b e seen, therefore, no t s o much a confounding facto r a s a n indicator o f th e violent inclination s o f th e state . 8. Th e statistic s o n whic h Rumme l relie s are inexact. Thus, some writ ers, drawin g o n newl y availabl e material , argu e tha t th e scal e o f stat e re pression an d killin g unde r th e Sovie t regim e ha s bee n considerabl y exag gerated (Wheatcroft , 1992 ; Nove, 1993,1994). Even if this criticism is correct, however , i t i s clea r tha t highl y centralize d societies , o f whic h th e Soviet Union i s but on e example, are characterized b y rates o f stat e killin g that greatl y excee d thos e foun d i n more democrati c regimes . 9. Sociall y disadvantage d group s hav e variabl e homicid e rate s amon g themselves. For instance, American Indian s have a lower rate than Africa n

Notes to Chapter 4 I 16 9 Americans. Perhaps some of this is due to differences i n local hierarchy an d settlement withi n thes e groups .

NOTES T O CHAPTE R 4

i. Al l parties involve d i n this case were Africa n Americans . 2. Th e approach know n a s network analysi s als o addresses how varia tion i n socia l tie s explain s behavior . Fo r a n introductio n t o th e networ k analysis o f crime , see Krohn (1986). 3. Fo r a n applicatio n o f th e theor y t o issue s o f evidenc e i n lega l con flict, se e Cooney (1994) . 4. Blac k (1976 : 93 ) treat s organizationa l distanc e hierarchically , a s a difference i n status . B y contrast, I treat i t here a s a lateral difference . Thi s allows me to explai n partisanshi p amon g organization s a t th e sam e statu s level. 5. Ther e i s n o agreed-upo n definitio n o f gang s i n th e scholarl y litera ture. Fo r a n overvie w o f th e issues , se e Bursi k an d Grasmick , 1993 : 114-123).

6. On e commo n wa y o f limitin g violenc e i n thes e societie s i s tha t groups expe l an y membe r wh o commit s the m t o conflic t to o frequentl y (Moore, 1972 : 89) . 7. Knauf t (1987 ) argue s tha t th e Gebus i provid e a n exceptio n t o fra ternal interes t grou p theory. But, consistent wit h th e theory, the Gebus i d o not feu d an d d o no t kil l on e anothe r i n interpersona l conflic t (Knauft , 1987: 471-473) . Th e Gebus i cas e suggest s tha t th e executio n o f witche s raises som e separat e issues . 8. A t firs t glance , Lee' s (1979 : 392 ) statemen t tha t fiftee n o f twenty two Ju/'hoans i homicide s occurre d a s part s o f feud s seem s t o contradic t the argument. However , most o f these "feuds " involve d a single act of retaliation fo r a n earlie r killing (1979 : 383). One conflict di d generate nin e killings, bu t mos t o f thes e aros e ou t o f faile d attempt s t o kil l a danger ous kille r rathe r tha n a tit-for-ta t exchang e o f homicid e (1979 : 390 39i)9. Eve n th e Ju/'hoansi rat e seem s hig h compare d t o moder n homicid e rates. Bu t recall th e cautio n note d i n th e previou s chapter : becaus e o f dif ferences i n medicin e an d technology , considerabl e cautio n mus t b e exer cised in comparing homicid e rates in modern an d premodern societie s (se e also Cooney , 1997a) .

170 I Notes to Chapter 5 10. Waoran i kinship classification i s known a s Dravidian classificatio n (see Kessing, 1975 : 105-112) . 11. Thir d partie s wit h tie s t o bot h side s ma y explai n a n interestin g finding i n the literature o n modern American homicide : that homicides be tween intimate s hav e fewe r witnesse s tha n thos e betwee n acquaintance s and stranger s (Zah n an d Sagi , 1987 : 389-390 ; Decker , 1993 : 605 , 607) . When intimate s hav e conflicts , th e probabilit y tha t thei r supporter s wil l have ties to the other sid e are high. These supporters ar e likely to interven e to sto p th e conflict . Intimat e homicid e occurs , then , whe n other s ar e no t present. O n th e othe r hand , whe n mor e distan t peopl e hav e conflicts , an y third partie s present ar e likely to be either distant from both , in which cas e they remai n neutra l a s the parties fight, o r t o hav e tie s to on e sid e only, in which case their suppor t tend s to encourage escalation . Homicide betwee n acquaintances an d stranger s i s therefor e mor e likel y t o tak e plac e i n th e presence o f others . 12. Othe r studie s o f America n homicid e repor t somewha t highe r per centages o f co-offenders . Thus , Block' s stud y o f Chicag o homicid e indi cates that 2 7 percent of cases involved co-offenders (calculate d fro m 1986 : 47, table 2 ) and a study o f murder case s in thirty-three randoml y sample d large urba n countie s foun d tha t 3 3 percen t involve d mor e tha n on e of fender (Dawso n an d Bolan d 1993 : 3, table 3) . Perhaps urba n homicid e i n the United State s is more collective . 13. Sinc e lega l official s ar e employee s o f th e state , they typicall y hav e distant organizationa l ties .

NOTES T O CHAPTE R 5

i . Th e element of public display in honor culture s is also evident in the considerable car e an d attentio n me n i n honor culture s devot e to thei r per sonal appearance . Honorabl e me n ar e ofte n dandie s wit h a highl y devel oped aestheti c o f th e self. 2. America n criminologist s hav e lon g bee n intereste d i n whethe r th e South has a culture of honor that can help to explain the region's high homicide rate. The empirica l evidenc e i s mixed (see , e.g., Stack , 1996) . Perhap s the South is too divers e a social unit to harbor a single cultural trait . Wor k that focuse s o n specifi c group s within th e South—especiall y rura l whites — appears t o b e mor e successfu l i n isolatin g a culture o f hono r (Nisbet t an d Cohen, 1996) , though, again , the data ar e not conclusiv e (Beck , 1996) .

Notes to Chapter 6 I 17 1 3. Hono r ca n sometime s hav e spillove r effect s a s well . Maintainin g a reputation fo r toughnes s ofte n lie s behin d predator y violenc e committe d by those who belon g to a culture o f hono r (see , e.g., Shakur , 1993 : 13). 4. Stabilit y and intimacy, though often foun d together , are distinct. Ties can b e stabl e bu t distan t (as , fo r instance , whe n tw o enem y group s wit h very little contact reside long-term in the same location), and fluid bu t close (as, for example , when highl y communa l nomadi c group s fission an d fus e regularly). 5. Nisbet t an d Cohe n (1996 ) argu e tha t hono r thrive s i n herdin g economies. While their argumen t ha s substance, it does not explai n hono r among Europea n aristocrat s whos e wealt h derive d fro m agricultura l es tates. 6. Hono r ca n in principle also arise in opposition t o the intervention o f nonlegal o r informa l thir d parties . However , informa l thir d partie s rarel y exhibit th e sam e degre e o f socia l distanc e an d statu s superiorit y o r inferi ority a s lega l official s an d henc e d o no t typicall y caus e a s muc h conflic t with disputants . Consequently , th e literatur e o n hono r tend s t o emphasiz e the struggle betwee n honor an d la w rather tha n hono r an d authorit y mor e generally. 7. Th e author s include d tw o othe r group s i n th e survey : Asian s an d non-West India n nonwhites . The y foun d tha t thes e group s wer e als o les s willing t o cooperat e wit h th e polic e tha n whites , althoug h th e difference s were les s marked tha n wit h Wes t Indians . 8. On e reaso n i s tha t th e clos e an d distan t tie s tha t underli e feudin g also appea r t o b e conduciv e t o persisten t an d hostil e litigatio n (Black , 1976). I f thi s i s correct, la w an d feudin g hav e differen t third-part y statu s characteristics bu t simila r third-part y relationa l an d organizationa l char acteristics. Hence, some degree of overlap between law and violence can be expected.

NOTES T O CHAPTE R 6

i. Ther e is, however, some evidence on the effects o f partisan interven tion by a third party on behalf o f a principal who enjoys lower social stand ing or possesses fewer socia l resources. Third-party suppor t i n favor o f th e lower-status principa l appear s t o discourag e th e higher-statu s principa l from engagin g i n violenc e bu t ma y encourag e th e weake r principa l t o d o so. A recent survey of the preindustrial literatur e o n marital conflict argue s

172 I Notes to Appendix A that marriage s i n which th e woman ca n cal l o n supporter s experienc e les s male-on-female violenc e tha n thos e i n which sh e is isolated (Baumgartner , 1993). Data o n sibling conflict suggest s that when parents punish the olde r and mor e dominan t chil d (an d thereb y sid e wit h hi s o r he r younge r sib ling), this increases th e overal l leve l o f aggressio n betwee n th e childre n b y emboldening th e younger chil d (Felson , 1983 ; Felson an d Russo , 1988) . 2. I n explorin g third-part y effects , attentio n should , i n addition , b e given t o th e possibilit y o f nonlinearity . Homicid e rates , a s w e hav e seen , are subjec t t o extrem e fluctuations . Acros s differen t societies , the y ca n range fro m nea r zer o to mor e tha n 1,00 0 pe r 100,00 0 (an d eve n higher i n the shor t term) . Behind extremel y hig h rate s o f homicid e ma y li e compar atively smal l changes i n third-party conditions . 3. Th e point at which a particular community comes to rest on the supplement-replacement continuu m wil l als o depend , i n part , o n wher e i t stands on another issue : how it organizes the system of street justice. A system o f stree t justic e coul d b e organize d a s a stand-alon e reform . Tha t is , peacemakers an d elder s coul d b e recruite d fro m th e loca l community , trained, an d employe d t o work amon g their peers. Alternatively, street justice coul d for m par t o f a large r packag e o f lega l an d socia l changes , suc h as Black's (1989 : chap. 3 ) intriguing ide a o f lega l cooperatives .

NOTES T O APPENDI XA

i. However , Maxfiel d treat s th e 1 5 percen t o f homicide s classifie d a s "other" a s conflict homicides . Since 1 2 percent o f these are committed be tween stranger s an d a furthe r 1 6 percent betwee n peopl e o f unknow n re lationship, this categor y i s likely to contai n som e predatory homicides . 2. Fo r purpose s o f thi s calculation , th e followin g categorie s i n Pol k (1994: 23, table 1 ) were treated a s nonmoralistic: "victim s of parental sui cide," "neonaticides, " "homicide s originating in other crimes," "victim s of mass killers," "specia l cases," and "merc y killings." There are 10 2 cases of this kind, constituting 26. 8 percent o f the total number , o r 28. 5 percen t o f the total know n cases .

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. 1989 . Violent offender s an d thei r victims . In Mediation and criminal justice: Victims, offenders and community, edite d by Martin Wrigh t and Bur t Galaway , 99-112 . London : Sage . United Nations . 1996 . Demographic yearbook, 1994. Ne w York : Unite d Nations. United State s Departmen t o f Justice. 1994 . Partnerships against violence: Promising programs resource guide, vol . 1 . Washington, D.C. : U.S. Department o f Justice. Unnithan, N . Prabha , Li n Huff-Corzine , Ja y Corzine , an d Hug h P . Witt . 1994. The currents of lethal violence: An integrated model of suicide and homicide. Albany : Stat e University o f New Yor k Press . Vandal, Gilles . 1991 . "Bloody Caddo" : White violenc e agains t black s in a Louisiana parish , 1865-1876. Journal of Social History 25:373-388 . van de n Steenhoven , Geert . 1962 . Leadership an d la w among the Eskimo s of th e Keewatin District , Northwes t Territories . Ph.D . diss., Universit y of Leiden . Vigil, James Diego. 1988 . Barrio gangs: Street life and identity in southern California. Austin : University o f Texa s Press . Waegel, William B . 1981 . Case routinizatio n i n investigativ e polic e work . Social Problems 28:263-275 . Waldron, Jarlath . 1992 . Maamtrasna: The murders and the mystery. Dublin: Edmund Burke . Wallace, Alison . 1986 . Homicide: The social reality. Sydney : Ne w Sout h Wales Bureau o f Crim e Statistic s an d Research . Wallace-Hadrill, J. M . 1959 . The bloodfeu d o f th e Franks . Journal of the John Rylands Library 41:459-487 . Waller, Altina L . 1988 . Feud: Hatfields, McCoys, and social change in Appalachia, 1860-1900. Chape l Hill : University o f North Carolin a Press . Warner, W . Lloyd . 1958 . A black civilization: A social study of an Australian tribe. Revise d ed . New York : Harper an d Brothers . Wheatcroft, Stephe n G. 1992 . More light on the scale of repression and excess mortalit y i n th e Sovie t Unio n i n th e 1930s . Soviet Studies 42:355-367. Wilbanks, William. 1984 . Murder in Miami: An analysis of homicide patterns and trends in Dade County (Miami), Florida, 1917-1983. Lan ham, Md. : University Pres s of America . Williams, Jack K . 1980 . Dueling in the old South: Vignettes of social history. Colleg e Station : Texas A6cM University Press . Williams, Kirk R. , an d Rober t L . Flewelling. 1988 . The socia l productio n

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Author Inde x Abbott, Jack Henry , 121 , 173 Agnew, Robert, 152 , 17 3 Akers, Ronald L. , 152 , 17 3 Albrecht, Sta n L. , 125 , 17 3 Amis, Martin, 118 , 17 3 Anderson, Elijah , 64-65 , 115 , 17 3 Anonymous, 28 , 17 3 Australian Burea u o f Statistics , 25 , 26, 173 Ayers, Edward L. , 18 , 43, 109, 114 , 118,173 Bachman, Ronet , 28 , 17 3 Baldus, David C , 9 , 17 3 Baldwin, James, 124 , 17 3 Balikci, Asen, 89 , 17 4 Barth, Frederik, 109 , 111 , 157, 17 4 Barton, Ro y Franklin , 32 , 81, 174 Baumgartner, M . R , 11 , 12, 23, 41-42, 59, 64 , 69 , 101-103 , 120 , 121 , 127, 139, 141 , 142, 147 , 161-162 , i67n . 10, i72n . 1 , 174 , 17 5 Beck, E. M., 37 , i7on . 2 , 174 , 19 2 Beckerman, Stephen , 54 , 17 4 Bennett Ross , Jane, i68n . 6 , 17 4 Berger, Brigitte, 113 , 114 , 17 4 Berger, Peter, 113 , 114, 17 4 Bernard, Thomas J., 14 , 17 4 Billings, Dwight B. , 33, 37, 131 , 175 Billson, Janet Mancini , 79 , 117 , 18 5 Bing, Leon, y6, 79, 17 4 Black, Donald, 3 , 6, 8-14 , 23 , 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 38, 39, 40, 41, 52 , 56, 59, 64, 68 , 69-72, 74, 75, 81, 84, 90, 97, 99, 104 , 1 1 3 , 120 , 1 2 1 , 1 2 3 , 1 2 5 ,

126, 127 , 135, 136, 137, 141 , 142, 150, 153 , 161-162, i66n . 9 , i68n . 5 , 169m 4 , 17m . 8 , 172 m 3 , 174-17 5 Black-Michaud, Jacob, 18 , 80, 17 5 Blau, Judith R. , 16 , 152 , 17 5 Blau, Peter M. , 16 , 152 , 17 5 Blee, Katherine M. , 33 , 37, 131 , 175 Block, Carolyn Rebecca , 5 , 16, 156, i66n. 9 , i67n . 9 , i7on . 12 , 175-17 6 Block, Richard , 16 , 17 6 Bodley, John H. , 54 , 17 6 Boehm, Christopher , 18 , 53 , 80, 81, 109, n o , 112 , 157 , 17 6 Bohannan, Paul , 15 , 16 , 157 , 17 6 Boland, Barbara , i7on . 12 , 17 8 Bordua, Davi d J., 29 , 183-18 4 Borg, Marian, 12 , 17 6 Bos well, Terry, 57 , 17 6 Bourdieu, Pierre , 113 , 17 6 Bourgois, Philippe, 4 1, 176 Bradley, Candace , 163 , 17 9 Braithwaite, John, 144 , 17 6 Brearly, H. C , 16 , 17 6 Breault, Kevi n D. , 24 , 26 , 28 , 18 4 Brownfield, David , i66n . 7 , 17 6 Brundage, W. Fitzhugh, 37 , 17 6 Bureau o f th e Census , 29 , 61 , 176 Bursik, Rober t J., i69n . 5 , 17 6 Burton, Michae l L. , 163 , 17 9 Butterfield, Fox , 18 , 113 , 121 , 176 Caldeira, Gregor y A. , 127 , 18 0 Canada, Geoffrey , 18 , 24, 68 , 114 , 115, 116 , 117 , 123 , 124 , 125-126 ,

145, *77

195

196 I Author Index Cannavale, Frank J. Jr., 123 , 17 7 Caplan, G. , 145 , 17 7 Carneiro, Rober t L. , 47, 17 7 Carter, Davi d L. , 125 , 17 7 Cerda, Luis , 18 , 76, 18 7 Chagnon, Napoleon , 18 , 53 , 97, 109 , 177 Christakos, Antigone, 5 , 156 , 17 5 Christie, Nils, 127 , 144 , 17 7 Clay, Henry, 3 6 Cohen, Dov , 121 , 122, i7on . 2 , 17m . 5, 18 8 Cohen, Lawrenc e E. , 6 , 16 , 26, 28, 165m 3 , i66n. 4 , 18 4 Colson, Elizabeth , 90, i67n . 3 , 17 7 Cooney, Mark, 10 , 19 , 30, 31 , 120, 165m 1 , 167ml . 1 , 2, 169ml . 3 , 9, 177 Cooper, Matthew, 53 , 18 9 Corzine, Jay, 16 , 26, 19 3 Courtwright, Davi d T. , 27 , 113 , 17 7 Cragg, Wesley, 144 , 17 7 Daly, Martin, 17 , 31, 79, 88 , 114 , 117 , 137, 153 , 157, 178 , 19 4 Danzig, Richard, 142 , 17 8 Davis, Robert C , 123 , 17 8 Dawson, John M. , 170 m 12 , 17 8 Decker, Scott , 3 , 15 , 18, 77, 78, 79, 82 , i7on. 11 , 178 Dentan, Rober t K. , 49 , 178 , 18 9 Dietz, Mary Lorenz , 4 , 17 8 Dixon, William J., 57 , 17 6 Donaldson, Greg , 116 , 120 , 125 , 17 8 Donne, John, 133 , 17 8 Donziger, Steve n R. , 29 , 17 8 Draper, Patricia , 55 , 17 8 Drapkin, Israel , 7 , 15 , 27, 28 , i66n . 5 , 184 Durham, Mar y E. , 111 , 178 Durkheim, Emile , 52 , 56 , 17 8 Ekland-Olson, Sheldon , 72-73 , 17 9 Elias, Norbert, 10 , 42, 52 , ^9, 167 m 1 1 , 17 9

Ellickson, Rober t C , 139 , 17 9

Elwin, Verrier, 157 , 17 9 Ember, Caro l R. , 47 , 52 , 163 , 17 9 Ember, Melvin, 47 , 52 , 17 9 Ericksen, Kare n Paige , 81 , 88, 17 9 Evans-Pritchard, E . E., 18 , 9 1, 109, n o , 17 9 Falcon, William D. , 123 , 17 7 Federal Burea u o f Investigation , 27 , 30 , 155, *79 Feeley, Malcolm M. , 126 , 17 9 Felson, Richard B. , 4, 7, 17 , 103 , 116 , 153, 172 m 1 , 179-180 , 19 2 Ferguson, R . Brian , i68n . 6 , 18 0 Ferracuti, Franco, 24 , 152 , 19 4 Flanagan, Timoth y J., 125 , 18 5 Flewelling, Rober t L. , 16 , 100 , 19 3 Flynn, Nicole, 27 , i66n . 4 , 19 0 Fox, Robin, 9 1 , 18 0 Freedman, Maurice , 80-81 , 18 0 Fried, Morton H. , 32 , 18 0 Friedrich, Paul , 93, 18 0 Furer-Haimendorf, Christop h von , i68n. 5 , 18 0 Galaway, Burt , 144 , 19 4 Garcia, Carole , 18 , 76, 18 7 Garcia, Robert , 18 , j6, 18 7 Gelles, Richard J., 103 , 104, 18 0 Gibson, James L. , 127 , 18 0 Gilsenan, Michael , i n , 18 0 Ginat, Joseph, 157 , 18 1 Given, James B. , 15, 33, 100, 157 , 18 1 Gluckman, Max , 9 1 , 167m 3 , 18 1 Goetting, Ann, 15 , 24, 27 , 18 1 Gottfredson, Michae l R. , 152 , 18 1 Graham, Michae l H. , 123 , 18 1 Grasmick, Harol d G. , 169 m 5 , 17 6 Gray, Jeremy, 124 , 19 1 Green, Edward, 25 , 30, 18 1 Green, Miles, 125 , 17 3 Greenberg, James B. , 93, 18 1 Greene, Jack R. , 145 , 18 1 Gronfors, Martti , 127 , 18 1 Groves, W. Byron, 152 , 153 , 185 , 19 0 Gurr, Ted Robert, 16 , 99, 18 1

Author Index I 19 7 Hagedorn, John M. , 18 , 77, 82 , 18 1 Hallpike, C . R. , 18 , 32, 97, 18 1 Hanawalt, Barbar a A. , 157 , 18 1 Harner, Michae l J., 52 , 80 , 109 , 111, 181

Harrington, Christin e B. , 143, 149, 181-182

Hart, C.W . M. , 52,89 , 18 2 Hasluck, Margaret , 32 , 80 , 109 , 111, 128, 157 , 18 2 Hawkins, Darnell , 64 , 18 2 Heider, Karl , 53 , 18 2 Henry, Andrew E , 16 , 152 , 18 2 Hepburn, John R. , 7 , 18 2 Hirschi, Travis, 137 , 152 , 181 , 182 Hobbes, Thomas, 40, 47-48, 50 , 54 , 58, 66 , 18 2 Hoebel, E . Adamson, 49 , 60 , i67n . 3 , 182, 18 5 Hofer, Han s Von , 28 , 29, 18 2 Horowitz, Ruth , 18 , 76, 77, 78, 113, 1 1 5 , 18 2

Horton, Heather , 81 , 88, 17 9 Horwitz, Alla n V. , 10 , 12 , 39, 9 1, 18 2 Howell, Signe , 50 , 18 2 Huff-Corzine, Lin , 16 , 26, 19 3 Human Relation s Are a Files , 161 , 182 International Labo r Office , 26 , 18 2 Irwin, John, 72 , 18 3 Jacobs, James B. , 72, 18 3 James, Oliver , 26 , 18 3 Just, Peter , 91, 183 Kahan, Da n M. , 149 , 18 6 Kang, Ga y Elizabeth , 9 1 , 183 Katz, Jack, 4 , 17 , 18 3 Keiser, R. Lincoln , 94-95 , 18 3 Kellner, Hansfried , 113 , 114, 17 4 Kelly, James, 18 , 35, 36, 18 3 Kennedy, Leslie , 2 , 15 , 24, 27 , 28 , 156 , 190 Kessing, Roger M. , i7on . 10 , 18 3 Kiefer, Thoma s M. , 18 , 81, 109, 112 , 129-130, 157 , 18 3

Kiernan, V. G., 18 , 34, 35 , 111 , 113, 123,183 Kinkead, Gwen , 129 , 18 3 Kleck, Gary , 29 , 77, 183-18 4 Klein, Malcolm, 18 , 75, 76, 82 , 84 , 183,186 Knauft, Bruce , 3 , 13 , 16, 18 , 53-54 , 97, i68n . 3 , 169 m 7 , 183-18 4 Koch, Klaus-Friedrich , 18 , 51 , 80, 157 , 184 Kposowa, Augustin e J., 24 , 26 , 28, 18 4 Krivo, Lauren J., i66n . 4 , 18 8 Kroeber, Theodora , 54 , 18 4 Krohn, Marvi n D. , 137 , 169 m 2 , 18 4 Kropotkin, Peter , 48, 184-18 5 Kunreuther, Frances , 123 , 17 8 Land, Kennet h C. , 6 , 16 , 26, 28, 165 m 3, i66n . 4 , 18 4 Landau, Simh a E , 7 , 15 , 27, 28 , i66n . 5,184 Lane, Roger, 26 , 100 , 18 4 Launay, Gilles , 144 , 18 4 Lee, Richard B. , 18, 46, 48, 55 , 89, 163, 167 m 2 , i68n . 3 , 169 m 8 , 18 5 Levi, Ken, 4, 17 , 116 , 18 5 Lewis, I. M., 97 , 129 , 18 5 Lifton, Rober t Jay, i68n . 7 , 18 5 Lindholm, Charles , 32 , 80 , 109 , 18 5 Lizarralde, Roberto , 54 , 17 4 Llewellyn, Karl N., 49, 60 , 18 5 Lowie, Robert H. , 109 , 18 5 Luckenbill, David E , 7 , 17 , 96, 103 , 116, 117 , 18 5 Lundsgaarde, Henr y P. , 15, 119, 18 5 Lynch, Michael J., 153 , 18 5 Mackellar, E Landis , 2 , 185-18 6 Maguire, Kathleen , 125 , 18 5 Majors, Richard , 79 , 117 , 18 5 Mann, Corama e Richey , 15 , 18 5 Manning, Pete r K. , 145 , 18 5 Marshall, Joseph, Jr., 125 , 18 5 Martinez, Ramiro , Jr., 28 , 18 6 Mastrofski, Stephe n D. , 145 , 18 1 Masumura, Wilfre d T , 51 , 186

198 I

Author Index

Maxfield, Michae l G. , 155-156 , i72n . 1, 18 6 Maxson, Chery l L. , 76, 183 , 18 6 McBarnet, Doreen , 126 , 18 6 McCall, Nathan, 118 , 18 6 McCall, Patricia, 6 , 16 , 26, 28, i65n . 3, i66n . 4 , 184 , 18 8 McGrath, Roge r D. , 18 , 109 , n o , 128 , 186 McKay, Henry D. , 120 , 152 , 19 0 McKee, Cindy , 143 , 18 7 McNight, David , 9 1 , 18 6 Meares, Tracey, 149 , 18 6 Meggitt, Mervyn , 80 , 83 , 18 6 Meier, Robert E , 30 , 19 2 Merry, Sall y Engle, 143 , 149 , 182 , 18 6 Merton, Rober t K. , 135 , 152 , 18 6 Messmer, Heinz , 144 , 18 7 Messner, Steven E, 51 , 151, 152, 186 , 189 Middleton, John, 52 , 79, 98, 18 7 Miller, Walter B. , 152, 18 7 Miller, William Ian , 3 , 109 , 18 7 Milner, Neal , 143 , 18 6 Moore, Joan W , 18 , 76, 18 7 Moore, Sall y Falk, i67n . 3 , i69n . 6 , 187 Morrill, Calvin , 12 , 139 , 143 , 18 7 Mukherjee, Satyansh u K. , 137 , 19 4 Muller, Edward N. , 57 , 18 6 Murphy, Rober t E , 91 , 188 Murray, Peter , 144 , 18 4 Nader, Laura , 93-94, 18 7 Naeshagen, Ferdinan d Linthoe , 99, 187 Naroll, Raoul , 161 , 187 Nash, June, 93, 18 7 Nettler, 28 , 18 8 Ngor, Haing , i68n . 7 , 18 8 Nisbett, Richar d E. , 121 , 122, i7on . 2 , 17m. 5 , 18 8 Nove, Alec, i68n . 8 , 18 8 Oliver, William, 17 , 116 , 18 8 Osterberg, Eva , 99, 18 8

Otterbein, Charlott e Swanson , 51 , 81, 188 Otterbein, Keit h E , 51 , 57, 81, 188 Otto, Hans-Uwe, 144 , 18 7 Parker, Karen E , i66n . 4 , 18 8 Pastore, Ann L. , 125 , 18 5 Paternoster, Raymond , 148 , 18 8 Pearson, Jessica, 143 , 18 8 Pepinsky, Harold E. , 144 , 18 9 Peters, E. L., 81,98 , 18 8 Peterson, Rut h D. , i66n . 4 , 18 8 Pettit, Philip, 144 , 17 6 Pilling, Arnold R. , 52 , 89, 182 , 18 8 Pitt-Rivers, Julian, 18 , 109 , 113 , 122, 123, 18 9 Polk, Kenneth, 17 , 24, 114 , 117 , 156 , i72n. 2 , 18 9 Porter, Bruce , 72, 18 9 Pulaski, Charle s A. , Jr., 9, 17 3 Quinney, Richar d X , 144 , 18 8 Reiss, Albert J., Jr., 28 , 52 , 77, 18 9 Ribner, Stephe n A. , 7 , 18 0 Richmond Times-Dispatch, 8 6 Robarchek, Carol e J., 49 , 60 , 62, 92-93, 18 9 Robarchek, Clayto n A. , 49, 60 , 62 , 92-93, 18 9 Rodman, Margaret , 52 , 18 9 Romanucci-Ross, Lola , 93, 18 9 Rosaldo, Renato, 81 , 157, 18 9 Rosenfeld, Richard , 51 , 151, 152, 187 , 189 Ross, Marc Howard , 51 , 81, 9 1, 163, 179,189 Ross, Susan, 103 , 19 2 Roth, Jeffrey A. , 28 , 52 , 77, 18 9 Ruggiero, Guido , 33 , 18 9 Rummel, R . J., 56 , 57 , 58 , i68n . 3 , 189-190 Runnymede Trus t an d Radica l Statis tics Race Group , 124 , 19 0 Russell, Victor, 123 , 17 8 Russett, Bruce , 52 , 17 9

Author Index Russo, Natalie, 17 , i72n . 1 , 18 0 Sagi, Philip C , 17cm . 11 , 194 Sampson, Rober t J., 152 , 19 0 Sanders, William B. , 76, 19 0 Saran, A. B., 157, 19 0 Schwartz, Lol a Romanucci , 93 , 19 0 Schwendinger, Herman , 153 , 19 0 Schwendinger, Julia, 153 , 19 0 Senechal d e la Roche, Roberta, 12-13 , 4 3 , 9 1 , 19 0 Shakur, Sanyika , 18 , 71, 76, 79, 95, 96, 125 , 130 , 17m . 3 , 19 0 Shaw, Clifford R. , 120 , 152 , 19 0 Sheley, Joseph E , 77 , 19 0 Sherman, Lawrenc e W.,41 , 148 , 19 0 Shihadeh, Edwar d S. , 27 , i66n . 4 , 19 0 Short, James E , Jr., 16 , 152 , 18 2 Siegel, Merryl S. , 7, 18 0 Silberman, Matthew , 121 , 190 Silbey, Susan, 143 , 18 6 Silverman, Robert , 2 , 15 , 24, 27 , 28, 156, 19 0 Simon, David , 123 , 19 1 Singer, J. David , i66n . 8 , 19 1 Singh, Gopa l K. , 24 , 26, 18 4 Small, Melvin, i66n . 8 , 19 1 Smith, Douglas A. , 30 , 19 2 Smith, J. David, 124 , 19 1 Sodergen, John A. , 51 , 184 Sorenson, E . Richard, 52 , 53 , 19 1 Spierenburg, Pieter , 99, 19 1 Stack, Stephen , i7on . 2 , 19 1 Statistics Canada , 27 , 19 1 Steadman, Henr y J., 7 , 17 , 116 , 18 0 Stewart, Frank , 108 , 19 1 Stirling, Paul, 9 1, 191 Stone, Lawrence, 18 , 33, 34, 43, 99, 100, 1 0 1 , n o , 19 1

Strang, Heather, 2 , 26, 27 , 28, 29, 19 1 Straus, Murray A. , 104 , 18 0 Sutherland, Edwin , 152 , 19 1 Suttles, Gerald D. , 116 , 19 1 Tedeschi, James X, 17 , 153 , 180, 19 1 Thoden, Va n Velzen, H. U . E, 81 , 191 Thoennes, Nancy, 143 , 18 8

I

19 9

Thomas, Elizabeth Marshall , 56 , 19 2 Thrasher, Frederi c M. , 18 , 75, 78, 192

Tilly, Charles, 52 , 19 2 Tittle, Charles R. , 30 , 152 , 19 2 Tolnay, Stewart E. , 37 , 19 2 Tout, T. E, 33 , 19 2 Toy, Calvin, j6, 19 2 Trench, Charle s Chenevix , 35 , 19 2 Tucker, James, 12 , 103 , 19 2 Turnbull, Coli n M. , 3 , 49, 19 2 Umbreit, Mark , 144 , 19 2 United Nations , 3 , 19 3 United State s Department o f Justice, 146, 19 3 Unnithan, N . Prabha , 16 , 26 , 19 3 Valencia, Frank, 18 , 76, 18 7 Vandal, Gilles , 37, 19 3 van De n Steenhoven , Geert , 9 1 , 193 Van Wetering, W, 81 , 191 Van Winkle, Barrik, 3 , 18 , 77, 78, 79, 82, 137 , 178 , 19 4 Vigil, James Diego , 76, 19 3 Villemez, Wayne J., 30 , 19 2 Waegel, William B. , 123, 19 3 Wakefield, Russel l P. , 25, 30, 18 1 Waldron, Jarlath, 128 , 19 3 Wallace, Alison, 15 , 25, 26, 29 , 19 3 Wallace-Hadrill, J. M., 33 , 19 3 Waller, Altina L. , 37 , 19 3 Warner, W Lloyd , 89 , 19 3 Wheatcroft, Stephe n G. , i68n . 8 , 193 Wheeler, Lonnie , 125 , 18 5 Whitehead, Nei l L. , i68n . 6 , 18 0 Wilbanks, William, 15 , 19 3 Williams, Jack K. , 18 , 36, n o , 112 , 193 Williams, Kirk R. , 16 , 100 , 19 3 Willis, Roy, 50 , 18 2 Wilson, Margo , 17 , 31, 79, 88 , 114 , " 7 > i37 > 153 , 157, 178 , 19 4 Witt, Hug h P. , 16,26, 19 3

200 I

Author Index

Wittfogel, Kar l A., 56 , 19 4 Wolff, Edwar d N. , 16$n. 3 , 19 4 Wolfgang, Marvi n E. , 2 , 14 , 15 , 24, 29, 114 , 152 , 157 , 19 4 Woodburn, James, 88 , 89, 19 4 Woodworth, George , 9, 17 3 Wright, Christine , 26 , 29 , 19 4 Wright, James D. , 77, 19 0 Wright, Martin , 144 , 19 4

Wyatt-Brown, Bertram , 18 , 36, 113, 194 Yanagishita, Machiko , 2 , 185-18 6 Yost, James A., 61 , i68n. 3 , 19 4 Zahn, Margare t A. , i7on . 11 , 194 Zimmerann, H . G. , 28 , 19 4 Zimring, Frankli n E. , 137 , 19 4

Subject Inde x Aborigines, 27-28 , 89 , 9 1 Adjudication, 39 , 5 1 Africa, 15 , 16 , 15 7 African-Americans, 37 , 139 , i69n . 1 ; and homicide , 27 , 28 , i66n . 4 , i66-i6yn. 9 , 168-16911. 9; an d honor, 115 , 116-117 , 118 ; and in formal settlement , 64-65 ; and law , 9,123-127 Age: and homicide , 2 , 27; and honor , 114,115 Agricultural societies , 79, 88 , 152 , 17m. 5 Albania, 32 , 80 , 109 , n o , i n , 128 , 163 Alcohol, 14 , 56 , 77-78, 11 3 American Indians , 28 , 168-169 m 9 . See also Cheyenn e Indians ; Plain s Indians Appalachia, 33 , 37 Arbitration, 7 , 51 , 59 Aristocrats, 42-43, 141 , 152; an d honor, n o , 111 , 113, 114, 118 , 122-123, 17in . 5 ; and law , 122-123; a n d partisanship , 100-101; an d violence , 18 , 33-36 . See also Brawling ; Dueling; Elites; Violence Ashanti, 16 3 Asia, 5 8 Assault, 13 , 24, -/6, 94, 137 , 145 , i66n. 7 . See also Brawling ; Domes tic violence; Nonlethal violenc e Audiences, 17 , 112 , 115-117 . See also Bystanders; Witnesse s

Australia, 15 , 24-25, 26 , 27-28, 29 , 89,91,156 Author's homicid e studies . See Crosscultural homicid e stud y (author's) ; Virginia homicid e stud y (author's ) Avoidance, 11 , 12, 39, 68 , 88, i68n . 5 Baltimore, 12 3 Banishment, 60 , 87 , i69n . 6 Bedouin, 81 , 98, 16 3 Benton, Thomas Hart , 3 6 Berkeley, Lord, 10 1 Black an d Baumgartner' s theor y o f th e third party , 8 , 1 1 Black's theoretical paradigm , 8-14 , 17 , 20-21, 137 ; and generality , 10 , 150 ; concept o f socia l status , 23-2 4 Black's theor y of : conflic t management , 8, 14 ; law, 8 , 9-10, 40 ; moralism , 11, 38-39 , 104 , 141 ; partisanship, 11, 14 , 69-72, 74 , 84 , 90, 99, 105 , 135; self-help , 11 , 14, 72, 74, 84 , 120

Botswana, 18 , 55 , 8 8 Brawling, 33-34 , 10 1 Brazil, 18 , 10 9 Brooklyn, 12 3 Burma, 5 8 Bystanders, 6 , 17 , 20, 75, 85. See also Audiences; Witnesse s Caddo Paris h (Louisiana) , 3 7 California, 96, 116 Cambodia, 58 , i68n . 7 Canada, 15 , 24, 26 , 27, 28 , 29, 15 6

201

202 I Subject Index Centralization, 51 , 57-58, i68nn . 7 , 8 Cheyenne Indians , 49-50, 59 , 60, 164 . See also America n Indians ; Plain s Indians Chiapas, Mexico, 16 4 Chicago, 16 , 18 , 124 , 156 , 166-167ml . 9, i7on . 1 2 China, 58 , 8 0 Clay, Henry, 3 6 Collective liability . See Liability, collec tive Collective violence, 12,1 3 College students , 77 , 13 9 Compensation, 32 , 87 , 88 , 142-143 , 144 Conflict, 136-137 , 138 ; and cross-cut ting ties, 89-98; among gangs, 75; and nonpartisanship , 89-106 ; partisanship, 7, 68-89 ; seriousness of , and violence , 5-6 ; an d thir d parties , 7-8, 133 , 140-150, and third-part y social status , 15 , 16, 23, 37-44, 45-66, 140-141 ; and third-part y so cial ties, 67-106, 141-142 . See_also Domestic violence; Dueling; Feuding; Homicide; Law; Peace; Peacemaking; Settlement; Vengeance; Violence Conflict management , 64 , 139 ; Black's theory of , 8 , 14 ; elementary form s of, 1 0 - n ; nonviolent , 139 ; studies of, 12 . See also Conflic t Conventionality. See Cultural statu s Courts, 4 1, 55, 82, 123 , 126, 14 3 Coworkers, 6 Crime: concept of , 153-15 4 Criminal history . See Normative statu s Criminal homicide . See Homicid e Criminal violence . See Violence Cross-cultural homicid e stud y (au thor's), 19-20 , 87-88 , 91-92 , 97-98; methodology , 161-16 4 Cross-cutting ties , 89-98 ; in moder n societies, 95-96; in preindustrial so cieties, 90-9 5 Cultural distance , 71 , 135 Cultural minorities . See Minoritie s

Cultural status , 9, 24 , 27-28 , 39 , 40, 131. See also Minoritie s Cyrenaica, 81 , 98 Darwin, Charles , 1 7 Data o n violence : anthropological , 138, i67~i68n . 3 ; official, 13-14 , 30-31, 13 8 Denmark, 2 4 Detroit, 15 , 27, 12 4 Disputants. See Homicide offenders ; Homicide victims ; Principal Partie s Disraeli, Benjamin, 3 5 Domestic violence , 12 , 31, 37, 4 1, 49, 103-104, 136 , 137 , 148 , 171-172 ^ 1

Dou Donggo , 9 1 "Dozens, the," 11 7 Drugs, 14,77-78 , 15 6 Dueling, 34-36 , 101 , 143, 152; AngloIrish, 35 ; European, 18 , 34, 44, 111, 123; lethality of , 36 ; North Ameri can, 18 , 44; southern, 36 , 11 2 Durkheim, Emile , 1 0 Economic status , 24-26 , 39 , 40, 72 . See also Inequality ; Povert y Ecuador, 61 , 92, 10 9 Educational attainment , 27 , 102 , 124 , 125, 127 , 128 , i66n . 5 Elders, 55 , 142-144 , 146 , 147 , 150 , i72n. 3 Elites, 122 , 152-153 ; and law , 126-127; and violence , 23 , 30-38, 42-44, 100-101 , 134-135, 152-153, 167ml . 10 , 11 . See also Aristocrats England: medieval/earl y modern , 15 , 18, 33-34 , 35 , 99, 100 , i n , 157 , 162, 163 ; modern, 2 , 24 , 77, 100 , 124, 140 , 17m . 7 Eskimos, 88 , 9 1, 164 Europe, 16 , 18 , 99, 151 ; medieval/early modern, 34 , 42-43, 44, 99, n o , i n , 113 , 134; modern, 57-58 , 12 7 Execution, 12 , 56-5 8

Subject Index I 20 3 Family members , 6 , 42, 59 , 64, 68 , 80, 85, 86 , 109 , i n , 128 , 137 , 139 , 140, 152 . See also Domesti c violence; Kinship Feuding, 7 , 18 , 36, 44, 51 , 52, 61, 70, 73, 83 , i n, 114 , 127 , 129 , 136 , 138, 152 , 154 ; absence o f i n Virgini a study, 85-87 ; elite, 32-33; gang, 72, 75-76, 154 ; and litigation , 17m . 8 ; preindustrial, 19 , 79-82, 87-89 , i69n. 8 ; theories of , 81-82 . See also Homicide; Vengeance; Violence Finland, 24 , 12 7 Fore, 5 3 France, 2 , 34 , 7 7 Frank, Lunatic , 96 Fraternal interes t grou p theory , 81 , 82, i69n. 7 Friends, 6 , 7, 59 , 64, 80 , 84 , 86 , 87 , 140. See also Third partie s Gangs, 7, 19 , 70, 72, 79, 87 , 125 , 146 , 154, 156 , i69n . 5 ; cross-cutting tie s among, 95-96 ; homicide rate s of , 2-3, 76-77 ; prison, 30 , 71, 72-73; street, 18 , 30, 74-79, 82 . See also Organized group s Gebusi, 3 , 53~54 ? 55 ? I 5 I 5 ^ n . 7 Gender: an d homicide , 2 , 15 , 17, 31; and honor , 11 5 Genocide, 12 . See also Executio n Germany, 2 , 28 , 57-5 8 Gisu, 15 7 Guns, 13 , 14, 77, 86-87 , 94? I 5 I - See also Weapon s Gypsies, 12 7 Hadza, 8 8 Handel, Georg e Frederick , 35 , 11 1 Harlem, 124 , 14 5 Headman, 59-60 , 6 2 Holland, ^ Homicide, 2 , 13-14 , 57 , 94, 123 , 127-130, 153 , 167m 11 ; and African-Americans, 27 , 28, i66n . 4 , 166-167m 9 , 168-169 m 9 ; and age ,

2, 27 ; as conflict, 17-19 ; and cul tural status , 27-28 ; data on , 13-14 , 138; and economi c status , 24-26 ; and educationa l attainment , 27 , i66n. 5 ; and gender , 2 , 15 , 17 , 31; and honor , 117 , 118-119 ; amon g hunter-gatherers, 88-89 ; and in equality, 16 , 26, 151 , i65~i66n. 3 ; and absenc e o f informa l settlement , 60-62, 64-66 ; and marita l status , 26-27; an d minorities , 2 , 25-26 , 27-28, 56 , 72; proportion tha t i s moralistic, 5 , 155-157 , 172ml . 1 , 2; and normativ e statu s (respectabil ity), 28-29 ; and organizationa l sta tus, 29-30 ; within organize d crime , 31, 37 ; patterns of , 14-15 ; predatory, 4, 155-157 , i66n . 6 , 172ml . 1 ; prison, 72-73 ; and radia l status , 26-27, i66n . 4 ; and relationa l dis tance o f principals , 137 , 170n.11; and socia l status , 2 , 15 , 23-37, 40 , 42-44, 134-135 ? i52.-i53 > 16711 . 11, 168-169 m 9 ; and statelessness , 40-41, 42-43 , 45-56; studies of , 14-19; an d third-part y socia l status , 16, 37-44 ? 134-135 ; and third party socia l ties, 67-106 ; and unem ployment, 26 , i66n . 4 . See also Feuding; Homicide offenders ; Homicide rates ; Homicide statistics ; Homicide victims ; Vengeance Homicide offender s 15 , 24, 30 , 31 , 32, 56, 73 ? 75? 85 ? 199; ag e of, 2 , 27 , 43; cultura l statu s of , 27-28 ; economic statu s of , 2 , 24-26 ; educa tional attainmen t of , 27 , 43; gender of, 2 , 15 , 31; marital statu s of , 26-27; multiple , 100 , 170 m 12 ; normative statu s of , 28-29 , 43; organizational statu s of , 29-30 ; among organize d criminals , 31 ; police, 31; purposes of , 16-17 ; radia l status of , 26-27 , 43; unemploymen t among, 26 , 43. See also Principa l parties

204 I

Subject Index

Homicide rates , 2-3 , 7, 50 , 64, 58 , 86, 93, i 6 8 - i 6 9 n . 9 , i69n . 9 , i7on . 2 , i72n. 2 ; of America n minorit y groups, 26 , 139 ; of Cheyenn e Indi ans, 49-50; o f gan g members, 2-3 , 75-77; o f Gebusi , 3 , 53-54 ; withi n Israel, 7 ; of Ju/'hoansi, 89 , 169 m 9 ; long-term declin e of , 16 , 99, 151 ; of Mexican villages , 93-94; o f Murn gin, 89 ; predictors of , 6 , 16 , 26, 27, 28. 151 , i65~i66n. 3 , i66n . 4 ; studies of , 15-16 ; of th e Unite d States, 2 Homicide statistics : validity of , 3 0 Homicide victims , 15 , 24, 30-31 , 56 , 75, 85 , 119 : age of, 27 , 43; cultural status of , 27-28 , 43; economic sta tus of , 2 , 24-26 , 43 ; educational at tainment of , 27 ; marital statu s of , 26-27; multiple , 100 ; normative sta tus of , 28-29 , 43? organizationa l status of , 29-30 ; radial statu s of , 26-27, 43 ; unemployment among , 26, 43. See also Principa l partie s Honor, 16 , 17 , 18 , 19 , 39, 42, 47, 64 , 86, 103 , 107-132, 137 , 141 , 157, 170m 2 ; absence of , i n suburbia , 121; an d African-Americans , 115 , 116-117, 118 ; and age , 114 , 115 ; and aristocrats , n o , i n , 113 , 114, 118, 122-123 , 17m . 5 ; and audi ences, 112 , 115-117 ; a s bravery , 108-109, 131 ; classical, 108-113 ; culture of , 109 , n o , 112 , 113 , 115, 116, 117 , 120 , 137 , 141 , i7on. 2 , 17m. 3 ; and dignity , 114 , 131 ; and disrespect, 113 , 118 ; and gangs , 75; and gender , 115 ; and herding , 17in . 5; homicides, 117 , 118-119 ; an d hunter-gatherers, 121 ; and insult , 109, n o , i n , 112-113 , 119 , 131, 141; an d law , 122-132 , 17m . 6 ; modern, 113-119 ; as a moral sys tem, 109 , 131 ; and passion , 113 , 117; an d persona l aesthetics , 170 m 1; and predation , 17in . 3 ; in prison ,

121; an d reputation , 115 , 131 ; and social status , 114-115 , 120 , 122-123, I 3 I 5 societies , 109-110 ; and stabl e socia l ties, 11-12 , 119-121; an d statelessness , 121, 122-132; an d apparen t trivialit y o f conflicts, i n , 117-119 , 131 ; and verbal aggression , 112 , 116-117 , 131 Houston, 15 , 11 8 Hunters an d gatherers , 88 , 89 , 121, i68n. 5 Iceland, 3 , 10 9 Ifugao, 81 , 164 Ilongot, 8 1 Immobility, 120 , 15 2 India, 15 7 Indonesia, 58 , 91 Inequality, 16 , 26, 151 , i65~i66n. 3 Infanticide, 4 , 153-15 4 Informal settlement . See Settlement, in formal Integration. See Radial statu s Interdependence, 52 , 80, 167 m 1 1 Intimacy. See Relational distanc e Ireland, 2 , 35 , 9 1, i n, 12 8 Israel, 7, 15 , 28, i66n . 5 Italy, 24 , 3 4 Jackson, Andrew , 3 6 Jale, 80 , 16 4 Japan, 58,77 , 14 0 Jivaro, 80 , 109 , i n , 16 4 Judges, 6 , 9, 11 , 39, 62 , 63, 127, 149 , 167m 10 . See also Lega l officials ; Settlement agent s Ju/'hoansi, 18 , 46, 48-49, 55-56 , 88 , 89, 162 , 169ml . 8 , 9; homicide cas e described, 45-46 . Killers. See Homicide offenders ; Princi pal partie s Kinship, 79-80 , 87-89 , 90-91 , 93 , 95, 97-98, 170 m 10 . See also Famil y Members Korea, 58 , 16 3

Subject Index I !Kung San. See Ju/'hoansi Latinos, 28 , 125 , 139 , i 6 6 - i 6 7 n . 9 Law, 59 , 63, 141, 148, i69n . 3 , 17m . 8; availability of , 11 , 16, 31 , 39-41 , 43, 65 , 134-135 ; Black's theory of , 8, 9-10, 40 ; and honor , 122-132 , 17in. 6 ; hostility t o i n Unite d States, 86 , 124-127 , 149 ; hostility to i n othe r societies , 127-129 , 149 ; manipulation of , 129-132 ; an d street justice , 147-148 ; and vio lence, 8 , 11 , 50, 62-66, 149 , 17m . 8. See also Courts ; Judges; Lawyers; Legal officials ; Prosecutors ; State ; Statelessness Lawyers, 9, 39 , 102 , 123 , 127 . See also Legal official s Lebanon, 11 1 Legal officials , 6 , 7-8 , 16 , 23, 39-40 , 4J> 43 , 53 > 55> ^5* 86 , 104 , 122 , 123, 124-129 , 147 , i67n . 10 , i7on . 13, 17m . 6 . See also Judges; Lawyers; Police; Prosecutor s Legal settlement . See Settlement, infor mal an d lega l compare d Lermontov, Mikhail , Iurevich , 3 5 Lethal assault . See Homicid e Lethal conflict . See Homicid e Lethal vengeance . See Homicide ; Vengeance Lethal violence . See Homicid e Liability, collective , 75-7 6 London, 124 , 15 7 Los Angeles, 18 , y6, 79 , 84 , 95-96, 124

Lugbara, 79 , 98, 16 3 Lynching, 12 , 36-37 , 4 3 Mae Enga , 80 , 82-8 3 Magistrate, 6 2 Malaya, 49 , 63 , 92 Manchu China , 16 3 Manslaughter, 4- 5 Marginality. See Radial statu s Maria Gond , 157 , 162 , 16 3

20 5

Marital status , 26-27 , 3 9 Marriage. See Marital statu s Mbuti Pygmies , 3 Mediation, 7 , 59-60 , 61 , 65, 143 , 144 , 146, 14 9 Mediators, 11 , 38, 9 1 Medicine, 13 , 50, 53 , i68n. 7 Mexico, 24 , 93, 16 4 Miami, 1 5 Milwaukee, 1 8 Minorities: an d homicide , 2 , 25-26 , 27-28, 56 , 72; and law , 40, 123-129, 145 ; and violence , 40 , 139,145 Modernization, 94-95 , 99-10 1 Montenegro, 81 , n o, 11 2 Moralism, n , 38-39 , 104-105 , 14 1 Moralistic violence . See Violence, a s morality Munda, 15 7 Murder. See Homicid e Murngin, 89 , 16 4 Negotiation, n , 3 9 Neighbors, 6 , 59 , 64, 68 , 9 1, 10 1 New Guinea , 3 , 18 , 32, 53 , 80, 8 2 New Sout h Wales , 15 , 25 New York , 18 , 25, 68, 101 , 116, 120 , 123, 124 , 125 , 126 , 129 , 14 5 Nigeria, 14 7 Nonlethal violence , 13 , 85, 136 , 137 . See also Assaul t Nonpartisanship, 68 ; cold, 70 , 72, 96, 99, 101 , 103; and thir d part y socia l ties, 89-106 , 170 m 11 ; and vio lence, 103-104 ; warm, 70 , 72, 9 0 Nonviolence. See Peace Normative status , 9, 24 , 28-29 , 39 , 40, 131, 14 6 North America , 16 , 18 , 49. See also Canada; United State s Northumberland, ear l of , 10 1 Norway, 9 9 Nuer, 18 , 9 1, 109, n o , 16 3 Oaxaca, 9 3

20 6 I Subject Index O'Connell, Daniel , 35-3 6 "Old head, " 65 , 14 2 Ona, 16 4 Onlookers. See Bystander s Oraon, 15 7 Organizational distance , 71 , 73, 78-79, 80 , 82 , 105 , i69n . 4 , i7on . 13. See also Third-party organiza tional distanc e Organizational status , 9, 24 , 29-30 , 3 9 Organized groups , 30 , 72, 73, 81, 87, 88, 89 , 105 . See also Kinship ; Gang s Pakistan, 32 , 80 , 94-95, 109 , 11 1 Partisans, 11 , 59, 68, 71, 9 1, 100, 102 , 103, i7on . 1 1 Partisanship, 7 , 69, 79, 82 , 84 , 87 , 100, 101 , 105, I 7 i - i 7 2 n . 1 ; Black's theory of , 11 , 14, 69-72 , 74 , 84 , 90, 99, 105 , 135 ; and conflict , 7 , 68-89 , i7on. 11 ; and kinship , 79-80 ; i n preindustrial societies , 100 ; strong, 70, 74 ; in suburbia, 102 ; and third party cultura l distance , 71 , 135; and third-party organizationa l distance , 72-73, 73-89 , 105-106 , 135 ; and third-party relationa l distance , 69-89, 105-106 , 135 ; and third party socia l status , 135 ; and thir d party socia l ties, 68-69 , i7on . 1 1 Peace, 11 , 20, 44, 48, 60, 61 , 64, 83, 90, 92 , 98, 99, 101-103 , 116 , 137 , 140, 14 6 Peacemakers, 7-8 , 20 , 70, 91, 133, 142, 144-146 , 147 , 150 , i72n . 3 Peacemaking, 61 , 70, 14 4 Peru, 10 9 Philadelphia, 15 , 24, 29 , 12 4 Philippines, 18 , 81, 112, 12 9 Plains Indians, 109 . See also America n Indians; Cheyenne Indian s Plateau Tonga , 16 3 Poindexter, George , 3 6 Police, 6 , 7, 20 , 30 , 31, 39, 4 1, 63, 94, 102, 122 , 123 , 124-129 , 145 , 147 , 148-149, 167 m 10 , 17m . 7

Poverty, 2 , 26, 40, 124 , 152 , i6$-i66n. 3 . See also Economi c sta tus; Inequality; Socia l statu s Predatory violence , 4-5, 137 , 172 m 1 Preindustrial societies , 48, 52 , 54 , 79-82, 87 , 88 , 90, 9 1, 92, 93, 94, 95, 98 , 100 , 138 , 151-152 , i 6 7 - i 6 8 n . 3 , i68n . 6 Principal parties , 20 , 69 , 70, 71, 74, 87, 97, 98, 99, 106 , 135 ; and law , 9 , 131; socia l characteristics of , 6 , 24 , 104, 125-126 , 137 , 170 m 11 ; effect of thir d partie s on , 7-8 , 38-39 , 59 , 63, 91 , 96, 116 , 121 , 137, 140-142 , 143, 144 . See also Homicid e offend ers; Homicide victim s Prison, 2 , 30, 71, 72-73, 86 , 121 , 130, 158-159 Prosecutors, 39 , 122 , 127 , 15 9 Pushkin, Aleksand r Sergeevich , 3 5 Qolla, 16 4 Radial status , 24 , 26-27 , 39 > 4°> 7 2> 114, 139 , i66n . 4 Rebellion, 12 , 56-5 7 Relational distance , 9, 4 1, 69, 73, 78, 80, 82 , 137 , 170 m 11 , 1 7 m. 4 . See also Third-part y relationa l distanc e Respectability. See Normative Statu s Restorative justice , 14 4 Richmond, 86 , 15 9 Rioting, 1 2 Robbery homicide , 4 Samoa, 16 4 San Francisco , 12 4 Savannah, 11 2 Self-help, 10-11 , 51 ; Black's theory of , 11, 14 , 72, 84 , 12 0 Semai, 49, 50 , 59-60 , 62 , 63 , 92 Serial homicide, 4 , 15 4 Settlement, 11 , 39, 42, 44, 46-47, 82 , 140, 149 ; informal, 59-66 , 90 , 105-106; informal an d lega l com pared, 62-6 6

Subject Index I 20 7 Settlement agents , 11 , 55, 59-60 , 73, 104-105, 141-14 2

Sexual homicide , 4 Shakespeare, William, n o Shavante, 16 4 Singapore, 7 7 Social class . See Social statu s Social distance , 69, 71 , 81, 97, 12 2 Social space , 20 , dimensions of , 8-9 ; and Durkheimia n theory , 10 ; and Marxian theory , 1 0 Social status , 65 , 84, 92, 149-150 ; an d homicide, 2 , 15 , 23-30, 40, 42-44 , 134-135, 152-153 , 167 m n , 168-169m 9 ; and honor , 114-115 , 120, 122-123 , I 3 I ? a n d l aw ? 9-> 3° 5 39-41, 123-129 , 141 ; and partisan ship, 135 ; and violence , 18 , 23, 30-31, 31-37 , 64-66 , 102 , i34-i35> i36 > 139-140 , 141 , i45> 152, i66nn . 7 , 8 , 9, i 6 8 - i 6 9 n . 9 . See also Third-party socia l statu s Soga, 15 7 Somalia, 129 , 16 3 South Africa , 2 4 South America , 8 0 Soviet Union, 58 , i68n . 8 Spain, 2 Sri Lanka, 2 4 State, 40, 114 , 127 , 131 ; colonial, 52-54, 82-83 , i68n . 4 ; definitio n of, 47 ; jurisdiction of , 63 ; limitations of , 63-64 , 66; status of , 39 , 42-43; an d violence , 33 , 45-59, 62-64, 66, 82-83 , 9 1, 167ml. 11 , 2. See also Execution ; Rebellion ; State lessness Statelessness, 40; actual, 40, 122 ; and honor, 121 , 122-132; and violence , 40-41, 42 , 44, 46, 47-56, 90-91 , i66n. 8 ; virtual, 65 , 122 , 130 , 137 , 141. See also Stateles s societie s Stateless societies , 32-33 , 46, 47-56 , 152, i67~i68n . 3 State societies , 54-56 , 153 , i68n . 6 Stevens, Alexander, 3 6

St. Louis, 15 , 18 , 76-77, 7 8 Street justice , 142-150 , 172 m 3 Subculture o f violence , 152 , 170 m 2 Suburbia, 12 , 101-103 , 121 , 131, 139 Sudan, 18 , 9 1, 109, n o Supporters. See Partisan s Swat Pathans, 109 , i n Swat Pukhtuns , 32 , 80 , 109 , 11 1 Sweden, 28 , 29, 99 Tallensi, 16 3 Tanzania, 8 8 Tauade, 3 2 Tausug, 18 , 81, 112, 129-13 0 Terrorism, 1 2 Texas, 72-73, 125 . See also Housto n Theories, of feuding , 81-82 ; of vio lence, 152-15 3 Theory: importanc e o f generality , 150-153 Third parties , 5 , 8, 9, 11-12 , 14 , 23, 55,134-140, 145 , ! 5 0 - i 5 4; an d law, 9, 125-132 , i69n.3 ; and moral ism, 11,38-39 , 104-105 , 141 ; and nonpartisanship, 7 , 68 , 89-106; an d partisanship, 7 , 68 , 69-73, 73-^9, 105-106; and violence , 7-8, 11-12 , 15, 16 , 17 , 19-20 , 21 , 37-44, 46-47, 59-66, 67-106 , 112 , 115, 116, 117 , 119-121 , 123-124, 133 , 140-150, 172 m 2 . See also Audi ences; Bystanders; Lawyers; Legal Officials; Partisans ; Peacemakers ; Police; Settlement Agents ; State; Third-party cultura l distance ; Third party organizationa l distance ; Third party relational distance ; Third-part y social status; Third-party socia l ties; Witnesses Third-party cultura l distance , 71, 135 Third-party organizationa l distance , 71; an d nonpartisanship , 72 , 89-106; an d partisanship , 71-72 , 73-89, 105-106 , 135 ; and violence , 71-73, 73-106 , 13 5 See also Orga nized group s

2o8 I Subject Index Third-party peacemakers . See Peacemakers Third-party relationa l distance , 69-71 , 72, 142 , 17m . 6 ; and moralism , 104-105, 141 ; and nonpartisanship , 70, 89-106 ; and partisanship , 69-71, 73-89 , 105-106 , 135;an d violence, 69-71 , 73-106 , 135 , 141, 149-150 Third-party settlement . See Settlemen t Third-party socia l status , 38 , 17m . 6 ; and moralism , 38-39 , 104 , 141 ; and partisanship, 135 ; and violence , 15 , 16, 23 , 37-44, 46-47, 56-59 , 62 , 63, 64 , 65 , 66, 73 , 122 , 134-135 , 140-141, 149-15 0 Third-party socia l ties, n , 68-69 ; close and distan t grou p ties , 73-83, 105 , 17in. 8 ; close and distan t individua l ties, 83-89 , 105 ; close ties, 96-98, 106; configurations of , 69 , 73-106 , 135, 136 ; cross-cutting ties , 89-98 , 105-106; distan t individua l ties , 99-105, 106 ; and gangs , 77-79; sta ble and honor , 119-121 . See also Third-party organizationa l distance ; Third-party relationa l distanc e Thull, 94-9 5 Tibet, 16 3 Tiv, 162 , 16 3 Tiwi, 8 9 Tlingit, 16 4 Toleration, 11 , 39 Tonga, 90-9 1 Tory Island, 9 1 Turkey, 91, 163 Uganda, 79 , 98 Unemployment, 2 , 26, 40, 65 , 124 , i66n.4 United States , 2 , 9, 15 , 16 , 24, 25, 26-27, 29 , 30 , 31, 49, 58 , 61 , 84, 100, 125 , 140 , 147 , 155 , 156 , i66nn. 4 , 9, i 6 8 - i 6 9 n . 9 , 170ml . 11, 12 ; and dueling , 44, 112 ; homicide among cultura l minorities ,

25-26, 28 ; moralistic homicide , 5 ; rates o f homicide , 2 , 61 ; southern, 18, 109 , n o , 112 , 113 , 118 , i7on . 2; Western frontier , 18 , 36, 43, 109 , n o , 12 8 Utah, 12 5 Venezuela, 18 , 10 9 Vengeance, 32 , 52 , 75, 85, 87, 88 , 92, 97-98, 109 , n o , i n , 120 , 127 , 128, 129-130 , 136 , 146 . See also Feuding Venice, 3 3 Victoria (Australia) , 156-15 7 Vigilantism, 1 2 Violence, 2 , 6 , 7 , 12 , 14 , 20 , 21 ; and alcohol/drugs, 14 , 56 , 77-78, 113 ; biographical account s of , 18 ; and centralization, 51 , 57-58, i68nn . 7 , 8; collective, 12 , 13 ; and cross-cut ting ties , 89-98 ; defined, 12-13 , 165m 2 ; domestic, 12 , 31, 37, 4 1, 49, 103-104 , 137 , 148 , I 7 i - i 7 2 n . 1; elite, 23 , 30-38,42-44 , 100-101, 134-135 , 152-153 , 167ml. 10 , 11 ; explanations of , 150-154; gang , 3 , 18 , 19 , 7^-73 , 74-79, 82 ; and guns/weapons , 13 , 14, 33 , 5° , 77, 86-87 , 94 , 100 , 151; intensifie s clos e an d distan t group ties , 82-83 ; historical ac counts of , 18 ; and honor , 107-132 ; among hunter-gatherers , 88-89 ; and informa l settlement , 59-66 ; and law , 8 , 11 , 50, 62-66 , 149 , 1 7 m . 8 ; and medicine , 50 , 53 , i68n. 7 ; among minorities , 40 , 139 , 145; a s morality, 3-5 , 11 , 136; an d nonpartisanship, 103-104 ; an d par tisanship, 84-85 ; predatory, 4-5 , 137; reduction of , 140-150 ; research possibilities , 134-140 ; an d seriousness o f conflict , 5-6 ; an d so cial status , 2 , 18 , 23-37, 64-66 , 102, 134-135 , 136 , 139-140 , 141 , 145, 152 , i66nn . 7 , 8 , 9; and stabil -

Subject Index I ity o f third-part y ties , 119-121, 132; an d th e state , 33 , 45-59, 62-64, 66, 82-83 , 9 1, 167ml. 11 , 2; and statelessness , 40-41 , 42 , 44 , 46, 47-56 , 90-91 , i66n . 8; theorie s of, 152-153 ; and thir d parties , 7-8 , 16, 17 , 19-20 , 21 , 37-44, 4^-47 , 59-66, 67-106 , 112 , 115 , 116 , 117, 119-121 , 123-124, 133 , 140-150, i72n . 2 ; and third-part y organizational distance , 71-73 , 73-106, 135 ; and third-part y rela tional distance , 69-71 , 73-106 , 135, 141 , 149-150; an d third-part y social status , 15 , 16 , 23 , 37-44 , 46-47, 56-59 , 62 , 63 , 64, 65 , 66, 73, 122 , 134-135 , 140-141 , 149-150. See also Assault ; Brawl ing; Collective violence ; Domesti c violence; Dueling; Execution ; Feud ing; Homicide; Homicid e offenders ; Homicide rates ; Homicide victims ; Infanticide; Lynching ; Manslaugh ter; Rebellion ; Robber y homicide ; Self-help; Seria l homicide ; Sexua l

20 9

homicide; Terrorism; Vengeance ; Vigilantism; Wa r Virginia, 11 8 Virginia homicid e stud y (author's) , 19 ; case described, 1-2 , 4 , 22 , 67, 86 , 107-108, 130 ; methodology , 158-160; partisanship in , 84-8 5 Waorani, 60-62 , 92-93, i7on . 1 0 War, 12 , 51 , 58, 167 m 2 , i68n . 4 Warriors, 7 , 8 , 20 , 74, 80 , 81 , 133 Washington, D.C. , 123 , 12 4 Weapons, 7 , 13 , 33, 50, 77, 94, 100 . See also Gun s Wellington, duk e of , 34-3 5 Witches, i69n . 7 Witnesses, 9, 86 , 96, i7on . 11 ; noncooperative, 123-124 , 127 , 128-130 , 145 Yanomamo, 18 , 109 , 16 4 Yapese, 16 4 Zaire, 3 Zambia, 9 0

About th e Autho r Mark Coone y hold s a doctora l degre e i n la w fro m Harvard La w Schoo l an d i n sociolog y fro m th e Universit y o f Virginia. H e i s currentl y Assistan t Professo r o f Sociolog y an d Adjunct Assistant Professor o f Law at the University of Georgia. A native of Ireland, he has previously bee n a member o f facult y at University Colleg e Dublin an d the University o f Zimbabwe .

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