The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises 9781400876549

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THE INTERMEDIARIES

Published for the CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY A complete list of the books published for the Princeton Center of International Studies follows the index

THE INTERMEDIARIES Third Parties in International Crises BY ORAN R. YOUNG

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY

1967

Copyright © 1967 by Princeton University Press ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

L. C. Card: 66-26590

Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey

To JOHN and

ELEANOR

Preface

T

HIS study of third-party intervention in crises constitutes an attempt to break new ground in generating hypotheses about the management of conflict. Though it is specifically oriented toward international crises, much of the material is relevant to a wide variety of contexts. The study is, therefore, primarily an hypothesis-raising rather than an hypothesis-testing effort. I have gone to some lengths to include extensive, illustrative material dealing with the concepts and propositions under discussion and to provide enough empirical evidence to establish the relevance of the study to real-world situations. I have not, however, attempted to treat most of the propositions in an exhaustive empirical fashion. In the analysis of contemporary phenomena, there is always a problem in keeping material up to date. I completed the basic substance of this study in the middle of 1965 and have since revised it to take note of developments up to approximately February 1966. In the present case, however, the fact that most of the empirical material is essentially illustrative mitigates this problem of datedness. Even in cases where specific situations have changed, the general types of problem under discussion remain important in international politics. A number of acknowledgments are in order at this time. The inception of this study traces back to a series of discussions between Jeremy Stone and myself in the early months of 1963. These discussions focused on the concrete material concerning United Nations activities during crises which now appears in Part II of the study. During this period, I also had the benefit of being able to talk with several members of the United Nations Secretariat about various concrete problems concerning United Nations interventions in crises. vii

PREFACE

I was subsequently able to broaden and extend this work very considerably during several years spent at Yale University. Among those who assisted me during this period I should like particularly to thank Walter Sharp, James P. Sewell, Karl W. Deutsch, and Robert A. Dahl. I am grateful to them all for advice on a wide variety of subjects. Finally, I am very grateful to Klaus Knorr and the Center of International Studies at Princeton University for the opportunity to revise the study substantially and to prepare it for pubhcation. During the year 1965-1966, the Center has provided an ideal atmosphere for this work. O.R.Y. Princeton, New Jersey June 1,1966

viii

Contents Preface

vii

Introduction

3

Part I: Intervention and Peacekeeping CHAPTER ONE: International Crises and Third-Party Functions International Crises: Their Nature and Characteristics Third-Party Intervention

9 25

CHAPTER TWO: Third-Party Tactics: An Intervenor's Repertory of Practice Mediatory and Conciliatory Actions Positive and Independent Actions Service Activities

50 61 68

CHAPTER THREE:

The Identity of the Third Party

Resources and Capabilities Potential Interveners CHAPTER FOUR:

80 91

Three Images of United Nations

Peacekeeping The Charter System—Great-Power Solidarity The Uniting for Peace Era—The United Nations and the Cold War The Hammarskjold Framework—Peacekeeping Despite the Cold War An Emergent Pattern? Some Comparisons of the Three Images

116 126 135 144 148

Part 11: Applications CHAPTER FIVE: United Nations Intervention in Soviet-American Crises Introduction The Soviet-American Confrontation The Problem of Acceptability CHAPTER SIX:

159 161 173

A Roster of Superpower Crises

Prevention Crisis Control Intrawar Limitations Restoration

206 208 228 246

Intervention by the SecretaryGeneral and Secretariat: The Mustering of Capabilities CHAPTER SEVEN:

Focus on the Secretary-General and the Secretariat Fulfillment of Requirements

263 271

Intervention by the SecretaryGeneral and Secretariat: The Performance of Instrumental Activities CHAPTER EIGHT:

The Utilization of Instrumental Activities A Resume of Problems

310 335

Part III: Prospects for the Future The Nature of Change and the Role of the Third Party CHAPTER NINE:

The Structure of the International System Alignments and Patterns of Conflict The Modalities of Coercion

350 366 382

Bibliography

401

Index

421

THE INTERMEDIARIES

Introduction HIS STUDY has two principal focuses. It deals both with the development of theory relating to the termination of international crises and with some concrete problems concerning United Nations peacekeeping operations. There is, however, a close relationship between the two areas, since theory performs the function of structuring the discussion of peacekeeping, and, since the data on the United Nations serves to illustrate various concepts, categories, and models developed at a considerably higher level of abstraction. The general theoretical problem addressed in the study concerns the termination of severe two-sided (though not necessarily only two-party) crises in the international arena. And the principal question for extended analysis focuses on the actions or types of activity which relevant third parties can undertake to facilitate the achievement of this result in various types of crisis. A somewhat blanket statement to the effect that third parties can frequently intervene effectively and constructively in crises appears from time to time in the literature on international politics. There are, however, no detailed analyses, either theoretical or empirical, which break down this general proposition and attempt to get at its roots. The theoretical thrust of the present study is, therefore, an effort to delve in some detail into the basic nature and conditions of third-party intervention in international crises. In brief, this objective leads to the following principal channels of enquiry. First, it is essential to investigate the basic nature of third-party intervention and the characteristics of crises which generate roles of this kind. Second, attention focuses on the range of distinguishable activities and tactics which third parties can undertake in the effort to facilitate the termination of crises. Third, an important variable in the analysis of third-party activities deals with the physical and

T

3

INTRODUCTION

nonphysical resources and requirements for the successful launching of a program of intervention. Fourth, there is some analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of various potential third parties in the international arena. Fifth, the relationships between the general type or class of crisis in question and the types of third-party activities which become relevant come in for a certain amount of discussion at various places in the study. Finally, a question of considerable importance in the later and more concrete portions of the text concerns the possibilities of a potential third party engaging in preparatory activities designed to increase the chances for successful intervention in future crises. The central goal of all of these lines of enquiry is the effort to outline at least the rudiments of a general theory of thirdparty intervention. At the same time, however, it seems clear that the resultant theoretical material and apparatus will gain substantially in both clarity and relevance through applications to some concrete situations. Moreover, some rather specific, policy-oriented problems dealing with United Nations peacekeeping call for detailed analysis at the present time. For these reasons, the present study contains some specific discussions focusing on a variety of possible types of SovietAmerican crisis as potential contexts of third-party intervention, and on the Secretary-General of the United Nations and his staff as potential intervenors. The analysis of international peacekeeping, at this time, is very much under the influence of a number of concepts and doctrines which date, for the most part, from the Hammarskjold administration. These concepts and doctrines, in general, take a dim view of the possibility of constructive United Nations intervention in superpower crises. As I. L. Claude, Jr., has written: ". . . he [Hammarskjold] virtually discarded the idea that the Organization could usefully or safely intervene in 'problems which are clearly and definitely within the orbit of present day conflict be4

INTRODUCTION

tween power blocs.' In such instances, he feared, it would be 'practically impossible for the Secretary-General to operate effectively with the means put at his disposal, short of risking seriously to impair the usefulness of his office. . . . ' n i The international system, however, is changing rapidly, and the opportunities and needs for international peacekeeping operations are no longer entirely the same as they were even a few short years ago during the Hammarskjold administration. In short, this study advances and discusses the proposition that the overall framework of the international system and the more specific relationships between the Soviet Union and the United States have been moving in directions which place the notion of constructive United Nations intervention in future Soviet-American crises clearly and definitely within the realm of the possible. For this reason, the body of the study includes a substantial amount of detailed material dealing with those dynamic elements in the international system which appear to be creating the basis for the type of peacekeeping operations mentioned in this paragraph and with the present and potential resources of the United Nations for handling the types of activity that might become relevant in this context. The concrete propositions concerning United Nations peacekeeping presented in this study are in no sense incompatible with the prevailing concepts and doctrines of peacekeeping. On the contrary, the presently accepted theory is still highly relevant to real-world situations, and it seems likely that it will remain important in the foreseeable future. The propositions advanced in this study are more nearly a set of supplementary ideas than the basis of an alternative to the present theory. In fact, they constitute a 1

1 . L. Claude, Jr., "The Political Framework of the United Nations' Financial Problems," International Organization, Vol. 17, No. 4 (1963), pp. 837-838—he is quoting from the Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General, 1959-1960.

5

INTRODUCTION

response to a segment of the broad spectrum of international crises to which the prevailing theory does not address itself. The thesis that the United Nations could or should intervene in future Soviet-American crises commands, as yet, little acceptance in principle and as a theoretical concept. But there are clear indications that the Organization will not be able to divorce itself entirely from such occurrences in practice.2 Given this situation, there are likely to be significant potential returns to efforts directed toward the initiation of preparatory activities designed to meet future demands as early as possible. In particular, the potential payoffs to actions designed to prepare people for any emerging doctrines of peacekeeping should be great enough to justify the devotion of considerable time and effort to such activities. From this perspective, the main body of the text of this study offers a number of concrete proposals and recommendations aimed at increasing United Nations capabilities to act in the role of a third party in future superpower crises. Finally, it is worth stressing that the general theory of third-party intervention is applicable to a number of possible interveners and to a wide variety of crises in the international arena. The concrete, empirical material included in this study is in no way designed to exhaust the potential relevance and applications of the general concepts and propositions elaborated. On the contrary, this material aims at tying these concepts and propositions down to one set of specific real-world situations which in any case appear to be ripe for analysis at the present time. 2

The way in which the United Nations became involved in the Cuban crisis of October 1962 (in this case through the office of the Secretary-General), despite views like those of Hammarskjold quoted above, would seem to lend substance to this proposition.

6

PART I

Intervention and Peacekeeping

. . . if we do not devise means of tackling and making safe the violent antagonisms which sometimes arise in the world in such a way that they do not spread and infect the community of nations, then all our efforts to improve on the past or to plan for the future will be in vain. U THANT

CHAPTER ONE

International Crises and Third-Party Functions

V

scholarly work, especially at the theoretical level, has been done on any aspect of international crises. As Charles McClelland has recently written, "acute crises have not often been made the focus either of theorizing or of intensive analytic research."1 For this reason the following discussions of crises in general and third-party intervention in particular inevitably tend to have a certain tentative quality about them and sometimes lack a desirable degree of precision. In short, it is not yet possible to elaborate a precise and adequately tested theory or set of theoretical propositions concerning international crises. But this very problem also points to the need for serious study in this area. ERY LITTLE

INTERNATIONAL CRISES: THEIR NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS

A. The Nature of International Crises The term "crisis" tends to be used without explanation and with the tacit assumption that its general meaning will somehow be understood. Unfortunately, this assumption does not appear to be a safe one, and the result is a great deal of confusion about the precise meaning of the concept. It may therefore be useful to supply for this study an orienting definition and a conceptual discussion of the nature of international crises. Exercises of this kind have severe limitations, but in this case it seems important to place some boundaries on the subject matter in question and to set forth several important analytic characteristics of inter1

Charles McClelland, "The Acute International Crisis," in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba (eds.), The International System (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 182.

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THE INTERMEDIARIES

national crises. In this discussion significant attention will be paid to the insights of systems theory.2 An international crisis, then, is a set of rapidly unfolding events3 which raises the impact of destabilizing forces in the general international system or any of its subsystems substantially above "normal" (i.e., average) levels and increases the likelihood of violence occurring in the system. Crises vary so greatly in scope and intensity that they may affect anything from a few components of the total system to the whole system; and they may vary from the production of disturbances that can be handled to the generation of definitively disruptive upheavals. Although the core meaning of the concept is relatively clear-cut, there are definite problems in establishing its boundaries. A crisis is generally considered to be a more taxing and disruptive disturbance than a dispute, but the operational boundary between the two notions is very hazy. Fortunately, it does not seem to be of crucial importance to make this distinction absolutely precise. The other boundary of the notion of crisis is easier to define. The most acute and extensive of crises would result in the immediate disruption or breakdown of the total international system. Less acute crises would leave the essential elements of the system intact, but they might tax its regulatory and control capacities seriously, cause considerable damage and destruction within the system, and set in motion changes 2 Of course, a variety of other perspectives could be employed. This study has been constructed, however, primarily from the point of view of the overall international system rather than its components. For a general introduction to systems theory consult, inter alia: L. von Bertalanffy, articles in General Systems Yearbook, Vol. 1 (1956) and Vol. 7 (1962); W. Ross Ashby, Design for a Brain (2nd ed.: New York: John Wiley, 1960), and Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government (Glencoe, IU.: The Free Press, 1963). 8 A given set of events may be causally linked together to form a full-fledged "crisis system" or only coincidentally juxtaposed.

10

INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND THIRD-PARTY FUNCTIONS

which would in time significantly affect the operations of the system. It is conceivable that a particularly severe crisis culminating in a major war could cause decision-makers to agree on the establishment of viable mechanisms designed to prevent its recurrence.4 Several important features of the definition of international crisis should perhaps be discussed in somewhat greater detail. First, crises are here conceived as sets of events which flare up or jell so rapidly that they become visible as crises with a certain suddenness. The roots and origins of such crises tend to stretch back over a considerable period of time, but the final stage of take-off and development is telescoped into a short space of time. Crises should, therefore, be distinguished from stresses and strains in the international system which build up slowly and have a cumulative effect. The population problem is gradually reaching the point of becoming a major systemic stress; the Cuban missile affair of 1962 was a real crisis. This distinction is one that is not often made explicitly, but it is important in the accurate delineation of the types of phenomena focused on in this study.5 Another feature worth noting is that crises can be defined in terms of rapid increases in the demands made on the control and regulatory capacities of the international system. Here the discussion turns on the homeostatic processes built into the system itself. A set of events that would constitute a severe crisis for a system with little homeostatic control would not even be perceived as a crisis for a system with better regulatory processes. In these terms, crises can be viewed as sets of events which tax the elasticity of the system, a property which in itself is likely to vary over a * Herman Kahn, Thinking About the Unthinkable (New York: Horizon Press, 1962), chaps. 2 and 5. 5 Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan in Power and Society, for example, stress increases in the imminence of violence but say nothing about time elements.

11

THE INTERMEDIARIES

period of time. A hypothesis has several times been set forth to the effect that social systems, in contrast to some natural systems, tend to be able to withstand short, sharp shocks more easily than gradually cumulated strains. This hypothesis may be worth keeping in mind in considering the workings of international crises. Finally, by now it is clear that crises are closely related to various problems of systemic stability.6 There is a direct relationship between crises and systemic stability when stability is defined as the tendency of a system's essential variables to remain within defined limits.7 In this context, it is probably useful to consider this relationship in terms of a set of concentric circles, in which the center is the equilibrium point of the system and each larger circle represents a class of crises one order of magnitude more severe than the smaller circle. The system's stability could then be stated in terms of the magnitude of crises it could undergo without losing its tendency to return to its equilibrium point. And with this framework it is possible to speak of types of crisis grouped by subject area which would fall into various rings of the concentric circle pattern. In the contemporary international system, as opposed to some narrower-gauge systems, large-scale political crises and especially politicomilitary crises tend to populate the outer rings of seriously destabilizing crises. For this reason the present study focuses particularly on crises of these varieties. Here the notion of crisis tolerance of the international system and its various subsystems becomes relevant. Crisis tolerance however, also, has some connections with the problems of stresses and strains. A system which has been gradually dis6

The whole question of systemic stability is very complex and tends to be rather obscure. On the subject of stability in international politics see Morton Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (New York: John Wiley, 1957), pt. i. 7 R. Hall and A. Fagen, "Definition of System," General Systems Yearbook, Vol. 1 (1956), p. 23.

1 2

INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND THIRD-PARTY FUNCTIONS

equilibrated by stresses and strains will almost certainly be less able to maintain its stability in the face of a severe crisis than a system which is not out of balance in this way when such a crisis flares up. The general, undifferentiated notion of crisis can be analyzed from a variety of perspectives. It is, of course, virtually impossible to make predictions ahead of time concerning the outbreak and course of specific crises. But there are a number of distinguishable types of crisis whose inner workings and basic mechanisms are quite separate and distinct. In the following paragraphs several of these types of crisis are identified and commented on briefly. One basic crisis mechanism is the phenomenon of positive feedback.8 Within a dynamic system certain components may behave in such a way as to elicit responses from other components which, in turn, have the effect of spurring the original components on to additional activities in the same direction as their first actions. Such mutual stimulation may go on through a number of rounds. This is the most important mechanism underlying the intensifying spiral of security dilemmas,9 and arms races have often been analyzed in these terms. In fact, L. F. Richardson's analyses of arms races in these terms have led to the use of the phrase "Richardson processes" to describe this mechanism.10 Even more relevant in the context of this study is the fact that escalation sequences leading to serious international crises generally operate on the basis of positive feedback. In this context, two crucial variables relating to positive feedback should be mentioned. The mechanism 8

Deutsch, op.cit., chap. 11. On this subject consult John Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), chap. 10. 10 Consult Anatol Rapaport, Fights, Games, and Debates (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960), pt. i, and Kenneth Boulding, Conflict and Defense (New York: Harper & Bros., 1962), chap. 2. 9

13

THE INTERMEDIARIES

depends on a given "fuel supply," whether it be money and material in arms races or resolve and commitment in escalation sequences. And if the fuel supply is exhausted before the upward spiral of the crisis results in breakdown or disruption in the system, the crisis is likely to die away rather quickly, leaving the system intact though perhaps rather severely damaged. In addition, it makes a great deal of difference whether the responses of sets of components are characteristically larger or smaller than the stimuli which cause them. The reference here is to the phenomena of under-responding and over-responding. A crisis system characterized by consistent over-response is likely to be extremely unstable in the sense that it will spiral toward higher levels of intensity and greater scope with increasing speed and in the sense that it is unlikely to generate a new equilibrium point somewhere along the upward spiral. Under-response, on the other hand, leads to crises with built-in "dampening" processes. A second type of systemic crisis is chiefly characterized by the failure of negative feedback processes and the consequent breakdown or disturbance of systemic steering mechanisms.11 Here the underlying crisis mechanism is based on what might be called steering pathologies. Irrational decisions, the development of blinders which distort decisions or lock steering devices, and the problems of rigidity which lead to tests of will such as the international game of "chicken"12 are all characteristic of this kind of crisis. Steering systems are, in fact, relatively complex and can be short-circuited at a number of different points. A system may receive distorted, inaccurate, or inadequate information; or it may fail to process its received information in 11

DeUtSCh, op.cit., chaps. 11 and 13. The juvenile game of "chicken" as an analog to certain aspects of international politics was first suggested by Bertrand Russell. See his Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1959), pp. 30-31. 12

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INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND THIRD-PARTY FUNCTIONS

useful ways; or it may be unable to make connections between received data and memory traces; or, finally, it may be subject to various forces which degrade its ability to implement or effect its decisions. Next, the overload crisis deserves mentioning. Any system has only a limited capacity to hand inputs and demands on its decision-making capacity. Most systems are able to handle day-to-day demands, but it is expensive to build and maintain extra capacity to handle unusually heavy loads or abnormal loads, with the result that all systems have a certain load capacity above which they tend to become unstable and to disintegrate or break down. A crisis of -this type can therefore be defined as a situation in which too many demands are placed on a system over a very short length of time. In the international system this is a particularly significant problem, since types of loads and demand levels tend to fluctuate rapidly and substantially. This type of crisis mechanism would seem to be especially important for the nation-state components of the overall international system, but it is also clearly relevant in discussing at least some system-wide crises. It is possible to identify an underload or "starvation" crisis mechanism which, in a sense, is the opposite of the crisis mechanism described in the previous paragraph. Systems may break down or be disrupted due to an input insufficiency. Thus an automobile breaks down when it runs out of fuel and a complex decision-making system cannot operate for long without a steady input of personnel. In general, however, it would appear that "starvation" crises are not as important as overload crises in the contemporary international system. Finally, there is a basic type of crisis which might be called an adaptation crisis. The principal characteristic of crises of this type is inadequacy of systemic learning capacity in the face of rapid and dynamic changes in the system. Thus, for example, it is presently an open question whether 15

THE INTERMEDIARIES

the international system has the learning capacity to adapt successfully to rapid changes in military technology. The consequences of the rapid introduction of various possible future weapons systems are often debated heatedly. The adaptation crisis is of great importance in the present international system in view of the fact that system-wide changes of a broad scope and impact are occurring with great rapidity. The problems of rigidity and brittleness are, in fact, becoming relevant if not crucial on many fronts. On balance, it is probable that the positive feedback crisis is central and most relevant for the study of thirdparty intervention designed to facilitate nonviolent crisis termination. Such crises are characteristically based on a stimulus-response interaction, and the international dilemma potential of this type of mechanism seems to be particularly great.13 But all of the basic crisis mechanisms, as well as various mixtures of these mechanisms, should be kept in mind in considering the theory and practice of third-party intervention. In particular, variations in the underlying crisis mechanism are likely to affect the types of third-party activities that may become relevant, the range of resources and capabilities a third party would need, and the overall likelihood that intervention can be carried out successfully in any given case. B. Some Parameters for the Study of Crises There are many factors and variables relevant to the study of international crises, and it is possible to construct various lists and typologies. Unfortunately, none of those that have been constructed to date is in any way adequate in the sense of containing a satisfying or comprehensive theory of political or systemic crises. And there is a consequent 13 Herman Kahn, "Escalation and its Strategic Context," in National Security: Political, Military and Economic Strategies in the Decade Ahead (New York: Praeger, 1963)—reprinted by the Hudson Institute as HI-241-P.

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INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND THIRD-PARTY FUNCTIONS

tendency to become lost in a welter of insufficiently integrated concepts and somewhat disjointed notions. Nevertheless, among the many sets of factors and characteristics that have been elaborated from time to time, there are a few that seem worth keeping in mind in the context of this study. One set of aspects that deserves consideration covers the causes, functions, and environment (context) of international crises. Crises virtually always have a multiplicity of causes, and their etiology can be traced in many complex series of events over substantial periods of time. It is probably useful, however, to distinguish between the proximate and underlying causes of crises. The immediate causes or antecedents of a crisis can often be pinpointed and explained in some detail. The job becomes much more difficult as one traces the origins of a crisis back over time and seeks for explanations at various levels of analysis. It is almost accepted practice to look upon a crisis as a pathological phenomenon and therefore dysfunctional by definition. This is probably an excessively rigid approach to the phenomenon of crisis. It is almost certainly true that some of the basic concepts developed by Simmel14 and Coser15 in pointing out various positive functions of conflict in general can be applied, mutatis mutandi, to international crises. A thorough analysis of almost any international crisis would certainly have to include a balancing of its functions and dysfunctions. This point becomes quite clear when various system levels are taken into account with the realization that what is dysfunctional at one system level may well be functional at another system level. As regards crisis environments in the contemporary international system, a distinction should be made particularly between crises which occur in nuclear 14

Georg Simmel, Conflict (translated by Kurt Wolff) (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1955). 15 Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1956).

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THE INTERMEDIARIES

environments and those occurring in non-nuclear environments. It is not necessary that nuclear weapons be actually utilized for a nuclear context to influence the development of a crisis substantially. Whenever the possibility of nuclear devices being employed is present, their presence, even if they are unused, will greatly influence the motivations, attitudes, and expectations of relevant decision-makers at all levels. A very interesting and suggestive set of characteristic aspects of international crises is elaborated in a study of such crises made by the Hudson Institute.16 These aspects have been given the form of capsule propositions, and, taken together, they are suggestive of many additional hypotheses concerning international crisis. The list follows: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

Turning points are perceived Decisions and actions are required Threats, warnings, or promises are seen The outcome will shape the future Events converge Uncertainties increase Control of events is decreased Urgency increases Information may become more inadequate Time pressures increase Interrelations among actors are changed (intra- and international) 12. International tensions increase (?)

These characteristics strongly support the view that periods of international crisis, whatever else they may be, are entirely different from noncrisis periods. And this conclusion leads directly to the proposition that extreme care should 16

Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener (eds.), Crises and Arms Control (Hudson Institute, HI-180-RR, 9 October 1962), pp. 7-11. This material on characteristics of crises derives primarily from the work of Anthony Wiener.

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INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND THIRD-PARTY FUNCTIONS

be exercised in applying noncrisis standards of relevance and feasibility to the analysis of crisis situations. A third set of factors includes the notions of intensity, duration, and time phases or stages. There is apparently a threshold of visibility below which events that have the potential to generate a crisis are not perceived as such or even as particularly relevant to the possibility of a future crisis. It is difficult to place such a threshold operationally because it exists in the minds of men rather than in objective reality, but its existence seems to be important in governing behavior patterns, expectations, and attitudes. Further, a crisis may hang in the threshold of visibility for some time, gradually becoming part of the accepted scenery, and only later catch people unprepared by blossoming into a full-blown severe crisis very suddenly. Crises, like other socio-political phenomena, appear to have definite life cycles in the sense that they develop, grow, and fade away and in the sense that they go through definite stages during the course of their existence." Moreover, it is almost certainly incorrect to analyze crises in terms of a uniformly rising level of tension and in terms of a unimodal distribution of severity or tension. Such an image leads easily to the view that crises build steadily toward a point of no return and that after this point there is little that can be done to facilitate their termination. In reality, however, it appears that crises tend to go through a variety of phases which differ significantly in terms of such variables as scope, intensity, and response patterns of the principal participants. Any given crisis is likely to exhibit various ups and 17

The notion of life cycles with distinguishable stages and processes has been used extensively in economics. Very little use has been made of this notion, however, by political scientists. For some rather tentative applications of life cycle concepts to the analysis of voting decisions and campaigns see Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld, and William McPhee, Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), chap. 13, especially pp. 280-290.

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THE INTERMEDIARIES

downs and to pass through a number of distinguishable phases during its life cycle. This staging or phasing process is of very great significance for the general problem of third-party attempts to facilitate a nonviolent termination of particular crises. It appears, in fact, that during any given crisis there are certain stages in which outside intervention is likely to have a noticeably greater chance of success than in other stages. A variety of factors is involved in such shifts, of which at least several may be mentioned here. Above all, it is clear that the evaluations of gains, losses, prospects, relevant variables, likely future developments, and so forth made by the principal parties tend to shift during the processes of bargaining and therefore during the life cycle of a crisis.18 It seems clear that some conjunctions of evaluations produce situations in which outside intervention is more likely to produce an impact than do others. In this connection, it might be added that there are frequently some possibilities for a third party itself to affect shifts in the evaluations made by the protagonists. Another important set of factors affecting the phasing phenomenon in crises might be grouped under the heading of domestic (intraparty) political developments.19 This heading covers such matters as developments in public opinion, rigidity and flexibility in decision-making apparatus, the impact of shifting fear levels and perceptions of the course of events, and domestic resource mobilization. It is also worth noting that a crisis may generate very important asymmetries in terms of these variables, especially in such cases as the pressures of public opinion.20 In general, then, 18

Fred Charles IkIe, How Nations Negotiate (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), chap. 10. 18 Ibid., chap. 8. 20 See, for example, Morton Kaplan and Nicholas Katzenbach, The Political Foundations of International Law (New York: John Wiley, 1961), p. 52.

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INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND THIRD-PARTY FUNCTIONS

the phenomenon of crisis life cycles should probably be studied extensively from the point of view of various possibilities of third-party intervention, even though a number of rather intangible elements such as diplomatic skill and precision timing are undoubtedly very important in determining the outcome of intervention efforts.21 Especially relevant for the analysis of terminating crises are such factors as rules, regulations, and methods of control. In no way does it detract from the importance of studying the possibilities of preventing international crises to say that the problems of controlling and regulating crises which do flare up should receive considerable attention. In fact, this emphasis stems more from a realistic assessment of the likelihood of serious crises developing in the future than from a negative outlook toward any possible avenue for the prevention of crises. Rules and regulations which derive from enlightened self-interest, reciprocal observation, caution, conservative or prudential behavior patterns, traditional norms, and accepted standards of conduct are not necessarily cast to the winds even in the most acute of crises. As Fred IkIe has recently stated, "Some rules of accommodation are observed even between bitter enemies whose relationship approaches a 'zero-sum' conflict. . . ."22 The idea of maintaining rules and regulations during the course of active warfare is anomalous only until the subtleties of human psychology are brought into the analysis. It is by no means inconceivable that certain types of international crisis or aspects of such crises could be partially or wholly institutionalized23 and brought within a framework of certain basic rules, with the result that their sharper dysfunctions could be reduced in significance. In fact, significant examples of such processes of institutionalization can be 21

Ann Douglas, "The Peaceful Settlement of Industrial and Intergroup Disputes," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1957), pp. 69-81. 22 IkIe, op.cit., p. 88. 23 McClelland, op.cit., pp. 198-203.

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found in both past and present conflict patterns. Hans Speier's formulation of the concept of agonistic warfare,24 for example, is of distinct relevance in this context. C. Some Notes on the System Level of Crises Crises within the general framework of the international system vary widely in terms of scope. In fact, it is possible to distinguish quite clearly a number of levels of international crisis which differ from each other in important respects on the basis of this variable. Above all, distinctions should be drawn among system-wide crises, subsystem upheavals, and component failures. A crisis in a systemic component may be extremely acute and generate problems which have substantial effects in wider international circles, but it is hardly likely to have the impact on the stability of the overall system which a crisis of broader scope, involving many of the system's components, would have. More specifically, several particular levels of crisis should be identified here. Interbloc crises involve a confrontation of major political blocs in the international system and are system-wide in the sense that their effects and repercussions are felt throughout the overall system. Since the dominant channel of conflict in the contemporary international system flows along the East-West axis,25 crises between the two blocs involved in this conflict are likely to carry with them greater dangers of system-wide destabilization than any other crises. There is evidence that other channels of conflict, especially the North-South channel, are becoming more important and this is adding additional dimensions and complexity to international crises.26 At present, however, the East-West conflict continues to retain 24

Hans Speier, Social Order and the Risks of War (New York: George W. Stewart, 1952), chap. 18. 25 George Liska, Nations in Alliance (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), chaps. 1 and 4. 28 Ibid., chap. 6.

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its high level of saliency. The fact that neutralism and nonalignment, for example, now tend to be defined in terms of this conflict in many cases is only one among many indications of this situation. Two distinct varieties of interbloc crisis might be mentioned. A crisis may occur as a direct confrontation between bloc leaders—e.g., a Soviet-American crisis—or it may take the form of a confrontation of lesser bloc members or of a lesser bloc member against the opposing leading bloc member. The concrete material presented in later chapters of this study focuses on SovietAmerican crises. The levels of crisis identified in the following paragraphs should therefore be separated clearly from interbloc crises. Coalition and alliance crises can be viewed as intrabloc or subsystem crises. Such crises involve the stability or integration of a particular bloc and tend to take the form of leader-follower confrontations. At the level of intrabloc relationships, the problems of stresses and strains are generally more important than crises. In Wolfer's phrase, the "stresses and strains in 'going it with others' "27 are likely to be both more prevalent and more important than the outright disruption or upheaval of crisis. There is no a priori method of predicting the impact of subsystem crises on the overall system. It is possible, however, for subsystems to be thoroughly rearranged or even disrupted without necessarily destabilizing the overall system in any radical sense. Since the basic component of the contemporary international system is the nation state, intranational crises can be looked upon as component disturbances or in some cases as component failures. Such crises are common in any system,28 and in the case of the international system they may 27

Arnold Wolfers (ed.), Alliance Policy in the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1959), p. 1. 28 Extensive work of a theoretical nature on component failures dates at least from studies conducted during World War II when

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not actually even become international crises in the sense that their effects may never seriously impinge on the stability of the overall system or any of its essential subsystems. Only when the developments in an intranational crisis generate significant effects in the international arena does the crisis become an international crisis. If a number of important systemic components were to undergo crises simultaneously, this in itself would probably constitute a system-wide crisis. Any system will have a certain tolerance for component failures beyond which the whole system will begin to become unstable. Crises may also occur between a bloc member or members and a nonbloc state or states. Many of the colonial and neo-colonial crises which pit an emerging state against a member of the Western bloc tend to fall under this rubric. The difficulty here is that crises on this level tend to become interbloc crises through the processes of intervention and escalation. A crisis centering around the efforts of an emerging state to achieve independence, for example, is extremely likely to pull in the leading bloc members of the East and the West. The distinction drawn in this paragraph, therefore, tends to become very hazy in practice even though it is conceptually clear. Finally, the extrabloc crisis occurs between states which are not members of any of the principal international blocs. The various Arab-Israeli crises have tended to display the characteristics of this type of crisis although the cases may not be perfectly clear-cut. In any case, here, too, interbloc rivalry has a tendency to spill over into such crises, and the processes of crisis escalation tend to take place. The danger of direct interbloc confrontation is sufficiently great to result in a frequent superimposition of interbloc contention onto extrabloc problems. But this, too, is potentially such ideas had military applications to such problems as keeping damaged warships afloat.

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dangerous, since what appears to be an extrabloc crisis may be suddenly transformed into a direct interbloc confrontation. This is why current theories of preventive diplomacy and activities designed to isolate crises from the cold war enjoy so much support. It is hoped that local crises can be prevented from taking on the character of system-wide crises with the consequent implications for stability. THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION Crises of various kinds are virtually certain to be prominent occurrences in the future. The problems of regulating them and facilitating their termination are, therefore, important subjects for analysis and study. This section focuses on the nature of third-party intervention and the various functions a third party can perform in facilitating the termination of severe international crises. Particular attention is devoted to the underlying sources of the roles in the bargaining processes characteristic of two-sided international crises, the variety of functions involved, and special characteristics of the international arena which are likely to create problems for an intervenor. The materials on the sources and functions of third-party actions tend to merge, but a partial separation will be made along these lines for the purposes of discussion. A. Sources of Third-Party Roles It is extremely difficult in the contemporary world to hypothecate an international crisis which is, strictly speaking, a zero-sum situation in the sense that the gains of one side are exactly equal to the losses of the other side. On the contrary, international crises tend to have a very distinct competitive-cooperative flavor29 and they may sometimes even take on the quality of positive-sum situations. The re29

On competitive-cooperative conflict see in general Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), chap. 4.

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lationship between the two sides is basically a constant bargaining process carried on through a wide variety of declaratory moves and concrete actions. And there are few cases, even between the bitterest of enemies, in which significant rules and limitations are not observed. As Boulding has put it: Bargaining is a positive-sum game [sic], frequently non-symmetrical between the parties, in which there is a curious mixture of cooperation and conflict—cooperation in that both parties with a certain range of possible solutions will be better off with a solution, that is, a bargain, than without one and conflict in that, within the range of possible solutions, the distribution of the total benefit between the two parties depends on the particular solution adopted.30 In some ways the situation is made more complicated by the fact that the processes of bargaining in many contemporary international crises are carried on between sides that wield the same basic order of actual or potential power and influence, so that the relationship cannot stabilize in a dominance-submission pattern. It is clear, particularly in the case of Soviet-American interaction, that the two parties are only "conditionally viable"31 in respect to each other so that the possibility of large-scale mutual destruction must be considered in the analysis. Under these circumstances, bargaining relationships are characterized by both interdependence among the participants and a mixing of the motives of each of the parties. Interdependent decision refers to a situation in which no participant can decide upon its own course of action without taking into account the possible actions of other participants. Bargaining relationships are therefore contingent 30

Boulding, op.cit., p. 314. For the concepts of conditional and unconditional viability see ibid., chap. 4. 31

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by nature, and the policies of the participants tend to take the form either of "If State X does A, then we must do B" or of "We must do C in the hopes of eliciting response D from X." In this connection, evaluation, expectations, the projection of expectations, and various bargaining tactics assume positions of central importance. The phenomenon of mixed motives does not refer to a situation in which the various motives of a participant are ambiguous or confused.32 It refers instead to the fact that in most bargaining contexts each party has a number of incentives, some of which indicate competition and others of which indicate cooperation as far as its relationships with the other party are concerned. The core notions of this pattern are illustrated by Model I. Here point E represents the situation at the onset of bargaining while curve AD indicates the boundary of maximum potential utility under the conditions imposed by the environment. The optimum outcome for participant X is at point A though he gains from any outcome above point C. For participant Y, on the other hand, the best outcome is at point D while he gains from any outcome beyond point B. Both sides gain from any movement in a northeasterly direction from E and both lose from any southwesterly movement. The two sides, therefore, have common or overlapping interests in achieving any movement of the fonner type and avoiding any movement of the latter type. However, they also have competitive interests, since each is interested in maximizing its own utility regardless of the outcome for its opponent. It is important to realize that there is a relatively large number of possible outcomes to a competitive-cooperative bargaining situation of this kind. Most simply, the relationship may remain at or revert to the status quo ante with no gains or losses being registered by either side. This outcome actually occurs with some regularity in international politics, though there is a tendency for it to shade gradu32

Schelling, op.cit., p. 89.

27

Model ally into a second type of consequence characterized by a loss for both sides. One side may lose while the other gains. This result would appear in the model as an outcome anywhere in the spaces bounded by points ABEG or points CDHE. A variation on this type of outcome covers the situation in which the utility of one participant remains unchanged while the other either gains or loses. Finally, there are many points at which the outcome is a gain for both sides. It is significant, however, that a very small fraction of these points would result in symmetrical gains. AU the others represent not only asymmetry but varying degrees of asymmetry. 28

INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND THIRD-PARTY FUNCTIONS

The basic model under discussion up to this point contains a basic structural symmetry which restricts it descriptive applicability. The five subsets of Model II illustrate a number of variations on the basic problem of competitivecooperative bargaining. Models Ha and Hb demonstrate the point that the input of competition and cooperation in a bargaining relationship may vary greatly. Model Ha represents a situation in which the cooperative interests are strong in the sense that a large proportion of the universe of outcomes are cases in which both sides gain, while Model Hb illustrates a very strongly competitive relationship. The next two figures deal with the very important question of asymmetrical balances of competitive and cooperative motives between the participants. In Model Hc, Participant Y has a great deal to gain and little to lose while the reverse is the case for Participant X. Model Hd simply maps the opposite set of priorities. Balances of this kind may vary in complex patterns, and it is important to note that they may interact with the differing strengths of competition and cooperation mentioned above to form a much larger universe of potential cases. The final subset constitutes a somewhat special case. This is a situation in which some of the cooperative outcomes have been artificially and arbitrarily excluded. Such a case has important implications for bargaining since it reduces the room for "cooperative haggling" while it leaves all the possibilities of noncooperative activities untouched. Real-life analogs to a situation of this kind might stem either from nonrational rigidities or from physical restraints. Discussions of bargaining focus primarily on the problems of 1) arriving at a bargain rather than an outcome of "no agreement," 2) the ways in which the specific location of the bargain in terms of utilities is finally settled on, and 3) avoiding an outcome whose consequence is a loss for both sides. In this connection, it is important to keep in mind the fact that even within the zones of cooperation 29

Model II

INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND THIRD-PARTY FUNCTIONS

(the areas bounded by points BCE and EHFG in Model I) there are significant problems of competition. In a situation where both sides gain, there is room for a great deal of conflict over the exact extent of the gains of each side, while the opposite case of mutual loss still leaves the problem of allocating the losses. One final problem which makes bargaining even more complicated concerns the question of interdependent utilities.38 Stated by way of example, the problem is to determine whether X would consider a gain by Y to be a loss for himself which should be compensated for or a gain for himself which should lead him to moderate his own expectations. Or, to take the reverse case, it is relevant to ask whether X will be willing to assume a greater loss himself if he knows that this will lead to increased losses for Y. In formal game theory, this set of problems is simply denied by promulgating the prescription that an actor must never take interdependent utilities into account in choosing his own course. In many real-life situations, however, the interdependence of utilities has substantial influence on one or both sides, and it is not possible simply to deny the whole question. The situations illustrated in the models are clearly made more dramatic when the two sides wield very great destructive capabilities and when, as a consequence, they are only conditionally viable vis-a-vis each other. The result is that the pay-offs to an outcome of mutual loss might very well be negative in the extreme for both sides, taking the form of highly destructive warfare. Although it is conceivable that an international crisis could be terminated with a simple return to the status quo ante, in any given crisis there is a significant though not very predictable possibility that this form of termination will not be a live option. In general, the size of the negative pay-offs to the outcome of 33

Consult also Stefan Valavanis, "The Resolution of Conflict When Utilities Interact," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 2, No. 2 (June 1958), pp. 156-169.

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mutual loss and the degree to which both sides are aware of the undesirable nature of such results will have an important influence on the strength of the common interests of the parties in arriving at a positive termination arrangement. At the same time it is true that a party which, due to various asymmetries, is less endangered by an outcome of mutual loss or which can persuade its opposite number that this is the case will gain in bargaining strength when it comes to determining the actual bargain to be struck.34 There are, however, a number of general reasons why the sides to such situations of crisis bargaining may have considerable difficulty in finally implementing their common or overlapping interests.35 In terms of the model discussed above, it may be very difficult to achieve movement in the direction of line BC from point E. Several distinct sets of problems may lead to this result and should be mentioned here. These problems may be considered the problems of the bargaining relationship. Several different types of ignorance and misunderstanding may influence the situation in important respects. Either or both parties may have problems of this type in respect to the nature of the bargaining relationship itself. For example, the relative position at the start of a crisis (i.e., point E) may be unknown or hard to define, or the exact nature of what would constitute a gain for either side may be hard to define or to agree upon even if defined. Perhaps even more important are the possibilities of ignorance and misunderstanding concerning the interests and motives of the other party. For example, the strength of the other party's fear of an outcome of mutual loss or the level of his commitment to a particular type of northeasterly movement may be unknown or perceived incorrectly. 34

Schelling, op.cit., chap. 2. Several more specific problems and dilemmas may characterize a particular bargaining relationship and will be discussed in later chapters. 35

32

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Another set of problems focuses around the emotional field of the crisis. Conflict situations are notorious for the degree to which they evoke emotional and nonrational reactions on the part of the participants. And such problems tend to be heightened both by the existence of a crisis atmosphere and by some of the peculiarities of the international arena. The pervasive influence of emotional responses can hamper the search for a bargaining solution or settlement in any of a number of ways. Examples would include the emotional distortion of reality and of opposing demands, the development of rigidities that have no real justification in terms of concrete interests, and increases in the frequency of irrational acts which bear little relationship to the goals and objectives of the parties. Finally, a number of severe dilemmas may arise from what might be called the demands and requirements of "strategic" bargaining. The bargaining relationship in which the admixture of conflict is very strong is a delicate balance. And the penalty for any misstep may be quite severe. In this situation great emphasis is generally placed on the maintenance of relative bargaining strength, on the creation of favorable expectations and attitudes on the part of both the opponent and outsiders, and on the use of a variety of bargaining tactics designed to make the most out of one's bargaining strength.36 When both sides bargain in a strategic fashion, as they often do in international crises, serious problems can arise. Neither side, for example, may be willing to take the first step toward termination and in so doing commit itself, both sides may be very anxious to avoid any appearance of making a concession, the premiums for appearing to be rigid and inflexible may sometimes be substantial, and, above all, the parties are likely to be desirous of avoiding any action that may cast doubt on 36

Kahn, Thinking About the Unthinkable, chap. 6, and Kahn and Wiener, eds., op.cit., pp. 251-263.

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their bargaining strength and skill in future situations.37 In connection with this last point concerning the future orientation of strategic bargaining, the importance of calculations of bargaining reputations should be emphasized.38 IkIe has put it in the following terms: The way in which a government negotiates and the conditions under which it accepts or rejects an agreement have an important bearing on its bargaining strength in the future. In every diplomatic confrontation, governments are trying not only to affect the terms of the agreement under negotiation but also to protect or improve their strength in future negotiations.39 And it is clear that the problem of bargaining reputations is important in the context of tacit as well as explicit bargaining situations. In the final analysis, it is possible to become so caught up in the dilemmas of strategic bargaining that the underlying dangers of an outcome of mutual loss are at least temporarily lost from sight. B. Nature of Third-Party Intervention The discussion of the various problems in which the parties to a crisis may become involved in the course of their efforts to reach an accommodation leads directly to the possibilities of third-party intervention. In fact, intervention will be defined here as any action taken by an actor that is not a direct party to the crisis, that is designed to reduce or remove one or more of the problems of the bargaining relationship and, therefore, to facilitate the termination of the crisis itself. The term "intervention" has, of course, been used on some occasions to refer to entry into a situation for the purposes of self-interested manipulation. The term is used here, however, in reference to the regula37

Schelling, op.cit., chaps. 2 and 3. IkIe, op.cit., chap. 6. 39 Ibid., p. 76. 38

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tion and termination of crisis and conflict situations. But even so, "the role is a complex one, with a whole spectrum of possible degrees of intervention into the conflict."40 Several general points concerning the nature of the role of a third party should be set forth for consideration here. Above all, the role is basically persuasive rather than coercive in the sense that it does not involve the direct use of military force. Various kinds of pressures can be put on the protagonists to force them to take steps toward a termination or solution and it may sometimes be useful to utilize supervisory teams and police forces. But the concept of third-party intervention does not cover acts amounting to entry by a party into the crisis as a participant on the same level as the original opponents. The role of the third party may, however, vary substantially along such axes as the following: formalityinformality, extensiveness of the resources committed by the third party, directness of penetration into the two-sided bargaining processes, and identity of the intervening party. But the role is ultimately directed toward aiding the parties to a crisis to realize their own common or overlapping interests when various problems threaten to disrupt or severely downgrade their bargaining relationship. In this sense the third party attempts to help both sides rather than to tip the balance toward one or the other. Finally, it should be noted explicitly that there is a real difference between regulating and terminating a crisis on the one hand and reaching a substantive settlement of the underlying issues. Especially in international conflicts, it may be possible to reach a real settlement only over an extended period of time. But third-party intervention may, nevertheless, be of great importance in terminating a given crisis in the sense of reducing the threat of violence in the system and bringing the destabilizing impact of the crisis under control. There are many kinds of intracrisis functions that a third Boulding, op.cit., p. 316.

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party may perform, and a premium is generally placed on inventiveness and imagination in specific crisis situations. Nevertheless, a discussion of some specific third-party functions may help to clarify the role and to convey a feeling for its nature. The following paragraphs will, therefore, focus on some illustrative functions which can be served through third-party intervention. At a minimum the very presence of a third party in the bargaining process is likely to have a noticeable effect on the behavior of the principals. Such a presence very often affects expectations and attitudes concerning acceptable behavior patterns. In discussing the mechanisms of conflict, Arthur Meyer has said: The mediator is a catalytic agent. The mere presence of an outsider, aside from anything he may do or say, will cause a change, and almost certainly a change for the better, in the behavior of the disputing parties. . . . Rudeness, irritation, and the habit of not listening . . . these are as vexing as the untenable arguments that accompany them. Progress has been made through the mediator's presence, though that presence has brought nothing more than temperate speech.41 And it is also possible that the presence of a third party, though it may not engage in any really organized or concrete activities, may provide a means for justifying concessions and rationalizing flexible behavior. As Stevens has put it: . . . it should be recognized that the mere fact of a mediator's entrance into a dispute provides the parties with a means for rationalizing retreats from previously held positions, particularly if the mediator can be made to ap41 Arthur Meyer, "Function of the Mediator in Collective Bargaining," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 13, No. 2 (January 1960), p. 161.

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pear to take part of the "responsibility" for any settlement.42 These propositions were originally set forth in connection with labor-management disputes, but they are formulated abstractly in terms of basic competitive-cooperative conflict mechanisms and should therefore be worth considering in the context of the international arena. It should, however, be noted that these functions would be most relevant to cases in which formal negotiations were being conducted. But this point should not be overdrawn. The impact of a third party in shaping expectations concerning acceptable behavior patterns even in a highly informal or tacit bargaining context might be substantial. The interjection of third-party views and evaluations is likely to have a significant effect on the expectations and attitudes of the participants in a crisis concerning the distribution of advantages and the course of the crisis as well as acceptable behavior patterns.43 External sanction or disapproval will have an effect, in many cases, on the certainty with which a party holds its position and on its ability to appeal to outside standards for support of its conduct. Similarly, intervention of this kind may affect the expectations of each party concerning the commitment of its opponent to its position and concerning the expectations of the opponent about its own firmness in holding its position. The attitudes and expectations which make up the bulk of the input into the constantly shifting evaluations of the parties are crucial to the outcome of any given bargaining relationship. And it is well worth noting that they tend to be highly susceptible to influence from a variety of sources. A third party may be particularly helpful in clearing up 42

Carl Stevens, Strategy and Collective Bargaining Negotiation (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1963), p. 130. 43 Morton Kaplan, "Bipolarity in a Revolutionary Age," in Morton Kaplan (ed.), The Revolution in World Politics (New York: John Wiley, 1962), p. 264.

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misunderstandings and unnecessary incompatibilities of images. In many situations the lack of any universal standards guiding selective perception and the absence of any universal criteria for the evaluation of data lead to rather substantial misunderstandings and snarls in communication.44 But the emotional problems, confusion, and convergence of events and difficulties typical of crisis environments are likely to add significantly to those misunderstandings. In this context, a well-informed and knowledgeable third party can pursue a variety of tactics to cut through some of the snarls of misunderstanding. Closely related to this point are the advantages of a third party in the effort to maintain neutral channels of communication for the protagonists and in acting as a go-between capable of delivering undistorted messages to both sides. The third party . . . has the advantage of being outside the emotional field that is created by the conflict. Consequently, he can both receive and give messages to either of the parties without the kind of distortion to which direct messages are subject.45 Thus it is often of great value for communications to pass through the mediating channels of a third party even when the physical capabilities for direct communication between the principal opponents are excellent. Mention should probably also be made of the role of an intervening party in dramatizing the dangers of failure to reach a positive termination of some kind. Jackson has suggested: . . . disputes are very difficult to solve in which one or both of the conflicting parties believe that, because of the comparative power which lies at their command, there are no substantial risks in a failure to reach agreement.46 44

45 IkIe, op.cit., p. 167. Boulding, op.cit., p. 316. Elmore Jackson, Meeting of Minds (New York: McGrawHill Book Co., 1952), p. 119. 46

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INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND THIRD-PARTY FUNCTIONS

And it would appear that this problem is especially great in international crises, both because of the possibly disastrous consequences of an outcome of mutual loss and because of the tendency of the parties to lose sight of these dangers in their preoccupation with the intricacies of strategic bargaining. Therefore, a third party which can drive home the importance of these dangers and muster pressure on the principal opponents to keep them in mind may play a role of considerable importance in the bargaining process. A rather powerful though delicate and even dangerous role for a third party may develop in cases where that party has control or partial control over the communications structure of the bargaining situation. As Stevens puts it: From an analytic point of view, one of the most important aspects of the mediation process47 is the mediator's control over the communications structure in the negotiation situation. Control of the communications structure generally facilitates attempts at persuasion and also coercion. . . . Generally speaking, control of the communications structure may enable the mediator to bring pressures to bear upon the parties which involve an element of deception.48 There is a great deal of power involved in controlling the flow of communications which could, in some cases at least, be turned to the task of facilitating the termination of crises. Techniques and tactics involved in this connection would include, for example, the suppression of information in cases where such information might be disruptive, timing the delivery of various messages, selecting material for emphasis and deemphasis, and even distorting messages in appropriate directions. This subject raises some extremely 47

Stevens uses the phrase "mediation process" very broadly and in a way that covers most of the activities included in this study under the heading of third-party intervention. 48 Stevens, op.cit., pp. 129, 130.

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delicate and complex problems. The power which flows from control of the communications structure could clearly be used in a self-interested fashion or even disruptively as well as in a manner conducive to the nonviolent termination of a crisis. In short, roles of this type would carry with them very great responsibilities, and wherever responsibility is involved there is also room for its abuse. Nevertheless, Lovell is almost certainly correct in suggesting that "at times the mediator's ability to alter or block the flow of information may be crucial."49 Among the most important areas in which a skillful third party can exercise significant influence is the creation of saliency for a particular crisis-termination arrangement.50 IkIe puts the notion of saliency very neatly in the following statement: Among the many alternatives for settling an issue, there are often a few which seem particularly prominent to the parties. These focal points are like a notch where a compromise might converge, a resting place where rising demands might come to a halt, or a barrier over which an initial proposal cannot be budged. In tacit bargaining, focal points help the parties to coordinate their expectations and positions. In negotiation, since coordination can be achieved through the exchange of proposals, focal points serve to reduce the alternatives that the parties must consider.51 Several elements or combinations of characteristics are likely to produce saliency. Among those commonly pointed out are prominence in the perceptions of the parties, uniqueness, simplicity, and a certain naturalness imparted 49

Hugh G. Lovell, "The Pressure Lever in Mediation," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 6, No. 1 (October 1952), p. 28. 50 Boulding, op.cit., pp. 317-318. 51 IkIe, op.cit., p. 213.

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by the structure of the situation itself. Symmetry may be a factor in creating saliency in some cases but it is by no means always a necessary element. In simple situations a salient solution—such as a 50-50 split of the benefits—is often quite obvious and easy to arrive at without intervention. But this is seldom the case in international problems, both because they are commonly characterized by a much higher level of complexity and because they are likely to involve a series of related points which are at best only vaguely commensurable.52 And the difficulties are frequently heightened by the unwillingness of either opponent to initiate a compromise or to show its desire to reach a termination. In such circumstances an intervening party may be able to take steps to create saliency for some intrinsically reasonable solution or termination. The third party may have a certain amount of authority with the protagonists, the unbiased nature of the proposal can be underlined, and outside opinion can sometimes be mobilized to create pressure for acceptance.53 Since the proposed termination arrangement may let the parties out of serious dilemmas, a strong tendency to favor the third party's suggestion may very well develop. This tendency will be particularly strong if the proposal is introduced just when the difficulties generated by the dilemmas are perceived most clearly by the parties. An interventionary role that has sometimes been utilized successfully consists of activities aimed at influencing the agenda of the bargaining situation.54 The order in which 52

The distinction Schelling draws between "distributional" and "efficiency" bargaining should also be considered in this context. The case of a 50-50 split of benefits is basically a problem of distribution. Many of the international crises under consideration, however, focus on problems of "efficiency" bargaining in the sense of "exploring for mutually profitable adjustments" (Schelling, op.cit., p. 21). 53 Boulding, op.cit., p. 318. 54 Schelling, op.cit., pp. 31, 51ff.

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issues are perceived and dealt with can have a substantial impact on the course of bargaining. And the task of setting the agenda, which is crucial in this context, is one that has often been left to outside influence. But "more important perhaps than the ordering of issues is the linking of separable issues into package deals and tie-ins"55 and, conversely, the separation of intractable issues that have been dealt with only in conjunction with each other. If deadlock is reached on a given set of issues, the introduction of additional issues or the separation of incommensurable problems may increase the possibilities of finding compensating compromises, and such changes will certainly generate new perspectives and evaluations on the part of both sides. The basic objective of third-party intervention here is to circumvent a particularly rigid confrontation and to inject an element of flexibility into the bargaining situation. Such efforts to alter the agenda probably should not be attempted when there is still hope of settling the original set of issues. And even under the best of circumstances it would undoubtedly require a great deal of skill on the part of a third party to implement this technique of influence. One of the sharpest dilemmas of bargaining focuses on the difficulties of undoing unilateral commitments blocking any hope of termination, or concurrent commitments that have blocked all progress toward termination. During the course of a bargaining sequence "a tactically contrived commitment"56 or even a sincere or straightforward commitment may become outmoded and dysfunctional. But various rigidities and considerations of bargaining reputation make it extremely difficult to undo or back away from commitments once they have been made. In this connection a variety of "face-saving" operations might be engaged in by a third party.57 Examples of this mechanism 55

IkIe, op.cit., p. 222. Stevens, op.cit., p. 134. 57 Ibid., pp. 134-135. 66

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would include: the development of rationalizations which the parties could use to justify withdrawing from commitments; demonstrations (sincere or contrived) of the present irrelevance of the commitment; the elaboration of mutual benefits to be had from moving beyond the fixated point of commitment; and the injection of a willingness to assume part of the responsibility for the ultimate termination arrangement. At this point it is becoming clear that a further elaboration of possibilities for third-party intervention must be tied closely to the nature of specific types of crisis. The role is one of great and varied potential, and a few examples can give only a rough indication of its scope and functions. These factors and variables, however, will turn up again in somewhat more specific form in discussions of possibilities for third-party intervention in various types of SovietAmerican crisis contained in later chapters. C. Third-Party Intervention and the Balance of Power A distinction should be drawn between the nature of the activities of an intervening third party on the one hand and those of the balancer (at any given moment) in a balanceof-power system.58 Above all, there is a difference in basic objectives. The intervening third party attempts to facilitate the realization of common interests and to contribute to the control of crises rather than to acquire power for itself or to add its weight to the fight against the hegemonic designs of one great power or coalition. In this context, there is a qualitative difference in the level of coercive force applied to various situations by the intervening party as differentiated from the balancer. It is, of course, clear that the probability of success for an intervening party in any given crisis will be related to the 58

On the balance of power see, in general, I. L. Claude, Jr., Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962), chaps. 2 and 3; Herz, op.cit., pp. 143-166, and Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics, pt. I.

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existence of at least a rough parity of power between the principal parties to the crisis.59 As Arthur Meyer has said in speaking of the function of mediation: When . . . bargaining power is equal . . . when each side knows that the other side can and, under certain provocations, will fight . . . the area of negotiation is broader and the usefulness of the mediator is correspondingly increased.60 In cases where the margin of power favoring either of the protagonists is small, even an intrinsically weak third party may be able to intervene with some real effect.61 The potential usefulness of third-party intervention is here emphasized by the fact that this type of power relationship is almost a necessary condition for the occurrence of serious international crises in the contemporary international arena. If this condition were not met, the dominant party would simply force the acceptance of its demands on the weaker party. However, several additional differences between thirdparty intervention and balancing should perhaps be identified at this point. One important distinction focuses on flexibility. The balance-of-power system postulates an extreme flexibility and fluidity of alliances,62 while the present notion of third-party intervention addresses itself to a rather more rigid situation in which the identity and alignment of the relevant blocs and parties is likely to remain unchanged from crisis to crisis. 59

A remark of Liska's made in another context seems relevant here as well—"The smaller the margin of power that favors either of two contending parties, the more relevant is the total power of an intrinsically weak third party" (George Liska, "The 'Third Party': The Rationale of Nonalignment," in Laurence Martin [ed.], Neutralism and Nonalignment [New York: Praeger, 1962], p. 80). 60 Meyer, op.cit., p. 165. 61 Liska, in Martin, op.cit., p. 80. 62 Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics, pp. 22-36.

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In such situations the intervening party makes no pretense of playing the role of a "third force" in the international system. It relies on basically persuasive activities and it exhibits no willingness to go to war either to balance the protagonists or to tip the scales in favor of one or the other of them. The objective of the third party is to help both sides realize their common interests while at the same time preventing consequences that might prove disruptive for the international system as a whole. D. Some Peculiarities of the International A rena In its essentials the concept of third-party intervention is relevant to a wide range of crisis situations and system levels including marital problems and labor-management disputes as well as international crises.63 But several characteristics of the contemporary international arena and of crises which occur within it make the problems of acting successfully as a third party during international crises particularly difficult and tend to limit the applicability of useful insights from the more generalized theory of third-party intervention. These characteristics do not necessarily reduce the importance of third-party activities in the international context but they do create certain problems which should be taken thoroughly into account. The international arena lacks a highly organized general community in the sense of a higher level of social or political organization with regulatory power and authority over both protagonists in a crisis.64 Furthermore, the notion of an underlying "public interest" in stability and nonviolent relationships is relatively weak. In industrial conflict, 63

For discussion and illustrations of some of the parallels see the following: Jackson, op.cit.; R. O. Blood, Jr., "Resolving Family Conflicts," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1960), pp. 209-219, and M. Barkun, "Conflict Resolution through Implicit Mediation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1964), pp. 121-130. 64 Jackson, op.cit., chap. 5.

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for example, the parties "are usually general parties in a single enterprise whose orderly continuance is of long-run advantage to both."65 And the national government is likely to take an important part in settling intractable disputes when they reach serious proportions. It is clear that this organized institutional matrix does not at present exist in the international arena. This general conclusion, however, should probably be tempered somewhat by an awareness of the facts that an underlying sense of international community is gradually becoming more important and that the notion of an international "public interest" is no longer totally foreign. Another difficulty involves the crucial importance and high level of the stakes involved in severe international crises. Crises in this context may very well have a significant bearing on the national survival of the states involved as functioning units. And, in general, situations perceived as threatening national security tend to take on an element of intractability. This basic difficulty is only exacerbated by the extreme emotional force and impact of severe international crises and by the frequently prominent role of ideology in distorting the perceptions of the protagonists and in whipping them up to forceful threats and rigid commitments. In some cases, the combination of powerful though manipulable national loyalties and ideological blinders may make the problems of direct bargaining between the principal parties almost insurmountable. Finally, it has been argued that the dilemmas and rigidities of bargaining relationships tend to become more severe in direct relation to the size and complexity of the units involved.66 What may be a soluble crisis in an interpersonal context can become an intractable conflict when large-scale, socio-political units are involved. And, of course, the nation state and the international bloc or coa65 66

46

Ibid., p. xiv. Ibid., chap. 5.

INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND THIRD-PARTY FUNCTIONS

lition are the largest and most complex units relevant to the discourse of human conflict. Despite such definite divergences, the similarities between international crises and disputes and crises occurring in a wide variety of other contexts are rather striking. Moving up the ladder of abstraction a bit, a number of important parallels emerge. Jackson has suggested the following list of parallels between industrial and international conflicts. And it appears that most of them also apply, mutatis mutandi, to a variety of other conflict situations. 1. Disputes occur between powerfully organized groups which have managed to preserve considerable freedom of action. 2. The conflicts touch what each organized group believes to be matters of vital interest. . . . Occasionally these matters are believed to relate to group survival. 3. The large majority of disputes in both fields involve the balance of power between the conflicting parties. 4. In each field the future status of the negotiators is frequently dependent on the degree to which they can achieve the initially outlined goals. 5. In both fields there is a growing realization of the economic and human cost of conflict. In many cases this is accompanied by a growing assent to the use of governmental or intergovernmental machinery designed to assist the reaching of agreement. 6. Conflicts in both areas are usually accompanied by strong emotional overtones, and the reduction of individual and group emotion is at least partially a problem in human relations, as well as being a problem in substantive settlement.er It should perhaps be added here that there also appear to be a number of structural similarities in crisis situations f Ibid., pp. 124-125.

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in a variety of contexts. Most crises appear to have a nonzero-sum pay-off matrix. The consequent bargaining relationship, therefore, takes on the quality of a "limited adversary" relationship.68 The focus of the interaction between the parties is on bargaining and usually bargaining of a strategic nature. And finally, most crisis situations seem to be potential generators of a variety of dilemmas which can block the achievement of a termination or solution. In fact, it would seem appropriate to place crises occurring in different contexts along a single spectrum for conceptual purposes. With this perspective, various types of crisis could be seen as overlapping substantially in terms of a number of variables but also showing areas of dissimilarity at the ends of the spectrum. This leads to what would appear to be a useful analysis in terms of hard-core and peripheral variables. On balance, then, it would seem that a good deal of care must be taken in transferring insights from the general literature on third-party intervention in crises to the specific context of international crises. But the similarities are great enough to make it foolish to discard this literature altogether. When the proper alterations are made, insights from a wide variety of contexts may be found to shed some light on the complex and intricate workings of international crises. 68

48

This concept was developed by Marshall Shulman.

CHAPTER TWO

Third-Party Tactics: An Intervenor's Repertory of Practice

T

in this chapter represents an attempt to look behind the general proposition that a third party can consider a variety of more or less complex tactics or instrumental activities in fashioning a program of intervention during a specific crisis. The previous chapter dealt at some length with the basic nature and functions of the third-party role, and it is now perhaps appropriate to move on to the delineation of a general repertory of practice for potential third parties during international crises. The very existence of common interests and serious dilemmas impeding their realization in an international crisis does not in itself guarantee that a third party can have a constructive role in a given situation. It is possible, for example, to imagine severe crises in which the nature of the dilemmas is such as to negate virtually all possibilities of successful intervention. In fact, there might even be cases in which attempts at intervention would contribute to an exacerbation of the original crisis. Neither side may be willing to consider seriously accepting the intervention of a third party, and suspicions, difficulties over impartiality, emotional distortions, lack of information, and various irrationalities may make the idea of intervention an empty suggestion in certain specific cases. It will, in short, be necessary to consider each type or class of crisis separately in order to come to grips with these problems in any final sense. It is necessary at this point, however, to take account of the fact that a third party can undertake a whole spectrum of different types of tactics and activities before attempting to evaluate the usefulness of intervening in a parHE MATERIAL

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ticular type of crisis. In the abstract delineation of a repertory of practice for third parties which follows, various tactics and instrumental activities are deliberately distinguished sharply from one another. In actual cases it is probable both that such clear-cut distinctions would be impossible and that an intervenor would find it useful to employ a mixture of tactics. The divisions made below, however, are useful at this point for purposes of clarity and understanding. Illustrations for this material have been drawn primarily from the record of United Nations peacekeeping operations. Examples of various types of intervention could, of course, be taken from a variety of other contexts. But the United Nations material is convenient, conceptually definable, and highly relevant to the more concrete discussions of later chapters. The instrumental activities and tactics under consideration have been grouped into several broad categories— mediatory and conciliatory actions, positive actions, and services—which will now be taken up in turn. MEDIATORY AND CONCILIATORY ACTIONS

International crises have been and will continue to be marked by the constant bargaining processes characteristic of competitive-cooperative situations. In fact, any given crisis can be described in terms of a continuousflowof tacit and explicit bargaining moves at a more intense and concentrated level than is common in noncrisis periods. This flow is made up both of the declaratory and verbal activities of the parties and of the various actions they take. There are many ways in which this bargaining process can be affected and influenced by actors which are not original parties to the crisis or the conflict underlying it. The tactics included under the heading of mediatory and conciliatory actions, however, are distinguished by the fact that the intervenor would actually enter into the arena of the bar50

THIRD-PARTY TACTICS

gaining process, converting it into a situation which might be described as having two protagonists and a third party combining the elements of a rules keeper and an interested mediator. The notion of entering into the actual processes of bargaining is meant to include direct participation in actual negotiations as well as activities aimed at facilitating more indirect or tacit bargaining processes between the two original sides to the crisis. The following specific types of activity can be included in this broad category. A. Persuasion The term "persuasion" here refers to the processes through which conflicting parties can become aware of common or overlapping interests and ways of capitalizing on them through contact with representatives of a third party. To take an example, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and his staff are in an almost unique position to undertake such activities during many crisis situations. Rather high-level representatives of both sides are often readily available. Here the development of strong permanent missions to the United Nations has been a key factor.1 Facilities are available for private or behind-thescenes activities and for consultations with representatives of the various parties concerned either separately or together. And the forum provided by the United Nations system is one in which such activities appear to be gaining a certain acceptance in the flow of mutual expectations. In general, then, the emphasis here is on the persuasiveness of solid argumentation rather than on the application of any form of overt pressure. Such tactics are already widely engaged in during international crises, even including those involving the great powers. The rounds of persuasive conferences held in Hammarskjold's office at United Nations headquarters in 1

See Wilder Foote (ed.), Dag Hammarskjold: Servant of Peace (New York: Harper & Row, c. 1963), p. 224.

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October 1956, from which agreement on the "six principles" emerged, constitute an example of persuasion involving some of the great powers.2 On the other hand, the activities of Johan Beck-Friis in dealing with the governments of Thailand and Cambodia in 19593 and of U Thant in his mission to Pakistan and India in September 1965 illustrate the potential of persuasive tactics carried out on the scene of the actual conflict. A study of the activities of Lie in reference to the first Berlin crisis during the fall of 19484 (though they were largely unsuccessful) and of Hammarskjold in connection with the release of eleven American airmen held by Communist China in 1955 is also useful in shedding light on the possible uses of persuasion by a third party. The notion of persuasion is an important one for a wide variety of international crises. Such activities will be particularly emphasized in later chapters dealing primarily with Soviet-American problems because the notion has sometimes been discounted in discussing "nuclear" crises and because the issues in such cases would be so different from those usually thought of in connection with persuasion that a good deal of preliminary thinking would be necessary to make the kind of persuasion under consideration here a real possibility. In general, the principal difficulty with persuasion probably lies in the gap between reaching representatives of the various nation states at the United Nations or elsewhere and reaching, with any significant impact, those nerves of governmental decision-making which would control national behavior in the situations in question. And there is 2

Joseph Lash, Dag Hammarskjold (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1961), chap. 6. 3 Richard Miller, Dag Hammarskjold and Crisis Diplomacy (New York: Oceana Press, 1961), chap. 9. *Trygve Lie, In the Cause of Peace (New York: Macmillan, 1954), chap 12.

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also a certain assumption of rationality underlying the roles contemplated under the rubric of persuasion. For these reasons it is certainly possible that persuasion might become unworkable during certain periods in the cycle of any crisis. But the notion of crisis life cycles, discussed in the previous chapter, suggests that persuasion could become relevant during later phases of a crisis which had earlier been unamenable to this type of intervention. B. Enunciation The possibility of influential third-party enunciation is somewhat peculiar to bargaining relationships, but it exists in a whole range of bargaining situations from marital problems through labor-management disputes to international conflicts. The notion of enunciation refers to the setting forth of clear-cut statements on the part of an outside party laying out its understanding of the issues involved and suggesting basic principles, procedures, or mechanisms through the use of which a solution or termination of the crisis might be achieved.5 The importance of enunciation lies in the possibilities of creating saliencies and focal points on which mutual expectations can center and of establishing at least minimal consensus concerning the precise points at issue. Fred IkIe catches the significance of this somewhat tricky concept very well in stating: The formulation of an issue may stake out the starting points and limits for concessions, fix the bench marks for evaluating gains and losses, and circumscribe the areas where pressures, threats, and inducements can be used.6 8

For a brilliant theoretical examination of this concept as well as a number of concrete illustrations see Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), chap. 3. 6 Fred Charles IkIe, How Nations Negotiate (New York: Harper &Row, 1964), p. 218.

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The process of enunciation can sometimes generate acceptable guidelines for decision-making and termination in an area which is perceived as having no natural breaking points around which to construct a mutually acceptable solution. Or it may play a coordinating role in getting the two sides to the point where they understand each other's perceptions of the key issues at stake. Or, again, it may relieve severe dilemmas in cases where both sides have engaged in committal tactics and are unwilling to take any steps that will give the appearance of giving in to the opponent or of taking the first step to reach termination or settlement. In addition, it is sometimes possible, through the use of this tactic, to create well-publicized barriers with the effect of setting up limiting rules of the game which are very difficult to break with impunity. An action that is acceptable when it can simply be deemphasized and undertaken quietly is likely to be another proposition entirely when its performance involves taking a positive step in violation of a clearly stated normative principle or rule.7 Although the notion of enunciation is very difficult to pin down precisely, several cases in the record of United Nations peacekeeping operations have some illustrative value. In the Cyprus case, for example, the Organization seems to have had some influence in rallying international support for the general principle that the minority community should not be simply destroyed or absorbed against its will. In this case, of course, the United Nations has gone even farther in the sense that some of its activities have had the effect of checking the ability of President Makarios to carry out his objectives without resistance.8 And the pro7

On the importance of clearly enunciated rules and principles that lack coercive support consult Roger Fisher, "Bringing Law to Bear on Governments," in Saul Mendlovitz (ed.), Legal and Political Problems of World Order (New York: Fund for Education Concerning World Peace Through World Law, 1962), pp. 104-114. 8 The first serious study of the Cyprus intervention is J. King

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gram undertaken in verifying the North Borneo elections in the summer of 1963 comes through on balance as a relatively powerful assertion, though on a tacit basis, of the principle that self-determination should be a focal point for the settlement of the conflict in question. This operation certainly seems to have had the effect of increasing the negative factors in Indonesia's calculations concerning a possible forceful conquest of the area. A similar effort to inject the principle of self-determination into a crisis situation through the process of enunciation, though in fact unsuccessful, can be seen in the response of the United Nations to the Hungarian crisis in the fall of 1956. The use of the tactic of enunciation by a third party during a severe international crisis, and especially during a "nuclear" crisis, however, is no simple matter. In the first place, such activities are likely to be useful only in a somewhat restricted range of situations. It might, in fact, do more harm than good, in some situations, to promulgate enunciations indiscriminately. Then, too, the use of this tactic requires a quick and precise sense of timing and appositeness. It is not nearly as difficult to see possibilities for such actions after the fact as it is to plan them on short notice in very tense and touchy situations. Nevertheless, the resource requirements for this form of intervention are not great except in the area of knowledge and information, and the impact in successful cases might be substantial. C. Elaboration and Initiation It might also be possible for a third party to take an active part in discussing and formulating the common or overlapping interests of the parties to a crisis as well as in interjecting into the bargaining process substantive proposals for termination or settlement which neither of the two protagonists would feel prepared to make on its own Gordon, "The U.N. in Cyprus," International Journal, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Summer 1964), pp. 326-347.

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initiative. The opportunity to shift at least some of the responsibility for initiating proposals onto a third party, in other words, can be an important factor in the context of strategic bargaining. The nature of such measures might vary considerably along several axes. For example, efforts toward elaboration and initiation could be either public or private in nature and they might range along a whole spectrum in terms of formality and informality. And the possible combinations of such variables would give a third party a number of options from which to tailor its program of intervention to the specific crisis at hand. Again, the concepts of creating saliencies and focal points, discussed in the preceding section, are central to an analysis of the potential usefulness of the types of intervention in question here. As IkIe puts it, "Proposals play a key role in the process through which the parties come to terms."9 But in this case several additional distinctions may be useful. Intervention of this kind might range from very general but persuasive proposals and discussions to rather detailed demonstrations of the dangers of existing situations coupled with concrete and specific suggestions for alleviating these dangers. And it is of considerable importance to notice that the third party might concern itself either with procedural points concerning methods for solving dilemmas or with the actual substance of possible termination or settlement arrangements. An awareness of this difference might be of real significance in constructing a program of intervention that would find acceptance in the eyes of both sides to a crisis. Although, in the case of the United Nations, the Charter does not encourage the promulgation of substantive proposals relating to conflicts or crises,10 the Organization has 9

IkIe, op.cit., p. 193. For a discussion of this question see Leland Goodrich, "Pacific Settlement of Disputes," American Political Science Review, Vol. 39, No. 5 (October 1945), pp. 956-970. 10

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THIRD-PARTY TACTICS

in fact initiated or lent support to substantive suggestions, as well as procedural proposals, during a number of significant international crises and conflicts. Some of the activities of the Conciliation Commission for Indonesia, for example, during the months in 1949 immediately preceding the roundtable conference at The Hague, had a noticeable impact on the handling of the merits of the various issues at that conference.11 And the activities of Ellsworth Bunker, who was acting as U Thant's representative, in the final negotiations leading to the Dutch-Indonesian agreement on West Irian apparently had a substantial impact on the terms of the final arrangement.12 Perhaps an even clearer case of elaboration and initiation emerges from the activities of Sakari Tuomioja as mediator in Cyprus before his untimely death in September 1964. The most important resource requirements for the activities here labeled "elaboration and initiation" lie, again, in the areas of knowledge and information. Such interventions, particularly if attempted in the context of superpower crises, would depend largely on a detailed and operational knowledge both of the general problems of contemporary politico-military relationships and of the more concrete and specific considerations involved in the analysis of weapons systems and tactics. It would, for example, be necessary to know whether the various reactions of the two sides to crisis developments had a basis in military realities or were more related to political and propaganda considerations. And it would be of great importance to be able to assess with reasonable accuracy the potential effects of various proposals on the military balances between the two sides at the strategic and conventional levels.13 Ac11 J. Foster Collins, "The United Nations and Indonesia," International Journal, Vol. 19, No. 2 (1964), p. 207. 12 Harlan Cleveland, "Crisis Diplomacy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 41, No. 4 (1963), p. 643. 13 These are precisely the types of question that the Secretary-

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ceptance of interventionary activities in these matters is hard to predict, but the areas are broad ones, and it seems likely that certain specific types of crisis, at least, would throw up some roles in the realm of elaboration and initiation if the relevant third party were well prepared to recognize and handle them. D. Interpretation A third party might engage in interpretative activities in regard to ambiguous situations either independently or on the request of the parties involved. To the extent that such activities were entirely unsolicited, the notion of interpretation would begin to shade into the concept of enunciation, but there would still be a far greater emphasis on clarifying factual situations than on setting forth principles, as is the case with enunciation. The focus in this area is, in fact, on the interpretation of sequences of events that clearly occurred but that are ambiguous, distorted, and controversial in the perspectives of the two sides. Not infrequently incompatible views concerning the origins of a crisis and its progress form a real block to efforts aimed at reducing the dangers of continued crisis activities, tensions, and alerts. Even without the acceptance of any provisions about the binding nature of interpretations or any agreement really to formalize the procedures of interpretation, the giving of "advisory" interpretations by a respected and independent intervenor might be very valuable. The records of United Nations operations do not contain a great deal that is relevant to this concept, but there is one ongoing case which falls within the scope of the concept of interpretation. Many of the activities of the various Mixed Armistice Commissions formed under the provisions of the General and his principal advisers were apparently unable to answer very successfully during the Cuban crisis of October 1962. For further discussion of strategic questions see infra, chap. 6.

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General Armistice Agreements relating to Palestine amount to interpretation of a fairly formal nature.14 The key figure on each of the commissions is a United Nations representative and at least some of the commissions have played a significant role, especially during the years immediately following the signing of the armistices in 1949 and during the years after the Suez crisis. Here again, the creation of salient points as a basis of mutual compromise and the establishment of bases for nonhumiliating movements away from rigid positions would be the keys to possible successes for intervention. It would probably not be difficult to acquire the resources needed for this type of activity, but it must be remembered that the notion of interpretation is a somewhat limited one which would only be applicable to a restricted range of situations. The notion should not, however, be discarded, especially when it comes to considerations of the establishment and maintenance of intrawar rules and limitations. E. Participation In some situations it is possible for a third party actually to engage as a participant in the processes of direct negotiation between the parties to international crises. As opposed to notions such as enunciation and behind-the-scenes persuasion discussed above, the concept of active participation in negotiations refers to situations of direct diplomatic contact on a three-cornered basis. In such circumstances an outside party might play any or all of the roles a third-party participant can undertake in a direct negotiation and bargaining situation. Such roles may range from conciliation through mediation to the generation and application of various types of pressure. The essence of these activities is the effort to facilitate by all available means the reaching of agreement on solutions to the prob14

David Brook, Preface to Peace (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1964), chap. 5.

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lems of a particular crisis through face-to-face contact between the parties to the crisis. And it is important to keep in mind that this role of participation may be aimed at various stages in the process of negotiation. Such stages range through efforts aimed at getting negotiations started, seeing that they are constructive and fruitful, and working out acceptable guarantees that the solutions agreed upon can be implemented successfully. The United Nations has acquired, over the years, a considerable body of experience which falls essentially under this heading of participation. A few of the most prominent cases may be mentioned here for illustrative purposes. The United Nations mediator and, later on, the acting mediator participated actively in the negotiations leading to the two truces in Palestine in the summer of 194815 and to the General Armistice Agreements concerning Palestine (here the acting mediator even provided the forum with his establishment at Rhodes) in the early months of 1949.16 Then, as already mentioned, the Secretary-General's representative participated in an active and forceful way during the final negotiation of the Dutch-Indonesian agreement concerning West Irian in 1962. And the crucial role of the United Nations mediator in organizing negotiations among the parties to the Cyprus conflict in 1964, as well as participating in them, is gradually becoming apparent.17 Other specific cases from United Nations practice might be cited in this context. The activities of the Good Offices Committee and the Conciliation Commission in Indonesia, the role of the Beck-Friis mission in catalyzing Thai-Cambodian negotiations in 1959, and many aspects of the Congo operation are all relevant to the discussion of third-party par15 Paul Mohn, "Problems of Truce Supervision," International Conciliation, No. 478 (1952). 16 Brook, op.cit., chap. 2. 17 Gordon, op.cit., and New York Times, August 1964.

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ticipation in direct negotiation between the parties to a conflict or crisis situation. It is often possible to undertake activities of the variety contemplated here in the technical or nominal sense. But it is quite another matter to perform this role effectively and with real influence. International negotiations generally, and interbloc negotiations in particular, have been notoriously difficult even when abstract cooperative interests have been strong,18 and the various pressures and tensions generated during a severe international crisis might make the wheels of negotiation very sticky and difficult to turn successfully. The resources required for success in this kind of intervention would not necessarily, however, be great in terms of equipment or other physical elements. What would be needed, above all, would be a fine sense of timing and diplomatic finesse coupled with a detailed knowledge of the politico-military realities of international crises which would allow for an understanding of the motivations and needs of the two sides in specific situations. And these are resources which are likely to be associated with individual human beings rather than organizations. Although an organizational matrix would no doubt be important, the availability and presence of a few able and well-prepared individuals would be the key to success with this kind of intervention. But it is pertinent to remark in this context that for the foreseeable future the Secretariat of the United Nations will probably be more capable of training and supplying personnel of this kind than any other source in the international arena. POSITIVE AND INDEPENDENT ACTIONS Returning to the context of the bargaining process discussed at the beginning of the previous section, a little 18

On the obstacles to successful negotiation consult, for example, John Spanier and Joseph Nogee, The Politics of Disarmament (New York: Praeger, 1962), especially chaps. 1 and 2.

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thought makes it clear that an outside party can affect this process in several ways and that actively entering into the flow of bargaining moves covers only one broad category of such activities. The focus shifts in this section to various positive actions and initiatives which a third party could undertake without transforming the two-sided process of bargaining into a full-fledged, three-cornered process. Here the idea is more nearly that of an intervenor who remains outside of the arena of the two-sided bargaining between the principal parties, but who takes independent actions which impinge upon and influence the course of the bargaining. Such activities may either modify the perceptions, perspectives, and behavior patterns of one or both sides to the point where a nonviolent termination can be reached or they may keep the two sides physically or mentally separated to a sufficient degree to avoid or mitigate open clashes. The following types of activity seem to fall into this broad category. A. Communication and Contact Several distinct and separable communications roles will be discussed in this chapter on third-party activities and tactics. Only one of them, however, falls in the rubric of positive and independent actions. This is the somewhat ambitious and difficult role of taking steps to ensure that the parties to a conflict or crisis receive and are made aware of a wide range of relevant information in an undistorted form. Ignorance, lack of awareness, distortion, the absence of accepted criteria for evaluation, and failure to integrate fully important data are all significant in terms of probabilities and dangerous in terms of possible effects in the context of various types of international crisis. Aware of the development of one or more of these phenomena in a specific crisis situation, a third party might be able to undertake a program designed to relieve these problems, at least in 62

THIRD-PARTY TACTICS

part, through efforts aimed at injecting undistorted data into the bargaining process. Although such a role is a rather difficult one to handle successfully and hard to distinguish clearly from the whole complex of third-party operations in particular situations, several episodes on the United Nations record appear to fall in this rubric. The activities of Pier Spinelli in Amman as head of the United Nations presence in Jordan during 1958 and 1959 were often directed toward the objective of keeping the Arab governments, and particularly the Jordanian government, informed concerning the actions and attitudes of the various parties relevant to the conflict. Conor Cruise O'Brien has stated definitely that he tried to inject undistorted information into the thought stream of Tshombe's regime in Katanga on several occasions when he thought the leaders were leaving important facts or calculations out of consideration.19 And many of the activities of U Thant during the Cuban crisis of October 1962 were directed toward the goal of making the leaders involved very clearly aware of certain facts which they showed some inclination to downgrade or shunt aside.20 The following areas are illustrative of a range of problems which might be dealt with in this way in the context of international crises: perceptions of the motives and intentions of each side and distortions in these areas; assessments of the course of hostilities and damage sustained; assessments and estimates of remaining military strength on 19 Conor Cruise O'Brien, To Katanga and Back (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1962), especially chap. 14. 20 There are many passing references to the role of U Thant during this crisis but no serious analysis has yet been attempted. For the particular point in question consult: U Thant, "Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General, 1962-1963," GAOR, 18th session (1963), Supplement No. IA; U Thant, "Interview with the Secretary-General," United Nations Review, January 1964, pp. 5-10, and Henry Pachter, Collision Course (New York: Praeger, 1963), pp. 93-97.

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each side; perceptions of the causes of a crisis or conflict, and misperceptions and ignorance of an opponent's military strength or actions. There are several significant points to be made concerning the resources required for this kind of intervention and concerning major problems and obstacles in this context. But since these points are similar to those which are relevant to the other communications activities discussed below, this material will be deferred to that section. B. Data Collection and Processing Somewhat related to several other possible activities but still conceptually distinguishable is the notion of crisis data collection and processing. The notion here is that a third party (in this context the United Nations is likely to be the only really significant possibility) might usefully be able to establish both a center for the steady intracrisis collection and processing of important data and a kind of registry at which the two sides to a crisis could make declarations in advance of intended actions or record ex post facto the reasons which led them to undertake various actions during a crisis. United Nations experience in these areas is at present not very rich. The registry notion is, in fact, an expansion and projection of the earlier notion of a registry for the launchings of space vehicles and satellites.21 And in a 21

This notion was first formalized in General Assembly Resolution 1721 (xvi) of 20 December 1961 on international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space. The resolution was adopted unanimously. Its relevant sections read as follows: The General Assembly: 1. Calls upon states launching objects into orbit or beyond to furnish information promptly to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, through the Secretary-General, for the registration of launchings; 2. Requests the Secretary-General to maintain a public registry of the information furnished in accordance with paragraph 1 above.

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broad sense the activities here labeled "data collection" have been undertaken during many crises, though very little has ever been done to prepare for the possibilities of such activities ahead of time and to smoothe the way for their performance. The data-processing role, however, might become a very important one, especially in aiding the parties to a crisis in assessing without distortion the unfolding sequence of the crisis and the consequences of various actions and reactions. During a limited nuclear war, for example, one of the most serious dangers would probably be generated by the inability of the antagonists to assess with much accuracy the results of the various nuclear exchanges. The reasoning behind the registry concept is perhaps less clear. But the present "limited adversary" relationships which prevail during most international crises are characterized more by threats, warnings, promises, and commitments than by the actual use of physical coercion.22 And this development tends to generate situations in which the parties may very much want to make at least some elements of their intended or actual behavior very clear to all concerned. In order to undertake such roles successfully an intervener would need, at least ideally, a substantial quantity of sophisticated information collection, reception, and processing equipment. And this is not a requirement to be considered lightly, since the consequences of faulty or insufficient preparations in these areas could have results of a most serious nature both for the particular crisis at hand and for the future prospects of third-party intervention in many contexts. The possession of adequate equipment, however, would be of little avail unless a small contingent of persons skilled in politico-military analysis was also available to operate this machinery. But these requirements are ultimately reasonably modest and should not necessarily 22

For an exploration of these concepts see Schelling, op.cit., chaps. 2 and 3.

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place insurmountable obstacles in the way of preparing for this type of activity. It would seem, for example, that a strong case could be made for an ongoing United Nations program aimed at gradually acquiring the necessary equipment,23 and it might very well be entirely feasible to train a small group of members of, say, the Executive Office of the Secretary-General in the appropriate skills. To what extent this capability could be utilized in a specific crisis is hard to predict, but it is certain that the prior establishment of such a capability would greatly enhance the potential usefulness of such interventionary activities if they were seriously attempted during a future crisis. C. Interposition In a limited class of international crises, the positive action of interposing physical contingents between the two sides might have an important arresting effect on the development of a crisis and forestall sequences that could lead directly to serious military exchanges. The relation of this type of activity to certain kinds of supervisory actions (see below) is definite, but here the notion refers especially to rapid intracrisis efforts at interposition without waiting for explicit consent rather than to the creation of presences to handle agreed-upon supervisory functions. Essentially the policy under consideration here is one of acting first and negotiating about the details of the facilitation of common interests later. In general, such activities would be relevant only in crises involving initial confrontations on the ground such as might be the case, for example, in various kinds of conventional European clashes between the NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, and they would have to be undertaken, in most cases, very quickly in order to be effective. A considerable body of United Nations experience is at least partially relevant to the notion under consideration 23

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Cf. infra, chap. 8.

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here. The United Nations Emergency Force in Suez was actually inserted as a kind of two-way interpositionary force, since it was designed to separate the Egyptian forces both from the Allied forces in the Port Said and Suez Canal areas and from the Israeli forces in the Sinai Peninsula.24 The United Nations presence in Yemen (UNYOM) during 1963 and 1964 was given the task of attempting to keep the two sides from clashing directly on the ground as well as the role of supervising the withdrawal agreement supposedly accepted by both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic. And the present United Nations force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) is an even more concrete example of an interpositionary operation since it has been given the task of patrolling the "green lines" used, especially in Nicosia, to separate the two sides and of inserting itself into threatening situations in the village areas before open clashes can take place.25 The notion described in the preceding paragraph differs to some extent, however, from the activities covered by these examples. As used in this study, the concept of interposition has a greater air of urgency and rapidity about it and a consequent deemphasis on the principle of explicit consent of the host party or parties. The examples given, on the other hand, tend to shade off into the type of activity to be discussed below under the rubric of supervision. This is perhaps not so much a qualitative difference as it is a result of the fact that interposition is being considered here primarily as an intracrisis tactic in fast-moving situations. The requirements for undertaking operations of this kind pose significant obstacles to their success, especially in the context of great-power crises. Interposing contingents would almost certainly have to be so large as to require authori24

For competent general accounts see William Frye, A United Nations Peace Force (New York: Oceana Press, 1957), and Gabriella Rosner, The United Nations Emergency Force (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963). 25 Gordon, op.cit.

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zation by a policy organ of the United Nations (it seems probable that such operations would have to be launched under the aegis of the United Nations) and to engender serious problems of recruitment, mobilization, transportation, and so forth.26 And one or more of the great powers or some combination of smaller states might destroy the hopes for such an operation by tying it up during the policy stage at United Nations headquarters. Further, the pressures of time in the types of situation in which interposition would be relevant might very well be simply too great to allow for success. It would, of course, be foolish to cast aside the notion of interposition without any further thought, but in general it seems reasonable to conclude that in most cases the main hopes for successful intervention in severe international crises are likely to lie in other areas. For the most part, successful third-party intervention in the foreseeable future is likely to follow not so much the notions of physical intervention or suppression—characteristic of discussions of "collective measures"27—as the various concepts, discussed in this study, concerning the facilitation of existing common and overlapping interests and the possibilities of helping the parties to a crisis to help themselves. SERVICE ACTIVITIES There is still another category of ways in which a third party can influence the bargaining process in directions favorable to the termination of a crisis. Situations are not 26

On these problems consult Ruth Russell, "United Nations Experiences with Military Forces: Political and Legal Aspects," Brookings Staff Paper (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, August 1964), chaps. 3 and 4. 27 Excellent discussions setting forth many of the underlying concepts involved in the notion of "collective measures" can be found in the reports of the United Nations Collective Measures Committee for 1951 and 1952. See GAOR, 6th session (1951), Supplement No. 13, and GAOR, 7th session (1952), Supplement No. 17.

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infrequently generated in which the parties to a crisis could reach some settlement if they felt they could negotiate with each other without losing bargaining strength or if machinery could be set up to facilitate the acceptable implementation of agreed-upon tacit or paper arrangements. But there are many reasons why the parties themselves may not be able to handle these problems successfully including various problems of commitment, prestige, mistrust, secrecy, and partiality. Problems of this sort can arise at any point along the spectrum of crises, from the difficulties of controlling the heightened dangers generated by nonviolent crises to the problems of terminating warfare. The possible roles for an intervenor in this context are essentially service roles, since they deal either with important activities which the principals cannot carry out for themselves or with prior arrangements needed to allow the principals to act on their own behalf. The notion is therefore one of servicing the bargaining process and facilitating its smooth operation. For example, the establishment of mechanisms to facilitate the maintenance of intrawar rules and limitations or the provision of the necessary services to allow for the successful implementation of a cease-fire are activities which the protagonists in a crisis of such proportions would very likely be unable to work out on a bilateral basis, even though they had strong common interests in maintaining rules or achieving a cease-fire. Among the services, the following activities seem to offer opportunities for third-party intervention. A. Communication and Contact It is now relevant to suggest that the maintenance and facilitation of communication between the principals in a severe international crisis would involve an important set of activities to which a third party might be able to contribute significantly. Two distinct service roles in this area should be differentiated. First, it may be important simply 69

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to keep lines of communication physically open and to guarantee that facilities of a neutral nature are available in case the opposing sides need them at any time. The problem here is to guarantee that communications facilities are available to those who want them. Second, there is the "postman" or "go-between" role. A third party, for example the Secretariat of the United Nations, might act as a messenger and perform communications services in cases where the antagonists find it impossible either physically or because of the problems of mistrust and emotional commitments to communicate successfully with each other on a direct basis. A kind of two-step, indirect communication might become crucial in such cases and the role of the middleman could become a very central one. Several general points about such communication and contact activities should be mentioned here (for the most part these apply equally to the communications activities mentioned in a previous section). Such activities could be conducted either privately or publicly. Although some publicity would probably be inevitable concerning operations conducted, for example, by the United Nations Secretariat, it might very well be possible to conduct such activities more or less along the lines of "quiet diplomacy."28 The actual resources required would vary, depending on the specific situation, but in any case they would not be very great except in the areas of knowledge and information. In the particular context of superpower crises it is worth giving serious consideration to the possibility of making the Moscow-Washington direct telecommunications link a three-way unit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations as the third corner of the triangle. Such a tie-in might give the Secretary-General a crucial capability to take action in high-speed crises on short notice in order to offer or undertake various communications operations. But, in 28 Hammarskjold in Foote (ed.), op.cit., pp. 170-174 (London address, 1958).

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general, the important resources for such communications roles would not be particularly extensive (except perhaps in the case of efforts to make the parties to a severe crisis aware of important information) and should be within the reach of a third party (especially in the case of the United Nations) if a little forethought and preliminary planning were exercised. There is a good deal of historical support for the notion that the role of facilitating intracrisis communication between opposing sides is an important one. Some of the evidence is the kind that shows what might have been done on an ex post facto basis rather than what actually was done,29 but the record is nevertheless rather impressive. The record of United Nations experience is particularly suggestive as far as the "go-between" role is concerned. Particularly relevant in this context are the activities of the SecretaryGeneral during the Cuban crisis of October 1962. There is now rather substantial support for the proposition that U Thant played a significant liaison role in this situation and that his office became an important cog in the two-step flow process of communication which was characteristic of many of the exchanges between the two superpowers during the crisis.30 And although little information is available on the matter, there are indications that the Secretary-General again played a significant liaison role between the Soviet Union and the United States in the political confrontation of November-December 1964 concerning United Nations financing.31 The basic conflict in this case was not solved, but the severe crisis atmosphere which had developed was ap29

The crisis which actually touched off World War I, for example, has frequently been analyzed in this vein. 80 On this point see Pachter, op.cit., pp. 93-97; Cleveland, op.cit., p. 646, and Andrew Boyd, "The Unknown United Nations," International Journal, Vol. 19, No. 2 (1964), p. 207. 31 On this crisis consult the daily issues of the New York Times for the last week of November and the first week of December 1964.

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preciably deflated during the first week in December. The United Nations has also accumulated a considerable body of experience with "go-between" and liaison operations in conflict situations not involving the superpowers directly. The original investigating team for the Balkans established in 1946 played a successful liaison role, the Good Offices Committee in Indonesia was several times used for the exchange of letters between the parties to the conflict, and the United Nations presence in Kashmir has on occasion become an important channel for the conveyance of views on that conflict between India and Pakistan.32 And many of the activities of the Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO) fall under the rubric of facilitating communication between various parties to the conflict.33 Several basic problems for an intervenor contemplating communications roles stand out as especially important though not necessarily insurmountable. Among these are the difficulties of establishing the authentic character of the operation in the eyes of the parties to the crisis, proving that the intervenor is impartial, and persuading the antagonists to avail themselves of the proffered opportunity to capitalize on their common and overlapping interests. B. Verification, Inspection, and Monitoring A number of different inspection and verification services might be important in alleviating various kinds of international crisis, but their performance might be impossible for the two principals as direct parties to a crisis. Several distinguishable varieties of service in this area can be singled out. First, there are efforts to guarantee that an 32

In reference to the cases mentioned in this sentence see Elmore Jackson, Meeting of Minds (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1952), pp. 104-109. 33 For the intricacies of UNTSO operations see, in particular, E. L. M. Burns, Between Arab and Israeli (New York: Obolensky, 1963).

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undesired sequence does not get started or become uncontrollable in periods of drastically heightened tension. Such would be the case with inspection services to prevent accidents or miscalculations under conditions of crisis. Second, there may be instances in which it would be possible to verify the nonwarlike nature of an event that had already occurred. If, for example, a genuine accident occurred (especially during a serious crisis), it might be possible for a well-prepared intervenor to take steps to alleviate the great problem of proving to the victim that the event was a true accident. Finally, such services could be important in monitoring the implementation of agreed-upon arrangements for the termination of a crisis and in guaranteeing that required or promised activities are actually carried out. Each of these three types of activity might be constructively undertaken in a number of different situations and their boundaries might even tend to blur in actual practice. But it seems worthwhile to make this breakdown for purposes of conceptual clarity. Verification and inspection activities differ from some of the other instrumental activities and tactics in that they would require more preliminary planning and preparation, they would be more extensive operations in terms of required resources, and they would be more likely to require authorization and acceptance by a policy-making body such as the Security Council or the General Assembly in the case of the United Nations. In addition, the use of third-party personnel in a situation of great importance to the two sides in an international crisis might give rise to problems of impartiality and questions concerning the objectivity and veracity of the activities and reports of the third party's teams. Some of these problems could be minimized by following the principles of positive rather than negative evidence,34 a procedure which would cut down on the 34

Thomas C. Schelling and Morton Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961), pp. 97-99.

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extent of activity and societal penetration necessary for verification and inspection, and by emphasizing that such services would be conducted on an emergency and ad hoc basis rather than as continuing operations. Moreover, the desperate needs for such services which the problems of a really severe crisis might well generate might make the various obstacles look much less significant.35 And one or two successes in the utilization of these services would probably have the widespread effect of making the objections to them appear rather unimpressive. The nearest the United Nations has come to a role of this kind in a serious "nuclear" or interbloc crisis was the suggestion that the Organization verify the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba in 1962. This role finally failed to materialize, not because the superpowers were ultimately unwilling to go through with it, but primarily because the Castro government in Cuba was unwilling to accept such activities. In nonsuperpower crises, on the other hand, the United Nations experience with verification and inspection roles is rather rich. The work of United Nations observers during the first and second Palestine truces in 194836 and of the Truce Supervision Organization in later years37 has been of considerable significance in this context. From all indications this is particularly true of the former case. The inspection work of the United Nations Emergency Force on the Armistice Demarcation Line (ADL) and the international boundary in Sinai is a good example of a successful inspection operation. And the influence of the Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) during the 1958 crisis is suggestive of the role that third-party verification can play in facilitating the termination of a crisis.38 Other 35

Thomas C. Schelling, "Arms Control: Proposal for a Special Surveillance Force," World Politics, Vol. 13, No. 1 (October 1960), pp. 1-18. 36 ST Mohn, op.cit. Brook, op.cit., and Burns, op.cit. 38 Miller, op.cit., chap. 7, and Lash, op.cit., chap. 9.

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significant actions of this kind on the United Nations record include the 1946-1947 operation in the Balkans under the direction of the Secretary-General, the Military Observer Group for India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), and the Secretary-General's activities in verifying the North Borneo elections in 1963. C. Supervision Related to the concepts of inspection and verification is the possibility of supervisory activities undertaken by a third party. The general notion of supervision is employed here to include: a) the setting up and operating of truce regimes or peace settlements; b) the observation and handling of violations of certain categories of agreed-upon rules during periods of open hostilities or near violence; and c) the temporary administration of areas or territories in dispute. The notion of United Nations supervision in a variety of conflicts and crises has already become familiar to students of United Nations peacekeeping operations. The United Nations supervisory work in the city of Port Said in December 1956 is an excellent example of third-party supervision in a situation involving powers of the importance of Britain and France, though it did not involve the two superpowers.39 Many of the activities carried on by the United Nations in the Congo had a strong supervisory element. This became particularly important in the period after the Congolese central government began to disintegrate rapidly in September 1960. And the Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) which operated in West Irian in 1962 and 1963 illustrates the notion of international administration of an area in dispute.40 There is 39

Burns, op.cit., chap. 16. Consult Russell, op.cit., pp. 126-133, and, for a critical view, Paul W. Van der Veur, "The United Nations in West Irian: A Critique," International Organization, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Winter 1964), pp. 53-73. 40

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also a scattering of experience with international supervisory activities outside the United Nations context or only on its periphery. Two cases from the history of the League are relevant here. In particular, the League Commission which played an important part in the administration of the province of Leticia, lying between Colombia and Peru, during 1933 and 1934 provides an excellent example of international administration of a disputed area." In addition, the work of the Plebiscite Commission for the Saar, together with the international security force which was created to supervise the plebiscite during 1934 and 1935, constitutes a relevant example of international supervision.42 A final case in point (though somewhat dubious in terms of success) encompasses the work of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, and the Indian "custodian force" established in July 1953 to aid in the process of implementing the Korean armistice.43 In all of these cases, the international operations have followed diplomatic agreements or acceptances by the parties involved and have served to handle the problems created by the gap between the diplomatic arena and the actual conditions in the field. But there might also be important roles of a supervisory nature in the actual physical workings of contemporary international crises. One example of this might be the creation of ongoing operations of a supervisory nature that might well be required to maintain the viability of the "rules of the game" during periods of limited hostilities in the present international arena.44 41 Francis Walters, A History of the League of Nations (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 536-540. 42 Ibid., chap. 49, and Rosner, op.cit., pp. 212-217. 43 On the conception and establishment of the NNRC and the NNSC consult William H. Vatcher, Jr., Panmunjom (New York: Praeger, 1958). 44 Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1957), chap. 8.

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Perhaps the major obstacle to this type of activity is the fact that international supervisory groups or "presences" designed to operate under conditions of severe international crisis would most likely have to be operations of significant proportions. They would, therefore, almost certainly have to be authorized in the case of the United Nations, for example, by a policy organ and would become affairs of high politics as well as operations requiring significant mobilization and back-up resources. But this does not really constitute sufficient cause to write off this type of third-party activity entirely. The record in this area is actually quite promising. And, as noted above, moments of severe crisis typically call forth somewhat unexpected and surprising motivations, actions, and responses. The desperate needs of the parties to a severe crisis may rearrange present considerations of feasibility rapidly and radically. D. Arbitration Although there is very little concrete material in the record of past events concerning the use of arbitral procedures during international crises, the utilization of procedures amounting to arbitration or quasi-arbitration should not perhaps be ruled out entirely in the context of severe international crises in the contemporary arena. It is significant to note that activities in this realm would require a preliminary bargain between the two sides to a crisis45 to shift some of their problems to the United Nations or to other international bodies and to abide by the decisions reached by the outside agent in question. And as will become more clearly apparent in later chapters, it seems likely that this type of activity is most relevant to the problems of maintaining intrawar restraints based on important common and overlapping interests and of dealing with alleged violations or abuses of these restraints. In other contexts, 45

Kenneth Boulding, Conflict and Defense (New York: Harper & Bros. 1962), p. 319.

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especially in cases dealing with the substantive problems at issue in a crisis, the obstacles to the utilization of arbitral procedures will almost certainly be overwhelming for the foreseeable future. Even in these areas, however, it might still be worth while to keep the notion of arbitration on the intellectual horizon in the event that such procedures should become relevant in the future. The resources required for the performance of this role would not, on the whole, be very great. The preliminary requirement would be a sound grasp of politico-military relationships in the contemporary international arena, together with readily available sources of additional information of a more specific and detailed nature concerning these matters in the context of the actual crisis at hand. The problems of enforcement, on the other hand, could probably be handled, in large part, by stating clearly and capitalizing on the acute danger of the outbreak of (or escalation toward) highly destructive military exchanges in the event that either side should reject an award or make an effort to circumvent its provisions. The crucial obstacle to interventionary activity of this kind is, of course, the problem of acceptability. The general history of arbitration in international law does not suggest much support for the usefulness of arbitration in this connection.46 Moreover, experiences with quasi-arbitral procedures in the cases of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea and the International Control Commissions in Indochina47 suggest that activities of this kind can only succeed under very special circumstances. The environment of severe international crisis might, however, turn many relationships 46 Percy E. Corbett, Law in Diplomacy (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1959), chap. 5. 47 On the operations of the three International Control Commissions, consult the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, The Future Character and Role of Peace Observation Arrangements Under the United Nations (Washington, D.C.: December 1964), Appendix III, pp. 673-769.

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inside out and create many unusual possibilities. In cases of desperate efforts to cut through the impasses in situations involving, for example, possible violations of various "rules of the game," accidents, or stalemated warfare (nuclear or otherwise), the potential importance of a well-conceived arbitration arrangement might be very great.

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CHAPTERTHREE

The Identity of the Third Party

T

HIS CHAPTER focuses on resources and capabilities required for successful third-party intervention and on actors in the present international system which appear to be candidates for potential interventionary roles in various types of crisis. Attention shifts, at this point, from the nature of the roles and activities which a third party may be able to perform during future crises to the problem of identifying the third party.

RESOURCES AND CAPABILITIES It is one thing to discuss various activities and tactics which a third party might be able to engage in during crises. But any program of intervention must be based on various resources and capabilities. Even in cases where the workings of a crisis have generated roles for an intervening party which would be acceptable to the protagonists, a third party capable of performing the roles in question must be found. And this may not always be an easy task. In short, considerations concerning resources form the single most important set of factors governing the selection and identity of third parties during crises. Resources and capabilities required for intervention vary greatly from one type of activity to another. Certain resource areas or categories, however, seem basic and come to the fore repeatedly in discussions of third-party intervention. These are the factors spelled out in this section. No specific combination or minimal threshold level of these resources should be taken as a necessity for intervention in any specific situation. Suffice it to say that some substantial package of these resources is likely to prove crucial in most intervention attempts. 80

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A. Basic Qualities Several resources which come very close to being defining characteristics of a third party have been placed under this heading. These factors are, for the most part, intangible, but they tend to be important resources in the sense of being prerequisites for the launching of a successful program of intervention. It may also be worth noting at this point that these elements tend to characterize institutional entities (be it a nonaligned state or the Secretariat of the United Nations) more than individual persons. Consider the following elements in this context: 1. IMPARTIALITY. In most situations the existence of a meaningful role for a third party will depend on the party's being perceived as an impartial participant (in the sense of having nothing to gain from aiding either protagonist and in the sense of being able to control any feelings of favoritism) in the eyes of the principal protagonists. Note that the most relevant form of impartiality here is subjective rather than objective, a fact which may make it either harder or easier to attain depending upon the circumstances of the situation and the nature of the opponents in the crisis. To the extent that an intervening party is perceived as partial to one side or the other, it loses its status as a true third party and becomes more and more assimilated to one or the other of the antagonists for all practical purposes. It should also be noted that impartiality differs from neutrality.1 Impartiality refers to a situation in which the third party favors neither side to a crisis and remains indifferent to the gains and losses of each side. Neutrality, on the other hand, refers to a situation in which the effects of the actions of a third party can be said to have no influence toward terminating a crisis more in favor of one side than the 1

A. Douglas, "What Can Research Tell Us About Mediation?" Labor Law Journal, Vol. 6, No. 8, August 1955, pp. 550-551.

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other. It is reasonable to expect substantial impartiality from a third party.2 But the very fact of intervening in a crisis at all makes strict neutrality virtually impossible to attain. As Ann Douglas has summarized it: It has been my impression that expert mediators who really assist the parties to settlement are not strictly neutral... in fact, by definition could not be . .. and that their entrance into the case inevitably feeds determinants into the flow of bargaining interaction which influence the direction and shape of the outcome.3 Unfortunately, it is highly likely that very severe crises involving extremely high stakes and participated in by ideologically sensitive parties will pose great difficulties for the achievement of operational impartiality of a subjective nature. There are several tactics which a third party might utilize to achieve subjective impartiality. A potential intervener might take steps to demonstrate convincingly its detachment from the situation and the absence of anything to be gained from a settlement favoring one side over the other. Another possibility is that impartiality may be attained through the building up of a reputation for impartiality in similar matters over time. Or again, impartiality may occasionally be demonstrated by the willing acceptance of a commitment to some not inconsiderable loss (e.g., loss of office for the United Nations Secretary-General) in the event that either side subsequently accuses the third party of partial behavior. This last route to impartiality, however, involves serious dangers for the third party and might open up various possibilities for manipulation on the part of the principal protagonists in the crisis. 2. INDEPENDENCE. Related to the previous points on 2

Wilder Foote (ed.), Dag Hammarskjold: Servant of Peace (New York: Harper & Row, c. 1963), pp. 329-349 (1961 Oxford speech entitled "The International Civil Servant in Law and Fact"). 3 Douglas, op.cit., p. 551.

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impartiality is the fact that it is generally important for a third party to be free from attachment to or dependence on a political entity that has a stake in the outcome of the crisis at hand. This requirement narrows the range of acceptable third parties considerably, and it may place a very heavy burden of detachment on the third party in practice. But this may also be a case in which a quality such as the absence of political supporters and the lack of a formal constituency (often cited, for example, as one of the problems of the Secretary-General of the United Nations4) may be turned to good account and made a valuable asset. A party with neither a constituency nor hampering partners is likely to be relatively unfettered and free to act with considerable flexibility and dispatch. And characteristics such as this may, in fact, give a third party an opportunity to maintain its service orientation and to keep its role from becoming politicized in the sense that it is perceived as affecting the politico-military balance between the two sides to a crisis. B. Ascribed Resources There are several third-party resources which are basically ascribed in the sense that they are more nearly accorded by the potential protagonists in a crisis than acquired objectively by the intervenor. A factor such as respect is a clear case in this pattern. But even a quality such as continuity (or relative permanence) ultimately fits into this category, since continuity depends, for all practical purposes, on continued acceptance by the parties (or potential parties) to a crisis. There are, of course, many things which a third party can do to affect, both positively and negatively, its ratings in these areas. But such actions are all aimed at changing the ascriptive evaluations of the protagonists. 1. SALIENCE. Above all, a third party must occupy a salient position in the eyes of the two sides to a crisis, both 4

See, for example, I. L. Claude, Jr., Swords into Plowshares (2nd ed.; New York: Random House, 1959), pp. 211-215.

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as a natural actor toward which to turn when problems arise and as a probable source of useful assistance.5 Salience here refers to the prominence or uniqueness of the third party itself in contrast to the salience of particular termination arrangements discussed in previous chapters. Salience of this type may fall to a third party because of its focal or noticeable position in the structure of the international system at any given time. Or it may accrue to the third party as a result of its conscious efforts to make itself known to potential protagonists in crises as a likely source to turn to for outside assistance. In either case, salience depends on a perceived quality of naturalness in delegating various activities to a particular third party together with a convergence of favorable expectations concerning the party in question among the decision-making elites of the two sides.6 One way to acquire salience is through the accumulation of precedent over a period of time. But there are other methods of accomplishing the same goal, such as the exercise of a precise sense of timing in critical situations or the utilization of the magnetism of personal persuasion on the part of a talented leader. 2. RESPECT. A quality which a third party would almost certainly require to a high degree is prestige or repute in the eyes of the parties to an international crisis. Whatever their feelings about the past actions or affiliations of the intervener, the two sides must feel that there is a certain propriety or naturalness about the actor performing the role in question and agree that this is what the third party "ought" to be doing in the given situation. Several forms of respect should be mentioned in this context. Perhaps most important for the prospects of third5

On the subject of salience consult, in general, Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), chaps. 2-4. 6 Carl Stevens, Strategy and Collective Bargaining Negotiations (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1963), pp. 122-127.

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party intervention is what might be called authoritative respect. This form of respect derives from a high standing in terms of such variables as status, credentials, rank, knowledge, and so forth which gives the party in question a prominent place in terms of international deference patterns.7 A second form of respect might be described as affectual respect. It derives from feelings on the part of the protagonists in a crisis that the third party in question empathizes with their problems, understands, is sympathetic, or is close to the realities of the bargaining process. For the persuasive and facilitative operations under discussion in this study, the possession of affectual respect may be of very great importance. A final category covers the phenomenon of calculated respect. Here respect is accorded to an outside party on the basis of hardheaded calculations concerning its effective power and influence. Although this form of respect is of great significance generally, it is not central to the problems and possibilities of third-party intervention. 3. CONTINUITY. It is generally desirable that an intervenor be an established factor in international politics and that it display a certain continuity. This is not to say that perpetuity is needed—far from it—but only to suggest that it is important to be able to predict with a substantial degree of certainty that a potential intervenor will still be present at some future time when a crisis actually occurs. The value of fostering expectations that an intervenor such as the United Nations, for example, will still be present and relevant when it is needed should not be underestimated. And there are other important values of continuity. A wealth of valuable experience is likely to be built up over the years which may give an intervenor such as the United Nations an important finesse in dealing with crisis situ7 Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1950), especially chap. 4.

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ations. And the reputation for sturdiness and ability to weather various storms which comes with continuity over a period of time can only have a positive effect on the image of a potential third party as far as crisis intervention is concerned. These general points should be modified in at least one respect, however. In international crises, as is apparently already the case in labor-management conflict, great significance may be attached to the "one-shot" intervenor. As Stevens says: . . . there may be an important place in collective bargaining for the mediator who is not overly concerned with his own viability . . . the "one-shot" mediator. Making a recommendation, patently shouldering responsibility for the outcome, is hazardous for the mediator . . . it exposes him to the risk of the disaffection of one side or the other, and may decrease his popularity as a candidate for subsequent mediations. Nevertheless, if failure to agree is because of failure of coercive commitment, facesaving may be an essential ingredient in resolution of the dispute.8 This notion is often shied away from as callous or somehow immoral. But it may sometimes constitute one of the few hopes for successful crisis termination in a bargaining arena, such as the international arena, which is characterized by high levels of competition and relatively low development of rules of the game. Several problems, however, with the notion of "one-shot" intervention place it in the realm of desperate or last-ditch possibilities. It can hardly be expected that the relevant third parties would agree to such programs of self-abnegation. And even in cases such as the Secretariat of the United Nations, where willingness to accept sacrifices might be found, the scarcity of firstclass talent for replacements (a problem which would be 8

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Stevens, op.cit., p. 135.

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heightened by the insecurity accompanying expendability) should make all parties concerned hesitant to push for programs of "one-shot" intervention. C. Personnel Qualifications The resources considered under this heading pertain primarily to the particular personnel involved in or designated for interventionary programs. Although the institution from which these persons are drawn may help them to acquire various capabilities, the skills and qualities in question will ultimately belong to the individuals. Moreover, in contrast to ascribed resources discussed above, these capabilities are more nearly objective in the sense that the persons involved can be said to have or to lack them more or less regardless of the subjectivities of the protagonists in a crisis. A partial (but only partial) exception to this general description is the quality of initiative, since one of the factors on which it depends is at least minimal acceptance by the protagonists. The following resources have been grouped in this category: 1. KNOWLEDGE OF POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS. Ultimately, an intervening party in a crisis situation is an element in the communications structure of the bargaining process.9 For this reason virtually every action that a third party can take depends upon and affects the evaluations, expectations, attitudes, and bargaining calculations of the principal parties. Moreover, the fact that the third-party roles under discussion in this study are basically persuasive rather than coercive means that the power of knowledge, information, and understanding is at the very heart of any influence that a third party may acquire. And the importance of knowledge is only underlined by the extreme complexity of contemporary crises, a factor which tends frequently to increase the pressure of impulses to resort to °Ibid.,pp. 129-130.

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coercive force and which certainly increases the delicacy and precision required for success in programs of persuasive intervention. In this context, it is hard to overstress the importance for a third party of acquiring a very thorough grasp of such matters as: the nature of strategic bargaining; the life-cycle phenomenon in the evolution of crises; the significance of "conditional viability" as opposed to "unconditional viability";10 the effects of various politicomilitary problems on the motivations of the principal parties; the significance of such concepts as preemption, surprise attack, escalation, active and passive defense, strategic invulnerability, and so forth; the delicate time factors involved, and the exact mechanisms through which parties may become locked into situations they cannot alleviate through their own initiatives. No potential intervenor can have available all the knowledge and information which might become important during future crises. But it is relevant to evaluate the channels (in terms of breadth and speed of mobilization) which such a party has available for the acquisition of additional knowledge and information during actual crisis sequences. Finally, it is worth noting that intervention based on inadequate or faulty knowledge may lead to serious detrimental results as well as to simple failure. In severe crises every step that an intervenor takes is likely to have substantial importance but not necessarily constructive significance. 2. SKILL. One of the most crucial and yet most difficult of all resources in intervention to pin down can, perhaps, be dealt with under the heading of diplomatic and bargaining skill. It is clear that there is a critical difference among individuals in their abilities, for example, to choose just the right formulation of a given suggestion or action and to intervene with an intuitive sense of strategic timing. The elements of this skill are very difficult to distinguish, but 10

On this distinction consult Kenneth Boulding, Conflict and Defense (New York: Harper & Bros., 1962), chap. 4.

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several factors may be singled out here.11 First, it is generally agreed that a precision sense of timing resulting in the ability to pick the exact moment when an action will penetrate the decision processes of the protagonists is important. Second, the same action or proposals can be articulated or formulated in different ways with surprisingly variant results in terms of the receptivity of the parties involved. Third, a significant element of skill in this context is made up of originality, imagination, and inventiveness in the search for new ways of looking at the crucial conflicts underlying the crisis and new ways of packaging and presenting the alternative routes to termination. Finally, a skillful intervenor usually manages to combine unobtrusiveness with an ability to convince others to adopt his suggestions as though they were their own. In this context, a premium is put on the ability to persuade each side that a given suggestion for termination is a gain for itself rather than a capitulation to the opponent. On balance, diplomatic and bargaining skill appears to be a somewhat nebulous combination of several elements. But it is of crucial importance in many crisis situations. 3. INITIATIVE. An intervenor cannot hope to function successfully without the ability to take at least some initiatives quickly, authoritatively, and with a sure hand. A party which can only implement or execute the ideas and requests of others is not likely to get very far in facilitating the termination of severe crises. Initiative in dealing with international crises is most basically a political matter. The most important problem involved centers on the question of acceptability in the eyes of the principal parties to a given crisis. A third party undertaking actions which are acceptable to the protagonists is 11

On this question some interesting thoughts can be found in Henry A. Landsberger, "Interim Report on a Research Project in Mediation," Labor Law Journal, Vol. 6, No. 8 (August 1955), pp. 552-560.

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likely to be able to get away with initiatives of many kinds. But the capacity for initiative must ultimately be generated within the third party itself and here certain limitations of a legal and personal nature are likely to be important. To take an example, a given Secretary-General of the United Nations will be limited not only by the political problems of acceptability during any given crisis but also by his interpretation of the constitutional limitations affecting his office and by his personal conception of the nature and functions of the office he holds. D. Physical Resource Control A final category is that of the physical resources that would be important in carrying out programs of third-party intervention. Physical resources of the types involved in various interventionary activities may be attainable without too much difficulty in some cases. But it is important to note that such resources must ultimately be measured and analyzed in terms of usability as well as in terms of mere existence. 1. PHYSICAL RESOURCES. The actual physical resources required for successful intervention vary extensively in terms of both scope and quantity depending upon the activity or tactic to be undertaken. In some cases the required resources would be minimal, since something on the order of suggestions or salient declarations might form the essential core of the intervention. In a number of cases, however, and particularly in contexts where service functions such as inspection or supervision are undertaken, a considerable range of physical capabilities might become important. Consider in this light the potential importance of such resources as the following: a) a wide variety of communications facilities; b) equipment and personnel for inspection and verification or supervision operations; c) technical and military experts in various areas; d) land and air transport; e) negotiating personnel and equipment; f) various 90

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types of warning system, and g) high-speed informationprocessing equipment. There are some types of interventionary activity in which the availability of substantial quantities of physical resources would be an outright necessity for success. And there are many other types of activity in which the prospects, although not entirely negated by a relative lack of physical resources, would be considerably improved by the availability of certain physical resources. 2. MOBILIZATION. In many types of crises, an intervening party would have to be able to launch the needed thirdparty actions or services with considerable dispatch if it were to entertain any real hope of success. And in all cases a certain smoothness in going into action would be an important capability for a third party. Although the ability to react on extremely short notice is not of crucial importance in all cases, the opportunity to intervene successfully might pass very quickly in many really severe crises (and especially "nuclear" crises). In addition, a third party will often be faced with the problem of starting almost from scratch in terms of physical resources and mobilizing an operation at a considerable distance from its home base. In this context, it is worth underscoring heavily the value of such preparatory activities as contingency planning dealing with the availability and mobilization of the necessary capabilities for various types of third-party actions. And in the area of mobilization a particularly important premium attaches to flexibility on the part of the third party. POTENTIAL

INTERVENORS

It is now important to face the identity question squarely. An analysis of a wide variety of types of crises suggests the following list of potential intervenors: 1) the uncommitted and nonaligned states; 2) aligned and semialigned states; 3) regional organizations; 4) nongovernmental organi91

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zations; and 5) the United Nations system. Unfortunately, there is a general lack of literature and data assessing the strengths and weaknesses of potential intervenors for the role of third party during international crises. It is possible to conceive of various research programs designed to generate data for such an assessment, but none of this work has yet been done and it would in most cases require major projects. In this section, therefore, the analysis is confined to clarifying the major issues and to formulating rather broad propositions. A. The Uncommitted States—Singly or in Combination The reference here is to states that are uncommitted or only slightly committed in terms of the East-West dichotomy and to the possibility that these states may be able to intervene constructively in interbloc or system-wide crises. This notion that states from the "third world" can play important interventionary roles in "bloc differences" is at present rather popular (especially with many leaders from uncommitted states) and there is, in fact, a certain amount of literature relevant to the prospects of third-party roles for such states. This literature leaves much to be desired, and there are several major problems with it from the point of view of drawing conclusions concerning the strengths and weaknesses of the uncommitted states as third parties. In particular, much of the material involved is very speculative, and arguments pro and con in this area are often formulated at such different levels of generality that comparison becomes difficult. Nevertheless, this is the only case in which there is a noticeable body of literature concerning potential intervenors and, therefore, the only area in this discussion in which analysis can at least be organized around existing argumentation. Conceptually, it is possible to distinguish cases in which third-party activities are undertaken by single states from those in which the intervention is mounted by some combi92

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nation of the uncommitted states. The various strands of argument on this question tend, however, to become so thoroughly mixed that the distinction is virtually impossible to cling to in practice. These two possibilities will, therefore, be placed together in one category, although comments bearing on this distinction will be added from time to time. As a broad generalization, it is probably accurate to say that the uncommitted states tend to fare better in terms of basic qualities and ascribed resources than in terms of personnel qualifications and physical resource control. It is true that some doubts are now being raised about the impartiality of some of the so-called nonaligned states, but when all is said and done, this probably amounts to no more than a normal level of doubt in a highly competitive arena. And it is also true that some analysts have raised serious questions concerning such matters as respect, prestige, and especially continuity with regard to the uncommitted states. On the other hand, the very nature of the contemporary international system has given these states a high level of salience as potential intervenors in interbloc crises. And the uncommitted states generally appear to be quite weak in the areas of personnel qualifications and physical resources. The physical resource problem may not be very acute for some types of intervention (e.g., mediatory activities) although it could become prohibitive in other contexts. But personnel deficiencies in the areas of knowledge, skill, and initiative constitute a serious obstacle in the way of virtually all programs of intervention. 1. ARGUMENTS WITH A POSITIVE TINGE. Arguments that the uncommitted states can, in fact, intervene constructively in at least some East-West crises tend to fall into two broad classes. First, and most simply, one often comes across very general but not very operational assertions that these states have in the past and can now play this role. For example, Lester Pearson has asserted that "These states have been a very important factor lessening some of the major 93

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crises we have faced in the past decade."12 And Liska has suggested that "On the global plane . . . nonaligned states can be useful as insulating buffer states, mediators and international policemen."13 Arguments of this variety, however, do not deal at all with the detailed procedures through which these results can be achieved. The other general class of arguments with a positive tinge is much more theoretical for the most part. The case for intervention by uncommitted states here tends to rest on derivations from various models of contemporary international politics. Several of these formulations are ingenious and deserve to be quoted at some length. Some of the most effective of these arguments have been made by Kaplan on the basis of his systemic view of international politics.14 On the one hand, he has suggested a rather detailed and specific role for the uncommitted states in the following terms: The interjection of a third party opinion changes the expectations that parties to a bargain have of the willingness of each to accept a particular criterion. Provided only that the criterion enunciated by the outside party is not clearly unreasonable, one bargainer sees that the other has external support for his arguments and is likely to reason that the other bargainer therefore expects him to give in. The other bargainer knows that the first reasons this way, and this increases the incentive of the second to hold out for the "arbitrated" solution. The mere fact that the external intervention changes the view of 12

Lester B. Pearson, "The New Face of Diplomacy," in Perspectives on Peace 1910-1960 (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1960), p. 126. 13 George Liska, "Tripartism: Dilemmas and Strategies," in Laurence Martin (ed.), Neutralism and Nonalignment (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 216. 14 Morton Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (New York: John Wiley, 1957), passim.

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each as to what the other expects and expects him to expect alters the situation to the advantage of one and to the disadvantage of the other. The greater the number of third parties intervening, and the more disinterested they appear, the more true this is (unless they differ with one another). Therefore, the uncommitted states as external mediators, intervenors, and so forth gain substantial power to affect bargaining between the United States and the Soviet Union . . . a power that may be greater than their military weight or than their value as allies or opponents on future issues, although these elements also enter into the determination.15 At the same time, Kaplan apparently sees a somewhat broader mediatory role for the uncommitted states. Their influence may extend beyond problems of shaping expectations in bargaining relationships. The formulation here is suggested in a statement by Kaplan and Katzenbach to the effect that: Mediation, thus, is not a general role of all nations of the loose bipolar system, but a specialized role. Uncommitted nations may exercise the same kind of role as that of the uncommitted parties who are often so useful in mediating industrial disputes. The process of accommodation is a difficult one, and the blocs would be in considerably greater trouble with each other if they did not have to appeal to uncommitted nations or if they could not turn to such uncommitted nations to mediate a compromise. Withdrawal from an announced position may be both difficult and painful if not eased by moral pressure and suasion from independent and neutral bystanders who are able to invoke larger principles as well as their own independent judgment. Sometimes the most 15

Morton Kaplan, "Bipolarity in a Revolutionary Age," in Morton Kaplan (ed.), The Revolution in World Politics (New York: John Wiley, 1963), p. 264.

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difficult step is to get contending parties to talk to each other. The uncommitted nations often perform yeoman work. This job may be done irresponsibly as well as responsibly, and it is possible that the greater responsiveness of the democratic nations to world opinion may yet weigh heavily and negatively in the race for survival. The mediatory function of the uncommitted nations is nonetheless, in principle at least, an important one for the stability of the loose bipolar system.16 Two points concerning these positions of Kaplan and Katzenbach should perhaps be stressed explicitly. Their positions flow naturally from Kaplan's loose bipolar model of the international system, which, he suggests, is at least roughly applicable to the reality of today. Given the assumptions and postulates of this model, it is difficult to see how the uncommitted states could escape such roles. Then too, these arguments lean toward the notion that various combinations of uncommitted states are likely to have much greater success in intervening than single states. After dismissing the single state as an effective intervenor, Kaplan and Katzenbach suggest that "large numbers of uncommitted states may have to play such a role through the United Nations or by means of joint political influence exercised informally."17 A further semitheoretical argument with a positive tinge is offered by Herz. His ideas stem from a theoretical analysis of the nature of contemporary bipolarity and of the impact of nuclear weapons on international political processes. His case for intervention by the uncommitted states is formulated in the following terms: 16

Morton Kaplan and Nicholas Katzenbach, The Political Foundations of International Law (New York: John Wiley, 1961), p. 52. 17 Morton Kaplan and Nicholas Katzenbach, "The Institutions of International Decision-Making," in Saul Mendlovitz (ed.), Legal and Political Problems of World Order (New York: Fund for Education Concerning World Peace Through World Law, 1962), p. 315.

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In certain circumstances, this [contemporary relations of power] gives them leeway for maneuvering and also for playing a mediating role in superpower relations. Indeed, since they are, or should be, interested in the avoidance of the "big" clash (in which, in all likelihood there would be no "innocent," unharmed, or profiteering "by-standers" anymore), they are the natural mediators. Their services in this capacity can be important, whether as supervisors of plebiscites or elections, or, in war, of the observance of rules of warfare, whether as initiators or supervisors of a cease fire, a truce, an armistice, prisoners' exchange, or what not. Through them, also, regimes not "recognizing" each other may speak to each other. While it is understandable that bloc powers, under bloc competition, compete for the alignment of still uncommitted countries, they should realize that the commitment of all would deprive them of services not easy to get along without so long as they are not unalterably committed to all-out war.18 A word should perhaps be added here concerning the perception of their own role by the uncommitted states. There can be Utile doubt that many leaders and especially intellectuals in the nonaligned states perceive themselves as playing interventionary roles of great significance for the stability of the overall international system. As Wilcox has put it: They look upon themselves as a kind of bridge between two competing camps, a third party whose unique position enables them to view with objectivity the issues and tensions of the cold war. . . . With such a detached view, they believe they are able, either through the United Nations or otherwise, to anticipate, and perhaps 18

John Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 294.

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prevent, situations from developing that might lead to serious conflict between the great powers.19 In fact, this general line of argument is quite frequently heard as part of a justification for policies of neutralism and nonalignment adopted by the uncommitted states. At the same time, it should be kept in mind that the leaders of these states perceive themselves in several other roles and that these other roles are sometimes incompatible with the role of third-party intervenor. Some indications of these problems will appear below in the arguments against intervention by the uncommitted states. 2 . RESTRICTIONS AND LIMITATIONS—ARGUMENTS WITH

A NEGATIVE TINGE. Some analysts have argued that a number of factors place very severe restrictions on the abilities of the uncommitted states to intervene in interbloc crises. Even some of those who have generally argued in favor of intervention by these states have not been able to escape noting some of these factors. For the most part, the negative arguments are not structured like the positive arguments. Whereas the latter are most often based on an approach to the overall international system, the negative arguments tend to deal with specific characteristics of the uncommitted states which reduce their ability to intervene successfully. This difference makes the various arguments difficult to compare meaningfully, but they can at least be made clear. Despite his general statement already quoted, Liska has formulated a series of points which tend to cast doubt on the capacity of nonaligned states to intervene in interbloc situations.20 His analysis suggests that such a state or states must possess the following qualities if they are to intervene with any hope of success: 19 Francis O. Wilcox, "The Nonaligned States and the United Nations," in Martin, op.cit., p. 124. 20 Liska in Martin, op.cit., pp. 212-221.

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1. The intervenor must itself be internally stable and viable; 2. A state attempting to act as a third party must itself be immune from outside interference in its domestic affairs; 3. An intervenor must have some independent strength though this need not necessarily be military. In considering the various nonaligned states, Liska concludes that they generally tend to fare rather poorly on these scales. He is therefore skeptical of their intervention potential, at least in the immediate future. Moreover, he suggests that the lack of viability of many of these states and their general desire to profit from the cold war may lead them to act more often as "divisors" than as "mediatormoderators."21 This argument is, in fact, quite powerful and persuasive, but there is at least one reservation that should be made explicit. It would appear that Liska is analyzing the capabilities of the uncommitted states for roles that often more nearly resemble that of a third force or balancer than those of the type of third party under analysis in this study. While this distinction is never drawn clearly, the fact that he seems to be contemplating rather different roles softens his negative conclusions, to some extent at least, as far as thirdparty intervention is concerned. A variety of additional and even more specific arguments with a negative tinge can be found in the literature. Various authors have suggested that the uncommitted states lack the prestige and influence in the eyes of the superpowers that would be necessary if they were to have any important role during crises.22 As Lefever has put it: 21

Ibid., p. 211. A "divisor" in this context is an agent which serves to initiate or to exacerbate conflicts between two or more states in the international system. 22 Henry Pachter, Collision Course (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 101.

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The contribution of the neutrals to the preservation of international peace and stability is severely limited. Their efforts to mediate big-power disputes are effective only when the big powers are willing to compromise their differences. If the willingness is present, an agreement can probably be reached through normal diplomatic channels, without mediation.23 This argument would seem to be strongest when applied to single uncommitted states. The case may be different when such states act in various combinations. The somewhat chaotic domestic situation of many nonaligned states and their tendency to become thoroughly absorbed in the enormous tasks of domestic development are often cited as reasons for not expecting too much from them in terms of intervening constructively in interbloc crises. Kripalani takes this position in stressing the lack of time and energy of the nonaligned states. His point is that: The underdeveloped Asio-African countries which have recently achieved freedom have so many political, economic and social problems of their own that they feel they must confine their attention to the solution of these rather than dabble in partisan international politics.24 Another, somewhat more belligerent, version of this type of argument is stated by Kissinger in the following terms: It is not clear why nations said to be in need of assistance in almost all aspects of their national life, many of which have difficulty organizing their own countries, should be presumed to be able to act with more wisdom in relation to the whole gamut of international problems.25 23

Ernest W. Lefever, "Nehru, Nasser, and Nkrumah on Neutralism," in Martin, op.cit., p. 118. 24 A. Kripalani, "For Principled Neutrality," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 38, No. 1 (1959), p. 56. 25 Henry A. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1962), p. 346.

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Another class of arguments stresses the lack of cohesion among the nonaligned states and their tendency to work at cross purposes, thus defeating attempts to intervene effectively in interbloc problems.26 And related to this point is the notion that many, if not most, of the nonaligned states actually are not sufficiently impartial to be accepted by both sides as disinterested outsiders.27 The familiar argument that "neutralism" means a tendency to favor the Soviet side on many issues is mentioned in this context. And the various points that have been made concerning the existence of a double standard and the disadvantages which accrue to the Western bargaining position from a greater responsiveness to external pressures and opinion fit in at this point. Kissinger has even gone so far as to suggest that there is some kind of a contradiction between intervening as a third party and the desire to remain uncommitted. He asserts, somewhat enigmatically: "As for the uncommitted, they cannot eat their cake and have it too. They cannot remain uncommitted and seek to act as arbiters of all disputes at the same time."28 In any case, the various points made in this group of arguments tend to cast doubt on the possibilities of uncommitted states combining their influence to intervene in interbloc crises. Their lack of cohesion and basic differences in outlook make this prospect doubtful. It has also been suggested that the uncommitted states lack the necessary competence and knowledge to handle interventionary activities in complicated crises. The point here is that intervention requires a variety of diplomatic skills and a thorough knowledge of superpower relationships which may not yet be available to many of the uncommitted states. This view, again, has been enunciated most strongly by Kissinger in the assertion that "The uncommitted are in no position to form a responsible judg26

Lefever in Martin, op.cit., p. 118. Liska in Martin, op.cit., pp. 211-238. 28 Kissinger, op.cit., p. 350.

27

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ment, much less to develop a serious program."29 That is, in fact, a rather harsh indictment, and the common failure to back it up with persuasive proof should be noted carefully. Finally, the point has been made that it may be foolish to expect the nonaligned states to play an essentially stabilizing role in the contemporary international arena when, in actuality, they are basically disruptive forces themselves. As Kaplan himself has suggested, "the uncommitted states are also opposed to the status quo; in that fact may lie an important element of instability in the contemporary bipolar system."30 This general view dovetails both with Liska's suggestion that third states may actually turn out to be "divisors" and with other arguments that the uncommitted states may be more interested in keeping cold war antagonisms alive than in easing the tension in East-West, relations. When all is said, it is still rather difficult to assess the potential of the uncommitted states as intervenors in interbloc crises. But several summary points may perhaps be made safely at this point. There appears to be some potential in the uncommitted states for successful intervention. In theory this potential looks reasonably impressive and substantial. In practice, however, there would appear to be so many restrictions and qualifications that the role must ultimately be described as rather limited and circumscribed for any practical purpose. And yet, this general conclusion will not necessarily hold for any specific crisis. As far as specific cases are concerned, prediction becomes most difficult. B. Aligned and Semialigned States There are two possible areas in which states aligned or semialigned in terms of the East-West dichotomy can inter29 30

Ibid., p. 345. Kaplan in Kaplan, op.cit., p. 264.

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vene: a) interbloc tensions and crises, and b) crises occurring in the "third world" without major bloc manipulations. Intervention of this type seems likely to be most practicable for states that are not leading bloc members, although there may be some room for relatively important states (especially those that are loosening ties with their own bloc) to intervene influentially in the second category of situations mentioned above. In general, the problems faced by aligned or semialigned intervenors are the opposite of those faced by the uncommitted states. They are often reasonably well prepared in terms of the various personnel qualifications and physical resources, but they are apt to score very poorly in terms of basic qualities and ascribed capabilities. In both potential areas for intervention mentioned above the aligned states are almost bound to encounter enormous difficulties in achieving any semblance of subjective or perceived impartiality. And independence tends, for the most part, to be out of the question unless the aligned state is for one reason or another in the process of changing the quality of its alignment and therefore able to point to its new status. In addition, there is little evidence that these states have any real salience or prestige as potential intervenors in the eyes of parties which might be involved in relevant crises. Interventionary moves on the part of a de Gaulle, for example, are presently treated with a certain disbelief and analyzed as almost "unnatural" in many circles. These difficulties almost certainly raise more serious obstacles to successful intervention than is the case with the opposite set of strengths and weaknesses faced by the uncommitted states. The aligned intervenor tends to be caught on the horns of a serious dilemma especially in the context of interbloc crises. Such a state can make a serious attempt to achieve political acceptability in the eyes of the parties to a crisis or a dispute. But in so doing it is likely to become more and more out of step with and, consequently, ostra103

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cized by its bloc. There is something of this development in the pattern of de Gaulle's recent attempts to intervene in Laos and Vietnam. On the other hand, the aligned state can take steps to guarantee that it remains well integrated into its own bloc. But the price for this course is likely to be a failure to become acceptable in the eyes of at least one of the protagonists. A good example of this pattern can be seen in the fate of the Rapacki plans for disengagement in central Europe.31 With special reference to crises developing in the "third world," however, an aligned state is likely to face several obstacles to the achievement of subjective impartiality that are often virtually insurmountable. There is the inevitable imperialist legacy, which tends to create problems whenever the flow of influence is from developed to underdeveloped areas. Then too, many recent cases of intervention by aligned states (even when accompanied by fine declaratory statements) have turned out to be more or less straightforward programs aimed at helping either the East or the West to achieve its favored outcome. Examples in recent years would include the activities of both sides in the Congo, Chinese intervention in Cuba, American participation in the Guatemalan affair of 1954, Chinese activities in Laos, and Soviet intervention in the Suez crisis. Finally, the risks of transforming an extrabloc crisis into an interbloc crisis and of inducing escalation are sufficiently great whenever a bloc member (under any guise) enters such an affair to make all sides rather wary of such developments. The principal thrust of the doctrine of preventive diplomacy, for example, is aimed precisely at this problem. It is difficult for an aligned state to achieve any real salience as a potential intervenor in either of the arenas 31

On the two Rapacki plans consult Eugene Hinterhoff, Disengagement (London: Stevens, 1959), chap. 8.

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mentioned above. This possibility tends to lie outside the convergence of expectations of the parties to crises and it certainly lacks any quality of prominence or naturalness in most contexts. One simply does not turn to a member of either major bloc for help of the kind under discussion in this study. Nor is the relevance of intervention by aligned states emphasized by the nature of the contemporary international system as is the case with uncommitted states intervening in interbloc crises. This analysis is underlined by the fact that it is difficult to find cases in the recent past that can be cited as successes for this type of intervention. The role of the Soviet Union in facilitating negotiations between India and Pakistan in January 1966 constitutes an important exception to this statement. It might also be possible to look upon Churchill's handling of British influence at Yalta in this light. And it may be that some of de Gaulle's present initiatives in the direction of southeast Asia will become important in this context. But in general the search for historical cases serves only to emphasize the impact of the obstacles facing this type of intervention. In passing it might be noted that this conclusion tends to bode ill for the cherished British hope of scrapping nuclear weapons and playing the role of intermediary between the United States and the Soviet Union while at the same time retaining a basically Western orientation. C. Regional Organizations A regional organization might intervene in subsystem or intrabloc crises in cases in which it is the general organization for the bloc. The recent efforts of NATO to deal with the Cyprus crisis and in particular with the Greek-Turkish tension generated by this crisis constitute a case in point. Or, again, a regional organization might intervene in local crises in cases in which it is the general organization for a whole region. The intervention of the Organization of 105

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American States in several Latin American conflicts fits into this pattern. In general, the situation in respect to possible intervention by regional organizations is somewhat inchoate and varies significantly from one organization to another. A few general comments may, however, be in order at this point. Questions concerning the impartiality and independence of regional organizations are not fully applicable since most of the relevant organizations of this type are little more than forums for their members and hardly have a sufficiently independent existence to be considered either partial or impartial in themselves. What is true, however, is that action taken within the framework of a regional organization sometimes appears to be on a higher or loftier plane than the conflict itself. And this process of detachment can lend an action a certain air of impartiality, even in cases in which this is hardly justified objectively. The recent actions of the Organization of African Unity impinging on the Congo situation and on South Africa might be cited as cases in point. The parties responsible for shaping the actions in question are likely to be the same whether the regional organization acts or not but the promulgation of actions through a regional structure sometimes makes a real difference in terms of a factor such as subjective impartiality. Regional organizations in recent years have tended to exhibit a strong "external orientation" and to concern themselves with the security of their area vis-a-vis outside threats32 rather than with the processes of interaction among their members. At the same time they have lacked salience as third-party intervenors in intraregional disputes to the point of being virtually irrelevant in many cases. A partial exception to this general conclusion is the Organi32

On this point see I. L. Claude, Jr., "The OAS, the UN, and the United States," International Conciliation, No. 547 (March 1964), pp. 16ff.

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zation of American States, but this, as Claude has pointed out, is more of a triumph for American foreign policy than an indication that this organization is gradually becoming a really significant third party.ss It is, however, true that changes are now becoming apparent in the matter of salience. Several regional organizations are characterized at this point by rapidly growing salience in the eyes of their constituents as at least potential third parties. This would seem to be especially significant in the case of an agency such as the Organization of African Unity, which shows signs of becoming the preferred organ for the handling of many intra-African problems. The Organization has, in fact, already played a role in dealing» with conflicts between Morocco and Algeria and between Ethiopia and SomaHa as well as in the negotiations resulting in the replacement of British troops in Tanganyika by Ethiopian and Nigerian contingents in 1964. Yet regional organizations are faced with very big problems in the areas of personnel qualifications and physical resources for intervention. Organizations with resources of this kind (such as NATO and to some extent the Warsaw Pact) are those which are most thoroughly oriented toward external security and which fare poorly in terms of impartiality and salience as well as in terms of basic political acceptability to the protagonists when it comes to the possibilities of third-party intervention. On the other hand, the regional organizations which are more acceptable as intervenors (e.g., the Organization of American States and the Organization of African Unity) have very little in the way of personnel and physical resources at their disposal and can only serve, for the most part, as forums for the accumulation and articulation of constituent interests. These difficulties produce a dilemma whose horns are relative unacceptability and relative impotence. 33 Ibid., pp. 17ff. The events of 1965 in the Dominican Republic suggest little reason to alter Claude's position on this point.

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This suggests that, at least for the present, regional organizations must be viewed more nearly as tactical instruments of other parties than as significant political interveners in their own right as far as third-party activities in crises is concerned. Claude's general conclusion to the effect that "So far as the ideal of relieving the general organization of the burden of settling intraregional disputes is concerned, the record thus far gives very limited support to the notion of the usefulness of regional agencies"34 seems to stand as an accurate description of reality. Claude himself tends to explain this result in terms of the focus on security problems and the external orientation of most of the regional organizations. But it seems relevant also to link this conclusion with some of the important resource deficiencies, noted above, that characterize the various regional organizations. D. Nongovernmental Organizations The reference here is to the wide range of international entities which are usually labeled nongovernmental organizations (ngo's). A case in point, which suggests the potential relevance of this category, is the International Committee of the Red Cross. The Red Cross has apparently served useful service roles during international conflicts on several occasions. Although very little information is available on these activities,35 there are indications that Red Cross personnel performed useful services as third parties during the Algerian war, and the fact that the Red Cross was able to penetrate to Budapest during the Hungarian crisis suggests that the organization has the ability at least to put itself in a position where the possibility of its role as third 34

I. L. Claude, Jr., Swords into Plowshares (3rd ed., New York: Random House, 1964), p. 106. 35 The following examples were suggested by Thomas C. Schelling in a personal communication on 7 January 1965 in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

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party becomes relevant. Moreover, at one point during the Cuban crisis of October 1962 the Red Cross was given serious consideration as a source of inspection teams designed to verify the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from the island. In this context, it should be noted, however, that the suggestion came to naught and that not the least of the opposition was voiced by the International Committee of the Red Cross itself. The real difficulty with nongovernmental organizations as potential intervenors is the fact that they tend to be weak in terms of too many of the important resources. In fact, their only real strength lies in the areas of the basic qualities of impartiality and independence. The nongovernmental nature of these organizations sometimes does allow for a substantial detachment from political struggles. But even this is not always the case, since many nongovernmental organizations are more or less government-sponsored or at least clearly identified with a particular state or bloc. For example, the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) is Communist-dominated and some of the powerful international business organizations like the Chamber of Commerce are Western-dominated. Even the International Committee of the Red Cross is dominated by a group of very conservative Swiss businessmen who are more strongly anti-Communist than most Americans. In short, very few of the nongovernmental organizations are really universal in the sense of bridging the East-West and North-South gaps. Perhaps even greater difficulties arise, however, in other areas. The nongovernmental organizations, for the most part, are far from being salient as potential third-party intervenors. Nor do they appear to be achieving an increasing level of salience in the eyes of potential crisis protagonists as time passes. And virtually the same may be said about the qualities of authoritative and affectual respect, which have been identified as important qualities for intervention, as well as about the quality of continuity. This lack 109

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of such qualities as salience and respect, coupled with typically low scores in such areas as relevant information and diplomatic skill, severely limits the interventionary roles which nongovernmental organizations might undertake successfully. In fact, these deficiencies tend to reduce the relevance of these agencies to various service roles such as inspection and supervision, which are useful in maintaining rules during a crisis or in implementing agreed-upon termination arrangements, and which are less demanding in terms of ascribed and personnel resources than other types of intervention. And it is in this context that nongovernmental organizations such as the Red Cross have most often been considered for possible third-party activities. Finally, the fact that most nongovernmental organizations lack the physical resources to carry out any really extensive or sophisticated service activities only serves to circumscribe further the range of potential third-party roles which such organizations could undertake successfully. In sum, the nongovernmental organizations are at present left with some potential to perform relatively simple service functions during international crises. E. The United Nations System Three separate facets of the United Nations system are relevant to this discussion of potential third parties. These facets include: 1) the United Nations forum as a cumulator and articulator for interventionary activities deriving especially from the uncommitted states; 2) intervention by the United Nations policy organs or their representatives; and 3) interventionary activities carried out primarily under the auspices of the Secretary-General and the Secretariat. In the first of these areas the United Nations serves primarily as an adjunct to the activities of the uncommitted states. The drift of the analysis concerning intervention by the uncommitted states suggested that they would probably have to act in combination to achieve success in many 1 10

THE IDENTITY OF THE THIRD PARTY

cases. But this analysis also pointed to certain tendencies of the uncommitted states to work at cross purposes. In this context, the United Nations might serve several important functions in increasing the influence of intervention on the part of the uncommitted states. Consider the following functions in this connection: 1) the aggregation of political opinion and influence; 2) coordination; 3) articulation of suggestions and programs in meaningful forms; and 4) programming of changes to meet unfolding events during a given crisis. In fact, in recent years there have been a number of indications that the uncommitted states are becoming increasingly aware of these possibilities of the United Nations and that they are taking steps to utilize them. Examples of actions on the part of the uncommitted states which support this conclusion include the development of caucuses in the General Assembly; the various uses to which advisory committees have been put; the appointment of leading delegates from the uncommitted states who are specifically assigned to the tasks of coordinating the influence of these states within the United Nations framework; and the pursuit of programs designed to increase the influence of the General Assembly, as well as to acquire influential offices within the Assembly for the uncommitted states. Perhaps the most striking aspect of the policy organs from the point of view of third-party intervention is the wide range of potentially significant actors and combinations of actors which fall under this heading. A Msting of the most outstanding possibilities in this context would include: 1) the president of the Security Council; 2) the president and officers of the General Assembly; 3) leading delegates from the nonpermanent members of the Council; 4) the "great United Nations personalities" operating generally in Assembly delegations; 5) former presidents of the General Assembly; 6) subsidiary organs of the Security Council (committees and commissions); and 7) sub1 11

THE INTERMEDIARIES

sidiary organs of the General Assembly. Many of these possibilities have been tried at various times, usually with very limited success, but not always without any success. A classic case from the record of the League is the intervention of Briand in the Greek-Bulgarian crisis of 1925 as president of the Council.36 And illustrative examples from the experience of the United Nations might include the actions of Herbert Evatt, as president of the Assembly, and of the delegates of the nonpermanent members of the Council in reference to the Berlin crisis in the fall of 1948; the role of Lester Pearson in establishing the Emergency Force during the Suez crisis; and the activities of the representatives of the nonpermanent members of the Security Council in securing action on the Cyprus question in March 1964. In general, these potential interveners tend to fare reasonably well in terms of basic qualities and personnel qualifications, with the exception of knowledge and information on some occasions. This is enough to make the possibility of this type of intervention worth discussing. But these actors have very serious gaps in the areas of ascribed resources and physical capabilities. Their structural position makes outstanding salience difficult to attain; also, authoritative respect is often lacking, with the result that declarations or actions by such parties frequently fail to penetrate the background noise of a crisis and are therefore often lost in the confusion of the situation. To make matters more difficult, these actors have direct control over very little in the way of physical resources, and they tend to be notoriously slow in mobilizing any serious activities. This eliminates the possibility of many interventionary actions entirely and tends to make serious intervention in rapidly unfolding crisis situations extremely unlikely. Left, therefore, as the forte of these potential inter36

Francis P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 311-315.

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THE IDENTITY OF THE THIRD PARTY

venors are various mediatory and conciliatory activities which can be undertaken during relatively protracted efforts to achieve the peaceful settlement of political disputes. A development of great significance in the international arena during recent years has been the growth of thirdparty capabilities lodged with the Secretary-General and Secretariat. Despite occasional setbacks and retrenchments, these actors show signs of being the most dynamic and active source of third-party intervention in the international system for a variety of types of crisis. The United Nations as a whole has grown substantially in stature as a nonstate intervenor in the last ten years. Hammarskjold himself suggested in 1959 that "the Organization has begun to gain a certain independent position."37 And Bloomfield has rightly pointed out that: For perhaps the first time in history, the SecretaryGeneral has begun to furnish to parties to a dispute a truly third party, not judicial but political, not representing any government but at the same time not bound by rules of law or by preference for the status quo.3S The principal thrust of the material in Part II of this study is, in fact, directed toward an analysis of the potential of the Secretary-General and the Secretariat for intervention. Any real substantive discussion of the possibilities for interventionary activities along these fines will therefore be deferred to later chapters.39 Suffice it to point out here, by way of adumbrating later conclusions, that the Secretary-General and the Secretariat may be better situated than most other potential third parties to play the role of intervenor in terms of such factors as: 1) impartiality as 37

Hammarskjold in Foote (ed.), op.cit., p. 210 (the 1959 Copenhagen speech entitled "Do We Need the United Nations?"). 88 Lincoln Bloomfield, The United Nations and U.S. Foreign Policy (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1960), p. 151. 89 Cf. infra, chaps. 7 and 8.

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THE INTERMEDIARIES

between the principal parties; 2) salience in the eyes of the protagonists; 3) prestige and respect accorded to suggestions; 4) unity and ability to act coherently; 5) availabiUty of diplomatic skill; and 6) the mobilization and coordination of actions. The detailed material on the Secretary-General and the Secretariat in later chapters is directed primarily toward possibilities for intervention in interbloc crises. This focus has been selected both because these problems seem ripe for analysis at the present time and because little previous work has been done in this area. And it should be noted explicitly that the Secretary-General and the Secretariat can play and have played very important third-party roles in extrabloc crises, North-South crises, postcolonial crises, and so forth. The importance of this point is underscored heavily by the fact that none of the other potential third parties discussed in this chapter seems to be equally prepared to handle the interventionary roles generated by these types of crisis.

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CHAPTER FOUR

Three Images of United Nations Peacekeeping deals with three images or models of third-party roles for the United Nations that serve or have served as guidelines for the activities of the Organization. These images represent a distillation from the peacekeeping experiences of the United Nations. The material in this chapter constitutes, therefore, more nearly an effort to construct a set of ideal types than a summary of the history of United Nations peacekeeping activities. The principal purposes are to elaborate the concepts and propositions that have been developed over the years in considering the various possibilities of utilizing the United Nations as a third party in international crises and to juxtapose these ideas with the more abstract material concerning third-party intervention discussed in the preceding chapters. In this context, an effort will be made to catch a glimpse of the changes in thinking concerning possible third-party roles for the United Nations by means of discussions of the shifts from one image of United Nations peacekeeping to another which have occurred. The first image or model deals with the system of peacekeeping which dominated the minds of statesmen in 1945 and which was largely incorporated into the provisions of the Charter. The second image covers the considerably altered outlook of the late forties and early fifties, which can be labeled roughly the Uniting for Peace era. Finally, a coherent image of peacekeeping activities has gradually developed out of the more modest principles elaborated during the years of the Hammarskjold administration and subsequently retained and utilized under the aegis of U Thant. The first of these images never got off the ground in the 1940's, though there are at present some indications of a

T

HIS CHAPTER

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return to patterns of peacekeeping that bear a certain resemblance to this image. The principles of the Uniting for Peace era have been dead since the mid-fifties and show few signs of becoming relevant again in the foreseeable future. By way of contrast, however, the major tenets of the third image are of substantial relevance in the present international arena, and it is likely that activities of the type envisioned under this rubric will be of considerable importance in the handling of a variety of future international crises. It is therefore of particular significance to note here that the specific concepts and propositions concerning international peacekeeping presented later in this study are not incompatible with the third image mentioned above. On the contrary, the two sets of ideas are basically complementary, since they are directed toward different types or aspects of crisis in the international system. THE CHARTER SYSTEM—GREAT-POWER SOLIDARITY The peacekeeping system embodied in the Charter grew out of the ideas and developments of the Second World War. It was thought to be of crucial importance for the wartime coalition to retain at least some of its cohesion in the postwar world. And this, of course, meant primarily a fairly close working relationship among the great powers —the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain. Statesmen of the rank of Churchill and Roosevelt, moreover, developed a number of broad notions about the international organization of the postwar period—for example, Roosevelt's plan to set up an arrangement regulated by four worldwide policemen and Churchill's notion of dividing the world into geographical spheres in each of which one or several great powers would be given primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. The peacekeeping system finally settled on at San Fran-

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cisco shows the stamp of these wartime influences very strongly, although it does not directly mirror either of the plans mentioned above. A scheme was set up whereby peacekeeping was to be primarily the responsibility of the five permanent members of the Security Council, who would guarantee the world against disturbances by presenting a united front to any "threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression." As I. L. Claude suggests: The security scheme of the Charter, then, was conceived as an arrangement for collective action against relatively minor disturbers of the peace, in cases where the great powers were united in the desire to take action or the willingness to permit action.1 There are several noteworthy points about this approach to peacekeeping. First, it was directed almost exclusively against unruly small powers, the "minor disturbers" of Claude's statement. The scheme, therefore, tended to set the great powers apart from, and almost inevitably against, all the other members of the international system. Second, the scheme called for unity among the great powers, though not necessarily for a willingness of each to participate actively in common actions in any particular case. If one great power were willing to take on the burden of action in a given case, the simple acquiescence of the others was thought to be sufficient to allow for actions under the provisions of the Charter.2 Third, the system consisted basically 1

1 . L. Claude, Jr., "The United Nations and the Use of Force," International Conciliation, No. 532 (1961), p. 329. 2 A strict reading of the Charter provisions suggests that all the permanent members of the Council would have to at least vote affirmatively on a resolution setting a peacekeeping operation in motion (Article 27.3). From the very first, however, United Nations practice has moved toward the proposition that tacit or passive acquiescence on the part of any given permanent member (i.e., failure actually to vote negatively) is sufficient to allow actions to be taken.

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THE INTERMEDIARIES

of a great-power guarantee against other parties committing acts of aggression, and it contained no provisions for problems arising among the great powers themselves. In view of the facts that the great powers had often come sharply into conflict in the past and that their disputes were likely to generate the most serious crises in the international system, it is hardly surprising that many thoughtful individuals raised important questions about the efficacy of the Charter system of peacekeeping already in 1945. In particular, many commentators adopted either the view that the Charter system would be too effective or the position that it would not be effective enough. Those who took the former position were afraid of great-power dominance. Thomas Hamilton, for example, has described the " . . . fears of the small Powers at San Francisco that the combined power of the five policemen, symbolized by the principle of unanimity in the Security Council would enable the Great Powers to run rough-shod over the rest of the world."3 Among these people it was only natural that the old question—quis custodiet custodesl—should be strongly emphasized. On the other hand, there were many others who felt that the whole system was simply unworkable and feared that it would never be implemented successfully. This group feared a general lack of effectiveness of the Charter system resulting in a situation characterized by the absence of any usable machinery to guarantee the maintenance of international peace and security. In both cases, doubt was expressed that the Organization could strike a workable balance in practice. By now it has become clear that this system of peacekeeping, like any other, contained several substantial and critical assumptions about the world of reality. First and foremost, of course, was the assumption that the common interests of the great powers could be made operational 8

Thomas Hamilton, "The U.N. and Trygve Lie," Foreign fairs, Vol. 29, No. 1 (1950), p. 71.

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and that great-power solidarity could be counted on to be effective at least in cases of serious threats to international peace. As Goodrich has suggested: It [the Charter system] clearly depended for its effectiveness on recognition by the permanent members that they had a common interest in keeping the peace and that they should compromise their differences in order that they might cooperate in furthering this common interest.4 This assumption and its lack of substance in reality have been discussed frequently at considerable length and it seems unnecessary to repeat this discussion here. There was a second important assumption underlying the Charter system which has tended to be overshadowed by the central role of the first assumption in the disruption of the system. It was assumed that the five permanent members of the Security Council would possess sufficient resources and power to handle all cases of threats to the peace and aggression not involving one of their own number. It was further assumed that this condition not only would hold at the time the Charter came into effect but that it would also hold through an indefinite future. The end of a great war is likely to create unusual conditions in which the victorious alliance is apt to hold considerable sway over the international system. But even in such cases it is extremely difficult to intervene in the affairs of individual nations or in the relations among nations in order to suppress situations that threaten to result in breaches of the peace or acts of aggression.5 The metaphor concerning international policemen is a faulty one, since it creates a 4

Leland Goodrich, The United Nations (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1959), p. 162. 5 On this point consult Oran R. Young, "The World System: Present Characteristics and Future Prospects," Hudson Institute, HI-277-D, 29 August 1963, chap. 5.

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THE INTERMEDIARIES

misleading impression of the role of international peace­ keeping forces.6 Interventions in this context would not be directed against. an individual lawbreaker unanimously condemned by the international community but against re­ visionist forces backed by substantial elements in the inter­ national community and in all probability pursuing goals containing at least a kernel of legitimacy. To extend this central assumption of supremacy on the part of the five permanent members of the Security Council into an in­ definite though dynamic future, moreover, is a very tall order. The passage of time is not generally kind to such attempts to superimpose a rather static ordering principle on a very dynamic system. The provisions for the institutionalization of the Charter system of peacekeeping are largely embodied in Chapter VII of the Charter. The Security Council is given "pri­ mary"7 responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, and provisions for it to acquire and utilize the elements of international coercion are contained in Articles 39 through 42, 43, 45, and 46 through 48. In particular these articles provide for the placing of sub­ stantial military resources at the disposal of the Security Council and for the establishment of a Military Staff Com­ mittee, composed of high-ranking officers from each of the five permanent members of the Council, to assist the political representatives in planning for the use of military forces and in directing military contingents in action. The Charter further provides the Council with the power to issue orders 8 and commands that are binding on nation states in various β

I. L. Claude, Jr., Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962), chap. 7. 7 The reference here is to the United Nations Charter, Article 24 (1). 8 The power to make binding decisions is not, in fact, without extensive limitations. In particular, it applies to procedural (as opposed to substantive) matters in the settlement of disputes and to enforcement measures taken under Articles 39ff.

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circumstances, and it contains a clear-cut pledge on the part of the member states to accept binding decisions of the Council promulgated under Articles 39 through 42.9 At the heart of the Charter system is the notion that aggression must be met with coercive sanctions and ultimately with military force if necessary.10 In the provisions of Chapter VII the emphasis is on the suppression of illegitimate actions and, in spirit if not in letter, on the notion of punishing or chastising those who commit acts of aggression. In this connection it is not surprising that the typical operations contemplated under this system come under the headings of collective measures and enforcement actions. Nor is it surprising that the Charter does not provide for the possibility of taking collective action against the will of any one of the great powers and that the veto (Article 27) is recognized as legitimate in matters dealt with under the provisions of Chapter VII.11 The Charter contains a number of provisions directed toward the transition from the realities of 1945 to the Charter system and toward the institutionalization of this image of peacekeeping. Chief among these are the provisions of Article 43 for agreements between member states and the Council regarding the "earmarking" of national military contingents for United Nations use,12 the provisions of Article 45 for especially rapid mobilization of air force contingents on behalf of the Organization during 9

United Nations Charter, Article 25. The Charter suggests a variety of noncoercive procedures aimed at international dispute settlement (Chapter VI of the Charter). The reference in the proposition stated here, however, is to the image of third-party operations labeled "the Charter System" in the present discussion. 11 For a general discussion of the veto see I. L. Claude, Jr., Swords into Plowshares (2nd ed.; New York: Random House, 1959), chap. 8. 12 On the fate of the Article 43 provisions consult Claude, Power and International Relations, pp. 173-190. 10

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crises, and the provisions of Articles 46 through 48 dealing with the establishment and operations of the Military Staff Committee. In addition, Article 106 permits the signatories of the Moscow Declaration of October 1943 plus France to take any enforcement actions that may be necessary prior to the coming into force of the Article 43 agreements. These provisions, however, came to naught. No agreements under Article 43 have ever been concluded, Article 45 has been a dead letter from the start, and the Military Staff Committee, which met regularly until 1948,13 has since been confined to obscurity and insignificance, though it continues to hold rather pathetic meetings. The Charter system, therefore, was never coherently implemented in practice. Outstanding among the reasons for its failure is the fact that great-power solidarity and agreement, which had characterized the war effort and which had carried over into the drafting of the Charter (at a minimally effective though not an optimal level), broke down, leading to the bipolarization of the international system and to the onset of the cold war. In fact, the spectacular failure of the assumption of great-power solidarity in the early postwar years made the other complex of assumptions underlying the Charter system quite irrelevant. This set of assumptions was therefore never subjected to the tests which would have followed from applications to real situations. It is quite probable that the assumption of great-power supremacy over the years would have been extremely difficult to meet successfully. But, however this may be, there can be no question that the system of activities contemplated in the image of United Nations intervention under discussion here foundered basically on the rocks of greatpower disunity and the antagonisms of the cold war.14 The 13

Ibid., pp. 173-190. On this point consult H. G. Nicholas, The United Nations as a Political Institution (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), 14

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THREE IMAGES OF UN PEACEKEEPING

competitive interests of the great powers began to obscure their common interests, and the newness and sharpness of the Soviet-American split made any movement toward cooperation virtually unthinkable in many contexts. In fact, there was a tendency for these powers to oppose each other on principle, even in cases where the opposition of their concrete interests was by no means clear-cut. This is the atmosphere in which the second image of peacekeeping to be discussed in this chapter arose. It was quite clearly a response to the failure of the Charter system, whose substance was determined primarily by the side in the cold war which happened, at the time, to be in a dominant position in the United Nations. Before discussing this second image, however, let us note several points concerning concrete United Nations activities during these early years. The peacekeeping activities of the United Nations in several specific cases demonstrated some kinship to the notions contained in the Charter system. It is important to be quite clear on the point that these activities were not similar enough to be considered applications of the Charter system, and that they contained elements of the other models to be discussed. There have, nevertheless, been certain cases in which a modicum of great-power solidarity (if only of the passive, noninterference variety) has been of importance in forwarding United Nations actions. There is something to the point made in this context by Goodrich to the effect that: . . . while the Security Council has not been able to act as the armed policeman, as the framers of the Charter had intended, it has nevertheless, within those areas where chap. 4; Trygve Lie, In the Cause of Peace (New York: Macmillan, 1954), chap. 2; and Leland M. Goodrich and Anne P. Simons, The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1955), chaps. 2 and 3.

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the permanent members have a common interest in preserving or restoring peace, been able to perform its police function with considerable success.15 During the early years, the Palestine question16 in its headquarters phase might be discussed under this heading, although it can hardly be maintained that any coherent notion of peacekeeping was either accepted or applied in the field operations in this case. The initiation of a program of United Nations activities in Kashmir was significantly influenced by the presence of at least minimal great-power consensus, and the later phases of the Indonesian case were characterized by at least tacit Soviet-American consensus which had important results.17 And in passing it might be noted that tacit great-power consensus has been a very important factor in a number of more recent developments, of which the creation of the Emergency Force in the Suez area and the activities of the initial phase of the Congo operation during July and August I960 18 have been only the most important. But even a cursory examination of these cases is enough to show that they have all differed from the type of operation hypothecated under the Charter system of peacekeeping in several important respects and that they can in no sense be treated as fullfledged applications of this system. The most reasonable conclusion, it would seem, remains the one suggesting that the Charter system was never properly launched and that it captivated the minds of statesmen more as a theory than as a blueprint for concrete action. Although the Charter system itself did not become sufficiently operational to provide guidelines for specific activi15

Goodrich, op.cit., p. 167. Lie, op.cit., chaps. 10 and 11. 17 On Indonesia see J. Foster Collins, "The United Nations and Indonesia," International Conciliation, No. 459 (1950). 18 A. L. Burns and Nina Heathcote, Peace-Keeping by U.N. Forces (New York: Praeger, 1963), chaps. 3 and 4. 16

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ties, a number of cases concerning the maintenance of international peace and security were dealt with in a rather ad hoc and somewhat disorganized fashion in the early years. Outstanding cases which fall under this heading include all or part of the following situations: 1) the difficulty over Soviet occupation of northwestern Iran at the end of the war; 2) guerrilla activities in Greece and the question of intervention in this affair on the part of Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria; 3) the series of conflicts which led eventually to the independence of Indonesia; 4) the Middle Eastern crises centering on Palestine; and 5) the crisis over Kashmir involving India and Pakistan. United Nations activities in these cases were universally more modest than the operations contemplated under the Charter system, sometimes of rather dubious constitutionality in terms of a strict interpretation of the Charter, and, for the most part, rather bastardized in form in the sense that they did not emanate from any coherent theory or image of peacekeeping. As mentioned above, an important precondition of action in at least several of these cases was the existence of tacit great-power agreement. But already, in practice at least, various procedures were being accepted that clearly adumbrate notions of peacekeeping which have since been elaborated in a more systematic and coherent fashion. A movement from the Security Council to the General Assembly, for example, can already be observed in the Greek case and in the Palestine case.19 And early signs of the attitudes that later became the focus of the Uniting for Peace model of peacekeeping (see below) can be seen in the handling of the Iranian case20 and in the establishment of the Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB) by the General Assembly in 1947.21 19 Robert Riggs, Politics in the United Nations (Urbana, III.: University of Illinois Press, 1958), chap. 4. 20 Lie, op.cit., chap. 5. 21 See Yearbook of the United Nations 1947-1948 (Lake Suc-

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It might be argued that these cases actually constitute the early phases of an image of international peacekeeping focusing on activities under Chapter VI of the Charter. But this proposition is difficult to support. During these early years the distinction between Chapter VI operations and Chapter VII operations began, in fact, to break down for all practical purposes. Peacekeeping activities were organized and set in motion whenever and however they could be, in view of the severe political restraints on the United Nations. The Charter system had failed for reasons discussed above. And the operations that were actually launched appealed to a wide variety of Charter provisions whenever this seemed relevant or, more frequently, simply refrained from mentioning specific Charter provisions at all when it seemed impossible to get agreement on the legal framework within which to carry on peacekeeping activities.22 THE UNITING FOR PEACE ERA THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE COLD WAR

During the late forties and early fifties, the Western bloc in the developing cold war held a clear numerical superiority in the policy organs of the United Nations.23 And this cess, N.Y.: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1949), pp. 298-302. 22 As a consequence, many of the peacekeeping operations have become subjects of considerable legal controversy. Some analysts search for factors in the operations themselves which can be taken as indications that given actions were taken under the auspices of one article or another. Others have sought to construct a general view of the responsibility of the Organization for the maintenance of peace and security based on Article 1 (1) rather than any of the more substantive articles. The truth seems to be that the ability of the United Nations to act during any given crisis depends largely on political factors regardless of the subtleties of legal authority. 23 In the Security Council the West could often muster majorities

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bloc was clearly desirous of utilizing the Organization in the struggle with the forces of communism. There were, however, several obstacles in the way of such a utilization of the United Nations. First, the Soviet bloc though outnumbered, could stall operations in the Security Council, the organ primarily responsible for dealing with peace and security problems under the Charter, through the use of the veto. Second, the prevailing ethos of the international arena was not compatible with direct and open utilization of the United Nations to forward the policy interests of one or several of its members. The Uniting for Peace theory of international peacekeeping was developed essentially as a response to these obstacles. It elaborated a view of peacekeeping in general and abstract terms which could be applied in such a way as to benefit the Western bloc in the cold war. Where the Charter system had centered on great-power solidarity, the new theory focused on the unification of the numerical majority of powers (both great and small) against the activities of one great power or its followers and dependents or both. A weak point in the old system was thus strengthened at least in theory. Small powers could now play a significant part in the work and responsibilities of peacekeeping while the great powers were no longer to be exempt from the application of collective measures and enforcement actions. In fact, the new theory was elaborated by those who felt that one of the original policemen of the Charter system (i.e., the Soviet Union) had turned into an errant policeman and was rapidly taking on the characteristics of a thief. It was therefore necessary, they argued, to alter the arrangements for peacekeeping so as to be able to deal with the unacceptable activities carried out or instigated by a great power. This view may seem somewhat unof 9-2 or even 10-1. In the General Assembly there were many cases in which the only negative votes were the (then) five members of the Soviet bloc.

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realistic as the basis of a program for peacekeeping by a truly international organization in the fifties, but it must be remembered that the proponents of the scheme saw it as a way of mobilizing Western power in an internationally acceptable form. The intrinsic weakness of the Organization was not considered a real handicap. This is, in fact, the situation to which Claude refers when he speaks of . . . our [the United States'] general commitment to the extraction of the fullest possible political value from the Organization as a buttress to the Western position in the global struggle. . . . We [the United States] have a long history of insisting that the United Nations ought to be able to act, even, if necessary, in the face of Soviet opposition.24 The new image of international peacekeeping was institutionalized primarily through the shifting of the focus of peace and security activities from the Security Council to the General Assembly25 and secondarily through the development of several devices designed to lessen the effect of the veto paralyzing Council activities. This shift to the Assembly was opportune for the West since in that organ there would be no veto and since the West still enjoyed the benefits of a more or less "permanent majority" in the Assembly.26 This shift, which was pushed informally along a number of channels, culminated formally in the passage of the Uniting for Peace Resolution (Acheson Plan) on 3 November 1950.27 The constitutionality of this resolution 24

1 . L. Claude, Jr., "The Containment and Resolution of Disputes," in Francis O. Wilcox and H. Field Haviland, Jr. (eds.), The United States and the United Nations (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1961), p. 122. 25 Consult H. G. Nicholas, The United Nations as a Political Institution (2nd ed.; London: Oxford University Press, 1962), chap. 5. 26 Riggs, op.cit., especially chap. 10. 27 General Assembly Resolution 377 (V).

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has been debated extensively among legal scholars and in the General Assembly itself. But, whatever the results of such debating have been, the mechanisms established by the resolution have been accepted as applicable and in force. The Uniting for Peace Resolution is a long and detailed resolution which contains references to the key notions of the new image of peacekeeping under discussion. The establishment of a formal mechanism for transferring the consideration of a given issue to the General Assembly in cases in which the Council has become paralyzed by the veto is only one of its provisions. The resolution also calls on the member states to "earmark" contingents in their national armed forces for potential United Nations use on call, and it provides for advisory services to any state wishing to rereceive outside advice or help in the setting up of such contingents. Then, too, it creates a Collective Measures Committee to analyze and survey the various measures open to the United Nations to meet threats to the peace or acts of aggression,28 as well as a Peace Observation Commission to act as a kind of watchdog and to bring to the attention of the Assembly or the Security Council any situation in the international arena which appears to pose a present or potential threat to the maintenance of international peace and security. Like the Charter system, the new peacekeeping scheme focused primarily on enforcement measures and on the use of armed strength to meet and suppress threats to the peace and acts of aggression. Such actions, however, would now be set in motion through requesting resolutions and nonobligatory recommendations emanating from the General Assembly or the Security Council rather than through bind28

This committee was actually formed, and it met at some length. Its principal reports were submitted to and accepted by the General Assembly in 1951 and 1952. See GAOR, 6th session (1951), Supplement No. 13; and GAOR, 7th session (1952), Supplement No. 17.

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ing orders or commands from the Council alone. This was therefore a weaker system in constitutional terms but its nature as a cover for Western prosecution of the cold war tended to make this problem effectively insignificant. In practice, it was thought that the United States, its allies, and any other states that might be persuaded in a given case would supply the forces, supplies, command and staff capabilities, and so forth for specific collective actions as the needs arose. With the breakdown of the system conceptualized in Articles 43 through 48 of the Charter, there was little further attempt to set the United Nations up with its own international forces.29 Such an attempt would have been impractical for a number of reasons and, above all, it would not have answered to the perceived needs of the Western bloc during this period. As is the case with any image of international peacekeeping, this one has several major complexes of assumptions which should at least be noted here. First, there is the assumption that the Western bloc was and would continue to be able to control the policy output of the United Nations. This would appear to require at least the ability to control one of the two major policy-making organs of the Organization and to neutralize the other or hold it in limbo. Ideally, perhaps, it would have been desirable to control the Council and neutralize the Assembly, since this would have been the most efficient arrangement as well as the one most nearly consonant with the Charter. The opposite arrangement, however, appeared to be the only feasible system in the late forties and was therefore pursued by the Western powers under American leadership, even though it 29

The only (partial) exceptions to this statement were the efforts on behalf of a United Nations brigade and a United Nations legion. On these programs consult Stephen M. Schwebel, "A United Nations 'Guard' and a United Nations 'Legion,'" Appendix to William R. Frye, A United Nations Peace Force (New York: Oceana Press, 1957), pp. 195-216.

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meant arousing some ill will on questions concerning the constitutionality of various moves. As it happened, it was possible to meet the requirements of this assumption in the late forties and early fifties. But here, too, the focus was on a somewhat static set of propositions that was destined not to survive the dynamic changes in the United Nations system which occurred in the middle and late fifties. A second principal assumption of this theory of peacekeeping was that the Western bloc would be able to muster a sufficient amount of usable military strength to handle threats to the peace and breaches of the peace, even in situations where one of the superpowers was itself in opposition, was to a greater or lesser degree aiding the opposition, or was simply obstructing the launching of peacekeeping activities by the Security Council. This image focuses on the notion of Western military supremacy in search of mechanisms for mobilization and channels for the establishment of legitimacy. There was no doubt that the image would fall down in practice if the forces and supplies were not forthcoming. When the theory was elaborated, it was by no means unreasonable to think in terms of meeting the requirements of this assumption. As time passed, however, problems arose here, too. But this raises questions concerning the practice and fate of the Uniting for Peace image of peacekeeping, which must be considered more directly at this point. The Korean intervention, set in motion in June 1950, is of course the principal example of action based largely on the theory of peacekeeping under discussion.30 This case, which arose before the passage of the Uniting for Peace 30

The best general accounts are Leland Goodrich, "Korea: Collective Measures against Aggression," International Conciliation, No. 494 (1953), and Leland Goodrich, Korea: A Study of U.S. Policy in the United Nations (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1956).

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Resolution, was first handled by the Security Council. Action by the Council was made possible by a set of fortuitous circumstances which included the absence of the Soviet delegate and the presence of a United Nations Commission along the thirty-eighth parallel at the time of the North Korean invasion. And it was in response to the return of the Soviet delegate in August that the political discussion concerning United Nations forces in Korea was moved to the General Assembly. This development was also at least the proximate source of the impetus behind the final passage of the Uniting for Peace Resolution in early November. Thus the problems encountered in this particular case led to the formal institutionalization of an image of peacekeeping which had been put into practice only informally in the preceding period. The situation was not, however, without its complications. After the fall of 1950 and particularly after the intervention of the Chinese, there was a growing hesitancy to enlarge or even to support adequately the United Nations operations in Korea.31 And in general, most of the members of the United Nations, including a number of those normally listed as members of the Western bloc, showed a definite and increasing dislike of prosecuting collective measures under American leadership in the Korean situation. This intervention, moreover, appears to have opened the eyes of many to the dangers and disadvantages of United Nations peacekeeping more than it set an influential precedent for future activities on the part of the Organization. In the field of peacekeeping operations the United Nations proceeded to withdraw and to reduce its activities, reaching what might fairly be labeled the nadir of its activities in the peace and security field during the years 1953 and 1954.82 31

Goodrich, Korea: A Study of U.S. Policy in the United Nations, chap. 7. 32 Consult Waldo Chamberlin and Thomas Hovet, Jr., Chronol-

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Certainly one cause of this development was the retraction following the initiation of the Korean operation noted above. But it should also be remembered that this was the period in which the West began to turn strongly away from the United Nations as far as cold-war considerations were concerned. After the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949, the emphasis began to swing more and more toward regional security pacts as the basis of the Western security system.33 As the West, and particularly the United States, became more and more impressed with the efficacy of an interlocking system of alliances, it began to cast the peacekeeping potentialities of the United Nations into greater disuse. And yet no alternative image, such as was later to be developed under Hammarskjold, had yet put in an explicit appearance to redirect the interests of the Organization in the general field of peace and security affairs. Thus, the Uniting for Peace image of peacekeeping began to decline even when the West was still able to fulfill the requirements of the principal assumptions underlying the theory. But this theory is now definitely a dead letter and has not been of any importance since the occurrence of important changes in the United Nations system and the international system which became manifest and operational in the mid-fifties. Since 1955 there has been a continuous decline in Western ability to control the policy organs of the United Nations and especially the General Assembly.34 This trend reached significant proportions in late 1955 with the first large influx of new members into the ogy and Fact Book of the United Nations 1941-1961 (New York: Oceana Press, 1961). 33 Consult Arnold Wolfers (ed.), Alliance Policy in the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1959), especially chaps. 3, 4, and 6. 34 T. A. Pyman, "The United Nations Secretary-Generalship," Australian Outlook, Vol. 15, No. 3 (1961), pp. 254-255.

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Organization and has become even more important in the intervening years. As a result, the "permanent majority" is a thing of the past and the assumption of policy control can no longer be met in reality. During this same period the Secretariat of the Organization has tended to become less and less West-oriented and to adopt a more nearly international view of crises and threats to the peace in the international arena. Thus the necessary institutional conditions for the utilization of the Uniting for Peace image no longer exist. Moreover, in recent years Western military supremacy has been challenged on a variety of fronts by the growing resources of the Soviet bloc and by the politico-military peculiarities of the various nonaligned areas of the world, in which Western military power has tended to become less and less usable. Without going into detail here, it seems safe to say that the changing military balance in the EastWest relationships and the gradual tendency of usable power to diffuse throughout the entire international system were instrumental in undercutting the second principal assumption of this image of peacekeeping and in contributing to its rather swift demise. The Uniting for Peace image of international peacekeeping was clearly a thing of the past by the fall of 1956. The fact that the United Nations took no effective steps to deal with the Hungarian crisis was more of a death blow to the Uniting for Peace theory than a setback for future attempts at international peacekeeping in general. And the launching of the Emergency Force in November 1956 was a clear-cut announcement of a new type of peacekeeping operation. Before moving on to this new type of activity, it only remains to point out that the Uniting for Peace Resolution itself (as opposed to the image of peacekeeping it originally symbolized) has remained in effect and has been utilized on several occasions to give the Assembly juris1 34

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diction over a particular matter.35 But the mechanisms, since 1956, have been used for purposes completely different from those envisioned by the resolution's original sponsors. Thus, while the mechanisms remain the same, the continued existence of the resolution in no way signifies that the Uniting for Peace image retains any substance or vitality. THE HAMMARSKJOLD FRAMEWORK—PEACEKEEPING DESPITE THE COLD WAR

The Korean experience heralded a decline in the peacekeeping activities of the United Nations. It was an attempt to get a particular theory of peacekeeping fully launched which failed to impress many member states, and its implications were disquieting to many. As mentioned above, the Uniting for Peace image began to decline steadily in the years following the initial activities in Korea. Leaders were disillusioned and pessimistic about the possibility of utilizing the United Nations to any good advantage in situations impinging on the cold war, and they had not yet been able to focus definitely on any alternative channels along which to direct the peacekeeping potential of the Organization. Starting roughly in late 1954, however, new roles in the realm of peacekeeping were uncovered and an increasing number of initiatives in this area were undertaken. Under the guiding hand of Secretary-General Hammarskjold a new image of United Nations peacekeeping gradually began to take shape. The antecedents of the image which began to develop at this time can be traced, in part, as far back as the early peacekeeping operations undertaken by the United Nations in a rather ad hoc fashion and aimed at filling the gap left by the failure of the Charter system to become operational.se 85

To date the resolution has been invoked in the following cases: (1) Suez, November 1956; (2) Hungary, November 1956; (3) Middle East, August 1958; (4) the Congo, September 1960; and (5) Bizerte, August 1961. se Cf. supra, pp. 124-126. , ~ -

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In a sense, the Hammarskjold framework is an organized and thought-out projection of some of the earlier actions taken in default of the then-reigning doctrines of peacekeeping. But there are also substantial differences between the earlier actions and the organized image of peacekeeping which has gradually developed into the Hammarskjold framework. For one thing, the temporal hiatus in peacekeeping activities in the early fifties necessitated a new start in this field. But, above all, the substantial changes in the international system and in the United Nations system which had been taking place in the intervening years (see below for discussion) resulted in the occurrence of major changes in the perspectives on peacekeeping and in operating procedures which led gradually to the elaboration of a new image of international peacekeeping. This approach to peacekeeping turned away from greatpower problems to focus on crises and disputes in the "third world." As Hammarskjold himself put it, ". . . conflicts arising within the non-committed areas offer opportunities for solution which avoid an aggravation of big Power differences and can remain uninfluenced by them."37 The idea of intervening in problems which were clearly within the orbit of the cold war was cast aside both as being unlikely to produce constructive results and as being likely to generate serious risks of impairing the Organization's ability to handle other problems usefully. On the other hand, it was felt that there are important peacekeeping problems in areas where the great powers have not become involved and in areas where quick action on the part of an international agency can insulate a crisis from an otherwise imminent great-power involvement. Hammarskjold put it in the following terms in the statement: 37

Wilder Foote (ed.), Dag Hammarskjold: Servant of Peace (New York: Harper & Row, c. 1963), p. 302 (Introduction to the Annual Report 1959-1960).

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Those efforts [United Nations peacekeeping efforts] must aim at keeping newly arising conflicts outside the sphere of bloc differences. Further, in the case of conflicts on the margin of, or inside, the sphere of bloc differences, the UN should seek to bring such conflicts out of this sphere through solutions aiming, in the first instance, at their strict localization.38 According to this image of peacekeeping, there are a variety of conflicts in which the United Nations might be able to play an important third-party role. The list of types of conflict under this heading would include problems between small powers not aligned with either East or West, conflicts arising from various aspects of the process of liquidating colonialism, postcolonial crises, conflicts arising at the periphery of the cold war which can be isolated from great-power involvement, and, according to Hammarskjold, certain disputes within the cold-war vortex which can be fished out and localized.39 In all these cases, the theory suggests that the basic objectives of international peacekeeping operations should be to underwrite the maintenance of at least minimal stability in the international system and to support the processes of peaceful change. This represents an important change from past images of peacekeeping. No longer is the perspective primarily that of the great powers or of one side in the coldwar struggles. Within the framework of this image, peacekeeping activities are undertaken more nearly from the point of view of securing the viability and welfare of the international community. Turning more specifically to the mechanisms and procedures elaborated in the Hammarskjold framework, the complexity (in the sense of being many-faceted) and flexi38

Ibid., pp. 302-303. Loc.cit., and Richard N. Gardiner, "Needed: A Stand-by U.N. Force," New York Times Magazine, 26 April 1964, Section 6, p. 12. 89

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bility of this image are most noticeable. It contains a number of underlying concepts and principles which form a kind of broad base on which an operation designed to meet the difficulties of a specific case can be built. Among these basic ideas and concepts the following stand out: preventive diplomacy, filling vacuums in the systems designed to maintain international peace and security, quiet diplomacy, brushfire operations, insulation of crises from great-power involvement, and the localization of conflict.40 Over the years, this broad foundation has been used to support a wide variety of concrete operations in specific situations. In fact, one of the notable features of this theory of peacekeeping has been its capacity to generate new forms of activity to meet the needs of specific cases. Among those agencies of United Nations intervention already utilized in this context the following might be mentioned: 1) police forces; 2) observer groups; 3) supervision teams; 4) United Nations presences; 5) mediators; 6) personal representatives of the Secretary-General; 7) technical assistance operations; and 8) temporary executive authorities. And the theory shows every sign of being able to support new and different forms of international action if and when the need arises during future crises. There are several additional respects in which the Hammarskjold framework diverges substantially from the earlier images of peacekeeping discussed above. This framework deemphasizes the notions of collective enforcement actions and of meeting aggression with the use of armed forces. On the contrary, the emphasis is more on maintaining the stability of the international system than on labeling and suppressing aggressors. Under this approach noncoercive or minimally coercive actions are generally relied on, and it is commonly considered immaterial to label one side to a i0

The development of these concepts can be traced very interestingly through the pages of Foote, op.cit., and of Joseph Lash, Dag Hammarskjold (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1961).

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dispute or crisis as the aggressor. Along with this shift goes an increasing emphasis on executive activities and, consequently, on the role of the Secretariat and the SecretaryGeneral as key actors in international peacekeeping activities. This last change in United Nations peacekeeping operations is a response to the frequent paralyzation of the Council and the increasing unwieldiness of the General Assembly,41 as well as to the fact that this image of peacekeeping is constructed in such a way as to generate activities that are essentially executive in nature. While the framework is rather broad and flexible in respect to the range of operations that can be subsumed under its auspices, it is interesting to note that a number of operating rules and arrangements have been developed in practice applying to most of the operations undertaken in this stream of activity. It is impossible to enumerate them all here but a sampling of these rules and arrangements may be of interest.42 First, there is a rule that contingents for United Nations forces should not be drawn from any of the great powers. This rule does not apply to personnel involved in supply and transportation operations, but it has been applied quite faithfully to field operations. Second, United Nations forces are to shoot only in self-defense except for very limited and specific additional purposes which can be based squarely on a particular resolution of a policy organ.43 Third, United Nations forces and presences are not to enter the territory of a sovereign state without the 41

Hans J. Morgenthau, "The New Secretary-General," Commentary, Vol. 35, No. 1 (1963), pp. 62-63. 42 For a discussion of such rules and arrangements consult especially the Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Emergency Force (9 October 1958), U.N. Doc. A/3943. 43 Examples would be the Security Council Resolution of 21 February 1961 authorizing the use of force, as a last resort, to prevent civil war in the Congo (U.N. Doc. S/4741) and the Security Council Resolution of 24 November 1964 authorizing the use of force to expel mercenaries from the Congo (U.N. Doc. S/5002).

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consent of that state. Thus, considerable deference is accorded to the local sovereign on the question of domestic jurisdiction, with the result that United Nations activities amount to a kind of peacekeeping by agreement. Fourth, when United Nations activities in a particular case have assumed major proportions, the Secretary-General has found it useful to set up an advisory committee to aid him in handling problems connected with the operation. These and other operating rules and arrangements have come to be highly respected components of the theory of peacekeeping under discussion and, in fact, they now constitute important elements which tend to unify and tie together the various strands of the theory. Once again, it is necessary to make some accounting of the principal assumptions underlying the image of peacekeeping under discussion. It is assumed that in many specific cases the great powers, and in particular the United States and the Soviet Union, will acquiesce to exclusion from the immediate realm of peacekeeping activities and to the reduction of opportunities to score cold-war gains in specific crisis situations. In some instances, however, the great powers must give their tacit consent to United Nations operations and even contribute certain supplies and capabilities if the peacekeeping operations are to be carried out successfully. By the same token United Nations intervention must be accepted by at least some of the parties directly involved in a dispute or crisis. It does not necessarily follow that all parties must openly agree to the intervention, but it is true that the theory is basically one of peacekeeping by consent and that it does not sanction the use of high-level coercion to force the parties to accept United Nations intervention. Activities under this theory are also highly dependent on the availability of executive leadership in the United Nations. In practice, this means that there must be a rather energetic and decisive Secretary-General who subscribes to 140

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a relatively broad view of the office he holds.44 The pressure of events in the present international arena tends to force the Secretary-General into this role in some cases, but the fact remains that much depends on the personality of the specific individual who holds this office. Finally, it is assumed that the necessary physical resources for a given operation can be assembled from somewhere and that some kind of financial arrangements can be made that will make it possible to set the operation in motion on at least a temporary basis. This last point represents a substantial assumption, and problems in these realms are affecting peacekeeping operations very noticeably at the present time. A further respect in which the Hammarskjold framework differs considerably from the other images of international peacekeeping lies in the facts that it has been the principal doctrine of United Nations peacekeeping for some years and especially that there is now a body of practice of significant proportions which can be legitimately associated with this image.45 The theory was hammered out in the context of very practical problems under the direction of Hammarskjold, who must be regarded as both its chief theorist and principal practitioner, and it has been retained and applied to new situations under the aegis of U Thant. Moreover, it can hardly be denied that at least some of the concrete applications of these concepts have been attended by success in the sense of aiding in the stabilization of situations which would otherwise have had more explosive and destructive results. The relative success of various specific interventions is, of course, hotly contested. But the general 44 On this point see the discussion at the beginning of chapter 7 infra and the references cited there. 45 For an overview of this body of practice see Andrew Boyd, United Nations: Piety, Myth, and Truth (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1962), chap. 5; and Richard Miller, Dag Hammarskjold and Crisis Diplomacy (New York: Oceana Press, 1961), passim.

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statement that this theory has some successes to its credit is not really in dispute. This image of peacekeeping first achieved prominence quite suddenly with the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt. Its elements had been building up, however, in the period immediately preceding November 1956, which was outwardly characterized by a certain quiescence in United Nations peacekeeping operations. There was a hint of some new concepts already in Hammarskjold's activities relating to the release of the eleven American airmen held by Communist China during the fall of 1954 and the winter of 1955. But the elements of the theory really began to become visible during 1956 in the course of Hammarskj old's efforts to deal with the ArabIsraeli truce supervision problems in the spring and in the context of his efforts to develop principles agreeable to the foreign ministers of Britain, France, and Egypt for the settlement of the Suez crisis during October.46 After the Suez crisis had made the new theory prominent, Hammarskjold continued to look for additional ways in which it could be employed constructively and for new forms of United Nations activities which might be adapted to meet the needs of specific crises. And his record of applications during the remainder of his tenure of office is impressive. Among the more salient cases to which the new theory of peacekeeping was adapted and applied are: 1) the canal-clearance operation of 1957; 2) the establishment of the observation group in Lebanon in June 1958; 3) the handling of the broader Middle Eastern crisis in the summer of 1958; 4) the Jordan presence of 1958 and 1959; 5) the Thailand-Cambodia dispute of 1958 and 1959; 6) the problems in Laos during 1959-1960; 7) the Buraimi dispute; and 8) the Congo operation during its 196046

The so-called "six principles" were actually hammered out primarily in Hammarskjold's office at U.N. headquarters. See Miller, op.cit., pp. 61-64.

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1961 phase. The results of these operations were mixed, but there is no doubt that the theory was actively applied under Hammarskjold. Interestingly, there has been no lack of cases handled by the Thant administration which fall under the rubric of the image of peacekeeping under discussion here. To begin with, Thant prosecuted the Congo operation actively and took the initiative on a number of matters connected with the case.47 But new operations have also been developed under his aegis. These situations include the West Irian negotiations and arrangements of 1962-1963, the United Nations presence in Yemen in 1963 and 1964, the verification of the elections in North Borneo during the summer of 1963, and the establishment of a United Nations police force and appointment of a mediator for Cyprus in 1964. These operations have differed in some particulars from those carried out under Hammarskjold. There has, for example, been less of a tendency for the policy organs to delegate authority to the Secretary-General and more emphasis on direct initiatives by the latter. And it can hardly be denied that there have been increasing difficulties in meeting the requirements concerning physical resources and financial arrangements which have set up osbtacles to United Nations activities.48 But the fundamental nature of the activities remains similar to those executed under Hammarskjold, and there is no doubt that they deserve to be treated under the heading of the image under discussion here. In short, the Hammarskjold framework, in its various forms and applications, retains a central position in the thinking about international peacekeeping at the present 47

Nina Heathcote, "American Policy towards the U.N. Operation in the Congo," Australian Outlook, Vol. 18, No. 1 (April 1964), pp. 77-97. 48 1 . L. Claude, Jr., "The Political Framework of the United Nations' Financial Problems," International Organization, Vol. 17, No. 4 (1963), pp. 831-859.

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time. Considerable effort is now being devoted to the exploration of its concepts and to the filling in of its basic categories with details and nuances.49 In fact, the evidence suggests that these ideas are presently of great importance and are likely to remain relevant for some time to come. There may be some difficulties in meeting the assumptions of the theory, such as those concerning the acceptance of intervention by the parties concerned and the possibility of making workable financial arrangements. But the pressures generated in the international system for an actor to play peacekeeping roles of this kind are great, and, even if the obstacles in the way of launching peacekeeping operations of this kind are not always overcome, they are likely to be overcome at least in some specific cases. This conclusion is particularly bolstered by the fact that the postcolonial arrangements in the "third world" seem likely to generate as many crises (although of a different nature) as the process of liquidating colonialism has generated in recent years. And it seems likely that postcolonial crises may frequently be susceptible to some kind of United Nations handling. For all these reasons it should be borne very clearly in mind that the peacekeeping proposals elaborated in later chapters of this study are in no way conceived as alternatives to this theory of peacekeeping. On the contrary, they will be discussed essentially as possible complementary practices. AN EMERGENT PATTERN? At the present time there are some indications of a shift in international peacekeeping, in at least some cases, toward a pattern emphasizing great-power cooperation and bearing a certain resemblance to the image of the Charter system. Though no doctrine or theory has yet appeared as a focus 49

See, for example, the articles in Lincoln P. Bloomfield (ed.), "International Force—A Symposium," International Organization, Vol. 17, No. 2 (1963).

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for these developments, several more de facto indicators are noteworthy.50 There has been a noticeable tendency toward restoring the Security Council to a position of primacy in the realm of peace and security problems, and this tendency has seemingly become more clear-cut in the wake of the financing crisis of 1964-1965. Moreover, recent United Nations activities in this area have emphasized Soviet-American common interests. Both superpowers voted for the 4 March 1964 resolution establishing the United Nations operation in Cyprus, as well as for subsequent resolutions dealing with the Cyprus case, and the events of September 1965 with regard to the IndiaPakistan hostilities represent an even more direct case of overlapping great-power interests in acting through the Security Council with the aim of stopping the fighting.51 Such developments resemble the arrangements of the Charter system, at least implicitly, in several ways. The great powers are showing a new interest in operating the mechanisms of peacekeeping themselves, rather than delegating such operations to the middle and smaller power or to the Secretary-General, and in supplying the political and physical resources necessary to undertake operations of some real significance. In this context, there appears to be a renewed willingness to contemplate the mobilization of pressure and the use of coercive as well as noncoercive activities within the framework of United Nations peacekeeping. In the India-Pakistan case, for example, serious references have been made to some of the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter in the effort to achieve ac50 For more extended discussion of these issues, consult Oran R. Young, "Trends in International Peacekeeping" (Research Monograph No. 22, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1 January 1966). 51 The detailed record of United Nations activities in these cases can be most easily traced in the pages of U.N. Monthly Chronicle, Vols. 1 and 2.

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ceptance of a cessation of hostilities.52 As a corollary, this set of developments tends to deemphasize the concept of peacekeeping by consent stressed in the Hammarskjold framework and to indicate a renewal of interest in enforcement measures at least in some cases. At the same time, there are several major differences between these recent trends and the arrangements contemplated under the Charter system. Minimum international order seems to be replacing the older goals of suppressing aggression and guaranteeing peace throughout the world. This new emphasis is born out of a fear of the destructiveness of large-scale warfare and the dangers of escalation during crises and does not have much grounding in concepts of equity, let alone justice. Moreover, the great powers no longer have the dominance in the United Nations which they had in the early postwar years. Even if the great powers really desired it, a thoroughgoing return to the Charter system would be impossible to square with the present patterns of power and distribution of interests in the Organization. Finally, there are some indications that the developments under discussion here represent, as far as the great powers are concerned, more of an interest in using the United Nations as a facade or an instrument than in revitalizing its peacekeeping capacities along the lines of Chapter VII. The Security Council may constitute a highly desirable vehicle for the implementation of the overlapping and often essentially conservative interests of the great powers, and especially of the present superpowers. It is unlikely, however, that the changes reported here will develop into a full-fledged image of United Nations peacekeeping or that a full-scale return to the Charter system is imminent. Some important factors both within the United Nations and more generally in international politics are likely to preclude such a progression. As mentioned 52

See U.N. Monthly Chronicle, Vol. 2, No. 9 (October 1965), pp. 16-20.

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above, the patterns of power and influence in the Organization have changed substantially since the early years. New blocs have become important, questions which really emanate from the North-South relationship are tending to supplant East-West problems in many instances, and the general environment at the United Nations is no longer congenial to overall dominance by the great powers. In addition, it is likely that Communist China will find its way into the Security Council eventually, creating difficulties for the superpowers in using that organ. And there is good reason to suppose that the General Assembly will be kept open as an alternative to the Security Council in the peace and security area. Such an arrangement is more likely to lead to a coexistence of elements from the various images of peacekeeping than to a full-scale resurgence of the Charter system. There are also several more general factors in international politics which militate against a full-scale resurgence of the Charter system. The decline of bipolarity and the gradual diffusion of usable power in the international system are leading to a situation in which the great powers would find it difficult to meet the assumption of military supremacy underlying the Charter system even if they were interested in doing so.53 Furthermore, the common interests of the great powers in operating a Charter-type system do not demonstrate sufficient strength and continuity to make this a live option. These interests are born more out of fear of modern military technology and the dangers of escalation than out of a convergence of positive goals. And though such negative interests may support common action in particular cases, they seem unlikely to be sufficient to form the basis of a viable system of international peacekeeping. Finally, a number of more specific issues such as China, Vietnam, and Berlin are likely to raise obstacles to an approach to peacekeeping based on substantial and operational great-power solidarity. 53

For further elaboration of these trends see chapter 9, infra.

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THE INTERMEDIARIES SOME COMPARISONS OF THE THREE IMAGES

Some of the differences among these images of peacekeeping have been pointed out in passing. It may, however, be interesting and useful to compare them more systematically on the basis of several clearly defined axes. The three images elaborated above clearly have some of the qualities of ideal types and are, therefore, somewhat removed from reality. In practice, the three focuses have tended to run together over the last twenty years, and it is not immediately clear how the transition from one to another was made. This is so even though the high-water mark in the acceptance and utilization of each image is much more easily discernible. This chapter will, therefore, conclude with some comments designed to underline the connections between the shift from one theory of peacekeeping to another, and important changes in the United Nations system and in the international system as a whole. Turning to some comparisons, consider first the principal actors focused on by the various images. Under the Charter system the great powers were given a preeminent role in actions designed to maintain the peace. And the resultant actions were always to be directed against small powers; never against one or more of the great powers themselves. The shift to the Uniting for Peace theory brought about a substantial change in this respect. Here both great powers and small powers—primarily the Western bloc—were to band together in taking collective measures. And the object of such actions was frequently to be one of the great powers or its followers and dependents or both. Finally, the Hammarskjold framework reaches a point that is almost the exact opposite of the Charter system in this respect. Here the great powers are to be largely excluded from peacekeeping operations in favor of the middle and smaller powers who are to cooperate in taking the necessary actions under the leadership of the Secretary-General. In actuality, 148

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then, on the question of relevant actors a shift from one end of the spectrum to the other, punctuated by stops at the three major focuses mentioned above, has characterized the line of progression. It is interesting that such a radical shift in this very basic element of peacekeeping activities should have taken place over such a short period of time. It is, in fact, a remarkable indicator of the dynamism of the contemporary international system. Simultaneous with the shift in relevant actors has been a marked transition in the characteristic types of action projected by the various images of peacekeeping. Under the Charter system the focus was on the notions of regulation and punishment. Enforcement actions were to characterize the activities of the responsible states, which were painted in the guise of policemen. The focus had already changed by the time the Uniting for Peace theory became dominant, though the change was not as substantial as some of the others discussed in this section. The new emphasis was on the notion of collective measures designed to suppress acts of aggression and to contain threats to the peace generated by states considered likely to be aggressors in the future. This focus was opportune since it provided a conceptual framework into which the idea of a coalition of great powers and small powers against any aggressor could easily be fitted and since it provided a high-sounding cover for the prosecution of the policy interests of the Western powers. A very radical change in characteristic actions accompanied the subsequent transition from the Uniting for Peace image to the Hammarskjold framework. The notion of peacekeeping now shed its connections with the use of high-level coercion, with the employment of military forces to "enforce" the peace,54 and with the use of collective 54

For a discussion of the problems involved in the use of force to "enforce" the peace see Frederick Schuman, The Commonwealth of Man (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), chap. 7.

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measures designed to suppress aggression in the sense of crushing it. In place of these notions a new set of ideas was brought to the fore. Peacekeeping activities would now be essentially noncoercive, based on the underlying consent of the direct parties to the crisis, and designed to facilitate nonmilitary settlement of dangerous situations. In addition, there was a new emphasis on isolating danger spots before they could blow up and, therefore, preventing the outbreak of actual hostilities wherever possible. This does not mean that coercive actions can never be employed under this theory; they have been employed in the past and may be employed to an equal or greater extent in the future. But the fact remains that, compared with past images of peacekeeping, the Hammarskjold framework radically deemphasizes the direct and immediate use of military force. The result in this area, then, is another continuum along which a shift has occurred. The shift from coercive to noncoercive peacekeeping activities correlates on the one hand with the passage of time and on the other hand with the breakdown of the security system envisioned in Chapter VII of the Charter and the subsequent decline of Western control of the United Nations system. The new actions have been designed more modestly and with a greater attachment to the interests of the international community as opposed to the interests of some part of this community. It is also interesting to compare the three images in terms of the sources from which they characteristically draw personnel, military contingents, supplies, and political backing. It is probably fair to say of the first two images of peacekeeping that they were essentially owned and operated by some or all of the great powers. In these cases, it was to be either the great powers in unison or the Western great powers which supplied the great bulk of the necessary resources for any United Nations action, without which peacekeeping would be little more than an empty concept. This relationship was made perfectly clear in the early 1 50

THREE IMAGES OF UN PEACEKEEPING

years of the Organization by the negotiations in the Military Staff Committee on various questions concerning contributions to a United Nations force.55 And it was driven home perhaps even more clearly by the thoroughness of American control over the Korean operation.56 A substantial break is evident in this realm, too, with the transition to operations formulated in the context of the Hammarskjold framework. Peacekeeping has become one of the key activities of the middle and smaller powers and the former in particular have been instrumental in pushing for the setting up of peacekeeping activities in specific cases and in supplying many of the necessary resources.57 This general conclusion must, however, be considerably modified when it comes to questions concerning such matters as logistics and transportation. Here the Organization has continued to depend heavily on the contributions of the great powers, and in particular of the United States, for a variety of important physical resources.58 During the later stages of the Congo operation, some efforts were made to break or reduce this dependence on great-power contributions. But there is little doubt that at least some types of action would still require substantial support from these sources. When it comes to political backing and support for executive activities in the realm of peacekeeping operations, however, the records of a number of the middle and smaller powers are especially outstanding. This is not to say that great powers do not support some operations of this kind; they do. But they no longer form the real backbone of essential supporters, since peacekeeping operations are no longer "their show" under the Hammarskjold framework. 35

Claude, Power and International Relations, pp. 173-190. Goodrich, 1953, op.cit. 67 Bloomfield, ed., op.cit., especially essays by Herbert Nicholas and Brian E. Urquhart. 58 Lincoln P. Bloomfield, International Military Forces (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1964), pp. 84-86. 56

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For the most part, transitions from one image of peacekeeping to another have been rather closely correlated with important developments and changes in the United Nations system. The Charter system never really became operative because the Organization itself from the very beginning failed to operate as the framers of the Charter had thought it would. The divergence between the thoughts of the statesmen in 1945 and the realities of international politics in 1946 is, in fact, remarkable. In particular, two key changes in the operating patterns of the United Nations can be associated with the shift to the Uniting for Peace era. On the one hand, the wartime alliance broke down and the powers that subsequently came together to form the Western bloc found themselves with a clear majority in the United Nations. These powers could see no reason not to utilize the Organization to forward their policy interests and they therefore set about the task of finding the proper procedures to accomplish this goal. On the other hand, the shift of activities from the Security Council to the General Assembly began at the very start of United Nations operations and its antecedents can be traced clearly to the hotly contested positions of the middle and smaller powers at San Francisco.59 And when the idea of deemphasizing the Council became important to the Western bloc leaders, it was not a difficult task to reactivate and enlist the interests of the smaller powers in reducing the dominance of the Security Council. The Western powers thus harnessed a change that already showed signs of getting under way and threw their weight in the scales in favor of this change. The result was a rapid shift in the direction indicated. The transition to the Hammarskjold framework is also closely associated with several important shifts in the institutional patterns of the Organization. In particular, it correlates closely with the rapid reorganization of the polit59

Cornelia Meigs, The Great Design (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1964), chaps. 3 and 4.

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ical complexion of the United Nations which was set in motion by the admission of sixteen new members in December 1955, an action which finally and decisively tipped the scales in favor of the policy of universality (with some exceptions) of membership.60 Consequently, the Organization has since begun to lose its Western flavor and orientation and to move strongly in the direction of emphasizing problems of the "third world" and of the smaller states in general. And the prevailing concepts of international peacekeeping have not been slow in following the path of these political changes. This fundamental transition has also been closely associated with several further developments which have favored the generation and utilization of the Hammarskjold framework. Along with the decline of Western numerical superiority has gone the passing of the "permanent majority" and the establishment of new voting balances which have favored the new concepts of peacekeeping. Finally, of particular importance have been the increases in stature and influence of the Secretary-General in the realm of peace and security matters.61 This development, which has been partly due to the increasing size and unwieldiness of the General Assembly in recent years, has been a significant factor in the transition to a theory of international peacekeeping which places special emphasis on the central position of executive actions. Similarly, it is possible to correlate changes in the prevailing image of peacekeeping with broad-scale shifts in the international system. A few comments on these correlations may further clarify the complex patterns of dynamic factors which lie behind manifest shifts from one image of peacekeeping to another. Above all, the development of a bipolar arrangement of power centers in the system, the tightening and loosening of this arrangement, and the gradual decline of bipolarity 60 61

Claude, Swords into Plowshares, pp. 451-459. See, for example, Boyd, op.cit., chaps. 5-7.

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have contributed to changes in peacekeeping arrangements.62 It should be noted that the phenomena of the cold war and the gradual diffusion of power throughout the system in recent years can be largely subsumed under the rubric of this very important set of factors. It seems clear that the Charter system of peacekeeping was basically incompatible with bipolarity and that the two could not coexist. The Charter system ultimately looked toward a kind of control arrangement in which the two basic groups in the world would not be balancing power centers but a small group of controlling states and a much larger group of states subjected to the regulations of those in the controlling group. The division of the world into two major camps with its attendant possibilities of taking a middle position and of playing the two sides off against each other meant the end of the Charter system. In this context, the Uniting for Peace era can fairly be represented as an episode in bipolar politics in which one of the two main camps was able to dominate the United Nations and to make a fairly sustained effort to utilize the Organization to forward its policy objectives. The development of the Hammarskjold framework has a somewhat more complex relationship to the politics of bipolarity. It was made possible by a combination of the continuation of the cold war and the gradual softening of bipolarity to the point where other factors could take on new significance in the international arena. It was the continuation of the cold war which led to the decline of peacekeeping operations in the early fifties and to the conclusion that the United Nations could do little in the realm of "bloc differences." But it was also the stand-off produced by bi62

The tightening and loosening of the bipolar arrangement of power centers are treated in theoretical terms in Morton Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (New York: John Wiley, 1957), and in practice in George Liska, Nations in Alliance (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962).

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polarity which reduced the usable power at the disposal of the superpowers and made it dangerous for them to intervene in the "third world." At the same time, the rise of the new theory of peacekeeping can be at least partially attributed to the new influence and interests of the middle and smaller powers and to the increasing prospects of crises developing which might be accurately described as essentially outside the cold-war arena. This brings into focus a trend of great importance in accounting for the transition to the Hammarskjold framework during the middle and late fifties. The opposing side of the coin of the declining rigidity and brittleness of bipolarity has been a shifting of the various lines and patterns of conflict in the international system.63 The conflict pattern in the system has been growing, at the same time, less stark and considerably more complex. Above all, the increasing importance of North-South conflicts and postcolonial conflicts has added a variety of new angles and complexities to the pattern of international conflict.64 These developments have not added greatly to the physical resources and capabilities of the United Nations, but they have created many new situations in which there is room for skillful intervention of a relatively noncoercive sort on the part of an actor which can combine a certain detachment in specific cases with a substantial amount of political stature in the eyes of national decision-makers. These factors would appear to be closely associated with both the generally noncoercive nature of activities carried out within the context of the Hammarskjold framework and the complexity and multifaceted nature of this image of international peacekeeping. Finally, a brief word should be added concerning the effects of postwar developments in weapons technology and strategy65 on images of international peacekeeping. As 63 65

ei Liska, op.cit., chap. 6. Ibid., chap. 6. For general discussions of these developments consult, inter

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mentioned above, Western military supremacy was one of the key factors which allowed the Western bloc to promulgate and implement the Uniting for Peace theory during the years when it was current doctrine. But as time has passed, developments in the areas under discussion here have increasingly militated against the utilization of the peacekeeping potential of the United Nations by any of the great powers to implement policies with direct cold-war significance. Such manipulation under conditions of a "balance of terror" are just too dangerous to be engaged in freely. In fact, rapid increases in the destructive capabilities of modern military systems have been a powerful factor in forwarding the drive to insulate dangerous situations from the intrusion of the cold war and at the same time to avoid the risks to the United Nations of intervening in crises involving the great powers. A great deal of emphasis has been placed especially on the likely explosive consequences of allowing the Soviet Union and the United States to become involved in crises in the "third world." And the exclusion of the great powers from direct participation is one of the most fundamental tenets of the theory of peacekeeping which has been labeled the Hammarskjold framework. Finally, by way of adumbrating later propositions, it might be mentioned here that the views of peacekeeping outlined in subsequent chapters are highly dependent on an analysis of trends in the fields of weapons technology and strategy in the sixties. Discussion of these factors will therefore become a central concern in later chapters. alia, Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, N J . : Princeton University Press, 1959); Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton, N J . : Princeton University Press, 1960), and Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton, N J . : Princeton University Press, 1961).

1 56

PART TWO

Applications

Perhaps a future generation, which knows the outcome of our present efforts, will look at them with some irony. They will see where we fumbled and they will find it difficult to understand why we did not see the direction more clearly and work more consistently toward the target it indicates. So it will always be, but let us hope that they will not find any reason to criticize us because of a lack of that combination of steadfastness of purpose and flexibility of approach which alone can guarantee that the possibilities which we are exploring have been tested to the full. Working at the edge of the development of human society is to work on the brink of the unknown. Much of what is done will one day prove to have been of little avail. That is no excuse for the failure to act in accordance with out best understanding, in recognition of its limits but with faith in the ultimate result of the creative evolution in which it is our privilege to cooperate. —DAG HAMMARSKJOLD

CHAPTER FIVE

United Nations Intervention in Soviet-American Crises of this study dealt with the problems of third-party intervention in international crises primarily in theoretical terms. It is, however, increasingly important at this point to begin to consider the more concrete material on interbloc crises mentioned in the Introduction. Therefore, this chapter and those that follow, are directed more specifically toward questions concerning intervention in Soviet-American crises. A considerable amount of material which is primarily theoretical and which should be applicable to other contexts besides the SovietAmerican arena will, in fact, be presented from time to time. But the level of analysis shifts toward more concrete and specific problems at this point. The present chapter deals with some general questions concerning the qualities of the Soviet-American relationship which tend to generate potential third-party roles and with the likelihood that thirdparty activities during crises would be acceptable to and accepted by the superpowers. Subsequent chapters discuss specific types of crisis in which interventionary activities might be constructively undertaken and analyze United Nations capabilities for handling third-party roles.

T

HE FIRST PART

INTRODUCTION

What can the United Nations do to facilitate the nonviolent termination of serious disputes and crises developing between the two principal blocs in the world today, or more directly between the Soviet Union and the United States? It has often been assumed that intervention in superpower politics is impossible and that third parties such as the United Nations must confine themselves to measures of 159

THE INTERMEDIARIES

preventive diplomacy and efforts to restrict the spreading of the cold war. In the light of contemporary politico-military developments, however, this assumption no longer seems so obvious. It will be the primary objective of this and subsequent chapters to analyze a range of possible roles for the United Nations in regulating interbloc crises and facilitating the nonviolent termination of serious disputes between the superpowers. This effort will focus primarily on relatively intense crises which carry with them a serious threat of the use of nuclear weapons or have already engendered the limited use of nuclear weapons. But within these limits there is almost a continuum of classes of crisis situations that deserves consideration. Such situations range from the deterrence of war in periods of heightened tension, through the limitation of wars that have already begun, to the termination of wars and the restoration of nonviolent relationships between the antagonists. There are, in addition, various preventive and preparatory measures an intervenor might undertake both to reduce the likelihood of a serious crisis developing which might lead to war and to prepare for an active role in the regulation and management of such a crisis if it should occur. It is perhaps worth noting that the material in this part of the study deals extensively with various kinds of events and situations that may never occur. But there is a certain finite danger or likelihood that one or more of these situations may arise in the future, and the results of such occurrences, if uncontrolled, would very likely be highly destructive if not catastrophic for the whole international system, as well as for the nation states most directly involved. The discussions included in these chapters pertain directly to warding off or restricting these dangerous sets of events. It is, of course, to be hoped that efforts such as this may help to ensure that such events never reach the stage of actuality. 1 60

UN INTERVENTION IN SOVIET-AMERICAN CRISES THE SOVIET-AMERICAN CONFRONTATION

Why does it make sense to talk about such facilitating or regulatory roles for the United Nations in the context of Soviet-American crises? To answer this question it is necessary to consider various elements in the relationships between the Soviet bloc and the Western bloc which account for the possibility. Above all, it is important to realize that the relationships between the two blocs are not those of pure or total conflict. On the contrary, East-West relationships may be characterized as competitive-cooperative and as typical of "limited adversaries."1 Schelling has stated this proposition rather well in the statement: It is not true that in the modern world a gain for the Russians is necessarily a loss for us, and vice versa. We can both suffer losses, and this fact provides scope for cooperation.2 It would be foolish to ignore the deeply conflictful elements in the East-West confrontation. Though the situation is dynamic and there are signs that the cold war may be gradually decreasing in intensity, profound problems of philosophy, pohtical doctrines and objectives, institutional structures, and self-interest still clearly divide the superpowers.8 As Wohlstetter has recently put it: We have interests in common with our opponents, but we deceive ourselves when we talk of these as overriding 1 The notion of "limited adversary" relations has been explored most thoroughly in the context of East-West relations by Marshal Shulman. 2 Thomas C. Schelling, "Reciprocal Measures for Arms Stabilization" in Daedalus (special issue on arms control edited by D. G. Brennan), Fall 1960, p. 894. 3 For a very insightful treatment of these problems which is still applicable see Robert C. Tucker, "Russia, the West, and World Order," World Politics, Vol. 12, No. 1 (October 1959), pp. 1-23.

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THE INTERMEDIARIES

all others. The Utopian proposals urged today by so many scientists and technologists ignore the durability of our political problems by calling for a final and immediate solution.4 At the same time, however, the strength of SovietAmerican common and overlapping interests is impressive and growing more so as changes take place in the overall international system. The scope of these common interests can be considered both in rather general and abstract terms and in more specific contexts. Turning first to some broad considerations of common concern, one can elaborate an interesting picture of emerging common interests and restraints. First and foremost, the two superpowers are strongly bound together by their desire to avoid the mutual destmctiveness of an uncontrolled crisis sequence which leads to warfare on a significant scale. The evidence suggests that both sides are now extremely fearful of the results of warfare, and that in recent years each side has become more aware of and impressed by the importance of avoiding the cul-de-sac of a crisis which leads to warfare. Common and overlapping interests in this area extend not only to the most basic interests in survival but also to the avoidance of any substantial destruction, even though it may not ultimately threaten survival. And there is little doubt that common interests of this negative variety would be vastly intensified and strongly activated on a short-term basis during any really severe "nuclear" crisis that might develop. Moreover, several additional sets of broad common and overlapping interests act to keep the Soviet-American confrontation limited and tend to draw the two powers together. To start with, both sides tend toward conservative behavior in political and military affairs, and this tendency is proba4 Albert Wohlstetter, "Technology, Prediction, and Disorder," in Richard Rosecrance (ed.), The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), p. 287.

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UN INTERVENTION IN SOVIET-AMERICAN CRISES

bly becoming more pronounced as time passes. Each of the superpowers is clearly, at this point, high on the list of "have" nations, and each tends to display the prudence which almost inevitably characterizes the actions of those who have much to lose and who greatly enjoy their material assets. The fact that this is true for the Soviet Union as well as for the United States is attested to by Halle in the prop­ osition: . . . as it has succeeded in its own self-development, the Soviet society has come to have more to lose by . . . a war than it had in 1917. Its avoidance, therefore, has come to be an increasingly important objective of its policy.5 In addition to this self-interested caution, however, both of the superpowers, and especially the Soviet Union,6 have a general history of substantial, though perhaps not dysfunctionally restrictive, caution and conservatism in mili­ tary affairs. Related to this question of conservative behavior is the fact that the two superpowers are gradually moving toward increasingly analogous positions vis-a-vis the overall interna­ tional system. Both are now extremely powerful and influen­ tial as superpowers, but each faces a likely decline in its relative power position in the system over the course of the foreseeable future as political influence tends to diffuse slowly throughout the whole system. This decline in relative influence appears to be coming despite the fact that each of the superpowers is continuing to grow in terms of absolute power. Given this trend of change, it seems safe to assume that each of the superpowers will develop a more and more active interest in maintaining its relative supremacy. And 5

Louis J. Halle, "The Quality of the Soviet Challenge," Survival, Vol. 3, No. 4 (July-August 1961), p. 162. β Consult, inter alia, Raymond Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age (rev. ed.; New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 255.

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the most likely way of achieving this goal will be for the superpowers to draw closer together, at least to the extent of establishing some rules of the game in international politics, both in order to protect themselves against outside encroachments on their power positions and in order to avoid the dangers attendant on canceling out each other's power entirely. Violent conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States might very well play into the hands of other actors in the system, and it cannot be assumed that the superpowers themselves will not become actively aware of this prospect as time passes. Already there are signs of the tentative development of one specific element of this general type of common interest in the actions and attitudes of the superpowers with regard to the problem of nuclear diffusion.7 Here is an instance in which the presently dominant forces in the system appear to be moving haltingly toward at least general agreement about the desirability of avoiding developments that would be basically destabilizing from their point of view and, consequently, of restricting the diffusion of power and influence in the international system. Leaving aside such broad-gauge considerations, one can outline Soviet-American common and overlapping interests in terms of rather specific problems.8 And it is worth noting that these problems in themselves might well be sufficient to create a variety of potential roles for the United Nations as intervenor. A number of specific examples could be elaborated in this context. But consider here the point made by Schelling when he stressed: 7 On this point see The Nth-Country Problem and Arms Control (Washington, D . C : National Planning Association, 1960), and Fred C. IkIe, "Nth Countries and Disarmament," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, December 1960, pp. 391-394. 8 This discussion of specific common interests relies heavily on Schelling, op.cit., and Alastair Buchan, "Arms and Security," Australian Outlook, Vol. 16, No. 2 (August 1962), pp. 113-159.

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UN INTERVENTION IN SOVIET-AMERICAN CRISES

The premise underlying my point of view is that a main determinant of the likelihood of war is the nature of present military technology. We and the Russians are trapped by our military technology.9 This perspective is a good springboard from which to delineate a number of specific Soviet-American common interests. Above all, the two sides have a strong interest in stabilizing, especially during crises, the mechanisms for strategic deterrence (including military hardware) which both sides have created.10 And this situation has generated a number of subsidiary points of converging interest. Included here are such problems as: 1) "avoiding the kind of false alarm, panic, misunderstanding, or loss of control, that may lead to an unpremeditated war";11 2) reducing the advantages of striking first and therefore the incentives to start a war through preemption; and 3) controlling the dangers of accidents and escalation, especially during periods of crisis. The focus on the problems engendered by modern technology and concrete military systems also suggests other specific areas of Soviet-American common interest. There is a tendency for interests to converge in preventing the expansion of the arms race to new dimensions such as outer space and chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) weapons systems.12 And indications are that these problems are already being handled with a certain amount of tacit and informal coordination. A further case of such concrete convergence of interest can be seen in the growing indications on both sides of a desire to control the uncertainties and instabilities generated by the technological (quali9

Schelling, op.cit., p. 895. Buchan, op.cit., pp. 127-128. 11 Schelling, op.cit., p. 894. 12 For a recent, though unclassified, discussion consult J. H. Rothschild, Tomorrow's Weapons (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1964). 10

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tative) arms race. There are additional examples of rather specific Soviet-American common interests, particularly in areas where there is an increasing mutual awareness of the traps of military technology. But by this point it should be clear that the common interests of the superpowers are not confined to the level of abstract generalizations. Now, given the fact that various common interests and at least emerging rules of the game are present in SovietAmerican relationships, there are still a number of rather acute politico-military problems which characterize these relationships. In particular these problems have the potential: 1) to generate extremely serious nuclear crises or wars in which the two superpowers would become involved; and 2) to lock the two sides into various positions of confrontation from which they would find it difficult if not impossible to extricate themselves on their own initiative. It is always possible, of course, that one side or the other may deliberately seek war at some future juncture. Under such conditions there would be little that any potential intervenor could do at the outset to guard against the outbreak of war, although intervention still might be relevant in the context of limiting the war while it lasts or of terminating violent hostilities. The existence of a variety of politico-military problems, however, creates a situation and and an environment in which there is a variety of ways by which a war, clearly undesired by both sides in the final analysis, might be touched off. Here especially the notion of outside intervention by a party such as the United Nations would seem to have considerable potential and importance. To clarify these propositions, consider briefly several types of problems which are of definite relevance to Soviet-American relations and which have the potential to take the development of a crisis situation out of the full control of the participants themselves. Considered at a high level of abstraction, the phenomenon of positive or amplifying feedback can be said to under166

UN INTERVENTION IN SOVIET-AMERICAN CRISES

lie most of the important politico-military problems which characterize the Soviet-American confrontation.13 Taking the whole complex of East-West relationships as a conflict system, it is possible to discern elements of the characteristic spiral of incremental responses and of the trading of initiatives that characterize positive feedback in many of the specific problems generated by the conflict system. Questions concerning the prevalence of over- and underresponse therefore take on great importance and should be kept in mind. But for present purposes it is important at this point to identify the problems under discussion more concretely. A. Security Dilemmas The phenomenon of the security dilemma is particularly prominent in the age of weapons of mass destruction which can at best be deterred and against which there is no absolute defense. As John Herz suggests, the mechanism of the dilemma springs from "a feeling of insecurity, deriving from mutual suspicion and mutual fear, which compels these units (the nations) to compete for ever more power in order to find more security, an effort which proves self-defeating because complete security remains ultimately unobtainable."14 In short, the presence of security dilemmas injects a strong element of instability into the realm of international politics through the search for absolute security, through the creation of feelings that a state should expect the worst to befall it and act accordingly, and through the assumption that other actors must be considered as opponents and antagonists.15 This dilemma has been a major 13

On this subject see, in general, Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1963), pp. 192-195. 14 John Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 231. 15 Herbert Butterfield, International Conflict in the Twentieth Century: A Christian View (New York: Harper & Bros., 1960), chap. 4.

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causative factor behind the contemporary arms race, and it seems safe to say that its tendency to emphasize conflict and undermine trust generates some doubts about the likelihood that the United States and the Soviet Union by themselves could realize their common interests in avoiding destruction, even, or perhaps particularly, during an intense "nuclear" crisis. B. Offense-Defense Dilemmas The contemporary superiority of offense over defense in the area of strategic weapons systems has created serious problems. The most notable of these derives from the gains to be had from striking first if nuclear war breaks out and the consequent incentive to preempt in cases where the opponent shows any signs of preparing an attack. A recent TEMPO study has stated the case as follows: . . . given the technological characteristics of current and future weapons, there is a considerable military advantage in striking first. Consequently a nation may feel compelled on the basis of minimal information to attack first in "self-defense." Thus the requirements for rapid decisions and the advantages of a first-strike operate to keep both sides poised for immediate action. And, as Schelling notes, in the light of current weapons technology, the things that each side does to make its own strategic force more secure . . . to make it more alert, less vulnerable to surprise, better able to strike quickly if that is the way the decision goes . . . are likely to be the kinds of actions that can be interpreted as preparations for attack. They are likely to be actions that increase the danger of "false alarm" on both sides and that could lead to a succession of decisions aggravating each side's perception of the need to pre-empt.18 16

C. McClintock, D. Hekhuis, A. L. Burns, and R. C. Tucker, "Introduction," in D. Hekhuis, C. McClintock, and A. L. Burns (eds.), International Stability (New York: John Wiley, 1964), p. 6.

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And in general, this dilemma tends to increase the likelihood of all types of basically unintended war and to restrict sharply the possibilities that the two sides can reach a mutually advantageous settlement in situations involving accidents and miscalculations as well as the tensions of escalation. Thus by telescoping the decision time of a defender and thereby increasing the dangers of "triggerhappy" actions, miscalculations, false alarms, technological accidents, and so forth, this dilemma has a tendency to make more likely the very actions which will, in turn, heighten perceptions of the intention to preempt. It is to be hoped that recent developments in the direction of invulnerability and stability in strategic weapons systems will reduce the dangers of shortened decision time and the jittery reactions which tend to underscore the problem of preemption. But it is clear that this general class of dilemmas reduces the possibilities that the superpowers will bargain directly for a solution or termination point during an intense "nuclear" crisis. C. Commitment and Bargaining Impediments Even where common interests are strong, the tendency of the parties to a crisis to commit themselves to particular actions or settlements that are unacceptable to the other side is likely to cause rigidities and emotional attachments that make it extremely difficult for the opponents, singly or together, to initiate or prosecute movements toward a settlement or a termination point.17 The use of commitments and threats, together with a whole range of specific bargaining tactics, is likely to pay off in many cases where a solution is, in fact, ultimately agreed upon. It has been aptly noted, for example, that in many societies the weak, the incorrigible, and the insane often have very strong, if 17

Consult Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), chap. 2.

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not commanding, bargaining positions.18 But the use of such tactics may result in a situation of "no settlement" or outright clash. This is particularly important in cases of "nuclear" crisis when such an outcome is likely to result in violence and may even mean major thermonuclear war. Characteristic elements of this class of problems can be listed as follows: a) dangers of weakening one's bargaining strength in one's own eyes or in the eyes of the opposing side; b) unwillingness to be the first to back down; c) embarrassment of appearing to accept one of the other side's favorite positions; d) fear of making a concession which may lead the opposing side to expect capitulation on an issue; e) unwillingness to risk a loss of prestige; f) unwillingness to have one's name associated with the suggestion of a particular measure; g) inflexibility caused by emotional and ideological commitments; h) inability to go back on promises to one's own people; and i) physical losses from backing down due to prior commitment of physical resources. The existence of these and other bargaining difficulties is likely to cause substantial problems, especially during a "nuclear" crisis when available time is short, the incentive to act without waiting is great, and the dangers of stalemate in the search for a solution or termination point are significant. D. "Escalation" Dilemmas Closely related to the problems of bargaining and to the general mechanisms of positive feedback are the dilemmas of crises which move up the ladder of mutual commitment to the point where an originally unintended war may break out. Thus a local crisis or a central situation of low intensity may escalate to a serious "nuclear" crisis through the mechanisms of a "competition in risk-taking"19 and through the upward spiral of commitment in a conflict in 18 19

Loc.cit. This concept was developed by Thomas C. Schelling.

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which neither side is willing to accept defeat locally or at a low level of intensity. Herman Kahn's delineation of the nature of escalation is suggestive of the quahty of dilemma which pervades this phenomenon: In the typical escalation situation there is some form of limited conflict between two sides; either side could win by increasing its efforts in some way, provided that the other side did not match the increase. Furthermore, in many situations it will be clear that, if the increase in effort were not matched and thus resulted in victory, the costs of the increased effort would be low in relation to the benefits of victory. It is, therefore, precisely the fear that the other side may react, indeed overreact, that is most likely to deter escalation, rather than the undesirability or cost of the escalation by itself. That is, in an escalation situation there is likely to be "a competition in 'risk-taking' or at least resolve."20 In such contexts, difficulties arise because there are apt to be important frictions which make deescalation difficult and because a mixture of emotions, misunderstandings, and symmetrical commitments may combine to give the escalatory spiral a life of its own which is at least partially beyond the reach of rational decision-making, even when the two sides begin to show some awareness of their common interests in avoiding large-scale destruction. Thus the dilemmas of uncontrolled escalation, which in some cases may proceed very rapidly, may not be solvable by either or both of the primary opponents, who find themselves locked into a system of progressively destabilizing developments. 20

Herman Kahn, "Escalation and its Strategic Context," in National Security: Political, Military and Economic Strategies in the Decade Ahead (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 476 (reprinted by Hudson Institute as HI-241-P).

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E. Alert and Relaxation Dilemmas At the outset of any serious crisis it is to be expected that the two sides will move to a high-alert status and undertake various measures to make their military forces more "war capable" and ready for any contingency. The dilemma here is generated by the fact that these very precautionary activities may later become an important barrier to implementing any political solution on which the two sides might be able to agree. For example, neither side may be able to relax crucial elements of its alert status, so long as the other side holds its alert, without placing itself at a serious, even though temporary, military disadvantage. And the problems of coordinated or synchronized relaxation without any third-party assistance may be very great due to the difficulties of establishing minimum trust, setting up mechanisms to guarantee authentic communication, and guaranteeing an adequate monitoring of the implementation of agreements to guard against various forms of cheating. The difficulties here center on what Schelling has called "withdrawal from the brink" under the tense conditions engendered by very serious crises.21 It is thus apparent that there are various problems that would be very likely to stand in the way of the realization of Soviet-American common interests under conditions of "nuclear" crisis. And this may be so even despite basically good intentions and honest efforts on the part of the protagonists. It is not difficult to imagine various hypothetical sequences of events in which the two sides, acting on their own or attempting to coordinate their activities, might reach an outcome of "no agreement" or open clash with highly destructive if not disastrous results. Under such circumstances, the potential utility of intervention by an im21

Consult Thomas C. Schelling and Morton Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961), pp. 25-26.

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partial third party such as the United Nations would be very great. And there is a broad spectrum of possible degrees and types of intervention which should be given serious consideration and linked to the various types of Soviet-American crisis during which they would be most useful. There is, of course, a variety of difficulties which a third party intervening in this environment would face, just as there are difficulties peculiar to any type of crisis situation. Some of the difficulties especially relevant to the international arena have already been mentioned in Chapter One.22 But there are several additional problems that would be generated or underlined by severe "nuclear" crises. First, in some cases, at least, time pressures would be considerably increased. In such cases it would very likely become a matter of doing something quickly or not at all. Second, the problem of high stakes would be especially emphasized during "nuclear" crises. In no other class of situations does the question of national survival impinge so clearly on the development of a crisis. Finally, several of the problems mentioned above develop in or are aggravated by an environment in which there is a constant threat of the use of nuclear weapons. THE PROBLEM OF ACCEPTABILITY

Perhaps the most salient objections to the concepts and propositions concerning third-party intervention elaborated in this study, however, are those formulated in terms of acceptability. It is highly likely that many will respond with the statement or impression that United Nations intervention sounds fine in abstract terms but that it is ultimately unrealistic, since the superpowers simply would not accept intervention of this kind during an actual "nuclear" crisis. The problem here is essentially one of dealing with the gap 22

Cf. supra, chap. 1, pp. 45-48.

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between somewhat abstract though demonstrable common interests and the abilities of the two superpowers to take steps to realize their common interests in an emergency situation. The obstacles and barriers to acceptance are very real ones, but it does seem, on balance, that these problems are not quite as overriding as they are sometimes thought to be. The following material expands on this proposition. Important to this analysis is the fact that recent years have witnessed a rather rapid trend toward increasing realization and awareness of the military and political realities of thermonuclear warfare and of the nuclear environment in general. Interestingly, the available evidence indicates that this development has been occurring to a substantial degree in the Soviet Union as well as in the United States. Although the Soviet Union has shown an apparent intellectual lag in such areas as arms control and some of the intricacies of stabilizing complex strategic weapons systems, the Russians have in recent years produced some very respectable and rather sensitive strategic analyses.23 This fact is frequently overlooked or denied in the West primarily because of a strong tendency to consider Soviet doctrine and analysis out of context or even in the context of American doctrine. There are, in fact, some deep-seated and significant doctrinal differences between Soviet and Western approaches to strategy (e.g., Soviet emphasis on the integration and utilization of all elements of the armed forces, greater Soviet interest in problems of war-fighting, and the Soviet concept of the long war) which influence the shape and substance of many specific strategic propositions. But when these differences are accounted for, Soviet strategic thinking tends to be essentially under23

The best general accounts in English are Garthoff, op.cit., Herbert Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union (rev. ed.; New York: Praeger, 1962), and Thomas Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964).

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standable and not—as some would have it—"primitive" at all. Turning more specifically to the point raised at the outset of the preceding paragraph, it is not difficult to find evidence for the sharply increasing awareness of and concern over the dangers and potential instabilities of a mutual deterrence arrangement on the strategic or direct confrontation level. American concern with these problems is evident in almost every publication or statement in the field today, but it may be of some interest to set down some indications of the evident Soviet concern with such problems. The Soviet defense minister, Marshal Malinovsky, who is both a powerful figure in the Soviet defense establishment and the possessor of a reputation for being rather belligerent and aggressive, stated as early as 1962: With the revolution which has taken place in military affairs and the equipping of the armies of States belonging to two opposing social systems with weapons of colossal destructive force, a new war, if the enemies of peace dare to unleash it, would cause all countries and peoples terrible disaster, which would far exceed anything which history has so far known.24 And he noticeably failed to bring forth the typical Soviet claim to the effect that even though a nuclear war would be highly destructive, it would result in a Soviet victory and the elimination of the West as a political force. This position has been stated with even greater vigor and detail by General Talensky,25 and the recent Soviet manual, Military Strategy, edited by Marshal Sokolovsky, has taken a very strong position on the dangers of war and the importance of taking steps to prevent its outbreak in the 1960's, stress24

Marshal R. Malinovsky, "Soviet Strategy," Survival, Vol. 4, No. 5 (September-October 1962), p. 229. 25 General N. Talensky, "The Character of Modern War," Survival, Vol. 3, No. 1 (January-February 1961), pp. 16-21.

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ing especially the dangers of accidental warfare and unintended escalation.26 Finally, Dallin, after weighing the evidence, has concluded: By contrast with the Stalin era, Soviet views on the prospect of nuclear war have become more realistic, and the attempts to avert it more rational. Having, moreover, achieved its military objective of highest priority, and being probably more than a little bothered by the prospect of spreading nuclear capabilities to other (potentially irresponsible) powers, Moscow is eager to reduce the likelihood of war, and first of all accidental war. . . .27 There is, furthermore, a significant tendency for Soviet and American strategic thinking to become more alike and to utilize similar frameworks of analysis as the military technology and force postures of the two sides come more and more to resemble each other. A. L. Burns makes this point in a very general way in speaking of "the convergence of strategic military doctrine recently noticeable among American, European, and Russian analysts."28 And Buchan has provided an interesting concrete example of this phenomenon drawn from the controversy over preemption and first-strike doctrines. He states: . . . in a period of high tension, when the strategic forces of both sides are alerted, some false move or information on the part of one superpower might convince the other that attack was inevitable and force him to 26

Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky (ed.), Military Strategy (GarthofT translation) (New York: Praeger, 1963), chap. 4. 27 Alexander Dallin, The Soviet Union at the United Nations (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 77. 28 Arthur L. Burns, "The Nth Country Problem, Mutual Deterrence, and International Stability," in Hekhuis, McClintock, and Burns, op.cit., p. 127; see also Arthur L. Burns, "Problems of Disarmament," in Hekhuis. McClintock, and Burns, op.cit., especially p. 197.

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strike the first blow. One of the interesting aspects of this problem has been the remarkably similar terms in which American and Soviet experts have analyzed it.29 Thus it seems safe to suggest, not only that the level of awareness on the two sides concerning dangers and problems of the poutico-miLitary environment is rising, but also that the perspective with which these difficulties are viewed by the two sides is tending to become more homogeneous and therefore reciprocally communicable. Since this study is concerned, broadly speaking, with the problem of arms control in Schelling's sense of "military collaboration with potential enemies to reduce the likelihood of war or to reduce its scope and violence,"30 it is of great interest to note that there appears to be a growing interest on both sides in questions of this type. The rising American interest in arms control is evident on all sides and requires no special documentation. Suffice it to say that the Kennedy-Johnson administration, speaking especially through the American Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, has given this type of thinking an important influence in policy-making circles. But for a long time there was extreme hostility to this type of analysis in the Soviet Union and consequently a rather closed and unreceptive attitude toward initiatives along these lines. It is therefore of some importance to note the fact that a number of analysts have recently suggested that this almost monolithic unreceptiveness appears now to be changing.31 Buchan has summarized this tendency well in the statement: There has, until recently, been intense antipathy in Russia to this whole concept of arms control as distinct from 29

Buchan, op.cit., p. 122. Schelling, "Reciprocal Measures for Arms Stabilization," op.cit., p. 894. 31 See, for example, Raymond Garthoff, "Manual of Soviet Strategy," The Reporter, Vol. 28, No. 14 (14 February 1963). 30

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comprehensive disarmament, of controlling and improving rather than attempting to dismantle the balance of power. But there are now signs that, caught between the fires of rising Chinese hostility and a growing American strategic capability, she is beginning to have second thoughts.32 In order to pursue the present analysis of the problem of acceptability in greater detail, a division will be made at this point between doctrinal and attitudinal factors which bear on the problem and more tangible actions and activities which suggest in a more objective sense that outside intervention might be found acceptable by the superpowers during a severe crisis. Turning first to an analysis of doctrines and attitudes, it becomes clear that in this area there are a number of ambiguities and contradictions or paradoxes in the thinking of each side. But there are, nevertheless, some interesting points concerning attitudes toward the United Nations, positions on the problem of international executive action, and doctrines bearing on strategic confrontations which can be underlined in this context. To begin with Soviet attitudes and doctrines, several conclusions seem worth stating. First, with respect to the United Nations in general33 it is rather fashionable to argue that the Soviet Union has tended to sabotage the proper operation of the Organization, or that the Soviets have generally shown a lack of interest in the United Nations and a disinclination to entrust it with responsibilities in any important area, or finally that an inherent incompatibility between a totalitarian regime with broadly hegemonic interests and the notion of an international organization ensures that the Soviets will regard the Organization in essentially negative terms. And certain facts can be adduced to back up each of 32 33

Buchan, op.cit., p. 127. Consult, in general, Dallin, op.cit., passim.

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these rather damning conclusions. But, in fact, this is only part of the picture, and it deserves to be balanced by some other considerations. On the one hand, the Russians have recently begun to articulate rather consistently friendly attitudes toward the United Nations, at least in general terms, and the evidence suggests that they are now beginning to feel that the Organization can undertake activities, even in the realm of peacekeeping operations, in which they might have a definite positive interest. A recent issue of International Affairs (Moscow) contains the following statements, which are typical of many that are now being made concerning the United Nations: The future of the United Nations and peace is indissoluble.34 The U.N. can and must serve as an effective instrument for the maintenance of world peace and the security of nations.35 On the other hand, the actual Soviet record at the United Nations is a mixed one rather than an unbroken catalog of acts of sabotage or expressions of disinterest. While it is true that the Soviets have indulged in several spectacular campaigns designed to curtail and restrict United Nations activities in some areas, it is also true that they have been among the supporters of increased United Nations competence and strength in other areas and other instances. Examples which are especially relevant to problems of peacekeeping would include: Soviet acquiescence in the United Nations operations in Cyprus; calls for additional United Nations actions in the Dominican Republic crisis; and collaboration with the United States in the Se34

"U.N. and Peace," International 1964, p. 3. 35 Ibid., p. 7.

Affairs

(Moscow), October

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curity Council's attempts to regulate the Indian-Pakistani clash in September 1965.36 In short, it would seem that the Soviet Union operates in the United Nations primarily in terms of a set of rather hardheaded calculations of national interest and that it responds favorably to activities of the Organization when they suit its view of its own national interest.37 That this kind of approach results in a definite interest in United Nations activities rather frequently seems obvious. And it now seems probable that the Soviets are tending to see more uses for the Organization than they have in the past. It is clearly true that the Soviets do not identify in ideological terms with the United Nations in the sense that certain of its members have, at least at the level of declaratory policy. But it also seems likely that Dallin is essentially right in suggesting that "Neither total withdrawal from nor total reliance on the U.N. is likely to find many advocates among the leaders of the Soviet camp."38 However, none of this should be in any way startling or necessarily negative in the context of the questions of acceptability under analysis in this discussion. It seems quite clear that all nations approach the United Nations basically from the perspective of national interest. An examination of Soviet attitudes toward international executive activities reveals essentially the same picture. It is, of course, rather fashionable to make a great deal of Soviet attacks on the United Nations executive in such forms as the attack on Hammarskjold and the organization of the se

Present Soviet interests in the usefulness of the United Nations in the peace and security areas are perhaps best set forth in: (1) the Soviet memorandum of July 10, 1964, on peacekeeping; and (2) Soviet statements during 1965 in the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations (see, for example, U.N. Monthly Chronicle, Vol. 2, No. 6 [June 1965], pp. 49-50). 37 This position is basically compatible with the conclusions of Dallin as developed in Dallin, op.cit. ^ Ibid., p. 188.

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office of the Secretary-General beginning in I960, the promulgation of the troika proposals, the "no neutral men" doctrine, and various efforts to increase Soviet representation and influence within the Secretariat. And it is perfectly clear that these points do, in fact, indicate a definite Soviet unhappiness with executive actions that impinge on their interests. But a balanced view of the record of recent years shows much more ambiguity and a much more varied attitude toward the United Nations executive. Positive elements such as the acceptance of Thant as Acting SecretaryGeneral in 1961, the acceptance of Thant as an impartial party during the Cuban crisis of the fall of 1962, Soviet willingness to utilize a United Nations inspectorate during the Cuban crisis, acceptance of Thant for a full term as Secretary-General, and Soviet readiness to support executive actions in cases where it is to their interest (e.g., colonial issues and certain peacekeeping operations) should not be overlooked in his context. In short, it seems basically correct to conclude that the Russians have by no means precluded the possibility of supporting at least limited executive action on the part of the United Nations and that they are rather willing to accept such actions when they perceive them to be compatible with their calculations of their basic interest. Turning to the realm of strategic doctrine, there would appear to be nothing in the serious discussions of Soviet doctrine which would definitively preclude Soviet interest in the intervention of the United Nations as a third party in future crises of a severe nature. Soviet strategic doctrine is not, in fact, either a blueprint for ultimate victory over the West or a hodgepodge of obsolescent directives based on the vagaries of interservice rivalries or on a tendency to cling stubbornly to outdated notions from a prenuclear age. On the contrary, it tends to deal with and express concern about many of the problems which are very much at the focus of much American strategic thinking. 1 81

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Above all, Soviet analysts have shown great interest in and concern over such problems as accidental war, escalation, miscalculations, surprise attack, preemption, and so forth, especially in the years since 1955. Osgood has stated in general terms: The Russians seem equally conscious of the disastrous damage that would be inflicted upon them in a nuclear war, and they too justify their strategic power in terms of a second-strike capability. In fact, Soviet strategic doctrine and defense policies give less indication of firststrike intentions than American doctrine and policies.39 But beyond this the Soviets seem to be very much concerned with the three problems which center on the notions of accident, surprise, and escalation. And the dangers attendant on these problems have been repeatedly emphasized by Soviet analysts.40 It is true, of course, that these positions, like many other positions in Soviet defense policy, are strongly influenced by Soviet force postures and weapons configurations; but this is neither startling nor indicative of any lack of genuineness of the concern expressed in these areas. And these are problem areas to which the notion of United Nations intervention during crises is likely to be particularly relevant. Perhaps one of the most significant differences between Soviet and American strategic thinking lies in the greater attention which the Soviets devote to the problems of waging war as contrasted with deterring war. As Garthoff has said, Soviet thinking operates on the guideline that ". . . while nuclear war is recognized as a cataclysmic prospect, this appreciation is not permitted to eclipse consideration of the means and methods of waging such a war should 89

Robert Osgood, "Stabilizing the Military Environment," in Hekhuis, McCIintock, and Burns, op.cit., p. 95. 40 For a particularly strong statement consult Sokolovsky, op.cit., especially pp. 180-183.

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it occur." The Soviets, for example, have a relatively detailed set of doctrines concerning non-nuclear general war, and they pay a good deal of attention to the specific roles of all of the branches of the armed forces during largescale conventional and even nuclear wars. It is somewhat difficult to assess the effects of this orientation on attitudes toward third-party intervention, but it seems relevant to suggest that it may make the Soviets rather more receptive to possibilities dealing with intrawar limitations and war termination than most American writers and analysts. To the extent that the Soviets still retain a Clausewitzian view of the uses of war to further policy objectives (which they certainly do more than the Americans), the resultant instrumental perspective on warfare may very well tend to look on the notion of outside intervention both pragmatically and favorably in this hardheaded sense. Whether such an orientation tends to reduce interest in controlling crises in order to reduce the likelihood of war breaking out is difficult to say. But it is clear that in the present nuclear environment other very potent factors tend in general to strengthen Soviet interests in crisis control. Although the Soviets recognize the possibility of general nuclear war, they have always tended to show a strong desire to avoid the use of nuclear devices in all limited or local warfare situations. And Garthoff has suggested relatively recently that "the Soviet desire to avoid use of nuclear weapons in any limited wars remains undiminished."42 This position is clearly grounded strongly in self-interest calculations—the Soviets have always been considerably stronger in conventional capabilities than in nuclear capabilities relative to the West—but it has become very deeply embedded in Soviet thought, and it gives the Soviet Union a clear-cut interest in the regulation and control of many types of crisis sequence. 41

Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age, p. 255. «Ibid., p. 253.

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This last Soviet position leads directly into the twoedged problem posed by the Soviet attitude toward limited nuclear war, graduated deterrence, controlled response, and counterforce targeting doctrines. The Soviets have tended to deny the feasibility of all of these possibilities, categorically proclaiming that any resort to nuclear weapons must escalate inexorably to all-out, general war. But several points concerning this position should be mentioned. The position has clearly been based on an analysis of Soviet forces and capabilities and on a correct appreciation of the fact that these concepts have been largely generated by American attempts to escape the surrender-versus-massiveretaliation bind. There are now many indications that this position is becoming diluted as Soviet nuclear capabilities increase.43 The Sokolovsky book, for example, is less harsh than previous Soviet policy statements on this question.44 And it is very significant that the second edition of this book contains substantial modifications of this position. Speaking of this second edition, Philip Windsor has stated that: It is particularly interesting on the question of limited war. The book is strongly sceptical about the possibility of limiting a conflict in which the two great powers or their allies were engaged: the introduction of nuclear weapons into any such conflict would make escalation to general war "very difficult" to prevent. Nevertheless, the book no longer asserts the inevitability of escalation into an all-out general war.45 43

See Thomas W. Wolfe, "Shifts in Soviet Strategic Thought," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 42, No. 3 (April 1964), pp. 480, 481, and "Marshal Macnamarsky's Options," The Economist, 27 November 1965, pp. 928-929. 44 Sokolovsky, op.cit., chap. 4. 45 Philip Windsor, "Military Strategy" (review of Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky, 2nd ed.), Survival, Vol. 6, No. 2 (March-April 1964), p. 94.

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And finally, it is highly likely that the Soviet tendency to reject limited war in doctrinal statements would not stop the Soviet Union from making every attempt to limit warfare if it occurs. Garthoff states: . . . there are cogent reasons to support the conclusion that the Soviets might, in fact, agree to limitation to tactical use of nuclear weapons. . . . The present Soviet rejection of the idea of the distinction between tactical and strategic use of nuclear weapons does not preclude its recognition of such a distinction in war, were the United States to introduce it.48 This whole set of considerations seems to cut two ways, primarily because Soviet thinking seems to be on the horns of a dilemma in this area and consequently in a rather fluid and ambiguous state. To the extent that the Soviets really believe in the inevitability of escalation following any first use of nuclear weapons—and there are significant indications of genuine Soviet fears of this sort—they should be rather receptive to the notion of outside intervention aimed at crisis control or, in other words, the reduction of the likelihood of war breaking out during severe "nuclear" crises. On the other hand, to the extent that these views are changing, it would seem probable that the possibilities of intrawar limitations and war termination will begin to interest the Soviets more as time passes. And this latter point dovetails with the interests that seem likely to be engendered by the Soviet concern with problems of war-fighting. Thus, Soviet attitudes and doctrines do not seem to preclude possible interest in outside intervention during future crises. There are, of course, obstacles; in addition to Soviet secrecy and "closedness," and Soviet suspicions concerning the impartiality and good faith of any outside party, there is the Soviet ideological insistence on the prospect of 46

Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age, pp. 110-111.

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inevitable military victory in any future war and on maintaining a sharp distinction between friends and enemies. But recognition of the problems and dangers of modern warfare is becoming explicit in the Soviet Union. And both Soviet pragmatism and the Soviet tendency to take an instrumental view of warfare should provide strong support at a minimum for considering the usefulness of outside intervention in at least some types of crisis situation. A number of points concerning American doctrines and attitudes are also worth emphasizing in the context of this analysis of the problem of acceptability. In general, it seems safe to say that the positions of the United States tend to pose fewer obstacles to the acceptance of United Nations intervention during crises than Soviet attitudes and doctrines. And there are some hardheaded reasons for this. Above all, the United States is more strongly committed to the international status quo than the Soviet Union and therefore inevitably tends to take a dimmer view of violent change under most circumstances. This produces a kind of built-in receptivity to ideas and concepts aimed at reducing the likelihood of large-scale war and controlling the damage caused by any war which does occur. This general orientation is strongly reinforced by the fact that the United States is the world's leading "have" nation. And there is no doubt both that the American people are aware of the dangers of losing their enormous material advantages and that the United States tends to exhibit rather prudential and conservative behavior in the international arena, at least partly as a consequence of its basically "satisfied" situation. In addition, the evidence suggests that the concept of possible destruction has had a substantial psychological impact in the United States and in the West in general. One possible response to this is to strike out preventively in the hopes of exorcising the danger as one would a malignancy. But now that this notion has become clearly unfeasible and discredited as a possible policy, a common re1 86

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sponse to the dangers in question is to act prudentially and conservatively. And this tends to create favorable attitudes toward both comprehensive disarmament and arms control in the sense discussed above. This general orientation, coupled with the increasing sophistication of American strategic analysis, has led to two separate sets of results essentially favorable toward the notion of outside intervention during severe crises. On the one hand, there is an increasing appreciation of the problems and potential danger areas involved in a mutual deterrence situation based on extremely sophisticated and complex strategic weapons systems and tied to a technological (qualitative) arms race. In this context, the problems of accidental warfare, miscalculated warfare, escalation, and, generally, the unintended use of large-scale force are receiving increasing attention. And the United States is placing increasing emphasis on strategic stability and the development of various safety measures. Harland Moulton, for example, has recently suggested that "One of the most important changes made by Secretary McNamara in the nation's general war strategy was to predicate all planning on the basis of a second-strike posture."47 In general, such developments should have the effect of making the United States profoundly interested in any prospects for crisis control at the strategic level as well as in limiting and especially terminating war before the damage level has become exorbitantly high. On the other hand, the United States has become interested, in recent years, in a whole spectrum of types of warfare, lying between the poles of local, conventional hostilities and all-out general war. American thinking has moved, sometimes rather aggressively, into many of the areas which the Soviets have tended to label as impossible and 47

Harland B. Moulton, "The McNamara General War Strategy," Orbis, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Summer 1964), p. 253.

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unfeasible. This is, of course, basically understandable. The United States has elaborated and pushed these doctrines as part of the effort to escape the surrender-versusmassive-retaliation bind, and in direct proportion to the declining credibility of massive retaliation in the contemporary world. The Soviets, however, have lacked the resources to compete in many of these areas and have been unhappy to contemplate the possibility of an increasingly credible American deterrent in less than all-out situations, based on such doctrines as those of limited war, graduated deterrence, controlled response, and limited strategic strikes. In any case, this trend in American thinking has tended to deemphasize the somewhat apocalyptic view of warfare characteristic of earlier years and to support a rather more instrumental view of the use of force. While the awareness of the dangers of a strategic mutual deterrence system tends to arouse interest in any prospects of crisis control, the developments outlined in this paragraph tend to increase interest in the various possibilities for intrawar limitation, and to some extent in the notion of a bargained termination rather than an ending of wars through exhaustion. Thus there are some very hardheaded reasons why the United States should be interested in the notion of outside intervention during "nuclear" crises, and it appears that problems of acceptability here are less significant than in the case of the Soviet Union. But a number of significant attitudes and doctrinal positions in the United States at present tend to have a dampening effect on the prospects of American acceptance of outside intervention during future crises. These factors should at least be mentioned here. First, although it is difficult to pin down or measure, the American decision-making system tends to be influenced by a somewhat emotional outlook on communism which conceptualizes problems in terms of good and evil and is often more than skeptical of the idea of "military collabo188

UN INTERVENTION IN SOVIET-AMERICAN CRISES

ration with potential enemies."48 Second, there is a significant amount of support in the United States for one form or another of the strategy favoring the attempt to acquire a credible first-strike capability, a strategy which tends to deemphasize the dangers of strategic weapons systems, mutual-deterrence relationships, and technological arms races. Third, there is some tendency to overestimate the intentions and capabilities of opponents and consequently to over-respond to their actions. This tendency is likely to reduce the prospects for stabilizing measures both before and during hostilities. Fourth, the United States has tendencies to place its hopes in "one-weapon" doctrines in the interests of savings in money and materiel. But this can often be done only at some cost in terms of safety, flexibility, and ability to control or regulate responses during crises or actual hostilities. Finally, the United States has sometimes indulged in procurement programs that have produced rather provocative military hardware, which has not been obviously necessary to any defensive strategy. And this has tended to have an adverse effect on attitudes toward the control and regulation of crises on both sides of the cold war. None of these factors seems sufficiently significant either at present or in the foreseeable future to offset the general point made above to the effect that the United States is likely to react favorably to many types of outside intervention during future crises. But they are significant enough to be considered seriously in analyzing the general problem of acceptability. Turning to the question of attitudes toward the United Nations, it seems safe to say that the United States has a rather favorable underlying attitude toward United Nations actions which is in noticeable contrast to the typical initial Soviet suspicion or hostility toward many United Nations 48 Schelling, "Reciprocal Measures for Arms Stabilization," op.cit., p. 894.

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operations. And this strongly positive orientation has held under both Republican and Democratic administrations in recent years. In fact, the criticism is sometimes made that the United States tends to utilize the Organization too much as a "cornerstone" of its policy and actually to abdicate some of its leadership in foreign policy by trying to shift the burden onto the United Nations.49 This contrast between American and Soviet orientations should not be ascribed to moral or ideational differences so much as to differences in calculations of national interest and ad hoc historical circumstances and developments affecting the United Nations. The United States seems to have felt an almost proprietary interest in the Organization due to its role in the founding of the United Nations. And the United States for a long time enjoyed a majority position in the Organization. Even today it is clearly the most influential single member. Moreover, the generally stabilizing programs and impact of the United Nations, as well as its influence in favor of peaceful and planned change—or at least not very violent change—have tended to fit in well with the basic interests of the United States. It is not, surprising, therefore, that the United States has developed a rather more favorable basic outlook toward the United Nations than has the Soviet Union. It should not, however, be assumed that this orientation is ironclad and unshakable. The changing nature of the Organization is generating some frictions with important United States interests, and there is a growing amount of criticism and skepticism directed toward the United Nations in American policy-making circles.50 Among the factors which can be associated with these developments are: 1) the 49

For an elaboration of this criticism see Raymond A. Moore, Jr. (ed.), The United Nations Reconsidered (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1963), "Introduction." 50 The essays included in Moore, op.cit., provide a good sampling of the relevant criticism.

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influx of new members into the Organization and the consequent fear of being outvoted or overwhelmed by "irresponsible" powers (often defined as those that flout American interests); 2) a feeling that many United Nations actions are inefficacious and rather peripheral; 3) a growing insistence that the American financial burden associated with the United Nations is either too great or disproportionate compared to the contributions of other members; and 4) a general fear of loss of control in the United Nations and a consequent fear that the Organization will act in various ways that are harmful to American interests. Some of the opposition to the United Nations seems more emotional than realistic and there are contradictions in much of the criticism, but these developments should not be simply discounted as insignificant. When all this is said, nevertheless, it remains true that the United States continues to manifest a rather favorable general orientation toward the United Nations and to play an influential supporting role in pushing many United Nations operations. In the most relevant area of peacekeeping operations, the United States has a record of support and crucial backing in many instances. Significantly, American support has remained strong even as international peacekeeping operations have shifted from the Uniting for Peace context to the Hammarskjold framework. In the latter context, the United States has played a crucial role, even though it has been barred from the contribution of force contingents. And it is worth noting that the United States has even shown an interest in ideas for United Nations activities that bear some resemblance to concepts discussed in subsequent chapters. For example, President Eisenhower, in an address to the General Assembly on 22 September 1960 stated: Today the danger of war by miscalculation could be reduced in times of crises, by the intervention, when 191

THE INTERMEDIARIES

requested by any nation seeking to prove its own peaceful intention, of an appropriate United Nations surveillance body.51 It has been noted that some of these favorable attitudes may change as time passes, since they are primarily geared to calculations of American national interests. But it seems likely that the immediate future will not see any drastic revisions in this favorable orientation. As might be expected, American attitudes toward international executive activities tend to stem from and therefore to follow attitudes toward the United Nations as a whole. Here again, strong national-interest considerations tend to generate American support for executive actions. And this support is also subject to the qualifications discussed above concerning the changeability of support based on nationalinterest calculations and the various frictions developing between United States interests and United Nations operations. For the immediate future, however, strong American support for the United Nations executive seems assured. The United States has recently been in the forefront in supporting executive capacities. It led the fight in 1961 which defeated the troika proposals and resulted in the election of Thant, and it has since been a rather consistent supporter of Thant. The closeness of the working relations between Thant and the United States in such matters as the Congo and the West Irian settlement is in many ways remarkable. Nor is there any indication that this American orientation is changing. Harlan Cleveland (then Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs), in listing American aims at the United Nations, has gone so far as to declare it to be a major American aim "2. To press for the 51 Dwight D. Eisenhower, speech in the General Assembly of the United Nations, 22 September 1960, in New York Times, 23 September 1960, p. 14.

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further strengthening of the executive capacities of the United Nations."52 In summary, it is relevant to note that the United States has supported the United Nations strongly, not so much out of any commitment to internationalism or supranationalism in itself, but out of essentially realistic national interest calculations. But this does not alter the fact that the American orientation toward and perspective on the Organization have been and remain very favorable. And there is little doubt that this set of attitudes has a certain real effect in predisposing the United States favorably toward United Nations operations in many contexts. While attitudes and doctrines are important in the context of the problem of acceptability, a number of existential conditions, either already present or developing in the relationships between the Soviet Union and the United States, have an important bearing on this matter. In this connection, several factors tend to reduce the scope and intensity of the problem of acceptability and deserve to be emphasized. Above all, it cannot be stressed enough that the types of crisis under consideration would be far more intense and severe than the ordinary crises which have periodically punctuated Soviet-American relations during most of the period of the cold war. Some notion of this difference can be obtained, for example, by realizing that the Cuban crisis of the fall of 1962 is, in terms of intensity, on the lower part of the scale of crises with which this portion of the study is concerned. Since it is often nearly impossible to make the very great operational significance of this point completely clear, it may be worth while to dwell on it at some length here. In this context, consider the concept of an "escalation ladder," which many analysts have found useful in thinking about international crises in the nuclear age. 52

Harlan Cleveland, "The Road Around Stalemate," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 40, No. 1 (October 1961), p. 36.

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THE INTERMEDIARIES

An "escalation ladder" is a linear arrangement of roughly increasing levels of intensity of crises. Such a ladder exhibits a progression of steps in what amounts to, we emphasize again, roughly speaking, an ascending order of intensity through which a given crisis may go. Any particular ladder is intended as an archetype which can serve as a pattern and context for the study of a certain class of international crises. Specific crises in this class do not necessarily follow any step-by-step progression and they may never escalate very far, but the escalation ladder provides a useful framework for the systematic study of the possibilities—both realized and unrealized. The order of the rungs is not sacred; many people would interchange some. There is also no implication that one must go inexorably up the ladder. One could go down as well as up, or skip steps. In short the ladder is intended only to describe a class of situations, and is useful only for the situations which are appropriate.53 Since this is both an important and a potentially confusing concept, a sample escalation ladder is included at this point. The postwar period has not yet witnessed a crisis that has escalated above rung twelve on this escalation ladder, but there are many types of far more intense crisis that could occur in a nuclear environment and that cannot be discounted as important possibilities. The Korean conflict, the Suez crisis of 1956, and the Cuban crisis of 1962 are perhaps the most intense crises experienced in the cold war to date, and it is clear that these crises belong in the socalled "traditional" and "intense" categories of the escalation ladder on opposite page.54 The Korean situation probably reached the highest level at rung twelve. The Suez 53

Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener (eds.), Crises and Arms Control (Hudson Institute, HI-180-RR, 9 October 1962), p. 84. 54 This escalation ladder appears in Herman Kahn, On Escalation (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 39.

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An Escalation Ladder A Generalized (or Abstract) Scenario

CIVILIAN CENTRAL WARS

44. 43. 42. 41. 40. 39.

AFTERMATHS Spasm or Insensate War Some Other Kinds of Controlled General War Civilian Devastation Attack Augmented Disarming Attack Countervalue Salvo Slow-Motion Countercity War

MILITARY CENTRAL WARS

38. 37. 36. 35. 34. 33. 32.

(CITY TARGETING THRESHOLD) Unmodified Counterforce Attack Counterforce-with-Avoidance Attack Constrained Disarming Attack Constrained Force-Reduction Salvo Slow-Motion Counterforce War Slow-Motion Counter-"Property" War Formal Declaration of "General" War

EXEMPLARY CENTRAL ATTACKS

31. 30. 29. 28. 27. 26.

(CENTRAL WAR THRESHOLD) Reciprocal Reprisals Complete Evacuation (Approximately 95 per cent) Exemplary Attacks on Population Exemplary Attacks Against Property Exemplary Attack on Military Demonstration Attack on Zone of Interior

BIZARRE CRISES

INTENSE CRISES

TRADITIONAL CRISES

SUBCRISIS MANEUVERING

(CENTRAL SANCTUARY THRESHOLD) 25. Evacuation (Approximately 70 per cent) 24. Unusual, Provocative, and Significant Countermeasures 23. Local Nuclear War—Military 22. Declaration of Limited Nuclear War 21. Local Nuclear War—Exemplary 20. 19. 18. 17. 16. 15. 14. 13. 12. 11. 10.

(NO NUCLEAR USE THRESHOLD) "Peaceful" World-Wide Embargo or Blockade "Justifiable" Counterforce Attack Spectacular Show or Demonstration of Force Limited Evacuation (Approximately 20 per cent) Nuclear "Ultimatums" Barely Nuclear War Declaration of Limited Conventional War Large Compound Escalation Large Conventional War (or Actions) Super-Ready Status Provocative Breaking Off of Diplomatic Relations

(NUCLEAR WAR IS UNTHINKABLE THRESHOLD) 9. Dramatic Military Confrontations 8. Harassing Acts of Violence 7. "Legal" Harassment—Retortions 6. Significant Mobilization 5. Show of Force 4. Hardening of Positions—Confrontation of Wills (DON'T ROCK THE BOAT THRESHOLD) 3. Solemn and Formal Declarations 2. Political, Economic, and Diplomatic Gestures 1. Ostensible Crisis DISAGREEMENT—COLD WAR

THE INTERMEDIARIES

case reached a similar level for Britain, France, Israel, and Egypt but certainly did not reach this level for the two superpowers. And the Cuban crisis, after moving steadily through rungs four through nine, can probably be said to have reached its peak at rung eleven. Crises at higher levels, and particularly at very high levels, would, however, be qualitatively different in many respects from situations generally cited as examples of international crises. Above all, radically different phenomena would become relevant. Among such phenomena would be the use of nuclear weapons, destructive attacks on the zones of interior of the two superpowers, and the evacuation of major urban complexes. As a result, it is probably safe to say that a number of the important concepts frequently used in discussing Soviet-American relations would no longer be relevant or applicable to crises when they reached high levels of escalation. For these reasons alone it seems inappropriate to suggest that the concepts of third-party intervention will be undermined in every case by problems of acceptability, if not by other factors. Such an argument is virtually always based on concepts and patterns of thought far more relevant to everyday cold-war situations than to situations of very severe crisis. In point of fact, there are some indications that often-quoted problems of acceptability might tend to disappear or diminish significantly in cases of extreme crisis and that, on the contrary, the two superpowers might get into situations in which both would be attempting desperately to overcome various types of dilemma of a war or near-war situation. Schelling, for example, has suggested that . . . the very gravity of the situation, the heroic nature of the accommodations required, the unprecedented seriousness of the moment, might make certain courses of action feasible that ordinarily would not seem to be, by 196

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making leaders on both sides aware of the demands of the situation, of the risks of not trying as well as in trying, and of the enemy's seriousness in seeking a conservative outcome.55 In the light of these possibilities, he then goes on to emphasize the importance of preparing "to take advantage of motives and political circumstances as they might be in a sudden crisis, rather than as they are during the normal ups and downs of the cold war."56 At the same time, it is no doubt true that some developments in severe crisis situations might tend to aggravate the problems of acceptability. Increasing rigidities, thorough commitments, the emotional impact of war or near-war conditions, and so forth, might lead to results of this kind. It certainly will not do to dismiss these possibilities, but it would be equally foolish to fail to recognize the differences between intense crises and most of those that have occurred to date and, therefore, to deal with objections concerning acceptability in terms that are not really applicable to the situations in question. A second significant set of points in this discussion relates 55

Thomas C. Schelling, "Arms Control: Proposal for a Special Surveillance Force," World Politics, Vol. 13, No. 1 (October 1960), p. 10. Similar points have been made very well by Y. Tandon in "The Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes," International Relations, Vol. 2, No. 9 (April 1964), pp. 555-587. He suggests: The situation, however, is different when viewed in the light of an international crisis . . . faced with an emergency situation, one is prepared to agree to emergency measures to help avert the crisis, provided, of course, that the measures taken deal only with that specific crisis. . . . In the heat of an international crisis, particularly if there is a danger that the crisis may escalate into a major war, the UN is better able to exploit the willingness of states to agree to novel devices and procedures which would help to restore the situation (pp. 565, 568). 56 Schelling, "Arms Control," p. 1.

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to the relationships of the United States and the Soviet Union to the international system and to the elements of incipient detente in the realm of military affairs that are growing between them.57 It has already been mentioned that the structural positions of the two powers vis-a-vis the international system as a whole are becoming increasingly similar, that both are beginning to manifest the similar interests of "have" powers as opposed to "have not" states, and that these shifts are having the effect of moving the two superpowers in the direction of conservatism and common or overlapping interests in maintaining their relative supremacy in the international arena.58 In addition, the various alliance problems which the processes of polycentrism are generating for both of the superpowers have a tendency to accentuate common political interests between the Soviet Union and the United States and to make these states increasingly aware of problems in which they have a joint interest. This is particularly true in the case of Chinese developments. This development in the realm of political interests does not alter the fact that both sides remain trapped by their military technology and subject to the various problems and dilemmas discussed earlier. But it does tend to affect their perspectives and attitudes in ways that might well make them more amenable to the notion of outside intervention during severe crises. As a result of these dynamic processes and of the increasing awareness of the military problems and dangers discussed earlier, the Soviet Union and the United States appear to be moving into a more limited and restricted adversary relationship, in which the rules of the games are be57

Consult, in general, on this point Arnold Wolfers (ed.), Changing East-West Relations and the Unity of the West (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1964). 58 On the validity of including the Soviet Union in this category see Roberto Ducci, "The World Order in the Sixties," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 42, No. 3 (April 1964), especially p. 383.

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coming more extensive and demanding than they have been in the past. Particularly in the potentially dangerous military area, common expectations about acceptable behavior and observable limitations are becoming accepted. Henry Pachter has recently underlined this trend in the statement: The big powers, therefore, consider each other neither as mortal enemies nor as partners, but rather as rivals contending with each other under certain rules of a game. It is true that the game may be very serious and that it may cost our lives if one of the players violates the rules. Moreover, these rules once included war, the game of kings; today they must exclude war; and they are therefore stricter.59 These changes do not remove from the realm of possibilities a variety of sequences through which Soviet-American wars could break out. Nor do they necessarily guarantee that intervention in future "nuclear" crises will be accepted by the superpowers. Chapter Six outlines a number of ways in which wars between the two powers could break out and suggests that these sequences are significant possibilities. But it would seem that the changes and trends described above, both in objective circumstances and in subjective awareness, are even now exercising a substantial influence toward smoothing out the problems of acceptability which have been raised. Finally, it is worth noting that there is an increasing tendency in both the Soviet Union and the United States to organize force postures on a second-strike basis and to deemphasize plans or projects aimed at achieving strategic superiority and acquiring credible first-strike capabilities in particular.60 This reflects both a greater interest on both sides in strategic stability and a judgment that strategic 59

Henry Pachter, Collision Course (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 136. 60 On this point consult, inter alia, Moulton, op.cit., pp. 251, 253.

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superiority would probably be virtually impossible to at­ tain in the contemporary world. This trend should by no means be taken as sufficient to allow us to stop worrying about severe crises and to assume that the possibilities of violent exchanges between the two superpowers are rapidly being undermined. Unfortunately, this is the type of factor which is all too often made the basis of wholly unwarranted wishful thinking. But this concrete tendency (which can be measured on the basis of procurement patterns and force postures) does indicate both that awareness of the dangers and instabilities of mutual deterrence is rising and that per­ spectives are changing in directions favorable to the ideas of controlling and regulating the dangers of war and the destructiveness of any hostilities that do break out. Significantly, the Soviet Union especially appears now to be gearing its development and procurement programs to­ ward the notion of finite deterrence at the strategic level and therefore toward guaranteeing second-strike capabilities rather than attempting to acquire credible first-strike capa­ bilities. A. L. Burns states that "In view of the arms race's course in 1961-1964 . . . it would appear that the U.S.S.R. has tacitly accepted a long-term inferiority in potential β1 for defense production. . . ." And in respect to the make­ up and organization of Soviet forces Mackintosh states that ". . . basically, the Soviet forces are organized for re­ taliation, and there is no evidence of any intention to 62 change this outlook in the foreseeable future." Thus the evidence now appears to suggest that the Soviet Union is showing great interest—perhaps even more than the United States—in the attainment of stability at the strategic level and in avoiding the dangers of a nuclear en61

Burns, op.cit., p. 122. Malcolm Mackintosh, "Soviet Strategic Postures," Survival, Vol. 4, No. 3 (May-June 1962), p. 119. 62

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UN INTERVENTION IN SOVIET-AMERICAN CRISES

vironment.63 That is, the power whose attitudes toward United Nations intervention during crises have been analyzed as being particularly suspicious and skeptical has now begun to show substantial interest in the dangers and instabilities of mutual deterrence. This development is not conclusive on any point but it does suggest that attitudes and perspectives are beginning to change in directions that make the problems of acceptability more tractable. Several additional factors that have a rather general bearing on the problems of acceptability remain to be considered. To begin with, it is worth emphasizing that many of the possible roles for the United Nations, which will be considered in detail in subsequent chapters, would probably not require very long or extensive build-up programs or preparations in order to create capabilities sufficient to carry them out successfully in the future. It is of the greatest importance to keep in mind the fact that the roles under consideration do not call for significant structural changes in the United Nations or far-reaching or expensive preparatory programs that would require detailed authorizations from the policy-making organs. It is, of course, hardly necessary to add that the various programs of a preparatory nature that could be undertaken vary greatly in terms of these considerations. It is clear that objections relating to costs in time or money would be relevant in considering some specific recommendations, given the present state of the Organization. But many of the proposals discussed in Chapters Seven and Eight concerning the acquisition of knowledge, skill, and general intellectual resources, the setting up of special communications facilities, the acclimatization of officials to thinking in relevant terms, and the performance of contingency calculations and preliminary planning operations would very likely not 63 On American awareness of this Soviet orientation see Moulton, op.cit., p. 251.

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THE INTERMEDIARIES

create serious problems in terms of these costs. And it is by no means irrelevant to suggest that, as time passes, some of the more extensive possibilities and recommendations may come more and more to the fore. A few words should perhaps be added at this point about the time factor in regard to the general concept of intervention in "nuclear" crises as well as in regard to the problems of acceptability. It has often been noted that the tendency for available time to telescope and the tendency for decision processes to speed up substantially are characteristic of the nuclear age, and it has sometimes been suggested that any sequence leading to the outbreak of a major war would occur so rapidly that there would not be time to take ameliorative actions. This, however, is by no means an absolute factor or an acceptable generalization. Crises still build up over a period of time, and there are almost always at least some indications that they are approaching. A war beginning with a strike like a bolt out of the blue is now considered extremely unlikely. Moreover, the nature of the time problem is changing, to some extent at least, with the acceptance of a number of recent developments that have had the effect of slowing down sequences of events that might lead to war. This is true of such developments as the movement toward invulnerable retaliatory systems, the direct telecommunications link between Moscow and Washington, and many unilaterally initiated safety measures. But perhaps the most important point to be made here is that many of the specific crisis sequences that will be discussed in some detail in Chapter Six have no intrinsic characteristics that would generate impossible time pressures. This is particularly true of certain situations involving intrawar limitations and problems of termination and restoration, but it is also true in some cases where the principal objective would be to ensure that war does not break out in a period of drastically heightened tension. The details of various situations will be discussed 202

UN INTERVENTION IN SOVIET-AMERICAN CRISES

in Chapter Six, but it can be said here that third-party intervention cannot simply be brushed aside on the ground that the telescoping of time makes such activities impossible as well as practically unacceptable. Finally, it is extremely important to recognize that the various types of situations and sequences under consideration in this study exhibit marked differences and cannot be handled as a single aggregate for purposes of dealing definitively with the problems of acceptability. Some general comments have been made about the problems of acceptability which, it is believed, are useful, but when it comes to concrete analysis of the acceptability of a particular type of third-party intervention in a given situation, it will be impossible to say anything very conclusive until the specific type of situation is treated individually on its own merits. It turns out, of course, that the problems and prospects of acceptability are not common to all cases and that different problems must be taken into account in each of the types of situation in which third-party intervention might become relevant at some future time. If nothing else, the point developed here suggests that the present study will not stand or fall on some broad generalizations about the problems of acceptability but rather that certain parts of it may turn out to be more applicable and relevant than other parts.

203

CHAPTERSIX

A Roster of Superpower Crises1

A

specific crises cannot be predicted with any accuracy, it is possible to distinguish various classes and types of international crisis. In general, the prospects for programs of third-party intervention depend rather heavily on the principal characteristics of the type of crisis at hand. This chapter focuses on various aspects of this relationship. The questions, however, are complex, and it is difficult to make any conclusive statements about the feasibility of particular actions in future situations. The material presented below is, therefore, merely illustrative and exploratory, and it should be taken as suggestive or indicative of potential interventionary activities rather than as an authoritative statement of feasible programs. In order to probe the specific nature of the relationship between third-party intervention and types of crisis, a range of Soviet-American crises has been chosen for detailed analysis. More specifically, the focus is on more or less direct Soviet-American confrontations at rather high levels of intensity involving at least a threat of central war. This particular range of crises has been chosen for analysis because it forms a conceptually neat grouping which can be separated from the general category of crisis rather sharply —and can therefore be handled with some degree of clarity —and because the types of crisis involved seem ripe for analysis at the present time. It is commonly assumed that third parties can do little in cases of "bloc differences," but politico-military trends and developments in the interLTHOUGH

1 Though the material in this chapter is important, it is not essential to an understanding of the general argument developed in Part II. The reader interested only in the principal thesis of the book may therefore find it desirable to skip or skim the chapter.

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national system now seem to be opening up real possibilities in this area. The illustrative nature of this material should, however, be kept clearly in mind. The general theory of third-party intervention in international crises is applicable to a number of additional ranges of crises. This chapter includes a series of short scenarios as an aid in suggesting the realistic quality of the kinds of situation under discussion. A scenario is a hypothetical description of plausible future events designed to portray problems in a form that is sufficiently concrete and realistic to be treated seriously. A discussion of the essential nature of the type of crisis under consideration, together with some remarks on the principal dangers involved, follows the exposition of each scenario. And finally, with the aid of the concrete material from the scenarios, the analysis of each type of crisis situation concludes with some illustrative points concerning programs of intervention a third party might be able to implement successfully. The discussion draws primarily on United Nations material in setting forth potential third-party roles in the Soviet-American confrontations under analysis. And programs involving executive activities come in for particular, though not exclusive, emphasis in many of the specific cases. These suggestions by no means exhaust the activities that ingenious United Nations planners might set in motion under the impetus of specific crises, but they are indicative of the possibilities. The detailed material in this chapter breaks down into the following sections: crisis control, intrawar limitations, and restoration. It is of great importance to analyze possible roles a third party may play in facilitating the termination of crises before hostilities break out. But analysis cannot stop there, since third parties might play equally, if not more, important roles subsequent to the outbreak of hostilities—either by limiting their scope or by aiding the participants to restore nonviolent relationships. 205

THE INTERMEDIAMES PREVENTION

Before we move into the main body of the chapter, a few words are in order on the notion of prevention. This notion encompasses the possibility that various parties could take steps, in noncrisis periods, to decrease the probability that sequences which could lead to warfare will, in fact, occur. Here the environment is one of "normal" cold-war levels of tension rather than the substantially heightened tension of major crises. It is clear that both Soviet and American leaders are now at least minimally aware of their strong common interests in avoiding mutual destruction, and various third parties might be able to capitalize on this awareness in ways that would tend to reduce the risks of open warfare breaking out. Although these possibilities of prevention lie outside the main focus of this study, a few brief comments on them at this point will serve as a kind of background for possibilities of intervention when severe crises dramatically heighten tensions. In this context, it is possible to differentiate between two types of preventive activities the United Nations might undertake. On one side, there are the long-term, ongoing, noncrisis-related measures which would be useful in making sure that serious crises never get started in the first place. A number of commonly discussed measures in this general area might be influenced to some extent at least by United Nations intervention. First, there are the usual political measures. These measures would include various kinds of political accommodation between the two superpowers, as well as efforts to encourage the development of a more general rapprochement. Second, the implementation of a complex set of arms-control arrangements may, in the future, present situations in which United Nations intervention could be very valuable. Although such efforts have been inapplicable in the past, there are some indications that this role may not be entirely devoid of content in the 206

A ROSTER OF SUPERPOWER CRISES

future. Third, efforts could be made to aid in the creation of important mutual expectations between the United States and the Soviet Union. It might, for example, be possible to create consensus on the notion that certain classes of crisis simply should not be taken as "nuclear" crises in which it is "legitimate" to consider the use of nuclear weapons in order to exercise one's influence.2 Fourth, programs designed to establish the actual undistorted positions of the two sides on various military and strategic issues and to see that these positions are communicated to relevant decision-makers might be of great value in preventing the development of severe crises.3 A second range of preventive activities includes the establishment of systems (beforehand) that could go into operation whenever interbloc tensions rise significantly above "normal" cold-war levels and would tend to aid in preventing the outbreak of war. For example, mechanisms could be set up to facilitate exchange of information on alert statuses and on the coordination of relaxation measures that would be fully prepared for immediate operation in the event that a major crisis occurs. Or, again, third parties might play an effective role in creating (beforehand) common expectations about the rules of the game which should be respected during major crises or limited wars. Such rules might regulate (in part at least) responses to various kinds of provocation and set up barriers to uncontrolled escalation which could lead very rapidly to undesired nuclear warfare. 2

It might, for example, be tacitly agreed that nuclear threats should not be employed in crises of the order of magnitude of the Suez crisis of 1956, or it might be agreed that nuclear weapons will only be introduced into situations in which a salient threshold of intensity or "firebreak" has been passed. 3 For comments on the importance of Soviet perceptions, the main point of which is also applicable to American perceptions, see Urie Bronfenbrenner, "Allowing for Soviet Perceptions," in Roger Fisher (ed.), International Conflict and Behavioral Science (New York: Basic Books, 1964), pp. 161-178.

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There are several ways in which inadvertent, uncalculated, and undesired warfare could break out between the United States and the Soviet Union. These different paths to war include accidental war, miscalculated war, uncontrolled escalation, and catalytic war. Both superpowers would like very much to avoid large-scale wars which might arise in any of these ways, and there is an area of strong cooperative interest in reducing the likelihood of war breaking out through any of these channels. But the existence of these cooperative interests does not necessarily mean that the superpowers can or will do much to allay the dangers involved. Here the dilemmas of the situation come into focus. It is quite probable that neither of the two superpowers can take the initiative in allaying many of these dangers without seriously weakening its bargaining position vis-a-vis its opponent or violating important commitments to its own citizens or allies. Then, too, the very nature of contemporary military technology creates a basis for some of these dangers which cannot be easily removed. Moreover, during periods of drastically heightened tensions between the two blocs of the order of the Cuban crisis or a localized conventional war, the dangers of the outbreak of nuclear war through the processes of "expansion" or "explosion" will be seriously increased.4 In addition, various "safety" measures that would almost certainly be taken by both sides during such a crisis would have the side effect of increasing the likelihood of an undesired nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union breaking out in any of several different ways. And the psychological disturbances and pressures of crisis conditions would also tend to increase these dangers. In such cases, however, it is possible that an intervening organ or person(s) could aid 4

See Morton H. Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age (New York: John Wiley, 1963), chap. 1.

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significantly in breaking up these impasses and bringing to fruition the common interests of the two blocs in preventing the development of any one of the sequences under consideration here. Crisis control in this sense refers to measures undertaken during serious crises to reduce the chances of sequences which could lead to undesired warfare of major proportions getting out of control. The materials that follow illustrate these problems and considerations more concretely. A. Accidental and Inadvertent War Scenario 1. During a conventional and localized war in Europe, both sides take steps to increase the alert status of their strategic forces. The U.S. increases the readiness of its missiles in Europe, decides to conduct a number of tests for its B-52 and B-58 bomber wings involving "fail-safe" exercises, and alerts its early-warning network to the danger that enemy attack may now be imminent. The S.U. takes steps to give its theater commander in Europe more discretion in the use of nuclear weapons, orders its warning systems to send in an alarm over any suspicious objects, and decides to undertake a speeded-up program designed to make its IRBMs more "war capable." As the war proceeds, however, both sides become fearful that the tacit ban on nuclear weapons will sooner or later be violated. Various influential groups on each side become impressed with the notion that it would be desirable to strike first in the event that a nuclear war should break out at any point. They therefore put pressure on the political leaders of the U.S. and S.U. to take steps to guarantee that their country will never be struck by the first blow of a nuclear war. The American groups, at this point, are thinking in terms of a counterforce disarming attack on the S.U. while the Russians are considering a substantial attack on Europe. The resistance to this pressure is great in both countries, but the emotional fervor generated by the war in Europe, which has 209

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caused great popular concern and excitement, forces the leaders on both sides to take some steps to satisfy the demands for nuclear "preparedness." Additional measures are taken on both sides to raise alert statuses. Command and control centers are put on a "war-fighting" basis, bombdamage centers are activated, and information on civil defense measures is distributed by the governments. Meanwhile the war in Europe seesaws back and forth, favoring first one side and then the other, and there are occasions on which various military leaders have been on the verge of attempting to broaden the scope of the war in the hope of "out-committing" the enemy. Scenario 2. Skirmishing has broken out on a small scale between NATO and Warsaw Pact troops in Germany. At this point several American reconnaissance aircraft, flying at very high altitudes, are brought down by the highly developed Soviet antiaircraft batteries. The incidents, of course, raise a great furor which is capped by denunciatory statements made by the Soviet leaders in extremely harsh terms. The central Russian charge is that the U.S. is engaging in extensive espionage activities in order to acquire accurate information about Soviet missile deployment and emplacement construction. This, it is suggested, constitutes conclusive proof that the degenerate capitalists, conscious of their declining strength, have decided to risk all in a preventive strike against the S.U. before the West collapses from internal decay. The furor dies down in due course, but subsequent U.S. intelligence reports indicate that the S.U. has given considerable priority to the task of making its strategic systems more "war capable" and that it appears to be holding its forces on an abnormally high alert status. The full significance of these developments is not understood by the U.S., but the J.C.S., together with other top-ranking military officers, conclude that the Soviet actions will give the Russians an extraordinary opportunity to strike the U.S. 210

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preventively unless countermeasures are taken. This view is supported so strongly by the military that the President finally yields and orders a series of countermeasures to guarantee U.S. forces against any possibility of a surprise attack from the S.U., even though there is a good deal of political resistance to this decision. Alert levels are raised for all U.S. strategic systems and truncated versions of the normal multiple-control mechanisms are ordered into effect. It soon becomes known that the Russians are fully aware of the U.S. countermeasures, but it is not so easy to fathom the nature of the Soviet military response to these measures. The central problem arising in both of these cases concerns increases in the dangers of accidents and inadvertent actions, leading to large-scale war, that are likely to accompany a serious crisis. There is some controversy over the general dangers of accidental war,5 but there is not likely to be much dispute over the proposition that these dangers would increase significantly during crisis periods. In fact, a simple elaboration of the various kinds of accident that might lead to war serves to illustrate this point.6 Technical accidents are a possibility. For example, one or more missiles might be launched accidentally or even detonated in the possessor's own territory due to technical failures. False alarms combined with significant pressures to make decisions hastily might lead to warfare. Various kinds of human error could result in accidents that would cause the opponent to retaliate. In addition, there are the problems 5

For general discussions consult, on the American side, Thomas C. Schelling, "Meteors, Mischief, and War," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 16 (September I960), pp. 292-297, and, on the Soviet side, Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky (ed.), Military Strategy (Garthoff translation) (New York: Praeger, 1963), chap. 4. 6 For an interesting discussion of some of these questions see John T. McNaughton, "Arms Restraint in Military Decision," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 7 (September 1963), pp. 228-234.

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of unauthorized behavior. These problems include insanity, insubordination, and the ambiguities of decentralized command arrangements. All four of these types of danger are raised in both of the scenarios. Finally, the second scenario introduces the possibility that self-fulfilling prophecies concerning the motives or actions of the opponent might lead to actual warfare. Most of these dangers are guarded against quite heavily and rather effectively under normal conditions, but it seems clear that some measures that are standard practice in raising alert statuses and shifting to a "war-fighting" basis during crises almost inevitably increase the dangers of these possibilities. What could the United Nations do in the situations outlined in the accidental-war scenarios? Beginning with the first scenario, consider the following suggestions. In this situation, the chief dangers arise from the raising of alert statuses. The Secretary-General, for example, might therefore enunciate clearly his understanding of the increased dangers and of the common interests of the two sides in avoiding accidental warfare. Such an action might be followed by the initiation of a detailed plan suggesting that both sides place specific safeguards on their strategic systems and that the United Nations could supply small inspection teams on an ad hoc basis to verify adherence to these safeguards. Due to the nature of contemporary strategic systems and military installations, such teams might be more useful in terms of symbolic and political impact than in terms of direct efforts to check on military hardware. But the importance of such symbolic and political functions during a severe crisis should not be underestimated. In this context, it will be remembered that the alert statuses on both sides were raised out of fear of an enemy strike and that the political resistance to such moves was strong. Relieving both sides of the liabilities of having to initiate such a plan for safeguards might therefore allow both to accept it without a loss of bargaining strength. 212

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On the other hand, the United Nations might attempt to combine persuasion and enunciation (for example, extensive discussions with the principal American and Soviet delegates to the United Nations) with service as a communications go-between in such a way as to encourage the acceptance of a more or less tacit Soviet-American agreement calling for mutual retention of various safeguards and safety devices on strategic weapons systems. Under such circumstances the use of tacit and indirect procedures of negotiation might very well be far more acceptable to the two sides than open and public contacts. In effect, this idea suggests that a certain amount of speed and flexibility in the use of weapons be reciprocally sacrificed for additional safety. And in this case the reciprocity involved as well as the political pressures within the two countries to alleviate the dangers might be a powerful influence in disposing decision-makers toward a favorable outlook on United Nations intervention of this type. In the second accidental-war scenario, there seem to be real possibilities for a third-party communications role. Various measures might be undertaken to communicate persuasively to the Soviet Union the fact that the United States is not taking any steps to prepare a preventive strike. Such activities could range from the relaying of all relevant information to the Soviet Union in undistorted form to offers to send a small team of Secretariat personnel to the United States to verify the situation on the spot.7 The United States should welcome such initiatives because of the real danger of false preemption by the Soviets, and it seems clear that the Soviet Union would have a strong interest in not raising the dangers of nuclear war too far on the basis of a false alarm. Aware of the fact that the United States is not planning 7 This idea is in some ways similar to D. G. Brennan's concept of "hostile observers." But note that here the emphasis is on the use of impartial third-party personnel.

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a nuclear strike, the Secretary-General might also undertake a policy of enunciation in declaring his understanding in clear-cut terms that the situation has been following the mechanisms of a self-fulfilling prophecy. This initiative could be coupled with the exercise of vigorous persuasive efforts to explain and discuss the nature of self-fulfilling prophecies in general terms and to indicate the connections of the situation in question with this kind of impasse. If intervention at this level were successful, it might then be possible to move on to ideas such as those discussed above for the safeguarding of strategic systems. B. Miscalculated War Scenario 3. During the most serious crisis yet over the future of Berlin, conflicting intelligence reports reach the Soviet high command concerning the activities of the U.S. While some reports indicate that the U.S. is not planning any major military operation, others indicate signs of something unusual afoot in the Pentagon, and still others indicate that the possibility of exemplary nuclear strikes is being seriously considered in various high U.S. governmental circles. It is not known which of these reports is accurate. Nor is it known precisely how much information the U.S. has on Soviet strategic systems and their deployment. On the Berlin front itself tension grows until finally small-scale conventional incidents occur at the two ends of the corridors linking Berlin with West Germany. At this point a missile explodes inside Soviet territory (it is not immediately known whether it is an American missile or one of the Soviet's own) without doing much physical damage, and the drift of incoming intelligence reports indicates that the U.S. is planning a major move of some kind. The secrecy surrounding this operation cannot, however, be broken in order to find out its nature. At this juncture representatives of the Soviet general staff bring in a report discussing alternative types of U.S.firststrikes and indicating that some 214

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hypothecated types of U.S. strike might seriously undermine Soviet second-strike capabilities. Such U.S. successes would certainly be highly dependent on the level of U.S. intelligence about Soviet forces and force postures but this level, it is emphasized, is not known with any degree of certainty. Miscalculated war is not only among the most serious general possibilities of nuclear war;8 it is also likely to be the consequence of situations that are especially prone to increase in danger and likelihood during periods of severe crisis. The scenario included here contains elements that could generate two of the three types of miscalculated war that can be distinguished analytically. First, such a war could result from misperceptions of an opponent's actions coupled with pressures for rapid decisions. Second, a miscalculated war might be the result of incorrect evaluations of actually perceived activities of the opponent. Both of these types of miscalculation are apparently closely related to the time pressures and psychological predispositions toward reactions of suspicion and mistrust which tend to characterize crisis decision-making. A third kind of miscalculation could follow from overconfidence that an opponent will back down in a particular situation or that an opponent will not retaliate to a specific provocation. This type of miscalculation is relevant almost solely to crisis conditions, since in this type of situation the kind of testing behavior in question is likely to assume serious proportions. Thus all three sequences are likely to be more dangerous possibilities during crises, and the problems of preventing their occurrence are likely to become correspondingly more difficult under such conditions. In including the miscalculated war scenario, an assumption is made that the United States was not, in fact, 8

Herman Kahn, Thinking About the Unthinkable (New York: Horizon Press, 1962), pp. 44-50.

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planning a nuclear strike on the Soviet Union. If the United States were planning such a strike, the case would become a problem in calculated war rather than miscalculated war.9 But even if this were not known with any certainty, the United Nations might be able to undertake several useful activities. It might emphasize communications functions in attempts to make the United States fully and urgently aware of conclusive information documenting Soviet fears about possible American strikes that could undermine Soviet second-strike capabilities (remember the general staff report) and point out the resultant dangers of Soviet preemption. If this activity were successful, the United Nations might proceed to offer its services as a go-between or postman to facilitate the communication of American assurances that the United States had no intention of initiating a strategic strike against the Soviet Union, as well as United States efforts to show that its available intelligence would be insufficient to guarantee the success of such a strike. If the United States were not, in fact, planning a strike, it should be willing to cooperate extensively in the working out of a satisfactory proof of its innocence. The United Nations might also suggest setting up small impartial groups (probably as United Nations teams) to verify the innocent nature of various "suspicious" actions which might be misconstrued as preparations for a strategic strike. It is to be expected that any military operations within a country during such a sensitive crisis period as portrayed in the scenario are likely to generate some more or less suspicious activities from the point of view of the opponent. In this situation both sides might accept the idea of verification teams, since the dangers of miscalculated war might otherwise be so pervasive that they would feel restrained from undertaking any military mobilization or preparations out of fear of faulty enemy perception or evaluation 8

hoc tit.

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of such activities. An impartial United Nations initiative in elaborating and suggesting this proposal might allow both sides to accept it without any loss of face. C. Wars of Uncontrolled Escalation Scenario 4. U.S. and Soviet commitments to contradictory German policies have reached new levels of rigidity as a result of a hardening of the lines of the cold-war conflict. In the U.S. public opinion is demanding a "hard line" on Berlin and on Germany, and the political parties consider any other policy an invitation to political defeat. In the S.U., commitment to victory in Germany has become a matter of ideological debate, but very powerful elements of the CPSU, including the neo-Stalinists and the military leaders, have staked a good deal of prestige on a "successful" outcome in Germany or at least in Berlin. At this point, a local uprising in the northern part of East Germany (near the West German border) results in the movement of a Soviet division to the area to back up the East German "police" forces. Initial success of the uprising leads to active intervention by the Soviet division, which in turn leads directly to the crossing of the border by West German troops of the Bundeswehr. The Soviets retaliate by sending ten divisions into West Germany, where serious fighting breaks out between these divisions and the NATO forward line, including some elements of the U.S. 7th Army. As the Red Army becomes hard pressed on the ground, the S.U. decides, rather than to retreat, to send in all the Warsaw Pact divisions in Eastern Europe, and it begins to add air cover. NATO, in its turn, finds its ground forces hard pressed and faces a real dilemma. Its options now appear to be tactical retreat to the Rhine line, introduction of tactical nuclear weapons, or the use of limited strategic strikes. There are indications that the fighting is beginning to arouse considerable emotional support among the people of the various countries. In the West the option 217

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of tactical retreat is being stigmatized in the mass media as an unacceptable giving-in to the enemy. The dangers of serious escalation arise in situations in which "either side could win [or stave off defeat] by increasing its effort in some way, provided that the other side did not match the increase."10 Such situations are quite commonly generated by serious crises and are likely to result in a kind of "competition in risk-taking"11 as the two sides reciprocally increase their efforts, always hoping that there will be no response. The consequent raising of the level of conflict may not lead to a nuclear war if one or both sides begin to back down or if decreasing responses lead to a new equilibrium that is at least temporarily stable.12 However, a combination of mutually inflexible commitments to achieve a "favorable" outcome in a given situation and increasing jumps in levels of effort could easily result in a major war that both sides would have gone to considerable lengths to avoid beforehand. The dangers of such a sequence being touched off are considerably heightened by the tensions, edginess, urgency, and mistrust generated by crisis conditions. And the initial rounds of the escalatory process tend in themselves to create a crisis atmosphere that significantly increases, through a process of positive feedback, the danger that the escalation process will get out of hand and become uncontrolled. 10

Herman Kahn, "Escalation and its Strategic Context," in National Security: Political, Military and Economic Strategies in the Decade Ahead (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 476 (reprinted by Hudson Institute as HI-241-P). 11 This concept was first developed and explored by Thomas C. Schelling. See his Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), chap. 8. 12 For a generally provocative discussion of the theory of such feedback processes with special reference to arms races see Anatol Rapaport, Fights, Games, and Debates (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960), chaps. 1 and 2.

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The German situation in the scenario is a good case of escalation in the sense that it suggests the undesired and somewhat inadvertent nature of the war from the point of view of the superpowers as well as the smooth and subtle process which led to its outbreak. But this does not necessarily mean that there is nothing for a potential intervenor to do in such a case. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, for example, might enunciate the danger of escalation to general war in a carefully prepared and widely disseminated statement and couple this initiative with an offer of a small United Nations supervisory presence13 to be stationed on the border of East and West Germany with the task of facilitating Soviet-American disengagement in the area. To be successful, such a proposal would have to follow closely the first contact of American and Soviet armed forces, but it might be gratefully seized upon at this point by both sides. In this context, it is important to notice that the United States and the Soviet Union did not start the EastWest part of the conflict and that they might very much desire to find a way out of being dragged into a more extensive war. It is notable that the tacit limitation which has prevented the direct contact of Soviet and American troops during the cold war is one that both sides have shown great interest in preserving." More modestly, the United Nations might simply elaborate the common interests of the two sides in avoiding general war and initiate a proposal suggesting the reestablishment of the old border between East and West Germany as a basis for the termination of hostilities. Such a proposal might be useful as long as the conflict remained localized and conventional. And the injection of such a proposal by the Secretary-General, for example, would both alleviate 13

This idea was initially suggested by Henry Kissinger's remarks on supervisory teams in Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1957), chap. 8. 14 See Halperin, op.cit., pp. 36-37.

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the hesitancy of both sides to take the first step toward crisis termination and force each side either to accept the proposal or to go publicly on record as rejecting a responsible termination suggestion. Again, it should be remembered that the United States and the Soviet Union were more or less dragged into the conflict under consideration and that both might be more than happy to find an acceptable means of getting out of the situation without more serious losses. D. Wars Resulting from Preemptive Strikes Scenario 5. It is known that both the U.S. and the S.U. have been working on ABM (antiballistic missile) systems on a large-scale basis for several years. Then increasing numbers of reports begin to filter out of the S.U., suggesting that the Russians are making major breakthroughs in ABM technology that could lead to great increases in the effectiveness of ballistic missile defenses. And, although some factors mitigate the dangers of such developments, the widespread publication of the reports in the U.S. immediately arouses jittery and fearful responses. The analogy is at once drawn with the "missile gap" of the late fifties. Only this time the publicists suggest that the danger is far more serious, since (they say) a successful Soviet ABM system would allow the S.U. to blackmail or attack the U.S. with impunity. The political pressures on the U.S. to make some effective response are very great, and the nation's leaders yield to it to the extent of shifting all available military resources over to ABM projects. But no concrete results are immediately forthcoming and the public clamor continues. The idea is more and more frequently heard that the U.S. should consider a preemptive, counterforce, disarming strike if it appears that the S.U. is about to commission operational ABM systems in significant numbers. Meanwhile, the S.U., perceiving the turmoil in the U.S. as a sign of temporary weakness, initiates a diplomatic crisis over Berlin and begins overtly to lend military 220

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aid and support to East German preparations to apply serious military pressure on the Western garrison in the divided city. In the midst of this crisis various irregular reports reach Washington suggesting that the first Soviet ABM systems are being placed in service. Closely linked to the possibilities of accidental war and miscalculated war are the dangers of falsely based preemption. It is important to distinguish here between falsely based and truly based preemption since the latter would actually lead to a form of calculated war in which the preemptor correctly assesses the intent or actions of the opponent and calculates that striking first is more desirable than striking second. Falsely based preemption could result, however, from the strains imposed by the "reciprocal fear of surprise attack"15 or from the continuously upsetting presence of serious uncertainties about the deployment of the enemy's forces or about technological breakthroughs which the opponent is reported to be utilizing. These dangers, too, are likely to be seriously heightened during severe crises. Fears, rumors, and reports of dangerous enemy activities are likely to flourish and to have a more seriously destabilizing effect under conditions of crisis. And worries concerning the possibility that the opponent will spring some new and decisive technological breakthrough during a crisis seem to be ever present, even though the nature of contemporary research and development would make such a surprise unveiling very difficult. There is evidently a common predisposition toward perceiving all elements of an opponent's behavior during a crisis as threatening. And whether or not the consequent perceptions are factually justified, they can generate a powerful political impact and therefore influence national decision-making substantially. 15

Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, chap. 9, explores this problem in some detail.

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In the present scenario it is assumed that the Soviets either do not have an ABM system or else possess a system that is in no sense decisive. Otherwise this would be a case involving a danger of truly based preemption rather than a situation in which there are common interests in avoiding undesired or inadvertent war. Again, however, this information would not necessarily have to be available in verifiable form in order for a third party to intervene effectively. The United Nations could undertake the communications function of making the Soviets fully aware of the American problem and domestic furor. Note that the Soviets evidently failed to assess this situation properly in taking actions to set off the Berlin crisis. And if this information could be communicated with sufficient urgency, an innocent Soviet Union should be willing to go quite far in taking steps to reassure the United States that there is no basis for calculated preemption. In such a situation the United Nations could offer to act as a postman or gobetween in communicating these reassurances successfully to the decision-makers in the United States. It might even offer to send representatives to the Soviet Union (with Soviet consent) to make afirst-handinspection of the situation. Along these lines, the United Nations might propose the establishment of a small verification team to investigate the operationality of ABM systems on both sides. If neither side has highly effective ABM capabilities and if each side is made aware of the urgent dangers of falsely based preemption because of faulty intelligence in this area, both should be interested in such a proposal. In fact, to the extent that crisis conditions make this danger of crucial significance, both sides may be very pleased to have an impartial third party propose such a mechanism.16 16

Thomas C. Schelling, "Arms Control: Proposal for a Special Surveillance Force," World Politics, Vol. 13, No. 1 (October 1960), pp. 1-19. Each side may want very badly to be able to

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E. Alert-Relaxation Problems Scenario 6. Serious conventional fighting involving the East and the West in Iran has led both the U.S. and the S.U. to place their strategic forces on superalert status. Every precaution has been taken by each side to guarantee itself against surprise attack. The U.S. has a very large proportion of its SAC on airborne alert, has shifted its command and control systems to a wartime basis, and has decided to utilize all the airborne and space surveillance capabilities at its disposal. The S.U. has taken roughly equivalent measures to prepare itself for all contingencies. Fortunately, round-the-clock political negotiations result in agreement on a settlement for the crisis. But it immediately becomes apparent that military relaxation and withdrawal from the brink of hostilities is not an easy matter. The problem is particularly knotty as regards the substantial number of bombers which the United States has flying airborne alert on a twenty-four-hour basis and the IRJBMs which have been brought to an extremely high state of readiness on the Soviet side. Both sides suddenly realize that an asymmetrical relaxation would favor the side that delayed longest and might even give that side such a decisive military advantage that it could launch a successful "disarming" attack against its opponent. It soon becomes clear that the only real solution to this problem would be simultaneous relaxation. But the technical and political problems of this approach cause serious delays. In the meantime, the strains of holding a superalert are growing, rapidly increasing the danger of accidents as well as causing military leaders to calculate that they must act positively soon or give the opponent the advantage by default as relaxation becomes a physical necessity. The dangers and strains of the resultant endurance contest grow with each passing day. demonstrate its "innocence" credibly in order to reduce the opponent's incentives to preempt. 223

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The key to this situation is the military problem of withdrawal from the "brink of war" following the political resolution of the major issues underlying a severe crisis or locahzed war.17 This problem of relaxing a superalert safely is peculiar to intense crises. A large number of complicated and technical "safety" measures are ordinarily implemented during high-level alerts in order to make strategic forces more "war capable" in the event that they should be needed. The dangers arise from the fact that an asymmetrical relaxation of some of these measures (not all of them) could give one side a definite military advantage, and the uncertainties generated through this process make it risky for either side to take any chances through premature relaxation or demobilization. Simultaneous relaxation is conceivable, but this procedure would require considerable coordination, which may be extremely difficult for two states which have just faced each other in attitudes of conflict. And since a superalert cannot be "held" indefinitely, any endurance contest in this area is likely to lead to additional uncertainties and asymmetries that will increase the likelihood of an undesired nuclear exchange occurring. Moreover, it is highly likely that the dangers of accidents and miscalculations would increase substantially if a superalert were "held" for very long. In short, withdrawing from the "brink of war" may present both sides with very serious problems. The common interests of the two sides in avoiding major military exchanges in such a situation, however, would be obvious and, above all, very strong. For these reasons this may be a type of situation in which the United Nations would stand an excellent chance of promoting a constructive and successful outcome. United Nations personnel might actually participate in the negotiations. It should be 17

For an explication of this problem see the concepts developed by Schelling in ibid.

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noted that political negotiations for the termination arrangement have already been set up, and it might be relatively easy for the United Nations to join in and press for some solution to the relaxation problem. In this context, the participating personnel might forcefully point out the dangers of failing to solve this problem, point to the willingness of the two sides to reach a political arrangement as an indication that the more technical problems should be solvable, and offer various technical suggestions. More specifically, the Secretary-General might offer to supply coordination facilities to make simultaneous relaxation possible. Such facilities might include simultaneous data processing by impartial personnel, the communication of up-to-the-minute data to both sides, and the supplying of impartial go-between personnel. In addition, the United Nations might be able to set up monitoring facilities to verify the fact that an agreed-upon relaxation schedule is implemented properly and on time by both sides. It should be emphasized that for both of these suggestions there might be some time to set the relevant mechanisms in motion since both the United States and the Soviet Union could undoubtedly hold their alerts at least over a short period. F. Arms-Control Violations During Crises Scenario 7. The Soviet-American detente has continued during the sixties and in some areas has shown signs of deepening in its impact. The two countries have concluded an agreement to put strict limitations on the production of nuclear devices and related delivery vehicles. And this agreement has been put into operation successfully on both sides. After the arrangement has been in operation for about two years, however, a serious Middle Eastern crisis appears on the horizon. The incumbent Syrian regime falls (for the fifth time in eight years), a left-wing regime is set up, and the S.U. moves in personnel and supplies in support 225

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of the new government. In response, the U.S. answers urgent requests from Jordan and Lebanon by deploying marine forces from the Sixth Fleet on the territories of the two countries, which are afraid of leftist influences across the border from Syria. The S.U. counters by airlifting substantial army elements into Syria, allegedly at the specific request of the new Syrian government. Citing the provisions of the Eisenhower Doctrine of the fifties, the U.S. issues an ultimatum demanding total withdrawal of S.U. forces from Syria immediately. As Western and Communist forces are deployed through the countries, the dangers of direct confrontation along the borders increase. At this juncture the S.U. issues a statement violently denouncing the actions of the U.S. and declaring that it is now forced to lay aside the arms-control limitations out of considerations of self-defense. And there are hints from various sources that the S.U. may have been violating the agreement for some time clandestinely. The West, however, has no idea of the length of time or extent of such violations, although public opinion tends to jump to pessimistic conclusions. The reaction of popular opinion in the U.S. to this development is violent. And American leaders fear (even though such fears are not, in fact, entirely justified objectively) that the S.U.'s violations may have allowed it to produce a reliable counterforce first-strike capability. Pressures from the military and various right-wing groups in the U.S. begin to mount in support of a policy of strategic preemption. The basic problem to be considered here stems from the fact that violations or the revelation of violations of an arms-control arrangement, at a crucial moment in a severe crisis, could change motivations extensively and increase pressures and temptations to take escalatory steps, to preempt, or to move precipitately in other directions without fully considering the risks involved. So long as the great 226

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powers retain the basic attributes of sovereignty, any armscontrol arrangement, even if supported by extensive inspection and operated by an international agency, can ultimately be discontinued or torn up by the great powers concerned more or less at will.18 And many possible armscontrol agreements could probably be violated fairly extensively on a clandestine basis, at least in view of presently available and foreseeable inspection and verification technology.19 This problem of the exacerbating effects of arms-control violations on severe crises is relevant to a great many varieties of arms-control arrangements. There are exceptions to this problem, such as the telecommunications link, whose violation would not yield advantages to either side, and various potential control measures which could only be violated significantly over a considerable period of time and in relatively obvious ways, since they would be predicated on major objective changes in capacities to make war. In all cases, however, in which there are substantial potential pay-offs to successful cheating, the problems under discussion here become relevant. The scenario situation suggests several possible avenues for United Nations intervention in this type of crisis. In the event that the Soviet violations had not, in fact, been going on for a long period, had only been minor in terms of output, or for any other reason had not yet resulted in a firststrike capability, assisting the flow of genuine communications between the two sides might develop into a vital role 18

For a well-rounded discussion consult Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race (New York: Praeger, 1961), especially pt. I. 19 On these problems see Jerome Wiesner, "Inspection for Disarmament," in Louis Henkin (ed.), Arms Control: Issues for the Public (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1961), pp. 112-140, and Seymour Melman, "General Report," in Seymour Melman (ed.), Inspection for Disarmament (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), pp. 3-55.

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for the United Nations. In this context, the Soviets would be extremely anxious to demonstrate the facts of the matter to the United States since they would desperately desire to avoid an American preemptive strike. And the Americans would have an interest in receiving reliable information to this effect in order to avoid a Soviet response to a falsely based preemptive strike or a Soviet attempt to preempt the American preemptive strike. Under such circumstances both sides might well acquiesce to the immediate dispatch of a small Secretariat team to verify the Soviet claim to the effect that it has no reliablefirst-strikecapability and to the utilization of United Nations channels to communicate important data on this subject to both sides. As the situation progressed, the United Nations might also have a supervisory role in the process of defusing, dismantling, or equalizing the "illegal" gains of one side. This is the type of role that actually came close to being accepted in the later stages of the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962.20 The idea here is to aid the two sides in implementing an agreement in an environment shot through with suspicion and mistrust. And it is not at all impossible that in the future a crisis even more tense and dangerous than the Cuban situation may generate dilemmas which would make the two sides happy to turn to the United Nations as the best available source of various kinds of supervisory personnel. INTRAWAR LIMITATIONS

Despite all efforts to the contrary, extended hostilities may break out between the Soviet Union and the United States at some point in the future. Such hostilities could range from various types of conventional war, through a whole spectrum of possible types of mixed nuclear and 20

Henry Pachter, Collision Course (New York: Praeger, 1963), chap. 2.

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conventional and limited nuclear war, to spasm or absolutely all-out war. If spasm war breaks out, there will be little hope of conscious limitation. This, however, is considered a highly unlikely event by most military analysts today, while certain other types of nuclear exchange or large-scale conventional warfare are not considered so unlikely.21 And if a war begins which is less than all-out, it is almost certainly safe to assume (as has been true in the past) that the major protagonists will have very strong common interests in restricting its geographical scope and intensity in at least some ways. At the very least they will have a strong mutual interest in seeing that the war does not "expand" or "explode" to the level of spasm war involving comprehensive mutual destruction. Even though such common interests may be very strong, however, the belligerents are likely to find it difficult to capitalize on them directly, since perceptions of hostility and conflict are likely to distort seriously the thinking of many decision-makers and since the notion of restraint in dealing with an ideological opponent is likely to be distasteful. Nevertheless, some leaders are likely to realize that common interests in at least minimizing large-scale destruction are very strong. In such a deadlocked situation the intervention of a third party may be of decisive importance in facilitating and pushing through the operationalization of the belligerents' common interests. And the results may be of great significance not only to the belligerents themselves but also to the shape of the whole international system after a major war. The material that follows represents an attempt to illustrate more concretely the common interests and dilemmas involved in limiting major wars. 21 For a variety of points of view on this question see, in general, the essays in Klaus Knorr and Thornton Read (eds.), Limited Strategic War (New York: Praeger, 1962).

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A. Exploration of Common Interests Scenario 8. A set of false warnings and hasty decisions has led the S.U. to conclude that the U.S. was putting in motion a controlled disarming strike against the S.U. and to implement a counterforce, preemptive strike before this could occur. In response to this miscalculated strike the U.S. has carried out a proportional strike against remaining Soviet missile installations. At this point communications facilities are seriously degraded and Soviet decision-makers, supposing that their original strike had not been a miscalculation at all, are preparing to respond in some fashion to the American strike. The Soviets have offensive weapons remaining, but they suspect that another strike would simply result in a second U.S. retaliation (or, as they see it, an American counter strike). All evidence suggests that the U.S. still has considerable force potential intact. Another round of destruction does not appear very inviting, but the alternatives to striking again also seem rather poor. In particular, a Soviet suggestion of cease-fire is considered dangerous because it would lead the U.S. to assume that the S.U. was prepared to back down or capitulate and would therefore open dangerous possibilities of blackmail. Unfortunately, time is short and some decision must be made quickly. At this point the Soviets receive a message from the Secretary-General of the United Nations pointing out that his data show that both sides have remaining invulnerable forces and that another round of strikes would simply result in more mutual destruction without exhausting either side militarily. The message goes on to suggest three-way negotiations including the U.S., the S.U., and the SecretaryGeneral to explore common interests, to ask for an immediate reply, and to say that an identical message has been sent to the U.S. The Soviets reply with an expression of their willingness to negotiate but suggest that they do not set much store by such procedures. At the same time they reply 230

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to the American retaliation with an exemplary strike that is carefully planned to avoid causing serious damage, but also to warn the U.S. that the S.U. is still in business and ready to retaliate against any future U.S. strikes. This is a situation in which there appears to be a real opportunity for the exploration of Soviet and American common interests in limiting the destructiveness of nuclear exchanges. But active belligerents generally find it difficult even to think about common interests, let alone to act on them. And this problem is likely to be accentuated in nuclear situations characterized by a telescoped time scale. Such thinking is hindered, above all, by the seeming necessity of committing emotions to the cause and perceiving the enemy as the apotheosis of evil while thefightinglasts. This problem might, however, be alleviated to some extent through the allocation by a third party of serious thought and analysis to concrete common interests at a time when national decision-makers are hardly capable of such activities. Such a party might be able to exercise a strong influence on the establishment of intrawar limitations through efforts to elaborate and formulate specific common interests, through the enunciation of such interests in specific suggestions to the belligerents, and through measures to guarantee that such ideas come to the attention of relevant decision-makers in the belligerent nations. In the situation of the scenario, the Secretary-General of the United Nations has already created a platform from which to engage in interventionary activities. And he has obtained at least tacit acceptance of the notion that it is the Secretary-General's business to deal with such matters. At this point he might publish a declaration enunciating his understanding of the need for limitations, put forth a detailed proposal for negotiations on the subject, and suggest an agenda of specific limitations that should be considered. The Soviet Union, and, it seems safe to say, the United 23 1

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States as well, is aware of the counterproductiveness of simply engaging in destructive strikes, but the key danger seems to lie in the fact that neither side feels that it can take the first steps toward Hmitations without seriously compromising its bargaining position. In such a situation the initiatives of the intervenor might gain salience and become focal points for limitations. There is also a real chance that they might form the basis for tacit agreements, even if direct negotiations should prove impossible. The Secretary-General might also use his platform to engage in several communications roles. He has already begun efforts to guarantee that the two sides are aware of information that might tend to induce limitations by confirming the invulnerability of residual forces on both sides. At this point he might act further to make sure that the two sides are fully cognizant of facts that would point toward the desirability of limitations. The stage is also set for the Secretary-General to play the role of postman in the process of facilitating indirect communications between the two sides. Such indirect communications could aid in pinpointing areas where limitations might be possible, and might become an important mechanism for the conclusion of tacit agreements on limitations in an environment characterized by the serious degradation of the normal channels of communication. B. Establishment of Ground Rules Scenario 9. A limited war in Europe has escalated to the level of tactical nuclear fighting. Hard pressed on the ground and faced with the choice of retreating or escalating, the NATO forces have introduced tactical nuclear weapons. Use of such weapons in battlefield situations and to interdict certain supplies has led the Warsaw Pact powers to respond in kind. As the war seesaws back and forth, the pressures to escalate mount, and decision-makers on both sides are hard pressed to keep the war from spreading. This 232

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situation is greatly aggravated by the fact that there are no clear-cut and accepted rules for commanders to utilize in deciding what are "legitimate" targets for nuclear weapons and what are not. In the absence of such rules there is an inevitable tendency to indulge in testing behavior whenever peripheral and doubtful cases are involved. This has led inevitably to a broadening of the target lists for nuclear weapons and is threatening to cause escalation to central warfare despite various efforts of high-level political decision-makers, who are aware of the strong common interests of the two sides in avoiding general war. There exist, today, no real ground rules or mutual expectations concerning the manner in which a nuclear war or even a large-scale conventional war in a nuclear environment would be fought.22 Presuming that no such rules were elaborated before a war broke out, there would still be a great common interest in developing a set of workable rules quickly before irreversible actions had been taken that would negate any possibility of setting up various important limitations. Certain basic rules would, in fact, be of central importance in keeping in check the possibility that a war might escalate to uncontrollable levels of intensity or spread in dangerous geographical directions. But, of course, the opening phases of a war may be inauspicious periods in which to set up workable and viable rules for the hostilities and violence that are to follow. Difficult problems such as those portrayed in the scenario would create obstacles to successful rule-making. Considering only the decision-making processes of the belligerents themselves, the probabilities of setting up viable rules under such circumstances would probably be very low. This is a situation, however, in which the activi22

Halperin, op.cit., chap. 6, and Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961), chaps. 1 and 2.

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ties and utterances of a salient and basically impartial third party might carry great weight and might be seized upon by both sides as a source of mutually acceptable and desirable rules. Under such circumstances, a third party which was well informed about the technological and strategic aspects of war in the nuclear era might become a major focal point in determining the conduct of the war. The case set up in the scenario might very well turn out to be a situation in which the United Nations could play a very influential role. The Secretary-General, for example, might elaborate in a well-publicized speech or statement an "impartial" scheme of basic rules. This might be accompanied by a well-reasoned document setting forth the analysis leading to each major type of rule and suggesting not only the adoption of the rules by both sides but also the processes by which such adoption might be undertaken and signalled. It is extremely important to note here the awareness (in the case at hand) on the part of the political leaders of the dangers of a ruleless situation and the consequent likelihood that they would be eager to agree at least tacitly on some such set of focal suggestions. It might very well turn out that their perception of the importance of limitations at this stage in the war would override various quibbles to the effect that some specific rule would tend to favor one side more than the other. The United Nations might also attempt to exercise influence through the processes of persuasion and behindthe-scenes discussions with high-level representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union (again the heads of the United Nations delegations come to mind). Such discussions might be carried on separately with each representative or in joint consultation. Here the effort would be to create common understandings, first on the nature of the dangers involved, and then on the coordination of mutual expectations concerning the nature of limitations that would be to the advantage of both sides. The result might be in 234

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an extension of the overlap in the expectations of the two sides and a consequent acceptance of tacit agreements on arms limitations. The importance of the awareness on the part of the political leaders of the dangers involved and their willingness to take steps to deal with -these dangers is crucial here as well as in the preceding suggestion. In a sense, the main difficulties in setting up rules in the situation under consideration center around problems of coordination and the delineation of salient boundary conditions. C. Maintenance of Ground Rules Scenario 10. In the course of a localized war in Europe, both sides have become concerned about the likelihood of enemy violations of various restraints that have been at first mutually observed. Such restraints include limitations on the kinds of weapons in use, avoidance of certain potential targets, and restriction of the geographical dimensions of the war. Enough ambiguous acts take place, however, to cast doubt on the adherence of both sides to these limitations, and there is pressure on each side not to get caught on the short end of violations. Moreover, the limitations are of considerable military importance in the sense that any number of violations by one side only could either give the violator a major military advantage in the localized war or lead to escalation to a considerably larger scale of warfare. Neither antagonist can provide acceptable evidence to its opponent to prove that it is not violating, since there is always the possibility that efforts to produce evidence are only cover-ups for actual violations or planned violations. In these circumstances both sides begin to fear actively the dangers of violations by the other side, and the pressures mount to break various limitations in order to provide insurance in the event that the opponent has secretly decided to do likewise. This course does not seem very appealing to the political leadership on either side, but there does not seem to be any workable procedure avail235

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able that can be used to increase the viability of the limitations, and the fears of being put at a disadvantage by enemy actions are growing steadily. The situation here deals with the problems of keeping ground rules viable under the stresses and strains of wartime conditions. Such rules may be accepted as important and desirable in themselves, but during large-scale hostilities, the exigencies of wartime decision-making are likely to lead to actions that either violate certain rules or are perceived by the other side as violations of various rules. Occasional violations of rules (even important ones) are probably inevitable under conditions of war, and it is hardly to be expected that the belligerents themselves can handle such problems except through the channels of violence. But, again, the dangers of escalation to all-out war are likely to be starkly real even to the leaders of the warring parties. In these circumstances a third party might play an actively constructive role in reducing the number of violations and in handling violations without causing escalation. In the case set forth above, there are several types of intervention which various United Nations groups might be able to undertake successfully. The Secretary-General might propose the establishment of inspection and verification teams. Such teams would be composed of small groups of authorized United Nations personnel, who would work directly with the armed forces of the two sides in order to verify their adherence to the various rules which had been accepted. Verification of such matters could probably be made easier and more acceptable by basing it, wherever possible, on the principle of positive evidence. Alternatively or concomitantly, a proposal could be made to set up a number of small supervisory teams.23 Such teams would operate in the battlefield areas and actively verify de facto 23

Kissinger, op.cit., chap. 8.

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adherence to such limitations as those on targets, weapons, and geographical boundaries. In both of these cases a crucial variable would be the extent of prewar planning and preparation for such activities. They could only be carried out by well-informed individuals who had thought about these problems in some detail before the war. But the chances of Soviet and American acceptance of such proposals should be substantial. Remember that the political leaders on both sides were aware of the dangers of escalation and resistant to allowing military violations. The crux of the problem was the fear that the other side would gain an advantage and the inability to initiate proposals for a resolution of the problem. The United Nations initiative, however, would remove this last problem, and it might very well set up a focal point around which political influence in the two countries could coalesce. In conjunction with inspection or supervision mechanisms, the United Nations might suggest the establishment of quasi-arbitral procedures to operate during the course of the hostilities. One idea would be to provide for ad hoc commissions to deal with various types of violations or alleged violations which would be invested with the authority to weigh evidence and make various awards. Such commissions might become valuable forums for the airing of complaints, and they might provide a somewhat ritualized mode of responding to intrawar disputes without resorting to escalation of levels of violence. The notion of quasi-arbitral procedures would probably be irrelevant in isolation, but it might prove useful as a follow-up to the kinds of mechanisms suggested above. D. Maintenance of Contact Scenario 11. The outbreak of a limited strategic war has virtually cut off direct diplomatic contact between the U.S. and the S.U. and has made both sides so distrustful of remaining communications that they are, for the most part, 237

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useless. Under these conditions, several rounds of blind strikes occur in such a way that neither side can assess with any accuracy the results of its strikes or the residual position of its opponent. Although, in fact, neither side is near military exhaustion and each side retains a large quantity of more or less invulnerable striking forces, there appears to be no credible way of communicating this information. Neither side is willing to initiate negotiations for a termination arrangement because neither knows enough about the situation to judge whether such a proposal would be in order, and neither is willing to risk losses in its bargaining position in order to find out. It is not at all clear how such a suggestion could be credibly communicated in any case. Under these circumstances, each side feels compelled to continue the war so long as the enemy shows no apparent signs of desiring to stop. One of the great problems of modern warfare stems from the difficulty of maintaining authentic intrawar contact among the major belligerents. In many cases (not all) it is of little value for two belligerents to have common interests if the contacts between them are radically reduced and communication is disrupted or has become discredited. The problems here include those of making the genuine character of communications credible to the receiver as well as simply maintaining basic physical contact. In the past, such contact problems have led to a great deal of unnecessary destruction, and there is every reason to suppose that such problems could arise during various kinds of war in the contemporary international arena. In the context of nuclear warfare, the problems of maintaining credible communications would be particularly accentuated and might be virtually unsolvable by the belligerents themselves, who could not convince their opponents of the genuine character of their suggestions or declarations. A third party with no real link of organization or interest to either side, how238

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ever, might be able to do a good deal toward breaking the log jam in the way of realizing common interests in this area. An intervenor in the limited strategic war situation of the scenario might concentrate on several communications functions. At a minimum, the United Nations might make an effort to keep communications circuits open at all times and to advertise their existence and availability. In this way non-Soviet and non-American facilities could be placed at the disposal of the belligerents on very short notice. And the Secretariat might be able to insert itself in the role of middleman in a two-step flow process of indirect communication between the two sides. The two sides could be primed for acceptance of this role by efforts on the part of the Secretariat to transmit to them and make them aware of important information about the objective course of the war. The information derived from such activities might be sufficient to make the two sides desire to communicate with each other even though they might still be unable to face each other directly. In fact, the key problems of the situation in the scenario are a basic lack of information, a mutual fear of initiating proposals for a solution, and a mutual fear of spurious communications. The activities of the United Nations, in helping to deal with the information gap and the problem of spurious information, might be sufficient to set in motion a process that would break the central knot. A role that looks rather promising for an intervenor in this situation centers around the uses of data collection and processing.24 The Secretariat, for example, might set up a data-processing operation together with a registry at which the two sides could declare their intentions, file justifications, or lodge protests whenever they so desired. Such an operation might become a focal point in a rather effi24

For some general remarks on the utilization of this tactic by a third party cf. supra, chap. 2, pp. 64-65.

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cient process of indirect communication between the United States and the Soviet Union. Each side could come to the data-processing center to look over the incoming data and to express its own feelings, desires, and motivations in cases where it was anxious to make the opponent aware of this information. There would probably be nothing to stop the Secretariat from setting up such an operation, though it would require a well-trained and well-informed (though perhaps not very large) staff. Such a program might be utilized very little by the belligerents, but the fact that it would cater to the desperate needs of each side for information without compromising the bargaining position of either suggests that it might be found useful.25 It should be noted that a successful operation of this kind would also give the Secretariat an injection point for the communication of various suggestions and proposals. E. Intrawar Deterrence Scenario 12. After a nuclear strike on the U.S. zone of interior by the S.U. and an American counterforce retaliation on remaining Soviet military installations, American leaders are desperately trying to assess the resulting situation. It is apparent that the U.S. has remaining striking forces that are more or less invulnerable, but it seems impossible to determine whether the same is true of the S.U. The Soviets, of course, maintain that they do have such forces, and they begin to display a few weapons (the possibility of repetition makes it difficult to assess the number precisely) one by one. They are, however, unwilling to 25

In situations of this type the location of United Nations headquarters in New York City might very well be a substantial hindrance. The United Nations complex would probably be endangered physically and might be disrupted as a functioning operation even if it were not destroyed. The general problem of the location of headquarters and some ideas for circumventing the difficulties are discussed at some length in a subsequent chapter (cf. infra, chap. 8, pp. 313-314).

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demonstrate the existence of any sizable number of surviving nuclear weapons because of their fear of giving the U.S. a chance to knock out the weapons as they are shown. Meanwhile, many American experts conclude that the remaining Soviet forces cannot be significantly large and begin to press for U.S. actions to make use of what they take to be a golden opportunity to get rid of the Soviet threat once and for all by demanding Soviet surrender and striking again if it is not forthcoming. The Soviets do, in fact, have a certain quantity of invulnerable striking forces still available, and they would very much like to find some "safe" way of conveying this information to the U.S. But no method of doing this is immediately forthcoming. This is a clear case of both the importance and problems of deterrence in an intrawar setting. Although the concept of deterrence is most often applied to situations in which the objective is to prevent the outbreak of war, the notion is also of great importance as applied to intrawar situations. The basic calculation of deterrence remains the same, and the equation involving the probability of retaliation to a particular action and the damage a retaliatory strike would cause is still applicable. In fact, it is the salience of deterrence considerations which lies at the heart of common interests in avoiding escalation from limited to all-out war and makes it possible to talk seriously about the United States and the Soviet Union engaging in "controlled" nuclear exchanges.28 But there are certain characteristics of typical wartime conditions that would tend to make intrawar deterrence peculiarly unstable and to generate serious problems. Lack of information about the enemy's forces, inability to assess the course of the war accurately, and emotional excitation, for example, would all fall into this category of problems. In general, the activities of a third party 26

Knorr and Read, op.cit., especially Herman Kahn, "Some Comments on Controlled War," chap. 2.

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in such situations should be directed toward redressing the imbalance caused by these stresses and strains. In the scenario, the key problems are a lack of information about the state of the opponent's strategic forces and an inability to assess accurately the results of a round of nuclear strikes. Given this situation, the United Nations might play an active commumcations role in transmitting to the two sides basic information about the course of the war and about force postures which could be plugged into deterrence calculations. A key problem would lie in making decision-makers urgently aware of such information as well as simply communicating it to them. And this might be another situation in which the procedure of setting up a data collection and processing center would be of great value. Such a center could collect and collate all accessible data from reconnaissance equipment, personal communications, and government notifications which bear in any way on the course of the war. It would probably be necessary to set up certain regulations governing the use of the center so that only accredited persons could utilize the data and so that obviously sensitive data could be withheld or restricted by the personnel in charge of the operation whenever necessary. In view of the extreme danger to the United States in carrying out a nuclear strike on the false assumption that the Soviets would be unable to retaliate and in view of the desperate dilemma facing the Soviets, the horns of which are surrender and acceptance of destruction on a substantial scale, it does not seem unreasonable to suppose that the two sides would be willing to accept the aid of the United Nations. In fact, such initiatives might be quickly seized upon as a possible mechanism for the alleviation of a very tight bind. The United Nations might also consider offering several small verification teams for the purpose of checking on the existence of remaining strategic forces in the two countries. This is a case in which some form of positive evidence veri242

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fication would probably yield a very quick and satisfactory, though somewhat rough, answer to the basic question involved. Or the Secretary-General himself could offer to make brief trips to the Soviet Union and the United States to see the strategic forces for himself and proclaim their existence on the basis of personal knowledge. In each of these cases, the suggestion becomes plausible and at least to some extent convincing when the dilemma of each side and the desperate need to find some way out of a situation that is potentially catastrophic are considered. F. Preventing A ccidents or Miscalculations Scenario 13. A conventional war of sizable proportions in Europe has led both the S.U. and U.S. to take a number of steps to increase their preparedness for the possibility of central war and to reduce any chances of being caught by a surprise attack. The U.S. has instituted a superalert affecting its SAC, missile-launching systems, command and control organizations, and bomb-damage centers. It has also raised the alert status of its several warning systems. The S.U. has undertaken similar measures, except that it retains a more highly centralized control over its intermediate missiles and tactical nuclear weapons in the European theater. These measures undoubtedly have the effect of reducing the likelihood of calculated central war by making it extremely uninviting for either side to initiate such a war. But while the measures induce caution in this sense, it becomes more and more apparent that an important result of the measures is to increase the dangers of various kinds of accidents and miscalculations. Neither side feels that it can relax the "safety" measures in question while the war continues, because to do so would give the opponent an asymmetrical military advantage and might be perceived as a form of giving in to the enemy. But pressure grows rapidly on both sides to take at least some steps in the direction of deescalation and to alleviate some of the 243

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dangers, which seem to loom larger as time passes and begin to weigh on the minds of the decision-makers. The war in Europe continues unabated, making direct cooperation on this strategic level extremely difficult. But the leaders on both sides feel a growing urgency to search for some way to deal with the various dangers of undesired strategic warfare. In the section on "crisis control" (above), the common interests and problems of the two sides in preventing "nuclear" accidents, miscalculations, and so forth in situations of severe crisis were discussed. In the event, however, that any war of sizable proportions breaks out, the dangers of various kinds of accidents and (especially) miscalculations would almost certainly drastically increase,27 and the consequences of such events might be the ruin of virtually all-out nuclear war. The common interests in avoiding such intrawar accidents or miscalculations are almost desperately clear-cut. But the dilemmas encountered in trying to alleviate such dangers might be equally outstanding. The situation would be characterized by the usual wartime distortions, rigidities, and emotional commitments, and in the nuclear context it might well be characterized by serious disruption or confusion of the decisionmaking apparatus as well. But this is an important case in which the almost totally unprecedented dangers and dilemmas of a war in a nuclear environment might make the belligerents not only willing but anxious to accept the activities of a third party. And, in general, a third party, perceived by the antagonists as being able to make contributions to the relaxation of tensions during a crisis of this type, might be able to intervene with positive results. The acute awareness of the leaders on both sides of the seriousness of the dangers (in the scenario) and the pressures on them to find some solution make this case appear 27

Halperin, op.cit., especially pp. 101-104.

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to be a hopeful one from the point of view of successful United Nations intervention. The Secretary-General, for example, might elaborate in a closely reasoned statement the outstanding dangers involved in the situation and suggest a concrete and specific program of strategic safeguards to be implemented by both sides. He might not only suggest specific safeguards but also set forth the reasoning behind them so that they might become focal points for each side to seize upon. Such safeguards might be implemented either explicitly or more or less tacitly by the two sides, but it would be the salient and impartial injection of these suggestions that would give them a compelling nature. The urgency of the situation and the desperation of the two sides could be expected to guarantee at least a serious hearing for such proposals. As in the case of various nonviolent crises, the United Nations could offer to provide inspection teams to guarantee that the strategic safeguards are implemented more or less simultaneously and according to a prearranged schedule. Moreover, if the intervention were successful to this point, a small monitoring service could be set up to run checks on the safeguards and to verify the fact that they were still in effect at various crucial danger points in the chain of command from time to time. Such an ongoing service would be an invaluable reassurance mechanism and might tend generally to ease fingers on the triggers of the strategic forces. A monitoring establishment of this kind could probably operate on the basis of positive evidence in many instances and might therefore be carried on with a very small contingent of personnel. The key to such an operation would lie, however, in the availability of a certain amount of necessary equipment and, above all, of a few highly trained and qualified individuals who could direct the teams. The plausibility of this suggestion is based on the same combination of awareness of danger, feelings of urgency, and growth of pressures for a solution that 245

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makes the whole situation a relatively hopeful one from the point of view of third-party intervention. RESTORATION

Just as it is important to take seriously the possibilities that large-scale and extended warfare may occur in the future, it is also worth analyzing the possibilities of terminating future wars short of the complete exhaustion or virtual destruction of one or both of the belligerents. At some point during the course of a large war (conventional, nuclear, or mixed) the belligerents are almost certain to develop common interests in terminating the hostilities and in restoring nonviolent relations on some basis. This basis may range along a spectrum from the comprehensive surrender of one side, through the reinstitution of the status quo ante, to the comprehensive surrender of the other side.28 It is, however, notorious that belligerents find it difficult to terminate hostilities successfully (short of symmetrical or asymmetrical destruction), even when both sides want badly to get out of the war and have very strong common interests which center on termination on some terms. Nuclear war or the imminence of escalation to nuclear war is likely to increase the probability that the United States and the Soviet Union will desire to terminate a war without demanding unconditional surrender, but it is also likely to add new problems in the forms of confusion, degradation of communication, and fear of remaining enemy striking forces in the event that even a temporary concession is made. The essential problem in terminating hostilities stems from the difficulty of reconciling common interests in reaching some end to thefightingwith conflicting interests of the two sides concerning the specific basis for such a termi28

For some very interesting comments on the question of surrender see Paul Kecskemeti, Strategic Surrender (New York: Atheneum Press, 1964), especially chaps. 1, 2, and 9.

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nation. But in a nuclear or near-nuclear context, there are likely to be situations in which the mutual desire to end the destructiveness of war becomes very strong. Such situations may arise right at the beginning of hostilities in cases of wars desired by neither side (e.g., accidental war or miscalculated war), or at any subsequent time in the course of a war. Here again a third party may prove to be of crucial importance in breaking up the problems involved and therefore in helping the principal antagonists to take steps toward the operationalization of their common interests in termination, without suffering the destruction of prolonged but undesired fighting. In general, an intervenor in such situations may clarify the issues, crystallize the common interests of the two parties, facilitate the negotiation of a cease-fire or a settlement, or aid in implementing an agreement and, therefore, in making possible cooperative solutions that would otherwise be unfeasible. The material that follows is again designed to make concrete the types of situation in which such intervention might be successful. A. Handling of Accidents, Miscalculations, Etc. Scenario 14. Two missiles strike the northeastern part of the U.S. Virtually simultaneously an excited Soviet official contacts Washington on the "hot line," identifies the missiles as Soviet, says that they were fired accidentally, and suggests that the S.U. would be willing to pay reparations for any damage caused. This leaves the U.S. in a severe dilemma. The impulse to retaliate automatically is cut short by a realization that the resultant Soviet response would lead to much greater destruction for the U.S. Nevertheless, if the missiles were actually uncoordinated harbingers of a Soviet general strike that failed to come off, it would probably pay the U.S. to preempt quickly. Or if they were simply tests to see what the S.U. could get away with under a nuclear umbrella, it might be disastrous to U.S. prestige and bargaining strength not to retaliate at least 247

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proportionally. But it is also quite possible that the Soviets were telling the truth. In this case any American retaliation could very well lead to catastrophe. The dilemma of the American decision-makers seems complete. The Soviets (who were telling the truth about the accident) want desperately to prove the truth of their claims, and it is obvious that American leaders would be relieved if they could be sure that the attack really was an accident. But it is also clear that the Soviets themselves cannot satisfy the U.S. on this point by any action of their own. The idea of intervening to prevent the occurrence of events such as accidents and miscalculations during periods of severe crisis and war has already been discussed. Nevertheless, it is possible that accidents, miscalculations, uncontrolled escalations, or secret attacks may, in fact, occur in the future and it seems certain that any of these events would generate an extremely serious and dangerous crisis.29 In any one of these situations it is highly likely that both the United States and the Soviet Union would want desperately to avoid the destruction of an undesired war, but the very nature of these events is such that they could easily lead to hasty or semiautomatic decisions to retaliate and thereby cause a major war. Involved here, unfortunately, are both knotty problems and very high stakes for the parties concerned as well as for the world in general. The development of relatively invulnerable second-strike capabilities in real quantities and of hardened defense systems has relieved time pressures in the area of preemption and "automatic" retaliation sufficiently to allow opponents to talk seriously about stopping hostilities arising from the sequences under discussion here before they get out of control. But the problems are still deep ones. Speaking generally, a flexible and mobile third party might intervene in such situations by supplying impartial verification and in29

Kahn, Thinking About the Unthinkable,

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chap. 2.

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spection services, engaging in semiarbitral procedures, or setting in motion mechanisms for rapid interbloc communication and negotiation. Both sides, in the scenario situation, wanted very badly to stop the sequence that had been set in motion, without widespread destruction. The chief problems involved stemmed from the difficulties of the Soviets in convincing the United States of the accidental nature of the event and the pressures on the United States to make some response to the Soviet "attack." Such a situation would seem ripe for constructive intervention by United Nations personnel, even if they had no immediate way of confirming definitively the accidental nature of the event. The key problem would be to beat the time limitations. The United Nations might undertake several communications roles. It might attempt to transmit a sense of urgency about the dangers to both sides and to make sure that each party was aware of all information whose impact would be reassuring in the sense of allowing the parties to ease their fingers on the trigger. And it might also attempt to insert itself between the parties as a go-between and as a link for indirect communication. In this case its role would be similar to that of a postman with a mission to extract letters from his clientele. The central points in the area of communication involve the slowing down of the impetus to destructive reactions and the opening up of contacts, if only indirect, between the United States and the Soviet Union. The United Nations might also offer to set up an ad hoc inspection team to go to the Soviet Union with the task of satisfying itself of the accidental nature of the missile launchings. Such a team would not have to be very large— it might be made up simply of a few members of the Executive Office of the Secretary-General—but it would have to be dispatched very quickly and, above all, it would have to be made up of individuals who were sufficiently well trained in military affairs (including technological prob249

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lems) to be able to form a meaningful judgment on the question before them in a relatively short span of time. The desperation of the Soviets and the extreme danger to the United States of reaching the wrong conclusion on this matter might combine with the saliency of an impartial initiative to make such a verification procedure acceptable to both sides. The Soviets would have to allow the team to come in, and the United States would take the chance of an incorrect evaluation, but the dangers of other courses would be extreme for both sides. B. Dealing with Catalytic Actions Scenario 15. During the late sixties and early seventies nuclear capabilities have been developed by a small number of leading second-rank powers. Earlier visions of widespread nuclear diffusion, involving a large number of countries, have not, however, become a reality. Now, in the early seventies, Japan, India, Germany, Brazil, the UAR, and Israel have added themselves to the five older members of the nuclear club. The nuclear capabilities of these states vary and there are many information gaps on this subject. It is, however, known that at least several of the states mentioned have capabilities which could penetrate S.U. and U.S. active air defenses to some extent on a first strike. During this period of burgeoning multipolarity, political conflicts are often exacerbated, North-South issues create added complications and animosities, and the older tacit rules of the game developed in the bipolar arena are tending to fall into disuse. Then, suddenly, a rather substantial missile attack against several Soviet cities is launched, and, while some of the missiles are destroyed by Soviet active defenses, considerable damage is inflicted on these urban areas. The national origin of the attack is not immediately ascertainable. The delivery vehicles are traced to points of origin in the South Atlantic, but several coun250

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tries, at least, are known to possess mobile missiles that could be launched in this fashion. The S.U. possesses relatively invulnerable weapons systems and is not forced for strategic reasons to strike back instantly or suffer annihilation. But popular pressure in the S.U. climbs almost instantly to a fever pitch. And the Soviet leaders are determined that some retaliation must be made somewhere. At this point the S.U. broadcasts an ultimatum to the effect that it will launch a proportionate "retaliatory" strike against the U.S. in forty-eight hours unless the U.S. or anyone else can prove before the time is up that the real source of the original attack was not the U.S. The U.S., of course, protests its innocence through every available channel. But the idea inevitably begins to grow that, if the S.U. cannot be persuaded of American innocence, it would be better for the U.S. to strike a preemptive blow against the S.U. toward the end of the forty-eight hours than for it simply to wait to absorb a Soviet first strike. It is no longer fashionable to consider catalytic warfare an important danger in Soviet-American relations, and the reasons for this deemphasis are quite substantial. Nevertheless, it still seems worth including this possibility in a set of models of potential superpower crises.30 The term "catalytic action" or "catalytic warfare" is generally used to refer to calculated attempts by a third state to involve other states in warfare against each other. The possibility of inadvertent actions on the part of a third state catalyzing a war between two states tends to be considered separately in most discussions. There are at least two distinguishable varieties of catalytic action.31 Single catalysis refers to the 30

Consult, in general, Arthur L. Burns, "The Rationale of Catalytic War," Research Monograph No. 3 (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton Center of International Studies, 1959), and Robert W. Tucker, "Stability and the Nth Country Problem," Study Memorandum No. 3 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Defense Analyses, 1961). 81 Burns, op.cit.

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case in which a third state strikes a secret blow at Country A hoping to make it believe that the attack was launched by Country B and to induce it to "counterattack" against Country B. Double catalysis is a somewhat more sophisticated activity in which the catalyzing agent strikes Countries A and B with secret and simultaneous blows in the hopes that each will assume that the other is to blame and that one or more rounds of mutual strikes between Countries A and B will follow. The notion of catalytic warfare encompasses several very complex logical problems,32 but the practical difficulties in carrying out catalytic actions in the contemporary international arena are substantial. It is becoming very difficult to disguise the origin of attacks. States which might be motivated to make any given attack would be very few. The peculiarities of various national weapons systems might give substantial hints as to the origin of an attack. And the increasing sophistication of warning and detection devices is making the launching of a secret attack more and more difficult. Still, the possibilities of launching an attack from the oceans (particularly from underwater as with a Polaris-type system) and the potential opportunities for launching attacks from outer space should not be entirely discounted in this context. Above all, however, successful catalytic actions involving the superpowers are becoming more and more unlikely in direct proportion to the success of the established nuclear powers in developing invulnerable weapons systems and conditions of parity, which ease pressures to make instantaneous decisions, to seek the advantages of surprise, and to preempt in suspicious situations. If, however, a catalytic strike should occur in the future, the United Nations might be able to undertake various 32

Burns, op.cit. Consider especially the discussion of various logical regressions in the context of catalytic warfare.

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activities aimed at reducing the likelihood that such an action would lead to a general Soviet-American war. Under such circumstances the United Nations might serve as an exceptionally important center for data collection and communication. At the United Nations, if anywhere, it might be possible to glean and piece together a great many bits and pieces of information which together might constitute substantial evidence concerning the real responsibility for the nuclear strike. If facilities for relaying all leads and relevant information to the United States and the Soviet Union could be combined with the data-processing activities mentioned above, this role might take on great significance. It is also possible that the United Nations could have an inspection and verification role if appropriate teams could be mobilized with sufficient speed. In the situation pictured in the scenario, the United States would probably welcome a neutral offer to send inspectors to its territory in search of definitive evidence concerning the question of whether or not the United States authored the attack in question. And it is worth noting that such a team might be able to put together a rather convincing proof of the fact that the United States was not responsible in a very short time in view of the fact that there would very likely be internal repercussions and bits of evidence of a reasonably obvious nature in the United States if it had, in fact, launched such an attack. It is difficult to conceal facts of this magnitude entirely in the United States. It is, therefore, at least possible to conceive of a small team of officials from the Executive Office of the Secretary-General, for example, being organized on very short notice and playing a rather useful verification role in such a situation. C. Negotiation of Truces and Cease-fires Scenario 16. A limited strategic war involving the two superpowers has broken out and has gone through several 253

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controlled exchanges of counterforce strikes. Starting with mere exemplary strikes, the exchanges have built up to major counterforce attacks designed to undermine the enemy's strategic striking power and to make him vulnerable to various kinds of blackmail. It rapidly becomes evident, however, that both sides have very large stocks of hardened and mobile nuclear weapons and delivery systems which cannot be knocked out, and the military experts on both sides become convinced that there is little or no chance of accomplishing anything of military value by continued nuclear strikes. Under these circumstances, the war becomes somewhat meaningless, although it shows no signs of terminating. Calling a halt to the war, in fact, poses a major problem since both sides claim that they are committed to achieving a "favorable" outcome and since each looks upon initiating cease-fire negotiations as a sign of giving in to the opponent. Such initiatives might, in fact, be interpreted by the opponent as signs of weakness and lead to dangerous attempts to apply pressure or blackmail tactics. But the destructiveness of continued nuclear exchanges is an overwhelming incentive to reach some cessation of actual hostilities and the pressures on the leaders of both sides to do something about this situation are mounting steadily. A nuclear war between the two blocs might very well result in a trading of "controlled" strikes which were destructive (though not inordinately destructive) but came nowhere near exhausting the military capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union. The immediate result would be a kind of destructive deadlock, and it is worth noting that contemporary trends in military technology and strategy seem to be leading in directions that are increasing the likelihood of such a deadlock in any future nuclear war. In such a situation, both sides might find it highly desirable to halt the actual hostilities, both in order to reduce the dangers of accidents or miscalculations lead254

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ing to large countervalue strikes and in order to avoid further destruction, even though they could not agree on any basic settlement or solution to the conflict. But reaching a cease-fire in the midst of a war is not an easy matter. It requires an acceptance of the idea of not achieving victory and a willingness to do business with an enemy who has probably been long portrayed as evil.33 And there would be very great technical problems in the negotiation and (especially) implementation of a cease-fire. The fate of the notion of terminating a major war short of comprehensive victory or defeat in the twentieth century provides ample testimony to the magnitude of these problems. In general terms, an intervenor in such situations might press for agreement on a cease-fire by offering salient and impartial formulations of this option and by acting as a gobetween in contacts between the belligerents. Such an intervenor might also play crucial service roles in facilitating the implementation of the cease-fire and in maintaining its viability. In a situation such as that portrayed in the scenario, the Secretary-General would very likely intervene to enunciate his understanding of the fact that the war had degenerated into a deadlock, and he might introduce a suggestion to the effect that a cease-fire would be the best hope for termination. He could communicate this proposal directly to both sides and request replies, a procedure that might be utilized to set the Secretary-General up in business as a gobetween in the process of indirect communication between the belligerents. Such a position would allow him to communicate important and undistorted information to both sides and to interject his own proposals in a decisive and salient fashion. The influence of mounting mutual de88

Due to the underlying American concept of war, this problem is likely to be particularly acute in the case of the United States. On this point consult Robert E. Osgood, Limited War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), chap. 2.

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struction might be counted on to make the United States and the Soviet Union take these proposals seriously, and the growing pressures on the leaders of both sides to find some solution should not be discounted as a factor making acceptance of such initiatives likely. Moreover, the conclusion of the national military experts that continuing the war would yield nothing of military value might also become an important influence in this direction. Taking another tack, the United Nations could offer to provide a small monitoring service to aid in the implementation and maintenance of a cease-fire or truce arrangement. The implicit assumption of this proposal that a cease-fire would be desirable might be influential in creating expectations favorable to a cease-fire. And the suggestion of a solution to the knotty implementation problem might go far toward breaking the log jam of resistance to a cease-fire based on the argument that it would break down anyway on the rocks of implementation difficulties. It is worth noting that such a program of intervention might not have to be hurried or rushed too quickly since a deadlocked situation might continue for some time without erupting into countervalue strikes. In general, the factors favoring the proposal of the preceding paragraph would also favor the acceptance of this suggestion, but here there would be the additional attraction of minimizing one of the key physical and psychological barriers to a serious consideration of agreeing on a cease-fire arrangement. D. Arrangement of Political Accommodations Scenario 17. A controlled, counterforce, central war has led basically to a stalemated situation in which neither side can exhaust the military resources and resolve of the other side. The war drags on with sporadic strikes at military installations, but the main exchanges have died out inconclusively. Nevertheless, both sides remain on a warfighting basis, neither side feels able to relax at all, and there 256

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is a substantial danger that destructive strikes will flare up again for one reason or another. And such a flare-up would very likely lead to a greater destruction of value targets than was the case earlier both because of the resultant degrading of command and control systems and because of the frustration engendered by the original exchanges. Neither side, however, makes any move to deal with this situation. Apparently decision-making processes are somewhat inefficient at this point, and in any case both sides are reluctant to make the first move toward termination. Although the dangers of the situation are more or less appreciated, there is a great fear of weakening subsequent bargaining positions and leaving one's country open to blackmail by creating an appearance of weakness. Moreover, decisionmakers on both sides stress the point (in internal conferences) that they do not see how the provisions of an accommodation could be acceptably implemented even if agreement were reached. At this juncture, however, the military leaders on both sides start to become jittery about the situation and begin to stress in their briefings the importance of various dangers which have developed. And influential opinion begins to coalesce around these views in putting pressure on the political leaders to do something to alleviate the dangers. In wars in which neither side could gain sufficient control of the politico-military arena to dictate the terms of a settlement, some form of accommodation through negotiation would be necessary to terminate the war with any finality and to reduce the dangers of a flare-up involving nuclear weapons following every provocative action by either side. In a stalemated situation in which active strikes had more or less died out or had become sporadic, degraded weapons and command systems still maintained on an alert, war-fighting basis might very well generate accidents or miscalculations which would be extremely dangerous in such an atmosphere. But if achieving agreement to a 257

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cease-fire would be difficult, the arrangement of some form of political accommodation would be still more difficult and would require great perseverance and skill. Even if the two sides desired to terminate the hostilities and to minimize the dangers of further destruction, it might prove extremely hard to reach agreement on the need to engage in concrete negotiations and on ground rules for negotiation that both sides could accept without perceiving their bargaining positions to be significantly weakened in the process. And negotiation and bargaining between active enemies would involve many problems stemming from emotional distortions, commitments, threats, promises, and subterfuges that would not yield easily even to the most skillful handling. In general, a skillful and impartial third party might intervene in such situations in order to make itself a focal point around which negotiations could center and in order to participate actively in such negotiations in a number of capacities. And again, the service functions of a third party in implementing any agreed-upon accommodation might be of crucial importance. In the concrete situation at hand, the United Nations might undertake several communications functions. It could attempt to reinforce conclusions about the stalemated condition of the war and the dangers of the ensuing situation, arrived at by the military leaders of the two sides at least, by conveying to both sides incoming data about the military and political consequences of the war. The United Nations might also utilize this role of conveying information to ask for answers to various questions and in so doing to slip into a go-between role which would open up at least indirect channels of communication between the United States and the Soviet Union. And this position might be used as a platform for the performance of the mediatory role of bringing pressure to bear on the two parties to enter into negotiations. Several factors in the 258

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situation suggest that acceptance of these initiatives on the part of the belligerents might be forthcoming. The leaders on both sides exhibited a basic appreciation of the dangers; the military briefings were a powerful reminder of these dangers; influential opinion tended to coalesce around demands that some termination arrangement be found; and the initiative of the United Nations would offer some alleviation of the disadvantages to either side which would arise from the initiation of negotiations on its own responsibility. The Secretary-General and the Secretariat might also take steps to participate more directly in the process of negotiation between the two sides. The might first muster various mediatory pressures and exercise their informal persuasive influence in convincing the United States and the Soviet Union of the need for negotiations and in dealing with problems such as the agenda, the negotiating rules, physical arrangements, and other details. As negotiations began to get under way, the Secretariat might participate actively in conciliating the various interests, organizing pressure at various points, and pointing out that certain problems could be solved by the provision of services through the United Nations. The likelihood that intervention of this type would be accepted by the belligerents would be strongly influenced by the skill and preparation of the Secretariat as well as by the factors mentioned in the preceding paragraph. E. Facilitation of Strategic Surrender Scenario 18. A central war with the U.S. has gone badly for the Soviets, and their remaining striking forces are very limited. The U.S. now has an overwhelming superiority in firepower, and its decision-makers are at least roughly aware of this disparity. In short, the U.S. could literally destroy the S.U. as a functioning socio-political system at this point. But it could not do this without paying a price since the S.U. retains in its limited forces enough invulner259

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able missiles to inflict considerable, though not lethal, damage on the U.S. in return for a knockout blow. The Soviets would desperately like to get out of the war with their state intact, and they suggest a basis for political accommodation. Responding to this suggestion, the U.S. asserts that the Soviets are beaten, points out that it could now blackmail the S.U. successfully, and asks for a rather comprehensive strategic surrender from the S.U. But the U.S. does not press this position too strongly since the war is still on and it desires to avoid a final Soviet countervalue strike at almost any cost. Both sides thus want to end the war, but their concrete suggestions for accomplishing this end are rather far apart. In the meantime, the war itself has assumed a slow-motion but still destructive nature, and pressures continue to mount on all sides to end the war and to remove the threat of a "city-busting" strike which hangs over peoples' heads on both sides. If one side in a nuclear war achieves sufficient dominance to impose the terms of a comprehensive surrender on its opponent, a third party will probably have a negligible or no constructive role in the situation. But developing trends in military technology and strategy appear to be reducing rapidly the likelihood of such an outcome, and the problems of various forms of partial strategic surrender are likely to be rather different from those of comprehensive strategic surrender. In particular, the side which is more or less beaten may still have sufficient strength to damage the victor painfully, or it may be difficult to assess the pronouncements of one side that its position is clearly that of a victor as against the claims of the other side that the situation in one of stalemate. In such situations, common interests are likely to be at least potentially strong between the underdog who desperately wants to avoid total destruction and the stronger power which would very much like to avoid a last desperate countervalue strike by the underdog. The difficulties of negotiating some form of partial sur260

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render would be similar to those of negotiating a political accommodation, except that there would be the added stresses of the "winner-loser" relationship. And in general the possibilities for constructive third-party intervention would also be similar to those of accommodation situations. In the case at hand, the United Nations might participate directly in the negotiation process, which would probably start tacitly and become explicit at some later point. As with the accommodation situation, the United Nations could start with efforts to bring mediatory pressures to bear on the two sides which might make the negotiations more explicit than they had been. These efforts might again lead to additional roles such as organizing conciliatory activities and bringing pressures to bear at strategic moments. In this situation, too, some very powerful factors might lead to the acceptance of concrete negotiations gradually brought on by the behind-the-scenes and informal activities of United Nations personnel. Such factors include the slowmotion but mounting destruction, the threats of "citybusting," and the mounting internal pressures to remove these threats. If the facts that the transition to formal negotiations would be gradual, and that the initiatives of the United Nations would relieve both sides of the liabilities of appearing to make the first steps or concessions, are added to these factors, the case for accepting such activities would probably be quite strong. The Secretary-General might also offer to set up a monitoring service for the implementation and maintenance of any political arrangement that was agreed to by the parties. As was the case with the cease-fire situation, such an offer might influence expectations through its basic assumption that a settlement should be reached, and it might remove a major obstacle to successful negotiations concerning the substantive conditions of a partial surrender acceptable to both parties. The offer might, in fact, open the way for the flood of popular opinion to achieve its full im261

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pact by cutting much of the ground out from under the position that implementation would be impossible, even if an agreement were concluded on paper. And in the event that such a monitoring service were actually required, it could probably be set up on a more or less temporary basis and it should not require a very large trained staff. The keys to being able to make such an offer would Ue in the preparation and preliminary planning which had been done before the war and in the availability of a very small number of well-trained individuals who could head the various monitoring teams. The factors influencing the acceptance of such a proposal would be similar to those mentioned in the preceding paragraph, with the addition of the fact that the offer of a solution to the implementation problem should reduce some of the hard-core resistance to negotiations in each country.

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CHAPTERSEVEN

Intervention by the Secretary-General and Secretariat: The Mustering of Capabilities

T

and the following chapter are devoted to an exploration of the present and potential resources of the Secretary-General and his staff for performing the types of third-party activities discussed in this study. Much of the material is relevant to a wide variety of international crises, but special emphasis is again placed on severe Soviet-American crises. From time to time, recommendations and proposals aimed at increasing the capabilities available for such interventionary work will be introduced and discussed. HIS CHAPTER

FOCUS ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE SECRETARIAT It has become increasingly apparent in the course of this study that the Secretary-General is likely to be by far the most important focal point in the United Nations system for the type of interventionary activities under analysis. This does not mean that other individuals or organs have no potential in this area. In fact, the history of some past crises suggests that it might be fruitful to consider the interventionary potential of a variety of elements in the United Nations system.1 But a little reflection on the nature of the specific roles set forth in preceding chapters will suggest the outstanding relevance of the Secretary-General, and the material presented in this chapter and the next chapter should reinforce this suggestion. It may, however, be useful 1 For some comments concerning the peacekeeping roles of elements of the United Nations system other than the SecretaryGeneral see Elmore Jackson, Meeting of Minds (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1952), chap. 4.

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to outline in very broad strokes at this point the principal reasons for the Secretary-General's outstanding position in this area. Third-party roles in severe crises would necessarily depend very heavily on executive power and authority. And the executive power in the United Nations system is focused rather intensely on the office of the Secretary-General.2 He is the spokesman of the whole Organization and, as Hammarskjold once said, "the neutral representative" of an Organization that "has begun to gain a certain independent position."3 As such, his executive powers, particularly those of an informal nature, are very impressive both in scope and depth when compared to those of any other element of the United Nations system. Closely related to this factor is the advantage the Secretary-General gains from his structural position in the system. He is the officer who, at one and the same time, is responsible for coordination and liaison activities in the system, who oversees the execution of policy decisions, and who controls the actual material and personnel resources that would be involved in most types of third-party intervention. In short, the Secretary-General, more than any other individual or group, has the ability to mobilize and wield the machinery and capabilities of the Organization. A third complex of issues falls under the general heading of salience. Included here is a whole series of factors such as attitudes, expectations, precedents, rules of the game, and international norms. But the central point is that the office of the Secretary-General has, over the years, acquired very great prestige and authority in the international 2

Consult Andrew Boyd, United Nations: Piety, Myth, and Truth (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1962), pp. 85-122. 3 Wilder Foote (ed.), Dag Hammarskjold: Servant of Peace (New York: Harper & Row, c. 1963), p. 210 (Copenhagen address, 1959).

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arena.* Individuals and governments are both conscious of the existence of this office and aware that it is a factor to be included in calculations concerning foreign-policy problems. In many areas, the executive initiatives of the Seccretary-General are now treated as perfectly normal, and there appears to be a growing body of international expectations according the Secretary-General a significant role in a wide range of disputes and crisis situations. There is, finally, the fact that the Secretary-General has comparative advantages over any other element in the United Nations system in problems of acceptability. One of the central problems in carrying out successful thirdparty activities in any area characterized by international tension is that of gaining at least minimal acceptance from the parties concerned. Without going into detail at this point, it is possible to say that the Secretary-General enjoys two broad types of advantage in this area. Related to the question of salience is the fact that precedents and expectations gradually piling up have the effect of reducing the novelty of executive action by the Secretary-General and of increasing the predispositions of the parties involved to accept such action as legitimate. Then too, the SecretaryGeneral has advantages in the realm of acceptability which spring from his relative impartiality and noninvolvement, his independence, and his ability to mobilize machinery comparatively rapidly. Several basic theories concerning the role of the Secretary-General and the Secretariat should perhaps be clarified at the outset. The principal divergence is that between the so-called minimalist and maximalist theories.5 In the * Elmore Jackson, "The Developing Role of the Secretary-General," International Organization, Vol. 11, No. 3 (1957), pp. 431445. 5 For material on the distinctions between these theories see Stephen Schwebel, The Secretary-General of the United Nations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952), pp. 3-13;

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actual practice of the United Nations this theoretical cleav­ age has always been handled by opting for some form of the maximalist approach. But the differences are funda­ mental ones, and the questions raised are still controver­ sial. The cornerstone of the minimalist theory is the notion that the Secretary-General ought to concentrate his atten­ tion on the tasks of administration before him and to re­ main, more or less, "politically celibate."6 He should be an efficient servant of the policy-making organs of the Organi­ zation without any pretense to holding an independent po­ sition of influence in the system or to interacting on the same level as the policy organs as an important element in the decision-making process of the system in his own right. It makes more sense in this context to speak of the efficiency of the Secretary-General than to discuss his power. A minimalist Secretary-General would therefore have little power in the intrasystem arenas of the Organization. He would conduct his diplomatic activity behind the scenes and quietly, if at all, and he would not fight for the right to make politically relevant interventions in the operations of the Organization. A certain amount of informal executive power might actually devolve on a minimalist SecretaryGeneral, as it did on Drummond in the 1920's, but he would accept such responsibilities only with great caution and he would not take the initiative in cases where executive 7 authority and initiative might be at stake. Moreover, this Boyd, op.cit., pp. 85-122; Sydney Bailey, The Secretariat of the United Nations (New York: Carnegie Endowment for Interna­ tional Peace, 1962), pp. 34-61, and Egon Ranshofen-Wertheimer, The International Secretariat: A Great Experiment in Interna­ tional Administration (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1945), chap. 4. β This phrase was coined by Hammarskjold in his address at Ox­ ford in 1961. Foote, op.cit., p. 331. T Boyd, op.cit., pp. 85-88.

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general caution and unwillingness to take the initiative would be stoutly buttressed by a conscious policy of interpreting both the constitutional provisions of the Organization and the resolutions of the various policy organs strictly and conservatively whenever possible. Andrew Boyd catches the essence of this orientation well in the following description of Sir Eric Drummond: Drummond was a Whitehall man to the core, strong in the belief that a Civil Service "had to be politically celibate (though perhaps not politically virgin)." When asked for advice, privately, he would give it, often to some effect; but even behind the scenes he would never do anything that might annoy one of the parties to a dispute. His public utterances were rare, formal, and discreet. He showed no wish to enlarge either the authority or the public image of his office. He never addressed the Assembly at all.8 And the fact that the tenets of minimalism dominated the Secretariat of the League of Nations throughout its existence is attested to by Ranshofen-Wertheimer in the statement that The two Secretaries-General kept scrupulously, even over-scrupulously, within the constitutional limits and did not even avail themselves as fully as they could have done of the marginal possibilities for action and influence open to them.9 The contrast between this basic approach and that of the maximalist is made startlingly clear by a consideration of such statements from United Nations practice as that of Trygve Lie to the effect that: ". . . to strengthen, for the critical times ahead, the office of the Secretary-General, in the framework of the United Nations and to enhance its 8 9

Ibid., p. 87. Ranshofen-Wertheimer, op.cit., p. 38.

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influence for peace in the world—has always been my first consideration,"10 and especially those of Dag Hammarskjold to the effect that: . . . the Organization has begun to gain a certain independent position, and . . . this tendency has led to the acceptance of an independent political and diplomatic activity on the part of the' Secretary-General as the "neutral" representative of the Organization. . . . I can do some things . . . which I have tried . . . that are easier for the Secretary-General to do in the ways available to him than for the other organs. There are things which the other organs can do and the Secretary-General cannot do. It is a question for everybody who has responsibility in this case to judge when we pass from a situation which should be handled by the means available to the Secretary-General to a situation which requires action by one of the other organs.11 This presents us with the crucial issue: is it possible for the Secretary-General to resolve controversial questions on a truly international basis without obtaining the formal decision of the organs? In my opinion and on the basis of my experience the answer is in the affirmative.12 The hallmarks of the maximalist approach are an emphasis on the general executive authority and powers of the Secretary-General and the Secretariat and on the position of the executive of the United Nations system as an important and, more or less, coequal element in the intrasystem power processes of the Organization. The Secretary-General must not be a mere administrator and servant io Trygve Lie, In the Cause of Peace (New York: Macmillan, 1954), p. 411. 11 Hammarskjold in Foote (ed.), op.cit., pp. 210 (Copenhagen address, 1959), 271. 12 Ibid., p. 346 (Oxford address, 1961).

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of the policy-making organs of the Organization. He must be a true statesman, a spokesman for the international community, and a factor to be reckoned with in the international political arena.13 As Hammarskjold expressed it, great stress should be laid on: . . . ensuring that the Secretary-General, as one of the main organs [sic] of the United Nations, shall have the opportunity of functioning as the spokesman of the Organization in its capacity as an independent opinion factor.14 In order to fill this role, the Secretary-General must make the most of his opportunities for undertaking fruitful political initiatives and he must not hesitate to applyflexibleand constructive interpretations to the provisions of the Charter and to the resolutions of the policy organs when this appears to him to be necessary. In short, the maximalist approach swings significantly toward concepts of leadership which are commonly used in discussing the executive branch of national governments.15 It is readily apparent that the position a particular Secretary-General's administration assumes on the conceptual spectrum between minimalism and maximalism will be of great importance in terms of the prospects of intervening in Soviet-American or any other severe international crises. Although the success of an actual attempt at thirdparty intervention in a specific crisis would depend on a 13

This basic notion can be traced from the pages of the final report of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations, PC/20, pp. 81-84, 86-87, through the writings of Hammarskjold, and on into the statements of Thant. 14 Hammarskjold in Foote (ed.), op.cit., p. 208 (Copenhagen address, 1959). 15 For discussions of such concepts see, for example, Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power (New York: John Wiley, 1960), and Clinton Rossiter, The American Presidency (2nd ed.; New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1960).

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delicate balance of political factors, the very notion of such intervention would be foreign to any administration with noticeable leanings toward minimalism, let alone a deep commitment to this end of the spectrum. The problems involved in intervention center, above all, on executive powers and functions. And it would require an administration quite strongly imbued with at least some of the principal tenets of maximalism to contemplate and carry out such activities successfully. The three administrations which have so far held office at the United Nations have been (or are) deeply committed to some form of the maximalist approach both in theory and in practice. These commitments have been expressed in varying forms, but it is impossible to escape the conclusion that the United Nations Secretariat has been generally guided by the tenets of maximalism just as the League Secretariat, even under Avenol,16 adopted a position much nearer the minimalist end of the spectrum. It is true that the executive power of the Secretary-General has been subjected to a series of cyclical swings in the years since 1946, but it is also true that the baseline of his power has shown a long-term tendency toward limited expansion. And the speed and alacrity with which U Thant was able to set this trend in motion again after the problems in the Congo during 1960-1961 and the grave dangers to the office resulting from Hammarskjold's death in September 1961 suggest that there is an underlying strength and resilience in the executive position of the Secretary-General. Evidently, the sources in the United Nations system and in the overall international system from which these powers arise are substantial enough to persist through specific crises and retrenchments. It may, therefore, be reasonable to conclude that although the dichotomy between minimalism and maximalism is a very important one for any consideration of intervention in severe international crises, the pres"Schwebel, op.cit., pp. 2-13, 215-224.

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ent maximalist orientation of the United Nations executive is sufficiently clear-cut and entrenched to place a substantial variety of third-party activities at least within the bounds of plausibility. FULFILLMENT OF REQUIREMENTS

One way of assessing the ability of the SecretaryGeneral and the Secretariat to perform third-party activities is to analyze their standing in terms of the various resources for intervention identified in Chapter Three. The main body of this chapter focuses on strengths and weaknesses of the Secretary-General and the Secretariat in these terms. In terms of the basic qualities for intervention discussed earlier, the Secretary-General and his staff are essentially very strong, particularly when compared with other potential intervenors. By most objective standards of impartiality and detachment the international Secretariat must be given, with only a few exceptions, a very high rating. In the context of intervention in interbloc crises, however, it would seem that subjective impartiality, in the sense of being perceived as such by the United States and the Soviet Union, is of even greater importance than impartiality in terms of some objective standard. And at this juncture certain difficulties arise. Whenever the Secretary-General intervenes in a situation actively or decisively, he is likely to increase the risk both that one side or the other will be unhappy with the result and that he will bear the brunt of the blame for what has happened. Perhaps there is a genuine trade-off between the likelihood that the Secretary-General will continue to be perceived as impartial and the extensiveness or decisiveness of the activities which he undertakes. And this relationship may tend to put a damper on his activities as an intervenor in many situations. However this may be, the fact remains that the Secre271

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tary-General and his staff come considerably closer to filling the requirements of subjective impartiality than does any other potential intervenor in interbloc crises. They do, in fact, come close enough on this score to make it reasonable to suggest that a major interbloc crisis might suddenly find the United States and the Soviet Union highly impressed by the credentials of impartiality presented by the Secretary-General. Even in the relatively low-level situation generated by the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, U Thant was able to present himself as an impartial intervenor without serious reservations on either side." In fact, even when one side had cause to protest that his proposals would result in a military advantage for the other side, there was no suggestion that the Secretary-General was acting in a partial manner or consciously trying to slant his proposals in favor of one side.18 The Soviet attacks on Hammarskjold starting in 1960 and their proclamations to the effect that there can be no neutral men may cast doubts on the possibility of the Secretary-General meeting the requirements of impartiality.19 The classic answer this assertion was given by Hammarskjold himself at a press conference in 1961 when he said: It may be true that in a very deep, human sense there is no neutral individual, because, as I said at Oxford, everyone, if he is worth anything, has to have his ideas 17

Henry Pachter, Collision Course (New York: Praeger, 1963), chap. 1. 18 The United States argued with a certain real cogency that Thant's proposal to the effect that the United States should cancel its blockade of Cuba in return for a Soviet agreement to refrain from shipping additional military supplies to the island would have asymmetrical consequences favoring the Soviet Union. At no time, however, did the United States cast doubt on Thant's basic impartiality. 19 Alexander Dallin, The Soviet Union at the United Nations (New York: Praeger, 1962), especially pp. 149-162.

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and ideals, . . . things which are dear to him, and so on. But what I do claim is that even a man who is in that sense not neutral can very well undertake and carry through neutral actions, because that is an act of integrity. That is to say, I would say there is no neutral man, but there is, if you have integrity, neutral action by the right kind of man. And "neutrality" may develop, after all, into a kind of jeu de mots. I am not neutral as regards the Charter; I am not neutral as regards facts. But this is not what we mean. What is meant by "neutrality" in this kind of debate is, of course, neutrality in relation to interests; and there I do claim that there is no insurmountable difficulty for anybody with the proper kind of guiding principles in carrying through such neutrality one hundred per cent.20 In terms of the concepts employed in Chapter Three, this is a very forceful statement of the essential distinction between impartiality and neutrality. And on balance, Hammarskjold's position on this question stands as a rather persuasive and reasonable one even though the whole question of "neutrality" becomes very complex when psychological variables are brought into the analysis.21 But this may all be to no avail if, for example, Soviet subjective attitudes do not change and if they remain operational. Subjective attitudes of this kind, however, are notably changeable under the impact of pragmatic considerations. Soviet acquiescence to Thant's activities in Cuba substantially postdates the original proclamation of the "no neutral men" doctrine. And there is every reason to suppose that in this realm, where a real measure of objective impartiality does exist, subjective attitudes on all sides will be open to alter20

Hammarskjold in Foote (ed.), op.cit., pp. 351-352. For a perceptive and critical analysis of this subject consult Conor Cruise O'Brien, To Katanga and Back (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1962), chap. 2. 21

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ation on the basis of essentially ad hoc and pragmatic calculations. In this particular context, a good deal would depend on the time at which a need for intervention in a crisis arose. Key factors would be whether, considering the impact of prior actions, the Secretary-General was in the good graces of the superpowers and at what point on the typical Soviet (and to a lesser extent American) love-hate cycle toward the Secretary-General the crisis in question occurred. This cycling or phasing of attitudes toward the SecretaryGeneral is one of the more interesting characteristics of the United Nations system in operation. The phenomenon appears to be based on short-term calculations and to stem essentially from reactions to the impact of particular actions on the part of the Secretary-General on specific calculations of national interest in the powers in question. Cycles of this kind do not, therefore, represent long-standing assessments and they may not ultimately mean very much, but their existence is very real and their effects on the prospects for third-party intervention could be great. In particular, an incumbent Secretary-General might find his hands virtually tied if a severe interbloc crisis occurred when one or the other of the superpowers was very much down on him for his recent activities. It would be easy to overstress this factor, but its relevance as a potential factor in reducing the chances of successful intervention in any specific situation cannot be denied. A substantial degree of independence would appear to be a requirement for successful intervention in superpower crises, although it is at best a mixed blessing and at worst a clear-cut weakness. Independence in the sense of the absence of a recognizable political base of support leads to weakness, since it tends to reduce the amount of forceful pressure which can be brought to bear by the SecretaryGeneral. He is not analogous to a government. And he has no formal constituency or party to lend force to his at274

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tempts to exercise pressure. But this very weakness can lead to the positive advantage of freedom from commitments and of leeway to act flexibly and impartially in the interests of the international community. Hammarskjold himself stated the case well when he said: The lack of means of "pressure" . . . if the word is not misunderstood . . . is in a certain sense a weakness which, however, is compensated for, by the freedom of action, the freedom of expression, which the Secretary-General can grant himself and which, I am happy to note, governments do grant him... .23 In the context of intervention in superpower crises, the emphasis is on the advantages of independence. The central thesis does not involve bringing overriding pressures to bear on the superpowers or coercing them but rather aiding them and facilitating the avoidance of dilemmas and the realization of common interests. For this purpose two crucial prerequisites are a certain flexibility of action which may stem from the lack of rigid commitments and the absence of any vested interests which would tend to prejudice the activities of the Secretary-General toward one side or the other in a severe crisis. Hammarskjold's statement is, in fact, a fair representation of the substantial degree of independence presently enjoyed by the Secretary-General and the Secretariat. Ahman's point concerning the Secretary-General is essentially correct: "He has no party behind him. He is on his own."24 The development in recent years of an informal constituency composed of small and nonaligned states has 22

Sven Ahman, "Mr. Hammarskjold's Not-So-Quiet Diplomacy," The Reporter, Vol. 19, No. 3 (4 September 1958), p. 12, and Eric Stein, "Mr. Hammarskjold, the Charter Law and the Future Role of the United Nations Secretary-General," American Journal of International Law, Vol. 56, No. 1 (1962), p. 31. 23 Hammarskjold in Foote (ed.), op.cit., p. 136. 24 Ahman, op.cit., p. 12.

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certainly lent support to the activities of the SecretaryGeneral in some crises. But in matters connected with EastWest controversies, in particular, the Secretary-General's independence remains notable. The underlying basis of this resource is actually incorporated in the Charter in the provisions of Article 100. And it is also clear that independence is strongly favored by the central concepts of a career civil service which have been guiding principles in the organization of the Secretariat over the years. This point brings up the controversy which opposes the notions of personnel representing national viewpoints in the Secretariat and of short-term secondment of personnel to the central tenets of a career international civil service.25 From the point of view of the requirement of independence, it is obvious that continued adherence to the international civil service principles is crucial to the continued presence of this positive asset of the Secretariat. And, factually speaking, it seems accurate to say that these civil service principles are still operational and dominant in the Organization though the percentage of total staff serving on a noncareer basis has risen above 20 per cent in recent years.26 Salience in the eyes of those who may be called on to accept third-party intervention is perhaps the most important of the ascribed resources for intervention. The Secretary-General and his staff enjoy very great strengths in this area relative to any other potential intervenor in interbloc crises. The Secretary-General's position in this respect is made strong by his structural situation in the overall United Nations system27 coupled with the structural po25

See, in general, C. Wilfred Jenks, "Some Problems of an International Civil Service," Public Administration Review, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1943), pp. 93-105, and Bailey, op.cit., pp. 16-33. 26 Bailey, op.cit., pp. 28-33. 27 Leland Goodrich, The United Nations (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1959), pp. 132-158, and The United Nations Secretariat, United Nations Studies No. 4 (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1950).

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sition of the Organization as a whole in the present loose bipolar international system. The Secretary-General is the only really influential individual who stands for and symbolizes the United Nations as a whole. He is the spokesman for the Organization, and he is often able to use its institutional matrix to project himself as a real international statesman. In short, it is to the Secretary-General that people naturally turn when the idea of United Nations action is mooted in many types of situations. And the fact that this basic salience has tended to become more prominent over the years is attested to even by realists such as Morgenthau in speaking of the ". . . present eminence of the office of the Secretary-General, unforeseen and unintended by the Charter. . . ."28 Moreover, the United Nations itself has become, over the years, a focal point around which a significant amount of action in the international arena swirls. Being the most salient element of the Organization means considerably more now than it did when the United Nations itself was seldom thought of in the context of crises and often bypassed. The salience of the Secretary-General was already emphasized by early expectations and concepts concerning his role. He was frequently looked upon, at least in abstract discussions, as a neutral, informed, and trusted official who would be capable of formulating issues in international terms.29 And it was specifically suggested that the incumbent in this office might have a considerable mediatory role in a variety of disputes and situations.30 These initial steps along the road toward salience have not been neglected or allowed to slip by any of the Secretaries-General who have served to date. Each of these men has taken a very active 28

Hans J. Morgenthau, "The New Secretary-General," Commentary, Vol. 35, No. 1 (January 1963), p. 62. 29 The United Nations Secretariat, pp. 35-38. 30 Leland Goodrich and Edvard Hambro, The Charter of the United Nations (rev. ed.; Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1949), p. 498.

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interest, although sometimes along varying lines, in inserting the office of Secretary-General into a variety of situations and creating widespread expectations concerning the potential uses of the office in performing third-party activities. The result is that the prestige and focal character of the office are now commented upon widely in both the press and official or semiofficial statements on the part of many governments. And the actual records of such crises as Berlin (1948-1949), Suez, the Congo, and especially the Cuban missile crisis attest to the clear-cut salience of the Secretary-General, even in the East-West sector of the contemporary international arena.31 In this context, a significant, though originally unforeseen, factor bolstering the salience of the SecretaryGeneral has been the prominent development of permanent missions of the member states at United Nations headquarters. It is through these permanent missions that the Secretary-General is able to develop his closest and most extensive contacts with the personnel and attitudes of the important states of the world. Staff members of the Secretary-General's Executive Office now interact informally and almost continuously with members of missions representing a very wide range of states. Contacts have become particularly far-reaching with states that maintain large permanent missions in New York. These contacts have already been influential in a number of ways,32 and it would seem that this channel might now be utilized for the conduct of important behind-the-scenes and informal efforts to create an awareness in the United States and the Soviet Union of the potential of the United Nations to intervene to their mutual advantage in a variety of possible interbloc crises. Such efforts would have the great advantage of being quiet, unhurried, and forceful in a persuasive rather than a coer81

See, for example, Pachter, op.cit., especially pp. 93-99. See, infra, chap. 8, pp. 310-311 for further comments on this subject. 32

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cive manner. And the use of this channel might very well offer an opportunity to make a substantial exploration of the various possibilities of United Nations intervention, without arousing widespread hostility and resistance to the whole idea. The requirements concerning respect, though important, are less tangible and harder to get a clear hold on than some of the other requirements under consideration. Nevertheless, several comments are in order on this subject here. Broadly speaking, it seems accurate to state that the prestige of the Secretary-General and the respect accorded him have been increasing with the passing of time but that they have been subject to the vagaries of short-term cycles and fluctuations which have sometimes obscured the longterm, secular trend. Significantly, the Secretary-General's gains in stature have been especially noticeable in the realm of authoritative respect,33 a type of respect that has been analyzed as being particularly important for third-party intervention. And relative to the position of the SecretaryGeneral of the League of Nations or of the heads of other contemporary intergovernmental organizations, the head of the United Nations commands a great reservoir of respect. It now makes a certain amount of sense to speak of the Secretary-General as a world statesman. The Soviet Union, for example, quite openly suggested a summit meeting over the Middle Eastern crisis of 1958 in which the Secretary-General would be a major participant.34 And a number of recent crises, including those over the Congo, West Irian, Yemen, and Cyprus, have generated situations in which no leading participant would have seriously 33

Jackson, "The Developing Role of the Secretary-General," op.cit., and Sidney Bailey, "The Troika and the Future of the United Nations," International Conciliation, No. 538 (May 1962), pt. III. 34

Ahman, op.cit., pp. 11-12.

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thought of leaving the Secretary-General out of the resultant negotiations. It may be worth while to make several additional distinctions in terms of respect. It is possible to distinguish, at least conceptually, between the respect accorded to the office itself and the additional respect which the incumbent at any given time receives from the powers. It is clear that these two types of respect interact closely, but some separations are possible. A number of analysts have noted the high and growing prestige attached to the office of the Secretary-General itself. And there is no doubt that any incumbent is now automatically accorded an enormous amount of respect compared to that accorded to the Secretary-General when Trygve Lie took up the reins in February 1946. But the prestige accorded to the office itself does not compare with that accorded to long-established and powerful executive positions in important national governments. For this reason, the prestige that has been added to the Secretary-Generalship by the incumbents themselves has been particularly important. Each of the SecretariesGeneral has brought certain resources to the office which have added to its stature in the eyes of the world. This was especially true of Hammarskjold, who became, as SecretaryGeneral, one of the towering figures of the postwar era by any criterion and, as such, one of the most influential.35 But it is also true in lesser degrees of the other SecretariesGeneral. On the other hand, respect and prestige are frequently not monolithic and undifferentiated. A man or an office may be respected for a variety of reasons or respected more by some states than by others. In this discussion, interest centers particularly on the respect which the superpowers accord to the Secretary-General in the realm of peace and security operations. Although it cannot be said that the 35

Bailey, "The Troika and the Future of the United Nations," op.cit.

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superpowers regard the Secretary-General in anything Uke the light in which he is regarded by many of the smaller states who have tended to become his informal supporters and constituents in recent years, it is accurate to say that the superpowers have taken notice of the substantial position of the Secretary-General. They may not be his enthusiastic supporters, but they have given indications of accepting the growing role of the Secretary-General in the international arena. Theirs is a more pragmatic and even grudging respect, but it is real, and it is a resource which might very well stand the Secretary-General in good stead in furture interbloc crises. An additional ascribed quality deals with the problem of continuity. The basic point here is rather clear-cut. Relative permanence allows both for an ease and deftness of action in the international arena that would not be possible for newcomers and for the building up of expectations concerning the propriety and apposite nature of action on the part of the Secretary-General in a variety of situations. Even though there have been several rather spectacular downfalls and retrenchments in the history of the office, the incumbent Secretaries-General and their top staffs have actually enjoyed a remarkable longevity in a volatile international arena, and the office itself has shown a strong element of continuity from administration to administration. Ranshofen-Wertheimer has stated in his analysis of the League that length of service and ". . . stability became in turn one of the major elements of the strength of the Secretariat and one of the sources of the confidence it enjoyed."36 And this point is essentially applicable to the Secretariat of the United Nations as well. In short, there is a foundation in fact for the comment that has sometimes been made to the effect that the SecretaryGeneral and his staff are the one real element of permase

Ranshofen-Wertheimer, op.cit., p. 350.

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nence and continuity in the United Nations system.37 And this characteristic is undoubtedly an asset from the point of view of the prospects for intervention in interbloc crises. Though continuity should in general be entered as an asset of the Secretary-General, several problems or potential problems in this realm should be taken into account. First, there is the question, mentioned earlier, of a careerservice Secretariat as opposed to a term-appointment arrangement. In the United Nations, term appointments are most frequently for periods of only two years. Such appointments are apparently justifiable in at least some cases on the basis of factors such as the scarcity of qualified personnel and the desire to have a broad range of nations represented in the international staff, but their impact is basically detrimental as far as the requirements of continuity are concerned. At present, however, this is no more than a potential problem, especially as far as the SecretaryGeneral himself and the Executive Office are concerned, since rather long tours of duty in these positions have been the rule over the years. Second, the activities undertaken during superpower crises might in some cases generate substantial risks for both the offices and persons in the top staff of the United Nations. The very performance of the activities in question might tend to undermine the permanence and continuity which are requirements for success in third-party intervention.38 And this problem is only emphasized by the fact that a major failure in dealing with a Soviet-American crises could knock some of the props out from under the Secretary-General's activities in other important areas. In a discussion of certain types of cold-war problems in 1960 Hammarskjold himself said that: . . . it is in such cases . . . practically impossible for the 37

See, for example, Goodrich, op.cit., p. 142. Jackson, "The Developing Role of the Secretary-General," op.cit., pp. 444ff. 38

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Secretary-General to operate effectively with the means put at his disposal, short of risking seriously to impair the usefulness of his office for the Organization in all the other cases for which the services of the United Nations Secretariat are needed.39 This danger can certainly be overplayed, however, and the activities of Thant in the 1962 Cuban crisis demonstrate that the Secretary-General can intervene in superpower problems, at least under certain circumstances, without undue risk to himself or his office. While the basic problem of risks and uncertainties is a very real one, it must ultimately be placed in a broader perspective. An acceptance of the possible expendability of the Secretary-General is not necessarily either dysfunctional or excessively insensitive. The veil of protectiveness that tends to be thrown around the Secretary-General, at least on the level of discussion, is a concomitant of picturing him as a civil servant. But the Secretary-General is now, and is likely to remain, an important political figure, subject to the problems and possibilities of political leadership. And it is one of the central characteristics of successful political leadership that it is willing to take calculated risks when important prizes are at stake. It is not necessary to carry this point to the extreme of Stevens' "one-shot" intervenor mentioned in Chapter One, and there is good reason for the Secretary-General to be cautious in accepting risks. But there is certainly no reason to view the occasional loss of a particular Secretary-General as a decisive threat to the office or as a great blow to the United Nations system. Even the healthiest political system inevitably takes a certain human toll, and the factors in the contemporary international system that generate a role for the Secretary89

Hammarskjold in Foote (ed.), op.cit., pp. 302-303 (Introduction to the Annual Report, 1959-1960). 283

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General seem sufficiently strong to make the collapse of this office improbable. These points have, in fact, been accepted far more realistically by the Secretaries-General of the United Nations themselves than by outside analysts. Each SecretaryGeneral has recognized the existence of dangers, but none has allowed this situation to deter him from acting in situations where his initiatives might have substantial political pay-offs. Hammarskjold's calculated behavior in many facets of the Congo operation, for example, and particularly his political manipulation of the threat to resign40 are notable examples of the acceptance and utilization of the political nature of the office. U Thant summarized the situation well in his 1965 statement that: . . . the Secretary-General must always be prepared to take an initiative, no matter what the consequences to him or his office may be, if he sincerely believes that it might make the difference between peace and war. In such a situation, the personal prestige of the SecretaryGeneral—and even the position of his office—must be considered to be expendable.... It follows that the powers and possibilities of the Secretary-General must be husbanded so that they can be used to the best possible advantage in the common interests of all nations. I have no intention of using them for any other purpose, nor yet of failing to use them to the full if I believe the situation demands it.41 The most basic of the personnel requirements, and perhaps the most basic of all the requirements for third-party intervention, deals with the possession of adequate politico40

See, for example, ibid., pp. 318-319 (Statement before the General Assembly, 3 October 1960). 41 U Thant, "Statement read at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, May 22, 1965," U.N. Monthly Chronicle, Vol. 2, No. 6 (June 1965), pp. 103, 104. 284

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military knowledge. The variety of types and the extent of knowledge which would have to be available in order for the Secretary-General to entertain any real hope of successful intervention in a superpower crisis would be very great, and yet this area is one in which the weaknesses of the Secretariat are most apparent and most extensive. There exists in the Secretariat at present no detailed and operational knowledge of a wide range of strategic problems dealing, for example, with central war, limited strategic war, controlled response, escalation, the various types of deterrence, reprisals and retaliations, or limited war. Moreover, there is an even greater gap in the realm of detailed technical knowledge concerning military technology in existence at presant and in the making for the future. And without knowledge in these areas or rapid access to it, it is impossible even to outline the range of feasible courses that any crisis might take, let alone to evaluate probabilities of various actions or of claims of military necessity on the part of the two sides to the conflict. In addition, it is difficult, if not impossible, to intervene constructively in a given crisis without an intimate knowledge of the fears, motives, and expectations of the United States and the Soviet Union. Confrontations in the nuclear age are entirely different from crises or even open clashes in the prenuclear era. The problems facing the parties to a crisis are different from what they were, and the calculations which finally lead them to act as they do cannot be understood solely on the basis of prenuclear concepts. An intervenor using antiquated categories and concepts cannot expect to perform successfully the very delicate tasks of helping the powers over their dilemmas and of formulating issues in a manner that is best calculated to promote the realization of the underlying common interests of the two sides. In fact, a third party with such faulty credentials may very well do more harm than good. At present, the Secretariat is very weak both in terms of 285

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information in these areas and in terms of the facilities to coordinate it and analyze it in such a way as to make the information usable even if it were available. The principal difficulty seems to be that there is no office or set of persons actually working in these areas.42 The office of the Military Adviser was finally set up formally in 1962, and this official now has a staff of three officers,43 seconded from national military establishments, at his disposal. At present, however, these officials focus almost exclusively on planning operations designed to facilitate the employment of peacekeeping operations of the police force or United Nations presence types which are useful primarily in preventive diplomacy or vacuum-filling situations. Thus, the office does not address itself to the task of dealing with matters relevant to Soviet-American crises, let alone major wars. In fact, the three officers devote the bulk of their time to rather detailed calculations concerning logistics, troop coordination, transportation, and other matters primarily dealing with the operation of police forces. The other sections of the Executive Office of the Secretary-General contain a number of political officers who appear to have their fingers very much on the strings of political developments and attitudes in the world but who make no pretense to extensive knowledge about either military strategy or military technology of the present and future. These officers simply do not possess the intellectual resources to deal with the delicate calculations and difficulties discussed in the preceding paragraphs. Some of 42

Hammarskjold in Foote (ed.), op.cit., p. 300 (Introduction to the Annual Report, 1959-1960). 43 "Issues before the Nineteenth General Assembly," International Conciliation, No. 550 (November 1964), p. 22n. The appointment of General Rikhye as UNEF commander for a period of one year commencing 1 February 1966, and the failure to announce any alternative arrangement for the headquarters staff, however, have cast doubt on the current utility of the Military Adviser's office.

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them might be trained in these areas without extraordinary difficulty, but the fact remains that they are not prepared in terms of the requirements of knowledge at present. The only other people in the Secretariat who have any real concern with or interest in these military problems are those in the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, and in particular in the Disarmament Affairs Group of this department. But even this group has no extensive professional competence in the fields of military strategy and military technology, and there are currently no viable Secretariat coordination procedures through which available knowledge could be siphoned, for example, from the Disarmament Affairs Group to the Executive Office. In general, the Disarmament Affairs Group is rather politically oriented. It is aware of the problems which are sometimes described under the heading of the politics of disarmament,44 but there is no one in the group who can lay claim to being acquainted with military strategy in a professional way, let alone to being a strategist in his own right. These are significant weaknesses in the resources of the Secretariat from the point of view of potential interventions in Soviet-American crises. The resultant problems were obviously illustrated by the attempts of the Secretary-General to intervene in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.45 Although there were, in fact, some things that U Thant could do constructively, it is quite clear that he suffered from a general lack of knowledge concerning strategic and technical matters. He was evidently unable to assess accurately what the effect of the steps he proposed 44

For a discussion of the politics of disarmament consult John Spanier and Joseph Nogee, The Politics of Disarmament (New York: Praeger, 1962), chaps. 1 and 2. 45 Information concerning this point can be most readily acquired through a perusal of the daily issues of the New York Times for the last ten days of October 1962.

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would be on the military balances in the situation. He did not have available a very sound analysis of the crucial question concerning the military as opposed to the political and psychological importance of the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba. And he did not fully understand the particular factors that determined Soviet and American moves at various stages in the crisis. It is not at all clear, however, that this general weakness in terms of knowledge cannot be alleviated substantially with a relatively modest expenditure of time and resources. There are some basic limitations on United Nations moves to build up the resources of the Organization in the area of politico-military knowledge, but a number of steps could be taken to good effect in the effort to alleviate this deficiency. In more specific terms, how might the Secretary-General and the Secretariat set about remedying this deficiency? Above all, a certain amount of staff time could be allocated to the task of increasing intellectual resources in this area. This would not have to be a formidable project. It might represent the work of a small staff of officials specifically set up for this purpose or, alternatively, it might be accomplished through the contribution of some time by a larger number of staff members in various parts of the Secretariat. It should, of course, be emphasized that this work is conceived as only one contribution to the total program of the Organization in the general realm of maintaining international peace and security. As such, it should not be given undue attention, but by the same token it should not be neglected as it is at present. A step that has been suggested on a number of occasions as a means of carrying out the program mentioned in the previous paragraph involves an expansion and possibly a reorganization of the present office of the Military Adviser. Per Haekkerup, the foreign minister of Denmark, has argued that 288

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. . . an examination should be made of the need to have military expertise available in the U.N. Secretariat in connection with peace-keeping operations. From the point of view of military efficiency, it would certainly be useful to strengthen the personnel of the military advisory machinery in the Secretariat. It should be left to the discretion of the Secretary-General to decide when such a step will be politically feasible.48 Moreover, several efforts have already been made to gain support for a move to increase the staff of this office to eight or nine. Though these efforts have had the backing of the Secretary-General and of the United States, they have not yet produced any results. This failure is apparently attributable more to a lack of sufficient interest than to specific political opposition. In the context of third-party operations, a reorganized military advisory staff might contribute contingency plans and military analyses to the effort to prepare the Secretariat for potential interventions. And it might be a highly useful source of readily available military expertise during periods of actual crisis. The launching of a United Nations Training and Research Institute47 constitutes another significant development in the context of efforts to increase the politicomilitary knowledge of the relevant staff members of the Secretariat. The Institute was formally launched in the early months of 1965,48 and it now has an executive director in the person of Gabriel d'Arboussier of Senegal. The Rockefeller Foundation has provided a headquarters for the 46

Per Haekkerup, "Scandinavia's Peace-Keeping Forces for U.N.," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 42, No. 4 (July 1964), p. 680. 47 For background information see U Thant, "United Nations Training and Research Institute," note by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, February 1964. 48 For additional details consult "Issues Before the Twentieth General Assembly," International Conciliation, No. 554 (September 1965), pp. 173-174.

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Institute, and available funds together with pledges have reached a level sufficient to allow for initial operations. UNITAR is formally independent of the office of the Seccretary-General, but, as Cox and Mathiasen have put it: The research activities of the Institute should be concerned primarily with strengthening the office of the Secretary-General in the support of his various duties. This could involve specific research programs relating to analyses of past and current operations and some contingency planning.49 As presently conceived, the Training and Research Institute will address itself to a wide range of social, economic, and political problems, but there is a definite interest in its potential contributions in the field of peacekeeping. In this context, its program might include a variety of activities relevant to third-party intervention such as gathering information and intelligence, at least limited contingency planning, coordination and monitoring of all research in the field of peacekeeping, and ad hoc assistance to the Secretary-General during actual crises. And it now seems quite probable that the Institute will be able to set up inservice training programs that would be of real use in increasing the politico-military knowledge of selected members of the United Nations staff. Even if the resources to deal with deficiencies in the area of knowledge are available, however, there may still be difficulties in siphoning the relevant information into the Secretariat without destroying its usefulness or arousing hostility. Although there are some real problems in this respect, they do not seem insoluble for the most part. Above all, it should be stressed that a great deal can be done in this area on the basis of self-help. The best strategic 49 Arthur M. Cox and Karl Mathiasen, "United Nations Training and Research Institute," Brookings Staff Paper (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, December 1964), p. 10.

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thinking is available in published form and can be studied by all who devote themselves to it. And a wealth of details concerning Soviet and American policies, together with an almost startling array of technical information dealing with the weapons systems and force postures of the two sides, can be pieced together without access to formally classified material. It is safe to say that a group of bright and conscientious officials at the United Nations could advance their knowledge of military affairs a long way almost entirely on their own initiative. Moreover, a variety of analytic techniques and devices could be utilized within the United Nations to increase the scope and depth of understanding of military affairs. Such techniques include the use of scenarios, planning operations, and various kinds of simulation and gaming devices. Scenarios may range from the capsule sketches used earlier in this study, which are useful for purposes of orientation and bringing important problems into focus, to much larger and more detailed scenarios, which are useful for planning operations and contingency work. And the use of gaming devices might bring home in a very stark and clear fashion the outstanding differences between present cold-war situations and the realities of severe crises both in terms of the motivations of the participants and in terms of the possibilities for thirdparty intervention. Another potentially useful mechanism for the acquisition of information and knowledge relevant to third-party intervention is the international conference of the type convened at Oslo in February 1964 under the auspices of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and at Ottawa in November 1964 under the auspices of the Canadian Government. These conferences were attended by representatives of countries either earmarking or frequently contributing contingents for international peacekeeping operations, as well as by members of the United Nations Secretariat. In the two cases mentioned, the sessions were 291

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specifically oriented toward detailed analyses of the problems of fielding an international force and of possible future requirements in this area. The conferences were not, therefore, especially significant from the point of view of acquiring knowledge relevant to possible interventions in interbloc crises. But this format suggests a fruitful means through which, among other things, knowledge can be channeled into the Secretariat. Several more specific outside sources might be utilized to good advantage by a United Nations group anxious to make up for deficiencies in the area of politico-military knowledge. It is, of course, true that many individuals who would be valuable in this context are too closely connected with either the Soviet or American government to be utilized for these purposes. Attempts to make use of such individuals would not only generate the distortions and dangers of a direct siphoning of information from the great powers into the United Nations; they would also tend to create insupportable risks for the Secretary-General and his staff. And it is, in any case, highly unlikely that the two superpowers would accept this kind of activity in the present world arena. But other types of useful contacts may be feasible. Some of the best strategists have little or no commitment to specific governments, and a number of informal procedures for the exchange of information could be utilized. Various persons have suggested, for example, that some of the more important policy research groups in the United States could make available their files of nonclassified material to accredited United Nations officials on some informal basis. And there are presently some movements under way to increase the exchange of information and views between Soviet and American military experts in which modest United Nations participation might be feasible. Of particular interest in this latter connection are the sessions that have been held under the auspices of the Joint Studies Group aimed at exploring various politico292

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military questions of interest to both the Soviet Union and the United States. Finally, there is every reason to believe that increasing personal contact between United Nations officials and various private experts in military affairs would be both possible and fruitful.50 The increasing frequency with which certain Secretariat members attend conferences dealing with arms and arms control indicates that this last point is already being taken seriously by at least some officials at the United Nations. Turning briefly from the problem of overcoming the basic deficiency in this area to the realities of actual crisis situations, it seems clear that in any given crisis the likelihood of success in a program of intervention would increase significantly if the Secretariat had sources from which it could acquire, on short order, a great deal of specific and detailed military information relevant to the crisis at hand. This, however, is a need which poses some real problems. The idea of setting up a United Nations intelligence unit has sometimes been mooted, but this does not appear to be feasible at the present time.51 The Organization is not now a sufficiently independent entity to support its own intelligence operations, and the idea would almost certainly be vetoed, at least in a de facto manner, by several of the most influential members of the United Nations. But there are other arrangements that might be useful in this general context. It would almost certainly be worth while to set up one or more coordinating and supervisory committees within the Secretariat to collect, process, and collate for 50

The relevant experts might be Soviet or American nationals but they certainly need not be limited to such persons. In fact, competence in these matters is increasing in various other countries fairly rapidly. And it might be desirable in many cases to utilize such nonsuperpower sources of knowledge and information when possible. 61 Cruise O'Brien, op.cit., p. 76, and Francis O. Wilcox and Carl M. Marcy, Proposals for Changes in the United Nations (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1955), p. 417.

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Secretariat usage the militarily relevant information concerning the crisis at hand that could be gleaned from the regular channels. Much can be learned from a systematic piecing together of all data that can be acquired from a variety of sources in the most open fashion. In addition, contacts could be made in the preparatory stage (discussed above) with individuals and organizations in the field of strategy and military affairs which might very well stand the Secretariat in good stead when a specific crisis arose. It is probably accurate to assert that there are a number of groups and individuals, especially in the United States, who would be both able and willing to offer the United Nations various data and analyses during an actual crisis, provided that informal procedures had been established beforehand which would facilitate this flow of information and which would tend to take the burden of initiative off the individuals and groups concerned. The requirement of skill is one that refers more to individuals than to organizations. Moreover, it is somewhat difficult to pin down with any exactitude the ingredients of skill in the international arena. Perhaps the crucial elements of skill in the context of interbloc crises are timing and the ability to formulate proposals and suggestions in a way designed to maximize the chances of eliciting acceptance from the parties involved. It is often hard to specify the reasons why one man has more skill of this kind than another, but the existence of major differences in this respect is beyond dispute. As far as the United Nations is concerned, a very great deal depends on the diplomatic skill of the incumbent Secretary-General. And this is a variable in terms of which it is hard to make predictions relevant to future superpower crises. The three individuals who have served to date as Secretary-General have differed substantially in terms of the possession of skill of the kind under con294

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sideration here. Hammarskjold, for example, was one of the most skillful diplomats of the modern era.63 His sense of timing was truly exceptional and his outstanding intellectual capabilities gave him the flexibility and imagination to search out and formulate proposals in an optimal fashion.54 Lie, on the other hand, possessed characteristics that inevitably reduced his skill in the areas under consideration here. He was a politician who tended to step into partisan positions on policy issues, and his blunt mannerisms frequently reduced his ability to handle the delicacies of skillful diplomacy. In short, there is no way to predict at present whether skill will be a strength or weakness of intervention on the part of the Secretary-General during a future crisis. The importance of skill does suggest, however, that the actual operation of specific United Nations interventions in severe crises should probably be more or less centralized in the Executive Office of the Secretary-General. In general, it seems safe to say that the Secretary-General and his Executive Office are the most likely sources in the United Nations system of the kind of skill under discussion. This is not to say that other branches of the Secretariat could not and should not contribute in a great variety of ways to the success of interventionary activities. The actual operation of third-party activities should be contrasted with the various preparatory activities which should be undertaken and to which a variety of individuals and groups within the Secretariat might contribute. It is clear that the types of activity under consideration 52

Examples of these differences can be found in Boyd, op.cit., pp. 85-122. 53 Walter Lippmann, "Dag Hammarskjold, United Nations Pioneer," International Organization, Vol. 15, No. 4 (1961), pp. 547-548. °* Oscar Schachter, "Dag Hammarskjold and the Relation of Law to Politics," American Journal of International Law, Vol. 56, No. 1 (1962), pp. 1-8.

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in this analysis, often being guided almost entirely by the Secretariat, would be impossible if the barriers to at least some important initiatives on the part of the SecretaryGeneral were very great. The general conclusion to be defended here, however, is that the power of the SecretaryGeneral in the realm of executive initiatives has expanded markedly in the years since 1946 and that his ability to take the initiative is now sufficiently broad and inclusive to cover many of the kinds of activity under discussion. The constitutional basis for this growth of a power of successful initiative on the part of the Secretary-General is not beyond questioning. It rests far more on the spirit of the Charter than on its letter. The basic proposition is that the Secretary-General, as the head of one of the principal organs of the United Nations under Article 7, has a general responsibility for securing and upholding the principles and objectives of the Organization. This thesis is supported by the notion that responsibilities of this kind also fall to the lot of the Secretary-General as the principal spokesman and "neutral" representative of the Organization.65 For these reasons he cannot, in fact, refuse to act whenever there is a reasonable chance that initiatives on his part would be beneficial in advancing the usefulness and viability of the Organization.56 However this may be, the practice of the United Nations has tended to confirm the Secretary-General's basic power of initiative. Lie took an active, though occasionally somewhat indiscreet, hand in initiating a number of significant operations. And under Hammarskjold, both theory and practice in this area were developed with great skill 55

For a good explanation of this theory consult C. H. Alexandrowicz, "The Secretary-General of the United Nations," International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 11 (1962), especially pp. 1125-1127. 66 Hammarskjold in Foote (ed.), op.cit., p. 267 (press conference, 1959).

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and success. During this administration the "doctrine of the autonomous character of the office of the SecretaryGeneral"57 was promulgated and the thesis that " 'unless there is an explicit decision to the contrary, the SecretaryGeneral can act.' . . . His right to act did not depend on express requests."58 became an operation guideline. By 1957 Hammarskjold could say with some authority: I believe that it is in keeping with the philosophy of the Charter that the Secretary-General should be expected to act also without such guidance [from the Security Council or the General Assembly], should this appear to him necessary in order to help in filling any vacuum that may appear in the systems which the Charter and traditional diplomacy provide for the safeguarding of peace and security.59 And it is notable that Thant has tended to rely heavily and often successfully on the authority of executive initiatives in his activities dealing with the maintenance of international peace and security. This has been particularly evident in such cases as Cuba, West Irian, and Cyprus. In general, then, the evidence appears to point to the conclusion that the Secretary-General's powers of initiative are at present substantial and, in many contexts, basically accepted in the world arena. Behind this general conclusion, however, there are several significant limitations. The exercise of the power of initiative brings up the problems of risks, as discussed above. For this reason, the Secretary-General has attempted on a number of occasions to get at least a covering resolution from a policy organ on which to base bis inter57 Joseph Lash, "Dag Hammarskjold's Conception of His Office," International Organization, Vol. 16, No. 3 (1962), p. 549. 58 Ibid., p. 552. 59 Hammarskjold in Foote (ed.), op.cit., p. 150 (statement before the General Assembly on his re-election to a second term, 26 September 1957).

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vention in a given situation. This procedure does not obviate the risks, but it can reduce them noticeably. The sharp criticisms of the Secretary-General for his Laotian initiatives in 1959 as compared with the moderate level of criticism stemming from his participation, for example, in the Cyprus negotiations during 1964 illustrate this point. As Oscar Schachter has put it, "third-party activity is much less likely to raise objection if it rests on legal authority and is brought within the framework of the Charter."60 In addition, there are certain cases in which political barriers simply rule out the possibility of successful initiative on the part of the Secretary-General.61 The Secretary-General has a substantial amount of influence, but he cannot coerce important states into accepting his initiatives against their will. In all probability, for example, no initiative would have increased the probability of getting a United Nations investigatory team into Hungary in November 1956. Turning to the question of physical resources, attention centers first on the actual existence of personnel resources and equipment. There are, at present, major weaknesses in the United Nations system in terms of some of these resources, but it seems likely that some of the problems, at least, could be substantially alleviated without making great changes in the present organization of the Secretariat and without touching off major political battles in the Organization. Many of the forms of intervention under discus60

Oscar Schachter, "The Relation of Law, Politics and Action in the United Nations," Academy of International Law, Recueil des Cours, Vol. 1 (1963), p. 203. 61 Arthur Gavshon's statement about Hammarskjold to the effect that "Clearly, when Hammarskjold's initiatives suited the powers, they were pleased. When they felt their national interests threatened by his actions, they were furious," seems to catch aptly both the possibilities of and restrictions on initiatives by the Secretary-General. See The Mysterious Death of Dag Hammarskjold (New York: Walker, 1962), p. 34.

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sion would not require extravagant resources clearly beyond the means of the Secretariat. What they would require is hardheaded planning and the efficient use of available capabilities. The existence of a considerable reservoir of personnel constitutes the most significant asset of the Secretariat in the realm of physical resources for intervention.62 Political problems, coupled with the difficulties of nonpermanent secondment and the requirements of geographical distribution, have resulted in the placing of some second-rate persons in the Secretariat. But, despite these problems, the Secretariat encompasses a substantial group of people who are both active and intelligent. And their backgrounds are sufficiently diverse so that acceptable personnel for activities affecting almost any state should be available. The skill, elan, and competence of the staff members of the Executive Office of the Secretary-General are especially outstanding. The selectivity of this group and the tendency to assign many of the most interesting tasks in the Secretariat to its members have resulted in the development of a number of fine officers who have real potential from the point of view of third-party activities. The staff of the Executive Office has fluctuated over the years from a low of about thirty to a high of over fifty. It presently stands at a figure just below forty. This figure, however, excludes the Under Secretaries for Special Political Affairs who have become increasingly important in the realm of peace and security operations. And it does not take into account the fact that the Secretary-General has shown a considerable ability to incorporate persons from various sources into the working directorate for a particular operation as the need has arisen. At the same time, this emphasis on the Executive Office 62

For useful discussions consult Jean Siotis, Essai sur Ie Secretariat International (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1963), chap. 3, and Bailey, The Secretariat of the United Nations, pp. 62-106.

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has tended to generate a certain cleavage between its members and the remaining Secretariat personnel, to underline the dullness of many regular Secretariat jobs, and to contribute to the failure to gain the advantages which would accrue to a more integrated program involving a larger number of persons. Gordenker has related the two sides of the situation neatly in stating that: . . . the executive office of the Secretary-General has tended to preempt policy functions, especially in the peace and security area. While this development provides the Secretary-General with a devoted and dependable immediate staff, it also narrows the number of officials with policy-making and diplomatic experience, reduces the institutionalization of the Secretary-General's efforts in the peace-maintaining field and limits the number of questions to which the Secretary-General and a small number of subordinates can possibly give attention.63 It is true, moreover, that virtually none of the available people are now trained for third-party activities, though they are all definitely available, and at least some of them are undoubtedly capable of absorbing a good deal of training in the relevant areas. Of particular interest in this context is the potential of the new Training and Research Institute in enhancing the capabilities of already available personnel. Suggestions dealing with Institute programs for in-service training and for seminars involving senior "civil servants" in the United Nations system would be especially relevant. Other suggestions have been advanced from time to time dealing with the stimulation of training in the realm of international peacekeeping. In terms of equipment and materiel, however, resources 63 Leon Gordenker, "The U.N. Secretary-General and the Maintenance of Peace," mimeographed report (Princeton, N.J.: Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1964), p. 34.

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are at present considerably more inadequate.64 The United Nations does not itself possess much in the way of transportation facilities, logistic and support capabilities, inspection and verification equipment, research and analysis capabilities, and so forth. For a given operation it is sometimes possible to shift equipment temporarily from an existing mission or force.65 But this possibility is severely limited both by the relatively low level of equipment available for most ongoing operations and by geographical restrictions. Above all, the United Nations does not have an available pool of equipment or a dependable ready source from which the immediate needs of an interventionary operation could be met on short notice. In the past, the United Nations has relied on the United States and its allies for a variety of physical resources66 that might not be forthcoming in a Soviet-American crisis and that might be very difficult to replace under such circumstances. In addition, the communications facilities of the Organization are not wholly adequate for at least some types of activity in the peace and security field. The "United Nations operates its own radio-telegraph network, linking its main offices,"67 and it has its own radio and television services used in broadcasting documentary information. A number of peacekeeping missions have found it necessary 64

A considerable amount of information on this subject can be acquired from a perusal of the essays in Lincoln Bloomfield (ed.), "International Force—A Symposium," International Organization, Vol. 17, No. 2 (1963). 65 This was done, for example, in the setting up of UNEF in 1956 and UNOGIL in 1958. In each case the source of equipment was the Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in Palestine. 68 See, for example, William Frye, A United Nations Peace Force (New York: Oceana Press, 1957), pp. 21-31, and Edward H. Bowman and James E. Fanning, "The Logistics of a U.N. Military Force," in Bloomfield, op.cit., pp. 355-376. 67 Everyman's United Nations (7th ed.; New York: United Nations Office of Public Information, 1964), p. 458.

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to establish local radio-telegraph networks, and these are still in existence in such cases as UNMOGIP, UNTSO, UNEF, UNFICYP. Moreover, United Nations missions have gained considerable experience over the years in using code to send messages through regular communications channels. These facilities are generally adequate for small and relatively slow-moving operations. Communication becomes a substantial problem, however, in fastmoving crises.68 And the necessity of placing a great deal of reliance on commercial communications facilities might become a serious liability in a superpower crisis, in which the problem of authentic communications would be important and in which the possibilities of tampering by one side, especially the United States, would be significant. Even so simple a matter as the intra-Secretariat telephone system is a commercial installation that could be easily disrupted either in the course of hostilities or on the initiative of the American government. A further difficulty involving physical resources concerns the time of the Secretary-General and his top staff. An increasing focus on executive activities has already caused (and in the future will almost certainly cause) a number of very serious problems in the administration of the Secretariat.69 This difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that the administrative demands on the top staff of the Secretariat have grown very rapidly over the years and are still growing. The pressures of these demands have from time to time created a certain hesitancy in contemplating the possibilities of undertaking important activities of a more nearly executive nature. Such problems are not un68

Some concrete examples of this difficulty are turned up by the detailed factual analysis of the Congo operation in Arthur L. Burns and Nina Heathcote, Peace-Keeping by U.N. Forces (New York: Praeger, 1963). 69 Jackson, "The Developing Role of the Secretary-General," op.cit., pp. 440ff.

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common, however, in a growing organization and should be ultimately solvable in a manner that leaves the top staff available for the performance of important executive functions. The President of the United States, for example, faced a rather similar situation on a much grander scale in the 1930's which was successfully solved in time.70 The final answers almost certainly lie in some combination of rationalizing administrative procedures, delegating authority in various ways, and decentralizing the decision-making operations of the system. But the main point to be stressed here is that problems of this kind should not be taken as debilitating and insoluble in the context of the United Nations. Furthermore, measures might be taken to alleviate some of these problems in the area of physical resources. In general, the fact that the Secretary-General has a certain amount of control over the budgetary processes and the financial assets of the Organization might be of assistance in some situations.71 But, in any case, many of the things that could be done would not necessarily be exorbitantly expensive. If serious interest develops in the possibilities of intervention in interbloc crises, the first logical step in the area of physical resources would be to carry out a detailed examination of the requirements for various types of intervention, of the resources presently available in the United Nations for meeting these requirements, and of programs through which deficiencies could be handled. Such an examination should be detailed, but it would not necessarily have to be extremely long or difficult to produce. This discussion suggests again the importance of preliminary planning and contingency analyses. In surveying assets and in mapping out programs designed to handle deficiencies, as 70

A variety of examples of problems of this kind can be traced in Neustadt, op.cit., and Rossiter, op.cit. 71 J. David Singer, Financing International Organization (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1961), pp. 153-159. 303

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well as in actually mobilizing and coordinating operations, the value of such activities can hardly be exaggerated. In dealing with resource problems there is really no other satisfactory way of planning on a rational basis. It is, therefore, interesting to notice that little serious contingency planning of any kind is carried on within the Secretariat at present and that actual operations tend to have an ad hoc character. The work of the Military Adviser dealing with police forces is at present the only work going on in the Secretariat which can be justifiably classified as contingency planning. This orientation may be perfectly acceptable in some areas, but in cases where the acquisition and allocation of resources are concerned, it tends to lead to serious difficulties. In this connection, some analysts have argued that planning operations would be too sensitive in political terms for the Secretariat to undertake. This argument seems to apply, however, primarily to rather public operations relating to stand-by or permanent military forces. The recommendation in this study, on the other hand, concerns informal and private planning operations aimed toward a range of noncoercive third-party activities. An additional possibility for circumventing the problems of political sensitivity might lie in utilizing the Training and Research Institute in the area of planning. In addition, it might be possible to establish certain arrangements or procedures which would not operate continuously but would be available for constructive use on fairly short notice. The distinction here is between mobile and immobile resources. A system for coordinating the relaxation of Soviet and American military alerts, for example, might be set up in such a way that its component parts could be both utilized for their regular tasks and brought quickly together into a functioning unit during periods of severe crisis. Or the resources for various inspection and verification tasks could be organized and perhaps even exercised to 304

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the point where they would be far more usable in a crisis situation than they are at present. Finally, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the United Nations can take steps to acquire directly at least some of the equipment and materiel it now lacks. A key point in this context is that much of the equipment in question would be of a rather basic and multifunctional nature whose acquisition would be justified on the basis of its usefulness for a variety of purposes. A more extensive and capable communications network under direct United Nations control, for example, would be useful for a wide variety of activities, including economic, social, humanitarian, and trusteeship affairs as well as political and security operations. And in such cases, where the costs would not be such as to put the project out of the realm of the possible, the combined weight of such varied functions might be utilized to achieve acceptance of proposals for various acquisitions. The requirements of mobilizing operations, often on short notice, present certain problems and point up certain weaknesses of the Secretariat as far as intervention in superpower crises is concerned. The picture is by no means entirely negative in this area, however, and some relatively modest measures could be taken to increase the mobilization capabilities of the Secretariat. Two basic types of mobilization problems might face the Secretariat in any attempt to intervene in a superpower crisis. Depending on the nature of the specific situation, there might well be some serious time pressures in organizing any kind of sophisticated operation more or less from scratch. It has already been pointed out that time pressures would not always be crucial, and it is also true that some types of operation would be much less extensive than others as far as mobilization is concerned, but, in general, the problem of a shortage of time would probably crop up frequently. In addition, there are the problems of integrating and coordinating an operation that might have several 305

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major facets and that might draw on personnel and materiel from a variety of sources. The Secretariat has, in fact, gained a great deal of valuable experience concerning the problems of mobilization in recent years.72 It is now capable of putting a small mission, headed by a senior staff member, into the field within a matter of hours. Recent experiences with situations such as Rhodesia illustrate this ability. Moreover, a number of larger operations such as UNEF, UNOGIL, ONUC, and UNFICYP have raised a wide variety of problems connected with putting a coordinated program into operation on relatively short notice. And this has led to a certain familiarity with many of the key problems among the members of the headquarters staff.73 No longer are people likely to be caught almost completely unprepared by unexpected problems. But many difficulties still remain. First, intervention in superpower crises would involve a number of problems beyond the compass of present peacekeeping experience. Second, no satisfactory high-level staff arrangements have ever been worked out at headquarters for handling problems of this kind.74 The establishment of the office of the Military Adviser and the general development of the Executive Office are important in the general context of international peacekeeping, but neither of these establishments is prepared or presently in the process of preparing itself for activities during severe superpower crises. Third, close analyses have not been undertaken to determine what resources would be needed for various types of 72

For information concerning this point see Dag Hammarskjold, "United Nations Emergency Force," U.N. Doc. A/3943 (9 October 1958), and Bloomfield, op.cit., pt. i. 73 Consult especially Hammarskjold, "United Nations Emergency Force," and Burns and Heathcote, op.cit., pp. 161-192. 7i Bailey, "The Troika and the Future of the United Nations," op.cit., p. 61, and Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, "The U.N. Secretary-General: His Role in World Politics," Fourteenth Report, 1962, pp. 38-44.

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intervention and where they might be obtained on relatively short notice. Fourth, serious-contingency planning and preliminary planning exercises have not been undertaken in this area, with the result that any actual operations must necessarily be ad hoc in nature. As this listing itself should indicate, some of these problems can be alleviated by preparatory activities which could be carried on rather quietly within the Secretariat and would not necessarily involve the Organization in any great expenditure. If the possibility of intervention in interbloc crises were taken seriously, a first step in the direction of increasing capabilities for rapid mobilization would be to rationalize the staffing arrangements in this area. The Military Adviser (or some newly established military staff unit within the Secretariat) could be given responsibilities as a coordinator of activities relevant to potential thirdparty operations. As Adlai Stevenson put it in 1964 in a general discussion of international peacekeeping: ". . . it would make sense for the U.N. itself to add to its military and planning staff, so peacekeeping operations can be set in motion with utmost speed and effectiveness."75 This would involve, at a minimum, detailing the resources in various parts of the Secretariat to be used for certain types of possible operations and making relevant people aware that they might have a potential role in future crises so that they could undertake at least some preparations. But, above all, some kind of crisis staff would be valuable. Such a staff could set up various procedures beforehand which could be put immediately into operation when the need arose, and it would serve as a focal point for the direction of actual operations during future crises. A staff of this kind should be small, and it would not require a great deal of the time of its members except during actual crisis periods. 75

Adlai Stevenson, "No Mission But Peace, No Enemy But War," McCaWs, Vol. 92, No. 1 (October 1964), p. 113.

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The value of contingency planning and advance preparations for mobilization has several times been recognized explicitly in the United Nations context, but few practical steps have been taken in these areas,76 least of all with regard to interbloc crises. The somewhat lame argument that international crises are too disparate and incommensurable for such planning to be valuable has been made, but this conclusion goes diametrically counter to the experience of most other organizations dealing with international crises in the contemporary world arena. In fact, a great deal of contingency planning concerning Soviet-American crises, utilizing a wide range of modern techniques of analysis and simulation is now being done in national planning offices. Nor would it be impossible by any means to conduct such planning from the point of view of the United Nations as an actor in the arena rather than from the point of view of a single nation state. Such a program would require a good deal of organization at the United Nations, but it would not necessarily be a voracious consumer of resources and it would not have to tie up a large number of important staff members to any significant degree. The potential uses of contacts with the various permanent missions to the United Nations, mentioned above, might also be significant in this area. Many of the key problems of mobilization involve not only the coordination of United Nations personnel and resources but also the integration of national resources and the utilization of national facilities. And it is these problems which have often, in the past, created time pressures and generated snags just as an operation has been on the verge of being launched." It would seem, however, that a close working 76

This statement is based on private communications from several members of the Secretariat, January 1964. 77 Consult, inter alia, Brian Urquhart, "United Nations Peace Forces and the Changing United Nations: An Institutional Perspective," in Bloomfield, op.cit., pp. 338-354.

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relationship between the Secretariat and the personnel in some of the important permanent missions might have significant pay-offs in preliminary planning that would help to iron out such problems during a future crisis. The success of such contacts would probably be highly dependent on the reorganization of high-level staff arrangements in the Secretariat itself, discussed above, and on the generation of concrete problems for discussion through such procedures as contingency planning. A few general remarks may be in order in closing this chapter. To repeat, these requirements constitute a set of optimal conditions. It is not to be expected that any potential intervenor could or need score near the top on each of these scales. What does seem to be true is that some substantial combination of capabilities would be necessary for intervention to have any real chance of success. And it also seems likely that some of the requirements are more central than others to the success of third-party activities. A high score in such areas as impartiality, salience, knowledge, and physical resources, for example, would seem to be at the heart of successful intervention in many situations. But it is difficult to make any concrete comparative judgments in this context. In general, the Secretary-General and his staff come out reasonably well in these findings. Their present situation demonstrates some important weaknesses, but it also seems to establish their position as the most plausible intervening agents in the international arena as far as many types of crisis are concerned. Moreover, the principal areas of weakness do not appear to be dead ends. It would seem, in fact, that several of the most outstanding deficiencies could be significantly alleviated through programs that are not unfeasible in any obvious way.

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Intervention by the Secretary-General and Secretariat: The Performance of Instrumental Activities to judge the capacity of the Secretary, General and his staff as intervening agents is to assess their abilities to carry out the various instrumental activities outlined in Chapter Two. Such an analysis touches on many of the same variables discussed in Chapter Seven, since the ability to carry out any given instrumental activity is based on some combination of the requirements and capabilities analyzed in that chapter. The comments in this chapter are therefore brief, for the most part, emphasizing only those points that have not already been discussed.

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NOTHER WAY

THE UTILIZATION OF INSTRUMENTAL ACTIVITIES

Beginning with the mediatory and conciliatory activities, this chapter proceeds through the various positive actions and service roles identified in Chapter Two. The first subject for discussion, therefore, is the notion of persuasion. The United Nations has unique advantages as a forum in which to exercise the techniques of behind-the-scenes persuasion. This fact has been particularly notable since the development of permanent missions in New York,1 which often provide excellent channels for close contacts and confidential exchanges with members of the Secretariat. The basic resources of the Secretary-General in this connection include the availability of responsible and often high1

SeC Wilder Foote (ed.), Dag Hammarskjold: Servant of Peace (New York: Harper & Row, c. 1963), p. 201 (Copenhagen address, 1959) and p. 224 (Introduction to the Annual Report, 19581959).

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ranking officials from the states which are parties to a crisis, the possibility of conducting extensive private discussions with relative ease, the ability to set up almost any combination of separate and joint conferences with representatives of the various parties, and the backing of a rather strong staff in the Secretariat. The Secretary-General also gains a certain advantage by being able to play the role of the host in such negotiations. The Secretaries-General have, in fact, been able to establish both far-ranging and extensive diplomatic contacts in the international arena. Both the Secretary-General and his senior assistants now conduct direct and private negotiations with important representatives of most of the states of the world. In reference to the activities of Hammarskjold, Joseph Lash stated some years ago that "Ambassadors and ministers move in and out of his office with almost conveyor-belt regularity."2 And this intense form of diplomatic activity centering around the Secretary-General has remained characteristic under the aegis of U Thant. Activities of this kind have become so extensive, in fact, that the Executive Office now plays an important role in gathering information and coordinating operations for the negotiating sessions of the Secretary-General and his top assistants. Moreover, the position of the Secretary-General is such that he can often draw on additional sources of persuasive influence during a crisis. Andrew Cordier has underlined this possibility in the statement that: . . . the Secretary-General may request representatives to assist him through their governments in intervening with the parties involved in a crisis or dispute. This form of diplomatic partnership between the Secretary-General and one or more Member States is a pattern that has repeatedly brought favorable results.3 2

Joseph Lash, "The Man on the 38th Floor," Harper's, Vol. 219, No. 1313 (October 1959), p. 49. 3 Andrew W. Cordier, "The Role of the Secretary-General," in

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The record of specific cases also suggests that the idea of persuasion in great-power conflicts may have real substance. Lie exploited his persuasive opportunities extensively during the first Berlin crisis, apparently not without some real impact, although without overall success.4 Hammarskjold, as might be expected from previous comments on his diplomatic skill, became a master at the type of operation that falls into the category of persuasion. To take one example involving the great powers, his participation in and guidance of the negotiations leading to the formulation of the "six principles" that were agreed to in the context of the Suez crisis by Britain, France, and Egypt during October 1956 are a tribute to his outstanding diplomatic virtuosity.5 Moreover, Thant's performance during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 indicates that this type of activity is still very much alive and of substantial importance. United Nations experience in this field suggests that a great deal depends upon the particular incumbent in the office of Secretary-General, but it also suggests that there is a recurrent role in this area to which the SecretaryGeneral is likely to be able to contribute more than any other potential intervenor. Activity of this variety is closely related to the concepts that Hammarskjold had in mind when he repeatedly stressed the importance of "quiet diplomacy" and a "diplomacy of conciliation" in the United Nations context.6 He clearly believed that the Secretariat Richard N. Swift (ed.), Annual Review of United Nations Affairs 1960-1961 (New York: Oceana Press, 1960), p. 10. Cordier cites the cases of Suez, Lebanon, Jordan, and the Congo in this connection. "Trygve Lie, In the Cause of Peace (New York: Macmillan, 1954), chap. 12. 5 It is probable that Hammarskjold actually drafted the text of the "six principles." 6 On these subjects consult Hammarskjold in Foote (ed.), op.cit., pp. 170-174 (London address, 1958), and Joseph Lash, Dag Hammarskjold (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1961), chap. 12.

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was in a very strong position to operate along these lines, and it is in no small part his own deeds that provide the most hopeful evidence for possible future successes in this area. There are, however, certain types of superpower, and especially "nuclear," crises in which the New York City location of the United Nations would very likely become a liability. Since this problem of location is also important in connection with other instrumental activities such as elaboration and initiation and communications operations, it seems most appropriate to discuss it here in rather general terms. The problem would be especially salient in crises characterized by the threat or actual existence of large-scale conventional warfare or some form of nuclear warfare.7 At worst, the headquarters facilities might sustain severe damage or almost total disruption in the course of the hostilities. But even at best, the fact that the headquarters of the United Nations is located on the territory of one of the states that would be a party to the crisis could cause serious problems. AU or part of the relevant missions might be hurriedly withdrawn from New York, and the breaking or reduction of many contacts in the United Nations arena would be quite plausible. In addition, the authentic nature of information or communiques emanating from New York might become suspect. There would probably be too much opportunity for tampering and manipulation on the part of the territorial state for this type of question not to arise. It may well be worth investigating the possibility of establishing a United Nations crisis center outside the United States as an answer to this problem and also as a means of handling some of the difficulties raised in the previous 7

United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, "The Status and Role of the Secretariat of the United Nations," Staff Study No. 12, 1 November 1955 (bound in collection of staff studies), p. 361.

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chapter. Geneva suggests itself for a number of reasons as a location for such a center, but there are other possible locations that might offer substantial advantages. A small crisis center might encompass a variety of planning operations, and it would very likely be highly useful in coordinating and integrating scattered United Nations programs in the general field of peacekeeping and international security. It could house communications facilities and equipment, held in readiness for a variety of possible operations. It might offer an ideal center for informal contingencyplanning operations. In this connection, the crisis center would probably be an ideal location for the data-collection and processing activities outlined in Chapter Two. A system for filing data relevant to potential peacekeeping operations together with lists of persons around the world with key skills would also be of great importance. Moreover, the center could operate as an organization point and control center for inspection or supervision teams as well as for a variety of other service activities that may become relevant in future crises. In short, a unified crisis center could become a closely knit operation through which to coordinate and exploit to maximum advantage the varied activities of the United Nations in the field of peace and security. Is the establishment of such a center a real possibility in the present world? The answer to this question must certainly be highly qualified at present, but it does not seem to be a categorical negative. It is important to note that, though a center of this kind would require a rather highly trained staff, it would not have to be a big, sprawling operation. An adequate staff could certainly be reckoned in tens, and there would not necessarily be any exorbitantly expensive equipment or facilities involved. From the legal point of view, the establishment of such an operation would pose no serious problems. It could become a special mission in the Secretariat, an additional section of the Executive Of3 14

PERFORMANCE OF INSTRUMENTAL ACTIVITIES

fice of the Secretary-General, a subsidiary organ of the Security Council under the provisions of Article 29 of the Charter, or, less likely, a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly under the provisions of Article 22. The real problems would, of course, be political ones. Even if the proposal for a crisis center did not arouse active hostility or resentment, it might founder on the rocks of political and bureaucratic inertia. Moreover, several more modest attempts to increase the peacekeeping facilities of the Secretariat in recent years have failed to obtain the necessary support. On the other hand, it would not be necessary to throw the proposal for a crisis center into the lion's den created by the fundamental political splits in the international arena. Steps could be taken to prevent the proposal from looking unduly provocative and to make it broadly appealing to the major groupings in the United Nations. In support of the proposal, it might be possible to appeal simultaneously to the overlapping interests of the superpowers in avoiding the mutual destruction of escalating warfare or the messy involvements of protracted local situations and to the general interests of many other states in preventive diplomacy and vacuum-filling operations. Success along these lines, though doubtful, would not be far-fetched at present. And the directions of change in the international system are presently such that the idea of a United Nations crisis center may become increasingly acceptable in the foreseeable future. There is little of importance to add here concerning the next three roles under the heading of mediatory and conciliatory activities. Enunciation, elaboration and initiation, and interpretation are all closely tied to the availability of various resources discussed in the previous chapter. With regard to the prospects for enunciation, it is worth emphasizing that this tactic demands a delicate sensitivity to the soft spots in politico-military relationships during crises. For these purposes, knowledge of strategic and technical 3 15

THE INTERMEDIARIES

details must go beyond mere possession to the acquisition of an almost intuitive "feel" for the narrow areas of giveand-take that do, in fact, exist in most crisis confrontations. The Cuban missile crisis of 1962, for example, demonstrated the possibility of a use for this tactic, but it also provided a striking indication of the inadequacies of the Secretary-General's "feel" for the nuances of politicomilitary interactions during superpower confrontations. The ability of the Secretary-General to operate successfully in the area of elaboration and initiation would, of course, be closely related to the characteristics of the incumbent in the office at the time a particular crisis arose. Beyond this, however, the injection of proposals into a crisis situation depends very much on factors concerning timing and underlying crisis dynamics. The same program of intervention may be accorded a widely divergent reception at different phases in the life cycle of a given crisis. For this reason, it seems likely that certain types of contingency planning would increase the capabilities of the Secretary-General in the realm of elaboration and initiation. Although specific crises are difficult to foresee, it is possible to map out various types and classes of crisis in some detail (consult Chapter Six for examples). In this connection, the Secretary-General might benefit substantially from efforts to analyze the underlying dynamics of major types of crisis and to identify points in typical crisis life cycles that would provide opportunities to penetrate the relevant impasses with well-timed and well-phrased proposals or suggestions. The success of virtually every case of interpretation would depend on the combination of an intimate grasp of the nature of the situation at hand and a highly salient position in the eyes of the Soviet Union and the United States. In addition, an important antecedent to success in this area would be an ability to exercise a subtle and delicate power of initiative in order to get the process under way at all. 3 16

PERFORMANCE OF INSTRUMENTAL ACTIVITIES

The final group of activities under the heading of mediation and conciliation covers the notion of direct participation in explicit negotiations involving the United States and the Soviet Union. Participation of this kind might lend itself to a number of constructive and influential activities on the part of a third party. Moreover, both the SecretaryGeneral and certain members of his top staff might find themselves very well placed for such roles by virtue of their participant yet impartial and independent status.8 They might, for example, engage with relative ease in activities involving the establishment of agendas or the alteration of an important agenda at a critical moment in the negotiations. In addition, the combined role of servicing the negotiations and participating in them might provide an excellent platform from which to influence the channels along which the negotiations would proceed. The role of what may be called a participating secretary has repeatedly turned out to be a crucial one in various types of negotiation. A party standing between the principal antagonists and possessing a sound grasp of the facts and dilemmas of the situation can often exercise a great deal of influence in very quiet and subtle ways. Interestingly enough, several past cases suggest that a role of this kind might be carried out successfully in SovietAmerican negotiations. Hammarskjold intervened actively and forcefully in the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference during the spring of I960.9 The Secretariat not only provides the housekeeping services for the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference; but the Secretary-General has taken part in the proceedings on several occasions as a 8 For theoretical discussions of the various possibilities of influencing negotiations through participation see Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), especially chaps. 2 and 3, and Kenneth Boulding, Conflict and Defense (New York: Harper & Bros., 1962), chap. 15. 9 Lash, Dag Hammarskjold, pp. 157-158.

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major participant.10 For a time, U Thant even had a top aide who was responsible for liaison with the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference in the person of Omar Loutfi. And this arrangement was ended only by the death of Loutfi. Moreover, work presently under way in the Disarmament Affairs Group is aimed at strengthening the hand of the Secretary-General for possible interventions in these negotiations in the future.11 Beyond this, expectations are gradually growing to the effect that participation by the Secretary-General in major negotiations is an appropriate activity rather than unheard-of intrusion. The Soviet Union, for example, proposed a summit conference during the Middle Eastern crisis of 1958 which would have included Hammarskjold as a major participant.12 Whatever the underlying motives behind suggestions of this kind may be, the notion of participation by the Secretary-General in great-power negotiations is becoming less foreign and rigidly unacceptable as time passes. Activities of this type could well become cases in point of the proposition that a severe interbloc crisis might, in fact, increase the acceptability of third-party intervention and even make the principal antagonists eager to accept outside assistance. The fact that the Secretary-General is gaining influence as a participant in negotiations under the rather sterile conditions of cold-war interactions, in which the pressures on the two sides to reach agreements are not great, or at least not very tangible, would appear to be a favorable sign. During a really serious crisis, moreover, the context of intervention might change substantially. It is easily possible to imagine circumstances of crisis, in which 10

Sydney Bailey, The United Nations: A Short Political Guide (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 117. 11 This statement is based on a private communication from a member of the Disarmament Affairs Group, January 1964. 12 Sven Ahman, "Mr. Hammarskjold's Not-So-Quiet Diplomacy," The Reporter, Vol. 19, No. 3 (4 September 1958), pp. 11-12.

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overlapping Soviet-American interests would become very tangible or even stark. And the strait jacket posed by various dilemmas might become oppressive. Under such circumstances, there is reason to suppose that participation by the Secretary-General and his top staff might rapidly come to seem desirable to the superpowers.13 In the second category of instrumental activities, the communications function of keeping the parties to a crisis informed concerning important developments comes up first. Discussion of this type of intervention will be deferred at this point, however, in order to treat the whole subject of communications activities in a unified fashion in a later section.14 This brings into focus the role of data collection and processing in the course of a serious Soviet-American crisis. The Executive Office of the Secretary-General and the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs currently include a good many individuals who, though relatively unprepared for such tasks at the moment, could be trained to play valuable roles in data-processing operations without an exorbitant expenditure of time or money. Moreover, the numbers of people involved in activities of this kind would not be very great, even though a few key individuals would require rather thorough training. In this connection, it is important to note that various regional installations in the United Nations system could probably make useful contributions in the area of data collection with a minimum of training for the individuals involved. John Holmes, in a discussion of the establishment of United Nations operations in Africa, has spoken of: . . . the extension of the network of U.N. agents whose specific functions of co-ordinating economic assistance 13

See, in general, Thomas C. Schelling, "Arms Control: A Proposal for a Special Surveillance Force," World Politics, Vol. 13, No. 1 (October 1960), pp. 1-18. " Cf. infra, pp. 324-328.

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need not prevent them from exercising mediatory functions and providing the Secretariat with intelligence free from national bias.15 Hammarskjold's use of a mission in Laos that was formally established to perform economic functions in order to acquire valuable information is well known. And the United Nations is gaining considerable experience with fact-finding missions, especially in the context of African upheavals. During actual crises, it seems quite plausible that at least some of the regional offices could serve as observer posts for central data-processing operations at headquarters. There are, moreover, additional sources of information that the Secretariat could almost certainly utilize to good advantage with a little preliminary planning and coordination. It would probably be possible to pick up a great deal of information broadcast or released in print at various important points in the world during a crisis. It also seems likely that it would be fairly easy to enlist the services of many individuals and organizations as sources of data in the event that a severe crisis developed. An encouraging development in this connection is the establishment by the World Veterans Federation of an office in Paris to collect information on peacekeeping operations under United Nations auspices. If the needs of the United Nations were made known widely and favorably, it is quite possible that large quantities of information would pour in from many corners during crises. Under these circumstances, the central data-processing operation would depend heavily on the procedures of piecing together various information fragments. The information deducible from an amalgamation of all available fragments is very often far more than the sum of the parts. The problem of organizational apparatus for a data15 John Holmes, "The United Nations in the Congo," International Journal, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter 1960-1961), p. 7.

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processing operation poses at present considerably greater difficulties than the problem of personnel. Conducting a data-processing center would be a small operation by the standards of most national governments, but it would require a basic facility as well as some more specific equipment. The resources of the United Nations are not at present wholly adequate, however, for such an undertaking. The Organization does have a radio-telegraph system that provides links for its main offices. And some of the more important field operations have had their own communications equipment for internal coordination.16 Nevertheless, these facilities are neither very extensive in their coverage nor capable of handling an unusually heavy load. While they will undoubtedly be valuable in future crises in transmitting information from a few important spots, they are hardly adequate for the establishment and central coordination of a really far-reaching data-collection network. These weaknesses, coupled with the problems of training, constitute the principal nonpolitical difficulties confronting this type of intervention. The United Nations may, however, be able to move in the direction of acquiring equipment relevant to data-collection operations, as mentioned earlier, by stressing the multifunctional nature of such equipment. Several additional points concerning the collection and processing of data deserve mention. First, it would probably be necessary to establish certain security provisions in utilizing the acquired data. At a minimum, some general rules concerning access to various types of information would be required. It is clear, for example, that control procedures for sensitive information that might yield politico-military advantages to one side would be necessary. It is not likely that the problems of setting up security arrangements would generate prohibitive difficulties, but they 16

On this and the previous statement consult Everyman's United Nations (7th ed.; New York: United Nations Office of Public Information, 1964), pp. 458-459.

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would have to be dealt with in some fashion at the outset of the operation. Second, the discussion of data collection raises again the notion of a United Nations intelligence service. The reasons why this idea seems unfeasible at present were outlined in the preceding chapter. Moreover, it seems quite likely, as indicated above, that a data-processing operation could circumvent this difficulty by acquiring information from a variety of less formal sources. Third, this role is another one for which the New York City location would probably become a serious liability, at least during very severe crises and Soviet-American wars. This problem is all the more serious since it might become most severe in those cases in which the need for this type of thirdparty activity is the greatest. Here again, the notion of a crisis center located outside the United States seems relevant. A final possibility in this second category focuses on the possibilities of physical interposition between Soviet and American forces during a severe crisis or limited war. An analysis of this role suggests a number of very serious difficulties that might well stand in the way of activities along these lines. It seems inappropriate to conclude that the notion of interposition is irrelevant, however, since activities of a rather similar nature have already been engaged in by the United Nations in situations where the odds seemed initially to be strongly against success. Perhaps the greatest problems facing interposition in the context of superpower crises are those dealing with time and location. The time period during which interposition in a Soviet-American confrontation or clash would be both relevant and feasible would probably be rather short. The basic difficulty here, then, stems from the necessity of mobilizing very rapidly. Moreover, intervention of this type could only occur in places that were accessible by means of fairly standard equipment and that were situated reasonably near a supply of personnel that the United Nations could 322

PERFORMANCE OF INSTRUMENTAL ACTIVITIES

tap. Beyond this, however, additional problems would tend to crop up. In contrast to a number of other instrumental activities, it would be impossible, in most cases, to carry out an interpositionary operation on the basis of available Secretariat personnel. The cumbersome procedures of authorization by a policy organ and contribution of contingents by member states would, therefore, be necessary.17 In addition, an operation of the requisite size would tend to engender a series of problems concerning the utilization of acceptable personnel, logistics, transportation, communications, and financing.18 The Secretariat is insufficiently equipped to handle a number of these problems on its own at present and would have to depend on substantial outside aid if an operation of this type were to be carried out at all. Finally, it is important to remember that in a situation of this kind the important contributions which the United States has made in solving these problems in the past would not be available. This is an impressive list of problems, and it tends to lead to pessimism about the possibilities of United Nations interposition in interbloc crises. The principal factor that mitigates this conclusion is the fact that the United Nations has undertaken somewhat similar activities in the past with some success. The most relevant example for purposes of this analysis is the case of UNEF in the Suez crisis of 1956,19 but additional cases such as Kashmir and Lebanon 17

These problems are discussed competently in Ruth Russell, "United Nations Experience with Military Forces: Political and Legal Aspects," Brookings Staff Paper (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, August 1964), especially chaps. 1 and 4. 18 See Lincoln P. Bloomfield (ed.), "International Force—A Symposium," International Organization, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Spring 1963), especially the essays in pt. i. 19 On Suez consult William R. Frye, A United Nations Peace Force (New York: Oceana Press, 1957), and Gabriella Rosner, The United Nations Emergency Force (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963). 323

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also have a bearing on the problems at hand.20 Though none of these cases involved a direct Soviet-American confrontation, they all engendered many of the problems mentioned above. In several instances, problems of this kind very nearly brought the operation to naught either before it was properly launched or during its early phases. There is probably little reason to conclude, however, that a nonfighting, interpositionary force would be much less likely to succeed, say, on the borders of East and West Germany than in the Sinai Peninsula and Port Said. Here again, Schelling's thesis to the effect that during certain types of "nuclear" crisis, the two superpowers might be very anxious to grasp at any reasonable device that promised to spring them loose from their dilemmas seems applicable.21 The relevant force would probably have to be created by the General Assembly, but then, this was also the case with UNEF in November 1956. The third category of instrumental activities covers the various service roles. There is perhaps no better way to approach a discussion of the capabilities of the SecretaryGeneral and his staff in the realm of communications operations22 than to quote the following statements concerning U Thant's role during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962: . . . the Secretary-General served as a moderator and letter-carrier, as a conveyor of rumors, assumptions, and gestures—a role someone must assume in international relations. If U Thant or an office of the Secretary-General had not existed, it would have been neces20

Most of these cases are dealt with in some detail in the various essays contained in Bloomfield, op.cit. On the Lebanon situation see also Lash, Dag Hammarskjold, pp. 112-127. 21 Schelling, "Arms Control: A Proposal for a Special Surveillance Force," op.cit. 22 The following comments are applicable, for the most part, to the independent function in this area, mentioned above, as well as to communications services. 324

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sary for the powers to invent them. Both parties found it practical to channel suggestions and semi-official communications through their United Nations ambassadors and to initiate preliminary contacts in discussions with the Secretary-General. Every time the United States and the USSR were not talking to each other, they could talk separately to the Secretary-General.... In all this, U Thant was more than a mechanical relay through which the parties maintained contact. His function could not have been fulfilled by any "hot wire." For a long time the United Nations has served its member states as a face saver. It is easier to bow before a hundred nations and earn credit for peaceful behavior than to surrender to an enemy whose purpose is victory. The impartial Secretary-General can demand a restraint that neither of the conflicting parties can exercise under pressure from the other.23 Moreover, both the direct statements of U Thant and official American statements on the crisis tend to confirm the importance of this role of the Secretary-General.24 These statements suggest that the Secretary-General is a very logical actor for the performance of certain very important communications roles in the contemporary international arena. The growing salience of the office, discussed above, is particularly important in giving the Secretary-General a focal position in the expectations of many national decisionmakers. At this point, however, some problems in the realm of physical resources for communications activities deserve mention. The United Nations does have its radio-telegraph system, operated in accordance with agreements with the 23

Henry Pachter, Collision Course (New York: Praeger, 1963), pp. 95-96. 24 See, for example, "Interview with the Secretary-General," United Nations Review, January 1964, p. 5; and "U.S. Participation in the U.N." (Report by the President to the Congress, 1962).

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United States.25 This represents an extension of a development begun under the League of Nations, which operated a wireless station of its own called Radio-Nations after February 1932.26 Ranshofen-Wertheimer suggests that "the chief motivating factor for the establishment of Radio-Nations lay in the use the Secretariat expected to make of it in times of emergency."27 The radio-telegraph system of the United Nations is not based so exclusively on the notion of emergency functions, but it has seen extensive use in support of various peacekeeping operations. The problem is, however, that these facilities are severely limited from the point of view of third-party operations. They link only the major United Nations offices. Transmitting and receiving apparatus is not very extensive in terms of either coverage or load capacity. And the system has very little protection against disruption by various means during severe crises. Aside from this, the United Nations relies on commercial communications installations. Though this by no means precludes useful third-party activities, as the Cuban case indicates, the use of commercial facilities during superpower crises might well be hampered by the requirements for authentic information and the dangers of physical degradation. Further problems posed by various communications activities include the facts that the New York City location might well become a serious liability for successful operations during really intense superpower confrontations and that the various weaknesses in terms of physical resources would probably be especially handicapping to the role of attempting to keep the protagonists actively informed, as 26

United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, op.cit., p. 355. 26 Egon Ranshofen-Wertheimer, The International Secretariat: A Great Experiment in International Administration (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1945), p. 195. 27 Loc.cit.

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contrasted with the more passive service functions in this area. Activities of the more positive variety would almost certainly have to be supported by some sort of datacollection and processing operation if they were to have an important impact during any given crisis. Can the present resources of the Secretariat be strengthened in this area with an eye toward future crises? There is the possibility of making the Moscow-Washington telecommunications link into a triangle with one corner at the United Nations. Such a connection would undoubtedly help to reduce the communications difficulties of the Secretary-General. Even better would be separate connections linking the United Nations with the two capitals, but such a step is probably not feasible in the immediate future. It does not seem unreasonable to suppose, however, that Soviet and American acceptance of a triangular "hot line" might be forthcoming in the foreseeable future, especially as part of some package deal and under pressure from various nonaligned political groupings. The Afro-Asian bloc or the neutrals at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference, for example, might well be able to put considerable pressure on the superpowers to accept such an arrangement. The notion of a crisis center designed to deal with the problems caused by the liability of the New York City location during grave crises and wars would also be relevant in this context. It would be possible, for example, to deal efficiently at such a center with the problem of coordinating communications operations and data-collection and processing activities. In addition, the creation of a crisis center would generate opportunities to integrate United Nations crisis operations in one place, to coordinate a wide range of activities, and to set up a small crisis staff that would be constantly available. The resultant necessity of carrying on many activities at a distance from the Secretary-General, who would have to spend most of his time in New York, might constitute a real 327

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disadvantage in establishing a crisis center. It is possible that high-level failures of coordination might result from such a separation. There appear, however, to be several possible remedies for this problem. The Secretary-General might fly to the crisis center during periods of really severe crisis and operate from there. Hammarskjold made quick shifts of location, generally back to New York, on several occasions at the outset of a major crisis.28 And, especially in cases of serious Soviet-American confrontation, it might actually be advantageous to get the Secretary-General out of New York City. It is by no means impossible to conceive of cases in which he would lose a good deal of his ability to influence events by staying in New York. It might also be possible to reduce many of the coordination difficulties by increasing the communications facilities under direct United Nations control and in so doing to move toward the objective of a substantial independent communications network for the Organization. Such a development would address itself both to the specific problem at hand and to several of the more general problems of launching successful third-party operations under the auspices of the United Nations. For reasons already discussed, the acquisition of the necessary equipment, in small steps, might not be beyond the realm of the possible. The personnel exists, and training could certainly be geared to the acquisition of equipment. What would be required, above all, for such a program would be an active and continuing effort to utilize even small opportunities to move in this direction to maximum effect. The second set of activities in the service category covers verification, inspection, and monitoring operations. There are two broadly distinguishable levels of operation in this 28

For the example of the Congo case, in which Hammarskjold flew to New York from Geneva, see Andrew Boyd, United Nations: Piety, Myth, and Truth (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1962), p. 120. 328

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area. On the one hand, some activities could be based primarily on Secretariat personnel and might even be set in motion without an explicit mandate from a policy organ of the United Nations, though a covering resolution would, in most cases, be helpful. The other level covers considerably larger operations based on extra-Secretariat personnel, explicitly authorized by a policy organ, and only organized and directed under the auspices of the Secretariat. The basic problems these larger operations pose would be similar to those mentioned in the discussion of interposition, and they have already been treated at some length in available studies.29 The focus here, therefore, will be on the considerably smaller operations in the former category. It would be possible to carry out operations of this kind through the use of rather small teams that could generally be mustered within the Secretariat on very short notice. The United Nations is already gaining considerable experience in mobilizing small teams very rapidly in the realm of fact-finding. In many cases, officials from the Executive Office itself can be utilized to form the core of the necessary teams. But there are other sources in the system that might provide personnel. The regional offices as in the case of Pier Spinelli in 1958,30 the United Nations Guards as in the case of Palestine in 1948,31 previously established missions as in the cases of UNEF and ONUC, and the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs might all be good sources of personnel in future crises. In addition, it might be worth while to reexamine some of Trygve Lie's more extended concepts dealing with the development of a United Nations guard force in the light of intervening changes in international politics and contemporary requirements.32 In general, however, Secretariat personnel tend to 29 See especially Frye, op.cit.; Bloomfield, op.cit., and Russell, op.cit. 30 31 Boyd, op.cit., p. 112. Lie, op.cit., pp. 187ff. 32 On this subject consult Stephen Schwebel, "A United Nations

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look very favorably on assignments to "go on mission,"33 and it would probably not be difficult to find the personnel for a number of small verification and inspection teams. Reliable sources within the Secretariat maintain that small teams can now be gotten into the field within a matter of hours in many cases. The most important problems in this area, as with several other instrumental activities, would focus on the training of staff members who might serve on such teams and on the acquisition of equipment for the operations in question. But in the case of such small operations neither of these problems seems in any way insurmountable. The objective would be, as Paul Martin has put it, "the creation of a pool of political and military officers who could be dispatched at once to the scene of an incident."34 In this connection, valuable preliminary planning and contingency exercises might well be possible. This would be particularly useful in locating skills and relevant knowledge within the Secretariat. Another valuable form of preparation would be an effort to carry out a survey and registration of important resources for inspection and verification operations around the world. This should be coupled with a concerted effort to familiarize key people in various countries with the basic nature of the operations in question and with the types of service they might be able to render during periods of crisis. Officials in nonaligned countries situated near areas of probable need for inspection or verification in future crises would seem especially relevant. In Europe, for example, the obvious 'Guard' and a United Nations 'Legion,'" in Frye, op.cit., pp. 195216. 33 This statement is based on private communications from members of the Secretariat. It seems to be no secret, however, that the variation, change of pace, and excitement of "going on mission" are attractive to many staff members in the Secretariat. 34 Paul Martin, "Peace-Keeping and the United Nations—The Broader View," International Affairs, Vol. 40, No. 2 (1964), p. 201. 330

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countries are Switzerland, Austria, and Sweden. These countries possess various resources whose availability could become important to United Nations inspection or verification teams during periods of crisis. Moreover, it does not seem unreasonable to suppose that countries such as these might be willing to cooperate with preparatory programs in this area. They would not be asked to hand anything over to the United Nations. They would only be asked to make available certain facilities and resources to small United Nations teams in the event of crisis and to make a sufficient commitment to this effect so that Secretariat officials could count on the availability of the resources in their contingency plans.35 Finally, it is worth noting that shortages of time might not become a really serious problem in the realm of inspection and verification in many cases. This is, of course, true of the preparatory stages discussed above, but it might also be the case during actual periods of crisis. Crisis confrontations would tend to reach a rather static stage by the time inspection or verification operations became relevant. And the small teams under consideration here would be highly mobile and capable of rapid launching. In short, small operations of this kind would have a number of advantages over larger peacekeeping missions. Very small teams would almost certainly be sufficient for many verification and inspection tasks, thus obviating the need for larger operations. The speed with which they could be set up and put in the field would give them an important advantage. It would be possible to operate small teams on an ad hoc and temporary basis. That is, the SecretaryGeneral could form them for specific tasks and then allow them to melt right back into the Secretariat. They would 85

On the somewhat related possibilities of stand-by force arrangements see U Thant's speech at Harvard University, 13 June 1963, United Nations Review, July 1963, pp. 54-57.

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tend to operate on the principle of positive evidence;36 their very smallness would guarantee this in most instances. Moreover, all these factors in combination might well make international inspection and verification procedures far more readily acceptable from the point of view of the Soviet Union and the United States than any large operations. Supervisory activities also fall under the heading of service roles. Operations in this area are subject to most of the problems and possibilities just discussed with reference to inspection, verification, and monitoring procedures. The principal distinction between large-scale and small-scale operations is important in this area as well, but several problems relevant especially to supervisory activities deserve mention at this point. Supervisory teams in the context of superpower crises would probably have to operate, in many cases, either under battlefield conditions or sufficiently close to belligerent operations to create certain hazards. The presence of various dangers would almost certainly not make it impossible to secure personnel willing to undertake missions of this kind. It might, however, make it important to select individuals for operating teams on the basis of somewhat different criteria than in the case of inspection or verification teams. Similarly, it would probably be desirable to create an international status for supervisory teams that would guarantee them protection and immunities in various situations. One possibility would be to make some of the rules of war and especially the relevant provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 194937 applicable to the personnel of international supervisory teams. In addition, the organization of supervisory operations 38

Thomas C. Schelling and Morton Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961), pp. 97-98. 37 For extended discussions of the Geneva Conventions see Morris Greenspan, The Modern Law of Land Warfare (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959). 332

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might also involve greater time pressures than the establishment of verification or inspection teams. The key situations in which supervisory activities would be relevant during Soviet-American crises include efforts to maintain the rules of the game for Hmited warfare in a nuclear environment and to provide safeguards against the expansion or explosion of limited hostilities.38 These are situations that could get out of hand easily and quickly, leading ultimately to large-scale disruption through the processes of escalation and amplifying feedback. For these reasons, speed in setting up supervisory operations could well become critical. Under these circumstances, the idea of small Secretariatstaffed teams that could be mobilized very rapidly is especially attractive. A final group of service roles falls under the headings of arbitration and quasi-arbitration. The Secretariat itself would probably be unable to carry out arbitral operations of the kind discussed in Chapter Two. Inspection or supervision teams might render opinions from time to time or actually settle various misunderstandings in ad hoc situations. By its very nature, however, the Secretariat is not an adjudicatory body with the qualities necessary for success in this realm of operations. Nevertheless, there may be some valuable contributions that the Secretary-General and his staff could make in this context. The Secretary-General might play a role in inducing the United States and the Soviet Union to submit to arbitral procedures in a given situation or class of situations. For this purpose, he might even utilize some of the other instrumental activities discussed earlier. In the event that procedures of this kind did come into play, the Secretariat would become an important source of staff and housekeeping facilities for the resultant operations. In addition, inspection or supervisory teams might play a valuable 38

Morton Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age (New York: John Wiley, 1963), chap. 1. 333

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role as sources of unbiased information that would be of great importance to a body attempting to exercise arbitral judgment. The problem of acquiring reliable information would probably be one of the keys to the whole notion of arbitration. Similar problems have, in fact, already arisen in United Nations practice. What is to be done, for example, when a state brings a case to the Security Council charging aggression while the accused party categorically (and plausibly) denies all responsibility? Both in Korea in 195039 and in Lebanon in 1958,40 information received from United Nations presences operating on the ground was of considerable importance in dealing with problems of this kind. In cases where arbitration would be inapplicable by itself, therefore, it might still be of some importance in conjunction with other forms of United Nations intervention. A reverse relationship might also be possible since the existence of arbitral procedures might sometimes allow inspection or supervision teams to forward problems they were unable to handle in the field to some recognized authority. The International Control Commissions established under the Geneva agreements of 1954 on Indochina, for example, have sometimes been able to utilize the existence of the cochairmanship in this fashion. Assuming that arbitral activities during crises became a real possibility, there are a number of forms in which they could be actualized. It seems probable, however, that the types of arbitral procedures that would become relevant during superpower crises would focus on ad hoc arrangements at a rather low and specific level. For the foreseeable future, this would almost certainly have to be the case, for example, in dealing with breaches or alleged breaches of various rules of the game in the course of limited hostili39

See Leland M. Goodrich, "Korea: Collective Measures Against Aggression," International Conciliation, No. 494 (October 1953). 40 Lash, Dag Hammarskjold, pp. 112-127. 334

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ties. In some cases, regional or even military-theater tribunals serviced by Secretariat personnel might be a possibility. At the moment, however, it does not seem likely that political consensus would be forthcoming for anything beyond ad hoc arrangements during actual periods of crisis. A RESUME OF PROBLEMS The discussion so far has focused on possibilities for action by the Secretary-General and his staff and on various prospects for the reduction of obstacles to such action. The general tenor of the discussion has been, on the whole, optimistic. Before closing, however, it seems important to take stock briefly of the general framework of problems facing the Secretary-General in the area of peace and security operations as a whole rather than on a piecemeal basis. The resultant list of difficulties is impressive, but there should be no impUcation that they will rule out action in given crises of the future. In fact, experience with a number of them suggests that they can be dealt with successfully in at least some specific situations, and the record of past cases is by no means discouraging. As always, fundamental political problems come first and foremost on the list of difficulties. Three broad classes of political problems stand out in the context of prospects for third-party operations during Soviet-American crises. To begin with, there is the problem of attaining the confidence and general political support necessary to initiate an intervention of this type. There exists at present a feeling that taking initiatives of this kind might be a little like walking a gangplank, and this feeling is not wholly unfounded. Similar problems of confidence exist, however, in all cases in which initiative on the part of the Secretary-General is innovative in nature, and they have not seriously deterred any of the Secretaries-General in the past. Though Hammarskjold, for example, was very articulate on the subject 335

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of risks to his office and the dangers of undermining the Secretary-General's usefulness in a variety of areas,41 he also enunciated and practiced the doctrine that the United Nations, and especially the Secretary-General, must respond in some way when there is a real chance that intervention will have positive consequences in a dangerous situation.42 In actual practice, he undertook innovative initiatives on a number of occasions with great skill and daring. Moreover, the other Secretaries-General have been far from excessively cautious in their approach to the problem of political initiative. Thant's 1965 statement to the effect that the Secretary-General must always take the initiative, regardless of consequences, if there is a real chance that his action can "make the difference between peace and war" is particularly significant in this connection.43 In short, there is every reason to suppose that the Secretary-General will stand willing to undertake innovative initiatives during future crises. This conclusion brings into focus the other sets of political problems. A second set of difficulties covers the broad area of acceptability. Given the confidence and support to initiate an intervention, how can the Secretary-General sell a specific program of activities to the United States and the Soviet Union? Since the third-party operations under analysis in this study are essentially noncoercive and facilitative by nature, acceptability is primarily a political problem. This is one of the central problems that Part II of this study addresses. A general discussion of acceptability in the context of Soviet-American crises appears in Chapter Five, 41 See, for example, Hammarskjold in Foote (ed.), op.cit., p. 302 (Introduction to the Annual Report, 1959-1960). 42 For a statement of this position consult Hammarskjold in Foote (ed.), op.cit., p. 267 (press conference, 1959). 43 For the general point as well as the quote see U Thant, "Statement Read at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, May 22, 1965," U.N. Monthly Chronicle, Vol. 2, No. 6 (June 1965), pp. 103-104.

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while Chapter Six breaks the problem down into a number of more specific parts through the use of scenarios. The immediately preceding material, moreover, deals in some detail with various questions relating to acceptability in connection with activities on the part of the SecretaryGeneral and the Secretariat. The final group of political problems, about which little serious analysis is now available, concerns the maintenance of political support for an operation after its initial acceptance and mobilization. Support in this sense refers both to general backing and to the provision of resources necessary for the continuation of an operation. There is, in fact, a growing awareness in United Nations circles that this set of problems encompasses a critical group of variables in determining the final success or failure of peacekeeping operations." The problem of maintaining support in both senses came critically to the fore in late 1960 and during 1961 in the context of the Congo operation. Since then, the dispute over the financing of UNEF and ONUC has underlined these problems sharply. There is no doubt, however, that the maintenance of political support for ongoing operations is one of the basic problems facing the Organization and especially the Secretary-General as its chief executive in a variety of contexts. Moreover, this appears to be an area in which the weakness of the Secretary-General, as compared with the chief executive of an established and reasonably stable state, is most clear-cut. He has neither a party that he can reliably command nor an organized network of political supporters. In addition, he does not control the wide variety of political deprivations and indulgences that constitute one of the principal informal sources of power for most chief execu44

A number of perceptive comments bearing on this problem appear in I. L. Claude, Jr., "The Political Framework of the United Nations' Financial Problems," International Organization, Vol. 17, No. 4 (1963), pp. 831-859. 337

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tives.45 The Secretary-General must, therefore, depend heavily upon his own wits in maintaining political support for many operations. He can, in fact, go far on the strength of his personality, the prestige generally accorded to his office, and a skill at welding political forces into loose coalitions. No matter what he does, however, there is often some danger of the bottom dropping out from under his activities. It is not difficult to understand why the Secretary-General has sometimes worried about risks and the dangers of overcommitment, at least when he has not been too busy acting to think about such things. As mentioned earlier, nevertheless, the Secretaries-General themselves have tended to take a more constructive attitude toward the necessity of taking political risks and the possibility of expendability than outside analysts. For this reason, they have sometimes succeeded in maintaining an operation in the face of very unfavorable odds posed by shifts in political alignments. It is probably reasonable to argue as a generalization that the legal problems of intervening in superpower crises are decidedly secondary to the political problems and that they do not present any insoluble obstacles to action by the Secretary-General. The relevant problems tend to focus on justifications for initiatory actions and on the legal competence to act under various circumstances in the absence of an explicit mandate from a policy organ. The constitutional basis of the powers of the Secretary-General in these realms is frequently controversial at best. But the practice of the United Nations has, from the beginning, tended to support wide competences and powers of initiative for the Secretary-General.46 In the absence of more explicit bases, these powers have received confirmation under the general responsibility of the Secretary-General to uphold the purposes and objectives of the United Nations and to act as its i5

On this subject see Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power (New York: John Wiley, 1960), especially chap. 3. 46 See, in general, Boyd, op.cit., pp. 85-122. 338

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spokesman in the international community. Hammarskjold developed both theory and practice in these areas with a delicate hand. And U Thant has so far been able to operate rather boldly in these waters although he has occasionally run into problems in cases such as the observer mission for Yemen and the establishment of UNIPOM during the Indian-Pakistani confrontation in September 1965.47 Even these legal problems, however, ultimately have a thoroughly political basis. This is not to deny that the risks are generally smaller when the Secretary-General is on solid legal ground than when he is experimenting outside the bounds of clear prescriptions.48 Nevertheless, if the political support and demand for an operation is strong enough, the Secretary-General can get away with almost anything he deems to be in the general interests of international peace and security. Activities of this kind, as Hammarskjold was fond of pointing out, are generally designed to carry out the spirit of the Charter rather than to uphold the letter of its provisions.49 In this connection, it is worth emphasizing that they may, therefore, constitute a channel through which the Organization can adapt itself to unfolding requirements without utilizing the cumbersome and frequently unfeasible processes of constitutional alteration. During much of the history of the United Nations, the distribution and interaction of political forces in the world 47

In September 1965 Thant came in for a certain amount of Soviet criticism concerning his interpretation of the provisions of the Security Council resolution of 20 September 1965 (Resolution 211) dealing with an India-Pakistan Observer Mission. 48 For some very perceptive comments on this subject see Oscar Schachter, "The Relation of Law, Politics and Action in the United Nations," Academy of International Law, Recueil des Cours, Vol. 1 (1963), especially pp. 203-204. 49 A good example of this view can be found in Hammarskjold's statement in Foote (ed.), op.cit., p. 150 (statement before the General Assembly on his Re-election to a Second Term, 1957).

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have been such as to encourage and support executive initiatives on the part of the Secretary-General in a variety of contexts. Soviet-American relations, moreover, are now undergoing a complex process of change that may well make third-party activities more acceptable in future crises. Sydney Bailey voices a widespread feeling in suggesting that "A revision of the Soviet view of the nature and purposes of a general international organization to keep the peace should not be excluded."50 And it seems probable that the somewhat smaller changes that would be necessary to bring the American posture to an orientation that would look with favor on third-party operations during crises are already beginning to occur. This last point will be pursued at some length in the following chapter in the discussion of such factors as the decline of bipolarity, the development of an embryonic Soviet-American detente, and the redistribution of conflict patterns in the international system. This brings the discussion to the difficulties posed by the financial limitations on the peace and security operations of the United Nations. Severe restrictions on the funds available to the Organization have always been a major limitation, but the so-called financing crisis of the United Nations that began to develop in a serious way during 1961 has sharply emphasized these financial problems.51 In legal terms, developments such as the International Court's advisory opinion of 20 July 1962 suggest an expansion of the financial powers of the Organization.52 The practical 50

Sydney Bailey, "The Troika and the Future of the U.N.," International Conciliation, No. 538 (May 1962), p. 13. 51 For a general analysis of the financing crisis see John G. Stoessinger and Associates, Financing the United Nations System (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution, 1964). The political implications of these financial difficulties are treated with insight in Claude, op.cit. 52 On the implications of the Advisory Opinion see Leo Gross, "Expenses of the United Nations for Peace-Keeping Operations,"

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significance of the financing crisis, however, has been to hamper the peacekeeping activities of the United Nations severely, especially with regard to larger operations of the police force variety. Recent operations have utilized various alternatives to assessed financing with some success. The West Irian operation and the Yemen mission were financed by the principal parties to the dispute. The Cyprus force has depended heavily on the contributors of contingents for the necessary resources. And voluntary contributions have helped in several cases. There is no doubt, however, that the crisis has increased the limitations on peacekeeping significantly. The premature termination of ONUC and the sluggishness in launching the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)53 are at least partially attributable to these financial problems. The Secretary-General has complained repeatedly, moreover, about the limitations caused by the increasing difficulty of financing peacekeeping operations. During 1964 and 1965 the financing crisis became further embroiled in the political contest between the Soviet Union and the United States. The opening of the nineteenth session of the General Assembly was postponed twice until 1 December 1964. The whole nineteenth session, moreover, was virtually wrecked by the near-showdown of the superpowers over the payment of arrears for peacekeeping operations and the application of Article 19 of the Charter. The immediate crisis was solved in September 1965 when the United States backed down on the issue of past debts and the two superpowers came to a de facto agreement to the effect that the great powers should exercise greater control over future peacekeeping operations. This means that the doctrine of assessedfinancingfor peaceInternational Organization, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Winter 1963), pp. 1-35. 53 J. King Gordon, "The U.N. in Cyprus," International Journal, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Summer 1964), p. 338.

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keeping activities has been lost, at least for the immediate future. In addition, there is little doubt that the crisis has had the result of striking a blow at the confidence in the general peacekeeping capabilities of the United Nations in many quarters. It is worth noting, however, that the crisis has not undermined the position of the SecretaryGeneral. Available information indicates, for example, that U Thant played a role of some importance in the effort to find a formula to allow the General Assembly to open on 1 December 1964 without a direct SovietAmerican showdown. Moreover, the whole crisis has served to emphasize the relative stability of the executive branch of the Organization and the important position of the Secretary-General as a spokesman for the international community. In analyzing third-party operations during superpower crises, it is useful to separate the financial problem into two parts: difficulties in financing preparatory activities, and difficulties in actually carrying out third-party operations during a crisis. In practice, the first problem is probably the greater of the two though it may not seem so at first. If the Secretariat can undertake any significant program of preparations, the Secretary-General may well have the capabilities for many types of intervention in readiness without waiting for special authorizations or arrangements. Under these circumstances, it is quite probable that a severe crisis would produce political agreement on a policy of going ahead with various activities on an "act now, pay later" basis.54 Moreover, a crisis of sufficient proportions to make both sides willing to accept outside assistance might well produce some positive arrangement to defray the consequent expenses in addition. On the other hand, in the foreseeable future there would probably be insurmountable obstacles to getting any really 54

Lincoln P. Bloomfield, in International Military Forces (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1964), p. 86, makes a rather similar point.

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substantial amount of money budgeted for preparatory activities pointing toward third-party operations in future crises. It is a well-taken point that more time is spent scrutinizing the expenditure of less money at the United Nations than anywhere else in the world.55 In fact, this general difficulty constitutes one of the important reasons why the present study focuses on rather modest recommendations. A great many of the suggestions discussed in this and the preceding chapter could be either funded within the framework of the typical regular budget of recent years or launched without any substantial increases in the budget of the Organization. In very rough terms, it seems probable that a total of one million dollars a year would be adequate in launching most of the preparatory programs under discussion. Several of the suggestions, moreover, are geared especially toward increasing efficiency in utilizing already available personnel. This is true, for example, of several suggestions concerning the Disarmament Affairs Group and the establishment of links between this group and the Executive Office aimed at maximizing the availability of important information during crises. Or, again, the intensive in-service training of as few as five to ten carefully selected staff members might pay off very well in organizing third-party operations during future crises. A number of the important problems in the actual conduct of peacekeeping operations focus on the availability and utilization of personnel. Previous sections have treated a number of aspects of this set of problems. In connection with third-party operations, however, where the number of persons involved is often small, it is worth stressing the difference between the acceptabiUty of the whole idea of United Nations intervention and the acceptability of particular members of the Secretariat for third-party work. Ex55

On the United Nations budgetary processes in general, consult J. David Singer, Financing International Organization (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1961). 343

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periences in such cases as UNEF and ONUC underline the variety of personnel problems that can arise as well as the critical importance of selecting personnel for any given operation with the utmost care.56 There is no reason why problems of this kind should pose insurmountable obstacles in most cases, but the penalties for failing to pay adequate attention to the selection of specific personnel can be very severe. The discussion of utilizing personnel suggests one additional recommendation. Though the principal emphasis in preparing for third-party roles during future crises would fall on the training of Secretariat staff members, important human resources in various parts of the world might prove useful during specific operations. At present, however, the relevant persons are not listed in any way that would allow the United Nations to locate needed persons on short notice. The present suggestion, therefore, is to aim toward the compilation of a crisis directory, listing persons who have useful skills and who might be available for specialized tasks on a temporary basis and on very short notice. A directory of this kind might especially emphasize persons with relevant diplomatic experience or with scientific training that might be useful, for example, in inspection, verification, or supervision operations. Scientific knowledge is an area in which the Secretariat staff can hardly expect to become expert. Therefore, the availability of outside scientists on a temporary basis might be especially valuable in conducting certain types of third-party operations. Finally, there are several sets of socio-cultural considerations that are relevant to third-party operations during periods of superpower crisis. To begin with, there are various problems in utilizing persons with widely divergent 56

Problems in this area have been treated with particular insight by Henry V. Dicks, "National Loyalty, Identity, and the International Soldier," in Bloomfleld, "International Force—A Symposium," op.cit., pp. 425-443.

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backgrounds in unified and highly integrated operations.57 These problems have been noted and discussed in some detail, especially in connection with the difficulties of the Congo operation. They are of some real importance but they seem, on the whole, manageable through the application of careful coordination procedures and sound judgment. Even more important, are the difficult problems that arise in dealing with diverging national styles of statecraft, special sensitivities, and the peculiarities of particular sociopolitical systems. There are very significant differences between the American and Soviet systems in these terms, for example, that would have to be taken into account in conducting many types of third-party operations. To illustrate, the general secrecy or closedness of the Soviet system and the somewhat emotional moralism of the American national style are both realities that would have to be dealt with as such. It would probably be worth undertaking some specific studies of these problems. In general, however, the kind of diplomatic skill that is often generated by service in the Executive Office of the Secretary-General would probably constitute the most valuable resource available in dealing with difficulties of this kind. 57

For discussion consult ibid., and Rosner, op.cit., chap. 5.

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PART ΠΙ

Prospects for the Future

An international system does not maintain a particular structure of alignments indefinitely. Transformations may be deliberately promoted by negotiations or by the build-up of lesser states by larger powers. Alliances break up or, much less frequently, consolidate into new political communities. The ever-present element of the unintended is greatest when alliances facilitate a transformation in the process of preventing another—by allowing new challengers to arise in Heu of the thwarted ones. GEORGE LISKA

CHAPTERNINE

The Nature of Change and the Role of the Third Party

T

HE PRECEDING CHAPTERS have concentrated primarily on the present characteristics of the international system which seem likely to generate useful roles for a third party during crises. There are, however, two important ways in which unfolding trends in the system may affect future prospects for third-party intervention. Changes can alter the very nature of crises in important ways. Ongoing trends may well have significant effects on such factors as the types, frequency, severity, dilemmas, and cooperative elements of future crises. Beyond this, changes in the overall system may alter the capacity of the United Nations and other potential third parties to act as intervening agents in severe international crises. In this connection, both objective and subjective (i.e., perceived) changes may be important in upgrading or downgrading the capacity of various actors to perform as third parties. The principal theme of this chapter is twofold. To begin with, the international system is presently undergoing rapid and substantial change on a number of fronts. Although the evidence suggests that these changes will not push beyond the bounds of a state system in the immediate future, they do add up to some substantial alterations in the bipolar patterns of the early postwar era. The second element in the principal theme of the chapter is that there is every reason to suppose that crises will continue to be characteristic occurrences in international political relationships. Crises involving the great powers are likely to remain important, although the evidence suggests that changes in the international system are also generating the underlying sources for various new patterns of crisis.

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The trends outlined in this chapter do not constitute an exhaustive list of developments which may have a bearing on third-party intervention in the foreseeable future. They do, however, represent the broad areas of change in a complex and dynamic system which presently appear to bear the greatest potential for impact on the general problem of intervention by third parties in various crisis situations. In this context, developments which may affect United Nations interventions in the Soviet-American arena receive particular emphasis at several points in the analysis. But the bulk of the material is relevant to the more general problems surrounding the whole notion of third-party intervention. THE STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM Both the basic units of the international system and the underlying patterns of their relations with each other are presently undergoing changes with far-reaching implications. Modifications in the nature of many of the nation states under the impact of such factors as decolonization and revolutionary developments in technology are reaching the level of major significance. The sheer expansion of the number of sovereign entities in the system alters its nature considerably. And the changing arrangements and groupings of the power centers of the system are undermining the applicability of many earlier assumptions. The level of analysis in discussing such system-wide considerations is rather high, but it is important to notice that the overall organization of the international system has, in fact, undergone extensive and rapid shifts at various times in the past. A. The Decline of Bipolarity A nation state system can accommodate a variety of alternative arrangements of power centers.1 The dynamic 1

For discussion consult Morton Kaplan, System and Process in

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processes of such a system, moreover, virtually guarantee that changes in the nature of these arrangements will take place from time to time. In this connection, the tight bipolarization of effective power in the system which developed in the aftermath of the Second World War represents what is actually a rather uncommon arrangement of power centers in a nation-state system and one that has seldom endured over substantial periods of time. And the pronounced nature of the bipolar distribution of power in the early postwar era made this arrangement even more unusual. The fact that the pattern of bipolarity tended also to be significantly asymmetrical in several respects, however, undoubtedly contributed to the underlying instability of the arrangement.2 In any case, a trend toward the decline of bipolarity and toward a more nearly pluralistic or multipolar arrangement of power centers has become increasingly evident in recent years. Though this trend sometimes proceeds by fits and starts as regards various elements of power and influence, it is now adding up to a significant movement in toto. Developments in this area focus on four central themes: 1) polycentrism within the established blocs; 2) the declining efficacy of major alliance systems; 3) the rise in the numbers and salience of extrabloc actors; and 4) the emergence (or indicated emergence) of several new "great" powers. Polycentrism refers to the increasing influence of centrifugal forces within the two major blocs of the bipolar International Politics (New York: John Wiley, 1957), pt. i, and Richard Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in World Politics (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1963). 2 Postwar bipolarity displayed important asymmetries in several respects including: 1) the uneven distribution of territory between the blocs; 2) inequality in the allocation of values (especially in terms of economic variables); and 3) divergences between the blocs in terms of support for the status quo or revisionism.

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system. Recent years have witnessed a decided loosening of the bonds of intrabloc cohesion and solidarity. For one thing, perceptions of serious external threats, an important source of coordination within alliances and coalitions, have faded on both sides to the point where they are losing a good deal of their former influence. Beyond this, however, states other than the bloc leaders are displaying growing signs of independence in their foreign policies, and developing disagreements of various kinds among bloc members are opening up additional room for maneuver among these states. As a consequence, the established alliances are showing advancing signs of disarray, and a trend toward the resurgence of national particularisms and individual goals among bloc members is well under way. An important result of these developments is the reduction of the tightness and neatness of the established arrangement of power centers in the system in favor of a growing ambiguity and a new amorphous quality in the principal lines of influence and conflict in international politics. As time passes, various states, especially France and mainland China so far, are openly and increasingly pursuing objectives at variance with the goals prescribed for them by their formal bloc commitments. Divergences of this kind have followed several principal channels. Above all, the leaders of these states are seeking independent political influence and stature, all the things which go into the notion of "grandeur." And increasingly, there have been differences based on rather straightforward calculations concerning the allocation of important political and economic values. These problems have sometimes come to the surface in a tendency for certain states to take an active interest in arenas of action frowned on by the established bloc leaders.8 But the underlying divergences of interests and objectives are becoming increasingly clear. 3

This is illustrated by activities such as the increasing interaction between France and Communist China and the unwillingness of

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Beyond these primarily political developments, there is also a tendency for the major alliance systems such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact to decline in efficacy as guarantors of the national security of their members. Though affiances remain important, especially among smaller powers and in regard to matters other than those directly affecting security, the phenomenon of decline in this area is an important factor contributing to the general decline of bipolarity.4 Several important subsidiary trends lie behind the declining efficacy of major affiances. The development of long-range delivery capabilities and more-or-less guaranteed second-strike forces on both sides of the cold war makes it increasingly difficult for the superpowers to offer fully credible guarantees to defend their lesser allies in all situations. Military intervention in favor of an ally would increase the dangers to either superpower of suffering an attack on its own homeland. Under these circumstances, mutual assistance commitments are degraded from the point of view of all parties to the alliance. At the same time, moreover, advances in military technology are reducing the usefulness of lesser allies to the great powers on at least two counts. First, an opposing great power can be threatened or deterred from the homeland without making use of the territory of allies for bases or other military installations. Second, rapid advances in mobile, long-range military capabilities are reducing the importance of allies to the great powers in at least some local situations.5 various members of the Western alliance to accept the economic boycott of Cuba proclaimed by the United States. 4 For an excellent discussion see Klaus Knorr, On The Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 152-163. 5 The United States has already acquired very extensive longrange military capabilities, and there are strong indications that the Soviet Union has made the basic decision to develop capabilities in this area.

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These considerations are leading to a reemergence of security calculations in specifically national terms as contrasted with the defense of an alliance as a whole. Such thinking is evident, for example, in the fears of various European states to the effect that they may become battlefields for a war generated essentially by Soviet-American antagonisms as well as in the unhappiness expressed by the superpowers at the possibility that a contest between lesser allies might draw them into a war which they did not desire to fight. Finally, the established security alliances are declining under the impact of the development, in some cases on a tacit basis, of various guarantee arrangements, which show little regard for the lines of formal alliance. The superpowers are finding that they have interests in safeguarding various states regardless of their alliance status. Both superpowers have participated in the semiarticulated guarantees to India which have developed since China's nuclear detonation in October 1964. It is a safe bet that the United States would have a strong interest in defending France in many situations even if the latter were to drop its formal ties with NATO. And, in general, dynamic changes in the interests of the great powers in offering guarantees of one sort or another to various states are reducing the efficacy of the more formal long-standing alliances. A third strand in the trend toward declining bipolarity centers on the rise of a considerable number of extrabloc actors to positions of some significance in the international system. This development hinges on a series of interrelated factors including: the rapid increase in the number of independent nation states in the postwar period; the tendency for the established great powers to cancel or neutralize each other's influence among the nonaligned states, and the gradual diffusion of usable power throughout the system. The nonaligned and uncommitted states have acquired a considerable amount of influence by virtue of their struc354

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rural position between the two major blocs in the system as well as by virtue of their own efforts to increase their strength and effectiveness. The fact that the two superpowers tend to compete for the allegiance of the uncommitted states gives the latter an opportunity to escape the domination of either bloc. And in the realm of positive actions, many of the nonaligned states have demonstrated an ability to manipulate their structural position with sufficient skill to guarantee themselves a freedom of action that goes well beyond that which would be supported by their ability to control the more tangible elements of power. The fourth, and perhaps most important, element in this trend focuses on the rise of several new (or resurgent) great powers in the international system. In this connection, the most obvious examples are France, mainland China, and the possible development of an integrated Europe as an effective actor in international politics. There are other candidates for great-power status in the foreseeable future, however, including such states as Japan, Germany, and India. There will certainly be substantial power differentials between these states and the two superpowers for a long while to come. But these actors are now displaying a significant degree of dynamism in their international activities, and they, in particular, have become beneficiaries of the ongoing redistribution of usable power in the international arena, discussed in a later section of this chapter. Actors which are intrinsically rather strong in terms of physical and human resources are, apparently, in the best position to capitalize on the tendency of usable power to diffuse and to turn this trend to their own advantage. These gains are now being buttressed in the cases of France and China, moreover, by major (and at least partially successful) efforts to acquire effective nuclear capabilities. In the case of the potential development of Europe, the trends in question are closely linked with progress in the various processes of economic and political integration. 355

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And this point opens up the prospect that some of the traditional actors in the international arena may undergo transformations in the course of time and that regional units may coalesce to replace some of the present states as effective actors. Although developments along these lines have not yet proceeded very far, the postwar period has seen a number of attempts to make at least the first steps toward regional coordination in international politics. Any further developments of this kind, however, are likely to unfold in widely varying manners. Regional groupings may coordinate their activities in some substantive areas and not in others. And it is very probable that a survey of the international system at any given point in time would show movement toward regional coordination in some areas coexisting with movement in the opposite direction in other areas rather than a uniform trend of any kind. Finally, it is worth noting that unfolding developments in various fields of technology are making it increasingly possible to coordinate the activities of states on the basis of common interests rather than focusing attention on the problems of drawing together the policies of states simply on the basis of geographical proximity. These developments are not at all likely to reduce the possible sources of severe crises in the international system, although they may mitigate the outstanding salience of the Soviet-American confrontation. It has, in fact, frequently been suggested that the trend toward multipolarity in the contemporary world will generate some important new sources of instability. This might be especially so if nuclear weapons begin to spread rather widely through the system as time passes. For one thing, the processes through which the decline of bipolarity is becoming manifest may create certain dangers of confrontation and crisis, especially among the great powers. The declining control of the bloc leaders is leading to a situation in which lesser states can catalyze crises in which the great powers might become 356

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involved against their will. Intra-alliance crises, moreover, which may result from the deterioration of present alliances, are fraught with dangers of escalation to the level of interbloc confrontations. The Hungarian uprising of 1956 exemplifies the dangers of such occurrences. Moreover, the unfolding of this trend is setting in motion a variety of new sources of international conflict. Many states, and especially the emerging great powers, are becoming more and more unhappy with their subordinate roles in the established patterns of international relations and are increasingly anxious to exercise their own initiatives in various directions. Most importantly, this leads at present to severe conflict over the exercise of power and control in the blocs as they are presently constituted. But it also results in new patterns of interest and disagreement which go substantially beyond the confines of bloc distinctions and which are making the present blocs increasingly obsolete. In addition, important problems are beginning to arise stemming from ideological disagreements outside the EastWest confrontation and from altercations concerning the allocations of territory, especially in Asia and Africa. The specific subject matter of these new patterns of conflict is not of central importance. The outstanding implications of the trend concern its effects on the underlying conflict pattern of the international system. At the same time, the movement toward multipolarity may also generate a variety of new constraints on national behavior of some significance. Growing uncertainties leading to a kind of chain-reaction deterrence may become important. These are the possibilities alluded to in Liska's notion of multilateral deterrence.6 Moreover, many conflicts, and especially great-power crises, are likely to be viewed less and less in zero-sum terms in an increasingly multipolar world, and cooperative interests in such situ6

George Liska, Nations in Alliance (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), pp. 269-284.

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ations can be expected to display a growing influence. In this context, the development of multipolarity is likely to increase the conservative and common interests of the established great powers. In so doing, it will underline their awareness of the dangers and dilemmas they face during periods of crisis. And to the extent that this happens, the great powers, especially, may become more and more willing to acquiesce in efforts on the part of various third parties to undertake interventional^ activities in a variety of situations. The specific form the movement toward pluralism in the international system takes will be of great importance for the prospects of crisis management in the future. The particular rigidities of the bipolar arrangement will be reduced in any case. But forms of multipolarity focusing on a small number of regional units, the development of a few new great powers, or systemic fragmentation are likely to differ substantially in terms of their implications for international conflict and crises. A world in which a large number of states possessed rather crude but independent nuclear capabilities, for example, would probably be a very dangerous one. The gradual development of a few new great powers, on the other hand, might reduce the brittleness of bipolarity without catalyzing the development of serious new instabilities. The emergence of several new great powers, in particular, is likely to generate some significant implications for crises in the international system. Such developments are not likely to reduce the frequency of crises. And whether crises will tend to be more or less dangerous and disruptive if this trend continues to unfold depends significantly on additional variables such as: 1) the basic political orientations and goals of the new power centers; 2) trends in the area of nuclear proliferation; and 3) the workings of some kind of a system of multilateral deterrence. More specifically, however, this trend may have several 358

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effects on the prospects for third-party intervention. One is that an emergent and unified Europe might be able to act as a successful third party, especially in confrontations involving the present superpowers. An alternative suggested by some analysts, however, is that the "new" Europe might play a role more nearly akin to that of a "third force" in various balancing processes which may become increasingly important in the foreseeable future. Another possibility is that the crisis-generating potential of an emergent and powerful China with clear-cut revisionist objectives may be very substantial. Crises involving a powerful China, at least at first, might constitute a rather poor field for thirdparty activity. On the other hand, problems of this kind suggest that future crises involving the United States and the Soviet Union may become more amenable to third-party intervention as time passes. The developments under analysis are likely to underline the basically conservative orientation of these powers.7 And advancing multipolarity will emphasize the growing common interests which the two superpowers have in seeing that they do not waste their power and relative strength in the international system fighting each other. Up to this point, the analysis has suggested that the unfolding of this trend is not likely to reduce the prospects for third-party intervention. There is one possible result of increasing multipolarity, however, which could have such an effect, at least temporarily. Advancing pluralism might lead to certain moves in the direction of a modified balanceof-power arrangement. And it is conceivable that developments along this line might result in the generation of substantial regulatory capacities outside of or only nominally within the framework of universal international organizations. In a full-blown version of a modified balance-of7 For some interesting comments on this subject consult Coral Bell, "Non-alignment and the Power Balance," Survival, Vol. 5, No. 6 (November-December 1963), especially p. 259.

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power system, the United Nations could come to act more nearly as a concert mechanism than as an "independent opinion factor."8 At the same time, the actors in the system might attempt to regulate conflicts and crises through various processes resembling a classical balancing mechanism and involving such elements as a more fluid pattern of coalitions and the use of overt force to restrain any actor attempting to amass too much power. While it lasted, a system of this kind would probably result in a considerably reduced scope for successful third-party interventions in international crises. But the reason this consequence might be temporary is that the modified balance system would very likely be highly unstable. In a world of nuclear weapons and many sovereign states, a balancing system would probably be too partial politically and too imprecise to perform the necessary regulatory functions successfully. It is, therefore, likely that it would either be abandoned or break down in a series of severe crises. In either event, the possibilities of third-party intervention in various situations would almost certainly become salient again. B. The Future of the State System It seems highly likely that the international system will retain the essential characteristics of a state system for the foreseeable future. However, several important changes now taking place may have a substantial long-term impact on the basic workings of the international system. Most contemporary thinking about international relations starts with the assumption that the position of the nation state as the fundamental unit of the system is somehow inexorably and indelibly set. This basic outlook has resulted in a very powerful resistance to any suggestion that important changes in the nature of the nation state are occur8

Hammarskjold in Wilder Foote (ed.), Dag Hammarskjold: Servant of Peace (New York: Harper & Row, c. 1963), p. 210 (Copenhagen address, 1959).

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ring or that there are growing prospects of community reaching beyond the nation state in at least some areas. In general opposition to this position, it is worth noting that the nation state is very much a phenomenon of modern history and that effective human communities have formed during much of recorded history at levels other than that of the nation state. Moreover, there is no particularly impressive evidence to suggest that the nation is now an unchangeable element in the system, though it is perhaps accurate to suggest that changes in this area are not likely to occur very rapidly. There are at least two basic ways of looking at the relevant trends in the underlying structure of the international system. To begin with, there is increasing evidence to support the thesis that the "hard-shelled" territorial state is gradually declining as a clear-cut and effective unit in the contemporary international arena.9 The increasing interpenetration among states means that clear-cut geographical boundaries are becoming very fuzzy in functional terms. And the birth of new states which have never been sharply distinguished from their neighbors only adds to this trend. In short, the nation states are exhibiting a growing permeability as increasing segments of the complex pattern of human activities diverge from the molds set by formal state boundaries. Perhaps equally important in shaping the trend toward the decline of the territorial state is the shift from unconditional to conditional viability brought on by the advent of nuclear weapons.10 No state can now guarantee itself absolutely against externally organized disruption. In the final analysis the shift from a defenseoriented to a deterrence-oriented world makes the continued existence of any state contingent upon the actions of 9 John Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 96-108. 10 On this subject see Kenneth Boulding, Conflict and Defense (New York: Harper & Bros., 1962), chaps. 4, 12, and 13.

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other states. These developments do not, of course, mean that the nation state is passing. But they do suggest that the nature of the state as the basic unit in the international system is changing and that the old "billiard ball" perspective on international politics is now wholly inadequate. Another approach to the developments in question focuses on trends with implications for the growth of a sense of international community. Several different measures are relevant to this question. One significant perspective deals with the growth of formal organizations cutting across state boundaries. In terms of both intergovernmental machinery and a wide variety of nongovernmental institutions, the twentieth century appears as the great age of transnational organization.11 Never before have the lines set by state boundaries been bypassed and put aside so extensively in terms of institutional arrangements. It is possible to question the importance of many of these arrangements or to suggest that such developments have not outpaced the growth of domestic institutions. But the fact remains that more transnational exchanges are now taking place than ever before. And the trend in this direction has generally been accelerating in recent decades. A second measure of the development of international community concerns the internationalization of human perspectives and expectations. Changes here are more difficult to substantiate but they are undoubtedly of great importance. Events occurring outside the nation are achieving increased salience in the minds of men all over the world. Governments now devote a greater percentage of their time and resources to foreign affairs than they have at least 11 FOr some interesting figures consult the following: (1) Annuaire de Ie Vie International (Paris: lOffice Central des Institutions Internationale); (2) Handbook of International Organizations (Geneva: The League of Nations); and (3) Yearbook of International Organizations (Brussels: The Union of International Associations).

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in the recent past. And there is little doubt that shifts in these areas are already becoming rather significant among various elites. Whether such changes will filter down into the broader ranks of effective opinion remains to be seen. In this connection, however, it seems likely that the growing tendency to discuss matters that go "beyond the national interest" and to speak in terms of world interests12 will have some real impact on popular perspectives and opinions. Not long ago such discussions would probably have been highly suspect, and certainly not respectable. Now they have begun to crop up with increasing frequency even in the pages of reports and papers financed by national governments. It may also be reasonable to consider the evolution of certain operating rules and regulations in international politics as a movement toward international consensus. Trends in this area are particularly noticeable in the context of relations between the superpowers. These powers are now showing signs of accepting certain restraints in competing for influence in the third world, the banning of threats to use nuclear weapons in certain types of crisis, and the limitation of the arms race in at least some areas. Though the United States and the Soviet Union are still profoundly at odds with each other, they appear to be moving in the direction of continuing their competition under at least minimal rules. There is, however, a high correlation between the development of such restraints and the unfolding of trends toward increased North-South conflict, the emergence of new great powers, and the decline of the established blocs, all changes which seem likely to introduce growing elements of revisionism and immoderation into the international system. The development of operational rules and restraints, therefore, may represent a cyclical pattern of change rather than a progressive trend. 12 For a good example see Max Lerner, The Age of Overkill (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1962), chap. 6.

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Conflicting actors may well tend to become more moderate and restrained as newer forces of conflict and immoderation rise in the system and as the older forces begin to acquire vested interests and to find themselves subjected to revisionist demands by newer forces of change. Not surprisingly, these indications of change in the underlying structure of the international system correlate rather well with a number of significant objective patterns of change in the system. The following patterns stand out in this connection: 1) the growth of international interdependencies on various levels (e.g., transportation, communications, economic relationships); 2) continuing increases in the destructive capabilities of military systems; 3) the development of cross-cultural contacts and awareness of other cultures; and 4) the diffusion of Western economic and material values around the world. On the other hand, various analysts have expressed doubts about the validity of arguments for the growth of international community which cite the development of various interdependencies. It is by no means clear that nation states are becoming more interdependent in any overall sense.13 Military alliances are generally declining in efficacy and economic autarchy is becoming increasingly feasible for some states. In any case, it is probably reasonable to argue that at the present time "interdependence has developed nowhere near to the point of producing a global community, unless it be a community of fear."14 Over the long run, these trends affecting the structural organization of the international system might very well reduce the frequency and destabilizing impact of severe international crises. Key factors in such a development would be a gradual lowering of the overall conflict level of the 13

For some discussion see Kenneth Waltz, "Contention and Management in International Relations," World Politics, Vol. 17, No. 4 (July 1965), pp. 720-744. " Ibid., p. 737.

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system and a growing emphasis on the cooperative elements in a wide variety of competitive-cooperative situations. This, however, is a long-run prospect which is very unlikely to yield immediate results. It is quite accurate to argue, for example, that the growth of international community has not yet reached the point of providing a major source of restraint on conflict among nation states. The development of effective international rules and regulations, however, may constitute a partial exception to this conclusion in several respects. To the extent that the cyclical notion suggested above is correct, such developments are not likely to reduce the frequency or intensity of international crises over the long run. In the short run, on the other hand, they may tone down superpower crises and lead to an increasing awareness of common interests in these states. Such a result might be of importance for the short-run viability of the international system. In particular, it suggests that willingness to accept third-party intervention in various types of crisis is likely to increase even though crises themselves will continue to break out. In addition, the development of rules and regulations may well be strongly correlated with the increasing relevance of new types of crisis in the system (e.g., North-South crises). Although such crises may create difficulties at first because of their newness and rawness, they may also carry less disruptive potential than superpower crises in the immediate future. The more general trends noted in this section may well encourage, over a period of time, the gradual creation of a web of expectations, attitudes, and perspectives in the minds of decision-makers which incorporates a favorable view of the potential usefulness of third-party, and especially United Nations, intervention in severe crises. The implications for third-party activities in this context center on the creation of a receptive intellectual climate. More specifically, such trends may well have a favorable impact on the 365

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respect for, prestige, and salience of international institutions such as the United Nations in the realm of crisis operations. And in -this connection, it seems accurate to suggest that the history of United Nations operations to date already demonstrates clear signs of this type of impact.15 In the end, however, it is important to emphasize the fact that trends of this kind are hardly likely to have dramatic and clear-cut effects on the international system in the immediate future. Their impact will, for the most part, be difficult to delineate clearly in any specific crisis of the near future. And, while the implications of these developments may be of great importance over the long run, their effects on specific crises are likely to be easily obscured in the near future. ALIGNMENTS AND PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

A second major set of trends in the international system deals with the alignments of the actors in the system and with the changing patterns of international conflict. Of particular interest are the growing complexities of the conflict pattern that is more and more coming to replace the clear-cut bipolarization of conflict characteristic of the early postwar period.16 Perhaps the most important development underlying these trends is that of a noticeable shifting and redistribution of effective power and influence in the system. The first section under this general heading, therefore, attempts to probe the sources of this development. Subsequent sections focus on particular shifts in the conflict and alignment patterns of the system which seem to have important implications for the future of third-party activities in crisis situations. 15

Compare, for example, the struggles of Lie in 1946 to gain acceptance of such basic prerogatives as active participation in Security Council deliberations with the generally unquestioned actions of Thant in the mid-sixties. 16 See, in general, Liska, op.cit., pp. 255-291.

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A. The Redistribution of Power and Influence Processes now well under way have generated a general tendency for effective power and influence to diffuse more widely through the international system. This "spread effect" stems primarily from a series of factors concerning the usability and the acquisition of power. To begin with, there is a very important distinction between the possession of the physical or tangible elements of power and the usabiUty of power. If a state feels restrained from actually using the physical elements of power in its possession, these forces decline considerably as components of its overall, effective influence. In the contemporary international arena, there are, in fact, instances when possession of the physical bases of power actually inhibits a state from acting so as to get its way or makes a state more vulnerable to the influence of others. In the thermonuclear era, the very states which possess the most impressive arrays of the physical constituents of force are most hampered by a variety of restraints on the actual use of their forces. The sources of this paradox are varied, but the following factors, at least, stand out: 1) the great powers tend to cancel each other out in their direct and many of their indirect confrontations; 2) the prospect that a state will employ physical force becomes decreasingly credible in proportion to the destructiveness of the weapons in question; 3) nuclear weapons are perceived as qualitatively different from other weapons and much less easily usable; 4) states with great power have more to lose than others and therefore more interest in minimizing the use of naked power; and 5) the very process of acquiring great power and influence tends to make a state more cautious and prudential. All these factors together are placing an increasing premium on the limited and sophisticated use of force as opposed to the direct application of superior physical resources. In this connection, "strategic" bargaining and the circumscribed application of coercion are becoming impor367

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tant. Straightforward violence is still acceptable in small, local confrontations. But this posture is simply too dangerous when there is a serious prospect that the great powers might become involved. For this reason, procedures involving commitments, threats, promises, and the manipulation of risk are acquiring increasing importance. Here a variety of factors beyond the mere possession of the physical elements of power are rapidly coming to the fore in the reckoning of effective power.17 Skill in timing, nerve, reputation, agility in handling the processes of communication, and the ability to manipulate risks and expectations have acquired great significance. And many of these capabilities are by no means monopolies of the so-called superpowers. Thus, various actors, far from dominant in terms of the physical bases of power, are currently becoming more prominent in the international system. As regards the question of acquisition, it seems quite clear that a state can achieve only declining marginal returns by continuing to develop the physical elements of power after it reaches a certain level in terms of weapons systems. Given the nature of nuclear weapons, it is quite possible for a state to acquire the capacity to inflict unacceptable destruction on any opponent but not for it to defend itself successfully against the destructive attacks of all opponents. There are, of course, arguments to demonstrate that additional forces will have some marginal utility, and the uncertainties of the qualitative arms race complicate calculations. When the fact of declining marginal utility is coupled, however, with the decreasing unit costs of major weapons systems, it seems plausible that the gap between the present superpowers and at least some of the emergent power centers in terms of effective power will decrease 17

Following Lasswell and Kaplan, effective power is here distinguished from formal or authoritative power. Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), especially pp. 133-141.

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over a period of time. If the new great powers cannot achieve equality of power, they may still reach the level of parity of effective power, at least for many purposes. Perhaps the distinction between relative and absolute power will clarify this point. Although the present bloc leaders are rapidly adding to their absolute power in the sense of continuing to acquire the physical elements of power, they are no longer increasing their relative influence in the international system.18 In fact, the analysis of this chapter suggests that the system is now characterized by the paradoxical condition of a relative decline in influence on the part of those states which, in terms of objective indicators, are increasing their stocks of the physical elements of absolute power most rapidly.19 All of this is not to argue, of course, that substantial inequalities of power among states will somehow disappear. What it does suggest, however, is that the tendency to place the superpowers on one side of the scales and to lump all of the other states together on the other side is no longer descriptive of reality. There is a need for at least several additional gradations. Some states will remain almost devoid of effective power in the international arena. Others are now benefiting substantially from the problems of usability which primarily afflict the great powers. Among the most important trends in this area at the present time are the movements of several emerging powers toward parity or near-parity with the superpowers in terms of effective power. Although this group of states is small, its constituents are strung out over a considerable space in terms of the acquisition of effective power. Several are 18

Michael Howard, "Military Power and International Order," International Affairs, Vol. 40, No. 3 (July 1964), p. 403. 19 One possibility that should be stressed is that an all-out attempt to increase absolute power may touch off responsive armaments programs in other states and therefore lead to serious detrimental results in terms of relative power—see, for example, Herz, op.cit., pp. 231-243.

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actively pursuing the goal of effective parity while others demonstrate no more than the potential to achieve such a position. Finally, the superpowers remain very much dominant at the present moment, although they are already losing relative power and exhibiting signs of uncertainty in the employment of their power. The next two sections analyze the consequences of these developments for possible third-party roles in several specific contexts. But several general points of some significance fit in here. To begin with, it is the conjunction of this diffusion of effective power and the movement toward multipolarity that really accounts for the expansion of the range and scope of crises in the international system noted in an earlier section. Increased gradations of power and more amorphous arrangements of power centers add to the variety and complexity of conflict patterns and crises in the system. And alongside these developments may be a tendency for the parties to find themselves with additional flexibility and room to maneuver in crisis situations. This should not, however, be taken to mean that crises will become less dangerous or less potentially destructive. In such a context, there is a real possibility that thirdparty activities might remain important over a wide range of situations. The trends in question are likely to make relations among various power centers increasingly nonzero-sum, and coalitions may take on a real fluidity that was lacking in the bipolar arena. A full-blown trend toward the diffusion of effective power might very well increase the capabilities of certain regional organizations or individual states to act as third parties during crises. And the dangers and uncertainties of multipolarity in a nuclear arena might generate important third-party roles for the United Nations. In particular, the roles of rules keeper, mediator, and service agency might take on great significance in such an environment. Even at this stage in its development, moreover, the 370

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trend toward a redistribution of effective power in the system is another factor emphasizing the intrinsic conservatism and common interests of the established superpowers.20 The interests of these powers in retarding the decline of their relative influence may well move them in the direction of accepting third-party intervention to facilitate nonviolent terminations of their own conflicts and crises. In such situations, third-party intervention might well become important to the superpowers as one means of reducing the opportunities for other states in the system to achieve influence by playing the superpowers off against each other. The redistribution of power in the international system has gone far enough at this time only to raise possibilities of this kind; it has not yet made any of them central features of the system. An additional factor which is likely to be of great importance in determining the implications and extensiveness of this trend concerns the question of nuclear proliferation. The prospects for the spread of nuclear weapons are actually superimposed on the broader trends toward the diffusion of effective power in the system. The two sets of developments are at least partially autonomous, but the trend toward nuclear diffusion should be treated as an important conjunctive factor in the picture emerging from this discussion. The general problem of nuclear proliferation encompasses at least two distinct sets of factors. The questions raised by the possibility of widespread nuclear diffusion (to thirty or forty countries) based on cheap, sketchy, and low-grade bombs and delivery systems21 are considerably different from those raised by the likely emergence of a 20

Kenneth Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," Daedalus, Summer 1964, pp. 903-904. 21 For a picture of the possible results of such a development, see Herman Kahn, "The Arms Race and Some of Its Hazards," Daedalus, Fall 1960, pp. 744-780.

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small number of new great powers possessing significant nuclear capabilities at several operational levels.22 Though the first alternative would probably have highly destabilizing implications, the likelihood of its becoming a reality in the foreseeable future is quite small.23 The comforting implications of Liska's theory of multilateral deterrence would almost certainly not hold when nuclear weapons of a crude nature were so easy to acquire that subnational groups as well as irresponsible nations could attain at least a primitive nuclear capability with relative ease.24 Developments along these lines would probably go far toward coalescing the common interests of the present superpowers, and they would almost certainly increase the dangers of catalytic actions and temptations to preemptive actions on the part of various small and vulnerable nuclear states. It seems very likely, however, that the realization of this alternative would lead to such major changes in the international system as to make fruitful speculation on their nature very difficult. On the other hand, it is highly probable that a small number of new great powers with significant nuclear capabilities will emerge in the near future. There are no insurmountable technological obstacles standing in the way of this development.25 And it now seems probable that the 22

This is the kind of situation pictured, for the most part, in Leonard Beaton and John Maddox, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Praeger, 1962). 23 See, for example, Richard Rosecrance (ed.), The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), especially chap. 13. 24 On the probable nature of international politics in the resultant environment consult Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener (eds.), Crises and Arms Control (Hudson Institute, HI-180-RR, 9 October 1962), pp. 69-78. 25 See Christoph Hohenemser, "The Nth Country Problem Today," in Seymour Melman (ed.), Disarmament: Its Politics and Economics (Boston: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1962), pp. 238-276.

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political incentives to go ahead with such programs will be sufficiently strong in some, if not all, of the states with the potential tofillthis role to make the realization of this alternative a reality in the foreseeable future. Perhaps the only development which might seriously affect this prediction would be a coordinated and effective effort on the part of the superpowers to deter proliferation. And such steps would have to be launched very soon in order to be really effective. In general, this trend is likely to add driving force to the tendencies, discussed above, of effective power to diffuse in the system. Whether or not developments along this line could produce any underlying stability in the system is extremely difficult to predict in advance. The concept of multilateral deterrence probably applies most aptly to a situation of this kind.26 But there would be wide inequalities of effective power among the resultant nuclear states which might produce serious uncertainties and sources of instability. Moreover, the question of stability in this context would be highly dependent on a number of specific characteristics of the new great powers as well as on the more abstract factors which can be included in a model of nuclear proliferation. The whole question of the spread of nuclear weapons is of especially great interest for the light it is already shedding on the common interests of the present superpowers. The fact that proliferation is now, in fact, occurring is causing the United States and the Soviet Union to think more seriously in terms of tacit and explicit steps which they might take to control this process. The Treaty of Moscow of 1963 banning nuclear tests in three environments was at least partially motivated on both sides by the desire to put a damper on the pace of developments leading in the direction of nuclear diffusion. Moreover, the actions of France and mainland China in refusing to accede to this treaty essentially represent a more or less 26

Liska, op.cit., pp. 269-284.

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open challenge to the supremacy of the superpowers. Nor is this the only indication that the Soviet Union and the United States are beginning to take a considerable interest in measures aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Further evidence of similar feelings include the Soviet withdrawal of nuclear aid to China in 1959 and 1960, American fears and hesitations concerning the development of independent nuclear forces in Western Europe, and the tacit Soviet-American agreement not to ship nuclear arms or equipment to any of the nonaligned and uncommitted states. B. The North-South Split Of considerable importance among the trends focusing on the patterns of conflict in the international system is the increasing salience of the North-South split. This pattern of opposition stems from several different sources. Above all, the dichotomy between the "have" nations and the "have not" nations in terms of the allocation of economic values is a source of diverging interests and conflict. A related and partially consequential problem derives from the fact that the North-South split tends to pit relatively satisfied and intrinsically conservative states against the forces of large-scale revision. And these problems are only exacerbated by the legacy of questions concerning superiority and supremacy which stem from the dominantdominated relationship in which many of these states stood until quite recently. The basic economic problems which hamper the attempts of many of the states of the South to achieve economic modernization lie at the heart of this emerging pattern of conflict. On the one hand, there is an increasing awareness of economic differences and a continuing revolution of rising expectations. As a result, more vigor and commitment are now being infused into developmental aid programs than ever before. At the same time, however, the eco374

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nomic gap between the North and the South in terms of most indicators of performance is increasing at a noticeable rate. Moreover, the "explosion" of population tends to heighten these difficulties in many countries, since increases in population often outstrip any economic gains made. In one way or another, this problem of growing economic gaps lies behind much of the bitterness and bellicosity which appear to be on the upswing in North-South relations. The increasing salience of the North-South split, however, is to a large extent a consequence of the growing effective power of the states of the South singly and, especially, in combination. When these states were too weak to offer any serious challenges to the dominant forces in the system, the North-South split tended to remain latent and in the shadow of more salient confrontations in the East-West pattern of conflict. Nevertheless, as various trends in the international system unfold, the South shows signs of becoming increasingly influential, and it has certainly demonstrated its interest in offering challenges to the dominant forces in the system where possible. Above all, the South has gained immensely from the East-West split and the frequent correlation between the development of nuclear weapons systems and the growth of limitations on the usability of physical forces. Significant factors in this process include: 1) the tendency of the East and the West to cancel out each other's effective power; 2) the failure of the North to face the South with a united front; 3) the consequent tendency for the established superpowers to manipulate the politics of the third world for cold-war purposes; and 4) a growing feeling in the North that the case of the South is at least partially justified in moral and ethical terms. In recent years, the states of the South have also been able to utilize the United Nations to increase their general influence in the international system as well as to advance their claims for developmental aid. In this connection, the 375

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Organization has served as forum, articulator of interests, and cumulator of influence for the states of the South. In particular, the availability of this resource has on several occasions served as a focal point for efforts to coordinate the forces of the South at least for the limited purposes of dealing with the established powers of the North. The 1964 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) provides an excellent example of developments along this line.27 But an increasing number of indicators point in this general direction. All this is not to argue that the South is now able to present a unified and disciplined front with any consistency. Many of these states have not yet achieved internal viability, and the frequency of violent disturbances and upheavals has been, in recent years, considerably higher in the Southern Hemisphere than in the Northern Hemisphere. Moreover, there is a great deal of regional disunity and conflict within the South itself. And yet, very little time has passed since the world was effectively dominated by Europe and North America for all practical purposes. In addition, the underlying sources of conflict between the North and the South are powerful enough to suggest that conflict along this axis will become increasingly important as time passes. In this perspective, recent developments represent little more than an initial squaring off of contestants. The development of this trend suggests several implications for the future of third-party intervention in international crises. The general pattern of crises will probably become more complicated than it is at present as the development of a North-South axis opens up new possibilities for manipulation and coalition-building. The consequent interpenetration of the lines of conflict and growth of opportunities to manipulate one pattern of conflict in order to 27

For an account which stresses this aspect of the conference see Richard N. Gardner, In Pursuit of World Order (New York: Praeger, 1964), pp. 160-172.

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achieve tactical gains in another arena will add a number of dimensions to the overall conflict pattern of the system. The introduction of North-South considerations may reduce the destructive potential of many crises at least temporarily due to the existence of power differences. But this development will by no means reduce the number of crises, and it is not likely to reduce their destructive potential permanently. The increasing salience of the North-South split is likely to have somewhat mixed results for the prospects of constructive intervention in crises by a third party such as the United Nations. For reasons mentioned above, the growing complexity of the crisis pattern of the system may well emphasize the importance of a number of third-party roles. More specifically, however, so long as the South remains the weaker side in terms of effective power, the prospects for at least some third-party intervention in North-South crises appear to be excellent. In this context, the stronger side would be the more intrinsically conservative of the participants while the weaker side would have a strong interest in intervention guaranteeing it against the dangers of being crushed by sheer physical preponderance. In addition, the juxtaposition of such crises with continuing elements of East-West conflict and the dangers of military escalation might make the North reasonably receptive to third-party activities in a variety of North-South crises. On the other hand, a South which became stridently and violently revisionist might well tend to reject, on essentially ideological grounds, the whole notion of third-party intervention aimed at avoiding or limiting violence. And the possibilities for United Nations intervention in NorthSouth crises may become increasingly circumscribed in certain cases in direct relation to the ability of the South to utilize the Organization as an instrument for aggregating its effective influence in the system.28 28

It is quite possible, however, that this may not happen. Even

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Finally, the growing strength of the South is another specific factor which is likely to make the established superpowers increasingly favorable to the notion of third-party intervention in East-West crises as time goes on. The awakening of the South is presently providing an arena for Soviet-American competition which seems less hazardous than direct confrontation. But any serious development in the position of the South would pose a challenge to the relative power of both the Soviet Union and the United States and emphasize the underlying common interests between them. C. The Soviet-American Detente It is presently popular to speak of a developing SovietAmerican detente and even to suggest that the detente may now be entering a phase in which it will play an important role in keeping the Soviet Union and the United States out of serious confrontations.29 As frequently happens with an attractive argument, however, this thesis is often blown up and elaborated to the point where its connections with reality are somewhat tenuous. The fact remains that the two socio-political systems are still profoundly at odds with one another both in the realm of ideology or world views and in the realm of more straightforward conflicts of national interest caused by their physical juxtaposition in a single arena. Moreover, the constant presence of specific sore at present, Southern unity within the United Nations holds over only a very limited range of issues. And as pluralism increases in the international system, the United Nations may become a microcosm of the larger conflict pattern rather than an instrument of any actor or coalition. 28 Such leading newspapers as the New York Times, for example, now employ the concept as common usage. It may be worth noting, however, that spokesmen for the United States State Department tend to show great diligence in dissociating themselves from any usage of the term "detente." 378

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points such as Vietnam, Berlin, and Europe more generally tends to cast a rather long shadow over movements in the direction of an operational detente. Nevertheless, a number of embryonic trends in the system point toward the gradual development of at least a limited Soviet-American detente and lend credence to the prospect that the detente will become more operational over a period of time. Above all, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the two sides to keep their ideological blinders in place in the cold war and in so doing to shut out the restraining implications of ongoing trends in the system. There is a rapidly growing awareness and knowledge of the dangers and difficulties of a thermonuclear environment and of various politico-military dilemmas. And this development tends to cut the ground from under the type of ideological intransigence which often makes crisis protagonists impervious to the dilemmas of reality. In particular, it is probably worth while to analyze the possibility that increased understanding of the dynamics of crisis will make both sides more willing to accept various forms of assistance proffered by a third party at an early stage of future crises. In addition, the developing pattern of conflict between the "have" nations and the "have not" nations is likely to facilitate the development of Soviet-American detente. It is true that the whole question of neo-colonialism will probably remain an important theme in cold-war interactions.30 And competition for the allegiance of the states of the third world as well as the dangers of local wars in such areas engenders significant irritations in relations between the superpowers. The fact that the two superpowers are unchangeably on the same side of the basic NorthSouth split, however, will probably lead, at least, to certain 30

For a particularly provocative analysis see Vernon Aspaturian, "Revolutionary Change and the Strategy of the Status Quo," in Laurence Martin (ed.), Neutralism and Nonalignment (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 165-195.

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tacit understandings. Understandings of this type may well deal with such matters as rules of the game for the EastWest competition in the third world and standards concerning off-limits behavior for each side. In addition, it seems likely that some tacit steps will be taken to reduce the present tendency of the superpowers to cancel out each other's power and, therefore, to undermine their usable power when dealing with the so-called uncommitted and nonaligned states. Therefore, as the conflict pattern of the system becomes more complex and as Soviet-American common interests tend to become more influential, the uncommitted states may well find it more and more difficult to play the established superpowers off against each other both profitably and with impunity. Perhaps the most concrete evidence for an unfolding Soviet-American detente stems from the "arms control dialogue." Since 1963, several important developments have occurred in this area including: 1) the establishment of a direct telecommunications link between Washington and Moscow (the "hot line"); 2) the negotiation of the partial test-ban treaty in the summer of 1963 and its subsequent ratification by a large number of states;31 3) the elaboration, in a resolution of the United Nations, of a set of informal agreements concerning a prohibition on the orbiting of weapons of massive destruction in space; 4) the negotiation of several joint projects for the exploration of outer space; 5) the unilateral announcement by both sides of decisions to cut back on the production of nuclear warheads;32 and 6) the further announcement by both sides of certain cuts in overall military spending. A number of observers have recently expressed disappointment that the progress in arms control in 1963 has not led to further concrete agreements, and several have suggested that the 31

For the text of the treaty see Rosecrance, The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons, pp. 315-317. 32 Parallel announcements on this subject appeared in April 1964. 380

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flurry of activity at that time was nothing more than a passing phenomenon. There has, however, been a certain real improvement in the ongoing dialogue on arms control, and it is possible to make a rather good argument for the proposition that tacit arms control has progressed since 1963 even without the conclusion of additional agreements of a more formal nature. All this is not to argue that hard-headed calculations of national interest are giving way to national self-abnegation in this area; they are not. What is apparently happening is that the most hard-headed of calculations are now generating results that are somewhat more favorable to various arms control arrangements and to a general easing of EastWest tension than was the case in the past. This does not necessarily imply identical interests. On the contrary, the process is probably more nearly analogous, on a lower level, to the notion of a confluence of self-interests on pragmatic action programs which has been discussed at length in analyses of economic and political integration.33 Some observers have argued that the incipient or embryonic Soviet-American detente either has already or will in the future substantially reduce the chances of severe EastWest crises or active hostilities. It is possible to argue, as a consequence, that the central propositions and proposals contained in Part II of this study come rather late since the basic problems to which they address themselves seem to be dissipating. In fact, however, it is highly likely that the trend toward a Soviet-American detente will do more to increase the capacities of the United Nations or other thirdparties as intervenors than to reduce the probability of serious Soviet-American crises breaking out in the near future. There are several reasons why this is so. While a con33

The classic formulation of this concept appears in Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958).

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tinuation of this trend may actually cut down the probabilities and dangers of crises somewhat, it is easy to exaggerate this tendency. A warning has already been given to the effect that whatever elements of detente do develop will be superimposed on a continuing base of profoundly competitive interests. And there is very little evidence to suggest a defusing of certain basic areas of conflict to the point where they will be incapable of igniting a severe crisis. The recent history of such sore spots as Vietnam, Berlin, and Cuba provides ample demonstration of the fact that it is possible for a severe crisis to develop even during a period of a so-called detente. Nor has the tendency toward detente vitiated the mechanisms of various politicomilitary dilemmas or nullified the instabilities of the balance of terror. In fact, military trends, discussed later in this chapter, suggest that there may be an exacerbation of at least some of these dangers in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, the trend toward detente is one of the principal factors that may increase the wilhngness of the superpowers to accept outside intervention for various purposes when a crisis does arise. Above all, developments along this line are likely to increase the attention paid by both sides to the dangers of their confrontation and to reduce whatever generalized hostility to the notion of thirdparty intervention there is on each side. In this connection, it is likely that the salience of the United Nations as a logical intervening agent in future crises will rise.34 THE MODALITIES OF COERCION

A final set of trends focuses on changes in the nature of international warfare and in the instruments of mihtary power. The concern here is with the effects of changing mihtary relationships on the prospects for successful third34

The events of the Cuban crisis of October 1962 indicate that the prospects for such a development are very real, and future crises are likely to reinforce this trend.

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party intervention in future crises. For purposes of analysis it seems desirable to divide the discussion into two sections. The first deals with developments in military technology and strategy flowing primarily from the introduction of nuclear weapons systems and which are profoundly altering the nature of relations among the great powers. The second section focuses on crises occurring in geographically circumscribed arenas. Here attention centers on the intrinsically local qualities of such conflicts as well as on important links between local crises and the overarching developments in military instruments mentioned above. A. Military Relations Among Great Powers One of the most important, and certainly the most spectacular, sets of trends in the international system falls under the heading of the continuing revolution in military technology and strategy. Very rapid and far-reaching changes of this kind have been in full swing since the end of World War II. The essential basis of these developments lies in a series of technological breakthroughs which have made possible great increases both in the destructive capabilities of the instruments of coercion and violence and in the geographical scope over which violent activities can occur in an interrelated pattern.35 The spectrum of possible types or levels of warfare has therefore been extended substantially, and the nature of lower-level warfare has been indelibly affected by the introduction of ever present possibilities of expansion or explosion to very much larger scales of violence. These technological developments have occasioned massive reorientations in the concepts and doctrines men apply to the use of force in international politics, the predispositions and psychological attitudes of 85

Important general treatments of this revolution include Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, N J . : Princeton University Press, 1959), and Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton, N J . : Princeton University Press, 1960).

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human beings toward war, and the emotional colorings characterizing human perceptions of actions involving the use of force across state boundaries. This great revolution in military affairs has given rise to the proposition that military power is of declining utility, at least in the hands of the great powers, and that nonmilitary instruments of power are likely to become increasingly salient.36 In this connection, there is little doubt that restraints on the actual physical use of military power by the great powers are increasing. Above all, there are the pragmatic restraints of mutual deterrence and military reciprocity. War in a nuclear arena is likely to have no real winner and it may result in mutual destruction leaving both sides worse off than before the war. Moreover, there are some hardheaded political reasons for the great powers to exercise restraint in employing the instruments of violence. These states have definite overlapping interests in reducing the extent to which they cancel out each other's effective power in relations with lesser powers as well as in maintaining their relative power positions in the international system. Also, some less tangible restraints on the physical use of the instruments of power are of growing importance. There is at least an incipient trend toward the development of norms proscribing the exercise of large-scale violence in international politics. While warfare was once a perfectly legitimate form of state behavior, resort to violence must now be justified and it must overcome the obstacles posed by widespread antipathies to any acts of international violence. An especially important development in this area of norms encompasses the widespread and rather powerful feeling that the use, and particularly the first use, of nuclear weapons should be proscribed. In addition, important political and moral damage in the domestic arena would ensue from the physical application of force by the great 36

See, for example, Knorr, op.cit., especially chap. 1.

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powers. Many publics now demonstrate a certain revulsion to the large-scale use of force, and it seems clear that decision-makers often look upon a decision to use force as a serious political liability. Finally, some significant restraints on the use of force are posed by the expected reactions of articulate world opinion. To the extent that many international relationships are based primarily on persuasion rather than coercion and that in international politics actions in any given arena will affect outcomes in other arenas and at other times, states must now pay considerable attention to the reactions of various relevant audiences to any decision to initiate or expand the use of force. These developments have not led to a decline in the utility of military power, however, so much as to a significant trend toward changing modes of employing the physical elements of force. In general, the great powers are now moving toward a far more sophisticated and measured utilization of force which deemphasizes crude matches of brute strength. On the one hand, force is now more and more employed as an important resource in bargaining relationships without actual physical application. The use of force for threats and commitments and in the process of affecting perspectives and evaluations is becoming increasingly important. Key variables here involve such factors as credibility, controllability, and proportionality. On the other hand, there is a tendency to refine the distinctions among the various modes in which force or pressure can be applied in a physical sense. Force can be employed in many relevant ways which go far beyond simple distinctions between, for example, conventional and nuclear warfare. In this area, the growing emphasis on controlled responses and the use of force in very limited or circumscribed forms is important. The instruments of force therefore retain substantial utility even in great-power relations, but there are impor385

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tant trends of change in the modes in which they are employed. Such developments carry important implications for the prospects of third-party intervention in future crises. While crises will continue to occur, they are not likely to lead to wholesale demonstrations of spasmodic violence. On the contrary, they will very likely center around the manipulation of bargaining processes, the search for credible threats and commitments, and the measured application of the instruments of force. In general, these developments are likely to increase the relevance and importance of third-party activities. The absence of massive physical disruption and the extended time available for crisis bargaining are likely to reduce important obstacles to third-party activities in some cases. But, above all, third-party intervention is geared especially to situations in which extended bargaining processes are of central importance. These changes have not, however, vitiated the problems and destabilizing aspects of the balance of terror. The military problems outlined in an earlier chapter are all still operable to a greater or lesser extent. The instabilities inherent in a balance predicated on high levels of armament remain important. In this connection, there is a finite, though perhaps small and incalculable, danger of warfare resulting from miscalculation, inadvertent actions, accidents, escalation, or catalytic acts. Moreover, the problems raised by the uncertainties of a balance of terror and the sensitivity of reactions to any perceived alarm are still in evidence. At the same time, several trends of development affecting these factors have some significant implications for the prospects of third-party intervention in crises. None of these trends is likely to lead in the foreseeable future to a situation in which a balance of terror no longer exists, but within this framework their effects may have farreaching significance. To start with, the great powers are now moving toward at least rough military parity, invulnerability of strategic 386

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weapons systems, and increasing certainty of being able to retaliate successfully after an opponent's first strike.37 There are indications that the United States will retain a substantial military superiority in absolute terms for the foreseeable future. But it seems highly unlikely that either side can achieve an ability to deliver a counterforce first strike against the other with any confidence of success. An important implication of this trend is its tendency to ease time pressures on decision-makers, making it possible for them to act more prudentially and to seek ways out of serious crises before launching preemptive or retaliatory strikes. The result of this is to reduce the pressures which build up during a crisis in favor of military preemption, to defuse, at least partially, the dangers caused by the reciprocal fear of surprise attack, and to cut down the advantages of striking first in the event that war appears to be inevitable.38 Developments along these lines should, therefore, tend to reduce the dangers of active hostilities breaking out during periods of heightened tension and severe crisis.39 This tendency is particularly important in the area labeled "crisis control" in this study. On the one hand, such developments may cut down the dangers of some situations and therefore reduce the importance or urgency of thirdparty activities. But, on the other hand, it is precisely these trends that are likely, in some cases, to provide the necessary time and structural situation to get a third-party operation under way. If active hostilities should break out, however, the changes under discussion here will probably 37

On the nature and implications of these developments see Klaus Knorr and Thornton Read (eds.), Limited Strategic War (New York: Praeger, 1962), passim. 38 Thomas C. Schelling, "Reciprocal Measures of Arms Stabilization," Daedalus, Fall 1960, pp. 892-914, and Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), chaps. 9 and 10. 39 Thomas C. Schelling, "Nuclear Strategy in Europe," World Politics, Vol. 14, No. 3 (1962), pp. 421-432. 387

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also be important in strengthening restraints on intrawar escalatory sequences and, therefore, in advancing the opportunities for intervention by a third party such as the United Nations.40 This leads to a set of developments which are, in a sense, derivatives of the trends noted above. Although the point is controversial, many analysts argue that the movement toward stalemate at the top levels of the military spectrum, manifested through the development of parity and invulnerable weapons systems, will tend to encourage the creation of a kind of high-level, strategic umbrella reducing the likelihood of large-scale, general warfare and, therefore, making the international arena safer for various kinds of lesser warfare.41 Actually, the argument concerning an umbrella effect has taken two major lines. It is possible to argue that the developments in question will increase the prospects of the superpowers fighting various types of limited wars which do not escalate uncontrollably. A somewhat more limited argument suggests that while uncertainties and instabilities will continue to keep the deterrence level high for any form of direct, great-power hostilities, the umbrella effect will tend to increase the chances of carrying on various types of local warfare without extended and direct great-power intervention. It does, in fact, seem that the development of a "strategic stalemate," featuring the construction of invulnerable retaliatory capacities, will strengthen the deterrence of escalatory processes at high levels of tension, as well as of explosions into large-scale, central warfare from lower levels of tension.42 And at least some types of lesser wars are 40 On the question of intrawar restraints see Thornton Read, "Limited Strategic War and Tactical Nuclear War," in Knorr and Read, op.cit., pp. 67-116. 41 Consult, for example, Klaus Knorr, "Limited Strategic War," in Knorr and Read, op.cit., pp. 3-31, and Helmut Schmidt, Defense or Retaliation (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 207-208. 42 Morton Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age (New York: John Wiley, 1963), chap. 1.

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likely to become more "thinkable" in direct relation to the degree to which high-level, strategic deterrence becomes credible and, therefore, operative. The reality of a signifi­ cant umbrella effect, however, is controversial, and it seems reasonable to express skepticism about developments along these lines, since they are predicated on several prop­ ositions concerning rationality and a number of additional psychological variables which are at present very obscure.43 Such skepticism appears to apply with particular force to the argument concerning limited wars in which the super­ powers themselves participate. In the event that the umbrella effect does achieve oper­ ational significance, however, third-party activities, and especially those of the United Nations, are likely to become increasingly relevant and useful in a variety of crisis situ­ ations, even though intervention aimed at preventing escalation to large-scale, general war may never become relevant. In this connection the possibilities of "intrawar limitations" and "restoration" involving lesser wars would probably grow considerably in importance. On the other side of the ledger, it is possible to argue that the develop­ ment of a more reliable United Nations or general thirdparty intervention capability in the system might actually exacerbate the consequences of the umbrella effect by contributing to a reduction of fears concerning uncontrol­ lable escalation. The argument here is that such a develop­ ment might encourage the outbreak of lesser wars even while contributing to the deterrence of strategic war­ 44 fare. Briefly, the answer to this point is that the exacer­ bation of the umbrella effect that might result from such a development would be of minor significance compared to 43

For an outspokenly skeptical treatment of the subject see Anatol Rapoport, Strategy and Conscience (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), pt. π. 44 For an interesting discussion of a similar problem see Thomas C. Schelling, "Arms Control: Proposal for a Special Surveillance Force," World Politics, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1960), pp. 1-18.

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the potential gains to be derived from third-party activities in lower-level situations. Another military development that has substantial implications for the prospects of third-party intervention in future crises focuses on the trend toward renewed interest in active defense systems. At the present time, there are growing indications that the superiority of the offense in the nuclear environment may be modified by defensive developments in the foreseeable future. The most important current prospect in this area concerns the possibilities of developing successful antiballistic missile (ABM) capabilities. Particularly significant in this context would be the operationalization of viable urban defense systems as distinguished from active defenses for weapons installations. The probability that active defenses will become operational in the near future is a matter that is extremely complex and difficult to analyze. There have recently been indications that some of the technical problems are yielding to research, and interest in ABM developments is high. It already seems clear that ABM systems capable of defending a superpower against an attack by a second-rank power will become feasible in the near future. But there is a sharp controversy about the desirability of moving forward in the ABM area in more general terms.45 Among indicators which point to a further development of ABM capabilities, the following stand out: 1) recent reports of gains in ABM technology; 2) the likely efficacy of ABM systems against lesser powers; 3) the impetus of the qualitative arms race; 4) pressures from military circles to operationalize any promising new weapons system; and 45 A particularly provocative, though merely fragmentary discussion of this subject can be found in Jeremy J. Stone, "Should the Soviet Union Procure an Urban Defense Anti-Ballistic Missile System?" (paper read before the Second International Arms Control Seminar, Ann Arbor, Michigan, January 1964). See also Jeremy J. Stone, Containing the Arms Race (Cambridge: M.LT. Press, 1966), chap. i.

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5) the fact that public opinion may well see ABM systems as increasing public safety. There are, however, some important forces working against the development of ABM capabilities. These include: 1) a probable lack of ABM effectiveness in the superpower context caused by rapid developments in penetration technology; 2) the very high level of effectiveness required to make urban defense systems really worth while; 3) cost-effectiveness considerations; 4) awareness of dangerous arms-race implications; and 5) strategic arguments concerning possible negative consequences of ABM deployment. In the event that a successful mutual deployment of ABM capabilities does take place in the foreseeable future, the implications for third-party activities are likely to be somewhat similar to those of the umbrella effect. Specifically, a renewed emphasis on active defenses would alter basic deterrence equations substantially in directions that would tend to make various kinds of limited warfare safer and more palatable. Whereas the existence of a strategic umbrella would tend to increase guaranteed mutual "punishment" potential, the development of active defense capabilities would heighten the importance of "denial" in deterrence calculations.46 Here too, third-party activities might become increasingly important in a variety of lower-level situations, even though their utilization to prevent the outbreak of a large-scale, central war might never become relevant. In this connection, however, it is worth noting that there is little reason to suppose that the existence of third-party capabilities would feed back into the mechanism of the trend in question to make the international system safer for low-level wars. In more general terms, it is also important to take note of trends dealing with the development of a wide variety of 46

The concepts of "punishment" and "denial" are developed in Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961), chap. 1.

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advanced and "exotic" weapons systems. Constant and rather large-scale research and development in these areas makes it likely that at least some of the various possibilities will become relevant and perhaps even crucial in the future. Many types of advanced systems are already coming rapidly within the bounds of technological feasibility. And while cost-effectiveness considerations are likely to undermine a high percentage of these projects, it is very probable that some, at least, will eventuate in deployable weapons systems. By way of illustrating the vast scope for advances in weapons technology, consider the following areas in which such developments may occur: 1) sophistication of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons (including "clean" bombs, neutron bombs, and so forth); 2) chemical and biological (CB) weapons; 3) ray weapons with particular emphasis on laser technology; 4) nature imbalancers and antienvironment weapons (e.g., tidal-wave generators, ice-cap melting facilities, or climate-changing devices); 5) capabilities for tampering with and manipulating the atmosphere (e.g., mechanisms to alter the electrical charges in the atmosphere); 6) space weapons and militarily relevant space technology; and 7) psychological weapons and thoughtcontrol devices. Unilateral breakthroughs in at least some of these areas could cause radical changes in the balance of terror between the present superpowers. But the nature of present scientific, technological, and economic systems makes the chances that important unilateral breakthroughs of this kind will reach the operational stage quite small.47 On the 47

Karl Deutsch expresses what appears to be the consensus on this matter in the statement that "no matter which country is first in the production of some new weapon, other countries on a comparable level of scientific and technological development will match it with corresponding productions of their own, well before the first country will have had time to develop its new weapons and delivery system to such levels of quantity and reliability as to be

392

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other hand, simultaneous development of various advanced and "exotic" weapons systems is not at all improbable, and the actual deployment of at least some of them would almost certainly tend to have a seriously destabilizing effect on the international system. This is undoubtedly true as a generalization, even though certain specific and concrete developments in these areas might have some stabilizing implications. In this context, the implications for United Nations or other third-party intervention are difficult to foresee with any clarity.48 Trends with respect to advanced weapons systems may well exacerbate various politico-military dilemmas and in so doing generate some obstacles to successful intervention in future crises. At the same time, however, many possible developments in these areas are likely to underline starkly the need for third-party assistance in dangerous situations and the need to create increasingly favorable attitudes and expectations toward thirdparty intervention in severe crises. The emphasis on new technology raises a somewhat more general point concerning the dynamics of the military balance that has important implications for the question of third-party intervention. In the light of constant advances in various areas of research and development, there is a continuous requirement for the adaptation and renewal of military balances on new technological bases.49 The dynamics of research and development virtually eliminate the possibility of achieving a relatively stable set of military balances in the international system and subsequently militarily decisive." Karl W. Deutsch, "The Impact of Science and Technology on International Politics," Daedalus, Fall 1959, p. 672. 48 Among other things, developments in these areas are classified to a degree which makes detailed comment impossible in an unclassified work of this nature. 49 Some rather insightful comments on this subject appear in Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race (New York: Praeger, 1961), chap. 12.

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relaxing with a sense of at least minimal security. Even if it were somehow possible to control direct military research and development, it would still be impossible to put brakes on militarily relevant advances in general science and technology that could relatively easily be applied to more direct military problems. Furthermore, the pace of research and development advances shows a long-term, secular tendency to accelerate and a spectacular tendency in this direction in the post-World War II period. For this reason, military balances are beginning to become obsolescent more and more rapidly after becoming operational, and it is now possible to find cases in which new balances hardly become fully operational before they begin to show signs of becoming outmoded.50 In such an environment, relative prowess in pursuing technological development assumes an important position in the general picture of international competition. The requirements of balance renewal argue strongly for the thesis that severe great-power crises are not likely to be outgrown or to become irrelevant in the foreseeable future. The uncertainties, testing behavior, and asymmetrical developments generated by the processes of balance renewal are almost certain to cause at least occasional crises. Though the specific characteristics of crisis bargaining processes may change, therefore, the notion of intervention by a third party such as the United Nations is likely to remain relevant. If nothing else, this discussion of trends affecting the military balance of terror suggests that change is an important characteristic of the system. The present period, particularly, is one of very extensive and rapid change. While some of the consequences may well have a stabilizing impact on military balances in the system, others are likely to create a variety of new problems. Whatever the international system may look like in the future, therefore, it 50

See especially Kahn, On Thermonuclear

394

War, pp. 417-474.

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certainly does not seem safe at this time to assume that severe crises, and especially great-power crises, are likely to become obsolescent or infrequent. B. Local Conflict Though the revolution in military technology and strategy has contributed to the infrequency with which active hostilities occur at the broad, interbloc level, the same cannot be said of various local arenas. The years since the end of World War II constitute a period in which military force has been actively employed in a wide variety of limited and local contexts. The great powers have participated only indirectly in these conflicts, for the most part, and the resultant fighting has remained sharply limited in geographical terms. On the other hand, an important diversification of the modes in which force is employed has occurred. And it is clear that, at the local level, violence remains one of the most important means for inducing changes in the prevailing status quo. Several important trends of development lie behind the present frequency and vigor of local crises and wars. To begin with, the postwar period has witnessed an unprecedented proliferation of sovereign states in the international system. The result has been a rapid increase in actors with inevitable divergences of interests as well as the establishment of a variety of new arenas in which to pursue conflicts of interest. Moreover, this proliferation of sovereign states is bound up with the processes of liquidating European colonialism that have been in full swing since the end of the Second World War. While these processes have been relatively swift and more peaceful than many expected, they have been an important cause of a variety of conflicts between the forces of independence and nationalism and the remaining colonial powers. In addition, the very speed with which colonial relationships have been dismantled has sown the seeds of crisis in a number of 395

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areas. The resultant artificiality of many boundaries and the lack of preparedness of various native administrations to govern successfully have led to grave postcolonial crises. This raises the point that many of the new states are not really cohesive and viable entities in the same sense as the older nation states. Boundaries are often based on little more than the fiats of past colonial administrators. Ethnic, religious, and cultural divergences are commonly extensive. And many states are plagued by low levels of integration and community. As a result, the possibility of serious crisis tends to be ever present. Internal uprisings and revolts are common. And the resultant confusion often generates incentives for neighboring states to display acquisitive impulses in regard to territory. Moreover, this context of upheaval quite frequently produces situations which are favorable to the intervention of various outside forces with ideological interests to pursue. Finally, local conflict is encouraged by a relative absence of some of the important restraints which cut down the incidence of active hostilities among the great powers. Above all, the fear of massive destruction is much less influential in local arenas. Though it is possible that a local war could escalate to broader arenas, the fears induced by immediate presence of nuclear weapons are far less pronounced in local wars. In addition, the declining legitimacy of active hostilities in great-power relations, which is often mentioned, is considerably less relevant in many local arenas. In this connection, some of the traditionally positive aspects of warfare are still emphasized. And to the extent that a given conflict can somehow be fitted into the flexible framework of doctrines concerning national liberation, it is still possible to muster positive ideological support for warfare. These continuing sources of local conflict are sharply underlined by their conjunction with a series of developments in the modes of conflict. The technical means of 396

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conflict in local arenas are becoming increasingly diverse and, in some cases, sophisticated. And these trends are joined with the development of new concepts and doctrines to produce or refine a varied spectrum of forms of local coercion. Notable among the forms which have become increasingly relevant are: coercive infiltration, guerrilla activities, various types of national liberation struggle, insurgency and counterinsurgency operations, and subconventional warfare. Moreover, a considerable effort is now being devoted to the generation of additional weapons and strategies for the prosecution of local wars under a wide range of physical conditions. International developments concerning local crises and wars are linked with the global military trends discussed in the previous section in several important, though rather complex, ways. Above all, the great majority of local crises occur in the Southern Hemisphere and unfold under a strategic umbrella created by the East-West military confrontation. The general effect of this is to increase substantially the freedom of action of the local parties to a crisis or war. The restraints on the use of force by the great powers stemming from their interactions at the strategic level cut down on the extent of outside intervention in many local situations. Moreover, when the great powers do intervene, the requirements of the East-West competition tend to dictate a certain symmetry of intervention. And this frequently leads to a tendency for the great powers to cancel or offset each other's influence in local arenas, thus reducing the opportunities for any great power either to manipulate local crises to its own advantage or to tip the local balance in favor of the side it would prefer to see gain the upper hand. Finally, the threat of unwanted escalation implicit in most interventions in local conflicts tends to solidify the strategic umbrella under which geographically restricted warfare occurs in the system at present. Despite all these limitations, however, an additional 397

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link between local and global military developments is provided by the fact that the great powers frequently do vie with each other for the support of the nonaligned and uncommitted states. Since each side is fearful that the other will begin to gain growing support in the third world, these powers occasionally undertake preemptive or responsive actions aimed at winning over an uncommitted area. Though these processes take place under severe restraints, the development of a local crisis situation, in particular, tends to generate incentives for the great powers to intervene in some form. The objectives in such cases center around attempts to score cold-war gains or to defeat opposing efforts to score such gains, but the consequences may be messy and protracted local wars as well as a heightened danger of serious escalation to broader arenas. At this point, the various patterns of conflict in the international system focusing on East-West, North-South, and local problems begin to show signs of fusion and interpenetration. One interesting trend emerging from these developments concerns the confrontation of qualitatively different modes of warfare. Outside powers intervening in the wars of the Southern Hemisphere tend to utilize the forms of conventional warfare which place a premium on technological and economic strength. Their local opponents, however, are much more efficient at utilizing various amorphous and highly politicized forms of subconventional warfare. This leads to a new form of warfare which is difficult to define and which is often sufficiently confused to make ongoing analysis extremely difficult. There are many asymmetries in warfare of this kind which will result in important differences in advantages accruing to the opposing sides. Experience with these mixed forms of warfare, however, is still so limited that the detailed nature of the asymmetrical advantages is presently unclear. These developments in the realm of local military conflict have several significant implications for third-party 398

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activities. To start with, they suggest that there will be no lack of international crises of various types in the foreseeable future which third parties can evaluate in terms of the prospects for successful programs of intervention. Such developments do indicate, however, that many significant crises are likely to occur at levels which do not seriously threaten the overall stability of the system. In this connection, there may be important roles for third parties in helping to regulate crises before they escalate beyond the local level. The determinants of escalation are related to a variety of factors discussed above, but it now seems likely that most escalation sequences will exhibit various thresholds and pauses which a third party might seize upon as important opportunities for launching interventionary activities. Moreover, these local developments may favor thirdparty, and especially United Nations, intervention for several reasons. Above all, the increasing awareness of the dangers of great-power involvement and of escalation sequences is generating a rapidly growing acceptance of programs of action designed to insulate local situations from the intrusion of the great powers. The aim here is not really to prevent the occurrence of crises; it is rather to guarantee that crises remain localized and therefore essentially harmless from the point of view of system-wide stability. Many of the states of the third world are becoming socialized into a pattern of accepting and even actively supporting United Nations activities (and occasionally those of regional organizations) aimed at sealing off local crises from outside interference and at handling them within a framework of local interests and local balances of power. Since local crises are likely to remain prominent in the future, the role of the United Nations along these lines is likely to continue or even to expand. In particular, it is worth noting that such developments will probably make the Hammarskjold framework, discussed in Chapter Four, a doctrine of international peacekeeping of continuing relevance. 399

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THE INTERMEDIARIES

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412

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419

THE INTERMEDIARIES

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SELZNICH, PHILIP.

420

INDEX accidental war, 209-214; handling of, 247-250; prevention of, 243-246 Africa, 319-320, 327 Afro-Asian bloc, 327 agonistic warfare, 22 Ahman, Sven, 275 alert status, 212, 223-225 Algeria, 108 aligned States, 102-105 alliances, 353-354 Anti-ballistic missile systems (ABM), 222, 390-391 arbitration, 77-79, 237, 333-335 arms: chemical and biological, 392; technology of, 392 arms control, 177-178, 225-228 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 177 arms race, 165-166, 168, 187, 189 Asia, 357 Austria, 331 Avenol, Joseph, 270 Bailey, Sydney, 340 balance of power, 43-45, 359360 Balkans, 72, 75. See also United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans bargaining: agendas, 41-42; competitive-co-operative, 2527; dilemmas, 32-34; "distributional" vs. "efficiency," 4In; interdependent, 26-27; interdependent utilities, 31; mixed motives, 27-31; reputation, 34 Beck-Friis, Johan, 52

Beck-Friis Mission, 60 Berlin, 147, 379, 382 Berlin crisis (1948-1949), 52, 112, 278, 312 bipolarity, 96, 102, 122-123, 147, 153-155, 350-360 Bizerte, 135n Bloomfield, Lincoln, 113 Boulding, Kenneth, 26 Boyd, Andrew, 267 Briand, Aristide, 112 Buchan, Alastair, 176-178 Bunker, Ellsworth, 57 Buraimi, 142 Burns, A. L., 176, 200 Castro, Fidel, 74 catalytic war, 250-253 cease-fire, 253-256 Chamber of Commerce, 109 "chicken," game of, 14 Chinese People's Republic, 142, 147, 352, 354-355, 359, 373374 Churchill, Winston, 105, 116 civil service, 276, 282 Claude, I. L., Jr., 4, 117, 128 Clausewitz, Karl von, 183 Cleveland, Harlan, 192 commitment, 42-43, 169-170 communication and contact, 6264, 69-72, 213, 216, 222, 227, 232, 237-240, 242, 249, 253, 255, 258, 324-328 Congo, 60, 75, 104, 106, 124, 135n, 139n, 142-143, 151, 192, 270, 278-279, 284, 312n, 337. See also United Nations Congo Operation Cordier, Andrew, 311

421

THE INTERMEDIARIES Coser, Lewis, 17 Cox, Arthur, 290 crises: adaptation crises, 15; alliance crises, 23; extra bloc crises, 24-25; interbloc crises, 22, 92-93; intranational crises, 23-24; negative feedback crises, 14; overload crises, 15; phases, 19-21; positive feedback crises, 13, 166-167; Soviet-American Crises, 5-6; "starvation" crises, 15 crisis center, 313-315, 327-328 Cuba, 382 Cuban crisis (1962), 6, 11, 58n, 63, 71, 74, 109, 181, 193-196, 208, 228, 272-273, 278, 283, 287, 297, 312, 316, 324-326, 382n Cyprus, 54, 57, 60, 105, 112, 143, 145, 179, 279, 297-298. See also United Nations Force in Cyprus Dallin, Alexander, 176, 180 d'Arboussier, Gabriel, 289 data collection and processing, 64-66, 239, 242, 253, 319322 de Gaulle, Charles, 103-105 detente, 198-199, 378-382 deterrence, graduated, 184, 188 Dominican Republic, 107n, 179 Douglas, Ann, 82 Drummond, Sir Eric, 266-267 East Germany (GDR), 219, 324 Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference, 317-318, 327 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 191-192 elaboration and initiation, 55-58, 219, 234, 245

422

enunciation, 53-55, 213-214, 219, 231, 255 escalation, 170-171, 217, 233 escalation ladder, 193-195 Ethiopia-Somalia conflict, 107 Evatt, Herbert, 112 "face-saving," 42-43 financing: United Nations, 71, 145, 340 France, 352, 354-355, 373 Garthoff, Raymond, 182-183, 185 Geneva, 314 Geneva Agreements (1954), 334 Geneva Conventions (1949), 332 Goodrich, Leland, 119, 123-124 Gordenker, Leon, 300 Great Britain, 105 Greece, 125 Greek-Bulgarian crisis (1925), 112 ground rules, 232-237, 363-365 Guatemala, 104 Haekkerup, Per, 288-289 Halle, Louis, 163 Hamilton, Thomas, 118 Hammarskjold, Dag, 4, 5, 51, 52, 113, 115, 133, 135-144, 146, 148, 150, 151-156, 158, 180, 191, 264, 268-270, 272273, 275, 280, 282-284, 295298, 312, 317-318, 320, 335336, 339, 399 Herz, John, 96-97, 167 Holmes, John, 319-320 "hot line," 70, 202, 227, 327, 380

INDEX Hudson Institute, 18 Hungarian crisis, 55, 108, 134, 135n, 298, 359 IkIe, Fred, 21, 34, 40, 53, 56 inadvertent warfare, 208-209 India, 354-355 India-Pakistandispute, 145, 180, 339. See also United Nations India-Pakistan Observer Mis­ sion, and United Nations Mil­ itary Observer Group for India and Pakistan India-Pakistan negotiations, 105 Indonesia, 57, 124-125. See also United Nations Good Offices Committee for Indonesia and United Nations Conciliation Commission for Indonesia intelligence operations, 293, 322 International Αβairs (Moscow), 179 International Community, 4546 International Control Commis­ sions for Indochina, 78, 334 International Court of Justice, 340 interposition, 66-68, 322-324 interpretation, 58-59 intervention, see resources for intervention intrawar rules, 59, 68, 76, 77, 183, 185 Iran, 125 Jackson, Elmore, 38, 47 Japan, 355 Johnson, Lyndon, 177 Joint Studies Group, 292-293 Jordan, 63, 142, 312n Kahn, Herman, 171

Kaplan, Morton, 94, 95-96, 102 Kashmir, 72, 124-125, 323 Katanga, 63 Katzenbach, Nicholas deB, 9596 Kennedy, John, 177 Kissinger, Henry, 100-102 Korea, 76, 131-133, 151, 194, 334; Chinese intervention, 132. See also United Nations Commission on Korea Kripalani, A., 100 Laos, 104, 142, 298, 320 laser technology, 392 Lash, Joseph, 311 League of Nations, 76, 112, 267, 270, 279, 281, 326 Lebanon, 312n, 323, 334. See also United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon Lefever, Ernest, 99-100 Leticia dispute, 76 Lie, Trygve, 52, 267-268, 280, 295-296, 312, 329, 366n Liska, George, 94, 98-99, 102, 348, 357, 372 Loutfi, Omar, 318 Lovell, Hugh, 40 Mackintosh, Malcolm, 200 Makarios, Archbishop, 54 Malinovsky, Marshal R. Y., 175 Martin, Paul, 330 Mathiasen, Karl, 290 McClelland, Charles, 9 McNamara, Robert, 187 Meyer, Arthur, 36, 44 Middle East, 279, 318 miscalculated war, 214-217; han­ dling of, 247-250; prevention of, 243-246

423

THE INTERMEDIARIES Morgenthau, Hans, 277 Morocco-Algeria conflict, 107 Moscow Declaration (1943), 122 Moulton, Harland, 187 NATO, 66, 105, 107, 133, 353354 neutralism, 98, 101 Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, 76 Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, 76, 78 New York City, 240n, 313, 322, 326-328 nongovernmental organizations, 108-110 North Borneo, 55, 75, 143 North-South split, 374-378 Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 291 nuclear proliferation, 164, 371374 nuclear strikes, 199-200 O'Brien, Conor Cruise, 63 offense-defense dilemmas, 168169 Organization of African Unity (OAU), 106-107 Organization of American States (OAS), 105-107 Osgood, Robert, 182 Oslo Conference (1964), 291 Ottawa Conference (1964), 291 outer space, 64, 252, 380, 392 Pachter, Henry, 199 Palestine, 60, 72, 74, 124-125, 329. See also United Nations Mixed Armistice Commissions for Palestine and United Na-

424

tions Truce Supervision Organization Palestine Mediator, 60 Participation, 59-61, 224-225, 258-259, 261, 317-319 Pearson, Lester, 93, 112 permanent missions, 278, 308309, 310-311 persuasion, 51-53, 213-214, 234, 310-315 Polaris missile, 252 political accommodation, 256259 positive evidence, 73-74, 236, 242, 245, 332 preemption, 220-222, 228, 248, 252 President (United States), 303 Radio-Nations, 326 Ranshofen-Wertheimer, Egon, 267, 281, 326 Rapacki Plan, 104 Red Cross, 108-110 regional actors, 356 regional organizations, 105-108 Resources for Intervention: continuity, 85-87, 281-284; impartiality, 81-82, 271-274; independence, 82-83, 274; initiative, 89-90, 295-298; knowledge of Politics—Military Affairs, 87-88, 284-294; mobilization of, 91, 305-309; physical, 90-91, 298-305; respect, 84-85, 279-281; skill, 88-89, 294-295 Rhodesia, 306 Richardson, L. F., 13 Rikhye, Indar Jit, 286n Rockefeller Foundation, 289290

INDEX Roosevelt, Franklin D., 116 Saar, Plebiscite Commission for, 76 salience, 40-41, 83-84, 264-265, 276-279 Schachter, Oscar, 298 Schelling, Thomas, 161, 164165, 168, 172, 177, 196-197 Secretariat, 61, 70, 86, 134, 139, 181, 239-240; and Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, 287, 319, 329; and Disarmament Affairs Group, 287, 318, 343 Secretary-General, 4, 51, 70, 83, 90, 113-114, 140-141, 153, 212, 219, 225, 231-232, 234, 236, 243, 245, 255, 259, 261; executive office of, 66, 249, 253, 278, 282, 286-287, 295, 299-300, 306, 311, 314315, 319, 329, 343, 345; maximalist theory, 267-269; minimalist theory, 266-267; office of the Military Adviser, 286, 288-289, 304, 306-307; Under Secretaries for Special Political Affairs, 299 security dilemmas, 167-168 Senegal, 289 Simmel, Georg, 17 Sinai Peninsula, 324 Spasm war, 229 Speier, Hans, 22 Spinelli, Pier, 63, 329 Sokolovsky, Marshal V. D., 175, 184 Stevens, Carl, 36-37, 39, 86, 283 Stevenson, Adlai, 307 strategic alert, 172 strategic surrender, 259-262

Suez Canal, 142 Suez crisis, 59, 67, 104, 135n, 142, 194-196, 207n, 278, 312, 312n, 323; Port Said, 75, 324; "Six Principles," 52, 142, 312. See also United Nations Emergency Force supervision, 75-77, 219, 228, 236-237, 332-333 Sweden, 331 Switzerland, 331 systemic stability, 12-13 Talensky, General N., 175 Tanganyika, 107 technological innovation, 393394 Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference, 317 Thailand-Cambodia dispute, 142 Thant, U, 8, 52, 63, 71, 115, 141-143, 181, 192, 270, 272273, 283, 284, 287, 297, 311312, 318, 324-325, 336, 339, 342, 366n Treaty of Moscow (1963), 373, 380 Troika, 181, 192 Tuomioja, Sakari, 57 "umbrella effect," 388-390 uncommitted states, 92-102 Union of South Africa, 106 United Nations, 4, 5, 110-114, 115-156, 178-181, 189-193, 206-207, 360; financing, 71, 145, 340; general Assembly, 73, 111-112 (Nineteenth Session of, 341); guards, 329; radio facilities, 301-302, 321, 325-326; Security Council, 73,

425

THE INTERMEDIARIES 111-112 (Military Staff Committee of, 120-122, 151); see also Secretariat and SecretaryGeneral United Nations Charter: Article 1,126n; Article 7, 296; Article 19, 341; Article 22, 315; Article 24, 12On; Article 25, 121n; Article 27, 117, 121; Article 29, 315; Article 100, 276; Article 106, 122; Chapter VI, 126; Chapter VII, 120122, 145-146, 150 United Nations Collective Measures Committee, 68n, 129 United Nations Commission on Korea, 132 United Nations Conciliation Commission for Indonesia, 57, 60 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNC T A D ) , 376 United Nations Congo Operation ( O N U C ) , 306, 329, 337, 341, 344-345 United Nations Emergency Force ( U N E F ) , 67, 74, 112, 124, 134, 142, 286n, 301n, 306, 323-324, 329, 337, 344 United Nations Force in Cyprus ( U N F I C Y P ) , 67, 302, 306, 341 United Nations Good Offices Committee for Indonesia, 60, 72 United Nations India-Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIP O M ) , 339 United Nations Military Observer Group for India and

426

Pakistan (UNMOGIP), 75, 302 United Nations Mixed Armistice Commissions for Palestine, 58-59 United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL), 74, 142, 301n, 306 United Nations Peace Observation Commission, 129 United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB), 125 United Nations Temporary Executive Authority ( U N T E A ) , 75 United Nations Training and Research Institute (UNIT A R ) , 289-290, 300, 304 United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), 72, 74, 302 United Nations Yemen Observer Mission (UNYOM), 67, 143, 339, 341 Uniting for Peace Resolution, 128-129, 131-132 verification, inspection, and monitoring, 72-75, 216-217, 222, 225, 228, 236, 242-243, 245, 249-250, 253, 256, 261262, 328-332 Vietnam, 147, 379, 382 war: agonistic, 22; catalytic, 250-253; inadvertent, 208209; spasm, 229. See also accidental and miscalculated war Warsaw Pact, 66, 107, 353 weapons, see arms

INDEX West Germany (FRG), 219, 324, 355 West Irian, 57, 60, 75, 143, 192, 279, 297, 341. See also United Nations Temporary Executive Authority Wilcox, Francis 0., 97-98 Windsor, Philip, 184 Wohlstetter, Albert, 161-162

World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), 109 World Veterans Federation (Paris), 320 Yalta Conference, 105 Yemen, 279. See also United Nations Yemen Observer Mission

427

Other books published for The Center of International Studies Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs Gabriel A. Almond, The Appeals of Communism Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, editors, The Politics of the Developing Areas Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations Richard J. Barnet and Richard A. FaIk, Security in Disarmament Cyril E. Black and Thomas P. Thornton, editors, Communism and Revolution: The Strategic Uses of Political Violence Robert J. C. Butow, Tojo and the Coming of the War Miriam Camps, Britain and the European Community, 1955-1933 Bernard C. Cohen, The Political Process and Foreign Policy: The Making of the Japanese Peace Settlement Bernard C. Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy Charles De Visscher, Theory and Reality in Public International Law, translated by P. E. Corbett Frederick S. Dunn, Peace-making and the Settlement with Japan Harry Eckstein, Division and Cohesion in Democracy: A Study of Norway Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War W. W. Kaufmann, editor, Military Policy and National Security Klaus Knorr, On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age Klaus Knorr, The War Potential of Nations Klaus Knorr, editor, NATO and American Security Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba, editors, The International System: Theoretical Essays Peter Kunstadter, Southeast Asian Tribes, Minorities, and Nations Sidney J. Ploss, Conflict and Decision-making in Soviet Russia Lucian W. Pye, Guerrilla Communism in Malaya James N. Rosenau, editor, International Aspects of Civil Strife James N. Rosenau, National Leadership and Foreign Policy: A Case Study in the Mobilization of Public Support Rolf Sannwald and Jacques Stohler, Economic Integration: Theoretical Assumptions and Consequences of European Unification. Translated by Herman F . Karreman Richard L. Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent African Nation Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs, With Special Reference to International Politics Thomas P. Thornton, The Third World in Soviet Perspective: Studies by Soviet Writers on the Developing Areas Sidney Verba, Small Groups and Political Behavior: A Study of Leadership Karl von Vorys, Political Development in Pakistan Myron Weiner, Party Politics in India