Status Warriors: War, Violence and Society in Homer and History [Bilingual ed.] 9050630758, 9789050630757

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DUTCH MONOGRAPHS ON ANCIENT HISTORY AND ARCHAEOLOGY EDITORS

F.J.A.M. MEIJER

-

H.W. PLEKET

VOLUME IX HANS VAN WEES

STATUS WARRIORS

STATUS WARRIORS WAR, VIOLENCE AND SOCIETY IN HOMER AND HISTORY

BY

HANS VAN WEES

J.C. GIEBEN, PUBLISHER AMSTERDAM 1992

CIP-DATA KONINKLIJKE BIBLIOTHEEK, DEN HAAG Wees, Hans van Status warriors : war, violence and society in Homer and history I by Hans van Wees. - Amsterdam: Gieben. (Dutch monographs on ancient history and archaeology, ISSN 0924-3550 : vol. 9) . Also published as thesis Leiden, 1992. - With index, ref. ISBN 90-5063-075-8 Subject heading: violence and society; history; Greek antiquity.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This book has benefited from the incisive criticism and helpful suggestions of a number of British and Dutch scholars. My work was supervised initially by the late prof. A.B. Breebaart (Amsterdam), whose enthusiasm and kind assistance were an important stimulus and are much missed. Later, profs. C.J. Ruijgh (Amsterdam) and H.W. Pleket (Leiden) acted as joint supervisors, while in Britain, where the actual research took place, prof. S.C. Humphreys (now of Ann Arbor, Michigan) and dr. T.J. Cornell (London) agreed to supervise the work in an unofficial capacity. All four, if I may say so, have been model supervisors : efficient, sharp and willing to make available for me a great deal of time in their busy schedules. In addition, much valuable advice was offered by dr. P.A. Cartledge (Cambridge) and prof. M.M. Willcock (London), who read and commented upon a substantial part of the manuscript, and by prof. H.S. Versnel (Leiden) and dr. H.W. Singor (Leiden), who did the same for the whole of it. Versions of part of the text were delivered as seminar papers at the Institute of Classical Studies (London), and benefited from subsequent discussion with fellow participants, among whom I should like to single out Philip de Souza. Those mentioned have helped to make this a far better book than it would otherwise have been; its remaining failings are entirely my responsibility. Other kinds of debts I owe to Floris Cohen, whose timely encouragement made all the difference, and to Jonathan Brown and Ewan Campbell whose computerexpertise and readiness to help saved me many weeks of work. Financial support came from a variety of sources. The British Council awarded me a scholarship in 1984-5, which enabled me to get started on my dissertation, and, what is more, to do so in Britain, which despite the present harsh financial climate is still an excellent place to do Ancient History. From April 1987 to July 1989, my research was funded by a subsidy from the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (N.W.O.). I produced the final version of the book while employed as a Tutorial Fellow in the School of History and Archaeology at the University of Wales College of Cardiff. In between, the generosity of the Department of History at University College London, the School of Archaeology and Ancient History at Leicester University and especially the Department of Mediterranean Studies at Queen Mary & Westfield College (London) in offering me part-time employment enabled me to continue work. I can only hope that this book will be regarded as added proof that the decision to close the Department of Mediterranean Studies was wholly unjustified. Although all of the above deserve great credit, I wish to dedicate this book to those whose influence on me and my work has been more fundamental still : to my parents, my brothers and my sister; to my teachers and fellow students at the University of Amsterdam, among whom Ren~ van Royen and Belco Beukers deserve particular mention; and, finally, to Yoshie Sugino, whose ideas on the wider issues involved in the subject of this book have deeply influenced mine.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

PREFACE CHAPTER ONE HISTORY IN POETRY ON RECONSTRUCTING THE HOMERIC WORLD

1

5

1. Fact and fantasy : the fourth race 2. Tradition : old poems or the latest songs?

6 10

3. The case of the Big Round Shield 4. History in poetry : points of method

17 22

(i) Compositional technique 12 (ii) Subject matter 13 (iii) Social function 14

CHAPTER 1WO LIFE IN TOWN THE ORGANISATION OF HOUSEHOLD, COMMUNITY AND STATE

25

1. 2. 3. 4.

26 28 31 36 41 44 49 53

5.

6. 7. 8.

The hidden society : reconstructions and models Buildings and people Government : the princes and the people Beyond the town A hero's home Friends : the men who come to dinner The economy of the estate Life in town : fact and fiction

CHAPTER THREE THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING ANGRY

1. Explanations of violence

61 63

2. The meaning of honour and excellence 3. Princes and bad men : ideals and exploitation

69 78

4. Competition I : personal excellence

89

STATUS, PERSONAL POWER AND VIOLENCE

(i) The fragmentary society 63 (ii) The heroic impulse 66 (iii) The shame-culture 67 (iv) Assumptions and questions 68

(i) Proper beatings 83 (ii) Unjust violence 85 (iii) Undeserved gifts 85 (iv) Fighting over plunder 87

5. Competition II : power and wealth 6. Competition III : the struggle for respect (i) The Benvolio-syndrome 110 (ii) The attraction of hybris 115

109

7. The ethics of anger

126

8. The might of men : strength, connections and justice 9. The importance of being angry : fact and fiction

138 153

(iii) The bullying tendency 118 (iv) Questions of superiority 122

(i) The moral boundaries of anger 128 (ii) Pity 130 (iii) Reconciliation 131 (iv) Self-control 135 (v) The authorities 137

CHAPTER FOUR PILLAGE AND DESTRUCTION PREDATORY AND STATUS WARFARE

101

167 168

1. Warriors at peace 2. Troy I : the insult that launched a thousand ships 3. Troy II : the ideal of annihilation ,4. Private conflicts, brawls and wars

191

5. Communities in competition : dangerous games

200

6. Predators 7. Booty and the Homeric economy

207 218

8. Gift-exchange : the hospitality-racket 9. Trade and plunder : profit and prestige 10. Pillage and destruction : fact and fiction

228 238 249

CONCLUSION

261

(i) The War of Men and Kentaurs 191 (ii) The War of Kouretes and Aitolians 192 (iii) The First Sack of Troy 193 (iv) The War of the Seven against Thebes 194 (v) The War of the Pylians and Epeians 195

(i) Champion-combat : Trojans versus Akhaians 200 (ii) Games : the humiliation of communities 202

(i) Subsistence economy : autarky and fair exchange 219 (ii) Treasure economy : greed and generosity 222 (iii) Convertibility of goods 223

(i) Homer 261 (ii) History 262 (iii) Violence 264

172

183

APPENDICES

267

Appendix One Towns And Townsfolk

269

1. The size of the population 269 2. Terms for towns and townsfolk 271

Appendix 7Wo Princes And Sc.eptres

274

1. Princely families and their elders 274 2. Symbolic and procedural functions of the sceptre 276

Appendix Three Monarchs, Dynasties, Temenea

281

1. Kings versus Big Men 281 2. The royal estates 294

Appendix Four Booty : Prizes And Portions

299

1. The mechanism of distribution 299 2. The principles of distribution 304

NOTES Notes Notes Notes Notes Notes Notes Notes Notes Notes

311

to Preface 313 to Chapter One 314 to Chapter Two 322 to Chapter Three 345 to Chapter Four 379 to Appendix One 406 to Appendix Two 407 to Appendix Three 410 to Appendix Four 413

BIBUOGRAPHY

417

INDICES

441

Subject index 443 Index of passages 451

PREFACE

Tall tales about supernatural forces and feats of superhuman strength are not the kind of material historians normally work with. If, moreover, these are tales of unknown date, origin and authorship, historians will generally give them a wide berth. But the tales told in Homer's Iliad and Odyssey are another matter. These oldest Greek epic poems feature monsters and miracles among which Akhilleus' talking horse (XIX.404-18) is only a minor marvel. When, where, how and why the poems were composed has been debated for centuries. Yet historians rely heavily on the Iliad and Odyssey in reconstructing early Greek history, adducing the epics as evidence for several periods, covering a millennium: the Mycenaean Age (1600-1100 B.C.), the Dark Age (1100-700), and sometimes also the Archaic Age (700-500). Not everyone finds this extraordinary state of affairs acceptable. Scholars increasingly feel that it is wrong to use the Iliad and Odyssey as historical sources at all. They hold that the poems are great literature but useless as evidence, except insofar as they corroborate information provided by other, better sources. This is a methodologically safe and sound view, but its implications are revolutionary. II\ dismissing the Iliad and Odyssey as sources one discards most of the evidence which supports established views of Dark Age social, economic, political and military organisation. For whereas epic evidence contributes only marginally to our knowledge of the other periods, it is fair to say that, in spite of a growing body of archaeological evidence, current ideas about the Dark Age continue to depend predominantly on evidence drawn from the Iliad and Odyssey. There is no other literary evidence for the period, and the archaeological evidence, although in principle independent of the epics, in practice is not wholly so : when it comes to interpreting the finds, familiar epic images exercise a powerful hold on the imagination. 1

2

In denying Homer's poems value as historical evidence, then, one shakes the foundations of modem reconstructions of Dark Age society. Moreover, one seriously undermines the common view that great changes began to take place in Greece at the beginning of the Archaic peiiod. For example, the notion that the early Archaic Age witnessed the rise of the city-state and the citizen-army derives primarily from the perception that, while Archaic poets and inscriptions refer to these institutions, Homer does not yet portray communities as city-states nor warriors as members of a phalanx of heavy-armed citizens. If one removes the Homeric evidence from the picture, the contrast vanishes. No longer is there literary evidence from which to argue that the Archaic texts refer to new political and military phenomena. Only archaeological evidence remains, and it is doubtful whether by itself this is strong enough to bear the weight of theories which posit fundamental historical changes in many areas of Greek life. Disregarding the epics means losing a large chunk of Greek history along with the most substantial surviving Greek texts prior to Herodotos' Histories. It seems to me that historians are not always fully aware of how much is at stake here, and I suspect that, if they were, many of them would be rather less willing to ignore the epics. But that does not alter the fact that the epics are a peculiar source, and that any historical reconstruction based on epic material is precarious. Ancient historians thus cannot use the epics as they would any other source, nor can they easily afford to leave them to one side. They have little choice but to confront the problems and look for acceptable ways of squeezing out of the poems what information they can. 2 One purpose of this book is to do just that. I shall attempt to offer a few methodological guidelines for the historical study of Homer, and a reconstruction of Homeric society that is partly new, and partly a defence of older views against more recent interpretations. In doing so, I am concerned first and foremost to shed some new light on early Greek history, but I belie~e that historical analysis is also a prerequisite for the study of the epics as works of literature. Literary criticism of the Iliad and Odyssey has reached great heights of popularity in the 'eighties, but all too often the poems have been treated as if they were products of our own culture and could be understood wholly in terms of our own values. Jasper Griffin is merely more outspoken than most when he sets "taste and sense" as his standards and overtly aims

3

"to defend as intellectually respectable the instinctive responses of the [modern] audience" (1980: 65, 139). Griffin and others have offered many valuable insights into the structure and meaning of the poems, but we shall see that these critics have more than once been led astray by their lack of historical perspective. The focus of this book will be on war and conflict in Homeric society, and ultimately on the question of the causes of violent conflict between individuals and between communities in the epic world. Although Homeric ideals of warriorhood and the heroic code have been much discussed, the fundamental causes of war and conflict in the epic world are rarely studied in any depth. Partly, no doubt, this is because the epics deal with legendary, not historical, clashes. But perhaps a more important reason is that violence is widely regarded as a natural phenomenon. It is believed that man is born aggressive and bound to injure, kill and make war time and again. If nature had its way, all men would be forever fighting all others; only the physical force of the state and the moral forces of civilisation impose restraints. Such a perception allows a simple explanation of Homeric war and conflict : men fight because their society has not yet developed a governmental apparatus or a system of ethics strong enough to stop them. However, it seems to me and it has seemed to others that this is too one-sided a notion of human nature, and entails an oversimplified view of the causes of conflict. J I shall therefore suggest a different explanation for the frequency of armed violence in the Iliad and Odyssey, and for the apparently lower level of violence in the internal conflicts, if not in the wars, of the Archaic Age. The legendary world of the epics may not seem an obvious place perhaps not even a useful place - to go for a study of violent behaviour. Still, by drawing from the poems some insight into the causes of conflict in Greek society, I hope to make a small contribution not only to the study of Greek epic and Greek history, but to the general question of why men fight.

5

CHAPTER ONE

HISTORY IN POETRY

On reconstructing the Homeric world

In modern Greek folklore, the ancient Greeks used to feature as an extinct race of giants, the Hellenes. Ancient buildings such as the Parthenon were at the beginning of the century still pointed out as the work of these giants. Farmers who ploughed up large bones in their fields claimed that these were the remains of Hellenes. People said : "There is a story that long ago in our region there used to live Hellenes, a people that went about in the nude mostly; a strong, tall people, well-disposed to mankind. Sometimes you may still see a Hellene in the woods." "Don't you believe the Hellenes existed'! They were tall as giants; so tall that when they fell down they could not get up again - and that is why they died out." 1

The ancient Greeks themselves, in turn, had a rather similar tradition about a race that preceded their own. They called it the race of heroes. The heroes, it was believed, were demi-gods and far stronger than ordinary mortals; they had become extinct as a result of the slaughter wrought in their last great battles, in the Theban and Trojan Wars. The ancient Greeks attributed to this race tombs and ruins from the distant past, and worshipped the heroes at many of these sites. Indeed, Sparta and Athens, the leading states of classical Greece, at the height of their power took great pains to locate and excavate in conquered territory the alleged remains of their local heroes, Orestes and Theseus respectively. The bones were then 'taken home' to be reburied and given a public cult. 2 Modern Greek fairy-tales about the giant Hellenes were few and short. They tell us nothing of historical value about antiquity and very little about the lives of Greek peasants at the turn of the century. The ancient Greeks, by contrast, had an extensive oral tradition handed down . by professional travelling bards who sang or recited lengthy epic poems

6

about the deeds of the heroes, describing in detail their houses and farms, their institutions, customs, norms and ideals. While most of this tradition, except for minute fragments, is lost to us, two poems survive in full : the Iliad and the Odyssey. In antiquity these were attributed to a single poet, known as Homer (Homeros). 3 To the historian, Homer's poems pose a tantalising problem. On the one hand, the quantity and quality of their narrative detail makes them a potentially rich source of information. On the other hand, as the analogy with recent Greek folktale shows, there are good a priori reasons to question the historical value of that information. In this chapter, we shall be looking more closely at the nature of the epic tradition about the heroes, and deal with the question of how one may use the epics as sources for Greek history. It will be argued that most historical interpretations of Homer, to varying degrees, have been affected by (1) a tendency to underestimate the extent to which the world of the heroes is a fantasy world, and (2) an overinclination to discern and disentangle 'layers' of tradition reflecting different periods of history. I hope to show that such interpretations are methodologically flawed on both counts, and that a different approach to the poems may lead to a new, and perhaps more valid, assessment of their value as historical sources.

1. FACT AND FANTASY: THE FOURTH RACE Greek epic stories claim to be true stories. A bard may boast that divine inspiration enables him to recall every last detail of what happened, down to the names of hundreds of obscure people and places and the exact nature of dozens of wounds inflicted in battle. He may even hint that, if the heroes of his stories could have heard him sing, they would have testified to his accuracy. 4 Ancient audiences were sceptical at times and accused epic poets of exaggerating and embellishing the past, but accepted that by and large they did tell the truth. According to ancient calculations, the heroes lived, not 'once upon a time', but in what we call the thirteenth and twelfth centuries B.C. Excavations in Greece since the 1860s have shown that in these centuries a distinct civilisation, now known as Mycenaean, flourished in

7

places such as Mykenai and Pylos where the heroes were supposed to have had their homes. Indeed, the Greeks themselves already identified visible Mycenaean remains as the walls and tombs built for the heroes. Clearly, the notion of a heroic race was not a complete fiction, but was based on at least some knowledge of the existence of Mycenaean culture. On the other hand, Greek tradition portrays the Mycenaeans as superhuman beings - which of course they were not. A hero (heros) in the ancient Greek sense is a man who has been not merely outstandingly brave or otherwise remarkable, but has been formally elevated to semidivine status after his death, and granted religious worship. Founders of cities, for example, were regularly awarded such posthumous status. An unusual case was the elevation to hero of the Spartan commander Brasidas in 422 B.C. when he fell while defending the city of Amphipolis. The local people "made an enclosure round his tomb, and ever since they have sacrificed to him as to a hero, and given games in his honour, and made annual offerings" (Thucydides V.11,1). People believed that in return the hero protected his worshippers and made them prosper. 5 In historical times, then, heroes existed only in the shape of the spirits of the great dead. But evidently, the Greeks imagined that the Mycenaeans had been living heroes. The most concise and explicit account of the heroic race is offered in Hesiod's poem Works' and Days, which says that before the present Iron Race of men, Gold, Silver, and Bronze Races populated the earth. After these, •vet again another race, the fourth upon the fertile soil, Zeus son ofKronos made: more just and better, A godlike race [genos] of men, of heroes, known as Demigods.•

(Worb and Days 157-60)

These became embroiled in wars at Thebes and Troy (161-65). "There then death's end closed over some of them; Others were given a living and a place to dwell away from men By Zeus son of Kronos; the Father settled them at the ends of the earth." (Worh and Days 166-68)

Hesiod's notion that the heroes constituted a fourth race may be his own, but otherwise his views about them were shared by the Greeks at

8

large. However, there is a school of thought which holds that Homer did not regard the characters of his poems as heroes in the Greek religious sense, but as mere mortals. It is suggested that the concept of heroes as semi-divine beings to be worshipped was in fact a new development of Homer's own day, inspired by the popularity of epic poetry about great men of the past. ' Very little can be said in favour of this view. A serious obstacle to it is a passage in the Iliad which says unambiguously that, at Troy, " ... many ox-hide shields and helmets And the race of demi-god men fell down into dust."

(XII.22-3)

Another obstacle is the fact that Homer often refers to his protagonists, individually and collectively, as heroes. Sometimes Homer's heroes call one another hero, too. It has been claimed that Homer's use of the term differs from later usage : to Homer heros meant something like 'lord' and was no more than a respectful way of referring to someone; after Homer this usage disappeared "fairly quickly" (West 1978: 370-3) and heros was applied to demi-gods only. 1 But this is pure speculation and surely unnecessary. It is far simpler to assume that the poet calls his protagonists heroes because his stories are set in a time when a race of heroes inhabited the earth; a hero addressing another as 'hero' is the equivalent of a man addressing another as 'man'. In short, Homer does share Hesiod's view of the heroes as a distinct, extinct, and semi-divine race. B Homer's heroes distinguish themselves from ordinary mortals by their proximity to the gods and their great physical strength. Many heroes have divine parents or ancestors, and receive personal visits from the gods. Their strengthjs such that they can lift and throw huge boulders. "Two men of the kind that live nowadays, even the best in a town, could not easily heave that stone from the ground onto a wagon, but he swung it easily on his own" (XII.447-9). !I

Other fantasy elements abound, though their scope appears restricted. Miraculous things happen, but never without the contriving of the gods; the heroes themselves perform no marvels other than feats of strength. There are monsters, but they live far across the sea, not in the lands inhabited by the heroes. Otherwise, there is nothing obviously fantastic,

9

except perhaps the references to vast wealth and large numbers of everything. In order to make use of the epics as historical sources, one must of course separate fact from fantasy. Fact, in this context, is such literary creation as reproduces in a fairly straightforward manner realities of some historical period, be they events or objects, norms or institutions. Fantasy is here defined as literary creation not directly corresponding to historical realities - though even this is ultimately rooted in reality. In antiquity, historians such as Herodotos and Thukydides separated the two by eliminating the impossible and implausible as fantasy, and retaining the rest as fact. Modem scholars have often proceeded in the same way. Thus, Moses Finley believed that one need only strip the epics "of supernatural intervention and superhuman capacities" in order to uncover historical realities (1977: 42). Others have identified further implausibilities and argued either that these are isolated fantasy elements which serve to remind the audience that the heroic world is unlike· their own (Redfield 1975: 35-9; Morris 1986a: 85-91; Giovannini 1989: 2937), or that these are part of a wholly fantastic image of the social and political structure of the world of the heroes (Geddes 1984; cf. Taplin 1986; Anastasiou 1981). 10 A practical problem with this approach is that plausibility is by no means a clear-cut criterion. Too often, scholars regard as implausible or even impossible what is merely unfamiliar. u More importantly, the approach has a fundamental methodological flaw : it fails to consider that the epics may contain plausible fantasy. If most of the heroic world at first sight seems realistic enough, this does not necessarily mean that it faithfully reproduces historical realities. The heroes, being demigods and supermen, are in these respects so far removed from any historical prototype as to be essentially a fairy-tale people. In consequence, we must reckon with the theoretical possibility that the whole world depicted in the epics is as fabulous as its inhabitants. If tradition told of heroes unlike any mortals that ever lived, it is possible in principle that tradition created for these heroes weapons, houses, institutions, customs and ideals unlike any that ever existed. However realistic these may appear, they might all be plausible fictions. In using the Iliad and Odyssey as historical evidence, therefore, one should reserve judgement on what is fact and what is fantasy in the epics. First, one should reconstruct the heroic world as a whole,

10

incorporating not only the seemingly realistic, but also the less plausible and even the blatantly imaginary elements. Only then should one try to distinguish epic fact from epic fantasy, analysing each individual piece of information in the light of the overall image of heroic society. When examined in their context, as I hope to demonstrate presently, some things which in isolation seem realistic enough may turn out to be fantastic. The reverse is true too : things which in themselves seem implausible may begin to make sense. Finally, when one has succeeded in separating fact from fantasy, one should not discard the latter. Historians are naturally most interested in the 'factual' aspects of the epic, but fantasy is a category of historical evidence in its own right. However far removed from reality, it is bound to reflect the experiences, fears and ideals of those who fantasise. The imaginary worlds of science-fiction, for example, from the totalitarian state of Oceania in George Orwell's 1984 to the evil Galactic Empire of George Lucas' Star Wars, tell us a great deal about the cultures from which they spring. So, too, even the imaginary aspects of the world of the heroes may indirectly provide valuable information on Greek culture. One of the contentions of this book is that many aspects of the heroic world - more than is usually recognised - are indeed fantastic to a degree, and reflect no historical reality but the ideals of Homer and his audience.

2.

TRADITION : OLD POEMS OR THE LATEST SONGS?

Epic stories were not simply invented from scratch by Homer. They were traditional stories. Apart from anything else, this is clear from the fact that the Odyssey tells the story of the Kyklops without o~ce mentioning that the monster has only one eye, although that information is crucial to the plot. Evidently the audience were supposed to have heard the story before and to know this. 12 This poses another set of problems for the historian. Where did the stories originate ? How were they transmitted ? Above all, how much did they change in transmission ?

11

Since the rediscovery of Mycenaean civilisation, a popular and plausible view has been that the epic tales had their origin in the Mycenaean age itself; more particularly, that the legend of a great war against the city of Troy was based on a historical event of that time. A less popular, but equally tenable proposition, however, is that the epic stories were not created until after the collapse of. Mycenaean civilisation, when only tombs and ruined walls remained, and there was no longer any knowledge of their history. The tale of Troy could have been made up by the Aeolian Greeks who came to settle in the plain of Troy a century or two later, and tried to account for the imposing ruins they encountered there. tJ Whatever the time of their origin, it is virtually certain that the stories were subsequently handed down in oral tradition before they were written down. 14 It is again a matter of dispute when the poems were committed to writing. In antiquity, it was believed that it was Homer who wrote down the Iliad and Odyssey, as well as most of the lost poems known as the Epic Cycle. Estimates of his lifetime varied wildly. Some made him a contemporary of the Trojan War, while the historian Theopompos placed him five centuries later (frg. 205). Most modern scholars believe that it was actually in the second half of the eighth century that the poems were given written form by a 'monumental' poet. Matters are complicated by the claim of some ancient sources that Homer's works were not preserved intact, but in fragments scattered all over Greece, until the Athenian tyrant Peisistratos around 550 B.C. commissioned a reconstruction of the original poems. The majority of modern scholars think that this so-called Peisistratean 'recension' in reality involved no more than marginally editing existing texts, and some would deny that it ever took place. Still, there are also those who argue that the poems were in fact written down at Peisistratos' instigation, and no earlier. ts The oral tradition that produced the Iliad and Odyssey, then, could have lasted for as little as two centuries or for as long as a millennium. In the course of transmission, the stories must have been subject to change, but it hard to tell how much, and in what ways, they changed. As was pointed out by Jan Vansina in his classic Oral Tradition (1961), the extent to which stories are altered and adapted in the process of retelling varies with the kind of tradition that preserves them. The extremes are 'fixed' traditions that value exact memorisation and word-

12

for-word transmission, and hence hardly change at all, and 'free' traditions that leave everything but the bare outline of the story to the imagination of the narrator, and hence may be thoroughly transformed. H Unfortunately, it is not clear to which kind of tradition the epics belong. Compositional technique, subject matter, and social function of the poems offer clues, but fail to provide us with a definite answer. (I) COMPOSmONAL TECHNIQUE

The tales of the heroes may have circulated as fire-side stories or the like before they were turned into poetry, but we can only examine them in the form in which we know them : as epic poems in dactylic hexameter verse. It would seem that oral performances of the epics relied on a mixture of memorisation and improvisation. Even after the poems had been written down, professional performers (rhapsoidoi) and upper class amateurs were able to recite them by heart; it is probable, therefore, that in part or in full they were also memorised before this. 11 On the other hand, the poems contain numerous stock phrases, lines and passages - so-called formulae - which, it is generally accepted, were primarily an aid to improvisation. Improvisation implies creative freedom and the possibility of change. Hence, in order to assess the extent to which the epics may have changed in the course of transmission, we need to know what proportion of any particular performance of the epics would be improvised rather than memorised. There appears to be no way of finding out. We also need to know more about the precise role of formulae in improvisation. A poet did not himself invent all the formulae he used, but drew upon a common stock of formulae. That is to say, when improvising new material, he would incorporate many traditional phrases, lines and passages which he had learned from his colleagues and predecessors. So much is clear, and it follows that a particularly convenient and resounding formula might remain in use for centuries, preserving some old poetic material within a changing oral 'text'. is We do not know, however, how changeable formulae were, and how much room they left for a poet's own invention. How often did a poet adapt or drop old formulae and invent new ones ? Did he have a choice of traditional formulae, or just one formula to express any given notion in any given ·metrical form ? What proportion of his work did in fact consist of formulae ? In the 1930s, Milman Parry, who was the first to attempt a thorough analysis of Homeric formulae, argued that the bulk of

13

the poems consisted of formulae, all of them traditional and leaving very little room for invention. This view has gained widespread support, but more recent studies adduce a good deal of evidence to show that much of the poems is not formulaic, that formulae change, and that they are used in a creative manner.1' So long as the debate continues, it is hard to use the technique of composition by formulae as an indication of the degree to which the transmission of the epics was free or fixed. (II) SUBJECT MATIER

The heroes and their stories, although they belonged to a fabulous past, played quite a lively symbolic role in Greek politics. Their semidivine power was taken quite seriously and cities took care to associate themselves with the appropriate heroes, especially in time of war. For instance, the Spartans attributed their success in establishing a hegemony over the Peloponnese in the mid-sixth century to the fact that, as mentioned, they had unearthed from enemy territory the bones of the hero Orestes and taken these home for worship. 20 Under these circumstances, what the epics had to say about the heroes could assume political importance. A notorious instance was the statement in the Iliad that, at Troy, Aias of Salamis "placed [his forces] where the ranks of Athenians were drawn up" (Il.558). The story has it that around 600 B.C., when the Athenians fought the Megarians for control over Salamis, they cited this verse as proof of their right to the territory; the Megarians supposedly countered that the verse was not by Homer, but an invention by the Athenians themselves. At around the same time, it was said, the Athenians claimed the right to the town of Sigeion, near Troy, simply by virtue of their having taken part in the Trojan War. During the Persian War, they demanded to lead the allied fleet, because Homer had called the Athenian commander at Troy a man "to whom no-one on earth was equal in organising horses and shieldbearing men" (Il.553-4). 21 We may find it hard to believe that this sort of argument carried any weight at all, but our sources suggest that it did. Note the tradition that Kleisthenes, tyrant of Sikyon, during a war with Argos banned public performances of epic poetry because he took offence at epic references to the heroes as 'Argives', men of Argos (Herodotos V.67). If so much was made of such seemingly trifling matters, it seems likely that epic poets would have felt it necessary to change their tales as political

14

situations changed. However, there is no evidence that they actually did so. 22 (ID) SOCIAL FUNCTION

The social function of singing or reciting stories is an indicator of the amount and kind of change that tradition allows. A tale told for amusement, say, is likely to be open to more rapid change than one told to convey historical information or teach traditional wisdom. Again, however, it is difficult to classify the epics in this respect. We have seen that they purport ~o present a true account of past events, yet at the same time the main purpose of these historical tales was to entertain. 23 The singer as depicted in the Odyssey performs for his keep at private parties, where his audience tells him when and what to sing. According to the Odyssey, "people praise more highly the newest song to reach their ears" (1.351-2). If so, a poet might try to please his audience with an unusual new version of a story, rather than faithfully reproduce an old one. It has been suggested that a poet might introduce a new character into a well-known story, or give a new view of a traditional hero. 24 Perhaps he might also tinker with the plot. The story of the death of Patroklos may show signs of having been 'treated' in this way, perhaps more than once. Destiny Postponed Before Patroklos even enters the battlefield, we are told that he will kill many warriors, including Sarpedon, and then fall by the hand of Hektor (XV.65-7). The fact that the poet gives away this much of the plot suggests that it was part of the traditional tale. Audiences already knew what was about to happen, and the poet was not robbing the story of suspense by revealing the outcome in advance. 25 The narrative pr Whereas honour consists in receiving deference mostly in face-to-face interaction, reputation consists in being well spoken of when and where one is not present. 20 In the epic world, what people in town will say about one is felt to be as important as what they do and say·to one's face. The honour offered to a 'good' man or woman takes many forms. Some of these, especially the more standard expressions of deference, are also known as 'privileges' (gera). 21 Small rituals of deference punctuate Homeric street life. Arete, wife of Alkinoos, "is honoured from the heart ... by the people, who greet her with words, looking at her as at a god, when she walks through town" (7.69-72). A good public speaker "stands out above the gathered people, and when he goes through town, they look at him as at a god" (8.172-3). The young Telemakhos experiences something similar : "He went to the town-square, and in his hand he held a broll7.C spear; he was not alone, but two fast-running dogs accompanied him. The goddess Athena steeped him in a wondrous charm, and all the people looked at him with admiration as he approached. He sat down on his father's bench, and the elders made room for him"

(2.10-14; 17.62-4).

Greetings, admiring and respectful glances, and moving aside for someone - forms of deference that presumably exist in every human society - are thus used here to express the honour in which the recipient is held. 22 The heroes appear not to have an elaborate or highly articulated etiquette of deference. 'Looking at someone as at a god', for example, does not involve anything as dramatic·as prostrating oneself, kneeling or bowing. As far as we can tell, it is merely a matter of showing admiration in one's facial expression. The scope for indicating different levels of honour in greetings and forms of address is restricted, too. The remark that Arete is always greeted "with words", may imply that there is also a less honorific, wordless way of greeting - perhaps a nod of the

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head or a wave of the hand. Certainly, some greetings "with words" are more honorific than others. One may be called simply by one's name, e.g. 'Diomedes', but it is a mark of honour to be addressed by one's father's name - in Diomedes' case 'Tydeides' or 'son of Tydeus' (X.689; cf. 159). One or more epithets may be added to the name. Some of these, such as "great kudos of the Akhaians", are highly complimentary and no doubt convey extra honour. They are not, however, formal titles, nor are they graded in any way. 23 Nor is there any evidence for status being differentiated by means of elaborate seating-arrangements or the like. On the face of it, this seems a comparatively egalitarian society. We shall see later, however, that below the surface lies a clearly stratified community. Deference may be shown in any number of other ways, "in war, or in a different sort of activity, or at a meal" (IV.258-9). Alkinoos honours his wife "as no other woman on earth is honoured" (7.67), apparently by giving great weight to her opinions, even in public matters. 24 Amyntor dishonours his wife by sleeping with a concubine (IX.450); when Laertes, by contrast, abstains from sleeping with a slave-girl (1.432), he presumably honours his wife in this way. Masters honour their slaves by taking good care of them; slaves dishonour their masters by disobedience. 25 Men honour a ruler by offering him gifts and by following him to war; they dishonour him by opposing his decisions. 26 A speaker in council or assembly is dishonoured if his views are rejected (IX.62; XIV.127); by implication, one honours a speaker by applauding him. A guest at a meal may be honoured with a privilege (geras) such as the best cut of meat or an extra serving of wine. 21 A visitor may be honoured with the offer of a bed and blankets for the night, or dishonoured by being left to sleep on the floor (19.253-4, 317-8; 20.12933). A man honours a social inferior by requesting his services; the man who serves honours his superior by doing so. 28 A mortal honours a god with sacrifice, and a god may honour or dishonour his worshippers by granting or denying their requests. 21> In sum, in Homeric society almost anything that involves any kind of deference to anyone's wishes or interests, can be described in terms of honour acknowledged and conferred, or denied and withheld. 30 The magnitude of one's honour, as of one's reputation, is supposed to correspond to the degree of one's 'excellence' . It is not right that the

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'bad' man and the 'good' man should be "in one honour" (IX.319), let alone that the 'worse' man should be honoured "on a whim", while the 'better' man is sent away in dishonour (20.132-3). The list of excellences or qualities (aretai) that may bring honour is quite long. As we have already seen, a charming appearance brings some honour to Telemakhos, and eloquence great honour to the anonymous orator. One Periphetes of Mykenai is described as a man "better [than his father] in all qualities, both in running and in fighting, and also among the foremost of the Mykenaians in intelligence" (XV.641-3). The Phaiakians as a people traditionally pride themselves on superior qualities of seamanship, running, singing, dancing (8.24153), and, secondarily, boxing, wrestling and long-jumping (8.102-3). The ethical qualities which we tend to associate with 'good' and 'bad' also play a part, although they receive little mention. For instance, "any man who is good and of sound mind loves and takes care of his wife" (IX.341-2), and a good woman is always faithful to her husband. Akhilleus is told that he will be more highly honoured if he refrains from quarrelling, since "friendliness is better" (IX.256-8). "Justice and proper behaviour" receive honour - from the gods, at any rate (14.84). Jt By far the most prominent male excellence, however, is military prowess. Not only are great warriors honoured and given special privileges, but physical strength and courage are such important qualities that "the best men" often simply means "the best fighters", and "a bad man" equals "a coward". Second place is taken by excellence 'in counsel' and third place by good looks. The most often cited quality of women is beauty, followed by skill in spinning, weaving and embroidery. Sometimes it seems as if physical, and to a lesser extent intellectual and moral, excellence is all that counts in the world of heroes. The very vocabulary of status, which tells us that 'goodness' is rewarded with honour and reputation, tends to create an impression of an egalitarian society where prestige derives frc.111 personal merit only. All the more so since wealth, birth and formal power are not often mentioned as ingredients of status. However, when they are mentioned, it becomes clear that these criteria do carry great weight. A straightforward connection between wealth and honour is made when it is said that Kastor, son of Hylax, "among the Cretans once was honoured by the people as if he were a god, for his prosperity and

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wealth" (14.205-6). Similarly, Odysseus says without being cynical that he would like to come home rich, for "it would be much more advantageous to arrive in the land of my fathers with a hand better filled, and I would be an object of greater respect and love to all men who saw me come back to lthaka" (11.358-61). There are considerable differences in wealth in Homeric society. Odysseus is twenty times richer than anyone else in his region (14.96-9). Since the poet frequently refers to rich men, we may assume that there are many who derive honour from their riches, just as Kastor and Odysseus do. How important it is to have wealth emerges from a speech by Diomedes, in which he prefaces what he has to say with a short family history, beginning with his great-grandfather but focusing on his father, Tydeus. "I too claim to be the offspring of a good father... He married the daughter of Adrestos and lived in a house rich in substance. He had plenty of wheat-bearing farmland, there were many planted orchards all round, and he used to have much livestock. He surpassed all Akhaians with the spear. Therefore, if I speak well, you must not say that my family is bad and without strength, and dishonour my speech" (XIV.113, 121-7)

Evidently, Diomedes has reason to believe that a man's eloquence and intelligence will not be honoured, unless he is also a man of wealth. Since it is not his own wealth or spearmanship that Diomedes highlights, but his father's, his speech indicates the importance of birth as well. So does another episode involving Diomedes. When he chooses a man to assist him in an important task, he is urged "not to leave the better man behind, out of respect ... and take along a worse one because you let yourself be ruled by respect when you look at his family" (X.237-9). Such a warning would not, of course, have been necessary unless one could normally expect ancestry to be given more consideration than suitability for the job. 32 As for positions of power, princes (basileis) - and priests, too - are honoured as such. 33 The Iliad raises the question of who is the better man : the best warrior or the most powerful prince. Akhilleus, the warrior, thinks himself equal to Agamemnon, the ruler, but Nestor argues that the ruling prince does not have "an equal share of honour". Akhilleus may be stronger and, as the son of a goddess, of better birth, but Agamemnon "is better because he rules over more people" (1.278-

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81). Diomedes, too, believes that even if Agamemnon is no warrior, he is still "honoured above all others for the sceptre" (IX.38), the symbol of his formal power. Since Nestor and Diomedes are renowned for their good sense, the view that the highest honour should be offered to those who hold positions of power is strongly represented, even if not uncontested. Some have tried to explain away such relatively rare passages as inconsistent with the general image of heroic society, but I would argue that the importance of wealth, birth and power is rarely asserted because it is taken for granted, and the poet does not like to dwell upon it. We shall come back to this point. The honour which one enjoys in the community and in the world at large is determined by one's share of the various qualities. But an additional, and altogether different, set of criteria comes into play in determining the honour one may expect to get from, and need to give to, any particular individual. Here, kinship, friendship and relative age weigh heavily. 34 We hear that Kastor used to honour his bastard son and his legitimate sons equally (14.203). Priamos honours his brother's son Melanippos and his son-in-law Imbrios as much as his own children (XIII.176; XV .551); Agamemnon is prepared to honour his future son-in-law equally with Orestes, his only son (IX.142, 284). Aias and his brother honoured their parents while they lived at home - and their loyal retainer Lykophron they honoured as highly (XV.439). Clearly, parents honour their children, and vice-versa, simply because they are parents and children. Presumably, all kinsmen and in-laws honour one another for the sake of the ties that bind them; though apparently one would not normally put one's bastards, nephews, in-laws and retainers on a par with one's parents and legitimate children. Friends, too, honour one another. Akhilleus honours his companion (hetairos) Patroklos as much as his "own head" (XVIII.81-2); after Patroklos' death, he most honours Automedon and Alkimos among his companions (XXIV .574-5). Patroklos, in tum, honours Akhilleus most highly, and Automedon next (XVl.146). Again, it appears that one honours a friend qua friend. Certainly the reasons given for honouring a ·friend especially highly need have little to do with his status in the community : Patroklos honours Automedon because he finds him the

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most reliable charioteer in battle (XVl.147), Hektor honours Podes "most of all the people, because he was a dear dinner-companion of his" (XVII.576-7), and Odysseus honours Eurybates "above his other companions, because this man's way of thinking was close to his own" (19.247-8; cf. V.325-6). By doing someone a favour, one may raise one's personal standing with him, and thereby raise the honour one deserves in his eyes. Thus, when Deiphobos voluntarily risks his life to stand by Hektor in combat, Hektor says : "~ven before now I loved you best by far of all the legitimate sons [of Priamos], but now I know in my mind that I shall honour you even more" (XXIl.233-5). Hektor, for his part, has made himself well-loved by the gods by means of constant sacrifices; in return for these "gifts", the gods honour him, too (XXIV.66-70). Conversely, personal antagonism may lead one to deny honour to a man whose status is high in the community at large. Aineias, for one, is honoured no less than Hektor by the army (V.467), and "like a god" by the Trojan people (Xl.58), but Priamos "used not to honour him at all, although he was a good man" (XIII.461). The reasons for his hostility are not given, but perhaps it goes back a generation, to the time when Aineias' father without permission put to stud on his own mares the immortal horses owned by Priamos' father (V.268-9). Age may further influence one's honour. Agamemnon expects Akhilleus to defer to him because, apart from anything else, he is the older man (IX.160-1), and among the gods, Zeus, Hera and Poseidon demand deference for their greater age (XV.164-6; IV.58-61; 13.141-4). Of course none of these criteria is peculiarly Homeric : our own social relations also involve deference, in the broad sense defined above, to kin and friends and elders. The difference is merely that conceptually, if not always in practice, · we tend to make a clear distinction between someone's private standing with us, on the one hand, and his public position ('social status'), on the other, while in the epics private and public statuses both form part of his 'honour'. Not only wealth, prowess and other excellences, but also the. nature of a man's relationships with others determine his status. The attribution of honour and display of deference are governed by certain norms. Although he may have some latitude, an individual is not free to grant and withhold deference on a whim. Hence a man can speak

76 of "the honour with which it is proper that I should be honoured" (XXIII.649), or of the "portion" of honour (moira, aisa) that is a man's lot in life (1.278, IX.608); hence one can calculate in advance how much honour one is likely to get, and one can legitimately complain about not being sufficiently honoured. 35 A man who behaves according to the norms of deference - and behavioural norms at large - is described as motivated by a sense of respect or shame (aidos). He who disregards them is disrespectful or shameless. 36 And those who have a right to receive honour are respect-wonhy (aidoios), such as a "respect-worthy" prince, for instance, or a "respect-worthy" housekeeper (IV.402; 1.139). In personal relations, besides a sense of respect, feelings of love or friendship (philotes) move one to honour one's kinsmen and friends. Conversely, it could be said that "ties of friendship are ties of reciprocal honour" (Riedinger 1976: 248). 37 The ways in which one expresses one's 'love' for one's children, wife, companions or slaves are inevitably subject to norms as well, but they leave more room for the expression of private sentiments in conferring unconventional or unusually high honours. Akhilleus' exceptionally strong love for Patroklos leads him to offer his friend unique and extravagant honours after his death. 38 Respect and love may spring from a sense of propriety or from more spontaneous feelings of admiration; in either case they make people defer to others in voluntary recognition of the latter's merits. We have already seen that even a man's wealth, according to Odysseus, may inspire "respect and love" in others. This suggests that honour is attributed by consensus. But there is a third emotion which inspires deference. This is fear. In order that the Phaiakians may "honour him like a god" (5.36), Athena ensures that Odysseus becomes "dear (philos) to all the Phaiakians, andfearsome (deinos) and worthy of respect" (8.21-2). The son of Kastor, having enriched himself through plundering abroad, becomes "fearsome and respect-worthy among the Kretans" (14.234). Fear plays a part even in the friendliest of relationships. The seagoddess Thetis is "fearsome and respect-worthy" to Hephaistos (XVIII.394). Helena tells Priamos : "Dear father-in-law, you are respect-worthy to me, and fearsome" (IIl.172). Eumaios, who is on very friendly terms with his master Telemakhos, nevertheless says that he "respects and fears" him (17.188). And although there could be no greater friendship than that of Akhilleus and Patroklos, Patroklos still

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regards Akhilleus as a "fearsome man", whom he does not dare to keep waiting any longer than necessary (Xl.649-55; cf. XXIV.435). The fear that inspires deference is obviously the fear of what the other might do if he or she felt treated without due respect. Responses to disrespect range from angry looks to armed assault; how fearsome a response one could expect from a man would largely depend on his willingness and power to harm those who offend him. Deference, then, is to some extent inspired by fear of a man's personal power, as well as by a sense of what is proper, and by a spontaneous appreciation of his merits. The epic vocabulary of status may be somewhat alien to us, but if we look at the concrete meaning of tim~, arete, aidos, and so on, we find that quite a few, though not all, of the criteria of status, expressions of deference, and motivations involved are rather like our own. There is little to justify Finley's claim that "it is in the nature of honour" to be more "exclusive, or at least hierarchic" than social status is in our society (1977: 118). Nor does honour consist merely of possessing and receiving scarce material resources, as Adkins maintains : wealth is a crucial criterion of status, but not the only one, and symbolic forms of deference are more common than material tokens of respect. There are, however, three aspects in which Homeric honour differs significantly from status in contemporary society, and which may contribute to the violence of the epic world. These are the relative prominence of physical prowess as a status-criterion, of fear as a motive for displaying deference, and of deference received as a constituent part of status. J!l

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3.

PRINCES AND BAD MEN : IDEALS AND EXPLOITATION

Brave and handsome heroes are such a common feature of all kinds of stories that we are not surprised to find that the heroes of the Iliad and Odyssey unite in themselves almost all the personal qualities that matter. Akhilleus is the most handsome of all the Akhaians, the fastest runner, and unbeatable in the chariot-race, as well as the greatest warrior. 40 Agamemnon is reckoned among the four best fighters in the Akhaian army (VII.179-80) and regarded as its very best javelin-thrower (XXIII.890-1). Physically, he "stands out among many and surpasses the heroes", like a bull in a herd of cows. "His eyes and head like Zeus', his waist like Ares', his chest like Poseidon's" (11.478-83). People wonder : "Who is that big and strong Akhaian man ? There may be others who are taller by as much as a head, but my eyes never saw someone so handsome and so dignified; for he looks like a prince" (111.167-70).

Odysseus, in addition to looking particularly handsome and dignified, is a man of great cunning and intelligence, a speaker of unrivalled eloquence, a top ten warrior, and one of the best runners and wrestlers in the Akhaian army. In his own community, he is by far the best archer; a quality which runs in the family, for the only man to come near Odysseus' level is his son. 41 The list of heroes with outstanding talents could be extended. We take such excellence for granted in our heroes, but a closer look at the epics shows that here it is more than a convention of story-telling. For a start, Homer's heroes are all princes (basileis). They are rulers or sons of rulers, never brave common soldiers, handsome young peasants, or clever sons of millers. But the poet goes even further. It is not just that he ignores the bravery, beauty and other qualities of everyone but princes. He denies that anyone but princes possesses these qualities. Princes in general are said to have a physical beauty that sets them apart from others. "You look like a prince" is a common expression. Even a prince dressed as a pauper can be recognised by "his fine large thighs, his broad shoulders, his chest, and sturdy arms" (18.66-74) : "in physique he looks like a prince" (20.194-6). 42 Beauty is so

79 characteristic of princes that Menelaos can tell two youths, whom he does not know and has never seen before: "The family of your parents has not disappeared from you. No, you are offspring of men who are sceptre-bearing princes ... , because bad men could not beget such sons" (4.62-4). Thus, princely beauty is supposed to be hereditary, and among the rest of the population - described as 'bad men' - beauty is supposedly not found at all. 43 It is therefore surely no coincidence that Thersites, described as the 'worst' of the Akhaians (Il.248-9), is also "the ugliest man who came to Troy : he was bow-legged and lame in one foot; his shoulders hunched, growing towards one another over his chest, and on them sat a pointed head with sparse woolly hair stuck on it" (11.216-9). 44

Another remarkable characteristic of princes is that they are all excellent warriors. The battle-narrative of the Iliad, by focusing on the actions of a small number of princes, creates the impression that these are better fighters than the others. It also more than once says explicitly that one prince or another is the best fighter among his countrymen, and it frequently attributes amazing feats of courage and prowess to such men. 45 Indeed, one passage categorically states that only princes 'count' in war. That statement occurs in an episode known as The Test, during which, to test their morale, the Akhaian army is falsely led to believe that the war is .being called off. Morale turns out to be lower than expected. The moment Agamemnon ends his speech, all those not privy to the scheme jump up and run off to their ships. To prevent a catastrophe, Odysseus springs into action. He borrows Agamemnon's sceptre, and runs in among the crowd. "Any prince and eminent man he met, he would restrain with gentle words after approaching him : 'Daimonie, it is not proper to intimidate you, as if you were a bad man. But you must sit down and make other men sit.'"

He would explain that there was a secret purpose to the false order, and that Agamemnon was likely to resent what had happened (11.188-97). "Any man of the people he saw and found shouting, he would strike with the sceptre and threaten in speech: 'Daimonie, sit still and listen to the word of others who are better men than you. You are no warrior, you have no strength, you are of no

80 account at all in war or in counsel. We cannot all be princes here, we Akhaians ! '" (11.198-203).

Eventually, he manages to restore order. A clear distinction is made once again. There are princes, who are spoken to politely and invited to give orders; and there is the rest of the people, who are treated with violence - as 'bad men' are, according to Odysseus - and told to obey the princes - their 'betters'. 46 Odysseus claims that none of the people, as opposed to the princes, are warriors with any significance in combat. Now, it is not the case that the people literally do not participate in battle. The battle-narrative may centre on the exploits of a few men, but their deeds are set against a background of continual mass-combat. One may note that according to Thersites it is the people, himself included, who are responsible for the capture of booty (11.229-38). 47 Therefore, when Odysseus says that these men are 'no warriors', he must mean that, although they fight, they are weak and ineffective as compared to the princes, who are strong, brave, and efficient killers. The princes are supposed to have all the martial qualities, the others none. The remark that the people are 'of no account in counsel' either, similarly tends to suggest that the people lack the intelligence and eloquence to contribute usefully to the princes' wise decision-making. The best evidence for this sharp contrast between handsome, brave and wise princes and the ugly, cowardly and dumb rest of the population is found in The Test, and there are only a few signs of it elsewhere in Horner. Some have argued that, if such a sharp distinction between princes and 'the people' or 'bad men' was meant to exist in the epic world, it ought to have made more frequent appearances in the poems. They therefore deny that the distinction is made by the poet. 48 It seems to me that the evidence discussed above cannot be explained away; yet it is indeed remarkable how rarely the distinction occurs. Its rarity, however, is not difficult to explain. The poets do not seek to create a complete picture of the heroic world. They tell stories about the ruling elite of this world, and non-princes only enter the poets' field of vision insofar as they affect the princes' lives. Thus, slaves appear because they are owned by princes, and craftsmen because they are employed by princes. For the same reason, the majority of the people normally appear only as an anonymous mass listening to princes in

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assembly and obeying their commands in battle. Thus, if the people lead a shadowy existence in the epics and are not often explicitly distinguished from· the princes, this is because in the heroic world the social ·distance between prince and 'common' man is such that personal contact between them is infrequent, or regarded as insignificant, or both, and deemed an unsuitable topic for a story. •t A community governed by an elite of wise, brave and handsome men sounds utopian. The idea becomes positively fantastic when one realises that this elite is supposed to be largely hereditary. That the princes form a hereditary aristocracy used to be assumed without argument. Finley went so far as to say that they form a social class "caste-like in its rigidity" (1977: 60). That view had earlier been challenged by Calhoun (1934), and has more recently been rejected by several scholars, on the grounds that there is much less evidence for birth as a criterion of status than one might have expected from a society ruled by an aristocracy of birth. 50 The objection is valid, but not decisive. Firstly, we have already seen that there is some evidence that good birth in general is a determinant of status. Secondly, and more importantly, it is clear that the status of prince is hereditary : the title belongs to the family rather than the individual· and is acquired at birth by a prince's children. It is also clear that the family sceptre and a prince's formal position of power in the community will normally be inherited by one of his sons. 51 This is not necessarily to say that one born a prince will always retain this status no matter what, or that one not born a prince can never gain entry into the elite. It does follow, however, that the status and powers of a prince are inherited as a rule. That· conclusion is confirmed by Menelaos' claim that princely beauty, too, is hereditary (4.62-4). We fmd in the epics, then, a hereditary ruling elite which allegedly has a monopoly on physical prowess, intelligence and beauty. We may add that the princes are evidently rich as well. Some of them are very wealthy, and there is certainly no hint that others might be less well-off. On the other hand, the princes may not have a monopoly on wealth: it is conceivable that not all the rich men who are mentioned are supposed to be princes. In any case, Homeric princes not only enjoy high birth, wealth and all formal power in the community, but they also monopolise all the personal excellences that are most highly rated, thus fully

82 justifying their status as "the best men" and that of the people as "the bad men". Birth, wealth and power may well go together, but it seems implausible that personal excellence, too, should be restricted to princes. It has been argued that only wealthy men could be efficient warriors, because only they had the means to get themselves arms, armour and chariots, and to train themselves in their use. In that sense, it is suggested, one might say that no poor man is a warrior, has strength or 'counts'. 52 One might argue along similar lines that only the wealthy had the leisure to learn the skills of public speaking and decisionmaking, and that sons of trained speakers would have had a better chance than anyone else of acquiring these skills. One might further argue that the wealthy could afford to eat better, dress better and spend more time grooming themselves, thus growing taller and looking more appealing than the poor. SJ But it seems to me that the epics are simply unrealistic in their depiction of the princes. The epics portray the hereditary elite in such a way as to suggest that it deserves all the deference it gets. Their physical beauty is supposed to be such that their inferiors gaze at them in admiration, as in assembly they gaze at the beauty of Telemakhos (2.10-4; 17.62-4) and Odysseus (8.16-23). When one comes face to face with these princes, one cannot help but give them the deferential looks that they regard as their due. In debate and court-sessions, they display a wisdom and righteousness which proves them worthy of having the power to decide and judge, and of receiving their court-fees. In battle, their prowess protects the town, providing additional justification for their power to rule, and repaying the gifts, shares of booty and royal estates that they receive from their people. These connections are made explicitly by the poet. He remarks that Sarpedon, for one, "protected Lykia with his judgements and his strength" (XVl.542). As for judgements, he commends the "good leadership" of a prince "who upholds proper judgements while ruling over many men", and he stresses the many benefits ·that this brings to the whole community. 54 As for strength, in a famous speech Sarpedon rhetorically asks why he and his cousin Glaukos are honoured with food, drink, seats of honour and estates in Lykia (Xll.310-4). He continues:

83 "Because of this we must now stand among the foremost of the Lykians and face hot battle, so that some Lykian ... may say : 'They are by no means without reputation, our princes who rule over Lykia, eat fat sheep, and drink choice sweet wine. No, they have great prowess too, since they fight among the foremost of the Lykians•• (XII.315-21; cf.VIII.161-3).

In the same vein, Agamemnon asks of those who share the wine of the elders that they should fight bravely in return (IV.257-64, 340-8). 55 Moreover, when Odysseus, in the Test, tells men of the people that they should listen to the princes, because the people do not count in war (11.200-2), he implies that princes deserve to give orders because they do count in war. In Homer's eyes, a prince should not rely merely on his noble birth to gain him the obedience, gifts and general deference of others : he must earn all these by the wisdom of his words and the daring of his deeds. It would seem that the poet has tailored his image of the heroic world to fit the ideology that hereditary power and honour should be justified by merit. He has created an ideal world in which the princes do enjoy an amazing monopoly of excellence. The fact that birth is so rarely mentioned as a criterion of status is due to the same ideology : the poet prefers to stress the personal qualities that justify a man's status, rather than the less meritorious assets that in practice largely determine it. !Ci The portrayal of the princes as truly excellent men, deserving of their honour, dominates the poems. Just occasionally, however, the poet allows us a glimpse of a different picture, in which the people resent the princes and refuse to honour them, and in which the princes reson to force in order to back up their position. The few passages which give this negative view imply that it is not a matter of isolated individuals falling short of the norm, but a common state of affairs. The dominant positive image of the princes, therefore, is not only rather implausible in itself, and suspect because it happens to match precisely the requirements of ideology, but also contradicted occasionally by the poet himself. (I) PROPER BEATINGS

When, during the Test, the army is in confusion and Odysseus restores order, he does not merely tell the people why they ought to defer to the princes, but with the sceptre beats them into silence. He thus uses the symbol of· legitimate public power as a weapon to enforce deference

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where it is not given voluntarily. Some believe that Homer here betrays a lack of understanding of the sacred nature of a 'true' sceptre, which, it is said, in reality would never have been used in so crude a manner. To me, it seems rather that this double use of the sceptre matches the epic idea that deference is inspired by both respect and fear. 57 Thersites, the last man of the people to remain standing and shouting during the Test, is treated more harshly than the rest by Odysseus. "Scowling at him, he rebuked him with a harsh speech : 'Thersites, rambling speaker, you are a fluent orator, but stop, and do not by yourself strive against the princes. I say that there is no man worse than you, of all those who came to Troy with Atreides. Therefore you must not speak with your mouth full of princes... If I find you once more behaving in the same senseless way as now, then may Odysseus no longer have a head on his shoulders•.. if I do not grab you, strip off your clothes, cloak and tunic and that which covers your shame, and send you off wailing to the ships, away from the meeting-place, beaten with shameful blows."

And with the sceptre he hits him so hard that he bleeds (II.245-68). Everyone laughs at this, and applauds Odysseus for putting Thersites in his place. "'His manly heart certainly will not again make him criticise the princes with insulting words.' Thus spoke the multitude" (Il.2708). 58 This is the only time in the poems that men of the people fail to defer to the princes in assembly. Opposition goes no further than heckling and joking, and is dropped as soon as a single prince asserts himself with threats and violence. By mentioning that the beating of Thersites found general approval, the poet conveys the message that the masses themselves accept that the princes have every right to use force against them. Yet conflict there is, and it is not an isolated incident. For Thersites is said to be a habitual heckler, whose wont it is to "strive against the princes at random, not coherently, [saying] whatever he thought might raise a laugh among the Akhaians" (Il.214-6). In this instance he jibes at Agamemnon, but normally his favourite targets are Akhilleus and Odysseus. When he interrupts a particular speaker, he is seen as attacking "the princes" collectively. That he can usually get away with it and raise a laugh among the people indicates that these feel some hostility towards the princes as a group. It follows that princes' rights to

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deference are questioned, and that it may regularly be necessary to use force. The princes, for their part, regard bullying as the proper way to deal with the common people, as is implied by the remark that it would not be proper to intimidate princes "as if they were bad men" (ll.190). (II) UNJUST VIOLENCE

The princes are supposed to make the community prosper, and prove themselves worthy of their power to pass judgement in disputes, by upholding what is right (themis, dik~). Yet the poet casually reveals that Zeus at times "gets angry, harbouring resentment towards men who use force to impose crooked verdicts in the town-square and drive out justice" (XVl.386-8). What is more, in praising Odysseus for "never doing or saying anything excessive among the people", Penelope reveals that the opposite "is the rule [dik~] for a godlike prince : one man he hates, another man he loves" (4.689-92). Suddenly, injustice appears to be the rule rather than the exception. " (111) UNDESERVED GIFTS

The people are supposed to honour their princes with gifts, including contributions to the princes' dinners known as the wine of the elders. A prince presumably expects common people to bring sheep, goats and jars of wine to his house; or perhaps he pays visits in town, tacitly or openly soliciting gifts from his hosts. The expectation that these gifts will be repayed with the princes' best efforts in battle seems mostly fulfilled. But it is to be noted that the greatest share of the people's gifts does not always go to the best warriors. Occasionally a prince does indeed get a share of honour as a direct reward for an outstanding feat of bravery (Vll.320-2; X.217), but among the Akhaian elders at Troy the largest quantities of wine are normally apportioned not to Akhilleus and Aias, the best warriors, but to Agamemnon and ldomeneus. Agamemnon reminds ldomeneus that "even when the other long-haired Akhaians have drunk their share, your cup is always full, to drink as I do, when you feel like it" (IV.261-3). ldomeneus is a brave man, but he is getting on in years (Xlll.361) and slowing down in action (Xlll.51215). We might add that Nestor, who is too old to fight, also gets his share. Why should these men receive greater honour than the others ? Presumably, Agamemnon can claim deference as both host and supreme commander. The special honour of the other two may be due to the fact that Nestor is the eldest of the commanders, leads the largest contingent

'°

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after Agamemnon's own, and is famous for his wisdom, while Idomeneus is also a senior figure, leads the next largest contingent, and is a particular friend of Menelaos (ITI.232-3). So the gifts given to princes are not always in proportion to their performance in battle. Still, Agamemnon and Idomeneus are great fighters, while Nestor was a warrior once and has other merits now, so the discrepancy between honour and merit is not too serious. But the gap may grow, as is evident from a remarkable statement made by Priamos in his distress at the death of his son Hektor. "He shouted at his own sons, abusing Helenos, Paris, Agathon, Pammon, Antiphonos, Polites, Deiphobos, Hippothoos and Dios; shouting, the old man told the nine of them:... 'Worthless children, shameful creatures ! If only all of you had been killed together, instead of Hektor... I begat the best sons in Troy, and I tell you not one of them is left... But all these shameful ones are still here, these boasters and dancers, the best men of the dance-floor, robbers of sheep and goats among their own people" (XXIV.248-62).

Priamos' sons do not go round at dead of night stealing the citizens' livestock. Presumably, the people give them sheep and goats to slaughter and eat. The difference is that Priamos, in his grief, declares that his sons do not deserve these gifts, because they are "best" only at dancing - not in battle, as Hektor was, and as princes in general are supposed to be. That is what makes them robbers. 61 The passage thus confirms that excellence in battle is the main justification for taking gifts from the people, and more importantly, (a) it shows that men who do not excel in battle may nevertheless continue to receive gifts, and (b) it suggests that those who undeservedly receive gifts may be resented by the people. There is a slight hint that gifts may be extorted by violence. It is suggested that Telemakhos might have 'borrowed' a ship "by force", against the will of the owner (4.646). There is also the reaction of gods when they do not receive the gifts that they regard as their due. They punish the offenders by sending a plague to kill them (1.64-5) or a wild animal to destroy their farms (IX.533-42). Since in general the behaviour of gods vis-a-vis mortals is analogous to that of princes towards their subjects, perhaps the poet imagines that princes too might resort to the threat of force to claim their gifts from the people.

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(IV) FIGHTING OVER PLUNDER

The distribution of plunder is a lucrative privilege of princes. Rulers and commanders are granted the right to take a first cut for themselves, give prl1.es to other princes on account of their social status, and deal with the rest as they see fit, so long as everyone gets a 'fair' share. '2 The problem is that there is no agreement as to what is fair. Akbilleus several times voices the opinion that his share of booty should match his contribution to the war, and he complains that Agamemnon is a "prince who devours the people• (demoboros basileus, 1.231), one who keeps far too much for himself, given that he does not do much fighting (1.163-8; IX.318-9, 328-33). Tbersites make the same point in a more general way.

•your huts are full of bl'Oll7.e and there are many select women in your hut, which you are the very first to receive from us Akhaians, when we sack a town. Do you want still more gold, b~ught from Troy by some Trojan as a ransom for his son, whom I or another Akhaian tied up and brought in 7 Or a young woman, so that you may make love to her 7• (11.226-32) •1.et us go home••• and leave him here in Troy to batten on his prius, so that he will see whether or not we are of some help to him.• (11.236-8) Odysseus' followers, too, feel bard done by. They mutter: "He brings many fine treasures from the booty of Troy, whereas we, who have completed the same journey, return home clasping together our empty bands" (10.40-2). 6.1 There is thus a widespread feeling that, while it is proper for princes to get a share of plunder, they tend to take for themselves more than they deserve, and give too little to their deserving subordina~. The negative view ·of princes, then, portrays them as parasites and exploiters. They take booty without fighting for it; they take gifts from their people without doing anything useful in return; they impose their judgements (and pocket the court-fees) without doing justice. People feel robbed, and in assembly vent their hostility in heckling their rulers. Moreover, in a hypothetical historical counterpart of the heroic world, the prowess of princes could never fully justify the honours they receive, not even if they were excellent warriors doing their utmost in defence of the community. In epic fantasy, a prince may be credited with a decisive influence over the course of battle. He turns the tide, saves the city and

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proves that his honour is well-deserved. In reality, under conditions of battle as Homer depicts them, with masses of men involved in active combat, no man, whatever his personal prowess or his advantages in equipment and training, could play such a decisive role. The combined efforts of the men of the community would decide the outcome of battle, and no individual display of valour could by itself merit the kind of deference that princes receive from the people. " If the princes nevertheless continue to rule and to receive gifts, fees, and large amounts of booty, this is partly because the people accept that princes have a traditional right to these things, and partly because the people are qfraid of the force that the princes may bring to ·bear on them. Note that the people seem easily intimidated. Those who are struck by Odysseus quickly sit down and hold their tongues (11.207-11). Thersites "sat down and was frightened; in his pain, he looked about helplessly, and wiped away a tear" (11.268-9). Thersites' crying instead of striking back suggests that he is a weak and cowardly man, and presumably 'bad men' are all supposed to be like that. But the use of force is effective not only because men of the people are physically and mentally weaker than princes. Kalkhas, the seer, hints at another reason to be afraid, when he asks Akhilleus to protect him from Agamemnon's anger : "For when a prince is angry with a worse man, he is the more powerful one. For even if he does swallow his anger for that day, afterwards he keeps resentment in his breast until he has his satisfaction" (1.80-3).

Kalkhas needs protection not so much because he is personally weak, as because princes apparently dispose of powers beyond their personal bodily strength, which sooner or later will enable them to do harm to 'worse' men. What powers these are we shall discover in the course of this chapter. In sum, so far as the status of the princes vis-tl-vis the people is concerned, prowess in battle, while featured prominently, is of ideological rather than practical importance. The princes will· receive deference from the people whether or not they are in fact excellent warriors; prowess is merely supposed to legitimate the honour given to princes as men of good birth and as holders of power. By contrast, the power to inspire fear in the common people, while barely mentioned, is in a number of passages revealed as a significant prop of the princes'

89 position. " To the extent that Homer depicts heroic society as ruled by a class of men spontaneously honoured by their subjects on account of their personal excellence, the poet reflects an ideology, not a reality, of stratification. How realistic the other aspects of bis image of social stratification are, we shall see. Two conclusions relevant to the problem of status rivalry and the violence of Homeric society may be drawn from all this. One, in relations between people and princes, fear is indeed a significant motive for deference, as our discussion of the concepts of status suggested it might be. Two, in relations between princes and people, personal qualities, in particular battle-prowess, are not actually as important a source of honour as first appears. How important are they in status rivalry among princes ?

4. COMPETITION I : PERSONAL EXCELLENCE Almost any situation offers opportunities for rivalry, and almost anything said or done can be taken as a challenge, if one is looking to compete. In Homeric society, some of the most routine activities may be given a competitive twist. Women doing the laundry spread their washing in the water and "tread it quickly in the throughs, making a competition of it" (6.91-2). A man claims : "No mortal can compete with me in manual skills : in properly laying a fire and splitting logs, in carving and roasting meat and pouring wine" (15.321-3). A vagrant, accused of being too lazy to work, retorts that be would harvest and plough more efficiently than his accuser, "if between the two of us we were to have a competition in work" (18.366-75)." It seems that "always to be the best and superior to others" - the instruction given by fathers to sons setting out to war - is a goal accepted by everyone and pursued everywhere. Rivalry for superior status among princes takes many shapes. We may look first at the kind of competition in which the contenders seek to display their personal qualities and achievements. Although this could in principle be amicable form of rivalry' it leads at times to hostility and

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violence. A minor but characteristic instance of such competition is a quarrel that breaks out during funeral games among spectators at the chariot-race. ldomeneus' Eyesight The pre-race favourite has crashed on the far side of the course, and when the horses come back into view of the spectators, Idomeneus, whose seat offers the best view, is the first to notice that the field has a new leader. He stands up to tell the others, adding : "Do I alone have a clear view of the horses, or do you too '1... Come, stand up and see for yourselves, for I cannot make them out well. I think it is... Diomedes" (XXIIl.450-72). He sounds cautious, but "Aias, son of Oileus, reproached him in a shaming manner: 'ldomeneus, why are you rashly speaking too soon ? The horses are still far away... Look at you, you are not the youngest of the Argives and you do not have the shaipest pair of eyes peering out of your head, but in words you are always rash. It is not for you to speak rashly, for there are other, better men present, too. The same horses as before are in the lead'" (473-81). Idomeneus angrily answers : "Aias, you are the best at quarreling, you evil-minded man, and in every other respect you are inferior to the Argives... • Whereas he had originally expressed himself cautiously, he is now absolutely sure about which horses lead and wants to bet on it, "so that you will know, when you pay up• (XXID.482-7). Aias is about to answer "with harsh words", when Akhilleus intervenes and tells them to stop their quarrel, "because it is not proper. You two would be indignant at another man too, if he were to behave in such a way.• He suggests that they watch the finish of the race quietly (XXID.488-98).

This little battle for status shows not only how a casual comment may be taken as a challenge, but also how it may produce an aggressive response, which may in tum lead to an escalation of hostilities. Keen eyesight is hardly the most important quality where status is concerned, but still it is one of the things that make some men better than others, and Aias speaks for those who believe that they are superior to Idomeneus in this respect. Even if Idomeneus really is in a better position to see what is happening and does not make a boast of his sharp eyes, Aias refuses to let pass his unintended challenge to others' superiority. Now, he might have answered this perceived challenge simply by giving his own view of the situation in the race, and waiting for events to show whose eyesight is the better, but he does not. Instead, he adopts a hostile tone, calling Idomeneus "rash" and too old to

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see properly. As soon as Aias turns the incident into a competition, and a hostile competition at that, Idomeneus follows suit. He strongly asserts his own superiority and denies Aias any quality at all. He also raises the stakes of the contest by placing a bet. Akhilleus' criticism shows that it is regarded as wrong to compete in too aggressive a manner, and it has been thought that the poet consciously portrays Aias as a "mean" man." An aggressive response to a challenge, however, is not uncommon. One may compare Zeus' attitude towards the building of a huge wall opposite the wall of Troy which Poseidon had once built. Poseidon himself exclaims : "This one will surely be famous as far as the light of day reaches, and they will forget the one that I and Apollo built" (VII.446-53). At this, Zeus is "greatly vexed" and says : "O popoi ! ... What are you saying ! Some other god might fear this scheme, one who is much weaker than you in [force of] hand and will. You, of course, will be famous as far as the light of day reaches.•

He proposes to destroy the wall as soon as the Akhaians leave Troy (Vll.454-63; XD.3-35). We might think that Poseidon has been defeated. fair and square, and ought to restore his reputation by building an even greater wall if he can. But Zeus finds the violent solution so obvious that he is impatient with Poseidon's plaint about his loss of status. Further instances of aggressive behaviour are found during the games, the most hotly contested of competitions. Besides chariot-racing, events at games may include boxing, wrestling, running, jumping, throwing the discus and javelin, archery and armed combat, as well as singing and dancing. When games are held at formal occasions, such as funerals and perhaps religious festiv!llS, prizes are awarded to the competitors; events organised ad hoc for entertainment need not involve prize-giving."' In either case, games provoke various degrees of aggression. Level One : bending the rules The chariot-race is the most competitive event at Patroklos' funeral games. "The heart of each competitor was pounding, eager as they were to win• (XXIII.370-1). When Diomedes sees his initial lead slip away from him, he sheds tears of anger (385). To be defeated or to crash one's chariot is regarded as a "disgrace• (elenkheie; 342, 408-10).

92 Antilokhos is so desperate to overtake Menelaos that he spurs on his horses by threatening to slaughter them if they fail (410-13), and then resorts to what in modem racing would be called kamikaze-tactics, cutting across Menelaos in such a way that the latter is forced to slow down in order to avoid a crash (415-41). Then, when at the finish he finds that his prize is about to be given to another competitor, he is ready to fight over it (553-5).

Valuable prizes are at stake, but victory as such seems to matter as much as the material reward : when deprived of his prize by Antilokhos, Menelaos never mentions the material loss, but resents the "shame" inflicted upon his "excellence" (XXIIl.571)." A will to win and a fear of shame combine to make the adrenalin flow and to produce behaviour more aggressive than that of contemporary sportsmen. It is not a great deal more aggressive, though, for Antilokhos accepts that he has gone too far, and apologizes at once when Menelaos protests at his dangerous driving. 10 It is agreed that Antilokhos' "youthful spirit" had for once got the better of him (589-90, 603), and he cedes his prize to Menelaos with an offer of compensation if required (591-5). Later on, he competes in the foot-race and comes in last, but this time he smiles, applauds the winner, Odysseus, and goes on to praise the running speed of Akhilleus (785-93). Level 7Wo : imimidating the opposition Penelope requires of her suitors that they perform a feat of archery that Odysseus used to perform. When all have failed even to string the bow, a poor visiting stranger - actually Odysseus himself in disguise - wants to give it a try. When he asks, the suitors become "exceedingly angry; they were afraid that he might string the bow". They try to frighten off the outside challenger, threatening violence. They tell him to be quiet, not to "compete with younger men", and warn him of "the great peril" that he will find himself in if he strings the bow. "You will meet no friendliness in our country, but at once we shall send you in a black ship to prince Ekhetos, who is a danger to all mortals. From there nothing can save you" (21.285-310). Penelope and Telemakhos insist that the stranger should be given a chance. The suitors then tum on the servant who is about to hand the bow to him, threatening to have him torn to pieces by dogs (21.360-7). 11

The suitors' aggression is provoked by their fear of being "shamed in the talk of men and women". They feel that it would be a "disgrace" for them if "some worse Akhaian" were to conclude that the suitors are not

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only lesser men than Odysseus, whose bow they cannot string, but inferior even to a "beggar" who can (21.323-9). The fact that they will also have to forgo their 'prize', Penelope, matters less to them (21.24955). Their fear of defeat is strong enough to drain the blood from their faces when, despite all threats, the beggar succeeds (21.412-3). Level Three : killing the winner In one instance, games lead to actual violence. Tydeus, sent to Thebes as

ambassador of a hostile army, challenges the locals to a series of athletic competitions and wins them all. The Thebans resent this, and set an ambush to kill him on his way back (IV.385-98). Odysseus, alone among the Phaialdans, may fear a similar fate when he refuses to compete in any games with his host. He says that if anyone were to do so, he would "spoil [kolouei] everything for himself" (8.207-11).

It is no doubt again a sense of shame at defeat that leads to the attempted murder, which is· presumably meant to wipe out the shame. Significantly, it is in rivalry with a foreigner that this high level of violence occurs. n Level Four : killing the challenger If men at times respond to defeat by killing a rival, the gods go still further. They maim and kill in response to a mere challenge. The Muses "mutilated" Thamyris in anger at his boast that he could defeat them in a singing contest (11.594-600). Apollo killed Eurytos, angry because this man had challenged him to an archery contest (8.224-8). Apollo and Artemis act along the same lines. They were angry at Niobe "because she used to compare herself to Leto", their mother, "and say that Leto had borne only two children, but she herself had given birth to many". So they killed Niobe's-twelve children (XXIV.602-9).

The aggression of the gods in dealing with mortal rivals can hardly be due to a fear that they might be defeated : their excellence is so vastly superior to that of any mortal that they might have calmly demonstrated their supreme skills, or indeed left mortals to their extravagant boasts. It seems rather that the gods are angry because they find the very fact of being challenged offensive. When, in an episode cited earlier, Poseidon is worried that the fame of his wall might be eclipsed, he complains to Zeus:

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"Is there any mortal on earth who will still let the gods know their intentions and plans 7 Do you not see that this time the Akhaians have built a wall... and have not offered hecatombs to the gods 7" (VIl.446-50).

Poseidon does not so much resent the fact that a wall is built, as the fact that it is built without anyone telling him. He might not have minded, if only his permission had been sought first. Posei4on, then, is less concerned about his reputation as a builder of walls than about the fact that the challenge to his reputation is insufficiently deferential. 73 Despite their different motivations, almost all these instances of aggressive behaviour by gods and mortals have something in common : threats and violence are used to protect the reputation of those whose personal qualities are already regarded as superior, or whose force is the greater. Young Aias claims to be speaking for the 'many' Akhaians who believe that they can see better than middle-aged Idomeneus, who is not known for his sharp eyes. The young and wealthy suitors attempt to intimidate an old and poor man. The Thebans are a large crowd of men on home ground against a single outsider. The gods, of course, are better and more powerful than any of their mortal challengers. Antilok:hos' aggressive driving is the only example of an underdog snatching victory by aggressive means - and he soon regrets having gone too far. 74 Insofar as a sense of shame at defeat inspires aggression, it is thus predominantly in men who feel that their established superiority is threatened, rather than in men who are very closely matched in competition, or in men who are keen to make their mark. Those whose superiority is not seriously threatened may yet become angry at the lack of deference implicit in a challenge, and they may use force to do down their would-be rivals. At the games, outbursts of violence are to some extent avoided by skewing contests in favour of the famous and powerful. In the prize. giving at the funeral games for P.atroklos several reputations are protected. Eumelos, who owns the best horses (II. 763-7) and is the best charioteer (XXIIl.289), crashes in the chariot-race and trails in fifth and last. Akhilleus offers him second prize, "as is proper", because Eumelos is, after all, "the best". The spectators approve (XXlll.53640). Later Nestor is given an extra prize although he is too old to

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compete. He regards this as an honour he deserves (615-52). In the final event, the javelin, Agamemnon is offered first prize before anyone has thrown, on the grounds that "we know how far you surpass everyone, and by how much you are the best in power [dynamis] and throwing" (892-7). Agamemnon is being spared the risk of defeat. The reference to his power suggests that not only his reputation as a javelinthrower is thus protected, but also his prestige as ruler of the Akhaians. 75 Moreover, it appears that only princes ever compete in any of the games, though the boxer Epeios is a possible exception (XXIll.664ff.). A commoner would have no chance of gaining a reputation as an athlete and upsetting princes who are supposed to be his superiors in this field as in others. Rivalry in public speaking is hedged in with similar threats and precautions. That councils, assemblies and courts are regarded as arenas of competition is clear. The assembly is a place "where men win glory" (1.490). Nestor makes a speech and Agamemnon says: "Yet again you defeat the Akhaians in assembly, old man" (11.370). A Trojan believes that "no mortal could compete with Odysseus" in eloquence (Ill.223). "Few Akhaians defeated [Thoas] in assembly when the young men competed with words" (XV.283-4). In court sessions, the contest is institutionalised : whoever offers the best judgement is awarded the court-fees as a prize. This form of competition too is open to princes only, and even among princes it is not purely a matter of displaying wisdom and eloquence. How highly a prince's advice is rated depends to a considerable extent on external factors : his wealth, his power, the status of his family. For instance, Nestor urges the elders to accept a proposal of Agamemnon's on the grounds that it emanates from "by far the best of Akhaians"; he would have rejected it, had it been put forward by "some other Akhaian" (11.80-3). The same reasoning leads him to call Agamemnon and Akhilleus "superior to the Danaans in counsel" (1.258). Not even Akhilleus himself thinks that his contributions to debate are particularly good in themselves. 76 Speeches are often aggressively criticised, as Poulydamas experiences :

96 "Somehow you always attack me in assemblies when I come up with good ideas, because it is absolutely not proper for one of the people to speak in opposition to you - not in council, never in battle - but your power must ever become greater" \XII.211-14),

he says to Hektor. When he proceeds to interpret a bird-omen to mean that the Trojan army should advance no further, Hektor gives him an angry look, calls him crazy, rejects the validity of bird-omens in general, accuses him of cowardice, and concludes : "If you hold back from the fighting or with words persuade someone else to tum away from battle, you will be struck by my spear at once, and you will die" (Xll.230-50). In a subsequent assembly he again bluntly rejects Poulydamas' proposal : "Not one Trojan will be persuaded by you, for I will not let them" (XVIII.296). Kalkhas expects the same sort of response from Agamemnon; when he is about to give his advice to the assembly, he first asks to be protected against him. Agamemnon actually accepts the proposal, but not without a show of anger. "The spirit surged in his black heart; his eyes shone like fire. With a look spelling evil, he spoke to Kalkhas first: 'Prophet of misery! You never say anything that is good[? to kreguon] for me!" (1.103-6)

In the assembly of the gods, Zeus allows no debate at all. The moment he has announced his intentions, he launches into a series of threats. "Whoever I see making plans of his own... will be struck and return to Olympos in an undignified way. Or I may grab him and throw him into Tartaros... , as far below Hades as the sky is above the earth. Then you will know how much the strongest of all gods I am." (VIll.2-17) 77

As in the games and other competitions, violence is threatened by men of superior status and power. However, whereas in games such men may use force to protect their reputations, threats uttered in assembly are meant to silence those whose opinions are unwelcome, never to silence a speaker who might otherwise eclipse one's reputation as an orator and wise man. Apparently, a reputation for eloquence and intelligence is less keenly pursued than one for athletic excellence. As for those who do seek to make their name in this field, they will find it difficult to achieve much unless they are, not merely princes, but high-ranking

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princes. Even then they must be careful not to say anything to antagonise their superiors. " One might have expected to find that within a community men vie with one another for recognition as the best warrior more than anything else. Finley claims that in history and literature Homer's heroes are unique in the "single-mindedness" with which they concentrate on proving their warlike qualities (1977: 28), and he may be right. Akhilleus decides to go to Troy in order to gain a reputation as a warrior, in the certain knowledge that he will have to pay with his life. Hektor says : "I feel a most terrible shame before the men and women of Troy, if like a bad man I skulk away from the battle. Nor is that what my spirit leads me to do, because I have learned to be a good man and to fight always among the foremost Trojans, gaining a great reputation for my father and myself" (Vl.441-6).

Diomedes similarly says "it is not in my nature [gennaion] to fight in a skulking way or to cower" (V.253-4), and, when forced by Zeus' thunder-bolts to give way before Hektor, he cannot bear the thought of Hektor boasting that Diomedes was afraid of him : "that is what he may say, and then may the wide earth open up for me" (Vill.147-50). These men have internalised the imperative to excel in combat, and are driven in addition by a sense of shame at failure. " Fame for them is more important than life, and shame makes them want to sink into the ground and die. One might therefore have expected that the heroes, when fighting the enemy, would consciously compete in valour with rival warriors on their own side. Surprisingly, they do not. In battle, the heroes do not deliberately draw the attention of fellow-warriors to themselves. If a man makes some spectacular gesture, such as raising a victim's head on a spear (XIV.496-507), or putting a foot on a dead warrior's chest and boast and shout, the action is always aimed at the enemy and intended to terrify them. Presumably, it would also catch the eye of at least some men on one's own side, but nothing in the speeches or in the narrative suggests that this is part of its purpose. • Nor is there any hint of conflict over the common practice of despoiling the enemy dead. "Time after time ... the heroes paused from their fighting in order to strip a slain opponent of his armour. In terms of the battle itself such a procedure was worse than absurd, it might jeopardize the whole expedition", but, argues Finley, to the individual

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warrior it is more important to take a piece of armour as a trophy to prove his personal success in combat than to help win a battle without "publicity" for himself (1977: 119). Idomeneus does in fact cite as proof of his bravery that he has accumulated twenty or more spears as well as shields, helmets and corselets, "which I take from the slain". Meriones boasts back that he too has "many Trojan spoils" (XIIl.259-68). Nevertheless, it happens that one warrior drags away and despoils the corpse of a man just killed by another warrior (IV.463-6), and it is apparently not unusual during pursuit of the enemy for men to hang back in order to collect for themselves as many spoils as they can (Vl.66-71; XV .347). Some may even go out onto the battlefield at dead of night to strip the dead (X.341-3, 387). Given the potential value of spoils as symbols of valour, one might have thought that such practices would lead to clashes between killer and plunderer, or that they would at least be disapproved of. Yet they are simply accepted. The only sign of rivalry is the mutual boasting of prowess. "We said we were the best", recalls Agamemnon. Before reaching Troy, the Akhaians bragged over dinner that each of them could take on "a hundred or two hundred" Trojans (VIIl.229-34). At Troy, while drinking with "the Trojan princes", Aineias used to boast that he would face even Akhilleus in battle (XX.83-5). Such claims of superiority over the enemy might well involve indirect rivalry with one's companions. Idomeneus engages in direct rivalry when he boasts to Meriones of his bravery. Yet he immediately afterwards pays a lengthy tribute to Meriones' courage (XIIl.275-91), and the episode ends with the two men deciding that "we should not be talking in this way, like little boys". They rejoin battle together (292-329). 11 Not even boasting is a source of conflict. There is one source of trouble, as we have seen : the problem of how large a share of booty is to be awarded to outstanding warriors. That problem, however, ·does not stem from rivalry in warriorhood. Agamemnon does not contest that Akhilleus is a greater warrior than he, nor does he seek to undermine Akhilleus' reputation (kleos) as such. Rather, he insists that greatness in battle does not deserve as much deference (tim~) as Akhilleus demands. 12 Apparently, the desire to be the best in battle does not drive a man to assert his superiority over his fellow-townsmen in an aggressive way.

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He fights his hardest against the enemy, and that is all he needs to do in order to gain and defend his status as a warrior. It is odd to find fair and open contest, and no sign of conflict, where the ostensibly most important personal quality is concerned, while competition in games and debate is slanted in favour of men of superior status, and even a reputation for sharp eyesight may be aggressively protected. One might argue that conflict is absent here because the collective war effort against the enemy takes precedence over in-group rivalry. That is· conceivable, although it does go against the common idea that a Homeric hero slaughters enemies in battle more in order to give proof of his own prowess than to contribute to overall victory. Finley's view that the heroes are prepared to "jeopardize the whole expedition" for the sake of a trophy has already been cited. Also, it is often said that Hektor knowingly sacrifices the safety of his city to a selfish desire to show his mettle as a warrior in a duel with Akhilleus (Finley 1977: 116). I would suggest, however, that the near-absence of direct rivalry and the total absence of conflict in demonstrations of warriorhood ties in with a conclusion I drew earlier : that as a criterion of status, warriorhood is of ideological rather than real importance. Martial excellence is simply ascribed to princes and rulers in order to justify their high status. The poet depicts the heroes as doing their utmost to live up to this ideal, but the absence of references to rivalry between warriors from the same community suggests that he is drawing on an image of real-life princes who do not actually try particularly hard to prove themselves great fighters. The same contrast between ideal and practice emerges in the criteria applied in the selecti9n of a 'good' husband. When several suitors vie for the hand of the same woman, as happens to Penelope and several other heroines, courtship, although not normally competitive, becomes a contest. "The best man" is supposed to be chosen to marry the woman. 13 Penelope decides to marry the man who can perform a certain feat of archery; she thus selects the best man on the basis of strength - required to string the bow - and skill. The suitors of Pero, Nestor's sister, are set the task of rustling the cattle oflphiklos (11.28797), and suitors in other such tales are put to similar tests. In spite of what these stories suggest, however, it is clear that "the best man" is normally the one who offers the highest bride-price to the

a

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bride's family and the most valuable presents to the bride herself. Penelope's suitors, too, expect to win her in this way. Ktesippos has come to court her "relying on the wealth of his father" (20.289-90), and when it becomes obvious that the suitors are about to fail the test, it is simply assumed that Penelope will after all marry "the one who gives most" (21.162). Also, she and her suitors agree that a poor man, even if be did pass the archery-test, could not be allowed to marry her, "for that is not at all proper" (21.314-19, 322). By setting suitors a task such as rustling cattle, the contradiction could be resolved, for success would simultaneously be proof of prowess and bring in wealth. But presumably this is a folk-tale motif, rather than a common custom. A courting competition, therefore, is really a contest of wealth, though notionally it is a contest of personal excellence. 14 Earlier, we saw that personal excellence, as a constituent of the honour in which princes are held by their subjects, plays a much smaller part than appears at first sight. We may now add that it also plays a lesser role than expected in the competition for status among the princes. There is little evidence that princes, within the community, engage in rivalry in martial qualities, and not a great deal more to suggest that there is rivalry in debate. Such conflicts as erupt in assembly spring from clashes of interest, not from keen competition in eloquence. The princes really put only their athletic skills to the test. To the extent that there is competition, it is subject to considerable restraints. A man of talent, even if be is a prince, will find his efforts to gain recognition for his abilities hampered by the fact that he is given less credit for his performance than those who outrank him or those whose reputations are already established. Above all, he will find that his superiors are prepared to use violence against him when he challenges or opposes them. His talents will get him nowhere, unless he is powerfid enough to protect himself from such dangers.

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5.

COMPETITION

II : POWER AND WEALTH

"To be a prince is not a bad thing", Telemakhos muses. "At once one's house becomes wealthier and oneself more honoured" (1.392-3). Hereditary power and private wealth, the two most important sources of status, without which a man's other qualities count for little, are in Homeric society the object of violent competition. Power is usurped, property is seized. Princely power, although a source of high honour, is displayed modestly. There is no sign of crowns, thrones or ermine robes. Princes are formally distinguished from the people at large by the gold-studded wooden sceptres they carry and by the fact that they have their traditional seats on the benches in the town-square; commoners would carry plain wooden staffs, and stand, or sit on the ground. The monarch appears to have no regalia to set him apart from the rest of the princes, unless perhaps he has a sceptre more ornate than most. As noted before, on the surface this is a rather egalitarian society. ss The absence of pomp and circumstance does not make princely power less desirable. One successful usurper is mentioned in the epics : Aigisthos, who murders his cousin Agamemnon and takes his place as ruler of Mykenai. He rules for seven years, until he in tum is murdered by Agamemnon's son, Orestes. In lthaka, at about the same time, local princes begin to undermine the position of Odysseus and his family, but an attempted coup three years later is frustrated by Odysseus and his son. Meanwhile, Akhilleus worries about his father, Peleus, who "excelled among all men in fortune and wealth and ruled the Myrmidons" (XXIV .535-6). In the absence of his son, he may be "worn down" by his neighbours (XXIV .488-9) : "Tell me if you know anything about Peleus, whether he still has honour among the many Myrmidons, or is dishonoured by them ... because old age has taken hold of his hands and feet. If only I were there to defend him ... I would make my spirit and untouchable hands a terror to those who use violence against him and force him away from honour.• (11.494-503)

This passage is of particular interest, for while the stories of Agamemnon and Odysseus are traditional tales wb,ose plots need not be characteristic of the poet's image of heroic society, there is no legend of

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Peleus' power being threatened. Since the poet nevertheless makes Akhilleus worry about his father's fate, he apparently imagines that in the world of the heroes, if a man is weak - because he is too young or too old, and has no one to support him - others are likely to attempt to deprive him of his position. Assassination of the incumbent is one means of taking over a position of power : Agamemnon falls victim to an ambush of twenty men; Odysseus' heir narrowly escapes one. Intimidation is another, less direct, means. Peleus' enemies are expected to use force to make life hard for him, rather than kill him outright. Odysseus' rivals use similar tactics against his son Telemakhos for three years before making an attempt to murder him. Under the pretext of courting his widowed mother, they visit him every day and take de facto control of his household. They hope in this way to keep him weak and prevent him from asserting his right to rule; they change tactics only when in the end he stands up for himself after all. '' Conversely, a ruler may use force to extend his dominion, as Poseidon does. Poseidon's domain is, of course, the sea. Everything in and on it must defer to him. With one exception. The Phaiakians have ships which know their own way across the sea, complete every journey within a day, and never come to harm (7.321-8; 8.556-63). It is their custom to escort home in safety all who ask their help. Poseidon resents this limitation to his sphere of control (8.31-3, 564-71; 13.173-8), and one day, when the Phaiakians unwittingly offend him, he threatens in retaliation to throw a ring of mountains around their city to cut them off from the sea. When the Phaiakians realise what is about to happen, they make a vow no longer to arrange safe sea-journeys for anyone (13.14987), thus ceding at least part of their privilege to Poseidon. Non-violent means of attaining formal power, other than by inheritance, are rare indeed. There is a theoretical possibility of becoming a monarch on the strength of one's merits when the incumbent has no heirs. 11 There is also a theoretical possibility of becoming a prince by gradually working one's way into the circuit of "fair meals which a trial-attending man should join". The Odyssey suggests that it would be a sign of Odysseus' losing his power if in his absence his son were to be no longer invited by "everyone" to these meals which princes ought to attend (11.185-7). In other words, princes are supposed to invite one another to meals: being invited means that one's status as a

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prince is acknowledged; not being invited means that it is challenged. If, as Andromakhe predicts, after Hektor's death his friends were no longer to tolerate his son Astyanax at their communal meals, they would thus presumably undermine the boy's status as prince and as potential ruler of Troy (XXII.490-9). 88 A prince, then, can lose his hereditary powers if a majority of his peers refuse to treat him as one of their own, denying him a place at their feasts, and presumably withholding other kinds of due deference as well. Perhaps one might ultimately lose even one's hereditary title of basileu.s in this way. Conceivably, the process could work in reverse, too. One not born a prince might gradually gain acceptance among princes, become a regular dinner-guest and ultimately assume the role of

basileu.s. "

As a rule, though, princely and monarchical power would be inherited, and usurpation would be the only other way of attaining it. It is therefore perhaps only to be expected that coups should be attempted. A further factor enters the equation, however. We shall see presently that alongside the desire for the prestige of formal princely power, the wish to demonstrate informal, personal power in a conspicuous manner plays a large part in driving a man to usurp another man's privilege.

The acquisition of wealth, the next most important criterion of status, is not surprisingly a major source of conflict. Wealth is displayed in town houses. The scale of the house itself - the size of the courtyard, the number of buildings in it, perhaps the size and height of the dining-hall - and the number of female slaves employed in it indicate the level of affluence. Most stress is laid on the exhibition of keimelia, treasure, inside the house. Bronze tripods, cauldrons and armour line the walls. Chairs have silver and ivory ornamental inlays; on the tables are silver and golden drinking vessels, among which decorated silver mixing-bowls of Phoenician workmanship are particularly prestigious. Menelaos and Helena own unusual items such as silver bath tubs and a silver wool-basket on wheels; their house contains such a vast collection of treasures that "the gleam of bronze ... and gold and amber and silver and ivory" inspires "awe" in his visitors (4.71-5). Wealth is also displayed on the person. Rich men and women wear fine clothes, sometimes embroidered or dyed purple, fastened with

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ornate pins. Women wear gold and amber earrings and necklaces, and elaborate headdress. Men carry silver-handled swords or daggers; they appear in public with fine hunting or 'show'-dogs and richly caparisoned horses. Very wealthy men hoard surplus treasure in their storerooms.'° Affluence may be displayed by distribution of wealth. Suitors may try to outdo one another with offers of gifts to the bride and of livestock to her family. Weddings and funerals involve wining and dining large numbers of guests. Cattle, slaves and treasure are handed out as prizes at funeral games. Extending hospitality to visitors from out of town provides an opportunity to show off wealth. Nestor insists on putting up his guests for the night; if they slept in their ships, it would seem as if he were "a pauper and a man totally without bedding, one who does not have cloaks and many bed-covers in his house for himself and his guests to sleep softly in. But I do have cloaks and beautiful covers" (3.347-51). Often, visitors are given gifts on their departure. There may well be an element of competition in these customs. People might try to present bigger and better weddings and funerals, and offer more lavish hospitality, than their neighbours. But remarkably the poems make no mention of any rivalry in generosity other than the rivalry in courtship. !II Scholars have argued that princes expend much wealth in feasting their 'followers' and that they vie with one another in generosity so as to attract as many followers as possible. In the previous chapter I have tried to show that this is not so : Homeric feasting predominantly takes the form of princes exchanging dinner-invitations on an equal basis, or sharing eranoi to which each of the diners brings his own contribution. Such feasts do create bands of friends, but involve no generosity or competition. n I have also tried to disprove the notion that much of the wealth of a household goes to provide a livelihood for a crowd of retainers (therapontes) who live at the expense of their master, performing services but no productive work. Instead I argued that fulltime, live-in retainers are a rarity, and that most retainers serve a master only for the duration of a military expedition, in the course of which they would presumably largely live off plunder. The scale of generosity involved in keeping retainers would therefore be small. !13 In short, large amounts of wealth are given away only on the occasion of weddings, funerals, and visits from abroad - events which by their

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very nature are rare. Some wealth may be spent on retainers, but these are few. There is little scope for generosity, and a distinct lack of evidence for competition in it. The major form of rivalry in wealth, it appears, is not generous distribution, but competitive display and hoarding of treasure. A man's wealth seems no more secure than his hereditary powers. Akhilleus is "robbed" by Agamemnon of Briseis, a woman given to him as a prize. An imaginary Cretan, in a tale spun by Odysseus, is robbed of his booty by Orsilokhos, son of ldomeneus (13.258-66). Telemakhos' enemies try to get at him by literally consuming his wealth in daily feasts; when they later make up their minds to kill him, they also decide to divide his property among themselves (16.383-6, cf. 2.334-6). Sarpedon, fighting at Troy, appears concerned about the "many possessions, coveted by those who are in need", which he has left behind in Lylria (V .478-81). Andromakhe feels certain that Astyanax will be robbed of his inheritance after Hektor's death: "Others will take from him his farmlands" (XXll.489). In general, it is assumed that a weak or absent man's property is unlikely to be left in peace. "The son of an absent father, who has no other supporters, suffers much at home" (4.164-5). Sarpedon's comment that "those in need" have an eye on his property suggests a scarcity of resources as the cause of violent competition for wealth. However, it is to be noted that even on "rocky" lthaka there is unclaimed land which could be made suitable for cultivation. ,,. In any case, scarcity cannot account for the actions of the wealthy princes who are involved in most of these cases. A second and more plausible explanation is that these men are motivated by extreme acquisitiveness, that they are "profit-minded" (1.149) and the "greediest of all men" (1.122), as Akhilleus calls Agamemnon. Acquisitive the heroes certainly are. They have an "almost overpowering accumulative instinct"; for them wealth is "an unequivocal good; the more wealth, the greater the good" (Finley 1977: 121-2). Odysseus and Menelaos in particular make long voyages in order to acquire riches. Menelaos tells guests admiring the splendour of his house : "There may be someone to rival me in property, but then again there may not be. For I went through much, and wandered far and wide, and in the eighth year I

106 brought it here in my ships, having wandered in Cyprus, Phoenicia and Egypt. I visited the Ethiopians and Sidonians and Erembi and Libya... gathering great wealth• (4.80-90)

Odysseus, for all his eagerness to get home, is prepared to extend his stay abroad if he sees an opportunity for gain. He tells the Phaiakians : •Even if you were to ask me to stay here for a year - if you prepared an escort home and gave me splendid gifts, I should be willing to do even that, and it would be much more profitable [polu kerdion] to reach my fatherland with my hands better filled .• (11.356-9)

Having arrived home incognito, he spreads the false rumour that "Odysseus could have been here long ago, but it seemed more profitable [ken'lion] to him to collect wealth, making a long journey. Thus does Odysseus surpass mortal men in knowledge of much that is profitable [kenlea polla]. No-one else could rival him." (19.282-6)

Revealingly, when he unexpectedly finds himself put ashore in what he believes is a strange land, the first thing he does is count the valuables he has brought with him, to make sure that nothing has been stolen by the crew of the ship that had carried him (13.215-6). Clearly, all this is meant to characterise Odysseus, not as a cold-hearted and greedy man, but as one whose presence of mind and self-control enable him to keep his eye on material interests even at times of great emotional stress. ts Several non-violent ways of satisfying the acquisitive drive are available to the heroes. They could in theory strive to raise production on their estates and convert surplus livestock and agricultural produce into treasure, either through barter or by 'commissioning' local craftsmen to manufacture them. They could also gain wealth by trading and collecting gifts abroad, and they might make the most of the gifts customarily presented to them by their people. " It seems likely, however, that the gains to be made by these me~s would be ·relatively small. The pressure of competition inight lead men to resort to forcible seizure as a shortcut, albeit a dangerous one, to riches. A further, quite different motive comes into view when one considers the symbolic dimension of the appropriation of wealth and usurpation of power.

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It is a key characteristic of the Homeric notion of honour, that the heroes discern symbolic expressions of deference and disrespect in a much wider spectrum of behaviour than we are inclined to do. We tend to see deference mostly in actions such as giving up one's seat and raising one's hat; disrespect in our terms is a matter of refusing to make such gestures or to perform nominal services. While we can see that, on an abstract level, many other actions also could be described in terms of deference or disrespect, we do not normally think of them in this way. The heroes, by contrast, are strongly conscious of this symbolic dimension in all kinds of actions, including violent ones such as murder and theft. All such acts seem to them to imply a lack of respect for the victim. Seizure of wealth or formal power is frequently described as an action that involves a lack of deference and hence "dishonours" the victim. fJ7 The Myrmidons would •dishonour• Peleus in depriving him of his power (11.496). Penelope's suitors •dishonour the house of a good man• (21.332-3; cf. 16.431), and •dishonour that man's wife and his fine son• (14.163-4; cf. 18.144; 22.370; 24.459). Akhilleus feels treated •as if I were some dishonoured immigrant• (IX.648; XVI.59); Agamemnon has •utterly dishonoured• him (XIII.113; cf. 1.171, 244, and passim).

To the heroes' minds, taking a man's wealth and privileges by force is a way of showing disrespect. As Akhilleus sees it, Agamemnon's actions are inspired by hybris, 'arrogance' (1.203; cf.214), as well as greed, and it is always hybris, never greed, of which Telemakhos' enemies are accused. !Ill An 'arrogant' act, in Homeric terms, is the infliction of humiliation for the sake of it. "Hybris is doing and saying things at which the victim incurs shame, not in order that one may achieve anything other than what is done, but simply to get pleasure from it. . . . Cause of the pleasure for the hybrizomes is that by harming people they think that they themselves are the more superior.• (Aristotle, Rhetorika 1378b, transl. N.R.E. Fisher) !19

So when the confiscation of Briseis and the depredations on Odysseus' estate are described as acts of hybris, evidently it is felt that their primary purpose is to humiliate Akhilleus and Telemakhos, respectively. The victims believe that their attackers treat · them with disrespect

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because they 'feel superior' and want to demonstrate their superiority, rather than enrich themselves or gain power. Those who dishonour others explain their own motives differently. Agamemnon ignores accusations of greed and hybrls, and explains that he is taking away Akhilleus' prize in retaliation for what he sees as Akhilleus' offensive behaviour. He intends to teach him and others a lesson. We shall see later that Orsilokhos has similar motives for taking booty from a fellow-Cretan. Again, it is not mere lust for power that leads Poseidon to extend his domain at the expense of the Phaiakians : he is punishing them. The lesson that retaliation is supposed to teach is spelled out by Agamemnon. He takes Briseis, "so that you may know clearly how much better than you I am, and so that another man too may shrink from thinking himself on a level with me and opposing me as an equal" (1.1817). 100 Both parties thus agree that the act is primarily meant to humiliate the victim and demonstrate the superiority of the aggressor. The views merely differ on the reasons for the display. The aggressor feels that it has been provoked and is justified in the circumstances, while the victim sees it as a form of self-gratification for which there is no legitimate excuse. So, on the one hand, the importance of wealth and formal power as sources of honour, the pressure of competition, and the fact that there are only a few, limited, non-violent means of acquisition in the heroic world, add up to a coherent explanation for the prevalence of violent conflict over wealth and power. On the other hand, some of these conflicts at least are attributed to a desire to show one's superiority, whether in response to provocation or in sheer hybris. One way or another, a man's rights to his property, and a prince's right to rule, appear to be under constant threat. The implication is that one cannot long enjoy wealth or formal power, the two most important sources of honour, unless one has enough personal, informal power to defend them. Why this should be so, and whether it is realistic, remains to be seen. 101

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6.

COMPETITION ill : THE STRUGGLE FOR RESPECT

The touchiness of Homeric men is their most striking trait of character. Touchiness consists in responding immediately and aggressively to a perceived lack of deference. We have seen that a lack of deference is one of the issues at stake in many of the conflicts discussed in previous sections. Challenges to contests of skill and even attempts at depriving someone of property and privileges may be regarded as signs of disrespect, and provoke anger on that count. We shall see that there are also numerous instances of disrespect which involve neither loss of material sources of honour nor a challenge to a reputation for personal excellence, but which nevertheless provoke great anger. A notable instance is Akbilleus' reception of Priamos, who bas come to the Akbaian camp to ransom the body of Hektor. He offers Priamos a seat, but bis guest declines and asks for Hektor' s body to be released first. Akbilleus, "scowling at him", answers: "'Do not provoke me, old man; I already intend to release Hektor to you ... Therefore do not stir my spirit further in grief; or else, old man, even under my own roof, I may not spare you ... '. Thus he spoke. The old man was afraid and obeyed his word• (XXIV.559-69).

One might have thought that the offer of a chair was no more than a polite gesture, and that Priamos' attitude is quite understandable, since he is after all trying to recover the corpse of bis own son. Certainly by our standards the situation would not justify more than some slight irritation on the part of Akbilleus. But evidently Akbilleus finds it so offensive to be refused that he threatens to kill the offender. 102 Modem readers of the epics tend to regard such touchiness as a flaw. The heroes are seen as "overblown egos asserting themselves through various forms of violence" (Whitman 1958: 183). Akbilleus is subject to "fits of narcissistic rage" (MacCary 1982: 92), and at one stage lapses into "a near-psychotic state of paranoid rage and anxiety" (Devereux 1978: 11). 103 The fact is, however, that in many societies, and indeed by some in our own society, it is considered vital for a man to be quick to anger. Benvolio, in Romeo and Juliet, merely takes a proper attitude to extremes:

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Thou wilt quarrel with a man for cracking nuts, having no other reason, but because thou hast huel eyes. What eye, but such an eye, would spy out such a quarrel?" (Act Ill, Scene I)

George, a soccer hooligan, is a little less imaginative in spotting insults but equally convinced of the need to respond with violence : "Most matches you get this. You get someone screwing you [i.e. staring] or just standing there all cocky like, so someone's got to go and take him down a peg or two.• (Marsh et.al. 1978: 104)

I shall argue that the heroes' touchiness springs from the nature of the Homeric concept of honour, and that their peculiar sensitivity to a lack of deference leads to a struggle for respect which is the third and greatest cause of violence in Homeric society - greater than either rivalry in personal excellence or competition for wealth and power. (I) THE BENVOLIO-SYNDROME

One may recall that deference is an integral part of the Homeric concept of honour. A man may possess all the qualities (aretal) that ought to earn him fame (kleos) and honour (tim~), but he does not actually have honour unless people treat him with deference (ti~). Now, it follows logically from this perception that, when denied due deference, one is deprived of honour. A man who is 'dishonoured' is one who has been trea1ed with disrespect. We may feel that an act of disrespect reflects badly on the perpetrator without affecting the standing of the victim, but the Homeric view is that, whatever it does for the perpetrator, an act of disrespect lowers the social status of the victim. 104 It is therefore not surprising that among the heroes a lack of deference should produce a more vehement response than it does in our society. To us, being treated with a lack of respect is in most circumstances merely a nuisance and inconvenience; to the heroes, it inherently means an acute loss of prestige as well. 105 A man's standing in the community is diminished even when the disrespect involved is purely symbolic and he suffers no loss of reputation, property or power; he is likely to be angry. When the disrespect involved does cause him some such loss, his standing is doubly diminished; he is likely to be doubly angry. In addition, Homeric ethics prescribe retaliation. The Homeric norm is that, faced with a lack of deference, one must enforce it.

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This norm is expressed by Akhilleus during his quarrel with Agamemnon. Agamemnon's lack of respect for him angers him so much that he has half a mind to kill the man, and begins to draw his sword. It requires divine intervention to persuade him to restrict himself to verbal abuse instead. He calls Agamemnon, among other things, a "creature cloaked in disrespect" (1.149, 158) and a "dog-face" (1.159, 225), 106 and vows not to serve under him again. When Agamemnon protests, • Akhilleus interrup~ him with his answer : 'I would be called a coward [deilos] and a nobody [ouridanos] if in everything, whatever you say, I gave in to you.'" (1.292-4)

He evidently believes that public opinion demands a show of anger from him. In fact, at least one Akhaian thinks that Akhilleus bas not gone far enough. Thersites is of the opinion that "Akhilleus bas not the least anger in his heart; no, he is a man who takes things easy [methemon]". "Otherwise," he says to Agamemnon, "you would now have committed your last outrage" (11.241-2); a clear hint that, to his mind, Akhilleus ought to have killed Agamemnon. The troops at large show solidarity with Akhilleus and give vent to their own anger at Agamemnon's lack of respect for his men, by shirking in battle (XID.108-13; cf. 83-98, 114-19). Agamemnon laments: "O popoi ! The other Akhaians too, then, like Akhilleus, nurse anger against me in their hearts and do not want to fight" (XIV.49-51; cf.131-2). Akhilleus thinks that the men are not asserting their anger strongly enough : "you are a ruler of nobodies", he tells Agamemnon (1.230-2). Thersites is more direct. He exhorts the ttoops to sail home and desert Agamemnon altogether. Anything less means that they are "bad disgraces; Akhaian women, no longer Akhaians" (11.235). 107 The attitude of Akhilleus and Thersites finds parallels in the attitude of the gods. One may recall Zeus' "vexed" reply to Poseidon's complaint about the Akhaians' lack of respect in failing to sacrifice to him before building a fortification wall to rival his own : he impatiently reminds Poseidon that be has the power to retaliate with force and should use it (VIl.446-63). Zeus advocates the same response when Poseidon takes offence at the fact that the Phaiakians have taken Odysseus home in comfort although Poseidon had wanted him to suffer much at sea.

112 Poseidon : "I will no longer be honoured among the immortal gods, when mortals -

these Phaiakians... - do not honour me at all.• (13.128-30) Zeus : • O popot ! . . . What are you saying I The gods certainly will not dishonour

you; it would be hard to make the eldest and the best a target for contempt. And if any human being is carried away by his strength and power, and does not honour you, you can later take revenge at any time. Do as you please.• (13.140-S) Poseidon : "I would immediately have done just what you say, but I always heed and avoid your anger.• (13.147-8)

Zeus' scathing reaction makes it plain that a powerful god must retaliate forcefully when treated with disrespect - not sit and complain. Poseidon promptly tries to correct the appearance of weakness by explaining that it was only out of deference to Zeus that he did not strike back at once. Hera, too, feels that she must vent her anger on those who have offended her. She and Athena "began to hate Troy and Priamos and his people because of the mistake of Alexandros, who antagonised the goddesses" by judging Aphrodite the winner in a beauty-contest among them (XXIV.27-9). Hera is hell-bent on the destruction of Troy; in fact, Zeus reproaches her with being too aggressive. She remains adamant : "Surely even a mortal will achieve his purposes for a man - although he is mortal and does not have our wisdom. So how could I, who claim to be the best of the goddesses ... - how could I not be obliged [ouk ophelon] to make trouble for the Trojans when I bear them a grudge '1" (XVID.362-7)

The principle is thus the same for gods and men : one must not allow oneself to be treated with disrespect; to retaliate forcefully and even violently is a sign of power and the mark of a 'real man' and a 'somebody'. Often, disrespect is detected where none is intended. The Phaiakians, for instance, are not even aware of offending Poseidon; nevertheless, both Zeus and Poseidon react as if they are doing it on purpose. Agamemnon's attitude is similar. Circumstances force him to relinquish his prize of booty, and he demands a new one "at once", but _Akhilleus points out that he will have to wait Ul)til Troy is saeked, since there is no longer any booty left to distribute. Without good reason 1111, Agamemnon suspects ulterior motives: "Do not hide your intentions like that, Akhilleus".

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"Do you want to hold on to your prb;e yourself, while I sit here just like that, without one 1• (1.131-4). He concludes: "That man wants to be above all others, he wants to have power over all, to rule all, to give orders to all. But I know someone who will not obey these.• (287-9)

While Akhilleus sees himself as defending his rights, Agamemnon sees him as trying to assert his power by treating his leader disrespectfully. Artemis causes the destruction of Oineus' orchard because he has failed to sacrifice to her. "Either he forgot or he ignored her; it was a great blindness in his spirit" (IX.537). The goddess retaliates without knowing whether the lack of deference was an oversight or a deliberate insult. 109 It would be misleading to conclude, as Adkins does, that intentions do not matter. "The essence of an affront is that another should dare to affront one" (Pitt-Rivers 1977: 6). Hence, when one of the suitors truthfully claims not to have been involved in any of the others' outrages, Odysseus kills him anyway since the man must have wanted to marry Penelope and wished Odysseus dead (22.310-29; 21.144-7). In general, the suitors keep trying to deny responsibility for their actions. They tell Telemakhos that "the suitors are not responsible [aitioi], but your own mother is" (2.87-8). They try to persuade Odysseus that Antinoos alone "bears responsibility for everything" (22.48-9). The bard employed by the suitors pleads for mercy on the grounds that he was forced to sing for them and did not perform willingly (22.351-3). When Agamemnon tries to reconcile Akhilleus, he begins by saying: "I am not responsible, but Zeus and Fate and Erinys who inhabits the darkness, who cast a savage blindness in my mind" (XIX.86-8). By shifting responsibility onto someone else, and onto the gods when there is no-one else to blame, these men are trying to deny that they intended to behave as offensively as they have undeniably done, and clearly they hope for greater leniency on account of this. no Distinctions between intentional and unintentional disrespect thus can and should be made, but the offended party often fails to do so. "You know well what a fearsome man he is", says Patroklos about Akhilleus, "he is quick to blame an innocent man [anaition aitiolJito]" (XI.653-4). The reason for this must be that Akhilleus, and everyone else who is offended, assumes that an act of disrespect is deliberate, until proven

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otherwise. Mere protestations of innocence may not be regarded as sufficient proof. "To maintain that one did not intend what one did is to require a certain indulgence on the part of the listener - an indulgence which may not be granted if he has been seriously affronted; for actions speak plainer than words where honour is concerned." (Pitt-Rivers 1977: 6)

The inclination to see deliberate insults everywhere is fostered by the fact that a man has enemies who wish him ill and actively seek to harm him. In contemporary Western society, only states are supposed to have enemies, and then only in time of war. In private relationships, one is not supposed to try to do serious harm to those one dislikes or happens to be in conflict with, and one is certainly not allowed to use violence against them. "Few of us nowadays ... expect to be involved for long in a relationship deserving the name of enmity, and a man who spoke of 'my enemies' could fairly be suspected of paranoia" (Dover 1974: 181). In other cultures, however, relations of enmity between individuals as well as communities are openly recognised. Among the Tausug, in the Philippines, for example, "the relationship between enemies is ... a fundamental legal category so that persons who are bantah [enemy] to each other are entitled to have this fact recognized" (Kiefer 1972: 63). Odysseus' idea of happiness includes misery for his enemies (dusmenees). "There is nothing better, nothing superior to this: when a man and woman keep house in harmony of mind. Much distress for their enemies, joy for their wellwishers; and they themselves hear people speaking of them a great deal." (6.182-5)

This is the only passage to suggest that a person or a family will normally have enemies within the community. Even so, it is presumably the norm. The feeling that there are people who are out to harm one, is bound to make one doubt others' motives and the sincerity of their apologies. There are certain limitations to the norm that disrespect must be punished with force. When offended by a friend, men are less inclined to anger. Agamemnon does not mind harsh words from Odysseus (XIV.82-102), because he knows that Odysseus is fundamentally welldisposed to him (IV.359-63; cf. XIV.103-6). A quarrel between

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Menelaos and Antilokhos is easily patched up. "Another man would not quickly have persuaded me", says Menelaos, but he wishes to show special consideration in the case of Antilokhos, in recognition of all that this young men and bis family have done for him (XXIll.606-8). By contrast, the fact that Agamemnon dislikes Akhilleus from the start (1.176) may help explain his fury at him. We shall later meet a further limitation : the norm that one should restrain one's anger when offended by an acknowledged social superior. Despite these restrictions, heroic touchiness, a Homeric version of what one might call the Benvolio-syndrome in reference to the Shakespearean character cited earlier, is a major source of conflict. Since deference is an integral part of honour, men must protect their honour by keeping a constant watch for signs of disrespect from their peers, except close friends, and from their inferiors. If they spot a lack of deference somewhere, they assume that it is deliberate, resent the consequent loss of status, and feel obliged to retaliate with force. Under these conditions, all the minor mistakes, oversights and unavoidable clashes of interest that are inherent in any form of social life, are liable to provoke outbursts of anger and violence. (D) THE ATIRACTION OF HYBRIS

Since men who fail to respond with force to signs of disrespect fall short of the Homeric norm, and lose face, an aggressive man can lower the status of others, and indirectly raise his own, by withholding deference from those unlikely to retaliate. Deliberate and unprovoked withholding of deference - including its most basic forms, such as respect for property rights and physical integrity - is known as, and motivated by, hybris. The very fact that there is a word for such acts and their motivation, suggests that they are not uncommon. Apart from the alleged hybris of Agamemnon in confiscating Briseis, and the clear hybris of the suitors in their behaviour towards Odysseus' family, slaves and property, most instances of 'arrogance' involve verbal and physical abuse of people in a vulnerable position - paupers and hired labourers. HumiliOlion of the weak A beggar, on his way to town, is overtaken by a goat-herd, who without provocation lets out a stream of abuse at him, and, while overtaking, tries to kick him off the path (17.215-34). On reaching town, a friend warns the

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beggar not to linger in the street, "or else someone may notice you outside and throw something at you or beat you" (17.278-9). While begging in the dining-hall of Odysseus, the beggar is bullied and ridiculed by Penelope's suitors. Footstools are thrown at him in anger (17.405-10, 458-63; 18.387-98). A second beggar turns up and the two of them are made to fight a boxing-match to "entertain" the diners (18.37), who "die laughing" when the second man is knocked out (18.100). The beggar's baldness and laziness are mocked (18.349-64). Finally, a cow's hoof is thrown at his head, for a laugh (20.287-302). One of the suitors tries to provoke Telemakhos, the nominal host, by telling him that the beggar and a second stranger staying at the house are worthless guests. He proposes to sell them as slaves. "Why not do as I say 7 That would be much more profitable. Let us throw these strangers in a ship with many oars and send them to the Sikeloi, where they will fetch you a good sum." (20.381-3) This appears to be something of a standard threat. It is incongruously echoed by the goat-herd. He threatens to put a fellow-slave on a ship and send him "far from Ithaka, so that he will bring me much wealth" (17.24950). As a slave, he would hardly be in a position to do this, and presumably he is merely aping the sort of threat the suitors make. Hired labourers are exposed to similar abuse. Poseidon and Apollo, in spite of being gods, once worked for Laomedon as thetes (XXI.441-9). Poseidon recalls how, when it was time to pay, "he forcibly kept our entire wages ... and sent us away... He threatened to bind our feet and hands and to send us off to be sold in distant islands. Indeed, he declared that he was going to lop off our ears" (XXl.451-5). 111 Akhilleus' repeated remark that he has been ill-treated "as if I were some dishonoured immigrant" (IX.648; XVI.59) suggests that people in a vulnerable position commonly have to put up with humiliation.

The purpose of the violence and intimidation is of course partly to scare off the beggars and labourers so as to avoid giving them their alms and wages. The threats to sell these people also mention the wealth that might be gained by doing so. But such material considerations are not uppermost. Most of the treatment suffered by the beggar is described as hybris (17.565, 581; 18.381) and in any case serves no purpose other than to entertain the suitors. The goat-herd's behaviour, too, is described as hybris and as a display of aglaiai, "splendid" or "showy" demeanour (17.244-6). The main reason for the deliberate humiliation of the weak is evidently the desire to demonstrate one's superiority to them. 112

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Hybrls is always condemned. Ill-treatment of beggars is supposed to provoke the wrath of Zeus himself, and even the suitors at times feel that they have gone too far. Nor does anyone approve of the suitors' collective acts of hybrls against the family of Odysseus. Penelope tells them that "those who dishonour... the house of an excellent man can never have a good reputation among the people" (21.331-3), and they themselves realize that "the people are no longer at all well-disposed to us" (16.375). Neighbouring communities will be outraged when they hear what is going on, and the gods may punish such "evil deeds" (2.657). 113 Yet despite the censure, hybrls appears to be a regular feature of Homeric life. In part this may be because it is not always easy to draw the line : one man's legitimate retaliation is another man's hybris. A more important reason, however, is the existence of the norm that one must respond with force to a lack of deference. If a man fails to respond in this way, be is regarded as a nobody and a woman. Therefore, although the perpetrators of hybrls are condemned, their helpless victims are, in a way, condemned too. We might commiserate with the 'innocent' who suffer, but in other societies victims may be more strongly despised for their weakness than assailants are for their aggression. A forcefully worded expression of this attitude has been recorded among the Sarakatsani of modem Epirus. •The family of Costas Pistiolis is very poor... One day I saw a youth pelting the little son of Costas with pieces of dung in his father's presence. Costas, however, could do nothing since the youth's father was an influential member of the cooperating group which only tolerated with difficulty the presence of the Pistiolis' family among its number. Another witness of the little scene swore and told me that you could copulate with .this man's daughter and he would stand by and hold your

coat.• 114

In Homer, no-one gives voice to quite so much contempt for victims. All the same, the feeling is that a man must stand up for himself even if this means almost certain death. Telemakhos is facing overwhelming odds in the attack upon his household, but even so those who hear of bis predicament, instead of sympathising, let him know that be must do something about it.

•no you willingly let yourself be subjected 1• (3.214;

16.95)

118 "Any man of good sense who came along would be indignant at seeing these many shameful deeds.• (1.228-9) "Even if I were alone and overwhelmed by sheer numbers, I would prefer to be killed in my own house, and die, rather than always witness these ugly deeds.• (16.105-7; cf. 20.31!5-19) 115

Victims of hybrls might be pitied, as Telemakhos is pitied by the Ithakans when he denounces the suitors before the assembled people, declaring that he would fight them "if only I had the strength", and throwing down his sceptre in tears of rage (2.40-81). Pity, however, is not the same as respect, and given the norms of Homeric society, Telemakhos' humiliation cannot help but diminish his honour in the community. Hybrls, then, is common despite being censured, because it offers men of power a means of depriving weaker men of status. For those who are confident that they have the strength and power to deal with their victims' attempts at retaliation, or even to deter them from retaliation altogether, it is tempting to treat less powerful men with disrespect. Their victims are thereby forced into a situation where they must either submit and lose face, or fight and lose their lives. The aggressors may lose their reputation for moral excellence, but they will have lowered the status of their victims and thereby raised their own. Hence, Homeric men are liable to get "carried away by their strength and power" (13.143) and to subject others to violence and threats in order to humiliate them. (m) THE BULLYING TENDENCY

Ideally, respect ought to be won by attaining personal excellence, wealth and formal power, but a strong man can of course force people to treat him with respect. The heroes often do appear to coerce deference. One kind of deference that may be won by means of intimidation is the service of a retainer. In performing personal services at the table and in battle, a retainer does "the things that worse men do for the good" (15.324). In other words, his services are a form of deference and symbolically express his inferiority to his master..They fulfil practical function as well, of course, but the master could equally well do most of the actual work himself or have it done by slaves. When a man gets retainers to do it instead, he does so to show the rest of the community that free men accept his superiority.

a

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Ambitious men are therefore likely to try to secure the services of as many retainers as possible - preferably of men who are of high status themselves. However, no one is likely to be willing to admit inferiority by serving another. The effect of these forces pulling in opposite directions appears to be that only exiles in need of protection become permanent retainers, and few men serve on a regular basis. Retainership is, however, the basis of army hierarchy, and at time of war many temporary master-retainer relations need to be forged. m Although a certain balance seems to have been struck, this state of affairs is liable to give rise to conflict, especially in the course of mobilising an army. One of Odysseus' lesser-known false tales is based on this premise. "I heard of Ithaka when I was still in Crete, far away across the sea - and now I have come here myself with all these goods, having left behind as much as this again with my children. I am on the run, for I killed Idomeneus' own son, Orsilokhos .. ., since he tried to rob me of all my Trojan booty ... , because I did not do his father a favour and act as his retainer [therapeuon] in the land of the Trojans; instead, I commanded other companions. I hit him with a bronze spear, when he returned from the fields, waiting for him with a friend in ambush by the roadside. The sky was very dark that night and nobody saw us. There were no witnesses when I took his life, but when I had killed him with that sharp weapon, I immediately sought out a ship, threw myself at the feet of some proud Phoenicians and offered them as much of the booty as they liked. I told them to take me aboard and get me to Pylos or Elis... But the force of the gale drove them off course, to this place." (13.256-76)

The Cretan in this story is rich, and powerful enough to lead a band of men in war. Idomeneus wants this man to serve him at Troy, rather than be a commander in his own right, but the Cretan refuses to accept a subordinate status in the army. 117 Orsilokhos' answer to the other's refusal to defer to him, is retaliation. He somehow contrives to take his share of booty from him. The Cretan in tum takes offence at the way he is treated, and murders Orsilokhos. There are no other incidents in the epics involving would-be masters and unwilling retainers, but given the importance to Homeric men of receiving deference, this kind of clash is inevitable. An element of compulsion is therefore bound to exist in many masterretainer relations. While exiles might serve a master in return for a livelihood and protection, others might serve, not out of respect for his

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superior qualities, nor for the sake of a 'friendship' created by his generosity, but because they fear that refusal might invite the kind of retaliation suffered by the Cretan. At the same time, of course, the episode illustrates that there is a limit to the deference that can be gained by means of intimidation. Even the most powerful man cannot enforce deference when his opponent is willing to go as far as the Cretan does in taking risks and making material sacrifices. Outside master-retainer relations, intimidation plays a large part when men are trying to impose their will on others. The role of coercion in relations between princes and people, and the aggressive attitude of Zeus, Agamemnon and Hektor in assembly has already been noted. Zeus threatens violence to the other gods without any provocation at all (Vill.2-17); Agamemnon and Hektor respond to proposals that displease them, but are not, it seems, either meant or taken to be disrespectful (1.103-6; XII.230-50). Heads of households may adopt a bullying attitude towards the other members. Threats are used on slaves, even by masters who are made out to be much loved. When Telemakhos comes home, his slaves greet him with great affection, weeping tears of joy and showering him with kisses (16.12-26; 17.31-5). All the same, the slave-women are terrified of Telemakhos; witness their reaction when one of them scolds a beggar, and is told: "'I shall at once go and tell Telemakhos what you said, bitch, so that he may hack you to pieces on the spot.' With these words he spread panic among the women; they scattered over the house, and all felt their knees go weak with fear, for they thought he spoke the truth.• (18.338-42)

Later, Telemakhos uses threats on the utterly loyal slave Eumaios, who is not carrying out an order because the suitors are intimidating him. "Telemakhos on his side shouted threateningly : 'Old friend, ... take care that I do not start throwing stones at you and chase you to the farm, although I am rather young; in strength I am the better man'.• (21.369-71)

These are not empty threats. Slaves who seriously offend their masters may be mutilated, put to the sword or hanged (22.440-5, 457-77; cf. 19.488-90).

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A notoriously tyrannical head of household is Zeus, who continually resorts to intimidation in order to impose his will on his wife, children and younger brother. At any sign of opposition to his plans, he threatens to beat the offenders, push them off their seats and throw them out of the house, or blast them with his thunderbolt. 111 This may be no more than the normal response to a lack of deference, but he goes beyond it when he taunts other gods with their weakness and says that it does not in the least concern him if he antagonises them (VIll.477-83; cf.XV.104-9). When he is affronted by one god, he takes out his anger on all of them. When Hera and Sleep once managed to obstruct one of his plans, "he became angry, hurling the gods around the house" (XIV.256-7). Ares is told that if he disobeys Zeus' order to stay away from battle, he will be beaten and also •plant a great evil for all the others. For at once Zeus will ... come to us on Olympos, and beat us one after the other, those who are guilty and those who are not.• (XV.128-37; cf. 1.577-81)

Zeus' aggressive behaviour is successful insofar as the gods are afraid of him and treat him with great respect. All rise when he enters; they do not dare to remain seated (1.533-5). Generally, they obey his commands. On the other hand, they do feel provoked and at times attempt to resist. One story relates how Hera, Poseidon and Athena at one stage formed a coalition against Zeus and managed to put him in chains (1.396-406). The dangers of enforcing deference are evident again. Mortal heads of household are far less and less often violent to members of their family. Most aggressive is Priamos, in his grief. He shouts orders at his sons, who are "afraid of the threats of their father" (XXIV .265). One may also note that the men of a household tend to adopt a domineering attitude towards the women. Telemakhos twice stops his mother from intervening in the proceedings at a feast in the dining-hall. •oo to your room and attend to your own work, weaving and spinning... [This matter] shall be the concern of all the men and above all it shall be my concern, for over this I have power in the house.• (1.356-9; 21.350-3) 119

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Hektor uses similar words to his wife, when she puts a suggestion to him as to the conduct of the war : "All these things are my concern, woman ... Go to your room and attend your own work" (Vl.441, 490). No threats are used, and both women obey at once, but the passages nevertheless indicate areas of potential conflict between the sexes in which the man may use force to impose his will when the woman resists, as Hera does. So, just as a man may use violence to deny respect to others, he may use violence to coerce respect for himself. The perception that deference is a constituent part of honour implies not only that one needs to receive deference in order to enjoy a certain status, but also that receiving deference in itself affords status. Therefore, it matters little whether respect is won by force or commanded by custom and merit. Enforced respect may not be 'sincere', but it nonetheless adds to a man's honour. (IV) QUESTIONS OF SUPERIORITY

Conflict may spring from uncertainty as to who should defer to whom. The Iliad contains a debate on the propriety of Akhilleus' response to dishonour at the hands of Agamemnon. As we have seen, Akhilleus himself claims that only a nobody would not be angry in his position. Thersites and many Akhaians agree. There is, however, a considerable body of opinion ranged against them. Nestor pleads with Akhilleus not to quarrel with Agamemnon, who, as ruler of the Akhaians, is his superior. 120 Agamemnon says bluntly: "He must give in... and he must submit to me, in that I am more princely, and in that I can claim to be his senior by birth" (IX.158-61). Diomedes suggests that Akhilleus is unduly proud (agenor, IX.699). Diomedes' own behaviour towards Agamemnon is accordingly humble. When one of his friends becomes angry at Agamemnon, who in a rather offensive manner exhorts him to join battle, Diomedes tells the man to be quiet (IV.368-418). Although he knows that he has been publicly insulted (IX.34-6), he quietly does as he is told, "respecting the rebuke of the respect-worthy prince" (IV.401-2). There is thus a view that Akhilleus ought to behave like Diomedes and feel more respect for Agamemnon's status than anger at Agamemnon's insult. Perhaps it is this consideration that causes him to hesitate for a moment and wonder if he should "end his anger and control his spirit" (1.192).

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Nevertheless, Akhilleus and those who support him believe that his anger is justified because they reject the notion that Agamemnon is Akhilleus' superior. Since Akhilleus is the "best of the Akhaians" in combat (1.244), he puts himself on a level with Agamemnon (1.185-7), and explains that he is angry because "an equal" has dishonoured him (XVl.52-4). Thersites goes further and berates Agamemnon for dishonouring "a man far better than him" (11.239), a notion consistent with his view that Akhilleus should have been even angrier than he already was (11.241-2). Agamemnon and Nestor argue against this that Akhilleus' excellence in war does not make him the equal of the ruling prince, and gives him no right to be angry. "You are very strong - so what ? That was a gift from some god." (1.178) •Although you are stronger and are the son of a goddess, he is the better man." (1.280-1). "Even if the eternal gods made him a warrior, did they therefore give him the right to utter insults?" (1.290-1)

In the same way, when Zeus threatens to use violence against Poseidon if he does not do as he is told, Poseidon is much offended, because Zeus "is of equal honour" (homotimos, XV.186; isomoros, XV.209), and thus has no right to order him about. Poseidon gives in when he is persuaded that Zeus is his superior insofar as he is the elder brother (XV .166, 182, 204). The implication, hinted at earlier, is that all are agreed that one should not be angry when offended by one's superiors. On the whole, this norm would seem to allow a ruler to dishonour lower-ranking princes, and allow princes to treat the common people with disrespect, without thereby necessarily provoking retaliation. As such it limits violence. The two episodes, h~wever, show that there may be some question as to who is to be considered superior to whom. Seniority is a clear criterion, but from the dispute between the great warrior and the great ruler no definite answer emerges. Different opinions are voiced by different characters, and the story does not point a moral in this respect. 121 The existence of different scales of value to determine status is obviously a major source of friction. Given the competitiveness of Homeric men, the situation would be exacerbated by an almost inevitable inclination to overrate oneself and underrate others. Whatever a man

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might think of himself and whatever level of deference he might demand, others would tend to regard it as too much. The struggle for respect thus in various ways - the boundaries between the four categories discussed above are not sharp - gives rise to conflict. Conflict in the epics is more commonly about questions of deference than about either rivalry in personal excellence or the possession of wealth and formal power. Moreover, as has been pointed out, these other types of conflict are perceived as involving questions of deference, too. The suitors' behaviour is often described in terms of the material damage they inflict on Odysseus' estate, but it is almost equally often described in terms of hybris and dishonour. As for the confiscation of Briseis, it is implied a few times that it was motivated by greed, and there are hints that it was unjust, but throughout the Iliad the matter is far more often discussed in terms of the dishonour inflicted upon Akhilleus. To the poet, at any rate, this dimension of the quarrel appeared crucial. It is significant that the struggle for respect is fought without regard for material advantage. Several conflicts involve purely symbolic forms of deference. Where material interests are at stake, the actions of the contenders show that these are not their main concern. Telemakhos is supposed to retaliate for what the suitors have done to him, even if it means that he will be killed and that his property will fall to his enemies. The killer of Orsilokhos retaliates for an attempt to confiscate his booty, but his motive is not to preserve his wealth, for he flees the country at once, leaves half his property behind and pays a high price for his passage abroad. When Poseidon feels offended by Zeus, he is prepared to fight his brother (XV.185-99), although he knows that he cannot win (VIIl.209-11). Apparently, respect ranks more highly than property: disrespect must be avenged, even at great material cost. We may conclude that the violence of Homeric ~ociety is due, not to a scarcity of resources, nor to competitiveness pure and simple, but to the fact that competitiveness is combined with the notion that deference is an integral pan of status. Separately, neither competition nor a demand for deference need to produce conflict. If the heroes had been highly competitive, but sought only fame (kleos), there would have been far less scope for conflict.

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One cannot acquire fame by compulsion : all one can do is strive to excel and hope that one will be highly regarded and well-spoken of by many people for a long time to come. If the heroes had sought deference - as indeed all men do - but not been competitive, there would also have been less scope for conflict. They might have treated one another with due respect, as defined by the norms, and not been too concerned with occasional lapses, nor too keen to get more respect than others willingly give. In combination, however, the two elements are bound to lead to violence. Unlike fame, deference can be enforced; lapses and deliberate denials of deference can be punished or avenged. Where deference is a crucial part of social status, and social status is the object of competition, coercion and resistance to coercion are bound to be commonplace. If our own society, which is quite competitive in matters of status, is much less violent in this respect than Homeric society, it may be because, to us, status is far less dependent on others' respect. We tend to perceive social status as an almost wholly abstract position. Deference is of course involved in our relationships with others, but it is conceptually cut off from our social status and hardly an object of competition. In Homeric society, the two are not distinguished, and the result is conflict.

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7. THE ETHICS OF ANGER

"Anger is to heroic what sex is to Victorian morality" (Mueller 1984: 33). In the epics, anger, not sex, is the dangerous, uncontrollable drive that rules men's lives. Anger, if anything, is what the epics are about. Since in contemporary middle-class culture anger is not a matter of much literary or philosophical interest, classicists are inclined to look for some more 'meaningful' subject beneath the surface of the narrative. "If the Iliad were merely the story of a man who lost his temper over a girl... it would never have attained the dimensions of greatness that mankind has granted it." (Arieti 1987: 1-2)

Some have found in the Iliad the story of a man alienated from his society and struggling to create a new system of values; others have seen in it a discourse on dealing with death. 121 The Odyssey is widely interpreted as a relatively simple tale of the triumph of good over evil. 123 But whatever else one may want to read into the Iliad, its subject as described in the proem is "the wrath of Akhilleus" and its destructive consequences (1.1-5). The Odyssey, which calls itself the story of "a man who wandered far and wide" (1.1), in fact is almost wholly devoted to a tale of revenge. Ancient audiences, I believe, would have understood the epics as stories of anger and revenge, not of alienation, death and justice - and they would have found the poems no less fascinating and meaningful for it. The heroes show great anger 124 at signs of disrespect. Most Homeric men would presumably feel anger spontaneously, but not all of them do. While Patroklos even as a child has such a temper that he kills another boy over a game, Telemakhos, as a young man, seems to feel no anger at the suitors who have invaded his home. He resigns himself to the idea that he is too weak to deal with them. Despondently, he eats and drinks in their company (1.114; 2.305), and does no more than day-dream about his father coming back and expelling the suitors (1.115-7, 163-5). Athena visits him with the express purpose of instilling some "spirit" (menos) in the young man (1.88-9). She reminds him that the suitors' behaviour ought to raise his indignation (1.228-9), and tells him that he must not pin his hopes on his father, but take action himself (1.267-70).

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She suggests that he should ultimately try to kill the suitors "whether by means of cunning or straightforwardly" (1.295-6), and she puts "spirit and courage in his heart" (1.320-1). As a result, Telemakhos begins to resist the suitors and refuses to give up even when his first attempts are unsuccessful. "Now that... my spirit has grown inside me, I shall try to set the demons of death on you" (2.314-6). From this moment on, he continues to show hostility to the suitors, despite the risk to his life. 12s Apparently, Telemakhos needs to learn to be angry, and to show it. Some men may never learn. Paris, for one, does not. When his brother Hektor finds him at home, while outside battle is raging, he assumes that Paris has retired from combat out of anger. Paris, however, explains that he is neither angry nor indignant : he is merely distressed (VI.326-36). As an adult, Paris still displays the 'childish' attitude of Telemakhos as a boy : his distress is not accompanied by anger, no doubt because he has "no sense" and is unconcerned with the "indignation" other people feel at his behaviour and the "many ugly things" they say about him (VI.349-53). Paris, one might say, is not properly socialised. 126 While we learn to see anger as a disruptive and largely undesirable emotion, which one experiences spontaneously but must try to repress, the heroes are taught to see it as a emotion they must express in certain circumstances, if they are to be regarded as real men. At the same time, they are aware that anger can get out of control and have catastrophic consequences. Preparing Hektor's corpse for its return to Troy, Akhilleus fears that he might kill Priamos if the old man shows any sign of anger at the sight of his dead son. He therefore makes sure that the body is kept from view (XXIV .582-6). He knows himself well enough to realise that he cannot control his anger even if he wants to. There is a notion that people who act violently have allowed themselves to "give in" to their sense of power or their feeling of hybris : they get carried away, as we would say. 121 'Iron itself draws a man' is a proverbial-sounding phrase used in the Odyssey (16.294; 19.13), meaning that the pull of weapons may lead a man to violence despite himself. Though men who enjoy conflict are hated (1.176-7; V.890-1; IX.63-4), strife, "gnawing at the spirit", keeps escalating. Strife "raises herself a little at first, and then her head touches the sky and she walks on earth" (IV.442-3). Even Akhilleus curses anger :

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"If only strife [eris] would vanish from gods and men - and anger, which drives even a man of sense to act brutally, and which, much sweeter than honey seeping down, spreads in men's hearts like smoke." (XVill.107-10)

Characteristic are the two complementary pieces of advice offered to Akhilleus by his father, when he leaves home to join the army. "My son, Athena and Hera will give you strength if they wish, but you must keep in check the proud spirit in your chest, for friendliness is better. You must abandon harmful strife, so that the Argives, young and old, will honour you more highly.• (IX.254-8)

That is one norm. 121 At the same time, Akhilleus is exhorted "always to be the best and superior to others" (Xl.784), and it is of course precisely this pursuit of superiority which requires a man to become angry whenever he perceives a lack of respect. Anger, then, is an emotion both dangerous and indispensable in Homeric society. The moral, psychological and practical problems posed by it are explored in some depth in the epics. (1) THE MORAL BOUNDARIES OF ANGER

The range of expressions of anger runs from the ubiquitous "scowling" at one's opponent 129, via insulting, threatening, robbing, beating and wounding him, to killing him and mutilating his corpse. In extreme fury, one may wish to eat one's enemy, but cannibalism remains in the realm of angry fantasy (IV.34-6; XXII.346-7; XXIV.212-13). A general rule appears to be that the intensity of anger displayed must be in proportion to the gravity of the offence. Even the least expression of anger may be out of place in a petty altercation. Mere insults are regarded as improper in the quarrel between Idomeneus and Aias about which of the two has the sharper eyesight. One of the reasons why, according to Nestor, Agamemnon should not have confiscated Akhilleus' prize is "because the Akhaians first gave the prize to him" (i.e. Akhilleus, 1.276). Apparently, Nestor reasons that, while Agamemnon has a right to be angry, Akhilleus has a right to his prize, and robbing him of this is too extreme a show of anger in the circumstances. 130 On the other hand, the most violent expressions of anger may be acceptable when the offence is serious. Odysseus in his rage slaughters all his wife's suitors, even the one man among them who had abstained

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from outrages. There is not a hint of criticism of this action. The twelve slave-women who have slept with the suitors are hanged. A "most pitiful" death, says the poet, and he describes how "their feet kicked a while - not for very long" (XXD.472-3). Telemakhos explains that to kill them with the sword would mean giving them "a clean death", which they do not deserve (461-4). Melanthios, a slave who had abetted the suitors, has his genitals "ripped out" and his nose, ears and feet cut off (XXll.474-7). Again there is no suggestion that such ferocity is anything but legitimate. Akhilleus' way of venting upon the Trojans his anger at the death of Patroklos does go beyond what is acceptable. Initially, he vows to avenge his friend's death by bringing him Hektor's head and executing twelve prisoners to be burnt with Patroklos on his funeral pyre (XVfil.334-7). Mutilation and decapitation of a dead enemy is a not uncommon practice. It is always performed or threatened as a deliberate act of revenge, and appears to provoke no criticism. 131 The execution of prisoners is a unique gesture, but passes with little comment. When the poet says that Akhilleus "planned bad things" (kaka, XXIII.175-6) for these men, he almost certainly means bad/or the victims. Akhilleus, however, appears to change his mind. Instead of cutting off Hektor's head, he ties the body to his chariot by means of leather straps passed through the heels of the corpse, and for twelve days drags it around Patroklos' tomb three times every day at dawn. Otherwise, the body is left to lie exposed, face down, at all times (XXIIl.24-6; XXIV.12-18). The poet as narrator still expresses no criticism, remarking only that Akhilleus "planned ugly things [aeikea] for Hektor" (XXIl.395; XXIII.24) - meaning mutilation ugly to see and suffer, rather than morally repugnant to inflict. 132 Those who are on Hektor's side, however, are made to voice strong opinions on Akhilleus' behaviour. "He has in his chest an immoderate heart and an unbending will; he knows only savagery [agria], like a lion letting himself be ruled by his great strength and proud heart... " (XXIV.40-3) "He is a raw-meat eater [omestes] and cannot be trusted." (XXIV.207)

He is accused of having "eradicated pity" and having no sense of respect (XXIV.44, 207-8). Apollo, who supports the Trojans, complains that Akhilleus' anger is out of proportion to his suffering : many people who

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have borne greater losses than he have been able to "let go" after mourning, yet Akhilleus persists in raging against a dead man. This is "by no means a fine or good thing for him to do", and the gods ought to be indignant at him "for he shames dumb earth" (XXIV.46-54). This is a partisan view, but even those who are on Akhilleus' side do not entirely disagree. Hera argues that the gods must give greater honour to Akhilleus than to Hektor and therefore let him do as he pleases, but she accepts that the gods ought to have been indignant at Akhilleus' behaviour if they had held both men in equal honour (XXIV.55-7). 133 By implication, the non-partisan view, the judgement of one who does not favour one side above the other, · would be that Akhilleus has gone too far in his abuse of Hektor. At the same time, the debate between Hera and Apollo makes clear that an 'objective' moral judgement of Akhilleus' anger is overridden by other considerations. It is only his enemies who criticise and seek to stop him. His friends will let him be as angry as he likes. 134 A few passages suggest that anger must be in proportion to the status of the offender as well. Hektor's mother exclaims that Akhilleus ought to have had more respect for her son's corpse, since when he was killed "he was not behaving like a coward, but standing before the Trojans ... thinking of neither flight nor evasion" (XXIV .214-6). The suitors' offence of courting Odysseus' wife is aggravated, it seems, by the fact that they are his inferiors : "0 popoi ! So they are eager to sleep in the bed of a brave man, being weaklings themselves" (4.333-4; 17.1245). 135 Perhaps the particularly gruesome punishment suffered by the slaves who have sided with the suitors is inflicted not only because of the gravity of their offence, but also because of their low status. Although there are limits to the expression of anger, then, a man who enjoys high status will be allowed to rage far more violently than a man of low status; and a man's friends will support him even if he goes too far. (II) PITY

A psychological restraint upon anger is compassfon. Even the angriest man is capable of feeling pity (eleos) for his victims. The sight of people suffering stirs up the sympathy and erodes the anger of those who made them suffer in the first place. Akhilleus is characterised as a "merciless" (IX.632; cf. XI.664-5) and inhumanly hard-hearted man (XVI.33-5), but even he feels pity when he sees Patroklos cry for the

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suffering Akhaians (XVI.5). He finds that he cannot remain angry, although he had said he would (XVI.60-3). Later, his anger against Hektor and his family also subsides when he feels pity for Priamos in his misery. 136 (Ill) RECONCILIATION

An axiom stated more than once in the Iliad is that, angry as he may be, a man must in principle be open to reconciliation. "The mind of a good man can be made to tum round" (XV.203). "Tame your great spirit; there is no need for you to have a merciless heart. Even the gods themselves can be brought round" (IX.496-7; cf. IX.158-9). An elaborate allegory is used to convince Akhilleus of the wisdom of forgiveness : "Entreaties [Utai] are lame, shrivelled, sideways-glancing daughters of great Zeus, and they occupy themselves with following Fatal Error [Ate] about. Fatal Error is strong and quick on her feet, which is why she gives them the slip and runs far ahead of them all; she beats them to it, and blinds people all over the earth. Behind her, the Entreaties make amends. He who treats the daughters of Zeus with respect when they arrive, him they praise highly and to him they listen when he calls upon them. But he who rejects them and flatly refuses - they go to Zeus and beg that Fatal Error may dog that man, so that he may be blinded and pay for it.• (IX.502-12)

The Entreaties represent a man who has made someone suffer, but now wishes to make peace. In a state of acute embarrassment, he approaches his victim with halting step ('lame'), cowering ('shrivelled'), and unable to look him in the eye ('sideways-glancing'). The allegory says that, when approached in this manner, one ought to allow oneself to be reconciled, because (a) one will be praised for it, and (b) one will be done by as one does. If a man gives in to others' entreaties, they will give in to his; if he rejects them, a time will come when he will have to beg for forgiveness only to find his pleas rejected. 137 While spelling out the idea that in principle it is good to make one's peace with former enemies, the epics also make clear that in practice reconciliation will only take place under certain conditions. Agamemnon, for instance, makes no effort to placate Akhilleus, although he has come to realise that he hi~self, not Akhilleus, is responsible for the quarrel between them (11.378) .. Odysseus later tells him that the right thing to do would have been to make overtures

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sooner : "In future, you will be more just [dtkaioteros] towards others as well, for it is nothing to be indignant about if a prince fully appeases a man, when one [i.e. a prince] has been the first to offend" (XIX.181-3). By contrast, Diomedes believes that even the belated approaches to Akhilleus are unnecessary, partly because to his mind Akhilleus has no reason to be angry, and partly because in his opinion Akhilleus' support is not really needed. 138 While it may be 'more just' to make up to those whom one has wronged, evidently the rights and wrongs take second place to the politics of the situation. An important moral issue is the question of when one should allow oneself to be appeased by one's enemy. Two considerations are uppermost : the amount of compensation (poine, apoina, tilM) one is offered, and the status of those who seek reconciliation. When Agamemnon decides to patch up his quarrel with Akhilleus, he offers him spectacular gifts to make up for what he has done. Three men are sent to convey the offer. The first, Odysseus, lists the gifts. The second, Phoinix, tells Akhilleus : "If Agamemnon did not bring gifts,... I would not exhort you to cast aside your wrath and defend the Argives, much as they need you; but as it is he offers many here and now, and promises more to come... Until now, your being angry has given no cause for indignation.• (IX.515-23)

He implies that to persist in anger rather than accept the gifts would arouse indignation. The third man, Aias, states the norm concretely: •A man will accept compensation even from the killer of his brother, or for the death of his own son. And the lciller stays there in the community after paying a great deal, and the other man, having accepted compensation, restrains his heart and his proud spirit.• (IX.632-6)

Phoinix adds a pragmatic reason for agreeing to a reconciliation. He recounts a story (IX.524-605), the point of which is that Akhilleus had better accept the gifts and rejoin battle, otherwise events may later force him to join battle anyway, without receiving compensation. lJ!I The status of those who wish to make peace is stressed no less than the value of their gifts. Agamemnon argues that he is superior to Akhilleus, who should therefore yield (IX.158-61). His envoys, aware that Akhilleus does not recognise Agamemnon's superiority, tactfully avoid

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using this araument. Instead, they stress their own status. Phoinix recalls how he has been a friend and tutor to Akhilleus (IX.434-95), and adds that "[Agamemnon] bu sent the best men to plead with you. He chose them from among the Akhaians, and of the Argives they are closest to you personally. You should not shame the words and feet of these men.• {IX.520-3)

In the same vein, Aias assures Akhilleus that the envoys are his best friends and exhorts him to "respect the roof-beam" under which they are gathered (IX.640-2). Akhilleus expresses his agreement with Aias, that is to say, he accepts that the gifts offered and the status of the envoys are strong reasons to give in (IX.643-5). Nevertheless, he refuses to be reconciled. Scholars have variously araued that such a refusal constitutes an unequivocal breach of Homeric norms; that Homeric norms leave a man free to accept or reject compensation as he sees fit; that the refusal is not so much a breach of norms as the beginning of a search for a new and higher morality. 1a This last view, appealing as it may be to the modem literary critic, does not stand up to examination. Akhilleus himself explains that he is unable to abide by the norms simply because he is too angry at having been dishonoured (IX.645-8). Over and over again, he complains that he feels "cheated", because he has not been treated with due respect (IX.307-45, 356-77). When he rejects the gifts, it is not because he has transcended a materialistic scale of values, but because no amount of gifts is enough to compensate him "until Agamemnon has fully made up to me for the disgrace that pains my spirit" (IX.378-87). In other words, he will accept gifts eventually, but first Agamemnon must suffer more. Hence, next day, when the Akhaians have indeed suffered another defeat, Akhilleus voices his hope for a renewed offer of compensation, and no more (Xl.609-10; :XVI.83-6). 141 That Akhilleus breaks no new ground is also apparent from the fact that Odysseus expects him to ignore the arauments stressed by the others. In his speech, Odysseus instead focuses on the plight of the army and araues that Akhilleus should rejoin battle out of pity (IX.22560). If he does, Agamemnon will give him many gifts. These are duly enumerated (260-99), but Odysseus immediately adds: "If you hate

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Agamemnon from the bottom of your heart, him and his gifts, then pity the other Pan-Akhaians" (300-6). If the view that Akhilleus searches for a new morality is untenable, so is the view that he acts entirely within the norms of Homeric society. Aias calls his attitude "savage" (IX.629), "implacable and bad" (636). He comments that Agamemnon's offer ("seven excellent women, and much else besides", IX.638-9) ought to be sufficient compensation for the loss of one woman. Diomedes sees Akhilleus' attitude as evidence of excessive pride (IX.699-700). Poseidon, when addressing Agamemnon, curses Akhilleus for not rejoining battle, adding that "he has no sense in him, not a bit" (XIV. 135-42). Akhilleus, then, does disregard certain moral standards, as well as pragmatic reasons for reconciliation, because his anger is too strong. Yet his breaking of the rules is not only predictable, but from a certain point of view even justifiable. When Poseidon is addressing a group of lower-ranking Akhaian commanders, he tells them that all blame for the losses suffered as a consequence of Akhilleus' continued refusal to fight lies with Agamemnon (XIIl.107-14). In the sequel, too, Akhilleus' refusal is largely ignored. At the final reconciliation, Agamemnon takes all the blame, Akhilleus none. 142 It is Agamemnon, not Akhilleus, who is told to be 'more just' in future. Apparently, one can appeal to certain standards of behaviour in order to put an angry man under moral pressure to calm down, or in order to make the victims of his anger feel that at least they have right on their side. But equally one can take the view that an angry man has the right to refuse any amount of compensation, and that those who provoked him remain responsible for the consequences of his anger. One may compare the trial scene depicted on the shield of Akhilleus. There, in a crowded town-square, the elders are sitting in judgement. "Two men were contending in a matter of compensation for a man who had been killed. One claimed that he was paying fully for it, and he was making this known to the people. The other refused to take anything. Both wanted to get a decision from an arbitrator." (XVIll.498-501) 143

Each elder in tum gives his judgement. No verdict is recorded, but it is evidently far from simple to decide whether rejecting an offer of compensation is right or wrong. Thus, the norms that govern the

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expression of anger do not provide iron rules regarding reconciliation. It is good to be receptive to offers of gifts in compensation; whether it is right to accept or reject a particular offer, however, is a matter of opinion. (IV) SELF-CONTROL

The Iliad features two men who fail to control their anger and suffer the consequences. "Giving in to his proud spirit" (IX.109), Agamemnon believes that his power allows him to indulge his anger at Akhilleus and ignore his opponent's threats to take his contingent out of the war. •sy all means run away ! . . . I am not begging you to stay on my account; there are others with me, who will honour me - zeus in particular... I pay no attention to you, and do not heed your resentment• (1.173-81).

He soon admits, however, that the chances of capturing Troy would be much better if he an~ Akhilleus could co-operate (11.377-80), and when the fighting goes against the Akhaians he comes to realise that Zeus - for reasons we shall discuss later - supports Akhilleus, not him. "I have made a fatal error [ate], I myself do not deny it. A man who is loved from the heart by Zeus is worth many men" (IX.115-8; cf.110; XIX.8691). The lesson is political rather than moral. Agamemnon has underestimated the power of one of his followers, and he pays the price. 144 Akhilleus admits that he cannot control his anger. For a long time it seems as if this does not matter. He has the power to be as angry as he likes and to inflict immense suffering on Agamemnon and the rest of the Akhaians, all of whom he holds responsible for his humiliation. 145 Then suddenly Patroklos is killed. To his mind, this cancels out all the satisfaction he had previously derived from harming his adversaries (XIX.56-8). He himself draws the moral, as we have already seen: anger is a bad thing (XVW.107-10). But the death of Patroklos had been decreed by fate; it was not a direct result of Akhilleus' anger and it was not meant to teach Akhilleus a lesson. Akhilleus regrets having been angry, only because as a result he happened to be away from battle when Patroklos and his other companions needed him (XVIII.98-104). 146 If anger is bad, then, this is not because it is morally wrong, but because it may have unpredictable and unwelcome side-effects.

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The Odyssey, by contrast 147, illustrates the virtues of being able to control one's anger. Odysseus has this ability, and it enables him to defeat more than a hundred enemies almost single-handedly. His self-control is first tested in the cave of the Kyklops. When his men are killed and eaten before his very eyes, Odysseus, in his "proud spirit", wants to stab the monster in the heart, but checks himself when he realises that if he kills the Kyklops, he will be left trapped inside the cave (9.299-305). This feat of self-control he later holds up as an example to himself, when his anger is provoked again, this time by the spectacle of his slave-women leaving the house at night to go and sleep with his enemies. He is so furious that his heart "barks".(20.13-16), but instead of killing the women (20 .10-11), he beats his chest and tells his heart that it should be able to bear this provocation since it put up with worse from the Kyklops (20.17-22). In all his encounters with the suitors and their hangers-on, while he is disguised as a beggar, Odysseus keeps his anger under control so as not to betray his identity. He is kicked by Melanthios, but although he feels like beating the man to death or smashing his head to the ground, he contains himself (17.233-8). A stool is thrown at him : "he shook his head in silence, brooding evil" (17.462-5). He is made to fight and decides to knock out his opponent rather than kill him, so that the suitors will not become suspicious (18.90-4). Another projectile flies at him, but he just inclines bis head to avoid it and inwardly smiles "very sardonically" (20.299-302). Telemakbos, too, manages to hold back his anger until the opportunity arises to kill the suitors by surprise (16.2747; 20.384-6). Not even Odysseus is perfect, though. Having escaped from the Kyklops and believing himself safe, Odysseus, "with a resentful spirit", calls out to the Kyklops and reveals his name, ignoring his companions' urgent advice against it. "They did not persuade my proud spirit", he says (9.491-505). Now that the Kyklops knows his opponent's name, he appeals to Poseidon to kill or harm Odysseus, ~ho is duly persecuted · throughout his wanderings. For ·once, Odysseus underestimates the power of an enemy, and lets his anger run away with him. The consequences are disastrous. The obvious message is that, for pragmatic reasons, it is wise to keep one's anger in check, without of course suppressing it altogether.

137 (V) THE AUTHORITIES

A final bit of political wisdom offered by the epics is that one should suppress one's an1er when told to do so by powerful third parties. Neither Akhilleus nor Odysseus let 10 their an1er until told to do so by the 1ods. Twice the 1ods intervene to restrain Akhilleus. The first time, Athena makes a startlin1 appearance as she pulls Akhilleus' hair and tells him not to draw his sword on A1amemnon (1.194-214). He replies : "One must obey your word, 1oddess, even if one is very an1ry in spirit, for it is better this way. He who obeys the 1ods, to him they listen well" (1.216-8). The second time, Thetis is sent to tell him on behalf of Zeus that all the 1ods object to his persistence in venting on Hektor's corpse his an1er about the death of Patroklos; he must now release the body. His answer is : "So be it. .. if Zeus himself says so" (XXIV.133-40). Akhilleus' an1er has not subsided, and while arranging the release he is on the brink of getting angry again and killing Hektor' s father, but, as he makes clear, he swallows his an1er in order to comply with Zeus' command (XXIV.559-70, 582-6). Odysseus' anger, too, is finally ended only after Zeus, through Athena, orders him to stop fighting (24.537-45). Akhilleus obeys the gods because he hopes to gain their favour; Zeus expects him to do so out of fear (XXIV .116). 148 What applies to relations between gods and princes probably applies by implication to relations between princes and common men as well : when a prince intervenes in one's quarrels, it is advisable to stay on his good side and swallow one's anger. So far as the ethics of anger and conflict are concerned, "the heroic code" turns out to be far from "complete and unambiguous" (pace Finley 1977 : 113). The heroes are encouraged to compete, and taught to feel and show anger where the norms of society require it. They are also encouraged not to be quarrelsome, and not to be too violent. They must show compassion, be willing to make peace, keep their anger under control, and submit to superiors and higher authorities. It might not be impossible to reconcile all these demands, but it would certainly not be easy, and the existence of rival norms would create uncertainties and differences of opinion as to what is morally the right thing to do in given circumstances. Heroic anger, while subject to considerable restraints, tends to get out of ·hand. Why this should be so is perhaps explained in Akhilleus'

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·answer to those who tell him to relent because the Akhaians will honour him if he swallows his anger for their sake (IX.602-5; cf. 257-8) : "I do not need that honour at all. I think that I am honoured with a portion allotted by Zeus" (IX.607-8). That 'portion' is Zeus' undivided support for him against his enemies, which enables him to continue doing them harm. Akhilleus is saying that, given a choice between the respect that he may earn for allowing himself to be appeased, and the respect and fear that he may inspire by doing as much damage as he can, he prefers the latter. In fact, Akhilleus is making fundamentally the same choice as those who act in hybrls : moral constraints are set aside to make more room for a display of force. The greater the power, the greater the temptation to disregard moral issues, give free rein to one's anger, and apply maximum force. Hence it is said that "even the gods themselves can be appeased, although they have greater excellence, honour and force" than mortals (IX.497-501), implying that those who have the greatest power and demand the highest respect are least inclined to moderation in anger. The choice is certainly not always a conscious one, as is clear from the heroes' sense of being carried away by anger or hybrls. I would suggest that these emotions seem uncontrollable because of the ambivalent values of the heroic world. Hybrls and excessive anger are censured; simultaneously, however, displays of force, of personal power to harm, are rewarded with respect and prestige. Tom between the demands of morality and the demands of status-competition, the heroes escape by allowing themselves to give in to their emotions and 'involuntarily' giving conspicuous displays of force that go beyond the bounds set by convention.

8. THE MIGHT OF MEN

STRENGTH, CONNECTIONS AND

JUSTICE

Mus1..-ular strength is widely seen as the distinguishing characteristic and most important asset of males. In Homeric society, physical strength appears to be even more important than in most other societies. A tall, muscular body is the Homeric ideal of masculine beauty; the heroes need strength not only in order to fulfil their role as warriors and

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to compete as athletes, but also to protect their property and privileges, and above all to enforce respect. Indeed, a superficial reading of the epics might suggest that muscle is all a man needs to achieve great honour. This is certainly the impression given by the image of Zeus, who rules among the gods by virtue of being the eldest, but who, if challenged, is able to defend his position single-handedly, thanks to his brute strength. "How about trying me, gods, so that you may all see for yourselves ? Hang a golden rope down from the sky and take hold of it, all you gods and goddesses. No, you would not pull down Zeus, the highest of rulers, from the sky to the plain, not even if you strained yourselves to the utmost. But when I in tum would want to pull in earnest, I could pull up the earth itself, the se.a itself. After that, I might tie the rope around a peak of Olympos and all these things would then be up in the air. So much superior to the gods and superior to men am I.• (VIIl.18-27)

He recalls a time when he used his superior strength to punish Hera : "I hung you up high, let two anvils hang down from your feet and tied an unbreakable golden chain to your hands. You hung among the sky and the clouds. The other gods on great Olympos were indignant. They stood around unable to untie you. Whomever I caught, I would grab and hurl from the threshold, and thus they fell to earth helplessly." (XV.18-24; cf. XIV.257)

Zeus also disposes of a unique weapon, the thunderbolt, which can inflict pain and lasting disability even upon immortals (e.g. Vlli.402-5), but he does not need to rely on this to hold his own ...., The gods accept that he is "decidedly the best in power and strength" (XV.105-8; cf. Vlli.210-11). On earth, the devastating defeat suffered by the Akhaians as a result of Akhilleus' angry withdrawal from battle, is attributed to the loss of the fighting power of Akhilleus personally. Agamemnon is repeatedly warned not to offend Akhilleus because he is "a great bulwark of the Akhaians" (1.282-4; IX.104-11). Akhilleus himself contrasts Trojan successes during his absence with Trojan weakness "when I did battle among the Akhaians" (IX.351-5). Patroklos later enters the fray wearing Akhilleus' armour, and the Trojans panic in the belief that Akhilleus himself has returned (Xl.798-801; XVI.40-3, 278-83). When Akhilleus does return, Poulydamas counsels the Trojans to retreat at once : "now I am terribly afraid of Akhilleus" (XVlli.261). In the final battle, the poet

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mentions no Akhaian warrior but Akhilleus, who seems to defeat the Trojans all by himself. 150 The importance of physical strength is again evident in the fact that old men without their sons, boys without their fathers, and women without their menfolk suffer at the hands of aggressive neighbours. It is assumed that the deaths of Hektor and Akhilleus mean that their families will lose their property and honour, and this is in fact the fate of Odysseus' family when he is presumed dead. On his return, Odysseus almost singlehandedly wipes out his enemies. Akhilleus imagines that he could have done the same, if only he had survived to come home. Thus the personal, informal power which features so prominently in the struggle for status, at first sight seems to rest almost entirely on personal physical strength. m But this is not the full picture. As Joseph Bonanno wrote of his life as godfather of a New York mafia family: "You need much more than your masculinity ... to survive in the Volcano. You need friends." (Bonanno 1983: 184) "The greatest avenue of upward mobility was not so much talent... as it was friendship, what Americans call connections." (ibid.: 63)

Connections are essential even to Homeric heroes. Ties of kinship and friendship have been discussed in the previous chapter, and it hardly needs saying that these ties also involve mutual support in conflict. It is said that "a man relies on his brothers in a fight, even when a great conflict develops" (16.97-8, 115-16). In revenge, fathers, brothers, sons, cousins and in-laws stand by one another: "for this is a disgrace which will become known even to future generations, if we do not avenge the deaths of our sons and brothers" (24.433-5). A few of Odysseus' friends in lthaka try to support Telemakhos against the suitors, and it is jokingly suggested that Telemakhos might "bring some helpers from Pylos or even from Sparta, since he is so very keen" (2.326-7). 152 Kinsmen and friends are potentially a great source of power. In their quarrel, Agamemnon and Akhilleus both rely on the support of their friends and war-time retainers. Two thousand five hundred Myrmidons (XVI.168-70) loyally withdraw from battle when Akhilleus tells them to, even though they themselves are eager to continue fighting (XVl.200-7). Akhilleus demands this loyalty. When one of his closest

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friends among bis followers pleads with him to make peace with Agamemnon, be tells him : "Do not••• do favoun for the hero Agamemnon. You must not be a friend to him, or else you may be hated by me, your friend. It is right for you to harm, with me, whomever harms me.• (IX.613-5)

That the withdrawal of all the Myrmidons gives Akhilleus' fury a greater sting is obvious and is in any case acknowledged by Akhilleus himself. He is aware that bis men form a powerful force even without him, and to prevent this from becoming too obvious, be instructs Patroklos, who is to lead them into battle, to do no more than drive back the Trojans a little, and not to follow this up with a sustained attack. If Patroklos and the Myrmidons are too successful in his absence, says Akhilleus, "you will make me more dishonoured" (XVl.87-90). 153 Akhilleus' personal power thus to a considerable extent rests on the combined physical force of his men. So does the informal power which enables Agamemnon to dishonour Akhilleus in the first place. He threatens that, if Akhilleus does not band over his prize quietly, "I shall come with more men to take her myself; and that will be even worse for him" (1.324-5). These men would no doubt be drawn from his own contingent. Akhilleus' comment that Agamemnon is able to rob him because he surpasses him in power (XVl.53-4), therefore, presumably refers to the informal power Agamemnon derives from the backing of his troops : bis contingent is twice as large as Akhilleus' (11.576). Agamemnon also seems to rely on the continued support of the rest of the army, but this turns out to be something of a miscalculation. 154 In time of peace, princes would not have large numbers of men at their direct command, and they would presumably be able to rely only on kinsmen, close friends and immediate dependants. To gain wider support, they would need to appeal to the people at large. Telemakhos calls an assembly and makes such an appeal once, but the people, although sympathetic, fail to support him actively. Their inactivity causes some puzzlement. Telemakhos is twice asked why the people are not helping him : is it because he has not asked for help, or do they for some obscure reason hate him ? (3.214-5; 16.95-6) The question is never really answered. When the suitors have tried and failed to

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assassinate Telemakhos, however, it is felt that he will now almost certainly be able to mobilise the people and get them to expel the suiton from Ithaka (16.375-84). The support of the people at large is apparently not easily gained, but it is potentially a greater source of power than the support of one's friends. 155 Connections among the gods are in the epic world a far greater asset than any other source of power. Akhilleus' success in making Agamemnon and the Akhaians suffer is in fact almost entirely due to the support of Zeus, rather than to his own prowess or the quality of his troops. In the first battle of the Iliad, the Akhaians do very well without the Myrmidons. Diomedes dominates the fighting, and tlie Trojans are in such desperate straits that the elders' wives organise an impromptu sacrifice to Athena and pray that she may rescue Troy and let Diomedes be killed (Vl.269-80, 286-311). Not until the next battle does the tide tum, and then it is entirely Zeus' doing. Agamemnon eventually gives in because he realises that "he is worth many men, a man whom z.eus loves from the heart" (IX.116-17). Without Zeus' intervention, Akhilleus' absence would not have been felt particularly strongly, and his anger would have been ineffectual. 156 Odysseus' anger too, for all his courage, cleverness, and skilful archery, would have been futile, had it not been for divine support. Telemakhos points out that "it is not possible for two men to fight those who are numerous and strong... No, you must consider whether you can think of some helper" (16.243-4, 256-7). Odysseus answers : "Will Athena and Zeus suffice for us, or shall I think of some other helper?" (16.260-1). While showing confidence before Telemakhos, Odysseus privately worries about his chances of escaping revenge once he has killed his enemies (20.41-3). Athena reassures him that with her aid he could defeat even "fifty bands of men" (20.45-51; cf. 13.386-96), and later she does indeed play a crucial role in defeating the suitors and their relatives. 157 It may seem inappropriate to speak of mortals having 'connections' among the gods, insofar as 'connections' has overtones of manipulated personal obligations, patronage and favouritism. But these things are in fact involved in relationships between gods and heroes. The gods have their own mortal kinsmen (mostly sons), friends, pro~g6s and loyal worshippers whom they seek to help, and enemies whom they seek to harm. Gods may need to weigh conflicting obligations against one

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another; they may also find themselves opposed by other gods. A certain amount of political manoeuvring may be required before interventions in human affairs can be carried out. 151 We are dealing here with an obviously fantastic element of the Homeric world, but one that is worth a closer look on the assumption - which is generally accepted - that relations between gods and mortals are largely analogous to relations between princes and commoners. Akhilleus defeats Agamemnon because Zeus owes him, or rather his mother, a favour, and because Zeus is able, though somewhat reluctant, to impose his will on the other gods by means of threats and at the cost of creating considerable hostility to himself. Later, Akhilleus gets away with his excessively furious mutilation of Hektor's corpse, because the gods feel obliged to support him more strongly than Hektor : Akhilleus' parents are personally close to the gods, while Hektor merely is someone who has offered the gods many gifts. Akhilleus' Connections (a) Agamemnon believes that he can do without Akhilleus, •for on my side there are others who will honour me, Zeus above an• (1.174-5). If Agamemnon expects Zeus to support him, the reason is presumably that Zeus, as ruler of the gods, is supposed to support his mortal counterparts against their enemies. 159 Akhilleus' claim on Zeus, however, is implicitly stronger. His mother, Thetis, had once saved Zeus from a coup by Hera, Poseidon and Athena, who had somehow managed to tie him up. Thetis had fetched the help of a hundred-hander, Briareos, who then sat beside Zeus as a sort of body-guard and frightened off the other gods (1.396-406). Akhilleus sends his mother to Zeus with instructions to remind him of the service she had rendered him on that occasion, and to ask him to return the favour now, by letting the Trojans win in order to hurt Agamemnon (1.393-5, 407-12). She duly does so (5034), and Zeus agrees to •honour• Akhilleus (e.g. 353-4, SOS, 508) in order not to make Thetis feel •dishonoured• (516). Zeus' decision antagonises several gods who for reasons of personal animosity seek the destruction of Troy, and do not like to see Trojans winning even temporarily. Hera and Athena are hostile to Troy on account of the judgement of Paris, who had declared Aphrodite more beautiful than they (XXIV.25-30). Hera argues that Zeus should let her have her way from time to time because of her senior position among the gods as the eldest goddess and the wife of Zeus (IV.57-61). Athena·complains that Zeus ought to show more consideration towards her, in return for all the help she has .given him in the past (Vlll.360-73).

144 Poseidon, too, has a grudge against Troy, on account of Laomedon's refusal to give him his wages for building the walls of the city (XXI.441-58). In addition, he is under some obligation to help the Akhaians, because they offer him "many pleasing gifts at Helike and Aigai" (VIII.201-4). He complains that Zeus has no right to impose his will on him, because they are equals (XV.185-99). These three gods regularly try to go against Zeus' will, but in the end they submit, partly because of Zeus' acknowledged superior force, partly because Zeus is the eldest of the gods (XV.166, 204), and partly because they do not wish to fight among themselves about the affairs of mortals (1.573-6). (b) When the gods debate if and how they should put a stop to Akhilleus' mutilation of Hektor's body, they discuss the question in terms of how much "honour" they owe to each of the two men. Apollo feels that the gods should help Hektor : "Did Hektor never burn for you the thigh-bones of unblemished cattle and goats?" (XXIV.32-5). Hera disagrees. She argues that Akhilleus deserves greater honour than Hektor, and that the gods should therefore allow him to mutilate his enemy if he wants to (XXIV.55-7). Akhilleus deserves greater honour, she says, because "Hektor is a mortal and sucked at a woman's breast, but Akhilleus is the offspring of a goddess whom I myself raised and nurtured and gave in marriage to a man, Peleus, who was loved deeply by the immortals. You were all present at the wedding, gods.• Turning to Apollo, she reminds him that he too had been there, and she accuses him of being "a friend of bad men" and "always unreliable" (XXIV.58-63). This presumably means that Apollo ought not to be taking sides with Hektor, because Hektor is of lower status than Akhilleus ("a bad man"), and because Apollo has been a friend of Akhilleus' family and should not now betray this friendship, proving to be "unreliable". Thus, while Apollo maintains that Hektor's many sacrifices put the gods under an obligation to him, Hera advances two reasons for siding with Akhilleus : he is of better birth, and he is a close friend. Zeus accepts both points of view, and in the end imposes a compromise. He tells Hera that "there shall not be one honour" (XXIV.66); in other words, Akhilleus will receive the greater deference. But at the same time he agrees with Apollo that "Hektor used to be dearest to the gods of all the mortals who live in Troy; for so he was to me, since he never failed to give me the gifts that are my own; my altar never lacked a fair feast of libations and fat" (XXIV.66-70). The compromise is that Hektor will be honoured in that his corpse will be spared further indignities; Akhilleus will be honoured as well in that the gods will not simply steal away the body, but arrange for Hektor's father to come and pay a large ransom for it. By this arrangement, Zeus intends to bring "glory" (kudos) to Akhilleus, and retain the "respect and friendship" of Thetis (XXIV.71-6, 104-11).

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Akhilleus' power thus rests primarily on his mother's connections among the gods. She has been raised by Hera almost as a daughter, and Zeus is in her debt. Both Hera and Zeus have other obligations too. Zeus owes support to Akhilleus' enemies - Agamemnon is a protege of his, and Hektor must be rewarded for all his gifts - but he rates his obligation to Thetis more highly than the others. Hera, on the other hand, is not prepared to help Akhilleus if this means helping her enemies, the Trojans, as well; she does support Akhilleus when there is no longer a conflict of interest. The balance of power among the gods, although precarious, is in Akhilleus' favour. The power of Odysseus is based on similar, though less complicated, connections. Athena and Zeus support him, partly in return for the many sacrifices he has offered them (1.60-7; 4.761-7), and partly because they admire his qualities, which are much like Athena's own (1.66; 13.330-2, 296-9). Poseidon, however, wants him to suffer, in punishment for the blinding of Polyphemos, his son (1.68-75; 9.526-36). For a long time, Athena does not dare to help Odysseus openly, "because she respected her father's brother" (6.329-30; 13.339-43), but eventually, in Poseidon's absence, she persuades Zeus to come to Odysseus' aid. With Zeus and the other gods against him, Poseidon is forced to stop persecuting Odysseus (1.19-27, 48-79; 5.282-96, 375-9). In Odysseus' subsequent confrontation with the suitors, the situation is even simpler : Athena and Zeus support him, none of the gods support his enemies. 160 It should be noted that, although the gods mostly consult Zeus before carrying out their plans, and his decisions are final, divine interventions are not always dictated by Zeus. He could in principle impose his will all the time, but he does not do so, wary of provoking too much hostility. In the case of Troy, Zeus himself would rather spare the city, because more than any other people the Trojans used to honour him with sacrifices (IV .44-9); yet the strength of feeling among some of the other gods is such that Zeus chooses to let them have their way, "so that this quarrel may not later become a great conflict between you and me" (IV.37-8). 161 At another time, he toys with the idea of circumventing fate to save the life of his son Sarpedon, but is deterred by the prospect of the "terrible resentment" that other gods will feel at not being allowed to save their own sons (XVl.433-49). 162

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In conflict between mortals, gods support their kin and friends regardless of the rights and wrongs of the issue. 163 Poseidon, for one, avenges the blinding of his son by Odysseus, although this had been· an act of self-defence, after Polyphemos had refused Odysseus hospitality, eaten six of his friends, and said some rude things about gods into the bargain. Surprisingly, in view of this, epic characters state more than once that the gods, and Zeus above all, are concerned to uphold justice in the world. "The blessed gods do not like terrible deeds, but they honour justice [di~] and proper behaviour among men." (14.83-4) "The gods, looking like visitors from abroad, taking all kinds of shapes, make their way around the cities, looking out for arrogant aggression [hybris] and for good order [eunomia] among men.• (17.485-7)

The heroes think of their struggles in terms of right and wrong. Agamemnon and Menelaos believe that the gods will cause Troy to fall because the Trojans have first broken the laws of hospitality and then their oaths as well, and thus are doubly in the wrong. Odysseus, his family and friends believe that the gods have engineered the defeat of the suitors in order to punish them for their misdeeds. 164 But the gods themselves, as we have seen, do not discuss the outcome of the Trojan War or of Odysseus' battle against the suitors in terms of doing justice among mortals. To the gods, intervention on earth is a matter of helping friends and hurting enemies. Scholars often say that the notion of gods upholding justice is incompatible with the actual motivations ascribed to Homeric gods. 165 It seems to me, however, that the gods simply try to do two things at once : they do seek to punish mortals who act unjustly or improperly, but they also wish to support their kin and friends. When it is not possible to do both, obligations to kin and friends have priority over demands of justice. This, I think, is implied in Hera's remark that the gods ought to do something about Akhilleus' improper behaviour towards Hektor only if they wish to honour the two men equally highly (XXIV.55-7). In other words, there are certain 'absolute' standards of justice, of proper behaviour among men, which the gods recognise and will uphold, but only when they have equal obligations to both transgressor and victim - or no obligations to either party, which

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amounts to the same thing. The gods will not uphold 'absolute' justice when doing so would adversely affect the interests of their friends and kin. 166 The overriding importance of personal loyalties means that justice can prevail only when a victim of aggression has the connections to make it prevail. There may be a certain cynicism in the juxtaposition of mortal characters who express the hope and belief that the gods will punish offenders, and gods who hold personal obligations paramount to such an extent that they barely even mention justice. On the other hand, it is no coincidence, of course, that right does prevail over wrong when Troy falls and the suitors are slaughtered : the story-tellers make sure that on the whole the heroes have better connections on Olympos than the villains. 167 Assuming that there are parallels between the politics of Olympos and the politics of a Ho~eric town, it follows that, just as connections among the gods are the greatest asset of a prince, so connections among princes are the greatest source of power for a commoner. Princes would try to help those commoners with whom they have certain ties of kinship and friendship - presumably rather distant kinship and instrumental friendship - and those who ply them with gifts of wine, sheep and goats. The existence of such personal obligations, rather than sheer arbitrariness, would explain why it is said that "it is the rule" for a prince to "love" one man and "hate" another (4.689-92). When asked for help by some commoner, a prince would first consult his peers, and the monarch in particular, on the proposed course of action. If it runs counter to the interests of other. princes or their 'friends' among the commoners, the balance of power among the princes determines which side ·gets its way. The monarch would have a decisive say in the matter, but he would have to try to satisfy the claims of all princes concerned. The analogy with the gods also suggests that princes would seek to avoid fighting among themselves over the affairs of commoners. When it comes to taking sides in a quarrel, personal obligations outweigh considerations of justice. This not only follows from the analogy with the gods, but is directly attested. Odysseus at one point pretends to the suitors that in his youth he too "committed many outrages, giving in to my force and power, relying on my father and my brothers" (18.139-40). The implication is that he expected his family to

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support him no matter what he did, no matter whom he offended, and that the suitors expect the same from their families. These are not unrealistically high expectations, as becomes clear when, after the suitors have been killed, more than half their relatives take up arms to take revenge. They do so despite knowing that their kinsmen have behaved outrageously, and despite their terror at hearing that the gods themselves have assisted in the slaughter (24.413-66): The implication for the administration of justice in a Homeric town is that princes in their role of judges would seek to enforce the law, but also to further the interests of their friends. Hence, while the ideal prince always succeeds in upholding justice (19.109-11), it is only to be expected that at times justice is "driven out by force" (XVl.386-8). 168 In situations of conflict, then, a man would rarely stand alone. Regardless of the rights and wrongs of his case, be would have a circle of kinsmen and friends strongly committed to his support. A prince might in addition draw on the services of commoners who are obliged to him or are eager to do him a favour; as a last resort, he might call upon the people at large to back him. A commoner, for his part, might get the help of one or two influential princes whose friendship he has in some way cultivated. With such networks of connections involved, any single individual's physical strength could hardly be a decisive factor in settling any particular conflict, or in the struggle for status generally. It is, for instance, unlikely that Hektor's young son should almost immediately lose bis property and status after his father's death, as Andromakbe imagines. After all, the boy would still be Priamos' grandson, and bis father's numerous brothers and brothers-in-law would surely stand by him. 10 Thus, by contrasting her son's past happiness (XXll.500-4) with an implausibly miserable future, Andromakbe stresses and exaggerates the importance of Hektor's physical strength to the wellbeing of bis family. Andromakbe's distorted perspective springs from her grief at the death of her husband, ~ut there is more to it than that. It is also part of a general trend in the epics to exaggerate the importance of physical strength as a constituent of status. The Iliad presents a picture of a Zeus stronger than all the other gods combined and therefore able to base his rule on strength of muscle. This is obviously unrealistic - no mortal monarch could have that kind of force. Moreover, this picture almost wholly ignores the other prop of

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Zeus' power, which is briefly referred to in a few passages : the gods have as much regard for Zeus' seniority of birth as for his superior strength. So too, the Iliad stresses the prowess of Akhilleus and the damage it enables him to inflict upon his enemies. Again, not only is his prowess fantastic even by heroic standards, but we find that actually Akhilleus' connections matter more than his strength. Most interesting is the role of physical strength in the Odyssey. After the power of the gods, the prowess of Odysseus is most instrumental in saving his family and property. Yet it plays such an important role only because the circumstances are highly exceptional : Odysseus lacks nearly all the normal sources of power. He has no close male relatives to fall back on, neither uncles nor brothers, and only one son (16.117-20). Several in-laws are mentioned - Penelope's brothers (15.16) and the husband of Odysseus' sister (15.366-7) - but there is no question of them coming to the rescue. Odysseus is said to have many friends in lthaka and abroad (19.238-40). Many of his local friends presumably followed him to Troy and perished to a man on the voyage home. Only three remaining friends in Ithaka are mentioned (17 .68-9), two of whom make some effort to help Telemakhos by making speeches against the suitors. As for his friends abroad, although Telemakhos visits two of the most powerful of these, Nestor and Menelaos, and although the suitors envisage the possibility of his receiving help from them, the support of these friends is neither asked nor offered. Odysseus moots the idea of going round the estate in secret to find out which of the slaves are still loyal; these might have provided manpower, but Telemakhos rejects the plan as too time-consuming (16.305-15). In the event, two slaves who happen to be at hand do fight beside Odysseus, and in the fight against the suitors' relatives they are joined by seven more (24.496-9). Finally, the people of Ithaka fail to come to Telemakhos' aid, although it is suggested that they might have been expected to do so. 110 The story of the Odyssey posits an unusual situation in which the hero has barely any kinsmen, and hardly any friends left; on top of that, the narrative deliberately ignores what would have been a real possibility in Homeric society : mobilising the remaining relatives and friends, connections abroad, slaves, and local population. The isolation of Odysseus is contrived; it serves to give the hero's prowess an unrealistically crucial role. 111

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Poetic exaggeration of the importance of strength goes hand in hand with exaggeration of the level of violence in heroic society. Andromakhe's prediction for her son, Akhilleus' worries about the fate of his father, and similar passages, suggest that without a strong man to defend it, a household will immediately be swallowed up by its neighbours, and that without personal strength, a ruler will be toppled at once. That would be unlikely to happen in a society where networks of connections play a role as important as they do in the world of the heroes. Physically weak men and families would not be targets of aggression so long as they were well-connected within and outside the community. Men would be less quick to resort to violence when conflict would involve not merely a one-to-one fight, but would draw into confrontation many supporters on both sides. Princes would have to be cautious about using force against their peers, when the outcome of a fight depended on how many supporters each side could persuade to join the fray, and whether or not either side could win the backing of the people at large. The involvement of many men would mean that every violent conflict would do immense damage. Also, as the quarrel of Agamemnon and Akhilleus shows, there would be a serious risk of miscalculating one's chances of success - a much more serious risk than there would be if all depended on one's own prowess. Conflicts between commoners would often be prevented from escalating by the intervention of princes. When either side made use of a contact in the ruling class, the princes - in the manner of Homeric gods - would take the matter in hand and impose a settlement agreed upon among themselves. The adversaries could only obey, in the way that Akhilleus and Odysseus obediently accept the settlements arranged for them by the gods. As for a hypothetical commoner fighting a prince, not only is there a norm which enjoins men not to oppose their superiors, but the disparity in personal power would in itself be enough to make that an unlikely event. Homeric society would thus leave less room for physical violence than the epics seem to suggest. It is not by chance that violence is most common and most severe in clashes between gods and men, for gods, unlike mortals, are totally immune from any risk of retaliation. Among mortals, physical violence would be most likely to occur when one party is sure of broad support while the other is almost entirely devoid of connections - as when a prince attacks a beggar, stranger or hired

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labourer, or when a prominent prince takes offence at the behaviour of a low-ranking commoner. One might speculate that force would be used more often by young men than by elders. Younger men presumably could not simply during their fathers' lifetimes make independent use of their father's friends and dependants, and they would not yet have established extensive networks of their own. The importance of a man's physical force would be in inverse proportion to the extent of his connections. 112 Finally, given the Homeric norm that a real man should retaliate for any lack of respect, there might be occasions when a man who had been offended would be determined to kill his enemy with total disregard for the consequences to himself, purely in order to demonstrate his manhood. The prospect of heavy material losses, exile or death, however, would surely act as a powerful deterrent most of the time. This is not to say, of course, that there is not a great deal of conflict in Homeric society. It is to say that, although competition for deference frequently leads to conflict, it does not often escalate to a point where physical violence is used. Men are angry when they feel their status is threatened; they express their anger forcefully, as they are supposed to. But the epic image of the heroic world, while on the surface portraying a violent society, implies a society in which conflict normally stops short of inflicting bodily or material harm, and is confined to verbal abuse and threats instead. Note how Agamemnon, after threatening to confiscate someone's prize, quickly draws back and says : "But we may consider these matters again at a later time" (1.140). Akhilleus, too, several times threatens more drastic action than he carries out. Again, it never comes to the kind of violent. confrontation between the gods threatened by Zeus and apparently common in the past. The suitors, for all their aggression and numerical strength, are easily silenced when Telemakhos asserts himself: "They all bit their lips, amazed at Telemakhos who spoke boldly". 173 Threats, not actual violence, appear to predominate, and to be quite effective. The heroic world, then, is one in which conflict is frequent. Conflict is violent at times, but not as violent or as often violent as a number of epic passages and the epic tales themselves suggest. Overemphasis on the incidence of violence and the importance of physical strength is, of course, a feature common to all epics and many other forms of fiction,

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including contemporary detective fiction and superhero-comics. But in the Iliad and Odyssey it may do more than add entertainment- value. The notion that society is violent provides a justification for aggressive self-assertion. It allows men to believe that, when they bully others into displaying deference, they are pre-empting others' aggression towards themselves. It enables them to think that responding fiercely to some slight or imagined provocation is not only what a man is supposed to do, but also a sensible course of action : if they did not retaliate at once, ever more serious attacks upon them would be bound to follow. This way of thinking lies behind Poseidon's comment that he will no longer be honoured by the gods when the Phaiakians fail to honour him (13.128-30). One unintended offence by mortals seems to him to jeopardise all his honour, his standing in everyone's eyes. Zeus' answer that "the gods will not dishonour you at all; it would be hard to make the eldest and best a target for contempt" (13.141-2) shows that the danger is mostly in Poseidon's mind. The illusion of danger, though, accounts for the violent response which follows. The epics foster the illusion of a highly violent world, and I would suggest that in so doing the poems do not merely justify to the audience the violent behaviour of the heroes, but also create an image of the world that indirectly justifies the anger which men feel and express in real life. 174 . The notion that physical strength is an essential prop of safety and status provides another form of justification. The epics show that the personal, informal power needed in conflict is founded on a network of connections far more than on personal muscle. By superficially stressing the importance of individual strength, however, they create an impression that only strong adult males can hold their own amidst the conflict and violence of society. Women, children, the aged and the weak appear in constant need of the protection provided by men; Andromakhe' s lament for the future of her orphaned son explicitly makes the point. 175 In creating this impression the poems legitimise the authority of adult males - in particular male authority over women.

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9. THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING ANGRY : FACT AND FICTION A complex picture of status and its relation to conflict has emerged. The epics suggest that the foundations of prestige are above all personal excellence and personal power to defend one's legitimate claims to respect; the poems create an impression that the greatest of excellences as well as the greatest part of personal power is physical strength. A closer look, however, reveals a stratified society with a ruling class of princes, where birth and wealth weigh far more heavily than personal qualities, and where connections based on obligations which override justice are a source of power far more significant than individual muscle. The image of a predominance of physical strength, it seems, is an ideal image. It arises from a notion that princes must earn their high honour in the community by fighting valiantly in battle for the protection of the town, and from a notion that men in general must earn their authority over their families .by using their strength to defend the household against aggressors. By contrast, the image of a stratified society, and of heroes whose power depends on networks of connections, is plausible in itself and does not appear to serve any obvious legitimising function. I would conclude, therefore, that heroic society consists of more than one reflection of a single historical society. The epics reproduce the realities of this society, while also introducing unrealistic elements inspired by this society's ideologies. In real life, ideology and practice can diverge considerably without being incompatible; they become inconsistent only when ideology and practice are made equally 'real' in the fictional world of the heroes. The greatest cause of conflict in the heroic world .is competition for prestige - more specifically competition for deference. There is rivalry in personal excellence, but this is not in itself a major cause of conflict. It is most intense in athletic contests, rather than in debate or battle; insofar as it does give rise to conflict, it is not so much because of the intensity of competition, as because those who enjoy social superiority or an established reputation feel that any attempt to rival them amounts to a lack of deference. There is also a struggle for wealth and formal power as sources of prestige. Since these are scarce resources, not easily acquired by non-violent means, the pressure of competition might seem an adequate explanation for conflict in this arena. Yet the poems suggest that aggressors seize such assets primarily to show contempt for their

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victims. The victims, for their part, seem less concerned at their material losses than at the fact that they have been treated without due deference. Finally, the majority of epic conflicts arise out of displays of disrespect. These may involve no material losses at all, nor affect anyone's reputation for excellence, yet provoke their victims to retaliate even against the odds and at great cost to themselves. The prevalence of conflict springing from competition for deference is accounted for by the Homeric perception that social status does not exist without deference : a man treated without respect by his fellows does not enjoy high status, however rich and noble he may be. As a result, the heroes are touchy in questions of respect. Their sensiti'9ity to insult is heightened by the feeling that they have enemies who seek to humiliate them; their lack of agreement on individuals' position within the hierarchy of the elite increases the chances of conflict. Even unintended slights are therefore punished with anger and force. Moreover, although deference ought to be given willingly, in acknowledgement of legitimate claims to respect, it may also be gained by force. Hence the heroes are inclined to use threats and violence to coerce deference to themselves. They also use force to withhold deference from others. Such aggressive behaviour is frowned upon as improper and hybristic, but it nevertheless inspires fear and thereby wins respect and enhances one's standing. The heroes are thus tempted to be aggressive in spite of moral strictures. Anger is the key emotion. It is not just a natural response to a loss of face, but it is required by Homeric norms, and instilled even in those who do not spontaneously feel it. In order to hold one's own in the struggle for respect one does not merely need personal power, one must be ready to use it, which involves certain risks even for the most powerful, and may involve almost certain death for the less powerful. Anger is needed to overcome hesitation and fear. Homeric society does set limits on the expression of anger, but the temptation is strong to ignore convention and inspire fear in others by allowing one's anger to run out of control. Thus conflict escalates and is perpetuated. This interpretation thus reverses the causal linlC:s posited by the three explanations of violence introduced at the outset. The fragmentation of Homeric society - which in any case, as I have tried to show in the previous chapter, does not run as deep as many have claimed - is not the cause of violent status rivalry, but its effect. The nature of Homeric status rivalry is the cause of violence, and it is this violence which keeps

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communities fragmented to the extent that they are. If Homeric communities do not have a strong, centralised government, this is not simply because they are 'still' at a primitive stage of political development and have 'not yet' progressed along evolutionary lines towards a higher level of organisation, but because their form of competition for status does not allow - or at least impedes - more political integration. It should be stressed, though, that the political fragmentation of the community does not mean that it is also socially fragmentary. The role of force and fear in social life may tend to encourage that view, but although there is conflict, the very fact that it is conflict about status shows how significant the community is to the heroes. Status is by definition something that one can only have in a group, and by comparison with others. A hero cannot regard himself as a man of high status unless he is widely talked about and shown proper deference by everyone he meets; individuals in Homeric society, even more than in our own, are dependent on others in this respect. The frequency of conflict, therefore, is an index of the importance attached to interaction within the community. The idea that incessant warfare causes the violence with which conflict within the community is fought, is also turned upside down. I would argue that violent competition for status within the community causes men to make private predatory expeditions abroad, and causes public wars when it is extended to relations between members of different communities, and between communities as such. This view will be defended in the next chapter. The notion that a scarcity of resources is a contributory cause of violent conflict and war is no doubt true, but on the interpretation advanced here its contribution is small. Insofar as a shortage of material resources causes conflict, this is not so much because there is an absolute shortage of necessities, but because the competition for status involves a constant demand for more and thus inevitably creates shortages. More importantly, a good deal of conflict revolves around symbolic expressions of respect rather than scarce resources, and often wealth is seized not because it is scarce, but because forcible seizure is a demonstration of superior power and an act of.contempt. In such cases, therefore, violence would be used even if there were an abundance of the goods in question;

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Shame, too, contributes to the heroes' violent behaviour. It seems likely that the psychological insecurity inherent in a personality with a great need of social approval helps trigger aggression more easily. But the heroes' high sensitivity to the opinion of others is not simply 'human nature' : it is itself the result of their habit of competing to win the deference of others. It is their concept of social status which requires them to be keenly aware of what others think of them, and hence to have a sense of shame. Moreover, the major cause of violence is clearly not the incoherent rage that is suggested by the reference to mental instability. When the heroes resort to violence they do so purposefully. They enforce deference to themselves in accordance with social norms, and when they break the norms, they do so deliberately in order to humiliate others. If on occasion they get carried away, this is due less to psychological insecurity than to the pressures of status rivalry. There is reason to think that the epic image of a heroic world rife with violent conflict over matters of deference is not entirely realistic. The poets can only draw a picture of frequent and ferocious conflict by crediting the heroes with fantastic prowess and by ignoring the deterrent effect that the risk of involving kin, friends, and even the community at large, ought to have had on the course of quarrels. There is also a hint of inconsistency in the suggestion that hereditary positions of power are under constant attack from rivals. It is hard to see how one could still speak, as the poet does, of a birthright to rule, if in Homeric society there is so little respect for this right that everyone tries to usurp it. I have suggested that heroic society is based on a historical society in which the demand for deference is less of a source of tension - because respect is more generally shown in obedience to custom - and in which the tensions that do surround status erupt into open violence less often because rivals fear one another's power. Epic exaggeration of the level of conflict may derive from an ideology that a man's status is under constant threat, and that he must always be ready to defend it. Such an ideology would serve to justify the violent and intimidating behaviour of men, and reinforces the notion that no household can survive without its male head. This does not mean that the model for Homeric society is in fact a wholly harmonious community. For one thing, men carry arms at all times. For another, even in contexts in which the role of force is played

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down and merit is made the foundation of honour - as is the case in the portrayal of princes - there are sudden glimpses of the underlying importance of force as a prop of social status. In a historical counterpart to heroic society, then, conflict would be common, though not as common as the poems suggest. One may also wonder whether, in this hypothetical historical counterpart of Homeric society, the struggle for deference would not be slightly less prominent a cause of conflict. Among people as acquisitive as the heroes appear to be, considerations of material gain and loss might in reality carry more weight than they do in the epics. In suggesting that the material interests at stake in a conflict are secondary to the symbolic expressions of disrespect involved, the poems may yet again reflect an ideal rather than reality - a notion perhaps that men ought to fight for motives 'higher' than the conservation of property. On the other hand, there is no reason to doubt that in a real society a struggle for deference could be a major cause of conflict. That the heroic world is based on such a society is indicated above all by the existence of the concept of hybris. Since hybris is defined as aggression for the sake of showing contempt, the society which created this concept evidently attached great significance to the symbolic dimension of conflict. Allowing for idealising distortion, the epics still depict a society in which conflict is relatively common, and in which the issue frequently is deference, or rather the lack of it. In this society, as a result, social status is based to a considerable extent on personal power. It is also based on other criteria, such as birth, wealth and merit; insofar as it is based on force, it relies on connections rather than on pure physical strength; and the use of force is subject to moral restrictions. In all these respects, Homeric society differs from the Chicago gangland with which I began. Homeric heroes therefore resort to violence less easily than the boys in these gangs do. But when violence does erupt, its primary purpose is the same : it is a show of conspicuous destruction, designed to inspire fear and respect, enhancing the status of the man who has such power to do harm. Homeric social status and conflict have clear parallels in Archaic and Classical Greek society. They may have had parallels in Dark Age or Mycenaean Greece as well, but the evidence on status and conflict in

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these periods is too thin to allow even tentative conclusions to be drawn. 176 (I) Aristocracies of birth were common in early Archaic Greece. Hesiod describes a Boiotian community of around 700 B.C. as governed by a group of princes (basileis), and Athens, for instance, was ruled by a group of noble families known as the Eupatridai. Wealth and birth continue to determine membership of the ruling class in Greek cities in the sixth century and long afterwards, but wealth becomes more and more important and hereditary aristocracies dissolve gradually : the term basileis is later applied only to power-holders - monarchs and magistrates - while the upper classes as a whole are designated by such vague terms as 'the best' or 'the rich'. 177 (II) Personal, informal power in Archaic Greece rests on networks of kinship and friendship, and on the ability to mobilise the support of the people at large, just as it does in the heroic world. In Athens, Kleisthenes' family, the Alkmeonidai, was said to consist of as many as seven hundred households, many of which were presumably included on the basis of a fictive kinship relation; in addition, Kleisthenes had a circle of personal friends (hetaireia), and he like others would also have had supporters of lower rank; finally, he succeeded in getting the body of the people on his side against his rivals. The idea that personal obligations weigh more heavily than the demands of impartial justice is still current in the fifth century, as is suggested for instance by the anecdote that Themistokles insisted that, as a judge, he would not want to be impartial but strive to benefit his friends more than others (Plutarch, Aristides 2,4; Moralia 807ab). Not until the mid-fifth century does an alternative basis of informal power begin to emerge in Athens, when Perikles and others make a show of rejecting personal connections and obligations, and of devoting themselves to the common good instead, thus giving priority to cultivating the support of the people at large. 178 (III) The Archaic and Classical concept of social status is close to the Homeric one. The vocabulary is the same : status is tim~, honour, acknowledged in various forms of deference (timaz), and derived from arete, excellence. Hesiod says that 11 arete and glory come with wealth 11 (Works & Days, 313), while Tyrtaios exactly mirrors the Homeric idealised view of excellence, when he lists a series of aretai - runningspeed, wrestling-strength, good looks, wealth, 'princeliness' and eloquence - and concludes that more important than any of these is

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martial prowess (F 9,1-14 Diehl). From the sixth century ony ards, utterances on the nature of excellence give greater prominence to moral excellence. 1

"Many bad men are rich, good men live in poverty; yet we will not exchange with them arete for wealth" (Solon F 4,1-3 Diehl = Theognis 315-7). "Choose to live with few possessions and be pious, rather than to be rich while consuming wealth unjustly. In justice all arete is summed up; every man is good... when he is just" (Theognis 145-8; Phokylides F 10 Diehl)

Nevertheless, in common usage one can still speak without explanation of a 'good' man to mean a brave man, and the phrase 'the good men' continues to refer to the upper classes. 179 As for deference, Xenophon, for example, describes the highest possible honour in terms of being served eagerly by everyone, being "gaped at" by all, everyone rising from their seats and making way in the streets for one·, and everyone present always "privileging" one in word and deed (Hiero 7 ,2). It may be noted that, according to Herodotos, publicly greeting one another by name is a custom characteristic of the Greeks. He contrasts it with the silent bowing of the Egyptians and the hierarchical forms of deference practised by the Persians, among whom it is customary to kiss an equal on the mouth, a superior on the cheek, and to prostrate oneself before one who is far superior (11.80; 1.134). The comparatively egalitarian Greek forms of deference are no different from those found in the epics; they remain unchanged until Hellenistic times. With the development of stateinstitutions, however, emerge institutional and formal privileges such as the double share of food offered to the Spartan kings, and the dinners at public expense provided for magistrates and guests of honour in the Prytaneion at Athens. (IV) The ideology that princes merit their hereditary status is found in Hesiod as well as in Homer. In Hesiod's view, princes - or many princes, at any rate - at birth receive from the Muses the gift of eloquence. Eloquence enables the princes to settle disputes in a just manner, and for this they are treated with respect by the people ('Iheogony 75-93). Like Homer, Hesiod elsewhere shows that in reality princes often rely on force instead of eloquence and wisdom (Works & Days 35-41, 202-64). The fact that Hesiod emphasises the princes' merit as judges, and does not mention their excellence in combat, while Homer

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stresses the latter far more than the former, is presumably due to the different contexts in which their remarks appear, and need not indicate a fundamental change in attitude. The Homeric notion that those who hold formal power in society earn this privilege through their achievements in battle, recurs in various forms in Greek history. Its most common expression is the view that the right to vote and hold office must be held by the well-off citizens who serve as hoplites, since it is these heavy-armed infantry soldiers who protect the community. One specifically Athenian variant is the view that political privileges should be shared by the poorer citizens who serve as rowers in the fleet, since the city's military power depends on them more than on hoplites. Given that in the epics it is the basileis who dominate battle, it seems likely that Homer represents the ideology current in Greek society during the political ascendancy of hereditary aristocracies. This would have been the period immediately prior to the rise of the hoplite class as a political force, a process which is ususally dated to the mid-seventh century. This date, however, is problematic. It is based on evidence for the development of hoplite equipment and hoplite phalanx tactics, but not only has the validity of this evidence been questioned, it is also far from certain that hoplites constituted a political force as soon as they became a military force. tso (V) The competitiveness of Archaic and Classical Greek society is well-known. Honour and reputation are its goals, just as they are in the epics. "It seems ... to be a big thing, honour", Xenophon has a character say. "Indeed, it seems to me... that this is what distinguishes a man from other living creatures, this striving for honour... The love of honour is not innate in dumb animals, nor even in all humans. Those who do have an innate desire for honour and praise [are superior beings, and] are to be regarded as men, not merely humans" (Hiero 7,1and3).

Rivalry in personal excellence among the upper classes of· Archaic Greece centres on athletic and musical competitions. As in the epics, this rivalry is keen, but not often a cause of conflict. Competition for political power is intense, and at times violent. During the Archaic age, it regularly leads to tyranny : the usurpation of constitutional power, or the forcible creation of an extra-constitutional position of power. Xenophon believes that a tyrant's primary goal is to win maximum

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deference (Hiero 7 ,2); Aristotle sees the honour bestowed by others as "the goal of political life" in general (Nicomachean Ethics 1095bJ. There is much competition for wealth, too. "No clear limit of wealth is set for men; those of us who now have the greatest livelihood double their efforts [or: 'are eager to double it']. Who could satisfy all ?" (Solon F 1,71-3 Diehl; Theognis 227-9). Illegitimate appropriation of wealth, by force or by deceit, is a common theme in Archaic poetry; the motive for it is sometimes said to be greed, but more often hybris. 1s1 Conflicts arising from verbal insults or humiliating actions are a notable feature of Archaic social life. The best-known example is perhaps the murder of Hipparkhos by Harmodios and Aristogeiton, which was allegedly provoked by Hipparkhos' deliberate humiliation of Harmodios, whose sister he declared unfit to participate in a prestigious religious procession (Thukydides Vl.56-7). The concepts of enmity and hybris remain prominent in Greek thought. Men often express the hope that they may harm their enemies, and the fear that their enemies may harm them. The fact that hybris in any form is made a punishable offence in Athenian law testifies that the deliberate withholding of deference is a major source of conflict, as it is in Homer. The role of intimidation in coercing deference is acknowledged in a verse that acquired the status of a proverb : "Where there is fear, there is also respect" (Stasinos, Kypria F 24 Davies). 182 Evidently the struggle for deference continues to be an important part of the competition for status, and a cause of violence. The frequency of violent conflict does, however, appear to diminish. A clear sign that society is becoming less violent is that at some point men give up the habit of carrying weapons at all times. Thukydides claims that the Athenians were the first to stop bearing arms (siderophoreisthai), but he does not say when this is supposed to have happened (1.6). It is also significant that there is barely a trace in Archaic sources of the Homeric notion that a man needs to be physically strong in order to defend himself and his household against aggressive neighbours. Given the dearth of evidence, it is hard to say when the change took place. It could have been during the Dark Age or it could have been in the seventh century. 183 In matters of status and conflict, then, the .Homeric world is in many ways similar to Archaic and Classical Greece. . More specifically, the heroic worJd could, so far as we can tell, in all respects be a reflection of

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early seventh-century society and ideology. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, though, it could also reflect an earlier age, as is commonly held. If so, one would have to conclude that in this particular sphere there were few changes from the Dark Age to early Archaic times, with perhaps one important exception : violent conflict decreased. Whenever it was that the practice of carrying arms was discontinued and Greek communities were 'pacified' to some extent, the change needs explanation. I have argued that the competition for deference is the cause of the conflict-ridden nature of heroic society, and I have just pointed out that historical Greeks, too, engage in keen competition for deference : so why does the level of violence decrease ? The cause, it seems to me, may lie in the effects of population growth. One possible effect is that, as communities increase in scale and a greater degree of organisation and specialisation becomes necessary, people become more 'interdependent' and a more centralised form of government is likely to emerge. One could argue, along the lines of Norbert Elias' theory on The Civilisation Process, that mutual dependence and central control curb opportunities for aggressive competition, and reduce violence. I think this is part of the explanation. But if it is true that, as I said earlier, status rivalry of the Homeric kind impedes political integration, one might wonder how it would be possible for a centralised organisation to emerge in spite of it. Would constant conflict within the community not simply prevent the development of a functioning organisation on a large scale? My suggestion is that it is possible for such an organisation to emerge because population growth directly affects the nature of status rivalry itself : conflict about deference decreases as the size of the community which assigns status increases. The logic of this is as follows. Acts of deference and disrespect by definition are symbolic expressions of someone's opinion of another - his opinion as to whether the other is inferior or superior to him, whether he is worthy of respect or contempt. In a small community, in which everyone knows everyone else, each man can expect -all others to have a certain opinion of him, and he can therefore judge their behaviour towards him as if it expressed their evaluation of him - regardless of whether it is meant to do so or not. If someone, say, steals his sheep, he will conclude that whoever did it must have a low opinion of him and

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hence has shown no respect for his property. If someone fails to show him due respect in face-to-face interaction, he will conclude, not that the man does not know who he is dealing with, but that the man looks down on him. In each case, he will have cause to be angry at the low status imputed to him. By contrast, in a large community in which many people do not know one another, no-one can expect everyone else to have an opinion of him. A man may have his sheep stolen by someone who does not know him and therefore cannot be thought to despise him. A man will often have a face-to-face encounter with someone he does not know, and in such encounters there is relatively little scope for giving or taking offence. People who do not know one another can, at an incidental meeting, arrive at only a rough estimate of one another's status, on the basis of what they see : man or woman, old or young, rich or poor. Neither party can judge, or be expected to judge, the standing of the other's family, the extent of his connections, the qualities on which he prides himself, and so on. Therefore, so long as the other's behaviour is roughly correct, neither party can have cause to feel treated with disrespect. Within the community, a man will of course have personal friends and enemies, and since these people do know him, he will scrutinise their behaviour for signs of disrespect, and defend his status among them. But the larger the community, the smaller the section of it that consists of personal acquaintances, and the less their deference contributes to a man's status in the community at large. The sum total of the honours one enjoys in one's private relationships is no longer equivalent to one's honour in the community : private standing and public status are differentiated. This leads to a further reduction in the level of violence. Since the deference shown by any particular private individual no longer immediately affects one's public status, there is less at stake when one is treated with disrespect by a personal friend or enemy, and hence less need to respond with anger and force. In larger communities, competition for status and deference does not abate, but takes a different form. The display of wealth now becomes even more important than it already was, because it is one of only a few ways in which one can impress one's status upon total strangers. It has been observed that even within modem cities there is a difference in this respect between those who live in long-established neighbourhoods and

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those who live on new estates. Of London's Eastenders in the 'fifties, it has been said that "in Bethnal Green ... people know intimately dozens of other local people living near at hand, their school-friends, their workmates, their pub-friends, and above all their relatives". On the 'Greenleigh' estate, by contrast, "nearly everyone is a stranger". In consequence, "in Bethnal Green it is not easy to give a man a single status, because he has so many; he has ... a low status as a scholar, high as a darts-player, low as a bargainer and high as a story-teller. In Greenleigh, he has something much more nearly approaching one status because something much more nearly approaching one criterion is used : his possessions." (Young & Willmott 1957: 161-3)

The above scenario seems to me to fit the Greek evidence well. Greek towns began to grow rapidly in the eighth century, and there was also a growing community of the ruling classes all over Greece. In the Archaic Age, upper class Greeks did not only form alliances of marriage and friendship across the boundaries of states, but they also met en masse at international games and festivals. As for the increasing importance of wealth, I have already mentioned that it becomes the single most important criterion of status in the sixth century. In fact, Thukydides says that when the Athenians laid down their weapons, they turned to a more "luxurious" way of living. He mentions the wearing of fine clothes and gold ornaments (1.6). Perhaps there is a connection here with the rise of the symposion and its new dining-customs in the late seventh century. Whatever its precise nature and date, it seems likely that the new 'luxury' indicates that the display of wealth has become more important than the dislay of force as a means of gaining prestige, and that conspicuous destruction has been overtaken by conspicuous consumption. 184 If this is what happened, it was a process not unique in history. The development of the Sicilian mafia during this century, as analysed by Pino Arlacchi, offers a striking parallel. According to a Sicilian informant: "Up until the end of the war, it didn't take much to become un' uomo di rispetto, in these parts. As soon as people got to be afraid of a young mafioso's courage and his bloodthirsty nature, then a group of followers would collect around the man ... [The mafiosi] used to waste no end of time arguing and fighting about which of them was

165 the most powerful... They were ignorant and they took more notice of a man's name, perhaps, than of his money. After the war, everything changed."

Arlacchi explains : 11 As mafia areas became integrated into the wider national community, so accumulated wealth increasingly took the place of the traditional symbols as evidence of prepotency and success 11 (Arlacchi 1983: 58; emphasis added). His informant continues "The politicians arrived, the Cassa [a regional investment agency] arrived. Televisions and cars arrived. To get respect, you started to need money. The more money, the more respect. The same as it is today, for that matter" (ibid.: 59). tss

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CHAPTER FOUR

PILLAGE AND DESTRUCTION Predatory and status warfare

"You probably raided because of woman theft, didn'r-you ?", asked Sisiwi, headman of a village of the warlike Yanomamo Indians, when he first heard of the Second World War. The anthropologist who had told him about it recorded that Sisiwi "was visibly disturbed" when this was denied. "He chatted for a moment with the others, seeming to doubt my answer. 'Was it because of witchcraft ?' he then asked. 'No,' I replied again. 'Ah ! Someone stole cultivated food from the other !' he exclaimed, citing confidently the only other incident that is deemed serious enough to provoke a man to wage war.• (Chagnon 1m: 123-4)

Sisiwi's response is remarkably similar to that of modem scholars confronted with stories of the Trojan war. Like him, they have felt disturbed at finding an unfamiliar cause attributed to a major war, and, like him, they have proceeded to list instead what they regard as "practical and unromantic" explanations. Shortage of essential supplies and labour power, commercial rivalry, imperial expansion, mass migration or sheer rapacity : all have been advanced to replace the "silly causes" and "oddities" of the traditional accounts. 1 The irony, of course, is that although their attempts at understanding the wars of an alien culture are so similar to his own, Sisiwi would no doubt have found these scholars' theories quite unsatisfactory and indeed unnecessary. To his mind, the Trojan War corild have had no better cause than the one advanced in epic tradition : the abduction of the wife of one prince by the son of another. 2 Historians are aware, of course, that there are cross-cultural differences in the nature and causes of war, but perhaps they have not fully appreciated just how wide the divide may be.3

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I do not intend to argue that the Trojan war really happened, nor even that the cause and course of this or any other heroic war are portrayed in a wholly realistic manner. The question to be addressed here is : what is the Homeric conception of the causes and goals and the nature of war in the world of the heroes ? One may think that of all the aspects of the heroic world covered in the poems, warfare is the subject on which one is least likely to find a coherent view. After all, the tales of war incorporated into the epics are based on traditional stories, which were presumably a mixture of mythicised history, historicised myth, and pure fantasy. 4 Such stories would not automatically add up to a 'view', and there is no a priori reason why a unified view should have been imposed upon them by the poets of the epic tradition. Nevertheless, we shall see that a variety of traditional material has in fact been welded into a consistent image of the practices and norms of Akhaian warfare. From a reconstruction of Homeric warfare, moreover, it will emerge that its fundamental causes match those of conflict within Homeric communities.

1.

WARRIORS AT PEACE

The heroes regard themselves as men "to whom Zeus gave the fate of living through hard wars, from youth until old age, until we perish, each of us" (XIV .85-7). The old man Nestor, we gather, has taken part in at least three wars, before he joins the expedition against Troy. Twice he fought against neighbouring peoples, the Epeians and the Arkadians; the third time he went further afield, fighting as an ally of the Lapiths against the Kentaurs, in the north. Diomedes, although still young, has already taken part in the sack of Thebes. Other men seem to make a habit of raiding. Odysseus, for one, has undertaken plundering expeditions prior to the Trojan War, and goes raiding again when the war is over. s "It is a curious phenomenon that a people as intelligent as the Greeks should have been so bellicose, so incompetent in the conduct of their foreign relations", says Grant (1987: 12), echoing a popular notion that ancient wars were frequent simply because there were no better, more 'intelligent' ways of settling interstate conflict. It is widely assumed that

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each ancient Greek state was in principle in a state of war with every other, except when and where an explicit, and always temporary, agreement to keep the peace was in force. One community could therefore legitimately attack another without provocation. It is also commonly thought that a principle of 'passive solidarity' was observed: that, if a single member of a community committed an offence against an outsider, the victim and his supporters could legitimately retaliate against the offender's community, or any of its members, regardless of whether this community condoned the offence. If these assumptions were true, the frequency of war could easily be understood. But, as Benedetto Bravo has shown, they are not in fact valid for ancient Greece (1980: 678-9, 942-3,959, 981-2), and we shall see that they are not valid for the heroic world either. ' An explanation of heroic warfare must take account of the fact that Homeric communities are quite capable of coexisting and even cooperating peacefully. The network of connections of a Homeric prince typically includes relatives and friends who live in other communities. Princes often make 'foreign friends' or 'guest-friends' (xeinol) by an exchange of gifts, as when Odysseus meets Iphitos of Oikhalia. At the time, they are both guests of a third person, Ortilokhos of Pherai in Messenia. Iphitos gives Odysseus a bow, quiver and arrows inherited from his father Eurytos (21.11-6, 31-3), and Odysseus gives him "a sharp sword and a strong spear, the start of a considerate xeinosrelationship" (xeinosune, 21.34-5). Similarly, the Aitolian ruler Oineus exchanges gifts with Bellerophontes of Ephyre, after keeping him as a guest for twenty days. "They also gave one another beautiful xeineia : Oineus gave a bright purple belt, Bellerophontes a two-handled golden cup" (Vl.216-20). The relationship thus established remains valid even though Bellerophontes emigrates to Lykia and the two never meet again; it is inherited by their descendants, who become "ancestral" xeinoi (Vl.215). When by chance Diomedes, grandson of Oineus, meets Glaukos, grandson of Bellerophontes, in battle, he reminds his opponent that, because of the exchange of gifts, "I am now your own xeinos in mid-Argos, and you [mine] in Lykia, if I ever visit that land" (VI.224-5). They therefore decide not to fight one another and to have a second exchange of gifts. They swap armour in full view of the other warriors, "so that they too may know that we declare ourselves ancestral xeinoi" (Vl.230-1). The

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episode strikingly illustrates both the permanence and the overriding importance of such formal connections abroad.' Odysseus, who is portrayed - not least by himself - as a man with an exceptional talent for making friends, B provides two examples of how a prince may use his contacts abroad. Ankhialos' A"ow-poison Mentes, son of Ankhialos, ruler of the Taphians, and Telemakhos are "one another's ancestral xeinoi from the beginning", i.e. at least since their grandfathers' time (1.180-1, 187-9). Mentes recalls that he first met Telemakhos' father Odysseus "drinking and being entertained in our house, on his way back from Ephyre after a visit to Ilos, son of Mermeros : Odysseus went there, too, in search of a lethal poison, to have something to smear on his bronze arrows. But [Ilos] did not give it to him, for he stood in awe of the immortal gods. But my father did : he always treated him as a great friend" (1.257-64). In other words, Odysseus had been in need of a commodity that was hard to come by, since the gods were supposed to disapprove of it. In order to acquire his arrow-poison, he asked for it among his xeinoi. They refused, but eventually a very good friend gave him what he wanted. It is later suggested that Telemakhos, too, might go to Ephyre to get poison (2.328-9) either the town is famous for its poisons or else Telemakhos is expected to make use of his father's contacts there.

The Cretan Connection When the Kephallenian fleet, on its way to Troy, is forced by storm to put in at Knossos, Odysseus seeks out the local ruler, Idomeneus, "his dear and respected xeinos" (19.191). Idomeneus having left, Aithon, his younger brother, receives Odysseus. Aithon remembers how, "having made a collection, I gave to the companions who followed him com and wine and cattle to slaughter, at public expense" (demothen, 19.196-8). They are fed for twelve days, until the storm abates (19.199-202). 9 Normally, it seems, a man would extend hospitality to a couple of visitors at most, not to an entire ship's crew, let alone to some six hundred men. 10 Rather than mere hospitality, therefore, this is an example of crisismanagement. As a result of the storm, Odysseus' fleet runs into logistic problems, which its commander solves by calling a favour from his friends among the local authorities. These mobilise the resources of their community to feed the visitors.

Relatives and friends abroad may also be called upon to perform yet greater favours : several of the allies of the Trojans are led by in-laws or

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xeinoi of Priamos, Hektor and Paris, and it is no doubt in recognition of

these relationships that they have come to the rescue. 11 Friendship and co-operation between members of different communities, then, are not unusual in the heroic world. Although these connections are private rather than public, they could be used to the benefit of entire communities. Hence, since Odysseus has many friends in Thesprotia (19.269-99; cf. 14.321-3), it is not surprising that the people of Ithaka can regard the Thesprotians at large as "in harmony" with themselves (16.427). There are mechanisms to deal with such conflicts as may occur between communities. It appears to be possible for an individual who has "a debt" owed to him abroad, simply to go there by himself and demand reparation. 12 More commonly, the community will send out representatives on an "embassy" (exesie). Priamos went on an embassy to the Thrakians, with an unspecified mission (XXIV .234-5), and Odysseus as a boy was sent on one to Messene, by his father and the other Ithakan elders, to seek compensation for three hundred stolen sheep (21.16-21). Such embassies would afford opportunities for peaceful settlement of disputes, and the fellow-townsmen of an offender might well be willing to negotiate. The lthakans, at any rate, are so keen to avoid disrupting relations with the Thesprotians that they once nearly lynched a local prince who had dared to raid Thesprotian territory (16. 424-30). 13 Even when war does break out, there are recognised procedures for negotiating, and for arranging a truce or conditional surrender. 14 In short, through the foreign connections of their princes, individuals and communities may be able to get what they need from abroad without using force; the same private connections, as well as public diplomacy, can in principle deal with interstate conflict as it occurs. In addition, war is not regarded as an agreeable solution to conflict. Although men may experience a "lust for battle" (kharme), and want the reputation to be won in combat, war is predominantly depicted as "wretched", "bad", "painful" and "full of tears". The agony, the sweat and exhaustion of warriors, the grief of the bereaved, are highlighted. The god of war, who likes battles, is hated for it by his father Zeus, and described as a "plague to man". 1s It has already been pointed out that, even if heroes like Akhilleus and the son of Kastor choose war over a

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quiet life, many others "shudder" at the sight of weapons (14.225-6) and prefer to stay at home (XXIIl.295-9). 16 In Homeric society, then, war is by no means always a necessary option, nor a popular one. Yet wars keep breaking out.

2.

TROY

I : THE INSULT THAT LAUNCHED A THOUSAND SHIPS

The Iliad and Odyssey reveal Homer's ideas about the causes and goals of six specific wars of the heroic age. By far the largest body of evidence refers, of course, to the Trojan War. Ever since the fifth century B.C., the aspect of this war that has most bothered historians is the fact that, when Paris took Helena to Troy, the Trojans did not send her back "on the next ship or at all events ... as soon as the expeditionary force arrived" (Adkins 1982: 320 n.50). There are, however, a number of relatively neglected problems which it is only logical to deal with first. Why did Paris abduct Helena ? Why was Menelaos willing to fight over her ? Why were the other Akhaians prepared to support him ? All versions of the tale agree that Paris carried off Helena because she had been promised him as his reward for proclaiming Aphrodite the most beautiful of the goddesses. Paris' judgement and the abduction were the result of his "lechery" (makhlosune, XXIV.30). Although sex by itself would seem a good enough explanation, in Homer there is more to the abduction than that. In spite of the fact that Helena had come with him voluntarily, Paris does not speak of 'seducing her', but of "snatching her away" (IIl.444). Apparently, he prefers to think of himself as having stolen her from Menelaos. Hektor regards the seduction of Helena as a daring exploit. He says, when he sees Paris acting like a coward, "Were you like that, when you gathered ... companions, sailed the sea ... , mingled with foreigners, and brought back from a distant country a beautiful woman related by marriage to spear-carrying men ?" (111.46-9)

Helena herself reminds Paris that "until now you used to boast that you were better than warlike Menelaos in your strength, your hands, your spear" (Ill.430-1). Her furious reaction to his defeat in single combat

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with Menelaos shows that she too had believed that Paris was the better man. "You have come out of battle. If only you had perished there, brought down by a mighty man, who once was my husband" (111.428-9). These remarks - as well as the fact that Paris had gratuitously provoked Menelaos further by carrying off "many possessions" of his along with Helena - show that the abduction is regarded by all concerned as a demonstration of Paris' courage and strength, at the expense of Menelaos. 11 Menelaos is keenly aware of this. It is true that he is prepared to fight Paris partly because , like "any good and sensible man", he "loves his own woman and cares for her" (IX.337-42), and that he seeks to "retaliate for the struggles and sighs of Helena" (11.589-90, cf. 356). 11 But first and foremost Menelaos is concerned with what he himself has suffered at the hands of Paris. He refers to the Trojan War as fought "for the sake of my honour" (tim~. XVll.92), to Paris as "the man who did me harm first" (111.351-2; cf. 28, 366), and to the abduction of his wife as "disgrace and shame ... inflicted upon me" (Xill.622-3). He is driven by resentment at what he feels is his own humiliation as cuckolded husband and deceived host. 1t His brother appears to feel humiliated as well : men have gone to war "for the sake of Agamemnon's honour", too (14.70-1, 117). It is not enough to say, then, that the Trojan War was caused by Paris' 'lust' for a woman 'loved' by Menelaos. The important question is why these men fought over her, and the Homeric answer is not that it was love or lust as such which made them use violence. According to the Iliad, Menelaos and Paris considered the seduction of Helena a matter of prestige. By winning her, Paris won a name for daring; by losing her, Menelaos and bis brother lost face. The epic view is that, more than anything else, both sides fought for the sake of their status. Menelaos' first move is to mobilise an army to fight with him. He is joined by some sixty-thousand men, who remain in the field for ten years. This made the Trojan War the largest exercise of military force in Greek legend, as Thukydides noted (l.3ff.). A number of traditional stories tried to explain why such a vast army supported Menelaos. The principal tale had it that most of the army's leaders had courted Helena, and that her father, Tyndareos, had prevented an escalation of rivalry by making each suitor swear to take up arms against any man trying to take her away from her chosen husband.

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Thus, by accident, all these men were bound to join forces with Menelaos in his fight against Paris. 20 Homer does not refer to any of this. When he does mention oaths taken by the Akhaians (11.339-41, cf. 286-8), he appears to be thinking of the kind of formal promise Idomeneus makes to Agamemnon when he assures him of his continuing support in battle : "Son of Atreus, I shall most certainly be a reliable companion to you as in the past I promised and confirmed with a nod" (IV.266-7). Other tales told of difficulties in getting certain men to join : how Kinyras of Cyprus sent a fleet of miniature ships, not the real ones he had promised; how Odysseus feigned madness; how the young Akhilleus was dressed up as a girl and sent into hiding. 21 In the Iliad, by contrast, Kinyras hears that the Akhaians are about to attack Troy and merely offers Agamemnon a magnificent cuirass, thus "pleasing the prince" (Xl.19-23). Akhilleus is simply visited at home by Nestor and Odysseus, and is a willing recruit (XI. 765-82). He later tells Agamemnon that he joined the expedition "in order to please you" (1.158). In the Odyssey, Agamemnon says only that he and Menelaos had gone to lthaka and "after a whole month crossed [back] over the entire wide sea, having with effort talked round Odysseus, the destroyer of cities" (24.115-9). The various colourful legends have thus been replaced in the epic with the general picture that Agamemnon and his brother relied on persuasion in mobilising leading men of other communities, and that these princes agreed to follow them as a personal favour. 22 One more aspect of the nature of Menelaos' army must be mentioned here. One might have expected the Akhaian forces to be regarded as a private army serving the private interests of its leader. But, as Jeanmaire (1939: 64) and Murray (1980: 53-4) have argued (contra Finley 1977: 103), the Akhaian expedition is meant to be a public venture. This is clearest in the case of the mobilisation on Crete. When, at one point, Odysseus pretends to be a Cretan commander, he claims that the Cretans "told me and the famous Idomeneus to lead the ships to Troy. There was no way of refusing; the harsh talk of the people forced [me/us]" (14.237-9). The precise meaning of this phrase is debatable, but in any case the decision of who is to lead the Cretan · contingent, and perhaps even the decision to send a. contingent to Troy in

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the first place, is somehow subject to public opinion. That implies a large measure of community involvement in the expedition. 23 The same applies to the whole Akhaian army. We find that a man refusing to join the expedition would face "the painful penalty of the Akhaians" (XIIl.669). His obligation of military service is thus to a collectivity, not to Menelaos or Agamemnon as private individuals. 24 Furthermore, it is the responsibility of the Akhaians at large to provide the commanders with food and drink during the campaign, just as at home they provide the elders of the community with wine and meat. Hence Menelaos addresses the commanders as "you who drink at public cost" (demia, XVII.249-50). 25 In sum, the contingents mobilised to defend the reputation of Helena's husband and her brother-in-law are public armies. They each not only come from a particular community, but represent that community. Together, these contingents appear to represent the "land" of Akhaia as a whole. 26 The aim of the Akhaian war effort is "to acquire honour [tim~ 27] for Menelaos and Agamemnon from the Trojans" (1.159-60; cf. V.552-3). As a first step towards this goal, Menelaos takes Odysseus on an "embassy" to Troy, where they address the people in assembly (111.20524; XI.139-40). The poet does not give us their speeches, but presumably they formulate the Akhaian demands in much the same way as Agamemnon does later : "the Trojans must return Helena and all the possessions and repay the Argives with some suitable honour, [the fame of] which will reach even future generations. If Priamos and the sons of Priamos refuse to pay me the honour ... , I shall stay here and fight for compensation until I reach the goal of war" (III.285-9; cf. 458-60). 28

From the fact that the envoys address the Trojans in assembly, from the way the goal of the expedition is described, and from the wording of the Akhaian demands, it is evident that they do not hold Paris and his family alone to account. The entire Trojan community is charged with, and accepts, responsibility for Paris' actions. Perhaps the actual financial burden of paying compensation is to be borne by the culprit alone (cf. VII.363-4), but conceptually at least the transaction is between two communities as well as between two families.

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The Trojans are given more than one opportunity to satisfy Menelaos' honour and avoid war by returning his wife and property to him, and offering some form of compensation. Yet they refuse to do so. Thus we return to the question that, as mentioned earlier, has long occupied students of the Trojan War. Why do the Trojans risk destruction by rejecting Menelaos' justifiable demands ? Herodotos knew of two attempts at making sense of the story. According to certain "knowledgeable" Persians, he said, the Trojans refused to return Helena as a matter of principle, since Akhaians had previously taken Io and Medeia from Asia without ever paying compensation (1.1-5). This explanation was made fun of by Aristophanes in his comic account of the causes of the Peloponnesian War (Akhamians 514-31), and Herodotos himself took it none too seriously. He found himself convinced, however, by the other explanation, which he claimed to have heard from Egyptian priests. Their story was that Helena had set out for Troy, but had been blown off course to Egypt, where the local ruler had detained her while sending Paris on his way. When Menelaos came to get her back, the Trojans truthfully replied that they did not have her. The Akhaians refused to believe this and attacked. 2!1 Among other versions of the story, one may note the Journal of the Trojan War, a make-believe eyewitness account of the war, probably written in the first century A.O. Its author, calling himself Dictys the Cretan, maintained that the Trojans kept Helena, "because they wanted the great wealth she had brought with her and they had fallen in love with the women who accompanied her to Troy" (Clarke 1981 : 29). Despite the bafflement of later authors, the Iliad in fact offers a coherent and plausible account of Trojan attitudes towards war. In a casual reference to the meeting in which the Trojans first decided not to pay compensation, the poet says that, after Menelaos and Odysseus had delivered their message, one Antimakhos, a wealthy Trojan, spoke. This man "in particular - hoping to get from Paris splendid gifts, gold - would not let Helena be given to Menelaos" (Xl.123-5). More than that, he "proposed in the Trojan assembly ... to kill Menelaos on the spot and not let him go back to the Akhaians" (XI.139-41). Not everyone agreed. Antenor offered Menelaos and Odysseus hospitality and admired their speeches (111.205-24), so presumably he supported their case. The Trojans, then, were divided.

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Some favoured compliance with Akhaian demands, others, Antimakhos "in particular", were prepared to provoke the enemy even further. We are not told how a final decision was reached. When the Iliad picks up the story, it is nine years later and the Trojans are all tired of war and hostile to Paris and Helena. Hektor says that the people ought to have stoned Paris to death for all the misery he has caused. JO Hence, when Menelaos and Paris suddenly agree to settle their differences in single combat and bring the war to an end, the Trojans "rejoice" (ill.111-2) and pray for peace (III.298-301, 320-3). Menelaos wins, and by the terms of the truce the Trojans ought to accept defeat, return Helena and pay compensation. .However, for reasons of their own, the gods decide that the war must go on. To that end they inspire the expert archer Pandaros to shoot at Menelaos while the truce is still in force. Menelaos is only wounded, but his life seems in danger (IV.13-219). One might have thought that the gods' intention was thus to provoke the Akhaians into re-opening hostilities. But no: it is the Trojans who take up arms and attack as soon as they see Menelaos hit (IV .220-2). Moreover, the gods persuade Pandaros that by killing Menelaos he will gain "glory and gratitude among all the Trojans, most of all from prince Paris, who will be the very first to bring you splendid gifts" (IV.95-7). Agamemnon also thinks that "glory" will be the assassin's reward (IV.197, 207), because, if Menelaos were to die, "the Akhaians would at once begin to think about [returning to] their fatherland, and we would leave behind Helena of Argos for Priamos and the Trojans to boast about" (IV.172-4). In other words, the death of Menelaos would tum certain defeat into a good chance of victory for the Trojans. Evidently, the gods - and Pandaros - are counting on the Trojan army to exploit this sudden opportunity. 31 It is assumed that, despite their general warweariness and despite their having sworn to keep the truce 32, the Trojans at large will be far from reluctant to fight when they feel they have a chance of winning. Menelaos does not die, and after an indecisive battle the Trojans meet to discuss the situation. Antenor urges them to keep their promise after all and return Helena to her husband (Vll.347-51). It is later suggested that this view is shared by many (VIl.393). Paris replies:

178 "Antenor, the things you say are no longer friendly to me. You could have thought of a speech better than that one... Now I shall speak among the Trojans. I flatly refuse. I shall not return the woman. But I am willing to give back all the possessions that I brought from Argos to our house, and even add things from my own household." (Vll.357-64)

Then Priamos gets up to announce that it will be up to Agamemnon and Menelaos to respond to "the statement of Paris, on account of whom the conflict arose" (VIl.374). The Trojans may agree with Antenor, but they show no sign of that now. Even though their prospects of victory have faded, they accept Priamos' proposal at once and disperse (VIl.379). The Akhaians reject the Trojan offer. A few days later another battle takes place. Previously, the Trojan army had always fought just outside the city walls and withdrawn into town at night. The aim had been merely to keep the Akhaians from taking the city. This purely defensive strategy was not a matter of principle, but had been imposed by necessity : the Trojan elders felt that their forces were not strong enough to do more than that. 33 Hektor, the commander-in-chief, on the other hand, favoured a more aggressive approach. He wanted "to fight at the stems of the ships" of the Akhaians, and despised the elders, who had prevented him from doing so, for what he saw as their "cowardice" (XV.721-5). On this new day of battle, however, the Akhaians are weakened by the absence of Akhilleus and his contingent, and the Trojans succeed in driving them back to their camp. The Akhaians at once realise what this means : Hektor is going to try to bum the ships and "butcher the Akhaians when in panic they run among their v~ssels through the smoke" (IX.242-3; cf. VII.71-2; VIII.235). And indeed he is. In order to prevent the Akliaians from escaping under cover of darkness (VIIl.497-15), he keeps the army in the field even at night. His plan has the support of the whole army, including that of Poulydamas, the most cautious of his men (VIIl.542; :XVIIl.257-60). Next day, the Trojan assault continues, but is ultimately repulsed by the Akhaians. Akhilleus rejoins battle. Nevertheless, Hektor insists on sustaining the offensive and most Trojans applaud his decision (XVIIl.261-310). The Trojans are apparently not content with defending their city, nor with chasing the Akhaians away. They seek to annihilate the enemy.

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Homer's Trojans, then, resent having been drawn into war, and long for an end to it, yet they go along with decisions which cannot fail to prolong hostilities, and they aggressively pursue victory in battle. Furthermore, it seems that the rights and wrongs of the matter are of little concern to them. No Trojan ever argues that the abduction of Helena was unjustified and should not be condoned. Antenor does object to the violation of a sworn agreement (VIl.350-3), but the point is completely ignored by Paris and Priamos in their replies. Why ? One reason is the power of Paris. As we have seen, his father Priamos, the ruler of Troy, supports him in the assembly. ~e does so, it seems, because he is generally well-disposed towards his son and his daughter-in-law. Unlike the other Trojans, he treats Helena in a kindly manner (ill.161-5; XXIV.770), and he is so concerned for Paris that he "shudders" at the prospect of him engaging in single combat, and cannot bear to stay and watch the tight. 34 One might add that several of Paris' uncles are elders too, and surely the poet imagines that they, and Paris' numerous brothers and cousins, side with him for the sake of kinship. 35 We have seen that Paris' wealth and status bring him further supporters. Antimakhos and Pandaros may not be the only ones who hope to gain material rewards from friendship with him. 36 Finally, we may suppose that all the "companions" who had collaborated with him in abducting Helena, would back him now, too. 37 Thus, even if the majority of Trojans dislike Paris and do not want war, there is a substantial and powerful group of people who will take his side against the Akhaians. When Hektor remarks that Paris has escaped the stoning he deserves, because "the Trojans are great cowards" (IIl.56), he must mean that they have refrained from venting their hatred for him because they are afraid of antagonising Paris' faction. The same explanation goes a long way towards explaining why the people do not oppose Paris in assembly, and why Paris, instead of answering the criticism levelled at him by Antenor, can simply call him a fool and reproach him for not being on his side. His power, and their 'cowardice', allow him to dominate the decision-making process. The Trojan herald who informs the Akhaians of the result stresses this. He does not restrict himself to relaying the official message, but goes out of his way to dissociate the Trojans at large from the actions of Paris. When mentioning Paris' abduction of Helena, he interjects: "if only he

180

had died first!" (VII.390). And when announcing that Paris refuses to return Helena, he adds " - although the Trojans told him to" (VIl.393). 38 The Akhaians, however, see the matter in an entirely different light. Their view is that the Trojans are willing accomplices to Paris. Menelaos has had his wife stolen and his life threatened when he came to get her back; he has been shot treacherously; he has seen the Trojans break a truce and try to destroy his army and fleet. He feels humiliated by all of this, and holds the entire Trojan people responsible. He shouts at them: "More than enough, the other disgrace and shame which you inflicted upon me, you cowards and bitches,... you who took off, just like that, with my wedded wife and many possessions ... , and now, on top of that, you strive to set fire to the ships and to kill the Akhaians" (Xill.622-9). 39

He goes on to say that the Trojans are "men full of hybrls ... whose spirit is always reckless [atasthalon]. They cannot get enough of war ... " (XIII.633-5, cf. 621). They enjoy battle more than other people enjoy even "sleep and love, sweet song and flawless dance" (XIII.636-9). In Menelaos' view the Trojans support Paris because they like fighting, and they like fighting because they are full of hybrls. 40 He believes, in other words, that Paris and his countrymen regard themselves as superior to Menelaos and his army, and continue to humiliate him because they enjoy an opportunity to display that superiority to themselves and to the world. Agamemnon appears to agree. He refers to the Trojans as "arrogant" (hyperenoreonton) and imagines that, after winning the war, they would insultingly stamp upon Menelaos' grave and ridicule Agamemnon's "pointless army" (ha/ion straton, IV.176-9). A sophisticated picture of Trojan motives thus emerges from the Iliad. On the one hand, they wish to live in peace and hate Paris for provoking the hostility of the Greeks. On the other hand, two things militate for war. First, many Trojans have good reason to support Paris, and all Trojans have good reason not to antagonise him - even if he is in the wrong. Second, the Trojans at large are keen to have a reputation for superior military strength; hence they seek victory in any confrontation, even if they are drawn into the conflict against their will, and, again, even if they are morally in the wrong. If Paris himself is prepared to settle, they are happy to live in peace. If he is ·not, the combination of

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his power and their desire to maintain a name as a strong, warlike people - particularly when victory seems within reach - tips the balance in favour of war. When negotiating with the enemy, they like to paint themselves as helpless victims of Paris' tyranny; the enemy prefers to judge them by their deeds and sees them all as wilful aggressors, full of hybrls. The Akhaians, for their part, while primarily seeking to punish the Trojans for humiliating Menelaos, have another goal besides revenge. They seek fame by defeating and destroying a powerful city. They say that the fall of Troy will bring Agamemnon "the greatest fame under the sun, because he destroyed such a large city and killed many men" (9.263-6; cf. IV.415-6). Should he fail to bring Troy down, he himself admits, he will go home with a "bad reputation" (11.115; IX.22), "the most shamed man in Argos" (IV.171; 11.285), because "this is an ugly thing, even for future generations to hear of, that so many Akhaian men of such quality, in this fruitless way, without effect, wage war and fight against a smaller number of men, and have no result at all to show for it" (11.119-22; cf.297-8; XIV.88-94).

In these passages, the Akhaians speak of the sack of Troy, not as a punishment, but as the outcome of a contest of strength between themselves and the Trojans. In this light, Helena seems less a wife to be recovered than a prize to be won, "something to boast about" for the winner. 41 War, of course, is inherently a contest of strength between adversaries, but for the Akhaians, as for the Trojans, this aspect of war assumes unusual importance. Winning the contest becomes a goal in itself, to be pursued even when other goals no longer matter. One might have thought that the Akhaian chieftains, who have no personal grievance against the Trojans and have joined only to do Agamemnon a favour (1.152-60), would be quite content to let Menelaos bear the brunt of his own quarrel, and to accept the failure of their expedition if he were to die in battle. One might also have thought that they would be glad to accept dismissal if their commander-in-chief were to announce that he is giving up and going home. Instead, they go out of their way to shield Menelaos from danger, afraid that "he might come to harm and so

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take them a long way from the goal of their efforts" (V.561-7; cf. VII.106), u and they reproach Agamemnon with his lack of determination, telling him to stay and fight. Victory has become so allimportant that they will even fight on if their leader withdraws and thus leaves them without any cause to fight for. Diomedes tells Agamemnon: "If you yourself are eager to go home, go I The road is open; the very many ships that followed you from Mykenai lie near the sea. But the other long-haired Akhaians will stay for as long as it takes to sack Troy. Let them too flee in their ships to their fatherland : the two of us, I and Sthenelos, shall fight until we reach our goal in Troy" (IX.42-9). 43

Once drawn into a conflict, the Akhaians no less than the Trojans feel compelled to prove that they are not "an unsightly army" (XIV.84), not "cowards and weaklings" (IX.40-1). Whatever other motives they may have for sacking Troy, one is the need to preserve and enhance their reputation and self-image as warriors.

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3.

TROY II

: THE IDEAL OF ANNIHILATION

The ultimate goal of both Akhaians and Trojans is the total destruction of the enemy. The Trojans want to kill the Akhaians and burn their fleet; the Akhaians, even at their departure from home, anticipating a negative response to their demands, promise "to return after sacking well-walled Troy" (11.286-8). War and destruction always go hand-inhand, of course, and the sacking of cities in particular is such a common feature of warfare that one is inclined to take it for granted. Yet destruction in war may serve as many different purposes as it takes different forms. The manner in which the destruction is wrought tells us much about the motives of the attacker. Three historical examples of the sacking of towns and villages may illustrate this point, and put the sack of Troy in perspective. Mount Hagen, New Guinea (1930s) Ongka, a big man of the Kawelka, recounts the story of a war of his youth between his tribe and the Tipuka. The war started when one of the Tipuka clans •came out against us with spears and shields, saying as a pretext that we had killed one of their men· by sorcery. We denied it... But... they said 'No, you killed him'. 'All right' we said, and joined battle". Soon the other Tipuka clans joined in, and •the Tipuka as a whole laid waste to our territory, cut bananas, burnt houses, slaughtered pigs, seized our wives". Next day, the defeated Kawelka sent out search parties for their women and children, who were then taken to safety in the villages of allied tribes. "We, the men, returned to the communal men's house... We had to stay and fight it out". After months of protracted fighting, the Kawelka "one day" took the Tipuka by surprise. •we swept over them, raped their women standing up, chopped bananas, axed pigs, fired houses. They fled like wild pigs... After they had satisfied themselves with destroying property and assaulting the women sexually, the Kawelka men said 'All right... Now there is no quarrel between us, let us separate and be quiet'.• Ongka adds : "These events are remembered in our ceremonial speeches. The [Tipuka] Oklembo say to us 'We drove you out and your mothers had to drink your daughters' urine'. We reply 'We drove you out and your old women had to clasp men and sleep with them in pigs' nests'". 44

The sack of these Papua villages appears to involve no plunder, only destruction. The point of cutting down banana-trees and butchering pigs is not to acquire food, but to destroy enemy property. The women are

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raped in order to humiliate their men, rather than for mere sexual gratification; that, at any rate, is what the later exchange of taunts suggests. There is no taking of prisoners, nor is there any attempt to annihilate the enemy - although men who resist may be killed, and the burning of houses may claim further victims. The population of a ravaged settlement finds temporary shelter with friends or in the forest, and in due course regroups, often re-settling its old territory. The purpose of destruction, it seems, is to inflict serious, but not irreparable, damage upon the enemy in order to demonstrate the superior prowess of one's own tribe. ·when the enemy has recovered sufficiently, he tries to retaliate in kind, and when the score is even, there are no hard feelings. Porto Bello (1668) and Panama (1671) In the second half of the seventeenth century, British buccaneers based in Jamaica, and French buccaneers in Haiti, continually plundered Spanish towns on the Amerio, section 2.

58. Some doubt that Thersites is meant to be a man of the people rather than an ugly

and undiplomatic prince. Some ancient sources claim that Thersites was a cousin of Diomedes (Pherekydes FGH 3 F 123 [= Schol. bT ad 11.212); Apollodoros, Bibliotheke 1.8,6), but there is not a hint of this in Homer. Blok (1991: 166-77) suggests that he may be a prince who occupies an institutional role as jester (a clown-prince ?). Others argue that he is simply a member of a society in which there is no fundamental distinction between people and princes (e.g. Kirk 1985 ad

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Il.212; Edwards 1987: 165). It is true, as Calhoun (1934: 305) and Geddes (1984: 22-3) stress, that nothing is said about Thersites' low birth, and that the fact that he is said to be the •worst• man in the army need not necessarily imply that he is one of the 'bad men' in the 'class'-sense. However, it is clear that he is treated in precisely the same way as the 'men of the people', as opposed to the princes, had been earlier. That, and his ugliness, and perhaps also his lack of a patronymic, makes it almost certain that he is meant to be a non-prince, as indeed he is generally believed to be (e.g. Finley 1977: 111-12; Thalmann 1988: 1-4). Several recent discussions rightly point out that one should not assume that the poet introduces Thersites merely to criticise him : the episode also serves to show the princes in a different (and not entirely favourable) light (Postlethwaite 1988; Rose 1988; Thalmann 1988). 59. See pp. 34-5, 147-8. 60. There is no direct evidence for this, but the analogy with the custom of travelling to gather gifts from hosts (pp. 232-7) shows that soliciting gifts might have been an accepted practice of princes. Note also that Telemakhos suggests that he might have gone round town collecting contributions from people - but he is speaking of compensalion for losses, not of gifts (2.76-8; cf 13.14-15). 61. Commentators on the passage always stress the implied contrast between 'robbers of their own people', and 'robbers of foreigners' : Priamos is criticising his sons for robbing the wrong people (e.g. MacLeod [1982), Leaf [1900), AmeisHentze (1868] ad XXIIl.262). But that does not explain why Priamos should suddenly call his sons 'robbers' at all. Hohendahl (1980: 72) thinks that "they really have the contemptible habit of stealing small livestock•. Cartier (1984: 162) notes the general possibility that gifts are extorted from the people. 62. See Appendix Four, section 1. 63. See Appendix Four, section 2. 64. The poet does, in fact, acknowledge that mass efforts can be decisive even in heroic battle and that it is hard even for the greatest heroes to achieve much on their own (XII.410-12; XX.356-7). Nevertheless, he suggests that the heroes may win battles almost single-handedly : see n.45. 65. The significant role of compulsion in the relation between the princes and their subjects is particularly stressed by Rihll (forthcoming) and Van Effenterre (1985: 122-37, who calls them 'les rois du muscle'). Cf. n.151. 66. In these examples, as well as in what follows, the word I translate as 'competition' is eris, often rendered as 'strife'. Hesiod distinguished a 'good' and a 'bad' eris; the bad one consisting of quarrels, wars and other forms of aggressive confrontation, the good one consisting of forms of 'friendly' rivalry, economic competition and contests of skill. Hogan shows that Homer's use of eris covers both good and bad forms, in fact •any competitive event" (1981: 27-33). Nagler's argument that eris always has negative connotations ("eris means conflict when

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perceived as disruptive, i.e. 'quarrel' or disorderly contention", 1988: 83) is unconvincing. 67. Whitman (1958) is particularly vitriolic in his judgement : "a mere thug"; "a sketch of mean violence• (165); •violent ruffian" (174); "outwardly a prince, but inwardly, as Homer never is weary of showing, a ruffian and a boor" (264); cf. Willcock 1976: ad XIII.202; XXIII.448, 774. I agree that the poet depicts Aias as a man more aggressive than most, but I do not think that the portrait is intended to be negative.

68. Lists of events : XXIII.257-897, including a shorter list at 629-45; 8.120-30.

The Phaiakians compete (with the outside world) in singing and dancing : 8.246384. The funeral ceremonies of Patroklos, "prince" Amarynkeus (XXIII.630-1), Oidipous (XXIII.679-80), Akhilleus (24.85-6, 90-2), and of princes in general (24.87-9), all include athletic competitions and prize-givings. The Phaiakians organise ad hoc games purely for entertainment; no prizes are given (8.100-384). Compare the suitors' leisure pursuit of throwing the javelin and discus (4.625-7 = 17.167-9; they also play board-games: 1.106-8). Cf. Redfield 1975: 204-7. An instance of competition at a religious festival may be the chariot-race in Elis (XI.699-701) to which Neleus sent a four-horse chariot "to compete for a tripod". Since the prize is known in advance, the occasion may be an institutionalised competition, and hence not an instance of funeral games. The passage could in fact be a reference to the Olympic games, if one accepts a date post 680 B.C. (when the chariot-race became an Olympic event) for the passage (cf. e.g. Leaf 1900, Willcock 1978 ad loc.).

69. Note also that Odysseus and the Phaiakians compete no less eagerly when there are no prizes to be had (see pp. 93, 202-4). The value of prizes is commented upon at XXIII.562 (•it will be worth much to him"), 703-5 (two prizes are estimated to have a value of twelve and four oxen, respectively), and 885 (another prize is "worth an ox"). Agamemnon mentions the great wealth his race-horses have won for him (IX.123-7 = 265-9). In historical Greece, too, competitors stood to win a good deal besides a token prize (Finley & Pleket 1976: 24; Duminil 1988: 20-3). 70. It is therefore untrue that "Homeric ethics did not require fair play" (O'Neal 1979: 13). Duminil argues that Antilokhos (and Nestor, who coaches him) represent a "new conception of sport" (1988: 27-30). She believes that, while by Antilokhos' standards and indeed "in our eyes", there is nothing wrong with Antilokhos' "trick", the •old values" of the Akhaians require the absence of anything one might call "tactics". Such speculation is uMecessary. Antilokhos accepts that he has gone too far in his eagerness to win, and surely even "in our eyes" it is unacceptable for a sportsman to take risks that may endanger other competitors. 71. They also try, it seems, to throw Odysseus off balance by sneering at him while he is preparing for his shot (21.396-404).

n. On Tydeus and on the Phaiakian games, see pp. 202-4.

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73. Cf. Adkins (1972c: 4) who stresses the material loss suffered by Poseidon in the absence of hecatombs, but also says that Poseidon is "concerned with fame rather than ti~". 74. As for Patroldos' manslaughter over a game of knucldebones (cited p. 63), we cannot know what moved him to anger, since the circumstances are not described. It might have been the result of competitiveness, but Patroldos might also have felt insulted or cheated for some reason. 75. It has been said that dynamis here refers to physical strength, "which is decisive for the distance of the throw• (Ameis-Hentze 1868: ad XXIIt891), but the parallel description of Agamemnon as •both a good basileus and a strong spearman• (111.179) tends to confirm that dynamis refers to his power as a ruler (cf. Redfield 1975: 207-10). Menelaos says that he does not wish to be regarded as 'pulling rank' in order to defeat Antilokhos (XXIII.576-8); his concern about this confirms that it is common practice. Cf. Adkins 1960a: 56; O'Neal 1979: 12-3. An interesting example of the way in which high status and superior personal performance are made to coincide, is mentioned by Whyte in his study of a 'gang' known as the Nortons c•noc•s boys"). "The records... show a very close correspondence between social position and bowling performance... Bowling scores did not fit automatically into this pattern. There were certain customary ways of behaving which exerted pressure upon the individuals... When [the leaders] bowled on opposite sides, they kidded one another good-naturedly. Good scores were expected of them, and bad scores were accounted for by bad luck or temporary lapses of form. When a follower threatened to better his position, the remarks took quite a different form. The boys shouted at him that he was lucky, that he was 'bowling over his head' ••. This type of verbal attack was very important in keeping the members 'in their places'.• (Whyte 1981: 23-4) 76. Akhilleus' low regard for his own qualities as a 'counsellor' : xvm. 106; cf. XI.786-9; Van Wees 1988: 18-9. Finley makes the point that 'the best in counsel' are the most powerful men, rather than the best speakers (1977: 115). The point is supported by Diomedes' concern to remind others of the status and wealth of his father, before he begins speaking (XIV.118-27; cited above, p. 73). Note that, if the interpretation of assembly, council and court-procedure advanced above, pp. 325, is correct, it is the ruler who 'judges' the speakers and decides who is the 'best'. 77. Other instances of aggressive behaviour in assembly are Agamemnon's response to Khryses (see n.102), and of course his response to Akhilleus' opposition to him. Paris, like Hektor, responds to a proposal by insulting the speaker in question ("If you are really serious, you must be crazy", VII.359-60); the suitors thr.eaten to inflict a heavy "penalty" on an old man who makes an unwelCf)me proposal based on a bird-omen, and, like Hektor, they reject the validity of such omens in general (2.178-93). 78. Note for instance the caution of Diomedes in making public speeches : in his first speech, he announces that he is going to oppose Agamemnon, and defends himself with the words: "as is allowed by custom [themis], lord, in assembly; you must not become angry". He also covers himself by reminding Agamemnon of a

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previous occasion when he, Diomedes, had quietly swallowed an insult from Agamemnon (IX.32-6). Later, he prefaces a five-line proposal with an eighteen-line self-justification in which he announces that he has a suggestion to make "if you are willing to listen and do not all feel a strong resentment because by birth I am the youngest among you", and proceeds to list his claims to be taken seriously (XIV.110-32; cf. p. 73). Most remarkable is Nestor's highly polite disagreement with Diomedes' first speech (IX.42-9). Before he offers his own advice, he assures Diomedes four times that his speech was excellent: "[l] You are the best of all your generation in counsel. [2] Not one Akhaian will criticise your words or speak against them... [3] You talk sense to the Argive princes, because [4] you speak as is proper" (IX.54-9). Note also Clay (1983: 188-208), who presents a convincing analysis of the dialogue between Athena and Odysseus at 13.221-439 as a 'duel of wits' in which each party diplomatically manages not to offend the other. 79. The force of the sense of shame is often expressed in the wish to die when shamed, see also e.g. IV.169-82; VII.125-31; XVII.415-9. Hooker (1987: 121-3) rightly draws attention to the distinction drawn by Hektor and Diomedes between the fear of incurring shame and more 'positive' reasons to fight well in battle. 80. Pandaros perhaps comes closest to drawing attention to his own achievements, when after hitting Diomedes with an arrow, he calls out •Forwards, Trojans... for the best of the Akhaians is hit, and I do not think that he will hold out against the powerful missile for long, if Apollo truly inspired me when I set out from Lykia" (V.102-5). But even in this instance, the warrior only obliquely refers to his own role in wounding an enemy, and the ostensible purpose of his exclamation is to exhort the army, not to boast of his achievements. (Pandaros appears to be portrayed as a rather over-confident warrior, see V.284-5.) I should mention again that the heroes are not fighting in isolation in front of the bulk of the army, as is sometimes suggested; if this were so, one might, of course, argue that they do not need to boast or show off, because they are already quite conspicuous. One might also argue that it would be too dangerous for a warrior to draw attention to himself in the midst of battle, but that danger certainly does not deter warriors in other cultures from showing off. Among the Kapauku of New Guinea, "a successful killer performs ukwaa wakii tai, a killer's dance. He runs around in a small circle, holding his bow at its lower end... He accompanies this dance by joyful screams, 'wuii-wuii', emitted at the highest pitch of his voice. This performance, which is put on despite the danger from flying arrows, is for the purpose of drawing attention to his success ... " (Pospisil 1963: 60). 81. Another instance is the boast of Odysseus (in his guise as beggar) that he is a better man in battle than Eurymakhos (18.376-80). Also, Apollo used to boast according to Artemis - that he could fight Poseidon and win (XXl.470-8). When he actually finds himself face-to-face with Poseidon, however, he refuses to fight, out of respect for his uncle (XXl.435-69). It seems, then, that Apollo's boast is only a way of expressing his claim to superior valour, not a real challenge to prove in a direct confrontation who is the better warrior. 82. The distinction is sometimes obscured when the problem is discussed in terms of 'glory'. Some suggest that Akhilleus after his quarrel with Agamemnon no longer

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wants to fight because he is disillusioned. He had dedicated his life to the pursuit of 'glory', but now he finds that in spite of his excellence he is not getting any. Bowra claims that Akhilleus thus develops •a strong mistrust of all military glory. •.. War is always like this• (1930: 196); Whitman believes that Akhilleus comes to realise that •glory is nothing. He can excuse himself of the whole ridiculous hoax• (1958: 188). This is misleading. Akhilleus hopes to gain fame, a reputation, by fighting, and in this he succeeds, whatever Agamemnon does. On the other hand, he also wants to be honoured for his services, and it is his resentment at not receiving sufficient deference from Agamemnon that makes him momentarily want to abandon the war. See further pp.122-3. 83. Penelope is to marry •the best of the Akhaians": 11.179; 16.76; 18.289; 19.528; 20.335 (cf. Nagy 1979: 38-9). The suitors speak of themselves as "competing for her excellence• (2.206; heineka tes aretes eridainomen), and Telemakhos laughingly refers to his mother as their "prize" (aethlon, 21.106-9). Nausikaa (6.34-5, 282-4) also has numerous suitors. Other stories of rivalry in courting include those of Atalanta (decided by a foot race against the bride!), Hippodameia (a chariot race against her father), Joie (an archery contest against her father) and Helena (see next note). 84. Penelope is to marry "the best of Akhaians and the one who provides the most" (20.335; cf. 16.76-7); •providing infinite bridewealth• (e.g. 19.529). Note also 15.16-18: Penelope's family tell her to marry Eurymakhos, "for he surpasses all the suitors in gifts [to her?] and keeps raising the bridewealth [hedna]". Presents to the prospective bride are mentioned explicitly at 18.278-301. For detailed discussions of the nature of Homeric bridewealth and the problem of its compatibility with the practice of giving dowries, see Morris 1986: 105-15; Finley 1981: 233-45; Snodgrass 1974: 115-18; Lacey 1966: 55-61; Finsler 1912. The tension between wealth and personal excellence is also brought out in the Hesiodic account of the courting of Helena. He states that Menelaos was bound to win by virtue of his wealth, "for he was the best of the Alchaians in flocks" (frg. 198.5-6 M/W), and that he did in fact "defeat all, by providing the most• (frg. 204.85-7; cf. 204.41-2), and then goes on to say thatAkhilleus would have won, had he been old enough at the time "for neither Menelaos nor anyone else could have defeated him in courting Helena" (204.87-92). Akhilleus' superiority clearly lies in his prowess, not in his wealth. Among the other suitors of Helena, Aias offers to drive off all the cattle of Troizen, Epidauros, Aigina, Mases, Megara, Korinthos, Hermione and Asine and make these her bridewealth, "for he excelled with his great spear" (Hesiod, frg. 204.44-51). It seems obvious to me that he means to attack these places and rustle their cattle, and so combine a show of prowess with an offer of wealth, but it has been suggested that all these places are in fact supposed by Hesiod to be part of Aias' own "dominions" (e.g. Finkelberg 1988: 32). 85. Sceptres : p. 33; Appendix 1\vo, section 2; public seats : pp. 29,33,34. 86. See Appendix Three, section l (pp. 285-92), for the suitors' aims and strategy. 87. See Appendix Three, section 1 (pp.282-3; 292).

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88. The passage is cited on p. 46 above. 89. The career of the son of Kastor may be an example of such social mobility. His father is described only as •a rich man• (14.200, 206) and may not have been a basileus. He himself starts off with only a fraction of the inheritance, but marries into a wealthy family and rises to be joint commander of the Cretan army at Troy (14.199-242). On the other hand, it is not clear that the son of Kastor does in fact attain the status of prince : he makes his name as a leader of 'pirates' (see pp. 20710) and perhaps such a man might play a leading part in the army without necessarily acquiring the title and powers of a basileus. In any case, the theoretical possibility of upward and downward mobility means that it is incorrect to speak of a social structure "caste-like in its rigidity" (Finley lm: 60). 90. Decorated chair : 19.55-8; Phoenician silver craters : 4.613-19 = 15.113-19 (a gift from the prince of Sidon, "the most beautiful and most valuable" of all Menelaos' treasures) and XXIII.740-8 (one which "in beauty far surpassed everything on earth•). Silver bath-tubs and wool-basket : 4.125-32. For other treasures, and for the house and slaves, see pp. 41-2, 49. Embroidered peploi: VI.289-95; 15.105; 18.292-3; purple cloaks: Vill.221; 19.225; purple and embroidered garment: ill.125-7; a very fine tunic: 19.232-5. Ornate pins: 19.226-31 (golden double pin with figures of dog and fawn locked in struggle); 18.293-4. Necklaces and earrings: 15.459-63; 18.295-300; XIV.182-3. Swords: e.g. 2.3; 22.74,79; Agamemnon's sword has a gold-studded hilt (XI.29-30). Daggers: XVIII.597-8. Show-dogs: 17.306-10; horse-ornament: IV.141-5 (purple-stained ivory cheek-piece, made in Maionia). The contents of Odysseus' storeroom(s) are described in some detail: 2.337-47; 21.8-14, 42-62. 91. I can find no evidence for rivalry in generosity in gift-exchange; see pp. 228-37. As for competition in one-sided generosity, the nearest the epics come to mentioning it, is when Agamemnon says that the prizes awarded at Akhilleus' funeral were more spectacular than any ever offered at funeral games (24.85-92). Note that, although the prizes given at the games for Patroklos are described in detail, no invidious comparisons are made with the value of prizes at other games. 92. See pp. 45-6. 93. See pp. 42-4.

94. Laertes owns a farm •which he himself once acquired, after he toiled very hard" (24.205-7). Surely this refers to bringing new land under cultivation (Andreev 1988: 32), and Finley offers no particular evidence for his claim that "few men actually did anything so absurd and foolhardy" as to "push beyond the frontier and take up vacant tand• (1977: 60). 95. That kerdoslkerdea means 'gain at the expense of another' is argued by Cozzo (1988). Finley (1977: 122) renders it 'advantage' rather than 'profit', but there can be no doubt that advantage in these contexts consists in material profit. On the subject of acquisitiveness, see also the comments of Finster (1914: 169-70), and Nilsson's interesting observation that "the poet can hardly ever bring himself to let

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the Trojans win weapons or horses as spoils, although many Akhaians are slain• (1924: 365 n.8). See further Chapter Four, sections 7-9. 96. For estate-production and craftsmen, seep. 52. For trade and gift-gathering, see Chapter Four, sections 7-9. For gifts from the people, see pp. 32-3, 35-6, 85-6. 97. On Adkins' interpretation of ti~. which is that honour is virtually identical with material possessions, 'dishonour' consists in the loss of wealth, but, as I have tried to show, Homeric dishonour consists in the denial of all kinds of deference, not only those which involve material loss. See pp. 69-71, esp. n.30; on dishonour, see also Maffi 1979. An example of Adkins' overemphasis on •material goods" as the basis of honour is his interpretation of the passage in which Poseidon explains why he wishes to deprive the Phaiakians of their privilege of sailing the seas in perfect safety. Poseidon is concerned that he will no longer be honoured by the gods, if the Phaiakians do not honour him (13.128-30, cited below, p. 112). Adkins says that Poseidon cannot allow the Phaiakians •too high a success-rate" because this "might diminish men's fear of the sea and of the sea-god; and if they did not fear the seagod, why should they offer him sacrifice, material goods as ti~?" (1972c: 4-6). In fact, Poseidon is primarily concerned with the reaction of his fellow-gods, not with that of mortals. The kinds of deference that the gods might deny him must surely be largely of a non-material nature. 98. The suitors' hybris: 1.227, 368; 3.207; 4.321, 627; 15.329; 16.86, 410, 418; 17.169, 588; 20.170, 370; 23.64; 24.282, 352; and see pp. 115-18 for further instances. 99. Fisher (1976 [translation on p.179); 1979) demonstrates the validity of Aristotle's definition for Homeric hybris and Greek hybris in general (con1ra MacDowell 1976; see also Murray 1983b: 269). Cf. n.182.

100. Agamemnon wants a prize as a substitute for one he has had to give up. From the start, he sees this as a test of power. He insists that he should be given a new prize, "or else I shall take one myself - I shall go and take yours, or the prize of Aias, or of Odysseus, and take it away. And he will be angry, whomever I pay a visit" (1.137-9). By implying that he is not afraid to provoke others' anger, Agamemnon asserts that he is more powerful than anyone else. For the motives of Orsilokhos, seep. 119. Note also that Aigisthos' coup in Mykenai is part of a long-running feud about which branch of the family has the right to rule (see Appendix Three, section 1 (pp.284-5) : his motive in taking power is at least partly revenge. 101. Adkins concludes that "in this society it is impossible that e.g. possessions should long remain the property of anyone who has not the courage and strength needed to defend them" (1960b: 28; emphasis added). As for power, Finley places great stress on "the element of naked force" ("a weak king was not a king, ... a king either had the might to rule or he did not rule at all") at the expense of "the dynastic principle" (1977: 83-7; cf. Van Effenterre and Rihll as cited in n.65 above, 151 .below).

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It is significant, however, that several threats to property and power are not real but merely imagined: see pp. 148-52, 156.

102. For the context of this outburst, and the problems surrounding it, see pp. 12931, n.140, p. 137. In a similar episode, the request of an old priest, Khryses, to be allowed to ransom his captive daughter, is rejected by Agamemnon in "a strong speech• : ••1.et me not catch you here at the ships, old man, either lingering now or Ieturning later... Go away, do not provoke me, if you wish to come home safely' ... The old man was frightened and did as he was told" (1.25-33). It should be said that in neither episode is the word 'dishonour' used, but it is clear from other passages that disobedience is regarded as bringing dishonour on the person disobeyed: seep. 71, esp. nn. 25-26. 103. Compare views on Agamemnon: he displays "a weak man's anger" (Edwards 1987: 179); according to Whitman "his prowess [is marred] by a savagery which is the product of uncertainty and fear" (1958: 163); cf. Bassett (1938: 196-7). Redfield, by contrast, rightly argues that Agamemnon's taking Briseis away from Akhilleus, although "a definite injustice", is not due to some character flaw, but "the enactment of ambiguities and contradictions within the culture" (1975: 97-8), and that Akhilleus is a "victim of his own ethic" (105-6). Griffin (1980: 74 n.46) rejects this, for the peculiar reasc>n that it is "too anthropological". Akhilleus has received a better press than Agamemnon : see pp. 126ff., esp. n.122. 104. This point is also made by Adkins, and I consider this a crucial insight of his. Dover (1983: 45), in making a number of valuable criticisms of Adkins' work, misses this point when he says that "I have always assumed that Odysseus killed the suitors for exactly the reasons for which I would have sought to kill them if I had been Odysseus : they have conspired against my son, pestered my wife and consumed my possessions. It is obscurantist to imply [as Adkins does] that Odysseus said to himself : 'My god, I must do something about my arete !'• I would agree with Adkins that there is a meaningful difference : Odysseus, unlike Dover, one assumes, would feel the need to restore his own social status, not merely to avenge the sufferings of his family and the loss of property. It is unfortunate, however, that Adkins li.11ks his important obsezyation to a number of arguments which are unconvincing and have provoked much criticism. Adkins is right to say that "to be koko~ is to be th' sort of person to whom [harm] may be done with impunity, since he cannot defend himself" (1960a: 42, as cited on p. 65), but wrong to say that this is the only meaning of kakos, and that "to do harm is not to be kokos" (ibid.). Again, he is right to say that "acts of injustice... diminish the [status] of the man who suffers them• (1966: 198), but wrong to say that they diminish "only" the status of the sufferer (ibid.; cf. p. 65 and n.13). See further nn.113, 115. Long (1970: 131), by contrast, goes too far in the opposite direction : the deeds of the suitors, he says, reflect badly on them "and on them alone". Pleket (1971: 3534) rightly notes that both sides are affected (cf. ibid. 357). (Incidentally, in a number of passages, Adkins refers to status as arete, rather than timA. This is not, I think, correct Homeric usage.) Note that the Homeric concept of honour precludes our notion that a man 'dishonours' himself by acting 'dishonourably' : a Homeric man may behave badly,

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and others may honour him less as a result, but it is they who dishonour him by their lack of deference, not he himself by his immorality. 105. This formulation of why dishonour produces a violent response is perhaps more accurate, if more prosaic, than Snell's comment, as quoted by Finley (19n: 117), that once "honour is destroyed, the moral existence of the loser collapses", or Adkins' remark that "since the roots of his existence have been struck at, the manner in which the Homeric hero... recovers tllM is likely to be violent• (1960b: 30; cf. 1972c: 3 and 6). 106. I would suggest that the insults "dog-face" and "dog's eyes• mean that Agamemnon, literally or metaphorically, looks people in the face without shame or respect, in the way a dog might stare at people. Hence Akhilleus later sneers that Agamemnon for all his shamelessness, and "although he Is a dog, did not dare to look me in the face" when he confiscated Briseis (IX.372-3). Fixing someone with a stare is, of course, often regarded as 'impudent', and it provokes the anger of 'George' (cited p. 110), for one. Kirk, however, explains "dog-face" as a reference to a "fawning• look (1985: ad 1.159). 107. Cf. Aineas' shirking in resentment at not being honoured by Priamos (XIll.459-61). One might argue that the Akhaians are angry, not at Agamemnon's treatment of Akhilleus as such, but at the result of that treatment, i.e. the withdrawal of the Myrmidons which allows the Trojans to gain the upper hand. Thersites' speech, however, plays on a sense of solidarity with Akhilleus: Agamemnon is reproached for dishonouring •a man far better than himself" (11.239-40; see below, pp. 122-4). 108. See Appendix Four, section 2, on the rule that booty, once distributed, should not be tampered with. On the other hand, perhaps there is a threat to Agamemnon in the fact that Akhilleus 'offers' him a large share of booty, when it is Agamemnon's prerogative to take what he wants. 109. Alternatively, the passage could be taken to mean 'either he forgot or it never occurred to him', in which case the offence would not be deliberate at all. 110. See Long's criticism (1970: 123-6) of Adkins' initial discussion (1960a: 1060), and Adkins' reply (1971: 4-5). Adkins discerns two situations in which intentions do matter (when "excuses are accepted") : (a) in "co-operative•, as opposed to "competitive•, activities (1971: 4), and (b) when "dependants", as opposed to heads of household, are involved (1960a: 36; Frisch [1949: 78] maintains precisely the opposite). Long points out that these distinctions are hard to trace in the evidence. The habit of blaming gods or ate for one's offensive actions has been seen as a sign of mental instability (Nilsson 1924: 374-5); it has also been suggested that it is a way of avoiding responsibility so as not to be shamed by one's own actions (Dodds 1951: 17-18; Mueller 1984: 130-2). While this may be true, it also functions as a peace-making device : by denying that the offensive act was intended, one removes its offensive quality, and makes it easier for the other party to accept reconciliation.

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111. On the exploitation of theres: Finley 1977: 57. Compare also the threats to the beggars to ship them off to the mainland, "to prince Ekhetos, who is a danger to all mortals, and who will cut off your nose and ears with merciless bronze, rip out your private parts and give them raw to the dogs to tear at" (18.84-7; cf. 18.115-6; 21.307-9). Whereas the suitors' other outrages are largely gratuitous, these threats serve the purpose of terrifying the beggars into doing (or refraining from) something. I suppose that here, too, the idea is that they are to be sold as slaves to Ekhetos, rather than simply sent there to be tortured, though Ekhetos might be no more than a bogey-man. 112. A parallel that springs to mind is the treatment of 'parasites' in Roman comedy: they are poor men invited to dinner to be made fun of (or make themselves ridiculous) and they are frequently beaten and get things thrown at them (Plautus, Curculio 392-8; Caplivi 88-90; Terence, Eunuchus 244-5). Like the Homeric beggar, the parasite is made to sit apart from the guests (Captivi 471, Stichus 488). A slightly more distant parallel is the mediaeval court-jester. 113. Adkins argues that such acts of aggression barely, if at all, affect the good reputation of the aggressors: Penelope's comment is explained away as a "persuasive definition" (see n.31). That this is mistaken is clear from the other passages cited and even clearer from the suitors' own response to Telemakhos' public complaints about their behaviour: they claim to be "not at all responsible" for the situation, and protest that Telemakhos' accusations are "shaming us" (aiskhunon) and put the blame [momon] on us" (2.85-7). Evidently, they are worried about their reputation. See n.115. The hybristic treatment of beggars is deplored particularly often. On one occasion, even the suitors themselves spontaneously tum against one of their number who has maltreated a beggar: "Antinoos, that was not a good thing ... " (17.481-8). Adkins and others argue that aggression against beggars, strangers and suppliants constitutes a separate moral category, because these people enjoy the special protection of Zeus (see n.167b). 114. Campbell 1964: 273. Campbell notes the general similarities between Sarakatsani and Homeric values (ibid.: 263 n.l). 115. The implications are, of course, that Telemakhos should not allow himself to be subjected; that he, if he is a man of good sense, should be indignant, too; and that he ought to fight and die, if necessary. There is some debate as to whether the "shameful deeds" (aiskhea) and "ugly deeds" (aeikea) are ugly and shameful for Telemakhos to suffer (so Adkins 1960a: 41-3; 1971: 7 n.36, 12) or for his enemies to commit (so Dover 1983: 39; Rowe 1983: 267; Pleket 1971: 357-8; Long 1971: 130-2). That they are aiskhos to commit is in fact implied at 2.86 (see n.113); yet the point of stressing the shameful and ugly nature of this behaviour is less to condemn it as such, than to incite Telemakhos to put a stop to it. Perhaps the terms are used in an objective sense : they refer to deeds that are ugly and shameful to do, as well as to suffer and witness (see nn.104, 132). 116. See pp.42-4, 48.

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117. Jeanmaire (1939: 107) takes the passage to mean that the Cretan •without reason" renounces a previously existing status as Idomeneus' retainer. Nowag (1983: 56-9) argues that the Cretan does serve Idomeneus, but in a way that is "not pleasing" to his master : he leads bands of men in plundering raids that are not sanctioned by Idomeneus. Both explanations take for granted that retainership is always a life-long status. As I have argued previously (see n.116), this is not so, and given that temporary, war-time retainership exists as well, it seems to me that my interpretation of the passage is the more natural. When Nestor says that, having been invited to join the War of the Lapiths and Kentaurs, "I fought on my own" (kat' em' auton, 1.263-71), he presumably means that he was asked (or allowed) to fight as a leader in his own right (i.e. not as a retainer of some great hero of the past). Note that quite prominent men such as Meriones and Sthenelos do serve as wartime retainers to even greater heroes (ldomeneus and Diomedes). 118. Zeus as a head of household: Calhoun 1935. Zeus' habit of throwing gods from the threshold of Olympos, slinging them by the feet or hair (1.591; XV.23; XIX.126-31) is perhaps meant to parallel the human habit of dragging people out of the house by the ankle (18.10-12; 21.299-300). Zeus also casts gods into Tartaros (VIII.14-17; V.897-8), which may be the equivalent of incarceration or of throwing criminals in the barathron. Seep. 138-9, esp. n.149. 119. West (1988: ad 1.356-9) calls this "adolescent rudeness" and thinks that Telemakhos "is made to go too far" : this seems to me an anachronistic perception of what the relation between mother and adult son ought to be. Perhaps another instance of a son adopting a domineering attitude towards this mother is an episode in which Akhilleus appeals to his mother for help against Agamemnon. He sits on the shore, weeping, and calls out: "Mother, ... Agamemnon has dishonoured me, for he has taken my prize and is keeping it". His mother hears him, emerges from the sea, takes his hand and ·says : "Child, why are you crying "!" Akhilleus answers : "You know. Why should I tell you all these things, when you know "!" Nevertheless, he proceeds to recount the whole story from the beginning (for reasons discussed by Wyatt 1988: 289-92; De Jong 1985). I would follow Ameis/Hentze (1868: ad 1.364) in assuming that Thetis knows, not because as a goddess she is supposed to be aware of all that goes on among mortals, but because Akhilleus has just told her. In other words, he is saying that the two lines in which he had described the situation should be enough for Thetis : her son has been dishonoured and that is all she needs to know; she must do something about it without asking for details. 120. 1.277-81 (cf. pp. 73-4). I take it that the reference to Agamemnon being "better... because he rules more men" is to his position as ruler over all Akhaians, rather than as ruler over a territory (Mykenai and environs) more populous than Akhilleus'. If the latter interpretation were correct, however, this would mean that the poet is envisaging a system of ranking monarchs (by the number of their subjects) that does not apply to the ranking of princes within a community. 121. In the initial dispute, as Bowra (1930: 18) puts it, both Agamemnon and Akhilleus are in the wrong, only Agamemnon more so (cf. Adkins 1960a: 38). I can see no grounds for arguing that Akhilleus' behaviour at this stage is "treason"

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(Stone 1988: 23, 36; Mueller 1984: 34-5), nor that, by contrast, Akhilleus is •undoubtedly in the right• (Lloyd-Jones 1983: 13) and •completely justifiecr (Segal 1971a: 94). Although the situation does not change fundamentally when Akhilleus later refuses an offer of compensation, his moral position does become weaker (see n.140), and he suffers the consequences of his actions (although the death of Patroklos is not meant to be a punishment for Akhilleus; see n.146). The poet, then, is not taking sides in an unequivocal manner, and does not favour 'prowess' over 'power' (pace Andreev 1988: 69-70) or vice-versa. 122. Akhilleus is seen as "a lonely and haunted sojourner among men of inconsequence and half-hearted ideals", who finds that "integrity and life are irreconcilable" (Whitman 1958: 185, 189). His "isolated devotion to an ideal" of "truth and justice" forces him to "withdraw from a society which appears as unjust and corrupt" (Segal 1971a: 97, 104; cf. Schein 1984: 104-10). In his alienation, he seeks for new values, and becomes "a figurehead of the race as it evolves", "an Abraham, a Buddha, a Jesus, a Lincoln" (Lee 1981: 97; Arieti 1987: 5, 11, 25; cf. MacCary 1982: 30, 41, 45). Akhilleus' discovery is variously said to be a "higher conception of honour" (Bassett 1938: 195, 199-201); "the glory of fatherhood" and •patriarchy" (Lee 1981: 100); the feeling of guilt (Arieti 1985: 202); and most commonly the insight that life and human values are meaningless in the face of death (Whitman 1958: 160; Redfield 1975: 218-19 [despite his earlier criticism of this view, ibid. 11]; Arieti 1987: 8). It has in fact been argued that Akhilleus develops a new 'language' to express his new ideas (Parry 1956). It may be noted that this theory relies in part on the argument that, when Akhilleus does use conventional expressions, 'we know' that he 'really' means something else (ibid. 1; cf. MacCary 1982: 57-8). For a strong counter-argument: Claus 1975. Akhilleus' violent behaviour when he returns to battle is seen as evidence, not of "blind ferocity" or •spite", but of a "detached perspective" and an awareness that "death is the law of the world" : his acceptance of death "ennobles" the slaughter of his enemies (Whitman 1958: 160; Griffin 1980a: 55, 75-6, 191). His rage against Hektor is treated, not as revenge, but as "a suicide disguised as revenge" (Devereux 1979: 9-14); "unable to forgive himself, [he] vents his rage against himself upon the body of Hektor" (Bassett 1938: 207; Arieti 1985: 202-3). Scholars who do recognise that Akhilleus' anger at his enemies is the subject of the Iliad, hold a variety of views on the poet's handling of the theme. Griffin (1980a: 74-6) suggests that Akhilleus' anger in the end "forces him to a degree of introspection beyond that of the others". Bowra(l930: 17, 199) believes that "the theme is how Achilles' temper leads him both to disaster and moral degradation". Geddes (1988: 8-10) argues that Homer presents the quarrel between Akhilleus and Agamemnon as "a fight between two children that gradually gets out of hand", in order to show "the way suffering can begin so... thoughtlessly". See also Edwards 1987: 231-6; Redfield 1975: 85. The idea that the Iliad shows "the nature and significance of what men do and suffer, of human life and death" (Bremer 1987: 41; Schein 1984: e.g. 72; Griffin 1980a: e.g. 177) is no doubt true, but the same could be said of almost any literary work. 123. "The suitor theme is... a tale of villainy and retribution" (Finley 1977: 140; similarly e.g. Dodds 1951: 32-3; Havelock 1978: 147-51; Griffin 1980a: 139;

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1980b: 46, 52, 54; Lloyd-Jones 1983: 31). It is commonly thought that a concern with justice is a phenomenon first found in the Odyssey (see n. 165), and more specifically that the Odyssey demonstrates that mortals are responsible for their own acts of injustice and cannot blame the gods (recently, Griffin 1980a: 164; LloydJones 1983: 31-2; Latacz 1984: 34-5; Kullmann 1985: 5-6). Clay (1983: 217-18) convincingly argues against this latter notion. 124. On the precise meanings of the Homeric words for anger (kholos, kotos, menis, etc.), see Considine 1966 and 1987; Adkins 1969b: 14-21; 1970: 40-1; Scully 1984; note also Rose (1979) on Odysseus' 'barking heart'. 125. See Appendix Three, section 1 (pp.285-92). Orestes' revenge on the killer of his father is held up as an example to Telemakhos (1.298-302; 3.193-238; cf. 4.546; 11.461; 24.97). 126. On the absence of anger in Paris, see Collins 1988: 30-5; cf. Willcock 1957: 24; Monsacre 1984: 44-9. Interesting is also the fact that Khryses, when threatened by Agamemnon (see n.102), is afraid (1.33), although Akhilleus assumes that the old man is angry (1.380; cf. Robbins 1990: 3; Rabel 1988: 476-80). Menelaos is another hero who does not always spontaneously feel anger (see pp. 187-8). 127. "Giving in" to hybris: e.g. 14.262; 17.431; to strength: e.g. 13.143; 18.139; to "a great-hearted spirit" : e.g. IX.109-10. References to "heart-eating strife" (thumoboros, e.g. XX.253) also suggest an emotional, uncontrollable dimension to conflict. It is unnecessary to explain away this phrase as meaning "costing lives", as Hogan (1981: 27) does. Eris itself may not be an emotion, as Hogan rightly argues, but it can still produce a "psychological pain" in those involved in it. 128. Hogan, while rightly stressing the negative adjectives found with 'strife' in the epics (1981: 27), argues that the idea that abandoning strife brings honour is invented by Odysseus (who 'reminds' Akhilleus of his father's advice) for this specific occasion : it does not normally apply. "Only special circumstances, and special pleading, would make it so" (ibid. 54; cf. Adkins 1982: 303). I see no reason to think so. 129. On 'scowling' or 'looking darkly' (hypodra idein), see Holoka, who argues that "lowered brows" are a "social dominance gesture" (1983: 4 n.8), and that this facial expression is used by one who regards himself as superior "to reassert his own superiority and his entitlement to deference in the comportment of the addressee" (16). 130. When Agamemnon admits that he "was the first to be harsh" (11.377-8), he implicitly admits that he has gone too far; whether he thinks that he has gone too far in confiscating Briseis, or in asking for a new prize in the first place, is not clear. 131. There are four instances of corpses being decapitated (warriors being killed by having their heads cut off are obviously another matter, as Segal [1971b: 20f.] appears to forget). Peneleos cuts off the head of Ilioneus, in revenge for Promakhos, and raises it on a spear to terrify the Trojans (XIV.493-505); Aias son of Oileus decapitates lmbrios, in revenge for Amphimakhos, and throws the head at

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Hektor (XIII.197-205); Agamemnon decapitates Koon, perhaps in revenge for a wound received from him (Xl.246-61), and he cuts off the head of Hippolokhos in revenge for his father's misdeeds (Xl.142-7; although Hippolokhos is actually killed in this way, the fact that his arms are cut off as well shows that Agamemnon mutilates him deliberately). It may well be that these acts are meant to characterise Agamemnon (Griffin 1980a: 53-4) and Aias (Whitman 1958: 164) as unusually fierce men, but that is not necessarily a negative portrait. Note also that Hektor plans to cut off and impale the head of Patroklos (XVII.1245; XVIIl.176-7), and Euphorbos intends to decapitate Menelaos, in revenge for his brother Hyperenor, and present the head to his parents (XVII.34-40). The Akhaians hope to inflict unspecified tu!ikea, 'ugly things' (see n.115, 132) on Sarpedon (XVl.559-60) and the Trojans hope to do the same to Patroklos (XVIII.179-80). When Hektor is dead, each of the Akhaians steps up to his body and stabs it (XXII.369-75). All this passes without comment, and appears to be "simply the decorum of warfare" (Motto/ Clark 1969: 111; cf. Sandstrom 1924: 57; contra e.g. Segal 197lb: 33). Akhilleus' treatment of Hektor is criticised, not because it involves mutilation as such, but because it involves persistent mutilation over a long period of time (see below). 132. Although the meaning of kaka and aeikea (see n.115) is contested, it seems clear that neither implies criticism in this context. Earlier in the Iliad, it is said that Akhilleus "planned bad things" for the Trojans when he entered battle (XXI.19), i.e. he wanted to kill them and have his revenge. No-one has argued that the poet here condemns the killing of enemies in battle - yet the phrase used is exactly the same as that applied to the execution of the prisoners (kaka de phresi medeto erga). As for tu!ikea, the fact that (a) those who mutilate a corpse say of themselves that they are inflicting "ugly things" upon it (XVl.559-60; XXII.335-6; cf. 256-9, 354), (b) even flies can make a corpse aeikes (XIX.26), (c) it is the friends of the victim who are supposed to be ashamed at allowing the body to be mutilated (XVI.498-500; XVII.556-8; XVIII.178-80), makes it clear that calling mutilation aeikea does not imply moral condemnation of it. So too: Bassett 1938: 203-6; Adkins 1960a: 42-3; Griffin 1980a: 85 n.9; Van Erp 1985: 15-16; contra Bowra 1930: 21; Frisch 1949: 50; Biehlolawek 1951: 16; Whitman 1958: 206; Segal 197lb: 13 (cf. 15); Pleket 1971: 355; Finley 1977: 137. The mutilation of Hektor is criticised, but not in these words (below). 133. When Apollo has proposed that the gods should help Hektor, Hera angrily answers: "Yes, those words of yours might come true - if you gods are going to hold Akhilleus and Hektor in the same honour" (XXIV.56-7). This is clearly sarcastic, but nevertheless implies that the norm cited by Apollo will only be upheld if both parties have equal ties with the gods. 134. See pp. 146-8 (esp. n.166) on the problem of friendship and justice. Interestingly, Murray (1934: 141) suggests that the mutilation of Hektor is "odious and ugly" to Homer, but that at an earlier stage of the tradition "the ferocity of [Akhilleus'] revenge was part of his glory". It seems to me that these two ways of looking at the episode do not belong to different periods, but exist side by side in Homer (see below, pp. 137-8).

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Whitman and Redfield are, I believe, right to argue that Akhilleus' tn:atment of Hektor, although condemned, represents •the heroic code... pressed to its logical conclusion• (Whitman 19S8: 213), and that the poet's main concern in reJating the episode is •to explore the implications of the [heroic] ethic itself9 (Redfield 197S: 261 n.76); I fail to see, however, that this leads to •a new insight•, as Whitman (ibid.) has it : see n.136. 135. The suitors are also specifically criticised for dishonouring an •excellent• man (aristeus, 21.331-3). Adkins argues that certain passages in which someone is told not to do something or other •although you are a good man• (agathos per eon; e.g. 1.131, 27S; XV.18S; XIX.lSS-7; XXIV.S3) imply that a •good man", i.e. someone of high status, could normally get away with the actions in question. This is what Adkins calls •the claim of the agathos• (see p. 6S above, esp. n.11). The implication is of course that one would normally be less offended at the aggressive behaviour of an agathos than at that of a man of low status (Adkins 1960a: 37-8, SO). Although the conclusion is probably right, the argument is weak: as Dover has pointed out, the expression need mean no more than that the person in question is generally a "good man•, but is in this particular act deviating from his normal standards (1983: 38; cf. Gagarin 1987: 30S; n.S6; Long 1970: 127-8). 136. On pity: Scott 1979: 8-14; Sandstrom 1924: 2S-30. It is because (a) he feels pity, and (b) he obeys the gods (see n.148) that Akhilleus ends his anger (so e.g. Bowra 1930: 22), not because he reaches new depths of understanding (contra e.g. Brenk 1986: 178; Redfield 197S: 218-19; Segal 1971a: lOS; further references in n.122, 148). As Adkins points out, •pity affects the emotions rather than the mind and need not lead to new insight• (1982: 324; cf. 316-19). Akhilleus' speech to Priamos shows an awareness of •shared humanity", but that is not a new insight - it is at best a •temporary and ordered vision of the sufferings and contradictions of human life" (Mueller 1984: 72-S), and at worst "clich6" (Edwards 1987: 310). 137. On the Utai, see also n.167(b). 138. For Diomedes' view that Akhilleus has no right to be angry, see pp. 122-4. When Agamemnon asks for advice after having been defeated by the Trojans, Diomedes proposes that they should fight on regardless (IX.40-9). Nestor mildly criticises him for not "reaching completion• in his speech (IX.S6). Nestor's amendments turn out to be (a) that a guard should be set, and (b) that Agamemnon should try to appease Akhilleus (IX.6S-7; 103-13). Surely the latter is the crucial point. When the embassy to Akhilleus has failed, Diomedes is quick to say that it would have been better not to have made overtures at all (IX.697-701), and he repeats his proposal to fight on regardless (704-9). It seems, then, that we are to understand that Diomedes had not initially overlooked the obvious possibility of asking Akhilleus for help, but had deliberately not advised it. It is no coincidence that it is Diomedes who dominates battle in Akhilleus' absence (see below). He believes that he and Sthenelos could capture Troy even without the rest of the Akhaians (IX.46-9), and he is consistently the first to speak in favour of war : VII.399-402; XIV.126-32 (cf. X.218-22). 139. Phoinix says: "Go for the gifts, for the Akhaians will honour you like a god; but if you rejoin battle without gifts, you will not be equally honoured• (IX.602-S).

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Gifts, then, are a consideration. Adkins (1960b: 29) insists that they are the only consideration here: the honour (or the lack of it) consists of gifts (or the lack of them). That is a possible reading, although it does make the text tautologous. It is also possible, and I think preferable, to read the text as a reiteration of the statement that Akhilleus will be more honoured if he is willing to abandon quarrels (IX.257-8); if Akhilleus accepts the gifts, he shows a readiness to be reconciled, and he will earn respect for this; if he refuses the gifts and does not fight until forced to, he demonstrates a quarrelsome nature and will be less highly regarded. 140. Akhilleus' refusal is seen as morally wrong by e.g. Bowra 1930: 18-21; Biehlolawek 1951: 16; Finley 1977: 117-18; Rexine 1977: 3-4; Lloyd-Jones 1983: 18; Mueller 1984: 44-9; Gagarin 1987: 302 (for different reasons also Rabel 1988: 479-80). His refusal is regarded as justified by e.g. Bassett 1938: 193-9; Adkins 1982: 308-10 (cf. 30S: •Who, save the affronted party, can determine how large the [compensation] should be?•); Van Erp 1985: 14; Edwards 1987: 235. His refusal is seen as the beginning of a new morality by e.g. Redfield 1975: 103-6 (Akhilleus adopts an •ethic fundamentalism and purity of spirit• which is 'wrong' only because one cannot afford to be a •moral absolutist"); further references in n.122. It seems to me that, when Akhilleus argues that he values his life more than booty (IX.401-9), he is not formulating a new ideology (as e.g. Arieti [1987: 14] has it), but merely changing his mind about the choice that he had made earlier, between a short life leading to fame and a long life in obscurity (IX.410-16). This change of heart is only temporary, and only serves to justify to himself the withdrawal from battle forced upon him. Again, when Akhilleus argues that he does not need the honour which his fellows will give him if he returns to battle, because he has honour from Zeus (IX.607-10), this does not mean that he has developed a new concept of honour (e.g. Arieti 1987: 17; Whitman 1958: 183). It merely means that the honour he receives from Zeus gives him all the power he needs in order to compel others to honour him, without him having to earn their respect by helping them in their need (see n. 139 and pp. 137-8). In the following, I am in agreement with the view of Motto and Clark (1969: 110) that "the only flaw that one can find in Akhilleus is the heroic, headlong 'swelling' of his emotions and actions to terrible magnitude... Yet such swelling is not so much his flaw as it is the source, the mark, of his heroic greatness". 141. Parry argues that Akhilleus does not really want compensation, and makes "demands that can never be satisfied" (1956: 6; cf. Redfield [1975: 16), who suggests that Akhilleus does not know what he wants from the embassy), and Page (1959: 30S-9) insists that the later passages are inconsistent with the initial refusal. Bowra (1930: 197) already denied any inconsistency, and Eichholz (1953: 141-2, 146-7) explains the situation most convincingly : Akhilleus never doubts that "restitution [is] worth having in itself", "only ... he must have it on his own terms and in his own time"; he is willing to accept compensation later when it is offered unconditionally and under extreme duress. Parry (loc. cit.) calls this "legalistic", but e.g. Willcock (1976: ad XI.608 and XVI.49-86) and Whitman (1982: 100-2) agree in seeing no inconsistency. 142. Agamemnon attributes his actions to the Ate that had blinded him, and offers to make amends (XIX.83-138). For the meaning of ate, see n.144. When Akhilleus says that Zeus "gives great atai to men• (XIX.270), there is nothing in the context to

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suggest that he is referring to an ate of his own, rather than of Agamemnon, nor is there any suggestion of this elsewhere (so e.g. Adkins 1982: 307-8; Van Erp 1985: 14; contra Bowra 1930: 19; Lloyd-Jones 1983: 23). 143. For discussions of what is at stake in this trial, see the works cited in Chapter '.lWo, nn. 34, 35. The text is sometimes translated differently, to mean that one party claimed that he had already paid compensation, and the other denied receiving anything (e.g. Bonner/Smith 1930:33-5; earlier 1984: 174-5; Lesky 1985: 18). The crucial translation of anaineto (XVIll.500) as 'he denied' is not, I think, justifiable. The verb anainomai is used 18 times in Homer and always means 'reject, refuse' (so too LSJ); in two of these passages it is used to mean 'reject (the truth of) a statement', and here the translation 'deny' is appropriate (IX.116; 14.149). In the present passage, however, what is rejected is not the statement that compensation has been offered, but explicitly the idea of 'taking anything' (meden helesthlll) : 'refuse' is therefore the proper translation. The only reason for adopting the more strained rendering is that to some it has seemed that a dispute over whether or not compensation has been paid makes better sense than one about whether compensation ought to be accepted "for why should that lead to arbitration '1" (Bonner/Smith loc.cit.) the implicit assumption is either that an offer of compensation ought simply to be accepted, or that there would be nothing to arbitrate about if it were refused. Neither assumption is warranted. The case of A~amemnon and Akhilleus shows that different views on the need to accept compensation are possible; and if compensation is refused, the killer who seeks to make amends will look for arbitration in order to get 'official' backing for his offer from the princes and the people, while the victim's relatives will look for the same kind of 'official' backing for their refusal to be reconciled and their implicit desire to exact vengeance on the killer. Compare the situation among the Tausug in the Philippines: "One of the most usual statements for litigants in a legal proceeding to make is 'We know we will have to accept settlement sooner or later, but give us another chance to fight first, then come back and try to settle us'" (Kiefer 1972: 68). As Bonner and Smith note, Homer mentions many instances of killers who have gone into exile (1930: 18-21) : presumably the relatives of their victims preferred revenge to reconciliation and compensation, too. 144. Although Odysseus and Nestor do speak of Agamemnon's behaviour in moral terms (see p. 308), he himself speaks only of ate, which as Dodds puts it, is "an unaccountable error•, and involves "no discernible moral guilt" (1951: 6; cf. 2-8; also Adkins 1960a: 50-1; 1970: 30; 1982: 302, 324-6; contra Lloyd-Jones 1983: 234). 145. He speaks in the plural of "you• who "take away what you have given" (1.229), and later concludes that the Akhaians are being slaughtered •on account of their transgressions• (XVI.18). These accusations are justified not merely by the fact that the Akhaians have done nothing to stop Agamemnon, but also by the fact that the 'priz.e' is awarded (and confiscated) by the ruler/war-leader nominally on behalf of the community (see Appendix Four, section 1).

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146. Some argue that Patroldos' death is intended to punish Akhilleus: Bowra 1930: 17, 19-21; Lloyd-Jones 1983: 21, 26-7; Gagarin 1987: 302. But whenever Patroldos' death is discussed by the gods, it is said to be a decree of Fate, and there is no suggestion that Akhilleus is supposed to 'learn a lesson' from it (VIll.470-7; XV.59-71; XVI.644-55). Indeed, as Adkins points out (1982: 308), Patroklos' death is said to be due to his own ale, not Akhilleus' : if only he had not continued to attack the Trojans, against Akhilleus' advice, he might have lived (XVI.684-7). 147. The contrast between the uncontrollable anger of Akhilleus and the self-control of Odysseus is to my mind the most important aspect of the general contrast between Akhilleus as a hero of 'might' (bie) and Odysseus as a hero of 'artifice' (metis) : Nagy 1979: esp. 59-61, 317; Edwards 1985; Krischer 1988: 17-19. 148. I should stress again that it is obedience to the gods, and a sense of pity, that put an end to Akhilleus' anger, not some new insight in the human condition: see n.136. Athena's arguments and Akhilleus' replies make it clear that the gods are to be seen as external, powerful 'authorities', not as projections of Akhilleus' own conscience (so too Redfield 1975: 78 [misunderstood perhaps by Griffin 1980a: 153]; Edwards 1987: 181); nor is it true to say that 'obedience' to Athena is a metaphorical way of saying that "in the presence of Athena one sees reason and acts on it" (Mueller 1984: 136). Note also how dangerous it is even to Akhilleus to disobey a god : the god of the river Xanthos very nearly kills him for disregarding his request to stop polluting his stream with blood and corpses (XXI. 21 lff.). 149. For the use of the thunderbolt, note the threat to Hera and Athena : "I shall paralyse the horses that pull their chariot. The women themselves I shall throw out of the car, and the chariot I shall overturn. Not in ten full years will these two be healed of the wounds which the thunderbolt is going to inflict" (Vll.402-5 = 41619; cf. vm.12 and 455-6; and also 11.781-3; XV.13-17; XXI.195-9). There is no doubt humour in the depiction of the gods, as in the depiction of mortals, but I do not think that Zeus' torturing Hera, or his bullying in general, is meant to be funny. Rather, it characterises him as a powerful 'father' whose strength enables him to impose his will on his family (cf. Synodiou 1987: 18-19; Beye 1974: 92; contra e.g. Bowra 1930: 222-4 ["pure comedy"]; Whitman 1970: 38-42 ["grotesquerie"]). 150. Similarly, the Aitolian army suffers great losses as a result of Meleagros' angry withdrawal from battle (IX.558-99); the Trojans are thought to be doomed when they lose Hektor (e.g. XXIV.728-30; cf. Van Wees 1988: 15-18). The loss is purely that of an individual's strength and bravery, not that of the strategical brilliance of a general (ibid. 20). 151. Adkins (1970: 28) regards this as realistic, and concludes that the head of a household, in defending his oikos, "could rely on no-one else, and the other members of the oikos needed him to secure their very existence" (cf. 1960b: 28; 1963: 32-3; 1972c: 12; 1982: 294; also Gouldner 1967: 17). Finley, too, treats this as a realistic feature of Homeric society : although developments in lthaka and Mykenai are dictated by the traditional plots of the stories, they "are precisely what would have occurred in this world, with its delicate, easily upset balance of powers" (1977: 86); in the Odyssey "the narrative detail points to an essential element of

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Odyssean life : to regain his throne the king could count on no-one but his wife, his son and his faithful slaves; in other words, royal power was personal power" (ibid. 91). Cf. Van Effenterre 1985: 122-37, and further below, with nn.171, 176. 152. Of the three friends of Odysseus who are mentioned (17.69-9), Mentor makes a speech against the suitors once (2.224-41) and Halitherses twice (2.157-76; 24.45162). In addition, Athena disguises herself as Mentor when she helps Odysseus and Telemakhos (2.393-3.372; 22.205-50; 24.502-48). As for the support of kinsmen in revenge, note also that it is seen as 'a good thing' to have a son who can avenge one's death (3.195-8). 153. Akhilleus also has another, and possibly more important, reason to restrain Patroklos: he fears that his friend may come to harm (Willcock 1976: ad XVI.8096). But this does not alter the fact that he acknowledges the potential strength of his followers without him (cf. XX.356-7 [n.64)).

154. When Agamemnon tells Akhilleus to 'run away' if he wants to, since there will still be 'others' to 'honour' him, (1.174-5), he presumably refers to the whole of the Akhaian army (as well as to the gods). For the actual attitude of the troops, see pp. 87, 111. 155. On the role of the people of Ithaka : Appendix Three, section 1 (pp. 290-2). The fact that a prince, in a conflict with other princes, can in principle appeal to the people at large confirms that Homeric society does not consist of permanent 'pyramids' of leaders and followers which embrace all of the community: there are apparently many men without ties to a particular prince, who are free to give their support to anyone who appeals for their help. See pp. 44-8, 55-6. 156. Zeus begins by prohibiting the gods from intervening in the fighting (VIII.152). Then he solemnly weighs the Keres, the fates of death, of the Akhaians and Trojans in golden scales to show that the Akhaians are now doomed (VIIl.68-74). Next, he thunders to cause panic among the Akhaians (VIII. 75-9). Finally, seeing that Diomedes is still not afraid, and still poses a great threat to the Trojans, Zeus forces him to retreat by nearly striking him with lightning (VIIl.130-44). Edwards (1987: 186) says that, although it is Zeus who makes sure that the Akhaians are defeated, "this is what one would have expected to happen anyway". That is indeed what the Iliad at times leads one to believe, but clearly the impression is false : Zeus' intervention is in fact essential. 157. Athena first appears in the guise of Mentor, to encourage Odysseus (22.20550); she then twice makes sure that a volley of spears thrown by the suitors goes astray (255-6; 272-3); finally, she raises the aigis and causes a panic among the suitors which decides the battle (297-309; cf.24.182-5). Athena reappears as Mentor when Odysseus is about to fight the suitors' relatives (24.502-3); she enables Laertes to kill Eupeithes (516-25) and causes a panic among the rest (529-35), before mediating to establish peace (541-8). It is noteworthy that, although Athena had been sent to lthaka instructed by Zeus to arrange a settlement (24.472-88), she allows Odysseus' party a few more successes, instead of imposing peace immediately. Not until Zeus makes lightning

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strike at her feet does she fulfil her original mission (24.539-44) : it would seem that Athena favours Odysseus more strongly than Zeus does.

1!8. On relations between gods and mortals, see e.g. Adkins 1960a: 64; 1969a: 223; and Clay (1983: 181-2) on a category of relations she calls "elective affinities". On the balance of honour and power among the gods, see e.g. Vemant 1974: 104-5. We shall see in some detail that the specific obligations that exist between gods and mortals are of great importance in determining divine actions. Wyatt (1988: 295) is therefore wrong to say that, when Akhilleus via Thetis asked Zeus' help, "he could have made his own appeal", or that Thetis on Akhilleus' behalf "could have used any excuse - including none at all - to gain Zeus' favour". 159. See n.33. 160. See below, esp. n.167.

161. Poseidon threatens that, if Zeus "without the consent of myself, Athena, Hera, Hermes and Hephaistos" withholds victory from the Akhaians, "let him know this: that there will be between the two of us anger beyond reconciliation" (XV.212-17). Hera also insists that she must have her way in this (IV.24-9, 57-61). In return for his co-operation, Zeus demands that Hera promises not to oppose him if in future he wishes to destroy one of her favourite cities. She tells him that he is free to destroy her favourites - Argos, Sparta, Mykenai - "when they become hateful to you" (IV.39-42, 50-3). "Let us give in to one another in these matters, I to you and you to me; the other gods will follow our lead" (IV.62-3). 162. On the relation between Zeus and Fate, see Vemant 1974: 105; Burkert 1985: 130; Taplin 1986: 75. 163. Although it is often said that an offence against a kinsman, friend or proteg~ of a god is seen as a direct offence against the ti~ of the god himself (Dodds 1951: 32, 52 n.18; Adkins e.g. 1972c: 9-11; 1987: 314; Finley 1977: 138; Lloyd-Jones 1983: 5, 7 [with modifications]), Gagarin rightly points out that in such cases "there is no indication that the god's interest or ti~ is directly involved" (1987: 293-4). Gagarin's notion that the gods intervene only because they have a general obligation to protect "unprotected persons• (ibid. 302-3) seems strained. It appears to me that the gods' interventions are inspired simply by a variety of personal obligations, including those of kinship and friendship. 164. Trojans to be punished for breaking the laws of hospitality : IIl.320-3, 350-4; cf. XIII.620-35; for breaking their oaths: IIl.297-301; IV.158-68, 235-9; cf. VII.350-3. Finley (1977: 140) is thus clearly wrong to say that the fall of Troy is "if anything, an act of divine injustice". The suitors punished for their misdeeds: 22.413-16; 23.63-7; 24.351-2. Odysseus also (prematurely) concludes that the gods have let him blind Polyphemos in order to punish the Kyldops for his evil deeds (9.477-9). The gap between the perception of the gods in the minds of mortals and the depiction of the gods by the poet has been noted by e.g. Nilsson 1924: 376; Clay 1983: 226.

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165. The clash is felt to be particularly sharp in the Iliad; it is believed that in the Odyssey the gods are much more concerned with justice. Mostly this is seen as the product of a historical development: Dodds 1951: 32-3; Finley 1977: 140-1; Tsagarakis 1977: 25, 136; Griffin 1980b: 51-4. Lloyd-Jones (1983: 30-1) and Mueller (1984: 146-7), however, see no more than a difference in "style and purpose" between the two poems in this respect. Clay (1983: 215-39) argues that the gods are not concerned with justice in the Odyssey either. The 'contradiction' within the Iliad (and to a lesser extent in the Odyssey) between the notion of gods as "guarantors of human norms", and their actual behaviour (Redfield 1975: 76, 213; Bowra 1930: 224), has been resolved in various ways. Adkins has argued that it is only z.eus who protects a few special categories of people and punishes a few particular offences; passages that testify to a more general divine concern for justice among mortals are explained away as belonging to "later strata" of the tradition (e.g. 1960a: 65-6; 1972a: 20 [see also n.162(b)]; cf. Frisch 1949: 57-8; Dodds 1951: 32; Mueller 1984: 146; Burkert 1985: 249; Kullmann 1985: 9-10 [see also Chapter 7Wo, n.35]). For the explanation of Lloyd-Jones, see following note. For my own explanation, see below, esp. n.167(a). 166. Lloyd-Jones, by contrast, has argued that Homer's concept of justice (dilre) includes defending one's honour, which in tum includes helping one's friends and harming one's enemies (1983: 4, 6, 17, 176; 1987a: 310; 1987b: 3; cf. Rexine 1977: 1-6; Lesky 1985: 10-12; Burkert 1985: 247-8). This view implies that whatever one does for a friend is 'right', and that there are no absolute standards of justice. However, while it is no doubt true that helping one's friends is a 'good' thing to do, it seems to me that Homer does distinguish what is objectively 'just' from what it is right to do for a friend, and that there is a potential conflict between the two (cf. n.168). (Note also the different line of argument pursued by UoydJones elsewhere, when he says that "part of the honour due to Zeus from mortals is the duty to abstain from crime against each other" [ibid.161).) I should stress again that it is primarily Akhilleus' close personal connections among the gods that overrule the demands of impartial justice. The basis for the gods' obligations to Akhilleus are spelled out (and have been discussed above), but scholars nevertheless tend to obscure them. Segal, for example, says that Hera sides with Akhilleus because she "is a natural enough champion of the cruel treatment of an enemy• (197lb: 60); O'Brien (1991: 119) suggests that it is because Akhilleus literally has Hera's "bile" in him, the bile having been transmitted by Hera suckling Thetis, and Thetis suckling Akhilleus (!). Adkins, while correctly stating that Akhilleus is honoured because he is the gods' friend (e.g. 1971: 10-11; 1975b: 244), and also because he is a 'better' man than Hektor (1982: 315), goes too far in saying that the gods would support anyone "who had .•. grounds for superior status" (i.e. regardless of his personal relationship with the gods) to the extent that they would let him "act as he chose to the weaker" (197Sb: 252) : there is no evidence for this. 167. (a) As Adkins puts it: "Though right triumphs in the main plots of both Iliad' and Odyssey, it does not do so because it is right" (i960a: 62). Lloyd-Jones' objection that it is not a coincidence that right triumphs (1983: 7-8; cf. Griffin 1980b: 27), is partly correct : the story-teller surely deliberately lets right prevail, in order to satisfy his audience. But it is significant that the motives attributed by the poet to those who have the power to make right prevail - the gods - have nothing to

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do with a desire to uphold justice : the happy outcome therefore is a result of a coincidental balance of power based on personal obligations. There is no fundamental difference between Iliad and Odyssey in respect of the relation between the gods and justice. In the Odyssey, we may be "generally given the impression of one undivided and righteous divine will" (Griffin 1980b: 54), but this is only a superficial impression. A closer look shows that the gods are not undivided (Z.Cus and Athena versus Poseidon [above]; perhaps also a hint of friction between z.eus and Athena [n.157)), and that they act from personal obligations - as they do in the Iliad. It is only mortals who say - as they do in the Iliad - that the gods will uphold justice. Fundamentally, the situation is unchanged. The impression of an "undivided and righteous divine will" stems purely from the fact that none of the gods appear to have personal obligations to any of the suitors. This is an interesting difference from the Iliad, where both sides have supporters, but it is a difference in plot; not a difference in ethical outlook (see above, with nn.160, 165). In view of this, it is better to speak of the Odyssey as a story of (legitimate) revenge than as a "tale of villainy and retribution" (Finley 1977: 140); Odysseus is certainly not "an almost anonymous agent of divine justice" (Griffin 1980b: 52). (See above, with n.123.) (b) Apart from imagining that the villains have fewer friends on Olympos than the heroes, there are several other ways of bridging the gap between the need to help friends and the need to uphold justice. One is the notion that certain categories of vulnerable people are special prot6g~s of z.eus : in protecting beggars, strangers and suppliants, therefore, z.eus is both helping friends and upholding justice (e.g. 6.207; 7.164-5, 180-1; 9.270-1; 13.213-14; 14.56-8; 16.421-3). A remarkable way of reconciling the demand for justice and the paramount importance of personal obligations is personification. By making the Entreaties (Litm) daughters of z.eus (IX.502-14), Homer reinforces the norm that a man must be open to reconciliation. He who refuses to accept compensation does not merely break a norm, but offends a daughter of Z.Cus, and Z.Cus will therefore retaliate, avenging his daughter and upholding a human norm at the same time. Hesiod achieves a similar but greater effect by personifying Justice (Dike) as a daughter of z.eus (Works cl Days 256-62). In addition, z.eus and the gods of the Underworld are credited with a particular concern to punish oathbreakers (e.g. m.276-80; XIX.258-60). Also, the Erinyes are made to guarantee proper behaviour, especially within the family (e.g. IX.453-7, 566-72; XV.204; XXl.412; 2.135; 11.280; cf. Adkins 1971: 13; 1987: 317; Dodds 1951: 32; Frisch 1949: 60). Whereas Adkins (as cited in n.165) sees all these as exceptions to the rule that the gods have no concern for justice, Lloyd-Jones argues, rightly I think, that they are part of a wider divine concern to uphold justice (1983: 5). Finally, the notion that the gods may give prosperity to the bad and misery to the good (e.g. 6.188-9; cf. XXIV.527-42) suggests a cynical view of the gods that counters, but may well coexist with, the view that they guarantee justice. Scholars, however, are too easily inclined to see "caprice" and "whim" in divine actions. It is not true, for instance, that Hera displays "brutal caprice towards friend and foe alike" (O'Brien 1991: 107) : on the contrary, insofar as it is within her power she consistently helps her friends and harms her enemies - and so do all the other gods (cf. Adkins 1960a: 64; Redfield 1975: 76 ["frivolous, unsteady creatures"]; Tsagarakis 1977: 135-6; and especially Clay 1983: 215-39).

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1Ci8. I would thus see in this passage a contrast between helping friends and doing justice, just as there is in Hera's speech (XXIV.S6-7). 169. Two responses to this passage have been to propose to delete it (Aristarkhos already proposed this •on the grounds that the destitution predicted is absurd for a son of the royal race while Priam and Hector's brothers are still alive• [Leaf 1900: ad XXII.487; cf. Ameis/Hent7.e 1868 and Monro 1897 ad loc.]) or to argue that it is a generalisation which is not really meant to apply to Astyanax (Leaf 1900: loc.cit.; Willcock 1978: ad XXII.484). I would suggest that this exaggerated image of Astyanax' fate actually fits in with Homer's view of heroic society : see below. 170. See n.lSS. 171. Contra the authors cited in n.lSl. 172. Hence, perhaps, Homer's depiction of youths as by definition rash and aggressive (e.g. m.105-7; cf. Collins 1988: 81). Compare Arlacchi's analysis of the traditional mqfia career : as a young man, the mqfioso establishes himself by acts of violence; once established, he seeks to consolidate his position, resorts to violence less, and relies on connections more (1986: 3-S4). 173. 1.381-2 = 18.410-.11. I take it that they bite their lips to suppress their anger; Lateiner (1989: 22-3), however, argues that they bite their lips in their determination not to stop making life hard for Telemakhos, although they realise that they are in the wrong. On Akhilleus' threats being worse than his actions: Adkins 1982: 294S. On the greater violence of divine conflict in the past: Griffin 1980a: 184. 174. Whether it is 'hard' to dishonour Poseidon because others feel a "psychological difficulty• in dishonouring one with a claim to high status (so Riedinger 1976: 258, esp. n.2), or because he is a formidable enemy (being •the best• of the gods; so Adkins 1972c: S), is not clear. Either way, the danger to his position is slight. Note that both Poseidon and Akhilleus try to keep up a deterrent ~e even when giving in : ~ey threaten serious consequences for anyone who dares go further than they have gone so far (XV.211-17; 1.297-303). The view that the epics create an illusion of constant conflict, rather than reflect reality in this respect, is also taken by Andreev 1988: 72 n. 212; Morris 1986a: 11620; Havelock 1978: 90-1; cf. Rowe 1983: 2S4). Morris plaunbly argues that this illusion justifies aristocratic dominance (ibid. 123-6); Havelock implausibly suggests that it is a •mnemonic requirement of oral epic• (ibid. 90). 175. See also the laments for Hektor at XXII.416-36; XXIV.723-76. Hektor, in fact, protects his family by protecting the city as a whole; cf. Adkins 1982: 320-1. 176. Note that Finley, despite favouring a date of 1000-800 B.C. for the Homeric world as a whole, says that the "mixture of might and counsel• that characterises the position of Zeus (and others) •bespoke the archaic world• (1977: 134; emphasis added). Van Effenterre (198S: 134) argues that the combination of settled institutions and a "rule of fist and sword• points to the Mycenaean Age : this is based on no more than a general (and possibly erroneous) impression that the

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Mycenaean age was violent, but would have retained some institutions of the 'peaceful' Minoan culture. 177. For Hesiod's bosileis, see esp. 'Iheogony 81-3, where it is made clear that one is born a prince, and at birth acquires the eloquence typical of a prince. On the Eupalrldai and Archaic aristocracies in general, see Stein-Holkeskamp 1989; Stahl 1987; Amheim 1977: 39-71 (esp. 46-51). On the changing meaning of basileus, see Cobet 1981; Drews 1983; Carlier 1984. On the designations for the upper classes, see Schulz 1981 (cf. Chapter 1Wo, n.20). 178. Kleisthenes' family, hetaireia, and popular support: Herodotos V.70, 72; 66, 69; Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 20.1-3. Compare 1the stories on Kirnon' s power-base : Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 27,3; Plutarch, Kimon 10. On the traditional bases of power, and the emergence of 'new politicians' in the mid-fifth century, see Connor 1971; also Rhodes 1986. As for the conflict between the demands of justice and friendship, it should be noted that Plutarch also relates a story that Themistokles refused to do a favour to a friend (Simonides) against the law (Moralia 807b; 'Ihemistokles 5,4) : clearly one could not simply ignore justice, but had to strike a delicate balance. Other anecdotes on the theme of "whether one ought to help friends against justice, and up to what point, and how" are recounted by Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae 1.3 (esp.1-9; 20). 179. At vv. 865-8, for example, Theognis uses arete to mean 'valour'. Adkins sees the statement that "in justice all arete is summed up" as an important new insight and a radical departure from Homeric conceptions (1960a: 78). Rather than a complete break with Homer, the passage seems to me to represent an overstatement of the same kind as Tyrtaios' notion that only valour constitutes true arete : the underlying concept of arete remains the same, but for the purposes of the poem a single aspect of it is stressed above all others (cf. Pleket 1971: 362-3; Dover 1983: 48).

lSo. Cf. Van Wees 1988: 23-4. Aristotle (Politics 1297b16-28) refers to a stage at which the hippeis, aristocratic horsemen, dominated warfare and politics; this is •after the monarchies" and before the rise of the hoplites. Whether or not horsemen really did dominate militarily, it is this stage of aristocratic political domination which Homer reflects : Homeric bosileis are hippeis (although they drive chariots rather than ride horses). Unless one is to argue that during "the monarchies" it was the monarchs who single-handedly decided battle, one must assume that at that stage, too, the hippeis dominated warfare; the fact that there are monarchs in the heroic world is therefore not an objection to identifying Homer's world with Aristotle's hippeis-stage. In fact, it seems to me that Aristotle added the phrase "after the monarchies" only to gloss over a problem in his theory of political development, viz. that monarchy, unlike aristocracy or democracy, could not easily be justified in terms of merit in combat. (The epics can only achieve this by presenting a distorted picture of battle; in Hellenistic times, the king was deemed to contribute crucially to battle through the influence of his presence or absence on the morale of his troops, and this in part justified his rule.) For a critical discussion of the evidence for the nature of the hoplite phalanx : Cawkwell 1989; cf. Krentz 1985; contrast Hanson 1989; 1991. On the question of whether or not hoplites constituted a political force when they first emerged as a military force, see Snodgrass 1965; Salmon 1977.

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181. On hybris (and greed) as a motive for seizing wealth : Hesiod, Works' cl Days 213-24; cf. 320-6; Solon 1.7-16; 4 Diehl; also the proverbial line "love of wealth will destroy Sparta, nothing else", cited as part of one of Tyrtaios' poems by Diodoros of Sicily (7.14), but often not included among Tyrtaios' fragments in modem editions. On archaic games, see e.g. Murray 1980: 193-7. With regard to tyrants, insofar as they come to power by exploiting popular discontent, they are of course unlike Homeric heroes, but to the extent that they usurp power with the help of friends and even the support of the people at large, in order to gain higher honour for themselves, they are no different. 182. A number of other instances of insults which led to violent conflict is given by Aristotle, Politics 1311a33ff. On enmity in general : e.g. Dover 1974: 180-3; Blundell 1989: 26-59. On hybris, e.g. Fisher 1976, 1979, 1990, forthcoming; Murray 1990a; MacDowell 1976. 183. Snodgrass (1980: 99-100) notes the change and links it with the discontinuation of the practice of depositing weapons in tombs as grave-gifts : "aristocrats may no longer have seen themselves as warriors before all else". Note also the mid-seventh century change in funerary art, from vases predominantly depicting scenes of warfare to vases depicting symposion-scenes (Murray 1980: 199). 184. Snodgrass suggests a 4% per annum population growth in the late eighth century (1980: 22-4); Morris (1987: 156-9) argues for a less "astronomical rate". It has been suggested to me that the increasing role of conspicuous consumption at the expense of conspicuous destruction might be due to an influx of new luxury goods from the Near East. I doubt, however, that the availability of luxury goods would in itself suffice to bring about the transformation : why did powerful and aggressive men not simply respond by seizing the new status symbols 1 185. The transition from violent competition to competition in wealth has taken place elsewhere, too, though under different circumstances. Many tribal societies that used to engage in continual warfare turned to competitive gift-exchange when colonising powers put a stop to armed violence in their territory - most famously so among the Kwakiutl, who gave the world the word potlatch (see p. 222). One may also note Thorstein Veblen's famous theory (1899) that mankind has developed from a barbarian stage at which the main source of status is "the taking of life", to a civilised stage at which conspicuous consumption and leisure are the most important. He explains this as the result of the growing importance of private property and "industry".

379

NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR 1. Quotations from resp. Caskey (1964: 11), Momigliano (1958: 113), and De Ste. Croix (1972: 218). Alternative causes of the Trojan War are suggested by e.g. Finley 1964; Kirk 1964; Caskey 1964; Page 1964; and further e.g. Bowra 1972: 83, cf. 88; Kirk 1962: 21-2, 40-1; N~lsson 1933: 26-7, cf. 113; Page 1959: 257; Wood 1985: 159-61, 167-8, 247-9; see also the discussions of recent work in Easton 1985: 189-90 and Latacz 1986: 111 (cf. 1988: 411). For ancient reinterpretations seep. 176. 2. Page (1964: 18 n. l) is unusual in allowing room for the possibility that, with a background of Trojan-Akhaian imperial and commercial rivalry, the abduction of Helena may have provided the "occasion" of war; Wood (1985: 250) argues that Helena may have been "used as a pretext for war" - a war which was primarily fought for booty (see also Casson 1959: 34). 3. Many are aware, for example, that there are societies which differ from our own in regarding the seizure of booty as a legitimate goal of war (see pp. 213-17). There is also wide acceptance of the idea that, although 'commercial rivalry' may be a cause of contemporary wars, it is not a feasible explanation for ancient wars. Cf. Strasburger 1972: 11-12. 4. For a methodological discussion on how to distinguish the 'historical kernel' from the myth and the fantasy contained in these tales, see Davies and Foxhall 1981: 87-110 (Davies), 111-35 (Hainsworth), 177-83 (Davies and Foxhall). Both Davies and Hainsworth in passing dismiss the abduction of Helena as a non-historical episode, derived from folk-tale. While I agree with their conclusion, I would argue that it is not methodologically sound to reject the story out of hand. Ideally, one ought to demonstrate that the social structures, cultural values and material resources of the societies which supposedly fought at Troy, were such that they would not have gone to war over this kind of incident.

S. The wars are discussed on pp. 191-9 (and in n.68), raids on pp. 207-13, where the distinction between the two is amplified. I should point out that I shall be using the term war rather loosely, to include private plundering raids, which narrower definitions of war would exclude.

6. Bravo traces these views back to K.F. Hermann's Lehrbuch der griechischen Staatsaltenhtlmer (18554 (18311)), an article by Dareste in REG 2 (1889), and Bruno

Keil's Eirene (1916). Another early expression of the view may be found in Riistow/K0chly (1852: 1). Nowag (1983: 24) has reached the same conclusion as Bravo, apparently independently. Bravo's discussion of the Homeric evidence (1980: 953-60, 974-7) is less convincing than the rest of his work: see below, p. 195.

7. Cf. Finley 1977: 99-103, 123; Herman 1987. See 228-37, below. 8. 1.175-7; 10.38-9; 19.239-40 (all cited in n.170); cf. 24.266-79.

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9. This is, in fact, one of Odysseus' lying tales, but even a false tale has to be plausible. 10. Note Nestor's reception of Telemakhos and Mentor : they are allowed to share in the great public sacrifice that is in progress when they arrive, but their crew of twenty men is not. (From 3.360-1, it is clear that they have remained at the ship; they are briefly invited to a sacrifice next day, but afterwards sleep on the ship [3.424-5, 431-2; 15.199-221).) 11. The Paphlagonian Harpalion is Paris' xeinos (XIII.660-1), the Lykian Sarpedon Hektor's (XVII.150). The Phrygian Asios is the brother of Priamos' wife (XVI.715-19). At least one of Priamos' sons-in-law, who lives in Pedaios, comes to Troy when the war breaks out (XIII.170-6). The fact that the allies are 'paid' for their services (XVIII.290-2) does not mean that obligations of kinship and friendship play no part in their recruitment. 12. Mentor says that he is parting from Telemakhos in order to travel by himself to the Kaukones, "where a debt is owed to me - and not a recent or a small one" (3.366-8). ('Mentor' is really the goddess Athena in disguise, and the story is only pretence.) 13. Further discussion and additional examples of embassies, as well as another reference to mob-lynching: pp. 176, 177, 179, 194-5. On Homeric diplomacy, see Wery 1979: 13-53. 14. See pp. 175, 177, 187. The heralds play a crucial role here in acting as mediators, cf. Wery 1979: esp. 21, 29, 34. 15. Homeric epithets for war are listed by Silk 1987: 73-7. For kharme, see Latacz (1966: 20-38, 125-7), who argues that it means 'lust for battle' rather than 'joy of battle', as often assumed. Although war is generally regarded in a negative light, I can find no trace of any notion that war is part of 'nature' as opposed to 'culture', or 'impure', pace Redfield (1975) who builds his interpretation of the Iliad around these concepts, presumably owing to the influence of Claude Levi-Strauss. At the other extreme, the suggestion that Homeric passages focusing on the suffering of the bereaved are meant to evoke, not pity, but contempt for the warrior who has failed to stay alive and protect them (Scott 1979) is as hard to substantiate as to disprove. 16. Seep. 53. 17. Many possessions" taken by Paris: III.70-2, 91-3, 282-5, 458-9; VII.350, 363, 389, 400; XIII.627-8; XXII.114-6. The image of Paris performing dangerous exploits is enhanced by a casual reference to his acquiring women in Sidon, on the way from Sparta to Troy (Vl.289-92). He is most likely to have captured them, although, as Ormerod (1924: 88) points out, he could have received them as a gift (cf. 24.266-79). Note that another early epic version of the story, that of the Kypria (as quoted by Herodotos, Il.117), made no mention of the episode. Perhaps this is another illustration of the Iliad's tendency to put a warlike complexion on private inter-community conflicts. (A late antique summary of the Kypria [frg. 1 =

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Proklos, Khrestomathia] does say that Paris "took the city" of Sidon. Presumably this is a later, revised version, adapted to the Iliad.) 18. Given that Helena had gone with Paris of her own accord, Akhaian concern for her well-being may seem out of place (as it has seemed to e.g. Willcock 1957: 23). But the poet has created room for it by taking every opportunity to portray Helena as bitterly regretting her decision: III.139-40, 171-6; VI.344-51; XXIV.763-4; 4.1456, 259-64. 19. Although the Trojans have broken an ethical norm in offending Menelaos, the "disgrace• (lobe) and "shame" (aiskhos) fall on him, not on the Trojans (so Adkins 1960a: 42; see also pp. 110-18, with nn.104, 115). The full passage is quoted below (at n.39). Menelaos' motive· is to wipe out his personal shame; he feels no responsibility for upholding the ethical norm as such - that is a task for Zeus (111.351-4; cf. XIII.623-5). 20. The suitor's oath is first mentioned by Hesiod (fr. 198 M/W); cf. Thukydides 1.9,1; Apollodoros III.10,9; Hyginus, Fabulae 78. For the total number of 60.000 for Menelaos' army, see Appendix One, section 1. 21. Kinyras: e.g. Apollodoros, Epitome 3.9; Schol. bT ad XI.20; Eustathios 827. 33-9. Akhilleus: e.g. Apollodoros III.13.8; Ovidius, Metamorphoses XIII.162-70; Hyginus, Fabulae 96. Odysseus: e.g. Kypria, fr. l; Hyginus, Fabulae 95.

22. Agamemnon has ties of guest-friendship with Melaneus, an Ithakan prince. Instead of recruiting this man for his army, Agamemnon merely stays at his house while trying to persuade Odysseus. The poet thus did not regard Odysseus as a personal friend of Agamemnon's, and perhaps imagined that Agamemnon turned to Odysseus because, as the local ruler, the latter would be able to influence the decision of the Ithakan community regarding the war, in a way that his friend Melaneus could not (24.102-22). 23. Jeanmaire (loc.cit.) sees the passage as the first ever reference to electing a magistrate, but the wording suggests a far less formal process. 24. The point is made by Finley 1957: 284-5 n.35; cf. Carlier 1984: 179. 25. On contributions of wine and food by the people to the meals of the elders, see pp. 32-3 and 85-6. 26. See pp. 39-40, 58. Akhaia as a political unit is probably a fantasy, unless it reflects Mycenaean conditions. 27. It is commonly assumed (as in LSJ) that time here has the specific meaning 'compensation', i.e. an amount of material goods (see Adkins 1960b: 24-32). Throughout most of the war, however, the aim of the Akhaians is not to gain material compensation, but to destroy Troy (see pp. 186-90). I suggest, therefore, that limA means 'honour', as usual, and that there are two ways of acquiring this honour for Menelaos "from the Trojans". Either the Trojans give honour, by expressing their respect for Menelaos with an offer of compensation (which makes

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up for their previous lack of respect, not for e.g. expenses incurred or hardships endured by Menelaos), or else the Akhaians take honour "from the Trojans" by punishing their lack of respect with destruction. Either way, the honour of Menelaos is restored. 28. It has been thought that Agamemnon is here adding a new condition for peace (e.g. Kirk 1985: ad m.286, and see the discussion in Bergold 1977: 98-101). It is true that compensation has not been mentioned in the Iliad until this moment, but it seems to me that so far it has simply been taken for granted - compensation being standard practice in Homeric society - and that it is now mentioned only because a solemn oath requires a careful formulation of the conditions. The embassy of Menelaos and Odysseus presumably took place when the army was already gathered at Troy, see Kypria, fr. 1; schol. ad m.206. The phrase "which will reach even future generations" (he te kai essomenoisi met' anthropoisi peletal) may rather mean "which may also take place among future generations" (so Ruijgh 1971: 410-11). 29. Herodotos II.113-20. The Egyptian account may be based on a variant Greek version which deliberately exonerated Helena from all blame for the war, claiming that she had been transported to Egypt by the gods, who had then fashioned a phantom image of her for Paris to seduce and the armies to fight over. The story is told in e.g. Euripides' Helena, and had allegedly been created by Stesikhoros in his so-called palinode(s). (An overview of recent discussions of the poem[s] in Gerber [1987: 126-7).) I would suggest that what the 'Egyptian priests' (whoever they are) did was to historicise this tale by removing the supernatural elements - the gods and the phantom double -, thus creating a watertight explanation for the Trojans' behaviour. In the resulting story, blame shifts back to Helena, but that need not have worried them. (This explanation is not considered by Lloyd in his discussion of the relation between Herodotos' account and the Stesikhoros-tradition [1988: 468).)

30. Stoning (lit.: "wearing a cloak of stone") : III.56-7. Hostility towards Helena: XXIV.767-72; III.159-60, 410-2; towards Paris: III.38-42; VI.280-5, cf. 325-31, 520-5 (of Hektor); VII. 390 (of Idaios); III.451-4 (of everyone). Note also the material cost of the war : XVID.288-92. 31. Bergold (1977: 152-3, 166), too, explains thus the "amazing" notion that Pandaros' deed will bring him glory and gratitude. However, he explains the Trojan advance into battle as a literary device to create a symmetry with the Akhaian advance in Book II (1977: 171-2). Further discussion in Ameis-Hentze (1868: Anhang, p.10-19). Kirk (1985: ad IV.221) summarises the explanations offered by ancient commentators. 32. One could argue that, strictly speaking, Menelaos should have killed Paris (111.281), not just 'defeated' him, as he did, and that the Trojans therefore do not really violate their oaths in refusing to give up Helena (so Kirk 1985: ad III.281-6, 306-7, 457). But if that is supposed to be the Trojans' view, the poet would surely have made them raise this point in justification of their actions. Since they do not, it seems that any form of defeat is equivalent to being killed.

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33. Fear of Akhilleus kept them near the city: IX.352-5 (cf.VI.431-4). 34. III.259, 304-9. As Kirk (1985: ad 306-7) and Edwards (1987: 194), with Schol. bT ad III.259 and 306, and Eustathios 412.26-9, point out, the fact that Priamos "shudders" (rhigesen) is a sign of affection for his son. Bergold (1977: 94, with n. l) argues that Priamos shudders with joy at the prospect of peace (so too Schol. b ad 259). The parallels he offers for this use of the verb, however, are all perfectly compatible with the idea that one shudders with fear, rather than joy. 35. Paris' uncles Lampos, Klytios and Hiketaon: III.146-53; XX.237-8; his cousins Dolops, Kaletor and Melanippos: XV.525-7, 419, 545-55; his brothers: VI.244-6; XXIV.493-7. On kinship obligations in general: pp. 147-8. 36. The parallel between Pandaros' and Antimakhos' motives makes it clear that one need not (with Bergold 1977: 86; Willcock 1978: ad Zoe.) assume the unusual meaning "having received [gold]" for dedegmenos in XI.124, with the implication that Antimakhos has been bribed. Like Pandaros, he spontaneously takes Paris' side, "hoping for [gold]" in return (cf. 2.186; so Leaf 1900: ib.). Bergold (1977: 152) points out that Paris is called "prince" only in this context, to emphasise his influential position. 37. Cf. III.46-7. Paris travelled with more than one ship (V.59-62), and a crew consists of either 20 or 50 men (see Appendix One, section 1). The minimum number of companions is therefore 40, and 150 or 200 are not unreasonable estimates. 38. We need not assume (with Leaf 1900: ad Vll.393) that Antenor is "regarded as the leader of a popular party". The herald uses other means too, to present the Trojans in a favourable light and facilitate negotiations : see De Jong 1987: 183-5. 39. The passage makes little sense if one assumes that Menelaos is reproaching the Trojans with being successful in battle ("an anti-climax", Leaf 1900 : ad Zoe.; "rather weak resentment", Willcock 1978 : ibid.). It seems to me that Menelaos is criticising them for their continual aggression against him, which they commit "just like that" (maps, 627), i.e. without cause. I should emphasise again (cf. n.19) that the "disgrace" and "shame" fall on Menelaos, not on the Trojans. Similarly, Antimakhos' proposal to kill Menelaos is described as "his ugly disgrace" (XI.142), meaning 'the disgrace inflicted by him upon Menelaos'. This is not to say, of course, that the behaviour of Antimakhos and the Trojans is not regarded as morally wrong: see pp. 110-18. 40. For hybris, see pp. 107-8, 115-18. 41. She is "a boast" (eukhoZe) to the Trojans, if they win : 11.160-1, 176-7; IV .1734. "No-one will blame the Trojans and Akhaians for long suffering hardships on account of such a woman : she is uncannily like the immortal goddesses to look at" (111.156-8). The war is referred to as aethZoi for her sake (111.126-8; cf. 3.262; 4.170) - aethZos meaning 'contest' or 'labour' : 'a task which puts one's abilities to the test'.

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42. Agamemnon, too, shields him: VII.107-16; X.233-40. 43. Cf. the discussions at IX.9-39; XIV.64-94. In a similar vein, Akhilleus fantasises about capturing Troy by himself (XVI.97-100). 44. The taunts exchanged are supposed to refer to actual incidents of the war. The story is taken from Ongka's 'self-account' recorded by Andrew Strathern (1979: 5661; cf. Strathem 1971). 45. Exquemelin was himself a buccaneer (a ship's doctor), and his work is regarded as a reliable source. The publication history of the book is convoluted : the first version of it (1678) was written in Dutch, but I have used a second Dutch version (Historie der Boecaniers [1700), re-published in 1971), based on two expanded English versions of it (Bucaniers of America and History of the Bucaniers [1684)), which Henry Morgan actually tried to suppress. The sack of Porto Bello is described in Chapter XIII, that of Panama in Chapter XVIII. 46. Cf. Hektor's vision of the fall of Troy: VI.448-65. Other refs. to enslavement of women and looting in sack of Troy : 1.127-9; IX.135-40 = 277-82; 3.154 (cf. 5.39-40 = 13.137-8; 13.262-4). Burning: 11.414-5; VI.331; XXI.375-6 (cf. XXII.410-11). Also: 11.113, 133; IX.20, 46. 47. The choice between destruction and giving up half of all movable wealth is also put before an unnamed city in XVIIl.509-13. Here, however, it is the attackers who offer this choice, and the defenders who prefer to fight. I should mention that Hektor' s reason for rejecting his own plan is not that he knows that Agamemnon and Menelaos would not accept it, but that he would have to put it to Akhilleus, who would not accept it because he has personal grounds to seek revenge on Hektor. 48. Children enslaved: 14.264-5; 15.381-8; IX.594. 49. Wickert-Micknat (1983: 38-9) argues that boys would be killed to prevent them from taking revenge for their fathers' deaths. Although in other circumstances this is commonly advanced as a justification, it does not seem to apply to the killings that accompany the sack of Troy. 50. Many scholars feel uncomfortable with this passage. Fenik (1986: 22-7) argues that the poet really regards such violent vengeance as deplorable, but cannot express this view owing to the constraints of formulaic diction. Goldhill (1990: 373-6) argues that aisima means 'fated' rather than 'right' or 'proper', i.e. that Agamemnon was 'destined' to say these words to his brother. Yamagata (1990: 420-30) argues that aisima means 'measured', i.e. that Agamemnon's speech "has been put in wellmeasured contrasts" (430) and is commended for its eloquence, not its content. While it is true that aisima does not necessarily mean 'morally right', (cf. VII.120- . 1), it still seems to me that 'right (in the circumstances)' is the most obvious interpretation, and does not clash with Homeric ethics, ac:Cording to which the need for revenge is stronger than the need to show mercy to suppliants (XXl.99-105). See Patroni's discussion of the passage (1942: 448-9).

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.Sl. A 'slip' on the part of the poet: the ships are supposed to be drawn up in tiers (XIV.30-6), so that the fint ship Hektor reaches cannot actually be dragged out to sea, and there is no reason to hold on to it. The only other conceivable explanation of Hektor's behaviour - that he is trying to climb aboard the ship - seems implausible since all he is said to do is to take and keep hold of the stem.

52. It is significant that this gesture is mentioned by Odysseus in a speech designed to bring Akhilleus back into action. By portraying Hektor's feeling of superiority, Odysseus is working upon Akhilleus' sense of rivalry with him: IX.229-46, 301-6• .S3. See pp. 61, 137-8.

54. Booty from Troy: n.46. Plundering of towns: pp. 210-13 . .S.S. Physical violence: 11.198-9, 265-9; threats: 11.191-7, 257-64, 346-7, 357-9, 3913; omens: 11.299-32, 348-53; shame: 11.284-98, 337-45; revenge: 11.354-6. Nor are the Trojans encouraged with promises of booty, although the Akhaian camp is full of it: Xll.7-8. Cf. Wickert-Micknat 1983: 25. By contrast, Nowag argues that the prospect of booty is the driving force behind the efforts of the bulk of the army (1983: 26-36). As evidence he cites the passage in which Nestor tells the Akhaians to rape Trojan women in revenge for Helena's sufferings (11.354-6), which he reads as: take booty (i.e. women) to make up for your own sufferings (i.e. years of fighting for the sake of Helena). I find this strained. Nowag also points out that Odysseus tells the men that it would be "totally shameful to stay long and come home empty" (keneon, 11.297-8). This may refer to returning without (much) booty, but it primarily refers to returning without having won, and without Helena. And in any case, Odysseus is concerned with the shame of it, not the material loss. One might argue that booty is not mentioned because the troops get very little of it, but even if this is true, it does not explain why the prospect of booty does not get much mention among the leaders either. .sci. IX.327; XVIll.265; 11.403; 24.113 . .S7. Ill.314-25. In all these respects, it is different from the duel between Hektor and Aias (pp. 200-2). The prayer for the guilty party to be punished should, I think, be explained as a standard formula for these occasions - otherwise the poet would not have made the Trojans utter it, since there is no doubt that Paris is the guilty party, and although the Trojans hate him, they no doubt want him to win (pp. 177-9). If the prayer is a formula, the practice of trial by combat must be well-established. Armstrong (1950: 73-8) and Fernandez Nieto (1975: 37-69) list and discuss the trials by combat (as distinct from duels 'for honour') known from Greek history and legend (cf. the list in Pritchett 1985: 17-20). The custom (often seen as a form of 'amelioration' of warfare [Pritchett ibid.: 16 n.52, 20-1; Gliick 1964: '25)) is in keeping with the Homeric scale of values, on which a show of might tends to count for more than a proof of right (see Chapter Three, sections 6-8).

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58. This view is supported by the fact that the preparations for the duel include the episode known as the Teikhoslcopia, which unquestionably is better suited to the beginning of the war than to its end. 59. Kirk attempts to stretch the interpretation of the Homeric tradition to imply a "brawl", too (1985: ad IT. 742-4, 745-6; 1.263-5, 268). The tradition of a fight on Mt. Pelion, rather than at the wedding, is also found in Hesiod (The Shield of Heralcles 178-90 : references to fighting with tree-branches) and in the story of how the Kentaurs killed the Lapith Kaineus by beating him into the ground with heavy branches (e.g. Apollonios Rhodios 1.57-64). Cf. Bethe 1921: col. 175-6.

60. There is some controversy as to which "wall" is meant, that of Kalydon or that of Pleuron. There can, in fact, be little doubt that the wall of Pleuron is meant. The only 'problem' is then that the fighting later moves from there to Kalydon. Willcock (e.g. 1976: ad IX.550-2) points out that Homer thus provides a parallel to the situation at Troy. He nevertheless finds this •a strangely mobile war", but it seems to me that, when both sides aim to destroy their enemy, such developments are to be expected. 61. He was killed in battle, by accident, in the version of Bakkhylides (V.124-51). Apollodoros (1.8.3) gives both the 'battle' and the 'brawl' version. For the latter see also Ovidius, Metamorphoses Vlll.270ff. 62. The Iliad is unique in saying that she did not kill him by magic, but merely brought about his temporary withdrawal by cursing him (IX.553-6, 565-72). For an explanation of this peculiarity, see Willcock 1964: 148-53. In yet another version, Meleagros was killed by Apollo in battle (see ibid. 151 n.4, 153-4; and Bremmer 1988: 37-56). Bremmer, too, concludes that Homer "has transformed the original dispute about the spoils into a true war between two nations" (ibid. 41-2). 63. The scattered references in Homer are pieced together on the basis of the story as it is told by e.g. Hellanikos (FGH 4 F 26a/b Schol. Ge ad XXI. 444 I Schol. A ad XX.146); Apollodoros 11.5.9, 6.4; Diodoros IV.32, 49.7.

=

64. Eighteen pentekonters: Apollodoros 11.6.4; the Argo: Diodoros IV.42, 49.6. Further details of the attack on the city are given in both accounts and also in Hellanikos FGH 4 F 109 (= T7.etzes, On Lykophron 469). 65. See pp. 115-16. 66. References to other leaders: Amphiaraos 15.244-7 (cf. Eriphyle-episode in 11.326-7); Kapaneus IV.403-10; Mekisteus XXID.678-80. The fate of the attackers: IV.409; VI.222-3; XIV.114; 15.247. Pausanias at IX.5.12 follows Apollodoros, while at IX.9.1 he follows Diodoros' version. There was an epic Thebais, attributed to Homer (cf. Pausanias IX.9.3), but of this only a few uninformative fragments are preserved. 67. Although Oidipous' legacy included the position of ruler of Thebes (cf. 11.275), and control over a public institution was thus at stake in this war, the conflict appears to be regarded as a private quarrel over a private inheritance of which this

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public position formed part. Hesiodos indicates this when he describes the war as fought •on account of the flocks of Oidipous" (Worb and Days 163). 68. The War of the Descendants is given only three lines in the Iliad (IV.406-8), and little can be said about it. The cause is not given, but was almost by definition the desire of the sons of the Seven to avenge the deaths of their fathers. See e.g. Apollodoros III.7.2; Diodoros IV.66; Pausanias IX.5.7, 9.2.; Hyginus, Fabulae 71. Homer further mentions a few wars without mentioning their causes/goals: Hera/des against the Pylians (Xl.690-3, see p. 197 below), Pylians against Arkadians (VII.132-57, see n. 74), Phrygians with their ally Priamos against Amazons (III.184-9 [note that Priamos' wife is from Phrygia: XVI.717-9]). 69. The idea that it is 'typical' is also supported by Wickert-Micknat (1983: 95) and Ormerod (1924: 73). It derives from reading a single episode of the war (the bootyraid) out of context. The idea that it is a 'phenomenon of the past' (so also Nowag 1983: 112) appears to be based solely on the fact that the story is told by an old man. The idea that it is unique (so also Nowag 1983: 111) is tenable only if one (as Bravo does) explains away the rest of the Homeric evidence. 70. One's share was presumably meant to be 'fair' in proportion to one's previous suffering. On sharing booty, see Appendix Four. 71. So Bravo (1980: 956-7), Lintott (1982: 17) and BOite (1934: 344). Bravo maintains that the raid was organised primarily to provide an opportunity for the initiation of young warriors (957). The only 'evidence' for this view is, it seems, the youth of the raiders. There is nothing to suggest with Murray (1980: 52) that it was initially a •private family venture" for which wider support was later gained by distributing the proceeds. 72. The chariots tum back when they reach "Bouprasion... and the Olenian Rock and the place called 'Hill of Aleision'" (XI.756-8). From 11.615-7 it is clear that "the Olenian Rock and Aleision" are on the border of "Bouprasion and Elis". (The actual location, if any, of these places is not known.) 73. In the War of the Seven against Thebes, Polyneikes' appeal for support in Mykenai is clearly addressed to the community. It is 'the Mykenaians' who are asked to "give allies" (i.e. mobilise men and send them with the Seven), and they collectively change their minds on account of the unfavourable oracles. It does seem likely, therefore, that the Seven themselves, too, lead public forces : it would be odd if a private army acquired a public ally. The people of Argos may be thought of as supporting Polyneikes partly because of the power of Adrestos, his father-in-law, and partly because, as son-in-law of their leading chieftain, Polyneikes is a member of their community. Concerning the Kouretes and Aitolians, and the Lapiths and Kentaurs, the very use of the tribal names to describe the warring parties suggests the involvement of public armies. The men who join Herakles in sacking Troy, however, could (but need not) be a privately gathered force. 74. Oakley is referring to "the Roman manner" of using single combat, but he rightly notes the parallels with the Greek situation (1985: 402-4). The duel between Nestor and Ereuthalion, in a war between "the assembled Pylians and Arkadian

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speannen at the walls of Pheia" (VIl.134-5), is probably also conceived as being of this type (since it is mentioned as a parallel to that of Hektor and Aias), but this is not clear from Nestor's account of it. Scenes of man-to-man combat in the midst of general battle should not be confused with champion combat (Van Wees 1988; Latacz 1977). 75. The herald and Hektor both add that it is getting dark, and that "it is also good to obey night" (VIl.282, 293) : perhaps a way of saving face, by playing down somewhat Aias' superiority as the reason for ending the duel. 76. E.g. Mueller 1984: 78. A (partial) parallel occurs, in fact, only in the fight between Poseidon and Apollo (XXI.435-69). See Van Wees 1988: 5. 77. In the same way, in armed combat at the funeral games of Patroklos, Diomedes and Aias need not fight on until one of them draws blood, as had been stipulated (XXIII.805-6, cf.818-9). Diomedes is awarded the prize (824-5) on the strength of a better overall performance (820-1), 78. For etai meaning 'fellow-townsmen', see Appendix One, section 2. Their joy may be partly for Aias' well-being, and partly for their enhanced reputation. Aias' reminder that he was "born and bred in Salamis" (VIl.199) indicates the latter. 79. Cf. p. 93; note also Mekisteus of Argos who "once went to Thebes when Oidipous had fallen, for the funeral. There he defeated all the Kadmeians" (XXIII.678-80). 80. So too Leaf (1900: ad XXIII.640). Another possible interpretation is that "because it remained on the spot" means "because it still remained to be won" (so Ameis-Hentze 1868 and Willcock 1978: ad loc.) - on this reading, of course, there is no evidence for rivalry between communities. 81. These (and further) figures are given by Nagler (1990: 355) in his discussion of sport and war in Homer. (He dates the war to 1975, which I believe to be a mistake.) It should be noted that the football defeat was not, of course, the only cause of war : it took place against a background of a long-running border dispute. Still, it was apparently the last straw. 82. Seep. 174 n.23. Although the son of Kastor is not supposed to have existed, his story has to appear plausible and is therefore good evidence for Akhaian norms and practices. One may note, moreover, the parallels with the life of the 'real' Odysseus, who was also reluctant to go to Troy (see p. 174 n.21) and was also involved in warfare both before and after the Trojan War (see below, n.92). 83. Strictly speaking, Odysseus does not call his eompanions lefsteres in the story of the son of Kastor, but only in a later story which is slightly different. The part of the story in which lelsteres are mentioned, however, is almost literally the same, so that I see no objection to the identification. See Benedetto Bravo's discussion of the term lefsteres (1980: 827-36). I prefer 'freebooters' to 'pirates/brigands', because (a) it reproduces the association with 'booty'; (b) it avoids the distinction between plundering by sea and

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by land - a distinction not made in the Greek, but implicit in 'pirates/brigands'; (c) most importantly, it is less strongly than 'pirates/brigands' associated with deviant behaviour and being socially outcast - associations which the Homeric word does not have, as we shall see. 84. 3.71-4 = 9.252-5 = Hymn to Apollo 452-5 (quoted below). "At random• (or "on spec.•; mapsldtos) is here contrasted with "on some [specific] business• (kala prexin): Ameis-Henu.e 1856: ad 3.72; Mele 1979: 71. Cf. nn. 93 and 97. 85. Five days from Crete to Egypt: 14.257. Three days from Troy to the mainland: 3.157-79; IX.362-3; cf. Kyprla frg. 10 (Hdt. II.117). Emphasis on the dangen and length of the journey, discussed by Seymour (1907: 287; 305-6), Glotz (1925: 146) and Casson (1959: 38). The legend that the Akhaians could not find Troy at first, says that they landed in Mysia, from where they were forced to return home. Only ten years later, and with a native guide, did they finally get to Troy : Kypria frg. 1. Homer does not mention this, but there may be an oblique reference to the episode in HelC.-ia's remark that she has been living in Troy for twenty (not ten) years (XXIV.765-6). Note also that the Phaiakians supposedly regard Euboia as the most distant place on earth (7.321-6). I suppose this is something of an Ionian joke at the expense of the Phaiakians, but it does suggest that in the Akhaian world everything east of Euboia is supposed to be alien territory. 86. Cf. Trojan hostility to Paris : p.177. 87. This, of course, is why this type of warfare is associated with expeditions across the sea (which in tum explains why it- is usually called 'piracy') : it is much easier to reach a sufficiently 'alien' land (and get away from it quickly) by sea than by land. But there is no inherent difference between raiding by sea and by land : both may be done by the same people, using the same tactics, to the same ends. (Homeric searaiders do not attack ships at sea: cf. Nowag 1983: 113-16.) 88. Compare the lersteres in the Hymn to Dionysos (7.31). 89. In the raids of Akhilleus and Odysseus (discussed below), certain men also get a relatively 'mild' treatment : Maron is allowed to buy his life with 'gifts'; Eetion is killed but given an honourable burial-in-armour. Note that Aineias was enslaved (rather than killed) after the fall of Troy, according to llias Milera frg. 14. Another possible explanation for the fact that the Egyptians enslave rather than kill the raiders is that this carries fewer risks if the captives are few in number and far from home. 90. Bravo (1980: 975-7; 1984: 103) emphasises the fact that 'piracy' is a category distinct from 'war', but he does not specify the exact difference between the two. Nowag (1983: 78, 94-106) also makes the distinction, but denies that the focus on plunder is an essential difference between the two. On the practices of Homeric sea- · raiding, see also Nowag 1983: 128-62. On ancient piracy in general : Garlan 1989: 173-201. 91. So too Seymour 1907: 610; Nowag 1983: 71-3. Menelaos is frequently credited with freebooting adventures after the war, as well, since he gathered great wealth on

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a journey in distant lands (3.278-312; 4.80-93). Hasebroek (1933: 16) in particular insists that he must have done so exclusively through plundering. Kirk (1962: 42) maintains that Menelaos gained his wealth through trade. In fact, all we are told is that some of Menelaos' valuables had been acquired as gifts from local people: 4.126-9; 15.113-9 (and cf. the gifts given to Helena: 4.125-6, 130-2, 227-30). See pp. 228-37, and on the question of to what extent gift-exchange, trade and raiding are separable, see pp.245-6. 92. There are two instances, though, which are at least likely to be freebooting raids. Almost as soon as he is home from the war, Odysseus plans to go out and plunder again : "As for the flocks of which the arrogant suitors have deprived me, I myself will plunder much rJJolla lerssomai], and the Akhaians will give me the rest, until all the pens shall have been filled• (23.356-8). In this case, since the booty is meant to compensate him for the livestock lost during his absence, he probably intends to take the initiative and rustle some foreigner's sheep, rather than wait for a war to break out and provide him with an opportunity to take booty. But we cannot be sure. Mele (1986:67-8) relies rather too heavily on this passage to prove the legitimacy of freebooting. Bravo (1980: 960), on the other hand, attempts to explain it away. He takes lerssomai here to mean •I shall take by force• and assumes that Odysseus intends to take sheep 'by force' (not 'as booty') from the families of those who have robbed him of his livestock in the first place - unless these offer compensation voluntarily. This posits an otherwise unattested meaning of the verb, and seems strained. Similar to Odysseus' words is Akhilleus' remark that, whereas a life once lost cannot be retrieved, •cattle and sheep are lerstoi• (IX.406), which apparently means that, if one loses one's livestock, one can always go out and rustle a few animals from someone else. Other passages cannot be used as evidence of freebooting practices. For example, we know that Odysseus has plundered at least once before the Trojan war - because Telemakhos refers to "the slaves which Odysseus acquired for me by taking booty [moi lerssato]" (1.398). But we do not know whether this is supposed to have happened on a freebooting raid or in the course of war. The same applies to the Messenian cattle-raid cited on p. 171 (cf. Bravo 1980: 959), and to 1.154; 9.405; 11.401-3 (cf. 24.111-3); 14.531; 15.384-6; 17.470-2; 20.49-51. The cattle raid of Nestor is, as I have argued (pp.195-8), not a freebooting raid, nor is the raid at XVIII.513-9. Conversely, references to the destruction of towns cannot by themselves be taken to represent 'status war', either. 93. References : n.84. Thukydides (1.5,2) says that in "the ancient poets" the question is asked "everywhere in the same way", which may mean that there were other poems which used the same formula. Note that the question strictly speaking is not 'Are you freebooters ?', as Thukydides says, but 'Are you wandering like [hoia] freebooters ?' (Nowag 1983: 168). Still, the implication remains that freebooting is common and that it is not offensive to be compared to a freebooter (Jackson 1985: 657; and below). 94. That freebooting is legitimate has long been regarded as a self-evident truth : see e.g. Riistow/KOc:hly (1852: 1) and, in very strong terms, Glotz (1925: 147). Its legitimacy has been called into question by Bravo (1980: 975-7 and 1984: 103),

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Wickert-Micknat (1983: 113-6), Nowag (1983: 163-70; cf. Jackson 1985: 755-7), and Holscher (1988: 208). 95. •There must always have been individualists and adventurers who did notflt into the normal social structure. Such was the Cretan ... • (Kirk 1962: 43, emphasis added). Note also the distorted description of the son of Kastor in Kirk 1968: 11516. Bravo (1980: 975-6) argues that the son of Kastor only engages in freebooting under the constraints of •harsh necessity•, i.e. because of his poverty - implying that it is not otherwise an acceptable activity. 96. Bravo (1980: 976) points out that other Cretans regard a freebooters' way of life with •horreur•. This again suggests disapproval, but what the text actually says is that, whereas the son of Kastor likes ships, battles, javelins and arrows, other people who come near them regard these things as katarrigela, 'things to ~ shudder all over'. This implies nothing but a fear of the dangers of warfare. Nowag (1983: 164-5, 169) argues that the success of the son of Kastor is due exclusively to the wealth he acquires in his expeditions; presumably Nowag implies that his wealth wipes out the shame attached to the means by which he has acquired it. 97. In the Hymn to Apollo, the question is 'friendly', too; in 9.252-5 it could be hostile. Bravo (1980: 976) is right to point out that the question does not in itself imply that freebooting is honourable, but he is wrong to say that the word mapsidios, •at random•, implies a negative judgement (as, it seems, does S. West [1988: ad 3. 72) when offering •recklessly• as a translation). In some contexts, the word may imply criticism, but here it clearly means •without definite destination• (see n.84). Note also the question put to, and by, the ghost of Agamemnon (11.401-3; cf. 24.111-3) - this may refer to freebooting. 98. Taphian freebooters : 15.427; 16.426. The Taphian ruler braves the anger of the gods to do Odysseus a favour (1.255-64; p. 170), while Athena chooses to disguise herself as Ankhialos' son to give Telemakhos advice "like a father to his son• on how to deal with his enemies (1.269-308). Moreover, the 'good' Eumaios trades with the Taphians : 14.449-52. 99. Eumaios is seen as a representative of a morality different from the dominant

one by e.g. Bravo (1980: 975). He is regarded as an individual exception by e.g. Mele (1986: 67-8). Holscher (1988: 208) leaves open both possibilities. Note that Eumaios, although now a slave - and in that sense a member of the lower classes was a member of the social 61ite (the son of a monarch) before he was kidnapped (15.412-14).

100. Once again, one cannot be entirely sure that these are freebooters, but it seems likely enough. It has been argued that the etymology of the word anarsioi ('without bonds [of friendship]', as the opposite of arthmioi), here given the usual translation •enemies•, suggests •cmen) not conforming to the rules (of society; of decent warfare)• (Hoekstra 1989: ad 14.85). On this interpretation, the word itself would imply a condemnation of freebooting. However, it clearly means merely 'enemy' in XXIV.365 (where it is used by a Greek of his countrymen's attitude towa."'ds Priamos), and 'enemy' seems the more appropriate translation wherever the word occurs (10.459; 11.401, 408; 24.111).

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101. See pp. 146-8. Note that Eumaios himself accepts only with considerable modifications the idea that the gods punish unjust behaviour. For one thing, he assumes that at least one god may be sympathetic enough to the suitors to give them "some message... that Odysseus has come to a miserable end", and thus reassure them that they may safely continue to act unjustly. Also, Eumaios' explanation of the suitors' lack of fear hinges on the idea that the suitors will no longer be in danger of retribution once Odysseus is dead. This implies that he does not expect the gods unconditionally to seek to punish them. With Odysseus dead, the gods may well cease to care what the suitors do. Apparently, if they punish them, it will be to help Odysseus, as a favour to a 'friend', not in order to uphold justice for its own sake. 102. The remark is regarded as 'inconsistent' by Hoekstra (1989: ad 14.86-8) and Holscher (1988: 230). Alternatively, one could explain it away as merely a poetic way of saying that the freebooters had enjoyed good fortune, without implying that Zeus had deliberately assisted them. 103. Harmand's remark is part of an oral 'intervention' at a congress - perhaps an unguarded moment. Among other explicit supporters of the human nature-approach are Kaletsch, who ends his survey of ancient piracy with a quote from Cassius Dio, to the effect that 'piracy will be practised for as long as human nature remains what it is' (1986: 500); Glotz, who discusses the development of trade in terms of 'moral' progress (1920: 48-9); and Andreades, who assumes that the Akhaians use violence without inhibition, on account of the "lack of a strong central government" (1933: 24-5). Note also Starr's reference to cattle-raiding as "a casual, almost involuntary reaction• (1977: 47-8). The approach is, of course, rooted in a prominent strand of theorising on the nature of society and of the state in general (seep. 63). 104. Alternatively, one might take 'the stomach' to represent greed, but since the passage is supposed to be a beggar's explanation of why he is willing to put up with abuse for the sake of scraps of food, hunger seems the more obvious interpretation. It should be noted, however, that even hunger may be an ideologically loaded concept: Forbes (1990: 9-12) notes that in contemporary Greece 'hunger' is used as an explanation for actions such as sheep-stealing, even by those whose diets appear quite satisfactory. "This sort of hunger is metaphorical, not intestinal... A rhetorical device for defending what they themselves feel is an embarassing, socially reprehensible practice" (ibid. 12). 105. Humphreys (1978: 164-8) points out that many young men of wealthy families would be available for such expeditions, since between the ages of sixteen and thirty they would be more or less redundant at home. They would not be needed for work on the estate, which is carried out by slaves, and they would not set up their own households before the age of thirty. Given that there are no large numbers of non-productive retainers in a prince's household (pp. 42-4), it is not the case - as it is, for example, with Viking raiders that a prince is forced to go plundering once or twice a year in order to provide food for his retinue. Nowag (1983: 178-9) suggests that wealthy men lead plundering expeditions to help their poor neighbours make ends meet; their aim is not profit for themselves,

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but to prevent the hostility of the poor from turning against rich landowners : freebooting is •a safety valve•.

106. The distinction is briefly indicated by Finley (1977: 60-1), and implicitly made also by earlier authors, yet precisely formulated only by Donlan (1981: 101-7) and Morris (19861>: 8-9). Cf. n.119, and on treasure also p. 52, 103-4. 107. See Chapter 7Wo, section 7. The following sketch is based essentially on the accounts ofHasebroek (1931: 14-33) and Finley (1977: 60-71); some of the gaps are filled in with the observations of other authors. The interpretation of the Homeric economy has been little affected by the 'modemist-primitivist' debate: the modernist account of Glotz (1920: 7-60), for instance, differs only marginally from that of the primitivists Hasebroek and Finley. Although the terms of this debate may have been misleading, as Humphreys (1978: 157) suggests, it has brought to the fore the methodologically important point that one should not automatically assume that the economic behaviour of another society is based on the same principles as our own (cf. Cartledge 1983: 3-6). 108. See also e.g. Glotz 1920: 8, 16; Hasebroek 1931: 15; Heichelheim 1958: 225; Austin/Vidal-Naquet 1972: 54-6; and cf. p. 52. 109. So Glotz (1920: 18; contradicting himself on p.48), Hasebroek (1931: 31), Finley allows for some 'internal' exchange, following the same rules as 'external' acquisition, but admits there is no evidence for it (1977: 71). Gift-exchange between members of different communities was first analysed at length by Finley in his The World of Odysseus of 1954. Its existence had, of course, been noted before then. Hasebroek had referred to it as "the gift-trade" (Schenkhandel) and remarked that it "plays a significant role among Homeric big men [Grossen], as it always does on a primitive level" (1931: 30). This approach, treating Homeric gift-exchange as one form of a practice found in many 'primitive' societies, was adopted by Finley and subsequent writers on the subject. Of older discussions, Finsler's (1914: 195-7) is useful. See pp. 228-37.

Bolkestein (1958: 105) and Donlan (1982a: 141 n. 7).

110. Coping with shortages : Glotz 1920: 8, 48; Hasebroek 1931: 29-30; Heichelheim 1958: 225; Austin/Vidal-Naquet 1972: 56-7; Finley 1977: 61-4 and 67 ("Imports alone motivated trade, never exports. There was never a need to export as such"); Hahn 1983: 30-1. Storing the surplus: Glotz 1920: 11, 48; Hasebroek 1931: 31 ("The Homeric nobility has so little interest in economic matters that it does not even bring the surplus of its agricultural produce on the market"). Giving away the surplus: Murray 1980: 49; 1983a: 196-7; Qviller 1981: 113ff.; Donlan 1982a: esp. 170-1; cf. 1982b: 9-10. On the role of gift-exchange in coping with shortages, see pp. 229-30, 237. 111. Cf. Glotz 1920: 48 (•13ach does business only so far as he actually needs. No one makes a living by selling the products of others"). That direct consumption is the rule also tends to be implied in the statements that acquisition is motivated by specific shortages (n.110), although it does not strictly follow from this proposition. Wickert-Micknat claims that direct consumption is the norm in the Iliad, but not in the Odyssey (1983: 138-40).

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112. So Austin/Vidal-Naquet (1972: 57); Mele (1979: 81; but cf. 1986: 76-8); Cartledge 1983: 9-10; Hahn 1983: 30-1; Cozzo 1988: 29. Cf. Bolkestein 1958: 104-5. Bravo disagrees: he argues that all Homeric trade involves making a profit, and that the princes therefore will have nothing to do with it (1984: esp. 119-20). Elsewhere, one sometimes finds the notion of profit casually slipping in : Glotz 1920: 18; Gray 1974: 117; Murray 1980: 70. Further discussion: pp. 238-44. 113. This point of Finley's (which he appears to have derived from Polanyi - see Humphreys 1978: 49) does not seem to have been taken up. It is, in any case, contradicted by the notion that it is possible for 'professional' traders to make a living (see below). A notion of a 'right', 'reasonable' price no doubt existed (cf. axios onos [pp. 241-2) and iustum pretlum), but such a notion does not, of course, exclude the operation of the laws of supply and demand : what is 'right' simply varies with circumstances. Humphreys (loc.cit.) points out another significant economic feature: "The major distinction between the modern economy... and that of earlier... societies is that exchange prices in the latter, whether fixed or bargained, have little connection with production decisions". In Homeric society, therefore, a household might exploit variations in supply and demand when exchanging goods, but it would not actually adapt its production to demand (cf. n. 162, 172). 114. More recent authors to assert this view are Garlan (1989: 189; 1978: 5), Cozzo (1988: 23-4), Andreev (1988: 72 n.212), Cartledge (1983: 11-12), Fine (1983: 63), Mele (1979: 59-64, 72-3, 101), Humphreys (1978: 167-8), Starr (1977: 51), Finley (1977: 64) and Austin/Vidal-Naquet (1972: 56). Bravo (1984: 103-5, 119, 127-9) disagrees : seep. 245 n.164. 115. Finley explicitly includes "small-scale herders and peasants" among these (1977: 71). 116. Both these types of trader are presumably meant when 'professional' traders are mentioned without further comment : cf. Glotz 1920: 49-55; Austin/Vidal-Naquet 1972: 57-8; Finley 1977: 70-1; Mele 1979: 81-3; 1986: 77-8, 94; Bravo 1977: 3340; 1983: 17; 1984: 99; Cartledge 1983: 9-12. 117. This type of trader has been put into the foreground by Bravo (1974: 150-4; 1977: 24-5; 1983: 24-5; 1984: 99-100). See also Humphreys (1978: 167); Mele (1979: 79); Cartledge (1983: 7-8); and already Glotz (1920: 58). 118. Finley speaks of "a very few ... living in the interstices of society" (1977: 70; this, as Paul Cartledge points out to me, echoes a Marxian phrase referring to mediaeval Jews). Cf. Glotz 1920: 52; Hasebroek 1928: 18-9; 1931: 31-2; Bravo 1977: 24; Redfield 1983: 233. Professional trade by non-Akhaians (Phoenicians) : e.g. Hasebroek 1928: 66; Austin/Vidal-Naquet 1972: 58; Finley 1977: 70, 158; Mele 1979: 87-9; Hahn 1983: 30-1. 119. Cf. Donlan and Morris, as cited in n.106, and Gernet (1968: 96-7, 134-6: mati~re d'un commerce noble'). Among the anthropological work on which the idea of separate spheres is based, Paul Bohannon' s study of the

keimelia as 'la

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Nigerian Tiv is important (Tribal and Peasant &:onomies, ed. G. Dalton (1967], 124ff.); also Raymond Firth, Primitive Polynesian &:onomy (19652], 336-44, and Edmund Leach, Political Systems of Highland Burma (1954), 142-4. 120. Cf. Finley 19TI: 64-7, 98-102, 120-3; Qviller 1981; Donlan 1982a/b. Also Humphreys 1978: 151-2; Bolkestein 1958: 104. On this matter, these authors take their models from the works of, among others, Bronislaw Malinowski (esp. Argonauts of the Westem Pacific (1922)), Marcel Mauss (Essal sur le don (1925)), Marshall Sahlins (e.g. Stone Age &:onomics (1972)), and Pierre Bourdieu (Outline of a Theory of Practice (1977]). The idea that all gift-giving in the Homeric world is reciprocal (Finley 19TI: 64) is clearly mistaken. Finley's own list of types of gifts includes •fees, rewards, prizes and ... bribes", as well as "taxes and other dues [andJ amends with a penal overtone• (ibid.: 66). Clearly, these are by definition not reciprocal. In fact, as far as I can see, explicit evidence for reciprocity in gift-giving is limited to instances of exchange with members of a different community. 121. It seems that Humphreys was the first to interpret Homeric gift-giving in terms of the potlatch (1978: 151). The idea was taken up and elaborated by Qviller (1981: esp. 113, 120-7) and Donlan (1982a: esp. 140-1, 145 n.16, 171 n.57; cf. 1982b). The original ethnographic work on the potlatch was done at the turn of the century by Franz Boas; for a summary of it, see Benedict (1935: 125-60); more recent studies include Codere 1950; Drucker/Heizer 1967. 122. Finley and others do not specify that accumulation is limited to the prestige sphere, but presumably they imply that this is so, for otherwise it is hard to see how households could be regarded as striving for accumulation and autarky at the same time. See pp. 223-4, below, on the significance in this context of the alleged nonconvertibility of goods. The acquisitive drive of the heroes : pp. 105-6. 123. Menelaos and Odysseus boast of the wealth (in gifts) they have acquired. The passage in which Odysseus as 'Eperitos' enumerates the gifts he has given, might be taken as a boast about his generosity, but the wording hardly suggests this : he says, for example, that he has never given gifts as lavish as he gave on that occasion, whereas one would expect a boaster to say rather that no-one else has ever given gifts as lavish as he has done. Even if one does take the passage as a boast, it offers no hint that the recipient stands to lose face if he does not reciprocate (24.266-79, see below). 124. Qviller argues that Phoinix 'loses status' after receiving a gift from Peleus which he cannot reciprocate, and that he becomes a follower of Peleus as a result (1981: 120-1). This is misleading. Phoinix does not/ail to reciprocate : he is not expected to give a counter-gift. Peleus offers him men and wealth, on the understanding that Phoinix is to be his retainer. The same applies to all those who depend upon a prince's generosity. There is no element of competition in this. Donlan maintains that Agamemnon's offer of compensation to Akhilleus is at the same time an attempt "to elevate his own prestige and to put Akhilleus under severe obligation•. This attempt is then supposedly neutralised by Akhilleus, who first refuses it, then accepts, but only "on his own terms", and finally beats it "with a brilliant display of generosity" : the funeral games for Patroklos, which are •a long

Notes to Chapter Four delayed ... counterstroke" (1989c: 2, 4 n.11, 5-6). motivations to be found in the text of the Iliad.

396 There is not a trace of such

125. It is not clear that those who posit a rule of non-convertibility are aware of its significance in this respect. See n.122. 126. By definition, since keimelion is something that can be 'laid up', as slaves and animals cannot be. That livestock is not treasure is explicitly stated at 4.600-2 (Telemakhos does not want horses as a gift, but some keimelion instead) and 2. 75 (keimelia and livestock [probata]). Donlan (1981: 101-2, 113-14 il.14; 115 n.16) maintains that female (but not male) slaves, and horses and mules (but not cattle and sheep) are items of treasure, "although the commonest Homeric expression keimelia - shows that small, portable items constituted the essential notion of treasure" (102). Morris (1986b: 9) suggests that the "top rank group" of goods includes women, cattle and "finished objects of metal". These categorisations are based on the perceived use of the commodities in question (see below), not on a categorical distinction made in the epics. I shall reserve the term 'treasure' for keimelia, and use the more general term 'prestige-wealth' for other items of symbolic value. We shall see that these may include slaves of both sexes and cattle as well as horses and mules. 127. Actual oxen are exchanged for wine at VII.472-4 (discussed below and on pp. 240-1, 244). When Eumaios 'buys' a slave from the Taphians, he presumably gives some of his pigs in return. 128. For the meaning of biotos: Donlan 1981: 15 n.16; Bravo 1983: 17-:18; 1984: 120-1; Mele 1986: 84-5. 129. Seep. 52. Donlan (1981: 105) notes that commissioning treasures is one way of acquiring them, but does not draw the conclusion that agricultural surplus is therefore convertible. 130. On the importance of textiles, see below, n.140. Note also that it is highly important in the heroic world to be cremated in an elaborate shroud (2.97-102), and that, when Hektor's corpse is lost and cannot be laid out in his "fine and pleasing garments", his wife decides to burn these anyway, to enhance his reputation (kleos) among the Trojans (XXll.510-14). 131. Donlan (1989c: 10-15) argues that inequality is the norm : a 'bright purple belt', he imagines, is an "unglamorous" gift compared to a golden cup or a sword; the party which "feels inferior" gives gifts of greater value. Glaukos is 'mad' only to the extent that the imbalance is too great : Diomedes had taken him by surprise with his sudden proposal to exchange gifts. While I shall argue presently that hierarchical exchange is in fact the norm in one kind of gift-exchange, it does not seem to me applicable to this type of direct exchange. Scholia on the episode are discussed by Maftei (1976: 52-3). A recent discussion is Traill 1990: 301-5. Pearson (1962: 37) believes that Glaukos' behaviour is perfectly acceptable by the standards of Homer's aristocratic audience, but that the poet, "a poor man for whom such magnificent gestures were unthinkable", "is

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allowing his own sense of values to intrude• when he calls it madness. Such a gap of understanding between the poet and his audience is scarcely credible. 132. Examples may be the cuirass brought by Phyleus from Ephyre (•a xeinos, Euphetes, lord of men, gave it to him to bring it to war•, XV.529-33) and the gifts of clothing offered to Odysseus on his way to Troy - Aithon gives him a cloak and tunic, and a sword (19.241-2) and supposes that another xeinos or a comrade (hetairos) may have done the same (19.237-9). Euphetes' gift, however, could equally well be interpreted u a 'symbolic' gift, or u a 'parting gift' (below), while sets of clothes are also offered u part of normal hospitality (below). Note that Aithon imagines that not only xeinoi but also 'comrades' - which must here imply members of the same community, u opposed to outsiders - might offer gifts at the outbreak of war. Note also that Ekhepolos is perhaps not regarded u a xeinos of Agamemnon's, for his home town, Sikyon, is part of the territory ruled by Agamemnon (II.572). 133. See pp. 47-8, 140-8. 134. There are no explicit references to the custom in the Iliad, but the cuirass and the helmet mentioned u xeineia at XV.529-33 and X.261-9 could well be partinggifts (see n.132). 135. Mules u a parting-gift: 15.85; cf. XXIV.278. Helena receives unusual parting gifts from wives of her Egyptian hosts : see below. 136. Eperitos: 24.306-9. Aithon met Odysseus when he left for Troy, i.e. twenty years before. He had been on his way to Doulikhion, but forced to land at Ithaka (14.334-59; compare 14.316-35 with 19.270-92). Mentes lut saw Odysseus before the Trojan War: 1.194-5. Note also the rarity of visits exchanged between relatives : just after Odysseus is born, his grandfather visits; no further visit takes place until Odysseus is grown up (19.399-413; cf. 4.797-811). 137. Cf. Odysseus' reception at Eumaios' farm : 14.45ff. Working on farms, u opposed to loitering about town: 17.10-21, 185-7, 223-8; 18.357-64. 138. Cf. Odysseus' reception at his own home: 17.336ff. Spending the night at a smithy or leskhe : 18.327-36. Jobs in the house: tending fire (18.317-9), holding torch (19.24-8). 139. Odysseus in his disguise u a poor old man is immediately offered better treatment than is usual for a beggar when he is presented to Telemakhos as a suppliant (16.67-89), and again when he proves to Penelope that he has once done her husband a great favour (19.185-260, 317-34; see below). Telemakhos and Peisistratos are at once offered full hospitality by Menelaos, ·because "they look like descendants of zeus• (4.27), i.e. they are recognised as men of high status. 140. The lowest level of full hospitality is extended to the poor old man who is regarded as a xeinos of Odysseus - perhaps because the household is not fully under control of its nominal head, and the uninvited guests who actually rule it do not allow greater generosity. The highest level of generosity is extended to Telemakhos

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in Sparta and to Odysseus on Skheria (4.48ff.; 6.209ff.; 7.126ff.). Discussions of Homeric hospitality as a 'type-scene' (e.g. Arend 1933: 39-52, 69-75, 99-105, 1246; Edwards 1975) fail to distinguish different levels of hospitality. The offer of a set of clothes deserves emphasis. It is mentioned frequently (3.467; 4.50; 5.264; 6.214; 8.441; 13.66-7; 14.320, 341-2; 14.515-6; 15.337-9; 16.79-80; 17.89-90; 17.549-50; 19.241-2; 21.339-41), and clothes (as well as a place by the fire, 17.572-3) are given high priority among the needs of a traveller, who has to keep out the cold (14.459-514; 17.22-5, 190-1, 556-9). In order to be able to provide hospitality, a household thus needs great quantities of textiles : not only clothes, but also blankets, pillows and the like, which Nestor singles out as the things most needed for the reception of a guest (3.346-55; cited on p. 104). Moreover, textiles are among the parting-gifts as well (see above; also Pedrick [1988] on women's role in providing hospitality). 141. Odysseus receives from "those who do the work" of cutting the meat "a share equal to that which was allotted to themselves (20.281-2). It is not clear whether this refers to a 'servant's share' which is smaller than that of the guests, or whether it simply means 'a share as large as that of any other guest'. Particularly good joints of meat are sometimes offered to guests as a sign of respect : 4.65-6; 14.434-41 (cf. VII.321-2 and 8.474-83). Seep. 71. 142. This help with transport is called pompe. Private ship : 8.31-6. Chariot : 3.368-70, 474-85. Place as passenger: 14.334-5; 19.291-2. Sandals: 16.80; 21.340-1. In combination with the footwear, a sword and spear are mentioned. I take these to be part of the pompe, rather than a separate parting-gift - on the road, the weapons are •a protector against dogs and men" (21.340; cf. 14.531). Aithon's gift of clothes and a sword to Odysseus on his way to Troy, on the other hand, may well be a parting-gift : presumably Odysseus at that time did not lack protection (19.241-2; see above). Note also that several superhuman hosts arrange for a favourable wind to blow, as part of their pompe: Kalypso (5.268), Aiolos (10.1726) and Kirke (11.6-8). 143. Cf. the distinction made at 17.222 (below, n.146). On the distinction between 'pity' and 'respect' : Riedinger 1980: 65; and cf. pp. 76-7, 130-1. 144. Alternatively, one might take kai allos to mean "even otherwise", i.e. "even if you do not provide hospitality, (at least) give me a gift". On this reading, the passage does not prove that hospitality need not include gifts. Instead, it shows that one could go round simply asking for gifts, without any need for hospitality. 145. It is not, I think, a coincidence that in some of the visits which do not end with an offer of gifts, the host is of higher status than his guest. The goddesses Kirke and Kalypso and the god Aiolos receive Odysseus with all the usual hospitality, and provide every means to help him on his way home (see n.142 adfln.). But they do not offer him gifts. Nestor is equally hospitable to Telemakhos, and tells his youngest son to drive his guest to Sparta, but he, too, omits the parting-gift. It is generally supposed that he would have made a present to Telemakhos on his return from Sparta, if only Telemakhos had given him the chance, instead of by-passing Pylos and rushing straight back to Ithaka (e.g. Thornton 1970: 45). That may be so. Still, in Sparta

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Nestor's son persuades Telemakhos to curb his anxiety to leave, and to wait for Menelaos to bring out his gifts; in Pylos he does not repeat this argument (15.4855, 193-221). Perhaps we should consider the possibility that Nestor did not plan to offer parting-gifts at all. Unlike Menelaos, he has no great debt of gratitude to Telemakhos' father, and Telemakhos himself is so far inferior to his host in power, prestige and age that he barely dares to address him when they first meet (3.21-4, 75-7). Nor does Telemakhos receive gifts from Dioldes on either of his visits to Pherai (3.488-90 = 15.186-8). These passages are very brief, so one might argue that the poet is simply taking the gift-giving for granted. However, the fact that no gifts from Dioldes are mentioned even when Telemakhos decides to give his (other) gifts in safe-keeping (16.326-7; 17.74-83), does suggest that Dioldes is not supposed to have given any. Odysseus, in his disguise as a Cretan, does not get gifts from either Pheidon or Penelope/Telemakhos (see n.139) even though they do offer him every other hospitality. The xeinia offered to Thetis (XVIll.387, 408) evidently consist of food and drink only (see also XI. 779). Those who perform some sort of favour at the special ,request of their guest are presumably not expected to give parting-gifts as well. 146. Odysseus almost at once asks the Kyldops for a gift; he does not wait for an offer (9.266-8). Note also that Mentes, who does wait for an offer, does not feel inhibited from asking Telemakhos to make the gift •a very beautiful one" (1.318). It has been noted (e.g. Finley 1977: 122) that no distinction is made in the Greek between the verbs for •to beg" and •to request a gift" : princes and beggars "ask" (aitizein); the difference is merely that beggars "ask for scraps, not for swords or cauldrons•. 147. One may speculate that an implicit threat of retaliation helps to inspire 'respect' in the host. After entering the Kyldops' cave, and before finding out that the Kyldops is a dangerous giant, Odysseus and his men help themselves to his food and slaughter some of his animals (9.231-3). Perhaps this is not so much an indication of high standards of hospitality (so Heubeck 1989: ad 9.231) as a measure of the men's self-confidence: seven armed men can take what they like and disregard their host's wishes. This, in combination with Odysseus' blunt request for a gift (n.146), suggests that a host may be intimidated into making gifts. (Although Odysseus does, at the same time, humbly call himself a suppliant, to gain the support of the gods for his request [9.269-71).) Note that Menelaos travels with five ships (c. 250 men) in Egypt (3.299-300), which may help to explain the Egyptians' generosity to him. Again, perhaps one reason why the Egyptians are generous to the son of Kastor is his recently forged bond with their ruler (14.278-84). 148. Hasebroek (1928: 18) and Bravo (1984: 105-6) argue that the son of Kastor objects to trading as such, but Mele (1986: 69) points out that his objection is to this particular trip only, because he suspects that it is a ti'ap. Since the son of Kastor has by this stage already been joint commander-in-chief of the Cretan army and become wealthy twice over, the fact that he was a bastard son, and had started out in life as a relatively poor man, have no bearing on his involvement in trade at this point.

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149. Cf. Finley 1977: 68. The fact that Athena chooses to play the role of Mentes, a prince on a trading expedition, shows that it is a respectable venture. See also n.98. The argument that Taphian attitudes to trade are not representative of heroic values, because they are "an exotic people", not Akhaians (esp. Bravo 1984: 104, 108; cf.1977: 24), is demolished by Mele (1986: 68-9). 150. I fail to understand Wickert-Micknat's reasons for denying that all this is evidence for the 'sale' of booty (1983: 138-9). Andersen (1990: 36-7) insists that the various references to the sale of Lykaon are inconsistent, although he admits that it is perfectly possible to make them add up to a consistent story (as found in the Kypria, according to Proldos' summary). 151. It has been argued (by e.g. Bravo 1984: 107) that Euneos' attitude to trade is un-Akhaian, because he is a 'barbarian'. However, even if the Lemnians are nonAkhaian (which the epic does not say), Euneos is clearly part of the Akhaian 6.lite. He is the son of Jason, one of the greatest heroes of Greek myth (Vll.468-9), and he is apparently Thoas' successor as ruler of Lemnos (XXIIl.745). Bravo seeks to dismiss Euneos because he is 'not a hero of the Trojan War' (loc.cit.), but Mele points out that this is not necessarily an indication of low social status (1986: 70). In any case, I can see no immediate difference between Euneos' attitude to trade and that of Akhilleus. 152. This is the only strictly Homeric evidence for what freebooters do with their booty. In addition, the Hymn to Demeter refers to a band of freebooters with a ship full of captive women whom they intend to sell (123-32), and the Hymn to Dionysos mentions the possibility of selling a captive young man in Egypt, Cyprus, among the Hyperboraians "or even beyond" (6-10, 28-9). 153. One might object that, if these men break one norm, they may well break other norms, too. However, when Laomedon and the suitors act in hybris, they are breaking certain norms in a way that demonstrates their power and hence is 'wrong' but nevertheless prestigious (see 115-18). By contrast, if trade were regarded with contempt, Laomedon and the suitors would, by becoming involved in it, be doing something not only 'wrong' but also contemptible - surely they would wish to avoid that. 154. One might argue that Euneos' motives are altruistic, and that he is trading wine as a favour to Agamemnon and Menelaos, whose troops are in need of it. In that case, the separate consignment of a thousand measures is presumably part of the favour, rather than a gift to 'buy' permission to trade (cf. XXIII. 744-5), as it is commonly, and I think rightly, interpreted (e.g. Stanley 1986: 9-10, 14). 155. It has often been pointed out that, on Ithaka, Laertes buys a female slave for the price of twenty oxen (1.431), which is five times as much as the Akhaians at Troy estimate to be the value of the slave offered as a prize by Akhilleus (XXIII. 705), see below. A number of explanations is possible - an obvious one would be that Laertes' slave is more beautiful or more skilled than the other -, but it is worth considering the suggestion of Ameis-Hentze (1868: ad XXIII. 705; also Gladstone 1870: 447) that the difference is due to the abundant supply of slaves as a result of successful warfare, compared to their relative scarcity in peace-time.

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156. See pp. 220-1. A description of a Phoenician trader selling a necklace to a chieftain's wife, refers to the mistress of the house and her maids handling the object and scrutinising it, "promising [a/the] price" (15.459-63). To me, this suggests haggling. 157. The contrast between 'worthy' and 'immense' is suggested by Mele (1979: 813, 87-8). "Worthy price" : 15.388 = 429; 20.383; cf. 8.405 = XXIII.562, and XXIII.885. "Infinite price" : 14.297; 15.452-3. The compensation offered by Agamemnon to Akhilleus is called "immense" (IX.120), as well as "worthy" (IX.261). Clearly, the former is a reference to its high absolute value, while the latter refers to the adequacy of its relative value (i.e. in comparison to the harm done/the merchandise offered). Note the "worthy ransom" promised at VI.46; XI.131, and the "immense ransom" at 1.13 = 372. 158. The son of Kastor also calls his Phoenician an "expert in deceit" (14.288). For

troktes, see e.g. Finley 1977: 70; Stanley 1986: 7.

159. Dishonest Thesprotian sailors : 14.334-59. Honest Phoenicians : 13.272-86. For opinions on the Homeric image of the Phoenicians: n.118. 160. This is implied by Finley 1977: 70 and in general appears to be the implicit reasoning of those who assert that the insult implies contempt for trade and profit (refs.: n.118) - unless perhaps it is assumed that Euryalos calls Odysseus a trader simply because that is the worst insult he can think of. 161. Finley makes a similar point in this context : "the heroes... could set honour above all material goods" (1977: 122). But he does not see Euryalos' insult as an expression of this attitude (ibid.: 68-70). Since the suffix -ter in prekter indicates that these men are "dedicated to [commercial] activity" (Bravo 1977: 34, following Benveniste, Noms d'agent, p.62), Bravo concludes that they are professsionals (loc. cit.; cf. his analogous interpretation of lelster, 1980: 975). 'Dedication' to an activity, however, may mean having a strong inclination towards it, rather than practising it professionally, and this fits the present interpretation quite well. One may compare the distinction drawn in the Icelandic Laxdaela Saga, when the hero chooses a crew for a voyage to Ireland. "He thought it imperative to choose men who were more like warriors than merchants" (Chapter 21; transl. M. Magnusson/H. Palsson [Penguin Classics]). Here, at any rate, we find, not two distinct 'professional' groups, but men who make good traders and men who make good warriors. Bravo is right to maintain contra Mele that this sort of trader is not a 'scandalous novelty' to the poet (1984: 114; Mele 1979: 81). If the wording of this passage is unusual, that is because such traders fall short of Homeric ethical standards and hence are given little space in the epic, not necessarily because they are a 'new' phenomenon. 162. This does not necessarily mean that the heroes buy goods for resale, nor that they adapt their production to market-demand (cf. n.111, 113 ad.fin.), but perhaps one should not exclude these possibilities (see n.172). It does mean that when the heroes have a surplus on their hands, they will consider what they know of the

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supply and demand situation and seek out the places where their goods are likely to have the highest value. 163. Some cattle eaten : VII.474 (their hides remain); compare the slaughter of animals at 9.45-6 and 9.464-70, 543-57; and the consumption of wine captured at Ismaros (9.163-5). Agamemnon keeps Khryseis (1.11-31, etc.) and seven women from Lesbos (IX.128-30 = 270-2); Akhilleus keeps Briseis (1.184-5, etc.) and Diomede (IX.663-5); Patroklos keeps Iphis (IX.666-8); Nestor keeps Hekamede (XI.624-7). Odysseus keeps personally captured slaves at home (1.398). Ransoms paid in gold, bronz.e, iron : Il.229-30; VI.46-50; XI.132-5; XXII.49-50; ransom higher than sale-price: XXI.80. Khryseis' father comes to the enemy camp (1.11-34, 370-9), while in the Hymn to Dionysos the freebooters apparently intend to seek out their captive's family (29-31). Akhilleus releases :Eetion's wife and Isos and Antiphos for ransoms paid by their fathers (VI.425-7; XI.106). Its greater value no doubt explains why the captors may not leave it to the prisoners' relatives to come and make an offer, but themselves get in touch in order to arrange a settlement. 164. References in n.114. 165. This distinction between the two types of ship is suggested by e.g. Gray (1974: 115-6), but Humphreys (1977: 351) equally plausibly suggest that the references are to "sizable seagoing vessels as opposed to small boats" (cf. 1978: 166). In any case, the differentiation does not go as far as it does in Greek history by 525 B.C., when merchant ships as opposed to warships are completely wind-powered (Humphreys 1978: 168-9; Snodgrass 1983: 16-17) : in addition to sails the Homeric cargo-ship has twenty oars. 166. Discussion of exports and imports in Homeric and Archaic economy : Bravo 1983: 17-23; Hahn 1983: 32-4; Snodgrass 1983: 18-25. 167. See Chapter Three. 168. Bought by l.aertes and inherited by Odysseus: Eurykleia (1.429-33) and Eumaios (15.482-4). Part of dowry: Dolios (4.735-7) and Aktoris (23.227-30). Born on estate: sons of Dolios and "old Sikelian woman" (24.387-90, 497). Significantly, when Odysseus (as beggar) asks Eumaios how he came to be a slave in Ithaka, he assumes that he was bought, not captured, by his owner (15.386-8). Of course, many slaves would initially have lost their freedom through capture. 169. For the notion that princes leave the work to their subordinates because it is shameful, e.g. Bravo 1984: 99-100. Note also that when the shepherd Melanthios threatens to sell his colleague Eumaios into slavery, he apparently intends personally to "take him far from Ithaka on a ship" (17.249-50). For 'subordinates' trading, see n.117. The arguments advanced to explain away the evidence of Mentes and Euneos are to my mind invalid: see nn.149 and 151. 170. When he decides to wait, Odysseus already suspects that the host might be a savage giant without respect for conventions (9.213-15). One may say that

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Odysseus' choice is required by the traditional tale. But if there were any awkwardness about it, the story could easily have been told without introducing the possibility of plundering at all. Odysseus expresses his pride in being a popular guest several times, when he puts the words into others' mouths: according to him, his companions say "O popoil How well-liked and respected he is among all people whose towns and countries he visits!• (10.38-9); in his disguise as Aithon, he says •Odysseus used to be a friend of many [xeinoi]; for few Akhaians were his equal• (19.239-40); as Eperitos, he claims that he never treated any guest better than he did Odysseus (24.267-8, quoted on p. 231). Telemakhos mentions the fact that Odysseus received many visitors, "because he himself, too, was epistrophos among men• (1.175-7). This presumably means that he made a habit of visiting people. Cf. n.8, above. 171. It may be noted that, among treasures, gold appears to come not only in the form of plate, but also in definite weights - talents and half-talents·- perhaps in the shape of small ingots. If so, these units of precious metal come quite close to coinage in its hoarding- (as opposed to exchange-) function. 172. This is not to suggest that Euneos started growing extra vines as soon as he heard about the Trojan War and realised the opportunities it offered. Information about the market situation would be neither precise nor quickly disseminated; production would not be very flexible (see nn.113, 162). But it is conceivable that landowners made the decision to produce on a regular basis surpluses of, say, wine, because they knew that there would generally be a demand for this commodity abroad. Cf. Herodotos' comment that twice a year "from every part of Greece" men sail to Egypt to sell wine (111.6). 173. Wickert-Micknat discerns three kinds of warfare. In the first, an invading (migratory) army aims to conquer a town for the sake of its territory and women; this is regarded as a reflection of the reality of the Age of Migrations, 1250-1000 B.C. (1983: 46; cf. 59-61). In the second, two settled communities fight one another, primarily for cattle and other booty, though severe retaliation may involve destroying the enemy town (without occupying its territory) and enslaving its women and children; this reflects the reality of the time when the Iliad was composed (1983: 46-7; cf. 61-2). In the third, private bands of pirates plunder for booty and kidnap and sell people; this reflects the reality of the time when the Odyssey was composed (87-103; cf. 138-40; similarly Holscher 1988: 206-8). Nowag (1983: 199-200) distinguishes three kinds of predatory warfare : Akhilleus' expeditions, which he dates to the Age of Migrations; most raids mentioned in the Odyssey, which reflect the poet's own lifetime; and the expeditions of the son of Kastor, which are not assigned a date, but said to be different from the other two. It is not uncommon to regard the raids of the son of Kastor as a reflection of the migrations of the so-called Sea Peoples (e.g. Kirk 1968: 115-16), but I see·no reason to separate this story from the rest of Homer.'s references to freebooting. 174. Reports by Vijitha Yapa (Times), Chris Nuttall (Guardian) and Gabriella Gamini (Independent). The name of the town is also given as Velvettithurai or Valbettiturai, and the casualty figures given vary slightly. The Indian government is reported to have denied that a massacre took place. Note that the newspapers refer to soldiers going "berserk" and "running amok", implying a loss of emotional

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control, while the massacre was evidently a deliberate and organised act of revenge. (The town, moreover, was the birthplace of a prominent Tamil Tiger guerilla leader.) 175. Ransoming of male captives: n.163; sale of male captives: pp. 238-9. 176. Seep. 49, esp. n.86 (Odysseus has not captured all his slaves in person, but many of them must have been captured at some stage, see n.168). Alternatively, one might explain the presence of as many male as female slaves as the result of freebooters capturing far more men than women (and hence restoring the balance), or as the result of slave-owners practising female infanticide on the children of household slaves. There is no evidence for either practice, but neither is inconceivable. 177. E.g. Aristotle, Politics 1256ab; Xenophon, Memorabilia III.6,7. Cf. Garlan 1989: 21-73; Finley 1985a: 67-87; 1985b: 156-61, 169-76, 204-7; Snodgrass 1980: 130; Humphreys 1978: 159-74; Ducrey 1977. 178. Note in particular Plutarch's discussion of attitudes to trade in the time of Solon, who is said to have been involved in trade himself - most probably as an 'occasional' trader (Life of Solon, 2 and 25). Among recent discussions of Archaic trade, note Bravo 1984: 121-39 (also 1983; 1977; 1974); Mele 1986: 80-99 (also 1979); Hahn 1983. Kees Ruijgh points out to me that in Mycenaean times textiles and scented oils appear to have been the most prominent trade goods. Neither of these is mentioned as such in Homer, although textiles do play an important role in gift-exchange. As for the 'hospitality-racket', there is to my knowledge no evidence outside Homer for anything like it - which is not necessarily to say that it never existed. 179. Thukydides states explicitly that the Spartans "did not make their allies pay tribute" (1.19). Wars over the control of games and temples, too, seem to me likely to be concerned with the prestige associated with such control rather than with the income derived from it. For wars over borderland, see below at n.181. 180. The oracle appears in the Anthologia Palatina (14.73). A presumably more recent version of it substituted 'Megarans' for 'Aigieis'; cf. Strabo X.1,3; Athenaios 278e; Suda, s.v. Humeis, o Megareis, and s.v. Aigieis. 181. For references to these wars, see De Ste. Croix 1972: 218-20; Singor 1988: 248-57. With regard to Kynouria, the territory disputed by Sparta and Argos, Kelly (1976: 49) says that it "had no economic importance for either state : its agricultural land was limited; it possessed no known natural resources; and the coastline, with few good harbours, was inhospitable". Kelly suggests that the territory was strategically important (ibid. 50). · A common interpretation of such wars is that they are 'ritual', providing an opportunity for young warriors to enter the adult world through an 'initiation' by combat (Garlan 1975: 26-31; Brelich 1961). I find this hard to reconcile with the tradition that Sparta and Argos selected the 300 best (not youngest) men to settle the battle, and with the fact that the outcome of the allegedly ritual fight was so

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important that whole armies went into battle when the initial result was not decisive. Seen. 182. 182. Ban on missiles : Strabo 448c (agreement between Khalkis and Eretria). Ban on cutting off water supply and razing city : Aiskhines 11.115 (Amphiktyonic Oath). Phrynon and Pittakos : e.g. Plutarch, Moralia 858ab; Diogenes Laertius I. 74. Battle of Champions : Herodotos 1.82. Custom of raising battle-trophies : Pritchett 1974: 246ff.; Singor 1988: 156-7, 267. Notion of agonal warfare e.g. Singor 1988: 260ff (who argues that between the Dark Age and the fifth-century warfare is agonal to the extent that cities are seldom, if ever, destroyed); Krischer 1988: 7-22 (who says that, in spite of agonal attitudes, a spirit of hostility, as opposed to rivalry, tends to 'break through'; cf. Berve 1966: 6-19). 183. Asine and Nauplia : Pausanias IV.24,4; 27,8; 35,2. Melia, Arisbe and Pellene: Vitruvius, De Architectura IV.1,3-5; Herodotos 1.151,2; P.Oxy. 1241, col.iii, 2-12 (cf. Ailianos, Varia Historia Vl.1,4). Kirrha and Sybaris: Aiskhines ID.107-9; Herodotos V.44-5; VI.21; Diodoros XIl.9,1-10; X.23; Strabo VI.263; Athenaios 52ld. Destruction in the fifth century : Karavites 1984: 33-76; Singor 1988: esp. 334-6. 184. A point made by Singor (1988: 247), and, with reference to mediaeval warfare (A.D. 1100-1250), also by Maso (1989: 103-9). Ostensibly agonistic practices of warfare need not exclude regular attempts at total destruction - as is evident, for instance, from a study of war among the Dani of New Guinea, whose wars are almost harmless most of the time, but occasionally turn very violent indeed (Heider 1979: 88-112).

406

NOTES TO APPENDIX ONE 1. On the ordinary siu of real Greek ships, see Chapter Four, n.165 2. See p. 80, 87-8, and cf. Van Wees 1988. The poorest members of the community are presumably meant to be excluded, as are slaves, but, since lightarmed men do seem to play a part in Homeric warfare, one need not assume that only a well-off (heavy-armed) ~te takes part in battle. 3. Ruschenbusch (1978) calculates that in Classical Greece the normalpolis comprised 450-1250 citiuns (of whom perhaps half fought as hoplites). Note also the si7.Cs of the contingents sent to fight at Plataea in 479 B.C. (Van Wees 1988: 23). Homer's communities are considerably smaller than Classical ones: the question is whether this means that he does not, after all, exaggerate much in this respect, or whether he exaggerates by the standards of even smaller (? Dark Age) communities. 4. The etymology of the word (*swe-tes, 'one's own people') may suggest that its meaning was rather fleitjble. It is also conceivable that small towns would have only a single phratry, so that 'phratry-members' and 'fellow-townsmen' would coincide.

407

NOTES TO APPENDIX TWO 1. There is an episode in the Iliad which implies that there were many basileis in the Akhaian army who were not prominent enough to be admitted to the 'council'. When Agamemnon conceives of a plan to test the morale of his troops, he explains his purpose to a group of basileis (11.53-86). As it turns out, the test fails, and "all those who had not heard of the plan" (11.143) run away to launch their ships and go home. Among them are "basileis and eminent men" (11.188). Odysseus tries to stop these princes with the words: "You do not yet know fully what the son of Atreus has in mind .... We did not all hear what he said in council" (11.192-4; in view of the context, this last sentence should be read as a statement, not as a question, as is often done). Assuming that all ruling basileis at least would take part in councilmeetings, the princes who are not informed must be the non-ruling local basileis in each contingent. 2. Penelope is eight times referred to as 'princess' (e.g. 4. 770) and four times addressed in this way (4.697; 16.337; 17.513, 583). Arete, wife of Alkinoos, is called 'princess' at7.241; 11.345; 13.53. 3. So Vlachos (1974: 107-11) on sceptre-bearers; cf. Hainsworth 1988: ad 8.47. Differently on boulephoroi: Calhoun 1934: 305-6; Vlachos 1974: 61-5; Carlier 1984: 145-6. 4. That these meetings of the 'leaders and counsellors' are restricted to the elite is confirmed by the fact that all the participants are personally invited (IX.9-12; 8.715). General assemblies are called by means of a proclamation to all the people, shouted out by the heralds. And in such assemblies the people are never addressed as 'leaders'. So too earlier 1984: 183 n.219 (and cf. Jeanmaire 1939: 28-9, 42) contra Finley 1981: 220. S. His grandfather, father and uncle(s) have all died: 11.641-2; XIV.112-20. Although he is among the three best warriors, he is not included in either of two lists of the best 'young men' : IX.80-6; XIX.193, 238-40 (Jeanmaire 1939: 35). Antilokhos and Thrasymedes are in these lists, because their father Nestor is still active, and Meriones is listed too, because he has accepted the 'junior' status of therapon to Idomeneus.

6. Whether or not this is the correct interpretation of 'elder', there can be no doubt that 'elders' and 'princes' are used (almost) interchangeably for the same group of people: Il.53 and 85-6; 11.404, 439 and 445; IX.89-90 and 710; XIX.303 and 309 (cf. Deger 1970: 114 n.721). There is no reason to think that the elders are all the older men (Rihll 1986: 88). 7. Odysseus' supporters, mentioned at 17.68-69, are Mentor (cf. 2.224-54, 286-7; 22.207-35 [his family: 221-3]), Halitherses (cf. 2.157-93 [his family: 178]; 24.45162) and Antiphos; and, at 2.386-7, 4.630-57, Noemon, son of Phronios, who voluntarily lends Telemakhos his ship (4.647) and puts himself on a par with the suitors (632, 652).

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8. I take it that Doulikhion, which provides another 52 hostile families, is not part of Kephallenia. Although the Odyssey regularly mentions it together with the Kephallenian islands, it is treated as a separate unit (the men from Doulikhion have their own leader [16.396-7] and the prince of Doulikhion, Akastos, is mentioned [14.335-6]), and in the Iliad it constitutes a separate contingent (led by Meges, II.625-30), of 40 ships. The elite of Doulikhion could thus be calculated at a minimum of 52 out of 2080 families, or exactly 2.5 % of the population. 9. XXIV.247; 13.437; 14.31; 17.199; 18.103; cf. the staff of Hephaistos (XVIIl.416) and the staff of Poseidon (XIII.59).

10. Cf. 11.46, 186; IX.38. Sceptre as a symbol of power of other rulers: VI.159 (Proitos); IX.156, 298 (Akhilleus). "Sceptre-bearing princes" in general: 1.279; 11.86; XIV.93; 2.231 = 5.9; 4.64; 8.41, 47. Note also: XVIII.556-7 and 3.412.

11. For the distinctions, see Kirk 1985: ad II.109. Carlier (1984: 190-2) and Griffin (1980: 9-12) distinguish the 'public' sceptre from the ruler's 'private' sceptre; Mondi (1980: 207-8) and Deger (1970: 82) distinguish the judge's sceptre from both. Easterling (1989: 106-14) rejects as "misleadingly documentary" (cf. p. 22) any attempt to identify the various sceptres; she stresses the "essential fluidity of this image", which means that the poet can freely use the image of the sceptre for symbolic purposes, without worrying about who is holding what sceptre. This is certainly possible in principle, but I hope to show that one can in fact discern in Homer's representations a single, simple use of the princely sceptre. 12. Other passages which refer to plural sceptre-bearers could, but need not, be explained as referring to monarchs only [e.g. 11.86; 4.64]). It is conceivable that 'sceptre-bearing' refers not to 'owning' a sceptre, but to having the right to 'hold' a (public) sceptre. 13. A third explanation is offered by e.g. Leaf (1900: ad XVIII.505). He says that

in the trial-scene "the plural skeptra seems to be used loosely, to imply that they all

had the staff in tum". Monro (1897: ad loc.) calls skeptra an "indefinite plural, referring to what was done several times". It seems to me that both are stretching the meaning of the plural unreasonably far in order to reconcile it with their view of the normal role of the sceptre in assembly (as expressed in their comments ad 1.234), on which see below. 14. On this interpretation, one would have to assume that public heralds do have their own sceptres, distinct from those of the princes (see below). 15. One passage (II.53ff.) in which a sceptre definitely is transferred from one man to another, cannot be taken as evidence for the practice under discussion, as is generally recognised. This is an episode in which the army has taken to flight, after Agamemnon, as a test of morale, had suggested that they should go home. In order to restore calm, Odysseus borrows Agamemnon's sceptre (11.185-7) and goes around telling the others that Agamemnon's apparent order was in fact a test (11.188-197). Since (a) the sceptre in question is Agamemnon's private, ancestral sceptre, not a

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'public' one; (b) no herald is involved in transferring the sceptre; and (c) the circumstances are most exceptional, with Odysseus using the sceptre to prove that he has Agamemnon's support in countermanding the 'order', it is clear that we are not here dealing with regular usembly procedure. 16. The role of heralds may be limited to carrying sceptres for their masters and calling for silence on their behalf. On only one occasion do heralds themselves use sceptres : when Aias and Hektor are duelling, a Trojan and an Akhaian herald separate the two men by holding sceptres between them. Perhaps these are distinct heralds' sceptres (see n.14), but on the other hand, the heralds might be acting on their masters' behalf and using their masters' sceptres (in the.way that Odysseus at one time borrows Agamemnon's sceptre in order to 'borrow' Agamemnon's authority [see n.15)).

410

NOTES TO APPENDIX THREE 1. The idea that the monarch has the largest number of followers is quite common (see e.g. Finley 1977: 59-60), but traditionally the assumption is that at the same time he has inherited the formal position of monarch. 2. A notion of institutionalised kingship is inherent in the 'feudal' model of Homeric society (esp. Nilsson 1933: 215-26). Homeric monarchy is regarded as institutional, but non-feudal, by earlier (1984: 178-94) and Cobet (1981: 29-30). Finley stresses that personal, informal power is essential for a ruler if he is to maintain his institutional, formal status of king (1977: 83-7; cf. 1970: 85). See also Chapter Three, section 8. 3. No sons are mentioned in any version of the story, but one cannot argue from silence here. It has been suggested that Lykian rules of inheritance are meant to be different from Akhaian ones, but I see no reason to think so (cf. Finley 1981: 226; Deger 1970: 131). 4. Because Homer does not mention the violent episodes of the Atreus and Thyestes story, commentators often assume that in his version the succession is supposed to proceed peacefully, one handing the sceptre to the other. But Homer in this passage is concerned to stress that the sceptre has long been in Agamemnon's family; he has no cause to dwell on the conflict involved, and the change of verb is a sufficiently clear hint that he is aware of the story. So too Rihll (forthcoming), who draws different conclusions. Cf. Easterling 1989: 104-5; Kirk 1985: ad 11.101-8.

S. That all his seven years of rule are after Agamemnon's death is confirmed by the fact that Menelaos returns home on the very day that Aigisthos and Klytaimnestra are buried (3.309-12); Menelaos had been wandering abroad for seven years after the end of the war (4.82), while Agamemnon had gone straight home. 6. Finley, for example, states that in spite of the existence of a hereditary monarchy, events on Ithaka represent a general principle: "The king is dead! The struggle for the throne is open!" (1977: esp. 84). Halverson (1985, 1986) and Rihll (1986) both draw essentially on the Odyssey for their material. 7. On Telemakhos' development, see e.g. Lacey 1966: 61-2, 64-5; and above, pp. 126-7. 8. So too Halverson 1986: 121-2, 126; Deger 1970: 143-50, esp. 146; contra Finley 1977: 88; Carlier 1984: 206-7; Cobet 1981: 28; Andreev 1979b: 371. 9. A point made by Finley (1977: 90; contrast his comments cited in n.8). 10. Not the customs of table-companionship, as is sometimes suggested: see n.70 to Chapter 7Wo. Customs of courtship: (a) staying at home: 16.390-1; 14.91; (b) offering gifts to the bride's family: 2.52-8; cf.15.16-18; (c) suitors' practice 'not the proper way' : 18.275-80; 14.90. Discussions of bride-price (and dowry) in Homer: Finley 1981: 233-45; Lacey 1966: 55-61; Snodgrass 1974: 115-18; Morris

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1986a: 105-14. Alden (1987: 130) is clearly wrong in saying that the suitors are "enjoying the legitimate traditional entertainment of contenders for the hand of a noble bride". 11. Compare the fate envisaged for old Peleus: his neighbours will "wear him down" (teirousi, XXIV.484-9; cf. 11.494-503), rather than kill him. 12. Mentes tells Telemalchos : "If you hear that [Odysseus] is dead... give your mother in marriage to a man. But when you have done these things, then consider... how you may kill the suitors in your home" (1.289-96). I do not think it is correct to assume, as some commentators do, that "obviously the suitors would leave ... if Penelope had made her choice among them" (S. West 1988: ad 1.293ff.). On that assumption, the explanation of this passage must be either that it is abruptly taken for granted that Odysseus is still alive, so that Penelope will not remarry and the suitors will stay (so West, toe.cit.), or that it is an awkward interpolation (so e.g. AmeisHentze 1856: ad 1.295). 13. Cf. Halverson 1985: 135; Finley 1977: 91-3; Deger 1970: 143. 14. See pp. 149-50, on the plot of the Odyssey. Note that the poet is apparently unable to explain the passivity of the people : when Telemalchos is first asked about the people's attitude, he does not answer; the second time, he admits that "the people at large are not hostile and do not hate me" (16.114), but he fails to explain why they do not support him. 15. I see no inconsistencies in the image of Homeric kingship that might warrant deconstructing it into a variety of overlapping and conflated images, as others have done (esp. Deger 1970; cf. Havelock 1978: 94-9). 16. In the following, I am in close agreement with the arguments and conclusions presented by Cartier (1984: 158-60). Similar views, but slightly different arguments, are advanced by Donlan (1989b: 129-33), Andreev (1988: 34-7) and Deger (1970: n.415 [pp.81-4 of the annotation]). A very different view is argued by Jeanmaire (1939: 72-84), but his notion that a temenos is something like a feudal fief is unsupported by the evidence (Finley 1981: 224-7; Carlier op.cit. 160; Deger toe.cit. p.83). 17. It does not follow that estates are given to kings (or gods, for that matter) "as compensation for service", as Donlan (1989b: 131), Andreev (1988: 34) and Jeanmaire (1939: 76-7) believe. Great warriors may receive a temenos as a reward for service, but as far as one can tell, kings receive a temenos simply because they are kings. That they (ought to) feel obliged to serve the people well in return is a different matter. 18. I should stress again that, as Finley has shown, the presence of temenea does not imply the existence of communally cultivated property (contra e.g. Andreev 1988: 34-8). The estate granted to the king, and many of the estates dedicated to the gods, would have been set apart from the regular 'lots' since time immemorial; on the relatively few occasions which required the assignation of new temenea, it would be quite possible to re-assign privately owned land and compensate the original owners.

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The temenos of a king or god would, in a sense, remain public property, but its cultivation would be the responsibility of the 'owner' - the king, or the priest who looks after a god's temenos. The land granted in reward for special services would presumably simply become private property. I am not convinced by Donlan' s interesting suggestion that it might have been common policy in the Dark Age to assign as yet uncultivated but potentially highly fertile land to kings and heroes, who would use their resources to develop it to the benefit the entire community, in the long run (1989b: 133-45). Some of the argument requires stretching the evidence, and much of it is pure speculation. 19. The other types of temenea have historical counterparts as well. In Classical Greece, an estate dedicated to a god is commonly called temenos. The granting of "selected" landed e8tates in return for great services to the community is mentioned, for example, by Herodotos (V .45). The term temenos is apparently not normally used in this connection, but there is an instance of it in Euripides' 1he Madness of Heralcles (1326-31), where the lands given in mythical times by the Athenians to Theseus in reward for saving the Athenian youths from the Minotaur are called

temene.

413

NOTES TO APPENDIX FOUR 1. Noted by Moreau (1895: 307) and Andreades (1915: 411). While no-one has denied this, it is often incorrectly assumed that the booty is divided among the combatants (e.g. Austin/Vidal-Naquet 1972: 56; Murray 1980 : 53). 2. The existence of two categories is commonly recognised. Keller (1902: 294), Murray (1980: 53) and Kirk (1985: ad 1.119), however, perhaps merely because of the brevity of their remarks, speak of all shares as gera. 3. Finley (1977: 95), and Austin/ Vidal-Naquet (1972: 56) speak as if only the highest chief receives a geras. 4. This is not a generally accepted view. earlier assumes that Agamemnon has a far larger 'share of honour' and that "without geras" is a rhetorical hyperbole (1984: 152 n.60). Note also the woman Eurymedousa, received as geras by Alkinoos from the booty of Apeira (7.9-11), and the woman Hekamede, given to Nestor from the booty of Tenedos (XI.625-7; she is not explicitly described as a geras, but likely to be one). 5. Similarly, Hektor promises a chariot and pair (from the plunder to be made at the final destruction of the Greek army) to Dolon (X.303-6, 321-3, 329-31). Kassandra is part of Agamemnon's share in the booty of Troy (11.421-3): she could well be his geras. The "fine geras" of Neoptolemos at the fall of Troy (11.534), however, consists, according to the llias Mikra, of two people - Andromakhe and Aineias (fr.14). 6. earlier suggests that Akhilleus has (illegitimately) kept the lyre and Eetion's wife to himself (1984: 152 n.55). I find this unlikely. Akhilleus also has a woman called Diomede from Lesbos (IX.664-5), who could be either a geras or part of the other share. 7. In one passage Akhilleus refers to the day "when I took [helomen] her, having destroyed Lyrnessos" (XIX.60). Although this has been taken to mean "took her to myself [from the booty]" (so Ameis-Hentze 1868: ad loc.; Wickert-Micknat 1983: 41, n.6), the expression for this used by Agamemnon is more specific: exelomen (IX.130), "I picked out", "I selected". Akhilleus' meaning could be "I took her (along with the rest of the booty)". My interpretation requires the latter reading. 8. Eurymedousa is given to Alkinoos by "the Phaiakians"; Hekamede to Nestor by "the Greeks" (see n.4). To Odysseus a ram is given "extra" (exokha) by his "companions" (9.550-1): this, too, is presumably a geras. In the llias Mikra, Neoptolemos receives his geras from the hands of "the best men among all the Greeks" (frg. 14).

9. Donlan sees an "ambiguity" between two modes of distribution, one "egalitarian, non-centralised", the other "ranked", which seem to occur side by side. (Rihll [forthcoming], building on Donlan's discussion, explains away the instances of ranked distribution, and argues that "the assembled army decides who ... gets what".)

Notes to Appendix Four

414

Similar compromises are suggested by Ameis-Hentze (1868: ad IX.367) and Wickert-Micknat (1983: 41 n.6). Others conclude that the evidence is inconsistent (e.g. Monro 1897: ad XI.704,705) or that it shows a historical development (Jeanmaire 1939: 80). 10. On this point, I find myself in close agreement with Carlier (1984: 152-3) once more, as well as with Detienne's discussion of the role of the •chef" as •celui qui represente la collectivi~·, and of the conceptual significance of placing booty •au milieu" for distribution (1967: 84-8). 11. Agamemnon does have the power to do the latter. Cf. p. 87. 12. This agrees with Finley in that only one •central authority• makes the decisions and the rest remain •passive" (1977: 68; cf. 63, 95) and with Finsler in so far as he maintains that gera are only nominally ("nach Formen•) a gift from the army (1914: 217). 13. The same freedom of choice is presupposed in Akhilleus' complaint about Agamemnon keeping "many things• and giving away "small quantities•, which presumably refers to Agamemnon's dealings with the 'portions' as well as to his alleged unfairness in distributing gera. 14. This is not said to be his geras, and the circumstances of the distribution - shares in the booty are given only to those who, like Neleus, had previously suffered materially at the hands of the Epeans (Xl.685-6, 698-704) - suggests that on this occasion no gera were given. 15. This is asserted, without argument, by e.g. Ameis-Hentze 1856: ad 9.160; Merry 1870: ad 9.152 and 14.232; Finley 1977: 63, 95; Wickert-Micknat 1983: 44. Only Moreau explicitly rejects this interpretation (1895: 309). 16. 'Equal' is the translation offered in LSJ, and is supported by e.g. Finsler (1914: 217), Chantraine (1968: s.v. issasthai) and Finley (1977: 95; cf. 63). Once more, Moreau is the only one to reject this (1895: 313). 17. Cf. Ameis-Hentze 1868 : comment and Anhang, ad XI. 705. 18. One could argue, however, that the portion of the leader might be the only exception to the norm of equality. 19. On the 'two kinds of equality', see Harvey 1965: 101-3. 'Proper' and 'fair' are the translations adopted by e.g. Rieu and Hammond in their Penguin Classics translations. This must be the meaning, too, of the phrase "equal [proper] meals", since it is clear that at these meals some people do in fact get more to eat and drink than others. Their extra shares are called gera, too. 20. To complicate matters, the word ison is used here too : in this context it can only mean "equal".

Notes to Appendix Four

415

21. This final stage has not, to my knowledge, been recognised so far. Compare the division of the catch in the hunt on Goat Island (9.157-60) : apart from one goat :;et aside for the leader (presumably as geras), "nine goats fell to each ship". Unless this is simply a way of indicating the total number of goats shot, it may suggest that the catch is divided, first between the crews, then, by the captains, among the crews. 22. This is explicitly said to happen "first" (Vill.289; 11.228). 23. See above, section 1. A further example of this, suggests Moreau (1895: 307), is the distribution of the Kyklops' flocks (9.543-9), in which perhaps all of Odysseus' followers, not merely the handful who ventured into the giant's cave, get a share. The text is not explicit on this. 24. Unless one regards Hekamede (who is "given by the Greeks") as part of Nestor's portion, rather than his geras. She is not explicitly said to be either (Xl.625-7). All the other things that are "given by the men" are explicitly called gera (or said to have been given "extra", exokha, 9.551). 25. On this point I agree with Adkins (1960: 58 n.16) in rejecting Finley's statement that a chief is "bound by what was generally deemed to be equitable" (1977: 68), i.e. that there are nomiative restrictions. lei. One may argue that the assignment of the ram to Odysseus (see n.8) is also a reward for merit, since it was Odysseus whose plan - in which the ram played a prominent part - led to the capture of the flocks.

27. So too, Murray (1980: 53), who does not go into the following problems. 28. Since the epics tend to give the impression that the criteria of princely status and merit in war always coincide, a number of scholars have concluded that gera are allocated "en tenant compte de la dignit6 ou de la naissance et des services rendus tant dans le combat que dans le conseil" (Moreau 1895: 312); "in recognition of their prowess and high station" (Murray 1917: 193); "fiir verdiente Heerfiihrer" (Wickert-Micknat 1983: 40). Such formulations obscure the fact that even in the epic world there are signs of friction between the two criteria. 29. Agamemnon rejects three- or fourfold compensation (1.131-4). Aias argues that seven girls for one should be enough for Ak:hilleus (IX.636-9), but Ak:hilleus counters that he is still too angry about being treated "as a dishonoured immigrant" (IX.646-8). 30. Adkins (most recently 1987: 319-20) has argued that this "blindness" implies the idea that Agamemnon has broken a norm. He argues that it implies .only that Agamemnon recognises that his deed - not 'wrong' in itself - has had catastrophic effects. This is true, but given the numerous other rejections of Agamemnon's action, I think it is clear that he has violated a norm, in so far as his action, unlike his normal practice of taking the lion's share of the booty, is generally thought to have given Ak:hilleus a legitimate reason to feel humiliated. Cf. p. 135, esp. n.144. 31. E.g. Kirk 1985: ad 1.298-301.

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