Status Warriors: War, Violence and Society in Homer and History 9050630758, 9789050630757

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STATUS

WARRIORS

DUTCH

MONOGRAPHS ON ANCIENT AND ARCHAEOLOG Y

HISTORY

EDITORS

F.J.A.M.

MEIJER

-

VOLUME HANS

STATUS

VAN

H.W. IX WEES

WARRIORS

PLEKET

STATUS

WARRIORS

WAR, VIOLENCE AND SOCIETY IN HOMER AND HISTORY

BY HANS

VAN

WEES

J.C. GIEBEN, PUBLISHER AMSTERDAM 1992

CIP-DATA KONINKLIJKE BIBLIOTHEEK, DEN HAAG Wees, Hans van

Status warriors : war, violence and society in Homer and history / by Hans van Wees. - Amsterdam : Gieben. (Dutch monographs on ancient history and archaeology, ISSN 0924-3550 : vol. 9) Also published as thesis Leiden, 1992. - With index, ref. ISBN 90-5063-075-8 Subject heading: violence and society ; history ; Greek antiquity.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book has benefited from the incisive criticism and helpful suggestions of a number of British and Dutch scholars. My work was supervised initially by the late prof.

A.B.

Breebaart (Amsterdam),

whose enthusiasm and kind assistance were an

important stimulus and are much missed. Later, profs. C.J. Ruijgh (Amsterdam) and H.W. Pleket (Leiden) acted as joint supervisors, while in Britain, where the actual research took place, prof. S.C. Humphreys (now of Ann Arbor, Michigan) and dr. T.J. Cornell (London) agreed to supervise the work in an unofficial capacity. All four, if I may say so, have been model supervisors : efficient, sharp and willing to make available for me a great deal of time in their busy schedules. In addition, much valuable advice was offered by dr. P.A. Cartledge (Cambridge) and prof. M.M. Willcock (London), who read and commented upon a substantial part of the manuscript, and by prof. H.S. Versnel (Leiden) and dr. H.W.

Singor (Leiden), who

did the same for the whole of it. Versions of part of the text were delivered as seminar papers at the Institute of Classical Studies (London), and benefited from subsequent discussion with fellow participants, among whom I should like to single out Philip de Souza. Those mentioned have helped to make this a far better book than it would otherwise have been; its remaining failings are entirely my responsibility. Other kinds of debts I owe to Floris Cohen, whose timely encouragement made ail the difference, and to Jonathan Brown and Ewan Campbell whose computerexpertise and readiness to help saved me many weeks of work.

Financial support came from a variety of sources.

The British Council awarded

me a scholarship in 1984-5, which enabled me to get started on my dissertation, and,

what is more, to do so in Britain, which despite the present harsh financial climate is still an excellent place to do Ancient History. From April 1987 to July 1989, my research was funded by a subsidy from the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (N.W.O.). I produced the final version of the book while employed as a Tutorial Fellow in the School of History and Archaeology at the University of Wales College of Cardiff. In between, the generosity of the Department of History at University College London, the School of Archaeology and Ancient History at Leicester University and especially the Department of Mediterranean Studies at Queen Mary & Westfield College (London) in offering me part-time employment enabled me to continue work. I can only hope that this book will be regarded as

added proof that the decision to close the Department of Mediterranean Studies was wholly unjustified.

Although all of the above deserve great credit, I wish to dedicate this book to those whose influence on me and my work has been more fundamental still : to my parents, my brothers and my sister; to my teachers and fellow students at the University of Amsterdam, among whom René van Royen and Eelco Beukers deserve particular mention; and, finally, to Yoshie Sugino, whose ideas on the wider issues

involved in the subject of this book have deeply influenced mine.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

PREFACE CHAPTER ONE HISTORY IN POETRY ON RECONSTRUCTING THE HOMERIC WORLD 1.

Fact and fantasy : the fourth race

2. Tradition : old poems or the latest songs ? (i) Compositional technique (ii) Subject matter 13

12

(iii) Social function 14

3.

The case of the Big Round Shield

4. History in poetry : points of method CHAPTER TWO

LIFE IN TOWN

SN

σα

ΒΟ

Ὁ DE

THE ORGANISATION OF HOUSEHOLD,

AND STATE

The hidden society : reconstructions and models Buildings and people Government : the princes and the people Beyond the town A hero's home Friends : the men who come to dinner The economy of the estate Life in town : fact and fiction

CHAPTER THREE STATUS,

1.

COMMUNITY

THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING ANGRY

PERSONAL POWER AND VIOLENCE

Explanations of violence (i) The fragmentary society 63 (ii) The heroic impulse 66 (iii) The shame-culture 67 (iv) Assumptions and questions

2. 3.

The meaning of honour and excellence Princes and bad men : ideals and exploitation (i) Proper beatings 83 (ii)

Unjust violence

69 78

85

(iii) Undeserved gifts 85 (iv) Fighting over plunder

4.

68

87

Competition I : personal excellence

89

5 Competition II : power and wealth 6. Competition III : the struggle for respect (i)

The Benvolio-syndrome

101 109

110

(ii) The attraction of Aybris 115 (111) The bullying tendency 118 (iv) Questions of superiority

122

126

The ethics of anger (i)

The moral boundaries of anger

(ii) Pity 130

(iii) Reconciliation

128

131

(iv) Self-control 135 (v) The authorities 137

8 9

The might of men : strength, connections and justice The importance of being angry : fact and fiction

CHAPTER FOUR PILLAGE AND PREDATORY AND STATUS WARFARE

DESTRUCTION

167 168. 172 183 191

1. Warriors at peace

un

Troy I: the insult that launched a thousand ships

Troy II : the ideal of annihilation Private conflicts, brawls and wars (i) (ii)

The War of Men and Kentaurs 191 The War of Kouretes and Aitolians

(iii) The First Sack of Troy

192

193

(iv) The War of the Seven against Thebes

(v) The War of the Pylians and Epeians

194

195

200

na

Communities in competition : dangerous games (i) Champion-combat : Trojans versus Akhaians 200 (ii) Games : the humiliation of communities 202 Predators

207 218

Booty and the Homeric economy (i) Subsistence economy : autarky and fair exchange (ii) Treasure economy : greed and generosity 222 (iii) Convertibility of goods

138 153

219

223

10. Pillage and destruction : fact and fiction

228 238 249

CONCLUSION

261

8. Gift-exchange : the hospitality-racket 9. Trade and plunder : profit and prestige

(i)

Homer

261

(ii) History 262 (iii) Violence

264

APPENDICES Appendix One

267

1. The size of the population 2.

269

Terms for towns and townsfolk

Appendix Two

271

Appendix Three

Appendix Four

281

281

Booty : Prizes And Portions

The mechanism of distribution

2. The principles of distribution

NOTES to to to to to to to to to

276

Monarchs, Dynasties, Temenea

1. Kings versus Big Men 2. The royal estates 294

Notes Notes Notes Notes Notes Notes Notes Notes Notes

274

Princes And Sceptres

1. Princely families and their elders 274 2. Symbolic and procedural functions of the sceptre

1.

269

Towns And Townsfolk

299

299

304

311 Preface 313 Chapter One 314 Chapter Two 322 Chapter Three 345 Chapter Four 379 Appendix One 406 Appendix Two 407 Appendix Three 410 Appendix Four 413

BIBLIOGRAPHY

417

INDICES

44]

Subject index 443 Index of passages 451

PREFACE

Tall tales about supernatural forces and feats of superhuman strength are not the kind of material historians normally work with. If,

moreover,

these

are tales

of unknown

date,

origin

and

authorship,

historians will generally give them a wide berth. But the tales told in Homer's Iliad and Odyssey are another matter. These oldest Greek epic poems feature monsters and miracles among which Akhilleus' talking horse (XIX.404-18) is only a minor marvel. When, where, how and

why the poems were composed

has been debated for centuries.

Yet

historians rely heavily on the /liad and Odyssey in reconstructing early Greek history, adducing the epics as evidence for several periods, covering a millennium : the Mycenaean Age (1600-1100 B.C.), the Dark Age (1100-700), and sometimes also the Archaic Age (700-500). Not everyone finds this extraordinary state of affairs acceptable. Scholars increasingly feel that it is wrong to use the /liad and Odyssey as historical sources at all. They hold that the poems are great literature

but useless as evidence, except insofar as they corroborate information provided by other, better sources. This is a methodologically safe and sound view, but its implications are revolutionary. In dismissing the Iliad and Odyssey as sources one discards most of the evidence which supports established views of Dark Age social, economic, political and

military

organisation.

For

whereas

epic

evidence

contributes

only

marginally to our knowledge of the other periods, it is fair to say that, in spite of a growing body of archaeological evidence, current ideas about the Dark Age continue to depend predominantly on evidence drawn from the Zliad and Odyssey. There is no other literary evidence for the period, and the archaeological evidence, although in principle independent of the epics, in practice is not wholly so : when it comes to interpreting the finds, familiar epic images exercise a powerful hold on the imagination. !

2

In denying Homer's poems value as historical evidence, then, one shakes the foundations of modern reconstructions of Dark Age society. Moreover, one seriously undermines the common view that great changes began to take place in Greece at the beginning of the Archaic peiiod. For example, the notion that the early Archaic Age witnessed

the rise of the city-state and the citizen-army derives primarily from the perception that, while Archaic poets and inscriptions refer to these institutions, Homer does not yet portray communities as city-states nor warriors as members of a phalanx of heavy-armed citizens. If one removes the Homeric evidence from the picture, the contrast vanishes. No longer is there literary evidence from which to argue that the Archaic

texts refer to new political and military phenomena. Only archaeological evidence remains, and it is doubtful whether by itself this is strong enough to bear the weight of theories which posit fundamental historical changes in many areas of Greek life. Disregarding the epics means losing a large chunk of Greek history along with the most substantial surviving Greek texts prior to Herodotos' Histories. It seems to me that historians are not always fully aware of

how much is at stake here, and I suspect that, if they were, many of them would be rather less willing to ignore the epics.

But that does not

alter the fact that the epics are a peculiar source, and that any historical reconstruction based on epic material is precarious. Ancient historians thus cannot use the epics as they would any other source, nor can they

easily afford to leave them to one side.

They have little choice but to

confront the problems and look for acceptable ways of squeezing out of the poems what information they can. 2

One purpose of this book is to do just that.

I shall attempt to offer a

few methodological guidelines for the historical study of Homer,

and a

reconstruction of Homeric society that is partly mew, and partly a defence of older views against more recent interpretations. In doing so, I am concerned first and foremost to shed some new light on early Greek history, but I believe that historical analysis is also a prerequisite for the study of the epics as works of literature. Literary criticism of the [liad and Odyssey has reached great heights of popularity in the ‘eighties, but all too often the poems have been treated as if they

were products of our own culture and could be understood wholly in terms of our own values. Jasper Griffin is merely more outspoken than most when he sets "taste and sense” as his standards and overtly aims

3

"to defend as intellectually respectable the instinctive responses of the [modern] audience” (1980: 65, 139). Griffin and others have offered many valuable insights into the structure and meaning of the poems, but we Shall see that these critics have more than once been led astray by their lack of historical perspective.

The focus of this book will be on war and conflict in Homeric society, and ultimately on the question of the causes of violent conflict between individuals and between communities in the epic world. Although Homeric ideals of warriorhood and the heroic code have

been much discussed, the fundamental causes of war and conflict in the epic world are rarely studied in any depth. Partly, no doubt, this is because the epics deal with legendary, not historical, clashes. But perhaps a more important reason is that violence is widely regarded as a natural phenomenon. It is believed that man is born aggressive and bound to injure, kill and make war time and again. If nature had its way, all men would be forever fighting all others; only the physical force of the state and the moral forces of civilisation impose restraints. Such a perception allows a simple explanation of Homeric war and conflict : men fight because their society has not yet developed a governmental apparatus or a system of ethics strong enough to stop them. However, it seems to me and it has seemed to others that this is too one-sided a notion of human nature, and entails an oversimplified

view of the causes of conflict. ?

I shall therefore suggest a different

explanation for the frequency of armed violence in the Iliad and Odyssey, and for the apparently lower level of violence in the internal conflicts, if not in the wars, of the Archaic Age. The legendary world of the epics may not seem an obvious place perhaps not even a useful place - to go for a study of violent behaviour. Still, by drawing from the poems some insight into the causes of conflict

in Greek society, I hope to make a small contribution not only to the study of Greek epic and Greek history, but to the general question of why men fight.

CHAPTER ONE

HISTORY IN POETRY On reconstructing the Homeric world

In modern Greek folklore, the ancient Greeks used to feature as an extinct race of giants, the Hellenes. Ancient buildings such as the Parthenon were at the beginning of the century still pointed out as the work of these giants. Farmers who ploughed up large bones in their fields claimed that these were the remains of Hellenes. People said : “There is a story that long ago in our region there used to live Hellenes, a people that went about in the nude mostly; a strong, tall people, well-disposed to mankind. Sometimes you may still see a Hellene in the woods.” "Don't you believe the Hellenes existed ? They were tall as giants; so tall that when

they fell down they could not get up again - and that is why

they died out." !

The ancient Greeks themselves, in turn, had a rather similar tradition about a race that preceded their own. They called it the race of heroes. The heroes, it was believed, were demi-gods and far stronger than ordinary mortals; they had become extinct as a result of the slaughter wrought in their last great battles, in the Theban and Trojan Wars. The

ancient Greeks attributed to this race tombs and ruins from the distant past, and worshipped the heroes at many of these sites. Indeed, Sparta and Athens, the leading states of classical Greece, at the height of their power took great pains to locate and excavate in conquered territory the alleged remains of their local heroes, Orestes and Theseus respectively. The bones were then ‘taken home’ to be reburied and given a public

cult. 2 Modern Greek fairy-tales about the giant Hellenes were few and short.

They tell us nothing of historical value about antiquity and very little about the lives of Greek peasants at the turn of the century. The ancient Greeks, by contrast, had an extensive oral tradition handed down by professional travelling bards who sang or recited lengthy epic poems

6 about the deeds of the heroes, describing in detail their houses and farms, their institutions, customs, norms and ideals. While most of this tradition, except for minute fragments, is lost to us, two poems survive in full : the Jiiad and the Odyssey. In antiquity these were attributed to a single poet, known as Homer (Homeros). 3 To the historian, Homer's poems pose a tantalising problem. On the one hand, the quantity and quality of their narrative detail makes them a

potentially rich source of information.

On the other hand, as the analogy

with recent Greek folktale shows, there are good a priori reasons to question the historical value of that information. In this chapter, we shall be looking more closely at the nature of the epic tradition about the heroes, and deal with the question of how one may use the epics as sources for Greek history. It will be argued that most historical interpretations of Homer, to varying degrees, have been affected by (1) a tendency to underestimate the extent to which the world of the heroes is a fantasy world, and (2) an overinclination to discern and disentangle 'layers' of tradition reflecting different periods of history. I hope to show that such interpretations are methodologically flawed on both counts, and that a different approach to the poems may lead to a new, and perhaps more valid, assessment of their value as historical

sources.

1. FACT AND FANTASY

: THE FOURTH RACE

Greek epic stories claim to be true stories. A bard may boast that divine inspiration enables him to recall every last detail of what happened, down to the names of hundreds of obscure people and places

and the exact nature of dozens of wounds inflicted in battle. He may even hint that, if the heroes of his stories could have heard him sing, they would have testified to his accuracy. * Ancient audiences were sceptical at times and accused epic poets of exaggerating and embellishing the past, but accepted that by and large they did tell the According to ancient calculations, the heroes lived, not ‘once truth.

upon a time’, but in what we call the thirteenth and twelfth centuries B.C. Excavations in Greece since the 1860s have shown that in these centuries a distinct civilisation, now known as Mycenaean,

flourished in

7

places such as Mykenai and Pylos where the heroes were supposed to have had their homes. Indeed, the Greeks themselves already identified

visible Mycenaean remains as the walls and tombs built for the heroes. Clearly, the notion of a heroic race was not a complete fiction, but was

based on at least some knowledge of the existence of Mycenaean culture. On the other hand, Greek tradition portrays the Mycenaeans as superhuman beings - which of course they were not. A hero (heros) in the ancient Greek sense is a man who has been not merely outstandingly

brave or otherwise remarkable, but has been formally elevated to semidivine status after his death, and granted religious worship. Founders of cities, for example, were regularly awarded such posthumous status. An unusual case was the elevation to hero of the Spartan commander Brasidas in 422 B.C. when he fell while defending the city of Amphipolis. The local people “made an enclosure round his tomb, and ever since they have sacrificed to him as to a hero, and given games in his honour, and made annual offerings" (Thucydides V.11,1). People believed that in return the hero protected his worshippers and made them prosper. 5 In historical times, then, heroes existed only in the shape of the spirits of the great dead. But evidently, the Greeks imagined that the Mycenaeans had been living heroes. The most concise and explicit account of the heroic race is offered in Hesiod's poem Works and Days, which says that before the present Iron Race of men, Gold, Silver, and Bronze Races populated the earth. After

these, "Yet again another race, the fourth upon the fertile soil, Zeus son of Kronos made : more just and better, A godlike race [genos] of men, of heroes, known as Demigods."

(Works and Days 157-60)

These became embroiled in wars at Thebes and Troy (161-65). "There then death's end closed over some of them;

Others were given a living and a place to dwell away from men By Zeus son of Kronos; the Father settled them at the ends of the earth." (Works and Days 166-68)

Hesiod's notion that the heroes constituted a fourth race may be his own, but otherwise his views about them were shared by the Greeks at

large. However, there is a school of thought which holds that Homer did not regard the characters of his poems as heroes in the Greek religious sense, but as mere mortals. It is suggested that the concept of heroes as semi-divine beings to be worshipped was in fact a new development of Homer's own day, inspired by the popularity of epic poetry about great men of the past. 6 Very little can be said in favour of this view. A serious obstacle to it is a passage in the /liad which says unambiguously that, at Troy, ”,.. many ox-hide shields and helmets And the race of demi-god men fell down into dust.”

(X11.22-3)

Another obstacle is the fact that Homer often refers to his protagonists,

individually and collectively, as heroes.

Sometimes Homer's heroes call

one another hero, too. It has been claimed that Homer's use of the term differs from later usage : to Homer heros meant something like 'lord' and was no more than a respectful way of referring to someone; after

Homer this usage disappeared "fairly quickly" (West 1978: 370-3) and heros was applied to demi-gods only. 7 But this is pure speculation and surely unnecessary.

It is far simpler to assume

that the poet calls his

protagonists heroes because his stories are set in a time when a race of heroes inhabited the earth; a hero addressing another as 'hero' is the equivalent of a man addressing another as ‘man’. In short, Homer does share Hesiod's view of the heroes as a distinct, extinct, and semi-divine

race. ὃ Homer's heroes distinguish themselves from ordinary mortals by their

proximity to the gods and their great physical strength. have divine parents or ancestors,

gods.

and receive personal

Many

heroes

visits from

the

Their strength is such that they can lift and throw huge boulders.

"Two men of the kind that live nowadays, even the best in a town, could not easily heave that stone from the ground onto a wagon, but he swung it easily on his own" (X11.447-9). 9

Other fantasy elements abound, though their scope appears restricted. Miraculous things happen, but never without the contriving of the gods;

the heroes themselves perform no marvels other than feats of strength. There are monsters, but they live far across the sea, not in the lands inhabited by the heroes. Otherwise, there is nothing obviously fantastic,

9 except

perhaps

the

references

to vast

wealth

and

large

numbers

of

everything. In order to make use of the epics as historical sources, one must of

course separate fact from fantasy. Fact, in this context, is such literary creation as reproduces in a fairly straightforward manner realities of some historical period, be they events or objects, norms or institutions. Fantasy is here defined as literary creation not directly corresponding to historical realities - though even this is ultimately rooted in reality. In antiquity, historians such as Herodotos and Thukydides separated the two by eliminating the impossible and implausible as fantasy, and retaining the rest as fact. Modern scholars have often proceeded in the same way. Thus, Moses Finley believed that one need only strip the

epics "οὗ supernatural intervention and superhuman capacities" in order to uncover historical realities (1977: 42). Others have identified further implausibilities and argued either that these are isolated fantasy elements

which serve to remind the audience that the heroic world is unlike their own (Redfield

1975: 35-9; Morris

1986a: 85-91; Giovannini

1989: 29-

37), or that these are part of a wholly fantastic image of the social and political structure of the world of the heroes (Geddes

1984; cf. Taplin

1986; Anastasiou 1981). 19 A practical problem with this approach is that plausibility is by no means a clear-cut criterion.

Too often, scholars regard as implausible or

even impossible what is merely unfamiliar. 11 More

importantly,

the approach has a fundamental

methodological

flaw : it fails to consider that the epics may contain plausible fantasy.

If

most of the heroic world at first sight seems realistic enough, this does

not necessarily mean that it faithfully reproduces historical realities. The heroes,

being

demigods

and

supermen,

are

in these

respects

so

far

removed from any historical prototype as to be essentially a fairy-tale people.

that the

In consequence, we must reckon with the theoretical possibility

whole

world

depicted

in the

epics

is as fabulous

as its

inhabitants. If tradition told of heroes unlike any mortals that ever lived, it is possible in principle that tradition created for these heroes weapons, houses, institutions, customs and ideals unlike any that ever existed.

However realistic these may appear, they might all be plausible fictions. In using the /liad and Odyssey as historical evidence, therefore, one

should reserve judgement on what is fact and what is fantasy in the epics.

First,

one

should

reconstruct

the

heroic

world

as a whole,

10

incorporating not only the seemingly realistic, but also the less plausible

and even the blatantly imaginary elements. Only then should one try to distinguish epic fact from epic fantasy, analysing each individual piece of information in the light of the overall image of heroic society. When examined

in their context,

things which

as I hope

in isolation seem

to demonstrate

realistic enough

presently,

may

some

turn out to be

fantastic. The reverse is true too : things which in themselves seem implausible may begin to make sense. Finally, when one has succeeded in separating fact from fantasy, one

should not discard the latter.

Historians are naturally most interested in

the ‘factual’ aspects of the epic, but fantasy is a category of historical

evidence in its own

right.

However

far removed

from

reality, it is

bound to reflect the experiences, fears and ideals of those who fantasise.

The

imaginary

worlds

of

science-fiction,

for

example,

from

the

totalitarian state of Oceania in George Orwell's 1984 to the evil Galactic Empire of George Lucas’ Star Wars, tell us a great deal about the cultures from which they spring. So, too, even the imaginary aspects of

the world of the heroes may indirectly provide valuable information on Greek culture. One of the contentions of this book is that many aspects of the heroic world - more than is usually recognised - are indeed fantastic to a degree, and reflect no historical reality but the ideals of Homer and his audience.

2. TRADITION : OLD POEMS OR THE LATEST SONGS 7 Epic stories were not simply invented from scratch by Homer. They were traditional stories. Apart from anything else, this is clear from the

fact

that the

Odyssey

tells the

story

of the

Kyklops

without

once

mentioning that the monster has only one eye, although that information is crucial to the plot. Evidently the audience were supposed to have heard the story before and to know this. 12 This poses another set of problems for the historian. Where did the stories originate ? How were

they transmitted transmission ?

7

Above

all,

how

much

did

they

change

in

11

Since

the

plausible view

rediscovery

has been

of Mycenaean

civilisation,

that the epic tales had

a popular

and

their origin in the

Mycenaean age itself; more particularly, that the legend of a great war against the city of Troy was based on a historical event of that time. A less popular, but equally tenable proposition, however, is that the epic

stories

were

not

created

until

after

the

collapse

of

Mycenaean

civilisation, when only tombs and ruined walls remained, and there was

no longer any knowledge of their history.

The tale of Troy could have

been made up by the Aeolian Greeks who came to settle in the plain of

Troy a century or two later, and tried to account for the imposing ruins they encountered there. 13 Whatever the time of their origin, it is virtually certain that the stories

were

subsequently

handed

down

in oral tradition before

they

were

written down. 14 It is again a matter of dispute when the poems were committed to writing. In antiquity, it was believed that it was Homer

who wrote down the /liad and Odyssey, as well as most of the lost poems known as the Epic Cycle. Estimates of his lifetime varied wildly. Some made him a contemporary of the Trojan War, while the historian Theopompos placed him five centuries later (frg. 205). Most modern

scholars believe that it was actually in the second half of the eighth century that the poems were given written form by a 'monumental' poet. Matters are complicated by the claim of some ancient sources that

Homer's works were not preserved intact, but in fragments scattered all over Greece, until the Athenian tyrant Peisistratos around 550 B.C. commissioned a reconstruction of the original poems. The majority of

modern

scholars think that this so-called Peisistratean

‘recension’

in

reality involved no more than marginally editing existing texts, and some would deny that it ever took place. Still, there are also those who argue that the poems were in fact written down at Peisistratos' instigation, and

no earlier. 15 The oral tradition that produced the Iliad and Odyssey, then, could have lasted for as little as two centuries or for as long as a millennium. In the course of transmission, the stories must have been subject to

change, but it hard to tell how much, and in what ways, they changed. As was pointed out by Jan Vansina in his classic Oral Tradition (1961),

the extent to which stories are altered and adapted in the process of retelling

varies

with

the

kind

of tradition

that preserves

them.

The

extremes are 'fixed' traditions that value exact memorisation and word-

12

for-word

transmission,

and

hence

hardly

change

at

all,

and

'free'

traditions that leave everything but the bare outline of the story to the imagination of the narrator, and hence may be thoroughly transformed. 16 Unfortunately, it is not clear to which kind of tradition the epics belong. Compositional technique, subject matter, and social function of the poems offer clues, but fail to provide us with a definite answer. (I) COMPOSITIONAL TECHNIQUE

The tales of the heroes may have circulated as fire-side stories or the like before they were turned into poetry, but we can only examine them in the form in which we know them : as epic poems in dactylic hexameter verse. It would seem that oral performances of the epics relied on a mixture of memorisation and improvisation. Even after the poems had been written down, professional performers (rhapsoidoi) and

upper class amateurs were able to recite them by heart; it is probable, therefore, that in part or in full they were also memorised before this. 17

On the other hand, the poems contain numerous stock phrases, lines and passages - so-called formulae - which, it is generally accepted, were primarily an aid to improvisation. Improvisation implies creative

freedom and the possibility of change. extent to which transmission, we

Hence,

in order to assess the

the epics may have changed in the course of need to know what proportion of any particular

performance of the epics would be improvised rather than memorised. There appears to be no way of finding out. We also need improvisation. A but drew upon a improvising new phrases, lines and

and predecessors.

to know poet did common material, passages

more about the precise role of formulae in not himself invent all the formulae he used, stock of formulae. That is to say, when he would incorporate many traditional which he had learned from his colleagues

So much is clear, and it follows that a particularly

convenient and resounding formula might remain in use for centuries, preserving some old poetic material within a changing oral ‘text’. 18 We do not know, however, how changeable formulae were, and how much

room they left for a poet's own invention.

How often did a poet adapt or

drop old formulae and invent new ones ? Did he have a choice of traditional formulae, or just one formula to express any given notion in

any given metrical form ? What proportion of his work did in fact consist of formulae ? In the 1930s, Milman Parry, who was the first to attempt a thorough analysis of Homeric formulae, argued that the bulk of

13

the poems consisted of formulae, all of them traditional and leaving very

little room for invention.

This view has gained widespread support, but

more recent studies adduce a good deal of evidence to show that much of

the poems is not formulaic, that formulae change, and that they are used in a creative manner. 19 So long as the debate continues, it is hard to use the technique of composition by formulae as an indication of the degree to which the transmission of the epics was free or fixed.

(Π) SUBJECT MATTER The heroes and their stories, although they belonged to a fabulous past, played quite a lively symbolic role in Greek politics. Their semidivine power was taken quite seriously and cities took care to associate

themselves with the appropriate heroes, especially in time of war. For instance, the Spartans attributed their success in establishing a hegemony over the Peloponnese in the mid-sixth century to the fact that, as mentioned, they had unearthed from enemy territory the bones of the hero Orestes and taken these home for worship. 29 Under these circumstances, what the epics had to say about the heroes

could

assume

political

importance.

A

notorious

instance

was

the

statement in the /liad that, at Troy, Aias of Salamis "placed [his forces) where the ranks of Athenians were drawn up” (11.558). The story has it that around 600 B.C., when the Athenians fought the Megarians for control over Salamis, they cited this verse as proof of their right to the territory; the Megarians supposedly countered that the verse was not by Homer, but an invention by the Athenians themselves. At around the same time, it was said, the Athenians claimed the right to the town of Sigeion, near Troy, simply by virtue of their having taken part in the

Trojan War. During the Persian War, they demanded to lead the allied fleet, because Homer had called the Athenian commander at Troy a man "to whom no-one on earth was equal in organising horses and shieldbearing men” (11.553-4). 2!

We may find it hard to believe that this sort of argument carried any weight at all, but our sources suggest that it did.

Note the tradition that

Kleisthenes, tyrant of Sikyon, during a war with Argos banned public performances of epic poetry because he took offence at epic references

to the heroes as 'Argives', men of Argos (Herodotos V.67). If so much was made of such seemingly trifling matters, it seems likely that epic poets

would

have

felt it necessary

to change

their tales as political

14

situations changed.

However, there is no evidence that they actually did

so, 2 (MI) SOCIAL FUNCTION

The social function of singing or reciting stories is an indicator of the amount

and

kind

of change

that

tradition

allows.

A

tale

told

for

amusement, say, is likely to be open to more rapid change than one told to convey

historical

information

or teach traditional wisdom.

however, it is difficult to classify the epics in this respect.

Again,

We have seen

that they purport to present a true account of past events, yet at the same

time the main purpose of these historical tales was to entertain.

2 The

singer as depicted in the Odyssey performs for his keep at private parties, where his audience tells him when and what to sing. According to the Odyssey, "people praise more highly the newest song to reach their ears” (1.351-2). If so, a poet might try to please his audience with

an unusual new version of a story, one. It has been suggested that a into a well-known story, or give Perhaps he might also tinker with

rather than faithfully reproduce an old poet might introduce a new character a new view of a traditional hero. 24 the plot. The story of the death of

Patroklos may show signs of having been 'treated' in this way, perhaps more than once. Destiny Postponed Before Patroklos even enters the battlefield, we are told that he will kill many warriors, including Sarpedon, and then fall by the hand of Hektor (XV.65-7). The fact that the poet gives away this much of the plot suggests

that it was part of the traditional tale. about to happen,

Audiences already knew what was

and the poet was not robbing

the story of suspense by

revealing the outcome in advance. 25 The narrative proceeds to the point where Patroklos has in fact killed Sarpedon and faces Hektor in a struggle over the corpse. The outline of the tale given previously suggests that this is when Patroklos dies. Instead, there is an unexpected twist to developments : Zeus decides not to let Patroklos be killed by Hektor yet. Patroklos drives Hektor and his men back (XVI.64455) and storms the wall of Troy three times (XVI.698-711). Again Hektor goes forth to fight him, and again events take a surprising tum. Patroklos survives combat with Hektor a second time (XVI.712-82).

Then,

charging

into the enemy once more, he falls as predicted (XVI.783-857).

This rather drawn-out narrative could be the product of an attempt, or perhaps

repeated

attempts,

to give an old

story

fresh

twists in order

to

15 Surprise audiences who have heard it before, whether in the versions of other bards, or in earlier performances by the poet himself. 26

If it was a general rule that, as the poet says, the latest epic songs were

the most popular, then the accurate recounting of allegedly historical facts would have had to take second place to the need to tell the story in an original way, and change would have been almost a necessity. However, we cannot be sure that this rule did indeed apply to epic

poetry as sung in historical times.

The poet may have imagined only

that the principle applied to epic poetry as sung in the time of the heroes, when legends were still in the making and one could compose new epics

on new heroic deeds. The historian thus must try to make use of the /liad and Odyssey as

sources without knowing more than that they may contain evidence for the Mycenaean

Age,

the Dark

Age

and

the Archaic

Age.

Ancient

evidence for the date and the nature of the epic oral tradition does not reveal with any degree of certainty when the tradition began, when it stopped, or how susceptible of change it was. The only means of ascertaining what period a given element of the heroic world reflects, therefore, is to turn to the archaeological and historical record and

compare. This

problem formulaic

seems

creeps

straightforward

in.

composition

Scholars must

picture of the heroic world.

enough,

but

often assume have

led

to

again

a methodological

that a long tradition of

inconsistencies

in the

epic

It is thought that centuries of stringing

together memorised passages, formulae and newly created verses resulted in discrepancies which poets and audiences either did not see or did not mind. The epics are, one might say, a patchwork, so "we can neither assume that the elements in a given passage are deliberately designed to be consistent, nor transfer our deductions from that passage to others" (Snodgrass 1964: 170). It follows from this point of view that one may legitimately study short passages and even single formulae in isolation and disregard their context in making comparisons with the archaeological and historical record. One problem with this approach is that it assumes too much. It is possible that the poets were not always aware of the meaning and

implications of material they inherited from their predecessors, but for

16

all we know they might have understood its every nuance and made creative use of it. Moreover, most historians would agree, I think, with

the many

recent literary studies of Homer

which stress the extent to

which the epics are coherently structured, consistent in characterisation, and subtle in reinterpreting traditional themes and phrases. 27 This view of the epics is clearly at odds with historical interpretations based on the assumption that poets often used traditional material uncomprehendingly or carelessly. Yet historians continue to adopt the patchwork-approach when it suits their purposes. 22 This is a serious methodological flaw. The assumption that the epics are a patchwork of disparate and sometimes incompatible materials poses a further methodological problem, or rather, aggravates a problem that is part of all historical enquiry. This is the fact that, in reconstructing ‘how it really was’,

historians consciously consideration because

or unconsciously often leave evidence out of it does not fit the theory. The patchwork-

hypothesis has the unfortunate effect of actually justifying this practice. Since it assumes that the texts under scrutiny are to some extent

incoherent and inconsistent, it allows one to build a theory on any part of the evidence one chooses, or to select evidence to suit some model, and

to dismiss the rest of it as belonging to a different layer of tradition.

Moreover, a side-effect of the approach is that some have made it their primary aim to discern layers of tradition within the epics.

As a result,

reflections of different historical realities are often detected on the slightest grounds. 29 I would suggest that in searching for historical parallels to aspects of the heroic world, one should not assume that the epics are a patchwork

nor disregard the context of any particular piece of epic evidence. Instead, one ought to treat the /liad and Odyssey in this respect as one would any other source : one should assume that the text is coherent, consistent and meaningful unless proven otherwise, and one should

therefore pay due attention to the context in which the evidence occurs. To my mind, this approach is methodologically sound regardless of whether the epics are in fact consistent. If they are not, one's efforts to find consistency will simply be frustrated, and one will have gained a strong argument to back up the patchwork-hypothesis. By contrast, an approach which expects to find inconsistency, or even sets out to look

for it, is liable to allow too much freedom of interpretation. danger

of seeing

discrepancies

where

a closer

look

might

It is in reveal

a

17

consistent text, and of being overly arbitrary in spotting discrepancies where a text is indeed inconsistent. My suggestion to assume a coherent text and study the evidence in context, then, is not based on a belief that

Homer consciously strove to create a consistent image of the heroic world, nor on 8 belief that the poets of the oral tradition unconsciously produced a consistent image. It is based purely on methodological

considerations. Once again I would conclude that, in using the /liad and Odyssey as historical evidence, one's first step should be to reconstruct the heroic world as a whole, striving to incorporate as much of the evidence as

possible into a coherent image, bearing in mind - and this is important that, as pointed out earlier, this image may be fantastic. Only then should one turn to the archaeological and historical record for parallels. It will be argued in this book that one need not strain the evidence in order to find in Homer an image of the heroic world a good deal more coherent than is normally admitted, and that in almost every respect one can find the origin of this image in the realities and ideologies of Homer's own day, the eighth and perhaps early seventh century.

3. THE CASE OF THE BIG ROUND SHIELD Some may feel that the foregoing is no more than an academic quibble.

It is all very well raising theoretical objections on points of method, but have not in practice studies of the poems proven that the epic world is a jumble of historical realities plus a restricted element of fantasy 7 The answer, I believe, is no. Quite apart from the fact that there still is considerable disagreement as to what historical period, if any, predominates in the poems, % the basic tenets of current views are not unassailable. An approach which avoids the methodological pitfalls

discussed above is practicable and may lead to a different view. An example may serve to illustrate its potential. If there is one area in which it ought to be simple to draw historical data from the epics, it is in the study of material culture. Arms, armour and clothing; houses, furniture and plate; carts, chariots and ships : we have detailed descriptions of all sorts of objects, and archaeologists have found potential counterparts from all relevant periods. Comparison

18

ought to be simple. Yet even here one's conclusions vary with one's approach. A case in point is the identification of the shields carried in battle by the heroes. Consider the following two descriptions : (1) *... Before him he held a shield, an even circle, Thick with ox-hides, much bronze beaten onto it." (XTII.803-4)

This passage is amplified elsewhere; it describes a round shield with an outer layer of bronze and several layers of leather stitched inside. 3! (2) "And around him the dark hide tapped his ankles and his neck, The outermost rim that ran round his bossed shield.” (V1.117-8)

This passage describes a shield of indeterminate shape, but clearly of huge size, covering the whole body. Elsewhere too, a shield is mentioned with a rim "reaching the feet" (XV.645-6), and the "broad shield”, "like a tower", carried by Aias (e.g. X1.485,527) must be a similar object. 32 Since passages (1) and (2) both refer to the shield carried by the Trojan commander, Hektor, and the great shield of Aias is said to have

had seven layers of hide and an outer layer of bronze (VII.219-23,2456), the obvious conclusion would seem to be that these passages depict different aspects of a single type of shield, which is round, man-sized and covered with bronze. But no-one has accepted that conclusion. The reasons are plain : (a) there is no historical parallel for such a shield, and (Ὁ) there cannot be a historical parallel for it, since a man-

sized shield can be neither round nor made of bronze. It cannot be round, because that would make it uselessly wide; it cannot be made of bronze, because it would be too heavy to carry. Ergo, a round bronze shield must be small, and a large shield must be light and oblong. This is true, but note that the argument is valid only if one assumes that the

epic shields represent real shields in the first place. Scholars have gone on to conclude that the epics know two types of shield. For each of these, parallels have been found in the archaeological record. Number one is a relatively small round bronze shield believed to correspond to a type of shield used in the Late Dark Age, or to the Archaic hoplite shield. Number two is a huge shield assumed to be made of leather and wood or wicker, and believed to

19

correspond to the body-covering figure-of-eight or tower-shields depicted in Mycenaean art. An obstacle to these identifications is that the poet does not distinguish two types of shield : he equips Hektor with now one, now the other type, and merges the two into one when describing the shield of Aias. The obstacle has usually been overcome by resorting to the argument that epic poets did not create a coherent picture of the heroic world. Verses describing Hektor's shield as covering him from head to toe are presumed to date from Mycenaean times and to have been retained in the tradition even when poets, ignoring the discrepancy, introduced a smaller, bronze shield into their songs. Thus, if one assumes that the epics are patchwork compositions and that the poets described real shields, one is led to conclude that heroic shields represent real shields of different historical periods. The

argument is plausible enough, but stands or falls with the basic premises. What

Matter

happens

when

in the way

we abandon these premises and approach

suggested

above

?

If we

make

it our

reconstruct a coherent epic world, we retain what anyway

aim

the

to

seemed the

obvious conclusion that there is a single type of epic shield, round, bronze and huge.

We know that no such thing ever existed, so we posit

that they are fantasy shields. In defence of this proposition it can be shown that such shields fit in a wider context which is both coherent and fantastic. For a start, some of the heroes use rather fanciful shields. Akhilleus owns one made by the

divine smith Hephaistos, which has five layers of metal instead of one two

of bronze,

panorama

one of gold,

of human

two of tin - and

is ornamented

with

a

life, worked in gold, silver, tin and lapis lazuli

(XVIM.474-609; XX.268-72). Agamemnon’s shield has a lapis lazuli centre, decorated with figures of a Gorgon flanked by Terror and Panic,

and surrounded with ten bronze rings on which twenty tin bosses are fixed (XI.32-9). Nestor has a shield of massive gold (VIII.192-3). Not surprisingly, there are no archaeological parallels for any of these

fantastic objects. So we need not necessarily expect other epic shields to be realistic either. Moreover, the heroes are supposed to possess superhuman strength, so if they are shown carrying shields of enormous weight, this presents no problem. On the contrary, it actually serves to illustrate their physical

' force. carry

Note that, according to the poet, ideally the best fighters should the

biggest

shields

(XIV.371-7).

It

may

therefore

be

no

20 coincidence that the description of a large shield cited above [2] occurs in a passage relating how Hektor, the best warrior in Troy, leaves the battlefield. The seemingly gratuitous detail of the shield, slung across

his shoulders, tapping his ankles and the back of his neck as he walks, may in fact be a deliberate and subtle hint at the prowess of the man,

measured by the size of his shield. It may suggest a picture of the Trojans looking over their shoulders to see the huge shield disappear in the distance, and realising that it is their best man who is leaving. Similarly, the many references to the broad shield of Aias bring to mind that Aias is the best warrior on the Greek side, not counting Akhilleus

who is mostly absent from battle. 34 The enormous size of some of the spears in use provides an analogy. The heroes use their spears for throwing as well as for stabbing. In real life, such weapons would have to be fairly short and light. Yet Hektor has an “eleven-cubit spear", i.e. a spear five metres long, with a “bronze tip surrounded with a golden band" (VI.319-20 = VIII.494-5), and Akhilleus has one so "heavy, big and sturdy” that “no other Akhaian could brandish it" (XVI.141-2). As with the shields, it has been argued

that we are dealing with two types of weapon : the one a heavy pike used for thrusting only, similar to those used by the Mycenaeans; the other a lighter spear which could be thrown as well, like those used in the Dark

Age and in early Archaic times.35

But, as with the shields, one could

equally well argue that the epics know only one kind of spear, a fantasy weapon, that can be thrown in spite of its size, because it is handled by

very strong men. To my mind, all this adds up to quite a good case for believing that

heroic shields (and spears) are unrealistic, but that the poets had a clear idea of how they looked and consistently described them as such. How was this coherent fantasy created ? I can see two possibilities. One is that epic poets inherited a Mycenaean tradition describing the large shields of that time. Then, as the oral tradition turned Mycenaeans into heroes, it also turned Mycenaean shields into armour fit for supermen, by substituting a round shape for a figure-of-eight or oblong

one and adding a layer of bronze, but retaining Mycenaean phrases and verses describing the size of the shields. # The other possibility - one that to my knowledge has not previously been considered - is that epic poets did nor inherit

a Mycenaean

poetic tradition, but, in inventing a

race of heroes, also invented huge shields for them.

That is to say, the

21

size of the heroes’ shields could be a purely fantastic element, not based

on any historical reality but on the belief that the heroes had superhuman strength.

In either case, the round shape was presumably a realistic element, introduced into the tradition in the Dark Age, when round shields were common, or in the Archaic Age, when they were the norm. The layer of bronze may also be a realistic element, in which case it was introduced not before the seventh century, when bronze-faced shields first appear. Alternatively, since bronze is regarded in the epics as a highly valuable metal, bronze-covered shields may be another Dark Age fantasy element, akin to Nestor’s shield of massive gold. 37

Our examination of this particular aspect of heroic material culture, then, gives us no cause to conclude that the epics consist of traditional materials carelessly stitched together. Nor does it provide positive evidence of formulae and verses which go back to the Mycenaean Age : it turns out to be possible, but not necessary, to posit that part of a

Mycenaean poetic tradition is preserved in Homeric shield-descriptions. We are led to conclude that the heroes’ shields represent Dark Age or

Archaic reality in respect of their shape, and Dark Age or Archaic fantasy in respect of their size; they represent either Archaic reality or Dark Age fantasy in respect of the material of which they are made. The fantastic size of the shields and the strength of the heroes suggest that they are the creation of a culture which places a high value upon physical prowess, while the covering layer of bronze, if it is a fantasy

element, may indicate a high regard for wealth. In sum, as far as shields are concerned, it appears that the epics consistently depict a version of Dark

Age

or Archaic

reflect one or two of This conclusion is of man-sized shields definitely Mycenaean

reality, which,

one might say, is glamorised to

the ideals of poet and audience. of some value in its own right, for the appearance has been widely regarded as one of only a few relics in the epics.** Its demotion from a certain

instance to merely a possible one would be a fairly serious blow to the

theory of Mycenaean origins and patchwork development.

But in the

present context, this examination of the shields is meant only to show that established historical approaches to, and interpretations of, Homer

are not necessarily correct and that the alternative approach proposed here is a viable one.

22 4. HISTORY IN POETRY

: POINTS OF METHOD

Given our ignorance of much of what we, as historians, need to know about the /liad and Odyssey, we should exercise extreme caution in trying to use these epics as historical evidence. Short of altogether abandoning them as sources, which we cannot really afford to do, the

methodologically safest way of proceeding is to (1) treat the poems like any other source insofar as one assumes that there is coherence and consistency in the text, except where one finds compelling evidence to the contrary; (2) treat the poems unlike most other sources insofar as one allows that the texts may contain a good deal of fantasy, even where this

is not immediately obvious. Rule

(1) implies that one should

set out to reconstruct a coherent

image of the world of the heroes, and only accept that it is a patchwork picture where the evidence forces one to. This reduces the risk of inappropriate models, preconceptions and arbitrary distinctions being imposed upon the evidence. Rule (2) implies that, when reconstructing the heroic world, one should consider the possibility that what at first

glance seems a jumble of mutually incompatible historical elements may in fact be a consistent fantasy. There is a risk here of succumbing to the temptation of calling fiction everything that does not suit one's favoured view of the history contained in the poems. To counter this danger, we must (3) explain the role of fantastic elements whenever their existence

is posited. fantasy

not

In fact, it is essential to account for the existence of an epic only

as a methodological

safeguard,

but

also

because

a

fantasy has no value as historical evidence unless it is explained why it was created. It will perhaps be objected that in all the above I have overlooked a crucial point : Homer, as scholars never cease to remind us, was a poet, not a historian. Poets, unlike historians, need not be consistent, nor represent reality in an accurate manner. This means, some say, that looking for consistency in the epic picture of the heroic world is a naive, misguided and "misleadingly documentary” enterprise (Easterling 1989: 114), while looking for accurate representation of reality is an “exercise

in literalism... best left for the tourist” (Scully 1990: 81). Such criticism seems to me misplaced. The mere fact that poets do not need to be consistent and accurate does not mean that they cannot be. Surely poets are in principle capable of consciously or unconsciously

23

producing

coherent

images

of

real

as

well

as

imaginary

worlds.

Whether or not Homer created such an image is a question we cannot answer until we have at least fried to reconstruct his heroic world. An attempt at reconstruction is made in the following chapters. I have tried to be scrupulous in adhering to the three rules of method formulated above. Each chapter therefore begins with an analysis of some aspect of the heroic world, which is based wholly on internal epic evidence, makes no a priori distinctions between realistic and fantastic components, takes note of the context in which the evidence occurs, and aims to incorporate wherever possible all available epic evidence on the matter into a single, coherent picture. In the final section of each chapter, the completed reconstruction is then briefly compared with the archaeological and historical record in an attempt to distinguish fact and

fiction in the heroic world, and to locate its origins in history. 39

25

CHAPTER TWO

LIFE IN TOWN The organisation of household, community and state

Cannibals are probably an explorer's favourite nightmare, and Odysseus, in the course of his fantastic voyage, duly encounters two groups of man-eating giants, the Laistrygonians and the Kyklopes. The Kyklopes are the more primitive of the two. They have no knowledge of agriculture or sea-faring, but live in caves, keep sheep and goats, and

gather wild grain and grapes for a living. "And for them no counsel-bearing public meetings, no law-sessions, but... each one lays down the law for his children and wives, and they are not concerned with one another" (9.112-15). 1

If this is Odysseus’ idea of savagery, then obviously his idea of civilisation involves a community in which people farm their land, sail the seas and are concerned with one another, gathering regularly to take

counsel

and

settle

disputes.

No

scholar

has

failed

to

spot

this

implication, but it has been denied much significance. “Nevertheless, Odysseus' own world was more one of pasturage than of tillage” (Finley 1977: 60). "Τῆς society of the Homeric poems, however much the author may imply that the manner of living of the Cyclopes is oldfashioned, [15] stil much more an agglomeration of individual

‘Cyclopean' households than an integrated society” (Adkins 1960: 53-4). It is widely believed that the heroes know hardly any community life and only a minimal, ineffectual form of government. 2 A first reading of the poems may well appear to confirm that belief. But reconstructing social and political organisation from the Iliad and Odyssey is rather like reconstructing the practice of law-enforcement

from the sort of detective fiction in which a private investigator, a Marple, Marlowe or Magnum P.I., solves crimes singlehandedly. If one

26 had only such stories to go by, surely one's first impression would be

that they depict a society in which law-enforcement is in the hands of a few clever and brave private individuals. It would take a second look to reveal that these stories presuppose that normally a large, public, institutional police-force, judiciary and prison-system do the work of the sleuth. So too with the epics. They focus on exceptional individuals and events, and may ignore or suspend the normal rules for the sake of the story. But we shall see that they contain enough scattered references and hints to show that the poets did see the heroes’ and Kyklopes' ways of

life as poles apart.

1. THE HIDDEN SOCIETY : RECONSTRUCTIONS AND MODELS

Just over a century ago, it must have seemed that there was little left to say about the society portrayed in the Iliad and Odyssey. In 1858, Gladstone had published three volumes of Studies on Homer and the Homeric Age (1725 pages), and from 1871 to 1885, Buchholz, not to be outdone, had produced a six-part German equivalent, Die Homerische Realien (2350 pages). Yet further studies have, of course, continued to

appear. Less detailed but more analytic than their predecessors, they offer a remarkable variety of interpretations of Homeric society. An early reconstruction, developed by Gustave Glotz (1904, 1920, 1925, 1928), described the basic social group in Homeric society as a clan (genos), a large kinship group which worships a common ancestor,

collectively owns

land, cattle and slaves,

and is led by a ‘king’

or

‘chief’, who is the most senior lineal descendant of the clan's ancestor. Clan-members form an aristocracy from which the landless and the poorest landholders are excluded. Among themselves, the clans are

ranked.

The chiefs of the most prominent clans are in charge of wider

kinship groups, known as phratries and tribes.

Finally, one predominant

clan-chief leads the community

Glotz spoke of ‘feudal’

as a whole.

relations between clans, and of 'vassal' chiefs (e.g. 1925: 127), but he was evidently using the terms very loosely, and it is not clear what kind

of relations he had in mind. Subsequently, Martin Nilsson (1933) and Henri Jeanmaire (1939) took

up the idea of a feudal society and abandoned

kinship as the main

27

organising principle. They saw the primary social unit as a baronial manor, cultivated by serfs, under a lord owing military service to the king who has granted him his fief. There is a hierarchy which embraces all of Greece, extending down from the king of kings, who holds court at

Mykenai, to the page-boys and equerries of his vassals’ vassals. This view next gave way in popularity to the interpretation advanced by Moses Finley (1954) and elaborated by Arthur Adkins (1960). They regarded the main form of social organisation in Homer as a household

(oikos). A Homeric household consists of an extended family with dependants and slaves; its most senior male is normally head of the household and he has all its property in private ownership.

There is a

closed aristocracy of birth to which all the wealthiest households belong. Although there is a certain amount of ranking among aristocrats and each community has a nominal monarch, households are autonomous and

autarkic to such an extent that community life is almost non-existent. The reconstruction offered by Finley in The World of Odysseus still

dominates textbooks.

But recent work by Oswyn Murray (1980), Bjorn

Qviller (1981), Walter Donlan (1982) and Pierre Carlier (1984), among others, suggests modifications important enough to amount to a new reconstruction. These authors discern rather smaller households, and

wider social networks.

Some of them also play down the importance of

birth as a criterion of rank, even to the point of denying that there is an aristocracy in Homer. 3 Given that all this is based on readings of the same two poems, the variation, as I said, is remarkable. But it is easily explained. The authors of these four reconstructions have studied the epics with four different models of society in mind. Glotz explicitly drew on the model of social evolution formulated by Fustel de Coulanges (1864), according to whom "The Family (Gens) was at first the only Form of Society”, as

one of his chapter-headings puts it (1864: were

clearly

thinking

of mediaeval

104). 4

European

Nilsson and others

feudalism.

Finley

was

influenced by another evolutionary model : a combination of the classical Greek notion that independent households are the original form of human association, and the theory of Karl Biicher (1893) that at an early stage of economic development, one finds a closed household-economy. 5

Recent writers have made much use of models based on ethnographic study, positing types of social organisation characterised by networks of

28

exchange dominated by so-called redistribution centred around chiefs. 6

big

men,

or

by

systems

of

That scholars have felt able to reconcile the evidence to such diverse models, is not because the epic image of heroic society is so vague that it will fit any interpretation. Rather, it is because scholars, for reasons suggested in the previous chapter, have not tried hard enough to incorporate all the available evidence into one coherent reconstruction. Still, Finley's World of Odysseus accounts for most of the evidence much better than earlier reconstructions, and subsequent work has in some respects improved upon Finley's. If for the moment we set aside models of society and theories of epic composition, and try again to uncover the

society hidden in the poems, we might be able to do better still.

2. BUILDINGS AND PEOPLE

The heroes live in small towns, inhabited perhaps by a few

hundred

and no more than a few thousand people.” The physical features of a Homeric town tell us much about the people who live in it. The first

thing

to

settlement.

meet

the

eye

is the

fortification-wall

Details of its construction

that

surrounds

are hard to trace, but we

the know

that it is made of stone and wood, and surmounted by battlements of some sort, or by a palisade. Although it is often referred to as ‘high’,

attackers are able to climb it without ladders, and to jump down safely. This

is partly

due

to the fact that the wall

is of a slightly

stepped

construction, which makes it easier to climb, but even so it is presumably no more than a few metres high. On the other hand, it is fairly thick, with enough room for more than one person to pass along the inside of the battlements. Each town has several gates, fitted with large wooden doors that can be bolted. In case of enemy attack, anxiously watching crowds gather on top of the gates, which means that

these must be quite massive structures. ® It is not only great cities such as Troy which have walls. Small towns in the neighbourhood of Troy, Thebe-under-Plakos and Lyrnessos, have walls and “lofty gates" as well. On the Greek mainland, not only famous "seven-gated" Thebes in Boiotia is walled, but Kalydon and Pleuron in Aitolia, and the obscure town of Pheia, probably in Arkadia,

29

too.

All these walls receive but a brief mention, always in a context of

war, when they are assaulted or destroyed. In other contexts, their existence is presumably taken for granted. The Odyssey, at any rate,

assumes that no settlement can survive without a wall : "Amphion and Zethos... first founded the seat of seven-gated Thebes, and they built a wall,

because

wall-less

they

could

not

dwell

in

spacious

Thebes,

however strong they were" (11.262-5). 9 Within the fortifications there are, of course, houses. Significantly, there also are streets, which implies that houses are numerous and

grouped relatively close together. The streets of Athens and Mykenai are singled out as "broad", and those of Troy are in addition "wellconstructed", which may suggest that they are paved.

Like walls, streets

are a normal feature of a Homeric town; everywhere "streets grow dark" at sunset. 19 Even more significant is the existence of a town-square, or meeting-place (agora). On the square is a circle of stone benches for the use of the so-called elders, whose status will be explained later. In Troy and Pylos, this meeting-place is situated “in front of the high doors” of

the house of the town's ruler, while the rulers of Ithaka and Skheria need to walk some way through town in order to reach it. The square itself is probably merely an open space, no cobble-stoned piazza, but the benches are made of cut and polished white marble, and fixed into the ground. 11

Nearby are shrines and altars for public worship.

Skheria has several

temples, one of them known as the Posideion; Troy has at least two, of

which the Athena-temple is notable for its large seated statue of the goddess.

It is customary to offer gold, rich robes, captured armour, and

the like to the gods, and to hang up these gifts on the temple-walls. The fact that temples may store a great wealth of such dedications suggests that they are substantial buildings. Again, it must be stressed that temples

are

nothing

unusual

: building

"a

rich

shrine

to

Helios

Hyperion", and endowing it with "many fine ornaments" (12.346-7), is seen as an obvious way of appeasing the wrath of this god. Alltars, too, are common, and sacred groves are often found in the surrounding country-side. 12 Next, there are two essential public amenities : the communal well and communal wash-basins. Just outside Ithaka, there is a rather picturesque “man-made,

fair-flowing

well from

which

the townsfolk drew

water.

Ithakos,

Neritos and Polyktor made it. In a circle all around it was a grove of well-watered

30 poplars, and cold water cascaded down from the rocks above. At the top, an altar to the nymphs had been built, on which all wayfarers used to sacrifice" (17.205-11).

Just below the walls of Troy, we find “beautiful broad washing-troughs of stone, where the beautiful wives and daughters of the Trojans used to

wash glossy garments" (XX11.153-5).

Where there are no specially built

basins, the washing is done at some suitable place along a riverbank or sea-shore to which the women take their laundry. 13 Finally, the town contains a remarkable public building known as the

‘lounge’, or leskhe.

During the day, people may go here to sit and talk.

At night, beggars find shelter in it. 14 When scholars discuss these architectural features, they tend to suggest that none of this amounts to much, and that a Homeric settlement is little more than a cluster of farms. 15 This is misleading. By modern

urban

standards,

Homeric

towns

may

not

be

impressive,

but

the

construction and maintenance of walls, wells and wash-basins, altars and temples, streets and benches, a meeting-place and a ‘lounge’, involve a considerable amount of communal organisation, and imply an active community life.

The impression created by the buildings is confirmed by what we are told about outdoor life in town. We find that first thing every morning, the men of the town gather in the square (agora). They carry spears and swords, as they always do when they go out, and they may bring their dogs. At the meeting-place, the men stand or sit together in little groups, discussing their affairs and catching up on the news. If there is someone who has recently returned from a journey abroad, he becomes the centre of attention, as a crowd gathers round to greet him. This happens to Telemakhos, though he prefers to avoid his enemies in the crowd, and to sit with some old friends who ask him all about his adventures (17.65-70). After a while everyone will go home to have breakfast and start work, but later in the day they may go out again "to

the benches and the voice [phemis] of the people” (15.468), in other words 'to sit and gossip’. 16 The presence of a public lounge enables men to go out and meet people even in bad weather.

Women stay away

from the town-square, but they do leave their houses and talk to others in the streets, and presumably regularly meet other women when drawing

water or treading the laundry. 17

31

On occasion, the townsfolk gather for athletic competitions, dances, big weddings and funerals, and above all religious ceremonies. The wives of the Trojan elders assemble to dedicate a female gown, a peplos, to Athena. On a festival-day observed by the entire community, the people of Ithaka come together in the grove of Apollo to offer a hecatomb. 18 On top of all that, there are the formal meetings and lawsessions mentioned earlier and to be discussed presently. The variety and number of public social occasions and of public buildings should dispel any notion that a house in a Homeric town is a "tiny island... surrounded by hostile darkness” (Adkins 1969a: 32). Epic tales tell of conflict and rivalry, but these heroic clashes are set in communities the inhabitants of which arguably have more frequent peaceful dealings with one another than the inhabitants of a modern city. It is not surprising, therefore, that a Homeric man should feel almost as strongly about his town as he does about his family. His home town he calls his fatherland, and to him the sight of "the smoke rising from his own country" (1.58-9) is the "sweetest" thing in the world (9.25-36). 19

3. GOVERNMENT

: THE PRINCES AND THE PEOPLE

A Homeric community is dominated by a group of families known as the princes (basileis), the leaders and counsellors, and the best, as opposed to the rest of the population, who are called simply the people (demos). Each princely family owns a sceptre, a golden or goldembossed staff, which symbolises its right to rule. 2! All members of the family bear the title of prince or princess (basileia), but only one of them holds the sceptre and exercises the powers that go with it. The "sceptrebearing” prince may in due course transfer his privilege to one of his sons; or else a son or other member of the family may take over when he

dies.

The men who actually exercise princely powers, as distinct from

those who merely belong to a princely family, are known as elders (gerontes). 2 One prince has wider powers than others, and this "most princely" man (IX.69) in town is known as the prince, or as the ruler (anax). 2

Nearly all the main characters of the epics are rulers among their own people,

and

with

the

exception

of the

savage

Kyklopes,

all heroic

32 communities recognise ἃ single ruler.

The existence of such monarchs is

so much taken for granted that visitors to an unknown

land ask as a

matter of course : "Who is the prince [basileus] of these men and rules

[enassoi] over them 7" (10.110).

Despite increasing scholarly support

for the view that a Homeric monarch is no more than a local big man, who owes his position of dominance to personal, informal power, the

evidence tends to favour the traditional view that Homeric occupy a formal, public, hereditary position. 24

monarchs

In exercising their powers, princes are assisted by so-called heralds (kerykes). Each prince has one or more private heralds who carry

messages and run errands for their masters.

In addition each town has a

number of “heralds who are workers for the people" (demioergoi, 19.135), in other words, public officials. Some of these public heralds

may rank as highly as the princes themselves. 25 In all community affairs, the elders decide. They settle disputes within the community. In special cases they allocate farmland to townsmen or immigrants. They maintain relations with other communities through

receiving foreign guests and sending out ambassadors.

In war, they

dictate strategy, and those among them who are young enough to fight,

take command of the army in battle.

They divide the plunder if the war

is won, and if it is lost, they swear an oath of surrender. 24 Most decisions are taken in meetings attended by princes only. The initiative in calling such a meeting is normally taken by the ruler, but

any prince can call one if he wishes.

Heralds are sent round to the

princes' houses to invite each man individually. Full meetings of ail the princes may be held in the town-square, while more select meetings take place over a meal at the home of the ruler or one of the elders. After discussion, the ruler formulates a final decision, if any is required. 27 The food and drink consumed on such occasions, referred to as the wine of the elders (gerousios oinos, TV.259-60; 13.8-9), is provided at public expense. The people bring in wine for their princes to drink while debating (IX.70-3); hence it is said that the princes drink "things

of the

community"

(demia,

XVII.249-50).

Presumably

they

also

contribute sheep and goats for them to slaughter and eat; hence Agamemnon reminds other princes that “you are always the first to respond to my [invitation to a} meal, whenever we Akhaians organise a

meal for the elders” (TV.343-4).

The phrase suggests that these meals

are notionally organised by the community,

as well as collectively paid

33

for. 28 The people at large thus play no active part in decision-making, but are passively involved in it. Sometimes the princes invite the people to be when they wish to “announce or discuss a (2.32). Any prince may tell the public heralds town to an assembly (agora). The elders take benches in the meeting-place and the people heralds shout at them to sit on the ground, be

princes” (11.98).

present at their debates, public [demios] matter" to call all the men of the their places on the stone gather round, while the silent and “listen to the

A significant phrase : only princes are supposed to

speak. Speakers then step forward, each holding a sceptre, inexperienced speakers clutching it stiffly, confident orators casually leaning on it, gesturing with it as they speak, even throwing it down in

outbursts of emotion. 29 When all announcements have been made and opinions expressed, it is again up to the ruler to formulate a decision. The people may shout in agreement or silently disapprove, but they have no vote or any say in the matter. Unless the princes remain divided amongst themselves : in that case the people can vote with their feet and follow one side or the other in walking out of the assembly. % Nevertheless, decisions taken by the princes are supposed to express the will of the people, as one can see from the fact that “the Trojans” (XX.184-6) and “the Lykians" (VI.1945) are said to make grants of land, while elsewhere it is clear that the actual decison to dispose of land lies with the elders (IX.574-80). 3! In short, certain matters are regarded as of public interest; some public

decision-making meetings are paid for by the people, while others are attended by the entire male population; decisions are meant to represent the will of the people.

All this implies a strong sense of community.

Scholars generally accept this, but seek to play down its significance by arguing that formal assemblies take place only sporadically. The evidence cited is a passage in the Odyssey, where an old man states that there has been no assembly in Ithaka since Odysseus, the ruler, left for

Troy (2.26-7) twenty years earlier. However, in the Iliad both the Greek army and the besieged Trojans have formal assemblies almost daily. 32 The difference is easily accounted for. The frequent crises of the Trojan War require many urgent decisions; hence the frequent assemblies. By contrast, it appears that during Odysseus' absence nothing happens in Ithaka. Hence no assembly needs to be called; minor matters can be dealt with in informal daily gatherings. The proper

34 conclusion,

then,

is

not

that

in

the

heroic

world

assemblies

are

infrequent, but that assemblies are called whenever a decision needs to be made. It would be unwise to assume that Homer is being realistic when he suggests that a town might do without assemblies - and without a ruler for twenty years on end. The poet has not always bothered to work out what the consequences of the passage of time ought to have been. 33

A special kind of public meeting is the law-session (themis).

These

sessions are regarded as highlights of life in town, along with weddingprocessions singled out as such among the representations of life and the universe which decorate the shield of Akhilleus (XVIII.497-508). Law-

sessions are a normal part of life even for an army on campaign (XI.8068). They are common enough to provide a way of expressing the time of day : one can say that it was "late, around the time when a man departs from the meeting-place to have a meal, after settling many quarrels of strong men who submit their cases to judgement” (12.439-40). As this phrase suggests, sessions are not organised ad hoc whenever a dispute arises, but are held on set days, when a number of current disputes are

dealt with. A session of the court is conducted in fundamentally the same way as a meeting of the assembly. The people gather in the town-square, and the elders sit on their benches. The litigants place a considerable sum in court-fees in the centre of the gathering, and state their cases. The elders then debate the matter, one after another taking his sceptre and getting up to make a speech. It is the task of the ruling prince to act as arbiter (istor) and settle the case by deciding who among the elders has given “the straightest judgement" and is to receive the fee in reward. 5 During the trial, the strong and emotional involvement of the community in the affairs of its members emerges, as the men who are watching take sides and shout their support for one side or the other, while the heralds try to hold them back (XVIII.502-3). As with other public decisions, the verdict of ruler and elders is felt to represent the collective judgement of the people. It is thought that the gods hold the community responsible

for the proper settlement of disputes.

They are expected to punish the

people at large when the elders give "crooked verdicts”, and to reward them when the ruler upholds justice. The typical punishment is a rainstorm which causes floods and landslides and destroys "the works of

35 men”

(XVI.384-92),

while

the

rewards

are

abundant

harvests,

prospering flocks and large catches of fish (19.109-14). 35 Among the other tasks of government, the distribution of booty features prominently. When warriors have successfully raided or sacked a town, there are captured men, women and children, along with horses, cattle and sheep, and pieces of gold, silver, bronze and iron to divide.

The customary method of distributing booty is a measure of the integration of the Homeric community. Plunder % is not simply retained by whoever gets his hands on it first, but is collected in some central space, in the town-square or in the army-camp when abroad, to be distributed by the ruler or by the prince who leads the army. Two kinds of shares are distinguished : prizes (gera) are selected single items of plunder - often captured women - offered as a special honour "to the best men and the princes" (IX.334); portions (moirai) are the remainder of the plunder, allotted “fairly” to all warriors who helped capture it, and

also to non-combatants who for some reason can claim a share.

The

procedure indicates a considerable level of organisation and centralisation. Furthermore, we find that in distributing the prizes, the ruler is once again supposed to be representing the will of the people, or at least the army, at large. For instance, although it is Agamemnon who chooses a prize

for Akhilleus

and

then

decides

to take

it back

again,

Akhilleus

speaks as if these are collective acts of the Akhaian army : "You (plural)

take away what you have given” (1.299).

One could of course argue that

the poet has no consistent conception of how booty was distributed, but

to my mind a more likely explanation is that he thinks of prizes as awarded by the ruler in the name of the entire community. 3 A corollary of the principle that princes represent the community is that the people may be asked to bear the expense of the more costly of the princes’ decisions. A notable example of this is the entertainment of foreign visitors. Whether on public or private business, a visitor is offered hospitality at the home of one of the princes. Initially, this is at the expense of the host, but, especially when the visitor is treated to a lavish reception, the host may "get compensation by making a collection among the people; for it is hard for individuals to do favours for free" (13.14-5). If the number of visitors is large, the people may be made to pay directly, as when Odysseus and the Kephallenian army visit Crete on

their way to Troy, and find themselves stranded there for twelve days,

36

owing

to unfavourable

winds.

Throughout,

they are provided

with

bread, wine and meat which is collected "from the people” (19.196-8). We may imagine other expenses, such as the provision of victims and other offerings for public sacrifice, being dealt with along the same

lines. %# A consistent picture thus emerges of a simple, but comprehensive and well-established system of government, in which all powers are concentrated in the hands of the princes; in which the final word in decision-making, judging and distributing booty rests with the ruling

prince; and in which expenses incurred by the princes are recovered from

the people.

ideology

Even

of government

more

which

importantly,

a picture

(a) recognises

public and private affairs, and (b) endows passive sovereignty in public matters, in princes’ decisions are attributed to the therefore, that in spite of the fact that most

emerges

a distinction

of an

between

the community with a sort of that many, if not all, of the people at large. It seems, men have no formal political

power, a town is conceived of as a political unit of which the entire male population forms part.

4. BEYOND THE TOWN Beyond the town, there is a larger political unit which has no name in

the epics. I shall call it the state, although it depends on one's choice of definition whether tribe or state is the more appropriate term. 3 The Homeric state incorporates a number of towns. Often these groups of towns have a collective name, such as Lakedaimon or Boiotia. Often their inhabitants share an ethnic name, which does not necessarily correspond to the name of the territory : Epeians live in Elis, Abantes in Euboia. We are told even less about the organisation of these states than about the towns. The information we do have, has received little attention. @

The most conspicuous evidence is the /liad's Catalogue of Ships, which

lists the Akhaian contingents fighting at Troy.

The

area from

which each contingent is recruited, is indicated by a few geographical features and the names of towns or islands. The identification of these places has been debated since antiquity, and in our time the main

37

question has been whether the Catalogue reflects Mycenaean or postMycenaean geography, but we may side-step these problems here. The important thing is that contingents are nearly always recruited from more

than

one

town.

Seven

or

more

towns

to a contingent

are

often

mentioned, and this may not be meant as a full list of settlements in each area. The largest contingent comprises no less than twenty-eight towns. With few exceptions, these contingents are commanded by a single leader, or by a pair of brothers. 41 So it appears that, in time of war, the

troops of several towns form a single military unit. By itself, the Catalogue of Ships would not be strong evidence. One could argue that it is not meant to depict a heroic form of political

organisation, but is simply the result of the poet taking a famous leader and then assigning to his command towns without famous leaders of their own, merely because he wishes to include all these places in his list. But the Catalogue does not stand by itself. Elsewhere in the Iliad, Agamemnon offers to make Akhilleus ruler of seven towns at once

(IX.149-56, 291-8).

The Odyssey mentions the island of Syrie which

contains two towns, both of them ruled by Ktesios, son of Ormenos (15.412-4). The Catalogue lists nine towns under Menelaos' leadership,

and the Odyssey confirms that several towns besides Sparta are ruled by him (4.176-7). Of particular interest is a story told by Nestor about a war of the Pylians, who according to the Catalogue inhabit nine towns, including the town of Pylos proper, against their neighbours, the Epeians. A band of men from the town of Pylos raid Epeian territory. The Epeians respond by attacking, not Pylos itself, but a border-town named Thryon;

an army from Pylos soon comes to the rescue and defeats the Epeians. @ The nine towns of the Pylians thus are regarded as a unit to the extent that an enemy attacked by one of them may retaliate against another. And they regard themselves as a unit, so that they support one another in the face of an invasion. Similarly, the Kikones of Ismaros get help from other Kikones in the area, against a raid (9.47-59). Indeed, it is common practice to ask neighbouring communities for military aid in an

emergency by lighting a fire-signal (XVIII.207-13).

There can therefore

be little doubt that the clusters of towns in the Catalogue are intended to

depict a form of organisation in which several towns unite in offensive and defensive war.

38

Apart from a common army, the Pylian towns also have at least one common religious festival. This is a large-scale sacrifice of bulls to Poseidon on the beach near Pylos. Nine groups of five hundred men slaughter a total of eighty-one bulls (3.5-8). Since the number of 4,500

Pylians matches that of the Pylian warriors who fight at Troy, all Pylian towns are presumably represented at the festival, as they are in the army, © Most day-to-day public business would presumably be dealt with at the level of the town, by the local monarch and elders. Still, groups of towns recognise not only a unified command in war, but also a single

ruler in peace.

That is evident from what is said about the seven towns

which Agamemnon offers to Akhilleus : "in them live men rich in sheep and rich in cattle, who will honour you with gifts like a god, and

complete splendid law-sessions under your sceptre" (IX.296-8; 154-6). “ Akhilleus is thus to become the superior of the seven princes who, we must assume, rule these towns. This notion of a hierarchy among ruling princes recurs in the /liad's version of the tale of Bellerophontes. "There is a town, Ephyre, in a corner of Argos. There lived Sisyphos... and he begat a son, Glaukos, and Glaukos begat Bellerophontes. To him, the gods granted beauty and desirable manhood. But Proitos meant him harm and drove him out of the land of the Argives, since he was a far better man, for Zeus had subjected [Bellerophontes] to [Proitos'] sceptre.” (VI. 152-9)

The family of Bellerophontes were "far the best men in Ephyre” (VI.209-10), and presumably ruled the place. But Proitos in turn apparently ruled Bellerophontes. Since Ephyre is described as a part Argos, Proitos' power is probably meant to extend over all towns Argive territory. © These scraps of information, then, tell us that Homeric state has a recognised monarch, and that at least nominally is its supreme judge. As

far as we

can

tell,

the

ruler

of a state

is also

the

ruler

of in the he

of a

particular town within the state. Odysseus rules the island and town of Ithaka, as well as all the islands and the part of the mainland inhabited

by the Kephallenians; Nestor rules Pylos proper, as well as the Pylians at large; Agamemnon rules Mykenai, as well as another ten cities in the

area.

Perhaps we may take it that the state normally is governed by the

ruling prince of its largest or wealthiest town.

39

The head of state with remarkable ease deposes and imposes local rulers within his territory. Without consulting anyone, Agamemnon can decide to appoint Akhilleus ruler of seven towns. Proitos of Argos is able to exile Bellerophontes of Ephyre. To him, the ruler of Lykia subsequently offers "half of all his princely honour” (VI.191-3), i.e. the

position of ruler over half the towns of Lykia.

Peleus, ruler of Phthia,

sets up Phoinix, an exile from Hellas, as ruler of the border area of Phthia inhabited by the Dolopes (IX.483-4). Later, Akhilleus proposes

to give Phoinix even greater powers, rhetorically exclaiming : "Be my equal as prince and earn half the honour" (IX.616). Whether the head of state is granted such far-reaching powers by consensus or is able to impose his will by the threat of force, we cannot tell. © In any case, he

is conceived of as a most powerful man. The nature of his further governmental powers is unclear. Presumably, unless his role of supreme judge is wholly nominal, certain disputes arising in the smaller communities, or perhaps between communities, would be brought before him, in the main town, rather

than before local rulers and elders. One could easily envisage him meeting with those who rule his towns or calling an occasional statewide popular assembly in order to take state-level decisions, but there is

not actually any evidence for this. Homer's

references

to states are

vague

and

few,

but

consistent.

Whether they reflect a historical reality is another matter. The Catalogue of Ships lists twenty-nine states on the Greek mainland which have united to fight a war. According to some versions of the tale

of Troy, Agamemnon was only able to gather this huge army thanks to unusual circumstances, and Greek unity was accidental and temporary. “7 Homer,

however,

phenomenon.

presents

Greek

unity

as

a

more

permanent

One sign of this is the collective names he gives to the

warriors : they are all Akhaians, Argives, Danaans, and what is more, All-Akhaians (Panakhaioi). Despite Thukydides' argument that Homer does not mark off the Greek states "as something separate from the outside world" (1.3), this last name clearly conveys a notion of a finite number of states, together forming an all-Akhaian 'nation'. The enemy,

the “Trojans, Dardanians and Lykians", have no such single name. 43 Another telling difference between the two sides is that those who help the Trojans are referred to as their “allies” (epikouroi), while none of the

40

states supporting Agamemnon and Menelaos are ever spoken of as such.

The Trojans spend all their treasures paying these allies for their services (XVIII.288-92), but Agamemnon appears to have no need to pay anyone.

An explanation that suggests itself is that the poet sees the

Trojan forces as a coalition of independent states, but imagines the Akhaian army as a force representing a single political entity. 9 That explanation is supported by the famous statement that Agamemnon rules "over many islands and all Argos" (11.108). can mean two things. In a narrow sense, it is a region

Argos in the

Peloponnese. If this is meant, the statement is rather odd. According to the Catalogue, Diomedes rules over this region, not Agamemnon. Moreover, there are not 'many' islands which could have formed part of Argive territory. It is better, therefore, to take ‘Argos’ in its wider sense, as a collective name for the ‘Greek’ heroic states, among which

there are many islands.

Thus, Agamemnon is presented as not merely

commander-in-chief of an all-Akhaian army, but also supreme ruler over all Akhaian states. 5% And indeed, only such a position could account for

the fact that he offers within his own domain bordering on that of though not necessarily

to Akhilleus seven towns which are situated not around Mykenai but in the territory of Menelaos, Nestor. 5! Again the epic picture is consistent, realistic.

The heroic world, then, knows a nation of All-Akhaians,

a political

unit conscious of being different from the rest, recognising a single ruler, and able to mobilise a single army.

This nation embraces twenty-

nine states. Each of these states consists of a number of towns. And each of these towns is a true social and political community uniting many households.

41] 5.

A HERO'S HOME Far

from

autonomous,

extensive political structure.

the

Homeric

household %2 is part

of an

But that does not lessen its importance as a

social group and as an economic unit, and fortunately the poet presents in some detail his vision of the household of a ruling prince. The prince owns the largest and most conspicuous house in town (6.300-3; 17.264-5). It consists of "one building after another” in a court-yard surrounded by a fortified wall with a gate (17.266-8). Geese and dogs are kept in the court-yard, and so are the horses and mules used for transport and draught. At times, livestock are brought in from the country, and left to feed for a while before being slaughtered. The

result is that much of the time the place is littered with dung and looks like a farm-yard. But, despite appearances, town-houses and farms are clearly distinct. 53 For one thing, farms lack the most eye-catching feature of the house of a prince : the great hall with its high, steep roof. The great hall is an oblong structure built of wood and stone, with a single entrance at one end and, inside, a hearth at the other. Its main function is as a dininghall capable of accommodating large numbers of guests. The furniture consists of small tables, different kinds of chairs covered with fleeces and hides, and foot-rests to keep one's feet off a floor which is merely flattened earth. Near the entrance is a rack which holds the spears of visitors. Extra light and heat are provided by braziers and torches. Shields and helmets are hung up on the wall; large bronze vessels may line the wall below them. For guests who stay overnight, beds may be set up outside the hall, in a porch formed by a shade projecting over the

entrance. 59 Near the great hall is another large building not found on a farm. We may call it the women's quarters, for, although men may enter the building and women are not confined to it, this is where the women of the household mostly work and sleep. Like the hall, it has a single

entrance, but it differs in that it apparently has two floors connected by a ladder or stairs, and is divided into rooms, including one or more storerooms. 55. Among the smaller buildings in the court-yard are bedrooms,

and perhaps further store-rooms and work-rooms. * It has generally been assumed that all these somehow form a single complex of halls and rooms, but in fact the bedrooms

appear to be free-standing structures,

42

and that might also be true of the dining-hall and the women's quarters. 57 The precise geographical relation between the various buildings is difficult to determine. 5 The prince also possesses large estates in the countryside, and from time to time he may spend several days away from home, inspecting his farms. It is not true, however, that “many of the nobles did not live in the towns" (Murray 1980: 48). A prince normally lives in his townhouse; one who takes to living permanently on the farm by that token renounces his princely powers. 59

The house is inhabited by a somewhat extended family : the prince, his wife, his unmarried children, and his married sons with their wives and

children.

Marriage is monogamous as a rule, although it is apparently

possible to have several wives, and it is common to keep slaveconcubines. While married sons usually stay at home, daughters leave the house when they wed. At the death of their father, the sons divide the inheritance among themselves and set up their own homes. @ Besides the family, numerous female slaves (dmoai) live in the house Odysseus and Alkinoos each keep fifty of them (22.421-2; 7.103-7).

A few free men who do not belong to the family may join the household as retainers (therapontes). Such men live in the house of their master; they perform personal services for him, such as preparing and serving his food or grooming and driving his horses; and they follow him to war. 6

It is commonly held that there are far more than 'a few’ retainers in a prince's household. Finley speaks of “a whole hierarchy” of them, forming a large part of “very imposing and very useful household forces" (1977: 58; cf. 103-4). Now, it is certainly true that some retainers are permanent members of a prince's household. Patroklos is an example : he lives at the home of his master Akhilleus and fights beside him at Troy. It is also true that the large numbers of warriors

who follow a prince to war are referred to as his retainers.

But a closer

look at the evidence shows that they are not all in the same position as

Patroklos. Some of the men who serve as retainers at a prince's home have their own households. Menelaos' chief retainer is Eteoneus, who appears on the scene ushering in guests to a wedding at Menelaos' home, and giving

orders to the other retainers (4.22-38).

Days

Menelaos'

"Eteoneus,

house.

In the early morning,

later, he reappears at son of Boethous,

43

approached him, having arisen from his sleep, for he lived not far from there. Menelaos told him to light a fire and roast some meat" (15.95-8). The chief retainer apparently does not live with his master and perhaps we may infer that the others do not either. Here, then, we have a second category of retainer : a man who has his own household and may even be powerful - Eteoneus is called “lord” (kreion, 4.22) - but still accepts retainer-status. Within this category we may perhaps distinguish on the

one hand constant companions, such as Eteoneus, who accompany their master on all his travels and will turn up early in the morning even on days when nothing in particular is happening, and on the other hand those who turn up to serve only on special occasions. Other retainers are even more distant from their masters. One retainer of Akhilleus, who travelled to Troy in the same ship as his master and shares his living-quarters in the field, did not live with Akhilleus before the war, indeed did not even have a personal relationship with him. This man, who is actually the god Hermes in disguise, claims that, from

among seven brothers, he was selected by lottery to serve (XXIV.396400). In another made-up story, Odysseus pretends to be a Cretan embroiled with the son of Idomeneus. Their feud started, he says, "because at Troy I did not act as retainer to please his father, but I was leader of other men" (13.265-6). In other words, this Cretan is no dependant of Idomeneus, but a leader of men in his own right; he is asked to accept retainer-status during the Trojan War, but he refuses. These tales may be false, but nevertheless it follows that there is a third

category

of retainer,

consisting

of men

who

serve

princes for the

duration of a military campaign, but otherwise live in their own houses and have little to do with their war-time leaders. @ There is reason to believe that few retainers are permanent members of a prince's household. We know of three, including Patroklos, and all three are refugees who once killed someone in their home town and therefore had to flee and seek protection elsewhere. I would suggest that perhaps the only retainers to live in their masters’ houses are refugees without a livelihood or a place to stay, while other retainers are local men with their own households. ® If so, the number of live-in retainers

ought

to be quite

low,

for only

the

most

powerful

princes

could

undertake to protect more than one or two killers in exile. An indication that the number of second-category retainers is low, too, may be found in a passage listing the princes who court Penelope. A

44

total of 108 suitors is served by no more than 8 retainers (16.247-53). δ. One

many

might speculate that the suitors from other towns could

retainers to follow them abroad,

not ask

but even the 12 suitors from

Ithaka itself, who need not leave town, have only two retainers between them. The obvious conclusion is that the majority of the suitors have no

retainers who serve them on a daily basis. © It would seem, then, that a princely household consists essentially of

the family and its many slaves. At most a handful of retainers live with the prince or regularly attend at his home. Many princes may have no such retainers at all.

In the event of war, a prince can call upon the

services of many others, but these men do not depend on him for their livelihood.

6. FRIENDS

: THE MEN WHO COME TO DINNER

Before turning from the town-house and its inhabitants to the rural estates, we should consider the web of persona! relations in which the

head of the household is enmeshed. Male kinsmen and in-laws constitute the core of the network, and friends make up the bulk of it. The patterns of inheritance and of residence after marriage mean that, while brothers even after setting up separate households live in close

proximity, maternal kin and in-laws live further away, frequently even in other communities. Contact with relatives resident in other communities is rare, and within the community relatives more distant than grandfathers, uncles and first cousins appear to play no part in social life. Hence a man has close relations with a small circle of kin only,

and of these his brothers are by far the most important to him. © A good friend (hetairos or philos) may, as the poet says, "be in no way less than a brother" (8.584-6), and a prince has many more friends than he has kinsmen. 67 The closest friends are what we may call fablecompanions. A prince often entertains guests. The epics tell of occasions on which a visitor from outside the community is offered hospitality for days or weeks on end, and on his departure is given a precious gift which establishes a formal friendship between host and guest. Although often mentioned, such occasions are by their very

45

nature infrequent. Less mentioned, but inherently more common, is the entertainment of fellow-townsmen. A notion that has gained prominence in recent work is that a prince

will organise feasts for large numbers of fellow-townsmen who do not, and

are not expected

to, reciprocate

in kind.

Instead,

their

regular

enjoyment of the prince's hospitality puts them under an obligation to serve and support him. ® This kind of hierarchical feasting is found in many societies, but, as far as I can see, it is not actually attested in the epics. Weddings and funerals are perhaps occasions when a prince provides a feast for “neighbours and townsmen" without expecting counter-invitations from the majority of his guests, but such occasions would hardly occur often enough to create significant obligations. There is no other evidence for hierarchical feasts, and in view of the many scenes of, and references to, banqueting, this silence is significant. 7 What we do find is egalitarian feasts, organised on a basis of balanced reciprocity. These are of two kinds. The Odyssey mentions, as a mark of the respect accorded to Odysseus even in his absence, the fact that his young son Telemakhos “eats the fair meals which a trial-attending man [i.e. a prince] should join; for everyone invites him” (11.185-7). Akhilleus, too, as son of the ruler of Phthia, is at times invited to dinner, presumably by local princes (IX.485-91). When, in the continued absence of Odysseus, the Ithakan princes stop inviting Telemakhos and instead begin to make aggressive, one-sided demands upon his hospitality, he reminds them of the proper way to behave : “Leave my house and take other meals, eating up your own possessions, alternating

from house to house" (1.374-5=2.139-40).

It would appear, therefore,

that it is customary for princes, including monarchs, from time to time to offer a feast for the benefit of their peers, who may be expected to invite them in turn. The technical term for a feast of this type may be eilapine,

but this is not certain. 7! The other kind of feast is the eranos, a type of meal to which each guest brings his own share of food and drink. 7 The custom is described at the end of a scene set in Menelaos' house suddenly we are told that “diners came to the house of drove up sheep and carried wine, and their wives sent them” (4.621-3). There is no special occasion for the lack of any prior hint from the poet that diners had been suggests that this is supposed to be a routine matter. 7

in Sparta, when the prince; they along bread for dinner, and the invited that day

46 A passage in the /liad shows that men normally belong to a group of

peers who regularly dine together. The passage describes the fate in store for Astyanax after the death of Hektor, which is presented as a fate that befalls all boys when their fathers die. "In his need the child goes up to the friends of his father, tugging at the cloak of

one, the tunic of another.

One of those who feel pity briefly holds out a cup : he

wets his lips, but does not wet his palate.

A boy with living parents even pushes

him away from the meal, hitting and scolding him : 'Get out at once | Your father does

not dine with

us.’

In tears,

the child goes back

to his widowed

mother.”

(XX11.492-9) The treatment of the orphan is remarkable 7, but what concerns us here is the fact that Hektor, or any man, is expected to have friends who dine together, and who continue to do so even when he is dead. These men thus do not depend on the generosity of Hektor, or of any particular individual among them, but form a dining club in which everyone counts as merely one member among many. Whether their feasts are organised on a basis of rotating hospitality or as eranoi is hard to say, but one way or another all diners evidently contribute their share. Given that both types of feasting require each participant to bear an equal share of the expense and organisational responsibility, it seems likely that the diners are of roughly equal status and wealth. Princes would presumably dine with princes, not with commoners. But whether or not this is so, it is clear that table-companionship in Homer is predominantly an egalitarian, not a hierarchical relation. The obligations it creates, therefore, are not those of obedience and service, but of mutual support. The bonds created by sharing meals could be quite powerful. Hektor, for one, has a friend whom he “honoured most highly among the people, because he was his dear eilapine-companion" (XVII.576-7). Table-

companionship

starts at an early age, since boys are taken along to

dinner by their fathers. The /liad offers a memorable picture of a very young Akhilleus dining out with his mentor Phoinix. Phoinix reminisces : "I made you the man you are, Akhilleus, and I loved you from the heart, because you never wanted to go to a dinner with anyone else, or to eat at home, until I made you sit on my knee and fed you, chopping up the meat and holding the wine to your

47 mouth.

Often you soaked the tunic on my chest with the wine you dribbled out in

your childlike clumsiness.” (IX.485-91)

We have already seen that Hektor and his friends bring their sons along, too, and that Telemakhos is invited even in the absence of his father. At the time, if the poet is consistent in his chronology, he is thirteen years old. Asa result, a boy would soon establish direct relationships with his father's friends and especially with the sons of his father's friends. With kinsmen, table-companions are thus at the heart of social networks. 75 The exchange of favours and gifts reinforces ties of companionship; it also creates friendships beyond the immediate circle of companions. By doing “good things" for another one puts him under an obligation to "repay benefactions" when one needs his help (22.208-9, 233-5). One may volunteer one's services in order to gain the favour of the powerful and wealthy. A prince could, for instance, make a public speech supporting the cause of another prince; the favour might be returned in the shape of a gift. 176 Telemakhos, trading on his credit as future ruler of Ithaka, manages to organise a voyage to Pylos by asking favours all over town. He borrows a ship from one Noemon and gets twenty young men of high status to row it (2.383-7). The crew are “volunteers” (2.291-2) and act "out of friendship" (3.363). Noemon explains that he gave his ship “voluntarily... What does anyone do, when such a man, with a troubled heart, makes a request ? It would be hard to refuse the gift" (4.649-51). The immediate return for these men is no more than a meal (15.506-7), but they earn Telemakhos' friendship and may benefit

in the long run (15.540-3; 17.71-81). Favours and gifts may bind princes even to men of far lower status, although presumably the friendship becomes increasingly asymmetrical and instrumental as the social distance grows. Common people "honour" a prince "with gifts, like a god" (IX.155,297). We are not told in sO many words how, when and why such gifts are presented, but the

phrase “like a god" is suggestive. Gods receive "gifts" in the form of sacrifices, libations and offerings of precious artefacts from mortals who need help, wish to show gratitude, or generally seek to stay in their favour. In return, gods will often grant a prayer, or develop a favourable disposition towards certain worshippers. In the same way, commoners probably cultivate the friendship of the powerful by bringing them livestock and other presents. The princes graciously accept and

48

will perhaps remember these gifts when the giver needs their help, say, in court. 77 Friendship as an organising principle in Homeric society has its widest application in mobilisation for war. In recruiting an army, a ruling prince gathers up to fifty personal retainers as well as many fellowleaders, each of whom has his own followers. 7 Among them are his relatives and his permanent retainers, but the rest of the forces is composed of men who regard their military service as a special favour to him. Thus, Akhilleus reminds Agamemnon, on behalf of the Akhaian army, that "we followed you... to please you” (1.158); those who fall in battle do so not 'in the line of duty’, but “while doing a favour [kharis)

to

the

sons

of

Atreus"

(5.306-7;

cf.

3.162-4).

These

are

not

euphemisms. Although the Akhaian leaders are his subjects, Agamemnon cannot order them to follow him. Akhilleus is free to grant or withhold his services, and it takes a full month for Agamemnon to persuade Odysseus to join the army, “having with difficulty prevailed upon him” (24.115-19). Again, one who serves as another man's personal retainer does so to "please" him (13.265). At the start of the expedition formal promises are made and oaths are sworn, not to assert a

permanent feudalistic loyalty, but to confirm that the leader will have the support of the men for the duration of the war. % Significantly, followers are called "companions" retainers, are

“persuaded”

are addressed

or “exhorted”

by their leaders

as

more

rather than given

"friends".®

A

prince,

often

than

orders,

and

it seems,

recruits an army in much the same way as Telemakhos organises his private expedition to Pylos : he asks and calls favours among his peers as well as his inferiors, drawing on old friendships and establishing new ones. 31 All this talk of companionship, friendship and reciprocity should not be taken to mean that peace and harmony prevail. A man has enemies as

well as friends.

Friends will quickly become enemies when they feel

neglected or slighted. And mere weakness may be enough for a man to be dropped by his companions, as the plight of the orphaned Astyanax suggests. Still, the fact remains that networks of friendship exist and

play an important part in the informal organisation of Homeric society.

49

7. THE ECONOMY OF THE ESTATE The Homeric landscape, or what we can discern of it, is rather empty.

There are no villages.

Outside town, apart from the occasional burial

mound, there are only cart-tracks and isolated farmsteads.

Among

them

are the farms of the princes, whose scattered holdings of arable land, ‘gardens’, herds and flocks add up to large estates. Farm-houses are of two kinds. One is a single-room cottage without

any furniture, in which eat and sleep the farm-hands, who are generally slaves (dmoes), although hired labourers (theres) are employed as well. Such is Odysseus’ pig-farm on Ithaka, managed by the slave Eumaios

and four other men.

This particular farm also has a court-yard wall and

pig-sties built by Eumaios

himself,

marking the care he has bestowed

upon his herds. ® The other kind is a substantial building, which at least contains seats and tables, and even a bath. Sometimes a prince may give to a trusted slave a wife, set up the couple in this type of farmhouse, and

allow them to have a family.

Odysseus owns a farm like this among his

gardens; it is run by the slave Dolios, his wife and their six sons, with the help of a number of slaves who "eat, sit and sleep" in "an outbuilding [klision] [which) runs all around” the main building. 83 Holdings and herds may be scattered over a wide area. One passage refers to men who own "far distant" farmlands (XXIII.832) and at least two Ithakans need a ship to reach their livestock grazing on the mainland. 384

All farm work is done by men and all domestic work by women. Therefore, except for the wives of the few married slaves, there are no women on the farms, and no male slaves in the town-house. The separation is strict. As a child, Eumaios was raised in the house, but he was sent off to a farm as soon as he was old enough to work; and

whereas Dolios' sons all stay with him on the farm, his daughter was sent to town at an early age. * Since the female slaves are all concentrated in town, while the men are scattered over the farms, and

since in addition episodes of the epic tales are set in town more often than in the country, readers get the impression that the bulk of the slaves

in a Homeric household are women. This is not so. An estimate of the number of Odysseus’ male slaves easily reaches fifty. 86 Another impression conveyed by the epics is that animal husbandry is predominant over agriculture. This, too, is deceptive. True, the richest

50 of the princes own vast herds. Even at its lowest ebb, Eumaios' farm has nearly a thousand pigs (14.13-20). Odysseus owns a further eleven herds of goats on Ithaka, and on the mainland another twelve herds of goats and twelve droves of pigs, plus twelve herds of cattle and twelve flocks of sheep (14.100-7). Herd sizes vary, but these fifty-nine herds

should amount to not less than three thousand animals. © In the same order of magnitude are the one hundred cattle and one thousand sheep and goats paid by Iphidamas as a bride-price (XI.244-5), and the three thousand horses of Erikhthonios, "the richest of men” (XX.219-22), although the latter would require more pasture than Odysseus’ livestock.

Odysseus is said to be twenty times richer than any of his countrymen (14.96-9), animals.

so an ordinary The

scale

rich

man

is impressive,

would

still own

but that does

a few

hundred

not necessarily

make

animal husbandry predominant. A prince's agricultural holdings and his herds are usually given equal prominence when his property is mentioned. Diomedes' father “lived in a house rich in livelihood, he had plenty of wheat-bearing ploughlands, surrounded by many orchards with trees, and he had much livestock" (XIV. 121-4). Telemakhos says that he is going to inspect both his "farmlands and herdsmen” (15.504; cf. 4.640). Besides herds, these men apparently own several farms. So does Alkinoos, among whose possessions are two “gardens”, one just outside town (6.291-4), another

adjoining his house (7.112-31). In general, a rich family may be referred to as “owners of many plots of land" (polukleroi, 14.211). We

also hear of a “large estate on the banks of the Xanthos"

owned

by

Bellerophontes and his descendants (XT1.313-4; VI.194-5), and of estates offered to Meleagros and Aineias (IX.577-80; XX.184-5), all of which consist of both "wheat-bearing” ploughland and vineyard. More significant than references to particular landholdings is the fact that human beings in general are represented as wine-drinkers and "breadeaters", not meat-eaters. The diet of Homeric princes almost always contains meat as well, but if anything is left out, it is meat. This in itself shows that in the economy of a princely estate agriculture and viticulture are at least as important as animal husbandry. 33 Agriculture may play an even greater part in the lives of the less

wealthy.

A modest property consists of "a house and a plot of land”

(kleros, 14.63). Thus the Trojans at large are reminded that by defending their city, each man will protect “his house and plot of land”

51

(XV.498), and a poor man is described as akleros, “without a plot of land" (11.490). No mention of flocks here. Perhaps the poet envisages a world where most people's property consists mainly of agricultural

land and where only the rich in addition own herds and flocks.

If so, he

mentions cattle and sheep frequently, not because they are common, but because they are a prestigious form of property. So too, he dwells on the preparation of meat while mentioning the consumption of bread and wine only in passing, because meat is a rare and prestigious food. 389 The variety of farm produce and the sophistication of agricultural methods should be noted. Apples, pears and pomegranates, figs and olives, and unspecified vegetables are grown in the "gardens", alongside vines (7.112-28). The soil is not merely ploughed, but manured with the dung of the farm animals; it is not merely watered by rain, but irrigated by means of man-made trenches which lead water from a well to all parts of the garden. The area is not merely cultivated, but enclosed by a stone wall to keep out floods, stray animals and thieves. The maintenance of such walls is mentioned frequently as a job for the

farmhands. A relatively intensive kind of agriculture is evidently practised in the gardens of the princes’ estates; whether it is the same on the ploughland we cannot tell. 99 The princes do not in person perform much agricultural labour. The younger princes are sometimes said to have been out in the fields, herding their fathers’ flocks, and princes do know how to plough, but

their role appears to be mainly supervisory.

The ideal image is that of a

prince who "stands in silence, holding a sceptre,... with joy in his heart", watching his men gathering in the harvest (XVIII.550-7). 9! The slaves are left to manage their affairs largely independently. Eumaios, for one, without consulting his owners, undertakes building-work on his pig-farm, and even buys himself a slave (14.5-10, 449-52). Eumaios can Slaughter pigs as he sees fit, for his own consumption and for his subordinates and guests. But he must make sure, of course, that he is able at any time to provide any number of pigs that his masters may require. 5 The poems do not reveal whether all estate production is organised in a similarly loose way, or whether other branches are subject to more

central control.

For example, large vats of wine are kept stored in the

town-house but it is not clear where and by whom the grapes have been processed. As for grain and wool, at least some and perhaps all of it is

52 sent to town to be processed by the female slaves, under supervision of

the prince's wife and the housekeeper (tamie). We find that twelve of Odysseus’ fifty slave-women are employed in grinding corn and baking bread for the daily needs of the household, and that a reserve of flour is kept in storage. Dozens of slave-women as well as the prince's wife and daughters spend most of their time spinning the wool produced by the flocks and weaving garments, blankets, sheets, seat-covers and wraps. Not all of the cloth produced is designed for immediate use, and much is stored in clothes-chests. 9 Finley argues that "the great households could almost realise their

ideal of absolute self-sufficiency" (1977: 61). Whether self-sufficiency is a Homeric ideal is a question to which we shall return, but it does seem that a hero's household is in practice able to provide for itself nearly all it needs for its subsistence. Certain specialised skills, however, must be brought in from outside. Smiths, carpenters and other craftsmen, physicians, diviners and bards are not members of a prince's household, but "public workers" (demioergoi). Whether they are based locally or travel from town to town, they are independent specialists who

must be rewarded (ibid.),

there

is one

need : metal.

for their services. resource

Moreover,

that very few

as Finley stresses

households

have,

and all

Considerable quantities of metal are required for tools,

armour and weapons, as well as for items of so-called treasure (keimelion), which play an important role as status-symbols, a role which

will be discussed later. Raw metal and metal artefacts would have to be obtained either from local smiths or from abroad by means of raiding, gift-exchange or barter. 93 A household

asset worth mentioning

in this connection

is the ship.

Many, if not all, princes own ships equipped with twenty or fifty oars as well as sails, beached in the natural harbours of coastal and island towns. Crews may be recruited from among the ship-owner's friends, as in the

case of Telemakhos' journey to Pylos, or from among his slaves and hired labourers. Not everyone can afford to havea ship of his own and gather his own crew. Even wealthy princes appear to own no more than one, maybe two, ships. Poorer men travel as passengers on someone

else's ship; on one busy route, between Ithaka and the mainland, there is a ferry-service. % Since even the wealthiest household depends to a smail extent upon

outside resources for its subsistence, it must obviously produce some

53

surplus to barter and to pay for specialists’ services.

If Finley is right to

say that the Homeric economic ideal is “absolute self-sufficiency”, then it follows that households aim to produce a surplus no larger than the minimum required for exchange “when an import was unavoidable" (1977: 67). In the final chapter, I hope to show that the epic evidence does not support Finley's contention, but on the contrary suggests that princely households are geared to producing as large a surplus as possible. For the moment, I should merely point out that Homeric estates, while large and in part intensively cultivated, do not need to feed many mouths other than members of the family and slaves. As I have tried to show, princes do not keep armies of retainers and hangers-on.

Thus, there is at least a theoretical possibility of surplus-production in excess of what is needed for subsistence-oriented exchange. In their daily lives, the princes,

gentlemen

farmers.

They

the heroes of the epic tales, are

live in relative leisure and luxury in their

imposing town-houses, occasionally supervising the work done for them by the dozens of slaves and labourers who tend their large landed estates, herds and flocks. It is important to remember that not every prince in the heroic world chooses to devote himself to war and die young and famous, as Akhilleus does. As Odysseus says at one point, "wars and javelins and arrows" are “miserable things, which are horrifying" to everyone but the keenest fighters (14.225-6). “Work and household management" (oikophelie, 14.222-3) are real alternatives.

8. LIFE IN TOWN

: FACT AND FICTION

What we have seen thus far of Homer's portrait of the lives of his

heroes reveals a coherent image of heroic society.

Not surprisingly, it is

a patchy and far from objective image. Princes, great halls and feasts of meat take the spotlight and are drawn in colourful detail. The common people, the more common houses, storerooms and stables, and the implicitly more usual meals of bread and wine remain in the background,

drawn in bare outline.

Nevertheless, by adding up the evidence and

pursuing its implications, one may recreate a consistent and fairly full picture.

54

Most of the individual features of this picture have of course been recognised by scholars previously, but the overall image offered here differs, I think, significantly from that of earlier reconstructions. We have found that Homeric heroes are neither clan-leaders, nor feudal lords, nor heads of large autonomous households, nor food-redistributing

big men or chiefs.

Instead, they are wealthy owners of private estates

and dozens of slaves. They have extensive networks of friends and connections, and lead active social lives within the communities which they rule. These communities are walled towns with public buildings

and an established system of government in which a hereditary monarch and the elders of princely families make decisions and pass judgements which notionally represent the will of the people. The towns in turn form part of wider political entities : the state and, ultimately, the Akhaian nation. How does this literary world relate to its historical counterparts ? A few general and tentative observations are all I have to offer; a more comprehensive and detailed comparison with Mycenaean, Dark Age and Archaic sources is still required. (1) The farms, houses and public buildings seem realistic and for the most part can be identified in the archaeological record. They are clearly not Mycenaean: where the Mycenaean palace has plastered floors, fitted bathrooms and wall-frescoes, the Homeric house has a floor of flattened earth, portable bath tubs, and walls hung with pieces of armour. Town walls and large, high-roofed halls do not appear until the ninth century; temples follow a century later. The implied density of settlement in town and the presence of further public buildings suggest a

relatively late stage of development. In all likelihood, a Homeric town represents real Greek towns as they were from the eighth century onwards. 9 (1) The princes’ estates, too, are clearly non-Mycenaean. While there is a superficial similarity insofar as both Homer and the Mycenaean texts show large numbers of slave women employed in textile production, the differences are fundamental. In Mycenaean textile manufacture,

hundreds of women are employed in spinning or weaving or carding wool, and a written record of their work is kept on tablets. In Homer, a few dozen women at most sit working beside their mistress, without a hint of any division of labour or record-keeping. Also, Mycenaean

55

rulers might possess flocks more than ten times as large as those of the supposedly very wealthy Odysseus. Odysseus’ wealth is presumbably measured by Dark Age or Archaic

standards.

His riches are almost certainly fantastic, but the implied level

of 'ordinary' wealth - twenty times less than his - may not be unrealistic. If I am correct in arguing that agriculture is the basic form of production in the epic world, while herds and flocks are for the rich only, there is

no fundamental difference between the Homeric economy and the Greek economy as it is depicted in the sources from Hesiod cnwards, and as it may already have been in the Dark Ages. On this interpretation, then, the epics do not provide evidence for a historical shift from pastoralism to agriculture, as some have argued. % (111) Social life in Homer can only be compared with that of Archaic Greece, since we do not know enough about the earlier periods. The daily gatherings in the agora, the athletic competitions and the religious festivals are all characteristically Greek. So too, is the practice of establishing friendships by exchanging favours and dinner-invitations, and by attending eranos-type meals. Hesiod, who like Homer rates a

close friend more highly than any kinsman except a brother (Works and Days 343-8, 707), gives advice on each of these matters : “Invite a friend to a meal, but leave an enemy alone” (342). "Be a friend to a friend, visit the one who visits” (353).

"Do not be aggressive at a communal meal [i.e. an eranos] with many guests, for [there] the pleasure is greatest and the expense least” (722-3).

"Give to one who may give and do not give to one who will not give. a giver; no-one gives to a non-giver” (354-5).

One gives to

Later sources show the continued importance of table-companionship in Archaic and Classical social organisation, whether in the form of mutual

invitations to symposia, or in the form of sharing communal meals, of which the syssitia of Sparta are the best-known example. By the late seventh century, however, certain dining-customs change : new forms of dinner-entertainment emerge, and diners no longer sit at tables but recline on couches. It seems likely, therefore, that epic social life

reflects that of Greek communities before the end of the seventh century. It must be stressed that in Homer, as in history, meals are shared by

social equals, general,

not by leaders and their retainers and dependants.

Homeric

society knows

few hierarchical private relations,

In and

56

such personal relations as there are between princes and commoners are

hardly mentioned. In this respect, too, the epics are close to historical Greece, which is notable for the virtual absence - from the sources at least - of relations of patronage and dependence. Some scholars have suggested a historical development which

the

central

horizontal

relation

structure,

in

from ἃ vertical social structure,

is that between

which

there

are

leader

and

separate

relations are predominantly between peers.

followers,

social

strata

in

to a

and

There is little support for

this in the epics, which portray a decidedly horizontal society. 9

(IV) Parallels between Mycenaean and Homeric political organisation on the level of the town are hard to draw. We know that there were Mycenaean monarchs with the title anax, and officials known as basileis, but they appear not to fulfil the same governmental roles as their

Homeric counterparts.

The Mycenaean lawagetas and koreter have no

Homeric counterpart at all. By contrast, Greek history does offer clear parallels. Firstly and most obviously, popular assemblies are a universal feature of Greek political organisation. Secondly, in Hesiod as in Homer princes govern the town and settle disputes in the agora, where they

either display their innate eloquence - according to the Theogony (79-93) - or take bribes and reach crooked judgements - according to the Works and Days (37-9, 202-24). Note that, as in Homer, the "whole town” is implicated in the princes’ verdicts : it will benefit from justice and be punished for injustice (W&D 225-47). Moreover, well into the Archaic

Age many Greek cities continued to be governed by aristocracies of birth similar to the princely elites of Homer and Hesiod, as I hope to show in the next chapter. Thirdly, throughout the Dark Age, according to Greek tradition, hereditary monarchs were ubiquitous, as they are in the epics. In Archaic times, too, hereditary monarchs could be found in a number

of Greek cities.

Fourthly, the notion of the town as a political unity,

which, I have argued, is found in the epics, is central to Greek political organisation and thinking. An important difference between Homeric and Archaic towns, however, is that from the mid-seventh century onwards, Greek cities are

governed

by

magistrates

with limited terms

of office and

restricted

spheres of authority, alongside, or instead of, hereditary rulers. Councils, courts and other governmental bodies similarly tend to diversify and specialise, and to have fixed numbers of members. There

is no

sign

of this

in Homer.

The

obvious

and

widely

accepted

57

conclusion is that the epics here reflect the society of the Dark or early Archaic Age, prior to these developments. There is thus a real change, in that governmental powers which in the epics are not sharply delineated and separated, become formalised, articulated and differentiated in the Archaic city. Nevertheless, I would again stress the continuity between Homeric and Archaic society. The emergence of new organs of government is of course an important historical process, but it does not amount to the emergence of a

fundamentally new kind of political organisation. As far as we can tell, the concept of the town as a political unity is no weaker in Homer than in history, the range of governmental powers is no narrower, and the effectiveness with which they are exercised is no less. 1%

(v) States embracing more than one town are a feature of Mycenaean as well as Archaic and Classical times, but their political organisation

differs from Homer's vague picture of local monarchs submitting to the most powerful ruler in the region. The kings of Mycenae and Pylos ruled over a number of districts governed by koreteres and perhaps smaller areas ruled by basileis. The Archaic and Classical city-state, while usually regarding itself as a single polis, often included a number of surrounding smaller settlements - such as the Athenian demes, or the towns of the perioikoi in Sparta - which might have their own magistrates. City-states often also sought to create regional hegemonies by subjecting a number of neighbouring towns, which again had their

own magistrates. ethnos,

political

which

Closest to the Homeric state is perhaps the Greek

consisted

institutions,

but

of a number

recognising

of towns,

a

common

each

with

their own

central

authority,

especially in time of war. Although I am not aware of any instance in which both the central authority and the local ruler were hereditary

monarchs, we cannot exclude the possibility that such a state of affairs was known during the Dark and early Archaic Ages.

The actual territories attributed to the heroes are hard to reconcile with the evidence for any single historical period.

Strikingly, the epics imply

that the king of Sparta rules over part of Messenia as well, and this should refer to the situation of the late eighth century at the earliest. On the other hand, the prominence of Mykenai and Pylos, for instance, can

only reflect the conditions of the Mycenaean Age; yet while the number of towns ruled by Pylos as given in the Catalogue of Ships matches the number given in the tablets, none of the names correspond.

One could

58 argue that Homeric political geography by and large reflects Mycenaean realities, although the details are garbled. Alternatively, Homer's political map might be largely imaginary, a mixture of contemporary realities and a dim knowledge of the past power of certain cities. 19 The Homeric conception of Akhaia as a nation under a single ruler is also open to two interpretations. It is not impossible that the Mycenaean world was in fact politically unified, although there is no explicit

evidence for this. Later, Greece certainly was never unified in this way, but Archaic Greeks did have a sense of Greek cultural unity and uniqueness which they expressed, for instance, in their celebration of Panhellenic games from which non-Greeks were excluded. So the epics in this respect may reproduce Mycenaean reality, or else they may present a fiction inspired by the Greeks' image of themselves as a

distinct people contrasted with a variety of foreign nations. 182 This reconstruction has not covered all aspects of the epic world, and

the archaeological and historical evidence has been surveyed in a cursory manner only. heroic world

Still, in what we have seen, the political geography of the is the only feature that definitely does not consistently

correspond to the reality of any single historical period. It is also the only feature that definitely contains at least a small Mycenaean component.

The Akhaian nation may, but need not, reflect Mycenaean

reality. A study of other aspects of the heroic world may well reveal more Mycenaean or unhistorical elements. But that will not alter the fact that the economic organisation of the household, the social organisation up to the level of the town, and the political organisation up to the level

of the state appear not only coherent but also entirely compatible with what we know of conditions in Greece in the eighth and early seventh century. We may conclude, then, that these basic features of heroic society are derived from this period, which almost certainly is the poet's own time.

Whether or not this is true, our reconstruction entails important historical conclusions.

The poems do not depict a pastoral society, nor

one characterised by vertical social relations, nor again one in which the household is effectively the largest political and social unit. The Iliad and Odyssey therefore provide no evidence for supposed historical shifts from pastoralism to agriculture and from vertical to horizontal social relations, nor for the emergence of the town as a political unit.

©

61

CHAPTER THREE

THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING ANGRY Status, personal power and violence

"This was our supreme purpose - to be known, to gain this certain respect", said Cupid. In the early ‘sixties, Cupid, aka Rough-head, and his friends, a group of boys between the ages of thirteen and fifteen, belonged to the Vice Lord Nation, a federation of Chicago street gangs. The Vice Lords had knives and guns, and used them upon the least provocation. Gang wars, said Cupid, "could get started over a little simple thing” (Keiser 1969: 60). "This one night we was just out having fun. We weren't out to shoot nobody in particular. I had a .41 Magnum, one of my partners had a .38 special, and a stud had a .32 short. We went down Harding shooting up peoples. I don't know who we were shooting at, or what for, but we were fighting the Cobras, and I guess we

were just shooting after everybody." (ibid.: 61)

The near random violence of the Vice Lords made them feared and respected in their neighbourhoods and beyond. "The peoples knew who we was... Everybody respected us to the highest. We were Lords” (ibid.: 68). One of the older gang members described Cupid and friends as "the roughest boys I ever met” (Keiser 1969: 16), and they must have been just about the roughest boys anyone ever met. But their behaviour

should

not be dismissed

as merely

deviant

and

delinquent.

Their

ambition to acquire fame and respect through violence is shared by many who regard a readiness to use force as the essence of masculinity. While in contemporary middle-class culture status derives primarily from

wealth displayed

in conspicuous

consumption,

in other cultures

and

subcultures, as among the Vice Lords, status is based above all on physical force displayed in acts and threats of what one might call conspicuous destruction, 1

62 Wherever such a conception of status prevails, conflict is bound to be endemic. Only in conflict can a man gain status; indeed, he may not be regarded as a man until he has proved himself in his first quarrel or until

he has killed his first enemy.

Conversely, in such a culture any conflict,

whatever its cause, is bound to become a contest in which one's status as a man of force is at stake. Giving in even a little, or hesitating to retaliate, may be seen as a sign of weakness and result in a loss of face.

We shall see that a similar, though more complicated, conception of social status is found in the Iliad and Odyssey, and that it is the fundamental cause of the frequent and fierce clashes between the heroes. A man whose status depends on his prowess is liable to harp on the dangers surrounding him and to exaggerate the violence of his own actions. “I got out on parole that time I shot my father", Cupid said in a

seemingly off-hand way.

But from the rest of his story it emerges that

he had in fact done no more than point a gun at his father.

mother stopped him (Keiser understand his claim that

1969:

71-2).

In this

Then his

light one

must

"If you's a man, you was a man... You was out there. You was holding that street twenty-four hours a day. And you just had to constantly fight life and death out there.” (ibid.: 68)

One may compare the violent soccer fan who, when asked what happens

to your victim when you ‘put the boot in’, answered : “He's dead”. Another fan corrected him : "Nah! He's alright - usually anyway" (Marsh 1982: 105).

Homer's view of the heroic world is similarly affected by an inclination to see threats and lethal acts of violence everywhere. It will be argued that, while Homeric society is a reflection of a real society which placed a high value on a man's readiness to fight, the epics exaggerate the level and frequency of violence because a state of permanent conflict is, in a sense, the aggressive man's ideal. 2

63 1. EXPLANATIONS OF VIOLENCE "As a child, I killed the son of Amphidamas,

without meaning to; 1

was angry over a game of knuckle-bones” (XXIII.87-8).

This incident

of Patroklos' youth characterises the level of violence of the epic world. Not only do violent confrontations form the subject-matter of the poems, but the heroes bear arms at all times, and the narrative is strewn with references to outbursts of anger, disputes and murders. Why do Homer's heroes behave so violently ? The question is rarely addressed directly, but answers are suggested in the works of several scholars, A.W.H. Adkins in particular.3 As I see it,

there

are

explanation.

currently

three

complementary,

but

distinct,

lines

of

The first identifies as the main cause of heroic violence the

fragmentary nature of Homeric

society, the second points to what is

called 'the heroic impulse’, and the third singles out the role of shame in

Homeric culture. (Ὁ THE FRAGMENTARY SOCIETY

It is an axiom of current popular wisdom that man is aggressive by nature, and that men will fight one another unless some power

intervenes.

It is also the basis of many

a scholarly theory.

As a

principle of political philosophy, this notion was famously formulated by Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan (1651) : mankind would be engaged in a constant war of all against all, if it were not for the state putting a stop to

it.

The idea recurs as the basis of a historical theory in Norbert Elias’

influential The Civilisation Process (1939), which argues that in the early Middle Ages, men still acted on aggressive impulses with little inhibition, and that inborn aggression was gradually suppressed only

when society subsequently dependent on one another.

became

more

complex

and

people

more

Because it is such a widely accepted notion, discussions of conflict in

the Homeric world hardly ever spell it out, though they often presuppose it. Adkins, however, has explicitly formulated the theory that the heroes are violent because they are virtually autonomous, in communities that have no central government strong enough to restrain the use of force. Where an aggressor need fear only his victim's personal power to

retaliate, "it is inevitable, given... the natural inclinations of mankind" that many a strong man “should pursue his own interest at the expense of

others” (Adkins 1960a: 61-2). 4

64 Adkins

argues that the main interest pursued by the heroes is the

acquisition of material goods.

Sometimes, he seems to suggest that this

is a matter of survival, that Homeric men fight over means of existence which, being "the produce of a not very fertile land" (1963: 33), are in

short supply.

Others, too, see conflict within the community, as well as

between communities, as motivated by a need for "essential supplies” of food and metals (Finley 1977: 63-4). More important than the fight for survival in Adkins’ theory, however, is the struggle for status, or, to use the Homeric term, timé, ‘honour’.

That this struggle is at the centre of the heroes' lives is universally acknowledged. “‘Always be the best, and superior to others’. This sums of the heroic code" (Edwards 1987: 150). "To acquire more [honour], and at all events not to lose any of what one has, is the

principal motivation of Homeric man" (Adkins 1972a: 15). 5 According to Adkins, the essential constituent of a hero's social status is wealth. "House, land, flocks, goods, chattels and dependants..., these things are

his timé... : these things are his position in society” (1960b: 31-2). “ Homeric men therefore seek to acquire wealth in order to gain honour, and in the absence of an effective central government each household is free to try to enrich itself at the expense of its neighbours. Besides wealth, personal qualities are considered an ingredient of

social status, and the heroes compete Most

prestigious,

it is thought,

are

to demonstrate these qualities. courage

and

physical

prowess.

Adkins does not separate the competition for wealth from the competitive display of prowess : prowess is always displayed by seizing wealth, and

the seizure of wealth inherently involves a demonstration of strength and courage. 7 Other personal qualities, though, such as athletic abilities, are displayed in forms of competition that in principle could be non-violent. Even in such competitions rival heroes sometimes resort to force, and on

Adkins’ view this too is presumably at least in part a matter of following ‘natural inclinations’ because there is no authority that might stop them. 9 An additional factor inspiring violence is the scarcity of honour. It is asserted that "a community given

time

: if one

man

containsa limited quantity of fimé at any

takes

more,

the others

must

lose some

as a

result" (Adkins 1960b: 31), and “the loss of simé naturally evokes a violent response in men” (id. 1972c: 3). Alvin Gouldner put it in a way that has caught on : the competition for honour "approaches a zero-sum

game, in that someone can win only if someone else loses (1967: 49). 9

65

As he points out, "a zero-sum game will engender more bitterness and a greater inclination to win at any cost” than other contests do, so that rivals are easily led "to break the rules when defeat is imminent or to attempt to conceal or deny defeat" (ib.: 50). In other words, there are certain norms of behaviour, both in competition for wealth and in contests of personal excellence, but the scarcity of the honour to be won

drives the heroes to resort to violence and deceit in order to defeat their rivals. 10 The main thrust of Adkins' argument is that fragmentation and the attendant prevalence of conflict produce a morality that does nothing to

inhibit violent behaviour.

Incessant warfare means that the community

cannot survive without good fighters; the lack of a central government means that the head of a household needs to be a fighter in order to hold his own against his neighbours. Hence a great warrior is so highly valued that he can literally get away with murder. His prowess gives him "a strong claim to act as he pleases” (Adkins 1966: 198; cf. 1960a:

37-8, 44-5, 50-1; 1982: 301).

“We may suppose that anyone in such a

society would tolerate some injustice, if need be, in exchange for effective protection" (1982: 314; cf. 1971: 10; 1972a: 14). 11 Adkins goes even further, and argues that acts of aggression against fellow-townsmen are not merely tolerated so long as the aggressor makes up for it by being a useful defender of the community, but are positively admired in themselves, as evidence of the might and daring of the perpetrator. When Homer speaks of a 'good' man (agathos), he usually means one who is brave and strong, and a man may harm others without

provocation and yet continue to be called a ‘good’ man, 12 It is Adkins’ controversial theory that a man can never be called ‘bad' for being violent, and that, although the Homeric moral vocabulary does have other ways of expressing disapproval of aggressive behaviour, these are too 'weak' to have much effect. He maintains that it is the man whose land or cattle have been taken away by force, or one who has lost a victory to a more aggressive competitor - in a word, the victim of violence - who is regarded as a 'bad man' (kakos) because he evidently lacks strength and courage. “To do harm is not to be kakos; to be kakos is to be the sort of person to whom [harm] may be done with impunity, since he cannot defend himself” (1960a: 42). "Acts of injustice, in traditional Greek values, diminish the [prestige] only of the man who suffers them" (1966: 198; emphasis added). 13

66

To sum up, the theory is that competition for honour leads to violence because (1) the absence of a central coercive power allows men to follow their ‘natural inclinations’ and pursue their own interest without regard for others, and (2) honour is scarce. Under these conditions, the use of

violence is not morally condemned; on the contrary, a successful act of aggression is applauded, and thereby to some extent encouraged. The result is, Adkins suggests, that the heroes so commonly resort to

violence that competition for prestige becomes purely a power-struggle. Wealth

and

excellence

may

appear

to give

a good

man

(agathos)

a

legitimate claim to honour, but in practice his honour is founded on his power (1960b: 31; 1971: 9-10). Honour "depends on the ability of the agathos to defend it. One has no 'right' to one’s timé otherwise” (1971:

10). (II) THE HEROIC IMPULSE While Adkins sees the fragmentation of communities as the primary reason why innate egoism and aggression are allowed and even encouraged to express themselves, the second explanation takes as its Starting point the prevalence of war. Because Homeric communities need defenders in their constant wars against neighbours, it is argued,

Homeric

men

are compelled

to cultivate a warrior-mentality.

"The

predator in man is allowed - even forced - to run wild" (Redfield 1975: 200; cf. 195, 198). The heroes must train themselves to be quick to anger, which is "a necessary condition of the warrior's success in battle"

(Mueller 1984: 33). When a man attains this fighting mentality, however, it may also affect

relations within the community. definition,

which

permits

(Redfield 1975: 104).

him

The warrior is “trapped by this selfneither

reconciliation

nor

retreat"

He is "trained to meet every emergency by an act

of reckless bravery, unable to make any other response, unable to cope with situations that cannot be dealt with by fighting it out" (Brooks 1977:

455). "To condition the warrior to an instant release of angry violence is one thing; to ensure that the target is chosen with discretion is another. ... Peer rivalry creates frustrations that are as conducive to the release of anger as the encounter with the enemy, but in coping with these frustrations the warnor must be patient - a task to which he is the less fitted the more he excels in his métier” (Mueller 1984: 33).

67

In other words, in Homeric society aggression is stimulated because it is needed in war; once stimulated, it spills over into community life, and particularly into the competition for status, because the aggressive man

cannot

differentiate

townsman.

sufficiently

between

foreign

enemy

and

rival

On this view, fragmentation of the community is not a cause

of violence,

but

an

effect of the aggressive

attitudes

produced

by

unremitting warfare.

(111) THE SHAME-CULTURE Using a term introduced by the anthropologist Ruth Benedict, E.R. Dodds dubbed the world of the epics "a shame-culture”, that is : a society in which the experience (or thought) of being criticised to one's

face or behind one's back evokes an acute feeling of shame. Shame is no doubt a universal human emotion, but it is markedly more powerful in

societies

standard"

where

(Adkins

exposes a man

"'what

1960a:

people

48).

will

"In

say'

such

[is]

the

a society

most

anything

to the contempt or ridicule of his fellows,

him to ‘lose face’, is felt as unbearable" (Dodds generally accepted to be true of heroic society.

important

which

which causes

1951: 18). This is “The Homeric hero

cannot fall back upon his own opinion of himself, for his self only has the value which other people put upon it" (Adkins 1960: 49). Shame is assigned a subsidiary role in the two theories discussed earlier. Both models include the extreme dependence of the heroes on the good opinion of others as a factor that makes them all the more anxious to succeed in the competition for honour. This competition is

already fought aggressively, for reasons set out above, and a sense of shame merely intensifies the violence. !4

Another view, however, is that shame is in itself the prime cause of violence. integrated, violence is himself is 1982: 61).

Regardless of whether communities are fragmentary or and whether or not war stimulates aggressive attitudes, bound to erupt in a shame-culture, where a man's image of "in the hands... of others to mutilate and destroy” (MacCary It is argued that in these circumstances the slightest reproach

or sign of contempt will produce what amounts to an identity crisis. This is a painful experience, liable to evoke strong emotions, aggression included. "Their violence is derived from a lack of clearly conceived individual identity, as opposed to social identity" (MacCary 1982: 28). 15

(IV) ASSUMPTIONS AND QUESTIONS Before

turning

to an examination

comments are in order. Hobbes,

a few general

First of all, the line of reasoning that unites

Elias and Adkins assumes

surely correct.

of the evidence,

innate egoism

in man,

and that is

However, it also makes the more dubious assumption

that innate egoism, unless constrained somehow, necessarily leads to acts of aggression. Yet even without morality and state power suppressing violence, two forces militate against the aggressive pursuit of selfinterest. One is altruism, which, surely, is no less than egoism an innate

capacity of man.

The other, which may carry more weight with cynics,

is fear : even strong men risk retaliation. I would argue that a mere absence of mechanisms of suppression does not sufficiently explain

violent behaviour. We need to identify a positive stimulus that drives men to “overcome mercy and terror”, as Redfield poetically puts it (1975: 104). 16 The stimulus identified by Redfield himself, as we have seen, is war. The existence of war is taken for granted : it lies within "the sphere of nature” (Redfield 1975: 200). The problem with this is that by assuming that "warfare is a natural activity for man" (Murray 1980: 120), one is again implying that innate egoism necessarily leads to violence - this time on the level of communities rather than individuals. I would object that altruism and fear are effective counters on this level too, and that again we need to look for a positive stimulus that might explain why a

community's

pursuit of self-interest so often leads to open

warfare,

despite the material and psychological cost of armed conflict. 17

That leaves the notion that it is the sense of shame and the associated psychological insecurity which tips the balance in favour of aggression. Again, it is assumed that this is a 'natural' state of affairs. "There is no reason to explain the existence of this scheme of values, for it springs from what is primitive and primary : ... society is not yet sufficiently well organised to allow the reflection (or coercion) which might produce a different system” (Adkins 1960a: 48-9).

Since a sense of shame stems from dependence on the good opinion of others, this view has the rather paradoxical implication that the need for

social approval is strongest where there is least social organisation.

A

need for approval clearly is a feature of human nature, but we must ask

69

what it is that makes this need more acute in some societies than in others. I would suggest that the answer in each case is status rivalry. The competition for status does of course play a part in each of the above explanations of violence, but I propose to stand these theories on their head. Instead of the struggle for prestige turning violent because of the fragmentary nature of society or the requirements of constant warfare, it will be argued that it is the Homeric struggle for prestige which causes aggressive behaviour and hence fragmentation and war. So too, the acute need of the Homeric hero for the approbation of his fellows is caused by the nature of status rivalry in his society, rather than being a part of human nature untouched by social and moral development. Not every form of violent conflict can be attributed to status rivalry, but the types of conflict occurring in Homeric society can; not every kind of status rivalry leads to violence, but the type of rivalry found in Homeric society does. In order to support these propositions, we shall be examining concepts of status, the practice and ideals of stratification, and the objects, norms and means of status rivalry in the heroic world.

2. THE MEANING OF HONOUR AND EXCELLENCE

Within a Homeric community,

individuals and families are ranked

from 'best' to 'worst' in order of their excellence or goodness man or woman of excellence ought to enjoy honour (time) reputation (kleos) in town. A lack of excellence, described (kakotes), brings a bad reputation and dishonour (atimie).

(arete). A and a good as badness Such is the

basic Homeric vocabulary of status. 13 Honour, in general, is the abstract, immaterial 'value' that one has in

one's own and others’ eyes.

In this sense it is the equivalent of our

notion of status. But honour, in Homer, is also the actions and words by which others acknowledge one's status, the respect with which one is treated. In the latter sense, it corresponds to what we call deference :

"that component of activity which functions as a symbolic

means by

which appreciation is regularly conveyed fo a recipient of this recipient" (Goffman 1967: 56). We tend to think of deference “as something a subordinate owes to his superordinate”, but there are also forms of

70 "symmetrical deference”

(ibid.: 59), expressions of respect exchanged

among social peers. The handshake is an example. "deference obligations that superordinates owe

Moreover, there are their subordinates"

(ibid.), such as not being contemptuous or too aloof towards them, and on occasion perhaps allowing them the ‘privilege’ of having a drink or meal with their betters. All these expressions of respect are covered by the Homeric word honour. 19

Whereas honour consists in receiving deference mostly in face-to-face interaction, reputation consists in being well spoken of when and where

one is not present. 2

In the epic world, what people in town will say

about one is felt to be as important as what they do and sayto one's face. The honour offered to a ‘good' man or woman takes many forms. Some of these, especially the more standard expressions of deference, are also known as 'privileges' (gera). 2! Small rituals of deference punctuate Homeric street life. Arete, wife of Alkinoos, “is honoured from the heart... by the people, who greet her with words, looking at her as at a god, when she walks through town”

(7.69-72). A good public speaker “stands out above the gathered people, and when he goes through town, they look at him as at a god" (8.172-3).

The young Telemakhos experiences something similar : "He went to the town-square, and in his hand he held a bronze spear; he was not alone, but two fast-running dogs accompanied him. The goddess Athena steeped him in a wondrous charm, and all the people looked at him with admiration as he approached. He sat down on his father's bench, and the elders made room for him” (2.10-14; 17.62-4).

Greetings, admiring and respectful glances, and moving aside for someone - forms of deference that presumably exist in every human society - are thus used here to express the honour in which the recipient

is held. 2 The heroes appear not to have an elaborate or highly articulated etiquette of deference. ‘Looking at someone as at a god’, for example, does not involve anything as dramatic-as prostrating oneself, kneeling or bowing. As far as we can tell, it is merely a matter of showing admiration in one's facial expression. The scope for indicating different levels of honour in greetings and forms of address is restricted, too. The remark that Arete is always greeted “with words”, may imply that there is also a less honorific, wordless way of greeting - perhaps a nod of the

71

head or a wave of the hand. more honorific than others.

Certainly, some greetings "with words" are One may be called simply by one's name,

e.g. 'Diomedes’, but it is a mark of honour to be addressed by one's father's name - in Diomedes' case ‘Tydeides' or 'son of Tydeus' (X.689; cf. 159). One or more epithets may be added to the name. Some of these, such as "great kudos of the Akhaians", are highly complimentary and no doubt convey extra honour. They are not, however, formal titles, nor are they graded in any way. 2 Nor is there any evidence for status being differentiated by means of elaborate seating-arrangements or the like. On the face of it, this seems a comparatively egalitarian society. We shall see later, however, that below the surface lies a

Clearly stratified community. Deference may be shown in any number of other ways, “in war, or in a different sort of activity, or at a meal" (TV.258-9). Alkinoos honours his wife "as no other woman on earth is honoured" (7.67), apparently by giving great weight to her opinions, even in public matters. 24 Amyntor dishonours his wife by sleeping with a concubine (IX.450); when Laertes, by contrast, abstains from sleeping with a slave-girl (1.432), he presumably honours his wife in this way. Masters honour their slaves by taking good care of them; slaves dishonour their masters by

disobedience. 3 Men honour a ruler by offering him gifts and by following him to war; they dishonour him by opposing his decisions. 26 A speaker in council or assembly is dishonoured if his views are rejected

(IX.62; XIV.127); by implication, one honours a speaker by applauding him. A guest at a meal may be honoured with a privilege (geras) such as the best cut of meat or an extra serving of wine. 27 A visitor may be honoured with the offer of a bed and blankets for the night, or dishonoured by being left to sleep on the floor (19.253-4, 317-8; 20.12933). A man honours a social inferior by requesting his services; the man who serves honours his superior by doing so. 3 A mortal honours a god with sacrifice, and a god may honour or dishonour his worshippers by granting or denying their requests. 29 In sum, in Homeric society almost anything that involves any kind of deference to anyone's wishes or interests, can be described in terms of honour acknowledged and conferred, or denied and withheld. 39 The magnitude of one's honour, as of one's reputation, is supposed to correspond to the degree of one's ‘excellence’. It is not right that the

72 ‘bad' man and alone that the ‘better’ man is The list of

quite long. some

honour

the 'good' man should 'worse' man should be sent away in dishonour excellences or qualities

be "in one honour” (IX.319), let honoured “on a whim", while the (20.132-3). (aretai) that may bring honour is

As we have already seen, a charming appearance brings to

anonymous orator.

Telemakhos,

and

eloquence

great

honour

to

the

One Periphetes of Mykenai is described as a man

"better (than his father] in all qualities, both in running and in fighting,

and also among the foremost of the Mykenaians in intelligence" (XV.641-3). The Phaiakians as a people traditionally pride themselves on superior qualities of seamanship, running, singing, dancing (8.24153), and, secondarily, boxing, wrestling and long-jumping (8.102-3).

The ethical qualities which we tend to associate with 'good' and ‘bad’ also play a part, although they receive little mention. For instance, “any man who is good and of sound mind loves and takes care of his wife" (IX.341-2), and a good woman is always faithful to her husband.

Akhilleus is told that he will be more highly honoured if he refrains from quarrelling,

since

“friendliness

is better"

(IX.256-8).

"Justice

and

proper behaviour” receive honour - from the gods, at any rate (14.84). 3! By far the most prominent male excellence, however, is military prowess. Not only are great warriors honoured and given special privileges, but physical strength and courage are such important qualities that "the best men” often simply means "the best fighters", and "a bad man" equals "a coward". Second place is taken by excellence ‘in

counsel’ and third place by good looks.

The most often cited quality of

women is beauty, followed by skill in spinning, weaving and embroidery. Sometimes it seems as if physical, and to a lesser extent intellectual and moral, excellence is all that counts in the world of heroes. The very

vocabulary of status, which tells us that 'goodness'

is rewarded

with

honour and reputation, tends to create an impression of an egalitarian

society where prestige derives from personal merit only.

All the more

so since wealth, birth and formal power are not often mentioned as ingredients of status. However, when they are mentioned, it becomes clear that these criteria do carry great weight.

A straightforward connection between wealth and honour is made when it is said that Kastor,

son of Hylax,

"among

honoured by the people as if he were a god,

the Cretans once was

for his prosperity and

73

wealth” (14.205-6). he

would

like

to

Similarly, Odysseus says without being cynical that come

home

rich,

for

"it

would

be

much

more

advantageous to arrive in the land of my fathers with a hand better filled, and I would be an object of greater respect and love to all men who saw me come back to Ithaka" (11.358-61). There are considerable

differences in wealth in Homeric society. Odysseus richer than anyone else in his region (14.96-9).

is twenty times Since the poet

frequently refers to rich men, we may assume that there are many who derive honour from their riches, just as Kastor and Odysseus do. How important it is to have wealth emerges from a speech by

Diomedes, in which he prefaces what he has to say with a short family history, beginning with his great-grandfather but focusing on his father, Tydeus. "I too claim to be the offspring of a good father... Adrestos and lived in a house rich in substance. farmland,

He married the daughter of

He had plenty of wheat-bearing

there were many planted orchards all round,

and he used to have much

livestock. He surpassed all Akhaians with the spear. Therefore, if I speak well, you must not say that my family is bad and without strength, and dishonour my speech” (XIV.113, 121-7)

Evidently, Diomedes

has reason to believe that a man's eloquence and

intelligence will not be honoured, unless he is also a man of wealth. Since

it is not

his

own

wealth

or spearmanship

that

Diomedes

highlights, but his father’s, his speech indicates the importance of birth as well. So does another episode involving Diomedes. When he chooses a man to assist him in an important task, he is urged "not to leave the better man behind, out of respect... and take along a worse one because you let yourself be ruled by respect when you look at his family" (X.237-9). Such a warning would not, of course, have been necessary unless one could normally expect ancestry to be given more consideration than suitability for the job. 32 As for positions of power, princes (basileis) - and priests, too - are honoured as such. 3. The Iliad raises the question of who is the better man : the best warrior or the most powerful prince. Akhilleus, the warrior, thinks himself equal to Agamemnon, the ruler, but Nestor argues that the ruling prince does not have "an equal share of honour”. Akhilleus may be stronger and, as the son of a goddess, of better birth, but Agamemnon "is better because he rules over more people” (1.278-

74

81).

Diomedes, too, believes that even if Agamemnon is no warrior, he

is still "honoured above all others for the sceptre” (IX.38), the symbol of his formal power. Since Nestor and Diomedes are renowned for their good sense, the view that the highest honour should be offered to those

who

hold

positions

of power

is strongly

represented,

even

if not

uncontested.

Some

have tried to explain away such relatively rare passages as

inconsistent with the general image of heroic society, but I would argue

that the importance of wealth, birth and power is rarely asserted because it is taken for granted, and the poet does not like to dwell upon it. shall come back to this point.

We

The honour which one enjoys in the community and in the world at large is determined by one's share of the various qualities. But an additional, and altogether different, set of criteria comes into play in determining the honour one may expect to get from, and need to give to, any particular individual. Here, kinship, friendship and relative age

weigh heavily. > We hear that Kastor used to honour his bastard son and his legitimate sons equally (14.203). Priamos honours his brother's son Melanippos and his son-in-law Imbrios as much as his own children (ΧΙΠ. 76; XV.551); Agamemnon is prepared to honour his future son-in-law equally with Orestes, his only son (IX.142, 284). Aias and his brother honoured their parents while they lived at home - and their loyal retainer

Lykophron they honoured as highly (XV.439). Clearly, parents honour their children, and vice-versa, simply because they are parents and children.

Presumably, all kinsmen and in-laws honour one another for

the sake of the ties that bind them; though apparently one would not normally put one's bastards, nephews, in-laws and retainers on a par with one's parents and legitimate children. Friends, too, honour one another. Akhilleus honours his companion (hetairos) Patroklos as much as his "own head" (XVITI.81-2); after Patroklos' death, he most honours Automedon and Alkimos among his

companions (XXIV.574-5).

Patroklos, in turn, honours Akhilleus most

highly, and Automedon next (XVI.146). Again, it appears that one honours a friend qua friend. Certainly the reasons given for honouring a

‘friend especially highly need have little to do with his status in the community

: Patroklos

honours

Automedon

because

he finds him the

75

most reliable charioteer in battle (XVI.147), Hektor honours Podes “most of all the people, because he was a dear dinner-companion of his" (XVII.576-7), and Odysseus honours Eurybates “above his other companions, because this man's way of thinking was close to his own" (19.247-8; cf. V.325-6). By doing someone a favour, one may raise one's personal standing

with him, and thereby raise the honour one deserves in his eyes. Thus, when Deiphobos voluntarily risks his life to stand by Hektor in combat, Hektor says: “even before now I loved you best by far of all the legitimate sons [of Priamos], but now I know in my mind that I shall honour you even more”

(XXII.233-5).

Hektor, for his part, has made

himself well-loved by the gods by means of constant sacrifices; in return for these "gifts", the gods honour personal antagonism may lead one is high in the community at large. than Hektor by the army (V.467), (X1.58), but Priamos "used not to

good man" (XIII.461). perhaps

it goes back

him, too (XXIV.66-70). Conversely, to deny honour to a man whose status Aineias, for one, is honoured no less and "like a god" by the Trojan people honour him at all, although he was a

The reasons for his hostility are not given, but a generation,

to the time

when

Aineias'

father

without permission put to stud on his own mares the immortal horses owned by Priamos’ father (V.268-9). Age may further influence one's honour. Agamemnon expects Akhilleus to defer to him because, apart from anything else, he is the older man (IX.160-1), and among the gods, Zeus, Hera and Poseidon demand deference for their greater age (XV.164-6; IV.58-61; 13.141-4).

Of course none of these criteria is peculiarly Homeric : our own social relations also involve deference, in the broad sense defined above, to kin and friends and elders. The difference is merely that conceptually, if not always in practice, we tend to make a clear distinction between

someone's private standing with us, on the one hand, and his public position (‘social status'), on the other, while in the epics private and public statuses both form part of his ‘honour’. Not only wealth, prowess and other excellences, but also the nature of a man's relationships with others determine his status.

The attribution of honour and display of deference are governed by certain norms. Although he may have some latitude, an individual is not free to grant and withhold deference on a whim.

Hence a man can speak

76

of "the honour with which it is proper that I should be honoured” (XXIII.649), or of the “portion” of honour (moira, aisa) that is a man's lot in life (1.278, IX.608); hence one can calculate in advance how much

honour one is likely to get, and one can legitimately complain about not being sufficiently honoured. 35 A man who behaves according to the norms of deference - and behavioural norms at large - is described as motivated by a sense of respect or shame (aidos). He who disregards them is disrespectful or shameless. % And those who have a right to receive honour are respect-worthy (aidoios), such as a "respect-worthy” prince, for instance, or a "respect-worthy” housekeeper (TV .402; 1.139). In personal relations, besides a sense of respect, feelings of love or friendship (philotes) move one to honour one's kinsmen and friends. Conversely, it could be said that “ties of friendship are ties of reciprocal

honour" (Riedinger

1976: 248). 37

The ways in which one expresses

one's ‘love’ for one's children, wife, companions or slaves are inevitably subject to norms as well, but they leave more room for the expression of private sentiments in conferring unconventional or unusually high honours. Akhilleus’ exceptionally strong love for Patroklos leads him to offer his friend unique and extravagant honours after his death. *

Respect and love may spring from a sense of propriety or from more spontaneous feelings of admiration; in either case they make people defer to others in voluntary recognition of the latter's merits. We have already seen that even a man's wealth, according to Odysseus, may inspire

"respect and love” in others.

This suggests that honour is attributed by

consensus. But there is a third emotion which inspires deference. This is fear. In order that the Phaiakians may “honour him like a god" (5.36),

Athena

ensures

that

Odysseus

Phaiakians, and fearsome son of Kastor, having becomes "fearsome and Fear plays a part even

goddess

Thetis

is

(XVIIHI.394). Helena respect-worthy to me,

becomes

“dear

(philos)

to

all

the

(deinos) and worthy of respect" (8.21-2). The enriched himself through plundering abroad, respect-worthy among the Kretans" (14.234). in the friendliest of relationships. The sea-

“fearsome

and

respect-worthy”

to

Hephaistos

tells Priamos : "Dear father-in-law, you are and fearsome” (11.172). Eumaios, who is on

very friendly terms with his master Telemakhos, nevertheless says that he "respects and fears" him (17.188). And although there could be no greater friendship than that of Akhilleus and Patroklos, Patroklos still

77

regards Akhilleus as a “fearsome man", whom he does not dare to keep

waiting any longer than necessary (X1.649-55; cf. XXIV.435). The fear that inspires deference is obviously the fear of what the other might do if he or she felt treated without due respect. Responses to disrespect range from angry looks to armed assault; how fearsome a response one could expect from a man would largely depend on his willingness and power to harm those who offend him. Deference, then, is to some extent inspired by fear of a man's personal power, as well as by a sense of what is proper, and by a spontaneous appreciation of his merits. The epic vocabulary of status may be somewhat alien to us, but if we look at the concrete meaning of time, arete, aidos, and so on, we find that quite a few, though not all, of the criteria of status, expressions of deference, and motivations involved are rather like our own. There is littie to justify Finley's claim that “it is in the nature of honour" to be more “exclusive, or at least hierarchic” than social status is in our society (1977: 118). Nor does honour consist merely of possessing and receiving scarce material resources, as Adkins maintains : wealth is a crucial criterion of status, but not the only one, and symbolic forms of deference are more common than material tokens of respect. There are, however, three aspects in which Homeric honour differs significantly from status in contemporary society, and which may

contribute to the violence of the epic world. These are the relative prominence of physical prowess as a status-criterion, of fear as a motive for displaying deference, and of deference received as a constituent part

of status. 39

78 3. PRINCES AND BAD ΜΕΝ : IDEALS AND EXPLOITATION Brave and handsome heroes are such a common feature of all kinds of

stories that we are not surprised to find that the heroes of the Iliad and Odyssey unite in themselves almost all the personal qualities that matter. Akhilleus is the most handsome of all the Akhaians, the fastest runner, and unbeatable in the chariot-race, as well as the greatest warrior. @

Agamemnon is reckoned among the four best fighters in the Akhaian army (VII.179-80) and regarded as its very best javelin-thrower (XXIII.890-1).

Physically, he "stands out among

many

and surpasses

the heroes", like a bull in a herd of cows.

"His eyes and head like

Zeus', his waist People wonder :

Poseidon's”

like

Ares',

his

chest

like

(11.478-83).

"Who is that big and strong Akhaian man ? There may be others who are taller by as much as a head, but my eyes never saw someone so handsome and so dignified; for he looks like a prince” (IIT. 167-70).

Odysseus, in addition to looking particularly handsome and dignified, is

a man

of great

cunning

and

intelligence,

a speaker

of unrivalled

eloquence, a top ten warrior, and one of the best runners and wrestlers

in the Akhaian army. In his own community, he is by far the best archer; a quality which runs in the family, for the only man to come near Odysseus’ level is his son. 41 The list of heroes with outstanding talents could be extended. We take such excellence for granted in our heroes, but a closer look at

the epics shows that here it is more than a convention of story-telling. For a start, Homer's heroes are all princes (basileis). They are rulers or sons of rulers, never brave common soldiers, handsome young peasants, or clever sons of millers. But the poet goes even further. It is

not just that he ignores the bravery, beauty and other qualities of everyone but princes. He denies that anyone but princes possesses these qualities.

Princes in general are said to have a physical beauty that sets them apart from others. "You look like a prince" is a common expression. Even a prince dressed as a pauper can be recognised by "his fine large thighs, his broad shoulders, his chest, and sturdy arms" (18.66-74) : "in physique he looks like a prince" (20.194-6).@ Beauty is so

79

characteristic of princes that Menelaos can tell two youths, whom

he

does not know and has never seen before : "The family of your parents has not disappeared from you. No, you are offspring of men who are sceptre-bearing princes..., because bad men could not beget such sons" (4.62-4). Thus, princely beauty is supposed to be hereditary, and among the rest of the population - described as ‘bad men’ - beauty is supposedly not found at all. © It is therefore surely no coincidence that Thersites, described as the 'worst' of the Akhaians (1I.248-9), is also "the ugliest man who came to Troy : he was bow-legged and lame in one foot; his shoulders hunched, growing towards one another over his chest, and on them sat a

pointed head with sparse woolly hair stuck on it" (TI.216-9). 4

Another remarkable characteristic of princes is that they are all excellent warriors. The battle-narrative of the Iliad, by focusing on the

actions of a small number of princes, creates the impression that these are better fighters than the others.

It also more than once says explicitly

that one prince or another is the best fighter among his countrymen, and it frequently attributes amazing men. 45 Indeed, one passage

feats of courage and prowess to such categorically states that only princes

‘count’ in war. That statement occurs in an episode known as The Test, during which,

to test their morale, the Akhaian army is falsely led to believe that the war is being called off. Morale turns out to be lower than expected. The moment Agamemnon ends his speech, all those not privy to the

scheme jump up and run off to their ships. Odysseus springs into action. runs in among the crowd.

To prevent a catastrophe,

He borrows Agamemnon’s

sceptre, and

"Any prince and eminent man he met, he would restrain with gentle words after approaching him : 'Daimonie, it is not proper to intimidate you, as if you were a bad man. But you must sit down and make other men sit.'”

He would explain that there was a secret purpose to the false order, and

that Agamemnon was likely to resent what had happened (II. 188-97). "Any man of the people he saw and found shouting, he would strike with the sceptre and threaten in speech : 'Daimonie, sit still and listen to the word of others who are

better men than you.

You are no warrior, you have no strength, you are of no

80 account at all in war or in counsel. (IT. 198-203).

We cannot all be princes here, we Akhaians !'°

Eventually, he manages to restore order. A clear distinction is made once again.

There are princes, who are

spoken to politely and invited to give orders; and there is the rest of the people, who are treated with violence - as ‘bad men’ are, according to Odysseus - and told to obey the princes - their ‘betters’. 4 Odysseus

claims that none of the people, as opposed to the princes, are warriors with any significance in combat. Now, it is not the case that the people literally do not participate in battle. The battle-narrative may centre on

the exploits of a few men, but their deeds are set against a background of continual mass-combat. One may note that according to Thersites it is the people, himself included, who are responsible for the capture of booty (11.229-38). 7 Therefore, when Odysseus says that these men are ‘no warriors’, he must mean that, although they fight, they are weak and ineffective as compared to the princes, who are strong, brave, and efficient killers. The princes are supposed to have all the martial qualities, the others none. The remark that the people are ‘of no account in counsel’ either, similarly tends to suggest that the people lack the intelligence and eloquence to contribute usefully to the princes’ wise decision-making. The best evidence for this sharp contrast between handsome, brave and wise princes and the ugly, cowardly and dumb rest of the population

is found in The Test, and there are only a few signs of it elsewhere in Homer. Some have argued that, if such a sharp distinction between princes and ‘the people’ or ‘bad men’ was meant to exist in the epic world, it ought to have made more frequent appearances in the poems.

They therefore deny that the distinction is made by the poet. #

It seems

to me that the evidence discussed above cannot be explained away; yet it is indeed remarkable how rarely the distinction occurs. Its rarity, however, is not difficult to explain. The poets do not seek to create a complete picture of the heroic world. They tell stories about the ruling elite of this world, and non-princes only enter the poets’ field of vision insofar as they affect the princes’ lives. Thus, slaves appear because they are owned by princes, and craftsmen because they are employed by princes. For the same reason, the majority of the people ‘normally appear only as an anonymous mass listening to princes in

8]

assembly and obeying their commands in battle. Thus, if the people lead a

shadowy

existence

in

the

epics

and

are

not

often

explicitly

distinguished from the princes, this is because in the heroic world the social distance between prince and ‘common’ man is such that personal contact between them is infrequent, or regarded as insignificant, or both,

and deemed an unsuitable topic for a story. “ A community governed by an elite of wise, brave and handsome men sounds utopian. The idea becomes positively fantastic when one realises that this elite is supposed to be largely hereditary. That the princes form a hereditary aristocracy used to be assumed

without argument.

Finley went so far as to say that they form a social

class "caste-like in its rigidity” (1977: 60).

That view had earlier been

challenged by Calhoun (1934), and has more recently been rejected by several scholars, on the grounds that there is much less evidence for birth as a criterion of status than one might have expected from a society

ruled by an aristocracy of birth. %* The objection is valid, but not decisive. Firstly, we have already seen that there is some evidence that good birth in general is a determinant of status. Secondly, and more importantly, it is clear that the status of prince is hereditary : the title belongs to the family rather than the individual and is acquired at birth by a prince's children. It is also clear that the family sceptre and a prince's formal position of power in the community will normally be

inherited by one of his sons. 5!

This is not necessarily to say that one

born a prince will always retain this status no matter what, or that one

not born a prince can never gain entry into the elite.

It does follow,

however, that the status and powers of a prince are inherited as a rule. That conclusion is confirmed by Menelaos' claim that princely beauty, too, is hereditary (4.62-4). We find in the epics, then, a hereditary ruling elite which allegedly has

a monopoly on physical prowess, intelligence and beauty. We may add that the princes are evidently rich as well. Some of them are very wealthy, and there is certainly no hint that others might be less well-off. On the other hand, the princes may not have a monopoly on wealth : it is conceivable that not all the rich men who are mentioned are supposed to be princes. In any case, Homeric princes not only enjoy high birth,

wealth and all formal power in the community, but they also monopolise all

the

personal

excellences

that

are

most

highly

rated,

thus

fully

82

justifying their status as "the best men" and that of the people as "the bad men”. Birth, wealth and power may well go together, but it seems implausible that personal excellence, too, should be restricted to princes.

It has been argued that only wealthy men could be efficient warriors, because only they had the means to get themselves arms, armour and chariots,

and

to train

themselves

in their

use.

In that sense,

it is

suggested, one might say that no poor man is a warrior, has strength or ‘counts’. 52 One might argue along similar lines that only the wealthy had the leisure to learn the skills of public speaking and decisionmaking, and that sons of trained speakers would have had a better chance than anyone else of acquiring these skills. One might further argue that the wealthy could afford to eat better, dress better and spend more time grooming themselves, thus growing taller and looking more appealing than the poor. 5. But it seems to me that the epics are simply unrealistic in their depiction of the princes. The epics portray the hereditary elite in such a way as to suggest that it deserves all the deference it gets. Their physical beauty is supposed to

be such that their inferiors gaze at them in admiration, as in assembly they gaze at the beauty of Telemakhos (2.10-4; 17.62-4) and Odysseus (8.16-23).

When one comes face to face with these princes, one cannot

help but give them the deferential looks that they regard as their due. In debate and court-sessions, they display a wisdom and righteousness which proves them worthy of having the power to decide and judge, and of receiving their court-fees. In battle, their prowess protects the town, providing additional justification for their power to rule, and repaying the gifts, shares of booty and royal estates that they receive from their people.

These connections are made explicitly by the poet. He remarks that Sarpedon, for one, "protected Lykia with his judgements and his strength" (XVI.542). As for judgements, he commends the "good leadership" of a prince "who upholds proper judgements while ruling over many men", and he stresses the many benefits that this brings to the whole community. As for strength, in a famous speech Sarpedon

rhetorically asks why he and his cousin Glaukos are honoured with food, drink, seats of honour and estates in Lykia (XII.310-4).

He continues :

83 "Because of this we must now stand among the foremost of the Lykians and face hot battle, so that some Lykian... may say : ‘They are by no means without reputation, our princes who mule over Lykia, eat fat sheep, and drink choice sweet wine. No,

they have great prowess too, since they fight among the foremost of the Lykians'" (X11.315-21; cf. VIII. 161-3). In the same vein, Agamemnon

asks of those who share the wine of the

elders that they should fight bravely in return (TV.257-64,

340-8). 55

Moreover, when Odysseus, in the Test, tells men of the people that they should listen to the princes, because the people do not count in war (II.200-2), he implies that princes deserve to give orders because they do count in war. In Homer's eyes, a prince should not rely merely on his noble birth to gain him the obedience, gifts and general deference of others : he must

earn all these by the wisdom of his words and the daring of his deeds.

It

would seem that the poet has tailored his image of the heroic world to fit the ideology that hereditary power and honour should be justified by

merit. amazing

He has created an ideal world in which the princes do enjoy an monopoly

of excellence.

The

fact

that

birth

is so

rarely

mentioned as a criterion of status is due to the same ideology : the poet prefers to stress the personal qualities that justify a man's status, rather than the less meritorious assets that in practice largely determine it. 56

The portrayal of the princes as truly excellent men, deserving of their honour, dominates the poems. Just occasionally, however, the poet allows us a glimpse of a different picture, in which the people resent the princes and refuse to honour them, and in which the princes resort to force in order to back up their position. The few passages which give

this negative view imply that it is not a matter of isolated individuals falling short of the norm, but a common state of affairs. The dominant positive image of the princes, therefore, is not only rather implausible in itself, and suspect because it happens to match precisely the requirements of ideology, but also contradicted occasionally by the poet

himself. (1) PROPER BEATINGS When, during the Test, the army is in confusion and Odysseus restores order, he does not merely tell the people why they ought to defer to the princes, but with the sceptre beats them into silence. He thus uses the

symbol of legitimate public power as a weapon

to enforce deference

84

where it is not given voluntarily.

Some believe that Homer here betrays

a lack of understanding of the sacred nature of a 'true' sceptre, which, it

is said, in reality would never have been used in so crude a manner. To me, it seems rather that this double use of the sceptre matches the epic idea that deference is inspired by both respect and fear. 57 Thersites, the last man of the people to remain standing and shouting

during the Test, is treated more harshly than the rest by Odysseus. "Scowling at him, he rebuked him with a harsh speech: ‘Thersites, rambling speaker, you are a fluent orator, but stop, and do not by yourself strive against the princes. I say that there is no man worse than you, of all those who came to Troy

with Atreides.

Therefore you must not speak with your mouth full of princes...

If I

find you once more behaving in the same senseless way as now, then may Odysseus

no longer have a head on his shoulders... if I do not grab you, strip off your clothes, cloak and tunic and that which covers your shame, and send you off wailing to the ships, away from the meeting-place, beaten with shameful blows.”

And with the sceptre he hits him so hard that he bleeds (11.245-68). Everyone laughs at this, and applauds Odysseus for putting Thersites in

his place.

“'His manly heart certainly will not again make him criticise

the princes

with

insulting words.'

Thus

spoke

the multitude"

(II.270-

8). 5 This is the only time in the poems that men of the people fail to defer to the princes in assembly. Opposition goes no further than heckling and joking, and is dropped

threats and violence.

as soon as a

single prince asserts himself with

By mentioning that the beating of Thersites found

general approval, the poet conveys the message that the masses themselves accept that the princes have every right to use force against

them. Yet conflict there is, and it is not an isolated incident. For Thersites is said to be a Aabitual heckler, whose wont it is to “strive against the princes at random, not coherently, [saying] whatever he thought might raise a laugh among the Akhaians” (II.214-6). In this instance he jibes at

Agamemnon,

but

normally

his

favourite

targets

are

Akhilleus

and

Odysseus. When he interrupts a particular speaker, he is seen as attacking "the princes” collectively. That he can usually get away with it

and

raise

a laugh

among

the people

hostility towards the princes as a group.

indicates

that these

feel some

It follows that princes’ rights to

85 deference are questioned, and that it may regularly be necessary to use force. The princes, for their part, regard bullying as the proper way to deal with the common people, as is implied by the remark that it would not be proper to intimidate princes "as if they were bad men” (II.190). (m) UNJUST VIOLENCE

The princes are supposed to make the community prosper, and prove themselves worthy of their power to pass judgement in disputes, by upholding what is right (themis, dike). Yet the poet casually reveals that Zeus at times "gets angry, harbouring resentment towards men who use force to impose crooked verdicts in the town-square and drive out justice” (XVI.386-8). What is more, in praising Odysseus for "never doing or saying anything excessive among the people”, Penelope reveals that the opposite "is the rule (dike) for a godlike prince : one man he

hates, another man he loves” (4.689-92).

Suddenly, injustice appears to

be the rule rather than the exception. 9

(IM) UNDESERVED GIFTS The people are supposed to honour their princes with gifts, including contributions to the princes’ dinners known as the wine of the elders. A prince presumably expects common people to bring sheep, goats and jars

of wine to his house; or perhaps he pays visits in town, tacitly or openly soliciting gifts from his hosts. ® The expectation that these gifts will be repayed with the princes’ best efforts in battle seems mostly fulfilled. But it is to be noted that the greatest share of the people's gifts does not always go to the best warriors. Occasionally a prince does indeed get a share of honour as a direct reward for an outstanding feat of bravery (VII.320-2; X.217), but among the Akhaian elders at Troy the largest quantities of wine are normally apportioned not to Akhilleus and Aias, the best warriors, but to Agamemnon and Idomeneus.

Agamemnon reminds Idomeneus that "even when the other long-haired Akhaians have drunk their share, your cup is always full, to drink as I do, when you feel like it" (TV.261-3). Idomeneus is a brave man, but he

is getting on in years (XIII.361) and slowing down in action (XIII.51215).

We

might add that Nestor, who is too old to fight, also gets his

share. Why should these men receive greater honour than the others ? Presumably, Agamemnon can claim deference as both host and supreme commander. The special honour of the other two may be due to the fact that Nestor is the eldest of the commanders, leads the largest contingent

86 after Agamemnon's own, and is famous for his wisdom, while Idomeneus is also a senior figure, leads the next largest contingent, and

is a particular friend of Menelaos (III.232-3). So the gifts given to princes are not always in proportion to their performance in battle. Still, Agamemnon

and

Idomeneus

are

great

warrior once and has other merits now,

fighters,

while

Nestor

shouted

at

his

own

sons,

abusing

a

so the discrepancy between

honour and merit is not too serious. But the gap may grow, as is evident from a remarkable made by Priamos in his distress at the death of his son Hektor. “He

was

Helenos,

Paris,

Agathon,

statement

Pammon,

Antiphonos, Polites, Deiphobos, Hippothoos and Dios; shouting, the old man told the nine of them:... ‘Worthless children, shameful creatures ! If only all of you had been killed together, instead of Hektor... I begat the best sons in Troy, and I

tell you not one of them is left...

But all these shameful ones are still here, these

boasters and dancers, the best men of the dance-floor, robbers of sheep and goats

among their own people” (XXIV.248-62). Priamos' sons do not go round at dead of night stealing the citizens' livestock. Presumably, the people give them sheep and goats to slaughter and eat. The difference is that Priamos, in his grief, declares

that his sons do not deserve these gifts, because they are "best" only at dancing - not in battle, as Hektor was,

and as princes in general are

supposed to be. That is what makes them robbers. 61 The passage thus confirms that excellence in battle is the main justification for taking gifts from the people, and more importantly, (a) it shows that men who do not excel in battle may nevertheless continue to receive gifts, and (Ὁ) it

suggests that those who undeservedly receive gifts may be resented by the people.

There is a slight hint that gifts may be extorted by violence.

It is

suggested that Telemakhos might have ‘borrowed’ a ship "by force", against the will of the owner (4.646). There is also the reaction of gods

when they do not receive the gifts that they regard as their due. They punish the offenders by sending a plague to kill them (1.64-5) or a wild animal to destroy their farms (IX.533-42). Since in general the behaviour of gods vis-d-vis mortals is analogous to that of princes towards their subjects, perhaps the poet imagines that princes too might resort to the threat of force to claim their gifts from the people.

87

(IV) FIGHTING OVER PLUNDER

The distribution of plunder is a lucrative privilege of princes. Rulers and commanders are granted the right to take a first cut for themselves, give prizes to other princes on account of their social status, and deal with the rest as they see fit, so long as everyone gets a ‘fair’ share. @ The problem is that there is no agreement as to what is fair. Akhilleus

several times voices the opinion that his share of booty should match his contribution to the war, and he complains that Agamemnon is a “prince who devours the people” (demoboros basileus, 1.231), one who keeps far too much for himself, given that he does not do much fighting (1.163-8;

IX.318-9, 328-33). way.

Thersites make the same point in a more general

"Your huts are full of bronze and there are many select women in your hut, which you are the very first to receive from us Akhaians, when we sack a town. Do you want still more gold, brought from Troy by some Trojan as a ransom for his son,

whom I or another Akhaian tied up and brought in 7 Or a young woman, so that you may make love to her 7" (TI.226-32) "Let us go home... and leave him here in Troy to batten on his prizes, so that he will see whether or not we are of some help to him.” (11.236-8)

Odysseus’ followers, too, feel hard done by. They mutter : "He brings many fine treasures from the booty of Troy, whereas we, who have completed the same journey, return home clasping together our empty

hands” (10.40.2). © There is thus a widespread feeling that, while it is proper for princes to get a share of plunder, they tend to take for themselves more than they deserve, and give too little to their deserving subordinates. The negative view of princes, then, portrays them as parasites and

exploiters.

They take booty without fighting for it; they take gifts from

their people without doing anything useful in return; they impose their judgements (and pocket the court-fees) without doing justice. People feel

robbed, and in assembly vent their hostility in heckling their rulers. Moreover, in a hypothetical historical counterpart of the heroic world,

the prowess of princes could never fully justify the honours they receive, not even if they were excellent warriors doing their utmost in defence of the community. In epic fantasy, a prince may be credited with a decisive influence over the course of battle. He turns the tide, saves the city and

proves that his honour is well-deserved.

In reality, under conditions of

battle as Homer depicts them, with masses of men involved in active combat, no man, whatever his personal prowess or his advantages in

equipment and training, could play such a decisive role. The combined efforts of the men of the community would decide the outcome of battle, and no individual display of valour could by itself merit the kind of deference that princes receive from the people. 4

If the princes nevertheless continue to rule and to receive gifts, fees, and large amounts of booty, this is partly because the people accept that princes have a traditional right to these things, and partly because the people are afraid of the force that the princes may bring to bear on them. Note that the people seem easily intimidated. Those who are struck by

Odysseus quickly sit down and hold their tongues (11.207-11).

Thersites

"sat down and was frightened; in his pain, he looked about helplessly,

and wiped away a tear" (I1.268-9).

Thersites' crying instead of striking

back suggests that he is a weak and cowardly man, and presumably ‘bad

men‘ are all supposed to be like that.

But the use of force is effective

not only because men of the people are physically and mentally weaker

than princes.

Kalkhas, the seer, hints at another reason to be afraid,

when he asks Akhilleus to protect him from Agamemnon's anger : "For when a prince is angry with a worse man, he is the more powerful one. For even if he does swallow his anger for that day, afterwards he keeps resentment in his breast until he has his satisfaction” (1.80-3).

Kalkhas needs protection not so much because he is personally weak, as

because

princes apparently dispose of powers

beyond

their personal

bodily strength, which sooner or later will enable them to do harm to

'worse' men.

What powers these are we shall discover in the course of

this chapter.

In sum, so far as the status of the princes vis-d-vis the people is concerned, prowess in battle, while featured prominently, is of ideological rather than practical importance. The princes will receive deference from the people whether or not they are in fact excellent

warriors; prowess is merely supposed to legitimate the honour given to princes as men of good birth and as holders of power. By contrast, the power to inspire fear in the common people, while barely mentioned, is in a number of passages revealed as a significant prop of the princes’

89 position. &

To the extent that Homer depicts heroic society as ruled by a

class of men spontaneously honoured by their subjects on account of their personal excellence, the poet reflects an ideology, not a reality, of stratification. How realistic the other aspects stratification are, we shall see.

of his image

of social

Two conclusions relevant to the problem of status rivalry and the violence of Homeric society may be drawn from all this. One, in relations between people and princes, fear is indeed a significant motive for deference, as our discussion of the concepts of status suggested it might be. Two, in relations between princes and people, personal qualities, in particular battle-prowess, are not actually as important a source of honour as first appears. How important are they in status rivalry among princes ?

4. COMPETITION I : PERSONAL EXCELLENCE Almost any situation offers opportunities for rivalry, and almost anything said or done can be taken as a challenge, if one is looking to compete. In Homeric society, some of the most routine activities may be given a competitive twist. Women doing the laundry spread their washing in the water and "tread it quickly in the throughs, making a competition of it" (6.91-2). A man claims : "No mortal can compete with me in manual skills : in properly laying a fire and splitting logs, in

carving and roasting meat and pouring wine” (15.321-3). A vagrant, accused of being too lazy to work, retorts that he would harvest and plough more efficiently than his accuser, "if between the two of us were to have a competition in work" (18.366-75). 6 It seems "always to be the best and superior to others” - the instruction given fathers to sons setting out to war - is a goal accepted by everyone pursued everywhere.

we that by and

Rivalry for superior status among princes takes many shapes. We may look first at the kind of competition in which the contenders seek to display their personal qualities and achievements. Although this could in

principle be an amicable form of rivalry, it leads at times to hostility and

90

violence.

A minor but characteristic instance of such competition is ἃ

quarrel that breaks

out during

funeral games

among

spectators at the

chariot-race. Idomeneus' Eyesight The pre-race favourite has crashed on the far side of the course, and when

the horses come back into view of the spectators, Idomeneus, whose seat offers the best view, is the first to notice that the field has a new leader.

He

stands up to tell the others, adding : "Do I alone have a clear view of the horses,

or do you

too ?... Come,

stand

up and

see for yourselves,

for I

cannot make them out well. I think it is... Diomedes” (XX111.450-72). He sounds cautious, but "Aias, son of Oileus, reproached him in a shaming

manner : ‘Idomeneus, why are you rashly speaking too soon ? The horses are still far away... Look at you, you are not the youngest of the Argives and you do not have the sharpest pair of eyes peering out of your head, but in words you are always rash. It is not for you to speak rashly, for there are other, better men present, too. The same horses as before are in the lead’”

(473-81). Idomeneus angrily answers : “Aias, you are the best at quarreling, you

evil-minded man, and in every other respect you are inferior to the Argives..." Whereas he had originally expressed himself cautiously, he is now absolutely sure about which horses lead and wants to bet on it, “so that you will know, when you pay up” (XXIII.482-7). Aias is about to answer "with harsh words", when Akhilleus intervenes and tells them to stop their quarrel, “because it is not proper. You two would be indignant at another man too, if he were to behave in such a way." He suggests that they watch the finish of the race quietly (XXTII.488-98).

This little battle for status shows not only how a casual comment may be taken as a challenge, but also how it may produce an aggressive response, which may in turn lead to an escalation of hostilities. Keen eyesight is hardly the most important quality where status is concerned, but still it is one of the things that make some men better than others, and Aias speaks for those who believe that they are superior to

Idomeneus

in this respect.

Even

if Idomeneus

really is in a better

position to see what is happening and does not make a boast of his sharp eyes, Aias refuses to let pass his unintended challenge to others'

superiority. Now, he might have answered this perceived challenge simply by giving his own view of the situation in the race, and waiting for events to show whose eyesight is the better, but he does not. Instead, he adopts a hostile tone, calling Idomeneus "rash" and too old to

91

see properly. As soon as Aias turns the incident into a competition, and a hostile competition at that, Idomeneus follows suit. He strongly asserts

his own superiority and denies Aias any quality at all. He also raises the stakes of the contest by placing a bet. Akhilleus' criticism shows that it is regarded as wrong to compete in

too

aggressive

a manner,

and

it has

been

thought

that

the

poet

consciously portrays Aias as a "mean" man. 67 An aggressive response to a challenge, however, is not uncommon. One may compare Zeus’ attitude towards the building of a huge wall opposite the wall of Troy

which Poseidon had once built.

Poseidon himself exclaims : “This one

will surely be famous as far as the light of day reaches, and they will forget the one that I and Apollo built" (VII.446-53). At this, Zeus is "greatly vexed” and says: "O popoi | ... What are you saying ! Some other god might fear this scheme, one who is much weaker than you in [force of} hand and will. You, of course, will be

famous as far as the light of day reaches.” He proposes to destroy the wall as soon as the Akhaians leave Troy (v11.454-63; XT1.3-35). We might think that Poseidon has been defeated fair and square, and ought to restore his reputation by building an even greater wall if he can. But Zeus finds the violent solution so obvious that he is impatient with Poseidon's plaint about his loss of status. Further instances of aggressive behaviour are found during the games, the most hotly contested of competitions. Besides chariot-racing, events at games may include boxing, wrestling, running, jumping, throwing the discus and javelin, archery and armed combat, as well as singing and dancing. When games are held at formal occasions, such as funerals and perhaps religious festivals, prizes are awarded to the competitors; events organised ad hoc for entertainment need not involve prize-giving. @ In either case, games provoke various degrees of aggression. Level One : bending the rules The chariot-race is the most competitive event at Patroklos' funeral games. "The heart of each competitor was pounding, eager as they were to win” (XXII.370-1). When Diomedes sees his initial lead slip away from him, he sheds tears of anger (385). To be defeated or to crash one's chariot is regarded as a "disgrace" (elenkheie; 342, 408-10).

92 Antilokhos is so desperate to overtake Menelaos that he spurs on his horses

by threatening to slaughter them if they fail (410-13), and then resorts to what in modem racing would be called kamikaze-tactics, cutting across Menelaos in such a way that the latter is forced to slow down in order to avoid a crash (415-41). Then, when at the finish he finds that his prize is about to be given to another competitor, he is ready to fight over it (553-5).

Valuable prizes are at stake, but victory as such seems to matter as much as the material reward : when deprived of his prize by Antilokhos, Menelaos never mentions the material loss, but resents the “shame" inflicted upon his “excellence” (XXIII.571). @ A will to win and a fear of shame combine to make the adrenalin flow and to produce behaviour more aggressive than that of contemporary sportsmen. It is not a great deal more aggressive, though, for Antilokhos accepts that he has gone too far, and apologizes at once when Menelaos protests at his dangerous driving. ® It is agreed that Antilokhos' "youthful spirit" had for once got the better of him (589-90, 603), and he cedes his prize to Menelaos

with

an

offer

of compensation

if required

(591-5).

Later

on,

he

competes in the foot-race and comes in last, but this time he smiles, applauds the winner, Odysseus, and goes on to praise the running speed

of Akhilleus (785-93). Level Two : intimidating the opposition Penelope requires of her suitors that they perform a feat of archery that Odysseus used to perform. When all have failed even to string the bow, a poor visiting stranger - actually Odysseus himself in disguise - wants to give

it a try.

When he asks, the suitors become "exceedingly angry; they were

afraid that he might string the bow”. They try to frighten off the outside challenger, threatening violence. They tell him to be quiet, not to “compete with younger men”, and warn him of "the great peril" that he will find himself in if he strings the bow. "You will meet no friendliness in our country, but at once we shall send you in a black

ship to prince Ekhetos, who is a danger to all mortals. From there nothing can save you” (21.285-310). Penelope and Telemakhos insist that the stranger should be given a chance. The suitors then turn on the servant who is about to hand the bow to him, threatening to have him torn to pieces by

dogs (21.360-7). 71

The suitors' aggression is provoked by their fear of being "shamed in the talk of men and women". They feel that it would be a "disgrace" for them if "some worse Akhaian" were to conclude that the suitors are not

93

only

lesser men

than Odysseus,

whose

bow

inferior even to a "beggar" who can (21.323-9).

they cannot string, but The fact that they will

also have to forgo their 'prize', Penelope, matters less to them (21.24955). Their fear of defeat is strong enough to drain the blood from their faces when, despite all threats, the beggar succeeds (21.412-3). Level Three : killing the winner

In one instance, games lead to actual violence. Tydeus, sent to Thebes as ambassador of a hostile army, challenges the locals to a series of athletic competitions and wins them all. The Thebans resent this, and set an ambush to kill him on his way back (TV.385-98). Odysseus, alone among the Phaiakians, may fear a similar fate when he refuses to compete in any games

with his host.

He says that if anyone were to do so, he would

"spoil

[kolouei] everything for himself” (8.207-11).

It is no doubt again a sense of shame at defeat that leads to the attempted murder, which is presumably meant to wipe out the shame. Significantly, it is in rivalry with a foreigner that this high level of violence occurs. 72 Level Four : killing the challenger If men at times respond to defeat by killing a rival, the gods go still further. They maim and kill in response to a mere challenge. The Muses "mutilated" Thamyris in anger at his boast that he could defeat them in a singing contest (11.594-600). Apollo killed Eurytos, angry because this man had challenged him to an archery contest (8.224-8). Apollo and Artemis act along the same lines. They were angry at Niobe "because she used to compare herself to Leto”, their mother, "and say that

Leto had borne only two children, but she herself had given birth to many”. So they killed Niobe's-twelve children (XXIV.602-9).

The aggression of the gods in dealing with mortal rivals can hardly be due to a fear that they might be defeated : their excellence is so vastly superior to that of any mortal that they might have calmly demonstrated

their supreme skills, or indeed left mortals to their extravagant boasts. It seems rather that the gods are angry because they find the very fact of being challenged offensive. When, in an episode cited earlier, Poseidon is worried that the fame of his wall might be eclipsed, he complains to Zeus:

"Is there any mortal on earth who will still let the gods know their intentions and plans ? Do you not see that this time the Akhaians have built a wall... and have not offered hecatombs to the gods 7" (VII.446-50).

Poseidon does not so much resent the fact that a wall is built, as the fact

that it is built without anyone telling him. He might not have minded, if only his permission had been sought first. Poseidon, then, is less concerned about his reputation as a builder of walls than about the fact

that the challenge to his reputation is insufficiently deferential. 73 Despite

their different

motivations,

almost

all these

instances

of

aggressive behaviour by gods and mortals have something in common : threats and violence are used to protect the reputation of those whose personal qualities are already regarded as superior, or whose force is the greater. Young Aias claims to be speaking for the 'many' Akhaians who

believe that they can see better than middle-aged Idomeneus, who is not known for his sharp eyes. The young and wealthy suitors attempt to intimidate an old and poor man. The Thebans are a large crowd of men on home ground against a single outsider. The gods, of course, are

better and Antilokhos'

more powerful than any of their mortal challengers. aggressive driving is the only example of an underdog

snatching victory by aggressive means - and he soon regrets having gone

too far. 74 Insofar as a sense of shame at defeat inspires aggression, it is thus

predominantly in men who feel that their established superiority is threatened, rather than in men who are very closely matched in competition, or in men who are keen to make their mark.

Those whose

superiority is not seriously threatened may yet become angry at the lack of deference implicit in a challenge, and they may use force to do down their would-be rivals. At the games, outbursts of violence are to some extent avoided by

skewing contests in favour of the famous and powerful.

In the prize-

giving at the funeral games for Patroklos several reputations are protected. Eumelos, who owns the best horses (II.763-7) and is the best charioteer CXXTII.289), crashes in the chariot-race and trails in fifth and last. Akhilleus offers him second prize, "as is proper", because

Eumelos is, after all, "the best". The spectators approve (XXIII.53640). Later Nestor is given an extra prize although he is too old to

95

compete. He regards this as an honour he deserves (615-52). In the final event, the javelin, Agamemnon is offered first prize before anyone has thrown, on the grounds that “we know how far you surpass everyone, and by how much you are the best in power [dynamis] and

throwing” (892-7).

Agamemnon is being spared the risk of defeat.

The

reference to his power suggests that not only his reputation as a javelinthrower is thus protected, but also his prestige as ruler of the

Akhaians. 75 Moreover, it appears games, though the boxer A commoner would have and upsetting princes who as in others.

that only princes ever compete in any of the Epeios is a possible exception (XXIII.664ff.). no chance of gaining a reputation as an athlete are supposed to be his superiors in this field

Rivalry in public speaking is hedged

in with similar threats and

precautions. That councils, assemblies and courts are regarded as arenas of competition is clear. The assembly is a place “where men win glory" (1.490). Nestor makes a speech and Agamemnon says : "Yet again you defeat the Akhaians in assembly, old man” (11.370). A Trojan believes that "no mortal could compete with Odysseus” in eloquence (III.223). "Few Akhaians defeated [Thoas) in assembly when the young men competed with words” (XV.283-4). In court sessions, the contest is institutionalised : whoever offers the best judgement is awarded the court-fees as a prize.

This form of competition too is open to princes only, and even among princes it is not purely a matter of displaying wisdom and eloquence. How highly a prince's advice is rated depends to a considerable extent on external factors : his wealth, his power, the status of his family. For instance, Nestor urges the elders to accept a proposal of Agamemnon's

on the grounds that it emanates from "by far the best of Akhaians"; he would have rejected it, had it been put forward by "some other Akhaian" (11.80-3). The same reasoning leads him to call Agamemnon and Akhilleus "superior to the Danaans in counsel” (1.258). Not even

Akhilleus himself thinks that his contributions to debate are particularly good in themselves. 76 Speeches are often experiences :

aggressively

criticised,

as

Poulydamas

96 "Somehow you always attack me in assemblies when I come up with good ideas, because it is absolutely not proper for one of the people to speak in opposition to you - not in council, never in battle - but your power must ever become greater” (XI1.211-14),

he says to Hektor. When he proceeds to interpret a bird-omen to mean that the Trojan army should advance no further, Hektor gives him an angry look, calls him crazy, rejects the validity of bird-omens in general, accuses him of cowardice, and concludes: "If you hold back from the fighting or with words persuade someone else to turn away from battle,

you will be struck by my spear at once, and you will die” (ΧΙ1.230-50). In a subsequent assembly he again bluntly rejects Poulydamas’ proposal :

"Not one Trojan will be persuaded by you, for I will not let them" (XVII.296). Kalkhas expects the same sort of response from Agamemnon; when he is about to give his advice to the assembly, he first asks to be protected against him. Agamemnon actually accepts the proposal, but not without a show of anger. “The spirit surged in his black heart; his eyes shone like fire. With a look spelling evil, he spoke to Kalkhas first : 'Prophet of misery! You never say anything that is good [? to kreguon) for met" (1.103-6)

In the assembly of the gods, Zeus allows no debate at all.

The moment

he has announced his intentions, he launches into a series of threats. "Whoever I see making plans of his own... will be struck and return to Olympos in an undignified way. Or I may grab him and throw him into Tartaros..., as far below

Hades as the sky is above the earth. all gods I am.” (VIII.2-17) 77

Then you will know how much the strongest of

As in the games and other competitions, violence is threatened by men

of superior status and power. However, whereas in games such men may use force to protect their reputations, threats uttered in assembly are meant to silence those whose opinions are unwelcome, never to silence a speaker who might otherwise eclipse one's reputation as an orator and

wise man.

Apparently, a reputation for eloquence and intelligence is

less keenly pursued than one for athletic excellence.

As for those who

do seek to make their name in this field, they will find it difficult to achieve much unless they are, not merely princes, but high-ranking

97

princes.

Even

then

they

must

be

careful

not

to

say

anything

to

antagonise their superiors. 7 One might have expected to find that within a community men vie with one another for recognition as the best warrior more than anything else. Finley claims that in history and literature Homer's heroes are unique in

the "single-mindedness”

with which they concentrate on proving their

warlike qualities (1977: 28), and he may be right. Akhilleus decides to go to Troy in order to gain a reputation as a warrior, in the certain knowledge that he will have to pay with his life. Hektor says : “I feel a most terrible shame before the men and women of Troy, if like a bad man I skulk away from the battle. Nor is that what my spirit leads me to do, because I have learned to be a good man and to fight always among the foremost Trojans,

gaining a great reputation for my father and myself” (VI.441-6).

Diomedes similarly says "it is not in my nature [gennaion] to fight in a skulking way or to cower" (V.253-4), and, when forced by Zeus' thunder-bolts to give way before Hektor, he cannot bear the thought of Hektor boasting that Diomedes was afraid of him : "that is what he may

say, and then may the wide earth open up for me” (VIII.147-50). These men have internalised the imperative to excel in combat, and are driven in addition by a sense of shame at failure. 7% Fame for them is more important than life, and shame makes them want to sink into the ground and die. One might therefore have expected that the heroes, when fighting the

enemy, would consciously compete in valour with rival warriors on their own side. Surprisingly, they do not. In battle, the heroes do not deliberately draw the attention of fellow-warriors to themselves. If a man makes some spectacular gesture, such as raising a victim's head on a spear (XIV.496-507), or putting a foot on a dead warrior's chest and

boast and shout, the action is always aimed at the enemy and intended to terrify them. Presumably, it would also catch the eye of at least some men on one's own side, but nothing in the speeches or in the narrative

suggests that this is part of its purpose. 80 Nor is there any hint of conflict over the common practice of despoiling the enemy dead. “Time after time... the heroes paused from their fighting in order to strip a slain opponent of his armour. In terms of the battle itself such a procedure was worse than absurd, it might jeopardize the whole expedition”, but, argues Finley, to the individual

98

warrior it is more important to take a piece of armour as a trophy to prove his personal success in combat than to help win a battle without "publicity" for himself (1977: 119). Idomeneus does in fact cite as proof of his bravery that he has accumulated twenty or more spears as well as shields, helmets and corselets, “which I take from the slain". Meriones boasts back that he too has "many Trojan spoils" (XIII.259-68). Nevertheless, it happens that one warrior drags away and despoils the

corpse of apparently in order to XV.347).

a man just not unusual collect for Some may

killed by another warrior (IV.463-6), and it is during pursuit of the enemy for men to hang back themselves as many spoils as they can (VI.66-71; even go out onto the battlefield at dead of night to

strip the dead (X.341-3, 387). Given the potential value of spoils as symbols of valour, one might have thought that such practices would lead to clashes between killer and plunderer, or that they would at least

be disapproved of. Yet they are simply accepted. The only sign of rivalry is the mutual boasting of prowess. "We said we were the best", recalls Agamemnon. Before reaching Troy, the Akhaians bragged over dinner that hundred or two hundred” Trojans

each of them (VIII.229-34).

could take on "a At Troy, while

drinking with “the Trojan princes", Aineias used to boast that he would face even Akhilleus in battle (XX.83-5). Such claims of superiority over the enemy might well involve indirect rivalry with one’s companions. Idomeneus engages in direct rivalry when he boasts to Meriones of his bravery. Yet he immediately afterwards pays a lengthy tribute to Meriones' courage (XIII.275-91), and the episode ends with the two men

deciding that "we should not be talking in this way, like little boys”. They rejoin battle together (292-329). 81

Not even boasting is a source

of conflict. There is one source of trouble, as we have seen : the problem of how large a share of booty is to be awarded to outstanding warriors. That problem, however, does not stem from rivalry in warriorhood. Agamemnon does not contest that Akhilleus is a greater warrior than he, nor does he seek to undermine Akhilleus' reputation (kleos) as such. Rather, he insists that greatness in battle does not deserve as much deference (timé) as Akhilleus demands. &

Apparently, the desire to be the best in battle does not drive a man to assert his superiority over his fellow-townsmen

in an aggressive way.

99

He fights his hardest against the enemy, and that is all he needs to do in order to gain and defend his status as a warrior. It is odd to find a fair and open contest, and no sign of conflict, where the ostensibly most important personal quality is concerned, while competition in games and debate is slanted in favour of men of superior status, and even a reputation for sharp eyesight may be aggressively

protected.

One might argue that conflict is absent here because the

collective war effort against the enemy takes precedence over in-group rivalry. That is conceivable, although it does go against the common idea that a Homeric hero slaughters enemies in battle more in order to give proof of his own prowess than to contribute to overall victory. Finley's view that the heroes are prepared to “jeopardize the whole expedition" for the sake of a trophy has already been cited. Also, it is

often said that Hektor knowingly sacrifices the safety of his city to a selfish desire to show his mettle as a warrior in a duel with Akhilleus (Finley 1977: 116). I would suggest, however, that the near-absence of direct rivalry and

the total absence of conflict in demonstrations of warriorhood ties in with a conclusion I drew earlier : that as a criterion of status, warriorhood is of ideological rather than real importance. Martial excellence is simply ascribed to princes and rulers in order to justify their high status. The poet depicts the heroes as doing their utmost to live up to this ideal, but the absence of references to rivalry between warriors from the same community suggests that he is drawing on an image of real-life princes who do not actually try particularly hard to prove themselves great fighters.

The same contrast between ideal and practice emerges in the criteria applied in the selection of a 'good' husband.

for the hand of the same woman,

When

several suitors vie

as happens to Penelope and several

other heroines, courtship, although not normally competitive, becomes a contest. "The best man" is supposed to be chosen to marry the

woman.

®

Penelope decides to marry the man

certain feat of archery;

who

can perform a

she thus selects the best man on the basis of

strength - required to string the bow - and skill. Nestor's sister, are set the task of rustling 97), and suitors in other such tales are put In spite of what these stories suggest, best man” is normally the one who offers

The suitors of Pero,

the cattle of Iphiklos (11.287to similar tests. however, it is clear that "the the highest bride-price to the

100

bride's family and the most valuable presents to the bride herself. Penelope's suitors, too, expect to win her in this way. Ktesippos has come to court her “relying on the wealth of his father” (20.289-90), and when it becomes obvious that the suitors are about to fail the test, it is

simply assumed that Penelope will ufter all marry “the one who gives most” (21.162). Also, she and her suitors agree that a poor man, even if he did pass the archery-test, could not be allowed to marry her, “for that is not at all proper" (21.314-19, 322).

By setting suitors a task such as rustling cattle, the contradiction could be resolved, for success would simultaneously be proof of prowess and bring in wealth. But presumably this is a folk-tale motif, rather than a common custom. A courting competition, therefore, is really a contest of wealth, though notionally it is a contest of personal excellence. 9 Earlier, we saw that personal excellence, as a constituent of the honour in which princes are held by their subjects, plays a much smaller part than appears at first sight. We may now add that it also plays a lesser role than expected in the competition for status among the princes. There is little evidence that princes, within the community, engage in

rivalry in martial qualities, and not a great deal more to suggest that there is rivalry in debate.

Such conflicts as erupt in assembly

from clashes of interest, not from keen competition in eloquence.

spring

The

princes really put only their athletic skills to the test.

To the extent that there is competition, it is subject to considerable restraints.

A man of talent, even if he is a prince, will find his efforts to

gain recognition for his abilities hampered by the fact that he is given less credit for his performance than those who outrank him or those whose reputations are already established. Above all, he will find that his superiors are prepared to use violence against him when he challenges or opposes them.

His talents will get him nowhere, unless he

is powerful enough to protect himself from such dangers.

101

5. COMPETITION II : POWER AND WEALTH "To be a prince is not a bad thing", Telemakhos muses. "At once one's house becomes wealthier and oneself more honoured" (1.392-3). Hereditary power and private wealth, the two most important sources of status, without which a man's other qualities count for little, are in Homeric society the object of violent competition. Power is usurped, property is seized. Princely modestly.

power,

although

a source

of high

honour,

is displayed

There is no sign of crowns, thrones or ermine robes.

Princes

are formally distinguished from the people at large by the gold-studded wooden sceptres they carry and by the fact that they have their traditional seats on the benches in the town-square; commoners would carry plain wooden staffs, and stand, or sit on the ground. The monarch appears to have no regalia to set him apart from the rest of the princes, unless perhaps he has a sceptre more ornate than most. As noted before, on the surface this is a rather egalitarian society. 85 The absence of pomp and circumstance does not make princely power less desirable. One successful usurper is mentioned in the epics : Aigisthos, who murders his cousin Agamemnon and takes his place as ruler of Mykenai. He rules for seven years, until he in turn is murdered by Agamemnon's son, Orestes. In Ithaka, at about the same time, local princes begin to undermine the position of Odysseus and his family, but an attempted coup three years later is frustrated by Odysseus and his son. Meanwhile, Akhilleus worries about his father, Peleus, who "excelled among all men in fortune and wealth and ruled the Myrmidons" (XXIV.535-6). In the absence of his son, he may be “worn down" by his neighbours (XXIV.488-9) : "Tell me if you know anything about Peleus, whether he still has honour among the many Myrmidons, or is dishonoured by them... because old age has taken hold of his hands and feet. If only I were there to defend him... I would make my spirit and untouchable hands a terror to those who use violence against him and force him away from honour.” (11.494-503)

This passage is of particular interest, for while the stories of Agamemnon and Odysseus are traditional tales whose plots need not be characteristic of the poet's image of heroic society, there is no legend of

102

Peleus'

power

being

threatened.

Since

the poet

nevertheless

makes

Akhilleus worry about his father's fate, he apparently imagines that in the world of the heroes, if a man is weak - because he is too young or too old, and has no one to support him - others are likely to attempt to deprive him of his position. Assassination of the incumbent is one means of taking over a position of power : Agamemnon falls victim to an ambush of twenty men;

Odysseus’ heir narrowly escapes one. Intimidation is another, less direct, means. Peleus’ enemies are expected to use force to make life hard for him, rather than kill him outright. Odysseus’ rivals use similar tactics against his son Telemakhos for three years before making an attempt to murder him. Under the pretext of courting his widowed mother, they visit him every day and take de facto control of his

household.

They hope in this way to keep him weak and prevent him

from asserting his right to rule; they change tactics only when in the end

he stands up for himself after all. 86 Conversely, a ruler may use force to extend his dominion, as Poseidon does. Poseidon's domain is, of course, the sea. Everything in and on it must defer to him. With one exception. The Phaiakians have ships which know their own way across the sea, complete every journey within a day, and never come to harm (7.321-8; 8.556-63). It is their custom to escort home in safety all who ask their help. Poseidon resents this limitation to his sphere of control (8.31-3, 564-71; 13.173-8), and

one day, when the Phaiakians unwittingly offend him, he threatens in retaliation to throw a ring of mountains around their city to cut them off from the sea. When the Phaiakians realise what is about to happen, they make a vow no longer to arrange safe sea-journeys for anyone (13.14987), thus ceding at least part of their privilege to Poseidon. Non-violent means of attaining formal power, other than by inheritance, are rare indeed. There is a theoretical possibility of

becoming a monarch on the strength of one's merits when the incumbent has no heirs. 87 There is also a theoretical possibility of becoming a prince by gradually working one's way into the circuit of "fair meals

which a trial-attending man should join". The Odyssey suggests that it would be a sign of Odysseus’ losing his power if in his absence his son were to be no longer invited by “everyone” to these meals which princes ought to attend (11.185-7). In other words, princes are supposed to invite one another to meals : being invited means that one's status as a

103

prince is acknowledged; not being invited means that it is challenged.

If,

as Andromakhe predicts, after Hektor's death his friends were no longer to tolerate his son Astyanax at their communal

meals, they would thus

presumably undermine the boy's status as prince and as potential ruler of Troy (XX1I.490-9). 8 A prince, then, can lose his hereditary powers if a majority of his peers refuse to treat him as one of their own, denying

him a place at their feasts, and presumably withholding other kinds of due deference as well. Perhaps one might ultimately lose even one's hereditary title of basileus in this way. Conceivably, the process could work in reverse, too. One not born a prince might gradually gain acceptance among princes, become a regular dinner-guest and ultimately assume the role of

basileus. 85 As a rule, though, princely and monarchical power would be inherited,

and usurpation

would

be the only other way

of attaining

it.

It is

therefore perhaps only to be expected that coups should be attempted. . A further factor enters the equation, however. We shall see presently that alongside the desire for the prestige of formal princely power, the wish to demonstrate informal, personal power in a conspicuous manner plays a large part in driving a man to usurp another man's privilege. The acquisition of wealth, the next most important criterion of status, is not surprisingly a major source of conflict.

Wealth is displayed in town houses.

The scale of the house itself - the

size of the courtyard, the number of buildings in it, perhaps the size and height of the dining-hall - and the number of female slaves employed in

it indicate the level of affluence. keimelia,

treasure,

inside

armour line the walls.

Most stress is laid on the exhibition of

the house.

Bronze

tripods,

cauldrons

and

Chairs have silver and ivory ornamental inlays;

on the tables are silver and golden drinking vessels, among which decorated silver mixing-bowls of Phoenician workmanship are particularly prestigious. Menelaos and Helena own unusual items such as silver bath tubs and a silver wool-basket on wheels; their house contains such a vast collection of treasures that "the gleam of bronze... and gold and amber and silver and ivory" inspires “awe” in his visitors

(4.71-5). Wealth is also displayed on the person. Rich men and women wear fine clothes, sometimes embroidered or dyed purple, fastened with

104

ornate pins. Women wear gold and amber earrings and necklaces, and elaborate headdress. Men carry silver-handled swords or daggers; they

appear in public with fine hunting or 'show'-dogs and richly caparisoned horses.

Very wealthy men hoard surplus treasure in their storerooms. % Affluence may be displayed by distribution of wealth. Suitors may try to outdo one another with offers of gifts to the bride and of livestock to

her family.

Weddings

and funerals involve wining and dining large

numbers of guests. Cattle, slaves and treasure are handed out as prizes at funeral games. Extending hospitality to visitors from out of town provides an opportunity to show off wealth. Nestor insists on putting up his guests for the night; if they slept in their ships, it would seem as if he were "a pauper and a man totally without bedding, one who does not

have cloaks and many bed-covers in his house for himself and his guests to sleep softly in. But I do have cloaks and beautiful covers" (3.347-51). Often, visitors are given gifts on their departure.

There may well be an

element of competition in these customs. People might try to present bigger and better weddings and funerals, and offer more lavish hospitality, than their neighbours.

mention of any courtship, 91

rivalry

in

But remarkably the poems make no

generosity

other

than

the

rivalry

in

Scholars have argued that princes expend much wealth in feasting their

‘followers’ and that they vie with one another in generosity so as to attract as many

followers as possible.

tried to show that this is not so the form of princes exchanging sharing eranoi to which each of Such feasts do create bands of competition. 9% I have also tried

In the previous chapter I have

: Homeric feasting predominantly takes dinner-invitations on an equal basis, or the diners brings his own contribution. friends, but involve no generosity or to disprove the notion that much of the

wealth of a household goes to provide a livelihood for a crowd of retainers (therapontes) who live at the expense of their master, performing services but no productive work. Instead I argued that fulltime, live-in retainers are a rarity, and that most retainers serve a master

only for the duration of a military expedition, in the course of which they would presumably largely live off plunder. The scale of generosity involved in keeping retainers would therefore be small. 9 In short, large amounts of wealth are given away only on the occasion of weddings, funerals, and visits from abroad - events which by their

105

very nature are rare.

Some wealth may be spent on retainers, but these

are few. There is little scope for generosity, and a distinct lack of evidence for competition in it. The major form of rivalry in wealth, it appears, is hoarding of A man's Akhilleus is as a prize. of his booty

not generous distribution, but competitive display and treasure. wealth seems no more secure than his hereditary powers. "robbed" by Agamemnon of Briseis, a woman given to him An imaginary Cretan, in a tale spun by Odysseus, is robbed by Orsilokhos, son of Idomeneus (13.258-66). Telemakhos'

enemies try to get at him by literally consuming his wealth in daily feasts; when they later make up their minds to kill him, they also decide

to divide

his

property

among

themselves

(16.383-6,

cf.

2.334-6).

Sarpedon, fighting at Troy, appears concerned about the "many possessions, coveted by those who are in need", which he has left behind

in Lykia (V.478-81). Andromakhe feels certain that Astyanax will be robbed of his inheritance after Hektor's death : "Others will take from him his farmlands” (XXTI1.489). In general, it is assumed that a weak or absent man's property is unlikely to be left in peace. “The son of an absent father, who has no other supporters, suffers much at home” (4.164-5). Sarpedon's comment that "those in need" have an eye on his property suggests a scarcity of resources as the cause of violent competition for wealth. However, it is to be noted that even on “rocky” Ithaka there is

unclaimed land which could be made suitable for cultivation.

In any

case, scarcity cannot account for the actions of the wealthy princes who

are involved in most of these cases. A second and more plausible explanation is that these men are motivated by extreme acquisitiveness, that they are "profit-minded" (1.149) and the "greediest of all men” (1.122), as Akhilleus calls Agamemnon. Acquisitive the heroes certainly are. They have an

"almost overpowering accumulative instinct"; for them wealth is "an unequivocal good; the more wealth, the greater the good” (Finley 1977: 121-2). Odysseus and Menelaos in particular make long voyages in order to acquire riches.

Menelaos tells guests admiring the splendour of his house : "There may be someone to rival me in property, but then again there may not be. For I went through much, and wandered far and wide, and in the eighth year I

106

brought it here in my ships, having wandered in Cyprus, Phoenicia and Egypt. I visited the Ethiopians and Sidonians and Erembi and Libya... gathering great wealth" (4.80-90) Odysseus, for all his eagerness to get home, is prepared to extend his

stay abroad if he sees an opportunity for gain.

He tells the Phaiakians :

"Even if you were to ask me to stay here for a year - if you prepared an escort home and gave me splendid gifts, I should be willing to do even that, and it would be much more profitable [polu kerdion] to reach my fatherland with my hands better filled." (11.356-9) Having arrived home incognito, he spreads the false rumour that "Odysseus could have been here long ago, but it seemed more profitable [kerdion] to him to collect wealth, making a long journey. Thus does Odysseus surpass mortal men in knowledge of much that is profitable [kerdea polla]. No-one else could rival

him.” (19.282-6) Revealingly, when he unexpectedly finds himself put ashore in what he

believes is a strange land, the first thing he does is count the valuables he has brought with him, to make sure that nothing has been stolen by the crew of the ship that had carried him (13.215-6). Clearly, all this is meant to characterise Odysseus, not as a cold-hearted and greedy man, but as one whose presence of mind and self-control enable him to keep

his eye on material interests even at times of great emotional stress. 9 Several non-violent ways of satisfying the acquisitive drive are available to the heroes. They could in theory strive to raise production on their estates and convert surplus livestock and agricultural produce into treasure, either through craftsmen to manufacture them. and collecting gifts abroad, and customarily presented to them

barter or by 'commissioning' local They could also gain wealth by trading they might make the most of the gifts by their people. It seems likely,

however, that the gains to be made by these means would be relatively small. The pressure of competition might lead men to resort to forcible seizure as a shortcut, albeit a dangerous one, to riches.

A further, quite different motive comes into view when one considers the symbolic dimension of the appropriation of wealth and usurpation of power.

107

It is a key characteristic of the Homeric notion of honour, that the heroes discern symbolic expressions of deference and disrespect in a much wider spectrum of behaviour than we are inclined to do. We tend to see deference mostly in actions such as giving up one's seat and raising one's hat; disrespect in our terms is a matter of refusing to make such gestures or to perform nominal services. While we can see that, on an abstract level, many other actions also could be described in terms of deference or disrespect, we do not normally think of them in this way. The heroes, by contrast, are strongly conscious of this symbolic dimension in all kinds of actions, including violent ones such as murder and theft. All such acts seem to them to imply a lack of respect for the

victim. Seizure of wealth or formal power is frequently described as an action that involves a lack of deference and hence "dishonours" the victim. 7 The Myrmidons would "dishonour” Peleus in depriving him of his power (11.496). Penelope’s suitors “dishonour the house of a good man" (21.332-3; cf. 16.431), and “dishonour that man's wife and his fine son” (14.163-4; cf. 18.144; 22.370;

24.459). Akhilleus feels treated "as if I were some dishonoured immigrant" (IX.648; XVI.59); Agamemnon has “utterly dishonoured” him (XTII.113; cf. 1.171, 244, and passim).

To the heroes’ minds, taking a man's wealth and privileges by force is a

way of showing disrespect. As Akhilleus sees it, Agamemnon's ‘arrogance’ (1.203; cf.214), as well as never greed, of which Telemakhos' ‘arrogant’ act, in Homeric terms, is the

actions are inspired by Aybris, greed, and it is always hybris, enemies are accused. % An infliction of humiliation for the

sake of it. "Hybris is doing and saying things at which the victim incurs shame, not in order that one may achieve anything other than what is done, but simply to get pleasure from it. ... Cause of the pleasure for the hybrizontes is that by harming people they think

that they

themselves

are

the

more

superior.”

(Aristotle,

Rhetorika

1378b,

trans]. N.R.E. Fisher) 9

So when the confiscation of Briseis and the depredations on Odysseus’ estate are described as acts of Aybris, evidently it is felt that their primary purpose is to humiliate Akhilleus and Telemakhos, respectively. The victims believe that their attackers treat them with disrespect

108

because they ‘feel superior’ and want to demonstrate their superiority, rather than enrich themselves or gain power.

Those who dishonour others explain their own motives differently. Agamemnon

ignores accusations of greed and Aybris, and explains that

he is taking away Akhilleus’ prize in retaliation for what he sees as Akhilleus' offensive behaviour. He intends to teach him and others a lesson. We shall see later that Orsilokhos has similar motives for taking booty from a fellow-Cretan. Again, it is not mere lust for power that leads Poseidon to extend his domain at the expense of the Phaiakians : he is punishing them.

The lesson that retaliation is supposed to teach is spelied out by Agamemnon. He takes Briseis, “so that you may know clearly how much better than you I am, and so that another man too may shrink from thinking himself on a level with me and opposing me as an equal” (I.181-

7). 100 Both parties thus agree that the act is primarily meant to humiliate the victim and demonstrate the superiority of the aggressor. The views merely differ on the reasons for the display. The aggressor feels that it has been provoked and is justified in the circumstances, while the victim sees it as a form of self-gratification for which there is no legitimate

excuse. So, on the one hand, the importance of wealth and formal power as sources of honour, the pressure of competition, and the fact that there are only a few, limited, non-violent means of acquisition in the heroic world, add up to a coherent explanation for the prevalence of violent conflict over wealth and power. On the other hand, some of these

conflicts at least are attributed to a desire to show one's superiority, whether in response to provocation or in sheer hybris. One way or another, a man's rights to his property, and a prince's right to rule, appear to be under constant threat. The implication is that one cannot long enjoy wealth or formal power, the two most important sources of honour, unless one has enough personal, informal power to defend them.

Why this should be so, and whether it is realistic, remains to be seen. 191

109

6. COMPETITION III : THE STRUGGLE FOR RESPECT The

touchiness

character.

of Homeric

| Touchiness

consists

men

in

is their

responding

aggressively to a perceived lack of deference.

of deference

most

striking

trait of

immediately

and

We have seen that a lack

is one of the issues at stake in many

of the conflicts

discussed in previous sections. Challenges to contests of skill and even attempts at depriving someone of property and privileges may be

regarded as signs of disrespect, and provoke anger on that count.

We

shall see that there are also numerous instances of disrespect which involve neither loss of material sources of honour nor a challenge to a reputation for personal excellence, but which nevertheless provoke great

anger. A notable instance is Akhilleus' reception of Priamos, who has come to the Akhaian camp to ransom the body of Hektor. He offers Priamos a seat, but his guest declines and asks for Hektor's body to be released first. Akhilleus, “scowling at him", answers : "'Do not provoke me, old man; I already intend to release Hektor to you... Therefore do not stir my spirit further in grief; or else, old man, even under my own roof, I may not spare you...'. Thus he spoke. The old man was afraid and obeyed his word” (XXIV.559-69).

One might have thought that the offer of a chair was no more than a polite gesture, and that Priamos’ attitude is quite understandable, since he is after all trying to recover the corpse of his own son. Certainly by our standards the situation would not justify more than some slight irritation on the part of Akhilleus. But evidently Akhilleus finds it so

offensive to be refused that he threatens to kill the offender. 102 Modern readers of the epics tend to regard such touchiness as a flaw. The heroes are seen as "overblown egos asserting themselves through various forms of violence" (Whitman 1958: 183). Akhilleus is subject to

"fits of narcissistic rage" (MacCary 1982: 92), and at one stage lapses into "a near-psychotic state of paranoid rage and anxiety" (Devereux 1978: 11). 10 The fact is, however, that in many societies, and indeed by some in

our own society, it is considered vital for a man to be quick to anger. Benvolio,

extremes :

in Romeo

and

Juliet,

merely

takes

a proper

attitude

to

0

Thou wilt quarrel with a man for cracking nuts, having no other reason, but because thou hast hazel eyes. What eye, but such an eye, would spy out such a quarrel 7" (Act III, Scene ἢ

George, a soccer hooligan, is a little less imaginative in spotting insults but equally convinced of the need to respond with violence : "Most matches you get this. You get someone screwing you [i.e. staring] or just standing there all cocky like, so someone's got to go and take him down a peg or two.” (Marsh et.al. 1978: 104)

I shall argue that the heroes’ touchiness springs from the nature of the Homeric concept of honour, and that their peculiar sensitivity to a lack of deference leads to a struggle for respect which is the third and greatest cause of violence in Homeric society - greater than either rivalry in personal excellence or competition for wealth and power. (I) THE BENVOLIO-SYNDROME One may recall that deference is an integral part of the Homeric

concept of honour. ought

to earn

him

A man may possess all the qualities (aretai) that fame

(kleos)

and

honour

(time),

but he does

not

actually have honour unless people treat him with deference (time). Now, it follows logically from this perception that, when denied due deference, one is deprived of honour. A man who is ‘dishonoured' is one who has been treated with disrespect. We may feel that an act of disrespect reflects badly on the perpetrator without affecting the standing of the victim, but the Homeric view is that, whatever it does for the perpetrator, an act of disrespect lowers the social status of the victim. 104 It is therefore not surprising that among the heroes a lack of deference should produce a more vehement response than it does in our society. To us, being treated with a lack of respect is in most circumstances

merely a nuisance and inconvenience; to the heroes, it inherently means an acute loss of prestige as well. 18 A man’s standing in the community is diminished even when the disrespect involved is purely symbolic and he suffers no loss of reputation, property or power; he is likely to be angry. When the disrespect involved does cause him some such loss, his standing is doubly diminished; he is likely to be doubly angry. In addition, Homeric ethics prescribe retaliation. The Homeric norm is that, faced with a lack of deference, one must enforce it.

111

This

norm

is expressed

by

Akhilleus

during

his

quarrel

with

Agamemnon. Agamemnon's lack of respect for him angers him so much that he has half a mind to kill the man, and begins to draw his sword. It requires divine intervention to persuade him to restrict himself to verbal abuse instead. He calls Agamemnon, among other things, a "creature

cloaked in disrespect” (1.149, 158) and a "dog-face” (1.159, 225), 1% and vows not to serve under him again.

When Agamemnon protests,

"Akhilleus interrupted him with his answer : 'I would be called a coward [deilos] and a nobody (outidanos] if in everything, whatever you say, I gave in to you.'” (1.292-4)

He evidently believes that public opinion demands a show him. In fact, at least one Akhaian thinks that Akhilleus has enough. Thersites is of the opinion that "Akhilleus has anger in his heart; no, he is a man who takes things easy

“Otherwise,” he says to Agamemnon,

of anger from not gone far not the least [methemon]".

“you would now have committed

your last outrage” (II.241-2); a clear hint that, to his mind, Akhilleus ought to have killed Agamemnon. The troops at large show solidarity with Akhilleus and give vent to their own anger at Agamemnon's lack of respect for his men, by shirking in battle (ΧΙΠ.108-13; cf. 83-98, 114-19). Agamemnon laments : "O popoi ! The other Akhaians too, then, like Akhilleus, nurse anger against me in their hearts and do not want to fight" (XIV.49-51;

cf.131-2).

Akhilleus thinks that the men are not asserting their anger

strongly enough:

(1.230-2).

“you are a ruler of nobodies”,

Thersites is more direct.

and desert Agamemnon

altogether.

he tells Agamemnon

He exhorts the ttoops to sail home Anything less means that they are

"bad disgraces; Akhaian women, no longer Akhaians” (11.235). 107 The attitude of Akhilleus and Thersites finds parallels in the attitude of the gods. One may recall Zeus’ “vexed” reply to Poseidon's complaint about the Akhaians' lack of respect in failing to sacrifice to him before building a fortification wall to rival his own: he impatiently reminds Poseidon that he has the power to retaliate with force and should use it (VII.446-63). Zeus advocates the same response when Poseidon takes

offence at the fact that the Phaiakians have taken Odysseus home comfort although Poseidon had wanted him to suffer much at sea.

in

112 Poseidon : “I will no longer be honoured among the immortal gods,

when mortals

-

these Phaiakians... - do not honour me at all." (13. 128-30) Zeus : “O popol ! ... What are you saying ! The gods certainly will not dishonour

you; it would be hard to make the eldest and the best a target for contempt.

And if

any human being is carried away by his strength and power, and does not honour

you, you can later take revenge at any time. Do as you please.” (13. 140-5) Poseidon : "1 would immediately have done just what you say, but I always heed and avoid your anger.” (13. 147-8)

Zeus' scathing reaction makes it plain that a powerful god must retaliate forcefully when treated with disrespect - not sit and complain. Poseidon promptly tries to correct the appearance of weakness by explaining that it

was only out of deference to Zeus that he did not strike back at once. Hera,

too, feels that she must vent her anger on those who

have

offended her. She and Athena “began to hate Troy and Priamos and his people because of the mistake of Alexandros, who antagonised the goddesses” by judging Aphrodite the winner in a beauty-contest among them (XXIV.27-9). Hera is hell-bent on the destruction of Troy; in fact, Zeus reproaches her with being too aggressive. She remains adamant : “Surely even a mortal will achieve his purposes for a man - although he is mortal and does not have our wisdom. So how couldI, who claim to be the best of the goddesses... - how could I not be obliged [ouk ophelon] to make trouble for the Trojans when I bear them a grudge 7" (XVIII.362-7)

The principle is thus the same for gods and men : one must not allow oneself to be treated with disrespect; to retaliate forcefully and even violently is a sign of power and the mark of a ‘real man’ and a ‘somebody’. Often, disrespect is detected where none is intended. The Phaiakians, for instance, are not even aware of offending Poseidon; nevertheless, both Zeus and Poseidon react as if they are doing it on purpose. Agamemnon's attitude is similar. Circumstances force him to relinquish his prize of booty, and he demands a new one "at once”, but Akhilleus points out that he will have to wait until Troy is saeked, since there is no

longer

any

booty

left

to

distribute.

Without

good

reason 1%,

Agamemnon suspects ulterior motives : "Do not hide your intentions like that, Akhilleus".

|

113 "Do you want to hold on to your prize yourself, while I sit here just like that, without one 7" (1.131-4). He concludes : "That man wants to be above all others, he wants to have power over all, to mule all, to give orders to all. But I know someone

who will not obey these." (287-9) While Akhilleus sees himself as defending his rights, Agamemnon sees him as trying to assert his power by treating his leader disrespectfully. Artemis causes the destruction of Oineus’ orchard because he has failed to sacrifice to her. “Either he forgot or he ignored her; it was a great blindness in his spirit” (IX.537). The goddess retaliates without knowing whether the lack of deference was an oversight or a deliberate

insult. 109 It would be misleading to conclude, as Adkins does, that intentions do not matter. “The essence of an affront is that another should dare to affront one” (Pitt-Rivers 1977: 6). Hence, when one of the suitors

truthfully claims not to have been involved in any of the others’ outrages, Odysseus kills him anyway since the man must have wanted to marry Penelope and wished Odysseus dead (22.310-29; 21.144-7). In general, the suitors keep trying to deny responsibility for their actions. They tell Telemakhos that "the suitors are not responsible (aitioi], but your own mother is" (2.87-8). They try to persuade Odysseus that

Antinoos alone

“bears responsibility for everything”

(22.48-9).

The

bard employed by the suitors pleads for mercy on the grounds that he was forced to sing for them and did not perform willingly (22.351-3). When Agamemnon tries to reconcile Akhilleus, he begins by saying : "I am not responsible, but Zeus and Fate and Erinys who inhabits the

darkness, who cast a savage blindness in my mind"

(XIX.86-8).

By

shifting responsibility onto someone else, and onto the gods when there is no-one else to blame, these men are trying to deny that they intended to behave as offensively as they have undeniably done, and clearly they hope for greater leniency on account of this. 10 Distinctions between intentional and unintentional disrespect thus can and should be made, but the offended party often fails to do so. "You know well what a fearsome man he is", says Patroklos about Akhilleus, "he is quick to blame an innocent man [anaition aitiodito)" (X1.653-4).

The reason for this must be that Akhilleus, and everyone else who is offended, assumes that an act of disrespect is deliberate, until proven

114

otherwise. Mere sufficient proof.

protestations

of innocence

may

not be

regarded

as

"To maintain that one did not intend what one did is to require a certain indulgence

on the part of the listener - an indulgence which may not be granted if he has been seriously affronted; for actions speak plainer than words where honour is concerned.” (Pitt-Rivers 1977: 6)

The inclination to see deliberate insults everywhere is fostered by the fact that a man has enemies who wish him ill and actively seek to harm him.

In contemporary Western society, only states are supposed to have

enemies, and then only in time of war.

In private relationships, one is

not supposed to try to do serious harm to those one dislikes or happens to be in conflict with, and one is certainly not allowed to use violence

against them.

“Few of us nowadays... expect to be involved for long in

a relationship deserving the name of enmity, and a man who

spoke of

"my enemies’ could fairly be suspected of paranoia” (Dover 1974: 181). In other cultures, however,

relations of enmity between individuals as

well as communities are openly recognised. Among the Tausug, in the Philippines, for example, “the relationship between enemies is... a fundamental legal category so that persons who are bantah [enemy] to each other are entitled to have this fact recognized" (Kiefer 1972: 63). Odysseus’ idea of happiness includes misery for his enemies (dusmenees). "There is nothing better, nothing superior to this: when a man and woman

house in harmony of mind.

keep

Much distress for their enemies, joy for their well-

wishers; and they themselves hear people speaking of them a great deal.” (6. 182-5)

This

is the only passage to suggest

that a person

or a family

will

normally have enemies within the community. Even so, it is presumably the norm. The feeling that there are people who are out to harm one, is

bound

to make

one doubt others'

motives

and the sincerity of their

apologies. There are certain limitations to the norm that disrespect must be punished with force. When offended by a friend, men are less inclined

to anger. Agamemnon does not mind harsh words from Odysseus (XIV.82-102), because he knows that Odysseus is fundamentally welldisposed

to

him

(IV.359-63;

cf.

XIV.103-6).

A

quarrel

between

115

Menelaos and Antilokhos is easily patched up. quickly have persuaded me", says Menelaos, special consideration in the case of Antilokhos, this young men and his family have done for

“Another man would not but he wishes to show in recognition of all that him (XXIII.606-8). By

contrast, the fact that Agamemnon dislikes Akhilleus from the start (1.176) may help explain his fury at him. We shall later meet a further limitation : the norm that one should restrain one's anger when offended by an acknowledged social superior. Despite these restrictions, heroic touchiness, a Homeric version of what one might call the Benvolio-syndrome in reference to the Shakespearean character cited earlier, is a major source of conflict. Since deference is an integral part of honour, men must protect their honour by keeping a constant watch for signs of disrespect from their peers, except close friends, and from their inferiors. If they spot a lack of deference somewhere, they assume that it is deliberate, resent the consequent loss of status, and feel obliged to retaliate with force. Under these

conditions,

all

the

minor

mistakes,

oversights

and

unavoidable

clashes of interest that are inherent in any form of social life, are liable to provoke outbursts of anger and violence.

(1!) THE ATTRACTION OF HYBRIS Since men who fail to respond with force to signs of disrespect fall short of the Homeric norm, and lose face, an aggressive man can lower the status of others, and indirectly raise his own, by withholding

deference from those unlikely to retaliate.

Deliberate and unprovoked

withholding of deference - including its most basic forms, such as respect for property rights and physical integrity - is known as, and

motivated by, Aybris.

The very fact that there is a word for such acts

and their motivation, suggests that they are not uncommon. Apart from the alleged kybris of Agamemnon in confiscating Briseis, and the clear hybris of the suitors in their behaviour towards Odysseus’ family, slaves and property, most instances of ‘arrogance’ involve verbal and physical abuse of people in a vulnerable position - paupers and hired labourers. Humiliation of the weak A beggar, on his way to town, is overtaken by a goat-herd, who without provocation lets out a stream of abuse at him, and, while overtaking, tries to kick him off the path (17.215-34). On reaching town, a friend wams the

116 beggar not to linger in the street, “or else someone may notice you outside and throw something at you or beat you" (17.278-9).

While begging in the dining-hall of Odysseus, the beggar is bullied and ridiculed by Penelope's suitors. Footstools are thrown at him in anger (17.405-10, 458-63; 18.387-98). A second beggar turns up and the two of them are made to fight a boxing-match to “entertain” the diners (18.37), who "die laughing” when the second man is knocked out (18.100). The beggar's baldness and laziness are mocked (18.349-64). Finally, a cow's hoof is thrown at his head, for a laugh (20.287-302). One of the suitors tries to provoke Telemakhos,

the nominal

host,

by

telling him that the beggar and a second stranger staying at the house are worthless guests. He proposes to sell them as slaves. “Why not do as I say ?

That would be much more profitable. Let us throw these strangers in a ship with many oars and send them to the Sikeloi, where they will fetch you a good sum." (20.381-3) This appears to be something of a standard threat. It is incongruously echoed by the goat-herd. He threatens to put a fellow-slave on a ship and

send him “far from Ithaka, so that he will bring me much wealth" (17.24950). Asa slave, he would hardly be in a position to do this, and presumably he is merely aping the sort of threat the suitors make.

Hired labourers are exposed to similar abuse. spite of being gods,

once worked

for Laomedon

Poseidon and Apollo, in as thetes (XX1.441-9).

Poseidon recalls how, when it was time to pay, "he forcibly kept our entire wages... and sent us away... He threatened to bind our feet and hands and to send us off to be sold in distant islands. Indeed, he declared that he was going to lop off our ears” (XXI.451-5). 111 Akhilleus' repeated remark that he has been ill-treated “as if I were some dishonoured immigrant” (IX.648; XVI.59) suggests that people in a

vulnerable position commonly have to put up with humiliation. The purpose of the violence and intimidation is of course partly to scare off the beggars and labourers so as to avoid giving them their alms and wages. The threats to sell these people also mention the wealth that might be gained by doing so. But such material considerations are not uppermost. Most of the treatment suffered by the beggar is described as

hybris (17.565, 581; 18.381) and in any case serves no purpose other than

to

entertain

the

suitors.

The

goat-herd's

behaviour,

too,

is

described as Aybris and as a display of aglaiai, “splendid” or “showy” demeanour (17.244-6).

The main reason for the deliberate humiliation

of the weak is evidently the desire to demonstrate one's superiority to them, 112

117

Hybris is always condemned. Ill-treatment of beggars is supposed to provoke the wrath of Zeus himself, and even the suitors at times feel that they have gone too far. Nor does anyone approve of the suitors'

collective acts of Aybris against the family of Odysseus. Penelope tells them that “those who dishonour... the house of an excellent man can never have a good reputation among the people" (21.331-3), and they themselves realize that "the people are no longer at all well-disposed to us” (16.375). Neighbouring communities will be outraged when they

hear what is going on, and the gods may punish such "evil deeds” (2.657). "3

Yet despite the censure, hybris appears to be a regular feature of

Homeric life. In part this may be because it is not always easy to draw the line : one man's legitimate retaliation is another man's Aybris. A more important reason, however, is the existence of the norm that one must respond with

force to a lack of deference. If a man fails to respond in this way, he is regarded as a nobody and a woman. Therefore, although the perpetrators of hybris are condemned, their helpless victims are, in a way, condemned too. We might commiserate with the ‘innocent’ who

suffer, but in other societies victims may be more strongly despised for their weakness than assailants are for their aggression. A forcefully worded expression of this attitude Sarakatsani of modern Epirus.

has

been

recorded

among

the

"The family of Costas Pistiolis is very poor... One day I saw a youth pelting the little son of Costas with pieces of dung in his father's presence. Costas, however, could do nothing since the youth's father was an influential member of the cooperating group which only tolerated with difficulty the presence of the Pistiolis‘ family among its number. Another witness of the little scene swore and told me that you could copulate with this man's daughter and he would stand by and hold your coat.”

114

In Homer, no-one gives voice to quite so much contempt for victims. All the same, the feeling is that a man must stand up for himself even if this means

almost certain death.

Telemakhos

is facing overwhelming

odds in the attack upon his household, but even so those who hear of his predicament, instead of sympathising, something about it.

let him

know

"Do you willingly let yourself be subjected 7" (3.214; 16.95)

that he must

do

118 "Any man of good sense who came along would be indignant at seeing these many shameful deeds.” (1.228-9) "Even if I were alone and overwhelmed by sheer numbers, I would prefer to be killed in my own house, and

die, rather than always

witness these ugly deeds.° (16. 105-7; cf. 20.315-19) 115

Victims of Aybris might be pitied, as Telemakhos is pitied by the Ithakans when he denounces the suitors before the assembled people, declaring that he would fight them "if only I had the strength", and throwing down his sceptre in tears of rage (2.40-81). Pity, however, is

not the same as respect, and given the norms of Homeric society, Telemakhos' humiliation cannot help but diminish his honour in the community. Hybris, then, is common despite being censured, because it offers men of power a means of depriving weaker men of status. For those who are confident that they have the strength and power to deal with their victims’ attempts at retaliation, or even to deter them from retaliation altogether, it is tempting to treat less powerful men with disrespect. Their victims are thereby forced into a situation where they must either submit and lose face, or fight and lose their lives. The aggressors may lose their status of men are (13.143)

reputation for moral excellence, but they will have lowered the their victims and thereby raised their own. Hence, Homeric liable to get “carried away by their strength and power" and to subject others to violence and threats in order to

humiliate them. (m) THE BULLYING TENDENCY

Ideally, respect ought to be won by attaining personal excellence, wealth and formal power, but a strong man can of course force people to

treat him with respect. The heroes often do appear to coerce deference. One kind of deference that may be won by means of intimidation is the service of a retainer. In performing personal services at the table and in battle, a retainer does "the things that worse men do for the good" (15.324). In other words, his services are a form of deference and

symbolically express his inferiority to his master. They fulfil a practical

function as well, of course, but the master could equally well do most of the actual work himself or have it done by slaves.

When a man gets

retainers to do it instead, he does so to show the rest of the community

that free men accept his superiority.

119

Ambitious men are therefore likely to try to secure the services of as many retainers as possible - preferably of men who are of high status

themselves.

However, no one is likely to be willing to admit inferiority

by serving another. The effect of these forces pulling in opposite directions appears to be that only exiles in need of protection become permanent retainers, and few men serve on a regular basis. Retainership is, however, the basis of army hierarchy, and at time of war many temporary master-retainer relations need to be forged. 116 Although a certain balance seems to have been struck, this state of affairs is liable to give rise to conflict, especially in the course of mobilising an army. One of Odysseus’ lesser-known false tales is based on this premise. "I heard of Ithaka when I was still in Crete, far away across the sea - and now I have come here myself with all these goods, having left behind as much as this again with my children. I am on the run, for I killed Idomeneus'

own

son, Orsilokhos...,

since he tried to

rob me of all my Trojan booty..., because I did not do his father a favour and act as his retainer [therapeuon] in the land of the Trojans; instead, I commanded other companions. I hit him with a bronze spear,

when

he returned from

the fields, waiting for him

with a friend in ambush by the roadside. The sky was very dark that night and nobody saw us. There were no witnesses when I took his life, but when I had killed him with that sharp weapon, I immediately sought out a ship, threw myself at the

feet of some proud Phoenicians and offered them as much of the booty as they liked. I told them to take me aboard and get me to Pylos or Elis...

But the force of the

gale drove them off course, to this place." (13.256-76)

The Cretan in this story is rich, and powerful enough to lead a band of men in war. Idomeneus wants this man to serve him at Troy, rather than be a commander in his own right, but the Cretan refuses to accept a

subordinate status in the army. 17 refusal to defer to him, is retaliation.

share of booty from him.

Orsilokhos' answer to the other's He somehow contrives to take his

The Cretan in turn takes offence at the way he

is treated, and murders Orsilokhos. There are no other incidents in the epics involving would-be masters and unwilling retainers, but given the importance to Homeric men of receiving deference, this kind of clash is inevitable.

An element of compulsion is therefore bound to exist in many masterretainer relations.

While exiles might serve a master in return for a

livelihood and protection, others might serve, not out of respect for his

120

superior qualities, nor for the sake of a ‘friendship’ created by his generosity, but because they fear that refusal might invite the kind of retaliation suffered by the Cretan.

At the same

time, of course,

the

episode illustrates that there is a limit to the deference that can be gained by means of intimidation. Even the most powerful man cannot enforce deference when his opponent is willing to go as far as the Cretan does in

taking risks and making material sacrifices. Outside master-retainer relations, intimidation plays a large part when men are trying to impose their will on others. The role of coercion in relations between princes and people, and the aggressive attitude of Zeus, Agamemnon and Hektor in assembly has already been noted.

Zeus threatens violence to the other gods without any provocation at all (VIII.2-17); Agamemnon and Hektor respond to proposals that displease them, but are not, it seems, either meant or taken to be disrespectful

(1.103-6; X11.230-50). Heads of households may adopt a bullying attitude towards the other members. Threats are used on slaves, even by masters who are made out to be much loved. When Telemakhos comes home, his slaves greet him with great affection, weeping tears of joy and showering him with kisses (16.12-26; 17.31-5). All the same, the slave-women are terrified of Telemakhos; witness their reaction when one of them scolds a beggar,

and is told : *"T shall at once go and tell Telemakhos what you said, bitch, so that he may hack you to pieces on the spot.‘ With these words he spread panic among the women;

they scattered over the house, and all felt their knees go weak with fear, for they thought he spoke the truth.” (18.338-42) Later, Telemakhos uses threats on the utterly loyal slave Eumaios, who is not carrying out an order because the suitors are intimidating him. "Telemakhos on his side shouted threateningly : ‘Old friend, ...take care that I do not start throwing stones at you and chase you to the farm, although I am rather young; in strength I am the better man'." (21.369-71)

These are not empty threats.

Slaves who seriously offend their masters

may be mutilated, put to the sword or hanged

19.488-90).

(22.440-5, 457-77;

cf.

121

A notoriously tyrannical head of household is Zeus, who continually resorts to intimidation in order to impose his will on his wife, children and younger brother. At any sign of opposition to his plans, he threatens to beat the offenders, push them off their seats and throw them out of the house, or blast them with his thunderbolt. 118 This may be no more than the normal response to a lack of deference, but he goes beyond it when he taunts other gods with their weakness and says that it does not in the least concern him if he antagonises them (VIII.477-83; cf.XV.104-9). When he is affronted by one god, he takes out his anger on all of them. When Hera and Sleep once managed to obstruct one of his plans, “he

became angry, hurling the gods around the house” (XIV.256-7). Ares is told that if he disobeys Zeus' order to stay away from battle, he will be beaten and also "plant a great evil for all the others.

For at once Zeus will... come to us on

Olympos, and beat us one after the other, those who are guilty and those who are not.” (XV.128-37; cf. 1.577-81)

Zeus’ aggressive behaviour is successful insofar as the gods are afraid of him and treat him with great respect. All rise when he enters; they do not dare to remain seated (1.533-5). Generally, they obey his commands. On the other hand, they do feel provoked and at times attempt to resist. One story relates how Hera, Poseidon and Athena at

one stage formed a coalition against Zeus and managed to put him in chains (1.396406). The dangers of enforcing deference are evident again. Mortal heads of household are far less and less often violent to members of their family.

Most aggressive is Priamos, in his grief.

He

shouts orders at his sons, who are "afraid of the threats of their father" (XXTV.265). One may also note that the men of a household tend to adopt a domineering attitude towards the women. Telemakhos twice

stops his mother from intervening in the proceedings at a feast in the dining-hall. "Go to your room and attend to your own work, weaving and spinning... [This matter] shall be the concer of all the men and above all it shall be my concem, for

over this I have power in the house.” (1.356-9; 21.350-3) 119

122

Hektor uses similar words to his wife, when she puts ἃ suggestion to him as to the conduct of the war : "All these things are my concem, woman... Go to your room and attend your own work" (VI.441, 490). No threats are used, and both women obey at once, but the passages nevertheless indicate areas of potential conflict between the sexes in which the man may use force to impose his will when the woman resists,

as Hera does. So, just as a man may use violence to deny respect to others, he may use

violence

to

coerce

respect

for

himself.

The

perception

that

deference is a constituent part of honour implies not only that one needs to receive deference in order to enjoy a certain status, but also that receiving deference in itself affords status. Therefore, it matters little whether respect is won by force or commanded by custom and merit. Enforced respect may not be ‘sincere’, but it nonetheless adds to a man's

honour. (IV) QUESTIONS OF SUPERIORITY Conflict may spring from uncertainty as to who should defer to whom. The /liad contains a debate on the propriety of Akhilleus' response to dishonour at the hands of Agamemnon. As we have seen, Akhilleus himself claims that only a nobody would not be angry in his position. Thersites and many Akhaians agree. There is, however, a considerable body of opinion ranged against them. Nestor pleads with Akhilleus not to quarrel with Agamemnon, who, as

ruler of the Akhaians, is his superior. 29

Agamemnon

"He

to me,

must

give

in...

and

he must

submit

says bluntly:

in that I am

more

princely, and in that I can claim to be his senior by birth" (IX.158-61). Diomedes

suggests

that Akhilleus

is unduly

proud

(agenor,

1X.699).

Diomedes' own behaviour towards Agamemnon is accordingly humble. When one of his friends becomes angry at Agamemnon, who in a rather offensive manner exhorts him to join battle, Diomedes tells the man to

be quiet ([V.368-418). Although he knows that he has been publicly insulted (IX.34-6), he quietly does as he is told, "respecting the rebuke of the respect-worthy prince” (TV.401-2). There is thus a view that Akhilleus ought to behave like Diomedes and feel more respect for Agamemnon's status than anger at Agamemnon's insult. Perhaps it is

this consideration that causes him to hesitate for a moment and wonder if he should "end his anger and contro! his spirit” (1.192).

123 Nevertheless,

Akhilleus and those who support him believe that his

anger is justified because

they reject the notion that Agamemnon

is

Akhilleus' superior. Since Akhilleus is the "best of the Akhaians” in combat (1.244), he puts himself on a level with Agamemnon (1.185-7), and explains that he is angry because "an equal" has dishonoured him (XV1.52-4). Thersites goes further and berates Agamemnon for dishonouring "a man far better than him” (11.239), a notion consistent

with his view that Akhilleus should have been even angrier than he already was (11.24]-2). Agamemnon and Nestor argue against this that Akhilleus' excellence in war does not make him the equal of the ruling prince, and gives him no right to be angry. "You are very strong - so what ? That was a gift from some god.” (1.178) "Although you are stronger and are the son of a goddess, he is the better man.” (1.280-1). "Even if the eternal gods made him a warrior, did they therefore give him the right to utter insults ?” (1.290-1)

In the same way, when Zeus threatens to use violence against Poseidon if he does not do as he is told, Poseidon is much offended, because Zeus "is of equal honour" (homotimos, XV .186; isomoros, XV.209), and thus has no right to order him about. Poseidon gives in when he is persuaded that Zeus is his superior insofar as he is the elder brother (XV.166, 182,

204). The implication, hinted at earlier, is that all are agreed that one should

not be angry when offended by one's superiors.

On the whole, this

norm would seem to allow a ruler to dishonour lower-ranking princes, and allow princes to treat the common people with disrespect, without thereby necessarily provoking retaliation. As such it limits violence. The two episodes, however, show that there may be some question as to who is to be considered superior to whom. Seniority is a clear criterion, but from the dispute between the great warrior and the great

ruler no definite answer emerges.

Different opinions are voiced by

different characters, and the story does not point a moral in this respect. 121 The existence of different scales of value to determine status is obviously a major source of friction. Given the competitiveness of Homeric men, the situation would be exacerbated by an almost inevitable inclination to overrate oneself and underrate others. Whatever a man

124

might think of himself and whatever level of deference he might demand, others would tend to regard it as too much.

The struggle for respect thus in various ways - the boundaries between the four categories discussed above are not sharp - gives rise to conflict. Conflict in the epics is more commonly about questions of deference than about either rivalry in personal excellence or the possession of wealth and formal power. Moreover, as has been pointed out, these other types of conflict are perceived as involving questions of deference, too. The suitors’ behaviour is often described in terms of the material damage

they inflict on Odysseus’

estate, but it is almost equally often

described in terms of hybris and dishonour.

As for the confiscation of

Briseis, it is implied a few times that it was motivated by greed, and there are hints that it was unjust, but throughout the Iliad the matter is far more often discussed in terms of the dishonour inflicted upon

Akhilleus.

To

the poet,

at any rate, this dimension

of the quarrel

appeared crucial.

It is significant that the struggle for respect is fought without regard for material advantage. Several conflicts involve purely symbolic forms of deference.

Where

material interests are at stake, the actions of the

contenders show that these are not their main concern.

Telemakhos is

supposed to retaliate for what the suitors have done to him, even if it

means that he will be killed and that his property will fall to his enemies. The killer of Orsilokhos retaliates for an attempt to confiscate his booty, but his motive is not to preserve his wealth, for he flees the country at once, leaves half his property behind and pays a high price for his passage abroad. When Poseidon feels offended by Zeus, he is prepared to fight his brother (XV.185-99), although he knows that he cannot win

(VIII.209-11).

Apparently, respect ranks more highly than property:

disrespect must be avenged, even at great material cost.

We may conclude that the violence of Homeric society is due, not to a scarcity of resources, nor to competitiveness pure and simple, but to the fact that competitiveness is combined with the notion that deference is an integral part of Status.

Separately, neither competition nor a demand for deference need to produce conflict. If the heroes had been highly competitive, but sought only fame (kleos), there would have been far less scope for conflict.

125

One cannot acquire fame by compulsion : all one can do is strive to excel and hope that one will be highly regarded and well-spoken of by many people for a long time to come. If the heroes had sought deference - as indeed all men do - but not been competitive, there would also have been less scope for conflict. They might have treated one another with due respect, as defined by the norms, and not been too concerned with occasional lapses, nor too keen to get more respect than others willingly give.

In combination, however, the two elements are bound to lead to violence. Unlike fame, deference can be enforced; lapses and deliberate denials of deference can be punished or avenged. Where deference is a crucial part of social status, and social status is the object of competition, coercion and resistance to coercion are bound to be commonplace. If our own society, which is quite competitive in matters of status, is much less violent in this respect than Homeric society, it may be because, to us, status is far less dependent on others’ respect. We tend

to

perceive

social

status

as

an

almost

wholly

abstract

position.

Deference is of course involved in our relationships with others, but it is conceptually cut off from our social status and hardly an object of competition. In Homeric society, the two are not distinguished, and the

result is conflict.

126 7. THE ETHICS OF ANGER "Anger is to heroic what sex is to Victorian morality” (Mueller 1984: 33). In the epics, anger, not sex, is the dangerous, uncontrollable drive that rules men's lives. Anger, if anything, is what the epics are about. Since in contemporary middle-class culture anger is not a matter of much literary or philosophical interest, classicists are inclined to look for

some more ‘meaningful’ subject beneath the surface of the narrative. "If the Iliad were merely the story of a man who lost his temper over a girl... it

would never have attained the dimensions of greatness that mankind has granted it.“ (Arieti 1987: 1-2)

Some

have found in the Iliad the story of a man alienated from his

society and struggling to create a new system of values; others have seen in it a discourse on dealing with death. !2 The Odyssey is widely

interpreted evil. 12

as a relatively But

whatever

simple

else one

tale of the triumph may

want

to read

of good

into the Iliad,

subject as described in the proem is "the wrath of Akhilleus”

over its

and its

destructive consequences (I.1-5). The Odyssey, which calls itself the story of "a man who wandered far and wide” (1.1), in fact is almost wholly devoted to a tale of revenge. Ancient audiences, I believe, would have understood the epics as stories of anger and revenge, not of

alienation, death and justice - and they would have found the poems no less fascinating and meaningful for it.

The heroes show great anger !24 at signs of disrespect.

Most Homeric

men would presumably feel anger spontaneously, but not all of them do. While Patroklos even as a child has such a temper that he kills another

boy over a game, Telemakhos, as a young man, seems to feel no anger at the suitors who have invaded his home. He resigns himself to the idea that he is too weak to deal with them. Despondently, he eats and drinks

in their company

(1.114;

2.305),

and does no more than day-dream

about his father coming back and expelling the suitors (1.115-7, 163-5). Athena visits him with the express purpose of instilling some "spirit" (menos) in the young man (1.88-9). She reminds him that the suitors’ behaviour ought to raise his indignation (1.228-9), and tells him that he must not pin his hopes on his father, but take action himself (1.267-70).

127

She suggests that he should ultimately try to kill the suitors "whether by means of cunning or straightforwardly" (1.295-6), and she puts "spirit and courage in his heart" (1.320-1). As a result, Telemakhos begins to resist the suitors and refuses to give up even when his first attempts are unsuccessful. "Now that... my spirit has grown inside me, I shall try to set the demons of death on you" (2.314-6). From this moment on, he continues to show hostility to the suitors, despite the risk to his life. 125

Apparently, Telemakhos needs to learn to be angry, and to show it. Some

men

may

never

learn.

Paris,

brother Hektor finds him at home,

for one,

does

not.

When

his

while outside battle is raging, he

assumes that Paris has retired from combat out of anger. Paris, however, explains that he is neither angry nor indignant : he is merely distressed (VI.326-36). As an adult, Paris still displays the 'childish' attitude of Telemakhos as a boy : his distress is not accompanied by anger, no doubt because he has "no sense" and is unconcerned with the "indignation" other people feel at his behaviour and the “many ugly things" they say about him (VI.349-53). Paris, one might say, is not properly socialised. 126 While we learn to see anger as a disruptive and largely undesirable emotion, which one experiences spontaneously but must try to repress, the heroes are taught to see it as a emotion they must express in certain circumstances, if they are to be regarded as real men. At the same time, they are aware that anger can get out of control and have catastrophic consequences. Preparing Hektor's corpse for its

return to Troy, Akhilleus fears that he might kill Priamos if the old man shows any sign of anger at the sight of his dead son.

He therefore makes

sure that the body is kept from view (XXIV.582-6).

He knows himself

well enough to realise that he cannot control his anger even if he wants to.

There is a notion that people who act violently have allowed themselves to “give in" to their sense of power or their feeling of hybris : they get carried away, as we would say. 127 'Iron itself draws a man’ is a proverbial-sounding phrase used in the Odyssey (16.294;

19.13), meaning that the pull of weapons may lead a man to violence despite himself. Though men who enjoy conflict are hated (1.176-7; V.890-1; IX.63-4), strife, "gnawing at the spirit", keeps escalating. Strife "raises herself a little at first, and then her head touches the sky and she walks on earth” (IV.442-3). Even Akhilleus curses anger :

128

“If only strife [eris] would vanish from gods and men - and anger, which drives even a man of sense to act brutally, and which, much sweeter than honey seeping down, spreads in men's hearts like smoke.” (XVIIT. 107-10)

Characteristic are the two complementary pieces of advice offered to Akhilleus by his father, when he leaves home to join the army. “My son, Athena and Hera will give you strength if they wish, but you must keep in check the proud spirit in your chest, for friendliness is better. You must abandon

harmful strife, so that the Argives, young and old, will honour you more highly." (IX.254-8)

That is one norm. 128 At the same time, Akhilleus is exhorted "always to be the best and superior to others" (XI.784), and it is of course precisely this pursuit of superiority which requires a man to become angry whenever he perceives a lack of respect. Anger, then, is an emotion

both dangerous

and

indispensable

in Homeric

society.

The

moral,

psychological and practical problems posed by it are explored in some

depth in the epics. (1) THE MORAL BOUNDARIES OF ANGER The range of expressions of anger runs from the ubiquitous "scowling" at one's opponent 129, via insulting, threatening, robbing, beating and

wounding

him, to killing him and mutilating his corpse.

In extreme

fury, one may wish to eat one's enemy, but cannibalism remains in the

realm of angry fantasy (IV.34-6; XXII.346-7; XXIV.212-13). A general rule appears to be that the intensity of anger displayed must be in proportion to the gravity of the offence.

Even the least expression

of anger may be out of place in a petty altercation. regarded which of according prize is

Mere insults are

as improper in the quarrel between Idomeneus and Aias about the two has the sharper eyesight. One of the reasons why, to Nestor, Agamemnon should not have confiscated Akhilleus' "because the Akhaians first gave the prize to him” (i.e.

Akhilleus, 1.276). Apparently, Nestor reasons that, while Agamemnon has a right to be angry, Akhilleus has a right to his prize, and robbing him of this is too extreme a show of anger in the circumstances. 139 On the other hand, the most violent expressions of anger may be acceptable when the offence is serious. Odysseus in his rage slaughters all his wife's suitors, even the one man among them who had abstained

129

from outrages. There is not a hint of criticism of this action. The twelve slave-women who have slept with the suitors are hanged. A "most pitiful" death, says the poet, and he describes how "their feet kicked a while - not for very long" (XXII.472-3). Telemakhos explains that to kill them with the sword would mean giving them "a clean death", which they do not deserve (461-4). Melanthios, a slave who had abetted the suitors, has his genitals "ripped out” and his nose, ears and feet cut off (XXT1I.474-7). Again there is no suggestion that such ferocity is anything but legitimate.

Akhilleus' way of venting upon the Trojans his anger at the death of Patroklos does go beyond what is acceptable. Initially, he vows to avenge his friend's death by bringing him Hektor's head and executing twelve prisoners to be burnt with Patroklos on his funeral pyre

(Xvm.334-7).

Mutilation and decapitation of a dead enemy is a not

uncommon practice.

It is always performed or threatened as a deliberate

act of revenge, and appears to provoke no criticism. 131

The execution

of prisoners is a unique gesture, but passes with little comment. When the poet says that Akhilleus "planned bad things” (kaka, XXIII.175-6)

for these men, he almost certainly means bad for the victims. however,

appears to change his mind.

Akhilleus,

Instead of cutting off Hektor's

head, he ties the body to his chariot by means of leather straps passed through the heels of the corpse, and for twelve days drags it around Patroklos' tomb three times every day at dawn. Otherwise, the body is left to lie exposed, face down, at all times (XXIII.24-6; XXIV.12-18). The poet as narrator still expresses no criticism, remarking only that

Akhilleus

"planned

ugly

things

[aeikea)

for

Hektor"

(XXII.395;

XXII.24) - meaning mutilation ugly to see and suffer, rather than morally repugnant to inflict. 532 Those who are on Hektor's side, however, are made to voice strong opinions on Akhilleus' behaviour. “He has savagery heart...” "He is a

in his chest an immoderate heart and an unbending will; he knows only [agria], like a lion letting himself be ruled by his great strength and proud (XXIV.40-3) raw-meat eater [omestes] and cannot be trusted." (XXTV.207)

He is accused of having "eradicated pity" and having no sense of respect (XXIV.44, 207-8). Apollo, who supports the Trojans, complains that Akhilleus' anger is out of proportion to his suffering : many people who

130

have borne greater losses than he have been able to "let go" after mourning, yet Akhilleus persists in raging against a dead man. This is "by no means a fine or good thing for him to do”, and the gods ought to be indignant at him "for he shames dumb earth" (XXIV.46-54). This is a partisan view, but even those who are on Akhilleus' side do not entirely disagree. Hera argues that the gods must give greater

honour to Akhilleus

than to Hektor

and therefore

let him do as he

pleases, but she accepts that the gods ought to have been indignant at

Akhilleus'

behaviour

if they

had

held

both

men

in

equal

honour

(XXIV.55-7). 13 By implication, the non-partisan view, the judgement of one who does not favour one side above the other, would be that

Akhilleus has gone too far in his abuse of Hektor. At the same time, the debate between Hera and Apollo makes clear that an ‘objective’ moral judgement of Akhilleus’ anger is overridden by

other considerations. It is only his enemies who criticise and seek to stop him. His friends will let him be as angry as he likes. 1% A few passages suggest that anger must be in proportion to the status of the offender as well. Hektor's mother exclaims that Akhilleus ought

to have had more respect for her son's corpse, since when he was killed "he was not behaving like a coward, but standing before the Trojans... thinking of neither flight nor evasion” (XXIV.214-6). The suitors’ offence of courting Odysseus' wife is aggravated, it seems, by the fact that they are his inferiors : "O popoi ! So they are eager to sleep in the

bed of a brave man, being weaklings themselves" (4.333-4; 17.1245). 1.5 Perhaps the particularly gruesome punishment suffered by the slaves who have sided with the suitors is inflicted not only because of the gravity of their offence, but also because of their low status.

Although there are limits to the expression of anger, then, a man who enjoys high status will be allowed to rage far more violently than a man

of low status; and a man's friends will support him even if he goes too far. (il) PITY A psychological restraint upon anger is compassion. Even the angriest man is capable of feeling pity (eleos) for his victims. The sight of

people suffering stirs up the sympathy and erodes the anger of those who made them suffer in the first place. Akhilleus is characterised as a "merciless"

(IX.632;

cf.

XI.664-5)

and

inhumanly

hard-hearted

man

(XV1.33-5), but even he feels pity when he sees Patroklos cry for the

131

suffering

Akhaians

(XVI.5).

He

finds that he cannot

although he had said he would (XVI.60-3).

remain

angry,

Later, his anger against

Hektor and his family also subsides when he feels pity for Priamos in his misery. 156

(πὴ RECONCILIATION An axiom stated more than once in the /liad is that, angry as he may be, a man must in principle be open to reconciliation. "The mind of a good man can be made to turn round" (XV.203). “Tame your great spirit; there is no need for you to have a merciless heart. Even the gods themselves can be brought round" (IX.496-7; cf. IX.158-9). An elaborate allegory is used to convince Akhilleus of the wisdom of forgiveness : "Entreaties [Litai] are lame, shrivelled, sideways-glancing daughters of great Zeus, and they occupy themselves with following Fatal Error [416] about. Fatal Error is strong and quick on her feet, which is why she gives them the slip and runs far ahead of them all; she beats them to it, and blinds people all over the earth.

Behind

her, the Entreaties make amends. He who treats the daughters of Zeus with respect when they arrive, him they praise highly and to him they listen when he calls upon them. But he who rejects them and flatly refuses - they go to Zeus and beg that Fatal Error may dog that man, so that he may be blinded and pay for it.” (IX.502-12)

The Entreaties represent a man who has made someone suffer, but now wishes to make peace. In a state of acute embarrassment, he approaches his victim with halting step (‘lame’), cowering (‘shrivelled’), and unable to look him in the eye (‘sideways-glancing'). The allegory says that, when approached in this manner, one ought to allow oneself to be reconciled, because (a) one will be praised for it, and (Ὁ) one will be done by as one does. If a man gives in to others’ entreaties, they will give in to his; if he rejects them, a time will come when he will have to beg for forgiveness only to find his pleas rejected. 137 While spelling out the idea that in principle it is good to make one's

peace with former enemies, the epics also make clear that in practice reconciliation will only take place under certain conditions. Agamemnon, for instance, makes no effort to placate Akhilleus, although he has come to realise that he himself, not Akhilleus, is

responsible for the quarrel between them (11.378).

Odysseus later tells

him

to make

that the

right

thing

to do

would

have

been

overtures

132

sooner : "In future, you will be more just [dikaioteros] towards others as

well, for it is nothing to be indignant about if a prince fully appeases a man, when one [i.e. a prince] has been the first to offend” (XIX.181-3). By contrast, Diomedes believes that even the belated approaches to Akhilleus are unnecessary, partly because to his mind Akhilleus has no

reason to be angry, and partly because in his opinion Akhilleus' support is not really needed. 138. While it may be ‘more just’ to make up to those whom one has wronged, evidently the rights and wrongs take second place to the politics of the situation. An important moral issue is the question of when one should allow oneself to be appeased by one's enemy. Two considerations are uppermost : the amount of compensation (poine, apoina, timé) one is offered, and the status of those who seek reconciliation. When

Agamemnon decides to patch up his quarrel with Akhilleus, he offers him spectacular gifts to make up for what he has done. Three men are sent to convey the offer. The first, Odysseus, lists the gifts. The second, Phoinix, tells Akhilleus : “If Agamemnon did not bring gifts,... I would not exhort you to cast aside your wrath and defend the Argives, much as they need you; but as it is he offers many here and now, and promises more to come... Until now, your being angry has

given no cause for indignation." (TX.515-23) He implies that to persist in anger rather than accept the gifts would arouse indignation. The third man, Aias, states the norm concretely : "A man will accept compensation even from the killer of his brother, or for the death of his own son. And the killer stays there in the community after paying a great deal, and the other man, having accepted compensation, restrains his heart and his proud spirit." (IX.632-6)

Phoinix adds a pragmatic reason for agreeing to a reconciliation. He recounts a story (IX.524-605), the point of which is that Akhilleus had better accept the gifts and rejoin battle, otherwise events may later force

him to join battle anyway, without receiving compensation. 139 The status of those who wish to make peace is stressed no less than the value of their gifts. Agamemnon argues that he ts superior to Akhilleus, who should therefore yield (IX.158-61). His envoys, aware that

Akhilleus does not recognise Agamemnon's superiority, tactfully avoid

133 using this argument. Instead, they stress their own status. Phoinix recalls how he has been a friend and tutor to Akhilleus (IX.434-95), and adds that *[Agamemnon] has sent the best men to plead with you. He chose them among the Akhaians, and of the Argives they are closest to you personally. should not shame the words and feet of these men." (TX.520-3)

from You

In the same vein, Aias assures Akhilleus that the envoys are his best friends and exhorts him to "respect the roof-beam" under which they are gathered (1X .640-2). Akhilleus expresses his agreement with Aias, that is to say, he accepts

that the gifts offered and the status of the envoys are strong reasons to give in (IX.643-5).

Nevertheless, he refuses to be reconciled.

Scholars

have variously argued that such a refusal constitutes an unequivocal breach

of Homeric

norms;

that Homeric

norms

leave a man

free to

accept or reject compensation as he sees fit; that the refusal is not so much a breach of norms as the beginning of a search for a new and higher morality. 19 This last view, appealing as it may be to the modern literary critic, does not stand up to examination. Akhilleus himself explains that he is unable to abide by the norms simply because he is too angry at having been dishonoured (IX.645-8). Over and over again, he complains that he feels "cheated", because he has not been treated with due respect (IX.307-45, 356-77). When he rejects the gifts, it is not because he has transcended a materialistic scale of values, but because no amount of gifts is enough to compensate him "until! Agamemnon has fully made up to me for the disgrace that pains my spirit” (DX.378-87). In other words, he will accept gifts eventually, but first Agamemnon must suffer more.

Hence, next day, when the Akhaians have indeed suffered another defeat, Akhilleus voices his hope for a renewed offer of compensation, and no more (X1.609-10; XVI.83-6). 14 That Akhilleus breaks no new ground is also apparent from the fact that Odysseus expects him to ignore the arguments stressed by the others. In his speech, Odysseus instead focuses on the plight of the army and argues that Akhilleus should rejoin battle out of pity (IX.22560). If he does, Agamemnon will give him many gifts. These are duly enumerated (260-99), but Odysseus immediately adds: “If you hate

[34

Agamemnon from the bottom of your heart, him and his gifts, then pity the other Pan-Akhaians” (300-6). If the view that Akhilleus searches for a new morality is untenable, so is the view that he acts entirely within the norms of Homeric society.

Aias calls his attitude “savage” (IX.629), He comments

that Agamemnon's

“implacable and bad” (636).

offer ("seven excellent women,

and

much else besides", [X.638-9) ought to be sufficient compensation for the loss of one woman. Diomedes sees Akhilleus' attitude as evidence of excessive pride (IX.699-700). Poseidon, when addressing Agamemnon, curses Akhilleus for not rejoining battle, adding that “he has no sense in him, not a bit" (XIV. 135-42). Akhilleus, then, does disregard certain moral standards, as well as pragmatic reasons for reconciliation, because his anger is too strong. Yet his breaking of the rules is not only predictable, but from a certain point of view even justifiable. When Poseidon is addressing a group of

lower-ranking Akhaian commanders, he tells them that all blame for the losses suffered as a consequence of Akhilleus’ continued refusal to fight lies with Agamemnon (XIII.107-14). In the sequel, too, Akhilleus' refusal is largely ignored. At the final reconciliation, Agamemnon takes all the blame, Akhilleus none. 142 It is Agamemnon, not Akhilleus, who is told to be ‘more just’ in future. Apparently, one can appeal to certain standards of behaviour in order to put an angry man under moral pressure to calm down, or in order to

make the victims of his anger feel that at least they have right on their side. But equally one can take the view that an angry man has the right to refuse any amount of compensation, and that those who provoked him remain responsible for the consequences of his anger. One may compare the trial scene depicted on the shield of Akhilleus. There, in a crowded town-square, the elders are sitting in judgement. "Two men were contending in a matter of compensation for a man who had been killed. One claimed that he was paying fully for it, and he was making this known to the people. The other refused to take anything. Both wanted to get a decision

from an arbitrator.“ (XVIII.498-501) 19 Each elder in turn gives his judgement.

No verdict is recorded, but it is

evidently

whether

far

compensation

from

simple

is right

to decide

or wrong.

Thus,

rejecting

the norms

an

offer

that govern

of the

135

expression of anger do not provide iron rules regarding reconciliation.

It

is good to be receptive to offers of gifts in compensation; whether it 18 right to accept or reject a particular offer, however, is a matter of opinion. (IV) SELF-CONTROL The Iliad features two men who fail to control their anger and suffer

the consequences. "Giving in to his proud spirit" (IX.109), Agamemnon believes that his power allows him to indulge his anger at Akhilleus and ignore his opponent's threats to take his contingent out of the war. "By all means run away ! ... I am not begging you to stay on my account; there are others with me, who will honour me - Zeus in particular... I pay no attention to you, and do not heed your resentment” (1.173-81).

He soon admits, however, that the chances of capturing Troy would be

much better if he and Akhilleus could co-operate (11.377-80), and when the fighting goes against the Akhaians he comes to realise that Zeus - for

reasons we shall discuss later - supports Akhilleus, not him. "I have made a fatal error [ate], I myself do not deny it. A man who is loved from the heart by Zeus is worth many men" (IX.115-8; cf.110; XIX.8691). The lesson is political rather than moral. Agamemnon has underestimated the power of one of his followers, and he pays the price. 14 Akhilleus admits that he cannot control his anger. For a long time it

seems as if this does not matter.

He has the power to be as angry as he

likes and to inflict immense suffering on Agamemnon and the rest of the Akhaians, all of whom he holds responsible for his humiliation. 145 Then

suddenly Patroklos is killed. To his mind, this cancels out all the satisfaction he had previously derived from harming his adversaries (XIX.56-8). He himself draws the moral, as we have already seen: anger is a bad thing (XVIII.107-10).

But the death of Patroklos had been

decreed by fate; it was not a direct result of Akhilleus' anger and it was not meant to teach Akhilleus a lesson. Akhilleus regrets having been angry, only because as a result he happened to be away from battle when Patroklos and his other companions needed him (XVIII.98-104). 14 If anger is bad, then, this is not because it is morally wrong, but because it may have unpredictable and unwelcome side-effects.

136

The Odyssey, by contrast I, illustrates the virtues of being able to control one's anger. Odysseus has this ability, and it enables him to defeat more than a hundred enemies almost single-handedly. His self-control is first tested in the cave of the Kyklops. When his men are killed and eaten before his very eyes, Odysseus, in his “proud spirit", wants to stab the monster in the heart, but checks himself when

he realises that if he kills the Kyklops, he will be left trapped inside the cave

(9.299-305).

This

feat of self-control

he later holds

up

as an

example to himself, when his anger is provoked again, this time by the spectacle of his slave-women leaving the house at night to go and sleep

with his enemies.

He is so furious that his heart "barks" (20.13-16), but

instead of killing the women (20.10-11), he beats his chest and tells his

heart that it should be able to bear this provocation since it put up with worse from the Kyklops (20.17-22). In all his encounters with the suitors and their hangers-on, while he is disguised as a beggar, Odysseus keeps his anger under control so as not

to betray his identity. like beating the man

He is kicked by Melanthios, but although he feels to death or smashing

contains himself (17.233-8).

his head to the ground,

he

A stool is thrown at him : “he shook his

head in silence, brooding evil" (17.462-5). He is made to fight and decides to knock out his opponent rather than kill him, so that the suitors

will not become suspicious (18.90-4). Another projectile flies at him, but he just inclines his head to avoid it and inwardly smiles "very sardonically” (20.299-302).

Telemakhos, too, manages to hold back his

anger until the opportunity arises to 7; 20.384-6). Not even Odysseus is perfect, Kyklops and believing himself safe, calls out to the Kyklops and reveals

kill the suitors by surprise (16.274though. Having escaped from the Odysseus, "with a resentful spirit", his name, ignoring his companions’

urgent advice against it. "They did not persuade my proud spirit", he says (9.491-505). Now that the Kyklops knows his opponent's name, he

appeals to Poseidon to kill or harm Odysseus, who is duly persecuted throughout

his

wanderings.

For once,

power of an enemy, and lets his anger consequences are disastrous.

Odysseus

run away

underestimates

with

him.

the

The

The obvious message is that, for pragmatic reasons, it is wise to keep one's anger in check, without of course suppressing it altogether.

137 (V) THE AUTHORITIES

A final bit of political wisdom offered by the epics is that one should suppress one's anger when told to do so by powerful third parties.

Neither Akhilleus nor Odysseus let go their anger until told to do so by the gods. Twice the gods intervene to restrain Akhilleus. The first time, Athena makes a startling appearance as she pulls Akhilleus' hair

and tells him not to draw his sword on Agamemnon (1.194-214). He replies : “One must obey your word, goddess, even if one is very angry in spirit, for it is better this way. He who obeys the gods, to him they listen well" (1.216-8). The second time, Thetis is sent to tell him on behalf of Zeus that all the gods object to his persistence in venting on Hektor's corpse his anger about the death of Patroklos; he must now release the body. His answer is : "So be it... if Zeus himself says so"

(XXTV.133-40).

Akhilleus’ anger has not subsided, and while arranging

the release he is on the brink of getting angry again and killing Hektor's father, but, as he makes clear, he swallows his anger in order to comply

with Zeus' command (XXIV.559-70, 582-6). Odysseus’ anger, too, is finally ended only after Zeus, through Athena, orders him to stop

fighting (24.537-45).

Akhilleus obeys the gods because he hopes to gain

their favour; Zeus expects him to do so out of fear (XXIV.116). 14 What applies to relations between gods and princes probably applies by implication to relations between princes and common men as well : when a prince intervenes in one's quarrels, it is advisable to stay on his good side and swallow one's anger. So far as the ethics of anger and conflict are concerned, "the heroic code” turns out to be far from “complete and unambiguous” (pace Finley

1977 : 113). The heroes are encouraged to compete, and taught to feel and show anger where the norms of society require it. They are also encouraged not to be quarrelsome, and not to be too violent. They must show compassion, be willing to make peace, keep their anger under control, and submit to superiors and higher authorities. It might not be impossible to reconcile all these demands, but it would certainly not be easy, and the existence of rival norms would create uncertainties and differences of opinion as to what is morally the right thing to do in given circumstances. Heroic anger, while subject to considerable restraints, tends to get out of hand. Why this should be so is perhaps explained in Akhilleus'

138

answer to those who tell him him if he swallows his anger not need that honour at all. allotted by Zeus" (LX.607-8). for him against his enemies,

to relent because the Akhaians will honour for their sake (IX.602-5; cf. 257-8) : "I do I think that I am honoured with a portion That ‘portion’ is Zeus' undivided support which enables him to continue doing them

harm. Akhilleus is saying that, given a choice between the respect that he may earn for allowing himself to be appeased, and the respect and fear that he may inspire by doing as much damage as he can, he prefers

the latter.

In fact, Akhilleus is making fundamentally the same choice as

those who act in Aybris : moral constraints are set aside to make

more

room for a display of force. The greater the power, the greater the temptation to disregard moral issues, give free rein to one's anger, and apply maximum force. Hence it is said that “even the gods themselves can be appeased, although they have greater excellence, honour and force” than mortals (IX.497-501), implying that those who have the greatest power and demand the highest

respect are least inclined to moderation in anger. The choice is certainly not always a conscious one, as is clear from the heroes’ sense of being carried away by anger or Aybris.

I would suggest

that these emotions seem uncontrollable because of the ambivalent values of the heroic world. Hybris and excessive anger are censured; simultaneously, however, displays of force, of personal power to harm, are rewarded with respect and prestige. Torn between the demands of

morality and the demands of status-competition, the heroes escape by allowing themselves to give in to their emotions and ‘involuntarily’ giving conspicuous displays of force that go beyond the bounds set by

convention.

8. THE JUSTICE

MIGHT

OF

MEN

:

STRENGTH,

CONNECTIONS

AND

Muscular strength is widely seen as the distinguishing characteristic and most important asset of males. In Homeric society, physical strength appears to be even more important than in most other societies.

A tall, muscular body is the Homeric

ideal of masculine beauty; the

heroes need strength not only in order to fulfil their role as warriors and

139

to compete as athletes, but also to protect their property and privileges, and above all to enforce respect. Indeed, a superficial reading of the epics might suggest that muscle is all a man needs to achieve great honour.

This is certainly the impression given by the image of Zeus, who rules among the gods by virtue of being the eldest, but who, if challenged, is

able to defend his position single-handedly, thanks to his brute strength. “How about trying me, gods, so that you may all see for yourselves 7 Hang a golden rope down from the sky and take hold of it, all you gods and goddesses. No, you would not pull down Zeus, the highest of rulers, from the sky to the plain, not even if you strained yourselves to the utmost. But when I in turn would want to pull in earnest, I could pull up the earth itself, the sea itself. After that, I might tie the rope around a peak of Olympos and all these things would then be up in the air. So much superior to the gods and superior to men am I." (VIII.18-27)

He recalls a time when he used his superior strength to punish Hera : "I hung you up high, let two anvils hang down from your feet and tied an unbreakable golden chain to your hands. You hung among the sky and the clouds. The other gods on great Olympos were indignant. They stood around unable to untie you. Whomever I caught, I would grab and hurl from the threshold, and thus they fell to earth helplessly.” (XV. 18-24; cf. XIV.257)

Zeus also disposes of a unique weapon, the thunderbolt, which can inflict pain and lasting disability even upon immortals (e.g. VIII.402-5), but he does not need to rely on this to hold his own. 149 The gods accept

that he is “decidedly the best in power and strength” (XV.105-8; VIII.210-11).

cf.

On earth, the devastating defeat suffered by the Akhaians as a result of

Akhilleus' angry withdrawal from battle, is attributed to the loss of the fighting power of Akhilleus personally. Agamemnon is repeatedly warned not to offend Akhilleus because he is "a great bulwark of the Akhaians" (1.282-4; IX.104-11). Akhilleus himself contrasts Trojan successes during his absence with Trojan weakness "when I did battle among the Akhaians" (IX.351-5). Patroklos later enters the fray wearing Akhilleus' armour, and the Trojans panic in the belief that Akhilleus himself has returned (X1.798-801; XVI.40-3, 278-83). When Akhilleus does return, Poulydamas counsels the Trojans to retreat at once : "now I am terribly afraid of Akhilleus" (XVIII.261). In the final battle, the poet

140

mentions

no Akhaian warrior but Akhilleus,

who

seems

to defeat the

Trojans all by himself. 159 The importance of physical strength is again evident in the fact that old men without their sons, boys without their fathers, and women without their menfolk suffer at the hands of aggressive neighbours. It is assumed that the deaths of Hektor and Akhilleus mean that their families will lose their property and honour, and this is in fact the fate of Odysseus’ family

when he is presumed dead. On his return, Odysseus almost singlehandedly wipes out his enemies. Akhilleus imagines that he could have done the same, if only he had survived to come home.

Thus the personal, informal power which features so prominently in the struggle for status, at first sight seems to rest almost entirely on personal physical strength. 151 But this is not the full picture. As Joseph Bonanno wrote of his life as godfather of a New York mafia family : "You need much more than your masculinity... to survive in the Volcano. You need friends.” (Bonanno 1983: 184) "The greatest avenue of upward mobility was not so much talent... as it was friendship, what Americans call connections.” (ibid.: 63)

Connections are essential even to Homeric heroes. Ties of kinship and friendship have been discussed in the previous

chapter, and it hardly needs saying that these ties also involve mutual support in conflict. It is said that "a man relies on his fight, even when a great conflict develops" (16.97-8, revenge, fathers, brothers, sons, cousins and in-laws another : "for this is a disgrace which will become known generations, if we do not avenge the deaths of our sons

(24.433-5).

A

few

of Odysseus’

friends

in Ithaka

brothers in a 115-16). In stand by one even to future and brothers"

try to support

Telemakhos against the suitors, and it is jokingly suggested that Telemakhos might “bring some helpers from Pylos or even from Sparta, since he is so very keen" (2.326-7). 12 Kinsmen and friends are potentially a great source of power. In their quarrel, Agamemnon and Akhilleus both rely on the support of

their friends and war-time retainers. Two thousand five hundred Myrmidons (XV1.168-70) loyally withdraw from battle when Akhilleus tells them to, even though they themselves are eager to continue fighting

(XV1.200-7).

Akhilleus demands this loyalty.

When one of his closest

14]

friends among his followers Agamemnon, he tells him :

pleads

with

"Do not... do favours for the hero Agamemnon.

or else you may be hated by me, your friend.

him

to

make

peace

with

You must not be a friend to him,

It is nght for you to harm, with me,

whomever harms me.” (IX.613-5)

That the withdrawal of all the Myrmidons gives Akhilleus' fury a greater sting is obvious and is in any case acknowledged by Akhilleus himself. He is aware that his men form a powerful force even without him, and to prevent this from becoming

too obvious,

he instructs Patroklos,

who

is

to lead them into battle, to do no more than drive back the Trojans a little, and not to follow this up with a sustained attack. If Patroklos and

the Myrmidons are too successful in his absence, says Akhilleus, "you will make me more dishonoured" (XVI.87-90). 133 Akhilleus' personal power thus to a considerable extent rests on the combined physical force of his men. So does the informal power which enables Agamemnon to dishonour Akhilleus in the first place. He threatens that, if Akhilleus does not hand over his prize quietly, "I shall come with more men to take her myself; and that will be even worse for him” (1.324-5). These men would no doubt be drawn from his own contingent. Akhilleus' comment that Agamemnon is able to rob him because he surpasses him in power (XV1.53-4), therefore, presumably refers to the informal power

Agamemnon derives from the backing of his troops : his contingent is twice as large as Akhilleus' (11.576). Agamemnon also seems to rely on the continued support of the rest of the army, but this turns out to be something of a miscalculation, 154 In time of peace, princes would not have large numbers of men at their

direct command,

and they would presumably be able to rely only on

kinsmen, close friends and immediate dependants. To gain wider support, they would need to appeal to the people at large. Telemakhos calls an assembly and makes such an appeal once, but the people,

although sympathetic,

fail to support him

actively.

Their

inactivity

causes some puzzlement. Telemakhos is twice asked why the people are not helping him : is it because he has not asked for help, or do they for some obscure reason hate him 7 (3.214-5; 16.95-6) The question is

never

really answered.

When

the suitors

have

tried and

failed to

142

assassinate Telemakhos, however, it is felt that he will now almost certainly be able to mobilise the people and get them to expel the suitors

from

Ithaka

(16.375-84).

The

apparently not easily gained,

support

of the

people

at large

is

but it is potentially a greater source of

power than the support of one's friends. 155 Connections among the gods are in the epic world a far greater asset than any other source of power. Akhilleus' success in making Agamemnon and the Akhaians suffer is in fact almost entirely due to the support of Zeus, rather than to his own prowess or the quality of his troops. In the first battle of the /liad, the Akhaians do very well without the Myrmidons. Diomedes dominates the fighting, and the Trojans are in such desperate straits that the elders' wives organise an impromptu sacrifice to Athena and pray that she may rescue Troy and let Diomedes be killed (VI.269-80, 286-311). Not until the next battle does the tide turn, and then it is entirely Zeus’ doing. Agamemnon eventually gives in because he realises that “he is worth many men, a man whom Zeus loves from the heart" (IX.116-17). Without Zeus‘ intervention, Akhilleus’ absence would not have been felt particularly strongly, and his anger would have been ineffectual. 15%

Odysseus’

anger too, for all his courage,

cleverness,

and skilful

archery, would have been futile, had it not been for divine support. Telemakhos points out that "it is not possible for two men to fight those who are numerous and strong... No, you must consider whether you can think of some helper" (16.243-4, 256-7). Odysseus answers : "Will Athena and Zeus suffice for us, or shall I think of some other heiper 7"

(16.260-1).

While showing confidence before Telemakhos,

Odysseus

privately worries about his chances of escaping revenge once he has killed his enemies (20.41-3). Athena reassures him that with her aid he

could defeat even "fifty bands of men” (20.45-51; cf. 13.386-96), and later she does indeed play a crucial role in defeating the suitors and their relatives. 157

It may seem inappropriate to speak of mortals having ‘connections’ among the gods, insofar as ‘connections’ has overtones of manipulated personal obligations, patronage and favouritism. But these things are in fact involved in relationships between gods and heroes. The gods have their own mortal kinsmen (mostly sons), friends, protégés and loyal

worshippers whom they seek to help, and enemies whom they seek to harm.

Gods

may

need

to weigh

conflicting

obligations

against

one

143

another; they may also find themselves opposed by other gods. A certain amount of political manoeuvring may be required before interventions in human affairs can be carried out. 159 We are dealing here with an obviously fantastic element of the Homeric world, but one that is worth a closer look on the assumption - which is generally accepted - that relations between gods and mortals are largely analogous to relations between princes and commoners. Akhilleus defeats Agamemnon because Zeus owes him, or rather his mother, a favour, and because Zeus is able, though somewhat reluctant, to impose his will on the other gods by means of threats and at the cost

of creating considerable hostility to himself. Later, Akhilleus gets away with his excessively furious mutilation of Hektor's corpse, because the gods feel obliged to support him more strongly than Hektor : Akhilleus’ parents are personally close to the gods, while Hektor merely is someone who has offered the gods many gifts. Akhilleus' Connections

(a) Agamemnon believes that he can do without Akhilleus, “for on my side there are others who will honour me, Zeus above all” (1.174-5). If Agamemnon

expects

Zeus

to support

him,

the reason

is presumably

that

Zeus, as ruler of the gods, is supposed to support his mortal counterparts

against their enemies. 159 Akhilleus’ claim on Zeus, however, is implicitly stronger. His mother, Thetis, had once saved Zeus from a coup by Hera, Poseidon and Athena, who had somehow managed to tie him up. Thetis had fetched the help of a hundred-hander, Briareos, who then sat beside Zeus as a sort of body-guard

and frightened off the other gods (1.396-406). Akhilleus sends his mother to Zeus with instructions to remind him of the service she had rendered him on that occasion, and to ask him to return the favour now, by letting the Trojans win in order to hurt Agamemnon (1.393-5, 407-12). She duly does so (5034), and Zeus agrees to “honour™

Akhilleus (e.g. 353-4, 505, 508) in order

not to make Thetis feel "dishonoured” (516). Zeus’ decision antagonises several gods who for reasons of personal animosity seek the destruction of Troy, and do not like to see Trojans winning even temporarily. Hera and Athena are hostile to Troy on account of the judgement of Paris, who had declared Aphrodite more beautiful than they (XXIV.25-30). Hera argues that Zeus should let her have her way from time to time because of her senior position among the gods as the eldest goddess and the wife of Zeus (IV.57-61). Athena-complains that Zeus ought to show more consideration towards her, in return for all the help she has given him in the past (VIII.360-73).

144

Poseidon, too, has a grudge against Troy, on account of Laomedon's refusal to give him his wages for building the walls of the city (XXI.441-58). In addition, he is under some obligation to help the Akhaians, because they offer him "many pleasing gifts at Helike and Aigai” (VIII.201-4). He complains that Zeus has no right to impose his will on him, because they are equals (XV.185-99). These three gods regularly try to go against Zeus’ will, but in the end they submit, partly because of Zeus’ acknowledged superior force, partly because Zeus is the eldest of the gods (XV.166,

204), and partly because they do not

wish to fight among themselves about the affairs of mortals (1.573-6). (δ) When the gods debate if and how they should put a stop to Akhilleus' mutilation of Hektor’s body, they discuss the question in terms of how much “honour” they owe to each of the two men. Apollo feels that the gods should help Hektor : "Did Hektor never burn for you the thigh-bones of unblemished cattle and goats ?” (XXIV.32-5). Hera disagrees. She argues that Akhilleus deserves greater honour than Hektor, and that the gods should therefore allow him to mutilate his enemy if he wants to (XXIV.55-7). Akhilleus deserves greater honour, she says, because "Hektor is a mortal and sucked at a woman's breast, but Akhilleus is the

offspring of a goddess whom I myself raised and nurtured and gave in marriage to a man, Peleus, who was loved deeply by the immortals. You were all present at the wedding, gods." Turning to Apollo,

she reminds him that he too had been there, and she

accuses him of being "a friend of bad men" and "always unreliable” (XXIV.58-63). This presumably means that Apollo ought not to be taking sides with Hektor, because Hektor is of lower status than Akhilleus ("a bad

man”), and because Apollo has been a friend of Akhilleus’ family and should not now betray this friendship, proving to be “unreliable”. Thus, while Apollo maintains that Hektor's many sacrifices put the gods under an obligation to him, Hera advances two reasons for siding with Akhilleus : he is of better birth, and he is a close friend.

Zeus accepts both points of view, and in the end imposes a compromise. He tells Hera that "there shall not be one honour” (XXIV.66); in other words, Akhilleus will receive the greater deference. But at the same time he

agrees with Apollo that "Hektor used to be dearest to the gods of all the mortals who live in Troy; for so he was to me, since he never failed to give

me the gifts that are my own; my altar never lacked a fair feast of libations and fat" (XX1V.66-70). The compromise is that Hektor will be honoured in that his corpse will be spared further indignities; Akhilleus will be honoured as well in that the gods will not simply steal away the body, but arrange for Hektor's father to come and pay a large ransom for it. By this arrangement, Zeus intends to bring "glory" (kudos) to Akhilleus, and retain the "respect and friendship” of Thetis (XXIV.71-6, 104-11).

145

Akhilleus' power thus rests primarily on his mother's connections among the gods. She has been raised by Hera almost as a daughter, and Zeus is in her debt. Both Hera and Zeus have other obligations too. Zeus owes support to Akhilleus’ enemies - Agamemnon is a protégé of his, and Hektor must be rewarded for all his gifts - but he rates his obligation to Thetis

more

highly

than

the others.

Hera,

on the other

hand,

is not

prepared to help Akhilleus if this means helping her enemies, the Trojans, as well; she does support Akhilleus when there is no longer a

conflict of interest.

The balance of power among the gods, although

precarious, is in Akhilleus’ favour. The power of Odysseus is based on similar, though less complicated, connections. Athena and Zeus support him, partly in return for the many sacrifices he has offered them (1.60-7; 4.761-7), and partly because they admire his qualities, which are much like Athena's own (1.66; 13.330-2, 296-9). Poseidon, however, wants him to suffer, in

punishment for the blinding of Polyphemos, his son (1.68-75; 9.526-36). For a long time, Athena does not dare to help Odysseus openly, "because she respected her father's brother" (6.329-30; 13.339-43), but eventually, in Poseidon's absence, she persuades Zeus to come to Odysseus’ aid. With Zeus and the other gods against him, Poseidon is forced to stop persecuting Odysseus (1.19-27, 48-79; 5.282-96, 375-9). In Odysseus’ subsequent confrontation with the suitors, the situation is even simpler : Athena and Zeus support him, none of the gods support his enemies. 19 It should be noted that, although the gods mostly consult Zeus before

carrying out their plans, and his decisions are final, divine interventions are not always dictated by Zeus. He could in principle impose his will all the time, but he does not do so, wary of provoking too much hostility. In the case of Troy, Zeus himself would rather spare the city, because more than any other people the Trojans used to honour him with sacrifices (TV.44-9); yet the strength of feeling among some of the other gods is such that Zeus chooses to let them have their way,

quarrel may

"so that this

not later become a great conflict between you and me”

(TV.37-8). 161 At another time, he toys with the idea of circumventing fate to save the life of his son Sarpedon, but is deterred by the prospect of the "terrible resentment" that other gods will feel at not being allowed to save their own sons (XVI.433-49), 162

146

In conflict between mortals, gods support their kin and friends regardless of the rights and wrongs of the issue. 18 Poseidon, for one,

avenges the blinding of his son by Odysseus, although this had been an act of self-defence, after Polyphemos had refused Odysseus hospitality,

eaten six of his friends, and said some rude things about gods into the bargain. Surprisingly, in view of this, epic characters state more than once that the gods, and Zeus above all, are concerned to uphold justice in the

world. "The blessed gods do not like terrible deeds, but they honour justice [dik2] and proper behaviour among men." (14.83-4)

"The gods, looking like visitors from abroad, taking all kinds of shapes, make their way around the cities, looking out for arrogant aggression [hybris) and for good order [eunomia] among men.” (17.485-7)

The heroes think of their struggles in terms of right and wrong. Agamemnon and Menelaos believe that the gods will cause Troy to fall because the Trojans have first broken the laws of hospitality and then their oaths as well, and thus are doubly in the wrong. Odysseus, his

family and friends believe that the gods have engineered the defeat of the suitors in order to punish them for their misdeeds. 1 But the gods themselves, as we have seen, do not discuss the outcome of the Trojan War or of Odysseus’ battle against the suitors in terms of doing justice among mortals. To the gods, intervention on earth is a matter of helping friends and hurting enemies.

Scholars often say that the notion of gods upholding justice is incompatible with the actual motivations ascribed to Homeric gods. 165. It seems to me, however, that the gods simply try to do two things at once : they do seek to punish mortals who act unjustly or improperly, but they also wish to support their kin and friends. When it is not possible to do both, obligations to kin and friends have priority over demands of justice. This, I think, is implied in Hera's remark that the gods ought to do something about Akhilleus' improper behaviour towards Hektor only if they wish to honour the two men equally highly (XXTV.55-7). In other words, there are certain ‘absolute’ standards of justice, of proper behaviour among men, which the gods recognise and

- will

uphold,

transgressor

but and

only

when

they

victim

- or

no

have

equal

obligations

to

obligations either

party,

to

both which

147

amounts to the same thing.

The gods will not uphold ‘absolute’ justice

when doing so would adversely affect the interests of their friends and kin. 166 The overriding importance of personal loyalties means that justice can prevail only when a victim of aggression has the connections to make it

prevail.

There may be a certain cynicism in the juxtaposition of mortal

characters who express the hope and belief that the gods will punish offenders, and gods who hold personal obligations paramount to such an extent that they barely even mention justice. On the other hand, it is no coincidence, of course, that right does prevail over wrong when Troy falls and the suitors are slaughtered : the story-tellers make sure that on the whole the heroes have better connections on Olympos than the villains. 167 Assuming that there are parallels between the politics of Olympos and the politics of a Homeric town, it follows that, just as connections among the gods are the greatest asset of a prince, so connections among princes are the greatest source of power for a commoner. Princes would try to

help those commoners with whom they have certain ties of kinship and friendship - presumably rather distant kinship and instrumental friendship - and those who ply them with gifts of wine, sheep and goats. The existence of such personal obligations, rather than sheer

arbitrariness, would explain why it is said that “it is the rule" for a prince to “love” one man and “hate” another (4.689-92).

When asked for help by some commoner, a prince would first consult his peers,

action.

and

the monarch

in particular,

on the proposed

course

of

If it runs counter to the interests of other princes or their

‘friends' among the commoners, the balance of power among the princes

determines which side ‚gets its way. The monarch would have a decisive say in the matter, but he would have to try to satisfy the claims of all princes concerned. The analogy with the gods also suggests that princes would

seek

to avoid

fighting

among

themselves

over

the

affairs

of

commoners. When

outweigh

it comes

to taking

considerations

sides in a quarrel,

of justice.

personal

This not only follows

obligations

from the

analogy with the gods, but is directly attested. Odysseus at one point pretends to the suitors that in his youth he too "committed many outrages, giving in to my force and power, relying on my father and my

brothers" (18.139-40).

The implication is that he expected his family to

148

support him no matter what he did, no matter whom

that the suitors expect the same from their families.

he offended, and

These are not

unrealistically high expectations, as becomes clear when, after the suitors have been killed, more than half their relatives take up arms to take revenge. They do so despite knowing that their kinsmen have behaved outrageously, and despite their terror at hearing that the gods themselves have assisted in the slaughter (24.413-66). The implication for the administration of justice in a Homeric town is that princes in their role of judges would seek to enforce the law, but also to further the

interests of their friends.

Hence, while the ideal prince always succeeds

in upholding justice (19.109-11), it is only to be expected that at times

justice is “driven out by force” (XVI.386-8). 168 In situations of conflict, then, a man would rarely stand alone. Regardless of the rights and wrongs of his case, he would have a circle of kinsmen and friends strongly committed to his support. A prince might in addition draw on the services of commoners who are obliged to him or are eager to do him a favour; as a last resort, he might call upon

the people at large to back him. A commoner, for his part, might get the help of one or two influential princes whose friendship he has in some way cultivated. With such networks of connections involved, any single individual's physical strength could hardly be a decisive factor in settling any particular conflict, or in the struggle for status generally. It is, for

instance, unlikely that Hektor's young son should almost immediately lose his property and status after his father's death, as Andromakhe imagines. After all, the boy would still be Priamos’ grandson, and his father's numerous brothers and brothers-in-law would surely stand by

him. 19

Thus, by contrasting her son's past happiness (XXII.500-4)

with an implausibly miserable future, Andromakhe stresses and exaggerates the importance of Hektor's physical strength to the wellbeing of his family. Andromakhe's distorted perspective springs from her grief at the death of her husband, but there is more to it than that. It

is also part of a general trend in the epics to exaggerate the importance of physical strength as a constituent of status. The /liad presents a picture of a Zeus stronger than all the other gods combined and therefore able to base his rule on strength of muscle. This is obviously unrealistic - no mortal monarch could have that kind of force. Moreover, this picture almost wholly ignores the other prop of

149

Zeus' power, which is briefly referred to in a few passages : the gods have as much regard for Zeus’ seniority of birth as for his superior strength. So too, the /liad stresses the prowess of Akhilleus and the damage it enables him to inflict upon his enemies. Again, not only is his prowess fantastic even by heroic standards, but we find that actually Akhilleus' connections matter more than his strength. Most interesting is the role of physical strength in the Odyssey. After the power of the gods, the prowess of Odysseus is most instrumental in saving his family and property. Yet it plays such an important role only because the circumstances are highly exceptional : Odysseus lacks nearly all the normal sources of power. He has no close male relatives to fall back

on,

neither

uncles

nor

brothers,

and

only

one

son

(16.117-20).

Several in-laws are mentioned - Penelope's brothers (15.16) and the husband of Odysseus’ sister (15.366-7) - but there is no question of them coming to the rescue. Odysseus is said to have many friends in Ithaka and abroad (19.238-40). Many of his local friends presumably followed

him to Troy and perished to a man on the voyage home.

Only three

remaining friends in Ithaka are mentioned (17.68-9), two of whom make some effort to help Telemakhos by making speeches against the suitors. As for his friends abroad, although Telemakhos visits two of the most powerful of these, Nestor and Menelaos, and although the suitors envisage the possibility of his receiving help from them, the support of these friends is neither asked nor offered. Odysseus moots the idea of going round the estate in secret to find out which of the slaves are still loyal; these might have provided manpower, but Telemakhos rejects the plan as too time-consuming (16.305-15). In

the event,

two

slaves

who

happen

to be

at hand

do

fight beside

Odysseus, and in the fight against the suitors' relatives they are joined by seven more (24.496-9). Finally, the people of Ithaka fail to come to Telemakhos' aid, although it is suggested that they might have been

expected to do so, 17 The story of the Odyssey posits an unusual situation in which the hero

has barely any kinsmen, and hardly any friends left; on top of that, the narrative deliberately ignores what would have been a real possibility in

Homeric

society:

mobilising

the

remaining

connections abroad, slaves, and local Odysseus is contrived; it serves to unrealistically crucial role. 171

relatives

and

friends,

population. The isolation of give the hero's prowess an

150

Poetic exaggeration of with exaggeration of Andromakhe's prediction of his father, and similar defend it, a household

the importance of strength goes hand the level of violence in heroic for her son, Akhilleus’ worries about passages, suggest that without a strong will immediately be swallowed up

in hand society. the fate man to by its

neighbours, and that without personal strength, a ruler will be toppled at once. That would be unlikely to happen in a society where networks of connections play a role as important as they do in the world of the heroes.

Physically weak men and families would not be targets of aggression so long as they were well-connected within and outside the community. Men would be less quick to resort to violence when conflict would involve not merely a one-to-one fight, but would draw into confrontation many supporters on both sides. Princes would have to be cautious about using force against their peers, when the outcome of a fight depended on how many supporters each side could persuade to join the fray, and whether or not either side could win the backing of the people at large. The involvement of many men would mean that every violent conflict would do immense damage. Also, as the quarrel of Agamemnon and Akhilleus shows, there would be a serious risk of miscalculating one's

chances of success - a much more serious risk than there would be if all depended on one’s own prowess.

Conflicts between commoners would

often be prevented from escalating by the intervention of princes.

When

either side made use of a contact in the ruling class, the princes - in the manner of Homeric gods - would take the matter in hand and impose a settlement agreed upon among themselves. The adversaries could only obey, in the way that Akhilleus and Odysseus obediently accept the settlements arranged for them by the gods. As for a hypothetical commoner fighting a prince, not only is there a norm which enjoins men not to oppose their superiors, but the disparity in personal power would

in itself be enough to make that an unlikely event. Homeric society would thus leave less room for physical violence than the epics seem to suggest. It is not by chance that violence is most common and most severe in clashes between gods and men, for gods,

unlike mortals, are totally immune from any risk of retaliation. Among mortals, physical violence would be most likely to occur when one party is sure of broad support while the other is almost entirely devoid of connections

- as when a

prince

attacks

a beggar,

stranger

or hired

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labourer, or when a prominent prince takes offence at the behaviour of a low-ranking commoner. One might speculate that force would be used

more often by young men than by elders.

Younger men presumably

could not simply during their fathers’ lifetimes make independent use of their father's friends and dependants, and they would not yet have established extensive networks of their own. The importance of a man's physical force would be in inverse proportion to the extent of his

connections. 172 Finally, given the Homeric norm that a real man should retaliate for any lack of respect, there might be occasions when a man who had been offended would be determined to kill his enemy with total disregard for the consequences to himself, purely in order to

demonstrate his manhood.

The prospect of heavy material losses, exile

or death, however, would surely act as a powerful deterrent most of the time. This is not to say, of course, that there is not a great deal of conflict in Homeric society. It is to say that, although competition for deference

frequently leads to conflict, it does not often escalate to a point where physical violence is used. Men are angry when they feel their status is threatened; they express their anger forcefully, as they are supposed to. But the epic image of the heroic world, while on the surface portraying a

violent society, implies a society in which conflict normally stops short of inflicting bodily or material harm, and is confined to verbal abuse and threats instead.

Note how

Agamemnon,

after threatening to confiscate someone's

prize, quickly draws back and says : "But we may consider these matters again at a later time” (1.140). Akhilleus, too, several times threatens more drastic action than he carries out. Again, it never comes to the kind of violent confrontation between the gods threatened by Zeus and apparently common in the past. The suitors, for all their aggression and numerical strength, are easily silenced when Telemakhos asserts himself : "They all bit their lips, amazed at Telemakhos who spoke boldly”. 173 Threats, not actual violence, appear to predominate, and to be quite effective. The heroic world, then, is one in which conflict is frequent. Conflict is violent at times, but not as violent or as often violent as a number of epic passages and the epic tales themselves suggest. Overemphasis on the incidence of violence and the importance of physical strength is, of course, a feature common to all epics and many other forms of fiction,

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including contemporary detective fiction and superhero-comics. But in the /liad and Odyssey it may do more than add entertainment- value.

The notion that society is violent provides a justification for aggressive self-assertion. It allows men to believe that, when they bully others into displaying deference, they are pre-empting others' aggression towards themselves. It enables them to think that responding fiercely to some

slight or imagined provocation is not only what a man is supposed to do, but also a sensible course of action : if they did not retaliate at once, ever more serious attacks upon them would be bound to follow. This

way of thinking lies behind Poseidon’s comment that he will no longer be honoured by the gods when the Phaiakians fail to honour him (13.128-30). One unintended offence by mortals seems to him to jeopardise all his honour, his standing in everyone's eyes. Zeus' answer

that “the gods will not dishonour you at all; it would be hard to make the eldest and best a target for contempt" (13.141-2) shows that the danger is mostly in Poseidon's mind. The illusion of danger, though, accounts for the violent response which follows. The epics foster the illusion of a

highly violent world, and I would suggest that in so doing the poems do not merely justify to the audience the violent behaviour of the heroes, but also create an image of the world that indirectly justifies the anger which men feel and express in real life. 174

The notion that physical strength is an essential prop of safety and status provides another form of justification.

The epics show

that the

personal, informal power needed in conflict is founded on a network of connections far more than on personal muscle. By superficially stressing the importance of individual strength, however, they create an impression that only strong adult males can hold their own amidst the conflict and violence of society. Women, children, the aged and the weak appear in constant need of the protection provided by men; Andromakhe's lament for the future of her orphaned son explicitly makes the point. 175 In creating this impression the poems legitimise the

authority of adult males - in particular male authority over women.

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9. THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING ANGRY : FACT AND FICTION A complex picture of status and its relation to conflict has emerged. The epics suggest that the foundations of prestige are above all personal excellence and personal power to defend one's legitimate claims to

respect; the poems create an impression that the greatest of excellences as well as the greatest part of personal power is physical strength.

A

closer look, however, reveals a stratified society with a ruling class of princes, where birth and wealth weigh far more heavily than personal qualities, and where connections based on obligations which override justice are a source of power far more significant than individual muscle. The image of a predominance of physical strength, it seems, is an ideal image. It arises from a notion that princes must earn their high honour

in the community by fighting valiantly in battle for the protection of the town, and from a notion that men in general must earn their authority over their families by using their strength to defend the household

against aggressors.

By contrast, the image of a stratified society, and of

heroes whose power depends on networks of connections, is plausible in itself and does not appear to serve any obvious legitimising function. I would conclude, therefore, that heroic society consists of more than one reflection of a single historical society. The epics reproduce the realities of this society, while also introducing unrealistic elements inspired by this society's ideologies. In real life, ideology and practice can diverge

considerably without being incompatible; they become inconsistent only when ideology and practice are made equally ‘real’ in the fictional world of the heroes.

The greatest cause of conflict in the heroic world is competition for prestige - more specifically competition for deference. There is rivalry in personal excellence, but this is not in itself a major cause of conflict. It is most intense in athletic contests, rather than in debate or battle; insofar as it does give rise to conflict, it is not so much because of the

intensity of competition, as because those who enjoy social superiority or an established reputation feel that any attempt to rival them amounts to a lack of deference. There is also a struggle for wealth and formal power as sources of prestige. Since these are scarce resources, not easily acquired by non-violent means, the pressure of competition might seem an adequate explanation for conflict in this arena. Yet the poems suggest

that aggressors seize such assets primarily to show contempt for their

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victims.

The

victims,

for

their

part,

seem

less

concerned

at their

material losses than at the fact that they have been treated without due deference. Finally, the majority of epic conflicts arise out of displays of disrespect. These may involve no material losses at all, nor affect anyone's reputation for excellence, yet provoke their victims to retaliate even against the odds and at great cost to themselves. The prevalence of conflict springing from competition for deference is

accounted for by the Homeric perception that social status does not exist without deference : a man treated without respect by his fellows does not enjoy high status, however rich and noble he may be. As a result, the heroes are touchy in questions of respect.

Their sensitivity to insult is

heightened by the feeling that they have enemies who seek to humiliate them; their lack of agreement on individuals’ position within the hierarchy of the elite increases the chances of conflict.

Even unintended

slights are therefore punished with anger and force. Moreover, although deference ought to be given willingly, in acknowledgement of legitimate claims to respect, it may also be gained by force. Hence the heroes are inclined to use threats and violence to coerce deference to themselves. They also use force to withhold deference from others.

Such aggressive

behaviour is frowned upon as improper and hybristic, but it nevertheless inspires fear and thereby wins respect and enhances one's standing.

The

heroes are thus tempted to be aggressive in spite of moral strictures. Anger is the key emotion. It is not just a natural response to a loss of face, but it is required by Homeric norms,

and instilled even in those

who do not spontaneously feel it. In order to hold one's own in the struggle for respect one does not merely need personal power, one must be ready to use it, which involves certain risks even for the most powerful, and may involve almost certain death for the less powerful.

Anger is needed to overcome hesitation and fear.

Homeric society does

set limits on the expression of anger, but the temptation is strong to ignore convention and inspire fear in others by allowing one's anger to run out of control. Thus conflict escalates and is perpetuated.

This interpretation thus reverses the causal links posited by the three explanations of violence introduced at the outset. The fragmentation of Homeric society - which in any case, as I have tried to show in the previous chapter, does not run as deep as many have claimed - is not the

cause of violent status rivalry, but its effect. The nature of Homeric Status rivalry is the cause of violence, and it is this violence which keeps

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communities fragmented to the extent that they are. If Homeric communities do not have a strong, centralised government, this is not

simply

because

they

are

'still'

at

a

primitive

stage

of

political

development and have ‘not yet' progressed along evolutionary lines towards a higher level of organisation, but because their form of competition for status does not allow - or at least impedes - more political integration. It should be stressed, though, that the political fragmentation of the community does not mean that it is also socially fragmentary. The role

of force and fear in social life may tend to encourage that view, but although there is conflict, the very fact that it is conflict about status

shows how significant the community

is to the heroes.

Status is by

definition something that one can only have in a group, and by comparison with others. A hero cannot regard himself as a man of high status unless he is widely talked about and shown proper deference by everyone he meets; individuals in Homeric society, even more than in our own, are dependent on others in this respect. The frequency of conflict, therefore, is an index of the importance attached to interaction within the community.

The idea that incessant warfare causes the violence with which conflict within the community is fought, is also turned upside down. I would argue that violent competition for status within the community causes men to make private predatory expeditions abroad, and causes public wars when it is extended to relations between members of different communities, and between communities as such. This view will be defended in the next chapter.

The notion that a scarcity of resources is a contributory cause of violent conflict and war is no doubt true, but on the interpretation advanced here its contribution is small. Insofar as a shortage of material resources causes conflict, this is not so much because there is an absolute shortage of necessities, but because the competition for status involves a constant demand for more and thus inevitably creates shortages. More importantly, a good deal of conflict revolves around symbolic expressions of respect rather than scarce resources, and often wealth is seized not because it is scarce, but because forcible seizure is a demonstration of superior power and an act of contempt. In such cases, therefore, violence would be used even if there were an abundance of the goods in question.

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Shame, too, contributes to the heroes’ violent behaviour. It seems likely that the psychological insecurity inherent in a personality with a great need of social approval helps trigger aggression more easily. But the heroes' high sensitivity to the opinion of others is not simply ‘human nature’: it is itself the result of their habit of competing to win the deference of others. It is their concept of social status which requires them to be keenly aware of what others think of them, and hence to have a sense of shame. Moreover, the major cause of violence is clearly not the incoherent rage that is suggested by the reference to mental instability. When the heroes resort to violence they do so purposefully. They enforce deference to themselves in accordance with social norms,

and when

they break the norms,

humiliate others.

they do so deliberately in order to

If on occasion they get carried away, this is due less to

psychological insecurity than to the pressures of status rivalry. There is reason to think that the epic image of a heroic world rife with violent conflict over matters of deference is not entirely realistic. The poets can only draw a picture of frequent and ferocious conflict by crediting the heroes with fantastic prowess and by ignoring the deterrent effect that the risk of involving kin, friends, and even the community at large, ought to have had on the course of quarrels. There is also a hint of inconsistency in the suggestion that hereditary positions of power are under constant attack from rivals. It is hard to see how one could still

speak, as the poet does, of a birthright to rule, if in Homeric society there is so little respect for this right that everyone tries to usurp it. I have suggested that heroic society is based on a historical society in

which the demand for deference is less of a source of tension - because respect is more generally shown in obedience the tensions that do surround status erupt into because rivals fear one another's power. Epic of conflict may derive from an ideology that

to custom - and in which open violence less often exaggeration of the level a man's status is under

constant threat, and that he must always be ready to defend it.

Such an

ideology would serve to justify the violent and intimidating behaviour of men, and reinforces the notion that no household can survive without its male head.

This does not mean that the model for Homeric society is in fact a wholly harmonious community. For one thing, men carry arms at all times. For another, even in contexts in which the role of force is played

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down and merit is made the foundation of honour - as is the case in the portrayal of princes - there are sudden glimpses of the underlying importance of force as a prop of social status. In a historical counterpart

to heroic

society,

then,

conflict would

be common,

though

not as

common as the poems suggest.

One may also wonder whether, in this hypothetical historical counterpart of Homeric society, the struggle for deference would not be slightly less prominent a cause of conflict.

Among people as acquisitive

as the heroes appear to be, considerations of material gain and loss might in reality carry more weight than they do in the epics.

In suggesting that

the material interests at stake in a conflict are secondary to the symbolic expressions of disrespect involved, the poems may yet again reflect an ideal rather than reality - a notion perhaps that men ought to fight for motives ‘higher’ than the conservation of property. On the other hand,

there is no reason to doubt that in a real society a struggle for deference could be a major cause of conflict. That the heroic world is based on such a society is indicated above all by the existence of the concept of hybris. Since hybris is defined as aggression for the sake of showing contempt, the society which created this concept evidently attached great significance to the symbolic dimension of conflict. Allowing for idealising distortion, the epics still depict a society in which conflict is relatively common, and in which the issue frequently is deference,

or rather the lack of it.

In this society,

as a result,

social

status is based to a considerable extent on personal power. It is also based on other criteria, such as birth, wealth and merit; insofar as it is

based on force, it relies on connections rather than on pure physical strength; and the use of force is subject to moral restrictions. In all these respects, Homeric society differs from the Chicago gangland with which

I began.

Homeric heroes therefore resort to violence less easily than the

boys in these gangs do. But when violence does erupt, its primary purpose is the same : it is a show of conspicuous destruction, designed to inspire fear and respect, enhancing the status of the man who has such power to do harm.

Homeric social status and conflict have clear parallels in Archaic and Classical Greek society. They may have had parallels in Dark Age or Mycenaean Greece as well, but the evidence on status and conflict in

158

these periods is too thin to allow even tentative conclusions to be drawn. 176 (1) Aristocracies of birth were common in early Archaic Greece.

Hesiod describes a Boiotian community of around 700 B.C. as governed by a group of princes (basileis), and Athens, for instance, was ruled by a group of noble families known as the Eupatridai. Wealth and birth

continue to determine membership of the ruling class in Greek cities in the sixth century and long afterwards, but wealth becomes more and more important and hereditary aristocracies dissolve gradually : the term basileis is later applied only to power-holders - monarchs and magistrates - while the upper classes as a whole are designated by such

vague terms as 'the best' or ‘the rich’. 177 (il) Personal, informal power in Archaic Greece rests on networks of kinship and friendship, and on the ability to mobilise the support of the people at large, just as it does in the heroic world. In Athens, Kleisthenes' family, the Alkmeonidai, was said to consist of as many as seven hundred households, many of which were presumably included on the basis of a fictive kinship relation; in addition, Kleisthenes had a circle of personal friends (hetaireia), and he like others would also have had supporters of lower rank; finally, he succeeded in getting the body

of the people on his side against his rivals.

The idea that personal

obligations weigh more heavily than the demands of impartial justice is

still current in the fifth century, as is suggested for instance by the anecdote that Themistokles insisted that, as a judge, he would not want to be impartial but strive to benefit his friends more than others (Plutarch, Aristides 2,4; Moralia 807ab). Not until the mid-fifth century does an alternative basis of informal power begin to emerge in Athens, when Perikles and others make a show of rejecting personal connections and obligations, and of devoting themselves to the common good instead, thus giving priority to cultivating the support of the people at large. 179 (mi) The Archaic and Classical concept of social status is close to the Homeric one. The vocabulary is the same: status is sim2, honour, acknowledged in various forms of deference (timai), and derived from arete, excellence. Hesiod says that "arere and glory come with wealth"

(Works

& Days,

313),

while Tyrtaios

exactly

mirrors

the Homeric

idealised view of excellence, when he lists a series of aretai - runningspeed, wrestling-strength, good looks, wealth, ‘princeliness' and

eloquence - and concludes that more

important than any of these is

159

martial prowess (Ε 9,1-14 Diehl). From the sixth century onwards, utterances on the nature of excellence give greater prominence to moral

excellence. “Many bad men are rich, good men live in poverty; yet we will not exchange with

them arete for wealth" (Solon F 4,1-3 Diehl = Theognis 315-7). "Choose to live with few possessions and be pious, rather than to be rich while consuming wealth unjustly. In justice all arete is summed up; every man is good... when he is just" (Theognis 145-8; Phokylides F 10 Diehl) Nevertheless, in common usage one can still speak without explanation of a 'good' man to mean a brave man, and the phrase ‘the good men' continues to refer to the upper classes. 179 As for deference, Xenophon, for example, describes the highest

possible honour in terms of being served eagerly by everyone, being "gaped at" by all, everyone rising from their seats and making way in the streets for one, and everyone present always “privileging” one in word and deed (Hiero 7,2). It may be noted that, according to Herodotos, publicly greeting one another by name is a custom characteristic of the Greeks. He contrasts it with the silent bowing of the Egyptians and the hierarchical forms of deference practised by the

Persians, among whom it is customary to kiss an equal on the mouth, a superior on the cheek,

superior (II.80; 1.134).

and to prostrate oneself before one who

is far

The comparatively egalitarian Greek forms of

deference are no different from those found in the epics; they remain

unchanged

until

Hellenistic

times.

With

the development

of state-

institutions, however, emerge institutional and formal privileges such as the double share of food offered to the Spartan kings, and the dinners at

public expense provided for magistrates and guests of honour

in the

Prytaneion at Athens.

(IV) The ideology that princes merit their hereditary status is found in Hesiod

princes,

as well as in Homer.

at any

In Hesiod's

rate - at birth receive

eloquence. Eloquence manner, and for this

view,

from

princes

the Muses

- or many

the gift of

enables the princes to settle disputes in a just they are treated with respect by the people

(Theogony 75-93). Like Homer, Hesiod elsewhere shows that in reality princes often rely on force instead of eloquence and wisdom (Works & Days 35-41, 202-64). The fact that Hesiod emphasises the princes’ merit as judges, and does not mention their excellence in combat, while Homer

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stresses the latter far more than the former, is presumably due to the different contexts in which their remarks appear, and need not indicate a fundamental change in attitude.

The Homeric notion that those who hold formal power in society earn this privilege through their achievements in battle, recurs in various forms in Greek history. Its most common expression is the view that the

right to vote and hoid office must be held by the well-off citizens who serve as hoplites, since it is these heavy-armed infantry soldiers who protect the community. One specifically Athenian variant is the view that political privileges should be shared by the poorer citizens who serve as rowers in the fleet, since the city's military power depends on them more than on hoplites. Given that in the epics it is the basileis who dominate

battle,

it seems

likely

that

Homer

represents

the

ideology

current in Greek society during the political ascendancy of hereditary aristocracies. This would have been the period immediately prior to the rise of the hoplite class as a political force, a process which is ususally dated to the mid-seventh century. This date, however, is problematic. It is based on evidence for the development of hoplite equipment and hoplite phalanx tactics, but not only has the validity of this evidence been questioned, it is also far from certain that hoplites constituted a political force as soon as they became a military force. 1% (v) The competitiveness of Archaic and Classical Greek society is well-known. Honour and reputation are its goals, just as they are in the epics. "It seems... to be a big thing, honour", Xenophon has a character

say. "Indeed, it seems to me... that this is what distinguishes a man from other living creatures, this striving for honour... The love of honour is not innate in dumb animals,

nor even in all humans.

Those who do have an innate desire for honour

and praise [are superior beings, and] are to be regarded as men, not merely humans” (Hiero 7,1 and 3).

Rivalry in personal excellence among the upper classes of Archaic Greece centres on athletic and musical competitions. As in the epics,

this rivalry is keen, but not often a cause of conflict. political power is intense, and at times violent.

Competition for

During the Archaic age,

it regularly leads to tyranny : the usurpation of constitutional power, or the

forcible

Xenophon

creation

of

an

extra-constitutional

believes that a tyrant's primary

goal

position

is to win

of

power.

maximum

161

deference (Hiero 7,2); Aristotle sees the honour bestowed by others as

“the goal

of political

life"

in general

(Nicomachean

Ethics

1095Sb).

There is much competition for wealth, too. "No clear limit of wealth is set for men; those of us who now have the greatest livelihood double their efforts [or: ‘are eager to double it']. Who could satisfy all 72" (Solon F 1,71-3 Diehl; Theognis 227-9). Illegitimate appropriation of wealth, by force or by deceit, is a common theme in Archaic poetry; the motive for it is sometimes said to be greed, but more often Aybris. 181 Conflicts arising from verbal insults or humiliating actions are a notable feature of Archaic social life. The best-known example is perhaps the murder of Hipparkhos by Harmodios and Aristogeiton, which was allegedly provoked by Hipparkhos' deliberate humiliation of Harmodios, whose sister he declared unfit to participate in a prestigious religious procession (Thukydides VI1.56-7). The concepts of enmity and

hybris remain prominent in Greek thought. Men often express the hope that they may harm their enemies, and the fear that their enemies may harm them. The fact that Aybris in any form is made a punishable offence in Athenian law testifies that the deliberate withholding of deference is a major source of conflict, as it is in Homer. The role of intimidation in coercing deference is acknowledged in a verse that acquired the status of a proverb: "Where there is fear, there is also respect" (Stasinos, Kypria F 24 Davies). 182 Evidently the struggle for

deference continues to be an important part of the competition for status, and a cause of violence. The frequency of violent conflict does, however, appear to diminish. A clear sign that society is becoming less violent is that at some point men give up the habit of carrying weapons at all times. Thukydides claims that the Athenians were the first to stop bearing arms (siderophoreisthai), but he does not say when this is supposed to have happened (1.6). It is also significant that there is barely a trace in Archaic sources of the Homeric notion that a man needs to be physically strong in order to defend himself and his household against aggressive neighbours. Given the dearth of evidence, it is hard to say when the change took place. It could have been during the Dark Age or it could have been in the seventh century. !® In matters of status and conflict, then, the Homeric world is in many

ways similar to Archaic and Classical Greece.

More specifically, the

heroic world could, so far as we can tell, in all respects be a reflection of

162

early seventh-century society and ideology. to the

contrary,

commonly held.

though,

it could

also

In the absence of evidence

reflect

an

earlier

age,

as

is

If so, one would have to conclude that in this particular

sphere there were

few changes

from

the Dark

Age

to early Archaic

times, with perhaps one important exception : violent conflict decreased. Whenever it was that the practice of carrying arms was discontinued and Greek communities were ‘pacified’ to some extent, the change needs

explanation.

I have argued that the competition for deference is the

cause of the conflict-ridden nature of heroic society, and I have just pointed out that historical Greeks, too, engage in keen competition for deference : so why does the level of violence decrease ? The cause, it seems to me, may lie in the effects of population growth. One possible effect is that, as communities increase in scale and a greater degree of organisation and specialisation becomes necessary, people become more ‘interdependent’ and a more centralised form of

government is likely to emerge. One could argue, along the lines of Norbert Elias' theory on The Civilisation Process, that mutual dependence and central control competition, and reduce violence.

curb

I think this is part of the explanation.

opportunities

for

aggressive

But if it is true that, as I said

earlier, status rivalry of the Homeric kind impedes political integration, one might wonder how it would be possible for a centralised organisation to emerge in spite of it. Would constant conflict within the community not simply prevent the development of a functioning organisation on a

large scale ? My suggestion is that it is possible for such an organisation to emerge because population growth directly affects the nature of status rivalry itself: conflict about deference decreases as the size of the

community which assigns status increases. The logic of this is as follows. Acts of deference and disrespect by definition are symbolic expressions of someone's opinion of another - his opinion as to whether the other is inferior or superior to him, whether he

is worthy of respect or contempt. In a small community, in which everyone knows everyone else, each man can expect all others to have a certain

opinion

of him,

and

he

can

therefore judge

their

behaviour

towards him as if it expressed their evaluation of him - regardless of whether it is meant to do so or not. If someone, say, steals his sheep, he will conclude that whoever did it must have a low opinion of him and

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hence has shown no respect for his property. If someone fails to show him due respect in face-to-face interaction, he will conclude, not that the man does not know who he is dealing with, but that the man looks down on him. In each case, he will have cause to be angry at the low status imputed to him. By contrast, in a large community in which many people do not know one another, no-one can expect everyone else to have an opinion of him. A man may have his sheep stolen by someone who does not know him and therefore cannot be thought to despise him. A man will often have a

face-to-face encounter with someone he does not know,

and in such

encounters there is relatively little scope for giving or taking offence. People who do not know one another can, at an incidental meeting, arrive at only a rough estimate of one another's status, on the basis of what they see : man or woman, old or young, rich or poor. Neither party can judge, or be expected to judge, the standing of the other's family, the extent of his connections, the qualities on which he prides himself, and so on. Therefore, so long as the other's behaviour is roughly correct, neither party can have cause to feel treated with disrespect.

Within the community, a man will of course have personal friends and enemies, and since these people do know him, he will scrutinise their behaviour for signs of disrespect, and defend his status among them.

But the larger the community, the smaller the section of it that consists of personal acquaintances, and the less their deference contributes to a man's status in the community at large. The sum total of the honours

one enjoys in one's private relationships is no longer equivalent to one's honour in the community: private standing and public status are differentiated.

This leads to a further reduction in the level of violence.

Since the deference shown by any particular private individual no longer immediately affects one's public status, there is less at stake when one is

treated with disrespect by a personal friend or enemy, and hence less need to respond with anger and force. In larger communities, competition for status and deference does not abate, but takes a different form. The display of wealth now becomes even more important than it already was, because it is one of only a few ways in which one can impress one's status upon total strangers. It has

been observed that even within modern cities there is a difference in this respect between those who live in long-established neighbourhoods and

164

those who live on new estates.

Of London's Eastenders in the 'fifties, it

has been said that “in Bethnal Green... people know intimately dozens of other local people living near at hand, their school-friends, their workmates, their pub-friends, and above all their relatives". On the

'Greenleigh' estate, by contrast, consequence,

"nearly everyone is a stranger".

In

"in Bethnal Green it is not easy to give a man a single status, because he has so many; he has... a low status as a scholar, high as a darts-player, low as a bargainer and high as a story-teller. In Greenleigh, he has something much more nearly approaching one status because something much more nearly approaching one criterion is used : his possessions.” (Young & Willmott 1957: 161-3)

The above scenario seems to me to fit the Greek evidence well.

Greek

towns began to grow rapidly in the eighth century, and there was also a growing community of the ruling classes all over Greece. In the Archaic

Age, upper class Greeks did not only form alliances of marriage and friendship across the boundaries of states, but they also met en masse at international games and festivals. As for the increasing importance of wealth, I have already mentioned that it becomes the single most

important criterion of status in the sixth century.

In fact, Thukydides

says that when the Athenians laid down their weapons, they turned to a more “luxurious” way of living. He mentions the wearing of fine clothes and gold ornaments (1.6). Perhaps there is a connection here with the rise of the symposion and its new dining-customs in the late seventh

century.

Whatever its precise nature and date, it seems likely that the

new ‘luxury’ indicates that the display of wealth has become more important than the dislay of force as a means of gaining prestige, and that conspicuous destruction has been overtaken by conspicuous consumption, 184 If this is what happened, it was a process not unique in history. The development of the Sicilian mafia during this century, as analysed by

Pino

Arlacchi,

offers

a striking

parallel.

According

to a Sicilian

informant : "Up until the end of the war, it didn't take much to become un’ uomo di rispetto, in these parts. As soon as people got to be afraid of a young mafioso's courage and his bloodthirsty nature, then a group of followers would collect around the man... [The mafiosi] used to waste no end of time arguing and fighting about which of them was

165 the most powerful... They were ignorant and they took more notice of a man's name, perhaps, than of his money. After the war, everything changed.”

Arlacchi explains : "As mafia areas became integrated into the wider national community, so accumulated wealth increasingly took the place of the traditional symbols as evidence of prepotency and success" (Arlacchi 1983: 58; emphasis added). His informant continues "The politicians arrived, the Cassa [a regional investment agency] arrived. Televisions and cars arrived. To get respect, you started to need money. The more money, the more respect. The same as it is today, for that matter" (ibid.: 59). 185

167

CHAPTER FOUR

PILLAGE AND DESTRUCTION Predatory and status warfare

"You probably raided because of woman theft, didn't you?", asked Säsäwä, headman of a village of the warlike Yanomamé Indians, when he first heard of the Second World War. The anthropologist who had told him about it recorded that Säsäwä "was visibly disturbed" when this was denied. "He chatted for a moment with the others, seeming to doubt my answer.

"Was it because of witchcraft ?' he then asked.

'No,' I replied again.

‘Ah

the other

1 Someone

stole

cultivated

food

from

!' he exclaimed,

citing

confidently the only other incident that is deemed serious enough to provoke a man to wage war." (Chagnon 1977: 123-4)

Säsäwä's response is remarkably similar to that of modern scholars confronted

with stories of the Trojan war.

Like him,

they have felt

disturbed at finding an unfamiliar cause attributed to a major war, and, like

him,

they

have

proceeded

to

list instead

“practical and unromantic" explanations. and

labour

power,

commercial

rivalry,

what

they

regard

as

Shortage of essential supplies imperial

expansion,

mass

migration or sheer rapacity : all have been advanced to replace the "silly causes" and “oddities” of the traditional accounts. ! The irony, of course, is that although their attempts at understanding the wars of an alien culture are so similar to his own, Säsäwä would no

doubt have found these scholars' theories quite unsatisfactory and indeed unnecessary. To his mind, the Trojan War could have had no better cause than the one advanced in epic tradition : the abduction of the wife of one prince by the son of another.

2 Historians are aware, of course,

that there are cross-cultural differences in the nature and causes of war, but perhaps they have not fully appreciated just how wide the divide may be. ?

168

I do not intend to argue that the Trojan war really happened, nor even that the cause and course of this or any other heroic war are portrayed in

a wholly realistic manner.

The question to be addressed here is : what is

the Homeric conception of the causes and goals and the nature of war in

the world of the heroes ? One may think that of all the aspects of the heroic world covered in the poems, warfare is the subject on which one is least

likely

to find

a coherent

view.

After

all, the tales of war

incorporated into the epics are based on traditional stories, which were presumably a mixture of mythicised history, historicised myth, and pure

fantasy. 4 Such stories would not automatically add up to a 'view', and there is no a priori reason why a unified view upon them by the poets of the epic tradition. that a variety of traditional material has in consistent image of the practices and norms of From a reconstruction of Homeric warfare,

that its fundamental communities.

1. WARRIORS

causes

match

should have been imposed Nevertheless, we shall see fact been welded into a Akhaian warfare. moreover, it will emerge

those of conflict within

Homeric

AT PEACE

The heroes regard themselves as men "to whom Zeus gave the fate of

living through hard wars, from youth until old age, until we perish, each of us” (XIV.85-7). The old man Nestor, we gather, has taken part in at least three wars, before he joins the expedition against Troy. Twice he fought against neighbouring peoples, the Epeians and the Arkadians; the third time he went further afıeld, fighting as an ally of the Lapiths against the Kentaurs, in the north. Diomedes, although still young, has already taken part in the sack of Thebes. Other men seem to make a

habit

of

raiding.

Odysseus,

for

expeditions prior to the Trojan War,

one,

has

undertaken

plundering

and goes raiding again when

the

war is over. 5 "It is a curious phenomenon that a people as intelligent as the Greeks should have been so bellicose, so incompetent in the conduct of their

foreign relations", says Grant (1987: 12), echoing a popular notion that ancient wars were frequent simply because there were no better, more 'intelligent' ways of settling interstate conflict. It is widely assumed that

169 each ancient Greek state was in principle in a state of war with every other, except when and where an explicit, and always temporary, agreement to keep the peace was in force. One community could therefore legitimately attack another without provocation. It is also commonly thought that a principle of ‘passive solidarity' was observed : that, if a single member of a community committed an offence against an outsider, the victim and his supporters could legitimately retaliate against the offender's community, or any of its members, regardless of whether this community condoned the offence. If these assumptions were true, the frequency of war could easily be understood. But, as Benedetto Bravo has shown, they are not in fact valid for ancient Greece (1980: 678-9, 942-3,959, 981-2), and we shall see that they are not valid for the

heroic world either. ® An explanation of heroic warfare must take account of the fact that

Homeric

communities

are quite capable

of coexisting

and

even

co-

operating peacefully. The network of connections of a Homeric prince typically includes relatives and friends who live in other communities. Princes often make ‘foreign friends' or ‘guest-friends' (xeinoi) by an exchange of gifts, as when Odysseus meets Iphitos of Oikhalia. At the time, they are both guests of a third person, Ortilokhos of Pherai in Messenia. Iphitos gives Odysseus a bow, quiver and arrows inherited

from his father Eurytos (21.11-6, 31-3), and Odysseus gives him

"a

sharp sword and a strong spear, the start of a considerate xeinosrelationship” (xeinosune, 21.34-5). Similarly, the Aitolian ruler Oineus exchanges gifts with Bellerophontes of Ephyre, after keeping him as a guest for twenty days. "They also gave one another beautiful xeineia : Oineus gave a bright

purple belt, Bellerophontes a two-handled golden cup" (VI.216-20). The relationship thus established remains valid even though Bellerophontes emigrates to Lykia and the two never meet again; it is inherited by their descendants, who become "ancestral" xeinoi (VI.215). When by chance Diomedes, grandson of Oineus, meets Glaukos, grandson of Bellerophontes, in battle, he reminds his opponent that, because of the exchange of gifts, "I am now your own xeinos in mid-Argos, and you [mine] in Lykia, if I ever visit that land” (VI.224-5). They therefore

decide not to fight one another and to have a second exchange of gifts. They swap armour in full view of the other warriors, “so that they too may know that we declare ourselves ancestral xeinoi" (VI.230-1).

The

170

episode strikingly illustrates both the permanence and the overriding importance of such formal connections abroad. 7 Odysseus, who is portrayed - not least by himself - as a man with an exceptional talent for making friends, ὃ provides two examples of how a prince may use his contacts abroad. Ankhialos' Arrow-poison Mentes, son of Ankhialos, ruler of the Taphians, and Telemakhos are “one another's ancestral xeinoi from the beginning", i.e. at least since their grandfathers’ time (1.180-1, 187-9). Mentes recalls that he first met Telemakhos' father Odysseus "drinking and being entertained in our house, on his way back from Ephyre after a visit to Ilos, son of Mermeros : Odysseus went there, too, in search of a lethal poison, to have something to

smear on his bronze arrows.

But [Ilos] did not give it to him, for he stood in

awe of the immortal gods.

But my father did : he always treated him as a

great friend” (1.257-64). In other words, Odysseus had been in need of a commodity that was hard to come by, since the gods were supposed to disapprove of it. In order to acquire his arrow-poison, he asked for it among his xeinoi. They refused, but eventually a very good friend gave him what he wanted. It is later suggested that Telemakhos, too, might go to Ephyre to get poison (2.328-9) either the town is famous for its poisons or else Telemakhos is expected to make use of his father's contacts there. The Cretan Connection

When the Kephallenian fleet, on its way to Troy, is forced by storm to put in at Knossos, Odysseus seeks out the local ruler, Idomeneus, “his dear and respected xeinos" (19.191). Idomeneus having left, Aithon, his younger brother,

receives

Odysseus.

Aithon

remembers

how,

"having

made

a

collection, I gave to the companions who followed him com and wine and cattle to slaughter,

at public expense”

(demothen,

19.196-8).

They are fed

for twelve days, until the storm abates (19.199-202). 9 Normally, it seems, a man would extend hospitality to a couple of visitors

at most, not to an entire ship's crew, let alone to some six hundred men. 1° Rather

than

management.

mere

hospitality,

therefore,

As a result of the storm,

this

is an

Odysseus’

example

of crisis-

fleet runs into logistic

problems, which its commander solves by calling a favour from his frends among the local authorities. These mobilise the resources of their community to feed the visitors.

Relatives and friends abroad may also be called upon to perform yet greater favours : several of the allies of the Trojans are led by in-laws or

171

xeinoi of Priamos, Hektor and Paris, and it is no doubt in recognition of

these relationships that they have come to the rescue. 11 Friendship and co-operation between members of different communities, then, are not unusual in the heroic world. Although these connections are private rather than public, they could be used to the benefit of entire communities. Hence, since Odysseus has many friends

in Thesprotia (19.269-99;

cf. 14.321-3),

it is not surprising that the

people of Ithaka can regard the Thesprotians at large as "in harmony” with themselves (16.427). There are mechanisms to deal with such conflicts as may occur between communities. It appears to be possible for an individual who

has “a debt" owed to him abroad, simply to go there by himself and demand reparation. 12 More commonly, the community will send out representatives on an “embassy” (exesie).

Priamos went on an embassy

to the

mission

Thrakians,

with

an

unspecified

(XXIV.234-5),

and

Odysseus as a boy was sent on one to Messene, by his father and the other Ithakan elders, to seek compensation for three hundred stolen

sheep

(21.16-21).

Such

embassies

would

afford

opportunities

for

peaceful settlement of disputes, and the fellow-townsmen of an offender might well be willing to negotiate. The Ithakans, at any rate, are so keen to avoid disrupting relations with the Thesprotians that they once

nearly lynched a local prince who had dared to raid Thesprotian territory (16. 424-30). 13 Even when war does break out, there are recognised procedures for negotiating, and for arranging a truce or conditional surrender. !4 In short, through the foreign connections of their princes,

individuals and communities may be able to get what they need from abroad without using force; the same private connections, as well as public diplomacy, can in principle deal with interstate conflict as it occurs. In addition, war is not regarded as an Although men may experience a "lust for reputation to be won in combat, war "wretched", "bad", "painful" and "full of and exhaustion of warriors, the grief of

agreeable solution to conflict. battle" (kharme), and want the is predominantly depicted as tears". The agony, the sweat the bereaved, are highlighted.

The god of war, who likes battles, is hated for it by his father Zeus, and described as a “plague to man”. 15 It has already been pointed out that, even if heroes like Akhilleus and the son of Kastor choose war over a

172

quiet life, many others "shudder" at the sight of weapons (14.225-6) and

prefer to stay at home (XXIII.295-9). 16 In Homeric society, then, war is by no means always a necessary option, nor a popular one.

Yet wars keep breaking out.

2. TROY I : THE INSULT THAT LAUNCHED A THOUSAND SHIPS The Iliad and Odyssey reveal Homer's ideas about the causes and goals of six specific wars of the heroic age. By far the largest body of evidence refers, of course, to the Trojan War. Ever since the fifth century B.C., the aspect of this war that has most bothered historians is the fact that, when Paris took Helena to Troy, the Trojans did not send her back “on the next ship or at all events... as soon as the expeditionary force arrived" (Adkins 1982: 320 n.50). There are, however, a number

of relatively neglected problems which it is only logical to deal with first. Why did Paris abduct Helena ? Why was Menelaos willing to fight over her 7 Why were the other Akhaians prepared to support him ? All versions of the tale agree that Paris carried off Helena because she had been promised him as his reward for proclaiming Aphrodite the most beautiful of the goddesses. Paris’ judgement and the abduction were the result of his "lechery" (makhlosune, XXIV.30). Although sex by itself would seem a good enough explanation, in Homer there is more to the abduction than that. In spite of the fact that Helena had come with

him

voluntarily,

"snatching

her

Paris away”

does

not

(III.444).

speak

of

Apparently,

‘seducing he prefers

her',

but

of

to think

of

himself as having stolen her from Menelaos. Hektor regards the seduction of Helena as a daring exploit. He says, when he sees Paris acting like a coward, “Were you like that, when you gathered... companions, sailed the sea..., mingled with foreigners, and brought back from a distant country a beautiful woman related by marriage to spear-carrying men 7" (III.46-9)

Helena herself reminds Paris that "until now you used to boast that you were better than warlike Menelaos in your strength, your hands, your spear" (TII.430-1).

Her furious reaction to his defeat in single combat

173

with Menelaos shows that she too had believed that Paris was the better man. “You have come out of battle. If only you had perished there, brought down by a mighty man, who once was my husband” (III.428-9). These remarks - as well as the fact that Paris had gratuitously provoked Menelaos further by carrying off “many possessions” of his along with Helena - show that the abduction is regarded by all concerned as a demonstration of Paris' courage and strength, at the expense of Menelaos. !7 Menelaos is keenly aware of this. It is true that he is prepared to fight Paris partly because , like "any good and sensible man”, he "loves his own woman and cares for her" (IX.337-42), and that he seeks to

"retaliate for the struggles and sighs of Helena” (11.589-90, cf. 356). 18 But first and foremost Menelaos is concerned with what he himself has suffered at the hands of Paris. He refers to the Trojan War as fought "for the sake of my honour” (timé, XVII.92), to Paris as "the man who did me harm first” (111.351-2; cf. 28, 366), and to the abduction of his wife as “disgrace and shame... inflicted upon me” (XIII.622-3). He is driven by resentment at what he feels is his own humiliation as cuckolded husband and deceived host. 19 His brother appears to feel

humiliated

as

well:

men

have

gone

to

war

"for

the

sake

of

Agamemnon's honour", too (14.70-1, 117). It is not enough to say, then, that the Trojan War was caused by Paris' ‘lust’ for a woman ‘loved’ by Menelaos. The important question is why these men fought over her, and the Homeric answer is not that it was love or lust as such which made them use violence. According to the Iliad, Menelaos and Paris considered the seduction of Helena a matter of

prestige.

By winning her, Paris won a name for daring; by losing her,

Menelaos and his brother lost face.

The epic view is that, more than

anything else, both sides fought for the sake of their status. Menelaos' first move is to mobilise an army to fight with him. He is joined by some sixty-thousand men, who remain in the field for ten years. This made the Trojan War the largest exercise of military force in Greek legend, as Thukydides noted (1.3ff.).

A number of traditional stories tried to explain why such a vast army supported Menelaos. The principal tale had it that most of the army's leaders had courted Helena, and that her father, Tyndareos, had prevented an escalation of rivalry by making each suitor swear to take up

arms against any man trying to take her away from her chosen husband.

174

Thus,

by

accident,

all these

men

were

bound

to join

forces

with

Menelaos in his fight against Paris. 2 Homer does not refer to any of this. When he does mention oaths taken by the Akhaians (11.339-41, cf. 286-8), he appears to be thinking of the kind of formal promise Idomeneus makes to Agamemnon when he assures him of his continuing support in battle : "Son of Atreus, I shall most certainly be a reliable

companion to you as in the past I promised and confirmed with a nod” (IV .266-7). Other tales told Kinyras of Cyprus had promised; how was dressed up as a Kinyras hears that offers Agamemnon

of difficulties in getting certain men to join: how sent a fleet of miniature ships, not the real ones he Odysseus feigned madness; how the young Akhilleus girl and sent into hiding. 2! In the /llad, by contrast, the Akhaians are about to attack Troy and merely a magnificent cuirass, thus "pleasing the prince"

(X1.19-23). Akhilleus is simply visited at home Odysseus, and is a willing recruit (XI.765-82).

by Nestor and He later tells

Agamemnon that he joined the expedition "in order to please you" (1.158). In the Odyssey, Agamemnon says only that he and Menelaos had gone to Ithaka and “after a whole month crossed [back] over the entire wide sea, having with effort talked round Odysseus, the destroyer

of cities” (24.115-9). The various colourful legends have thus been replaced in the epic with the general picture that Agamemnon and his brother relied on persuasion in mobilising leading men of other communities, and that these princes

agreed to follow them as a personal favour. 22 One more aspect of the nature of Menelaos' army must be mentioned here. One might have expected the Akhaian forces to be regarded as a

private

army

serving

the

private

interests

of its

leader.

But,

as

Jeanmaire (1939: 64) and Murray (1980: 53-4) have argued (contra Finley 1977: 103), the Akhaian expedition is meant to be a public

venture. This is clearest in the case of the mobilisation on Crete. When, at one point, Odysseus pretends to be a Cretan commander, he claims that the Cretans "told me and the famous Idomeneus to lead the ships to Troy. There was no way of refusing; the harsh talk of the people forced [me/us]" (14.237-9). The precise meaning of this phrase is debatable, but in any case the decision of who is to lead the Cretan contingent, and perhaps even the decision to send a contingent to Troy in

175

the first place, is somehow

subject to public opinion.

That implies a

large measure of community involvement in the expedition. 2 The same applies to the whole Akhaian army. We find that a man refusing to join the expedition would face "the painful penalty of the

Akhaians”

(XIII.669).

His obligation of military service is thus to a

collectivity, not to Menelaos or Agamemnon as private individuals. 2, Furthermore, it is the responsibility of the Akhaians at large to provide the commanders with food and drink during the campaign, just as at home they provide the elders of the community with wine and meat.

Hence Menelaos addresses the commanders as “you who drink at public cost" (demia, XVII.249-50). 25

In sum, the contingents mobilised to defend the reputation of Helena's husband and her brother-in-law are public armies.

come

from

a particular

community,

They each not only

but represent

that community.

Together, these contingents appear to represent the "land" of Akhaia as a whole. 26 The aim of the Akhaian war effort is "to acquire honour [time 27] for

Menelaos and Agamemnon from the Trojans” (I.159-60; cf. V.552-3). As a first step towards this goal, Menelaos takes Odysseus on an “embassy” to Troy, where they address the people in assembly (III.205-

24; XI.139-40). The poet does not give us their speeches, but presumably they formulate the Akhaian demands in much the same way as Agamemnon does later : “the Trojans must return Helena and all the possessions some suitable honour, [the fame of] which will reach Priamos and the sons of Priamos refuse to pay me the and fight for compensation until I reach the goal of war"

and repay even future honour..., (III.285-9;

the Argives with generations. If I shall stay here cf. 458-60). 28

From the fact that the envoys address the Trojans in assembly, from the way the goal of the expedition is described, and from the wording of the

Akhaian demands, it is evident that they do not hold Paris and his family alone to account. The entire Trojan community is charged with, and accepts, responsibility for Paris' actions. Perhaps the actual financial

burden of paying compensation is to be borne by the culprit alone (cf. VII.363-4),

but conceptually

at least the transaction

communities as well as between two families.

is between

two

176

The Trojans are given more than one opportunity to satisfy Menelaos’

honour and avoid war by returning his wife and property to him, and offering some form of compensation. Yet they refuse to do so. Thus we return

to the question

that,

as mentioned

students of the Trojan War.

earlier,

has

long

occupied

Why do the Trojans risk destruction by

rejecting Menelaos' justifiable demands 7 Herodotos knew of two attempts at making sense of the story. According to certain "knowledgeable" Persians, he said, the Trojans

refused to return Helena as a matter of principle, since Akhaians had previously taken Io and Medeia from Asia without ever paying compensation (I.1-5). This explanation was made fun of by Aristophanes in his comic account of the causes of the Peloponnesian War (Akharnians 514-31), and Herodotos himself took it none too

seriously.

He

found

explanation,

which

himself

he claimed

convinced, to have

however,

heard

from

by

the

Egyptian

other priests.

Their story was that Helena had set out for Troy, but had been blown off course to Egypt, where the local ruler had detained her while sending Paris on his way. When Menelaos came to get her back, the Trojans

truthfully replied that they did not have her. believe this and attacked. 29

The Akhaians refused to

Among other versions of the story, one may note the Journal of the Trojan War, a make-believe eyewitness account of the war, probably written in the first century A.D. Its author, calling himself Dictys the Cretan, maintained that the Trojans kept Helena, “because they wanted the great wealth she had brought with her and they had fallen in love with the women who accompanied her to Troy" (Clarke 1981 : 29).

Despite the bafflement of later authors, the /liad in fact offers a coherent and plausible account of Trojan attitudes towards war.

In a casual reference to the meeting in which the Trojans first decided not to pay compensation, the poet says that, after Menelaos and Odysseus had delivered their message, one Antimakhos, a wealthy Trojan, spoke. This man "in particular - hoping to get from Paris splendid gifts, gold - would not let Helena be given to Menelaos”

(X1.123-5).

More than that, he “proposed in the Trojan assembly... to

kill Menelaos (X1.139-41).

Odysseus

on the spot and not let him go back to the Akhaians” Not everyone agreed. Antenor offered Menelaos and

hospitality

and

admired

presumably he supported their case.

their

speeches

(III.205-24),

so

The Trojans, then, were divided.

177

Some favoured compliance with Akhaian demands,

others, Antimakhos

"in particular", were prepared to provoke the enemy even further. We are not told how a final decision was reached. When the /liad picks up the story, it is nine years later and the Trojans are all tired of war and hostile to Paris and Helena. Hektor says that the people ought to have stoned Paris to death for all the misery he has caused. 9 Hence, when Menelaos and Paris suddenly agree to settle their differences in single combat and bring the war to an end, the Trojans "rejoice" (III.111-2) and pray for peace (III.298-301, 320-3). Menelaos wins, and by the terms of the truce the Trojans ought to accept

defeat, return Helena and pay compensation. However, for reasons of their own, the gods decide that the war must go on. To that end they inspire the expert archer Pandaros to shoot at Menelaos while the truce

is still in force. (IV.13-219).

Menelaos is only wounded, but his life seems in danger

One might have thought that the gods' intention was thus to provoke

the Akhaians into re-opening hostilities.

But no: it is the Trojans who

take up arms and attack as soon as they see Menelaos hit (TV.220-2). Moreover, the gods persuade Pandaros that by killing Menelaos he will gain “glory and gratitude among all the Trojans, most of all from prince

Paris, who will be the very first to bring you splendid gifts” (TV.95-7). Agamemnon also thinks that "glory" will be the assassin's reward (TV.197, 207), because, if Menelaos were to die, "the Akhaians would at once begin to think about [returning to] their fatherland, and we would leave behind Helena of Argos for Priamos and the Trojans to boast about" (IV.172-4). In other words, the death of Menelaos would turn certain defeat into a good chance of victory for the Trojans. Evidently, the gods - and Pandaros - are counting on the Trojan army to exploit this sudden opportunity. ?! It is assumed that, despite their general warweariness and despite their having sworn to keep the truce 32, the Trojans at large will be far from reluctant to fight when they feel they have a chance of winning. Menelaos does not die, and after an indecisive battle the Trojans meet

to discuss the situation.

Antenor urges them to keep their promise after

all and return Helena to her husband (VII.347-51).

that this view is shared by many (VII.393).

It is later suggested

Paris replies :

178

*Antenor, the things you say are no longer friendly to me. of a speech better than that one...

You could have thought

Now I shall speak among the Trojans. I flatly

refuse. I shall not retum the woman. But I am willing to give back all the possessions that I brought from Argos to our house, and even add things from my own household.” (VII.357-64) Then Priamos gets up to announce that it will be up to Agamemnon and Menelaos to respond to "the statement of Paris, on account of whom the conflict arose” (VII.374). The Trojans may agree with Antenor, but

they show no sign of that now. Even though their prospects of victory have faded, they accept Priamos’ proposal at once and disperse (v11.379). The Akhaians reject the Trojan offer. A few days later another battle takes place. Previously, the Trojan army had always fought just outside the city walls and withdrawn into town at night. The aim had been

merely to keep the Akhaians from taking the city.

This purely defensive

strategy was not a matter of principle, but had been imposed by necessity : the Trojan elders felt that their forces were not strong enough to do more than that. 33 Hektor, the commander-in-chief, on the other hand, favoured a more aggressive approach. He wanted "to fight at the sterns of the ships” of the Akhaians, and despised the elders, who had prevented him from doing so, for what he saw as their "cowardice"

(XV.721-5). On this new day of battle, however, the Akhaians are weakened by the absence of Akhilleus and his contingent, and the Trojans succeed in

driving them back to their camp.

The Akhaians at once realise what this

means : Hektor is going to try to burn the ships and "butcher the Akhaians when in panic they min among their vessels through the smoke" (IX.242-3; cf. VII.71-2; VIII.235). And indeed he is. In order to prevent the Akliaians from escaping under cover of darkness (VIII.497-15), he keeps the army in the field even at night. His plan has the support of the whole army, including that of Poulydamas, the most cautious of his men (VIII.542; XVIII.257-60). Next day, the Trojan assault continues, but is ultimately repulsed by the Akhaians. Akhilleus rejoins battle. Nevertheless, Hektor insists on

sustaining the offensive and most Trojans applaud his decision CXVIII.261-310). The Trojans are apparently not content with defending their city, nor with chasing the Akhaians away. They seek to annihilate the enemy.

179

Homer's Trojans, then, resent having been drawn into war, and long for an end to it, yet they go along with decisions which cannot fail to prolong hostilities, and they aggressively pursue victory in battle.

Furthermore, it seems that the rights and wrongs of the matter are of little concern to them. No Trojan ever argues that the abduction of Helena was unjustified and should not be condoned. Antenor does object

to the violation of a sworn agreement (VII.350-3), but the point is completely ignored by Paris and Priamos in their replies. Why ? One reason is the power of Paris. As we have seen, his father Priamos, the ruler of Troy, supports him in the assembly.

He does so, it

seems, because he is generally well-disposed towards his son and his daughter-in-law. Unlike the other Trojans, he treats Helena in a kindly manner (III.161-5; XXTV.770), and he is so concerned for Paris that he

"shudders" at the prospect of him engaging in single combat, and cannot bear to stay and watch the fight. 4 One might add that several of Paris’ uncles are elders too, and surely the poet imagines that they, and Paris'

numerous brothers and cousins, side with him for the sake of kinship. 35 We have seen that Paris' wealth and status bring him further supporters.

Antimakhos and Pandaros may not be the only ones who hope to gain material rewards from friendship with him. * Finally, we may suppose that all the “companions” who had collaborated with him in abducting Helena, would back him now, too. 57

Thus, even if the majority of Trojans dislike Paris and do not want war, there is a substantial and powerful group of people who will take

his side against the Akhaians. escaped

the

stoning

he

When

deserves,

Hektor remarks that Paris has

because

"the

Trojans

are

great

cowards" (111.56), he must mean that they have refrained from venting their hatred for him because they are afraid of antagonising Paris’ faction. The same explanation goes a long way towards explaining why the people do not oppose Paris in assembly, and why Paris, instead of

answering the criticism levelled at him by Antenor, can simply call him a fool and reproach him for not being on his side. His power, and their ‘cowardice’, allow him to dominate the decision-making process. The Trojan herald who informs the Akhaians of the result stresses this. He does not restrict himself to relaying the official message, but goes out of his way to dissociate the Trojans at large from the actions of Paris. When mentioning Paris' abduction of Helena, he interjects : "if only he

180

had died first!" (VI1.390).

And when announcing that Paris refuses to

return Helena, he adds " - although the Trojans sold him to” (VII.393). 3% The Akhaians, however, see the matter in an entirely different light. Their

view

is

that

the

Trojans

are

willing

accomplices

to

Paris.

Menelaos has had his wife stolen and his life threatened when he came to get her back; he has been shot treacherously; he has seen the Trojans break a truce and try to destroy his army and fleet. He feels humiliated by all of this, and holds the entire Trojan people responsible. He shouts at them : “More than enough, the other disgrace and shame which you inflicted upon me, you

cowards and bitches,... you who took off, just like that, with my wedded wife and many possessions..., and now, on top of that, you strive to set fire to the ships and

to kill the Akhaians” (XIII.622-9). 39

He goes on to say that the Trojans are "men full of Aybris... whose spirit is always reckless [atasthalon].

They cannot get enough of war..."

(ΧΙΠ.633-5, cf. 621). They enjoy battle more than other people enjoy even "sleep and love, sweet song and flawless dance” (XIII.636-9). In Menelaos' view the Trojans support Paris because they like fighting, and they like fighting because they are full of kybris. @ He believes, in other words, that Paris and his countrymen regard themselves as superior to Menelaos and his army, and continue to humiliate him because they enjoy an opportunity to display that superiority to themselves and to the world. Agamemnon appears to agree. He refers to the Trojans as "arrogant" (Ayperenoreonton) and imagines that, after winning the war, they would insultingly stamp upon Menelaos' grave and ridicule Agamemnon's "pointless army” (halion straton, IV.176-9). A sophisticated picture of Trojan motives thus emerges from the Iliad. On the one hand, they wish to live in peace and hate Paris for provoking

the hostility of the Greeks.

On the other hand, two things militate for

war. First, many Trojans have good reason to support Paris, and all Trojans have good reason not to antagonise him - even if he is in the wrong. Second, the Trojans at large are keen to have a reputation for superior military strength; hence they seek victory in any confrontation, even if they are drawn into the conflict against their will, and, again, even if they are morally in the wrong. If Paris himself is prepared to settle, they are happy to live in peace. If he is not, the combination of

181

his power and their desire to maintain a name as a strong, warlike people - particularly when victory seems within reach - tips the balance in favour of war. When negotiating with the enemy, they like to paint themselves as helpless victims of Paris' tyranny; the enemy prefers to judge them by their deeds and sees them all as wilful aggressors, full of

hybris. The Akhaians, for their part, while primarily seeking to punish the Trojans for humiliating Menelaos,

have another goal besides revenge.

They seek fame by defeating and destroying a powerful city. They say that the fall of Troy will bring Agamemnon "the greatest fame under the sun, because he destroyed such a large city and killed many men" (9.263-6; cf. TV.415-6). Should he fail to bring Troy down, he himself admits, he will go home with a "bad reputation” (11.115; IX.22), "the most shamed man in Argos" (IV.171; 11.285), because "this is an ugly thing, even for future generations to hear of, that so many Akhaian men of such quality, in this fruitless way, without effect, wage war and fight against a smaller

number

of men,

and

have

no result at all to show

for it” (II.119-22;

cf.297-8; XTV.88-94).

In these passages, the Akhaians speak of the sack of Troy, not as a punishment, but as the outcome of a contest of strength between themselves and the Trojans. In this light, Helena seems less a wife to be

recovered than a prize to be won,

“something to boast about" for the

winner, 4! War, of course, is inherently a contest of strength between adversaries, but for the Akhaians, as for the Trojans, this aspect of war

assumes unusual importance.

Winning the contest becomes a goal in

itself, to be pursued even when other goals no longer matter. One might have thought that the Akhaian chieftains, who have no personal grievance against the Trojans and have joined only to do Agamemnon a favour (1.152-60), would be quite content to let Menelaos bear the brunt of his own quarrel, and to accept the failure of their expedition if he were to die in battle. One might also have thought that they would be glad to accept dismissal if their commander-in-chief were to announce

that he is giving up and going home.

Instead, they go out of their way to

shield Menelaos from danger, afraid that "he might come to harm and so

182

take them

a long way

from the goal of their efforts"

(V.561-7;

cf.

VII.106), and they reproach Agamemnon with his lack of determination, telling him to stay and fight. Victory has become so all-

important that they will even fight on if their leader withdraws and thus leaves them without any cause to fight for. Diomedes _ tells Agamemnon: "If you yourself are eager that followed you from Akhaians will stay for as ships to their fatherland :

to go home, go ! The road is open; the very many ships Mykenai lie near the sea. But the other long-haired long as it takes to sack Troy. Let them too flee in their the two of us, I and Sthenelos, shall fight until we reach

our goal in Troy” (IX.42-9). @ Once drawn into a conflict, the Akhaians no less than the Trojans feel compelled to prove that they are not "an unsightly army" (XIV.84), not

“cowards and weaklings” (IX.40-1). Whatever other motives they may have for sacking Troy, one is the need to preserve and enhance their reputation and self-image as warriors.

183 3. TROY I: THE IDEAL OF ANNIHILATION The ultimate goal of both Akhaians and Trojans is the total destruction of the enemy. The Trojans want to kill the Akhaians and burn their fleet; the Akhaians, even at their departure from home, anticipating a negative response to their demands, promise "to return after sacking well-walled Troy” (11.286-8). War and destruction always go hand-inhand, of course, and the sacking of cities in particular is such a common

feature of warfare

that one is inclined to take it for granted.

Yet

destruction in war may serve as many different purposes as it takes different forms. The manner in which the destruction is wrought tells us

much about the motives of the attacker. Three historical examples of the sacking of towns and villages may illustrate this point, and put the sack of Troy in perspective. Mount Hagen, New Guinea (1930s) Ongka, a big man of the Kawelka, recounts the story of a war of his youth between his tribe and the Tipuka. The war started when one of the Tipuka clans “came out against us with spears and shields, saying as a pretext that we

had killed one of their men by sorcery. 'No, you killed him’.

We denied it...

‘All right' we said, and joined battle”.

But... they said Soon the other

Tipuka clans joined in, and “the Tipuka as a whole laid waste to our territory, cut bananas, burnt houses, slaughtered pigs, seized our wives". Next day, the defeated Kawelka sent out search parties for their women and children, who were then taken to safety in the villages of allied tribes. "We, the men, returned to the communal men's house...

We had to stay and fight

it out”. After months of protracted fighting, the Kawelka "one day” took the Tipuka by surprise. “We swept over them, raped their women standing up, chopped bananas, axed pigs, fired houses. They fled like wild pigs... After they had satisfied themselves with destroying property and assaulting the women sexually, the Kawelka men said 'All right... Now there is no quarrel between us, let us separate and be quiet’.*

Ongka adds : "These events are remembered in our ceremonial speeches. The [Tipuka] Oklembo say to us 'We drove you out and your mothers had to

drink your daughters’ urine’. We reply 'We drove you out and your old women had to clasp men and sleep with them in pigs’ nests’". “' The sack of these Papua villages appears to involve no plunder,

destruction.

only

The point of cutting down banana-trees and butchering pigs

is not to acquire food, but to destroy enemy property.

The women are

184

raped in order to humiliate their men, rather than for mere sexual gratification; that, at any rate, is what the later exchange of taunts suggests. There is no taking of prisoners, nor is there any attempt to annihilate the enemy - although men who resist may be killed, and the

burning of houses may claim further victims. The population of a ravaged settlement finds temporary shelter with friends or in the forest, and in due course regroups, often re-settling its old territory. The purpose of destruction, it seems, is to inflict serious, but not irreparable, damage upon the enemy in order to demonstrate the superior prowess of

one's own tribe. When the enemy has recovered sufficiently, he tries to retaliate in kind, and when the score is even, there are no hard feelings. Porto Bello (1668) and Panama (1671) In the second half of the seventeenth century, British buccaneers based in

Jamaica, and French buccaneers in Haiti, continually plundered Spanish towns on the American mainland. Their methods are exemplified by Henry Morgan's raid on Porto Bello, a town of 400 families, with a garrison of 300 soldiers, and many large warehouses owned by non-resident merchants. Morgan's men, according to the eyewitness account of Alexander Exquemelin, once the garrison had surrendered, collected all captives and put them under guard in the town's castle - men and women separately. The buccaneers ate and drank, then raped the women. Next day, they plundered the town, and after that began systematically to torture their prisoners, beginning with the wealthiest, in order to make them reveal where they had hidden or buried the rest of their valuables and money. Having kept this up

for fifteen days, while Spanish forces were gathering against them, they threatened to blow up the fortifications, burn the town and execute the surviving prisoners unless a large ransom was paid. A few of the captives were released to make the arrangements,

and somehow

managed to find the

sum required. Morgan's more famous raid on Panama took a somewhat different course. Soon after the town had been captured, Morgan had it set on fire. His men were mystified and angry, and did all they could to extinguish the fire, even

trying to cut it off by means of controlled explosions.

Exquemelin laments

the loss of 2,000 rich houses, seven monasteries, a nunnery, a church and a hospital, all decorated with paintings and tapestries, and of an additional 3,000 common houses, 200 warehouses and “a very large house for the trade

in negroes".

The buccaneers did manage to dig out quite a lot of gold and

silver from the smouldering remains, and every day for three weeks Morgan sent out bands of 200 men to round up those inhabitants of the city who had taken refuge in the jungle and the mountains. As usual, prisoners were tortured for their hidden wealth. After about a month, the buccaneers left.

185

Not being in a position to demand a ransom for an already ruined city, they made do with putting a price on each of their 600 prisoners individually. Those whose ransoms were not paid, were sold as slaves. Morgan's answer to captives pleading to be released, says Exquemelin, was that he had come looking not for moans, but for money. 45

The events of the sack of these two Central American towns are almost exactly the reverse of what happened in New Guinea. Women, as far as one can tell, are raped for sexual gratification only; there is no hint that their husbands, brothers and sons are meant to be humiliated.

Otherwise, the buccaneers are only interested in self-enrichment.

They

spend weeks on end in a captured place plundering, as well as torturing, ransoming and selling captives, and finally even ransoming the buildings of the town, in order to squeeze the last drop of wealth out of the area.

Men are killed only when they cannot be taken alive, or when there is no longer any prospect of making a gain from them.

a minimum,

with the buccaneers

in Panama

Destruction is kept to

opposing

their leader's

baffling decision to burn the town, and fighting to save it. New Carthage, Spain (209 B.C.)

Polybios' Histories include a description of the Roman way of sacking cities. The description applies specifically to the capture of New Carthage by Scipio Africanus during the Second Punic War, but is presumably based on

Polybios' own experience of Roman military customs half a century later. Scipio's troops successfully stormed the town. "According to their custom, he sent most of them against the people in the city, with orders to kill anyone they came across, to spare no-one, and not to begin plundering until given the Signal. I think they do this to inspire terror; hence in cities captured by the Romans one also often sees not only slaughtered people, but even dogs cut in half and severed parts of other creatures. This time, too, such sights were extremely common, on account of the large number of those captured" (X.15,4-6). Not long afterwards, the city's garrison surrendered. "When this had happened, and the signal had been given, they stopped slaughtering

and turned to plunder” (X. 15,8). Only a part of the troops was actually involved in gathering booty, while the rest remained under arms and at the ready. The plunder was collected centrally and sold, the proceeds distributed among the troops - with absolute fairness and integrity, according to Polybios (X.15,9- 17,5). Ten thousand prisoners were taken, who would normally have been sold into slavery, but on this occasion Scipio generously released all the free citizens among them (X.17,6). Polybios leaves little doubt that often captive women would be

raped, but he stresses that Scipio refused a woman offered to him by some of

186 his soldiers, and promised to protect certain other female prisoners as well (X. 18-19).

Where the buccaneers plunder and the Papua New Guineans destroy,

the Romans

do both,

but in two separate phases.

One

may

doubt

whether in reality these were quite as neatly distinguished as Polybios maintains, but some distinction must have been made. First, a show of force involving the annihilation of literally everything that moves;

second, a systematic collection of movable goods and a rounding up of prisoners, to enrich troops, army coffers and the Roman treasury. Roman methods of sacking thus suggest that the display of power and the acquisition of wealth are goals of equal importance in Roman warfare. It is worth noting that the horrific violence of the first phase is not the work of men going berserk or running amok - insofar as that implies a loss of rational control over one's actions. The soldiers are ordered to start slaughtering, and they stop at a given signal. Evidently they are well in control of themselves and purposefully cause a bloodbath.

The sack of Troy is different from all of the above. What will happen to the city is never in doubt.

Priamos will see

“sons killed and daughters being dragged away, and rooms ransacked, and innocent children thrown to the floor in the terrible destruction, and daughters-in-law dragged off by grim Akhaian hands. And myself last - outside my own door meat-eating dogs will tug at me, when someone... has taken the life from my limbs" (XXU.628).

The entire city will be looted and finally "consumed by a smouldering fire, from the citadel downwards"

(XXII.410-11). #

All this is standard

Homeric practice, as is clear from a passage in which Kleopatra "listed everything" for her husband Meleagros, "all the sorrows which befall people whose city is taken : they kill the men, fire razes the city, other men lead away the children and deep-girdled women” (IX.591-5). It is obvious, then, that destruction and slaughter are war-aims in themselves, not semi-accidental results of widespread looting or of attempts to achieve objectives such as retrieving Helena and the stolen

goods, and seizing compensation.

Once the Trojans have rejected the

initial demands, the Akhaians seek to annihilate them. Occasionally, a compromise is suggested, but when the Akhaians have the upper hand,

187

the general feeling among them is that it is no longer enough for the Trojans to comply with the original demands. "Let no-one now accept goods from Paris. Or even Helena. It is obvious, even to a complete fool, that the Trojans are already caught in the web of destruction”, says Diomedes. All shout their approval (VII.400-4). The Trojans will not even be allowed to surrender. A standard form

of conditional surrender does exist, whereby the city under attack may escape sacking by giving up half of its movable wealth to the enemy. Hektor, in a moment of desperation, considers that he "might on behalf of the Trojans take the oath of the elders not to hide anything, but to divide everything into two, the wealth which the city contains", but immediately realises that such an offer is not going to be accepted (XXT.111-28). * The Trojans must either fight to the end, or abandon

the city, fleeing by night (XXITI.383-4; XXIV .381-5).

with

their

possessions

loaded

on

carts

In fact, there are signs that the sack of Troy is to be exceptionally violent. The common procedure is, it seems, to enslave all children.@

But Andromakhe

doubts whether her son Astyanax will be sold into

slavery along with her, or whether “some Akhaian will grab you by the

arm and in anger hur! you down from the wall to a miserable death".

If

the latter, she imagines his killer will be “someone perhaps whose brother, or father, or son even, was killed by Hektor” (XXIV.732-7). Her fears are justified by the words shouted by Agamemnon when he notices that his brother is about to spare a Trojan's life in battle : "Menelaos ! Why are you so concerned for people 7 I suppose you had the best possible treatment at home, from the Trojans ? Not one of them must slip through our hands and escape sheer destruction, not even a boy carried in his mother's womb; not even he must escape. All together they must be swept out of Troy, [their bodies} uncared for and unseen." (V1.55-60)

This suggests that, although as a rule children are spared, boys may be

killed as well as men when their captors seek personal revenge. ® Great ferocity and a desire for vengeance are suggested Agamemnon's

desire

"to

send

crashing

down

Priamos’

by

roof-beam

blackened with smoke, and make his doors go up in flames” (II.414-5). Again, Nestor appears to exhort the army to rape Trojan women in revenge. “Let no-one be in a hurry to return home before he has slept with the wife of a Trojan, to exact vengeance for Helena's [abduction]"

188

(11.354-6).

One suspects that the capture of women would have involved

rape in any case, but it remains significant that this is not mentioned elsewhere in the Iliad. Nestor's words thus serve to create at least an impression that the sack of the city is going to be uncommonly violent.

The destruction of the enemy may thus be pursued with greater intensity when a desire for revenge comes into play. One notes that the Akhaians do not commit random atrocities. The possibility of men being enslaved or women killed, does not appear to occur to anyone. Even Agamemnon, in his extremist rhetoric, does not speak of killing Trojan women. Instead, he pushes the distinction between the sexes to

impossible lengths by demanding

the death of male, but not female,

foetuses.

This pursuit of vengeance provocation,

but

rule-bound

is not simply

behaviour.

a ‘natural’

Menelaos,

fight his enemies in blind anger. Agamemnon has "the proper thing" (aisima, VI.62), as the poet puts and spare none. Menelaos is persuaded, but does prisoner. He merely pushes him aside and leaves

stab him to death (VI.62-5).

response

for one,

does

to not

to remind him to do it 59: to kill them all, not kill his Trojan it to Agamemnon to

To him, taking violent revenge does not

come naturally. He kills and destroys because he knows he is obliged to. The destruction of Troy, in sum, is not the result of passions getting out of hand. On the contrary, it is a deliberate act, executed to the requirements of the Homeric ethics of vengeance. The Trojans in turn are as fierce as the Akhaians in their desire to destroy the enemy. In the midst of battle, Hektor himself grabs hold of the stern of a ship (XV.704). "Once [he] had taken hold of the stern, he never

let

go,

and

with

his

hands

on

the

stern-post

commanded

the

Trojans : ‘Bring fire !... Now Zeus has given us a day to make up for everything’ (XV.716-9). Hektor evidently wishes to burn the ship as an act of revenge, ands tries to prevent the vessel from being dragged out to sea and escaping with its crew. 5! He also sees the destruction of the Akhaians as a way of ensuring that “others, too, will hate to wage war... against the Trojans" (VIII.515-6). A telling detail is that "Hektor, greatly exulting in his strength... threatens to cut off the high stern-posts of the ships" before burning them (IX.237,241). That would not be much of a practical contribution to demolishing the ships, and must be a symbolic gesture. 52 I suggest that we should see it, and the annihilation

189

of the enemy in general, as an act of conspicuous destruction, meant to demonstrate the strength and power of its perpetrators. Conspicuously absent among Akhaian motives is a desire for booty. There is no doubt that from the beginning they intend to take booty from Troy, and they eventually do. Moreover, in the course of the war they attack nearby towns and islands for the sake of plunder. * But the prospect of booty is never offered as a reason for making war on Troy. Not in the discussions among the princes, nor in the exhortations addressed to the troops. At one point, the massed ranks of fighters, thoroughly tired of war, start a run on the ships and set out for home. They are brought back into line with beatings, death-threats, and with

reminders of the omens that promised victory, of the shame incurred by defeat, and of the need for vengeance.

think is most likely to persuade

them

But not a word of what we might

: the riches

in store for the

conquerors. 55 We must assume that the poet felt that the acquisition of wealth, although a consequence of victory, was not a prominent goal of the Akhaians, or at any rate not a goal he ought to mention. One reason may be that the demands of vengeance and the aim of enriching oneself clash. The code of revenge may require one to destroy, in a manner of speaking, one's own wealth. When Menelaos allows Agamemnon to kill his prisoner, he forgoes the "bronze and gold and much-worked iron" which would have been his if he had spared the man's life and accepted a

ransom (VI.45-51).

And Astyanax' vengeful killer could have sold the

boy for a good price instead.

The currently popular view of the Trojan War as a large-scale raid for metals and other supplies, then, is not one the /liad subscribes to.

The

Akhaian army is much unlike a band of buccaneers, in that it is primarily after revenge and reputation, not riches.

The heroes are in this respect

closer to the tribesmen of New Guinea.

A crucial difference, however,

is the heroes' commitment to annihilating the enemy, rather than merely

doing damage. The Akhaians do combine destruction with plunder, as the Romans do. Their way of combining the two, though, is quite different from the Roman one. Instead of separate phases, the heroes discern separate spheres of destruction and plunder : men and real estate are destroyed, women and movables are taken as booty. Hence in the epics, war is often described, not simply as one group fighting another, but as one group of men fighting other men "over their women". 56

190

Perhaps the practice stems from a notion that women are not enemies themselves, merely dependants of enemies. If so, one would only need to kill the men in order to annihilate the enemy. The women and wealth can be carried off, not only to enrich the victors, but to underline what

feeble protectors the vanquished have been. There is an alternative to war as a means of settling the quarrel between Menelaos and Paris : the apparently well-established practice of trial by combat. . In the Jliad, it is suddenly and spontaneously proposed

by Paris, and, to the joy of both sides, accepted by Menelaos. An arena is marked out and lots are drawn for the right to cast the first spear. The on-lookers pray that the one who is in the wrong may die. 5’ To us, this seems ἃ much better way of solving the conflict than war. "Such a duel, in all common sense, ought to have taken place long before this”

(Edwards 1987: with the idea ?

188).

Why does it take Paris nine years to come up

The usual explanation is that the episode traditionally took place in the

first year of the war, but that Homer incongruously incorporated it into his account of a few weeks in the last year of the war, for the sake of its intrinsic dramatic interest. exercise such freedom in for thinking that the duel valid. We may think that

* There is little doubt that an epic poet could composition. On the other hand, our reasons should have been fought earlier may not be a man should fight his own fights, and not get

others to do it for him; and that conflicts should be settled with minimal use of force.

previous

In Homeric

chapter,

honour

society, however,

may

be won

as we have seen in the

by applying

maximum

force

against one's enemies, using not only one's own strength, but also the combined power of all one's relatives, friends and connections. Given this norm, the duel of Menelaos and Paris may have been deliberately,

and perhaps traditionally, placed towards the end of the war.

A contest

of personal prowess may have been seen as a last resort; the first thing

adversaries would have been expected to do was to turn to a contest of power and mobilise the widest possible support with the intention of doing the greatest possible damage.

We shall see that there are in fact several Homeric tales of war which display this pattern : the hero does not fight his enemy man-to-man, but destroys him and his people with the aid of all the forces he can muster.

191 4. PRIVATE CONFLICTS,

BRAWLS AND WARS

The [liad and Odyssey mention the causes and goals of five legendary

wars fought a generation before the sack of Troy.

Four of these are

familiar from other sources, too. Comparison shows that the epic versions of the stories, while similar to one another and to the epic presentation of the Trojan War, are distinct from those of other

traditions.

Which suggests that there is a peculiarly Homeric manner of

telling tales of war. (1) THE WAR OF MEN AND KENTAURS

The ‘men’ in question are the Lapiths of north-eastern Thessaly; the Kentaurs a tribe of half-human creatures living on Mt. Pelion. Part of their story is told in the Odyssey, as a warning against drunkenness : "Wine confused even that Kentaur, the famous Eurytion, when he stayed with the great-hearted Peirithods, after travelling to the Lapiths. On that occasion he addled his brain with wine, and while out of his senses he did ill deeds in Peirithos' house. The heroes were hurt. They jumped up, dragged him through the porch out of doors and cut off his ears and nose with a merciless blade.

He went away, with his addled

brain... From this arose the conflict between Kentaurs and men. came to grief first, through his heavy drinking.” (21.295-304)

And he himself

The /liad provides further details in a reminiscence of Nestor's : "Peirithoös [and the other Lapith leaders, as well as their ally Theseus] had grown to

be the strongest men on earth. They were the strongest and they fought the strongest mountain savages and they utterly destroyed them. And [says Nestor] I mingled with these men after travelling from Pylos, a distant land far away, because they themselves invited me.” (1.263-70)

Finally, it is said that on the very day that his wife bore him a son, "Peirithoös took revenge on the hairy savages. He drove them away from Pelion and chased them towards the Aithikes" (11.740-4).

Other sources inform drunk was Peirithods' indecently assaulting the Kentaurs who attended

us that the occasion on which Eurytion had got wedding and. that his "ill deeds" consisted of bride. The story further says that the numerous the wedding all tried to rape the female guests.

As a result, a fight broke out between them and the Lapiths there and then.

192

The Homeric account, however, is quite different.

There is only one

offender, Eurytion, who is punished immediately and leaves in distress. There is no fight as yet : the Lapiths take the time to call upon a distant ally to join them and a decisive battle is not fought until at least nine months later. It appears to take place in the territory of the Kentaurs, on Mt. Pelion. Thus, what in one tradition is a drunken brawl at a party, is in the Homeric tradition a full-scale war, “a planned campaign”

(Willcock 1970: ad 11.742). 9 The cause of this war is a private quarrel - the offensive behaviour of a foreign guest at a wedding - but the angry host, apart from in person retaliating violently against the offender, also gathers a large army to take revenge on the whole tribe of Kentaurs. As

in the case of the Trojan War, the entire community is held responsible for the acts of a single member and its punishment is destruction. Unlike the Trojans, the Kentaurs escape by leaving their territory. (1) THE WAR OF THE KOURETES AND AITOLIANS The 'Aitolians’ here are the inhabitants of Kalydon, ruled by Oineus; the Kouretes are the people of the neighbouring town of Pleuron, among them the brothers of Althaia, Oineus' wife. Oineus had unwittingly

offended the goddess Artemis and she had sent a giant wild boar to ravage his farmland. "Meleagros, son of Oineus, killed it, after gathering huntsmen and hunting dogs from many towns; for it would not have been brought down by a few men. ... And Artemis caused there to be much turmoil and shouting on account of it, on account

of the boar's head and hairy hide, between the Kouretes and the great-hearted Aitolians." (IX.543-9)

Other sources inform us that the animal's head and hide were supposed

to be the reward for whoever killed it.

Meleagros refused to give this

prize to his mother's brothers, who claimed it. In one version, he killed his uncles immediately after the hunt as they stood arguing on the spot

where the boar had been killed. As soon as his mother Althaia heard of this, she killed her son by magic, in revenge for the death of her brothers. In this version, then, the conflict again consists of a violent brawl. The Homeric version of the tale, on the other hand, mentions no immediate killings. Instead, the “shouting” somehow escalates into war. "Now, while warlike Meleagros did battle, it went badly for the Kouretes and they could not remain outside the wall, ® numerous as they

193

were” (IX.550-2). Only then, apparently, does Meleagros kill one of Althaia's brothers (IX.567), © and she in anger brings about his elimination. @ Then the war turns in favour of the Kouretes, and soon "the Kouretes and warlike Aitolians fought around the city of Kalydon and slew

one another

- the Aitolians defending

Kalydon,

determined to destroy it utterly in war" (IX.529-32).

the Kouretes

At one point they

begin to “climb the wall and sack the great city" (IX.588-9), but in the end are driven out again.

It appears that Meleagros' uncles feel slighted at being deprived of a prestigious hunting trophy and mobilise their fellow-townsmen to take revenge, not on Meleagros alone, but on the people of Kalydon. Their

aim is to destroy that city. The Kalydonians do more than defend themselves : they too strive to destroy their enemies and for a while actually succeed in besieging them in Pleuron.

And the cause of all this

is a private quarrel among members of a hunting party

recruited

from

several communities. An ancient commentator thought that this "shows that people who are stricken by a god fall out and fight over worthless things” (Schol. bT ad [X.547-8). The Iliad, however, finds no madness in this war. (im) THE FIRST SACK OF TROY

Laomedon,

ruler

of Troy,

had

offended

Poseidon

and

Apollo

(XX1.441-57, cf. VII.448-53), and they had sent an amphibious monster to terrorise the Trojans. Laomedon offered his immortal horses (cf.

V.265-70) to whoever would kill the creature. this task (XX.145-8), and claimed his reward.

Herakles accomplished But Laomedon went back

on his promise. "[Herakles) destroyed sacred Troy through the lack of sense of one man, the proud Laomedon, who attacked him with ill words in spite of his good work, and refused to part with the horses, for the sake of which [Herakles] had come from afar.” (V.648-51)

One of Herakles’

sons boasts : "My

father... once came here, for the

sake of Laomedon's horses, with only six ships... and utterly destroyed the city of

Troy.

He left its streets bereaved." (V.639-42) ©

Other versions say that Herakles came with eighteen fifty-oared ships, i.e. with 900 men, or, on the contrary, with only one ship and a small company, but of the highest quality : the Argo and her crew. In any

case, all agree that he brought an army to destroy Troy. *

Why did

Herakles not attack Laomedon in person, the very moment he refused to

194 pay up ? Hellanikos apparently attempted to explain the course of events

by claiming that Laomedon pretended to keep his promise, but substituted mortal horses for the divine ones. Herakles did not notice this until it was too late.

Then he gathered forces and returned to Troy

(FGH 4 F 26b). But this is clearly not what happened in the Homeric story. Laomedon openly deprived Herakles of his reward, and Herakles, strong as he was, for some reason chose to retaliate by leading

an army against the whole city. Laomedon provokes war not only by withholding the material reward, but also by speaking "ill words". An indication of the sort of thing Laomedon is supposed to have said to Herakles may be found in the words he speaks to Poseidon and Apollo in a similar situation - he

threatens to sell them as slaves and to cut off their ears (XX1.441-55). In the Odyssey, similar threats serve to characterise Penelope's suitors as "full of Aybris". © It seems, therefore, that in the Homeric version the

first Sack aggressive,

of Troy and

and

the Trojan

misguided,

display

War

are both

of superiority

provoked on

the

part

by

an of a

powerful Trojan. Each time, the victim turns out to be powerful enough to strike back, and Troy is destroyed. (IV) THE WAR OF THE SEVEN AGAINST THEBES Although he gives quite a few details which coincide closely with the

story as it is told elsewhere, Homer does not actually tell us the cause of the war.

However,

given these details, the Homeric

could not have differed much from the usual one. and

Polyneikes,

sons

of Oidipous,

quarreled

view of its cause

The Thebans Eteokles over

their

inheritance.

Polyneikes was forced out of the country by his brother, and went to Sikyon, where he married a daughter of the ruler Adrestos (cf. 11.572). Adrestos collected an army in order to restore his son-in-law to his

inheritance. The seven leaders of this army included Tydeus, who had married another daughter of Adrestos (XIV.115-25). "[Tydeus] came to Mykenai in peace, as a foreign visitor, together with the godlike

Polyneikes, to gather men.

They were at the time leading an army against the sacred

walls of Thebes and strongly pleaded to be given allies of renown. And [the Mykenaians] wanted to give these and approved of their request. But Zeus made them change their minds with a show of unfavourable omens. Now, when they had departed and were advancing along the road, they came to [the river] Asopos... There the Akhaians sent ahead Tydeus as a messenger. And he went and found

many Kadmeians at a feast in the house of Eteokles” (IV.376-86).

Tydeus was alone

195 (IV.388; V.803-4; X.285-8), Kadmeians there" (X.288-9).

and

“brought a mild

[meilikhion]

message

to the

He was unsuccessful in his mission. The Seven attacked Thebes, but were defeated. At some stage, Polyneikes challenged Eteokles to a duel

and the brothers killed one another.

The duel is not mentioned by

Homer, and its timing is differently reported in the various versions of the story. Aeschylos, in his Seven Against Thebes, places it during the battle, and Diodoros (IV.65) places it before the battle, but Apollodoros (111.6,1-7,1) says that it happened after the battle. © The original quarrel is once more a private one. 67 This time it takes

place within a community and escalates into war because one of the parties has allies outside. Otherwise, the sequence of events runs parallel to that of the Trojan War. The offended party gathers an army, then sends a messenger to announce the terms on which a settlement is possible. The other party refuses to comply and drags his whole

community into war. The possibility of a trial by combat is, in one version at any rate, not raised until both sides have suffered heavy losses in battle. 68 (V) THE WAR OF THE PYLIANS AND THE EPEIANS The Epeians are the inhabitants of Elis and Bouprasion, the Pylians' neighbours to the north. Nestor once told the long tale of this war to Patroklos, who was in too much of a hurry to sit down and remained standing in the doorway throughout. Some say that this story illustrates

"a typical [Homeric] 'war'" (Finley 1977: 46; cf. Lintott 1982: 17). Others say that “land raids" such as the one described by Nestor “seem normally to have been somewhat minor and clandestine affairs, and are mainly referred to as phenomena of the past" (Murray 1980: 52). Yet others say that the war in question is unique and does not fit into any historical category (Bravo 1980: 956-7). ® As we shall see, the fighting between the Pylians and Epeians is indeed unusual. But it is no more

than a variation within the Homeric pattern, and that variation is explained by the peculiar relations of power between the warring communities. Neleus, ruler of the Pylians and father of Nestor, had sent to Elis "four race-horses and their chariot... for the games : they were to nun for a tripod. But the [Epeian) lord of men Augeias held them back there, and sent the driver away

196

in distress on account of the horses” (X1.699-702).

Thus, "ἃ great debt was owed in

Elis to [Neleus].” (X1.698)

Moreover,

said Nestor,

"the Epeians owed

a debt to many

[Pylians]",

because "being arrogant [hyperephaneontes] and acting in hybris against us, they committed evil deeds” (X1.688, 694-5).

The Epeians apparently

subjected their neighbours to persistent harassment. Their victims felt, as Menelaos did about the Trojans, that the enemy was motivated by hybris.

Augeias' behaviour quite justified this view.

He did not merely

confiscate the horses, but spoke "words" which made Neleus "angry“ (X1.703), and sent the charioteer back to tell the tale (rather than kill or

enslave him). This suggests that the affair was intended as a calculated insult. The Epeians, then, did harm to the Pylians primarily for the joy of showing everyone just how strong they were and how little they feared their neighbours. The Pylians eventually attacked the Epeians to get rhusia, ‘compensation’ (XI.674). A group of men led by Nestor "went to war”

(X1.684). This

They fell on the herds of one Itymoneus, "who lived in Elis".

victim

was

apparently

chosen

at

random

to

pay

for

his

countrymen's misdeeds. The Pylians killed the owner and put his "rustic men“ (agroiotai) to flight, capturing some of the herdsmen (XI.672-6,

697). "We rounded up and drove away from the plain an immense amount of booty : fifty herds of cattle, fifty flocks of sheep, fifty droves of pigs, fifty widely-scattered flocks of goats, and one hundred and fifty brown horses - all mares, many of them with foals. We drove these through the night towards the town, into Neleus'

Pylos...

At the break of day, heralds announced that those should come to whom a

debt was owed in Elis. And when these assembled, the leading men of the Pylians made a distribution” (X1.677-88). Neleus took his share “and gave the rest to be

divided among the people, so that no-one should go short of a fair share.” (X1.7045) 7 The cattle-rustlers appear to have been a group of very young men. Nestor was not yet old enough to be allowed to fight in pitched battle

(X1.717-9, Bravo 1980: 957).

Young as they were, the raiders evidently

acted, not on their own initiative, but with the blessing of the city's leaders, and from the start sought “compensation” for their fellowtownsmen, not private gain. Hence the sacrifices offered afterwards "all

197 over

town"

(706-7).

Their

attack,

therefore,

was

a

community

venture, 71 "A conflict arose between the men of Elis and us over the cattle-raid", Nestor's story continued (X1.671-2). "On the third day, they all came, many men as well as horses, with all possible speed”.

They set up camp

in the plain of Thryoessa, a border town, “intent on destroying it” (70713, 733). The Pylians did not hear of the invasion until late at night. They were “not unwilling... but very keen to do battle" (714-7), Nestor being

particularly

eager

(717-21).

Immediately

the

chariotry

and

"masses of footsoldiers" assembled at the river Minyeios, near Arene. At dawn, they set out and reached their destination before dark (722-33). Next day, the Pylians fought and routed the enemy, pursuing them until

they crossed back into Epeian territory (734-61). 7 Yet again, a private quarrel leads to war and whole communities get involved in the conflict. It is the Pylian community which organises a retaliatory attack. The attack is directed, not against the original offenders, but against the Epeian community, as represented by a randomly chosen victim. Accordingly, the armed forces of the whole Epeian community march out to avenge him. And they again direct their attack, not against the cattle-rustlers, but against an unsuspecting Pylian

border town. As in other wars, the conflict is a matter of prestige.

Although the

confiscated race-horses and the lifted cattle are no doubt of great material value to their owners and to the thieves, it would be wrong to

say that in this war “the profit-motive... was dominant" (Finley 1985: 76).

Profit is made, but as Nestor tells the story, it is the symbolic value

of the animals that is dominant.

Both sides wish to seize and hold the

opponent's property, in order to prove their own superior power. The crucial difference between this conflict and the other legendary wars is that the original dispute is not an isolated incident, but part of a

pattern of aggressive behaviour on the part of the Epeians.

Nestor

explained that their attitude was due to the fact that "we in Pylos had been weakened and were few, because the mighty Herakles had

come and weakened us in previous years.

All the best men had been killed : of the

twelve sons the flawless Neleus had had, I alone was left. (X1.689-93)

All the others had died.”

198

The numerical hybris.

superiority of the Epeians thus accounts for their

It also accounts for the unusual

conduct of this war.

neither the Pylians nor the Epeians at any point by diplomatic means, although in principle possible. One can see why. The Epeians solution; they were looking for an opportunity might.

The

diplomacy.

Pylians

were

aware

First,

tried to get compensation this would have been did not want a peaceful to display their military

of this and

did

not

bother

to try

Second, the Pylians initially sent out a band of young men,

not the whole army, to retaliate. The reason must be that, given their inferior numbers, they would not normally have stood a chance in open battle, whereas raiding tactics, relying on surprise and daring, gave them

a chance of getting even with the enemy. mobilised

each

and

advantage into play.

every

man,

in

order

The Epeians, to

bring

their

of course, numerical

Third, when the Pylians unexpectedly defeated the

Epeians, through their own enthusiasm and the valour of Nestor (XI.72749), as well as the help of Zeus and Athena - there is a moral here for Patroklos to draw - they did not follow up their victory with a counterattack on the enemy, as the Trojans and the Kouretes did. Presumably,

they had to be content with chasing the enemy out of Pylian territory because their reduced numbers made it impossible to attempt to destroy an Epeian town. The above reconstruction of six legendary wars justifies, I think, my suggestion that the epic account is not a random or uncomprehending compilation of traditional stories. In the Homeric tale of Troy, a variety of fantastic stories of the recruitment of Agamemnon's army disappears in favour of a uniform and more prosaic account. Well-known traditions about the brawls at the wedding of Peirithoös and at the hunt of the Kalydonian boar are ignored and replaced with tales of full-scale war. The causes of both wars against Troy, which Herodotos and Hellanikos

felt they could only make sense of by giving them a new twist, are presented without any sign of awkwardness - the Homeric interpretation of the Trojans' motives being particularly subtle. From the epic version of these tales emerges a clear Homeric conception of the causes, goals and nature of Akhaian warfare. The causes of conflict between communities are the same as those of conflict within the community. Men whose wives are abducted or assaulted,

whose

inheritance,

wages

or prizes

are withheld,

feel not

199

merely

injured

but insulted,

“dishonoured".

Whether

or not

their

opponent is in fact motivated by Aybris, the victims are likely to interpret

his actions as if he were.

They will regard his actions as a deliberate

show of disrespect, and as the first move in a contest of power.

will want to retaliate, in order to demonstrate their own power

They

and

restore their status. Meanwhile, the offender, even if he did not intend to provoke the other, will be reluctant to make amends, in case this should be seen as an admission of weakness. In some societies, men in

such a situation would be expected to rely solely on their personal strength to avenge themselves. In Homeric society, the enemies may decide to fight man-to-man in a trial by combat, but the first response of even a hero as great as Herakles is to mobilise the support of a large

armed force. In the Epeian and the Trojan War, at least, this leads to the mobilisation of whole communities and thus to the fielding of public

armies. 7 That the protagonists succeed in bringing about public mobilisation is due partly to their personal influence over their fellowtownsmen. There is, however, another and perhaps more fundamental reason why communities get involved in private quarrels. Once drawn into war, what matters more to Akhaians and Trojans than the private dispute immediately at issue is the need to win for the sake of their

collective reputations as warriors. More significantly, the story of the Pylians and Epeians suggests that all Epeians feel superior to their Pylian neighbours and wish to demonstrate their collective military might. The individual acts of aggression by Augeias and others are condoned and

supported, therefore, not merely because the aggressors are powerful men in Elis, but also because their actions implicitly assert the superior strength of the Epeians at large. We must consider, then, the role of

community rivalry.

200

5. COMMUNITIES IN COMPETITION

: DANGEROUS GAMES

Homeric princes pursue their rivalries not only by means of inflicting

harm and taking revenge, but also by means of competition in games. The same is true of Homeric communities. Through their athletes and fighters, communities compete in 'international' games and in championcombat.

(Ὁ CHAMPION-COMBAT : TROJANS VERSUS AKHAIANS Single combat takes several forms in the /liad. It may function as a substitute for battle, as when Menelaos and Paris attempt to decide the

issue of the war between them. part of battle.

Alternatively, it may at times form a

Here, we are concerned with a third kind, “a side-show

mostly irrelevant to the outcome of battle” (Oakley 1985: 402).

This

type of combat is represented in the Iliad by the duel of Hektor and Aias. 74 The duel takes place at the end of a day's fighting, at the instigation of Apollo and Athena, who wish to bring battle to an end (VII.23-54). The commanders get their armies to sit down (55-56), and Hektor issues a challenge for one "champion" (promos, 75) from among “all the best men of the Pan-Akhaians” (73, cf. 159) to fight him to the death. Nothing is staked on the outcome of the duel, but the winner may take the dead man's armour and weapons (78, 82), and will acquire a fame which "never shall perish" (91).

Menelaos volunteers, but is told that he

does not stand a chance against Hektor (92-122). After further encouragement, nine others come forward (123-60, 161-9), from whom

Aias is selected by lot (170-91).

The champions fight, until the heralds

intervene with the words : "Do not battle and fight any longer, my children.

Zeus loves you both, both of you

are warriors : all of us know that, too" (279-81). Hektor concurs : "Aias, since the god gave you great size and strength and good sense, and you are the best by far of

the Akhaians with the spear, let us now stop the fight." (288-90) 75

When Aias accepts (283-6), the combatants exchange gifts (299-305) and part. The armies withdraw for the night, to fight again next day. Evidently, this duel is not meant to influence the course of the battle or

the outcome of the war in any way.

It is, moreover, set off from the war

by an emphatic absence of hostility between the champions.

The winner

201

is to return the corpse of the other to his countrymen for proper burial (VII.79-80, 84-6); he is not to leave it exposed or mutilate it. The

contrast with Akhilleus' later treatment of Hektor's body is obvious and no doubt deliberate. When the duel ends in a draw, the men exchange gifts to show that there are no hard feelings, "so that some Akhaian or

Trojan may say : "They fought on account of a soul-consuming rivalry [eris], but then parted in friendship, having made peace'” (arthmesante,

v11.300-2). In the absence of hostility, there is no reason to kill one's adversary, except to prove one's warlike abilities. This has several consequences for the nature of the duel. For one thing, fighting skill, not otherwise given much attention in the epic (Mueller 1984: 77-8), gains

prominence.

Aias assures the Akhaians that no-one can defeat him "by

strength or skill", because he himself is not “unexperienced” (VII.1979). Hektor tells Aias that it is no use trying to intimidate him, since he knows everything there is to know about fighting : how to handle a shield, how to charge in a chariot, how to "dance for murderous Ares in

standing combat” (VII.235-41). Furthermore, the champions disdain easy opportunities to gain advantage. They do not try to get in the first blow, although in their

duel, unlike a trial by combat, no lots are drawn for the right to throw first. Instead, Aias takes a deliberate risk by inviting Hektor to "begin the fight” (232).

Not to be outdone, Hektor, while accepting the offer,

warns Aias before throwing his spear. "I do not want to hit you - such a man - by stealth, peering [for a chance], but openly..." (242-3). This exchange

is sometimes

cited as the epitome

of a chivalrous

code

of

warfare which supposedly pervades the epic. In fact, it is highly unusual, Homeric warriors being generally quite willing to take their adversaries by surprise. 76 Hektor and Aias are here imposing extraordinary restrictions upon themselves. By doing so even though they are faced with "such a man", such a redoubtable warrior, they impress the onlookers with their courage and self-confidence. Lastly, it is not always necessary to continue the duel to the death.

The champions may be satisfied with having given a good performance as is clear from the argument used by the heralds that there is no need to fight on, because it is already obvious to everyone that both are fine ᾿ warriors, and from Hektor's argument that Aias should stop because he

202 has shown himself opponent. 77

superior

to

the

other

Akhaians,

if not

to

his

The combatants act as representatives of their armies and communities as well as on their own behalf. It is "the Akhaians“ who "set up a champion” (VII.116; cf. 136); not to have done so would have been a “terrible, terrible disgrace” (lobe, 97-8), "a great sorrow to the land of Akhaia” (124). When Aias takes up the challenge, he boasts to Hektor of the greatness of the Akhaians, not of his personal strength. “Hektor, now, all alone, you will find out what sort of men are the best among the

Akhaians...

We are the kind of men who will face you in fight, and

there are many of us" (226-32).

And, he adds, our very best man is not

even fighting ! Apparently the reputation of the "Pan-Akhaians" - and presumably that of the Trojans too - is felt to be at stake. Not surprisingly, therefore, the involvement on both sides is intense. The Akhaians pray for a favourable draw (177-80), then pray for Aias'

success and rejoice when they see the intimidating effect he has on Hektor (194-214). Everyone is happy when he returns, his "fellowtownsmen and companions” in particular (294-5), 7® and Agamemnon rewards him with a special share of meat (321-2). The Trojans for their part are all shaking with fear (215) and are relieved to see Hektor back

safe (296-8, 307-10). Thus, in the course of the Trojan War hostilities are interrupted and give way to a ‘friendly’ but nevertheless lethal contest of fighting skill

and courage.

Rather than see champion-combat as the product of “a

total lack of military discipline” (Glück 1964: 26, 31), or even as a form

of “stupidity” and “childish exhibitionism" (Turney-High 1949: 72), we should regard it as a meaningful institution. It gives individual warriors - presumably men of high standing, not just any volunteer - a chance to show off their strength, skill and courage before a large audience. It also gives communities an opportunity to compete in a demonstration of the excellence of their fighting men. (I) GAMES : THE HUMILIATION OF COMMUNITIES Community rivalry is much in evidence at the Phaiakian games, which give rise to tensions which it takes considerable diplomatic skill to diffuse. These games are organised to entertain an as yet unidentified visitor from abroad, who turns out to be Odysseus. Alkinoos proposes

to "try our hand at all games, so that when he comes home our guest may

tell his friends

how

much

better than others we

are in boxing,

203

wrestling, jumping and running” (8.100-3).

The avowed aim of these

games is thus to prove to foreigners the superiority of the Phaiakians as a nation. "Many fine young men” get up to compete in the events mentioned, as well as in throwing the discus (8.110-30). Two of the young men,

Alkinoos' son Laodamas and one Euryalos, then ask Odysseus to join in. When he declines the challenge, Euryalos becomes abusive and tells him, "you do not look like an athlete", you look more like a professional trader (158-64).

discus.

Odysseus is deeply offended, and jumps up to hurl a

It is much heavier than those used by the other competitors, but

nevertheless surpasses every previous attempt. "The stone flew humming through the air; they cowered down on the ground, the Phaiakians of the long oars, the famous sailors, men ducking the throw" (8.185-93). Although the poet does not spell it out, his description is slanted to show the Phaiakians utterly humiliated after Alkinoos' boast of

their superiority. The goddess Athena appears in human guise to praise Odysseus loudly (193-8). He is "pleased to see a kind friend in the gathering". "Then he spoke more lightly among the Phaiakians: ‘Now - reach that, youngsters !... Anyone else who wants to may come here and try me, because you

have made me very angry... Any Phaiakian, except Laodamas himself, because he is my guest-friend. Who would fight with a friend? He who engages his host among

a foreign people in the rivalry of games is a senseless man and a nobody : he

spoils everything for himself.'” (200-11)

Odysseus,

then, is aware that his success is likely to antagonise the

Phaiakians at large, and is relieved to find some support among them. Still, he expects hostility from the defeated individuals at least. At his challenge the crowd falls silent. Then Alkinoos assures

Odysseus that he finds his words "not displeasing" and concedes his qualities (234-40). But the reputation of the Phaiakians as a nation must be saved. As if it were a well-known fact, Alkinoos now states that the Phaiakians are not good boxers or wrestlers. But they have other qualities, and these will be demonstrated to Odysseus "so that our guest

when he comes home may tell his friends how much better than others we are in seamanship, running, dance and song” (241-53). This tactful U-tum saves the situation. Odysseus is treated to a display of dancing

and

a rendition

of the Love

of Ares

and Aphrodite.

He

is duly

204

impressed.

“Lord Alkinoos,... you boasted that your dancers were the

best, and this has proved to be true. I am watching with awe" (382-4). Alkinoos "rejoices" and tells his people, “this stranger seems a very

sensible man to me” (385-8).

He goes on to suggest that they should

give him the gifts usually given to guests, and orders Euryalos to apologise for his insulting remarks. Note that an apology is forthcoming

only now that Alkinoos and Odysseus have allowed the Phaiakians to save face. What

is at stake

in the Phaiakian

games,

then,

is the collective

reputation of the Phaiakians; what is threatened and defended is the position of the Phaiakian people in the hierarchy of heroic communities. The episode may shed some light on the story that Tydeus, alone in Thebes, challenged the "Kadmeian youths" to games, and, having "won everything with ease” (V.802-8; IV.387-90), was attacked on his way back by an ambush set for him because “the Kadmeians were angry" at having been defeated (TV.391-8; cf. X.289-90). % Tydeus’ challenge to the Thebans is cited in evidence of his courage, rather than his athletic prowess, so obviously the Theban response, outrageous as it may seem

to us, was only to be expected : Tydeus was deliberately making trouble for himself. Although, as we have seen in the previous chapter, powerful men in Homeric society commonly respond aggressively to ‘insulting’ challenges and humiliating defeats at the hands of ostensibly weaker

men,

the Theban

response

is exceptionally violent even by Homeric

standards. If they could nevertheless be expected to react in this way, they must have been regarded as having suffered an exceptionally deep humiliation. I would suggest that the aggravating circumstance is that it is a foreigner who has defeated them; that the whole Theban community resents having been made to look bad by an outsider. The scale of the

ambush

- "fifty young

men under two leaders”

(IV.393) - may also

suggest that the Theban revenge is a communal venture rather than a private initiative of the defeated athletes. There is one other episode which perhaps suggests that the reputation of communities as well as individuals is at stake in games. "When the Epeians buried Amarynkeus in Bouprasion, and the prince's sons held games", not only Epeians, but Aitolians and Pylians competed. On that occasion, Nestor beat all competitors in boxing, wrestling, running and the javelin.

205

"Only

in the chariot-race”,

he recalls,

"did the sons οὗ Aktor drive past me,...

feeling strongly [agassamenoi] about the victory, because indeed the biggest prize remained on the spot.” (par’ ausothi, XXIII.630-40)

The meaning of this is debated, but it may be that the sons of Aktor were keen to win and pleased with their victory because it meant that the main prize would stay 'on the spot', that is to say, in Elis, rather than go to

Pylos along with all the minor prizes. ® If they were eager to keep the prize in Elis, rather than merely for themselves, then clearly they sought to defend the reputation of their country as well as their own name. It may seem that I have been labouring a self-evident point, but it has in fact been asserted that "the world of Odysseus was... unprepared to socialize the contest, so to speak". A Homeric hero allegedly “sought

victory in the chariot-race... for himself alone".

Only "later, when the

community principle gained mastery, the polis shared in the glory" (Finley 1977: 120). The evidence shows otherwise. Contenders are conscious of representing a community. They strive to defend and

enhance its status. The stories of these games sound like variations on a theme : a single outsider humiliates a whole community by defeating its champion athletes. It variously takes diplomatic manoeuvring, a last-minute victory, or a violent revenge to restore the community's prestige. Communities, then, become angry and violent when challenged and

defeated in sports, just as individuals do. unknown

elsewhere,

of course.

This sort of behaviour is not

In Andalusia,

for instance,

villagers

might attack a visiting football team that is about to defeat the locals. "In Ubrique... the pueblo defended their honour against humiliation by a more expert team from Cortes de la Frontera which scored two goals in the first five

minutes, yet failed to win the match.

Unprepared to submit to such treatment, the

infuriated public drove the visitors off the field and out of the town in a hailstorm of stones.” (Pitt-Rivers 1977: 33)

One can see how in such circumstances one act of retaliation might lead

to another, and a contest of athletic skill could easily turn into a contest of power. The line separating friendly rivalry and war would be thin. In fact, it is not long ago that Honduras and ΕἸ Salvador fought the socalled Soccer War (1969) because El Salvador wanted revenge for a 3-0

206

defeat by Honduras. The fighting left 6,000 dead and 12,000 wounded, 81 How close the two kinds of rivalry are in the heroic world is suggested by Nestor, who in his story about the war with Elis is at pains to point out that, besides the hundred men he killed in battle, he "would have destroyed the sons of Aktor... too, if [Poseidon] had not hidden them in

a thick mist and rescued them” (X1.750-2).

In battle, Nestor is keen to

find and kill those with whom in time of peace he competes in games. Note also how Neleus sends his horses to compete in a race in Elis, only to find that the man in charge of the games steals them, by way of a challenge to war. Conversely, Tydeus, as the ambassador of an army about to invade, decides to compete against his enemies in sports; and Hektor interrupts battle to organise a ‘friendly’ combat of champions. Akhaian princes and communities seek to establish their superiority by

either means and with ease switch from one to the other as opportunities present themselves. We may conclude that Homeric communities share the desire of the heroes “always to be the best and excel above others” (VI.208 =

X1.784).

This is the fundamental cause of Homeric wars.

The private

disputes that provide immediate causes for war are no different from other heroic quarrels, except that they involve opponents from outside the community. As is the Homeric norm, the protagonists use all

resources at their disposal against the enemy.

If they are powerful men,

this means that they mobilise a large part of their communities on the basis of personal obligations. Such broad support helps them to sway the community assembly when it meets to decide on war or peace. But a

more

decisive

neighbours.

factor

is the community's

sense

of rivalry

with

its

A community which feels collectively superior may actively

encourage its members to harm outsiders, as a display of the community's power. Even if collective Aybris is not the actual motive, a community will be inclined to assume that an outsider who has harmed one of its members would not have dared to do so unless he felt certain of the support and the superior power of his own community. It is because private acts of aggression are seen as implicit challenges to the collective honour of the community, that the people at large are so comparatively easily persuaded to take up arms against outsiders in support of fellow-townsmen.

207

The political organisation and the cultural values of Homeric society, then, are such that the immediate causes of the six legendary wars under discussion are perfectly plausible in themselves. Including the abduction of Helena as the cause of the Trojan War. We shall see later that this does not mean that they are also realistic, let alone historical. The general goal of these wars, we find, is entirely consistent with the Homeric ideal of demonstrating one's power and defending one's honour

by means of conspicuous destruction.

In Homeric wars, communities

attempt to prove the extent of their power by doing as much damage as possible to their rivals. A weak community facing a powerful one may

have to be content with raiding the enemy's flocks or merely keeping him off its land. But if the balance of forces is favourable, the warring towns aim for the ultimate proof of power : the total destruction of their rival. We shall see below that this is not the only kind of warfare described in the epics. To distinguish it from the type of hostilities we shall be discussing presently, I propose to refer to it as status warfare. For its immediate causes are private disputes about status; its underlying cause

is community competition for status; and by burning, killing, enslaving and plundering, the contending individuals and communities defend and enhance their status in a hierarchy of power.

strive to

6. PREDATORS The

son of Kastor

Hylakides

- one

of the personae

adopted

by

Odysseus after returning to Ithaka incognito - had been joint commander of the Cretan contingent at Troy.

He had apparently been unwilling to

join the expedition, for he says that public opinion had forced him to go.® This son of Kastor, as Odysseus portrays him, is not always reluctant to fight. On the contrary, he is a man who likes ambushes, ships, battles, javelins and arrows (14.212-28). He has led nine expeditions abroad before the Trojan War (14.229-31), and after the war

spends no more than a month with wife and children before setting out on a tenth voyage (14.244-7). So why should he have been unwilling to fight at Troy?

The answer

is that the type of warfare he so keenly

208

conducts is quite different from the public status warfare into which he is

drawn by Agamemnon. The son of Kastor calls the men who join him on his last trip, letsteres

(17.425), a term which is never applied to the combatants in any of the legendary wars. Leisteres means 'men who [habitually] take booty’ (lets). In other words, these are men who fight first and foremost for the sake of plunder. The usual translation of their name is 'pirates’ and 'brigands', but I shall call them ‘freebooters'. © Freebooting expeditions have five distinguishing characteristics. (0 They are private ventures. The son of Kastor himself takes the initiative to sail and does not consult other leaders or the people at large.

On another occasion, the Ithakan Eupeithes goes so far as to join a band of Taphian freebooters in the face of his countrymen's disapproval (16.424-30). Although we may assume that the community tries to exercise some control over its members’ freebooting activities, plundering expeditions are not, it seems, organised on behalf of the community. (11) Freebooters are said to travel "at random", that is to say, they do not have a specific destination in mind. 86 Their attacks are therefore not aimed at a particular enemy, and it follows that they plunder without provocation. And indeed, the son of Kastor chooses to plunder in Egypt

without any justification other than that "my heart told me to sail to Egypt"

(14.246;

cf.

17.425-6),

while

Eupeithes

and

the

Taphians

"troubled" Thesprotia, which was actually on good terms with Ithaka (16.426-7). (1) Freebooters tend to raid in distant lands : the Cretans in Egypt, and a second group of Taphians (who live not far from Ithaka) in

Phoenicia (15.425-9).

It must be emphasised that although some of these

places are only a few days’ sailing apart, the poet treats this as an enormous Nestor,

distance.

A

can barely hope

man

who

goes to Egypt

ever to get home

cover the distance within a year (3.318-22).

again;

or Phoenicia, not even

says

birds can

He is exaggerating, but

even when speaking in earnest he considers the three-day crossing from Troy to the Akhaian mainland a major voyage. So does Akhilleus, who

thinks it unlikely that his country would ever be raided by Trojans, because it is too far away. And there is a legend that the Akhaian army could not even find Troy, at first. 8 There are therefore in these

209 instances no established ties of either friendship or enmity between the

communities of the raiders and those of the victims. The raid of Eupeithes and the Taphians on their good neighbours in Thesprotia obviously does not fit the pattern. The Ithakans are furious when they hear what he has done.

"The people wanted to kill him, tear

out his heart, and devour his large and plentiful property" (16.428-9). It could be that they object to Eupeithes’ actions because they regard it as ethically wrong to harm a friendly community, but the pitch of their anger rather suggests that they are afraid that the freebooters' victims,

whether

friends

or enemies,

might

retaliate against

the Ithakans

at

large. * I would suggest that Eupeithes has broken a tacit agreement that freebooters are to raid only peoples so distant that the victims would have no clue as to where their attackers came from, so that they would not be able to avenge themselves on the freebooters' fellow-countrymen

whom they would presumably hold responsible. victims are non-Akhaian

and

stand outside

Moreover, when the

the group

of communities

with which relations of rivalry are maintained, they will be less inclined to interpret the raid as a challenge to their status as a community, and hence less determined to retaliate even if they do discover the identity of the attackers, #7 (IV) Freebooters primarily use ambushing tactics.

who sailed to Sidon in Phoenicia, “snatched away”

Thus, the Taphians

a woman who walked

into their arms "when she came in from the country-side” (15.425-9). 8,

The son of Kastor intended his Egyptian raid to proceed in the same way. "I brought the curved ships to a halt in the River Aigyptos. At that point, I told my keen companions to stay there at the ships and guard

them, and I instructed scouts to mount look-out posts" (14.258-61 = 17.427-30). The raiders were thus supposed to keep out of sight, while their scouts looked for suitable targets and opportunities. In this case, the plan failed. The men all went ashore and set to plundering : "succumbing to Aybris, carried away by their enthusiasm, they

immediately destroyed the superb farms of the Egyptians, led away the

women and children and killed the men" (14.262-5 = 17.431-4). The Cretans,

then,

whose

fleet consisted

of nine

ships

(14.248),

gave

a

conspicuous display of violence, because they were confident of their strength. The son of Kastor apparently had not thought they were strong enough

came

for such tactics, and as it turned out, he was right.

to grief.

Presumably

freebooting

forces

would

His men

normally

be

210

smaller and hence try all the more to attract as little attention as possible while ambushing individual victims or rounding up flocks, and to make a quick get-away. They do so, of course, to escape retaliation, and also perhaps to avoid any risk of being identified. (Vv) The victims of a freebooting raid, for their part, seem less keen to

annihilate

the invaders

than,

say,

the Trojans

are

to wipe

out the

Akhaians and vice-versa. When the Egyptians mount a successful counter-attack upon the son of Kastor and his freebooters, they do not

kill all the raiders, but take many of them alive "to do forced labour for them" (14.272 = 17.441). ® In the absence of a rivalry to be pursued, perhaps they feel less inclined to give a display of their power than to draw material benefit from their victory. Thus,

freebooting is a distinct form of warfare. % Freebooters aim to

take booty from abroad without exposing

minimum with

their

themselves

to more than the

risk, and without embroiling their home-towns victims.

In these

circumstances,

the

role

in a conflict

of taking

cannot be quite the same as in the context of status conflict.

booty

Rather than

a way of proving one's power, it is first and foremost a way of making a living. The son of Kastor for one saw his "estate increase rapidly" with the “very many things” he seized (14.231-3). Its primary aim being the acquisition of wealth, one might call freebooting predatory warfare. There is a second kind of predatory warfare, which is practised during and after the Trojan War by members of the forces besieging the city.

During the war, part of the army is diverted from the siege of Troy to raid surrounding settlements. Akhilleus, who leads the raiders, describes his exploits as "fighting with men for the sake of their wives". "By ship", he says, "I destroyed twelve cities and on foot I claim eleven

around Troy.

From all of these I took many fine treasures” (IX.325-31).

All the booty is handed over to Agamemnon (IX.331-3), which indicates that the raids are conducted under his authority, not on private initiative.

Part of the purpose of these expeditions is presumably to provide food and other supplies for the army. Akhilleus’ Raids

Akhilleus captures at least ten women Tenedos (XI.625-7),

while “destroying” the islands of

Skyros (IX.667-8) and Lesbos (IX.128-30,

270-2, 664-

211 5). His men also destroy the towns of Lyrnessos, Pedasos and Thebe in the course of a single expedition (11.691; XX.92-6). Concerning the fall of Lymessos, we are told that the Akhaians open hostilities with a raid on the cattle grazing on Mt. Ida (XX.91, 188-9). It is perhaps

on

this

occasion

that

Isos

and

Antiphos,

sons

of

Priamos,

are

captured "while shepherding” (X1.104-6, 112). Other men who are tending their flocks - only Aineias is mentioned - run away and take refuge in the

town of Lymessos (XX.191).

Its inhabitants come out to fight the raiders, as

may be inferred from the fact that one of them is killed "in front of the town"

(XTX.292),

Further casualties are Mynes and his brother Epistrophos, sons

of the local ruler, as well as at least three more men (11.692-3; XIX.293-4). The Akhaians destroy Lyrnessos (XIX.296; XX.92, 192), and take captive the women of the town, one of whom is Briseis (11.690; XX.193-4). The fall of Thebe-under-Plakos comes about after the Akhaians again begin by raiding the townsmen's flocks, as is clear from the fact that the seven sons

of the local ruler, Eetion, are killed “among the cattle and sheep” (V1.421-3).

Ultimately, the Akhaians “utterly destroyed the walls of Thebe" (11.691; cf. VI.415), and took away “everything” (1.367). Akhilleus personally killed Eetion and then buried him in armour (VI.416-20; cf. XXIIL.828). As part of the booty, apart from Khryseis, daughter of a priest of Apollo (1.369), are mentioned Eetion's wife (VI.425-7), as well as a lyre (IX.188), a horse (XV1.152-3),

and a lump

of iron (XXIII.826-9),

all of which

belonged

to

Eetion.

Two of the cities taken maintain close connections with the Trojans : Pedasos is inhabited by Leleges (XX.92-6), who are allies of Troy (X.429); moreover, a daughter of the town's ruler is married to Priamos

(XXI.85-8).

A daughter of the ruler of Thebe is married to Hektor

(V1.413-25). It is therefore conceivable that the Akhaian raid on these places is part of the punishment they seek to inflict on the Trojans. But

since it is unlikely that the islands, too, were regarded as part of the Trojan coalition, it seems

more probable that the raiding was random

and that the main goal was booty.

Significantly, Nestor, in the Odyssey,

recalls how the Akhaians suffered, "wandering across the sea in our ships, in search of booty [kata letda], wherever Akhilleus would lead us"

(3.105-6).

Akhilleus himself, too, places great stress on the booty these

raids have brought in, when he says that he has been "piling up wealth

and riches" (1.161-71). After the war, the Kephallenian fleet of twelve ships led by Odysseus, sailing home by itself, destroys Ismaros, a city of the Kikones. On a later stop in their journey, a small band of men goes ashore to

212

reconnoitre, and they end up rustling the sheep of the Kyklops Polyphemos. Both times, the whole contingent shares in the plunder. Odysseus’ Raids After killing the male inhabitants of Ismaros, the Kephallenians take the women and much movable property from the town (9.39-42), including amphorae of wine (9.163-5). One man is spared, Maron, who owes his life to the fact that he is a priest, and that he offers his captors valuable gifts (9.197-205). Other men escape and alert a group of Kikones who live further inland. These come to the rescue and drive Odysseus' men away (9.43-66). In the country of the Kyklopes, twelve men under the command of

Odysseus go ashore to inspect an inhabited cave nearby.

They find it full of

lambs,

in sight.

kids, cheeses and

milk.

The owner

is nowhere

The

men

plead with their leader “to take the cheeses and go back, quickly driving the kids and lambs out of their pens and into our fast ship, and then sail away

over the salt water" (9.225-7). Odysseus initially rejects this plan, not because he has ethical objections, but because he is keen to meet the Kyklops in person. Thus, he passes up an opportunity to plunder. He admits afterwards that it would have been "much more profitable” to do as his men suggested (9.228), and when the Kyklops turns out to be hostile and lalls six of them, Odysseus and the others fall back on the original plan and make off with his flocks after all (9.464-6, 548-9).

The Kikones had sided with the Trojans in the war (II.846-7), but the Kyklopes, of course, had not. If the Kephallenians rob the latter without

having the least grudge against them, there is no reason to assume that they sack Ismaros because they have a score to settle. Like Akhilleus, they raided at random and for the sake of booty. 9%!

In this respect, as well as in plundering distant places which are not likely to retaliate against their home-country,

freebooters.

| Unlike

freebooters,

however,

these armies behave

they

do

not

like

restrict

themselves to ambushing tactics, but are prepared to storm and destroy towns. This probably is not because their objectives are different, but

because their forces are relatively large - even Odysseus’ contingent, one of the smallest in the Akhaian army, is larger than the army of the son of Kastor. The fact that the attacks on Lyrnessos and Thebe both begin with a cattle-raid, suggests that the main goal of the Akhaians is not to

destroy towns as such, but to find easy targets to plunder, including towns if opportunities present themselves. This type of predatory warfare, however, is in two respects fundamentally different from

213

freebooting : it is carried out by armies which are (a) public, and (Ὁ) primarily mobilised for other purposes than taking booty. This makes it a phenomenon in its own right. It is widely and rightly accepted that freebooting is commonly practised in the Homeric world, and that by Akhaian standards it is a

legitimate, indeed respectable, way of making a living.

It needs pointing

out, however, that much of what is often cited as evidence for the commonness of freebooting in fact only proves that cattle-raiding and ambush tactics are in common use, and that there are frequent opportunities to take booty. Although all of these things are often associated with freebooting, they do occur in status warfare as well. In most cases, it is impossible to determine from the context which of the

two is meant. % The only clear evidence that freebooting is much practised is a question put more than once to visiting foreigners. "From where did

you sail...?

Is it on some business ?

Or are you wandering at random

across the sea, like freebooters who

travel around and risk their lives

doing harm to people who live elsewhere 7",

It would probably be a

mistake to conclude that a group of travellers abroad is as likely as not a band of freebooters, but the question at any rate indicates that it is not unusual to be paid a (peaceful) visit by a freebooting party on its way to plundering elsewhere. 9 The well-established notion that freebooting is a legitimate activity has

recently been challenged * and has in any case always been undermined by a passage in the Odyssey, in which the swine-herd Eumaios appears to condemn the practice on moral grounds. A look at the evidence will serve to reaffirm the accepted view, and will in addition show that Eumaios may not actually be raising ethical objections to freebooting. The best evidence for the legitimacy of freebooting is the brilliant

career of the son of Kastor.

He starts out in life with only a small

inheritance, but, as we have seen, a great appetite for fighting. As a result of his first nine expeditions, he not only grows rich, but also

becomes

“feared

and

respected

among

the

Cretans"

(14.234).

"I

received," he says, "a woman in marriage from great land-owning men, due to my excellence [arete], because I was not useless, not one to run away from war" (14.211-3). And we know that he came to be a commander at Troy.

214

It is sometimes said that this story does not prove that freebooting is ἃ legitimate career, because the son of Kastor is an exceptional character, a relatively poor and inordinately bellicose man. % But this is quite beside the point, which is that his unusual eagerness to go out and plunder makes him an acceptable son-in-law to a prominent family, as

well as the obvious candidate to lead the Cretan army. In short, it brings him to the very top of the social hierarchy. It does not make him an outcast who has to hide his ‘treasure’ and live in inaccessible hideaways, as 'pirates’ may have to do in societies which disapprove of their

way of life. % The next best evidence is the fact that foreign visitors may be asked whether perhaps they are freebooters. Those who ask this question merely want to know whether the new arrivals have a particular reason for visiting or are just drifting, as freebooters might. It is not an anxious or hostile question. Nestor, for example, puts it to his guests only after he has let them take part in a sacrificial meal. “It is never assumed

either that those who were so questioned would shrink from admitting the fact, or that those who were interested in finding out the fact would reproach

them

with

it", as Thukydides

pointed

out

(1.5,2;

trsl.

Rex

Warner). 97 Again, the people most associated with freebooting are the Taphians,

and it is unlikely that this is intended to put them in "rather an unfavourable light" (pace S. West 1988: ad 1.105), for the poet has chosen to depict the rulers of the Taphians as close and selfless friends of his Odysseus. ® One could argue that these princes need not have

been freebooters themselves and need not have been ‘tainted’ by the raiding activities of their subjects, but in the absence of any comment from the poet to that effect, it is more probable that Homer simply did not regard Taphians as unsavoury characters in any respect.

Finally, although this does not necessarily mean that freebooting is legitimate, the and apparently booty, implies The above,

fact that the troops mobilised to besiege Troy frequently, without scruples, turn to raiding nearby settlements for that plundering without provocation may be acceptable. I think, is all the unambiguous evidence we have for a

favourable view of predatory warfare. It is admittedly not much, but it nevertheless bears out the common notion that in the Homeric world freebooting is regarded as unobjectionable, and that a freebooter earns a high status among his fellow-countrymen.

successful

215

The passage in the Odyssey in which Eumaios allegedly presents an unfavourable view of freebooting stands quite alone. It has been suggested that Eumaios gives voice to an under-current of thought about

freebooting. Some have added that it is particularly appropriate for the poet to have made Eumaios spokesman for this point of view - a man who himself was kidnapped and sold into slavery as a child, and who, as a swine-herd,

represents

the

lower

classes,

who

are

hit hardest

by

freebooting raids. 9 But does Eumaios really criticise unprovoked plundering abroad ? In the relevant part of his speech, Eumaios complains that Penelope's suitors exercise no restraint in slaughtering his master’s herds and drinking his wine. (a) (Ὁ) and (c) has are

He continues :

"They do not have a thought for retribution or compassion.” (14.82) "The blessed gods certainly do not like evil deeds, but they honour what is right, the proper deeds of men.” (14.83-4) "Even hostile men and enemies, if they have set foot on foreign soil, and Zeus given them booty, and they have filled their ships and go back home - even they seized by a strong fear of retribution.” (14.85-8)

(d) “But these people here know something, I tell you; they have had some message from a god that this man [i.e. Odysseus) has come to a miserable end - that is why they refuse to conduct their courting in a proper manner and to go to their own homes.” (14.89-91)

The drift of this speech is as follows : (a) the suitors are not afraid of

retribution; (b/c) they ought to be afraid, because firstly (Ὁ), the gods do not approve of their behaviour, and secondly (c), even freebooters fear retribution 1%; (d) the explanation for their lack of fear is that somehow they are certain that Odysseus will not return to punish them. On the current interpretation, freebooters are mentioned as a group of people who, like the suitors, commit an injustice, but who, in contrast to the

suitors, display the normal reaction, viz. fear of punishment. There could then be two reasons to say that "even" freebooters are afraid. One is that freebooters are the most hardened criminals imaginable, people who do not feel fear, even when there are good objective grounds for being afraid. The other is that freebooters are regarded as perpetrators

of only a minor offence in comparison with the misdeeds of the suitors. This is certainly a possible reading of the passage, but not the only

one.

The crucial question is : what kind of retribution do freebooters

216

fear?

The

current

interpretation assumes

(i) that they are afraid of

divine retribution, and (ii) that this divine retribution will be inspired by the gods' disapproval of injustice as such. Neither assumption is necessarily true, and if it is not divine retribution, or if it is divine

retribution motivated by considerations other than a concern for justice, then the passage does not imply that freebooting is morally wrong. Let us look at assumption (i) first. When the poet refers to divine

retribution, he normally specifically calls it theon opis, ‘retribution of the gods' (XVI.388; 20.215; 21.28). In this passage, however, Eumaios refers simply to opis, ‘retribution’. In (c) therefore, he may be saying

that freebooters are afraid of the retribution that may be exacted by their victims, rather than by the gods. Again, when he says that the suitors "do not have a thought for retribution", he may

mean both the divine

punishment hinted at in (b) and the vengeance of their victim, Odysseus, hinted at in (d). The passage may thus draw a contrast between (c) and (d) : if even successful freebooters who are already on their way home,

and

therefore

probably

out of danger,

are still afraid of what their

victims might do in retaliation, then the suitors, who are staying at the scene of the crime, so to speak, and therefore vulnerable to revenge,

ought to be all the more afraid - unless they know that their victim is dead and cannot retaliate.

Mention of the gods’ concern for justice, in

(b), could then be taken as a warning meant to apply only to the suitors, who behave unjustly, not to freebooters, whose activities are legitimate. If, for the sake of argument, we assume that it is, after all, divine may still question assumption (ii). inspired by the gods’ concern to justice. Actually, the paramount

ignore the above considerations and retribution that freebooters fear, we Divine retribution is not necessarily uphold the norms of propriety and concern of Homeric gods when

intervening in the affairs of mortals is to honour personal obligations; justice as such is of secondary importance to them. 101 Thus, if Eumaios says that the freebooters fear punishment at the hand of a god, he may mean that they are afraid that the patron god of the community which

they have attacked may yet punish them, not for unethical behaviour, but for harming his worshippers and protégés. The remark that “Zeus has given them booty” acquires added significance in this context. It suggests that even freebooters who enjoy the personal support of Zeus still fear that they may have provoked the anger of a lesser god. 12 On

this interpretation, too, the meaning of Eumaios'

comparison between

217

the suitors and freebooters may be that the freebooters are in a situation where they have antagonised others but are in little danger of suffering retaliation (c), while the suitors are in a position where they have

antagonised others and could expect to be in great danger (d). suitors

have

an

additional

reason

to

fear

the

gods,

for

they

The have

misbehaved (b). The freebooters have not. If either of the above interpretations is correct, Eumaios does not pronounce on the morality of freebooting one way or the other, and the only evidence for a negative view of the practice disappears.

Predatory warfare - private, unprovoked raiding abroad for the sake of plunder - is a common and legitimate activity in the heroic world. Why 7 Often, scholars fall back on the view that this kind of predatory

behaviour aggression.

is simply

part of human

nature,

as are

other

forms

of

It may not be stated in so many words that human beings

are motivated by an "animal need of prey" (Harmand 1977: 433), but this is widely taken for granted. One can tell from the fact that students of Homeric warfare rarely show any inclination to ask why the Akhaians go raiding.

To many,

the only thing that needs explaining is why the

heroes occasionally turn instead to non-violent means of acquisition. 1% Others,

however,

have

sought

to explain

predatory

warfare

as a

method - the only method feasible within the Homeric economic system of remedying shortages of essential supplies. I shall argue for a different explanation, but one that does indeed lie in the nature of the Homeric economy and Homeric values.

218

7. BOOTY AND THE HOMERIC

ECONOMY

“It is impossible to suppress the unrelenting stomach, a pernicious thing that does mankind much harm. On account of it people even fit out solidly-constructed ships, and across the sea bring harm upon hostile men." (17.286-9; cf. 15.343-5; 17.473-4)

In this

complaint,

uttered

by

Odysseus

when

he

is impersonating

a

beggar, we have an apparently straightforward and plausible explanation of freebooting : men are driven to it by hunger. !

But hunger, although

it may be a cause of freebooting, is not a sufficient explanation. The son of Kastor organises his last raid when he has already acquired great riches and has risen to the top of the Cretan élite. He has the resources to fit out nine ships, and can afford to slaughter enough live-

stock to feed his crews - probably some 450 men - for six days (14.24851). men

Indeed, as Thukydides realised (1.5), no raiding party of hungry could have got far without a rich man like the son of Kastor to

provide them with transport and provisions. Moreover, it is by no means clear that even the majority of freebooters are paupers. When Telemakhos gathers a crew for his voyage to Pylos and Sparta, he recruits young men of his own age and social standing, who join him for

the sake of friendship (3.363-4; 4.652). It is likely enough that the wealthy leader of a freebooting expedition would similarly be joined by friends, well-off men like himself. 16

To understand what factors other than sheer poverty motivate men to go raiding abroad, we must take a closer look at the Homeric economy.

Among

all the aspects of Homeric society analysed by historians, the

economy stands out as the area which has benefited most from comparative study and model-building. The resulting reconstruction of

how the Homeric economy works, and what role plunder plays in it, is fascinating,

sophisticated

and quite

persuasive

in itself.

It does

not,

however, properly account for the epic evidence, as I hope to show. A central perceived is there is a production,

feature of the Homeric economic system as it is currently its division into two separate spheres. On the one hand, sphere of subsistence economy, which encompasses the distribution and consumption of food, drink, clothing, tools

and the other necessities of life.

On the other hand, there is a sphere of

prestige economy, which encompasses goods known as treasures (keimelia).

the exchange of certain luxury Between the two spheres, it is

219 argued, there is little or no ‘convertibility’; that is to say : subsistence goods cannot, or only with difficulty, be exchanged for treasure - and

vice-versa, 1%

(1) SUBSISTENCE ECONOMY : AUTARKY AND FAIR EXCHANGE The workings of the princes’ estates have been described in some detail in a previous chapter. 157 One will remember that land, livestock and almost all other means of production are owned by heads of households, and exploited by their owners’ extended families, slaves and hired labourers. The bulk of the produce is consumed by the members of the household. It is universally accepted that a Homeric household strives to be completely self-sufficient. "Its activities, in so far as they were concerned with the satisfaction of material wants, were guided by one principle, to meet the consuming needs of the lord and his people... by the products of his estates" (Finley 1977: 61). In consequence, ideally no member of the household should ever have to get anything from elsewhere, and it is thought that the largest households dispose of such

extensive and varied resources that they can “almost realise their ideal" (ibid.). 1% Another consequence is said to be that there is no attempt produce a surplus beyond "the necessity of having the proper goods the counter-gift when an import was unavoidable" (ibid : 67). In practice, households normally fall short of total autarky and need acquire goods from outside. They could seek to make up

to for to the

deficiencies by plunder, trade and gift-exchange. It is generally agreed that goods are acquired by these means predominantly from outside the community, not from other households in the same town, ! and that trade plays the least significant part in the process. Differences of opinion on the relative importance of the other two are reflected in the fact that some see a "parasitic economy" (Andréades 1933: 24-5) where

others see a "gift-exchange economy” (Humphreys 1978: 143). It is believed that, within the subsistence sphere, goods are acquired from abroad onty to cope with specific shortages, not simply to accumulate wealth regardless of immediate needs. If there are no

specific shortages, one does not go out to plunder.

Nor does one engage

in trade, not even if the household happens to have produced a surplus.

Surplus produce is stored and hoarded, or given away in a display of ᾿ generosity. 11¢

220

It is also believed that goods are acquired only for direct consumption and personal use, "rather than for resale" (Humphreys 1978: 167). 11} The

implication

is that, rather than loot at random,

freebooters

rustle

cattle and cut crops when their families lack food, take slaves when they need labour power, and seize metals when they are short of tools or weapons.

Similarly, princes who trade practise direct barter, taking in

exchange for their surplus nothing but goods required by their own households. Moreover, it:is argued that Homeric princes do not have a "profitmotive” in acquiring goods through peaceful exchange. "If there was one

thing

that was

taboo

in Homeric

exchanges

it was

gain

in the

exchange. Whether in trade or any other mutual relationship, the abiding principle was equality and mutual benefit" (Finley 1977: 67). In other words, princes who trade do not seek to get the highest possible

value in exchange for their wares; they have some idea of the value of goods and do not try to get more than the usual amount for them. 112 Finley goes so far as to argue that it is not even possible to make a profit through exchange, because in the Homeric world the value of goods is the same everywhere and at all times. "The supply-and-demand market [was] a mechanism unknown in Troy or Ithaca... Exchange rates were customary and conventional..., and they were commonly known and respected" (ibid.: 67-8). 113 By contrast, the gains made in a freebooting raid are of course at others' expense. In the course of a single voyage in search of supplies, the heroes are

likely to resort to all available means of acquisition.

Obviously,

if a

household has a need, but no surplus to exchange, its men have no option but to plunder; on a typical voyage, however, the travellers would load their ships with "a little merchandise on the outward voyage", “unpacking merchandise when they did not feel themselves strong, and looting at the first opportunity" (Glotz 1926: 51, 49). Whether they decide to plunder or to do business in the places they visit would thus depend upon local military strength. 114 It is not made clear under what circumstances gift-exchange would be preferred to the other options. This model of economic behaviour is supposed to apply to the great

majority of people in the Homeric world who are in one way or another part of a producing household. 115 But there are those who make their living exclusively from plunder or trade. ways in which such people might live

One can conceive of various entirely on the proceeds of

221

freebooting, or a combination of freebooting and trade, but the only form of livelihood singled out for comment has been that of the ‘professional’ trader. The professional trader may be someone who owns no means of production, but does have wares to trade.

Such a trader cannot in the

long term survive by exchanging his goods for food and drink for his own consumption. He must exploit variations in supply and demand, in order to increase the value of his capital. In other words, he must try to make a profit. Thus, it is said, he offends against the norm. Another

type of professional trader is the man who does own means of production, but uses these primarily to produce goods for trade, rather than direct consumption. He too might seek to make a profit in the exchange,

though

not

necessarily

so.

He

against the norm of striving for autarky. 116

would,

however,

offend

Finally, a professional

trader may be a subordinate member of a large productive household who is employed by his master primarily to travel abroad and exchange

the household-surplus. 117 Partly because of their ‘unethical’ behaviour, and partly because of their low social status, all these types of traders are treated with contempt. It is believed that there are in fact very few of them in the Homeric world, and that the few there are, are non-Akhaians

- mainly Phoenicians. 118 We shall be dealing later with the epic evidence on which this interpretation of the nature of acquisition from abroad is based. As for the ideal of autarky, there appears to be no trace of it in the poems. The ideal is certainly not put into words, and I fail to see how one might deduce its existence from anything the heroes do.

As far as I

can tell, modern scholars have simply projected onto Homeric society the ideal of self-sufficient households and city-states that prevailed in Classical Greece. Nevertheless, we may regard it as probable that Homeric households, like Classical ones, are supposed to aim at autarky to the extent that they strive to produce all they need for their own subsistence. However, we shall find that the corollary to this, the notion that Homeric households do not strive to produce more than they need for their own use, and that they seek to acquire goods abroad only to cope with specific shortages at home, is a much more questionable

proposition.

222

(Π) TREASURE ECONOMY : Alongside the subsistence treasures, precious objects which are of little utilitarian

GREED AND GENEROSITY sphere we find a sphere in which circulate made of imperishable or durable materials, value but important as symbols of status.

"'Treasure' is keimelion, literally something that can be laid away.

In the poems

treasure was of bronze, iron, or gold, less often of silver or fine cloth, and usually it

was shaped into goblets, tripods or cauldrons. Such objects had some direct use value and they could provide aesthetic satisfaction, too... but neither function was of real moment compared to their value as symbolic wealth or prestige wealth. The

twin uses of treasure were in possessing it and in giving it away... Until the appropriate occasion for a gift presented itself, most treasure was kept hidden under lock and key." (Finley 1977: 61) 119 Giving away a treasure,

concrete

expression

it is argued,

of the

creation

or

serves two purposes:

reaffirmation

of

it is a

friendship

between donor and recipient (Finley 1977: 123); it is also a move in a competition in generosity, for “one measure of a man's true worth was

how much he could give away in treasure” (ibid.:

121).

Finley lays

particular stress on the norm of strictly balanced reciprocity which is supposed to govern gift-giving. "No one ever gave anything... without proper recompense" (1977: 64); that is to say : Homeric gift-giving is always gift-exchange, and its rules demand that gift and counter-gift be

of equal value. 120 It is not wholly clear how, in Finley's view, rivalry in generosity and a rule of strict reciprocity might operate simultaneously. Others have subsequently worked out that this is possible only when the rivals are competing in generosity towards one another rather than to third parties; the recipient of a gift having to counter with one of equivalent or greater value, on pain of suffering defeat and losing face. This is gift-exchange of the potlatch-type, a prominent phenomenon in cultures across the world. 121 In contrast to the subsistence sphere, where autarky is the aim, the aim in the prestige sphere is accumulation : "the more wealth, the greater the good" (Finley 1977: 122). 122 The more treasure one accumulates, the more one can give away and the better one's chances of success in gift-

giving rivalry.

However,

“the amassing of a quantity of treasure... is

difficult" because “circulation of prestige objects does not, by itself, yield a disposable surplus"; since one must counter a gift of treasure with a treasure of equal value, "there is no net increase in the amount

223

available to either party” (Donlan 1981: 108). At best one may acquire a temporary surplus by deferring the counter-gift. In the long run, as Donlan says, “the principal means” of increasing one's store of treasure is plundering abroad, although items of treasure are only a small part of

the booty one is likely to capture (ibid.: 108-9). While the heroes’ accumulative drive and their custom of exchanging treasure on certain occasions are clearly attested in the epics, the notion that they engage in competitive gift-exchange rests on much more shaky foundations. For one thing, it is not easy to see how a gift could simultaneously serve to create a bond of friendship and to initiate a giftgiving rivalry between donor and recipient. Surely the rivalry would tend to undermine the friendship. More importantly, there appears to be

no Homeric evidence whatever for most of the essential features of the potlatch.

When Finley states that "heroes boasted of the gifts... they had

given as signs of their prowess” (1977: 121), he is merely inferring from his model that they must have done: there is no trace of it in the epics. 19 Again, when Qviller raises the question of "what happened if one could not return a gift", he has to admit that “the Homeric evidence is silent", and find the answer elsewhere : "in comparative anthropology

it is a commonplace that people who cannot reciprocate, suffer defeat and

lose

status”

(1981:

120).

Indeed,

Qviller

admits

that the very

existence of "rivalry in gift-giving” is inadequately documented, when he says that "one may safely assume that [it] was much more widespread than one can observe from the evidence” (ibid.: 127). 124 Such gaps in the epic material are difficult to account for and suggest that the porlaschmodel may not apply.

We shall return to this problem.

(m) CONVERTIBILITY OF GOODS

The economic model applied to the heroic world posits that "gift-objects [are] classified into a hierarchical sequence of ranks... The ranking is of course culturally specific, and sometimes factors other than scarcity are important... Each rank of gifts normally has an appropriate social context in which

it is used...

Items of one exchange rank normally cannot be used to obtain those of a

higher rank... In some cases, objects can never be exchanged between spheres." (Morris 1986b: 8-9)

Although it has only recently been formulated, the norm of nonconvertibility is an essential part of the current interpretation of the Homeric economy. Only if it is true that subsistence goods cannot be

224

converted into treasure, is it possible to maintain that in the subsistence sphere one aims at autarky while in the prestige sphere one aims to accumulate as much as one can. For if it were possible to exchange,

cay, several bags of wheat, or a few amphorae of wine, or a couple of sheep, for a golden pin or bracelet or some other item of treasure, then

the desire to accumulate treasure would surely lead people to strive to produce as large an agricultural surplus as possible and convert it into prestige goods. Obviously one cannot aim at autarky while at the same time aiming to create maximum surplus for exchange purposes. By contrast, if there is no way of converting subsistence goods into treasure, a surplus is of no use in this respect and one can strive for autarky as far as agricultural and pastoral production is concerned, while using any other means available to increase one's wealth in treasure. 125 Once again, it proves difficult to substantiate the model. The first thing one would expect to find, if the model were correct, is a sharp distinction between prestige goods on the one hand, subsistence goods on the other. In the absence of a clear distinction one would be able to exchange large quantities of less prestigious items for smaller quantities of more prestigious ones, and thus gradually convert upwards until one

had crossed the hazy boundary between treasure and non-treasure.

A

sharp distinction, then, would be necessary. Does it exist in the epics ? The term treasure, keimelion, designates durable and storable

valuables only, and does not apply to slaves or any kind of livestock. 126 Yet in the context of gift-giving slaves, cattle and horses appear alongside, and on a par with, treasure. Agamemnon offers Teukros a gift as a reward: "a tripod, or two horses with their chariot, or a woman” (VIII.290-1). Menelaos predicts that Telemakhos will receive from each of his hosts : "a tripod or a good bronze cauldron, or two mules, or a golden cup” (15.84-5). He himself offers Telemakhos three horses with a chariot, and a golden cup (4.590-1). Telemakhos explains that there is no space or fodder for horses on Ithaka, and asks for a different gift : "let it be treasure" (4.600-8). Menelaos smilingly offers

him

a splendid

keimelion

instead:

a silver mixing-bowl

(4.609-19).

Clearly, this is not meant to be a more expensive gift, let alone a gift from a higher-ranking category. It is merely a more suitable present of

the same value. In prize-giving at games, a pregnant mare ranks above a cauldron, two talents of gold, and a two-handled bowl (XXIIT.265-70); a mule ranks

225

above a two-handled cup (654-6); an ox ranks above half a talent of gold (750-1). In fact, an ox, or even an ox-hide, is apparently a standard prize for the winner of a foot-race (XXII.159-60). The mules which

draw Priamos’ cart had been given to him by “the Mysians, as a splendid [aglaa] gift” (XXIV.278).

It is not surprising, then, that Agamemnon's

offer of compensation to Akhilleus includes twelve horses and twentyseven

women

as well

as

much

treasure

(IX.121-40=264-82),

while

Eperitos' alleged parting-gift to Odysseus comprises four women as well as gold, treasure horses, be used made.

silver and cloth (24.274-9). While the most precious items of may be worth more than even the most valuable women or the latter are more valuable than certain lesser treasures, and can for the same gift-giving purposes. No categorical distinction is

Nor can one distinguish items of treasure from other prestige wealth by their non-utilitarian nature : tripods and cauldrons are used to boil water for washing and cooking purposes (e.g. XVIII.346-51; XXI.3615); cups, craters and bowls are used as drinking-vessels.

A lump of iron

awarded as a prize in funeral games is expected to be put to practical use : whoever wins it can have farming-tools made from it (XXIII.82635). Instead of distinct ranked categories of objects, then, we find a wide spectrum of metal artefacts, textiles, animals and slaves, all of which may serve as gifts and have both utilitarian and prestige value. Moreover, we find that treasures and slaves are valued in terms of the

number of 'oxen' they are worth.

A set of golden armour is said to be

worth "a hundred oxen" (hekatomboia, V1.235-6); as a girl, Eurykleia was bought for "twenty oxen” (1.428-31); a large tripod is valued at twelve oxen (XXIII.702-3); a set of bronze armour is worth nine (V1.235-6); another slave-woman is valued at four (XXII.704-5); and a cauldron is “worth one ox” (XXII.885). It is said "that the measure of value, cattle, did not itself function as a medium of exchange. Laertes

bought Eurykleia for unspecified objects worth twenty oxen; he would never have traded the oxen for a slave" (Finley 1977: 67; Donlan 1981: 104). Such a state of affairs, in which cattle cannot be exchanged for

prestige

goods,

is just

what

exchange-spheres, of course.

is required

by

the

model

of distinct

But so far as I can see, there is nothing in

the epics to say that a man might not actually barter cattle for slaves and - treasure. 127

226

Even assuming that cattle are not used in exchange,

it is significant

that the heroes express the value of a tripod or a woman in terms of a common measure.

In an exchange-system where goods are divided into

ranked categories and cannot be converted from one category to another, objects would be “valued ordinally, not cardinally" as Morris puts it (1986b: 8). A universal standard by which to measure their relative values would be useless, indeed meaningless.

The heroes, by contrast,

are able to assess relative value. They can price a woman at four times as much as a cauldron and a tripod at three times as much as a woman. Surely such a system of valuation would not exist unless there was a practical possibility of giving four cauldrons for a woman or three women for a tripod - whether in gift-exchange or in barter. At the very least, then, it ought to have been possible to exchange slaves for treasure. There is in fact one explicit instance of this. Patroklos, on

behalf of Akhilleus, receives a silver crater in (part-)exchange for a male captive, Lykaon (XXIII.740-7). Perhaps the most important objection to the non-convertibility theory is that treasure can apparently be exchanged for agricultural produce. Euneos sends ships to Troy with a cargo of wine, which is bartered for slaves, oxen and ox-hides, but also for bronze and iron. Donlan

plausibly suggests that the metal would be predominantly in the form of arms and armour, which he rates the "lowliest* form of treasure (1981: 113 n.14). That may be so, but it is treasure nonetheless. Also, when

the island of Syrie is visited by a Phoenician trading-ship, its inhabitants offer biotos,

'livelihood',

that is to say agricultural produce

(15.446,

456), 128 in exchange for items such as a gold-and-amber necklace (15.460), described contemptuously as "trinkets" (15.416), but clearly valuable treasures. Conversely, it is stated that Odysseus’ accumulated stores of bronze, gold and iron are so large that they "might still feed [boskoi] someone else even in the tenth generation" (14.323-6=19.2935), which, if taken literally, suggests that Odysseus’ descendants might

convert his treasures into food and drink.

Finally, it is possible to

commission a local or foreign craftsman to create, say, a shield, cup or tripod. As was pointed out earlier, craftsmen are probably paid in produce, wine and meat : one more way of converting subsistence goods

into treasure, 129 All in all, it would seem that there is no evidence for separate spheres of exchange in Homer, and quite a few indications that in principle

227

anything, from corn and wine, via cattle and slaves, to cloth and precious metal artefacts, either directly or in several stages of exchange, could be converted into anything else. In addition, one must consider the fact that one form of treasure, cloth, is produced within the household, by the female slaves and the women of

the family. Although to us cloth may seem to be inferior to precious metal items of treasure, in the heroic world finely woven, dyed and embroidered garments and coverings of all kinds feature prominently in

gift-giving. Thirteen Phaiakian princes give Odysseus a gown, a tunic, and a talent of gold each (8.389-93). Eperitos' gift to Odysseus includes no less than twelve cloaks, twelve spreads, twelve gowns and twelve tunics (24.273-9). Priamos' ransom for Hektor also contains twelve of each of these, plus twelve female robes, besides gold and bronze

(XXIV.229-35). Less lavish gifts often consist of cloth only. 15° Now, if a household itself produces one kind of treasure, and is in principle able to convert its surpluses into other forms of treasure by commission or exchange, then, as noted above, the desire to accumulate

treasure will lead the household to aim to produce quantities of cloth far in excess of subsistence requirements, and to aim to produce as large an

agricultural surplus as possible, for the sake of the treasure it can buy. These aims are obviously incompatible with a striving for autarky. Since such a striving is in any case not attested, I suggest that it does not in fact exist in the heroic world. In sum, the logic of the Homeric economic system dictates that the productive efforts of a household are geared towards, first, the direct satisfaction of the subsistence needs of its members; second, the creation

of the maximum surplus of cloth, crops and live-stock. The exchange activities of the household - symbolic dimensions aside - are accordingly aimed, first, at providing such subsistence goods as cannot be produced at home; second, at acquiring prestige goods which can be stored and kept and hence accumulated indefinitely.

In the light of this conclusion we may now look more closely at the nature of the various Homeric forms of acquisition abroad, and ask why plundering occupies a prominent place among these.

228 8. GIFT-EXCHANGE

: THE HOSPITALITY-RACKET

There is only one Homeric word to denote gifts given to members of another community and the food, drink and shelter offered to visitors from abroad : xein(e)ia, ‘things given to a foreigner’ or ‘gifts of guestfriendship’ (cf. Kakridis 1963: 105-7). We may nevertheless distinguish

three sub-types, each with its own function. The first type is the exchange of symbols of friendship. We have already encountered three instances of it : the exchange of a purple belt

and a golden cup between Oineus and Bellerophontes on the occasion of the latter's visit to Aitolia (VI.216-20); the exchange of armour between Diomedes and Glaukos when they meet on the battlefield (VI.230-6); and the gift of a bow, quiver and arrows by Iphitos to Odysseus in return for

a sword and a spear, when these two happen to meet in Messenia (21.1135). A fourth instance is the exchange between Hektor and Aias after their duel. So that onlookers may see their "friendship", Hektor gives Aias a silver-handled sword with sheath and baldric; he receives a

"bright purple belt” in return (VII.299-305).

An unusual feature here is

that the friendship is to be temporary : hostilities will resume the next day (VII.290-2). In each of these four instances, (a) gift and counter-gift are made

simultaneously; (b) the purpose of the exchange is to start a friendship, or to demonstrate to outsiders the existence of a friendship; (c) the gifts

are single objects (or sets of objects), mostly weaponry or armour, and apparently always things which the donor happens to be carrying with him or to have on his person; (d) the objects exchanged are supposed to

be of roughly equivalent value.

This final point is confirmed by the

poet's famous comment that Glaukos must have been mad to exchange

armour with Diomedes because Glaukos’ golden armour was worth far more than that of Diomedes, which was made of bronze (VI.234-6). 131

In most circumstances an exchange of armour is presumably acceptable because there would be no great difference in value between one set and another. This kind of gift-exchange clearly serves almost exclusively the symbolic purpose of affirming or re-affirming ties of friendship. The

exchange does not involve competitive generosity, or else Glaukos would have been praised by the poet for a marvellous victory in gift-giving rivalry, not declared insane for exchanging gold for bronze. Its

229

economic aspect is negligible, since it involves no subsistence goods and does not add to one's store of treasure even temporarily, since the counter-gift is to be equal and immediate.

The second type of gift-giving is the special request.

We

have

previously encountered examples of this, too. One is the gift of arrowpoison by Ankhialos to Odysseus, who had been asking for it among his friends (1.257-64); the other is the provision of food and drink for

Odysseus’ fleet by Aithon (19.185-202).

A third example is the gift of

armour by Hephaistos to Thetis, for her son Akhilleus. Akhilleus' Armour

When Thetis notices that Akhilleus has lost his armour to the enemy, she promises to get him a new set (XVIII.130-7). She pays a visit to Hephaistos, and is hospitably received as a xeinos (XVIII.387, 408). Apparently, since she has ‘married out’, she is regarded as an outsider by the community on

Olympos (as is Kalypso, cf. 5.91). Hephaistos and his wife remark that Thetis has not often visited in the past (XVIII.306, 425; cf 5.88), and Hephaistos at once realises that he is going to be asked a favour (XVIII.4247; cf. 5.87-90). Since he is greatly indebted to Thetis on account of what she has done for him in the past, he feels obliged to do as she asks (X VITI.394407) and overnight forges a magnificent set of armour for her son (XVI.462-615).

In each case, (a) the gift is made without a counter-gift, although it is

likely that a counter-gift may be requested at a future occasion; (b) ties of friendship between the parties involved are already established; (c) the gift offered is something the recipient urgently needs and specifically requests.

A variation on this type is the gift offered to a xeinos who is about to go

to war.

sending

him

Kinyras,

the Cyprian

an unusual

cuirass

prince,

“pleases”

as a xeineion

when

Agamemnon

by

he hears

that

preparations for an attack on Troy are under way (X1.19-23).

At the

start of the war, one Ekhepolos of Sikyon also gives Agamemnon a gift a race-horse called Aithe - "so that he would not have to follow him to windy Troy, but might enjoy himself staying at home” (XXIII.295-9). There

are other references

to gifts of arms,

armour

and

clothing

in

connection with war, and these may be of a similar nature, 132 These gifts differ slightly from others of this type in that they are not specifically

requested

commodities.

Rather,

men

realise

that

their

230

friends are faced with a special temporary provisioning,

created

by

war,

and

they

need

more

of man-power

or

less

and

spontaneously

decide to help them out by joining their forces or contributing material goods.

This type of gift-giving is one way of doing a friend a favour. The exchange of favours is not characteristic of xeinos-relations only, but a pervasive feature of Homeric social life. 19 A gift given as a favour by a friend abroad has of course a certain symbolic value as a sign of friendship, but its primary role is utilitarian. It is potentially an important means of satisfying the subsistence needs of a household, and even of a community. Its nature makes it unlikely that competition in

generosity could be involved. The gift is not a challenge, since the recipient asks for it; even if it were a challenge, the recipient could not take it up, since presumably it is for the donor to decide if and when a return-favour is required and what form it is to take. The third type - often spoken of in the literature as if it were the only type - is the giving of parting-gifis. The Odyssey often mentions offers of gifts to foreign visitors who are about to depart. 4 The nature of

such gifts may be illustrated by examples already alluded to. Parting-gifts (i) On Skheria, Odysseus immediately receives all hospitality, when he announces himself as a suppliant. The Phaiakians offer him food, a bath, clothes, a bed and a promise of transport back home,

who he is and where he has come from.

all before they know

But there is no mention of gifts until

the next day, after he has proved that he is an excellent athlete, and has paid

the Phaiakians a great compliment by calling them the best dancers in the world. Then his host says : "This xeinos seems a very sensible man to me. Come, let us give him a xeineion, as is proper" (8.388-9). Twelve princes each give him a gown and a cloak, and a talent of gold; the host himself substitutes a golden cup for the latter (8.390-5, 417-48). That night, Odysseus finally reveals his identity and tells his story. The Phaiakians are impressed. The hostess, Arete, asks: "Phaiakians, what do you think of this man - his looks, his stature, and his inner mind 7 He may be my guest, but all of you share the honour. Do not, therefore,... be so sparing with gifts to one who goes short [of them)” (11.336-40). Now that

the Phaiakians know who he is, they apparently feel that the quality of their gifts does not match the standing of their guest: each of them in addition gives Odysseus a tripod and a cauldron (13.13-19). That this is an expression of their extraordinary respect for him is confirmed by Zeus’ prophecy that

231

"they will honour him like a god, with all their heart,... giving bronze and gold in abundance and many garments" (5.36-9; cf. 19.280-1; 23.339-41). (ii) Back home, Odysseus invents a story in which the generosity of the fictional Eperitos of Sikania surpasses even that of the Phaiakians. "OnceI entertained a man... who came to us, and no other xeinos from far away was

ever better liked when he came to my house [philion emon hiketo doma)... And I gave him such xeineia-gifts as were proper.

Of well-wrought gold I

gave him seven talents; I gave him an all-silver crater with flower-designs, and twelve single tunics, twelve spreads, twelve beautiful gowns and twelve

cloaks to go with them. And apart from that, also four pretty women, skilled workers, whom he chose for himself." (24.266-79) (iii) Menelaos offers Telemakhos three horses with a chariot, and a golden cup. At Telemakhos' request, a silver krater is substituted for the horses; Menelaos' wife on her own initiative adds a peplos, which she has woven herself,

for

Telemakhos’

future

wife

to

wear

(4.589-619;

15.99-132).

Although no particular reason is given for his generosity, it may be relevant that Menelaos describes his guest as the son of the man to whom he intended "to show friendship above all the other Argives, when he should come" (4.171-2). Since Odysseus has disappeared and Menelaos' good intentions

have thus far

been frustrated, he may be transferring his gratitude to his

friend's son. (iv) Telemakhos himself offers a gift "such as dear xeinoi give to xeinoi" to Mentes. Their two families have enjoyed a long-standing friendship.

Telemakhos' generosity may be partly inspired by the fact that his visitor has given him advice “as father to son” (1.307-13).

Parting gifts are (a) customary, as is clear from several of the passages cited, and is stated explicitly elsewhere (9.268); (b) composed of items treasure, slaves, horses, and elsewhere mules, too 135 - chosen by the

host, although the guest may be given some say in their selection; (c) meant to express feelings of respect and friendship, as is shown by the Phaiakian gifts which become increasingly lavish as the standing of the guest rises in the eyes of the hosts. Moreover, parting-gifts are (d) supposed to be reciprocated when the donor makes a return visit. Eperitos says that, when he gave his visitor

"countless" gifts (24.283), "we two hoped to come together in hospitality and to give splendid gifts [in future]” (24.313-4). He is told that his xeinos, had he still been alive when Eperitos came to visit him, “would have sent you off with a good return in gifts [eu doroisin ameipsamenos)

232

and in fine hospitality, for that is the custom when someone has made a start" (24.284-6).

In the same vein, Telemakhos is told that if he gives

Mentes a "very beautiful" gift, "it will be worth a return to you” (soi d’ axion estai amoibes, 1.318). It is important to note that neither of these two passages - which are the only evidence for the custom of presenting

a counter-gift - specifies that the counter-gift must be worth as much as the initial one.

Although

Finley renders the latter phrase : "[it] will

bring you a worthy one in exchange” (1977: 65), and West suggests that it means : “it will bring you its full value in the shape of a return" (1988: ad loc.; cf. Stanford

1964: ad 316-8), a notion of exact equivalence is

not necessarily conveyed good return". This says This may seem a mere of these passages makes

by the Greek phrase, nor by the reference to "ἃ only that the donor will get something in return. quibble, but we shall see that the interpretation an important difference to our understanding of

the parting-gift and of the associated phenomenon

of the gift-gathering

voyage. "If you want to roam up and down Hellas and central Argos while I accompany you in person, I shall get horses ready and lead you to the cities of men. No-one will send us off just like that; they will give us something to take away, at least one gift,

a tripod or cauldron, or a pair of mules, or a golden cup.” (15.80-5) That is Menelaos' offer to Telemakhos. The idea evidently is that Menelaos will take him on a guided tour of much of Akhaia in order to

collect parting-gifts

from

a series of hosts.

Menelaos

himself had

previously undertaken a similar trip further afield. The wealth in treasure that overawes visitors to his house (4.69-75) had been collected

in the Africa come baths,

course of a seven-year voyage in the Near East and Northern (4.80-90), and a substantial part, if not all, of this fortune had Menelaos' way in the form of gifts. He had received two silver two tripods and ten talents of gold from Polybos of Egyptian

Thebes (4.126-9), and a precious mixing bowl

from the prince of the

Sidonians (4.615-19 = 15.115-19). Helena had been presented with a golden spindle and a silver wool-basket on wheels by Polybos' wife Alkandre (4.125-6,

130-2), and she had been given a number of "fine

healing drugs” by another Egyptian woman (4.227-9). Odysseus, posing as the 'son of Kastor', tells people that, having been saved by the intervention of an Egyptian prince after losing all his men

233

in his

last freebooting

raid,

he,

"gathering great wealth among

like Menelaos,

the Egyptians

spent

seven

years

- because they all gave

gifts" (14.285-6). He also spreads the rumour that in the course of his travels Odysseus had declined an offer of transport back to Ithaka, and had gone to Thesprotia, where, by “asking for gifts all over the country" (19.273), he had accumulated a huge amount of bronze, silver and iron

(14.321-6; 19.293-5). The purpose of this heroic habit of travelling for no reason other than to solicit parting-gifts from a string of hosts is self-enrichment. The wealth thus acquired is put on display by Menelaos, who boasts that it

has made him the richest man on earth (4.78-81). once

mentions

the fact that it is "more

Odysseus more than

profitable”

(kerdion,

19.283;

cf.19.285; 11.358) to gather as many gifts as one can, and boasts that he has acquired enough to feed his family for ten generations (14.325; 19.294). Clearly, he has every intention of keeping the rich gifts he has accumulated. There is no question of competitive generosity in the exchange of parting-gifts. If such poftlatch-style rivalry had prevailed, heroes who travel in search of gifts would have been inviting ruin by taking upon

themselves so many simultaneous challenges. Rather than boast of the wealth acquired in this way, Menelaos and Odysseus ought to have worried about where to find sufficient treasure to outdo their hosts in generosity when the latter pay a return visit. The parting-gift, then, is not a challenge but ‘profit’ to the departing guest.

Stanford has commented that "the constant harping... on the advantages of extracting xeineia from hosts ... gives

one the feeling that the etiquette of Homeric hospitality was coming very near to being exploited as a 'racket'.” (1964: ad 15.54-5)

I think that this is indeed

what

happens.

obvious how a hospitality-racket might work. the rule, received, soliciting Part of intruded"

Menelaos and Odysseus and do not, in the long gifts. the explanation, as Finley (1977: 64). The story of

But it is not immediately

If balanced reciprocity is

must return as much as they have run, gain much by going round and points out, is that "an element of risk Eperitos is a clear illustration of that

risk : he “gave those gifts in vain", for by the time he pays a return visit,

234 his erstwhile guest has died (24.281-3). In general, counter-visits appear to be rare. Eperitos calls on his xeinos five years after the first visit,

while Aithon visits after twenty years, and both do so by accident. Mentes deliberately stops off at Ithaka to visit Odysseus. In his case more than twenty years have passed since he last saw him. 1% Some gift-givers, especially those who live far away, may never make a return visit at all. The gifts that the Phaiakians heap upon Odysseus are, says Alkinoos, "for free" (proikos, 13.15). He knows that they will never be repaid - presumably because the Phaiakians live in isolation and do not intend to visit Ithaka (6.201-5).

One way of exploiting the customs of hospitality is thus to visit a large number of people abroad and gamble on the probability that many of these will never come

to collect the debt owed

to them.

The

more

distant the lands one visits, the better one's chances of making a profit from

gift-gathering;

in the heroic

world,

Egyptians,

Phoenicians,

and

even exotic tribes like the Erembi, are supposed to practice the same forms of hospitality as the Akhaians do. The better prospects of making lasting gains in the more distant parts of the world would be offset to

some extent by the increased dangers of travel, but a willingness to take risks might be rewarded with a fortune in gifts of treasure. This explanation works well for the wealth acquired from the Phaiakians by Odysseus, and in Egypt and other distant lands by Menelaos and the son of Kastor. It works less well for Telemakhos' proposed tour of the Peloponnese and Odysseus’ alleged trek across Thesprotia. The journey from either region to Ithaka is short, although still regarded with some apprehension by travellers. I would suggest that there is a further factor which enables certain people to turn the customs of hospitality into a source of wealth for

themselves : the exchange of parting gifts is governed by a norm, not of balanced, but of hierarchical reciprocity. The parting-gift, as pointed out earlier, ‘honours’ the recipient; it is an expression of friendship and respect. As the Phaiakians' admiration for Odysseus increases, so does the value of their gifts to him. The same is true of hospitality in general. The greater the respect for the guest, the greater the generosity with which he is treated.

235 Degrees of hospitality

(i) The lowest level of hospitality is extended to those who have no ties to the host and are poor.

They are regarded as beggars.

On a farm, they might

be allowed to stay, receiving food and shelter in return for work. 137

In

town, they are at best allowed to sit on the threshold of someone's dining-hall and ask the diners for a few scraps; they are supposed to leave at night and sleep in the local smithy or leskhe. Even so, they may be expected to do

odd-jobs while they are in the house. 138 (14.388-9; 19.253).

Their hosts feel pity for them

(ii) Full hospitality is extended to those who have some relationship to the

host, or look as if they are of high social status, or present themselves as suppliants,

i.e.

ask

not

merely

for

food

and

shelter,

but

for

help

and

protection. 139 They are given a bath, a regular share of the meal, a bed and a set of clothes. If they intend to travel on, they are also helped to find transport and given food for the journey. There are grades of hospitality within this category. At worst, the guest is

offered an “unseemly” chair and a small table near the threshold, barely inside the dining-hall (20.257-61); at best, he gets a seat next to the host, and

near the fire. !

His share of food varies in quantity and quality. 141

The

transport provided ranges from the luxury of a private ship and crew or a chariot with driver, through a modest place as a passenger on a ship that

happens to be sailing anyway, to the austerity of a stout pair of sandals. 142 The hosts’ motives in receiving guests in this manner differ from their motives in tolerating beggars in their homes. When Penelope discovers that a foreign visitor, who had so far been treated as a beggar, is in fact a xeinos of her husband's (17.522; 19.185-202), she at once promises him full

hospitality, exclaiming : "Xeinos, to me you have thus far been someone to be pitied, but now you shall be a friend and a respected man [aidoios] in my house” (19.253-4). Telemakhos too distinguishes between "a better man",

who should be “honoured in the house with a bed and food” and "a worse man”, who might "just lie there, uncared for” (20. 129-33). !@ (iii) The offer of a parting-gift in addition to board and lodging may raise hospitality to a still higher level of respect, for such gifts, although customary, are not given to each and every guest. That one could extend

hospitality to a guest without offering him a gift on his departure is implied when someone is asked “whether you would provide some hospitality [xeineion], or even in another way [kai allos] give a gift [dorinen], as is the custom between xeinoi" (9.267-8). The gift here appears as an extra, not as a

basic ingredient of hospitality. 1

Since the parting-gift and hospitality in general are meant to be expressions of respect, considerations of social status are bound to play a

236 part in determining how generous the host will be.

Quite apart from his

personal feelings towards his guest, he must take into account how much honour the visitor regards as his due. Assuming that, as seems likely, the counter-gift is also regarded as an expression of respect, its value,

too, would be determined by the status of the recipient, not by the value of the initial gift.

In other words, a man must express his respect for

visitors of higher standing and greater power by offering them valuable gifts, but his social superiors need give him no more than a small gift in exchange when he returns the visit. Therefore, in order to make a profit, a man travelling abroad may simply seek out hosts of lower rank. These, in obedience to the norm of respect, will offer him large gifts. Should they return the visit, he will give them counter-gifts which are far less valuable, though still "good" in proportion to the respect these men deserve. Thus, he is able to make considerable gains at their expense, without breaking the rules of giftgiving. 15 One can see the advantage to Telemakhos of having

Menelaos

come

with

him

in person

Peloponnese : his hosts would

on

his

proposed

tour

of the

no doubt offer greater gifts to a young

man accompanied by one of the most powerful rulers in Akhaia than to a young man by himself. A drawback of visiting men of comparatively low status is that these are unlikely to possess the kind of spectacular treasures that Menelaos and his peers dispose of, but they might still own the more modest prestige goods that Menelaos lists : a tripod, a cauldron, a cup, or a pair

of mules (15.80-5). almost

certainly

Those who do not possess any goods of this quality

have

at least

one

kind

of treasure

to give

away:

garments and other woven stuffs produced by their women. Even the least valuable of these gifts adds to the recipient's store of wealth, and many cheap gifts might perhaps in due course be converted into a treasure worth displaying. The exchange of parting-gifts, it seems, reflects the concept of honour

found

throughout

the

epics.

Homeric

honour

is ideally

given

in

recognition of personal qualities and accomplishments, but is in practice often given in deference to inherited status, or out of fear. So too, the Odyssey presents two faces of the customs of hospitality. On the one

hand,

we

find the host who

spontaneously

offers gifts to his guest,

because he feels deep friendship for the man, and admires his personal qualities, or because he feels obliged to him for some special favour he

237

has performed.

The guest, for his part, appreciates the honour done to

him and reciprocates lavishly when an occasion presents itself. On the other hand, we find the travelling prince who, relying on his superior status, seeks out a host in order to "ask" him "for swords or cauldrons” (17.222),

intending

to repay

as little as he can

within

the

rules

of

exchange. 14 To some extent, he may also rely on superior power and a threat of force. Fear of him may inhibit his hosts from ever requesting anything in return. 147 Whether it is the entrepreneurial spirit of certain princes which leads

them to make long and risky voyages in order to collect gifts from those who live far away and are unlikely to turn up on their doorstep afterwards, or whether it is a norm of hierarchical reciprocity which allows men of standing and men of power to run a true hospitalityracket, or both - the fact remains that the customary parting-gift is exploited for the sake of accumulating treasure. In the heroic world,

those who, like Menelaos and Odysseus, manage to get rich by these means are not regarded as greedy exploiters. On the contrary, they boast about it and become "more respected and better liked by all men” (11.360-1). The three types of gift-giving among xeinoi each play a different role. The function of a direct and balanced exchange of tokens of friendship is almost wholly symbolic. The generalised reciprocity of giving gifts at

the special request of a foreign friend primarily serves to meet some of the

economic

communities.

and

military

subsistence

needs

of

households

and

The customary exchange of parting-gifts on a basis of

deferred, and probably hierarchical, reciprocity is intended as a symbolic expression of respect, but also offers enterprising men, especially men of rank, a means of accumulating treasure at the expense of their hosts.

The various kinds of gift-exchange, then, can in principle fulfil the same economic roles as trade and freebooting. The most important conclusion to be drawn, however, is that in the heroic world it is possible,

legitimate, and indeed admirable, to make profit in the exchange.

238

9. TRADE AND PLUNDER : PROFIT AND PRESTIGE Having made a fortune freebooting, and having, after his failed final

raid, made a second fortune in seven years of gift-gathering in Egypt, the son of Kastor embarks upon the third stage of his chequered career. He turns to trade. A Phoenician, who has been his host for a full year, asks him to accompany him and "carry a cargo” to Libya (14.290-8). He is reluctant, but - presumably on account of the hospitality he has enjoyed - feels obliged to go (14.298). His reluctance stems, as far as one can tell, not from a dislike of trade as such, but from his suspicions that his host may have secret plans to sell him as a slave once they reach their destination (14.296-7). 1@ The venture ends in shipwreck, with the

son of Kastor as sole survivor. The Phoenician in the story is probably a professional trader; the son of Kastor, although he takes part in a trading voyage, is not. This is a distinction to keep in mind when evaluating the evidence for trade in the heroic world. Professional merchants are rare in the epics; ‘occasional’ traders are by no means uncommon.

First of all, there is Mentes, ruler of the Taphians, who puts in at Ithaka on a voyage from Taphos to Temesa (perhaps a place in Cyprus)

"in search of bronze", carrying a cargo of iron to exchange (1.180-4). We may presume that Mentes trades because he, or his country, is in need of bronze and happens to have a surplus of iron. This is the kind of

trade that scholars suppose to be the only kind respectable in the heroic world : barter to deal with specific shortages and for direct consumption only. 19 But there are other kinds of occasional trade, too. The Akhaians besieging Troy engage in barter with the inhabitants of nearby islands. "Ships carrying wine had arrived from Lemnos, a large number, which had been sent out by Euneos son of Jason [and Hypsipyle). The son of Jason had given them a thousand measures of wine as a separate consignment to bring to Agamemnon and Menelaos, sons of Atreus. From these [ships] the long-haired Akhaians took wine some for bronze, some for shining iron; some for hides, some for live cattle; and some for slaves." (V11.467-75)

The commodities given in exhange for wine are presumably items of booty. At other times, the Akhaians may take the initiative and themselves travel to the islands to trade their booty. Akhilleus transports

239 a number of male captives "across the sea... to Samos [=Samothrake], and to Imbros and Lemnos" (XXIV.751-3, cf. XX1.102; XXII.45). One of his customers in Lemnos is again Euneos, son of Jason, who pays the

value of "a hundred oxen", including an ornamented silver mixing bowl, for Lykaon, a son of Priamos (XX1.40-1, 58, 78-9; ΧΧΙΠ.741-7). 15

The Akhaians presumably barter their booty because they are short of wine, which fits in well with the established view of the Homeric economy, which tells us that "imports alone motivated trade, never

exports” (Finley 1977: 67).

This view does not, however, make much

sense of the actions of Euneos and Akhilleus.

It asks us to believe that

Euneos sends out his ships because he happens to be in need of cattle and

hides, bronze and iron, and slaves. of wine to spare.

Fortunately, he has a large quantity

Akhilleus, on the same view, sends Patroklos to sell

Lykaon because he stands in need of, among other things, a silver mixing-bowl. Making due allowance for cultural differences in economic ethics, this interpretation still seems quite improbable to me. Surely, Euneos and Akhilleus are motivated by a desire to export - to sell surplus agricultural produce and surplus slaves respectively, regardless

of specific import needs.

They

are willing to accept more

or less

anything offered in exchange for their goods, as long as it is sufficiently valuable. 151 Elsewhere, we find frequent references to the buying and selling of slaves. Laertes, for example, "bought [priato) with his own possessions" Eurykleia, who was later to become his housekeeper (1.430). Eumaios bought a slave from Taphian traders to serve as his

personal attendant and fellow-worker on the pig-farm (14.452).

The

mother of the son of Kastor was a “bought [onete] concubine” (14.2023). The source of these slaves is not identified, but war and freebooting

are obvious possibilities. Besides the Akhaian sale of captives, there is an instance of Taphian freebooters capturing a woman in Sidon in Phoenicia, then selling her in Syrie (15.425-9), wherever that is supposed to have been located. When Odysseus asks Eumaios how he came to be a slave, he suggests only these two options : "Was it sacked, the broad-streeted city of men in which your father and mother used to live ? Or did hostile men take you in their ships when you were by yourself with the sheep and cattle, and did they take you for sale overseas to the house of this man, and did he give a worthy sum 7" (axion onon, 15.384-8) 152

240

In fact, Eumaios

had been kidnapped by his Phoenician nurse, who

had given him to visiting Phoenician traders to sell for an “immense sum" (murion onon, 15.450-3, 482-3). The son of Kastor was in danger of being sold by his treacherous Phoenician host, as we have seen, and shortly after escaping he is enslaved by the crew of a Thesprotian ship, who were meant to take him as a passenger to Doulikhion; he escapes again (14.334-59). Laomedon threatens to put his hired labourers in chains and sell them "in distant islands" (XXI.451-5). Melanthios threatens to take a fellow-slave away "far from Ithaka, so that he may fetch me much wealth" (volun bioton, 17.249-50). Finally, one of the suitors jokingly suggests that it would be “much more profitable” for them to sell Telemakhos' guests “to the Sikeloi, where they will fetch

you

a

worthy

sum"

(axion,

20.381-3).

Enslaving

one's

guests,

passengers, labourers and the like is obviously an outrageous way to behave, but the selling of slaves as such is apparently unobjectionable or else princes like Laomedon and the suitors would not have associated

themselves with it. 18 The little we are told about those who sell, threaten to sell, or think of selling, slaves suggests that their motives are the same as those of Akhilleus. There is no hint that either freebooters or princes who abuse their power enslave others in order to exchange them for a specific commodity of which they stand in need. Rather, they seem to make

slaves in order to sell them for whatever "worthy sum" they can get. What, if not the need for specific imports, brings Homeric men to export slaves and agricultural surplus? As for Akhilleus, one may speculate that he wishes to exchange slaves who, although a form of prestige-wealth, are of no immediate practical use to him and need to be guarded and fed, for items of treasure which can be stored and transported more conveniently, and make more of an impression as a display of wealth. Euneos, too, converts some of his agricultural surplus into bronze and iron treasure, while slaves, cattle, and maybe even hides, are probably also more prestigious possessions than a large stock of wine. 154 There are signs, however, that, for Euneos at least, there is more to trade than that. Not long after buying a slave from Akhilleus at a price of one hundred oxen, he releases him for a ransom. The hypothetical norm of non-profit exchange would lead us to assume that the ransom should be more or

241

less equal to the sale-price.

much" (XX1.80).

Euneos, however, receives "three times as

This is not necessarily to say that from the outset he

was motivated by the hope of receiving just such a ransom and making a huge profit, but it is a distinct possibility. One should not ignore the fact that the Akhaians have at this point recently completed a series of

successful booty-raids on twenty-three towns.

As a result, there must be

a glut of all sorts of goods in the camp, while wine, one suspects, is in relatively short supply. If the laws of supply and demand operate, Euneos will get far more value for his wine from the Akhaian army than

he is likely to get elsewhere. 155 But do the laws of supply and demand operate ?

Finley has argued

that they do not, and that exchange ratios are fixed by convention. There is no real evidence for this. The fact that it is possible to express the value of goods in units of cattle does not imply that prices are set; it merely means that people can by and large agree on the value of some commodity at a particular time, in a particular place. When the poet mentions a large tripod to be awarded to the winner of a wrestlingmatch, he adds that "the Akhaians among themselves [ἐπὶ sphisi] valued it at twelve oxen" (XXIII.702-3); the second prize, a female slave, "they valued at four oxen" (704-5). The value of these commodities is evidently not prescribed by tradition, but established on the spot by the spectators at the games, whose assessment need not apply at other places and other times. Moreover, if it is true that there are professional traders, who can only make a living by exploiting variations and fluctuations in exchange ratios, prices cannot have been fixed. 156 That conclusion would be irrelevant if it were true that it is socially unacceptable for an Akhaian to pursue profit. This notion partly derives from the general hypothesis that gain at the expense of another is banned

from “any mutual relationship” in Homeric society (Finley 1977: 67). Since we have already found that it is perfectly acceptable for a man to

gain from gift-exchange, that argument must be discounted.

Among the

concrete evidence adduced is the fact that men who sell slaves aim to get

"a worthy sum”.

This, it is said, means that they intend to sell them for

no more and no less than their ‘true’ value, as opposed to an "immense"

or “infinite”,

i.e. the highest possible,

price sought by professional

traders such as the Phoenicians. But, as Bravo (1984: 112-4, 119-20) points out, this is reading too much into the words. One can say only

242

that the sellers hope to get αἱ least the sum which they think their slaves

are worth, which may be an “immense” amount. 157 The only other evidence consists of two passages criticising Phoenicians and one insult addressed to Odysseus, which, if they condemn trade at all, condemn professional trade only, not all kinds of trade and profit. Phoenician Greed

The Phoenician traders who kidnap Eumaios and sell him to Laertes are professional traders. They sell the "trinkets", metalware and jewellery for which Phoenician craftsmen were famous and which were almost certainly produced for sale abroad (15.416, 459-63; cf. XXIII.741-4). The fact that these traders spend no less than a year in a single town peddling their wares (15.455-6) confirms that trade is their full-time occupation and sole source of income. Eumaios refers to them as "nibblers” (troktai, 15.415-6); the son of Kastor also calls the Phoenician trader who took him to Libya a "nibbler, who had

done much harm to people” (14.288-9).

This is the full extent of anti-

Phoenician sentiment in the epics. A "nibbler” is presumably a greedy person, someone who ‘eats up' other people's property, perhaps in a stealthy

manner. 1533

The insult may refer to the Phoenicians’ habit of living off

trade-profits, but it may equally well refer to the greed they display outside their trading activities : after all, one of them intends to enslave his business partner, while the others get an accomplice to steal a customer's treasures (15.448-9, 466-70) and to kidnap his son. Moreover, to balance the negative image of Phoenicians created by these two stories, there are episodes in the Odyssey which show that such practices are not confined to Phoenicians, and that there are also honest Phoenicians

who abstain from deceit. 159 It is therefore far from certain that the Phoenicians as a people are criticised for being professional traders, let alone that they are

condemned merely for seeking profit from trade. Euryalos' Trader : Class or Character ?

When Odysseus declines to compete in the Phaiakian games, his challenger Euryalos exclaims : “Indeed, stranger, I do not in the least take you for a man who is good at games..., but for someone who, travelling here and there

(thamizon] in a ship with many oars, as a leader of sailors who are 'men of business'

[prekteres],

is mindful

of the cargo and

keeps his eye on the

243 merchandise and attractive profits.

You do not appear to be an athlete.”

(8.159-64) What is wrong with this kind of trader is primarily that such a man is incapable of competing in games. Euryalos' outburst begins and ends with the assertion that Odysseus is no athlete, and Odysseus, while ignoring the allegation that he is a trader, angrily replies "I am not inexperiencedin games, as you claim” (179-80). He proceeds to give a demonstration of his skill as a sportsman.

A common interpretation of the insult is that, since only princes are good athletes in the heroic world, Euryalos concludes from Odysseus’ refusal to compete that this stranger is (a) not a prince, and (b) a professional trader,

since no other lower class person would be likely to travel to a spot as isolated as the island of the Phaiakians. 1 Another interpretation, advanced by Mele (1986: 77), suggests that the insult refers, not to class, but to character. It may be that Odysseus’ princely status is taken for granted - note that Euryalos calls him a “leader” (arkhos) of sailors, and that another competitor has already commented that Odysseus is "not a bad man qua physical specimen” (8.134-6; cf. 8.14-23). What Euryalos concludes from his refusal is perhaps that Odysseus, although a prince, lacks the right mentaliry for games. Euryalos may be drawing a contrast between, on the one hand, a man who is always ready to take up a challenge and enhance his reputation, and on the other hand, a man who only seeks wealth. One who wants to make a name for himself “ought to know about games, for there is no greater fame for a man, as long as he lives, than what he achieves with his feet and his hands” (8.146-8). One who wants only to enrich himself, by contrast, does not train to be an athlete, and avoids risks and challenges so as not to endanger his business prospects. He is not necessarily a professional trader, but someone

who, when he does go abroad, is only interested in doing trade and thinks only of exchanging his wares at a profit.

this

may

expeditions

be

because

abroad,

they

share

their

rather than because

If his crew are ‘men of business’,

leader's they

attitude

towards

are professional

their

traders or

sailors specialised in sailing merchantmen. 161 Euryalos' insult may be read either as a condemnation of professional traders or as a condemnation of any man, whatever his social status and sources of livelihood, who pursues profit to the exclusion of the pursuit of honour and fame. If the former, rejecting a livelihood drawn entirely from trade need not imply rejection of occasional trade nor of seeking to make profit from occasional trade. If the latter, disapproving of men who let the profit-motive dominate their actions need not imply disapproval of men who seek profit but remain prepared to defend their

244

honour

and

enhance

their

reputation

even

if this

means

incurring

material loss. The evidence, then, does nor say that it is socially unacceptable for a hero to engage in occasional trade, nor that it is impossible or regarded

as improper to make a profit from barter. This brings us back to Euneos, who makes a large profit on a slave he has bought from Akhilleus, and trades wine for booty when wine is in great demand and booty in abundant supply. There is nothing to preclude the tempting conclusion that Euneos has an eye on the favourable market-situation when he decides to export his wine, and aims to sell his surplus at the highest possible price. Although our information is sparse, it is clear that import to satisfy

immediate

material needs is only one aspect of Homeric

heroes also engage in occasional export-motivated trade.

trade.

The

They exchange

surpluses of produce and booty, most often slaves, for a variety of goods which do not meet immediate and specific shortages. The purpose of such exchange is at least in part to convert common commodities into more

prestigious

addition,

possessions,

it is likely

items

that the heroes

of

treasure

seek

in

to make

particular.

a profit

In

in the

exchange; that they hope to increase the total value of their wares by exploiting variations of supply and demand. Not only do Euneos' activities give us reason to think so, but there is also the fact that the heroes are keen to make a profit even from gift-exchange. If they can legitimately turn the customs of hospitality into a source of profit for

themselves, then surely they can legitimately make a profit from barter, too, 16 Plundering

as a means

of acquisition thus appears

in a new

light.

Rather than an exception to the rule of fair exchange allegedly practised in gift-giving and trade abroad,

it is simply one more

instance of the

heroes’ habit of accumulating wealth at the expense of outsiders. Part of the booty is of immediate use to the raiders. Some of the livestock captured by the Akhaians is slaughtered and eaten. Akhilleus uses a captured horse to pull his chariot (XVI.152-3), amuses himself playing a precious captured lyre (IX.186-9), and uses a captured lump of iron in a weight-throwing contest. Many Akhaians keep captured women as servants and bed-partners. Another part of the booty, however, is bartered, as we have seen. Captives may also be released

245

for a ransom, which takes the form of wrought iron, bronze and gold,

and is probably higher than the price the same captive fetches when sold as a slave, 168 Thus, plunderers do not raid selectively for items of which they or their families or communities stand in immediate need. Rather, they take whatever they can get and dispose through ransoming and trade of what they do not wish to keep. Like trade and gift-exchange, plundering

serves not merely to meet shortages, but to accumulate wealth. The question Akhaians in their gift-gathering or naturally, surfaces

remains : why, and under what circumstances, do search for riches resort to freebooting, rather than to trade? The assumption that plundering comes in the common answer that the Akhaians will acquire

wealth through forcible seizure, unless they are deterred by the power of their potential victims - a notion which ties in with the view that trade,

gift-exchange and freebooting are generally practised in the course of a single expedition. ' We have seen that those who set out to plunder do indeed engage in trade as well, insofar as they sell their booty. But I would suggest that those who set out with a cargo of goods to exchange

tend to confine themselves to trade. The standard question ‘are you travelling at random, like freebooters, or on some business ?', would have little meaning if those who are ‘on business', no less than freebooters, start plundering at the first

opportunity. The fact that the question is posed in these terms means that ventures such as those of Euneos and Mentes, which have a specific destination and a definite goal, are distinct from freebooting expeditions.

It is likely enough that Mentes, for instance, would on occasion indulge in a spot of plundering, as other Taphians do, but apparently he would

not be expected to do so during a trading voyage. Moreover, on one of two possible interpretations of Euryalos' comment on trade, there may be non-professional traders who are called ‘men of business' because they do not engage in plundering at any time. Perhaps a certain degree of differentiation is noticeable on a material level, too. We find two references to a “cargo-ship" (nefls phortis) which tell us that the hull of this type of vessel is broader, and its mast bigger, than those of other

ships (5.249-51; 9.319-24). These other ships might be narrower, lighter and faster vessels used by freebooters, but this is not certain. 165 If trade and freebooting are differentiated to this extent, it follows that

whether a foreign community is treated as a trading partner or as a place

246

fit to plunder, does not primarily depend on its power, but on the current intentions of the visitors. On the one hand, there are freebooters, who as long as their ships are empty would raid any sufficiently distant place, and as soon as the holds are filled would barter their booty wherever there might be a demand for it. On the other hand, there are travellers who intend to engage in peaceful exchange, regardless of whether their trading partners are weak or powerful. Some of these men might abuse

their trading visits and steal from or deceive those with whom they are dealing, but they would not normally resort to armed violence and ambushing tactics (cf. Bravo 1984: 104). So why do some men turn to freebooting rather than trade or giftgathering ? An obvious answer is that only a relatively small amount of

wealth can be acquired by non-violent means. Gains from a successful raid are inherently larger than those from gift-exchange and barter; moreover, one assumes that even a large princely estate produces only a modest surplus, and that its products are not much in demand. Given a strong competitive drive to accumulate wealth, a Homeric man is bound to find that by exchange he cannot get as much as he wants. "To make the balance he throws his sword into the scale” (Glotz 1920: 53). 1% One should not forget, however, that the use of violence, while

potentially highly profitable, is also highly dangerous. This leads us to a second, complementary explanation of freebooting. By forcibly taking wealth from abroad, a freebooter not only increases his fortune, but also proves his bravery and strength as a warrior; the leader of a freebooting party in addition demonstrates his power to mobilise armed forces and

inflict damage on others.

Warlike qualities are highly rated in Homeric

society, and informal power appears to be no less important a determinant of social status than wealth as such. 167 The heroes, then, resort to freebooting, despite its risks, because violent appropriation is not only a way of acquiring much wealth, but also a prestigious way of

acquiring it. This scale of values is reflected in Telemakhos' reference to "the slaves which Odysseus acquired for me as booty [moi lefssato]" (1.398). In the course of the Odyssey, we find out that among Odysseus’ slaves there are two whom he has inherited from his father, who in turn had

bought them; two whom he received as part of his wife's dowry; and six who had been born into slavery on the estate. 18 The origin of the majority is never mentioned, but this little statistic shows that Odysseus

247

did not get his slaves necessarily, and probably not in majority, by capture. Telemakhos thus overemphasises plundering as a direct source of Odysseus' wealth. He does so because booty is a more highly rated source of income than home production, dowry, or barter. That barter is a less prestigious means of acquisition is, of course, confirmed by the criticism of 'men of business’ : those who trade

without also striving to gain a name for personal excellence deserve contempt.

Again, it is no coincidence that princes often send their subordinates to engage in trade on their behalf. Mentes, ruler of the Taphians, and the son of Kastor personally board ship and travel to exchange their wares, but Euneos "sends out" his ships and merchandise, and Akhilleus puts his retainer Patroklos in charge of the sale of Lykaon. The suitors and Laomedon, too, threaten to "send", rather than take, men by ship to be

sold in distant lands.

Many think that princes do not wish to get directly

involved in trade because they regard it as an improper activity. It seems to me, however, that occasional trade is merely a neutral activity :

not disgraceful, but not particularly prestigious either.

Hence princes

may in person travel and barter if they so wish. But since there is no special credit to be derived from the activity itself, they may equally well

leave the actual work to their subordinates and themselves merely enjoy its profits. 19 By contrast, there is no instance of anyone sending their dependants

which

out on a plundering

confirms

that

freebooting

raid without

is

a

more

participating

prestigious

in person,

means

of

acquisition.

If the heroes prefer to amass a fortune by means of violence at the expense of foreigners because, besides wealth, it brings them a name for prowess and power, why do they at times solicit gifts, instead of plunder? Again this is not simply a matter of the balance of forces. Odysseus has a perfect opportunity to take all the Kyklops' lambs and kids without risk, but he prefers to wait and ask for a gift, which would

inevitably be worth far less in material terms, and be no proof of warlike ability. The reason may be that the parting-gift, as a symbol of respect, contributes to the recipient's prestige in another way.

Whereas booty

represents, so to speak, the fear and respect one is able to inspire in an enemy by the use of force, the gift ideally represents the 'love' and respect one's personal qualities inspire in a friend. Gifts from a savage giant such as Polyphemos would be proof of exceptional qualities. 170

248

To sum up : despite the fact that there are evidently substantial numbers

of poverty-stricken

men

in the Homeric

world,

hunger

and

want are not the fundamental causes of predatory warfare. The poor and needy may take part in booty-raids, but the well-off and very rich do, too. The fundamental causes of predatory warfare are, firstly, the acquisitive ethic of the heroes, and, secondly, the importance of prestige derived from prowess and personal power in Homeric society.

Homeric households, besides seeking self-sufficiency to the extent that each strives to produce all it needs for its subsistence, are engaged in a competitive and therefore open-ended accumulation of treasure and other prestige wealth. The storable and durable nature of treasure makes

virtually limitless accumulation feasible in principle. !7 Agricultural surplus can be converted into prestige-wealth, so that we

may assume that a household aims to produce as large a surplus as it can. Other than the fact that cultivated, however, there is Since we have found that trade of converting surplus produce

princely estates are relatively intensively no explicit Homeric evidence for this. abroad is regarded as a legitimate means into prestige-wealth, a means which in

addition offers opportunities for making

a profit in the exchange,

it

would not be surprising if apart from catering for subsistence needs, large estates might in part be geared towards production for trade. Again there is no direct evidence for this, though Euneos may be an

estate-owner who produces quantities of wine far in excess of household requirements, because he expects to be able to barter it on favourable terms for prestige goods. 172

Production and trade, however, offer only limited scope for selfenrichment, given a relatively primitive technology and few profitably marketable products. The pressures of competitive acquisition are such that princes resort to other means of acquisition : freebooting, and the exploitation of gift-exchange relationships by means of a hospitalityracket. This, however, is but a partial explanation of these two phenomena. Booty and gifts are sought for their symbolic as well as

material value. They confer kinds of prestige which trade profits cannot bring. Homeric princes turn to predatory warfare because those who forcibly seize the wealth of foreigners kill two birds with one stone. They get rich and establish themselves as warriors and men of power. They become both “feared and respected" (14.234).

249

10. PILLAGE AND DESTRUCTION

: FACT AND FICTION

There have been a few scholarly attempts to distinguish in the epics two or more incompatible types of warfare belonging to different strata of the oral tradition. 1? Such attempts have little justification, for the Iliad and Odyssey offer a coherent picture of heroic warfare. The

immediate causes, nature and goals of six legendary wars as treated by Homer - quite possibly against the weight of a less coherent tradition add up to a unified image of status warfare; private predatory warfare is consistently presented as a common and legitimate practice in the heroic

world, coexisting with public wars for status. The fundamental cause of both types of Homeric warfare is a pervasive competition for status. Competitive assertion of power is the cause of status wars. Individuals as well as whole communities seek to demonstrate their superiority to rivals abroad by inflicting greater damage and humiliation upon their rivals than these can inflict upon them. Private contests of power between leading figures of different communities tend to escalate into public clashes, because the

protagonists aim to mobilise the support of as many as possible of their fellow-countrymen, who in turn are all the more ready to fight since they regard a challenge to the personal power of one of their own as an implicit challenge to the collective power of the community. Thus, in the heroic world an abundance of manpower and resources is liable to cause war. Homeric states fight when they prosper, in order to

demonstrate their prosperity - an urgent need of land, food or other supplies does not feature in the epics as a cause of public war. Status rivalry within communities is the cause of predatory warfare. Homeric princes are engaged in competitive accumulation of wealth -

predominantly

destined

to

be

hoarded

and

displayed,

rather

than

distributed generously - as well as competitive assertion of warriorhood and power. In the previous chapter we found that the combination of

these forms of rivalry at times leads men to seize the wealth of fellowtownsmen; we now find that it also, and perhaps more commonly, drives them to go out on private plundering expeditions. In predatory warfare, the heroes pursue internal rivalries by acquiring riches abroad and

demonstrating their martial prowess and personal power at the expense of outsiders.

250

One imagines that in a real world as acquisitive as the Homeric one, there would be a considerable overlap between the causes of these two

types of warfare. The acquisition of wealth would surely be a prominent goal of war even in public expeditions mounted primarily to fight for the prestige of the community and its leaders.

In the epics, however, these

two goals of warfare are kept apart. The vocabulary of warfare itself suggests a clear distinction. By definition, those who with an act of hybris initiate a status war, do not seek material benefit from it, but the sheer pleasure of feeling superior. Freebooters, on the other hand, again

by definition, are after booty only. The poet reinforces this distinction by ignoring the prospect of booty as a motivating force in any of the legendary status wars he deals with. Moreover, he depicts Odysseus and Odysseus' alter ego, the son of Kastor, as reluctant to fight in one such war, although these two men are otherwise notable for their eagerness to

exploit all opportunities for self-enrichment.

Apparently, although those

who fight status wars stand to win great wealth, a desire for wealth is not supposed to be part of their motivation. The reason for this is that the

pursuit of material profit, although important and perfectly legitimate in itself, is a relatively low-ranking goal of life. It ranks lower than the pursuit of a warlike reputation, which in turn appears to be subordinate to the assertion of power.

Thus, the epic idealises the great wars of the

past by attributing to the heroes who fought them only the highest motives. Given the nature of the competition for status in the Homeric world, the immediate causes attributed to legendary wars are not as "silly" as they have been made out to be. Since a private injury or insult,

intentional or otherwise, suffered by a prominent prince at the hands of a foreigner, is bound to be regarded as a challenge to his power and to the

power of his community, it may well become a cause of war. Nevertheless, the poet himself indicates that another type of immediate

cause

is more

common.

fighting the Trojans,

When

Akhilleus

explains

he says that he has no personal

his reasons grudge

for

against

them, "for they have never driven off my cattle or horses, nor have they ever destroyed crops in Phthia” (1.154-6). In other words, not personal conflicts between princes, but raids on a community's herds and

farmland are the normal immediate cause of war.

It does not matter

here whether such raids are deliberate challenges to a contest of power, or freebooting raids gone wrong. Thus, the legendary wars begin with

251 incidents which,

although possible,

are not common

causes of war

in

Homeric society. The superficial explanation of this is that the poet must introduce such uncommon causes because they are part of the tradition. But, as we have seen, there are versions of the tradition in which famous quarrels lead to brawls, not wars. One must ask why the poet ignored those

versions. One must also ask why there were no traditional tales of wars caused by unprovoked cattle-raids. Apparently, man-to-man clashes, more than raids on cattle and crops, appealed to audiences. The reason, I think, is that such conflicts between men, over women, inheritances,

and even hunting-trophies, were an important part of life to Homer's audience.

In view of the attitude towards the exercise of personal power

revealed in the poems, we may assume that most of the audience would have

liked

their quarrels

with

members

fought out in a full-scale war.

of other

communities

to be

But very few could have been in a

position to make this wish come true. "Private life offers plenty of opportunities for the exercise of power..., but its scope

is very limited.

Public life is much wider in the scope of affairs with which it deals,

but in most cases the individual can wield little power in it. A choice appears to present itself between a significant part in an insignificant sphere or an insignificant part in a significant sphere.” (Humphreys 1983: xii)

As

Humphreys

points

out,

Attic

tragedy

resolved

this dilemma

“by

conferring a world-shaking quality on intrafamilial power struggles", the stories of which it derived from heroic legend (ibid.).

The epics achieve

a similar effect. The heroes are endowed with the power that men lack in reality. There is Menelaos, who is able to mobilise the whole of Akhaia in revenge for the seduction of his wife. And there is Herakles, who serves Laomedon in a position equivalent to that of a thes - a hired

labourer, one of the lowest and most vulnerable positions in society - and suffers the fate of many thetes : his promised wages are withheld. But Herakles, unlike real labourers, need not resign himself to his fate. He

has an army at his disposal and returns to punish the man who has dared to exploit him. The tradition represented by the epics, then, by the selection of immediate causes which it attributes to legendary wars, turns status war into a wish-fulfilling, idealised version of everyday private conflict.

252

Contests of power in the heroic world take the form of attempts to wreak conspicuous destruction; the goal of status warfare is accordingly

the annihilation of the opponent by killing all enemy males, enslaving their women and children and razing their city. But since the poet idealises the motives and the power of belligerents, he also idealises their

goals and their ability to achieve them. For a start, the slaughter of all adult males and enslavement of the rest of the inhabitants of a town is not easily achieved even by a victorious army. In practice, many, perhaps a majority, would evade capture, as was the case in the sackings

of towns and villages by Caribbean pirates and New Guinean tribesmen described earlier. The Valvedditturai massacre of August 2, 1989, strikingly illustrates that the damage done by an army on the rampage,

while horrific,

may

fall far short of total destruction.

According

to

newspaper reports, Indian "peace-keeping" forces attacked Valvedditturai, a Tamil town on the north coast of Sri Lanka, in revenge for the death of six soldiers in a guerilla ambush. "A Citizens' were

involved

Committee in cordon

official says thousands of Indian peace-keeping and

soldiers

search operations a few hours after the [ambush]...

According to local residents [the Indians) went berserk. They shelled populated areas and then went into the homes..." (The Times, August 12, 1989) "[The] troops tried to raze the town... Victims, including women, children and the elderly, were either burned to death in their homes, lined up against walls and shot, or made to lie

face down on the ground where they were shot in the back." (The Guardian, same date)

Appalling as the incident is, the efforts of "thousands" of men armed with automatic weapons, explosives and inflammable chemicals did not

destroy the town. Out of a population of 15,000, no more than fifty-one were killed and twenty seriously wounded, while "123 houses, 43 shops, 4 cinemas, a library, 69 vehicles, 12 fishing boats and 129 nets were set on fire" (The Guardian, ibid.). 14 Homeric heroes armed only with swords, spears and firebrands could hardly have succeeded in inflicting more extensive damage upon their enemies.

Secondly, one may assume that in reality armies would often not be strong enough even to attempt the destruction of the enemy. An assault on a fortified town is bound to be costly in terms of human life and material resources, and unlikely to succeed when the balance of forces is roughly equal. Belligerents are therefore likely to content themselves

253 with doing more limited damage by means of raiding - as the Pylians do in their war against the Epeians - or indeed with merely defending their

own territory from enemy incursions.

Only in epic fantasy are armies

regularly strong enough to annihilate entire communities, and only in the epics are manpower and resources available to conduct a successful tenyear siege.

Thirdly, in reality the acquisitive drive would clash with the desire to destroy when it comes to killing men and boys who might fetch a high ransom or sale-price if spared.

In fact, while it is stated as a general

norm that all men captured must be killed, it is quite clear that it is common for men captured in battle to be ransomed or sold. 175 There is little reason to think that the treatment of prisoners taken in battle is

categorically different from that of prisoners taken in the sack of a city. Moreover, a head-count of Odysseus' servants shows that he owns about as many male as female slaves, which implies that on balance as many men as women are captured rather than killed. It would seem that ideally men are slaughtered, while in practice in large numbers of them

are enslaved. 176 Thus, in respect of the causes and goals of status warfare, as so often elsewhere, the poet turns the ideals of the present into the reality of the imaginary heroic past. Most features of Homeric warfare appear in historical Greek wars, too.

"On the one hand poverty, which inspires daring through necessity, and on the other hand affluence, which through hybris inspires a desire for more (pleonexia],... lead men out into danger.” (Thukydides III.45,4)

Pleonexia, rather than necessity, is identified as the fundamental cause of war by both Plato and Aristotle (Garlan

1989:

24-31).

The concept,

which encompasses the desire for more power and prestige as well as the desire for more wealth, does not occur in Homer, but it well describes motives that dominate the actions of the heroes no less than those of the Greeks. (1) Ancient authors are aware of the role of war as a means of acquiring wealth, and the importance of this role has more recently been

much stressed by scholars. 177 The force of the acquisitive drive in fifth-

254

century Athens, for instance, is illustrated by Herodotos' story that in 489 B.C. the general Miltiades asked the assembly for seventy ships, “without informing them what country he would attack, but saying that he would make them rich if they followed him, for he would lead them against the kind of country from which they could easily carry off gold in abundance.” (VI.132)

That was good enough for the Athenians, and a fleet was launched.

The role of foreign trade as an alternative means of acquisition in Archaic and Classical Greece is a contentious issue, but Hesiod at any rate assumes that many a farmer owns a ship and spends the sailing season trading for profit (Works & Days 618-34). He exhorts farmers to produce as must... toil your cargo profit after

much as they can ("If in your at toil after toil” [381-2]), and in a big one. The larger the profit" (643-5). Hesiod even

heart you long for riches, you to "praise a small ship, but put cargo, the greater will be the envisages the possibility that a

farmer may sell all of his produce; he counsels against this on account of the risks, not the ethics, of the practice : "leave the greater part behind,

take the lesser part as your cargo, for it is terrible to encounter disaster among the waves of the sea” (689-91).

Several sources suggest that in

the sixth century it was still acceptable for men of high standing to engage in trade in person, and that those who made spectacular profits from their ventures gained considerable renown. As in Homer, though,

they might equally well send out dependants to trade on their behalf. 17% (11) Status rivalry between communities is a constant feature of Archaic and Classical Greek history.

The eagerness of city-states to be regarded

as the 'foremost' of the Greeks and to be honoured accordingly is evident in their continuous struggles to establish a position of leadership, a hegemony,

for themselves.

Argos, for instance, fights its neighbours

for the leadership of the region; in the sixth century, Sparta fights Argos for the leadership of the entire Peloponnese; in the fifth century, Athens

fights Sparta for the leadership of all Hellas.

Even in the face of a

Persian invasion, status rivalry keeps spoiling Greek attempts at cooperation. According to Herodotos, two potential allies drop out because the others are unwilling to accord them sufficiently prestigious roles in the alliance (VII.148-9, 158-62), and just before the crucial

battle of Plataia, the Athenians and Tegeans quarrel over the privilege of holding the left wing, each arguing that their military achievements have

255 earned them this honour (IX.26-7). Other forms of rivalry include the Panhellenic games, which play as important a role as funeral games do in the epics.

The benefits of leadership and international prestige are predominantly symbolic - at least they were until the Athenians in 478 B.C. began to raise tribute, and in other ways too increasingly exploited the material resources of those who acknowledged their hegemony. Hence we must assume that rivalry and conflict between city-states is largely inspired by the wish to defend and enhance the intangible honour of the community. 179 Characteristic is the story of the Aigieis, inhabitants of a small town in Akhaia, who, probably in the seventh century, defeated an Aitolian fleet and captured a single fifty-oared ship. They put up a

commemorative dedication at Delphi and expectantly asked the oracle : "Who are the strongest of the Greeks 7"

The answer was disappointing :

"Of all land, Pelasgian Argos is best,/ Thessalian horses, Spartan women,/ And the men who drink the water of beautiful Arethousa [in Khalkis)./ But even better than these are the men who live between Tiryns and Arkadia rich in sheep,/ The linencorseleted Argives, goads of war./ You Aigieis are not third or fourth,/ Nor twelfth - not in words, not in numbers.” 180

The Greeks, it seems, are united not only by a common language and religion, but also by a common rivalry to be the best. One of the roles of Delphi, both as an oracle and as the place to erect monuments to one's success, is to judge the status contest of the Greek states.

The competitive assertion of power and the accumulation of wealth often went hand-in-hand. As Garlan puts it: "Most conflicts between organised states were simultaneously economic and political in character” (1975: 183). However, when he goes on to say that "exploitation and subjection were synonymous"

(ibid.), he is going too

far. In many Greek wars there was no attempt to exploit the defeated enemy. Sparta and Argos, Athens and Thebes, Korinth and Megara, Samos and Miletos fought for centuries over nothing but the control of small border territories of very little economic value. I would suggest that,

more

prestige

than

by

anything

else,

demonstrating

the

their

neighbours, and that the contested excuse for fighting. 181

states

in question

military territories

sought

superiority were

no

over more

to gain

their than

an

256

Moreover, just as Homer portrays the Akhaian heroes at Troy as fighting for honour rather than wealth, so does Herodotos

idealise the

Greeks as motivated by a desire for personal excellence rather than riches.

When

the Persians

hear that the Greeks,

after the battle of

Thermopylai, are still attending the Olympic games, they wonder what prize is at stake. When told that it is only an olive-wreath, a Persian exclaims to his commander : "Papai, Mardonios ! What kind men are you making us fight - men who hold a contest not for the sake of money, but for the sake of arete 1" (VIII.26). The implication is clear : the ideal Greek state, too, fights wars to demonstrate its prowess, regardless of material loss or gain. (m) The goals of Archaic and Classical warfare, it seems to me, are

essentially the same as those of Homeric warfare: to demonstrate superior strength by doing more damage to the enemy than he is able to do in return, and ultimately, especially when strongly provoked, to destroy him.

As a rule, Archaic wars stop far short of destruction, and

indeed there are a few examples

of states which agree by treaty to

practise restraint in making war upon one another.

They swear not to

use missiles, not to cut off the water supply, not to raze the enemy city after capture. There are also a few examples of states choosing trial by combat as a means of settling war. In the late seventh century, the Athenian general Phrynon fought in single combat against the Mitylenian ruler Pittakos in order to settle their states' respective claims to territory

in Asia Minor. In the mid-sixth century, Sparta and Argos each selected 300 champions to settle their differences in combat. The custom of raising a trophy on the spot where the enemy first turned and fled indicates that victory in a pitched battle, rather than the sack of a town, has become in itself an objective of war. On account of such selfrestraint, Archaic wars have often been called agonal as opposed to total. 12 This is appropriate insofar as warring states deliberately reduced the scope for destruction by limiting the forms and objectives of

combat and the number of combatants. If, however, 'agonal' is meant to imply that belligerents categorically rejected annihilation of the enemy as a legitimate goal of war, then use of the term is misleading. Annihilation remains the ultimate sanction

throughout the Archaic and Classical periods. Tyrtaios takes for granted that those who are defeated in war become wanderers "with their own mother and old father, little children and wedded wife" and must beg for

257

a living (F 6 Diehl). Evidently, the poet imagines that the victorious enemy may destroy the conquered city and force the inhabitants to flee. There were traditions about the destruction of Asine and Nauplia in the eighth century,

Melia,

Arisbe and Pellene in the seventh,

Kirrha and

Sybaris in the sixth, and there is solid historical evidence for the destruction of numerous cities in the Classical period. 1 The fact that many Greek wars continued for generations and even centuries of desultory fighting without ending in the annihilation of either side is not, I think, evidence of a strictly agonistic attitude to warfare. It is a consequence of, on the one hand, the practical difficulty of destroying an enemy whose resources are not far inferior to one's own, and on the other hand, the nature of warfare as a competition for status. Status can be held only in a group, and by comparison to others : that applies to states as it does to individuals. Hence even if a state has the power to destroy its rivals, it should not do so too often, or else none

will be

left to acknowledge

its superiority.

4

But

given

serious

provocation, or especially favourable circumstances, Greek states do aim

to destroy. Thus, Melia and Kirrha were destroyed in punishment for sacrilege by powerful coalitions of states. One may note that some fifty years after the Battle of the Champions, when Sparta is again at war with Argos, there is no sign of agonistic restraint. The Spartans attack by surprise, slaughter those who surrender, and burn alive those who have

taken refuge in the woods. Six thousand Argives are killed. When the Spartan commander returns home, he is put on trial for not having also sacked the city of Argos itself (Herodotos VI.76-82; cf. VII.148). In practice, then, annihilation of the enemy may be uncommon, but it

remains

what

it is in Homer:

the ultimate proof of power,

and a

legitimate goal of war. (IV) Freebooters were common throughout ancient history, and over the centuries several Greek communities - Phokaia, Samos, Crete,

Aitolia - earned a reputation for practising piracy.

However, by the fifth

century

longer

in most

of Greece

freebooting

was

no

regarded

as a

legitimate, let alone prestigious, activity. Thukydides speaks of it as a way of life respected only in marginal and backward regions (1.5). The moment of change is hard to date, but is likely to have coincided with the decline of physical strength and personal coercive power as sources of social status, discussed in the previous chapter. As wealth becomes more important than either of these qualities, freebooting loses its appeal

258

as a means of demonstrating warriorhood and power; it is now a source of prestige only insofar as it is a source of wealth. The opportunity to enhance their status in more than one respect used to tempt princes to

lead freebooting expeditions, but now that they stand to gain wealth only, such men weigh the advantages of plundering against the dangers of combat, and on the whole decide that the risks are no longer worthwhile.

While the violent assertion of power loses much of its significance as a form of status rivalry between individuals, it remains an essential feature of status rivalry between Greek communities. International status rivalry does take on certain new aspects in the sixth century. The circuit of Panhellenic games is established. The custom of raising battle-trophies develops. The Spartans add a new dimension to the concept of superior

status by creating for themselves not only a position of acknowledged military preeminence but a position of actual leadership over other states.

Polykrates of Samos,

according to Herodotos

(III.122) invents

the notion of thalassocracy in establishing himself as the first to rule the waves. Yet important though these developments are, they do not fundamentally alter the nature of competition between states. They

merely institutionalise the status rivalry that throughout Greek history is as important a cause of war as it is in the world of the heroes.

261

CONCLUSION

The long tradition of Homeric scholarship and the abiding fascination exercised by the /liad and Odyssey have combined to awkward effect : "every scholar, once in his life-time, wants to talk about Homer; no other scholar wants to listen to him" (Gomme 1962: 1). "The former feels that in some significant way he, and he only, has perceived the truth; of the latter, those who in general agree are impatient because the speaker is only saying what they have always known but have not had the conceit to say in public; those who disagree think that all this has been contradicted and disproved

long ago.” (ibid.) If I have nevertheless undertaken yet another study of Homer, it is because I believed that a thorough and methodical analysis of the epics as historical sources could still lead to some new and worthwhile insights

into Homer and history. Looking at the result, it does seem to me that at least a few of my conclusions are new - though it is hard to be completely certain when dealing with such a vast amount of scholarship. Whether they are also tenable and worthwhile is, of course, for the reader to decide.

The main conclusions may be summarised as follows.

(1) HOMER Following the approach set out in Chapter One, we have found it possible to reconstruct a coherent image of all the aspects of the heroic

world that have been examined. Some of these images, though coherent, are fantastic, that is to say, they do not reflect historical reality; instead, they appear to reflect certain ideals articulated in the epics. Whenever there is any sign of inconsistency - which is rarely - this can be attributed to the poet representing simultaneously a realistic image of the world and

an idealised version of it, rather than to poetic whim or to a confused oral tradition.

Nowhere have we found a compelling or even merely a

262

good reason to distinguish different layers of tradition within the poems or to separate the world of the Odyssey from that of the liad.

In all the material covered here, the only elements that definitely reflect Mycenaean

conditions

occur

in the political geography

of the

heroic world, and these are not of a kind that necessarily implies a continuous oral poetic tradition reaching back to the Mycenaean Age. There are quite a few other elements that could in theory stem from a

Mycenaean tradition, but if so, they have been fully amalgamated into a non-Mycenaean setting. This cannot, of course, matter, if only because there are aspects of particular its material culture, that have not been have we dealt with linguistic features of the epics

be the last word on the the heroic world, in investigated here. Nor that may provide clues

as to the nature and date of the tradition. Still, we have studied most aspects of the world of the heroes, and ali but one of these appear to reflect the realities and ideals of eighth or early seventh century society. Thus,

the oral tradition,

whatever

its origins,

must have been

highly

flexible : the epic view of the heroic world almost exclusively reflects the society in which the poems reached their final form. The conclusion that there is a high degree of coherence in the epic picture of the world does not necessarily mean that a single poet created both poems, but it is compatible with that view. More interesting from

the point of view of literary interpretation are two other conclusions. Firstly, the poems appear to be concerned primarily with the ethical, psychological and practical problems associated with anger and revenge, rather than with alienation, death or justice - subjects with which modern

interpretations tend to be preoccupied.

Secondly, there appears to be an

extra dimension to features of the poems that are often regarded as no more than common characteristics of the genre of epic poetry - such as the beauty and prowess of the heroes, the shadowy existence of the common people, the focus on conflict, and the decisive role of an individual's physical strength. We have found that these features of the epic world reflect ideals of social stratification in Homer's own time. By presenting these ideals of stratification as the reality of the past, the epics indirectly legitimise the reality of stratification in the present.

(11) HISTORY In the preface, it was argued that historians cannot afford to ignore Homeric evidence, because it is essential to current views of the Dark Age (including the eighth century) and hence to theories of the changes

263 that took place at the end of this period. Discarding the epics as sources, it was suggested, would mean such a serious loss of evidence that these theories might no longer have any basis. Ironically, the implications of

the present reconstruction of Homeric society are somewhat similar to the effect of ignoring the epics as sources. Homer's image of the heroic age turns out to be so similar to what we know of the Archaic Age that

many perceived contrasts between Homeric/Dark society are reduced to the point of vanishing. The Homeric

economy

Age

and

Archaic

is not predominantly pastoral, but as much

agrarian-based as the economy of Archaic Greece. Nor is it marked by an ideal of autarky, non-profit exchange and accumulation for the sake of generous

redistribution:

it is as

much

exploitation as the Archaic economy.

characterised

by

greed

and

Homeric society does not revolve

around vertical relations : there is a predominance of horizontal ties, just as there is in the Archaic Age. Nor is it, as some have suggested, egalitarian and class-less. It is stratified in the same way as early

Archaic society.

There is no clear contrast between 'total' Homeric war

and ‘agonal’ Archaic warfare. Finally, Homeric political organisation is not effectively limited to the level of the household with only the most

elementary form of central government. Its political institutions do differ from those of the Archaic Age, but the fundamental structures of government are very similar, and, in Homer as in Archaic Greece, cities

are the main political units. One might conclude that Homer reflects the early Archaic Age itself, or one might argue that the poems reflect Dark Age conditions and that there is thus a great deal of continuity between the two periods. In either

case, the epics provide little or no evidence for historical change in any of these respects.

However, several important historical developments do remain, and central

to these

are

the related

processes

of population

growth,

the

formalisation of organs of government, the growing importance of wealth and conspicuous consumption and leisure in the competiiion for status, and the reduction in the frequency of violent conflict. I have argued that population growth affects the type of violent competition for status found in the epics, because in larger communities

where the inhabitants no longer all know one another, the importance of deference as a constituent of status declines and the scope for conflict decreases. At the same time, the drop in violent conflict between

264

members

of the same community allows a greater political integration,

which is simultaneously stimulated by the organisational needs of a growing population. As a result, a more formal and articulated governmental apparatus emerges, while in social life the focus of status

rivalry shifts to conspicuous consumption and leisure, as wealth becomes the main criterion of status in larger, less close-knit communities. A great deal of further research would be necessary to substantiate this hypothesis, but perhaps it is worth it. (111) VIOLENCE

We have seen that Homeric violence may be the result of a form of status rivalry which is primarily concerned with securing deference, 'honour', from others, and which takes place in a face-to-face community. It is perhaps somewhat rash to draw conclusions about real-

life violence on the basis of the literary violence portrayed in two epic poems. It would be certainly be rash to jump to general conclusions about The Causes of Violence on the basis of a single form of it. Yet there do seem to be similarities between conflict as it is fought in the world of the heroes and conflict as it takes place in a number of contemporary

cultures and subcultures.

Perhaps

Homer

does help us

understand at least one kind of real-life violence. There is, I believe, something useful to be gained from a study of war and violence in Homer,

regardless of whether my specific conclusions

will stand up to scrutiny.

In our society, while we tend to regard violent

behaviour as part of human nature, we denounce most kinds of violence as primitive, mindless, or as a sign of a disordered mind. We have found, however, that in the Homeric world violence is none of these

things. It is used with a purpose; it has a meaning. Aggression is no doubt rooted in human biology, but in Homer, rather than being the result of an uncontrollable animal instinct erupting and cracking the veneer of civilisation, acts of violence are a product of society no less

than the civilised 'veneer' itself. Instead of telling ourselves that those who act violently have simply failed to rise above

human

nature,

we

should

ask ourselves

to what

extent in our society, too, violence is a cultural phenomenon. Our dominant values may strongly reject any form of violence, from child abuse and wife-battering to street-fighting and vandalism, to terrorism and warfare, but simultaneously we subscribe to notions of masculinity, personal autonomy and state sovereignty, and adopt attitudes towards

265

competition and social hierarchy, which may violent conflict that ostensibly we seek to avoid.

stimulate the kinds of

Those who see violent conflict as a merely natural, and therefore unescapable, phenomenon are bound to conclude that there is nothing to

be done about it except to arm onself to the teeth in order to deter the enemy and make sure that one is not going to be at the receiving end when the inevitable happens. Strategies of deterrence, such as the

expansion of a nuclear arsenal, bringing back hanging, arming the police force, or encouraging private ownership of guns, may be successful -

certainly in the short term - but their risks and cost are evident.

In order

to combat violence more effectively and with a greater chance of lasting success, one must, I believe, begin with the realisation that violence may be a creation of society rather than a phenomenon of nature, and proceed to investigate its origins, rather than take its existence for granted.

APPENDICES

269

APPENDIX ONE

TOWNS AND TOWNSFOLK

1. THE SIZE OF THE POPULATION We are never told how many people live in Troy or Ithaka or any other town, but it is possible to arrive at highly tentative estimates by extrapolating from the few data we have. It should be noted that the following calculations are meant to establish no more than an order of magnitude, and no more than the numbers envisaged by the poet. The numbers are perhaps not likely to be realistic, but that is a separate problem.

The size of Akhaian towns can be estimated on the basis of the number of soldiers they contribute to Agamemnon's army. The Akhaian contingents, nearly all of which are recruited from more than one town,

vary in size from 3 to 100 ships; 40 being the round average as well as by far the most common number (11.494-759). The size of the crews also varies,

but fifty appears

to be a common,

and roughly

average,

number of men to a ship. ! In the Catalogue of Ships, the Boiotians are said to have 120 men to a ship (11.510), while Philoktetes' ships carry 50 men each (11.719). Thukydides (1.10,4) took these to represent the maximum and minimum sizes, but we find that the number 50 recurs, while 120 does not.

Akhilleus’ ships have crews of 50 (XVI.170), and the Phaiakian crew picked for Odysseus consists of 52 men (8.34-6, 48-9). Odysseus’ own crew, too, appears to consist of 50 men, plus 2 leaders : after the Kyklops has eaten 6 of his crew (9.288-91, 311, 344), Odysseus is left with 2x22 men, and one co-leader (10.203-9); the original crew therefore consisted of 52 men (assuming that the "six men from each ship" who had died earlier [9.60-1] have now been forgotten, or that the crew has tacitly been brought

up to strength again by taking men from the other ships).

270 Elsewhere, we find one reference to a "hundred-oared ship" (XX.247), and

several references to ships with crews of 20 (1.141-4 and 308-11; 1,280 and 2.212-3; 4.669 and 778; 9.322).

The total of Akhaian forces would thus be about 60.000 men (1186x50). which is in line with the explicitly given total of 50.000 men on the side of the Trojans (1000x50; VIII.562-3). To arrive at the average number of soldiers contributed by each town, we must multiply the number of ships in a contingent by 50 and then

divide it by the number of towns that have contributed to the contingent. For example, since the 90 ships of the Pylians come from 9 towns, according to the Catalogue, each town provides on average (90x50:9 =)

500 men.

Since the 40 ships of the Phokians come from 8 towns, each

of these provides (40x50:8 =) 250 men. The exceptional Boiotian contingent, with its 50 crews of 120, comes from 29 towns, which means the average town in Boiotia provides 207 men. The averages of the other contingents are : Methone 88, Pherai 138, Syme 150, Rhodos 150, Lokris 250, Euboia 286, Kos 300, Arkadia 333, Lakedaimon 333, Aitolia 400, Phylake 400, Argissa 400, Argos 444, Mykenai

454,

Trikke

500,

Ormenion

500,

Krete

571,

Salamis

600,

Aspledon/Orkhomenos 750. Of Odysseus’ contingent we are told that it is recruited from among the Kephallenians who live in three islands and on the mainland; assuming that each of these areas contains one town (cf. "the Kephallenian towns", 21.252; 24.355), we arrive at an average of (12x50:4 =) 150 men per town. For the remaining six contingents (Athens, Elis, Doulikhion, Phthia, Kyphos and Magnesia), the average cannot be calculated because the Catalogue does not give a list of towns in these areas. Not counting these last six contingents, we get a total of. (894x50+ 50x120 =) 50.700 men from 152 towns, i.e. an average of 334 men per town. All these averages are likely to be on the high side, because the poet may not have intended to give a full list of all the towns in the various regions (cf. n.41 to Chapter Two).

The poet may not have been of his Catalogue of Ships, general order of magnitude imagined the smallest towns

aware of the precise numerical implications but presumably he had some notion of the involved. The evidence suggests that he as contributing to the army no more than,

say, 50 men, and the largest towns perhaps 1,000 men at the most.

271

How one extrapolates from this to the total number of inhabitants of a town depends,

(see Chapter

of course, on one's view of Homeric

Two,

sections

5 and 6).

I would

army-recruitment

suggest

that every

household in town contributes on average one man to the army : only

one of the seven sons of Polyktor joins (XXTV.397-400), and only one of the four sons of Aigyptios (2.15-22). Occasionally two brothers fight side by side, but such instances are offset by households which contribute no men at all (XXI11.295-9). (In a defensive war, by contrast, all men fit to fight would no doubt be mobilised.) The assumption that the whole community is represented is based on the presence of large numbers of non-basileis in the army? and is supported by the fact that

the number of Pylian troops is the same as that of Pylians partaking of a sacrifice at home : 4,500 (3.5-8

[9x500];

IT.602

[90x50];

cf. Vlachos

1974: 264-7). | In sum, Homeric towns probably consist of not less than 50, and up to 1,000, households, representing perhaps some 200-4,000 people, not counting slaves and hired labourers. The town of Ithaka, for example,

might have only about 150 households, or 600 people; an average town would contain some 300 households, or 1200 people. 9

2. TERMS FOR TOWNS AND TOWNSFOLK

Homeric

Greek and Classical Greek use the same two words for

'city' : polis and astu.

Of these, polis is the more common word in the

epics, occurring 236 times (polis 204; ptolis 32), as compared to astu 137 times. Astu always means the city as a complex of houses and other buildings.

Polis, however, in Classical times may also mean the city as

a community of people. Homer, too, seems to make a distinction between the two words; he makes Glaukos say to Hektor : "Now think of a way to save the polis and the astu" (XVII.144).

In many Homeric .

contexts, it would be quite possible.to interpret polis as referring to the ‘community’ rather than to the physical settlement, but on the other hand that interpretation is nowhere necessary. The meaning of polis in Homer is certainly not restricted to that of ‘citadel’ or ‘fortress’, as opposed to

the rest of the city (cf. Thukydides I1.15,6), for the poet repeatedly speaks of the citadel of Troy as the ‘high’ city, polis akre (e.g.

272

VI.88,257,297,317; Ν11.345, XXII.383; XXIV.728; Pergamos akre : V.460; VI.512) or akropolis (8.494, 504). The inhabitants of a town are twice called astoi (X1.242; 13.192), and five times referred to as poli(e)tai (11.806; XV.558; XXII.429; 7.131; 17,206), ‘city-dwellers' or 'citizens’ (Scully 1990: 55-6).

It seems to me that there is a third word for them : etai.

This word

occurs nine times in the epics. Its meaning in classical times is '(private) citizen’, and ancient scholars believed that in Homer too it is used as a synonym for politai (cf. Jeanmaire 1939: 105-7). Modern scholars,

however, have found this interpretation unsatisfactory and sought to explain δαὶ in different ways. Glotz suggests that it means 'phratrymembers’ (1904: 87-91); Jeanmaire favours 'an inner circle of hetairoi' (loc.cit.); Andrewes offers 'kinsmen more distant than kasignetoi' (1961: 134-5); Stagakis simply equates erai and hetairoi (1968), and Gates opts for 'kinsmen within the household’ (1971: 118-26; cf. Scully 1990: 55 ("blood relations"]). Nevertheless, the meaning 'townsmen' or 'citizens'

is to my mind more plausible than any of the alternatives. When Hektor leaves battle, his mother tells him: "you have tired yourself in defence of your efai" (V1.262). Here 'fellow-townsmen' is

much the most great defender (Compare also When the gods

appropriate meaning : Hektor is always depicted as the of Troy as a whole, not of his 'kinsmen' or 'friends' only. XI.242, where Iphidamas dies "defending his astoi".) decide that the body of Sarpedon is to be transported to

Lykia, where "his brothers and esai shall give him a burial” (XVI.456,

674), it is again most likely that these are all his fellow-townsmen. Certainly when Hektor, a hero of similar stature, is buried, the entire

population of Troy takes part in the funeral ceremonies (XXTV .665-6, 703-804). Most of the other contexts allow of more than one interpretation, but suit the meaning

'townsmen'

very well.

Thus, when Menelaos gives a

wedding party, it is attended by "many efai" (4.3), by "neighbours and etai" (4.16).

That a large wedding-feast should be attended by ‘many

townsmen' is not surprising.

Also, when Hektor tells Aias that all the

Akhaians will rejoice when they see him return safely, “especially your etai and those who are your friends [hetairoi]” (VII.295), it is quite natural for him to mention specifically Aias' fellow-townsmen, i.e. the men of Salamis.

273

The Trojan women who ask for news of their “sons, brothers, efai and husbands" (VI.239-40) may well be asking for news of their townsmen in general. A slight problem here is the sequence: we might have

expected the husbands to be mentioned before the townsmen. Similarly, when "many efai and cousins" gather to beg Phoinix not to leave town (IX.464), they may well be townsmen, although it is odd that they are mentioned before cousins. In both instances, the order of words may be due to metrical requirements, for it is not possible simply to reverse the order of the words without disrupting the metre.

The only problematic passage is 15.273-4 : Theoklymenos says that he has killed a man and is now on the run from his victim's "many brothers and etai in Argos - they have great power over the Akhaians". Here ‘kinsmen' or ‘friends’ is the meaning one would expect. Yet it is not impossible that the townsfolk at large are supposed to have taken sides

with the victim and his brothers against Theoklymenos, and that it is the powerful position of the city of Argos among the cities of Akhaia which poses a threat to Theoklymenos.

Etai, then, probably does mean 'townsmen'’, after all. 4 There is thus a marked continuity in vocabulary from epic to classical usage : polis, astu, politai, astoi and etai all already have roughly their later meanings.

274

APPENDIX TWO

PRINCES AND SCEPTRES

1. PRINCELY FAMILIES AND THEIR ELDERS The presence of numerous princes in a community is clearly attested in

the Odyssey. Telemakhos says that, besides himself and his father Odysseus, "there are many other Akhaian basileis, too, in the island of Ithaka,

young

Eurymakhos, Elsewhere,

and

old"

(1.394-5).

Two

Ithakans,

are explicitly referred to as princes Alkinoos,

addressing

the

“leaders

and

Antinoos

(18.64-5; counsellors

and

24.179). of the

Phaiakians”, states that in his country "twelve pre-eminent basileis as leaders govern the people; I myself am the thirteenth" (8.387, 390-1). The addition of the unusual epithet “pre-eminent” (ariprepees) and of the predicate "as leaders" (arkhoi) suggests that these thirteen are the most

powerful men among a wider group of princes (cf. Carlier 1984: 145-6). The

/liad presupposes

a similar situation in Troy,

"while drinking wine", boasts of his prowess

where

Aineias,

"to the Trojan princes“

(XX.84), and where not only Priamos but his son Paris, too, is referred

to as a basileus (IV.96).

The Akhaian forces are also led by a large

number of basileis, but in this ‘international’ army all princes mentioned

by name turn out to be monarchs.

Although it has sometimes been

argued that, in contrast to the situation in Ithaka, Skheria and Troy, only

monarchs have the title basileus in the Akhaian army (e.g. Deger 1970: 59 n.253), the more obvious explanation is that "in the great host before Troy" there are "so many kings who are actual rulers of poleis that they alone fill the stage to overflowing and crowd out the petty kings... In Ithaca and Phaeacia, on the other hand, ... the petty kings loom larger because the stage is smaller, and for no other

reason” (Calhoun 1934: 306-7). 1

275

Not only is the title of prince borne by many men in a Homeric community but each prince's family shares his title. When Telemakhos says that there are many ofher princes in Ithaka, he is implying that he himself is a prince, too; yet he is not even old enough to run his own household. Nausikaa, daughter of Alkinoos, is referred to as 'princess’ (basileia, 6.115) while she is still unmarried. She and Telemakhos must derive their title from their fathers’ status. The wives of Odysseus and Alkinoos, too, are both called basileia.2 Moreover, 'princeliness' is a characteristic of families, as well as of individuals : Telemakhos is told that “there is no other family more princely (basileuteros] than yours among the people of Ithaka. You [plural] shall be forever the more powerful" (15.533-4). There are, then, a number of princely families in a Homeric

community.

Presumably

it normally

is the

head

of the

princely

household who takes part in law-sessions, council-meetings and public debate. Perhaps, therefore, the adjectives "trial-attending” (dikaspolos, e.g. 1.238), "advice-giving" (boulephoros, e.g. XX.83) and "sceptrebearing" (skeptoukhos, e.g. 11.86) - usually regarded as mere ornamental epithets for a prince - serve to distinguish the prince at the head of the household from his sons, who are princes too, but who neither judge nor

advise nor hold the sceptre. > Along the same lines, we may explain the term "elder" (geron). At first sight, the word seems to be used as a synonym for ‘prince’. The men who join Agamemnon in a council-meeting are called "great-hearted

elders” when they sit down (11.53) and "sceptre-bearing princes” when they rise (1I.86). I would suggest, however, that “elders” refers more specifically to heads of princely households, sceptre-bearers, as opposed to their sons. In the Iliad, Agamemnon calls a meeting of the ‘leaders and counsellors’ (hegetores ede medontes, IX.17) or 'princes' (IX.59, 710). In addressing this meeting, Nestor distinguishes the young men (Kouroi, IX.68), whom he tells to mount a guard outside the army camp, from the elders (IX.68-70, 89-90), who are to go and have a meal in Agamemnon's quarters. In the Odyssey, a meeting of the Phaiakian "leaders and counsellors’ (8.11, 26) follows the same pattern. Alkinoos tells the young men to get a ship ready to sail, and adds "but the others, sceptre-holding princes, must come to my beautiful house” for a meal (8.40-2). "He led the way, and the sceptre-holders went with him"

276

(8.46.7).

Those who are invited had earlier been referred to as elders

(7.189).4

There

are,

then,

two

groups:

elders

or sceptre-holding

princes on the one hand, and young princes on the other.

The distinction

is not purely a matter of age, for Diomedes, who is young enough to be Nestor's youngest son (IX.57-8), is reckoned among the elders. The reason, I think, is that, regardless of his age, Diomedes happens to be the oldest living man in his family.5 The distinction between the two groups thus is not one of age, but of ‘seniority’ within the family. The head of the household ‘young’ princes. §

is an elder;

other

members

of the family are

As for the number of princely families in a community, we may base an estimate on what we are told about the Kephallenians. Their fleet consists of 12 ships (11.637; 9.159) with crews of 52 men. If every Kephallenian

household

is represented

by

on

average

one

Appendix One), this adds up to a population of 624 families. are told that “all those who rule over Ithaka" (1.247

man

(see

Now, we

= 16.124) and “all

the best men who have power over the islands" (1.245 = 16.122= 19.130) are trying to ruin Odysseus' family. The numbers given are : 12 from Ithaka, 20 from Zakynthos and 24 from Same (16.249-51). The claim

that these comprise “all” rulers is a rhetorical exaggeration, for in Ithaka alone there are at least four men of high status who remain on Odysseus’ side.”

So if we

add to the 56 families hostile to Odysseus,

say, a

maximum of about half as many again which support him, we end up with an elite of at most 84 out of 624 families, or just under 12% of the population.

Obviously this is a highly unreliable computation, but it may

give us some idea of the proportions the poet had in mind. ®

2. SYMBOLIC AND PROCEDURAL FUNCTIONS OF THE SCEPTRE Several kinds of sceptre (skeptron) feature in the epics, but not, I think, as many as is generally believed. First of all, skeptron or skepanion can mean a plain staff used as a walking stick - perhaps

simply a branch cut from a tree.” Secondly, priests and seers carry skeptra, presumably as a badge of status. The staff held by the famous seer Teiresias is made of, or decorated with, gold (11.91), as is that of Apolio's priest Khryses, which in addition is decorated with "the

277

woollen

bands

of Apollo”

(1.14-5,

28,

374).

Thirdly,

and

I believe

lastly, there are the skeptra which are carried by princes and symbolise princely power. Agamemnon, for one, has a golden sceptre (11.268), "to carry, to rule over many islands and all Argos” (II.107-8), and he is reminded that “you are ruler over many men, and Zeus has entrusted

you with the sceptre..., so that you may be prince to them" (IX.97-9; cf. 11.204-6). 19 Three further kinds of sceptre are commonly discerned : the staff held by public speakers, the judge's staff, and the herald's staff.!! I shall argue that all three are in fact identical with the prince's sceptre. To begin with, it must be noted that not only monarchs, but all heads

of princely families appear to own sceptres, for at least twelve, and probably more, Phaiakian basileis are called “sceptre-bearing princes” (8.41,47). 12 Next, princes’ sceptres are associated with the administration of law. "Zeus has entrusted [Agamemnon] with the sceptre and laws" (themistes, IX.98-9; cf. 11.205-6). The people "will complete shining law-sessions [fhemistes] under [Akhilleus’] sceptre* (IX. 156,298; cf. 11.569-71). It seems, then, that each princely family owns a sceptre which symbolises its power to rule, and in particular its power to judge.

With this in mind, we may turn to the role of the sceptre in trials. The so-called trial-scene on the shield of Akhilleus depicts a crowd of people who have gathered to cheer on one or other of the litigants. "And heralds held back the crowd. The elders sat on polished stone [benches] in a sacred circle and held in their hands the scepters of/from the heralds [skeptra kerukon, gen. pl.]... Then, with these [sceptres], they jumped up and gave their judgements in tum.” (XVIII.503-6)

There

are two ways

of explaining

the procedure.

The

sceptres

in

question might belong to the heralds, in which case the elders who wished to speak would ‘borrow’ a sceptre from one of the heralds to hold while delivering judgement. Alternatively, the sceptres might belong to the elders, in which case the sceptres would be carried by the elders’ private heralds who would hand them to their masters whenever the latter wish to deliver their judgements. 3 The advantage of this second interpretation, of course, is that, if the princes hold their own sceptres while judging, it is clear why princely sceptres are associated

278

with the power to judge. By contrast, this association would be hard to understand if the judges' sceptres belonged to the heralds.

An important piece of evidence is a passage in which Akhilleus, speaking in a meeting of the assembly, suddenly swears an oath "by this sceptre” (1.234). It is a sceptre of wood, decorated with golden studs (1.234-7, 246), and he has apparently been holding it, although we had

not previously been told so.

Similarly, Agamemnon

at the end of a

meeting raises "the sceptre” to swear an oath (VII.411-2). In another meeting Hektor is asked to raise "the sceptre" and swear to keep a promise; he "took the sceptre in his hands and made an oath" (X.321,

328). When Akhilleus swears, he says of the sceptre which he is holding that "trial-attending (dikaspoloi] Akhaians hold it in their hands, men who uphold the laws for Zeus; it [i.e. the sceptre] shall be a great

oath" (1.237-9). This remark shows that one and the same sceptre is used in law-sessions and in assemblies. So, if the princes in the trialscene hold their own sceptres, they hold them in the assembly, too.

this

is certainly

true

of Agamemnon,

who

addresses

the

And

assembly

"leaning on" his ancestral sceptre, not on a herald's or public speaker's

staff (11.100-1, 109). The problem with this interpretation is that Akhilleus appears to be saying that the sceptre he is holding is also held by other princes, when

they sit in judgement. It would follow that in law-sessions and assemblies there is only one sceptre, which is held by the speakers in turn. And there are two further passages which could be taken to show that this was indeed the normal procedure in assemblies : Menelaos and Telemakhos are both offered a sceptre by a herald when they rise to make a speech (XXIII.566-9 and 2.37-8). A widely accepted theory is that there is a single sceptre, passed by a herald from speaker to speaker in order to indicate who has the floor (e.g. Finley 1977: 80). One objection against this theory is the plural “sceptres" in the trialscene, which can only be explained away by stretching the meaning of the passage quite far (see n.13). Another objection is that Agamemnon does not take a sceptre from a herald, but holds his own. Nor does the theory account for the connection between the princely sceptre and the administration of justice. Finally, as Mondi (1980: 207-8) has pointed out, it is odd that there is so little evidence for this practice of handing over the sceptre. There is no mention of the sceptre being returned to the herald, or of it being passed on to the next speaker; twice it is thrown

279

down (1.245-6; 2.80-1), but nothing is said about it being picked up for,

or by, the next man to speak.

In fact, the procedure is only attested -

implicitly, if at all - in the three passages cited above. If the procedure were customary, one might have expected a standard verse or formula to

describe it. A closer look at the Menelaos- and Telemakhos-passages shows that they are not solid evidence for the practice. “Menelaos stood up among them... A herald put a sceptre in his hands and called for the Argives to be silent. Then [Menelaos] spoke...” (XXIII.566-9). This could be a public herald handing Menelaos a public sceptre, but it could equally well be Menelaos' personal herald handing him his own princely sceptre. Note that Menelaos has just finished competing in a chariot race and would thus have had every reason to let a herald hold his sceptre for him. Telemakhos' case is a little more complicated. The question is here whether or not Telemakhos has access to a sceptre of his own : did Odysseus take the family sceptre with him to Troy, or did he leave it behind ? If the poet assumed that he left it, the reference to the herald placing a sceptre in Telemakhos' hands might mark the dramatic moment when he first takes up his father's sceptre in public, just as he had earlier for the first time in a formal meeting taken his father's seat among the elders (2.14). Alternatively, if the poet assumed that Odysseus had taken his sceptre abroad, the passage might indicate ἃ special arrangement rather than a common practice : a young man who, due to circumstances, happens not to have his own sceptre, is given one by a public herald.'4 In either case, the passage can be explained satisfactorily without reference to a practice of passing round a public sceptre. 15

This leaves us with a single piece of evidence

for this custom -

Akhilleus' comment on the sceptre - and even this is open to a different interpretation. When he swears "by this sceptre", Akhilleus may be taking an oath on 'the princely sceptre‘ in the abstract, rather than merely on the concrete sceptre he is holding - just as one might put one's hand on a particular copy of the Bible in order to swear on The Bible as

an abstract entity.

Certainly,

as we

have

seen,

swearing

'by this

sceptre', 1.6. the princely sceptre as opposed to the priestly one or the

common

walking-stick,

common

form of taking an oath : Agamemnon

asked to do the same.

is not an idiosyncracy

of Akhilleus’,

but a

does it, and Hektor

is

An oath 'by the sceptre' as an abstraction is thus

280

conceivable. If that is granted, it becomes possible to interpret Akhilleus' subsequent remarks as referring to princely sceptres at large,

not merely to the sceptre in his hand. When he says that 'it' was once cut from a tree and is now held by princes sitting in judgement, he might be giving a generic description of a sceptre; in other words, he might be

saying, not that a single sceptre is shared by the princes, but that the sceptre is an object always carried by princes when they act as judges. In the same way, one might say of the Bible that ‘people swear on this book in courts throughout the country’, without, of course, implying that

they all swear on the same copy of it. It is thus possible that Akhilleus

is simply holding his own

family

sceptre, and that the princes he is referring to are envisaged as each holding their own family sceptres as well. The advantage of this interpretation is that it meets with none of the objections raised above, and that it produces a simple and consistent picture of the role of the sceptre in Homeric society. Instead of separate princes’, judges’ and public

speakers’

sceptres,

there

are

only

the sceptres

owned

by

the

princely families. Such sceptres symbolise the power of the family and are carried by its representatives in assemblies and courts of law. 16

281

APPENDIX THREE

MONARCHS,

DYNASTIES,

TEMENEA

1. KINGS VERSUS BIG MEN No-one used to have any hesitation in Homeric community a king. He was seen important governmental roles, including commander-in-chief. Recently, however,

fails to present

a picture of a ‘proper’

calling the ruling prince of a as a hereditary monarch with those of supreme judge and it has been argued that Homer

king,

because

he does

not

‘understand’ monarchy as an institution (Geddes 1984: 28-36; Dickinson

1986: 33-4; Sealey 1990: 134).

Others believe that Homer portrays a

ruler who is a kind of monarch, but not what we would call a king (Andreev 1979b: 382-3; Halverson 1985: 129-36; 1986: 119-21; Rihll 1986; forthcoming). And it has even been said that Homer does not depict monarchs at all (Drews 1983: 100-15). The traditional view was based more on general assumptions about kingship than on a close reading of the texts, and recent scholarship is therefore in principle quite right to challenge it. Yet it seems to me that the older view is largely correct, and that 'king' is not too inappropriate a title for Homeric rulers, after all. Two objections have been advanced against the traditional view. One is that, although monarchs are mentioned, there is no meaningful role for them in the Homeric system of government. This argument is untenable.

A Homeric monarch may not fulfil the same roles as, say, the kings of European history, but, as Carlier (1984:

he does fulfil a number described above (pp.32-6).

of essential

137-230) has shown in detail,

functions.

These

The second objection is that the position of a Homeric

hereditary and not even institutionalised.

have

been

ruler is not

In the Homeric world, it is

argued, a man gradually builds up an informal, personal position of power, influence and prestige, until the whole community de facto

282

acknowledges that he has established himself as the local big man. It could be a matter of earning “others' respect... through his just, intelligent, and successful actions and decisions", so that he, "as his reputation grows... silently and unobtrusively "graduates' to become known as a basileus" (Rihil 1986: 91). Alternatively, it could be “a position based above all on wealth... and secondarily on personal ability and charisma", attaining which is “a matter of ability, enterprise, and chance” (Halverson 1986: 121). Or again, it could be "an achieved

status... based on shifting pyramids of personal followers" (Donlan 1989a: 25). ! Whichever of these one chooses, it is a position dependent on personal resources. One cannot strictly inherit or transfer it. One may lose it to others as they become more respected or powerful than oneself. At times, no single prince may emerge as sufficiently dominant

to occupy the status of ruler at all. The traditional view of Homeric kings, by contrast, implies that there is in the community a permanent, institutional and even constitutional, status of ruler, which a man cannot create for himself but which he must

either inherit, or be offered, or usurp by force. 2 To my mind, the tales of the monarchs of Troy, Lykia, Mykenai and Ithaka, as told by Homer, show that there is such an institutional status. The Dynasty of Dardanos Meeting Akhilleus in battle, Aineias recites his “descent and blood” (XX.213-241) before joining combat, thus providing us with a history of the

ruling dynasty.

Before the city was built, Dardanos, son of Zeus, founded a

community occupying the slopes of Mt. Ida. Dardanos had a son, prince Erikhthonios (XX.219). His son was Tros, “ruler over the Trojans” (XX.230).

With

him,

the line of descent

split:

one

of Tros'

sons

was

Assarakos, who begat Kapys, who begat Ankhises, who begat Aineias. Tros' other son was Ilos; elsewhere, Ilos is called "an elder of the people (demogeron)

of

ancient

times"

(X1.372),

and

his

great

burial-mound

remained conspicuous on the Trojan plain. Ilos’ son was Laomedon, who employed Poseidon and Apollo to build a wall round the city, and Herakles to rid Troy of an amphibious monster (V.635-51; VII.952-3; XX.144-8; XXI.441-57). Evidently, he too was ruler of the Trojans. Laomedon's son Priamos rules during the Trojan War, and he and his brothers, Lampos,

Klytios and Hiketaon, are referred to as “elders of the people" (III.146-9). Priamos has fifty sons and twelve daughters. His brothers have children too (XV .419-28, 525-59, 573-84).

283

Akhilleus mocks Aineias, asking aloud what makes Aineias risk his life against a superior opponent.

Is he perhaps “hoping to rule the Trojans 7"

"But even if you were to kill me, Priamos will not for that reason put the privilege in your hands,

for he has children, and he is of sound mind,

not

foolish” (XX. 178-83). Aineias, however, is destined to rule Troy after all. The gods intervene to save him from Akhilleus, because “it is his fate to escape, so that the family of Dardanos shall not be without seed and disappear without trace... For

Zeus has already begun to hate the family of Priamos, and now the force of Aineias is to rule over the Trojans,

(XX.302-8).

and

so are his children's children”

Akhilleus' sneer at Aineias shows that a Trojan cannot become a ruling prince simply by becoming more popular or personally influential than Priamos. Aineias can only rule the Trojans if the reigning monarch decides to transfer this ‘privilege’ to him. In principle Priamos can

apparently hand over power when he likes and to whom he likes.

In

practice, however, his options are limited. If he has children, he will choose one of his sons to succeed. To do otherwise is regarded as a mark of senility. The norm is thus for the monarchy to be inherited by a member of the ruler's family, though not necessarily his eldest son (cf. Redfield 1976: 112-13; Carlier 1984: 187-90). Presumably only when he has no sons would a ruler transfer his position to a man of particular

merit, such as Aineias. In the legendary history of Troy, the norm of succession from father to son seems to have started even before the city itself existed, and to have

been maintained over six generations, until interrupted by the death in war of the ruler and all his nearest kin. Even then the gods are concerned that the same family should continue to rule, and ensure that a distant relative survives to take power. The succession from father to son then begins again and continues into the distant future. The Princes of Lykia Glaukos is another warrior to recite his “descent and blood” before combat (VI.150-211). He begins with Sisyphos, who begat Glaukos, who begat

Bellerophontes.

These were, he says, “by far the best men in Ephyre”

(VI.209-10). Bellerophontes, however, was exiled to Lykia by the ruler of Argos (see p. 38 above). After many trials, the ruler of Lykia realised that Bellerophontes was "a strong descendant of a god”. "He kept him there, gave him his daughter and gave him half of all princely honour” (VI. 191-3).

284 Then Bellerophontes begat a son, Hippolokhos, and a daughter, Laodameia.

Glaukos is Hippolokhos’ son. Laodameia bore a son, Sarpedon. The Iliad presents both Sarpedon and Glaukos as leaders of the Lykian army and “princes {who} govern over Lykia” (XT1.318-9), but Sarpedon is probably the senior ruler, for it is he who leads in battle and "protected Lykia with his judgements and his strength” (XVI.542).

The situation here is far less clear-cut than in Troy, but one salient point is that the monarch is able to give away half his ‘honour’. As pointed out on p.39 above, this notion recurs in a sudden offer of Akhilleus' to his old tutor Phoinix : "Be my equal as prince and carn half

the honour" (IX.616).

I take it that ‘half the position of ruler’ means

control over (roughly) half the ruler's subjects and territory. The Lykian ruler and Akhilleus, like Priamos, then, are able to transfer their position

to another.

The

physical prowess,

Lykian chooses but why

Bellerophontes

for his outstanding

he chooses to give it to an outsider at all,

remains a matter of speculation.

It would be consistent with Trojan

practice if he did so because he had no sons. 3 In any case, the marriage between Bellerophontes and the prince's daughter creates a family-bond between the present ruler and the next, and for at least two generations after Bellerophontes, his descendants rule, although the succession apparently does not run simply from father

to son. The Sceptre of Pelops Agamemnon,

ruler of Mykenai,

owns

an

"ancestral

sceptre,

imperishable" (11.46), made by Hephaistos, the divine smith.

forever

Its original

owner was Pelops, who had been given it by Zeus, via Hermes, the divine messenger. "And Pelops in tum gave it to Atreus, shepherd of the people;

Atreus, dying, left it to Thyestes, owner of many sheep, and Thyestes in tum left it to Agamemnon" (II.100-8). Homer does not give the story behind the transmission of this sceptre, but presumably its outlines would have been well-known to the audience. Common to all versions of the tale is that Atreus and Thyestes were brothers who both wanted to rule, and both for a

time achieved their goal by violence and trickery.

This is reflected in the

choice of words : Pelops gives the sceptre to his son Atreus, but when Atreus dies it is merely left to his enemy, and again it is left, not given, by Thyestes to his late enemy's son, Agamemnon. ὁ

The family history is taken up in the Odyssey.

While Agamemnon is at

Troy, his wife Klytaimnestra is seduced by the son of Thyestes, Aigisthos, who takes her to his own house (3.262-75). Aigisthos employs a man to

285 keep a permanent look-out, so that he has advance warning of return, and is able to prepare an ambush of twenty men, Agamemnon and all his companions (4.512-37; 11.387-9). joins in and kills the concubine brought by Agamemnon from 26).

“For seven years Aigisthos ruled Mykenai,

Agamemnon's who slaughter Klytaimnestra Troy (11.409-

rich in gold, having killed

the son of Atreus, and he subjected the people to himself. In the eighth year, to his misfortune, Orestes [Agamemnon's son], back from Athens, came to him and killed the murderer of his father" (3.304-7).

The struggle for power in Mykenai can only be understood on the assumption that there is a formal monarchy. Firstly, Pelops' sceptre would

not

pass

back

and

forth

between

enemies,

unless

these

were

competing for a specific status that is symbolised by it, rather than each building up for himself a position of informal, personal power, and striving to gain popular recognition. Secondly, the fact that Aigisthos does not begin to reign until he has killed Agamemnon5, shows that, however powerful he is, he cannot become ruler of Mykenai while Agamemnon lives. Not even if he marries Agamemnon's wife, and regardless of whether Agamemnon is away or at home. If one cannot attain the position of monarch without first eliminating the incumbent,

this position must be a formalised one. In the legendary history of Mykenai

violent usurpation

is more

common than peaceful succession, yet it is to be noted that power remains within a narrow circle of kin for three generations (or four, counting Orestes). The Arkeisiads and Their Enemies

"Zeus made us a family of only sons”, says Telemakhos, "Arkeisios begat Laertes as his only son, and he as father in turn begat only Odysseus, and

Odysseus begat only me and left me behind in his house” (16.117-120).

We

are not told what Arkeisios’ status was, but Laertes ruled the Kephallenians

(24.378; i.e. the people of Ithaka and nearby islands) and so did Odysseus. It is ordained by Zeus that Odysseus "must be basileus for ever" (24.483).

Indeed, it is foretold that his family will be "forever the more powerful” in Ithaka (15.533-4). For a time,

however,

the rule of the Arkeisiads

is under threat,

when

Odysseus fails to come home after the Trojan war. Odysseus himself is the first to begin worrying. Three years after the war, he meets the ghost of his mother in the Underworld, and asks: "Tell me about the father and son I have left behind. Is my privilege still with them, or does some other man already have it, and do they say that I will retum no more 7" (11.174-6).

286 She reassures him that no-one has taken his place yet. where he is, in the country, and does not go down

His father “stays

to town" (187-8), but

Odysseus 'privilege' remains with Telemakhos, still a child at the time. After another four years of absence, men from almost every ruling family in the region begin to court Odysseus' wife, Penelope.

They keep this up for

three years, taking their meals daily at Odysseus’ house and eating their way through his wealth (2.50-9, 89-110). Two of them, at least, Eurymakhos and Antinoos, aim to take Odysseus’ place as ruler of Ithaka. Telemakhos fears

for his property and his life (1.250-1).

Yet he does nothing about the suitors‘

transgressions. When the Odyssey picks up the story, Telemakhos is about twenty years old, and, inspired by a visit from Athena, suddenly takes action. He tells the

suitors that he wants them out of his house.

They "bite their lips", amazed at

his new-found courage. Antinoos exclaims: "May Zeus never make you basileus in Ithaka, which is your patrimony by birth” (1.386-7). Telemakhos answers that he might like to rule, but is nevertheless prepared to let another man take power. “But I shall be master of our house", he adds (1.388-97).

Next day, he calls a meeting of the people to denounce the suitors publicly. His speech has little practical effect.

Next, he gets himself a ship and a crew

of twenty of the best men in Ithaka and sails to Pylos in search of news about his father. This worries the suitors, who organise an ambush of twenty men to kill him on his way back (4.667-72). When the attempt fails, a new ambush is proposed at once, but postponed in order to consult the will of the gods, “for it is a fearsome thing to kill the offspring of a prince” (16.363406).

Next day, the suitors again plan an ambush,

account of a bad omen (20.241-7). That same day, Odysseus suddenly Telemakhos

relatives,

revenge. intervene. is restored (24.483-6,

and

two

loyal

led by Antinoos'

servants,

father,

and again put it off, on

reappears.

he kills all

108

With suitors.

realise what has happened,

the

help

of

When

their

they

want

They seek out Odysseus, and attack. Before long, the gods Both sides are made to stop fighting and swear an oath. Odysseus to power, and all live in friendship, peace and plenty “as before” 546-7).

Among the Kephallenians, the position of monarch is hereditary.

Not

only are the Arkeisiads destined to remain in power forever, but even the family’s worst enemy accepts that it is their birth-right to rule. Yet it is in Ithaka alone that we find a struggle for power between princely families, and it is the situation in Ithaka which has been most cited in

evidence by those who argue that there are no real kings in the heroic world. 6 The Ithakan story will have to be discussed at length in order to explain what exactly it tells us about the nature of Homeric monarchy.

287

In Ithaka, as in Mykenai, only the ruler's creates a vacuum of power. Odysseus can ‘privilege’, as family property, will in his and son, and will not pass into anyone

presumed dead.

death, not his mere absence, take it for granted that the absence 'be with’ his father else's hands unless he is

But why does Odysseus think that another family is

likely to take power when he is no longer expected to return? One might have thought that Telemakhos, the legitimate heir, would succeed to the monarchy, even if he is only thirteen years old. The answer is suggested by Antinoos' proposal to kill Telemakhos. He says that they should assassinate him “before he reaches full adulthood" (4.668). In combination with his expressed wish that Telemakhos may never inherit Odysseus’ position, this strongly hints that Telemakhos cannot inherit until he becomes an adult.

Now, all the signs are that, in Homeric society, a young man does not automatically attain adulthood on reaching a certain age, but must gain recognition as an adult by displaying the appropriate behaviour. Before Athena's inspiring visit, Telemakhos was a child. “His mother was not accustomed to allow him to give orders to the slave-women", because he was too young (22.426-7). He did “childish things” (1.296-7), such as remaining passive in the face of the suitors’ transgressions, and "daydreaming about his fine father - that he might someday come back... and

himself have the honour and be master of his property” (1.113-18; 2.303-5). After the visit, he changes. He announces that he is no longer a child (2.313-16; 18.228-9), insists on being treated as master of house, and begins ordering his mother about. She is as surprised as the suitors are a few minutes later, when he starts talking back to them, but she

accepts his authority (1.345-61).7 It is in response to these sudden first signs of adult behaviour that the question of who is to succeed Odysseus is first mentioned. Telemakhos' taking charge of his father's property thus is seen as a first step towards his assuming power in the community. Telemakhos, to protect himself, denies that he wants to take that next step (‘Let someone else rule’), but the following day, in summoning the assembly - and taking his father's seat in the agora (2.14) - his actions belie his words. It would seem that a legitimate heir to the sceptre can only take power

if he is able and willing to assert his claim

to rule.

Telemakhos

therefore could not become the prince of Ithaka at the age of thirteen, or

even at seventeen, when the suitors began their plotting.

For the same

288 reason, power could not have reverted to Laertes.

He was too old.

It

was presumably because of age that he had already abdicated in favour

of his son. Mentor,

When Odysseus sailed for Troy, he asked an old friend,

to look after his household

"the old man”

(2.225-7).

for him,

taking instructions from

Even at the time, Laertes was apparently

unable to run the household actively, though nominally he was in charge.

So he would hardly have been able to rule the community.

And when

later he leaves town altogether and settles on one of his farms, there remains no doubt at all that he is unwilling to assert any claim to power

he might possess. With Odysseus presumed dead, Telemakhos too young,

Laertes too

old, and - in "a family of only sons” - no brothers, uncles or nephews available to succeed instead, there is a total power-vacuum. Even so, the Arkeisiads' right to the monarchy is respected for no less

than

seven

years

after

Odysseus'

disappearance.

Then

Kephallenian princés gradually begin to stake their claims.

not

by

ignoring

Odysseus'

powerless

heir

and

the

other

They do so,

competing

among

themselves to become the biggest man around, but by attacking Telemakhos. They get at him indirectly, through courting his mother. The traditional notion that they court Penelope because whomever she chooses to wed will be the new monarch, is mistaken.® This view would give her a surprising amount of power, and in any case is not borne out

by the evidence. In one passage Telemakhos bitterly describes Eurymakhos as “the one most determined to marry my mother and to hold the privilege of Odysseus” (15.521-2). This is the only place in the whole of the Odyssey to suggest a connection between the two.

But even

these verses really only say that the suitors want power and Penelope, not that they want power through Penelope. Moreover, there are three passages which show that the suitors do not seek to marry Penelope in order to become the new prince.

Firstly, Antinoos tells his fellow-suitors that, if they shrink back from murdering Telemakhos and decide to let him “live and have all his patrimony” - which as we have seen includes his right to rule - "then let

us no longer gather here to eat his property..., but let each man court her from his own home, trying to win her with a bride-price" (16.387-91). He is assuming that, even if they give up their designs on power, the other suitors will still want to marry Penelope. A not unimportant motive is likely to be physical attraction. Certainly, when she has made

289

a brief appearance before her suitors, they all noisily "prayed that they might lie beside her in bed" (1.365-6; 18.212-13). Secondly, Antinoos himself is accused of having become the suitors' ringleader

"not

because

he

needed

or

wanted

such

a marriage,

but

because he had other plans... : he hoped to be himself basileus over the people of Ithaka" (22.48-53). Antinoos thus differs from the other suitors in that he does not want to marry Penelope for her own sake.

And although he does court her, she is apparently not essential to his ‘other plans’.

Thirdly,

Telemakhos

says that any of the other Ithakan princes,

"young and old” (1.395), may take Odysseus' place as ruler.

Since the

suitors are described as "the sons of those men who are the best here” (2.51), they are all young princes. So there are no old princes among those who court Penelope, and yet Telemakhos thinks that an old man might replace Odysseus. Obviously, if neither Antinoos nor the old princes need to marry Penelope, it cannot be her choice of husband that decides the successionissue. Thus those who court Penelope are not expecting any gain from the marriage as such, other than a beautiful wife of a good family, the prestige of having beaten more than a hundred rivals for her hand, and perhaps a tenuous family-connection with the previous ruler. ? So how does courting Penelope further Antinoos' and others’ ambitions to rule? Since even a legitimate heir to the monarchy can

only rule if he is able and willing to lay claim to the sceptre, the suitors do not actually need to kill Telemakhos in order to usurp his rights, if they can somehow deter him from asserting himself. The strategy they pursue successfully for three years is to exploit the customs of

courtship. 1% Normally, men stay at home and make bride-price offers to the prospective wife's family. But the suitors use the fact that Penelope fails to give them an outright ‘yes' or ‘no’, as an excuse for paying her

daily visits and consuming huge quantities of food and drink at her expense. They argue that this will keep her under pressure and force her to come to a decision (2.87-126). The effect of their intimidating continual presence in his house is to prevent Telemakhos from claiming his property, let alone the monarchy.

So long as Telemakhos does nothing but day-dream, the suitors need only to keep bullying him to ensure that Ithaka is left without a legitimate ruler. When he first fights back, there is a crisis. They ‘bite their lips’,

290 and in the assembly first defend themselves, then make threats against Telemakhos' few friends. But when there appears to be no popular support for Telemakhos, they relax. Antinoos, “laughing, grabbed his hand, and said : 'Telemakhos, you great orator, let go your anger. Let there be no more hostile deed or word brewing in your heart, but come, let us eat and drink, just as it used to be" (2.301-5). All that the suitors want at this stage, then, is to return to the original plan of keeping Telemakhos weak and resigned to his fate. There is no question of assassinating him, 11 They intend to pursue this strategy for as long as necessary. It is expected that they will continue to eat at Telemakhos' expense, even if Penelope should suddenly decide to marry, and leave them without an

excuse for visiting (1.289-96). 12 Presumably, when Odysseus’ property runs out, or even earlier, the moment will come when it is evident to all

Ithakans that Telemakhos is never going to stake his claim, and at that point the other princes will begin to compete among themselves for his position.

But until then, the monarchy is not at stake.

It becomes less and less

likely that Telemakhos will in fact succeed, but he is still regarded as the

legitimate heir.

Only his property is in immediate danger.

That explains

why the succession-issue is so rarely mentioned in the Odyssey. In fact, it only crops up in the three passages discussed earlier, while the damage

done by the suitors to Odysseus’ property and their behaviour towards his wife and maids are the subject of countless complaints. Most remarkably, the monarchy is not mentioned by anyone at all during the meeting of the assembly in which Telemakhos tries to gain popular support. Asked at the outset what matter of public concern he wants to bring before the people, he answers that it is "nothing public...

but a matter that concerns myself" (2.44-5). all about the loss of property he has suffered.

The subsequent debate is The people feel sorry for

him, but do not take action, because even though they outnumber the suitors, they find it “hard to fight about a meal" (2.244-5). Some have

concluded that in Homer the position of monarch is of little importance and of no public interest.45 I would rather conclude that no-one denounces the suitors for trying to abrogate the Arkeisiads' right to rule,

because as yet the suitors have done nothing that amounts to an overt, direct coup.

29]

Still, one might argue that, if the people cannot even be bothered to protect the property of their future ruler, the monarchy cannot have meant much to them. However, it is significant that the poet hints that popular intervention could have been a serious threat to the suitors. Twice he has someone ask Telemakhos : "Tell me, do you let yourself be oppressed without resistance, or do the people of the land hate you 7"

(3.214-15; 16.95-6).

Clearly, the assumption is that one would expect

the people to support someone in Telemakhos' position, unless they have specific reasons to be hostile to him. Perhaps the same expectation is subtly reflected in the suitors' response to developments. I have already

mentioned their nervous reaction to Telemakhos' assertiveness and to the prospect of facing a popular assembly. When the meeting has come to nothing, Telemakhos continues to display his anger, but now the suitors are no longer disturbed. Instead, Antinoos laughs and the others joke

about Telemakhos' hostility and about how ‘unfortunate’ it would be if he were to have an ‘accident’ (2.323-36).

indicates,

I think,

that they

had

been

The change in their attitude

genuinely

worried

possibility that he might get the people of Ithaka on his side. fears prove unfounded, they regain confidence.

about

the

When these

The reason why the people of Ithaka do not intervene in the conflict over Odysseus’ wife and property is that the plot of the Odyssey does not allow such an intervention. The fact that the poet nevertheless hints at the likelihood of popular action suggests that to his mind this would have been the normal course of events, and that he felt unable to ignore it. 14 The next development changes the entire situation. Telemakhos with

twenty

companions

secretly leaves

the country,

and

the suitors

are

impressed with his ability to organise and his readiness to take risks (4.658-68). It also occurs to them that he might be trying to find help abroad for a counter-offensive (2.325-7). Now they change strategy and decide to kill him. That does constitute a direct attack on the monarchy. So when their assassination-attempt fails, the suitors are even more worried than before about the reaction of the people of Ithaka, who “are no longer at all well-disposed to us". They expect Telemakhos to denounce them before the people at once, and believe that "they will not

approve when they hear of evil deeds. If only they do not harm us and drive us out of our country, so that we will find ourselves in another land" (16.375-82). But the people never find out about the failed coup.

292

Telemakhos does not call an assembly, for he now knows that his father has returned and is ready to take his own revenge. What would have happened if the Kephallenian princes had succeeded in killing Telemakhos ? Their plans deal only with the property. “Let us kill him... and we may have his livelihood and property and divide it

fairly amongst ourselves, while we may give the house to his mother and whoever marries her" (16.383-6; cf. 2.334-6). Nothing about the monarchy. It seems likely enough that at this stage a form of big man competition

would have come into its own.

As shown in Chapter Three, princes

would always be striving to gain and maintain informal power, seeking to acquire the highest reputation, the greatest wealth, and the largest

number

of friends.

Presumably

the

man

most

successful

in such

struggles for informal power would have laid claim to formal monarchical power after the death of Telemakhos. Perhaps the man who got Penelope would have the edge, on account of his proven superiority over his rivals in courting, and his distant link to Odysseus. Or the man

most

responsible

for the death of Telemakhos

position to take over.

might be in the best

We can only guess.

The important point is that the monarchy in Ithaka is not normally or commonly attained through a contest for power between princely families. There is one family which possesses a hereditary right to rule.

This right is never questioned and fully respected for seven years after the reigning monarch's disappearance.

Even then it might not have been

taken away from the ruling family but for the fact that there is only one potential ruler left alive among them. These unusual circumstances offer a chance of creating a power-vacuum by eliminating a single man. It is

only because the younger princes cautiously exploit this rare opportunity, that there is a prospect of a general contest for the position of monarch. In conclusion, it may be said that Homer's account of the histories of these four dynasties presupposes an institutionalised, hereditary monarchy. It is not an informal position of power that a man may carve out for himself within a community - as indicated by the fact that no-one ᾿ς can challenge for the position without eliminating the incumbent and taking the sceptre that symbolises his status.

The status is regarded as

family-property and the acting head of the family can dispose of all, or

293 part, of it as he sees fit. The norm is for him to hand it on to one of his sons; hence the son of a prince may regard the position as part of his inheritance. The ideal appears to be for a single family to retain the

monarchy for all time.

That, at any rate, is the situation favoured by

Zeus at Troy and Ithaka.

The monarchy is of sufficient importance to the community for the people at large to be concerned with its preservation. Although the attitude of the people of Mykenai to Aigisthos' take-over is not specified

in the brief references to these events, and although the story-line of the Odyssey has no room for an intervention by the community, it is made clear that collective popular action is a distinct possibility. The perpetrators of a failed coup may expect to be exiled in punishment.

That having been said, it must be pointed out that Homeric 'kingship' has several characteristic features that set it apart from other kinds of monarchy. 15 One such peculiarity is that the reigning prince is in principle free to choose when and to whom he transfers his power. He may hold on to it as long as Nestor of Pylos, who ruled for "three generations” (3.245), or he may relinquish it as early as Laertes did. He may appoint the eldest of his sons to succeed, but it seems that he might

well pick a younger one.

If there are no sons, he is free to choose.

Here, an element of merit comes into play, alongside birth. A ruler might decide to hand over to the most capable among his sons, relatives,

or outside candidates. A second characteristic is that, although birth-right to the monarchy is essential,

it is not enough

by

itself.

The

legitimate

heir

must,

like

Telemakhos, actively claim his right; it is not automatically granted to him. This is where an element of power comes into play, alongside birth. Probably a monarch does not need to fight continually against contenders for his position: legitimate claims are _ generally acknowledged and a fairly small effort may be enough to safeguard them (see p. 151). Yet the effort has to be made, and there can therefore be no obedience to child-kings or mad monarchs in the Homeric world. A final characteristic is that the ruler must exercise his rights in

person.

There is no delegation of power.

There are no regents.

Mentor

looks after Odysseus’ household, but does not take his place as ruler; Agamemnon leaves behind only one man, a singer, to chaperon Klytaimnestra (3.267-71). As a result, in the absence of the prince, his

powers are simply not exercised.

When a prince dies without an adult

294

heir, there is ἃ power-vacuum.

This will last until a son or relative of

the prince grows up and asserts his rights, or, failing that, until some other family somehow manages to acquire the sceptre.

2. THE ROYAL ESTATES “While the king reigned, he... had the use of a separate estate, called a

temenos, which the community placed at his disposal."

These words

appeared in the original British edition (1956) of Finley's The World of Odysseus (p.104). A year later, Finley published an article in Historia,

in which he rejected this interpretation of temenos (1957, pp.147-56), and in a footnote (p.148 n.3) accused himself of using "misleading phraseology"

in the earlier statement.

Nevertheless,

when

a revised

edition of The World of Odysseus appeared twenty years later, the original formulation remained unchanged (1977: 95). Another few years later,

the

Historia-article

was

re-published,

and

this

too

remained

unchanged, except that the self-criticism had disappeared from the footnote - presumably because Finley “deleted from the annotation comments on older publications that seem to me no longer to merit republication” (1981: 212).

In Historia, Finley was primarily concerned to argue that the existence of temenea

in

Homer

does

not

necessarily

imply

the

existence

of

cultivated communal land, and his arguments to that effect (1981: 22730) are strong and have rightly won considerable acceptance (e.g. Donlan 1989b: 133; Carlier 1984: 158 n.92; Deger 1970: n.415 [p.83]). However, he also argued that the semenos was not crown-land, placed at the disposal of the king by the community, but was "a ‘privately

owned’ estate which differed from all other estates solely by the fact that it belonged to a king" (1981: 225). This second argument could well have been dispensed with, since the validity of the first argument does

not depend on it. Since, moreover, it is not easily reconciled with the sources, Finley's own ambivalence about it is not surprising. A survey

of the evidence

suggests

that the widely

accepted

originally adopted by Finley is, after all, the correct one. 16

view

295 (i) The most important evidence relates to the temenos which the Lykians “set aside” (tamon) for Bellerophontes, when he was given ‘half the kingship' by his father-in-law (VI.191-5). Bellerophontes' grandson Sarpedon refers to a

temenos - presumably the same one, passed down by inheritance - in a famous speech to his fellow-ruler Glaukos : "Glaukos,

why are we two honoured above all others in Lykia, with a seat

and meat and more cups, and [why do] all look upon us as if upon gods ? And we possessa great temenos on the banks of the Xanthos... Therefore we must now take our stand among the foremost of the Lykians and face hot battle, so that some Lykian... may speak thus: "It is certainly not without

reputation that our basileis rule over Lykia and eat fat sheep and drink choice sweet wine; no, their prowess is great when they fight among the foremostof

the Lykians" (XII.310-21).

By itself, the fact that Bellerophontes on his accession is given land by the community tells us only that land given by the community could be referred to as a semenos. It is not clear whether the people offer a temenos to him because he is made king, or merely because he is a

recent immigrant in need of land to settle on. But Sarpedon's comments are more informative. He treats the femenos as one of a number of honours granted to him by his subjects, and he feels obligated to the people on account of it. One could argue that Sarpedon has a long

memory and feels indebted to the Lykians for their special generosity to his landless grandfather, but a more likely explanation is that the temenos,

like the ‘seat, meat and wine’, is a standard mark of honour

given to ruling princes. Finley himself accepts this, but argues that the poet here intends to depict a custom peculiar to Lykia, and not found among the Akhaians (1981: 226). That is not impossible, but on the other hand there is nothing to support it either. It is therefore better to avoid special pleading, and conclude that Sarpedon is meant to be expressing a sentiment appropriate to heroic monarchs in general. It follows that all Homeric kings are supposed to have a femenos which they regard as a 'gift' from the community.

The rest of the evidence referring to temenea held by kings is perfectly compatible with this view, but it must be added that it is equally compatible with the view that they are simply private property. (ii) Of two kings, Alkinoos (6.291-4) and the anonymous basileus on the shield of Akhilleus (XVIII.550-60), we are told that they possess a temenos, but we know nothing more about these estates.

296

(iii) A certain Iphition, who is called “a leader of many men” (XX.283) and hence is presumably a ruler, or the son of a ruler, owns a “patrimonial

temenos" (XX.391). This could be private property, but, since kingship is hereditary, it could equally well be crown-property. (iv) Odysseus’ temenos is mentioned twice. Once, when it is said that the dung heaped up outside his court-yard gate is meant to “manure the /emenos* (17.279). One would imagine that all of Odysseus’ lands need manuring, and it is not clear why the poet should wish to single out the crown-lands in this context. But it is, of course, quite possible that he did so. The temenos is also mentioned in the course of Odysseus’ conversation with his mother in the Underworld. When he asks whether anyone has taken over the kingship, she

answers that this has not happened yet and adds that “Telemakhos holds the temenea in comfort (hekelos, 11. 184-5; the plural semenea perhaps indicates

that the temenos as a whole consists of several individual plots of land). This may mean that the temenos will go to whomever succeeds Odysseus as king, and hence that it is crown-property. On the other hand, Odysseus’ mother

may well be thinking of Telemakhos' untroubled enjoyment of his (father's) private property, which is to come to an end a few years later, when the suitors take over the household.

Finley's strongest argument against the notion of temenos as crownland is an argument from silence. He notes that "in the endless talk

about the fate of Odysseus' estate, no one ever mentions his femenos" (1981: 226). But, as we have seen in the previous section, hardly anyone mentions his kingship either. The fact that the succession is not yet at issue may explain why the sernenos is not discussed much. Finley also notes that nothing is said about Agamemnon's temenos when he is murdered, or about the Phaiakians assigning a semenos to the king when

they distribute land in their new settlement (1981: 225-6; 286 n.60).

In

both cases the brevity of the narrative seems to me to account for the

absence of such references. Finley’s argument is weakest in explaining why some estates are called temenea rather than kleroi (‘lots'), which in Homeric and Classical

Greek

is the

normal

word

for private

agricultural

holdings.

His

suggestion - that a private estate is called temenos when it belongs to a king, and kleros when it belongs to anyone else - is untenable, since we also find temenea owned by gods and by men other than monarchs. (v) Two temenea are mentioned which might have been (but in fact are not)

given by the Aitolians to Meleagros (IX.574-80) and by the Trojans to Aineias (XX.185-6) in reward for great services in war - defeating the Kouretes, and killing Akhilleus, respectively. Kingship plays no part in the

297

granting of these estates; indeed, the possibility of awarding land to Aineias is raised immediately after the possibility of his becoming king has been ruled out (XX. 180-4). (vi) Three temenea are mentioned which belong to gods: Zeus (VIII.48), Sperkheios (XXIII.148) and Aphrodite (8.363). These lands each contain an altar to the divinity. (In addition, Pyrasos is metaphorically described as "temenos of Demeter” [11.695-6].)

At the very least, one would have to modify Finley's view and explain temenos as a term used for estates owned by kings, gods, or men of merit, as opposed to ordinary people. However, a comparison of the

various kinds of femenos suggests a different explanation.

An element

common to all three may be that they are the gift of the community to an individual. This is certainly true of the temenea of the Lykian kings and of Meleagros and Aineias; it is almost certainly true of the temenea of

the gods

(although

these might conceivably

have

been dedicated

by

private individuals); and it is probably true of the remenea of the other kings as well (although there is no explicit evidence either way). Kleros could thus refer to a man's regular 'lot' of land, inherited or acquired

privately, whereas semenos could indicate a piece of land assigned to a man (or god) by the community, as a mark of honour. 17 Some support for this interpretation may be found in the analogous pattern of distribution of booty. Here, every man receives an 'allotted' portion, but the "basileis and the best men” receive in addition a socalled prize, which is a mark of honour given to them on behalf of the community (see Appendix Four, section 1). The probable etymology of

the word temenos fits in well with this : its derivation from the verb temnein, 'to cut', as many have noted, suggests that it is somehow a special 'cut' of land. In sum, Sarpedon's comments on his temenos, as well as the probable

meaning of the term temenos itself, imply that a Homeric king does have "the use of a separate estate... which the community placed at his disposal".

The existence of such crown-land confirms that the Homeric

monarchy has an institutional character. 18 References to historical royal domains are rare, but suffice to show

that these existed

in Archaic

Greece.

The

kings

of Kyrene

were

assigned a number of "selected temenea” in a constitutional reform of the mid-sixth century (Herodotos TV.161), and the Spartan kings, too, were

298

given the use of "selected land" (to which, however, the term temenos is

not applied by Xenophon, Constitution of the Spartans XV.3). We have no evidence on Dark Age femenea. In Mycenaean times, the ruler and the lawagetas

of Pylos

each owned

a temenos

(PY

Er 312),

but,

as

Carlier points out, in spite of the continuity of vocabulary, it is unlikely that these estates were regarded as 'gifts' from the community (1984: 63). 19

299

APPENDIX FOUR

BOOTY

: PRIZES AND PORTIONS

1. THE MECHANISM OF DISTRIBUTION "Many fine treasures" come into the hands of Akhilleus and his men

each time they destroy a town near Troy.

"And I", says Akhilleus,

"brought everything and gave it to Agamemnon. He, having stayed behind at the ships, took it, distributed it in small quantities and kept many things" (IX.328-33). Agamemnon, then, has not joined the expeditions led by Akhilleus, but is given all of the profits to distribute, and is able to take the lion's share of plunder every time. Similarly, the aged prince of Pylos, Neleus, leaves it to a band of young men to raid the cattle of the Epeians, but when the raiders return, the booty is collected in the town-square, and it is Neleus who has first choice and

divides the rest among the Pylians - many of whom, as far as one can tell, had stayed at home, too (X1.670-88, 696-709). From this we may infer that the booty captured by a group of warriors

must

be

put

acknowledge,

at

the

even

disposal

of

the

highest-ranking

if he is not the same person

prince

as the leader of the

expedition, and has not been actively involved in the venture. out the plunder combatants. !

among

at least some

of his subjects,

There are two categories of shares in booty.

they

He shares

including

non-

One consists of so-called

gera, generally translated 'prizes' or ‘gifts of honour'.2 Among the things Agamemnon gives away are "gera to the best men and the princes" (IX.334), and among the things he keeps each time is a valuable

geras for himself (1.163-7).3 From the proceeds of one of Akhilleus' expeditions, which seems to have overrun the towns of Thebe, Pedasos and Lyrnessos in one go (see pp.210-11 above), Agamemnon has for his geras the daughter of Khryses.

This one woman apparently constitutes

300

his entire geras, not merely part of it, since he claims that, if he should lose her, he would be "without geras" (1.118-20).4 From the booty of

the same expedition Akhilleus gets Briseis for his geras (T1.689-91), and it is reasonable

to suppose

that she,

too,

represents

received by him in the course of distribution.

the

total geras

Even from the plunder

eventually to be taken from Troy itself, the most valuable gera are not

expected to consist of more than one item. When the city falls, Agamemnon promises Teukros, "I shall put in your hands the first presbeon [=geras] after my own - a tripod, or a pair of horses with a chariot, or a woman" (VIII.289-91). 5

A geras is not the only thing to be had from the plunder.

We find in

Akhilleus' possession an iron discus, a part-silver ornamented lyre, a horse called Pedasos, and the wife of the prince Eetion, all taken from Thebe in the course of the same expedition that brought him his geras Briseis (XXII.826-9; [X.188; XV1.152-3; VI.425-7). These items are

presumably part of the "gold and red bronze and well-girdled women and grey iron” and "all the things that", Akhilleus says, (elakhon, IX.365-7). 6 Similarly, the 'son of Kastor' says :

"fell to me”

"Nine times I led men and ships abroad [from Crete] and each time very many things came into my hands. Out of these I took what I liked [menoeikea - this, one

assumes, refers to the geras he takes as leader] [lankhanon) afterwards” (14.230-3).

and

many

things fell to me

The things that "fall to” a man constitute the second category of share. They are given a name in another passage, where it is said that Neoptolemos receives a geras "and a portion" (moira; 11.534).

‘Portion’ may not be a technical term for this second type of share, but I will adopt it as such in what follows.

Men may thus receive, first, a

geras, next, a ‘portion’. It is important to note that Akhilleus'

greater Kastor, accepts that the

portion appears

to have

far

material value than his geras. It may be the same for the son of who gets "many things" as his portion. Moreover, if one that a geras normally consists of a single item, one must assume seven exceedingly beautiful and highly skilled women chosen by

Agamemnon from the plunder of Lesbos (IX.128-30 = 270-2) are, not a geras, but (part of) a portion. The same must be true of the twenty most

beautiful women, plus shiploads of gold and bronze which Akhilleus will be allowed to pick from the booty, when Troy falls (IX.137-40 = 279-

301

82).

It seems, then, that the poet imagines the most prominent men

receiving great riches as their portion of the proceeds of war, and on top of those a single geras - something precious and perhaps of great

immaterial value, but of far less material worth than the rest of their share. The evidence for the actual mechanism of distribution of either kind of share is somewhat problematic. As for gera, we have already met Akhilleus' statement that it is Agamemnon

who receives the assembled

booty and decides what to keep and what to give away as gera and portions.

Accordingly, he states that his geras Briseis was given to him

by Agamemnon (IX.367-8).

But elsewhere he repeatedly asserts that she

was given by “the Greeks” (1.162; XVI.56; cf. XVIII.444; 1.276,392). 7 Indeed, it is said that Agamemnon himself had received Khryseis from

"the Greeks" (1.366-9).

One man maintains that Agamemnon's quarters

are "full of bronze, and there are many selected women in there, which we Greeks give [him] first of all, whenever we take a town" (T1.226-8). The speaker later adds captive sons of Trojans to his list, and calls these gifts gera (I1.229-31, 236). ® Most of the limited discussion on the distribution of booty has revolved around this point. Felix Moreau (1895: 309-14), A.T. Murray (1917: 187-94) and Walter Donlan (1982a: 158-9) have formulated various, rather vague, compromises in which both the king and the assembly are supposed to exercise some influence over the division of plunder.® The behaviour of the rulers, however, seems to preclude any

influence on the part of their subjects.

A theoretical need for their

consent would be hard to reconcile with, for example, the fact that Agamemnon is able to promise Teukros a geras on the spur of the moment, in the thick of the fight (VIII.289ff.).

A better way of reconciling the evidence is to make two assumptions. First, that, when men are said to have "given" a geras to their leader, this means that they have put the entire booty at his disposal, for him to choose his own geras from.!® This assumption is supported by Akhilleus' contention that the Greeks can give Agamemnon a geras only if there is a "large common store” (1.124). If Agamemnon loses his

original geras after the booty has been divided, a new geras can only be offered if "the men... bring these things back together again" (1.126). He implicitly rules out the possibility of any individual Greek

302

volunteering

to

return

to

Agamemnon

part

of

his

share,

and

the

possibility of Agamemnon himself taking back from an individual some of what has been handed out to him. 11 The reason for this, it seems to me, is that only by taking from a "large common store" can the king exercise his freedom of choice while at the same time preserving the

notion that ultimately his geras is a gift from his men. The second assumption is that, when it is said that men have given gera to subordinate princes, such as Akhilleus and Nestor, this means that the ruler has presented these men with gifts ‘on behalf of the people’. No active involvement of the people need be implied, merely the existence of a notion that Agamemnon's choices represent the choices of the men at large. Such a notion, in fact, surfaces when

Agamemnon decides to withdraw a geras from Akhilleus.

Although no

other Greek shows any sign of actively supporting this course of action, Akhilleus tells the assembly : "you [plural] take away what you gave”

(1.299). In short, when there is booty to be distributed, the king picks a geras for himself and hands out gera of his own choosing to "the best men and the princes”. His dispositions are regarded as expressing the collective

will of all the men involved in the capture of the booty. 12 Concerning the allocation of the portions, we have already seen that Agamemnon again is able to choose his own share of the booty from Lesbos and that he is at liberty to offer Akhilleus a large portion in the future booty from Troy. 3 We further find that Neleus, as ruler of the

Pylians, has first choice of a share in the immense booty captured from Elis by a band of Pylian raiders, and picks "a herd of cattle and a large flock of sheep..., selecting three hundred [animals] plus their shepherds” (X1.696-7). 14 This suggests that the chief has as much freedom in

distributing portions as he has in handing out gera. A possible obstacle to this interpretation is that the verb lankhanein, used by Akhilleus and the son of Kastor to indicate how they acquired their portions, may mean "to obtain by lot". Some have thought,

therefore,

that

portions,

as

opposed

to

gera,

are

distributed,

not

according to the king's preferences, but randomly - by casting lots, for

example. 15 However, the verb may equally well mean simply “to obtain (as one's share)” (cf. LSJ) and it need not have the connotation “by lot”, here.

303 A second possible obstacle is that each of those who participate in the distribution is said to receive an ise, variously translated as an "equal", “fair”, "just" or "proper" share.16 Neleus, so the story goes, gave the

remainder of the booty from Elis "to the people to divide, so that no-one needed to go deprived of an ise share by him" (XI.704-5). And Odysseus says that, when he and his men captured the women and wealth of Ismaros, and again when they managed to rustle Polyphemos' flocks, they “divided them, so that no-one needed to go deprived of an ise share by me” (9.42; 9.549). If we take it that equality of portions is the norm, obviously the chief cannot freely allocate whatever he likes to whomever he likes. There are, however, clear indications that neither the people of Pylos nor the companions of Odysseus do in fact get portions of equal material value. In the case of the Pylians, this follows from the fact that each of them is supposed to receive a share in compensation for previous losses (XI.685-6): surely, as ancient

commentators already noted 17, the size of their shares in the booty ought to vary in proportion to the extent of their losses. And the claim of Odysseus that his men do not go short of their “equal” share clashes with their complaint that they come home "with empty hands", while their leader brings back "many beautiful treasures from Troy, from the plunder” (10.38-42). 18

These data are easily reconciled by assuming that ise in this context means "fair" or "proper". 19 The portions are, as it were, equal, not to one another, but to what the recipient deserves to get. Odysseus’ men, then, apparently disagree with their leader in their assessment of what is proper. That the principle of propriety, rather than that of equality, is supposed to be observed in the division of booty, is further demonstrated

by a remark of Akhilleus' to the effect that "a good man” and "a bad man" ought not to receive an "equal portion" (IX.316-9). 20 The matter will be taken up in the next section.

The evidence, then, does not say that all portions of booty are equal, nor that they are assigned by lot. What it does say is that Agamemnon and Neleus designate portions for themselves and others as they see fit. It further says that Neleus and Odysseus are concerned to give everyone a proper share. And it shows that some of Agamemnon's and Odysseus’ followers feel that their leaders do not, in fact, handle the distribution ‘properly’.

304 Finally, it appears that the ruler does not personally allocate portions, as opposed to gera, to all the men involved. The booty which Neleus

left "to the people to divide" was, Nestor recalls, divided by the "leading men of the Pylians" (X1.687-8). And we hear that Patroklos received from the plunder of Skyros a woman called Iphis, “whom Akhilleus

provided for him" (IX.666-8). This woman originally presumably came to Akhilleus as part of the portion assigned to him by Agamemnon. Insofar as the scanty evidence allows us to draw conclusions, it would seem that the king divides all that remains after gera have been selected into large portions and assigns these to leading men - himself included. It is then up to these leaders to decide how much to keep as their personal portion and what to share out among their followers. 2! In sum, we discern five phases of distribution. First, when all the booty is brought together, the most prominent leader involved in the venture selects a geras for himself. 2 Second, he gives gera to “princes” and “best men”. Third, the dominant leader picks a portion for himself. Fourth, he assigns portions to subordinate leaders. Fifth,

each leader distributes part of his portion to his followers (see Table on next page).

2. THE PRINCIPLES OF DISTRIBUTION

According to what norms does a prince distribute gera and portions ? Concerning portions, we have already encountered the notion that he ought to try to provide everyone with a 'proper' amount. As we saw, there are divergent interpretations of propriety. The most articulate spokesman for one of these is Akhilleus. I refer again to his protest that

"there was an equal portion for one who stayed behind and for one who fought

hard

(IX.318-9).

indeed.

The

bad

and

the good

had

the

same

The implication is, of course, that one who

ought to get more than one who slacks.

honour”

fights hard

Akhilleus resents the fact that he

has been through "sleepless nights and bloody days"(IX.325-6), “piling up riches and wealth" for Agamemnon (1.171), although Agamemnon - himself has done no fighting at all (1.225-8). He compares himself to a

bird bringing food for its young, itself suffering hardship (IX.323-4).

305 TABLE: SUMMARY

OF EVIDENCE ON PHASES OF DISTRIBUTION

The table below includes all evidence on the mechanism of distribution of booty. I have indicated to which phase of distribution, in my view, belong the items mentioned : I: ruler's geras; II: others’ gera; III : ruler's portion; IV : princes’ portions; V : followers' portions. A "7" indicates that there are no data available for this particular phase, while "-" indicates that the phase did not occur. In phase I and II, the italicised items are explicitly attested as gera, the others are presumed to be gera on other grounds. A. [που

v. Elis

Ἔ I: 300 sheep and cattle men {shepherds} IV : "a proper share”

V

: “a proper share”

(X1.696-7) (X1.697) (X1.705)

(X1.705)

C. Son of Kastor in nine expeditions I: “what he likes” (14.232) Il :? II: "many things” (14.232) D. Akhaiansv. "towns around Troy and I

B. Phaiakians v. Apeira I : woman (7.9-11) Il :? Ill: ? IV

:?

v:?

IV :? v:?

E. Akhalans v. “the islands”

: woman (1.366-9; cf.1.188)

women al. 226), bronze (11.226), men a. 230; cf. 11.237) 11 : woman (IX.367-8; to Akhilleus) geras (1.138; Aias; Odysseus)

I

: woman (X1.625-7: Nestor)

Hl:

ΠῚ: 7 women (IX.128-30) "many things” (IX.333)

IV

: iron discus (XXITI.826-9) silver lyre (TX. 188) horse ἄνι 152-3)

IV

: woman (IX.664-5) woman (IX.667-8)

woman (VI.425-7)

gold, bronze, women, iron (IX.365-7; all to Akhilleus) "small quantities” (IX.333) v:?

V

: woman (IX.666-8; to Patroklos)

F. Akhaians v. Troy [incl. Trojans v. Akhaians] I : woman (11.421-3) IT : tripod / chariot / woman (VIII.289-91; promised to Teukros) chariot (X.303-6; promised to Dolon) geras (11.534; to Neoptolemos [Little Iliad: woman and man)) IT:

IV : 20 women, gold, bronze (IX.137-40; to Akhilleus) "many beautiful treasures" (10.40; to Odysseus) Vv . “empty hands” (10.42; Odysseus’ followers) G. Odysseus c.s. v. Ismaros I: ᾿ II: III-V : "a proper share"(9.42)

H. Odysseus c.s. v. Kyklops I: ram (9.550-1) π :III-V : "ἃ proper share"(9.549)

306

From Akhilleus' point of view, then, a share in the booty is something one

deserves

by

fighting,

and

a proper

share

recipient adequately for his fighting efforts.

ought

to

reward

the

He is not alone in holding

this view. Thersites hints that Agamemnon, in appropriating to himself so much of the booty, fails to realise that, without the united efforts of his followers, there would be no booty to begin with (1I.225-31, 235-8). The implication evidently is that the men's labours ought to be rewarded

with larger shares in the plunder.

Odysseus' followers resent the fact

that their leader comes home laden with treasure, while their hands are

"empty", although they all have "completed the same journey” (10.41). They have taken the same trouble and risks, and feel that their gains in booty ought to reflect this. Reasonable as this principle of reward according to merit may seem, it is apparently not applied by either Agamemnon or Odysseus, or the men would not be complaining this way. Clearly, the reason for being given a share often has nothing to do with one's contribution to the capture of booty - as one must infer from the fact that persons who have not taken any part in the action may be included in the distribution. 3 Of the two instances in which an explicit motive for assigning a portion is mentioned, we find that in one the king decides to use the plunder to

meet a public contingency. Among the Pylians, raiders and noncombatants alike, booty is handed out by way of compensation to those who have previously suffered material losses and humiliation at the hands

of the enemy

(X1.685-705).

In the

other

instance,

the

ruler

decides to spend some of the booty to pay a private debt. Agamemnon offers Akhilleus an especially rich portion in part-compensation for having publicly humiliated him (IX.137-40). The context shows that these are perfectly 'proper' things to do with booty. Thus, there appears to be a wide range of purposes for which a chief may legitimately use the booty acquired by his followers. Rewarding his warriors for their efforts is merely one of these purposes.

It is significant that, while it is frequently said that gera are “given by the men”, portion. 4

there is no instance of this expression being applied to a I would suggest that the notion of "the men” as the ultimate

authority in the distribution of shares does indeed only apply to gera. The king shares out portions on his own authority, without even a notional role for his followers' wishes. The legitimacy of his right to do so is supported by Nestor and Odysseus, who implicitly reject the

307 complaints οὗ Akhilleus and Thersites with the words “do not attempt to

rival the prince, strongly opposing him" (1.277-8; 11.247). In sum, it appears that, whereas some followers insist that rewarding merit in war must be one of their leader's most prominent aims, several of the leading princes view as 'proper' any division of portions he may choose to make. There is, then, no trace of a conception that the ruler

must follow commonly accepted guidelines for the distribution of plunder. Insofar as there are any constraints upon his freedom to assign portions, they are imposed upon him by a need to “respect” his followers and not undermine

his own position by alienating too many

of them.

These are considerations of power, not of rights. 25 In the allocation of prizes, the leader appears to have less freedom. Men receive gera either because they are princes or because they have excelled in battle or performed some other special service. (i) On the one hand, there are gera offered in reward for merit. Hektor promises a share - which I take to be a geras - in the booty he hopes to capture, as “worthy wages” (X.304) for a dangerous mission. Agamemnon offers a geras to express his satisfaction with a warrior's string of successes in battle (VIII.281-2, 286-91). Akhilleus stresses that, to his mind, his geras represents a reward “for which I toiled hard" (1.161-2) and “which I gained by my spear, [by] destroying a walled town" (XVI.57, cf.

IX.343). he

Accordingly, when the same geras has been taken away from him,

protests

that

“there

was

no

gratitude

[kharis)

at all

for endlessly,

relentlessly fighting the enemy (IX.316-7). "I have suffered bitterly, constantly risking my life in battle, and now I have nothing to show for it" (IX.321-2). 26 A different kind of merit is acknowledged when Nestor is given a geras "because he was consistently the best man of all in counsel” (XI.627). (ii) On the other hand, Alkinoos, ruler of Skheria, gets his geras “because he

ruled over all the Phaiakians, and the people listened to him as to a god" (7.10-11). Here, there is no reference to any particular merit. The king gets a geras simply because he is the king. As for Agamemnon, although no explicit reason why he should have a geras is ever given, we hear that “it is not proper” for him not to have one (1.118-9). And since he definitely

cannot claim to have eared this particular prize by fighting (cf. [X.328-33), it seems likely that he, too, gets it by virtue of being a ruling prince. The general statement that gera are distributed “to the best men and the

princes" (1.334), suggests that all princes, regardless of their contribution to battle, receive prizes.

308 Behind the two criteria, one may discern a single principle. once more complaining to Agamemnon, says : "I never have a geras equal to yours.

Akhilleus,

My hands dominate the greater part of the

stormy battle, yet when the time of distribution arrives, your geras is much bigger. I have something

small,

but welcome,

to take to the ships after I have exhausted

myself fighting” (1.163-8).

By

implication,

Akhilleus

lays

claim

to a geras

of equal

value.

In

response to this demand, Agamemnon angrily points out "how much better [pherteros] than you I am" and he denies that Akhilleus, or anyone else, has a right "to speak on a level with me"

(ison emoi phasthai,

1.186-7). Agamemnon, then, appears to see a claim to an equal geras as a claim to equal status. And this is apparently what Akhilleus intended to convey : he later exclaims that Agamemnon is no more than "an equal" (homoios, XV1.53). We may infer that the distribution of prizes is supposed to follow the principle ‘the higher the status, the more valuable the geras'. 27

A source of friction is that men may judge status by different criteria. Akhilleus, as we have seen, emphasizes his contribution to battle as the reason why he should have a geras as valuable as that of Agamemnon. Agamemnon, however, while acknowledging Akhilleus' warlike qualities, dismisses them as irrelevant : "So what, if you are strong? A god must have made you that way” (1.178, cf.290-1). Akhilleus, for his

part, accepts that Agamemnon “surpasses me in power" (XVI.53-4), but that does not change his view of him as "an equal”. Note that not even Akhilleus thinks that only martial excellence ought to be acknowledged -

in which case he should have argued that Agamemnon deserves no geras at all. It is thus admitted that both excellence in battle and a formal position of power entitle a man to a prize, but there is a clash of opinion as to how much weight should be attached to either factor. 23 This clash acquires a greater significance when one realises whose respect is supposed to be conveyed through gera. In the first instance, of course, the respect symbolised in the geras is shown, if not necessarily felt, by the prince who hands out the booty. But, as we have seen, he is, at least nominally, performing the distribution of gera on

behalf of a group - "the men”, “his comrades”, all those who one way or another are involved in the distribution. It follows that, in assigning gera, the king shows who, according to him and ideally according to the

309

whole

community,

is a member

of the élite of princes and eminent

fighters, and who is not; and who among these men ranks higher than whom. The allocation of gera is, as it were, an ‘official’ statement about the community hierarchy. This gives gera a symbolic importance far exceeding their material value, which, as I have pointed out, is small in

comparison to that of the other shares. Perhaps part of the reason why both Agamemnon

and Akhilleus wax

so indignant at the prospect of losing their gera and reject offers of compensation, is that three-, fourand even sevenfold material compensation does not quite make up for the symbolic damage suffered in the loss of a status symbol. 29 A final principle is that, once distribution has taken place, it must not be tampered with. When Agamemnon, in exceptional circumstances, loses his geras, he insists on having a replacement and proposes that either the entire booty be reassembled for him to make a new choice from, or he will forcibly take one of the gera already assigned to men such as Akhilleus, Aias and Odysseus (1.135-9; cf.123-6). The first

alternative is mentioned only briefly and rejected by Akhilleus as "improper" (1.126). Agamemnon eventually opts for the second alternative and this is 9), his mother Thetis (IX.111; cf. 1.275-6) as a “dishonouring”

rejected, not only by Akhilleus (1.356, cf. XVI.58(1.507) and Thersites (11.240), but also by Nestor and the Greeks at large (XIII.108-14; cf. XIX.85-6) act. It is regarded as a deed of hybris by the

goddess Athena as well as by Akhilleus (1.203, 214), and as "unjust" by Odysseus (XIX.181-3). In fact, Agamemnon himself soon admits that, in making his demand, it was he who “started being difficult" (1.378), and he later explains that he was impelled by a "savage blindness” in

actually taking back the geras in question (XIX.88-9). 3 From Akhilleus' and Thersites' point of view, as the poet presents it, Agamemnon's behaviour in reappropriating a geras may be only a worse form of what they regard as Agamemnon's customary abuse of power in allocating shares. And Agamemnon's point of view, during his fit of

anger, may be that he has as much right to take back a geras as he has to give it away in the first place. But everyone else seems to draw a definite line between one and the other. One may note Akhilleus' suggestion that, if reappropriating gera is bad, reappropriating portions would be worse. He announces that he will not try to prevent anyone from taking his geras Briseis away from

310

him,

"since you [plural] take away from me what you gave" (1.298-9),

but that, if anyone tries to touch any other property of his, "soon your black blood will spurt around my spear" (1.300-3). As some have pointed out, Akhilleus conjures up an imaginary threat in order to give himself an opportunity to display defiance and to save face. 31 Still, the distinction he makes here may be significant. If Agamemnon takes back a geras, the victim may choose to believe that he does so on behalf of the Greeks. Akhilleus thus argues that he does not want to resist a ‘community-decision', even though it violates certain norms. But if Agamemnon were to take anything from Akhilleus' portion, it would be a 'private' humiliation - and his victim would not take that lying down. The following principles thus govern the distribution of booty.

First, a small part of the booty community’, in the form of prizes.

is distributed 'on behalf of the In allocating these gera which

ideally express the community's respect for its most prominent men, the

leader must weigh claims to respect based on power against those based on prowess. Second, the remainder of the booty is distributed by the leader in his own name and without any normative restrictions.

In practice, he must

weigh the claims of the men who have actually seized the booty and wish to be rewarded with a sizeable part of it, against other claims, including

those of non-combatants, and against his own needs and desires.

Once

everything has been disposed of, he no longer has the right to interfere

with the booty. The amount of power exercised by the ruler, and the role of the community in the process are worth noting. Booty does not belong to the warriors who capture it, but to the prince they recognise as their leader, and, through him, to the wider community of all those who are

his subordinates.

Despite the fact that the people who constitute the

community have no real influence over the award of shares, and despite

the fact that 'their' gifts are of comparatively little material value, the allocation of gera is an institutionalised custom to which high symbolic

value

is attached.

This

points

to a remarkably

strong

feeling

of

belonging to a community larger than the household, and larger than the

band of leader and followers.

NOTES

313

NOTES TO THE PREFACE 1. The importance of the epics in interpreting the archaeological record is stressed by Morris (1986a: 128). Note, for example, the common idea that "the archacological evidence from grave goods", combined with epic evidence, shows

that “warfare in the late Dark Age was heavily dependent on the individual champion and his companions... The rest of the community seems to have... done little more than watch the duels of the nobility” (Murray 1980: 54). In fact, the archaeological evidence (weapons, armour, and painted scenes of battle on vases) does not tell us anything about different roles for noble champions and common soldiers. That idea is based exclusively on epic material. (For different interpretations of Homeric battles, see pp. 80, 87-8.)

2. On the other hand, one should not exaggerate the difference between Homer and other historical sources.

To the extent that the epics are a source of information on

Homer's own society, the poet's selectivity, bias and freedom of interpretation are perhaps not all that much greater than they would have been, had he been a historian (of his own age) rather than a poet. See pp. 22-3 below.

3. See further pp. 63-9 below.

314

NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE 1.

Kakridis 1967: no.s 3 and 5 (pp. 12ff.); both from Thessaly.

The Greeks who

spoke of giant Hellenes still called themselves 'Romans' (Rhomaioi), not Hellenes as they do now. Kakridis' fascinating collection of stories amply illustrates the association of the Hellenes with the ruins of the past, and also with large bones dug up by farmers. There is a great variety of stories explaining how the Hellenes became extinct. One variant attributes this to a plague of killer gnats, which drove

them to live underground in rock-lined chambers,

with only a few possessions

[: Greek graves with grave-goods!], until they wasted away (no.49, Crete).

2. Herodotos 1.67-8 (who notes that the bones of Orestes were gigantic); Plutarch, Kimon 8; Theseus 36. See p.13. 3. Some ancient sources say that homeros meant 'blind man' in the Aeolian dialect (see Chantraine 1968: s.v. homeros [p.797]). The Odyssey depicts a blind bard at work, and it is not uncommon cultures, too.

for blind men to earn a living as singers in other

(For examples see Bowra 1952: 420-2; and note also the blind monks

who recited the epic tales of the Heike and Genji in mediaeval Japan, accompanying themselves on a stringed instrument called biwa.) Homeros may thus originally have been a nickname of an epic poet, or even a generic nickname for epic poets at large. A less plausible ancient interpretation was that the poet's name was derived from ‘hostage’ (homeros). Homer's real name was sometimes supposed to have been Melesigenes, or Meles, or Altes (see e.g. The Contest of Homer and Hesiod, 313-

14). 4. When Odysseus (incognito) hears a bard singing of his master-stroke, the stratagem of the Wooden Horse, he showers the singer with "the highest praise” :

"You sing of the Akhaians' fate exactly as you should... almost as if you yourself were there or were told by another [who was there]” (8.487-91). The poet appeals to the Muses for accurate information (esp. II.434-92); note the stress on accuracy in 11.368-70. Finkelberg (1990) points out that an appeal to the Muses actually allows the poet to exercise a good deal of creative freedom while maintaining a facade of

accuracy. See also Finley 1977: 40-41, 145; Redfield 1975: 35; Jensen 1980: 6280; Morris 1986a: 88-9; Finkelberg 1987; Giovannini 1989: 27; Edwards 1990: 322-3. §. Discussions of the nature of hero-cult : Rohde 1907: 146-199; Farnell 1921: esp. 95-6, 280-342, 361-72; Burkert 1977: 203-8; Kearns 1989; Lacroix 1989: 61-9, 8298. Archaeological evidence for hero-cults: Coldstream 1976; Morris 1988; Whitley 1988; Snodgrass 1988. 6. Soe.g. Rohde 1907: 148; West 1978: 370; Snodgrass 1988: 21. 7. So West 1978: 370-3; Snodgrass 1988: 21; Kearns 1989: 2. Cf. Farnell 1921: 16; Morris 1988: 754; Vandiver 1991: 16-28. A variation is the view that heros meant ‘lord’ in Mycenaean

use of it is archaising.

times, but no longer in Homer's own day, and that his

This would require us to assume that he is being highly

Notes to Chapter One

315

"polite' in extending a Mycenaean honorific term to include all age. The idea that heros originally meant ‘lord' rests on no more is used as a form of address in Homer and on the theory that the the name Hera, which, it is suggested, may originally have been

men of than the word is a title :

the heroic fact that it related to ‘mistress’

(see Chantraine 1968: s.v. heros [p.417]). Others have said that heros “in the Iliad signifies a warrior who lives and dies in the pursuit of honour and glory" (Schein 1984: 69), or that "warrior and hero are synonyms" (Finley 1977: 113), but this appears to be based merely on the meaning of ‘hero’ in English, and is unjustified. Nor does there seem to be any reason to think that heros is "ἃ class term for the... aristocracy” which "at times... even seems to embrace all the free men” (Finley 1977: 28). of Ithaka are referred to as heroes (1.272),

presumably - is called "the hero by assuming that Homer thought As explained below, I would divine being', and that Homeric an age of living demigods. 8.

The fact that the assembled people and a bard - not an aristocrat,

Demodokos” (8.483) can be explained more simply of all men of that era as heroes. suggest that heros never meant anything but 'semiusage is part of the epic fantasy that once there was

This implies that Homer was familiar with the practice of hero-cult.

The epics

do not refer to heroes being worshipped after death, and this has sometimes been taken to show that in Homer's time hero-cults did not yet exist. However, as Beloch pointed out long ago (1912: 168 n.1), if such references are absent, this is because the heroes were not supposed to have worshipped one another while their race walked the earth; hero-worship was thought to have begun only when the heroic race had died out and had been succeeded by ordinary mortals (the Iron race, in Hesiod's terms).

Some heroes were regarded as ancestors of families and tribes that survived into and beyond Classical times. It is not clear how this was reconciled with the notion that the heroic race had become extinct. 9.

Superhuman

strength

: V.302-4

(Diomedes);

XII.378-86

(Aias);

XX.287

(Akhilleus); cf. X1.635-6 (Nestor). In Greek thought, superhuman strength is often a mark of semi-divine status (Gordon 1988: 62-4). Not all heroes are equally strong : the ordinary Akhaian is three times less strong than Akhilleus (XXIV.4536). There is no sign in Homer of the heroes being 'more just', as Hesiod says they were. 10. For Herodotos', Thukydides' and modern approaches to the historicity of the

Trojan War, see p. 176.

Finley's position has been criticised by Hampl (1962: 37-

8); Long (1970: 122); Vidal-Naquet (1990: 36-8 : the epic world may seem “un tout cohérent, nullement fantaisiste”, but "cela ne signifie pas... que cette description soit ‘réaliste'"). Elsewhere, Finley lists a few features of the epic world which he interprets as deliberate (but mistaken) archaisms (1977: 148-9); it is these which

form the core of the fantasy elements listed by Redfield, Morris and Giovannini. Redfield calls the sum of these elements the “epic distance” which separates the world of the heroes from the world of the audience. He further suggests that this epic distance is ‘collapsed’ in the Odyssey (1975: 37, 39; cf. Morris 1986a: 91).

Since his only evidence is the fact that the Odyssey features epic singers while the Iliad does not, I would not accept that thesis; there is no ground for the [implicit]

Notes to Chapter One

316

claim that the poet of the Iliad deliberately excluded professional epic singers from

its world, as a distancing effect. Morris distinguishes, apart from distancing elements, an element of ideological distortion (1986: 123-7). This is an important feature of the heroic world, which I shall be discussing as one form of Homeric fantasy. 11. Examples of this are Homeric kingship, regarded as implausible by Geddes (1984) and others, and the Homeric use of the chariot, which is almost universally regarded as implausible. Kingship is discussed in Appendix Three, section 1; I hope to discuss Homeric chariots elsewhere. 12. Other indications that the epic stories are traditional : (a) the oral formular style of the poems (see n.18); (Ὁ) the elliptic references in the Iliad and Odyssey to other, apparently well-known, tales (exx. in Chapter Four, section 4); (c) the appearance of variant versions of epic stories, esp. in early vase-painting (Schefold 1966; Johansen 1967), but also in archaic choral lyric and classical tragedy. To say that the stories are traditional does not, of course, necessarily mean that there was no room for new invention in telling them. 13. This is the view of Heubeck

(1989); cf. Morris (1988: 750).

(1984:

14-21):

also Tausend

(1990),

Giovannini

Heubeck’s position involves either explaining away

the Mycenaean elements that have been discerned in the poems (see below, n.30), or

assuming that epic hexameter poetry existed as a genre in Mycenaean times and has left traces in the tradition, but that the specific epic tales told in Mycenaean times were replaced with stories of later date. Giovannini (1989: 29) adduces an interesting example of how a story may grow up to explain ruins about which there is no real knowledge : Kalakh and Niniveh were sacked in 614 and 612 by the Babylonians and the Medes, but two centuries later the story (as recorded by Xenophon, Anabasis III.4.6-12) was current that they had been attacked by the Persians (c. 560) and destroyed through divine intervention. 14. Evidence for oral tradition : (a) the appearance of formulae in the poems (see

n.18); (b) the apparent absence of any form of writing between the Linear B of Mycenaean

times and the alphabetic inscriptions of the eighth century

Cyprus continues to use its own script throughout the Dark Age).

(although

Ruijgh (1989:

580-4), however, argues that alphabetic writing must have been in use for some considerable time before its first attestation. 15. So Jensen (1980), followed by Sealey (1990: 127-35, esp.131). The more common view is represented by West (1988: 36-40); Finley (1977: 38-9). Merkelbach (1952) takes an intermediate position. There are three theories about the way in which the poems might have been created by a ‘monumental’ poet : he either composed a ‘definitive’ oral version which was memorised by his successors, or dictated his oral text to a scribe, or himself composed in writing (see Janko 1990). 16. Vansina 1961: esp. 56; see also Vansina 1985; Finnegan 1977.

Finley's comparison of the epics with the Song of Roland is of little value (1977: 478), since he takes no account of the differences in kind between the two traditions. More sophisticated use of comparative material is made by Morris (1986: 83-9), who argues that the epic is of a kind of tradition that may change a great deal because (a)

Notes to Chapter One

317

it is composed in a flexible verse form (hexameters), and (Ὁ) it professes to represent the ‘truth' (which changes as the world changes, even if people perceive it as immutable).

17. Xenophon, Symposion II1.5 (cf. TV.6); a professional rhapsode is portrayed in Plato’s Jon : apart from reciting epics in competition at public festivals, he is supposed to be able to explain their ‘deeper' meaning. It has been argued that the so-called Catalogue of Ships (11.494-759) was composed in Mycenaean times and

subsequently memorised word-for-word (e.g. Webster 1958: 132; cf. 99), but this is very doubtful : see Giovannini 1969; Hope Simpson/Lazenby 1970; Kirk 1985: 168240, 248-63. 18. For the history of the study of formulae, see the surveys of Hainsworth (1968: 1-22) and Shive (1987: 3-20); also n.19. The formulae for historical interpretation was already noted by Beloch "überall steht Uraltes unvermittelt neben verhältnissmässig Jungem, est die Formel, die das Alte geschützt und erhalten hat.”

the subject in implication of (1912: 183): und überall is

19. See Parry 1971 (reprinted 1990), esp. ‘Studies in the Epic Technique of Oral

Verse-Making' (1930, 1932).

He argued that the formulae form a system, which is

both extensive and economic, i.e. which provides one single formula for each possible metrical form of each given concept. As Willcock puts it, this implies that “the poem virtually composes itself” (1990: 3), and would seem to leave very little

room

indeed

for creativity and change.

Yet Parry

“clearly felt that the world

depicted in these texts was... that of Homer and his contemporaries", according to

his son Adam Parry (Parry 1971: xlv). I find it hard to reconcile these views. "Since Parry, Homer has slowly been gaining support at the expense of the tradition” (Shive 1987: 132). Studies which stress the role of change, choice and creativity in formulaic composition include Hoekstra 1965; Hainsworth 1968; Whallon

1969:

1-70;

and

more

recently Shive

1987;

Finkelberg

1989;

Sale

1989

(who argues that "it is hard to escape the conclusion that the traditional poet was expected to be able to compose non-formulaically", as well as in formulae; p.380); Edwards 1990; in general also Finley 1977: 149-50; Taplin 1986: 66-70; Silk 1987: 13-26. 20.

Kleisthenes

of Sikyon

attempted to rid himself of the local hero Adrastos,

because of his legendary association with Sikyon's enemy Argos. When forbidden by an oracle to dig up and cast out the hero's bones, he imported from Thebes the bones of Melanippos, (Herodotos V.67).

Adrastos'

arch-enemy,

and

transferred

the cult

to him

21. Salamis : Aristotle, Rhetoric 1375b30; Schol.A ad 11.553; Schol.b ad 11.558; Plutarch, Solon 10; Strabo, Geography 9.1.10; Diogenes Laertius 1.48, 57; Quintilian 5.11.40, Sigeion : Herodotos V.94. Leadership : Herodotos VII.161. Cf. Jensen 1980: 167ff.; Vandiver 1991: 61-4.

22. Except for the contested tradition that Peisistratos' ‘editors’ interpolated two lines on Salamis (see n.21) and also inserted in the Odyssey a line mentioning Theseus “to please the Athenians” (Plutarch, Theseus 20 [citing Hereas of Megara, FGH 486 F 1]). There is also the possibility that references to the destiny of

Notesto Chapter One

318

Aineias and his descendants as rulers of the territory of Troy (XX.300-8; cf. Hymn to Aphrodite 196-7) reflect the political situation of the Archaic Age, when the Aineiadai ruled at Skepsis in the Troad (e.g. Willcock 1984: ad XX.302-8). In respect of the weight attached to Homer's words in such matters, the epics are rather like the Bible, as is often pointed out. On the other hand, a passage in Herodotos (VII.159) shows the Spartans interpreting the poems to suit themselves, without changing the texts. They ignore the fact that the epic Agamemnon ruled Mykenai, and speak as if he had ruled Sparta, arguing that Sparta must lead the Greeks because Agamemnon once did, too (cf. Vandiver 1991: 62). 23. Epic songs are called “charms” (1.337) with which singers "entertain" (terpein; 1.347; 8.45); when a singer pauses, the audience tell him to continue "because they are enjoying his words" (8.90-91, 368). The bard Phemios is called Terpiades, "son of Entertainer” (22.330). In the Odyssey singers normally perform at dinner-parties, but once in the town-square (8.250-380). Epic song is the main diversion at these occasions, often accompanied by dancing (1.152; 4.15-19; 9.3-11; cf. Jensen 1980:

62-80). No doubt the epics also played a role in instilling ethical values in the audience, by explicitly stating norms (Havelock 1978), or by bestowing praise and blame on their protagonists (Nagy 1979), but there is nothing in the poems to suggest that this was regarded as their main function. On the Greek attitude to "poetry and history’ in general : Gomme 1954. 24. Several attempts have been made to show that Hektor and Patroklos were late inventions: Scott 1921: 205-39 (cf. Nilsson 1933: 264-6); Pestalozzi and Schadewaldt, as summarised by Kullmann 1960: 58-63. Page (1959: 248-51, 286-8) argues against these theories. Willcock (forthcoming a) suggests that Sarpedon may

have

been

newly

created,

or

at

least

given

a new

character,

by

Homer.

Characterisation in general : e.g. Griffin 1980: 50-80. 25. It is sometimes said that the use of advance plot-summaries is a feature of the epic style because creating suspense is not an aim of Greek epic poetry (cf. Duckworth 1966). I would argue that, if plot-summaries are a feature of epic style,

this is because the outline and outcome of the traditional stories with which the poets work are known to the audience, and afford no opportunity for suspense. It seems quite conceivable that a poet would strive to create a certain amount of suspense by varying his narrative within the limits imposed by the established plot. 26. This view is, of course, at odds with the idea that Patroklos and Sarpedon are new creations (see n.24). A general freedom in adapting story-lines is indicated by the fact that the poet apparently adapts well-known stories, such as those of Meleagros (see Chapter Four, section 4) and Niobe (XXIV.602-17), to suit the context in which he refers to them. One story (1.396-406; see pp. 121, 143) may even have been invented from scratch (Willcock 1964). Choral lyric and fifthcentury tragedy also appear to take considerable liberties with traditional plots.

27. See e.g. the studies collected under the telling titles Homer.

Tradition and

Invention (Fenik 1978) and Homer ; Beyond Oral Poetry (Bremer et.al. 1987). In fact, almost all literary studies of the epic, including those of the ancient commentators, assume that the poet responsible for the epics as we have them chose

Notes to Chapter One

319

his words carefully and invested them with symbolism. e.g. Lynn-George (1982).

The approach is criticised by

28. An example is given below, in section 3. The term ‘patchwork’ was used by Nilsson (1933: 212). More recently the term amalgam‘ has been widely adopted : Kirk (1962: 179), for example, refers to "the cultural and linguistic amalgam’. In an amalgam, of course, one can no longer distinguish the original components, which have been forged into a single new entity. In a patchwork, by contrast, the original components remain clearly discernible as such, and one can see where they have been joined together.

‘amalgam‘

is thus appropriate to the Homeric

The term

world only if one holds, as some

scholars do, that the epics "fuse widely divergent eras into a coherent unity” (Scully 1990: 82; emphasis added; also Silk 1987: 29). However, if one believes that the epics are in places inconsistent and juxtapose incompatible elements, scholars do, ‘patchwork’ would appear to be a more suitable term.

as many

29. Modern examples of this will be mentioned in the following chapters. This approach has perhaps been inspired by ancient Homeric scholarship. From Hellenistic times there was a so-called ‘analytic’ tradition, which looked for inconsistencies between Iliad and Odyssey in order to prove that the two poems were not by the same poet; there was also a school of textual criticism, represented by Aristarkhos, which looked for lapses of good taste and other evidence that certain verses of either poem were not by Homer himself, but had been interpolated by later and inferior rhapsodes. For an illustration of the arguments used in the ancient debate : Maftei 1976. (In general, it may be noted that alleged discrepancies between the narrative of events and references to the same events in direct speech can easily be explained : the speaking characters express a personal bias in their version of what has happened.) 30. The Archaic element is generally deemed to be small, but assessments of the Mycenaean element vary a great deal. Kirk accepts only a few items as Mycenaean (1960; 1962: 179-192; 1985: 7-10); so does Finley (“a pitiful crop”, 1977: 150).

On this view, which is widely held, most of the amalgam is of Dark Age date.

On

the other hand, there is a school of thought which takes the amalgam to contain a

substantial or even predominant Mycenaean element.

Arguments to this effect are

Offered by e.g. Nilsson (1933: 137-50, 212-41) and Webster (1958: 91-135). Hooker (1988: 63) argues "that we may assign even more of Homer to the Bronze Age than Webster thought it advisable to do”. Such views have been criticised by e.g. Finley 1981: 213-32; Heubeck 1984: 39-62; 1984a; Vidal-Naquet 1990: 35-6 ("un cadavre qu'il faut régulitrement tuer"). To what extent the language of the epics contains identifiably Mycenaean features is also debated : see Ruijgh 1957; 1985:

143-90; 1989: 573-9; Hoekstra 1965: 140-5; Kirk 1962:

Among those who hold are further differences as would favour the eighth himself lived (so Morris Strassburger

1952:

192-210;

1985: 5-7).

that the Homeric world mostly reflects the Dark Age there to precisely what part of the Dark Age. The majority century on the assumption that this was when Homer [1986a], who argues his case in detail; see also e.g.

492).

(1977: 48), while Andreev ninth.

Finley,

(1988:

however,

prefers the tenth and

13-14) and Donlan

(1989a:

ninth centuries

28) fasten on the

Notes to Chapter One

320

31. Its construction is described in XII.294-7 (cf. 22.184-6); its shape is a matter of some debate. The phrase most often used, and translated here (after Hammond) as “even circle", is pantos’ else. Although ‘equal on all sides‘, i.e. ‘round’, is a commonly accepted meaning (e.g. Snodgrass 1964: 171), it is open to interpretation (Borchhardt 1977: 3; Reichel 1901: 17; Trümpy 1950: 21-3). But the shield is also referred to as kuklos, a circle. This is less often used (X1.33; XII.297; XX.280), but leaves little room for doubt (unless one extends its meaning to ‘oval’, as e.g. Reichel (1901: 20) did). 32. Reichel (1901: 18) and others also take the epithet 'man-covering' (amphibrotos) to indicate a man-sized shield, but obviously a shield of any size or shape could be called ‘man-covering' (cf. Borchhardt 1977: 3). One of the problems with Aias' shield (see also next note) is that, in my view,

only the adjective "broad" indicates the size of the shield; contrary to the common view, the phrase "like a tower" (eute purgon) does not indicate its height and width,

but its thickness. The main connotation of ‘tower’ in the epic is impenetrability : of impenetrably dense ranks of warriors it is said “they press themselves together like a tower (purgedon)”

(XIII.152) and that "they hold together like a tower”

(XV.618),

in the same way that they may be said to form a fence (herkas) of bronze (XV.5667) or a wall which even the wind cannot penetrate (XVI.211-7). That connotation is

most appropriate to Aias’ shield, which has seven layers of ox-hide, as compared to the three layers of hide on the shield of his brother Teukros (VII.220, etc.; X1.548; cf. XV.479 : four layers, including one of bronze 7) and the five (metal) layers of

the shield of Akhilleus (XX.270-2). In the present discussion, I am leaving out of consideration two further important features of the shield : the kanones and the shield-strap (n.37). 33. The distinction between two types of shield goes back at least as far as Rüstow and Köchly (1852: 15-17); the argument that a round bronze shield could not

realistically be man-sized was stated explicitly by Helbig (1884:

222-4).

The

identification of the large shield with the Mycenaean tower-shield was proposed by

Reichel in 1894 (1901:

1-50).

Identifications of both types were subsequently

debated intensely (see the summaries of Finsler (1914: 136-8] and Nilsson [1933: 143-5]), but consensus has now settled on a few Mycenaean and many Dark Age shields (Lorimer 1950:

Aias' hat from as huge "broad”,

132-92; Snodgrass 1964: 37-68,

170-1; Borchhardt 1977).

shield ("as inseparable from its owner as his telescope from Nelson or his Napoleon” [Bowra 1930: 253]) presents a problem because it is described and bronze-faced in one breath (VII.219-23, 245-8) and because it is which Mycenaean shields are not and which makes better sense if it refers

to a round shield (Lorimer 1950: 182-3). 34. Note that Akhilleus even in an emergency will not use anyone else's equipment, “except the shield of Aias” (XVIII.193).

The strength required to carry this shield is

indicated by the unique reference to Aias' men carrying his shield for him when he gets tired (X111.709-11).

The third shield is mentioned, not to highlight the might of

its owner Periphetes (although he is a good man "in every respect”, XV.642), but because he happens to trip on its rim (XV.645-8).

Notes to Chapter One

321

35. Note that the Macedonian sarissa, which was roughly as long as Hektor's spear, needed to be wielded with two hands.

Discussion of types of spear : Lorimer 1950:

254-61; Snodgrass 1964: 115-39, 174; Höckmann 1980. A complication is that javelins are often used in pairs, pikes singly; this factor is left out of account here. 36. If Mycenaean and later elements were thus forged intoa single new entity - and I stress that this is not the usual view - then it would be appropriate to call the poems an amalgam, rather than a patchwork (n.28). 37. That Dark Age shields were made of leather is widely accepted. Not all of them were round : square and so-called Dipylon-shields are attested as well (cf. Lorimer

1950:

153-80;

Snodgrass

1964:

37-68;

Borchhardt

1977:

17-24,

27,

36-44).

Archaic hoplite-shields do not seem to have been constructed in the way described in

the epic : leather lining is attested, but only as a single layer, backed with wood (illustrated in Connolly 1977: 33). In any case, one can make no definite statement on the historical reality behind the epic shields without considering the aspects of its construction that I have left out of account (n.32 ad fin.). 38. See esp. Kirk 1960: 190-2; 1985: 8-9. The case for regarding the so-called boar's tusk helmet (X.261-71) as a Mycenaean relic is much stronger. 39. I have previously applied this approach in my studies of aspects of warfare in the Hiad (Van Wees 1986; 1988). In these, without explicitly stating any rules of method, I argued that the epic presents us with a coherent, though partly fantastic, picture of military organisation and patterns of combat.

322

NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO 1. Kyklopes : 9.106-11, 125-9, 181-9, 216-23, 237-49. Laistrygones : 10.80-132. There is a view that the Kyklopes are not meant to represent mere savages, but rather a mixture of savagery and a utopian existence (Kirk 1970: 162-71; VidalNaquet 1981: 21-2; Mondi

1983:

17-28); but I would agree with Sullivan (1990:

16)

that they are portrayed as “a thoroughly and uniformly unpleasant bunch of ogres”. Themis means both "(divine) law' and 'the place where/meeting in which matters

of law are discussed’ (so at X1.807-8). In the present passage, the second meaning (‘law-session’) seems more appropriate, since here the focus is on the absence of communal meetings and interfamilial contact among the Kyklopes (contra e.g. Finley 1977: 78). 2. This is the view of Finley and Adkins; also e.g. Andreev 1979a: 398-405 (but cf. id. 1988: 14-27); Posner 1979; Halverson 1985, 1986; Rihll 1986. By contrast, Vlachos (1974: 49) gives the Kyklopes-passage its full weight; Havelock (1978: 80), Murray (1980: 53-4, 57-60, 63-4), and Carlier (1984: 182-6), too, credit the Homeric community with a greater corporate role. 3. Murray 1980: 38-68; also 1983a: 196-9; 1983b: 271; 1983c. Donlan also 1979; 1981; 1982a/b; 1985; 1989a/b/c. Others who have revised Finley's views in one way or another : Drews 1983; Bourgeois 1983; Halverson 1985, 1986; Rihll 1986, forthcoming; Andreev 1988; cf. Geddes 1984. These authors do have predecessors in e.g. Calhoun (1934) and Finsler (1914: 191-2), but in their time these represented minority views, and I have mentioned only the successively most prominent schools of thought, and of these only the most explicit representatives. Jeanmaire, for example, appears to be the only scholar who has actually tried to argue (rather than take for granted) that Homeric chiefs hold their land in fief, not in private ownership (1939: 84-5); cf. Nilsson 1933: 212-41. The view is criticised by Finley 1981: 2223. For the kinship-model : Glotz 1904: 3-18; 1920: 1-60; 1928: 7-13; 1925: 113-

42; criticised by Finley [1954] 1977: 105, 1985a: 90-3.

For the oikos-model, esp.

Finley 1977: 105, and 56-63. 4.

Glotz refers to Fustel de Coulanges more than once (e.g. 1928: If.); he does not,

however, take over his theories wholesale.

5.

He does not explicitly say so, but these two do seem to have inspired him; cf.

Finley 1981: 12-3, on Bücher. 6. Often cited are Marshall Sahlins' work on Melanesian and Polynesian data (note esp. 'Poor Man, Rich Man, Big-Man, Chief’, CSSH 5 [1963], 285-303), Edmund Leach on Political Systems of Highland Burma (1964) - often via the reinterpretation of his data by Jonathan Friedman in M. Bloch (ed.), Marxist Analyses and Social Anthropology (1975), 161-202 (a reinterpretation which Leach himself,

incidentally, rejected) - and Morton Fried, The Evolution of Political Society (1967). 7.

See Appendix One.

Notes to Chapter Two

323

8. Most of the details are taken from the construction of the wall around the Greek ships, which seems no different from normal town-walls (cf. VII.443-53, conıra Drerup 1969: 101). Stone and wood : XII.28-9, 36, 259-60. Battlements : e.g. XII.258, 263, 397-9, 424-5 (Greek wall); XXII.3 (Troy). Palissade : 7.44-5 (Skheria). Climbing up: e.g. XVI.702-3 (Troy); jumping down: XII.390. A stepped construction is suggested by references to the ‘elbow' of the Trojan wall (XVI.702-3, maybe a ledge) and to the 'tiers’ of the Greek wall (X11.258, 444; krossai, a word used by Herodotos [11.125] for the steps of a pyramid; and cf. XIV.35). Walking inside battlements : XT1.265-6. Gate-doors : XII.118-23, 45362; XXIV.446. Crowd on top of gate : I. 141-55; VI.371-3; XXT1.25-91, 447-74. 9. Towns in Troad : Π.690-1; XVI.57. Kalydon, Pleuron : [X.552, 573-4. Pheia : VIT.135 (its name and location are debated). Tiryns and Gortyn have the epithet “walled”

(11.559, 646).

The anonymous

city on the shield of Akhilleus has walls

(XVIIT.514-5). General references to walls in war: IV.308; V.31, 445. The Odyssey mentions only the walls of Thebes, Troy (14.472) and Skheria ("a marvel to behold", 6.9; 7.44-5); but cf. 10.3. It is sometimes argued (see n.15) that Ithaka, Pylos and Sparta do not have walls, because none are mentioned when people enter or leave these cities.

That

is a weak argument;

note that no walls or gates are

mentioned when Priamos leaves Troy (XXIV.327-32) although Troy certainly does have

them.

Discussion

of walls in Homer:

Scully

(1990;

1981);

also Albracht

(1895). 10. Athens : 7.80; Mykenai : IV.52; Troy : e.g. 11.12; V.642; 22.230, and VI.391 ("well-constructed");

elsewhere : XX.254;

15.441.

The

formula

“The

sun

went

down and all the streets grew dark" occurs seven times in the Odyssey (e.g. 2.388).

The importance of the existence of streets is recognised by Hoffmann (1956: 153). 11. Benches : XVIII.503-4 (circle); 2.14; 3.406-8 (white stone, polished); 6.266-7 (dug into the ground); see n.97. Location at Pylos: 3.407; Troy : 11.788-9; VII.345-6; Ithaka : 2.10-11; 17.61-85; Skheria : 8.4-5 (the agora of Skheria appears to be outside the walls, cf. 7.43-4; 6.262-6). 12. Skheria : 6.10, 266. Troy : V.445-8; VII.83 (Apollo); V1.297-303 (Athena). Erekhtheion at Athens : 11.549-51; cf. 7.81. Temple and oracle at Delphi : IX.404-

5; 8.79-80. “Roofing” of a temple : 1.39. Hanging up offerings : VII.81-3; 3.2735; cf. VI.302-3. Scholars have attempted to explain away some of these references : see n.15. Altars: 13.187; 6.161-2; 17.210-11; 1.440; 11.303-7; VIII.47-8 (cf. XXII. 169-72), 238-9, 249-50; XI.808; ΧΧΠΙ.144-8.

Sacred groves : 6.291-2, 321-

2; 9.200-1; 20.276-8. 13. Welt on Ithaka: cf. 20.153-8; on Skheria : 7.129-31, cf. 19-20; on Syrie: 15.442; at Telepylos : 10.105-11; Messeis (in Sparta) and Hypereia (in Thessaly) : VI.457-8. Washing on the river-bank : 6.56-109; on the shore: 15.420. See Wickert-Micknat 1982: 56-7, 59-60. 14, 18.328-9. This is the only reference to it, but it shows that the existence of a leskhe is taken for granted. For its function as a place to talk, see the sources ' adduced in LSJ s.v. Note that an alternative (warm) place to talk and find shelter is

Notes to Chapter Two

324

the local smithy (/oc.cit, and Hesiod, Works and Days 493-7), and that the existence of a "public house” (demios oikos) is implied at 20.264-5. 15. Strasburger (1952: 495-6) speaks of ‘fortified villages'; Halverson (1985: 137-9) finds no walls or public buildings at all. Detailed studies of Homeric material culture, such as Helbig (1887: 93-6, 421-2), Seymour (1907: 115-6), Lorimer (1950: 439-50), Drerup (1969: 101, 103-5, 131) and Townsend-Vermeule (1974: 106-8), tend wherever possible to cast doubt on the meaning of the passages in question, playing down the number, size and quality of walls and temples in particular. The explicitly described walls and buildings of Skheria are treated as ‘exceptional’. It seems to me that the reason for this is not the ambiguity of the texts, but the difficulty of reconciling them with Mycenaean and Dark Age finds (see n.97).

Contrast

Grote

(1851:

148),

who,

innocent

of archaeology,

stressed

the

presence of public buildings. Murray (1980: 63-5) does acknowledge their existence; Scully (1990; 1981) stresses the prominent role of town walls in the epics. The wells, wash-basins and leskhe are ignored in the literature. 16.

day:

Daily

morning-gatherings : (i) when

20.124-46,

cf.

248-59.

Both

Telemakhos

times

returns:

Telemakhos

immediately after waking and has a meal on his retum home.

17.61-95;

leaves

(ii) next

for the agora

On the day after that,

we do not hear of a meeting, because Telemakhos does not attend.

On the day of

Telemakhos’ departure there is a formal meeting (see below), instead of the normal gathering. See Carlier (1984: 184); Geddes (1984: 31). For the meaning of 15.468, see Jeanmaire (1939: 52-3) and Carlier (loc.cit.); this meeting takes place after the (evening?) meal. The epics seem to suggest that all the men of the town spend time in the agora; in a real world, presumably only the better-off sections of the population would. Whenever Telemakhos appears in the town-square, he carries a spear and brings his dogs; swords are apparently carried at all times (e.g. 22.74). On the significance of bearing arms : pp. 63, 161-2. 17. Meetings in the street : XX.251-5 (two quarreling women coming out into the street); 7.71-2; 15.440-4. Cf. ΠΙ.141-55; VI.371-3; XXI1.447-74. 18. Athletics : 8.100-200; XVIII.491-6; funerals: celebrations : VI.269-80, on Ithaka); see also 3.4-9,

dances : 8.250-380; XVIII.590-606; weddings : 4.3-19; e.g. XXIII.257-897; and esp. 629-43. Religious 286-312 (Troy); 20.276-8; cf. 20.156 ("a festival for all” 32ff. (Pylos).

19. The Homeric notion of the fatherland (parre, patris) has been much neglected. It is not true, as is sometimes suggested, that it concretely amounts to no more than a man's household : the pasris as well as the household is something a man longs for when he is abroad (9.28-36; 10.474). The patris is identified with the demos, i.e. the people and region (see Jeanmaire 1939: 44-54; Welskopf 1981: 163-92), and

with the polis, the city, from which one originates (8.555;

13.233; cf. Donlan

1989a: 13-14). Hektor famously says that "one omen is best: to fight for the fatherland” (XII.243) and that "it is no shame to die in defence of the fatherland" (XV.496-7). The fact that he goes on to say that, in doing so, a man will protect his

family, does not mean that the family is all that really matters to a hero.

As

325

Notes to Chapter Two

Greenhalgh (1972: $35) puts it, the community is “able to inspire affection, pride,

social obligation and patriotic duty”. 20. That basileus is a family status is argued in Appendix Two, section 1. For the translation ‘prince’, rather than the widely used 'king', see n.23. The Homeric plural is actually basilees. Another term for prince, rarely used, is aisymneter

(XXIV.347; 8.258). In many contexts, ‘best men' means merely the bravest men, and any man may be called a leader if he is in charge of a few others. But there are passages in which "leaders and counsellors’ (hegetores and medontes), "best men' (aristoi, aristees) and ‘princes’ clearly refer to a ruling elite: best men = princes: VII.327 and 344; leaders = princes : IX.17 and 59/710; 8.11/26 and 41; best men

= leaders : X.300

and 301; XVII.245 and 248; best men = princes = leaders : X.326-7 and 146-7 with 194-5 and 533.

Also: "all the best men who exercise power over the islands"

(1.245

19,130; cf. X.214).

=

16.122

=

That the ‘best men'

and

'leaders' are a

social elite is a widely accepted view (e.g. Finley 1977: 51, 53, 107; Andreev 1988: 59-72; a detailed analysis of the terminology in Schultz 1981: 74-5), but there are

contrary views on their social status and on the distinction between princes and people : see pp. 80-1 below. 21. Ownership and use of sceptres are problematic matters, which are discussed in Appendix Two, section 2.

22. This is an unconventional view defended in Appendix Two, section 1. 23. Since basileus may refer both to the monarch and to the wider group of rulers, | have

chosen

to

translate

it as

‘prince’,

which

covers

both

senses

as

well

("a

sovereign ruler; a monarch, king” as well as “the English rendering of a title of nobility in some foreign countries", as the OED has it). Cf. West (1988: ad 1.3867) on the need for a vague translation. Carlier (1984: 143-50) argues that basileus in the singular always refers to the

monarch, and basilees in the plural to the wider group of princes, but he does not convincingly explain away the ‘exceptions’. Deger (1970: 59 n.253) argues that basileis in the wider sense is a new development in the Odyssey, and resorts to explaining its occurrence in the /liad as “a meaningless expression". Andreev (1979b: 373-4) argues that the singular and plural usages are incompatible, and falls back on the argument that “poetic logic is not the same as common sense”. It seems to me that all this is unnecessary : basileus simply has two meanings which can only be distinguished by their context (e.g. when a man is called ‘prince and ruler’, or when he is called 'prince of Χ' or 'prince in Y', he is likely to be the monarch,

rather than just any local prince). Anax means ‘master’ and can be used for the master of a house, of a slave, or of

an animal, as well as for the 'master' of a town; one can also humbly address a god as 'master'. That in the last usage anax acquires a religious connotation is no reason

to think that the religious sense is primary and the other usages “debased" forms, as e.g. Deger (1970: 52) and Mondi (1980: 212) assert (compare the secondary religious connotations acquired by the word ‘lord’ when used to refer to God). The

terminology is discussed by e.g. Vlachos 1974: 87-107; Descat 1979; Cobet 1981: 12-18; Carlier 1984: 215-30.

Notes to Chapter Two

326

It seems that princes other than the monarch all have the same formal powers. The adjective “most princely” and “more princely” (basileuteros, 15.533; ΓΧ. 160), therefore, can only be applied to the ruler of a town as compared to the other local princes, or to the ruler of more than one town as compared to subordinate rulers (see

pp. 38-9, and Carlier 1984: 144-5). 24. See Appendix Three, section 1 for arguments in support of this contention, and for a discussion of contrary views. One argument shared by all the latter is that the monarch does not appear to have a real role in government : this point has been effectively refuted by Carlier (1984), whose reconstruction of Homeric political

organisation I follow in many respects. 25. Eumedes, who is referred to as simply "the herald" while other men are referred to as “herald of prince X”, is presumably a public official; he appears to be the equal of the princes, for not only is he a rich man, but his son, Dolon, attends a meeting of Trojan leaders (X.299-301; 314ff.). The distinction between public and private heralds is not generally accepted. It is explicitly rejected by Buchholz (1881: 56 n.1), and Finley, for one, claims that a ruler's personal retainers are also his “public officials" (1977: 94). The term demioergoi is also applied to craftsmen and other skilled specialists (17.383-5),

because,

as with

public

heralds,

their

services

community at large or to any member of the community, ‘master’ (cf. Finley 1977: 56). See also n.95.

are

available

to

the

as opposed to a single

26. Ambassadors: 21.16-21 (see p. 171); strategy: XV.719-23; surrender: XXI1.117-21. Their other roles are discussed below. See also Appendix Three, section 2, on femenea.

27. On meetings of the princes: Carlier 1984:

145-50.

It would be somewhat

misleading to speak of a ‘council’ in this context, because there is no fixed body of

councillors : it is up to the prince who calls the meeting to decide who are to be invited. See Appendix Two, section 1. Carlier has pointed out the important fact that the ruler has the final word, and gives the order to carry out such decisions as have been reached, even if he does not

always in person formulate these decisions (1984: 167, 170, 186, 504, 510; see IX.96-102; ΧΙΙ.211-15; ΧΙΠ.726-35; cf. 7.161 and 11.344-6). This is one governmental role which distinguishes the ruler from other princes (see n. 24 ad fin., and below for further roles). Consensus, though, is clearly important : proposals are

often applauded by all present (e.g. VII.403; IX.173) and Nestor at times speaks to support decisions taken by Agamemnon (II.76-86; IX. 162-72). 28. Most of the evidence cited refers to the arrangements within the army at Troy, but the fact that among the Phaiakians, too, gerousios oinos is consumed (13.8-9) suggests that the practice is the same in the towns.

One might dismiss the reference to "we Akhaians' as merely a manner of speaking, but in view of the fact that the wine is explicitly 'a thing of the people’, it seems

better to take the phrase at face-value and conclude that Agamemnon offers this kind of hospitality on behalf of the people at large. 1915: 386-7.

Cf. Jeanmaire 1939: 85-9; Andréades

327

Notes to Chapter Two

Carlier (1984: 155-7) and Moreau (1894) argue that the wine of the elders is not a special category of customary gift from the people, but is simply taken by the

princes from the gifts of wine and other goods with which they are ‘honoured’ by the people. If so, the fact that the elders as ‘a thing of the the community. The wine not be confused with other

the princes continue to regard the wine shared out among people’ shows a remarkably strong sense of obligation to of the elders, or ‘royal banquet' as some call it, should types of commensality : see p. 44-6. On the norms of

distribution, see pp. 85-6. 29.

Use

of

the

sceptre:

111.218-9;

11.100-1,

109;

1.245-6;

2.80-1.

On

the

procedural role of the sceptre, see Appendix Two, section 2. 30. Detailed discussions of assembly procedure : Finley 1977: 78-82; Murray 1980: 58-60;

Geddes

1984:

31-2 and Carlier

1984:

182-6

who

again

makes

the crucial

point that it is the ruler who has the final word (as at e.g. 11.369-94; V11.365-79, 405-13; see n.27 above), against Geddes' view that the assembly functions effectively without him. An assembly may however be called in the ruler's absence, and when this happens in Ithaka, it is simply one of the other princes who suggests breaking up the assembly when all have had their say (2.252-8). For ‘voting with

one's feet’, see 3.137-58 and 24.463-6. 31. Andreev (1979a: 395-6; 1988: 17), too, notes that decisions are taken formally in name of the people. It must be admitted that ‘the Trojans’ could be used to refer to Trojan elders only, but the analogy with the ‘wine of the elders’ (above), dispute settlement and the distribution of booty (below) suggests that here, too, the people at large are meant. 32. There are supposed to have been at least a few meetings in the agora during a space of twelve days (1.490; cf. the assemblies in progress at I.12-23 and VII.3823). 33. Thus the logistic problems of a ten-year war as opposed to a seasonal expedition

are unsolved, and in twenty years Odysseus and his wife appear not to age at all. Finley (1977: 82-3) and others assume that Homer is being realistic in this respect; they argue that the ten or twenty years’ absence of the rulers during the Trojan War shows that real Dark Age kings were more or less redundant. The continuity of informal assemblies in Ithaka is stressed by Havelock 1978: 145-6; Carlier 1984:

184. 34. The main evidence for the procedure is the 'trial-scene' on the shield of Akhilleus (XVIII.497-508), the interpretation of which is hotly debated.

Gagarin 1986: 26-33; Ruschenbusch 1982; MacDowell Wolff 1946: 34-49; Bonner/Smith 1930: 31-41.

1978:

See e.g.

18-21; Thir 1970;

The interpretation I am following here is that of Carlier (1984: convincingly solves a number of notorious difficulties. The passage litigants seek a judgement from an istor, then describes the elders speeches, and finally says that the elder who speaks most justly will fees (two talents of gold; the talent is in Homer clearly a much smaller any of the talents current in Classical times). The questions that arise

172-7), who states that the making their get the courtmeasure than are (a) who is

Notes to Chapter Two

328

the istor and what is his role; (Ὁ) who decides which elder has spoken best; (c) what is the role of the monarch, who is elsewhere said to dispense justice. With regard to the last point, it has often been said that the monarch has no role at all in the process as depicted on the shield and that any mention of the monarch as judge is a Mycenaean “survival” (Gernet 1968: 243; Geddes 1984: 33-4; cf. Frisch 1949: 40; Bonner/Smith 1930: 29-30). Carlier's solution is to assume that it is the monarch who performs the role of istor (cf. XXTII.487), and that it is the istor who

decides which elder has given the best judgement (and thus de facto judges the case). The role of the monarch in judging is thus analogous to his role in other forms of decision-making : he formulates the final decision. (On the issue at stake in the scene : see p. 134.) This interpretation accounts for all references to law-sessions (the one reference to "a man” who gets up after settling many disputes does not, of course, imply that this man has settled these disputes all by himself, or that he is not an elder, contra Buchholz 1881: 23), so that we are left with a consistent image of the procedure.

35. Gernet (1968: 220) and Carlier (1984: 173) both point out that verdicts are given by a collective and are therefore a community matter. Humphreys (1983b: 231-2) suggests that the two talents of gold are displayed during the law-sessions to produce a “distancing” effect; they function as a "legitimating device by which a judgement is represented as emanating from the community as such.” The passages describing the rewards and punishments for upholding or failing to uphold justice are often dismissed as inconsistent with Homeric views on justice and on kingship. They are taken to mean that the king as such brings prosperity to his people, and it is thought odd that elsewhere in the poems "no-one mentions any barrenness or plague that might descend on the city when the rightful ruler is excluded" (as Geddes [1984: 30] puts it). But the text specifically refers to the administration of justice, as e.g. Nilsson

(1933 : 220) and Mondi

(1980:

213

n.6)

admit ("the old idea has been... modernized by the reference to the nghteousness of

the king”).

The status of the monarch and the usurpation of power, therefore, are

not at issue. The other objection, that Homeric gods are not normally concerned with jusuce for its own sake, will be discussed below, pp. 146-7. 36. As opposed to the spoils (armour, prisoners) taken in the course of battle, which the captors are allowed to keep. For the following, see also p. 87 below, and Appendix Four.

37. This applies to the prizes, but perhaps not to the portions; see Appendix Four, section 1. 38. So Vlachos 1974: 68; Moreau 1895: 316, 319-20. For more on Odysseus‘ reception in Crete : p. 170. The only information we actually have on provision for public sacrifice is that Priamos’ wife provides from her own stores a peplos to offer to Athena (V1.288-311). In Pylos, nine groups (hedrai) who take part in a sacrifice each provide nine bulls (3.7-8), but it is not clear who, within each group, bears the cost. 39. The terms demos and ge/gaia are used to refer to such political units covering more

than one

town

(e.g.

the demos

of the Kephallenians,

20.210;

demos

of the

Notes to Chapter Two

329

Thesprotians, 17.526; 19.271; Boiotia, V.710; cf. Lykia, e.g. VI.225; XVI.437), but they also refer to the territory of a single town within a ‘state’ (e.g. the demos of Ithaka, 1.103;

14.126 etc.; Athens, 11.547; cf. Hymn to Apollo 30; Apaisos, 11.828;

Hyde, XX.385). As for choosing to call this political unit a state, one may well object that ‘state’ suggests a more formalised and centralised organisation (so Scully 1990: 1 and 55, following Runciman 1982) but it still seems more appropriate than 'tribe' which could misleadingly suggest a predominantly kinship-based structure. 40. It is sometimes asserted that single towns are the only political unit in the epics (e.g. Hoffman 1956: 154-5). 41. The Catalogue : 11.484-760. The Cretan contingent is recruited from seven towns which are mentioned by name, and from “the others who lived in the hundred towns of Crete” (11.645-9; cf. the 90

Cretan towns mentioned 19.172-4).

The seven named towns are apparently only the

most prominent ones, Similarly, of the Athenian contingent only Athens itself is mentioned (11.546-52), although the Odyssey knows at least one other town, Marathon (7.80-1). On the political geography of the Catalogue, see pp. 57-8.

42. X1.670-761; cf. 11.591-602.

"Thryoessa polis" (XI.711) is presumably the town

called Thryon in the Catalogue (11.592).

The tale is discussed at length on pp. 195-

8. 43. See Appendix One, section 1 for a discussion of these data. 44. Liparas teleousi themistas (TX.298, 156), here translated as “complete splendid law-sessions" (cf. n.1 above) could also be translated as "pay him rich dues". This does not alter the implication that he is to rule supreme in these cities, but removes the reference to his (nominal?) role as judge.

45. A complication here is that later versions of the story said that Bellerophon(tes) had left Ephyre and taken refuge in Argos after killing a man (so scholia ad loc. and Apollodoros 11.3.1). Thus he would have been subjected to Proitos as a refugee, not as a subordinate ruler. As Leaf points out, the reference to the sceptre is not appropriate for “accidental authority over an exile from a foreign country" (1900: ad VI.159). Others have pointed out that it is possible to explain the phrase as referring to Proitos’ power over the Argives, not Bellerophontes (so Willcock 1978: ad loc.; Kirk 1990: ad VI.157-9). I would argue that the remark that Proitos was "a far better man” suggests that his power over Bellerophontes was more permanent; compare the phrase which describes Agamemnon as "better" than Akhilleus, "because he rules more men" (1.281). I would therefore agree with Willcock (1976:

ad V1.157-9) that in Homer Bellerophontes rules Ephyre as Proitos' subordinate. "The land [demos] of the Argives” from which Bellerophontes is expelled need not mean the territory of the city of Argos, but could refer to the wider territory of the ‘state’ (see n.39), including Ephyre. On either interpretation, one difficulty remains : if Ephyre is another name for Corinth, as is generally accepted, it would according to the Catalogue be subject to Mykenai, not Argos (II.559-80). Since the story of Bellerophontes takes place long

Notes to Chapter Two

330

before the Trojan War, a possible explanation is that the Mycenaeans were supposed to have since expanded their territory at the expense of the Argives (cf. Page 1959: 129-132). 46. Cf. Carlier 1984: 179-80. Those who interpret Homeric society on feudal lines, maintain of course that the ‘king’ is regarded as the ‘owner’ of all the land, and therefore has the right to give cities in fief to ‘vassals’

(see Nilsson

1933:

236-8).

Contrast, however, Menelaos' proposal to reward Odysseus for his help in war by transferring him and his people to a city nearer Sparta. To that end, Menelaos intends to “evacuate” one of the towns “that are ruled by me" (4.169-177). Here, Odysseus and the Ithakans are given land, but evidently this does not make them Menelaos' vassals, for offering subordinate status to an independent ruler would be an odd way of rewarding him. It does seem rather likely that Menelaos would rely on force to make his own subjects leave their homes (the verb for 'to evacuate‘ [exalapazo] also means ‘to destroy‘). Whatever the poet had in mind, it was clearly more than a “temporary symmachy” (Andreev 1988: 21) in time of war that bound towns together.

47. See pp. 173-4 48. Panakhaioi : 11.404; VII.73, 159, 327, 385; IX.301; X.1; XIX.193; XXIII.236; 1.239; 14.369; 24.32. The phrase "Panellenes [All-Hellenes] and Akhaians" also occurs

(11.530).

(For

metrical

reasons

Homer

calls Greece Akhaiis,

rather

than

Akhaia, but I shall use the latter name.) "Trojans, Lykians and Dardanians” : e.g. VIII.173; X1.286; XIIL.150; "Trojans, Dardanians and allies” : e.g. 111.456; VII.318; "Trojans and allies” : e.g. VI.111. 49. So, too, Deger 1970: 129-30. When Polyneikes, Tydeus and the Argives come to ask for the help of the Mykenaians against Thebes, they ask them to give epikouroi (IV.376-9). This is the only occasion on which this term is applied to Akhaians. Either the poet has momentarily abandoned his concept of the Akhaians as a single political entity (see n.102), or Akhaian unity 15 supposed to exist only visa-vis outsiders, or Akhaian unity is supposed to have emerged only under Agamemnon's personal leadership, after the war against Thebes. 50. Note also Priamos’ exclamation : "O blessed son of Atreus...!

the young Akhaians subject to you [foi dedmeato)".

Many indeed are

He is referring to the entire

army (III.182-90). There is no doubt that 'Argos‘ can refer to all of Greece (e.g. 1.30; VI.456; XV.372).

Kirk (1985: ad 11.108) declares that it is "out of the question” that Argos

could have this meaning here (contra e.g. Leaf 1900: ad loc.). I fail to see why unless perhaps the argument is that such a political unit is unrealistic, but that is another matter (see p. 58).

51. IX.149-56,

291-8.

Pylos, at IX.153, 295.

(as

well

as

Lakedaimon

in

Cf. Willcock

Messenia,

: 21.13,

1978: ad 149.

They are said to border on

Pherai, one of the seven (IX.151, 293), lies in Lakedaimon

which

implies

that

part

of

Messenia

belongs

to

15-6; cf. n.101).

Other, less plausible, explanations for Agamemnon's power over these towns are that they are part of "an unclaimed residue of minor settlements and communities”

331

Notes to Chapter Two

(Gladstone 1870: 416); or that Agamemnon is supposed to be not only king of Mykenai, but, together with Menelaos, king of Sparta as well (Finsler 1914: 217-18; there is no other evidence for this notion). 52. Since The World of Odysseus, the term oikos is often used to denote the Homeric

household.

In view of the importance the household is supposed to have had to the

heroes, it is worth pointing out that oikos in Homer is not the value-laden in classical Greek. (Perhaps because the tension between the interests of and the polis is not as strongly articulated as it is in Classical times.) Homer mostly means ‘house’, or even ‘room' (e.g. 1.360), although it is for the resources (not the members) of the household (e.g. 4.318).

word it is the oikos Oikos in also used

$3. The presence of many buildings within the court-yard is also suggested by the use of plurals to indicate the house : domata, οἰκία, megara. The court-yard is large enough to provide space for throwing the discus and javelin (4.625-7, with 678;

17.167-9; cf. 1.103-12). Geese : 19.536 (Ithaka); 15.161-3 (Sparta). e.g. XXIV.266-82.

Dung:

17.297-8

(Ithaka);

Dogs : 17.291ff. XXIV.161-5,

Mules and horses : 640 (Troy).

Cattle,

sheep, goats and pigs brought in from the countryside : 3.421-2, 430-1 (Pylos), and

e.g. 17.170-1, 212-14; 20.173-6,

185-9 (Ithaka).

Left to feed for a while, then

slaughtered : 20.162-4;. cf. 173-6, 185-9 and 17.212-14. It is misleading to say that the house is “accessible to an alarming number of farm animals” (Geddes 1984: 26),

or that it is "clearly a large farm house” (Halverson 1985: 137). With the exception of the geese, all farm-animals are kept in the country; the dung they leave is swept out and used to manure the farm land (17.297-9; so, too, Gray 1955: 8). It is also wrong to regard the presence of dung and geese in Odysseus’ courtyard as a sign that his house is a "second class palace" as compared to Menelaos' "first class palace” (Wace 1962: 489): Menelaos' house has geese, too, and Priamos’ courtyard is equally littered with dung. Note the consistency of the image of the courtyard : there is an altar for sacrifice, which is conveniently placed in the feeding-area for the animals (khortos, X1.772-6; cf. 22.333-6, 379), and it is in the feeding-area that there is most dung (XXTV.640).

54. Among the many discussions of Homeric houses, I have found especially useful Drerup 1969: esp. 129-30; Gray 1955; Bassett 1919. The great hall is commonly known as the megaron, but again the term is not used in this specific sense in

Homer, who uses it to mean any 'room' (see Knox 1970). Use of stone : 17.30;-20.258 (threshold); 10.210-11 (Kirke's house); cf. VI.2448; 23.190-4 (bedrooms built of stone). The steep roof : XXIII.710-13. (Plommer (1977: 82] objects that it is mentioned only once; this is true, but the image is consistent with the many references to "high roofs” [e.g. 4.304).) Armour on walls: 16.284-6; 19.1-9; 22.23-5; the fact that Odysseus and Telemakhos remove them to another room (19.14ff) does not mean that this other room is an “armoury” (contra e.g. Bassett 1919: 306; cf. Finley 1977: 63). Tripods along walls:

XVIII.373-6.

Spear-rack : 1.127-8.

The shade (aithousa) projecting over the door, together with the pillars or beams that presumably support it, forms the ‘porch’ (prodomos); there is nothing to suggest that the porch is a separate room attached to the front of the hall (comra Plommer

1977: 80-1).

There are also aithousai along the court-yard wall:

walls" (Plommer : ibid.) may be too grand a term for them.

"colonnaded

The space in front of

Notes to Chapter Two

332

the courtyard gate is called proshyron. It is not clear whether there is a shade here too, but there is no reason to think that the prothyron is a “roofed building" (ibid.).

$5. Odysseus’ slave women work in a building (also called megaron or megara), in which they are twice locked up by the housekeeper (19. 16-64; 21.235-41, 381-7; cf. 22.394-401). That this contains more than one room is suggested at 23.41 (thalamol). Penelope often stays in which she retreats regularly (4.718 surrounded by maids (4.719-21), it building just mentioned. The ‘upstairs room', accessible

a thalamos which is not the ‘upstairs room" into with 750-2, 759-61). Since in this room she is seems likely that it is one of the rooms of the by ladder or stairs (1.330), in which Penelope

sleeps (2.358, 15.515-7) is not the marital bedroom (23.364-5), and is not part of an upper floor of the great hall, for when Penelope comes down from it, she enters the hall via the outer entrance (‘stone threshold’ 23.88; cf. 19.53). Probably, therefore, it is located on an upper floor of the women’s quarters. Presumably, the upstairs store-room (21.5-10) is there, too.

Wickert-Micknat (1982: 71-2) points out that women are not confined to these quarters, and that men sometimes enter them.

56. Marital bedroom of Odysseus : 23.190-4. the 62 bedrooms

of Priamos'

children

building for grinding corn : 20.105-8.

Telemakhos’ bedroom : 1.425-42 (cf.

[VI.242-5]).

A storeroom : 2.337ff.

A

A tholos (presumably a round structure, but

its function is a matter for conjecture) : 22.441.

$7. Telemakhos'

bedroom is "in a part of the courtyard with a view all round”

(periskeptos, 1.425-6), and Odysseus built his marital bedroom “around” an olivetree in the courtyard (23.192). Drerup suggests that the laure (see n.58) is a narrow ‘alley’ separating the dining-hall from the other buildings (1969: 130).

58. Unfortunately, all the more precise indications of which building is where are hard to understand. We do not know, for example, what exactly kas’ antestin (20.387) means, or what and where the orsothyre, laure (see n.57) and rhogas are (22.126-43). Note Havelock's imaginative suggestion that the /aure is the lavatory, placed at the back of the dining-hall and accessible via the orsothyre ("arse-door"[!]; 1978: 84). 59. Inspection of farms : 4.638-40;

15.503-5.

There is not a single reference to a

princely house in the countryside; Odysseus, Nestor, Menelaos and Alkinoos all live in town; the houses of Priamos and his sons are on the acropolis of Troy. Laertes has left his town-house and stays on the farm (1.189-90; 11.187-8), but only because

he is mourning

for his lost son and no longer wants to rule (11.188-96);

cf.

Hoffmann 1956: 154, 60. See Lacey 1968: 39-47; also Murray 1980: 41-2. Priamos has several wives (XX1.85-9; XXII.48-51, XXTV.493-7). This may, as is often suggested, be a little ‘local colour’, a “typically oriental” harem (e.g. Deger 1970: 122-4); on the other hand, the god Hephaistos, married to Aphrodite according to the Odyssey (8.266ff.), has another wife, Kharis, in the Iliad (XVIII.382ff.) : inconsistency or polygamy 7

Notes to Chapter Two

333

Lacey (1966: 55-61; 1968: 39-40) suggests that there are two patterns of residence for women after marriage, the second being for daughters to stay at home and for their husbands to come and live in the house of their fathers-in-law (uxorilocal residence). Most of the alleged evidence for this fails to support the notion: in a number of cases the (prospective) son-in-law is an exile from home, so that he cannot take a wife to his own house, and he is given a place of his own to live in after marriage (VI.191-3; XIV.119-25; 7.311-16). Whether or not Iphidamas (X1.211-45) lives with his father-in-law (rather than merely in the same country) is

hard to say.

Nestor's sons-in-law, in spite of what is sometimes said, do not in fact

live with him - they go home at the end of the evening meal (3.396, which I take to refer to his sons-in-law only, since his sons are apparently still in the house next morning when they come out of their rooms {thalamoi, 3.413]). That leaves only Priamos and his sons-in-law, who definitely do live with him (V1.242-50). But one may note that at least one of them used to live elsewhere with his wife, and came to Troy only when the war broke out (XIII.170-6; cf. XV.545-54 and IV.499-500); it

may be that Priamos’ sons-in-law live with him only for the duration of the war (cf. V.473-4). Married sons staying at home (viri- and patrilocal residence) : of the six sons of Nestor who live with him (3.412-15), only one is unmarried (3.400-1); Alkinoos has two married sons as well as three unmarried ones living with him (6.62-3); before

Laertes retired to the countryside (n.59), Odysseus and Penelope evidently shared the house with him; Priamos’ fifty sons "with their wives" live with their father (VI.242-6), but see above on his sons-in-law, and note that Hektor and Paris have

already set up their own households (V1.313-17, 370). It has been observed that the existence of a special term for husband's brother's wife, einater, (i.e. a term not including brother's wife, as our ‘sister-in-law’ does), for a husband's brother, daer,

and husband's sister, galods, reflects a virilocal pattern of residence (Finley 1977: 77-8, Gates 1971). Division of inheritance : 14.207-10; cf. XV.187-95. 61. The basic meaning of therapon is 'he who serves' (pace Stagakis [1966: 415], who claims that it has the same meaning as hetairos [see n.66], and that it refers to a

reciprocal relation). A Greenhalgh 1982: 85-6).

less often

used

synonym

is opaon

(Stagakis

1967;

It is commonly, but wrongly, asserted that there is a difference between the therapontes of the Iliad and those of the Odyssey : retainers in the Iliad are believed to be of higher social status, and to perform more dignified services, than their counterparts in the Odyssey (Andreev 1988: 54-7; Carlier 1984: 181-2; DegerJalkotzy 1978: 153; Kakridis 1963: 85; Nilsson 1933: 233; Finsler 1914: 189, 220; and especially Ramming 1973: 24, 90-7). In fact, there is no difference at all in the kind of services they perform. Ramming, who attempts a detailed demonstration of the differences, needs to resort to fanciful distinctions. He says that retainers in both epics do the same hard and lowly work, but that in the Iliad they only do so out of

“war-time necessity" (ibid.: 90-4).

He also argues that, although it is categorically

stated that carving meat and mixing wine are things "lesser people do for their betters" (15.324), this is "wishful thinking”: only men of relatively high status perform such more dignified services (ibid.: 96-7). As I see it, there is really only one difference between the two epics in this respect : since the Iliad deals with war, retainers are often shown fighting in battle, and thus make a more ‘heroic’ impression than they do in performing domestic tasks only.

Notes to Chapter Two

334

As for their social status, there is nothing to suggest that retainers in the Odyssey are not of high status : one is called "lord Eteoneus" (4.22, see below), and the Ithakan princes are attended by "beautiful, well-clad young men” (15.330-3). On the other hand, the term therapon is also applied to all those who follow Akhilleus to war (XVI.272; XV11.165), which almost certainly includes many men of low rank. Thus, in principle, anyone could be a therapon (so Finley [1977: 104] contra Garlan (1988: 37; 'non-nobles' only} and Greenhalgh (1982: 81-3; 'nobles' only]).

Finally, the fact that a retainer may be called a “carver” or a “wine-steward” does not necessanly mean that he is a specialist (Mireau 1954: 63) or that this is his “official title” (Glotz

1929: 43).

Some

retainers are called kerykes (heralds) : they

are specifically entrusted with conveying messages and running addition perform other tasks (mixing wine, pouring water) as well. 62.

On

the relation between

leaders and war-time

(1988: 47-9, 57-8), Carlier (1984: 181-2) many retainers serve in war only - they are a Hausgefolgschaft, as Deger puts it (also Versnel (1980: 108-27, esp. 116-17) and

retainers,

errands,

see p. 48.

but in

Andreev

and Deger (1970: 76-9) also stress that predominantly a Heeresgefolgschaft, not Deger-Jalkotzy 1978: 152). Note also Bremmer (1982), who discuss Homeric

retainers in the context of a debate on the nature of retinues in early Rome. 63. So,

too, Carlier

1984:

181-2.

By contrast,

Greenhalgh

(1982:

83-4)

suggests

that these refugees are the "top-therapontes” in the household. The exiles are Patroklos (XXIII.84-90), Lykophron (XV.430-9) and probably also Epeigeus (XVI.570-6). There is also Phoinix who, having run away from home after a quarrel with his father (IX.447-84), is set up as a ruler in his own right by Peleus, but may have lived with Peleus for a time (1X.485-91). Of other retainers, we simply do not know where they live. I can find no evidence that the poet and the herald who work for the suitors in the Odyssey are supposed to have been resident in Odysseus’ household. The bard who guards Klytaimnestra (n.65) might, but need not, have lived with Agamemnon previously. 64. Andreev (1988: 51) regards these as “group servants", not private retainers, but I see no reason to think so. Two out of eight are from Ithaka and are called therapontes, the other six are from Doulikhion and are called dresteres (cf. 15.330). A drester is a ‘worker’ in general, but the list of these dresteres' tasks (15.318-24)

comprises precisely the things a retainer does (chopping wood, lighting a fire, roasting meat, carving, and pouring wine). The Ithakan suitors suddenly dispose of a few more therapontes at 18.291-301. 65. Note that Odysseus and Agamemnon leave no retainer behind when they go to war; Agamemnon leaves only a bard to chaperon his wife (3.267-8). One might argue that they would have left more men to look after their homes, if they had had large numbers of permanent retainers. 66. Finley (1977: 105) points out the relative unimportance of kinship: “other strong and often more binding relationships were established outside the bloodgroup” (cf. Murray 1983a: 196; Donlan 1982a: 151; 1985; 1989a: 8-11). On the importance of brothers, see p. 147- 8. There are a few references to efai, whom many regard as kinsmen (wrongly, I think : see Appendix One, section 2), and three references to phratries, which some

Notes to Chapter Two

335

see as wider kinship groups (see n.99). Andreev (1988: 40-5) argues that such organisations, and kinsmen in general, are more important in Homeric society than

they seem.

On kinship terminology : Gates 1971.

67. Philos means ‘one's own', and hence, when applied to people, ‘loved one', ‘dear one'. The word hetairos means two things : (a) it denotes “participation in a common enterprise" (Humphreys 1978: 165), and can be translated as 'companion'; (b) it denotes a man who frequently keeps another's company, and can be translated

as ‘friend’.

It is misleading to give it more specific meanings, such as ‘follower'

(Deger-Jalkotzy

1978:

152), or the whole list of meanings provided by Kakridis

(1963: 52ff.; cf. the odd speculations on hetaireia in Stagakis

1975).

Nor is there

any distinction between its usage in the Iliad and in the Odyssey, as Jeanmaire (1939: 100) claims. Both philos and hetairos can be applied to relatives, retainers and all sorts of friends, social equals as well as inferiors (see n.80). A therapon is always a hetairos - companion or friend -, but a hetalros is not necessarily a therapon.

68. See pp. 169-71 and 228-37. 69. Donlan cement

1989a: esp.

12-13;

1982a: esp. 140 (“economic generosity... is the

that binds leaders and subordinates");

also

1982b;

Fagerström

1988:

144;

Qviller 1981: esp. 116-17, 124-5; Humphreys 1978: 69; and already Nilsson 1933:

230-4.

This view tacitly replaces Finley's live-in retainers with somewhat less

dependent followers, who are merely fed and entertained by their leaders; they are referred to by the authors as hetairoi, rather than therapontes. Donlan (1989a: 28)

describes the obligations that are created through feasting as “ties of deferential friendship’, i.e. they are hierarchical, but nearly equal. 70. The funeral feast of Hektor is attended by ‘the people’ (laos; XXIV.665, cf.

801-3); that of Patroklos by 'innumerable' (murioi) Myrmidons (XXIII.26-34); that of Aigisthos and Klytaimnestra by "the Argives” (3.308-10). See Carlier 1984: 155. Whether or not the people at large are invited to the weddings of Menelaos' children (4.3-19) depends on one's interpretation of etai, which I take to mean 'townsmen' (see Appendix One, section 2). Contrast the apparently closed ‘wedding' of

Penelope (23.131-6, 142-52). It is possible that large-scale sacrifices provided an opportunity for largesse, but it

may equally well be that the expense was recovered from the people (see n.38). There are feasts called eilapinai which might be interpreted as hierarchical, non-

reciprocal feasts, but another interpretation (see n.71) is equally possible. It is certainly not true that Penelope's suitors come to eat at Odysseus’ house every day because they are Odysseus’ followers or retainers, who would eat at his expense whenever he was at home, and are in his absence "abusing their rights” (Nilsson

1933: 230) or "outstaying their welcome” (Murray 1980: 50) as retainers.

The

suitors come to dinner as part of their courtship, and it is the customs of courting that they abuse. Their excuse for visiting every day is that they wish to keep Penelope under pressure and force her to decide (2.87-126). 71. The contexts in which the word eilapine is used contrast this type of meal with the eranos (below, n.72) and suggest that it is a lavish affair (1.226 [contrasted with eranos and, as also in XVIII.491, associated with wedding-feasts]; 11.415; X.217; XXIII.201; the verb eilapinazein apparently means ‘feasting’ in general, without

Notes to Chapter Two

336

reference to a specific kind of feast (2.57; 17.410, 536; XIV.241)}). Probably, therefore, the full cost of eilapinai is borne by the host, rather than shared by the diners, and such meals are attended by whomever the host wishes to invite, rather than always the same group of friends. This could refer to egalitarian, reciprocal feasts,

but

the only

evidence

to that effect

is a reference

to Hektor

holding

an

‘eilapine-companion’ in the highest esteem (XVII.576-7). It is also possible, therefore, that an eilapine is a hierarchical feast (n.70), and if so, the name for reciprocal feasts must be eranos (so Longo 1983: 252; Gemet 1968: 191-4; Jeanmaire 1939: 96). In that case, there are two types of feast called eranos; the other kind - which is the only kind I shall be calling eranos -is discussed below, n.72).

Some have found the passage about Telemakhos' attendance at princely feasts out of place : Jeanmaire wishes to delete it ("a gloss by one of the poets of the Nekyia”,

1939: 91). 72. Eranos : 1.226; 11.415. For the meaning of the term : Longo 1983; Gemet 1968: 47-8, 191-5; Buchholz 1883: 196-8. The eranos is often wrongly ignored: Donlan (1982a: 164 n.46) says that it has "only the shadowiest existence in the epics”, and Nilsson (1933: 231 n.4 and 5) tries unconvincingly to explain it away. See also Vondeling 1961: 7-11.

It must be stressed that the organisation and significance of each of the kinds of meal discussed above differs, and that all differ from the 'wine of the elders’ (or ‘royal banquet’; this is provided at public expense [pp.32-3] so that there is no reciprocity, and the obligations created are to the people at large [pp. 82-3, 85-6]). Despite the differences, all these meals are often lumped together in the literature. Finley makes no distinctions at all (1977: 123-6). Murray speaks of “reciprocal feasts at which

“equals”

attend, and at which,

at the same time, a leader through

“generosity” creates a band of men “obligated to follow him"; leaders compete with one another for followers (1983a: 197-8; 1980: 49-50) : it seems to me that this is a conflation of two different kinds of meal. The ‘wine of the elders‘ is generally confused with other types of meal: Andreev 1988: 46; Donlan 1982a: 163-5; Deger-Jalkotzy 1978: 151 (who concludes that there is an “amalgam of different conceptions” in the matter); Nilsson 1933: 230-2; Finsler 1914: 191-2; Moreau 1894: 138. See also Murray 1990. Although there are distinctions, it is not always possible to tell from Homer to what type any given feast belongs (e.g. 7.49-50 or 15.466-7). 73. Some commentators,

by contrast, have concluded that it should therefore be

deleted as an ‘interpolation’ : Ameis-Hentze 1856: Anhang ad 4.621 (cf. West 1988: ad 4.621-4). From a literary point of view, the passage provides a contrast between the proper behaviour of Menelaos' guests and the outrageous behaviour of the uninvited guests in Odysseus’ house, to which the story is returning next (4.625ff.).

74, Especially insofar as it is applicable to Astyanax : see pp. 140, 148, 152. Aristarchos found it unacceptable and deleted the passage (followed by Leaf 1900: ad XXII.487). But Willcock

Deger (1970: (1978:

127) calls it "unorganic and as it were ‘stuck on'“.

ad XXII.484)

finds it acceptable

as it stands,

(1988: 49-50) uses it as evidence for the existence of dining clubs.

and

Andreev

Notes to Chapter Two

337

75. I would follow Oswyn Murray in stressing the importance of upper class bands of table-companions (or 'sympotic' groups) as the crucial “organ of social control” over the lower classes (1990; 1983a: 196; cf. Lombardo 1988: 267-71), while disagreeing with his views on the relation between table-companions and warriorbands (see n.81). Finley makes a brief allusion to feasts as an element of class organisation: “It was as if the constant repetition of the feast were somehow necessary for the preservation of the group”, whether οἶκος or class (1977: 125). Unfortunately we cannot say how large on average a group of table-companions would be, or how many such groups there would be within a Homeric community.

76. XI.123-5, 138-42; 2.186; cf. IV.93-9.

Gifts play an important part in Homeric

society, as has often been pointed out (e.g. Gernet 1968: 182-97; Finley 1977: 64ff; Donlan 1982a/b), but the significance of exchanging favours is not always noted : see pp. 140-8.

7Ί. Sacrifices are called “gifts” at e.g. XXIV.68.

On relations between gods and

mortals, and the parallels with relations between princes and commoners, see e.g. Adkins 1972, and further pp. 147-8. Geddes thus goes too far in saying that there are in Homer “no references at all to any client relationship” (1984: 26-7), but it is true that such relations are barely mentioned : see pp. 55-6.

78. The number 50 is derived from the size of a ship's crew (Appendix One, section 1), as well as from the size of the bands gathered around Trojan campfires (VIII.562-3) and the size of an ambush (IV.391-5). Another common size for a ship's crew is 20 (Appendix One); also an ambush of twenty : 4.530-1. As I have argued above (pp.42-4), most of these personal retainers act as such for the duration of the campaign only. The need to recruit fellow-leaders applies not only to Agamemnon, who recruits rulers of other Akhaian states to help him (below), but presumably also to the commanders of 'state'-contingents, who are each followed by a number of ‘local’ leaders : cf. Van Wees (1986: 287-8 and 290 n.28). (I should like to correct a number of errors I made in the footnote just cited : (a)

Poulydamas is not a cousin of Hektor's; (Ὁ) not three, but four (or possibly five: ΧΙ.59) sons of Antenor are leaders, and two of these are in fact mentioned

in the

Catalogue as well (1I.819-23); (c) a further Trojan leader is Alkathoos, brother-inlaw of Aineias; (d) the references to "Trojan leaders" in n.14 should read : XII.88100, 196; XV.516-7 (cf. XI.57-60).]

79. Promises and oaths : Π.286-8, 339-41; IV.266-7; cf. Deger 1970: 112. Akhilleus and Patroklos are asked by Nestor and Odysseus "and you two were very willing” (X1.782); when Akhilleus (1.169ff.), Agamemnon does nothing to stop him. Some military service, and again they do so “to please the

XX111.296-9, 19.237-9).

to join the expedition : withdraws his services men substitute gifts for prince” (XI.20-3; cf.

Although Agamemnon is depicted as ruler over all Akhaia,

his power to mobilise the other monarchs is evidently not supposed to be absolute.

80. The choice of words is remarked upon by Geddes 1984: 32; Donlan 1979: 67 n.6.

It must be stressed that the term hetairoi is applied to all warriors, not merely

to the élite.

All the men

of Odysseus’

fleet who

are killed by the Kikones,

the

Notes to Chapter Two

338

Kyklops, or the Laistrygones are hetairoi of all the survivors (9.63, 566;

10.134).

All men left out on the battlefield at Troy are hetairoi of all those who have fled within the walls (XII.122). The whole army may be described as hetairoi of Menelaos (XVII.680) or Hektor (XIII.778) or Akhilleus (1X.630-1). A whole contingent not directly led by Menelaos may be regarded as consisting of his Aetairoi

(XVII.703).

81. There are two other views : (i) A prince recruits a band of warriors from among

his dependants, whether live-in retainers or followers dependent on his generosity in feasting (e.g.

Finley

1977:

103-4;

Nilsson

1933:

230-2).

(ii) A prince recruits a

band of warriors from among his peers, primarily his table-companions; he and his friends form what is often called a Mdnnerbund (e.g. Murray 1983a: 198; 1980: 523; Jeanmaire 1939: 42, 50-1, 100).

commoners

who

On both views, the bulk of the army consists of

do not form part of the warrior-bands.

As to how

these are

recruited, “we are left in rather complete darkness", as Finley (1977: 103) puts it. Both views are, I think, partly right. Princes do bring their dependants to war if they have any, but, as I have argued, many princes do not. It also seems likely that table-companions would fight together, but it could well be that one circle of companions contained several potential leaders, so that the group would split up in war; it could equally well be that men from outside the dining-club might join one of these leaders. There is no evidence one way or another. A weakness of both views is that they exclude the bulk of the army from their model of recruitment.

As I have already said, all men in the army are one another's

hetairoi (n.80) and princes as well as commoners may be therapontes of a leader (n.61). Elsewhere I have argued that the bulk of the warriors participates in battle in the same way as the princes do (Van Wees 1988; contra the notion that they are passive spectators). It seems simplest, therefore, to assume that there is no fundamental difference between élite warrior-bands and the masses, and that a prince

simply recruits followers of all ranks by means of a variety of ties, including kinship, table-companionship, economic dependence and instrumental friendships (similarly Andreev 1988: 57; Finsler 1914; 219, cf. 191-2). Perhaps he might also frighten less powerful men into following him. On the problem of how the so-called phratries relate to the war-bands thus created, see n.99 below. 82. 14.5-28, 48-51, 410-56, 508-33; cf. Richter 1968: 25-9. 83. 24.208-12, 358-85; cf. Richter 1968: 24-5. I take it that the outbuilding (24.208-10) is occupied not by Dolios and his family, who apparently live in the main building (24.386-412), but by the other slaves, subordinate to Dolios, who are

mentioned again at 24.222-5. The custom of rewarding a hard-working slave with a (slave) wife and a house as well as a plot of land, is mentioned at 14.62-6. Presumably Dolios is one of those who has been so rewarded. 84. Odysseus has most of his herds grazing on the mainland, looked after by his own men as well as 'strangers' (14.100-2), and his cattle are ferried across from the mainland when required (20.185-8). The Ithakan Noemon has twelve mares grazing in Elis, and needs his ship to fetch one (4.634-7).

Notes to Chapter Two 85. Eumaios : 15.361-70.

339 Dolios' daughter : 18.321-3.

In fact, apart from the six

sons who stay on the farm (24.497), there is also Melantheus, son of Dolios, who is

in charge of the herds of goats (17.212-13). Dolios, he, too, works in the countryside.

But even if he is a son of the same

A general distinction between the men on

the farms and the women in town is made at 16.304-5, 311-20.

86. On Ithaka, Odysseus has 5 men to look after his pigs (14.24-6) and more than 3 men herding his goats (3 of them come to town : 17.212-14). four groups of herds (14.100-7, see below).

have a total of at least 29 herdsmen.

Outside Ithaka, he has

Assuming five men for each group, we

The ‘garden’ is run by Dolios, his six sons and

a number of other slaves (see n.83), which should add up to at least

a dozen men.

This gives a total of 41, and Odysseus very probably owns further agricultural holdings run by other slaves. Note that Glotz (1920: 20) estimates a number of 50 male slaves and nevertheless goes on to say that there were many more females. Garlan (1988: 32-3) rightly points out that the predominance of females is an “optical illusion”, but wrongly assumes that male slaves would

house as well (as does Finley 1977: 55). Ignoring the fact slaves run Odysseus’ ‘garden’, he also asserts that slaves herding only, agriculture being left to hired labourers. On between Iliad and Odyssey in patterns of slave-owning, see p.

work in the town-

that Dolios and other would be involved in the alleged difference 253.

87. The size of a herd of cattle and a flock of sheep is given as 50 once (12.127-30); Eumaios herds 12 x 50 sows and 360 boars which probably represents 12 droves of 80 animals each - and the numbers are supposed to have dropped below the usual standard (14.13-20); "a herd of cattle and a large flock of sheep" is said to consist of 300 animals (X1.696-7). The fact that these numbers may be unrealistic (Rihll 1986: 87) does not matter in the present context (see n.98 below). 88. Mankind 8.222; 9.89, gods in this barley and (presumably

as bread-eaters : V1.142; XI1.322; XXI.76, 465; 1.349; 2.290; 6.8; 191; 10.101; 20.108; and V.341, where they are contrasted with the respect. When Telemakhos goes on a journey, he takes 20 bags of 12 amphorae of wine (2.289-91, 349-55, 379-80), but no meat because it would not keep). The capacity of the land to bear wheat,

barley and wine is stressed : among the Kyklopes all three grow spontaneously (9.108-11); Syros is "rich in wheat and rich in wine” as well as in live-stock (15.406); and the epithet "rich in wheat" is also applied to Lakedaimon (15.372; cf. 4.602-4); Messenia (3.495); Elis (X1.756); Doulikhion (e.g. 14.335); Troy (XX1.602); and to all of Greece ("Argos’ : XV.372). Note also the ‘garden’ of Priamos, just outside Troy (XX1.34-8; fig trees grow in it). Agricultural similes are

common : e.g. X1.67-9 (reapers in field of wheat and barley); X1.558-62 (donkey in a com-field); XTI.421-3 (quarrel over farmland boundary). For a detailed discussion, see Richter 1968: 32, 87-146. The importance of agriculture is thus clear (contra e.g. Geddes 1984: 26-7; Murray 1980: 46-7; Finley 1977: 60). One of the reasons why to us it may seem less important than animal husbandry is that we do not know the number and the size of land-holdings, while we do know the numbers of animals. We hear of plots four or fifty gues in size, but we do not know how much that is ([X.578-80; 7.112-13; 18.371-5; cf. Richter 1968: 13-5; and Walbank 1983: 181 n.5 on the later meaning of gue as a type, not a measure, of landholding).

Notes to Chapter Two

340

89. On kleros : Andreev 1988: 29-31; Richter 1968: 11-12. See also Appendix Three, section 2, on temenos. I would suggest that, when Eumaios describes the wealth of Odysseus in term of herds (14.96-104), and the inhabitants of the seven towns offered to Akhilleus are described as "rich in sheep, rich in cattle” (IX.154, 296), this is because livestock are as such a sign of wealth: plough-land and ‘gardens' are taken for granted. As for the apparent stresson meat-eating, two further points should be noted : (a) slaughtering animals and roasting the meat is part of the meal in Homer; this in contrast to the preparation of bread and wine, which takes place beforehand. As a result, descriptions of meals contain many lines on the preparation of meat, while bread and wine are simply offered in a line each. (b) The image of constant feasting on meat is reinforced by the fact that the epics so often deal with special occasions. When Telemakhos arrives in Pylos, a great sacrifice is conveniently in progress; next day, his host organises another sacrifice in honour of Athena who has appeared to him. Then, when Telemakhos moves on to Sparta, he happens to arrive in the middle of a wedding. These are, of course, rare occasions, on which more meat

than usual would be consumed. As for the /liad, the fact that it deals with an army in the field, living off plundered live-stock to a large extent, again allows a more than average consumption of meat. In the ‘daily lives’ of the heroes, by implication, meat might play a lesser part. Note also the absence of any reference to eating fish, which presumably was too 'common' to rate a mention in the epics. 90. On intensive agriculture : Donlan 1989a: 140-1; Richter 1968: 104-7. Fruits and vegetables : 7.112-28 (cf.11.589-90); 24.246-7, 340-2. Manuring : 17.297-9. Irrigation : 7.129-30;

XXI.

257-62.

Walls:

V.88-92;

XVII.561-6;

7.112-13.

Dolios and all the other slaves are away from the farm, “gathering stones to make a wall for the garden” (24.222-5); “gathering stones and planting big trees" is the work offered to a thes at 18.357-9. Note the legend of the services performed by Poseidon and Apollo as thetes for Laomedon : Apollo herded cattle, and Poseidon

built the walls of Troy (XX1.441-57).

Perhaps this is modelled on the tasks a thes

would typically perform. 91. Princes herding : e.g. XXI.89-91, Supervision : 15.504-5.

187-90; XI.101-6.

Ploughing : 18.371-5.

92. Eumaios describes the arrangement when he says that the gods have made prosper his "work..., from which I ate and drank and gave to those who must be

respected" (15.372-3).

When a visitor arrives, Eumaios takes two piglets from the

sties and slaughters them, explaining that the boars are reserved for his masters (or at any rate for the suitors of Penelope, who have taken over the house; 14.72-81). But towards the evening, when the boars are brought in, he decides to slaughter one of these, after all, both for the sake of his guest, and because he feels that he and his men deserve a treat after all their hard work (14.410-17). It seems, therefore, that Eumaios has considerable freedom to manage his resources as long as he is able to fulfill the demands of "those who must be respected", which I take to mean his masters as well as his guests. The herdsmen appear to receive one tunic and one cloak each from their masters (14.513-4; 15.368-70). It seems likely that they are also provided with bread and wine (cf. 16.82-4), although Eumaios' remark that he “eats and drinks” from his "work" might suggest that he provides for himself. A kind master might invite his

341

Notes to Chapter Two

slaves up to town once in a while, and give them a meal and "something to take back to the farm" (15.374-9). Another measure of the independence of the slaves is the fact that Philoitios, who is in charge of Odysseus’ cattle on the mainland, considers seeking a new master and taking

the

herds

along

(20.209-21).

Garlan

(1988:

35)

also

emphasises

the

independence of slaves, contra Finley (1977: 62-3) who believes that all produce is redistributed from the central stores of the household. 93. Stores of flour : 2.354-5, 380. Stores of wine : e.g. 2.340-3. The housekeeper is a slave with a privileged position, who has the keys to the storerooms (e.g. 2.337-80; 9.204-7). Odysseus in fact has two housekeepers : Eurykleia (2.345-7) and Eurynome (17.495). The twelve women who grind corn appear to do so just before dawn : the slowest among them is still grinding her share when dawn breaks (20.91 with 105-10). When

they have done their work, they retire to bed (20.109).

At dawn,

it is said,

Odysseus’ slave-women rise and light the fire (20.122-3). Since it seems unlikely that twelve maids go to sleep just before dawn only to get up again at daybreak, we must assume that they are working an ‘early shift'. The reason is presumably that the flour is used to make bread for the day, although this is not explicitly stated (note the ‘old baking-woman’ at 18.27). A practice of working in shifts may also explain why it is said that in Alkinoos’ house "some grind corn, others spin and weave”

(7.103-6).

94. Textiles stored: 2.339; 8.438-41; 15.104-8, 123-30; VI.271-3, 288-95. Textiles play an important role in hospitality (see pp. 229-31, 235-6) and as status symbols (pp. 102-4, 227).

95. On treasure and the acquisition of metal abroad : pp. 103; 218-48 (esp. 222-7).

On craftsmen : Finley 1977: 55-6; Eckstein 1974: 3ff. (and see n.25 above). There is nothing in the epics to suggest that craftsmen are members of princely households, or that there is some kind of communal arrangement for remunerating their services; so far as we can tell, craftsmen are independent and are simply paid

by their customers as they work (Finley 1977: 56).

Craftsmen make precious

objects to order : Tykhios fashions a huge bronze-covered shield for Aias (VII.2203); Polybos makes a purple ball for Alkinoos' sons (8.372-3). A prince might provide the materials to be used, as Nestor provides the gold for the smith Laerkes to

gild the horns of a sacrificial animal (3.425-6, 432-8), but perhaps a craftsman might have his own stocks of raw materials as well (cf. Hephaistos : XVIII.474-5).

The

craftsman's wages would presumably be paid in kind (flour, wine, live-stock) and if he

provided

the

raw

materials,

he

would

probably

be

reimbursed

in

the

same

way (cf. p. 226). 96. For the size of ships’ crews, see Appendix One, section 1.

slaves and hired men: 4.642-4.

Ship manned by

It is not explicitly said that most princes own a

ship, but that seems to be the implication of their frequent travelling and raiding, and occasional trading, by sea (see Chapter Four, sections 6-9). Noemon certainly owns a ship, and one ship only (4.630-7). Paris uses more than one ship for his voyage to Sparta, but these are specially built for the occasion (V.59-64). Telemakhos has no ship available, presumably because his father has taken his ship(s) to Troy. The same may apply to Odysseus’ friends Mentor, Halitherses and Antiphos, who are

Notes to Chapter Two

342

apparently unable to provide a ship when Telemakhos needs it: perhaps they have lent their vessels to Odysseus for his expedition to Troy, although there is no hint that this is so. When Antinoos (4.669) asks the other suitors to “give me a ship" for an ambush at sea, he may be asking merely for ‘permission’ to use his own ship for this purpose (i.e. he may be asking the others to consent to his plan to lay an ambush, rather than to actually provide the ship for it); if not, it is presumably a ship belonging to one of the other princes who court Penelope.

In Phaiakia, “each man” has his ship (6.265).

It is not clear who provides the newly-built vessel that brings Odysseus home (8.346). Passengers on others'

ships : 2.318-20;

13.271-7;

14.334-6,

15.256-86.

Ferry-

service : 20.187-8.

97. Fundamental differences between Mycenaean and Homeric houses are pointed out by Gray (1955: 10-11), who nevertheless stresses Mycenaean parallels. Insofar as there are similarities between Mycenaean and Homeric buildings (such as the plan of the central hall, the presence of a court-yard, and possibly of passages between buildings) they are no closer to Mycenaean than to late Dark Age or early Archaic architecture, The coping of kyanos on Alkinoos' house, which has often been cited as a parallel to the decoration found at Tiryns (e.g. Plommer 1977: 82; Wace 1962: 489-97),

should not be taken out of context:

it is part of a house made of bronze

with a silver door-frame, and hence clearly a fantasy-element (7.86-90). Brief discussions of archaeological evidence for 8th and 7th century houses and towns : Scully (1990: 85-7), Murray (1980: 47-9, 64-5); in more detail, see e.g. Akurgal 1983 (Smyrna); Boardman 1967: 3-64 (Emporio); Cambitoglou et al. 1971, 1988 (Zagora); and the works cited in n.15 above.

Murray notes that buildings grouped round the dining-hall have not been found, except in Mycenaean palaces, and this is a problem in identifying Homer's houses with those of a single historical period. Murray's solution (as cited above), that houses on that scale would be located outside town, is not, I think, acceptable (see n.59). Benches in the agora are a feature of Archaic Dreros (Willetts 1969: 90), but

a circle of benches has not, to my knowledge, been attested for any period.

98. Division of labour in Mycenaean textile production : 'spinning women’ (a-ra-kate-ja), ‘weaving women' (i-te-ja), and distinguished in tablets PY Aa/Ab/Ad,

'wool-carding women’ (pe-ki-ti-ri-ja) are as Kees Ruijgh points out to me. For

numbers of slave women and livestock in the tablets, see e.g. Carlier (1984:

211).

118-25,

The absence of references to scribes and bureaucracy in Homer, taken by

itself, could at a pinch be explained as the result of the poet avoiding such ‘unpoetic’ matters. The absence of labour-specialisation and above all the small scale of Homeric slave- and livestock-owning, however, are striking - especially given the epic tendency to exaggerate the scale of things - and make it clear that the poet had no idea of conditions in Mycenaean times. It has recently been argued that the po-ku-ta of Mycenaean tablets are a social group equivalent to Homeric (and later Greek) theres, insofar as they are landless men, who own a few animals only (Ruijgh, forthcoming a). If so, the mention of a ‘community

of po-ku-fa'

(po-ku-te-ro da-mo ), which

owns a slave (KN

C911.6),

suggests that these Mycenaean thetes are organised to an extent not found in Homer, whose thetes appear to be isolated, even migratory.

Notes to Chapter Two

343

That wealthy men owned live-stock on a large scale in Archaic times is suggested

by a well-known reference in Aristotle to “the cattle of the rich” in seventh-century Megara (Politeia 130 54 21ff.).

For the notion of a shift from pastoralism to agriculture : e.g. Snodgrass 1987: 193-209; 1980: 35-7; Fagerström 1988: 142-4; Murray 1980: 46-7. 99. For the shift from vertical to horizontal relations:

Donlan

1981: 110); Andreev 1988: 59, 75; Qviller 1981: 111, 114-16,

1989a:

27-8 (cf.

135-41; Calhoun

1934: 308-12. Bourgeois (1983) argues that vertical and horizontal relations "alternate" in Homer. Humphreys (1978: 69) and Greenhalgh (1982: 84, 86) argue

for a decline in the importance of personal followers as a source of political power; Humphreys, though, rightly points out that in Homer exchange relations between equals are more important than with inferiors (ibid.). It seems likely that patronclient relationships did exist in Greece, but that an ideology of equality led to their existence being veiled by the Greeks and ignored by Homer : cf. Millett 1989; also

Cartledge (1987: 139-159) on the role of patronage in Spartan society. It is sometimes

suggested

that the prominence

of companions,

friends

and

followers is a fantasy element (Andreev 1988: 40-5: "a poetic model") or an element

derived from the Age of Migrations (Andrewes 1961: 138-9).

The argument is that

such relations are at odds with the existence of phratries mentioned by the poet and taken to be a contemporary feature.

Phratries, however, might have coexisted with

networks of friends and relations; indeed they might be these very networks (see e.g. Jeanmaire 1939: 133-4; and briefly Van Wees 1986: 298-9, 301 n.74). Murray, while rightly noting the predominance of horizontal relations, posits a

transformation of upper-class peer groups from warrior-bands to leisure groups (1983c: Si; cf. 1983a: 198). I am doubtful about this. As I suggested earlier, Homeric table-companions probably would not fight as a single, exclusive unit in

battle, and they certainly would spend much leisure time together.

The difference

between them and Archaic symposiasts appears to be small in this respect. As for the emergence of new dining-customs (see Murray 1980: 80; Dentzer 1982), these perhaps represent the development of a more distinctive ‘aristocratic’ life-style, and therefore a sharpening of class-distinctions, rather than the emergence of leisure groups as such. Part of the same process may be the appearance of the gymnasion and the palaistra - neither of them found in the epics. See also pp. 163-5

below. 100. The discontinuity between Mycenaean and Homeric political organisation is argued by e.g. Carlier 1984: 128, 211-14; Drews 1983; Finley 1981: 218-21; Thomas 1966: 392-3. Apart from the title anax, the ‘divine connections’ of the

Homeric king are often adduced as a Mycenaean element (e.g. Deger 1970: esp. 181; Mondi 1980). However, Zeus' support for kings and princes is not fundamentally different from Apollo's patronage of singers and archers, and seems wholly integrated into the Homeric conception of relations between gods and mortals. On law-procedures in early Greece: e.g. Gagarin 1986: 19-50. On the formalisation of these procedures : Humphreys 1983b. On formalisation in general

e.g. Finley 1981: 87; Starr 1961: 134-5. It has been argued that there is one example of a formal Council in the epics: the thirteen princes who dominate Phaiakia (e.g. Deger 1970: 165). But the mere fact that a definite number ‘rulers’ is given does not mean that this is an institutionalised situation.

of

Notes to Chapter Two

344

101. Mycenaean state-organisation : Chadwick 1976: 69-77; Hooker 1976: 183-5. Greek ethnos : Ehrenberg 1969: 22-5, 120-31. Political geography : Spartan rule over part of Messenia is implied by 21.13-16

(with 3.488-9),

where the town of Pherai is said to be in Lakedaimon and in

Messenia at the same time.

The Catalogue names "Messe" as one of the places

tuled by Menelaos (11.582) and it may not be a coincidence that it is Menelaos who comes to the aid of two men from Pherai (V.541-63). Cf. Finster 1914: 217-8. Apart from the prominence of Mykenai and Pylos, the importance of Troy, the absence of Greeks from Asia Minor, and the absence of Dorians (except 19.177, and possibly an indirect reference to Dorian tribal organisation at 11.655-6) must reflect Mycenaean conditions; perhaps the separation of Orchomenos and Aspledon from Boiotia (11.511-16) is another Mycenaean feature.

The Greeks had a clear tradition

that the Dorians had migrated into the Peloponnese and the Ionians and Acolians to Asia Minor well after the heroic age; the fact that the epic picture takes account of this state of affairs is not, therefore, evidence of the continuity of a Mycenaean poetic tradition. The geography of Pylos would be better evidence of this, if the correspondence between the tablets and the epics were a little more clear-cut : for the

parallels and differences, see e.g. Hooker 1988: 60-1; Deger 1970: 153. Discussions of Homeric political geography in general: Hope Simpson/Lazenby 1970; Giovannini 1969; Kirk 1985:

168-240, 248-63.

I am not aware of any evidence for (pre-Hellenistic) Greek rulers being in a position to give away cities, as epic monarchs are, but the practice was not unknown in the Near East and Egypt. Greeks were at times the beneficiaries of such gifts : Themistokles, for one, received a number of cities from the Persian king Artaxerxes (Plutarch, Themistokles 29,7), and, as Harry Pleket points out to me, a certain

Pedon was rewarded with a city by the Egyptian pharaoh Psammetichos I (664-610) (SEG 37 (1987), no. 994). 102. For detailed discussion of the possibility of Mycenaean political unity, see e.g. Carlier 1984: 132-4; Deger 1970: 90-2, 111-12, 182. Carlier 1984: 180 notes parallels between

the way

Agamemnon

leads the Akhaians and the way Athens,

Sparta and Thebes led their ‘allies’ in Classical times. On the Archaic Panhellenic ideal: Silk 1987: 3.

The view that a sense of Greek

cultural unity was inspired by the epics seems implausible to me: surely even a poem as influential as the Iliad could hardly have imposed a sense of unity upon a group of communities which had not previously felt it, merely by telling them that they had been united in the past.

345

NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE 1. There is an element of this in, for example, traditional Mediterranean cultures (see e.g. Pitt-Rivers 1977: 1-47; Davies 1977: 89-101; Campbell 1964: 263-320; also, on mafia, Arlacchi 1986; Blok 1974) and in the subculture of British soccer hooligans (cf. Marsh et.al. 1978; 1982). 2. As Morris points out, "any society contains elements of both conflict and harmony; and different self representations will emphasize the two to different

extents” (1986a:

119).

As for soccer hooligans, Marsh has argued that they

persistently exaggerate the danger active creation... of excitement. avoided. ...Ergo, soccer terraces fans ‘know’ that this is not the (1978: 97).

Ina

of life on the terraces : “fans are engaged in the For fans, regularity and safety are things to be are potentially dangerous and unpredictable. Since case... they must conspire to construct disorder“

later paper, he withdraws somewhat from this position (1982:

116).

3. The explanation of conflict and violence in the epic world is not the central theme of Adkins' work - he is concerned with matters of moral vocabulary and the development of Greek ethics. In the following discussion I shall have to ignore many of Adkins’ arguments and take certain relevant theories and observations out of their contexts. 4. On the absence of a central government: Adkins 1960a: 35, 52; 1963: 35; 1969a: 21; and see p. 27 above. On the sanction of private retaliation : Adkins 1960a: 50, 61; 19606: 31; 1971: 9. 5.

Cf.

Adkins

1960a:

63;

1960b:

30

("time

is of

paramount

importance”,

it

constitutes “the roots of his existence"); 1982: 297 (“the goal of the Homeric agathos is to protect and if possible increase his simé"). Similarly e.g. Carter 1986: 1-2; Latacz 1984: 29; Finley 1977: 113; Redfield 1975: 33-4; Gouldner 1967: 48; Finsler 1914: 158-9, 6. The importance of wealth as a source of honour is also indicated by Adkins’ translation of simé as e.g. “status and possessions” (1970: 33; cf. 1982: 292 n.3; 1972a: 14) and "status-conferring possessions” (1982: 297; cf. 1972c: 15). See pp. 69-71, 77. 7.

He also argues that in Homeric society only strong men can be wealthy and only

wealthy men strong : 1960a: 32-5; 1960b: 28; 1969a: 21; 1970: 27; 1982: 293-4; see pp. 79-80, 82-3 (esp. n.52), 87-8.

8. The role of such personal excellences is marginal in Adkins’ view : only military prowess really counts (1960a: 71). 9. Cf. Finley's assertion that honour is by definition scarce : "it must be exclusive, or at least hierarchic. When everyone attains equal honour, then there is no honour for anyone” (1977: 118).

Notes to Chapter Three 10. Adkins comments or no” (1972a: 21). where one cannot be to attempt to succeed 12, 14; 1972a: 18-9;

346

that a man must defend his simé “by any effective means, just He also repeatedly stresses that “in a crisis”, i.e. a situation simultaneously 'just' or ‘truthful’ and successful, one is bound at the cost of having to lie or use violence : 1960a: 46; 1971: 1972b: 15-6; 1975a: 214-5 (his use of the notion of a “crisis”

of values at 1982: 326 is different).

Cf. O'Neal 1979: 13; Hogan 1981: 34-43.

Note that this competitiveness may also have a delayed effect : even if a man does not break the rules of the contest, he may bear a grudge towards one who has defeated him ‘fairly’, and retaliate later (cf. 1.81-2).

11. On the community's

need

for warriors:

Adkins

1960a:

36, 71;

1966:

195;

1969a: 21; 1971: 6-7; 1975a: 209; 1982: 292.

12. See already Grote (1851: 88): "The general epithets of good, just, &c. εὐ signify the man... whose arm is strong to destroy or to protect, whatever may be the tum of his moral sentiments; while... bad designates the poor, lowly and weak,

from whose dispositions, be they ever so virtuous, society has little either to hope or fear.“ On

the etymology

and possible Homeric

meaning

of agathos,

see Ruijgh

(forthcoming b).

13. For Adkins’ notion of a clear hierarchy of value-terms, with agathos at the top : 1960a: 30-45, 1960b: 23, 31. This notion and Adkins' interpretation of the evidence have been criticised by, among others, Long (1971), Pleket (1971), Dover (1983); Rowe (1983) and Lloyd-Jones (1983: 1-27; cf. 230 n.7; 240-2). Cf. n.31 below.

14. Gouldner in fact argues that honour is scarce only in shame-cultures (1967: 50). In Adkins’ argument the existence of a shame-culture is mainly mentioned as the reason why - as Adkins sees it - only appearances and results, not intentions, matter (on this question see pp. 112-14). 15. MacCary appears to be alone in arguing this view explicitly, but note Adkins’ comments on the heroes’ sense of insecurity (1960b: 29;

1972c:

3) and nervousness

(1969b: 16), and Nilsson (1924) on their ‘lability’.

16. Redfield argues that "man is essentially a creature of culture", and that violent behaviour, while “natural”, does not come easily to man. "Man cannot escape his essence; if for a time he denies it, this denial must be forced upon him by... enormous pressures... Man's entry into the sphere of nature can never be spontaneous or relaxed” (1975: 200-1). I should explain that by ‘altruism’ I do not mean selfless devotion to the welfare of others, but merely a reluctance to inflict suffering upon others. This is surely as ‘natural’ an inclination of man as the desire to harm enemies;

the common

notion

that everything ‘bad' in man is 'natural', while all ‘good’ exists only as the result of civilisation, education and coercion, seems to me to run counter to experience.

See

also next note.

17.

I would follow e.g. Montagu (1976) in rejecting the view that an aggressive

impulse is always spontaneously building up inside people, regardless of what happens to them, and must eventually be released, as well as the view that "enmity... is the innate response of an organism to any and all members of its own

Notes to Chapter Three

347

species" and is partially and temporarily suspended only in the face of a common enemy (Ardrey 1967: 294). There is a biological basis for aggression, but the expression of aggression is not biologically determined. Human beings merely have a capacity for aggressive behaviour which is activated by certain stimuli and may, in the absence of such stimuli, never be activated at all. 18. Many authors leave arere untranslated, since it is recognised that the traditional translation ‘virtue’ is too narrow in focusing on moral 'goodness’ to the exclusion of

physical qualities and skills.

‘Goodness’ would seem an accurate, but awkward

rendering. Kakotes can mean 'misery', ‘harm’ (e.g. X11.332; though kakon/kaka is more commonly used to mean this), as well as ‘badness’ (e.g. 11.368, XIII.108, XV.721). Both arete and kakotes often refer to courage and cowardice, respectively; see below.

Afimie is used only once (13.142), but the verbs asiman and

atimazein are common, and the adjective atimos occurs as well. 19. Examples of these kinds of deference are given below; Goffmann's wide definition of deference is unusual (cf. Pocock 1976), but suits Homeric simé better than the more colloquial narrow definition which includes respect shown by inferiors to superiors only. Adkins‘ definitions of timé (as cited in n.6) tend to focus on the status- rather than the deference-side, but he does occasionally acknowledge that honour includes "the attentions which others must pay in order to acknowledge and maintain it” (1960a: 63). Cf. Nilsson 1924: 365; Lloyd-Jones (timé is "honour due"), 1971: 4; Riedinger (simé "est en fait conféré par les autres”), 1976: 252; and Edwards ("the public acknowledgement of superiority"), 1987: 150. The two sides of “γιὸ are best illustrated by a passage in which it is said that men

are induced by the timé of the divine Litai to obey these goddesses, and that by obeying

the Litai

men

confer timé

upon

them

(1X.513-14).

So the Litai are

simultaneously said to have honour (status), which demands deference, and to gain

honour from the deference offered. Homeric honour is unlike the modern concept in that it is not a feeling, not a sense that one must live up to one's status and reputation (cf. Pitt-Rivers, 1977: 1-17). Another difference is pointed out in n. 104. 20. The distinction is made in slightly different terms by e.g. Silk 1987: 71; Carter 1986: 1-3; Latacz 1984: 29; Redfield 1975: 33. Honour and reputation are not always distinguished : Adkins, for example, sees ‘reputation’ as a (small) part of ‘honour’ (1960b: 29-30; 1972c: 3; by contrast, he elsewhere suggests that striving for fame may prevent one from maximising one's honour, 1982: 306). There is a third component of status, kudos, described by Redfield as "a kind of lustre or mana which belongs to the successful... a kind of star quality or charisma, an enlargement of the person” (1975: 33). So far as I can see, kudos is not an independent ingredient of status, but a consequence of acquiring a special honour and/or reputation. 21. The term 'privilege' (geras) is most often (25x) applied to a special share of booty (see Appendix Four, section 1). Otherwise, there is the privilege of the gods, which is to receive libations and the smoke of bumt sacrifices ([V.49; XXIV.70); the privilege of elders, which is to give orders "and make speeches” (TV.322-3; IX.422); the privilege of being given a special share of food (4.65-6; 20.297); the

Notes to Chapter Three

348

privilege of being a prince, which is on one occasion described as "ἃ privilege which the people gave" (7.150; also XX.182; 11.175, 184; 15.522); and the privilege of the dead, which consists of being lamented and given a lock of hair, funeral rites and

a burial mound with stela (XV1.457, 675; ΧΧΠΙ.9; 4.197-8; 24.189-90, 295-6).

In

relations with the gods and the dead, the notion of ‘face-to-face deference’ needs to be stretched a little, of course.

22. Honour is mentioned explicitly only in the verses on Arete, but I take it thar ‘looking at someone as at a god’ (see also XII.312) is part of what is elsewhere called ‘honouring someone like a god' (e.g. V.78;

IX.603; X1.58;

XVI.605;

5.36;

11.484-5; 14.205). That ‘looking at’ refers to the physical act of looking at, rather than the mental state of ‘having regard for', a person, is clear from the fact that it occurs only when one meets the person in question "walking through town”. It is also clear that one can “honour” someone "with a seat" : see n.27. 23. A problem in interpreting forms of address and complimentary epithets is that the poets may have chosen them merely as formulaic verse-fillers. However, Hohendahl (1980: 77-80, 145-8) argues that in a number of passages in the liad, at

any rate, forms of address are chosen deliberately to suit the situation and to express nuances of respect. Another way of expressing respect, it seems, is to omit the e-me altogether and substitute the appelation etheie (14.145-7). Judging from its occurrences, this term can only be used among people of close and long-standing acquaintance (VI.518; X.37; XXII.229, 239; XXTII.94; cf. Bettini 1988:

154-60).

I have discussed the above forms of deference at some length, because they have

so far received hardly any attention in the literature. 24. It is because her opinions count that Odysseus is advised to make his requests directly to her, although it is Alkinoos who takes the final decisions (7.53-5, 75-7, 139-61; cf. 11.335-53). It is said that she “solves quarrels even of men“ (7.74): I would suggest that she achieves this, too, through her influence over her husband. Presumably, these men's quarrels would be settled before the princes in the town-

square and Arete's role is behind the scenes.

She would appeal to her husband, the

ruling prince, to favour those who have appealed to her. 25. Laertes honours the slave Eurykleia (as highly as his own wife, 1.432); Antikleia honours the slave Eumaios "only a little less" than her own daughter (15.365), and it is part of this honour to provide him with a cloak and tunic and good sandals, as

well as to let him come to the town-house from the countryside and entertain him with food, drink and conversation (for a slave likes "to talk to the mistress and hear all the news", 15.377-9).

Disobedience on the part of the slaves is often said to dishonour the master or mistress (and the housekeeper as well, 22.424-5) : 16.307, 317; 19.498; 22.418. Obedient slaves honour the master : 16.306.

26. Gifts : IX.155, 297. him, Agamemnon

When Akhilleus announces that he will no longer fight for

tells him that he does not care, for "there are others with me, who

will honour me” (1.174-5).

Insofar as he is referring to the other Akhaians, he must

mean that they will honour him by continuing to fight on his behalf.

Similarly, the

Myrmidons honour Akhilleus by fighting for him (XVI.271-4). When Akhilleus opposes Agamemnon's proposals, he is told that he should not "quarrel with the

349

Notes to Chapter Three

prince, for a sceptre-bearing prince does not have an equal share of honour” (1.2779) : evidently his greater honour (status) requires others to honour (defer to) him by submitting to his authority. 27. IV.257-63; VII.161-2 and XT1.310-11 (which also mention ‘a seat’ - either a seat of honour at dinner, or a reference to the elders' benches in the town-square); and see the references in n.21 and 22.

28. This follows from the fact that men frequently request the services of those they ‘honour most' : Akhilleus lets himself be served by Patroklos at dinner (IX.202-20)

as well as in battle; later, he lets himself be served by the two men he honours most after Patroklos (XXIV.472-6, 572-5). Cf. V.325-7; XVI.145-7. As for honouring a man by serving him, it seems to me that in performing the services “which worse men perform for the good” (these include cutting firewood, lighting a fire, roasting and carving meat, and serving wine, 15.322-4), one acknowledges one’s inferior status and thus implicitly honours one's superior. See pp. 118-20. 29. Honouring a god : IV.46; VIII.540; IX.155, 297, 302-3, 603.

Gods honouring

mortals : Zeus honours Akhilleus by arranging at his request for the tide of battle to turn against the Akhaians

(e.g.

1.505, 559; II.4; VIIL.372;

Hektor by making him strong in battle (XV.612; XVII.99).

XV.77);

he honours

Apollo honours Khryses

by bringing a plague on the Akhaians, in order to avenge him (1.454). Thunder and a rain of blood are also used by the gods to honour mortals (X1.45-6; XVI.459-60). Adkins' distinction between mortals, who honour others directly, and gods, who

honour mortals indirectly, by causing other men to honour those whom the gods wish to see honoured, appears to be unfounded (1960b: 31). 30. For a further discussion of all these forms of deference in Homer, see Riedinger 1976: esp. 252-4. Riedinger's article is an important corrective to Adkins’ discussion of honour (1960b; but see n.35). Adkins tries to show that honour consists predominantly of material wealth, and that deference consists almost entirely of transfers of goods (followed by Edwards (1987: 150], who says that “[honour]

must be marked by material tributes and gifts"; Mueller

[1984:

32]:

rim2 is

"literally an assessment of his worth expressed in material goods” (emphasis added);

Whitman [1982: 24]: Homeric "tokens of respect” are “somewhat materialistic", and a man's honour is “concretely represented by the quantity of his booty"). Clearly,

non-material forms of deference are very common in the epics, and indeed must be by their nature far more pervasive than gifts, even if they are not often mentioned. One might compare the ‘litany' of honour in Hobbes’ Leviathan : "To pray to another, for ayde of any kind, is to Honour... To obey, is to Honour... To give great gifts to a man, is to Honour him... To be sedulous in promoting anothers good; also to flatter, is to Honour’, etc. (1651: 42-3). 31. Adkins believes that a man cannot be called ‘good’ merely for being ‘moral’, in

Homeric usage ; only those who are successful in some form of competition are *good'.

He therefore explains away the passage about a good man ‘loving’ his wife

as a "persuasive definition’, i.e. an unorthodox point of view put forward by someone who has a case to plead, but not accepted by society at large (1960a: 39-40; 1971: 6-7). This line of argument has been justly criticised by Long 1970: 134; Rowe 1983: 266.

(Incidentally, Adkins wrongly interprets the passage as meaning

350

Notes to Chapter Three

that a 'good' man "does not lust after other women"; he comments that “chastity” was never a part of Greek male arete [1960a: 40]. But the context of the passage makes it clear that ‘loving one's wife’ need mean no more than making an effort to keep her to oneself !) Two other passages which suggest that ‘unethical’ behaviour may seriously affect one's reputation and standing as a good man (16.418ff.;

21.331ff.) are also declared ‘persuasive definitions' by Adkins. On the problem of the role of ‘justice’ or ‘co-operative excellence’ in Homer, see

pp. 146-8. 32. Also, it is an argument in favour of allowing a ‘beggar’ to compete in a game, that he has “a good father” (21.335); cf. the references to the "good fathers' of Akhilleus (XX1.109), Helena (VI.292; 22.227) and Tyro (11.235). Telemakhos is said to be "of good blood” (4.611); Akhilleus is said to be of "higher birth” than Patroklos (X1.786-7), and the fact that his mother is a goddess is stressed (1.280).

The

standing of one's parents thus does influence one's own;

the occasional

recitation of genealogies suggests that one's further ancestors count as well. Calhoun (1934: 197-205) is right to point out that this does not amount to a great deal of evidence (cf. Geddes 1984: 20). On the problem of whether or not the Homeric world knows an aristocracy of birth, see p. 81.

33. The position of basileus is several times described as an honour in itself (and as

a geras, see n.21) : VI.193, 616; XX.181; 1.117; 11.338, 495, 503; 24.30.

It is

also said that princes have honour from Zeus, which presumably means that Zeus

honours them because they are princes : 1.278-9; 11.197; cf. 1.175; XVII.251. Riedinger 1976: 246-7.

See

Note also the adjectives 'Zeus-born' (diogenes) and ‘Zeus-

nurtured’ (diotrephes) applied to princes.

Priests honoured by the people at large :

V.76-8; XV1.603-5. 34. For personal relations and relative age as a source of honour, see Riedinger (1976: 247-9), who seems to be the only scholar to date to have recognised this side of honour. 35. The argument is presented in greater detail by Riedinger (1976: 254-263), who argues against Adkins’ view that a man only has as much honour as his power enables him to take from others (see p. 66). Although Riedinger is right to stress the importance of norms in attributing and conferring honour (which Adkins does not wholly deny, in any case), he goes too far, as I hope to show, in arguing that power and force play hardly any role at all in this matter.

36. See the excellent analysis of aidos in Riedinger

1980.

Aidos involves a

psychological shrinking back, a feeling of reluctance to transgress. It is conventionally rendered as 'shame', but Riedinger distinguishes its use in two

different contexts : one is the feeling of aidos when experienced "par un individu devant un autre"

(62),

for which

“la traduction par

‘respect’

est assurément

la

meilleure possible" (65), the other is the feeling when experienced before people at large, a ‘respect’ for public opinion,

and in this sense it is better translated as

“shame” (66-8). See also e.g. Lloyd-Jones 1987; Scott 1980; Verdenius 1945.

Notes to Chapter Three

351

37. As Riedinger points out, 'to honour’ and ‘to love' (philein) are used almost as

synonyms, as at e.g. 1.197; IX.117-8; 10.38; 14.83-4; 15.543 = 17.56. It is said that Akhilleus failed to appreciate "the friendship of his companions, with which we honoured him" (IX.630-1); this suggests that friendship is the emotion that inspires one to honour another, If, however, one believes that friendship in Homeric Greek does not refer to emotions so much as to ‘friendly deeds' (Adkins

1963: 34-5), one

could argue that friendship is one form of deference. 38. The killing of twelve Trojan prisoners to accompany Patroklos on his funeral

pyre, and Akhilleus’ persistence in maltreating the corpse of Hektor in revenge for Patroklos, are certainly unique in the epics, and the abuse of Hektor, at any rate, is

regarded by Apollo as out of all proportion to Akhilleus' suffering (XXTV.31-54). Akhilleus, however, feels that he owes it to Patroklos to do these things: XXIV.591-5.

Whether these ‘honours’ are criticised by the poet as morally wrong

is a much debated question; see pp.

129-30.

On the unusual intensity of the

friendship between Akhilleus and Patroklos (and on the question of whether this indicates a homosexual relationship), see Clarke 1978. 39. See p. 110ff. for a further discussion of differences. 40. 11.673-4 (beauty), 768-70 (warrior and charioteer); XXIII.274-8

(charioteer),

790-2 (runner).

41. 111.211 and e.g. 6.229-45 (beauty); 9.19-20 (cunning); III.216-24 (eloquence); VII.159-69 (warrior); XXIII.700-39; 4.341-5 = 17.132-6 (wrestler); XX111.790-2 (runner); 8.215-22 and 21.111-185 (archery). 42. "You look like a prince" (17.416; 24.253 [in stature and looks]; III.170).

"Does

not look like a bad man” (1.411 [face]); “looking like a young aisymneter* (XXIV.347), or like "the son of a ruler” (13.223). One can tell an aristeus by his looks (III.44-5). But some men of rank are not handsome : Dolon (X.314-6); a fluent speaker (8.167-72); perhaps Eurybates (19.246-7). Compare also the way in which Nausikaa's beauty stands out from that of her (beautiful) slave-women: 6.101-9.

43. Calhoun (1934: 203-4) argues that the passage means only that good looks may be inherited (cf. Geddes 1984: 20), but clearly what Menelaos says is that 'bad men’ cannot

have

sons

who

look

handsome,

and

thus

no

bad

man

can

ever

look

as

handsome as a prince. 44. On Thersites' social status, see n.58.

45. E.g. Pyraikhmes, leader of the Paionians “was the best man at fighting" (16.292); Aias “by himself“ holds the Trojan army at bay (11.566-71). For a detailed discussion of the evidence, see Van Wees (1988: 15-17, 21-2), and on the narrative pattern of ‘zooming ἱπ' on a few heroes in the midst of a large crowd of warriors, also Willcock forthcoming b; Latacz 1977: 76-81. Cf. n.47 and 64 below. 46. Halverson (1985: 130-2) argues that, since in other contexts ‘the people’ means the whole population, princes included, the intended contrast in these passages is

Notes to Chapter Three

352

between men who are quiet and men who shows (131 n.4). That seems to me far too strained a reading of the text. Geddes (1984: 22-3) points out that princes "are not invariably spoken to politely" and that two men of high status "are also at least threatened

make

with a blow",

a categorical

but this does not alter the fact that Odysseus

distinction between

princes and

people.

here does

(Geddes'

further

observation [ibid.] that elsewhere ‘harsh’ words are spoken to slackers and 'gentle' words to keen fighters, is irrelevant.) Cf. Kirk 1968: 112; and further n.48 below. 47. For recent reconstructions of Homeric battle that recognise the active role of the masses : Willcock: forthcoming b; Van Wees 1988: 2-14; Morris 1987: 196-201; Pritchett 1985: 7-33; Latacz 1977 (esp. 225); Kirk 1968: 111. Some believe that the masses are present but do little more than shout and throw stones from a safe

distance (e.g. Murray

1980: 54).

Thersites'

claim is often (wrongly,

regarded as an "exaggeration", an unfounded boast (e.g. Thalmann wholly different interpretation : Singor 1990,

48. Geddes (1984: 21-2; cf. Calhoun

‘cowards’,

‘the common

including princely cowards,

people’.

but again,

used in contrast to princes, as it is in 4.62-4 and implicitly treatment said to be appropriate to bad men but not to treatment meted out to the ‘men of the people’ at 198ff.), princes as a category. A separate question raised by these passages is what kind Calhoun (op.cit.: 304), Geddes (op.cit.: 22) and Halverson that it is a distinction between

17).

A

1934: 309) rightly points out that ‘the people’

the entire population of a town or region. But when it is used ‘princes’, as it is at 11.188 v. 198, it clearly does mean the princes’ Halverson as cited in n.46. Similarly, Calhoun argues that 'bad men’ is "not used of the folk and file of the army” (op.cit.: 301; cf. Geddes op.cit.: 20). It is true e.g.

I think)

1988.

(demos or laos/laoi) does not necessarily mean

can mean

1988:

It can mean

in contrast to subjects. Cf. or of the rank that ‘bad men’

when

the term is

in II.188-90 (since the princes is exactly the it must refer to nonof distinction is made : (op.cit.: 133) suggest

'officers' and ‘soldiers’, or ‘leaders’ and ‘followers’,

and no more than that. But since the princes hold all formal power in the community, a distinction is also implied between a muling élite and its subjects. Since this élite is largely hereditary (see below with n.50), since it is categorically distinguished in looks, prowess, courage and wisdom from non-princes, since it maintains some social distance from its subjects (below with n.49), and since its members form dining-clubs and other associations among themselves (see pp. 44-7, 102-3), it seems to me that there is every reason to regard it as a class-distinction, too.

49. This seems to me a more accurate explanation of the people's absence than the common notion that it is somehow a characteristic of heroic poetry as a genre to exclude commoners categorically - a notion nightly questioned by Geddes (1984: 27). 50.

Calhoun,

1934:

192-208;

cf. Geddes

1984:

19-20;

Halverson

1985;

cf. Rihll

1986. Geddes points out that there are differences of opinion as to how many references to good birth one might reasonably expect (op.cit.: 20 n.20). Finley

claims that the epics contain “endless recitation of genealogies* (1977: 59; cf. 1981:

Notes to Chapter Three

353

224), while Calhoun says that “there is slight attention to the lineage of the major champions” (1934: 205). 51. See Appendix Two, section 1 and Appendix Three, section 1. 52. This is a not uncommon argument, put forward most explicitly by Adkins (1960a: 34-5; 1969a: 21; 1970: 29; 1982: 293-4). Adkins also argues the converse :

that only the strong could be wealthy, since the weak would be unable to hold their own against their neighbours (1960a: 33; 1960b: 28).

53. Compare the following comment on the situation in Sicily early this century : "The sons of a longtime ranching family were easy to distingish in Sicily. They ate more meat than the general population and consequently grew to be taller than the rest. For instance, the Bonanno brothers [prominent maflosi, the author's father and uncles] were all six feet tall or better.” (Bonanno 1983: 25-6).

54. 19.108-14. See pp. 34-5 above. 55. It must be stressed that they do not acquire these privileges by fighting bravely : they receive privileges by virtue of their status as princes.

Fighting bravely is

merely a way of justifying their enjoyment of privileges (cf. Van Wees 1988: 18-21; Pucci 1988: 138, also n.156; Thalmann 1988: 5-6). Riedinger suggests that Sarpedon is asking himself a real question and comes up with an unusual answer that justifies the rulers’ honour in a novel way (1976: 261).

By contrast, it seems to me

that the ideology expressed in the answer pervades the epic portrayal of princes. 56. This answer is also suggested by Geddes (1984: 20): "If aristocrats existed among the people who listened to [Homer], they might have expected him to explain aristocratic status as being due to superior achievement and talent rather than to the

accident of birth.” (Oddly, Geddes advances this as his reason for not studying the 'nobles' of Homeric society, but turning instead to a study of the non-nobles - of whom he then fails to find a trace.) Rihll criticises Geddes’ suggestion as assuming "an ideology befitting a meritocracy” and being "clearly anachronistic” (1986: 86).

I fail to see why the epic poets could not (yet?) have been familiar with a meritocratic system of values. (In fact, Rihll's argument leads her to conclude that prince is a status acquired by personal merit.) 57. E.g. Deger (1970: 84-5) believes that Homer does not 'understand' the sceptre; Carlier (1984: 192) rightly sees no contradiction. Mondi (1980: 208-12) suggests that the sceptre is the symbolic equivalent of Zeus' thunderbolt, and can therefore be both a symbol of sacral status and an instrument of force; but perhaps no such symbolic interpretation is necessary. On sceptres, see also Appendix Two, section 2. 58. Some doubt that Thersitesis meant to be a man of the people rather than an ugly

and undiplomatic prince.

Some ancient sources claim that Thersites was a cousin of

Diomedes (Pherekydes FGH 3 F 123 (= Schol. bT ad 11.212]; Apollodoros, Bibliotheke 1.8,6), but there is not a hint of this in Homer. Blok (1991: 166-77) suggests that he may be a prince who occupies an institutional role as jester (a clown-prince 7). Others argue that he is simply a member of a society in which there is no fundamental distinction between people and princes (e.g. Kirk 1985 ad

Notes to Chapter Three 11.212; Edwards 1987: 165).

354 It is true, as Calhoun (1934: 305) and Geddes (1984:

22-3) stress, that nothing is said about Thersites' low birth, and that the fact that he

is said to be the “worst” man in the army need not necessarily imply that he is one of the ‘bad men’ in the 'class'-sense. However, it is clear that he is treated in precisely the same way as the 'men of the people’, as opposed to the princes, had been earlier. That, and his ugliness, and perhaps also his lack of a patronymic, makes it almost certain that he is meant to be a non-prince, as indeed he is generally believed to be (e.g. Finley 1977: 111-12; Thalmann 1988: 1-4). Several recent discussions rightly point out that one should not assume that the poet introduces Thersites merely to criticise him : the episode also serves to show the princes in a different (and not entirely favourable) light (Postlethwaite

1988; Rose

1988; Thalmann 1988). 59. See pp. 34-5, 147-8.

60. There is no direct evidence for this, but the analogy with the custom of travelling to gather gifts from hosts (pp. 232-7) shows that soliciting gifts might have been an accepted practice of princes. Note also that Telemakhos suggests that he might have gone round town collecting contributions from people - but he is speaking of compensation for losses, not of gifts (2.76-8; cf 13.14-15).

61. Commentators on the passage always stress the implied contrast between ‘robbers of their own people’, and ‘robbers of foreigners’ : Priamos is criticising his sons

for robbing

the wrong

people

(e.g.

MacLeod

[1982],

Leaf

[1900],

Ameis-

Hentze [1868] ad XXIII.262). But that does not explain why Priamos should suddenly call his sons ‘robbers’ at all. Hohendahl (1980: 72) thinks that "they really have the contemptible habit of stealing small livestock”. Carlier (1984: 162) notes the general possibility that gifts are extorted from the people. 62. See Appendix Four, section 1. 63. See Appendix Four, section 2. 64. The poet does, in fact, acknowledge that mass efforts can be decisive even in heroic battle and that it is hard even for the greatest heroes to achieve much on their own

(XI1.410-12;

XX.356-7).

Nevertheless,

he suggests that the heroes may

win

battles almost single-handedly : see n.45. 65. The significant role of compulsion in the relation between the princes and their subjects is particularly stressed by Rihll (forthcoming) and Van Effenterre (1985: 122-37, who calls them ‘les rois du muscle’). Cf. n.151. 66. In these examples, as well as in what follows, the word 1 translate as ‘competition’ is eris, often rendered as ‘strife’. Hesiod distinguished a ‘good’ and a ‘bad’ eris; the bad one consisting of quarrels, wars and other forms of aggressive confrontation, the good one consisting of forms of 'friendly' rivalry, economic competition and contests of skill. Hogan shows that Homer's use of eris covers both good and bad forms, in fact "any competitive event" (1981: 27-33). Nagler's argument that eris always has negative connotations ("eris means conflict when

Notes to Chapter Three perceived as disruptive, unconvincing.

355 i.e.

‘quarrel’

or disorderly

contention",

1988:

83)

is

67. Whitman (1958) is particularly vitriolic in his judgement : "a mere thug”; "a sketch of inwardly, Willcock man more

mean violence” (165); “violent ruffian” (174); “outwardly a prince, but as Homer never is weary of showing, a ruffian and a boor" (264); cf. 1976: ad ΧΙΠ.202; XXIII.448, 774. I agree that the poet depicts Aias as a aggressive than most, but I do not think that the portrait is intended to be

negative. 68. Lists of events : XXIII.257-897,

including a shorter list at 629-45;

8.120-30.

The Phaiakians compete (with the outside world) in singing and dancing : 8.246-

384.

The funeral ceremonies of Patroklos, “prince” Amarynkeus (XXIII.630-1),

Oidipous

(XX111.679-80),

Akhilleus

(24.85-6,

90-2),

and

of princes

in

general

(24.87-9), all include athletic competitions and prize-givings. The Phaiakians organise ad hoc games purely for entertainment; no prizes are given (8. 100-384). Compare the suitors’ leisure pursuit of throwing the javelin and discus (4.625-7 =

17.167-9; they also play board-games : 1.106-8).

Cf. Redfield 1975: 204-7.

An instance of competition at a religious festival may be the chariot-race in Elis (X1.699-701) to which Neleus sent a four-horse chariot "to compete for a tripod”. Since the prize is known in advance, the occasion may be an institutionalised competition, and hence not an instance of funeral games. The passage could in fact be a reference to the Olympic games, if one accepts a date post 680 B.C. (when the chariot-race became an Olympic event) for the passage (cf. e.g. Leaf 1900, Willcock

1978 ad loc.). 69. Note also that Odysseus and the Phaiakians compete no less eagerly when there are no prizes to be had (see pp. 93, 202-4). The value of prizes is commented upon at ΧΧΙΠ.562 (“it will be worth much to him"), 703-5 (two prizes are estimated to have a value of twelve and four oxen, respectively), and 885 (another prize is “worth

an ox”). Agamemnon mentions the great wealth his race-horses have won for him (IX.123-7 = 265-9). In historical Greece, too, competitors stood to win a good deal besides a token prize (Finley & Pleket 1976 : 24; Duminil 1988: 20-3). 70. It is therefore untrue that "Homeric ethics did not require fair play” (O'Neal 1979:

13).

Duminil argues that Antilokhos (and Nestor, who coaches him) represent

a "new conception of sport" (1988: 27-30). She believes that, while by Antilokhos' standards and indeed "in our eyes", there is nothing wrong with Antilokhos' "trick", the “old values” of the Akhaians require the absence of anything one might call "tactics". Such speculation is unnecessary. Antilokhos accepts that he has gone too far in his eagerness to win, and surely even “in our eyes” it is unacceptable for a sportsman to take risks that may endanger other competitors.

71. They also try, it seems, to throw Odysseus off balance by sneering at him while he is preparing for his shot (21.396-404). 72. On Tydeus and on the Phaiakian games, see pp. 202-4.

Notes to Chapter Three

356

73. Cf. Adkins (1972c: 4) who stresses the material loss suffered by Poseidon in the absence of hecatombs, but also says that Poseidon is "concerned with fame rather than sim”.

74. As for Patroklos' manslaughter over a game of kmucklebones (cited p. 63), we cannot know what moved him to anger, since the circumstances are not described. It

might have been the result of competitiveness, but Patroklos might also have felt insulted or cheated for some reason. 75. It has been said that dynamis here refers to physical strength, "which is decisive for the distance of the throw” (Ameis-Hentze 1868: ad XXIII.891), but the parallel

description of Agamemnon as "both a good basileus and a strong spearman” (111.179) tends to confirm that dynamis refers to his power as a ruler (cf. Redfield

1975: 207-10). Menelaos says that he does not wish to be regarded as ‘pulling rank’ in order to defeat Antilokhos (XXTII.576-8); his concern about this confirms that it is common

practice.

Cf. Adkins 1960a: 56; O'Neal 1979: 12-3.

An interesting example of the way in which high status and superior personal performance are made to coincide, is mentioned by Whyte in his study of a ‘gang’ known as the Nortons ("Doc's boys"). "The records... show a very close correspondence between social position and bowling performance... Bowling scores

did not fit automatically into this pattern.

There were certain customary ways of

behaving which exerted pressure upon the individuals... When [the leaders] bowled on opposite sides, they kidded one another good-naturedly. Good scores were expected of them, and bad scores were accounted for by bad luck or temporary lapses of form. When a follower threatened to better his position, the remarks took

quite a different form. The boys shouted at him that he was lucky, that he was ‘bowling over his head’... This type of verbal attack was very important in keeping the members 'in their places’." (Whyte 1981: 23-4)

76. Akhilleus' low regard for his own qualities as a ‘counsellor’ : XVIII. 106; cf. X1.786-9; Van Wees 1988 : 18-9. Finley makes the point that 'the best in counsel’ are the most powerful men, rather than the best speakers (1977: 115).

The point is

supported by Diomedes' concern to remind others of the status and wealth of his father, before he begins speaking (XTV.118-27; cited above, p. 73). Note that, if the interpretation of assembly, council and court-procedure advanced above, pp. 325, is correct, it is the ruler who 'judges' the speakers and decides who is the ‘best’. ΤΊ. Other instances of aggressive behaviour in assembly are Agamemnon's response

to Khryses (see n.102), and of course his response to Akhilleus' opposition to him. Paris, like Hektor, responds to a proposal by insulting the speaker in question ("If you are really serious, you must be crazy", VII.359-60); the suitors threaten to inflict a heavy “penalty” on an old man who makes an unwelcome proposal based on

a .178-93).

and, like Hektor, they reject the validity of such omens in general

78. Note for instance the caution of Diomedesin making public speeches : in his

first speech, he announces that he is going to oppose Agamemnon, and defends himself with the words : "as is allowed by custom [themis], lord, in assembly; you must not become angry“. He also covers himself by reminding Agamemnon of a

Notes to Chapter Three

357

previous occasion when he, Diomedes, had quietly swallowed an insult from Agamemnon (1X.32-6). Later, he prefaces a five-line proposal with an eighteen-line self-justification in which he announces that he has a suggestion to make “if you are willing to listen and do not all feel a strong resentment because by birth I am the youngest among you”, and proceeds to list his claims to be taken seriously (XIV.110-32; cf. p. 73). Most remarkable is Nestor's highly polite disagreement with Diomedes' first speech (IX.42-9). Before he offers his own advice, he assures Diomedes four times that his speech was excellent : "[1] You are the best of all your generation in counsel. [2] Not one Akhaian will criticise your words or speak against them... [3] You talk sense to the Argive princes, because [4] you speak as is

proper" (IX.54-9). Note also Clay (1983: 188-208), who presents a convincing analysis of the dialogue between Athena and Odysseus at 13.221-439 as a ‘duel of wits' in which each party diplomatically manages not to offend the other. 79. The force of the sense of shame

is often expressed in the wish to die when

shamed, see also e.g. IV.169-82; VII.125-31; XVII.415-9.

Hooker (1987: 121-3)

rightly draws attention to the distinction drawn by Hektor and Diomedes between the fear of incurring shame and more 'positive' reasons to fight well in battle. 80. Pandaros perhaps comes closest to drawing attention to his own achievements, when after hitting Diomedes with an arrow,

he calls out "Forwards,

Trojans...

for

the best of the Akhaians is hit, and I do not think that he will hold out against the powerful missile for long, if Apollo truly inspired me when I set out from Lykia” (V.102-5). But even in this instance, the warrior only obliquely refers to his own

role in wounding an enemy, and the ostensible purpose of his exclamation is to exhort the army, not to boast of his achievements. (Pandaros appears to be portrayed as a rather over-confident warrior, see V.284-5.) I should mention again that the heroes are nor fighting in isolation in front of the bulk of the army, as is sometimes suggested; if this were so, one might, of course, argue that they do not need to boast or show off, because they are already quite conspicuous. One might also argue that it would be too dangerous for a warrior to draw attention to himself in the midst of battle, but that danger certainly does not deter

warriors in other cultures from showing off.

Among the Kapauku of New Guinea,

"a successful killer performs ukwaa wakii tai, a killer's dance. small

circle,

joyful

holding

screams,

performance,

his bow

‘wuii-wuii',

at its lower end...

emitted

He runs around in a

He accompanies

this dance by

at the highest pitch of his voice.

which is put on despite the danger from flying arrows,

This

is for the

purpose of drawing attention to his success...” (Pospisil 1963: 60). 81. Another instance is the boast of Odysseus (in his guise better man in battle than Eurymakhos (18.376-80). Also, according to Artemis - that he could fight Poseidon and win actually finds himself face-to-face with Poseidon, however, of respect for his uncle (XX1.435-69). It seems, then, that way of expressing his claim to superior valour, not a real direct confrontation who is the better warrior.

as beggar) that he is a Apollo used to boast (XX1.470-8). When he he refuses to fight, out Apollo's boast is only a challenge to prove in a

82. The distinction is sometimes obscured when the problem is discussed in terms of ‘glory’.

Some suggest that Akhilleus after his quarrel with Agamemnon

no longer

Notes to Chapter Three

358

wants to fight because he is disillusioned. He had dedicated his life to the pursuit of ‘glory’, but now he finds that in spite of his excellence he is not getting any. Bowra claims that Akhilleus thus develops “a strong mistrust of all military glory. ...War is always like this” (1930: 196); Whitman believes that Akhilleus comes to realise that “glory is nothing. He can excuse himself of the whole ridiculous hoax" (1958: 188). This is misleading. Akhilleus hopes to gain fame, a reputation, by fighting, and in this he succeeds, whatever Agamemnon does. On the other hand, he also wants to be honoured for his services, and it is his resentment at not receiving

sufficient deference from Agamemnon that makes him momentarily want to abandon the war. See further pp. 122-3. 83.

Penelope

is to marry

19.528; 20.335 "competing for

Telemakhos Nausikaa

courting

"the best of the Akhaians” : 11.179;

(cf. Nagy 1979: 38-9). her excellence’ (2.206;

include

282-4)

18.289;

The suitors speak of themselves as heineka tes aretes eridainomen), and

laughingly refers to his mother as their “prize”

(6.34-5,

16.76;

also has numerous

those of Atalanta (decided

suitors.

Other

(aethion, 21.106-9). stories of rivalry

in

by a foot race against the bride !),

Hippodameia (a chariot race against her father), Iole (an archery contest against her father) and Helena (see next note).

84. Penelope is to marry “the best of Akhaians and the one who provides the most" (20.335; cf. 16.76-7); "providing infinite bridewealth” (e.g. 19.529). Note also 15.16-18: Penelope's family tell her to marry Eurymakhos, "for he surpasses all the suitors in gifts [to her 7} and keeps raising the bridewealth [hedna]". Presents to the prospective bride are mentioned explicitly at 18.278-301. For detailed discussions of the nature of Homeric bridewealth and the problem of its compatibility with the practice of giving dowries, see Morris 1986: 105-15; Finley 1981: 233-45; Snodgrass 1974: 115-18; Lacey 1966: 55-61; Finsler 1912. The tension between wealth and personal excellence is also brought out in the Hesiodic account of the courting of Helena. He states that Menelaos was bound to win by virtue of his wealth,

198.5-6 M/W),

"for he was the best of the Akhaians

in flocks” (frg.

and that he did in fact “defeat all, by providing the most” (frg.

204.85-7; cf. 204.41-2), and then goes on to say that Akhilleus would have won, had

he been old enough at the time “for neither Menelaos nor anyone else could have defeated him in courting Helena” (204.87-92). Akhilleus' superiority clearly lies in his prowess, not in his wealth. Among the other suitors of Helena, Aias offers to drive off all the cattle of Troizen, Epidauros, Aigina, Mases, Megara, Korinthos, Hermione and Asine and

make these her bridewealth, "for he excelled with his great spear” (Hesiod, frg. 204.44-51). It seems obvious to me that he means to attack these places and rustle their cattle, and so combine a show of prowess with an offer of wealth, but it has

been suggested that all these places are in fact supposed by Hesiod to be part of Aias' own "dominions" (e.g. Finkelberg 1988: 32). 85. Sceptres : p. 33; Appendix Two, section 2; public seats : pp. 29,33,34.

86. See Appendix Three, section 1 (pp. 285-92), for the suitors’ aims and strategy. 87. See Appendix Three, section 1 (pp.282-3; 292).

Notes to Chapter Three

359

88. The passage is cited on p. 46 above.

89. The career of the son of Kastor may be an example of such social mobility.

His

father is described only as "a rich man" (14.200, 206) and may not have been a

basileus. He himself starts off with only a fraction of the inheritance, but marries into a wealthy family and rises to be joint commander of the Cretan army at Troy (14.199-242). On the other hand, it is not clear that the son of Kastor does in fact attain the status of prince : he makes his name as a leader of ‘pirates’ (see pp. 20710) and perhaps such a man might play a leading part in the army without necessarily acquiring the title and powers of a basileus.

In any case, the theoretical possibility of upward and downward mobility means that it is incorrect to speak of a social structure “caste-like in its rigidity" (Finley 1977: 60). 90. Decorated chair : 19.55-8; Phoenician silver craters : 4.613-19 = 15.113-19 (a

gift from the prince of Sidon, “the most beautiful and most valuable” of all Menelaos' treasures) and XXIII.740-8 (one which "in beauty far surpassed everything on earth"). Silver bath-tubs and wool-basket : 4.125-32. For other treasures, and for the house and slaves, see pp. 41-2, 49. Embroidered peploi : VI.289-95; 15.105; 18.292-3; purple cloaks: VII.221; 19.225; purple and

embroidered 19,226-31 18.293-4.

garment:

III.125-7; a very

fine tunic:

19.232-5.

Omate

pins:

(golden double pin with figures of dog and fawn locked in struggle); Necklaces and earrings : 15.459-63;

18.295-300; XIV.182-3.

Swords :

e.g. 2.3; 22.74,79; Agamemnon's sword has a gold-studded hilt (XI.29-30). Daggers: XVIII.597-8. Show-dogs: 17.306-10; horse-ornament: IV.141-5 (purple-stained ivory cheek-piece, made in Maionia). The contents of Odysseus’ storeroom(s) are described in some detail : 2.337-47; 21.8-14, 42-62.

91. I can find no evidence for rivalry in generosity in gift-exchange; see pp. 228-37.

As for competition in one-sided generosity, the nearest the epics come to mentioning it, is when Agamemnon says that the prizes awarded at Akhilleus' funeral were more Spectacular than any ever offered at funeral games (24.85-92). Note that, although

the prizes given at the games for Patroklos are described in detail, no invidious comparisons are made with the value of prizes at other games.

92. See pp. 45-6. 93. See pp. 42-4. 94. Laertes owns a farm “which he himself once acquired, after he toiled very hard" (24.205-7). Surely this refers to bringing new land under cultivation (Andreev 1988: 32), and Finley offers no particular evidence for his claim that "few men actually did anything so absurd and foolhardy“ as to “push beyond the frontier and take up vacant land” (1977: 60).

95. That kerdos/kerdea means ‘gain at the expense of another' is argued by Cozzo (1988).

Finley (1977: 122) renders it ‘advantage’ rather than 'profit', but there can

be no doubt that advantage in these contexts consists in material profit.

On the

subject of acquisitiveness, see also the comments of Finsler (1914: 169-70), and Nilsson's interesting observation that “the poet can hardly ever bring himself to let

Notes to Chapter Three

360

the Trojans win weapons or horses as spoils, although many Akhaians are slain" (1924: 365 n.8). See further Chapter Four, sections 7-9. 96. For estate-production and craftsmen, see p. 52.

For trade and gift-gathering, see

Chapter Four, sections 7-9. For gifts from the people, see pp. 32-3, 35-6, 85-6. 97. On Adkins’ interpretation of timé, which is that honour is virtually identical with material possessions,

‘dishonour' consists in the loss of wealth, but, as I have tried

to show, Homeric dishonour consists in the denial of all kinds of deference, not only those which involve material loss. See pp. 69-71, esp. n.30; on dishonour, see also Maffi 1979. An example of Adkins' overemphasis on “material goods” as the basis of honour is his interpretation of the passage in which Poseidon explains why he wishes to deprive the Phaiakians of their privilege of sailing the seas in perfect safety. Poseidon is concerned that he will no longer be honoured by the gods, if the Phaiakians do not honour him (13.128-30, cited below, p. 112).

Adkins says that

Poseidon cannot allow the Phaiakians "too high a success-rate” because this "might diminish men's fear of the sea and of the sea-god; and if they did not fear the seagod, why should they offer him sacrifice, material goods as timé 2" (1972c: 4-6). In

fact, Poseidon is primarily concerned with the reaction of his fellow-gods, not with that of mortals. The kinds of deference that the gods might deny him must surely be largely of a non-material nature. 98. The suitors’ hybris : 1.227, 368; 3.207; 4.321, 627; 15.329; 16.86, 410, 418; 17.169, 588; 20.170, 370; 23.64; 24.282, 352; and see pp. 115-18 for further instances. 99.

Fisher

Aristotle's MacDowell

(1976

definition

[translation

on

for Homeric

p.179};

1979)

hybris and

1976; see also Murray 1983b: 269).

demonstrates

Greek

hybris

the

validity

in general

of

(contra

Cf. n.182.

100. Agamemnon wants a prize as a substitute for one he has had to give up. From the start, he sees this as a test of power. He insists that he should be given a new prize, "or else I shall take one myself - I shall go and take yours, or the prize of Aias, or of Odysseus, and take it away. And he will be angry, whomever I pay a visit” (1.137-9). By implying that he is not afraid to provoke others’ anger, Agamemnon asserts that he is more powerful than anyone else. For the motives of Orsilokhos, see p. 119. Note also that Aigisthos’ coup in Mykenai is part of a long-running feud about which

branch of the family has the right to rule (see Appendix Three, section 1 (pp.284-5) : his motive in taking power is at least partly revenge.

101. Adkins concludes that "in this society it is impossible that e.g. possessions should long remain the property of anyone who has not the courage and strength needed to defend them” (1960b: 28; emphasis added). As for power, Finley places great stress on “the element of naked force” ("a weak king was not a king, ...a king either had the might to rule or he did not rule at all”) at the expense of "the dynastic principle" (1977: 83-7; cf. Van Effenterre and Rihll as cited in n.65 above, 151 below).

361

Notes to Chapter Three

It is significant, however, that several threats to property and power are not real but merely imagined : see pp. 148-52, 156.

102. For the context of this outburst, and the problems surrounding it, see pp. 12931, n.140, p. 137. In a similar episode, the request ofan old priest, Khryses, to be allowed to ransom his captive daughter, is rejected by Agamemnon in "a strong speech" : "'Let me not catch you here at the ships, old man, either lingering now or

retuming later...

Go away, do not provoke me, if you wish to come home safely’...

The old man was frightened and did as he was told” (1.25-33). It should be said that in neither episode is the word ‘dishonour' used, but it is clear from other passages that disobedience is regarded as bringing dishonour on the

person disobeyed : see p. 71, esp. nn. 25-26.

103. Compare views on Agamemnon : he displays "a weak man's anger" (Edwards 1987: 179); according to Whitman "his prowess [is marred] by a savagery which is the product of uncertainty and fear" (1958: 163); cf. Bassett (1938: 196-7). Redfield, by contrast, rightly argues that Agamemnon’s taking Briseis away from Akhilleus, although "a definite injustice", is not due to some character flaw, but "the

enactment of ambiguities and contradictions within the culture” (1975: 97-8), and that Akhilleus is a "victim of his own ethic” (105-6).

Griffin (1980: 74 n.46) rejects

this, for the peculiar reason that it is "too anthropological”. Akhilleus has received a better press than Agamemnon: n.122.

see pp.

126ff., esp.

104. This point is also made by Adkins, and I consider this a crucial insight of his. Dover (1983: 45), in making a number of valuable criticisms of Adkins’ work,

misses this point when he says that "I have always assumed that Odysseus killed the suitors for exactly the reasons for which I would have sought to kill them if I had been Odysseus: they have consumed my possessions. It said to himself : 'My god, I with Adkins that there is a

conspired against my son, pestered my wife and is obscurantist to imply [as Adkins does) that Odysseus must do something about my arete !'" I would agree meaningful difference : Odysseus, unlike Dover, one

assumes, would feel the need to restore his own social status, not merely to avenge the sufferings of his family and the loss of property. It is unfortunate, however, that Adkins links his important observation to a number

of arguments which are unconvincing and have provoked much criticism. Adkins is right to say that "to be kakos is to be the sort of person to whom [harm] may be done with impunity, since he cannot defend himself” (1960a: 42, as cited on p. 65), but wrong to say that this is the only meaning of kakos, and that "to do harm is not to be kakos" (ibid.). Again, he is right to say that “acts of injustice... diminish the [status] of the man who suffers them" (1966: 198), but wrong to say that they diminish “only” the status of the sufferer (ibid.; cf. p. 65 and n.13).

See further nn.113,

115.

Long (1970: 131), by contrast, goes too far in the opposite direction : the deeds of

the suitors, he says, reflect badly on them "and on them alone”. 4) rightly notes that both sides are affected (cf. ibid. 357).

Pleket (1971: 353-

(Incidentally, in a number of passages, Adkins refers to status as arete, rather than timé.

This is not, I think, correct Homeric usage.)

Note that the Homeric concept of honour precludes our notion that a man ‘dishonours’ himself by acting ‘dishonourably’ : a Homeric man may behave badly,

Notes to Chapter Three

362

and others may honour him less as a result, but it is they who dishonour him by their lack of deference, not he himself by his immorality. 105. This formulation of why dishonour produces a violent response is perhaps more accurate, if more prosaic, than Snell's comment,

as quoted by Finley (1977:

117),

that once “honour is destroyed, the moral existence of the loser collapses", or Adkins’ remark that “since the roots of his existence have been struck at, the manner in which the Homeric hero... recovers tim? is likely to be violent” (1960b: 30; cf. 1972c: 3 and 6).

106. I would suggest that the insults "dog-face" and “dog's eyes" mean that Agamemnon, literally or metaphorically, looks people in the face without shame or respect, in the way a dog might stare at people. Agamemnon

Hence Akhilleus later sneers that

for all his shamelessness, and “although he is a dog, did not dare to

look me in the face” when he confiscated Briseis (IX.372-3). Fixing someone with a stare is, of course, often regarded as ‘impudent’, and it provokes the anger of ‘George’ (cited p. 110), for one.

Kirk, however, explains "dog-face” as a reference

to a "fawning" look (1985: ad 1.159). 107. Cf. Aineas’ shirking in resentment at not being honoured by Priamos (XII1.459-61). One might argue that the Akhaians are angry, not at Agamemnon's treatment of Akhilleus as such, but at the resuls of that treatment, i.e. the withdrawal

of the Myrmidons which allows the Trojans to gain the upper hand. speech, however,

Thersites'

plays on a sense of solidarity with Akhilleus : Agamemnon

is

reproached for dishonouring "a man far better than himself" (11.239-40; see below, pp. 122-4). 108.

See Appendix Four, section 2, on the rule that booty,

once distributed, should

not be tampered with. On the other hand, perhaps there is ἃ threat to Agamemnon in

the fact that Akhilleus ‘offers’ him a large share of booty, when it is Agamemnon's prerogative to take what he wants.

109. Alternatively, the passage could be taken to mean ‘either he forgot or it never occurred to him', in which case the offence would not be deliberate at all. 110. See Long's criticism (1970: 123-6) of Adkins’ initial discussion (1960a: 1060), and Adkins’ reply (1971: 4-5). Adkins discerns two situations in which intentions do matter (when "excuses are accepted"): (a) in "co-operative", as opposed

to

"competitive",

activities

(1971:

4),

and

(Ὁ)

when

“dependants”,

as

opposed to heads of household, are involved (1960a: 36; Frisch (1949: 78] maintains precisely the opposite). Long points out that these distinctions are hard to trace in the evidence.

The habit of blaming gods or ate for one's offensive actions has been seen as a sign of mental instability (Nilsson 1924: 374-5); it has also been suggested that it is a way of avoiding responsibility so as not to be shamed by one's own actions (Dodds 1951:

17-18; Mueller

1984:

130-2).

While this may be true, it also functions as a

peace-making device : by denying that the offensive act was intended, one removes its offensive quality, and makes it easier for the other party to accept reconciliation.

Notes to Chapter Three

363

111. On the exploitation of thetes : Finley 1977: 57. Compare also the threats to the beggars to ship them off to the mainland, “to prince Ekhetos, who is a danger to all

mortals, and who will cut off your nose and ears with merciless bronze, rip out your private parts and give them raw to the dogs to tear at” (18.84-7; cf. 18.115-6; 21.307-9). Whereas the suitors’ other outrages are largely gratuitous, these threats serve the purpose of terrifying the beggars into doing (or refraining from)

something. Ekhetos,

I suppose that here, too, the idea is that they are to be sold as slaves to

rather than simply sent there to be tortured, though Ekhetos might be no

more than a bogey-man. 112. A parallel that springs to mind is the treatment of 'parasites' in Roman comedy : they are poor men invited to dinner to be made fun of (or make themselves ridiculous) and they are frequently beaten and get things thrown at them (Plautus, Curculio 392-8; Captivi 88-90; Terence, Eunuchus 244-5). Like the Homeric beggar, the parasite is made to sit apart from the guests (Caprivi 471, Stichus 488). A slightly more distant parallel is the mediaeval court-jester. 113. Adkins argues that such acts of aggression barely, if at all, affect the good

reputation

of

the

aggressors:

Penelope's

comment

is explained

away

as

a

"persuasive definition” (see n.31). That this is mistaken is clear from the other passages cited and even clearer from the suitors' own response to Telemakhos’ public complaints about their behaviour : they claim to be “not at all responsible” for the situation, and protest that Telemakhos' accusations are “shaming us” (aiskhunon) and put the blame [momon] on us" (2.85-7). Evidently, they are worried about their reputation. See n.115.

The hybristic treatment of beggars is deplored particularly often. On one occasion, even the suitors themselves spontaneously turn against one of their number who has maltreated a beggar : "Antinoos, that was not a good thing..." (17.481-8).

Adkins and others argue that aggression against beggars, strangers and suppliants constitutes a separate moral category, because these people enjoy the special protection of Zeus (see n.167b).

114.

Campbell

1964:

273.

Campbell

notes

the

general

similarities

between

Sarakatsani and Homeric values (ibid.: 263 n.1). 115. The implications are, of course, that Telemakhos should not allow himself to be subjected; that he, if he is a man of good sense, should be indignant, too; and that he

ought to fight and die, if necessary. “shameful deeds"

There is some debate as to whether the

(aiskhea) and "ugly deeds”

Telemakhos to suffer (so Adkins

1960a: 41-3;

(aeikea) are ugly and shameful for 1971: 7 n.36,

12) or for his enemies

to commit (so Dover 1983: 39; Rowe 1983: 267; Pleket 1971: 357-8; Long 1971: 130-2). That they are aiskhos to commit is in fact implied at 2.86 (see n.113); yet the point of stressing the shameful and ugly nature of this behaviour is less to condemn it as such, than to incite Telemakhos to put a stop to it. Perhaps the terms are used in an objective sense : they refer to deeds that are ugly and shameful to do, as well as to suffer and witness (see nn.104, 132).

116. See pp.42-4, 48.

Notes to Chapter Three

364

117. Jeanmaire (1939: 107) takes the passage to mean that the Cretan "without reason" renounces a previously existing status as Idomeneus' retainer. Nowag (1983: 56-9) argues that the Cretan does serve Idomeneus, but in a way that is “not pleasing” to his master: he leads bands of men in plundering raids that are not sanctioned by Idomeneus. Both explanations take for granted that retainership is always a life-long status. As I have argued previously (see n.116), this is not so,

and given that temporary, war-time retainership exists as well, it seems to me that my interpretation of the passage is the more natural. When Nestor says that, having been invited to join the War of the Lapiths and Kentaurs, “I fought on my own" (kat' em’ auton, 1.263-71), he presumably means that he was asked (or allowed) to fight as a leader in his own right (i.e. not as a retainer of some great hero of the past). Note that quite prominent men such as Meriones and Sthenelos do serve as wartime retainers to even greater heroes (Idomeneus and Diomedes).

118. Zeus as a head of household : Calhoun from the threshold of Olympos,

1935.

Zeus‘ habit of throwing gods

slinging them by the feet or hair (1.591;

XV.23;

XIX.126-31) is perhaps meant to parallel the human habit of dragging people out of the house by the ankle (18.10-12; 21.299-300). Zeus also casts gods into Tartaros (VIII. 14-17; V.897-8), which may be the equivalent of incarceration or of throwing

criminals in the barathron.

See p. 138-9, esp. n.149.

119. West (1988: ad 1.356-9) calls this “adolescent rudeness" and thinks that Telemakhos “is made to go too far" : this seems to me an anachronistic perception of what the relation between mother and adult son ought to be. Perhaps another instance of a son adopting a domineering attitude towards this mother is an episode in which Akhilleus appeals to his mother for help against Agamemnon.

He

sits

on

the

shore,

weeping,

and

calls

out:

“Mother,...

Agamemnon has dishonoured me, for he has taken my prize and is keeping it". His mother hears him, emerges from the sea, takes his hand and says : "Child, why are you crying ?" Akhilleus answers : "You know. Why should I tell you all these things, when you know ?" Nevertheless, he proceeds to recount the whole story from the beginning (for reasons discussed by Wyatt 1988: 289-92; De Jong 1985). I would follow Ameis/Hentze (1868: ad 1.364) in assuming that Thetis knows, not because as a goddess she is supposed to be aware of all that goes on among mortals, but because Akhilleus has just told her. In other words, he is saying that the two lines in which he had described the situation should be enough for Thetis : her son has been dishonoured and that is all she needs to know; she must do something about it without asking for details. 120.

1.277-81

(cf. pp. 73-4).

I take it that the reference to Agamemnon

"better... because he rules more men”

rather than as ruler over a territory (Mykenai Akhilleus’.

being

is to his position as ruler over all Akhaians,

and environs) more populous than

If the latter interpretation were correct, however,

this would mean that

the poet is envisaging a system of ranking monarchs (by the number of their Subjects) that does not apply to the ranking of princes within a community. 121. In the initial dispute, as Bowra (1930: 18) puts it, both Agamemnon and Akhilleus are in the wrong, only Agamemnon more so (cf. Adkins 1960a: 38). I can see no grounds for arguing that Akhilleus’ behaviour at this stage is “treason”

Notes to Chapter Three (Stone

1988:

23,

36;

365 Mueller

1984:

34-5),

nor that, by contrast,

Akhilleus

is

"undoubtedly in the right" (Lloyd-Jones 1983: 13) and “completely justified” (Segal 1971a: 94). Although the situation does not change fundamentally when Akhilleus later refuses an offer of compensation, his moral position does become weaker (see n.140), and he suffers the consequences of his actions (although the death of Patroklos is not meant to be a punishment for Akhilleus; see n.146). The poet, then, is not taking sides in an unequivocal manner, and does not favour ‘prowess’ over 'power' (pace Andreev 1988: 69-70) or vice-versa. 122. Akhilleus is seen as "a inconsequence and half-hearted irreconcilable” (Whitman 1958: "truth and justice” forces him to

lonely and haunted sojourner among men of ideals", who finds that "integrity and life are 185, 189). His “isolated devotion to an ideal” of “withdraw from a society which appears as unjust

and corrupt” (Segal 1971a: 97, 104; cf. Schein

1984:

104-10).

In his alienation, he

seeks for new values, and becomes "a figurehead of the race as it evolves", "an Abraham, a Buddha, a Jesus, a Lincoln” (Lee 1981: 97; Arieti 1987: 5, 11, 25; cf. MacCary 1982: 30, 41, 45).

Akhilleus' discovery is variously said to be a “higher conception of honour" (Bassett 1938: 195, 199-201); "the glory of fatherhood" and “patriarchy” (Lee 1981: 100); the feeling of guilt (Arieti 1985: 202); and most commonly the insight that life and human values are meaningless in the face of death (Whitman 1958: 160;

Redfield 1975: 218-19 (despite his earlier criticism of this view, ibid. 11]; Arieti 1987: 8). It has in fact been argued that Akhilleus develops a new ‘language’ to express his new ideas (Parry 1956). It may be noted that this theory relies in part on the argument that, when Akhilleus does use conventional expressions, ‘we know' that he 'really' means something else (ibid. 7; cf. MacCary 1982: 57-8). Fora strong counter-argument : Claus 1975. Akhilleus’ violent behaviour when he returns to battle is seen as evidence, not of

"blind ferocity” or “spite”, but of a “detached perspective” and an awareness that “death is the law of the world" : his acceptance of death “ennobles” the slaughter of his enemies (Whitman

1958:

160; Griffin

1980a: 55, 75-6,

191).

His rage against

Hektor is treated, not as revenge, but as "a suicide disguised as revenge” (Devereux 1979: 9-14); "unable to forgive himself, [he] vents his rage against himself upon the body of Hektor” (Bassett 1938: 207; Arieti 1985: 202-3).

Scholars who do recognise that Akhilleus' anger at his enemies is the subject of the Iliad, hold a variety of views on the poet's handling of the theme. Griffin (1980a: 74-6) suggests that Akhilleus’ anger in the end “forces him to a degree of introspection beyond that of the others”. Bowra(1930: 17, 199) believes that “the theme is how Achilles’ temper leads him both to disaster and moral degradation". Geddes (1988: 8-10) argues that Homer presents the quarrel between Akhilleus and Agamemnon as "a fight between two children that gradually gets out of hand”, in order to show "the way suffering can begin so... thoughtlessly”. See also Edwards 1987; 231-6; Redfield 1975: 85. The idea that the /liad shows "the nature and significance of what men do and suffer, of human life and death” (Bremer 1987: 41; Schein 1984: e.g. 72; Griffin

1980a: e.g. 177) is no doubt true, but the same could be said of almost any literary work.

123. “The suitor theme is... a tale of villainy and retribution” (Finley 1977: similarly e.g. Dodds 1951: 32-3; Havelock 1978: 147-51; Griffin 1980a:

140; 139;

Notes to Chapter Three

366

1980b: 46, 52, 54; Lloyd-Jones

1983: 31).

It is commonly

thought that a concern

with justice is a phenomenon first found in the Odyssey (see n. 165), and more specifically that the Odyssey demonstrates that mortals are responsible for their own acts of injustice and cannot blame the gods (recently, Griffin 1980a: 164; LloydJones

1983:

31-2; Latacz

1984: 34-5; Kullmann

1985:

5-6).

Clay (1983:

217-18)

convincingly argues against this latter notion. 124. On the precise meanings of the Homeric words for anger (kholos, kotos, menis, etc.), see Considine 1966 and 1987; Adkins 1969b: 14-21; 1970: 40-1; Scully 1984; note also Rose (1979) on Odysseus’ ‘barking heart‘. 125. See Appendix Three, section | (pp.285-92). Orestes’ revenge on the killer of his father is held up as an example to Telemakhos (1.298-302; 3. 193-238; cf. 4.546; 11.461; 24.97). 126. On the absence of anger in Paris, see Collins 1988: 30-5; cf. Willcock 1957: 24; Monsacré 1984: 44-9. Interesting is also the fact that Khryses, when threatened

by Agamemnon (see n.102), is afraid (1.33), although Akhilleus assumes that the old man is angry (1.380; cf. Robbins 1990: 3; Rabel 1988: 476-80). Menelaos is another hero who does not always spontaneously feel anger (see pp. 187-8). 127. "Giving in” to hybris : e.g. 14.262; 17.431; to strength : e.g. 13.143; 18.139; to “a great-hearted spirit”: e.g. IX.109-10. References to "heart-eating strife” (thumoboros,

e.g. XX.253)

also suggest an emotional,

uncontrollable dimension to

conflict. It is unnecessary to explain away this phrase as meaning "costing lives", as Hogan (1981: 27) does. Eris itself may not be an emotion, as Hogan rightly argues, but it can still produce a "psychological pain” in those involved in it. 128. Hogan, while rightly stressing the negative adjectives found with ‘strife’ in the epics (1981: 27), argues that the idea that abandoning strife brings honour 1s invented by Odysseus (who ‘reminds’ Akhilleus of his father's advice) for this specific occasion : it does not normally apply. "Only special circumstances, and special pleading, would reason to think so.

make

it so”

(ibid.

54; cf. Adkins

1982:

303).

I see no

129. On ‘scowling’ or ‘looking darkly’ (hypodra idein), see Holoka, who argues that “lowered brows” are a "social dominance gesture” (1983: 4 n.8), and that this facial

expression is used by one who regards himself as superior "to reassert his own superiority and his entitlement to deference in the comportment of the addressee” (16). 130.

When

Agamemnon

admits that he "was the first to be harsh”

(11.377-8),

he

implicitly admits that he has gone too far; whether he thinks that he has gone too far in confiscating Bniseis, or in asking for a new prize in the first place, is not clear. 131. There are four instances of corpses being decapitated (warriors being killed by having

their heads

cut off are obviously

another

matter,

as Segal

[1971b:

20f.]

appears to forget). Peneleos cuts off the head of Ilioneus, in revenge for Promakhos, and raises it on a spear to terrify the Trojans (XTV.493-505); Aias son of Oileus decapitates Imbrios, in revenge for Amphimakhos, and throws the head at

Notes to Chapter Three

367

Hektor (XIII.197-205); Agamemnon decapitates Koön, perhaps in revenge for a wound received from him (XI.246-61), and he cuts off the head of Hippolokhos in revenge for his father's misdeeds (X1.142-7; although Hippolokhos is actually killed in this way, the fact that his arms are cut off as well shows that Agamemnon mutilates him deliberately). It may well be that these acts are meant to characterise Agamemnon

(Griffin

1980a:

53-4)

and

Aias

(Whitman

1958:

164)

as unusually

fierce men, but that is not necessarily a negative portrait. Note also that Hektor plans to cut off and impale the head of Patroklos (XVII. 1245; XVIII.176-7), and Euphorbos intends to decapitate Menelaos, in revenge for his brother Hyperenor, and present the head to his parents (XVII.34-40). The Akhaians

hope to inflict unspecified aeikea,

‘ugly things’ (see n.115,

132) on Sarpedon

(XV1.559-60) and the Trojans hope to do the same to Patroklos (XVIII.179-80). When Hektor is dead, each of the Akhaians steps up to his body and stabs it (XX11.369-75). All this passes without comment, and appears to be "simply the decorum of warfare” (Motto/ Clark 1969:

111; cf. Sandstrom

1924: 57; contra e.g.

Segal 1971b: 33). Akhilleus’ treatment of Hektor is criticised, not because it involves mutilation as such, but because it involves persistent mutilation over a long period of time (see below).

132. Although the meaning of kaka and aeikea (see n.115) is contested, it seems clear that neither implies criticism in this context. Earlier in the /liad, it is said that Akhilleus “planned bad things" for the Trojans when he entered battle (XX1.19), i.e. he wanted to kill them and have his revenge. No-one has argued that the poet here condemns the killing of enemies in battle - yet the phrase used is exactly the same as that applied to the execution of the prisoners (kaka de phresi medeto erga). As for aeikea, the fact that (a) those who mutilate a corpse say of themselves that

they are inflicting "ugly things" upon it (XVI.559-60; XXII.335-6; cf. 256-9, 354), (Ὁ) even flies can make a corpse aeikes (XIX.26), (c) it is the friends of the victim

who are supposed to be ashamed at allowing the body to be mutilated (XVI.498-500; XVII.556-8; XVIII.178-80), makes it clear that calling mutilation aeikea does not

imply moral condemnation of it. So too : Bassett 1938: 203-6; Adkins 1960a: 42-3; Griffin 1980a: 85 n.9; Van Erp 1985: 15-16; consra Bowra 1930: 21; Frisch 1949: 50; Biehlolawek

1951:

16; Whitman

1958: 206; Segal 1971b:

13 (cf. 15); Pleket

1971: 355; Finley 1977: 137. The mutilation of Hektor is criticised, but not in these words (below). 133. When

Apolio has proposed that the gods should help Hektor,

Hera angrily

answers : "Yes, those words of yours might come true - if you gods are going to hold Akhilleus and Hektor in the same honour” (XXIV.56-7). This is clearly sarcastic, but nevertheless implies that the norm cited by Apollo will only be upheld if both parties have equal ties with the gods. 134.

See

pp.

146-8

(esp.

n.166)

on

the

problem

of

friendship

and

justice.

Interestingly, Murray (1934: 141) suggests that the mutilation of Hektor is “odious and ugly” to Homer, but that at an earlier stage of the tradition “the ferocity of [Akhilleus'] revenge was part of his glory”. It seems to me that these two ways of looking at the episode do not belong to different periods, but exist side by side in Homer (see below, pp. 137-8).

Notes to Chapter Three

368

Whitman and Redfield are, I believe, right to argue that Akhilleus’ treatmentof Hektor, although condemned, represents “the heroic code... pressed to its logical conclusion” (Whitman 1958: 213), and that the poet's main concern in relating the

episode is "to explore the implications of the [heroic] ethic itself (Redfield 1975: 261

n.76);

I fail to see, however,

that this leads to "a new insight", as Whitman

(ibid.) has it : see n.136.

135. The suitors are also specifically criticised for dishonouring an “excellent” man (aristeus, 21.331-3). Adkins argues that certain passages in which someone is told not to do something or other “although you are a good man" (agathos 1.131, 275; XV.185; XIX.155-7; XXIV.53) imply that a "good man", of high status, could normally get away with the actions in question. Adkins calls "the claim of the agathos" (see p. 65 above, esp.

per eon; e.g. i.e. someone This is what n.1l). The

implication is of course that one would normally be less offended at the aggressive behaviour of an agathos than at that of a man of low status (Adkins 1960a: 37-8,

50). Although the conclusion is probably right, the argument is weak : as Dover has pointed out, the expression need mean no more than that the person in question is generally a "good man”, but is in this particular act deviating from his normal standards (1983: 38; cf. Gagarin 1987: 305; n.56; Long 1970: 127-8). 136. On pity : Scott 1979: 8-14; Sandstrom

pity, and (b) Bowra 1930: Brenk 1986: n.122, 148). and need not

1924: 25-30.

It is because (a) he feels

he obeys the gods (see n.148) that Akhilleus ends his anger (so e.g. 22), not because he reaches new depths of understanding (contra e.g. 178; Redfield 1975: 218-19; Segal 1971la: 105; further references in As Adkins points out, "pity affects the emotions rather than the mind lead to new insight” (1982: 324; cf. 316-19). Akhilleus’ speech to

Priamos shows an awareness of “shared humanity“, but that is not a new insight - it

is at best a “temporary and ordered vision of the sufferings and contradictions of human life” (Mueller 1984: 72-5), and at worst “cliché” (Edwards 1987: 310). 137. On the Litai, see also n.167(b).

138. For Diomedes' view that Akhilleus has no right to be angry, see pp. 122-4. When

Agamemnon

asks for advice after having

been defeated by the Trojans,

Diomedes proposes that they should fight on regardless (IX.40-9). criticises him

for not

"reaching

completion”

in his speech

Nestor mildly

(IX.56).

Nestor's

amendments tum out to be (a) that a guard should be set, and (Ὁ) that Agamemnon

should try to appease Akhilleus (IX.65-7; 103-13).

Surely the latter is the crucial

point. When the embassy to Akhilleus has failed, Diomedes is quick to say that would have been better not to have made overtures at all (IX.697-701), and repeats his proposal to fight on regardless (704-9). It seems, then, that we are understand that Diomedes had not initially overlooked the obvious possibility

asking Akhilleus for help, but had deliberately not advised it.

it he to of

It is no coincidence

that it is Diomedes who dominates battle in Akhilleus' absence (see below). He believes that he and Sthenelos could capture Troy even without the rest of the Akhaians (IX.46-9), and he is consistently the first to speak in favour of war: VII.399-402; XIV. 126-32 (cf. X.218-22).

139, Phoinix says : "Go for the gifts, for the Akhaians will honour you like a god; but if you rejoin battle without gifts, you will not be equally honoured" (IX.602-5).

Notes to Chapter Three Gifts, then, are a consideration.

369 Adkins (1960b:

29) insists that they are the only

consideration here : the honour (or the lack of it) consists of gifts (or the lack of them). That is a possible reading, although it does make the text tautologous. It is also possible, and 1 think preferable, to read the text as a reiteration of the statement that Akhilleus will be more honoured if he is willing to abandon quarrels (IX.257-8); if Akhilleus accepts the gifts, he shows a readiness to be reconciled, and he will earn respect for this; if he refuses the gifts and does not fight until forced to, he demonstrates a quarrelsome nature and will be less highly regarded. 140. Akhilleus’ refusal is seen as morally wrong by e.g. Bowra 1930: 18-21; Biehlolawek 1951: 16; Finley 1977: 117-18; Rexine 1977: 3-4; Lloyd-Jones 1983: 18; Mueller 1984: 44-9; Gagarin 1987: 302 (for different reasons also Rabel 1988: 479-80). His refusal is regarded as justified by e.g. Bassett 1938: 193-9; Adkins 1982: 308-10 (cf. 305: “Who, save the affronted party, can determine how large the [compensation] should be 75); Van Erp 1985: 14; Edwards 1987: 235. His refusal is seen as the beginning of a new morality by e.g. Redfield 1975: 103-6 (Akhilleus adopts an “ethic fundamentalism and purity of spirit" which is 'wrong' only because one cannot afford to be a "moral absolutist”); further references in n.122.

It seems to me that, when Akhilleus argues that he values his life more than booty (IX.401-9), he is not formulating a new ideology (as e.g. Arieti [1987: 14] has it), but merely changing his mind about the choice that he had made earlier, between a short life leading to fame and a long life in obscurity (IX.410-16). This change of heart is only temporary, and only serves to justify to himself the withdrawal from battle forced upon him. Again, when Akhilleus argues that he does not need the honour which his fellows will give him if he returns to battle, because he has honour from Zeus (IX.607-10), this does not mean that he has developed a new concept of honour (e.g. Arieti 1987: 17; Whitman 1958: 183). It merely means that the honour he receives from Zeus gives him all the power he needs in order to compel others to honour him, without him having to eam their respect by helping them in their need (see n. 139 and pp. 137-8). In the following, I am in agreement with the view of Motto and Clark (1969: 110) that “the only flaw that one can find in Akhilleus is the heroic, headlong ‘swelling’ of his emotions and actions to terrible magnitude... Yet such swelling is not so much his flaw as it is the source, the mark, of his heroic greatness". 141.

Parry argues that Akhilleus does not really want compensation,

“demands that can never be satisfied” (1956: 6; cf. Redfield [1975:

and makes

16], who

Suggests that Akhilleus does not know what he wants from the embassy), and Page (1959: 305-9) insists that the later passages are inconsistent with the initial refusal. Bowra (1930: 197) already denied any inconsistency, and Eichholz (1953: 141-2, 146-7) explains the situation most convincingly: Akhilleus never doubts that “restitution [15] worth having in itself", “only... he must have it on his own terms

and in his own time”; he is willing to accept compensation later when it is offered unconditionally and under extreme duress.

Parry (loc. cit.) calls this “legalistic”, but

e.g. Willcock (1976: ad XI.608 and XVI.49-86) and Whitman (1982: 100-2) agree in seeing no inconsistency. 142. Agamemnon attributes his actions to the Are that had blinded him, and offers to make amends (XIX.83-138). For the meaning of ate, see n.144. When Akhilleus

says that Zeus “gives great atai to men“ (XIX.270), there is nothing in the context to

370

Notes to Chapter Three

suggest that he is referring to an ate of his own, rather than of Agamemnon, nor is there any suggestion of this elsewhere (so e.g. Adkins 1982: 307-8; Van Exp 1985: 14; contra Bowra 1930: 19; Lloyd-Jones 1983: 23). 143. For discussions of what is at stake in this trial, see the works cited in Chapter

Two, nn. 34, 35. The text is sometimes translated differently, to mean that one party claimed that he had already paid compensation, and the other denied receiving anything (e.g. Bonner/Smith

1930:33-5;

Carlier

1984:

174-5;

Lesky

1985:

18).

The

crucial

translation of anaineto (XVIII.500) as 'he denied’ is not, I think, justifiable. The verb anainomai is used 18 times in Homer and always means ‘reject, refuse’ (so too LSJ); in two of these passages it is used to mean ‘reject (the truth of) a statement’, and here the translation 'deny' is appropriate (IX.116; 14.149). In the present passage, however, what is rejected is not the statement that compensation has been offered, but explicitly the idea of ‘taking anything’ (meden helesthai) : ‘refuse’ is therefore the proper translation. The only reason for adopting the more strained rendering is that to some it has

seemed that a dispute over whether or not compensation has been paid makes better sense than one about whether compensation ought to be accepted "for why should that lead to arbitration 7" (Bonner/Smith Joc.cit.) the implicit assumption is either

that an offer of compensation ought simply to be accepted, or that there would be nothing to arbitrate about if it were refused. Neither assumption is warranted. The case of Agamemnon and Akhilleus shows that different views on the need to accept compensation are possible; and if compensation

is refused, the killer who seeks to

make amends will look for arbitration in order to get ‘official’ backing for from the princes and the people, while the victim's relatives will look for kind of 'official' backing for their refusal to be reconciled and their implicit exact vengeance on the killer. Compare the situation among the Tausug in the Philippines : "One of usual statements for litigants in a legal proceeding to make is ‘We know

his offer the same desire to the most we will

have to accept settlement sooner or later, but give us another chance to fight first,

then come back and try to settle us’" (Kiefer 1972: 68). As Bonner and Smith note, Homer mentions many instances of killers who have gone into exile (1930: 18-21) :

presumably the relatives of their victims preferred revenge to reconciliation and compensation, too. 144. Although Odysseus and Nestor do speak of Agamemnon’s behaviour in moral terms (see p. 308), he himself speaks only of ate, which as Dodds puts it, is "an unaccountable error", and involves “no discernible moral guilt"

(1951:

6; cf. 2-8;

also Adkins 1960a: 50-1; 1970: 30; 1982: 302, 324-6; contra Lloyd-Jones 1983: 234). 145. He speaks in the plural of "you" who "take away what you have given" (1.229), and later concludes that the Akhaians are being slaughtered “on account of their

transgressions” (XV1.18).

These accusations are justified not merely by the fact that

the Akhaians have done nothing to stop Agamemnon,

but also by the fact that the

‘prize' is awarded (and confiscated) by the ruler/war-leader nominally on behalf of the community (see Appendix Four, section 1).

Notes to Chapter Three

371

146. Some argue that Patroklos’ death is intended to punish Akhilleus : Bowra 1930: 17, 19-21; Lloyd-Jones 1983: 21, 26-7; Gagarin 1987: 302. But whenever Patroklos’ death is discussed by the gods, it is said to be a decree of Fate, and there

is no suggestion that Akhilleus is supposed to ‘learn a lesson' from it (VIII.470-7; XV.59-71; XVI.644-55). Indeed, as Adkins points out (1982: 308), Patroklos' death is said to be due to his own ase, not Akhilleus' : if only he had not continued to attack the Trojans, against Akhilleus' advice, he might have lived (XVI.684-7). 147. The contrast between the uncontrollable anger of Akhilleus and the self-control of Odysseus is to my mind the most important aspect of the general contrast between Akhilleus as a hero of ‘might’ (bie) and Odysseus as a hero of ‘artifice’ (metis) : Nagy 1979: esp. 59-61, 317; Edwards 1985; Krischer 1988: 17-19.

148. I should stress again that it is obedience to the gods, and a sense of pity, that put an end to Akhilleus' anger, not some new insight in the human n.136. Athena's arguments and Akhilleus' replies make it clear that be seen as external, powerful ‘authorities’, not as projections of conscience (so too Redfield 1975: 78 [misunderstood perhaps by 153); Edwards 1987: 181); nor is it true to say that ‘obedience’

condition : see the gods are to Akhilleus' own Griffin 1980a: to Athena is a

metaphorical way of saying that "in the presence of Athena one sees reason and acts on it” (Mueller 1984: 136). Note also how dangerous it is even to Akhilleus to disobey a god : the god of the river Xanthos very nearly kills him for disregarding

his request to stop polluting his stream with blood and corpses (XXI. 211ff.). 149. For the use of the thunderbolt,

note the threat to Hera and Athena:

“I shall

paralyse the horses that pull their chariot. The women themselves I shall throw out of the car, and the chariot I shall overturn. Not in ten full years will these two be healed of the wounds which the thunderbolt is going to inflict” (VII.402-5 = 416-

19; cf. VIII.12 and 455-6; and also 11.781-3; XV.13-17; XXI. 195-9). There is no doubt humour in the depiction of the gods, as in the depiction of mortals, but I do not think that Zeus’ torturing Hera, or his bullying in general, is

meant to be funny.

Rather, it characterises him as a powerful

'father' whose

strength enables him to impose his will on his family (cf. Synodiou

Beye 1974: 92; contra e.g.

1987:

18-19;

Bowra 1930: 222-4 ["pure comedy"); Whitman 1970:

38-42 ["grotesquerie”]).

150. Similarly, the Aitolian army suffers great losses as a result of Meleagros' angry withdrawal

from battle (IX.558-99);

the Trojans are thought

to be doomed

they lose Hektor (e.g. XXIV.728-30; cf. Van Wees

1988:

purely

not that of the strategical

that of an individual's

strength and

bravery,

15-18).

when

The loss is

brilliance of a general (ibid. 20). 151, Adkins (1970: 28) regards this as realistic, and concludes that the head of a household, in defending his oikos, "could rely on no-one else, and the other members

of the oikos needed him to secure their very existence”

1963: 32-3; 1972c: 12; 1982: 294; also Gouldner 1967: 17).

(cf.

1960b:

28;

Finley, too, treats this

as a realistic feature of Homeric society: although developments in Ithaka and Mykenai are dictated by the traditional plots of the stories, they "are precisely what would have occurred in this world, with its delicate, easily upset balance of powers” (1977: 86); in the Odyssey “the narrative detail points to an essential element of

Notes to Chapter Three

372

Odyssean life : to regain his throne the king could count on no-one but his wife, his son and his faithful slaves; in other words, royal power was personal power” (ibid. 91).

Cf. Van Effenterre 1985: 122-37, and further below, with nn.171,

176.

152. Of the three friends of Odysseus who are mentioned (17.69-9), Mentor makes a speech against the suitors once (2.224-41) and Halitherses twice (2.157-76; 24.45162). In addition, Athena disguises herself as Mentor when she helps Odysseus and Telemakhos (2.393-3.372; 22.205-50; 24.502-48). As for the support of kinsmen in

revenge, note also that it is seen as 'a good thing' to have a son who can avenge one's death (3. 195-8).

153. Akhilleus also has another, and possibly more important, reason to restrain Patroklos : he fears that his friend may come to harm (Willcock 1976: ad XVI.8096). But this does not alter the fact that he acknowledges the potential strength of his followers without him (cf. XX.356-7 [n.64]). 154. When Agamemnon tells Akhilleus to 'run away' if he wants to, since there will still be ‘others' to ‘honour’ him, (1.174-5), he presumably refers to the whole of the Akhaian army (as well as to the gods). For the actual attitude of the troops, see pp.

87, 111. 155. On the role of the people of Ithaka : Appendix Three, section 1 (pp. 290-2). The fact that a prince, in a conflict with other princes, can in principle appeal to the people at large confirms that Homeric society does not consist of permanent ‘pyramids' of leaders and followers which embrace all of the community : there are apparently many men without ties to a particular prince, who are free to give their support to anyone who appeals for their help. See pp. 44-8, 55-6. 156. Zeus begins by prohibiting the gods from intervening in the fighting (VII.152).

Then he solemnly weighs the Keres,

the fates of death, of the Akhaians and

Trojans in golden scales to show that the Akhaians are now doomed (VIII.68-74). Next, he thunders to cause panic among the Akhaians (VIII.75-9). Finally, seeing that Diomedes is still not afraid, and still poses a great threat to the Trojans, Zeus

forces him to retreat by nearly striking him with lightning (VIII.130-44). (1987:

186)

says that, although

it is Zeus

who

makes

Edwards

sure that the Akhaians are

defeated, “this is what one would have expected to happen anyway". That is indeed what the /liad at tmes leads one to believe, but clearly the impression is false : Zeus' intervention is in fact essential. 157. Athena first appears in the guise of Mentor, to encourage Odysseus (22.20550); she then twice makes sure that a volley of spears thrown by the suitors goes astray (255-6; 272-3); finally, she raises the aigis and causes a panic among the suitors which decides the battle (297-309; cf.24.182-5). Athena reappears as Mentor when Odysseus is about to fight the suitors' relatives (24.502-3); she enables Laertes to kill Eupeithes (516-25) and causes a panic among the rest (529-35), before

mediating to establish peace (541-8). It is noteworthy that, although Athena had been sent to Ithaka instructed by Zeus to

arrange

a

settlement

(24.472-88),

she

allows

successes, instead of imposing peace immediately.

Odysseus'

party

a

few

more

Not until Zeus makes lightning

Notes to Chapter Three

373

strike at her feet does she fulfil her original mission (24.539-44) : it would seem that

Athena favours Odysseus more strongly than Zeus does.

158. On relations between gods and mortals, see e.g. Adkins 1960a: 64; 1969a: 223; and Clay (1983: 181-2) on a category of relations she calls “elective affinities”. On the balance of honour and power among the gods, see e.g. Vernant 1974: 104-5. We shall see in some detail that the specific obligations that exist between gods and mortals are of great importance in determining divine actions. Wyatt (1988: 295) is therefore wrong to say that, when Akhilleus via Thetis asked Zeus’ help, "he could have made his own appeal”, or that Thetis on Akhilleus' behalf "could have used any excuse - including none at all - to gain Zeus’ favour". 159. See n.33. 160. See below, esp. n. 167. 161. Poseidon threatens that, if Zeus "without the consent of myself, Athena, Hera, Hermes and Hephaistos" withholds victory from the Akhaians, "let him know this : that there will be between the two of us anger beyond reconciliation” (XV.212-17). Hera also insists that she must have her way in this (IV.24-9, 57-61). In return for

his co-operation, Zeus demands that Hera promises not to oppose him if in future he wishes to destroy one of her favourite cities. She tells him that he is free to destroy her favourites - Argos, Sparta, Mykenai - “when they become hateful to you” (IV.39-42, 50-3). "Let us give in to one another in these matters, I to you and you to me; the other gods will follow our lead” (TV.62-3). 162. On the relation between Zeus and Fate, see Vernant 1974:

105; Burkert 1985:

130; Taplin 1986: 75. 163. Although it is often said that an offence against a kinsman, friend or protégé of a god is seen as a direct offence against the rim2 of the god himself (Dodds 1951:

32, 52 n.18; Adkins e.g. 1972c: 9-11; 1987: 314; Finley 1977: 138; Lloyd-Jones 1983: 5, 7 (with modifications]), Gagarin rightly points out that in such cases "there

is no indication that the god's interest or time is directly involved” (1987: 293-4). Gagarin's notion that the gods intervene only because they have a general obligation

to protect "unprotected persons” (ibid. 302-3) seems strained. the gods'

It appears to me that

interventions are inspired simply by a variety of personal obligations,

including those of kinship and friendship. 164. Trojans to be punished for breaking the laws of hospitality : 111.320-3, 350-4;

cf. XII.620-35; for breaking their oaths: Π]|.297-301; IV.158-68, 235-9; cf. v11.350-3. Finley (1977: 140) is thus clearly wrong to say that the fall of Troy is "if anything, an act of divine injustice".

The

suitors punished

for their misdeeds:

22.413-16;

23.63-7;

24.351-2.

Odysseus also (prematurely) concludes that the gods have let him blind Polyphemos in order to punish the Kyklops for his evil deeds (9.477-9). The gap between the perception of the gods in the minds of mortals and the

depiction of the gods by the poet has been noted by e.g. Nilsson 1924: 376; Clay 1983: 226.

Notes to Chapter Three

374

165. The clash is felt to be particularly sharp in the Iliad; it is believed that in the Odyssey the gods are much more concerned with justice. Mostly this is seen as the product of a historical development : Dodds 1951: 32-3; Finley 1977: 140-1; Tsagarakis 1977: 25, 136; Griffin 1980b: 51-4. Lloyd-Jones (1983: 30-1) and Mueller (1984: 146-7), however, see no more than a difference in “style and purpose” between the two poems in this respect. Clay (1983: 215-39) argues that the gods are not concerned with justice in the Odyssey either. The ‘contradiction’ within the /liad (and to a lesser extent in the Odyssey) between the notion of gods as “guarantors of human norms”, and their actual behaviour (Redfield 1975: 76, 213; Bowra 1930: 224), has been resolved in various ways. Adkins has argued that it is only Zeus who protects a few special categories of people and punishes a few particular offences; passages that testify to a more general divine concem for justice among mortals are explained away as belonging to "later strata" of the tradition (e.g. 1960a: 65-6; 1972a: 20 [see also n.162(b)]; cf. Frisch 1949: 57-8; Dodds 1951: 32; Mueller 1984: 146; Burkert 1985: 249; Kullmann 1985: 9-10 [see also Chapter Two, n.35]). For the explanation of Lloyd-Jones, see following note.

For my own explanation, see below, esp. n.167(a). 166. Lioyd-Jones, by contrast, has argued that Homer's concept of justice (diké) includes defending one's honour, which in turn includes helping one's friends and harming one's enemies (1983: 4, 6, 17, 176; 1987a: 310; 1987b: 3; cf. Rexine 1977: 1-6; Lesky 1985: 10-12; Burkert 1985: 247-8). This view implies that whatever one does for a friend is 'right', and that there are no absolute standards of justice. However, while it is no doubt true that helping one's friends is a 'good' thing to do, it seems to me that Homer does distinguish what is objectively ‘just’ from what it is right to do for a friend, and that there is a potential conflict between the two (cf. n.168). (Note also the different line of argument pursued by Lioyd-

Jones elsewhere, when he says that "part of the honour due to Zeus from mortals is the duty to abstain from crime against each other” (ibid. 161].) I should stress again that it is primarily Akhilleus' close personal connections

among the gods that overrule the demands of impartial justice.

The basis for the

gods' obligations to Akhilleus are spelled out (and have been discussed above), but scholars nevertheless tend to obscure them. Segal, for example, says that Hera sides with Akhilleus because she “is a natural enough champion of the cruel treatment of an enemy” (1971b: 60); O'Brien (1991: 119) suggests that it is because Akhilleus literally has Hera's “bile” in him, the bile having been transmitted by Hera suckling Thetis, and Thetis suckling Akhilleus (!). Adkins, while correctly stating that Akhilleus is honoured because he is the gods’ friend (e.g. 1971: 10-11; 1975b: 244),

and also because he is a ‘better’ man than Hektor (1982: 315), goes too far in saying that the gods would support anyone “who had... grounds for superior status” (i.e. regardless of his personal relationship with the gods) to the extent that they would let him "act as he chose to the weaker" (1975b: 252) : there is no evidence for this.

167. (a) As Adkins puts it : "Though right triumphs in the main plots of both Iliad

and Odyssey, it does not do so because it is right” (1960a: 62).

Lloyd-Jones'

objection that it is not a coincidence that right triumphs (1983: 7-8; cf. Griffin 1980b: 27), is partly correct : the story-teller surely deliberately \ets right prevail, in order to satisfy his audience. But it is significant that the motives attributed by the poet to those who have the power to make right prevail - the gods - have nothing to

Notes to Chapter Three

375

do with a desire to uphold justice : the happy outcome therefore is a result of a coincidental balance of power based on personal obligations. There is no fundamental difference between Iliad and Odyssey in respect of the relation between the gods and justice. In the Odyssey, we may be “generally given the impression of one undivided and righteous divine will" (Griffin 1980b: 54), but

this is only a superficial impression. A closer look shows that the gods are not undivided (Zeus and Athena versus Poseidon [above]; perhaps also a hint of friction between Zeus and Athena [n.157}), and that they act from personal obligations - as

they do in the Iliad. It is only mortals who say - as they do in the Iliad - that the gods will uphold justice. Fundamentally, the situation is unchanged. The impression of an "undivided and righteous divine will" stems purely from the fact that none of the gods appear to have personal obligations to any of the suitors. This is an interesting difference from the Iliad, where both sides have supporters, but it is a difference in plot; not a difference in ethical outlook (see above, with nn.160, 165). In view of this, it is better to speak of the Odyssey as a story of (legitimate) revenge than as a “tale of villainy and retribution” (Finley 1977: 140); Odysseus is certainly not “an almost anonymous agent of divine justice” (Griffin 1980b: 52). (See above, with n.123.)

(b) Apart from imagining that the villains have fewer friends on Olympos than the heroes, there are several other ways of bridging the gap between the need to help friends and the need to uphold justice. One is the notion that certain categories of vulnerable people are special protégés of Zeus : in protecting beggars, strangers and suppliants, therefore, Zeus is both helping friends and upholding justice (e.g. 6.207; 7.164-5, 180-1; 9.270-1; 13.213-14; 14.56-8; 16.421-3). A remarkable way of reconciling the demand for justice and the paramount importance of personal obligations is personification. By making the Entreaties (Litai) daughters of Zeus (IX.502-14), Homer reinforces the norm that

be open to reconciliation. break a norm,

a man must

He who refuses to accept compensation does not merely

but offends a daughter of Zeus,

and

Zeus

will therefore retaliate,

avenging his daughter and upholding a human norm at the same time. Hesiod achieves a similar but greater effect by personifying Justice (Diké) as a daughter of Zeus (Works & Days 256-62). In addition, Zeus and the gods of the Underworld are credited with a particular concern to punish oathbreakers (e.g. III.276-80; XIX.258-60). Also, the Erinyes are made to guarantee proper behaviour, especially within the family (e.g. IX.453-7, 566-72; XV.204; XXI.412; 2.135; 11.280; cf. Adkins 1971: 13; 1987: 317; Dodds 1951: 32; Frisch 1949: 60). Whereas Adkins (as cited in n.165) sees all these as exceptions to the rule that the gods have no concern for justice, Lloyd-Jones argues, rightly I think, that they are part of a wider divine concern to uphold justice (1983: 5). Finally, the notion that the gods may give prosperity to the bad and misery to the good (e.g. 6.188-9; cf. XXIV.527-42) suggests a cynical view of the gods that counters, but may well coexist with, the view that they guarantee justice. Scholars, however, are too easily inclined to see “caprice” and "whim" in divine actions. It is not true,

for instance,

that Hera

displays

“brutal caprice

towards

friend and

foe

alike" (O'Brien 1991: 107) : on the contrary, insofar as it is within her power she consistently helps her friends and harms her enemies - and so do all the other gods (cf. Adkins 1960a: 64; Redfield 1975: 76 ["frivolous, unsteady creatures"); Tsagarakis 1977: 135-6; and especially Clay 1983: 215-39).

Notes to Chapter Three

376

168. I would thus see in this passage a contrast between helping friends and doing justice, just as there is in Hera's speech (XXIV.56-7). 169. Two responses to this passage have been to propose to delete it (Aristarkhos already proposed this "on the grounds that the destitution predicted is absurd for a son of the royal race while Priam and Hector's brothers are still alive” [Leaf 1900: ad XXT1.487; cf. Ameis/Hentze 1868 and Monro 1897 ad loc.]) or to argue that it is

a generalisation which is not really meant to apply to Astyanax (Leaf 1900: loc.cit.; Willcock 1978: ad XXII.484). I would suggest that this exaggerated image of Astyanax' fate actually fits in with Homer's view of heroic society : see below. 170. See n.155. 171. Contra the authors cited in 0.151.

172. Hence, perhaps, Homer's depiction of youths as by definition rash and aggressive (e.g. ΠΙ.105-7; cf. Collins 1988: 81). Compare Arlacchi's analysis of

the traditional mafia career : as a young man, the mafioso establishes himself by acts of violence; once established, he seeks to consolidate his position, resorts to violence

less, and relies on connections more (1986: 3-54). 173. 1.381-2 = 18.410-11.

I take it that they bite their lips to suppress their anger;

Lateiner (1989: 22-3), however, argues that they bite their lips in their determination

not to stop making life hard for Telemakhos, although they realise that they are in the wrong. On Akhilleus' threats being worse than his actions : Adkins 1982: 294-

5. On the greater violence of divine conflict in the past : Griffin 1980a: 184. 174. Whether it is ‘hard’ to dishonour Poseidon because others feel a "psychological difficulty” in dishonouring one with a claim to high status (so Riedinger 1976: 258, esp. n.2), or because he is a formidable enemy (being "the best" of the gods; so Adkins 1972c: 5), is not clear. Either way, the danger to his position is slight. Note that both Poseidon and Akhilleus try to keep up a deterrent facade even when giving in : they threaten serious consequences for anyone who dares go further than they have gone so far (XV.211-17; 1.297-303). The view that the epics create an illusion of constant conflict, rather than reflect

reality in this respect, is also taken by Andreev 1988: 72 n. 212; Morris 1986a: 11620; Havelock 1978: 90-1; cf. Rowe 1983: 254). Morris plausibly argues that this illusion justifies aristocratic dominance (ibid. 123-6); Havelock implausibly suggests that it is a “mnemonic requirement of oral epic” (ibid. 90). 175. See also the laments for Hektor at XXTI.416-36;

XXIV.723-76.

Hektor,

in

fact, protects his family by protecting the city as a whole; cf. Adkins 1982: 320-1. 176. Note that Finley, despite favouring a date of 1000-800 B.C. for the Homeric world as a whole, says that the "mixture of might and counsel” that characterises the position of Zeus (and others) “bespoke the archaic world” (1977: 134; emphasis added). Van Effenterre (1985: 134) argues that the combination of settled institutions and a "rule of fist and sword” points to the Mycenaean Age: this is based on no more than a general (and possibly erroneous) impression that the

Notes to Chapter Three Mycenaean age was violent, ‘peaceful’ Minoan culture.

377 but would

have

retained

some

institutions

of the

177. For Hesiod's basileis, see esp. Theogony 81-3, where it is made clear that one

is born a prince, and at birth acquires the eloquence typical of a prince.

On the

Eupatridai and Archaic aristocracies in general, see Stein-Hölkeskamp 1989; Stahl 1987; Amheim 1977: 39-71 (esp. 46-51). On the changing meaning of basileus, see

Cobet 1981; Drews 1983; Carlier 1984.

On the designations for the upper classes,

see Schulz 1981 (cf. Chapter Two, n.20). 178. Kleisthenes' family, hetaireia, and popular support : Herodotos V.70, 72; 66,

69; Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 20.1-3. Compare ‘the stories on Kimon's power-base : Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 27,3; Plutarch, Kimon 10. On the traditional bases of power,

and the emergence of ‘new politicians’ in the mid-fifth century, see Connor 1971; also Rhodes 1986. As for the conflict between the demands of justice and friendship, it should be noted that Plutarch also relates a story that Themistokles refused to do a favour to a friend (Simonides) against the law (Moralia 8070; Themistokles 5,4) : clearly one could not simply ignore justice, but had to strike a delicate balance. Other anecdotes on the theme of "whether one ought to help

friends against justice, and up to what point, and how" are recounted by Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae 1.3 (esp.1-9; 20). 179. At vv. 865-8, for example, Theognis uses areie to mean 'valour'. Adkins sees the statement that "in justice all arete is summed up" as an important new insight and a radical departure from Homeric conceptions (1960a: 78). Rather than a complete break with Homer, the passage seems to me to represent an overstatement of the same kind as Tyrtaios' notion that only valour constitutes true arere : the underlying concept of arete remains the same, but for the purposes of the poem a single aspect of it is stressed above all others (cf. Pleket 1971: 362-3; Dover 1983: 48). 180. Cf. Van Wees

1988: 23-4.

Aristotle (Politics 1297b16-28) refers to a stage at

which the hippeis, aristocratic horsemen, dominated warfare and politics; this is "after the monarchies” and before the rise of the hoplites. Whether or not horsemen really did dominate militarily, it is this stage of aristocratic political domination which Homer reflects : Homeric basileis are hippeis (although they drive chariots rather than ride horses). Unless one is to argue that during "the monarchies” it was the monarchs who single-handedly decided battle, one must assume that at that stage, too, the Aippeis dominated warfare; the fact that there are monarchs in the heroic

world is therefore not an objection to identifying Homer's world with Aristotle's hippeis-stage. In fact, it seems to me that Aristotle added the phrase “after the monarchies" only to gloss over a problem in his theory of political development, viz.

that monarchy,

unlike aristocracy or democracy, could not easily be justified in

terms of merit in combat. (The epics can only achieve this by presenting a distorted picture of battle; in Hellenistic times, the king was deemed to contribute crucially to battle through the influence of his presence or absence on the morale of his troops, and this in part justified his rule.)

For a critical discussion of the evidence for the nature of the hoplite phalanx : Cawkwell 1989; cf. Krentz 1985; contrast Hanson 1989; 1991.

On the question of

whether or not hoplites constituted a political force when they first emerged as a military force, see Snodgrass 1965; Salmon 1977.

Notes to Chapter Three

378

181. On hybris (and greed) as a motive for seizing wealth : Hesiod, Works & Days 213-24; cf. 320-6; Solon

1.7-16; 4 Diehl; also the proverbial line “love of wealth

will destroy Sparta, nothing else", cited as part of one of Tyrtaios’ poems by Diodoros of Sicily (7.14), but often not included among Tyrtaios' fragments in modem editions. On archaic games, see e.g. Murray 1980: 193-7. With regard to tyrants, insofar as they come to power by exploiting popular discontent,

they are of course unlike Homeric

heroes,

but to the extent that they

usurp power with the help of friends and even the support of the people at large, in order to gain higher honour for themselves, they are no different. 182. A number of other instances of insults which led to violent conflict is given by Aristotle, Politics 1311a33ff. On enmity in general: e.g. Dover 1974: 180-3; Blundell

1989:

26-59.

On

hybris,

e.g.

Fisher

1976,

1979,

1990,

forthcoming;

Murray 1990a; MacDowell 1976. 183. Snodgrass (1980: 99-100) notes the change and links it with the discontinuation

of the practice of depositing weapons in tombs as grave-gifts : “aristocrats may no longer have seen themselves as warriors before all else". Note also the mid-seventh century change in funerary art, from vases predominantly depicting scenes of warfare to vases depicting symposion-scenes (Murray 1980: 199). 184.

Snodgrass

suggests

a 4%

per annum

century (1980: 22-4); Morris (1987:

population

growth

in the late eighth

156-9) argues for a less "astronomical rate”.

It has been suggested to me that the increasing role of conspicuous consumption at the expense of conspicuous destruction might be due to an influx of new luxury goods from the Near East. I doubt, however, that the availability of luxury goods would in itself suffice to bring about the transformation : why did powerful and aggressive men not simply respond by seizing the new status symbols ?

185. The transition from violent competition to competition in wealth has taken place elsewhere,

too,

though

under different circumstances.

Many

tribal societies that

used to engage in continual warfare turned to competitive gift-exchange when colonising powers put a stop to armed violence in their territory - most famously 30 among the Kwakiutl, who gave the world the word potlatch (see p. 222). One may also note Thorstein Veblen’s famous theory (1899) that mankind has developed from a barbarian stage at which the main source of status is "the taking of life", to a civilised stage at which conspicuous consumption and leisure are the most important. He explains this as the result of the growing importance of private property and "industry”.

379

NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR 1.

Quotations from resp. Caskey (1964:

11), Momigliano (1958:

113), and De Ste.

Croix (1972: 218). Alternative causes of the Trojan War are suggested by e.g. Finley 1964; Kirk 1964; Caskey 1964; Page 1964; and further e.g. Bowra 1972: 83, cf. 88; Kirk 1962; 21-2, 40-1; Nilsson 1933: 26-7, cf. 113; Page 1959: 257; Wood 1985: 159-61, 167-8, 247-9; see also the discussions of recent work in Easton 1985:

189-90 and Latacz 1986: 111 (cf. 1988: 411). 176.

For ancient reinterpretations see p.

2. Page (1964: 18 n.1) is unusual in allowing room for the possibility that, with a background of Trojan-Akhaian imperial and commercial rivalry, the abduction of Helena

may

have provided

the "occasion"

of war;

Wood

(1985:

250) argues that

Helena may have been "used as a pretext for war" - a war which was primarily fought for booty (see also Casson 1959: 34). 3. Many are aware, for example, that there are societies which differ from our own in regarding the seizure of booty as a legitimate goal of war (see pp. 213-17). There is also wide acceptance of the idea that, although ‘commercial rivalry’ may be a cause of contemporary wars, it is not a feasible explanation for ancient wars. Cf. Strasburger 1972: 11-12. 4. For a methodological discussion on how to distinguish the ‘historical kernel‘ from the myth and the fantasy contained in these tales, see Davies and Foxhall 1981: 87-110 (Davies), 111-35 (Hainsworth), 177-83 (Davies and Foxhall). Both Davies and Hainsworth in passing dismiss the abduction of Helena as a non-historical episode, derived from folk-tale. While I agree with their conclusion, I would argue

that it is not methodologically sound to reject the story out of hand.

Ideally, one

ought to demonstrate that the social structures, cultural values and material resources of the societies which supposedly fought at Troy, were such that they would not have gone to war over this kind of incident. 5. The wars are discussed on pp. 191-9 (and in n.68), raids on pp. 207-13, where the distinction between the two is amplified. I should point out that I shall be using the term war rather loosely, to include private plundering raids, which narrower definitions of war would exclude. 6. Bravo traces these views back to K.F. Hermann's Lehrbuch der griechischen Staatsalterthümer (18554 [18311]), an article by Dareste in REG 2 (1889), and Bruno Keil's Eirene (1916). Another early expression of the view may be found in Rüstow/Köchly (1852: 1). Nowag (1983: 24) has reached the same conclusion as Bravo, apparently independently. Bravo's discussion of the Homeric evidence (1980: 953-60, 974-7) is less convincing than the rest of his work : see below, p. 195. 7. Cf. Finley 1977: 99-103, 123; Herman 1987.

See 228-37, below.

8. 1.175-7; 10.38-9; 19.239-40 (all cited in n.170); cf. 24.266-79.

Notes to Chapter Four

380

9. This is, in fact, one of Odysseus’ plausible.

lying tales, but even a false tale has to be

10. Note Nestor's reception of Telemakhos and Mentor : they are allowed to share in

the great public sacrifice that is in progress when they arrive, but their crew of twenty men is not,

(From 3.360-1, it is clear that they have remained at the ship;

they are briefly invited to a sacrifice next day, but afterwards sleep on the ship [3.424-5, 431-2; 15.199-221].) 11. The Paphlagonian Harpalion is Paris’ xeinos (XIT1.660-1), the Lykian Sarpedon Hektor's

(XVII.150).

The

Phrygian

Asios

is the

brother

of

Priamos’

wife

(XV1.715-19). At least one of Priamos' sons-in-law, who lives in Pedaios, comes to Troy when the war breaks out (XI11.170-6). The fact that the allies are ‘paid’ for

their services (XVIII.290-2) does not mean that obligations of kinship and friendship play no part in their recruitment.

12. Mentor says that he is parting from Telemakhos in order to travel by himself to the Kaukones,

(3.366-8). pretence.)

"where

a debt is owed

to me

- and

not a recent or a small one”

(‘Mentor' is really the goddess Athena in disguise, and the story is only

13. Further discussion and additional examples of embassies, as well as another reference to mob-lynching : pp. 176, 177, 179, 194-5.

On Homeric diplomacy, see

Wery 1979: 13-53. 14. See pp.

175,

mediators, cf. Wéry

177,

187.

The heralds play a crucial role here in acting as

1979: esp. 21, 29, 34.

15. Homeric epithets for war are listed by Silk 1987: 73-7.

For kharme, see Latacz

(1966: 20-38, 125-7), who argues that it means ‘lust for battle’ rather than ‘joy of battle’, as often assumed. Although war is generally regarded in a negative light, I can find no trace of any notion that war is part of ‘nature’ as opposed to ‘culture’, or ‘impure’, pace Redfield (1975) who builds his interpretation of the /liad around these concepts, presumably owing to the influence of Claude Lévi-Strauss. At the other extreme, the suggestion that Homeric passages focusing on the suffering of the bereaved are meant to evoke, not pity, but contempt for the warrior who has failed to stay alive and protect them (Scott 1979) is as hard to substantiate as to disprove.

16. See p. 53. 17. Many possessions” taken by Paris : ITI.70-2, 91-3, 282-5, 458-9; VII.350, 363, 389, 400; XIII.627-8; XXII.114-6. The image of Paris performing dangerous exploits is enhanced by a casual reference to his acquiring women in Sidon, on the way from Sparta to Troy (VI.289-92). He is most likely to have captured them, although, as Ormerod (1924: 88) points out, he could have received them as a gift (cf. 24.266-79). Note that another early epic version of the story, that of the Kypria (as quoted by Herodotos, 11.117), made no mention of the episode. Perhaps this is another illustration of the Iliad's tendency to put a warlike complexion on private inter-community conflicts. (A late antique summary of the Kypria [frg. 1 =

Notes to Chapter Four

381

Proklos, Khrestomathia] does say that Paris “took the city” of Sidon.

Presumably

this is a later, revised version, adapted to the /liad.) 18. Given that Helena had gone with Paris of her own accord, Akhaian concern for

her well-being may seem out of place (as it has seemed to e.g. Willcock 1957: 23). But the poet has created room for it by taking every opportunity to portray Helena as

bitterly regretting her decision : I1.139-40, 171-6; VI.344-51; XXIV.763-4; 4. 1456, 259-64.

19. Although the Trojans have broken an ethical norm in offending Menelaos, the “disgrace” (lobe) and “shame” (aiskhos) fall on him, not on the Trojans (so Adkins 1960a: 42; see also pp. 110-18, with nn.104, 115). The full passage is quoted below (at n.39).

Menelaos'

responsibility for upholding (11.351-4; cf. XIII.623-5).

motive is to wipe out his personal shame;

the ethical norm

he feels no

as such - that is a task for Zeus

20. The suitor's oath is first mentioned by Hesiod (fr. 198 M/W); cf. Thukydides 1.9,1; Apollodoros III.10,9, Hyginus, Fabulae 78. For the total number of 60.000 for Menelaos' army, see Appendix One, section 1. 21. Kinyras : e.g. Apollodoros, Epitome 3.9; Schol. DT ad X1.20; Eustathios 827. 33-9,

Akhilleus : e.g. Apollodoros ΠΙ.13.8; Ovidius, Metamorphoses XIII.162-70;

Hyginus, Fabulae 96.

Odysseus : e.g. Kypria, fr. 1; Hyginus, Fabulae 95.

22. Agamemnon has ties of guest-friendship with Melaneus, an Ithakan prince. Instead of recruiting this man for his army, Agamemnon merely stays at his house while trying to persuade Odysseus. The poet thus did not regard Odysseus as a personal friend of Agamemnon's, and perhaps imagined that Agamemnon turned to Odysseus because, as the local ruler, the latter would be able to influence the decision of the Ithakan community regarding the war, in a way that his friend Melaneus could not (24. 102-22).

23. Jeanmaire (loc.cit.) sees the passage as the first ever reference to electing a magistrate, but the wording suggests a far less formal process. 24. The point is made by Finley 1957: 284-5 n.35; cf. Carlier 1984: 179. 25. On contributions of wine and food by the people to the meals of the elders, see

pp. 32-3 and 85-6. 26. See pp. 39-40, 58.

Akhaia as a political unit is probably a fantasy, unless it

reflects Mycenaean conditions. 27. It is commonly assumed (as in LSJ) that time here has the specific meaning ‘compensation’,

1.6.

an

amount

of

material

goods

(see

Adkins

1960b:

24-32).

Throughout most of the war, however, the aim of the Akhaians is not to gain material compensation, but to destroy Troy (see pp. 186-90). I suggest, therefore, that sim2 means ‘honour’, as usual, and that there are two ways of acquiring this honour for Menelaos "from the Trojans". Either the Trojans give honour, by expressing their respect for Menelaos with an offer of compensation (which makes

Notes to Chapter Four

382

up for their previous lack of respect, not for e.g. expenses incurred or hardships endured by Menelaos), or else the Akhaians take honour “from the Trojans” by punishing their lack of respect with destruction. Either way, the honour of Menelaos is restored. 28. It has been thought that Agamemnon is here adding a new condition for peace (e.g. Kirk 1985: ad 111.286, and see the discussion in Bergold 1977: 98-101). It is true that compensation has not been mentioned in the Iliad until this moment, but it seems to me that so far it has simply been taken for granted - compensation being standard practice in Homeric society - and that it is now mentioned only because a solemn oath requires a careful formulation of the conditions. The embassy of Menelaos and Odysseus presumably took place when the army was already gathered at Troy, see Kypria, fr. 1; schol. ad 111.206. The phrase "which will reach even future generations" (he te kai essomenoisi met’ anthropoisi peletai) may rather mean “which may also take place among future generations” (so

Ruijgh 1971: 410-11). 29. Herodotos II.113-20. The Egyptian account may be based on a variant Greek version which deliberately exonerated Helena from all blame for the war, claiming that she had been transported to Egypt by the gods, who had then fashioned a phantom image of her for Paris to seduce and the armies to fight over. The story is told in e.g. Euripides' Helena, and had allegedly been created by Stesikhoros in his so-called palinode(s). (An overview of recent discussions of the poem[s] in Gerber [1987: 126-7].) I would suggest that what the "Egyptian priests' (whoever they are) did was to historicise this tale by removing the supernatural elements - the gods and the phantom double -, thus creating a watertight explanation for the Trojans’ behaviour.

In the resulting story, blame

have worried them.

shifts back to Helena,

but that need not

(This explanation is not considered by Lloyd in his discussion

of the relation between Herodotos' account and the Stesikhoros-tradition [1988: 46-

8).)

30. Stoning (lit.: “wearing a cloak of stone") : ΠΙ.56-7.

Hostility towards Helena :

XXIV.767-72; III.159-60, 410-2; towards Paris : III.38-42; VI.280-5, cf. 325-31, 520-5 (of Hektor); VII. 390 (of Idaios); I11.451-4 (of everyone). Note also the material cost of the war : X VIII.288-92. 31. Bergold (1977: 152-3, 166), too, explains Pandaros' deed will bring him glory and gratitude.

thus the “amazing” notion that However, he explains the Trojan

advance into battle as a literary device to create a symmetry with the Akhaian advance in Book II (1977: 171-2). Further discussion in Ameis-Hentze (1868: Anhang, p.10-19). Kirk (1985: ad IV.221) summarises the explanations offered by ancient commentators. 32. One could argue that, strictly speaking, Menelaos should have killed Paris (11.281), not just ‘defeated’ him, as he did, and that the Trojans therefore do not

really violate their oaths in refusing to give up Helena (so Kirk 1985: ad III.281-6, 306-7, 457). But if that is supposed to be the Trojans’ view, the poet would surely have made them raise this point in justification of their actions.

seems that any form of defeat is equivalent to being killed.

Since they do not, it

Notes to Chapter Four

383

33. Fear of Akhilleus kept them near the city: IX.352-5 (cf. VI.431-4). 34. 111.259, 304-9.

As Kirk (1985: ad 306-7) and Edwards (1987: 194), with Schol.

bT ad 111.259 and 306, and Eustathios 412.26-9,

point out, the fact that Priamos

"shudders" (rhigesen) is a sign of affection for his son. Bergold (1977: 94, with n.1) argues that Priamos shudders with joy at the prospect of peace (so too Schol. b ad 259). The parallels he offers for this use of the verb, however, are all perfectly compatible with the idea that one shudders with fear, rather than joy.

35. Paris’ uncles Lampos, Klytios and Hiketaon : III.146-53; XX.237-8; his cousins Dolops, Kaletor and Melanippos : XV.525-7, 419, 545-55; his brothers : VI.244-6; XXIV.493-7. On kinship obligations in general : pp. 147-8. 36. The parallel between Pandaros' and Antimakhos' motives makes it clear that one need not (with Bergold 1977: 86; Willcock 1978: ad loc.) assume the unusual meaning "having received [gold]” for dedegmenos in XI.124, with the implication

that Antimakhos has been bribed.

Like Pandaros, he spontaneously takes Paris'

side, “hoping for [gold]" in return (cf. 2.186; so Leaf 1900: ib.). Bergold (1977: 152) points out that Paris is called “prince” only in this context, to emphasise his influential position. 37. Cf. III.46-7. Paris travelled with more than one ship (V.59-62), and a crew consists of either 20 or 50 men (see Appendix One, section 1). The minimum number

of companions

is therefore

40,

and

150

or

200

are

not

unreasonable

estimates. 38. We need not assume (with Leaf 1900: ad VII.393) that Antenor is “regarded as the leader of a popular party". The herald uses other means too, to present the Trojans in a favourable light and facilitate negotiations : see De Jong 1987: 183-5. 39. The passage makes little sense if one assumes that Menelaos is reproaching the Trojans with being successful in battle ("an anti-climax”, Leaf 1900: ad loc.; "rather weak resentment", Willcock

1978 : ibid.).

It seems to me that Menelaos is

criticising them for their continual aggression against him, which they commit "just like that" (maps, 627), i.e. without cause.

I should emphasise again (cf. n.19) that

the “disgrace” and “shame” fall on Menelaos, not on the Trojans. Similarly, Antimakhos’ proposal to kill Menelaos is described as "his ugly disgrace” (XI.142),

meaning

'the disgrace inflicted by him upon Menelaos'.

This is not to say, of

course, that the behaviour of Antimakhos and the Trojans is not regarded as morally

wrong : see pp. 110-18.

40. For hybris, see pp. 107-8, 115-18. 41. She is "a boast" (eukhole) to the Trojans, if they win : II.160-1,

176-7; IV.173-

4. “No-one will blame the Trojans and Akhaians for long suffering hardships on account of such a woman : she is uncannily like the immortal goddesses to look at“ (11.156-8).

The war is referred to as aethloi for her sake (111.126-8;

cf. 3.262;

4.170) - aethlos meaning ‘contest’ or 'labour' : 'a task which puts one's abilities to the test’.

Notes to Chapter Four

384

42. Agamemnon, too, shields him : VII.107-16; X.233-40. 43.

Cf.

the discussions

at IX.9-39;

XIV.64-94.

In a similar vein,

Akhilleus

fantasises about capturing Troy by himself (XV1.97-100).

44. The taunts exchanged are supposed to refer to actual incidents of the war. The story is taken from Ongka's 'self-account' recorded by Andrew Strathern (1979: 5661; cf. Strathern 1971). 45. Exquemelin was himself a buccaneer (a ship's doctor), and his work is regarded

as a reliable source.

The publication history of the book is convoluted : the first

version of it (1678) was written in Dutch, but I have used a second Dutch version (Historié der Boecaniers [1700], re-published in 1971), based on two expanded English versions of it (Bucaniers of America and History of the Bucaniers [1684]),

which

Henry

Morgan

actually tried to suppress.

The sack of Porto Bello is

described in Chapter XIII, that of Panama in Chapter XVIII.

46. Cf. Hektor's vision of the fall of Troy : VI.448-65.

Other refs. to enslavement

of women and looting in sack of Troy : 1.127-9; IX.135-40 = 277-82; 3.154 (cf. 5.39-40 = 13.137-8; 13.262-4). Burning: 11.414-5; VI.331; XX1.375-6 (cf. XXI1.410-11).

Also : II.113, 133; IX.20, 46.

47. The choice between destruction and giving up half of all movable wealth is put before an unnamed city in XVIII.509-13. Here, however, it is the attackers offer this choice, and the defenders who prefer to fight. I should mention Hektor's reason for rejecting his own plan is not that he knows that Agamemnon Menelaos would not accept it, but that he would have to put it to Akhilleus, would not accept it because he has personal grounds to seek revenge on Hektor.

also who that and who

48. Children enslaved : 14.264-5; 15.381-8; IX.594.

49. Wickert-Micknat (1983: 38-9) argues that boys would be killed to prevent them from taking revenge for their fathers' deaths. Although in other circumstances this

is commonly advanced as a justification, it does not seem to apply to the killings that accompany the sack of Troy. 50. Many scholars feel uncomfortable with this passage. Fenik (1986: 22-7) argues that the poet really regards such violent vengeance as deplorable, but cannot express this view owing to the constraints of formulaic diction. Goldhill (1990: 373-6) argues that aisima means 'fated' rather than 'right' or "proper', i.e. that Agamemnon was ‘destined’ to say these words to his brother. Yamagata (1990: 420-30) argues that aisima means ‘measured’, 1.6. that Agamemnon's speech "has been put in wellmeasured contrasts” (430) and is commended for its eloquence, not its content.

While it is true that aisima does not necessarily mean ‘morally right’, (cf. VII.1201),

it still

seems

to me

that

‘right

(in the circumstances)’

is the

most

obvious

interpretation, and does not clash with Homeric ethics, according to which the need for revenge is stronger than the need to show mercy to suppliants (XX1.99-105).

See Patroni's discussion of the passage (1942: 448-9).

Notes to Chapter Four

385

51. A ‘slip’ on the part of the poet : the ships are supposed to be drawn up in fers (XTV.30-6), so that the first ship

Hektor reaches cannot actually be dragged out to

sea, and there is no reason to hold on to it.

The only other conceivable explanation of Hektor's behaviour - that he is trying to climb aboard the ship - seems implausible since all he is said to do is to take and keep hold of the stern.

52. It is significant that this gesture is mentioned by Odysseus in a speech designed to bring Akhilleus back into action.

By portraying Hektor's feeling of superiority,

Odysseus is working upon Akhilleus' sense of rivalry with him : IX.229-46, 301-6. 53. See pp. 61, 137-8. $4. Booty from Troy: n.46.

Plundering of towns: pp. 210-13.

$5. Physical violence: I1.198-9, 265-9; threats: 11.191-7, 257-64, 346-7, 357-9, 3913; omens: 11.299-32, 348-53; shame: 11.284-98, 337-45; revenge: I1.354-6. Nor are the Trojans encouraged with promises of booty, although the Akhaian camp is full of

it: XII.7-8. Cf. Wickert-Micknat 1983: 25. By contrast, Nowag argues that the prospect of booty is the driving force behind the efforts of the bulk of the army (1983: 26-36). As evidence he cites the passage in which Nestor tells the Akhaians to rape Trojan women in revenge for Helena's sufferings (T1.354-6), which he reads as : take booty (i.e. women) to make up for your own sufferings (i.e. years of fighting for the sake of Helena). I find this strained. Nowag also points out that Odysseus tells the men that it would be “totally shameful to stay long and come home empty” (keneon, 11.297-8). This may refer to retuming without (much) booty, but it primarily refers to returning without having won, and without Helena. And in any case, Odysseus is concerned with the shame of it, not the material loss. One might argue that booty is not mentioned because the troops get very little of

it, but even if this is true, it does not explain why the prospect of booty does not get much mention among the leaders either. 56. IX.327; XVIII.265; 11.403; 24.113. 57. 11.314-25. In all these respects, it is different from the duel between Hektor and Aias (pp. 200-2). The prayer for the guilty party to be punished should, I think, be explained as a standard formula for these occasions - otherwise the poet would not have made the Trojans utter it, since there is no doubt that Paris is the guilty party, and although the Trojans hate him, they no doubt want him to win (pp. 177-9). If the prayer is a formula, the practice of trial by combat must be well-established. Armstrong (1950: 73-8) and Fernandez Nieto (1975: 37-69) list and discuss the trials by combat (as distinct from duels ‘for honour’) known from Greek history and legend (cf. the list in Pritchett 1985:

17-20).

‘amelioration’ of warfare [Pritchett ibid.:

The custom (often seen as a form of

16 n.52,

20-1; Glück

1964: 25]) is in

keeping with the Homeric scale of values, on which a show of might tends to count for more than a proof of right (see Chapter Three, sections 6-8).

Notes to Chapter Four

386

58. This view is supported by the fact that the preparations for the duel include the episode known as the Teikhoskopia, which unquestionably is better suited to the beginning of the war than to its end. 59. Kirk attempts to stretch the interpretation of the Homeric tradition to imply a “brawl”, too (1985: ad 11.742-4, 745-6; 1.263-5, 268). The tradition of a fight on Mt.

Pelion,

rather than

at the wedding,

is also found

in Hesiod

(The Shield of

Herakles 178-90 : references to fighting with tree-branches) and in the story of how the Kentaurs killed the Lapith Kaineus by beating him into the ground with heavy branches (e.g. Apollonios Rhodios I.57-64). Cf. Bethe 1921: col. 175-6. 60. There is some controversy as to which "wall" is meant, that of Kalydon or that of Pleuron.

There can, in fact, be little doubt that the wall of Pleuron is meant.

The

only ‘problem’ is then that the fighting later moves from there to Kalydon. Willcock (e.g. 1976: ad IX.550-2) points out that Homer thus provides a parallel to the situation at Troy. He nevertheless finds this "a strangely mobile war”, but it seems to me that, when both sides aim to destroy their enemy, such developments are to be expected. 61.

He was killed in battle, by accident, in the version of Bakkhylides (V.124-51).

Apollodoros (1.8.3) gives both the ‘battle’ and the 'brawl' version. also Ovidius, Metamorphoses VIII.270ff.

For the latter see

62. The /liad is unique in saying that she did not kill him by magic, but merely brought about his temporary withdrawal by cursing him (1X.553-6, 565-72). For an explanation of this peculiarity, see Willcock 1964: 148-53. In yet another version, Meleagros was killed by Apollo in battle (see ibid. 151 n.4, 153-4; and Bremmer 1988: 37-56). Bremmer, too, concludes that Homer "has transformed the original

dispute about the spoils into a true war between two nations” (ibid. 41-2). 63. The scattered references in Homer are pieced together on the basis of the story as it is told by e.g. Hellanikos (FGH 4 F 26a/b = Schol. Ge ad XXI. 444 / Schol.

A ad XX.146); Apollodoros 11.5.9, 6.4; Diodoros IV.32, 49.7. 64. Eighteen pentekonters : Apollodoros 11.6.4; the Argo : Diodoros IV.42, 49.6. Further details of the attack on the city are given in both accounts and also in Hellanikos FGH 4 F 109 (= Tzetzes, On Lykophron 469). 65. See pp. 115-16. 66.

References

to other leaders:

Amphiaraos

15.244-7

(cf.

11.326-7); Kapaneus IV.403-10; Mekisteus XXIII.678-80. attackers : IV.409; VI.222-3; XIV.114; 15.247. Pausanias

Eriphyle-episode The fate at IX.5.12

in

of the follows

Apollodoros, while at IX.9.1 he follows Diodoros' version. There was an epic Thebais, attributed to Homer (cf. Pausanias IX.9.3), but of this only a few uninformative fragments are preserved. 67. Although Oidipous’ legacy included the position of ruler of Thebes (cf. 11.275), and

control

over a public

institution

was

thus at stake

in this war,

the conflict

appears to be regarded as a private quarrel over a private inheritance of which this

Notes to Chapter Four

387

public position formed part. Hesiodos indicates this when he describes the war as fought “on account of the flocks of Oidipous" (Works and Days 163).

68. The War of the Descendants is given only three lines in the Iliad (TV.406-8), and little can be said about it. The cause is not given, but was almost by definition the desire of the sons of the Seven to avenge the deaths of their fathers. See e.g. Apollodoros III.7.2; Diodoros IV.66; Pausanias IX.5.7, 9.2.; Hyginus, Fabulae 71. Homer further mentions a few wars without mentioning their causes/goals: Herakles against the Pylians (X1.690-3, see p. 197 below), Pylians against Arkadians (VII.132-57, see n.74), Phrygians with their ally Priamos against Amazons (1T1.184-9 [note that Priamos‘ wife is from Phrygia : XVI.717-9)). 69. The idea that it is 'typical‘ is also supported by Wickert-Micknat Ormerod (1924: 73). It derives from reading a single episode of the raid) out of context. The idea that it is a ‘phenomenon of the past’ 1983: 112) appears to be based solely on the fact that the story is man.

The idea that it is unique (so also Nowag

1983:

(1983: 95) and war (the booty(so also Nowag told by an old

111) is tenable only if one (as

Bravo does) explains away the rest of the Homeric evidence. 70. One's share was presumably meant to be ‘fair’ in proportion to one's previous suffering. On sharing booty, see Appendix Four. 71.

So Bravo

(1980:

956-7),

Lintott

(1982:

17) and

Bölte

(1934:

344).

Bravo

maintains that the raid was organised primarily to provide an opportunity for the initiation of young warriors (957). The only ‘evidence’ for this view is, it seems, the youth of the raiders. There is nothing to suggest with Murray (1980: 52) that it

was initially a “private family venture” for which wider support was later gained by distributing the proceeds. 72. The chariots tum back when they reach "Bouprasion... and the Olenian Rock

and the place called 'Hill of Aleision'* (X1.756-8). From 11.615-7 it is clear that "the Olenian Rock and Aleision" are on the border of "Bouprasion and Elis". (The actual location, if any, of these places is not known.)

73. In the War of the Seven against Thebes, Polyneikes' appeal for support in Mykenai is clearly addressed to the community.

It is 'the Mykenaians’

asked to "give allies” (i.e. mobilise men and send them

who are

with the Seven), and they

collectively change their minds on account of the unfavourable oracles.

It does seem

likely, therefore, that the Seven themselves, too, lead public forces : it would be odd if a private army acquired a public ally. The people of Argos may be thought of as supporting Polyneikes partly because of the power of Adrestos, his father-in-law, and partly because, as son-in-law of their leading chieftain, Polyneikes is a member of their community. Concerning the Kouretes and Aitolians, and the Lapiths and Kentaurs, the very use of the tribal names to describe the warring parties suggests the involvement of public armies. The men who join Herakles in sacking Troy, however, could (but need not) be a privately gathered force. 74. Oakley is referring to "the Roman manner” of using single combat, but he rightly notes the parallels with the Greek situation (1985: 402-4). The duel between Nestor and Ereuthalion, in a war between “the assembled Pylians and Arkadian

Notes to Chapter Four

388

spearmen at the walls of Pheia” (VII.134-5), is probably also conceived as being of this type (since it is mentioned as a parallel to that of Hektor and Aias), but this is not clear from Nestor's account of it. Scenes of man-to-man combat in the midst of general battle should not be confused with champion combat (Van Wees 1988; Latacz 1977).

75. The herald and Hektor both add that it is getting dark, and that “it is also good to obey night” (V11.282, 293): perhaps a way of saving face, somewhat Aias' superiority as the reason for ending the duel.

by playing

down

76. E.g. Mueller 1984: 78. A (partial) parallel occurs, in fact, only in the fight between Poseidon and Apollo (XXT.435-69). See Van Wees 1988: 5. 77. In the same way, in armed combat at the funeral games of Patroklos, Diomedes and Aias need not fight on until one of them draws blood, as had been stipulated (XXIII.805-6, cf.818-9). Diomedes is awarded the prize (824-5) on the strength of a better overall performance (820-1),

78. For etai meaning ‘fellow-townsmen', see Appendix One, section 2. Their joy may be partly for Aias' well-being, and partly for their enhanced reputation. Aias' reminder that he was "born and bred in Salamis" (VII. 199) indicates the latter. 79. Cf. p. 93; note also Mekisteus of Argos who

"once went to Thebes

Oidipous

defeated

had

fallen,

for

the

funeral.

There

he

all

the

when

Kadmeians"

(XXIII.678-80). 80. So too Leaf (1900:

ad XXIII.640).

Another possible interpretation

is that

"because it remained on the spot” means “because it still remained to be won" (so Ameis-Hentze 1868 and Willcock 1978: ad loc.) - on this reading, of course, there is

no evidence for rivalry between communities.

81. These (and further) figures are given by Nagler (1990: 355) in his discussion of sport and war in Homer. mistake.)

It should be noted

(He dates the war to 1975, which I believe to be a that the football defeat was not, of course,

the only

cause of war : it took place against a background of a long-running border dispute. Still, it was apparently the last straw. 82. See p. 174 n.23. Although the son of Kastor is not supposed to have existed, his story has to appear plausible and is therefore good evidence for Akhaian norms and practices. One may note, moreover, the parallels with the life of the 'real' Odysseus, who was also reluctant to go to Troy (see p. 174 n.21) and was also involved in warfare both before and after the Trojan War (see below, n.92).

83. Strictly speaking, Odysseus does not call his companions lefsteres in the story of the son of Kastor, but only in a later story which is slightly different. The part of the story in which lefsteres are mentioned, however,

is almost literally the same, so

that I see no objection to the identification. See Benedetto Bravo's discussion of the term leisteres (1980: 827-36). I prefer 'freebooters' to 'pirates/brigands', because (a) it reproduces the association with 'booty'; (Ὁ) it avoids the distinction between plundering by sea and

Notes to Chapter Four

389

by land - a distinction not made in the Greek, but implicit in 'pirates/brigands’; (c)

most importantly, it is less strongly than 'pirates/brigands' associated with deviant behaviour and being socially outcast - associations which the Homeric word does not have, as we shall see.

84. 3.71-4 = 9.252-5 = Hymn to Apollo 452-5 (quoted below). "At random" (or "on spec."; mapsidios) is here contrasted with "on some [specific] business" (kara prexin) : Ameis-Hentze 1856: ad 3.72; Mele 1979: 71.

85. Five days from Crete to Egypt:

14.257.

Cf. nn. 93 and 97.

Three days from Troy to the

mainland : 3.157-79; [X.362-3; cf. Kypria frg. 10 (Hdt. 11.117}.

Emphasis on the

dangers and length of the journey, discussed by Seymour (1907: 287; 305-6), Glotz (1925: 146) and Casson (1959: 38). The legend that the Akhaians could not find Troy at first, Mysia, from where they were forced to return home. Only a native guide, did they finally get to Troy : Kypria frg. 1. this, but there may be an oblique reference to the episode

says that they landed in ten years later, and with Homer does not mention in Helöna's remark that

she has been living in Troy for twenty (not ten) years (XXIV.765-6).

Note also that the Phaiakians supposedly regard Euboia as the most distant place

on earth (7.321-6).

I suppose this is something of an Ionian joke at the expense of

the Phaiakians, but it does suggest that in the Akhaian world everything east of Euboia is supposed to be alien territory. 86. Cf. Trojan hostility to Paris : p.177. 87. This, of course, is why this type of warfare is associated with expeditions across the sea (which in turn explains why it is usually called 'piracy’) : it is much easier to

reach a sufficiently 'alien' land (and get away from it quickly) by sea than by land. But there is no inherent difference between raiding by sea and by land : both may be done by the same people, using the same tactics, to the same ends. (Homeric sea-

raiders do not attack ships at sea : cf. Nowag 1983: 113-16.) 88. Compare the lelsteres in the Hymn to Dionysos (7.31). 89. In the raids of Akhilleus and Odysseus (discussed below), certain men also get a

relatively 'mild' treatment : Maron is allowed to buy his life with ‘gifts’; Eetion is killed but given an honourable burial-in-armour. Note that Aineias was enslaved (rather than killed) after the fall of Troy, according to Ilias Mikra frg. 14. Another

possible explanation for the fact that the Egyptians enslave rather than kill the raiders is that this carries fewer risks if the captives are few in number and far from home. 90. Bravo (1980: 975-7; 1984: 103) emphasises the fact that 'piracy' is a category distinct from ‘war’, but he does not specify the exact difference between the two. Nowag (1983: 78, 94-106) also makes the distinction, but denies that the focus on plunder is an essential difference between the two. On the practices of Homeric sea- raiding, see also Nowag 1983: 128-62. Qn ancient piracy in general : Garlan 1989:

173-201. 91. So too Seymour 1907: 610; Nowag 1983: 71-3.

Menelaos is frequently credited

with freebooting adventures after the war, as well, since he gathered great wealth on

Notes to Chapter Four

390

a joumey in distant lands (3.278-312; 4.80-93). Hasebroek (1933: 16) in particular insists that he must have done so exclusively through plundering. Kirk (1962: 42) maintains that Menelaos gained his wealth through trade.

In fact, all we are told is

that some of Menelaos' valuables had been acquired as gifts from local people: 4.126-9; 15.113-9 (and cf. the gifts given to Helena : 4.125-6, 130-2, 227-30). See pp. 228-37, and on the question of to what extent gift-exchange, trade and raiding are separable, see pp.245-6. 92. There are two instances, though, which are at least likely to be freebooting raids. Almost as soon as he is home from the war, Odysseus plans to go out and plunder again : “As for the flocks of which the arrogant suitors have deprived me, I myself will plunder much [polla lelssomai], and the Akhaians will give me the rest, until all the pens shall have been filled” (23.356-8). In this case, since the booty is meant to

compensate him for the livestock lost during his absence, he probably intends to take the initiative and rustle some foreigner's sheep, rather than wait for a war to break out and provide him with an opportunity to take booty. But we cannot be sure. Mele (1986:67-8) relies rather too heavily on this passage to prove the legitimacy of freebooting. Bravo (1980: 960), on the other hand, attempts to explain it away. He takes leissomai here to mean "I shall take by force" and assumes that Odysseus intends to take sheep ‘by force’ (not ‘as booty’) from the families of those who have robbed him of his livestock in the first place - unless these offer compensation voluntarily. This posits an otherwise unattested meaning of the verb, and seems Strained. Similar to Odysseus' words is Akhilleus' remark that, whereas a life once lost cannot be retrieved, “cattle and sheep are lefstoi" (IX.406), which apparently means that, if one loses one's livestock, one can always go out and rustle a few animals from someone else. Other passages cannot be used as evidence of freebooting practices.

For example,

we know that Odysseus has plundered at least once before the Trojan war - because Telemakhos refers to “the slaves which Odysseus acquired for me by taking booty [moi lerssato]"

(1.398).

But we do not know

whether

this is supposed

to have

happened on a freebooting raid or in the course of war. The same applies to the Messenian cattle-raid cited on p. 171 (cf. Bravo 1980: 959), and to 1.154; 9.405; 11.401-3 (cf. 24.111-3); 14.531; 15.384-6; 17.470-2; 20.49-51. The cattle raid of Nestor is, as I have argued (pp.195-8), not a freebooting raid, nor is the raid at XVIII.513-9. Conversely, references to the destruction of towns cannot by themselves be taken to represent 'status war', either. 93. References: n.84. Thukydides (1.5,2) says that in "the ancient poets” the question is asked “everywhere in the same way", which may mean that there were other poems which used the same formula. Note that the question strictly speaking is not ‘Are you freebooters ?', as Thukydides says, but 'Are you wandering like [koia] freebooters 7 (Nowag 1983: 168). Still, the implication remains that freebooting is common and that it is not offensive to be compared to a freebooter (Jackson 1985: 657; and below).

94. That freebooting is legitimate has long been regarded as a self-evident truth : see e.g. Rüstow/Köchly (1852: 1) and, in very strong terms, Glotz (1925: 147). Its legitimacy has been called into question by Bravo (1980: 975-7 and 1984: 103),

Notes to Chapter Four

391

Wickert-Micknat (1983: 113-6), Nowag (1983: 163-70; cf. Jackson 1985: 755-7), and Hölscher (1988: 208). 95. “There must always have been individualists and adventurers who did not fit into the normal social structure. Such was the Cretan ...” (Kirk 1962: 43, emphasis added). Note also the distorted description of the son of Kastor in Kirk 1968: 11516. Bravo (1980: 975-6) argues that the son of Kastor only engages in freebooting under the constraints of “harsh necessity”, i.e. because of his poverty - implying that it is not otherwise an acceptable activity. 96. Bravo (1980: 976) points out that other Cretans regard a freebooters’ way of life

with "horreur".

This again suggests disapproval, but what the text actually says is

that, whereas the son of Kastor likes ships, battles, javelins and arrows, other people who come near them regard these things as katarrigela, ‘things to make shudder all

over’.

This implies nothing but a fear of the dangers of warfare.

Nowag (1983:

164-5, 169) argues that the success of the son of Kastor is due exclusively to the wealth he acquires in his expeditions; presumably Nowag implies that his wealth wipes out the shame attached to the means by which he has acquired it. 97. In the Hymn to Apollo, the question is 'friendly', too; in 9.252-5 it could be hostile. Bravo (1980: 976) is right to point out that the question does not in itself imply that freebooting is honourable, but he is wrong to say that the word mapsidios,

"at random”, implies a negative judgement (as, it seems, does S. West (1988: ad 3.72] when offering “recklessly as a translation).

In some contexts, the word may

imply criticism, but here it clearly means "without definite destination” (see n.84). Note also the question put to, and by, the ghost of Agamemnon 24.111-3) - this may refer to freebooting. 98. Taphian freebooters : 15.427; 16.426. The Taphian ruler the gods to do Odysseus a favour (1.255-64; p. 170), while disguise herself as Ankhialos' son to give Telemakhos advice son” on how to deal with his enemies (1.269-308). Moreover,

(11.401-3;

cf.

braves the anger of Athena chooses to “like a father to his the 'good’ Eumaios

trades with the Taphians : 14.449-52. 99. Eumaios is seen as a representative of a morality different from the dominant one by e.g. Bravo (1980: 975). He is regarded as an individual exception by e.g. Mele (1986: 67-8). Hölscher (1988: 208) leaves open both possibilities. Note that Eumaios, although now a slave - and in that sense a member of the lower classes was a member of the social élite (the son of a monarch)

before he was kidnapped

(15.412-14).

100. Once again, one cannot be entirely sure that these are freebooters, but it seems likely enough.

It has been argued that the etymology of the word anarsioi ("without

bonds [of friendship]’, as the opposite of arıhmioi), here given the usual translation "enemies",

suggests

"(men)

not

conforming

to

the

rules

(of society;

of decent

warfare)" (Hoekstra 1989: ad 14.85). On this interpretation, the word itself would imply a condemnation of freebooting. However, it clearly means merely ‘enemy' in

XXIV.365

(where it is used by a Greek of his countrymen's attitude towards

Priamos), and 'enemy' seems the more appropriate translation wherever the word

occurs (10.459; 11.401, 408; 24.111).

Notes to Chapter Four

392

101. See pp. 146-8. Note that Eumaios himself accepts only with considerable modifications the idea that the gods punish unjust behaviour. For one thing, he assumes that at least one god may be sympathetic enough to the suitors to give them “some message... that Odysseus has come to a miserable end", and thus reassure them that they may safely continue to act unjustly. Also, Eumaios’ explanation of the suitors’ lack of fear hinges on the idea that the suitors will no longer be in danger of retribution once Odysseus is dead. This implies that he does not expect the gods unconditionally to seek to punish them. With Odysseus dead, the gods may well cease to care what the suitors do. Apparently, if they punish them, it will be to help

Odysseus, as a favour to a ‘friend’, not in order to uphold justice for its own sake. 102. The remark is regarded as ‘inconsistent’ by Hoekstra (1989: ad 14.86-8) and Hölscher (1988: 230).

Alternatively, one could explain it away as merely a poetic

way of saying that the freebooters had enjoyed good fortune, without implying that Zeus had deliberately assisted them. 103. Harmand's remark is part of an oral ‘intervention’ at a congress - perhaps an unguarded moment. Among other explicit supporters of the human nature-approach

are Kaletsch, who ends his survey of ancient piracy with a quote from Cassius Dio, to the effect that ‘piracy will be practised for as long as human nature remains what it is’ (1986: 500); Glotz, who discusses the development of trade in terms of ‘moral’ progress (1920: 48-9); and Andréades, who assumes that the Akhaians use violence without inhibition, on account of the “lack of a strong central government” (1933:

24-5). Note also Starr's reference to cattle-raiding as "a casual, almost involuntary reaction” (1977: 47-8). The approach is, of course, rooted in a prominent strand of

theorising on the nature of society and of the state in general (see p. 63). 104. Alternatively, one might take ‘the stomach’ to represent greed, but since the passage is supposed to be a beggar's explanation of why he is willing to put up with abuse for the sake of scraps of food, hunger seems the more obvious interpretation.

It should be noted, however,

that even hunger may be an ideologically loaded

concept : Forbes (1990: 9-12) notes that in contemporary Greece ‘hunger’ is used as

an explanation for actions such as sheep-stealing, even by those whose diets appear quite satisfactory. “This sort of hunger is metaphorical, not intestinal... A rhetorical device for defending what they themselves feel is an embarassing, socially

reprehensible practice” (ibid. 12). 105. Humphreys (1978: 164-8) points out that many young men of wealthy families would be available for such expeditions, since between the ages of sixteen and thirty they would be more or less redundant at home. They would not be needed for work on the estate, which is carried out by slaves, and they would not set up their own households before the age of thirty. Given that there are no large numbers of non-productive retainers in a prince's household (pp. 42-4), it is not the case - as it is, for example, with Viking raiders that a prince is forced to go plundering once or twice a year in order to provide food

for his retinue. Nowag (1983: 178-9) suggests that wealthy men lead plundering expeditions to help their poor neighbours make ends meet; their aim is not profit for themselves,

Notes to Chapter Four

393

but to prevent the hostility of the poor from

tuming

against rich landowners :

freebooting is "a safety valve". 106. The distinction is briefly indicated by Finley (1977: 60-1), and implicitly made also by earlier authors, yet precisely formulated only by Donlan (1981: 101-7) and Morris (1986b: 8-9). Cf. n.119, and on treasure also p. 52, 103-4.

107. See Chapter Two, section 7.

The following sketch is based essentially on the

accounts of Hasebroek (1931: 14-33) and Finley (1977: 60-71); some of the gaps are filled in with the observations of other authors.

The interpretation of the Homeric economy

has been little affected by the

*modernist-primitivist' debate : the modernist account of Glotz (1920: 7-60), for instance, differs only marginally from that of the primitivists Hasebroek and Finley. Although the terms of this debate may have been misleading, as Humphreys (1978: 157) suggests, it has brought to the fore the methodologically important point that one should not automatically assume that the economic behaviour of another society

is based on the same principles as our own (cf. Cartledge 1983: 3-6). 108. See also e.g. Glotz 1920: 8, 16; Hasebroek 1931:

15; Heichelheim

1958: 225;

Austin/Vidal-Naquet 1972: 54-6; and cf. p. 52. 109. So Glotz (1920: Bolkestein (1958:

18; contradicting himself on p.48), Hasebroek (1931: 31),

105) and Donlan

(1982a:

141

n.7).

Finley allows for some

‘internal’ exchange, following the same rules as 'external' acquisition, but admits there is no evidence for it (1977: 71).

Gift-exchange between members of different communities was first analysed at length by Finley in his The World of Odysseus of 1954. Its existence had, of course, been noted before then. Hasebroek had referred to it as "the gift-trade”

(Schenkhandel) and remarked that it "plays a significant role among Homeric big men [Grossen], as it always does on a primitive level” (1931: 30). This approach, treating Homeric gift-exchange as one form of a practice found in many ‘primitive’

societies, was adopted by Finley and subsequent writers on the subject. discussions, Finsler's (1914: 195-7) is useful. See pp. 228-37.

Of older

110. Coping with shortages: Glotz 1920: 8, 48; Hasebroek 1931: 29-30; Heichelheim 1958: 225; Austin/Vidal-Naquet 1972: 56-7; Finley 1977: 61-4 and 67 ("Imports alone motivated trade, never exports. There was never a need to export as such"); Hahn 1983: 30-1. Storing the surplus : Glotz 1920: 11, 48; Hasebroek 1931: 31 (“The Homeric nobility has so little interest in economic matters that it does not even bring the surplus of its agricultural produce on the market"), Giving

away the surplus: Murray 1980: 49; 1983a: 196-7; Qviller 1981: 113ff.; Donian 1982a: esp. 170-1; cf. 1982b: 9-10. On the role of gift-exchange in coping with shortages, see pp. 229-30, 237. 111. Cf. Glotz 1920: 48 ("Each does business only so far as he actually needs. No one makes a living by selling the products of others"). That direct consumption is the rule also tends to be implied in the statements that acquisition is motivated by specific shortages (n.110), although it does not strictly follow from this proposition. Wickert-Micknat claims that direct consumption is the norm in the /liad, but not in the Odyssey (1983: 138-40).

Notes to Chapter Four

394

112. So Austin/Vidal-Naquet (1972: 57); Mele (1979: 81; but cf. 1986: 76-8); Cartledge 1983: 9-10; Hahn 1983: 30-1; Cozzo 1988: 29. Cf. Bolkestein 1958: 104-5. Bravo disagrees: he argues that all Homeric trade involves making a profit, and that the princes therefore will have nothing to do with it (1984: esp. 119-20). Elsewhere, one sometimes finds the notion of profit casually slipping in : Glow

1920: 18; Gray 1974: 117; Murray 1980: 70. Further discussion : pp. 238-44. 113. This point of Finley's (which he appears to have derived from Polanyi - see Humphreys 1978: 49) does not seem to have been taken up. It is, in any case, contradicted by the notion that it is possible for ‘professional’ traders to make a

living (see below).

A notion of a ‘right’, 'reasonable' price no doubt existed (cf.

axios onos (pp. 241-2] and iustum preriwn), but such a notion does not, of course, exclude the operation of the laws of supply and demand : what is ‘right’ simply varies with circumstances. Humphreys (loc.cit.) points out another significant economic feature : "The major distinction between the modern economy... and that of earlier... societies is that exchange prices in the latter, whether fixed or bargained, have little connection with production decisions". In Homeric society, therefore, a household might exploit variations in supply and demand when exchanging goods, but it would not actually adapt its production to demand (cf. n. 162, 172). 114. More recent authors to assert this view are Garlan (1989:

189; 1978: 5), Cozzo

(1988: 23-4), Andreev (1988: 72 n.212), Cartledge (1983: 11-12), Fine (1983: 63), Mele (1979: 59-64, 72-3, 101), Humphreys (1978: 167-8), Starr (1977: 51), Finley (1977: 64) and Austin/Vidal-Naquet (1972: 56). Bravo (1984: 103-5, 119, 127-9)

disagrees : see p. 245 n.164. 115. Finley (1977: 71).

explicitly

includes

“small-scale

herders

and

peasants”

among

these

116. Both these types of trader are presumably meant when ‘professional’ traders are mentioned without further comment : cf. Glotz 1920: 49-55; Austin/Vidal-Naquet 1972: 57-8; Finley 1977: 70-1; Mele 1979: 81-3; 1986: 77-8, 94; Bravo 1977: 3340; 1983: 17; 1984: 99; Cartledge 1983: 9-12. 117. This type of trader has been put into the foreground by Bravo (1974: 1977: 24-5; 1983: 24-5; 1984: 99-100). See also Humphreys (1979: 79); Cartledge (1983: 7-8); and already Glotz (1920: 58).

(1978:

150-4;

167);

Mele

118. Finley speaks of "a very few... living in the interstices of society” (1977: 70; this, as Paul Cartledge points out to me, echoes a Marxian phrase referring to mediaeval Jews).

Cf. Glotz

1977: 24; Redfield 1983: 233.

1920:

52; Hasebroek

e.g. Hasebroek 1928: 66; Austin/Vidal-Naquet Mele 1979: 87-9; Hahn 1983: 30-1. 119.

Cf.

Donlan

and Morris,

1928:

18-9;

1931:

31-2; Bravo

Professional trade by non-Akhaians (Phoenicians) :

as cited in n.106,

1972:

58;

and Gernet

Finley

(1968:

1977:

96-7,

70,

158;

134-6:

keimelia as ‘la matiére d'un commerce noble‘). Among the anthropological work on which the idea of separate spheres is based, Paul Bohannon’s study of the

Notes to Chapter Four

395

Nigerian Tiv is important (Tribal and Peasant Economies, ed. Ὁ. Dalton [1967],

124ff.); also Raymond Firth, Primitive Polynesian Economy [19652], 336-44, and Edmund Leach, Political Systems of Highland Burma [1954], 142-4. 120. Cf. Finley 1977: 64-7, 98-102, 120-3; Qviller 1981; Donlan 1982a/b. Also Humphreys 1978: 151-2; Bolkestein 1958: 104. On this matter, these authors take their

models

from

the

works

of,

among

others,

Bronislaw

Malinowski

(esp.

Argonauts of the Western Pacific [1922]), Marcel Mauss (Essai sur le don {1925)),

Marshall Sahlins (e.g. Stone Age Economics [1972]), and Pierre Bourdieu (Ousline of a Theory of Practice [1977)). The idea that all gift-giving in the Homeric world is reciprocal (Finley 1977: 64) is clearly mistaken. Finley's own list of types of gifts includes "fees, rewards, prizes and... bribes”, as well as “taxes and other dues [and] amends with a penal overtone” (ibid.: 66). Clearly, these are by definition not reciprocal. In fact, as far as I can see, explicit evidence for reciprocity in gift-giving is limited to instances of

exchange with members of a different community. 121. It seems that Humphreys was the first to interpret Homeric gift-giving in terms of the potlasch (1978: 151). The idea was taken up and elaborated by Qviller (1981: esp. 113, 120-7) and Donlan (1982a: esp. 140-1, 145 n.16, 171 n.57; cf. 1982b). The original ethnographic work on the potlatch was done at the tum of the century by Franz

Boas;

for a summary

of it, see Benedict

(1935:

125-60);

more

recent

studies include Codere 1950; Drucker/Heizer 1967.

122. Finley and others do not specify that accumulation is limited to the prestige sphere, but presumably they imply that this is so, for otherwise it is hard to see how households could be regarded as striving for accumulation and autarky at the same time. See pp. 223-4, below, on the significance in this context of the alleged nonconvertibility of goods. The acquisitive drive of the heroes : pp. 105-6. 123. Menelaos and Odysseus boast of the wealth (in gifts) they have acquired. The passage in which Odysseus as 'Eperitos' enumerates the gifts he has given, might be taken as a boast about his generosity, but the wording hardly suggests this : he says,

for example, that he has never given gifts as lavish as he gave on that occasion, whereas one would expect a boaster to say rather that no-one else has ever given gifts as lavish as he has done. Even if one does take the passage as a boast, it offers no hint that the recipient stands to lose face if he does not reciprocate (24.266-79, see below). 124. Qviller argues that Phoinix ‘loses status‘ after receiving a gift from Peleus which he cannot reciprocate, and that he becomes a follower of Peleus as a result

(1981: 120-1).

This is misleading.

Phoinix does not fail to reciprocate : he is not

expected to give a counter-gift. Peleus offers him men and wealth, on the understanding that Phoinix is to be his retainer. The same applies to all those who depend upon a prince's generosity. There is no element of competition in this. Donlan maintains that Agamemnon’s offer of compensation to Akhilleus is at the same time an attempt "to elevate his own prestige and to put Akhilleus under severe obligation”. This attempt is then supposedly neutralised by Akhilleus, who first refuses it, then accepts, but only "on his own terms”, and finally beats it "with a brilliant display of generosity" : the funeral games for Patroklos, which are "a long

Notes to Chapter Four

396

delayed... counterstroke” (1989c: 2, 4 n.11, 5-6). motivations to be found in the text of the Iliad.

There is not a trace of such

125. It is not clear that those who posit a rule of non-convertibility are aware of its significance in this respect. See n.122. 126. By definition, since keimelion is something that can be ‘laid up’, as slaves and animals cannot be. That livestock is not treasure is explicitly stated at 4.600-2 (Telemakhos does not want horses as a gift, but some keimelion instead) and 2.75 (keimelia and livestock [probata]). Donlan (1981: 101-2, 113-14 n.14; 115 n.16) maintains that female (but not male) slaves, and horses and mules (but not cattle and sheep) are items of treasure, “although the commonest Homeric expression keimelia - shows that small, portable items constituted the essential notion of treasure" (102). Morris (1986b: 9) suggests that the “top rank group" of goods includes women, cattle and "finished objects of metal". These categorisations are based on the perceived use of the commodities in question (see below), not on a categorical distinction made in the epics. I shall reserve the term

'treasure'

for keimelia, and use the more general term

"prestige-wealth’ for other items of symbolic value. We shall see that these may include slaves of both sexes and cattle as well as horses and mules. 127. Actual oxen are exchanged for wine at VII.472-4 (discussed below and on pp. 240-1, 244). When Eumaios 'buys' a slave from the Taphians, he presumably gives some of his pigs in return. 128. For the meaning of biotos : Donlan 120-1; Mele 1986: 84-5. 129. See p. 52.

Donlan (1981:

1981:

15 n.16; Bravo

1983:

17-18;

1984:

105) notes that commissioning treasures is one way

of acquiring them, but does not draw the conclusion that agricultural surplus is therefore convertible.

130. On the importance of textiles, see below, n.140.

Note also that it is highly

important in the heroic world to be cremated in an elaborate shroud (2.97-102), and

that, when Hektor's corpse is lost and cannot be laid out in his “fine and pleasing garments”, his wife decides to burn these anyway,

to enhance his reputation (kleos)

among the Trojans (XXII.510-14). 131. Donlan (1989c: 10-15) argues that inequality is the norm: a ‘bright purple belt’, he imagines, is an “unglamorous” gift compared to a golden cup or a sword; the party which "feels inferior" gives gifts of greater value. Glaukos is 'mad' only to the extent that the imbalance is too great : Diomedes had taken him by surprise with his sudden proposal to exchange gifts. While I shall argue presently that hierarchical exchange is in fact the norm in one kind of gift-exchange, it does not seem to me applicable to this type of direct exchange. Scholia on the episode are discussed by Maftei (1976: 52-3). A recent discussion is Traill 1990: 301-5. Pearson (1962: 37) believes that Glaukos’ behaviour is perfectly acceptable by the standards of Homer's aristocratic audience, but that the poet, “a poor man for whom such magnificent gestures were unthinkable", “is

Notes to Chapter Four

397

allowing his own sense of values to intrude” when he calls it madness.

Such a gap

of understanding between the poet and his audience is scarcely credible. 132. Examples may be the cuirass brought by Phyleus from Ephyre ("a xeinos, Euphetes, lord of men, gave it to him to bring it to war", XV.529-33) and the gifts of clothing offered to Odysseus on his way to Troy - Aithon gives him a cloak and tunic,

and

a sword

(hetairos) may

(19.241-2)

and

supposes

that another xeinos

have done the same (19.237-9).

Euphetes'

or a comrade

gift, however,

could

equally well be interpreted as a ‘symbolic’ gift, or as a ‘parting gift‘ (below), while sets of clothes are also offered as part of normal hospitality (below).

Note that Aithon imagines that not only xeinoi but also ‘comrades' - which must here imply members of the same community, as opposed to outsiders - might offer gifts at the outbreak of war. Note also that Ekhepolos is perhaps not regarded as a xeinos of Agamemnon's, for his home town, Sikyon, is part of the territory ruled by Agamemnon (11.572).

133. See pp. 47-8, 140-8. 134. There are no explicit references to the custom in the Iliad, but the cuirass and

the helmet mentioned as xeineia at XV.529-33 and X.261-9 could well be partinggifts (see n.132).

135. Mules as a parting-gift:

15.85; cf. XXIV.278.

Helena receives unusual

parting gifts from wives of her Egyptian hosts : see below. 136. Eperitos : 24.306-9. Aithon met Odysseus when he left for Troy, i.e. twenty years before. He had been on his way to Doulikhion, but forced to land at Ithaka (14.334-59; compare 14.316-35 with 19.270-92). Mentes last saw Odysseus before the Trojan War: 1.194-5. Note also the rarity of visits exchanged between relatives : just after Odysseus is born, his grandfather visits; no further visit takes place until Odysseus is grown up (19.399-413; cf. 4.797-811).

137. Cf. Odysseus' reception at Eumaios' farm: 14.45ff.

Working on farms, as

opposed to loitering about town : 17.10-21, 185-7, 223-8; 18.357-64. 138. Cf. Odysseus’ reception at his own home : 17.336ff. Spending the night at a smithy or leskhe : 18.327-36. Jobs in the house : tending fire (18.317-9), holding torch (19.24-8). 139.

Odysseus

in his disguise as a poor old man

is immediately offered better

treatment than is usual for a beggar when he is presented to Telemakhos as a suppliant (16.67-89), and again when he proves to Penelope that he has once done her husband

a great favour (19.185-260,

317-34;

see below).

Telemakhos

and

Peisistratos are at once offered full hospitality by Menelaos, because “they look like descendants of Zeus" (4.27), i.e. they are recognised as men of high status. 140. The lowest level of full hospitality is extended to the poor old man who is regarded as a xeinos of Odysseus - perhaps because the household is not fully under control of its nominal head, and the uninvited guests who actually rule it do not allow greater generosity. The highest level of generosity is extended to Telemakhos

Notes to Chapter Four

398

in Sparta and to Odysseus on Skheria (4.48ff.; 6.209ff.; 7.126ff.). Discussions of Homeric hospitality as a 'type-scene’ (e.g. Arend 1933: 39-52, 69-75, 99-105, 1246; Edwards 1975) fail to distinguish different levels of hospitality. The offer of a set of clothes deserves emphasis. It is mentioned frequently (3.467; 4.50; 5.264, 6.214; 8.441; 13.66-7; 14.320, 341-2; 14.515-6; 15.337-9; 16.79-80; 17.89-90; 17.549-50; 19.241-2; 21.339-41), and clothes (as well as a place by the fire, 17.572-3) are given high priority among the needs of a traveller, who has to keep out the cold (14.459-514; 17.22-5, 190-1, 556-9). In order to be able to provide hospitality, a household thus needs great quantities of textiles : not only clothes, but also blankets, pillows and the like, which Nestor singles out as the things most needed for the reception of a guest (3.346-55; cited on p. 104).

Moreover, textiles are among the parting-gifts as well (see above; [1988] on women's role in providing hospitality).

also Pedrick

141. Odysseus receives from “those who do the work" of cutting the meat "a share equal to that which was allotted to themselves (20.281-2).

It is not clear whether

this refers to a ‘servant's share’ which is smaller than that of the guests, or whether

it simply means 'a share as large as that of any other guest’. Particularly good joints of meat are sometimes offered to guests as a sign of respect : 4.65-6; 14.434-41 (cf.

VII.321-2 and 8.474-83).

See p. 71.

142. This help with transport is called pompe.

Private ship: 8.31-6.

Chariot:

3.368-70, 474-85. Place as passenger: 14.334-5; 19.291-2. Sandals: 16.80; 21.340-1. In combination with the footwear, a sword and spear are mentioned. I take these to be part of the pompe, rather than a separate parting-gift - on the road, the weapons are "a protector against dogs and men“ (21.340; cf. 14.531). Aithon's

gift of clothes and a sword to Odysseus on his way to Troy, on the other hand, may well be ἃ parting-gift : presumably Odysseus at that time did not lack protection

(19.241-2; see above). Note also that several superhuman hosts arrange for a favourable wind to blow, as part of their pompe : Kalypso (5.268), Aiolos (10. 1726) and Kirke (11.6-8).

143. Cf. the distinction made at 17.222 (below, n.146). On the distinction between ‘pity’ and ‘respect’ : Riedinger 1980: 65; and cf. pp. 76-7, 130-1. 144. Altematively, one might take kai allos to mean "even otherwise", i.e. "even if

you do not provide hospitality, (at least) give me a gift".

On this reading, the

passage does not prove that hospitality need not include gifts. Instead, it shows that one could go round simply asking for gifts, without any need for hospitality. 145. It is not, I think, a coincidence that in some of the visits which do not end with an offer of gifts, the host is of higher status than his guest. The goddesses Kirke and

Kalypso and the god Aiolos receive Odysseus with all the usual hospitality, and provide every means to help him on his way home (see n.142 ad fin.).

But they do

not offer him gifts. Nestor is equally hospitable to Telemakhos, and tells his youngest son to drive his guest to Sparta, but he, too, omits the parting-gift. It is generally supposed that he would have made a present to Telemakhos on his return from Sparta, if only Telemakhos had given him the chance, instead of by-passing Pylos and rushing straight back to Ithaka (e.g. Thornton 1970: 45). That may be so. Still, in Sparta

Notes to Chapter Four

399

Nestor's son persuades Telemakhos to curb his anxiety to leave, and to wait for

Menelaos to bring

out his gifts; in Pylos he does not repeat this argument (15.48-

55, 193-221). Perhaps we should consider the possibility that Nestor did not plan to offer parting-gifts at all. Unlike Menelaos, he has no great debt of gratitude to

Telemakhos' father, and Telemakhos himself is so far inferior to his host in power, prestige and age that he barely dares to address him when they first meet (3.21-4,

75-7). Nor does Telemakhos receive gifts from Diokles on either of his visits to Pherai (3.488-90 = 15.186-8). These passages are very brief, so one might argue that the poet is simply taking the gift-giving for granted. However, the fact that no gifts from Diokles are mentioned even when Telemakhos decides to give his (other) gifts in safe-keeping (16.326-7; 17.74-83), does suggest that Diokles is not supposed to have given any. Odysseus, in his disguise as a Cretan, does not get gifts from either Pheidon or

Penelope/Telemakhos (see n.139) even though they do offer him every other hospitality. The xeinia offered to Thetis (XVIII.387, 408) evidently consist of food and drink only (see also X1.779). Those who perform some sort of favour at the special request of their guest are presumably not expected to give parting-gifts as well. 146. Odysseus almost at once asks the Kyklops for a gift; he does not wait for an offer (9.266-8). Note also that Mentes, who does wait for an offer, does not feel inhibited from asking Telemakhos to make the gift "a very beautiful one” (1.318). It has been noted (e.g. Finley 1977: 122) that no distinction is made in the Greek between the verbs for "to beg" and "to request a gift” : princes and beggars “ask” (aitizein); the difference is merely that beggars "ask for scraps, not for swords or cauldrons". 147. One may speculate that an implicit threat of retaliation helps to inspire 'respect' in the host. After entering the Kyklops' cave, and before finding out that the Kyklops is a dangerous giant, Odysseus and his men help themselves to his food and slaughter some of his animals (9.231-3). Perhaps this is not so much an indication

of high standards of hospitality (so Heubeck 1989: ad 9.231) as a measure of the men's self-confidence : seven armed men can take what they like and disregard their host's wishes.

This, in combination with Odysseus’ blunt request for a gift (n.146),

suggests that a host may be intimidated into making gifts. (Although Odysseus does, at the same time, humbly call himself a suppliant, to gain the support of the gods for his request [9.269-71].) Note that Menelaos travels with five ships (c. 250 men) in Egypt (3.299-300), which may help to explain the Egyptians' generosity to him. Again, perhaps one reason why the Egyptians are generous to the son of Kastor is his recently forged

bond with their ruler (14.278-84). 148. Hasebroek (1928: 18) and Bravo (1984: 105-6) argue that the son of Kastor objects to trading as such, but Mele (1986: 69) points out that his objection is to this particular trip only, because he suspects that it is a trap. Since the son of Kastor has by this stage already been joint commander-in-chief of the Cretan army and become wealthy twice over, the fact that he was a bastard son, and had started out in life as a relatively poor man, have no bearing on his involvement in trade at this point.

Notes to Chapter Four

400

149. Cf. Finley 1977: 68. The fact that Athena chooses to play the role of Mentes, ἃ prince on a trading expedition, shows that it is a respectable venture. See also n.98. The argument that Taphian attitudes to trade are not representative of heroic values, because they are “an exotic people”, not Akhaians (esp. Bravo 1984: 104, 108; cf.1977: 24), is demolished by Mele (1986: 68-9). 150. I fail to understand Wickert-Micknat's reasons for denying that all this is evidence for the ‘sale’ of booty (1983: 138-9). Andersen (1990: 36-7) insists that

the various references to the sale of Lykaon are inconsistent, although he admits that it is perfectly possible to make them add up to a consistent story (as found in the Kypria, according to Proklos' summary). 151. It has been argued (by e.g. Bravo 1984: 107) that Euneos' attitude to trade is un-Akhaian, because he is a ‘barbarian’. However, even if the Lemnians are non-

Akhaian (which the epic does not say), Euneos is clearly part of the Akhaian élite. He is the son of Jason, one of the greatest heroes of Greek myth (VII.468-9), and he

is apparently Thoas' dismiss Euneos

successor as ruler of Lemnos

(XXIII.745).

because he is ‘not a hero of the Trojan War'

Bravo seeks to

(/oc.cit.), but Mele

points out that this is not necessarily an indication of low social status (1986: 70). In any case, I can see no immediate difference between Euneos' attitude to trade and that of Akhilleus.

152. This is the only strictly Homeric evidence for what booty. In addition, the Hymn to Demeter refers to a band full of captive women whom they intend to sell (123-32), mentions the possibility of selling a captive young man in Hyperboraians "or even beyond" (6-10, 28-9).

freebooters do with their of freebooters with a ship and the Hymn to Dionysos Egypt, Cyprus, among the

153. One might object that, if these men break one norm, they may well break other norms, too. However, when Laomedon and the suitors act in hybris, they are breaking certain norms in a way that demonstrates their power and hence is ‘wrong’ but nevertheless prestigious (see 115-18).

By contrast, if trade were regarded with

contempt, Laomedon and the suitors would, by becoming involved in it, be doing something not only ‘wrong’ but also contemptible - surely they would wish to avoid that. 154. One might argue that Euneos' motives are altruistic, and that he is trading wine as a favour to Agamemnon and Menelaos, whose troops are in need of it. In that case, the separate consignment of a thousand measures is presumably part of the favour, rather than a gift to ‘buy’ permission to trade (cf. XXTII.744-5), as it is commonly, and I think rightly, interpreted (e.g. Stanley 1986: 9-10, 14). 155. It has often been pointed out that, on Ithaka, Laertes buys a female slave for the

price of twenty oxen (1.431), which is five times as much as the Akhaians at Troy estimate to be the value of the slave offered as a prize by Akhilleus (XXTII.705), see

below. A number of explanations is possible - an obvious one would be that Laertes‘ slave is more beautiful or more skilled than the other -, but it is worth

considering the suggestion of Ameis-Hentze (1868: ad XXIII.705; also Gladstone 1870: 447) that the difference is due to the abundant supply of slaves as a result of successful warfare, compared to their relative scarcity in peace-time.

Notes to Chapter Four

401

156. See pp. 220-1. A description of a Phoenician trader selling a necklace to a chieftain's wife, refers to the mistress of the house and her maids handling the object and scrutinising it, "promising

[a/the] price” (15.459-63).

To me,

this suggests

haggling. 157. The contrast between ‘worthy’ and ‘immense’ is suggested by Mele (1979: 813, 87-8). “Worthy price" : 15.388 = 429; 20.383; cf. 8.405 = XXIII.562, and XXII.885. “Infinite price": 14.297; 15.452-3. The compensation offered by Agamemnon to Akhilleus is called “immense” (IX.120), as well as “worthy” (IX.261). Clearly, the former is a reference to its high absolute value, while the latter refers to the adequacy of its relative value (i.e. in comparison to the harm done/the merchandise offered). Note the "worthy ransom" promised at VI.46, XI.131, and the “immense ransom” at I.13 = 372. 158. The son of Kastor also calls his Phoenician an “expert in deceit" (14.288). troktes, see e.g. Finley 1977: 70; Stanley 1986: 7.

For

159. Dishonest Thesprotian sailors : 14.334-59. Honest Phoenicians : 13.272-86. For opinions on the Homeric image of the Phoenicians : n.118. 160. This is implied by Finley reasoning of those who assert (refs.: n.118) - unless perhaps simply because that is the worst

1977: 70 and in general appears to be the implicit that the insult implies contempt for trade and profit it is assumed that Euryalos calls Odysseus a trader insult he can think of.

161. Finley makes a similar point in this context: “the heroes... could set honour above all material goods” (1977: 122). But he does not see Euryalos' insult as an expression of this attitude (ibid.: 68-70). Since the suffix -ser in prekter indicates that these men are "dedicated to [commercial] activity” (Bravo 1977: 34, following Benveniste, Noms d‘agent, p.62), Bravo concludes that they are professsionals (/oc.cit.; cf. his analogous interpretation of lefster, 1980: 975). ‘Dedication’ to an activity, however, may mean having a

strong inclination towards it, rather than practising it professionally, and this fits the present interpretation quite well. One may compare the distinction drawn in the Icelandic Laxdaela Saga, when the hero chooses a crew for a voyage to Ireland.

"He thought it imperative to choose men who were more like warriors than merchants" (Chapter 21; transl. M. Magnusson/H. Palsson [Penguin Classics]). Here, at any rate, we find, not two distinct ‘professional’ groups, but men who make good traders and men who make good warriors. Bravo is right to maintain contra Mele that this sort of trader is not a ‘scandalous novelty’ to the poet (1984:

114; Mele

1979: 81).

If the wording of this passage is

unusual, that is because such traders fall short of Homeric ethical standards and hence are given little space in the epic, not necessarily because they are a ‘new’ phenomenon. 162. This does not necessarily mean that the heroes buy goods for resale, nor that they adapt their production to market-demand (cf. n.111, 113 ad fin.), but perhaps one should not exclude these possibilities (see n.172). It does mean that when the heroes have a surplus on their hands, they will consider what they know of the

Notes to Chapter Four

402

supply and demand situation and seek out the places where their goods are likely to

have the highest value. 163. Some cattle eaten:

VII.474

(their hides remain); compare the slaughter of

animals at 9.45-6 and 9.464-70, 543-57; and the consumption of wine captured at Ismaros (9.163-5). Agamemnon keeps Khryseis (1.11-31, etc.) and seven women from Lesbos (IX.128-30 = 270-2); Akhilleus keeps Briseis (1.184-5, etc.) and Diomede (IX.663-5); Patroklos keeps Iphis (IX.666-8); Nestor keeps Hekamede (X1.624-7). Odysseus keeps personally captured slaves at home (1.398). Ransoms paid in gold, bronze, iron : II.229-30; V1.46-50; X1.132-5; XXII.49-50;

ransom higher than sale-price : XX1.80. Khryseis’ father comes to the enemy camp (1.11-34, 370-9), while in the Hymn to Dionysos the freebooters apparently intend to seek out their captive's family

(29-31).

Akhilleus releases Eetion's wife and

Isos

and Antiphos for ransoms paid by their fathers (VI.425-7; XI. 106). Its greater value no doubt explains why the captors may not leave it to the prisoners’ relatives to come

and

make

an

offer,

but

themselves

get

in

touch

in

order

to arrange

a

settlement. 164. References in n.114.

165. This distinction between the two types of ship is suggested by e.g. Gray (1974: 115-6), but Humphreys (1977: 351) equally plausibly suggest that the references are to "sizable seagoing vessels as opposed to small boats” (cf. 1978:

166).

In any case,

the differentiation does not go as far as it does in Greek history by 525 B.C., when merchant ships as opposed to warships are completely wind-powered (Humphreys 1978: 168-9; Snodgrass 1983: 16-17) : in addition to sails the Homeric cargo-ship has twenty oars. 166. Discussion of exports and imports in Homeric and Archaic economy : Bravo

1983: 17-23; Hahn 1983: 32-4; Snodgrass 1983: 18-25. 167. See Chapter Three.

168.

Bought by Laertes and inherited by Odysseus : Eurykleia (1.429-33) and

Eumaios (15.482-4). Part of dowry : Dolios (4.735-7) and Aktoris (23.227-30). Born on estate: sons of Dolios and "old Sikelian woman” (24.387-90, 497). Significantly, when Odysseus (as beggar) asks Eumaios how he came to be a slave in Ithaka, he assumes that he was boughs, not captured, by his owner (15.386-8).

Of

course, many slaves would initially have lost their freedom through capture. 169. For the notion that princes leave the work to their subordinates because it is shameful, e.g. Bravo 1984: 99-100. Note also that when the shepherd Melanthios threatens to sell his colleague

Eumaios into slavery, he apparently intends personally to “take him far from Ithaka on a ship" (17.249-50). For ‘subordinates’ trading, see n.117. The arguments advanced to explain away the evidence of Mentes and Euneos are to my mind invalid : see nn.149 and 151. 170. When he decides to wait, Odysseus already suspects that the host might be a Savage giant without respect for conventions (9.213-15). One may say that

Notes to Chapter Four Odysseus'

403

choice is required by the traditional tale.

But if there were any

awkwardness about it, the story could easily have been told without introducing the possibility of plundering at all. Odysseus expresses his pride in being a popular guest several times, when he puts

the words into others’ mouths: according to him, his companions say "O popoi! How well-liked and respected he is among all people whose towns and countries he visits!” (10.38-9); in his disguise as Aithon, he says "Odysseus used to be a friend of

many [xeinoi]; for few Akhaians were his equal” (19.239-40); as Eperitos, he claims that he never treated any guest better than he did Odysseus (24.267-8, quoted on p. 231). Telemakhos mentions the fact that Odysseus received many visitors, "because he himself, too, was epistrophos among men" (1.175-7). This presumably means that he made a habit of visiting people. Cf. n.8, above. 171.

It may be noted that, among treasures, gold appears to come not only in the

form of plate, but also in definite weights - talents and half-talenıs - perhaps in the shape of small ingots. If so, these units of precious metal come quite close to coinage in its hoarding- (as opposed to exchange-) function. 172. This is not to suggest that Euneos started growing extra vines as soon as he heard about the Trojan War and realised the opportunities it offered. Information about the market situation would be neither precise nor quickly disseminated; production would not be very flexible (see nn.113,

162).

But it is conceivable that

landowners made the decision to produce on a regular basis surpluses of, say, wine, because they knew that there would generally be a demand for this commodity abroad. Cf. Herodotos' comment that twice a year "from every part of Greece“ men

sail to Egypt to sell wine (1.6). 173. Wickert-Micknat discerns three kinds of warfare. In the first, an invading (migratory) army aims to conquer a town for the sake of its territory and women;

this is regarded as a reflection of the reality of the Age of Migrations, 1250-1000 B.C. (1983: 46; cf. 59-61). In the second, two settled communities fight one another, primarily for cattle and other booty, though severe retaliation may involve

destroying the enemy town (without occupying its territory) and enslaving its women and children; this reflects the reality of the time when the Iliad was composed (1983: 46-7; cf. 61-2). In the third, private bands of pirates plunder for booty and kidnap and sell people; this reflects the reality of the time when the Odyssey was composed

(87-103; cf. 138-40; similarly Hölscher 1988: 206-8). Nowag (1983: 199-200) distinguishes three kinds of predatory warfare : Akhilleus'

expeditions, which he dates to the Age of Migrations; most raids mentioned in the Odyssey, which reflect the poet's own lifetime; and the expeditions of the son of Kastor, which are not assigned a date, but said to be different from the other two. It

is not uncommon to regard the raids of the son of Kastor as a reflection of the migrations of the so-called Sea Peoples (e.g. Kirk 1968: 115-16), but I see no reason

to separate this story from the rest of Homer's references to freebooting. 174. Reports by Vijitha Yapa (Times), Chris Nuttall (Guardian) and Gabriella Gamini (Independent), The name of the town is also given as Velvettithurai or Valbettiturai, and the casualty figures given vary slightly. The Indian government is reported to have denied that a massacre took place. Note that the newspapers refer to soldiers going "berserk" and "running amok", implying a loss of emotional

Notes to Chapter Four

404

control, while the massacre was evidently a deliberate and organised act of revenge. (The town, moreover, was the birthplace of a prominent Tamil Tiger guerilla leader.) 175. Ransoming of male captives: n.163; sale of male captives: pp. 238-9.

176. See p. 49, esp. n.86 (Odysseus has not captured all his slaves in person, but many of them must have been captured at some stage, see n.168). Alternatively, one might explain the presence of as many male as female slaves as the result of freebooters capturing far more men than women (and hence restoring the balance), or as the result of slave-owners practising female infanticide on the children of household

slaves.

There

is

no

evidence

for

either

practice,

but

neither

is

inconceivable. 177. E.g. Aristotle, Politics 1256ab; Xenophon, Memorabilia 111.6,7. Cf. Garlan 1989: 21-73; Finley 1985a: 67-87; 1985b: 156-61, 169-76, 204-7, Snodgrass 1980: 130; Humphreys 1978: 159-74; Ducrey 1977. 178. Note in particular Plutarch's discussion of attitudes to trade in the time of Solon, who is said to have been involved in trade himself - most probably as an ‘occasional’ trader (Life of Solon, 2 and 25). Among recent discussions of Archaic trade, note Bravo

1984:

121-39 (also

1983;

1977;

1974); Mele

1986:

80-99 (also

1979); Hahn 1983, Kees Ruijgh points out to me that in Mycenaean times textiles and scented oils appear to have been the most prominent trade goods. Neither of these is mentioned as such in Homer, although textiles do play an important role in gift-exchange. As for the 'hospitality-racket', there is to my knowledge no evidence outside Homer for anything like it - which is not necessarily to say that it never existed. 179. Thukydides states explicitly that the Spartans "did not make their allies pay tribute” (1.19).

Wars over the control of games and temples, too, seem to me likely

to be concerned with the prestige associated with such control rather than with the income derived from it.

For wars over borderland, see below at n.181.

180. The oracle appears in the Anthologia Palatina (14.73). recent version of it substituted 'Megarans'

A presumably more

for ‘Aigieis'; cf. Strabo X.1,3; Athenaios

278e; Suda, s.v. Hwneis, o Megareis, and s.v. Aigieis. 181.

For references to these wars,

see De Ste. Croix

1972:

218-20;

Singor

1988:

248-57. With regard to Kynouria, the territory disputed by Sparta and Argos, Kelly (1976: 49) says that it "had no economic importance for either state : its agncultural land was limited; it possessed no known

natural resources; and the coastline, with

few good harbours, was inhospitable". Kelly suggests that the territory was strategically important (ibid. 50). A common interpretation of such wars is that they are 'ritual', providing an opportunity for young warriors to enter the adult world through an ‘initiation’ by combat (Garlan

1975: 26-31;

Brelich

1961).

I find this hard to reconcile with the

tradition that Sparta and Argos selected the 300 best (not youngest) men to settle the battle, and with the fact that the outcome of the allegedly ritual fight was so

Notes to Chapter Four

405

important that whole armies went into battle when the initial result was not decisive.

See n. 182. 182. Ban on missiles : Strabo 448c (agreement between Khalkis and Eretria).

Ban

on cutting off water supply and razing city : Aiskhines II.115 (Amphiktyonic Oath).

Phrynon and Pittakos : e.g. Plutarch, Moralia 858ab; Diogenes Laertius I.74. Battle of Champions : Herodotos I.82.

Custom of raising battle-trophies : Pritchett 1974:

246ff.; Singor 1988: 156-7, 267.

Notion of agonal warfare e.g. Singor 1988: 260ff

(who argues that between the Dark Age and the fifth-century warfare is agonal to the extent that cities are seldom, if ever, destroyed); Krischer 1988: 7-22 (who says that,

in spite of agonal attitudes, a spirit of hostility, as opposed to rivalry, tends to 'break through’; cf. Berve 1966: 6-19). 183. Asine and Nauplia: Pausanias IV.24,4; 27,8; 35,2. Melia, Arisbe and Pellene : Vitruvius, De Architectura IV.1,3-5; Herodotos 1.151,2; P.Oxy. 1241, col.iii, 2-12 (cf. Ailianos, Varia Historia VI.1,4). Kirrha and Sybaris : Aiskhines II.107-9;,

Herodotos

Athenaios 5214,

V.44-5;

VI.21;

Diodoros

XII.9,1-10;

X.23;

Strabo

VI.263;

Destruction in the fifth century : Karavites 1984: 33-76; Singor

1988: esp. 334-6. 184. A point made by Singor (1988: 247), and, with reference to mediaeval warfare (A.D. 1100-1250), also by Maso (1989: 103-9). Ostensibly agonistic practices of warfare need not exclude regular attempts at total destruction - as is evident, for instance, from a study of war among the Dani of New Guinea, whose wars are

almost harmless most of the time, but occasionally turn very violent indeed (Heider 1979: 88-112).

NOTES TO APPENDIX ONE 1. On the ordinary size of real Greek ships, see Chapter Four, n.165 2.

See p. 80,

87-8,

and cf. Van

Wees

1988.

The poorest

members

of the

community are presumably meant to be excluded, as are slaves, but, since lightarmed men do seem to play a part in Homeric warfare,

one need not assume that

only a well-off (heavy-armed) élite takes part in battle. 3. Ruschenbusch (1978) calculates that in Classical Greece the normalpolis comprised 450-1250 citizens (of whom perhaps half fought as hoplites). Note also the sizes of the contingents sent to fight at Plataea in 479 B.C. (Van Wees 1988: 23). Homer's communities are considerably smaller than Classical ones: the question is whether this means that he does not, after all, exaggerate much in this respect, or whether he exaggerates by the standards of even smaller (? Dark Age) communities. 4. The etymology of the word (“*swe-ies, ‘one's own people’) may suggest that its meaning was rather flexible. It is also conceivable that small towns would have only

a single phratry, so that 'phratry-members' and 'fellow-townsmen' would coincide.

NOTES TO APPENDIX TWO 1. There is an episode in the Iliad which implies that there were many basileis in the Akhaian army who were not prominent enough to be admitted to the ‘council’. When Agamemnon conceives of a plan to test the morale of his troops, he explains

his purpose to a group of basileis (11.53-86). those who had not heard of the plan” home. Among them are "basileis and these princes with the words : "You has in mind. ... We did not all hear

As it turns out, the test fails, and “all

(11.143) run away to launch their ships and go eminent men" (11.188). Odysseus tries to stop do not yet know fully what the son of Atreus what he said in council” (TI.192-4; in view of

the context, this last sentence should be read as a statement, not as a question, as is

often done). Assuming that all ruling basileis at least would take part in councilmeetings, the princes who are not informed must be the non-ruling local basileis in each contingent. 2.

Penelope is eight times referred to as ‘princess’

addressed in this way

(4.697;

16.337;

17.513,

583).

(e.g. 4.770) and four times Arete,

wife of Alkinoos,

is

called 'princess' at 7.241; 11.345; 13.53. 3. So Vlachos (1974: 107-11) on sceptre-bearers; cf. Hainsworth 1988: ad 8.47. Differently on boulephoroi : Calhoun 1934: 305-6; Vlachos 1974: 61-5; Carlier 1984: 145-6, 4. That these meetings of the ‘leaders and counsellors’ are restricted to the élite is confirmed by the fact that all the participants are personally invited (IX.9-12; 8.715). General assemblies are called by means of a proclamation to all the people, shouted out by the heralds. And in such assemblies the people are never addressed as ‘leaders’. So too Carlier 1984: 183 n.219 (and cf. Jeanmaire 1939: 28-9, 42) contra Finley 1981: 220. §. His grandfather, father and uncle(s) have all died: II.641-2; XIV.112-20. Although he is among the three best warriors, he is not included in either of two lists of the best ‘young men': IX.80-6; XIX.193, 238-40 (Jeanmaire 1939: 35). Antilokhos and Thrasymedes are in these lists, because their father Nestor is still active, and Meriones is listed too, because he has accepted the ‘junior’ status of therapon to Idomeneus.

6. Whether or not this is the correct interpretation of ‘elder’, there can be no doubt that ‘elders’ and ‘princes’ are used (almost) interchangeably for the same group of people : 11.53 and 85-6; Π.404, 439 and 445; IX.89-90 and 710; XIX.303 and 309

(cf. Deger 1970: 114 n.721). older men (Rihll 1986: 88).

There is no reason to think that the elders are all the

7. Odysseus' supporters, mentioned at 17.68-69, are Mentor (cf. 2.224-54, 286-7; 22.207-35 [his family: 221-3]), Halitherses (cf. 2.157-93 [his family: 178]; 24.45162) and Antiphos; and, at 2.386-7, 4.630-57, Noemon, son of Phronios, who voluntarily lends Telemakhos his ship (4.647) and puts himself on a par with the suitors (632, 652).

Notes to Appendix Two

408

8. I take it that Doulikhion, which provides another 52 hostile families, is not part of Kephallenia. Although the Odyssey regularly mentions it together with the Kephallenian islands, it is treated as a separate unit (the men from Doulikhion have their own

leader [16.396-7]

and the prince of Doulikhion,

Akastos,

is mentioned

(14.335-6}), and in the Zliad it constitutes a separate contingent (led by Meges, 11.625-30), of 40 ships. The elite of Doulikhion could thus be calculated at a minimum of 52 out of 2080 families, or exactly 2.5% of the population. 9. XXIV.247; 13.437; 14.31; 17.199; 18.103; (XVIII.416) and the staff of Poseidon (XT11.59). 10. Cf. 11.46, 186; IX.38.

the

staff of Hephaistos

Sceptre as a symbol of power of other rulers : ΥἹ. 159

(Proitos); IX.156, 298 (Akhilleus). 11.86; XTV.93; 2.231

cf.

“Sceptre-bearing princes” in general : 1.279;

= 5.9; 4.64; 8.41, 47.

Note also : XVIII.556-7 and 3.412.

11. For the distinctions, see Kirk 1985: ad 11.109. Carlier (1984: 190-2) and Griffin (1980: 9-12) distinguish the ‘public’ sceptre from the ruler's ‘private’ sceptre;

Mondi (1980: 207-8) and Deger (1970: 82) distinguish the judge's sceptre from both. Easterling (1989: 106-14) rejects as "misleadingly documentary" (cf. p. 22) any attempt to identify the various sceptres; she stresses the “essential fluidity of this image", which means that the poet can freely use the image of the sceptre for symbolic purposes, without worrying about who is holding what sceptre. This is certainly possible in principle, but I hope to show that one can in fact discern in Homer's representations a single, simple use of the princely sceptre. 12. Other passages

which

refer to plural

sceptre-bearers could,

explained as referring to monarchs only [e.g. 11.86; 4.64]).

but need

not, be

It is conceivable that

‘sceptre-bearing’ refers not to 'owning' a sceptre, but to having the right to 'hold' a (public) sceptre.

13. A third explanation is offered by e.g. Leaf (1900: ad XVIIT.505). He says that in the trial-scene “the plural skeptra seems to be used loosely, to imply that they all had the staff in tum”. Monro (1897: ad loc.) calls skeptra an “indefinite plural, referring to what was done several times". It seems to me that both are stretching the meaning of the plural unreasonably far in order to reconcile it with their view of the normal role of the sceptre in assembly (as expressed in their comments ad 1.234), on which see below.

14. On this interpretation, one would have to assume that public heralds do have their own sceptres, distinct from those of the princes (see below).

15. One passage (II.53ff.) in which a sceptre definitely is transferred from one man to another,

cannot

be taken

as evidence

for the practice

under discussion,

as is

generally recognised. This is an episode in which the army has taken to flight, after Agamemnon, as a test of morale, had suggested that they should go home. In order

to restore calm, Odysseus borrows Agamemnon's sceptre (11.185-7) and goes around telling the others that Agamemnon's apparent order was in fact a test (II. 188-197). Since (a) the sceptre in question is Agamemnon's private, ancestral sceptre, not a

Notes to Appendix Two ‘public’ one; (Ὁ) circumstances are has Agamemnon's here dealing with

409

no herald is involved in transferring the sceptre; and (c) the most exceptional, with Odysseus using the sceptre to prove that he support in countermanding the ‘order’, it is clear that we are not regular assembly procedure.

16. The role of heralds may be limited to carrying sceptres for their masters and

calling for silence on their behalf.

On only one occasion do heralds themselves use

sceptres : when Aias and Hektor are duelling, a Trojan and an Akhaian herald separate the two men by holding sceptres between them. Perhaps these are distinct heralds' sceptres (see n.14), but on the other hand, the heralds might be acting on

their masters' behalf and using their masters’ sceptres (in the way that Odysseus at one time borrows Agamemnon's authority [see n.15)).

sceptre

in

order

to

'borrow'

Agamemnon's

410

NOTES TO APPENDIX THREE 1. The idea that the monarch has the largest number of followers is quite common (see e.g. Finley 1977: 59-60), but traditionally the assumption is that at the same time he has inherited the formal position of monarch. 2. A notion of institutionalised kingship is inherent in the ‘feudal’ model of Homeric society (esp. Nilsson 1933: 215-26). Homeric monarchy is regarded as institutional,

but non-feudal,

Finley stresses that personal,

by Carlier (1984:

178-94) and Cobet

(1981:

29-30).

informal power is essential for a ruler if he is to

maintain his institutional, formal status of king (1977: 83-7; cf. 1970: 85).

See also

Chapter Three, section 8. 3.

No sons are mentioned in any version of the story, but one cannot argue from

silence here.

It has been suggested that Lykian rules of inheritance are meant to be

different from Akhaian ones, but I see no reason to think so (cf. Finley Deger 1970: 131).

1981: 226;

4. Because Homer does not mention the violent episodes of the Atreus and Thyestes story, commentators often assume that in his version the succession is supposed to proceed peacefully, one handing the sceptre to the other. But Homer in this passage is concerned to stress that the sceptre has long been in Agamemnon’s family; he has

no cause to dwell on the conflict involved, and the change of verb is a sufficiently clear hint that he is aware of the story. So too Rihll (forthcoming), who draws different conclusions. Cf. Easterling 1989: 104-5; Kirk 1985: ad II.101-8. §. That all his seven years of rule are after Agamemnon's death is confirmed by the fact that Menelaos returns home on the very day that Aigisthos and Klytaimnestra are buried (3.309-12);

Menelaos

had been wandering

abroad

for seven years after the

end of the war (4.82), while Agamemnon had gone straight home. 6. Finley, for example, states that in spite of the existence of a hereditary monarchy, events on Ithaka represent a general principle : "The king is dead! The struggle for the throne is open!” (1977: esp. 84). Halverson (1985, 1986) and Rihil (1986) both draw essentially on the Odyssey for their material. 7. On Telemakhos' 126-7.

development,

see e.g. Lacey

1966: 61-2, 64-5; and above, pp.

8. So too Halverson 1986: 121-2, 126; Deger 1970: 143-50, esp. 146; conıra Finley 1977: 88; Carlier 1984: 206-7; Cobet 1981: 28; Andreev 1979b : 371. 9.

A point made by Finley (1977: 90; contrast his comments cited in n.8).

10. Not the customs of table-companionship, as is sometimes suggested : see n.70 to Chapter Two. Customs of courtship; (a) staying at home : 16.390-1; 14.91; (b) offering gifts to the bride’s family : 2.52-8; cf.15.16-18; (0) suitors’ practice ‘not the proper way’: 18.275-80; 14.90. Discussions of bride-price (and dowry) in Homer : Finley 1981: 233-45; Lacey 1966: 55-61; Snodgrass 1974: 115-18; Morris

Notes to Appendix Three 1986a: 105-14.

411

Alden (1987: 130) is clearly wrong in saying that the suitors are

“enjoying the legitimate traditional entertainment of contenders for the hand of a

noble bride". 11. Compare

the fate envisaged

for old Peleus:

his neighbours will “wear him

down” (teirousi, XXTV.484-9; cf. 11.494-503), rather than kill him.

12. Mentes tells Telemakhos : "If you hear that [Odysseus] is dead... give your mother in marriage to a man.

But when you have done these things, then consider...

how you may kill the suitors in your home” (1.289-96).

I do not think it is correct

to assume, as some commentators do, that “obviously the suitors would leave... if Penelope had made her choice among them” (5. West 1988: ad 1.293ff.). On that assumption, the explanation of this passage must be either that it is abruptly taken for granted that Odysseus is stil] alive, so that Penelope will not remarry and the suitors will stay (so West, loc.cit.), or that it is an awkward interpolation (so e.g. AmeisHentze 1856: ad 1.295). 13. Cf. Halverson 1985: 135; Finley 1977: 91-3; Deger 1970: 143.

14. See pp. 149-50, on the plot of the Odyssey. Note that the poet is apparently unable to explain the passivity of the people : when Telemakhos is first asked about the people's attitude, he does not answer; the second time, he admits that “the people at large are not hostile and do not hate me” (16.114), but he fails to explain why they do not support him. 15. I see no inconsistencies in the image of Homeric kingship that might warrant deconstructing it into a variety of overlapping and conflated images, as others have done (esp. Deger 1970; cf. Havelock 1978: 94-9).

16. In the following, I am in close agreement with the arguments and conclusions presented by Carlier (1984: 158-60). Similar views, but slightly different arguments, are advanced by Donlan (1989b: 129-33), Andreev (1988: 34-7) and Deger (1970: n.415 [pp.81-4 of the annotation]). A very different view is argued by Jeanmaire (1939: 72-84), but his notion that a temenos is something like a feudal fief is unsupported by the evidence (Finley 1981: 224-7; Carlier op.cit. 160, Deger loc.cit. p.83). 17, It does not follow that estates are given to kings (or gods, for that matter) “as compensation

for

service",

as

Donlan

(1989b:

131),

Andreev

(1988:

34)

and

Jeanmaire (1939: 76-7) believe. Great warriors may receive a femenos as a reward for service, but as far as one can tell, kings receive a temenos simply because they are kings. That they (ought to) feel obliged to serve the people well in return is a different matter. 18. I should stress again that, as Finley has shown, the presence of temenea does not imply the existence of communally cultivated property (contra e.g. Andreev 1988:

34-8). The estate granted to the king, and many of the estates dedicated to the gods, would have been set apart from the regular ‘lots’ since time immemorial; on the relatively few occasions which required the assignation of new temenea, it would be quite possible to re-assign privately owned land and compensate the original owners.

Notes to Appendix Three

412

The temenos of a king or god would, in a sense, remain public property, but its cultivation would be the responsibility of the 'owner' - the king, or the priest who looks after a god's temenos. The land granted in reward for special services would presumably simply become private property. I am not convinced by Donlan's interesting suggestion that it might have been common policy in the Dark Age to assign as yet uncultivated but potentially highly

fertile land to kings and heroes, who would use their resources to develop it to the benefit

the

entire

community,

in the long

run

(1989b:

133-45).

Some

of the

argument requires stretching the evidence, and much of it is pure speculation.

19. The other types of temenea have historical counterparts as well. In Classical Greece, an estate dedicated to a god is commonly called temenos. The granting of "selected" landed estates in return for great services to the community is mentioned, for example, by Herodotos (V.45). The term temenos is apparently not normally

used in this connection, but there is an instance of it in Euripides’ The Madness of Herakles (1326-31),

where

the lands given

in mythical

times by the Athenians

to

Theseus in reward for saving the Athenian youths from the Minotaur are called temene.

413

NOTES TO APPENDIX FOUR 1. Noted by Moreau (1895: 307) and Andréades (1915: 411). While no-one has denied this, it is often incorrectly assumed that the booty is divided among the combatants (e.g. Austin/Vidal-Naquet 1972: 56; Murray 1980 : 53).

2.

The existence of two categories is commonly recognised.

Keller (1902: 294),

Murray (1980: 53) and Kirk (1985: ad 1.119), however, perhaps merely because of

the brevity of their remarks, speak of all shares as gera. 3.

Finley

(1977:

95), and

Austin/ Vidal-Naquet

(1972:

56)

speak as if only the

highest chief receives a geras. 4. This is not a generally accepted view. Carlier assumes that Agamemnon has a far larger 'share of honour' and that "without geras” is a rhetorical hyperbole (1984: 152 n.60). Note also the woman Eurymedousa, received as geras by Alkinoos from the booty of Apeira (7.9-11), and the woman Hekamede, given to Nestor from the booty of Tenedos (X1.625-7; she is not explicitly described as a geras, but likely to be one). 5. Similarly, Hektor promises a chariot and pair (from the plunder to be made at the final destruction of the Greek army) to Dolon (X.303-6, 321-3, 329-31). Kassandra is part of Agamemnon's share in the booty of Troy (11.421-3): she could well be his geras. The "fine geras" of Neoptolemos at the fall of Troy (11.534), however, consists, according to the Ilias Mikra, of two people - Andromakhe and Aineias (fr.14).

6. Carlier suggests that Akhilleus has (illegitimately) kept the lyre and Eetion's wife to himself (1984: 152 n.55).

I find this unlikely.

Akhilleus also has a woman called

Diomede from Lesbos (TX.664-5), who could be either a geras or part of the other

share.

7.

In one passage Akhilleus refers to the day “when I took [helomen] her, having

destroyed Lyrnessos" (XIX.60). Although this has been taken to mean "took her to myself [from the booty}” (so Ameis-Hentze 1868: ad loc.; Wickert-Micknat 1983: 41, n.6), the expression for this used by Agamemnon is more specific : exelomen (TX.130), "I picked out", "I selected". Akhilleus' meaning could be "I took her (along with the rest of the booty)". My interpretation requires the latter reading. 8. “the

Eurymedousa is given to Alkinoos by "the Phaiakians"; Hekamede to Nestor by Greeks"

(see

n.4).

To

Odysseus

a ram

is given

“extra”

(exokha)

by

his

“companions” (9.550-1): this, too, is presumably a geras. In the Ilias Mikra, Neoptolemos receives his geras from the hands of "the best men among all the Greeks" (frg. 14). 9.

Donlan sees an “ambiguity” between two modes of distribution, one "egalitarian,

non-centralised",

the other

“ranked",

which

seem

to occur

side by

side.

(Rihll

(forthcoming), building on Donlan's discussion, explains away the instances of ranked distribution, and argues that "the assembled army decides who... gets what".)

Notes to Appendix Four

414

Similar compromises are suggested by Ameis-Hentze (1868: ad IX.367) and Wickert-Micknat (1983: 41 n.6). Others conclude that the evidence is inconsistent (e.g.

Monro

1897:

ad

X1.704,705)

or

that

it shows

a historical

development

(Jeanmaire 1939 : 80). 10. On this point, I find myself in close agreement with Carlier (1984: 152-3) once more, as well as with Detienne's discussion of the role of the “chef” as "celui qui représente la collectivité", and of the conceptual significance of placing booty "au milieu" for distribution (1967: 84-8). 11. Agamemnon does have the power to do the latter.

Cf. p. 87.

12. This agrees with Finley in that only one “central authority” makes the decisions and the rest remain “passive” (1977: 68; cf.

63, 95) and with Finsler in so far as he

maintains that gera are only nominally ("nach Formen") a gift from the army (1914: 217). 13. The same freedom of choice is presupposed in Akhilleus' complaint about Agamemnon keeping “many things" and giving away "small quantities", which presumably refers to Agamemnon’s dealings with the ‘portions’ as well as to his alleged unfairness in distributing gera. 14. This is not said to be his geras, and the circumstances of the distribution - shares in the booty are given only to those who, like Neleus, had previously suffered materially at the hands of the Epeans (X1.685-6, 698-704) - suggests that on this occasion no gera were given. 15.

This

is asserted,

without

argument,

by

e.g.

Ameis-Hentze

1856:

ad 9.160;

Merry 1870: ad 9.152 and 14.232; Finley 1977: 63, 95; Wickert-Micknat 1983: 44. Only Moreau explicitly rejects this interpretation (1895: 309). 16. ‘Equal’ is the translation offered in LSJ, and is supported by e.g. Finsler (1914: 217), Chantraine (1968: s.v. issasthai) and Finley (1977: 95; cf. 63).

Once more,

Moreau is the only one to reject this (1895: 313). 17. Cf. Ameis-Hentze 1868 : comment and Anhang, ad X1.705. 18. One could argue, however, that the portion of the leader might be the only exception to the norm of equality. 19. On the ‘two kinds of equality’, see Harvey 1965: 101-3. the

translations

adopted

by

e.g.

Rieu

and

Hammond

‘Proper’ and ‘fair’ are

in their

Penguin

Classics

translations. This must be the meaning, too, of the phrase "equal [proper] meals’, since it is clear that at these meals some people do in fact get more to eat and drink than others. Their extra shares are called gera, too. 20. To complicate matters, the word ison is used here too : in this context it can only

mean "equal".

Notes to Appendix Four

415

21. This final stage has not, to my knowledge, been recognised so far. Compare the division of the catch in the hunt on Goat Island (9.157-60) : apart from one goat "εἴ aside for the leader (presumably as geras), "nine goats fell to each ship". Unless this is simply a way of indicating the total number of goats shot, it may suggest that the catch is divided, first between the crews, then, by the captains, among the crews.

22. This is explicitly said to happen "first" (VITI.289; 11.228). 23. See above, section 1.

A further example of this, suggests Moreau (1895: 307),

is the distribution of the Kyklops' flocks (9.543-9), in which perhaps all of Odysseus’ followers, not merely the handful who ventured into the giant's cave, get a share.

The text is not explicit on this.

24. Unless one regards Hekamede (who is “given by the Greeks") as part of Nestor's portion, rather than his geras. She is not explicitly said to be either (X1.625-7). All the other things that are "given by the men” are explicitly called gera (or said to have been given "extra", exokha, 9.551). 25. On this point I agree with Adkins (1960: 58 n.16) in rejecting Finley's statement that a chief is "bound by what was generally deemed to be equitable” (1977: 68), i.e. that there are normative restrictions. 26. One may argue that the assignment of the ram to Odysseus (see n.8) is also a reward for merit, since it was Odysseus whose plan - in which the ram played a prominent part - led to the capture of the flocks. 27. So too, Murray (1980: 53), who does not go into the following problems. 28. Since the epics tend to give the impression that the criteria of princely status and merit in war always coincide, a number of scholars have concluded that gera are allocated "en tenant compte de la dignité ou de la naissance et des services rendus tant dans le combat que dans le conseil" (Moreau 1895: 312); “in recognition of their prowess and high station" (Murray 1917: 193); "für verdiente Heerführer” (Wickert-Micknat 1983: 40). Such formulations obscure the fact that even in the epic world there are signs of friction between the two criteria. 29. Agamemnon rejects three- or fourfold compensation (1.131-4). Aias argues that seven girls for one should be enough for Akhilleus (IX.636-9), but Akhilleus counters that he is still too angry about being treated "as a dishonoured immigrant"

(IX.646-8). 30. Adkins (most recently 1987: 319-20) has argued that this “blindness” implies the idea that Agamemnon has broken a norm. He argues that it implies only that Agamemnon recognises that his deed - not ‘wrong’ in itself - has had catastrophic effects. This is true, but given the numerous other rejections of Agamemnon's action, I think it is clear that he has violated a norm, in so far as his action, unlike his normal practice of taking the lion's share of the booty, is generally thought to have given Akhilleus a legitimate reason to feel humiliated. Cf. p. 135, esp. n.144.

31. E.g. Kirk 1985: ad 1.298-301.

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INDICES

443

SUBJECT INDEX B "Bad Men’ : Stratification Barter : see Trade

A Abduction of Helen : 167, 172-3 Accumulation of wealth (‘acquisitive drive’): 64, 105-6,

see

Social

Barathron : 364 n.118 Basileis : 325 n.23; see Princes Beauty : 72, 78-9, 138, 262 Beggars, treatment of : 115-17 Benches,

stone:

29,

277,

342

153, 155, 157, 161, 189, 222-4, 227, 232-3, 237, 244-5, 248, 24950, 253-6, 263

n.97 Benvolio(-syndrome) : 115

Adulthood : 287

Bethnal

Aeikea : 363 n.115; 367 n.132

164 Big Men : 28, 32, 54, 281-2, 288, 292

Agamemnon, interpretations of : 361 n.103, 367 0.131 Aggression : see Human Nature;

Violence; Anger Agora : 29-30, 32-4, 55 Agriculture,

role and

Green,

social

109-10, status in:

Birth, as a criterion of status : 73-

4, 81-3, 158 nature

οἵ:

49-51, 55, 58 Aias son of Oileus, interpretations of : 91, 355 n.67, 367 n.131 Aidos : 76; see Respect; Shame Aiskhea : 363 n.115

Aisymneter : 325 n.20 Akhaia, as a political unit : 39-40, 58, 175

Biwa monks : 314 n.3 Blind bards : 314 n.3

Boar's tusk helmet : 320 n.38 Boasting : 98 Booty: 184-6, 189, 208, 211, 244,; distribution of : 35, 87, 297, 299-310; see Freebooting Buccaneers,

Caribbean:

184-5,

189 Bullying : see Coercion

Akhilleus, interpretations of : 262,

365

n.122;

and Hektor:

129-30,

143-5; see Corpses, treatment of Anax : 325 n.23; see Monarch

Altars : 29 Anger: 109-15, 151-2, 154, 262 Animal

122-4,

husbandry,

126-38,

ς Cannibalism : 25, 128 Caprice of the gods : 375 n.167b Centralisation : 162

role οὗ : 49-

51, 55, 58, 263-4 Arete : 347 n.18; see Excellence

Army-recruitment : 39-40, 43-4, 48, 119, 173-5, 271, 364 n.117

Champion combat : 200-2 Chariots, use of : 316 n.11 Chiefs : 28, 54

Assassination : see Violence

City, as a political unit : 36, 56-7, 58, 263; terminology : 271-3; see Community; Town

Assemblies : 33-4, 56; see Agora; Sceptres

Civilisation Process : 63, 68, 162 Coercion: 118-22, 154; see

Astoi/astu : see City

Violence Cloth, as

Afe : 131, 135, 370 n.144 Autarky : 52-3, 219, 221,

227, 248, 263

224,

treasure:

227, 236, 398 n.140

52,

103-4,

Combat, nature of : 80, 87-8, 979, 201, 313 n.1, 321 n.39, 338 n.81, 377 n.180 Commensality : se Tablecompanionship Commoners/common people: see Social Stratification Community, role and perception of: 33-6, 174-5, 192-5, 196-9, 293, 297, 302, 306, 308-10, 327 n.28; organisation of : 26-7, 31-6,

38, 54, 56-7, 63, 162; see Towns; and cf. States

Diet : 50-1, 53, 340 n.89 Diplomatic

relations:

32,

171,

175, 194-5, 198 Dishonour/disrespect : 107-8; see Deference Doc's boys’ bowling scores : 356 n.75 Dog-face, as an insult: 111, 362

n.106 Doulikhion : 408 n.8

Dynasties: Trojan: 282-3; Lykian : 283-4; Mykenaian : 2845; Ithakan : 285-6

Comparative studies : 218, 23-4,

393 n.109, 394-5 n.119-121 Compensation : 132-5, 175, 196

Competition : see Rivalry Conflict : see Violence Connections : 44-8,

54,

140-52,

164, 169-71 Consistency : 36, 40, 53, 58, 261-

2; see Inconsistency Conspicuous consumption

E Economy : 49-53, 218-27, 263, 393 n.107, economic spheres: subsistence economy 218-21, 227, prestige economy 218, 222-3; convertibility of goods : 106, 219,

and

223-7, 244, 248; surplusproduction : 52-3, 106, 219, 221,

Conspicuous destruction: 61, 138, 157, 164, 187-90, 207, 209, 252-3 Convertibility of goods: see Economy Corpses, treatment of : 97-8, 201, 366-7 n.131 Courtship : 99-100, 289 Craftsmen : 52, 226, 326 n.25, 341 η.95

224, 227, 246, 248, 254; ‘entrepreneurial’ spirit : 234, 237; see Agriculture; Animal

leisure : 61, 163-5, 263-4

D Dani warfare : 405 n.184 Death, heroic attitude to : 262; of Patroklos : 14, 135

Decapitation:

see

Corpses,

treatment of

Decision-making : 32-4; 95-6 Deference : 69-71,

75-7,

82-9,

94, 98, 107-8, 109-25, 143-4, 153-4, 156-7, 159-63, 263-4 Delphi : 255 Demioergoi : Craftsmen

see

Heralds;

husbandry;

Autarky;

Profit-

motive; Treasure; Trade

Ellapine : 45 Elders : 29, 31-6, 275-6 Eloquence : 72, 82, 95-6, 100 Enemies : 48, 75, 114, 154

Epic poems, nature of : 6, 80-1, 152, 262, 352 n.49 Eranos : 46-7 Eris : see Strife; Violence Estates, organisation and cultivation of : 49-53, 54-5, 248 Etai : 272-3 Ethics of conflict : 65-6, 110-12, 114-15, 117-18, 122-3, 126-38, 188-90 Excellence(s) : 69, 72-4, 75, 7882, 158-9, 371 n.147 Exile(s) : 43, 119, 291, 293, 370 n.143

445

Ε

H

Fame : see Reputation Fantasy : 1, 8-10, 17, 19-23, 87, 148-52; see Idealisation

Hall (megaron) : 41, 53, 54

Farmhouses Fate : 145

: 49, 54

Heralds : 32-4, 277-80, 334 n.6i,

Fatherland : 31 Favours : 47-8, see Connections

409 n.16 75,

174, 229-30;

Fear : 68, 76-7, 88-9, 154, 161 Feasting: see Eilapine, Eranos, Hierarchical

feasts;

Table-

companionship Feudalism : 26-7, 54

First Sack of Troy : 193-4, 251 Folk-tales, modern Greek : 5 Force : see Violence Formalisation : 57, 263-4; Institutionalisation

warfare

74-5,

76,

Herds, size of : 50 Hero-cult : 7, 13

Heroes : 5-9, 13, 19-20 Hetairoi : 335 n.67, 337-8 n.80; see Friendship Hierarchical reciprocity : 234-7, 396 n.131 Hierarchical feasts : 45 Hippeis : 377 1.180 Hired labour : 49, 115-16

see

Fragmentation : 63-7, 154-5 Freebooters/freebooting : 208-10, 213-18, 219-20, 244-8, 257-8, 388-9 n.83; see Pirates; Predatory Friendship :

Haus- and Heeresgefolgschaft : 334 n.62; see Retainers Heckling : 84, 87

114-15,

Historical parallels : 153, 157-65, 253-8, n.30, 355 n.68-9, 376 Historical processes 65, 263-4, 256-8, n.183 Homer : 6, 11 Honour: 64-5,

18-21, 54-8, 262-3, 319 n.176 : 55-8, 158297-8, 378

69-77,

107-25,

Funerals : 31, 45, 104

173, 175, 199, 236-7, 347 n.19, 361 n.104; see Deference; Status, concepts of Hospitality : 44-5, 104-5, 230-7 Household, as a political unit:

G

27, 54, 58; organisation of: 27, 41-4; behaviour of heads of : 120-

130, 140-1; see Connections

Friendship and justice : 146-8

Games : 30, 55, 90-5,

100,

160,

164, 195-6, 202-6 Generosity: 45-6, 104-5, 219, 222-3, 230-7, 249, 263, 359 n.91 Gera : see Prizes; Privileges Gerontes : see Elders Gift-exchange and -giving : 47-8, 85-6, 106, 200-1, 219-20, 222-5, 228-37, 247-8, 395 n.120 Gods and mortals : 137, 142-7 Government : see City; Elders;

2 Houses : 41-2, 53, 54, 103 Human

Nature:

3,

63,

68-9,

156, 217, 392 n.103 Humiliation : see Hybris Humour

: 371 0.149

Hybris : 107-8, 115-18, 124, 127, 138, 157, 161, 180-1, 194, 196, 198-9, 206, 209, 250, 253, 309, 400 n.153

Monarchs; State

Greed:

see

Accumulation

of

169-71;

see

wealth

Guest-friends Diplomatic

:

relations;

exchange; Hospitality

Gift-

I Idealisation : 62, 82-3, 88-9, 99100, 152, 153, 156-7, 250, 251-3, 261

446 Inconsistency :

261-2,

319

16-17,

n.29,

328

35,

156,

n.35,

411

Literary interpretation : 2-3, 223, 109, 126, 133, 190, 262

n.15 Inheritance : 42

Initiation by combat : 387 n.71, 400-1 1.181 Institutionalisation : 95, 258; see Formalisation

Integration of community : 155, 264 Intentions : 112-14, 154 Interdependence : 162 Interstate

relations : 169-71;

see

Diplomatic relations Intimidation : 102, 116, see Coercion; Fear; Threats

120-2;

J Justice : 85, 146-8, 158, 179-80, 262, 374-5 n.167, 392 n. 101

Männerbund : 338 n.81 Mafia/mafiosi: 140, 164-5, 345 n.1, 353 n.53, 376 n.172 Male dominance: 121-2, 152, 156 Marriage:

42;

see

Courtship;

Weddings Masculinity : 61, 109-14, 117-18, 138 Mass, role of in battle : 306, 313; see Combat, nature of Massacres : see Goals of war Mass-enslavement: 253; see

Goals of war Maximum force, application of : 190; see Conspicuous destruction Meat-consumption : see Diet Megaron : see Hall Merit, as a criterion of status : 72,

K Kalakh

M

76-7, 82-3, 156-7, 159-60 and

Niniveh,

sack

of:

316 n.13 Kapauku killer's dance: 357 n.80 Kawelka destruction of enemy : 183-4, 189 Keimelia : see Treasure Keryx : see Herald King : see Monarch Kinship : 26, 44, 74,

140,

Metal, need for : 52

Methodological issues : 9-10, 1517, 22-3, 25-6 Models : 27-8, 218, 223-5 Monarch : 31-6, 56, 281-94; at state level : 38-9 Mutilation:

116,

129;

see

146-8,

Corpses, treatment of Mycenaean elements : 7, 18-21, 58, 262, 319 n.30, 328 n.34

134-

New Carthage, sack of : 185-6 Nobodies (Outidanoi) : 111, 117; see Masculinity

149, 170, 179 Kleos : see Reputation

N L Law-session : 34-5, 5; see Themis

56; cf.

Leis : see Booty Leisteres : see Freebooters

Leskhe : 30, 235

O

Leviathan : 63, 68, 349 n.30

Obligations : Connections

Litai : 131, 347 n.19, 375 n.167b

see

Favours;

447 Oikos : 331 n.52; see Household; Estate Oral tradition, nature of : 10-15, 20-1, 262

Power, formal: 31-6, 101-3, 108, 282, 285, 292-4, 297; as a criterion of status : 308, 310

Orestes, bones of : 5, 13

108, 140-52, 153, 157, 158ff., 179, 190, 199, 246, 248, 249-51, 255, 258, 281-2, 292; as a

informal:

criterion

P

of

77,

status:

88,

73-4,

103,

101-3,

153, 157

Pan-Akhaians : see Akhaia Panama,

Power,

Power relations : 137, 147-8, 150, 307; among gods : 142-5; see

sack of : 184-5

Parasites : 363 n.112 Parting-gifts : 230-7; see Giftexchange Passive solidarity : 169 Pastoralism : see Animal husbandry Pesisistratean recension : 11 Personification : 375 n.167b Phaiakians: 93, 102, 111-12, 202-4, 230-1, 234 Philos : 335 n.67; see Friendship Phoeniclans : 221, 226, 240-2 Phratries : 334 n.66, 338 n.81, 343 n.%9 Pirates : 208, 214, 388-9 n.83, 389 n.90, 392 n.103; see Freebooters Pity : 118, 130-1, 235, 398 n.143 Pleonexia : 253 Plot-requirements : Odyssey : 334, 101, 149-50, 291, 293, 403 n.170; Zliad : 101 Ptunder : see _Freebooting; Predatory Warfare Poison : 170

Polis : see City; emergence

of:

see City, as a political unit

Political geography : 57-8, 262 Pompe : 398 n.142 Popular support, as a source of power : 33, 141-2, 148, 149, 158, 179, 286, 290-1, 293, 378 n.181 Population growth : 162-4, 263, 378 n.184 Population size : 28, 269-71

Portions, of booty : 300-10 Portobello, sack of : 184-5 Potlatch : 222-3, 233, 378 n.185; see Generosity

Connections; Power, informal Power struggle : 101-3, 108, 160-

l, 285-9 — (Ithaka), (Mykenai), 293

284-5

Predatory warfare : 210-13, 24950, 253-4; see Freebooting

Prestige : see Deference; Honour; Social Status Prestige wealth : see Treasure

Princes : formal

powers:

31-6,

158; qualities : 78-83; as a social group: 81-2, 102-3, 158, 274-6,

337 n.75; criticism of: 83-7, 3069 Privileges (gera) : 70 Prizes: 91, 94-5, 224-5, 359 n.91;

of booty

(gera):

87,

299-

310 Profit-motive : 197, 220-1, 237, 241-4, 248, 254, 263 Prowess : 64-5, 72, 75, 79-80, 87-9, 97-100, 138-40, 148-52, 153, 158-9, 246, 248, 249-50, 255-8, 262, 308, 310; of Akhilleus : 139-41, 142, 149; of Odysseus : 140, 142, 149-50 Public interest : 33, 36

Q

Qualities : see Excellence Quarrek : of Agamemnon and Akhilleus : 73-4, 87, 98, 112-13, 122-3, 128, 131-4, 135, 143-5, 364-5 n.121; of Idomeneus and Aias : 90-1, 128

448

Ε Raids: 250-2; on Apeira: 305; on Epeians: 195-7, 299, 302-6; on Ismaros: 212, 303, 305; on Kyklopes: 212, 303, 305; on

Lymessos,

Pedasos

and

Thebe-

under-Plakos : 210-12, 299-300, 305; on Tenedos, Skyros and Lesbos : 210, 305; see Predatory Warfare; Son of Kastor Ransom

: 244-5, 253

Rape : 183-5, 187-8 Reconciliation : 131-5 Religious ceremonies : 31, 47, 55

Reputation : 61, 69-70, 97, 98, 124-5, 154, 180-2 Residence patterns : 42, 44, 333 n.60 Respect : 61, 76, 109-25, 234-7; see Deference; Honour

Retainers : 42-4, 53, 104-5, 20, 140-1

118-

Revenge : 108, 126, 187-8, 262

Rivalry : 69, 89, 153-4, 156, 1601; in personal

qualities:

64,

89-

100, 153, 160; in wealth: 64-5, 100, 105-6, 108, 163-5, 264; in generosity : 104-5; in gift-giving: 223, 228, 230, 233; in courtship:

99-100, 104; in personal power : 66, 249-51; for deference: see Deference; Power struggle; Violence; berween communities : 93, 180-2, 197-9, 202-7, 249-51, 254-5, 258; see Status warfare Roman destruction of enemy : 185-6, 189 Royal banquet : 327 n.28; 336

Self-control: 186

127,

135-6,

138,

Self-sufficiency : see Autarky Seven against Thebes : 168, 1945 Shame : 67-9, 76, 93, 94, 97, 156 Shields : 17-21 Ships and crews: 52, 245, 26970 Single combat : 200 Slaves: 42, 103, 120, 129-30, 149; economic roles οὔ: 49, 52; sale of: 116, 226, 239-41; sexratio : 49, 253, 404 n.176 Soccer War : 205-6 Social life : 30-1, 44-8, 54, 55 Social mobility : 102-3 Social relations, ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’: 45-8, 55-6, 263, 372 n.155 Social status : concepts of: 61-2, 75, 77, 110, 122, 124-5, 154, 156, 158, 162-4; criteria of: 72-4, 74-5, 102-3, 122-4, 148, 153, 156-7, 158-9; symbols of: 101, 103-4, 222-3, 276-7, 280, 309 Social stratification : 31, 56, 7889, 153, 262-3 Socialisation and anger: 126-7, 188 Son of Kastor: 72-3, 74, 76, 207-10, 212-14, 218, 232-3, 238, 239-40, 250, 300, 302, 305, 388 n.82, 391 n.95-6, 399 n.147-8, 403 n.173

Song of Roland : 316 n.16 State : 36-40, 54, 57

Status rivalry : see Rivalry

n.72; see Wine of the elders

Status warfare : 172,

Royal estate (temenos) : 294-8 Ruler/ruling prince : see

213, 249-51, 254-6, 258 Strata of tradition : 249, 261-2, 403 n.173 Strife : 127-8; see Eris; Violence Streets : 29-31 Succession to power : 31, 282-94 Surrender : 187

Monarch

5 Sarakatsani ethics : 117 Sceptres : 31, 33, 83-4, 284-5, 292 Scowling : 128

276-80,

199, 207-8,

449

Τ Table-companionship : 44-7, 55, 104 Tact : 203-4; 357 n.78 Talent (weight): 403 n.171 Taphians : 208-9, 214, 239, 400 n.149 Tausug : concept of enmity : 114; attitude to dispute settlement : 370 n.143 Temenos : 297. see Royal Estate Temples : 29 Thallassocracy : 258 Themis : 322 n.1; 329 n.44 Therapon : 333 n.61; see Retainer Thetes : see Hired labour Threats: 92-3, 95-6, 151; see Anger; Violence Time : see Deference; Honour Touchiness: 109-10, 154;

Violence : 3, 61-9, 83-4, 86, 914, 100-2, 105-8, 110, 115, 11819, 124-5, 140, 148, 150-2, 1537, 161-5, 263-5; see Anger; Ethics of conflict

WwW Walls, fortification : 28-30 War: causes of: 3, 155, 167-9, 172-82, 206-7, 217-18, 248-51, 253-8, 392 n.105; immediate causes of: 191-7, 250-1; goals of: 168, 175, 178, 183-90; 207, 252-3, 256-7; frequency of: 1689; agonal and total: 256-7, 263; attitudes to: 171-2, 176-82; 380 n.15; see Predatory warfare; Status

see

Anger

Towns, physical features of : 2830, 54 Town-square : see Agora Trade: 52, 106, 219-20, 226, 238-48, 254 Traders : professional : 221, 238, 241-3; occasional: 238, 244-5, 247 Treasure : 52, 103-4, 218, 222, 224-7, 248, 396 n.126 Trial by combat : 177, 190, 195, 199, 201, 256 Trojan War: 167-8, 172-83, 186-90, 207, 251 Trophies : 97-8, 256, 258 Tyranny : 160-1

U Ubrique soccer match : 205 Ugliness : 79-80 Usurpation : see Power Struggie

warfare Warlike qualities : see Prowess Warrior mentality : 66-7 Wars, legendary : of Aitolians and Kouretes: 192-3; of Men and Kensaurs : 168, 191-2; of Pylians and Epeians : 168, 195-8; see also First Sack of Troy; Seven against

Thebes; Trojan War Wash-basins, communal : 29-30 Weapons, carrying of: 30, 63,

104, 156, 161-2; as ornaments : 41, 54 Wealth, as a criterion of status: 72-4, 75, 103-5 Weddings, 31, 45, 104 Wells, communal : 29-30 Wine of the elders : 32-3, 85-6, 175 Wisdom : 80, 95-6 Women's quarters : 41

x Xeinoi:

exchange

V Valvedditturai massacre : 252 Vice Lords : 61, 157

see

Guest-friends;

Gift-

450

Y Yanomamd, causes of among : 167 Youth and violence : 151

war

Ζ Zeus, prowess and power of : 121, 139, 145, 148-9; violence of : 121

451

INDEX OF PASSAGES

173; 334-6 : 188, 385 n.55; 370: 95; 377-80 : 131,

135, 366 n.130;

414-15: 187; 478-83: 78; 484 92: 314; 511-16: 344 n.101; 553-4: 13; 558: 13; 589-90:

1. HOMER

173; 594-600: 93; 602: 271; 655-6 : 344 n. 101; 740-4: 191

ILIAD n.102;

11.46.09: 172; 56: 179; 105-7:

366 n.126; 64-5: 86; 80-3: 88; 103-6: 96, 120; 118-20: 300, 307; 123-6: 301, 309; 131-4: 113, 368 n.135; 135-9 : 309, 360

383 n.4l; 161-5: 179; 167-70: 78; 172: 76; 182-90: 330 n.50;

1.1-5:

n.100;

126;

140:

25-33:

151;

361

158:

48,

174;

159-60: 111, 175, 181; 161-2: 301, 307; 163-8: 87, 299, 308; 173-81: 135; 1745: 143, 348 n.26, 372 n.154; 176: 115; 1767: 127; 178: 123, 308; 185-7:

376 n.172;

205-24:

111-12:

175-6;

177;

156-8:

223 : 95; 232-3:

86; 285-9: 175; 298-301 : 177; 320-3 : 177; 428-31 : 172-3; 444: 172

IV 24-63 : 373 n.161; 34-6 : 128;

123, 308; 192: 122; 203, 214: 309; 216-18: 137; 225-8: 11), 304; 229 : 370 n.145; 230-2 : 87,

37-8:

lll;

207 : 177, 220-2: 177; 257-64: 32, 83, 85, 349 n.27; 258-9: 71; 266-7 : 174; 340-8: 83; 343-4: 32-3, 359-63: 114; 368-418: 122; 376-88 : 194-5; 385-98 : 93, 204; 401-2: 122; 442-3: 127; 463-6 : 98; 478-81 : 105

234-46:

278-80;

258:

95;

263-71: 191, 364 n.117; 275-6: 128, 309, 368 n.135; 277-81 : 734, 349 n.26, 364 n.120; 280-1: 123;

282-4:

139;

287-9:

113;

290-1: 123, 308; 292-4: 111; 297-303 : 376 n.174; 298-9: 35, 302, 310; 300-3: 310; 324-5: 141; 356 : 309;

364:

145;

143; 95-7: 172-4:

44-9:

145;

177, 274;

177;

176-9:

57-61:

171:

181;

180;

197,

364 n.119;

366-9: 301; 380: 366 n.126; 396-406 : 121, 143, 318; 507: 309; 833-5: 121; 5736: 144; 577-81 : 121

V .253-4 : 97; 265-70 : 193; 5617: 181; 639-51: 193; 802-8: 195, 204; 890-1 : 127

VI_.45-51 : 189; 55-60: 187; 62II.80-3 : 95: 98 : 98; 100-8 : 277, 284; 108 : 40; 115 : 181; 119-22: 181;

185-7:

408

n.15;

188-90:

352 n.48; 188-203 : 79-80; 190: 85; 192-4: 407 n.1; 200-2: 83; 204-6 : 277; 207-11 : 88; 214-16: 84; 216-19 : 79; 225-38 : 87, 301, 306; 235: 111; 239-40: 362 n.107; 240: 309; 241-2: 111, 123; 245-78 : 84; 248-9 : 79: 2689: 88; 285: 181; 286-8: 183; 297-8: 181, 385 n.55; 351-2:

§:

188; 66-71:

98;

117-18:

18-

20; 150-211: 283-4; 152-9: 38; 191-5 : 33, 39, 50, 295, 333 n.60; 208: 206; 215: 169; 216-20: 169, 228; 224-5: 169; 230-6: 169, 228; 239-40 : 273; 242-50: 333 n.60; 262: 272; 288-311: 328 n. 38; 289-92: 380 n.17; 319-20: 20; 326-36: 127; 34953:

122

127;

441-6:

97,

122;

490:

452 VII.23-322 : 200-2, 228; 106: 181; 282, 293: 388 n.75; 295: 272; 347-53 : 177, 179; 357-64:

369 n.140; 613-15: 141; 616: 39, 284; 629: 134; 630-1: 351 n.37; 632-6: 132, 134; 638-9:

177-8,

175;

134; 640-8 : 133; 648 : 116; 666-

374-9: 177; 390-3: 177, 179; 400-4 : 187; 446-63 : 91, 94, 111; 467-75 : 226, 238, 240-1, 244

8: 304; 697-709: 368 n.138; 699-700 : 122, 134; 765-82 : 174; 798-801 : 139

VIII.1-52, 68-79, 130-44: 372 n.156; 2-17: 96, 120; 18-27: 139; 147-50 : 97; 161-3 : 83, 349 n.27; 192-3: 19; 201-4: 144; 209-11: 124, 139; 229-34: 98;

X.68-9 : 71; 237-9: 73; 285-9:

235:

X1.19-23 : 229; 32-9:

356

178;

n.77;

363-4:

286-91:

300-1,

307;

360-73 : 143; 477-83: 121; 494 §: 20; 497-515: 178; 515-16: 188; 542 : 178; 562-3 : 270

IX .9-12 : 407 n.4; 19-23: 174, 181; 32-6: 182,

368

122, 357 n.78; 40-9:

n.138;

§49:

357 n.78;

195; 304 : 307; 341-3 : 98; 387: 98

19; 123.

§ : 176; 383 n.36; 139-41 : 175-6;

142:

383

n.39;

211-45:

333

n.60; 244-5 : 50; 627 : 307; 649-

ΑΚ. 77, 113; 670-761 : 37, 195-8; 670-88 : 299, 302-5; 685-705 : 306; 696-709 : 299, 302-5; 71719 : 196; 750-2 : 206; 784: 128, 206; 806-8 : 34, 322 n.1

368 n.138; 63-4 : 127; 65-7: 368 n.138; 68-90 : 275; 70-3 : 32; 806: 407 n.5; 97-9: 277; 103-13:

139, 309, 368 n.138; 115-18: 135, 142; 128-30 = 270-2 : 300; 137-40 = 279-82 : 300, 306; 14956 = 291-8: 37, 40; 154-6 = 296-8: 38, 277; 158-61: 122, 131-2; 225-306: 133-4; 237, 241: 188; 254-8; 72, 128, 138, 369 n.140; 307-45 : 133; 316-19: 72, 87, 303-4, 307; 321-2 : 307; 323-4: 304; 325-33: 87, 210, 299, 304, 307; 334: 35, 299, 307; 337-42: 173; 341-2: 72; 343 : 307; 351-5: 139; 356-77: 133; 365-8: 300-1; 372-3: 362 n.106; 378-87 : 133; 401-16 : 369 n.140;

n.92;

434-95:

133; 464:

406:

273; 483-4:

39; 485-

91:

496-7:

45-7;

390

131; 497-501:

138; §02-14: 131, 375 n.167b; 513-14 : 347 n.19; 515-23 : 1323; 524-605 : 132; 529-89 : 192-3; §33-42 : 86, 113; 574-80 : 33, 50, 296, 591-5: 186; 602-5: 138, 368-9 n.139; 607-10: 133, 138;

XII.22-3 : 8; 211-14: 96; 23050:96, 120; 258 : 323 n.8; 2947: 320 n.31; 310-21 : 82-3, 295, 349 n.27; 313-14: 50; 444: 323 n.8; 447-9 : 8

XIII.107-14:

111,

134,

309;

170-6: 333 n.60; 259-68: 98; 275-329: 98, 622-9: 173, 180; 633-9 : 180; 669 : 175; 803-4 : 18

XIV .30-6:

385

n.51;

49-51:

111; 82-102 : 114, 181; 84: 182; 85-7: 168; 110-32: 333 n.60, 356 n.76, 357 n.78; 121-7: 50,

73;

131-2:

111;

135-42:

134;

256-7 : 121, 139

XV .18-24 : 139; 65-7: 14; 1049:

121,

139:

128-37:

121;

166-

209 : 123-4, 144; 203 : 131; 21117:

373 η.161,

376 n.174; 283.

453 4: 95; 347: 98; 498 : 50-1; 645. 6: 18; 704-19 : 188; 721-5 : 178

XVI_5 : 131; 18 : 370 0.145; 403: 139; §2-4: 123, 141, 308; 301; 57: 307; 589: 116, 60-3: 131; 80-96: 141, n.153; 83-6: 133; 141-2: 200-7 : 140; 278-83: 139; 92: 35, 85, 148; 433-49:

56: 309; 372 20; 384. 145;

456 : 272; 542 : 82, 284; 644-55 :

14; 698-857 : 14; 702-3 : 323 n.8

XVII.144: 175

271;

249-50:

32,

135;

107-10:

128, 135; 130-7: 229; 207-13: 37; 257-310: 178; 261: 139; 288-92 : 40, 380 n.11; 296: 96; 306-427 : 229;

334-7:

129;

362-

7: 112; 394: 76; 474-609: 19; 497-508 : 34, 134; 500: 370 n. 143; 503-6: 277, 509-13: 384 n.47

XIX .56-8 : 135; 60: 413 n.7; 85-6: 309; 86-8: 113; 88-91: 135, 309; 181-3 : 132, 309; 23840 : 407 n.5; 270 : 369 n.142

XX .83-5 : 98; 84: 274; 178-84: 283, 297; 184-6: 33, 50, 296-7; 213-41 : 282-3; 219-22 : 50; 268-

19; 302-8

: 283,

318; 391:

XXI.40-1, 58, 78-80, 102 : 239, 241; 435-69 : 388

143, 194; 116, 240

XXII.246: 356

n.74;

129;

175-6:

87-8: 129;

63,

295-9:

171, 229, 271; 370-595 : 91-2; 450-98 : 90-1; 536-40: 95; 5669: 278-9; 576-8 : 356 n.75; 6068: 115; 615-52: 95, 630-40: 205; 678-80 : 388 n.79; 705 : 400

n.155; 740-7 : 226, 239; 785-93 : 92; 805-25 : 388 n.77; 832: 49;

XVIII.98-104:

72: 296

XXII_.45 : 239; 62-8 : 186; 11128 : 187; 153-5: 30; 233-5 : 75; 346-7: 128; 383-4: 187; 395: 129; 410-11: 186; 461-4: 129; 472-7: 129; 489-99: 46, 103, 105, 148; 500-4: 148; 510-14: 396 n.130

441-9:

n.76;

116;

441-58 :

451-5:

892-7 : 95

XXIV

.12-18 : 129; 25-30 : 143,

172; 31-54 : 144, 351 n.38; 40-4 :

129; 46-54 : 130; 53 : 368 n.135; 55.7: 130, 144, 146, 367 n.133, 376 n.168; 58-76: 144; 66-70: 75; 116:

137; 133-40 : 137; 207-

8:

212-13:

129;

128;

214-16:

130; 234-5: 171; 248-62: 86; 265 : 121; 365 ; 391 n.100; 3815: 187: 396-400 : 43, 271; 484-

9: 101, 411 n.11; 559-70: 109, 137; 882-6: 127, 137; S91-5: 351 n.38; 602-9 : 93; 732-7 : 187; 751-3 : 239; 765-6 : 389 n.85

ODYSSEY 1.1: 126; 19-27: 145; 58-9 : 31; 60-7: 145; 68-75: 145; 76-9: 145; 88-9: 126; 113-18: 126, 287; 163-5: 126; 175-7: 403 n.170; 180-4 : 170, 238; 189-90 :

170, 332 n.59; 228-9: 118, 126; 257-64 : 170, 229, 234; 267-70: 126; 289-96 : 127, 290, 411 n.12; 296-7 : 287; 307-18 : 231-2, n.146; 345-61 : 287; 351-2:

399 14;

454 356-9 : 121; 365-6: 289; 374-5: 45; 381-2 : 151, 376 n.173; 38697 : 286; 394-5 : 274, 289; 398: 246, 390 n.92; 430: 239; 431: 400 n.155

2.14 : 279, 287; 18-22 : 271; 267: 33-4; 32: 33; 37-8: 278-9; 44-5 : 290; 50-9 : 286; 65-7 : 117; 80-1: 118, 279; 85-7: 363 n.113/115; 87-126 : 286, 289, 335 n.70; 87-8: 113; 97-102: 396 n.130; 139-40: 45; 178-93: 356 n.77;

225-7:

288;

238-9:

170;

244-5: 290; 301-16: 127, 290; 305: 126; 323-36: 291-2

287, 140,

3.5.8: 38, 271, 328 n.38; 71-4: 213, 389 n.84; 195-8 : 372 n.152; 214-15 : 117, 141, 291; 262-307: 284-5; 267-71: 293, 334 n.65; 308-10 : 335 n.70; 318-22 : 208; 347-51:

104;

366-8:

380

n.12;

7.10-11 : 307; 103-6:

341

75-7:

n.93;

348 n.24;

311-16:

333

n.60; 321-6 : 389 n.85

8.7-15 : 407 n.4; 11-47: 275-7; 21-2 : 76; 31-3:

102; 90-1:

318

n.23; 100-448 : 202-4, 230; 159. 64: 242-3; 207-11: 93; 224-8:

93; 390-1: 274; 564-71 : 102

487-91:

314;

9.25.36: 31; 39-66: 212; 42: 303; 47-59 : 37; 112-15 : 25; 15760: 415 n.21; 163-5, 197-205: 212; 225-8: 212; 231-3: 399 n.147; 2§2-§ : 213, 389 n.84; 391 n.97; 266-8: 231, 235, 399 n.146; 299-305: 136; 319-24: 245: 464-6 : 212; 491-505 : 136; 526-36: 145; 543-9: 415 n.23; 548-9 : 212, 303

10.38-42 : 87,

303,

306,

403

396 : 333 1.60

n.170; 110 : 32

4.3-19: 272, 335 n.70; 22-38: 42-3; 62-4 : 79, 81, 352 n.48; 6990 : 106, 232-3; 71-5: 103; 125-

11.1746 : 285; 184-5 : 296; 1857:

45,

n.59;

102-3; 262-5:

187-8: 29:

286,

332

287-97:

99;

227-9 : 232; 333-4 : 130; §12-37: 285; 589-619 : 224, 231; 615-19:

336-40 : 230; 356-9: 106; 35861 : 73, 233; 368-70 : 314; 490: 51; 494-503: 101; 411 n.11;

232;

534 : 300

32 : 232;

164-5 : 105; 176-7 : 37;

621-3:

45;

646:

86;

649-

51 : 47; 667-72 : 286-7, 342 n.96; 689-92 : 85, 147; 761-7 : 145

12.346-7 : 29; 439-40 : 34 5.249-51:

245;

282-96:

145;

13.8.9:

306-7 : 48; 375-9 : 145

6.91.2: 89; 115: 114: 329-30 : 145

275;

182-5:

32;

13-19:

35,

230,

234; 128-3 : 112, 152, 360 n.97; 140-8 : 112, 152; 149-178 : 102; 215-16 : 106; 221-439 : 357 n.78; 256-67 : 119;

258-66:

105;

265-

6 : 43, 48; 339-43 : 145; 386-96 : 142

455

14.13.20: 50; 62-6: 338 η.83;

116;

63:

410-11 : 151, 376 0.173

50; 70-1:

173; 82-91:

215-

17; 83-4 : 72, 146; 96-9 : 50; 1007: 50; 117: 173; 202-72 : 20710, 213, 239; 205-6: 73; 211: 50; 222-6: 53, 171, 391 n.96; 230-3: 300; 234: 76; 237-9: 174;

278-84 : 399

n.147;

285-9:

233, 240, 242; 321-6 : 226, 233; 334-59 : 240;

410-17:

340

0.92;

366-75 : 89;

387-98:

116;

19.13: 127; 109-14: 35, 135: 32; 185-202: 35-6, 229, 234; 238-40: 149,

148; 170, 403

n.170;

106;

273:

233;

282-6:

283 : 233; 293-5 : 226, 233; 48890 : 120

452 : 239

15.80-5: 115-19:

224, 232; 232;

273-4:

988:

43;

273;

318-

24; 89, 118, 333 n.61; 334 n.64, 349 n.28;

9:

348

372-3 : 340 n.92; 377-

n.25;

384-8:

239,

402

n.168; 412-14 : 37; 418-83 : 226,

240, 242; 425-9: 208-9, 239; 459-63 : 401 n.156; 468 : 30, 324 n.16; 504: 50; 521-2 : 288; 5334: 274, 285

20.10-22 : 136; 41-51 : 142; 10510: 341 n.93; 124-59 : 324 n.16; 132-3: 72; 194-6: 78; 209-21:

341 n.92; 241-7: 286; 264-5: 324 n.14; 281-2 : 398 n.141; 287302: 116; 289-90: 100; 299302 : 136; 315-19: 118; 381-3: 116, 240; 384-6: 136; 440-5, 457-77 - 120

21.11-16:

16.12-26 : 120; 95-6: 117, 141,

21:

169, 344 n.101; 16-

171; 31-5:

249-55:

93;

162:

100;

285-310 : 92;

169;

295.

291; 97-8 : 140; 105-7 : 118; 115-

304:

16 : 140; 117-20: 149, 285; 2434, 256-7, 260-1: 142; 274-7: 136; 294: 127; 205-15: 149; 363-406 : 286; 375-82 : 117, 142, 291; 383-6: 105, 292; 387-91: 288; 424-30: 171, 208-9; 427: 171

93; 331-3 : 117; 350-3 : 121; 3607:92, 369-71 : 120; 412-13 : 93

191; 314-22:

100; 323-9:

22.48.53: 289; 48-9: 113; 74: 324 n.16; 184-6 : 320 n.31; 20556 : 372 n.157; 208-9, 233-5 : 47; 272-3, 297-309 : 372 n.157; 310. 29 : 113; 351-3 : 113; 426-7 : 287

17.31.5: n.16;

120; 61-95:

124-5:

130;

149,

324

188 : 76; 205.

11: 29-30; 215-34: 115; 233-8: 136; 244-6: 116; 249-50: 116, 240, 402 n.169; 278-9 : 116; 2869: 218; 405-10: 116; 425-41: 208-10; 458-65: 116, 136; 4818 : 363 n.113; 485-7: 146

18.37:

116; 64-5: 274; 84-7:

363 n.111; 90-4: 136; 100: 139-40 : 147; 212-13 : 289;

9:

287;

338-42:

120,

116; 228-

349-64:

23.356-8 : 390 n.92 24.102-22 : 380 n.22; 115-19: 48, 174; 179: 274; 205-7: 359 n.94;

208-10,

222-5:

338

n.83;

266-314 : 227, 231-2, 233-4; 2678: 403 n.170; 413-66 : 148; 4335: 140; 483-6: 285-6; 496-9: 149: 502-48: 137, 372-3 n.157; 546-7 : 286