Parties, Institutions and Preferences: The Shape and Impact of Partisan Politics (Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft) 3658351322, 9783658351328

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Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft

Erik Baltz · Sven Kosanke Susanne Pickel Hrsg.

Parties, Institutions and Preferences The Shape and Impact of Partisan Politics

Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft Reihe herausgegeben von Steffen Kailitz, Hannah-Arendt-Institut für Totalitarismusforschung, Dresden, Germany Susanne Pickel, LS für Politikwissenschaft, Universität Duisburg-Essen, Duisburg, Germany Claudia Wiesner, Hochschule Fulda, Fulda, Germany

Die Schriftenreihe bietet ein Forum für alle, die sich in Forschung und Lehre mit zentralen Themen und Fragestellungen der der Vergleichenden Politikwissenschaft befassen. Sie steht dabei Beiträgen aller theoretischen und methodischen Zugänge der Vergleichenden Politikwissenschaft offen. Es sind sowohl theoretisch und/oder konzeptionell als auch empirisch oder methodisch ausgerichtete Schriften willkommen. Entsprechend der Internationalität der Vergleichenden Politikwissenschaft versteht sich die Reihe als ein internationales Forum des wissenschaftlichen Diskurses. Es werden daher deutsch- und englischsprachige Bände publiziert. Die Schriftenreihe wird im Auftrag der Sektion Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft der Deutschen Vereinigung für Politikwissenschaft herausgegeben. Die Aufnahme jeden Bandes der Reihe erfolgt durch ein Begutachtungsverfahren. The series offers a forum for all who deal in research and teaching with topics and questions of all subfields of comparative politics. It is open to contributions from all theoretical and methodological approaches to comparative politics. Both theoretically and/or conceptually as well as empirically or methodologically oriented writings are welcome. In keeping with the international nature of comparative politics, the series sees itself as an international forum for scholarly discourse. Therefore, volumes in German and English language will be published. The series is published on behalf of the section Comparative Politics of the German Political Science Association. Each volume in the series is accepted through a peer-review process.

More information about this series at https://link.springer.com/bookseries/13436

Erik Baltz · Sven Kosanke · Susanne Pickel Editors

Parties, Institutions and Preferences The Shape and Impact of Partisan Politics

Editors Erik Baltz Institut für Politik- und Kommunikationswissenschaft Universität Greifswald Greifswald, Germany

Sven Kosanke Institut für Politik- und Kommunikationswissenschaft Universität Greifswald Greifswald, Germany

Susanne Pickel Institut für Politikwissenschaft Universität Duisburg-Essen Duisburg, Germany

ISSN 2569-8672 ISSN 2569-8702 (electronic) Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft ISBN 978-3-658-35132-8 ISBN 978-3-658-35133-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-35133-5 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Responsible Editor: Jan Treibel This Springer VS imprint is published by the registered company Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH part of Springer Nature. The registered company address is: Abraham-Lincoln-Str. 46, 65189 Wiesbaden, Germany

Contents

Parties, Institutions and Preferences: The Shape and Impact of Partisan Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Erik Baltz, Sven Kosanke, and Susanne Pickel

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Parties as Central Actors Ökologie vs. Ökonomie. Zum Einfluss von Umweltperformanz und Parteienwettbewerb auf „grüne“ Parteipositionen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nils Düpont und Martin Rachuj

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Women’s Role in Promoting Environmental Issues: Evidence from 19 Industrialized Democracies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Corinna Kroeber

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Zwischenparteilicher Wettbewerb und Ideologische Diversität . . . . . . . . Sven Kosanke Larger or Smaller Inter-Party Policy Differences? What Do Citizens and MPs Believe? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Magnus Hagevi The ‘Lifespan’ of Green Parties in Western Europe: An Evaluation . . . Ferdinand Müller-Rommel

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Agenda-Setting Power of Governmental Parties Bringing Cohesion In . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Christoph Oberst

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Regierungsdauer in Mittel- und Osteuropa. Ein dreidimensionales Erklärungsmodell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Philipp Harfst

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Do Too Many Cooks Spoil the Broth? How a Cabinet’s Internal Decision-Making Impacts Cabinets’ Survival . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Erik Baltz

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Measuring of Output and Outcome Honesty is the Best Policy? The Short- and Long-Term Electoral Costs of (Welfare) Pledge Breaking and Their Economic and Political Scope Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Alexander Horn The Politics of Unemployment Benefit Reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Jan Helmdag and Kati Kuitto

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Umweltschutz zwischen Staat und Markt: Regulierung und Performanz in 37 Ländern 1970–2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Andreas Duit, Sijeong Lim, und Thomas Sommerer

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Politische Unterstützung und Systempersistenz unter Einfluss des Klimawandels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Susanne Pickel und Gert Pickel

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Looking Onwards Parties and Diffusion: The Way Forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse

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Pfadabhängigkeit. Bestimmung und Forschungsstrategie . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hans-Joachim Lauth

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Projection Effects: Coping with Assimilation and Contrast . . . . . . . . . . . Guido Tiemann

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Quantitative Forschung in Lateinamerika: Einige ungebetene Hinweise für harte Empiriker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nikolaus Werz

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Editors and Contributors

About the Editors Erik Baltz ist wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Lehrstuhl für Vergleichende Regierungslehre an der Universität Greifswald, Deutschland. Sven Kosanke ist Journalist und Projektleiter beim Katapult Magazin in Greifswald, Deutschland. Susanne Pickel ist Professorin für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft an der 36 Universität Duisburg-Essen, Deutschland.

Contributors Erik Baltz ist wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Lehrstuhl für Vergleichende Regierungslehre an der Universität Greifswald, Deutschland. Tanja A. Börzel ist Professorin für Politikwissenschaft, insbesondere Europäische Integration an der Freien Universität Berlin, Deutschland. Andreas Duit ist Professor für Politikwissenschaft an der Universität Stockholm, Schweden. Nils Düpont ist wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter im SFB 1342 „Globale Entwicklungsdynamiken von Sozialpolitik“ an der Universität Bremen, Deutschland. Magnus Hagevi ist Professor für Politikwissenschaft an der Linnaeus Universität in Växjö, Schweden.

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Philipp Harfst ist Vertretungsprofessor für politische Systeme und Systemvergleich an der Technischen Universität Dresden, Deutschland. Jan Helmdag ist wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Schwedischen Institut für Sozialforschung an der Stockholm Universität, Schweden. Alexander Horn ist Forschungsgruppenleiter der Emmy Noether Gruppe „Varieties of Egalitarianism“ an der Universität Konstanz, Deutschland. Sven Kosanke ist Journalist und Projektleiter beim Katapult Magazin in Greifswald, Deutschland. Corinna Kroeber ist Juniorprofessorin für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft an der Universität Greifwald, Deutschland. Kati Kuitto ist wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin am Finnish Centre for Pension, Finnland. Hans-Joachim Lauth ist Professor für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft und Systemlehre an der Universität Würzburg, Deutschland. Sijeong Lim ist wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin an der Universität Stockholm, Schweden. Ferdinand Müller-Rommel ist Professor für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft an der Leuphana Universität Lüneburg, Deutschland. Christoph Oberst ist Geschäftsführer der Fraktion von Bündnis 90/ Die Grünen und Tierschutzpartei im Kreistag Vorpommern-Greifswald und der Grünen Fraktion in der Greifswalder Bürgerschaft. Gert Pickel ist Professor für Religions- und Kirchensoziologie an der Universität Leipzig, Deutschland. Susanne Pickel ist Professorin für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft an der Universität Duisburg-Essen, Deutschland. Martin Rachuj ist Stipendiat der Graduiertenförderung an der Universität Greifswald, Deutschland. Thomas Risse ist Professor für Internationale Beziehungen an der Freien Universität Berlin, Deutschland. Thomas Sommerer ist Professor für Politikwissenschaft, insbesondere internationale Organisationen an der Universität Potsdam, Deutschland.

Editors and Contributors

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Guido Tiemann ist assoziierter Professor für Vergleichende Europäische Politik am Institut für Höhere Studien in Wien, Österreich. Nikolaus Werz ist emeritierter Professor für Vergleichende Regierungslehre an der Universität Rostock, Deutschland.

Parties, Institutions and Preferences: The Shape and Impact of Partisan Politics Erik Baltz, Sven Kosanke und Susanne Pickel

Mit dem vorliegenden Band ehren wir Detlef Jahn anlässlich seiner Emeritierung. Detlef Jahn hat sein wissenschaftliches Wirken einem Thema gewidmet, das uns noch lange beschäftigen wird und über das Wohl und Wehe der künftigen Generationen entscheiden wird – der Umweltpolitik insbesondere in den OECD-Ländern. Dieses Lebenswerk hat er im Band „The Politics of Environmental Performance. Institutions and Preferences in Industrialized Democracies“ zusammengefasst (Jahn 2016). Sein Interesse für politische Prozesse in modernen Demokratien brachte mit dem „Parties, Institutions, Preferences Dataset“ (PIP) (Jahn et al. 2020) einen Datensatz – der auch namensstiftend für diesen Sammelband ist – hervor. Er enthält nicht nur umfangreiche Informationen über politische Institutionen in den entwickelten Demokratien, sondern ermöglicht es darüber hinaus, die ideologischen Positionen für diese Institutionen entlang verschiedener Dimensionen zu berechnen. Die Flexibilität und Konsistenz des daraus entstandenen „Agenda Setting Power Models“ (ASPM) zählt nach wie

E. Baltz (B) Institut für Politik- und Kommunikationswissenschaft, Universität Greifswald, Greifswald, Deutschland e-mail: [email protected] S. Kosanke Institut für Politik- und Kommunikationswissenschaft, Universität Greifswald, Greifswald, Deutschland e-mail: [email protected] S. Pickel Institut für Politikwissenschaft, Universität Duisburg-Essen, Duisburg, Deutschland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2022 E. Baltz et al. (eds.), Parties, Institutions and Preferences, Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-35133-5_1

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vor zu den elaboriertesten Wegen zur Berechnung von ideologischen Positionen. Neben der Umweltpolitik zählte die Sozialpolitik stets zu den heißesten Eisen in Detlef Jahns Feuer. So trug er gemeinsam mit Lyle Scruggs und Kati Kuitto eine umfangreiche Datenbasis zu wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Ersatzleistungen zusammen, die als „Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset“ (CWED2) breite Öffentlichkeitswirksamkeit erlangte. (Scruggs et al. 2014) Als Sprecher der DVPW-Sektion „Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft“ (2002–2009) lag es nahe, dass er sein bekanntestes Werk – „Einführung in die Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft“ – verfasst hat, das inzwischen in der zweiten Auflage erschienen ist (Jahn 2013). Der Band „Einführung in die Politikwissenschaft“ mit Thomas Bernauer, Patrick Kuhn und Stefanie Walter liegt bereits in der vierten Auflage vor (Bernauer et al. 2015). Aus seinen zahlreichen Aufenthalten an Universitäten rund um den Globus (Italien, Schweden, Großbritannien, Finnland, USA, Chile, Australien und Neuseeland) resultierte schließlich auch ein Fokus auf den Einfluss der Globalisierung auf die Staatstätigkeit. Und schlussendlich geht es wohl auch auf seine Reisetätigkeit zurück, dass am Ende der Karriere ein neues Gebiet ins Zentrum seines Interesses gerückt ist: Es dürfte weitgehend unbekannt sein, dass Detlef Jahn eine Vorliebe für Lateinamerika und die Karibik entwickelt hat. In den vergangenen Jahren reiste er mehrfach in die Region und äußerte den Wunsch, seine Forschungen auf Lateinamerika und die Karibik auszudehnen. Da er seine Pläne in der Regel umzusetzen pflegt, handelt es sich also um ein durchaus relevantes Thema. Wir werden am Ende des Bandes darauf zurückkommen. Detlef Jahn hat die Menschen, die mit ihm gearbeitet haben, durch wissenschaftliche Zähigkeit und den Willen, nicht aufzugeben, wenn er etwas erarbeiten wollte, beeindruckt. Klare Ziele kennzeichnen seine wissenschaftliche Karriere, aber auch die Absicht, nicht alles am heimischen Herd zu kochen, sondern den Blick und den Körper in die Ferne schweifen zu lassen, um über den Tellerrand hinaus neue Aspekte und Forschungsziele zu ermitteln. Und genau diese Zähigkeit und Zielstrebigkeit vermochten ihn auch stets bei seinen Mitstreiter:innen zu beeindrucken. Zahlreiche seiner Weggefährt:innen, mit denen er gearbeitet und publiziert hat, sind zusammengekommen, um ihm mit diesem Band „Danke“ zu sagen und an die gemeinsame Zeit zu erinnern. Gerne hätten wir den bereits zugesagten Aufsatz seines langjährigen Freundes Michael Minkenberg in diesem Band publiziert. Dass dem nicht so ist, ist allein das Verschulden der Herausgeber. Wir bitten um Entschudligung, denn ohne Michael ist der Band eigentlich unvollständig.

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Inhalte und Ziele des Buches Politische Parteien stehen im Zentrum moderner Demokratien. Es gibt eine lange Tradition in der Politikwissenschaft, Parteien als die Hauptakteure in der politischen Arena zu definieren und zu behandeln. Parteien sind einflussreiche Akteure in den meisten Phasen des politischen Spiels innerhalb der entwickelten Demokratien. Die ‚parties-do-matter‘-Hypothese ist einer der am besten erforschten Ansätze in dieser Hinsicht. Allerdings hat sich noch kein einheitlicher Konsens gebildet, um Parteien sensibel zu klassifizieren und gleichzeitig die Komplexität der Realität ausreichend zu reduzieren. Das offensichtlichste Unterscheidungsmerkmal ist die Zugehörigkeit zu verschiedenen Parteienfamilien und Ideologien und die daraus abgeleiteten politischen Positionen. Diese Positionen zu messen, steht seit langem im Zentrum der wissenschaftlichen vergleichenden Parteienforschung und ist noch immer nicht abschließend geklärt. Darüber hinaus werden Parteien von verschiedenen Merkmalen der politischen Arena beeinflusst, wie z. B. den Eigenschaften des Parteiensystems, der Kohäsion und dem Geschlecht ihrer Repräsentanten. Um all diese Verbindungen zu verknüpfen, sucht das vorliegende Buch nach Erklärungen für diese Wechselwirkungen, und konzentriert sich auf die traditionelle Sichtweise der Parteien-Wähler-Vertretung, Parteien und ihre jeweiligen Positionen und Parteiensysteme als zentrale Akteure, die Rolle der Regierungsinstitutionen sowie auf politische Inputs, Outputs und Outcomes und den Agenda-Setting-Prozess. Dazu fokussiert unser Band im ersten Teil vor allem auf die grundlegenden Charakteristika der politischen Akteure wie Parteien und das Parteiensystem und ihre ideologische Zusammensetzung. Hier wird auf den Stand der Forschung zur Positionierung von Parteien, relevante Dimensionen und einige externe Einflüsse, wie z. B. innerparteiliche Kohäsion und Geschlecht, verwiesen. Nils Düpont und Martin Rachuj schließen an eine der wichtigsten Erkenntnisse Detlef Jahns an, wonach sich die Umweltperformanz einer Regierung nur dann positiv entwickelt, wenn die Präferenzen des Agenda Setters entsprechend ‚grüner‘ werden. Folglich bleibt zu erklären, welche Faktoren eine solche Entwicklung des Agenda Setters bedingen. Es zeigt sich, dass hierbei vor allem der Parteienwettbewerb und die Position des Medianwählers von entscheidender Bedeutung sind. Ferner führt auch eine Verschlechterung der Umweltperformanz zu einer stärkeren Betonung grüner Politiken, die jedoch rasch wieder nachlässt, wenn sich der Problemdruck wieder reduziert. Corinna Kröber untersucht in ihrem Beitrag den Zusammenhang zwischen der Unterstützung der Parteien für Umweltfragen und dem Anteil von Frauen in

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Parteiämtern. Sie argumentiert, dass Parteien, die von Frauen geführt werden oder einen höheren Anteil von Frauen in der Fraktion haben, vermehrt den Umweltschutz und ökologische Themen in ihren Wahlprogrammen betonen. In ihrer zweistufigen Analyse zeigt Corinna Kröber zunächst, dass Frauen in industriellen Demokratien prinzipiell eher umweltfreundlicher eingestellt sind als Männer. Weiterhin legt sie dar, dass der Anteil von umweltfreundlichen und ökologischen Themen im Wahlprogram zunimmt, wenn der Anteil von Frauen mit Parteiämtern zunimmt. Sven Kosanke legt in seinem Beitrag den Fokus auf das innerparteiliche Verhalten von Parteien bezüglich des zwischenparteilichen Wettbewerbs. Er argumentiert, dass Parteien ideologisch diverse Positionen einnehmen, wenn das institutionelle Umfeld dies erfordert. Er zeigt, dass in weniger proportionalen Wahlsystemen Parteien sich strategisch für ein diverseres Wahlprogramm entscheiden, wohingegen proportionale Wahlsysteme zu ideologisch schmaleren Wahlprogrammen führen. Zur Messung der Diversität des Wahlprogramms verwendet Sven Kosanke den Kohäsionsindex von Detlef Jahn und Christoph Oberst. Magnus Hagevi betrachtet das Wechselspiel zwischen den wahrgenommenen und bevorzugten politischen Distanzen im schwedischen Parteiensystem. Er untersucht, ob beides von der eigenen ideologischen Positionierung beeinflusst ist. Der analysierte Effekt stellt sich in unterschiedlichem Ausmaß für Wähler:innen und Abgeordnete ein. So präferieren Wähler:innen mit ideologisch extremen Positionen größere Distanzen innerhalb des Parteiensystems als solche mit zentristischen Positionen, wohingegen dieser Effekt unter den Abgeordneten nur sehr eingeschränkt eintritt. Ferdinand Müller-Rommel beschreibt die Lebensläufe von der Geburt über das Erwachsenenleben und den Tod von grünen Parteien in siebzehn westeuropäischen Ländern. Er fasst sie dabei als „sterbliche“ Organisationen auf, die ihr Werden und Vergehen als starke, mittelstarke oder schwache Parteien gestalten können. In einigen Ländern sind sie bedeutende Vertreter ökologischer Interessen geworden, in anderen sind sie nach einigen Jahren wieder völlig aus der Politik verschwunden. Manche bleiben in der Phase des politischen Wettbewerbs um Wählerstimmen hängen, andere schaffen es in die nationalen Parlamente und die erfolgreichsten – in Deutschland, Finnland, Italien, Frankreich, Belgien, Irland, Schweden, Luxemburg, Griechenland und Österreich – sogar in die jeweiligen Regierungen. Dort werden sie die etablierten Parteiensysteme auch in Zukunft herausfordern.

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Im zweiten Teil wird die Rolle der Regierungsinstitutionen im Politikgestaltungsprozess dargestellt, wobei die Charakteristika der Agenda-Setting-Macht und die Konsequenzen für das Überleben der Regierung behandelt werden. Beide Teile zusammen zielen darauf ab, den Prozess der Präferenzaggregation aufzuzeigen, beginnend bei den Wählern, gefolgt von den Parteien und endend mit der Umsetzung der Politik durch die Regierung. Ein weiteres Thema sind daher die Dimensionen, die für das Handeln von Parteien relevant sind. Wenn sie im Amt sind, agieren Parteien als Agenda-Setter, die durch ihre politischen Unternehmungen die öffentliche Politik beeinflussen und gleichzeitig durch andere – möglicherweise auch parteipolitische – Akteure (Vetospieler), die Umstände, unter denen sie agieren (z. B. Zweikammersystem, Föderalismus, Mehrheitsverhältnisse usw.) oder Konventionen und Vereinbarungen, die frühere Kabinette getroffen haben (Pfadabhängigkeit), eingeschränkt werden. Durch ihre Arbeit produziert die Regierung jedoch mehrere Outputs und Ergebnisse, die die Gesellschaft auf verschiedene Weise beeinflussen. Christoph Oberst knüpft mit seiner Arbeit direkt an die Grundgedanken des „Agenda Setting Power Models“ an. Er kritisiert, dass der innerparteiliche Zusammenhalt bei der Untersuchung von politischen Entscheidungsprozessen zu häufig vernachlässigt wird. In seinem Kapitel argumentiert er, dass der Einfluss des Vetospielers auf den Arbeitsminister bei Arbeitsmarktreformen durch die innerparteiliche Kohäsion moderiert wird. Es zeigt sich, dass es einen signifikanten Unterschied macht, ob Akteure mit einer geeinten oder wenig geeinten Partei im Rücken agieren. Philipp Harfst öffnet mit seinem Kapitel das Forschungsfeld der Regierungsdauer. Hierzu erweitert er zunächst den etablierten Attributes Ansatz, indem er systematisch zwischen institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen sowie Akteurskonstellationen und Verhalten unterscheidet. Dadurch ermöglicht er es Interdependenzen zwischen den Dimensionen theoretisch plausibel herzuleiten und anschließend auch empirisch zu identifizieren. Seine dreidimensionale Konzeptualisierung erweitert das Verständnis über Risikofaktoren mittel- und osteuropäischer Regierungen. Das Kapitel von Erik Baltz ist ebenfalls in diesem Forschungsgebiet angesiedelt. Dieser beleuchtet die internen Entscheidungsmechanismen von politischen Regierungen und postuliert, dass der Modus der internen Entscheidungsfindung die Überlebensdauer von Regierungen prolongierend bzw. restriktiv beeinflusst. Hierbei greift er auf eine Klassifizierung von Detlef Jahn aus dem ASPM zurück, welche die entwickelten Demokratien entlang verschiedener Mechanismen der internen Entscheidungsfindung einteilt.

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Der dritte Teil befasst sich weiter mit den Ergebnissen der zuvor beschriebenen Mechanismen, wobei wir uns auf einige klassische Politikbereiche der vergleichenden Forschung wie die Sozial- und Umweltpolitik konzentrieren. Alexander Horn untersucht in seinem Beitrag die elektoralen Kosten, denen sich Regierungen stellen müssen, wenn sie wohlfahrtsstaatliche Wahlversprechen brechen. Kurzfristig zeigt sich, dass die Stimmanteile rapide sinken, wenn Regierungsparteien ihren Wahlversprechen nicht nachkommen. Der Effekt verstärkt sich sogar, wenn der Ausbau von wirtschaftlicher Prosperität ansonsten eher gering ist. Eine Verwässerung erfolgt erst nach etwa zwei Wahlen und kann nur dann aufrechterhalten werden, wenn die Regierungsparteien so lange im Amt bleiben und es der Opposition gelingt, das Brechen der Wahlversprechen permanent zu politisieren. Jan Helmdag und Kati Kuitto modellieren in Ihrem Beitrag den Einfluss der Regierungsideologie auf die Lohnersatzraten für Arbeitslose. Hierbei adressieren sie sowohl das „Dependent Variable“-Problem als auch das „Independent Variable“-Problem und implementieren damit zwei wesentliche Ergebnisse des Schaffens von Detlef Jahn in die wissenschaftliche Debatte der Wohlfahrtsforschung. Sie finden Muster für Expansions- und Rückbaubestrebungen von linken und rechten Regierungen und mahnen dadurch zur Vorsicht bei der Bewertung empirischer Ergebnisse in vergleichbaren Studien. Ebenso betonen sie den Einfluss von politischen und institutionellen Vetospielern auf den Output politischer Regierungen. Das Kapitel von Thomas Duit, Sijeong Lim und Andreas Sommerer beleuchtet die Effektivität von staatlicher Regulierung bezüglich der Umweltperformanz. Hierzu identifizieren sie fünf regulatorische Wirkungspfade und analysieren deren Relevanz anhand von umweltpolitischen Maßnahmen. Dazu greifen die Autor:innen auf etablierte theoretische Konzepte aus der vergleichenden Forschung zurück. Empirisch zeigt sich ein uneinheitliches Bild: die Effektivität von nationalstaatlicher Regulierung variiert sowohl zwischen den Ländern als auch zwischen den Politikfeldern. Susanne und Gert Pickel untersuchen die politische Unterstützung und Systempersistenz unter dem Einfluss des Klimawandels. Angesichts der zunehmenden Instrumentalisierung des Themas durch Rechtspopulist:innen, ihrer Position der Ablehnung eines menschengemachten Klimawandels und einer steigenden Protestdynamik für mehr Klimagerechtigkeit in den europäischen Gesellschaften ist ein Zugang über politische Einstellungen und die politische Kultur notwendig. Der weit überwiegende Teil der Europäer:innen nimmt den weltweiten Klimawandel als menschengemacht und bedrohlich wahr. Es finden sich geringe Länderunterschiede. Die Skepsis gegenüber dem Klimawandel wird am ehesten

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im Osten Europas sichtbar. Die für eine Civic Culture förderliche Mobilisierung für den Klimawandel muss erst noch ihren Weg in die politischen Institutionen finden. Ist dies gelungen, dann könnte der Klimawandel zur institutionellen Vollendung des Wertewandels seit den 1970er Jahren beitragen. Zum Schluss wagen wir einen Blick über den Tellerrand, indem wir einige Perspektiven grob adaptieren, die auf den ersten Blick ignoriert wurden, aber zu substanziellen Einsichten führen können, wenn sie erkannt werden. Tanja Börzel und Thomas Risse verknüpfen in ihrem Kapitel zwei wesentliche Erkenntnisse Detlef Jahns miteinander, indem sie seine Forschung zu politischen Parteien mit Erkenntnissen aus der Diffusionsforschung verbinden. Sie führen aus, dass Diffusion zwischen Parteien nicht nur nützlich ist, um den rasanten Aufstieg populistischer Parteien in Europa zu erklären, sondern für eine Vielzahl von parteipolitischen Fragestellungen einen potentiellen Erklärungsfaktor darstellen. Dadurch käme diesem Ansatz eine wesentlich umfangreichere Bedeutung innerhalb dieser Forschungsrichtung zuteil. Hans-Joachim Lauth geht in seinem Beitrag auf das Theorem der Pfadabhängigkeit ein. Das Konzept der Pfandabhängigkeit ist in den Sozialwissenschaften häufig sehr vage und divergiert in seinen Definitionen. Auch die anschließende methodische Vorgehensweise bleibt zu oft unzureichend und liegt nur selten im Fokus des Interesses. Zur Entwicklung einer einheitlicheren empirischen Forschungsstrategie geht Hans-Joachim Lauth auf die Deutungsvielfalt der Begriffe Pfadabhängigkeit und Pfadstabilität sowie auf verschiedenen Transformationsmustern von Pfaden ein. Weiterhin identifiziert er elementare Wirkungsmechanismen, die mit der Stabilität eines Pfades in Verbindung gebracht werden kann. Guido Tiemann schlägt gegen Ende des Bandes noch einmal methodische Töne an. In seinem Kapitel beschreibt er Verzerrungen in der Positionierung von Parteien durch Wähler:innen, welche dadurch zustande kommen, dass Wähler:innen diejenigen Parteien mit welchen sie sympathisieren deutlich näher an der eigenen Position verorten, wohingegen Parteien, die sie nicht favorisieren übermäßig weit entfernt von der eigenen Position verortet werden. Zudem bietet er eine Skalierungsmethode an, welche diese Art der Verzerrung behebt und damit die Validität der Daten verbessert. Im letzten Kapitel dieses Bandes unterbreitet Nikolaus Werz einige Ratschläge fürs Reisegepäck in die Karibik und Lateinamerika, damit es nicht zu unangenehmen Überraschungen kommt. In seiner Einführung in die vergleichende

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Politikwissenschaft (2013) zitiert Detlef Jahn u. a. Howard Wiarda, der von einer „distinkten Tradition“, d. h. besonderen Gegebenheiten Lateinamerikas ausgeht (Wiarda 2001). Wie verträgt sich eine solche Aussage mit universellen Annahmen der Wissenschaft? Haben die Zahlen nicht überall die gleiche Bedeutung? Gilt es ferne Regionen eher einfühlsam zu verstehen als mit quantitativen Methoden zu erfassen? Sind die Regionalstudien (area studies) eine angemessene Antwort auf solche Unterschiede? Durch diesen umfassenden Blick auf die durchaus vielfältige Landschaft der Parteienforschung, hoffen wir dem Wirken von Detlef Jahn - mit seiner unverwechselbaren Art und Weise auf die Dinge zu blicken gerecht werden zu können. Auch allen anderen Leser:innen bietet der vorliegende Band einige interessante Einblicke in den Forschungsbereich sowie zahlreiche Anknüpfungspunkte auch tiefer in angliedernde Forschungszweige einzutauchen. Nicht zuletzt gilt unser Dank all denjenigen Menschen, die uns bei der Erstellung dieses Sammelbandes an den verschiedenen Stationen und Prozessen so tatkräftig unterstützt haben. Ohne diese Art der Kollaboration wäre der Band eine stille Forderung geblieben.

Literatur Bernauer T., Jahn, D., Kuhn, P., Walter, S. 2015. Einführung in die Politikwissenschaft, 3rd edn. Studienkurs Politikwissenschaft. Baden-Baden: Nomos. Nomos. Jahn, D. 2013. Einführung in die vergleichende Politikwissenschaft, 2nd edn. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Jahn, D. 2016. The Politics of Environmental Performance: Institutions and Preferences in Industrialized Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jahn, D., Düpont, N., Kosanke, S., Baltz, E. 2020. PIP – Parties, Institutions & Preferences. https://ipk.uni-greifswald.de/en/political-science/chair-for-comparative-politics/. Scruggs, L., Jahn, D., Kuitto, K. 2014. Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset 2. [Version 2014-03]. University of Connecticut & University of Greifswald. Wiarda, H. J. 2001. The Soul of Latin America. The Cultural and Political Tradition. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Parties as Central Actors

Ökologie vs. Ökonomie. Zum Einfluss von Umweltperformanz und Parteienwettbewerb auf „grüne“ Parteipositionen Nils Düpont und Martin Rachuj 1

Einleitung

Wie viele entwickelte Industrienationen, so erlebte auch Deutschland in den 1960er und 1970er Jahren einen beispiellosen Aufstand der Jugend. Während der steigende Lebensstandard die Nachkriegsgesellschaft zunächst befriedete, wurde vor allem der jüngeren Generation schnell bewusst, welcher Preis dafür zu zahlen war. Die erhöhte Mobilität durch die so genannte Massenmotorisierung ging mit steigender Luftverschmutzung, vor allem in den Städten, einher. Die energiehungrige Industrie zwischen Rhein und Ruhr, Garant für den neu gewonnenen Wohlstand, hatte nicht zuletzt durch den Kohletagebau ganze Landstriche in Wüsten verwandelt. Spätestens mit der Ölkrise 1973 wurde die Abhängigkeit der modernen Gesellschaft von fossilen Rohstoffen schmerzlich bewusst. In der Folge wurde der Ausbau der Nukleartechnologie als vermeintlich sichere und saubere Alternative weiter forciert, sodass eine ganze Reihe von Kernkraftwerken Nils Düpont arbeitet als PostDoc im SFB 1342 „Globale Entwicklungsdynamiken von Sozialpolitik“ an der Universität Bremen; Martin Rachuj ist Bogislaw Fellow an der Universität Greifswald. N. Düpont (B) SOCIUM Forschungszentrum Ungleichheit Und Sozialpolitik, Universität Bremen, Bremen, Deutschland e-mail: [email protected] M. Rachuj Institut für Politik- und Kommunikationswissenschaft, Universität Greifswald, Greifswald, Deutschland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2022 E. Baltz et al. (eds.), Parties, Institutions and Preferences, Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-35133-5_2

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in den 1970er Jahren in Betrieb ging. Damit war nun aber eine neue Qualität erreicht: So groß wie die Verheißungen der Nukleartechnologie erschienen auch ihre Gefahren. In diesen Jahren begann eine Sorge in den entwickelten Industrienationen umzugehen: Werden unsere Kinder noch eine Welt vorfinden, in der Leben möglich ist? Anti-Atomkraft-Proteste wie 1975 im badischen Wyhl oder gegen das schwedische, aber nahe Kopenhagen liegende Kraftwerk in Barsebäck 1985 prägten eine neue Zeit, in der Umweltprobleme öffentlich thematisiert und die Grenzen des Wachstums betont wurden. Nicht zuletzt stellten die Aktivisten der Umweltbewegung dabei auch die überkommenen Formen politischen Protests infrage: Die Reaktion des Staates auf Großdemonstrationen, Sitzblockaden und Besetzungen ließen Zweifel daran wachsen, ob in bestehenden Parteien Fragen der Umwelt je ernst genommen werden würden. Die Gründung der Grünen 1980 in Karlsruhe war wie die Gründung von Ecolo in Belgien im selben Jahr die logische Konsequenz. Trotz einer Welle von „grünen“ Parteineugründungen in den 1980ern in vielen westeuropäischen Demokratien dauerte es Jahre, bis grüne Parteien zunächst in die Parlamente und später in die Regierung einziehen konnten. Derweil sind die Ergebnisse dieses Marsches durch die Institutionen sehr unterschiedlich: Während einige Länder wie Dänemark und die Niederlande erhebliche Fortschritte erzielt haben, lässt sich für viele andere Industriestaaten konstatieren, dass diese „may have been successful in combating the old problems but fall short with the new environmental challenges. Other countries […] have not reduced pollution […] or have even increased overall pollution“ (Jahn 2016b, S. 154). Es verwundert daher kaum, dass heute, mehr als ein halbes Jahrhundert später, mit der „Fridays for Future“-Bewegung abermals eine junge Generation aus Sorge um die Zukunft auf die Straße geht. Gleichzeitig bleibt fraglich, ob und welche politischen Akteure nachhaltig zu einer Verbesserung beitragen können. In „The Politics of Environmental Performance“ gibt Detlef Jahn (2016b) hierauf eine klare Antwort, wonach das komplexe Wechselspiel zwischen Parteien in Regierung und Opposition entscheidend ist, um Veränderungen überkommener Politiken und deren Auswirkung auf die Umwelt zu erklären. Er durchleuchtet hierbei den politischen Prozess der Umweltpolitik und liefert mit dem „Agenda Setting Power Modell“ den entscheidenden Hinweis, dass es eines „grüner“ werdenden Agenda Setters in der Regierung bedarf, um Verbesserungen herbeizuführen. Vor diesem Hintergrund stellt sich die in seiner Analyse offen gebliebene Frage, welche Faktoren wiederum erklären, wann Parteien responsiv reagieren und grüne Themen in ihre Wahlprogramme aufnehmen? Im Sinne der Systemtheorie ergänzt die vorliegende Arbeit somit die Untersuchung von Jahn,

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beleuchtet den vorgelagerten Prozess und mögliche Rückkoppelungseffekte, und fragt nach dem Einfluss den die Umwelt, die Gesellschaft, Verbände und Gewerkschaften, neue soziale Bewegungen sowie der Parteienwettbewerb selbst auf das „grüner werden“ von Parteien haben. Zur Beantwortung diskutieren und betten wir die eben genannten Faktoren zunächst in ein systemtheoretisches Modell der Interessenvermittlung ein. Empirisch untersuchen wir anschließend ihren Einfluss auf die ideologischen Veränderungen – sogenannte Policy Moves – von 150 Parteien in 20 hoch entwickelten Demokratien zwischen 1981 und 2012 entlang einer „Ökologie vs. Ökonomie“-Dimension („green-growth“; Jahn 2016b). Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass sich Parteien vornehmlich an ihren direkten Wettbewerbern sowie am Medianwähler orientieren. Die Umweltverschmutzung selbst hat durchaus einen direkten Einfluss auf die Themenbetonung der Parteien, allerdings nur solange sie virulent ist: während eine Verschlechterung dafür sorgt, dass Parteien grüner werden, führt ironischerweise eine Verbesserung dazu, dass (wieder) verstärkt wachstumsorientierte Positionen eingenommen werden. Die Stärke außerparlamentarischer Umweltbewegungen und Gewerkschaften wird weitgehend ignoriert. Diese Ergebnisse decken sich mit der Forschung zu Policy Moves auf einer „klassischen“ Links-Rechts-Achse, bestätigen die zentrale Bedeutung von Parteien für den Willensbildungs- und Entscheidungsprozess, und sind mit Blick auf das zu lösende Problem der Umweltverschmutzung doch wenig ermutigend.

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Eine systemtheoretische Perspektive auf Policy Moves

Schon Eastons klassische Systemtheorie betont die Einbettung und Abhängigkeit des politischen Systems von seiner Umwelt (Easton 1965, S. 32). Das politische System ist mit Nachfrage und Stress aus der Umwelt konfrontiert, erhält aus dieser aber auch Unterstützung. Innerhalb des Systems erfolgt die Transformation dieser Eingaben in Ausgaben in Form von Entscheidungen und Handlungen welche wiederum auf die Umwelt mittels Rückkopplungsschleife wirken (Easton 1965, S. 30). Politik ist somit ein fortlaufender Prozess der Veränderung und Adaption. In einer weiterentwickelten Form entsteht daraus ein Modell der Interessenvermittlung, in dem sich auch die Inkorporation ökologischer Standpunkte verorten lässt (Jahn 2000, S. 71). Abb. 1 verdeutlicht die Zusammenhänge zwischen den einzelnen Akteuren des politischen Prozesses. Das Modell betont die Rolle von Parteien als zentrale Institution der Interessenaggregation, Vermittlung und Durchsetzung. Gleichzeitig wird deutlich, dass

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Abb. 1 Eine systemtheoretische Perspektive auf Parteipositionen. (Quelle: eigene Darstellung in Anlehnung an Easton 1965; Rucht 1991; Jahn 2000; punktiert: Analysefokus von Jahn 2016b; dunkelgrau: abhängige Variable dieser Analyse (AV), UV: unabhängige Variablen)

auch politische Vorfeldinstitutionen, wie neue soziale Bewegungen, Verbände und Gewerkschaften, eine wichtige Verbindung zwischen dem zentralen politischen Entscheidungssystem einerseits und der Gesellschaft andererseits bilden. Alle diese intermediären Akteure aggregieren und artikulieren Interessen, die dann im politisch-administrativen System weiterverarbeitet werden, wo sie Eingang in den Output finden. Diese Leistungen des zentralen politischen Entscheidungssystems wirken zurück auf die Umwelt, zeitigen Effekte und beeinflussen damit letztlich die ins System wiedereingespeisten Interessen und Anforderungen der Gesellschaft. Dem Modell wohnt somit ein impliziter Fokus auf Veränderungen und Adaption der Akteure, der Systeme und der Umwelt inne. Das von Jahn (2016b) postulierte „Agenda Setting Power“-Modell (ASPM) nimmt hierbei alle Elemente des politischen Prozesses und das Wechselspiel zwischen Agenda Settern und Vetospielern, wozu auch Verbände und neue soziale Bewegungen (NSM) gehören, innerhalb des zentralen politischen Entscheidungssystems in den Blick. Mit Hilfe des ASPM wiederum kann dann der Einfluss politischer Akteure – und somit der Einfluss von Parteien – auf das ökologische System, auf die Veränderung der Umweltperformanz, erklärt werden. Hierbei konnte Jahn zeigen, dass eine grünere Regierungsposition einen positiven Einfluss auf die Umweltperformanz eines Landes hat. Weil Parteien und die Veränderung ihrer ideologischen Position das konstituierende Element, der Startpunkt des ASPM sind, greifen wir in der vorliegenden Arbeit wesentliche Konzepte des Systemmodells auf und nehmen die dem ASPM vorgelagerten Prozesse in den Blick. Ziel hierbei ist, die Einflüsse zu identifizieren, die den Bedeutungszuwachs ökologischer Standpunkte in Wahlprogrammen von Parteien

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erklären, also eben jene Policy Moves die im Sinne der Jahn’schen Analyse zur Verbesserung der Umweltbedingungen führen. In Anlehnung an das in Abb. 1 skizzierte Modell fokussieren wir auf fünf Einflussfaktoren, die in den nächsten Abschnitten diskutiert werden. Parteien und Parteienwettbewerb Geprägt durch die Analyse von Equlibria in räumlichen Modellen des Parteienwettbewerbs richtete sich erst merklich später das Augenmerk auf die Triebkräfte ideologischer Veränderungen von Parteien. In seiner „New Spatial Theory“ legte Budge (1994) dar, dass die zwei wichtigsten Entscheidungsregeln für Parteien, die mit Unsicherheit konfrontiert sind wie Wähler wohl auf eine Veränderung reagieren würden, die „alternation rule“ und die „evaluate last move rule“ sind. Die Logik der ersten Regel ist, dass eine Partei (zumindest teilweise) zu ihrem vorherigen Standpunkt zurückkehrt, sei es als Ergebnis interner Flügelkämpfe (Budge et al. 2010), dem Verlust von (Stamm-) Wählern oder äußerem Druck nach unpopulären Policies (Budge 1994, S. 453). Obgleich alternierendes Verhalten auf den ersten Blick ein wenig simpel erscheint, umgeht eine Partei so einerseits die Gefahr eines ideologischen „leapfroggings“ von Konkurrenten, andererseits kann auf Dauer die Issue Ownership eines Themas und die Unterstützung durch die Kernwählerschaft gesichert werden (Budge 2015). Der Logik der zweiten Regel zufolge entscheiden sich Parteien im Lichte des vorangegangenen Wahlergebnisses, wobei sich wenig überraschend zeigte, dass erst deutliche Verluste zu einer stärkeren Neupositionierung führen (Schumacher et al. 2015; Mair 1983; Panebianco 1988). Beides spricht für eine langfristig relativ stabile politische Position und tendenziell gegen die Aufnahme oder stärkere Betonung grüner Themen, sofern eine Partei, wie originärer Weise die grüne Parteifamilie, nicht von Anbeginn diese Thematik adressiert hat. Veränderungen ergeben sich indes aus dem Parteienwettbewerb: das Auftreten grüner Parteien als Konkurrenten zwang die etablierten Parteien zu einer Antwort – manche reagierten auf den Erfolg der Neulinge in dem sie ihre Themen übernahmen, herunterspielten oder ihnen gar kontrovers entgegentraten (Meguid 2008). Veränderungen sind somit immer auch eine Reaktion auf vorangegangene Policy Moves von Rivalen (Adams und Somer-Topcu 2009; Williams 2015). Die Orientierung an den politischen Wettbewerbern steht dabei nur scheinbar im Widerspruch zu den grundsätzlichen Bemühungen, eine bestimmte Wählerbasis durch glaubwürdige Positionierung innerhalb eines bestimmten ideologischen Spektrums zu sichern: Parteien agieren im Rahmen der Optimierung der auf sie entfallenden Wählerstimmen innerhalb eines Nullsummenspiels – eine Positionsveränderung von Konkurrenten kann erlauben, auch die eigene Position zu verschieben ohne

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Wähler zu verlieren. Damit ist es den Parteien möglich, auf grundlegende Verschiebungen des zugrunde liegenden Wählerpotentials zu reagieren und langsam den ursprünglichen ideologischen Korridor zu verlassen (Laver und Sergenti 2012). Gesellschaft Die Gesellschaft trägt Regelungsbedarf an das politische System heran und unterstützt dieses, wenn hinreichende Legitimation vorhanden ist. Entsprechend wichtig ist es für das zentrale politische Entscheidungssystem, enge Verbindungen zur Gesellschaft zu unterhalten. Problematisch für politische Entscheidungsträger ist, dass Positionen in der Gesellschaft nicht unmittelbar bestimmt werden können – ein Grund, warum Parteien in einem Umfeld der Unsicherheit agieren (Budge 1994). Am ehesten noch können in repräsentativen Demokratien Wahlergebnisse als geronnene Form der öffentlichen Meinung interpretiert werden, da diese unmittelbare Auswirkung sowohl auf die Parteien als auch auf die Besetzung von Regierungsämtern haben. Eine entscheidende Rolle kommt hierbei dem Medianwähler zu. Wie McDonald und Budge (2005) überzeugend herausarbeiten, lässt sich anhand der „Median-Mandatstheorie“ eine Linie vom Medienwähler zum Medianparlamentarier, zum Median der Regierung und schließlich zum Outcome ziehen, denn „[w]ithout the median voter, a knowable and coherent majority simply cannot be formed, by definition“ (McDonald und Budge 2005, S. 26). Hierbei berücksichtigt die Medianwählertheorie explizit eine ideologische Dimension, da lediglich gilt, dass Parteien und Wähler ihre Präferenzen in einem ähnlichen Politikraum formulieren müssen. Übertragen auf die Ökologie-Ökonomie-Dimension lässt sich folglich erwarten, dass es zunächst eines grüner werdenden Medianwählers bedarf, damit Parteien diesen Themen in ihrer Programmatik stärkeres Gewicht geben. Verbände und Gewerkschaften Ähnlich wie Parteien nehmen auch Verbände und Gewerkschaften Forderungen von Teilen der Gesellschaft auf, bündeln und artikulieren diese und nehmen damit Einfluss auf die Entscheidungen des zentralen politischen Entscheidungssystems. Die Etablierung korporatistischer Arrangements zielt darauf ab, durch das Zusammenspiel von konfligierenden Interessensvertretungen und dem Staat als Vermittler Probleme kollektiven Handelns zu überwinden. Bezogen auf Umweltschutz bzw. den Umgang mit natürlichen Ressourcen – beides abstrakte Güter bei denen kollektive Handlungsprobleme höchst virulent sind (Ostrom 1990) – gibt es zwei widersprüchliche Thesen (Jahn 2016b, S. 22 f.): So begünstigen einerseits bereits existente korporatistische Strukturen, dass überhaupt Probleme des kollektiven Handelns adressiert werden. Da es sich hierbei oft um ökonomische Ziele handelt, hilft es, wenn ökologische Überlegungen im Einklang mit diesen stehen. Der regelmäßige

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Informationsaustausch und die Etablierung von Vertrauen zwischen allen Konfliktbeteiligten sowie die mitunter direkte Beteiligung an politischen Entscheidungen sorgen dann für eine höhere Akzeptanz, Sichtbarkeit und Relevanz grüner Themen, die sich in entsprechenden Forderungen in Richtung der (Regierungs-) Parteien niederschlagen können. Demgegenüber steht die These, dass korporatistische Arrangements zwischen Gewerkschaften und Arbeitgeberverbänden sich lange vor allem mit rein ökonomischen Fragen beschäftigten und Umweltaspekte bzw. grüne Themen marginalisierten, mitunter als Statthalter einer „economic growth coalition“ in Opposition zur Umweltbewegung stehen (Schnaiberg 1980, S. 208). Obgleich einige Untersuchungen zu Umweltpolitik gezeigt haben, dass Korporatismus eine bedeutende Erklärvariable darstellt (Jahn 1998; Scruggs 2001, 1999) bleibt in unserem Fall zunächst offen, ob sich die Stärke und Veränderung des Korporatismus auch in Policy Moves von Parteien niederschlägt. Neue soziale Bewegungen Anders als Verbände und Gewerkschaften haben soziale Bewegungen keinen direkten Zugang zum politisch-administrativen System. Dennoch können auch sie wichtige Akteure bei der Interessenaggregation und -artikulation in demokratisch verfassten Gesellschaften sein. Zunächst sind soziale Bewegungen „best conceived of as temporary public spaces, as moments of collective creation that provide societies with ideas, identities, and even ideals“ (Eyerman und Jamison 1991, S. 4). Sie können dann entstehen, wenn die Responsivität des politischen Systems zu gering oder zu langsam ausfällt, d. h. die Bürgerinnen und Bürger den Eindruck gewinnen, dass neue Themen durch die Parteien ignoriert werden. Merkmal solcher Bewegungen, wie in den 1970ern und 1980ern die Anti-Atomkraftund die Umweltbewegung, ist gerade, dass sie die tradierten Formen der politischen Entscheidungsfindung und Willensbildung infrage stellen, ihre Aktionen also bewusst „violate the boundaries or tolerance limits of a system, thereby pushing the system beyond the range of variations that it can tolerate without altering its structure“ (Melucci 1989, S. 29). Ihre Existenz kann somit als grundlegendes Problem interpretiert werden, da sie die korrekte Funktionsweise des politischen Systems infrage stellen. Dies gilt besonders, wenn neue soziale Bewegungen dauerhaft erstarken. In responsiven Systemen hingegen würden derartige Bewegungen schnell wieder verschwinden (Jahn 2016b, S. 26), weil entweder Parteien versuchen die Unterstützung dieser Bewegungen zu erlangen, indem sie entsprechende Forderungen übernehmen und in Outputs des politisch-administrativen Systems übersetzen (Dryzek et al. 2003), oder ihrerseits den Weg der Institutionalisierung gehen und neue Parteien gründen mit dem Ergebnis, dass sie spätestens dann als neue Konkurrenten im Parteienwettbewerb eine Reaktion der etablierten Parteien hervorrufen.

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Beides lässt erwarten, dass sich die Stärke der neuen sozialen Bewegungen in einer stärkeren Betonung grüner Themen in der Programmatik von Parteien niederschlägt. Der Erfolg neuer sozialer Bewegungen hängt also direkt von der Rückkopplungsschleife zwischen dem politischen System und der Umwelt ab, wobei aber Ruchts (1999, S. 205) Analyse des „Paradox der Umweltbewegung“ in weiten Teilen auch heute noch gültig ist, nämlich die Tatsache, dass “[its] success becomes apparent when we consider the movement ’s growth and consolidation, its role as an agenda setter […] On the other hand, however, the movement has been largely unsuccessful in halting environmental deterioration.“ Damit wird zugleich ein Licht auf den finalen Aspekt geworfen, dessen Einfluss auf „grüne“ Policy Moves ergründet werden soll. Umweltproblemdruck Das gesamte politische System sowie die Gesellschaft sind in die Umwelt eingebettet und von dieser abhängig. Umweltveränderungen des ökologischen Systems haben daher direkte Konsequenzen für die Bevölkerung. Obgleich es keinen mechanistischen Effekt gibt der von verstärkten Umweltproblemen automatisch zu erhöhter Berücksichtigung dieses Themas in Wahlprogrammen führt, so agieren Parteien ihrerseits nicht im luftleeren Raum. Jede Veränderung wird über die Artikulation dieser Probleme durch Akteure in das politisch-administrative System eingespeist. Dennoch kann auf die gleiche Problemlage mit unterschiedlichen Lösungsrezepten reagiert werden, sodass Raum für ideologisch divergierende Antworten bestehen bleibt. Im Sinne der Easton’schen Rückkopplungsschleife wirkt die Implementation von Umweltschutzmaßnahmen und ökologischen Policies auf die Umwelt zurück, schwächt den Problemdruck und damit möglicherweise auch die Themensalienz. Umgekehrt kann eine massive Verschlechterung der Umweltperformanz als Ergebnis wachstumsorientierter Policies die Sichtbarkeit und Relevanz ökologischer Positionen erhöhen und somit erneut via Gesellschaft, Korporatismus, oder neuen sozialen Bewegungen aber auch direkt auf Parteien wirken, gleichsam als Vorwegnahme des zukünftigen Handlungsbedarfs. Offen bleibt indes, welchen Einfluss das Level der Umweltverschmutzung hat: so könnte eine Umwelt, in der Leben grundsätzlich bereits problematisch ist, zu einer stärkeren Betonung ökologischer Standpunkte führen. Während Jahns (2016b) Analyse Hoffnung macht, dass grünere Positionen des Agenda Setters zu einer Verbesserung der Umweltperformanz führen, stellte sich die Frage, was dazu führt, dass Parteien grüner werden, jene ideologischen Veränderungen also, die den Startpunkt seiner Analyse bilden. Um die Rückwirkung von Umweltperformanz auf Policy Moves zu untersuchen haben wir sie neben weiteren

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Einflussfaktoren in ein systemtheoretisch inspiriertes Modell der Interessenvermittlung (Jahn 2000, S. 71) eingebettet. Dies bildet die Basis für die folgende empirische Analyse zur Erklärung von Policy Moves auf der Ökologie-Ökonomie-Dimension.

3

Daten und Methodik

Um die Frage zu klären, ob die inhärente Logik des Parteienwettbewerbs, korporatistische Arrangements, neue soziale Bewegungen, der Medianwähler oder der unvermittelte Umweltproblemdruck dafür sorgen, dass Parteien in ihrer Programmatik grüner werden, untersuchen wir den Einfluss der vorgenannten Faktoren auf die Policy Moves von 150 Parteien in 20 hochentwickelten, westlichen Demokratien1 von 1981 bis 2012 entlang der von Jahn (2016b) identifizierten ideologischen Ökologie-Ökonomie-Dimension. Im Analysefokus stehen hierbei im Sinne des systemtheoretischen „flows“ die Änderung der jeweiligen Messgrößen und weniger ihre absolute Höhe. Veränderungen sind von zentraler Bedeutung, weil diese den gewohnten Status Quo infrage stellen. Sie wirken sich sichtbar auf die Lebenswelt aus, stellen Gewissheiten infrage und signalisieren Handlungsbedarf. Am Beispiel der Umweltperformanz lässt sich dies eindrücklich illustrieren: Während die Entnahme von Wasser aus einer natürlichen Quelle normal ist, unabhängig vom absoluten Maß, so stört erst die Änderung dieser Entnahmemenge das bestehende Gleichgewicht und erfordert vielfältige Anpassungen, zum Beispiel durch kostenintensivere Erschließung tieferer Wasserschichten bei versiegenden Grundwasserquellen oder der Kontingentierung von Verbrauchsmengen. Erst die Veränderung also erfordert eine Reaktion. Analog gilt diese Logik auch für andere Einflussfaktoren: Während sich Parteien in ihrem jeweiligen ideologischen Korridor einrichten, bringen Änderungen der Programmatik der Konkurrenten oder das Auftauchen neuer Mitbewerber Bewegung in das Feld und erfordern eine Neupositionierungen. Vor diesem Hintergrund ist Parteienwettbewerb selten statisch, wie es formale, räumliche Politikmodelle oft annehmen; vielmehr gilt, dass „party competition is a complex and evolving dynamic process“ (Laver und Sergenti 2012, S. 3). 1

Diese sind: Australien, Österreich, Belgien, Kanada, Dänemark, Finnland, Frankreich, Deutschland, Griechenland, Irland, Italien, Niederlande, Neuseeland, Norwegen, Portugal, Spanien, Schweden, Schweiz, Großbritannien, und die USA. Wir schließen hierbei Japan aus, weil es „really is a one-off case […], since it is the only instance of a country of non-European antecedents to become an advanced capitalist democracy “ (Castles 1998, S. 9).

20

N. Düpont und M. Rachuj

3.1 Die Veränderung grüner Parteipositionen Bisherige Studien zur Veränderung ideologischer Parteipositionen fokussierten fast ausschließlich auf die in westlichen Demokratien etablierte Links-RechtsDimension. Jahn (2016b) indes konnte zeigen, dass insbesondere zur Erklärung von Umweltperformanz eine zweite ideologische Dimension höchst relevant ist: die „Ökologie vs. Ökonomie“-Dimension („green-growth“). Während in Ländern wie Kanada, den Niederlanden und Norwegen grüne Kernthemen dauerhaft in die etablierte Links-Rechts-Dimension aufgenommen wurden, unterscheidet sich dies in anderen Ländern sowohl zeitlich als auch hinsichtlich der Frage, ob sie als „linke“ oder „rechte“ Themen integriert wurden (Jahn 2014, S. 300). Während es hinreichend Evidenz gibt, unter welchen Bedingungen sich Parteien auf der Links-Rechts-Achse verändern (für einen Überblick siehe Adams 2012; Fagerholm 2015), ist bisher offen, ob ähnliche Einflussfaktoren und Argumente analog für Positionsveränderungen auf einer explizit „grünen “ ideologischen Dimension gelten. Zur Messung des Bedeutungsgewinns oder -verlustes grüner Themen in Wahlprogrammen nutzen wir daher den von Jahn (2016b) entwickelten „Green-Growth Core Index“ (GG Core), welchem die Inhaltsanalyse von Wahlprogrammen durch das Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP; Volkens et al. 2020) als Datengrundlage dient. Startpunkt der Indexbildung ist die „grüne politische Theorie“, in der Jahn (2016b, S. 43 ff.) drei Perspektiven identifiziert: dem produktionistischen Paradigma stehen die Pole Umweltschutz und Ökologismus entgegen, wobei ersteres weniger stark in Opposition zum Produktionismus steht. Im zweiten Schritt identifiziert er zu den jeweiligen Polen passende CMP-Kategorien (pers) (vgl. Tab. 1). Um die inhärente Dimensionalität einer Zusammenstellung unter-

Tab. 1 Core Items der Ökologie-Ökonomie-Dimension Ökonomie

Ökologie

Wachstum

Umweltschutz

Ökologismus

Per408: Economic Goals

Per501: Environmental Protection: Positive

Per416: Anti-Growth Economy

Per410: Productivitiy: Positive Per411: Technology and Infrastructure: Positive (Quelle: Jahn 2016b, S. 46)

Ökologie vs. Ökonomie. Zum Einfluss von Umweltperformanz …

21

schiedlicher CMP-Kategorien zu berücksichtigten, erfolgt eine multidimensionale Skalierung und Extraktion eines Gewichtungsfaktors, welcher die Anordnung der pers entlang einer einzigen Dimension – „Ökologie“ (negative Werte) vs. „Ökonomie“ (positive Werte) – erlaubt (Jahn 2016b, S. 46 ff.). Die abhängige Variable unserer Analyse schließlich ist die Positionsveränderung einer Partei i auf der GG Core-Dimension zwischen zwei Wahlzeitpunkten, ein sogenannter Policy Move: GG Cor eit = GG Cor eW ahlzeit punkt it − GG Cor eW ahlzeit punkt it−1 Ein positiver Wert bedeutet, dass eine Partei in ihrem Wahlprogramm verstärkt wachstumsorientierte Aussagen tätigt, während ein negativer Wert erfasst, dass eine Partei im Vergleich zur vergangenen Wahl stärker grüne Themen akzentuiert. Abb. 2 zeigt die Entwicklung der GG Core Positionen der 150 untersuchten Parteien zwischen 1981 und 2012. Augenscheinlich ist die Validität des GG Core-Indexes gegeben, da Parteien, die der grünen Parteifamilie zugerechnet werden, deutlich zum grünen Pol tendieren, dicht gefolgt von Agrariern. Die Daten spiegeln auch das Dilemma insbesondere der Sozialdemokraten wieder, welches eine ins links-libertär vs. rechts-autoritär kippende Hauptkonfliktachse in vielen westlichen Demokratien mit sich brachte (Kitschelt 1994): während sich einige sozialdemokratische Parteien der grünen Thematik öffneten, gingen andere vor dem Hintergrund der ursprünglichen „klassischen“ Wählerklientel den umgedrehten Weg und besetzen weiterhin stark wachstumsorientierte Positionen. Über den gesamten Zeitraum betrachtet findet sich jedoch Evidenz für Ruchts „Paradox der Umweltbewegung“, dass nämlich zumindest im Sinne des Agenda Settings im Mittel eine stärkere Orientierung hin zu ökologischeren Standpunkten stattgefunden hat.

3.2 Die Einflussfaktoren und ihre Messung Mit der Messung der abhängigen Variable als Policy Move schließen wir analytisch an die umfangreiche Literatur an, die sich seit der Studie von Adams et al. (2004) um die Frage „What moves parties?“ dreht. Mit Ausnahme von Adams et al. (2009) und Ezrow und Hellwig (2014), die den Einfluss wirtschaftlicher Globalisierung auf Links-Rechts-Positionen untersuchen, hat diese Forschung institutionelle Rahmen- oder Umweltbedingungen bislang weitgehend ignoriert

22

N. Düpont und M. Rachuj

Abb. 2 Die Entwicklung der Ökologie-Ökonomie-Dimension, 1981–2012. (Quelle: eigene Darstellung)

und sich vornehmlich mit Parteicharakteristiken (bspw. Adams et al. 2006; Schumacher et al. 2013) oder dem Einfluss bestimmter Wählergruppen (vgl. Adams und Ezrow 2009; Ezrow et al. 2011) befasst. Gemein ist allen Studien die regelmäßige Feststellung, dass „political parties shift their ideological positions in response to public opinion“ (Adams et al. 2004, S. 608). Um den Einfluss der Gesellschaft und der öffentlichen Meinung im Modell zu berücksichtigen, operationalisieren wir die Veränderung des Medienwählers basierend auf der von Kim und Fording (1998) entwickelten und von McDonald und Budge (2005) modifizierten Messung via Parteiideologie-

Ökologie vs. Ökonomie. Zum Einfluss von Umweltperformanz …

23

und Wahldaten (vgl. Adams und Somer-Topcu 2009; Williams 2015). Sie basiert auf der Annahme, dass Wahlergebnisse eine Form institutionell geronnener öffentlicher Meinung sind. Der Vorteil gegenüber Umfragen besteht darin, dass Daten für deutlich mehr Länder und Wahlzeitpunkte verfügbar sind. Um die Position des Medianwählers für die hier untersuchte Forschungsfrage nutzbar zu machen übertragen wir diese, analog zu den Policy Moves, von der Links-RechtsAchse auf die Ökologie-Ökonomie-Dimension und berechnen die Veränderung des Medianwählers zwischen zwei Wahlzeitpunkten. Wie im obigen Zitat von Laver und Sergenti deutlich wurde, ist Parteiwettbewerb nicht statisch. Mehrere Studien zeigen, dass sich Parteien gegenseitig beobachten und aufeinander reagieren, Parteienwettbewerb mitunter also aus einer diffusionalen Perspektive betrachtet werden sollte (Düpont und Rachuj 2021, S. 3): sie reagieren gleichförmig auf vorangegangene Policy Moves der Konkurrenten (Adams und Somer-Topcu 2009; Williams 2015), sie begegnen neuen Konkurrenten durch Übernahme oder Herunterspielen ihrer Themen (Meguid 2008), und „they adjust their issue attention in response to (lagged) changes in other parties’ issue attention’“ (Green-Pedersen und Mortensen 2015, S. 748). Zur Operationalisierung dieser dem Parteienwettbewerb inhärenten Konkurrenzlogik nehmen wir den Mittelwert der Policy Moves der jeweiligen Konkurrenten bei der vorhergehenden Wahl als unabhängige Variable auf. Zur Messung des Einflusses von Verbänden und Gewerkschaften greifen wir auf den Korporatismus-Index von Jahn (2016a) zurück. Aufbauend auf die Arbeiten von Siaroff (1999), entwickelt er einen Index, der Korporatismus als Trias aus Struktur, Funktion und Reichweite auffasst, bei dem das Ergebnis korporatistischer Arrangements aus dem Zusammenspiel von konfligierenden Interessensvertretungen (input) und dem Staat als Vermittler (throughput) entsteht, wenn eine Einigung mit gewisser Reichweite (output) erzielt wird (Jahn 2016a, S. 52). Obgleich der Index einen starken Fokus auf Gewerkschaften und Tarifverhandlungen legt, steht er als zeitvarianter Index für alle untersuchten Länder zur Verfügung und eignet sich daher gut für longitudinale Analysen, insbesondere da gezeigt werden konnte, dass korporatistische Arrangements auch im Bereich der Umweltpolitik relevant sind (Jahn 1998; Scruggs 1999, 2001). Die systematische Erfassung neuer sozialer Bewegungen („new social movements“, NSM) ist ein stark unterbelichtetes Feld der vergleichenden Politikwissenschaft. Trotz dieser Umstände entwickelte Jahn (2016b, S. 181 ff.) einen zeitvarianten Index der Stärke der NSM aufbauend auf spärliche, quantitativvergleichende Daten, die er systematisch um Informationen aus Länder- und Fallstudien ergänzte. Der Index kombiniert insbesondere die Stärke (oder Schwäche) der in vielen Ländern seit den 1970er auftretenden Umweltbewegungen mit der

24

N. Düpont und M. Rachuj

Stärke der Anti-Atomkraftbewegung. Noch bevor in einigen Ländern aus diesen Bewegungen die ersten grünen Parteien entstanden, und erst recht mit dem Eintritt in den Parteienwettbewerb, forderten sie den Status Quo heraus und zwangen die etablierten Parteien zu Reaktionen. Der Index ist daher gut geeignet, nicht nur den Einfluss dieser Bewegungen auf das Parteiensystem als Ganzes, sondern auch den Einfluss auf die Programmatik einzelner Parteien zu untersuchen. Schließlich gilt es herauszufinden, ob die Umweltverschmutzung bzw. die Umweltperformanz eines Landes einen unmittelbaren Einfluss auf das Aufkommen oder Verschwinden grüner Themen in Parteiprogrammen hat, in dem Parteien qua externem Handlungsbedarf zu einer Reaktion gezwungen werden. Eine Operationalisierung über einzelne Indikatoren wie Luft- oder Wasserverschmutzung greift dabei zu kurz. In einer ausführlichen Diskussion der Vorund Nachteile bestehender Indizes zur Erfassung des Umweltzustandes eines Landes stellt Jahn (2016b, S. 91 ff.) heraus, dass ein Umweltperformanzindex nicht nur der Komplexität und Multidimensionalität von Umweltproblemen gerecht werden muss, sondern nur solche Aspekte berücksichtigen sollte, die von (politischen) Akteuren erkannt und beeinflusst bzw. für die sie verantwortlich gemacht werden können. Mittels Faktorenanalyse von 14 dafür infrage kommenden Teilindikatoren identifiziert Jahn (2016b, S. 132 ff.) drei Dimensionen – „general environmental performance“, „mundane performance“ sowie „water pollution“ – wobei der erste Faktor den Löwenanteil der Varianz der Daten erklärt. Positive Werte spiegeln hierbei einen schlechten Zustand der Umwelt wider, niedrige Werte eine gute Performanz. Der Index der „allgemeinen Umweltperformanz“ eignet sich besonders zur Untersuchung des unmittelbaren Einflusses auf Parteien, denn „[m]any issues contained in this dimension are often in the headlines in the explanation of climate change (atmospheric emissions), dying forests (SOx, NOx, CO), environmental degradation through consumption (waste), or technological progress (nuclear energy)“ (Jahn 2016b, S. 136) und signalisieren somit aktuellen und zukünftigen Handlungsbedarf.

3.3 Modelspezifikation Um den Einfluss der unterschiedlichen Faktoren auf die Veränderungen der Betonung grüner Themen zu untersuchen schätzen wir eine lineare OLS-Regression. Eine Besonderheit bei der Analyse von Policy Moves stellt hierbei die hierarchische Datenstruktur dar, weil die beobachteten Veränderungen der ideologischen Position auf der Ökologie-Ökonomie-Dimension sowohl innerhalb der Parteien verbunden und diese wiederum in ein Land eingebettet sind. Gleichzeitig

Ökologie vs. Ökonomie. Zum Einfluss von Umweltperformanz …

25

klumpen die beobachteten Policy Moves innerhalb von Wahlen, welche ebenfalls in Ländern geclustert sind. Obgleich Mehrebenenmodelle grundsätzlich geeignet sind diese Struktur zu berücksichtigen2 ergaben die Voranalysen, dass der Intraklassenkorrelationskoeffizienten sehr oft nahe Null lag, so dass eine Gruppierung auf diesen Ebenen keinen Mehrwert hat (Hox und Wijngaards-de Meij 2015, S. 135). Auch die Nullhypothese, dass die Varianz zwischen den Clustern Null ist, konnte nicht verworfen werden – ein weiteres Indiz, dass Mehrebenenmodelle nicht notwendig sind (Rabe-Hesketh und Skrondal 2012, S. 536). Um dem longitudinalen Charakter der Daten dennoch Rechnung zu tragen, machen wir Gebrauch von einem statistisch simpleren Modell, einer linearen Paneldatenanalyse mit „fixed effects“-Schätzern (FE) für Parteien. Eine Empfehlung für FE-Modelle gilt vor allem dann, wenn die Namen der Untersuchungsobjekte nicht austauschbar sind, anders als bspw. die Namen von Surveyteilnehmern (Fortin-Rittberger 2015, S. 396). In der Ergebnistabelle berichten wir ergänzend die Hausman-Test-Statistik zur Abwägung, ob das FE-Modell gegenüber einem Modell mit „random effects“-Schätzer (RE) zu bevorzugen wäre.3 Im Appendix befinden sich die entsprechenden Ergebnisse der RE-Modelle; alternative Modelspezifizierungen (bspw. Mehrebenenmodelle) sowie weitere Robustheits- und Sensitivitätsanalysen unterstützen die berichteten Ergebnisse und werden auf Anfrage von den Autoren bereitgestellt. Tab. 2 zeigt zusammenfassend die Fallauswahl, die Anzahl der betrachteten Parteien pro Land bzw. die Anzahl der untersuchten Policy Moves neben deskriptiven Kennzahlen der eben diskutierten unabhängigen Variablen.

4

Was macht Parteien „grüner“?

Ausgehend von einem systemtheoretisch inspirierten Modell der Interessenvermittlung gehen wir der Frage nach, ob die Aufnahme grüner Themen in Parteiprogramme vom Parteienwettbewerb, der Umweltperformanz, dem Medienwähler oder intermediären Akteuren abhängt. Hierzu analysieren wir die Positionsänderung von Parteien auf der Ökologie-Ökonomie-Dimension bzw. die Stärke und die Veränderungen korporatistischer Arrangements, neuer sozialer 2

Siehe Meyer (2013, S. 225 ff.) für eine ausführliche Diskussion der mit der Datenstruktur einhergehenden Herausforderungen und Möglichkeiten, ihnen zu begegnen. 3 Für eine ausführlichere Diskussion der statistischen Unterschiede sowie der Vor- und Nachteile von FE vs. RE-Modellen siehe bspw. Plümper et al. 2005; Rabe-Hesketh und Skrondal 2012.

1981

1983

1982

Norwegen

Portugal

Spanien

1981

Neuseeland

1983

Deutschland

1981

1981

Frankreich

1983

1983

Finnland

Niederlande

1981

Dänemark

Italien

1984

Kanada

1981

1981

Belgien

1981

1983

Österreich

Irland

1983

Australien

Griechenland

Min

Land

Jahr

2011

2011

2009

2011

2012

2008

2011

2009

2009

2012

2011

2011

2011

2010

2008

2010

Max

10

9

7

9

12

12

7

5

5

6

9

13

5

13

4

5

N

Anzahl Parteien

52

53

56

38

64

40

39

27

34

32

53

91

29

68

33

35

N

5,85

−0,03

2,15

−0,16

2,99 5,39

0,20

−0,05

3,54

−0,55 5,83

4,76

−0,67 0,00

2,76 3,88

−0,45 −0,05

3,24

0,02

2,30

5,36

−0,47 0,07

4,13 3,63

4,30

−0,14 −0,70

3,33

−0,34

−1,09

SD

Ø

Policy Moves (GG Core)

Parteienwettbewerb

−0,01 1,67

−0,06 1,32

2,16 3,06

−0,34

3,54

2,18

3,97

2,65

−0,44

0,03

−0,48

−0,51

−0,08

2,38

1,65

−0,21 0,09

3,93

2,47

3,42

1,67

3,29

1,92

SD

−0,05

−0,28

−0,70

−0,59

−0,29

−0,15

Ø

Policy Moves Konkurrenten (GG Core)

−0,33

0,85

−0,09

0,21

−0,44

−1,27

−0,48

1,39

3,13

2,28

3,20

1,57

3,75

3,26

2,23

3,33

−0,52

1,62

−0,01

3,43

3,92

3,07

1,50

2,55

2,15

SD

−0,16

−0,35

−0,38

−1,25

−0,33

−0,40

−0,64

Ø

−0,39

−1,90

0,76

0,31

1,60

0,30

−1,93 0,41

1,46

0,80

1,23

0,93

1,34

0,98

0,51

1,16

0,35

0,51

0,58

0,28

SD

0,87

−1,00

−0,74

−1,62

2,93

−0,64

−0,44

0,45

−1,56

−1,33

−0,11

−1,92

Ø

0,29

0,00

0,74

−0,90

0,79

0,47

−0,16

0,20

0,42

0,07

0,99

0,49

−1,26

0,65

0,93

−0,43

Ø

0,14

0,10

0,29

0,45

0,16

0,27

0,57

0,16

0,01

0,05

0,22

0,12

0,03

0,23

0,04

0,48

SD

Stärke Korporatismus 1981–2012

Intermediäre Akteure Stärke NSM 1981–2012

Gesellschaft  Medianwähler (GG Core)

Tab. 2 Fallauswahl und deskriptive Statistiken der unabhängigen Variablen Umweltbedingungen

66,55

56,39

65,83

70,34

61,11

63,58

61,89

63,76

67,16

68,04

74,70

65,74

96,45

69,98

60,78

82,52

Ø

(Fortsetzung)

3,41

4,96

3,46

2,29

5,45

2,38

4,23

2,24

5,67

5,18

4,12

4,84

2,08

4,14

1,97

1,36

SD

Umweltperformanz 1981–2012

26 N. Düpont und M. Rachuj

Min

1982

1983

1983

1984

1981

Land

Schweden

Schweiz

Großbritannien

USA

Gesamt

Jahr

2012

2012

2010

2011

2010

Max

Tab. 2 (Fortsetzung)

150

2

4

6

7

N

Anzahl Parteien

874

16

19

41

54

N 3,45 3,68 2,19 2,04 4,11

−0,26 −0,17 −0,21 −0,24

SD

0,34

Ø

Policy Moves (GG Core)

Parteienwettbewerb

−0,22

−0,08

−0,16

−0,15

0,40

Ø

2,60

2,23

2,09

2,34

2,36

SD

Policy Moves Konkurrenten (GG Core)

−0,26

−0,19

−0,35

0,02

0,23

Ø

2,77

1,68

1,99

2,16

2,98

SD

−0,32

0,56

−0,92

1,45

0,17

Ø

1,53

1,55

0,39

1,42

0,94

SD

0,26

−1,28

−0,93

0,29

0,56

Ø

0,64

0,00

0,11

0,07

0,17

SD

Stärke Korporatismus 1981–2012

Intermediäre Akteure Stärke NSM 1981–2012

Gesellschaft  Medianwähler (GG Core)

Umweltbedingungen

67,70

88,28

70,40

60,80

68,03

Ø

9,20

4,30

7,50

5,86

4,96

SD

Umweltperformanz 1981–2012

Ökologie vs. Ökonomie. Zum Einfluss von Umweltperformanz … 27

28

N. Düpont und M. Rachuj

Bewegungen und der Umweltverschmutzung der betreffenden Länder. Die Analyse erfolgt in konsekutiven Schritten: Zunächst berechnen wir separate Modelle für den Parteienwettbewerb, die intermediären Akteure sowie die Umweltperformanz. Abschließend schätzen wir alle Faktoren in einem Gesamtmodell, um die multiple Natur des politischen Prozesses zu berücksichtigen. Zur Erinnerung sei vermerkt, dass negative Werte der abhängigen Variable beobachtet werden, wenn Parteien „grüner“ werden, während positive Werte der Policy Moves auf eine stärkere Betonung wachstumsorientierter Positionen hindeuten. Tab. 3 fasst die Ergebnisse der Regressionsanalyse zusammen. Ergebnis des ersten Modells ist, dass sich Parteien entlang der ÖkonomieÖkologie-Dimension so verhalten wie dies bereits für die Links-Rechts Dimension berichtet wurde (Adams et al. 2004, S. 608). Im Sinne der „alternation rule“ (Budge 1994, S. 453) zeigt der negative Koeffizient des vorherigen Policy Moves, dass Parteien häufig mit einer gegenläufigen Bewegung zur nächsten Wahl reagieren, sodass sich eine Art „Sägezahnmuster“ ergibt. Auch auf der Ökologie-Ökonomie-Dimension oszillieren sie innerhalb eines bestimmten Korridors, um einerseits ideologisches „leapfrogging“ zu vermeiden als auch langfristig „ihre“ Themenhoheit zu sichern (Budge 2015). Der positive Koeffizient für die Policy Moves der Konkurrenten wiederum zeigt, dass sich Parteien bei ökologischen Themen an ihren Rivalen orientieren: auf „grüner“ werdende Konkurrenten reagieren Parteien mit einer stärkeren Akzentuierung dieser Themen bei der nächsten Wahl. Analog gilt dies aber auch, wenn die Konkurrenz verstärkt wachstumsorientierte Positionen vertritt. Die Ergebnisse entsprechen hierbei den Erkenntnissen zum Einfluss von Rivalen auf Policy Moves in der Links-Rechts-Dimension (Adams und Somer-Topcu 2009; Williams 2015). Damit also im Sinne der Jahn’schen Analyse der Agenda Setter „grüner“ wird und zu einer Verbesserung der Umweltperformanz führt, bedarf es offensichtlich eines Impulses von „außen“. Im zweiten Modell analysieren wir daher den Einfluss intermediärer Akteure sowie der Gesellschaft. Dabei zeigt sich zunächst das erwartete Muster: Die Änderung der Position des Medienwählers hat einen starken, positiven Effekt auf die Änderung der Themensalienz in Parteiprogrammen in dieselbe Richtung. Umso „grüner“ der Medianwähler wird, umso „grüner“ wird auch das betreffende Parteiprogramm. Dieses Resultat entspricht den aus der MedianMandatstheorie gewonnenen Vermutungen, und bestätigt zugleich den starken Einfluss der öffentlichen Meinung auf Parteien (Adams et al. 2004). Unerwartete Ergebnisse zeigen sich indes bei der Analyse der intermediären Akteure. Die Zunahme der Stärke neuer sozialer Bewegung ist mit einer stärkeren Wachstumsorientierung der Parteien assoziiert. Obgleich dieser Effekt statistisch

(2)

(3)

(4)

(0,055)

Konkurrenten (GG Core)

UmweltperformanzWahljahr t−1

 UmweltperformanzWahljahr t−1

Stärke des KorporatismusWahljahr t−1

 Stärke des KorporatismusWahljahr t−1

Stärke der NSMWahljahr t−1

 Stärke der NSMWahljahr t−1

−0,086+ (0,047)

−0,116* (0,056)

(Fortsetzung)

(0,162)

(0,198)

(0,612) −0,464**

−0,080

(0,697) −0,492*

(0,737)

−0,120

(0,217)

(0,238) (0,832)

0,075 0,832

(0,234)

−0,037 0,498

0,316

(0,267)

(0,047)

(0,052) 0,367

0,588***

0,615***

(0,051)

0,299***

 Medianwähler (GG Core)

(0,031)

(0,035)

−0,451***

0,207***

−0,466***

Parteienwettbewerb Gesellschaft & Intermediäre Akteure Umweltperformanz Gesamt

(1)

Ø Vorheriger Policy Move der

Vorheriger Policy Move (GG Core)

Tab. 3 Regressionsergebnisse

Ökologie vs. Ökonomie. Zum Einfluss von Umweltperformanz … 29

2,008 3,869 0,213

R2

0,021

0,999

0,801

874

0,190

0,194

3,924

1,924

(3)

0,605

3,619

874

0,013

0,026

4,304

2,215

Ja

(3,695)

6,986+

(4)

0,030

22,762

874

0,323

0,388

3,428

2,318

Ja

(3,183)

5,352+

Anmerkung: Regressionskoeffizienten mit Standardfehlern in Klammern (Fixed-Effects Modell [FE]; Gruppierungsvariable: Parteien); Signifikanzniveau: + p < 0,10, * p < 0,05, ** p < 0,01, *** p < 0,001. Korrespondierende Random-Effects Modelle [RE] befinden sich im Appendix

Hausman-Test FE vs. RE: p

13,232

874

N

Hausman-Test FE vs. RE:

0,182

R2

innerhalb



SD of α j

Chi2

(0,352) Ja

(0,248) Ja

(2) −0,046

(1) −0,452+

SD of  i j



FE Part

Dekaden FE

Konstante

Tab. 3 (Fortsetzung)

30 N. Düpont und M. Rachuj

Ökologie vs. Ökonomie. Zum Einfluss von Umweltperformanz …

31

nicht signifikant und zudem im Gesamtmodell schwächer ausgeprägt ist, deutet er daraufhin, dass eine erstarkende Umweltbewegung zumindest in den betrachteten Ländern und dem beobachteten Zeitraum eher zu einer gegenläufigen Reaktion vieler Parteien geführt hat. Dies mag erklären, warum letztlich „grüne“ Parteien gegründet wurden, weisen die Ergebnisse des ersten Modells doch daraufhin, dass Bewegung im Parteienwettbewerb aus der Konkurrenzsituation erwächst. Ein ähnliches Ergebnis zeigt sich auch für die Stärke der neuen sozialen Bewegungen. Insgesamt ist damit nicht von einem eigenständigen Effekt neuer sozialer Bewegungen auf die Position von Parteien auszugehen. Dies spricht zunächst für grundsätzlich responsive politische Systeme, denen es gelingt Anforderungen der Gesellschaft umzusetzen, ohne dass dazu eine starke Umweltbewegung notwendig wäre. Wenn auch nicht Gegenstand dieser Analyse, so lässt sich auf Grundlage der Ergebnisse dennoch mutmaßen, dass in einigen Ländern im Sinne der Feedbackschleife des Modells der Interessenvermittlung eine Nichtbeachtung oder gar Ablehnung grüner Themen durch die etablierten Parteien zu einem Erstarken der Protestbewegung führte. Einschränkend gilt aber, dass unser Untersuchungszeitraum erst nach der Initialphase der Umweltbewegung Ende der 1970er Jahre und der Gründung erster grüner Parteien einsetzt, eine Ausdehnung des Analysezeitraums daher sicherlich nuanciertere Schlüsse zuließe. Analog zu den neuen sozialen Bewegungen verhält sich der Einfluss korporatistischer Akteure: Weder die absolute Höhe noch die Veränderung ihrer Stärke haben einen signifikanten Einfluss auf die Veränderung von Parteien hinsichtlich grüner Themen. Ungeachtet der statistischen Signifikanz lässt sich für den beobachteten Zeitraum aber auch hier festhalten, dass eine Zunahme korporatistischer Arrangements zu einer stärkeren Betonung von wachstumsorientierten Positionen führt. Mutmaßlich waren Verbände und Gewerkschaften in diesem Zeitraum noch stark an dem prägenden Gegensatz von Arbeit und Kapital orientiert, klammerten somit Fragen des Umweltschutzes in den von ihnen vermittelten Interessen aus und waren tendenziell weiterhin Teil der „economic growth coalition“ (Schnaiberg 1980, S. 208). Auch wenn es nicht an Evidenz mangelt, dass Umweltverschmutzung und Klimawandel negative Folgen für die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung haben (siehe exemplarisch Batten 2018; OECD 2015), bleibt abzuwarten, ob ein allgemeiner Bedeutungsgewinn ökologischer Themen dafür sorgt, dass auch Verbände und Gewerkschaften künftig stärker auf diese Problematik eingehen werden und in der Folge auch einen größeren Einfluss auf die Positionierung der Parteien erlangen werden. Jahn (2016b) konnte zeigen, dass ein grüner Agenda Setter einen positiven Einfluss auf die Umweltperformanz eines Landes hat. Im Sinne der Easton’schen Feedbackschleife stellt sich daher abschließend die Frage, inwieweit die Salienz

32

N. Düpont und M. Rachuj

grüner Themen in Parteiprogrammen unmittelbar durch den Zustand der Umwelt bedingt wird. Eine Antwort liefert das Umweltperformanz-Modell, indem die Stärke als auch die Veränderung der allgemeinen Umweltperformanz berücksichtigt ist. Interessant ist, dass sowohl die Veränderung als auch das Level einen statistisch signifikanten, negativen Einfluss haben. Zur leichteren Interpretation veranschaulicht Abb. 3 den Effekt der Umweltperformanz auf den vorhergesagten Policy Move auf der Ökologie-Ökonomie-Dimension. Eine Verschlechterung der Umweltperformanz (positive Werte) führt demnach zu einer stärkeren Hinwendung zu grünen Themen. Eine (starke) Verbesserung indes scheint dafür zu sorgen, dass der unmittelbare Problemdruck nachlässt und Parteien sich (wieder) verstärkt ökonomischen Positionen zuwenden. Ähnliches gilt für das Level der Umweltperformanz: während ein relativ guter Zustand (niedrige Werte) keinen statistisch signifikanten Einfluss hat, sorgt eine schlechte Umweltperformanz dafür, dass ökologische Positionen verstärkt betont werden. Dies zeigt, dass Jahns (2016b, S. 136) Vermutung zutreffend ist, dass „[m]any issues contained in this dimension are often in the headlines in the explanation

Abb. 3 Einfluss der Umweltperformanz auf Policy Moves (GG Core). (Anmerkung: Vorhergesagte Werte mit 90%-Konfidenzintervall basierend auf Modell 4; übrige Kovariaten auf ihrem Mittelwert konstant gehalten und unter der Annahme, dass FE = 0; die rechte Achse zeigt die Dichte der empirischen Verteilung. Quelle: eigene Darstellung)

Ökologie vs. Ökonomie. Zum Einfluss von Umweltperformanz …

33

of climate change […], dying forests […], environmental degradation […] or technological progress (nuclear energy)“ und daher mitunter unmittelbaren Einfluss auf Parteiprogramme haben, in dem die Notwendigkeit für Handeln und die Adressierung von Lösungen unausweichlich werden. Insgesamt weisen die Ergebnisse darauf hin, dass die Rückkopplungsschleife zwischen Parteien und ihrer Umwelt in den untersuchten Ländern grundsätzlich in Takt war, wobei vor allem Veränderungen, weniger jedoch die absolute Höhe der Umweltperformanz entscheidend ist. Im Sinne der Jahn’schen Analyse, dass ökologisch orientiertere Agenda Setter zu einer Verbesserung der Umweltperformanz beitragen, zeigt sich indes, dass umweltverbessernde Maßnahmen ein zweischneidiges Schwert sind: so notwendig sie angesichts der realen Umstände sind, so sehr sorgt eine Verbesserung dafür, dass der unmittelbare Handlungsdruck sinkt und schwächere Impulse für weitergehende Handlungen als neuerlicher Input einfließen. In der Gesamtschau der untersuchten Einflussfaktoren zeigt sich, dass dem Medienwähler eine prominente Rolle zufällt. Dies deutet auf ein rationales Verhalten von Parteien hin, da sie von der Gunst der Wähler abhängig und auf ihre Unterstützung angewiesen sind. Die Ignoranz für Änderungen des Wählerwillens würde kurz- wie langfristig negative Konsequenzen für die Existenz einer Partei haben. In diesem Sinne lässt sich auch erklären, dass die intermediären Akteure keinen direkten Einfluss auf grüne Parteienpositionen haben: Ihre Kapazität beschränkt sich auf die Beeinflussung der öffentlichen Meinung und auf eine informelle Vetospielerposition im politischen Prozess. Parteien können diesem Druck also ausweichen, solange sie in der Lage sind die Unterstützung der Wähler zu sichern. Bezüglich der Umweltperformanz zeigt sich, dass vor allem die Veränderung und weniger der absolute Problemdruck, die entscheidende Größe ist. Wie vermutet, reagieren Parteien stärker auf Veränderungen des Status Quo. Diese stellen eine neue Herausforderung dar, auf die Parteien reagieren müssen. Hinsichtlich des Parteienwettbewerbs wird deutlich, dass Parteien hier der inhärenten Logik des Wettbewerbs unterworfen sind. Die Umweltproblematik an sich stellt dabei die Funktionslogik nicht auf den Kopf. Vielmehr zeigen sich die gleichen Muster, wie sie bei den „old politics“ auf einer Links-Rechts-Achse zu beobachten sind: Parteien sind zunächst gebunden durch ihre eigene vergangene Positionierung. Um die Kernwählerschaft und ihr Issue Ownership zu sichern, können sie nicht allzu lange oder allzu weit von ihrer ideologischen Idealposition abweichen (Budge 2015). Policy Moves der Konkurrenten indes eröffnen neue Räume für eigene Positionsänderungen. Erst dann reagieren Parteien auf den ideologischen Drift des Parteiensystems und können ihre ursprüngliche Nische verlassen (Laver und Sergenti 2012).

34

5

N. Düpont und M. Rachuj

Schluss

Ausgangspunkt des Beitrags war die Feststellung, dass ökologisch orientierte Agenda Setter einen positiven Einfluss auf die Umweltperformanz eines Landes haben (Jahn 2016b). Unbeantwortet blieb aber die Frage, was dazu führt, dass Parteien sich ideologisch verändern und verstärkt ökologische Standpunkte in ihren Wahlprogrammen betonen, also eben jene Policy Moves machen, die im Sinne der Jahn’schen Analyse zur Verbesserung der Umweltbedingungen führen. Ausgehend von einem systemtheoretisch inspirierten Modell der Interessenvermittlung (Jahn 2000, S. 71) haben wir fünf potentielle Einflussfaktoren identifiziert, um die Konjunktur grüner Themen in Parteiprogrammen zu erklären. Empirisch haben wir hierbei den Einfluss von konkurrierenden Parteien, vom Medienwähler, von Gewerkschaften und Verbänden sowie neuer sozialer Bewegungen und schließlich der Umweltperformanz eines Landes auf die Policy Moves von 150 Parteien entlang einer Ökologie-Ökonomie-Dimension (Jahn 2016b) in 20 entwickelten Demokratien für den Zeitraum von 1981 bis 2012 untersucht. Die Analyse zeigt zunächst, dass die grundlegende Funktionslogik des Parteienwettbewerbs nicht nur auf der Links-Rechts-Dimension, sondern auch auf der Ökologie-Ökonomie-Dimension zum Tragen kommt. Ein Gegensatz von „new“ und „old politics“ besteht hier also nicht. Das alternierende Verhalten von Parteien, auf einen Policy Move mit einer Gegenbewegung bei der nächsten Wahl zu reagieren, weist neben wettbewerbslogischen Gründen zur Sicherung des Issue Ownership (Budge 2015) auch darauf hin, dass Parteien insbesondere auf der Ökologie-Ökonomie-Dimension einen beständigen Ausgleich zwischen diesen Positionen suchen. Dabei zeigt sich, dass Parteien rationale und responsive Akteure sind. Sie orientieren sich vornehmlich an den Anforderungen der Wähler und der Umwelt. Im Sinne der Systemtheorie ist die Rückkopplungsschleife zwischen dem politischen System und der Umwelt geschlossen. Unsere Ergebnisse komplettieren somit Jahns Analyse und sprechen grundsätzlich für die Kapazität der untersuchten Systeme, auf Veränderungen der Umweltanforderungen einzugehen. Damit gilt aber weiterhin Ruchts (1999, S. 205) Analyse des „Paradox der Umweltbewegung“, wonach zwar die Themensalienz ökologischer Standpunkte mit zunehmender Umweltverschmutzung steigt, selbst eine leichte Verbesserung der Umweltperformanz aber dazu führt, dass Parteien sich (wieder) verstärkt wachstumsorientierteren Positionen zuwenden. Eine nachhaltige Verbesserung ist somit kaum zu erwarten. Analytisch betrachtet wäre eine Ausdehnung des Untersuchungszeitraums wünschenswert, um sowohl die gestiegene Relevanz des Themas in den letzten Jahren, als auch die Frühphase der Umweltbewegung in den 1970ern besser

Ökologie vs. Ökonomie. Zum Einfluss von Umweltperformanz …

35

in die Analyse miteinzubeziehen. So könnte ein nuanciertes Bild des in dieser Analyse überraschend nicht vorhandenen Einflusses intermediärer Akteure auf Parteien gezeichnet werden. Hinsichtlich aktueller drängender Themen wie dem Klimaschutz sind die Ergebnisse indes alarmierend: Erst mit merklichen Veränderungen der Umwelt und des Klimas ist eine adäquate politische Reaktion zu erwarten. Für das Klimasystem, geprägt durch Kipppunkte und selbstverstärkende Effekte, könnte dies bereits zu spät sein. Fraglich ist, ob die Umweltbewegung (erneut) in der Lage sein wird, hinreichend Druck im politischen Prozess aufzubauen oder die Lebensgrundlagen erst unwiderruflich zerstört sein müssen, bevor die Umwelt auf alle Akteure gleichermaßen wirkt.

Appendix

(3)

(4)

(0,051)

Konkurrenten (GG Core)

 UmweltperformanzWahljahr t−1

Stärke des KorporatismusWahljahr t−1

 Stärke des KorporatismusWahljahr t−1

Stärke der NSMWahljahr t−1

 Stärke der NSMWahljahr t−1

 Medianwähler (GG Core)

0,308***

(0,604) −0,071 (0,213)

(0,668) −0,011 (0,208)

(Fortsetzung)

−0,409**

0,605

(0,091)

0,541

−0,020

(0,099)

(0,185)

(0,205) 0,017

0,308+

(0,043)

(0,047) 0,368+

0,594***

0,610***

(0,046)

(0,028)

−0,397***

Gesamt

(0,032)

−0,398*

Umwelt-performanz

0,215***

-0,420***

Parteien-wettbewerb

Ø Vorheriger Policy Move der

Vorheriger Policy Move (GG Core)

(2) Gesellschaft & Intermediäre Akteure

(1)

Tab. 4 Regressionsergebnisse Random-Effects Modelle

36 N. Düpont und M. Rachuj

0,213

R2 874

N

874

0,191

−0,002 (0,015)

−0,020 (0,016) (1,093)

874

0,024

0,022

4,304

0,000

Ja

874

0,350

0,384

3,428

0,000

Ja

(1,046)

−0,216

(0,144)

(0,169)

0,731

(4)

(3)

Anmerkung: Regressionkoeffizienten mit Standardfehlern in Klammern (Random-Effects Modell [RE]; Gruppierungsvariable: Parteien); Signifikanzniveau: + p < 0,10, * p < 0,05, ** p < 0,01, *** p < 0,001

0,182

R2

0,194

3,924

3,869

innerhalb

0,000

0,000

Random Part √ ϕ √ θ

(0,250) Ja

(0,226) Ja

−0,027

(2)

−0,385+

(1)

Dekaden FE

Konstante

UmweltperformanzWahljahr t−1

Tab. 4 (Fortsetzung)

Ökologie vs. Ökonomie. Zum Einfluss von Umweltperformanz … 37

38

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Women’s Role in Promoting Environmental Issues: Evidence from 19 Industrialized Democracies Corinna Kroeber

1

Introduction

Party positions towards green politics are one of the key explanatory factors for the environmental performance of industrialized democracies (Jahn 2016). In particular “[…] when government parties move to the green or to the left side, this has a positive effect on environmental performance” (Jahn 2016, p. 6). Far beyond simply grouping individuals with similar ideological positions, parties constitute the platform for debates about policy positions and priorities that are later on presented to the electorate (Key 1942; Teorell 1999). Previous research emphasizes the explanatory power of party-level factors such as party ideology or electoral vulnerability for party positions towards the environment (Carter 2013; Spoon et al. 2014; Farstad 2018). This study aims to contribute to a better understanding of the conditions under which parties emphasize green issues by revealing the role of the sex of the actors involved in the party decision-making process. Women in party offices can lead to substantial shifts in party positions by promoting leftist and women-friendly policies (Kittilson 2011; Greene and O’Brien 2016). In this article, I aim to extend this research by studying the relationship between party positions towards the environment and the sex of party officials and answer the following research question: How do party positions concerning green and growth policies change as women’s presence in party offices increases? I argue that women in parties’ parliamentary groups and as party leaders are key actors in shaping their organizations’ stances towards the environment. As a C. Kroeber (B) Institut für Politik- und Kommunikationswissenschaft, Universität Greifswald, Greifswald, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2022 E. Baltz et al. (eds.), Parties, Institutions and Preferences, Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-35133-5_3

41

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C. Kroeber

consequence of women’s presence, parties become more supportive of environmentalist and ecologist positions and less supportive of productionist policies. This pattern occurs as a response to the gender gap in public opinion more broadly: Through socialization, women develop higher levels of empathy and support for state measures necessary to protect the environment. Previous studies suggest that women as party leaders mostly shape party positions on issues that pertain directly to women’s gender (Kittilson 2011), while women’s presence in parties’ parliamentary groups leads to moves towards redistributive concerns (Greene and O’Brien 2016). This chapter adds to this literature by uncovering the difference women make for party stances on the green-growth dimension of political conflict. To investigate this topic, I analyze attitudes at the mass and policy positions at the elite level in 19 industrialized democracies between 1995 and 2018. As a first step, I study the relationship between gender and political attitudes at the mass level. For that purpose, I make use of survey data from the World Value Survey (Inglehart et al. 2014). The evidence shows that women are in fact more likely to display environmentalist and ecologist attitudes than men. Afterwards, I investigate the impact of women in party offices on party positions towards the environment based on data from the comparative manifesto project (Volkens et al. 2019) and data on women in party offices. The analyses reveal that the importance of environmentalist and ecologist issues in party manifestos grows together with women’s impact on their content. However, the empirical evidence also indicates that the importance of productionist statements for party manifestos does not decrease consistently as woman politicians become more influential. This article is the first to study the relationship between party positions on the green-growth dimension of political conflict and women in party organizations. The evidence presented here extends the set of policy fields in which woman have the potential to change the legislative agenda from social justice, gender quotas, or welfare state extension to environmentalist and ecologist positions. However, women appear to be more successful in adding new green ideas to their agenda rather than in dropping established productionist positions.

2

Gender and the Green-Growth Dimension of Political Conflict: Women’s Heart of Green

According to Jahn (2016, pp. 44–46), political conflict about environmental protection includes three types of positions: First, the productionist position is based on the idea that humans are superior to all other beings on earth and should

Women’s Role in Promoting Environmental Issues …

43

therefore dominate the planet. This position implies unconditional support for economic growth. Second, the environmentalist position welcomes technological progress as long as it leads to environmental protection. Just like the productionist stance, the environmentalist focuses on the well-being of the people, but keeps the side-effects of human action in mind. In turn, the third position, the ecologist, rejects all ideas of growth, since it endangers other beings. In the subsequent paragraphs, I argue that women at the mass and elite level are more supportive of environmentalist and ecologist positions, but less supportive of productionist positions than men and that, as a consequence, women’s presence in party offices leads to changes in party positions along these dimensions. Previous scholarly work interested in gender differences in policy preferences related to the environment at the mass level finds that women tend to hold more environmental-friendly attitudes than men (for a review of the literature see McCright and Xiao 2014).1 They are more concerned with threats that follow from environmental damages (Stern et al. 1993), display a higher willingness to pay to reduce the risks connected to global warming (Joireman and Liu 2014), and engage in more environmental-friendly private behavior (Hunter et al. 2004). Furthermore, women show higher levels of support for sustainable development (De Silva and Pownall 2014). Even though most of these studies engage with gender differences in policy preferences in the context of the United States, comparative research suggests that the gender gap in envrionmental friendly behavior persists across all industrialized democracies (Hunter et al. 2004).2 The extant literature explains this pattern through two rationales: gender socialization and gendered social roles (Davidson and Freudenburg 1996; Blocker and Eckberg 1997). The first logic proposes that childhood socialization leads to different attitudes and basic values with women showing higher levels and salience of altruism and empathy as well as stronger support for egalitarianism and government activism than men (Gilligan 1982; Jaffee and Hyde 2000; Dietz et al. 2002). In consequence, women become more concerned with safety and care of others, more religious, perceive risks as more threatening, and have more trust in science – all factors that correlate positively with environmental concerns (McCright and Xiao 2014). The second rational implies that men and women 1

There is also amble evidence that men and women tend to differ on a broad variety of other political issues such as stricter sexual harassment laws, more liberal abortion rights, or generous parental leave, child care options, redistributive policies, same-sex marriage, or the use of force in international conflicts (Togeby 1994; Herek 2002; Gidengil et al. 2003; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006; Campbell and Childs 2015; Lizotte 2015; Clark 2017). 2 Yet, levels of gender inequality or economic scarcity probably moderate this relationship (Chan et al. 2019).

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perform different roles in the society as a consequence of their employment and homemaker status. According to this logic, men, in their traditional role as financial providers, are more concerned with the economy, while women in their role as caretakers of the family at home are more receptive to environmental concerns. Translating these rationals and the extant literature to the context of not only environmentalist, but also ecologist and productionist positions, I expect the following pattern in public opinion: H1 : Women tend to hold stronger environmentalist and ecologist attitudes than men, but men tend to hold stronger productionist attitudes than women. Previous scholarly work argues that a similar sex gap in policy preferences exists at the elite level as well. The “Politics of Presence” argument (Phillips 1995) suggest that women as politicians take up the distinct preferences of women in the electorate. Shared life experiences should enable women in politics to understand and approximate women’s preferences more successfully than men (Phillips 1995; Mansbridge 1999). An extensive set of literature provides support for sex differences in the policy orientations of those running for and elected to legislative positions (Tremblay 1998; Thomas and Welch 2001; Childs and Withey 2004; Celis 2006; Barnes 2012; Baumann et al. 2015; Lloren and Rosset 2017).3 Empirical studies investigating attitudes and behavior concerning environmental policies at the elite level focused on the level of MPs so far. This set of research finds that women legislators are more likely than their men colleagues to vote for stricter environmental regulation (Fredriksson and Wang 2011 in a study on the United States) and sustainable energy policies (Fraune 2016 in a study on Germany and the United States). Ramstetter and Habersack (2020) reconfirm these insights in their comparative study of six European countries by showing that women MPs are more likely to support environmental-friendly legislation.4 However, to shape party positions, woman politicians must succeed in transforming party agendas. To date, two studies engaged with the role of politicians’ sex for party positions: In an initial study, Kittilson (2011) investigates the impact of women in party executive committees in twenty-four post-industrial democracies between 1990 and 2003, taking 142 parties into account. She finds that higher shares of women in parliamentary delegations and in party executives lead

3

Notably, women candidates and MPs seems to be just as inclined as their men colleagues to support legislation leading to an extension of the welfare state (Erickson 1997; Norris and Lovenduski 2004; MacDonald and O’Brien 2011; Lloren and Rosset 2017). 4 Yet, they also find that MPs express equal levels of concern for the environment independent of their sex, thereby revealing that attitudes and behavior of men MPs can be inconsistent.

Women’s Role in Promoting Environmental Issues …

45

to a stronger emphasis of social justice in party programs (i.e. need for fair treatment of all people and the end of sex-based discrimination) as well as to the introduction of party-level gender quotas, but not to positional revisions concerning welfare policies such as health service, social housing, or education. Using more recent data, Greene and O’Brien (2016) study 20 democracies between 1952 and 2011 for a total of 110 parties. While interested in the effect of the share of women MPs on party positions, they also take the sex of party leaders into account. The study reveals that women’s leadership of a party enhances issue diversity, but does not impact the left–right positioning of parties according to their findings (for similar evidence see also O’Brien 2019). Higher shares of women in parties, in turn, also impact the left–right positioning of parties according to their findings. These insights suggest two conclusions: Firstly, women’s influence depends on the policy area under study – while the effects on the traditional left–right position appear less consistent, they are stronger on other issues. We do not (yet) know how the women politicians might shape their parties’ environmentalist, ecologist, and productionist positions. Secondly, women in parties’ parliamentary groups and as party leaders do not necessarily unfold a similar effect on their organizations’ policy positions, which suggests that not all women in the party might be equally successful in influencing party positions. In this study, I therefore investigate how both sets of actor influence party positions towards the environment and test the following hypotheses: H2 : As the share of women in a party’s parliamentary group increases, the manifesto becomes more supportive of environmentalist and ecologist policies, but less supportive of productionist policies. H3 : If a party is led by a woman as opposed to a man, it becomes more supportive of environmentalist and ecologist policies, but less supportive of productionist policies.

3

Case Selection, Operationalization and Data

To test these hypotheses, the present article studies green-growth positions of citizens and parties in 19 developed democracies over three decades (Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Latvia, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, United States). The country sample includes a broad variety of political, institutional, and cultural contexts, which enhances the external validity of the findings.

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The analyses rely on mass- and party-level data for these countries. At the mass-level, I study citizens’ policy preferences on the green-growth dimension of political conflict based on data from the World Value Survey between 1994 and 2014 (Inglehart et al. 2014, wave 1 to 6). The dataset includes up to 31,600 respondents, with some variation depending on the indicator under study.5 At the party-level, I investigate parties’ policy positions on the green-growth dimension of political conflict based on data from the MARPOR project between 1995 and 2018 (Volkens et al. 2019). The analyses include 478 observations, stemming from 102 parties that are observed at several points in time.6

3.1 Dependent Variables: Green-Growth Policy Attitudes of Citizens and Policy Positions of Parties To test the existence of a gender gap in support for environmentalist, ecologist and productionist attitudes in the population, I use four items from the World Value Survey. Two variables capture individuals’ environmentalist positions as opposed to productionist, i.e. their desire to protect nature at the expense of economic growth. Another indicator reveal whether a person believes that nature is superior to humans and hence capture ecologist attitudes as well as to what extend a person supports technological progress as an indicator of productionist attitudes. Table 1 provides detailed information on each of the four items.7 To reveal party priorities concerning environmentalist, ecologist and productionist issues, I build on the MARPOR items identified by Jahn (2011) and Jahn (2016) as indicating parties’ green-growth positions. One indicator reveals the word share in the manifesto engaging with environmentalist positions, one with ecologist positions, and three with productionist positions. Table 2 describes the content of these items in more detail.8 In the analysis of party manifestos, I study first differences, i.e. how the share of words in a manifesto engaging with the respective topic changes from one election to the next. Party positions shift considerably over time, but no systematic pattern concerning the direction of these changes occurs (see summary statistics 5

In the appendix, I provide more detailed information on the number of respondents per country, wave and indicator (see Table 6 in the appendix). 6 Table 7 in the appendix provides a complete list of parties and years of manifestos included in the analyses. 7 For summary statistics of all items see Table 8 in the appendix. 8 For summary statistics of all items see Table 9 in the appendix.

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Table 1 Indicators for citizens’ green-growth policy attitudes Policy dimension

Item

Details

Environmentalist

Green vs. growth (B008, binary)

‘1’ Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs ‘0’ Economic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority, even if the environment suffers to some extent

Environmentalist

Give income to protect environment (B001, binary)

‘1’ Would give part of my income for the environment ‘0’ Would not give part of my income for the environment

Ecologist

Humans vs. nature (B009, binary)

‘1’ Human beings should coexist with nature ‘0’ Human beings should master nature

Productionist

Technological progress (E234, interval)

‘1’ the world is a lot worse off because of science and technology … ‘10’ the world is a lot better of because of science and technology

Annotations: World Value Survey items in parentheses

in Table 9 in the appendix). The largest range of values occurs for environmental protection, with changes in issue emphasis in party manifestos between −22.83 and 30.97. These extremes are both observed from the Liberal Party of Canada, which placed more emphasis on environmental protection in 2008 and reduced issue salience again in 2011. Positive references to technology and infrastructure display the strongest time trend, with a mean increase of 0.68 points from one election to the next (with p < 0.001). Economic goals tend to become less prominent in party manifestos over time (−0.60 with p < 0.01), while references to an anti-growth economy appear to become slightly more frequent (0.14 with p < 0.1). There is no clear time trend for changes in references to environmental protection and economic growth.

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Table 2 Indicators for parties’ green-growth policy positions Policy dimension Item

Details

Environmentalist

Environmental protection (+) (Per501)

General policies in favor of protecting the environment, fighting climate change, and other “green” policies

Ecologist

Anti-growth economy (+) (Per416)

Favorable mentions of anti-growth politics. Rejection of the idea that all growth is good growth. Opposition to growth that causes environmental or societal harm. Call for sustainable economic development

Productionist

Economic growth (+) (Per410)

The paradigm of economic growth

Productionist

Technology and infrastructure (+) Technology and Infrastructure: (Per411) Positive: Importance of modernization of industry and updated methods of transport and communication

Productionist

General economic goals (+) (Per408)

Broad and general economic goals that are not mentioned in relation to any other category. General economic statements that fail to include any specific goal

Annotations: MARPOR items in parentheses

3.2 Independent Variables: Sex of Citizens and Party Leaders The main explanatory variable is the sex of respondents for the mass-level analysis and party leaders and MPs for the party-level analysis. Data on respondents’ sex is provided by the World Value Survey. The variable takes the value ‘1’ for a woman and ‘0’ for a man. For the sex of the party leader, I make use of data by Kroeber (2021). The data captures the sex of the person who led a party during the critical phase of discussing and agreeing on a manifesto. For most cases, this is the individual who also ran the electoral campaign of the subsequent election. However, in a few instances, leadership changes in the critical phase of the electoral race. If so, I take the sex of the person leading the party at the moment of the election, because someone who replaces a running party leader during a campaign was

Women’s Role in Promoting Environmental Issues …

49

probably also involved into drafting early version of the manifesto, meaning this person was already in the inner circle of power. The variable takes the value ‘1’ if a party is led by a woman and ‘0’ if not. For the share of women in parties’ parliamentary groups, I take both their overall strength and their momentum into account. I use two variables from the data prepared by Kroeber (2021): The first one captures the share of women in a party’s parliamentary group in the ongoing term, i.e. in office when the new manifesto stands for debate. The second one includes the increase in the share of women from the ongoing term to the next and hence capture the numerical strength of the promising woman aspirants for executive office who are involved into the development of the manifesto.

3.3 Control Variables All models at the mass-level are logistic or linear regression models with country fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the country level. The country fixed effects capture all cultural and contextual factors that impact the level of support for environmental protection in the population (Diekmann and Franzen 1999; Sarigöllü 2008). Additionally, the analysis of mass-level data includes a list of individual-level control variables capturing confounding factors that typically impact political attitudes. A first individual-level control variable is age. Generations differ substantially by socialization and life experiences, in particular but not only due to changing economic conditions (Nord et al. 1998). A count variable measures age and can take values between 15 and 99. Second, the models take individuals’ income level into account, operationalized as country-level quintiles with larger values indicating higher income. This control variable is based on the rational that more financial resourcea, make it easier for a person to finance an environment-friendly life style (Whitehead 1991; Franzen 2003; Hidano et al. 2005). Third, the models include the level of education, given that higher levels of formal education should enhance individuals’ capacity to trace information and understand the complexity related to environmental challenges (Blomquist and Whitehead 1998; Witzke and Urfei 2001). I include a standardized eightpoint scale for education ranging from 1 ‘inadequately completed elementary education’ to 8 ‘University with degree/Higher education”. Last, differences in individuals’ attitudes towards the environment might just be a side-effect of underlying ideological differences, with more right-wing respondents displaying larger support for economic growth (Witzke and Urfei 2001; Torgler and GarcíaValiñas 2007). I therefore also include individuals’ left–right self-placement on

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a scale from 1 “left” to 10 “right”. All necessary data for this purpose can be found in the World Value Survey. All analyses at the elite level are error correction models. This modelling strategy allows to capture unobserved heterogeneity in the panel data (De Boef and Keele 2008). In this manner, the models hence abstract not only from partyspecific effects, but also their variation over time. The models include a lagged dependent variable to take the autocorrelation between party positions at t0 ant t−1 into account. Moreover, decade fixed effects capture changing time trends over time. In addition to these factors, the main models include control variables that change over time and might thereby impact the degree to which parties change their positions depending on the sex of the involved politicians.9 Firstly, I include a dummy variable that takes the value ‘1’ if a woman party leader is the first one and it is her first electoral campaign, and ‘0’ for all other cases. Most likely, the selection of the first woman party leader goes hand in hand with a window of opportunity, in which party positions are more likely to change. This variable is based on Kroeber (2021). Secondly, I include a variable capturing party losses between the last and current election (vote share t−1 –t0 , based on Volkens et al. 2019). Decreasing polling results might motivate parties to revise their party manifestos to increase their attractiveness to voters in upcoming elections (Harmel and Janda 1994). At the same time, internal crises increase the chances of outsiders such as women to be selected for top executive positions (Ryan and Haslam 2005; O’Brien 2015). Given that comparing pooling data for a large number of parties across time and countries is difficult, I approximate this concept with the actual loss in votes.

4

Empirical Evidence for the Gender Gap in Environmentalist, Ecologist and Productionist Attitudes at the Mass Level

As a first step of the analysis, I test the expectation that women in the electorate display higher levels of environmentalist and ecologist attitudes than men, but lower levels of productionist attitudes (H1). Table 3 compares the average values for the four items identifying attitudes on the green-growth dimension of political conflict in the population over men and

9

Given that I estimate error correction models, variables that impact the overall party position, but not its modification over time, cannot enhance the explanatory power of the models.

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51

Table 3 T-Tests for mean comparison of environmentalist, ecologist and productionist attitudes between male and female respondents (with unequal variance) Attitude dimension

Variable

Mean Men

Mean Women

Difference

P > |t|

Environmentalist

Growth vs. environment

0.562

0.584

0.022

0.000

Income vs. environment

0.578

0.595

0.017

0.064

Ecologist

Humans vs. nature

0.907

0.931

0.023

0.000

Productionist

Rejecting technological progress

3.771

4.043

0.272

0.000

Annotations: Observations in the survey data are weighted by equilibrated weight

women. The mean differences between the sexes reveal that women are consistently more likely to say that protecting the environment should be given priority over economic growth than men (with p = 0.000). Moreover, they are more likely to say that humans should coexist with nature rather than mastering it (with p = 0.000) and to reject technological progress (with p = 0.000). Women also appear to be more willing than men to give parts of their income for the environment, but in this case, the gender gap in attitudes does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance (with p = 0.064). While statistically significantly different from zero for the most variables, the size of the differences between men and women appear to be moderate: For the binary indicators, the mean differences range between 1.7%- and 2.3%-points, while the continuous indicator increases roughly one quarter of a point. To see whether this relationship holds when controlling for a broad set of individual- and country-level factors, I estimate logit models for the binary indicators and a linear regression for the continuous measure for rejecting technological progress. The full models are presented in Table 4, while Fig. 1 allows to compare the key coefficients. Overall, the analysis reaffirms that women at the citizens level lean more towards green attitudes than men as suggested by Hypothesis 1. Looking at environmentalist attitudes, Fig. 1 indicates that women are about 1.13 times more likely than men to support environmental protection over economic growth and creating jobs; and about 1.12 more likely to be willing to give parts of their income to protect the environment. Turning to ecologist attitudes, the likelihood that respondents are more supportive of the statement that human beings should coexist rather than master nature increases by about 35% if the respondent is a woman compared to a man. Lastly, women also tend to reject technological

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Table 4 Regression of environmentalist, ecologist, and productionist attitudes on citizens’ individual characteristics

Sex = Women Age

Growth vs. environment

Income vs. environment

Humans vs. nature

Rejecting technological progress

OR/(SE)

OR/(SE)

OR/(SE)

b/(SE)

1.1302**

1.1166***

1.3568**

0.2330***

(0.0485)

(0.0370)

(0.0322)

(0.1328)

0.9956***

1.0030

1.0048*

−0.0072

(0.0013)

(0.0022)

(0.0023)

(0.0040)

1.0548***

1.0316*

−0.0966**

Level of income 1.0263*** (0.0066)

(0.0168)

(0.0134)

(0.0214)

Level of education

1.1241***

1.1351***

1.0767***

−0.0885**

(0.0159)

(0.0172)

(0.0232)

(0.0218)

Left–right self-

0.8901***

0.8727***

0.8951*

−0.0559*

placement

(0.0223)

(0.0177)

(0.0439)

(0.0188)

Year survey

0.9988

0.9518

0.9581

−0.0568

(0.0163)

(0.0259)

(0.0286)

(0.0334)

Constant

118.9894 (66.9342)

Observations

28,451

13,138

13,100

0.051

0.058

0.036

Adjusted R2 Pseudo R2

15,920 0.063

Annotations: The models for ‘growth vs. environment’, ‘income vs. environment’ and ‘humans vs. nature’ are logistic regression models. Figures for these models display exponentiated coefficients. The model for ‘rejecting technological progress’ is a linear regression model. All models include country fixed effects (omitted from presentation for reasons of simplification). Standard errors are clustered at the country level and presented in parentheses. Observations in the survey data are weighted by equilibrated weight. With * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

progress more frequently than men: For them, the predicted value is 0.23 points or one fifth of a standard deviation higher. All coefficients reach conventional levels of statistical significance and the effect strengths are substantial. These findings are robust to changes in the modelling strategy and additional confounding variables. Firstly, I ran multi-level fixed effect models with random

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53

Fig. 1 Marginal effect of sex on environmentalist, ecologist, and productionist attitudes of citizens with 95% confidence intervals. Annotations: Figure based on coefficients presented in Table 4. Effects on growth vs. environment, income vs. environment, and humans vs. nature are displayed as effects on odd ratios. Effects on technology are displayed as effects on linear predictions

effects for sex and standard errors clustered at the country level. The effect of sex on the four indicators for green-growth attitudes remain about equal in strength and level of statistical significance. The interclass correlation coefficients reveal that the respondents within countries are not more similar than across countries and that models without random effects are hence most appropriate. Moreover, I tested whether having children is more decisive for respondents’ attitudes than their sex (Dupont 2004). I therefore added a dummy variable that takes the value ‘1’ if respondents are parents and ‘0’ if not. However, having children does not unfold a statistically significant effect on either of the four attitudinal variables, while the effect of sex remains unchanged. Lastly, I also take the sector in which a respondent works into account, since some sectors might be more vulnerable to changes in the economic structure. The dummy variable takes the value ‘1’ if a respondent is a worker or part of the agricultural sector (agricultural

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worker, farmer, semi-skilled manual worker, unskilled manual worker, skilled manual worker, and professional worker) and ‘0’ if not. Those working in vulnerable sectors are less likely to state that human beings should coexist rather than master nature, but the variable does not unfold a clear effect on any other variable belonging to the green-growth dimension of political conflict. Again, the effect of respondent’s sex remains stable despite this additional confounder. Overall, this first step of the analyses hence confirms the proposition that the attitudes of men and women towards the environment differ. Women are considerably more likely to hold environmentalist and ecologist attitudes than men, and are less supportive of productionist stances. In the next stage of the analysis, I aim to uncover to what degree this pattern translates into a distinct impact of woman politicians on party agendas.

5

Empirical Evidence for the Impact of Women Politicians on Environmentalist and Ecologist References in Party Manifestos

I estimate multi-level regression models of change in parties’ environmentalist, ecologist, and productionist positions from one election to the next (i.e. first differences). All models nest party-manifestos in parties in countries. Standard errors are clustered at the country level to capture different levels of heterogeneity between countries. Table 5 presents the results for each of the five items measuring party positions on the green-growth dimension of political conflict. Starting with changes in the emphasis of environmentalist and ecologist policies in party manifestos, the models indicate that, as women’s presence in any party office increases, such references become more prominent. If the share of women party legislators in office at the time the new manifesto stands for debate is 18%-points higher (one standard deviation), environmentalist statements in the party manifesto increase 0.15 points (about 1/60 of a standard deviation, with p = 0.096) and ecologist statements about 0.35 points (about 1/6 of a standard deviation with p = 0.006). In addition to this general effect of women’s presence, if women gain momentum as indicated by growing seat shares, the model shows that parties emphasize sustainable policies even further. An increase of the share of women legislators of 14%-points (one standard deviation) leads references to environment policies to rise about 0.11 points and to an anti-growth environment to rise about 0.15%-points (with p = 0.038 and p = 0.010). Parties led by a woman also tend to increasingly refer to environmentalist statements and the effect is more substantial than the previous ones, with an increase of

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55

Table 5 Multi-level linear regression of change in parties’ environmentalist, ecologist, and productionist positions on the presence of women in party offices Environmental protection

Anti-growth economy

Economic growth: positive

Technology & infrastructure: positive

Economic goals b/(SE)

b/(SE)

b/(SE)

b/(SE)

b/(SE)

leader =

2.3906***

0.5331+

−0.5169

−1.3807+

0.2094

woman

(0.6104)

(0.2902)

(0.3606)

(0.7206)

(0.7028)

% women in

0.0443+

0.0197**

−0.0052

−0.0076

−0.0075

parl. group (t−1 )

(0.0266)

(0.0072)

(0.0074)

(0.0117)

(0.0064)

% women in parl

0.0419*

0.0204*

−0.0052

−0.0046

−0.0212*

group (t−1 to t0 )

(0.0202)

(0.0080)

(0.0111)

(0.0164)

(0.0092)

% party votes −0.0246

−0.0159*

−0.0311

−0.0243

−0.0442*

(t−1 to t0 )

(0.0326)

(0.0074)

(0.0207)

(0.0291)

(0.0180)

leader =

−1.8416+

0.5261

0.0727

1.1226

0.1056

first woman (t0 )

(0.9771)

(0.5789)

(0.3603)

(0.7946)

(0.5359)

Constant

0.1480

0.1191

2.4155***

7.8971***

2.8961**

(0.4524)

(0.3848)

(0.7068)

(0.7388)

(0.8986)

Observations

373

373

373

373

373

AIC

2148.4

1486.0

1685.0

2132.5

1704.6

BIC

2187.6

1525.3

1724.2

2175.6

1743.8

Annotations: All models are multi-level linear regression models with single party-year observations clustered by parties clustered by countries. All models include country and decade fixed effects (omitted from presentation for reasons of simplification). Coefficients indicate effects on first differences. Standard errors are clustered at the country level and presented in parentheses. With + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

about 1.1 standard deviations in reference to environmental protection (with p < 0.001). The effect of women’s party leadership on changes in the manifesto concerning an anti-growth economy is smaller in size, but with about a quarter of a standard deviation still substantial (with p = 0.066). Nevertheless, this evidence supports the positive relationship between women in party organizations

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and parties’ emphasis on environmentalist and ecologist positions proposed in Hypotheses 2 to 3. Turning to the other side of the coin, I also expected to find decreasing emphasis on productionist policies as women’s presence in parties grows. Given the mostly negative effects of the explanatory variables, the overall pattern appears to support this expectation. However, most of these coefficients are not statistically significantly different from zero. Notably, increasing presence of women in parties’ parliamentary groups from one election to the next has a negative, statistically significant effect on the proportion of references to general economic goals (with p = 0.021). Women’s party leadership furthermore has a statistically significant and substantial negative effect on positive references to technology and infrastructure in their organizations’ manifestos (with p = 0.055). Beyond these patters, however, the relationship between women in party offices and party productionist positions appears to be spurious at best. Again, I ran a series of robustness tests to see whether the findings hold if the modelling strategy and confounders vary. Firstly, I tested whether the effect of women as party leaders might be context-sensitive and allowed for random effects at the party level. The results are reported in Table 13 in the appendix and indicate no substantial changes to those reported in the text. Moreover, I investigate to what extent party ideology moderates the relationship between women in party organizations and changes in party manifestos concerning the frequency of environmentalist, ecologist, and productionist statements. For that purpose, I introduce a binary variable that takes the value ‘1’ for parties that are on the right side of the ideological spectrum and ‘0’ for those that are on the left side of the ideological spectrum according to the MARPOR data. Using this variable, I estimated two additional interactive models: The first one includes an interaction term between the sex of the party leader and party ideology, while the second one includes an interaction term between the share of women in the party parliamentary group (t−1 ) and the increase in the share of women in the party parliamentary group (t−1 to t0 ). All results are reported in Table 14 and 15 in the appendix. As in the previously presented models, the frequency of references of environmental protection and an anti-growth economy in party manifestos increases with party leadership by a woman and with high and increasing proportions of women legislators. This finding holds independent of party ideology. While additional substantial and statistically significant effects of the interaction terms indicate that women in right-wing parties are unique and should receive further attention in future research, the patterns discussed above remain stable. Overall, these tests reconfirm that as women’s presence in party organizations becomes more pronounced, party manifestos increasingly emphasize green policies.

Women’s Role in Promoting Environmental Issues …

6

57

Conclusion

This study engaged with the role of women in party offices for the positioning of their organizations concerning the green-growth dimension of party competition. I proposed that women politicians lobby for larger emphasis on environmentalist and ecologist positions, trying to promote the distinct interests of women in the electorate. The first set of empirical evidence presented here provided support for the existence of a gender gap in policy preferences at the mass level: Women in advanced industrial democracies are more likely than men to value the environment over growth in general and their own income more specifically as well as to reject technological progress and believe that humans should coexist with nature instead of mastering it. The second set of empirical evidence presented here revealed that parties change their positions towards the environment as women’s presence in party offices becomes more pronounced. In a nutshell, parties tend to move towards green politics as more women engage in the process of negotiating the party manifesto. While women’s increasing presence in party parliamentary groups only occurs with rather modest changes in the content of party manifestos, parties led by a woman change their agenda substantially and emphasize environmentalist and ecologist issues to a larger degree than they did under men’s leadership. In their role as new actors in politics, women are known to be able to promote new ideas (Greene and O’Brien 2016) and this study clarifies that green policies are such a topic. At the same time, this does not imply that party manifestos reduce productionist statements. Apparently, ideas not in line with the interest of the newbies do not necessarily disappear from the party agenda during this process. The distinction between environmentalist and ecologist positions on the one hand and productionist positions on the other hand as introduced by Jahn (2016) allows uncovering this differentiated pattern linking women in party offices and changes in party positions towards the environment. What remains to be discussed is the elephant in the room: Do women bring in the new ideas concerning green policies, or are do other actors make use of the window of opportunity that allows women to increasingly enter party organizations to promote their policy preferences? In other words, what this analysis could not solve is the question whether the observed relationship is causal or spurious. Yet, the interpretation of the findings as presented here has one clear advantage: There is a solid causal mechanism explaining why women hold distinct attitudes on the green-growth dimension of political conflict and how these distinct attitudes translate into lobby work for changes in party positions. By contrast, it is less conclusive that other actors who would like to change the agenda

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of their party should wait until women increasingly enter their organization to present these ideas. If someone aims to renew their organizations’ stances on the environment, (potentially to attract votes), why not starting to promote these ideas at any other time? Nevertheless, it is one of the main tasks of future research to explore the underlying mechanisms in more detail. A suitable tool for this purpose will be interviews with party representatives, who can reveal details about the decision-making process behind changes in party manifestos.

Appendix

Women’s Role in Promoting Environmental Issues …

59

Table 6 Respondents by indicator for green-growth attitudes, country, and survey wave Country

Indicator

Observations per wave 1994–1998

Australia

B008

1999–2004

1,679

B001 B009 B008

1,006

3,932 1,254 1,759

1,263 597

1,014

2,277

749

1,346

807

807

744

744

E234 Canada

1,247

1,759

B001 B009

2010–2014

1,254

E234 Bulgaria

Total 2005–2009

835

835

B008

1,531

1,596

3,127

B001

1,677

1,739

3,416

B009

1,678

E234 Czech

B008

Republic

B001 B009

1,678 1,771

1,771

762

762

906

906

E234 Finland

B008

811

B001 B009 B008

908 892

1,392

1,471

912 1,692

1,715

1,647 1,739

B008

4,555 1,715

1,647

E234 Israel

908 912

B001 B009

1,709

892

E234 Germany

898

767

1,920

3,659 767

B001 B009 E234 Latvia

B008

895

895 (continued)

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Table 6 (continued) Country

Indicator

Observations per wave 1994–1998

1999–2004

Total 2005–2009

2010–2014

B001 B009

1,153

1,153

E234 New

B008

Zealand

B001 B009

866

614

B008

976 724

991

B001 B009 B008 B009 B008

929

929 1,033

753

682

939

768

995

865

795

E234 Switzerland

1,905

930

B001

724

914

1,033

E234 Spain

2,089 713

976

E234 Norway

609

713

728

3,358 1,763 1660

1,065

B001

930 984

1,073

2,090

990

1,718

1,077

1,077

B009 E234 United

B008

States

B001 B009

1,073 1,191 1,318

1,034

1,142

1,116

1,149

B008

10,665

B001 B009 E234

11,323

5,497 2,265

795

E234 Total

1,073 2,130

2,434 1,148

2,147

3,295

4,014

10,560

6,421

31,660

3,561

11,286

14,847

3,589

14,912 10,736

6,830

17,566

Women’s Role in Promoting Environmental Issues …

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Table 7 Countries, parties, and manifestos included in the dataset Country

Party

Year of manifesto

Australia

Australian Labour Party

1996, 1998, 2002, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016

Australian Greens

2013, 2016

Liberal National Party of Queensland

2013, 2016

Liberal Party of Australia

1996, 1998, 2002, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016

National Party of Australia

1996, 1998, 2002, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016

Austrian Freedom Party

1995, 1999, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2013, 2017

Greens

1995, 1999, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2013, 2017

Austrian People’s Party

1995, 1999, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2013, 2017

Austrian Social Democratic Party

1995, 1999, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2013, 2017

National Union Attack

2013, 2014

Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria

2013, 2014, 2017

Austria

Bulgaria

Canada

Quebec Bloc

2000, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2011

Conservative Party of Canada

2006, 2008, 2011, 2015

Liberal Party of Canada

2000, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2011, 2015

New Democratic Party

2000, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2011

Czech

Czech Social Democratic Party

1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2013, 2017

Republic

Christian and Democratic Union Czech People’s Party

1998, 2002, 2006, 2010

Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia

1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2013, 2017

Civic Democratic Party

1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2013, 2017

Association for the Republic – Republican Party of Czechoslovakia

1998, 2002

(continued)

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Table 7 (continued) Country

Denmark

Finland

Germany

Greece

Party

Year of manifesto

Tradition, Responsibility, Prosperity 09

2010, 2013, 2017

Danish People’s Party

2001, 2005, 2007, 2011, 2015

Conservative People’s Party

1998, 2001, 2005, 2007, 2011, 2015

Christian People’s Party

1998, 2001

Danish Social-Liberal Party

1998, 2001, 2005, 2007, 2011

Social Democratic Party

1998, 2001, 2005, 2007, 2011, 2015

Socialist People’s Party

1998, 2001, 2005, 2007, 2011, 2015

Liberals

1998, 2001, 2005, 2007, 2011, 2015

Christian Democrats in Finland

2003, 2007, 2011, 2015

National Coalition

1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015

True Finns

2011, 2015

Swedish People’s Party

1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015

Finnish Centre

1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015

Finnish Social Democrats

1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015

Left Wing Alliance

1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015

Green Union

1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015

Alliance ‘90/Greens

1998, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2017

Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union

1998, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2017

Free Democratic Party

1998, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2013

The Left/ Party of Democratic Socialism

1998, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2017

Social Democratic Party of Germany

1998, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2017

Independent Greeks

2012 (2), 2015 (1)

Communist Party of Greece

1996, 2000, 2004, 2007, 2009, 2012 (1), 2012 (2), 2015 (1), 2015 (2)

New Democracy

1996, 2000, 2004, 2007, 2009, 2012 (1), 2012 (2), 2015 (1), 2015 (2)

Panhellenic Socialist Movement

1996, 2000, 2004, 2007, 2009, 2012 (1), 2012 (2), 2015 (1), 2015 (2) (continued)

Women’s Role in Promoting Environmental Issues …

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Table 7 (continued) Country

Iceland

Ireland

Israel

Latvia

Party

Year of manifesto

Coalition of the Radical Left

2004, 2007, 2009, 2012 (1), 2012 (2), 2015 (1), 2015 (2)004

Golden Dawn

2012 (2), 2015 (1)

Bright Future

2013, 2016, 2017

Progressive Party

2007, 2009, 2013, 2016, 2017

The Alliance

2007, 2009, 2013, 2016, 2017

Independence Party

2007, 2009, 2013, 2016, 2017

Left Green Movement

2007, 2009, 2013, 2016, 2017

Family of the Irish

2007, 2011, 2016

Green Party

2007, 2011

Labour Party

2007, 2011, 2016

We Ourselves

2007, 2011, 2016

Soldiers of Destiny

2007, 2011, 2016

Forward

2006, 2009, 2013

Israeli Labour Party

2003, 2006, 2009, 2013

Israel is Our Home

2006, 2009

The Jewish Home

2009, 2013, 2015

The Consolidation

1996, 1999, 2003, 2006, 2009

National Religious Party

1996, 1999, 2003, 2006

Meretz

1996, 1999, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2013, 2015

Sephardi Torah Guardians

1996, 1999, 2003, 2006, 2009

United Torah Judaism

1999, 2003

National Alliance ‘All For Latvia!’ 2014, 2018 – ‘For Fatherland and Freedom Latvian National Independence Movement’ Unity

New Zealand ACT New Zealand The Alliance

2014, 2018 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014, 2017 1996, 1999 (continued)

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Table 7 (continued) Country

Norway

Portugal

Spain

Switzerland

Party

Year of manifesto

Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand

2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014, 2017

New Zealand Labour Party

1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014, 2017

M¯aori Party

2008, 2011, 2014, 2017

New Zealand National Party

1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014, 2017

New Zealand First Party

1996, 1999, 2002

United Future New Zealand

2008, 2011, 2014

Progress Party

2013, 2017

Conservative Party

2013, 2017

Christian People’s Party

2013, 2017

Centre Party

2013, 2017

Socialist Left Party

2013, 2017

Liberal Party

2013, 2017

Left Bloc

2002, 2005, 2009, 2011, 2015

Social Democratic Center-Popular Party

1995, 1999, 2002

Social Democratic Center-Popular Party

2005, 2009, 2011

Portuguese Communist Party

1995, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2011, 2015

Socialist Party

1995, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2011, 2015

Social Democratic Party

1995, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2011

Catalan Republican Left

2015, 2016

United Left

2000, 2004, 2008, 2011

People’s Party

2000, 2004, 2008, 2011, 2015, 2016

Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party

2000, 2004, 2008, 2011, 2015, 2016

Christian Democratic People’s Party of Switzerland

1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015

Federal Democratic Union

1995, 1999, 2003, 2007 (continued)

Women’s Role in Promoting Environmental Issues …

65

Table 7 (continued) Country

Party

Year of manifesto

Radical Democratic Party

1995, 1999, 2003, 2007

Independents’ Alliance

1995, 1999

Liberal Party of Switzerland

1995, 1999, 2003

Swiss Democrats

1999, 2003

Social Democratic Party of Switzerland

1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015

Swiss People’s Party

1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015

United

Democratic Party

1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016

States

Republican Party

1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016

Income vs. environment

B001

I am now going to read out some statements about the environment. For each one read out, can you tell me whether you agree strongly, agree, disagree or strongly disagree? Would give part of my income for the environment ‘0’ disagree/disagree strongly ‘1’ agree/agree strongly

Growth vs. environment

WVS. variable

Question and Coding

Here are two statements people B008 sometimes make when discussing the environment and economic growth. Which of them comes closer to your own point of view? ‘0’ Economic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority, even if the environment suffers to some extent ‘1’ Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs

Variable name

14,847

31,660

Obs

Table 8 Summary statistics for data used to study citizens’ attitudes towards the environment

0.59

0.57

Mean

0.49

0.50

SD

0

0

Min

(continued)

1

1

Max

66 C. Kroeber

All things considered, would you say that the world is better off, or worse off, because of science and technology? Please tell me which comes closest to your view on this scale: ‘1’ the world is a lot better off ‘10’ the world is a lot worse off

Gender of respondent ‘0’ male ‘1’ female

Age of respondent (continuous measure) X003

Income of respondent ‘1’ lowest income percentile ‘10’ highest income percentile

Technology

Gender

Age

Income

X047

X001

E234

B009

Humans and nature

WVS. variable

Question and Coding

For each of the following pairs of statements, please tell me which one comes closest to your own views: ‘0’ Human beings should master nature ‘1’ Human beings should coexist with nature

Variable name

Table 8 (continued)

36,884

36,884

36,884

17,566

14,912

Obs

5.09

46.79

1.53

3.80

0.92

Mean

2.48

17.13

0.50

2.05

0.27

SD

1

15

1

1

0

Min

(continued)

10

99

2

10

1

Max

Women’s Role in Promoting Environmental Issues … 67

Respondents self positioning on political E033 scale ‘1’ Left – ‘10’ Right

Survey year

Left–Right placement

Year

S020

X025

Educational attainment of respondent ‘1’ Inadequately completed elementary education ‘2’ Completed (compulsory) elementary education ‘3’ Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type ‘4’ Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type ‘5’ Incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type ‘6’ Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type ‘7’ Some university-level education, without degree ‘8’ University-level education, with degree

Education

WVS. variable

Question and Coding

Variable name

Table 8 (continued)

36,884

32,497

36,884

Obs

5.34

4.95

Mean

1.99

2.20

SD

1989

1

1

Min

(continued)

2013

10

8

Max

68 C. Kroeber

Question and Coding

Respondent has children ‘0’ no ‘1’ yes

Respondent works in sector vulnerably to transformation of economy (agricultural worker, farmer with own farm, professional worker, skilled manual worker, semi-skilled manual worker, unskilled manual worker) ‘0’ no ‘1’ yes

Variable name

Children

Vulnerable sector

Table 8 (continued)

X036

X011

WVS. variable

22,917

36,884

Obs

0.53

0.74

Mean

0.50

0.44

SD

0

0

Min

1

1

Max

Women’s Role in Promoting Environmental Issues … 69

Environmental protection (t−1 )

General policies in favour of Manifesto, per501 protecting the environment, fighting climate change, and other “green” policies. For instance: General preservation of natural resources; Preservation of countryside, forests, etc.; Protection of national parks; Animal rights May include a great variance of policies that have the unified goal of environmental protection

Environmental protection (t−1 to t0 )

Source

Question and Coding

Variable name

5.207

−0.055

Mean

Table 9 Summary statistics of data used to study party positions towards the environment

5.394

5.317

SD

0.000

−22.830

Min

(continued)

36.210

30.970

Max

70 C. Kroeber

Economic growth: positive (t−1 )

Manifesto, per416

Source

The paradigm of economic Manifesto, per410 growth. Includes: General need to encourage or facilitate greater production; Need for the government to take measures to aid economic growth

Favourable mentions of anti-growth politics. Rejection of the idea that all growth is good growth. Opposition to growth that causes environmental or societal harm. Call for sustainable economic development

Anti-growth economy: positive (t−1 to t0 )

Anti-growth economy: positive (t−1 ) Economic growth: positive (t−1 to t0 )

Question and Coding

Variable name

Table 9 (continued)

2.854

2.892

−0.088

2.350

2.085

2.116

SD

1.145

0.142

Mean

0.000

−14.340

(continued)

15.280

9.260

14.860

11.970

−11.970

0.000

Max

Min

Women’s Role in Promoting Environmental Issues … 71

Technology and infrastructure: positive (t−1 )

Importance of modernisation Manifesto, per411 of industry and updated methods of transport and communication. May include: Importance of science and technological developments in industry; Need for training and research within the economy; Calls for public spending on infrastructure such as roads and bridges; Support for public spending on technological infrastructure (e.g.: broadband internet, etc.)

Technology and infrastructure: positive (t−1 to t0 )

Source

Question and Coding

Variable name

Table 9 (continued)

5.252

0.682

Mean

4.471

4.984

SD

(continued)

27.270

25.830

−18.770

0.000

Max

Min

72 C. Kroeber

Leader = first woman (t0 )

Economic goals (t−1 ) Leader = woman (t0 )

Gender of party leader Own data before t0 ‘0’ Party lead by a man during electoral campaign ‘1’ Party lead by a woman during electoral campaign First occurrence of female Own data party leadership ‘0’ Party led by a man or not the first time a woman leads the party during an electoral campaign ‘1’ First time a woman leads the party during an electoral campaign

Broad and general economic Manifesto, per408 goals that are not mentioned in relation to any other category. General economic statements that fail to include any specific goal

Economic goals (t−1 to t0 )

Source

Question and Coding

Variable name

Table 9 (continued)

0.123

2.443 0.207

−0.598

Mean

0.329

3.253 0.406

3.366

SD

0

0.000 0

−18.780

Min

(continued)

1

19.920 1

9.470

Max

Women’s Role in Promoting Environmental Issues … 73

Green party

Right-wing party

% party votes (t−1 to t0 ) ENPP (t−1 to t0 )

Effective number of parliamentary parties Party ideology ‘0’ not right-wing ‘1’ right-wing party Green party family ‘0’ not green ‘1’ green Manifesto

Manifesto

Share of women in party Own data parliamentary group Absolute number of women Own data in party parliamentary group at t0 Party vote share Manifesto

% women in parl. group (t−1 to t0 ) Women in party parliamentary group (t0 )

Source

Question and Coding

Variable name

Table 9 (continued)

5.865

−0.655

0.071

0.397

0.257

0.490

0.841

12.584

10.560

0.156

14.082

SD

2.452

Mean

0

1

1

2.596

−2.542 0

20.570

−30.740

85.000

60.000

−80.000 0.000

Max

Min

74 C. Kroeber

Women’s Role in Promoting Environmental Issues …

75

Table 10 Robustness test: Multi-level regression of environmentalist, ecologist, and productionist attitudes on citizens’ individual characteristics with citizens nested in countries and random effects for the sex of respondents Growth vs. environment

Income vs. environment

Humans vs. nature

Rejecting technological progress

OR/(SE)

OR/(SE)

OR/(SE)

b/(SE)

Sex = Female

1.1254**

1.1166***

1.3942**

0.2330***

(0.0489)

(0.0322)

(0.1506)

(0.0305)

Age

0.9956***

1.0030

1.0048*

−0.0072***

(0.0013)

(0.0022)

(0.0023)

(0.0009)

1.0548***

1.0313*

−0.0966***

(0.0067)

(0.0168)

(0.0135)

(0.0074)

Level of education

1.1243***

1.1351***

1.0770***

−0.0885***

(0.0159)

(0.0172)

(0.0231)

(0.0083)

Left–right self-

0.8899***

0.8728***

0.8950*

−0.0559***

placement

(0.0223)

(0.0177)

(0.0440)

(0.0079)

Year survey

0.9989

0.9518

0.9578

−0.0568***

(0.0164)

(0.0259)

(0.0287)

(0.0068)

Constant

18.2667

8.9744e + 42

2.3692e + 38

118.9894***

(600.2930)

(4.8953e + 44)

(1.4183e + 40) (13.5758)

Observations

28,451

13,138

13,100

Level of income 1.0260***

15,920

Annotation: The models for ‘growth vs. environment’, ‘income vs. environment’ and ‘humans vs. nature’ are logistic regression models. Figures for these models display exponentiated coefficients. The model for ‘rejecting technological progress’ is a linear regression model. All models include country fixed effects (omitted from presentation for reasons of simplification). Standard errors are clustered at the country level and presented in parentheses. Observations in the survey data are weighted by equilibrated weight. With * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

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Table 11 Robustness test: Regression of environmentalist, ecologist, and productionist attitudes on citizens’ individual characteristics with additional control variable for parenthood

Sex = Female Children = Yes Age

Growth vs. environment

Income vs. environment

Humans vs. nature

Rejecting technological progress

b/(OR)

b/(OR)

b/(OR)

b/(SE)

1.1371**

1.1102***

1.3341**

0.2330***

(0.0544)

(0.0332)

(0.1238)

(0.0415)

0.9751

0.9022

1.1402

0.0695

(0.0239)

(0.0655)

(0.1198)

(0.0591)

0.9957***

1.0032

1.0033

−0.0073

(0.0012)

(0.0019)

(0.0029)

(0.0044)

1.0552**

1.0274*

−0.0899***

Level of income 1.0284*** (0.0078)

(0.0182)

(0.0122)

(0.0171)

Level of education

1.1276***

1.1250***

1.0794***

−0.0858**

(0.0163)

(0.0192)

(0.0225)

(0.0201)

Left–right self-

0.8867***

0.8739***

0.8958*

−0.0521*

placement

(0.0206)

(0.0202)

(0.0451)

(0.0213)

Year survey

0.9977

0.9839

0.9593

−0.0675

(0.0172)

(0.0280)

(0.0297)

(0.0395)

Constant

140.3283 (79.3091)

Observations

26,507

11,964

13,065

Adjusted R2 Pseudo

R2

14,741 0.062

0.049

0.062

0.036

Annotation: The models for ‘growth vs. environment’, ‘income vs. environment’ and ‘humans vs. nature’ are logistic regression models. Figures for these models display exponentiated coefficients. The model for ‘rejecting technological progress’ is a linear regression model. All models include country fixed effects (omitted from presentation for reasons of simplification). Standard errors are clustered at the country level and presented in parentheses. Observations in the survey data are weighted by equilibrated weight. With * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Women’s Role in Promoting Environmental Issues …

77

Table 12 Robustness test: Regression of environmentalist, ecologist, and productionist attitudes on citizens’ individual characteristics with additional control variable for employment sector

Sex = Female

Growth vs. environment

Income vs. environment

Humans vs. nature

Rejecting technological progress

b/(OR)

b/(OR)

b/(OR)

b/(SE)

1.1652**

1.1550***

1.2669**

0.1979*

(0.0572)

(0.0489)

(0.1002)

(0.0600)

Vulnerable sector

1.0845

1.0129

0.8515**

0.0206

= Yes

(0.0484)

(0.0522)

(0.0450)

(0.0577)

0.9963

1.0063*

1.0053*

−0.0070

(0.0028)

(0.0026)

(0.0025)

(0.0056)

1.0390***

1.0327**

−0.0784**

Age

Level of income 1.0360*** (0.0092)

(0.0091)

(0.0120)

(0.0174)

Level of education

1.1506***

1.1408***

1.0750**

−0.0921**

(0.0194)

(0.0246)

(0.0238)

(0.0237)

Left–right self-

0.9040***

0.8749***

0.8947*

−0.0975**

placement

(0.0253)

(0.0205)

(0.0464)

(0.0224)

Year survey

1.0254

0.9424

0.9598

−0.0343

(0.0135)

(0.0394)

(0.0302)

(0.0548)

Constant

74.1827 (110.3631)

Observations

17,118

9178

12,053

Adjusted R2 Pseudo

R2

5609 0.051

0.052

0.064

0.035

Annotation: The models for ‘growth vs. environment’, ‘income vs. environment’ and ‘humans vs. nature’ are logistic regression models. Figures for these models display exponentiated coefficients. The model for ‘rejecting technological progress’ is a linear regression model. All models include country fixed effects (omitted from presentation for reasons of simplification). Standard errors are clustered at the country level and presented in parentheses. Observations in the survey data are weighted by equilibrated weight. With * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

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Table 13 Robustness test: Multi-level linear regression of change in parties’ environmentalist, ecologist, and productionist positions on the presence of women in party offices with random effects for the sex of party leaders Environmental protection

Anti-growth economy

Economic growth: positive

Technology & infrastructure: positive

Economic goals

b/(SE)

b/(SE)

b/(SE)

b/(SE)

b/(SE)

leader =

2.6706***

0.9382***

−0.6012

−1.3807+

0.2471

woman

(0.6628)

(0.2791)

(0.3789)

(0.7206)

(0.6831)

% women in

0.0414

0.0165*

−0.0019

−0.0076

−0.0084

parl. group (t−1 )

(0.0272)

(0.0076)

(0.0078)

(0.0117)

(0.0063)

% women in parl

0.0410*

0.0202*

−0.0042

−0.0046

−0.0218*

group (t−1 to t0 )

(0.0202)

(0.0081)

(0.0110)

(0.0164)

(0.0092)

% party votes −0.0276

−0.0160*

−0.0314

−0.0243

−0.0449*

(t−1 to t0 )

(0.0321)

(0.0065)

(0.0209)

(0.0291)

(0.0184)

leader =

−2.1128*

0.0514

0.3022

1.1226

0.1409

first woman (t0 )

(0.9164)

(0.3918)

(0.3591)

(0.7946)

(0.5175)

Constant

0.3704

0.2460

2.4162***

7.8971***

2.9299***

(0.5606)

(0.3517)

(0.6857)

(0.7388)

(0.8891)

Observations

373

373

373

373

373

AIC

2148.0

1455.3

1688.2

2126.5

1704.0

BIC

2191.2

1498.4

1735.3

2157.9

1743.3

Annotations: All models are multi-level linear regression models with single party-year observations clustered by parties clustered by countries. All models include country and decade fixed effects (omitted from presentation for reasons of simplification). Coefficients indicate effects on first differences. Standard errors are clustered at the country level and presented in parentheses. With + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Women’s Role in Promoting Environmental Issues …

79

Table 14 Robustness test: Multi-level linear regression of change in parties’ environmentalist, ecologist, and productionist positions on the presence of women in party offices with additional interaction of party ideology with sex of party leader Environmental protection

Anti-growth economy

Economic growth: positive

Technology & infrastructure: positive

Economic goals

b/(SE)

b/(SE)

b/(SE)

b/(SE)

b/(SE) 0.5549

leader =

1.9533**

0.5531

−0.2220

−2.1004*

woman

(0.7166)

(0.3495)

(0.4412)

(0.8451)

(0.7272)

party = right

−2.1961**

−0.2444+

0.7315*

−2.6580**

0.5980

(0.8353)

(0.1350)

(0.3320)

(0.9043)

(0.3915)

1.8411*

−0.3637

−1.3248*

1.9642**

−1.8378**

party = right

(0.8449)

(0.9240)

(0.5433)

(0.6750)

(0.6232)

% women in

0.0313

0.0170*

−0.0014

−0.0278+

−0.0059

parl. group (t−1 )

(0.0272)

(0.0066)

(0.0080)

(0.0161)

(0.0055)

% women in parl

0.0317+

0.0187*

−0.0020

−0.0190

−0.0192*

group (t−1 to t0 )

(0.0179)

(0.0076)

(0.0096)

(0.0164)

(0.0091)

% party votes −0.0198

−0.0154*

−0.0340+

−0.0199

−0.0470**

(t−1 to t0 )

(0.0310)

(0.0075)

(0.0194)

(0.0321)

(0.0181)

leader =

−1.9575*

0.6601

0.2628

1.2051

0.4457

first woman (t0 )

(0.9594)

(0.5124)

(0.3973)

(0.7964)

(0.4714)

Constant

−0.2205

−20.4384

−21.8567

−23.7141

−28.7374

(3.5784)

(67.6405)

(.)

(52.4456)

(56.6829)

Observations

373

373

373

373

373

AIC

2139.7

1487.3

1681.6

2110.0

1702.1

BIC

2190.7

1534.3

1728.7

2157.0

1753.1

Leader = woman *

Annotations: All models are multi-level linear regression models with single party-year observations clustered by parties clustered by countries. All models include country and decade fixed effects (omitted from presentation for reasons of simplification). Coefficients indicate effects on first differences. Standard errors are clustered at the country level and presented in parentheses. With + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

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Table 15 Robustness test: Multi-level linear regression of change in parties’ environmentalist, ecologist, and productionist positions on the presence of women in party offices with additional interaction of party ideology with the share of women in party parliamentary groups (t−1 , t−1 to t0 ) Environ-mental protection

Anti-growth economy

Economic growth: positive

Technology & infra-structure: positive

Economic goals

b/(SE)

b/(SE)

b/(SE)

b/(SE)

b/(SE)

leader =

2.2208**

0.5084+

−0.5069

−1.7574*

0.2493

woman

(0.6809)

(0.2961)

(0.4401)

(0.7426)

(0.7689)

% women in

0.0370

0.0163+

−0.0016

−0.0419

−0.0034

parl. group (t−1 )

(0.0351)

(0.0094)

(0.0097)

(0.0259)

(0.0072)

party = right

−1.1187

−0.3582

0.2956

−3.5456*

0.4270

(1.2035)

(0.3652)

(0.4884)

(1.5117)

(0.5354)

−0.0247

0.0021

0.0051

0.0451

−0.0060

(0.0179)

(0.0198)

(0.0350)

(0.0132)

0.0192

−0.0117

−0.0441+

−0.0160

(0.0137)

(0.0119)

(0.0228)

(0.0110)

% women in parl. group

(t−1 ) * party = (0.0320) right % women in parl

0.0469*

group (t−1 to (0.0203) t0 ) % women in parl. group

−0.0473*

−0.0018

0.0301+

0.0807**

−0.0117

(t−1 to t0 ) * party right

(0.0196)

(0.0277)

(0.0168)

(0.0271)

(0.0168)

% party votes

−0.0223

−0.0149*

−0.0317

−0.0198

−0.0452*

(t−1 to t0 )

(0.0318)

(0.0073)

(0.0198)

(0.0309)

(0.0182)

leader =

−1.6067

0.5700

0.0536

1.6458+

0.0525

first woman (t0 )

(1.0462)

(0.5806)

(0.4448)

(0.8941)

(0.6078)

Constant

1.4486+

0.3766

2.0813**

10.4173***

2.6284**

(0.8021)

(0.3486)

(0.7658)

(1.1919)

(0.8207)

Observations

373

373

373

373

373

AIC

2140.4

1491.7

1685.5

2111.8

1709.4

BIC

2191.4

1546.6

1736.5

2166.7

1760.4

Annotations: All models are multi-level linear regression models with single party-year observations clustered by parties clustered by countries. All models include country and decade fixed effects (omitted from presentation for reasons of simplification). Coefficients indicate effects on first differences. Standard errors are clustered at the country level and presented in parentheses. With + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Women’s Role in Promoting Environmental Issues …

81

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Zwischenparteilicher Wettbewerb und Ideologische Diversität Sven Kosanke

1

Ideologische Diversität als strategische Entscheidung

Politische Parteien sind zentrale Akteure in modernen Demokratien. Parteien können als Gruppen von Menschen definiert werden, die die gleichen Sichtweisen auf politische Themen haben (Burke 1803). Anders ausgedrückt: Parteimitglieder zeigen eine ähnliche ideologische Ausrichtung. Das erklärte Ziel jeder Partei ist die Erlangung von politischen Ämtern (office-seeking) und die Implementierung von Politiken (policy-seeking, siehe unter anderem Schattschneider 1942; Downs 1957; Epstein 1980; für eine Zusammenfassung White 2006). Um diese Ziele zu erreichen, sind Wahlsiege entscheidend. Cox und McCubbins (1993) sehen die Maximierung von Wählerinnenstimmen (vote-seeking) als notwenige Bedingung, um politische Ämter zu erlangen und Politik nach den eigenen Präferenzen zu gestalten (Müller und Strøm 1999). In der Politikwissenschaft existiert ein Konsens über den Einfluss von ökonomischen, institutionellen und politischen Variablen auf das strategische, stimmenmaximierende Verhalten von Parteien. Einer der Kernfaktoren zur Beschreibung stimmenmaximierenden Verhaltens ist die Positionierung beziehungsweise Bewegung auf einer ideologischen Dimension. Die Positionen von Parteien können durch verschiedene unabhängige Variablen wie ökonomische Globalisierung (Adams et al. 2009; Haupt 2010; Ezrow und Hellwig 2014), Wahlsysteme (Cox 1990; Merrill und Adams 2002; Calvo und Hellwig 2011; Gallego und Schofiel 2016), Verhalten von politischen Wettbewerberinnen (Adams S. Kosanke (B) Institut für Politik- und Kommunikationswissenschaft, Universität Greifswald, Greifswald, Deutschland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2022 E. Baltz et al. (eds.), Parties, Institutions and Preferences, Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-35133-5_4

85

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und Somer-Topcu 2009; Williams 2015), öffentliche Meinung (Adams et al. 2004), soziale Bewegungen (Jahn 2017), Parteitypen (Adams et al. 2006; Böhmelt et al. 2016), interne Struktur von Parteien (Meyer 2013; Schumacher et al. 2013; Lehrer und Lin 2018) und Diffusion (Düpont 2017) erklärt werden. Die Kernannahme dieses Forschungsstranges basiert auf dem räumlichen Wählen. Parteien nehmen die Position ein, von der sie glauben, dass dort ein Hochpunkt in der Verteilung der Wählerinnen liegt. Die Parteienposition nimmt Einfluss darauf, wie viele Wählerinnen eine Partei auf sich vereinigen kann. Sie bestimmt also den Wahlerfolg von Parteien im politischen Wettbewerb (Downs 1957). Darüber hinaus gibt es nur wenige Arbeiten zum strategischen Verhalten von Parteien (Lacewell 2017). Das Konzept des strategischen Wählens impliziert, dass Parteien im Wettbewerb nur einen ideologischen Standpunkt einnehmen. Jüngerer Forschung erweitert dies und führt Begriff wie die programmatische Klarheit (Giebler et al. 2015; Lacewell 2017; Bräuning und Giger 2018), Diversität des programmatischen Angebots (Zons 2015), ideologische Breite (Greene 2016; Van Heck 2018), Verschleierung der politischen Position (Rovny 2012), Mehrdeutigkeit (Cahill 2017), Mehrdimensionalität (De Vries und Hobolt 2012; Van de Wardt 2014; Rovny 2015; Ward et al. 2015) oder die broad-appeal-Strategie (Somer-Topcu 2015) ein. Diese gehen weiter als der bisherige dominierende Ansatz der Parteienpositionierung und werden sowohl als erklärende, als auch als zu erklärende Variablen verwendet. Es wird argumentiert, dass unter bestimmten Bedingungen Ungenauigkeit, Verschleierung oder auch Diversität der ideologischen Position des parteipolitischen Programmes strategisch vorteilhaft sein können (Rovny 2012; Lacewell 2017). Das heißt, durch eine wenig präzise Formulierung der ideologischen Standpunkte generieren Parteien mehr Wählerstimmen, als bei klarer Benennung dieser (Somer-Topcu 2015). Diese sogenannte Diversität ist sinnvoll, wenn wettbewerbsrelevante, politische Dimensionen im Gegensatz zu den Präferenzen der Wählerschaft der Parteien stehen. Lacewell (2017) beispielsweise argumentiert und zeigt, dass Parteien eine klare Position zu ökonomischer Globalisierung einnehmen, wenn dies ein Kern ihres ideologischen Programms ist (issue ownership). Parteien, für die ökonomische Globalisierung kein profitabler Standpunkt ist, sind weniger klar in ihren Aussagen oder verschleiern diese im Wahlprogramm. Eine solche Strategie findet auch Anwendung, wenn Parteien versuchen entgegenstehende ideologische Lager zu verbinden oder um Wählerinnen und innerparteiliche Gruppen zu mobilisieren (Greene 2016). Durch die Strategie eines diversen Standpunktes sollen so viele Wählerinnen wie möglich angesprochen werden, um entsprechend Stimmen zu maximieren und Wahlen zu gewinnen (Downs 1957; Somer-Topcu 2015).

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Neben dem Konzept der ideologischen Diversität wird die innerparteiliche Kohäsion in der Literatur zur Erklärung der Varianz der Parteienideologie genannt. Auf Individual- und auf Parteienebene werden hierbei die Konsequenzen und Gründe für innerparteilichen Zusammenhalt untersucht. Der individuelle Kohäsionsansatz konzentriert sich auf das Verhalten von Parlamentarierinnen, Kandidatinnen und Parteieliten. Es wird angenommen, dass diese in ihrem Verhalten durch die Umwelt beeinflusst werden. Sowohl innerparteiliche (z. B. Kandidatinnenauswahl, siehe Depauw und Martin 2009) als auch zwischenparteiliche Faktoren (z. B. Wahlsystem, siehe Itzkovich-Malka und Hazan 2017) beeinflussen das parlamentarisch (Abstimmungs)Verhalten von Politikerinnen (Sieberer 2006, 2010). Es wird argumentiert, dass das politische Umfeld Anreize setzt, sich konform zu den Standpunkten der Partei zu verhalten oder von diesem abzuweichen. Gemessen wird dies in der Regel durch die Auswertung namentlicher Abstimmungen (Rice 1925; Hix et al. 2005; Stecker 2015). Die Entscheidung für ein bestimmtes Verhaltensmuster basiert auf der Abwägung, welches für die entsprechende Politikerin vorteilhafter ist und eine Wiederwahl beziehungsweise eine Maximum an Wählerstimmen ermöglicht (Carey und Shugart 1995). Kohäsion auf Parteienebene ist das Bindeglied zwischen dem individualistischen Ansatz und dem strategischen Verhalten von Parteien bezüglich ihrer strategischen Breite. Der Definition von Kitschelt und Smyth (2002, S. 129) folgend, ist innerparteiliche Kohäsion die Fähigkeit einer Partei eine Verbindung zur Bevölkerung aufzubauen. Eine starke innerparteiliche Kohäsion bedeutet für die beiden Autoren, dass die gesamte Partei mit all ihren Mitgliedern eine gemeinsame oder zumindest sehr ähnliche Position zu einem politischen Themas repräsentiert. Parteien haben somit eine enge Bindung zu einer bestimmten Gruppe des Elektorats, also ihrer Wählerschaft. Ein geringer innerparteilicher Zusammenhalt bedeutet, dass innerhalb der Partei mehrdeutige und diverse Standpunkte existieren. Parteien sind weniger klar in ihren Positionen. Neben Kitschelt und Smyth (2002) greifen Jahn und Oberst (2012) dieses Konzept auf und untersuchen die ideologische Kohäsion für sozialdemokratische Parteien in Skandinavien. Andere Autoren wie Özbudun (1970), Jensen (2000) sowie Giannetti und Benoit (2009) betonen demgegenüber vor allem das Agieren als Gruppe. Zur Unterscheidung der beiden Konzepte Kohäsion und ideologische Diversität, die eine Art ideologische Breite beschreiben, kann angeführt werden, dass Kohäsion nicht aufgrund eines strategischen Kalküls erzeugt werden kann. Vielmehr entsteht diese zufällig durch den Zusammenschluss von Personen zu Parteien. Die Kohäsion entspricht der Abweichung der aggregierten, intrinsischen

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Präferenzen aller Parteimitglieder. Ideologische Diversität hingegen ist strategisch gewählt und wird in Wahlprogrammen, Reden und weiteren Äußerungen der Parteien und seiner Elite präsentiert, um Wählerinnen zu binden. Dieser Artikel erläutert und überprüft, wie zwischenparteilicher Wettbewerb das innerparteiliche Kalkül der ideologischen Diversität beeinflusst. Zwischenparteilicher Wettbewerb wird als relevanteste externe Bedingung des politischen Wettstreits als erklärende Variable gewählt (Carey und Shugart 1995; Sieberer 2010). Außerdem wird argumentiert, inwieweit der Kohäsionsindex von Jahn und Oberst (2012) ein Maß für ideologische Diversität sein kann, um beiden Konzepten gerecht zu werden. Wählerinnen und Parteien nutzen die in Wahlprogrammen dargelegte Ideologie als gekürzte Formulierung für ihr politisches Verhalten. Durch Unsicherheiten und Informationsflut sowie der Tendenz zur Reduktion von Komplexität ist Ideologie eine Möglichkeit für Wählerinnen mit geringem Aufwand den Standpunkt jeder Partei mit den eigenen Vorstellungen einer guten Gesellschaft beziehungsweise eines guten Lebens zu vergleichen (Downs 1957). Die Kommunikation zwischen Parteien und Wählerinnen findet auf mehreren Kanälen statt: Um Wählerinnen die eigenen Policy-Präferenzen und Ideologien näherzubringen, werden Wahlprogramme formuliert. In diesen präsentieren Parteien, welches Thema für sie am wichtigsten ist und wie sie den zughörigen Policy-Plan umsetzen wollen. Die Formulierung der Wahlprogramme der Parteien ist aber nicht zu allen Themen kohärent. Parteien können beispielsweise extremere oder gemäßigtere linke Positionen zu bestimmten Themen einnehmen, während sie bei anderen eher rechtere Ansichten vertreten (Somer-Topcu 2015). Aus den Wahlprogrammen können Wissenschaftlerinnen, Medien, politische Kontrahentinnen und vor allem die Wählerinnen ablesen, welche politische Parteien sich wo ideologisch positioniert (Adams et al. 2011; Greene 2016; Harmel 2018). Die ideologische Diversität kann folglich aus Wahlprogrammen ermittelt werden.

2

Der Einfluss von zwischenparteilichem Wettbewerb

Um die ideologische Diversität einer Partei entlang einer ideologischen Dimension zu erklären, wird im Folgenden ein räumliches Model verwendet. Das Model basiert auf zwei Kernannahmen: Parteien kennen das institutionelle und politische Umfeld und sind über die Eigenschaften und Konsequenzen der Wählerinnenverteilung, politischen Institutionen wie das Wahlsystem sowie die Anzahl der konkurrierenden Parteien informiert. Das heißt, zwischenparteilicher Wettbewerb ist voraussagbar und bietet die Möglichkeit die ideologische Diversität

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entsprechend anzupassen (Tsebelis 1990, S. 92 ff.). Außerdem agieren Parteien (und Wählerinnen) stimmenmaximierend. Politische Themen, die Stimmen bei der Wahl versprechen, werden in den Wahlprogrammen hervorgehoben (Greene 2016). Gleichzeitig stimmen Wählerinnen für die Partei, deren ideologische Ansichten am ehesten dem persönlichen politischen Standpunkt entsprechen, um so den eigenen Nutzen zu maximieren. Für Parteien ist es also rational, eine ideologische Position mit programmatischer Diversität einzunehmen, die den Ansichten der Kernwählerschaft entgegenkommt. Krehbiel (2000) betont diesbezüglich, dass das Elektorat in drei Gruppen unterteilt werden kann: Die Gruppe der Kernwählerinnen, welche immer für die Parteien stimmen, die zweite Gruppe der Wechselwählerinnen, die manchmal, aber nicht immer für die Partei stimmen und Wählerinnen, die niemals für die Parteien votieren werden. Daher kann angenommen werden, dass Parteien versuchen vor allem die ersten beiden Gruppen zu gewinnen. Parteien wählen ihre ideologische Diversität angepasst an die Verteilungen der Kernwählerschaft und Wechselwählerinnen. Parteien versuchen also nicht das gesamte ideologische Spektrum mit einem sehr breiten Wahlprogramm zu bedienen. Sie agieren vielmehr entsprechend der politischen und institutionellen Umwelt, um wiederum ihren Stimmen und ihrem Wahlerfolg zu maximieren. Im Modell wird eine einfache Links-Rechts-Dimension verwendet, auf der sich die politischen Parteien mit ihren mehr oder weniger diversen Wahlprogrammen positionieren. Die Medianwählerin befindet sich in der Mitte der Links-Rechts-Achse und unterteilt das Elektorat in jeweils gleichgroße Gruppen. Für die Erklärung der ideologischen Diversität ist es irrelevant, ob sich Parteien Links oder Rechts von der Medianwählerin befinden (Downs 1957). Die Proportionalität von Wahlsystemen entscheidet über den zwischenparteilichen Wettbewerb. Parteien wissen um die Konsequenzen unterschiedlicher ausgestalteter Wahlinstitutionen. Die Proportionalität von Wahlsystemen beeinflusst die Chance eine Wahl zu gewinnen immens. Sowohl der direkte mechanische, als auch der indirekte psychologische Effekt beeinflussen die Proportionalität (Duverger 1954; Riker 1982). Aufgrund geringerer Einflüsse beider Effekte in proportionalen Wahlsystemen, haben hier auch kleinere Parteien eine Chance auf eine erfolgreiche Wahl. Es ist nur eine geringe Anzahl an Stimmen nötig, um Erfolg zu haben. Daher können in proportionalen Wahlsystemen, Wahlprogramme mit einer geringeren ideologischen Diversität verwendet werden. Im Gegensatz dazu müssen Parteien in disproportionalen Wahlsystemen ideologisch wesentlich diverser aufgestellt sein. In solchen Systemen benötigen Parteien eine (absolute) Mehrheit an Stimmen, um eine Wahl für sich zu entscheiden. Auf Grund dieses

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strategischen Kalküls präsentieren Parteien ein breites ideologisches Portfolio (Clark und Golder 2006). Es wird die folgende Hypothese abgeleitet: H1 : Je proportionaler ein Wahlsystem ist, desto geringer ist die ideologische Diversität des Wahlprogrammes.

Als zweite Erklärungsvariable wird die Anzahl der Parteien (Parteiensystemfragmentierung) für den zwischenparteilichen Wettbewerb herangezogen. Exemplarisch wird dafür im Folgenden zwischen Mehrparteiensystemen (oberer Graph) und Zweiparteiensystemen unterschieden (unterer Graph, siehe Abb. 1). Dargestellt ist eine angenommene Wählerinnenverteilung, welche durch eine prototypische Standardnormalverteilung präsentiert wird. Geteilt wird diese durch die Medianwählerin. Diese befindet sich in der Mitte der Links-Rechts-Achse. Außerdem sind die Parteien A, B, C und D abgebildet. In einem Mehrparteiensystem ist die Anzahl der Wettbewerberinnen um das Elektorat vergleichsweise hoch. Der obere Graph in Abb. 1 enthält vier Parteien: ein linke Partei (A), ein links-liberale Partei (B), eine rechts-liberale Partei (C) und eine rechte Partei (D). Wird eine Partei mit einer großen Anzahl an Wettbewerberinnen konfrontiert, ist es wichtig, ein relativ schmales, ideologisches Portfolio aufzuweisen. Parteien brauchen in diesem Fall vornehmlich die Unterstützung ihrer Kernwählerschaft und einen Teil der Wechselwählerinnen, um ausreichend Stimmen für einen Wahlsieg zu erhalten. Würden Parteien in einem Mehrparteiensystem ideologische breit auftreten könnte diese Partei durch eine konkurrierende Partei ersetzt werden, da das Vertrauen der Wählerinnen bezüglich der zentralen Position schwindet und die Differenzierung zur Gegnerin verschwimmt (Enelow und Hinich 1989). Anreiz für eine breitere, ideologische Ausrichtung besteht hingegen in Systemen mit zwei beziehungsweise wenigen Konkurrentinnen (siehe unteren Graph in Abb. 1). Dargestellt ist ein Zweiparteiensystem mit einer linken Partei (A) und einer rechten Partei (B). Mit einer geringen Anzahl an Konkurrentinnen benötigen Parteien mehr Stimmen als die direkten Kontrahentinnen um als Gewinnerin aus einer Wahl hervorzugehen. Es ist daher wahrscheinlich, dass Parteien ihr Wahlprogramm so divers wie möglich aufstellen um sowohl liberalere, als auch extremistische Wählerinnen zu gewinnen. Die liberale Mitte ist hierbei besonders relevant, da dort ein Großteil des Wählerinnenpotentials liegt. Somit wird als zweite Hypothese formuliert: H2 : Je höher die Fragmentierung des Parteiensystems, desto geringer ist die ideologische Breite.

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L

R A

B

MV

C

L

D

R A

MV

B

Abb. 1 Einfluss der Parteiensystemfragmentierung. (Quelle: Eigene Darstellung in Anlehnung an Downs 1957)

3

Daten und Methode

3.1 Abhängige Variable Ziel dieses Beitrages ist es, den Einfluss des zwischenparteilichen Wettbewerbs auf das innerparteiliche Verhalten in Form von ideologischer Diversität in einer quantitative Studie zu untersuchen. Hierfür wird der Kohäsionsindex von Jahn

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und Oberst (2012) verwendet. Diesen bezeichnen die Autoren als Maß des innerparteilichen Zusammenhalts, aber bietet er vielmehr auch die Möglichkeit ideologische Diversität von Parteien durch Daten aus Wahlprogrammen zu messen. Im Folgenden wird dieser Index adaptiert und für die Verwendung zur Messung ideologischer Diversität in Wahlprogrammen angepasst. Jahn und Oberst benennen drei Anforderungen die ein solcher Index zur Analyse des strategischen parteipolitischen Verhaltens aufweisen muss: 1. Die Analyseeinheit muss eine einzelne Partei sein. 2. Der Index muss zwischen Zeitpunkten und zwischen Parteien variieren. 3. Die ideologische Diversität kann auf einer einzelnen Dimension, die für eine Partei wichtig ist, abgebildet werden. Der Index von Jahn und Oberst hält auch genau diese Bedingungen ein. Sie verwenden hierfür einen Ansatz von Kitschelt und Smyth (2002, S. 1239; siehe auch Kitschelt 2000), der die einzelne Partei in den Mittelpunkt stellt. Kitschelt und Smyth befragen Parteieliten, nach der ideologischen Position der Partei bezügliche verschiedener politischer Themen. Die resultierende Standardabweichung zeigt, wie stark eine Partei intern geeint ist. Eine kleine Standardabweichung entspricht einer hohen innerparteilichen Kohäsion, während eine hohe Abweichung weniger geeinte Parteien impliziert. Mit gleicher Vorgehensweise bestimmen Jahn und Oberst (2012) die innerparteiliche Kohäsion durch die Auswertung von Wahlprogrammen, in dem sie die durchschnittliche Abweichung von der durchschnittlichen Parteiposition (Volkens et al. 2017) berechnen. Die Verwendung von Wahlprogrammen als Datenquelle ist möglich, da die adressierten Themen durch eine Mehrheit innerhalb einer Partei akzeptiert sind (Klingemann et al. 1994, S. 21). Wahlprogramme beinhalten eine Vielzahl von Themen. In der Politikwissenschaft ist es eine gängige Möglichkeit aus den Programmen eine ideologische Position zu berechnen. Die Zahl der im Programm enthaltenen Themen lässt Rückschlüsse auf die Diversität innerhalb der Partei zu und darüber hinaus auf die Größe des potentiell angesprochenen Elektorats. Daher kann der Kohäsionsindex von Jahn und Oberst auch als Diversitätsindex bezüglich der strategischen, ideologischen Ausrichtung der Parteien angesehen werden. In der Literatur existiert nur wenig fundiertes Wissen über die Erstellung von Wahlprogrammen (Däubler 2013). Es ist bekannt, dass Wahlprogramme ein wichtiges Werkzeug für Parteien ist den Wählerinnen ihre politischen Ziele zu vermitteln. Wählerinnen können so einfach beobachten nach der Wahl abgleichen, ob Verhalten der Partei den Versprechungen im Wahlprogramm gleichkommt

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(Rölle 2002; Maurer 2007). Ein Kritikpunkt am adaptierten Jahn und OberstIndex ist, dass innerparteiliche Divergenzen im Wahlprogramm nicht ausreichend abgebildet werden. In einer Fallstudie zur Landtagswahl in Baden-Württemberg 2006 untersucht Däubler (2013) den Erstellungsprozess von Wahlprogrammen. Er zeigt, dass etliche Parteimitglieder und innerparteiliche Faktionen ihre politischen Themen im Wahlprogramm verankert haben wollen. Das Weglassen von kontroversen Themen wird dabei nur wenig genutzt. Die Implementierung von Kernthemen mehrerer innerparteilichen Gruppierungen und Faktionen ist der Regelfall, um einer entsprechenden Menge an Wählerinnen für sich zu gewinnen. In westlichen Gesellschaften ist die Links-Rechts Dimension die entscheidende für Wählerinnen und Parteien (De Vries et al. 2013). Daher wird in diesem Beitrag die Diversität von Parteien (p) mit dieser zentralen Dimension verbunden. Der Index von Jahn und Oberst wird wie folgt berechnet1 : Diver sit at ¨ =

 n     LR stimulus scor e per ,L R −   I mpor tance L R  i=1

Der Hauptteil des Index besteht aus dem Verhältnis des Links-RechtsIdeologieindex (LR) und der zugehörigen Importance. Der LR und die Importance werden basierend auf Jahn (2011) berechnet. Der LR ist die Summe aller Themen (per), die als Links oder Rechts zu einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt in einem bestimmten Land angesehen werden (siehe Jahn 2011 für weitere Informationen). Die Importance ist der prozentuale Anteil aller pers, die als Links-Recht-Themen identifiziert werden. Dieser Faktor beschreibt, wie oft Linke und Rechte Themen im Wahlprogramm betont werden. In anderen Worten: Die Wichtigkeiten der Links-Rechts-Dimension für eine Partei. Die Spannweite der Importance reicht von 0 bis 100. Der höchste Wert 100 impliziert, dass alle Aussagen im Wahlprogramm sich auf die Links-Rechts-Dimension beziehen, während der niedrigste Wert 0 bedeutet, dass Parteien diese Dimension überhaupt nicht betonen. Der Quotient des LR und der Importance zeigt die durchschnittliche Bewegung einer Partei nach Links (oder Rechts) pro Aussage an, die im Wahlprogramm getätigt wird.2 1

Vereinfachte Darstellung. Beispiel: Eine Partei hat einen LR-Wert von 20 (leicht Rechts). Weiterhin sind 5 von 100 (5%) Aussagen im Wahlprogramm mit der LR-Dimension verbunden und demnach LRAussagen. Die Teilung des LR durch die Importance ergibt 4 (20/5 = 4). Dies bedeutet, dass eine Partei durchschnittlich 4 Punkte mehr nach Rechts pro Aussage geht oder jede Aussage im Wahlprogramm die Partei auf der Links-Rechts Dimension nach Rechts bewegt.

2

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Es ist anzunehmen, dass nicht jedes Statement in einem Wahlprogramm eine Partei in gleichem Maße in gleiche Richtung (Links/Rechts) bewegt. Manche Aussagen führen Parteien mit großen Schritten in die eine Richtung, während andere Formulierungen Parteien langsam auf entgegengesetzte Seite bringen. Daher subtrahieren Jahn und Oberst den Quotienten des LR und der Importance vom LR-Wert (stimulus score) für jedes per im Wahlprogramm. Die Subtraktion berechnet für jede Aussage die Abweichung von der durchschnittlichen Links-Rechts Bewegung (LR/Importance).3 Eine große Abweichung impliziert, dass eine Parteien sowohl Linke als auch Rechte Themen mit unterschiedlicher Intensität betont. Das bedeutet eine große ideologische Diversität im Wahlprogramm bezüglich der Links-Rechts Position. Ist die Abweichung relativ klein, ist die Partei weniger breit aufgestellt. In ihrem Wahlprogramm betont die Partei dann mehr oder weniger die gleichen Themen, mit der gleichen Intensität und der gleichen ideologischen Richtung. Zusammengefasst weisen große Werte des Diversitätsindex auf Parteien mit breit gefächerten Wahlprogrammen hin, kleine Werte zeigen eine geringere ideologische Diversität an. Der vollständige Wertebereich des Diversitätsindex für parteipolitische Wahlprogramme reicht von 0 bis 100. Abb. 2 zeigt den Boxplot für den verwendeten Diversitätsindex von Jahn und Oberst (2012). Insgesamt variiert der Median aller Länder zwischen 15 und 35. Basierend auf der Position der einzelnen Boxplots der Länder im oberen Bereich der Abbildung und einem arithmetischen Mittel von 28,2 sowie einer Standardabweichung von 12,0 kann geschlossen werden, dass Parteien mit einen Diversitätsindex von 40 oder größer ein relativ diverses Wahlprogramm aufweisen. Werte unter 16 implizieren hingegen ein homogenes Wahlprogram, welches nur eine geringe Bandbreite an politischen Themen präsentiert. Interessanterweise haben die Parteien in Dänemark (208) mit einem Median von 42 einen wesentlich geringen Diversitätswert. Aktuell ist unbekannt, warum hier eine 3

Beispiel: Im vorherigen Beispiel ist die Abweichung 0. Jede Aussage bewegt den LR-Wert einer Partei um 5 Punkte nach rechts. Die ist aber unüblich. Unterschiedliche Aussagen in Wahlprogrammen betonen Linke Policies, während andere Aussagen rechte Themen befürworten. Wenn man annimmt, dass 4 von 5 Aussagen eine Partei nur 3 Punkte nach Rechts drückt und das fünfte Statement zusätzlich 8 Punkte die Parteiposition nach Rechts verschiebt, da dies ein Rechtes Thema ist und besonders wichtig für die Partei ist. In Summe ist der LR-Wert einer Partei der gleiche wie in dem Beispiel zuvor: 20 (4 × 3 + 8 = 20). Aber im vorherigen Beispiel ist die Abweichung 0, während im letzteren die aggregierte Abweichung 8 ist (4 × 1 + 4 = 8). Dies impliziert, dass der Index unterschiedliche Level der Einigkeit aufgrund der uneinheitlichen Betonung von Statements darstellen kann. Die zweite Berechnung zeigt einen niedrigeren Wert der Kohäsion, da in diesem Fall die Partei und ihr Wahlprogramm mehr unterteilt bezüglich ihrer Links-Rechts-Position ist.

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Abb. 2 Boxplot 4 – Ideologische Diversität (Jahn und Oberst 2012)

solch große Differenz im Vergleich zu den restlichen Ländern und Parteien vorliegt. Weiterhin kann aufgrund der großen Anzahl an Beobachtungen nur eine geringe Zahl an Ausreißern beobachtet werden.

3.2 Unabhängige Variablen Um den Einfluss des zwischenparteilichen Wettbewerbs auf das Parteienverhalten zu erfassen, werden verschiedene unabhängige Variablen verwendet. Für die erste Hypothese wird die durchschnittliche, logarithmierte Wahlkreisgröße als unabhängige Variable (Bormann und Golder 2013; Pilet et al. 2016) verwendet. 4 Untersuchte Länder dargestellt mit ISO-Codes: 36: Australien, 40: Österreich, 56: Belgien, 100: Bulgarien, 124: Kanada, 191: Kroatien, 203: Tschechien, 208: Dänemark, 233: Estland, 246: Finnland, 250: Frankreich, 276: Deutschland, 300: Griechenland, 348: Ungarn, 352: Island, 372: Irland, 380: Italien, 392: Japan, 428: Lettland, 440: Litauen, 442: Luxemburg, 470: Malta, 528: Niederlande, 554: Neuseeland, 578: Norwegen, 616: Polen, 620: Portugal, 642: Rumänien, 703: Slowakei, 705: Slowenien, 724: Spanien, 752: Schweden, 756: Schweiz, 826: Vereinigtes Königreich, 840: USA.

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Die Wahlkreisgröße beschreibt die durchschnittliche Anzahl an Parlamentsmitgliedern, die in einem Wahlkreis gewählt werden. Bisherige Forschung zeigt, dass diese Variable ungefähr 60% der Erklärungskraft des Wahlsystems enthält (Ordeshook und Shvetsova 1994; Benoit 2001; Clark und Golder 2006,). Es wird der Logarithmus gewählt, da das Hinzufügen eines Sitzes zu einem kleinen Wahlkreis, gemessen an der Zahl der entsendeten Parlamentarier, einen größeren Effekt auf das Verhalten der Kandidatinnen und Parteien hat, als wenn die gleiche Änderung in einem großen Wahlkreis passiert (Cox 1997). Um einem OmittedVariable-Bias zuvorzukommen, wird auf die Anzahl der Sitze, die auf der oberen Wahlsystemebene verteilt werden kontrolliert (Clark und Golder 2006). Die zweite unabhängige Variable ist die Effektive Anzahl an Parteien die Stimmen in einem bestimmten Land (c) zu einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt (Effective Number of Parties, ENEP) erhalten haben (Taagepera und Shugart 1993): 1 2 Stimmenanteil p i=1

E N E Pc =  p

Die ENEP zeigt die hypothetische Anzahl an Parteien mit ähnlicher Größe (Stimmenanteil), die den gleichen Einfluss auf die Fragmentierung auf das Parteiensystem eines Landes haben. Der Vorteil im Vergleich zur absoluten Anzahl der konkurrierenden Parteien ist, dass der Index gewichtet zum Stimmenanteil ist. Starke Parteien, gemessen an ihrem Stimmenanteil, haben einen größeren Einfluss auf die ENEP als kleinere Parteien (Taagepera und Shugart 1993).

3.3 Kontrollvariablen Es werden verschiedene Kontrollvariablen für die Parteienebene verwendet, welche in früheren Studien diskutiert wurden. Da die Medianwählerin eine große Relevanz für die Argumentation der beiden postulierten Zusammenhänge zwischen Diversität und Wahlsystem beziehungsweise Parteiensystem hat, wird die Distanz zwischen der ideologischen Parteienposition und der Medianwählerin berechnet. Für die Berechnung der ideologischen Position der Medianwählerin (MV ), wird die Schätzung von Kim und Fording (1998) mit der McDonald und Budge (2005) Anpassung verwendet. Die daraus resultierende unabhängige Variable ist der Betrag der Differenz zwischen der Parteiposition und der Medianwählerin des jeweiligen Landes:

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  Distanz zum M V p =  L R p − L R M V  Niedrige Werte dieser Variablen implizieren eine geringe Distanz, während große Werte weiter entfernte Positionen zur Medianwählerin präsentieren. Der Betrag wird gewählt, da es unwesentlich ist, ob eine Partei Links oder Rechts vor der Medianwählerin liegt. Entsprechend der Parteiencharakteristiken wird die Parteiideologie (Close 2018; siehe für die Berechnung Jahn 2011), die Parteigröße gemessen am Stimmenanteil (Shomer 2017) und der Parteistatus als Regierungbeziehungsweise Oppositionspartei (Curini und Zucchini 2012) in das Modell aufgenommen.

3.4 Methode In der nachfolgenden Analyse ist eine Partei eines bestimmten Landes zu einer bestimmten Wahl die Untersuchungseinheit. Dies ist passend, da zum einen in dieser Studie das Interesse an der ideologischen Diversität einer Partei im Mittelpunkt steht und zum anderen die Varianz der abhängigen Variablen zwischen den Wahlen null ist, da die verwendeten Daten für die Wahlprogramme nur zur jeder Wahl aktualisiert werden. Daher führt die Implementierung von „Zwischenjahren“ zu keinem erhöhten Informationsgewinn. Zum Test der Hypothesen werden mehrere Mehrebenenmodelle berechnet (Hox und Wijngaards-de Meij 2015). Diese Art der Modellierung ist nötig, da der intraclass correlationTest zeigt, dass 34,7% der Varianz der abhängigen Variablen sich auf der höheren Ebene befinden. Weiterhin sind die Parteien (Fälle) sowohl genestet, als auch beeinflusst durch die höher gelegenen „Länder-Wahlen“. Daher werden sowohl zeitspezifische Faktoren, als auch Ländercharakteristika beachtet. Weiterhin werden keine länderspezifischen Fixed-Effects im Model verwendet, da die unabhängige Variable der Wahlkreisgröße nur wenig über die Zeit variiert. Dies präsentiert eine Art von Fixed Effekts (Plümper und Tröger 2007; Fortin-Rittberger 2015). Dies resultiert in dem folgenden Modell: Diver sit at ¨ p = β1 W ahlkr eisgr oße ¨ c + β2 E N E Pc + βm K ontr ollvariablen p + βn K ontr ollvariablen c + α + ε p,c Die vorliegende Untersuchung fokussiert sich auf moderne und etablierte Demokratien. Parteien in diesen Ländern sind responsiv zu ihren Wählern. Es

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wird der Zeitraum zwischen 1945 und 2016 untersucht. Diese Periode wurde aufgrund der Vergleichbarkeit der Wahlen basierend auf der Verfügbarkeit der Daten und der Länder zur Generalisierung der Konklusion in einer quantitativen Studie gewählt. Insgesamt werden in diesem Zeitraum 36 Länder mit 546 Parteien einbezogen.

4

Analyse und Ergebnisse

Die abhängige Variable ist die ideologische Diversität einer politischen Partei auf der Links-Rechts-Dimension, welche strategisch durch die Konstituierung des Wahlprogrammes gewählt wird. Um die benannten Hypothesen zu überprüfen werden verschiedene Modelle berechnet, um die Einflüsse der unabhängigen Variablen auf die abhängige Variable sowohl separat, als auch gemeinsam zu untersuchen (siehe Tab. 1). Im Allgemeinen zeigen die Ergebnisse, dass ein größerer zwischenparteilicher Wettbewerb in Form von proportionaler Repräsentation zu geringerer ideologischer Diversität führt. Die Modelle 1 und 2 zeigen die isolierten Effekte der beiden unabhängigen Variablen. Modell 1 legt nahe, dass die durchschnittliche, logarithmierte Wahlkreisgröße einen signifikanten Einfluss auf die abhängige Variable hat. Der negative Koeffizient verweist darauf, dass proportionalere Wahlsysteme zu einer geringeren Diversität der Parteien führen. Dies unterstützt vorläufig Hypothese H1 und zeigt, dass Parteien sich programmatisch diverser aufstellen, wenn die institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen dies zulassen und sie in großen Wahlkreisen agieren. Modell 2 demonstriert, dass ein signifikanter, isolierter Effekt der Parteiensystemfragmentierung auf die ideologische Diversität existiert. Dies stützt ebenfalls vorläufig die formulierte Hypothese H2 . In Mehrparteiensystemen sind Parteien monothematischer aufgestellt, als in Systemen mit wenigen Parteien. Diese Ergebnisse zeigen, dass sowohl zwischenparteilicher Wettbewerb auf der Parteienebene, als auch auf der Systemebene das programmatische Verhalten beeinflusst. In Modell 3 sind beide unabhängigen Variablen enthalten. Dieses Modell verweist darauf, dass nur noch die logarithmierte durchschnittliche Wahlkreisgröße weiterhin signifikante Ergebnisse in die zuvor beschriebene Richtung liefert. Der Einfluss wird geringfügig kleiner. Interessanterweise wird die Beziehung zwischen der Anzahl der Parteien und der abhängigen Variablen insignifikant, marginal kleiner, verbleibt aber positiv. Dieses Ergebnis ist auf die beiden soziologischen Gesetzmäßigkeiten: Duvergers Gesetze und Hypothese (Duverger 1954; Riker 1982) zurückzuführen. Basierend auf der bisherigen Forschung ist

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Tab. 1 Regressionsmodelle Modell 1

Modell 2

−0.53*

Durchschn. Wahlkreisgröße (log)

(−2.03) ENEP

Modell 3

Modell 4

−0.43*

−0.35**

(−1.99)

(−1.44)

−0.19*

−0.16

−0.16

(−2.03)

(−1.02)

(−1.43)

Distanz zum MV

+ 0.73***

Sitze höhere Ebene

−0.00

Parteiideologie

+ 0.13***

(26.87) (−0.99) (+7.51) Parteigröße

+ 0.02

Regierungspartei (=1)

0.03

(1.31) (0.08) 72.5***

72.5***

76.7***

77.0***

(132.03)

(128.14)

(130.04)

(97.21)

1.89***

1.89***

1.65***

1.65***

(45.73)

(45.62)

(35.38)

(33.57)

Residuen – Systemlevel

2.22***

2.21***

2.12***

2.12***

(158.99)

(159.03)

(151.86)

(141.41)

N

3067

3067

3067

3067

Konstante – Parteilevel Konstante – Systemlevel

z-Statistik in Klammern.

+

*

p < 0.1, p < 0.05,

**

p < 0.01,

***

p < 0.001.

anzunehmen, dass eine hohe Multikollinearität zwischen der Wahlkreisgröße und Anzahl der Parteien vorliegt (siehe beispielsweise Clark und Golder 2006). Modell 4 beinhaltet alle unabhängigen Variablen und Kontrollvariablen. Mit der Implementierung der Kontrollvariablen zeigt die Analyse ein relativ robustes Ergebnis. Der Einfluss des Wahlsystems sinkt leicht, ist aber weiterhin signifikant. Der statistische Zusammenhang zwischen ENEP und der abhängigen Variablen verändert sich hingegen überhaupt nicht. Weiterhin haben die beiden Kontrollvariablen die Distanz zum Medianwählen und Parteienideologie einen signifikanten Einfluss. Es zeigt sich zum einen, dass je dichter Parteien am Medianwähler liegen, die Diversität zunimmt und zum anderen, dass rechte Parteien diverser

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aufgestellt sind. Insgesamt ist zu schließen, dass zwischenparteilicher Wettbewerb einen Einfluss auf die ideologische Diversität von Parteien hat. Sowohl die Proportionalität des Wahlsystems, als auch die Parteiensystemfragmentierung zeigen Anzeichen als relevante Erklärungsfaktoren für das strategische Verhalten von politischen Parteien.

5

Zusammenfassung

In diesem Beitrag zur Würdigung der Arbeit von Detlef Jahn, wird der Einfluss von zwischenparteilichem Wettbewerb auf die ideologische Diversität von politischen Parteien untersucht. Es wird angenommen, dass Parteien aufgrund von äußeren, systemischen Faktoren die Diversität ihres Parteiprogrammes strategisch auswählen. Stimmenmaximierendes Verhalten zugrunde legend, wird argumentiert, dass sowohl das Wahlsystem, als auch die Parteiensystemfragmentierung die Diversität von Parteien beeinflussen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass in proportionalen Wahlsystemen Parteien ideologisch weniger divers sind, als in disproportionalen Mehrheitswahlsystemen. Dies basiert auf der Annahme, dass Parteien nicht gezwungen sind mit ihrem Wahlprogramm eine sehr große Menge an Wählern an sich zu binden. Interessanterweise muss die zweite Hypothese zurückgewiesen werden, da die Anzahl der konkurrierenden Parteien keinen signifikanten Einfluss hat. Die Ergebnisse unterstützen das erklärte Ziel, welches sich mit der Erweiterung des strategischen Kalküls von Parteien basierend auf dem Medianwählerintheorem befasst. Das Ziel ist es, dass nicht nur ein einzelner ideologischer Punkt (siehe beispielsweise Adams et al. 2004) das strategische Verhalten von Parteien definiert, sondern die ideologische Diversität ebenfalls Relevanz besitzt. Die Grundannahme ist, dass Parteien sich soweit ideologisch divers aufstellen, wie sie müssen, um ihre Wählerinnenstimmen zu maximieren und Erfolg bei einer Wahl zu haben. Das dies durch zwischenparteilichen Wettbewerb moderiert wird, stellt eine weitere Neuerung dieses Forschungsfeldes dar. Für zukünftige Forschung gilt es zum einen weitere Erklärungsvariablen für die ideologische Diversität zu finden und zum anderen das strategische Verhalten von Parteien auch abweichend von klassischen Erklärungsansätzen zu beleuchten.

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Larger or Smaller Inter-Party Policy Differences? What Do Citizens and MPs Believe? Magnus Hagevi

1

Introduction1

The perception of and preference for increasing or decreasing policy distances between parties is important. Political actors’ perception of the policy positions of political parties is one of the critical features of a working representative democracy (Schattschneider 1942; Schumpeter 1942; Dahl 1971). Indeed, party scholars warn that inter-party policy differences that narrow to the point where party positions converge may imperil democracy (Katz and Mair 1995, 2009; Kitschelt 1995, 2000, 2018; Jahn and Hagevi 1999). The fear is that citizens will have difficulty choosing what party to vote for if they believe the positions of the parties are similar. In that sense, the extreme convergence of party positions is a challenge to representative democracy. Contrary to this gloomy picture of democracy, studies of representation tend to show greater polarisation between MPs of different parties than among their voters (cf. Hagevi and Loxbo 2018). Indeed, in recent decades, scholars have emphasised increasing policy polarisation between political parties (Lindvall et al. 2017; Bäck and Caroll 2018). However, some scholars argue that there is increasing affective polarisation between representatives of different parties (Bauman et al. 2017). Such suggestions point towards other explanations of perceived and preferred policy distance between 1

As part of the research project Decreased ideological polarization and conflict? (DIPAC), this study is supported by the Swedish Research Council (Grant id: Grant id: 2014-1246) and the Crafoord Foundation (Grant id: 20150635).

M. Hagevi (B) Department of Political Science, Linnaeus University, Växjö, Sweden e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2022 E. Baltz et al. (eds.), Parties, Institutions and Preferences, Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-35133-5_5

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parties than the rational calculations of parties’ actual policy positions (cf. Downs 1957). Instead, the focus is on psychological explanations of how individuals perceive policy distance between parties. Some argue that the ideological position of the individual affect how they evaluate the ideological distance between parties (Granberg and Brown 1992; Merrill et al. 2001). Is the perceived and preferred policy distance in a party system affected by the ideological position of the individual? In the next section, I will develop the theoretical assumptions of this chapter and present the study’s hypotheses based on psychological and rational assumptions on how the ideological position of individuals affect the evaluation of policy distances between parties. This is followed by a discussion of the study’s case, data, empirical operationalisations, and measurements. Thereafter, I present the findings, including the results of the hypothesis testing. Finally, I summarise the findings and draw my conclusions.

2

Theory and Hypotheses

Donald Granberg and Thad Brown (1992) argued that people want to minimise the difference between themselves and their most preferred party while maximising the difference from the party they dislike the most. They based this assumption on balance theory, i.e., people strive to create, recreate, or maintain a sense of cognitive balance (Heider 1958), and social judgement theory, i.e., people perceive parties they like as politically close to themselves, while they want the policies of parties they dislike to be more distant from their own political views (Sherif and Hovland 1961; Parducci and Marshall 1962; Whittaker 1967). In social judgement theory, these psychological tendencies are referred to as contrast and assimilation, respectively. Based on the theory of contrast and assimilation, Granberg and Brown argued that people with extreme ideological positions want to place parties they dislike far away from their own policy position by exaggerating the distance, while they want to place parties they like close to their own position by excessively shortening the policy distance. Indeed, I argue that, based on the theory of contrast and assimilation, individuals with extreme ideological positions ought to perceive and prefer greater policy differences in a party system than do people with more centrist ideological positions. According to this theory, an individual with an extreme ideological position strives to perceive the policies of parties with opposite ideological positions as highly contrasting to his or her own, while striving to perceive the policies of ideologically related parties as similar to his or her own extreme position. Due

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to his or her extreme position, such an individual can then perceive the distance between ideologically opposite parties as relatively large and thus also the policy distances in the entire party system as relatively large. Indeed, such persons also ought to prefer large distances within a party system. Instead, a person with a more centrist ideological position tends to have less need to emphasise differences between the parties in a party system, while the pursuit of assimilation leads such a person to prefer relatively small policy differences in a party system. Based on the psychological theory of contrast and assimilation, a first hypothesis can therefore be formulated. Hypothesis 1

An ideologically extreme position leads individuals to perceive and prefer greater policy differences in a party system than do people with a more centrist ideological position. To what extent psychological processes such as contrast and assimilation affect the assessment of policy distance between political parties can, according to Merrill et al. (2001), be dependent on the individual’s role in politics. Some people are more politically engaged, have rather extensive political participation, and have greater knowledge of politics than do others. I argue that it is more common to find more comprehensive commitment to, participation in, and knowledge of politics among members of parliament (MPs) than among other citizens (cf. Öhberg 2011, p. 60). The differences between people such as MPs and other citizens should, according to Merrill et al. (2001), reflect that the former have greater knowledge of present and past political realities and therefore have greater ability to estimate the policy positions of parties without psychological bias. Briefly put, regarding judgements of policy distance between parties, MPs tend to be less inclined to wishful thinking than are other citizens. If Merrill et al.’s (2001) assumption is correct, psychological processes such as assimilation and contrast should be less important among MPs than among other citizens. In that case, it should mean that the differences in the perception of policy distances in a party system are relatively small between ideologically extreme and more centrist-oriented MPs. Such an effect of contrast and assimilation should be more visible among other citizens. This leads to the second hypothesis of the study.

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Hypothesis 2

Among MPs, extreme versus centrist ideological positions have no significant effects on the perception of the policy distance within a party system, while such effects are significant among other citizens. However, rational choice-based theories do not consider individual psychology. Instead, such theories are based on evaluation of the costs and benefits to the individual, leading to the importance of policy proximity between the views of the individual and party policies: individuals perceive the shortest policy distance to the party whose policies are most beneficial to them (Downs 1957). The psychological pursuit of assimilation or contrast is not assumed to affect the individual’s perception of policy distance in a party system. However, there are individuals whose ideological positions do not fully correspond to those of the party they sympathise with. In that case, it would be rational to be dissatisfied with the policy distance to this party and wish to reduce it. Indeed, Giovanni Sartori (1976, p. 78–79) noted the existence of discrete ideological orientations within parties and the occurrence of party-internal far-left and far-right factions. Depending on whether a party is perceived as politically left-wing or right-wing, the significance of far-left and far-right factions varies as regards polarisation and moderation (McCarty et al. 2001). The far-left faction in left-wing parties tends to support policies that entail greater polarisation in the party system, while the far-right faction in such parties instead has a moderating effect. The same applies to the far-left faction in parties on the right wing of the party system, while these parties’ far-right factions instead promote increased polarisation in the party system. While the far-left faction in parties to the left and the far-right faction in parties to the right can be described as polarising factions, the farright faction in parties to the left and the far-left faction in parties to the right can be described as moderating factions. Based on this assumption, it would primarily be individuals in parties’ polarising factions who prefer larger inter-party policy differences. This assumption – based on rational choice theory (not on psychological theories) – leads to the third hypothesis of this study. Hypothesis 3

Individuals in polarising party factions tend to prefer larger policy distances within a party system than do other individuals.

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However, I argue that it is possible to mix assumptions from the psychological and rational choice theories. As suggested by Merrill et al. (2001), individuals such as MPs ought to be less affected by the psychology of assimilation and contrast than are other citizens. Perhaps this means that MPs might make more rational judgements of the policy distance in party systems than do other citizens. If so, whether or not one belongs to a polarising party faction ought to have a greater effect on the preferred ideological distance in a party system among MPs than among other citizens. This leads us to the last hypothesis of the study. Hypothesis 4

MPs belonging to a polarising party faction tend to prefer larger policy distances in party systems than do other MPs, while no such significant effects are found among other citizens.

3

Case, Data, Operationalisations, and Measurements

In studies of policy distances in a party system, the empirical data are often based on some form of assessment of the parties’ actual ideological positions (Granberg and Brown 1992; Merrill et al. 2001; Jahn 2011; Thomassen and van Ham 2015; Bakker et al. 2015; Holmberg 2018; Hagevi and Loxbo 2018). When studying psychological and rational choice explanations of policy distance between parties using such data, there may be difficulties separating psychological from rational assessments of the policy distance between parties. To reduce the risk of such problems, this study examines data on citizens’ and MPs’ perceptions of and preferences for ideological distance in the party system as such, not their perceptions of parties’ policy positions on given issues or ideological dimensions (Loxbo 2014). To my knowledge, regarding perception of and preference for inter-party policy distances among citizens and MPs, the only available data are surveys conducted among Swedish MPs and citizens. Accordingly, based on data availability, Sweden is the case of this study. The Swedish political system is an established parliamentary democracy whose proportional electoral system is strongly partycentric. During the time the surveys were conducted, there were eight parties in the Swedish Riksdag (parliament): the Social Democrats (113 seats), Moderates (107 seats), Sweden Democrats (49 seats), Green Party (25 seats), Centre Party (22 seats), Left Party (21 seats), Liberals (19 seats), and Christian Democrats (16 seats). Throughout the term of office (2014–2018), the Social Democrats and

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the Green Party formed a coalition government. At this time, a large majority of citizens and MPs perceived the Social Democratic Party, Green Party, and Left Party as politically left wing, while the Moderate Party, Sweden Democrats, Centre Party, Liberals, and Christian Democrats were considered right wing (Hagevi 2015). This study uses two data sources for Swedish MPs and citizens. The first is the parliamentary survey Riksdagsenkäten 2014 conducted by researchers at the University of Gothenburg (Karlsson and Lindstrand 2018) on MPs in office after the general election of 2014. A total of 306 out of 349 MPs (87.7%) completed the survey. The second source is Surveyinstitutet’s Survey 2016 conducted by researchers at Linnaeus University (Hagevi 2016) on a representative sample of the Swedish population aged 18–85 years. In total, 1290 respondents (43.0%) completed Survey 2016. This study uses Survey 2016 and Riksdagsenkäten 2014 to map the opinions of citizens and MPs, to study their perceptions of and preferences for policy distance within the Swedish party system.

3.1 Dependent Variables This study’s two dependent variables are based on two identical survey questions in Survey 2016 and Riksdagsenkät 2014. The first question addresses perceptions of inter-party policy distance in Sweden using a reference point of some years previously: “Thinking back eight or ten years ago, do you think policy differences between the political parties in the Riksdag are larger or smaller today?” The second question aims to measure preferences for wider policy gaps between the parties (polarisation) or narrower gaps between the parties (convergence): “Thinking about how the parties discuss policy in Sweden today, would you prefer larger or smaller policy differences between the political parties?” For both of these questions, respondents could answer on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (much smaller) to 10 (much larger). Figure 1 illustrates the perceptions and preferences among citizens and MPs concerning inter-party policy differences. Figure 1 shows that most citizens and MPs believe that the parties have converged in terms of policy in the last 8–10 years. Figure 1 also shows that most citizens and MPs would prefer larger policy differences between the parties. This means that the proportion of citizens and MPs that perceives smaller inter-party policy differences is larger than the proportion that prefers this condition. Many citizens and MPs thus believe that the trend is going in the wrong direction.

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30 25

Percent

20 15

10 5 0 0 1 Much smaller

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9 10 Much larger

Fig. 1 Perceived change (solid lines) and preferred policy differences (dotted lines) between Swedish parties among Swedish citizens, 2016 (black lines), and MPs, 2014 (grey lines) (percent). Sources: Parliamentary Survey 2014, University of Gothenburg (Karlsson and Lindstrand 2018) and Survey 2016, Surveyinstitutet, Linnaeus University (Hagevi 2016)

In light of this study’s theoretical point of departure, I assume that survey responses indicating that policy differences between parties are larger today than 8–10 years ago were given by individuals who perceive large policy distances between parties in the Swedish party system. Opposite responses, i.e., perceiving smaller policy differences between parties, indicate individuals who perceive small policy distances within the Swedish party system. Also, I consider persons who prefer greater policy distances between parties to be indicating grievances over the small policy distances between parties, partly due to the perceived moderate policy positions of their preferred party. Correspondingly, survey responders wishing for smaller policy distances between parties are indicating criticism of excessive policy distances in the Swedish party system and that the policy position of their preferred party is too extreme.

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3.2 Independent Variables To test Hypotheses 1 and 2, both of which compare people having extreme and more centrist ideological positions, it was necessary to analyse data on the ideological positions of individuals. I used the respondents’ self-placement on an 11-point left–right scale ranging from 0 (far left) to 10 (far right) to study ideologically extreme respondents. People who placed themselves on the first two steps of the scale to the left (0–1) or the last two steps on the right (9–10) were categorised as ideologically extreme and all others were placed in the “Other” category. Hypothesis 1 gained support if ideologically extreme citizens and MPs perceived policy convergence between parties to be relatively strong and/or would prefer relatively great polarisation in the Swedish party system. Hypothesis 2 gained support if an extreme ideological position among MPs had no significant effect on the perception of policy convergence or increased policy distance in the Swedish party system, while such effects were significant among other citizens.2 Hypotheses 3 and 4 also examined ideology but concerned intra-party relationships within a given party supported by certain MPs and citizens. People whose party was to the left and who believed they were on the left in that party were regarded as belonging to a polarising party faction, as were people whose party was to the right and who believed they were on the right in that party. In both cases, the categorization means that MPs and citizens whose policy positions are between the position of their party and towards the ideological centre (or even further), or when the policy positions of MPs/citizens and parties coincide, hold moderating positions. People’s perceptions of their own position on the left–right scale were studied using the previously mentioned 11-point subjective left–right scale ranging from 0 (far left) to 10 (far right). This position was compared with the position the person believed that their party occupied on a similar 11-point left–right scale. If the party was politically left wing and the person believed they were on the left in the party, that person belonged to a polarising party faction. Likewise, a person belonged to a polarising party faction if that person was on the right in a politically right-wing party. If the MPs and citizens who belonged to a polarising party faction preferred greater inter-party polarisation, Hypothesis 2

It is not appropriate to use the preferred policy distance between parties to test Hypothesis 2. This hypothesis is based on assumptions of contrast and assimilation according to psychological theory. However, it may also be rational for an individual with an ideologically extreme position to prefer a greater policy distance between parties. To keep possible theoretical explanations distinct, Hypothesis 2 is not tested on preferred policy distance between parties. Regarding Hypothesis 1, the risk of a similar conflict of interpretation is relatively minor.

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3 gained support. Hypothesis 4 was supported if MPs belonging to a polarising party faction tended to prefer greater policy distance between parties than did other MPs while no such corresponding effects were significant among citizens. An individual’s position on the left–right dimension may correlate with the perceived or preferred distance between parties. Individuals at one end of the left–right dimension might perceive convergence or prefer polarisation more than do people at the opposite end. For example, people on the left may perceive greater convergence and prefer more polarisation than do people on the right (or vice versa). To control for this, the analyses also include the self-reported position of MPs and citizens on the 11-point left–right scale. This study tests these hypotheses using multiple linear regression analyses (the regression analyses studied only citizens who support parties represented in parliament). The results reported are non-standardised regression coefficients (OLS estimates). Regarding significance testing, I will consider results with p < 0.10 in the analysis of MPs and results with p < 0.05 in the analysis of citizens. I deviate from the usual criterion of statistical significance, i.e., p < 0.05, because there a maximum of 349 MPs in the Swedish Parliament, a number that affects the calculation of the significance level.

4

Findings

This study’s hypotheses are based on the idea that ideology significantly affects perceptions and preferences concerning inter-party policy differences. In this section, I first report findings related to Hypothesis 1, followed by findings related to Hypotheses 2, 3, and, 4. I present the empirical data in two tables: Table 1 presents the results for the perceived inter-party policy distance for citizens and MPs and Table 2 presents the results for the preferred inter-party policy distance for citizens and MPs. Hypothesis 1 posits that, compared with other people, ideologically extreme individuals who identify as far left or far right also perceive larger polarisation and prefer larger inter-party policy differences. Data related to the first part of Hypothesis 1 (i.e., that ideologically extreme citizens and MPs tend, more than others, to perceive large policy polarisation) are presented in Table 1. In two columns each for citizens and MPs, Table 1 shows the effects of the independent variables. For both citizens and MPs, the first column shows bivariate effects (bivariate 1 for citizens and bivariate 2 for MPs) using OLS regression estimates. The other column for each sample (model 1 for citizens and model 2 for MPs)

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Table 1 Effects of ideological factors on citizens’ and MPs’ perceptions of whether interparty policy differences have become larger or smaller (OLS estimate) Citizens

MPs

Bivariate 1

Model 1

Bivariate 2

Model 2

Self-placement on the left–right scale

0.05

0.05

– 0.09

0.08

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0,06)

(0.06)

Extreme ideological position

0.43*

0.51**

– 1.10**

– 0.75

(0.24)

(0.24)

(0.44)

(0.46)

– 0.44**

– 0.47**

– 0.74***

– 0.60**

(0.19)

(0.19)

(0.28)

(0.29)

–

4.02***

–

5.40*** (0.33)

Polarising faction in the party Constant

–

(0.20)

–

R2

–

0.01***

–

0.03***

Number of respondents

857–943

857

268–279

268

Note: Perceptions that policy differences have changed are coded according to an 11point scale ranging from 0 (much smaller difference) to 10 (much larger difference). Selfplacement on the left–right scale is coded according to an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (far left) to 10 (far right). Extreme ideological position is coded 1 and the others are coded 0. A polarising faction in the party is coded 1 and the others are coded 0. Significance notations: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10

reports the effects of self-placement on the left–right scale, extreme ideological position, and polarising faction in the party in a multiple OLS regression analysis. The bivariate effects (bivariates 1 and 2) indicate correlation between a single independent variable and the dependent variable. Models 1 and 2, however, illustrate how the effects of the independent variables interact. In Table 1, the variables are coded so that the positive effect of extreme ideological position supports Hypothesis 1. Extreme ideological positions result in positive effects on citizens’ perception of policy polarisation (i.e., Hypothesis 1 gains support), but not concerning MPs’ perception of the same (i.e., Hypothesis 1 is not supported). Among citizens, the bivariate correlation does not meet the accepted criterion for statistical significance. Indeed, Model 1, which also considers the effect of citizens’ selfplacement on the left–right scale and whether they are in polarising factions in parties, shows that extreme self-placement on the left–right scale has significant effects on citizens’ perception of policy polarisation. This result supports

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Table 2 Effects of ideological factors on citizens’ and MPs’ preferences for larger or smaller inter-party policy differences (OLS estimate) Citizens

MPs

Bivariate 1

Model 1

Bivariate 2

Model 2

Self-placement on the left–right scale

0.09**

0.08**

– 0.05

– 0.05

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.05)

(0.05)

Extreme ideological position

0.97***

0.92***

0.78**

0.63*

(0.25)

(0.25)

(0.36)

(0.38)

0.55***

0.49**

0.54**

0.42*

(0.20)

(0.25)

(0.23)

(0.24)

–

5.04***

–

6.46*** (0.27)

Polarising faction in the party Constant

–

(0.21)

–

R2

–

0.03***

–

0.02**

Number of respondents

887–972

887

265–274

265

Note: Preferences for policy differences are coded based on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (much smaller difference) to 10 (much larger difference). Self-placement on the left–right scale is coded based on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (far left) to 10 (far right). Extreme ideological position is coded 1 and the others are coded 0. A polarising faction in the party is coded 1 and the others are coded 0. Significance notations: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10

Hypothesis 1. However, among MPs, the bivariate correlation indicates a tendency opposite to that stipulated by Hypothesis 1. Moreover, in the corresponding Model 2 for MPs, extreme ideological self-placement loses significance. Still, Hypothesis 1 is not supported among MPs. In Table 2, the hypotheses are tested by examining citizens’ and MPs’ preferences for greater or smaller inter-party policy distances. Also in this case, it is possible to test Hypothesis 1, since it posits that ideologically extreme citizens and MPs tend to prefer increased policy polarisation more than others do. As in the previous table, Table 2 reports effects for citizens and MPs in two columns for bivariate correlations and two models with multiple regressions. In Table 2, the variables are coded so that the positive effect of extreme ideological position supports Hypothesis 1. The results in Table 2 support Hypothesis 1. Ideologically extreme citizens and MPs tend to prefer larger inter-party policy differences, although the significance of the results among MPs is weak in model 2. However, since only the Table 2 results regarding preferred policy distances, but not the Table 1 results regarding

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perceived policy distances, support Hypothesis 1 among MPs, Hypothesis 1 gains support among citizens, but is only partly supported among MPs. As to the testing of Hypothesis 2, it stipulates that ideologically extreme citizens (but not correspondingly extreme MPs) tend to perceive larger polarisation than do other citizens. Among MPs, however, no such effect should be significant. Hypothesis 2 is tested in Table 1. According to Table 1, among citizens, extreme ideological positions tend to result in positive effects on perceived inter-party differences (i.e., extreme ideological positions tend to result in the perception of larger inter-party differences). This is in accordance with Hypothesis 2. However, among MPs, no such effects are evident. Instead, among MPs, the bivariate effect is negative and the multiple regression analysis (model 2) indicates no significant effect; this also supports Hypothesis 2. Both Hypotheses 3 and 4 consider ideological conditions within parties and the preferred inter-party distances presented in Table 2. According to Hypothesis 3, citizens and MPs who belong to polarising factions within their parties prefer larger inter-party policy differences than do other people. In Table 2, the variables are coded so that the positive effect of a polarising party faction supports Hypothesis 3. This hypothesis gains support among both citizens and MPs in terms of both bivariate relationships and the regression models, even though the significance of the effect of MPs in polarising party positions in Model 2 is weak. This means that those who belong to polarising party factions, compared with others, prefer greater inter-party policy differences. Such a result about the preferred policy distance between parties is assumed to indicate grievances due to the perception of overly moderate policy positions of the preferred party among individuals in polarising party factions. Indeed, the results in Table 1 support such an interpretation as citizens and MPs in the polarising party factions indicate negative effects on the perception of inter-party polarisation. Hypothesis 4 also considers ideological conditions within the parties: MPs who belong to polarising factions within their parties tend to prefer relatively large inter-party policy differences, while no such effect should be significant among citizens. Data related to Hypothesis 4 are also presented in Table 2 and the variables are coded so that the positive effect of belonging to polarising factions within their parties among MPs, and the insignificant effect of the same among citizens, supports Hypothesis 4. The results in Table 2 do not support Hypothesis 4. Instead of the effect differing significantly between citizens and MPs, those who belong to polarising factions in their parties tend to prefer larger inter-party policy differences among citizens as well as MPs (as already mentioned, in model 2, the significance of this effect among MPs is weak).

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Alongside hypothesis testing, the results in Table 2 show the positive effect of self-placement on the left–right scale on citizens’ preferred inter-party policy distances. This means that citizens on the political left do not prefer larger interparty policy differences as much as do right-leaning citizens. It is possible that this result is related to the Swedish political situation after the general election of 2014. Under the leadership of a Social Democratic prime minister, two left-wing parties formed a minority government. To get its bills passed in parliament, this government needed support from right-wing parties. In such a situation, citizens who support a left-wing government may tend to prefer smaller policy differences if it makes it easier for the government to gain parliamentary support for its bills. Unsurprisingly, due to the small number of respondents who were ideologically extreme and in polarising factions in their parties, the explained variance (R2 ) is low in Tables 1 and 2.

5

Conclusions

This chapter has analysed Swedish citizens’ and MPs’ perceptions and preferences concerning inter-party policy differences. One theoretical departure point of the study was the psychological theory of contrast and assimilation (Granberg and Brown 1992): individuals with extreme ideological positions tend to perceive and prefer greater policy differences in a party system than do individuals with more centrist ideological positions. According to this theory, individuals with extreme ideological positions prefer their parties to stand in relatively large contrast to parties with opposite ideological positions, while the same individuals strive to perceive the policies of ideologically related parties as similar to their own extreme positions. This study confirms this assumption regarding preferences as to inter-party policy differences. However, concerning perceived policy positions, the theory gains support only among citizens, but not among MPs. Also relating to the psychological theory of contrast and assimilation, this study tests the assumption that MPs, when assessing the policy distance between parties, are less inclined to be affected by psychological processes of contrast and assimilation than are other citizens (cf. Merrill et al. 2001). Indeed, the results of this study indicate that, compared with a centrist ideological orientation, an extreme ideological position leads to the perception of a greater policy distance between parties among citizens, but not among MPs. This means that the effects of psychological processes of contrast and assimilation are conditioned by the political role of the individual.

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A second theoretical departure point of this study is rational choice theory (Downs 1957): In a party, polarising party factions strive to change the policy position of the party and increase policy polarisation in the party system. Indeed, this study shows that individuals in polarising party factions do prefer larger inter-party differences. Combining assumptions made by the psychological theory of contrast and assimilation (Merrill et al. 2001) with rational choice theory (Downs 1957; Sartori 1976), this study also investigated whether membership in a polarising party faction was more important for the preference for greater inter-party policy distance among MPs than among other citizens. The results of this study did not support such a possibility; instead, MPs as well as other citizens make similar rational conclusions as to their preferred inter-party policy distances in a party system. A general result is that citizens believe that parties have converged in terms of policy, but would prefer that parties have more polarised positions. When considering MPs as a collective, they were good representatives of the citizens because their perceptions and preferences of inter-party distances tended to correspond. However, it seems as though psychological theories do a better job of explaining perceptions of policy distance among citizens in general than among politically involved groups with good political knowledge such as most MPs. Also, regardless of the political role of the individual, rational calculation to increase the political benefits of individuals’ party preferences is effective for understanding preferences for increased policy polarisation in a party system.

References Bäck, H., and Caroll,. 2018. Polarization and gridlock in parliamentary regimes. The Legislative Scholar 3 (1): 2–5. Bakker, R., C. de Vries, E. Edwards, L. Hooghe, S. Jolly, G. Marks, J. Polk, J. Rovny, M. Steenberger, and M.A. Vachudova. 2015. Measuring party positions in Europe: The Chapel Hill expert survey trend file 1999–2010. Party Politics 21: 143–152. Baumann, M., Back, H. and Carroll, R. (2017). A Divided Parliament? Rhetorical Polarization in the Swedish Riksdag. Paper presented at Polarization, institutional design and the future of representative democracy: Workshop, Berlin, 5–7 Oktober. Dahl, R. 1971. Polyarchy: Participation and opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press. Downs, A. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: The Free Press. Granberg, D., and T.A. Brown. 1992. The Perception of Ideological Distance. The Western Political Quarterly 45 (3): 727–750. Hagevi, M. (2015) Den svenska väljaren 2014, Malmö, Gleerups. Hagevi, M. 2016. ’Survey 2016: Teknisk rapport’. Surveyjournalen 3 (2): 19–28.

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Hagevi, M., and K. Loxbo. 2018. Are the Predictions of the Cartel Party Thesis Supported in the Swedish Case? In Cartelisation, Convergence or Increasing Similarities? ed. H. Enroth and M. Hagevi, 43–69. Lessons from Parties in Parliament, London: ECPR Press/Rowman & Littlefield International. Heider, F. 1958. The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations. New York: Wiley. Holmberg. S. (2018) ’Policyöverensstämmelse är viktigt’ In: Karlsson, D. (eds.) Folkets främsta företrädare, Göteborg, University of Gothenburg pp. 25–50. Jahn, D. 2011. Conceptualizing Left and Right in comparative politics: Towards a deductive approach. Party Politics 17 (6): 745–765. Jahn, D. and Hagevi, M. (1999) ‘Parteien und Fraktionen in Schweden: Entwicklungen zur Kartellpartei’ In: Helms, L. (ed.) Parteien und Fraktionen: Ein internationaler Vergleich. Opladen: Leske + Budrich, pp. 145–170. Karlsson, D., and L. Lindstrand. 2018. ’Om riksdagsundersökningen’. In Folkets främsta företrädare, ed. D. Karlsson, 207–218. Göteborg: University of Gothenburg. Katz, R.S., and P. Mair. 1995. Changing Models of Party Organizations and Party Democracy: The Emergence of The Cartel Party. Party Politics 1: 5–28. Katz, R.S., and P. Mair. 2009. The Cartel Party Thesis: A Restatement. Perspectives on Politics 7: 753–766. Kitschelt, H. 1995. The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Kitschelt, H. 2000. Citizens, Politicians, and Party Cartelisation: Political Representation and State Failure in Post-Industrial Democracies. European Journal of Political Research 37: 149–179. Kitschelt, H. 2018. Cartels and competitions: An introduction. In Cartelisation, Convergence or Increasing Similarities? ed. H. Enroth and M. Hagevi, 1–13. Lessons from Parties in Parliament, London: ECPR Press/Rowman & Littlefield International. Lindvall, J., Bäck, H., Dahlström, C., Naurin, E., Teorell, J. (2017). Samverkan och strid i den parlamentariska demokratin. Stockholm: SNS Förlag. Loxbo, K. 2014. Voters’ perceptions of policy convergence and the short-term opportunities of anti-immigrant parties: Examples from Sweden. Scandinavian Political Studies 37: 239–262. McCarty, N., K.T. Poole, and H. Rosenthal. 2001. The Hunt for Party Discipline in Congress. American Political Science Review 95: 673–687. Merrill, S., III., B. Grofman, and J. Adams. 2001. Assimilation and contrast effects in voter projections of party locations: Evidence from Norway, France, and USA. European Journal of Political Representation 40 (2): 199–221. Öhberg, P. 2011. Politiker med karriärambitioner – en omöjlig självklarhet: En studie om karriärambitionernas betydelse i den representativa demokratin. Göteborg: Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg. Parducci, A., and L.M. Marshall. 1962. Assimilation vs contrast in the anchoring of perceptual judgements of weights. Journal of Experimental Psychology 63 (5): 426–437. Sartori, G. 1976. Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schattschneider, E.E. 1942. Party Government. New York: Farrar and Rinehart. Schumpeter, J. A. (1942) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York, Harper & Brothers.

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Sherif, M., and C. Hovland. 1961. Social Judgment: Assimilation and Contrast Effects in Communication and Attitude Change. New Haven: Yale University Press. Thomassen, J., and C. van Ham. 2015. Failing political representation or a change in kind? In The Role of Parties in Twenty-First Century Politics: Responsive and Responsible? ed. L. Bartolini. Bardi and S. and Trechsel, A. H., 173–192. Abingdon: Routledge. Whittaker, J. O. (1967) ‘Perception and Judgement in the Political Extremist.’ Journal of Communication, 17 (2): 136–141.

The ‘Lifespan’ of Green Parties in Western Europe: An Evaluation Ferdinand Müller-Rommel

1

Introduction

Some 50 years ago, the first Green councilors and regional parliamentarians were elected and less than a decade later, Green parties successfully placed candidates in several national elections in Western Europe. Since then, green parties have developed around the world in 61 countries, among them 15 in Africa, 12 in the Americas, 14 in the Asia-pacific region, and 32 in Europe (MüllerRommel 2011, p. 1052). Most green parties outside of Europe developed not before in the mid 1990s, and have remained relatively minor political players, particularly in presidential systems. This is one reason why nearly all comparative research and scholarly debates focus on electorally successful green parties in Europe, particularly on those Greens that held a ‘blackmail potential’ in coalition governments. The political profile of Green parties in European democracies basically consists of three elements that define the ‘green party family’. First, most of these parties follow the basic idea of the New Politics concept. Thus, they generally embrace a left-wing standpoint consisting of fervent equalitarianism (equal rights for minorities), strong ecological and anti-nuclear power thinking, and solidarity with the Third World. They campaign for a genuine sharing of wealth between rich and poor nations, for a rigorous climate change, and for assistance to underprivileged countries. In a nutshell, green parties introduce a new form of programmatic and ideological thinking that is less consistent with the ideological position of traditional ‘old’ parties on the ‘right’ and the ‘left’ of the European F. Müller-Rommel (B) Zentrum Für Demokratieforschung, Leuphana Universität Lüneburg, Lüneburg, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2022 E. Baltz et al. (eds.), Parties, Institutions and Preferences, Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-35133-5_6

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party system. Instead, they offer a set of alternative and emancipative values that differ significantly from the established larger parties. Second, green parties display a much stronger preference for participatory party organization than established parties. Their organizational structure gives local party branches more autonomy in decision-making and a maximum chance of interest articulation from grassroots initiatives. Thus, the process of decentralization is considered an essential precondition for meaningful participation. The third characteristic that sets European green parties apart is that they have a similar electorate with attributes that differ significantly from those of established parties. Comparative data on the electorate of the Greens have, for instance, shown that followers of new social movements and their ideas are among the majority of green party voters. They are for the most part below the age of 50, highly educated, and occupied in service positions where the traditional class conflict is virtually non-existent (for example in the public administration as well as in the educational system). Although there was some diversity in the programmatic demands, and in the degree of participatory party organization, green parties developed rapidly: between 1978 and 1989 new green parties were founded in 15 Western European countries.1 At that time several scholars and journalists predicted that the electoral strength of the Greens will diminish immediately after the established parties have adopted the ‘environmental issues’ into their party programs. As we now know, this did not happen. On the contrary, green parties have developed in all European parliamentary democracies albeit with a different ‘party lifespan’. Forty years after the formation of green parties on national level it therefore seems reasonable to look back at their ‘political life’, including their ‘date of birth’, their ‘period of adulthood’, and their ‘time of death’, in a systematic comparative manner. Although some early studies have given first explanations about the ‘rise’, the ‘success’, and the ‘decline’ of green parties (among others Detlef Jahn’s, 1993a, seminal contribution on Green parties in Sweden and Germany, but also previous research by Kitschelt 1989, and Müller-Rommel 1989), a historical mapping of the many green parties that developed over the past decades 1

Green parties were also founded in several Central Eastern European parliamentary democracies after the transition to democracy in 1989/90. They entered national parliaments once (or more) in nine countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) and national governments in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Latvia, Slovakia, and Slovenia. However, in contrast to Western Europe the electoral support of the Greens in Central and Eastern Europe declined rapidly over the past thirty years. (Jordan 2010: 45ff.; Frankland 2016: 59 ff.). This is a major reason why these parties are not included in our analysis.

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is still lacking. Which of these parties were founded at what times? Which of these parties had a longer or a shorter ‘life’? Which of them have been more or less influential within national party systems? This chapter provides a comparative evaluation of green parties’ ‘lifespan’ in Western Europe. It summarizes descriptive empirical information which may be important for understanding the substantial changes that took place in some European party systems over the past four decades (Mair 1997).

2

Green Parties as Mortal Organizations: A Conceptual Framework

By contrast to several established parties in Western Europe, the Greens are no ‘frozen’ components of party systems (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Karvonen and Kuhnle 2001). Depending on the country, they have changed significantly over time and in several respects. Most changes have taken place by positive or negative electoral results others by changes in the parties’ program and their organizational structure. We therefore consider green parties as mortal organizations: they are ‘born’, they pass through infancy, youth, adulthood, and may ‘pass away’ earlier or later in their party age. Interestingly enough, research on green parties has mostly concentrated on single aspects of their ‘adulthood’ (i.e. their electoral success, their party organization and party program, and their participation in national governments). Yet, in order to understand the overall effect of green parties on European political systems, their lifespan needs to be examined comprehensively under comparative perspective (Müller-Rommel 2002; van Haute 2016). The development of political parties can be characterized by means of thresholds that they have to pass during their life. In their seminal book on ‘Party Systems and Voter Alignments’, Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967) already suggest that the transformation of cleavages into party systems is channeled by a sequence of thresholds that any new political movement (party) has to pass in order to introduce new political demands within a political system. Among these thresholds is first, the threshold of legitimation (i.e. does the right for petitions, criticism, and opposition exist?); second, the threshold of incorporation (i.e. do political citizenship rights exist for supporters and opponents of the political system?); third, the threshold of representation (i.e. can new movements gain own representative organs?); fourth the threshold of majority power (i.e. are there builtin checks and balances against numerical majority rule?) (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, p. 27). This concept was further developed by Don Rawson (1969) who

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systematically described the origin and the development of the Labor parties in five countries (United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Sweden, and Norway). Kenneth Janda (1970/1980) also utilized Lipset and Rokkan’s idea in his framework for analyzing the development of political parties under cross-national perspective. Based on these findings, Mogens Pedersen (1982) finally introduced a heuristic typology for mapping the major phases of minor parties’ origin, their fates and their political impact. The basic idea of this typology of party lifespans was that minor parties increase and decrease their electoral, their parliamentary and in some cases even their governmental strength over time. Pedersen suggests that the life of minor parties can be divided into four discrete thresholds, which each party has to pass in order to become influential in any democratic political system. First, the threshold of declaration which may have two forms of interpretation. On the one hand, it is the point in time when a group of politically active citizens decides their first participate in elections; on the other hand it may be the time when a party declares to abstain from further electoral participation. Second, the threshold of authorization which refers to meeting the legal regulations that have to be fulfilled by a party in order to participate in elections (i.e. a certain number of signatures collected in favor of a candidate or a deposit of a certain amount of money by the respective party). Only after these requirements are fulfilled, political parties are authorized to nominate candidates for elections and participate from others benefits such as state financial support or regulated access to state-controlled TV. Third, the threshold of representation which is the point when parties gain seats in parliament for the first time. Thereby, the operational definition of this threshold, i.e. the number of votes necessary to obtain seats in the legislature, is typically defined in the national electoral law. Fourth, the threshold of relevance which is defined by the early writings of Giovanni Sartori (1976, p. 19–25) who suggests that minor parties – no matter how small they are – must be counted as relevant if they have either ‘coalition potential’ or ‘blackmail potential’. Thus, Sartori examines relevancy only with ‘winners’ among political parties. However, minor parties may also be relevant in the maintenance of the status quo within party systems, for instance, in the process of negotiations among major and minor parties within the boundaries of a given party system. Minor parties might also be relevant as testing ground for new ideas which are then picked up by the established (usually larger) parties and thereby affect their political behavior. Finally, minor parties may also be relevant as a programmatic ‘safety belt’ for discontented voters (Herzog 1987). No matter

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how political relevance is defined, minor parties seek to pass the threshold of relevance for becoming influential as a party in government. With these conceptual tools in mind, we examine the various lifespans of green parties aiming to identify patterns of their political impact on party systems in Western Europe. Similar to Pedersen, we suggest that green parties have to pass thresholds on their way to become politically successful. In contrast to Pedersen, however, we introduce three (rather than four) thresholds that are also based on partially different measurements. The first threshold is labeled as electoral campaigning. According to Pedersen (1982, p. 6–7) a party’s declaration to attend in electoral competition is usually coupled with campaigning, collecting signatures for registration and other events whereby these activities are legally ‘authorized’ on different grounds in each country. All political parties need to fulfill these requirements for participating in the election itself. Thus, by definition green parties have passed both of these thresholds once they actively participate in the campaigning for elections with own candidates. The definition of the second threshold, representation in parliament, is the same as Pedersen’s ‘representation’ but terminologically more precise. The third threshold, government participation, is defined by the number of ministers that green parties hold in national governments which is empirically easier to measure than ‘coalition potential’ or ‘blackmail potential’ in party governments as suggested by Pedersen.

2.1 The Threshold of Electoral Campaigning: From New Social Movements to Green Parties As noted in the literature, green parties started their political activities by nominating own candidates for local and regional parliaments and governments (Müller-Rommel 1993; Richardson and Rootes 1995; O’Neill 1997). It is, of course, impossible at that point to empirically identify the various activities of Green parties on subnational level across Europe over the past fifty years. We therefore suggest to concentrate on a measurable and unbiased criterion of electoral campaigning by considering only those green parties that have participated in national parliamentary elections with own candidates. The question why Green parties declared to campaign for national parliament in the 1970s and 1980s cannot be answered without examining their roots in the student movements of the 1960s, as well as the subsequent flowering of the environmental, the anti-nuclear and the peace movements. When the student movements in the 1960s disappeared, other political movements rapidly developed in many Western European countries. Most of these

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emerged spontaneously on the local level as politically independent citizeninitiative groups. These groups were interested in single issues such as the provision of parks; they protested against urban renewal, new highways, or the construction of nuclear power plants. At that time, the citizen initiatives employed a variety of ‘new forms of political actions’ (Barnes and Kaase 1979) in seeking to influence policy decisions. Citizens mobilized public opinion via unconventional political behavior characteristics of earlier student movements, such as demonstrations and occasional ‘sit-ins’, information campaigns, and similar tactics. They also utilized local and national laws to obtain public access to urban renewal and construction plans, and to force compulsory hearings for those directly concerned with local environmental issues. This led to the establishment of federal umbrella organizations in order to strengthen the political impact of the environmental movement nationally. For instance, the Bundesverband Bürgerinitiativen Umweltschutz (BBU) was founded in Germany in 1972, the Amis de la Terre in France in 1971, the Swedish Miljvardsgruppernas Riförbund (MIGRI) in 1971, and the Dutch Vereiniging Milieudefensie (VDM) in 1972. In the 1970s, the nuclear energy issue became dominant in several Western European countries. Heavily influenced by the oil crisis, most European governments decided to expand their nuclear program. It was precisely the nuclear power issue, however, that demonstrated the need for organizing political movements at the national level, since energy problems could not be resolved at the local level (Jahn 1992). More and more local action groups in various countries formed nationally organized ‘anti-nuclear power’ organizations such as the Organization for Information on Nuclear Power(OOA) in Denmark founded in 1974, the committee for the coordination of Regional Anti-Nuclear Power Initiatives (LEK) in the Netherland in 1973, the Environmental Federation (Miljöverbund) in Sweden 1976, the Initiative of Anti-Nuclear Power Plants (IAG) in Austria in 1976, and the Action against Nuclear Power (AMA) in Norway in 1974. A few years later, the environmental issue was joined by a debate over the NATO dual-track decision on intermediate nuclear forces and the eventual stationing of Cruise and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe. This political decision created considerable solidarity among new social movements across European national borders. Large demonstrations were held, along with illegal occupations of proposed missile sites. Most of these activities were initiated by nationally organized peace movements. In the early 1980s, most citizen initiative groups and new social movements looked for closer contact with the Social Democrats or other large, established left-wing parties in their nation. They expected those parties to act as an effective force against unlimited economic growth, the destruction of the environment

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and the stationing of nuclear weapons. Major efforts were made to influence the nuclear policy of the Social Democrats and other labor and socialist parties, albeit without much success. For several reasons the large left parties could not (or would not) respond adequately to the demands of the new social movement followers. First, in many European countries the socialist parties held governing power during the 1970s, precisely around the time that these nations underwent a crucial economic crisis with the subsequent increase in unemployment rates. Leftist governments were forced to work more closely with the trade unions and other ‘conventional’ interest groups in order to manage the economic crisis. However, the trade unions in Western Europe have been strong advocates of economic growth as mechanism for improving the status of the employers (Jahn 1993). Since the socialists and other established leftist parties were, to varying degrees, dependent upon the electoral support of the trade union leaders and rank-and file membership, an environmental or anti-nuclear power position by these parties directed against the trade unions’ economic policy would have been damaging for them. Therefore, the issues brought up by new political movements in the 1970s have not figured prominently in most socialist parties’ platforms or policy stands, although there were anti-nuclear and environmental factions in these parties albeit as intraparty minorities. Today, we know that these new political movements have altered established politics over the past decades by having created a ‘new policy dimension of green growth which moved governments to become greener than ever before’ (Jahn 2017, p. 145). Second, the hierarchical, bureaucratic organizational structure and ‘catch all’ character of most socialist parties made it almost impossible for new political movements to implement any major policy change in a short period of time. By and large, Michel’s classic analysis of the ‘iron law of oligarchy’ contained a lot of truth about the internal life of the socialist parties in Western Europe at that time (and even today! see Koß 2021). Hence, the negative experiences of the new political movements’ followers with the established left-wing parties, as well as the perceived lack of responsiveness of other political institutions in becoming to grips with a fundamentally different policy approach of new social movement adherents, became the major reasons for the green parties to declare their participation in national election. Already in the 1970s green movements in four countries have passed the threshold of electoral campaigning. In the United Kingdom the ecologists participated for the first time in the 1974 national elections under the name People’s Party. One year later, they changed their name into Ecology Party. In France, the ‘Ecological List’ nominated their first presidential candidate in 1974 and

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declared their participation in the 1978 national parliamentary election. It was, however, not until 1984 that the various factions within the French green movement founded the Green Party. Inspired by the French Greens, the ecologists in Belgium have formed two green parties in 1981 (AGALEV for the Flemish and ECOLO for the Wallons). Yet, the green movements in both parts of the country campaigned already for the first time in the 1977 national parliamentary election. In Luxembourg, the followers of various new social movements declared to nominate candidates for the 1979 national elections while the Green party was only founded in 1983 for receiving a better electoral option at the 1984 national and European elections. The Greens in Finland already campaigned with own candidates for the 1979 national elections. Yet, because of the fragmented green movement with its widespread skepticism towards a formal party organization, the Green party was only established in 1987. The majority of all Green parties in Europe declared their national electoral participation in the 1980s. In (West) Germany, the national Green Party was founded in 1980 prior to the parliamentary election. The Greens in Sweden founded their national party in 1981 and participated for the first time in the 1982 general election. In order to maximize their voter turnout, they changed the parties’ name from Miljöpartiet to Green Party in 1984, before nominating their own candidates for the 1985 national election. The Greens in Ireland were founded in 1981 and declared to participate in the 1982 general election. In Austria, two green parties were founded in 1982: The Alternative List (ALÖ) and the Green Union (VGÖ). Both green parties campaigned separately for the 1983 elections and did not get enough electoral support to pass the four percent threshold provided by the electoral law. For the 1986 national elections both green parties formed an alliance and have been electorally more successful (see below). In Switzerland, several decentralized green parties founded the Federation of Green Parties (GPS) on national level already in May 1983. One month later, some leftwing followers of the alternative groups established the ‘Green Alternative List’ (GAS). Both groups participated with own candidates in the 1983 general election and remained stable as two-party electoral coalition over the past decades. Around the same time, the environment movements in Portugal founded a green party but did not participate in national elections before 1987. Already at that time, the party did not run on their own, but only on a coalition list together with the Communist Party which is in a way surprising since there is no threshold hurdle in the Portuguese electoral law. The first green party in Denmark was founded in 1983 but did not compete in the subsequent general election of 1984. Instead it took them another three years to improve their organizational and programmatic profile for campaigning in the 1987 national elections. In Italy, a

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national organization of a federal type of green party was founded in 1986 in order to integrate the various green local lists for campaigning collectively in the 1987 general election. For similar reasons, the local green party lists in Spain founded a national party in 1984 and were authorized for the first time to participate in the 1989 national elections. In Norway, the green party was founded immediately before the 1989 national elections in which the party campaigned for the first time with own candidates. In the same year, the green party (GreenLeft) in the Netherlands was founded as an electoral federation of four small-left wing parties that had already been represented in the Dutch parliament during the 1970s (Christian People Party, Communist Party, Pacifist-Socialist Party, Political Party of Radicals). The campaigned for the first time successfully during the 1989 national parliamentary elections. While the majority of all green parties passed the thresholds of electoral campaigning for national parliament between 1974 and 1989 two additional green parties have been founded more recently. In Greece, a national green party did not participate in a parliamentary election before 2007, although environmental lists have been politically active since the 1980s and even won a seat in the 1989 and 1990 national elections. Furthermore, in Denmark a new green party emerged after their absence of more than twenty years on national level. In 2013, the political activists of the various new social movements founded a new green ‘Alternative’ party that participated for the first time in the 2015 national election with remarkable electoral success (see Appendix I) (Table 1). In sum, we find two patters of green party development in the preparliamentary phase. Heavily based on the support of the new social movements, all green electoral alliances during the 1970s declared to campaign for general elections even before a national green party was founded. Yet, in the following decades the Greens only passed the threshold of electoral campaigning after having formed an own party on national level whereby in the majority of all cases, the party was founded shortly before the national election took place.

2.2 The Threshold of Representation in Parliament: Green Parties Becoming Politically ‘important’ Out of the nineteen green parties that passed the thresholds of electoral campaigning fifteen overcame the second barrier (the Greens in the two parts of Belgium are counted as one party) while three green parties remained politically unimportant. Among the later are the Spanish Greens that were—from the very beginning of their party formation in 1983—marked by profound party-internal

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Table 1 Year of passing the threshold of electoral campaigning (national level). (Year of national Green Party Foundation) 1970–1979

1980–1989

United Kingdom

1974 (1975)

Germany

1980 (1980)

France

1974 (1984)

Sweden

1982 (1981)

Belgium (ECOLO)

1977 (1980)

Ireland

1982 (1981)

Belgium (AGALEV)

1977 (1982)

Austria

1983 (1982)

Luxembourg

1979 (1983)

Switzerland

1979 (1983)

Finland

1979 (1988)

Portugal

1987 (1982)

Denmark I

1987 (1983)

Italy

1987 (1986)

1990 – 2020

Spain

1989 (1985)

Greece

2007 (2002)

Norway

1989 (1989)

Denmark II

2015 (2013)

Netherlands

1989 (1983)

conflicts which could not be solved over the years. Differences in strategic goals and leadership styles fostered the fragmentation and made the integration of the various environmental movements impossible. Moreover, the existence of a multiparty system and an electoral threshold of three percent for national parliamentary elections made it hard for the green party in Spain to pass the threshold of representation. A second green party that did not passed the threshold of parliamentary representation were the Danish Greens in the 1980s. Although they have nominated candidates for three subsequent general elections, the party did not pass the two percent electoral hurdle for gaining seats in parliament. Their success was hampered by the presence of the small ‘Socialist People Party’ that has taken up green issues in their party program. In the early 1990s the party disappeared from the political scene. Finally, the green party in Portugal entered parliament in 1987 for the first time but only as a coalition partner of an electoral alliance together with the Communist party (Unitarian Democratic Coalition, CDU). Thus, the Portuguese Greens never stood on their own for elections which is why they are excluded from the further analysis. The political performance of all other green parties that have passed the threshold of parliamentary representation varies considerably across Europe. There are, for instance, green parties with high and low electoral results as well as those

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with many or just a few seats in national parliaments. A systematic longitudinal description as well as aggregated values of the green parties’ political performance on national level are provided in Appendix I and Table 2. Admittedly, the electoral strength of the Greens remained rather marginal compared to those of the large established parties. It is also true that some green parties have lost electoral support in recent years, for instance in Belgium, Sweden and Great Britain. Yet, their electoral losses were not too dramatic. In other countries the electoral performance of the Greens increased substantially such as in Austria, Ireland, Finland, and Switzerland. Overall, there is no empirical evidence that shows a significant decline of green parties’ electoral performance. In contrast, green parties have stabilized their electoral success in major European

Table 2 Green Parties after having passed the threshold of parliament (1979–2020). (parliamentary performance). Countries

Passing threshold (year)

Parliamentary terms (N)

Average seats of Greens in parliament (N)

Average seats of national parliaments (N)

Parliamentary strength (factor)

Austria

1986

10

16

183

8.7

Belgium

1981

11

12

172

7.0

Denmark

1987

2

7

179

3.9

Finland

1983

10

11

200

5.5

France

1997

5

6

577

1.0

Germany

1983

10

48

622

7.7

Greece

1989

2

1

300

0.3

Italy

1987

6

13

630

2.0

Ireland

1989

7

4

165

2.4

Luxembourg

1984

8

6

60

10.0

Netherlands

1989

9

8

150

5.3

Norway

2013

2

1

169

0.6

Sweden

1988

8

19

349

5.4

Switzerland

1979

11

12

200

6.0

United Kingdom

2010

4

1

650

0.1

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countries over the past twenty years and thereby strengthened both their organizational structure and their overall stability. Thus, the electoral performance of green parties that have passed the threshold of parliamentary representation did not develop as badly as predicted by some political analysts (Bürklin 1985; Alber 1989; Mair 2001). The electoral strength of green parties is, of course, related to their parliamentary performance. Over the past forty years, green parties were represented in 105 national legislations with a total of 1450 seats in parliament across fifteen European countries. Five green parties entered national parliaments already in the 1980s (Finland, Germany, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Switzerland) and remained continuously represented until 2020. In three countries the Greens gained seats in the 1980s but their representation in parliament was interrupted due to low electoral results. In Austria, for instance, they held parliamentary seats from 1986 to 2020 with the exception of two years (from 2017 to 2019). Similarly, in Sweden and Ireland the Greens entered parliament in 1988 and 1989, but were absent for short periods from 1991 to 1994 and from 2011 to 2016 (respectively). In two countries the Greens were only represented in parliament for eleven and sixteen years and then disappeared from the party system (Italy 1987–2008; Greece 1989–2015). Finally, in Denmark, the Greens tried to pass the threshold of parliament three times (1987, 1988, 1990), but failed. It was not before 2015 that a new green party entered the Danish Folketing (see Appendix I). The variation in the electoral results and the parliamentary representation of green parties are strongly determined by the different electoral laws of the various European countries. In Germany, for instance, parties need to pass a five per cent electoral threshold in order to enter parliament. Other countries have introduced electoral thresholds of four per cent (Sweden, Norway, Austria, Italy) and two per cent (Denmark). Furthermore, several countries follow an electoral system of complete proportional representation with no thresholds at all (Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Luxembourg) which explains why in some of these countries, the electoral results and the number of parliamentary seats are comparatively low. In Great Britain, the Greens face the problem of a majority electoral system and in France political parties need to gain at least 12.5 per cent of the vote in the first ballot in order to be eligible for running in the second ballot which is based on a system of genuine proportional representation. Although green parties have an opportunity to articulate their political demands in parliament debates, their political impact on national policy dependent upon their parliamentary strength. The later can be measured by the total number of seats in national parliament divided by the number of green parties’ seats. The results in Table 2 provide aggregate measures on the parliamentary

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strength of the Greens over forty years and can be summarized under three headings: first, the parliamentary strength of green parties is strikingly lower than those of most other parties in European party systems: their average proportional share in national parliaments is below ten percent (except for Luxembourg where the Greens hold ten per cent of the seats on average). Second, in eight (out of fifteen) countries the parliamentary strength of green parties ranges between five and ten percent (Luxembourg, Austria, Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, Finland, Sweden, and the Netherlands). As noted below, these are the same countries in which the Greens have a ‘blackmail’ potential as junior coalition partner in government (Sartori 1976, p. 121ff; Smith 1991, p. 26). Third, the green parties’ parliamentary impact is moderate in France, Ireland and (most recently) Demark while it is extremely low in Norway and the United Kingdom. Finally, the Greens in Greece and Italy have not been very strong in parliament before they completely disappeared from the national level of the party system. In sum, these empirical findings illustrate that the electoral as well as the parliamentary performance of green parties have improved remarkably over the past decades in several countries. In fact, the Greens were not only a temporary phenomenon but have developed to a stable element of most European party systems. Thus, the often quoted ‘new politics dimension’ (Jahn 1993; MüllerRommel and Poguntke 1995) which green parties have introduced to European party systems has consolidated itself over the past forty years.

2.3 The Threshold of Government Participation: Green Parties Becoming Politically ‘relevant’ Joining cabinet governments became a central objective of all successful green parties although the issue of moving from opposition to government was always heavily discussed within the party. On the one hand, some intra party factions claimed that a representation in government might lead to decreasing electoral and parliamentary support, on the other hand governmental participation was promoted by others as a political opportunity receiving more influence on cabinet decision-making and governmental policy. Those who argued against governmental participation have stressed four potential problems. First, while being member of a coalition government the Greens would get into difficulties when solely focusing on their own policy programs. As governing parties, they are urged to respond to various policy fields including foreign, domestic, economic and financial policy. To develop own policy suggestions in these fields might, however, contradict to some of their original issue

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preferences. For example, severe cuts in the national budget that governing green parties might have to support in coalition government could hinder the implementation of new environmental policy. Secondly, as opposition parties in national parliaments, the Greens may introduce radical answers to radical policy requests. Thereby, they may affect political issues and the tone of political life by bringing controversial matters to parliament and in front of the public. As junior partners in coalition governments, they would, however, no longer be able to follow this (radical) strategy, since compromises between coalition partners need to be achieved. Thus, the Greens would lose its former ‘political freedom’ (as opposition parties) while being in government. Thirdly, the green parties’ program which is primarily oriented towards local, decentralised political participation might contradict with the need of a governing party to participate in centralised cabinet decisionmaking. Fourthly, green party voters expected their party to behave differently in government coalitions than the established parties. For instance, voters may anticipate more transparency of cabinet decision-making once the Greens have entered government. However, the stable management structures within the political executives of most European countries make it extremely difficult for green parties to draw a dividing line to the established coalition partners in government. Despite this discussion about the trade-off between office and policy seeking on the one hand and electoral results on the other, green parties have passed the threshold of governmental and became junior partner of coalition governments in ten countries albeit in two waves: The first wave lasted from 1995 to 1999 and the second wave began in 2014. The first green party minister entered government in Finland (1995), followed by green party cabinet members in Italy (1996), in France (1997), in Germany (1998) and in Belgium (1999). Most recently, the Greens joined coalition governments in another four countries: Sweden (2014), Luxembourg (2014), Greece (2015), and Austria (2020). Interestingly enough, the government duration of these parties varied substantially. The Greens in Finland held the longest representation in national government (16 years), followed by the French Greens (9 years), the German, the Italian, the Swedish Greens (7 years respectively), the Greens in Belgium, Ireland, and Luxembourg (6 years each) as well as the Green party in Austria (2 years) and in Greece (one year). In several countries these parties have crossed the threshold of relevance several times. (see Table 3 and Appendix II). A second crucial indicator of green parties’ success in government is the number of ministries it attains. Green parties have been members of 24 European cabinets. In each of these cabinets, the Greens received between one and four ministries. The total number of these ministries for each country differs considerably (see Appendix II). While the Greens in Finland and Sweden gained a total

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Table 3 Green Parties after having passed the threshold of government (1995–2020) Country

Year passed threshold

Years in office

Number of ministries

Number of ministers

Finland

1995

16

10

10

Italy

1996

7

5

5

France

1997

9

5

6

Germany

1998

7

7

4

Belgium

1999

6

4

4

Ireland

2007

6 (in office)

5

4

Sweden

2014

7

11

13

Luxemburg

2014

6 (in office)

7

5

Greece

2015

1

1

1

Austria

2020

2 (in office)

3

3

58

55

Total

of 10 and 11 ministerial positions (respectively) upon entering government, the number of ministries range between three and seven in the other countries. A third aspect of green parties’ political impact on government is the portfolio allocation. Due to their policy preferences and their pivotal position in cabinet, the Greens were usually allocated the ministry of environment in all coalition governments. Only in the cases of Austria (2020- in office), Finland (2007–2011), France (2012–2014 and 2016–2017), and Italy (2000–2001) did they not receive this portfolio. Most of the other ministerial positions held by the Greens have only a ‘low prestige’ compared to the other cabinet portfolios (i.e. the ministries of sport, family, youth, mobility, housing, tourism, and gender) (see for a definition of low medium and high portfolios Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor Robinson 2016). These ministries have hardly any public visibility and are characterized by a lack of financial and administrative resources. Yet, some green parties have also allocated portfolios that exercise a significant control over governmental policy. Among these highly visible and prestigious portfolios are the ministries of foreign affairs, justice, interior, economics and finance. The Greens in Germany (1998– 2005), for instance, and their counterparts in Finland (2019 – in office) allocated the ministry of foreign affairs while the green party in Sweden holds the finance portfolio since 2014. Over the past twenty-five years, the Greens have been in charge of 58 ministries in 23 cabinet governments. These ministries were governed by 26 female

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and 29 male ministers. Thus, the share of female ministers is much higher among the Greens than in any other political party (see Appendix II).

3

Dimensions of Green Parties’ Lifespan

As stated above, green parties passed – to varying degrees—the three different political thresholds during their lifespan. In order to understand the political impact of the Greens in a historical context all three thresholds need to be considered simultaneously. Following the argument by Mogens Pedersen (1982), we suggest to study the ‘life’ of green parties in lifespan-curves (hereafter Ls-curves). These can be described in terms of three dimensions, namely the modality, the dispersion, and the skewness of Ls-curves. By means of these dimensions it is possible to describe the ‘ups’ and ‘downs’ of any green party in Europe on a longitudinal dimension, no matter whether the party existed for decades or only for a few years. The first dimension of a LS-curve is its modality which may be defined by three different types: unimodal, bimodal, multimodal. A unimodal Ls curve describes green parties that have passed all thresholds up-bound only once in their life. In a bi- or a multimodal curve, green parties have crossed the various thresholds several times. The Greens may, for instance, temporarily drop below the threshold of parliament and (even more common) the threshold of governance. Some may even fall below the threshold of electoral campaigning and disappear from the national party system. Only three green parties have dropped the threshold of parliament once in their political life: The Greens in Austria (2017), in Ireland (2011) and in Sweden (1991). Several other green parties have experienced a bi- and multimodal lifespan in their governmental participation. In Belgium, the Greens have been in government between 1999 and 2003 and then again since 2019 while in France they joined the cabinet between 1997 to 2002 and stayed in opposition for ten years before entering government again in 2012. Similarly, the green parties’ representation in government has been interrupted once in Italy (2001–2006) and in Ireland (2011–2020). Only the Finish Greens have followed a multimodal lifespan. They participated in coalition governments from 1995 to 2003, 2007 to 2013 and since 2019. A second dimension that characterizes the lifespans of green parties is the dispersion of the Ls-curve which is defined by the parties’ age or termination in national politics. The number of years that green parties participate in elections,

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parliaments and governments varies considerably across Europe. In seven countries, the Greens have constantly participated in national politics (i.e. campaigned for national elections) since more than forty years (Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Switzerland and the United Kingdom). In other countries, the presence of green parties in national politics was limited, for instance, in Italy from 1987 until 2008, in Denmark from 1987 until 1994, and in Greece from 1989 until 2015. The third dimension of the Ls-curve is its skewness which is defined as a symmetrical fairly stable lifespan including minor upward and downward trends. The Greens in Denmark, Switzerland, Italy, and Greece exemplify this Ls-curve. In a nutshell, the three Ls-curves provide two central findings: First, most green parties in Europe follow a unimodal and bimodal lifespan curve meaning that these parties have (so far) only passed the thresholds up-bound or dropped once from the threshold of government to the lower threshold of parliament. Moreover, green parties that have passed the threshold of parliament usually do not completely disappear (i.e. ‘died’). Exception are the Greens in Denmark (in the early 1980s), in Italy, and in Greece. For reasons that need further descriptive evaluation, the Greens in these three countries stopped campaigning for national elections at one point in time. Second, the analysis shows that the number of years green parties ‘invested’ from the first campaigning for national elections to the first representation in parliament varies substantially. While the Greens in France and Norway participated in national elections for 23 and 14 years (respectively) until they entered governments, their counterparts in Denmark, Italy, Switzerland and the Netherlands have passed the threshold of national campaigning and parliamentary representation at the same time. Third, among the Greens who passed the threshold to government we find three different Ls-curves: those who have been stable members of parliament for a long time (26 to 33 years) prior to entering government (i.e. the Greens in Austria, Luxembourg, and Sweden); those who held parliamentary seats for a moderate time 9 to 18 years) before becoming junior coalition partners (Belgium, Finland, Germany, Italy, and Ireland), and the Greens in France who entered government for the first time in the same year they passed the threshold of parliament. The empirical evidence, presented above, show that the lifespan patterns of green parties consist of three distinction types: strong, moderate and weak green party performers. Among the first group are those Greens that have followed a unimodal upbound lifespan passing all three thresholds or a bimodal curve with temporal drops below the threshold of government. The moderate Greens are characterized by having long-lasting parliamentary experiences while the weak

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Table 4 The Lifespans of Green Parties on National Level (1977–2020) Passing Thresholds (years)

Number of years from

Electoral Parliament Government campaigning parliament campaigning (Interruptions) to parliament to government Austria

1983

1986 (1)

2019

3

33

Belgium

1977

1981

1999

4

18

Denmark

1987

1987 (1)

–

0

–

Finland

1979

1983

1995

4

12

France

1974

1997

1997

23

0

Germany

1980

1983

1998

3

15

Greece

2007

1989

2015

Italy

1987

1987

1996

0

9

Ireland

1982

1989 (1)

2007

7

18

Luxembourg 1979

1984

2014

5

30

Netherlands

1989

1989

–

0

–

Norway

1989

2013

–

14

–

Portugal

1987

–

–

–

–

Spain

1989

–

–

–

–

Sweden

1982

1988 (1)

2014

6

26

Switzerland

1979

1979

–

0

–

United Kingdom

1974

2010

–

6

–

Greens have campaigned in national elections but never entered parliament or have only been marginally represented in parliament for a short period of time (see Table 4).

4

Conclusion

This chapter has evaluated the ‘lives’ of green parties in comparative perspective. It has applied Mogens Pedersen’s (1982) party lifespan approach as a heuristic concept for analyzing the historical development of the Greens in Europe. What, if anything, can be gained from this descriptive overview of green parties’ lifespan? First, we find that green parties are indeed mortal organizations bounded in

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different lifespans. Second, we suggest that the extent to which the Greens prove to be a relevant political challenger of the traditional parties and party systems may depend largely upon their individual lifespan. In countries where the Greens have reached their ‘adulthood’ we may expect more challenges to the established structures of party competition than in countries where the Greens are still in their ‘infancy’ or ‘adolescence’. Thus, the Greens will remain major political player in countries such as Belgium, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg and Sweden and with an increasing tendency also in Austria, France, Denmark, Switzerland and Norway. In other countries like Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Italy they will remain politically unimportant. Given these findings, at least four sets of open questions come to mind which need to be examined in further research: which are the factors that account for a long and a short ‘life’ of green parties? Which are the institutional, cultural and economic conditions that support the growth of green parties? Which factors explain the green parties’ recuperations once they dropped below one of the thresholds? Which are the conditions that facilitate the growth of Green parties? These and other questions need to be answered in order to explain and predict the ‘lifespan’ and the political impact of green parties more accurately.

Appendix I Green parties’ electoral and parliamentary performance Austria (1)

1983

1986

1990

1994

1995

1999

2002

2006

2008

2013

2017

2019

(2)

3.2

4.8

6.8

7.3

4.8

7.4

9.5

11.1

10.4

12.4

3.8

13.9

(3)

0

8

10

13

9

14

17

21

20

24

0

26

(4)

0-

183

183

183

183

183

183

183

183

183

-

183

(5)

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

-

1

Belgium (1)

1978

1981

1985

1987

1991

1995

1999

2003

2007

2010

2014

2019

(2)

0.8

4.5

6.2

7.1

10.0

8.4

14.4

5.5

9.1

9.2

8.6

6.1

(3)

0

4

9

9

17

11

20

4

12

13

12

21

(4)-

-

212

212

212

212

150

150

150

150

150

150

150

(5)

-

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

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F. Müller-Rommel

Denmark (1)

1987

1988

1990

2015

2019. (The Alternative green party founded 2013)

(2)

1.3

1.4

0.9

4.8

3.0

(3)

0

0

0

9

5

(4)

–

–

–

179

179

(5)

–

–

–

0

0

Finland (1)

1979

1983

1987

1991

1995

1999

2003

2007

2011

2015

2019

(2)

0.1

1.4

4.0

6.8

6.5

7.3

8.0

8.5

7.3

8.5

11.5

(3)

–

2

4

10

9

11

14

15

10

15

20

(4)

–

200

200

200

200

200

200

200

200

200

200

(5)

–

0

0

0

1

1

0

1

1

0

1

France (1)

1978

1981

1986

1988

1993

1997

2002

2007

2012

2017

(2)

2.1

1.1

1.2

0.4

0.1

1.6

0.5

0.7

2.9

0.2

(3)

–

–

–

–

–

7

3

4

17

1

(4)

–

–

–

–

–

577

577

577

577

577

(5)

–

–

–

–

–

1

0

0

1

1

Greece (1)

1989

1990

2007

2009

2012(1) 2012(2)

(2)

0.6

0.8

1.1

2.5

2.9

(3)

1

1

0

0

0

0

(4)

300

300

–

–

–

–

(5)

0

0

–

–

–

1 (green party not in parliament)

0.9

The ‘Lifespan’ of Green Parties in Western Europe: An Evaluation

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Germany (1)

1980

1983

1987

1990

1994

1998

2002

2005

2009

2013

2017

(2)

1.5

5.6

8.3

5.1

7.3

6.7

8.6

8.1

10.7

8.4

8.9

(3)

0

28

44

8

49

47

55

51

68

63

67

(4)

–

520

519

672

669

669

603

614

622

631

709

(5)

–

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

0

Italy (1)

1987

1992

1994

1996

2001

2006

(2)

2.5

2.8

2.7

2.5

2.2

2.1

(3)

13

16

11

14

8

15

(4)

630

630

630

630

630

630

(5)

0

0

0

0

0

1

Ireland (1)

1982

1997

1989

1992

1997

2002

2007

2011

2016

2020

(2)

0.2

0.4

1.5

1.4

2.8

3.9

4.7

1.9

2.7

7.1

(3)

0

0

1

1

2

6

6

0

2

12

(4)

–

–

166

167

168

169

166

–

158

160

(5)

–

–

0

0

0

0

1

–

0

1

Luxembourg (1)

1979

1984

1989

1994

1999

2004

2009

2013

2018

(2)

1.0

5.2

8.4

9.9

9.1

11.6

11.7

10.1

15.1

(3)

0

2

4

5

5

7

7

6

9

(4)

–

64

60

60

60

60

60

60

60

(5)

–

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

Netherlands (1)

1989

1994

1998

2002

2003

2006

2010

2012

2017

(2)

4.1

3.5

7.3

7.0

5.1

4.6

6.7

2.3

9.1

(3)

6

5

11

10

8

7

10

4

14

(4)

150

150

150

150

150

150

150

150

150

(5)

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

144

F. Müller-Rommel

Norway (1)

1989

1993

1997

2001

2005

2009

2013

2017

(2)

0.4

0.1

0.2

0.2

0.1

0.4

2.8

3.2

(3)

–

–

–

–

–

–

1

1

(4)

–

–

–

–

–

–

169

169

(5)

–

–

–

–

–

–

0

0

Sweden (1)

1982

1985

1988

1991

1994

1998

2002

2006

2010

2014

2018

(2)

1.7

1.5

5.5

3.4

5.0

4.5

4.7

5.2

7.3

6.8

4.4

(3)

–

–

20

–

18

16

17

19

25

24

16

(4)

–

–

349

–

349

349

349

349

349

349

349

(5)

–

–

0

–

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

Switzerland (1)

1979

1983

1987

1991

1995

1999

2003

2007

2011

2015

2019

(2)

0.6

6.4

7.7

7.4

6.5

5.0

7.4

9.6

8.4

7.1

13.2

(3)

1

3

9

14

8

8

13

20

15

11

28

(4)

200

200

200

200

200

200

200

200

200

200

200

(5)

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

United Kingdom (1)

1979

1983

1987

1992

1997

2001

2005

2010

2015

2017

2019

(2)

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.5

0.2

0.6

1.0

1.0

3.8

1.6

2.7

(3)

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

1

(4)

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

650

650

650

650

(5)

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

0

0

0

0

(1) year of campaigning for parliament; (2) electoral results (3) number of green party seats in parliament (4) overall number of seats in parliament (5) participation in government coalition (0=no; 1=yes)

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Appendix II Green Parties’ governmental performance Country

Years in Office

Ministry (Portfolio)

Minister (Name)(1)

Austria

2020 – (2021)

Art, Culture, Sport

Werner Kogler

Social Affairs, Health

Rudolf Anschober

Belgium

Finland

Justice

Alma Zadic

1999 – 2003

Environment, Health

Magda Aelvoet

Mobility, Transport

Isabelle Durant

2020 – (2021)

Environment, Climate

Zakia Khattabi

Mobility, Transport

George Gilkinet

1995 – 1999

Environment

Pekka Haavisto

1999 – 2002

Environment

Satu Hassi

Health, Social Service

Osmo Soininvaaru (99–21)

Justice

Tuija Brax

Labor

Targa Cronberg (07–09)

2007 – 2011

Anni Sinnemäki (09–11) 2011 – 2014

International Development

Heidi Hantala (11–13)

Environment

Ville Ninistö

Foreign Affairs

Pekka Haavisto

Pekka Haavisto (13–14) 2019 – (2021)

France

1997 – 2002

Interior

Maria Ohlsalo

Environment

Krista Mikkonen

Environment

Yves Chochet (97–01) Dominique Yoynet (01–02)

2012 – 2014

Regional Development

Cecile Duflot

Developmental Aid

Pascal Canfin

Housing

Emmanuelle Cosse

2017 – 2018

Ecological Transition

Nicolas Hulot

1998 – 2002

Foreign

Joschka Fischer

Environment

Jürgen Trittin

2016 – 2017 Germany

2002 – 2005

Health

Andrea Fischer (98–01)

Agriculture

Renate Künast (01–02)

Foreign

Joschka Fischer

146

Country

Greece

F. Müller-Rommel

Years in Office

2015

Ministry (Portfolio)

Minister (Name)(1)

Environment

Jürgen Trittin

Agriculture

Renate Künast

Environment

Giannis Tsironis (Jan-Sep) (Green party was not represented in parliament)

Italy

Ireland

Luxembourg

1996 – 2000

Edo Ronchi

Equal Opportunities

Laura Balbo (98–00)

2000 – 2001

Agriculture, Forestry

Alfonso Pecoraro Scanio

Community Policy

Gianni Francesco Mattioli

2006 – 2008

Environment

Alfonso Pecoraro Scanio

2007 – 2011

Communication, Energy

Eamon Ryan

Environment,

John Gormley

2020 – (2021)

Environment, Transport

Eamon Ryan

Tourism, Culture, Sport

Catherine Martin

2013 – 2018

2018-(2021)

Sweden

Environment

2014 – 2019

Equality, Youth, Integration

Roderic O’Gorman

Justice

Felix Braz

Sustainable Development

Francois Bausch

Environment

Carole Dieschbourg

Justice, Culture

Samantha Tanson

Interior, Defence, Mobility

Francois Bausch

Energy

Claude Turmes

Housing

Henri Kox

Finance, Consumer Affairs

Per Bolund

Environment

Asa Romson (14–16) Karolina Skog (16–19)

Education

Gustav Fridolin

Climate, Int. Development

Isabella Lövin

Culture and Democracy

Alice Bah Kuhnke

Digitalization, Housing

Mehmet Kaplan (14–16)

Finance, Consumer Affairs

Per Bolund (19–21)

Environment, Climate

Isabelle Lövin (19–21)

Peter Eriksson (16–19) 2019 – (2021)

Asa Lindhagen (since 21)

The ‘Lifespan’ of Green Parties in Western Europe: An Evaluation

Country

Years in Office

Ministry (Portfolio)

Minister (Name)(1)

International Development

Peter Eriksson (19–20)

147

Per Bolund (since 21) Per Olsson Fridh (since 20) Gender, Equality

Asa Lindhagen (19–21)

Culture and Democracy

Amanda Lind

Märta Stenevi (since 21) (1) Female ministers in italic

References Alber, Jens. 1989. Modernization, Cleavage Structure and the Rise of the Green Parties and Lists in Europe. In New Politics in Western Europe, ed. Ferdinand Müller-Rommel, 195– 210. London: Boulder/Westview. Barnes, Samuel and Max Kaase (eds.). Political Action. SAGE Publisher 1979. Bartolini, Stefano, and Peter Mair. 1990. Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bürklin, Wilhelm. 1985. The German Greens: The Post-Industrial Non-Established and the Party System. International Political Science Review 6 (4): 463–482. Escobar-Lemmon, Maria C., and Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson. 2016. Women in Presidential Cabinets: Power Players or Abundant Tokens? New York: Oxford University Press. Frankland, Gene E. (2016). Central and Eastern European Green parties: Rise, fall, and revival? In: Green Parties in Europe (ed.). Von Haute, Emilie, 59–91. London: Routledge. Herzog, Hanna. 1987. Minor Parties The Relevancy Perspective. Comparative Politics 19 (3): 317–329. Jahn, Detlef. 1992. Nuclear Power, Energy Policy, and New Politics in Sweden and Germany. Environmental Politics 1 (3): 383–417. Jahn, Detlef. 1993. New Politics and Trade Unions. Aldershot: Dartmouth. Jahn, Detlef. 1993. The Rise and the Decline of New Politics and the Greens in Sweden and Germany. European Journal of Political Research 24 (2): 177–194. Jahn, Detlef (2017). New Internal Politics in Western Europe, In: Parties, Governments and Elites (eds.) Harfst, Philipp, Ina Kubbe, and Thomas Poguntke. Wiesbaden: Springer. Janda, Kenneth (1970). A Conceptional Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Political Parties, Sage Professional Papers, Comparative Politics Series no. 01–02. Janda, Kenneth. 1980. Political Parties: A Cross-National Survey. New York: MacMillan. Jordan, Gerhard. 2010. Grüne in Mittel- und Osteuropa – ein wechselvoller Weg. In Heinrich Böll Stiftung, ed. Grünes. Gedächnis, 45–58. Berlin: Heinrich Böll Stiftung. Karvonen, Lauri, and Stein Kuhle, eds. 2001. Party Systems and Voter Alignments Revisited. London: Routledge. Kitschelt, Herbert. 1989. The Logic of Party Formation. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

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Koß, Michael. 2021. Demokratie ohne Mehrheit? München: dtv. Lipset, Martin, and Stein Rokkan. 1967. Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments. In Party Systems and Voter Alignments, ed. Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, 1–64. New York: Free Press. Mair, Peter. 1997. Party System Change. Approaches and Interpretations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mair, Peter. 2001. The Green Challenge and Political Competition. German Politics 10 (2): 99–116. Müller-Rommel, Ferdinand (ed.) (1989). New Politics in Western Europe. Boulder: Westview (2nd edition, ebook, Routledge 2019) Müller-Rommel, Ferdinand (1993). Grüne Parteien in Westeuropa. Entwicklungsphasen und Erfolgsbedingungen. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag Müller-Rommel, Ferdinand. 2002. The Lifespan and the Political Performance of Green parties in Western Europe. Environmental Politics 11 (1): 1–16. Müller-Rommel, Ferdinand, and Thomas Poguntke, eds. 1995. New Politics. London: Dartmouth. Müller-Rommel, Ferdinand. 2011. Green Parties. In International Encyclopedia of Political Science, ed. Dirk Berg-Schlosser, Bertrand Badie, and Leonardo Morlino, 1051–1054. London: Sage. O’Neill, Michael. 1997. Green Parties and Political Change in Contemporary Europe. Aldershot: Ashgate. Pedersen, Mogens. 1982. Towards a New Typology of Party Lifespans and Minor Parties. Scandinavian Political Studies 5 (1): 1–16. Rawson, Don. 1969. The Life-Span of Labour Parties. Political Studies 17 (3): 313–333. Richardson, Dick, and Chris Rootes, eds. 1995. The Green Challenge. London: Routledge. Sartori, Giovanni. 1976. Parties and Party Systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Von Haute, Emilie (ed.) (2016). Green Parties in Europe. London: Routledge

Agenda-Setting Power of Governmental Parties

Bringing Cohesion In Christoph Oberst

1

Introduction

According to Tsebelis (Tsebelis 2002) the configurations of veto players of a political system “affect the set of outcomes that can replace the status quo (the winset)”. These configurations depend on the number of veto players, their ideological preferences, the ideological distance of their preferences and their cohesion. Concerning cohesion Tsebelis concludes that “the lower the party cohesion, the lower is policy stability” (Tsebelis 2002, p. 84). In other words, it is expected that high tensions within a party are more likely not leading to policy change, or in a nutshell that policy outcomes are affected by tensions within a party.1 A possible explanation of this function gives Hanna Bäck by stating “that parties suffering from low intra-party cohesion are likely to lose bargaining power […] and as a result, heterogeneous parties should be less likely to shape policy outcomes” (Bäck 2012, p. 73). Intra-party cohesion is a crucial analytical tool of veto player theory, but it has long been neglected in empirical analyses explaining policy change. This article seeks to contribute to a better understanding of the importance of party cohesion in political decision-making processes and a more adequate empirical application of cohesion by asking “does ideological party cohesion matter”? I will answer this question by applying an index of ideological party cohesion (IPC) invented 1

Actually Tsebelis differentiates that “in decisions by majority rule policy stability increases with cohesion; in decisions by qualified majority policy stability decreases with cohesion” (Tsebelis 2002, p. 62). I will come back to this later.

C. Oberst (B) BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, Greifswald, Germany © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2022 E. Baltz et al. (eds.), Parties, Institutions and Preferences, Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-35133-5_7

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by Detlef Jahn and myself (Jahn and Oberst 2012) for an analysis of political institutions and partisan effects on labour market reforms. The task is to combine existing indices of partisan and veto player theory with the new measure of IPC. I will try to handle this task in a three-step manner. First, I replicate the empirical study by Becher (2009) that examines the impact of veto players on labour ministers for labour market reforms. Secondly, I extend the replication dataset to extend the scope of time, and therefore cases, in the paper. I will do this mainly by taking the chance to update the data of the papers´ dependent variable with data from the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset (CWED2) project (Scruggs et al. 2013). Additionally, I will change the ideological dimension that Becher uses (“myrl3”), which is a parsimonious indicator with market economic, effective governance and welfare issues based on the data of the MARPOR Project, into the deductive Left–Right index with country and time-specific aspects invented by Jahn (2010). As a third step, I add cohesion to the models by interaction with the ideological positions of the agenda setting minister to be able to analyse the effects of a party´s cohesion on a party´s position. The rationale behind the extended replication is to test whether not only position and the range of the respective veto players of a labour minister (and its interaction) affects the outcomes of labour market reforms, but also the cohesion of the ministers´ party. The general result of this study is that cohesion matters. The direction and function though is not so clear and needs further elaboration.

2

Theory

There is a huge amount of literature in quantitative research that proves that the partisan hypothesis still has a considerable effect within policy making (Allan and Scruggs 2004; Avdagic 2013; Jensen 2012; Knill, Debus, and Heichel 2010; Neumayer 2003; Schmidt 1996; Schmidt 2002, just to name a view). Studies of late and since additionally prove the relevant impact of veto players either directly or via interaction with the partisan hypothesis. The study of Michael Becher (2009) is one of those studies. The aim of the Becher study is to re-examine “how veto players matter for labour market reforms in [20] advanced industrial democracies” (Becher 2009, p. 53) from 1972–2000 with a particular focus on ministerial power. Labour market reforms, as the study’s dependent variable, are measured with the CWED data on unemployment insurance entitlements (NRR; (Scruggs 2004)) by Lyle Scruggs and employment protection legislation with data from Allard (EPL; (Allard 2005)). Becher’s findings are that the impact of ministerial partisanship

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is conditional on the ideological distance between veto players and that the capability of a minister to change the status quo towards the own preference declines, as the ideological distance between veto players increases (Becher 2009, p. 53). He shows that rightward2 shifts of the minister “lead to substantial cutbacks only if ideological distance is relatively small” (Becher 2009, p. 49). He tests for different models of agenda setting power within the cabinet and concludes, that the mixed finding concerning the dependent variable “is consistent with the idea that the autonomy of cabinet ministers within their jurisdiction is greater for policies that are not money intensive” (Becher 2009, p. 54). The task of the following is to bring in the long neglected ideological cohesion of parties into partisan and veto player models by a model that respects the combination of these three parts with respective indices. In the empirical part of this paper I will do this by replicating and extending the above described study of Michael Becher. But first things first why and how should ideological party cohesion have an impact on policies?

2.1 What is ideological party cohesion and why should it matter? Definitions to describe “the internal life of parties” (Katz 2002) are manifold and often subsumed under the term “factionalism” (Boucek 2009). In this direction one of the oldest definitions has been provided by Raphael Zariski (1960, p. 33), where he defines “a faction as any intra-party combination, clique or grouping whose members share a sense of common identity and common purpose and are organized to act collectively - as a distinct bloc within the party - to achieve their goals”, which can be “patronage […], the fulfilment of local, regional, or group interests, influence on party strategy, influence on party and governmental policy, and the promotion of a discrete set of values to which members of the faction subscribe” (Zariski 1960, p. 33). Additional to this factional based definition Sartori (1976) took ideology as a driving force into account and distinguishes between factions that are ideologically oriented and factions that are office-seeking. Ergun 2

His policy dimension is called “myrl3” which originally stems from the Parties – Governments – Legislatures (PGL) File Collection of Cusack and Engelhardt (2002). The dimension grasps f. ex. aspects of Free Entrepreneurship, Economic Orthodoxy, Governmental and Administrative Efficiency, Welfare Expansion, Market Regulation or Economic Planning. For a recent debate on the saliency and comparability of the Leftright dimension see Benoit and Däubler 2014; Budge and Meyer 2013; Dinas and Gemenis 2010; Franzmann 2013; Franzmann and Kaiser 2006; Jahn 2011; Jahn 2014.

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Özbudun (1970) took a different approach and spoke conceptually of behavioural versus non behavioural approaches culminating in disciplinal versus ideological driven cohesion of a party. This could also be described as a “top-down” versus “bottom-up” approach as Bowler, Farrell and Katz (1999) put it. For my study here, I will rely on this latter approach and concentrate on the bottom-up ideological driven cohesion of a party. Ideological cohesion within this approach can be seen as resulting “from the interaction of individual cost–benefit calculations of the various intra-party actors with party and government rules, and with the feature of the party system” (Strøm and Müller 2009, p. 34–35). In detail the cost–benefit calculations of the intraparty actors are determined by policy and career related preferences, institutional party and state rules, as well as by party system conditions (Strøm and Müller 2009, p. 34–40). The more similar the results of the cost-benefit calculations of the actors are, the higher the cohesion will be. This model can be extended with the assumptions of Barry Burden (2007, p. 43), as cited by Baumann et al. (Baumann et al. 2013, p. 187), who sees the personal characteristics as the driving force for the preferences of each parliamentary delegate. Burden analyses, that there are internal factors and personal characteristics like values, experiences and self-interest, and external factors like the party line, constituency preferences and lobbying that all influence the parliamentary activity either directly or filtered through preferences. A visualization of the combination of these two models can be seen in the following Fig. 1. I will take this approach and assume that these resulting levels of party cohesion are visible on the party level and regularly manifest into the election programmes to which each party agrees upon at the party congress. Therefore, ideological party cohesion is measureable as a result of cost and benefit calculations mainly driven by preferences. After having defined ideological party cohesion, I will turn to the effects cohesion can have for policy making to focus on the subject “cohesion matters”. Now why should ideological party cohesion matter for policy making? The answer is threefold and sets the policy making party in the focus of the analysis: first cohesion is an analytical part of the configurations of veto players of a political system that “affect the set of outcomes that can replace the status quo (the winset)” (Tsebelis 2002), and second it increases the agenda setting power and third the bargaining power of the respective policy making party as well.

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Fig. 1 Determinants of Party Cohesion extended Model based on Müller (2000) and Burden (2007). (Source: Own graphic based on Müller 2000 and Burden 2007)

2.2 The Effects of Cohesion within Veto Player Theory Let´s start with the effects cohesion can have from the perspective of veto player theory. A veto player, according to the seminal work of George Tsebelis (2002), is defined by its potency to veto against “a (labour market) reform” and could be either individual (a president) or collective (a second chamber) and institutional or partisan. Parties can be defined as collective actors and when taking part in a coalition they are a relevant veto player. Tsebelis gives us three assumptions, the first is that the more veto players are involved, the higher policy stability or the more unlikely of a (labour market) reform is. The second assumption is that the wider the ideological distance of the preferences of the veto players is, the higher policy stability will be too. The third assumption is that the cohesion of the collective veto player influences the outcome as well. He concludes that “the lower the party cohesion, the lower is policy stability” (Tsebelis 2002) and even states that “[i]t is because parties are not cohesive that policymaking becomes possible” (Tsebelis 2002). His analytical tools core and winset are widely accepted, but less research has been done with the analytical concept yolk, which can be a tool to determinate cohesion in a collective veto player. The yolk can be best described as a measure how exact the ideal position of a collective veto player can be concentrated (Baltz 2009). To create the yolk, we first have to identify whether the decision game is

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a simple majority or a qualified majority game. Let us assume first, for sake of clarity here, a simple majority game.3 To identify the yolk now, we first have to draw median lines between the players with a simple majority on each side, now the yolk itself “is the smallest circle intersecting all medians” (Tsebelis 2002, p. 45). The centre of that circle is called (Y) and its distance to the Status Quo (SQ) is called (d), while (Y) has a measurable radius (r). With this information we can draw a wincircle around (Y) with the radius of (d + 2r). This wincircle always contains the SQ, so that outside of this circle no compromise will be settled (Tsebelis 2002, p. 47). Tsebelis states, that we can use this wincircle around Y as the circle for “a fictitious individual veto player” that “can replace the collective veto player” (Tsebelis 2002, p. 47). Thus, we are able to widen the indifferences curves of the decision makers by the radii of their yolks, which then leads to the assumption that the more concentrated the yolk is, the higher policy stability will be! The Fig. 2 gives a good impression for that function, only with the extended circles there´ll be a chance to agree on a point within the plane named WABC. The above leads Tsebelis to two conjectures. The first is that “Policy stability increases as the m-cohesion of a collective veto player increases (as the radius of the yolk decreases)” and the second that “an increase in size of […] a collective veto player […] increases its m-cohesion (decreases the size of its yolk), and consequently increases policy stability (Tsebelis 2002, p. 48). In oversimplified words, we can summarize for simple majority decisions that the more cohesive a collective veto player is, the less likely a reform will be. As we kept in mind, the above holds true for simple majorities, turning to qualified majorities the result of the model summarized in conjectures is quite diverse. Tsebelis starts again with the three-step approach, where majority lines between the actors have to be drawn first. The difference to the median lines, as for simple majorities, is that now only relevant dividers count, called q-dividers, which are relevant when they leave the SQ on the not mayoral side of the divider. Then quite similarly a q-yolk and q-wincircle are to be created. The conjecture 3

Let allow us a small preview of the operationalization of this paper that will later lead to the answer to the question whether a minister is influenced by the cohesion of his or her party, because we should assume accordingly a labour minister of party A that wants to reform the labour market, but has to bargain that with his coalitional “veto” partners in cabinet of party B and party C and also with his own party A. Will the decision then be made by simple or qualified majority, or are there other mechanisms that influence the legislative process which are determined by party cohesion, like agenda setting or bargaining power? We should keep this question here in mind.

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Source: Tsebelis 1995, p. 300.

Fig. 2 Difference between individual and collective decision makers (Tsebelis 1995, p. 300). (Source: Tsebelis 1995, p. 300)

then is quite the other direction. Tsebelis shows that in cases of qualified majority “policy stability decreases as the q-cohesion of a collective veto player increases” (Tsebelis 2002, p. 54) and secondly, but less astonishing, he proves with his model, that the higher the threshold for the majority in a collective veto player is, policy stability increases (or remains at least the same) (Tsebelis 2002, p. 54). Again, in oversimplified words, we can summarize that with qualified majority the more cohesive a collective veto player is, the more likely reforms will be made. It is a hard task to empirically test the above described effects cohesion can have within veto player theory, due to the fact, that Tsebelis comes to two adversary conjectures. We simply do not know whether decisions in ministerial or cabinet decision making, which involves for example coordination among coalition partners, are arrived at with simple or qualified majority. I will overcome this problem by taking advantage of the concepts of Agenda Setting Power and Bargaining Power.

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2.3 The Effects of Cohesion via Agenda Setting and Bargaining Power There are several studies stating that the concepts of Agenda Setting and Bargaining Power either have strong implications for or are implicated by the cohesion of parties (Bäck 2009; Bäck 2012; Blumenau 2012; Cox and McCubbins 2005; Debus and Bräuninger 2009; Giannetti and Laver 2009; Laver and Shepsle 1996; Meyer 2012; Mitchell 1999; Pedersen 2010). These studies will be introduced here shortly to link ideological party cohesion to policy making via Agenda Setting Power and Bargaining Power. I will start with Agenda Setting Power, the “bedrock of party government” (Cox and McCubbins 2005, p. 204).

2.3.1 Agenda Setting Power Agenda Setting Power as described in the seminal work of Cox and McCubbins (2005) is the power to push or to slow down the legislation of bills. Whereas tools of the former are subsumed under the term positive agenda power, tools of the later are called negative agenda power. From Cox and McCubbins (2005) we do know that party cohesion, in terms of homogeneity of preferences, increases positive agenda power, through favouring the distribution of positive instead of negative power. The mechanism for this is, that becoming more homogenous in preferences, trust between the members of the group with proposal and veto powers will be increased (Cox and McCubbins 2005, p. 204). Ways to accomplish this, however, are “changes in the rules, or […] changes in the fiduciary standard expected of officeholders, or both” (Cox and McCubbins 2005, p. 208), which could be for example, a removal of committee chairmen by the party. One step further, based on the chain of delegation by Strøm (2000; 2003; Strøm and Müller 2009), Thomas Meyer (2012, p. 485) examines in his study “the consequences of intra-party dissent for coalition governments”. He asks how “intra-party dissent affect[s] a minister’s agenda setting-power” (Meyer 2012, p. 485). He builds simulation models on the assumption of the chain of delegation where: “Voters delegate to the members of parliament who, in turn, delegate power to the cabinet. Within the cabinet, jurisdictions are delegated to individual ministers, and these ministers delegate many crucial tasks to their civil servants” (Meyer 2012, p. 485). Meyer combines this with the assumption of Laver and Shepsle (1994; 1996) that “ministers are agenda setters within their jurisdiction” (Becher 2009, p. 37). He further individualizes the decision-making process and his simulations suggest:

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“that parties may benefit from deviant behaviour within their own ranks: whereas the party in charge of a respective portfolio suffers from an increase in the number of veto players, the coalition partner can move the policy output closer to its ideal position than it would be the case in the unitary actor model.” (Meyer 2012, p. 501)

He concludes that “dissent-shirking and (potential) sabotage lead to a decrease of the minister´s agenda setting power” (Meyer 2012, p. 501), which fosters the party that is not holding the ministerial post. The resulting functional direction of the effects ideological party cohesion has on Agenda Setting Power is therefore: the more homogenous parties are, the more positive agenda power they have.

2.3.2 Bargaining Power Concerning the effect cohesion has on Bargaining Power the results of several studies can be summarized as: homogenous parties do have more Bargaining Power. Bargaining Power can be simply defined as having a better bargaining position over a second actor in a bargaining situation due to different aspects of which information is one of the most important. For example, if party B knows that party A is incoherent on a policy move, the bargaining position of the leader of party A is weakened, since he or she could be replaced by the dissent faction within party A. In her study Helene Pedersen examines the impact of intra-party politics on the coalition behaviour of political parties (Pedersen 2010). She tests the impact of the formal internal power distribution within Danish political parties on their ability to participate in winning legislative accommodations by setting up a model with external and internal bargaining resources. Her results favour the hypothesis of Strøm (1990) “that parties with decentralized decision procedures are less effective in coalition negotiations”, which is contrary to Maor’s (1998) proposition that “decentralized parties are stronger in coalition negotiations” (Pedersen 2010, p. 750), and “suggest that parties with strong national party organs are more inclined to stick to policy ideals, making them less attractive and flexible in inter-party negotiations.” (Pedersen 2010, p. 750). Drawing on the works of Laver and Schofield (1990), Luebbert (1986) and Mitchell (1999) Hanna Bäck (2008, p. 74, 2009) points into the same direction and suggests “that intra-party tensions can have systematic effects on bargaining […] more specifically, tensions should negatively affect parties’ ability to enter government”. Mitchell (1999, p. 281) states that it is unlikely that dissent backbenchers of a party seek to break down the own coalition after it is once set up, but they can “rebel on particular policy items, punishing the party´s ministers for

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drifting too far away from party policies and reminding their leaders that they cannot always be taken for granted.” It is clear, that the more diverse the preferences of all actors within the party are, the higher are the chances for such a rebellion against drifting away from the actors’ preferences. Mitchell concludes that “coalition maintenance primarily involves continuous bargaining in which delicate trade-off has to be struck between negotiations among and within parties” (Mitchell 1999, p. 283). Concerning the effect of cohesion on policy outcomes itself, Bäck states that (2012, p. 73): “Intra-party cohesion may also affect policy outcomes due to that parties suffering from low intra-party cohesion are likely to lose bargaining power. This in turn may lead to that their impact on legislative output and the implementation stage decreases, and as a result, heterogeneous parties should be less likely to shape policy outcomes.”

In a similar vein Debus and Bräuninger (2009) see effects of cohesion in the negotiations of portfolio allocations during coalition bargaining. They show “that the appointment of individual ministers who belong to party factions is used to increase bargaining leverage inside the coalition government” (Debus and Bräuninger 2009, p. 141). Here the conjecture can be made that a minister is then dependent or accountable to “its faction”. Cohesion thus certainly plays a role for her or him too.

2.3.3 A Model of Constraints of Ministerial Policy Preferences I will take the approaches described above and use them to link the assumptions that Tsebelis made for cohesion and the assumptions by the above cited scholars for agenda setting and bargaining power to model answers to the question whether policy outcomes are affected by tensions within a party – or in simple words: whether cohesion matters. But instead of modelling intra-party dissent with forms of not joining (shirking) and sabotage, as for example Meyer did, I will take ideological party cohesion as the driving force and subsume the above cited mechanisms of Agenda Setting Power and Bargaining Power as ministerial bargaining power to set up the following hypothesis: H1: A minister backed by a homogenous party is more likely able to set the agenda in her or his preferred direction due to ministerial bargaining power (see also Bäck 2012, p. 37). Therefore cohesion constraints the “room for manoeuvre available to the agenda setter” (Bäck 2012; Becher 2009; Tsebelis 2002) and so I assume that policy output is not only constrained by the policy preference of the ministry, but also by the ideological party cohesion of the minister’s party. A visualization of this,

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extended with a veto player function as an additional constraining factor, which is the veto player preference constellation of the ministry (e.g. coalitional partners, presidents, second chambers), can be seen in the Fig. 3. In the above model the directional mechanism for policy outputs is the ministerial policy preference. This is in line with partisan theory and draws also on assumptions from Laver and Shepsle’s Ministerial Discretion Model (Laver and Shepsle 1990, 1994, 1996, 1999). In their model a coalition is a kind of agreement about the allocation of ministerial portfolios and coalitional behaviour is then constrained by the credibility of the ministers in cabinet, their parties’ preferences and their autonomous like policymaking. Tsebelis summarizes the model as that “[M]inisterial discretion results from the minister’s ability to shape the agenda of collective cabinet decisions rather than to determine cabinet decision once the agenda had been set” (Laver and Shepsle 1996, p. 33 cited in Tsebelis 2002, p. 107). However, indeed Laver and Shepsle see their approach as easily expendable to “take account of intraparty politics” precisely because they are not dealing with “political parties, themselves, but important party politicians – cabinet ministers” (Laver and Shepsle 1996, p. 247). These cabinet ministers seek to establish credible policy positions requested by their parties (Laver and Shepsle 1996, p. 248). The authors show that “in certain circumstances at least, intraparty politics can have a profound impact on the making and breaking of governments” through three mechanisms (Laver and Shepsle 1996, p. 250), of which the first is having “more than one credible policy position available” (Laver and Shepsle 1996, p. 250), the second is the impact of changes of factional leadership and the

Fig. 3 Constraints of Ministerial Policy Preferences. (Source: Own graphic)

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third the impact of party splitting (Laver and Shepsle 1996, p. 251–60). Concerning the first mechanism the authors state “that a party can gain useful strategic options from having senior politicians with diverse policy positions” (Laver and Shepsle 1996, p. 259) by enabling the party leadership to switch between ideal points and so move policies. Although being aware of the recently renewed criticism of the model by Tsebelis (2002, p. 108), who disagrees and denies that ministers do have enough agenda setting power to control the agenda,4 I nevertheless stick to the model of Laver and Shepsle and take three theoretical assumptions from it: First, a minister is able to decide on policies, second, he or she is dependent from the support of her or his party, third, although being strategically an advantage for the party leadership to have a “diversity of ideal points among its senior politicians” (Laver and Shepsle 1996, p. 256), being ideological cohesive equips a party’s minister with power to dictate policy in his jurisdiction and this accumulates the minister’s credibility. In the following I will empirically analyse the assumptions made above to test whether ideological party cohesion matters.

3

Empiric Part

3.1 Operationalization Thus far, most studies with party cohesion in focus were interested in explaining coalition building or portfolio allocation and only some with other outcomes of interparty negotiations. Additionally, most of these studies deal with roll-call data as a proxy for party cohesion or use data such as the Rice Index or the Agreement Index (Hixet et al. 2005; Powell 2000; Rice 1925). That kind of data is clearly linked to a disciplinal concept of cohesion as defined above. Due the ability of the US congressional roll-call data, these studies are often narrowed to this very special area, which again is rather based on a disciplinal than a preferential mode of cohesion up to now. An inspiring attempt with the focus to explain government formation as determined also by ideological party cohesion has been conducted by Paul Warwick (2000, 2006). Warwick conducted a policy horizons approach where limits of compromise result in lower and upper bounds for each party on 4

Tsebelis simultaneously points to the importance and respective impact of the role of prime ministers, the negotiated government program and government meetings that all diminish the power of the portfolio minister (Tsebelis 2002, p. 108; Tsebelis and Ha 2013).

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each policy dimension, which can serve as a proxy for ideological party cohesion. Although he also tests his approach empirically with data received from expert judgments and the Comparative Manifestos Project, I will take a different track and use the index of Jahn and Oberst (2012) for several reasons. Jahn and Oberst were the first to develop an index of ideological party cohesion (IPC) that compares “party cohesion over time and across various political parties” (2012, p. 222). Therefore, this index is suitable for time-series-crosssection models. The authors define parties as collective actors with the implication that every actor within the party has its own set of positions and preferences. In their study they limit themselves to a single policy dimension, although they state that “intraparty conflict often occurs when two or more ideological dimensions diverge “ (Jahn and Oberst 2012, p. 223). The index could be criticized on the occurrence of low cohesion values stating a cohesive party with fewer tensions, but hiding the fact that the analysed policy dimension is simply not important for the parties’ actors. The index therefore accounts for saliency via the analytical tool “importance” and so controls for the saliency of the conflict for each party (and therefore the party system too). Additionally, the index can be combined to two- or more-dimensional indices via this tool. On the other hand, the authors used a deductive country- and time-specific Left–right dimension (LR) conducted by Jahn (2011) based on data of the MARPOR Project (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006; Volkens et al. 2013). This LR dimension should be heavily relevant for most of the parties.5 By focusing on ideological party cohesion as manifested in party programmes conducted for elections I pin myself to a non-behavioural or ideological driven definition of cohesion where the unit of research is a party at one point in time. The index itself is conducted on the weighted average deviation of the Left– right statements a party makes in an election manifesto. Additionally, the degrees of radicalism of the statements are taken into account, which have been derived from stimulus scores of the multi-dimensional scaling analysis conducted for the LR index. Because the data has many outliers we used the mean absolute deviation (ad). We weight the ad with the frequency a statement has been made. This rawdata is finally multiplied with the importance (saliency score) of the dimension for the specific party. The formula for the weighted ad is: n adw =

5

i=1 wi ∗ |x i n i=1 wi

− b|

n i=1 wi ∗ x i , b=  n i=1 wi

For an interesting debate about the assets and drawbacks of this Leftright index see Benoit and Däubler 2014; Budge and Meyer 2013; Dinas and Gemenis 2010; Franzmann 2013; Franzmann and Kaiser 2006; Jahn 2011; Jahn 2014.

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In the equation, adw is the weighted average deviation. The term wi is the weight for the ith observation, which is the frequency of use of a specific statement. The stimulus score in the ith statement is xi , while b calculates the weighted arithmetic mean of all stimulus scores. (Jahn and Oberst 2012, p. 231). The index I use for veto player data has been conducted by Jahn (2010) and is also based on the time- and country specific Left-right index of Jahn (2011). It takes positional data of coalition partners, positional data of second chambers and presidents likewise into account and departs partially from the index Tsebelis conducted (see Tsebelis and Chang 2004). Like within Tsebelis index the ideological range between the veto players that are farthest away counts. Veto players that fall between the poles of the range will be absorbed. The index differs from Tsebelis´ index in questions of bicameral and presidential strength, and it uses time variant positional data of the parties, which is not the least merit of this index. The higher the values of this cohesion index the more diverse the ideology of the veto players of the index is.

3.2 Replication and extension of the Becher 2009 study What follows is a replication of a part of the study of Michael Becher (2009) and its step by step extension. I will use his transparent and reluctant replication files, but focus exclusively on his models with net unemployment insurance entitlements as dependent variable. Afterwards I interchange his political dimension and extend the cases of Becher’s models with additional data to broaden the scope of time. Finally, I will “bring cohesion into” the models. In the empiric report, I will focus on the results of the regressions and the marginal effects exclusively. Descriptive data for the variables is to be found in the appendix. I will not report on the control variables, as long as they are in line with the results of the original study. As a starting point I replicated Becher´s findings for the original time frame of the years 1972 until 2000 with his original dataset and came to exactly the same results (see regression model 1). As a second step I changed the policy dimension from “myrl3” to the Leftright dimension conducted by Jahn (2011) for the partisanship of the labour minister and the adjusted veto player index (“jahn2” in orig.) also conducted by Jahn (2010) for the veto player data. I got the same, slightly better in terms of R2 results for the original time frame (see regression model 2). Worth mentioning is that the veto player distance variable gained significance. At the controllers, the insignificant controller budget deficit changed its sign and the lagged controller

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percentage of population over 64 lost significance. Besides that, every sign and level of significance were in the same direction. Therefore, I assume using the LR Dimension of Jahn is suitable and adds slightly explanatory power. As a third step (see regression model 3), I extended all variables6 to the time frame of 19707 until 2011. Doing this, the model lost half of its explanatory power. However, since the impact of the partisan data is much more in my research focus, than explaining the reforms of unemployment insurance rates, I will rely on the models nevertheless. The outcome of the partisan variables and most part of the controllers is in the same direction and levels of significance. Subsequently, I set up the same model but bring cohesion in via two partite interaction with the positional variable without (see regression model 4) and with veto players as a main effect (see regression model 5). Again, all signs show the expected direction and the interaction term is significant. Finally, I set up a model (see regression model 6) that includes positional, veto player and cohesion aspects as a tripartite interaction. To interpret tripartite interactions is not an easy task and although the tripartite interaction term is not significant, I stick to the advice of Mitchell (2012, p. 163), that in the presence of a three-way interaction, interpretations of lower interactions are not fruitful and marginal effects should be considered to interpret the impact of the interaction. The following tables show the regression estimates and a short explanation of the time and dimensional frame used for each regression.

3.3 The marginal effects of cohesion The interpretation of the influence of the marginal effects of the respective interacted partisan variables for four of the six models above are interesting (Fig. 4). The interpretation of the marginal effects for the first model, the original model of Becher, is that veto players have a relevant effect. The effect is significant and negative for veto players until (0.75), which can be interpreted as until that range of veto player, a significant effect shows that the more veto player, the less the capability of the labour minister to implement the policy preferred (Becher 2009, 6

This extension is possible by thankfully drawing on the datasets of Armingeon, Knöpfel, Weisstanner, Engler, Potolidis, and Gerber 2013 and for the dependent variable on data from the CWED2 project of Scruggs, Jahn, and Kuitto 2013. 7 Becher (2009, p. 38) sets the 1973 oil crisis as starting point for his study, the robustness of the models when extending the time frame to the year of 1971 is to be checked accordingly. There is some missing data producing gaps, most variables start 1971.

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Model 1

Model 2 Becher Model within LR Dimension

-.4

-.04

Effects on Fitted Values -.2 0 .2

Effects on Fitted Values -.02 0 .02

.4

.04

Becher original Model

0

.5

1 vrange_myrl3

1.5

0

2

.1

.2 a_jahn2100

.3

.4

Observations: 382

Observations: 391

Model 3

Model 5 Oberst Model, LR Dim., extended time frame, POS#COH; VPL

-.2

-.1

Effects on Fitted Values 0 .1

Effects on Fitted Values -.1 0

.2

.1

Oberst Model, LR Dimension, extended time frame, POS#VPL

0

.1

Observations: 570

.2 a_jahn2100

.3

.4

0

.1

.2

.3 .4 COHESION

.5

.6

.7

Observations: 570

Fig. 4 Marginal effects for model 1, 2, 3 and 5. (Source: Marginal Effect. Own calculation)

p. 49). At the end of the scale the effect becomes significant again but turns to the positive side of the scale. Becher (2009, p. 51) interprets this rather rare event as a possible outcome of logrolling among parties. In the second model the direction of the effect is the same, although the turning effect starts at lower levels of veto player influence and is more distinct. In my interpretation the capability of the minister to implement his preferred policy is so small due to high levels of veto player influence, that the minister even has to go against his preferred partisan line. Nevertheless, we can result from these two models that veto players do have an impact on policy outcomes.

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Extending the time frame as in the third model weakens the relevancy of this effect and the room to manoeuver in the preferred direction is even narrower. Additionally, the turning effect starts already with lower levels of veto player. Bringing cohesion in as in the fourth (not reported here) and fifth model leads to the assumption that also cohesion has a relevant and significant effect on policy making. The less tensions within the minister’s party, the more capable of implementing the preferred policy the minister is. This result is significant until a level of cohesion of (0.45). The result shows that, when the minister is backed by an internal unified party, the minister can act in line of the partisan hypothesis. With increasing levels of cohesion this effect becomes insignificant, but also positive, which implies a similar trend as for veto player effects. The interpretation of the average marginal effect of the tripartite interaction of position, cohesion and veto players underlines the above assumed interpretations. First, as can be seen from the average marginal effects of position as a function of cohesion and veto players (Fig. 5), it can be said, that cohesion and veto players do have relevant impact on the positional impact of the labour ministries. The positional impact is negative and significant, when there are almost none and less veto players (dotted and diamonded line) and this impact shrinks by increasing levels of cohesion, stating that the more incoherent the party of the labour minister is and the more veto players act, the less partisan impact on NRR will there be. By that we can interpret that a left labour minister can raise NRR better when s/he has no internal dispute and less veto players, whereas a right minister can reduce NRR better within the same constellation of low internal dispute and veto player. This effect is significant for the constellation of zero veto players through all levels of cohesion and also for small veto players (0.1) until a high level of cohesion (0.45). This result is generally in line with partisan hypothesis. But with higher levels of veto players and more internal dispute the partisan effect is turned around, stating a positive effect of ministerial position on the NRR rate, which can be interpreted as follows: when many veto players are to be played and internal division is high, the partisan effect is then that left ministers reduce and right ministers expand NRR. This effect is significant for a (0.35) level of cohesion with high veto players (0.3) and also significant for a (0.25) level of cohesion with very high veto player (0.4) constellations. The following graph (Fig. 6) shows the above levels of veto players in detail with confidence intervals on a 95% level to be able to analyse the significance of the different veto player levels.

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-.2

Effects on Fitted Values -.1 0 .1 .2

Avrg Marg Effects of Position as a function of Cohesion and VPL POS#COH#VPL

0

.2

.4

.6

Cohesion L.a_jahn2100=0 L.a_jahn2100=.2 L.a_jahn2100=.4

L.a_jahn2100=.1 L.a_jahn2100=.3

Vetoplayer: From .0 to .4; no confid. interv. shown

Observations: 570

Fig. 5 Average Marginal Effect of the three-way Interaction. (Source: Marginal Effects. Own Calculation)

4

Discussion

By replicating and extending the study of Becher (2009) with cases I could show that his findings that veto players constrain the room to manoeuvre still hold true within a different political dimension. The dimension I have analysed here is a deductive Left-right index with additional time- and country specific aspects conducted by Jahn (2011). In a next step I “brought ideological party cohesion in” via the index by Jahn and Oberst (2002). I interacted this index in different models with position and in a three-way interaction with position and veto player aspects. Doing this I not only confirmed the result of Becher, that it is „premature to dismiss the importance of veto players” (Becher 2009, p. 34), I have also shown that a minister backed by an ideological homogenous party is more likely able to

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Avrg Marg Effects of Position as a function of Cohesion and VPL POS#COH#VPL

-.25

-.15

Effects on Fitted Values -.1 -.05 0

Effects on Fitted Values -.1 -.05 -.15 -.2

0

.05

Avrg Marg Effects of Position as a function of Cohesion and VPL POS#COH#VPL

0

.2

.4

0

.6

.2

.4

.6

Cohesion

Cohesion Vetoplayer: .0

Vetoplayer: .1

Observations: 570

Observations: 570

Avrg Marg Effects of Position as a function of Cohesion and VPL POS#COH#VPL

-.2

-.15

Effects on Fitted Values -.1 0 .1

Effects on Fitted Values -.05 -.1 0 .05

.2

.1

Avrg Marg Effects of Position as a function of Cohesion and VPL POS#COH#VPL

0

.2

.4

.6

0

Cohesion

.2

.4

.6

Cohesion

Vetoplayer: .2

Vetoplayer: .3

Observations: 570

Observations: 570

-.2

Effects on Fitted Values 0 .2

.4

Avrg Marg Effects of Position as a function of Cohesion and VPL POS#COH#VPL

0

.2

.4 Cohesion

Vetoplayer: .4

.6

The Graphs show in ascending order the average marginal effects of posion as a funcon of cohesion and veto players by different levels of veto players. A negave effect is in line with the parsan hypothesis, zero cohesion is associated with less ideological tensions within a party and zero veto players are associated with less adverse veto players.

Observations: 570

Fig. 6 Average marginal effects of position as a function of cohesion and veto players by different levels of veto player. (Source: Marginal Effects. Own Calculation)

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set the agenda in her or his preferred direction. Therefore, cohesion matters for policy outputs. Since this is a relevant effect, cohesion should not be neglected in policy research too. The analysis brought also to light that the higher internal dispute of the ministerial party and the broader the ideological range of veto players is, the capability of a minister to implement policies in the preferred direction shrinks. Additionally, with high levels of internal dispute and veto players ministerial effects are even associated with outputs against the line of partisan hypothesis. Further research has to be done whether this could be linked to concepts like “blame avoidance” or is just a result of partisan logrolling, like Becher (2009, p. 51) puts it. The model above should also be tested in other policy areas. By proving the applicability of the new index of ideological party cohesion the door has been opened for until now neglected research concerning cohesion.

Appendix Countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Great Britain (Table 1, 2), (Table 3, 4 and 5).

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Table 1 Descriptive overview of the 6 models used #

Model

Time period

Cases

Ideol. dimension

Dep. Var

1

Becher 2009 original data

1973–2000

391

Myrl3

Orig

2

Becher 2009 original data; same cases; LR dimension

1973–2000

382

LR

Orig

3

Extended data; extended cases; LR dimension

1971–2011

570

LR

Ext

4

Extended data; extended cases; LR dimension; Cohesion included

1971–2011

570

LR

Ext

5

Extended data; extended cases; LR dimension; Cohesion and Veto Players included

1971–2011

570

LR

Ext

6

Extended data; extended cases; LR dimension; Cohesion and Veto Players included as 3 term interaction

1971–2011

570

LR

Ext

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Table 2 Panel regression estimates (1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Labourminister Position

−0.030* (0.005)

−0.258* (0.034)

-0.089* (0.016)

−0.142* (0.034)

−0.140* (0.035)

−0.133* (0.058)

Vetoplayer Distance

−0.002 (0.005)

−0.061* (0.025)

−0.026 (0.014)

−0.040* (0.014)

0.022 (0.030)

0.027* (0.010)

0.055* (0.013)

0.018* (0.009)

Labourminister Cohesion Position # Vetoplayer

0.027* (0.006)

1.338* (0.163)

0.630* (0.096)

0.560 (0.441) 0.279* (0.082)

Position # Cohesion

0.267* (0.085)

0.065 (0.139)

Vetoplayer # Cohesion

−0.200* (0.081)

Position # Vetoplayer # Cohesion

0.285 (0.908)

Lagged dependent variable

−0.569* (0.026)

−0.525* (0.024)

−0.120* (0.015)

−0.124* (0.015)

−0.123* (0.015)

−0.121* (0.015)

L.Corporatism

0.069* (0.012)

0.053* (0.009)

0.010* (0.005)

0.020* (0.005)

0.018* (0.005)

0.008 (0.005)

L.Unemployment rate

−0.010* (0.001)

−0.008* (0.001)

−0.002* (0.001)

−0.002* (0.001)

−0.002* (0.001)

−0.002* (0.001)

D.Unemployment rate

−0.005* (0.002)

−0.005* (0.002)

−0.003* (0.001)

−0.002 (0.001)

−0.002 (0.001)

−0.003* (0.001)

L.Trade openness (%GDP)

−0.001* (0.000)

−0.001* (0.000)

−0.000 (0.000)

−0.000 (0.000)

-0.000 (0.000)

−0.000* (0.000)

D.Trade openness (%GDP)

−0.001 (0.001)

−0.001 (0.001)

−0.001* (0.000)

−0.001* (0.000)

−0.001* (0.000)

−0.001* (0.000)

L.Log of GDP per capita

−0.115* (0.041)

−0.102* (0.040)

0.004 (0.007)

0.001 (0.008)

0.003 (0.008)

0.006 (0.007)

L.GDP growth

0.002* (0.001)

0.002* (0.001)

−0.003* (0.001)

−0.002* (0.001)

−0.002* (0.001)

−0.002* (0.001)

L.Population over 64 (%)

0.008* (0.003)

0.004 (0.003)

0.001 (0.001)

0.002 (0.001)

0.002 (0.001)

0.002 (0.001)

D.Population over 64 (%)

−0.010 (0.019)

-0.018 (0.014)

-0.010 (0.007)

−0.010 (0.007)

−0.010 (0.007)

−0.010 (0.007) (continued)

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Table 2 (continued) (1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

L.De-industrialization

0.016* (0.002)

0.013* (0.002)

0.001* (0.000)

0.002* (0.000)

0.002* (0.000)

0.002* (0.000)

D.De-industrialization

0.013* (0.002)

0.011* (0.002)

0.001 (0.001)

0.001 (0.001)

0.001 (0.001)

0.001 (0.001)

L.Budget deficit (%GDP)

-0.001 (0.001)

0.001 (0.001)

-0.000 (0.000)

−0.001 (0.000)

−0.001 (0.000)

-0.000 (0.000)

Countries

17

17

17

17

17

17

r2

0.420

0.436

0.226

0.210

0.214

0.236

adjusted_r2

0.317

0.333

0.116

0.097

0.100

0.120

Observations

391

382

570

570

570

570

Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, all models with random and fixed effects, not reported here; L = one year lag; D = first difference; Excluding CAN and GBR because of assuming not to have veto players does not alter the results of the marginal effects.

Table 3 Correlation of Positional Data Becher model vs Oberst model Labour minister Position Oberst LR

Labour minister Position Becher myrl 3

Veto Players Range Oberst LR

1

-0.1491

Veto Players -0.0140 Range Becher myrl 3

-0.0452

0.5990

Veto Players Range Oberst LR

-0.1491

1

Labour minister Position Becher myrl 3

0.5922

-0.0745

174

C. Oberst

Table 4 Descriptives all cases Variable

N

Mean

min

max

Becher D. Dep Var

456

0

−0.760

0.760

Oberst D. Dep Var

634

0

−0.140

0.260

Becher LM Position

451

−0.150

−1

1

LM Position LR

694

0.0100

−0.230

0.320

Becher Veto player

463

0.420

0

1.810

Vetoplayer LR

697

0.0700

0

0.390

Becher POS*VPL

451

−0.0600

−1.560

1.690

LM Cohesion LR

694

0.290

0

0.640

Becher Lagged dep var

473

0.600

0

0.940

Oberst Lagged dep var

646

0.600

0.0700

0.930

Becher siaroff

493

3.410

1.630

4.750

a siaroff

714

3.410

1.630

4.750

Becher Unempl

510

6.350

0

17.15

a unemp

697

6.030

0

17.15

Becher openk

493

57.01

11.45

186.0

a openk

697

57.56

11.32

172.4

Becher lgdp lag

510

9.780

8.920

10.21

a lgdp lag

702

9.640

7.160

11.46

Becher gdpgr

510

2.730

−7.300

11.70

a realgdpgr

697

2.580

−8.350

11.31

Becher elderly

505

13.49

7.340

17.99

a elderly

686

13.85

7.070

22.75

Becher deind

510

64.12

43.28

77.12

a deind

695

63.35

40.07

97.94

Becher deficit

486

0.0100

−11.76

12.99

a deficit

659

0.250

−28.51

16.10

23

29

27

28

23

27

28

Japan

Netherlands

New Zealand

Norway

Sweden

Switzerland

26

Ireland

Italy

24

27

Germany

26

Finland

France

29

27

24

Belgium

Denmark

26

Austria

Canada

27

Australia

0.40 0.37

−0.41

−0.37 0.39

0.26

−0.25

0.060

0.34

0.72

0.040

0.11

0.35

0.36

−0.20

0.31

0.47

0.28

−0.74 0.49

0.62

−0.18

−0.27

0.35

−0.23

−0.36

0.65

0.34

−0.38

0.14

0.63

−0.060

1.09

0.28

0.17

0.040

0.39

0.14

0.61

0.25

0.71

0.38

0.68

0.50

0

0.68

0.46

0.82

0.31

0.50

0.39

0.13

0.21

0.21

0.29

0.37

0.50

0.31

0.23

0.44

0

0.43

0.45

0.48

sd

mean

N

sd

Vetoplayer (vrange myrl3)

Labourminister (labour m3)

mean

BECHER

BECHER

Table 5 Descriptives by Countries

42

36

38

42

42

42

41

42

42

37

42

42

38

42

42

42

N

0.10

0.03

−0.04

0.07

0.05

0.07

0.05

0.06

−0.02 0.03

0.09

0.04

0.06

0.07

0.10

0.10

0.11

0.05

0.03

−0.01

−0.01

0.01

−0.04

0.05

0.05

0.07

−0.01 0.02

0.05

0.07

sd

−0.03

0.01

mean

Labourminister (LMposC1)

OBERST

0.24

0.04

0.04

0.02

0.08

0.02

0.06

0.03

0.12

0.08

0.19

0.07

0.05

0.08

0.05

0.06

mean

0.09

0.07

0.04

0.06

0.06

0.03

0.05

0.03

0.06

0.08

0.11

0.07

0.07

0.05

0.06

0.06

sd

Vetoplayer (a jahn2100)

OBERST

0.38

0.28

0.25

0.30

0.30

0.27

0.24

0.22

0.27

0.34

0.27

0.37

0.32

0.27

0.25

0.24

mean

(continued)

0.11

0.07

0.05

0.06

0.08

0.08

0.07

0.10

0.07

0.09

0.15

0.12

0.11

0.06

0.05

0.05

sd

Cohesion (LMcohC1)

OBERST

Bringing Cohesion In 175

30

451

Great Britain

Total

0.52 0.53

0.24

−0.15 0.42

0 0.46

0

sd

mean

N

sd

Vetoplayer (vrange myrl3)

Labourminister (labour m3)

mean

BECHER

BECHER

Table 5 (continued)

694

42

N 0.01

0.06

mean

Labourminister (LMposC1)

OBERST

0.08

0.08

sd 0.07

0

mean 0.09

0

sd

Vetoplayer (a jahn2100)

OBERST

0.29

0.36

mean

0.10

0.09

sd

Cohesion (LMcohC1)

OBERST

176 C. Oberst

Bringing Cohesion In

177

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Regierungsdauer in Mittel- und Osteuropa. Ein dreidimensionales Erklärungsmodell Philipp Harfst

1

Einleitung

Demokratische Systeme haben mit einem widersprüchlichen Doppelcharakter zu leben: Während sie dauerhafte, demokratisch legitimierte Regierungen anstreben, ist es gleichzeitig ihr erklärtes Ziel, regelmäßig für demokratisch herbeigeführte Machtwechsel zu sorgen. Neben dem Bedürfnis nach politischer Stabilität steht also der Wunsch nach alternierenden Regierungen. Dieser Zwiespalt wird auch auf Seiten der Bürger empfunden: „[V]oters in democracies seem to share both a desire for continuity and stability and a readiness for weariness with too much of it and a yearning for change “ (Linz 1998, S. 28). Allerdings wäre eine Regierung ohne ein gewisses Mindestmaß an Dauerhaftigkeit nicht in der Lage, ihre Aufgaben zufriedenstellend zu bewältigen, da die Formulierung und Durchsetzung allgemein verbindlicher Entscheidungen sehr zeitaufwändig sind (vgl. Linz 1998, S. 23). Allzu kurzlebigen Regierungen fehlt schlicht die Zeit, kohärente politische Programme zu entwickeln und zu implementieren, sie werden als „ineffective policy-makers“ (Lijphart 1984, S. 165) bezeichnet. Auch wenn dauerhafte P. Harfst (B) Institut für Politikwissenschaft, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Göttingen, Deutschland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2022 E. Baltz et al. (eds.), Parties, Institutions and Preferences, Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-35133-5_8

181

182

P. Harfst

Regierungen natürlich nicht automatisch effektiv sind, so haben sie im Vergleich zu ihren instabilen Gegenstücken zumindest die Gelegenheit, effektive Regierungsarbeit zu leisten. Darüber hinaus sind Regierungen zentrale Akteure in der Formulierung und Implementation von Politik und daher maßgeblich am Gelingen oder Scheitern politischer Maßnahmen beteiligt, wie Jahn (2016) beispielhaft für den Bereich der Umweltpolitik demonstriert – auch wenn Jahn und Müller-Rommel (2010) für mittel- und osteuropäische Demokratien zeigen, dass andere Vetospieler einen stärkeren Effekt auf die politische Performanz eines Staates haben als die direkt an der Regierung beteiligten Akteure. Diese Feststellungen verweisen auf die politische Relevanz der Dauerhaftigkeit demokratischer Regierungen und sind der Ausgangspunkt dieses Beitrags. Die Forschung zur Regierungsstabilität ist maßgeblich geprägt von zwei Ansätzen, dem Attribut- und dem Ereignisansatz (Laver 2003). Die Vertreter beider Forschungsrichtungen haben sich, wie ein Debattenbeitrag in der American Political Science Review (Strøm et al. 1988) nachzeichenet, zunächst heftige Diskussionen geliefert. Allerdings merkt Laver (2003, S. 28–29) an, dass diese Auseinandersetzung weniger inhaltlich, sondern – als Folge des Übergangs von Regressionsmodellen zu komplexeren Ereignisdatenanalysen – vielmehr methodisch geprägt sei. Mit dem Beitrag von King, Alt, Burns und Laver (1990), in dem die Autoren eine Kombination von Attribut- und Ereignis-Ansatz als „unified model“ vorschlagen, darf dieser methodische Graben als überwunden gelten. Heute gilt die von King et al. (1990) eingeführte Variante der Ereignisdatenanalyse mit ihren Weiterentwicklungen als methodischer Goldstandard der Forschung zur Regierungsdauer (Laver 2003, S. 29). Im Zuge dieser methodisch geprägten Debatte ist jedoch die konzeptionelle Auseinandersetzung mit dem Phänomen der Regierungsdauer etwas aus dem Blick geraten. Dieser Artikel leistet einen Beitrag zur Weiterentwicklung der konzeptionellen Debatten in diesem Feld. Dabei gehe ich davon aus, dass das Risiko eines Regierungssturzes dreidimensional zu konzeptualisieren ist und von institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen, der Konstellation parteipolitischer Akteure im Parlament sowie den Ergebnissen ihrer Interaktionen abhängt. Die Konzeptualisierung in drei Dimensionen bietet gegenüber bisher vorliegenden Ansätzen den Vorteil, dass Annahmen zur Wirkung jeder einzelnen Dimension wie auch zum Zusammenwirken dieser Dimensionen formuliert werden können. Ich prüfe dieses dreidimensionale Modell empirisch am Beispiel junger mittel- und osteuropäischer Demokratien. Hierzu präsentiere ich im Folgenden zunächst die bisherigen Entwicklungen der Forschung zur Dauerhaftigkeit von Regierungen und entwickle auf dieser Grundlage mein dreidimensionales Konzept. In der Folge operationalisiere ich abhängige und unabhängige Variablen, liefere

Regierungsdauer in Mittel- und Osteuropa …

183

einen Überblick über die Entwicklung der Regierungsdauer in Mittel- und Osteuropa und prüfe schließlich die Annahmen meines Modells mithilfe einer Ereignisdatenanalyse.

2

Koalitionsforschung und Regierungsdauer

Laver (2003) beschreibt zwei Ansätze, die die Forschung zur Dauerhaftigkeit von Regierungen in parlamentarischen Demokratien geprägt haben: den Attribut- und den Ereignis-Ansatz. Der Ereignis-Ansatz geht zurück auf Browne et al. (1984), die den Prozess der Auflösung eines Kabinetts zunächst als rein stochastisches Ereignis beschreiben. In der Folge wird dieses Ausgangsmodell um Indikatoren erweitert, die im Zeitverlauf einer gewissen Varianz unterliegen. Grofman und van Roozendaal (1997, S. 441–443) identifizieren zwei Kategorien von Bestimmungsgründen der Regierungsdauer, die diesem Ansatz zuzuordnen sind. Dabei handelt es sich zunächst um parlaments- und regierungsexterne Faktoren, die zum Sturz einer Regierung beitragen können. Zu nennen wären beispielsweise ökonomische Krisen wie steigende Arbeitslosigkeit oder Inflationsschübe. In diesem Zusammenhang zeigt Saalfeld (2013) in einer vergleichenden Analyse, dass steigende Arbeitslosigkeit stärker zur Instabilität einer Regierung beiträgt als die Entwicklung der Inflation. Die zweite Gruppe zeitvarianter Einflussfaktoren ist verbunden mit den antizipierten Ergebnissen eines Regierungssturzes. Hierzu zählen mögliche Gewinne der beteiligten Parteien bei künftigen Neuwahlen oder eine vorteilhaftere Verteilung von Portfolios nach einer Umbildung der Regierung, aber auch potentielle Transaktionskosten, die bei bevorstehenden Koalitionsverhandlungen entstehen sowie Opportunitätskosten, die aus entgangenen Gewinnen einer fortgesetzten Beteiligung an der gestürzten Regierung resultieren. Während die Effekte der ersten Kategorie zeitvarianter Ereignisse sich beispielsweise mit Hilfe von Wirtschaftsdaten prinzipiell vergleichend untersuchen lassen, sind Schocks, die die Erwartungen rational kalkulierender und handelnder Akteure betreffen, nur schwer modellierbar, da sie auf Abwägungen der Regierungspartner beruhen, die nicht direkt beobachtbar sind. Wohl auch aus diesem Grund lassen sich, so Grofman und van Roozendaal (1997, S. 443), die zuletzt genannten Mechanismen vornehmlich in „a few illustrative case studies“ nachweisen. Der vorliegende Artikel hingegen zielt auf eine systematisch vergleichende Analyse (Jahn 2013, S. 27–35) der Regierungsdauer in mittel- und osteuropäischen Staaten und konzentriert sich daher auf jene Bestimmungsfaktoren, die der Attribut-Ansatz herausgearbeitet hat. Sein innovativer Beitrag liegt dabei in einer

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neuen Konzeptualisierung dieser Faktoren in einem dreidimensionalen Modell zur Betrachtung des Risikos eines vorzeitigen Scheiterns einer Regierung. Erstens analysiere ich die in den jeweiligen Verfassungen geregelte formale Beziehung zwischen Parlament und Regierung als Dimension des institutionellen Risikos. Als zweite Dimension betrachte ich das von der jeweiligen Akteurskonstellation ausgehende Risiko, unter dem ich die Eigenschaften des legislativen Parteiensystems fasse. In der dritten Dimension schließlich berücksichtigt mein Ansatz das Risiko, das von den Ergebnissen des Verhaltens parteipolitischer Akteure bei der Regierungsbildung ausgeht und bezieht so die Charakteristika der jeweiligen Regierung in das Erklärungsmodell mit ein. Damit werden konventionelle Determinanten der Regierungsdauer konzeptionell neu sortiert. Meine These lautet, dass alle drei Dimensionen einen jeweils eigenen, charakteristischen Beitrag zum Risiko eines vorzeitigen Sturzes einer Regierung leisten. Darüber hinaus bietet die dreidimensionale Konzeptualisierung des Risikos eines Regierungssturzes den großen Vorteil, mögliche Interaktionsbeziehungen zwischen den drei Dimensionen explizit formulieren und empirisch überprüfen zu können. Die Erkenntnisse des Ereignis-Ansatzes werden dabei insofern maßgeblich berücksichtigt, als sie in die Auswahl eines geeigneten statistischen Modells einfließen. Bevor ich zu einer genaueren Schilderung meines dreidimensionalen Konzepts des Risikos eines frühzeitigen Regierungsendes komme, fasse ich im Folgenden die zentralen Erkenntnisse des Attribut-Ansatzes zusammen.

2.1

Bestimmungsfaktoren der Regierungsdauer: der Attribut-Ansatz

Welche für die Regierungsdauer wichtigen Einflussfaktoren des Attribut-Ansatzes lassen sich nach heutigem Kenntnisstand benennen? Laut Grofman und van Roozendaal (1997, S. 428; vgl. auch Kropp 2008, 2010; Müller 2004; Warwick 1994) sind drei Kategorien von Variablen relevant: 1) Größenverhältnisse der Parteien in Parlament und Regierung; 2) programmatische Charakteristika des Parteiensystems und der Regierung; sowie 3) institutionelle Determinanten. In der ersten Kategorie benennen Grofman und van Roozendaal (1997, S. 428–432) insgesamt vier relevante Faktoren. Erstens korreliert eine starke Fragmentierung des legislativen Parteiensystems negativ mit der Regierungsdauer. Zweitens wurde argumentiert, dass eine starke elektorale Volatilität einen negativen Einfluss auf die Dauerhaftigkeit von Regierungen hat, wobei empirische Analysen diesen Zusammenhang nicht zweifelsfrei belegen. Drittens hat auch eine hohe Anzahl an Regierungsparteien einen negativen Einfluss auf die Dauer einer Regierung.

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Diese empirischen Ergebnisse reflektieren die von Dodd (1976) formulierte Annahme, dass minimale Gewinnkoalitionen stabiler seien als übergroße oder Minderheitsregierungen. Viertens schließlich ist die Anzahl beziehungsweise die Gesamtdauer der Regierungsbildungsversuche als Bestimmungsfaktor der Regierungsstabilität untersucht worden. In diesem Fall sind jedoch sowohl die theoretischen Argumente wie auch die empirischen Ergebnisse widersprüchlich. Auch neuere Studien wie die von Bergmann et al. (2015) bestätigen, dass der Status als Mehrheitskabinett eine zentrale Variable zur Erklärung der Dauerhaftigkeit einer Regierung ist. Der zweite Komplex von Einflussfaktoren des Attribut-Ansatzes betrifft programmatische Charakteristika von Parlament und Regierung. Grofman und van Roozendal (1997, S. 432–437) benennen wiederum vier Variablen. Erstens die Polarisierung des legislativen Parteiensystems beziehungsweise die parlamentarische Präsenz von Anti-System-Parteien, die einen negativen Effekt auf die Dauerhaftigkeit von Regierungen haben. Zweitens hat auch die programmatische Diversität der Regierung selbst einen negativen – wenngleich in einigen Untersuchungen nur schwachen – Effekt auf die Regierungsdauer. Drittens hat die parlamentarische Präsenz einer dominierenden, programmatisch zentral positionierten Partei einen stabilisierenden Effekt auf eine Regierung. Viertens schließlich hat die Anzahl der im Parlament repräsentierten Konfliktlinien, die eng mit der Anzahl der Parlamentsparteien zusammenhängt, einen negativen Effekt auf die Regierungsdauer. Drittens ist dem Attribut-Ansatz der Komplex der institutionellen Einflussfaktoren (Grofman und van Roozendaal 1997, S. 437–441) zuzuordnen. Dieser Komplex beinhaltet die Möglichkeit der Regierungspartei(en), das Parlament auflösen zu können, was die Dauerhaftigkeit von Regierungen absenkt. Weiterhin spielt eine Rolle, wie viel Zeit einer Regierung bis zur nächsten regulären Parlamentswahl verbleibt, da die Opportunitätskosten eines Regierungssturzes mit der Abnahme dieses Wertes sinken. Darüber hinaus hat Strøm (1985) die Bedeutung von Investiturregeln in die Debatte eingeführt, die laut King et al. (1990) einen negativen Effekt auf die Dauerhaftigkeit einer Regierung haben. Schließlich haben auch starke Machtressourcen des Parlaments einen negativen Einfluss auf die Regierungsdauer.

2.2

Junge Demokratien als Sonderfall?

Aber stellt die Dauerhaftigkeit der Regierungen der mittel- und osteuropäischen EU-Mitgliedsstaaten einen Sonderfall dar? Anders als beispielsweise Grotz und

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Weber (2012) gehe ich hier davon aus, dass die für etablierte Demokratien entwickelten Konzepte mehr als 20 Jahre nach dem Ende des Staatssozialismus durchaus auf junge Demokratien übertragbar sind. So kann die Konsolidierung parlamentarischer Demokratien in Mittel- und Osteuropa inzwischen als abgeschlossen betrachtet werden (Blondel und Müller-Rommel 2001; Blondel et al. 2007; Merkel 2007). Zudem sollten sich gerade institutionelle Regeln in jungen Demokratien vergleichsweise frühzeitig stabilisieren: „konstitutionelle Organe und politische Institutionen, sind sie erst einmal etabliert, [entwickeln] schon nach kurzer Frist eine starke endogene Tendenz zum Einfrieren optimaler wie suboptimaler Arrangements“ (Merkel et al. 1996, S. 13). Darüber hinaus handelt es sich bei allen hier betrachteten Fällen, der Definition Steffanis (1996) folgend, um parlamentarische Systeme, die ihre Parlamente zudem mit relativ starken Kompetenzen ausgestattet haben (Zielonka 1994, S. 90). Daher eignen sich die Staaten Mittel- und Osteuropas in besonderer Weise, gerade institutionelle Risiken eines vorzeitigen Sturzes der Regierung zu untersuchen. Darüber hinaus sind in den vergangenen Jahren einige Arbeiten zur Dauerhaftigkeit von Regierungen in der Region erschienen, die die Übertragbarkeit der klassischen, aus der Literatur zu westlichen Demokratien bekannten, Einflussfaktoren belegen. So haben die Anzahl der Regierungsparteien, der Mehrheitsstatus einer Regierung, ihr Status als Übergangsregierung und die Inflationsrate den erwarteten Effekt auf die Dauerhaftigkeit mittel- und osteuropäischer Regierungen (Somer-Topcu und Laron 2008). Nikolenyi (2004) wendet die Theorie des stabilisierenden Effekts dominanter, programmatisch zentral positionierter Parteien erfolgreich für die Erklärung der Regierungsdauer in Polen, der Tschechischen Republik und Ungarn an. Einzelne Analysen behandeln junge und etablierte Demokratien darüber hinaus in ein und demselben Datensatz (Bergmann et al. 2015; Jäckle 2009; Saalfeld 2013; Schleiter und Morgan-Jones 2010); sie finden zum Teil zwar einen Effekt des Konsolidierungsfortschritts, nicht jedoch der geographischen Zugehörigkeit zu Mittel- und Osteuropa. Andere Autoren hingegen betonen für den mittel- und osteuropäischen Kontext spezifische Einflussfaktoren. Vor allem die Rolle ehemaliger Regimeparteien hat eine Reihe von Publikationen inspiriert, die sich mit dem Effekt des Regime Divide für die Bildung (Druckman und Roberts 2007; Grzymala-Busse 2001) und die Dauerhaftigkeit (Grotz und Weber 2012; Tzelgov 2011) von Koalitionen beschäftigen. Grotz und Weber (2012, S. 706–708) vergleichen die Rolle der Nachfolgerinnen der ehemaligen kommunistischen Regimeparteien mit derjenigen extremistischer Parteien in Westeuropa. Sind sie im Parlament vertreten, destabilisieren sie eine Regierung, da sie jede Kooperation mit ehemaligen AntiRegime-Parteien verweigern. Umgekehrt weist Tzelgov (2011) darauf hin, dass

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die Beteiligung von Nachfolgeparteien an einer Regierung diese stabilisiert, da Nachfolgeparteien, um überhaupt Regierungsbeteiligung zu erreichen, gegenüber ihren Koalitionspartnern zu vergleichsweise großen Zugeständnissen in Bezug auf die Portfolioverteilung bereit sind. Allerdings lässt sich zeigen, dass diese besondere Rolle ehemaliger Systemparteien für die Dauerhaftigkeit mittel- und osteuropäischer Regierungen lediglich im ersten Jahrzehnt nach dem Ende des Staatssozialismus von Bedeutung ist (Grotz und Weber 2012, S. 710). Daher sollte es heute, mehr als 30 Jahre nach der Regimetransition, ausreichend sein, in der empirischen Analyse auf mögliche Reifeeffekte zu kontrollieren, ohne die Rolle von Nachfolgeparteien explizit zu berücksichtigen.

2.3

Ein dreidimensionales Erklärungsmodell

Zusammenfassend festhalten lässt sich, dass die Forschung zur Regierungsstabilität – sei es mithilfe formaler Modelle oder durch eher induktive empirische Forschung – einige wesentliche Faktoren herausgearbeitet hat, die die Dauerhaftigkeit einer Regierung maßgeblich bestimmen. Es handelt sich um Charakteristika des Parteiensystems, Merkmale der Regierung selbst sowie institutionelle Einflussfaktoren. Darüber hinaus herrscht Einigkeit, dass externe Schocks oder Ereignisse, die manchmal theoretisch herausgearbeitet und explizit benannt, in jedem Fall jedoch stochastisch modelliert werden, das Leben einer jeden Regierung in unvorhersehbarer Weise beenden können. Schließlich zeigen Fallstudien, dass Kosten-Nutzen-Abwägungen einzelner Regierungsparteien die Auflösung beziehungsweise den Fortbestand bestimmter Koalitionen erklären können. Insofern scheint die Luft für weitergehende Analysen dünn zu sein. Entweder sie warten mit einem neuen Datensatz oder Fallbeispiel auf, an dem die bekannten Fragen erneut und auf breiterer empirischer Grundlage bearbeitet werden können (diesen Ansatz verfolgt beispielsweise Jäckle 2009); oder sie formulieren ein neues theoretisch-konzeptionelles Argument, das empirisch auf seine Plausibilität geprüft werden kann. Diesen zweiten Weg schlage ich im Folgenden ein. Ausgangspunkt meiner konzeptionellen Überlegungen ist das Bestreben, die bisher als unabhängige Variablen untersuchten Einzeldeterminanten der Regierungsdauer zu drei Gruppen zusammenzufassen. In meiner Analyse betrachte ich die Effekte von Institutionen, Akteurskonstellationen und Ergebnissen des Akteursverhaltens zunächst einzeln, um anschließend zu fragen, welche Interaktionsbeziehungen zwischen diesen drei Dimensionen und ihrem Effekt auf die Stabilität einer Regierung beobachtbar sind. Dabei sind alle drei Dimensionen so

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P. Harfst

konzeptualisiert, dass sie das Risiko eines vorzeitigen Scheiterns der Regierung beschreiben. Mit diesem Ansatz folge ich der von Müller-Rommel et al. (2008) formulierten Forderung, systematisch zwischen formalen institutionellen Arrangements und Akteurskonstellationen zu unterscheiden. Da es im Unterschied zu der Arbeit von Müller-Rommel et al. (2008) in diesem Beitrag jedoch nicht um die Performanz politischer Systeme, sondern um die Stabilität von Regierungen geht, müssen in der hier vorliegenden dimensionalen Analyse die zu berücksichtigenden Einflussfaktoren entsprechend angepasst werden. Die oben zusammengefasste Literatur zur Regierungsstabilität hat neben institutionellen Variablen und Akteurskonstellationen auch die Charakteristika einer Regierung selbst als relevante Größe beschrieben. Ich gehe im Folgenden daher der Frage nach, inwiefern die Konfiguration parlamentarisch-institutioneller Regelsysteme (Dimension 1), Charakteristika des Parteiensystems (Dimension 2) sowie Attribute der Regierung selbst (Dimension 3) einen Effekt auf die Dauerhaftigkeit einer Regierung ausüben. Dimension 1 beschreibt das institutionelle Risiko für die Dauerhaftigkeit einer Regierung und greift damit einen lange Zeit nur stiefmütterlich behandelten Aspekt der Forschung zur Regierungsdauer (Laver und Schofield 1990, S. 198) auf. Formale institutionelle Regeln zum Verhältnis von Exekutive und Legislative haben zumindest in parlamentarischen Systemen, in denen das Überleben einer Regierung von der fortgesetzten Unterstützung durch eine parlamentarische Mehrheit abhängt, einen erheblichen Einfluss auf deren Dauerhaftigkeit. Lupia und Strøm (1995, S. 651) schlagen vor, „[d]ismissal and dissolution powers“ zu berücksichtigen, Strøm (1985) weist auf die Bedeutung von Investiturrechten hin. Auch Jäckle (2009) untersucht den Effekt von Investiturrechten. Bei der Konzeptualisierung des institutionellen Risikos eines vorzeitigen Regierungssturzes in Dimension 1 orientiere ich mich daher, den Erkenntnissen Strøms (1984, 1990) folgend, an dem Grundgedanken, dass parlamentarische Machtressourcen, die aus Investiturrechten sowie den Regelungen zu Misstrauensvoten und Parlamentsauflösungen erwachsen, einen negativen Einfluss auf die Dauerhaftigkeit einer Regierung haben. Dimension 2 bildet die Akteurskonstellation ab, die sich auf Eigenschaften des legislativen Parteiensystems zurückführen lässt. Es hat sich gezeigt, dass sowohl eine zunehmende Fragmentierung als auch eine starke programmatische Polarisierung des legislativen Parteiensystems substantiell zum Risiko des vorzeitigen Sturzes einer Regierung beitragen. Dimension 3 betrachtet mit den Charakteristika der schließlich gebildeten Regierung die Ergebnisse des Verhaltens der in Dimension 2 zusammengefassten parteipolitischen

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Akteure. Hier rücken die Anzahl der Regierungsparteien sowie deren programmatische Diversität in den Blick. In beiden Fällen erhöht eine Zunahme das Risiko einer Regierung, vorzeitig beendet zu werden. Ein wesentlicher Erklärungsfaktor für die Dauerhaftigkeit einer Regierung ist darüber hinaus ihr jeweiliger Mehrheitsstatus. Sowohl Minderheits- als auch übergroße Koalitionen sind instabiler als minimale Gewinnkoalitionen. Bezüglich möglicher Interaktionen zwischen den drei Dimensionen gehe ich erstens davon aus, dass das institutionelle Risiko der Dimension 1 den Rahmen bildet, in dem das durch bestimmte Akteurskonstellationen definierte Risiko (Dimension 2) für die Dauerhaftigkeit einer Regierung sich erst entfalten kann. Daher – so die hier verfolgte These – bedingen sich die Effekte des institutionellen Risikos und der Akteurskonstellation gegenseitig. Darüber hinaus weist Strøm (1984, 1990) darauf hin, dass ein bestimmtes Ergebnis von Akteursverhalten – nämlich die Bildung von Minderheitsregierungen – unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Maximierung politischer Inhalte und/oder des Wahlerfolgs als ein rational begründbares Verhalten begriffen werden kann, sofern unterschiedliche institutionelle Rahmenbedingungen berücksichtigt werden. Je stärker die Einflussmöglichkeiten der Parlamentsparteien im Gesetzgebungsprozess, desto eher kann eine Partei darauf verzichten, politischen Einfluss in der Regierung auszuüben und stattdessen parlamentarische Verfahren nutzen, um eigene politische Ziele durchzusetzen und damit auch zukünftige Wahlchancen wahren. Vor diesem Hintergrund müssen wir davon ausgehen, dass auch die Dimensionen 1 und 3 sich gegenseitig bedingen und dies als Interaktion berücksichtigen. Schließlich ist anzunehmen, dass auch Akteurskonstellationen und das Verhalten dieser Akteure bei der Bildung einer Regierung interdependente Phänomene sind, da bestimmte Parteisystemkonfigurationen (Dimension 2) die Bildung bestimmter Regierungen (Dimension 3) überhaupt erst möglich machen. Daher werden in den folgenden Analysen Interaktionen aller drei Dimensionen miteinander berücksichtigt.

3

Dauerhaftigkeit mittel- und osteuropäischer Regierungen in empirischer Perspektive

Die folgende Analyse der Dauerhaftigkeit von mittel- und osteuropäischen Regierungen greift zur Bestimmung der abhängigen Variable sowie der unabhängigen Variablen der Dimensionen 2 und 3 im Wesentlichen auf die ParlGovDatenbank (Döring und Manow 2020) in der stabilen Version 12/2020 zurück. Berücksichtigt werden alle Regierungen, die in den einzelnen Ländern nach der

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jeweiligen Gründungswahl (vgl. Müller-Rommel et al. 2004, S. 871) gebildet wurden. Die Definition des Beginns einer neuen Regierung bei Döring und Manow lautet folgendermaßen: „(1) any change in the set of parties with cabinet membership; (2) any change of the prime minister; (3) any general election“.1 Darüber hinaus markieren Rücktrittsgesuche des Premierministers, eine verlorene Vertrauensabstimmung sowie ein erfolgreiches Misstrauensvotum das Ende einer Regierung. Eine neue Regierung beginnt an dem Tag, der auf das Ende einer Vorgängerin folgt. Diese Definition folgt gängigen Kriterien, die Laver (2003, S. 26) als allgemein anerkannt bezeichnet. Berücksichtigung finden bei der Kodierung auch Fraktionsaustritte einzelner Parlamentarier, sofern diese den Mehrheitsstatus der Regierung verändern. Im Datensatz ausgewiesen sind darüber hinaus Übergangsregierungen, wenn diese als provisorisch bezeichnet werden können, als technische Experten-Regierungen ins Amt gelangen, sich nicht auf einzelne Parteien stützen oder nach dem formalen Sturz einer Regierung übergangsweise für mehr als drei Monate im Amt bleiben. Bei Anwendung dieser Kriterien können zum Stichtag 8. Dezember 2020 insgesamt 185 Regierungen in zehn mittel- und osteuropäischen Staaten identifiziert werden. Von diesen 185 Regierungen ist in jedem Land am Ende des Beobachtungszeitraumes eine Regierung im Amt, die in der folgenden deskriptiven Analyse zunächst nicht berücksichtigt wird, da in diesen Fällen eine abschließende Angabe einer Regierungsdauer nicht möglich ist. Es verbleiben für die folgende deskriptive Analyse demnach zunächst 175 gültige Beobachtungen. Die Dauer einer Regierung wird in Tagen gemessen, da diese Maßeinheit übersichtlich ist und sich problemlos in Monate oder Jahre umrechnen lässt. Im Untersuchungszeitraum überdauern mittel- und osteuropäische Regierungen durchschnittlich 555,1 Tage oder rund 18,5 Monate; die Standardabweichung beträgt 401,3 Tage. Dieser Wert sowie die Standardabweichungen nach Ländern (siehe Tab. 1) deuten auf gewichtige Unterschiede sowohl zwischen Ländern als auch zwischen einzelnen Regierungen innerhalb eines Landes hin. Den Negativrekord unter allen hier untersuchten Regierungen stellte mit einer Amtsdauer von lediglich 36 Tagen die erste Regierung Waldemar Pawlaks in Polen auf. Pawlak wurde von Präsident Wał˛esa am 5. Juni 1992 zum Premierminister ernannt, verfehlte jedoch eine Parlamentsmehrheit. Seine Regierung wird hier als Übergangsregierung gewertet, da Pawlak nach dem Sturz der Regierung Olszewski am 5. Juni 1992 die Regierungsgeschäfte übernommen hat (Kriterium: Wechsel Premierminister), dann aber an einer Vertrauensabstimmung im Sejm scheiterte und von Hanna Suchocka ersetzt wurde, der es schließlich 1

http://www.parlgov.org/documentation/codebook/#cabinet, abgerufen am 28.12.2020.

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gelang, eine parlamentarische Mehrheit zu organisieren (Tworzecki 1994). Die kürzeste reguläre Regierung im vorliegenden Datensatz ist das erste in der unabhängigen Slowakei gebildete Kabinett unter der Führung Vladimír Meˇciars, das aufgrund von Austritten aus der Partei des Premiers am 19. März 1993 nach lediglich 66 Tagen im Amt seine parlamentarische Mehrheit verlor (Fitzmaurice 1995). Die Regierung mit der längsten Amtsdauer finden wir mit 1525 Tagen oder etwas mehr als vier Jahren in Bulgarien. Es handelt sich um die im Mai 1997 gebildete Regierung Kostov. Die im Beobachtungszeitraum dauerhafteste Expertenregierung wurde unter der Führung Jan Fischers im April 2009 in der Tschechischen Republik gebildet. Ebenfalls 1400 Tage oder mehr – und damit eine volle Legislaturperiode von vier Jahren – überdauern im Beobachtungszeitraum weitere 16 Regierungen: je vier in der Slowakei und Ungarn, drei in Bulgarien, je zwei in Slowenien und der Tschechischen Republik sowie eine in Polen. Die im Mittel dauerhaftesten Regierungen finden wir in Ungarn (929 Tage). Mit einigem Abstand folgen Bulgarien (684 Tage), die Slowakei (662 Tage), Slowenien (661 Tage), die Tschechische Republik (621 Tage), sowie Estland (605 Tage).

Tab. 1 Regierungsdauer in Mittel- und Osteuropa Land

N

Min

Max

Mittelwert

Bulgaria

13

77

1525

683,9

Standardabweichung 588,5

Czech Republic

15

146

1459

620,5

449,6

Estonia

16

103

1086

605,4

298,8

Hungary

11

206

1461

928,5

499,4

Latvia

24

70

968

387,5

233,0

Lithuania

21

84

1072

463,3

274,1

Poland

20

36

1463

509,5

351,6

Romania

25

70

911

399,3

241,3

Slovakia

15

66

1465

662,0

569,6

Slovenia

15

176

1453

660,8

420,2

Total

175

36

1525

555,1

401,3

Anmerkungen: Eigene Berechnung auf der Grundlage von Angaben der ParlGov-Datenbank (Döring und Manow 2020)

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3.1

P. Harfst

Operationalisierung der drei Dimensionen

Wie nun lassen sich diese substantiellen Unterschiede sowohl zwischen Ländern als auch innerhalb einzelner Staaten erklären? Ich gehe davon aus, dass ein dreidimensionales Modell der Regierungsdauer zur Erklärung der beobachtbaren Phänomene beitragen kann. Dabei ist die erste Dimension, das institutionelle Risiko, ein Wert, der über den gesamten Beobachtungszeitraum hinweg stabil bleibt. Institutionelle Veränderungen im Verhältnis von Parlament und Regierung hat es in keinem der hier betrachteten Staaten gegeben. So ist das institutionelle Risiko in besonderem Maße geeignet, die Varianz zwischen Staaten zu erklären. Die zweite und dritte Dimension, die Akteurskonstellation und die Ergebnisse des Akteursverhaltens, sind im Zeitverlauf auch innerhalb der beobachteten Staaten variabel und damit potentiell in der Lage, Unterschiede innerhalb dieser Staaten aufzuklären. Die folgenden Ausführungen widmen sich der Operationalisierung der drei Dimensionen. Daran schließen sich die Erläuterung des statistischen Modells sowie die Analyse der Daten und deren Interpretation an. Dimension 1 erfasst das institutionelle Risiko, dem eine Regierung ausgesetzt ist. Sie fasst die konstitutionellen Regelungen zur Investiturabstimmung, zum Misstrauensvotum und zur Parlamentsauflösung zusammen, wird auf der Grundlage der Verfassungstexte der zehn hier betrachteten Staaten erhoben und ordinal kodiert. Je höher das institutionelle Risiko eines vorzeitigen Scheiterns der Regierung, desto höher der Punktwert jedes Einzelindikators.2 Der RisikoIndex, der dann als Dimension 1 in die Analyse einfließt, ist die Summe aus den drei Einzelindikatoren. Dimension 2 bildet die Akteurskonstellation ab und beschreibt das parlamentarische Parteiensystem. Sie fasst zwei Indikatoren zusammen: die Fragmentierung des Parlaments sowie seine Polarisierung. Fragmentierung ist operationalisiert als die effektive Anzahl legislativer Parlamentsparteien (Laakso und Taagepera 1979), Polarisierung misst die programmatische Diversität dieses Systems und berechnet sich nach Dalton (2008) auf der Grundlage einer

2

Kodierung des Indikators Investitur: 1) jeder einzelne Minister vom Parlament gewählt; 2) Regierung als Ganzes vom Parlament gewählt; 3) Premier, vom Parlament gewählt, ernennt übrige Regierungsmitglieder; 4) keine Investiturabstimmung. Kodierung des Indikators Misstrauensvotum: 1) konstruktives Misstrauensvotum; 2) Kabinett als Ganzes kann vom Parlament entlassen werden; 3) jeder einzelne Minister kann vom Parlament entlassen werden. Kodierung des Indikators Auflösung: 1) Auflösung durch Regierung nicht möglich; 2) Auflösung nur als Reaktion auf Misstrauensvotum möglich; 3) Auflösung eingeschränkt durch Häufigkeit und Zeitpunkt; 4) uneingeschränktes Auflösungsrecht der Regierung.

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nach Sitzanteilen gewichteten Rechts-Links-Positionierung jeder einzelnen Parlamentspartei.3 Dimension 3 fasst die Ergebnisse des Akteursverhaltens zusammen und beschreibt mit fünf Variablen die Charakteristika einer Regierung. Die Variable Anzahl der Regierungsparteien gibt an, wie viele Parteien Minister in der jeweiligen Regierung stellen. Die Variable Sitzanteil der Regierung erfasst den von den Regierungsparteien kontrollierten prozentualen Anteil an Parlamentssitzen. Diese Variable bildet zwei Charakteristika einer Regierung ab, die beide einen starken Einfluss auf deren Dauerhaftigkeit haben: ihr Status als Minderheits- und als übergroße Regierung. Nimmt die Variable Werte unter 50 an, haben wir es mit einer Minderheitsregierung zu tun. Je stärker der Wert dieser Variable über den Wert von 50 hinausgeht, desto wahrscheinlicher ist die betreffende Regierung eine übergroße Regierung. Zusammen mit der Anzahl der Regierungsparteien lässt sich dann die Dauerhaftigkeit dieser Regierung modellieren, ohne dass DummyVariablen für einzelne Regierungstypen gebildet werden müssen. Allerdings ist der erwartete Einfluss des Sitzanteils der Regierung auf ihre Dauerhaftigkeit in dieser Operationalisierung kurvlinear: sowohl sehr kleine als auch sehr große Sitzanteile lassen einen negativen Effekt auf die Regierungsdauer erwarten. Daher wird neben dem Sitzanteil der Regierung auch der Einfluss des quadrierten Sitzanteils geschätzt. Die Variable Programmatische Diversität der Regierung wird berechnet als die Distanz der beiden programmatisch am weitesten voneinander entfernten Regierungsparteien auf der Rechts-Links-Achse.4 Schließlich berücksichtigt Dimension 3 mit Hilfe einer dichotom kodierten Variable, ob eine Regierung als Übergangsregierung (1) oder als reguläre Regierung (0) gebildet wurde. Die Variablen der Dimensionen 2 und 3 sind der ParlGov-Datenbank (Döring und Manow 2020) entnommen oder auf deren Grundlage berechnet. Die Zusammenfassung der jeweiligen Variablen zu einer Dimension erfolgt in allen drei Fällen durch Addition der Einzelwerte. In allen folgenden Berechnungen werden außerdem zwei Kontrollvariablen einbezogen. Das Alter der Demokratie misst die Zeit, die seit den Gründungswahlen vergangen ist. Diese Variable prüft Reifeeffekte, die auftreten können, wenn beispielsweise institutionelle Arrangements erst mit der Zeit ihre volle Wirkung entfalten, wenn Parteiensysteme sich nach und nach konsolidieren 3

Die Polarisierungs-Daten sind der ParlGov-Datenbank (www.parlgov.org) entnommen. Der jeweilige Rechts-Links-Score einer Partei wird dort durch ihren mittleren Score auf den durch Experten-Befragungen gewonnenen Skalen von Benoit und Laver (2006), Castles und Mair (1984), den Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (Hooghe et al. 2010; Steenbergen und Marks 2007) sowie Huber und Inglehart (1995) generiert. 4 Zur Bestimmung der jeweiligen Rechts-Links-Scores einzelner Parteien vgl. Fußnote 3.

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oder bestimmte Muster der Regierungsbildung, wie beispielsweise im Umgang mit Nachfolgeparteien, sich im Zeitverlauf wandeln beziehungsweise erst einige Jahre nach dem Ende des Staatssozialismus durchsetzen. Das Alter der Wahlperiode kontrolliert für die Zeit, die bei Regierungsbildung seit der vorherigen Parlamentswahl verstrichen ist und trägt der Tatsache Rechnung, dass eine später in der Legislaturperiode gebildete Regierung weniger Zeit bis zu der nächsten regulären Parlamentswahl hat und daher zwangsläufig nicht so dauerhaft sein kann, wie eine Regierung, die gleich zu Beginn der Legislaturperiode gebildet wurde. Da die Verfassungen in allen hier betrachteten Staaten eine vierjährige Legislaturperiode vorsehen, ist darüber hinaus eine Kontrolle für deren maximal mögliche Länge nicht notwendig. Beide Variablen werden in Tagen gemessen.

3.2

Regierungsdauer in Mittel- und Osteuropa und ihre drei Bestimmungsdimensionen

Untersuchungen westlicher parlamentarischer Systeme kommen zu dem Schluss, dass die Stabilität einer Regierung neben stochastischen Ereignissen systematisch vor allem auf der Grundlage bestimmter Attribute einer Regierung erklärbar ist. Diese Attribute fasse ich in drei Dimensionen zusammen, die jeweils in spezifischer Weise zum Risiko einer Regierung, gestürzt zu werden, beitragen. Die drei Dimensionen beschreiben das institutionelle Risiko sowie die Risiken, die von Akteurskonstellationen und dem bei der Regierungsbildung beobachtbaren Verhalten dieser Akteure ausgehen. Ich nehme an, dass das Gesamtrisiko für die Regierungsdauer abhängig ist von einem Zusammenspiel dieser drei Dimensionen. Dieses Risiko für die Dauerhaftigkeit einer Regierung überprüfe ich mit Hilfe einer Ereignisdatenanalyse. Hierzu verwende ich ein semiparametrisches Cox-Modell, das eine nichtparametrische Schätzung des Basis-Hazards mit einer parametrischen Schätzung des Einflusses der Kovariaten kombiniert. Dieses Modell erlaubt es, den Einfluss der drei Dimensionen zu schätzen, ohne eine spezifische Annahme zur Form des Basis-Hazards formulieren zu müssen (BoxSteffensmeier und Jones 2004, Kap. 4). Dies bietet sich an, da eine Annahme zur Form des stochastischen Teils der Ereignisdatenanalyse nicht formuliert werden kann.5 Der möglicherweise unbeobachteten Heterogenität auf Länderebene wird zunächst durch die Verwendung robuster Standardfehler Rechnung getragen, das endgültige Modell schätze ich unter Verwendung von Länder-Dummies. In der 5

Eine umfassende Diskussion der Gründe, die für die Verwendung eines Cox-Modells zur Schätzung von Regierungsdauer sprechen, findet sich bei Jäckle (2009).

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Analyse werden alle 185 Regierungen, die in Mittel- und Osteuropa im Untersuchungszeitraum gebildet wurden, berücksichtigt. Die zehn Regierungen, die am Ende des Untersuchungszeitraumes am 8. Dezember 2020 noch im Amt waren, werden als rechtszensierte Beobachtungen behandelt. Tab. 2 zeigt die Ergebnisse der Ereignisdatenanalyse. Ausgewiesen werden Hazardraten (HR), die man durch Exponieren der ursprünglichen Koeffizienten erhält. Im Vergleich zu nicht exponierten Koeffizienten haben Hazardraten den Vorteil, direkt interpretierbar zu sein: Ein HR-Wert von 2,0 bedeutet eine Verdopplung des Risikos des Scheiterns einer Regierung, wenn die jeweilige unabhängige Variable um eine Einheit steigt, während 0,5 Punkte eine Halbierung dieses Risikos anzeigt. Modell 1, das lediglich die Indices der drei Dimensionen als unabhängige Variablen enthält, zeigt, dass sowohl Dimension 1 als auch Dimension 2 den erwarteten positiven Effekt auf das Risiko des Scheiterns einer Regierung haben. Dimension 3 hingegen hat einen nicht erwarteten negativen, aber sehr schwachen Effekt auf dieses Risiko. Modell 2 ergänzt die beiden Kontrollvariablen. Von diesen hat lediglich das Alter der Legislaturperiode einen positiven Effekt auf das Risiko eines vorzeitigen Regierungssturzes. Für das Alter der Demokratie hingegen ist ein substantieller Effekt auf die Dauerhaftigkeit einer Regierung nicht nachweisbar. Die Schlussfolgerung aus dieser Beobachtung muss lauten, dass Reifeeffekte, die mit der fortschreitenden Konsolidierung der Demokratie in Mittel- und Osteuropa zu erklären wären, für die Dauerhaftigkeit der dortigen Regierungen keine Rolle spielen. Wir können also davon ausgehen, dass bereits mit Bildung der jeweiligen Gründungsregierungen die theoretisch postulierten Effekte der drei Dimensionen Institutionelles Risiko, Akteurskonstellation und Ergebnisse des Akteursverhaltens voll ausgeprägt sind. Die vornehmlich aus der Betrachtung etablierter Demokratien abgeleiteten Annahmen lassen sich demnach offensichtlich auch auf junge Demokratien in Mittel- und Osteuropa übertragen. Da dies ausweislich des ebenfalls nicht signifikanten Koeffizienten auch in Modell 3, in dem die Interaktionen der drei Risiko-Dimensionen eingeführt werden, gilt, berücksichtigt Modell 4 diese weder statistisch noch konzeptionell relevante Kontrollvariable nicht mehr und enthält nurmehr ausschließlich die aus theoretischer Perspektive substantiell interessanten Variablen.6 Daher erfolgt die weitere Auswertung auf der Grundlage des

6

Das Modell besteht alle von Box-Steffensmeier und Jones (2004) empfohlenen Robustheitstests. Vor allem bestätigen sowohl graphische Analysen als auch der statistische GrambschTherneau-Test die für ein Cox-Modell zentrale Annahme proportionaler Hazards.

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Tab. 2 Ereignisdaten-Modelle zur Erklärung des Risikos für die Dauerhaftigkeit einer Regierung in Abhängigkeit von drei Dimensionen (1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Hazardrate

Hazardrate

Hazardrate

Hazardrate

b (SF)

b (SF)

b (SF)

b (SF)

Dimension 1

1.1654*

1.0886+

0.1729**

0.1518***

(0.0734)

(0.0476)

(0.1044)

(0.0726)

Dimension 2

1.2154*

1.2023*

0.2506

0.2128

(0.0936)

(0.1093)

(0.2925)

(0.2122)

Dimension 3

0.9996***

0.9998*

0.9956***

0.9953***

(0.0001)

(0.0001)

(0.0013)

(0.0009)

Alter Wahlperiode

1.0014***

1.0014***

1.0014***

(0.0002)

(0.0003)

(0.0003)

Alter Demokratie

1.0000

1.0000

(0.0000)

(0.0000) 1.2753

1.3062*

(0.1993)

(0.1726)

Dim1 * Dim3

1.0006***

1.0007***

(0.0002)

(0.0001)

Dim2 * Dim3

1.0005

1.0006*

(0.0003)

(0.0003)

Dim1 * Dim2 * Dim3

0.9999+

0.9999**

(0.0000)

(0.0000)

Dim1 * Dim2

N

185.0000

185.0000

185.0000

185.0000

Anzahl Cluster

10.0000

10.0000

10.0000

10.0000

p

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

pseudo

R2

0.0265

0.0503

0.0573

0.0569

BIC

1461.2754

1436.3580

1446.8350

1442.1498

Log Likelihood

−722.8072

−705.1281

−699.9259

−700.1935

Anmerkungen: Cox-Ereignisdatenanalyse; Koeffizienten sind Hazardraten; Modelle 1–4: robuste Standardfehler (SF) mit Länderclustern in Klammern; Modell 5: Länder-Dummies (Koeffizienten nicht abgedruckt); + p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001; eigene Berechnung auf der Grundlage von Angaben der ParlGov-Datenbank (Döring und Manow 2020)

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Modells 4. Dafür sprechen auch die in Tab. 2 ausgewiesenen Werte der BICStatistik, die Modell 4 im Vergleich zu Modell 3 als das Modell mit der besseren Anpassungsgüte ausweisen. Zunächst erhöht eine Regierungsbildung zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt der Wahlperiode das Risiko eines vorzeitigen Sturzes einer Regierung. Mit jedem Tag, der bei Bildung einer Regierung in der laufenden Legislaturperiode vergangen ist, steigt das Risiko eines vorzeitigen Scheiterns um 0,14 % an. Sind etwa zwei Drittel einer regulären vierjährigen Legislaturperiode (also 1000 von rund 1500 Tagen) vergangen, ist das vorzeitige Ende einer Regierung demnach 1,4 Mal höher als bei einer zu Beginn der Wahlperiode gebildeten Regierung. Dies ist ein erstaunlich niedriger Wert, der den Schluss nahelegt, dass Transaktionsund Opportunitätskosten gegenüber den möglichen Gewinnen aus dem Sturz einer Regierung selbst gegen Ende der Legislaturperiode überwiegen. Bis auf den Koeffizienten der Dimensionen 2 sind die übrigen Variablen in Modell 4 auf 0,05-Niveau statistisch signifikant. Allerdings lassen sich die Koeffizienten einer Interaktion und ihrer konstitutiven Therme nur für diejenigen Fälle direkt interpretieren, in denen der Wert der jeweils interagierten Variablen den Wert null annimmt. Dies aber ist in den hier zur Rede stehenden Fällen theoretisch nicht angemessen, da beispielsweise weder risikolose Institutionen noch Parteiensysteme ohne Parteien oder programmatische Differenzen denkbar sind. Es empfiehlt sich daher eine graphische Darstellung des Einflusses der jeweils interessierenden über verschiedene Werte der interagierten Variable (Brambor et al. 2006; Kam und Fanzese 2007).7 Alle sechs abgebildeten Interaktionen zeigen statistisch signifikante Effekte (vgl. Abb. 1): Über den Wertbereich der institutionellen Dimension 1 hinweg wirken sich Veränderungen in der Akteurskonstellation (Dimension 2) nur im oberen Bereich der Verteilung aus. Erst wenn das institutionelle Risiko einen Indexwert von 6,8 Punkten überschreitet, stellen sich signifikante Effekte der Akteurskonstellation ein. Indexwerte in dieser Höhe sind in allen Staaten außer Bulgarien, Ungarn und Slowenien beobachtbar. In der Mehrheit der mittelund osteuropäischen Staaten sehen sich Regierungen, die durch ihren Status als Minderheits- oder übergroße Regierung, durch eine hohe Anzahl an Regierungsparteien und deren starke Polarisierung in besonderem Maße geprägt

7

Im Folgenden orientiere ich mich an dem Vorgehen bei Grotz und Weber (2012). Die Schätzung der jeweiligen Koeffizienten und ihrer Standardfehler beruht auf zehntausend Simulationen auf der Basis der geschätzten Koeffizienten des Modells 4. Ich danke Till Weber, der mir die Stata-Syntax für die Simulation der Koeffizienten und die anschließende Berechnung der Hazardraten und ihrer Standardfehler zur Verfügung gestellt hat.

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sind, also mit einem durch konstitutionell fixierte institutionelle Arrangements erhöhten Risiko des vorzeitigen Scheiterns konfrontiert. Ein illustratives Beispiel für die Bedeutung der Akteurskonstellation ist Polen, da wir hier im Beobachtungszeitraum sowohl ein mit 10,9 effektiven Parteien hochgradig fragmentiertes, als auch ein mit lediglich 2,9 effektiven Parteien nur schwach fragmentiertes Parlament finden. In letzterem war Donald Tusk in der Lage, eine Regierung über eine gesamte Legislaturperiode hinweg im Amt zu halten. Das hochgradig fragmentierte Parlament hingegen, das aus den ersten vollständig freien Wahlen im Oktober 1991 hervorgegangen war, wurde nach nicht einmal zwei Jahren aufgelöst. In dieser Zeit bildeten die insgesamt 19 ‚realen‘ Parlamentsparteien vier Regierungen, von denen keine einzige länger als 321 Tage im Amt blieb. In Folge einer Wahlreform zogen in das im September 1993 neu gewählte Parlament lediglich 3,9 effektive bzw. sieben ‚reale‘ Parteien ein. In diesem deutlich geringer fragmentierten Parlament wurden zwar insgesamt auch drei Regierungen gebildet, diese waren mit durchschnittlich 489 Tagen jedoch deutlich dauerhafter als diejenigen der vorangegangenen Legislaturperiode. Es zeigt sich also, dass in einem relativ kurzen Zeitabschnitt und unter denselben institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen verschiedene Akteurskonstellationen, zusammengefasst in Dimension 2, sehr unterschiedlich dauerhafte Regierungen hervorbringen können. Damit bestätigt sich, dass die Zahl der Parlamentsparteien und deren Polarisierung einen substantiellen Effekt auf die Stabilität einer Regierung haben. Über den Wertbereich der Institutionen-Dimension beobachten wir auch unterschiedliche Auswirkungen des Akteursverhaltens. Wie erwartet nimmt das Risiko eines frühen Scheiterns der Regierung mit zunehmender Anzahl der Regierungsparteien, deren zunehmender Polarisierung sowie ihrem Status als Minderheits- oder übergroße Regierung zu. Diesen Zusammenhang beobachten wir bei Indexwerten von 7,3 oder mehr auf der Dimension 2, die wir in Estland, Lettland, Litauen, Polen und der Slowakei finden. In diesen fünf Staaten sollten die Parteien darauf achten, Regierungen mit möglichst wenigen, programmatisch kohärenten Partnern zu bilden und einen minimalen Gewinnstatus zu erreichen. Am anderen Ende des Wertbereichs der Dimension 1, bei IndexWerten von 6,3 und kleiner,lben Schwellenwerte wie für beobachten wir ein unerwartetes Ergebnis: risikoreiches Akteursverhalten wirkt sich hier positiv auf die Dauerhaftigkeit einer Regierung aus, das Risiko eines vorzeitigen Scheiterns sinkt. In dem betroffenen Staat (Bulgarien) sind die institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen offenkundig in der Lage, die aus dem Akteursverhalten resultierenden Risiken auszugleichen und die Regierungen trotz einer hohen Anzahl programmatisch divergenter Regierungsparteien zu stabilisieren. Tatsächlich zählen, wie

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Abb. 1 Effekte einer Veränderung der Dimensionen 1, 2 und 3 über alle Werte der jeweils anderen Dimensionen. (Anmerkungen: Hazardrate einer Veränderung der Dimensionen 1 und 2 um eine, der Dimension 3 um 100 Einheit(en); y-Achse zum Teil logarithmiert; gestrichelte Linien: 95 Prozent-Konfidenzintervall; eigene Berechnung auf der Grundlage von Angaben der ParlGov-Datenbank (Döring und Manow 2020))

oben bereits dargestellt, bulgarische Regierungen mit zu den stabilsten in der gesamten Region. Im Fall des Einflusses der Dimensionen 1 und 3 über verschiedene Werte der Akteurskonstellation hinweg ist ebenfalls zu beobachten, dass sich der Effekt der beiden Dimensionen ungefähr in der Mitte der Spannweite der Akteursdimension umkehrt. Sowohl institutionelle als auch verhaltensinduzierte Risiken werden von risikoarmen Akteurskonstellationen mehr als abgefedert. Signifikant negative Effekte der Dimension 1 beobachten wir bei Werten unter 5,0 auf der Akteursdimension, positive Effekte, die für zunehmende Risiken stehen, bei Werten über 8,3. Im Mittel erreicht genau die Hälfte der Staaten (Bulgarien, Tschechische Republik, Ungarn, Rumänien, Slowakei), Akteurswerte unter 5,0. In diesen Fällen hat ein zunehmendes institutionelles Risiko einen positiven Effekt auf die Regierungsstabilität, da die Akteurskonstellation so risikoarm ist, dass sie zunehmende institutionelle Risiken auszugleichen vermag. Keiner der Staaten erreicht hingegen einen Akteurs-Mittelwert größer als 8,3. Wir müssen

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P. Harfst

also einzelne Regierungen betrachten, um positiven Effekten des institutionellen Risikos auf die Spur zu kommen. Dabei fällt auf, dass alle vier Regierungen, auf die diese Bedingungen zutreffen, nach den Wahlen am 27. Oktober 1991 in Polen gebildet wurden und damit in eine Zeit der politischen Instabilität in diesem Land fallen, die unter anderem durch eine Reform des Wahlsystems überwunden werden konnte (siehe oben). Für die Effekte, die von einem zunehmend risikoreichen Verhalten bei der Bildung einer Regierung bei unterschiedlichen Akteursrisiken ausgehen, gelten ungefähr dieselben Schwellenwerte wie für die Wirkung von Dimension 1 bei unterschiedlichen Werten auf Dimension 2: Bei Akteurs-Indexwerten von unter 5 Punkten stabilisieren zunehmende Verhaltensrisiken eine Regierung, während bei Index-Werten von mehr als 8 Punkten das Risiko eines vorzeitigen Endes der Regierung steigt. Bei geringen Akteursrisiken wiegen offenbar riskante Entscheidungen bei der Regierungsbildung weniger schwer und die Regierungen bleiben stabil, auch wenn ihr aus dem Verhalten der Beteiligten resultierendes Risiko steigt. Bleibt schließlich noch ein Blick auf die Effekte, die aus steigenden Risiken in den Dimensionen 1 und 2 bei unterschiedlichen Verhaltens-Risiken erwachsen. Wiederum gilt, dass bei geringen Werten des Verhaltens-Index zunehmende institutionelle und Akteursrisiken sogar stabilisierend auf eine Regierung wirken, während die Kombination von hohen institutionellen und Akteursrisiken mit risikoreichem Verhalten der Akteure zu größerer Instabilität einer Regierung führt. Wie lassen sich die Ergebnisse in ihrer Gesamtheit nun interpretieren? In allen Fällen ließ sich zeigen, dass die Kombination verschiedener Risikofaktoren abträglich für die Stabilität einer Regierung ist. Dies entspricht den eingangs formulierten Erwartungen. Zu beobachten ist aber auch, dass geringe Risiken auf einer Dimension in allen bis auf einem Fall in der Lage sind, hohe Risiken auf den anderen Dimensionen auszugleichen. So sind Regierungen tendenziell stabiler, auch wenn sie mit höheren institutionellen Risiken konfrontiert werden – solange die aus den Dimensionen 2 und 3 erwachsenden Risiken relativ gering sind. Offenkundig sind politische Akteure also in der Lage, institutionelle Risiken bis zu einem gewissen Grad auszugleichen. Erstaunlicher Weise sind es gerade institutionelle Arrangements, die im Fall zunehmend riskanter Akteurskonstellationen eine solche heilsame Wirkung nicht ausüben können. Geringe institutionelle Risiken haben bei zunehmend riskanten Akteurskonstellationen keine signifikanten Effekte auf die Dauerhaftigkeit einer Regierung. Die Stabilität einer Regierung scheint also weniger von institutionellen Arrangements als vielmehr von der Akteurskonstellation und dem Verhalten dieser Akteure im

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Prozess der Regierungsbildung abzuhängen. Dies ist eine gute Nachricht für politische Praktiker und wirft gleichzeitig Fragen zu den Möglichkeiten und Grenzen des „institutional engineering“ auf.

4

Zusammenfassung

Auf der Grundlage klassischer Annahmen der Koalitions- und Regierungsstabilitätsforschung präsentiere ich in diesem Beitrag eine Neukonzeptualisierung der Determinanten der Regierungsdauer. Statt die Effekte einer Reihe von Einzelvariablen zu testen, identifiziere ich drei Dimensionen, die die Dauerhaftigkeit von Regierungen erklären können. Die drei Dimensionen entsprechen den institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen, der Akteurskonstellation sowie den Ergebnissen des Akteursverhaltens. Jeder dieser drei Dimensionen, so meine Annahme, wohnt ein spezifisches Risiko für die Dauerhaftigkeit einer Regierung inne. Der Vorteil einer dimensionalen Konzeptualisierung dieses Risikos liegt darin, dass Annahmen zu Wechselwirkungen dieser drei Dimensionen formuliert und empirisch getestet werden können. Meine Annahme lautet, dass sich das Risiko einer Dimension erst entfalten kann, wenn auch die jeweils anderen Dimensionen die Regierung einem erhöhten Risiko für ihre Stabilität aussetzen. Die jeweiligen Risiken verhalten sich demnach interdependent. In einer Ereignisdatenanalyse kann ich zeigen, dass vor allem hohe institutionelle Risiken erwartungsgemäß zur Destabilisierung einer Regierung beitragen, wenn sie mit zunehmenden Risiken aus den beiden anderen Dimensionen kombiniert werden. Je stärker also ein Parteiensystem polarisiert und fragmentiert ist und je weiter eine Regierung vom Status als minimale Gewinnkoalition abweicht und zudem fragmentiert und polarisiert ist, desto größer ist ihr Risiko, angesichts hoher institutioneller Risiken tatsächlich vorzeitig zu scheitern. Im Lichte dieser Ergebnisse zeigen sich deutlich die Vorteile einer dimensionalen Konzeptualisierung, die es zulässt, Annahmen über das Zusammenwirken verschiedener Dimensionen zu formulieren und zu testen. Meine Ereignisdatenanalyse kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass tatsächlich Interaktionseffekte zwischen den drei Dimensionen existieren. Allerdings verstärken sich diese Risiken – anders als zunächst angenommen – nicht in allen Fällen gegenseitig. Vielmehr können geringe Akteurs- und Verhaltensrisiken aus den jeweils anderen Dimensionen erwachsenden Risiken ausgleichen und sogar abmildern. Insgesamt zeigt sich, dass die Analyse der Dauerhaftigkeit von Regierungen in Mittel- und Osteuropa mithilfe eines dimensionalen Ansatzes ein

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vielversprechender Weg ist, der neue Erkenntnisse zum Zusammenspiel institutioneller Rahmenbedingungen, den Akteurskonstellationen und den Ergebnissen des Akteursverhaltens bei der Bildung von Regierungen generiert. Der Vorteil der dimensionalen Konzeptualisierung zieht jedoch auch einen Nachteil nach sich, da der Beitrag einzelner Variablen aufgrund der Aggregation zu Indices nicht mehr sichtbar gemacht werden kann. Insofern verstehe ich meine hier präsentierten Ergebnisse als Inspiration für weitere Forschung auf dem Gebiet der Regierungs- und Stabilitätsforschung. Dabei verdient insbesondere die – unerwartete – Möglichkeit des Ausgleichs hoher Risiken in einem durch geringere Risiken in einem der anderen Bereiche weiterer konzeptueller, theoretischer und empirischer Betrachtungen.

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Do Too Many Cooks Spoil the Broth? How a Cabinet’s Internal Decision-Making Impacts Cabinets’ Survival Erik Baltz 1

Introduction

The scholarly work has brought forth a broad variety of studies about politicians’ and parties’ motivation for their actions in the political process. Even though, most researchers agree that there are three main incentive structures— votes, office and policy benefits—studies put varying emphasis on how to weigh the motivations and which of them is more important (Müller and Strøm 1999). However, most parties strive for government participation in order to extract some benefits from the office ranks, as hard negotiations over government formation indicate regularly. Occupying the office ranks is, hence, an attractive goal for political parties. Nevertheless, parties are constituted to serve longer than a regular constitutional term, thus maintaining the office ranks is a reasonable incentive for political parties as well. Most of the established research focuses either on attributes or external events to make informed statements about the longevity of governments (Herman and Sanders 1977; Powell 1982; Browne et al. 1984, 1986; Strøm 1985; Warwick 1994; Saalfeld 2008; Maoz and Somer-Topcu 2010; Bergman et al. 2015). However, procedures that take place within the institutions were oftentimes neglected so far. The present chapter strives to close this research gap by answering the following research question: How do cabinets’ internal decision-making procedures influence cabinet stability? E. Baltz (B) Institut Für Politik- Und Kommunikationswissenschaft, Universität Greifswald, Greifswald, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2022 E. Baltz et al. (eds.), Parties, Institutions and Preferences, Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-35133-5_9

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Three different decision-making procedures are analyzed concerning their impact on the survival of cabinets. Each of them illustrates an independent form of organization according to the number of players involved and the stability of the compromises reached. The models under consideration range from inclusive forms of decision making such as the cabinet party model to more exclusive forms such as minister party model and prime minister model. By analyzing 365 cabinets from 15 countries in a Cox proportional hazard regression, the investigation reveals a considerable impact of inclusiveness for decision-making within cabinets. The chapter proceeds as follows: first, the most important contributions to government duration literature are discussed. Afterwards, I present three models taken from Jahn (2016) and hypothesize their expected influence on government duration. In the analytical sections, I explain relevant specifications of the research design and conduct several analytical steps to test the hypotheses. In the discussion section, the results are summarized and tied back to the theoretical expectations. The conclusion section consists of an outline of the implications for the academic field and future studies.

2

Literature Review

Studies on government survival build the center of coalition research. Studies on government duration and termination are one of the three features that build up most of the literature on government behavior with government formation and portfolio allocation being the other two. Due to its substantial importance for comparative political science, a voluminous literature has emerged during the last decades. From an empirical view, cabinet stability is important due to significant differences within and between countries (Grofman 1989). Whereas countries such as Germany almost always exhaust the whole period of the constitutional inter election period (CIEP), other countries such as Italy face a much higher volatility of changes in their governmental settings (Cioffi-Revilla 1984; Curini and Zucchini 2012). At the end of the last century, the literature on government duration was split into two camps: the attributes approach and the critical events approach.1 The

1

For an excellent literature overview on government duration including the discussion of the most important challenges within the research vein see Laver and Schofield (1990); Grofman and van Roozendaal (1997) and Laver (2003).

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main difference between both schools are their statements over the shape of hazard rates illustrating the risk of termination in the next period.2 Whereas the attributes approach states that the risk of termination follows a certain shape –rising monotonously—in dependence of different characteristics of the cabinet and the parliamentary situation, the critical events approach stresses that the termination risk is constant over the whole legislature. The attributes that are deemed relevant, ought to be features of the parties which are holding portfolios, the government as an independent entity, the characteristics of the parliament and the party system. The most important characteristics that are considered as strong predictors—from a statistical point of view—are majority status in the lower chamber (Herman and Sanders 1977; Strøm 1985; Saalfeld 2008), minimal (connected) winning status (Strøm et al. 2008; Bergman et al. 2015) fragmentation of the party system (Rae 1967; Taylor and Herman 1971), polarization within the parliament (Powell 1982; Maoz and Somer-Topcu 2010) and ideological diversity within the cabinet and parliament (Warwick 1992, 1994). Some of the more recent contributions enlarge the pool of potential explanatory factors, e.g. the impact of existence and the length of coalition agreements (Moury and Timmermans 2014; Krauss 2018), party congruence (Martínez-Cantó and Bergmann 2020) and the share of female legislators within the executive (Krauss and Kroeber 2020). On the other hand, the critical events camp argues, that these characteristics are of minor importance and only external, critical events like economic crises, inter- and intra-state conflicts, environmental disasters or huge shifts in the political support for parties or cabinets can destabilize the cabinet in a sufficiently strong manner to foster a government breakdown (Frendreis 1983; Browne et al. 1984; Saalfeld 2013). This approach is refined by Grofman and van Roozendaal (1997) who argued, that the events itself do not impact the stability of political governments, but the reaction of decision-makers determine if the cabinet destabilizes. They observe that governments do not always suffer under external shocks and some that appear to be good crisis managers can benefit from crises, e.g. Merkel II cabinet in Germany.3 Besides the fact that many of the mentioned publications were published more recently, the initial step of unifying both approaches was taken by King et al. (1990). They present a ‘unified model’ where both approaches are included simultaneously in their model. A major aspect of this study, that had a pathbreaking 2

For a discussion about the shape of hazard rates in this regard see Diermeier and Stevenson (1999). 3 During the financial crisis of 2009, the cabinet managed to get better off at the pools during the crisis due to the increase in confidence of voters in the cabinet.

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impact on most of the later findings, is the usage of event history modelling. This technique has enabled researchers to model the role of time and the switching direction as well as the importance of impact during certain periods more accurately. Event history modelling is nowadays the most frequently used estimation technique to analyze challenges concerning time-spans such as cabinet duration.4 Attributes that are concerned with intra-party or intra-cabinet issues are barely present in the scientific literature so far (Giannetti and Benoit 2009). Angenendt and Schmitt (2017), for instance, show that cabinet parties suffer more strongly from premature cabinet termination in the subsequent election if the termination was due to intra-party or intra-cabinet conflicts, e.g. over certain policies. Greene (2017) supports this claim by underlining the relevance of a cabinet parties’ flexibility during the legislation. As he argues, governments that are prepared to negotiate about resources on a wide range of issues are better equipped to moderate policy disagreements and subsequently, will last longer. However, this effect is limited if a critical amount of dissension is reached, since more disagreements decrease the benefits of staying in office and in turn make premature termination a more rewarding option. Krauss and Kroeber (2020) argue that women in the executive have an appeasing effect on cabinet conflicts since women apply more consensual and compromise-oriented conflict resolution strategies making intra-cabinet disputes less likely to emerge and escalate.5 As other authors postulated earlier, intra-party politics are a potential field of research and are getting more scientific attention recently (Laver and Schofield 1990; Saalfeld 2008). The chapter on hand strives to contribute to this research vein by offering an institutional approach for explaining government duration by cabinet characteristics. It is assumed that the internal organization of decision-making in general and the number of relevant people as well as the inclusiveness of decision-making in detail have a substantial impact on the risk of premature cabinet termination. In the following, I describe the basic arguments and present the analytical models.

3

Decision-making in Western-European democracies

The political systems in the Western-European democracies are very similar at the first sight. All of them hinge on elections that are held regularly (between 4

Event history modelling and survival analysis are used interchangeably in the following, describing one and the same estimation technique. For methodological details see BoxSteffensmeier and Jones (2004) or Fisher and Lin (1999). 5 For a similar analysis based on group polarization theory see Martin (2018).

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3 and 5 years), the cabinet depends on the parliament and the representation of voters’ preferences is organized through parties that are moreover the main actors in the political arena, arranging the functioning of the parliament and the cabinet. In order to make government participation an overt option, the participation in the government has to lead to some benefits for all coalition members. As long as those benefits are sufficiently high for all coalition members, the cabinet is stable, however, if the benefits from government participation become negative for at least one coalition party, the affected party has no longer incentives to be part of the government and might leave the cabinet instead. However, the institutional setting of different countries varies in some other respects. Even though the institutions that are relevant for legislation are the same, the decisionmaking procedures differ according to the rules that the institutions apply for decision-making. The parliament relies on some kind of majority rule, that could vary between the importance of passed laws—e.g. constitutional amendments require a qualified majority, whereas simple laws only need to achieve a simple majority—but is not so diverse in between country comparisons. For governments, especially the number of involved people is more decisive, since due to the lower number of decision-makers, individual preferences might be more decisive for the outcome. An additional minister ought to be more influential for government decision-making than an additional legislator in the parliament. Following this argument, the number of involved decision-makers might have an considerable impact on the outcome as Sandler and Hartley (2001) outlined in the context of economics of alliances. Following their findings, “small groups are more likely to solve the collective action problem compared with groups of many nations” (Sandler and Hartley 2001, p. 891). This finding rests on the assumption that the winset—the area that is preferred by all involved players over the status quo—decreases with an increasing number of involved people (Tsebelis 2002; Drüner et al. 2018). In the context of cabinet duration and decision-making the number of involved players is relevant at two points: during negotiations within the cabinet and after negotiations. If cabinets negotiate over policies or procedural issues, varying preferences lead to a situation, where the winset decreases as outlined above. That means, that the more diverse preferences are within the cabinet, the harder it is to find a compromise that is acceptable for all cabinet members. Moreover, diverse preferences might provoke intra-cabinet conflicts. Damgaard (2014), for instance, outlined that cabinet terminations due to intra-cabinet conflict are a frequently observed phenomenon in Western-European democracies. Therefore, a higher number of involved players with diverse preferences can be associated

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with higher risks of intra-cabinet conflict that subsequently threatens governments survival. However, if the cabinet managed to reach a compromise between many diverging preferences, the acceptance of those compromises is likely to be high in the aftermath of negotiations. This is due to the inclusiveness of the reached compromises. Following Lijphart (2012) changes of the status quo are more extensive if many veto players agree on a certain issue. The same argument could be made for the stability of the compromises reached. If the preferences of all players impact the final outcome, no player has reason to feel unrepresented or passed over by the outcome and therefore the stability of the cabinet is not endangered. The inclusiveness of the decision-making procedures, in turn, depends on organizational differences between cabinets in different national contexts. Jahn (2016) has taken those organizational differences into account for analyzing the differences in environmental performance of highly industrialized societies. His claim was to define an ideological position of cabinets. In order to define the government position, he determines how the ideological positions of the cabinet parties has to be weighted for the overall government position, which consequently results in the development of the Agenda-Setting Power Model (ASPM). As a result, he filters out three different cabinet models, that are a sufficiently sensitive classification of cabinet decision-making for developed democracies. The three types he identifies are the cabinet party model (Strøm 1994), ministerial party model (Laver and Shepsle 1994) and the prime-minister model (Poguntke and Webb 2005), that I discuss in more detail in the following sections. The consideration of these cabinet types enables Jahn to model the ideological government position in different countries more accurately and policy-sensitive. The same insights are also likely to appear in the study of cabinet duration and therefore expand the horizon of intra-cabinet impacts for this particular dimension.

3.1 Cabinet party model The cabinet party model was first introduced by Strøm (1994). The main assumption of this model is that there is no policy-specific distribution of competences within the cabinet. All members of the cabinet agree at least to some extent on a common programmatic strategy in every single relevant policy issue. The decision how to proceed on certain policy fields is therefore decided collectively by all coalition partners or all cabinet members, respectively. On the one hand, this enables all cabinet members to influence the cabinet policy in many aspects and provides all decisions of the cabinet with a broad legitimacy. On the other

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hand, it is more difficult for external actors to hold single cabinet members or coalition parties accountable and simultaneously prepare the ground for disagreements at the negotiation table. Since all cabinet members are involved in every cabinet decision, the cabinet has to find a feasible compromise between all persons involved.6 Next to the immense amount of time getting consumed if every decision has to be passed by the whole cabinet, another challenge appears when the cabinet fails to reach a compromise. In this case, the situation requires a functional mechanism to guarantee that the demanded compromise is brought about. Notwithstanding the fact, that coalition parties are unlikely to have the same or at least similar preferences on all policy fields it is more reasonable to assume that at least some policy fields are more disputed, hence, conflictual.

3.2 Minister party model The minister party model dates back to the seminal study of Laver and Shepsle (1994). Following their line of argumentation, the actual cabinet conflicts take place before cabinet formation is complete during the bargaining over portfolio allocation. Disputes can arise over which coalition party will get which portfolio, however, once these disputes are settled and the ministers take over their offices, they can act completely independent from coalition partners or other cabinet members. For Jahn (2016) this reveals the opportunity to calculate an ideological position that is policy-specific, but represents the whole government and is determined by the ideological position of the party that controls the respective portfolio. For a coalition government that consists of a green and a conservative party, with the green party controlling the portfolio for environment, only the ideological position of the green party has to be considered in order to calculate the ideological position of the government on the policy field of environmental protection. For the present study, the mode of action is very similar. Since only one minister is responsible for the legislation for a limited amount of policies (assuming that one portfolio might be responsible for more than one policy), there is actually no reason to expect conflicts within the cabinet during legislation since all 6

This circumstance is less severe as it might appear at first sight, since the cabinet parties can be expected to act as single actors in this regard, reducing the number of involved entities from the number of cabinet members to the number of cabinet parties. However, this reduction does not imply that every coalition party is represented by only one person, but by a group of cabinet members. The posted cabinet party delegates are accountable to the cabinet parties and might change from issue to issue.

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distributional struggles take place during the cabinet’s formation process. However, in reality the distribution of policy fields is not as unambiguous as it might appear here. The policies concerning environmental protection fall clearly into the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Environment, however, depending on the planned programs, there might be dimensions that touches other ministries such as the Ministry of Economy or Agriculture if the adopted laws restrict the behavior of enterprises or peasantries. If such situations emerge, conflicts between ministries are especially likely if distinct cabinet parties occupy the different ministries.

3.3 Prime minister model Following Jahn (2016) the prime minister model is the least researched model. This cabinet type rests on the assumption that the prime minister has an outstanding role within the cabinet with a certain degree of control over every policy (Poguntke and Webb 2005). However, Jahn (2016) rightly criticize, that since only the prime minister controls the policies, parties have no incentive to participate in a government as long as they do not provide the prime minister. One could argue that parties might be motivated by office or vote benefits that can be provided by other departments as well, but to assume that parties join cabinets without any impact on public policy seems to be implausible. For tackling this implausibility, Jahn suggests to consider this model as being bilateral in the sense that every decision that is made by the government is the result of negotiations between the prime minister and the minister that controls the respective domain. Taking this view, the prime minister exerts policy competence in order to verify or amend the policies that were under elaboration by the ministries. Since this competence is unique to the prime minister, the outstanding role, proposed by Poguntke and Webb (2005), is taken into account. However, even though this adjustment is feasible in order to calculate the ideological government position for this model, it is not helpful to describe the legislation with respect to potential conflicts during the decision-making process. If, e.g. the prime minister and minister for environment belong to the same coalition party, there is only little reason to assume that legislation in this jurisdiction ought to be conflictual. Actually, this situation is similar to the situation where two ministers commonly pass legislation, but belong to the same cabinet party under the minister party model. If prime minister and minister for environment belong to different cabinet parties the situation is very similar to the minister party model case, where two ministers belong to different parties but have to commonly pass legislation. The only difference is that the cabinet’s hierarchy clearly emphasizes the prime minister,

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which enables the prime minister to resolve potential disputes autocratically. The power to do so is the main difference between both models, whereas under the minister party model, the dispute has to be settled among equals, the prime minister model comprises the option to settle potential conflicts through the prime minister’s policy competence.

3.4 Termination risk of cabinets’ type of decision-making After describing all relevant models that where introduced to comparative studies by Jahn (2016), I proceed by describing how each model impacts the phenomenon under consideration. The effects are broken down into effects during and after negotiations. As outlined above, it is much harder to reach compromises among many entities than within smaller groups. This leads to the assumption that the potential risk of conflict for passing legislation increases the more people are involved. Under this supposition the cabinet model might be the most conflictual one, since under this decision-making model all cabinet members—with different party affiliations, ideological positions, etc.—have to strive for compromises leading to many potential conflicts that threatens the survival of the cabinet and consequently leading to more premature terminations. Moreover, the risk to extract negative benefits from government participation is comparable high, since many entities have to agree regularly over certain issues, so that premature government termination is an overt option for all parties involved. This decision-making process is in particular conflictual if more parties participate in the government. Since the cabinet party model is the most inclusive one in terms of diverse preferences, the risk of premature termination ought to be higher under this decision-making procedure. This leads to the first hypothesis: H1a : Premature government termination is more likely if cabinets operate under the cabinet party model. The expected effects of the other two models are less striking. The prime minister model as well as the minister party model, consist of a very similar number of relevant players (including all ministers whose portfolios are affected for the minister party model plus the prime minister for the prime minister model) and organizational structures. Therefore, I expect them to have a more similar impact on the phenomenon under consideration than the cabinet party model. H2a : Premature government termination is equally likely if cabinets operate under the minister party model or the prime minister model. For the time after negotiations, the expected impacts are different. Even though, conflicts might be more extensive under the cabinet party model of

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decision-making, the broad involvement of all cabinet parties increases the information all cabinet partners collect about each other. Due to the low information asymmetry, the acceptance and stability of a reached compromise is high. Subsequently, if a cabinet is able to find a compromise, that all cabinet members can agree on, conflicts over the issue under consideration are most likely to be minor if not absent in the future and hence no longer jeopardize the survival of the cabinet (Lijphart 2012; Jahn 2016). Taking this perspective, the extensive amount of people involved in this model of decision-making can be regarded a blessing rather than a curse. The outlined perspective leads to the following competing hypothesis: H1b : Premature government termination is less likely if cabinets operate under the cabinet party model. For the post-negotiation time, the outstanding role of the prime minister comes into play. Ministers under the minister party model have to agree in a way that is not stipulated. Therefore, disputes might be potentially long-lasting and more threatening for the survival of the government. Under the prime minister model, however, those disputes can be settled by the prime minister’s policy competence. The solution strategy is, hence, implemented constitutionally and can be understood as a constitutional safety mechanism. Subsequently, intra-cabinet disputes are expected to be shorter and less threatening for government survival under the prime minister model, leading to the fourth hypothesis: H2b : Premature government termination is more likely if cabinets operate under the minister party model than under the prime minister model.

4

Research Design

In the following, I will describe the main characteristics of my research design. Since an appropriate modelling of time will be needed, in order to make robust statements about the validity of the expected mechanisms at work, I conduct a semi-parametric Cox-proportional hazard regression model. The Cox-model offers the great advantage of deriving the shape of the hazard rate from the data, makes theoretically guided assumptions about this shape redundant. My sample contains 15 Western-European countries that are developed and experienced democracies.7 The time under observation starts from the first inauguration of a 7

The included countries are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

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democratically elected cabinet in 1944 (Ireland, de Valera VI) until the last inaugurated government in 2010 (Netherlands, Rutte). The whole sample contains 432 governments, whereas only 365 enter the final analysis due to data availability for some of the variables. All of the countries in the sample experienced at least 8 cabinets (Spain) and a maximum of 49 cabinets (Italy) during the time under observation. The dependent variable of my analysis is the duration of government survival measured in days. The duration is measured as the difference between the reported starting point and the endpoint of the same government. Since there is no clear-cut convention about which event is associated with the inauguration of the government, several country-specific measurements are used. The inauguration of government is coded as the day on which one of the following events took place: inauguration by the head of state, date of investiture vote, date of the general election or other technical criteria, e.g. a change in the party composition. If information on several events for the same government are available, the first event (inauguration by the head of state) is prioritized over the second (date of investiture vote) and the third (date of general election) over the fourth (technical criteria). The procedure of finding the date of government termination is similar. The termination of government is coded as the day on which one of the following events took place: acceptance of resignation by head of state, vote of no confidence, date of general election or other technical criteria, e.g. change in party composition or death of prime minister. The prioritizing scheme is identical to the formation date. Due to the emergence of midterm terminations and the varying duration of legislatures between countries, the range of cabinet duration is very wide, reaching from only 7 days (Belgium, Spaak, 1946) to 1830 days (UK, Major II, 1992–1997). The underlying data was taken from the European Representative Democracy Data Archive (ERDDA) (Andersson et al. 2014). As it can be seen in Table 1, the countries in the sample differ in various regards. Some countries experience short periods of government duration such as Belgium, Finland or Italy, whereas cabinets in other countries are used to stay longer in office, e.g. in Austria, Ireland, Spain or the United Kingdom.8 The differences in the standard deviation are not as large, as to indicate countryspecific determinants that favor or impede longer government durations. However, if one uses the minimum and maximum values as a unit of comparison, it is noticeable that almost all countries experienced very short cabinets with less than 8

Note, that although the CIEP is 4 years in most of the countries, some countries deal with a CIEP of 5 years, such as Austria (since 2008), Ireland, Italy and the United Kingdom. Another aspect that ought to be regarded is the fact that some cabinets come into office during the CIEP and are, thus, only able to govern a much shorter period until the subsequent general elections are held.

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Table 1 Summary Statistics for Government Duration by Country Country

N

Austria

21

Belgium Denmark Finland

Mean

Standard Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

892.0

422.6

160

1431

34

572.9

520.7

7

1501

31

652.3

338.4

40

1350

38

496.8

403.9

36

1438

France

23

681.0

443.2

31

1799

Germany

26

726.4

514.5

14

1452

Greece

10

808.6

529.5

97

1474

Ireland

21

907.0

387.5

233

1555

Italy

49

349.0

307.8

9

1628

Netherlands

22

850.0

539.4

80

1638

Norway

26

754.3

397.6

24

1435

Portugal

11

683.1

535.7

96

1511

Spain

8

1003.6

336.0

606

1407

Sweden

25

770.8

401.8

167

1463

United Kingdom

20

1005.9

541.1

30

1830

Total

365

683.1

467.1

7

1830

100 days in office with Austria, Ireland, Spain and Sweden being the exceptions. Nonetheless, all countries experienced at least one very long cabinet term lasting at least 1350 days in office (Denmark) as maximum values indicate. The main independent variable is the type of cabinet decision-making the governments in different countries work with. In order to assign the countries in the sample to one of the three types of cabinet decision-making presented earlier, (Jahn 2016, pp. 61–67) conducts a cluster analysis using data from O’Malley (2007), Bertelsmann Stiftung (2009) and Strøm et al. (2003). The result is a classification of 19 developed democracies (including the 15 countries of the present study) for their type of decision-making within the cabinet, as presented in Table 2. Table 2 shows that three of the four Scandinavian countries apply the cabinet party model. The two Westminster systems (Ireland and the United Kingdom) can be assigned to the prime minister model. The continental European countries spread over all three categories, whereas no southern European country can be found within the cabinet party model category. Even though some assignments seem to be reasonable, there is no obvious geographical spreading. One might

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Table 2 Type of cabinet decision-making Prime minister model

Minister party model

Cabinet party model

Denmark

Germany

Austria

France

Greece

Belgium

Ireland

Italy

Finland

Spain

Netherlands

Portugal

Norway

United Kingdom

Sweden

Source: (Jahn, p. 67) with reduced sample

argue, that the minister party model is underrepresented in the sample, since only three countries belong to this category, which could lead to serious biases of the results. Since this category comprises a sufficiently high number of 97 cabinets, which is mainly due to Italy, this worry is unfounded. The variable is measured as an nominal variable that contains the three presented categories with the prime minister model constituting the lowest category, the cabinet party model depicting the highest category and the minister party cabinet model lying in between. Since there is no linear connection between all categories, the variable is treated as posing three independent categories instead of assuming a linear increase between the categories.9 The control variables are based on the model of Svenja Krauss (2018) that contains the most predictive variables from the literature on cabinet stability. The first control variable is the maximum possible cabinet duration counting the days between the inauguration of the respective cabinet and the date of the subsequent general election, distinguishing cabinets that formed immediately after general elections and those formed in midterm. Since shorter terms in office decrease the benefits cabinet parties can extract from their offices (Krauss 2018) and hence lower opportunity costs for premature terminations (Saalfeld 2008; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009), shorter possible maximum cabinet durations are expected to increase the risk of premature cabinet termination. The second control variable is the effective number of parliamentary parties. The variable is measured following the approach of Laakso and Taagepera (1979). Since parties strive for maximum utility through their behavior in parliament, the chance of extracting a higher benefit by forming a government with another parliamentary party increases the more 9

This is important for the proper interpretation of the hazard ratios later in the regression model.

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parties are available for government formation (Taylor and Herman 1971; Warwick 1994; Martínez-Cantó and Bergmann 2020). If the incumbent government was already threatened by some disputes, one of the cabinet parties might find it more beneficial to form a new government with another parliamentary party without holding new elections. The more parties are present in the legislature, the more chances to do so might appear. Hence, the more parties available in the parliament the higher the chance of premature government termination (Saalfeld 2008, p. 346). The third control variable contains the minimal winning status of the government. Minimum winning coalitions provide the best distribution of office goods among the coalition members and are expected to be favorable for all cabinet parties. Thus, all coalition parties have incentives to maintain the government and the risk of premature termination ought to be reduced by the minimal winning status of the cabinet. The fourth control variable tackles the ideological dimension, embodied by the minimal connected winning status. Cabinet parties are minimal connected winning, if they are situated next to each other on the left–right continuum. Since disputes between coalition partners are less likely if the partners share at least some of their preferences, minimal connected winning is expected to decrease the risk of premature termination (Saalfeld 2008). The last control variable contains the minority status of the cabinet. Minority cabinets are expected to be less durable, since they are more exposed to parliamentary defeat (Strøm and Swindle 2002; Saalfeld 2008). Due to their vulnerability, minority governments are also less capable in gaining policy benefits since they are more restricted in passing legislation in accordance to their preferences (Krauss 2018; Strøm and Swindle 2002). Moreover, minority governments might strive to enlarge the cabinet in order to convert the disadvantages of minority status into advantages of majority status. All data to measure the control variables was taken from the ERDDA (Andersson et al. 2014).

5

Evidence for cabinets’ decision-making on cabinet stability

Figure 1 shows two descriptive graphs for the interaction between the type of decision-making within the cabinet (from now on referred to as cabinet type) and its duration. The left panel illustrates the termination of cabinets belonging to the three cabinet types over time. The three lines indicate how many cabinets terminate as time proceeds relative to the number of cabinets belonging

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Fig. 1 Survival rate and hazard rate by cabinet type. (Note: Own visualization based on data taken from Andersson et al. 2014)

to the respective category. As can be seen, half of the cabinets of the minister party model terminate at around 500 days in office. The other two lines last on until around 750 days (cabinet party model) and 1000 days (prime minister model), respectively. Moreover, all three lines converge as the 1500 days threshold approaches. The cabinet party model and prime minister model proceed almost on the same level with the cabinet party model indicating slightly earlier terminations. Note, that comparisons between all three types may be misleading due to the differences in lengths of the CIEP. Whereas the prime minister model contains two countries with a CIEP of 5 years (Ireland and UK), the minister party model has one country with a longer CIEP (Italy). With Austria the cabinet party model also has one country with a 5-year term, however, Austria changed its CIEP from 4 to 5 years in 2008. Those disparities clearly bias the implications from the left panel. The right panel illustrates the hazard ratios of all countries in the sample, clustered by their cabinet type. The graphs indicate the risk of

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termination on the next day during the whole CIEP, given that the cabinets withstand until this day. All three lines stay constant - with a risk of less than 0.2% of termination—during the first 1000 days in office. However, the order changes several times during this time. After a short increase the minister party model decreases after the first 500 days in office, whereas the prime minister model almost linearly increases during the first 1000 days. The cabinet party model is the most constant model with a slight increase at the beginning. After passing the 1000-days threshold all 3 models sharply increase, raising the risk of termination from less than 0.2% up to more than 0.6%. While the minister party and cabinet party model proceed almost identically, the prime minister model increases more moderately until 1500 days and a comparable increase afterwards. Both graphs indicate that the cabinet types are distinct from each other, with their own proceedings and termination risks.10 Table 3 presents the results of the models in order to test the hypotheses. All of them are Cox-proportional hazard models over a set of 365 governments. The first 3 models are the same as indicated by the equal number of observations, Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Log-Likelihood (ll). The differences between the models are only due to the baseline category of the explanatory variable consisting of 3 different categories that are independent from each other and comprise no internal ranking. In order to consider the effect distinctions between all three categories, three models were conducted with alternating baseline categories. The first model (M1) estimates the effects of the minister party and cabinet party model in contrast to the prime minister model. The observed effects are very different: whereas the minister party model has a one third higher risk of premature termination compared to the prime minister model, the cabinet party model operates with a one fourth lower risk. Hence, the minister party model is the most cautious model, followed by the prime minister model. The cabinet party model, however, seems to be more stable compared to the other two cabinet types. Although, the effect size is noteworthy, only the cabinet party model reaches significance on the 0.05-level. The difference between minister party and prime minister model, however, fails to reach this quota, barely. In the second model (M2), the minister party model is handled as the baseline category. The results from the previous model are supported here. The prime minister model has a one fourth lower risk of premature termination compared to the minister party model that is nearly significant at the 0.05 level. In turn, the cabinet party model is almost half as precarious as the minister party model on a highly significant level. The third model 10

Those findings are backed by the Log-Rank-Test and the Wilcoxon-Breslow-Gehan-Test that both report significant differences between the categories.

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Table 3 Cox-proportional hazard regressions

Baseline Category

M1

M2

M3

M4

M5

Prime Minister Model

Minister Party Model

Cabinet Party Model

NonCabinet Model

Minister vs. Prime Minister Model

0.750

1.352*

(0.112)

(0.182)

Prime Minster Minister

1.801***

1.333 (0.198)

1.472*

(0.256)

(0.225)

0.740*

0.555***

0.655***

(0.100)

(0.079)

(0.076)

0.998***

0.998***

0.998***

0.998***

0.999***

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

1.098

1.098

1.098

1.097

1.176

(0.054)

(0.054)

(0.054)

(0.054)

(0.109)

0.508***

0.508***

0.508***

0.521***

0.343**

(0.094)

(0.094)

(0.094)

(0.096)

(0.119)

1.344

1.344

1.344

1.361

1.516

(0.287)

(0.287)

(0.287)

(0.290)

(0.541)

Minority Situation in Parliament

1.692**

1.692**

1.692**

1.707**

1.795*

(0.288)

(0.288)

(0.288)

(0.291)

(0.410)

Observations

365

365

365

365

199

Cabinet

-

Controls Max Possible Cab Duration Effective No. Parl Parties Minimal Winning Coalition Minimal Winning Connected Coalition

(continued)

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Table 3 (continued) M1

M2

M3

M4

M5

AIC

3423.9

3423.9

3423.9

3425.6

1626.6

ll

−1704.9

−1704.9

−1704.9

−1706.8

−807.3

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

(M3) illustrates the impact from the last perspective: prime minister model as well as minister party model indicate a significantly higher chance of premature government termination compared to the cabinet party model. While the prime minister model signals a 35% higher risk, the minister party model is displaying a more than 80% higher risk, which is remarkable. Moreover, the effect of the minister party model is significant on the highest level, whereas the prime minister model reaches the 0.05 level of significance. Two lessons can be drawn, taking the first three models into account. First, countries operating under the cabinet party model are least endangered by early terminations. Independently from the chosen baseline category, countries operating under the cabinet party model are least at risk for premature government terminations and, hence, the most stable the most stable cabinet type. This first finding is a strong support for hypothesis 1b. Second, the difference between prime minister model and minister party model is associated with higher risks of premature terminations, but not significantly different from each other. This finding can be understood as support for hypothesis 2b. In order to get more support in this regard, the fourth model (M4) is conducted with a slightly different explanatory variable. The categories of prime minister model and minister party model are subsumed in order to maintain the effect those two models have in contrast to the cabinet party model. As can be seen, the effect is highly significant and substantial indicating a one third lower risk of terminations for countries operating under the cabinet party model in contrast to countries that do not. The additional evidence from Model M4 suggests a verification of hypothesis 2b, however, this might be misleading. The model indicates only the outstanding impact of the cabinet party model, but makes no clear statement about the difference between prime minister and minister party model. Hence, a fifth model (M5) is conducted focusing only on countries operating under the latter two models.11 here the evidence is much clearer. The minister 11

The difference in the number of observations refers to the number of observations assigned to the cabinet party model.

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party model has an almost 50% higher chance of premature termination than the prime minister model being significant on the 0.05-level. This indicates the substantial difference between the two models and, thus, signifies support for hypothesis 2b. The control variables show similar behavior over all models. The maximal possible cabinet duration is highly significant, but generates almost no substantial effect on the dependent variable. The effective number of parliamentary parties shows an almost 10% higher chance of termination, but is insignificant in all models. The status as minimal winning coalition is one of the strongest predictors in the models, indicating an almost 50% lower chance of termination. Another strong predictor is the minority situation in parliament that coincides with an almost 70% higher risk of termination. Those two variables support the claim that majority status in parliament is crucial for long-lasting and stable governments and is best played out by cabinets that control a majority of seats in parliament, but exclude every party from the government that is not needed in order to secure the majority. However, it seems to be unnecessary that those cabinets are ideologically connected since this variable is insignificant over all models. The last model (M5) is slightly different, due to the lower number of observations. Basically, all hazard ratios stay the same except the minimal winning coalition that is slightly lower and the minority situation in parliament that is slightly higher than before. The hazard ratio of minimal connected winning coalition is also a bit higher, but still insignificant. The model fit for those models that are nested, especially model M1-M3 in comparison to model M4 stays the same, with slightly better performance in model M4 that should not be overestimated here.

6

Discussion

The results presented above indicate mixed evidence for the question of “how do cabinets’ internal decision-making procedures influence cabinet stability?”. What appears to be the most convincing finding of the analysis is the observation that countries operating under the cabinet party model experienced the most stable governments during the time under observation. Regardless of model specifications the cabinet party model can be assigned to significant lower risks of government termination compared to countries applying the other decisionmaking procedures. The effect is stable whether or not the competing models are compared in aggregated or disaggregated manner. Furthermore, the cabinet party model is the only model that has a negative impact on failure risks, whereas the

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other two models face higher risks. All those findings clearly back the validity of hypothesis 1b stating that countries operating under the cabinet party model are less likely to terminate prematurely. Hence, the argumentation following the huge legitimacy and acceptance of decisions being made by all cabinet parties is reasonable. Although, the process of decision-making ought to be conflictual under this procedure, once a compromise is formed, there is little reason to assume conflicts to arise from this. The inclusion of all cabinet parties in every decisionmaking process acts inclusively and does not raise potential for intra-cabinet conflict, thus, too many cooks do not spoil the broth. The second hypothesis dealt with the difference between the remaining two models of decision making: the prime minister and minister party model, respectively. Here, the evidence is less clear. In the complete models (M1 – M4), the differences between the impacts of both models, do always lead in the same direction, especially concerning the level of significance, since the impacts were not significant from each other or significantly different from the cabinet party model, simultaneously.12 However, the fifth model (M5) uncovered the significant difference between the two models in a model where only those observations entered the analysis that belonged to one of the two cabinet types. The evidence in this final analysis was more unambiguous, indicating a significant difference between the two models on the 0.05-level of significance. The strength of the effect, however, is remarkable with a nearly 50% higher risk of termination for the minister party model. Since the last model is the most direct test for the impact outlined in hypothesis 2 and followed by the strong evidence presented here, hypothesis 2a can be accepted. From a theoretical point of view, it is better for the longevity of a cabinet to enforce a solution by the authority of the prime minister if a collective decision is no option. Since this competence is codified by the constitution, the decision by the prime minister has a larger legitimacy than a compromise that was formed between the cabinet partners by a procedure that is not constitutionally codified. This might be due to some other competences of the prime ministerial office, e.g. regarding the distribution of cabinet benefits leading to a situation where conflicts with the prime minister might be more costly for other ministers compared to cabinets with a weaker prime minister.

12

Even though, the minister party model was significant on the 0.001 level of significance, while the prime minister model only reached the 0.05 level.

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Conclusion

There are three lessons that can be learned from this investigation. Probably the most important finding is that internal decision-making procedures matter for the analysis of government duration. The present study enlarges the intra-cabinetmatters argument that was introduced to cabinet duration research by Martin (2018) as well as Krauss and Kroeber (2020) by an institutional perspective. The results convincingly show that there are significant differences between countries operating under diverse modes of government decision-making. Since this dimension is most often left out of the analysis, the present study shows strong evidence for a more sensitive handling of internal procedures since they are strong predictors for different phenomena under investigation. The present study might serve as a door opener for future studies that investigate internal characteristics of political actors more closely. Furthermore, since the clustering in this study is straightforward, a more accurate measurement can be developed in future studies. The second finding is that inclusive decision-making procedures have the most harmless impact on government duration. This is due to the broad acceptance and legitimacy of the compromises that were formed as outlined above. Moreover, this inclusive bargaining environment gives the political actors—coalition parties or cabinet members—the feeling of being heard and that their voice matters in order to find solutions for cabinet issues. Such an environment is less likely to produce serious disputes. Third, if the decision-making procedure is less inclusive, it is better for cabinets if there is a constitutionally mandated institution, e.g. the prime minister that decides over policy disputes. If the prime minister is mandated with judging competences, conflicts are settled much faster, burdening the bargaining environment between the cabinet partner for a shorter time and therefore prevent that those disputes lead to hardened fronts on the long run. In contrast, if such a safeguarding is not implemented, conflicts are more likely to evolve into serious and long-lasting trenches within the cabinet that almost inevitably threatens the survival of the government. The effects that were found during this study are, however, not stable over time. As some additional analysis showed, does the positive effect of the concepts under consideration diminish over time. They are good predictors for the beginning of the legislature, but by the proceeding governmental term, the effect of cabinet type decreases to nearly zero as government termination approaches. Consequently, the effects that were found are not fundamentally relevant for the whole cabinet term, but a rather good description for the processes that take place at the beginning of the governmental term.

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Furthermore, some other questions arise from the investigations in this study. For instance, do the findings of the first implications hold in other aspects of coalition research? If an inclusive negotiation environment is soothing for the blaze up of serious disputes within the cabinet, can the same effect be found in government formation research? If the decision-making process during the legislature include all cabinet parties, there is no reason to assume hard struggles over portfolio allocations since the occupation of certain portfolios is less decisive for compromises over certain policies. Moreover, this implication might reflect in shorter periods of government formation or fewer attempts to form a cabinet. On the other hand, if the occupation of the prime minister office has such a strong impact on how policy conflicts are settled, coalition parties in countries operating under the prime minister model have stronger incentives to strive for the prime minister office during periods of portfolio distribution negotiations.

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Measuring of Output and Outcome

Honesty is the Best Policy? The Shortand Long-Term Electoral Costs of (Welfare) Pledge Breaking and Their Economic and Political Scope Conditions Alexander Horn 1

Introduction

The election pledge is a core element of representative democracy—and nonetheless usually neglected in the even more sophisticated literature on the electoral fallout from unpopular (welfare) reforms (e.g., Arndt 2013; Davidson and Marx 2013; Elmelund-Præstekær et al. 2015; Giger 2011; Giger and Nelson 2011; Lindbom 2014). Election pledges allow the voter to discriminate between parties in order to choose the one that best represents the voter’s preferences. From the perspective of democratic quality and citizen satisfaction, it is therefore fortunate that there is generally a positive link between the promises of parties and their subsequent policies (Hofferbert and Budge 1992; Klingemann et al. 1994; Mansergh and Thomson 2007; Thomson et al. 2017). Still, sometimes partiescum-governments are either unable or unwilling to stick to the pledges that won them the election. Plenty of anecdotes exist of such pledge breaking and how it can ruin the relationship between voters and the government, yet very little systematic research exists on the topic. Focusing on the welfare state, a key political issue in all advanced democracies, we therefore ask three related and simple— but highly consequential—questions: do voters punish governments for welfare pledge breaking? If so, under what conditions? Perhaps most importantly, what A. Horn (B) Emmy Noether Group „Varieties of Egalitarianism“, Cluster „The Politics of Inequality“, Universität Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2022 E. Baltz et al. (eds.), Parties, Institutions and Preferences, Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-35133-5_10

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time horizon is relevant when we talk of punishment for welfare pledge breaking? Some parties may recover more quickly from voters’ wrath than others, and the most important costs of not living up to the expectations raised in a campaign may be long-term, not short-term. Perhaps the most cliché yet instructive example here is the German SPD, which has yet to recover from its—in eyes of its (pro-welfare) core constituency and many political observers – unannounced unemployment insurance reforms between 2002 and 2005. One reason why there has been so little focus on the effect of broken welfare promises is a lack of appropriate data on the pledge-vote link. It is difficult enough to account for reforms that were announced and never materialized. It is even harder to account for unannounced reforms that took the electorate by surprise. To address this problem, we utilize two well-known datasets—the Comparative Manifestos Project and the Comparative Entitlements Dataset – to create a continuous measure of welfare pledge breaking. Our welfare pledge gap measure has four key features that distinguish it from the well established approach according to which “a statement committing a party to one specific action or outcome that can be clearly determined to have occurred or not” (Thomson et al. 2017, p. 532). We hope that it becomes clear why it is worthwhile to also consider ‘positional’ alternatives to discrete pledges and why we prefer a measure that goes beyond discrete pledges and is welfare specific. These differences matter, as they can lead to more worrisome results regarding the question if parties still do what they say (Horn and Jensen 2017). In any case, the following differences should not be mistaken as a general critique of the efforts, the dataset, and approach of the Comparative Party Pledges Project, CPPP (Thomson et al. 2017). We concede that the rationales we list here for drawing on the welfare pledge gap for this paper may be less compelling in research on specific pledges (no tax increases) or pledges across issues. First, our measure is continuous. This means that we do not only capture whether or not a promise is kept, but the degree to which it is kept. Second, it encompasses not just explicit promises, but also more vague statements of intent. Both of these features are vital in order to account for how the electoral politics of the welfare state plays out. If a party states in its program that it disagrees with the welfare cutbacks of the previous government or appeals to groups of welfare beneficiaries, this raises expectations that are easily disappointed, although they may not technically constitute a promise. Third, and related, we also capture cases in which path-breaking reforms were not announced pre-election (as in the example of the SPD-led reforms above). While we discuss the measure and its validity further below, a quick glance at Fig. 1 helps to get a first idea of the intuition behind the welfare pledge gap. In the UK post-1979, the radical ideas of

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-5 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

Welfare Pledges

Generosity Change

Fig. 1 Welfare pledges and generosity change, 1971–2011 in 18 Western democracies. (Source: Welfare Pledge of government as explained under Step 1 in this article (based on Manifesto data from Volkens et al. 2019 and Klingemann et al., 2006). Generosity Change as explained under Step 2 (based on Scruggs et al. 2014))

retrenchment that Thatcher outlined pre-election were also implemented. By contrast, in Germany, the centre-right governments under Kohl in the 1980s failed to translate their (more modest) promises to scale back the welfare state (Vis 2009).1 Vice versa, starting after the election, the German red-green coalition 1

The motivation of Kohl and the CDU/CSU had a moral impetus that deviated from the economic justifications for welfare retrenchment that the junior coalition partner (FDP) provided. It is worth citing this section from Kohl’s inauguration and program here. Not because of the curious attempt to mirror Anglo-Saxon politicians, but because it illustrates that a strong anti-welfare signal (captured by our gap measure) to voters can be send without a discrete promise. “The question of the future is not how much the state can do for its citizens. The question of the future is how liberty, dynamism, and self-responsibility can flourish anew […] Too many have, too long, lived at the expense of others: the state at the expense of its citizens, the citizens at the expense of other citizens […] all of us at the expense of future generations. […] If we continue on the old path without reflection, we expose people to a new kind of alienation of an anonymous, bureaucratic welfare state, just when the social market economy has freed them from the alienation of unfettered capitalism.” (Kohl 1982).

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2002–2005 implemented controversial labour market and welfare reforms that were not announced in a program. Fourth, the data covers 18 advanced democracies from 1971 to 2011 for a total of 220 election cycles, enabling us to explore the political, economic, and institutional context of the pledge-vote link over the course of three consecutive elections (t1-3) after a cabinets’ inauguration (t0), while using a steady yardstick to measure the welfare pledge gap. We find a strong effect of welfare pledge breaking on governments’ vote shares. Compared to a government that keeps its promises, a government that delivers one standard deviation less welfare than promised loses about one percentage point of its votes. Investigating the economic, political, and institutional conditions surrounding such punishment, we also find that pledge breaking is punished more severely when a country’s growth is low. This suggests that voters are more tolerant of pledge breaking when their own, or society’s, economic situation is improving. In contrast, the ideological colour of the government does not matter for voters’ response to broken promises. Looking at the long-term effects of pledge breaking, we find that the saying honesty is the best policy only holds under very specific conditions; namely if the non-pledge breakers heavily politicize the issue. Our results shed important light on the quality of representative democracy. It would seem that voters, at least on average, keep track of politics sufficiently well to react when governments fail to deliver what they promised. Whether it is good or bad that this reaction only endures for one legislative term unless the opposition politicizes the issue heavily is for the reader to decide. Our results also add to the burgeoning literature on voter reactions to welfare state reforms (e.g., Arndt 2013; Davidson and Marx 2013; Elmelund-Præstekær et al. 2015; Giger 2011; Giger and Nelson 2011; Lindbom 2014). This literature hitherto ignored long-term effects and came up with rather mixed results regarding whether or not reform leads to punishment. From our perspective, such mixed findings are not all that surprising because sometimes governments actually win office on a campaign promising to rein in and limit the welfare state (one may think of Thatcher in the UK in her 1979 campaign). In this situation, reforming the welfare state equals keeping the promises that brought the government to power. In other situations, reform of the welfare state may come as a real surprise (again, see the mildly pro-welfare positions of the SPD in 2002). The task we set ourselves is to assess whether and when this comes at a short- or long-term price.

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Representative Democracy And The Welfare State

A core purpose of representative democracy is to ensure that the policy preferences of the electorate affect the legislation of a polity (Manin 1997; Pitkin 1967). The extent of such substantive representation is arguably the most studied, and debated, aspect of welfare state research, although often not framed as a matter of representation in the literature. Starting with the work of Castles and McKinlay (1979), Stephens (1979) and Korpi (1983), a long line of scholars has investigated whether and how governments representing specific social groups, or classes, influence welfare state developments (see, among many others, Allan and Scruggs 2004; Gillens 2012; Häusermann 2010; Huber and Stephens 2001, 2014; Jensen 2014; Jensen and Mortensen 2014; Pierson 1994, 1996; Rehm 2011; Rueda 2007). Elections constitute the direct link between voters and governments. During the election campaign parties propose what they want to achieve if they win office and voters then select the parties they prefer. Although voters also employ other types of information, e.g., about the likeability of party leaders, the policy platforms of parties are essential because they indicate parties’ issue priorities. Work by Hofferbert and Budge (1992), Klingemann et al. (1994), Mansergh and Thomson (2007), Horn and Jensen (2017) and Thomson et al. (2017) show that governments on average adhere to their election pledges, emphasizing the important role of policy platforms in election campaigns. Yet sometimes election promises are broken. This implies that a core function of democracy—ensuring the substantive representation of voters’ policy preferences—fails. Plenty of anecdotes exist to testify to the significance of pledge breaking as well as how it can seriously hurt a government to be caught running away from its promises. The Danish Thorning government that came into office in 2011, for example, quickly earned the nickname ‘the pledge breaker government’, with devastating consequences for its popular support. Breaking an electoral pledge is, of course, always a problem from the perspective of the substantive representation of citizens. Still, there are governments that are not punished for breaking their electoral pledges. One case in point is the first Reinfeldt government in Sweden from 2006–2010. It campaigned on a promise to protect the welfare state, then implemented the biggest generosity cuts in Sweden’s post-war history, but was re-elected and even gained votes. There are potentially several reasons that governments get off the hook like this. For one thing, governments can be more or less excused by their voters if the circumstances under which the promises were made alter considerably. If the economy turns sour, this could lead to less stiff voter reaction when the government has

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to renege on its promises. Similarly, pledge breaking may be forgiven if the government does not control the legislative arena because of a fragmented political system or a strong corporatist tradition. Globalization has, in a similar vein, been suggested to reduce the likelihood that voters will blame national politicians for bad performance (Hellwig 2008). Additionally, a fragmented political system can, for instance, also make it difficult for voters to place blame in the first place (Powell and Whitten 1993), while a booming economy may make pledge breaking less important as voters feel compensated via an improving private economic situation (Jensen 2007). A government’s reputation might also either enhance or dampen voters’ reactions. Assuming that left-wing parties are highly trusted by the electorate to protect the welfare state (Ross 2000), one can hypothesize that left-wing governments will find it easier to be forgiven by the voters for not delivering as much as promised. The welfare state literature is home to a rapidly expanding body of work on the electoral consequences of welfare state reforms (e.g., Arndt 2013; ElmelundPræstekær et al. 2015; Giger 2011; Giger and Nelson 2011; Schumacher et al. 2013). These studies have produced mixed findings. Overall, there appears to be no systematic tendency for voters to punish their government for introducing welfare reforms. In our view, however, all of these studies have overlooked a central aspect, namely that some governments in fact are elected on a promise of welfare reform. A famous example is Thatcher’s 1979 landslide victory, which was secured on a platform of austerity and anti-unionism. That the many welfare state reforms from 1979 onwards were unpopular in some quarters is unquestionable, but conservative voters got precisely what they bargained for—and re-elected the government three times. To focus on broken election pledges, in other words, means that we get much closer to the reality of political life when assessing voter reactions to welfare state change. Parties run on all sorts of platforms, and depending on the circumstances of the time, the qualities of the leaders, and other factors, both pro- and antiwelfare parties get a chance to occupy office. In short, focusing on the electoral consequences of pledge breaking is not just interesting in order to evaluate the quality of representative democracy, but also important to moving extant research on the reform-vote link forward.

3

Measuring Welfare Pledge Breaking

There has been little systematic research into the extent of pledge breaking. A few large-N studies code promises across a range of policy domains and whether

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or not the promise was kept (e.g., Mansergh and Thomson 2007; Naurin 2014; Thomson et al. 2017). While an impressive data collection effort, from our perspective there are several problems with the approach of these studies. First, simply coding whether or not a pledge was kept is extremely crude—even if, as some of these studies allow, a pledge can be only ‘partially kept’. This is not least the case in the welfare state domain. If a party promises to increase a social security benefits by 10 percent but then only increases benefits by eight percent, how does one code that? Clearly it is an increase, but not as large as promised—yet still quite substantial and not far from the promised 10 percent. Second, and equally important, pledges are rarely very explicit. While of course some pledges are made explicitly, many are more vague indications of intent. Politicians will often convey a strong impression of commitment to a policy goal, be it more or less welfare-related, without providing explicit yardsticks. For example, in the 2010 UK general election, the incumbent Labour government promised to ‘raise family living standards’, ‘protect frontline services’, and ‘strengthen the fairness in communities’ under the headline of ‘A Future Fair for All’. How does one code the fulfilment of such statements into a yes/no variable? As another example, in the 2015 Danish general election, the leader of the main opposition party, which eventually would go on to win, explicitly underscored that he would not make concrete promises, only point in the direction his government would go if granted the majority (in this case: limiting social spending). Third, the existing data does not cover the length of time nor the number of countries that we are interested in, namely mature Western welfare states. Building on a procedure outlined in Horn and Jensen (2017), the approach we use solves these problems. It proceeds in two steps. First, we use data from 1971– 2011 and 18 Western democracies from the Comparative Manifestos Project to create a measure of the welfare policy pledge. What impression did the parties that later got into government send to the electorate? Did they emphasize welfare state expansion and the importance of social equality, or did they rather emphasize fiscal and economic responsibility? Second, we estimate the effect of these pledges on the change in welfare state generosity. We find a clear effect: when the government promises more welfare, they deliver it, and vice versa. However, a substantial gap remains between what governments promised to do and what they actually delivered, i.e., between predicted and observed generosity. We call this distance the pledge gap. The pledge gap is the key independent variable we use in the analyses.

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3.1 Step 1: Constructing a Measure of Welfare State Pledges What balance did governments strike between promises of welfare state expansion and the levelling of market results on the one hand and fiscal and economic responsibility on the other? The index we suggest is based on the well-known Comparative Manifesto Project, which measured the emphasis on 56 substantial topics as a share of parties’ election manifestos (Klingemann et al. 2006). Our index needs to be able to handle the fact that anti-welfare governments will rarely state directly that they want to slash programs. Rather, they will talk about the need for fiscal responsibility and related issues, entailing that the index should include both the pro-welfare categories as well as the categories capturing economic conservatism. First, we add the categories of welfare state expansion and greater equality (‘equality positive/social justice’, ‘welfare state expansion’) with favourable mentions of state intervention and market scepticism (‘market regulation’, ‘economic planning’, ‘controlled economy’, ‘Keynesian demand management’). We then subtract from this score welfare-sceptic, anti-egalitarian, and meritocratic positions (‘welfare state limitation’, ‘labour groups: negative’, ‘middle class/professional groups’) as well as anti-interventionist and laissez-faire economic positions and promises of budgetary restraint (‘free market economy’, ‘economic orthodoxy’). For coalition governments, the parties are weighted according to their cabinet shares (i.e., the share of ministers). The resulting score can be interpreted as the net welfare position of the government. The more positive the pledge variable, the more generous the welfare policies are expected to be.  (Share (welfare state expansion, greater equality, state intervention, market scepticism)  − (Share (welfare limitation, meritocracy, anti − interventionism, laissez − faire, budget restraint)) =Welfare Pledge (net welfare position of the government, weighted by the number of ministers)

The grey line in Fig. 1 (referring to the left y-scale) maps the welfare pledges of governments for the 18 countries we analyse. Note that many of the shifts in the variable are caused by changes in the parties in government, which obviously is what we should expect, and which indicates that the variable has a high level of face validity. For example, in the 1970s, the British governments held a clear-cut pro-welfare position, which turned anti-welfare in 1979 with Thatcher and then again positive in 1997 with the Blair government. In the arch-typical universal welfare state of Sweden, the dominance of the Social Democrats is easy to spot,

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but so is the centre-right government that replaced them for a short spell in the early 1990s in the midst of an economic meltdown and which ran on a platform of austerity. In Switzerland, with its stable governments that always include all the biggest parties in parliament, it is unsurprising to see that the welfare position of the government consistently hovers around neutral for the entire period. At the same time, it should be noted that our measure of governments’ welfare position is much more fine-grained than traditional left–right dichotomies (the correlation between the two measures is 0.44 in our data set). The conservative governments under Koizumi in Japan and Kohl in Germany were, by our measure, much less anti-welfare than Thatcher; something that is well established to actually be the case. Yet all three governments are typically lumped together as ‘centre-right’ or ‘right wing’ in traditional quantitative measures of government ideology, which normally use (very infrequently conducted) expert surveys to categorize parties into a few party families. In other words, by using our measure, we obtain much more accurate and time-varying information about governments’ welfare positions than we otherwise would have. The grey line of governments’ welfare positions in Fig. 1 can also be compared with the changes in welfare generosity implemented by the very same governments, displayed as the black line (the generosity measure is introduced immediately below). Note that the pledges are visualized as levels and scaled on the left y-scale whereas generosity is shown as net change per cabinet on the right y-scale, meaning that any point over the 0 demarcation of the right y-scale represents welfare expansion. According to this heuristic, neither the drastic expansion of social programs under Bruton in Ireland (1994–1997) nor the fierce retrenchment in Thatcher’s first term (1979–1983) came as a surprise to the electorate. Other governments pledge allegiance to the welfare state before the election, only to implement policies that stand in marked contrast to these pledges once they are in office, e.g., the first cabinet under Reinfeldt in Sweden (2006–2010). In order to investigate such deviations systematically, we measure the gap between welfare pledges and welfare policies: the pledge gap.

3.2 Step 2: Constructing a Measure of Pledge Gap We account for net changes in welfare state policies in the election period via the well-known generosity index, which is derived from the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset (Scruggs et al. 2014). A key quality of the dataset is that it reflects political decisions much better than public spending, which has a large non-discretionary component (e.g., rising unemployment automatically

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increases public spending without any political decisions being made). The generosity index we use here summarizes changes in unemployment insurance and sick pay insurance based on developments in income replacement rates for families and singles, benefit duration, benefit qualification period, waiting days, and coverage ratios (for details, see Scruggs et al. 2014). Higher values on the index indicate more generous programs and less strict eligibility conditions. We do not include pensions in the index because these almost never take effect in the same election cycle as they are legislated, meaning that changes in the generosity index for pensions in a given election cycle do not reflect decisions taken in that cycle (Green-Pedersen 2004). The black line in Fig. 1 tracks the changes in this index for 18 countries between 1971 and 2011. Our approach is to calculate the extent to which welfare pledges explain these changes and then use the gap between the predicted and the actual changes as the independent variable to investigate whether and how pledge breaking affects the electoral gains and losses of governments in the short and the long term. As a first step, we calculate a baseline model that takes into account only the electoral pledges to explain generosity changes. We choose such a parsimonious model as, at this stage, we only want to estimate the gap between pledges and policies. The unit of analysis is the country-cabinet period. For each cabinet, we record the welfare pledges in the campaign, marking the beginning of the election period as well as the net changes in generosity from the year of the election to the year of the next election. Cabinet reshuffles between two elections are only counted as a new cabinet if the party composition changes. We address the problems common in the analysis of time series cross-sectional data—unit heterogeneity, autoregressiveness, and heteroskedasticity—as they would violate the assumptions underlying general OLS. We use Prais-Winsten regressions with panel-corrected standard errors to account for autoregression and heteroskedasticity. We also include country dummies. Such a fixed-effects approach accounts for unit heterogeneity and implies that we can safely exclude the possibility that unobserved, stable, country-specific circumstances drive the regression results. That is, our estimation relates to the effect of changes in welfare pledges over time within a country on changes in generosity within a country. Apart from the econometric conservativeness of fixed effects (higher standard errors and less bias), we find it conceptually intuitive that the pledge gap of a government in a specific country should be calculated against the background of the link between welfare pledges and welfare policies in that country (i.e., controlling for country specifics). It is worth noting, however, that we can reproduce the main results of the paper without fixed effects. The results are reported below in Eq. 1:

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 Generosity = Welfare pledge + fixed effects + ε β = (0.025) S.E = (0.007) P-value = (0.000)

(1)

Electoral pledges are a highly significant positive determinant of changes in total welfare state generosity over the cabinet period. In substantial terms, a one standard deviation change on the pledge variable leads to a 0.21 standard deviation change on the generosity variable ((12.01 × 0.025))/1.42). It is relevant to note that the result can be reproduced if we, as a robustness test, rerun the regression, dropping each individual category of the welfare pledge index one at the time. In other words, the substantial and significant effect of welfare pledges is not dependent on any individual category from the manifesto data. Next, we predict the generosity changes expected according to these results. Subsequently we subtract the actually observed change in generosity from the predicted generosity change (Eq. 2). The resulting pledge gap, the gap between predicted and observed changes, is the core independent variable in the remainder of this paper. Pledge Gap = Predicted Generosity Change − Observed Generosity Change

(2)

Two examples may help to further clarify the measure. First, the second red-green government under Schröder in Germany (2002–2005) scores a pledge gap of 1.9, slightly above the standard deviation of the pledge gap variable of 1.4. This is the result of a prediction of −0.1 based on a mildly pro-welfare platform in the 2002 election and an observed change of −2. This fits the historical accounts. The Social Democrat Schröder had edged in a re-election victory, and then, in contrast to the election program and campaign, his new cabinet introduced the Hartz IV reforms and various generosity-reducing reforms in sickness insurance. Second, the first Reinfeldt government in Sweden (2006–2010) serves as a less typical and more drastic example of pledge breaking. Their welfare-friendly preelection rhetoric suggested that the level of welfare generosity would by and large be sustained (−0.1). However, despite his pro-welfare pledges, Reinfeldt presided over the second largest drop recorded in the Swedish time series (−3.1), causing a pledge gap of 3. One way to think about the relevance of these numbers is to consider how the level of welfare generosity in Germany and Sweden would have looked if the promises of Schröder and Reinfeldt had been kept, compared to the actually observed levels at the end of their cabinet periods. Levels of

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welfare generosity accumulate over decades. It is therefore noticeable that the pledge gaps in both cases add up to 10 percent differences in the overall level of generosity. As Schröder and Reinfeldt delivered less than promised, generosity levels landed at 23.4 and 23.1 rather than 25.3 and 26.1, respectively.

3.3 Other Variables Having constructed our main independent variable, the pledge gap measure, we now turn to the other variables used in the analysis. We provide an overview of all the variables, including a short description, the mean and standard deviation, and the sources of the data in Table 2 in the appendix. To avoid confusion, we first discuss the data and the results for the short-term electoral fallout before we move to long-term effects. Thus, for now, our dependent variable is the change in a government’s vote share since the last election. Subtracting the government’s combined vote share at the last election from its vote share at the end of the cabinet gives us a positive or negative percentage point value that can be directly interpreted as the electoral gains and losses of a cabinet. We also include a set of controls, some of which will be included in interaction models to see whether they condition the effect of pledge gap on vote share. As discussed above, depending on the economic and political context, voters may either willingly excuse governments for pledge breaking or be unable to attribute blame for it. A bad economy may make it reasonable to refrain from doing what was promised, but could, on the other hand, also increase the pain voters experience. To see which, if any, of these effects are present we include a measure of GDP growth and the unemployment rate. It has also been argued that voters tend to punish politicians less harshly in highly globalized economies because they realize that the government is less to blame for poor performance. To get at this effect a measure of economic globalization is included, conventionally measured as imports and exports relative to GDP. To get at the political and institutional context we include three different measures. First is the institutional constraint facing governments. As mentioned, constraints may make voters more acceptant of pledge breaking since the government cannot unilaterally implement its preferred policies. High institutional constraints also reduce the ability of voters to unambiguously place blame on the government, something that should also dampen the pledge gap-vote share relationship. Institutional constraints are defined as an additive index of countermajoritarian institutions. Corporatism may work much the same way as high institutional constraints because it implies that governments are less at liberty to

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pursue the policies of their own choice, but also that blame-worthiness becomes diffused. To measure corporatism we rely on Jahn’s (2016) index because it provides the most encompassing and most recent data. The reputation of left-wing parties as defenders of the welfare state may also condition how broken promises will affect a government’s subsequent vote share. To account for this possibility we use a cabinet share measure. We subtract the share of left parties from the share of right parties. The measure thus varies between −100 (left) and 100 (right). Apart from these variables, which we can theoretically hypothesize might condition the impact of the pledge gap, we include the strength of the cabinet, measured as the seat share in parliament. A strong government is more likely to lose in the next election than a weak government, simply because of regression to the mean. We also include the number of years a cabinet is in office because governments lose votes over time – the co-called cost of ruling (Nannestad and Paldam 1994). To keep it simple, we explain how we capture and model long-term vote share changes when we look at t2 and t3 further below.

4

The Electoral Fallout From Pledge Breaking: Main Effects (at t1)

Table 1 reports the results from six regressions that test the direct effect of the pledge gap on vote share. The regressions are estimated the same way as Eq. 1 above; that is, with a Prais-Winsten estimator, panel-corrected standard errors, and fixed effects. All models draw on the same 220 governments in 18 countries that we used to calculate the pledge gap. Model 1 contains the stripped-down version where only the pledge gaps themselves are included together with the fixed effects (which are not shown). There is a substantially large and statistically significant relationship. If a government delivers one standard deviation less than promised, they lose 0.8 percentage points of their vote share. This is clearly a substantial effect, and one that becomes bigger in all of the subsequent models, varying between 0.8 and 1 percentage points. In the next five models we gradually introduce the controls block-wise. In Model 2, we add cabinet-partisanship; in Model 3 the economic variables; in Model 4 the institutions; in Model 5 all the previous; and, finally, in Model 6 we also add cabinet duration and cabinet strength. Across all models the effect of the pledge gap remains roughly the same and statistically significant. Apart from this main effect, it transpires that increasing GDP boosts a government’s vote share. A change in GDP growth of 1% leads to a considerable gain of 0.9

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percentage points in all three models in which we included GDP growth. Perhaps more surprisingly, right-wing governments tend to perform slightly better than left-wing ones. In all models, governments composed only of right-wing parties get roughly 1 percentage point more than centrist governments. As expected, cabinet strength and thus success at the last election (the one that brought the cabinet into office) is significantly and substantially associated with vote losses of the government parties at the upcoming election. Cabinet duration does not matter. The explained variation of our models increases from 13 per cent in the baseline model (1) to 26 per cent in the full model (6).

4.1 The Role of Political, Economic, and Institutional Context (at t1) Having established that pledge breaking affects changes in governments’ vote shares, we now want to study whether this main effect is conditioned by the economic, political, or institutional context. Table 3 in the appendix reports a total of six interaction models using Model 6 in Table 1 as the baseline. Again, we use a Prais-Winsten estimator with panel-corrected standard errors and fixed effects. The number of institutional constraints is the context variable with by far the smallest within-country variation. We therefore did not include country dummies in the institutional model (Model 6) in order to also draw on the considerable institutional variation between countries. To ease interpretation, Fig. 2 displays the marginal effect of the pledge gap from two of these interaction models (left panel: Model 1 for partisanship, right panel: Model 2 for GDP growth). On the horizontal axis the relevant conditional factor is listed (partisanship or growth), while the vertical axis reports the effect of the pledge gap on governments’ vote share. The solid line represents the point estimate and the dashed line the 90 percent confidence interval. Out of the six political, economic, and institutional factors under consideration, only a good macro-economic performance significantly eases the electoral fallout from pledge breaking. The insignificant interaction coefficients in Models 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 result in horizontal slopes in the respective margin plots we inspected (which is why we only show Model 1 as a typical non-effect). This means that neither the political colouring of the government, nor unemployment, globalization, corporatism, or institutional constraints condition the negative effect of pledge breaking on changes in the government’s combined vote share. By contrast, GDP growth has a clear impact. While the average economic growth rate for OECD governments hovers around 2.5 percent, the negative effect

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Table 1 Vote share changes of the government, main effects

Pledge Gap

(1)

(2)

(3)

Baseline

Politics

Economics Institutions Combined Full

(4)

(5)

(6)

−0.582** −0.639** −0.627**

−0.705**

−0.651**

−0.608**

(0.284) Right-Left

(0.288)

(0.294)

(0.288)

(0.286)

(0.292)

0.0102*

0.0127**

0.00921*

0.0123**

0.0103*

(0.00539)

(0.00532) (0.00519) GDP growth Unemployment Globalization

(0.00534)

(0.00541)

0.920***

0.901***

0.889***

(0.275)

(0.272)

(0.270)

0.235

0.190

0.232

(0.189)

(0.196)

(0.189)

0.00310

−0.00866 −0.00217

(0.0324) Corporatism Institutional constraints

(0.0444)

(0.0409)

−1.551

−0.817

−0.922

(1.155)

(1.171)

(1.157)

0.604

0.671

0.675

(0.750)

(1.041)

(0.965) −0.230

Cabinet duration

(0.443) −0.225***

Cabinet strength

(0.0601) Observations

220

220

220

R2

0.126111 0.133385 0.177981

220

220

220

0.140295

0.180063

0.259704

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions. All models are with fixed effects. Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

of pledge breaking—ceteris paribus—turns insignificant if governments preside over economies that grow by three per cent or more. Growth thus (at least) helps to explain how cabinets such as the Alliance government of Reinfeldt in Sweden 2010 can politically survive unannounced cutbacks (according to Armingeon et al. (2015), Sweden’s real GDP growth was 5.68 percent 2010, a success that Reinfeldt stressed to defend unannounced welfare cutbacks and expectable tax cuts).

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Fig. 2 Average marginal short-term (t1) effect of pledge gap on change in vote share. Source: Based on Model 1 and 2 of Table 3 (appendix). The y-axis indicates the average marginal effect of the pledge gap on the change in vote share of the government (in percentage points). Dashed lines are 90% confidence intervals

To make sure that the moderating effect of GDP growth is not an artefact of our specification, we conducted a series of further tests as summarized in Table 4 in the appendix. We start from a basic model that only includes the interaction terms and country dummies (Model 7). We then stepwise add the economic (Model 8), institutional (Model 9), and cabinet variables (Model 10). For all four models, the conditioning effect of GDP growth on the negative effect of the pledge gap remains highly significant. In the next step, we test whether the welfare pledge and the party label of the largest opposition party influence the interaction of pledge breaking and macro-economic performance (Model 11). Again, the interaction remains stable in terms of significance and effect size. Finally, we assess whether it depends on partisanship whether a booming economy allows cabinets to get away with pledge breaking (Model 12). The three-way interaction (of pledge gap x growth x partisanship) turns out to be insignificant, suggesting that no differences exist between left and right governments. In sum, the results suggest that pledge breaking consistently exerts a substantial negative influence, though one that is moderated by the state of the economy. Of course, these results tell us nothing about how lasting losses due to pledge breaking are, and whether there are factors that explain how permanent electoral punishment is. To assess this, we need to trace the losses of pledge breaking cabinets over several consecutive election periods.

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4.2 Pledge Breaking And Electoral Punishment In The Long Term (at t2 and t3). Our dependent variable thus far was the net change in the vote share of cabinet parties compared to the election result that brought it into office (t0). This comparison of the t0-value with the next election (t1) is also the default strategy in research on electoral punishment for cutbacks and not per se problematic, but it does not allow us to take a more long-term view. Thus, based on Döring and Manow’s (2015) ParlGov database, our next step was to track the election results of the former government parties for two additional elections (t2, t3). This means that the comparison at t2 and t3 is still done with regard to the election result at t0 – the initial pre-pledge breaking level of support. For instance, governments who were pledge breaking by one standard deviation (1.4) between t0 and t1, received a vote share that was 8.3 percent lower at t2 compared to t0, whereas the average former government lost only 5.7 percent, and those who delivered one standard deviation more than promised only 3.8 percent. These figures may have a certain face validity. Yet, the real question is: Do panel regression confirm long(er)-lasting effects from welfare pledge breaking? Although there are certain constellations in which we find significant longterm effects of previous pledge breaking, we can not identify effects as broad and robust as reported above for the short term consequences of pledge breaking. For the very long-term test at t3, we find no effects of the pledge gap accumulated between t0 and t1. For the more proximate losses at t2 (again, compared to t0), we “only” found persistent negative effects under the condition of issue politicization after pledge breaking. These are the results we show and discuss here. We looked at the interplay of whether the pledge breaking parties remain in office or not, the economic context, partisanship, and politicization of the welfare issue by the opposition. To do so, we added the pro welfare items we already listed under Step 1. We draw on politicization of the welfare issue by the opposition—more specifically, the leading opposition party—because we assume that this emphasis on the welfare issue harms previous pledge breakers, as it will often come in the form of direct or indirect reminders about their broken welfare pledges. In line with this assumption, we already know from previous research that politicization by the opposition reduces governments’ inclination to break welfare pledges in the first place (Horn and Jensen 2017). The long-term (marginal) effects of the pledge gap at t2, conditional on the opposition politicization are shown in Fig. 3.2 2

All models in Table 5 (appendix) result in similar effects plots. The first three models (13, 14, 15) use an interaction of the pledge gap and politicization to explain vote share changes,

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Fig. 3 Average marginal long-term (t2) effect of pledge gap on change in vote share Source: Based on Model 15 of Table 5 in the appendix. The y-axis indicates the average marginal effect of the pledge gap on the change in vote share of the government (in percentage points). Dashed lines are 90% confidence intervals

While there is in general no pledge gap effect at t2, for parties that stay in office, there is a pronounced negative long-term effect in case of high welfare politicization. Given a medium–high or high politicization of welfare issues, there is still a negative effect at t2. The cut-off is a value of 40 in a distribution reaching from 0 to 59. Below the cut-off, with more moderate welfare politicization, this effect is insignificant. This pattern is robust across models, indicating long-term risks from pledge breaking. Neither at t2 nor t3 did we find that partisanship or the economic situation interact with the pledge gap variable or the pledge gap variable and welfare politicization (in a way that yields robust results). In other words, the result based on an if -condition to zoom in on the cases in which the government between t1 and t2 was identical with the one between t0 and t1. Model 16, 17, and 18 get at this relationship with a three-way interaction (i.e., pledge gap at t1 x politicization x t1-t2 cabinet identical with t0-t1). Staying in government (i.e., cabinet continues after t1) is insignificant in terms of main effects and the interaction with the pledge gap in all models we have tried – signaling that it is the interaction with issue politicization that is decisive.

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we present in Fig. 3 is not mediated by these factors. Since we already found a similar result for the short-term effects (t1), it seems fair to conclude that the effect of pledge breaking does not depend on partisanship. This means that, while the obvious examples include social democratic parties faced with accusations from parties to their left, the politicization of broken pledges (or at least cutting more than “promised”) can also harm centrist and right parties.

5

Conclusion

Based on the calculation of the pledge gap, or the gap between the welfare pledges of a government pre-election and the policy changes it implements postelection, we analysed the effects of pledge breaking on the electoral gains and losses of cabinets at the following election(s). We have looked at the role of partisanship, economic performance and institutional context as three potential scope conditions, and we assessed the long-term electoral fallout from pledge-breaking. None of these questions has been addressed in previous research. We found four main results: First, in line with intuitive notions about pledge breaking, we find a clear link between pledge breaking and electoral performance. If cabinets do not match their pro-welfare campaign rhetoric with actual policies when in government, they pay a substantial political price. From the perspective of democratic theory, it is reassuring that unanticipated and unannounced policy changes are recognized and sanctioned by voters. This finding also has important implications for the growing literature on voter reactions to welfare state reform. The mixed results this literature has produced do not factor in whether welfare state reforms come as a surprise to voters or not. Our results suggest that this is an important omission and that pledges and pledge breaking should be considered when investigating the electoral consequences of reforms in future studies. Second, the persistently strong effect of pledge breaking interacts with macroeconomic performance. One could expect the electorate to be more forgiving about broken welfare pledges if the government faced a problematic economic situation. Instead, low growth adds insult to injury for pledge-breaking cabinets. The implication is clear. Governments need a clear programmatic mandate to reform the welfare state. Once in government, even a bad macro-economic climate does not justify unannounced policy changes. The oft-cited cases of Chancellor Schröder in Germany in his second term and the demoscopic malaise of the Hollande presidency in France provide ample illustration that saying one thing (or nothing) and doing another is not appreciated by electorates. Only if reforms yield economic fruits before the next election can governments get away with

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unannounced program cutbacks. As these examples suggest, however, that election may arrive earlier than expected, because unannounced reforms can cause losses in subnational elections and factional quarrels within the government. Institutions, meanwhile, are of little relevance regarding the electoral fallout from pledge breaking. Counter-majoritarian institutions such as a strong second chamber provide no protection for cabinets against the affliction of voters that feel misled. Likewise, neither pluralist bargaining structures nor the possibility that unions or employer peak organizations will mobilize against policy changes in corporatist settings affects the electoral consequences from pledge breaking significantly. A final finding is that the long-term electoral effects of breaking welfare pledges are modest and rarely robust, contrary to what one might expect based on high-profile cases of unannounced cutbacks. We find no persistent negative effects of the pledge gap at t3. At t2, such effects exist for one realistic scenario: to the extent that losses explainable by the pledge gap are long-term, this is due to a politicization of the welfare state issue—which often includes the broken welfare pledges of the past—by the opposition. Otherwise, there are no persistent negative long-term effects from pledge breaking that go beyond short-term electoral losses. Thus, while honouring their pledges helps cabinet parties to minimize losses in the short term, honesty may not necessarily be the best policy in the long term—especially if no one reminds the voters of former welfare pledge breaking.

Appendix

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Table 2 Variable overview Variable

Description

Mean

Pledge gap

Predicted change – observed change (see Step 1 and 2)

0

1.4

Vote share change

Election result of cabinet (at t1/2/3) minus election result when coming to office at t0 (Döring and Manow 2015)

−3.5

6.8

Cabinet/Right-Left

Right minus Left cabinet share in %

5.0

71.6

Economic growth

Growth of real gross domestic product in percentage

2.5

1.6

Unemployment

Percentage of civilian labor force

6.2

3.3

Globalization

Import + export/share of GDP

65.2

30.9

Corporatism

Tripartite bargaining (Jahn 2016)

0.2

1.1

Institutions/constraints

Sum of institutional constraints

2.4

1.4

Cabinet duration

Years in office for each cabinet

3

Cabinet strength

Seat share of all government parties

53.8

12.5

Welfare politicization

Emphasis of largest opposition party on welfare (CMP)

16.1

9.7

Source: Data from CPDS by Armingeon et al. (2015); if not indicated otherwise

SD

1.25

0.984*** (0.275)

(0.275)

−0.285 (0.430) −0.223*** (0.0599)

−0.228

(0.443)

−0.225***

(0.0601)

Cabinet duration

Cabinet strength

(0.963)

(0.972)

constraints

(1.078) 0.397

(1.157)

0.618

(0.0416) −0.798

(0.0421)

−0.897

0.0185

0.000887

(0.185)

(0.00541)

(0.00541)

0.898*** 0.275

0.00936*

(0.189)

(0.334)

(0.352)

(0.299)

0.0103*

0.233

−0.676**

−1.241***

−0.635**

Institutional

Corporatism

Globalization

Unemployment

GDP growth

Right-Left

Pledge gap

(3)

Parties

(4)

(0.0601)

−0.225***

(0.444)

−0.240

(0.975)

0.666

(1.152)

−0.915

(0.0601)

−0.226***

(0.448)

−0.220

(0.982)

0.687

(1.162)

−0.925

(0.0418)

−0.00283

−0.000907 (0.0419)

(0.194)

0.228

(0.288)

0.877***

(0.00539)

0.0103*

(0.862)

−0.502

Globalization

(0.189)

0.233

(0.282)

0.901***

(0.00541)

0.0104*

Unemployment

(2) GDP

(1)

Table 3 Effect of Pledge gap in different contexts (5)

(0.0604)

−0.223***

(0.445)

−0.240

(0.971)

0.709

(1.156)

−0.875

(0.0411)

−0.00148

(0.188)

0.234

(0.271)

0.886***

(0.00540)

0.0102*

(0.316)

−0.571*

Corporatism

(6)

(continued)

(0.00520)

0.00712

(0.628)

0.271

(0.0352)

−0.113***

(0.387)

−0.318

(0.227)

0.736***

(0.459)

0.746

(0.0177)

−0.0293*

(0.157)

−0.0559

(0.312)

0.590*

Constraints

254 A. Horn

220

(0.0917)

0.191**

(2)

220

(0.0582)

0.0107

(3)

220

(0.0106)

−0.00126

(4)

(0.346)

−0.173

(5)

(6)

0.260599

0.124271

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions. All models are with fixed effects except Model 6. Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

0.259756

R2 0.259717

0.259694

Observations 0.272298

(0.225) 220

220

constraints 220

−0.293

(0.00454)

−0.00154

(1)

Institutional

Corporatism

Globalization

Unemployment

GDP growth

Right-Left

Interaction terms Pledge gap x

Table 3 (continued)

Honesty is the Best Policy? The Short- and Long-Term … 255

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Table 4 Interaction of pledge gap and economic growth

Pledge gap GDP growth Pledge gap x GDP

(7)

(8)

(9)

Baseline

Economy

Institutions Technical

−1.052*** −1.287*** −1.287***

(10)

(11)

(12)

Opposition Right-Left

−1.243*** −1.214***

−1.231***

(0.323)

(0.357)

(0.355)

(0.350)

(0.364)

(0.378)

0.912***

0.946***

0.910***

0.912***

0.983***

1.128***

(0.287)

(0.280)

(0.279)

(0.281)

(0.309)

(0.323)

0.183**

0.213**

0.203**

0.201**

0.204**

0.346***

(0.0922)

(0.0943)

(0.0949)

(0.0924)

(0.0946)

(0.129)

0.259

0.219

0.264

0.302

0.265

(0.189)

(0.194)

(0.187)

(0.190)

(0.193)

0.0226

0.0239

0.0281

0.0154

0.0161

(0.0317)

(0.0441)

(0.0407)

(0.0458)

(0.0477)

Unemployment Globalization Corporatism Institutional constraints

−1.125

−1.148

−0.652

−0.607

(1.039)

(1.036)

(1.093)

(1.144)

0.203

0.257

0.433

0.290

(1.018)

(0.938)

(1.133)

(1.176)

Cabinet duration Cabinet strength

−0.257

−0.213

−0.273

(0.436)

(0.447)

(0.449)

−0.227*** −0.234***

−0.242***

(0.0592)

(0.0641)

(0.0644)

−0.000163 0.00753

Opposition party

(0.00588) Opposition pledge

(0.00996)

0.0458

0.0365

(0.0391)

(0.0406)

Right-Left

0.0239 (0.0154) −0.00681

Pledge gap x Right-Left

(0.00820) −0.00382

GDP x Right-Left

(0.00408) Pledge gap x GDP x

0.00369

Right-Left

(0.00292)

Observations

220

220

220

220

208

208

R2

0.176448

0.183068

0.184854

0.265529

0.269546

0.283656

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions. All models are with fixed effects. Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

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Table 5 Long-term vote share changes (t2 vs. t0) (13)

(14)

(16)

(17)

Baseline

Institutions Full

(15)

Baseline

Institutions Full

Pledge gap

2.153*

2.223*

−1.413

−1.765*

(1.158)

(1.234)

(1.118)

(1.066)

(1.023)

(1.005)

Opposition

−0.0787

−0.0699

0.0119

0.0599

0.0254

0.00229

(0.0924)

(0.105)

(0.0733)

(0.0770)

(0.0783)

(0.0778)

Pledge gap x

−0.0958** −0.0980** −0.102**

0.0786

0.0906

0.0872

Opposition

(0.0475)

(0.0601)

(0.0572)

(0.0556)

2.125*

(18) −1.715*

(0.0490)

(0.0475)

0.890

0.990

−2.843

−2.750

(2.680)

(1.154)

(1.970)

(1.964)

Institutional

−0.326

0.820*

−1.816

−2.644*

constraints

(2.216)

(0.478)

(1.219)

(1.422)

Corporatism

Right-Left GDP growth

0.0135

0.0115

(0.0109)

(0.00705)

0.260

0.0393

(0.486)

(0.371)

Unemployment

−0.429

0.291

(0.359)

(0.282)

Globalization

−0.0329

0.0522

(0.0536)

(0.0564)

−0.250

0.279

(0.570)

(0.485)

−0.260***

−0.212***

Cabinet duration Cabinet strength

(0.0662)

(0.0767)

Still in government

−0.148*

−0.174**

−0.144*

x Pledge gap x Oppostion pledge

(0.0869)

(0.0860)

(0.0851)

(continued)

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Table 5 (continued) (13)

(14)

(15)

(16)

(17)

(18)

Observations

82

82

82

198

198

198

R2

0.264668

0.265986

0.224127

0.186873 0.209045

0.276074

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions.Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Models 13, 14, 16, 17, 18 with country fixed effects. Models 13, 14, and 15 based on the condition of continuous government participation (same government parties between t0 and t1 as in period t1-t2). Models 16, 17, and 18 use a three-way interaction consisting of the opposition welfare pledge and the aforementioned continuation in government

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The Politics of Unemployment Benefit Reforms Jan Helmdag and Kati Kuitto

1

Introduction

In his seminal book “The Politics of Environmental Performance”, Detlef Jahn (2016b) develops the agenda-setting power model (ASPM) to study changes in environmental policy outcomes by analyzing the complex interaction between governments and their respective veto players. The main idea behind the ASPM is that governments and veto players engage in an interactive process of political negotiation characterized by subsequent phases of political compromise due to different ideological positions of the actors involved. In this context, the further the respective veto player is ideologically apart from the position of the incumbent government, the more afar the resulting compromise will be from the government’s originally perceived policy. As a result, governments that do not face veto players are free to act without impediment and able to implement policies as they were originally intended, while those that do face veto players (either within government coalitions, parliament, or second chambers) repeatedly form compromises that ultimately deviate from their preferred policies. The main theoretical assumption that builds the basis of the ASPM is that government ideology determines policy output. Most of the political science and public policy literature focuses thereby on the ideological left-right orientation of a given government and propose that leftist governments produce different J. Helmdag (B) Swedish Institute for Social Research (SOFI), Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden e-mail: [email protected] K. Kuitto Finnish Centre for Pensions (ETK), Helsinki, Finland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2022 E. Baltz et al. (eds.), Parties, Institutions and Preferences, Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-35133-5_11

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policies than their rightist counterparts. In the case of welfare state policies, the resulting difference in output is known as the classical partisanship-theory, which posits that leftist governments expand welfare policies while rightist governments seek to restrict them. Since most governments in advanced democracies do not act unchecked and usually face political or institutional veto players most of the time, the originally desired policy output is oftentimes altered through a process of policy negotiation. This means that when veto players are present, the expansive or restrictive character of social policy legislation is often altered to some degree in the direction of the veto player’s ideological position. In this paper, we apply the analytical framework of the ASPM for analyzing the political economy of welfare state reforms by examining changes in unemployment benefit generosity in 21 OECD countries from 1971 to 2010. Specifically, following the classical partisanship-framework, we answer the question of whether government ideology has a substantial impact on unemployment compensation legislation and if veto players exert a significant influence on legislation by altering it towards their own ideological position. Our results show that the application of the ASPM generally confirms the main assumption of the classical partisanship-framework and that classical partisanship influence can be detected. Contrary to previous studies, however, we now for the first demonstrate that both leftist expansion and rightist retrenchment occur simultaneously. Furthermore, our results indicate that governments implement reforms that fit their ideological profile but are restricted by their political and institutional opponents within the political system they are embedded. Thus, the classical partisanship effect is strongest when both leftist and rightist governments are unchallenged by veto players. However, if a government is challenged by a veto player and the higher the ideological range of that veto player becomes, the lower the level of benefit expansion or reduction that can be implemented. The results also show that there is an interactive relationship between governments and their respective veto players that reduces the ability of governments to implement reforms without constraint. We conclude by addressing the implications of our empirical findings and outlining prospects for future research that takes into account the country-specific and time-varying characteristics of welfare state analysis concepts through the application of more refined operationalization procedures as suggested by Jahn and the ASPM.

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263

Theory

At the core of the ASPM lies the assumption that government ideology exerts an impact on legislation. Thus, our main assumption is that governments implement legislation that is in line with the classical partisanship-framework. Studies that focus on the explanation of classical partisanship theory are first and foremost based on the general assumption that governments are formed by parties that in turn produce certain policy outcomes that correspond to their underlying ideology. Once parties are elected and become part of the government, they are able to implement those policies that they (implicitly or explicitly) expressed during the preceding election campaign. Legislative action, in turn, has a significant impact on economic and social outcomes, which ultimately rounds out the partisanship argument that parties are able to affect the economy and society. Depending on the ideological backgrounds and the preferences of their constituents, parties can adopt policies that are congruent with their ideological views and influence future policy outcomes to be consistent with their preferences. When a particular party achieves long-term electoral success and manages to remain in government for an extended period of time, the overall political direction (and even culture) of a country is significantly altered so that policies and national institutions conform to that party’s ideological orientation (Esping-Andersen 1990; Schmidt 1983, 2010; Stephens 1979). The earliest analyses of the different approaches taken by governments to the reciprocal relationship between unemployment and inflation can be found in the works of Hibbs (1977), Tufte (1978), and Schmidt (1982). In detail, they describe how leftist and rightist parties pursue different strategies to address the issue, acting along their respective voter preferences. The partisanship-approach and its implications were soon applied to comparative studies focused of the welfare state and authors began to study how parties favor expansion or retrenchment of benefits (e.g., see Schmidt 1983; Stephens 1979). Other authors began to include the role of the social partners, trade unions and cross-class alliances in their analyses, formulating what they called the ‘power resource’-approach, which in turn had a marked influence on comparative welfare state research (e.g., see Esping-Andersen 1985, 1990; Korpi 1983). Classical partisan theory assumes that leftist parties strife for expansion of social policy legislation, while their rightist counterpart favors containment or reduction of the welfare state. At the heart of this debate is to what degree a society should devote itself to re-distribution of income and risk, since it is debatable where inequalities stem from and whether they should be minimized. In this regard, (Bobbio 1996, p. 68–69) notes that “the egalitarian condemns

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social inequality in the name of natural equality, and the anti-egalitarian condemns social equality in the name of natural inequality”. To achieve economic equality, leftist parties propose legislation that makes benefits more universalistic, egalitarian, and redistributive. Rightist parties, on the other hand, seek to either to curb benefit expansion by implementing legislation that introduces benefit cuts or reduces coverage by re-defining eligibility criteria that increases targeting of social policies (Kitschelt 1994; Korpi 1983; Offe 1984). In the comparative welfare state literature, a large number of empirical studies support these theoretical claims and provide empirical evidence for the existence and stability of this relationship over extended periods of time (see e.g. Hicks and Swank 1992; Huber et al. 1993; Huber and Stephens 2001; Kittel and Obinger 2003; Obinger and Schmitt 2018; Schmidt 1997; Schmitt and Zohlnhöfer 2019; Swank 2001). While leftist parties (i.e. Social Democrats and Socialists) sometimes have ambiguous attitudes towards ‘active’ social policies (Helmdag and Kuitto 2018), they generally favor ‘passive’ benefits that are characterized by higher rates of wage replacement in case of job loss. The core electorate of leftist parties (i.e. blue-collar workers) favors generous unemployment benefits, since they “have greater exposure to rising unemployment than supporters of [r]ight parties” (Hibbs 1992, p. 362) and therefore rely on measures with higher degrees of de-commodification. Additionally, loss of employment can have severe consequences on the lives of workers and their families, because they no longer can uphold their living standards, since income from employment is oftentimes their sole source of income. Therefore, laborers want social risk protection and institutionalized forms collective solidarity which they can rely on in economic downturns and dismissals (Jahn, 2018). However, since the core electorate of leftist parties usually is not sufficient for reaching electoral majorities, leftist parties must also try to appeal to other constituencies to form cross- class coalitions that grant them parliamentary majorities (Esping-Andersen 1985, 1990). For example, the hegemonic position of the Swedish Social Democrats (SAP) that endured from 1936 until 1990 with only a few years of interruption was largely based on a ‘red-green’ coalition between urban workers and rural farmers that led to the construction of the most generous welfare state. Previous quantitative-empirical research affirms this notion and has shown that leftist parties do have an impact on unemployment benefits (see e.g. Allan and Scruggs 2004; Huber and Stephens 2015; Huo et al. 2008; Jensen 2012a; Swank 2005, 2020). While leftist parties generally favor expansion of the welfare state, rightist parties, which comprise secular-conservative and Christian democratic parties with a neo-classical economic profile, prefer a reduction of it, instead. This notion

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stems from the idea that the government and public institutions are not to interfere in private matters. Instead of relying on public insurance, rightist parties promote individual economic responsibility and private insurance as an alternative to public schemes, instead (Castles and Obinger 2007). Rightist parties typically find the majority of their voters in the middle and upper-class, religious communities, and among employers. Supporters of rightist parties prefer lower taxes and social security contributions, since these lower non-wage labor costs that they have to pay at a disproportionately higher rate and with diminishing returns, because they typically are above-average income earners or employers.1 The inevitable consequence of reductions in taxes and social security contributions in the medium-term is a decrease in public welfare, which relies on them as primary sources of finance. An increase in public debt could counteract rising public expenditure and lack of funding caused by lesser taxation and contributions. However, orthodox economics and fiscal austerity to contain rising costs form two cornerstones of right-wing parties’ ideology, which in turn makes increases in public debt rather unlikely in times of declining or negative growth (Amable et al. 2006). This ideological link can be particularly well observed in the second half of the twentieth century, when the Western world experienced the end of the ‘golden age’ of the welfare state and conservative parties gained control of government. The terms of office of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (in office from 1979–90) and President Ronald Reagan (in office from 1981–89) are the two most prominent examples for the end of the ‘golden age’, as the 1980s in Great Britain and the United States are characterized by deep cuts to social welfare (Pierson 1994). The biggest cuts in unemployment benefits were actually caused by ‘tax-clawbacks’, which are achieved by broadening the taxable base by making benefits subject to taxation, which was introduced in 1982 in the United Kingdom and 1987 in the United States (Allan and Scruggs 2004, p. 498; Korpi and Palme 1998, pp. 433, 444). Referring back to the Swedish case mentioned above and the end of the hegemony the SAP during a deep recession in the early-1990s, we can observe that the cutbacks in social policies introduced by the center-right governments under Prime Ministers Carl Bildt (in office 1991–4) and Fredrik Reinfeldt (in office 2006–14) led to Sweden’s relegation from first to eighth place in terms of overall generosity (Jahn and Helmdag 2019). Comparative empirical research on welfare state development shows that rightist parties 1

The reduction in return is based on the idea that they contribute the same in relative terms, but instead receive the identical benefit/service in absolute terms. The exception to that rule are the earnings-related benefits one can typically find in Continental Europe (Esping-Andersen 1990). However, even those relatively generous benefits are characterized by maximum benefit ceilings.

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oppose welfare state expansion, especially when those parties promote a more radical ‘free market’-ideology (Horn 2017; Jensen 2012a, b, 2014; Jensen and Mortensen 2014). Drawing from the theoretical argument and the empirical evidence outlined above, we formulate two hypotheses that stem from the classical partisanshipframework. Focusing on the main difference between leftist and rightist governments in unemployment benefit legislation, we hypothesize the intended direction of policy change as follows: H 1 : Leftist governments increase the generosity of unemployment benefits. H 2 : Rightist governments decrease the generosity of unemployment benefits.

Governments, whether they are left or right, are constrained in implementing reforms by veto players. According to Tsebelis (1995, 2002), veto players can be either partisan or institutional. While partisan veto players stem from governmental coalitions that can be typically found in multi-party systems, institutional veto players are established by the constitution and the separation of powers granted by it (Tsebelis 1995, p. 302; Tsebelis 2002, p. 12). Generally speaking, the greater the number of veto players and the ideological range that veto players occupy on the left-right continuum, the more difficult it becomes for incumbent governments to deviate from the status quo. (Tsebelis 2002, p. 294). As soon as veto players gain relevance in the political system, they try to shape policies so that they approximate their ideological conceptions or even block legislation entirely. Thus, when leftist governments face veto players in the policy bargain process, their efforts of benefit expansion get opposed. In the same vein, rightist governments are opposed by veto players that try to avoid cutbacks or at least limit their extent so that economic disadvantages are mitigated for their constituents. Many studies acknowledge the importance of veto players in the process of unemployment benefit reform (e.g., see Jensen 2012a, b; Korpi and Palme 2003; Swank 2011), yet only a handful of studies explore the institutional entanglement of governments and their respective veto players by explicitly analyzing the reciprocal relationship between the two actors in the policy negotiation process (e.g., see Becher 2010; Horn and Jensen 2017; Kühner 2010, 2018; Swank 2013). These studies show that veto players are indeed capable of influencing the political process to some degree. Thus, our third and final hypothesis takes the reciprocal relationship between governments and their respective veto players into account:

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H 3 : The higher the veto player range, the more constrained governments become in shaping legislation and the less expansive (or restrictive) the policy output.

Since our hypotheses postulate both an additive-linear (H 1 and H 2 ) and a multiplicative relationship (H 3 ), the next section is dedicated to explaining our analytical strategy of testing those hypotheses. Before we proceed with that, however, we will discuss how we measure unemployment benefit reforms as well as government ideology and veto player ranges before conducting our statistical analysis.

3

Data and Method

In this section we discuss the dependent and independent variables we are using in our analysis to investigate whether our sample of 21 OECD countries from 1971 to 2010 features a classical partisanship-relationship. We start by introducing our two dependent variables that capture unemployment benefit legislation before turning to the main independent variables of the ASPM that capture the ideological position of governments and the ideological range of the opposing the veto player. After a brief discussion of the economic and institutional control variables, we show how the ASPM and its optimised lags is applied in the regression models. Descriptive statistics of all variables used in our analysis are provided in Table 4 of the appendix.

3.1 Dependent Variable In this study, we will use two different measures that capture the extent of social rights for unemployed. Both variables stem from the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset 2 (Scruggs et al. 2017) and represent replacement rates and benefit generosity of unemployment insurance. While replacement rates capture the relative amount of previous net wages that beneficiaries get in case of unemployment, benefit generosity is a more complex measure that – besides benefit replacement rates – also incorporates the necessary length of the contribution period that qualifies for eligibility, the duration of benefit payment, waiting days, and the overall coverage of the scheme (Scruggs 2007). It is widely acknowledged in comparative welfare state research that social rights data is more suited for analyzing the essence of the welfare state (EspingAndersen 1990; Korpi 1989), since results of analyses that rely on expenditure

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data can be oftentimes misleading. This is because instead of institutionalized micro-level characteristics like wage replacement and eligibility, social expenditure mainly represents a function of macro-level indicators such as economic growth and need (i.e. the number of recipients) – an issue that is also known as the ‘dependent variable problem’ (Castles 1994; Scruggs 2007; Siegel 2007). Multiple authors have argued that the ‘dependent variable problem’ is one of the main reasons why comparative studies of the political economy of welfare state reforms have (falsely) rejected the classical partisanship-framework in the past (Allan and Scruggs 2004; Korpi and Palme 1998).

3.2 Independent Variables Our main independent variables are government ideology and veto player range and stem from the ASPM (Jahn 2010, 2011, 2016b) aswell as the Parties, Institutions & Preferences (PIP) dataset (Jahn et al. 2018, 2020). Both indicators are based on an aggregation of party positions that forms the LR-index, which is based on party manifesto data collected by the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006; Volkens et al. 2013). In a nutshell, the LR-index consists of two sub-indices that represent the country-specific and time-varying ideological position of a given party along a left-right continuum at any given point in time. The first sub-component is a set of ten ‘core’ statements that represent the essence of the left-right continuum that is deducted from the theoretical framework provided by Bobbio (1996). Irrespective of the country of interest, the core component of the LR-index always consists of the same ten statements, of which four are assigned to socialism, and three to economic liberalism and conservatism, each.2 The second part of the LRindex is the so-called ‘plus’-component, which takes into account the changing character of what is left and right within countries and across time.3 Taking the

2 The policy statements assigned to socialism are ‘nationalization’ (per413), ‘controlled economy’ (per412), ‘eco- nomic planning’ (per404), and ‘market regulation’ (per403). The statements representing economic liberalism are ‘welfare state limitation’ (per505), ‘free enterprise’ (per401), and ‘economic orthodoxy’ (per414). Finally, the three statements that are assigned to conservatism are ‘traditional morality’ (per603), ‘social harmony’ (per606), and ‘national way of life’ (per601). All statements are drawn from Budge et al. (2001); Klingemann et al. (2006); Volkens et al. (2013). 3 Contrary to the core-statements which are drawn deductively from a theoretical framework, the plus-statements are inductively identified by running several regression models

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two sub-components together, all ten ‘core’ statements and a varying number of additional ‘plus’-statements that differ across time and space form the LR-index.4 The advantage of using the LR-index is that it circumvents certain issues that arise from the ‘independent variable problem’, which is a term coined by Horn (2017) that borrows from the ‘dependent variable problem’. The main issue of the independent variable problems is that indicators that are based on expert judgements mostly rely on plain left-right dichotomies or left-center-right trichotomies (Castles and Mair 1984; Schmidt 1992). Furthermore, expert judgments are invariant over time and their operationalization relies on weighted seats in parliaments or cabinets, which in turn only vaguely captures government ideology (Horn 2017; Jahn 2011). The LR-index addresses this issue by providing a time-variant ideological positioning of parties along a left-right continuum that allows for deviation in ideology. Additionally, the ideological position of a given government is determined by different forms of operationalization that allows for a country-specific context. To determine the ideological position of a government, the ASPM uses various aggregation procedures that take into account the political system and the organization of the legislative and executive branches of each country. The ASPM features three major forms of cabinet decision rules based on either the head of government (‘prime minister model’), individual cabinet members (‘minister model’), or all members of a cabinet (‘cabinet-model’), respectively.5 Additionally, the ASPM also includes unique modeling for Switzerland and the United States which take into account the specific indiosyncratic characteristics of the political systems of the two countries (for a detailed explanation, see Jahn 2016b, pp. 71–78). The veto player range variable represents the ideological distance one or multiple veto players comprise. If and only if a political or institutional veto player range becomes relevant, the veto player range is greater than zero, which in (Jahn 2011, pp. 755–756). The result is that the LR-index for a given country might feature statements that are not present in others. 4 For example, the issue of being a proponent or opponent of EC/EU-membership is a heavily contested issue along the left-right spectrum in the United Kingdom, whereas it never appears to stir much conflict along that continuum in Finland (Jahn et al. 2018, pp. 73, 170). 5 The ‘prime minister model’ comprises Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Ireland, New Zealand (until 2000), Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The ‘minister model’ features Germany, Greece, Italy, and Japan. The ‘cabinet model’ comprises Austria, Belgium, Finland, the Netherlands, New Zealand (2000 onwards), Norway, and Sweden and is characterized by collective cabinet decision (Jahn 2016b, p. 67). For determining the ideological position of a government that corresponds to the prime minister model and the minister model, we take the minister of labor as a reference point.

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turn signifies its relevance. The veto player range variables contain both political and institutional veto players once they are able to exert influence of the policy-bargaining process. Political veto players can be either part of a governmental coalition or the closest faction in parliament that supports a minority coalition.6 Institutional veto players are represented by presidents in a semipresidential democracy (i.e. France, Portugal, and Finland until 2000) or relevant second chambers.7 Besides the main independent variables, we include an identical set of seven control variables in our regression models. Four of the seven control variables are economic controls that capture the pressure the functional aspect of benefit expenditure and potential pressure that is put on welfare systems. We include levels and differences of GDP per capita (OECD 2021c), which captures the overall level of wealth and any potential fluctuation caused by business cycles. We also include levels and changes in unemployment rates and employment rates (OECD 2021a) to capture the need for benefits and the amount of contributors and potential beneficiaries. The last economic control we include is central government debt, measured as share percentage of GDP (OECD 2021b), to control for the financial framework over which a government disposes. To control for the degree of integration of tripartite agreements between governments, unions, and employer associations, we include the degree of corporatism (Jahn 2016a), which basically represents the variable that captures the ‘power resource’-approach in our estimation. We also include trade openness, which is a proxy for measuring the amount of governmental pressure to keep non-wage labour costs at a low level and is taken from the Penn World Table (Feenstra and Timmer 2015). The underlying argument for using trade openness is that reducing labor costs provides domestic companies a competitive advantage in the international market and also attracts foreign companies and investments, which in turn sets a downward tax spiral in motion that ultimately leads to a ‘race to the bottom’ in taxation. Lastly, we also control for the impact of the European Employment Strategy (EES), by including a dichotomous dummy variable that distinguishes membership from 6

The inclusion of an extra-governmental parliamentary faction that the governments have to rely on for reaching a majority is one of the key changes that Jahn introduces to Tsebelis’ veto player theory (cf. Jahn 2016b, p. 68). 7 According to (Tsebelis 2002), the countries for which second chambers are considered to be relevant for legislation are Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. Jahn (2016b) expands the list of countries with relevant second chambers with the addition of Belgium, France, Japan, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain (Jahn 2016b, p. 69). Additionally, the veto player range for France, Switzerland, and the United States is uniquely determined.

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non-membership. Previous studies that use expenditure data have shown that the EES exerts a substantial effect on labor market policies (Helmdag and Kuitto 2018; Paetzold and van Vliet 2014; van Vliet and Koster 2011).8

3.3 Method The unit of our analysis are country-years for differences in unemployment benefit replacement rates and generosity. We use error correction models (ECM) that estimate changes in our two dependent variables (De Boef and Keele 2008; Keele et al. 2016). The main advantage of ECMs is that they allow for a simultaneous estimation of short and long-term parameters for each independent variable, which is crucial in our research design, since we assume that functional explanatory variables (e.g. economic growth or changes in unemployment and employment rates) have a short-term impact, whereas ideology variables (i.e. government ideology and veto player ranges) exert a long-term impact. In addition, ECMs also allow for unbiased estimation of non- stationary dependent variables that may be co-integrated with the independent variables and otherwise would result in spurious correlation. To account for heterogeneity in both the spatial and temporal dimensions, we add unit fixed effects and a singular temporal parameter, resulting in the following equation: yi,t = α0 + α1 yi,t−1 +



k βk X i,t +



l βl X i,t−1 +

I −1 

αi + tn + εi,t , (1)

i=1

where i represents panels (i.e. countries) and t the periods (i.e. years). The equation contains the overall constant, levels of the lagged dependent variable, unit fixed effects, and a singular parameter for capturing temporal heterogeneity. A distinctive feature of ECM is that each continuous exogenous variable is represented by two separate parameters, which are captures by first-order differences and temporally lagged levels. To integrate the ASPM into an ECM, we add government ideology and veto player range to the equation and assign different temporal lags to each parameter to account for successive episodes in the policy negotiation process (Jahn 2016b, 8

Although the European Employment Strategy is primarily targeted at the promotion of active labor market policies and not directly targeted at ‘passive’ benefits, it could still be argued that there is a trade-off in the expansion of active measures to the disadvantage of passive measures (Paetzold and van Vliet 2014).

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pp. 35–38).9 Both variables for government ideology and veto player range are assigned different temporal lags that are determined via the policy negotiation process and an inductive procedure conducted prior to the analysis to determine the optimal length of the lags (Jahn 2016b, pp. 38–41). The inductive optimization process searches for a panel-specific lag ϕ that potentially ranges from x i,t−1 to x i,t−5 and that exerts the greatest impact in increasing the fit of the statistical model. In a next step, the government ideology variable is assigned the inductively determined lag ϕ, so that we obtain two parameters that represent the long-term and the short-term effect of government ideology. Since one of the main features of the ASPM is that veto players respond to governments after they propose a certain policy for legislation, we assign time lags to the two parameters for veto player range that take this assumption into account by adding an additional temporal unit (i.e. one year) to each parameter. In a final step, we include two multiplicative terms that capture the interactive relationship between government ideology and veto player ranges in the short and long-run. Ultimately, the addition of the six parameters that represent the ASPM leads to the following equation: yi,t = α0 + α1 yi,t−1 +

I −1 

αi +



l βk X i,t +



n βm X i,t−1

i=1 m n m n + β0 GIi,t+1−φ + β1 GIi,t−φ + β2 VPi,t+2−φ + β3 VPi,t+1−φ m m n m + β4 GIi,t+1−φ × VPi,t+2−φ + β5 GIi,t−φ × VPi,t+2−φ

+ tn + εi,t

(2)

We have tested the robustness of the results by formulating alternative models with a conventional uniform lag structure.10 Additionally, we also test for possible non-linearity of both government ideology and the interaction between governments and veto players (Hainmueller et al. 2019).11 In general, the results 9

Addressing this issue, Jahn (2016b) writes: “In principle the relationship works in such a way that the agenda setter aims to move the status quo in its favored direction and the veto player tries to dilute this intention by moving its preferred position. Because the agenda setter has the agenda setting power, the result is often that the veto player does not move the outcome toward its favored position but rather that it minimizes a policy change and preserves the status quo.” (Jahn 2016b, p. 32). 10 The results of the robustness checks are provided in Tables 5 and 6 in the appendix of the paper. 11 The models with non-linear parameters and interactions are provided in Table 7 and Fig. 3 of the appendix.

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of the robustness checks confirm our findings and the classical partisanshiprelationship could be detected in models that use uniform lags and non-linear parameterizations of the main independent variables.

4

Empirical Analysis

The results of our regression analyses are presented in Tables 1 and 2. For each dependent variable, we present three nested models (i.e. base, full, and multiplicative) that add a set of additional parameters. The first column in each table represents the baseline model, which contains short and long-term estimators for government ideology and veto player ranges. The two long-term parameters that contain lagged levels are temporally optimised and each country is assigned a specific lag ϕ that varies between x t−1 and x t−5 .12 The second column in each regression table represents the full model, which adds a set of economic and institutional control variables to the baseline model to allow comparison of the robustness of the results. Finally, the third column contains multiplicative models that include two interaction terms for short- and long-term parameters of government ideology and veto player ranges to test for an interactive relationship. The model fit parameters show that the interactive models perform best, as they have the highest values for R2adj and the lowest values for the root mean squared error (RMSE).13 The addition of control variables improves the fit for all models, while the estimated coefficients of our main independent variables 12 In Tables 5 and 6 in the appendix, we present our models with a uniform lag structure instead of a country- specific lag structure that relies on an iterative inductive determination of ϕi beforehand. The alternative analysis with the uniform lag structure shows that our results remain robust and the classical partisanship- relationship upholds for both unemployment benefit replacement rates and generosity, although point estimates are slightly diminished. Additionally, we can also observe a short-term relationship between governments and veto players for changes in benefit generosity. These results implicate that when governments move away from their original ideological position (either to the left or right), veto players are more effective in obstructing legislation by making it less expansive or regressive, depending on the government position. Therefore, the models show that there is a short and long-term relationship between governments and veto players, that gets obfuscated in the models with a country-specific lag structure, which is more focused on the long-run relationship between the two actors. 13 We provide two different measures of model fit since the explanatory power of the determination coefficient R2 adj is rather limited within in an ECM. For example, if we substitute the parameterization of the dependent variable with yi,t instead of yit, all parameters (except the lagged dependent variable yi,t − 1 for obvious reasons) remain identical, while R2 adj reaches values of up to 0.980 for model A3 and 0.974 for model B3. Therefore, a comparison

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Table 1 Changes in unemployment benefit generosity in 21 OECD countries, 1971–2010 Replacement rate: y = 0.138; σ = 3.484

Unemployment replacement ratei,t − 1

Model B1

Model B1

Model B1

Base

Full

ASPM

−0.146***

−0.151***

−0.171***

(0.021)

(0.020)

(0.021)

Agenda-setting power model Government ideologyi,t − ϕ + 1 Government ideologyi,t − ϕ Veto player rangei,t − ϕ + 2

−0.022

−0.032

(0.028)

(0.028)

−0.075***

−0.076***

−0.154***

(0.022)

(0.022)

(0.027)

0.042

0.041

0.028

(0.028) Veto player rangei,t − ϕ + 1

−0.024

(0.028)

−0.033 (0.021)

(0.028) −0.042* (0.021)

Gov. ideologyi,t − ϕ + 1 × Veto player rangei,t − ϕ + 2

(0.028) −0.032 (0.021) −0.002 (0.005)

Gov. ideologyi,t − ϕ × Veto player rangei,t − ϕ + 1

0.009*** (0.002)

Control variables GDP per capitai,t

−0.602

GDP per capitai,t − 1

−0.220

Unemployment ratei,t

−0.169

(1.552) (0.490) (0.153) Unemployment ratei,t − 1 Employment ratei,t Employment ratei,t − 1

−0.683 (1.504) −0.110 (0.484) −0.135 (0.152)

0.019

0.034

(0.082)

(0.079)

0.002

0.034

(0.114)

(0.112)

0.111*

0.129* (continued)

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Table 1 (continued) Replacement rate: y = 0.138; σ = 3.484 Model B1

Model B1

Model B1

Base

Full

ASPM

(0.054) Debti,t

0.093*** (0.023)

Debti,t − 1 Corporatismi,t

0.007 (0.006)

1.376

1.242

(0.721)

(0.721)

−0.006

Trade opennessi,t − 1 European Employment Strategyi,t

(0.023)

(0.006)

(0.586) Trade opennessi,t

0.085***

0.006

1.530**

Corporatismi,t − 1

(0.052)

1.327* (0.583) −0.012

(0.026)

(0.026)

−0.039**

−0.039**

(0.013)

(0.013)

0.508

0.338

(0.496) 774

(0.492)

n

774

774

N

21

21

21

T

36.9

36.9

36.9

R2

0.109

0.132

0.153

RMSE

3.194

3.159

3.123

ρ

0.124

0.106

0.105

Notes: Prais-Winsten regression estimates based on panel-specific autocorrelation structure and panel-corrected standard errors (in parentheses). The variables capturing the agendasetting power model (i.e. government ideology and veto player range) are temporally optimized lags with each panel having a panel-specific time lag with an overall average length of 2.57 years. All models include a constant, unit fixed effects, and a linear parameter that captures temporal dependence (all not shown) Symbols: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

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Table 2 Changes in unemployment benefit generosity in 21 OECD countries, 1971–2010 Benefit generosity: y = 0.561; σ = 4.678

Unemployment benefit generosityi,t − 1

Model B1

Model B1

Model B1

Base

Full

ASPM

−0.181***

−0.189***

−0.199***

(0.019)

(0.019)

(0.018)

Agenda-setting power model Government ideologyi,t − ϕ + 1

0.017

0.016

0.003

(0.036)

(0.035)

(0.035)

Government ideologyi,t − ϕ

−0.051

Veto player rangei,t − ϕ + 2

−0.028

Veto player rangei,t − ϕ + 1

−0.018

(0.033) (0.038) (0.030)

−0.045 (0.033) −0.010 (0.037) −0.035 (0.031)

Gov. ideologyi,t-ϕ+1 × Veto player rangei,t − ϕ + 2

−0.172*** (0.037) −0.025 (0.036) −0.036 (0.028) −0.002 (0.010)

Gov. ideologyi,t-ϕ × Veto player rangei,t − ϕ + 1

0.017*** (0.003)

Control variables GDP per capitai,t GDP per capitai,t − 1 Unemployment ratei,t Unemployment ratei,t − 1 Employment ratei,t

6.646** (2.348)

(2.339)

0.993

1.371

(0.766)

(0.762)

0.001

0.042

(0.213)

(0.212)

0.016

0.008

(0.108)

(0.102)

−0.031 (0.168)

Employment ratei,t − 1

7.628**

0.203*

−0.067 (0.166) 0.224** (continued)

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Table 2 (continued) Benefit generosity: y = 0.561; σ = 4.678 Model B1

Model B1

Model B1

Base

Full

ASPM

Debti,t

(0.086)

(0.087)

0.063*

0.069*

(0.031)

(0.031)

0.019*

Debti,t − 1

(0.008) Corporatismi,t Corporatismi,t − 1

0.367

0.169 (0.840)

1.352

0.964

−0.010 (0.039)

Trade opennessi,t − 1

(0.793) −0.018 (0.038)

0.020

0.015

(0.025)

(0.024)

−0.812

European Employment Strategyi,t

(0.008)

(0.855) (0.880) Trade opennessi,t

0.022**

(0.681) 775

−0.937 (0.621)

n

775

775

N

21

21

21

T

36.9

36.9

36.9

R2

0.166

0.181

0.213

RMSE

3.954

3.932

3.873

ρ

0.220

0.218

0.195

Notes: Prais-Winsten regression estimates based on panel-specific autocorrelation structure and panel-corrected standard errors (in parentheses). The variables capturing the agendasetting power model (i.e. government ideology and veto player range) are temporally optimized lags with each panel having a panel-specific time lag with an overall average length of 2.90 years. All models include a constant, unit fixed effects, and a linear parameter that captures temporal dependence (all not shown) Symbols: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

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remain stable. Furthermore, the extra addition of short and long-term interactions for government ideology and veto player ranges markedly improves model fit. Thus, we can already assess that an interactive relationship between governments and veto players is present in our sample, and omission of this relationship leads to omitted variable bias. The non-multiplicative models (A1 and A2) measuring changes in replacement rates show that government ideology exerts a negative influence. All eight short- and long-term parameters for government ideology are negative, implying that lower scores on the LR-scale are correlated with higher benefit replacement rates. Both long-run coefficients are statistically significant at p < 0.001, indicating that we can infer a non-random classical partisanship. For veto players, we can observe that long-term changes in the ideological range are also negatively correlated at p < 0.05, implying that larger ideological ranges are negatively correlated with changes in replacement rates. The multiplicative model that contains the linear interactions of the short- and long-term coefficients for government ideology and veto player range has two notable results: Firstly, the constitutive linear parameter for long-term government ideology is now twice as large in effect size.14 Secondly, the interaction of the long-term parameters is significant at p < 0.001, indicating that governments and veto players share a conditional relationship and that policy bargaining is present in our sample. Figure 1 shows both the unconditional marginal effect of government on predictions of changes in replacement rates and the conditional marginal effect. The left sub-figure shows the unconditional effect of government ideology on the of model fit parameters for ECMs is fruitful only for nested models in relative terms, but not for absolute comparisons. 14 Since the veto player variable comprises the value of zero (i.e. the veto player can either exert no influence or shares an identical ideological position with the government), interpreting the unconditional effect of a constitutive term makes sense in both theoretical and empirical terms. According to (Brambor et al. 2006), researchers “should refrain from interpreting the constitutive elements of interaction terms as unconditional or average effects”, because a constitutive term cannot be interpreted in the same way as a regular additive parameter from a non-multiplicative (i.e. linear) model due to the presence of the multiplicative term (Brambor et al. 2006, p. 71). The only valid interpretation of a constitutive term is its additive effect on the dependent variable if and only if the moderating variable contains the value of zero (cf. Brambor et al. 2006, p. 72). In our example, the veto player range comprises the value zero and it forms the modulus (about 23 percent of all cases) within its overall distribution. Thus, an interpretation of the unconditional effect of government ideology on the linear prediction of changes on unemployment benefit legislation where the veto player is absent (i.e. has a value of zero) is theoretically and empirically sound and provides us with insights that complement the analysis of the conditional marginal effect.

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Fig. 1 Unconditional and conditional marginal effect of government ideology on replacement rates. (Note(s): Line plots show linear (un)conditional marginal effect of levels in government ideology on changes in unemployment benefit replacement rates, based on estimates from model A3 (full model with controls). Vertical axis represents the linear prediction (upper plot) or the effect on the linear prediction (lower plot). Horizontal axis represents levels of government ideology with an underlying kernel density plot showing the overall distribution of government ideology. Veto player range is set to zero (upper plot) or to its observed mean (lower plot), while all other exogenous variables are set to the observed mean. Dashed curves represent 95% confidence intervals. Figures were created with ‘interactplot’ package (Helmdag 2017))

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dependent variable when the veto player is absent (i.e. the ideological range equals zero). The figure confirms the results described above and shows that in the absence of veto players, leftist governments exert a positive effect on changes in replacement rates, while governments with a rightist position have a negative effect. More specifically, when the government’s ideological position on the LRscale falls below the value of 0.8 (46 percent of all observations), it exerts a positive impact on changes in replacement rates. Looking at the effect of rightist governments, we can observe a significant effect that becomes negative once the ideological position of the government exceeds an ideological position of 6.6 or higher (15 percent of all observations) on the LR-scale. Taken together, we can clearly observe classical partisanship when the veto player is absent and governments can act freely. The sub-figure on the right shows the conditional marginal effect when the veto player range is set to its observed mean. The results show that the veto player exerts a diametrically opposed effect and the positive effect of leftist governments on changes in replacement rates is reduced when veto players are present. In fact, when the government ideological position is below −1.9 (more than 27 percent of observations), the veto player is able to significantly diminish the social policy expansion of leftist governments. At the other end of the ideological spectrum, veto players are also able to exert significant influence on legislation when the government takes a rightist position. When the government’s ideological position exceeds a value 9.6 (about 7 percent of the overall sample), veto players are able to reduce the retrenchment efforts of the rightist government. Thus, we can see that veto players significantly affect the policy output of both leftist and rightist governments by diminishing their effort to either increase or decrease replacement rates. As for our four models estimating changes in unemployment benefit generosity, our results show that both the baseline model and the full model show no significant impact of government ideology and veto players. The two longterm parameters for government ideology and all four parameters for veto player ranges are negative and none of them reaches statistical significance. Therefore, we can conclude that there is no linear-additive effect of government ideology and veto players on changes in benefit generosity. However, these results only serve as evidence for the absence of on additive effect of both variables, as the multiplicative model shows that our data features a classical partisanship once we account for the interactive relationship between governments and veto players and both the constitutive parameter for government ideology and the interaction of both long-term parameters become significant at the 99.9 percent level.

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This suggests that reforms in unemployment benefit generosity are influenced by government ideology and the relationship between governments and veto players. Figure 2 shows the conditional and the unconditional marginal effect of governments and veto players on the linear prediction of changes in benefit generosity. The unconditional marginal effect graph clearly shows that we can observe cases of leftist expansion and rightist retrenchment when governments are unopposed by veto players. In addition, the figure also shows that a significant share of centrist parties also engage in benefit expansion. More specifically, when a government’s ideological position is at 2.6 or below, which includes almost two-thirds (64 percent) of all observations in the sample, we can observe an increase in the generosity of benefits. Therefore, our analysis shows not only cases of leftist expansion, but also the occurrence of centrist expansion in our sample. At the right end of the ideological spectrum, governments exert a significant negative influence on the generosity of unemployment benefits, as soon as the ideological position exceeds a threshold of 11.0 (about 5 percent of all observations), which confirms the existence of rightist retrenchment. Again, the right-hand side of Fig. 2 shows the conditional marginal effect when veto player range is set to its observed mean. The analysis shows that veto players exert a significantly negative impact on the linear prediction once government ideology is below −1.2 (50 percent of observations), implying that veto players are successful in reducing the expansive efforts of leftist governments. At the other end of the ideological spectrum, veto players are able to exert a positive impact on the prediction of changes in benefit generosity once government ideology exceeds a value of 6.1 on the LR-index (16 percent of observations), which in turn implies that veto players are effective in reducing the retrenchment efforts of rightist government. In sum, we can observe leftist and centrist expansion as well as rightist retrenchment for benefit generosity reform. From an institutional perspective, veto players, once they become politically relevant, play a crucial role in the legislation of unemployment benefit reforms, acting as a corrective and limiting the extent of expansion or retrenchment that a government can undertake. In Table 3, we compiled a summary of our results and list ideological thresholds at which effects of partisanship and institutionalism can be observed. Our results show that both partisanship and institutionalism play crucial roles in the unemployment benefit legislation process and that we can identify the presence of both sub-components of the classical partisanship-framework (i.e. leftist expansion and rightist retrenchment) for our two dependent variables. For legislation concerning changes in replacement rates, 61 percent of our observations show a

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Fig. 2 Unconditional and conditional marginal effect of government ideology on benefit generosity. (Note(s): Line plots show linear (un)conditional marginal effect of levels in government ideology on changes in unemployment benefit generosity, based on estimates from model B3 (full model with controls). For further notes, see Fig. 1)

(15 %)

≥6.6 (6 %)

≥11.0

(5 %)

(31 %)

≥6.1

E>xxxx