Virtue Ethics in the Letter to Titus: An Interdisciplinary Study. Kontexte Und Normen Neutestamentlicher Ethik (Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen Zum Neuen Testament 2.reihe, 13) 9783161592324, 9783161592331, 3161592328

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Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament · 2. Reihe Herausgeber / Editor

Jörg Frey (Zürich) Mitherausgeber / Associate Editors Markus Bockmuehl (Oxford) · James A. Kelhoffer (Uppsala) Tobias Nicklas (Regensburg) · Janet Spittler (Charlottesville, VA) J. Ross Wagner (Durham, NC)

560

Dogara Ishaya Manomi

Virtue Ethics in the Letter to Titus An Inter-disciplinary Study Kontexte und Normen neutestamentlicher Ethik / Contexts and Norms of New Testament Ethics Volume XII

Mohr Siebeck

Dogara Ishaya Manomi, born 1985; 2008 BA; 2009 Professional Diploma in Education; 2013 MA in Linguistics and (Bible) Translation with specialization in New Testament; 2019 PhD in New Testament studies from the University of Mainz, Germany; currently a full-time lecturer at the Theological College of Northern Nigeria located in Jos, Plateau state, Nigeria, an Affiliated Researcher of the Evangelische Theologische Faculteit, Leuven, Belgium, and a Research Associate of the University of Pretoria, South Africa. orcid.org/0000-0003-2092-4596

ISBN   978-3-16-159232-4 / eISBN 978-3-16-159233-1

DOI  10.1628/978-3-16-159233-1

ISSN   0340-9570 / eISSN 2568-7484 (Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen

Testament, 2. Reihe)

Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliographie; detailed bibliographic data are available at http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2021  by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, Germany. www.mohrsiebeck.com This book may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, in any form (beyond that permitted by copyright law) without the publisher’s written permission. This applies particularly to reproductions, translations and storage and processing in electronic systems. The book was typeset by Martin Fischer in Tübingen, printed by Laupp & Göbel in Gomaringen on non-aging paper and bound by Buchbinderei Nädele in Nehren. Printed in Germany.

Dedication First to Barsheba, my beloved wife, and our children Ambaam, Ambiim, and Annika-Ambaamirah, for their endless love and sacrifices for my sake. Second, to my beloved parents, Rev. Ishaya and Mrs. Rhodah Manomi, for sacrificing their comfort to give us the formal education that they were not privileged to have. Above all, this book is dedicated to the triune God – the source and goal of my intellect, knowledge, and everything – whom I am learning daily to love with all my heart, soul, and mind.

Acknowledgments This book is a slightly revised version of my doctoral dissertation titled Exegethics: A Virtue-ethical Reading of the Letter to Titus: An Inter-disciplinary Interaction between Biblical Ethics and Virtue Ethics Theory using the “Exegethics” Methodology, which was undertaken, submitted, and defended at the Faculty of Protestant Theology, Johannes Gutenberg University, Mainz, Germany (2016–2019). “It takes a whole village to raise a child” (African proverb). This proverb expresses the process and product of my doctoral study, which has resulted in this book. Looking at the number of people who have contributed to the success of my stay and research in Mainz, I see myself as a child that the whole “village” is raising. Time and space may not allow me to mention all, but a few names, to whom I am deeply indebted, need to be mentioned here for the key roles they have played through it all. Suffice it to say, nevertheless, that I (and none of these people mentioned below) am responsible for any mistakes, errors, or any kind of shortcomings in this book. I owe a great debt of gratitude for the success of this research to my primary supervisor, Prof. Dr. Ruben Zimmermann. His commitment to high academic excellence has raised the bar very high for me and has challenged me to work harder and aim higher. His vast knowledge, patient guidance, probing questions, and stimulating insight related to biblical exegesis, biblical ethics, philosophical ethics, and contemporary interpretation and application of biblical ethics, among others, have all been deployed in challenging me to ensure that my inter-disciplinary dissertation meets the standards of biblical exegesis, ethics, and hermeneutics respectively. Beyond academics, his personal virtues evident in his lifestyle of humility, generosity, transparency, commitment to my general well-being and that of my family, and his Christian commitment combined with academic excellence have and will continue to serve as a model to me. Long before I started applying for doctoral studies, I had prayed that God should give me such a supervisor. And Prof. Dr. Zimmermann is the answer to that prayer. My second debt of gratitude goes to my second supervisor, Prof. Dr. Stephan Grätzel from the Department of Philosophy, JGU Mainz. His vast expertise and works on applied philosophy and virtue ethics, to mention a few, have provided me with a clear and concise knowledge of virtue ethics that made it easier to build bridges between biblical ethics and philosophical ethics. His humility and

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encouraging comments on my dissertation have tremendously helped me complete this research. On the side of sponsorship, I express my deepest and special gratitude to Prof. Suleiman E. Bogoro, the Executive Secretary of TETFund (Nigeria), who, through the leadership of the Church of Christ in Nations (COCIN), provided the scholarship that got me started and into the second year of my research. Thanks are due Rev. Dauda D. Jimra (and other COCIN clergy) for initiating and sustaining the discussions with Prof. Bogoro (even when I had no idea about it) that led to sponsoring my doctoral study, and for facilitating the process. Ich danke auch der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland (EKD) und der Kulturabteilung des Auswärtigen Amtes für die finanzielle Unterstützung. The EKD’s generous grants for my family and me to stay in Germany from the second year till the completion of my doctoral research in the third year has greatly brought relief, enabled me to concentrate on my research and to finish it successfully. My gratitude also goes to the members of the Neutestamentliche Sozietät of the Faculty of Theology, University of Mainz, under the leadership of Prof. Dr. Friedrich W. Horn, Prof. Dr. Konrad Huber, and Prof. Dr. Ruben Zimmermann, for providing such a serene, friendly, and relational academic atmosphere that enhances the constructive exchange of ideas. The questions, comments, criticisms, and advice during my presentations and during personal discussions have further shaped my thoughts and improved this work. Among the many participants at the Soziatät and other colleagues at the University of Mainz, I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Dieter Roth, Prof. Dr. Susanne Luther, Prof. Dr. Völker Küster, Dr. David Jimenez Cardenas, Dr. Olivia Rahmsdorf, Dr. Christopher Jones, Lena Schaeffer, Dr. Axel Seidou, Dr. Tanja Dannenmann, Joomee Hur, Charlotte Haußmann, Mirjam Jekel, Zacharias Shoukry, and Kerstin Neubert, among others, who have read at least portions of this book at some point or discussed, in numerous conversations, aspects of my research. Their questions, comments, and encouragement have proven very helpful. Similar appreciation goes to the members of the research center for “Ethics in Antiquity and Christianity” (e/ac) and staff of the Welcome Center/International Office for their support. Outside the University of Mainz community, my gratitude goes to Prof. Dr. Andy Warren-Rothlin, Dr. Irvin and Dr. Coleen Starwalt, Dr. Nelida Nevaros, Mr. Abari Agyeno, Dr. Sunday Agyeno, and Rev. Dr. Sylvester D. Dachomo whose encouragements and/or comments have helped me a lot and have improved different aspects of my dissertation. Special thanks to Dr. John and Pam Hollman for proofreading the entire manuscript and polishing the English before submission for defense, and special thanks to Dr. Coleen Starwalt for proofreading the entire manuscript and polishing the language for publication after the defense. All these have improved the clarity of my expressions considerably. Mr. Abari Agyeno and Mr. Atiku Shidawa have helped me with technical and

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typesetting issues while finalizing the manuscript for publication, for which I am also grateful. For their support, I would like to thank my colleagues, friends, and students at the Theological College of Northern Nigeria (TCNN); COCIN family; Philipp-­ Jakob-Spener-Haus Mainz; SMD International Bible Study Group Mainz; Prof. Dr. Mirjam Zimmermann; Pastor Dr. Jens Martin and Jane Sautter and all members of the Auferstehungsgemeinde in Mainz; all members of the Evangelische Stadtmission Oppenheim; and members of the Pentecost International Worship Center (P. I. W. C.) Mainz. Special thanks to Mr. Klaus and Heidi Strub for providing us an affordable house in Nierstein, for helping with my family’s visa process, and for their support in numerous ways. I am deeply grateful to my parents, Rev. Ishaya and Rhodah B. Manomi, and my siblings and their families: Rahila James, Yusuf I. Bamas, Silas I. Manomi, Rauta Joshua, John I. Bamas, and Sunday I. Manomi. Special thanks are due our foster daughter Afiniki Tsabta. Their prayers, goodwill, and words of encouragement bring me fresh hope every day. My debt of gratitude to my wife and children is reserved to this point because they are most special to me. My wife Barsheba and our children Ambaam, Ambiim, and Annika-Ambaamirah have been all I could ever pray to have as wife and children respectively. I am glad that we were able to reunite and spend the last year of my stay in Germany and returned to Nigeria together. Thank you for all the sacrifices you made to allow me to complete this study. I am also very grateful to Prof. Dr. Jörg Frey for his interest in this work, his helpful feedback, and for accepting it into the WUNT II series. I would also like to thank the Mohr Siebeck team, especially Elena Müller, Tobias Stäbler, and Matthias Spitzner for a pleasant experience working together to finalize the manuscript for publication. Last but actually the first and greatest of all, is my utmost and infinite gratitude to God, for providing me with the intellectual, psychological, spiritual, financial, and every help I needed to complete this study. This research is about Him and to His glory forever and ever. Amen. Thank you very much. Vielen Dank (German). Na gode sosai (Hausa). Manyar monda (Zaar). Jos (Nigeria), November 2020

Dogara Ishaya Manomi

Table of Contents Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VII List of Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XV List of Tables and Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XVII

Chapter 1: Description of Concepts and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.1 Authorship of the Letter to Titus: Hermeneutical and  Methodological Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.2 Locating the Premises of the Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2.1 Inter-disciplinary Premise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2.2 Inter-cultural Premise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

1.3 Virtue Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.3.1 General Description of Virtue Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1.3.2 Historical Dimensions of Virtue Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 1.3.3 Neo-Aristotelian or Contemporary Virtue Ethics: What? Why? How? 32 1.3.4 Virtue Ethics in NT Ethics and Current Christian Ethics . . . . . . . . . . 36 1.3.5 Characteristics of Virtue Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 1.3.6 Working Definition of Virtue Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

1.4 Methodological Framework of the Research: From “Implicit Ethics” to “Exegethics” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 1.5 The “Implicit Ethics” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 1.5.1 The Linguistic Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 1.5.2 Norms or Maxims for Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 1.5.3 History of Traditions of Individual Norms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 1.5.4 Values and the Priority of Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 1.5.5 Ethical Reflection/Generating Moral Significance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 1.5.6 The Moral Agent(s) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 1.5.7 Reflected Ethos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 1.5.8 Addressee or Range of Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

1.6 Exegethics: An Adapted Version of the “Implicit Ethics” Methodology 55 1.6.1 Linguistic Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

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1.6.2 Moral Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 1.6.3 Ethical Reflection/Generating Moral Significance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 1.6.4 History of Traditions of Individual Norms or Lexemes . . . . . . . . . . . 58 1.6.5 Range of Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

1.7 Summary and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

Chapter 2: History of Interpretation of the Selected Virtues in Titus 61 2.1 Σωφροσύνη: History of Interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 2.2 Δικαιοσύνη: History of Interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 2.3 Εὐσέβεια: History of Interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 2.3.1 Earlier Interpretations from Schlatter (1936) to Foerster (1971) . . . . 89 2.3.2 Other Earlier Interpretations not Reported by Marshall . . . . . . . . . . . 93 2.3.3 Recent Interpretations from Marshall (1999) to Bray (2019) . . . . . . . 100

2.4 Καλὰ ἔργα: History of Interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 2.5 Summary and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

Chapter 3: A Virtue-Ethical Reading of the Letter to Titus . . . . . . . . 123 3.1 A Virtue-Ethical Reading of the σωφροσύνη Cognates in the Letter to Titus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 3.1.1 Linguistic Form of the σωφροσύνη Cognates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 3.1.2 Moral Agents of the σωφροσύνη Cognates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 3.1.3 Ethical Argumentation/Reflection for σωφροσύνη . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 3.1.4 History of Traditions of σωφροσύνη . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 3.1.5 Range of Application of σωφροσύνη . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 3.1.6 Summary of the Key Virtue-Ethical Perspectives of the σωφροσύνη Cognates in Titus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162 3.1.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162

3.2 A Virtue-Ethical Reading of the δικαιοσύνη Cognate in the Letter to Titus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 3.2.1 Justification by Faith in Pauline Scholarship: A Brief Look . . . . . . . . 163 3.2.2 Δικαιοσύνη and its Cognates in the Letter to Titus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167 3.2.2.1 Linguistic Form of the δικαιοσύνη Cognates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168 3.2.2.2 Moral Agents of δικαιοσύνη . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 3.2.2.3 Ethical Argumentation/Reflection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175 3.2.2.4 History of Traditions of δικαιοσύνη . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175 3.2.2.5 Range of Application of δικαιοσύνη . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187 3.2.3 Summary of the Key Virtue-Ethical Perspectives of the δικαιοσύνη Cognates in Titus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187

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3.3 Reading the εὐσέβεια cognates in the letter to Titus Virtue-ethically . . 188 3.3.1 Linguistic Form of the εὐσέβεια Cognates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189 3.3.2 Moral Agents of εὐσέβεια . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199 3.3.3 Ethical Argumentation/Reflection for εὐσέβεια . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202 3.3.4 History of Tradition of the εὐσέβεια Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204 3.3.5 Range of Application of εὐσέβεια . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208 3.3.6 Summary of the Key Virtue-Ethical Perspectives of the εὐσέβεια Cluster in Titus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209

3.4 A Virtue-Ethical Reading of the καλὰ ἔργα Cluster in Titus . . . . . . . . . . 210 3.4.1 Linguistic Form of the καλὰ ἔργα Cluster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211 3.4.2 Moral Agents of the καλὰ ἔργα Cluster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223 3.4.3 History of Tradition of the καλὰ ἔργα Cluster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224 3.4.4 Ethical Argumentation/Reflection for καλὰ ἔργα . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228 3.4.5 Range of Application of καλὰ ἔργα . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235 3.4.6 Summary and Conclusion of the Virtue-ethical Perspectives of the καλὰ ἔργα Cluster in Titus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235

3.5 Re-reading the “Household Codes” in Titus Virtue-Ethically . . . . . . . . 236 3.5.1 A Different Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240 3.5.2 Linguistic Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241 3.5.3 Norms and Maxims for “Being” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249 3.5.4 Moral Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252 3.5.5 Ethical Argumentation/Reflection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256 3.5.6 Reflected Ethos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258 3.5.7 Range of Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260 3.5.8 Reflections for Appropriating the “Household Codes” . . . . . . . . . . . 260 3.5.9 Summary of the Virtue-Ethical Perspectives of the “Household Codes” in Titus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264 3.5.10 Summary and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265

Chapter 4: Appropriating the Virtue-Ethical Perspective of Titus into African Ethics: Hermeneutical, Contextual, and Ethnological Reflections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267 4.1 A Description of African Ethics and its Virtue-Ethical Perspectives . . . 267 4.1.1 Preliminary Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268

4.2 The Four S Schema: Sources, Senses, Symbols, and Services of Character in African Traditional Religion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269 4.2.1 Sources of Character . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269 4.2.2 Senses of Character . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274 4.2.3 Symbols of Character . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280 4.2.4 Services of Character . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285

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4.3 General Summary of the Key Virtue-Ethical Perspectives of the Letter to Titus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289 4.3.1 Σωφροσύνη . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289 4.3.2 Δικαιοσύνη . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290 4.3.3 Εὐσέβεια . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290 4.3.4 Καλὰ ἔργα . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291

4.4 A Comparative Analysis of the Two Virtue-ethical Perspectives: Tandems, Tensions, and Appropriations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292 4.4.1 Tandems between the Virtue-Ethical Perspectives of Titus and African Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292 4.4.2 Tensions between Virtue Ethics/the Virtue-Ethical Perspectives of Titus and African Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294

4.5 Excursus: “Continuity” as a Telos in African Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302 4.6 Towards an African Biblical Virtue Ethics? Negotiations, Concessions, and Appropriation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305 4.6.1 Negotiations, Concessions, and Appropriations Related to Foundational and Theoretical Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305 4.6.2 Tandems, Tensions and Appropriations of the Two Virtue-Ethical Perspectives with Emphasis on σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, εὐσέβεια, and καλὰ ἔργα . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310

4.7 The Five-fold Exegethical Steps towards an African Biblical Virtue Ethics: Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316 4.8 Summary and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317

Chapter 5: Summary and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319 Critical Self-reflection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331 Index of Biblical and Extracanonical References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359 Index of Modern Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367 Subject Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371

List of Abbreviations The SBL Handbook of Style: For Biblical Studies and Related Disciplines (2nd Edition) was consulted.1 Other abbreviations are listed below. ATR CC COCIN EABS EKD ET GCC Int’l JGU LCC LXX NIV NKJV NRSV NT OT P. I. W. C. PCC PE RCC RSV SBL SMD TCNN TETFund UK USA

African Traditional Religion Church Council Church of Christ in Nations European Association of Biblical Studies Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland English Translation2 General Church Council International Johannes Gutenberg-University Local Church Council Septuagint New International Version New King James Version New Revised Standard Version New Testament Old Testament Pentecost International Worship Center Provincial Church Council Pastoral Epistles Regional Church Council Revised Standard Version Society of Biblical Literature Studentenmission in Deutschland Theological College of Northern Nigeria Tertiary Education Trustfund United Kingdom United States of America

1 The SBL Handbook of Style: For Biblical Studies and Related Disciplines, 2nd ed. (Atlanta, GA: SBL Press, 2014). 2 Thanks is due Jacob Cerone for translating most of the German sentences into English while copy-editing the manuscript for publication. Noteworthy, however, is that these translations are provided only to aid understanding for readers who may not know any German.

List of Tables and Figures Table 1: Overview of Ethical Norms of Being/Conduct in Titus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 Table 2: Participle Verbs in the Household Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249 Figure 1: Zimmermann’s Implicit Ethics Organogram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Figure 2: The Exegethics Organogram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Figure 3: The Four S Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269 Figure 4: The Five-fold Exegethical Steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316

Chapter 1

Description of Concepts and Methodology 1.1 Authorship of the Letter to Titus: Hermeneutical and Methodological Implications It is helpful, before describing the premises, concepts, and methodology of this book, to mention that I am aware of the long debated yet persistent question of authorship regarding the letters to Timothy and Titus, commonly known as the Pastoral Epistles (PE), the Pastoral Letters, or the Pastorals (used interchangeably throughout this research).1 However, in this research, the authorship debate is intentionally avoided for the following three reasons. First, it plays little or no role in my text-based virtue-ethical reading of the letter to Titus.2 Second, it has been thoroughly investigated and succinctly argued over a long period of time and by scholars from both sides of the debate: for or against Paul’s authorship.3 In my opinion, the authorship debate has been 1  According to Percy N. Harrison (The Problem of the Pastoral Epistles [Milford: Oxford University Press, 1921], 13, citing Zahn, Einleitung in das Neue Testament [Deichert, 1906], 447), the use of the term “pastoral” in connection with the letters to Timothy and Titus traces back to Thomas Aquinas (1274) and D. N. Berdot (1703). But its modern use as a technical term for the three letters is traced to a series of lectures by Paul Anton, delivered at the University of Halle, Germany, between 1726–1727, and edited by J. A. Maier in 1753–1755 under the title Exegetische Abhandlung der Pastoral-Briefe Pauli an Timotheum und Titum. Similarly, Frances Young affirms that the term “Pastoral Epistles” in reference to the three letters to Titus and Timothy seems to have originated from Paul Anton in 1726–1727 (The Theology of the Pastoral Letters, New Testament Theology [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994], 1). They are generally designated with this title because of their character as letters addressed to two ‘pastors’ in relation to shepherding their churches. 2 Rather than distract the reader with the controversial authorship question, I prefer that the reader first reads the content of this research before reflecting on whether my virtue-ethical reading of the text aligns it more with the so-called authentic Pauline letters or not. In this way, the reader is given the chance to make a decision about authorship based on the content of this research, rather than stating a position on authorship upfront. 3 For elaborate discussions of the authorship from both sides of the debate, see, among many others, Lewis R. Donelson, Pseudepigraphy and Ethical Argument in the Pastoral Epistles (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1986). Philip H. Towner, The Letters to Timothy and Titus, The New International Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006). Ben Witherington III, Letters and Homilies for Helenized Christians, vol. 1 (Downers Grove and Nottingham: IVP Academic and Apollos, 2006). Luke Timothy Johnson, Letters to Paul’s Delegates: 1 Timothy, 2 Timothy, Titus, New Testament in Context (Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International, 1996), and many others, including the arguments for a possibility of Luke’s

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over-flooded4 with contrasting views such that it is not enough for one to just hold to an opinion, but to argue it extensively. Embarking on such an extensive (historical-critical) authorship debate would detract attention from focusing on the exegetical analysis of the content of the selected text: the letter to Titus.5 Since the authorship debate is still controversial, taking a position in a study whose focus is not to address this question has the potential of distracting the reader away from the content of my virtue-ethical analysis and into trying to agree or disagree with my position on authorship, thereby betraying the purpose of the research. Third, taking and defending such a position on the authorship would unnecessarily necessitate space and time beyond what is appropriate for a doctoral research project that is not primarily addressing the authorship question. Based on the above-mentioned reasons, this research prefers to take a neutral position regarding authorship. Where it is important or necessary, it refers simply to the “author,” referring to an implied historical author (be it Paul or a pseudonymous Paul), intentionally pushing the authorship debate to the background. Even when referring to other scholarly works that have taken a position in favor of or against Paul’s authorship, this research prefers to refer to the “author” for consistency. In this way, the present research respects the claims of the text without necessarily affirming or rejecting Paul’s authorship. Nevertheless, not engaging in the authorship debate implies that the letter to Titus is read “on its own terms,” respecting its own (historical) claims  – from Paul to Titus in Crete (Titus 1:1–5; 3:12–15), written probably around 63– 65AD.6 Whether written by the authentic Paul or a pseudonymous Paul, the text seeks to situate itself within the first century and among the first group of believers in Crete (cf. Titus 1:1–5; 3:12–15). Dislodging the text out of this premise and period (to a second century period after Paul) could constitute more of a hinderance than an aid to understanding its theological-ethical orientation. The authorship of the PE, see e. g. Stephen G. Wilson, Luke and the Pastoral Epistles (London: SPCK, 1979). 4 Jermo Van Nes similarly expresses concern regarding how the study of the PE has been mainly characterized by the authorship debate. See Jermo van Nes, “On the Origin of the Pastorals’ Authenticity Criticism: A “New” Perspective,” https://www.academia.edu/22917002/. 02. May 2018 and Van Nes, “On the Origin of the Pastorals’ Authenticity Criticism: A ‘New Perspective’,” New Testament Studies 62 (2016): 315–320. 5 See Alfred A. Genade, Persuading the Cretans: A Text-Generated Persuasive Analysis of the Letter to Titus (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2011), 1, see also n. 1. Genade adopts a similar approach in his study of the letter to Titus, arguing specifically that “the identity of the author is of little consequence to the analysis performed” in his text-generated persuasive analysis of the letter to Titus. One of the reasons he does not engage in the authorship debate, just like this study, is that the authorship question has been thoroughly investigated from all sides of the debate, but at the expense of deeper analysis of the text in its own rights as an individual text. Hence, Genade regards the letter to Titus as having “its own voice and can stand on its own” (emphasis in italics original). 6 Andreas J. Köstenberger, Commentary on 1–2 Timothy & Titus, Biblical Theology for Christian Proclamation (Nashville: Holman, 2017), 295.

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hermeneutical and methodological implication of respecting the claims of the text without necessarily affirming or rejecting Paul’s authorship to this research is that the research focuses more on the text as a theological-ethical resource for early believers in Christ, in its inter-textual relations with other texts within the Corpus Paulinum, than focusing on its inter-textual relation with texts produced by Christians from the second century onward, especially those produced by the early church fathers.

1.2 Locating the Premises of the Research 1.2.1 Inter-disciplinary Premise This research is located within an inter-disciplinary premise between biblical studies and virtue ethics theory. A major methodological criticism against biblical ethicists is that “their ethical claims either have no direct and sustained reference to or are not built upon any major ethical theories.”7 This study, therefore, employs virtue ethics theory as the hermeneutical framework on which its ethical claims stand. Similarly, N. T. Wright observes that just as most writers on NT ethics pay little attention to the concept of virtue despite the significant presence of the concept in the NT, so also most recent writings on virtue ethics pay little attention to the NT.8 This study hopes, therefore, to contribute to bridging this gap by engaging extensively in a focused virtue-ethical exegesis of Titus. Moreover, based on the observation that many biblical scholars are beginning to use a virtue approach as a hermeneutical tool, Lucas Chan has even argued that there is an “emerging consensus” among biblical ethicists and moral theologians regarding the appropriation of virtue theory as the most appropriate hermeneutical tool for such an inter-disciplinary interaction.9 This study, therefore, joins this conversation and contributes to the novel attempts by biblical scholars to build bridges between biblical studies and virtue ethics.10  7 Lucas Chan, Biblical Ethics in the 21st Century: Developments, Emerging Consensus, and Future Directions (New York: Paulist Press, 2013), 29. While Chan directs this criticism especially to some of the leading biblical ethicists like Richard B. Hays, Frank J. Matera, Sandra M. Schneiders, and Rasiah S. Sugirtharajah, it is a criticism that applies to many more scholars.  8 Tom Wright, Virtue Reborn (London: SPCK, 2010), 246. It is noteworthy that Wright’s book is not only an excellent go-to for practical application of virtue theory in every day Christian living, but also useful for academic purposes. The book is intended for popular audiences rather than for academics only.  9 See Chan, Biblical Ethics in the 21st Century, 52–74. Throughout the book, Chan gives concrete examples of how biblical theologians and Christian ethicists are beginning to engage each other’s works or expressing the need for such an inter-disciplinary engagement. Chan hopes that such cooperation will go beyond bridge-building to integration and dialogue. 10 For example, Daniel J. Harrington and James F. Keenan, Paul and Virtue Ethics: Building Bridges between NT Studies and Moral Theology (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publ.,

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However, both the text selected and the methodology applied in this research mark a significant difference and a new approach compared to other scholarly works in this inter-disciplinary field of research. While other scholars have focused largely on selected themes and short passages from biblical texts,11 this research takes the whole letter to Titus into focus. This makes the approach of this book more text-based and exegetical than most previous works in this field. Regarding methodology, none of the previous virtue-ethical interpretations of Scripture has applied the methodology used in this research. It could even be argued that until now, there has not been a comprehensive methodology for reading a biblical text virtue-ethically. Hence, this study seeks to fill this methodological gap using the exegethics methodology, being an adapted version of “implicit ethics” – a comprehensive methodology for reading biblical texts ethically. Moreover, the previous works on virtue ethics in the New Testament have concentrated mostly on the Gospels,12 Paul’s undisputed letters, and Johannine literature, almost entirely neglecting the Pastoral Epistles. Even Harrington and Keenan, whose works have made significant contribution to this novel interdisciplinary conversation,13 only have a very brief discussion on the PE. Surprisingly, they do not identify any correlation between virtue ethics and the Pastorals, apart from the connection of the Pastorals with Paul’s authentic letters. They argue, therefore, that disconnecting the Pastorals from Paul’s authentic letters would lead to an appeal to the ethics of the Pastorals as “legalistic, cultural Christianity without theological depth.”14 Their conclusion implies that the PE depend on the authentic Pauline letters and cannot be read virtue-ethically on their own. 2010). Daniel Harrington and James F. Keenan. Jesus and Virtue Ethics: Building Bridges Between NT Studies and Moral Theology (Lanham: Sheed and Ward, 2002). 11 For example, Harrington and Keenan’s Paul and Virtue Ethics and Jesus and Virtue Ethics. Chan also criticizes biblical and theological ethicists, e. g. Richard A. Burridge, Allen Verhey, etc., arguing that their study of NT ethics does not contain enough exegetical material (Biblical Ethics in the 21st Century, 59, 66). This study seeks, therefore, to be as intensively exegetical as possible. 12 For a recent work on a virtue-ethical interpretation of the Beatitudes in the Gospels, see William C. Mattison III, The Sermon on the Mount and Moral Theology: A Virtue Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017). 13 Harrington and Keenan, Paul and Virtue Ethics. Harrington and Keenan, Jesus and Virtue Ethics. 14 Harrington and Keenan, Paul and Virtue Ethics, 117. By describing the ethics of the Pastorals as “legalistic, cultural Christianity without theological depth,” Harrington and Keenan imply that the ethical perspective of the PE is deontological. Conversely, this research argues that the ethical perspective of Titus is not legalistic nor cultural, but virtue-ethical. Moreover, the text is not “without theological depth,” as they argue. Instead, the linguistic elements, theological motifs, and ethical norms are rich in content and they converge together to construct a virtue approach to ethics.

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On the contrary, this study, considering Titus as an individual text, contends that the ethical perspective of Titus can be interpreted and described as a virtueethical perspective. The linguistic elements, theological motifs, and ethical norms embedded in the text are rich in meaning and together they (re)present an ethic of character or virtue that is not “legalistic, cultural Christianity without theological depth,” as posited by Harrington and Keenan. If the present study successfully proves its hypothesis and argues its points, then it could dispel Harrington and Keenan’s conclusion regarding virtue in the PE. Moreover, it would demonstrate that not only the PE as a corpus, but each of the letters independently can be read virtue-ethically. Another inter-disciplinary context of this book is the attention it gives to African biblical hermeneutics in chapter four. The findings of this research, namely, the virtue-ethical perspectives of Titus, will be appropriated into an African context. In this process, African ethics in its ethnological frame and African biblical hermeneutics as independent fields of research15 are engaged in an interdisciplinary interaction with virtue ethics and biblical ethics. Nonetheless, the main inter-disciplinary character of this book is most evident in the virtue-ethical analyses of Titus in chapter three, the main chapter of the study. 1.2.2 Inter-cultural Premise The historical background and contemporary form of virtue ethics have been greatly shaped by Western culture. Therefore, Western cultural concepts have dominated discussions on virtue ethics among biblical ethicists. Recently, however, there have been attempts to bring other cultural perspectives to the table.16 However, while scholarly discussions on virtue ethics have been robust in the West and some considerable efforts are being made from Asian perspectives, African ethics and its virtue-ethical concepts have not been given much attention.17 This study, therefore, locates itself in an inter-cultural context by engaging in cultural analysis, trying to understand the conceptions of virtue in some African cultures in comparison to the conceptions of virtue in Western cultures and in biblical texts.

15 Thaddeus Metz, “The Virtue of African Ethics,” in The Handbook of Virtue Ethics, ed. Stan Van Hooft et al. (Durham: Acumen, 2014), 276. Metz notes that African ethics as a professional field of research emerged around the 1960s. 16 Such as by Chan’s perspective as an Asian scholar (Biblical Ethics in the 21st Century). 17 Metz, “The Virtue of African Ethics,” 276. Metz laments that while scholarly discussion on virtue ethics is fairly robust in the Western world, little attention is given to African virtue ethics.

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1.3 Virtue Ethics In an inter-disciplinary study of this nature, one between virtue ethics and biblical ethics,18 it is helpful to describe and demarcate the concept of virtue such research employs, largely because of the various accounts of virtue available and the different aspects each account emphasizes.19 In addition, the historical dimensions of the virtue approach to ethics, the modifications it has undergone, and the nuances it has gained or lost over time necessitate such a conceptual delineation. It is also noteworthy that in order to keep the focus on virtue ethics and not dabble into the arguments about the differences between ethics and morality, between virtue and character, and between virtue theory and virtue ethics, these terms will be used interchangeably. This unit of the research describes virtue ethics under seven headings, albeit briefly: general description of virtue ethics; historical dimensions of virtue ethics; neo-Aristotelian or contemporary virtue ethics; virtue ethics in NT ethics and current Christian ethics; characteristics of virtue ethics; the working definition of virtue ethics this research employs; and the methodological framework of the research. While I shall discuss more precisely what contemporary virtue ethics means and how it is neo-Aristotelian below, suffice it to mention now that this study adopts the neo-Aristotelian concept of virtue, popularly known as virtue ethics theory, in its contemporary form in the Western20 world. Virtue ethics, in this 18  In regard to the term “ethics” itself, Victor Paul Furnish rightly argues that ethics refers or applies to the “special consideration of the nature, forms, principles, and goals of ‘right’ or ‘good’ conduct” (Theology and Ethics in Paul [Nashville: Abingdon, 1968], 209). The ethicist does not inquire into norms only but also makes inquiries into the subject and object of ethical action (actor or agent, and receiver respectively). Furnish goes further to argue that by this definition, Paul himself does not deal with ethics in a systematic, deliberate and self-conscious way as a modern ethicist would. Hence, it is inappropriate to speak of Pauline ethics in a sense of Paul’s own self-conscious, systematic and critical analysis of the grounds, motives, forms and goals of Christian conduct. Furnish then contends that Pauline ethics refers, instead, to the study of the “theological convictions which underlie Paul’s concrete exhortations and instructions and, second, of the way those convictions shape his responses to practical questions of conduct.” Since the PE are normally considered as belonging to the “Pauline” tradition directly or indirectly, this research agrees with Furnish’s definition of ethics and his description of the concept and the tasks of studying Pauline ethics. The authorship argument of the letter to Titus, however, is not pursued in this research, as explained above. 19 For example, different scholars are committed to studying virtue ethics as it relates to different aspects such as classical virtues, contemporary virtue ethics, the natural virtues, theological virtues, intellectual virtues, Platonic virtues, Aristotelian virtues, Augustinian virtues, Thomistic virtues, and so on. For different types of virtue, see Robin W. Lovin, An Introduction to Christian Ethics: Goals, Duties, and Virtues (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2011), 185–208. 20 Even though I am an African, it becomes necessary to employ the Western account of virtue ethics because Africa has not, yet, articulated a concept of virtue that is sensitive to its contextual issues. Understanding the concept of virtue in the Western world becomes, there-

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construal and as conceived in this study, has five major characteristics that shape and demarcate it. This account of virtue and the five characteristics21 discussed below are adopted in this study for the following reasons. First, they are comprehensive. They simultaneously capture, express, and represent both the main classical and contemporary concepts of virtue as an ethical theory. Second, they are a collection and summary of the main features of the theory as expressed by the leading proponents, both in secular philosophy and moral theology.22 Third, some biblical theologians and Christian ethicists have provided a model by using these characteristics as hermeneutical tools for building bridges between virtue ethics and biblical studies. However, as noted above, none of the scholars has attempted an extensive virtue-ethical analysis of the letter to Titus or the PE. Moreover, none of them commits to analyzing virtue-ethical characteristics at a whole text level, as this study seeks to do with the text of Titus. This, therefore, leaves a research gap that the present research seeks to fill. The methodology and the text selected are new to the current research on virtue ethics in biblical literature. In addition, this research considers some aspects of virtue ethics that are often neglected, such as the sources and symbols of character, which will be included in the working definition of virtue ethics below, and in the appropriation into an African context in chapter four. This research analyzes and identifies the presence of the concepts of virtue as represented by these characteristics in three aspects of the letter to Titus, namely, the linguistic elements, theological motifs, and ethical norms. These three aspects are analyzed under a fivefold methodological grid comprising the linguistic form (intra-textual, inter-textual, and extra-textual levels); moral agents; ethical argumentation; history of tradition; and range of application of the selected ethical norms respectively.23 1.3.1 General Description of Virtue Ethics a) Virtue(s): Description For an accountable description of virtue ethics as an ethical theory, it is helpful to describe or define the term “virtue” itself, starting with Aristotle. In the Nicho­ fore, a starting point for other parts of the world to articulate their own virtue ethics that pays attention to their distinctives. Part of this research moves in this direction by seeking to appropriate the concept of virtue into an African context. 21 Here, we rely heavily on Chan’s summary of the characteristics and dimensions of virtue ethics as construed in the Western world (See Chan, Biblical Ethics in the 21st Century, 83–84). However, we add “particularity” to the characteristics, which Chan does not mention. 22 Chan mentions most of them, while a few points are added here (Biblical Ethics in the 21st Century, 83–84). 23 See the section on methodology below for an explanation of these models.

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machean Ethics, Aristotle regards ἀρετή “virtue or excellence” as a characteristic or character trait that enables anything to perform its function well. In relation to humans, a virtue is that characteristic or character trait which makes a person good, and which enables a person to perform his function well.24 In relation to moral virtues, which will be the focus of our study, as opposed to intellectual virtues, Aristotle regards moral virtue as concerned with dispositions, emotions, and actions which aims at the median between excess and deficiency (in German: “Übermaß und Mangel”25), which both “miss the mark.” Virtue is, therefore, the mean,26 meaning “that which is equidistant from each of the extremes … which is neither too much nor too little.”27 Thus, virtue, or a virtuous person always aims at the mean. Particularly, moral virtue, unlike intellectual virtue, is the one that must always aim at the mean because it is the one concerned with passions, desires, and actions, which are the non-rational aspects of humans that can have excess, defect, and the mean.28 In a broader sense, Aristotle regards virtue or excellence as a “characteristic involving choice, and that consists in observing the mean relative to us, a mean which is defined by rational principle, such as a man of practical wisdom would use to determine it.”29 Following Aristotle, Alasdyre MacIntyre, who is widely regarded as one of the (if not the) most influential contemporary virtue ethicists, defines virtues as moral qualities “the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices.”30 Similarly, Daniel Russell 24 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics II 5–6, translated by Martin Ostwald (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, 1962), 41. 25 Or, according to Horn, the median between “Zuwenig” (“too little”) and “Zuviel” (“too much”), which he describes as the “Mesotes-Lehre” (Mesotes’s teaching). According to Horn, “die Tapferkeit etwa liegt zwischen der Freiheit und der Tollkühnheit, die Besonnenheit zwischen der Empfindungslosigkeit und der Zügellosigkeit, die Freigiebigkeit zwischen Verschwendung und Geiz” (ET: “bravery, for example, lies between freedom and recklessness, prudence between insensitivity and licentiousness, generosity between waste and stinginess.”). And all of these medians are determined in each specific situation through the activity of prudence or wisdom (German: Klugheit). Friedrich W. Horn, “‘Tugend’ als ethische Norm in Antike und Christentum: Tugend und Tugendbegriff in griechisch-hellenistischer Philosophie, biblischer, jüdischer und frühchristlicher Theologie,” in Ethische Normen des frühen Christentums: Gut – Leben – Leib – Tugend, ed. Friedrich W. Horn, Ulrich Volp, and Ruben Zimmermann, WUNT 313, Kontexte und Normen neutestamentlicher Ethik 4 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2013), 387. 26 The “mean” in Aristotelian ethics refers to the moderate position or the middle ground between two extremes, e. g. excess and lack. See Primavesi and Rapp, Aristoteles, 101. 27 Nichomachean Ethics II:1106:25–35. 28 Nichomachean Ethics II:1106b, The Works of Aristotle, translated into English under the editorship of W. D. Ross (London: Oxford University Press, 1915). The “mean” in Aristotelian terms means the moderate position or middle ground between too much and too little. 29 Nichomachean Ethics II:5–6. 30 Alasdaire MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2nd ed. (London: Duckworth, 1985), 191, cited in Daniel Statman, “Introduction to Virtue Ethics,” in Virtue Ethics: A Critical Reader, ed. Daniel Statman (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997), 1–41, here 15. See also MacIntyre, “The Nature of the Virtues,” in Virtue Ethics, ed. Stephen Darwall (Malden, MA: Blackwell,

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notes that from ancient to contemporary conceptions of virtue ethics, virtues are regarded as “those character traits that are essential to living a fulfilling human life, a life in which one both cares about the right things and has the wisdom and skill to act intelligently about those things.”31 Julia Annas also regards virtues as “dispositions with an affective aspect, involving the emotions, and an intellectual aspect, involving the development of practical reasoning.”32 The virtues are to some extent states in which a person is, on which basis one could be said to be courageous, kind, generous, just, loving, and the like.33 Philippa Foot notes that, in the moral sense of the word, as inspired by Aristotle and Aquinas, a virtue is virtuous when it is beneficial to its possessor and others, if it involves the “goodness of the will,” and if it functions as a corrective to human passions and temptations that are harmful.34 Joseph Kotva, a theological ethicist, similarly defines virtue as a state of character or character trait acquired over time, which contributes to the human good. The virtues, in their plurality, involve both the intellect and the will, both the rational and affective parts of the self. The virtues are the “tendencies, dispositions, and capabilities necessary to the human good, to the best kind of human life.”35 b) Virtue Ethics: Description We shall now move from defining and describing the term “virtue” to describing virtue ethics as an ethical theory. Daniel Statman notes that the major distinguishing factor between virtue ethics and other ethical theories is that, in virtue ethics, “the basic judgments in ethics are judgments about character.”36 In praise of the virtue-ethical approach, Statman argues that virtue ethics is more congenial than the deontological approach to ethics because it sufficiently recognizes the significance of people as moral agents – their differences, their subjectivity, their emotions, and their social contexts.37 2003),148. Statman and Klein argue that MacIntyre is the most influential virtue ethicist (Daniel Statman, “Introduction to Virtue Ethics,” 34, n. 93 and Sherwin Klein, “Platonic Virtue Theory and Business Ethics,” Business and Professional Ethics 8 [1989] 59–92, here 59). 31 Daniel C. Russell, “Introduction,” in The Cambridge Companion to Virtue Ethics, ed. Daniel Russell, Cambridge Companions to Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 1–6. 32 Julia Annas, “The Virtues” in The Morality of Happiness, ed. Julia Annas (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). 33 Annas, “The Virtues.” 34 Philippa Foot, Virtues and Vices and other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 35 Joseph J. Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1996), 38. 36 Statman, “Introduction,” 7 (emphasis original). 37 Statman, “Introduction,” 8.

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Stan Van Hooft, similarly, states that “virtue ethics theorizes the characteristic states of the [moral] agent which lead to action, deeming those that lead to morally good actions or, more broadly, socially acceptable actions, to be virtues, and those that lead to unacceptable or morally bad actions as vices.”38 In this way, virtue ethics looks away from the concept of moral duty and its consequences to understanding the moral life of persons, exploring motives, inner states, character and its enrichment.39 The virtue of a person forms her/his quest for self-realization and connects one’s reason and motivation, which determine one’s actions.40 In this light, virtue is a “necessary condition both for seeing moral facts and for being a moral agent.”41 Similarly, Harrington and Keenan note that virtue ethics as an ethical theory, unlike other ethical theories, is primarily concerned with the morality of “persons” more than the morality of particular “actions.”42 In virtue ethics, the question is not about what actions are morally permissible, but about who we are and what we should become. The tripolar questions that describe and summarize virtue ethicists’ concerns are “Who are we?” “Who ought we to become?” and “How are we to get there?”43 Virtue ethics, therefore, is concerned with the entirety of a person’s identity and character, both in personal and social life. Rules, principles, and commands are relevant in virtue ethics only to the extent that they illustrate or exemplify certain valued or disvalued inner character dispositions of persons44 or as they help in character development. John Christman, from a socio-political point of view, notes that virtue theory begins with the conception of the ideal human life, in which the person flourishes, i. e. enjoys the highest degree of moral happiness as the fundamental moral good.45 In this sense, character traits or virtues are defined, which are thought to be necessary for leading this flourishing life or attaining the good life. Practices, institutions, and communities are evaluated on the basis of how they make such a development towards flourishing possible, and how they meet the demands of the virtues.46 The greatest achievement of an individual, a community, an institution, or a state is, therefore, to ensure that people flourish and attain the good life as conceived in virtue ethics. In this socio-political construal, virtue ethics conceives human beings as “fundamentally social beings, 38 Stan

Van Hooft, “Introduction,” in The Handbook of Virtue Ethics, 2–3. Van Hooft, “Introduction,” 3. 40 Stan Van Hooft, “Virtue and Identity,” in The Handbook of Virtue Ethics, 161. 41 Stan Van Hooft, “Virtue and Identity,” 161. 42 Harrington and Keenan, Paul and Virtue Ethics, 3. 43 Harrington and Keenan, Paul and Virtue Ethics, 3. 44 Metz, “The Virtue of African Ethics,” 395. 45 John Christman, Social and Political Philosophy: A Contemporary Introduction (London and New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2002), 16. 46 Christman, Social and Political Philosophy, 16. 39 Stan

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whose happiness can only be understood in terms of the social context in which they live and grow.”47 The traditional family structure portrayed and fostered in the letter to Titus makes a virtue-ethical reading of the letter plausible, because, as Statman notes, “virtue ethics conceives of human beings as rooted in particular cultural traditions, and not as abstract individuals governed by a universal concept of obligation.”48 On this basis, preferring the virtue approach to ethics implies, to some extent, preferring a return to traditional society.49 Furthermore, the connection between virtue ethics and culture also presupposes the relevance or place of community in virtue ethics, because the virtue-ethical notion of flourishing is not universal, but is to be understood relatively in people’s traditions and communities.50 Whether the return of virtue ethics to traditional society is possible in the 21st century is a different question, the answer to which would obviously be no! Instead, contemporary virtue ethicists could adopt, adapt, and appropriate some principles and insights from the traditional societies. Moreover, this connection between virtue ethics and culture shows the relevance of the fourth chapter of this study, which explores the forms and functions of virtue in selected traditional African cultures. Julia Annas’s argument for the place of practical reasoning in virtue ethics is relevant to the consideration of virtue ethics in Titus because Titus implies a relationship between godliness, knowledge, and truth,51 among other notions, that signal the intrinsic co-existence and participation of both affect and intellect in the operation of virtue, as typified by the frequent use of σωφροσύνη “selfcontrol/being sensible.” Annas argues that being an agent-based ethical theory, virtue ethics involves practical reasoning or reflection of the moral agent. Since virtue ethics is said to involve the entirety of one’s life, it equally means that it involves practical reasoning and knowledge of the virtues and why the agent lives by or practices them. Any account of virtue that neglects this or any aspect of a person’s consciousness is a limitation to the concept of virtue ethics.52  Christman, Social and Political Philosophy, 16.  Statman, “Virtue Ethics,” 15. 49 Statman, “Virtue Ethics,” 16. 50 Statman, “Virtue Ethics,” 17. 51 See κατὰ πίστιν ἐκλεκτῶν θεοῦ καὶ ἐπίγνωσιν ἀληθείας τῆς κατ᾽ εὐσέβειαν “for the purpose of the faith of the elected ones of God and the knowledge of the truth that leads to godliness” (Titus 1:1). Nonetheless, this research does not attempt to develop this argument but only to draw attention to it in relation to the description of virtue ethics. This is, however, a viable area for further inquiry in another research project. 52 Julia Annas, “Virtue Ethics,” in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, ed. David Copp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 514–534. See pages 528–529 for more discussion on the role of practical reasoning in virtue ethics, tracing it from the classical account of virtue. By way of application, we could argue that it is for the purpose of the rationality or consciousness of the moral agent that the author of Titus combines knowledge, truth, and godliness, or godliness based on knowledge of the truth. For the same purpose, the author keeps emphasizing the 47 48

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Annas further argues that regarding virtues as only a means to an end that is independent of the virtuous person is a resort to a consequentialist ethical theory. If the point for having the virtue is disconnected from the agent’s own concerns with her/his own life, and the role of, or the connection between practical reasoning and the virtues is eliminated, it only leaves a reduced concept of virtue ethics, as it does not establish a connection between virtue and the agent’s life priorities.53 The virtue-ethical conception of the end or the telos at which the agent aims provides a rationale for virtue and the virtues. In this way, the virtuous person and the virtues are connected with the end. This unity of the virtuous person, the virtues, and the telos displace the consideration of the virtues in a “piecemeal” way.54 Moreover, Annas contends that giving an account of the virtues without a kind of “eudaimonist framework” is also a reduced account of virtue ethics.55 Annas laments, therefore, that most of the criticisms against virtue ethics have been largely targeted at some “reduced” versions of it, and not on the whole theory. She finds in the classical version a more comprehensive virtue theory than the reduced versions of modern ethical theory. She thinks, therefore, that the future of virtue ethics is in engaging the classical theories (which she finds adequate) in modern ways. In her words, “the future belongs to theories that do in modern terms what the classical theories did in theirs.”56As an example of this modern way of doing classical ethics, Annas argues that any ethical theory should be grounded on naturalism.57 In relation to virtue ethics in particular, she argues that contemporary virtue ethics should make “substantial appeal to the naturality of our human nature,” should clarify the relation of virtue to flourishing, and the relation of virtue to practical reasoning.58 Furthermore, Annas rightly notes that while virtue ethics considers the place of community and social relations as significant for developing the appropriate virtues, the concept of the community itself needs to be clearly articulated. How do the virtues embed in different communities? Or how do they develop in different communities? How do we define the community? As geographical, cultural, religious, creedal, or biological? She argues, therefore, that over-­emphasis on the development of the virtues within existing traditions and societies risks tilting virtue ethics towards relativism.59 Relativistic virtue theory holds that “different virtues are developed within contexts that cannot be meaningfully compared need to teach sound doctrine and to teach the people how to be virtuous. This is to enable the believers to learn, know, and decide for and by themselves how to live or practice the virtues. 53 Annas, “Virtue Ethics,” 530. 54 Annas, “Virtue Ethics,” 531. 55 Annas, “Virtue Ethics,” 531. 56 Annas, “Virtue Ethics,” 533. 57 Annas, “Virtue Ethics,” 533. 58 Annas, “Virtue Ethics,” 533. 59 Annas, “Virtue Ethics,” 532.

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and thus are removed from mutual discussion and criticism.”60 Conversely, the classical version of virtue stresses virtue as an ideal that is not limited to a particular social context, which has earned it heavy criticism among modern ethical thinkers who think it is too conservative and overstretches the importance of the social context at the expense of other ethical considerations, for example, individual concerns.61 Annas’s preference for a naturalistic account of virtue ethics is in direct contrast to Statman’s argument for a culturally, contextually, and traditionally oriented virtue ethics, as discussed above. While there are merits in some of Annas’s arguments, for example, the risk of relativism in multiple versions of virtue theory, this study does not approach virtue theory from a naturalistic standpoint as Annas suggests. Instead, it approaches it from a particularistic standpoint, because it is an exegetical analysis of a biblical text that finds its intelligibility in the Christian tradition. While Annas’s proposal for a naturalistic virtue ethic has some merits in the sense that it reduces the risk of relativizing virtue, it, nevertheless, poses the problems associated with a virtue ethic that is based on realism. For example, it does not take the distinctive cultural, traditional, and contextual differences amongst people seriously. Such differences are significant because the conception of virtue, happiness, and flourishing are to a large extent subjectively, contextually, and culturally defined, notwithstanding the overlaps. It is on this basis that this research seeks to appropriate the virtue-ethical concepts of Titus into an African context. In sum, the various scholarly positions discussed above show that virtue ethics is the consideration of the dispositions, habits, and character traits of moral persons more than the morality of actions. In other words, virtue ethics is an agentbased ethical theory compared to other theories that are action-based. It concerns itself more with the “being” of the agents than their “doing.” The concerns of virtue ethics are summed up in the tripolar questions: Who are we? Who ought we, or can we become? How do we get there, in the sense of what habits, dispositions, practices, and actions will move us to who we ought to be? We shall describe the working definition of virtue ethics employed in this study below. 1.3.2 Historical Dimensions of Virtue Ethics Virtue ethics is often regarded as a new moral theory emerging out of dissatisfaction with the deontological and consequentialist ethical theories. However, it is not a new concept, rather a newly revived concept. Considerations of virtue in relation to ethics originated in ancient Greek philosophy with Plato and Aristotle. In this unit of the study, we shall discuss their concepts of virtue briefly. 60 Annas, 61 Annas,

“Virtue Ethics,” 532. “Virtue Ethics,” 532.

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a) Plato on Virtue(s) Plato says virtue consists in a “harmony or beauty of the soul,” and actions are considered good or bad, better or worse to the extent that they sustain and improve or fail to sustain and improve such inner harmony or beauty of both the individual and the state.62 In the Republic, Plato identifies four cardinal virtues that typify a well-functioning state or individual, namely; σοφία “wisdom,” ἀνδρεία “courage,” σωφρωσύνη “self-control,” and δικαιοσύνη “justice.”63 Plato’s position on σωφρωσύνη “self-control” is worth mentioning here, because σωφρωσύνη is the virtue with the highest number of occurrences in the letter to Titus, and a significant portion of this book is dedicated to it. Plato notes the individual and political functions of self-control, showing it to be, unlike courage and wisdom, a virtue of unanimity, a balance, and a harmony between the “naturally worse and naturally better” elements of every individual and every society.64 b) The Stoics’ Concept of Virtue The Stoics regard virtue as the most important thing in life, even more important than pleasure, wealth, and life itself. They even regard virtue as the only good thing in life that brings happiness. All other things humans pursue do not bring happiness.65 Virtue finds its importance in the fact that it is “necessary for our happiness, and sufficient for our happiness, and indeed the sole component and contributor to our happiness.”66 The Stoics compare anyone who has virtue to Zeus himself, being the example of a perfectly happy being. The twist in the Stoic’s concept of virtue, however, is that, none of us humans has virtue or is virtuous. Instead, humans are all equally vicious, wretched, and as a result, miserable. While they acknowledge that one can make some 62 Republic 432a. Michael Slote, “Virtue Ethics,” in Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, ed. Hugh LaFollette and Ingmar Persson, 2nd ed. (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 395. Oliver Primavesi and Christof Rapp, Aristoteles, Wissen (Berlin: C. H. Beck, 2016), 98. 63 Platon Werke, vol. 4: Politeia (Der Staat), ed. Dietrich Kurz, Greek text by Emile Chambry, German translation by Friedrich Schleiermacher (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1971), 303. English translations “wisdom, courage, self-discipline, and morality/justice” from Plato Republic 432a, trans. by Robin Waterfield (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 133; and “wise, valiant, temperate, and just” from The Republic of Plato, 3rd ed., translated with corrections by B. Jowett (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), 117. It is worth noting that Waterfield often translates δικαιοσύνη as “morality” instead of justice; and σωφρωσύνη as “self-discipline” instead of self-control or “being sensible” (cf. Republic 430D, Waterfield, 137). The German translations of Plato’s four cardinal virtues are: Weisheit, Tapferkeit, Besonnenheit, und Gerechtichkeit. 64 Republic 432a, Waterfield, 139. 65 Tad Brennan, “The Stoic Theory of Virtue,” in The Routledge Companion to Virtue Ethics, ed. Lorraine Besser-Jones and Michael Slote (New York and London: Routledge, 2015), 32– 49, here 29. 66 Brennan, “Stoic,” 29.

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progress towards virtue, they insist that one remains “thoroughly vicious and not even partly virtuous.”67 And all vicious beings are insane, enslaved, and live as enemies of humanity. Only the Sages are truly virtuous and therefore sane, free, friendly, wealthy, lovable, and beautiful.68 Moreover, Sandbach notes that the Stoics regarded goodness and badness as absolutes in the sense that there is no median or grades between them: a person is either fully good or fully bad. It is on this basis that all human beings, except the very few Sages, are bad and unhappy, because such an absolute and ideal goodness is unattainable. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, the Stoics maintained that humans can be “making an advance” towards goodness, though still wicked and miserable.69 Furthermore, for the Stoics, virtue is intellectual, always a matter of knowledge and wisdom. They also recognized that “habituation was necessary if virtue was to be acquired.”70 Virtue involved training human reason to think correctly. This is why Zeno defined the cardinal virtues in terms of wisdom: justice as wisdom acting in fair distribution; temperance or self-control as wisdom concerned with acquisition; and courage or bravery as wisdom concerned with endurance. Wisdom itself is knowledge of what a person should or should not do, or knowledge of good or bad.71 The Stoics place moral judgment at the whole of one’s life. To them, “since consistency of one’s whole life is the goal, something is radically wrong with each action or belief until all of one’s actions, dispositions, and opinions are brought into harmony with one another and with the will of Nature … until the whole man is in complete harmony, something is wrong with everything he does.”72 Building on the definition of virtue as a consistent or more literally agreeing disposition, Brennan reviews the Stoics’ theory of virtue under three questions emanating from the definition of virtue upheld by many scholars, as described above. First, what is virtue a disposition of? To this question, Brennan notes that the Stoics regard virtue to be the disposition of the soul, nature, or reason of the possessor of the virtue, be it humans or anything else. In his words, a virtue is a “disposition of the pneumatic principle of the thing that has the virtue; e. g. the reason of a human being, or the ‘nature’ of a tree.”73 Second, to what action or “doing” is virtue a disposition to? The answer is that, a virtue is a disposition to do that which is consistent with the substance, soul, nature, or reason of that thing. For humans, it would be that virtue is the disposition to do or practice 67 Brennan,

“Stoic,” 29. “Stoic,” 29. 69 F. H. Sandbach, Ancient Culture and Society: The Stoics (London: Chatton & Windus, 1975), 41–42. 70 Sandbach, Ancient Culture and Society, 44–45. 71 Sandbach, Ancient Culture and Society, 42. 72 Brad Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985), 175. 73 Brennan, “Stoic,” 38. 68 Brennan,

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that which is in consonance with reason. Third, to what is virtue consistent or in agreement with? To this question, Brennan argues that the Stoics regard virtue as consistent or in agreement with the “external standard of nature, both human nature and cosmic nature, i. e. the will of Zeus.”74 What we can observe from the brief discussion on the Stoic concept of virtue above is that the Stoics show some level of “defeatist” attitude towards virtue – while they desire virtue, they equally believe that virtue is unattainable for humans. The Stoic concept of the unattainability of virtue is, however, not in the Aristotelian and neo-Aristotelian perfectionist sense of virtue. The Aristotelian and neo-Aristotelian concept of virtue calls its possessor to continuous growth in it, but not in a defeatist sense, but in an optimistic sense of positive growth. c) Aristotle’s Account of Virtue While different Greek-philosophical schools had their different concepts of virtue, as discussed above, Aristotle’s concept of virtue in relation to ethics or morality has provided the foundation and shape to contemporary virtue ethics theory more than any other, which is why contemporary virtue ethics could easily be referred to as neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics.75 For this reason, we shall discuss Aristotle’s concept of virtue more elaborately here, referring to Nicomachean Ethics Book II–VII and Eudamian Ethics Books I–III. Afterwards, we shall discuss the sense in which contemporary virtue ethics is mainly neo-Aristotelian. Aristotle argued that the moral life cannot be governed by rules or general principles, and the criterion for judging right action is the “rational ethical perceptions of the virtuous individual in situations of ethical choice.”76 Aristotle differentiates between intellectual (διανοντική) and moral (ἠθική) virtues (ἀρετή). Intellectual virtues include, for example, theoretical wisdom, understanding, and practical wisdom. Moral virtues include, for example, generosity and self-control. Intellectual virtues originate or are acquired/imparted through teaching (διδασκαλία), thereby requiring experience and time, while moral virtue is formed by habit (ἔθος), from which, not surprising, the word ethics is derived.77 Thus, the moral virtues are not infused or implanted into us by nature, but acquired through these two processes: education and habituation, especially from childhood.78 Moreover, it is moral virtue that is concerned with emotions 74 Brennan,

“Stoic,” 42. D. Biermann notes that while it was Plato who identified the “cardinal virtues,” it was Aristotle who thoroughly expounded them, which “supplied the enduring framework” of virtue ethics and its subsequent adherents. See Joel D. Biermann, A Case for Character: Towards a Lutheran Virtue Ethics (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2014), 16, citing Nichomachean Ethics, especially Book II–VII. 76 Slote, “Virtue Ethics,” 395. 77 Nichomachean Ethics II, 15–30. 78 Primavesi and Rapp, Aristoteles, 100. 75 Joel

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(παθός) and actions (πρᾶξις), which is why the “mean” (μέσος or μεσότης) is the appropriate sphere of the virtue.79 Σοφροσύνη in Titus (especially 2:2–6, 12, cf. 1:8) is used as a virtue that moderates or provides the “mean” in relation to desires or passions, which is why Risto Saarinen argues that, unlike in some Greek philosophical schools, “the Pastoral Epistles recommend a moderation of passions rather than their complete extinction.”80 While Aristotle’s virtues could be classified into intellectual and moral virtues, he, nevertheless, does not maintain a hardline difference between the two categories. He regarded virtue, generally speaking, as “eine Mischung aus ethischen und dianoetischen Tugenden” (“a mixture of ethical and dianotic virtues”) such that the differentiation played no role in his ethical system.81 Focusing more on the moral than the intellectual virtues, Aristotle, in the Nichomachean Ethics, discusses the following virtues as prominent among others: ἀνδρεία “courage,” which is the mean between fear and over-confidence or cowardice and recklessness; σωφροσύνη “self-control” the mean between restraint and mastery in regards to pleasures; ἐλευθεριότητος “generosity,” the mean in regards to material goods, the two extremes being extravagance and stinginess; μεγαλοπρεπείας “magnificence” or “suitable expenditure” as a mean between vulgarity and tightfistedness or stinginess; μεγαλοψυχία “magnanimity,”82 “high-mindedness” or “pride” (positively, related to honor or positive self-esteem, or knowing one’s worth); πραότης “gentleness,” the mean in relation to feelings of anger; φιλία “friendliness” as the mean between flattery or obsequiousness and grouchiness or quarrelsomeness; ἐπιεικής “honesty or truthfulness” as the mean between boastfulness and self-deception; and δικαιοσύνη “justice,” which he hails as “the highest of all virtues, more admirable than morning star and evening star … ‘In justice every virtue is summed up.’”83 Justice is complete virtue and excellence in its fullest because he who possesses it makes use of it by himself (as an individual virtue) and in relation to others (as a social or political virtue). Moreover, Aristotle mentions, among many other 79  Aristotelis, Ethica Nichomachea II, 6, 10–20; ET from Ethica Nicomachea, trans. Ingram Bywater (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894, 1949), 32. 80 Risto Saarinen, The Pastoral Epistles with Philemon & Jude, Brazos Theological Commentary on the Bible (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2008), 182. 81 Stephan Grätzel, System der Ethik: Existenzielle Fragestellungen der Praktischen Philosophie, Grundlagen der Praktischen Philosophie (London: Turnshare, 2006), 1:34–35. 82 MacIntyre, “The Nature of the Virtues,” 145, notes that no English translation of Aristotle’s concept of μεγαλοψυχία is satisfactory. Μεγαλοψυχία, fairly translated as magnanimity, is one of the virtues Aristotle regards as being only available to the rich and socially high class of the society, and are unavailable to the poor, even if they are free people and not slaves. The mean in relation to magnanimity is not clear to me in Aristotle’s work, which is why I skip mentioning the mean above. 83 Nichomachean Ethics III, 1115a–V (Ostward, 66–145; for the Greek version, see Bywater, 53–113). See also Grätzel, System der Ethik, 34–35, where he mentions that justice (Gerechtichkeit), in Aristotle’s ethics, is “eine sehr hoch stehende Tugend.”

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less prominent virtues, “wittiness” (cleverness, keenness) as a mean between “buffoonery” (frivolity) and “boorishness” (crudeness, incivility). Other virtues Aristotle talks about are “nameless virtues,” but their mean can be described. For example, he talks about the mean between the two extremes of ambition and lack of ambition, without naming the virtue.84 Aristotle introduces the doctrine of the mean because of the tendency of character to be good or bad, or of virtues to be deficient or excessive.85 Moreover, according to Aristotle, these many moral virtues manifest themselves in different or all aspects of life. For example, in the face of danger, courage is the needed virtue; in the context of desires, prudence or self-control is the needed virtue; in the context of giving gifts, generosity is the needed virtue; and in the context of trade or any form of distribution of goods, justice is the needed virtue. Such virtues, argues Aristotle, do not originate from nature, instead, “die Vortrefflichkeit des Charakters besteht nämlich gerade darin, dass die Begierden, Emotionen, Neigungen des selbst unvernünftigen Seelenteils so ausfallen, wie es die praktische Vernunft anordnen würde.”86 But not every good action qualifies as virtuous, except those that are done not out of compulsion but volition. Volitional or willful virtuous actions are the ones which bring us true happiness or flourishing, and which qualify as virtuous. In the words of Primavesi and Rapp, for Aristotle, “Tugendhaftes Verhalten trägt nur dann zu unserem Glück bei, wenn wir es gerne tun und wenn sich in unseren Entscheidungen eine Anerkennung für die Ziele der entsprechenden Tugend ausdrückt.”87 In the Eudamean Ethics II, being one of his major treatises on (virtue) ethics, Aristotle asserts that “in every divisible continuum there exists excess, deficiency, and a mean … in all cases the mean relative to us is best; for that is as knowledge and rational principle prescribe. And in all cases that also produces the best state.”88 Happiness is the best state, the final good, the end; and happiness is synonymous to acting well and living well. This, therefore,  Nichomachean Ethics V, 1129b, 25–35, Martin Ostward, p. 114. Bereich zwischen den Verfehlungen ist daher immer eine Mitte, so dass die Tugend jeweils durch die richtige Mitte zwischen zwei exzessiven und daher lasterhaften Tendenzen bestimmt ist.” ET: “The area between the transgressions is a middle, such that virtue is always determined by the right middle between two excesses and therefore vicious tendencies.” Primavesi and Rapp, Aristoteles, 101. 86 Primavesi and Rapp, Aristoteles, 99. ET: “the excellence of character consists precisely in the fact that the appetites, emotions, inclinations of the even unreasonable part of the soul turn out as practical reason would order it.” 87 Primavesi and Rapp, Aristoteles, 99. ET: “Virtuous behavior only contributes to our happiness if we do it with pleasure and if our decisions express an appreciation for the goals of the corresponding virtue.” 88 Eudamean Ethics II, 3, 20–25. See Aristotle, Eudamean Ethics I, II, and VIII, trans. Michael Woods, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 15–16. 84

85 “Der

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means that happiness is not to be understood as eventful, but is to be seen as an aggregate of one’s life and as a whole.89 Stephan Grätzel has described and engaged with Aristotle’s concept of virtue in a concise and clear manner, with critical remarks. Therefore, because of its relevance to this study, this unit of the research will depend on his work, especially for a broader understanding of the word ἀρετή in Aristotle’s ethics. Nevertheless, we shall complement Grätzel’s work with other scholars, especially in engaging with Aristotle’s ideas of flourishing and the “mean.” Since this unit will engage with German texts, it is worth noting that Grätzel argues that the Latin translation of ἀρετή, virtus (German “Tugend”90) with the nuance of “Männlichkeit,” has narrowed Aristotle’s concept of ἀρετή.91 It is also noteworthy that Ottfried Höffe translates ἀρετή in German as “Tugend,”92 while Rapp and Primavesi translate it as “Vortrefflichkeit” “excellence, primeness, or sublimity” or Tugend “virtue, excellence.”93 Describing Aristotle’s ethics as a fundamentally practical ethics more than a theoretical one, Höffe notes that ethics is basically related more to ways of behavior than to cognition. For example, Aristotle’s discourse about courage is not about the term courage itself, “sondern am konkreten Tapfersein gemessen wird. Dieser Maßstab entspricht der allgemeinen Forderung, die Ethik nicht des Erkennens, sondern des Handelns wegen zu betreiben.”94 Similar to Höffe and Grätzel’s approach to ethics from a practical philosophical point of view, this unit discusses Aristotle’s ethics as a practical ethics, with more focus on the moral virtues than the intellectual ones.95 For Aristotle, ἀρετή is primarily the aptitude or efficiency for a particular purpose. In the words of Grätzel, Aristotle sees ἀρετή as “die Tauglichkeit für einen bestimmten Zweck.”96 Aristotle derives and argues his philosophical concept of virtue with an analogy of human skills. He argues that each human skill and profession, such as carpentry and medical practice, develops its own sense of virtue (ἀρετή). Such skills are necessary for excellence in that profession. The 89 Eudamean

Ethics II, 1, 1219a–1219b. Woods (trans.), 13. System der Ethik, 34. Grätzel notes how the word “Tugend” is now a rare word in today’s culture, due to its strong religious connotation. 91 Grätzel, System der Ethik, 34. 92 Höffe, Praktische Philosophie, 172. 93 Primavesi and Rapp, Aristoteles, 97. 94 Höffe, Praktische Philosophie, 172. ET: “but is measured by concrete courage. This yardstick corresponds to the general demand that ethics should be pursued not for the sake of knowledge but for the sake of action.” It means courage is not about the metaphysical discussions of the term, but the concrete situation of being courageous. Such a yardstick for measuring virtues agrees with the claim that ethics, especially Aristotle’s, is not about cognitive exercise but actual behavior or conduct. 95 German: “Sittliche und Verstandestugenden.” See Höffe, Praktische Philosophie, 172. See also Horn, “Tugend,” 387. 96 Grätzel, System der Ethik, 33. ET: “The suitability or aptitude for a specific purpose.” 90 Grätzel,

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virtues are precisely the skills needed for excellence.97 This excellent purpose or goal to which the professional skills move, gives meaning to the concrete skills and to the professions themselves. Without such a definite connection between skills and goal, the skills become meaningless. While there are different human excellences or virtues, “die höchste Tugend ist die jenige, die um ihrer selbst willen geschieht. Diese Tugend ist diejenige Tugend, die zur Glückseligkeit führt.”98 Similarly, Rapp and Primavesi note that, according to Aristotle, what human beings regard as the highest good and strive towards achieving is “das Glück oder das glückliche Leben (eudaimonia),”99 and there is no controversy in the fact that happiness is the highest good. The controversy arises, however, when the question is asked concerning the origin of happiness – does happiness come from money, wealth, fame, and the like? To this question, Aristotle argues that wealth, fame, honor, and the like are instruments to achieving an aim, but living a happy life is itself the goal. Moreover, Aristotle argues that human happiness has something to do with human reason, arguing that “das Glück soll daher durch die vernünftige Natur des Menschen bestimmt werden.”100 Aristotle expounds on the ethical implication of the words “ethics” and “ethos” from their etymological background. He shows that the term ethics derives from the term ethos. Grätzel notes that while this etymological connection between the two terms does not pose any linguistic problem, it poses a philosophical one. The philosophical problem lies in the implication it projects that we acquire a definite character (ethics) through habituation “Gewöhnung” (ethos).101 This further implies that our habits, attitudes, and character emanate from the same source. It shows also that character does not originate from natural conditions,102 but develops through habituation. This is the very implication that Grätzel considers “eine höchste problematische Ableitung, da sie unter Grätzel, System der Ethik, 34. System der Ethik, 34. ET: “the highest virtue is that which happens for its own sake. This virtue is the virtue that leads to happiness.” Grätzel notes that the ethical question in regard to Glückseligkeit “happiness or flourishing” is about a life that is successful or a life which “works.” The question is, “wie kann Leben gelingen?” (ET: how to lead a successful life?”). The question of moral skills, virtues, or ability finds its ethical relevance in this, because it leads to the question, “was kann ich?” (“What can I?”) However, these moral abilities in themselves do not make life successful, because “das Gelingen des Lebens ist nicht machbar. Leben kann man nicht konstruieren, auch nicht verfassen” (ibid., 224). ET: “the successful life is not feasible. Life cannot be constructed, nor can it be drawn up.”  99 Primavesi and Rapp, Aristoteles, 95. ET: “happiness or the happy life (eudaimonia).” 100 Primavesi and Rapp, Aristoteles, 96. ET: “happiness should therefore come from the reasonable nature of man.” 101 Grätzel, System der Ethik, 35. Grätzel traces the concept of behaviorism, namely, that “unsere Eigenschaften werden durch Gewöhnung ausgebildet,” to this philosophical implication. 102 See Grätzel, System der Ethik, 35. Grätzel notes how the arguments about the source of character, either as acquired or naturally given through birth, began right from Aristotle’s time. He notes how Thomas Aquinas differs from Aristotle by arguing that there are naturally born character qualities or skills. See ibid., 36–37, for more discussion on the differences  97

 98 Grätzel,

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stellt, dass Charakter, Haltung und Eigenschaften erworben werden müssen und die Würde damit leistungsabhängig ist, d. h. verdient werden muss.”103 In other words, the philosophical problem with Aristotle’s derivation of the philosophical nuances of the terms ethics and ethos is that character has to be acquired, which implies that human dignity or worth also has to be earned, depending on one’s performative ability.104 Regarding the ultimate purpose for human behavior or actions, Aristotle sees happiness or human flourishing as the ultimate and best good. While individual acts have their particular concrete and pragmatic goals, “das Glück … ist das oberste Gut, auf das wir hinstreben und welches alle unsere Einzelbestrebungen im Leben begleitet. Alle einzelnen Bestrebungen sind Teilbestrebungen, die auf die Glückseligkeit bzw. das Glück hinzielen.”105 Noteworthy is the fact that in Aristotle’s concept, this “Glückseligkeit” (happiness or flourishing) finds its worth and its essence in itself, not in some external value, norm, or essence. Human behavior pursues this flourishing always for its own sake, not for something else.106 Aristotle’s central argument regarding happiness and virtue is that, when we, as humans, exercise our reason in a virtuous way, then we become truly happy.107 Aristotle further argues why happiness or flourishing is in itself the highest and best good and not a part of a greater good. He argues that this “Glückseligkeit” is in itself self-sufficient (selbstgenügsam) because it is not only about the happiness or flourishing of individuals but of the society at large.108 Such happiness “ist nicht über das eigene Ich, über das eigene Selbst, zu erfahren, sondern sie ist nur in der Gemeinschaft, im geglückten Vollzug der Gesellschaft, möglich.”109 Grätzel notes that the problem with this understanding is that it generalizes happiness at the expense of the individual’s feeling, and that it does not clearly explain what happiness is to different people. Differentiating individual and societal happiness raises not only the question of how to experience or achieve between “angeborenen Fertigkeiten” (naturally born skills or competences) and the “erworbenen Fertigkeiten” (acquired skills or competences). 103 Grätzel, System der Ethik, 35. ET: “a highly problematic derivation, since it assumes that character, support, and qualities must be acquired and dignity is performance-related, i. e., must be earned.” 104 Grätzel, System der Ethik, 34. 105 Grätzel, System der Ethik, 39. ET: “Happiness … is the supreme good towards which we strive and which accompanies all our individual efforts in life. All individual endeavors are partial endeavors that aim at bliss or happiness.” 106 Grätzel, System der Ethik, 40, citing Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 1097b. 107 Primavesa and Rapp, Aristoteles, 97. 108 Grätzel, System der Ethik, 40. 109 Grätzel, System der Ethik, 40. ET: “is not to be experienced through one’s own ego, through one’s own self, but is possible only in community, in the successful consummation of society.”

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this happiness, but what exactly happiness is, in the first place.110 In this regard, Aristotle specifies two aspects of what happiness is. In the first account, happiness is not a personal feeling, but Lebenswerk, which is the flourishing or happiness of the society at large. In the words of Grätzel, “das vollständig geglückte Leben wäre dann nicht eines, in dem man seine eigenen Angelegenheiten zur Zufriedenheit erledigt hat, sondern ein solches, in dem ich etwas für die Gemeinschaft getan habe.”111 The second aspect of what happiness is, is that a person’s single acts are not enough to conclude that one has the quality to lead a happy life or to make others happy. Rather, “ein geglücktes Leben ist ein vollendetes Leben im Hinblick auf die Vollendung tugendhaften Handelns.”112 In sum, Aristotle considers happiness as that which works in service of the society. He also sees happiness not as what we achieve momentarily or instantaneously, but as that which we achieve throughout a lifetime.113 Aristotle’s concept of virtue, as discussed above, can be summarized in six points. First, virtues are dispositions, characteristics or character traits. Second and closely related to the first point, virtues constitute a pattern that results in similar actions at different occasions. Third, virtues are means or medians between two extremes of excess and deficiency. Fourth, virtues lead to happiness or flourishing. Fifth, virtues are voluntary and subject to human control. Sixth, reason dictates the operations or function of virtue.114 In a general sense, the main difference between the NT concept of virtue and virtue lists compared to the Greek-philosophical virtues, as represented by Aristotle’s concept discussed above, is that the virtues are not ideals born out of an individual’s decision to achieve personal happiness, but they are ideals born out of a commitment to living a life of discipleship, with Jesus Christ as the ultimate moral exemplar. Friedrich W. Horn holds a similar position. He says the virtues in the NT “sind nicht ein Gegenstand oder das Ideal einer autonomen ethischen Entscheidung, auch nicht durchgehend Mittel zum Glück oder zum höchsten Gut, sondern sie werden auf christliche Kontexte bezogen.”115 The Christian  Grätzel, System der Ethik, 41.  Grätzel, System der Ethik, 41. ET: “the completely blessed/happy life would then be not one in which one has done one’s own affairs to satisfaction, but one in which I have done something for the community.” 112 Grätzel, System der Ethik, 41. ET: “a blessed life is life completed with respect to the completion of virtuous action.” Grätzel notes how this is different from the understanding of happiness in Hedonism, namely, as a desire or a personal experience of happiness. 113 Grätzel, System der Ethik, 42. Mary Midgley also says εὐδαιμονία in Aristotelian terms, and with difference from the English word happiness, is not ascribed to mere phases and moments of life, nor is it ascribed to children and animals. “It belongs to a complete life.” Mary Midgley, “Teleological Theories of Morality,” in An Enclyclopaedia of Philosophy, ed. G. H. R. Parkinson (London: Routledge, 1988), 547. 114 Nichomachean Ethics III, 1114b, 25–34. 115 Friedrich W. Horn, “Tugendlehre im Neuen Testament? Eine Problemanzeige” in Ethische Normen des frühen Christentums: Gut – Leben – Leib – Tugend, ed. Friedrich W. Horn, Ulrich 110 111

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context to which these virtues relate is specifically the new identity, character, and reality effected through the Christ-event.116 Grätzel’s discussion of Aristotle’s concept of ἀρετή, as discussed above, is helpful to this research because it enables us to trace the following characteristics of contemporary neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics theory back to Aristotle. First, his concept of a goal or purpose towards which all actions lead traces the contemporary virtue-ethical concept of a moral telos back to Aristotle. Second, the concept of perfectionism (calling people to continuous growth in virtue) in contemporary virtue ethics theory finds its root also in Aristotle’s concept of happiness as not something achieved in a moment but throughout a lifetime. Third, his concept of happiness as not a personal or individual experience and feeling but a societal flourishing lays the foundation for the concept and role of community in contemporary virtue ethics. Fourth, his argument that a person’s character is not naturally born but acquired or earned through habituation or familiarization lays the foundation for the concept of particularity of moral agents in contemporary virtue ethics, on the one hand, and the relevance of community, on the other hand. Fifth, since character is acquired, it means one could be taught or learn to acquire it, which gives rise to the concept of character development through training in contemporary virtue ethics. Sixth, Aristotle’s emphasis on character and quality of persons instead of actions, seeing actions only as practices that aid habituation lays the foundation for contemporary virtueethical emphasis on moral “being” over “doing” or on the morality of persons over the morality of actions.117 Due to its historical roots traced to Plato and Aristotle and its prevalence in Greco-Roman culture, as discussed above, it is argued that virtue ethics was the dominant approach to ethics in the world of Western classical antiquity, but it lost its influence during the modern era, until its revival in recent decades,118 triggered by G. E. M. Anscombe’s article in 1958, followed by the works of Volp, and Ruben Zimmermann, WUNT 313 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2013), 423–424. ET: “are not an object or the ideal of an autonomous ethical decision, nor are they continuously means to happiness or to the highest good, but they are related to Christian contexts.” Horn makes this statement particularly in relation to the list of virtues in Gal 5. 116 Horn, “Tugendlehre im Neuen Testament?” 424, describes the virtues in this context as the outflow or product of the new reality and being “in the Spirit.” In his words, “Die Tugenden sind folglich geradezu Ausfluss der neuen Lebenswirklichkeit, des Seins im Geist (Gal 3,2.3.5.14; 4.6; 5,16.25; 6,1.8).” ET: “The virtues are therefore the very outpouring of the new reality of life, of being in the Spirit (Gal 3:2, 3, 5, 15; 4:6; 5:16, 25; 6:1, 8).” I use the term “Christ-event” throughout this research in reference to the Christian understanding of the entirety of the coming, mission, and work of Jesus Christ on earth (e. g. the incarnation, cross, resurrection, atonement, teachings, ascension, etc.), and its salvific, redemptive, transformative, and ethical implications for believers in Christ. 117 These characteristics of virtue ethics will be further explained below. They are the characteristics that this research seeks to find in the letter to Titus, and to identify the Christian distinctives introduced into the concept of virtue in the letter to Titus. 118 Midgley, “Teleological Theories of Morality,” 395.

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Alasdair MacIntyre119 and others. A brief summary of Anscombe’s article that triggered the revival of virtue ethics up to its present forms is helpful here. Anscombe presents three theses in her paper: first, that doing moral philosophy without a clear philosophy of psychology is unprofitable. Hence, she advises that moral philosophers stop philosophizing until they develop an adequate philosophy of psychology, which they lack. Second, she argues that the concepts of moral obligation, duty, right and wrong, and moral ought are mere survivals or “derivatives from survivals” (bits and pieces) from an earlier ethical concept that no longer survives (referring to classical virtue ethics, especially Aristotle’s). Hence, these concepts should be jettisoned. Third, she argues that there is no important difference between the moral philosophers of her day and the earlier popular English writers on moral philosophy from Sidgwick on. Hence, whatever deficiencies there were in the moral philosophies of the earlier writers were also found among the moral philosophers of her day.120 Anscombe further observes the stark contrast between modern moral philosophy and the classical one, especially that of Aristotle. For example, she notes that the term “moral” itself comes from Aristotle, but it is used in a different sense compared to Aristotle’s. Aristotle distinguishes between moral and intellectual virtues, but modern moral philosophy seems to wrongly assign the word “moral” to even intellectual failures. Based on the stark difference in the points of emphasis and concepts between modern and classical moral philosophy, Anscombe argues that “we cannot, then, look to Aristotle for any elucidation of the modern way of talking about ‘moral’ goodness, obligation, etc.”121 In other words, for modern ethical theorists to really do ethics in an Aristotelian way, they have to define the concepts, e. g. “moral,” as Aristotle himself does. As a further critique of the philosophical ethical vocabularies of her time, e. g. justice and injustice, Anscombe argues that a duty or obligation-based ethics cannot explain how an unjust person is a bad person, or an unjust action is a bad action. Such an explanation belongs to virtue ethics, “for the proof that an unjust man is a bad man would require a positive account of justice as a ‘virtue.’”122 With such criticism and theses, Anscombe set the stage for the now revamped discussions, literature, and recently contextual appropriations of virtue ethics.

119 E. g.

MacIntyre, After Virtue, and idem, Three Rival Versions of Moral Inquiry. “Modern Moral Philosophy” in Ethics, Religion and Politics: The Collected Philosophical Papers of G. E. M. Anscombe, Vol. 3 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), 26. 121 Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” 26–27. 122 Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” 29. 120 G. E. M. Anscombe,

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d) Patristics and Medieval Accounts of Virtue Ethics Paying attention to Augustine’s City of God and Aquinas’s Summa Theologica, this section considers, albeit briefly, the concepts of virtue among a few patristic and medieval writers, especially Augustine and Aquinas respectively,123 whose concepts of virtue have greatly shaped contemporary Christian virtue ethics more than others. i) Augustine of Hippo (354–430) For Augustine, because of the power or control the soul exercises over the body and reason exercises over the vices, if the soul and reason of a human being are not based on true knowledge of and subordinated to God, they “are themselves vices rather than virtues … are puffed up and proud, and so must be reckoned as vices rather than as virtues.”124 Augustine regards faith and love as mutually involved and inseparable Christian virtues because faith emanates from the divinely imparted love of God in humans, and in turn, love is developed and grows to its fullness by faith. Hope, being a “joyful yearning towards ultimate perfect fruition of the object of love,” is a product of the unity between love and faith.125 In line with Paul, Augustine regards these three virtues (faith, hope, and love) as forming the basis of Christian virtue. Beyond the Christian virtues, Augustine recognizes also the cardinal virtues (prudence, temperance, courage, and justice), but that even though they are of non-Christian origin, they are, in their true essence the expression of love to God in different aspects.126 For example, God being the object of love, temperance is an expression of love to God by keeping oneself undefiled. Courage is love enduring all things for the sake of God. Justice is love in service to God and

123 John M. Rist notes that in relation to human capacity for moral action and the effects of the fall, “Aquinas morally follows Augustine more directly.” Hence, his concept of virtue is an expansion of Augustine’s virtue concept, integrated with Aristotle’s. See John M. Rist, “Augustine, Aristotelianism, and Aquinas: Three Varieties of Philosophical Adaptation,” in Aquinas the Augustinian, ed. Michael Dauphinais, Barry David, and Matthew Levering (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 89. 124 Augustine, The City of God IV:19.25 (Greene, 235). See also Jean Porter, “Virtue Ethics,” in The Cambridge Companion to Christian Ethics, ed. Robin Gill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 97–111, here 100, citing Augustine’s De Civitate Dei 19.25. See also David F. Wells, Losing our Virtue: Why the Church must Recover its Moral Vision (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 4–13, who compares the moral decline of the 21st century West to that of the Roman period, which prompted Augustine’s reflections, leading to his series of writings titled the City of God. 125 Henry Sidgwick, History of Ethics, with an additional chapter by Alban G. Widgery (London: Macmillan, 1931), 131. 126 Sidgwick, History of Ethics, 132.

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neighbor and governing rightly. Prudence is love choosing which things help her to love God and neighbor against those things which hinder.127 In these ways, we could say, Augustine regards all virtues as expressions of one quality, namely, Christian love. “This love bestows the ability to place all human affections in their right order, loving God above all, and loving creatures as expressions of God’s goodness, within the parameters set by God’s decrees.”128 Porter notes that while Augustine’s concept of virtue had, in the long run, a greater influence on future discussions on virtue than that of any other patristic writer, his concept of virtue, however, in the short run, has less influence compared to the practical and pastoral concepts of virtue advanced by John Cassian (c. 360–c. 435) and Pope Gregory the Great (c. 540–604).129 While Cassian was writing purposely for monks and ascetics and Gregory was writing to provide practical guidance for lay Christians, both of them, however, agree on the fact that virtues function to correct and eliminate the vices, which they regard as the most urgent need of the Christian. To this end, both Cassian and Gregory provided lists of the most serious vices and their corresponding virtues that corrected them. For example, the virtue of humility corrected the vice of pride, love corrected envy, and the like. Coming from these backgrounds, reflections on morality in the early medieval period focused on the practicalities of the Christian life, with little commitment to the theoretical or meta-ethical analysis of virtue and the virtues. The virtues, nevertheless, featured sporadically in discussions and in relation to related topics like the Beatitudes, the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and so on.130 ii) Virtue Ethics in the Medieval Era We can describe two contrasting accounts of the virtues in the early scholastic periods from the writings of Peter Abelard (1074–c. 1142) and Peter Lombard (c. 1100–60). While Abelard defined virtue in the Aristotelian tradition as inner dispositions that enable moral actions, Lombard defined virtue in the Augustinian tradition from a theological viewpoint as “good quality of the mind, by which one lives rightly and which no one uses badly, that God alone works in man.”131 Lombard explained that while God provides or effects virtue in the 127 Sidgwick,

History of Ethics, 132. “Virtue Ethics,” 100. 129 Porter, “Virtue Ethics,” 100–101. 130 Porter, “Virtue Ethics,” 101. 131 Peter Lombard, Sentences 2.27.I, I (Quaracchi I:480), cited in Mark D. Jordan, “Theology and Philosophy,” in The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, eds Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 232–251, here 237. Jordan notes that Aquinas had to face the tension between this definition of virtue (from Augustine through Lombard) and the one from Aristotle, which Aquinas tries to reconcile in his treatise. However, as Jordan further notes, Aquinas explicitly defends the definition from Augustine and 128 Porter,

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human soul, it is the responsibility of humans to bring out this virtue in the form of practical acts by way of exercising their free will with the help of God’s grace. This implies that Lombard does not see the possibility of a true virtue without God’s grace, which also implies that it is not possible to discuss a distinctively philosophical account of virtue in Christian theology.132 Unlike Lombard, subsequent scholastic scholars tried to combine philosophical and theological accounts of virtue. William of Auxerre (c. 1150–1231), for example, distinguished between theological and political virtues. The theological virtues, which depend on grace, are faith, hope, and love, while the political virtues, which are the classical cardinal virtues, are prudence, courage, self-control, and justice. The political virtues originate from the natural law, known through the vision of God that is available to all humans, and are necessary for social life.133 According to William, the political virtues cannot lead to salvation because they are attainable without grace and are available to all, both believers and non-believers. However, “they do serve as a preparation for the theological virtues, and they provide a medium through which the theological virtues can be expressed in external acts.”134 Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225–74) stands out among scholastics as the most influential exponent of a combination of philosophical and theological virtues. It is, therefore, not surprising that Sidgwick describes Aquinas’s moral philosophy as mainly “Aristotelianism with a Neo-Platonic tinge, interpreted and supplemented by a view of Christian doctrine derived chiefly from Augustine.”135 Hence, studying Aquinas in relation to virtue ethics provides a glimpse into Platonic, Aristotelian, and Augustinian concepts of virtue in a synthetic and adapted way. In relation to Aristotle in particular, Sanford notes that “Aquinas’s approach is not merely a modified Aristotelian ethics, it is an ethic that deliberately seeks to surpass in a way that completes rather than negates that proposed by Aristotle.”136 In his Summa Theologica, Aquinas, in agreement with Lombard and Augustine, defines virtue as “a good quality of the mind, by which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad use, which God works in us, without us.”137 Aquinas identifies seven virtues altogether, four of which are the cardinal (natural) virtues while three are theological virtues. The natural virtues are prudentia “prudence,” Lombard and tries to incorporate the natural virtues into this theological definition of virtue. See also Porter, “Virtue Ethics,” 101. 132 Porter, “Virtue Ethics,” 101. 133 Porter, “Virtue Ethics,” 102. 134 Porter, “Virtue Ethics,” 102, citing Summa Aurea 19, Intro. 135 Sidgwick, History of Ethics, 141. 136 Jonathan J. Sanford, Before Virtue: Assessing Contemporary Virtue Ethics (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2015), 56. 137 Summa Theologica I–II 55.4. See also Porter, “Virtue Ethics,” 102.

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justitia “justice,” temperantia “temperance,” and fortitudo “fortitude,”138 while the supernatural (theological) virtues are fides “faith,” spes “hope,” and charitas “charity.”139 Aquinas goes on to explain each of the aspects of his definition in the whole of the fourth paragraph of the Summa Theologica II 55. For example, he clarifies that only the theological virtues are brought about in us and without any action on our part. On this basis, they are “infused virtues.” In his words, “infused virtue is caused in us by God without any action on our part, but not without our consent. This is the sense of the words which God works in us without us. As to those things which are done by us, God causes them in us, yet not without action on our part, for He works in every will and in every nature.”140 By this, Aquinas differentiates between infused and acquired virtues. Infused virtues “direct us sufficiently to our supernatural end, … to God himself,”141 while acquired virtues aim to attain the human good rationally discerned.142 The acquired virtues are the cardinal virtues, which can be viewed as general qualities of any morally good person or as specific virtues each with their characteristics and expressions in practical forms.143 The infused virtues, on the other hand, “include not only the theological virtues, but also infused cardinal virtues, which are specifically different from their acquired counterparts because they are directed towards a different end.”144 It is noteworthy that, unlike Augustine and William discussed above, Aquinas argues that the virtues acquired by human efforts, as opposed to infused virtues, are also genuine virtues but in a limited way, and that “no one can attain salvation without the infused virtues.”145 Aquinas establishes the connection between virtue and happiness by categorizing happiness into two categories, namely, natural and supernatural hap138 Summa

Theologica II 61.2.  Summa Theologica II 62.1–4. For an evangelical appraisal of Thomas Aquinas’s virtues, see Norman Geisler, Thomas Aquinas: An Evangelical Appraisal (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1991), 170–175. 140 Summa Theologica II 55.4 (emphasis original). 141  Summa Theologica II 63.3. 142 Summa Theologica I–II 63.3. See also Porter, “Virtue Ethics,” 102. See also Ralp McInerny, “Ethics,” in The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, ed. Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 196–216, here 203, who notes that in Aristotle and Aquinas, what qualifies an activity to be called rational is not only that it is an act of reason, but it is also that “it comes under the sway of reason even though it is an act of another human faculty” (ibid., 203). On this basis, human emotions can be said to be reasonable or rational if they are operated under the influence of reason. See Nichomachean Ethics I, 13, for the details of this concept. See also Aidan Nichols, Discovering Aquinas: An Introduction to his Life, Work and Influence (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 2002), 96–100, for a summary of Aquinas’s concept of virtue. 143 Summa Theologica I–II 61.1. See also Porter, “Virtue Ethics,” 102. 144 Porter, “Virtue Ethics,” 102, citing Summa Theologica I–II 63.3, 4. See also Geisler, “Aquinas,” 41. 145 Porter, “Virtue Ethics,” 102–103, citing Summa Theologica I–II 62.1, 2. 139

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piness. Natural happiness “is proportionate to human nature … which man can obtain by means of his natural principles” while supernatural happiness is “happiness surpassing man’s nature, and which man can obtain by the power of God alone, by a kind of participation of the Godhead” (cf. 2 Pet 1:4).146 The natural or cardinal virtues direct humans to obtaining natural happiness, but lack the capacity to direct them to obtaining supernatural happiness. Therefore, it is necessary for humans to receive the theological virtues, which direct them towards supernatural happiness in relation to God. While we have been mentioning “theological virtues,” it is important to return to Aquinas himself for the proper understanding of the senses in which faith, hope, and love or charity are called theological virtues and are, therefore, different from the natural virtues. First, these virtues are theological because God is their object in the sense that they direct us to God. Second, they are theological because they are infused in us by God alone. Third, they are theological in the sense that they are not naturally made known to us except by divine revelation in the Holy Scripture. Fourth, they are called divine virtues “not as though God were virtuous by reason of them, but because by them God makes us virtuous, and directs us to Himself.”147 Aquinas follows Aristotle and Abelard in regarding virtue as stable dispositions that incline a person to act in certain consistent ways.148 He categorizes virtues into intellectual virtues, which are morally neutral, e. g. knowledge, and moral virtues, which pertain to passions and will, and pertain to the intellectual virtues also to the extent that they orient towards or contribute to action.149 Moreover, according to Aquinas, each of the four cardinal virtues corresponds with one of the distinctive faculties of the human soul. For example, prudence or practical wisdom, which is strictly speaking a virtue of the practical intellect, enables the agent to choose in accordance with her overall conception of goodness; justice orients the will towards the common good; fortitude shapes the irascible passions in such a way as to resist obstacles to attaining what is truly good; and temperance shapes the passions of desire in such a way that the agent desires what is truly in accordance with the overall good.150 The theological virtues are likewise associated with specific faculties; faith is a virtue of the intellect, while hope and charity are virtues of the will.151

Furthermore, Aquinas agrees with Aristotle that the virtues are united or connected in some way. For example, each of the cardinal virtues requires some level of prudence in actual practice, being agent-based, which is why he refers to Aristotle that “no moral virtue can be without prudence; since it is proper to moral 146 Summa

Theologica II 62.1. Theologica II 62.1. 148 Summa Theologica I–II 55.1. See also Porter, “Virtue Ethics,” 103. 149 Summa Theologica I–II 58.1, cited in Porter, “Virtue Ethics,” 103. 150 Summa Theologica I–II 59.2; 60.3–5. See also Porter, “Virtue Ethics,” 103. 151 Porter, “Virtue Ethics,” 103, citing Summa Theologica II–II 4.2; 18.1; 24.1. 147 Summa

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virtue to make a right choice, for it is an elective habit.”152 Nonetheless, argues Aquinas, prudence is not independent of other virtues, because one cannot have prudence without the moral virtues. This underscores the unity of the virtues.153 Moreover, he quotes Gregory in this regard, saying, “a virtue cannot be perfect as a virtue, if isolated from the others: for there can be no true prudence without temperance, justice and fortitude.”154 Similarly, each of the theological or infused virtues presupposes charity or love in its actual practice.155 e) Perspectives on Virtue in the Modern Era David Hume (1711–1776) finds the grounds for morality in the feeling of approval or disapproval of one’s or other people’s motives for action (e. g. generosity, parental or peer approval, etc.), relating such motives with virtues, which he regards as the disposition to respond to and act in a certain consistent way in different situations.156 Contrary to the dominant classical and medieval concepts of virtue advanced by Aristotle, Aquinas, and others, Hume argues that passion rather than reason is what moves humans to action. Therefore, the passions and desires, from where virtues arise, do not depend on reason directly, for reason alone is not a sufficient basis for determining the moral judgment of acts, whether blame or approval.157 Nevertheless, he admits that virtues such as justice, “which presuppose rational social conventions for their origin and exercise” in diverse forms, depend on reason indirectly.158 In his work The Nature of True Virtue, Jonathan Edwards (1703–1758) argues, in consonance with Hume and other “moral-sense” theorists, that moral judgment is based on sentiments rather than reason or rationality. He describes virtue as a “kind of beauty of disposition and action,” and the sentiment on which moral judgments are based is “a sense of delight in the presence of virtue.”159 Edwards categorizes the beauty of virtue into two: first, virtue brings about harmony and proportion, seen in the operation of, say, justice in human relationships. Second, virtue is benevolence towards being in general, involving God as the infinite being and other beings.160 He further argues that natural virtues do not save (in the Christian sense of the word), yet they are excellent and are subsumed and transformed by spiritual virtues. It is only in this sense that virtue can be

152 Summa

Theologica II 65.1. Theologica II 65.1. 154 Summa Theologica II 65.1, citing Gregory, Moral, xxii. I. 155 Summa Theologica I–II 65.2. See also Porter, “Virtue Ethics,” 103. 156 Porter, “Virtue Ethics,” 104. 157 Sidgwick, History of Ethics, 206. 158 Porter, “Virtue Ethics,” 104. 159 Porter, “Virtue Ethics,” 104. 160 Porter, “Virtue Ethics,” 104–105. 153 Summa

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regarded as true virtue, as expressing God’s grace in the human heart, and as an effect and sign of election, not a cause or basis for it.161 Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834) posits that moral reasoning involves three categories: the highest good, duty, and virtue. While the three are related, they each emphasize distinctive aspects of morality. Schleiermacher’s concept of virtue is close to Aristotle’s idea of practical wisdom. He regards virtue as “a capacity which enables the individual to understand and act upon the concrete implications of the moral law.”162 Based on the different accounts and points of emphasis of different scholars from the patristic to contemporary periods concerning virtue ethics, discussed above, Porter rightly observes that it is a mistake to assume only a singular definitive account of virtue, or to assume that all virtue theorists will agree on the meaning and implications of the concepts of virtue. In other words, there are plurality of virtue accounts.163 With this plurality of virtue concepts and emphases, it is worth restating at this point that this study lays specific emphasis on the neo-Aristotelian account of virtue, broadly stated. This account of virtue, though with different emphases depending on who is theorizing, still retains a dominant focus on features such as a sense of a moral telos related to human flourishing, focus on character or moral “being” more than moral “doing,” a concept of perfectionism, a commitment to character development, and an acknowledgment of the particularity of moral agents. Nevertheless, a section of this study will also explore virtue ethics from a particularly African context, which may lay a different emphasis than the features mentioned above. For example, community as a moral rationale will play a more central role in an African form and function of virtue than it has been in the predominantly Euro-centric accounts of virtue. Having discussed all these historical dimensions of virtue, it is helpful at this point to describe what neo-Aristotelian or contemporary virtue ethics actually is. Having discussed the historical dimensions of virtue ethics from Greek philosophy, Christian ethics (patristics), and its current revival in secular philosophy, we can identify some basic features that have characterized virtue ethics throughout and in the different accounts. The outstanding feature is that throughout, the normativity of virtue ethics has found its significance and grounds in social and existential standards of honor and admirability, instead of having objective grounds “in religion, pure reason, or utilitarian calculation.”164 Moreover, it is 161 Porter,

“Virtue Ethics,” 105. “Virtue Ethics,” 105. 163 See MacIntyre, “The Nature of the Virtues,” 144–167, for a discussion on the different accounts of not only virtue theory, but the actual list of virtues upheld by different classical virtue ethicists (e. g. Homer and Aristotle) and how they differ from each other, from NT virtues, and from our contemporary virtues. 164 Van Hooft, “Introduction,” in The Handbook of Virtue Ethics, 2. Kotva identifies three factors responsible for the renewed interest in virtue ethics: the widespread opinion that con162 Porter,

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worth noting that from its Greco-Roman origin to its revival and current shapes, emphasis on inner character, dispositions, and motivation, instead of rules and actions, have always characterized the theory and practice of virtue.165 In relation to other ethical theories, Annas notes that the consequential ethical theory, over the years, has seen virtue as instrumental to achieving some detachedly defined goods from the agent her/himself. On its own part, the Kantian ethical theory, until recently, has been “narrowly obsessed”166 with rules and principles. These two theories have placed much or only focus on actions in isolation from, and at the expense of, the agents.167 In favor of these two ethical theories, virtue theory has been neglected over the years to the point that consequentialism and deontology have been assumed to be the only two major ethical theories. However, the resurgence or revival of virtue ethics has challenged this assumption and provided a third alternative.168 Moreover, virtue ethics has also provided resources that have benefitted and enriched these ethical theories.169 Annas, therefore, argues that virtue ethics has developed beyond the stage of resurgence to a “recognized ethical approach.”170 In consonance with Annas, this research employs neo-Aristotelian (also called contemporary) virtue ethics as an independent and alternative ethical theory on which its ethical claims are built. Our next task, however, is to describe precisely what we mean by contemporary virtue ethics and the ways in which it is neo-Aristotelian. 1.3.3 Neo-Aristotelian or Contemporary Virtue Ethics: What? Why? How? Aristotle’s ethics, as discussed above, has “set the contemporary virtue ethics movement on its course.”171 A history of contemporary virtue ethics could be said to begin with Aristotle or even earlier with Plato. However, to describe contemporary virtue ethics as simply a return to the classical virtue ethics, as proposed by Annas, is to ignore its distinctive contents, contours, and nuances.172 Sanford argues, therefore, that contemporary virtue ethics is not just a return to or a revival of ancient Greco-Roman virtue ethics, but is a movement that is continually being shaped by the very questions of their counterpart and rival temporary society is in moral crisis, the rise of historical consciousness, and the failure of modern ethical systems to provide a comprehensive picture of human moral experience (The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 6). 165 Van Hooft, “Introduction,” 2. 166 Annas, “Virtue Ethics,” 533. 167 Annas, “Virtue Ethics,” 533. 168 “Third way” in Annas’ words (Annas, “Virtue Ethics,” 533). 169 Annas, “Virtue Ethics,” 533. 170 Annas, “Virtue Ethics,” 533. 171 Sanford, Before Virtue, 46. 172 Sanford, Before Virtue, 52.

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moral theories such as deontology, consequentialism, and the like  – which it seeks to replace or displace as the dominant ethical theory. This is evident, argues Sanford, in the way that most scholarly writings by contemporary virtue ethicists are polemical in nature, responding to already advanced and anticipated criticisms. To this extent, the so-called revival of virtue ethics in the 1950s is, according to Sanford, rather than a revival of classical virtue ethics, something new, namely “an Anglo-American response to the dominant features of AngloAmerican moral philosophy,” while it partially recovers classical virtue ethics in the process.173 As Sanford observes, while contemporary Christian virtue ethics, as a variety of contemporary virtue ethics in general, engages with and draws from the works of their secular counterparts, the contemporary secular virtue ethicists ignore the numerous works on virtue ethics among Christian virtue ethicists. For example, the virtue concepts of Aquinas, such as his differentiating natural from spiritual or infused virtues and the role of the grace of God in acquiring and practicing the virtues is hardly pursued by the majority of contemporary secular virtue ethicists. Some of them even argue that virtue ethics is a completely secular territory, and the Christian doctrines of original sin, grace, divine law, supernatural happiness, and the like, place it at odds with any virtue-ethical theorizing.174 On the contrary, Sanford argues that “given the historical continuity between the classical and contemporary world provided by Christian moral theorizing, calls to jettison Christian-influenced moral philosophy are, among other things, paradoxical.”175 On the basis of their differences, according to Sanford, contemporary virtue ethics needs to be distinguished from Aristotelian and Thomistic virtue ethics, because contemporary virtue ethics draws from a vast number of other ethical approaches like Humean, Kantian, Nietzchean, and so on. And the presence of these different ethical traditions in the different accounts of contemporary virtue ethics gives a clue to identifying what and how precisely contemporary virtue ethics is.176 What is noticeable from Sanford’s description of contemporary virtue ethics is that he overstretches its distinction from Aristotle’s virtue ethics. However, a glance through the body of literature on virtue ethics by current scholars, as diverse as they may be, seem to counteract Sanford’s argument. To the extent that current virtue ethicists still emphasize character, habits, moral

173 Sanford,

Before Virtue, 53. Before Virtue, 56–57. Sanford mentions this, citing the arguments by and in Annette Baier, Postures of the Mind: Essays on Mind and Morals (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985); and also Richard Taylor’s Virtue Ethics: An Introduction (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2002). 175 Sanford, Before Virtue, 57, n. 13. 176 Sanford, Before Virtue, 57. 174 Sanford,

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telos, moral agency and the like, as the pillars of virtue ethics, contemporary virtue ethics is still more Aristotelian than not. Rosalind Hursthouse and Peter Sampson’s description of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics is more precise than Sanford’s. Hursthouse notes that contemporary virtue ethics is neo-Aristotelian in two senses: first, in the sense that its adherents are of the consensus that Aristotle’s negative position regarding slavery and women is wrong. Second, its adherents do not restrict themselves to Aristotle’s list of virtues, e. g. by now including charity, which Aristotle does not. Instead, it is Aristotelian to the extent that “it aims to stick pretty close to his ethical writings wherever else it can.”177 Similarly, Sampson asserts that virtue ethics is not a new theory but an old one, and Aristotle is still held as its foremost exponent. On this basis, many contemporary virtue ethicists regard themselves as Aristotelians because they adhere to his fundamental ideas, but describe themselves as neo-Aristotelians as a protest against some of Aristotle’s conclusions or positions which seem to endorse, for example, slavery and unequal treatment of women. Moreover, neoAristotelian virtue ethicists differ from Aristotle in that they do not articulate the connection between virtue and politics as Aristotle does.178 Nevertheless, neoAristotelian virtue ethicists cover a broader scope than Aristotle, especially with the recent focus on contextual virtue ethics in relation to professional roles,179 religious groups, ethnic groups and cultures, and the like. While this study acknowledges some differences between Aristotelian and neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, it, however, understands and employs the terms neo-Aristotelian or contemporary virtue ethics in more ways than the ones described by Sanford, Hursthouse, and Sampson above, due mainly to its distinctive focus on a biblical text within a Christian tradition. The contemporary virtue ethics and its characteristics employed in this research is neo-Aristotelian in the way that it uses Aristotelian insights as a lens to reading a biblical text virtue-ethically, something which Aristotle himself did not do, neither did he construct his account of virtue with any known biblical text or concept in view. Second, it is neo-Aristotelian because it not only engages with secular neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicists but also engages with the theological virtue ethicists as well, integrating their ideas of virtue in reading Titus virtue-ethically. The pre177 Rosalind

Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 8. Sampson, “Contemporary Virtue Ethics and Aristotle,” in Virtue Ethics: A Critical Reader, ed. Daniel Statman (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997), 245–259, here 245. Ottfried Höffe notes that Aristotle knows two types of practical sciences, namely, ethics and politics. See Ottfried Höffe, “Einführung,” in Praktische Philosophie. Das Modell des Aristoteles (Berlin and Boston: de Gruyter, 2012), 1–35, here 22. 179 Tom Wright, Virtue Reborn (London: SPCK, 2010), ix, notes that over the last few years, the idea of virtue “has been making a come back in popular writing and thinking,” and people in different professional organizations are now talking about how to develop virtue instead of simply providing a set of rules to be blindly followed in form of professional ethics. 178 Peter

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vious interpretations and application of Aristotle’s concepts in biblical or theological ethics have also been considered in this research. Moreover, it is my opinion that even the temporal and chronological distance between Aristotle and us, and the different set of questions and moral quandaries we face, are themselves enough to describe our engagement with Aristotle’s virtue concepts as neo-Aristotelian, even if we try to understand and apply his insights without reservations. One may wonder why this research adopts contemporary neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics in reading a biblical text that is itself obviously not a “contemporary text” (regarding its time of writing) rather than adopting Aristotle’s virtue concept directly, thereby dealing with both texts of antiquity? Five reasons underpin the adoption of the neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics rather than Aristotle’s virtue concept directly. First, it adopts neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics because it is of broader scope than Aristotle’s ethics, having been adapted, expanded, and applied to different contexts over time. Such a broader scope reflects the complexities of (and therefore make it more suitable for dealing with) biblical ethics on the one hand, and contemporary Christian ethics on the other, both to which this study seeks to contribute. Second, neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics is adopted because, even though now broader in scope than Aristotle’s virtue concept and the identified virtues, it still retains many central insights of Aristotle, such that its Aristotelian shape is easily noticeable. Hence, adopting neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics enables this research to gain from Aristotle’s insights as well as gain from its subsequent development up to this time. Third, being a study that seeks to build bridges between biblical studies and virtue ethics theory, or between biblical scholars and virtue ethicists, it is more appropriate to engage with the contemporary virtue ethicists “in their own terms.” Fourth, since a section of this study seeks to apply its findings to a contemporary lived ethical context in Africa, it is beneficial to adopt contemporary virtue ethics, as described above. Fifth, adopting a strictly Aristotelian virtue concept would restrict or hinder this study from engaging with Christian virtue ethics, which has developed since the time of Aristotle. Christian virtue ethics, developed by Augustine, Aquinas, and many others, all fall under the neo-Aristotelian virtue concept. Ignoring such a large body of knowledge on Christian virtue ethics that has a direct relevance to this study in favor of a strictly Aristotelian virtue ethics would be a deficit, rather than an advantage to this study. As noted above, notwithstanding, contemporary virtue ethicists seem to have ignored the considerable work done on virtue ethics by Christian or theological virtue ethicists. The implication of such a lack of interest to any study in biblical virtue ethics, such as this study, is that while one draws the main concepts and contours of virtue ethics theory from both the secular and theological virtue ethicists, one has to rely more on the theological virtue ethicists when dealing with the actual analysis of the forms and functions of specific virtue-ethical

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norms in any given biblical text. This is the case in this study,180 which is why we will now give an overview of the discussions on virtue ethics in NT and contemporary Christian ethics. 1.3.4 Virtue Ethics in NT Ethics and Current Christian Ethics Friedrich W. Horn discusses the concept of virtue in the NT, including the PE,181 in a concise and clear manner, and points out some problems that a NT construct of virtue would need to take note of. We shall, therefore, report Horn’s work briefly for its relevance to this research, before mentioning what other scholars have noted about virtue ethics in the NT. Horn notes that the term ἀρετή appears only four times in the NT (Phil 4:8; 1 Pet 2:9; 2 Pet 1:3, 5).182 In reference to the list of virtues in 2 Pet 1:5–7, Horn gives important arguments that apply also to the list of virtues in Titus 2:12–14; 3:3–7, regarding the theological grounding of the virtues. He notes that based on 2 Pet 1:4, Christians will participate in the divine nature of God in the future. However, in the interim, they have fled or are fleeing the corrupt and perishable desires of the world. The virtues, therefore, are “entweder der Modus des Entfliehens aus der Vergänglichkeit und stehen der Begierde gegenüber, oder aber sie sind bereits die Lebensform des neuen Standes im Glauben, allerdings noch vor der endgültigen Vergottung.”183 The explicit grounding of the virtues on the Christ-event in Titus 2:12–14 and the “we were” but now “we are”184 rhetoric 180 Nevertheless, I hope that my engaging secular ethical terminology like ethical norms, moral agency, ethical argumentation, and so on, makes it easier for non-theological virtue ethicists to engage with this work. 181 Nevertheless, the methodology adopted in this research, the detailed nature of it, and the single focus on the letter to Titus gives this research a different approach to Horn’s. 182 See Horn, “Tugendlehre im Neuen Testament?” 417–420, for the history of reception of the virtue theory in Hellenistic Judaism and the use of the concept in German NT ethics studies. Horn notes that while virtue theory functioned in the ethics of the surrounding cultures of the NT world, it does not play any significant role in NT writings. See ibid, 420–424, for a discussion on the use of ἀρετή and the virtue concept in other parts of the NT, apart from the PE. What is of special relevance to this research is the way Horn notices the positive reception of the virtue concept in early Christianity and the connection between the virtues and faith. He notes specifically that the “Begriff und Sache sind also unbestritten positiv aufgenommen” (ET: “concept and matter are therefore undisputedly, positively received”) in which case, “faith produces virtue, which is moral excellence.” See ibid, 422, citing J. Daryl Charles, Virtue admidst Vice. The Catalog of Virtues in 2 Peter 1, JSNT.S 150 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997), 156. In the letter to Titus, the virtue concept and the virtues are explicitly grounded on the Christ-event. 183 Horn, “Tugendlehre im Neuen Testament?” 421 (ET: “either the mode of escaping from transience and confronting (sinful) desires, or they are already the way of life of the new status or state in faith, but before the final deification.” 184 Westerholm describes this change in Titus 3:5–7 as “regeneration.” Stephen Westerholm, Law and Ethics in Early Judaism and the New Testament, WUNT 383 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2017), 304.

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of Titus 3:3–7 suggests that the virtues are not only instruments of fleeing from the corrupt desires of the world, but much more. They are already the new way of living as believers in Christ. Nevertheless, in the interim between this new reality through the Christ-event and the coming Parousia, the “grace” keeps teaching believers to say no to ungodliness and worldly desires, and to live selfcontrolled, just, and godly lives. With specific reference to the PE, Horn notes that we encounter “eine umfängliche185 Tugendethik, auch wenn der Begriff ἀρετή fehlt.”186 He argues that εὐσέβεια replaces ἀρετή in the virtue concept of the Pastorals. “Εὐσέβεια umschließt den religiösen und den ethisch-moralischen Bereich, ist auf ‘die Pietät, die Ehrfurcht, das Gott wohlgefällige Verhalten’187 bezogen und ist daher so etwas wie der Zentralbegriff der Theologie der Pastoralbriefe.”188 Similarly, Jens Herzer notes that the term εὐσέβεια in 2 Timothy and Titus describe “die christologisch begründete Lebenshaltung.”189 Similar to Horn, Ian J. H. McDonald’s statement regarding the study of ἀρετή in the NT is significant. McDonald observes that “when we enquire more closely of the specifically moral denotations of ἀρετή in the NT, we need to distinguish between the use of the term ἀρετή and [its] field of reference.”190 This implies that the notion of virtue could be conveyed or even intended where 185 As to the reason for the prevalence and positive acceptance of Hellenistic virtue theory in the PE, Horn finds Dibelius’s christliche Bürgerlichkeit thesis “zu einfach und wirkt geradezu plakativ” (Horn, “Tugendlehre im Neuen Testament?” 425–246 [ET: “too simple and too pithy”]), citing A. Standhartinger, “Eusebeia in den Pastoralbriefen. Ein Beitrag zum Einfluss römischen Denkens auf das entstehende Christentum,” NovT 48 (2006): 51–82. He notes that current research is searching for the influence of Roman ethics as the possible influence on the Pastorals in this regard. The influence is especially that of the Roman custom of publicly praising deserving citizens. 186 Horn, “Tugendlehre im Neuen Testament?” 424 (ET: “ample references to virtue ethics, even though the term ἀρετή is missing”). While Horn notes the absence of ἀρετή, its replacement with εὐσέβεια, and the reason for using εὐσέβεια frequently in the PE, he does not specifically suggest the reason why the author avoids the term ἀρετή itself. This research argues, nevertheless, that the author avoids the term ἀρετή because, being the umbrella term for the virtues, its use would overshadow the Christian distinctives he sought to introduce to the concept of virtue. This is why he resorted to using one of the key virtues, namely, εὐσέβεια, in place of ἀρετή. 187 Horn, “Tugendlehre im Neuen Testament?” who cites Schrage, Ethik, 266. 188 Horn, “Tugendlehre im Neuen Testament?” 425 (ET: “Εὐσέβεια encompasses the religious and the ethical-moral domain, is related to ‘piety, reverence, behavior pleasing to God’ and is therefore something like the central concept of the theology of the Pastoral Epistles”). Horn notes also that εὐσέβεια appears in both Greek literature and Hellenistic Judaism. 189 J. Herzer, “Das Geheimnis der Frömmigkeit (1 Tim 3, 16) – Sprache und Stil der Pastoralbriefe im Kontext hellenistisch-römischer Popularphilosophie,” ThQ 187 (2007): 309–329, here 326, cited in Horn, “Tugendlehre im Neuen Testament?” 425 (ET: “the christologically based way of life”). 190 McDonald, The Crucible of Christian Morality: Religion in the First Christian Centuries (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 201.

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ἀρετή may not necessarily appear as a word.191 On this basis, McDonald finds in Titus 2:12 an absence of the word ἀρετή, but the presence of the concept. He describes παιδεία in the verse as a “training course in moral formation.”192 One could, therefore, say that the case in Titus 2:12 is a Christian version of the Greek “civilization,” which could be described as “Christianization.” However, the agent which does the teaching is “the grace of God” and the trainees are exclusively believers. In this way, the author presents a Christian version of the means of acquiring virtue. Horn argues that one difference between the Pastorals and Paul’s letters is in the way the Pastorals use δικαιοσύνη as a virtue while Paul uses it as grace imparted through faith in Christ.193 However, an exception needs to be made to Horn’s argument. Titus 3:5 explicitly states that the kindness and love of God appeared and saved the believers οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων τῶν ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ ἃ ἐποιήσαμεν ἡμεῖς “not because of the righteous things/works we had done,” but because of his mercy.194 In this case, we find a Pauline concept of δικαιοσύνη in the Pastorals. Horn rightly argues that the Pauline account of virtue was a critique of the Hellenistic virtue concept as personal competence, skills, practices, dispositions, and character necessary for achieving the conceived good or flourishing. The absence of the term εὐδαιμονία “happiness or flourishing” in the whole NT attests to the fact that the NT distances itself from the Hellenistic virtue concept 191  This precisely describes and even justifies our approach of reading the letter to Titus virtue-ethically, even though the word ἀρετή does not occur therein, see Jens Herzer, “‘These Things Are Excellent And Profitable To Everyone’ (Titus 3:8): The Kindness of God as Paradigm for Ethics,” in Character Ethics and the New Testament: Moral Dimensions of Scripture, ed. Robert L. Brawley (London: Westminster John Knox Press, 2007), 131. 192 McDonald, The Crucible of Christian Morality, 201. He notes further that the negative aspect of renouncing the ungodliness and worldly desires in Titus 2:12, which is a product of παιδεία, echoes the philosophical concerns for the control of passion, and in this case may be referring back to honoring the vows the believers had taken in baptism. The linguistic support for McDonald is the fact that the verb ἀρνησάμενοι is an aorist participle, “having renounced,” which could refer to the single decisive event of baptism. Walter L. Liefeld, 1 and 2 Timothy, Titus, The NIV Application Commentary (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1999), 339, notes that the παιδεία cognate used in Titus 2:12 is the “comprehensive Greek term for education. It connotes a disciplined kind of formation or training for life.” He notes that even the term “training” fails to translate all the elements of παιδεία in Greek. He argues further that the dual purposes of παιδεία described in Titus 2:12, namely, renouncing ungodliness and worldly desires on the one hand, and living a self-controlled, just, and godly life on the other, demonstrates the meaning of παιδεία in Greek better than any English word can communicate. 193 Horn, “Tugendlehre im Neuen Testament?” 425. 194 Thomas C. Oden, First and Second Timothy and Titus, Interpretation (Louisville: John Knox Press, 1989), 36, citing Gordon D. Fee, 1 and 2 Timothy and Titus, A Good News Commentary (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1984), 156, interprets Titus 3:4–7 as follows: “his own mercy” as the basis of salvation; new birth, “new life, put right with God” as the what of salvation; “through the Holy Spirit which God poured out abundantly through Jesus Christ ” as the means or how of salvation; “the eternal life hoped for” as the goal of salvation.

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of human flourishing linguistically and conceptually.195 For Paul, wholeness or flourishing is not about self-improvement or achieving happiness. Rather, wholeness or flourishing is connected to God.196 According to Horn, Paul also rejects that the concepts of virtue in the Torah and in Hellenistic Greek ethics could make one virtuous. The Law and all human efforts to be virtuous fail because of the power of sin which leads to death. Instead, it is the Spirit of God that believers received through or during baptism that makes it possible to live a virtuous life.197 This does not mean, however, that Paul does not employ virtue terms and themes. Even though he occasionally employs virtue vocabulary and themes, the zentrales Anliegen, mittels der Tugenden die eigene Persönlichkeit auszubilden und in der Tugend das Glück oder einen Weg zum Glück zu finden, bewegt ihn jedoch nicht … Die gelegentliche Rezeption des Inventars der antiken Tugendethik ist vornehmlich auf Werte und Normen der Gemeindeethik, nicht aber des Individuums bezogen.198

Horn further notes that the closest Paul gets to the concept of virtue or its parallel is the fact that he is also interested in the character traits of the moral agents or subjects that form the basis of their actions, and not in the morality of the actions themselves.199 The similar emphasis of the letter to Titus on moral “being” more than “doing,” as we shall discuss below, corresponds with Paul’s virtue concept in this regard. Moreover, by introducing divine agency200 (the “grace” teaching us) in the virtue concept connected to the cardinal virtues (Titus 2:12) and the baptismal formula (Titus 3:3–7), the letter to Titus follows Paul in demonstrating 195 Horn,

“Tugendlehre im Neuen Testament?” 427. Gott und das Glück. Das Schicksal des guten Lebens im Christentum (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2004), 38f, cited in Horn, “Tugendlehre im Neuen Testament?” 426–427. According to Lauster, Paul argues for “einen Zusammenhang zwischen Gott und Glück” (ET: “a connection between God and happiness”). 197 Horn, “Tugendlehre im Neuen Testament?” 428–429. 198 Horn, “Tugendlehre im Neuen Testament?” 430–431. ET: “however, he is not moved by the central concern to develop one’s own personality by means of the virtues and to find happiness or a way to happiness in virtue. … The occasional reception of the inventory of ancient virtue ethics is primarily related to values and norms of community ethics, but not of the individual.”). 199 Horn, “Tugendlehre im Neuen Testament?” 431. 200  Alfred Plummer, The Pastoral Epistles, The Expositor’s Bible Commentary, 3rd ed. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, Paternoster, 1891), 282, describes Titus 3:4–7 as a cooperation of divine persons in effecting a new birth of the believer, which he also describes as regeneration. Similarly, Aquinas (Timothy, Titus, and Phhilemon, 188–189) comments that regeneration in this verse means renovation, through which humans participate in the divine nature and are able to abandon the old ways of life. The new nature given through regeneration “is added unto our nature, which still remains.” Gottfried Holtz, Die Pastoralbriefe, Theologischer Handkommentar zum Neuen Testament 13 (Berlin: Evangelische Verlangsanstalt, 1965), 226, also describes the teaching role of God’s grace here as not the teaching of the law as in Gal 3:24 f., but a “pneumatischen göttlichen Unterricht” (ET: “godly pneumatic teaching”). 196 J. Lauster,

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that personal self-improvement, moral education for character development, and laws do not make one virtuous. The Christ-event does. The “grace,” being the ethical representation of the Christ-event,201 continues to teach the believer to live a virtuous life. One difference we could note, however, between the virtue concept of Titus and that of Paul as presented by Horn, is that Titus does not explicate the conception of virtue as “Gemeindeethik” (“community ethic”) over and above its individual implications. Regarding its suitability for biblical studies, James F. Keenan states three arguments why virtue ethics is the best approach to biblical or theological ethics as follows: first, virtue ethics fits the narrative of the NT and can explain how the story of Jesus, in particular, shapes the moral character of individuals and communities. Second, virtue ethics attends to the deeper level of moral existence Jesus addresses in his teachings, namely, the heart, the personal center of convictions, emotions, and commitment. Third, virtue ethics fits the common mode of moral discourse in the NT as “paradigms that establish certain patterns of disposition that guide action.”202 Moreover, Gilbert Meilaender notes that virtue ethics, being an ethic that concerns itself mainly with the person rather than works, is likely to be of interest to Christian thinkers. One of the reasons for such interest is that virtue ethics does not attend to the hard cases life presents but to the “continuities of life – traits of life developed over time and (relatively) stable over time.”203 Another reason for such an interest is virtue ethics’s likeliness to focus on spiritual disciplines on the basis that they contribute to making believers the persons they are or should be.204 William C. Spohn also asserts that “the most adequate ethical approach to Scripture is that of character and virtue ethics.”205 Furthermore, in terms of its viability as an ethical theory compared to deontological, consequentialist, and utilitarian theories, many scholars have described virtue ethics as the most appropriate way to approach morality in general and to approach scriptural ethics in particular. Spohn, for example, says virtue ethics “provides the most comprehensive account of moral experience and … it stands closer to the issues of moral life … with its attention to character, [it] is the appropriate way to approach scripture since it discloses the character of 201 Hutson describes “grace” here as “an abstract metaphor for the Christ-event.” Christopher R. Hutson, First and Second Timothy and Titus. Paideia (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2019), 232. 202 James F. Keenan, A History of Catholic Moral Theology in the Twentieth Century: From Confessing Sins to Liberating Consciences (London and New York: Continuum, 2010), 76, citing William C. Spohn, Go and Do Likewise: Jesus and Ethics (New York and London: Continuum, 2003), 28. 203 Gilbert Meilaender, “Christian Theology: Ethics,” in The Blackwell Companion to Paul, ed. Stephen Westerholm (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2014), 584. 204 Meilaender, “Christian Theology: Ethics,” 584. 205 William C. Spohn, “Scripture,” in The Oxford Handbook of Theological Ethics, ed. Gilbert Meilaender and William Werpehowski (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 94.

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God.”206 Similarly, Robert B. Louden notes that in virtue ethics, “more emphasis will be placed on the development of character and on acquiring requisite skills of judgment and perception, and less will be placed on intellectualistic efforts to resolve quandaries that confront adults after their characters are set.”207 Virtue ethics’s focus on the condition of the heart or the inner dispositions, motives, and character development or enrichment significantly mark and set it apart as a more promising moral theory than other approaches. Van Hooft rightly says virtue ethics is concerned with “the enrichment and deepening of our lives as sensitive and deliberative individuals and as responsible members of society.”208 Kotva also describes virtue ethics as a “proactive ethical theory.”209 Similarly, Harrington and Keenan say virtue ethics is a “pro-active system of ethics … concerned with the ordinary, and all-encompassing.”210 While dilemma-based ethical theories present ethics as an “emergency room” and the moral agent is little more than a reactor to other people’s dilemmas such as abortion, euthanasia, etc., virtue ethics instead moves ahead with less “glamour” and “drama,” seeing the agent not as a reactor but an actor.211 From a Christian ethical point of view, Wayne Grudem notes that “a Christian ethical system should emphasize virtue ethics because the Bible teaches that we should seek to develop a Christlike character.”212 For example, Rom 8:29 talks about believers being “conformed to the image of his Son”; and 1 Cor 11:1 talks about being imitators of Paul, as he imitates Christ. Similarly, 2 Pet 1:5 urges believers to make every effort to supplement their faith with ἀρετή “virtue.”213 Grudem notes, however, that Christian ethics is a combination of deontological, teleological, and virtue-ethical moral insights: deontological because it defines right and wrong based on the rules God has given in Scripture; teleological because it seeks a good result, which is, to do everything to the glory of God; and virtue-ethical because it seeks to develop Christlike character in each person.214

206 Spohn,

Go and Do Likewise, 27–28.

207 Robert B. Louden, “Virtue Ethics,” in Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics, ed. Ruth Chadwick,

2nd ed. (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2012), 4:509. 208 Stan Van Hooft, “Introduction,” in The Handbook of Virtue Ethics, 3. 209 Chan, Biblical Ethics in the 21st Century, 84, citing Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 39. 210 Harrington and Keenan, Paul and Virtue Ethics, 5–6. 211 Harrington and Keenan, Paul and Virtue Ethics, 5–6. 212 Wayne Grudem, Christian Ethics: An Introduction to Biblical Moral Reasoning (Wheaton: Crossway, 2018), 42. Grudem defines ethical virtues or character traits as “habitual inward dispositions to act, feel, respond, and think in morally good ways” (ibid., 108, 1246). See ibid., 110–113, for Grudem’s selected list of Christlike character traits in the NT, many of which feature in the letter to Titus, e. g. love, peace, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness, selfcontrol, hope, perseverance or endurance, hospitality, humility, godliness, holiness, and the like. 213 Grudem, Christian Ethics, 42. 214 Grudem, Christian Ethics, 43.

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Grudem further notes that to his best knowledge, the OT does not have a “compact set of instructions on virtue ethics” like the NT passages that emphasize moral virtues such as love, humility, forgiveness, faith, joy, steadfastness, and the like (Gal 5:22–23; Eph 4:31–32; Phil 4:8–9; Col 3:12–17, etc.).215 Hence, he concludes that the high level of emphasis of the NT on inward moral virtues fits well with the new covenant as opposed to the old covenant of the OT, because the message of the new covenant as reflected in the NT is written “not on tablets of stone but on tablets of human hearts” (2 Cor 3:3).216 Despite his identification of virtue-ethical insights in the Bible, Grudem gives a word of caution that while biblical ethics could have similarities with Greek philosophical ethics, their ethical values are not the same. To explain these different ethical values, he quotes Robert C. Roberts, who is worth quoting here as well: Some things that are true of Christian hope may not be true of Marxist hope; what is true of Christian peace may not be true of Stoic equanimity; what is true of Christian courage may not be true of Aristotelian courage. The way a mature Christian handles his fear (namely, his courage) will essentially involve his belief that God is present and trustworthy; thus it will depend on the practice of prayer and the experience of the Holy Spirit. Since the Aristotelian neither practices prayer, nor believes that God is present, nor has any experience of the Holy Spirit, his courage is not the same trait as the Christian’s.217

From a theological perspective, Jean Porter notes that some theologians, following Stanley Hauerwas’s lead, are beginning to reflect on some specific virtues that are particularly Christian in character. Moreover, some Protestant theologians are beginning to explore virtue ethics as a viable approach to how the experience of God’s grace could formulate individual and communal aspects of life. Porter then makes an inviting observation when he says that although much distinguished work has been done in the revival process of virtue ethics so far, “the Christian tradition of the virtues still offers many unexplored possibilities for theological ethics.”218 This study explores one of those “many unexplored” areas in biblical and theological virtue ethics studies, with particular focus on the letter to Titus. Similarly, Jonathan R. Wilson rightly observes a gap in virtue ethics research and notes that while the virtue approach to ethics is being retrieved among Christian ethicists and they are now reading Scripture more attentively, and even though it is beginning to make some impact, such retrieval is still in its early stage within biblical studies. He, therefore, sees hope 215 Grudem,

Christian Ethics, 244–245. Christian Ethics, 244–245. 217 Grudem, Christian Ethics, 108, citing R. C. Roberts, “Character,” in New Dictionary of Christian Ethics and Pastoral Theology, ed. David J. Atkinson and David H. Field (Leicester, UK: InterVarsity, and Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1995), 66. 218 Jean Porter, “Virtue Ethics,” in The Cambridge Companion to Virtue Ethics, ed. Robin Gill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 108. 216 Grudem,

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in some “cross-fertilization” between the fields of Christian ethics and biblical scholarship.219 The inter-disciplinary nature of this research involves virtue ethics, biblical studies, and Christian ethics, thereby contributing to this “crossfertilization.” The consideration of character in contemporary Christian ethics is built on the traditional claim that “faith in Christ along with God’s grace have a transforming effect on human nature in general and on each Christian in particular, and that such transformation is at least potentially visible over time in individuals and communities.”220 Therefore, the role of community, for example the Christian community, in character development is vital. The community provides the stories, judgments, convictions, examples and exemplars of the good life, which are deeply rooted in the historical developments of the community. The community that values its history and wants its stories and moral vocabulary appropriated perpetually “will charge certain members with the proclamation, teaching, and evocation of normative stories and with responsibilities in assisting its members with their attempts at character development.”221 However, the concept of community itself could be ambiguous in many ways due to the different levels and social contexts one could describe as community. It could be construed in local, small, or broad terms. One way to understand community is to use the analogy of character of individuals. Just like different individuals have different characters, sometimes similar, but sometimes significantly different, so also “community might also be said to have character itself.”222 This understanding narrows the concept of community to be a group of people defined by some shared biological, cultural, religious, and other commonalities that inform their perception of their identity and solidarity. Since the argument as to what a “Christian community” is falls outside the purview of this book, it suffices to simply use the term “community” or “Christian community,” broadly stated. Nevertheless, the virtue-ethical norms analyzed here could be appropriated into various local contexts. Chapter four illustrates such an appropriation into an African context.

219 Jonathan R. Wilson, “Virtue(s),” in Dictionary of Scripture and Ethics, ed. Joel B. Green (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2011), 811. 220 Richard Bondi, “Character,” in The Westminster Dictionary of Christian Ethics, ed. James F. Childress and John Macquarrie (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986), 83. 221 Bondi, “Character,” 83. In our reading of Titus, we will show how Titus is primarily the one the author assigns this responsibility, and the elders and bishops to assist in that. This is why he instructs Titus to teach and be an example. Other people instructed to teach are elderly women, men, and church elders. Sound doctrine is the author’s description of the history or tradition of the faith community, which must be diligently taught for character development of the members. 222 Bondi, “Character,” 83.

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1.3.5 Characteristics of Virtue Ethics This study employs the following characteristics of virtue ethics, garnered from the overview of virtue ethics discussed above: a) Teleology Wilson rightly observes that teleology is perhaps the central insight in the virtue ethics tradition. Telos in the virtue tradition “identifies the purpose or end for which we are made.”223 Virtue and the virtues require “a sense of a telos of human existence, of some good, to which the virtues contribute, that gains its intelligibility from a community’s concrete life.”224 Virtue as well as the virtues essentially entail a teleological account of human life.225 The sense of a moral goal leading to human good or excellence, which the individual and the community move towards through the acquisition and practicing of the virtues, gives virtue ethics a particular teleological structure. The teleological structure of virtue ethics is particular and dynamic in nature in the sense that it is not only concerned with “who we are,” but also with “who we could become.” The three central questions in virtue ethics, as noted above, give virtue ethics a unique teleological structure: Who am I? Who ought I to become? And how do I get there? Or what ought I do (in order to get there)?226 In this framework, practices or actions are only “transformative virtuous acts.”227 The human telos involves human activities that are made possible by the virtues and are at the same time consistent with the virtues. Such activities are performed for their own sake and for the sake of the human good.228 The telos in virtue theory is regarded as the best kind of life humans could live, both at the individual and communal levels.229 223  Wilson, “Virtue(s),” 812. Also see Romanus Cessario, Introduction to Moral Theology (Washington DC.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2001), 183–191. 224 Stanley Hauerwas, “Virtue,” in The Westminster Dictionary of Christian Ethics, ed. James F. Childress and John Macquarrie (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986), 648–650. 225  Hauerwas, “Virtue,” 648–650. 226 See Bert Musschenga, “Narrative Theology and Narrative Ethics,” in Does Religion Matter Morally? A Critical Reappraisal of the Thesis of Morality’s Independence from Religion, ed. A. W. Musschenga (Kampen: Kok Pharos, 1995), 201, for a critique of these virtue-ethical questions. Musschenga argues that in a pluralistic society of today, each moral tradition is just one among many, and has to take into account other moral traditions. In this light, he criticizes Hauerwas’s narrative ethics of virtue, especially its central questions. He argues that “an ethics which takes the problems of plurality seriously cannot confine itself to the question ‘Who am I/who do I want to be?’ (or: ‘Who are we/do we want to be?’). Another ethical question must be added: Who am I/do I want to be among/together with others who think and act differently?’” The willingness to relate and live with people who think differently should become part of one’s identity too. 227 Chan, Biblical Ethics in the 21st Century, 83. 228 Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 38. 229 Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 38.

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Nonetheless, the virtue-ethical telos is not to be understood as a narrowed and restrictive telos. For a virtue-ethical telos, “a partially determinate notion of the human good is necessary … but the telos need not be narrowly or restrictively defined. The human good can be understood in a way that allows for many forms of life and ways of embodying the virtues.”230 b) Concern with Human Good or Human Flourishing A virtue is instrumental to the human good, which is conceived as individual and corporate.231 Relationships and corporate activities are essential to the true human telos itself and the journey towards realizing it. The individual needs others to learn virtues from.232 Moreover, some of the virtues are by nature social, for example, hospitality, justice, generosity, and the like.233 c) Focus on Moral Character and its Development Virtue ethics focuses on moral character of persons and its development, and therefore prioritizes “being” over “doing.” In this framework, virtues are regarded as acquired dispositions and habits that include both “tendencies to react in characteristic ways in similar and related settings … [and] all those states of character or character traits that influence how we act and choose.”234 Character development and the practices of persons and community are important aspects of the theory. Virtue ethics, like any other ethics, recommends actions, but first recommends the kind of persons we should become, which should inform the choices and actions we take to lead us to becoming virtuous persons. In virtue ethics, “one’s being is formed in and through ‘doing,’ and while ‘being’ paves the way for ‘doing,’ ‘doing’ shapes ‘being’”235 in a virtuous, not vicious, circle.236 Its focus on moral persons and their character development more than moral actions gives room for discernment in virtue ethics.237 d) Perfectionism Virtue ethics bears a kind of perfectionism. Its perfectionist structure is in two ways. On the one hand, it is perfectionist in the sense of regarding moral progress as continuous throughout lifetime. The moral agent does not attend 230 Kotva,

The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 38. The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 108. 232 Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 108. 233 Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 108. 234 Chan, Biblical Ethics in the 21st Century, 84, citing Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 24. 235 Chan, Biblical Ethics in the 21st Century, 84. 236 Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 38. 237 Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 39. 231 Kotva,

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moral perfection, because there is always room for improvement. Nevertheless, this kind of perfectionism does not mandate “an impossible ideal. Instead, the telos is always before us, always calling us toward a fuller realization of the best life for humans to live.”238 On the other hand, it is perfectionist in the sense that it regards all aspects of life as morally relevant and it continuously calls everyone to growth in all aspects of life.239 Virtue ethics is, therefore, a proactive ethical theory that involves one’s entire life and identity. Each knowingly performed moral action takes one a step further in becoming a certain kind of person. In its perfectionist structure, virtue ethics engages the commonplace, ordinary and day-to-day life rather than exceptional moral quandaries. e) Particularity or Exclusivity of Moral Agents Even though virtue ethicists concern themselves with the entirety of one’s life and issues of commonplace morality, they do not presume that everyone is or could be automatically virtuous. In other words, virtue ethics assumes that everyone could be or has the potential to be virtuous, but not everyone is virtuous at the same time and at the same level. Kotva rightly puts it thus, “virtue ethics does not assume that everyone has equal insight into every situation or that everyone’s voice should carry equal weight in every decision.”240 There are processes that lead to one being virtuous or more virtuous than another. Since virtue ethics is a person-oriented and not action-oriented ethics, its exclusivity is understandable or even justifiable. One way to identify a virtue-related moral agency is if the moral agency is exclusive or involves a group of people who have been trained, enabled, or have developed certain character traits that justify their moral expectations or standards. The emphasis of virtue theory on character development raises the standard of its agency, thereby making it exclusive. Jennifer A. Herdt identifies “particularity” as one of the varieties of contemporary Christian virtue ethics.241 Particularistic theological virtue ethics insists on the distinctive character of Christian virtues and argues that such virtues find intelligibility and relevance only within the shared Christian narrative, tradition and sense of telos.242 The particularists “reject the notion of a set of 238 Kotva,

The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 39. Biblical Ethics in the 21st Century, 84. See also Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 39. 240 Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 151. 241 This is worth including here because this research is within the premise of biblical and theological ethics. 242 Jennifer A. Herdt, “Varieties of Contemporary Christian Virtue Ethics,” in The Routledge Companion to Virtue Ethics, ed. Lorraine Besser-Jones and Michael Slote (New York and London: Routledge, 2015), 227, citing S. Hauerwas and W. Willimon, Resident Aliens (Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 1989), 78. 239 Chan,

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universal virtues grounded in human nature and basic natural inclinations.”243 Instead, virtue ethicists “emphasize the gradual, grace-enabled formation of Christian virtues and character through communal practices and narratives, notably through the liturgical and paraliturgical practices of the church.”244 The particularists see the Church, therefore, as the context for character formation.245 1.3.6 Working Definition of Virtue Ethics a) Virtue or Character Having given an overview and characteristics of virtue ethics above, we now turn to describing the working definition of virtue and virtue ethics that will undergird our inquiry in the letter to Titus. We start with a definition of the terms “virtue” or “character,” being the key term(s) in virtue ethics theory, before giving a working definition of virtue ethics for this research. Since this research is inter-disciplinary and does not intend to give a comprehensive account of virtue and virtue ethics or to argue for its place in biblical, theological and Christian ethics,246 it suffices to use the terms “virtue” and “character” interchangeably, despite the tendency to separate their slightly distinctive nuances in some contexts. This research regards “virtue” or “character” as an inner disposition,247 tendency, attitude, and ability to act in certain consistent patterns, which leads towards realizing individual and communal telos.248 243 Herdt,

“Varieties of Contemporary Christian Virtue Ethics,” 228. “Varieties of Contemporary Christian Virtue Ethics,” 227–228, citing S. Hauerwas and S. Wells, The Blackwell Companion to Christian Ethics (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2006), no page number given. 245 Herdt, “Varieties of Contemporary Christian Virtue Ethics,” 227–228. In addition to the characteristics of virtue ethics discussed above, Chan identifies four dimensions of virtue ethics to include: dispositions and character formation; practices and habits; moral exemplar; and community and community identity (Biblical Ethics in the 21st Century, 84–92). 246 For such a comprehensive work on virtue ethics, see Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics. 247 Spohn connects emotions with dispositions, that “emotions are the more conscious expressions of dispositions, which are habitual character dynamics that become motivations for specific actions” (Go and Do Likewise, 121). Spohn says emotions are the products of our cognitive evaluations of the import of events, people, and possibilities. They engage us with our surroundings and other people. However, emotions are different from sentiments. Sentiments are self-referential and not other-regarding. But emotions dispose and incline us towards an appropriate response. “Virtues have an emotional component because they are inclinations as well as abilities to act in certain ways” (Spohn, Go and Do Likewise, 121). For example, courageous people do not only have the ability to act courageously but are inclined or disposed to act courageously. Language, paradigmatic stories, significant memories as structured social expectations guide our dispositions (Spohn, Go and Do Likewise, 121). 248 See Spohn, Go and Do Likewise, 28, citing Lee H. Yearly, “Recent Work on Virtue,” Religious Studies Review 16 (1990), 2, for a similar definition: “A virtue is a disposition to act, desire and feel that involves the exercise of judgment and leads to a recognizable human ex244 Herdt,

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b) Virtue Ethics It is noteworthy also that the terms “virtue ethics” and “virtue theory” are used interchangeably in this research, notwithstanding the tendency to differentiate them in some cases. Most of the definitions and descriptions of virtue ethics as a theory, as observed from our discussion of various scholarly descriptions of the theory above, omit some vital aspects in virtue ethics discourse, for example, the sources and symbols of character.249 This research, therefore, gives a broader and more comprehensive working definition of virtue ethics as follows: Virtue ethics is a critical250 reflection on the source(s), sense(s), symbol(s), and service(s) of character in moral (trans)formation and function. This definition, hence, incorporates both the theoretical and practical aspects of virtue ethics. This definition develops into a methodology of studying the concept of virtue in African ethics in chapter four.

1.4 Methodological Framework of the Research: From “Implicit Ethics” to “Exegethics” It is helpful to state the research questions and hypothesis that undergird the use of this methodology before explaining the methodological approach of the study. a) Research Questions The main questions that guide this inquiry include the following: What ethical norms, concepts, or approaches are in the letter to Titus? How do those ethical norms, concepts, and approaches correspond to the virtue-ethical approach to ethics? Are the corresponding points explicit or implicit? On a more general level, must the Greek word for virtue ‘ἀρετή’ appear in a NT text before it qualifies to be described as a “virtue-ethical text”? What would it take to describe a biblical passage or text as “virtue-ethical”? Could the letter to Titus be described as a “virtue-ethical text?” cellence, an instance of human flourishing.” Spohn notes that different traditions and cultures give different meanings to the same virtues. For example, courage may refer to steadfastness in combat in one culture, and to following one’s conscience and convictions against social pressure in another (Spohn, God and Do Likewise, 28). He argues, therefore, that there are no universally agreed-upon virtues that are prevalent in all cultures or traditions, or that are valued the same way. 249 Considerations of the sources and symbols of character could prove helpful in understanding character or virtue in African ethics, as indicated in the Four S Schema methodology applied in chapter four. 250 “Critical” because it requires a scientific methodology and engagement. By “critical,” this research deliberately wants to shift from the simplistic descriptions of biblical ethics, e. g. the indicative and imperative proposal, which does not take complexities of moral discourse into account.

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b) Hypothesis The hypothesis of this research is thus: Even though the Greek word for virtue “ἀρετή”251 does not appear within the letter to Titus, the ethical perspective of the letter could correspond significantly to the virtue-ethical approach to ethics.252 The presence of virtue-ethical features implicitly and explicitly embedded in the linguistic elements, theological motifs, and ethical norms seem so prevalent and central that the letter to Titus could be rightly described as a “virtue-ethical text.” This hypothesis will be tested and its claims substantiated by analyzing the virtue-ethical features embedded in the linguistic, theological, and ethical aspects of the text under a fivefold methodological grid: the linguistic dimensions (intratextual, inter-textual, and extra-textual), moral agency, ethical argumentation, history of traditions, and range of application. These five models will be applied in reading σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, εὐσέβεια, καλὰ ἔργα, and the “household codes” in the letter to Titus virtue-ethically.

1.5 The “Implicit Ethics” This study adopts and adapts Ruben Zimmermann’s methodology for reading a biblical text ethically, known as “Implicit Ethics.”253 Before summarizing 251  Meaning moral excellence, goodness, redemptive acts, power (God). Barclay M. Newman Jr., A Concise Greek-English Dictionary of the New Testament (London: UBS, 1971), as used in the Translator’s Workplace (Software). 252 Wilson makes a profound statement by noting that even though there are not many biblical passages where “virtue” is an appropriate translation of the Hebrew or Greek, there are many biblical passages “calling us to the formation of perduring character traits through practices (or habits) directed toward a telos that participates in God’s redemptive work identified by the narrative of the gospel that forms a people” (“Virtue(s),” 811–812). Similarly, Ian H. McDonald makes a significant statement in regard to the study of ἀρετή in the NT, when he says “when we enquire more closely of the specifically moral denotations of ἀρετή in the NT, we need to distinguish between the use of the term ἀρετή and [its] field of reference” (The Crucible of Christian Morality, 201). This implies that the notion of virtue could be conveyed or even intended where ἀρετή may not necessarily appear as a word. It is about the concept, and not the word. On this basis, McDonald finds in Titus 2:12 an absence of the word ἀρετή, but the presence of the concept. He describes παιδεία in the verse as a “training course in moral formation.” 253  Ruben Zimmermann, “Ethics in the New Testament and Language: Basic Explorations and Eph 5:21–33 as Test Case,” in Moral Language in the New Testament: The Inter-relatedness of Language and Ethics in Early Christian Writings, ed. Ruben Zimmermann, Jan G. van der Watt, and Susanne Luther, WUNT 2/296, Kontexte und Normen neutestamentlicher Ethik 2 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 26. See also Zimmermann, “How to read Biblical Texts Ethically: The New Methods of ‘Implicit Ethics,’ in Dealing with Biblical Ethics” (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the SBL, San Diego, 23 November 2014). For a detailed explanation and illustrative application of all the models of “Implicit Ethics” in German, see Ruben Zimmermann, Die Logik der Liebe: Die ‘implizite Ethik’ der Paulusbriefe am Beispiel des 1. Korintherbriefs, Biblisch-Theologische Studien 162 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ru-

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Zimmermann’s methodology, it is helpful to describe the arguments that undergird his “Implicit Ethics” methodology. Zimmermann describes his model as “implicit” because what the biblical ethics reader seeks to do is to unearth both implicit and explicit ethical “properties”254 embedded in a biblical text. At the background of this concept of implicit ethics is Zimmermann’s conclusion that even though the Bible is a book of ethics, no biblical book or text presents an organized or reasoned ethical structure consistent with ethical theory of action. Such a structure has to be critically analyzed, recognized, and presented in forms consistent with modern ethical theories. In order to achieve this, Zimmermann presents eight (8) models or grids for reading a biblical text ethically. In other words, he presents eight ways to analyze and recognize ethical norms in biblical texts, summarized as follows:255 1.5.1 The Linguistic Form The first signal or pointer to an ethical property in a text is the language or the linguistic form of the ethical norm or maxim itself.256 An ethical reader’s task at this level is to identify the ethical properties or elements at three linguistic levels: intra-textual, inter-textual, and extra-textual levels. a) Intra-Textual Level Here, the ethical reader or the “exegetical ethicist”257 seeks to find out the grammatical imperatives in the text, which are common pointers to an ethical content. Zimmermann finds, as an example, the imperative ἀγαπᾶτε “love” in Ephesians 5:25 as an ethical norm which only applies to the husband, and ὑποτασσόμενοι “be submissive” as not an imperative, therefore not an ethical requirement (at least linguistically) for the wife to submit to her husband as it has been traditionally interpreted and translated.258 We shall discuss this further when discussing the household codes in chapter three below. precht, 2016), translated as The Logic of Love: Discovering Paul’s “Implicit Ethics” through 1 Corinthians, trans Dieter T. Roth (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2018). 254 My word (not Zimmermann’s), as a way of describing it “in my own words.” I include in “properties”any thing, person, idea, or element that relates to ethics in a text or context. 255 It is worth noting that since my task here is to provide a summary, I retain Zimmermann’s key terms, especially headings, while I try to explain the concepts in my own words, so as not to “distort” the central idea with new words and concepts that may not accountably represent Zimmermann’s methodology. 256 Zimmermann argues that language conveys ethical meaning, and ethics requires language (“Ethics in the New Testament and Language,” 28). For a detailed discussion of language and ethics in the “Implicit Ethics” methodology, see Zimmermann, Logic of Love, 32–42. 257 My own description of a biblical ethical reader who is simultaneously an exegete on the one hand and an ethicist on the other. 258 Zimmermann, “How to Read Biblical Texts Ethically,” 7. See Zimmermann, Logic of Love, 32–37, for a detailed discussion on the intra-textual function of imperatives.

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b) Inter-Textual Level Here, the reader seeks to understand the genre of the text in comparison with other similar texts in the Bible, paying attention to “longer passages of text and their intertextual connections rather than individual sentences.”259 The consideration of inter-textual dimensions to ethical norms and maxims helps the reader understand the commonality and/or peculiarity of the ethical message, which further helps in understanding the particular ethical posture of any given biblical text. It is noteworthy, however, that I use the term “inter-textual” in this research in a slightly different way from Zimmermann. While Zimmermann looks at longer passages of texts and their inter-textual connections instead of paying attention to individual sentences in different texts, I focus on individual sentences and even terminologies that are similar across the individual texts that constitute the Pastoral Epistles. In other words, Zimmermann looks at macro-inter-textual relations while I focus on the micro-inter-textual elements. Specifically, my use of “inter-textual” is basically in the context of the similarities and differences of terms, concepts, and sentences across 1 and 2 Timothy and Titus, comparing the use of σωφροσύν, δικαιοσύνη, εὐσέβεια, and καλὰ ἔργα in the three letters. Nevertheless, the only context in which I use the term “inter-textual” in the same way Zimmermann uses it is in my virtue-ethical reading of the “household codes” (Titus 2:1–10) as a genre or a pericope (rather than reading individual virtues) in comparison with other household codes in the NT (Col 3:18–4:1; Eph 5:21–6:9; 1 Pet 2:18–3:7; 1 Tim 2:8–15). c) Extra-Textual Level Here, the reader seeks to discover the illocutionary (speech act) effect or intent of the speaker or writer of the text. He does this by considering, for example, which set of people are addressed with the imperatives, and asks questions such as the following: What is the frequency of occurrences of an ethical norm or maxim? To which person or group of people does a given norm apply mostly? Zimmermann describes this as discovering the “hidden imperatives” in texts, compared to explicit grammatical imperatives in texts.260 Identifying these three aspects of the linguistic forms of a biblical text helps the reader to recognize the actual structure of the language and its ethical weight, which could be different from a popular opinion, as will be illustrated in our virtue-ethical analysis of the household codes below. 259 Zimmermann, Logic of Love, 39. See also pages 39–42 for the detailed discussion of the inter-textual dimension to linguistic form. See also Zimmermann, “How to Read Biblical Texts Ethically,” 7–8. 260 Zimmermann, Logic of Love, 37. See also Zimmermann, “How to Read Biblical Texts Ethically,” 8.

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1.5.2 Norms or Maxims for Action In this model, the reader seeks to identify the ethical norms embedded in a text. Zimmermann defines an ethical norm as “a pronouncement within an ethical statement or discourse that justifies the claim to an ‘ought’ or sets forth an attribution of value in terms of the conduct of an individual or a group.”261 This implies that an ethical norm is anything (person, idea, word, maxim, or material) in an ethical statement or expression that argues for or strengthens the argument for a particular behavior regarded as right. For example, the Torah, Paul, righteousness, Kingdom of God, and Jesus could be norms in different contexts. 1.5.3 History of Traditions of Individual Norms It is one thing to identify the norms and maxims, but it is another thing to trace their background, traditions, or sources from which they emanate. For NT studies, Zimmermann identifies three sources of norms as Jewish (OT) norms, Greek (Hellenistic) philosophical norms, and Early Christian norms.262 Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that NT ethics, though flooded with diverse backgrounds, was not totally left at the mercy of these three traditions. Instead, the NT writers modified and applied such norms into their Christian contexts, thereby assuming some Christian distinctives. 1.5.4 Values and the Priority of Values In this model, the ethical reader seeks to identify the ethical values and their scale of preference or hierarchy within the text. Values in the Bible are not all equal, and the reader needs to assign to each value its appropriate weight. Otherwise, ethical decisions may be wrongly based on less-prioritized values at the expense of the highly prioritized ones, which ultimately betrays the ethical message of the text. Zimmermann notes that values could be grouped into classes such as good or bad and could be grouped into comparisons such as not so good, good, better, best, and so on. A valid means of identifying such hierarchy of values is the use of rhetorical analysis of a text.263

261 Zimmermann, Logic of Love, 43, emphasis original. See the full discussion on ethical norms in Zimmermann, Logic of Love, 42–48. See also Zimmermann, “How to Read Biblical Texts Ethically,” 8–10. 262 Zimmermann, Logic of Love, 48–51. See also Zimmermann, “How to Read Biblical Texts Ethically,” 10–11. 263 Zimmermann, “How to Read Biblical Texts Ethically,” 11–12. See the detailed discussion on “ethics as a system of values” in Zimmermann, Logic of Love, 52–60.

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1.5.5 Ethical Reflection/Generating Moral Significance This is a central point in following the “implicit ethics” models. Here, the reader “examines norms’ claims to validity and the textual strategies employed in setting forth plausibility as it relates to the evaluation of certain actions.”264 In other words, the biblical ethicist seeks to understand the logical argumentation used to establish the extant validity (or invalidity) of each ethical norm. Zimmermann categorizes the means of generating moral significance in texts into two broad aspects, namely argumentative ethics of persuasion and aesthetic or etho-poetic ethics of understanding.265 In the argumentative or rational means of generating moral significance, the questions include: what argument(s) does the author use to persuade the readers to see the significance of an ethical norm or a moral behavior? Does the significance or validity of the moral decision and action lie in a prescribed norm (deontological) or in the consequence involved or a certain goal to be achieved (teleological)?266 In the aesthetic or ethopoetic means of generating moral significance, Zimmermann argues, ethical significance is generated inherently through non-discursive and literary-stylistic linguistic forms of texts such as in narratives (narrative ethics), metaphors (metaphorical ethics), mimesis or role models showcased in texts (mimetic ethics), and doxology or hymns (doxological or hymnic ethics).267 It is worth noting that biblical texts, in most cases, do not show how the significance of moral norms are argued. The reader, therefore, analyzes the text to find the ethical argumentation. 1.5.6 The Moral Agent(s) In this model, the reader seeks to identify the person or group of persons who are expected to behave in a certain way. This model takes into account all the factors involved in making one truly a moral subject, such as a person’s reason, will, emotions, conscience, and character generally. The moral agent could be autonomous or heteronomous. A moral agent is regarded as heteronomous if his or her moral actions or standards of moral judgment and behavior are not necessarily based on “reason and freedom, but law and command, not on one’s own will, but God’s will” or the will of someone (or something) else, e. g. an 264 Zimmermann, Logic of Love, 60. See also Zimmermann, “How to Read Biblical Texts Ethically,” 12–14. 265 Zimmermann, Logic of Love, 62. 266 An ethical argumentation is deontological if “one deduces the morally right action based on a given norm,” while it is teleological or consequentialist “when the justification for the value of an action is drawn from the outcome or goal” of the given moral action (Zimmermann, Logic of Love, 65). 267 Zimmermann, Logic of Love, 67–73.

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apostle like Paul, in early Christianity.268 On the other hand, a moral subject is regarded autonomous if he or she arrives at a moral action based on his or her own autonomous or sovereign judgment. Zimmermann finds both the heteronomous and autonomous groundings of ethics in Paul. Typical examples are: the appeal to the “will of God” in urging the Thessalonians (4:3; cf. 5:18) to abstain from sexual immorality (Thessalonian believers are, therefore, the heteronomous moral agents); and Paul’s appeal to Philemon to arrive at his own independent and voluntary decision to take his former slave Onesimus back, even though Paul could invoke a heteronomous ethic on him. With many similar examples, argues Zimmermann, it is evident that Paul’s sense of moral agency involves both heteronomy and autonomy in different contexts, and it is the task of the biblical ethicist to analyze where and why either a heteronomous or autonomous moral agency is invoked, and to possibly find their middle ground.269 It is worth noting, however, that just like moral agents could be described as autonomous or heteronomous, virtues can also be described as autonomous or heteronomous, especially regarding their practical application in lived morality. A virtue is autonomous if it exists and could be practiced independently, without an external enabling force or determinant. In my opinion, virtues within Christian ethics (and most theistic virtues perhaps?) could be described as heteronomous virtues, to the extent that the believer’s regeneration or renewal through faith in Christ is believed to provide the moral capacity for their practice. Examples of heteronomous virtues are found explicitly in the triad of virtues “selfcontrol, justice, and godliness” in Titus 2:12, which Saarinen rightly describes as “not autonomous virtues, but remain connected with the epiphany of God’s grace.”270 In other words, these three virtues are heteronomous here, unlike in secular Greek philosophy, because their acquisition and practice is determined by the Christ-event and its continuous training or enabling the believers to live self-controlled, just, and godly lives. 1.5.7 Reflected Ethos Here, the ethical reader seeks to discover the precise ethos arrived at as a result of the ethical reflection or argumentation. Ethos refers to the specific prescriptive moral demand expressed based on an ethical reflection. Zimmermann refers to the process of “thinking out”271 all the factors surrounding a moral norm as “descriptive-ethos-reference” while the expected behavior (ethos) that is arrived at 268 Zimmermann, Logic of Love, 77. See the detailed discussion on moral agency on pages 73–82. See also Zimmermann, “How to Read Biblical Texts Ethically,” 14–15. 269 Zimmermann, Logic of Love, 76–77. 270 Saarinen, The Pastoral Epistles, 182. 271 In my own words.

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by reason of reflection as “prescriptive-ethos-reference.”272 Usually, an ethos established in this way is expected to serve as a model for similar occurrences in the future. In this way, a new ethos is formed. 1.5.8 Addressee or Range of Application At this level, the ethical reader seeks to identify who the intended audience of an ethos or practical moral action is. Is the moral action intended to be applied locally or universally? For a period or for all periods? Does it apply to a particular individual, group or all? Zimmermann rightly notes that even the addressee is to be discovered from the text itself (and there is usually a hint, at least), not just some vague and uncritical application of ethical principles or actions to the contemporary audience. Nevertheless, one could derive ethical insights from some case studies in the Bible, but that should only be based on a somewhat “general” ethical principle that allows for appropriation.273 While Zimmermann neatly and sequentially presents his model of “Implicit Ethics,” he notes that they could be applied individually or selectively. The models, if carefully applied in the ethical reading of a biblical text, have the potential to raise the standards and status of biblical ethics on theoretical and terminological levels, thereby making biblical ethics operate in resonance and consonance with systematic-theological and moral-philosophical ethical discourse.

1.6 Exegethics: An Adapted Version of the “Implicit Ethics” Methodology The “implicit ethics” methodology, described above, has been applied in reading some parts of the NT such as 1 Corinthians 9, but has not been applied in reading Titus or any of the PE. In this study, it will be adopted and adapted in Titus for the first time, with significant differences in approach from Zimmermann’s. For example, Zimmermann picks a pericope (passage) and finds the different implicit ethical models therein, such as the Linguistic Form, Norms of Action, Moral Agents, Ethical Argumentation, and so on. In this research, however, we will first identify the virtue-ethical norms or maxims in the letter to Titus, and then apply other models in reading the selected norm in the passage rather than in reading all ethical norms within a given passage. The starting point in our exegethics methodology is, therefore, different from the starting point in the implicit ethics methodology. 272 Zimmermann, “How to Read Biblical Texts Ethically,” 16. See the detailed discussion in Zimmermann, Logic of Love, 82–89. 273 “How to Read Biblical Texts Ethically,” 16–17. See the detailed discussion on the range of application in Zimmermann, Logic of Love, 89–94.

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The differences between the two methodologies can be summarized thus: While the implicit ethics approach applies the eight models in reading a passage or pericope, the exegethics approach applies the models in reading only the individual virtue-ethical norms generated from the text. While the broad passage or pericope is the focus in the implicit ethics approach, the specific virtue-related norms in the passage are the focal points in the exegethics approach, reading the virtue-ethical norms out of the text, not into the text. Moreover, the exegethics methodology, as applied in this research, will engage only six out of Zimmermann’s eight implicit ethics models. Among the six, this research singles out the ethical norm/maxim to be the focal point, while applying the other five models to reading the selected norm within the boundaries of the letter to Titus, primarily. The only exception to this is the reading of the household codes as a pericope (Titus 2:1–10). Since this passage is a pericope, the implicit ethics methodology is applied directly. Adopting and adapting the implicit ethics methodology into the form it takes in our exegethics methodology is appropriate because this research has a narrower focus on virtue ethics compared to Zimmermann’s general focus on ethics. In order to keep the focus on the virtues located in the text, such a broadly applicable methodology (implicit ethics) has to be modified and confined to the virtue-ethical norms. In summary, while Zimmermann’s implicit ethics is a methodology for reading a biblical text ethically, my exegethics is a methodology for reading a biblical text virtue-ethically. Nevertheless, it is not possible in a project of this nature, with space and time constraints, to do a virtue-ethical analysis of all the ethical norms in the letter to Titus. After all, not all ethical norms may qualify as virtue-ethical norms. Therefore, δικαιοσύνη, εὐσέβεια, σωφροσύνη, καλὰ ἔργα and the household codes have been selected, based on some five criteria: First, δικαιοσύνη, εὐσέβεια, and σωφροσύνη, in addition to their separate occurrences, appear together as “cardinal virtues” in Titus 2:12 and play a central role in the ethics of the text. Second, all of them appear in relation to the Christ-event, implicitly or explicitly, which makes it plausible and accountable to argue for the virtue-ethical function of theological concepts in Titus. Third, σωφροσύνη and καλὰ ἔργα are the ethical norms with the highest number of occurrences in Titus. This suggests that they play a central role in the ethical perspective of the text. Fourth, the household codes generates high scholarly interest and contributes significantly to the perceived ethical structure of Titus. It contains a confluence of ethical norms, virtues, and gender- and age-based ethical instructions that should not be ignored in any attempt to understand the ethical structure of the letter. Fifth, these norms together are found in all three chapters of the text and widely spread enough to support the argument or claim regarding the virtue-ethical structure of the entire letter to Titus rather than some selected sections.

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Having described the eight models or grid of the implicit ethics methodology above, it is helpful, at this point, to briefly explain the select six models we propose to adopt and adapt in the exegethics methodology and to describe precisely how they will be applied in reading the letter to Titus virtue-ethically. 1.6.1 Linguistic Form As noted above, the first and clearest indication of an ethical norm in a text is the language or the linguistic form of the text itself.274 At this level, this research seeks to discover the linguistic form(s) of each of the selected virtue-ethical norms, namely, σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, εὐσέβεια, καλὰ ἔργα, and the “household codes” as a genre. The linguistic analysis is done at three levels: intratextual, inter-textual, and extra-textual levels. At each level, the central question is, how do these linguistic elements relate to the virtue-ethical approach to ethics? Do they correspond to the characteristics and concerns of virtue ethics or not? 1.6.2 Moral Agents In this model, we seek to identify the moral agent(s) or group of persons who are to learn, acquire, or practice the virtues, as it relates to σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, εὐσέβεια, καλὰ ἔργα, and the “household codes.” Moreover, with this model, we seek to answer the question, how does the concept of moral agency presented in Titus correspond with the virtue-ethical approach? Are the emphases laid on the “being” or on the “doing” of the agents? In other words, is the focus on moral actions or moral persons? Is there a particularist or exclusivist tendency in the agency? Furthermore, are there instances where moral agents are presented as moral exemplars, consistent with the virtue-ethical concept of moral exemplar or not? 1.6.3 Ethical Reflection/Generating Moral Significance Under this model, we seek to identify the logical argumentation used by the author to convince his readers to value, accept, learn, acquire, or practice the selected virtues. The central questions here are, do the ethical reflections correspond with virtue-ethical argumentation or not? For example, does the author appeal to the new identity or state of “being” of the believers as a reason for moral behavior and action or does he appeal to the “will of God” in a

274 See Zimmermann, “Ethics in the New Testament and Language,” 28–50, on the forms of ethical language within the NT.

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deontological275 sense? Or does he present a consequentialist argumentation for action? Does he appeal to a sense of moral telos or moral excellence as a reason for moral behavior in a virtue-ethical perfectionist way or not? 1.6.4 History of Traditions of Individual Norms or Lexemes For NT ethics, Zimmermann identifies three sources of norms as Jewish (OT) norms, Hellenistic (Greco-Roman) philosophical norms, and Early Christian (NT) norms, as explained above. In our virtue-ethical reading of Titus, we seek to trace the source(s) of virtue-related ethical norms and maxims among these three traditions. Moreover, we seek to discover whether the source of the norm relates to a virtue concept or not. For example, does the concept of doing “good works” in the OT tradition have anything to do with the character of persons, thereby virtue-ethical, or was it understood only as a sense of duty or obedience to God’s command, thereby deontological? 1.6.5 Range of Application This model touches on both exegesis and hermeneutics. Here, we seek to discover from the text the intended range of application of the virtue-related norms in Titus. Is it intended to apply locally to Cretan believers alone or universally? For a period or for all periods? Does the norm apply only to a particular person, group, age, gender, social status, ecclesiastical office, or to all? At this point also, one could describe or preliminarily try to appropriate the norms into a specific context today. However, such an attempt at appropriation is only valid if the reading of the range of application shows that the norm is applicable to all people and at all times. Nonetheless, the main section dedicated to appropriations of the virtues in this study is chapter four. Under this model, moreover, we seek to discover if the range of application relates to virtue concerns or not. For example, does it suggest a continuous, habitual application of the norm, consistent with one’s character, or a onetime, single, or short-term application? In conclusion, it is worth restating that since these methodological models are a grid, they are applied in such a way that they complement each other in the process of reading the letter to Titus virtue-ethically. Overall, the exegethics methodology described here is applied in chapter three, being the main chapter 275 Nevertheless, it needs to be stated that even though virtue ethics has become an ethical theory of its own alongside deontological and consequentialist ethical theories, one could still use a deontological or teleological argumentation for why people need to possess a certain virtue, especially in a religious text like the NT. Therefore, there is a possibility of finding deontological elements in a virtue-ethical reading of a biblical text, as will be demonstrated in virtue-ethical analysis below.

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8. Realm of ­Application

1. Moral Language

2. Norms

3. History of Traditions

“Implicit Ethics”

7. Lived Ethos

6. Moral Agents

5. Ethical Argumentation

4. Hierarchy of  Values

Figure 1: Zimmermann’s Implicit Ethics Organogram

Linguistic Form Range of Application Virtue-ethical Norm

History of Traditions Ethical Reflection / Argumentation

Figure 2: The Exegethics Organogram

Moral Agents

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of this study. Using other sub-methodologies such as the “Four S Schema” and the “Progressive-Negotiated-Ethics,” the findings of our virtue-ethical analyses in chapter three are then applied in chapter four by way of hermeneutical appropriations into an African context.

1.7 Summary and Conclusion In sum, this chapter delineates the concept of virtue ethics and the methodological framework employed in this research. The contemporary neo-Aristotelian concept of virtue ethics is employed. Virtue ethics, in this construal, is an ethic of character, attending to inner dispositions, motives, moral development, and the morality of persons more than the morality of actions. In other words, it concerns itself more with the “being” of moral agents than their “doing.” Moreover, this account of virtue ethics, as engaged in this research, considers the sources, senses, symbols, and services of character in understanding moral formation and function. The exegethics methodology, which is an adapted version of Zimmermann’s “implicit ethics” methodology, has been employed as the methodological framework for this research. This methodology is applied in seeking to understand the virtue-ethical perspectives related to five ethical norms in Titus, namely, σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, εὐσέβεια, καλὰ ἔργα, and the “household codes.” The virtueethical perspectives related to these norms are sought out through an exegetical consideration of the linguistic elements, theological motifs, and ethical elements under a selected methodological grid as follows: linguistic levels, moral agents, ethical argumentation, history of traditions, and range of application. Having mapped out the concepts and methodology employed in this study, the stage is now set to map out the history of interpretation of the selected norms. The next chapter, therefore, reports the history of interpretation of σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, εὐσέβεια, and καλὰ ἔργα in the letter to Titus. This history of research will show how other interpretations are closer or further from the virtueethical interpretation this research undertakes. It will further help by indicating the need and justification for a virtue-ethical interpretation of Titus.

Chapter 2

History of Interpretation of the Selected Virtues in Titus This chapter reports the history of interpretation of the selected ethical norms in Titus, namely, σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, εὐσέβεια, and καλῶν ἔργων. Reporting the history of interpretation by way of a literature review is useful for assessing how other interpretations of these ethical norms are further from or closer to a virtue-ethical interpretation. However, beyond just reporting previous interpretations, critical observations and review will be made in the process, especially in relation to the relevance of the previous interpretations to this research.

2.1 Σωφροσύνη: History of Interpretation The history of interpretation(s) of σωφροσύνη in the PE is chronologically reported from Donald Guthrie’s work (1958) to Gerald Bray’s work (2019). The particular focus of this research on bringing NT studies and virtue ethics into conversation informs the choice of starting the history of interpretation of σωφροσύνη from 1958. 1958 was the year that marked the beginning of the revival of virtue ethics in contemporary scholarship, triggered by G. E. M. Anscombe’s article, and later followed by Alasdair MacIntyre and others,1 as noted above. Reporting the history of interpretation from 1958 makes it possible to identify, if any, the influence the revival of virtue ethics has had on subsequent interpretations of the σωφρο-cluster in Titus. A summary of how those interpretations are closer or further from a virtue-ethical interpretation will be given towards the end of this section. Donald Guthrie’s (1958) brief description of the σωφροσύνη word group in the PE could be summarized as soberness, temperance,2 general moderation, and self-control.3 This description captures most of the key nuances of the word group but it is not detailed enough because it does not clarify some elements 1 See

Van Hooft, “Introduction” in The Handbook of Virtue Ethics, 2. James F. Keenan, Virtues for Ordinary Christians (Kansas City: Sheed & Ward, 1996), 89–95, for a discussion on how one could develop and live the virtue of temperance, and other virtues in ordinary daily Christian life. 3 Donald Guthrie, The Pastoral Epistles, TNTC (Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, 1958, 1984), 191. See also Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, Henry Stuart Jones, and Roderick McKenzie (Oxford: Clarendon, 1940), 1751–1752. They give the range of meaning to include “to be of sound mind, be temperate, moderate, prudent, self-controlled, to come to one’s senses, to learn 2 See

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that interest a virtue ethicist, such as the nuances’ relation to inner dispositions and character. Lewis R. Donelson (1986) notes that the communal understanding of σωφροσύνη is dominant in the PE. The author of the PE preferred this understanding because it promotes harmony in the state, community, and one’s soul, and because he “wants to emphasize cooperative virtues rather than ascetic ones.”4 Donelson further notes that the author employs, in Titus 2:12, three of the four (Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic) cardinal virtues, namely, σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, and εὐσέβεια, in describing the manner of life the Christ-event teaches the believers to live. The exact combination of the virtues reflects “Christian sensibilities.”5 Philip H. Towner (The Goal of our Instruction [1989], The Letters to Timothy and Titus [2006]) notes that the σωφροσύνη word group plays a significant role in the Pastoral Letters’ vision of visible Christian existence in the world. The concept was familiar in Hellenistic and earlier Greek ethics, and was expressed in ideas such as prudence, moderation, discretion, and self-control.6 These same ideas are conveyed in the Pastorals but with specific contextual nuances. moderation, to be chastened (passive); discretion, moderation in sensual desires, a moderate form of government (political sense),” and so on. 4  Lewis R. Donelson, Pseudepigraphy and Ethical Argument in the Pastoral Epistles (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck), 173, 196. It is interesting how Donelson’s interpretation immediately answers one of the objections against a Christian account of virtue ethics, namely, that it is “sectarian,” encouraging social irresponsibility and withdrawal (see Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 151–153). Donelson’s argument that the concept of self-control in the PE is intended to promote harmony in the state, community, and one’s soul, and it is more of a cooperate than ascetic virtue, answers the objection against Christian virtue ethics as being self-centered. However, Donelson’s argument may or may not have been influenced by the revival of virtue ethics. He obviously does not write as a virtue ethicist. Carolyn Osiek, exploring “self-sacrifice” as a social value and its meaning in the NT, notes that “in a dyadic culture the concept of self as an individual entity is closely attached to the experience of self as part of a social grouping.” Even though her work is neither focused on virtue ethics nor on Titus in particular, her point about the social meaning of “self” in relation to “self-control,” which we identify as a virtue in Titus and in the NT at large, helps in responding to the objection against virtue ethics as being “self-centered.” Carolyn Osiek, “Self-Sacrifice,” in Biblical Social Values and Their Meaning: A Handbook, ed. John J. Pilch and Bruce J. Malina (Peabody: Hendrickson, 1993), 158. Similarly, Bruce C. Birch and Larry L. Rasmussen say “self” is “radically dependent upon its social world.” And yet, it (“self”) has its own “creative influence upon its particular social world.” Bruce C. Birch and Larry L. Rasmussen, Bible and Ethics in the Christian Life (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1976), 85–86. 5 Donelson, Pseudepigraphy, 173. See also I. Howard Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, ICC (Edinburgh, T&T Clark, 1999), 182–184. Guthrie, referring precisely to “self-control” or “selfmastery” motif in the PE, argues against the view that the term does not have any Christian distinctive by saying that it has “an essential religious conception in the New Testament” (The Pastoral Epistles, 194). Stephen C. Mott, “Greek Ethics and Christian Conversion: The Philonic Background of Titus II:10–14 and III:3–7,” NovT 20:1 (1978), 26–29, has noted that the use of three cardinal virtues to represent the popular four was also common in Hellenistic philosophy. 6 Philip H. Towner, The Goal of Our Instruction: The Structure of Theology and Ethics in the Pastoral Epistles (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1989), 161. See also Philip H. Towner, The Letters to Timothy and Titus, NICNT (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006), 207.

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What distinguishes the PE’s concept of σωφροσύνη from that of popular secular philosophy, however, is “the determinative place of the Christ-event for the possibility of attaining the kind of outward conduct signified by σωφροσύνη.”7 What the Greeks regarded as the goal of education, i. e. the inculcation of Greek ‘civilization’ as marked by the cardinal virtues, the author “saw as the jurisdiction of the grace of God in Christ,”8 but in each case, moral change of persons is involved.9 The idea of moral change of persons relates to virtue ethics’ emphasis on character development. Stephen C. Mott, however, notes a striking similarity between Philo and Titus 2:12 regarding παιδεία “teaching” as a means to ethical deliverance, as “the cause of radical moral change.”10 Philo regarded παιδεία as the first stage towards the life of virtue.11 Even though Mott seeks to trace the Philonic and overall Greek-philosophical background to every aspect of Titus 2:10–14 and 3:3–7, he nevertheless acknowledges the distinctive Christian adaptations of the author, and concedes (at least) that “the distinctive Christian quality of the new life is not its content but its grounding in Christ’s atonement (2:14; 3:6) and its hope (2:13; 3:7).”12 The next chapter, which contains the virtue-ethical analysis of Titus, will discuss more on how the author of Titus appropriates a Christian virtue-ethical concept by adding the “grace” concept to παιδεία. Moreover, the next chapter will discuss how the concept of “moral change” is in consonance with virtue ethics theory.13 Towner asserts that Titus 2:12 gives the clearest example of the role of the Christ-event in σωφροσύνη, converting and educating believers towards the

 7 Towner,

The Goal of Our Instruction, 161. See also Towner, The Letters to Timothy and Titus, 207–208.  8  Towner, The Letters to Timothy and Titus, 208.  9 Towner, The Letters to Timothy and Titus, 208. See also Ceslas Spicq, “σωφρονέω, σωφρονίζω, σωφρονισμός, σωφρόνως, σωφροσύνη, σώφρον” in Theological Lexicon of the New Testament, trans. and ed. James D. Ernest (Peabody: Hendrickson, 1994), 3:362, “it is an educative grace.” See also Jouette M. Bassler, 1 Timothy, 2 Timothy and Titus, Abingdon NT Commentaries (Nashville: Abingdon, 1996), 199, where she describes the effect of the teachinggrace as “moral improvement,” and later, as a power that brings about “real moral transformation.” This idea of moral change, as already noted, has a virtue-ethical relevance. 10 Mott, Greek Ethics and Christian Conversion, 33–34. 11 Mott, Greek Ethics and Christian Conversion, 33–34. 12 Mott, Greek Ethics and Christian Conversion, 48. C. H. Dodd summarizes four aspects in which Christian ethics in the NT is grounded in the Gospel, in a marked difference with that of their secular contemporaries as follows: the relation of ethics to Christian eschatology, the concept of the “Body of Christ,” the imitation of Christ, and the primacy of love over charity (Gospel and Law: The Relation of Faith and Ethics in Early Christianity [New York: Columbia University Press, 1951], 25). 13 See Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 127–130, 168–170, for a discussion on how the secular account of virtue ethics could or should be adapted in Christian ethics to accommodate the “grace” concept.

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σωφροσύνη kind of lifestyle.14 This is true of all other occurrences in the PE (cf. Titus 2:4, 5, 6, 2 Tim 1:7, 1 Tim 2:9–10, 2:15). Even in its occurrence among the catalogue of virtues as qualifications for the office of the bishop in 1 Tim 3:2 and Titus 1:8, which are quite similar to traditional leadership codes, σωφροσύνη denotes “a virtue or characteristic of the genuine life of faith.”15 In this way, according to Towner, the author of the Pastorals “insists that the genuine Christian’s life be marked by observable respectability that takes the form of prudence, moderation, discretion, and self-control,”16 whose appropriation and practice depended on the Christ-event.17 Towner notes that σωφροσύνη is not a new concept in the NT (cf. Rom 12:3),18 but the author of the Pastorals discusses the need for σωφροσύνη in the believer’s life with more emphasis because the emergence of false teachers19 and their perverse behavior was threatening the reputation of the church among non-believers.20 Noting that the “teaching” that the grace does is in present active participle form and the recipients of the teaching are “us,” it suggests an ongoing activity or process.21 In Platonic and other Greek philosophies, teaching was an integral

14  Tower, The Goal of Our Instruction, 108, 161. Towner argues that Titus 2:11–14 relates to the paraenesis issued to each group from Titus 2:1–10 and believers in general (Titus 3:1–2), and not only to the slaves which are the last to be mentioned among the groups. See also Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 184. See also Towner, The Letters to Timothy and Titus, 206–208. 15 Towner, The Goal of Our Instruction, 162. While Towner interprets σωφροσύνη in Titus 1:8 as ‘prudence,’ he interprets ἐγκρατῆ, which conveys a similar idea to the σωφροσύνη word group as ‘self-control.’ Jens Herzer, says the author of Titus recalls baptism in Titus 3:5–6 as “the very point in life at which God’s merciful acts changed not only a person’s status before God, but also the person’s thinking and doing under the influence of the Holy Spirit.” Herzer rightly argues that the pneumatological dimension in this text is significant to understanding the ethical argumentation because it reveals the “motivating force behind Christians’ behavior towards all humans,” which he thinks is not un-Pauline. Jens Herzer, “‘These Things Are Excellent And Profitable To Everyone’ (Titus 3:8): The Kindness of God as Paradigm for Ethics,” in Character Ethics and the New Testament: Moral Dimensions of Scripture, ed. Robert L. Brawley (London: Westminster John Knox Press, 2007), 131. 16  Towner, The Goal of Our Instruction, 162. 17 Towner, The Goal of Our Instruction, 162. 18 See Siegfried Wibbing, “σωφροσύνη,” in The New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology, ed. Colin Brown (Grand Rapids: Regency/Zondervan, 1976, 1986), 2:502. 19 It seems that the nature of the opposition does not suggest a full-blown opposition or even external one, but some internal opposition by people who raised objections and proposed alternative approaches. It seems the opponents could still listen to Titus in the church community, since he was asked to convict them through teaching, without necessarily engaging in arguments with them. See Gerd Lüdemann, Heretics: The Other Side of Early Christianity, trans. John Bowden (London: SCM, 1996), 135–142, for more discussion on the heretics in the PE. 20 Towner, The Goal of Our Instruction, 162. 21 See Towner, The Goal of Our Instruction, 747. Zimmermann notes that a present imperative in koine Greek is “progressive or durative” and is used to refer to actions that are ongoing (Logic of Love, 35). This is the case with παιδεύουσα in Titus 2:12.

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part of civilizing people, leading to acquiring ἀρετή “virtue,” which is quantified in the cardinal virtues.22 Jerome D. Quinn (1990) argues that there is no single meaning of the σωφρο-terminology in the PE because different words are used for different persons and in different literary genres such as the household codes, leadership codes, church orders, sacramental paraenesis, etc. However, one thing that is common in the different usages is that they indicate “a deliberate and reflective integration of Christian life with some of the qualities that Hellenistic society and its educated spokesmen considered most important in human life.”23 Since there is no single translation that encapsulates all the different nuances, Quinn translates each of the words in the cluster separately. He translates σωφρονεῖν as “to use common sense, be in one’s mind,” σωφρονίζωσιν as “to spur on,” σώφρονως as “sensibly,” and σώφρον as “sensible.” He argues that the σωφρο-word group belongs to the σω(ς) cluster of terms along with σώζω (to save) and σωτήρ (savior), and in the PE, they are all related to the concept of salvation in God through Jesus Christ.24 The Pastoral Epistles’ use of the σωφρο-word group as a virtue illustrates not only how salvation was believed to bestow health, but specifically how that health results in a positive internal moral character.25 This connection is nowhere more clearly illustrated in the PE than in Titus 2:11–14, especially the idea that the “saving grace” (σωτήριος) disciplines believers to renounce worldly desires and to live sensible (σωφρόνως), honest, and godly lives in this age. According to Quinn, the play on words between σωτήριος and σωφρόνως here is not accidental nor is it arbitrary, but functions to relate the whole preceding instructions on believers’ character and conduct to baptismal faith.26 It is noteworthy that the σωφρο-terminologies appear frequently in that instruction (Titus 2:2, 4, 5 and 6). The adverbial form, σωφρόνως in Titus 2:12 shows that the way of living expressed by the σωφρο-cluster of words is grounded in the χάρις σωτήριος “saving grace” of the savior God.27 The author of the PE is  Towner, The Goal of Our Instruction, 747.  Jerome D. Quinn, The Letter to Titus: A New Translation with Notes and Commentary and An Introduction to Titus, I and II Timothy, The Pastoral Epistles, The Anchor Bible 35 (New York: Doubleday, 1990), 304–315. 24 Quinn, The Letter to Titus, 315. 25 Quinn, The Letter to Titus, 313. This argument is based on Quinn’s insistence that all the usage of the σωφρο-word group in the PE are related to the saving work of God through Jesus Christ (e. g. Titus 1:3–4 cf. 3:4–6, etc.). 26 Quinn, The Letter to Titus, 314. 27 Quinn, The Letter to Titus, 314. James D. Miller, The Pastoral Letters as Composite Documents (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 130–133, does not see a connection or continuity between the paraenesis in 2:1–10 and the “creedal fragment” in Titus 2:11–14. He believes it is a readily independent text inserted by an author whose only connecting marker was probably the σωτῆρος in 2:10 and the σωτήριος, which still do not justify a good connection or adaptation. This is contra Tower, who argues that Titus 2:11–14 relates to the paraenesis is22 23

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particularly concerned with the relationship between σωφροσύνη and the Christevent, which distinguishes his understanding and application of the word from the Greek moral philosophers. In connecting the household codes of Titus 2:2–10 with the Christ-event of Titus 2:11–14 (where σωφροσύνη appears in both cases), the author of Titus does what Col 3:18, 20 and Eph 6:1 have done by inserting “in the Lord” into the traditional household codes.28 Quinn continues that in Greek thought, the σωφρο-word group designates nuances of “internal equilibrium and sense of balance,” referring to mental health in general. The English word “sanity” captures some of these Greek nuances.29 This notion of the σωφρο-word group as basically referring to internal qualities, attitudes, and dispositions is of particular relevance to the next chapter which will undertake a virtue-ethical reading of Titus.30 Titus 2:1–10 mentions the moral agents of the σωφρο-word group as Christian old men, old women, young adults, but not Christian slaves. According to Quinn, the simplistic, material, and instrumental definition of slaves in the Hellenistic world may account for their omission here. However, the paraenesis addressed to all believers in Titus 2:11–14 includes slaves too, and therefore overrides their omission in other places in Titus and the Pastorals as a whole.31 Nevertheless, the fact that masters (who were not simplistic, material, and instrumental like slaves) are also omitted challenges Quinn’s argument, except if there were no believing masters in Crete (cf. Titus 2:9).32 If there were believing masters, then the reason for omission could be that the problem of lack of self-control was not found or prominent among slaves and masters at that time; or slaves (on the one sued to each group from Titus 2:1–10, and believers in general (Titus 3:1–2), and not only to the slaves which are the last to be mentioned among the groups (The Goal of Our Instruction, 108, 161). See also Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 184. See also Towner, The Letters to Timothy and Titus, 206–208. Towner’s argument seems more accountable and convincing, and the connection between Titus 2:11–14 to 2:1–10 and other parts of the text is recognized in this research. In a different but related context, Marshall argues that the noun form “faith” in the PE is used in the same sense as Paul uses “in Christ.” Marshall, “Faith and Works in the Pastoral Epistles,” SNTU 9 (1984), 213. 28  Quinn, The Letter to Titus, 314. Richard A. Burridge, Imitating Jesus: An Inclusive Approach to New Testament Ethics (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 137, notes two points about the “household codes” in the NT compared to their Greco-Roman counterparts: that they are given a Christological grounding, and they are given a kind of balance among the members, with less emphasis on hierarchical control but more on mutuality and reciprocity. See also Richard B. Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament: A Contemporary Introduction to New Testament Ethics (Edinburgh: T&T Clark and HarperCollins, 1996), 64, for a similar discussion. 29 Quinn, The Letter to Titus, 314. 30 See Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 103–131, for a discussion on how the nuances of internal qualities, attitudes, and dispositions in the gospel according to Matthew and some selected Pauline letters are described as equivalent to virtue-ethical concerns, thereby validating the argument that virtue ethics is in consonance with the moral vision of the NT. 31 Quinn, The Letter to Titus, 314–315. 32 This verse does not indicate whether the masters mentioned were believers in Christ or not, but only asks the slaves to be submissive to them.

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hand) and masters (on the other hand) were not regarded as separate groups in the church, but were included in the gender and age categorization (Titus 2:2–6: elderly men, elderly women, young women, and young men). It could be argued, moreover, that in Titus 2:9, the author indirectly asks the slaves to show self-control, but with a different vocabulary “ὑποτάσσω” (to submit to) which was more suitable for their status and service than the σωφρο-cluster. The slave’s being submissive “in all things” and not speaking against their masters includes “selfcontrol,” perhaps control of anger or ill-feelings towards their masters. Their submission “in all things” also corresponds with “self-control” which is to be expressed in all aspects of life. In another aspect that is of specific relevance to the virtue-ethical reading of the σωφρο-cluster as ethical norms, Quinn notes that “the internal equilibrium”33 that it designates belongs to or involves every aspect of a person’s life. He adds that the contrast between “worldly lusts” and a “sensible” life in Titus 2:12 reminds the reader that σωφροσύνη refers “even to an inner control of one’s physical appetites,” which the English word ‘temperance’ partially expresses.34 In Quinn’s words, “the savior in the Pastoral Epistles has touched and healed all of the internal human powers on whose exercise depend the virtues prized by Hellenistic society.”35 This understanding of the Christ-event resulting in “internal, ethical deliverance and moral change”36 succinctly expresses the virtueethical perspective of σωφροσύνη in the PE, especially in Titus. The virtueethical analysis in the next chapter will demonstrate this further. Moreover, the verb ζήσωμεν “to live” in Titus 2:12 conveys a sense of a dramatic formation of a new identity37 and character that relate with three of the 33 Quinn’s

words (The Letter to Titus, 315). The Letter to Titus, 315. See also James M. Gustafson, Christ and the Moral Life (New York, Evanton, and London: Harper and Row, 1968), 103, who says “temperance governs concupiscence.” 35 Quinn, The Letter to Titus, 315. Abraham J. Malherbe has a whole chapter on soteriology and its moral dimension and implications in the PE, especially in Titus. See Abraham J. Malherbe, “‘Christ Jesus Came into the World to Save Sinners’: Soteriology in the Pastoral Epistles,” in Salvation in the New Testament: Perspectives on Soteriology, ed. Jan G. Van Der Watt (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2005), 331–357. 36 Quinn’s words (The Letter to Titus, 315). See also Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 184, “moral change from the old way of life … which the grace of God in Christ effects.” 37 Rikard Roitto, “Act as a Christ-Believer, as a Household Member or as Both? – A Cognitive Perspective on the Relationship between the Social Identity in Christ and Household Identities in Pauline and Deutero-Pauline Texts,” in Identity Formation in the New Testament, ed. Bengt Holmberg and Mikael Winninge, WUNT 227 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 151– 152. See also Miller, The Pastoral Epistles as Composite Documents, 130–133. Roitto misses the point when he says the rhetoric in Titus 2:1–10 expresses less integration of the household identity and Christian identity (as two independent, sometimes conflicting identities) than 1 Tim 3:1–13. He says in the household codes in Titus 2:1–10 “there are no analogies to the narrative of Christ in order to motivate this behavior; no references to the will of God, to future judgement or to what is fitting in Christ” (151). Roitto’s error is fundamental, and it is exactly his disconnecting (or negligence of the connection between) the household codes in 34 Quinn,

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norms being considered in this study (self-control, justice, and godliness). The teaching, training, or discipline which the grace of God does38 is to renounce the ungodliness and worldly desires and to make the transition to a new way of living possible. Being used with an ingressive aorist, the conversion described here implies a start of a “vital process, a ζωή that is not to be confused with material human existence, a βίος,” but which is eternal life (cf. 1:2; 3:7).39 William D. Mounce agrees with Quinn here when he says the ζήσωμεν here “to live,” may be ingressive, denoting “to begin to live.” This indicates a positive change in a person’s life, resulting from the denial of ungodliness and worldly desires.40 The idea of a formation of a new, acceptable moral identity and character as a result of teaching is a virtue-ethical approach to morality. Ceslas Spicq (1994) translates σωφρονέω as “to be moderate, sober-minded, sensible;” σωφρονίζω “to instill a sense of moderation, restore someone to his senses, instruct, train;”41 σωφρονισμός “having good judgment, of sound mind;” σωφρόνος “with good sense, with self-control;” σωφροσύνη “prudence, moderation, sound judgment, decency, self-control, mastery of passions;” σώφρον Titus 2:1–10 from the soteriological grounding of the succeeding paraenesis in Titus 2:11–14, which many scholars have rightly identified (See Quinn, The Letter to Titus, 314; Tower, The Goal of Our Instruction, 108, 161; Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 184. See also Towner, The Letters to Timothy and Titus, 206–208). Frank J. Matera, New Testament Ethics: The Legacies of Jesus and Paul (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1996), 241–247, discusses how the good works and the virtues in the PE are subordinated to God’s grace, thereby carrying a Christian identity. Guthrie describes Titus 2:11–3:7 as “the theological basis for Christian living,” and explicitly says “the connecting particle for proves that this verse leads on directly from the last” (The Pastoral Epistles, 197–198). Contra Roitto, I think that Titus 2:1–14 expresses the highest integration of Christian identity and household identity, which are summarized again with the three virtues as self-control, righteousness, and godliness in Titus 2:12. 38 See James L. Price, Interpreting the New Testament, 2nd ed. (New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, 1971), 513, citing C. K. Barrett, Pastoral Epistles, 137. Price says that the idea of God’s grace training people to renounce godless ways is not found in Paul’s letters. The difference is that while here grace is educating, in Paul’s letters, grace is liberating, and by it, people are set free from worldly passions. By this, Price downplays the moral significance of “the grace” here. While I agree that the “grace” as used here is primarily educating, it needs to be stated that it educates towards moral liberation. It therefore plays the role of liberatingeducation. 39 Quinn, The Letter to Titus, 166. The Greek fonts render Quinn’s “zooee and bios” respectively. 40 William D. Mounce, Pastoral Epistles, WBC 46 (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 2000), 424. Mounce says that in the PE, God’s grace is the instructor, not Hellenistic philosophy. Towner says the norm σώφρον and its cognates, especially in Titus 2:12, is “explicitly identified with the new life made possible by the Christ-event” (The Letters to Timothy and Titus, 720). The Christ-event is the mystical source of this life. 41 See also Claire S. Smith, Pauline Communities as ‘Scholastic Communities’: A Study of the Vocabulary of ‘Teaching’ in 1 Corinthians, 1 and 2 Timothy and Titus, WUNT 2/335 (Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012), 339–340. Smith argues that the use in Philo, Josephus, and other contemporary Greek writers suggests the meaning to “chasten” or “recall a person to their senses” or “to an appropriate or former way of operating” by means of persuasion, punishment, etc.

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“moderate, sensible.”42 In a statement that is of relevance to this study, Spicq notes that while connoting moderation and justice, the concept of σωφροσύνη “has to do with character and life conduct … and so becomes a general virtue, the knowledge of what to do and what to avoid.”43 Its relationship with character and its use as a general virtue correspond with virtue ethics’ concern with character and all aspects of a person’s life. However, by saying that the PE treat σωφροσύνη “primarily as a feminine virtue,”44 Spicq generalizes and attributes to Titus what may not be accountably said if Titus is studied as an individual text. A close observation of all the occurrences and moral agents of the σωφρο-word group in Titus as an individual text shows that it is evenly distributed among all the groups – five occurrences to five different groups: the bishop in Titus 1:8; elderly men in Titus 2:2; elderly women in Titus 2:4; younger women in Titus 2:5; younger men in Titus 2:6, and all believers in Titus 2:12. By this ratio, coupled with the argument that the bishop in that context would most probably be a male, it could be argued, contra Spicq, that in Titus, σωφροσύνη is projected more as a masculine virtue than a feminine one.45 Again, it is worth noting that Spicq’s generalization illustrates one of the disadvantages46 of reading the so-called PE as a corpus, or reading Titus against the background of the letters to Timothy. In order to avoid this pitfall, this study treats Titus as an individual text.47

42 Spicq,

“σωφρονέω,” 359. “σωφρονέω,” 361, citing SVF, 1:190; 3:262, 265. 44 Spicq, “σωφρονέω,” 361. See also Ulrike Wagener, Die Ordnung des “Houses Gottes”, WUNT 2/65 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1994), 81, who describes σωφροσύνη as a having a “Frauen sexualitätsbezogene Bedeutung” (meaning it is often used in relation to women’s sexual purity). 45 Annette B. Huizenga also notes that the σωφροσύνη virtue is urged an equal number of times for women and men, and two times for the entire audience. Nevertheless, she argues that the author perceives “gender-based differences in how this virtue is acted out.” Huizenga’s opinion differs from Spicq’s assertion and from mine, to some degree. Annette B. Huizenga, Moral Education for Women in the Pastoral Epistles and Pythagorean Letters: Philosophers of the Household (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 330. 46 Gerd Lüdemann, Heretics: The Other Side of Early Christianity, trans. John Bowden (London: SCM, 1996), 136, does not seem to see any disadvantages in considering the PE as a corpus. He describes them, citing Heinrich Julius Holtzmann (Lehrbuch der historischkritischen Einleitung in das Neue Testament [Freiburg: Mohr Siebeck, 1892], 274) as “indivisibly triplets as Ephesians and Colossians are twins.” 47 See Herzer, “These Things Are Excellent And Profitable To Everyone,” 127–134. Herzer also adopts the individual text approach. See Ernst R. Wendland, “‘Let No One Disregard You!’ (Titus 2:15): Church Discipline and the Construction of Discourse in a Personal, ‘Pastoral Epistle,’” in Discourse Analysis and the New Testament: Approaches and Results, ed. Stanley E. Porter & Jeffrey T. Reed, JSOT Supplement Series 170, Studies in New Testament Greek 4 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press,1999), 334–336, where he laments the negligence of Titus as an individual text in NT scholarship generally, seeing it as a “miniature 1 Timothy.” 43 Spicq,

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Jouette M. Bassler (1996) notes that σωφροσύνη is the most significant and the favorite48 among the author’s ethical terms in the PE and the wider culture of their time. Like Quinn, she notes that the concept is untranslatable by a single English term, but it expresses prudence, discretion, temperance, sound judgement, and self-control (in different contexts) that characterized the Greek ideal of human behavior.49 Being one of the four Stoic cardinal virtues, it was popular in philosophical discourse and found on tombstone inscriptions. The σωφροσύνη and its cognates in the Pastorals relate to the behavior expected of all members of the church.50 Similarly, Frank Matera’s (1996) concise interpretation of the σωφροσύνη word group circles around self-control and prudence.51 Considering which German translation would best express the classical usage of the term, Wagener notes that in German, “Besonnenheit” (“prudence”) or “Mäßigung” (“moderation”) would be the best translation of σωφροσύνη in its classical Greek usage.52 I. Howard Marshall (1999) asserts that the σωφρο-word group in the PE convey the idea of self-control and moderation, and their extensive53 use gives the character of the instructions regarding Christian lifestyle.54 In classical Greek thought, σωφροσύνη is related to αἰδώς “reverence, respect.”55 Originally, it conveyed the idea of a sound mind, and “represented the virtue of restraint of desire, hence the sense of ‘rational,’ intellectually sound, free from illusion, purposeful, self-controlled, with prudent reserve, modest, decorous.”56 Ignorance and frivolity were considered the opposites of σωφροσύνη, which was one of the four cardinal virtues along with σοφία “wisdom or prudence,” ἄνδρεια “courage,” and δικαιοσύνη “justice,” especially in the Stoic philosophical school.57 One of its narrowed meanings58 is in relation to women’s chastity, self-control,

48 See also J. L. Houlden, Ethics and the New Testament (London and Oxford: Mowbrays, 1975), 64, who says temperance, good sense, and piety are the PE author’s favorite qualities, while profligacy and foolishness of talk and behavior are his most hated sins. 49 Bassler, 1 Timothy, 2 Timothy and Titus, 58. 50 Bassler, 1 Timothy, 2 Timothy and Titus, 58. See also Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 182–183. 51 Matera, New Testament Ethics, 241–247. 52 Wagener, Die Ordnung des “Houses Gottes”, 80. 53 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 182, says the σωφρο-word group is the most strongly represented in the Pastoral Epistles. 54 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 182. 55 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 182. See also Towner, The Letters to Timothy and Titus, 207. 56 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 182. See also Towner, The Letters to Timothy and Titus, 207. 57 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 182. 58 See Robert Falconer, The Pastoral Epistles (Oxford: Clarendon, 1937), 104, who notes that in Stoic cycles, ἐγκράτεια was regarded as a subordinate virtue to σωφροσύνη.

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and purity, which was close to ἐγκράτεια59 “discipline, self-control, or mastery over,” referring to sexual chastity or purity.60 Marshall says the author of the PE adopts and adapts the σωφρο-concept into Christian morality by relating it to the Christ-event.61 In what is specifically relevant to our virtue-ethical reading of Titus, Marshall observes that the adoption of the word group in the PE, especially in Titus 2:12, conveys the idea of a “suitable restraint in every aspect,” a self-control which leads a person to behave appropriately in each unforeseen situation, and which is seen as a positive virtue to hold as the Christian is faced with the realities of living in the world.62 This allowance of a person to virtuously discern and decide the appropriate behavior in each moral situation, without a prior concrete rule of action, is particularly a virtue-ethical approach to morality. Moreover, the fact that selfcontrol or restraint is expected to apply to ‘every aspect’ of a person’s life is also virtue-ethical. Marshall summarizes the use of the σωφρο-word group in the PE by noting that its relation to the Christ-event “depicts a balanced demeanor characterized by self-control, prudence, and good judgement … The theological foundation for life articulated in Titus 2:11–14 requires that it be understood as a quality which faith in Christ produces … and throughout the Pastoral Epistles, it stands as one of the marks of genuine Christian life.”63 Similarly, William D. Mounce (2000) asserts that the use of σωφροσύνη in Titus 1:8 means “self-control” and is closely related to the idea of ἐγκράτεια “disciplined.”64 He thinks the σωφρο-word group is the key term in the ethical codes in Titus 2:1–10 because it applies to nearly all the groups, and because it is also a key term among the leadership requirements for elders in Titus 1:8. The cognate verb σωφρονίζειν in Titus 2:4, used in addressing older women, means “to encourage.”65 Σώφρονας in Titus 2:5 in relation to younger women could convey the idea of sexual chastity.66 Mounce, holding to Pauline authorship, argues 59 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 182–183. See also Bassler, 1 Timothy, 2 Timothy, Titus, 196. Spicq, “σωφρονέω,” 360 notes that sometimes the concept of the word group was confused with ἐγκράτεια. 60 See “ἐγκράτεια” in Timothy Friberg and Barbara Friberg, Analytical Lexicon of the Greek New Testament (2003, 2008, 2013), in Paratext 9.0. See also Bruce W. Winter, Roman Wives, Roman Widows: The Appearance of New Women and the Pauline Communities (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 145, who says σωφροσύνη (in Greco-Roman context) in relation to women refers to sexual fidelity, and was sometimes associated with a woman’s faithfulness to her husband. 61 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 184. 62 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 184. 63 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 184. See Towner, The Letters to Timothy and Titus, 208, who finds that the virtues described by self-control and its cognates are products of faith and therefore a component of authentic Christian existence. 64 Mounce, Pastoral Epistles, 391. 65 Mounce, Pastoral Epistles, 407–409. 66 Mounce, Pastoral Epistles, 411.

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that in addressing younger men in Titus 2:6, Paul avoids his normal pattern of mentioning their particular character traits and summarizes his instruction aptly with σωφρονεῖν, “to be self-controlled” in all things, being the key term of the passage.67 Its adverbial usage “σωφρόνως“ in Titus 2:12 is interpreted as “in a self-controlled manner,” and is connected with other σωφρο-cognates in Titus 2:2–6.68 Fiore (2007) does not pay much attention to the σωφρο– word group in the PE. However, he briefly notes that “the virtue of self-control, commonly encouraged among both men and women, has diverse expression according to gender status and sphere of activity.”69 The observation that it is a virtue encouraged among both genders is relevant to the virtue-ethical analysis this research undertakes. The range of meaning Fiore gives for the different forms is “modesty and self-control.”70 Annette B. Huizenga (2013), in a general statement about the application of “self-control” to the two genders in the PE from a feminist71 reading, argues that the author does not give much attention to instructing the men, compared to his instruction of the women. Contrastively, she notes, the author describes σωφροσύνη in relation to women in more detail “so that it becomes the umbrella virtue for his teachings directed toward women.”72 By describing σωφροσύνη as the “umbrella virtue,” Huizenga subdues other norms in the same list to be only descriptions or explications of how the “self-control” norm is to be applied by women. However, looking at Titus as an individual text, there are no clear linguistic grounds, or other grounds for that matter, for Huizinga’s conclusion. If Titus is treated as an individual text, and if the sequence of the instructions is of any significance, Huizenga’s argument could be challenged even by the fact that in Titus 2:2–6 (which plays a significant role in her conclusion), the instruction “to be” self-controlled or “to have” the σωφροσύνη virtue does not begin with women but men, and also ends in verse 6 with the young men, while women are in the middle. That could signify, at both intra-textual and extra-textual 67 Mounce,

Pastoral Epistles, 407, 412. Pastoral Epistles, 424. 69 Benjamin Fiore, The Pastoral Epistles: First Timothy, Second Timothy, Titus, Sacra Pagina Series 12 (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2007), 208. 70 Fiore and Harrington, The Pastoral Epistles, 208–211. 71 Denise Lardner Carmody asks and seeks to find what constitutes the “good life” for women, in the light of Thomistic virtue ethic’s search for “the good life.” She notes that the good life, both for women and men, is “fundamental to our ability to decide and to act as rational agents, and to attain the fullness of our human life.” See Susan Frank Parsons, Feminism & Christian Ethics, New Studies in Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 238, citing Denise Lardner Carmody, Virtuous Woman: Reflections on Christian Feminist Ethics (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1992), 8. 72 Huizenga, Moral Education, 334. See pages 329–349, for an elaborate discussion on the gender differentiation of the σωφροσύνη word group in the PE. 68 Mounce,

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(illocutionary) linguistic levels, that the author places equal (if not more) emphasis on men to be self-controlled or sensible. While the author asks older women to exhort younger women towards σωφροσύνη, he asks Titus to do the same with younger men (Titus 2:6). This provides a balance in terms of emphasis and the means of acquiring the virtue between the two genders. Moreover, if the fact that the author could possibly think of Titus as a higher spiritual and moral figure for teaching or exhortation compared to the older women is taken into account, then the argument could be advanced that the author of Titus prioritizes men’s acquisition of the σωφροσύνη virtue more than women’s.73 Furthermore, the fact that the bishop, who must also be “self-controlled” (Titus 1:8), was most likely a male, strengthens the argument that the norm in Titus is addressed more to men than to women. Huizenga’s interpretation could have been influenced only by the use of the σωφρο-word group in 1 Timothy (cf. 2:9, 15), which she generalizes for all of the PE. Again, this illustrates the disadvantages of treating the different texts as a corpus. Andreas Köstenberger (2017) notes that the σωφρο-word group in the PE expresses different but related meanings that include “correct reasoning and moderation and living life in a reasonable and sensible way, with proper decorum.”74 Σωφροσύνη in classical Greek was used as the virtue of rationality, having a sound mind, or lacking ignorance.75 Following Mounce and Marshall, Köstenberger holds that the grounding of σωφροσύνη on the Christ-event in Titus 2:12 shows that the author has not radically changed the meaning of the term, neither has he uncritically and simply applied Greek moral categories to the church. The author agrees with the secular culture on the need to pursue self-control, but also recognizes that it is only through what God has done in Christ that one can be genuinely self-controlled.76 Robert W. Yarbrough (2018) describes the entire σωφρο-word group as referring to (moral) qualities such as temperance, prudence, moderation, a good sense of judgement, being reasonable, rational, and self-controlled.77 He translates σώφρονας in Titus 2:2 and 2:5 as “temperate” and self-controlled respectively (cf. σωφρονεῖν in 2:6 “to be self-controlled”).78 Of particular relevance to our virtue-ethical analysis, Yarbrough notes that by using σωφρονίζωσιν in Titus 2:4, the author “does not so much say what younger women should be ‘urged’ to do as he presents what kind of wife a younger married woman should be en73 This is in addition to Titus 1:8 which is only applicable to the bishop (male), and Titus 2:12 which applies to all believers. 74 Köstenberger, 1–2 Timothy & Titus, 504. 75 Köstenberger, 1–2 Timothy & Titus, 504. 76 Köstenberger, 1–2 Timothy & Titus, 505. See Marshall, Pastoral Epistles, 184; Mounce, Pastoral Epistles, 114; and Towner, The Goal of Our Instruction, 161. 77 Yarbrough, Letters, 513. 78 Yarbrough, Letters, 509, 515.

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couraged to be by their godly older peers, who have wisdom of years to draw upon.”79 Yarbrough’s point agrees with our virtue-ethical analysis below, that the virtues in Titus are geared towards the moral development of the different groups towards “being” morally good rather than “doing” morally good things. This is in consonance with the virtue approach to morality, which lays emphasis on the morality of persons (being) more than the morality of actions (doing). Gerald Bray (2019) notes that the frequent occurrences of σωφροσύνη in Titus represents the foundation of Christian life therein. He translates σωφρόνως as “wisely,” meaning the believer’s application of “sanctified common sense” in every relationship and in every situation.80 Summary: Four points that are relevant for this research are observed from the history of interpretation of σωφροσύνη. First, none of the interpreters interprets the cognates with a particular focus on virtue ethics. Nevertheless, some of them have mentioned some virtue-ethical elements or perspectives without necessarily referring to virtue ethics theory. Moreover, even the aspects they have mentioned, which relate to virtue ethics, are not described in ethical terms, least in virtue-ethical terms. Describing ethical contents in biblical texts without basing them on a particular ethical theory and without engaging the appropriate ethical terminologies makes it difficult to bring biblical studies into conversation with moral theology or ethics in general. This study, therefore, seeks to remedy this deficit by assigning the virtue-ethical elements in the letter to Titus their appropriate virtue-ethical terminologies. Second, the more detailed the interpretation, the more the virtue-ethical perspectives are pointed out. For example, Quinn’s, Towner’s, and Marshall’s more detailed interpretation capture more virtue-ethical perspectives than those of Guthrie and Fiore. This is why our virtue-ethical analysis below will be detailed, in order to recover all the virtueethical features and nuances of σωφροσύνη in Titus. Third, we could argue that the revival of virtue ethics has indirectly influenced some recent interpretations of σωφροσύνη in Titus, such that its meaning is more and more associated with character. Examples include Quinn’s description of the concept as relating to internal equilibrium and all aspects of life, and Yarbrough’s description of σωφρονίζωσιν in Titus 2:4 as not urging the younger women on what “to do,” but on the kind of wives they are “to be.” These are virtue-ethical descriptions of the σωφρο-cognates, even though these scholars do not identify them as particularly virtue-ethical. Fourth, the virtue-ethical perspectives that could be recovered from these previous interpretations include: the internal operation of σωφροσύνη (Quinn: “internal equilibrium”); its focus on the morality of persons more than that 79 Yarbrough,

Letters, 513. Bray, The Pastoral Epistles, International Theological Commentary (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2019), 523. 80 Gerald

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of specific moral actions; its relation to all-aspects-of life or commonplace morality; its applicability to all groups and both genders; its grounding on the Christ-event; and the idea of character formation or continuous improvement through teaching. However, there are more virtue-ethical aspects to be recovered, especially by considering the linguistic elements, moral agency, and the ethical argumentation of the cognates, which other interpreters have not surfaced (at least not in sufficient detail). The virtue-ethical reading of Titus in chapter three will bring the virtue-ethical perspectives of σωφροσύνη recovered from this history of interpretations, add other virtue-ethical perspectives that are not identified by these scholars, and bring them all into direct conversation with contemporary virtue ethics theory.

2.2 Δικαιοσύνη: History of Interpretation The history of interpretation of the δικαιοσύνη cognate will be reported starting from Gottlob Schrenk’s (1961) work to Gerald Bray’s work (2019). Selected interpretations are presented here, therefore not exhaustive, but wide-ranging enough to give an overview of the history of interpretation to recent scholarship. It is also wide enough to give a clue into whether the interpretations have developed towards a virtue-ethical interpretation, after the revival of virtue ethics theory in 1958. Moreover, the aim of reporting the history of interpretations is to engage with other scholars and their works before undertaking a virtue-ethical interpretation in chapter three.81 Gottlob Schrenk (1961)82 notes that δίκαιος comes from, and has a connection with the stem δίκη,83 which denotes tradition, custom, or law. In relation to persons, a δίκαιος is one who conforms to, is civilized in, or observes customs.84 It also denotes one who fulfills obligations to God and to men. In legal terms, it denotes one who observes the legal norms or civil duties in general. In relation to ethics, the term δίκαιος “has a significance for the whole of life, since life in society demands a plenitude of virtues.”85 In this context, τό δίκαιον “the just” 81 It is noteworthy that for some of the scholars (e. g. Spicq, Brown, Schrenk, and Seebass), I will take their general interpretation of the cognate in this section and discuss their interpretation of the cognate as used in the LXX, OT, and Early Christianity in the section on History of Traditions in chapter three. 82 See Gottlob Schrenk and Gottfried Quell, “Δίκη, δίκαιος, δικαιοσύνη, δικαιόω, δικαίωμα, δικαίωσις, δικαιοκρισία,” TDNT 2:178–225. 83 See Horst Seebass, “Righteousness, Justification ‘δικαιοσύνη’” NIDNTT 3:353. He notes that in the Platonic school, it was right and proper to accept the existence of diverse social status with their different degrees of power, and to take upon oneself that which befits one’s status. In this way, δίκη “acquired the status of the axiomatic, unshakable foundation of all human life.” 84 Schrenk, “δίκη,”182. 85 Schrenk, “δίκη,”182.

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is linked with τό καλόν, ἀγαθόν “the good,” and πρέπον “conspicuous.”86 Its significance in the whole of life and its connection with other virtues makes δίκαιος “a significant term in ethics”87 in the Greco-Roman world, as is evident in its constant presence in the popular four cardinal virtues: φρόνιμος, σώφρων, δίκαιος, ἀνδρεῖος (wisdom, self-control, justice, courage), from which many other virtues are appropriated. Horst Seebass: “Righteousness, Justification δικαιοσύνη” (NIDNTT). Similar to Schrenk, Seebass notes that all the words in the δίκαι-cognate are derivatives of δικῆ, which originally meant “instruction,” but later (at different times) came to mean law, punishment for wrong doing, and that essential part of humanity which makes human social life in society possible.88 In view of this, the δίκαιος “was originally one whose behaviour fitted into the framework of his society and who fulfilled his rightful obligations towards the gods and his fellow-men;” and this is what sets him apart from the unrighteous.89 The term also came to take a more legal and ethical nuance in relation to the law, meaning to conform to the legal, static, social order.90 Its neuter form “τό δίκαιον” best expresses the legal and ethical meaning the word later assumed, meaning that which is legally and ethically right; to treat someone justly; or to give someone what is due him/her.91 John A. Ziesler (1972) studies the δικ-words according to their linguistic forms in the PE, for example, verbs as one group, nouns and adjectives/adverbs as different groups respectively. Starting with the verbs, Ziesler argues that the verb ἐδικαιώθη ἐν πνεύματι “vindicated by the Spirit” (1 Tim 3:16 NIV)92 is probably demonstrative but serving a forensic purpose. The verb means Christ is proved right, or vindicated, at a cosmic or celestial level, which happens “in the Spirit,” meaning that the resurrection confirms his messiahship.93 Ziesler further argues that “justified” here could even be an equivalent of “glorified.”94 The verb δικαιωθέντες in Titus 3:7, in view of Titus 3:5, means “that man cannot really claim to be righteous with his own law-righteousness, that justification is of the ungodly, and that it is purely a matter of grace.”95 Ziesler thinks the nuance “make righteous” is possible here, but prefers a nuance of a declaratory (as opposed to demonstrative) interpretation because it agrees with the meaning 86 Schrenk,

“δίκη,”182. “δίκη,”182. 88 Sebass, “δικαιοσύνη,” 3:353. 89 Sebass, “δικαιοσύνη,” 3:353, citing Homer, Odyssey II, 13: 209, English trans. by A. T. Murray, revised by George E. Dimock (Cambridge, MA and London, ENG.: Harvard University Press, 1995), 16 and 17. 90 Sebass, “δικαιοσύνη,” 353. 91 Sebass, “δικαιοσύνη,” 353. Also Barclay, Letters, 239. 92 “Vindicated in spirit” (RSV). 93 J. A. Ziesler, The Meaning of Righteousness in Paul: A Linguistic and Theological Enquiry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 154–155. 94 Ziesler, The Meaning of Righteousness, 155. 95 Ziesler, The Meaning of Righteousness, 155. 87 Schrenk,

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in other (Pauline) literature.96 He argues that the justification here depends on baptism and the renewal in the Holy Spirit that baptism represents, indicating that justification is of the baptized and converted ungodly, not just simply for the ungodly.97 A careful observation suggests that Ziesler’s arguments contradict each other in a way. If he prefers the declaratory interpretation of δικαιωθέντες in Titus 3:7 and it depends on baptism, what then is to be said about the “renewal in the Holy Spirit?” (Titus 3:5). I contend that the meaning of “renewal by the Holy Spirit” is strong enough to connote a two-sided nuance of a declaratory righteousness and a demonstrative (ethical renewal) righteousness (“make righteous”). This argument is possible on two grounds: first, given the fact that both the immediate context (Titus chapter 3, especially verses 3–6) and the entire context of the letter to Titus is more heavily ethical than theological, an ethical understanding of justification is more appropriate. Second, the fact that the conjunction καὶ “and” separates λουτροῦ παλιγγενεσίας “washing of rebirth” and ἀνακαινώσεως πνεύματος ἁγίου “renewal by the Holy Spirit” suggests two different but related facts or events of justification. It is related to baptism on the one hand and related to an actual ethical change of the believer on the other. In that way, justification does not “depend on ‘regeneration and renewal in the Holy Spirit’” as Ziesler argues, but justification makes regeneration and renewal in the Holy Spirit possible.98 The second linguistic group Ziesler studies are the nouns. He notes that all the noun forms of the word group in the PE are used in an ethical sense (1 Tim 6:11; 2 Tim 2:22; 3:16; 4:8; Titus 3:5). One could even be taught (παιδεία) in “righteousness” (2 Tim 3:16, cf. the adverbial form in Titus 2:12). The noun form as used in 1 and 2 Timothy “refer[s] to the Christian’s righteousness, while Titus 3:5 denotes that human righteousness which cannot save. All three are in relation to God.”99 Ziesler is of the view that “crown of righteousness” in 2 Tim 4:8 means “crown as a reward for righteousness,” especially because of the athletic imagery attached to it.100 However, Ziesler is also aware that taking this view means that righteousness is an ethical and meritorious achievement in the sense of ‘my own righteousness,’ not the ‘righteousness of Christ,’ “and this  96 Ziesler,

The Meaning of Righteousness, 155. The Meaning of Righteousness, 155.  98 See Ziesler, The Meaning of Righteousness, 155.  99 See Ziesler, The Meaning of Righteousness, 155. 100 Ziesler (The Meaning of Righteousness, 155) disagrees with Lock’s view that in addition, the crown means “crown consisting in righteousness” (Walter Lock, The Pastoral Epistles, ICC [Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1924], 115). Ziesler rightly argues that Lock’s view means that righteousness is thoroughly eschatological, referring to a life of or in heaven (cf. ‘crown of life’ in Rev 2:10). However, he does not totally refute Lock’s view, but only prefers the other view based on its connection with the athletic imagery.  97 Ziesler,

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comes very oddly indeed in a supposedly Pauline letter,” he argues.101 Ziesler’s argument here does not take into account the two-sides of justification as I have argued above. From Titus 2:12 and 3:3–7, I have argued above that the believer’s justification/ righteousness was a declaratory one on the one hand and a continuously transformative one (demonstrative) on the other (“teaching us to live righteous lives”).102 The nuance of teaching probably indicates human cooperation with the divine agency to live a righteous life. It is this kind of righteousness (which incorporates human and divine agency) that will be rewarded with a ‘crown’ or ‘wreath’ in eschatological context. If the PE are treated as a corpus, as Ziesler himself does, then it could be argued that Titus clarifies the context in which we should understand the “crown of righteousness” in 2 Timothy. The believer shall receive the “crown of righteousness” (reward/wreath) because he/she has lived in a righteous manner as taught and enabled by “the grace.” The third linguistic group Ziesler treats are the adjectives and adverbs. The adjectival and adverbial forms appear four times in the PE (1 Tim 1:9; 2 Tim 4:8; Titus 1:8; 2:12). Ziesler notes that all these occurrences are used in an ethical sense: in 1 Tim 1:9, it is used in reference to people for whom the law does not apply because they are morally good. In Titus 1:8, the adjective is used in a list of virtuous attributes required of a bishop, while in Titus 2:12 it describes the manner of life of believers in Christ. The description of God as “righteous Judge” in 2 Tim 4:8 lays emphasis on his rewarding good works accordingly rather than punishing evil deeds.103 Jerome Quinn’s (1990) interpretation focuses specifically on how the word group is used in Titus. He identifies a relation between the use of δίκαιος in Titus 2:12 and in Titus 1:8. In the two instances, the cognates of the adjectives σώφρονα and δίκαιον translated as “sensible, upright” appear in the same order. Εὐσεβῶς “godly, devoted” being the third virtue in the list of the triad in 2:12 101 Ziesler,

The Meaning of Righteousness, 155–156. Vogel, “Ob Tugend lehrbar sei: Stimmen und Gegenstimmen im hellenistischen Judentum mit einem Ausblick auf Paulus,” in Jenseits von Indikativ und Imperativ, ed. Friedrich W. Horn and Ruben Zimmermann, WUNT 238 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009), 159–176, here 173 examines whether virtue (German: Tugend), according to Paul, is something that one can be taught for practical living or not. He concludes that the concept of teaching virtues for practical living is not presented in Paul. Instead, Paul’s ethics is strickly an “internal ethics” (German: Binnenethik) because practical living in obedience to the law requires or is enabled by the Holy Spirit received at conversion, not the human teaching of the virtues as was the case in Greek philosophical ethics and Judaism. In his words, “Christliche Ethik wäre dann strikt nur als Binnenethik möglich, weil ein lebensdienstlicher Rekurs auf den Nomos nach paulinischem Verständnis den initialen Geistempfang bei der Bekehrung voraussetzt” (Vogel, “Ob Tugend lehrbar sei,” 173). ET: “Christian ethics would then be possible strictly only as internal ethics, because recourse to a life of service to the nomos after a Pauline understanding presupposes that one has received the Spirit through conversion.” 103 Ziesler, The Meaning of Righteousness, 156. 102 Manuel

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also relates with ὅσιον “holy, devoted,” which immediately follows “sensible” and “upright/righteous” in Titus 1:8.104 However, one notable difference is that in Titus 1:8, unlike Titus 2:12, there is no direct connection with the Christ-event. In this regard, Quinn thinks that the baptismal confession in 2:12 is perhaps the source for the qualification in Titus 1:8.105 However, I argue that it is not only the baptismal confession in Titus 2:12 that gives a Christian context to the virtues listed in 1:8, but also the introductory statements of the letter (Titus 1:1). The ethical agenda106 of the whole text located in Titus 1:1, namely, “the faith of God’s elect and knowledge of the truth leading towards godliness” already signals a Christian (theological) distinctive to the author’s ethics and therefore sets it apart from Greek-philosophical virtues. Quinn continues that by engaging the triad of virtues, the author appeals to both Jewish and Roman audiences, for the ideal of OT teaching and prayer is for man to be just, honest, and upright, while the Roman ideal is to be pious or reverent.107 Among the Greeks, the three qualities would, however, refer to giving what was due to oneself, to others, and to the gods: σωφροσύνη to oneself, δικαιοσύνη to fellow human beings, and εὐσέβεια to the gods.108 Aquinas, similarly, says self-control is regarding “whatever measured use of exterior things and intrinsic passions,” justice is regarding one’s neighbor, and godliness regarding God.109 By this interpretation, Quinn implies that among the triad of virtues, justice or uprightness is the only virtue that is evidently other-regarding or social. The otherregarding nature of this justice is significant for the virtue-ethical analysis and for hermeneutical appropriations in the next chapters of this volume. Nevertheless, our virtue-ethical analysis and its application into an African context below will explicate how self-control and godliness could also be other-regarding. Quinn argues that even though there are similar triadic appearances of virtues in Greco-Roman ethics,110 there is none that appears in the precise form and 104 Quinn,

The Letter to Titus, 166.  Quinn, The Letter to Titus, 166. 106  See the section of this research on εὐσέβεια in the letter to Titus for a more detailed discussion of the ethical agenda of the letter to Titus. 107 Quinn, The Letter to Titus, 166–167. 108 Quinn, The Letter to Titus, 167. Here, we find Xenophon’s final sketch of the virtues of Socrates in Memorabilia 4.8.11 – “so religious (εὐσεβής) that he did not do anything without the counsel of the gods; so just (δίκαίος) that he did no injury to any man however small.” See Xenophon, Memorabilia IV, 8:11, trans. E. C. Marchant and O. J. Todd, rev. by Jeffrey Henderson (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2013), 375. See also Smith, Pauline Communities, 318, who says the three adverbs address, in turn, behavior of self, relationship with others, and relationship with God. 109 Thomas Aquinas, Commentaries on St. Paul’s Epistles to Timothy, Titus, and Philemon, trans. and ed. Chrysostom Baer, O. Praem (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2007), 181. 110 Plato’s conception of an ideal society is one characterized by the tetradic virtues “wise, strong, sensible, just” (Quinn, The Letter to Titus, 167, citing Plato, Republic 4.427E). 105

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order found in Titus 2:12. This, therefore, becomes an evidence that the author was not just collecting materials arbitrarily and using them uncritically, but materials were carefully selected and adapted into a Christian context.111 In the words of Quinn, this implies that “the Christian tradition here was discriminating in its assimilation of Hellenistic ethical values. Some were adopted; some were put on hold; some were modified to the point of rejection.”112 The similarities113 in the triad of virtues in Titus 2:12, according to Quinn, suggests that one could distinguish but cannot separate them in Christian living. Being sensible, upright, and godly “is a cipher that stands for that fullness of the virtuous life which ‘the grace of God’ generates in his family.”114 George W. Knight III (1992) notes that the adverb δικαίως in Titus 2:12 means “righteously” or “in an upright manner.” In the same way it appears in a trilogy here along with “self-control” and “godliness,” it also appears in 1 Thess 2:10 in another trilogy with “holy” and “blameless.”115 Like Quinn, Knight also argues that the three adverbs “in a self-controlled manner, in a righteous manner, and in a godly manner” refer to oneself, to one’s relationship with others, and to one’s relationship with God respectively. That is, they refer to “thoughtful self-control, to uprightness in dealings with others, and to genuine piety in relation to God.”116 Ceslas Spicq (1994), similar to Schrenk and Seebass, also traces δική, meaning “custom, justice, punishment” as the root word from which other cognates derive, such as δίκαιος (conforming to law or custom, right, virtuous), δικαιοσύνη (justice, righteousness), δικαιόω (to justify, pronounce just), δικαίωμα (justification, righteousness, righteous decree, just requirement), δικαίωσις (justification), δικαστής (judge).117 In its adverbial or adjectival form, δίκαιος modifies a person who conforms to law118 or things which are regarded as normal or as they ought to be. By Aristotle’s definition, a δίκαιος “conforms to the law and is equal.”119 In all Greek literature, Spicq notes, a just person is regarded as just not only in his responsi-

111 See Smith, Pauline Communities, 318–319. Smith says Paul has not uncritically identified the virtues in Titus 2:12 because of their association with Greek παιδεία, but “their content and character is thoroughly Christian by virtue of their relation to the saving work of Christ and the gospel.” 112 Quinn, The Letter to Titus, 168. 113 Such as “the assonance, the rhyming -ōs of the adverbs, the polysyndeton, the adverbial usage.” Quinn, The Letter to Titus, 168. 114 Quinn, The Letter to Titus, 168. See Mott, Greek Ethics and Christian Conversion, 29. 115 George W. Knight III, The Pastoral Epistles: A Commentary on the Greek Text (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1992), 320. 116 Knight, The Pastoral Epistles, 320. 117 Spicq, “δίκαιος, δικαιοσύνη, δικαιόω, δικαίωμα, δικαίωσις, δικαστής, δίκη,” TLNT 1:319. 118 Spicq, “δίκαιος,” 319, citing Homer, Odyssey 6:120. 119 Spicq, “δίκαιος,” citing Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 5.2.1199a33.

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bilities towards humans but also to the gods, thereby combining justice with piety.120 Jouette M. Bassler (1996) understands δίκαιος “righteous/upright” as a description of one who “conforms to established norms,” and that it is the goal of the Christian life in 2 Tim 3:16.121 However, I contend that understanding righteousness or uprightness as merely conforming to established norms best fits the Greco-Roman ethical understanding of the concept, different from the Christian distinctive that has been incorporated into it in Titus. The Christian concept of “uprightness” as a product of the Christ-event and continuous teaching by “the grace” makes it different from the Greco-Roman concept of an external virtue of trying to conform to established norms into an internal virtue that constitutes one’s life and moves positively towards expressing the inner quality of the believer. This is the same kind of idea that lies behind the conception of some works that may seemingly be “good” but do not qualify as good works because of their detachment from the effect of the Christ-event on the moral agent (Titus 1:16). Bassler describes the effect of the teaching which “the grace” carries out (Titus 2:11–12) as “moral improvement,” and later, as a power that brings about “real moral transformation.”122 This idea of moral change, as already noted, has a virtue-ethical relevance, and will be discussed further. I. Howard Marshall (1999) notes that along with other words which were prominent in Greek ethical thought, the δικ-word group plays an important role in the PE’s conception of the Christian life.123 The common meaning of δίκαιος is uprightness of conduct and justice in one’s dealings with people in general life. Marshall points out the Christian distinctive to the δίκαιος concept when he says that “however, in the Pastoral Epistles, primarily through [Titus] 2:12 … behavior that is δίκαιος transcends the secular notion of a cardinal virtue. Its orientation is the Christ-event.”124 According to Marshall, unlike the nuance in Titus 2:12, δικαιοσύνη in Titus 3:5 (cf. 2 Tim 4:8) and δικαιόω in its passive form as δικαιωθέντες in Titus 3:7 (cf. 1 Tim 3:16) convey the Pauline sense of justification by faith.125 While I agree with Marshall that the nuances convey the Pauline sense of justification by faith 120 Spicq,

“δίκαιος,” 321. 1 Timothy, 2 Timothy, Titus, 200. 122 Bassler, 1 Timothy, 2 Timothy, Titus, 199. 123 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 164. 124 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 164. Cf. Titus 3:16. 125 See Marshall, Pastoral Epistles, 164. See also Towner, The Goal of Our Instruction, 163. Towner thinks that while 2 Tim 4:8 may also refer to justification, in which case the “crown of righteousness” would refer to the fulfillment of the righteousness given by God, the context may suggest, instead, that eternal life is the “crown” and is the reward promised to be given to those who live a life of righteousness. He argues that this is the sense that is intended in 1 Tim 6:11, 2 Tim 2:22 (as a contrast to ἀδίκια, v. 19), and 3:16. 121 Bassler,

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to a large extent, his differentiating the nuances of the δίκαιος word group in Titus 2:12 and Titus 3:5, 7 could be misleading. It suggests that the use in 2:12 is ethical while those of 3:5 and 7 are theological. I argue, on the contrary, that the three usages are altogether ethical and theological at the same time, and not in disagreement with Pauline concept of justification by faith.126 The author talks about righteousness and how believers have been justified in Titus 3:5, 7 only in the context of, and to the extent that such justification does not only declare them righteous but also effects ethical transformation. This is why it is set in contrast to unbelievers who are still “foolish, disobedient, being led astray, serving various lusts and pleasures, living in malice and envy, being hateful, hating one another” (Titus 3:3). The believers were formerly in that ethical state, but the theological acts of justification and salvation changed their moral state (noting “the washing of regeneration and renewal by the Holy Spirit” in Titus 3:5). It is on the basis of this “theolo-ethical” (or theolethical) justification that Titus is to “remind them to be submissive to authorities, to obey them, and to be ready for every good work, to blaspheme no one, to be peaceable, gentle, in all things to demonstrate humility127 to all men” (Titus 3:1–2).128 Bringing this understanding of Titus 3:5, 7 into conversation with Titus 2:11– 14 where the grace of God has been revealed to all men (theological) and is teaching us to say no to ungodliness and worldly desires and to live sensible, righteous/just and godly lives in this age (ethical), one sees a deliberate intersection of theology and ethics in the briefest details possible. Based on this understanding, the two passages could hardly be accountably separated, and could hardly be accountably said to be in disagreement with Paul’s concept of justification.129 The teaching act of “the grace” is inherently bound to the justification of the sinner and the overall effect of the Christ-event on the believer. In this case, the teaching/training which “the grace of God” does on the believer is on the basis of his being justified and saved by God. Even though this is not explicitly stated, the author’s limiting of the moral agents from “all men” to “us” (believers) indicates that he does not expect that nonbelievers who have not been 126 Ziesler, The Meaning of Righteousness, 155, as pointed out above, has argued that all the noun forms are used in ethical sense. Marshall, however, seems to say that the adverbial form in Titus 2:12 is the ethical one while the noun and verbal forms in 3:5 and 7 respectively convey the theological nuance of Paul’s justification by faith. But my argument, which slightly differs from theirs, is that Titus 2:12; 3:5, 7 are equally ethical and theological and should not be separated into theological or ethical. 127 MacIntyre, “The Nature of the Virtues,” 145–146, notes that one of the differences between the virtues of Aristotle and those of the NT is seen in the way that the NT praises humility as a virtue while Aristotle seems to regard it as a vice relative to magnanimity. 128 Note the “γάρ” that follows this statement and leads on to the justification discourse. 129 Fiore, The Pastoral Epistles, 219, identifies Rom 3:27–28; 4:2–6; 9:12; Gal 2:16; Eph 2:8– 9 as examples of Pauline texts which show the similarity of the concept of justification between Paul and the PE. Fiore’s argument is further discussed below.

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justified and saved could be taught by the grace to renounce ungodliness and worldly desires and to live in a self-controlled, righteous/just and godly manner. I, therefore, contend that it is not accountable to separate theology from ethics or to detach the Pauline concept of justification by faith from Titus 2:11–14 and 3:5, 7, as Ziesler and Marshall have tried to do in different ways. However, I concede that the usage of δίκαιος in Titus 1:8 in relation to the qualifications of the bishop lacks a direct theological grounding. Nevertheless, it could be argued that the ethical agenda of Titus with its theological grounding set from the opening verses theologizes or “Christianizes” the list of virtues expected of a bishop and all other groups in the text.130 Marshall argues further that δίκαιος often appeared together with σωφροσύνη and ὅσιος as the cardinal virtues.131 The three virtues listed in Titus 2:12 coincide with three of the popular four cardinal virtues, with only ἀνδρεία missing. In Greek ethics, these virtues functioned as ideals.132 The adverb δικαίως in Titus 2:12 “describes life in accordance with standards of justice and fairness.”133 William D. Mounce (2000) argues that δίκαιος “just” is used in the PE in the ethical sense of a just behavior.134 Together with its counterpart ὅσιος “holy,” they describe behavior that is appropriate toward people and God respectively.135 Mounce does not clarify well enough what he means by “in its ethical sense of just behavior” in comparison with the Pauline concept of justification by faith. If he means that it is used in a different sense from the Pauline sense of justification by faith, then his argument downplays or even neglects Titus’s theological statements whose similarity with the Pauline concept of justification by faith could be strongly argued. Statements such as “the faith of God’s elect” (Titus 1:1), “the grace of God has been revealed” (Titus 2:11), “he saved us not because of the righteousness which we have done” (Titus 3:5), “washing of regeneration and renewal by the Holy Spirit” (Titus 3:5), “having been justified” (Titus 3:7 in the context of theological justification and ethical transformation),136 all show that 130 See Quinn, The Letter to Titus, 166. Quinn thinks the theological grounding for Titus 1:8 is to be found in the baptismal confession in Titus 3:7, while I argue that the opening statement “the faith of God’s elect and the knowledge of the truth towards godliness” also already provides a theological grounding. 131 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 164. 132 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 271. 133 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 270, cf. Luke 23:41; 1 Cor 15:34; 1 Thess 2:10; 1 Pet 2:23; 1 Clement 51:2; 62:1. Marshall mentions how Mott notes the connection of the virtues to education. The goal of παιδεία is ἀρετή (virtue), and the goal of education by the grace here is coincidentally the development of these cardinal virtues. 134 Mounce, Pastoral Epistles, 391. 135 Mounce, Pastoral Epistles, 391. Cf. Luke 1:75; Eph 4:24; 1 Thess 2:10 where the two ideas are paired with the same sense of duality. 136 See George M. Wieland, The Significance of Salvation: A Study of Salvation Language in the Pastoral Epistles, Paternoster Biblical Monographs (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2006), 203.

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the author shares in Paul’s concept of justification by faith, but has only explicated the ethical aspects of such justification in line with his concern about the ethical situation of the Cretan city and church. The “we were” but now “we are” dialectics in Titus 3:3–7 and the nuance conveyed by the assertion that the grace has been revealed “to all men” but teaching “us” (believers) to live righteous lives show that Christian ethical living is made possible only through the divine acts of justification, salvation, and sanctification. In this way, the author of Titus is not against Paul, but for Paul. N. T. Wright (2004), in a brief application of the term δικαίως “just or in a just manner” in Titus 2:12, notes that the word is used positively as one element of the concept of “righteousness,” implying that justice is expected to be a principle at work in the life of the believer in Christ.137 Δίκαιος here “designates a life that has been both put to rights itself and is devoted to working so that the world may be put to rights as well.”138 The hermeneutical section of this volume will discuss how justice could be appropriated and applied in daily life in an African context. Philip H. Towner (2006) notes that “uprightness” often appeared as a counterpart to “self-control,” and is one of the cardinal virtues by which the author characterizes the life of faith in Titus 2:12. In reference to leadership in Titus 1:8, “the term focuses on behavior that is just, fair, and inherently honest in dealing with people.”139 Towner also asserts that the triad of virtues in Titus 2:12 were of Hellenistic origin, but were adapted into Christian ethics. He describes the Hellenistic material as having been carefully “Christianized,” and the three virtues which in Hellenistic thought would have been nothing more than common moral values “have been plunged into the Christian reservoir of the author’s thought.”140 As noted above, the three virtues have been described as expressing three levels of relationship: the self, one’s neighbor, and God.141 However, Towner thinks that the order of the list as it appears in Titus 2:12 may have been determined more by the traditional cardinal virtues than by a desire to infer relations to self, neighbor, and God.142 The Christian content of δίκαιος, which distinguishes it from Hellenistic ethics, is developed in Titus 2:12, where righteous or upright living becomes an obligation introduced and made possible by the grace of God in Christ. Towner sums up his thoughts about the δίκαιος word group in the PE by saying 137 Tom Wright, Paul for Everyone: The Pastoral Epistles: 1 and 2 Timothy and Titus (London: SPCK, 2002, 2004), 157. 138 Wright, The Pastoral Epistles, 157. 139 Towner, The Letters to Timothy and Titus, 689–690. 140 Towner, The Goal of Our Instruction, 160. 141 Marshall, The Pastoral Letters, 271, cited in Towner, The Letters to Timothy and Titus, 749. 142 Towner, The Letters to Timothy and Titus, 749.

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through the δίκαιος word group, the aspect of discernable righteousness or uprightness is added to the qualities that constitute observable side of Christian existence. In the author’s mind this quality can only be realized through new life in Christ, which itself results from the proclamation of the true gospel.143

Towner’s point about the possibility of living an upright/just life through the new life occasioned by the Christ-event will be relevant to the analysis of the moral agents of the δίκαιος norm in chapter three. Fiore (2007) has a brief discussion on the concept of righteousness in Titus 3:5, 7, which is worth reporting here, especially because, unlike most other scholars, he shows how close the concept is to the Pauline concept of justification and righteousness. In reference to the statement “not in consequence of works in righteousness we ourselves did” (Titus 3:5), Fiore notes that “the divine initiative, safeguarded here, stands at the heart of Pauline teaching about works and righteousness (Rom 3:27–28; 4:2–6; 9:12; Gal 2:16; Eph 2:8–9), although the phrase ‘works in righteousness …’ is not Pauline.”144 The “works in righteousness” is an expanded version of Paul’s “works of the law,” and it expands the reference to include good deeds of Gentiles (which therefore includes Titus and the Cretans)145 as not being the basis of their salvation. Fiore further notes that the statement “does not pass judgment on whether the deeds were righteous or not, but denies the presumptive assertion that they were and that they therefore constitute a claim to salvation.”146 In reference to the phrase “through the washing of rebirth and renewal by the Holy Spirit,” Fiore and Harrington note that it refers to an initial inner transformation in the believer, which is symbolized in baptism.147 The subjective genitive shows that it is the Holy Spirit who effects both the renewal and the rebirth, and his indwelling in the believer (cf. 2 Tim 1:14, Acts 2:33) “enables the faithful to live pure lives as the new creation.”148 In relation to the statement “being rendered righteous by his favor” in Titus 3:7, Fiore, again, argues that it is not at odds with Paul. “The saying hews closely to the Pauline explanation of justification as a divine favor that has results both present and future.”149 In regard to the argument for a declarative or ethical (transformative) justification, Fiore rightly argues for the two together, as I have done above.150 143 Towner,

The Goal of Our Instruction, 163. The Pastoral Epistles, 219. 145 Fiore, The Pastoral Epistles, 219. 146 Fiore, The Pastoral Epistles, 219. 147 Fiore, The Pastoral Epistles, 220. 148 Fiore, The Pastoral Epistles, 220. 149 Fiore, The Pastoral Epistles, 221. 150 Fiore, The Pastoral Epistles, 221. Fiore notes further that the two effects of justification are noted by Paul in 1 Cor 6:11. 144 Fiore,

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Fiore’s interpretation is more virtue-ethical than the other ones reported above. His interpretation of righteousness and justification shows how its effects affect the whole of a person, define a new moral identity, and enable a virtuous life. Moreover, his argument for a strong connection between the brief theological statements in the PE with Paul is inviting. Nevertheless, his work is a commentary, and not a targeted effort to discuss the elements and features of virtue ethics in the Pastorals. This research, therefore, goes a step further from his and focuses specifically on how such understandings of the virtues and theological statements in Titus are in consonance or dissonance with contemporary conceptions of virtue ethics. Furthermore, part of this book will be an attempt to appropriate such virtue-ethical features into an African context. Harry O. Maier (2013) argues that δικαιοσύνη and its cognates in the deuteroPauline letters “takes leave of its more technical theological associations and becomes connected with civic virtue when used to describe the qualities of a right leader or community member” (see 1 Tim 6:11; 2 Tim 2:22; 3:16; Titus 1:8).151 He further notes that even though the PE do not directly use the word ἀρετή, they invoke the virtue δικαιοσύνη “periphrastically” when they require from leaders qualities such as being without reproach, lover of good, purity in speech and conduct, intercession from a pure heart, pure conscience, prudent, devout, self-controlled, and so on. All such virtues converge in the three adverbial cardinal virtues: “self-controlled, righteous/just, and godly,” which the grace of God teaches Christ’s followers.152 To further his central thesis, Maier places all the virtue lists in the Pastorals in their imperial contexts, emphasizing their similarity with urban imperial and honorific culture, paying less emphasis on the adaptations the author(s) of the letters has made. While acknowledging the notable similarities, it is also worth noting that when attention is given to the differences in the same way Maier has focused on identifying the similarities, there may be considerable differences that indicate not an arbitrary collection and adoption of secular materials but a deliberate, thoughtful, and targeted engagement with, and adaption of secular materials into the Christian context, as Titus 2:12 and 3:3–7 indicate. Moreover, Maier’s argument that in the PE, righteousness/justice “takes leave of its more technical and theological associations” in favor of a civic virtue is right in some respects but needs to be contested in other aspects. For example, Titus 2:12 and 3:3–7 show how the Pauline nuances of justification by faith and ethical nuances of righteousness or justice are both employed. The difference, however, is that in the PE, the motifs are not developed or argued compared to the so-called authentic Pauline letters. And the reason for not developing 151 Harry O. Maier, Picturing Paul in Empire: Imperial Image, Text and Persuasion in Colossians, Ephesians and the Pastoral Epistles (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 170. 152 Maier, Picturing Paul, 170.

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such arguments could be that the author assumes that the reader(s), primarily Timothy and Titus (his trusted co-workers) are already familiar with Paul’s concept of declarative justification by faith, but he wants to emphasize the ethical and transformative aspect of that justification because of the situation in Ephesus and Crete. Robert W. Yarbrough (2018) notes that δίκαιος “righteous” can be used to refer to God (e. g. 2 Tim 4:8) or to a believer, both in the OT and NT (e. g. Rom 3:10; 5:7). In reference to human beings, Yarbrough observes that δίκαιος (e. g. in Titus 1:8) can mean “upright,” highlighting its human ethical quality, or “righteous,” highlighting a spiritual status (justification) that is central to Paul’s theology. Like Yarbrough, I agree that the NIV’s choice of translating δίκαιον in Titus 1:8 as “upright” instead of “righteous” is reasonable,153 seeing that it appears in a list of virtues instead of a discourse on justification by faith. However, the possibility of an implied notion of uprightness as a result of the believer’s being justified or made righteous should not be ruled out even in this verse, noting that the author is generally referring to believers in Crete who are among “the elect” (Titus 1:1) who have been “justified by grace” (Titus 3:8), and who are being taught by “the grace” to live self-controlled, just, and godly lives. Gerald Bray (2019) notes the day-to-day implication of δικαίως “justly” to the believer as meaning living an honest life, which explains the reason for its translation as “upright” in some cases. He notes, however, that the word has other nuances that should not be neglected, such as right thinking, forming opinions about people based on knowledge and not mere prejudice, seeking the good of everyone and not just of oneself, proper use of resources, genuine care for the poor and needy, and the like.154 Summary: It is helpful, at this point, to give a summary of the key points and observations from the history of interpretations of the δίκαι‑ word group, as follows: first, the δίκαι-cognates have a basic meaning related to justice, righteousness, and uprightness. However, δικαιοσύνη generally conveys more the sense of righteous acts towards others or towards established laws than the notion of inner, spiritual righteousness. Nevertheless, the latter is not totally absent in Titus, only that it is not as explicit as the former. We have argued that the concept of justification in Titus is a two-sided one: a declarative and demonstrative (transformative) justification. Second, different nuances are conveyed by the different cognates of δικαιοσύνη as used in the PE. Some seem more ethical while others seem more theological. Some conform to Greek-philosophical ethics while others do not. Third, among the triad of virtues which often appear 153 Yarbrough, Letters, 487. Nevertheless, he wonders why out of the 79 occurrences of the term in the NT, NIV translates it as “upright” only 3 times. He, therefore, sees an argument to be made against excluding the notion of “uprightness” from Paul’s notion of righteousness. 154 Bray, Pastoral Epistles, 523.

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together, δικαιοσύνη is more evidently other-regarding or social than others. The social aspect of it means being just to everyone in the sense of giving to and/ or doing unto others what is due them. Fourth, a δίκαιος person is expected to be δίκαιος in all aspects of life. Fifth, the δίκαιος notion was popular in Greekphilosophical ethics, but the author of Titus adopts and adapts the nuances into the Christ-event, both explicitly and implicitly. Sixth, more recent interpretations such as that of Marshall, Towner, and Fiore, compared to earlier interpretations, recognize more and more how the author of the PE has adapted the δίκαιος virtue into the Christ-event. Some of the virtue-ethical perspectives identified from the history of interpretations above are as follows: first, the emphasis of the virtue is on persons, not actions. It is people who are to be just/righteous and express such justice in general life. Second, it is a commonplace virtue which encompasses the totality of a person’s life. A just person will be expected to be just in his behavior at home, work, church, leadership, and simply “in all things.” Third, it is a socially expressed virtue which ensures human and societal flourishing. However, the various interpretations, except that of Fiore, do not show how the virtue relates with the inner quality or dispositions of a person clear enough as would be expected in virtue ethics. Moreover, none of the scholars I have read has attempted to identify, recover, and construct the virtue-ethical characteristics of the δίκαι‑ cognate in the PE. Chapter three of this study will, therefore, attempt to perform a virtue-ethical reading of δικαιοσύνη in the letter to Titus as an individual text. Nevertheless, inter-textual references to 1 and 2 Timothy will be made.

2.3 Εὐσέβεια: History of Interpretation The concept of εὐσέβεια in the PE has a long history of interpretation, hence, only select ones are reported here. Because this research regards εὐσέβεια as the main virtue in the letter to Titus (as our virtue-ethical analysis below will show), its history of interpretation will be reported a little more extensively under three periods ranging from 1936–2019. For εὐσέβεια, we will trace the history of interpretation earlier than 1958 (the year that marks the revival of classical virtue ethics in contemporary ethics) because it seems to have generated more interest and more scholarly works than the other virtues in the PE. With such a long history and repertoire of scholarly works, it is helpful to report the history of interpretations earlier than 1958. Marshall has reported the history of interpretation of εὐσέβεια from earlier interpretations starting from Adolf Schlatter’s work (1936) up to Werner Foerster’s work (1971) on the one hand, and other scholars following Foerster up to Jürgen Roloff (1988). For these earlier works, this research depends on Mar-

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shall’s work for the summary of their critical interpretations.155 However, some aspects of Foester’s interpretation which Marshall does not point out, but which are relevant for the virtue-ethical reading of Titus, will be discussed in this research. Moreover, the present research will report the works of some earlier scholars whose interpretations Marshall does not report,156 but which are relevant to this research. Furthermore, this research will report the works of more recent scholars whose works were published after Marshall’s report, starting from Marshall himself (1999) to Bray (2019). This will not only help build a bridge between earlier and recent interpretations, but much more, it will give a broader and up to date understanding and appreciation of the development(s) in the interpretation of εὐσέβεια. Critical observations and review will be made in the course of reporting the previous interpretations. In this way, it is possible to understand how previous interpretations are closer or further from a virtueethical interpretation, which this research undertakes. 2.3.1 Earlier Interpretations from Schlatter (1936) to Foerster (1971) Earlier critical scholars like Schlatter and Spicq hold that in a purely religious manner, εὐσέβεια denotes “conduct and an attitude that honours God.”157 Heinrich J. Holtzmann sees εὐσέβεια as a reflection of the developments in the thought of the church about Christian religious living in relation to the church’s identity and ecclesiology as a monolithic institution.158 Εὐσέβεια, emerging from such reflection, was merely “churchly” morality, “not a manner of life that stems from any theological notion.”159 According to Holtzmann, εὐσέβεια is a word that describes a combination of good works and blameless living, morality or just religious way of life which “conforms to the ecclesiastical and practical shape of the church in the world.”160 For Martin Dibelius, εὐσέβεια became the foundation stone for his “christliche Bürgerlichkeit”161 or bürgerliches Christentum (Christian citizenship) thesis. He 155 See

Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 135–144. he does not report in the detail that we need for our reading here. For example, he does not report Philip H. Towner’s (The Goal of our Instruction, 1989) interpretation in detail. 157 Adolf Schlatter, Die Kirche der Griechen im Urteil des Paulus (Stuttgart: Calwer, 1936, 1958), 176, cited in Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 136. Also see Towner, The Goal of Our Instruction, 147. 158 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 136, citing Heinrich J. Holtzmann, Die Pastoralbriefe, kritisch und exegetisch behandelt (Leipzig: Engelmann, 1880), 176–179. 159 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 136, citing Holtzmann, Die Pastoralbriefe, 176–179. 160 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 136, citing Holtzmann, Die Pastoralbriefe, 176–179. 161 For a sharp critique of Dibelius’s bürgerliches Christentum, see John W. Wainwright, “Eusebeia: Syncretism or Conservative Contextualization?” Evangelical Quarterly 65:3 (1993): 211–224. Wainwright argues that Dibelius’s argument for a bürgerliches Christentum in the PE is based more on historical-critical conclusions which situate the PE after Paul, around the 2nd century, than on exegetical bases. Adopting an exegetical approach, he concludes that the use 156 Or

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sees εὐσέβεια as not only the fulfillment of special cultic activities or duties, but a general lifestyle that is pleasing to God and people.162 His theory of Christian citizenship states that in the light of the delayed Parousia later after Paul, the church was at a crossroads. It then became necessary for the church to negotiate her place in a hostile world. If they held tightly to Christianity in Pauline terms, especially its vibrancy and isolation from secular systems due to its expectation of an imminent Parousia, the continued existence of the church could be threatened. But if they adapted to the secular concepts of respectability, there was a chance of continuity. Based on the need for this adjustment, the church, drawing from pagan vocabulary and concept, found in εὐσέβεια a concept that suited a Christian version of secular morality.163 Foerster combines different elements in presenting his interpretation. He notes that in Greco-Roman usage, εὐσέβεια referred to a general attitude of reverence to gods, persons, and the orders of society as created or approved by the gods.164 As time went on, in popular usage, the word came to mean piety, meaning not only an attitude of respect but actual worship of the gods via various cultic acts. Beyond outward attitudes and acts, “an inner attitude is always expressed in the outward act.”165 In both Greek and Roman thoughts, piety was a highly respected virtue and duty. The Latin equivalent of piety is pietas, and a temple was consecrated to Pietas as a goddess in 191 BC in Rome.166 Originating from this pagan thought, according to Foerster, εὐσέβεια in the Christian context came to mean a manner of life that respects world orders such as marriage, family, creation, and so on, but grounded in the will of God the creator (cf. 1 Tim 4:10).167 The opponents undermined such world orders in the churches addressed in the PE based on their Gnostic orientation and its ascetic practices, which is why the author tries to reinstate this respect (Foerster bases of εὐσέβεια in the PE is not an example of a christliche Bürgerlichkeit (224). Similarly, see See Roland Schwarz, Bürgerliches Christentum im Neuen Testament? Eine Studie zu Ethik, Amt und Recht in den Pastoralbriefen, Österreiche Biblische Studien 4 (Klosterneuburg: Verlag Österreichiches Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1983). See especially pages 111–121, for a discussion of the key ethical terms of the PE, and a critique of Dibelius’s bürgerliches Christentum. Schwarz concludes that “die ethischen Begriffe der Past eweisen sich bei näherer Untersuchung nicht so ‘bürgerlich’, wie sie bei oberflächlicher Betrachtung erscheinen” (121). ET: “the ethical concepts of the Pastoral Epistles do not prove on closer examination to be as ‘bourgeois’ as they appear on a superficial examination.” 162 Martin Dibelius and Hans Conzelmann, The Pastoral Epistles, trans. Philip Buttolph and Adela Yarbro, Hermeneia (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1972), 39. See Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 136. See also Towner, The Goal of Our Instruction, 147. 163 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 136. 164 See BDAG, 412–413. 165 Werner Foerster, “εὐσεβής, εὐσέβεια, εὐσεβέω,” in TDNT 7:177. Also see Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 137. 166 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 137 n. 76. 167 Foerster, “εὐσεβής, εὐσέβεια, εὐσεβέω,” 183–184.

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this argument on 1 Tim 2:2; 5:4).168 Unlike Dibelius, Foerster argues that Christian εὐσέβεια is grounded in πίστις “faith,” the Christ-event (1 Tim 3:16), and the will of God (1 Tim 4:10).169 He sees εὐσέβεια as a life born out of πίστις which, “in conscious contrast to the false teachers’ ethic, pays due heed to the created orders of the world.”170 However, Foerster differentiates the use of piety in the PE from that of Judaism and the Greek world. While Jewish piety was based on the Law and Greek piety was based on cultic acts, “there is no trace of a legalistic bondage of εὐσέβεια in the Pastorals.”171 He thinks that εὐσέβεια, as used in the NT, is not a virtue but simply a manner of life, even though it may be pursued like an ideal and even practiced.172 Its absence among the lists of qualities in 2 Tim 2:22 suggests to Foerster that it is not in the same category of importance with faith and love, nor is it central in the PE.173 He concludes, therefore, that the word εὐσέβεια does not have strong theological and especially christological basis compared to πίστις,174 and its primary connection to world orders and the conduct of man tilts it towards moralism. For this reason, Foerster argues, adopting the εὐσέβεια word group would have negative consequences for the church.175 Marshall criticizes Dibelius and Holtzmann that they undermine the theological foundations of εὐσέβεια. And despite Foerster’s efforts to reclaim the theological foundations in the PE by grounding it on πίστις, he follows Dibelius in using only a few verses to determine their interpretation. Marshall argues, moreover, that Dibelius and Holtzman allow the Greco-Roman concept of the word group, regarded as a virtue, to overshadow their understanding of the concept as used in the PE.176 Contrary to Foerster’s view, I argue that εὐσέβεια is presented as a virtue in Titus and of no lesser prominence or centrality compared to πίστις. Rather, εὐ168 Ibid.

See also Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 137. The Pastoral Epistles, 137. 170 Towner, The Goal of Our Instruction, 147, citing W. Foerster, “εὐσέβεια in den Pastoralbriefen,” NTS 5 (1959): 217–270. See also Foerster, “εὐσεβής, εὐσέβεια, εὐσεβέω,” 183. 171  Foerster, “εὐσεβής, εὐσέβεια, εὐσεβέω,” 183. He argues that in the PE, the Law only played a role among the opponents, which the author repudiates (cf. 1 Tim 1:7, Titus 1:13). 172 Foerster, “εὐσεβής, εὐσέβεια, εὐσεβέω,” 183. 173 On the contrary, Wolfgang Schrage argues that in all three PE, eusebeia has “taken over the pre-eminence of love,” and now serves as the central concept and fundamental attitude. Wolfgang Schrage, The Ethics of the New Testament, trans. David E. Green (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 260. 174 See also Bernhard Mutschler, Glaube in den Pastoralbriefen: Pistis als Mitte christlicher Existenz, WUNT 256 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 205–206, where he compares πίστις with εὐσέβεια in the PE and concludes that πίστις is an older and familiar term in the Pauline tradition compared to εὐσέβεια, which originates from Greek-philosophical ethics. Moreover, he notes that εὐσέβεια is used more in practical living than πίστις is. 175 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 137. See also Foerster, “εὐσεβής, εὐσέβεια, εὐσεβέω,” 183. 176 Foerster, “εὐσεβής, εὐσέβεια, εὐσεβέω,” 137. 169 Marshall,

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σέβεια is a broader concept that incorporates faith,177 as will be demonstrated in the virtue-ethical reading of Titus in chapter three. Foerster’s downplay of the significance of εὐσέβεια compared to πίστις is largely based on his reading of the letters to Timothy, but he generalizes it to refer to the PE as a whole. This is another example of the disadvantages of reading the Pastorals as a corpus, which does not allow their distinctive voices to be heard. Even though Foerster downplays the significant role of εὐσέβεια in the PE, he makes three points which are relevant to our virtue-ethical reading of Titus. First, in the Greek world, an element of rational knowledge entered into the εὐσέβεια concept, since one has to know how to serve the gods in an acceptable manner.178 This element of rational knowledge179 is a virtue-ethical concept180 and is present in Titus’ account of εὐσέβεια (Titus 1:1; 2:12), as will be argued in the virtue-ethical analysis in chapter three. Second, εὐσέβεια can be regarded as an ἀρετή in the Greek sphere, like other virtues such as σωφροσύνη.181 Third, in the PE, εὐσέβεια denotes a manner of life that covers the totality of man’s conduct in relation to self, other people, and God, based on the Christ-event. Born out of πίστις, εὐσέβεια relates to everyday life.182 Other scholars following the ones mentioned above have built on the previous interpretations reported above. Norbert Brox183 treats the εὐσέβεια word group in the PE more thoroughly than Foerster. He sees εὐσέβεια as more than respect for the natural orders. Even though it is drawn from the secular environment, it gains a new sense in the context of Christian behavior. Also, even though it appears as one among others in a list of virtues, it means more than respectable 177 See Towner, The Goal of Our Instruction, 152. On the contrary, Mutschler, Glaube, 206, argues that εὐσέβεια is a variation of πίστις, but not its replacement, neither its synonym. 178 Foerster, “εὐσεβής, εὐσέβεια, εὐσεβέω,” 177. 179 See also Mounce, The Pastoral Epistles, 379, referring to “knowledge of the truth” as understanding of the faith. 180 For a discussion on the place of moral knowledge in virtue ethics, see Philippa Foot, Virtues and Vices (Oxford: Clarendon Press and Oxford University Press, 2002), 4–6. Also see Julia Annas, “Virtue Ethics,” 514–534. 181 Foerster, “εὐσεβής, εὐσέβεια, εὐσεβέω,” 178. In the virtue-ethical analysis below, I will argue that this concept in the Greek sphere is represented in Titus, but the difference only lies in its grounding on the Christ-event. Self-control appears in about five places in Titus (e. g. Titus 1:8; 2:2), and is one of the virtues we will study. 182 Foerster, “εὐσεβής, εὐσέβεια, εὐσεβέω,” 182–184. Virtue ethics concerns itself with the totality of a person’s life and common place morality of a person, not some moral actions or dilemma. See Donelson, Pseudepigraphy, 129–133. Donelson mentions how some scholars have argued that the author of the PE had nothing but his own sense of piety which was familiar and expresses itself in commonplace ethics. He was only a good churchman without his own system, theology or ethics, which is why he drew from many traditions in unsystematic, copyand-paste manner, if he thought it would advance his ethics. This accounts for the several enthymemes in his ethical argumentation. 183 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 137, citing Norbert Brox, Die Pastoralbriefe, Regensburger Neues Testament (Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet, 1968), 174–177.

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or reverent behavior; “it is the response of faith, but that which is appropriate in the later church’s post-charismatic situation.”184 Hermann von Lips introduces a new idea into the interpretation of εὐσέβεια, namely, the connection between “godliness” and “knowledge.”185 He demonstrates this connection from both Hellenistic Jewish and Greco-Roman sources but holds that the Greek concept was more prevalent in its function in the PE.186 In Hellenistic vocabulary, Lips finds that εὐσέβεια denoted an attitude of general respect or reverence towards elders, the dead, fatherland, rulers, masters, etc.187 He further tries to interpret the term based on all its occurrences in the PE. Judging from passages such as 1 Tim 6:5–6, 2 Tim 3:5 and Titus 1:16, Lips concludes that “the term describes the Christian life from the standpoint of the two inter-related aspects of religious knowledge (Glaubenserkenntnis or Glaubenswahrheit) and corresponding conduct (praktische Verhalten).”188 Roloff argues that Foerster’s interpretation of εὐσέβεια is too narrow. He also does not take up Lips’s idea connecting godliness with knowledge and conduct. For Roloff, “godliness is a visible life lived by the grace of God in all directions.”189 Based on Titus 2:12, he notes the Christian element that has been inserted into the concept, i. e. “the grace teaching us,” but holds that it describes a life which still conforms to Greco-Roman ethical standards, and which serves the Christians’ justification of their place in the world.190 2.3.2 Other Earlier Interpretations not Reported by Marshall Walter Lock (1936) is one earlier scholar whose interpretation of εὐσέβεια is not reported by Marshall, but relevant for the present research. It deserves a mention here in order to indicate how some earlier scholars, even before Foerster, did not take note of the significant role εὐσέβεια plays in the theology and ethics of the PE, but subsumed εὐσέβεια to πίστις. This limits their understanding of the ethics of the PE. Lock regards the use of the preposition κατά in κατ’ εὐσέβειαν, κατὰ πίστιν, κατ’ ἐπιταγήν, and κατ’ κοινὴν πίστιν as giving the standard of the corresponding nouns, but each standard varies according to context. While Lock indicates the relation of the preposition κατά in Titus 1:1 to πίστις, as indicating 184 Marshall,

The Pastoral Epistles, 138. von Lips, Glaube – Gemeinde – Amt: Zum Verständnis der Ordination in den Pastoralbriefen (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1979), 82–83. 186 von Lips, Glaube, 82–83, cited in Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 138. See also Towner, The Goal of Our Instruction, 148. 187 Towner, The Goal of Our Instruction, 148. 188 von Lips, Glaube, 83, 87. See also Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 138. 189 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 138, citing Jürgen Roloff, Der erste Brief an Timotheus, Evangelisch-Katholischer Kommentar zum neuen Testament XV (Zürich, Neukirchen-Vluyn: Benziger and Neukirchner, 1988), 117–118. 190 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 138. 185 Hermann

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those who are “chosen in conformity with the faith,” he does not say anything about its relation to εὐσέβεια in the same verse.191 This leaves a vacuum in his interpretation of Titus 1:1. In Titus 2:12, he only notes that ἀσέβεια, meaning impiety and all wrong thoughts about God and attendant actions (as characteristic of the heathens), is a contrast of εὐσέβεια.192 In general, Lock does not seem to notice the key role εὐσέβεια plays in understanding the theological and ethical perspectives of Titus. Jesse Sell (1982) understands the construction “knowledge of the truth” (“leading to godliness;” Titus 1:1) in all its usages in the PE and Hebrews to mean, in his words, “Christsein,” meaning “everything involved in ‘being Christian.’”193 Knowledge of the truth and godliness involve an understanding of correct Christian doctrine and its expression in one’s way of life. It involves all the elements of soteriology as well.194 A. T. Hanson (1982) asserts that the whole phrase “and their (the elected ones of God) knowledge of the truth which accords with godliness” (Titus 1:1) simply means “orthodox Christian faith.”195 Hanson’s simple but broad interpretation is due to his understanding of the preposition κατά as a term vaguely and loosely used to connect Paul’s office with Christian orthodoxy.196 He argues that “God’s elect” in Titus 1:1 refers to all Christians, devoid of any special emphasis on the doctrine of predestination.197 Hanson’s interpretation of κατά is a typical example of the disadvantage of neglecting linguistic functions of words in a biblical text. Hanson’s neglect of, or simplistic regard of κατά as a vague preposition leads him to a vague and uncritical interpretation of εὐσέβεια and other terms as referring merely to “Christian orthodoxy.”198 However, a careful virtue-ethical reading of κατά and εὐσέ191 Walter Lock, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Pastoral Epistles (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1936), 125. 192 Lock, Pastoral Epistles, 144. 193 Jesse Sell, The Knowledge of the Truth – Two Doctrines: The Book of Thomas the Contender (CG II,7) and the False Teachers in the Pastoral Epistles, Europäische Hochschulschriften XXIII/194 (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1982), 3–7, 79–82. 194  Sell, The Knowledge of the Truth – Two Doctrines, 3–7, 79–82. Matera also notes that while the teaching required in Titus 2:12 may appear highly moralistic to some, it is deeply rooted in the letter’s (and the PE as a whole) understanding of God’s grace and the soteriological reasons for conduct. See Matera, New Testament Ethics, 241. 195 A. T. Hanson, Pastoral Epistles, The New Century Bible Commentary (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982), 169. 196 Hanson, Pastoral Epistles, 169. See also Houlden, Ethics and the New Testament, 63–65, who argues that morality and orthodoxy are the “twin pillars” of the PE author’s outlook. He sees Christian life “most clearly in moral terms.” But Houlden’s conclusion seems to neglect the significant theological and soteriological statements in the letters, especially in Titus. 197 Hanson, Pastoral Epistles, 169. Arland J. Hultgren, I–II Timothy, Titus, 150, says “elect” is a term referring to Christians in general. 198 Scholars who have taken note of the significance of that linguistic element have come up with a more theologically grounded understanding of εὐσέβεια. E. g. Towner, Marshall,

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βεια in Titus shows how their linguistic and theological relevance move beyond mere Christian orthodoxy to a personal faith in Christ and personal virtue, as will be demonstrated in our virtue-ethical analysis in chapter three of this study. Homer A. Kent Jr. (1982) interprets κατά in Titus 1:1 as “in accord with,” introducing the standard or yardstick by which Paul’s apostleship is to be measured. The standard of Paul’s apostleship is “the faith of God’s elect and the knowledge of the truth,” which to Homer, refers to “believers’ personal faith in the revealed truths of salvation.”199 Godliness in Titus 1:1 means reverence towards God, as opposed to ungodliness in Titus 2:12, referring to lack of reverence toward God. The adverb εὐσεβῶς in Titus 2:12 means to live in a godly manner, signifying that “Christian conduct should manifest reverence toward God who provided salvation.”200 Arland J. Hultgren (1984) regards εὐσέβεια in Titus 1:1 as one of the key virtues in the Pastorals, and interprets it as referring to “right belief and right conduct” as twin attributes of the Christian life. Contrary to the εὐσέβεια kind of life, the heretics on the other hand only professed to know God but their deeds did not match their profession.201 Walther Günther (1986) notes that the original meaning of the root σεβ- is “to maintain a distance” by stepping back from someone, and each context gave the reason for maintaining the distance. It later developed the metaphorical meaning of trepidation related to shame, wonder, fear, and later reverence. The words derived from σεβ- were popular in Greek culture and conveyed the idea of devoutness and righteousness in the Greek context, which was evident in one’s holy trepidation, wonder, or admiration as a response to the majesty of things, people, or divine entities.202 One’s country, dreams, parents, heroes, and dead ancestors could be the objects of such reverence. In both Greek and Jewish Hellenistic worlds, εὐσέβεια denoted a moral attitude, which was lacking in earlier NT writings,203 but was later given a Christian connotation in the PE and 2 Peter.204 Günther notes further that faith (πίστις) in the PE, unlike in other NT writings, conveys an ethical nuance and relates to this world. It is more of a virtue in the PE and it means one’s attitude to life. It is only on this basis that

Mounce, Kent, Lock. We will also take note of its function in our virtue-ethical reading below. 199 Homer A. Kent, Jr., The Pastoral Epistles: Studies in 1 and 2 Timothy and Titus (Chicago: Moody Press, 1982), 210. He thinks the Cretan believers’ full knowledge of the truth which had produced godliness will assent or measure the authenticity of Paul’s ministry. 200 Kent, Jr., The Pastoral Epistles, 227–228. 201 Hultgren, I–II Timothy, Titus, 150. 202 Walter Günther, “Godliness, Piety: σέβομαι,” in NIDNTT 2: 91–92. 203 Günther explains that the reason why members of the εὐσέβ word group do not feature in early NT writings is because they were used in reference to non-Christian piety but were later given Christian content in the PE and 2 Peter (Günther, “Godliness, Piety: σέβομαι,” 94–95). 204 Günther, “Godliness, Piety: σέβομαι,” 92.

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the Hellenistic εὐσέβεια can be a faithful rendering of the OT φοβός θεού “fear of God.”205 Lewis R. Donelson (1986) says εὐσέβεια describes the religious lifestyle which the author proposes as “the best way to live the present life as well as being the ticket to eternal rewards.”206 He notes that the PE present salvation at two levels: in this life and the life to come, and virtues are presented not only as prerequisites for eternal life but also as the best way to live here on earth. The virtuous life is thus the only life worth living.207 Donelson traces the root of this idea to Greek philosophers such as Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. The Stoics saw the telos of life as “life in agreement with nature,” which is equivalent to the virtuous life. And virtue itself is the “goal towards which nature guides us.”208 Since the author of Titus has a positive outlook towards the cosmos and its orders in the Christian context, it is appropriate to think that he presents a Christian version of this cosmological telos to mean that the telos of life is life in agreement with God’s revelation in and through Christ (the Christ-event and all its ethical implications). Virtue is that towards which this revelation guides the believers, i. e. godliness in this life, and being in glory with Christ when he returns (cf. Titus 1:1; 2:11–14). This will be discussed further in the virtue-ethical analysis section of this volume. Philip H. Towner’s (1989)209 interpretation will be reported here more elaborately because of its thoroughness and relevance to this study. Towner notes that in diaspora Judaism, the notion of respectable attitude towards the gods is the translation of the Hebrew yir’at, translated in relation to YHWH as ‘fear of the Lord’ or a reverential awe emanating from genuine knowledge of the one true God (cf. LXX Isa 11:2; 33:6; Prov 1:7).210 In 1 Tim 6:3, 5, 6 and 11, a knowledge of God and a correct lifestyle converge in εὐσέβεια.211 From this, a relationship can be established between 2 Tim 3:5 and Titus 1:16: the positive ‘form of godliness’ and the negative ‘claim knowing God but deny him by their actions’ shows that the opponents had a partial understanding of εὐσέβεια. They regarded their knowledge of God (alone) as εὐσέβεια, while the author tries to give the 205 Günther thinks that good works are included in the πιστίς concept in the PE, but not in the sense of justification by works, rather in the context of the outcome of faith (“Godliness, Piety: σέβομαι,” 94–95). 206 Donelson, Pseudepigraphy, 154. 207 Donelson, Pseudepigraphy, 154. 208 Donelson, Pseudepigraphy, 154. 209 Marshall reports Towner’s interpretation (and actually wrote his commentary in collaboration with Towner), but not in the detail we need for our purpose here. Towner’s interpretation is broad and relevant to our virtue-ethical reading so that it should be reported directly, from his own 1989 book The Goal of Our Instruction. 210 Towner, The Goal of Our Instruction, 148. 211 Towner, The Goal of Our Instruction, 150.

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whole of it to mean εὐσέβεια is both knowledge and conduct.212 In another place, Towner mentions that the emphasis in 1 Timothy is placed on εὐσέβεια, where it refers to conduct that is related with the Jewish concept of the fear of the Lord, which was also a familiar concept in Greek moral vocabulary.213 Considering 1 Tim 6:5 and 2 Tim 3:5, Towner draws the following conclusions about εὐσέβεια: first, the false teachers understood εὐσέβεια as consisting only of the knowledge of God or divine things; second, they separated knowledge from ethics/outward behavior (consciously or unconsciously); third, the author thought that their (false teachers) knowledge of God (“form of godliness”) was partial, because they had not allowed it to affect their conduct.214 However, reading the letter to Titus as an individual text suggests that Towner generalizes his interpretation, ascribing to Titus what 1 and 2 Timothy say. Based on Titus, the author did not see the false teachers’ “form of godliness” as only their “knowledge of God.” Instead, it was their teaching with zeal based on a claimed knowledge of God that was their form of godliness (Titus 1:11, 16). Their form of godliness could not have been the knowledge of God because the author does not give room for a possibility of any genuine knowledge of God without right conduct. Even in Titus 1:16, the author does not say that the opponents have knowledge of God but deny its power as in 2 Tim 3:5; rather, he says they “claim” to have knowledge of the truth. This suggests that he does not agree that they have knowledge of God in the first place, but they only claim to have it. The author of Titus implies that the true knowledge of God has inherent “power” which involves both inner and outer aspects of conduct positively. Therefore, living an ungodly life indicates that one’s knowledge of God is only a claim and is not genuine. Moreover, Towner sees the statement “knowledge of the truth leading to godliness” (Titus 1:1) as a technical description of coming to faith in Christ. The uses of the adverb in 2 Tim 3:12 and Titus 2:12 are references to the new existence issued in a particular way of living.215 He sees an implicit idea in the relation between εὐσέβεια and the knowledge of God – that the observable Christian lifestyle in εὐσέβεια has been made possible because of the historical Christ-event and the salvation it brings (1 Tim 3:16; Titus 2:11–14).216 The reference to proper conduct in the preceding verse before the “mystery of godliness” hymn in 1 Tim 3:16 gives even the hymn an ethical tone. The mystery of godliness is the Christ212 Towner,

The Goal of Our Instruction, 148. Marshall, “The Pastoral Epistles,” in The Blackwell Companion to Paul, ed. Stephen Westerholm (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2014), 119. 214 Towner, The Goal of Our Instruction, 149. 215 Towner, The Goal of Our Instruction, 150. Towner notes the en Christoo of 2 Tim 3:12 and the kerygmatic material of Titus 2:11–14. He argues that 2 Tim 3:12 displaces Dibelius and Foerster’s interpretation of εὐσέβεια, namely, that it indicates a compromise to the world in an effort to avoid persecution and gain acceptance (Christian citizenship thesis). 216 Towner, The Goal of Our Instruction, 150. 213 I. Howard

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event and the proclamation of it.217 In 1 Tim 3:16, theology and ethics intersect in the word εὐσέβεια, and it brings about the “convergence of Glaubenserkenntnis and conduct into a single entity.”218 Our virtue-ethical reading of Titus will demonstrate a similar interrelation between knowledge of God and Christian conduct based on Titus 1:1 and 2:12. In these cases, the Christ-event is at the heart of εὐσέβεια, and this manner of life is the yardstick or standard of genuine conversion.219 In Titus 2:12, it shows how God’s redemptive work through the Christ-event is intended to produce a new way of life in contrast to that of the ungodly people of the world. Based on this and the connection Towner identifies in 1 Timothy, it is evident that in the author’s mind, “εὐσέβεια rests upon a soteriological foundation.”220 Regarding the relationship between εὐσέβεια and πίστις, Towner argues that they do not express equivalent ideas. Πίστις conveys the idea of Christian existence in relation to faith, relationship with Christ, and continuing belief in the apostolic teaching, while εὐσέβεια conveys the idea of Christian existence emanating from faith in (and knowledge of) God. In this way, εὐσέβεια does not exclude πίστις, but “incorporates it.”221 Εὐσέβεια in the PE does not convey any special connotation different from other similar concepts in the NT, as such ideas have repeatedly occurred in earlier Pauline letters, argues Towner.222 Regarding the reason why the author uses the εὐσέβεια concept and vocabulary in the PE with so much emphasis, Towner argues, is because the opponents and false teachers had distorted the teaching on soteriology and had propounded a gnosis-oriented Christian living, drawing a thick line between faith and practice as if faith in Christ is only a cognitive exercise. This had negative results for the church, its institutions, and its witness to a pagan world. Even when the false teachers tried to relate faith with praxis, it ended in ascetism or libertinism, which were both misrepresentations of the church. It, therefore, became necessary for the author to engage their own vocabulary in order to correct their wrong teachings about the Christ-event and the nature of Christian living in the present age. The author then tries to show that salvation is both past, present, and future, and it changes the quality of life of believers in this present age. However, since their salvation is not yet consummated, believers are expected to make progress towards the final telos. In this way, using

217 Towner,

The Goal of Our Instruction, 151. The Goal of Our Instruction, 151, contra Lips, Glaube, 84. Lips removes the idea of conduct from ευσέβεια in this context. 219 See Towner, The Goal of Our Instruction, 151. 220 Towner, The Goal of Our Instruction, 152. 221 Towner, The Goal of Our Instruction, 152. By this, Towner reverses Foerster’s subordination of εὐσέβεια under πίστις. See Foerster, “εὐσεβής, εὐσέβεια, εὐσεβέω,” 183. 222 Towner, The Goal of Our Instruction, 152. 218 Towner,

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the εὐσέβεια word group, the author realigned faith, knowledge, and conduct accordingly.223 George W. Knight III (1979, 1992)224 makes a brief comment on εὐσέβεια in Titus 1:1, interpreting it as godly life of one who fears and serves God.225 He agrees with the RSV rendering of κατά in 1:1 as “to further” the faith of God’s elect, implying, in correspondence with Rom 1:5, that Paul’s apostleship is to “bring about the obedience of faith among the Gentiles.”226 Knight sees faith here as used in the “subjective sense of saving faith … (and such) faith is in the purview of that which issues into godliness.”227 He views the conjunction καί as joining ἐπίγνωσιν to πίστιν to be a joint object of the preposition κατά. Noting the presence of the definite article τῆς coming after the noun ἀληθείας and preceding κατ᾽ εὐσέβειαν, Knight argues that the author is emphasizing here that ἀληθεία is “that truth which pertains to or produces εὐσέβεια.”228 This understanding of “the truth” as producing godliness will be picked up and discussed in the virtueethical reading of εὐσέβεια in the next chapter. Knight interprets the adverb εὐσεβῶς in Titus 2:12 as “in a godly manner,” noting that in the literature of the author’s time, it was used in reference to a person’s relation to God. Knight connects this verse with the opening statement in Titus 1:1 “knowledge of the truth that is according to godliness.”229 He further notes that the adverb “godly” in Titus 2:12 characterizes only one thing, namely, living. Godliness is an expression of the Christian life lived in Christ Jesus. In a statement that will be relevant in our virtue-ethical analysis later, Knight says “the godly life stems forth from Christ Jesus and is able to be lived out by the power of Christ Jesus within and working through one. Only the man in Christ Jesus has true εὐσέβεια or may exercise himself toward a fuller realization of it or may live a true εὐσέβεια.”230 Εὐσέβεια in Titus 2:12 is, therefore, both soteriologically and eschatologically founded and oriented.231 Frances Young (1994) opines that εὐσέβεια is of Hellenistic origin and indicates the Hellenistic Judaistic nature of the churches addressed in the PE. It 223 Towner, The Goal of Our Instruction, 152. W. E. Vine, The Epistles to Timothy and Titus (Grand Rapids: Oliphants, 1965), rightly describes the PE in his sub-title as dealing with “faith and conduct.” Similarly, Ben Witherington III, A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary on Titus, 1–2 Timothy and 1–3 John(Downers Grove and Nottingham: IVP, 2006), 1:128 describes the content of Titus 2:1–15 as “behavior and belief.” 224 Marshall does not report Knight’s interpretation of εὐσέβεια. He only reports Knight’s earlier work (1968). Hence, I report his later work here (1979 and 1992). 225 Knight, The Pastoral Epistles, 283. 226 Knight, The Pastoral Epistles, 283.. 227 George W. Knight III, The Faithful Sayings in the Pastoral Letters (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1979), 71. 228 Knight, The Pastoral Epistles, 283. 229 Knight, The Pastoral Epistles, 320. 230 Knight, The Faithful Sayings, 71. 231 Knight, The Faithful Sayings, 71.

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is an equivalent of the biblical “fear of the Lord,” meaning a faith that reflects itself in appropriate lifestyle.232 Frank J. Matera (1996) notes from the perspective of “the grace” teaching towards εὐσέβεια in Titus 2:12 that whatever good works or conduct believers exhibit are not merely outcomes of character training, but only attainable in the life of grace, and “ultimately derive from a divine pedagogy.”233 Matera views εὐσέβεια as moral behavior proceeding from the true knowledge of God.234 Richard B. Hays (1996), focusing on the usage of the word in 1 Timothy, prefers to render εὐσέβεια as “piety” instead of “godliness,” due to its Latin origin pietas. He interprets piety to mean “dutiful reverence.”235 Hays gives this rendering against the background that the moral vision of the PE was not primarily theological,236 neither was it given serious ethical argumentation. Instead, it was primarily aimed to achieve social order among believers and to survive pressures from outside.237 However, contrary to Hay’s argument, our virtue-ethical reading below will demonstrate how both ethical and theological argumentations for the virtues are implicitly embedded in the linguistic elements, theological motifs, and ethical norms in the letter to Titus. 2.3.3 Recent Interpretations from Marshall (1999) to Bray (2019) Marshall’s work, like Towner’s, has critical exegetical thoroughness and relevance to the virtue-ethical reading of Titus in this study. Marshall posits that in Titus 1:1; 2:12; 1 Tim 2:2; 3:16; 4:7; 6:3, 5; 2 Tim 3:5, 12, the word group describes the life or the manner of life that represents true Christianity, synonymous to θεοσέβεια in 1 Tim 2:10.238 The Christ-event is the basis of εὐσέβεια (1 Tim 3:16; 2 Tim 3:12; cf. Titus 2:12), and εὐσέβεια is integrally related to the knowledge of God, the gospel, the truth, and the grace of God (Titus 1:1; 1 Tim 6:3, 5, 6, 11). Godliness presupposes a knowledge of God’s requirements. It does not consist only of cultic acts or even congregational worship, but the whole life of a Christian.239 This concern with the whole of a Christian life instead of spe-

232 Young,

Pastoral Letters, 21, citing Towner, The Goal of Our Instruction, 147–154. New Testament Ethics, 242–243. 234 Matera, New Testament Ethics, 243, citing Towner, The Goal of Our Instruction, 147–152. See Harrington and Keenan, Jesus and Virtue Ethics, 21, for a summary of Matera’s overall conclusions about the shape of NT ethics. 235 Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament, 69–71. 236 Hays (The Moral Vision of the New Testament, 69–71) thinks there is scant theological and ethical argumentation for the ethics of the PE, assuming that there was already a fixed ethical structure that only needed to be faithfully maintained. 237 Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament, 71. 238 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 143. 239 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 143. 233 Matera,

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cific cultic or moral acts gives εὐσέβεια a particularly virtue-ethical posture, as will be discussed later.240 Godliness is a thorough description of life which involves not only the divine but also human agency. The individual is to decide to pursue εὐσέβεια actively and consciously (1 Tim 4:7; Titus 2:12).241 Marshall concisely but succinctly describes εὐσέβεια in the PE as “a comprehensive term for the Christian life, combining inner and outer dimensions, and is no more a virtue than are faith and love which are equally comprehensive terms for the characteristics of Christian living.”242 He further notes that even though in 1 Tim 6:11 and Titus 2:12, godliness is one of the qualities or manners of life to be lived, or one characteristic of a Christian life, it does not warrant the argument that it is simply one of the virtues, because there is a strong tendency to describe the whole of life in Christ as godliness.243 When compared to Gal 5:22–23, faith and love do not assume any special status more than the other characteristics of the life that is controlled by the Spirit.244 I limit Mounce’s (2000) interpretation of godliness to Titus 1:1 only because it is directly relevant to our inquiry. Mounce argues that the main question in understanding “the faith of God’s elect and the knowledge of the truth towards godliness” (Titus 1:1) lies in understanding the meaning of the two occurrences of κατά.245 Κατά here indicates purpose,246 which informs his translation of κατ᾽ εὐσέβειαν as “produces godliness.” This rendering represents a common theme in the PE that right belief and right behavior inherently go together.247 Mounce identifies an implicit trilogy in Titus 1:1, namely, faith, knowledge (the intellectual understanding of the faith), and godliness (the corresponding be240 Virtue

ethics bears a kind of perfectionism: perfectionism in the sense of “viewing all aspects of life as morally relevant and in calling everyone to growth in every area of life.” Chan, Biblical Ethics in the 21st Century, 84, citing Kotva, 39. Chan says virtue ethics is a proactive ethical theory that involves one’s entire life and identity. 241 See Julia Annas, “Virtue Ethics,” 514–534, for a discussion on the relation of virtue ethics with human agency and rationality. See Stanley B. Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), 38–44, for a discussion on “Character and Agency,” and 121–130, for a discussion on the place of decision in virtue approach to morality. Also see Kyle B. Wells, Grace and Agency in Paul and Second Temple Judaism: Interpreting the Transformation of the Heart (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2015), 16, 295–300, etc. for a summary of the integration and inseparability of divine grace and moral competence in Pauline theology and ethics, which I think is faithfully represented in Titus. 242 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 143. 243 See also Towner, The Goal of Our Instruction, 152. He says godliness incorporates faith, and not faith incorporating godliness. 244 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 143, cf. Mott, Greek Ethics and Christian Conversion, 22–48. 245 Huizenga (Moral Education, 268) also takes each κατά with the accusative in Titus 1:1–3 as conveying a sense of purpose, agreeing with Smyth, Greek Grammar, 1690. 246 We shall argue in our reading that it does not only indicate purpose, but also a process. 247 Mounce, The Pastoral Epistles, 380.

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havior that proceeds from faith). The trilogy is presented as necessary elements of faith and form the purpose and goal of Paul’s ministry.248 Ἀλήθεια “truth” is a technical term for “the gospel” in the PE, which underscores the need to understand the content of the preached message. This trilogy encapsulates Paul’s solution to the problems in the churches addressed in the PE.249 Mounce further notes that there are many similarities between 1 Timothy and Titus, but that Titus is “more concerned with the basic ingredients of Christianity,”250 e. g. faith and obedience, and the opening verses of the letter highlight these emphases.251 One such highlight is the occurrence of εὐσέβεια in Titus 1:1, being “a technical term in the Pastoral Epistles for the total commitment of one’s life to God with emphasis on the practical outworking of that faith.”252 Fiore (2007) questions Dibelius’ argument for a bourgeois Christianity and its interpretation of piety in relation to it.253 Among popular Greek philosophers, notes Fiore, εὐσέβεια came to mean “knowledge of divine worship” and ἀσέβεια meant “ignorance of divine worship,” while in Gnostic texts it meant “piety with knowledge.”254 In the diaspora Jewish translation of the concept in the LXX, it is “fear of the Lord” or “reverential awe” in passages where it is related with the knowledge of God (Isa 11:2; 33:6; Prov 1:7).255 The false teachers, as presented in Titus 1:16, hold their knowledge of God alone as piety, either divorcing ethics from theology or using their misguided theology to indulge in immoral behaviors. The author, therefore, falsifies this way of life and reinstates that true piety manifests itself in corresponding deeds.256 In Titus 2:12–14, Fiore establishes a link between “the present devout life in this age, rendered pure of lawlessness” with the “hope of the Parousia.”257 Similarly, recognizing the truth in hope of eternal life is found in Titus 1:1.258 Overall, Fiore argues that piety, as presented in Titus and the PE as a whole, includes the intellectual aspect of faith (which is correct doctrine) and equally sees the Christian life as a visible outcome of that correct knowledge of God. What makes this kind of life possible is the saving act of Jesus Christ which brings new life. This new life, though present here, also looks ahead to the coming Parousia 248 Mounce,

The Pastoral Epistles, 379. The Pastoral Epistles, 379. 250 Mounce, The Pastoral Epistles, 380. 251 By this, Mounce comes closer to my argument below that the statement “knowledge of the truth that leads to godliness” in Titus 1:1 sets the ethical agendum of the whole text. 252 Mounce, The Pastoral Epistles, 380. 253 Fiore, The Pastoral Epistles, 58. 254 Fiore, The Pastoral Epistles, 58. 255 Fiore, The Pastoral Epistles, 58. 256 Fiore, The Pastoral Epistles, 58. I have argued above that what the author regards in Timothy as “form of godliness” is in Titus broader than mere “knowledge of God” without corresponding conduct. It includes primarily their zealous teaching based on a claimed knowledge. 257 Fiore, The Pastoral Epistles, 58. 258 Fiore, The Pastoral Epistles, 58. 249 Mounce,

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and the following eternal life with hope.259 Fiore, therefore, concludes that the author of the PE employs this concept of εὐσέβεια because it basically addresses and corrects the erroneous teachings and lifestyle of the false teachers, which had adverse negative effects on the church.260 Harrington and Keenan (2010)261 argue that εὐσέβεια is a concept that provides a good connection between the so-called theological virtues, summarized as faith, hope and love, and the ‘natural’ virtues, summarized in the cardinal virtues: courage,262 temperance, and justice.263 The theological virtues are more of gifts from God than human accomplishment, and they provide a proper theological context for pursuance of other virtues and avoidance of the vices.264 Harrington and Keenan see in Titus 2:11–14 a combination of different backgrounds as follows: Christian theological background (the grace of God), Roman imperial cult (bringing salvation to all … our great God and Savior), Jewish eschatology (in the present age), and the classical moral tradition (temperance, justice, and piety). They, therefore, see this passage as an evidence of an emerging urban Christianity in the late first and early second centuries, characterized by bringing together various elements from various backgrounds to create theological vocabularies and concepts “for expressing the effects of the Christ-event and for helping Christians actualize the gospel.”265 They argue that it is in this context that εὐσέβεια finds its place into the Christian vocabulary, as attested by its frequent use in the PE. However, Harrington and Keenan’s argument that the frequent appearance of εὐσέβεια in the PE is evidence of an emerging urban Christianity in the early church needs to be contested. Such an argument would have been more acceptable if εὐσέβεια was not already a familiar word in other traditions but was created as a necessity born out of the emerging urban Christianity, and the need to explain the Christ-event and the Christian life as a whole. Rather, I contend, in agreement with Towner, that its frequent use is due to the frequency of its misuse 259 Fiore,

The Pastoral Epistles, 58. The Pastoral Epistles, 58. I have argued above that the author engages the term not only for polemical purposes, but because it had developed to include both inner and outer aspects and the totality of life – therefore suitable to represent the Christ-event and its lifechanging effect on a person. 261 Both Harrington and Keenan are virtue ethicists but have made only very little (passing) mention of virtue ethics in the PE, least of all in Titus. And where they mention the PE, they read them as a corpus, not as distinct texts as this research seeks to do. Their virtue-ethical study has focused largely on the Gospels and the so-called authentic Pauline letters. But our study focuses primarily on virtue ethics in Titus as an individual text, with a different and new methodology compared to that of Harrington and Keenan. 262 Horn, “Tugend,” 387, describes courage (German: Tapferkeit) among the cardinal virtues as “Zivilcourage,” which relates to the courage to hold on to one’s opinion, and the courage to endure situations like sickness, guilt, sorrow, and so on. 263 Harrington and Keenan, Paul and Virtue Ethics, 118–119. 264 Harrington and Keenan, Paul and Virtue Ethics, 119. 265 Harrington and Keenan, Paul and Virtue Ethics, 119. 260 Fiore,

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by the opponents or false teachers. This is most evident in reading Titus as an individual text. As a corrective, the author makes sure that anywhere he uses the term εὐσέβεια, it is grounded on the Christ-event, with implicit polemical undertones.266 Nevertheless, much more than polemics, the author finds εὐσέβεια an appropriate term because the meaning had developed at that time to include all aspects of a person’s life, which is a good representation of the effect of the Christ-event on the believer. Douglas Wilson (2016), using hermeneutical analogies, notes that “knowledge of the truth” in Titus 1:1 is only one side of the coin, while the other side of the coin is “godliness.”267 Wilson’s “coin” analogy underscores the ethical and theological connectedness of these terminologies in Titus 1:1. Understanding “truth” here as “sound doctrine” or the outcome of it, Wilson argues that it is wrong to suppose that “sound doctrine” automatically brings about “godliness,” because “it is possible to have a sound head and a rotten heart.”268 However, Wilson’s understanding of “truth” here as “sound doctrine” is questionable. Its connection with “faith,” which precedes it here, suggests that “truth” here refers to the inner, personal, and appreciative awareness and consciousness of the individual believer’s new life and identity in Christ. This argument is strengthened when we note, as Larry J. Perkins asserts, that “the qualification of πίστις with ἐκλεκτῶν indicates that this anarthrous usage refers to belief placed in Christ by specific people rather than the content of the Christian gospel” (Titus 1:1).269 “Sound doctrine,” referring to the continuous instruction that Titus is to give, is to enable the believers to develop and “bring out” this inner and spiritual reality, “truth” in general life, which in other words is “godliness.” This argument is further made plausible by considering the fact that “the grace” (referring to the Christ-event and its ethical implications on the believer) continues to train believers to renounce impiety or ungodliness and to live self-controlled, just, and godly lives. “Knowledge of the truth” in Titus 1:1, therefore, involves both the “spiritual” and cognitive dimensions of knowledge. Andreas Köstenberger (2017), like many other commentators, notes that εὐσέβεια “godliness” or “piety” was a prevalent concept in Greco-Roman virtue lists and inscriptions. Generally, it referred to reverence, and specifically, it referred to a kind of behavior or cultic activities that pleased the gods.270 The 266 For a general discussion on the polemic of the PE, see Lloyd K. Pietersen, The Polemic of the Pastorals: A Sociological Examination of the Development of Pauline Christianity (London, New York: T&T Clark, 2004). 267 Douglas Wilson, The Pillar of the Truth: A Commentary on the Pastoral Epistles: 1 Timothy, 2 Timothy, Titus (Moscow, ID: Canon Press, 2016), 108. 268 Wilson, The Pillar of the Truth, 108, paraphrasing William Gurnall. 269 Larry J. Perkins, The Pastoral Epistles: A Handbook on the Greek Text (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2017), 243. 270 Köstenberger, 1–2 Timothy & Titus, 498.

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PE’s exceptional emphasis on the virtue of piety is evident in the high number of occurrences of the εὐσέβ-word group in the PE while in the rest of the NT, it occurs only in 2 Peter and Acts (Acts 3:12; 10:2, 7; 17:23; 2 Pet 1:3, 6, 7; 2:9; 3:11).271 New Testament scholars have often understood and interpreted the term in the light of its Hellenistic usage and as indicating the early church’s accommodation to secular cultural morality, because of the prevalence of the term in Greco-Roman culture and its scarce usage in the NT. Köstenberger, however, argues against this interpretation because it ignores the OT and Apocryphal use of the term. Moreover, he argues, while the PE made effort to contextualize the Christian faith in its Hellenistic milieu, their usage of the term is simultaneously grounded in both the OT and apostolic traditions that grant them significant distinction from the Hellenistic culture.272 In the PE, the word group that translates as “godliness” conveys a Gentile version of the OT “fear of the Lord.”273 Godliness in the PE, therefore, “refers to a particular way of living that reflects knowing God and being in a close, reverent relationship with him.”274 According to Köstenberger, the special usage of εὐσέβεια in the PE is seen in the way that the author normally uses it only in specific situations, and it does not normally appear among the list of virtues, except in 1 Tim 6:11 and Titus 2:12. Köstenberger agrees with Towner who argues that godliness should not be understood as simply one of the virtues, because “the whole of the data strongly confirms its function of describing, in one term, authentic Christian existence as the interplay of the knowledge of God (variously expressed) and its observable outworking in behavior that is appropriate to that knowledge.”275 Using different methodologies and from different perspectives from Köstenberger, Towner, and others, the virtue-ethical analysis of the letter to Titus in this study also acknowledges the centrality or specialty of εὐσέβεια in the PE. Our virtue-ethical analysis in chapter three below will show how the author, employing linguistic elements, theological motifs, and ethical norms and maxims, uses εὐσέβεια as the main virtue. Moreover, Köstenberger notes the connection between knowledge and conduct in the PE, seeing godliness as stemming from the right knowledge of God.276 He summarizes his understanding of the use of godliness in the PE as “a life lived in light of Christ’s first and second comings, a life that not only professes knowledge of God but demonstrates that knowledge in godly, Christian behavior.”277 271 Köstenberger,

1–2 Timothy & Titus, 498–499. 1–2 Timothy & Titus, 499. 273 Köstenberger, 1–2 Timothy & Titus, 499. 274 Köstenberger, 1–2 Timothy & Titus, 499, citing Towner, Letters to Timothy and Titus, 173. 275 Köstenberger, 1–2 Timothy & Titus, 499, n. 453, citing Towner, Letters to Timothy and Titus, 174. 276 Köstenberger, 1–2 Timothy & Titus, 503. 277 Köstenberger, 1–2 Timothy & Titus, 503. 272 Köstenberger,

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Narrowing our focus to Titus, Köstenberger understands the use of εὐσέβεια in Titus 1:1 as one of the goals of the Christian life.278 However, this study understands it as not just one of the goals, but “the (main) goal” of the Christian life, as far as its use in the letter to Titus is concerned, as will be demonstrated in our virtue-ethical analysis below. Köstenberger notes that the sequence of the three terms “knowledge, truth, and godliness” (Titus 1:1) is that “conversion is the pathway to knowledge” of the truth. The dictum credo ut intellegam “faith seeking understanding,”279 commonly attributed to Augustine and others, perfectly illustrates the connection between faith and knowledge in Titus 1:1.280 But this knowledge of the truth is not an end in itself, but a means to an end. The end is, therefore, godliness. Godliness is the end because it represents “mature Christian character.”281 Furthermore, the triad “sensible, righteous, and godly” in Titus 2:12, Köstenberger asserts, “contextualizes Christian teaching in a Greek environment where these kinds of virtues were highly esteemed.”282 The grounding of εὐσέβεια on the Christevent in Titus 2:11–12 shows the connection between ethics and eschatology.283 Acquiring and developing virtuous character as the goal of παιδεία (education) was a popular concept in Greek culture. However, the author of Titus shows the difference between Christian teaching and Greek-philosophical teaching by showing that instead of human efforts, it is divine grace that enables and requires virtuous living. Even though Köstenberger does not describe the function of godliness in this verse in virtue-ethical terms, his interpretation of godliness as “the end” to which faith or conversion and the knowledge of the truth leads correlates with the virtue-ethical concept of a moral telos, as will be discussed extensively in our virtue-ethical analysis below. Christopher T. Hoklotubbe (2017) notes that in the PE, εὐσέβεια “pietas, piety” is the “ideal way of life” (1 Tim 2:2; 4:7; 2 Tim 3:12; Titus 2:12).284 This ideal is in accordance with proper instruction or sound teaching (1 Tim 6:3) and the “truth” (Titus 1:1). Hoklotubbe argues that the use of “piety” in the PE is polemical (1 Tim 3:16; Titus 1:1; 2:12), in the same way that the question of what constitutes true piety was a hot topic of debate among different philosophical schools, who also advanced their own concepts of piety polemically.285 Piety was regarded in high esteem in the Roman culture because it was associated with 278 Köstenberger,

1–2 Timothy & Titus, 499. 1–2 Timothy & Titus, 308, n. 60. 280 Köstenberger, 1–2 Timothy & Titus, 307–308. 281 Köstenberger, 1–2 Timothy & Titus, 308. 282 Köstenberger, 1–2 Timothy & Titus, 338. 283 Köstenberger, 1–2 Timothy & Titus, 499. 284 T. Christopher Hoklotubbe, Civilized Piety: The Rhetoric of “Pietas” in the Pastoral Epistles and the Roman Empire (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2017), 4. 285 Hoklotubbe, Civilized Piety, 212. 279 Köstenberger,

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imperial domination.286 It was regarded as the essential symbol of “social prosperity and peace within both the microcosm of the household and the macrocosm of the empire.”287 Anyone who possessed piety as a virtue was considered to in part provide a solution to the ills of the household and the empire. It is from this background, argues Hoklotubbe, that the author of the PE appropriates (e. g. in Titus 2:11–12) the wider cultural currency of piety in order to “naturalize and build consensus around his vision of an ekklesia that is persuasive to insiders and nonoffensive and even compelling to outsiders.”288 Robert W. Yarbrough (2018) argues that while it is not clear why the euseb‑ word group is used more frequently in the PE than other parts of the NT, it can be said that εὐσέβεια aligns well with the PE’s emphasis on God and Christ as “savior.”289 He argues further that despite some differences, godliness in the PE is situated within the semantic field of other NT expressions that describe practical Christian life as a result of the believer’s faith in Christ and communion with God. Moreover, the use of godliness in the PE is distinct from that of moralism.290 Specifically, godliness in the PE is not some vague and random piety, neither is it abstract. Instead, its norm is the knowledge of the truth, and it affects the believer’s day-to-day life, relationships, conduct, and general lifestyle.291 Gerald Bray (2019) notes that the word εὐσέβεια “godliness or piety” is a description of what was expected of both Jews and pagans in observation their religious rites. According to Bray, Paul saw nothing wrong with the basic idea of godliness, as he himself wanted to be godly, except that Christian godliness was different from Jewish godliness in the sense that Christian godliness “was not the correct performance of certain rituals, even those that had been mandated by God in the law of Moses, that made a person ‘godly,’ but a spiritual rebirth that could only come through a personal encounter with God by faith in Jesus Christ.”292 Since Christ is the truth, the elect come to know what true godliness is by knowing Christ, thereby obeying him and submitting to his lordship. The goal of the Christian godliness is eternal life, which is part of the elect’s reality now, but awaiting consummation in the eschaton.293 Moreover, Bray describes godliness as being turned towards God, and that it is fundamental to the believer.294 286 Hoklotubbe,

Civilized Piety, 102. Civilized Piety, 102. 288 Hoklotubbe, Civilized Piety, 102. 289 Robert W. Yarbrough, The Letters to Timothy and Titus (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2018), 63. 290 Yarbrough, The Letters to Timothy and Titus, 63–64. 291 Yarbrough, The Letters to Timothy and Titus, 469. 292 Bray, The Pastoral Epistles, 468. 293 Bray, Pastoral Epistles, 468. 294 Bray, Pastoral Epistles, 523. 287 Hoklotubbe,

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Summary and conclusion: The following six observations and conclusions can be made from the history of interpretation of εὐσέβεια as discussed above. First, recent scholars recognize or ascribe more theological or soteriological background to εὐσέβεια than earlier scholars. Second, both earlier and recent interpreters acknowledge the secular origin of εὐσέβεια, but recent scholars recognize the Christian distinctive it assumes in the PE more than earlier interpreters. This distinctiveness is significant to our virtue-ethical reading of Titus because it shows how recent scholars are beginning to associate the virtues in the PE with the transformative, identity-defining and character-forming concept of the Christ-event. Third, recent scholars are increasingly taking into consideration the OT background(s) of the word, unlike earlier interpreters who mostly focused only on the Greek-philosophical background. The inclusion of the OT background has possibly contributed to the gradual shift from the “Christian citizenship” interpretation to a more theological one, especially the concepts of “godliness and knowledge” being connected with the OT’s concept of fear of and knowledge of God. Fourth, there is an increasing awareness that the virtues in the PE were not merely a set of rules for action, but patterns of character for living the Christian life in its entirety. This could be an indication of a growing interest and awareness of virtue approaches in the study of NT ethics. Fifth, most, if not all, of the scholars have read the norm εὐσέβεια in Titus with three lenses or against three backgrounds, at the disadvantage of Titus: against the background of Greco-Roman and Hellenistic Jewish culture, against the background of the socalled authentic Pauline letters, and against the background of 1 and 2 Timothy, regarding the Pastoral Letters as a corpus. The virtue-ethical reading adopted in this research, however, deviates from this approach and seeks to “liberate” Titus from these backgrounds by reading it as an individual text in its own right. Sixth, earlier interpreters mostly saw godliness only in relation to different specified aspects of life, e. g. worship to the gods, respect to rulers and authorities, and the like. Conversely, recent interpreters are increasingly taking note of how the virtue εὐσέβεια not only deals with some aspects of a person’s life, but with its totality. It could be argued that some of the earlier interpreters were mostly influenced by Dibelius’ “Christian citizenship”295 interpretation while recent scholars are increasingly broadening the perspective to mean the motivation was not just for good citizenship to maintain peace, but an attempt to live a genuine Christian life for what it is. Such a genuine Christian life automatically and simultaneously serves eschatological and citizenship (social) concerns. This is a significant shift that probably illustrates the gradual influence of virtue ethics (since its resurgence in 1958) on recent PE and New Testatment 295 See Dibelius and Conzelmann, Pastoral Epistles, 39. Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 136. Towner, The Goal of Our Instruction, 147.

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ethics scholars respectively. It suggests that the virtue-ethical hermeneutic is increasingly gaining grounds in NT ethics scholarship. Even though recent biblical interpreters do not explicitly approach biblical ethics from a virtue framework, they recover some of the virtue-ethical elements that earlier interpreters seemed to have neglected. Hence, this is the right time, and the stage is set, for a virtueethical reading of whole corpus of NT texts. In this light, this book undertakes a virtue-ethical interpretation of the letter to Titus and as such could serve as a paradigm and provide a comprehensive methodology for a virtue-ethical reading of other biblical texts.

2.4 Καλὰ ἔργα: History of Interpretation This unit reports how select scholars have interpreted the norm “good works” in the letter to Titus,296 from Donelson’s interpretation (1986) to Bray’s interpretation (2019). Reporting from 1986 to the present makes it possible to see how directly or indirectly the revival of interest in virtue ethics from 1958297 influences the interpretations of biblical ethical norms. However, since it is not possible to give a detailed report of each scholar’s interpretation, we will only summarize and where applicable, highlight aspects of their interpretation that are relevant to the virtue-ethical interpretation this project undertakes. Donelson (1986) considers the place of good works in the PE to be so central that “in the end (at the second epiphany) everything depends upon the question whether one practiced good works or not. Everything else is a means to that end.”298 He further notes that the Christ-event, through baptism and the gift of the Holy Spirit, accomplishes an “anthropological transformation” that is oriented towards good works. Such a connection between baptism, the Spirit, and good works is familiar in early Christianity (cf. Eph 2:10).299 The connection between good works and the Christ-event and its anthropological transformative function will be more elaborately discussed in our analyses of the virtue-ethical elements in the letter to Titus.

296 Nevertheless, since most of the scholars treat the Pastoral Letters as a corpus, they therefore do not interpret good works in Titus as an individual text. Treating them as a corpus makes it difficult to identify the ethical structure of good works in Titus as an individual text. This is one reason why this research approaches the letters as individual texts. In this history of interpretation, we will keep the focus on Titus. Nevertheless, where the scholars treat them as a corpus and it is difficult to extract Titus alone, it will be reported as such. 297 See Van Hooft, introduction to The Handbook of Virtue Ethics, 2. Van Hooft notes that scholarly interest in virtue ethics was revived starting with G. E. M. Anscombe’s article in 1958 and later followed by Alasdair MacIntyre and others. 298 Donelson, Pseudepigraphy, 196. 299 Donelson, Pseudepigraphy, 196.

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Quinn (1990) notes that the use of ἔργα300 in Titus 1:16 and 3:5 (cf. 2 Tim 1:9) without a modifier such as ἀγαθά/καλά does not result in holiness301 and may be considered vicious (cf. 2 Tim 4:4).302 These two occurrences in relation to the opponents (Titus 1:16) and pre-conversion morality (Titus 3:5) confirm that without the modifier, ἔργα could connote vices rather than virtues.303 Quinn describes the reference to the opponents as those who deny God by their own deeds and who do not stand the test of any good works (1:16) as the climax of the author’s indictment of the opponents (Titus 1:9–16). While the opponents took pride in “their superfluity of good works,” the author of Titus discredits them of any good works.304 The author then presents his own account of good works in Titus chapters 2 and 3. Christian good works, according to the author, are the works which find their basis on grace and faith (cf. 2:14; 3:4–7; 2 Tim 3:17). Although such good works may have superficial resemblance to those done by unbelievers, “they are basically as different as gold and brass.”305 In Titus 2:7, Titus is urged to offer himself as a pattern of good works. More than doing good works along with the young men, Titus is to do good works that would attract the young men to do the same. The addition of the modifier “good or fine” here, unlike the first appearance of “deeds/works” in Titus 1:16, gives a positive nuance to works, referring to good and visibly attractive works. Nevertheless, Titus being a pattern of good works is also based on the Christ-event.306 In a general sense, Quinn notes that it is a presupposition in the PE that believers do “fine deeds.” Their fine deeds or good works would open a possibility for unbelievers to assess such deeds and to engage in dialogue with them about the origin and end of their conduct. Such a dialogue would then lead to an understanding of the Christ-event as the basis of the believer’s good deeds (cf. Titus 2:11–15; 3:4–7).307 According to Quinn, the use of ζηλωτὴν καλῶν ἔργων “zealot for good works” (Titus 2:14) in a Christian confessional context indicates not only a commit300 Quinn uses the transliterated form of the Greek words. However, we use the Greek fonts here for consistency with other uses of Greek fonts in this book. 301 J. Ayodeji Adewuya, Holiness in the Letters of Paul: The Necessary Response to the Gospel (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2016), 155, sees a link between “godliness” and “holiness” in the PE and describes εὐσέβεια “godliness” in the PE as a “holiness terminology.” 302 Quinn, The Letter to Titus, 103–104. 303 See Quinn, The Letter to Titus, 114–116. Quinn describes the opponents (Jewish Christians) as “neither Christian nor Jewish” (114) because they were against the pagan converts who did not carry out the prescriptions of the Torah. 304 Quinn, The Letter to Titus, 115. 305 Quinn, The Letter to Titus, 116. Quinn compares the critique of the opponents here to the critique of pagans in Rom 1:28. The two passages illustrate that resisting God’s revelation perverts human knowledge, be it that of pagans or Jews. Consequently, it “pollutes human conduct in relation to all creatures” (116). 306 Quinn, The Letter to Titus, 139. 307 Quinn, The Letter to Titus, 139–141.

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ment to “the ethical interest of the Hellenistic world but also a repudiation of a Palestinian political activism that promised to compromise the Jewish-Christian community envisioned by the letter to Titus.”308 Quinn, therefore, describes the good works endorsed in Titus 2:14 as having “intra-Christian repercussions.”309 By insisting on the inner effect of the Christ-event and its corresponding visible conducts, the PE balance the tension between the emphasis on visible good deeds and the risk of hypocrisy on the one hand, and the emphasis on inner good deeds and the risk of non-missional Christianity on the other hand.310 Moreover, Quinn tries to identify the concrete actions that constitute the content of “good deeds” in the PE. He notes that the singular ἔργον in Titus 1:16 refers to the work of ecclesial ministry. The καλὰ ἔργα in Titus 2:7 include Titus’s works of teaching and preaching which are “visible, impartial, respectable, wholesome, unimpeachable.”311 In Titus 3:8 and 14, the general instruction to take the lead in good deeds is exemplified in the material support to be given to the missionaries who would visit the Cretan churches.312 The content of ἔργον ἀγαθόν is more general because of its frequent use with πᾶν “every,” and is therefore difficult to specify, compared to καλὰ ἔργα. Nevertheless, it refers to good works done in everyday commonplace life.313 Quinn summarizes that in the PE, the good deeds are God’s deeds, not “our works.” Those works which are qualified as “ours” are criticized and rendered useless (cf. Titus 3:5; 2 Tim 1:9). Καλὰ/ἀγαθά ἔργα, referring to good deeds of the believer, are never qualified as “ours” or “yours.” In the real sense, the believer does not “do” these works, yet they are physically and attractively good. The good works refer to works of charity and the honest works the believer does in everyday life (cf. Titus 1:16; 3:1).314 Quinn’s interpretation of the use of good works in Titus is relevant to our reading of Titus virtue-ethically, especially how he notices the inner to outer dimensions of the good works and how they relate to everyday and common308 Quinn,

The Letter to Titus, 175. The Letter to Titus, 175. Quinn notes the connection between the use of good works in Titus 2:14 and Titus 3:5. That of Titus 3:5 has Pauline nuances of justification by faith, not by any works believers have done (cf. Titus 1:16; 2 Tim 4:14; Luke 11:48). Without mentioning “works of the Law” as in authentic Pauline letters, the Pastoral Epistles’ unqualified ἔργα is taken in a similar negative sense. Hence, whenever the PE refer to deeds in a good sense, they employ the qualifier “good” (ἀγαθός or καλός). Notable is the fact that these same terms are the most basic terms for expressing ethical values in the Hellenistic world (Quinn, The Letter to Titus, 175). 310 See Quinn, The Letter to Titus, 175–176. 311 Quinn, The Letter to Titus, 176. 312 Quinn, The Letter to Titus, 176. Similar content of good works the other Pastoral Letters include that in 1 Tim 5:10, where the fine deeds of a qualified widow include bringing up her family well, hospitality, helping the oppressed, etc. In 1 Tim 6:17–18, the rich are to do good and be rich in “good deeds” such as generosity and readiness to share their goods. 313 Quinn, The Letter to Titus, 176. 314 Quinn, The Letter to Titus, 176. 309 Quinn,

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place morality. Our virtue-ethical analysis below will take note of additional virtue-ethical features that Quinn does not mention. According to Knight (1992), the “deeds” by which the opponents deny God (Titus 1:16), even though not explicitly mentioned in Titus, may be similar to the ascetic practices described in 1 Tim 4:1–4. By such ascetic practices, the opponents “reject what God gives to be gratefully received, deny the Creator’s goodness, and show that they do not really know him who made all things good.”315 He notes further that in Titus 2:7, Titus is to be an example of good works to the younger men, but perhaps also to all the groups, noting the use of ἡμῶν “us” in verse 8 and 1 Tim 4:12.316 Knight argues that the good works in Titus 2:1–10 and the reference to zeal for good works in Titus 2:14 is fully Pauline (cf. 1 Cor 3:13–14; 2 Cor 9:8; Eph 2:10; Col 1:10; 2 Thess 2:17), showing good works as the proper effect of the Christevent.317 He regards the instruction to the believers to “be ready for every good work” in Titus 3:1 also as fully and exclusively Pauline, occurring eight times.318 The use of πᾶν in the singular form specifies every individual good work and implies a broad possibility of application. The believers’ being “ready” also conveys the nuance of being ready and willing to do any good work.319 Knight’s note that the believers are to keep learning to do good deeds through the practical activity of doing good works (Titus 3:14) is relevant for our virtueethical reading of Titus.320 Even though virtue ethics focuses more on the morality of persons than actions, it regards concrete moral actions as a means of developing character that leads one towards his or her telos. Such a concept of learning virtues by practice is a continuous lifetime process in the same way that the present imperative verb μανθανέτωσαν “let them learn” (Titus 3:14) indicates a continuous process. Similar to Quinn, Bassler (1996)321 also notes that the contrast with the opponents in Titus reaches its climax in the phrase “zealous for good deeds” (Titus 2:14). The teachings of the opponents, described as myths rooted in Jewish traditions, only produces people who are unfit for any good work (Titus 1:16), while the sound teachings of the author, based on the Christ-event, produces people who are “zealous for every good work.” Bassler notes that the instruction to be self-controlled or sensible “in all aspects” in Titus 2:7 may reinforce the in315 Knight, The Pastoral Epistles, 303. Regarding the identity of the opponents, Knight argues that they are not outsiders but within the Christian community. He argues that the errors of the opponents described in Titus are not typical of Jews. He maintains that Paul normally deals with false teachers within, not outside the church, and this is the same case here (304). 316 Knight, The Pastoral Epistles, 311. 317 Knight, The Pastoral Epistles, 328. 318 Knight, The Pastoral Epistles, 333. 319 Knight, The Pastoral Epistles, 333. 320 Knight, The Pastoral Epistles, 333. 321 See Bassler, 1 Timothy, 2 Timothy and Titus.

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struction for young men in verse 6 instead of the instructions to Titus in verse 7. The density of the Greek here makes it difficult to determine, she concludes.322 Moreover, Bassler notes that the reference to God’s salvation not because of righteous works provides a good balance to the recurrent mention of good works in Titus.323 The notion of salvation and grace bestowed apart from works of righteousness, Bassler argues, is in tandem with the Pauline message of grace (cf. Rom 3:24, 28; 4:2–5; 11:16; Gal 2:16, 21; Eph 2:8–9; 1 Tim 1:13–14; 2 Tim 1:9). In agreement with Paul, the author states that “good works result from, and do not precede or evoke, God’s grace.”324 The reference to good works in Titus 3:14 repeats 3:8 but in a context of concrete hospitality as good work. However, this hospitality is not in “urgent needs” but “necessary needs,” referring to the necessities of life that the traveling Christian workers would need.325 Such good works are what it means to be productive or fruitful. Bassler understands being productive or fruitful here to refer to “tangible results of an active faith that has expressed itself in generous deeds of service to others.”326 The statement “to be ready for every good work” (Titus 3:1), Bassler contends, refers to the fullness of the Christian life, not just political obedience. By this statement, the author of Titus draws another contrast to the opponents whom he describes as “unfit for any good work” (Titus 1:16). Bassler sees a connection between the various arenas of behavior, linked by the concept of authority, namely, obedience to political authorities, church authorities,327 and family authorities. Such all-round obedience provides and maintains social order in all units of the society.328 Bassler’s argument that the instruction to “be ready for every good work” refers to the fullness of the Christian life is relevant to virtue-ethical perfectionism, which sees every aspect of life as morally relevant, as the discussions in chapter three will explain. Marshall (1999), in his excursus on good works in the PE, notes the central role the concept plays in describing the Christian life in the PE. In what is of relevance to the virtue-ethical interest of this research, he notes that the use of “every good work” (e. g. Titus 3:1) “generalizes the singular to the point that it approaches a habitual activity.”329 Similarly, virtue ethics concerns itself with inner dispositions and moral habits that constitute character. 322 See

Bassler, 1 Timothy, 2 Timothy and Titus, 201. 1 Timothy, 2 Timothy and Titus, 208. 324 Bassler, 1 Timothy, 2 Timothy and Titus, 208–209. 325 Bassler, 1 Timothy, 2 Timothy and Titus, 213–214. 326 Bassler, 1 Timothy, 2 Timothy and Titus, 213–214. 327 Especially in the context of the instruction to Titus to rebuke “with all authority,” see Bassler, 1 Timothy, 2 Timothy, Titus, 205. 328 Bassler, 1 Timothy, 2 Timothy and Titus, 205. 329 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 228. 323 Bassler,

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Marshall, moreover, argues that the Pauline concept of good works as moral activities resulting from salvation are repeated in the Pastorals’ concept of good works as resulting from the conversion and regeneration experience of the believer.330 He, therefore, sees a connection between the Christ-event and good works in Titus 2:14 as similar to Eph 2:10, which describes the goal of salvation as living a life characterized by good works.331 Furthermore, Marshall asserts that the basis of the instruction ἵνα φροντίζωσιν καλῶν ἔργων προΐστασθαι “so that they may be careful to devote themselves to good words” (Titus 3:8) is found in the link between the Christ-event and Christian life-style already established in Titus 2:14 and 3:5. He concludes, therefore, that the good works in the PE are theologically founded. They categorize the whole of Christian life as a product or fruit of the Christ-event. Such good deeds manifest themselves in concrete acts of service for the good of others, such as meeting practical needs of believers in Titus 3:14.332 Regarding the exhortation to “be ready for every good work” (Titus 3:1), Marshall argues that it reflects a tradition already established in Rom 13:3 and 1 Pet 2:14. However, unlike these two passages, there is no statement related to the responsibility of the secular rulers to do justice in Titus. Nevertheless, this might have been implicitly assumed in Titus.333 Of relevance to our virtue-ethical focus is Marshall’s argument that the phrase “good works” “hardly implies a limitation – do only what is good.”334 In the virtue-ethical reading of Titus in chapter three, we will discuss how Titus presents good works as a virtue-ethical norm by not specifying the concrete acts of good works but leaving it to the creative and broad appropriation of the virtuous moral agents. Similar to Quinn and Marshall, Mounce (2000)335 notes that good works is a central theme in the PE, especially in Titus.336 He traces the central thrust of the letter to Titus to “the practical necessity of good deeds.”337 The frequent occurrences (Titus 1:16; 2:7, 14; 3:8, 14) and the grounding of good works on the Christ-event (Titus 2:11–14) all attest to the centrality of the concept of good works in Titus.

330 Marshall,

The Pastoral Epistles, 228. The Pastoral Epistles, 229. 332 Cf. 1 Tim 5:10 – raising children, showing hospitality, serving other believers humbly. Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 229. 333 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 302. 334 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 302. 335 William Mounce, Pastoral Epistles, WBC 46 (Nashville: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 2000). 336 Mounce, Pastoral Epistles, 413. Bassler also says insistence on good works is a recurrent theme in Titus. Bassler, 1 Timothy, 2 Timothy and Titus, 188. 337 Mounce, Pastoral Epistles, 459. 331 Marshall,

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Moreover, Mounce notes that the deeds of the opponents, which proved that they did not know God, was how they insisted on Jewish inspired ascetism as a means of salvation and their general lifestyle characterized by sin and greed (cf. Titus 1:10, 11).338 Titus’s good works in 2:7 contrast with the opponents who do not stand the test of any good works (1:16). Moreover, the believers who are to be zealous for good works in 2:14 also stand in contrast to the opponents who are unfit for any good works.339 In Titus 3:8, the Cretan believers are to learn Christian theology and its demands on their lives in order to pursue good works earnestly. This is another example of how right theology and right conduct are inseparable in Titus.340 Mounce’s description of good works as integrating right theology and conduct through learning agrees with the virtue-ethical concept of moral development through moral education. Towner (2006) identifies three foundational issues that need to be understood in order to appreciate the significance of the phrase “good works” in the PE. The first issue is the fact that eschatological salvation (in the present age) is grounded in the Christ-event. Second, the author has affirmed the Pauline concept of justification by faith and has dismissed all claims to justification from human efforts (Titus 3:5; cf. 2 Tim 1:9). Third, the depiction of good works as a visible effect of the Christ-event on the believer is a continuation of Pauline theology and ethics.341 In relation to the letter to Titus specifically, Towner argues that good works is in the same category but different aspects with πίστις and εὐσέβεια. Πίστις takes a vertical dimension of the life of faith in Christ; εὐσέβεια combines belief, knowledge, and conduct; and καλὰ ἔργα takes a horizontal dimension of the believer’s relationship with all people and the cosmos.342 Towner regards the description of the opponents in Titus 1:16 (“unfit for any good work”) as perhaps hyperbolic, yet intensive enough to place them outside the people of God because “there is nothing they can do; their ‘faith’ produces no legitimate fruit; they are outside the faith.”343 He notes a two-dimensional importance of the phrase good deeds in Titus 2:7 as an observable aspect of Titus’s Christian life. On one dimension, it shows, in agreement with Titus 2:14, that the purpose of Christ’s self-offering is explicitly to give believers new life, which enables them to be “zealous for good deeds.” On the other 338 Mounce,

Pastoral Epistles, 403. Pastoral Epistles, 432. Mounce notes here that “the believer’s zeal comes not from an intellectual acceptance of Hellenistic philosophy but from a full understanding of the redemptive work of Christ.” 340 Mounce, Pastoral Epistles, 452. 341 Towner, The Goal of Our Instruction, 153. 342 Towner, The Goal of Our Instruction, 153. 343 Towner, The Letters to Timothy and Titus, 710. 339 Mounce,

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dimension, Titus will set himself as a positive contrast to the opponents who are “unfit for any good works” (Titus 1:16). Similarly, the exhortation to the believers to be “ready for every good work” (Titus 3:1) provides a positive contrast to the opponents’ moral weakness as those “unfit for any good work.”344 Furthermore, Towner argues that the reason why the opponents lack such good deeds is that they have not been purified from the moral decay of Crete (Titus 1:15–16). Hence, stating the source of good deeds (i. e. the purifying effect of the Christ-event), the author “takes up language that was apparently central to the opponent’s Judaizing doctrines about ‘purity’ … to anchor Christian purity in God’s grace.”345 Towner also asserts that Titus 2:14 gives the clearest information regarding the source of good works, namely, the self-offering of Christ. Good works, therefore, is the purpose of the entire Christ-event (cf. Eph 2:10). Moreover, the description “those who believe in God” in Titus 3:14, according to Towner, indicates “the intrinsic relation of the Christ-event to ‘good works.’”346 The closing of the christological formula in Titus 2:14 with the phrase “zealous for good deeds” links the Christ-event described there back to the ethical teachings in 2:1–10. This keeps the relationship between theology and ethics in Titus closer.347 Similar to Knight and Marshall, Towner contends that the concept of good deeds is “Pauline shorthand … for the visible outward dimension of Christian existence,” especially evident in the letters to his co-workers (Titus 1:16; 2:7; 3:8, 14; Eph 2:10).348 The statement “these things are good” in Titus 3:1 (“things” referring to “good deeds”), implying that these good deeds are good, appears like a tautology. However, Towner continues, it is not out of place to emphasize it in this way because “good deeds” is “heavily coded language for authentic Christian living.”349 Such a wordplay might qualify as an example of paronomasia, used for emphasis.350 The imperative verb μανθανέτωσαν “let them learn,” asking the Cretan believers to learn to show good works (Titus 3:14), means learning by doing as opposed to learning through formal instruction.351 As noted above, such a concept of learning corresponds to the virtue-ethical concept of moral development through the practice of virtues. Towner argues that the shift from the “good 344 Towner, The Letters to Timothy and Titus, 731, 771. Towner notes that “good deeds” in Titus 3:8 forms a verbal link to Titus 3:1 (Towner, The Letters to Timothy and Titus, 789). 345 Towner, The Goal of Our Instruction, 764. 346 Towner, The Goal of Our Instruction, 153. 347 Towner, The Letters to Timothy and Titus, 764. 348 Towner, The Letters to Timothy and Titus, 764. 349 Towner, The Letters to Timothy and Titus, 793. 350 Towner, The Letters to Timothy and Titus, 793, emphasis original. 351 Towner, The Letters to Timothy and Titus, 802.

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works” metaphor to “fruits” metaphor in Titus 3:14 is similar to such shifts in Col 1:10 and Eph 5:11.352 Of notable relevance to this study is how Towner interprets the transformative effect of the Christ-event in Titus 2:14 in terms of “becoming” and “being,” as products of the purification terminology.353 He says “from the perspective of cause and effect, authentic Christian identity involves a creative act of ‘becoming’ (redemption, purification) that makes a unique quality of ‘being’ possible.”354 Towner’s argument is relevant to our virtue-ethical reading because virtue ethics lays more emphasis on being virtuous than merely doing good deeds. W. Hulitt Gloer (2010) also notes that good works in Titus is “theologically determined … characterizing the whole of the Christian life as a work of God’s grace with visible results, the fruit produced by genuine faith.”355 Good works, in this sense, refers to services or activities of the believer that spring out of one’s conversion and regeneration. Gloer argues further that the link established between the Christ-event and lifestyle in Titus 2:14 and 3:5–7 is the basis for the “implicit command” to believers to be careful to devote themselves to good works in 3:8 (cf. 1 Tim 2:10).356 Robert W. Wall and Richard B. Steele (2012) describe the phrase “zealous for good works” (Titus 2:14) as “the key to the interplay between moral teaching and theological confession, which forms the literary structure of the letter’s paraenesis.”357 The good works are the covenant-keeping works of believers who are redeemed and are special people, and who have the hope of eternal life when God the Savior appears.358 Titus 3:1 explicates the fact that the effect of God’s saving and teaching grace on the community of believers “is not just an inward property, and it does not force believers to the margins of society in radical nonconformity but rather toward the mainstream of society for ‘every good work’ (cf. 1 Tim 2:10; 3:6–7).”359 Wall and Steele note that what is at stake in Titus is the moral and spiritual transformation of the Cretan believers from a life characterized by vice to a life characterized by virtue, made possible by the epiphany and conducted by the 352 Towner,

The Letters to Timothy and Titus, 803. The Letters to Timothy and Titus, 763–766. 354 Towner, The Letters to Timothy and Titus, 764. 355 W. Hulitt Gloer, 1 & 2 Timothy – Titus, Smyth & Helwys Bible Commentary (Georgia: Smyth & Helwys, 2010), 38. 356 Gloer, 1 & 2 Timothy – Titus, 38. Gloer argues further that the connection between conversion and good works in Titus is “thoroughly Pauline,” which is most evident in Eph 2:8–10, regarded as “Pauline gospel in miniature” (38). 357 Robert W. Wall and Richard B. Steele, 1 & 2 Timothy and Titus, The Two Horizons New Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids, Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2012), 356. 358 Wall and Steele, 1 & 2 Timothy and Titus, 357. 359 Wall and Steele, 1 & 2 Timothy and Titus, 384. 353 Towner,

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guidance of the Holy Spirit.360 They argue that given the significance accorded to good works in Titus, one clearly notices that God’s mercy not only forgives sins and imputes righteousness, it also produces good works through the work of the Holy Spirit, which secures the future of the covenant community with God (cf. Rom 2:1–16; 6:22).361 Wall and Steele’s identification of the moral transformative effect of the Christ-event is relevant to our virtue-ethical interest, as will be discussed in chapter three. Jörg Röder (2013) regards the use of ἀγαθός in 1 Tim 1:5 and 19 in relation to conscience as “innere Haltung” (“inner attitude”) which, through God’s grace and Spirit experienced in baptism, has been cleansed from sin. Such a cleansed heart or conscience, argues Röder, is to be understood as an inner disposition which has external or visible effects.362 The visible effects of good works are seen, for example in hospitality, in bringing up children well, and so on (1 Tim 5:10). Röder rightly notes that the instruction that a widow must be one who devotes herself to all kinds of good works in the last phrase of 1 Tim 5:10 emphasizes both the good works and the corresponding inner disposition of the doer of the good works, emanating from one’s faith in Christ.363 In his words, such good works demonstrate “innere Disposition der Handelnden: Werke aus tiefer Glaubensüberzeugung und christlicher Liebe.”364 Röder regards the instructions to Christians on how to behave in relation to governing authorities and secular societies in Rom 13, Titus 3, and 1 Pet 2 as forms of good works that believers in Christ are urged to demonstrate, even if they suffer for it. Such good works, argues Röder, even though emanating from the Christian faith, are not intended to be identity markers of believers as opposed to unbelievers, but are works that the wider society regards as good as well.365 Two points that are relevant to our virtue-ethical analysis of good works in Titus stand out from Röder’s discussion: first, that good works, though external, emanate from an internal goodness as an inner attitude or disposition that has been (trans)formed in Christ. Virtue ethics 360 Wall and Steele, 1 & 2 Timothy and Titus, 366. Wall and Steele note that the use of the two terms “rebirth and renewal” in this regard seems to indicate a transformed existence as the ultimate goal of the process of Christian maturity, even though vaguely stated. Some scholars even think that the two terms refer to two “discrete stages”  – first rebirth, then renewal, which together make each believer morally competent. Similarly, Johnson observes that the instructions to the different groups in the household codes in Titus are banal and rudimentary, suggesting that the Cretan believers were new converts (Johnson, Letters, 233–235). 361 Wall and Steele, 1 & 2 Timothy and Titus, 367. 362 Jörg Röder, “Was ist ‘gut’ im Neuen Testament? Funktionale Bedeutungsmöglichkeiten des ἀγαθός-Begriffs in der ethischen Argumentation,” in Ethische Normen des frühen Christen­ tums, ed. Friedrich W. Horn, Ulrich Volp, and Ruben Zimmermann, WUNT 313 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2013), 93–129, here 111–112. 363 Röder, “Was ist ‘gut’ im Neuen Testament?” 113. 364 Röder, “Was ist ‘gut’ im Neuen Testament?” 113. ET: “inner disposition of the actors or agents: works from a deep conviction of faith and Christian love.” 365 Röder, “Was ist ‘gut’ im Neuen Testament?” 113.

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lays emphasis on inner dispositions and character. Second, that the sphere of meaning of good works is broad and relates to one’s relationships and behaviors in all aspects of life, for example, within the Christian community and in relation to secular authorities and the society at large. Virtue ethics regards every aspect of life as morally relevant and expects a virtuous person to be virtuous in every aspect of life. Huizenga (2013) notes that even though some of the virtues in the PE apply to the two genders, there are explicit gender-based differences in the actual practice of these virtues.366 Good works in Titus is an example of a virtue that applies to all believers and without specifying specific concrete good acts. For example, in Titus 2:14, every believer in Crete is to show good works, “but whether one is male or female determines the range of ‘good works’ one ought to seek after and possibly attain.”367 Even though she does not explicitly say this is a virtue-ethical norm,368 Huizenga’s statement supports one of the arguments of this book (as seen in chapter three) that the concept of good works in Titus is more in tandem with the virtue-ethical approach than the concept of good works in 1 Timothy. Titus focuses on the person who shows good works and leaves the specific acts of good works to the virtuous person to creatively and responsibly apply in concrete situations. Scholars often refer to 1 Timothy (e. g. 6:17–19) when identifying the specific acts described as good works in the PE. Hardly do they refer to Titus when referring to concrete examples of such good works because Titus does not give such concrete examples, except for contested instances (cf. Titus 2:7; 3:14).369 The absence or sparse mention of such concrete good deeds gives the phrase good works in Titus a virtue-ethical posture. Douglas Wilson (2016) argues that the use of justification by grace in Titus 3:3–7 does not displace the place and importance of “good works.” Instead, free justification and grace constitute the only possible foundations for good works.370 Based on the statement “those who have believed in God are to be careful to do good works” (Titus 3:8), Wilson contrasts belief in God and belief in good works paradoxically. He notes that only those who reject trusting in good works but rather trust in Christ can do good works, while those who reject Christ but rather trust in good works cannot do them. Wilson describes this paradox analogically in this way: “when you get basic doctrine under your belt, you then have your hands free to get involved in good works.”371 366 Huizenga,

Moral Education, 307. Moral Education, 307. 368 It is not clear if Huizenga regards good works as a virtue-ethical norm in the contemporary sense of virtue ethics. 369 See Young, Pastoral Letters, 31. Many scholars do not ask why Titus does not mention the concrete “good works,” perhaps because they consider the Pastorals as a corpus, thereby imposing the content of 1 Timothy on Titus. 370 Wilson, The Pillar of the Truth, 134. 371 Wilson, The Pillar of the Truth, 134. 367 Huizenga,

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While Wilson’s grounding of good works on the Christ-event is accountable, it is not clear on what basis (at least, as far as the letter to Titus is concerned) he places good works as an object of personal faith or trust in the same way that Christ or God is an object of faith. Nevertheless, our virtue-ethical analysis below will show how the author of Titus connects good works with the Christ-event, which expresses a similar concept Wilson seeks to explain with his analogy of grounding good works on the Christ-event. Andreas Köstenberger (2017) treats the concept of good works (ἔργον ἀγάθον, καλόν ἔργον) and “proper conduct” (ἀναστροφή, ἀναστρέφω) in the PE together, interpreting them as meaning almost the same thing. He notes that, following the Pauline gospel of grace, the level of emphasis on good works and proper conduct in the PE is a major distinctive.372 The level of emphasis is seen in the way that all the groups within the household are urged to show good works: women generally, including widows (1 Tim 2:10; Titus 2:5; 1 Tim 5:10), slaves (1 Tim 6:2), the rich (1 Tim 6:18), all believers (Titus 2:14; 3:8, 14), and Timothy and Titus as leaders (1 Tim 4:12; 2 Tim 2:21; 3:17; Titus 2:7). On the other hand, those who profess knowing God but deny him by their deeds are said to be unfit for “any good works.”373 In the PE, Köstenberger argues, good works are grounded on eschatology and theology (the Christ-event).374 Robert W. Yarbrough (2018) notes that “work/s” in the PE are not bad in themselves. Rather, “works” may be bad only if the convictions that inform the works are wrong or bad, as the case in Titus 1:16.375 The author of Titus describes those who have been “defiled” and are “unbelieving” as “unfit for any good works” because, Yarbrough argues, “acts that honor God are those arising from fellowship with him – God is at work in believers’ lives both to will and do what pleases him (see Phil 2:12–13).”376 Gerald Bray (2019) notes that the instruction to Titus to show hospitality to Zenas and Apollos and to send them off with whatever they needed (Titus 3:14) seems to be one of the “good works” that Paul wanted “our people” to devote themselves to.377 The history of interpretations of good works discussed above shows that even though none of the scholars has read Titus with a virtue-ethical lens, some of them have mentioned some nuances of good works that are relevant to our virtue-ethical reading of the text. Nevertheless, there are other significant virtueethical elements that none of the scholars has highlighted, for example, the ethical function of the linguistic verb “to be” (in its various forms) in relation to 372 Köstenberger,

1–2 Timothy & Titus, 505. 1–2 Timothy & Titus, 505. 374 Köstenberger, 1–2 Timothy & Titus, 506. 375 Yarbrough, Letters, 502–503. 376 Yarbrough, Letters, 504. 377 Bray, Pastoral Epistles, 565. 373 Köstenberger,

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the phrase “good works.” Chapter three undertakes a virtue-ethical reading of the norm “good works,” in which its virtue-ethical perspectives will be discussed in regard to the linguistic form, moral agents, ethical argumentation, history of traditions, and range of application.

2.5 Summary and Conclusion This chapter has reviewed previous literature with particular focus on how it interprets the norms σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, εὐσέβεια, and καλὰ ἔργα in the letter to Titus. The literature review shows that none of the scholars has approached his or her interpretation from a virtue-ethical standpoint. Nevertheless, even though they do not mention many significant virtue-ethical aspects of these norms as used in Titus, some of them have mentioned some aspects of the interpretation that are relevant to virtue ethics. However, the previous interpretations, as reported above, are a typical example of Chan’s observation that a major methodological weakness of biblical ethicists is that they do not build their ethical claims upon any standard ethical theory, neither do they have direct and sustained reference to a given ethical theory.378 To the best of my knowledge, none of the scholarly works consulted builds its ethical interpretations on any recognized ethical theory, neither do they sufficiently engage with the appropriate moral philosophical terminologies. The deficit of such an ethical reading of scripture is that it hinders the inter-disciplinary interaction between biblical ethics and moral philosophy, in the same way that it hinders an inter-disciplinary conversation between biblical studies and systematic moral theology. Recognizing that no biblical text presents a coherent ethical theory,379 Zimmermann’s “implicit ethics” methodology, from which the exegethics methodology of this research emerges, was developed purposely to standardize biblical ethics for a compatible inter-disciplinary interaction with contemporary philosophical ethics and moral theology.

378 Chan, Biblical Ethics in the 21st Century, 29. Chan’s criticism is directly in relation to scholars like Richard B. Hays, Frank J. Matera, Sandra M. Schneiders, and Rasiah S. Sugirtharajah, but it applies to most other scholars. 379 See Zimmermann, “Ethics in the New Testament and Language,” 22–23, who argues that the “implicit ethics” approach finds its validity in the fact that the NT authors do not offer any “systematic account for norms of action and contexts of reason” like Aristotle and others. Similarly, Kotva argues that there is no systematic account of ethics or a developed ethical theory in the NT (The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 103). In regard to Pauline ethics, Furnish also argues that Paul himself does not deal with ethics in a systematic, deliberate, and self-conscious way as a modern ethicist would do. Hence, it is inappropriate to speak of Pauline ethics in a sense of Paul’s own self-conscious, systematic, and critical analysis of the grounds, motives, forms, and goals of moral behavior. Furnish, Theology and Ethics in Paul, 209.

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This research, therefore, finds its uniqueness, relevance, and currency in the way that it illustrates how ethics in Titus and in the PE could be analyzed and standardized, compatible with contemporary moral philosophical and moral theological concepts and terminologies.380 In this way, this study seeks to significantly contribute a new knowledge and methodology to the study of ethics in the PE and virtue ethics in biblical texts. Some examples of how previous interpretations have not engaged with standard ethical concepts and terminologies and how this research engages them are helpful here. While many of them describe, for example, εὐσέβεια simply as encompassing all aspects of human life, this research describes such in virtueethical term as perfectionism. Other ethical terminologies employed in this research, which are not employed in previous interpretations, include moral agency, ethical argumentation or generating moral significance, moral reasoning, virtue, intellectual virtues, human flourishing or eudaimonia, moral education, moral development, “being” and “doing,” and so on. The next chapter, therefore, takes up a detailed virtue-ethical analysis of σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, εὐσέβεια, and καλὰ ἔργα, engaging the exegethics methodology using virtue ethics as the major ethical framework on which its ethical claims are built.

380 See Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 103, who argues that there is no systematic account of ethics or a developed ethical theory in the NT. For a similar argument regarding NT ethics, see also Furnish, Theology and Ethics in Paul, 209.

Chapter 3

A Virtue-Ethical Reading of the Letter to Titus Before engaging in the actual virtue-ethical analysis of our selected norms, it is helpful at this point to provide a tabular overview of most of the ethical norms1 in the letter to Titus, from among which we have selected five for analysis in this research. This overview is important because these are the ethical norms with which our selected five ethical norms and the virtue-ethical features we are analyzing will be interacting throughout the study. Hence, providing a brief orientation about these norms and their occurrences in Titus will be helpful before we pick up our primary task of reading the text virtue-ethically, which is the main contribution of this study. Table 1: Overview of Ethical Norms of Being/Conduct in Titus Selected Norms of Conduct/Being

Occurrences in Titus

Slave/servant (δοῦ38λος; δουλεύω)

1:1 (calling); 2:9 (social status); 3:3 (serving desires)

God (Θεός)

1:1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 16; 2:5, 10, 11, 13; 3:4, 8

Apostle (ἀπόστολος) (office)

1:1

Jesus Christ (Ἰησοῦς Χριστός)

1:1; 1:4; 2:13; 3:6

Faith, faithfulness, belief (πίστις, πιστεύω)

1:1, 4, 13; 2:2, 10, 3:8, 14

Election (ἐκλεκτός)

1:1

Knowledge (ἐπίγνωσις, οἶδα)

1:1; cf. 1:16; 3:11

Truth (ἀλήθεια, ἀληθής)

1:1, 13, 14

Godliness, ungodliness (εὐσέβεια, ἀσέβεια)

1:1; 2:12

Hope (of eternal life) (ἐλπίδι ζωῆς αἰωνίου)

1:2; 2:13; 3:7

Word (of God) (λόγος)

1:3, 9; 2:5; cf. 2:8; 3:8

1 Zimmermann (Logic of Love, 43) defines an ethical norm as “a pronouncement within an ethical statement or discourse that justifies the claim to an ‘ought’ or sets forth an attribution of value in terms of the conduct of an individual or a group” (emphasis in italics original). See the full discussion on ethical norms in ibid., 42–48. See also Zimmermann, “How to Read Biblical Texts Ethically,” 8–10. It is noteworthy that the norms in the table are arranged according to their first appearances.

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Selected Norms of Conduct/Being

Occurrences in Titus

(Our) Savior (God, Jesus Christ), salvation (σωτήρ, σωτῆρος, σώζω)

1:3, 4; 2:10, 13; 3:4, 5, 6

Authority, command (ἐπιταγή)

1:3; 2:15

Titus (Τίτος)

1:4; cf. σύ 1:5; 2:1, 15; 3:8, 12; 3:15, also “yourself” σεαυτοῦ (2:7)

Crete (Κρήτη) & Cretans (Κρής)

1:5, 12

Set right, correct (ἐπιδιορθώσῃ)

1:5

Command, direct (διετάσσω)

1:5

Elder (office) (πρεσβυτέρος)

1:5

“To be/being” (relation to persons or character) 1:6, 7, 16; 2:2, 4; 3:1, 2, 3, 11, 14 (εἶναι) Blameless (ἀνέγκλητος)

1:6, 7

Husband of one wife (μιᾶς γυναικὸς ἀνήρ)

1:6

Trustworthiness, faithfulness, faithful saying (πιστός; πιστός ὁ λόγος)

1:6, 9; 3:8

Faithful/believing children (τέκνα ἔχων πιστά) 1:6 Accusation (κατηγορία)

1:6

Debauchery (ἀσωτία)

1:6

Rebellion (ἀνυπότακτος)

1:6, 10

Bishop/overseer (ἐπίσκοπος)

1:7

Stewardship (οἰκονόμος)

1:7

Self-will, stubbornness (αὐθάδης)

1:7

Anger (ὀργίλος)

1:7

Drunkenness/addiction to wine (πάροινος)

1:7

Bully/violence (πλήκτης)

1:7

Greediness (αἰσχροκερδῆς)

1:7

Hospitality (φιλόξενος)

1:8

Loving what is good (φιλάγαθος)

1:8

Sensible, self-control, self-discipline ­(σωφροσύνη)

1:8; 2:2, 4, 5, 6, 12

Justice, righteousness (δικαιοσύνη)

1:8; 2:12

Righteousness, holiness (ὅσιος)

1:8

Self-control, discipline (ἐγκρατῆς)

1:8

Exhortation, encouragement (παρακαλεῖν)

1:9; 2:6, 15

2.5 Summary and Conclusion

Selected Norms of Conduct/Being

Occurrences in Titus

Doctrine, teaching (διδασκαλία)

1:9; 2:1, 2, 7, 10

Good health, sound (doctrine, faith) (ὑγιαινείν) 1:9, 13; 2:1, 2 Speaking against (ἀντιλέγειν)

1:9; 2:9

Rebuke, conviction (ἐλέγχειν)

1:9, 13; 2:15

Idle talkers (ματαιολόγοι)

1:10

Deceivers (φρεναπάται)

1:10

Circumcision (περιτομῆς)

1:10

Household, home (οἴκος)

1:11

Profit, gain (κέρδος)

1:11

Prophet (προφήτης)

1:12

Liar (ψεῦστής)

1:12

Evil wild beasts (κακὰ θηρία)

1:12

Lazy gluttons (γαστέρες ἀργαί)

1:12

Testimony, witness (μαρτυρία)

1:13

People, human beings (ἀνθρώποι)

1:14; 2:11; 3:2, 8, 10

Jewish myths and commandments (Ἰουδαϊκοῖς 1:14 μύθοις καὶ ἐντολαῖς ἀνθρώπων) Purity, cleanliness (καθαρὰ)

1:15

Defilement (μιαίνω)

1:15

Unbelief, faithlessness (ἀπίστοις)

1:15

Mind, intellect (νοῦς)

1:15

Conscience (συνείδησις)

1:15

Confession, profession (ὁμολογείν)

1:16

Denial (ἀρνεόμαι)

1:16; 2:12

Abominability, detestability (βδελυκτός)

1:16

Disobedience (ἀπειθής)

1:16; 3:3

Disqualification, being unfit (ἀδόκιμος)

1:16

Good works, works ἔργον, ἔργον ἀγαθόν, καλὰ ἔργα

1:16; 2:7, 14; 3:1, 5, 8, 3:14

Elderly men (πρεσβύτης) (age and gender)

2:2

Temperateness, soberness (νηφαλίος)

2:2

Dignity, honorability, seriousness (σεμνός, ­σεμνότης)

2:2, 7

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Selected Norms of Conduct/Being

Occurrences in Titus

Love (ἀγάπη, φιλέω)

2:2; 3:15

Perseverance, endurance (ὑπομονή)

2:2

Elderly woman (age and gender) (πρεσβῦτις)

2:3

Reverence (ἱεροπρεπής)

2:3

Slander (διαβόλος)

2:3

Addiction to wine (οἴνῳ πολλῷ δεδουλωμένας) 2:3 Teaching what is good (καλοδιδασκάλους)

2:3

Young woman (age and gender) (νεός, νέας)

2:4

Husband-loving (φιλάνδρος)

2:4

Child-loving (φιλοτέκνος)

2:4

Holiness, purity (ἁγνός)

2:5

Home-working (οἰκουργός)

2:5

Good, goodness (ἀγαθός, καλός)

2:5, 10; 3:8

Submission, obedience (ὑποτάσσω)

2:5, 9 cf. 3:1 obedience (πειθαρχεῖν)

Blasphemy (βλασφημέω)

2:5; 3:2

Young men (age and gender) (νεός, νεωτέρος)

2:6

Example, pattern (τύπος)

2:7

Integrity, soundness (ἀφθορία)

2:7

Healthy speech (λόγον ὑγιῆ)

2:8

Beyond reproach (ἀκατάγνωστος)

2:8

Opponent (ἐναντίος)

2:8

Shame (ἐντρέπω)

2:8

Worthlessness, evil (φαῦλος)

2:8

Master (social status) (δεσπότης)

2:9

“In all things, in every aspect, everything, all” (πᾶς, πάντα)

1:15, 16; 2:7, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15; 3:1, 2, 15

Satisfaction, well-pleasing (εὐαρέστος)

2:9

Misappropriation (νοσφίζειν)

2:10

To adorn, decorate (κοσμείν)

2:10

Manifestation, appearance (of God, of his grace and loving kindness) (ἐπιφαίνω, ­ἐπιφάνεια)

2:11, 13; 3:4

Grace (χάρις)

1:4; 2:11; 3:7, 15

2.5 Summary and Conclusion

Selected Norms of Conduct/Being

Occurrences in Titus

Desires (sinful) (ἐπιθυμίαι)

2:12; 3:3

Self-giving (of Christ for us) (δίδωμι ἑαυτοῦ)

2:14

Glory of God (δόξα)

2:13

Redemption (λυτρόω)

2:14

Lawlessness, iniquity (ἀνομία)

2:14

Purification, cleansing (καθαρίζειν)

2:14

Special, chosen (people) (περιούσιος)

2:14

Zeal, enthusiasm (ζηλωτής)

2:14

To disregard, look down on (περιφρονείν)

2:15

Memory, to remember (ὑπομιμνῄσκειν)

3:1

Rulers and authorities (ἀρχή ἐξουσία)

3:1

Readiness (for every good work) (ἑτοίμος)

3:1

Peaceability (ἀμάχος)

3:2

Humility, meekness (ἐπιεικής)

3:2

Gentleness (πραΰτης)

3:2

Foolishness (ἀνόητος)

3:3

Going astray, being misled (πλανώμενοι)

3:3

Pleasure (ἡδονή)

3:3

Malice (κακία)

3:3

Envy (φθόνος)

3:3

Hatred (στυγητός, μισείν)

3:3

Loving-kindness (φιλανθρωπία)

3:4

Mercy, compassion (ἔλεος)

3:5

(Baptismal) Bath (λουτρόν)

3:5

Rebirth, regeneration (παλιγγενεςία)

3:5

Renewal (ἀνακαίνωσις)

3:5

Holy Spirit (πνεῦμα ἅγιος)

3:5

Heirship, inheritance (κληρονόμος)

3:7

Wish, desire (βούλομαί)

3:8

Speaking confidently, insistence ­(διαβεβαιόομαι)

3:8

To be intentional, careful (φροντίζειν)

3:8

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Selected Norms of Conduct/Being

Occurrences in Titus

To put forth, bring forth/out, devotion to ­(προΐστημι)

3:8, 14

Profitability, usefulness (ὠφέλιμος)

3:8

(Foolish) Debate (ζήτησις)

3:9

Genealogy (γενεαλογία)

3:9

Strife, discord (ἔρις)

3:9

Fight, quarrel (μάχη)

3:9

Law (pertaining to), lawyer (νομικός)

3:9, 13

To avoid, have nothing to do with (περιιστημι) 3:9 Unprofitability, uselessness, vanity (ἀνωφελής, 3:9 μάταιος) Division, schism, factionalism (αἱρετικός)

3:10

Warning, admonition (νουθεσία)

3:10

To reject, refuse (αραιτέομαι)

3:10

Perversion (ἐκστρέφω)

3:11

Sin, wrong (ἁμαρτάνω)

3:11

Self-condemnation (αὐτοκατάκριτος)

3:11

To learn (μανθανείν)

3:14

Need, necessity (χρεία)

3:14

Unfruitfulness, unproductivity (ἄκαρπος)

3:15

Being the main chapter of this study, this chapter applies the exegethics methodology by exegetically analyzing σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, εὐσέβεια, καλὰ ἔργα, and the household codes virtue-ethically. The chapter applies the five models of exegethics in reading each of the above listed norms in the letter to Titus virtueethically, in the order in which they are listed here.2 Through the virtue-ethical reading, this research seeks to discover the concepts of virtue that are in the letter to Titus in relation to the characteristics of virtue ethics discussed in chapter one of this research, which include a sense of a moral telos; more emphasis on the character, habits, and inner dispositions of moral persons than on the morality of actions; a concern for human flourishing or human good; a sense of moral perfectionism in the sense of a call for continu2 Their sequence here does not follow any strong pattern. However, the first three, namely; σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, and εὐσέβεια are treated here in the order in which they appear in Titus 2:12. The others, that is, καλὰ ἔργα and the “household codes,” are treated after the first three in order not to “interrupt” the sequence of those three as they appear in Titus 2:12.

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ous moral growth and concern with every aspect of life as morally relevant; a sense of particularity of the moral agents; the concept of moral exemplar; a concern for moral development through training or education; and a sense of the moral significance of the community. In our analysis, we will identify and discuss any correlation between these characteristics of virtue ethics and the ethical properties in the text. The prevalence and centrality of these virtue-ethical features in Titus or absence of them will lead to a conclusion, namely, whether the letter to Titus could be accountably described as a “virtue-ethical text” or not. If it qualifies for the description of a virtue-ethical-text, it would, therefore, prove or validate the hypothesis of this research. Moreover, it would contribute to the ongoing scholarly efforts to build bridges between virtue ethics and biblical ethics.

3.1 A Virtue-Ethical Reading of the σωφροσύνη Cognates in the Letter to Titus One of the (if not the most) popular objections3 to the virtue-ethical approach to morality in Christian4 circles is that it is too self-centered and narcissistic, (over)emphasizing “self” over and against the theological and biblical emphasis on the Christian’s loving and sacrificial surrendering of “self” to God and others.5 In this regard, any Christian account of virtue ethics, Kotva asserts, must make some adaptations, corrections, or alterations of especially the “self” con3 See R. B. Louden, “Virtue Ethics,” in Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics, ed. Ruth R. Chadwick, 2nd ed. (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2012), 4:503–509, for a discussion on the objections to virtue ethics in secular circles and their appropriate responses, especially as it relates to applied ethics, see also Justin Oakley and Dean Cocking, Virtue Ethics and Professional Roles (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 31–38. They have a similar discussion of the criticisms against virtue ethics in philosophical cycles and their appropriate responses. They also have a discussion on the nature of virtue ethics, and the rest of the book for a general discussion on the suitability of virtue approach to professional roles and ethics (Louden, “Virtue Ethics,” 7 ff.). 4 I am aware of the complexities and technicalities that surround the word “Christian,” especially in scholarly circles. Suffice it, therefore, to say that throughout this research, I use the term “Christian” in the simplest form and confessional sense of a reference to believers in Christ (whatever that involves) and the institution that represents that term, i. e. “the church” as a body of believers in Christ broadly stated, both from the first century up until now and into the future. 5 See Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 143–147, who responds to this and other objections against the Christian appropriation of virtue ethics. He argues that there is an implicit self-regarding in every other ethical theory, and virtue ethics has only explicated that implicit motif. Nevertheless, his conclusion is that virtue ethics is too other-regarding to be objected as self-centered. For example, some, if not all, virtues themselves are acquired and expressed in the context of relationships and community. For example, hospitality, courage, “distributive” justice, and so on. And human flourishing as a telos is not defined or achieved exploitatively at the expense of others, but in company and for the common good of all. See also Harrington and Keenan, Paul and Virtue Ethics, 8–12, who also respond to the objections against virtue ethics.

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cept in the light of the biblical and theological concept of “grace” as it relates to moral agency.6 Considered to be one among the cardinal virtues in many Greek-philosophical schools and in the PE, the motif of “self-control,”7 as the name implies, perhaps justifies the skepticism and indictment of virtue ethics by some Christian ethicists as being narcissistic and self-centered. Therefore, in consonance with Kotva’s suggestion of adapting, among others, the biblical “grace” motif relating to moral agency in Christian virtue ethics, this section sets out to analyze how the text of Titus (re)presents a Christian perspective to the virtue-ethical concept of “self-control.” In other words, this section has as its aim to read the extent to which “self” is de-selfed (or not) in the way the σωφροσύνη word group in Titus is used. The concept of self-control in Titus is represented by the σωφρο-word group as follows: σώφρονα “self-controlled” (1:8), σώφρονας “self-controlled” (2:2), σωφρονίζωσιν “so that they would exhort” (2:4), σώφρονας “self-controlled” (2:5), σωφρονεῖν “sensible” (2:6), and a related ἐγκρατῆ, meaning discipline or self-control. Being the ethical norm with the highest number of occurrences in the text and with the widest application to various groups in the Cretan church, the σωφροσύνη cognates require a comprehensive reading. Our approach or methodology is expected to be comprehensive enough for such an exegetical reading because it is designed to consider various important aspects such as the linguistic form, moral agents, history of traditions, ethical argumentation, and range of application. 3.1.1 Linguistic Form of the σωφροσύνη Cognates Here, the linguistic forms of the following occurrences of the σωφροσύνη cognate will be read virtue-ethically: σώφρονα (1:8), σώφρονας (2:2), σωφρονίζωσιν (2:4), σώφρονας (2:5), σωφρονεῖν (2:6). As noted in our methodology, the linguistic form involves three levels, namely, the intra-textual level, the intertextual level, and the extra-textual level. 6 Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 74–76, 129–131, 168–70. But Kotva does not see this adaption as implying that virtue ethics and Christian ethics are non-fitting opposites, instead, it is a complementing and enriching relationship – there is no inherent tension between the two. His main point is that grace initiates and continually makes the believer’s effort and moral growth possible but does not eliminate the need for effort and growth on the person’s part. In essence, both divine grace and human agency co-exist and co-operate to make the acquisition and practicing of moral virtues possible. 7 It is worth noting that, as discussed in chapter two above, σωφροσύνη connotes “self-control” in some respects, but also connotes “being sensible” or “being in right state of mind.” Since it would be confusing to employ all the nuances of the term in this research, self-control is employed as the most appropriate rendering because it has the capacity to comprise both the sense of “being sensible,” “being in the right state of mind,” and being able to control one’s desires and emotions.

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a) Intra-Textual Level i) Σώφρονα “self-controlled” (Titus 1:8) The norm σώφρονα here is used as an accusative adjective, and the verb related to it is εἶναι “to be,”8 found in verse 7. Εἶναι is the present active infinitive form of εἰμί “I am.” As a “to be” verb, it does not indicate “doing” or “action” but “being,” describing a state of “being” expected of one who is to occupy the office of the bishop. When combined with the adjective, it expresses the idea of σώφρονα εἶναι9 “being self-controlled” or “possessing the virtue/quality of selfcontrol.” With this idea, the author does not focus on the morality of the actions of the person, but the kind of person one should be, in terms of moral character. In other words, the use of σώφρονα in Titus 1:8 is concerned primarily with the moral “being” of a person more than “doing.” Putting emphasis on “being” more than “doing” is precisely a central feature of virtue ethics.10 Moreover, Titus 1:8 does not specify the aspects of life in which the moral agent11 is to be self-controlled, for example in relation to sexual matters, anger, and so on. This implies an implicit reference to every aspect of a person’s life as a moral agent. It involves both common and dilemmatic aspects of morality. Such an ethical concern for all aspects of life of a moral agent further gives a virtue-ethical nuance to the use of σώφρονα in Titus 1:8, because virtue ethics is perfectionist in the sense that it concerns itself with the moral relevance of every aspect of a person’s life. Kotva describes it well when he says virtue ethics is a kind of perfectionist ethics in two ways. First, every voluntary human act is regarded as morally relevant. This applies to this text to the extent that the bishop’s self-control is implied to be in all aspects of life. Second, a virtue-ethical perfectionism calls the moral agent to keep growing and improving his or her character in all aspects of life, as one moves towards a defined and envisioned moral telos.12 However,  8 Εἶναι “to be” is the verb used for all other qualities expected of a bishop, which also appear as adjectives. Therefore, what is said of self-control here could be said of other norms in the list.  9 See Ülrich Luck, “σώφρων, σωφρονέω, σωφρονίζω, σωφρονισμός, σωφροσύνη,” in TDNT VII: 1097–1104, here 1103, who says the σώφρονα εἶναι of the bishop in 1 Tim 3:2 and Titus 1:8 does not only refer to “conduct appropriate to faith but also to presuppositions necessary for the discharge of a leading office.” 10 See Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 30–31, on how virtue ethics prioritizes “being” over “doing.” See also Chan, Biblical Ethics in the 21st Century, 84, who notes that virtue ethics is a proactive ethical system encompassing one’s entire life. “It engages the commonplace and concerns what is ordinary rather than those exceptional moral dilemmas.” 11 Since one of the aspects of this research will discuss the moral agents of the selected norms extensively, it suffices here to simply mention “moral agents” without actually having to name them in each case, thereby pre-empting the section on moral agents. 12 Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 37–38. Nevertheless, Kotva clarifies that the perfectionist nature of virtue ethics is not a “brittle perfectionism” where the ideal must be realized for one to receive positive evaluation. Rather, the telos, being an ideal of human excellence and perfection, cannot be fully realized. He succinctly captures the point by say-

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this second aspect of virtue-ethical perfectionism does not feature in this case because there is no linguistic or theological element that suggests that the bishop is called unto a continuous growth in self-control. Nevertheless, it could be summarized that the emphasis on moral “being” more than “doing” in the linguistic form of σώφρονα in Titus 1:8 corresponds to the virtue approach to morality. ii) Σώφρονας “self-controlled” (Titus 2:2) In this verse, σώφρονας is used as an accusative noun directly linked to the verb εἶναι in a similar way σώφρονα does in Titus 1:8. All that is said about the virtue-ethical perspective of σώφρονα εἶναι in Titus 1:8 above can be said about the σώφρονας εἶναι in Titus 2:2, namely, that it lays more emphasis on “being” more than “doing” and it involves every aspect of life. The only difference is that while the cognate in Titus 1:8 is an adjective, therefore implying a quality of character to possess, the cognate in Titus 2:2 is a noun, implying a state of being of the moral agent. Nonetheless, the use of both the adjectival and noun forms here focus more on the morality of persons than the morality of actions, thereby corresponding with a virtue-ethical approach.13 iii) Σωφρονίζωσιν “so that they may exhort” (Titus 2:4) Here, σωφρονίζωσιν appears as a present active subjunctive verb, translated as “so that they would exhort.”14 The word has an inherent sense of teaching (for) character development or virtue acquisition. It originally meant to instill a sense of moderation, to train, discipline, teach, or to “restore to sense.”15 The concept of teaching or training persons to develop certain character or virtues is an important feature of a virtue-ethical approach to morality.16 The use of σωφρονίζωσιν in the present tense and active voice here suggests a continuous process of inculcating character among younger women by the older women, which

ing “virtue ethics is not perfectionist in the sense of mandating an impossible ideal. It is perfectionist in the sense of viewing all aspects of life as morally relevant and in calling everyone to continual growth in every area of life.” 13 See Harrington and Keenan, Paul and Virtue Ethics, 3, for a discussion on the virtueethical concern with the morality of persons more than that of actions. 14 See Luck, “σωφροσύνη,” 1104. See Huizenga, Moral Education, 391–392: it literally means “to recall a person to his senses” (LSJ, s. v. σωφρονίζω), “to instruct in prudence or behavior that is becoming and shows good judgment” (BDAG, s. v. σωφρονίζω), “for spurring on” (Quinn, Letter to Titus, 120), “so that they might advise” (L. T. Johnson, Letters to Paul’s Delegates, 230), “then they can advise” (Dibelius and Conzelmann, Pastoral Epistles, 139). Guthrie thinks “train the younger women” does more justice to the Greek construction with ἵνα (The Pastoral Epistles, 193). 15 Spicq, “σωφρονέω,” 359. 16 See Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 26–29, for a discussion on the place of human agency and moral education in virtue ethics.

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correlates with the perfectionist concept of virtue ethics.17 The intended outcome of this teaching activity is also virtue-ethical, as will be discussed below. Moreover, an implicit virtue-ethical concept of moral exemplar or mimesis could be argued here, based on the ἵνα that connects Titus 2 verses 3 and 4. In verse 3, the author addresses older women concerning their own moral standing to “be reverent in behavior, teaching what is good, not slanderers, and not enslaved to much wine,” ἵνα σωφρονίζωσιν “so that they would teach.” This implies that the expected good character of the older women was not just for its own sake, neither was it only for them to be in their rightful senses to teach the younger women, but also so that they would serve as good models of the kind of character to inculcate in younger women by their teaching. The ἵνα σωφρονίζωσιν, therefore, introduces an implicit mimetic ethics into the picture. Mimetic ethics is equivalent to virtue ethics’ concept of moral exemplar, where mentors, models, guides, and exemplars are needed for two purposes: first, being skills, the virtues need examples to show what they mean practically. Second, the exemplars teach and encourage others to act likewise.18 In sum, the linguistic feature of σωφρονίζωσιν in Titus 2:4 has two virtueethical nuances. First, it expresses the virtue-ethical concept of character development through teaching. Second, it expresses the virtue-ethical concept of moral exemplar. iv) Σώφρονας “self-controlled” (Titus 2:5) The discussion on the linguistic form of σώφρονα εἶναι in 1:8 above directly applies to σώφρονας in this verse, therefore we will not repeat the details. It only needs to be added here that σώφρονας is one of the contents and outcomes of the σωφρονίζωσιν (“teaching, training, exhorting, restoring to senses and moderation”) in 2:4 above. This means that both the process (training) and the content and outcome of the training (self-control) are virtue-ethical in the sense that they relate to character development. v) Σωφρονεῖν “to be self-controlled or sensible” (Titus 2:6): Σωφρονεῖν here is linked to the verb παρακάλει, a present imperative verb, which translates as “to exhort.” Σωφρονεῖν is used as a present active infinitive verb, meaning “to be sensible,” or “to be self-controlled.” Titus is commanded to exhort the young men σωφρονεῖν “to be self-controlled.” The two verbs here, σωφρονεῖν and παρακάλει, both convey virtue-ethical concepts. Both the means or process of developing the character, namely; ‘παρακάλει’ – exhorting the young people, and the intended outcome, namely; σω17 Kotva, 18 Chan,

The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 37–38. Biblical Ethics in the 21st Century, 88.

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φρονεῖν – to be sensible, are virtue-ethical approaches to morality. The former relates with virtue ethics’ concept of teaching or training as a means of acquiring virtue or developing moral character, while the latter relates with virtue ethics’ consideration of self-control as a virtue that enables one to act virtuously in every situation. Moreover, the fact that the young men are not asked to be sensible in some specified aspects, e. g. sexuality, implies being sensible in all aspects of life as a lifestyle, which represents a virtue-ethical concept of perfectionism, regarding the entirety of a person’s life as morally significant.19 vi) Σωφρόνως “self-controlled or in a self-controlled manner” (Titus 2:12) The norm σωφρόνως is used here as an adverb, and first among the list of three positive moral qualities (σωφρόνως, δικαίως, εὐσεβῶς) that are similar to the Greek-philosophical cardinal virtues. Here, they are the three virtues that the “grace” teaches believers to live. Being an adverb, it suggests a manner of life that is characterized by moderation, being sensible, and being self-controlled, rather than specific moral actions to be performed. This already indicates the virtue-ethical perspective the norm bears. As noted in chapter two above, Titus 2:12 is the clearest expression of the connection between the Christ-event and moral living in not only Titus, but the PE at large. In relation to the virtue-ethical functions of the σωφροσύνη word group in Titus, this verse is also most significant. Apart from the triad virtues σωφρόνως “sensibly/self-controlled,” δικαίως “justly/righteously,” and εὐσεβῶς “godly” (Titus 2:11–12), the author introduces and integrates distinctive early Christian concepts in his account of virtue, thereby significantly modifying the Greek-philosophical virtue concept. One of the verbs related to εὐσεβῶς in Titus 2:12 is παιδεύουσα “teaching.” Being a present active participle verb form of παιδειά, it suggests a continuing process of moral training.20 The virtue-ethical concept here is that living a godly life 19 See

Chan, Biblical Ethics in the 21st Century, 84. Pauline Communities, 318–319, 321–322, notes that “the continuing aspect of the instruction suggests the nuances of training, encouragement, persuasion, practice, and discipline. See also Lock, Pastoral Epistles, 144. Lock has training, discipline, the educative power of God’s grace. Lock notes that the thought conveyed here is similar to the Greek idea of “redemption from ignorance.” He thinks this agrees with Pauline thought, and the focus here is primarily on “redemption from moral evil.” Hanson, Pastoral Epistles, 183–184, on the other hand, argues that the author uses παιδεύουσα here to mean “chastise,” not “educate.” He argues that in contemporary pagan philosophical vocabulary, παιδεία (training) was an “autonomous activity, a form of self-improvement,” but the author here appropriates it in the Christian context of God’s dealing with people. Moreover, Hultgren, I–II Timothy, Titus, 164, notes that grace has an “educative effect, not in a speculative way, but in the sense of moral training.” Irving Alans Sparks, The Pastoral Epistles: Introduction and Commentary (San Diego: Institute of Biblical Studies, 1985), 83, says the manifestation of God’s grace in Christ is “instructive for believers; it teaches them ‘how’ to live in this world.” 20 Smith,

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comes through training (equipping, teaching21), which corresponds with the Greek-philosophical concept of παιδεία as a means of civilizing in the virtues.22 In addition, the author moralizes the early Christian concept “the grace of God” which has been revealed, presenting it as the moral effect of the Christevent on the believer.23 The author, therefore, integrates this moral aspect of “the grace” with the concept of παιδεία in relation to moral agency of the triad virtues: self-control, justice, and godliness.24 The teaching, training, discipline, and equipping that the “grace” does is to achieve two things: to make possible the renunciation of ungodliness and worldly desires, on the one hand, but much more, to initiate and make possible a transition to a new way of living. Moreover, the verb ζήσωμεν is used as an active subjunctive aorist, meaning “to live,” which has an ingressive nuance, denoting “to begin to live,” thereby marking a definite radical change in a person’s life.25 The ingressive aorist here points to the fact that the conversion described, on the basis of the Christevent, implies a definite and dramatic start of a new kind of life that is different from material existence.26 The notion of a beginning and continuous formation of a new moral identity and character as a result of training is a virtueethical approach to morality,27 corresponding with the virtue-ethical concept of perfectionism and moral development.

21 Knight,

The Pastoral Epistles, 319, understands παιδεύουσα and other related verbs in Titus 2:12 as having an ongoing present significance because it is the controlling verb and is a present tense. Kent, The Pastoral Epistles, 227, has “to educate, train, chastise,” and in Titus 2:12, it is for believers in this present age, before Christ’s return. 22 Towner, The Letters to Timothy and Titus, 747. See Young, Pastoral Letters, 79–84, for more discussion on teaching and learning in the ancient world. She notes that “the education of mind and body through παιδεία was the classical Greek ideal” which is reflected in the Pastorals (79). 23 See Towner, The Goal of Our Instruction, 151; Smith, Pauline Communities, 318–319. 24 Donelson, Pseudepigraphy, 142–143, presents a similar argument by asserting that in the PE, the Christ-event has both epistemological and ontic consequences on the believer. He argues that Titus 3:4–7 indicates a connection between the epiphany, cultic baptism, and a radical moral transformation. This transformation enables the baptized believers to live ethical lives that are not accessible to non-believers. Donelson, therefore, concludes that the primary role of the Spirit in the PE is not an ethical guide but for ethical enablement. He argues further that this conclusion is in contrast to Paul’s pneumatological concept of walking in the Spirit. He adds that the idea of receiving ethical power at baptism was a common notion in early Christianity. 25 Mounce, Pastoral Epistles, 424. Mounce says in the PE, God’s grace is the instructor, not Hellenistic philosophy. Towner, The Letters to Timothy and Titus, 720, says the norm σώφρον and its cognates, especially in Titus 2:12, is “explicitly identified with the new life made possible by the Christ-event.” The Christ-event is the mystical source of this life. 26 Quinn, The Letter to Titus, 166. 27 See Bondi, “Character,” 82–84. Also See R. C. Roberts, “Character,” in New Dictionary of Christian Ethics and Pastoral Theology, ed. David J. Atkinson and David J. Field (Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, 1995), 69.

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b) Inter-Textual Level The linguistic form of σώφρονα as it appears in Titus 1:8 is the same as in 1 Tim 3:2 and are the only occurrences in the NT. Also noteworthy is the fact that the moral agents in the two verses are the ἐπίσκοπος “overseer, bishop.” All the virtue-ethical elements σώφρονα conveys in Titus 1:8, as discussed above, are also present in 1 Tim 3:2. For example, its focus on the morality of persons more than the morality of actions, its focus on character or quality to possess instead of concrete actions to perform, its focus on the totality of one’s life instead of selected aspects of life are present in the two occurrences. However, while Titus has the highest occurrences of the σωφροσύνη word group in the PE, there are significant differences between the usage of the word group in Titus and 2 Timothy, on the one hand, and 1 Timothy, on the other hand. 1 Timothy’s usage is more female-gendered than Titus and 2 Timothy.28 The two occurrences in 1 Timothy (2:9, 15) are used exclusively in relation to women. In 1 Tim 2:9, women are to dress with σωφροσύνη as befitting women who profess to worshipping God, and in 1 Tim 2:15, women will be saved through childbirth if they continue in faith, love, and holiness with σωφροσύνη.29 These two instances exclude men in a general sense. Turning to Titus and 2 Timothy, we find a different approach where every group in the Cretan church shares in the moral agency of σωφροσύνη:30 Titus 1:8 applies the norm specifically to the bishop (singular); Titus 2:2 applies to older men; Titus 2:4 applies to older women with an attendant responsibility to teach; Titus 2:5 applies to younger women; and Titus 2:6 applies to younger men. Titus 2:12 then applies to all believers “us,” which includes slaves and possibly believing masters, who seem to have been omitted so far. In a similar usage to Titus, 2 Timothy has only one occurrence which applies to all believers. In reminding Timothy to fan into flame the gift of God which he received through the laying on of hands, the author says a general statement that is applicable to all believers, namely, that God has not given “us” the spirit of cowardice, but of power, love, and σωφρονισμοῦ “of self-control.” This has 28 See Huizenga, Moral Education, 329–343, for an elaborate discussion on the gender differences in the application of the σωφρο-word group in the PE. She argues that the author applies the norm to women in more detail than to men. But I think that Huizenga’s consideration of the letters as a corpus leads her to generalize to the disadvantage of the distinctive voice of Titus. Looking at Titus alone, there may not be accountable grounds for Huizenga’s conclusion. See the discussion above on History of Interpretation: Huizenga (2013) for my argument contra Huizenga to the “genderedness” of the norm in Titus. 29 For a thorough discussion of “women saved through childbearing …” in 1 Tim 2:15, see Anna Rebecca Solevåg, “The Pastoral Epistles,” in Birthing Salvation: Gender and Class in Early Christian Childbearing Discourse (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 85–135 . 30 A detailed discussion on the moral agents of the σωφροσύνη word group is undertaken below. However, the issue of moral agency is mentioned here in the context of the differences between the use of the norm in Titus and the other Pastoral Letters.

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two similarities to the usage in Titus that are worth noting here. First, the idea of “us” as moral agents of σωφροσύνη and the idea of divine agency associated to our agency (“God has given”). This similar concept is most evident in Titus 2:12. Just as God has given “the grace” which enables “us” (all believers) to live selfcontrolled lives, so also in 2 Tim 1:7 God has given the Spirit31 which gives “us” (or is for our) power, probably implying power to love and to exercise self-control.32 On this basis, we can say that Titus and 2 Timothy explicitly ground the norm σωφροσύνη on the Christ-event, indicating the role of divine agency on the human moral agents, while 1 Timothy does not.33 Second, Titus and 2 Timothy consider believers universally as the moral agents, while 1 Timothy considers only women and the bishop as the moral agents. Furthermore, 1 Tim 2:9 applies it in relation to women’s dressing and good deeds, specifying the aspect of its application, while such specification is absent in Titus and 2 Timothy. For these reasons, it is evident that Titus and 2 Timothy’s usage of the σωφροσύνη word group is more virtue-ethical than 1 Timothy.34 c) Extra-Textual Level Five illocutionary effects could be deduced from the linguistic analysis above. First, the fact that Titus has the highest number of occurrences of the σωφροσύνη word group in the whole NT suggests that the author attaches significant importance to the norm. Second, the fact that the author applies this norm to all the groups in the household as well as to the Cretan church shows that he wants 31 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 698–699, rightly notes that the Spirit here could be understood as referring to God’s gift to all believers at Pentecost or conferred at conversion, on the one hand, or referring to God’s gift of the Spirit to leaders such as during commissioning for ministry, on the other. Whichever is the case, what is important for our consideration here is that the Holy Spirit is what is being referred to, and is in connection with the Christ-event or its proclamation. 32 In this way, I understand the construction ἀλλὰ δυνάμεως καὶ ἀγάπης καὶ σωφρονισμοῦ as “but (the spirit) of power – power of love and of self-control,” instead of “the spirit of power, of love, and of self-control.” But this construction is still problematic because it rudely disconnects the triad by omitting the first καί. See Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 698–700, and Towner, The Letters to Timothy and Titus, 460–463, for consideration of “power, love and selfcontrol” as separate qualities. 33 Andy Johnson, “Self-Control,” in The New Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible, ed. Katharine Doob Sakenfield (Nashville: Abingdon, 2009), 5:160–161, notes, in a rather general but relevant statement, that in the NT, self-control is “characterized by a Spirit-enabled, stable pattern of thinking and acting that conforms to the power of God made strong in human weakness.” 34 Jens Herzer has argued for and pointed out some significant similarities between Titus and 2 Timothy together and how they differ from 1 Timothy. My conclusion above seems to support his argument, though from a different standpoint, namely, a virtue-ethical one. See Jens Herzer, “Rearranging the Household of God: A New Perspective on the Pastoral Epistles,” in Empsychoi logoi – Religious Innovations in Antiquity: Studies in Honour of Pieter Willem van der Horst, ed. Alberdina Houtman et al. (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2008), 547–566.

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to see the virtue inculcated and lived by everyone in the Cretan Christian community.35 Third, even though not explicit, the author includes believing slaves and masters among those required to acquire and practice σωφροσύνη by using an inclusive and general pronoun “us” in Titus 2:12. Fourth, being the first in the literary sequence of the three cardinal virtues in Titus 2:12 could suggest that the author gives σωφροσύνη some prominence over the other virtues in the list.36 Fifth, the fact that self-control as a virtue inherently refers to internal qualities, dispositions, and character and how they are expressed on the outside, suggests the author’s concern for a virtue-oriented morality that transcends mere legalism and moralism. Therefore, we could summarize the linguistic virtue-ethical perspectives of the σωφροσύνη word group in Titus as follows. First, the different verbal forms used in relation to the virtue indicate a focus on moral “being” more than “doing,” relating to the morality of persons more than the morality of actions. The noun, adjectival, and adverbial forms indicate one’s state of being, quality or manner of life respectively. Second, the norm is presented with a perfectionist nuance in the sense that one is to continually grow in it and practice it in every aspect of life. Third, the norm applies to all groups in the church. Fourth, the virtue is to be acquired through training as a means of character development. Fifth, one could develop or acquire the norm through learning from the life and actions of moral exemplars. Sixth, the nature of the virtue itself inherently relates to internal qualities, dispositions, attitudes, rationality, sensibility, character, and the expression of these inner qualities in one’s daily life.

35 Keenan notes that virtue ethics concerns itself with identity, and a person’s identity needs a story or narrative, a framework which “synthesizes our diverse moments of experience into a coherent whole.” One’s personal identity comes to identify with this story and the community that tries to live out this story. This seems to be the case where the author of Titus seeks to see how every person brings her/his personal identity in the process of living true to the self-control (and other) virtues of the community. See Keenan, A History of Catholic Moral Theology, 76, citing Spohn, Go and Do Likewise, 28, and Spohn, What Are They Saying About Scripture and Ethics? 81–82. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 160–161, also notes that in the ancient and medieval worlds, the individual is identified and constituted in and through certain roles s/he plays in the society, and “those roles which bind the individual to the communities in and through which alone specifically human goods are to be attained.” This emphasizes the place of community in virtue ethics, because the person confronts the world as a member of a specific family, clan, tribe, city, nation, or kingdom, all as different parts of the community. 36 Horn, “Tugendlehre im Neuen Testament?” 423 notes that in understanding the catalog of virtues in 2 Peter, the number of the virtues, the order in which they appear, and the “Kopf‑ und Schlussstellung einer Tugend” (“first and last position of a virtue”) in a catalog should be noted. Horn notes how Paul places agape, which he regards as the highest virtue, in the first position.

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3.1.2 Moral Agents of the σωφροσύνη Cognates The moral agents of the σωφροσύνη cognates in Titus are mostly gendered, but later unified in reference to all believers. a) ὁ ἐπίσκοπος “the bishop” (Titus 1:7–8) The moral agent here is a singular agent, referring to a specific ecclesial office(r).37 His agency is not for the norm σωφροσύνη alone, but other norms such as δίκαιον “just,” ὅσιον “holy,” and ἐγκρατῆ “disciplined.”38 In finding the moral agents of an ethical norm, our methodology proposes a consideration of the factors that constitute the moral subject as well, such as the will, reason, and emotions of the moral agent.39 The dominant “self-control” and “sensible” nuances, its relation to the entirety of life, and the inner to outer dimensions of the σωφροσύνη virtue indicate that different factors constitute the moral subject, such as reason (rationality), will, consciousness, and emotions.40 Its involving these different factors applies to its other occurrences in the letter to Titus. The bishop is presented here as a heteronomous moral agent. This is indicated by the phrase “as God’s steward” (Titus 1:7), which is to be understood as the author’s appeal to God as an autonomous agent. The author himself is a heteronomous agent, who has in Titus 1:1 declared himself a slave of God and an apostle of Jesus Christ. This subjects his agency to God’s autonomous agency. 37 See Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 170–181, for elaborate discussion on “bishop/overseer” and “elders.” See also Quinn, Letter to Titus, 88, that the author of the PE considers the terms ἐπίσκοπος in Titus 1:7 and πρεσβυτέροι in 1:5 as somewhat equivalent, but not synonymous. 38 See Quinn, Letter to Titus, 89–90, who notes that there is no ethical analysis of the relations between the qualities listed here. 39 Ruben Zimmermann, Jan G. Van Der Watt, and Susanne Luther, eds., Moral Language in the New Testament: The Inter-relatedness of Language and Ethics in Early Christian Writings, WUNT 2/296 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 26. For a detailed explanation and illustrative application of all the models of “Implicit Ethics,” see Ruben Zimmermann, Die Logik der Liebe: Die ‘implizite Ethik’ der Paulusbriefe am Beispiel des 1. Korintherbriefs, BiblischTheologische Studien 162 (Neukirchen: Neukirchener Verlag, 2016). 40 John Oakley and Dean Cocking, Virtue Ethics and Professional Roles (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 168, citing Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II.6. II6b15 and III. I. IIIIbI–2, argue that virtue ethics, though emphasizing moral development, does not exonerate persons from emotions that they have passively acquired such as anger because moral virtue concerns itself with passions and actions as well. And the actions proceeding from anger, as an example, are the person’s actions, so s/he is responsible. For an entire study dedicated to emotions in relation to morality, see Justin Oakley, Morality and Emotions (London and New York: Routledge, 1992). See also Rosalind Hurthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford Scholarship Online, 2003), 1–16, for a chapter on “Virtue and the Emotions.” For an elaborate discussion on emotions in the NT, see Matthew Elliott, Faithful Feelings: Emotions in the New Testament (Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, 2005).

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Moreover, since the author commands Titus to appoint a bishop who is “self-controlled/sensible,” it suggests that Titus is also a heteronomous agent. However, there is no explicit connection between the bishop’s agency and divine agency (through the Christ-event) to differentiate it from popular Greek-philosophical leadership codes.41 Nevertheless, an implicit divine agency in relation to the bishop could be inferred by considering the overall picture of the book, especially Titus 2:12, as will be discussed below. In sum, the virtue-ethical perspectives of the bishop’s moral agency could be enumerated as follows. First, it is the ‘person’ of the bishop that is in view more than his actions. The emphasis is on his “being” more than his “doing.” Second, his moral agency for the norm is not in specific aspects of life, and not even limited to his leadership duties, but the entirety of his life. Third, there is a sense of continuity in the agency, which is represented in the present tense and active voice of εἶναι. Fourth, the inner disposition42 and equilibrium43 of the moral agent conveyed in this norm is distinctively virtue-ethical.44 b) Πρεσβύτας “elderly men” (Titus 2:2) The “elderly men” who are the moral agents here are to be understood as a subgroup among the believers in Crete and not to be misunderstood with the ministerial πρεσβύτερος “elder” in Titus 1:5.45 The virtue-ethical perspectives of their agency are similar to those of the bishop enumerated above, which include a focus on the morality of persons, and perfectionism. Similarly, the intra-textual discussion above on the virtue-ethical role of εἶναι “to be” in moral agency is applicable here, showing how this linguistic element places the emphasis on moral “being” more than “doing. c) πρεσβύτιδας “elderly women” (Titus 2:3–4) Similar to the “elderly men,” the “elderly women” (Titus 2:3) here designate a group among believers, not an ecclesiastical office.46 The verb σωφρονίζωσιν in Titus 2:4 gives a slightly different perspective to the older women’s moral 41 See Towner, The Goal of Our Instruction, 162, who argues that even though the lists of virtues or qualities for the office of the bishop in Titus 1:8 and 1 Tim 3:2 almost certainly represent traditional Greek forms, the term σώφρον would denote a virtue or characteristic that represents genuine life in Christ. 42 See Luck, “σωφροσύνη,” 1103. 43 See Quinn, Letter to Titus, 314. The word group designates “internal equilibrium and sense of balance.” 44 See Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 104–106, 120–121, for a discussion on how internal qualities in Matthew’s gospel and some Pauline letters are virtue-ethical. 45 See Quinn, Letter to Titus, 117. Except in Titus 2:2, the term πρεσβύτας occurs only in a singular form in the NT (Luke 1:18, Phlm 9), and the feminine version, referring to elderly (old) women in Titus 2:2 πρεσβύτιδας, in biblical Greek, is found only in 4 Macc 16:14. 46 See Quinn, Letter to Titus, 117.

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agency compared to the older men. It has two sides to it, connoting not only “being self-controlled” but also “being” and “spurring/exhorting” others to be self-controlled. It indicates spurring, exhorting, teaching or training others to be self-controlled by being self-controlled and by teaching them to be self-controlled. In our text, the older women are to be told to behave well so that they would spur or teach younger women47 how to be self-controlled. Here also, all the virtue-ethical perspectives of the σωφροσύνη cognates that are discussed under the moral agency of the bishop and elderly men above apply here, but with additional virtue-ethical nuances. The additional nuance is an implicit presence of the concept of moral exemplar. The older women are to teach, not by a didactic means only, but by exemplary means as well. Σωφρονίζω, connoting the nuance ‘to spur someone,’48 is not limited to mere didactics. The elderly women’s exemplary lifestyle is also a significant implicit means of exhorting the younger women to be virtuous. Both the didactic and moral exemplar means of spurring others to be virtuous are virtue-ethical approaches to morality. d) Τάς νέας “the young women” (Titus 2:4–5) Τάς νέας is to be understood with reference to young women as a group among the Cretan believers, in a similar way that the elderly men, elderly women, and younger men are different groups instead of an ecclesiastical position. Their agency is to result from the teaching or spurring by the elderly women, which implies heteronomous moral agency. In other words, the young women are to be self-controlled by learning from the life and teaching of older women who practice self-control. Another indication of their heteronomous agency is conveyed in the statement ἵνα μή ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ βλασφημῆται “so that the word of God would not be blasphemed” (Titus 2:5). The author invokes the word of God as a reason to be self-controlled, with God whose word is sacred and should not be blasphemed as an implicit autonomous agent. The virtue-ethical function of εἶναι and all other virtue-ethical perspectives of the moral agents of the σωφροσύνη word group discussed above also apply to the young women’s moral agency here. For example, a focus on the morality of “being” more than the morality of “doing,” a

47 Margaret Y. MacDonald, “Children in House Churches in the Light of New Research on Families in the Roman World,” in The World of Jesus and the Early Church: Identity and Interpretation in Early Communities of Faith, ed. Craig S. Evans (Peabody: Hendrickson, 2011), 80, argues that the reason why older women are asked to continue teaching younger women in the PE is because the girls were married off at adolescence to older men, thus “it is important to consider their ongoing education by older females throughout the process of a first marriage and the birth of a first child.” She notes further that marriage was the most visible mark of adulthood for girls, but there was only a small difference between a girl child and wife. 48 See Quinn, Letter to Titus, 120; Luck, “σωφροσύνη,” 1104.

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concern for perfectionist application of the virtue, and a concern for character development. e) Νεωτέρους “young men” (Titus 2:6) The young men here are also to be understood as a group in the Cretan church. While εἶναι which plays a notable virtue-ethical role in other occurrences is lacking here, the infinitive verb form of the virtue itself, that is, ‘σωφρονεῖν’ “to be sensible, self-controlled”49 does almost exactly what εἶναι does to the noun and adjectival forms of the norm in Titus 1:8; 2:2, 5. The infinitive form also indicates that the young men are “to be” self-controlled. The young men are also heteronomous agents because Titus is to exhort (παρακάλει) them to be sensible, suggesting Titus as an autonomous agent here. Nevertheless, Titus is also, in some respect, a heteronomous agent to the author who gives him the instruction. While in the previous verse older women are to exhort, teach, or spur (by their exemplary life and teaching) the young women to be self-controlled, here Titus is the one to exhort or teach the young men to be self-controlled. The next verse (Titus 2:7) then notes that Titus is to be an example (to the young men inclusively) “in all things.” This explicitly introduces the moral exemplar concept of virtue ethics in the young men’s moral agency. f) Ἡμᾶς “us” (Titus 2:12) This is the only place in Titus where a general or “universal” moral agency applies to the σωφροσύνη word group. This is not surprising because this is the point at which the author explicitly grounds the norm σωφροσύνη on the Christ-event.50 Even if the argument that the author casually adopts traditional secular ethical codes (in this case the σωφροσύνη cognates) is sustained in the previous occurrences, which explains the gendered or grouped moral agency, here we find an explicit early Christian adaptation of the norm, which accounts for its non-gendered and particularistic application. In chapter two above, we have noted particularism or exclusivity as one of the characteristics of virtue ethics. The moral agency here, referring only to believers as a group, is therefore virtue-ethical. 49 Or to live “measured and orderly life.” See Luck, “σωφροσύνη,” 1103. See also Spicq, “σωφρονέω,” 360. 50 See Towner, The Goal of Our Instruction, 108, 161, “the clearest example of the role of the Christ-event” in self-control and other ethical norms. Donelson, Pseudepigraphy, 173, says the author adopts three of the four Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic cardinal virtues and gives it a “Christian distinctive.” See also Quinn, Letter to Titus, 314, the author grounds it on soteriology. Schrage, The Ethics of the New Testament, trans. David E. Green (Edinburg: T&T Clark, 1988), 258, also notes that the PE base their ethics on soteriology, interpreting it as a response to God’s grace, but that they associate it more with the incarnation and give it a “different accent” than earlier disciples of Paul.

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It is also in this verse that we find an interplay between the roles of the divine and human agencies, conveyed in the idea of “the grace” of God παιδεύουσα ἡμᾶς “training us.” Kotva examines the connection between systematic theology and Pauline biblical studies with virtue ethics, with specific focus on the role of “grace” in moral agency. He argues that any Christian account of virtue ethics must adapt the concept of grace in moral agency. However, he argues, “grace does not eliminate the need for human effort … responsibility for our actions accompanies our liberation in Christ.”51 In Titus 2:12, we see a case where the roles of “the grace” and human agency are complementary in the sense that the “grace of God” does the training or teaching while the believer does the renouncing of ungodliness and worldly desires, thereby living a self-controlled, righteous, and godly life.52 In Titus 2:11–12, the significant role of the Christ-event marks a major difference between the ethics of Titus and its contemporary Greek-philosophical concept of self-control. It is at this point that we find a clear case where the “self” aspect of self-control as a virtue in Greek-philosophical53 thought is “de-selfed” and/or “co-selfed” in the sense that it ceases to be an autonomous “self-agent,” as it were, but shares agency with a divine agent called “the grace.”54 The role of “the grace” here is not to be limited to the cognitive aspect of teaching or to developing intellectual virtues only, but as enabling one to live a self-controlled, righteous, and godly life. Titus 2:11–12 is the peak of the ethical posture of the letter to Titus. Therefore, it is not surprising that it is here we  Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 130. Volker Rabens, The Holy Spirit and Ethics in Paul: Transformation and Empowering for Religious-Ethical Life, WUNT 2/283 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 21, 250–252. See also Gilbert Meilaender, “Divine Grace and Ethics,” in The Oxford Handbook of Theological Ethics, ed. Gilbert Meilaender and William Werpehowski (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 74–88, for more discussion on the role of divine agency in Christian ethics. Also relevant is John M. G. Barclay, “Grace and the Transformation of Agency in Christ” in Redefining FirstCentury Jewish and Christian Identities: Essays in Honor of Ed Parish Sanders, ed. Fabian E. Udoh et al (Notre Dame: The University of Notre Dame Press, 2008), 372–389. 53 Even though the σωφρο-cluster were familiar and could have been borrowed from Greek philosophy, the author notably adapts and presents a Christian version of it, which is grounded on the effect the Christ-event has on a person. While the Greeks thought teaching or ‘civilization’ and human effort are enough to develop σωφροσύνη, the author of Titus shows that it depends more on divine agency and its continuous training and enabling of the believer. See also Christensen, who says that the fact that “Christ is the source and exemplar of selfcontrol and Christians are invited to likewise give of themselves for the sake of the gospel, differs greatly from the established teachings of the cardinal ethical virtues in Greco-Roman literature.” Sean Christensen, “The Pursuit of Self-Control: Titus 2:1–14 and Accommodation to Christ.” Journal for the Study of Paul and His Letters 6.2 (2016): 161–80 here 180. 54 See Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 74–76, 129–131, 168–70, who rightly argues that in Christian virtue ethics, grace initiates and continually makes our effort and moral growth possible but does not eliminate the need for effort and growth on the person’s part. In essence, both divine grace and human agency co-exist and co-operate to make the acquisition and expression of moral virtues possible. 51

52 See

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find these three important virtues (self-control, justice, and godliness) brought together in the form of the traditional cardinal virtues. Titus 2:11–12, therefore, contains and expresses the “moral vision”55 of the letter to Titus. We can identify four ways in which “self” is “de-selfed” and/or “co-selfed” in Titus’s account of self-control. First, the “self” (person) has to be taught by divine agency in order to exhibit “self-control.” Second, the “self” alone is incapable of self-control. It needs not only the cognitive teaching of the divine agent but needs enabling as well. The divine agency seems to play a greater role in being self-controlled by virtue of its function of “teaching” and “enabling” simultaneously. Third, the “self” itself does not decide aspects of life over which it practices self-control but is expected to be self-controlled in all aspects of life. Fourth, the “self” does not exhibit self-control for its own benefit only, or in relation to its own “self” only, but to and for the benefit of others. To these extents, the Greek-philosophical virtue self-control is “de-selfed” and/or “coselfed” in Titus. The virtue-ethical perspectives of the general moral agency “us” in Titus 2:12 could be summarized as follows: first, the grounding of the virtue on the Christevent with its nuance of “moral transformation” (new identity and character formation56) is virtue-ethical, relating to moral “being” more than moral “doing.” Second, the continuous didactic work of the grace of God on the believer to develop self-control corresponds with the virtue-ethical notion of character development. Yarbrough is right in noting that the “teaching” (how to live self-controlled, just, and godly lives) is not simply instructions, but education, guidance, and discipline related to parental or pastoral oversight or supervision.57 Third, the non-specification of the aspects of life in which the moral agents are to show self-control and the absence of concrete ethos correspond to the virtueethical concept of perfectionism. Fourth, the universal yet particularistic nature of the moral agents (“us” – believers) corresponds with the virtue-ethical concept of particularism.58 It is worth reiterating here that while believing slaves and masters seem left out of the moral agency for this norm in the previous verses, the author now includes them in the “us” moral agency.59 55 This description is inspired by Richard B. Hay’s book, The Moral Vision of the New Testament (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996). 56 See Birch and Rasmussen, Bible and Ethics in the Christian Life, 104, for a discussion on how biblical characters (persons) as examples can shape one’s character in Christian ethics today. 57 Yarbrough, Letters, 526. 58 Kotva rightly puts it thus, “virtue ethics does not assume that everyone has equal insight into every situation or that everyone’s voice should carry equal weight in every decision” (The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 151). While Kotva’s point is not directly about the overall “exclusivity” of moral agency in virtue ethics as found in the text of Titus, it gives a hint to the fact that not everyone is assumed to be virtuous, or at least not everyone is virtuous at the same level. 59 See Quinn, Letter to Titus, 314–315.

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3.1.3 Ethical Argumentation/Reflection for σωφροσύνη Since the different σωφροσύνη clusters appear in different places and relate to different moral agents, it is possible to find more than one ethical argumentation for a single norm. Therefore, this unit of the study analyzes both explicit and implicit means by which the author generates moral significance. In other words, we seek to identify how the author argues to convince the moral agents to learn, acquire, or practice the selected ethical norms. Moreover, our task here involves finding out if those argumentations relate to virtue-ethical characteristics or not, and to what extent. In Titus 1:8, the bishop is to be self-controlled, along with other qualities. The ethical argumentation is to be traced from verse 7, where the author turns from addressing elders to addressing the bishop. The expression ὡς θεοῦ οἰκονόμον “as God’s steward” is an implicit ethical argumentation, for it appeals to the God-given leadership role of the bishop as the reason for being self-controlled, along with the other moral qualities enumerated in the immediate context. The implicit reflection behind the instruction to the bishop is that, beyond the official duties required, the office of the bishop has attendant moral standards expected of its occupant. Therefore, the bishop should be self-controlled based on character or virtue in order to discharge his ministerial duties appropriately. This ethical argumentation has two dimensions. On the one hand, there is an appeal to God as the giver of the stewardship, and on the other hand, there is an appeal to the position or office of the bishop as a reason for developing or acquiring self-control. The former is evident in the way that the text does not just say “as a steward” but “as God’s steward.” Invoking God into the stewardship here strengthens the ethical argumentation. Both sides of the argumentation fit more into a deontological ethical argumentation than a virtue-ethical one. This is because both God (as presented here) and the ministerial office of the bishop do not directly constitute inner disposition, character, or “being” of the bishop as a moral agent. They could both be regarded as external factors, since God is presented only as the giver of the stewardship and that the office of the bishop is something one receives, and not a character trait acquired. The absence of an explicit grounding of this argumentation on the Christ-event or on character could suggest that the author adopts Greek leadership codes with little60 or no adaptation.61 Nevertheless, the Christ-event and inclusive terminology “us” in 60 The inclusion of “God” (singular) in the stewardship, instead of “gods” (or the emperor?) is what I understand as at least an element of the author’s little adaptation, if it is established that he borrowed the material from Greek-philosophical leadership codes. 61 Schrage, The Ethics of the New Testament, 263, argues that the requirements for the offices of the bishop and deacons in the PE “are not even specifically Christian. They refer to universal human moral qualities that are also demanded by the bourgeois ethics of the Hellenistic world.” On this and other notes, the author has “undeniably … moralized the Christian message.” But we have noted how in Titus 2:11–14, the author sums up all the ethical requirements

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Titus 2:12 includes the bishop in the virtue-ethical argumentation for self-control, as will be discussed below. In Titus 2:2–6 we find different occurrences of self-control applied to different groups. We will, therefore, analyze the argumentations or lack of them as applied to each group. The first group addressed is the elderly men. There seems to be no implicit or explicit ethical argumentation for them to acquire or practice selfcontrol. Titus is only asked to “speak to elderly men to be temperate, honorable, self-controlled, being healthy in the faith, in love, and in perseverance.” The second group are the elderly women (Titus 2:3–4). In their case, the ethical argumentation is introduced by the ἵνα “so that” immediately preceding the verb σωφρονίζωσιν “they would exhort.” As discussed above, this verb is two-dimensional. On the one hand, it inherently implies living a self-controlled life; on the other hand, it implies spurring others on to live in the same manner. The implicit ethical argumentation, therefore, is that the elderly women are to behave well (verse 3) so that they would be self-controlled enough to “exhort or spur” the younger women to be husband-loving, children-loving, self-controlled, and so on. The virtue-ethical perspective to this argumentation is the “exhorting/ spurring” nuance, which is a process of character development. And the implicit idea of the teachers (elderly women) themselves being expected to be “in their senses, sensible, or self-controlled” in order to exhort or spur on the young women relates to their internal sensibility or disposition. The implicit reflection is that the elderly women cannot “bring the young women to their senses” without first being in their own senses. In the context of this teaching role, the older women are autonomous moral agents. The reference to their “being” (inner disposition and sensibility) as the basis of their “doing”62 (teaching or exhorting the younger women) indicates a virtue-ethical argumentation. The next group to which self-control applies are the young women (Titus 2:5). Here we find an explicit ethical argument in the statement ἵνα μή ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ βλασφημῆται “so that the word of God would not be blasphemed.” The author generates moral significance for the young women to be self-controlled, chaste, devoted to domestic works,63 good, and being submissive to their own husbands by appealing to the sanctity of the word of God, which could be blasphemed by outsiders if young women do not live an ethically appropriate lifestyle.64 We could describe this argumentation as a missional-ethicalin the three cardinal virtues and grounds them on the Christ-event. On this note, the author has not “moralized the Christian message,” rather, he has Christianized the moral message. 62 See Birch and Rasmussen, Bible and Ethics in the Christian Life, 94–104, for further discussion on the place of decision-making and action in Christian ethics. 63 Johnson rightly notes that the women’s being devoted to domestic works or being good house keepers is not “a description of how well the house is managed so much as a description of their moral character as keepers/managers of the house” (Letters to Paul’s Delegates, 231). 64 See Wagener, Die Ordnung des “Hauses Gottes”, 86–87, who also notes that good works in the PE had an important function both within and outside the church. Within the church,

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argumentation. It fits more into the category of deontological and consequentialist ethical argumentations than a virtue-ethical one. In the deontological category, the sacredness of the word of God becomes a reason for moral action. In the consequentialist category, the need to avoid blasphemy to the word of God from outsiders because of the young women’s misbehavior becomes an argumentation for right behavior. Moreover, the implied positive nuance that their good behavior would attract respect instead of blasphemy to the sacredness of the word of God also fits into the consequentialist ethical reflection. Furthermore, the ethical argumentation in relation to the young women is oriented towards a deontological and consequentialist ethical framework and not virtue-ethical because, first, it does not relate directly to the dispositions or character of the young women or their telos in the sense of what they would become by practicing the virtues. Instead, the argumentation is located in external factors outside the character of the moral agents (young women), namely, the word of God and outsiders’ respectability. The only virtue-ethical nuance in this argumentation is the inherent nature of self-control itself, which entails internal qualities and dispositions. In other words, Titus 2:5 does not generate a virtueethical argumentation for young women to be self-controlled. The last group addressed are the young men (Titus 2:6), whom Titus is to exhort to be “sensible/self-controlled,” without any ethical argumentation for it, similar to the elderly men above.65 In Titus 2:12, the three cardinal virtues: self-control, justice, and godliness share the same ethical argumentation. In this case, the ethical argumentation features both a deontological and a virtue-ethical reflection, though implicit. The two argumentations are conveyed in the statement: for the grace has been revealed to all men, and that grace is teaching “us” (believers). The deontological argumentation is in the fact that grace “has been revealed,” stating facts of “what is” or what has happened. In addition, the deontological argumentation is strengthened by the fact that Christ has given himself for “us,” to redeem and purify a special people for himself (Titus 2: 13–14). These statements of fact are they are marks of a person’s true faith, and outside the church, they are positive attractions to non-believers. 65 This leaves room for further investigation (perhaps around the historical background) into why there are ethical argumentations for the feminine gender but there are none for the masculine gender here. I have argued above that if we read Titus as an individual text, we could even conclude that the virtue of self-control applies more to the masculine gender than the feminine. The use of ethical argumentation for the females and not for the males is different from Huizenga’s argument that the author uses the virtue in more detail with respect to females than males. Her argumentation is based on the number of occurrences and application in the whole PE, especially judging from 1 Timothy, while mine is based on the virtue-ethical reading of the ethical argumentation in Titus alone, which Huizenga does not refer to. See Huizenga, Moral Education, 329–343, for an extensive discussion on the gender differences in the application of the σωφρο-word group in the PE.

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deontological because, in themselves, they do not have anything directly to do with the character of the moral agents. However, the phrase “teaching us” conveys the virtue-ethical aspect of the argumentation. It corresponds with the virtue-ethical characteristic of teaching or training for moral development. In this case, it is virtue-ethical because it directly relates to the character of persons, not some external factors. The teaching is intended to change the moral agent such that the reason for moral action emanates from within the person, i. e. what he/she has learned from the teaching/training by “the grace.” What the author says, in essence, is that because the believers are being trained or equipped, it becomes a reason to be self-controlled, corresponding to their training. Moreover, we can deduce a teleological virtue-ethical reflection in the “teaching us” concept by looking ahead to the outcome of the teaching, namely, to live a self-controlled, righteous, and godly life. The teaching enables the believers to move towards their moral telos, namely, living self-controlled, just, and godly lives. Bray, however, cautions against introducing a non-existent substantive ‘lives’ to the three adverbs “sensibly, justly, godly” in Titus 2:12, thereby rendering the adverbs as adjectives of “lives.” He argues, instead, that the three adverbs are attached directly to the verb ζήσωμεν “we may live,” implying that “it is not the lives of the saved that must be selfcontrolled, upright and godly, but the way they live. The difference in meaning is that Paul did not envisage an objective standard of what saved people ought to be like but rather demanded that they should think and act in ways that were compatible with their calling.”66 In what is of specific relevance to our virtueethical interpretation, Bray notes that it is the principle, not prescriptions, of godly living that is in view in this passage. This implies that the moral agent works out the practical implications of godly living in each situation, rather than having an objective and artificial standard that specifies precisely what it means to live a godly life.67 Johnson, though not approaching Titus from a virtue-ethical standpoint, notes that instead of providing moral purity codes, God here (Titus 2:11–15; cf. 1:15) purifies the people internally, such that they have an internal capacity to live a prudent, just, and godly life.68 Moreover, in what sounds like a typical virtueethical statement, Johnson describes the kerygmatic material in Titus 3:1–8a as the author’s elaboration of the “internal dispositions” that should motivate the Cretan believers’ submission to the ruling authorities.69 66 Bray,

Pastoral Epistles, 523. Pastoral Epistles, 523. 68 Johnson, Letters, 241. Johnson further notes that the verb paideuein means “educating in human culture” generally (241). In this regard, Bray (Pastoral Epistles, 523) also affirms that “it is by the Holy Spirit that we are given both the ability to identify ungodliness and the strength to turn away from it.” 69 Johnson, Letters, 246. 67 Bray,

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The “us” in Titus 2:12, understood as referring to all believers because of its grounding on the Christ-event, includes the bishop (Titus 1:7–8) whose ethical argument is not virtue-ethical, and all the groups self-control applies to in Titus 2:2–6, especially the older men and younger men to whom no ethical argumentation is generated. For this reason, we could now accountably say that the virtue-ethical argumentations in Titus 2:12 fill in the missing or omitted virtue-ethical argumentations in relation to the bishop, elderly men, and younger men. Moreover, an implicit teleological argumentation is found in the succeeding verse (Titus 2:13), in the statement “waiting for the blessed hope and appearance of the glory of our great God and Saviour, Jesus Christ.” Kotva’s attempt to connect the virtue-ethical concept of a moral telos to the systematic theological concepts of sanctification and Christology will be helpful and applicable in analyzing the teleological argumentation in Titus 2:13. Kotva draws an important connection between virtue ethics’ concept of the telos of life, which is a continuous pursuit throughout one’s lifetime, to the Christian systematic theological concept of sanctification and Christology. In a Christian moral reasoning of sanctification (implying continuous moral growth) and Christology (where Christ is a norm for living, and a telos), “we can become more like Christ, but we are never (in this life) fully conformed to Christ’s image.”70 This marks a significant difference between secular virtue ethics and Christian virtue ethics. While secular virtue ethics looks towards “happiness” as the telos of life, the Christian virtue ethics looks towards Christ as the telos of life. Also, while the former looks towards a telos in this life, the latter looks towards a telos beyond this life. Nevertheless, this should not be exaggerated to mean that Christians do not believe in any end in this life. Instead, the end beyond this life “only completes the renewal begun in this world. The goal after death is the consummation of a journey or process begun in repentance and continued sanctification.”71 It is noteworthy here that even in the neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics theory, the telos is an ideal of human excellence that can never be fully realized in this world. One can keep moving towards it, “but never completely realize the goal.”72 It therefore makes sense that the Christian account of virtue theory looks to a fuller realization of the telos beyond this life, since even the secular account does not provide for its realization in this life. This seems to be the case in Titus 2:11–14, where the Christian distinctive of a telos beyond this life is expressed. In Titus 2:11–14, self-control, along with righteousness and godliness, are a preparation for the glorious return of Jesus Christ. The author implicitly 70 Kotva,

The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 76. The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 76. 72 Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 76. 71 Kotva,

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argues that believers should be self-controlled in the process of waiting or as a preparation for the return of Jesus Christ, which is a greater and final telos for the believers.73 In virtue ethics, both the virtues and the telos they lead towards are inseparable. The virtues themselves are constituent components of the telos, of the best kind of life. In other words, the virtues are not just means to an end, but inherent components of the end or telos itself.74 In our text here, self-control is, therefore, both a telos in itself, which one should keep moving towards in this life, but also a means towards and a constituent part of the final telos75 for believers – to be with Christ in eternal glory. The eschatological return of Christ becomes, therefore, a teleological ethical argumentation and motivation for self-control. The norm self-control, in this framework, plays a role in the inner dispositions and character of the person and at the same time plays a role in the movement of the person towards a this-worldly and other-worldly telos. Titus 2:14, with the statement “who gave himself for us, in order to redeem us from every iniquity and to purify to himself a special people, zealous for good works” also expresses a deontological ethical reflection, but one with virtue-ethical contours. It indicates a constituent ethical aspect of the Christevent, showing that Jesus Christ gave himself to redeem moral persons. Moral redemption might also be in view here because it is followed with a statement of what we are redeemed from, namely, “every iniquity.” The statement “to purify a people” further indicates the moral aspect of the redemption. The focus on redeeming and purifying “people/persons” from every iniquity keeps the focus on the morality of the moral agents and their character, hence, a virtue-ethical deontological reflection. Moreover, another virtue-ethical argumentation could be analyzed in Titus 3:7 from the statement “in order that having been justified by that grace, we should become heirs according to the hope of eternal life.” The statement “having been justified” is a deontological reflection, but with virtue-ethical elements because 73 See

Donelson, Pseudepigraphy, 154. The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 20. See also Keenan, A History of Catholic Moral Theology, 76, citing Spohn, Go and Do Likewise, 42, “virtues are means to the good life and components of it.” 75 See Kathryn Tanner, “Eschatology and Ethics,” in The Oxford Handbook of Theological Ethics, ed. Gilbert Meilaender and William Werpehowski (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 41–56, for a general discussion on how eschatology impacts Christian ethics. But of special relevance to our “two-level telos” thesis (in this life and in the life to come) in Titus, Tanner talks about “a temporalized or de-temporalized eschaton.” She thinks that the real tension in Christian eschatology lies more in the question of “whether or not, and (if so) the manner in which, the eschaton is temporalized” than in the popular discussion of the tension between realized, or “already” and “not yet” eschatology. In Titus 2:11–14, there seems to be a case of a “temporal” eschatology which could be expressed in terms of attaining to a considerable level of the virtues mentioned in Titus 2:12 (self-control, righteousness, and godliness), as a “telos” in this life (which is a temporal eschaton), and the de-temporalized eschaton is expressed in the statement “waiting for the blessed hope and appearance of the glory of our great God and Saviour, Jesus Christ” (Titus 2:13), which implies a final and eternal telos. 74 Kotva,

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the focus is on what has happened to the “being” of the person, that it is they as persons who have been justified, not their moral actions. The focus on the justification of the moral agents could be applied to answering the primary question in virtue ethics: “who are we?” The answer is, therefore, that “we are people who have been justified by the grace.” The second virtue ethics’ question, “who ought we to become?” (or, in the words of MacIntyre, “man-as-he-could-beif-he-realized-his-telos”76) is also answered by the following statement: “we ought to become heirs according to the hope of eternal life.” The subjunctive mood and deponent feature of γενηθῶμεν “we might or should become” (NRSV, NIV) denotes a possibility and process, not an already completed becoming. The deponent sense of “we might become heirs” instead of the completely passive “we might be made heirs” employs human agency in the process of “becoming heirs,” and points to it as a telos or goal to be achieved ahead. These nuances are in consonance with virtue-ethical moral reasoning of human telos as what a person envisions as flourishing or happiness, and the virtues are means to attaining that telos. 3.1.4 History of Traditions of σωφροσύνη This section will analyze the Greco-Roman (Hellenistic), Jewish (OT), and early Christian (NT) backgrounds of σωφροσύνη. Virtue ethics being our ethical framework for this study, a careful analysis of these backgrounds helps in identifying the origin of the virtue-ethical nuances to the norm σωφροσύνη, and the adaption the author of Titus has made to it. Suffice it to begin with a consideration of the etymology of the σωφροσύνη word group, because some of its important virtue-ethical nuances are traceable to its etymological background. Etymological background of σωφροσύνη: The word is a contraction of σαόφρων, which comes from a combination of two words σάος, σῶς, σῶος, meaning “sound,” and φρένες, meaning “mind,”77 or “heart as the seat of the passions, the place where activities of the soul are located.”78 The verb σωφρονέω later came into use.79 Put together, the word, therefore, originally means “sound mind.” Quinn also traces the etymology of the σωφρο-word group to σῶς and φρέν “mind and heart.” He reports Philo’s remark that the term which describes the health of the soul is σωφροσύνη, which he refers to as “the virtue that makes one’s thinking sane.”80 These references to rationality, internal qualities, and

76 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 52. See also Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 17, for an explanation of MacIntyre’s teleological scheme of virtue ethics. 77 Luck, “σωφροσύνη,” 1097. 78 Wibbing, “σωφροσύνη,” 501. 79 Luck, “σωφροσύνη,” 1097. 80 Quinn, The Letter to Titus, 314, citing Philo, Virt. 14.

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dispositions indicate that some of the virtue-ethical nuances of the word have existed from its root. Ülrich Luck notes that the word group conveys thoughts that are characteristically Greek, therefore difficult to translate, but better described. He describes its nuances in different ways as denoting “rational,” in the sense of what is intellectually sound, what is without illusion, and what is purposeful. It also denotes “discretion,” in the sense of moderation, self-control, prudent reserve, modesty, decorum, discipline, political order, and wisdom.81 Similarly, Spicq notes that the concept expressed by these word groups are strictly untranslatable. With their etymology traced to σώς and φρείν, they express first the idea of spiritual health in terms of appropriate reasoning, then an additional sense of moderation and reserve which finds expression in an inner equilibrium.82 Siegfried Wibbing also traces the meaning to be prudence and self-control, with positive connotations as antonyms of ignorance and frivolity.83 Bruce Winter notes that, with its Latin equivalent pudicitia, the σωφρο-word group as used in Titus 2:2–6 refers to “conscience which keeps a person from shameful [sexual] actions.”84 Overall, the different accounts of the etymological background show that the nuances of internal disposition and character, which are of particular relevance to virtue ethics, are traceable to the root of the σωφρο-word group. a) The Greco-Roman (Hellenistic) Tradition of the σωφρο-Cognate This σωφρο-word group has different nuances in different philosophical schools, but they often depend on the pre-philosophical concepts of rationality, self-control, discretion, and modesty, in relation to someone else or divine entities.85 Despite its broad nuances and difficulty of translation, the σωφροσύνη concept in the Greek world could be said to refer to “basic attitude which alone makes possible certain concrete modes of conduct and in which these continue to have their root.”86 The nature of the underlying attitude in σωφροσύνη could be understood by establishing its connection with αἰδώς ‘reverence, respect.’ “Proper conduct rooted in αἰδώς is marked by restraint or modesty expressed primarily in relation to someone else.”87 Σωφροσύνη was already a constituent part of the canon of the cardinal virtues in pre-philosophic days. And during the philosophic days, different schools had 81 Luck,

“σωφροσύνη,” 1097–1098. “σωφρονέω,” 359. 83 Wibbing, “σωφροσύνη,” 501. See also “σωφρονέω,” “σωφρονίζω,” “σωφρόνως,” “σωφροσύνη,” “σώφρων,” BDAG, 986–987. 84 Winter, Roman Wives, Roman Widows, 145. 85 Luck, “σωφροσύνη,” 1097–1098. 86 Luck, “σωφροσύνη,” 1098. 87 Luck, “σωφροσύνη,” 1098. 82 Spicq,

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different understandings of it. For the Platonic school, σωφροσύνη cannot be disassociated with the anthropologically oriented (“man-centred”88) doctrine of the state. Σωφροσύνη is the agreement between the three classes of the society (the ἄρχοντες “rulers,” φύλακες “wardens or guards,” γεωργοί και δημιουργοί “workers or servants”) as to who should rule, which is reached by the restraint (or moderation) of the lower classes, making it possible for each part to do its job.89 This school of thought understood σωφροσύνη as one of the four cardinal virtues,90 specifically as a virtue of restraint in respect to desire, and also in relation to the wellbeing of the state.91 While Plato does not identify a single definition of σωφροσύνη, his political dimension to it is that σωφροσύνη is the “ruling over and harmony among the elements of the soul and ruling over and harmony among the members of the state.”92 In his words proper, Plato asserts that unlike courage and wisdom, both of which imbued the community with their respective qualities while being properties of only a part of the community, self-discipline literally spans the whole octaval spread of the community, and makes the weakest, the strongest, and the ones in between all sing in unison, whatever criterion you choose in order to assess their relative strengths – intelligence, physical strength, numerical quantity, wealth, and so on … self-discipline was this unanimity, a harmony between the naturally worse and naturally better elements of society as to which of them should rule both in a community and in every individual.93

The best premise for a functional constitution and laws of the state is, therefore, where power, reason, and self-control meet.94 This understanding is also true for the desires where all virtues are seen as united, “but in their differentiation, they include the possibility of further subdivision in each individual case.”95 In a similar direction, Aristotle holds that in relation to desire, σωφροσύνη refers to the mean (μεσότης) between “license and stupidity.”96 And in relation to bravery, he argues that women have less σωφροσύνη than men.97  Wibbing, “σωφροσύνη,” 501. “σωφροσύνη,” 1098–1099. See also Wibbing, “σωφροσύνη,” 501. 90 Wibbing, “σωφροσύνη,” 501. The four cardinal virtues are: wisdom (sophia), courage (andrea), prudence (soophrosynee), and justice (dikaiosynee). Wibbing thinks Plato’s inclusion of “prudence” among the four cardinal virtues is a consolidation of the eudaimonism which had pervaded early philosophical ideas. 91 Luck, “σωφροσύνη,” 1099. 92 Donelson, Pseudepigraphy, 196. 93 Plato Republic 432a, translated by Robin Waterfield (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 139. For the Greek and German versions, see Platon Werke IV: ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ “Der Staat”, ed. Dietrich Kurz, Griechischer Text von Emile Chambry, Deutsche Übersetzung von Friedrich Schleiermacher (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1971), 317–318. 94 Luck, “σωφροσύνη,” 1099. 95 Wibbing, “σωφροσύνη,” 501. 96 Luck, “σωφροσύνη,” 1099. 97 Luck, “σωφροσύνη,” 1099. 88

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In Stoic and popular philosophy, σωφροσύνη was regarded as one of the cardinal virtues,98 but is expanded in an extended list of subordinate virtues such as discipline, obedience, decency, propriety, modesty, temperance,99 and self-control. However, such a sub-division of σωφροσύνη is intended only to give precision and concreteness for concrete situations.100 The cardinal virtues function to indicate the unity of virtue as manifested in different ethical traditions, which is why there are normally long lists of virtues and vices in different ethical traditions, based on the cardinal virtues. Σωφροσύνη still had its established place even in the list of virtues and vices in popular philosophy’s practical ethical approach. For example, it was regarded as one of the virtues of rulers, one of the virtues in professional life, and one of the special virtues of a woman, especially in relation to sexual chastity.101 Despite the restricted nuances the σωφροσύνη concept conveyed in different Greek-philosophical schools, the general sense of mindful self-control or discretion lingered on. It was expected of man to work on himself “until he sees σωφροσύνη, which already has a transcendent character as a virtue.”102 b) Jewish (OT) Tradition of the σωφρο-Cognate There is no Hebrew equivalent of σωφροσύνη in the LXX. From OT perspective, virtue (self-control included) is regarded as a transcendent divine gift from the divine creator of the world, and is manifested in man’s obedience.103 The LXX translates the Hebrew concept mῦsar “restraint of one’s spirit”104 with the Greek word παιδεία, and avoids the use of σωφροσύνη and its derivatives a great deal, because they saw a profound distinction between the OT concept and the popular Greek-philosophical understanding of σωφροσύνη.105 The sense of discipline denoted by mῦsar does not refer to moderation or modesty as a result of  98 Luck, “σωφροσύνη,” 1099–1100. See also Spicq, “σωφρονέω,” 360, who adds that in Stoic philosophy, the word is especially identified with prudence (Esth 3:13; cf. Wis 9:11), and that it was a virtue of rulers. He notes that it is sometimes contrasted with debauchery (akolasia).  99 Gretchen J. Reydams-Schils, “Clement of Alexandria on Woman and Marriage in the Light of the NT Household Codes,” in Greco-Roman Culture and the New Testament: Studies Commemorating the Centennial of the Pontifical Biblical Institute, ed. David E Aune and Fredrick E. Brenk (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2012), 121. Reydams-Schils notes that Clement values the virtue of temperance because of his moral outlook on self-control. Self-control and temperance cover all aspects of life, not only the sexual aspect. 100 Wibbing, “σωφροσύνη,” 501. 101 Luck, “σωφροσύνη,” 1100. 102 Luck, “σωφροσύνη,” 1100. 103 Wibbing, “σωφροσύνη,” 502. See also Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 183. See also Spicq, “σωφρονέω,” 359–360. Spicq says it is unknown in the LXX. 104 Johnson, “Self-Control,” 160–161. ‘mῦsar lerukho’ “restraint of one’s spirit” in Prov 25:28. 105 Luck, “σωφροσύνη,” 1100.

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one’s own self-evaluation (as it is in Greek thought), but as a result of the work of the teacher, who could be a father (e. g. Prov 1:8; 15:5; 19:20) or God (Deut 11:2; Isa 26:16; Jer 30:14; Prov 15:10).106 However, there are few occurrences of the σωφροσύνη group, but only in texts that are extant in Greek alone, or texts in which Hellenistic influence is self-evident. For example, in Wis 9:11, the cardinal virtues “σωφροσύνη, φρόνησις, and δικαιοσύνη are brought into association and traced back to the wisdom which lives with God in symbiosis.”107 Marshall, similarly, notes that the dynamic of σωφροσύνη as one of the elastic lists of cardinal virtues and extolled as a key to controlling emotions shows that it was not regarded merely as the power of reason and mind.108 Rather, Hellenistic Judaism, unlike the Greek philosophers, understood the qualities represented by the concept “to be grounded not only in reason or control of the mind, but in Torah.”109 In 4 Macc 5:23, σωφροσύνη relates to the Law, that the law teaches self-control (cf. 4 Macc 2:21–23; Wis 9:11).110 In 4 Macc 2:23, it is indicated that one could be able to live by the Stoic cardinal virtues as a result of education received from the Law (cf. 4 Macc 2:16, 18; 3:17, 19).111 Other LXX uses of σωφροσύνη refer to abstinence from wine (e. g. Jud 16:3), chastity (e. g. Josh 4:2; 9:2; 10:2, 3), and purity in general (e. g. Baruch 4:4). In these cases, σωφροσύνη has both “ascetic and dualistic tendencies which go beyond mere exhortation.”112 It could, therefore, be said that σωφροσύνη in the LXX is closely related to the Law, and therefore “‘baptized’ into Judaism.”113 Johnson even goes so far as to say that both the OT and NT expect God’s redeemed and holy people to exercise selfcontrol, being the virtue for restraining “destructive desires and passions forbidden by God’s command/Torah.”114 The inherent teaching and divine aspects of σωφροσύνη in the Jewish sense marks a significant difference with the Greek-philosophical usage, and further gives it a virtue-ethical perspective of moral development through training or teaching. Because the Jewish concept includes divine agency and teaching, we 106 Luck,

“σωφροσύνη,” 1100. “σωφροσύνη,” 1100. See also Wibbing, “σωφροσύνη,” 502. See also Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 183. 108 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 183. 109 Towner, The Letters to Timothy and Titus, 207. 110 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 183. 111 Luck, “σωφροσύνη,” 1100–1101. See Johnson, “Self-Control,” 160. Johnson argues here that in the OT, self-control does not consist of autonomously determining the good from nature and setting one’s mind on it but of heeding the good located in God’s command/Torah (e. g. Gen 3; Mic 6:8). And in 4 Maccabees, σωφροσύνη gives reason mastery over all desires, and unlike Stoicism, reason tames the desires that are forbidden in the Torah. And in this context, the Torah teaches self-control (5:23) as does personified wisdom (Wis 8:7). Moreover, the Torah provides the standards for the exercise of “self-control.” 112 Luck, “σωφροσύνη,” 1101. 113 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 183. 114 Johnson, “Self-Control,” 160. 107 Luck,

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could argue that by adding divine agency and connecting it with παιδεία in Titus 2:12, the author of Titus recovers parts of the Jewish concept of σωφροσύνη but grounds it on the Christ-event. c) Early Christian (NT) Tradition of the σωφρο-Cluster Like the LXX, the σωφροσύνη word group does not appear frequently in the NT. There are only 14 occurrences, with 8 of them in the PE.115 In most cases, it was used in reference to “the material exposition of faith in the world.”116 It is used in Mark 5:15 to mean “right mind/senses” (σωφρονοῦντα) in reference to the demoniac who was healed by Jesus and was seen well dressed and in his “right mind/senses.” In Acts 26:25, Paul argues that he is speaking “reasonable/rational words” (σωφροσύνης) as a response to the charge of insanity against him.117 In Rom 12:3, Paul employs the classical sense of the word group when he contrasts σωφρονεῖν “to observe the proper measure,” “not to transgress the set laws” with ὑπερφρονεῖν “to be haughty in thought about oneself.”118 But the “measure” Paul gives here is μέτρον πίστεως (measure of faith) which God gives each person and is exhibited in one’s integration into, and service in the community.119 Luck argues that “do not be haughty, but associate with the lowly” (Rom 12:16 NRSV) offers an exposition of σωφρονεῖν. In Phil 2:3, the σωφροσύνη of the Christian is ταπεινοφροσύνῃ “humility, self-effacement”120 as opposed to arrogance.121 Luck argues that the conspicuous absence of σωφροσύνη in the list of virtues in Col 3:12–15, 1 Thess 2:10, and Titus 2:12 suggests skepticism on the part of the early believers from using the word, for the same reason the LXX avoids it.122 However, it seems Luck does not recognize that Titus 2:12 uses σωφρόνως, the adverbial form of σωφροσύνη in a list of virtues. Therefore, it is incorrect to generalize that σωφροσύνη is absent from the list of virtues in Titus 2:12. In 1 Pet 4:7, we find the imperative σωφρονήσατε with the sense of “be sober and moderate” in the face of imminent eschatology, and against the background 115 Donelson notes that σωφροσύνη and its cognates have more frequency of occurrence than the εὐσέβεια concept (Pseudepigraphy, 173). He says there are 16 occurrences of σωφροσύνη and its cognates in the NT, and 10 of them are in the PE. Quinn says the author of the PE has the widest conceivable application of the σωφρο-language (The Letter to Titus, 315). Marshall also says 16 occurrences in the NT, and 10 in the PE, and are therefore characteristic and distinctive of the Pastorals (Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 182). Huizenga says 16 occurrences in the NT, and 10 in the PE (Moral Education, 330). 116 Luck, “σωφροσύνη,” 1102. 117 See Luck, “σωφροσύνη,” 1102. See also Quinn, The Letter to Titus, 314. 118 Luck, “σωφροσύνη,” 1102. 119 Luck, “σωφροσύνη,” 1102. 120 See “ταπεινοφροσύνη” in Friberg, Analytical Lexicon of the New Testament, in Paratext 9.0. 121 Luck, “σώφρων,” 1102. See also list of Christian virtues in Col 3:12. 122 Luck, “σώφρων,” 1102.

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of the temptation to fall into “eschatological frenzy.”123 This is more than just an attitude to maintain, it should also lead to prayer and total self-surrender to the coming Lord. In the context of the Christian community, Marshall notes that σωφρονεῖν results in mutual love (1 Pet 4:8),124 and is used as a Christian virtue in 1 Pet 4:7 and in the PE.125 Luck notes that the concept of the σωφρο-word group in the PE is an evidence of heavy influence of popular Greek philosophy with its ethical traditions in early Christian ethics. The word group functions in the PE mainly to characterize Christian life in the world, whose goal is summarized in Titus 2:12 as “σωφρόνως καὶ δικαίως καὶ εὐσεβῶς ζήσωμεν ἐν τῷ νῦν αἰῶνι.”126 Marshall describes its use here as “a fundamental characteristic of the Christian life.”127 The clearest evidence of a link between the ethics of the PE and that of Hellenistic ethical traditions is in the household codes and the list of virtues and vices (e. g. Titus 2:2–6).128 In opposition to the Gnostic detachment from the world, the Christians are to manifest their faith in a proper attitude to the world, which is marked by moderation and contentment (1 Tim 4:3–5; 6:6–10, 17–19). General αἰδώς and σωφροσύνη “modesty and moderation” is expected of women (1 Tim 2:9). Σώφρονας in Titus 2:5 is used with reference to women’s chastity and a disciplined lifestyle129 as a Christian virtue, “which already displays the stamp of early Christian tradition.”130 In Titus 2:6, σωφρονεῖν is used in reference to young men’s “measured and orderly life.”131 But the σώ123 Luck,

“σώφρων,” 1102. See also Spicq, “σωφρονέω,” 360. “σώφρων,” 1102–1103. 125 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 184. 126 Luck, “σωφροσύνη,” 1103. 127 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 184. 128 Luck, “σωφροσύνη,” 1103. 129 Luck, “σώφρων,” 1103. 130 Wibbing, “σωφροσύνη,” 502, cf. 1 Tim 2:9. 131 Luck, “σωφροσύνη,” 1103. See also Spicq, “σωφρονέω,” 360. I think the statement “Cretans are unceasingly liars, evil wild animals, and lazy gluttons” in Titus 1:12 plays a significant role in understanding the ethics of Titus. And it contributes to the distinctiveness of the text from Timothy (the whole of Crete as a synonym of deceit and moral decadence). It could be said that some of the members of the Cretan church belonged to this category of people described here. This is why the author was not quick to appoint elders or bishop, but left Titus to do some thorough moral development and evaluation first, knowing the background from which the Cretan believers come. That is also why the two different but related tasks are given to Titus: straightening what was left unfinished on the one hand, and appointing elders on the other, perhaps after a considerable evaluation and success of the first task. Hence, Titus 1:12 should be understood in the light of Titus 1:5. This particularly accounts for the widespread instruction to be “self-controlled” over and above all other instructions, and why it applies to each group in the Cretan church. It also accounts for the proclamation in Titus 2:12 about grace teaching “us” to renounce ungodliness and worldly desires and passions, which is a description of the Cretan situation in Titus 1:12. Some of them could have been newly converted, and Titus is to convict them rigorously so that they would be healthy in faith. Their unhealthy ethical background could account for the high emphasis on teaching and on the sharp distinction between 124 Luck,

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φρονα εἶναι of the bishop in 1 Tim 3:2 and Titus 1:8 does not only refer to “conduct appropriate to faith but also to presuppositions necessary for the discharge of a leading office.”132 Similarly, Plummer argues that the use of self-control in the NT in connection with the gospel has additional “intensified” meaning to that of Plato and Aristotle and other Greek philosophical schools. Beyond its function in controlling sensual desires, self-control in the NT “is that power over ourselves which keeps under control, not only bodily impulses, but spiritual impulses also.”133 This is necessary because, there are spiritual “frenzy” and “self-indulgence” that could be likened to lack of bodily self-control. Regarding the reasons for the extensive use of the σωφρο-word group in the PE compared to the rest of the NT, Luck argues that the adoption of the word group in the PE (in the context of Christian living in the world) should not be understood as simply the evidence of intrusion of Christian respectability that was new to the Gospel. Instead, the ethical traditions with their developed concepts helped to correct the pneumatic-ecstatic misunderstanding of the faith. Moreover, it helped wade off dualistic tendencies which separated life in the world from life before God, with resultant ascetic or libertinistic lifestyle.134 In agreement with Dibelius, Luck argues that at the background of the adoption of the word group in the PE is the fading imminent eschatological expectation, which compelled the believers in Christ to reassess their relation to the world in concrete terms.135 Wibbing notes a significant distinction between the NT, on the one hand, and Greco-Roman philosophy and its idea of virtue, on the other. It is not a surprise that there is no moral philosophy and no scheme of the four cardinal virtues found in the NT, says Wibbing, “even though the paraenetical sections have adopted much from their environment and made use of their language and forms.”136 Wibbing argues that in relation to definite situations which demand concrete obedience, the Greek ideal of a virtue is absent in the NT in the sense that the Greeks do not give or expect concrete ethos for action like the NT does. Instead, the Greeks expect prudent discretion, decision, and action of the virtuous person. However, regarding the catalog of virtues and vices, “the PE the former life and the present life of the believer (Titus 3:3–7), and the need for a rational understanding of that transformative event and its effect as giving them a new identity in contrast to their prior description as wild animals, lazy gluttons, but instead now being depicted as self-controlled, righteous, and godly people. 132 Luck, “σωφροσύνη,” 1103. 133 Plummer, The Pastoral Epistles, 16. 134 Luck, “σωφροσύνη,” 1103. 135 Luck, “σωφροσύνη,” 1103. 136 Wibbing, “σωφροσύνη,” 502. See also Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 183, who says the cardinal virtues are nowhere listed as a group in the NT. Justice and prudence (Titus 3:8; cf. Luke 1:17; Eph 1:8) are upheld in the NT as more important than bravery (1 Cor 16:13) and wisdom (Eph 5:13; Jas 3:13).

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stand within the tradition of their Hellenistic environment, and thus adopt the admonition to be prudent in the correspondingly general sense of moral formulae (1 Tim 3:2; Titus 1:8; 2:2).”137 The manner in which contemporary virtue ethics theory lays more emphasis on the character and prudent discretion of virtuous persons than on concrete ethos for action is an evidence of Greek-philosophical origin of contemporary virtue ethics theory. Nevertheless, rules and principles are not totally neglected, but given a secondary place.138 The verb σωφρονίζω “to make someone a σώφρον,” i. e. “to bring someone to reason”139 sustains the LXX concept of teaching (for) virtue. The σωφρονίζωσιν “let them exhort/let them bring them to sense”140 in Titus 2:4 refers to how older women should behave well so that they could teach, exhort, spur, or bring the younger women to reason, as noted above.141 Here again we find the implicit teaching or exhorting concept of the word group in the LXX sustained in the NT. Σωφρονισμός is found only from the imperial period and has a definite active sense in secular literature, meaning “to make to understand” or “to make wise.” Because understanding was understood as the basis of virtue and upright living, it also denoted “admonition to do better.”142 In rare cases, it also denoted discretion in the sense of moderation or discipline.143 The use of σωφρονισμοῦ in 2 Tim 1:7 along with δυνάμεως “power” and ἀγάπης “love” and in relation to πνεῦμα “spirit” suggests that the regulated life expected of believers is under137 Wibbing,

“σωφροσύνη,” 502. Schrage, New Testament Ethics, 263, reports Wendland’s argument that the church of the PE has not yet succumbed to the danger of becoming a “moral institution” because of its extant and strong holding on to “the Lord Jesus Christ, the grace of God, and the substance of sound doctrine.” But Schrage thinks, nevertheless, that it is dangerously close to crossing the line and has in fact at some points already crossed it. 138 See Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 31–37, for a discussion on the place of discernment and rules and consequences in virtue ethics. Harrington and Keenan, in responding to objections raised against virtue ethics as being unable to provide normative guidance, have argued that the virtue-ethical concept of “prudence” provides a normative guidance in almost concrete terms (Harrington and Keenan, Paul and Virtue Ethics, 8–12). 139 Luck, “σωφροσύνη,” 1104. See Huizenga, Moral Education, 391–392: it literally means “to recall a person to his senses” (LSJ, s. v. σωφρονίζω), “to instruct in prudence or behavior that is becoming and shows good judgment” (BDAG, s. v. σωφρονίζω), “for spurring on” (Quinn, Letter to Titus, 120), “so that they might advise” (Johnson, Letters to Paul’s Delegates, 230), “then they can advise” (Dibelius and Conzelmann, Pastoral Epistles, 139). Guthrie thinks “train the younger women” does more justice to the Greek construction with ἵνα (The Pastoral Epistles, 193). 140 Huizenga, Moral Education, 391, notes the existence of a variant reading with σωφρονίζειν, which, in agreement with the preceding ἵνα, suggests a subjunctive use other than the indicative in our variant. 141 See Luck, “σωφροσύνη,” 1104. Huizenga has “so that they may instruct.” She further notes that the ‑ιζω ending is a denominative verb-form ending, which denotes action, and therefore is transitive in nature, taking the young women as the direct objects of the action (Moral Education, 391). 142 Luck, “σωφροσύνη,” 1104. 143 Luck, “σωφροσύνη,” 1104.

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stood as enabled by the Spirit,144 which differentiates it from the Hellenistic concept.145 With reference to Rom 12:3, Wibbing also notes the Christian distinctive in the NT usage of the σωφροσύνη word group, namely, that the nature and motif of thoughtful and prudent action is not based on one’s character or moral achievement. Instead, the ability and deliberate effort towards prudence is grounded in the Christian faith.146 From the Hellenistic, Jewish, and early Christian traditions of the σωφρο-word group discussed above, we can identify five virtue-ethical perspectives. First, from its root, the nuance of internal qualities and dispositions is found in the three traditions and has persisted to its contemporary philosophical meaning. The fact that all the three traditions recognize that σωφροσύνη involves one’s inner dispositions of sensibility, rationality, moderation, and self-control which exhibits itself in external conduct shows the virtue-ethical nature of the word group.147 Second, while the word refers basically to internal qualities, its outward expression of respectability both in social and individual spheres are given due consideration in the three traditions. Third, there is no single word that could aptly define or describe the original Greek nuance of σωφροσύνη. This also implies that there is no single ethos that represents σωφροσύνη. Therefore, the norm is expressed with diverse sub-concepts in less concrete terms which relate to the totality of one’s life. Even though self-control is a better representation of the concept, it is still not perfect as it apparently does not convey the divine elements added in the LXX and the NT traditions. Fourth, the LXX’s additional nuance of teaching and the divine elements that are also sustained in the NT further highlight the virtue-ethical currency of the word group. Moreover, the teaching and the divine elements incorporated into the σωφροσύνη concept in the OT and NT traditions considerably “de-selfed” the strong “self” nuance of the word in Greek philosophy. Such a “de-selfing” is most evident in Titus 2:12. Fifth, the inclusion of σωφροσύνη in Greek practical philosophy and its applicability to all groups of people such as rulers and subjects, men and women, show that it is a commonplace virtue expected of everyone in society, thereby 144 Schrage, The Ethics of the New Testament, 258, notes a lack, or only minimal presence, of Pauline eschatology and pneumatology in the PE. He finds only the barest minimum of baptism or the work of the Holy Spirit in Titus 3:5–6 and 2 Tim 1:7. The purpose and result of the work of the Holy Spirit is that “those who are baptized will come to good works through justification and as heirs.” These two passages recall Paul’s description of the Holy Spirit as the power of the new life in Christ. 145 Luck, “σωφροσύνη,” 1104. Luck sees a link between 2 Tim 1:7 and Rom 8:15. See also Fiore, The Pastoral Epistles, 210: the favor of God effects the conversion from vice to virtue and makes Christians capable of performing good deeds. Fiore thinks that the idea in Titus expands Paul’s declaration in 2 Cor 9:5 and moves it towards a more soteriological direction. 146 Wibbing, “σωφροσύνη,” 502. See also Spicq, “σωφρονέω,” 360. 147 See Quinn, Letter to Titus, 314, on his description of σωφροσύνη as “internal equilibrium.”

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correlating with the virtue-ethical concept of perfectionism. Its social relevance makes it not only a personal virtue, but also a communal virtue. Generally, the frequent occurrences of “in all things” in relation to ethics in the PE (cf. Titus 2:9, 10; 3:2) indicates a sustained interest in commonplace, everyday morality instead of exceptional moral dilemmas.148 This also corresponds with perfectionism as one of the features of virtue ethics theory, which regards every aspect of life as morally relevant. However, virtue ethics theory does not assume that everyone possesses or practices virtue in equal measure. This, therefore, calls for the need to have moral exemplars whose lives exemplify how to possess and practice self-control both at home and in the church (cf. Titus 2:4: older women as moral exemplars at home, and 2:7: Titus as a moral exemplar). 3.1.5 Range of Application of σωφροσύνη In Titus 1:7–8, the norm applies only to the bishop, perhaps the bishop Titus is asked to appoint in Crete. Similarly, in Titus 2:2–6, the norm applies only to elderly men, elderly women, young women, and young men in the church in Crete because they are gendered and grouped. Conversely, in Titus 2:11–14, a general statement is made which applies to believers at all time and in all places. The statement refers to the believers, to whom grace has been revealed, whom grace teaches, and who are saved, purified, waiting for the Parousia, and so on. All these are general statements that suggest the applicability of the σωφροσύνη norm to all believers at all times and in all places. This range of applications makes contextual sense, knowing that the author claims to be Paul, who describes himself in the opening verses as an apostle for the faith of God’s elect. The reference to “God’s elect” is another universally applicable term in the text. The virtue-ethical perspectives of the range of application are first, the exclusive applicability to believers alone. Second, the applicability of the norm in commonplace morality, involving one’s entire life, is virtue-ethical. We can therefore conclude that in Titus, the norm σωφροσύνη applies to believers in Christ universally.149 Since our virtue-ethical analysis here shows that σωφροσύνη in the letter to Titus has a universal range of application, chapter four reflects on and develops an appropriate hermeneutical methodology, with practical examples of applying σωφροσύνη into an African context. One of the characteristics of contemporary virtue ethics is a consideration of the community in moral discourse. The community provides an individual the platform to learn the virtues by practice and by observing moral exemplars. Even 148 Schrage, The New Testament Ethics, 259, citing Bultmann, Theology (B), 536, says that in the PE, as a whole, “grace is understood as a power that shapes everyday life.” 149 For an elaborate hermeneutical appropriation of self-control in Christian ethics today, see David S. Cunningham, Christian Ethics: The End of the Law (London and New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2008), 251–255.

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though implicit in most cases, the use of σωφροσύνη in Titus has both personal and social relevance. For example, the instruction to young men to be self-controlled could imply applying self-control or being sensible in relation to their wives. Chapter four of this study will show how self-control can be applied in contemporary social and communal context, with focus on an African context. 3.1.6 Summary of the Key Virtue-Ethical Perspectives of the σωφροσύνη Cognates in Titus Overall, Titus’s account of the σωφροσύνη cognates significantly bears some key Christian virtue-ethical perspectives and approaches to morality which can be stated as follows. First, it bears a sense of a moral telos. Being one of the three cardinal virtues in Titus 2:12, σωφροσύνη has a sense of moral telos. It is a constituent part of this-worldly telos and at the same time it has relevance for the other-worldly telos in the sense that living a self-controlled life prepares one for the return of Christ and a life with him in eternal glory. Second, it conveys the virtue-ethical concept of perfectionism in two ways: on the one hand, it is perfectionist in the sense that one does not attend perfect or full self-control in this life, therefore it keeps calling the believer to growth and more selfcontrol. On the other hand, the use of the σωφροσύνη cognate in Titus requires application or practice in every aspect of life, both in commonplace, day to day life, and in dramatic moral quandaries. Third, the understanding of teaching as the process of acquiring self-control and the understanding of character as its source correspond with the virtue-ethical concept and process of character development. Fourth, the relation of self-control with internal rationality, sensibility, dispositions, attitudes, and emotions agrees with virtue-ethical concerns. Fifth, the fact that the use of self-control in Titus pays almost no attention to concrete moral actions “doing” but pays great attention to the morality of the moral agents “being” correlates with a virtue-ethical approach. Sixth, the grounding of selfcontrol on the Christ-event and its applicability only to believers in Christ agrees with the virtue-ethical concept of particularism. The applicability of self-control to personal and social contexts agrees with the virtue-ethical role of community in character formation and function. 3.1.7 Conclusion In the letter to Titus, we find in the cluster of words which could generally be denoted as self-control a motif that gives low-keyed tone and currency to the anthropological “self.” The anthropological “self” that is operational in secular virtue ethics is de-emphasized in favor of a transformed “self” which is continually enabled and taught how to live or behave by a divine agent described as “the grace of God.” In other words, the typical “self” motif in the secular virtue

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of self-control is, to a considerable degree, “de-selfed” and/or “co-selfed” in the letter to Titus. The norm self-control basically operates as an internal quality, disposition, or character, but expressed also in external attitudes and actions of moderation, sensibility, and respectability. Its usage in Titus corresponds with the concepts and characteristics of virtue ethics significantly.

3.2 A Virtue-Ethical Reading of the δικαιοσύνη Cognate in the Letter to Titus Justice as a personal, social, and political virtue has generated great interest in antiquity and contemporary ethical discourses. Its constant presence among the popular cardinal virtues is indicative of its prominence in Greco-Roman ethics. In Pauline scholarship, δικαιοσύνη and its cognates have been predominantly approached, studied, and understood in the context of justification by faith in Christ apart from the law, works, or human efforts. This justification is regarded as God’s act of declaring a sinner righteous on account of his or her faith in Christ and not because of any good works one has done. In other words, δικαιοσύνη and its cognates have been conventionally studied and interpreted more in a theological context than in an ethical context. This research, however, deviates from that dominant approach to exploring the virtue-ethical relevance of δικαιοσύνη and its cognates in the letter to Titus. But before analyzing the virtue-ethical features of δικαιοσύνη and its cognates in Titus, it is helpful to provide a brief insight into the dominant approach to the study of δικαιοσύνη and its cognates in Pauline scholarship under the dominant theme of justification by faith, which will further highlight how my virtueethical reading deviates from the conventional approach. 3.2.1 Justification by Faith in Pauline Scholarship: A Brief Look Michael Wolter notes that Paul’s usage of justification (German: Rechtfertigung) in connection with faith in Christ originated from his letter to Galatians in the context of his mission to the Gentiles (Gal 2:16; 3:6, 8, 11, 24; 5:5).150 It was necessary for Paul to connect justification and faith due to the presence of Jewish Christians in the Galatian congregation who insisted that Gentiles must first become Jews by observing Jewish identity-marking practices such as circumcision before being accepted into Christianity or among Abraham’s descendants, the people of God (see Gal 5:2; 6:12–13).151 These Jewish Christians further legiti150 Michael Wolter, “Die Rechtfertigungslehre,” in Paulus Handbuch, ed. Friederich W. Horn (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2013), 347–350, here 347–348. 151 Wolter, “Rechtfertigungslehre,” 348. This was because these Jewish Christians regarded Christianity as a form of Judaism, hence, they insisted that Gentiles must observe Jewish iden-

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mized their theological position by referring to the covenant between God and Abraham, which was marked by circumcision as a sign of that covenant (Gen 17:1–14).152 The opponent’s reference to Abraham to legitimize their theological position accounts for Paul also starting his counter argument by referring to Abraham in Gal 3:6,153 citing Gen 15:6 (see also Gal 3:7–9; cf. Gen 12:3; 18:18) to show that God justified Abraham on account of his faith, not circumcision. This, therefore, implies that Gentiles who believe in Christ are justified by their faith, along with Abraham.154 In this way, Paul shows that faith becomes the major factor that levels the ground and dispels the difference between Jews and Gentiles.155 Wolter describes this role of faith as “Gleichmacher”156 (“equalizer”), which undoes, in Paul’s thought, the difference between Jews and Gentiles.157 Similarly, Udo Schnelle notes that the hamartiological difference between Jews and Gentiles no longer exists in the light of justification by faith in Galatians.158 In all of these, Wolter rightly notes, Paul uses the concept of justification by faith in Galatians apologetically to legitimize his mission to the Gentiles.159 However, Paul’s missional use of justification by faith developed into a complex theological concept in his letter to the Roman believers, in which he expands and develops its theological, anthropological, and ecclesiological aspects and implications.160 The anthropological significance of justification by faith includes its relevance to character formation and function, which, therefore, allows the possibility of exploring the virtue-ethical relevance of Paul’s concept of justification that this research seeks to undertake. Friederich W. Horn distinguishes between the earlier and later uses of the term ‘justification’ in Paul’s writings. He notes that in the earlier usage, especially tity markers as a necessary prequisite for acceptance in the church. 152 Wolter, “Rechtfertigungslehre,” 348. 153 Wolter notes that Paul’s concept of justification by faith and not works of the law may not have originated from the Antiochan controversy (see Acts 15:1ff), but from his newly acquired linguistic and theological terminologies in his response to the Jewish Christians in Galatians, based on Gen 15 (Wolter, “Rechtfertigungslehre,” 349). Nevertheless, his new missional theological concept applies anachronistically to the Antioch controversy. 154 Wolter, “Rechtfertigungslehre,” 348. 155 Wolter argues that even though Paul’s reference to faith as that which neutralizes the difference between Jews and Gentiles appears in his response to the specific situation in the Galatian church, this does not relegate or limit the scope of his theology of justification by faith. Instead, he builds up the concept further in his letter to the Romans, thereby making it one of his “universal” theological notions (Wolter, “Rechtfertigungslehre,” 349). 156 German, meaning “equalizer” or that which levels the ground. 157 Wolter, “Rechtfertigungslehre,” 349. 158 Udo Schnelle, Paulus: Leben und Denken, 2nd rev, and expanded ed. (Berlin and Boston: de Gruyter, 2014), 289. See Schnelle, Paulus, 289–300, for a discussion on justification by faith in Galatians. 159 Wolter, “Rechtfertigungslehre,” 350. 160 Wolter, “Rechtfertigungslehre,” 350.

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evident in 1 Thessalonians and 1 Corinthians, Paul’s use of ‘justification’ was not linked to faith in Christ nor to the law. Instead, it was used in the context of baptism, showing the ontological change in the status of a baptized person.161 In his words, “in diesen frühen Rechtfertigungsaussagen spielen Christusglaube und Gesetz als Alternative noch keine erkennbare Rolle. Vielmehr scheint das Gesetz für Paulus geradezu gleichgültig betrachtet worden zu sein (1 Kor 7,17– 20).”162 The first statement, Horn notes, which Paul makes on justification by faith and on which his later doctrine of justification is built upon is found in Gal 2:16a: “… a person is justified not by works of the law but through faith in Jesus Christ.” Paul develops this argument further in Rom 3:20, 28163 and other places. Outside the letter to Galatians, only Romans and Philippians use justification in connection with faith (Rom 1:17; 3:22, 25, 26, 28, 30; 4:3, 5, 9, 11, 13; 5:1; 9:30; 10:4, 6, 1; Phil 3:9),164 and in the entire Pauline writings, no other word is used in close connection with justification as faith.165 Starting from Galatians and later in Romans, justification is used in connection with faith in Christ as a substitute to the law.166 Nevertheless, the law here is to be understood, argues Horn, as the Torah or ritual practices rather than one’s meritorious good works. In other words, it is Jewish religious practices such as circumcision, dietary laws, observing religious festivals, etc., which J. G. Dunn calls Jewish “identity markers” and “boundary markers” in the New Perspective on Paul, that are not required for justification by faith in Christ (cf. Acts 15:1–11; Gal 2:1–10).167 Put simply, the “works of the law” that Paul juxtaposes with justification are not human meritorious good works but Jewish legal provisions for accepting Gentiles into Judaism. Building on the connection established between justification and faith in Christ in Galatians, Paul’s subsequent discussion on justification is chris161  Friederich W. Horn, “Rechtfertigung (NT),” in Das wissenschaftliche Bibellexikon im Internet – Wibilex (Deutsche Bibel Gesellschaft, April 2011), 4–5. 162 Horn, “Rechtfertigung,” 5. ET: “in these early statements about justification, faith in Christ and the law as alternatives do not yet play a recognizable role. Rather, the law seems to have been viewed with almost indifference by Paul (1 Cor 7:17–20).” 163  Horn, “Rechtfertigung,” 5, citing Michael Theobald, “Rechtfertigung und Ekklesiologie nach Paulus. Anmerkungen zur ‘Gemeinsamen Erklärung zur Rechtfertigungslehre,’” in M. Theobald, Studien zum Römerbrief, WUNT 136 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001), 226–240, 164–225. See also Udo Schnelle, Paulus, 289. 164 Wolter, “Rechtfertigungslehre,” 348. Wolter notes that in all of Paul’s writings, justification is about the relationship between God and people: God is the subject and people are the recipients of justification. 165 Wolter, “Rechtfertigungslehre,” 348. 166 See also Wolter, “Rechtfertigungslehre,” 349–350, on the relationship between justification and works of the law, referring to Jewish practices that were required of Gentiles before joining the people of God. 167 Horn, “Rechtfertigung,” 5–6. See Horn, “Rechtfertigung,” 6–8, for a discussion on the use of “justification” in the later letters of Paul (Philippians, Galatians, Romans) and 13–15, for a discussion on justification in the book of James and other NT texts.

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tologically configured. This christological configuration shows that justification is beyond imputing righteousness to the believer. Instead, justification, used in a baptismal context, has an ontic and existential significance in the sense that it indicates a significant change in the person’s status before God as well as his or her character, as evident in statements like you were but now you are, you are in Christ, you are a new creation, and the like (e. g. Rom 13:11–14; Gal 3:26– 28; 6:15; 2 Cor 5:17).168 Udo Schnelle notes that this sacramental sense of justification through faith in Christ agrees with Paul’s basic notion of Christology and its implication for believers, namely, transformation and participation.169 Of relevance to my study of the Pastoral Epistles in general and Titus in particular, is Horn’s statement that in the Pauline school (referring to the disputed Pauline letters), only Ephesians, 1 and 2 Timothy, and Titus pick up the justification terminology, while Colossians and 2 Thessalonians do not pick up the theme. He notes that in the disputed Pauline letters, Paul’s theological use of justification by faith in opposition to observing Jewish identity markers (as “works of the law”) is dropped, and justification is rather placed in opposition to an individual’s meritorious good works.170 Horn’s words strike the difference between the concept of justification in Paul’s authentic letters and the disputed ones. He says in the disputed letters, justification “geht nicht mehr um die Frage der Grenze zum Judentum, sondern um das Können und Vermögen des Menschen im Blick auf seine Begegnung mit Gott.”171 Used in the context of salvation, justification is regarded in the disputed Pauline letters as not acquired through one’s righteous deeds172 (cf. Eph 2:5–10; 2 Tim 1:9; Titus 3:3–5, 8), but through the grace of God. This implies that while believers in Christ are not justified because of their righteous deeds, righteous deeds are integral part of their Christian life after being justified. This concept of justification, Horn argues, agrees with the pre-Pauline concept of justification, and does not nullify the significance of good works for those who have salvation in Christ. Moreover, this concept of justification presented in the disputed Pauline letters widens the hermeneutical possibilities of the term ‘justification’ beyond Paul’s antithesis between justification by faith as opposed to justification by observing Jewish identity markers.173 168 Horn,

“Rechtfertigung,” 9. Schnelle, Theologie des Neuen Testaments (Göttingen: UTB, 2007), 237, cited in Horn, “Rechtfertigung,” 8. 170 Horn, “Rechtfertigung,” 10–11. See also Schnelle, Paulus, 441–442, for a discussion on participation and transformation in Paul’s Christology. 171 Horn, “Rechtfertigung,” 12. ET: “is no longer about the question of the boundaries to Judaism, but about man’s ability and capability with respect to his encounter with God.” This means that justification in the disputed Pauline letters is no longer about the boundary between Judaism and Christianity, but about an individual’s ability as a result of his encounter with God. 172 As opposed to Paul’s reference to the works of the law, referring to Jewish religious and ceremonial practices. 173 Horn, “Rechtfertigung,” 12. 169 Udo

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In the disputed Pauline letters, justification does not annul the place of an individual’s good works, since good works are explicitly required of the baptized believers (e. g. Eph 2:10; Titus 3:3–5, 8).174 This requirement of good works from baptized believers makes it possible to talk about justification as a virtue rather than in the stricter Pauline concept of justification by faith apart from works, be they an individual’s good works or works of the law in reference to Jewish identity markers. Two points from Horn’s arguments discussed above are relevant for my virtue-ethical analysis of the letter to Titus. First, that the concept of justification in the disputed Pauline letters opens up wider hermeneutical possibilities makes my virtue-ethical reading of Titus plausible, as one of such hermeneutical possibilities. Second, that the emphasis on δικαιοσύνη in the disputed Pauline letters is no longer on the antithesis between justification by faith and Jewish identity markers but between justification by faith and an individual’s righteous deeds or good works makes it possible to read δικαιοσύνη and its cognates as a virtueethical norm due to its relation to the moral character of individual persons. It is on this basis that this section of the research explores the place of character (and character formation) as it relates to δικαιοσύνη in the letter to Titus. 3.2.2 Δικαιοσύνη and its Cognates in the Letter to Titus The δικαιοσύνη word group, generally rendered in English as “just(ice)/righteous(ness),” appears four times in the letter to Titus, but plays significant roles in understanding the theology and ethics of the letter. Its appearance among the three cardinal virtues (Titus 2:12), which sum up the virtues in the PE, indicates its significance both in the letter and in the PE at large. This underscores the need to do a virtue-ethical reading of all the δικαιοσύνη cognates for an accountable understanding of the concept in Titus. The four occurrences of the cognate in Titus include: δίκαιον (1:8), δικαίως (2:12), δικαιοσύνη (3:5), δικαιωθέντες (3:7), while its occurrence in the letters to Timothy include: 1 Tim 6:11; 2 Tim 2:22; 3:16; 2 Tim 4:8. Our analysis here follows the five models of our methodology, analyzing the linguistic form, the moral agents, the ethical argumentation, the history of traditions, and the range of application of the δικαιοσύνη cognates.

174 Horn,

“Rechtfertigung,” 12.

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3.2.2.1 Linguistic Form of the δικαιοσύνη Cognates As noted above, ethics is first reflected in language.175 The linguistic analysis will be at three levels, namely, the intra-textual level, the inter-textual level, and the extra-textual level. a) Intra-Textual Level i) Δίκαιος “just or righteous” (Titus 1:8) The word δίκαιος in Titus 1:8 is used in relation to the verb εἶναι “to be,”176 which is traced back to verse 7. Together with the adjective, they express the idea of δίκαιον εἶναι “to be or being just/righteous.” This puts the emphasis of the ethical norm on the “being” more than the “doing” of the bishop. In other words, the focus here is not on the morality of the actions of the bishop, but on the kind of person he is, or should be, as a matter of moral character.177 As noted in the history of interpretation above, there is no strong emphasis on how the virtue “justice, righteousness or uprightness” is or should be an inner disposition. It has often been described as other-regarding, with less emphasis on its internality which makes its outward expression possible. However, its use here in the sense of “being just” gives it the quality of an inner disposition, because “being” relates to inner dispositions and character. This usage corresponds with virtue ethic’s emphasis on “being” over “doing.”178 Moreover, the absence of specific aspects of life where the bishop is expected to demonstrate justice (e. g. in leadership roles, family relations, etc.) corresponds with the virtue-ethical concept of perfectionism, because it implies an implicit reference to the totality of life. Summarily, the use of δίκαιος in Titus 1:8 corresponds with the virtue-ethical features of focusing on the morality or “being” of a person more than his or her “doing,” and is perfectionist in the sense that it applies to every aspect of life. 175 Zimmermann argues that language conveys ethical meaning, and ethics requires language. See Zimmermann, “Ethics in the New Testament and Language,” 19–50. 176 Εἶναι is the verb standing for all other qualities expected of a bishop, which also appear as adjectives. Therefore, what is said of self-control here could be said of other norms in the list. 177 See Saarinen, The Pastoral Epistles, 172, who rightly describes the required qualities of an elder in Titus 1:7–9 as “moral characteristics.” Similarly, Thomas D. Lea and Hayne P. Griffin, Jr., 1, 2 Timothy, Titus, The New American Commentary 34. (Nashville: Broadman, 1992), 282, describes the moral qualities required of an elder or overseer in Titus 1:1–8 as “personality and character qualifications,” while those in v. 6 as related to his marriage and family (280). 178 See Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics II: 1106:25–35. Kotva also discusses how virtue ethics prioritizes “being” over “doing” (The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 30–31). Chan similarly notes that virtue ethics is a proactive ethical system encompassing one’s entire life (Biblical Ethics in the 21st Century, 84). “It engages the commonplace and concerns what is ordinary rather than those exceptional moral dilemmas.”

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ii) Δικαίως “just/righteous or in a just manner” (Titus 2:12) Used as an adverb and second among the list of the three positive moral qualities which “grace” teaches believers to live, δικαίως suggests a manner of life that is characterized by a just treatment of other people and a generally upright behavior that conforms to, and is acceptable in society rather than specified moral actions to be performed. In this way, δικαίως is used virtue-ethically. Hulitt Gloer notes that the just or righteous life referred to in Titus 2:12 expresses a Hebraic notion of righteousness, “which called for living in right relationship with God and one’s fellow human beings,”179 while self-control and godliness were adapted Hellenistic notions. From this understanding, a righteous life produces godliness and self-control.180 It is noteworthy that most of the other virtue-ethical features related to δικαίως “just/in a just manner” (Titus 2:12) have already been analyzed under the virtue-ethical analysis of σωφροσύνη “self-control” above, hence, no need repeating them here. iii) Δικαιοσύνη “justice/righteousness” (Titus 3:5) Being a feminine dative noun in singular form, δικαιοσύνη translates as “righteousness, justice” or “righteous things” (NIV). Von Lips describes the use of δικαιοσύνη in this verse in connection to baptism as “traditional.”181 It is used here in the context of the basis of salvation, stating that God saved us “not because of the righteousness which we had done.” Gloer notes that the “works of righteousness” mentioned here refers to the way of living and conduct that God requires. However, the author wants to clarify that while God is pleased with a righteous life, such righteousness is not the basis of salvation but the result of it. God’s mercy, not man’s righteousness, is the basis of salvation.182 The fact that δικαιοσύνη is used in Titus 3:5 to describe the pre-conversion situation of the believer means it has little to offer to our understanding of Christian virtue ethics. Moreover, its reference to “doing” or “works” rather than “being” of the moral agents at a pre-conversion level makes the emphasis less virtue-ethical, generally. If any, the virtue-ethical significance of δικαιοσύνη in Titus 3:5 is that it shows how at the pre-conversion level, the believers were non-virtuous. Even their efforts to do righteous deeds could not make them righteous because their righteousness was not from character or “being.” However, after conversion and experiencing the moral transformative effect of the Christ-event (cf. Titus 2:11– 14), the believers become righteous and could do righteous deeds that were truly righteous by virtue of their emanating from character. 179 Gloer,

1 & 2 Timothy – Titus, 66. 1 & 2 Timothy – Titus, 66. 181 Lips, Glaube, 77. 182 Gloer, 1 & 2 Timothy – Titus, 80. 180 Gloer,

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iv) Δικαιωθέντες “having been justified” (Titus 3:7) Being an aorist passive participle verb, nominative masculine and first-personplural form, δικαιωθέντες translates as “having been justified.”183 As argued in the history of interpretation above, this is one of the places (and Titus 3:5) where the use of δικαιοσύνη in the PE is closer to Paul’s concept of justification by faith.184 However, this research argues that the author of the PE uses it more in the context of moral transformation than declarative justification. In this way, the author explicates the ethical perspective of Paul’s concept of justification by faith. The use of “we were” and “now we are” rhetoric (Titus 3:7) in relation to the significant demarcation between the past and present moral state of the believers explicates the ethical perspectives of justification and the Christ-event as a whole. The past pre-conversion moral state was characterized by vices such as disobedience, malice, hatred, envy, serving various lusts and pleasures, while the present post-conversion moral state of the believer is characterized by virtues such as humility, gentleness, peaceful relations, and submission to authorities (Titus 3:3–7). The virtue-ethical perspective of this transformative experience is that it changes persons from “doing righteous things” (cf. Titus 3:5) to “being righteous” (cf. Titus 1:8 discussion above). Second, it makes righteousness an inner disposition or quality in a person. In other words, it internalizes justice/ righteousness. Every just act is, therefore, grounded on the inner change that has happened to the believers as a result of the Christ-event. b) Inter-textual Level 1 Timothy 1:9 uses δικαίῳ, an adjectival pronoun meaning “for the righteous/ just” in the context that the law does not exist for righteous people but for the lawbreakers, rebellious, and ungodly people. There is no such usage in Titus. Thornton notes that the use of δίκαιος in 1 Tim 1:9 is not in the context of one’s right or wrong standing before God; rather, it is in the context of one’s way of upright or righteous living.185 The appearance of δικαιοσύνη next to εὐσέβεια in a list of virtues in 1 Tim 1:9 is similar to the sequence in Titus 2:12 where in a triad of virtues, δικαιοσύνη appears next to εὐσέβεια. Δίκαιον in Titus 1:8 also 183 “We

might be justified” (RSV). even argues that its use here is “pure Paul, echoing his discussion with Judaizers in Romans and Galatians” (1 & 2 Timothy – Titus, 83). Gloer further notes that it is not surprising that Paul would sound this note to Cretan Christians, because there was a large Jewish population in Crete, with Judaizing tendencies. 185 Dillon T. Thornton, Hostility in the House of God: An Investigation of the Opponents in 1 and 2 Timothy, Bulletin for Biblical Research Supplement 15 (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2016), 95. Thornton, however, notes that even though justification by faith is not directly in view here, it can be indirectly implied in the wider context of 1 Tim 1:10–11. 184 Gloer

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stands in a list of virtues along with σωφροσύνη, ὅσιος, and others, but not with εὐσέβεια directly. 1 Timothy 6:11 has δικαιοσύνη “righteousness” in the context of the author commanding Timothy to flee from the love of money and to aim at, strive for, or pursue (δίωκε “pursue, strive for, run after”) righteousness and other virtues such as godliness, faith, love, patience, and gentleness. It is not clear from the text if the author’s command to Timothy to “pursue/strive for” righteousness is intended to mean he should “strive to be righteous/just” or “strive to do righteous deeds,” even though doing righteous deeds cannot make one “be” righteous. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the nuance of “strive to be righteous” would be more virtue-ethical than “strive to do righteous deeds.” Of all the four occurrences of the cognate in Titus, there is no context which suggests that a person should strive towards righteousness in the same way that righteousness is presented as a goal Timothy is to strive towards attaining (1 Tim 6:11). Titus 2:12 shows that even the believer’s righteous living is taught and enabled by “the grace,” but not excluding human cooperation. Moreover, Titus 3:5 shows how human righteousness is unable to save him. The use of righteousness in Titus 3:7 shows how God has justified believers who could not be saved through the righteous things they had done. Based on the aforementioned, we could argue that the concepts of “righteousness” or “being just” in Titus and 1 Tim are parallel to each other. In other words, Titus and 1 Tim have different concepts of righteousness or justice. In 2 Tim 2:22, δικαιοσύνη is used almost in the same context as that of 1 Tim 6:11. Timothy is commanded to flee the evil desires of youth and “aim at, pursue, strive for” (δίωκε) righteousness and other virtues such as faith, love, and peace. The difference, however, is that while in 2 Tim 2:22 Timothy is to flee from “youthful lusts” generally, in 1 Tim 6:11 he is to flee from “all these things,” which from the context we know that it is referring to the love of money. Moreover, righteousness stands next to godliness in the list of virtues in 1 Tim 6:11 and in Titus 2:12, but here godliness does not appear in the list of virtues. In 2 Tim 3:16 δικαιοσύνη is used in the context of the Scripture being useful for teaching, rebuking, correcting, and παιδείαν τὴν ἐν δικαιοσύνη “training in righteousness.” There are similarities between the nuances of “training in righteousness” here and the grace of God training believers to live righteous/ just lives in Titus 2:12. The two passages both agree that one could be trained or taught to be just/righteous. However, the differences seem more fundamental than the similarities. In Titus 2:12, the teaching agent is identified as “the grace of God” (which refers to the Christ-event and its moral-transformative effect on the believer) while in 2 Tim 3:16, the Scripture is only said to be useful for teaching without identifying the agent who teaches. Moreover, unlike in Titus 2:12, there is no direct grounding or connection between the training in righteousness and

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the Christ-event in 2 Tim 3:16. Timothy is only asked to continue in what he has learned and has become convinced of (2 Tim 3:14). In 2 Tim 4:8, we find a seemingly material understanding of righteousness. Δικαιοσύνη “righteousness” is a reward which the Lord, the δίκαιος “righteous” judge will award the apostle on the last day. However, it is not clear from the context and the linguistic form if by δικαιοσύνης στέφανος “crown/wreath of righteousness” (or “a wreath expressing honor, achievement, and reward”186) the author envisions the reward as “the state of being made righteous”187 or a material prize for having lived a righteous life or done righteous deeds, as Johnson’s translation “crown given to the righteous” suggests.188 Taking the author’s command to Timothy to “aim at, pursue, or strive for” righteousness (1 Tim 6:11; 2 Tim 2:22) in view, it is most likely that by “crown of righteousness” he is referring to a material prize for living a righteous life. From the context, the author implies that he himself has successfully lived a righteous life and is about to receive the reward for it. On this basis, he enjoins Timothy to also aim at living a righteous life. However, if “crown of righteousness” refers to “being made righteous” as the reward, then it disagrees with Titus 3:7 which shows that believers have already “been justified/made righteous” (δικαιωθέντες in aorist form, indicating a single action189) and are not waiting to be made righteous as a future reward. Understanding the believer’s justification as a single past event agrees with Paul’s concept of justification by faith. In any case, the two possible meanings of “crown of righteousness” in 2 Tim 4:8 do not find similarity with any of the nuances of the δικαιοσύνη word group in Titus. Generally, we can say that at inter-textual levels of the use of the δικαιοσύνη cognate in the PE, there are no considerable similarities and differences that cut across the three letters. c) Extra-Textual Level We can identify the following illocutionary and perlocutionary190 effects from the linguistic analyses of δικαιοσύνη: First, the δικαιοσύνη word group finds more theological grounding in Titus than in the other Pastoral Letters. Second, among the triad of virtues in which the δικαιοσύνη cognates normally occur (self-control, just, godly), δίκαιος is more readily other-regarding than others. 186 Yarbrough,

Letters, 445. 2 Tim 4:8 in Paratext 9.0. 188 Johnson, Letters, 91. 189 See Zimmermann, Logic of Love, 35, noting that in koine Greek, the aorist tense is usually used to refer to a single action or happening. 190 See Zimmermann, Logic of Love, 37–38: illocutionary speech act “accomplishes an act through a statement as it brings intentions, wish, emotion, etc. of the speaker to expression,” while perlocutionary speech act “describes the contingent effects upon hearers,” such as conviction, persuasion, or shock. 187 See

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Third, there is no consistent nuance of the norm “righteous/just” in the PE, because both the moral and theological nuances are found in different contexts. Fourth, the words of the δικαιοσύνη word group in Titus have different meanings from each other. Their different grammatical functions signal the categories in which they are used. The two which have to do with moral virtues are used as adjectives (Titus 1:8; 2:12) while the ones which relate to the theological understanding of justification as God’s act of declaring a person just appear as nouns or passive verbs. However, there is an implicit ethical aspect to justification by faith. Fifth, there are two major strands of meaning of the δικαιοσύνη cognate, namely “righteous” or “just,” which could be similar or different, depending on the context. In the contexts wherein the nuance of virtue is more evident (e. g. Titus 1:8; 2:12), it connotes more of “justice” (just behavior) than righteousness, while in the contexts where the motif of “being justified” by God is in view, it connotes more the nuance of “righteousness” than “justice.” Nonetheless, when the two nuances are placed in the overall context of the Christ-event as it is in the letter to Titus, then even the nuance of “just” behavior is on the basis of a life which has been transformed by the Christ-event. Hence, the illocutionary and perlocutionary virtue-ethical speech effects or perspectives identified from the linguistic analyses of δικαιοσύνη above are as follows: First, δικαιοσύνη in Titus expresses more the nuance of “being just/ righteous” than “doing righteous deeds,” thereby intended to persuade the moral agents to be just, beyond simply doing just or righteous things sporadically. Second, every believer, both leaders and followers, are expected to be just (cf. Titus 1:8 bishop; 2:12 “us” – all believers). Third, Titus does not specify concrete aspects of life or actions which represent being righteous or just, hence, the just person is expected to be just in all aspects of life. Fourth, both Titus and 2 Timothy share the virtue-ethical nuance that one could be trained to be righteous/just or to do just deeds, hence, indirectly calling on the moral agents to participate or cooperate in this training to be just or righteous. 3.2.2.2 Moral Agents of δικαιοσύνη The moral agents of the δικαιοσύνη cognates in Titus can be simply categorized into two groups: The bishop (Titus 1:8) and believers (Titus 2:12; 3:5, 7). a) ὁ ἐπίσκοπος “the bishop” (Titus 1:7–8) The bishop as the moral agent is not to be only δίκαιος. His agency also includes other norms such as σωφροσύνη “self-control,” ὅσιος “holiness,” and ἐγκρατής “discipline, self-discipline/control.”191 We will only summarize the virtue191 See Quinn, Letter to Titus, 89–90, who notes that there is no ethical analysis of the relations between the qualities listed here.

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ethical perspectives of the bishop’s moral agency here because we have already discussed it in detail under the moral agency of σωφροσύνη above. The virtue-ethical perspectives of the agency for the δικαιοσύνη norm in this verse could be enumerated as follows: first, it focuses on the “being” of the bishop as a moral person, not his “doing.” He is “to be” just, not “to do” just deeds. Second, the moral agency is not limited to leadership roles, but every aspect of life. Third, the present tense and active voice of εἶναι shows that as a moral agent, the bishop is to continuously be just. b) ἡμᾶς “us” (Titus 2:12) Here the moral agency of the norm δίκαιος is generalized and universalized in reference to all believers, unlike in Titus 1:8 where it is used in reference to the bishop. Here we find a cooperation between the roles of the divine and human agencies, represented in the concept of the grace of God παιδεύουσα ἡμᾶς “training us” (Titus 2:12). The author integrates divine and human agency in a way that they complement each other.192 The grace of God does the training or teaching, while the believer does the learning, renouncing of ungodliness and worldly desires, and lives a righteous life.193 Moreover, the grounding of δικαιοσύνη on the Christ-event in Titus 2:11–12 distinguishes it from the Greek-philosophical concept of justice. The virtue-ethical perspectives of the moral agency of δίκαιος in Titus 2:12 could be outlined in this way: First, the grounding of the virtue on the Christevent and its role in forming a new identity and character194 of the believer and its continuous growth through training corresponds to the virtue-ethical feature of moral development. However, there is no concept of divine co-agency in the Greek-philosophical concept of moral education. Second, the non-specification of the aspects of its application in life and the absence of concrete ethos correspond with the virtue-ethical concept of perfectionism. Third, the universal yet particularist nature of the moral agents (“us” – believers) agrees with virtueethical particularism.195 192 Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 130. Kotva examines the connection between systematic theology and Pauline biblical studies with virtue ethics, with specific focus on the role of “grace” in moral agency. He concludes that any Christian account of virtue ethics must adapt the concept of grace in moral agency. However, “grace does not eliminate the need for human effort … responsibility for our actions accompanies our liberation in Christ.” 193 See Rabens, The Holy Spirit and Ethics in Paul, 21, 250–252. See also Meilaender, “Divine Grace and Ethics,” 74–88, for more discussion on the role of divine agency in Christian ethics. See also Barclay, “Grace and the Transformation of Agency in Christ,” 372–389. 194 See Birch and Rasmussen, Bible and Ethics in the Christian Life, 104, for a discussion of how biblical characters can serve as examples and can shape character in Christian ethics today. 195 Kotva, as noted above, rightly observes that “virtue ethics does not assume that everyone has equal insight into every situation or that everyone’s voice should carry equal weight

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3.2.2.3 Ethical Argumentation/Reflection The ethical argumentation for the δικαιοσύνη cognates in Titus 1:8 and 2:12 is the same as the ethical argumentation for the σωφροσύνη cognates in Titus 1:8 and 2:12, which has been discussed in detail above. Therefore, we will only summarize the main points here, especially as they relate to δικαιοσύνη. In Titus 1:8, the author generates moral significance for δικαιοσύνη “justice or righteousness” by appealing to the office or leadership role of the bishop as God’s steward. He argues, implicitly, that the office of the bishop has attendant moral standards, and justice is one of them. The mention of God as the giver of the stewardship also serves as an argument for being just. Such ethical argumentations align more with the deontological ethical framework than the virtue-ethical one, because they do not relate to the character or being of the moral agent. In Titus 2:12–14, the triad σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, and εὐσέβεια “self-control, justice, and godliness” shares the same ethical argumentation. The author employs both deontological and virtue-ethical argumentations in the statement “for the grace has been revealed to all men, teaching us.” The fact that the grace has been revealed and that Christ has given himself to redeem the believers serve as deontological ethical argumentations for living a just life. They are deontological because they are statements of basic fact of what has already happened to the believer. The virtue-ethical argumentation is conveyed in the phrase “teaching/training us,” corresponding with the virtue-ethical concept of moral development. It is virtue-ethical because it relates to the means of developing character, enabling the believers to live just or righteous lives. 3.2.2.4 History of Traditions of δικαιοσύνη a) The Greco-Roman (Hellenistic) Tradition of δικαιοσύνη The Stoics interpreted the term δίκαιος in relation to the state of a man rather than man’s history. In the words of Schrenk, the Stoic interpretation “makes it clear that man is here understood statically rather than historically.”196 Plato, on the other hand, considers righteousness/justice as a political virtue. His political conception is that a just person (one who has a political virtue) is one who is able to establish order and harmony among men.197 However, the virtue is eventually in every decision” (The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 151). Kotva’s point is not directly on the overall “exclusivity” of moral agency in virtue ethics as found in the text pf Titus, but it gives a hint to the fact that not everyone is assumed to be virtuous, or at least not everyone is virtuous at the same level. 196 Schrenk, “δίκη,” 183. 197 Spicq, “δίκαιος, δικαιοσύνη, δικαιόω, δικαίωμα, δικαίωσις, δικαστής, δίκη,” TLNT 1:321.

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“anchored in the soul of man, who inwardly comes to what is proper to himself, to inner order and the harmony of spiritual virtues.”198 Thus, in Platonic terms, δίκαιος denotes a habit that exists in, and is controlled by the man himself.199 This concept later developed into concerns with man’s existing state which is expressed in general life.200 Τό δίκαιον “the just” was considered in Greek literature “as an innate idea that belongs to human nature, like the beautiful, the good, and the fitting.”201 On this basis, Josephus does not regard the heroes he extols only as δίκαιοι but adds the significant catchword τὴν φύσιν δίκαιοι “the naturally just” to show how the virtue becomes natural in them.202 Josephus regards the opposite of the δίκαιος as παράβασις τῆς ἀρετῆς,203 which could be translated as “violation of the virtue.” Interpreting δίκαιος around the two meanings of being “faithful to the law” and “virtuous,” Schrenk argues that Josephus’ lists of virtues, in which δίκαιος always appears along with goodness, self-control, and others, do not bear any difference from general contemporary Hellenistic usage.204 Spicq, however, argues that based on the influence of the LXX, Josephus has a religious understanding of the just person as one who is faithful to divine commands and is also a person of honesty and rectitude.205 Influenced by Stoic philosophy, Philo makes δικαιοσύνη a cardinal virtue, but with a higher status beyond its legal meaning.206 He gives more prominence to δικαιοσύνη in his lists of (cardinal) virtues than others. He enthusiastically extols the δίκαιος, indicative of the glorification of man in the Hellenistic world. “The δίκαιος is a true prop of the human race … in which he remains for the healing of sicknesses … confronting the unrighteous multitude … even after he himself has attained to all-healing righteousness.”207 Philo regards πίστις “faith” too as δικαιοσύνη, in which context Abraham, Noah, and other patriarchs are described as δίκαιοι “righteous ones.” In this case, there is a connection between the OT and Hellenistic understanding of δικαιοσύνη in Philo’s thought.208 198 Schrenk,

“δίκη,” 183.  Schrenk, “δίκη,” 183. 200 Schrenk, “δίκη,” 183. 201 Spicq, “δίκαιος,” 321. 202 Josephus, Ant. 7:110; 9:216. See The New Complete Works of Josephus, ed. William Whiston, comm. Paul L. Maier, revised and expanded (Grand Rapids: Kregel, 1999), 241, 326. See also Schrenk, “δίκη,” 183. 203 Jos. Ant., 6:93, cited in Schrenk, “δίκη,” 183. 204 Schrenk, “δίκη,” 183. 205 Jos. Ant., 6:165; 6:210; 18:18; etc., cited in Spicq, “δίκαιος,” 321–322. 206 Spicq, “δίκαιος,” 321, citing Philo, Alleg. Interp 2.18. For an example of a just person beyond the legal terms, Philo says “the just (δίκαιος) is the stay of the human race; he brings his personal property to the community and gives unstintingly for the good of those who find a use for it. He then seeks from God, who alone possesses all wealth, that which he does not have” (Philo, Alleg. Interp. 2:121, cited in Spicq, “δίκαιος,” 321, n. 11). 207 Schrenk, “δίκη,” 183. 208 Schrenk, “δίκη,” 183. 199

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Even though Philo and Josephus’s understanding of δικαιοσύνη is, to a large extent, in consonance with their Greek counterparts, they both show a strong connection with the OT in a way that distinguishes their understanding considerably. Josephus uses δίκαιος “righteous, just” in reference to OT saints,209 but also sometimes as a predicate for God.210 One time he uses it as a vindication of God’s judgment, while at other times he conventionalizes the word simply as δίκαιον ἐστιν “it is proper,” and uses it for divine Law at other times. Δίκαιος could also imply “what is fitting and proper” and “what is meritorious.”211 In general, Josephus links ἀλήθεια with δίκαιος.212 Thus, Josephus understands a δίκαιος as the person who obeys God’s command.213 In other contexts, he uses δίκαιος in the sense of “worthy,”214 “punctilious,”215 and in the sense that one could become a δίκαιος through penance.216 Nevertheless, Philo uses δίκαιος as a predicate for God more often than Josephus; and God is never ἄδικος.217 In different contexts in the Greek and Hellenistic world, the δίκαιος person could refer to the person who gives each one what is fitting to them, including punishment or retribution for breaking the law. It could also mean rights, ordinances, duties, or demands.218 While in the Greek and Hellenistic world δίκαιος is used to refer to qualities of both persons and things,219 Schrenk notes that it is never used for things in the NT, but only for persons. Josephus and Philo, for example, use δίκαιος as a predicate of things in the sense of “justified,”220 “proper,”221 “fitting,”222 or “established,”223 which are “never found in the NT.”224 However, we could find many occurrences of expressions like κρίσις δικαία “righteous judgment” (John 5:30) or δίκαιαι ὁδοί “righteous ways” (Rev 15:3).225 In a more general description, Korinna Zamfir notes that self-control, justice, and godliness in the PE are virtues associated with honor and shame that were familiar to their contemporary society. The expectation on church leaders in 209 Jos.

Ant., 9:33; 10:38; 14:172, cited in Schrenk, “δίκη,” 183. Ant. 2:108, cited in Schrenk, “δίκη,” 183. 211 Jos. Ant., 2:140, cited in Schrenk, “δίκη,” 185. 212 Jos. Ant., 7:269; 8:23, cited in Schrenk, “δίκη,” 183. 213 Jos. Ant., 6:165; 8:208, cited in Schrenk, “δίκη,” 183. 214 Jos. Ant., 5:197; 16:212, cited in Schrenk, “δίκη,” 183. 215 Jos. Ant., 15:106, cited in Schrenk, “δίκη,”183. 216 Jos. Ant., 6:21, cited in Schrenk, “δίκη,” 183. 217 Schrenk, “δίκη,” 183. 218 Schrenk, “δίκη,” 184. 219 E. g. in quantitative nuances such as equal, even, exact, precise, or correct in relation to weights and measurements. 220 Jos. Ant., 5:150, cited in Schrenk, “δίκη,” 184. 221 Jos. Ant., 2:272, cited in Schrenk, “δίκη,” 184. 222 Jos. Ant., 1:318, cited in Schrenk, “δίκη,” 184. 223 Jos. Vit., 93, cited in Schrenk, “δίκη,” 184. 224 Schrenk, “δίκη,” 184. 225 Ibid. See Jos. Ant., 13:290. 210 Jos.

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Ephesus and Crete, including Timothy and Titus, to acquire and practice these virtues is similar to the expectations placed on candidates for leadership in the wider Greco-Roman society.226 b) Jewish (OT) Tradition of δικαιοσύνη Even though there are similarities between the Greek-philosophical and wider Hellenistic usages, there is a decisive change in the LXX usage due to the influence of OT motifs. The fundamental belief in God connects δικαιοσύνη firmly to the judgment of God. In the LXX, “the concept of virtue is replaced by the basic question of how man is to stand before this judgment expressed in the Law as a standard.”227 While the Greeks used it in legal contexts, the LXX uses it in religious contexts. In Greek thought, a δίκαιος is one who meets the standards of ordinary legal norms and fulfills his general civic duties, while in the LXX, a δίκαιος is one who “fulfills his duties towards God and the theocratic society, meeting God’s claims in this relationship. It is as he satisfies the demand of God that he has right on his side and therefore a righteous cause before God.”228 The antonyms of δίκαιος in the LXX further show the distinctive religious rootedness of the term; terms like ἄδικος (Prov 12:17; 29:27), ἁμαρτωλός (Tob 4:17), ἀσεβής (Gen 18:23; Prov 10:28; Wis 3:10), and παράνομος (Job 17:8).229 The LXX understanding of δίκαιος is built on the background understanding that God is himself δίκαιος. Schrenk succinctly notes that “the fact that in Hellenistic Judaism, too, God can be called δίκαιος, the One who is infallibly consistent in the normative self-determination of His own nature, and who maintains unswerving faithfulness in the fulfillment of His promises and covenant agreements, prepares the ground for the crucial religious importance of the term in the NT” (cf. 2 Esd 9:15, Tob 3:2; Deut 32:4).230 Similarly, Spicq notes that the LXX understanding of a δίκαιος person is based on the fact that God himself is just and upright (Deut 32:4; Ps 11:7); is a just judge (Jer 12:1; Ps 7:12; Tob 3:2); acts justly (Gen 18:25; Judg 5:11; Ps 145:17); rewards and punishes with justice (Ps 62:13); and that his justice is connected to his goodness (Ps 116:5).231 In the context of synagogue discourses, the concept of δικαιοσύνη was heavily dominated by the concept of rewards for it. Apart from the distinction between the righteous and the unrighteous, there was also the conception of δίκαιος at different levels or scales, such as the wholly righteous, wholly ungodly, the 226 Korinna Zamfir, Men and Women in the Household of God: A Contextual Approach to Roles and Ministries in the Pastoral Epistles (Göttingen and Bristol: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013), 119–120. 227 Schrenk, “δίκη,” 185. 228 Schrenk, “δίκη,” 185. 229 Schrenk, “δίκη,” 185. 230 Schrenk, “δίκη,” 185–186. 231 Spicq, “δίκαιος,” 322.

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averagely righteous, and the penitent. The wholly righteous were those who had kept the Torah perfectly. The wholly ungodly had more transgressions than merits. The averagely righteous had an equal balance of observance and violation. And the penitent were the subject of debate as to whether they should be ranked above the wholly righteous or not.232 The patriarchs, especially Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Noah, and others were accorded the “wholly righteous” level of δίκαιος.233 Some Jewish teachers, prophets, and righteous men were also considered among the righteous, whose prayer God seeks, and which can turn “His thoughts from severity to mercy.”234 The Messiah is also δίκαιος, “not only because he carries out God’s will, but because he possesses this attribute, which is proper to good sovereigns, and because he establishes justice on earth” (Jer 23:5–6 “a just seed/righteous branch; he will practice judgment and justice in the land”; 33:15; cf. Isa 53:11; Zech 9:9).235 Both in the synagogue and in the apocalyptic discourses, the Messiah was regarded as righteous because his whole nature and action conform to the divine will.236 He was commonly designated in the synagogues as “the Messiah our righteousness” (cf. Jer 23:5, 6; 33:15; Zech 9:9; Wis 2:18). Righteousness was expected to mark the messianic period, and “revelation in the coming time of salvation is particularly for the righteous, whose fulfillment of works carries with it the greatest promise.”237 In relation to persons in the OT, the δίκαιος is contrasted with impious transgressors and is therefore innocent (Exod 23:6–8; Ezek 23:45). He or she is one who does the will of God (Sir 16:3), is religious and perfect (Gen 6:9), is impartial (Deut 16:19), and generous (2 Kgs 10:9; 1 Sam 24:18). He or she is just before God (Gen 7:1) and a “son of God” (Wis 2:18) whose soul is in God’s hands (Wis 3:1; 5:1, 15). When the just are persecuted (Wis 2:10–18), they are still loved and will be exalted by God (Ps 146:7; Isa 24:16).238 Seebass notes that the δίκαιος in different OT contexts and translating different Hebrew words conveys the nuances of right, correct, straightforward, upright, innocent, and virtuous.239 He argues that “righteousness in the OT is not a matter of actions conforming to a given set of absolute legal standards,

232 Schrenk,

“δίκη,” 186. “δίκη,” 186. Schrenk notes that the synagogue did not give Abel the prominence he receives in the NT. 234 Schrenk, “δίκη,” 186. 235 Spicq, “δίκαιος,” 322. 236 Schrenk, “δίκη,” 186, citing H. Dechent, “Der ‘Gerechte’  – eine Bezeichnung für den Messias,” ThStKr 100 (1927/8), 439. 237 Schrenk, “δίκη,” 187. 238 Spicq, “δίκαιος,” 322. 239 Seebass, “Righteousness, Justification ‘δικαιοσύνη,’” 355. 233 Schrenk,

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but of behavior which is in keeping with the two-way relationship between God and man.”240 Moreover, in the OT, the understanding of righteousness shifted from a “national righteousness” to “individual righteousness.”241 In Seebass’s words, before the exile, the pledge of God’s presence among people was their free, independent possession of the land, with his righteousness covering both the people and the land they owned. Afterwards [exilic and post-exilic periods], however, God’s pledge is his gift of the law, which provides clear terms of reference for righteousness between man and man, and at the same time the framework within which a man may share, and go on sharing, in Yahweh’s righteousness.242 In the intertestamental period, the concept of righteousness shifted more towards the character of goodness.243

c) Early Christian (NT) Tradition of δικαιοσύνη Schrenk argues that there are significant differences between the NT concept of δικαιοσύνη and the Greek ideal of virtue which is viewed more as man’s independent achievement.244 The only traces of the Greek concept are in the Gospels where Jesus is regarded as δίκαιος from the Roman point of view by the Romans. However, even those references involve “customary or traditional modes of expression which are not very closely connected with the Greek conception as such.”245 Examples are Matt 27:19, 24 where the wife of Pilate and Pilate himself call Jesus the δίκαιος, and the Centurion’s confession at the cross in Luke 23:47 (cf. also Herod’s description of John as a “righteous and holy man” in Mk 6:20); probably meaning both that Jesus is innocent and morally righteous.246 Spicq, on the other hand, finds similarities between the NT and secular usages of δίκαιος, especially its neuter form. For example, the master of the vineyard promises to give the workers “what is right/proper/just” (Matt 20:4), everyone can judge what is right (Luke 12:57), masters should provide their slaves with what is “just and equitable” (Col 4:1); and Peter considers it “right/just” to keep believers in Christ watchful (2 Pet 1:13). In other cases, the obligation to be δίκαιος is “Christianized” by explicitly connecting it to God (Acts 4:19; 2 Thess 1:6).247 240 Seebass,

“Righteousness, Justification ‘δικαιοσύνη,’” 355. Seebass, “Righteousness, Justification ‘δικαιοσύνη,’” 355. 242 See Seebass, “Righteousness, Justification ‘δικαιοσύνη,’” 355–356. 243 See Seebass, “Righteousness, Justification ‘δικαιοσύνη,’” 356. 244 Schrenk, “δίκη,” 187. 245 Schrenk, “δίκη,” 187. 246 Schrenk, “δίκη,” 187. For discussions of the use of “righteousness” word group in different books of the NT, see See Brown, “Righteousness, Justification ‘δικαιοσύνη,’” 360–371. And for a discussion of different scholars’ understanding of the righteousness word group (e. g. Barth, Käsemann, Ziesler), see ibid, 371–373. 247 Spicq, “δίκαιος,” 323. 241 See

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Despite the instances of similarities with secular usage, Spicq argues, the use of δίκαιος in the NT aligns more with the LXX usage.248 God is just and has demonstrated his justice by fulfilling his promise of salvation and making those who have believed in Jesus also just (Rom 3:26, cf. 1 John 1:9). God is always just in the way he punishes the godless and rewards the faithful (Rev 16:5, 7; 19:2). God’s justice transcends the legal understanding of it and is synonymous with his integrity and perfection.249 The Messiah is the “Holy and Just One” (Acts 3:14; 7:52; 22:14; 1 Pet 3:18; cf. Isa 53:11; Jer 23:5). In terms of persons, a δίκαιος is one who does the will of God and is set apart, in contrast to the disobedient or sinner (cf. Matt 9:13; Mark 2:17, etc.). The righteous is one who receives as his reward “the resurrection of the just” (Acts 14:14; cf. Acts 24:15; Matt 10:41).250 The appearance of ὅσα δίκαια “whatever is righteous” in Phil 4:8 along with ἀληθής, σεμνός, ἁγνός, προσφιλής, etc., notes Schrenk, seem to follow Hellenistic virtue lists, describing social conduct in conventional contemporary terms. However, “it is inconceivable that Paul should not be using δίκαια for action in accordance with the will of God.”251 In direct relevance to our focus on Titus, Schrenk notes that even though the expression σωφρόνως καὶ δικαίως καὶ εὐσεβῶς ζήσωμεν “we may live self-controlled, just, and godly lives” in Titus 2:12 correspond to Greek ethics, “this characteristic of the Pastorals does not imply material agreement with the Greek view of virtue.”252 This research, similarly, argues that even though this verse corresponds to Greek-philosophical ethics as far as the list of the virtues are concerned, the author gives it a distinctive Christian virtue-ethical nuance by connecting it with the Christ-event and its continuous moral-transformative effect. The conventional sense of δίκαιος is found in 2 Pet 1:13 “I think it fitting, right” and Luke 12:57 “judge what is right” (cf. Col 4:1; Matt 20:4; Phil 1:7). However, these conventional usages signal the need to find a definition of the word in the NT which is oriented on God. Hence, in Acts 4:19, we find an explicit addition of ἐνώπιον τοῦ θεοῦ “in the sight/opinion of God” to δικαιοσύνη, which anchors it on God. Similarly, παρά θεῷ “in the sight of God” is added in 2 Thess 1:6. The “right and fitting” in Eph 6:1, even though without explicitly mentioning God, most likely does not refer to “right and fitting” in natural law, but “that which corresponds to the righteous divine order enjoined by the commandment.”253 In other places, the OT understanding is strictly maintained, but applied in the context of salvation through the Christ-event as understood in the NT. 248 Spicq,

“δίκαιος,” 323. “δίκαιος,” 324. 250 Spicq, “δίκαιος,” 325. 251 Schrenk, “δίκη,” 187–188. 252 Schrenk, “δίκη,” 188. 253 Schrenk, “δίκη,” 188. 249 Spicq,

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In the book of Revelation, calling God δίκαιος from the perspective of judgment is similar to the OT concept (cf. Rev 16:5, 7; 19:2; 15:3). 1 Peter 2:23 also shows that Christ committed judgment to God who τῷ κρίνοντι δικαίως “judges righteously.” In John 17:15 also, the vocative πάτερ δίκαιε “righteous father” is an appeal to God’s righteousness by which he accepts the disciples as different from the world on account of their acceptance of the One he has sent. Describing the Law as δίκαια in Rom 7:12 could be said to relate with the OT concept of regarding the Law as God’s righteous demand which also represents his majesty.254 On the other hand, we find OT concepts that have been significantly adapted in the context of the Christ-event which occupies a central place in the NT. In Rom 3:26, we find a reference to God as just and one who justifies those who have faith in Jesus. In this case, “the justice of the One who is absolutely righteous is demonstrated in the atoning sacrifice of Jesus.”255 We find a similar concept in 1 John 1:9, where God is described as δίκαιος “in the sense of a righteousness which both judges and saves.”256 In relation to Messianic designation as δίκαιος, the following verses show the connection between it and his fulfilling the will of God in and through his work centered on the cross: Acts 3:13; 7:52; 22:14; 1 Pet 3:18; 1 John 2:1.257 In 1 John 2:29; 3:7, an argument is advanced that those who profess to belong to Christ who is δίκαιος must show corresponding righteous conduct. John 5:30 and 2 Tim 4:8 show that Christ the δίκαιος will participate in the eschatological righteous judgment of God.258 The NT still follows the OT sense of regarding the patriarchs and other saints as δίκαιος, because they did God’s will and so were different from the wicked works of other people in their generations. Examples of such righteous people are Abel and other innocent martyrs (Matt 23:33; Heb 1:14; cf. 1 John 3:12; 2 Pet 2:7, cf. 8), OT prophets and righteous men (Matt 13:17; 23:29).259 In narrative passages describing Jewish relationships, δικαιοσύνη is often used in reference to fidelity to the Law, with the relationship to God sometimes emphasized (e. g. Zacharias and Elisabeth in Luke 1:6; Simeon in Luke 2:25; Cornelius in Acts 10:22; and Joseph in Matt 1:19).260 In Mark 2:7 (cf. Matt 5:45; Luke 5:35; 15:7), the Jewish antithesis of δίκαιος and ἄδικος/ἁμαρτωλός is adopted but used ironically in the sense that both the Pharisees who are the δίκαιοι and the publicans who are the ἁμαρτωλοί are called to conversion.261 Never254 Schrenk,

“δίκη,” 188. “δίκη,” 188. 256 Schrenk, “δίκη,” 188. 257 Schrenk, “δίκη,” 188–189. 258 Schrenk, “δίκη,” 189. 259 Schrenk, “δίκη,” 189. 260 Schrenk, “δίκη,” 189. 261 Schrenk, “δίκη,” 189. 255 Schrenk,

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theless, “the fact that the customary standards are accepted shows that for all the relativity there is an appreciation of the moral distinctions and that the zeal of the righteous finds recognition.”262 Such distinctions could also be traced in Paul (Rom 5:6–7: δίκαιος/ἀσεβής), despite his concept of justification and anthropology that is centered on salvation.263 The Synoptic gospels reject the hypocrisy and self-confidence/piety associated with the δίκαιος (cf. Matt 23:28; Luke 20:20; 18:9). “This repudiation of the nature of δίκαιος as habit, appearance and self-confidence, and of associated contempt for others, means that a question-mark is put behind the claim of the righteous” (cf. Luke 18:14; 16:15).264 This indicates a push for a deeper understanding of what it means to be a δίκαιος from a legalistic perspective to a Christ-oriented (faith-based) perspective. Another sense of δίκαιος in the NT is in reference to the disciple or Christian as one who truly fulfills the Law or the divine will of God (e. g. Matt 10:41; 13:43, 49; cf. Dan 12:3; 23:37, 46; Jas 5:6, 16). What is said about the OT saints as δίκαιοι is transferred to believers in Christ, who are the δίκαιοι in contrast to the ἀσεβεῖς ἁμαρτωλοί (1 Pet 3:12; 4:18; Heb 12:23; Rev 2:11). However, all the NT passages mentioned so far have not shown how one becomes δίκαιος. We will, therefore, look into Paul’s writings for this.265 As noted above, Paul sometimes accepts the righteous/unrighteous distinction based on the divine law, apart from his concept of justification by faith, which “is in keeping with the starting point of his whole new train of thought, namely, that the fulfillment of the divine will is a self-evident demand”266 (cf. Rom 2:13). In this context, the δίκαιος is one who will be declared so by divine sentence because of his or her obedience to the Law.267 In another context, Paul shows how humanity is generally unable to fulfill the Law because they are under sin. Hence, one only becomes δίκαιος by receiving in faith the revealed righteousness of God which saves (Rom 1:17; 3:10; Gal 3:11; cf. Hab 2:4). The δίκαιος, therefore, is one who is justified by faith.268 In Rom 5:18–19, Paul talks about being made or presented as δίκαιος in the last judgment, implying an already-not-yet process of being made righteous. 262 Schrenk,

“δίκη,” 189. “δίκη,” 189. 264 Schrenk, “δίκη,” 190. 265 Schrenk, “δίκη,” 190. It is also noteworthy that I will be using “Paul” and “Paul’s writings” interchangeably, referring to the undisputed letters of Paul: Romans, 1 Corinthians, 2 Corinthians, Philippians, Galatians, 1 Thessalonians, and Philemon. 266 Schrenk, “δίκη,” 190. 267 Schrenk, “δίκη,” 190. 268 Schrenk, “δίκη,” 191. Schrenk notes that the antithetical structure of the section leads Paul to the juxtaposition of αμαρτωλοί and δίκαιοι, and he does not say that believers are now δίκαιοι. But in 1 Thess 2:10, we find also a situation where Paul uses δίκαιος in reference to the Christian life as it corresponds to divine law. 263 Schrenk,

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Paul retains and enriches some aspects of the OT idea of righteousness or justice, adding that mere knowledge of the law does not make a person just, but putting it into practice does (Rom 2:13; cf. Rom 3:10; Ps14:1). However, Paul’s major contribution, different from the OT concept, is his idea that “a new form of justice/righteousness has appeared, no longer a legal or sacrificial justice, nor even moral, but a religious and internal righteousness.”269 In this new way of becoming δίκαιος, Christ’s righteousness is inherited through faith (Rom 5:18–19 ff.), and therefore a gift from God. In this line of thought, good works are not discarded but are seen only as the manifestations or fruits of this internal righteousness, which is inherently tied to Christ.270 The believer is, thus, righteous “not so much on the moral plane of virtues as in the theological order: the δίκαιος is a new creation (2 Cor 5:17), enters into communion with God, is a new being.”271 The believer’s justification gives him life (Rom 5:18; 8:10). Through the leading of the Holy Spirit, the believer is not only able to discern what is good and bad but also wants what God wants (see Rom 8:14; Gal 3:11; 5:18). The law is primarily not meant for the just (the ones justified by Christ), but for the sinners (1 Tim 1:9).272 In 1 Tim 1:9, the author goes against the antinomians who had the wrong attitude towards the Law. The Christian as δίκαιος is set in antithesis to the lawless, and his freedom from the Law consists in his conducting himself according to the divine law.273 The demand on the bishop to be δίκαιος in Titus 1:8 could both mean that his life be in accordance with the divine norm, or he should be able to make just decisions as part of his episcopal duties.274 Brown’s contribution to the discussion is worth considering in isolation and in more detail. His discussion of the concept of δικαιοσύνη in the PE is particularly interesting, and we will respond to his arguments. Brown identifies the reference of the adjective δίκαιος in Paul’s letters to God (Rom 3:26), to Christ (2 Tim 4:8), to men (Rom 1:17; cf. Gal 3:11; Heb 10:38; Rom 2:13; 3:10; etc.) and to things (Rom 7:12; Eph 6:1; Phil 1:7; 4:8; etc.).275 He argues that Paul uses the different forms of the word group in different contexts and with varied meanings than any other NT author. Moreover, Paul’s understanding of God’s righteousness (based on his covenantal relationship with his people) and his justification of sinners is closer to the OT concept than that of any other NT authors.276 In this covenant-based righteousness, people’s sin does not foil God’s righteousness. God remains sovereign and savior despite humanity’s sin. Having dealt with sin 269 Spicq,

“δίκαιος,” 325. Spicq, “δίκαιος,” 325, n. 26. 271 Spicq, “δίκαιος,” 325. 272 Spicq, “δίκαιος,” 326. 273 Schrenk, “δίκη,” 190. 274 Schrenk, “δίκη,” 190. 275 Brown, “Righteousness, Justification ‘δικαιοσύνη,’” 362. 276 Brown, “Righteousness, Justification ‘δικαιοσύνη,’” 363. 270 See

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through the Christ-event, a new righteousness is accessible both to Jews and Gentiles (cf. Rom 5:16–19) who are the “new humanity” (Rom 3:30; cf. Gal 3:8). In this righteousness, no man could be justified based on perfect observance of the law (Gal 2:21; cf. 3:21). Only the man who has died to sin and is so justified can do God’s will or keep the law (cf. Rom 6:7, 10). Essentially, Paul’s contention is that man is justified only by faith in Christ – “trusting utterly and only in God’s grace, which by definition must be a gift” (see Rom 3:24, 26, 28; 5:1; Gal 2:16).277 Having been justified in this way, the believer lives only for God (Rom 6:7, 11, 19; 10:4). Righteousness, as conceived by Paul, has both present and future dimensions. Just as the full manifestation of God’s kingdom is expected at the resurrection, so also the full revelation of God’s righteousness is expected at the second coming of Christ (Gal 5:5; cf. 2:17; Rom 5:19; believers “through the Spirit, by faith, wait for the hope of righteousness”).278 Except in this context, Paul’s understanding of a believer’s justification is as a past or already accomplished event. Brown argues that in Paul, what connects the present and future righteousness is that while believers have already become God’s own people, there is still enmity between him and the world at large (Rom 5:18–19 “all men”). The individual’s justification “springs entirely from that of all men … so that it is not we who possess righteousness but righteousness which possesses us; we are its servants (Rom 6:18; 2 Cor 3:9). Our justification both comes from and extends into the future.”279 To this extent, one could accept Brown’s argument. However, his next set of arguments are contestable, especially as they relate to the PE. Brown argues that there is a discontinuity with the Pauline understanding of righteousness in the early church. He contends that “Paul’s doctrine of righteousness was so alien to the early church that Colossians makes no use whatsoever of these words; Ephesians has them merely in certain echo-like phrases … while the Pastorals speak of them entirely in terms of Hellenistic virtues.”280 While one could agree with Brown that generally, Paul’s concept of righteousness as having a divine origin and being declarative is not strong or strongly elaborated in the PE, it is unaccountable to accept his conclusion that “Paul’s doctrine of God’s righteousness was so alien” in the PE, when Titus is studied as an individual text. Titus 2:12 and 3:5, 7 (which Brown himself cites but does not mention their similarity or difference with Paul’s undisputed letters)281 make a strong case for a divine-oriented nature of the righteousness in question. In the 277 Brown,

“Righteousness, Justification ‘δικαιοσύνη,’” 363. “Righteousness, Justification ‘δικαιοσύνη,’” 365. 279 Brown, “Righteousness, Justification ‘δικαιοσύνη,’” 365. 280 Brown, “Righteousness, Justification ‘δικαιοσύνη,’” 365: Eph 4:24; 5:9; 6:14; 1 Tim 1:9; 6:11; 2 Tim 2:22; 3:16; 4:7; Titus 1:8; 2:22; 3:7. 281 See Brown, “Righteousness, Justification ‘δικαιοσύνη,’” 365. 278 Brown,

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first instance, the grace which teaches believers to live “righteous/just” lives is “God’s grace” (“the grace of God has been revealed to all people”), and the “us” this grace is teaching particularizes the ascription or attribution of who is righteous in a fashion that could be said to be Pauline.282 However, it has to be conceded that in Titus 1:8, there is no evidence of connecting righteousness with any divine act or principle as in Paul, therefore suggesting its similarity with the Greek-philosophical virtues. Nevertheless, we have argued above that the theological concepts in Titus 1:1–2 and the confessional statements in Titus 2:11–12, 14; 3:7 provide a theological grounding for δίκαιος and other virtues in Titus 1:8. Moreover, a similarity exists between the use of πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις “all men/ people” in Titus 2:12 and πάντας ἀνθρώπους “all men/people” in Rom 5:18–19. Titus shows how “all men” need God’s righteousness and grace (implicitly because “all men have sinned”), like Rom 5:18 which says the result of one trespass was condemnation for “all men.” Rom 5:18 says the result of one act of righteousness brings life to “all men,” which is similar to what Titus says that the grace of God has been revealed to “all men.” The last connection could be argued from Rom 5:19 which says through the obedience of one man, “many will be made righteous.” Saying “many” and not “all” here particularizes the actual people who would become righteous. The “will be” language is not to be understood as eschatological language or a mere future grammatical tense, as this will contradict Paul’s concept of the believers’ being justified or made righteous as a past event. Instead, it is to be understood as language of “particularity,” meaning not all, but many will be made righteous. In this way, Paul shows that even though the gift of righteousness is available to all, only those who receive it through faith are (or will be) made righteous in reality. In summary, the three history of traditions of δικαιοσύνη show that the Greeks have a basically legal and conventional understanding of just or righteous persons and acts, while the LXX has a religious understanding of it, based on the just character of God as demonstrated in his covenantal relationship with people. In the NT, however, we find a mixture of both the Greek and Jewish concepts in different contexts, but with the Jewish concept more prevalent. Paul makes the richest contribution to the concept of righteousness in the NT by introducing the concept of a righteousness that is not based on the Law or human effort, but faith in Christ, thereby being ascribed the righteousness of God. The PE, Titus 282 Fiore, Pastoral Epistles, 219–221, also argues that the concepts of righteousness in Titus 3:5 and 7 are in agreement with Paul’s concept of righteousness, and he cites Rom 3:27–28; 4:2– 6; 9:12; Gal 2:16; Eph 2:8–9 as examples. Saarinen, The Pastoral Epistles, 191, also says Titus 3:5 recapitulates Paul’s language of justification by faith, and that “have been justified by grace” in Titus 3:7 is also Pauline and probably derives from Rom 3:24. However, Saarinen thinks the emphasis here lies in the completion of the event of justification and its (moral) effects, rather than just the concept of justification.

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in particular, further “develops” Paul’s theological concept by explicating the ethical implications of that faith-based righteousness. In this way, Titus and the authentic Pauline texts complement each other.283 The virtue-ethical nuances identified from the history of traditions are as follows. First, the understanding of righteousness or justice in Greek philosophy (particularly Plato) as internal harmony indicates its connection to character. Second, the understanding of righteousness as the character of God, the Messiah, and some OT saints gives it a virtue-ethical nuance of an ethical concept related to the moral being of persons. Paul’s grounding of the virtue on the Christ-event and the eschatological dimension to it corresponds to a virtue-ethical nuance of internal dispositions, moral transformation, and a sense of moral telos. 3.2.2.5 Range of Application of δικαιοσύνη The range of application of justice in Titus 1:7–8 and 2:11–14 is the same as that of self-control in the same verses. Having discussed the range of application of self-control in detail above, we will only summarize the main points here in relation to justice. While being just in Titus 1:7–8 applies only to the bishop, it applies to all believers in Titus 2:11–14, including the bishop. The fact that the author includes himself (“us”) among those whom the grace teaches to live a just life suggests that he intends it to be a norm for all believers beyond Crete. On this basis, we could accountably say that the range of application of the norm justice or righteousness applies to believers universally. Moreover, the fact that the text does not prescribe concrete ethos for justice suggests that it should be applied in all aspects of life and at all time. This, therefore, corresponds with the perfectionist nature of virtue ethics. 3.2.3 Summary of the Key Virtue-Ethical Perspectives of the δικαιοσύνη Cognates in Titus The account of Titus’s use of the δικαιοσύνη cognates correspond with some virtue-ethical perspectives and approaches to morality as follows. First, it has a sense of a moral telos in its use among the three cardinal virtues in Titus 2:12–14. It is an integral part of this-worldly telos and at the same time it has relevance for the other-worldly telos to the extent that living a just or righteous life fulfills one of the purposes of the Christ-event (to train or enable believers to live godly 283 This statement has something to do with what one holds in regard to the authorship question. If one holds to pseudonymous authorship, then one could say they complement each other. If another holds to the Pauline authorship, then this becomes a point that advances the argument. But since this research does not take a position regarding the authorship of the letter to Titus but chooses to keep the focus on the content of the text (as explained above), I prefer to just say the concepts as expressed in the texts complement each other, regardless of who their authors are.

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lives) on the one hand, and prepares the believers for the return of Christ and life with him in eternal glory. Second, it expresses the virtue-ethical concept of perfectionism in two ways. On the one hand, the believer does not become perfectly or fully just and righteous in this life, hence the need for continuous training and growth in virtue. On the other hand, the use of the δικαιοσύνη cognate in Titus, both in reference to ecclesiastical office (e. g. elder or bishop) and all believers requires living a just life in all aspects of life. Third, the understanding of training as the process of acquiring justice as a virtue corresponds with the virtue-ethical concept and process of character development. Fourth, the understanding that the use of δικαιοσύνη in Titus pays almost no attention to concrete moral actions (“doing”) but pays great attention to the morality of the moral agents (“being”) correlates with a virtue-ethical approach. Fifth, the theological grounding of δικαιοσύνη on the Christ-event and its applicability only to believers in Christ aligns with the virtue-ethical concept of particularism.

3.3 Reading the εὐσέβεια cognates in the letter to Titus Virtue-ethically The εὐσέβεια “piety or godliness”284 cognates appear only twice in the letter to Titus (1:1; 2:12) and about ten times in 1 and 2 Timothy (1 Tim 2:2; 3:6, 12; 4:7, 8; 6:3, 5, 6, 11; 2 Tim 3:5), but the concept plays a key role in understanding the virtue-ethical perspective of the text of Titus and the PE at large.285 The opposite rendering, ἀσέβεια “ungodliness,” appears once in Titus (2:12).286 One example of the key roles εὐσέβεια has played in the study of the PE is that its concept and prevalence in pagan ethical thought of the 1st century is at the heart of the now popular “christliche Bürgerlichkeit” (“Christian citizenship”) thesis, which, starting from Dibelius, suggests to many biblical scholars the adoption of a secular morality indicating the early church’s compromise to the world.287 This study, therefore, embarks on a detailed virtue-ethical analysis of the εὐσέβεια concept in the letter to Titus. This will lead to an understanding of the extent to which the author adopts and adapts (or not) the secular concept of 284 “Godliness” is preferred here because it captures both the nuances of the Greek-philosophical and the early Christian nuances of “piety” together. 285 Hultgren regards it as “one of the chief virtues of the Pastorals” (I–II Timothy, Titus, 150, 164). Also that the three virtues in Titus 2:12: sobriety, uprightness, and godliness are the author’s three most valued qualities of the Christian life. Similarly, Michalea Engelmann, Unzertrennliche Drillinge? Motivsemantische Untersuchungen zum literarischen Verhältnis der Pastoralbriefe, Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche 192 (Berlin and Boston: de Gruyter, 2012), 350, also notes that the use of the εὐσέβ‑ word group in Titus has a central function, based on its strategic positioning in the introductory section of the letter and its being a contrast of godlessness and false teaching in 2:12. 286 See Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 135. 287 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 136.

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εὐσέβεια into his Christian context. In other words, our analysis will lead to understanding how the author grounds the concept of εὐσέβεια in the Christian conception. To what degree does the author make the secular concept of piety/godliness truly “God-ly” in early Christian sense? What virtue-ethical perspectives are there in his account of εὐσέβεια? 3.3.1 Linguistic Form of the εὐσέβεια Cognates a) Intra-textual Level i) Εὐσέβεια “godliness” (Titus 1:1) In its intra-textual function in Titus 1:1, εὐσέβεια appears as a feminine accusative singular noun (εὐσέβειαν) and does not have a verb directly related to it but a preposition. In this case, we will look at the function it has as a noun in this context to see if that function relates to virtue ethics or not. While norms such as σώφρονα “self-controlled” (Titus 1:8) is used as an adjective (thereby describing moral quality of a person), εὐσεβῶς “godly” (Titus 2:12) as an adverb (describing a manner of life of moral persons), εὐσέβειαν in Titus 1:1 appears as a noun, describing an entity, a state288 of Christian living. It describes a state of “being”289 of moral persons. It also describes a telos to attain (telos of faith and knowledge of the truth), not just a virtue to acquire and practice. As noted in chapter one above, virtue ethics is teleological in nature, requiring “a sense of a telos of human existence, of some good, to which the virtues contribute.”290 Titus’s account of virtue presents a sense of a moral telos right from the opening verses. The telos is presented at two levels, namely, a this-worldly telos and other-worldly telos. The this-worldly telos is εὐσέβεια, and the other-worldly291 telos is ἐπ᾽ ἐλπίδι ζωῆς αἰωνίου “according the hope of eternal life” (Titus 1:1–2). The author understands his apostleship in connection to these two-level moral teloi. It is not surprising that in Titus 2:12–14, he describes these two-level teloi again, repeating εὐσέβεια along with other virtues. Another implicit connection exists between the telos expressed in godliness in Titus 1:1 and the idea of a “productive life” towards the end of the text (Titus 3:14), just before the final greetings. The author restates a similar expression of 288 Towner sees en eusebeia in 1 Tim 2:2 as suggesting the ‘state’ of the Christian out of which among other things, a proper regard for the world orders proceeds (The Goal of Our Instruction, 149). This is in contrast to Dibelius and Foerster’s argument that respectability to the world orders is the most important feature of the lifestyle represented by εὐσεβεία. 289 See Chan, Biblical Ethics in the 21st Century, 84, for more discussion on “being” and “doing” in virtue ethics. 290 Hauerwas, “Virtue,” 648–650. Also see Chan, Biblical Ethics in the 21st Century, 78–96, for more discussions on teleology and other characteristics of virtue ethics. 291 Yarbrough, Letters, 470, describes this as the “other-worldly” dimension of Titus’s “thisworldly” assignment in Crete.

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the telos introduced in 1:1 with the concept of “productive”292 lives, by saying ἵνα μὴ ὦσιν ἄκαρποι “that they may not be unproductive”293 (Titus 3:14). In this case, godliness and productive Christian life refer to the same telos, or at least two sides of one telos. A productive life is one which combines faith, the intellectual or rational knowledge of the truth, and the corresponding conduct. Any kind of life short of these three elements together, in other words, short of εὐσέβεια, is an unproductive life. Nevertheless, the idea of a “productive or fruitful life” in Titus 3:14 appears in direct relation to the norm “good works.” In our virtueethical analysis of good works below, we shall discuss how good works and “productive or fruitful” life are understood from a perspective of morality of persons, thereby related to the combination of faith, knowledge, and conduct. The sequence or placement of the statements that indicate this-worldly and other-worldly moral telos within the letter to Titus could also be analyzed using some form of rhetorical structure. The statements of telos seem to have been strategically and rhetorically placed in the opening, middle, and closing sections of the letter. The opening statement of the letter already signals the two-level telos in the statements “towards godliness” and “the hope of eternal life” respectively (Titus 1:1–2). This opening statement is what I describe as setting the virtue-ethical agendum of the entire text, namely, living a godly life in this world as a preparation for the return of Christ and for a life with him in eternal glory. Having set the virtue-ethical agendum of the text at the beginning in this way, we find an exposition and climax of the author’s ethical agenda in the middle of the text (Titus 2:11–14),294 which is marked by the three cardinal virtues (self-control, justice, and godliness) and explicit statements of the two-level telos again (“in this age” and “waiting for the blessed hope …”). Towards the end of the letter (Titus 3:14), being the last statement before the final greetings and remarks, we find a recap of the virtue-ethical agendum in a different but all-encompassing expression “so that they may not be unproductive/unfruitful.” A fruitful life, in 292 The

concept of living a productive, happy, or flourishing life is a virtue-ethical concept. is possible to illustrate virtue ethics in Titus with the “fruit” idea in Gal 5:22 because in Titus 3:14, the vicious or unproductive life or character is presented with the symbol of “fruitfulness” (ἄκαρποι). Horn, “Tugendlehre im Neuen Testament?” 424 notes that the understanding of the virtues as καρπός “fruit” of the Spirit, as a singular noun, is instructive. It indicates that the virtues are the outflow of the believer’s new reality and being in the Spirit. See the virtueethical analysis of good works in this research for more on the analogy between virtue and fruitfulness. 294 Wendland also finds a similar link between Titus 1:1–4, 2:11–14, and 3:3–7 in relation to the soteriological grounding of the author’s directives concerning church discipline (“‘Let No One Disregard You!’” 343–344). See also Luke Timothy Johnson, Letters to Paul’s Delegates: 1 Timothy, 2 Timothy, Titus, New Testament in Context (Pennsylvania: Trinity Press International, 1996), 217–219. Johnson sees literary connections in the greetings (Titus 1:1–5) and in the text. For example, hope of eternal life in 1:2 has a connection with hope in 3:7, so also “truth in accord with godliness” in 1:1 connects with righteousness, godliness, and self-control in 2:12. 293 It

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the author’s overall conception, is a life of godliness expressing itself in good works, in hope and as a preparation for life with Christ in eternal glory. ii) The Linguistic Element κατά (Titus 1:1) Moreover, the κατά in Titus 1:1 plays more than a linguistic role. It plays a virtueethical role. The understanding of εὐσέβεια as a telos informs and grounds my interpretation and translation of the highly debated τῆς κατ᾽ εὐσέβειαν as “leads to godliness or towards godliness”295 and not simply “according to, or in accordance with godliness.”296 William Barclays’ translation of κατά as “enables” is even more revealing of its virtue-ethical function than we construe here. He translates τῆς κατ᾽ εὐσέβειαν as “which enables a man to live a really religious life.”297 Arichea and Hatton rightly note that translating it as “leads to godliness” requires “godliness” to be definitely taken in its ethical sense, namely, “living as God wants.”298 More than its prepositional linguistic function, κατά plays a significant virtue-ethical role, pointing to the overall telos of the election and the “knowledge of the truth.” Beyond pointing to the telos, it has a nuance of “enabling” as well. It implies that the faith of the elect and their knowledge of the truth “leads to godliness,” nuancing “enabling” godliness. This κατά points even to the moral telos of the entire letter to Titus, based on our argument that εὐσέβεια represents the virtue-ethical agendum of the letter to Titus, with all other virtues expressing different aspects of εὐσέβεια, understood as a combination of faith, knowledge, and corresponding conduct.

295 In

agreement with Mounce, Pastoral Epistles, 379–380, as discussed above. is how many scholars and translators render κατά here (e. g. ESV “accords with godliness”; Johnson, Letters, 216, “in accord with godliness”), which I think does not represent the author’s teleological virtue-ethical posture. Even Aquinas, who could be described as a virtue ethicist (cf. his Summa Theologica II), translates it as “according to godliness.” See Aquinas, Timothy, Titus, and Philemon, 156. Martin Luther, Lectures on Titus, Philemon, and Hebrews, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan and Walter A. Hansen, Luther’s Works 29 (Saint Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1968), 9, also translates it as “truth which accords with godliness.” He further defines godliness as serving God and worshipping him. And knowledge according to godliness means this knowledge teaches and has godliness, or godliness is located in it (ibid., 10). He asserts that “there is no godliness except in faith and in truth, because we know that nothing binds the conscience” (ibid., 10). See also Engelmann, Unzertrennliche Drillinge? 436–437, for a discussion on the functions of κατά in the opening verses of Titus. 297 William Barclay, The Letters to Timothy, Titus, and Philemon, The Daily Bible Study Series, rev. ed. (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1975), 227. Translating εὐσέβεια as “religious life,” Barclay regards it as the result of faith and knowledge, referring to how to live. He asserts that “a truly religious life is one which a man is on the right terms with God, with himself and with his fellow-men. It is a life in which a man can cope alike with the great moments and the everyday duties. It is a life in which Christ lives again” (ibid., 227). 298 Daniel C. Arichea and Howard A. Hatton, A Handbook on Paul’s Letters to Timothy and to Titus (New York: United Bible Societies, 1995), 262. See pages 261–262, for translation options of the phrases “faith of God’s elect” and “knowledge of the truth.” 296 This

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Furthermore, the κατά in Titus 1:1 expresses an implicit virtue-ethical concept of moral “exemplar”299 based on the author’s assertion that his apostleship is “for the faith of the elect.”300 Beyond his ministerial calling to lead the elect to faith and to guide them into knowing the truth that leads to godliness, the author is implicitly a moral exemplar of the εὐσέβεια kind of life that combines faith, genuine knowledge of the truth, and corresponding conduct.301 In his absence in Crete, he projects Titus to be that exemplar of εὐσέβεια by asking him to be an example “in all things” (Titus 2:7), which include being an example in faith, knowledge, and corresponding conduct.302 iii) Εὐσεβῶς “godly or in a godly manner“ (Titus 2:12) The virtue-ethical element here lies in its linguistic form and some of the verbs related to it. Being an adverb, it conveys a virtue-ethical concept of a manner of life to be lived instead of specific moral action(s) to be done. The phrase ζήσωμεν ἐν τῷ νῦν αἰῶνι “to live in the present age” shows that such a virtue-oriented life is possible in this life because of the Christ-event (Titus 2:11–14). Moreover, one of the verbs related to this norm is παιδεύουσα. Being a present active nominative participle verb,303 it suggests a continuing process of moral training. Smith notes that “the continuing aspect of the instruction suggests the nuances of training, encouragement, persuasion, practice, and discipline.”304 The virtueethical concept here is that living a godly life comes through training (equipping, teaching305), and the agent which trains is “the grace of God.”306 The flow of idea here could be described thusly: the Christ-event is transformative, and it effects an inner change in a person, or accomplishes a new identity and character,307 299 See

Chan, Biblical Ethics in the 21st Century, 88–90, for a discussion on moral exemplar as one of the four dimensions of virtue ethics. 300 Barclay translates this statement as “to awaken faith in God’s chosen ones” (Letters, 227). 301 Fiore, in his detailed doctoral dissertation titled “The Function of Personal Example in the Socratic and Pastoral Epistles” has a section dedicated to discussing “Implicit Examples in the Letters,” but does not seem to notice the implicit example that could be argued in Titus 1:1. See Benjamin Fiore, “The Function of Personal Example in the Socratic and Pastoral Epistles” (PhD diss., Yale University, 1982), 398–402. 302 Huizenga understands teachers in the Pastorals as examples for imitation. Judging from a “corpus” of the PE perspective, and how Paul depicts himself in other Pauline letters, she thinks that the repeated instruction for Titus to seek after “good deeds” (despite no evident detail of Paul’s life in Titus, unlike the letters to Timothy) would have the life and faith of Paul “as their chief referent.” See Annette B. Huizenga, Moral Education, 268. 303 See Titus 2:12 in Paratext 9.0. 304 Smith, Pauline Communities, 318–319, 321–322. 305 Knight, Commentary on the Pastoral Epistles, 319, understands παιδεύουσα and other related verbs in 2:12 as having an ongoing present significance because it is the controlling verb, and because it is in present tense. Kent, The Pastoral Epistles, 227, has to “educate, train, chastise,” and in Titus 2:12, it is for believers in this present age, before Christ’s return. 306 See Towner, The Goal of Our Instruction, 151; Smith, Pauline Communities, 318–319. 307 See Bondi, “Character,” 82–84. Also See Roberts, “Character,” 69.

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which is inherently capable of enabling one to renounce the ungodliness of the world and to live a godly life. Volker Rabens examines the role of the Holy Spirit and ethics in Paul and concludes that the work of the Holy Spirit in ethics is relational-transformative in a complex way. “It is primarily through deep knowledge of, and an intimate relationship with God, Jesus Christ and with the community of faith that people are transformed and empowered by the Spirit for religious-ethical life.”308 Even though Rabens’ study relates directly to the authentic Pauline letters, his thesis is applicable to understanding the role of the divine agency in the ethical structure of Titus.309 In a complex and relational way, the author shows that the transformative work of the Christ-event and the believer’s rational and continuous understanding (“knowledge of the truth”) of this fact brings empowerment for ethical living (cf. Titus 1:1–3, 2:11–14 and 3:4–8). Donelson asserts that in the PE, the Christ-event has both epistemological and ontic consequences for the believer. This is indicated, for example, in Titus 3:4–7, in a connection between the epiphany, cultic baptism, and a radical moral transformation. This transformation enables the baptized believers to live ethical lives that are not accessible to unbelievers. The primary role of the Spirit in the PE is, therefore, not for ethical guidance but for ethical enablement, unlike Paul’s pneumatological concept of walking in the Spirit.310 iv) Ἀσέβεια “ungodliness” (Titus 2:12) Being the direct opposite of εὐσέβεια, the linguistic form and ethical posture of εὐσέβειαν discussed above contrasts with ἀσέβειαν.311 Being a feminine singular accusative noun, it also describes a state of being, disposition, or character of persons than actions. In this case, it depicts a life that is devoid of belief in God, the effect of the Christ-event, and the consequent manner of life that proceeds from it. By implication, it depicts a life that is not virtuous, which is said to be prevalent in the “world.”312 This is why the grace of God teaches believers in Christ to say no to such a worldly life. Our argument that εὐσέβεια is the virtue-ethical telos towards which believers move is strengthened by the way the author places ἀσέβεια in juxtaposition with 308 Rabens, The Holy Spirit and Ethics in Paul, 21, 250–252. See also Meilaender, “Divine Grace and Ethics,” 74–88, for more discussion on the role of divine agency in Christian ethics. 309 After all, it is almost a scholarly consensus that the PE belong to the wider Pauline tradition. 310 Donelson, Pseudepigraphy, 142–143. The idea of receiving ethical power at Baptism was a common notion in early Christianity, says Donelson. 311 For a discussion on the root word and its other cognates, see Günther, “Godliness, Piety: σέβομαι,” 91–95. For various traditions of the word (Greek World, Hellenistic Judaism, and the NT), see Foerster, “εὐσεβής, εὐσέβεια, εὐσεβέω,” 185–190. 312 Knight, Commentary on the Pastoral Epistles, 319, says ἀσέβεια means godlessness or impiety in both thought and action (cf. Rom 1:18; 11:26; 2 Tim 2:16; Jude 15, 18).

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εὐσέβεια. While ἀσέβεια is the manner of life or character from which believers turn, εὐσέβεια is the moral telos to which they turn. The fact that the author does not use the direct opposite of the other two virtues (self-control and justice) that appear together with εὐσέβεια313 in Titus 2:12 suggests that he gives prominence to εὐσέβεια and sees the other virtues as various ways of living a godly life. b) Inter-Textual Level 1 Timothy 2:2: ἵνα ἤρεμον καὶ ἡσύχιον βίον διάγωμεν ἐν πάσῃ εὐσεβείᾳ καὶ σεμνότητι “that we may lead a tranquil and quiet life in all godliness and dignity.” The use of εὐσέβεια here is similar to that of Titus 1:1 and 2:12 in the sense that it describes a state of being, not a set of actions, that constitute godliness. Godliness is a way to live. However, its usage differs with Titus in the sense that there is no apparent connection here with the Christ-event and its moral transformative effect. Prayers for kings and those in authorities is what is presumed to provide an enabling environment for godliness to thrive. 1 Timothy 3:16: καὶ ὁμολογουμένως μέγα ἐστὶν τὸ τῆς εὐσεβείας μυστήριον “and undeniably great is the mystery of godliness.” The idea of godliness having or being a mystery, namely, the Christ-event, is similar, and could throw more light on Titus’s “knowledge of the truth that leads to godliness” (Titus 1:1) and “the grace of God which has been revealed to all men, equipping us to say no to ungodliness … and to live godly lives” (Titus 2:11–12). The summary of the Christ-event as the “mystery of godliness” is arguably the most explicated virtue-ethical perspective of the use of εὐσεβείᾳ in 1 Timothy. It shows that godliness results from the Christ-event, which by implication, defines a new identity of the believers. This also indicates the Christian perspective the author brings to the secular and pagan concepts of εὐσεβεία.314 One clue to understanding the author’s idea of the Christ-event being a life and character-transforming, identity-changing experience is his idea of “once we were” and “now we are,” in a sharp contrast to those he considers unbelievers (Titus 3:3–7). In this regard, “the moral life is predicated upon change in the situation of the believer.”315 1 Timothy 4:7, 8: Γύμναζε δὲ σεαυτὸν πρὸς εὐσέβειαν “but train yourself towards godliness” and ἡ δὲ εὐσέβεια πρὸς πάντα ὠφέλιμός ἐστιν ἐπαγγελίαν ἔχουσα ζωῆς τῆς νῦν καὶ τῆς μελλούσης “but godliness is profitable for all things, holding promise both for this life and the life to come.” Both Titus and Timothy agree on the virtue-ethical concept of character development of persons through training or teaching but differ in their conception of the agent 313 Nevertheless, “worldly” desires in Titus 2:12 could be taken as the opposite of “self-control,” although not directly like that of ἀσέβεια and εὐσέβεια. 314 See Towner, The Goal of Our Instruction, 151, as discussed above. 315 Matera, New Testament Ethics, 243. Matera notes here that Titus 3:4–7 is the clearest statement of justification by faith in the PE.

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who does the training. While Titus emphasizes the role of the divine agency in training towards godliness (Titus 1:1; 2:11–12),316 1 Timothy emphasizes the role of the human agency instead.317 The two passages (1 Tim 4:7–8, Titus 2:11– 12) show that even though knowledge of the truth leads to godliness, the grace equips one towards godliness, and the mystery of godliness is the Christ-event, and the continuous training towards godliness to sustain or perfect it is necessary. This is one example of where and when virtue ethics involves actions or ‘doing.’318 Actions do not answer the virtue-ethical question “who are we?” but contribute to answering the question, “how do we get there?”319 We get to our telos by practicing the virtues in concrete day-to-day life. Consistently and consciously practicing the virtues makes one virtuous. In this way, “doing” strengthens “being.” Like Titus 1:1 and 2:12, 1 Tim 4:7–8 also presents a virtue-ethical teleology. Godliness, in itself, is a virtue or a telos in this life. But much more, it also leads to a greater telos “in the life to come.” This is similar to Titus’ telos of εὐσέβεια in 2:11–13, which shows that living a godly life is a telos to be attained “in this life,” while waiting for a greater telos “the blessed hope.” Other uses of εὐσέβεια in 1 Tim 6:3, 5, 6, and 11 have no direct connection with the Christ-event but are focused on the wrong perception of godliness by the opponents, and the author’s attempt to correct the misconception. 1 Timothy 6:11 points out godliness as one of the virtues Timothy is to pursue. These usages, to some degree, do not carry the weight with which Titus and other parts of 1 Timothy use εὐσέβεια with a clear connection between godliness and the Christ-event. 2 Timothy 3:5: ἔχοντες μόρφωσιν εὐσεβείας τὴν δὲ δύναμιν αὐτῆς ἠρνημένοι “having a form of godliness, but denying its power.”320 This verse, though seemingly introducing a new idea to the εὐσέβεια concept, namely, an inherent power, it explicates the implicit idea of the notion of power in the author’s version of εὐσέβεια in Titus. In Titus 1:1, the knowledge of the truth “leads to or 316  See Matera, New Testament Ethics, 244, where, in a general statement, he says the PE do not present an autonomous moral or ethical system, owing to the strong relations between theology and ethics. 317 But because implicit elements of both divine and human agencies could be argued in both texts, it is preferable to say that they complement each other rather than totally disagree with each other. 318 See Stanley Hauerwas, Christians Among the Virtues (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), 25, 127. Also see Chan, Biblical Ethics in the 21st Century, 83. He notes that in virtue ethics, practices or actions are only transformative virtuous acts. 319 See Harrington and Keenan, Paul and Virtue Ethics, 3, for a discussion on the three virtue ethics questions: who are we, who ought we to become, and how do we get there? 320 Foerster, “εὐσεβής, εὐσέβεια, εὐσεβέω,” 182, understands the opponents’ denying of the power of godliness to mean they deny “its influence in shaping life.” This suggests a virtueethical concept, as we argue for an implicit inherent power for shaping life in the εὐσέβεια concept of Titus 1:1.

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enables godliness.” And Titus 2:11–12 shows that the grace equips/trains believers to live godly lives, thereby suggesting the presence of an implicit inherent power in the teaching agent “the grace,”321 whose transformative effect enables living a godly life. By implication, the life of godliness is determined or enabled by the transforming power of the Christ-event. The Christ-event and all its properties in the life of a believer cannot be separated from the godly life the believer lives. 2 Timothy 3:5, therefore, shows that it is an error to fake godliness without actual experience of the power of the Christ-event that enables it. This is an implicit polemic directed at the false teachers who championed a different way or kind of morality – a legalistic, Mosaic-based type, other than the one based on the new life through the Christ-event. We can conclude the inter-textual analysis by noting that Titus and 2 Timothy have fewer occurrences of the εὐσέβεια word group and concept than 1 Timothy. Second, the concept of εὐσέβεια in Titus and 2 Timothy are similar to each other and more virtue related than 1 Timothy. While 1 Timothy has many occurrences of εὐσέβεια that do not relate to character or morality of persons in connection with the Christ-event, all the occurrences in Titus and 2 Timothy relate to the character of persons in connection to the Christ-event. c) Extra-Textual Level The rhetorical structural and theologically-grounded use of the εὐσέβεια concept at the beginning,322 middle, and end of the letter suggests that it is the key virtue and the umbrella term for all the virtues in the letter to Titus, which defines the overall ethical framework of the author. Considering εὐσέβεια as the umbrella term for the virtues implies that it is intended to perform the function of the Greek-philosophical ἀρετή “virtue.” The author implicitly adapts the secular concept of εὐδαιμονία “happiness or human flourishing”323 as the “good life” by substituting the Greek-philosophical ἀρετή “virtue” with εὐσέβεια.324 Instead of aiming at living “the good life” as 321 See

Towner, The Goal of Our Instruction, 151; Smith, Pauline Communities, 318–319. “‘Let No One Disregard You!’” 335–350, has done a discourse analysis of Titus, with particular focus on Titus 2:15, and has noted that Titus 1:1 is a concentration of most of the key topics that are picked up in the epistle. 323 Grätzel, System der Ethik, 34. Grätzel notes that while there are different human excellences or virtues, “die höchste Tugend ist die jenige, die um ihrer selbst willen geschieht. Diese Tugend ist diejenige Tugend, die zur Glückseligkeit führt.” ET: “the highest virtue is the one which happens for its own sake. This virtue is the virtue which leads to happiness.” See Grätzel, System der Ethik, 40–41, for a discussion on Aristotle’s concept of happiness and the problems Grätzel sees therein. 324 This argument agrees with Horn and Herzer, who argue generally (not based on Titus alone, as this research does) that εὐσέβεια replaces ἀρετή in the PE. See Horn, “Tugendlehre im Neuen Testament?” 425. See also J. Herzer, “Geheimnis der Frömmigkeit – Sprache und Stil der Pastoralbriefe im Kontext hellenistisch-römischer Popularphilosophie,” ThQ 187 (2007): 309–329, here 326, cited in Horn, “Tugendlehre im Neuen Testament?” 425. It is noteworthy 322 Wendland,

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Greek philosophy proposes, the author of Titus proposes aiming at living “the godly life.”325 He intends to show that εὐσέβεια as the telos for believers is both the good life and the godly life. It is on this basis that among the triad of cardinal virtues326 that appear along with εὐσέβεια in Titus 2:12, εὐσέβεια is the only one that finds explicit grounding on the Christ-event in all its occurrences.327 This is no coincidence, but a deliberate and careful use of εὐσέβεια as a virtue in itself, but also expressing the concept of ἀρετή in a Christian context without using the actual word ἀρε-

that applying different methodologies each, both Herzer, Horn, and I arrive at a similar conclusion about the use of εὐσέβεια in place of ἀρετή in the letter to Titus. However, what Herzer and Horn seem not to have mentioned, which this research argues, is that the reason for replacing ἀρετή with εὐσέβεια is in order not to overshadow the Christian distinctives the author seeks to articulate in his concept of virtue. It is also noteworthy that due to my lack of German language proficiency especially at the beginning of this research, I arrived at the conclusion of this argument without any idea of Horn and Herzer’s similar conclusions. I only read their works in German (between February to April 2018) after I had completed the first draft of my dissertation, which necessitated revising the work in order to incorporate their arguments. See also Nelida Naveros Cordova, “Paul’s Εὐσέβεια and Paul’s Πνεῦμα: The Appropriation and Alteration of Hellenistic and Greek-Philosophical Traditions in Their Ethical Discourses” (PhD diss., Loyola University Chicago, 2016), 262. This argument is further made plausible by the fact that, according to Cordova, εὐσέβεια was considered by Philo as “the virtue,” in regard to the unity of the virtues which most Greek-philosophical schools upheld. This indicates the currency and plausibility of using εὐσέβεια in place of the highly prized ἀρετή. The author of Titus and Philo both regard εὐσέβεια as “the virtue.” The difference, however, is that the author of Titus uses εὐσέβεια as a substitute to ἀρετή and explicitly grounds it on the Christ-event, thereby “Christianizing” his concept of virtue. 325 Robert J. Karris, The Pastoral Epistles (Dublin: Vitalis, 1979), 100–101, gives an example of what it means to live a godly life in the PE as follows: Godliness means involving oneself in the structures and institutions of society which “promote religion and human welfare. The ‘godly’ person is the one who goes to church, who has served country in military service, who is dedicated to spouse and family, who is active in civic organizations which foster the fine arts, etc.” 326 Grätzel, System der Ethic, 34. Grätzel notes that in regard to the cardinal virtues comprising temperance, courage, wisdom, and justice, Aristotle gave prominence to justice, regarding it as “eine sehr hoch stehende Tugend” (ET: “A very important virtue”). In a general sense, the main difference between the NT concept of virtue and virtue lists compared to the Greek-philosophical virtues, as represented by Aristotle’s concept, according to Horn, is that the virtues “sind nicht ein Gegenstand oder das Ideal einer autonomen ethischen Entscheidung, auch nicht durchgehend Mittel zum Glück oder zum höchsten Gut, sondern sie werden auf christliche Kontexte bezogen.” ET: “are not an object or the ideal of an autonomous ethical decision, nor are they a continuous means to happiness or the highest good, but are related to Christian context.” Horn, “Tugendlehre im Neuen Testament?” 423–424. Horn makes this statement in the particular context of the list of virtues in Gal 5. The Christian context to which these virtues relate is specifically the new identity, character, and reality effected through the Christ-event. 327 Cordova, “Paul’s Εὐσέβεια and Paul’s Πνεῦμα,” 271. Cordova similarly points that “in Philo’s thought, if you have εὐσέβεια, you have all the other virtues and that includes the four cardinal virtues.”

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τή.328 Virtue or excellence (ἀρετή) in the author’s concept and unlike in Greek philosophy, is a combination of Christian faith, knowledge of the truth, and corresponding conduct, which he dynamically combines in his concept of εὐσέβεια. The reasons for not using ἀρετή throughout the text are the same as for using εὐσέβεια sparsely in the text. Being the umbrella329 term for the concept of virtue, ἀρετή could overshadow the Christian distinctive the author intends to express in his construal of an alternative concept of virtue that addresses early Christian concerns. And since εὐσέβεια was also a popular concept in the wider secular culture, the author scarcely uses the term. But when he uses it, he explicitly grounds it on the Christ-event to vividly portray the Christian distinctive he introduces to the concept. Therefore, the concept of εὐσέβεια in Titus does in the Christian account of virtue what ἀρετή does in the Greek-philosophical account of virtue. This argument is grounded on three observations regarding the use of εὐσέβεια in Titus: Its teleological, theological, and substitutionary use. It is teleological because it is the telos of faith and knowledge of the truth in this life; and it prepares the believer for the final telos of being with Christ in eternal glory. It is theological because all its usages are grounded on the Christ-event. It is substitutionary because it is used as the substitute for the Greek-philosophical concept of ἀρετή. In conclusion, five virtue-ethical concepts or characteristics stand out from the virtue-ethical analysis of the linguistic form of εὐσέβεια in Titus. First, εὐσέβεια’s teleological usage corresponds with virtue-ethical teleology. Second, εὐσέβεια relates with the moral “being” of persons more than their “doing.” Third, εὐσέβεια involves all aspects of a person’s life, both secular and sacred, dramatic and simple daily life, therefore corresponding with the virtue-ethical concept of moral perfectionism. Fourth, εὐσέβεια involves character development in the sense that persons can grow in εὐσέβεια through teaching, equipping, training, or discipline, and this involves both human and divine cooperation. Fifth, εὐσέβεια involves not just dispositions, but also rational knowledge by the agent of the virtue and why she/he acquires and practices the virtues.

328 Horn, “Tugendlehre im Neuen Testament?” 418 argues rightly that the concept of ἀρετή is used broadly in the PE and in 2 Peter “sowohl begrifflich als auch sachlich” (ET: “both conceptually and factually”) without using the actual word ἀρετή. This is one incident in which the concept appears without the actual word ἀρετή. 329 Horn notes how ἀρετή in Phil 4:8 loses its position as the “Oberbegriff” (generic term) of the virtues and only appears as one among the list of virtues. Horn, “Tugendlehre im Neuen Testament?” 421. Horn’s description of ἀρετή as the “Oberbegriff” of the virtues indirectly supports the argument of this research that the author of the Pastorals avoids using the “umbrella term” ἀρετή in order to explicate the Christian distinctives he introduces to the virtue concept, even though Horn himself does not make such claim.

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3.3.2 Moral Agents of εὐσέβεια a) Ἐκλεκτῶν θεοῦ “elected ones of God” (Titus 1:1) The “elected ones of God” who have the “knowledge of the truth” are the moral agents of the norm εὐσέβεια here. It is not explicit if the author has only the elect in Crete in mind or the elect universally. But it makes more sense to think that he has the universally elect believers in mind,330 in the light of his later generic pronouns in reference to all believers in Christ (Titus 2:8, 12, 14; 3:3, 5, 6, 7, 8). Nowhere in the text does he indicate that his apostleship is for believers in Crete alone. Since the author says he is Paul, it makes sense to see the scope of his ministry beyond Crete. b) ἡμᾶς “us, we” (Titus 2:12) Believers “us, we” are moral agents of εὐσέβεια. Titus 2:12 is a continuation of the statement in verse 11, which says the grace of God has been revealed “to all people.” Looking at this, it seems that the moral agents intended here are “all people.” However, a careful reading suggests that the author makes a distinction between “all people” in verse 11 and “us, we” in verse 12. Two things about the “saving grace of God” are noteworthy here: first, the grace has been revealed, and second, the grace teaches. This distinction can be further argued linguistically. Linguistically, ἐπεφάνη “has been revealed” is in passive voice, while παιδεύουσα “teaching” is in the active voice.331 By using a passive voice for the first point about the “grace of God,” namely, that “it has been revealed to all men” (with an aorist tense, possibly suggesting a single event in the past),332 the author intends to show that this is a general revelation to all humanity, inviting all people to salvation in Christ. In this case, humanity is a passive receiver of the grace that has been revealed. He explicates this by adding “to all people,” implying a general universal call to salvation through grace. But by using a present active voice for the second point about the revealed grace, namely, that it is “teaching/equipping us,” the author intends to show the potency, the activity, and the efficacy of that grace on those who have believed in Christ. It is such people that the grace continuously trains,

330 Hultgren, I–II Timothy, Titus, 150, interprets “elect” as a term referring to Christians in general, and not the doctrine of predestination. 331 This translation is contrary to some translations which translate them both as active, thereby distorting their theological and ethical postures. E. g. NIV, NKJV, RSV, etc. Huizenga, Moral Education, 275, also translates the linguistic form as “for the grace of God appeared ” (instead of has been revealed) for salvation for all people …. 332 Zimmermann, Logic of Love, 35, notes, with reference to aorist imperatives, that in koine Greek, the aorist tense is definitive or ingressive, and normally used to refer to a single action or happening.

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equips, or teaches.333 This is why he now narrows the agency using the pronouns “us, we,” a pronoun of particularity for believers in Christ (cf. other uses of “us, we” in Titus 2:8, 10, 13, 14; 3:3, 4, 5, 6, 14). The message intended here is that the grace has been revealed “to all people” (general), but it only teaches “us” who believe (particular). On this basis, the moral agents of εὐσέβεια in Titus 2:12 are heteronomous agents, as opposed to autonomous agents. Their moral agency is mostly (but not only) dependent on the enabling and teaching that “the grace” does. The author’s overall theological and ethical strength of the Christ-event and its attendant nuances would be contradicted if we interpret the role of “the grace” to mean it trains/equips “all people” to live godly lives instead of referring only to believers. Moreover, by saying the grace trains/equips “us” to renounce the “ungodliness and worldly desires of this age,” the author emboldens the dividing line between “all people” and “us.” Those who are living in the ungodliness and worldly desires of this age are those who do not share in the transformative effect of the Christ-event and are thus not trained by it. Titus 2:13–14 further shows how the author uses “us and we” in particular reference to believers by the use of exclusive terms as blessed hope, redeemed, purify, special people, and zealous for good works. We can, therefore, accountably assert, based on this argument, that the moral agents of the norm εὐσέβεια in Titus 2:12 are believers. Godliness, in the author’s conception, is only possible through the transformative work of the Christ-event on the believer.334 By making the agents of the norm godliness exclusive (believers), the author presents a virtue-ethical perspective of moral agency in two ways. In the first instance, showing that the agents have to be trained to live godly lives corresponds with the virtue-ethical concept of moral development. Virtue ethics concerns itself with character development of persons through training or discipline, leading to a rational knowledge, decision, moral growth, and living a virtuous life.335 The overall commitment of the letter to Titus to teaching correct doctrine suggests a commitment to the moral agent’s rational understanding of the virtues. The moral agent’s knowledge of the virtues and the need to acquire them corresponds with virtue-ethical concerns in two ways. First, it corresponds with the virtue-ethical concern for inner dispositions, resulting in a sustained pattern of behavior that is regarded as virtuous. Second, it indicates the unity of the agent, the virtue, and the telos altogether.

333 Maier, Picturing Paul in Empire, 170, also renders it as “the grace of God has appeared (instead of has been revealed) to train Christ followers to lead self-controlled, righteous/just, and godly lives.” 334 Towner, The Goal of Our Instruction, 150; see also Mounce, Pastoral Epistles, 380. 335 For a discussion on the place of moral knowledge in virtue ethics, see Foot, Virtues and Vices, 4–6. Also see Annas, “Virtue Ethics,” 514–534.

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In the second instance, the particularity of the agents presents them as inseparably connected to the virtue itself. The virtue (godliness) is inherently part of the Christ-event (Titus 1:1; 2:11–14), and the Christ-event transforms the believers in such a way that their identity could not be defined independently of it. This relates to the central question in virtue ethics, namely, who am I? The Christ-event is so transforming that it determines and defines the new identity and character of the believers. That is what sets them apart from the ungodliness and worldly desires of this age (Titus 2:13).336 One difference between virtue ethics and consequentialist and deontological ethical theories is that the agent and the virtues are inseparable in virtue ethics. Seeing the virtues as only means to an end that is independent of the virtuous person is a resort to a consequentialist theory. If the point for having the virtue is disconnected from the agent’s own concerns with her/his own life, and the connection between practical reasoning and the virtues is eliminated, it only leaves an incomplete version of virtue ethics, since there is no established connection between virtue and the agent’s life priorities.337 It is helpful at this point to restate some of the points mentioned in our discussion of virtue ethics in NT studies and in Christian ethics in chapter one above, and to show how that relates to our virtue-ethical reading of the letter to Titus. In comparison with Christian ethics today, Bondi rightly notes that Christian character in contemporary Christian ethics is built on the traditional claim that faith in Christ transforms human nature in general and each Christian in particular, which is made visible in the life of an individual and the faith community.338 The church is, therefore, the learning community where Christian character is formed and continuously shaped.339 Verhey also summarizes NT ethics by saying it is diverse, but in and through it, the God of Scripture “still forms and reforms conduct and character and community until they are something ‘new’ ….”340 This understanding of NT and Christian ethics finds expression in the letter to Titus as well. For example, the particularity of the moral agents as “believers in Christ” reveals how the author understands the role of

336 Hays’s three focal points of NT ethics: community, cross, and new creation, in a way, can be appropriated in support of my point here (The Moral Vision of the New Testament, 193–200). The believer-agent is intricately connected to the community and its story and virtue, the cross which made that possible, and the new life which he does not have alone but in concert with others. All of these are inseparably connected in shaping or transforming a believer’s character. 337 Annas, “Virtue Ethics,” 530. 338 Bondi, “Character,” 142–143. 339 Young, Pastoral Letters, 58. She further says in a general sense that “the ethics of the Pastorals are fundamentally theological” (ibid., 31). 340 Allen Verhey, “Ethics in Scripture,” in Dictionary of Scripture and Ethics, ed. Joel B. Green (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2011), 11.

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the Christ-event in forming new and potent moral character of individuals and the faith community.341 The commitment to the new identity and character of the believers in Christ as moral agents of εὐσέβεια corresponds with the virtue-ethical concern for the morality of persons and their character development. Particularizing the moral agents to believers in Christ also corresponds with the virtue-ethical notion of particularism. The fact that the agents are to keep growing in εὐσέβεια, being continuously trained by the “grace,” corresponds with the virtue-ethical notion of perfectionism. Moreover, the fact that the text does not suggest concrete norms for action or ethos that constitute εὐσέβεια shows that it applies in all aspects of life, hence, corresponding with the virtue-ethical notion of perfectionism. 3.3.3 Ethical Argumentation/Reflection for εὐσέβεια Titus 1:1 contains three implicit deontologically-oriented ethical reflections. First, because the believers are the elected ones of God, their election inherently calls for living godly lives. Second, because the knowledge of the truth (which they have) inherently leads towards godliness, they are to live godly lives. Since godliness is an integral part of their salvation, they are to live godly lives. Third, godliness is an integral part or purpose of the author’s calling and ministry to them. He is a servant of God and an apostle of Jesus Christ “for the sake of the elected ones of God and the knowledge of the truth which leads to godliness.” By implication, their living godly lives signifies that the author is fulfilling his ministry accordingly. On the other hand, their living ungodly lives would mean that the purpose for his calling is not fulfilled. The ethical reflection here is that, because of these three implicit deontological reasons, the believers are to live godly lives. These argumentations are deontological because they describe a fact, a principle, or “what is” as a ground for ethical action. Virtue ethics is by nature teleological, as already noted. But this is a rare case where we find a deontological virtue-ethical argumentation. A deontological ethical argumentation is virtue-ethical if it states a fact about “who or what is,” in relation to moral persons as a reason for ethical action, and not some external principles disconnected from the moral agent. The preposition κατά “towards” also contains a virtue-ethical teleological argumentation. It relates closely (but slightly differently) to the third deontological argumentation above concerning the author’s purpose of calling. Godliness is the telos of the believers’ faith, and it also serves as the preparation for the eternal telos of their salvation. The text does not say when, how, or in what manner the knowledge of the truth leads to godliness. However, when we bring the use of εὐσέβεια in Titus 1:1 into conversation with the second use in Titus 2:12, it shows 341 See

Knight, The Faithful Sayings, 71. See also Towner, The Goal of Our Instruction, 150.

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that the process involved in the knowledge of the truth leading to godliness is an ongoing, lifelong process towards the other-worldly telos. The fact that godliness is the telos their knowledge of the truth and election leads towards becomes an implicit ethical reflection for the believers to live godly lives.342 The ethical argumentation in Titus 2:12 applies to self-control, justice, and godliness, therefore the ethical argumentation will only be briefly mentioned here because it has been extensively discussed in relation to self-control above. In summary, this verse contains both deontological and teleological argumentations. The fact that the grace has been revealed to all people and is teaching believers to live godly lives is a deontological ethical argumentation, which generates moral significance from a principle of what God has done for the believer through the Christ-event. The fact that the believers are waiting for the blessed hope and appearance of the glory of God and Savior Jesus Christ (Titus 2:13) conveys the teleological ethical argumentation, generating moral significance from the future hope and final telos of belief in Christ.343 N. T. Wright rightly connects the NT eschatological concept of the “end” to Aristotle’s concept of the human telos. He states that “the Christian vision of the ultimate future, the ‘end’ or ‘goal’ of our human vocation, takes place within the New Testament’s scheme of thought which in Aristotle’s philosophical scheme … is taken by his idea of the human telos, or goal.”344 In describing the connection between the telos and the virtues, Wright notes that the virtues are the “strengths of character you need to develop in the present so that you can be shaped for that ultimate goal.” In Titus, the allusions to the eschatological return of Christ and its associated glorious eternal life (e. g. Titus 1:2 and 2:13) is a good analogy of the similarity between Aristotle’s concept of a moral telos and the biblical eschatological telos. The similarity is most evident when we observe that the allusions to an eschatological other-worldy telos are all connected to virtues and Christian living in the present age or a this-worldly telos (cf. knowledge of the truth towards godliness, in hope of eternal life in 1:1–2; and living self-controlled, just, and godly lives while waiting for the blessed hope and glorious appearance of Christ). In summary, the ethical reflection for the norm εὐσέβεια in Titus is implicit, but virtue-ethical in nature for two reasons. First, the deontological ethical reflections relate to the moral transformative effect of the Christ-event on be342 See Annas, “Virtue Ethics,” 531 for a discussion of the unity and inseparability of the virtues, the telos, and the virtuous person himself. 343 See Donelson, Pseudepigraphy, 154. 344 Trevin Wax, “The Rebirth of Virtue: An Interview with N. T. Wright,” The Gospel Coalition, U. S. Edition, 5 January 2010, https://www.thegospelcoalition.org/blogs/trevin-wax/ the-rebirth-of-virtue-an-interview-with-n-t-wright/. See a review of After You Believe (the U. S. version of N. T. Wright’s Virtue Reborn) here. William McDavid, “The Virtues and Vices of N. T. Wright’s After You Believe,” 24 July 2013, https://www.mbird.com/2013/07/the-virtuesand-vices-of-n-t-wrights-after-you-believe/.

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lievers, and not some arbitrary external argumentation that is detached from direct connection with the agent’s character. The ethical argumentation looks into the moral agent and his situation or character. Such an implicit argumentation is virtue-ethical because it finds its intelligibility in the “being” of the moral agent, and not some external principles or factors. Second, both the deontological and teleological argumentations fit into, or answer the three major virtue-ethical questions, summarized as follows: Who are we? We are believers in Christ, the elected ones of God, redeemed, purified, and are being trained continuously by “the grace.” Who ought we to become? We ought to become godly people in this life, through which we move to our other-worldly telos of being with Christ when he returns in glory. How do we, or ought we to get there? We ought to get there by living godly lives or practicing godly acts while here on earth, as a preparation, and as we wait for the glorious return of Jesus Christ. 3.3.4 History of Tradition of the εὐσέβεια Concept It is noteworthy that the history of interpretation of εὐσέβεια in chapter two of this study captures most of the information that is relevant for the history of tradition here. Having already discussed most of the points under the history of interpretation, we will only summarize some of the points that are relevant to the history of tradition here, in order to keep the flow of thought in this section in line with our methodology. a) Greco-Roman (Hellenistic) Tradition of εὐσέβεια The concept of εὐσέβεια in the Greek world connotes an attitude of reverence, which could be directed towards various persons and objects.345 In Classical Greek, piety, a translation of εὐσέβεια, could refer to reverence towards deceased relatives or living relatives, rulers such as the emperor, judges, aliens, oaths, and the law generally. The word referred primarily to respect towards domestic, national, and international orders which are sustained and sanctioned by the gods.346 Because all these world orders were believed to be sustained by the gods, it is understandable that the word later came to refer more and more to the gods than other persons and objects. The meaning later narrowed to mean not only piety but actual worship towards the gods and the world orders they sustained. Of interest to our virtue-ethical reading is that, even though it was ex-

345 Here also, Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, has done a work on these three sources of tradition, on which I rely heavily. 346 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 138. See Foerster, “εὐσεβής, εὐσέβεια, εὐσεβέω,” 175– 178, for discussion of εὐσέβεια in the Greek world.

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pressed by outward acts, it was believed that an inner attitude was always the basis for the outward expression of εὐσέβεια.347 In the Roman world, the corresponding concept was that of pietas. Greene defines it as “dutiful respect towards gods, fatherland and parents and other kinsmen.”348 In summary, εὐσέβεια was a positive concept in the Greco-Roman world, and was essentially religious, with the gods always in close or distant view. It was sometimes used to refer to an attitude to the gods, with slight difference from a righteous attitude towards human institutions and people.349 b) Jewish (OT) Tradition of εὐσέβεια Quinn champions the argument that in order to understand the concept of εὐσέβεια in the NT, we need to consider its usage in the Hellenistic Jewish thought.350 This research will, therefore, consider the concept of εὐσέβεια in the Hellenistic Jewish tradition for a better understanding of the concept in the PE. The noun εὐσέβεια appears 59 times in the LXX; 4 in the canonical books, 5 in the Apocrypha, 3 in 3 Macc, and 47 in 4 Maccabees.351 It translates Hebrew concepts such as “the fear of Yahweh” (cf. Prov 1:7; Isa 11:2; 33:6). Another word used in the same manner in the LXX is θεοσέβεια (Gen 20:11; Job 28:28, etc.). The opposite word is ἀσέβεια, which referred to rebellion against God. The adjective εὐσεβής, occurring in several places also in the LXX, translates as “righteous” (Prov 12:12; Isa 24:16; 26:7). The verb forms εὐσεβέω and εὐσεβῶς appear only in the noncanonical books.352 Marshall notes that the concepts which the εὐσέβεια word group translates in the PE are to some extent biblical and faithful to the OT concepts. For example, “piety” in Isa 11:2 and 33:6 combines “knowledge” and “the fear of the Lord” (cf. Prov 1:7). In other places, “εὐσέβεια comprehensively describes a kind of behavior that pleases God” (e. g. Prov 13:11; cf. Wis 10:12).353 Quinn sees the modern word “religion,” which is lacking in Greek and Hebrew languages, as the best description of the interplay between the knowledge of God and its corresponding conduct. He argues that εὐσέβεια offers the Hellenist Jews a term to explain themselves to their contemporary society.354 Since there is no such a term in Hebrew, they needed a term that would combine the related concepts of “the fear of God,” “the knowledge of God,” and the appropriate response or conduct, and εὐσέβεια was the most appropriate word for that. Even 347 Foerster,

“εὐσεβής, εὐσέβεια, εὐσεβέω,” 177; Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 138–139. The Pastoral Epistles, 139, citing W. C. Greene and John Scheid, OCD, 1182. 349 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 139. 350 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 140, citing Quinn, Letter to Titus, 282–291. 351 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 140. See also Foerster, “εὐσεβής, εὐσέβεια, εὐσεβέω,” 179–181, for the use of εὐσέβεια in Judaism, LXX, the Pseudepigrapha, Josephus, and Philo. 352 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 140. 353 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 140. 354 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 140–141, citing Quinn, Letter to Titus, 287. 348 Marshall,

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though in Greek thought it was basically regarded as a virtue related to cultic acts directly or indirectly, εὐσέβεια had a broad capacity to combine and express inner and outer aspects of loyalty to God, which adequately expressed the OT and Jewish concept of “piety” or spiritual life in general.355 The term εὐσέβεια, therefore, functioned in Hellenistic Judaism to describe the fear of the Lord and the practical conduct or lifestyle that proceeds from it, combining knowledge of God and behavior.356 c) Early Christian (NT) Tradition/Usage of εὐσέβεια Similar to the OT, the NT gives evidences of similar dynamic combinations of the knowledge of God and conduct but adapted with Christian distinctives. The highest number of occurrences of the εὐσέβεια word group in the NT is in the PE, followed by Acts and 2 Peter. Its usage in Acts 17:23, referring to the religion of the people of Athens, denotes “actual exercise of religion” in cultic terms, in form of practical worship unto the gods.357 Acts 10:2 combines εὐσέβης and φοβούμενος, showing that man reveres, venerates, and worships God because he fears him.358 In Acts 10:2, 7, the adjective used (εὐσεβής and εὐσεβῆ respectively) means “pious,” referring to the “God-fearers” like Cornelius. Their being pious refers to their worship of the God of the Jews, and the outward evidence of their piety is seen in practical conduct such as almsgiving and prayer. Considering Peter’s conclusion towards the end of the story of Cornelius, it seems obvious that the knowledge and fear of God and practical conduct are combined. Acts 3:12 shows that the two disciples, Peter and John, have a Christian piety from which the people thought the healing flowed, even though it is not in itself the source of the healing miracle mentioned in the passage.359 Turning to 2 Peter, we find broader and narrower usages of the term εὐσέβεια. 2 Peter 1:3 shows that God’s power has given us all that we need for life and ‘godliness,’ that is, “eternal life and the way of life that goes along with it.”360 This entails the entire life of a Christian. In 2 Pet 2:9, in the context of the preceding discussions, εὐσέβεια describes the godly people who belong to the same category as Noah and Lot, whom God will rescue. These godly people are in direct contrast to the ungodly, who belong to the same category as the fallen angels, the sinners in Noah’s time, and Sodom and Gomorrah. 2 Peter 3:11 makes use of the plural εὐσέβειαι to refer to godly deeds that reflect a godly life. 2 Peter 355 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 140. See also Foerster, “εὐσεβής, εὐσέβεια, εὐσεβέω,” 181–185, for the usage of the word in the NT and the Post-Apostolic Fathers. 356 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 140. 357 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 142. 358 Günther, “Godliness, Piety: σέβομαι,” 94. 359 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 142. 360 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 142.

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1:7 also gives a narrower usage of the term, as one of the several behavioral qualities or virtues the believer is to seek in growing measures.361 Günther observes that in 2 Peter, εὐσέβεια refers to the Christian manner of life in constant view of Christ’s return. “The Christian who lives in this expectation attains to knowledge and is preserved from temptation” (2 Pet 1:3–8; 2:9; 3:11–13).362 Scholars have argued concerning the reasons why the εὐσέβεια word group is used in the PE with such prominence compared to other parts of the NT. Marshall finds a polemical function of the εὐσέβεια word group in the PE. He argues that in the Hellenistic Jewish writings, the polemical usage of the word was directed against the godless (ἀσέβεια) people (Prov 1:7; 3 Macc 2:31–32), but in the Pastorals and other places, it was directed specifically against the false teachers (cf. Titus 2:12; 1 Tim 1:9; 2 Tim 2:16; cf. 2 Pet 2:6).363 This polemical usage shows that there could be fake piety devoted only to outward religious activities or intellectual knowledge without the right inner attitude and general upright living. Some scholars, considering 1 Tim 6:5 and 2 Tim 3:5, argue that the author of the Pastorals used the term εὐσέβεια more frequently because the heretics used it wrongly, therefore the need to redefine and correct the misconception. However, Marshall notes that its usage in Acts and 2 Peter suggests usages other than just polemics.364 Other scholars see the frequent use of εὐσέβεια in the Pastorals as evidence of the influence of Luke on Paul.365 Marshall, however, questions this conclusion, wondering why Paul would find it necessary to adopt this vocabulary in writing to close associates instead of Hellenistic audiences.366 However, this research argues367 that looking at the fact that the letters were addressed to the associates but with the congregations in mind, it is possible for the author to consider using εὐσέβεια. While Quinn argues that the word is chosen in the PE because it provides a contact point between Christianity and the pagan society, Marshall argues that it could ironically be that the currency of the word in Greco-Roman thought might have been the main reason for its delayed and limited use in the vocabulary of the early church in general.368 361 See

Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 142. “Godliness, Piety: σέβομαι,” 95. 363 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 143. 364 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 143; cf. Fee, 1 and 2 Timothy and Titus, 63, cf. Lips, Glaube, 82–3. 365 See Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 144. 366 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 143. 367 Contra Marshall, pro Knight. See Knight, The Pastoral Epistles, 320–321. Upholding Pauline authorship of the PE, Knight disagrees with Dibelius-Conzelmann’s terminologybased argument against Pauline authorship, arguing rather that Paul is not adopting or approving Greek piety or ethics, but using their terms to express Christian piety and ethics, as is the case in the NT letters. After all, Paul had resolved to be “all things to all people” (1 Cor 9:22), and his reader in Crete is Greek. 368 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 143, citing Quinn, Titus, 289. 362 Günther,

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While it is difficult to identify one of these arguments as weightier than others, one thing we could find relevant to our virtue-ethical argument is that at the time of writing the PE, εὐσέβεια in Greek philosophy had developed and consistently maintained a meaning that involved inner attitude that shows itself in outer attitude of respect and reverence.369 The fact that such nuances fit into the understanding of the inner and outer dimensions of the effect of the Christ-event could be the reason why the author of the PE finds it an appropriate term.370 Nevertheless, as we have argued above, in its usage in Titus, the author uses εὐσέβεια sparsely as a substitute for ἀρετή, and always grounds it on the Christ-event in order to explicate the Christian distinctives of it. Looking at the various contexts in which the word is used in the PE, it could be said that the concept of εὐσέβεια, even though loaded with various traditions, assumes a distinctively Christian posture. This is especially evident in Titus, considering how each of its occurrences is implicitly or explicitly grounded on the Christ-event and its moral transformative effect.371 Three virtue-ethical concepts emerge from the various history of traditions of εὐσέβεια. First, the fact that εὐσέβεια involves both inner and outer attitudes towards revered persons and objects makes it virtue-ethical. Second, the idea of εὐσέβεια combining various elements such as knowledge of God, fear of God, and corresponding conduct implies a totality of a person’s life. Third, the fact that the traditions see moral actions (e. g. almsgiving) as indicative of an inner presence of εὐσέβεια shows that the focus was more on the morality of persons than the morality of actions. 3.3.5 Range of Application of εὐσέβεια In Titus 1:1 and 2:12, the norm εὐσέβεια has universal applicability. The “elect,” who possess the “knowledge of the truth” does not refer to believers in the region of Crete alone. Believers in Christ are still regarded today as the elect, redeemed, and so on, therefore sharing in the applicability of this norm. The range of application of εὐσέβεια in Titus is virtue-ethical in two ways. First, its applicability exclusively to believers in Christ corresponds with particularism in virtue ethics. Second, the focus on the morality of the moral agents more than their actions, and its applicability in all aspects of life all correspond with virtue-ethical concerns.

369 See

Foerster, “εὐσεβής, εὐσέβεια, εὐσεβέω,” 176–177. Foerster, “εὐσεβής, εὐσέβεια, εὐσεβέω,” 176–177. 371 Marshall, The Pastoral Epistles, 144. 370 See

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3.3.6 Summary of the Key Virtue-Ethical Perspectives of the εὐσέβεια Cluster in Titus Our analyses above identify or explicate six virtue-ethical perspectives of εὐσέβεια in the letter to Titus. First, we have argued that the preposition κατά in Titus 1:1 not only plays a linguistic role, but a virtue-ethical one, indicating the moral telos of belief in Christ. It introduces the virtue-ethical agendum of the letter to Titus. Second, εὐσέβεια involves the entirety of a person’s life, thereby corresponding with the virtue-ethical perfectionist nature. Third, εὐσέβεια combines both inner and outer aspects of a person’s moral life, thereby correlating with the virtue-ethical focus on inner dispositions and character. Fourth, the use of εὐσέβεια within the purview of belief in Christ is in tandem with virtue-ethical particularism. Fifth, the fact that one has to be continuously trained to live a godly life corresponds with the virtue-ethical concept of moral development through training. Nevertheless, its grounding on the Christ-event features both divine and human agency in moral cooperation. Sixth, both the deontological and teleological argumentations for εὐσέβεια are virtue-ethical, finding their essence in the “being” and the sense of telos of the moral agent, and not external principles or a sense of moral obligation. Nonetheless, even though we have analyzed an implicit allusion to moral exemplar in the use of εὐσέβεια in Titus 1:1,372 the virtue-ethical concept of moral exemplar is not prominent in relation to εὐσέβεια. In conclusion, the concept of εὐσέβεια in Titus describes a life that is generally virtuous in relation to inner character and outer conduct, based on the understanding of the Christ-event and its continuous transformative effect. The virtue εὐσέβεια is lived in conformity to the faith community’s perception of virtue, reverence, and respectability. The function of the norm εὐσέβεια (re)presents most of the key virtue-ethical concepts such as a sense of a moral telos, perfectionism, particularism, inner dispositions and character, and moral development. To the extent that all the elements and features of virtue ethics are grounded in the early Christian understanding of the moral transformative effect of the Christ-event which was not obtainable in Greek-philosophical ethics, εὐ372 See Donelson, Pseudepigraphy, 61–62, where he notes that Timothy and Titus were not merely to convey authority to deal with specific situations, but they functioned also as paradigmatic models. He sees all the biographical remarks of the author, ascribed to Paul, as not merely providing verisimilitude, but as “portraits of heroes to be imitated.” Donelson even goes further to see imitative pedagogical motif in all the characters mentioned in the PE, noting that this was common in the pseudepigraphy culture of the time. On the other hand, Luke Timothy Johnson thinks Paul does not appear as a model in Titus, unlike 1 Timothy. However, I think Luke Timothy Johnson has not paid attention to the implicit aspects of the author’s function as a moral exemplar. See Luke Timothy Johnson, “II Timothy and the Polemic against False Teachers: A Reexamination,” in Contested Issues in Christian Origins and the New Testament: Collected Essays (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013), 360–361.

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σέβεια is truly “God-ly.” It corresponds with the contemporary Christian account of virtue ethics.373

3.4 A Virtue-Ethical Reading of the καλὰ ἔργα Cluster in Titus On the surface, the phrase “good works,” as the name implies, appears to be an ethical norm more concerned with the morality of works than the morality of persons. It would seem, therefore, a contradiction to say good works is a virtue-ethical norm. How could an ethical norm whose name orients towards the morality of actions or “doing” (works) qualify as a virtue-ethical norm, being an agent-based ethical theory, which focuses on the morality of persons or “being” more than “doing”? This study, however, argues that the phrase “good works,” as used in the letter to Titus, corresponds to the virtue-ethical approach to ethics.374 The linguistic elements, theological notions, and ethical properties related to the norm good works bear significant resemblance to virtue-ethical concerns, implicitly or explicitly. Our virtue-ethical analysis will demonstrate this claim by highlighting the virtue-ethical characteristics of good works as it relates to its linguistic forms, moral agents, history of traditions, ethical argumentation, and range of application. Under these five methodological grids, careful attention will be given to linguistic elements, theological motifs, and ethical norms that correlate with the concepts and characteristics of virtue ethics. The task here is a descriptive analysis of the correlation between the ethical structure of καλὰ ἔργα in Titus, as understood, and the virtue approach to ethics, as construed in contemporary neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics. Nuances of καλὰ ἔργα that do not correspond with virtue ethics will also be noted.

373 Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 143–147, argues extensively, both from biblical and theological aspects, for a Christian virtue ethics, and he recommends some necessary adaptations, especially in regard to “self” as a moral agent. He recommends an integration of the biblical and theological concept of “grace” as it relates to moral agency in the Christian account of virtue ethics. 374 See Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 103, for a similar discussion on the correlations between virtue ethics and Matthean and Pauline ethics, without claiming that they develop a virtue ethic or intentionally work from a virtue framework. Kotva even argues that there is no systematic account of ethics or a developed ethical theory in the NT. Hence, to insist that the author of Titus intentionally develops and constructs a virtue ethic would be to “infuse” an opinion into the text. Nevertheless, suffice it to say that the ethical concerns expressed in the letter to Titus have significant points of contact and correspondence with virtueethical concerns.

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3.4.1 Linguistic Form of the καλὰ ἔργα Cluster The phrase “good works” or “works” appears in the letter to Titus frequently and in various linguistic constructs, such as ἔργον ἀγαθόν (Titus 1:16), καλῶν ἔργων (Titus 2:7), καλῶν ἔργων (Titus 2:14), ἔργον ἀγαθόν (Titus 3:1), καλῶν ἔργων (3:8), and καλῶν ἔργων (Titus 3:14). We will analyze the linguistic form at three levels, namely, intra-textual level, inter-textual level, and extra-textual level. a) Intra-Textual Level i) ἔργον ἀγαθὸν “good work” (Titus 1:16) Ἔργον occurs as an accusative singular neuter noun, meaning “work” while ἀγαθόν375 occurs as singular neuter accusative adjective, qualifying the noun ἔργον. The norm ἔργον ἀγαθόν in this verse does not have an imperative verb related to it. Instead, it has a present active nominative masculine participle verb ὄντες “to be/being.” As noted above, we could argue that the author’s frequent use of the form of verb “to be/being” serves virtue-ethical purposes that go beyond their linguistic function. In this verse, he uses the verb ὄντες “to be/being” to describe the opponents in character terms as those who are defiled, are detestable, and do not stand the test of any good work. By combining the linguistic element ὄντες “to be” and tracing the ethical notion καὶ πρὸς πᾶν ἔργον ἀγαθὸν ἀδόκιμοι “not fit for any good works” to the theological notion βδελυκτοί “being defiled”376 in reference to moral defilement of those who have not been transformed by the Christ-event (cf. Titus 3:3–7), the author dynamically integrates linguistic, theological, and ethical notions to construct a virtue-ethical description of the opponents. These three elements combine to suggest that just like virtue and virtuous acts are traceable to the character of a person, so also vices are traceable to the character of a non-virtuous person. This throws light on the author’s perception of morality as a matter of character, inner disposition, and moral state more than actions. Moreover, seeing that the author does not assess the morality of the works of the opponents, rather, he assesses their character, it suggests a virtue approach to ethics. It is they themselves (the defiled persons) who do not stand the test of any good works. Köstenberger rightly asserts that this does not mean that an unsaved person can’t do any good thing, but that “any good work starts properly with salvation in Christ, followed by good works,” as seen in Eph 2:8–10 and in 375 Ἀγαθόν as singular would have raised questions as to what it means in comparison with other occurrences which are mostly in the plural form, but the indefinite adjective πᾶν shows why it is singular. 376 If we compare the statement “they confess knowing God but deny him by their works” with the author’s “ethical agendum” in Titus 1:1: “knowledge of the truth that leads to godliness,” we will see that the idea of virtue-oriented ethics and close connection between belief and behavior flow through the text.

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Paul’s teaching in 2 Cor 13:5–7, where being “disqualified” (ἀδοκίμοι) amounts to being “outside of Christ.”377 Furthermore, it is worth pointing out the antithetical structure of this verse, which is most evident in the use of ἔργοι “works” (bad works implied here) and ἔργον ἀγαθόν “good works.” While the false teachers confess knowing God (in the same way that Titus and others do), it is by their bad works as opposed to good works that they deny God. Therefore, “bad works” in contrast to “good works” is what makes or explicates the difference. ii) καλὰ ἔργα “good works” (Titus 2:7–8) Three terms in the statement περὶ πάντα, σεαυτὸν παρεχόμενος τύπον καλῶν ἔργων “offering378 yourself as a pattern of ‘good works’” convey virtue-ethical nuances: σεαυτὸν, τύπον, and περὶ πάντα. Σεαυτόν “yourself”379 explicitly shows that the focus is on Titus as a moral person who is to offer himself as a pattern of good works, rather than some list of good works that he should demonstrate for others to imitate. Moreover, σεαυτὸν is in consonance with virtueethical focus on the wholeness of a person’s life as morally relevant. Titus is to offer “himself,” not his “works” (though included) as a pattern of good works. Similarly, τύπον “pattern, model, example” conveys the virtue-ethical concept of moral exemplar, where moral persons are first the example, not just their actions.380 While teleological and deontological ethical theories view a good person as someone who achieves the goals (telos) or who performs the duties and obeys the rules that reason has identified as right actions, in virtue-ethical approach, “it is the good person who provides direction in selecting the right actions.”381 This underscores the importance of the concept of moral exemplar in 377 Köstenberger,

1–2 Timothy and Titus, 326, emphasis original. Pastoral Epistles, 413, has “showing.” He notes that the participle παρεχόμενος has the force of an imperative here. And the reflexive pronoun σεαυτὸν emphasizes the force of the middle voice παρεχόμενος. 379 Martin Luther on Titus 2:5 says “because the heathen cannot see our faith, they ought to see our works, then hear our doctrine, and then be converted.” See Luther’s Works, ed. J. Pelikan (St. Louis: Concordia, 1966), 29:57, cited by Quinn, Titus, 142, cited in Mounce, Pastoral Epistles, 413. Generally, Luther says this about the letter to Titus: “This is a short epistle, but a model of Christian doctrine, in which is comprehended in a masterful way all that is necessary for a Christian to know and to live.” See Martin Luther, “Preface to the Epistle of St. Paul to Titus,” in Luther’s Works, ed. E. Theodore Bachmann, Word and Sacrament I (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1960), 35:389. 380 Marshall, Pastoral Epistles, 254, states that τύπος here means “archetype, pattern, model, hence, moral example, pattern of a determinative nature.” He cites Walter’s stress that Titus is not to be an example to the congregation only, but to be an example of an ideal believer, just like Timothy in 1 Tim 4:12. Donelson, Pseudepigraphy, 93, notes that the Pastorals were written in a time in which the use of moral exemplars or “paradigms” to give an ethical content and shape was prevalent in Greco-Roman ethics. 381 Lovin, An Introduction to Christian Ethics, 187. 378 Mounce,

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the virtue approach to ethics. Titus 2:7, therefore, has an explicit moral exemplar, where Titus is the good person who provides direction in selecting right actions. The author uses περὶ πάντα “in all things” as a broadly applicable substitute to the concrete content of “good works.”382 Instead of naming inexhaustible concrete norms383 that could put a limit to the good works Titus is to exemplify, the author shows that his being a moral exemplar is open-endedly περὶ πάντα “in all aspects, in all things”384 (cf. “in everything” NIV; “in all respects” NRSV). Moreover, good works is to be understood as an overarching ethical norm in Titus 2:7–8. Yarbrough rightly notes that the author does not enumerate or codify the “works” he has in mind. Hence, the works could be understood as “whatever is right in God’s sight, given the whole scope and wealth of biblical ethical teaching, especially that of Jesus and the apostles but also the Old Testament as Jesus and the apostles appropriated it and taught their followers.”385 Nevertheless, a few concrete norms that belong to good works are mentioned here, such as ἀφθορία “integrity” and σεμνότης “dignity” (in διδασκαλία “teaching”) on the one hand, and λόγον ὑγιῆ “sound or healthy speech” on the other. This shows that the semantic range of good works goes beyond the qualities of concrete moral actions such as hospitality, sexual chastity, justice, and so on, but also includes the quality or incorrupt nature of the doctrine one holds and teaches. Σεμνότης “dignity, reverence, seriousness, probity” appears only in the PE (Titus 2:7; 1 Tim 2:2; 3:4). Like integrity, dignity in teaching as an example of good works also shows that “good works” include the quality and seriousness with which one undertakes his responsibilities. A cognate386 of σεμνότης “dignity,” namely, σεμνός “dignity, worthy of respect” also appears in the instruction to elders in Titus 2:2 as one of the marks of character of the elders, and means “that which is sublime, majestic, holy, 382 Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that some scholars (e. g. Quinn, Titus, 176.) have interpreted the succeeding statements “in teaching, show yourself as a standard of integrity and dignity, with healthy speech beyond reproach” (Titus 2:7–8) as the concrete examples of the content of good works the author has in mind. However, the text does not warrant such a conclusion. The author, in this verse, asks Titus to show himself an example “in all things” particularly to the young men. Since the young men are not asked to be teachers in the whole text, it is not accountable to ask Titus to be an example to them in “teaching.” Being an example in teaching, integrity, etc. as contents of the good works referred to in Titus 2:7 would be acceptable only to the extent that they are only a few examples of the “good works,” otherwise there will be no need for the author to start with asking Titus to show himself an example “in all things.” 383 For example, helping the poor, sexual purity, hospitality, and the like. 384 Bassler, 1 Timothy, 2 Timothy and Titus, 197, notes that the instruction to be self-controlled or sensible “in all aspects” in Titus 2:7 may reinforce the instruction for young men in verse 6 instead of the instructions to Titus in verse 7. The density of the Greek here makes it difficult to determine. 385 Yarbrough, Letters, 521. 386 Yarbrough, Letters, 509, 521, does not mention whether σεμνότης and σεμνός are cognates. But Köstenberger, 1 –2 Timothy and Titus, 335, treats them as cognates.

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evoking reverence.”387 Barclay notes that the word describes behavior which is serious in the correct way. “It does not describe the demeanour of a person who is a gloomy killjoy, but the conduct of the man who knows that he lives in the light of eternity.”388 Apart from its use in Titus 2:2, it appears in three other places in the NT: once in Phil 4:8 and twice in 1 Tim 3:8 and 11. Lea and Griffin rightly note that λόγον ὑγιῆ should not be understood or translated as “sound doctrine” in the context of a body of instructions that faithfully represent the apostolic message, but as a “healthy, persuasive, well-thoughtout, and attractively delivered presentation of the Christian gospel,” which is the kind of speech that the opponents cannot condemn.389 However, regarding “sound speech” as an aspect of good works and in the light of the instruction to Titus to be a moral exemplar “in all things,” it seems to have a wider semantic range beyond the context of structured or formal teaching, but normal speech in everyday life. Hendriksen expresses the point more succinctly by noting that: not only must his (Titus) more formal teaching be characterized by purity of contents and gravity of method, but his entire speech (his word wherever and whenever it is spoken), whether it is uttered in the form of a sermon, a lesson, a message of consolation, or even an ordinary daily conversation, must be sound and incensurable, that is, not open to just rebuke.390

In other words, “soundness or healthiness of speech” as used in Titus 2:8 is allencompassing, urging a healthy speech that often builds up others and serves as an example to other believers on how to speak healthy words that build up other people. It expresses a similar idea as the statement “let your conversation be always full of grace, seasoned with salt” (Col 4:6). While we have described integrity and dignity in teaching and healthiness of speech as concrete norms of the overarching good works in Titus 2:7–8, it is noteworthy that their concreteness is not deontological in form of concrete ethos for specific moral action like “you shall not steal.” Instead, they are still virtueethical to the extent that they are open and agent-based, without specific moral actions that would constitute a teaching that is with(out) integrity and dignity or a speech that is (un)healthy. Thus, the ethical norms “teaching with integrity and dignity” and “healthy speech” exemplify or concretize aspects of “good works,” being the all-encompassing ethical norm of Titus 2:7–8, and yet remain open and agent-based, which gives them a virtue-ethical shape. In summary, the reference to Titus as a moral exemplar “in all aspects” and the use of “good works” as an umbrella term for unlimited morally good acts shift the focus away from the concrete moral actions Titus is to exemplify to 387 Yarbrough,

Letters, 509, citing NIDNT 2:92. Letters, 247. 389 Lea and Griffin, 1, 2 Timothy, Titus, 304, see also n. 22. 390 William Hendriksen, 1 and 2 Timothy and Titus, New Testament Commentary (London: The Banner of Truth Trust, 1957, 1960, 1972), 367. 388 Barclay,

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his whole life as a moral exemplar. This corresponds with two virtue-ethical features, namely, moral exemplar and perfectionism. iii) ζηλωτὴν καλῶν ἔργων “a zealot/zealous for good works” (Titus 2:14) There is no imperative verb, and no other form of verb at all, directly related to “good works” in this verse. Rather, the verbs directly relate to the people who are to be “zealous for good works.” The verbs λυτρώσηται “he might redeem” and καθαρίσῃ “he might purify” for himself a people, zealous for good works, both relate to the morality of persons more than morality of actions. By using these verbs, the author intentionally applies the verbs to the persons who would be zealous for good works because they are redeemed and purified, instead of applying the verb to the good works themselves. Moreover, the fact that the good works are on the basis that the believers have been redeemed and purified (as against those who are defiled, their minds and consciences defiled, cf. Titus 1:16) suggests that the author focuses on their character as the source of their zeal for good works and the source of the good works themselves. Barclay’s description of Titus 2:11–14 (which is the basis of the good works) as the “moral power of the incarnation” is apt. He asserts that only a few NT passages “so vividly set out the moral power of the Incarnation as this does. Its whole stress is the miracle of moral change which Jesus Christ can work.”391 It is in the context of such a moral transformative miracle that believers become zealous for good works. Furthermore, in the phrase ζηλωτὴν καλῶν ἔργων “zealous for good works” in this verse, the author has a possibility of using a verb which connotes “doing,” which would shift the focus away from the persons to the works, such as the case of ἀγαθοεργεῖν “to do good” in 1 Tim 6:18 (cf. καλοποιεῖν in 2 Thess 3:13; ποιεῖν τὸ καλόν in Rom 7:21; τὸ καλὸν ποιῆτε in 2 Cor 13:7; καλὸν ποιοῦντες in Gal 6:9).392 However, he chooses to use the genitive case stating, “for good works” instead of “to do good works.” In this way, the use of the genitive case shifts the focus away from the good works to the persons who would do the good works, which keeps the focus on the character of persons. This suggests that the author might be deliberately avoiding a morality of “doing” in favor of a morality of “being.” Whether one translates ζηλωτὴν καλῶν ἔργων as “a zealot for good works” or “zealous for good works,” the emphasis remains on the moral persons more than the good works they are zealous for. 391 Barclay,

Letters, 256. Pastoral Epistles, 22. Lock finds no essential difference between Paul and the writer of the PE in their use of “good works” to describe the Christian life (ibid., 22). He thinks that the slight difference in the phrases suggests two different writers. But both Paul and whoever wrote the PE tried to show that the Christians’ lives and visible good works were “chief means of winning the heathen to Christ.” 392 Lock,

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Additionally, like the antithesis between “bad works” and “good works” in Titus 1:16 discussed above, we find here also an antithesis393 between ἀνομία and καλὰ ἔργα, namely, Jesus gave himself with the purpose of redeeming the believers (“us”) from all iniquities, on the one hand, and with the purpose of purifying them so they could become zealous for good works, on the other. This antithesis does not, however, show explicitly that being purified through the Christ-event automatically or immediately makes one zealous for good works. Nevertheless, it shows, at the least, that being zealous for good works is one of the purposes or expectations of the believers as a result of their purification.394 The several instructions to Titus to teach sound doctrine and be a moral exemplar of good works (Titus 2:7–8), and all other means of moral development might have been intended to contribute to making the believers “zealous for good works.” Benjamin Lappenga undertakes a study on the term ζηλωτής in Titus 2:14, and concludes that it is used primarily to emphasize the polemic against the opponents already stated in Titus 1:10–16 and 3:3, 9–11, serving as a “kind of title or symbol for distinguishing the identity of Pauline Christ-followers from the rivals.”395 Moreover, he finds that the polemical function of ζηλωτής combines both the Greek notion of “emulation” and the Jewish notion of “zeal.”396 While Lappenga’s polemical construal of ζηλωτής in Titus is not a virtue-ethical discussion of the term, his description of its function in constructing the identity of the believers contributes to the general argument of this study that the ethics of Titus, though generating from Jewish and Greek traditions, is significantly grounded on the Christ-event and its moral transformative effect on the believers. iv) πρὸς πᾶν ἔργον ἀγαθὸν ἑτοίμους εἶναι “to be prepared towards/for every good work” (Titus 3:1) Similar to Titus 1:16 above, ἔργον ἀγαθόν occurs here in connection with εἶναι, a verb “to be.” This further serves a virtue-ethical purpose in the sense that the choice of the linguistic form εἶναι with ἑτοίμους “to be ready/prepared” suggests a deliberate choice of a verb that focuses on moral persons more than moral 393 Yarbrough, Letters, 531, describes this antithesis as “dual purpose” of Christ’s selfless giving. See pages 531–532, for more discussion on the expression “zealous for good works” and other terminologies used in this verse. 394 See Yarbrough, Letters, 532, who notes that “the notion of a salvation through faith that generates zeal for good works is ubiquitous in Scripture and left its mark on the apostolic fathers.” By this, however, Yarbrough does not indicate the immediacy or the process that produces or generates the zeal for good works after purification. Does the zeal come automatically, or does it depend on the “sound teaching” and all other processes of moral development? 395 Benjamin J. Lappenga, “‘Zealots for Good Works’: The Polemical Repercussions of the Word ζηλωτής in Titus 2:14,” CBQ 75 (2013): 717–718. 396 Ibid.

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actions. Being a present active verb, it expresses the idea of the moral person’s continuous readiness for good works. Beyond linguistic function, the use of εἶναι as a verb “to be” here again plays a virtue-ethical role. Moreover, like Titus 2:14397 above, the author has the option of using ἀγαθοεργεῖν (cf. 1 Tim 6:18) or other similar verbs which connote “doing” more than “being,” but he chooses a different construct. By using the preposition πρός “for or towards,” he employs a construct denoting “being,” expressing “be prepared for or towards good works.” In a virtue-ethical context, the difference (even though slight) between “to be prepared to do good works” and “to be prepared for good works” is significant. The latter conveys the virtue-ethical nuance of moral “being” slightly more than the former. Again, this is another case where the author avoids using a concrete verb that connotes “doing” and uses a preposition that connotes moral “being” in order to keep the focus on the moral character of persons. Furthermore, the use of the preposition πᾶν (“every”) indicates how the focus in this text is not on any concrete good works but on every aspect of the life of the moral persons. v) καλῶν ἔργων … προΐστασθαι (3:8), μανθανέτωσαν … καλῶν ἔργων προΐστασθαι (3:14) The two most important verbs, as far as the norm good works in Titus is concerned, are μανθανέτωσαν (“let them learn”) and προΐστασθαι (“to bring out/ devote themselves to”). Προΐστασθαι, from προΐστημι has, among others, the semantic domain “to project” (German vorstehen),398 “to come forward or be brought forward, to manage, to lead, to guide,”399 to lead out, put or bring out, to devote oneself to (responsibly).400 From the context of the letter to Titus, which presupposes the inner qualities and character of moral agents, it seems that the semantic domain “to project” or “to lead out” (visibly) is in view. The appearances of προΐστασθαι twice in the same chapter and only in reference to the ethical norm καλὰ ἔργα raises interest on its intended ethical effect. It occurs both in present middle infinitive form, but in connection with the imperative μανθανέτωσαν in Titus 3:14.

397 Saarinen, Pastoral Epistles, 190, notes that good works in Titus 2:14 and 3:1 refer generally to “external manifestation of the virtues of moderation.” 398 Walter Bauer, Griechisch-Deutsches Wörterbuch zu den Schriften des Neuen Testaments und der übrigen urchristlichen Literatur (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1971), 1402. 399 Frederick W. Danker, rev. ed., A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and other Early Christian Literature, 3rd edition (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 2000), 870. Based on Walter Bauer’s Griechisch-Deutsches Wörterbuch zu den Schriften des Neuen Testaments und der übrigen urchristlichen Literatur (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1971). 400 See also Gingrich and Danker, Greek New Testament Lexicon.

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Titus is asked to speak the faithful message confidently so that those who have believed in God may learn προΐστασθαι “to lead out/bring out/forth”401 good works. From the context of the entire letter to Titus, translating προΐστασθαι as “to lead out/bring out or forth” captures the intended semantic domain and ethical nuance of the verb more than other possible translations like “to devote to.” Three points could be identified in Titus, which show that the author sees the moral capacity of believers as an inner disposition that needs to be “brought or led out”: first, the general focus on the moral character of persons and its development more than the morality of actions; second, the grounding of all the ethical instructions on the Christ-event, which accomplishes both internal and external transformation of the believers; third, the description of the opponents and the moral decadence of the Cretans in character terms. Based on this understanding, προΐστασθαι, therefore, plays explicit linguistic and virtueethical functions, on the one hand, and an implicit theological function, on the other hand. Προΐστημι provides a theological balance to the frequent use of good works in Titus. It gives a balance between the personal and missional aspects of the Christian life. The inner possession of character through the Christ-event relates to the personal aspect, while the process of bringing it out in the form of good works relates to the missional aspect. Moreover, the use of προΐστημι in the present infinitive and middle voice (προΐστασθαι) in Titus 3:8 and 3:14 shows that the believers, as moral agents, are to continuously bring out good works. The middle voice implies the human cooperation with the divine agency in bringing out good works, as is the case with the cardinal virtues in Titus 2:12. Similarly, the occurrence of προΐστασθαι with the imperative μανθανέτωσαν shows the prominence and intended theological and ethical nuances of the verb. Μανθανέτωσαν is the main verb in Titus 3:14 and the only imperative verb in Titus that directly relates to “good works.” Being a 3rd person plural active imperative verb, it translates as “let them learn.” Learning in the wider context of character development is a key feature of virtue ethics, as discussed above, being a significant process of acquiring the required virtues and forfeiting vices. The use of the imperative μανθανέτωσαν here does not command the people “to do” good works, but along with the verb προΐστασθαι, “to learn to bring out good works.” Understanding the use of προΐστασθαι and μανθανέτωσαν in the overall context of frequent exhortations to teach sound doctrine highlights the strong em401 Alternative translation is “learn to devote themselves to,” but I think, unlike many translations, the semantic sense of “lead or bring out” is more appropriate, more so that it is more virtue-oriented than “devote oneself to.” When we look at the preposition and the verb that combine to form this word separately, πρό (before) and ἵστημι (to put, place, set, put forward), hence, to “put forward, lead out, or bring forth,” its virtue-ethical sense is clearer.

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phasis on character development through παιδεία. For example, Titus is instructed to teach sound doctrine; the bishop and elders to be able to teach sound doctrine; and older women to teach younger women. All these instructions to teach are so that the believers will “learn to bring out good works.” Moreover, the use of προΐστασθαι and μανθανέτωσαν in the context of the Christ-event and the frequent instructions to teach throws more light on the author’s purpose of leaving Titus in Crete,402 namely, “to set right the things left behind” (Titus 1:5). It shows that “the things left behind” are primarily character development through rigorous teaching and being a moral exemplar. This indicates that even though the effect of the Christ-event changes the inner character of the believer, the new character does not automatically develop or “come out.” Its development and visible display in good works require continuous learning and practice on the part of the believer, in collaboration with the divine agency. In other words, while the author presupposes the presence of a new and transformed character of the believers, he shows that the development of this new character and its transmission from an inner reality to outer visible works involves continuous human and divine cooperation in learning and teaching respectively. Thomas Aquinas, who can rightly be described as a virtue ethicist by virtue of his appropriating and expanding Aristotle’s ethics in his Summa Theologica, also comments that the instruction to Titus to “set in order the things that are wanting” (Titus 1:5) is related to sins of omission rather than transgression.403 Even though by this, Aquinas does not directly say this is virtue-ethical, he implies it by describing what is to be set right as “sins of omission,” which setting right would require a process of acquiring or developing the virtues that are missing among the believers, not necessarily sins that they were committing. vi) A Virtue-Ethical Function of the “Fruit” Metaphor The “fruit” metaphor in Titus 3:14 also supports the argument that the author presupposes an “inner deposit” of a new and transformed character of the believers. Fruits are visible realities of an invisible root, stem, branches, and all the factors that make the tree fruitful. In the same way, the good works of the believer are only but visible realities of the invisible effect of the Christ-event 402 Johnson, Letters, 221, notes that apelipon “I left” is to be understood in an appointive rather than geographical sense. Yarbrough, Letters, 477–478, notes that the other task of Titus in Crete, to “put in order what was left unfinished,” as a different task from the appointment of elders, is a “blanket directive,” while appointing qualified elders is a primary means of achieving it. Whatever that unclear task is, Yarbrough argues, it is “perhaps best thought of as involving the range of topics that Paul touches on elsewhere in the letter as it unfolds, like dealing with opponents, instructing the faithful, encouraging household and relational godliness, instilling eschatological hope, and more.” 403 Aquinas, Timothy, Titus, Philemon, 159.

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and all other factors that make that reality visible, such as teaching sound doctrine and learning from moral exemplars. We shall discuss more on the “fruit” metaphor as it relates to the ethical argumentation for good works below. b) Inter-Textual Level 1 Timothy 2:10 has ἔργων ἀγαθῶν, relating to women’s dressing, with “good deeds.” As noted earlier, Titus only uses the adjective ἀγαθόν in singular form and uses καλῶν in plural. However, 1 Tim 2:10 has a plural form ἀγαθῶν in relation to women. There is no explicit imperative here for the women to do “good works,” but that their piety is to be seen through “good works.” The focus here is on the morality of persons more than the morality of actions, which correlates with a virtue-ethical emphasis on moral agency than on moral actions. 1 Timothy 5:10 has ἔργοις καλοῖς (dative neuter plural noun and adjective respectively) and ἔργῳ ἀγαθῷ (dative neuter singular noun and adjective respectively). These two occurrences do not have imperative verbs related to “good works.” The verb for ἔργοις καλοῖς is μαρτυρουμένη “being testified of good works,” in relation to widows. Similar to the predominant nuance of good works in Titus, this occurrence also puts the focus on the moral person more than the moral action described as “good works.” It is the widow who is being testified of good works, not the works that are being testified of. The verb for ἔργον ἀγαθόν is ἐπηκολούθησεν, an indicative aorist active, 3rd person singular verb meaning “dedicated to good works.” This also describes a woman who qualifies as a widow. Similar to Titus, this usage also puts the emphasis on the moral person more than the moral action. It is the widow as a moral person who is dedicated to good works. 1 Timothy 5:25 has τὰ ἔργα τὰ καλά “the good works” (neuter plural nominative noun and neuter plural nominative adjective respectively).404 There is no imperative verb related to τὰ ἔργα τὰ καλά. The verb here is εἰσιν (“are”) from 1 Tim 5:24. The good works “are” evident. Unlike the occurrences in 1 Tim 5:10 and in Titus discussed above, the verb here focuses on the good works as moral actions more than the moral persons who perform them. This suggests a nonvirtue-ethical usage of good works. In 1 Tim 6:18, we find ἀγαθοεργεῖν “to do good,” with a semantic sense of “doing” or performing. It also has πλουτεῖν ἐν ἔργοις καλοῖς “to be rich in good deeds.” Both occurrences here lay emphasis on the acts of good works more than the moral agent who does the good works. Timothy is to charge the rich people “to do” good and “to be rich in” good deeds, just as they are rich in material things. 404 Even though it may not suggest any special nuance, it is noteworthy how definite articles are used here while in all the different forms in Titus, definite articles are not used for “good works.”

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The analysis above shows that there are similarities and differences between 1 Timothy and Titus regarding their use of the ethical norm “good works.” In regard to similarity, they both rarely use an explicit imperative for the norm “good works.” While 1 Timothy does not use an imperative at all, Titus has only one imperative μανθανέτωσαν “let them learn” (Titus 3:14). In regard to their differences, 1 Timothy (except in 2:10) lays more emphasis on the moral actions described as good works while Titus lays more emphasis on the moral persons who are to “bring out good works.” Another identifiable difference between the use of good works in Titus and 1 Timothy is that while Titus hardly states the practical content of “good works,”405 Timothy states the content of good works in practical and specific actions. Such practical contents of good works in 1 Timothy include raising children, showing hospitality, washing the feet of the saints, helping the afflicted, and the rich being generous in giving (cf. 1 Tim 5:10–11; 3:1). Being an agentbased moral theory, virtue-ethics is less committed to listing concrete moral acts. Instead, it is concerned with the virtuous person’s discernment and creative appropriation of the broadly stated virtues. This, therefore, indicates that Titus’s concept of good works is more virtue-ethical than that of 1 Timothy. 2 Timothy 2:21 has εἰς πᾶν ἔργον ἀγαθὸν ἡτοιμασμένον “having been ready/ prepared for every good work.” The neuter singular perfect passive nominative participle verb ἡτοιμασμένον “having been prepared” for every good work is similar to the virtue-ethical concept of character development prevalent in Titus. The connection between the Christ-event and being prepared for good works here is similar to the description of the Christ-event as purifying believers and making them “zealous for good works” (Titus 2:14).406 The notion of “equipping” also correlates with the concept of παιδεία as a civilizing or virtue-acquiring process in Titus 2:11–12. In a similar statement with “having been ready/prepared for every good work” (2 Tim 2:21), believers are asked to be “ready for every good work” in Titus 3:1. 2 Timothy 3:17 also has πρὸς πᾶν ἔργον ἀγαθὸν ἐξηρτισμένος “equipped for/ towards every good work.”407 The verb ἐξηρτισμένος (a masculine nominative perfect passive particle verb) translates as “having been prepared/equipped” for every good work. No explicit imperative verb occurs here. However, the notion 405 See

the exception in Titus 2:7–8 discussed above. Titus 3:5–8, also 2 Tim 1:9; cf. Titus 3:5. In the context of these verses, the “equipping” and “purifying” seem to correlate with the systematic theological notion of sanctification. Stock argues, however, against this possibility, noting that in Titus 3:7, “justify” does not mean “make righteous” but “declare righteous.” See Eugene Stock, Plain Talks on the Pastoral Epistles (London: Robert Scott and Paternoster, 1914), 138–139, 265. For a thorough discussion on the Christian concept of sanctification and character development, see Stanley Hauerwas, Character and the Christian Life: A Study in Theological Ethics (San Antonio: Trinity University Press, 1975), 179–227. 407 KJV: “thoroughly furnished unto every good work.” 406 Cf.

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of equipping persons for good works is similar to Titus’ frequent exhortations to teach sound doctrine as a way of training people to live virtuous lives (cf. Titus 2:12; 3:8, 14). In summary, the inter-textual comparison of the norm good works above shows that Titus and 2 Timothy convey similar and virtue-related nuances more than 1 Timothy. While Titus and 2 Timothy lay more emphasis on moral persons and their character development for “good works,” 1 Timothy lays more emphasis on the moral actions described as “good works.” Nevertheless, Titus conveys stronger and more explicit virtue-ethical nuances than 2 Timothy because it is only in Titus that we find the explicit virtue-related imperative “let them learn to bring out good works” (Titus 3:14). c) Extra-Textual Level This research identifies four illocutionary effects and some indirect (nonlinguistically determined) ethical “oughts” from the use of good works in Titus. First, “good works” in its different forms is a frequent concept in Titus with 8 occurrences.408 The fact that all the occurrences relate more to the morality or character of persons in the context of the moral effect of the Christ-event than the morality of actions suggests that, overall, the ethical structure of good works in Titus is virtue-ethical. An example of an assertive illocutionary effect (where the author commits himself to the truth of the proposition he declares)409 is seen in the statement “who gave himself for us, in order to redeem us from every iniquity” (Titus 2:14). Even though not an imperative, the truth of this proposition constitutes part of the “ought” for the believers to be “zealous for good works.” Second, the use of προΐστασθαι “to lead or bring out” good works in relation to “the faithful saying” (πιστὸς ὁ λόγος), a statement of solemnity that both commits the speaker and invites the addressees to its truth, relates with assertive illocutionary speech act,410 because it indicates the prominence of the “oughtness” of good works.411 Third, the fact that the most important and the only explicit command related to good works in Titus is μανθανέτωσαν “let our412 people (all believers) learn,” fits into the directive illocutionary speech act.413 Moreover, it shows the centrality 408 Comprising ἔργοις (Titus 1:16 bad works implied); ἔργον ἀγαθόν (Titus 1:16), καλῶν ἔργων (Titus 2:7), καλῶν ἔργων (Titus 2:14), ἔργον ἀγαθόν (Titus 3:1), οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων τῶν ἐν δικαιοσύνη (Titus 3:5: theological/ethical), καλῶν ἔργων (Titus 3:8), καλῶν ἔργων (Titus 3:14). 409 See Zimmermann, Logic of Love, 38. 410 See Zimmermann, Logic of Love, 38. 411 The effect of the “faithful sayings” in Titus could be compared to Jesus’ use of “verily verily I say unto you,” e. g. in John 14:12–14. 412 “Our” suggests all believers, but this will be discussed more under “Range of Application.” 413 See Zimmermann, Logic of Love, 38.

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and prominence of the virtue-ethical concept of character development through teaching and learning. This is more evident in the way the verb is used along with προΐστασθαι “bring out/forth.” Furthermore, by applying this command to all believers in Crete, unlike other instructions directed to individual groups, it shows that this is the most important instruction the author intends to give regarding “good works.” Leaving this instruction towards the concluding part of the letter, just before the final greetings, could suggest that the author rhetorically reserves the most important information regarding good works towards the end. Fourth, scholars have often treated the Pastoral Letters simply as a corpus, therefore assuming that they have the same or similar ethical approaches. However, the inter-textual linguistic analysis above shows a possibility of a significant difference between the ethical approaches in Titus and 1 Timothy. Titus presents a more virtue-oriented ethics than 1 Timothy. In regard to their ethical approaches, we have observed that Titus and 2 Timothy are similar to each other and more virtue-ethical than 1 Timothy. 3.4.2 Moral Agents of the καλὰ ἔργα Cluster Each occurrence of an ethical norm is addressed to a certain individual or group of individuals. In this section, we seek to identify the intended moral agents of each occurrence of good works in Titus and analyze how their moral agency relates to virtue ethics. a) The Opponents (Titus 1:16) The opponents are described as detestable, disobedient, etc., and are those who deny God by their “works,” implying “bad works.” Their moral agency is virtueethical because it describes them in character terms. It is they themselves, that is their character, that is unfit for any good works. b) Mimetic Moral Agency (Titus 2:7) We find in this verse mimetic moral agency, as discussed in the linguistic analysis of this verse above. Titus is to offer himself as a moral exemplar of good works, while the Cretan believers are implicit moral agents who learn good works from Titus. As noted above, Titus’s moral agency is virtue-ethical because it focuses on his entire life as morally relevant for others to emulate. c) “We, a people” (Titus 2:14) All believers are moral agents of good works here (“a zealot/zealous for good works”).414 The use of “us, a people” here in direct relation to the Christ-event 414 Mounce

rightly says that “the believer’s zeal comes not from an intellectual acceptance of

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indicates moral agency of believers universally. Similarly, in Titus 3:8, all believers “those who believe in God” are moral agents of “good works.” Towner notes rightly that the designation “those who believe in God” points to an intrinsic relation between good works and the Christ-event.415 d) “Them” (Titus 3:1), “ours, those who belong to us” (Titus 3:14) The pronouns “them” (Titus 3:1) and “ours, those who belong to us” (Titus 3:14) refer particularly to all believers in Crete, but implicitly applicable to believers universally, in the context of the unity of believers in Christ (cf. Titus 1:1–3; 3:8). The moral agents of good works in these passages correlate with the virtueethical concept of particularism, since it limits the moral agency to believers in Christ alone, and ties it to the Christ-event. 3.4.3 History of Tradition of the καλὰ ἔργα Cluster a) Greco-Roman Tradition Grundmann notes that καλός was used in the Greek tradition in three senses, namely, that which is organically sound, that which is beautiful in appearance, and that which is morally good. Encompassing these three senses, καλός could be described as that which is “ordered” or orderly.416 The term καλός found its prominence in Greek thought due to these ranges of meaning it had. By using καλός and its cognates, the Greeks had in mind “the total state of soundness, health, wholeness and order, whether in external appearance or internal disposition.”417 Lock asserts that the terms ἀγαθός and καλός were distinguished in Hellenistic Greek, even though the distinction later became blurred. Ἀγαθός was used for what is practically or morally good, while καλός was used for what is aesthetically good, beautiful, or good to the eyes.418 Plato regarded ἀγαθόν (neuter form, denoting “goodness” as a concept rather than an adjective) in the context of what is morally and practically good and as the central idea which unites humanity with the divine, while καλόν, that which is aesthetically good or beautiful, is closely related to ἀγαθόν in uniting the cosmos with the divine. By this, Plato does not regard καλόν as merely a result of ἀγαθόν, but an aspect of it.419 The concept of καλός found prominence in Platonic and overall Greek thought because of its connecting the divine and Hellenistic philosophy but from a full understanding of the redemptive work of Christ (Mounce, Pastoral Epistles, 432). 415 Towner, The Goal of Our Instruction, 153. 416 Grundmann, “καλός,” 537. 417 Grundmann, “καλός,” 537. 418 Lock, Pastoral Epistles, 22. 419 Grundmann, “καλός,” 540. See also Grundmann, “ἀγαθός,” 10–16, for a discussion on ἀγαθός.

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the cosmos. “The καλόν, which as an eternal idea belongs to the realm of the divine, is the form of the good which fuses deity, world and man into an ideal unity.”420 The aesthetic and moral aspects of καλός and ἀγαθός give meaning, essence, sense of belonging and togetherness, and eternity into the human life.421 Aristotle, however, divides the concept of the καλόν (neuter form) into two, namely, what is naturally beautiful and what is morally beautiful, and it is the telos of virtue. In this way, Aristotle lays more emphasis on the moral aspect of καλός than Plato.422 From Aristotle on, the Stoics and subsequent Greek philosophical schools emphasized more the moral aspect of καλός than its aesthetic aspect, as was the case with Plato.423 In its popular usage, the term καλός (except in Hellenistic Jewish origin and usage of καλὰ ἔργα) was influenced by Stoic ethics,424 and it bears a similar sense as in Plutarch, denoting what is “good, excellent, orderly and right.”425 However, it is used in the PE in the context of the Gospel, as understood by believers at that period.426 As our history of interpretation in chapter two and the analysis in this chapter show, both ἀγαθός and καλός are used more in the Christian moral sense in Titus than in an aesthetic sense. Mounce rightly asserts that the believer’s zeal for good works does not come from an “intellectual acceptance of Hellenistic philosophy but from a full understanding of the redemptive work of Christ.”427 b) Jewish (OT) Tradition Good works in the Pastorals also have a Hellenistic Jewish background. Grundmann notes that the use of καλός in 1 Tim 2:3 (“this is good, and pleases God our Savior” NIV) is same as in the LXX, where “καλόν takes its distinctive flavor from the will of God.”428 However, it is important to note that Titus does not appeal to the will of God as a basis for good works. We will discuss this under the Ethical Argumentation below. Similar to Grundmann, Stephen Ray notes that the idea of good works owes its genealogy to Christian reading of the OT and Jewish practices, which deeply influenced early Christian communities.429 The phrase “zealot for good works” 420 Grundmann,

“καλός,” 541. “καλός,” 541. 422 Grundmann, “καλός,” 541–542, citing Ant. I.1, p. 639b, 20; Rhet., I.7, p. 136b, 27 f. 423 Grundmann, “καλός,” 541. 424 Grundmann, “καλός,” 550. 425 Grundmann, “καλός,” 550. 426 Grundmann, “καλός,” 550. 427 Mounce, Pastoral Epistles, 432. 428 Grundmann, “καλός,” 549. 429 Stephen G. Ray Jr. “Good Works,” in Dictionary of Scripture and Ethics, ed. Joel B. Green Grand Rapids: Baker Academy, 2011), 335. 421 Grundmann,

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in Titus 2:14 suggests an OT root of “good works.” By using ζηλωτής,430 the author “lifts the entire web of OT reflections into the contemporary situation.”431 Ζηλωτής is often used both in noun and verb forms to describe one’s devotion to God and the Torah.432 Keener notes that Judaism praised zeal for God, and zeal at that period was mostly associated with the Jewish sect, the Zealots.433 However, he doubts if the author would use it in reference to the Zealots.434 Furthermore, Marshall notes that the use of “zealot” echoes Ezek 37:23,435 which is used here as an addition to the thought pattern borrowed from Ps 129:8.436 However, while the connection between “zealot” in Titus 2:14 and these OT texts could be assumed, we need to note that the connection is more in the context of God redeeming, purifying, and claiming the people as his own than in the context of making them zealous for good works, even though that could be implied. One more indication of an OT tradition behind the use of good works in Titus 2:14 is the OT origin of the concept of “redeemed” and “purifying a people for himself” (cf. Exod 19:5; Deut 4:20; 7:6; 14:2; cf. 1 Sam 12:22; 2 Sam 7:24; Ps 135:4).437 c) Early Christian Tradition Lock’s observation regarding the use of ἀγαθός and καλός in the NT applies to Titus too and it is taken as such in this study. He affirms that the use of ἀγαθός and καλός in the NT “may often be a mere desire for euphony or variety which decides the choice of the two words.”438 For this reason, this research uses ἀγαθός and καλός interchangeably, because our analysis does not trace any distinction in their usage in Titus. However, we shall limit our discussion of καλός and ἀγαθός in this unit to the corpus Paulinum, in order to emphasize the difference between its use in the undisputed Pauline letters and the PE. Paul uses ἀγαθός and καλός synony430 Probably

a Hellenistic Jewish word. Letters to Titus and Titus, 64. 432 Towner, Letters to Titus and Titus, 764, n. 70: cf. 1 Macc 2:24; 2 Macc 4:2; Josephus, Ant. 12: 27; Acts 21:20; 23:3; Gal 1:14; 1 Pet 3:13. 433 Note that Titus 2:14 uses “zealot for good works,” not zealous for good works as it is in many translations. 434 Craig S. Keener, The IVP Bible Background Commentary: New Testament (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1993), 639. 435 ἵνα μὴ μιαίνωνται ἔτι ἐν τοῖς εἰδώλοις αὐτῶν καὶ ῥύσομαι αὐτοὺς ἀπὸ πασῶν τῶν ἀνομιῶν αὐτῶν ὧν ἡμάρτοσαν ἐν αὐταῖς καὶ καθαριῶ αὐτούς καὶ ἔσονταί μοι εἰς λαόν καὶ ἐγὼ κύριος ἔσομαι αὐτοῖς εἰς θεόν (Ezek 37:23). 436 καὶ αὐτὸς λυτρώσεται τὸν Ισραηλ ἐκ πασῶν τῶν ἀνομιῶν αὐτοῦ (Ps 129:8). Marshall, Pastoral Epistles, 285. See also Towner, The Letters to Timothy and Titus, 758–766, for a discussion on the various traditions represented in Titus 2:14. 437 Keener, The IVP Bible Background Commentary, 639. 438 Lock, Pastoral Epistles, 22. 431 Towner,

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mously,439 as seen in the way he uses both ἀγαθός and καλός in Rom 7:18. In Rom 7:18 and 21, the “good” is that which Paul wishes inwardly to do, but finds it conflicting with the law of the flesh such that he is not able to do the good. Other places Paul uses ἀγαθός or καλός include: 2 Cor 13:7; Gal 6:9; Rom 12:17; 1 Cor 7:1, 8, 26; Gal 4:18; Rom 14:12; 7:16; 1 Cor 5:6. In other places, Paul uses the concept of good works or practical examples of it in the form of demonstrating love by meeting the needs of the needy, hospitality, etc., without using either ἀγαθός or καλός (e. g. Rom 12:13, 20; 1 Cor 16:11). In other non-Pauline apostolic epistles, the concept or application of good works in the form of hospitality, care for the needy, etc. is referred to without the use of ἀγαθός and καλός (e. g. Jas 1:27; 2:15, 16; 1 Pet 4:9; Heb 13:2–3; 3 John 5–6440). Even though the Pastorals belong to the wider Pauline tradition, Grundmann notes that there is a distinction between the Pauline usage of καλός and the Pastorals. Καλός is used 24 times in the Pastorals and only 16 times in the authentic Pauline letters. He further notes that the distinction is clearer in the way that Paul uses it almost always as a noun while the Pastorals use it almost always as an adjective with ἔργων or ἔργα.441 Titus 2:14 shows that καλὰ ἔργα “good works” are in the mind of Christ during redemption, or even the purpose of redemption. Relating good works with redemption is traceable to early Christian tradition. Good works in the whole NT are works of love and mercy, and in the PE, “mode of life fashioned by love on the basis of faith” (cf. 1 Tim 5:10 and Titus 3:8).442 According to Towner, the source of good works in the Pastorals is best seen in Titus 2:14, where good works is seen as a product of Christ’s redemptive work on the believer. Good works are the outcome of conversion and are essentially part of the Christian’s new life. He further argues that even other occurrences which do not directly link good works to salvation imply such a meaning.443 As noted in the history of interpretation in chapter two above, Gloer asserts that good works in the PE is theologically grounded as a fruit or visible result of one’s faith in Christ and regeneration.444 With specific reference to Titus 2:14 and 3:5–7, Gloer notes that the connection between the Christ-event and the believer’s lifestyle forms the basis for the “implicit command” to believers to be careful to devote themselves to good works in 3:8 (cf. 1 Tim 2:10).445 439 Grundmann,

“καλός,” 549. “καλός,” 549. See also Grundmann, “ἀγαθός,” 10–19. 441 Grundmann, “καλός,” 536–550, citing A. Jülicher-E. Fascher, Einleitung in das Neue Testament (Tübingen: Mohr, 1931), 169. 442 Grundmann, “καλός,” 549. 443 Tower, The Goal of Our Instruction, 153–154. 444 W. Hulitt Gloer, 1 & 2 Timothy – Titus, 38. 445 Gloer, 1 & 2 Timothy – Titus, 38. Gloer argues further that the connection between conversion and good works in Titus is “thoroughly Pauline,” which is most evident in Eph 2:8–10, regarded as “Pauline gospel in miniature” (ibid., 38). 440 Grundmann,

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Gloer, Grundmann, Mounce, Towner, and many other scholars agree that the use of good works in the PE, in reference to the activity of the believer emanating from conversion, is present in earlier Pauline letters, and functions in similar ways. In earlier Pauline letters, good works depict “the work of God through human hands.”446 Similarly, Mounce argues that the idea of Christ coming not only to save but to change lives in the PE is also prevalent in the Pauline tradition (e. g. Eph 2:10) and in the NT.447 However, Mounce argues, more emphasis is laid on the concept of good works in the Pastorals only because of the historical situation,448 especially the opponents’ teachings which separated belief from behavior, leading to immorality. Summarizing the use of the different forms of καλός in the NT, Grundmann argues that the word did not achieve any distinctive meaning other than its use in Hellenistic Judaism and Greek culture. Any additional significance it conveys is based on the fact that it is “combined with concepts and ideas of distinctive NT content.”449 While these scholars have identified the continuing NT and Pauline traditional understanding of the norm good works and some modifications in the Pastorals, they have not identified the ethical nature or posture the modified form of good works takes, especially in Titus. Moreover, they have not identified the particular ethical theory that their understanding of good works represents. It therefore needs to be added that the modified form of good works in Titus takes a virtueethical posture, as has been analyzed in this research. The discussion of the history of traditions above shows that the author of Titus creatively adopts Jewish, Greek, and early Christian traditions in his use of the norm “good works.” Towner’s succinct description of the author’s450 creative adaptation of various traditions is best reported in his words. He says, “the life of virtue that the Greeks idealized and the Cretan teachers diluted Paul here declares to be the realistic potential of those who respond to the one true God in faith.”451 3.4.4 Ethical Argumentation/Reflection for καλὰ ἔργα Titus 2:7–8 presents an explicit outward looking ethical argumentation: ἵνα ὁ ἐξ ἐναντίας ἐντραπῇ μηδὲν ἔχων λέγειν περὶ ἡμῶν φαῦλον “so that the opposing

446 Towner,

The Goal of Our Instruction, 153. Pastoral Epistles, 166. 448 Mounce, Pastoral Epistles, 166. 449 Grundmann, “καλός,” 550. 450 Towner holds to the Pauline authorship of the Pastorals. 451 Towner, The Letters to Timothy and Titus, 766. 447 Mounce,

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one452 may turn out to be put to shame once and for all, having nothing bad to say against us.”453 The inclusion of the concept of shame and an implicit notion of honor in this verse could be understood as an implicit virtue-ethical argumentation. Shaming of the opposition, notes Fiore, was “a technique of gaining greater honor for the victor in the struggle,” which reflects the concern of the males for the status of honor, seeing that the verse here applies to Titus, the young men, and all believers.454 In other words, the author heightens the argumentation or motivation for Titus to be a good moral exemplar and for the young men to be self-controlled by showing that in this way, they would shame their opponents and earn themselves more honor. It is noteworthy that while Titus is the moral agent in this verse, the ethical reflection is for all believers, including the author. The author argues why Titus should be a pattern of good works: so that the opponent will be put to shame, having nothing to say against the believers generally,455 not against Titus alone. By this, the author introduces the significance of community and solidarity to strengthen his ethical argumentation. This ethical reflection, in itself, does not convey any explicit virtue-ethical argumentation. However, a closer look at the preceding statement in Titus 2:7 περὶ πάντα, σεαυτὸν παρεχόμενος τύπον καλῶν ἔργων “in all aspects offering yourself as a standard of good works” shows an implicit mimetic virtue-ethical argumentation. An ethic is mimetic when “the valorization of a certain person, action or virtue serves as an argument for the validity of a certain ethic, which is to be attained by means of mimesis, or imitation, of the valorized point of reference.”456 The author generates moral significance here by implying that, since Titus is to teach others to do good works in all aspects, he himself needs to provide a practical example of good works in all aspects.457 Mimesis or moral exemplar is an important feature in virtue theory, especially in Christian virtue ethics, for “virtue is acquired through ongoing imitation of those who have mas452 “Someone from the opposite side” according to Raymond F. Collins, 1 & 2 Timothy and Titus: A Commentary, The New Testament Library (Louisville, London: Westminster John Knox, 2002), 345. 453  Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that this argumentation is not only for good works but for other norms as well such as teaching, integrity, dignity, and sound speech (Titus 2:7–8). 454 Fiore, Pastoral Epistles, 210. 455 Emphasis mine. 456 Blossom Stefaniw, “Mimetic Ethics,” in Metapher – Narration – Mimesis – Doxologie: Begründungsformen frühchristlicher und antiker Ethik, Kontexte und Normen neutestamentlicher Ethik VII, ed. Ulrich Volp, Friedrich W. Horn, and Ruben Zimmermann, WUNT 356 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2016), 191. See the whole chapter for discussions of mimesis in different contexts in ibid., 191–287. 457 The implicit mimetic ethical argumentation is best understood when we refer back to what the author has said about the opponents in Titus 1:16: they confess knowing God but deny him by their works. They are detestable, disobedient and do not stand the test of any good work. While the opponents “do not stand the test of any good works,” Titus is to be “a pattern of good works” in all things.

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tered the virtue-cultivating practice … the master is Christ, yet secondarily, disciples also learn to recognize excellence of practice by observing and imitating those who are more mature in faith.”458 Titus 2:14: ἵνα λυτρώσηται ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ πάσης ἀνομίας καὶ καθαρίσῃ ἑαυτῷ λαὸν περιούσιον, ζηλωτὴν καλῶν ἔργων “in order to redeem us from every iniquity and to purify to himself a special people, zealous for good works.” This expression conveys an implicit virtue-ethical reflection, which can be explained as thus: the Christ-event starts a radical moral transformation (cf. Titus 3:3–7) that continues to develop in and through the practice of the virtues. Developing and practicing the virtues requires both divine and human agency (Titus 2:12). The ultimate moral purpose of Christ’s self-giving, of the redemption of believers from iniquity, and of their purification is to lead to “good works.” Having been redeemed and purified, the believers are now able to show genuine good works as an outer and physical expression of their inner and spiritual reality. Failure to bring out good works in this way undermines the purpose of, and even renders their redemption useless. Therefore, believers in Christ are to be zealous for good works because that constitutes an integral part of the purpose of their redemption.459 Titus 3:1: “Remind460 them to be ready for every good work.” The “them” in 3:1 and the fact that Titus is to remind “them” is to be understood as a collective pronoun for the various groups of Cretan believers addressed in the immediately preceding context (Titus 2:1–15).461 This, therefore, implies that the ethical argumentation of being “ready for every good work” could be traced 458 Nikki Coffey Tousley and Brad J. Kallenberg, “Virtue Ethics,” in Dictionary of Scripture and Ethics, ed. Joel B. Green (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2011), 818. 459 Wall and Steele, 1 & 2 Timothy and Titus, 390, note that “the letter to Titus summarizes and synthesizes the pneumatology of the entire Pauline corpus and places special emphasis on the Spirit’s agency in enabling believers to experience God’s salvation personally and in transforming their moral and devotional lives accordingly.” 460 Quinn, Letter to Titus, 183, notes that the present imperative “remind” here has an iterative nuance, meaning “keep reminding.” 461 Contra Quinn, Letter to Titus, 182–183, who argues that Titus is to remind the opponents whom he was previously to refute. Quinn describes this as “rhetorical flashback” and traces it to Paul himself (cf. Rom 9:30–10:21 dividing the remaining part of Rom 9 from 11; 1 Cor 13 dividing 1 Cor 12 and 14). However, Quinn’s argument would have found credence if there were no logical flow between this section (Titus 3:1 ff.) and the immediately preceding section (Titus 2:1–14), which would necessitate tracing the “flashback” to a distant context. The case here is that of instructions that concern relationships among the believers themselves, smoothly followed by instructions that concern their relationships with the outsiders and authorities. This contextual flow, therefore, does not necessitate seeking for a distant “flashback” as Quinn proposes. Moreover, the strong words of condemnation of the opponents, described as “unfit for every good work” (cf. Titus 1:16; 3:3–5), hardly warrants Quinn’s argument that Titus is to remind them to be ready for “every good work.” Knight, Pastoral Epistles, 332, argues also that those to be reminded are Christians on Crete, not non-Christians, because Paul had only taught the believers. While he addresses them in specific groups in Titus 2:1–10, he addresses them together in Titus 3:1.

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back to the moral agents in the preceding chapter. On this basis, the missional462 ethical argumentation in Titus 2:5 and 10 (“so that the word of God would not be blasphemed” and “so that in all things they may make the teaching of God our Saviour attractive”), used in reference to young women and slaves respectively, may be implicitly intended to apply to the “them” in 3:1 as well. Nevertheless, this ethical argumentation does not fit into the virtue-ethical framework in the sense that it finds its reason for moral behavior in an external entity (God and His Word) without a direct connection to the “being” of the moral persons. Such an ethical argumentation leans more towards deontological ethical theories than virtue ethics. Titus 3:8: Πιστὸς ὁ λόγος … ταῦτά ἐστιν καλὰ καὶ ὠφέλιμα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις “the message is true … these things463 are good and useful to the people.” This verse has two important virtue-ethical argumentations for “good works,” more especially that it is in the context of “the faithful sayings.” The use of a conjunction καί (“and”), separating “this is good” from “is useful to the people” suggests two ethical reflections combined in this statement. One regards the goodness of good works in itself, and the other one regards the usefulness of good works to the community. In order to understand the virtue-ethical argumentations of this verse more clearly, we need to compare it with a similar argumentation in 1 Timothy. 1 Timothy 2:3 has the ethical argumentation “for this is good and acceptable in the sight of God our savior” (NRS). The expression “acceptable in the sight of God” is another way of expressing “this is the will of God.” The significant virtue-ethical difference is that Titus 3:8 does not appeal to the “will of God” as the basis for good works as 1 Timothy 2:3 does.464 Instead, Titus gives both a virtue-ethical argumentation (“for this is good”465) and a utilitarian argumentation (“and is profitable to all people”). Even though the text does not say how these things are profitable, the fact that they are “profitable to all people”466 includes the profitability of good works to both the doer, the receiver, and all people. 462  Cynthia L. Westfall also describes the ethical motivations in Titus 2:1–9 as missional. See Cynthia L. Westfall, Paul and Gender: Reclaiming the Apostle’s Vision for Men and Women in Christ (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2016), 147–148, n. 12. 463 “These things” obviously does not mean “good works” only but all that has been said in that context. 464 This is one example of the kinds of differences that exist between the ethical content of Titus and 1 Timothy, which is often neglected when they are read together as a corpus. 465 Note that unlike 1 Timothy 2:3 which says, “for this is good and acceptable in the sight of God our savior” (NRS), Titus does not say to whom the good deeds are good or acceptable. He leaves that open, and only said: “for this is good, and it is profitable to all men.” This has a virtue-ethical significance. 466 It seems that the author is presenting a Christian version of the Greek-philosophical concept of εὐδαιμονία. It is worth noting also that the 21st century virtue ethics has grown and added features beyond Aristotle’s idea of εὐδαιμονία, criticizing it for its insistence that an act is virtuous only if it benefits the virtuous person. Contemporary virtue ethicists, inspired by

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The lingering question, however, is, why does the author not appeal to the will of God for this norm as explicitly as in 1 Timothy 2:3? A virtue-ethical answer could be advanced here, as follows. By omitting the will of God in his argumentation, the author of Titus shifts the focus from a deontological reflection (“will of God”) to a virtue-ethical teleological467 and eudaimonist reflection (self-sufficiency of good works). In the Aristotelian concept of virtue, happiness or flourishing (German: Glückseligkeit) is the highest good. However, this happiness finds its worth and its essence in itself, not in some external value or norm. Human behavior pursues this flourishing always for its own sake, not for something else.468 It seems that it is from this perspective that the author of Titus omits the “will of God” here in his ethical argumentation. Instead, he shows that the goodness of good works is located in the “good works” themselves, not in some external entity, command, law, or moral duty. Moreover, Aristotelian virtue ethics holds that the kind of happiness that is in itself the highest and best good and is self-sufficient (German: selbstgenügsam) is that which is not only about the happiness or flourishing of individuals but of the society at large.469 Again, it seems that it is from this frame of mind that the author mentions that good works is “useful to all people.” Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that by omitting “the will of God,” Titus 3:8 does not present a “non-Christian” concept of virtue. By mentioning the moral agents of good works in 3:8 as “those who have believed in God” and the general grounding of the norm on the Christ-event, the author implicitly recovers the concept of “the will of God.” His not mentioning it explicitly attests to the author’s virtue approach to ethics. Furthermore, the omission of the “will of God” here could be understood as the author’s attempt, consciously or unconsciously, to construct a virtue kind of ethic that is relevant to Greek philosophy and sensitive to early Christian concerns simultaneously. Hence, he generates moral significance for good works from the goodness of good works themselves, the benefit of good works to the virtuous person, the community of believers, and humanity in general.

the Christian story of Christ’s sacrificial offering of himself, think that an act could be virtuous even if the virtuous person does not benefit from it (and actually suffers from it), but if it is done for the good of others. 467 Virtue ethics has a form of teleology. The idea of good works being “profitable to all men” here is related to virtue ethics’ teleological and eudaimonist concept of “human flourishing.” Wilson, “Virtue(s),” 812, rightly says that teleology is perhaps the central insight in the virtue ethics tradition. Telos in the virtue tradition “identifies the purpose or end for which we are made.” See also Romanus Cessario, Introduction to Moral Theology, 183–191. 468 Grätzel, System der Ethik, 40, citing Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 1097b. 469 Grätzel, System der Ethik, 40.

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Virtue ethics, especially in the Aristotelian470 tradition, is about what is “good” and leads to human flourishing. Building on Aristotle’s idea of goodness to the virtuous individual, contemporary virtue ethics is continuously negotiating the place of community in virtue ethics.471 Thus, Titus’s “this is good and useful to the people” represents both Aristotelian and neo-Aristotelian virtue vision. Titus 3:14 ἵνα μὴ ὦσιν ἄκαρποι “so that they may not be unfruitful.” Under the intra-textual linguistic form of this verse above, we have discussed how the προΐστασθαι and μανθανέτωσαν in this verse are the most important verbs as far as the virtue-ethical interpretation of the norm good works in Titus is concerned. Now, the ethical argumentation further confirms and strengthens that argument. The ethical reflection why all believers in Crete (“our people”) are to learn to “bring out” good works is “so that they may not be unfruitful/unproductive.” Reading this verse with the earlier description of the opponents in mind gives clarity to its meaning. The opponents profess knowing God but deny him by their deeds, therefore, they are unfit (in other words, unfruitful, unproductive) for any good work (Titus 1:16). The implicit message is that, any believer in Christ whose belief fails to produce good behavior or good works is an unfruitful person. The fruits or products of faith are the good works, whatever they are. Nevertheless, the good works do not flow out automatically, but one has to learn to bring them out. The ethical argumentation, therefore, is that if believers do not want to be unfruitful, let them learn to bring out “good works.” The idea of being “unproductive/unfruitful” represents the opposite of the Aristotelian virtue-ethical concept of εὐδαιμονία (“human flourishing, wellbeing”), which is “the good.” In this context, the believers flourish towards εὐδαιμονία472 when they do good works. However, if they fail to show good works, they do not flourish and so do not move towards εὐδαιμονία. Consequently, they become unproductive or unfruitful. Good works, therefore, become a means of avoiding unproductivity in life, on the one hand, and a means of achieving productivity in life, on the other. 470 See Coffey Tousley and Kallenberg, “Virtue Ethics,” 815 on Aristotle’s telos of virtue ethics as εὐδαιμονία or human flourishing. Also Cornelis Bennema, “Virtue Ethics in the Gospel of John: The Johannine Characters as Moral Agents,” Pages 167–181 in L. D. Chrupcala (ed.), Rediscovering John: Essays on the Fourth Gospel in Honor of Frederic Manns. Studium Biblicum Franciscanum 80. (Milan: Edizioni Terra Santa, 2013). 471 See Harrington and Keenan, Paul and Virtue Ethics, 129–158, for more discussion on virtue ethics and community. For more on the community in virtue ethics, see Michael Slote, “Virtue Ethics,” in Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, ed. Hugh LaFollette and Ingmar Persson, 2nd ed. (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 396. In a Christian account of virtue ethics, the church can be identified as the community or institution that together defines the telos and participates in the virtues that lead to the telos, namely, conformity to Christ. See Wilson, “Virtue(s),” 812–813, on the concept of community in virtue ethics and how the church forms such a community in Christian virtue ethics. 472 See Bennema, “Virtue Ethics in the Gospel of John.”

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We could describe the use of “fruitfulness” here as metaphorical ethical argumentation. Being metaphorical, it permits an interpretation using an analogy, as follows: the mention of fruits implies an implicit mental imagery of a tree. Hardly would one think of fruits without thinking of a tree. At a simple, nonscientific level,473 a good tree has four major components, namely, root(s), stem, branches, and fruits. The fruits are only the visible aspects of an invisible source, namely, the roots and all the factors necessary for the existence and functioning of the tree, such as sun energy, water, and so on. While the author compares “good works” with “fruits” or fruitfulness, he might have implicitly implied that the “invisible” character from which the good works emanate represents the invisible roots (and all other elements) of a tree from which fruits find their source and nourishment. Regarding the stem, the author might have also implied that the stem, being the mediating component between the invisible roots and the visible branches and fruits, represents all that is necessary for the transmission of the invisible reality of a new and transformed character to a visible reality in “good works.” Examples of the factors that constitute the mediating “stem” include teaching sound doctrine, learning from the teaching of “the grace,” learning from the life of moral exemplars, and learning by practicing the virtues, which the author emphasizes throughout the letter. These are the processes and activities involved in “learning to bring out” good works. Such processes and activities mediate between the inner character of the believer and good works in the same way that the stem of a tree mediates between the roots and the fruits. In summary, we can identify five virtue-ethical and one non-virtue-ethical argumentation for the norm good works in Titus. First, Titus is to do good works so he can be a good moral exemplar (Titus 2:7). Second, believers are to show good works because it is an integral purpose and moral telos of the Christ-event (Titus 2:14). Third, believers are to be ready for good works because good works are “good” in themselves (Titus 3:1). Fourth, believers are to show good works because they (good works) are profitable to all people, leading to individual and community flourishing (Titus 3:1). Fifth, believers are to learn to bring out good works because they make a believer fruitful, leading to εὐδαιμονία (3:14). The non-virtue-ethical argumentation is that good works attract outsiders to the Christian faith (cf. Titus 3:1), which is still teleological, but tilting more towards a mixture of utilitarian and consequentialist argumentation in the sense that it seeks to fulfill a certain goal or purpose, or to achieve a certain result that is not directly related to the character of the moral agent. Since the goal to be achieved or the result to get (attracting outsiders to the Christian faith) does not 473 The author’s understanding of a tree, writing in antiquity, might have been this simple of an understanding of the components of a tree. Therefore, the simplified, non-scientific analogy given here might be a good representation of the level of understanding of botany in antiquity.

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directly relate to how this goal or result will affect the character of the believers, it may not fit into the virtue-ethical kind of argumentation. 3.4.5 Range of Application of καλὰ ἔργα Good works is required of all believers in Crete, not Titus alone. Only once is Titus asked to set the standard for good works “in all things” (2:7). All other instances address all believers in Crete. For example, “a people, zealous for good works” (2:14), “them” (3:1), “those who have believed in God” (3:8), and “our people”474 (3:14). However, there are implicit indications of the universal applicability of the norm good works in Titus 2:14, 3:8, and 3:14, especially because the author regards himself as an apostle to “the elect” generally (Titus 1:1). Moreover, the fact that the norm “good works,” unlike other norms, is not gendered (male or female) and is not restricted to any specific group (e. g. women, men, youths, deacons) attests to its universal applicability. In summary, good works in Titus has both a particular and universal range of applications, but it applies exclusively to believers in Christ. Moreover, Titus shows that there are no universally specified concrete actions called “good works.” The virtuous person is to responsibly, creatively, and contextually “bring out” the good character in him or her in the form of moral actions and behavior that are acceptable in a wide range of contexts. 3.4.6 Summary and Conclusion of the Virtue-ethical Perspectives of the καλὰ ἔργα Cluster in Titus The norm good works plays an important role in the ethical structure of Titus. The main virtue-ethical argumentation for good works is that it is good in itself and is profitable to all people. Not showing good works means being unfruitful. Its grounding on the Christ-event gives it a Christian perspective compared to Jewish and Greek-philosophical concepts. Good works is exclusively an ethical norm for believers in Crete and universally. By way of contemporary hermeneutical appropriation in Christian475 ethics, believers in Christ are not to expect non-believers to show them good works. Rather, they are to show good works “to all people,” both believers and un474 See Van Nes’s interesting, though not convincing (to me) counter-argument regarding who “our people” in Titus 3:14 are. He argues that οἱ ἡμέτεροι in Titus 3:14 does not refer to believers in Christ generally, but to Artemas, Tychicus, Zenas, and Apollos mentioned in Titus 3:12–13. Van Nes, “Who are ‘Our People’ (οἱ ἡμέτεροι) in Titus 3:14? A New Proposal,” Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses 95/4 (2019): 661–665. 475 For more on some specific Christian virtues among other virtues, read Stanley Hauerwas and Charles Pinches, Christian Among the Virtues: Theological Conversations with Ancient and Modern Ethics (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997).

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believers, including unbelieving authorities. Good works between believers and unbelievers are, therefore, not reciprocal, but missional. Good works in Titus correspond with the following virtue-ethical characteristics: focus on the character of persons and inner, habitual dispositions more than moral actions; the concept of moral exemplar; the concept of character development through moral education; a sense of moral telos; and a virtueethical sense of perfectionism. Nevertheless, its grounding on the Christ-event and its moral transformative function presents some Christian distinctives that distinguish it from the secular Aristotelian and neo-Aristotelian virtue concepts.476

3.5 Re-reading the “Household Codes” in Titus Virtue-Ethically The following passages of the NT are usually classified as “household codes” (German: Haustafeln)477 based on “formal elements,”478 especially their “direct form of address, consistent relational pairings and reciprocal commands”: Col 3:18–4:1; Eph 5:21–6:9; 1 Pet 2:18–3:7; 1 Tim 2:8–15 and Titus 2:1–10,479 all of which are located within the so-called deutero-Pauline or disputed Pauline letters. There has not been a consensus in scholarship regarding the source, structure, purpose, and influence of the household codes in the NT.480 However, following an elaborate consideration of the major works on the NT household codes, Stanley E. Porter identifies at least five major and overlapping interpretive patterns of the NT “household codes,”481 which we shall summarize and also mention the missing interpretive pattern(s) in Porter’s work. 476 See Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 129–131, for an example of how Christian virtue ethics could adapt and reformulate virtue ethics using the concept of “grace.” 477 “Haustafeln” is the German word that has been translated into English as “household codes.” It is traced to Martin Luther, who only used it to refer to his collation of the broad body of ethical teaching from the NT, without identifying any particular texts as the “Haustafeln,” as is the case in contemporary scholarship, which now uses it as a technical term for passages of the NT that relate to Christian life in the household context. See Hering, Colossian and Ephesian Haustafeln, 1–4, for the origin of the word Haustafeln and its technical use in current scholarship. 478 See Zimmermann, “How to Read Biblical Texts Ethically,” 8. 1 Timothy 2:8–15 is not included in Zimmermann’s list of the NT “household codes.” It is added here because the Pastorals are particularly in focus in this research. 479 See David L. Balch, Let Wives be Submissive: The Domestic Code in 1 Peter, Society of Biblical Literature Monograph Series 26 (Chico: Scholars Press, 1981), 1. 480 John H. Elliott, A Home for the Homeless: A Sociological Exegesis of 1 Peter, Its Situation and Strategy (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1981), 208. 481 Stanley E. Porter, “Paul, Virtues, Vices, and Household Codes,” in Paul in the GrecoRoman World: A Handbook, ed. J. Paul Sampley (London, Oxford, et al: T&T Clark, 2016), 2:372. The following are some of the works from which Porter drew his five interpretive patterns: David E. Aune, Greco-Roman Literature and the New Testament, SBL Sources for

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The first interpretive pattern is form-critical in nature. Followers of this pattern identify Greek-philosophical terminologies and concepts in the NT household codes, and conclude that the NT authors adopted and adapted Stoic ethical thoughts and values in their household codes as a strategy of negotiating their place in the world, consequent to the delay in the Parousia that had characterized Pauline Christianity.482 The second pattern of interpretation sees the NT household codes as originating from Jewish family structures and values rather than Hellenistic philosophy. Porter notes, however, that lack of providing convincing parallels of such household codes in Judaism limits this hypothesis.483 The third interpretive pattern asserts that “the household codes were distinctly Christian in nature, and served a social function.”484 The adherents of this hypothesis base their arguments on features such as the prevalence of the concept of “obedience” in the household codes, and the use of “in the Lord,” among others.485 Porter calls the fourth interpretive pattern the “Roman hypothesis,” because its adherents hold that, even though the NT writers included elements or materials from Hellenistic and Jewish backgrounds, their primary concern was social and political, trying to show that “organized and controlled early Christians were not a threat to Roman social order.”486 The fifth interpretive pattern is “contextual,” whose adherents argue that the NT household codes encompass a variety of social and theological contexts, through which “Paul … displayed the new social values of Christian communities even if they were within their larger contexts.”487 This pattern of interpretation does not see any apologetic agenda driving the NT household codes.488 Ben Witherington, following this interpretive pattern and after a careful study Biblical Literature Study 21 (Atlanta, GA: Scholar Press, 1988), 25–50; James E. Crouch. The Origin and Intention of the Colossian Haustafeln (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972). Elliott, Home for the Homeless; Balch, Let Wives be Submissive; James P. Hering, The Colossian and Ephesian Haustafeln in Theological Context: An Analysis of their Origins, Relationship, and Message (New York et al: Peter Lang, 2007). 482 Porter, “Paul, Virtues, Vices, and Household Codes,” 372. Porter identifies Martin Dibelius and Karl Weidinger as examples of the main proponents of the Stoic interpretive pattern. 483 Porter, “Paul, Virtues, Vices, and Household Codes,” 372. Porter identifies Ernst Lohmeyer, David Daube as adherents of this hypothesis, while James Crouch later adapted it to mean the NT household codes originated from Hellenistic Judaism. However, all the adherents still regard the form-critical conclusions of Dibelius and others. 484 Porter, “Paul, Virtues, Vices, and Household Codes,” 372. 485 Porter, “Paul, Virtues, Vices, and Household Codes,” 372. According to Porter, Karl Heinrich Rengstorf and Karl Schroeder are the main adherents of this theory. 486 Porter, “Paul, Virtues, Vices, and Household Codes,” 373. Porter identifies David Balch, Klaus Thraede, and Dieter Lührmann as the proponents of this theory. 487 Porter, “Paul, Virtues, Vices, and Household Codes,” 372. 488 Porter, “Paul, Virtues, Vices, and Household Codes,” 372. He identifies John Elliot, Margaret MacDonald, and a growing number of scholars as adhering to this hypothesis.

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and survey of the materials, came to the conclusion that while discussions on household management were common in antiquity, he finds “no direct evidence of a household table and certainly nothing like what we find in the New Testament with reciprocal pairs that are commanded directly.”489 While Porter’s summary of the interpretive patterns is helpful, it is, nevertheless, not exhaustive, and his five interpretive patterns focus more on the origin, purpose, and function of the household codes in early Christianity than on their history of reception in our contemporary context. For example, the feminist interpretive pattern is missing, among others,490 even though these contemporary contextual interpretations could be understood as a sub-category of Porter’s five patterns of interpretation. In the next paragraphs, we shall identify some feminist interpretations of the household codes in the PE and the methodological frameworks that account for their conclusions, before undertaking our virtueethical interpretation. Feminist readings of Scripture have indicted the household codes in the PE of promoting patriarchalism, injustice, and oppression.491 Generally, three areas of the household codes research can be identified as the bases for the indictments: the source of the materials, the perceived lack of theological substantiation, and the seeming “distance” and inapplicability to contemporary culture. Frances Young says the Pastorals “have shaped a world in which women and others have been subordinated and devalued on the authority of God’s word.”492 She asserts, therefore, that in a democratic society which has a totally different view of women, lay people, and slaves, the Pastorals cannot but become “texts of terror.”493 Lilian Portefaix also laments that the Pastorals’ instruction regarding women have been “causing oppression inside and outside the church from late antiquity up to the present time.”494 Similarly, Elisabeth Schüssler 489  Ben Witherington III, Women and the Genesis of Christianity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 147. 490 E. g. queer, post-colonial, liberationist, and womanist interpretative patterns. 491 Some of the indictments by feminist scholars that I have reported here are drawn from Dogara Ishaya Manomi, “What does Biblical ‘Exegethics’ Do? Method, Trajectories, and Reflections from an African Context,” in What Does Theology Do, Actually? Observing Theology and the Transcultural, ed. Matthew Ryan Robinson and Inja Inderst (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2020), 243–258. 492 Young, Pastoral Letters, 146. 493 Young, Pastoral Letters, 146., n. 3. 494 Lilian Portefaix, “‘Good Citizenship’ in the Household of God: Women’s Position in the Pastorals Reconsidered in the Light of Roman Rule,” in A Feminist Companion to the DeuteroPauline Epistles, ed. Amy-Jill Levine and Marianne Blickenstaff (London: T&T Clark International, 2003), 157–158. Portefaix laments that instead of considering them as admonitions by the author to a few communities during the reign of Trajan in the eastern part of Aegean, they have over time been directly applied to all Christian women of all periods. Young, Pastoral Letters, 2, also notes that to a large extent, the teachings in the Pastorals are culture-specific, and women readers have found much there that has tended to marginalize them in some church structures. In a similar vein, Huizenga, Moral Education, 18–19, thinks that the Pastorals

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Fiorenza indicts the Pastorals for advocating the patriarchal order of submission and subordination.495 Linda M. Maloney argues that from a feminist point of view, the Pastorals are “the most revealing part of Christian Testament … and the most frustrating.”496 She, therefore, indicts them of “heavy and unmistakable misogyny.”497 These selected voices echo many contemporary voices indicting the ethics of the PE. Such indictments have been (in)formed and influenced by four exegetical and hermeneutical factors. First, reading the Pastorals together as a corpus instead of individual letters with significantly different voices despite their similarities. Second, reading them against the background of Greco-Roman philosophical ethics. Third, reading them against the background of the so-called Pauline authentic letters. This approach has led scholars to over-dwell on the authorship498 question, while the texts themselves call for their individual voices to be heard. Fourth, the hermeneutical approach to the “household codes” as rules for action instead of virtues for acquisition has invoked the indictments. However, a different exegetical and hermeneutical approach may open a new perspective to understanding the household ethics in the PE.

participate in the ongoing philosophical discussion of women’s moral formation but from an early Christian perspective. The author throughout offers sex-specific moral teachings (e. g. 1 Tim 2:8, Titus 1:5–9; 2:1–8) because he believes in some essential differences between male and female as some contemporary philosophers did. She further says that the Pastorals’ gender specific ethics makes the author believe that women are more easily seduced into immorality (1 Tim 2:14), which is why he proffers not only wifely submission to her husband (Titus 2:5) but her total fulfillment of the three socially approved female domestic roles of wife, mother, and mistress of the household (1 Tim 2:15; 5:9, 14; 2 Tim 1:5; Titus 2:4–5). Osiek and Balch propose some of the Pythagorean women’s texts as “possible documented precedent” to the teaching program for women outlined in Titus 2:3–5 (see Huizinga, Moral Education, 22). Maier, Picturing Paul in Empire, 164, also notes that it is specifically in the presentation of the harmoniously functioning household as the blueprint for faithful religious practice and belief that modern interpreters have expressed their greatest discontent with the Pastorals. In the light of these concerns, this study shall propose some hermeneutical paradigms for appropriation in different contemporary contexts. 495 Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, In Memory of Her: A Feminist Theological Reconstruction of Christian Origins (New York: Crossroad, 1983), 289. See also Bernadette J. Brooten, “Early Christian Women and their Cultural Context: Issues of Method in Historical Reconstructions,” in Feminist Perspectives on Biblical Scholarship, ed. Adela Yarbro Collins (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, Society for Biblical Literature, 1985), 65–92, for a discussion on the GrecoRoman cultural context of women in early Christianity. 496 Linda M. Maloney, “The Pastoral Epistles,” in Searching the Scriptures: A Feminist Commentary, ed. Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza (New York: Crossroad, 1994), 361. 497 Maloney, “The Pastoral Epistles,” 363. 498 As noted above, this research takes a neutral position regarding the authorship of the letter to Titus because it plays very little role in the present inquiry. Where necessary, it simply refers to the “author.” Nevertheless, in a few instances where some of the works consulted have taken a position on the authorship, their opinion is reported with their position, if it advances their argument and if it relates to our discussion here.

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3.5.1 A Different Approach This research adopts a counter-approach to the four popular methodological and hermeneutical approaches mentioned above. First, it treats the letters as individual texts, but recognizing their similarities at inter-textual levels. Second, it adopts a text-based approach, shifting the focus from their Greco-Roman background to the message of the texts themselves. Third, no attempt is made to read them against the background of Paul’s authentic letters. However, where it is important, similarities with the authentic Pauline texts will be mentioned at inter-textual levels. Fourth, virtue ethics being the main ethical framework, this research adopts a virtue-ethical approach to both exegetical and hermeneutical questions. However, it is noteworthy that there are overlaps between our discussion of the household codes and some norms that we have already discussed in the previous sections, such as σωφροσύνη and its cognates, which appear frequently in the household codes but also in other parts of Titus. Adopting Ruben Zimmermann’s “implicit ethics” methodology, this research shifts the focus and moves a step further from a consideration of the backgrounds or sources of the materials in the text.499 Instead, it pays cursory attention to the virtue-ethical features of not only the virtues but also the linguistic elements that are weaved together with the virtues in clauses and phrases within the text. In the hermeneutical aspect, this research proposes a virtue-ethical appropriation of the household codes. It argues that when approached from a virtueethical standpoint, the linguistic, theological, and ethical properties of Titus’ household codes (re)present “prototypical” household virtues over and against “archetypical” ones.500 It argues that even the range of application of the ethical contents in the text for today are to be discovered within the text itself. These approaches provide an alternative reading and open a “new” dimension to understanding and appropriating Titus’s “household codes.” Two questions form the agenda of our virtue-ethical re-reading of the household codes: an exegetical question and a hermeneutical one. The exegetical ques499 This shift is mainly because so much has been done in this regard. Concerns about the background of the Pastorals has dominated scholarship for a while. For a recent extensive discussion on the background culture and source of materials in the Pastorals, see Harry O. Maier, Picturing Paul in Empire, 2013. 500  According to Fiorenza, In Memory of Her, 33, feminist theology challenges biblical theological scholarship to develop a paradigm for biblical interpretation which presents the NT not “as an archetype but as a prototype,” understanding archetype as presenting an ideal, unchanging, and timeless pattern while prototype presents biblical ethics as “critically open to the possibilities of its own transformation.” Even though the methodological approach to this research is different from the feminist approach, the interpretation of the household codes in Titus responds positively to Fiorenza’s challenge. The virtue-ethical approach adopted here understands the household virtues in Titus 2:1–10 as not “archetypes” but “prototypes” for a functional Christian household, on the basis that there is no concrete ethos for action but virtues for acquisition and creative application.

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tion is, what implicit and explicit virtue-ethical perspectives can be discovered in Titus’s account of the household codes?501 The hermeneutical question is, how could those virtue-ethical perspectives provide a paradigm for appropriating the household codes today? The hypothesis in this unit of the research is that, approached from a virtueethical perspective with a careful reading of the linguistic elements of the virtues and their corresponding verbs, and their theological underpinnings, Titus’s account of the so-called household codes has features that significantly correspond to the virtue-ethical approach to morality as conceived in contemporary virtue ethics theory. Moreover, Titus’s account could provide a paradigm for contemporary appropriation which could “liberate” the NT household codes from the “text of terror” indictment to a “text of honor,” promoting just, fair, and understanding relationships in contemporary Christian households. The methodological grid applied for reading the household codes differs slightly from the ones applied in reading the selected virtues above, because the “household codes” is a pericope. Hence, Zimmermann’s “implicit ethics” methodology will be applied here without significant adaptation. 3.5.2 Linguistic Form a) Intra-Textual Level At the intra-textual level, the “implicit ethics” methodology proposes a focus on the linguistic forms of imperative verbs within the selected text, as explained in our description of methodology in chapter one above. In addition, this research considers the linguistic forms of other verbal moods in order to see how they relate to a virtue-ethical perspective or not. The first verb at the beginning of the pericope is λάλει, which is a present active second person singular imperative verb, translated as “speak,” “keep speaking,” or “teach” (NRSV, cf. NIV “you must teach”). Being in the present tense, it implies a continuous process of teaching or speaking to the different groups addressed in the pericope. In this research, the translation “teach” is preferred to the translation “speak” because it is more appropriate to both the immediate and wider contexts of the text.502 Its appropriateness is especially ev501 The inter-textual aspect of this research will also seek to answer the question, “how does the virtue-ethical perspective of the household codes in Titus differentiate it from other NT accounts of the household codes? 502 See Smith, Pauline Communities, 119–120. Smith says λάλει “to speak, to say” refers to authoritative teaching by virtue of the content, the contrast with false teachers, the purpose and expected outcome of the teaching, and Titus’ relationship with believers in Crete. Huizenga, Moral Education, 391 n. 43, notes that the λάλει in Titus 2:1 forms an inclusio with another λάλει in Titus 2:15. Mounce also says the verb carries the meaning of “teach.” Mounce, Pastoral Epistles, 408.

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ident when we take into consideration the expected outcome of the action expressed in λάλει; namely, “to be/become” (virtuous). In the context of character development, one is not “told to be virtuous,” instead, one is “taught to be virtuous.” The older men, older women, and other groups in Crete are to be “taught to be virtuous,” not “told to do virtuous deeds.” This suggests a virtueethical approach to character development. There are only two direct imperative verbs in this pericope: λάλει (2:1) and παρακάλει (2:6). The two imperatives address Titus directly on what to do in regard to teaching the groups. Λάλει is used in relation to teaching the elderly men, elderly women, and young women, while παρακάλει is used in relation to the young men and slaves. All the virtues mentioned in relation to these imperatives are expected outcomes of the teaching/exhorting. These two teaching/training imperatives503 convey virtue-ethical perspectives in two ways: first, they express a continuous504 and even rigorous process of character development through the act of teaching/training. Concerted teaching/ training as a means of acquiring virtue has been a key virtue-ethical approach to ethics from antiquity. In Plato and other Greek philosophers, teaching was an integral process of civilizing and the acquisition of ἀρετή (virtue), which are summarized in the cardinal virtues: prudence, courage, justice, self-control.505 Second, the expected outcome of teaching gives the imperative verbs a virtueethical meaning, namely, “to be/become” temperate, honorable, self-controlled, and so on. Virtue ethics is more concerned with “being/becoming” virtuous than “doing” virtuous acts. Another verb whose linguistic significance to the virtue-ethical reading of Titus permeates the text is εἶναι, a present active infinitive form of εἰμί. Within the pericope (Titus 2:1–10), εἶναι appears four times in relation to the moral character of the moral agents (2:2, 4, 9). First, Titus is to teach the older men “to be” (εἶναι) temperate, honorable, self-controlled, being healthy in faith, in love, and in perseverance. Second, he is to teach the older women “to be” (εἶναι) reverent in behavior, teaching what is good, not slanderers, and not enslaved to much wine. Third, the older women are to teach the younger women “to be” (εἶναι) husband-loving, children-loving, self-controlled, chaste, devoted to domestic works, good,506 being submissive to their own husbands. Fourth, Titus is to 503 Young, Pastoral Letters, 78, notes that there are about seventy imperatives and twentyfive indirect expressions of command in the PE, which indicate their didactic tone. 504 See Towner, The Letters to Timothy and Titus, 747. 505 Towner, The Letters to Timothy and Titus, 747. See Young, Pastoral Letters, 79–84, for more discussion on teaching and learning in the ancient world. She notes that “the education of mind and body through παιδεία was the classical Greek ideal” which is reflected in the Pastorals (79). 506 Huizenga, Moral Education, 392 n. 51, notes the textual problem of whether to regard ἀγαθάς as an adjective modifying οἰκουργούς (house-workers) or as an independent virtue in the list. She prefers to read it as a modifier to οἰκουργούς because of the continual emphasis of

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exhort slaves “to be” (εἶναι) pleasing. Εἶναι is not directly used in relation to young men, but the nuance of “to be/being” is captured in the infinitive σωφρονεῖν “to be sensible.” This means that the verb εἶναι is used in relation to each of the groups that constitute the household. The virtue-ethical significance of εἶναι lies primarily in its being an intransitive verb related to “being,” instead of an action-oriented transitive verb related to “doing.” Being a verb “to be,” εἶναι describes a state of moral being of persons. When combined with the adjectival forms of the virtues whose primary linguistic function is to describe and qualify moral qualities of persons rather than moral actions, it expresses, for example, the idea of “being self-controlled” (σώφρονας εἶναι507) or “possessing the virtue/quality of self-control.” In this way, the verb and the virtues combine to focus more on the kind of persons the moral agents should be in terms of moral character, than on the morality of actions. In other words, εἶναι relates basically to the “being” instead of “doing” of the moral agents. The “doing” of the moral agents, nevertheless, proceeds from their “being.” Barclay succinctly captures this point when he describes the whole of Titus chapter two, where the household codes are located, as “the Christian character in action,” showing each of the groups “what they ought to be within the world.”508 It is noteworthy that this virtue-ethical construal of εἶναι and its cognates is neither arbitrary nor unaccountable. Understanding εἶναι as playing more than a linguistic role but also a virtue-ethical one is consistent with both the other linguistic elements, theological motifs, and ethical norms in Titus, which all function to place the focus on the moral “being” of persons. Dibelius and Conzelmann come close to this interpretation of εἶναι in Titus when they observe that the household codes in Titus 2:2–10 are “not formulated as a sequence of imperatives, as is usually the case in these rules for the household, but primarily as a series of adjectives (with ‘to be’ εἶναι).”509 On this basis, argue Dibelius and Conzelmann further, the instructions here “look like a catalogue of duties than a list of rules for the household.”510 While Dibelius and Conzelmann’s relating εἶναι with household “duties” instead of “rules” does not explicate its relation to character or “moral being,” it at least clears the way for its relation to character, the Pastorals on household management. But on the grounds that both ἀγαθάς and οἰκουργούς are adjectives in the same way with other virtues in the list, this research regards them as independent virtues. See also Mounce, Pastoral Epistles, 412. 507 See Luck, “σωφροσύνη,” 1103, who says the σώφρονα εἶναι of the bishop in 1 Tim 3:2 and Titus 1:8 refers not only to “conduct appropriate to faith but also to presuppositions necessary for the discharge of a leading office.” 508 Barclay, Letters, 246–247. 509 Dibelius and Conzelmann, Pastoral Epistles, 139. Interestingly, they further note that the infinitive εἶναι “to be” does not have the force of an imperative verb, but is subordinated, in this case, to λάλει “speak, proclaim, teach” or πρέπει “what is proper, or what befits” in 2:1. 510 Dibelius and Conzelmann, Pastoral Epistles, 139.

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since moral duties could be performed out of the internal moral “being” of the moral agents and not merely out of a sense of duty or “doing” – just to fulfill externally required moral duties, for different reasons. Our virtue-ethical analyses of various linguistic elements, theological notions, and ethical norms above, all combine to give validity to our fresh interpretation of εἶναι as an implicit virtue-ethical element relating to “moral being” beyond its explicit verbal function “to be.” For example, the frequent appearance of the virtues in adjectival and adverbial forms (e. g. Titus 1:8; 2:12), thereby describing the moral qualities of a person’s “being” is consistent with the use of εἶναι to describe the moral “being” of persons. Moreover, the use of theological notions to describe how the Christ-event transforms moral character continuously (e. g. Titus 2:12, 14; 3:3–7) is also consistent with the use of εἶναι in relation to moral character of persons. Notwithstanding, it is noteworthy that this new virtue-ethical interpretation of εἶναι “to be/being” does not mean that every appearance of a form of εἰμί or εἶναι “to be” in Titus is virtue-ethical. For example, in our table of norms in Titus, the use of different forms of “to be” that are not virtue-ethical are omitted, e. g. Titus 1:10 (εἰσίν “there are” rebellious people); 1:13 (the testimony ἐστίν “is” true); 3:8 (these things ἐστίν “are” good and useful); 3:9 (controversies, genealogies, etc. εἰσίν “are” unprofitable). These uses of “to be” (as opposed to the virtue-ethical ones discussed above) are used in the ordinary linguistic function, with no established relation to the “being” or moral character of persons. As an ethical theory, virtue ethics is basically concerned with the moral being of persons more than their moral actions.511 In this regard, the ethical perspective of Titus is in tandem with a virtue-ethical perspective. Moreover, “being” involves the totality of a person’s life while “doing/action” involves specific concrete aspects. Virtue ethics concerns itself with commonplace morality and the entirety of one’s life. Kotva rightly describes it by saying virtue ethics is a kind of perfectionist ethics in the sense that every voluntary human act is regarded as morally relevant, and everyone is called to growth in every aspect of life.512

511 See Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 30–31, on how virtue ethics prioritizes “being” over “doing.” See also Chan, Biblical Ethics in the 21st Century, 84, virtue ethics is a proactive ethical system encompassing one’s entire life. “It engages the commonplace and concerns what is ordinary rather than those exceptional moral dilemmas.” 512 Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 37–38. Nevertheless, Kotva clarifies that the perfectionist nature of virtue ethics is not a “brittle perfectionism” where the ideal must be realized for one to receive positive evaluation. Rather, the telos, being an ideal of human excellence and perfection, cannot be fully realized. He succinctly captures the point by saying “virtue ethics is not perfectionist in the sense of mandating an impossible ideal. It is perfectionist in the sense of viewing all aspects of life as morally relevant and in calling everyone to continual growth in every area of life.”

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b) Inter-Textual Level As noted above, these passages of the NT are often categorized as “household codes” based on “formal elements”:513 Col 3:18–4:1; Eph 5:21–6:9; 1 Pet 2:18–3:7; 1 Tim 2:8–15 and Titus 2:1–10. It is possible to consider different intertextual aspects of the household codes of these texts. However, in the present research, only one of the norms, namely, “submission” between wives and husbands will be discussed. “Submission” is chosen first because of the controversy and tension it has generated in NT scholarship.514 Second, it is chosen because it illustrates how the household ethics in Titus are particularly virtue-ethical more than other NT household codes. 1 Timothy 2:11 uses the noun form ἐν πάσῃ ὑποταγῆ “in all submission.” Even though in both Titus and Timothy submission is used in relation to women, ὑποταγῆ in Timothy does not explicitly refer to the wife’s submission to her husband, but her learning in quietness and “in all submission.” It therefore conveys a different message from ὑποταγῆ in Titus. In Eph 5:21–31, we find two uses of “submission,” but none of them is a direct linguistic imperative to the wives (alone) to submit to their husbands. Ὑποτασσόμενοι, a second person plural present passive participle verb with an imperatival sense, introduces the section in Eph 5:21, commanding both husband and wife to submit to each other out of reverence for Christ. While the present passive participle verb in Eph 5:21 has an imperative nuance especially because of its use in the second person plural, the present passive participle verb (third person plural) ὑποτασσομένας515 in Titus 2:5 does not have such an imperatival nuance. It only describes an expected outcome of the teaching that older women are to give to the younger women, but not a direct address to the younger women to be submissive to their husbands. Moreover, the difference between the two accounts is that Titus 2:5 mentions submission in relation to the wives alone, while Eph 5:21 mentions submission in relation to both husbands and wives. 513 See Zimmermann, “How to Read Biblical Texts Ethically,” 8. 1 Timothy 2:8–15 is not included in Zimmermann’s list of the NT “household codes.” It is added here because the Pastorals are particularly in focus in this research. 514 Young’s description of the PE as “texts of terror” is mainly due to their encouragement of hierarchical structures in families and the society which subordinates women and other groups (Pastoral Letters, 146). 515 Contra Quinn, Letter to Titus, 137, who calls it “a quasi-imperatival participle” for the wife to be subordinate to her husband. This research argues that there is no linguistic imperatival nuance attached to this verb. Because ethics is first reflected in language, caution needs to be taken in inserting imperatives in biblical texts where the language does not warrant it. Moreover, when read in the context of the frequency of the verb εἶναι, the absence of a concrete ethos, and the fact that the instructions are about what the younger women are to be taught and not instructing them directly on what “to do,” there is hardly a way to find an imperative there. See Zimmermann, Van Der Watt, and Luther, eds., Moral Language in the New Testament, 19– 50, for more discussion on the reflection of ethics in language.

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The present passive indicative verb ὑποτάσσεται in Eph 5:24 points to the Church’s submission to Christ as being a model for the wife’s submission to her husband.516 However, it is worth noting that in the Greek text, there is neither an imperative verb commanding, nor a subjunctive verb admonishing wives to submit to their husbands. Many translations deduce a third person imperative (“‘so let wives also be subject’ in everything to their husbands” RSV) or a subjunctive nuance (“‘so also wives should submit’ to their husbands in everything” NIV) as an implied message based on the context, and not an explicit linguistic command to wives to submit to their husbands. On the other hand, however, there is an imperative verb ἀγαπᾶτε (Eph 5:26), commanding husbands to love their wives. Zimmermann rightly argues, on this basis, that Eph 5:21–31 “is not primarily admonishing women, but rather that men are being instructed on their obligation to love.”517 In Titus also, there are no such direct instructions to husbands to love their wives, just as there are no direct imperatives to wives to submit to their husbands. Zimmermann’s argument is valid based on the notion that the first pointer to an ethical instruction is in the language itself. Hence, if the author intended to command wives to submit to their husbands, he would have chosen to use an imperative verb to express that, as he has done for the instruction to men to love their wives. Ὑποτασσόμενοι “submission” in 1 Pet 3:1 has the same linguistic features as ὑποτασσόμενοι in Eph 5:21. Both of them are second person plural present passive participle verbs with an imperatival sense. However, the difference is that while in 1 Peter wives alone are commanded to be submissive to their husbands, in Ephesians both husbands and wives are instructed to be submissive to each other. Titus does not have such an imperatival nuance, as mentioned above. The use of the present passive participle ὑποτασσομένας (“being submissive”) in Titus 2:5 conveys a different nuance as the present passive imperative ὑπο516 See Maier, Picturing Paul in Empire, 164–166. According to Maier, “the Pastorals present the harmoniously functioning household as the blueprint for faithful religious practice and believe.” This is the context of “household codes” that many modern interpreters express their discontent with the Pastorals. The letters repeatedly return to traditional female gender roles as mark of a rightly worshipping and behaving household of God. Mary Rose D’Angelo points that this is more evident in the exhortations for women to marry and have children (1 Tim 2:15; 5:4; Titus 1:11). She links the household codes with “Augustan era marital legislation as well as idealization of the household of Trajan in Pliny’s Panegyric” (cited in Maier, Picturing Paul, 164). Maier notes that ancient Greek writers described the household as the most basic element of civic rule and harmony, and this is the tradition underlying the household codes in the NT and other extracanonical materials (Maier, Picturing Paul, 165). However, the Pastorals expand and adapt “Haustafel topos” in a new and dynamic way by equating a properly governed church with a properly governed household (1 Tim 3:1–12; Titus 1:5–9). In the Pastorals, the household church and imperial ideals have been successfully wedded such that good citizenship, traditional gender performance, and being a Christ-follower had become identical (Maier, Picturing Paul, 166). 517 Zimmermann, “How to Read Biblical Texts Ethically,” 8. See also Manomi, “What does Biblical ‘Exegethics’ Do?” 252.

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τάσσεσθε “be submissive” in Col 3:18. One important difference between the two occurrences is that while in Titus there is no direct command to the younger women (addressed in the third person plural) to submit to their husbands, the wives in Colossians are directly addressed with a passive imperative verb in the second person plural “be submissive.” Moreover, Titus shows that the younger women’s being submissive to their husbands as a virtue should come as a result or as an outcome of the training they shall receive from the older women, not just an arbitrary expectation to be submissive without the necessary training or acquisition of that virtue. This argument is contra Johnson, who says that the subordination of the women in Titus 2:5 “is commanded.”518 There are, however, no linguistic and theological imperatives that warrant describing this exhortation as a command. The difference between a direct imperatival verb, commanding wives to submit to their husbands (Col 3:18) and a passive participle verb encouraging wives to learn and acquire the virtues leading to “being submissive” (Titus 2:5) is significant to our virtue-ethical reading of Titus. It shows how Titus’s account of the household codes is more virtue-ethical than that of Colossians. Ὑποτασσομένας (“being submissive” Titus 2:5) is presented as a virtue to be acquired and creatively applied. Its acquisition is dependent on the training the younger women would receive from the older women. Stated differently, the “submission” of wives to their husbands in Titus is presented as a virtue to be acquired, not a command or rule to be obeyed. There is no concrete ethos for specified moral action(s) in Titus’s account of submission. This research argues further that part of the training of the younger women to “becoming/being submissive” would include how to creatively exhibit the virtue of submission – for example, knowing when, how, or the “limits” of being submissive. This understanding of the virtue of submission, namely, as a virtue to be continuously acquired and creatively applied rather than a code or rule to be arbitrarily and unconditionally obeyed, challenges the popular interpretation of the household codes as rules for action. To a considerable extent, it also gives a balance and serves as a corrective to the male-dominative interpretation and patriarchally-oriented claim to the wife’s submission to her husband519 “in all things” (cf. Eph 5:24). Being a virtue to be acquired continuously and exhibited creatively and positively and not a fixed ethos with a “single-lane” action, it provides some balance to Ephesians’ “in all things” (Eph 5:24).520 Moreover, con518 Johnson,

Letters, 235. Letter to Titus, 129, notes that the unusual chiasm of placing men in both first and last places in Titus 2:2–6 gives a certain precedence and distinction to age, but not sexual differences. Moreover, the chiasm overrules the patriarchal sequence that would have been expected. 520 This is on the basis that both texts (Ephesians and Titus) are regarded as Scripture and normative for Christians, and each one of them should be interpreted in consideration of the other. 519 Quinn,

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sidering the fact that the first on the list of the virtues the younger women are to learn to exhibit is love for their husbands (φιλάνδρους), it suggests that their “being submissive” to their husbands is expected to be a loving submission, not a compelling or legalistic one. c) Extra-Textual Level As a directive illocutionary or speech act,521 the fact that the author introduces the household codes in Titus 2:1–10 with an imperative to “teach” suggests that his primary instruction is not immediate concrete application of the virtues in the household, but teaching, learning, and acquiring the virtues first. Moreover, the fact that the only two imperative verbs used in the household pericope relate to teaching/training/exhorting signals that the main emphasis of the household codes here is not on the virtues mentioned or the groups mentioned, but on Titus and the teaching he is to do. This is what is to be taken at first value, while concerns about how to apply the virtues in real life situations in the household are to be taken at second value, predicated on or as an outcome of the teaching. Part of the things to learn in the process of acquiring the virtues is how to apply them in concrete moral situations creatively. The absence of concrete ethos in Titus’s household virtues supports this argument. Furthermore, the frequent occurrence of εἶναι “to be” in relation to the instructions given to each group shows that the focus is on the morality of persons more than the morality of actions. The use of εἶναι in the present active (tense and voice respectively) also suggests a continuous and developing state of moral “being” of the agents. The author is more interested in the morality of Cretan believers as persons than in the morality of their actions. While Greek-philosophical virtue ethics points only to teaching/training as a means of acquiring virtues,522 the author of Titus points to both human-teaching and divine-teaching as the means of acquiring virtues. But much more, he grounds the possibility of divine-teaching/ training on the Christ-event. The fact that the household virtues are followed immediately by the theological-ethical section of Titus 2:11–14 shows that the household virtues are to be understood in the light of the Christ-event.523 The theological statements in the opening verses (Titus 1:1–4) and in 3:3–7 further support the grounding of all the virtues in Titus on the Christ-event. From the aforementioned linguistic categories, one significant point stands out in relation to the virtue-ethical reading of the text, namely, none of the virtues 521 See

Zimmermann, Logic of Love, 38. Young, Pastoral Letters, 79–84, for more discussion on teaching and learning in the ancient world. 523 Quinn, Letter to Titus, 130, notes that the conspicuous absence of the injunction to honor God or Christ in Titus’s account of the “household codes” is compensated for by adding Titus 2:11–14 “on the faith as the matrix presupposed for all Christian living.” 522 See

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mentioned in the so called “household codes” is presented as an imperative verb, demanding a concrete moral action to be “done.” In other words, in Titus’s account, there are only moral virtues, not moral rules or commands. The linguistic categories of adjectives, adverbs, verbs, and nouns point to virtues to be acquired through training, leading to one’s “being virtuous” over and against mere rules for action. This is a significant point in understanding the ethics of Titus from a virtue-ethical standpoint. 3.5.3 Norms and Maxims for “Being” This research heuristically categorizes norms into two: moral norms and “nonmoral” norms.524 Most norms in the household codes take the forms of either adjectives, thereby qualities to be possessed as opposed to actions to be done, or participles, expressing the nuance of “being” more than “doing.” A few other norms are in other linguistic categories. In this section, we group the virtues according to their different linguistic categories in order to clarify how they fit into the context of virtues to be acquired rather than actions to be performed. Table 2: Participle Verbs in the Household Codes (Titus 2:1–10) Verse Participle

Translation

Nuance: “Being” or “doing”?

2:1

ὑγιαινούσῃ: Pres. Act. Part. Being sound, healthy (Titus’s teaching)

“Being” over “doing”

2:2

ὑγιαίνοντας: Pres. Act. Part.

To be healthy or sound (older men … in faith, love, and perseverance)

“Being” over “doing”

2:3

μὴ δεδουλωμένας: Pres. Pass. Part.

Not to be enslaved to much “Being” over “doing” wine (older women not to be enslaved to much wine) or not being enslaved – one explicated aspect of the virtue of “self-control.”

524 As mentioned earlier, Zimmermann defines a norm as anything (person, idea, material, elements) in an ethical sentence or discourse which argues for or claims what individuals or groups ought to do. For example, the Torah, Paul, righteousness, Kingdom of God, and Jesus could be norms in different contexts. Norms which are not virtues in themselves, e. g. Paul, Titus, age, bishopric, and maxims like “that the word of God may not be blasphemed” (Titus 2:4–5) are what I regard as “non-moral norms” here, in contrast to virtues such as self-control, justice, hospitality, etc. This heuristic differentiation is important because our focus here is not on ethics in general but on virtue ethics in particular. It is, therefore, important to focus only on the norms that qualify as virtues. See Zimmermann, “How to Read Biblical Texts Ethically,” 8. For a more elaborate discussion on ethical norms, see Zimmermann, The Logic of Love, 42–52; idem, Die Logik der Liebe, 55–62.

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Verse Participle

Translation

Nuance: “Being” or “doing”?

2:5

ὑποτασσομένας: Pres. Pass. Being submissive (younger “Being” over “doing” Part. women being submissive to their husbands)

2:9

ὑποτάσσεσθαι: Pres. Pass. Inf.

To be submissive (slaves to be submissive to their masters)

“Being” over “doing”

The second linguistic category are adjectives: Most of the virtues in Titus’s household codes are presented as adjectives connected to the verb εἶναι, whose nuances of “being” over “doing” have been discussed above. They are as follows: νηφαλίους (sober or temperate); σεμνούς (honourable); σώφρονας (self-controlled); μὴ διαβόλους (not slanderous); καλοδιδασκάλους (to be teaching what is good or good-teaching); φιλάνδρους (husband-loving/to love their husbands); φιλοτέκνους (children-loving/to love their children); σώφρονας (self-controlled); ἁγνάς (pure); οἰκουργούς (home-working); ἀγαθάς (good); and εὐαρέστους (well-pleasing). All these describe the “being” more than “doing” of the believers in Crete. The third linguistic category are nouns: πίστει (faith), ἀγάπῃ (love), ὑπομονῇ (perseverance). Other linguistic categories rarely used for the virtues are subjunctive and infinitive verbs. The virtue of self-control through training/teaching is conveyed in σωφρονίζωσιν,525 a present active subjunctive verb526 with a preceding ἵνα, meaning the older women are not to be enslaved to much wine “so that they would exhort/bring back to sense” the younger women. Self-control or “being sensible or considerate” as a virtue is also expressed in the infinitive verb σωφρονεῖν “to be sensible/self-controlled” in relation to young men. Similarly, the virtue of “being submissive” is conveyed in the present passive infinitive ὑποτάσσεσθαι in relation to slaves’ submission to their masters. It is worth reiterating that what is observable from these categories of moral norms is that the household moral norms in Titus, being virtues without concrete ethos, are not norms for action, but norms for “being.” In following the “implicit ethics” methodology, a norm in an ethical sentence is not only concrete ethos for action, but “ist eine Äußerung, die in einem 525 See Smith, Pauline Communities, 339–340; Huizenga, Moral Education, 391 n. 48, for more discussion on this NT hapax legomenon. Huizenga notes that this verb has an important indicative variant as σωφρονίξουσιν, but argues that the ἵνα favors a subjunctive nuance, which is followed in the Pastorals. See Quinn, Letter to Titus, 120. Citing Smyth, Greek Grammar, 866.6, Huizenga further notes that the verb is denominative, denoting action with a transitive sense. In this case, the young women are the objects of the action of the elderly women. This verb will be further discussed below under the section on ethical argumentation. 526 An NT hapax legomenon.

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ethischen Satz bzw. Diskurs einen Sollensanspruch an das Verhalten eines Einzelnen bzw. Einer Gruppe begründet oder die eine Wertzuschreibung vollzieht.”527 In this regard, additional moral norms and maxims are found in Titus 2:1–10. These additional norms are what this research regards as “non-moral” norms for heuristic purposes, in order to differentiate them from norms which directly express moral action or virtue. The first among such “non-moral” norms is “age” as a norm for moral being/ action. The author addresses his audience according to their age groups as πρεσβύτας (elderly men), πρεσβύτιδας (elderly women), νέας (young women), νεωτέρους (young men). Their different ages express or claim what moral virtues they should acquire and exhibit. Age is, therefore, a norm in the sense that it becomes a reason for acquiring and practicing moral virtues. The second one is “gender” as a norm for moral being/action. Giving separate instructions to men and women projects their gender differentiation as a norm for acquiring and practicing certain virtues.528 Social status is also a non-moral norm, which expresses and claims certain virtues from slaves as a social group (Titus 2:9–10). By presenting his apostolic credentials as “Paul, a servant of God and an apostle of Jesus Christ” (Titus 1:1), the author becomes a norm, instructing and claiming what Titus his “genuine son based on a shared faith” (Titus 1:4) ought to do. His claims on Titus are not only in relation to discharging pastoral duties, but also in matters of private life and behavior (Titus 1:5, 13; 2:1, 7–8, 15; 3:1, 8–13). The roles of Titus in Crete, involving teaching and appointing leaders, among others, makes him a norm to the Cretan believers as well. In this case, the author and Titus are norms to the Cretan believers, claiming moral behavior from the groups addressed in the letter. The following maxims are also norms: “So that the word of God would not be blasphemed” (Titus 2:5), “so that the opposing one may turn out to be put to shame once and for all, having nothing bad to say against us” (2:8); and “so that in all things they may make the teaching of God our Savior attractive” (Titus 2:10). Even though these maxims in themselves are not virtues or concrete ethos 527 Zimmermann, Die Logik der Liebe, 56. For the English summary, see Zimmermann, “How to Read Biblical Texts Ethically,” 8. See the English translation of this definition of norm in Zimmermann, Logic of Love, 43: A “‘norm is a pronouncement within an ethical statement or discourse that justifies the claim to an ‘ought’ or sets forth an attribution of value in terms of the conduct of an individual or a group.” 528 As noted above, Quinn, Letter to Titus, 129, however, observes that the unusual chiasm of placing men in both first and last places in Titus 2:2–6 gives a certain precedence and distinction to age, but not to sexual differences. Moreover, the chiasm overrules the patriarchal sequence that would have been expected. While Quinn’s consideration of the chiastic structure is worth considering in relation to whether it is age or gender distinction that is in focus, it does not change the fact that one of the categories for the author’s ethical instruction is gender. Gender is therefore a norm. Nevertheless, as shall be seen below, self-control is a virtue required from both women and men, old and young.

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for action, they express and claim moral actions from young women, Titus,529 and slaves respectively;530 therefore, they qualify as norms. 3.5.4 Moral Agents There are five groups of moral agents in the household codes, with Titus himself as the sixth. The moral agents are categorized into groups based on age (elderly people and young people), gender (elderly men and elderly women, young men and young women), and social status (slaves). The term “elder” here is to be understood in relation to age only, not ecclesiastical office.531 Each group is given different sets of instructions. a) Πρεσβύτας “elderly men” as Moral Agents (Titus 2:2) The elderly men are moral agents of the following virtues: being temperate, honorable, self-control, being healthy in the faith, in love, and in perseverance. Their agency is related more to “being” than “doing” because of the relation between the verb εἶναι and the virtues. b) Πρεσβύτιδας “elderly women” as Moral Agents (Titus 2:2) The moral agency of the elderly women relates to the following virtues: being reverent in behavior, teaching what is good,532 not slanderers, and not enslaved to much wine. The verb σωφρονίζωσιν in Titus 2:4 has two perspectives to the moral agency of the elderly women, connoting not only “being self-controlled,” but “being” and “spurring/exhorting” younger women to be self-controlled, 529 Fiore, Pastoral Epistles, 210, notes that this argumentation is not only for Titus but also for the young men to whom he is to be an example. 530 Knight, Pastoral Epistles, 316. 531 See Quinn, Letter to Titus, 117. Except in Titus 2:2, the term πρεσβύτας occurs only in a singular form in the NT (Luke 1:18; Phlm 9). The feminine version, referring to elderly (old) women in Titus 2:2 πρεσβύτιδας, in biblical Greek, is found only in 4 Macc 16:14. 532 Gilbert Bilezikian, Beyond Sex Roles: What the Bible Says About a Woman’s Place in Church and Family (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1985), 176–177, notes that the composite Greek word καλοδιδασκάλους (Titus 2:3) for women as “teachers of what is good” is a construct that conveys a similar meaning to “teachers of the law.” It connotes specialists who are officially appointed as teachers and are recognized as such in the community. Bilezikian argues that “the fact that one of the attributions of these women teachers was the training of younger women does not limit their teaching to women only” (177). In any case, Bilezikian thinks that the existence of authorized women teachers among the Cretan believers must influence the interpretation of 1 Timothy 2:12 which puts a restriction on women teaching. Margaret Y. MacDonald notes that the women teachers here may have included both older married women and widows. Margaret Y. MacDonald, “Rereading Paul: Early Interpreters of Paul on Women and Gender,” in Women and Christian Origins, ed. Ross S. Kraemer and Mary R. D’Angelo (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 248.

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and by so doing, to “bring them back to their senses.”533 They are to be spurring, exhorting, teaching or training young women to behave well not only by exhortations but also by their own good behavior.534 The nuance of exhorting, training or teaching not only by a didactic means, but also by the exemplary lifestyle of elderly women is in consonance with the “moral exemplar”535 concept of virtue ethics. c) Τάς νέας “the young women” as Moral Agents (Titus 2:5) The young women’s moral agency relates to: loving their husbands and children, being self-controlled, chaste, devoted to domestic works, good, and being submissive to their own husbands.536 They are heteronomous moral agents because their behavior is to be an outcome of the teaching/training (and exemplary lifestyle) they receive from the elderly women. The statement ἵνα μή ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ βλασφημῆται “so that the word of God would not be blasphemed” further shows another aspect of the heteronomous moral agency of the young women. God who is sacred, and whose word is also sacred and should not be blasphemed, serves as an implicit autonomous agent.

533 Winter, Roman Wives, Roman Widows, 154–159, reports the history of interpretation of this verb. He disagrees with the “teach, exhort, train” translations or interpretations. He argues that the fundamental meaning of the verb is to “restore one’s senses” in relation to a particular matter or course of action. He argues further that this verb is to be understood in the light of the excesses occasioned by the freedom Cretan women enjoyed in their popular culture. The young women were prone to follow the popular culture of excessive wine-drinking, sexual immorality, etc., which is why the older women are instructed to “bring them (young women) back to their senses”, i. e. back from neglecting their “primary” household responsibilities and following non-Christian young women. The present research, however, incorporates the two possible interpretations of the verb because they both fit into the context. I argue that the two possible interpretations are the reason the author uses the word, which is not used anywhere else in the NT. 534 Margaret Y. MacDonald thinks the reason why older women are asked to continue teaching younger women in the PE is because the girls were married off at adolescence to older men, thus “it is important to consider their ongoing education by older females throughout the process of a first marriage and the birth of a first child.” She notes further that marriage was the most visible mark of adulthood for girls, but there was only a small difference between a girl child and wife. Margaret Y. MacDonald, “Children in House Churches in the Light of New Research on Families in the Roman World,” in The World of Jesus and the Early Church: Identity and Interpretation in Early Communities of Faith, ed. Craig S. Evans (Peabody: Hendrickson, 2011), 80. 535 Chan, Biblical Ethics in the 21st Century, 84–92. The concept of “moral exemplar” is among the four dimensions of virtue ethics theory. 536 Johnson, Letters, 234, draws attention to the fact that the young women are instructed to submit to their own husbands because there were some other male teachers who were “making inroads into the structure of domestic authority” (cf. Titus 1:11). Similarly, Johnson (ibid.) sees the possibility of powerful external (outside the household) allegiances, which is why slaves are admonished to submit to “their own masters.”

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d) Νεωτέρους “young men” as Moral Agents (Titus 2:6) This research argues that the young men referred to here are to be understood as the husbands of the young women previously addressed.537 This understanding fits into the contrast the author projects by instructing elderly men and elderly women, young women and young men respectively. The young men are moral agents of the norm “being sensible.” They are heteronomous agents like the young women because Titus is to exhort (παρακάλει) them to be sensible, suggesting that Titus is the autonomous agent in this context. However, in the overall context of the letter, Titus is also a heteronomous agent to the author who gives him the instruction. Titus is to exhort or teach the young men to be “sensible.” The next verse (7) notes that Titus is to be an example (to the young men inclusive) “in all things,” in tandem with virtue-ethical moral exemplar. While it is not clear why the author mentions σωφρονεῖν as the only virtue that the younger men need to be exhorted to acquire, this research argues that the author intentionally summarizes the virtues of the young men into a single but broadly applicable term σωφρονεῖν “to be sensible.”538 Σωφρονεῖν provides a sensible, balanced, reasoned, considerate, and friendly relationship of the young husbands to their wives.539 This research argues further that the exhortations Titus is to give to the young husbands “to be sensible” involves their learning to understand and allow a creative exhibition of submission from their wives, and not arbitrarily demanding a legalistic and unconditional submission. A husband’s “being sensible” involves also realizing when it is more appropriate to “submit” to his wife instead of expecting submission from the wife as a rule all the time.540 It can also be argued that by summarizing the instruction to the young men with σωφρονεῖν, the author was culturally sensitive. Facing the dilemma between 537 Quinn, Letter to Titus, 138–139, notes that the correlative ὡσαύτως (similarly) connects the instruction to the young men with that of the young women, and also that the next instruction belongs “to the moral equilibrium of men up to fifty.” This supports the argument that the men in view here are the group of middle-aged men among whom are the husbands of the young women addressed. 538 Knight, Pastoral Epistles, 310, makes an important observation when he says, “in a real sense σωφρονεῖν does not stand alone as the only characteristic asked of the younger men since the ways in which Titus is urged to be an example to them are also traits that they are thereby urged to have.” Knight’s point is further validated when the phrase “in all things/aspects” (Titus 2:7) is taken into consideration. The young men are to follow Titus’s good examples “in all aspects,” thereby implying a broader list of virtues than the ones mentioned for each of the groups. Quinn, Letter to Titus, 138, also notes that among the lists of the aforementioned virtues for different groups, σωφρονεῖν in relation to the young men “receives the widest possible extension.” Barclay, Letters, 251, also describes this instruction to the younger men as a “pregnant” instruction. 539 This interpretation agrees with 1 Pet 3:7, which admonishes husbands to “be considerate as you live with your wives, and treat them with respect …” 540 Quinn, Letter to Titus, 137, notes that while wives are advised to submit to their husbands, there is no directive anywhere in the NT for husbands to subject their wives to themselves (cf. Col 3:19).

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the high status accorded to husbands in a patriarchal541 society where husbands claim their wives’ submission542 on the one hand, and the Christian teaching of the husband’s love and humility towards all people (including his wife) on the other hand, the author presents σωφρονεῖν as a negotiated, condensed, and implicit expression of all the virtues young men (and husbands) needed to acquire and practice.543 In this way, young Christian husbands would be self-controlled, considerate, loving, moderate, and sometimes “submitting” in their relationships with their wives without losing their patriarchal-societal-status. Nevertheless, the main focus of the instructions is that both young men and young women are to be trained to acquire virtues for living in a household that reflects the Christian witness and at the same time earns the respect of outsiders. f) Δούλους “slaves” as Moral Agents (Titus 2:9) The slaves’ moral agency relates to being submissive to their own masters in all things; being pleasing; not speaking against their masters; not hiding back anything for themselves; and demonstrating perfect trust in all things (Titus 2:9– 10).544 They are heteronomous moral agents because they are to behave in these ways based on the instructions they receive from Titus.

541  Young, Pastoral Letters, 113–114, notes how many scholars have suggested that the freedom and charisma which characterized the earliest churches is being “suppressed by progressive patriarchalization” in the Pastorals. 542 Quinn, Letter to Titus, 138, observes that σωφρονεῖν suggested chaste conduct even for pagan men, but that is only one aspect of “being sensible” in Titus. Taking into consideration the instruction to the elderly men which includes “being temperate, honorable, self-controlled, being healthy in the faith, in love, and in perseverance,” one would expect that the list of instructions to the younger men should be longer. Since there are many more instructions to the younger men, the author chooses to give one instruction that encompasses all. 543 Mounce, Pastoral Epistles, 412, rightly notes that instead of listing all the virtues as in the case of other groups, the author summarizes his instruction to the younger men by using the key term of the passage, namely, σωφρονεῖν. The several occurrences of the self-control cognate are to be understood in the light of the description of the Cretans in Titus 1:13. The most appropriate virtue to be inculcated in the light of such misbehavior is, therefore, the virtue of self-control (see Mounce, Pastoral Epistles, 412). Winter, Roman Wives, 151, also says the young men were to have self-control “in all areas of their lives.” 544 While it falls outside the focus of this research to discuss the morality of the approval (or lack of condemnation) of slavery in this verse and in the NT generally, Aquinas’s comment on the subject matter is interesting. He notes that the heresy that believing slaves, having been made sons of God through Christ, should not obey human masters anymore originated among the Jews, and was adopted by some Christians. Aquinas then argues that slavery belongs to justice, and faith in Christ does not abolish justice, but keeps it. Hence, “justice makes some subject to others, but such service regards the body. For now through Christ we are freed from slavery regarding the soul but from neither slavery nor corruption of the body. However, in the future, we shall also be freed from bodily slavery and bodily corruption.”

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g) Titus as a Moral Agent (Titus 2:1, 7–8) Titus’ role in the moral development of the household members is primarily teaching and being a good example. The author instructs him to teach what befits healthy doctrine and to be a standard of good works, integrity, dignity, and healthy speech in all things. Titus is to be regarded on the one hand as a heteronomous agent because his actions are based on the instructions he receives from the author; and on the other hand as an autonomous agent because the behavior of the Cretan believers is to be the outcome of the instruction he gives them. 3.5.5 Ethical Argumentation/Reflection Our task here is to analyze the explicit and implicit means by which the author generates moral significance for the ethical norms in the household pericope and how those argumentations relate or do not relate to virtue ethics. In relation to the elderly men, no ethical argumentation is given (Titus 2:2). Titus is only asked to speak to elderly men to be temperate, honorable, etc. However, as noted above, age is a norm in the household codes. The age of the elderly men, therefore, serves as an implicit argumentation for them to be temperate, honorable, self-controlled, healthy in faith, in love, and in perseverance. Being an implicit ethical argumentation, the text does not explicate how their being elderly is connected to the virtues required of them. However, noting that εἶναι σεμνούς “to be honorable” is a virtue required only of elderly men in this text, it suggests a connection with age-related respectability. Moreover, by addressing the elderly men as a group, the author implicitly argues for the need for them to acquire and practice the virtues that would earn them respect in accordance with their age in a patriarchal society. The ethical argumentation in relation to elderly women (Titus 2:3–4) is introduced by the ἵνα “so that” immediately preceding the verb σωφρονίζωσιν “so that they would exhort and bring back to their senses.” As noted above, this verb inherently implies living a self-controlled545 life on the one hand, and spurring others to live in the same manner on the other hand. The implicit ethical argumentation is that the elderly women are to behave well so that they would be self-controlled enough to exhort, spur, and bring the young women “back to their senses,” with the result that the younger women will be loving their husbands, loving their children, being self-controlled, and so on. The virtue-ethical perspective to this argumentation is the nuance of training for moral development. The implicit nuance of the elderly women as teaching agents being expected to be “in their senses, sensible, or self-controlled” relates 545 Contra Mounce, Pastoral Epistles, 411, who says that although this term belongs to the σωφρον-cognate, it does not carry the cognate’s meaning of “self-control.”

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to their internal546 disposition and rationality. In this way, the emphasis is placed on their “being” rather than their “doing,” corresponding with the virtue-ethical concern with the inner qualities, dispositions, and rationality of moral beings. In relation to young women (Titus 2:4–5), an explicit ethical argument is found in the statement ἵνα μή ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ βλασφημῆται “so that the word of God would not be blasphemed.”547 The author generates moral significance for the young women to be self-controlled, chaste, devoted to domestic works, good, and being submissive to their own husbands by appealing to the sanctity of the word of God. The word of God could be blasphemed by outsiders if the young women do not live an ethically appropriate lifestyle. This missional ethical argumentation leans towards the deontological and consequentialist ethical theories, as noted above. It is a deontological ethical argumentation in the sense that the sacredness of the word of God is a reason for acquiring the enumerated virtues. On the other hand, it is categorized under the consequential ethical argumentation in the sense that the expected negative result of not acquiring the virtues (namely, causing outsiders to blaspheme the word of God) becomes a reason for acquiring the virtues. If the young women become virtuous, the word of God will be respected by outsiders. If they do not become virtuous, the word of God will be blasphemed. However, both the deontological and consequential ethical argumentations here are not virtue-ethical in the sense that they do not relate to the “being” of the agents or what they would become if they inculcate and practice the virtues. Instead, external factors, namely, the word of God and respectability before outsiders are invoked to generate moral significance. Even though virtue ethics has elements of consequentialist teleology and there is a teleological element to this argumentation, it does not fit into the virtue-ethical perspective of teleology548 because it is detached from the “being” of the moral agent. Virtueethical teleology is agent-based teleology in the sense that it looks forward primarily to what kind of person one would be or become as a result of acquiring and practicing the virtue(s).549 546 Quinn, Letter to Titus, 313, associates the virtue σωφροσύνη with the σωτήρ cognate, and notes that the σωφρο-terminology for virtue “illustrates how the health bestowed by salvation is linked to the internal moral character that emanates from the healing.” 547 Fiore, Pastoral Epistles, 209, describes this and other similar maxims (cf. Titus 2:5, 8, 10) as “the apologetic purpose for including the material.” Balch also argues that the NT household codes are apologetic responses to outsiders’ criticism. See David L. Balch, “Household Codes,” in Greco-Roman Literature and the New Testament: Selected Forms and Genres, ed. David E. Aune (Atlanta, GA: Scholar Press, The Society of Biblical Literature, 1988), 29. 548 There are non-virtue-ethical concepts of teleology, which are found in the consequentialist ethical theory, and the ethical argumentation for the young women to be self-controlled best fits the consequentialist teleology more than the virtue-ethical one. 549 See Harrington and Keenan, Paul and Virtue Ethics, 3. See also Van Hooft, “Introduction,” in The Handbook of Virtue Ethics, 2–3. See Hauerwas, “Virtue,” 648–650. Also see

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A similar ethical argumentation to that of the young women is expressed in relation to the slaves. Titus is to instruct them to be submissive to their own masters in all things, to be pleasing, not speaking against their masters; not hiding back anything for themselves; but demonstrating perfect trust in all things, “so that in all things they may make the teaching of God our Savior attractive” (Titus 2:9–10). The missional nuance of making the Christian doctrine attractive to outsiders becomes the reason for acquiring and practicing the virtues. This argumentation also does not express a virtue-ethical concern directly. Similar to the elderly men above, no ethical argumentation is given in relation to the young men (2:6), whom Titus is to exhort to be “sensible/self-controlled.”550 However, if we understand the statement “so that the opposing one may turn out to be put to shame once and for all” (Titus 2:8) to apply also to the young men in verse 7, then the ethical argumentation related to the concept of shame and honor applies to the young men along with Titus.551 3.5.6 Reflected Ethos In “implicit ethics,” ethos has to do with “lived ethics,” focusing on the relationship between “observations and description in a scriptural text and actual practice.”552 Zimmermann categorizes “ethos” into descriptive-ethos-reference, which has to do with a reflective consideration of recurrent behavior, and prescriptive-ethos-reference, which resolves a recurrent behavior by prescribing a new and concrete behavior to be done in similar situations. Such a prescribed behavior or moral action emerges as an ethos, a conventional concrete behavior or action expected in similar moral situations.553 Chan, Biblical Ethics in the 21st Century, 78–96, for more discussions on the characteristics of virtue ethics, which teleology is one. 550 As noted above, this is a gap that requires further investigation into why there are ethical argumentations for the feminine gender, but there are none for the masculine. However, Verner’s description of the individual exhortations in the “household codes” as “scheme” and Balch’s description as “topos” could help in this regard. See David C. Verner, The Household of God: The Social World of the Pastoral Epistles, SBL Dissertation Series 71 (California: Scholar Press, 1983), 84–91. See also David E. Aune, Greco-Roman Literature and the New Testament: Selected Forms and Genres (Atlanta, GA: Scholar Press, The Society of Biblical Literature, 1988), 36. 551 See Fiore, Pastoral Epistles, 210, for a description of how shame and honor plays out in this verse. 552 Zimmermann, “How to Read Biblical Texts Ethically,” 16. For a more detailed discussion, see Zimmermann, The Logic of Love, 82–89, and Zimmermann, Die Logik der Liebe, 109–116. 553 Zimmermann, “How to Read Biblical Texts Ethically,” 15–16. Zimmermann here cites 1 Cor 6:12–20 as an example of how Paul reflects on a moral issue (sexual immorality) in Corinth and arrives at an ethos, giving a concrete line of action for them to “flee from sexual immorality.”

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This research finds no concrete prescriptive-ethos-reference in Titus’s household virtues. The only ethos which comes close to a concrete action is the instruction to elderly women not “to be enslaved to much wine” (Titus 2:3). We do not know much about the state of the congregation in Crete, however, following Winter’s reading of this instruction regarding modest drinking of wine against the background of the description of the Cretans as “lazy gluttons”554 (Titus 1:13) and the pre-conversion state of the believers as “serving various lusts and pleasures” (Titus 3:3), this reflected ethos could be understood as a newly created or institutionalized prescriptive ethos with future implications rather than a descriptive reflection on an already extant or conventional ethos.555 Moreover, the reason or the expected outcome of this instruction, namely, to exhort or bring the younger women to their senses (so they would love their husbands, children, etc. in a Christian context) could suggest a new non-conventional prescriptive ethos. Nonetheless, it could also be argued that this reflected ethos is a reference to a conventional norm, if we assume that in a normal household situation in antiquity, it was customary for older women to teach and exhort younger women, and would, therefore, be required to be in their “senses” to be able to do that, hence the instruction not to be enslaved to much wine. In any case, we have only tried to differentiate between an extant or a new future-oriented ethos for heuristic purposes, enabling us to imagine the nature of the congregation and the wider culture behind the ethos. However, it is noteworthy that even this prescriptive ethos to elderly women not to be enslaved to much wine is only one explicated aspect of the overarching virtue of self-control. This is no surprise because the author instructs the elderly men and young women to be self-controlled but does not mention self-control in the instruction to elderly women. Instead, he explicates one aspect of selfcontrol, namely, “not to be enslaved to much wine.” This explicated and applied aspect of a broadly applicable virtue of self-control, therefore, replaces the virtue of self-control in relation to elderly women. Even though it could be regarded as a reflected ethos, “not to be enslaved to much wine” is not regarded as a reflected ethos in the concrete sense of it. It does not prohibit drinking wine but instructs that the elderly women should not be enslaved to it. What would be described as “being enslaved to much wine” would be different in different contexts and to different people. 554 See Winter, Roman Wives, 152–154, for a discussion on the cultural background to the instruction to elderly women not to be enslaved to much wine. Like other household virtues and vices, Winter understands this instruction in connection with the comment in Titus 1:12–13 about Cretans being “unceasingly liars, evil wild animals, and lazy gluttons” (traditionally credited to Epimeides, though not mentioned in Titus). 555 See Zimmermann, The Logic of Love, 87, for example regarding sex with prostitutes in 1 Cor 6.

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3.5.7 Range of Application Even though Titus and the believers in Crete are the primary addressees of the letter, the household virtues as construed in this research have universal applicability, predicated on these three factors: first, the fact that they are “household virtues” for acquisition and application, not “household rules” for concrete action, gives them universal applicability. They are virtues to be acquired through training and to be appropriated in different contexts creatively, not rules to be obeyed arbitrarily. In other words, in Titus’s household instructions, there are only virtues to acquire, not rules to obey.556 This is evident by the absence of concrete ethos in the text. Second, the theological statements succeeding the household virtues (Titus 2:11–14) ground the virtues on the Christ-event, thereby giving them universality. Moreover, the ethical agendum of the whole letter (Titus 1:1–5a), the theological statements in Titus 2:11–14 and towards the end of the letter (Titus 3:3–7) point to the universal applicability of the virtues. Third, the fact that almost all groups that constitute the household (except children, cf. Titus 2:4) are addressed gives the virtues universal applicability. 3.5.8 Reflections for Appropriating the “Household Codes” Chapter four of this study is committed to hermeneutical appropriations of the selected virtues analyzed in chapter three. However, we will reflect on how the household codes could be applied today in this section because chapter four will be committed only to appropriating self-control, justice, godliness, and good works into an African context. a) Reflections for General Appropriation The variations in the kinds of virtues and the levels of emphases given to different groups557 in Titus 2:1–10 is due to the patriarchal and gender-sensitive cultural milieu and the internal realities within the Cretan church from which the text emerged. Nevertheless, this research finds a prevailing “common” virtue that is required of each group irrespective of age or gender, namely, “self-con556 See also Michael F. Bird, “What Do We Do with the Household Codes today?” in The Gender Conversation: Evangelical Perspectives on Gender, Scripture, and the Christian Life, ed. Edwina Murphy and David Starling (Eugene, OR: Morling Press, 2016), 72, who, in his summary, notes that “the household codes cannot be applied in a static fashion to our own time; rather, they must be appropriated in light of some cultural hermeneutics.” 557 For example, there are over five virtues related to young women (Titus 2:4–5) but only one virtue related to young men (Titus 2:6). Towner, The Goal of Our Instruction, 161, argues that in Titus, living up to the ethical expectations of believers (e. g. self-control) is grounded on and made possible by the Christ-event as represented in Titus 2:11–14, and this is what distinguishes it from similar instructions from the author’s Hellenistic counterparts.

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trol.”558 This, therefore, implies that in this text, self-control is the virtue that is not so much patriarchalized, gendered, or limited to a certain age group. Self-control is presented as a general virtue that ensures proper function of the household. This fact is not reflected in most discussions related to the “household codes.” Such discussions, both in academic and non-academic circles, have been dominated by the argument about submission of wives to their husbands, as noted above. However, the virtue-ethical reading adopted in this research has shown how Titus pays little attention to the issue of submission but pays greater attention to self-control.559 Among all the virtues in Titus’ household, self-control, therefore, emerges as a key560 virtue with the highest potentiality for universal applicability. This argument is strengthened, moreover, by the fact that among all the virtues, σωφροσύνη has the highest number of occurrences.561 Furthermore, the fact that self-control is one of the three cardinal virtues listed in Titus 2:12 indicates its currency in the author’s ethical perspective. This, therefore, provides a model 558 Some of the instructions related to self-control are implicit, and in other cases, only one applicable aspect of self-control is explicated. For example, instead of commanding the elderly women to be “self-controlled,” they are to be instructed not to be “enslaved to much wine” (Titus 2:3–4). 559  Quinn, Letter to Titus, 129–130, argues that the derivative σώφρον “sensible” found in relation to the four groups addressed shows the importance of the self-control code, reflective of its centrality in Greek ethics. He therefore proposes that “the repeated urging of subordination upon wives and slaves (Titus 2:5, 9) ought itself to be subordinated to the common sense urged even more frequently.” 560 See Huizenga, Moral Education, 202–213, for a discussion on the centrality of this virtue in the Pythagorean letters, especially as it relates to women. She notes that in the “good woman topos,” the virtue of σωφροσύνη “would be placed at the center of a woman’s very person” (Huizenga, Moral Education, 209). Σωφροσύνη was to be demonstrated primarily in the context of the household, especially in the woman’s sexual faithfulness to her husband (Huizenga, Moral Education, 207). It functioned as the woman’s “home-base, functioning as both the beginning and the ending of her life-journey” (Huizenga, Moral Education, 205). The centrality of σωφροσύνη in Titus’ household virtues is evident in its frequent occurrence and application (implicit and explicit) to all the household groups. Huizinga argues that based on ancient sources, even though σωφροσύνη is a virtue for both men and women, it is “more for a woman than for a man and plays a more integrative role in her moral development” (Huizenga, Moral Education, 211). While the integrative role of σωφροσύνη is traceable in Titus, its application is more in relation to men than women, contrary to Huizenga’s conclusion based on the ancient sources she consulted (cf. Titus 1:8; 2:2; 3–5, 6). 561  Smith notes that the repeated need for Christians to learn self-control and live moderately and sensibly (Titus 1:6; 2:2, 4, 5) suggests conforming to this content would have distinguished Christians from Cretan society (cf. Titus 1:12). Smith, Pauline Communities, 285, citing Winter, Roman Wives, 144–45. See Winter, Roman Wives, 141–169, for a discussion on the cultural background of Crete, especially in relation to women’s freedom, which influences the ethics in Titus 2:2–6. Winter argues that Cretan women enjoyed a greater deal of freedom than women in any other part of the Greco-Roman world, even before the Roman rule of Crete. Such freedom bred a culture of excessiveness in relation to drinking, sexual activities, and so on, among Cretan women. It is from this background that the emphasis on self-control in Titus is to be understood, because it was the virtue that could distinguish Christians from others.

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for appropriating the household virtues into contemporary household ethics in different contexts.562 In a society with comparably less gender-sensitive household ethics, an attempt at appropriation should start from and focus on the “common” virtues that apply to all the household members, such as self-control in this context. b) Reflections for Appropriation into an African Context In an attempt to appropriate Titus’s household virtues into an African Christian context, self-control is therefore the central virtue to start from and build on. This means laying emphasis where Titus lays emphasis. If husbands, wives, and young people are all strategically taught to acquire and practice the virtue of self-control or “being sensible” as exemplified in Titus, most of the vices that characterize marriages in Africa would be greatly reduced. For example, wifebattering, domestic violence, adultery (and sometimes divorce as a resultant effect) would be greatly reduced in households where self-control is a central virtue. Titus presents a set of household virtues that shift attention from the maledominated and patriarchal-oriented virtues such as the wife’s submission to her husband to the mutual virtue of self-control. This study, therefore, follows Titus in calling for a shift in focus from the much debated and patriarchalculture-inspired argument regarding wives’ submission to their husbands, both in academic and ecclesiastical circles, to a focus on the virtue of self-control (first among others), which promotes mutual, sensible, and understanding relationships among members of the household. Submission can mutually exist between couples within the framework of self-control, while self-control can hardly exist within the framework of a one-sided submission, as has been the common emphasis. Centralizing self-control rather than submission, as Titus does, the socalled “household codes” would no longer be regarded as a “text of terror” but a text of honor and even a text of tenor563 for African families. However, Titus’s household virtues are in tension with some aspects of household ethics in Africa. For example, the wife’s submission is understood generally as a rule to be unconditionally and uncritically obeyed in many African cultures. However, Titus shows that submission is a virtue to be acquired as an internal disposition and character and to be lovingly and creatively practiced in the con562 Portefaix similarly proposes that instead of simply considering the instructions concerning women’s roles as valid for all Christian women of all periods, thereby causing oppression, they should be “read and appreciated as an attempt at contextualization in a situation when evolving Christian communities had to adjust themselves to conditions dictated for them by an oppressive regime.” Portefaix, “‘Good Citizenship’ in the Household of God,” 157–158. 563 “Tenor” is used here figuratively. Just like the musical tenor provides a melodious sound that balances other vocal parts, so also the virtue of self-control functions in a household context to provide a balanced, mutual, and understanding relationship among family members.

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text of other virtues such as love. Titus also shows that the husband’s relationship to his submissive wife should be characterized by being sensible, self-controlled, and considerate, which encompasses love, kindness, and understanding in relating with the wife. Approaching the household codes as rules to be obeyed instead of virtues to be desired and acquired makes the virtues seem like burdens instead of blessings. As burdens, they create the possibility for the reluctant “stronger” members of the household to manipulate the “weaker” members selfishly. This is the case in many African cultures, where what was generally regarded as the responsibility of the husbands (e. g. providing food for the family) has to a large extent been abdicated to the wives.564 From a virtue-ethical standpoint, this study proposes that, rather than being approached as “household codes” with deontological and consequentialist argumentations, the virtues be approached and taught as “household virtues” where one sees his responsibilities as desirable virtues to be acquired and practiced, leading to human flourishing, and not rules to be reluctantly obeyed. Virtue ethics as a theory is to a large extent eudaemonist, aspiring for personal and other-regarding human flourishing by acquiring and practicing the virtues. Any appropriation of the virtues without a kind of “eudaemonist framework”565 is, therefore, a reduced version of virtue ethics theory.566 This is a perspective from which African Christian ethics could approach and appropriate the household virtues. Being virtues, practicing them leads to becoming a more virtuous person and living a more flourishing life. It also leads to flourishing families and communities. In this sense, for example, the husband sees the expectation on him to provide for the family not as rule and therefore burden to be reluctantly fulfilled, but as a virtue and a means to growth in the virtue of hard work. He, therefore, joyfully works hard to flourish in his family responsibilities, just as he desires to flourish in other aspects of life. If such a concept of eudaimonia is integrated into teachings on Christian family life in African churches, theological colleges, etc., it has the potential to promote peaceful and flourishing family relationships.

564 From my personal experience living in over ten different villages in Northern Nigeria as a Pastor’s child, and later working as a Pastor myself, there are growing concerns that men have abandoned their responsibilities of providing food and other needs for the family to the women. In such villages, one sees how men gather under trees playing chess and cards while their wives and children go to farm to earn a living. This is a case of manipulating responsibilities to the disadvantage of the “weaker” ones because the “stronger” ones consider the virtues as burdens or rules rather than virtues. 565 Annas, “Virtue Ethics,” 531. 566 Annas, “Virtue Ethics,” 531.

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Virtues are considerably gendered in many African cultures. However, in virtue ethics theory, the virtues are not considered in a “piecemeal”567 way but in unity. One implication of the unity of the virtues is that the virtues are not emphatically gendered. The man who possesses the “manly or masculine”568 virtue of courage or hard work is also aware that he needs to acquire the “womanly or feminine” virtue of tender care, compassion, and humility. In this framework, the household becomes a platform for the husband to learn humility and compassion by practicing these virtues in relating with his wife and children. Having learned (by practice) the virtues from home, such a husband will be seen practicing such “feminine” virtues outside the home, in his relation to all people. In this way, the society becomes a loving and better place to live for everyone, because everyone is committed to learning, acquiring, and practicing noble virtues. Similarly, the household becomes a platform for the wife to acquire and practice the “masculine” virtue of courage by, for example, unequivocally expressing her dissatisfaction or even protesting her husband’s misuse of his patriarchal privileges to her disadvantage and that of the children. Nevertheless, they all learn, acquire, and practice these virtues with loving self-control, being the piloting virtue. In this way, both the husband and the wife move from simply obeying household rules to living a virtuous life in the household. 3.5.9 Summary of the Virtue-Ethical Perspectives of the “Household Codes” in Titus This research discovers five virtue-ethical perspectives in Titus’s household virtues. First, Titus presents virtues for acquisition and not rules for action. Second, the verbs and the virtues all relate to the morality of persons more than the morality of actions. Third, all the virtues are related to inner dispositions more than external actions. Fourth, the means of acquiring and developing the virtues is teaching or training for character development. Fifth, older members of the household serve as moral exemplars to the younger ones. In conclusion, the so-called “household codes” in Titus significantly bear a virtue-ethical approach to ethics. A careful reading of the linguistic elements of the text suggests that the virtues, contrary to popular opinion, are not rules for moral action but virtues for character acquisition, development, and appropriation. The text focuses more on the “being” than “doing” of the moral agents. Considered from this standpoint, Titus’s household codes could be appropriated in contemporary contexts as a “text of honor” instead of a “text of terror.” This, 567 Annas, “Virtue Ethics,” 531, says that the virtuous person and the virtues are connected with the end (telos). And it is this unity that displaces the consideration of the virtues in a “piecemeal” way. 568 “Womanly and manly” virtues are mentioned here only in reference to general perception, but not the opinion of this research.

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therefore, provides an interpretive and appropriative paradigm to other NT accounts of the “household codes.” 3.5.10 Summary and Conclusion In this chapter, we have analyzed σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, εὐσέβεια, καλὰ ἔργα, and the household codes virtue-ethically, applying the exegethics methodology for the selected norms and the “implicit ethics” methodology for the “household codes.” Through the virtue-ethical reading, this study finds that all the characteristics of virtue ethics discussed in chapter one of this study find representation in the use of the selected norms in the letter to Titus. The norms express virtueethical characteristics as follows: a sense of a moral telos; more emphasis on the character, habits, and inner dispositions of moral persons more than the morality of actions; a concern for human flourishing or human good. Other characteristics include a sense of moral perfectionism in the sense of a call for continuous moral growth and concern with every aspect of life as morally relevant; a sense of particularity of the moral agents; the concept of moral exemplar; a concern for moral development through training or education; and a sense of the moral significance of the community. Being the main chapter of this research, the central argument here is that the prevalence and centrality of these virtue-ethical features in Titus, except for a few non-virtue-ethical instances, makes the ethical perspective of the entire letter virtue-ethical. On this basis, it is justified to describe the letter to Titus as a “virtue-ethical text.” The next chapter focuses on the hermeneutical appropriation of the virtues discussed in this chapter into an African context.

Chapter 4

Appropriating the Virtue-Ethical Perspective of Titus into African Ethics: Hermeneutical, Contextual, and Ethnological Reflections This chapter appropriates the findings of the virtue-ethical analysis of the letter to Titus in chapter three of this research. It demonstrates the complexities involved in appropriating biblical ethics through a synthesis of four-layered structure and methodologies. The first layer describes African ethics using the Four S Schema methodology, seeking to understand the place of virtue in African ethics within the purview of the sources, senses, symbols, and services of character. The second layer summarizes the virtue-ethical perspectives of Titus, as analyzed in chapter three, in order to maintain the flow of thought in this chapter. The third layer analyzes the tandems and tensions between the virtue-ethical perspectives of Titus and that of African ethics. Through a synthesis of the two virtue-ethical perspectives (Titus and African ethics), the fourth layer engages the Progressive-Negotiated-Ethics methodology and emerges a third-horizon virtue-ethical perspective that is at once accountable to the biblical text (Titus) and relevant to African Christian ethics.

4.1 A Description of African Ethics and its Virtue-Ethical Perspectives In this section, the Four S Schema methodology will be applied. The four S represent the questions this section seeks to answer: What is the source of virtue in African ethics? What senses of virtue are in African ethics? What symbols are employed to represent those virtues? And what service does virtue do to individuals and community? In order words, how does virtue serve individual and community telos? The Four S Schema methodology helps to delineate and limit the boundaries of this section, making it possible to discuss only relevant information. Moreover, the Four S in this chapter, on the one hand, provide a connection with the definition of virtue ethics as employed and explained in chapter one of this book, which also anchors around the Four S. On the other hand, it provides a connection with chapter three (the main chapter of the study), which discusses different aspects of the sources, senses, symbols, and services of virtue in different aspects of the letter to Titus, but under the exegethics methodology.

268 Chapter 4: Appropriating the Virtue-Ethical Perspective of Titus into African Ethics Furthermore, exploring the concepts of virtue in African ethics within the purview of the four S will help provide a general background to African ethics, which will enable us to understand the actual negotiations, concessions, and appropriations that need to be done between African ethics and biblical ethics. However, it is noteworthy that the four S overlap with each other, and therefore are not intended to be taken as distinct and independent. Their categorization here is for heuristic purposes. 4.1.1 Preliminary Considerations Consequent to the absence of a single text to refer to as the sacred text for African religion(s) and ethics due to its extant oral status, this section discusses the various contributions of scholars on African ethics based on the relation of their opinions to any of the Four S categorization. Our discussion of the Four S here is ethnological in the sense that the information regarding the sources, senses, symbols, and services of character are generated from ethnic groups and their worldviews. While such cultural understandings and worldviews apply to many other African tribes in most cases, they are unique in other cases. Moreover, I will include my own experiences,1 critical remarks, and opinion in the course of this discussion. Furthermore, some aspects of African ethics that relate with the ethical perspectives of the letter to Titus will be mentioned here, while the tandems and tensions between the two ethical perspectives as it relates to the four virtues discussed in chapter three will be analyzed below.

1 While it is impossible to capture all my life experiences that have formed my knowledge and judgment regarding African ethics, it is, nevertheless, possible to mention a little about my background, so as to give an insight into the natural and social factors that have shaped what constitutes my “experience.” I am a Nigerian, born and grew up in Northern Nigeria, in a Christian family and community. I have lived in six different villages that speak the Zaar language and two Nigerian cities, thereby giving me an insight into how culture and ethics operates both in rural and urban areas. Moreover, my studies from primary school to University level in constant interaction with people from other tribes and parts of Nigeria provides me further insight into Nigerian culture and ethics.

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4.2 The Four S Schema: Sources, Senses, Symbols, and Services of Character in African Traditional Religion

Sources

Services

Four “S” Schema

Senses

Symbols

Figure 3: The Four S Schema

4.2.1 Sources of Character “Source” here refers not only to abstract ideas of the origin of character or virtue but also to institutions and processes of acquiring and/or developing virtue. What are the sources of character? What do Africans perceive as the source of one’s character or virtue? Is character viewed as hereditary or not? Does virtue emanate from a divine source or not? What roles do family, community, and rites of passage play in character development or virtue acquisition? a) Divine Source(s) of Character in African Ethics Paulinus Odozor notes that it is a widespread concept in African Traditional Religion (ATR) that each person “incarnates in the land through the creative act of the protective (dynamic) spirit assigned to the person by God.” That “dynamic

270 Chapter 4: Appropriating the Virtue-Ethical Perspective of Titus into African Ethics protective spirit” is known among the Igbo people of Nigeria as chi; among the Yorubas of Nigeria as ori; among the Ewe or the Asante of Ghana as ka or kre; in Ancient Egypt as ka.2 Of particular relevance to the question of the source of character is that among the Igbos, it is known that “a person receives his portion in life, even his character, as an endowment from his chi even before he enters into the world.”3 However, the person also has a say or choice in his destiny, and can sometimes disagree with chi.4 This signals that some African ethnic groups consider one’s character as originated from, or determined by a divine, supernatural source, but with the possibility for human will and interference in its function in practical life. Similarly, Segun Gbadegesin notes that among the Yorubas, iwa “character,” originally meaning “the fact of being, living, or existence,” is probably the most important moral concept, because a person is morally evaluated, positively or negatively, based on it.5 Gbadegesin reports a Yoruba myth which regards iwa (as both character and existence) as the creation of the deity who originates life. In this concept, one’s character is believed to be derived from one’s existence or creation by the deity. Character, in this case, is the “cosmetic” or adornment of existence. As adornment, good character could fade or turn bad, due to several factors such as tragedies.6 It is on this account that moral education finds its essence. In order to avoid the tragedy of a good character turning bad, “there is the need for character training from the beginning so that the cosmetic of iwa (character) may have time to sink into the core of iwa (existence) very early in life.”7 This moral concept among the Yorubas testifies to the complexities of moral reasoning in African cultures, which goes beyond mere taboos and communal rules as commonly assumed. Regarding ethical consciousness, rationality, and reasoning, Elechi Amadi holds that there is no precise and scientific definition of goodness or virtue because it varies from one society to another.8 In this regard, “to question the

2 Paulinus I. Odozor, Morality Truly Christian, Truly African: Foundational, Methodological, and Theological Considerations (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2014), 209, citing Lochukwu Uzukwu, A Listening Church: Autonomy and Communion in African Churches (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1996), 36–37. 3 Odozor, Morality, 209–210. 4 Odozor, Morality, 209–210. 5 Segun Gbadegesin, “Individuality, Community, and the Moral Order,” in The African Philosophy Reader, ed. P. H. Coetzee and A. P. J. Roux (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 303–304. 6 Gbadegesin, “Individuality, Community, and the Moral Order,” 304. 7 Gbadegesin, “Individuality, Community, and the Moral Order,” 305. 8 It seems that while the Western world has “pluralistic ethical individuals” (different individuals with different lifestyles and justifications for it), the African world has “pluralistic ethical communities” (different communities with different lifestyles). This underscores the communal nature of African ethics over and against an individual ethics.

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ethical behaviour of a people and to expect a rational answer [as to its source or sense] is largely futile.”9 b) Natural Law as Source of Character in African Ethics Some scholars argue that there is the concept of natural law in African ethics. Odozor, for example, argues that even though the community is central to African ethics, African persons and societies have a sense of the natural law and do not all share one and the same “monolithic” way of moral reasoning or making moral decisions. The moral reasoning and the world of Africans at large are as complex as in other parts of the world, and they bring many factors into consideration in moral reasoning. He concludes that “traditional African moral reasoning is partly deontological, partly teleological, and partly everything else, depending on the issue at stake, the view of God the individual has, and the understanding of the human good in question which needs to be preserved, articulated, or enhanced.”10 This description of African moral reasoning is similar to Grudem’s description of Christian ethics, mentioned above, that Christian ethics combines deontological, teleological, and virtue-ethical insights.11 Similarly, Bolaji E. argues for the concept of the natural law in African ethics. In his famous book on African traditional religion titled Olodumare, he asserts that people’s knowledge of goodness or virtue is intuitively God-given, and “has always been part of human nature.”12 He thinks the experience of morality comes before theory. In his words, the sense of right and wrong “was there first, before man began to find the reasons why certain modes of behaviour should be preferred to certain others, and the reasons given are often little more than rationalization.”13 He then lists some God-given virtues of the Yoruba ethnic group to include chastity, hospitality, kindness, truthfulness, and the capacity to exercise restraint from theft.14 While Idowu argues that character or virtue is God-given, he does not address the questions that arise from such a conclusion, such as why are there significantly different and sometimes contradicting virtues in different African communities? How does African religion and ethics explain the origin and existence of vices as opposites of virtues, if virtues are simply God-given?15 Never 9 Elechi Amadi,

52.

10 Odozor,

Ethics in Nigerian Culture (Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books, 1982),

Morality, 250. Christian Ethics, 43. 12 Bolaji E. Idowu, Olodumare: God in Yoruba Belief (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), 146. See also Amadi, Ethics in Nigerian Culture, 51–52. 13 Idowu, Olodumare, 146, cited in Amadi, Ethics in Nigerian Culture, 51–52. 14 Amadi, Ethics in Nigerian Culture, 52, citing Idowu, Olodumare, 146. 15 This research does not attempt to answer these questions either, but to mention them in order to demonstrate the inadequacy of scientific discussions and information on the source of character in African ethics. 11 Grudem,

272 Chapter 4: Appropriating the Virtue-Ethical Perspective of Titus into African Ethics theless, Odozor’s concept of chi, mentioned above, being the divinely endowed portion and character of a person, but with a possibility of human interference,16 implicitly explains the source of evil character, namely, the human will acting against his divinely endowed chi. c) Two Foundational Values in African Ethics Thaddeus Metz’s identification of the foundational values in African ethics also give a clue to the source of virtue. He identifies two foundational values for virtue in sub-Saharan Africa as community and vitality.17 The concept of Ubuntu as a famous concept among the Nguni speakers in southern Africa, and now famous across the continent, is grounded on the idea that human beings share certain natures, but also have certain natures that are distinctively human and of higher quality than the animals. Therefore, “one’s basic aim in life should be to develop the valuable features of human nature, or to exhibit ubuntu, humanness.”18 When one is said to have Ubuntu, it means he/she is “generous, hospitable, friendly, caring, and compassionate.”19 Criticizing someone for inappropriate behavior, people could say that “he is not a person” or even “he is an animal;”20 in other words, he does not have Ubuntu. d) The “African Personality” and its Relevance to the Source of Virtue This sub-section appropriates Johnson Sofola’s concept of the African personality into understanding the source of virtue and moral agency of African persons. Coming from a social sciences background, Sofolo defines personality to refer to the organization of attitudes and values of an individual which constitute a pattern that the individual is identified with. At the foundational level of this definition of personality is a basic, more stable and difficult-to-change aspect of a person’s personality which is often referred to as one’s “characterstructure.”21 The basic factor which informs and defines one’s personality is the social structure, or in broader terms, the culture in which one is socialized. It is in this context that one can talk about an “African personality,” meaning one whose organization of attitudes and values are shaped by and identified with distinctively African cultural features.22 In Sofola’s words,

16 Odozor,

Morality, 209–210. “The Virtue of African Ethics,” 276–284. 18 Metz, “The Virtue of African Ethics,” 277. 19 Metz, “The Virtue of African Ethics,” citing Tutu 1999:34. 20 Metz, “The Virtue of African Ethics,” citing Letseka 2000:186; Dandala 2009:260. 21 J. A. Sofola, African Culture and the African Personality: What Makes an African Person African (Ibadan: African Resources Publishers, 1973), 1. 22 Sofola, African Culture and the African Personality, 1–10. 17 Metz,

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The ‘African personality’ is reflected in those cultural characteristics which are distinctively African, the African common denominator of culture, so to speak, be it the implicit idea which can be likened to an innate spirit, or the practical manifestations of these ideas as can be seen in the African social institutions of family, systems of economy and government, the African arts, the music, the works of art, the philosophy, etc., and even the mode of dressing.23

By this definition, Sofola implies that the cultural environment, in other words, the community, is the source of one’s character or virtue. His idea of culture is that it is the acquired system of behavior, beliefs, ideas, and the artifacts shared by a people which are socially transmitted from generation to generation.24 This, by implication, shows that the community in African culture is not only the source of character but its determinant and regulator. Describing the social and communal nature of African culture further, Sofola notes that even marriage between a man and a woman is more between two families or lineages than two individuals.25 Marriage is viewed as a union of two lineages for the purpose of “procreation, companionship, assistantship etc. and the continuity of that relationship,” which is quite different from the Western view of marriage as basically a union of two individuals.26 The emphasis on the communal nature of African ethics and its relevance to virtue ethics will be discussed below. Sofola identifies some core cultures of Africa which form the contents, ingredients or building blocks of the African personality and character, which could be summarized as follows: emphasis on wholesome relationships among people and altruism;27 respect for elders for moral reasons and human worth; community fellow-feeling reflected in the communal land tenure and ownership; 23 Sofola,

African Culture and the African Personality, 4. African Culture and the African Personality, 5. Sofola partially disagrees that Africa has no single culture, in favor of the argument that there are certain cultural denominators or characteristics that permeate the different African cultures. While he argues that there are many of such distinctively and generally African cultural denominators, he identifies one and most important of them, namely, the communal or social nature of African ethics. In his words, he asserts that all African cultures “commonly agreed that collectivity of life is the order in African societies” (ibid., 4). 25 See Francis-Xavier S. Kyewalyanga, Traditional Religion, Custom, and Christianity in Uganda (Freiburg: Freiburg im Breisgau, 1976), 56. Kyewalyanga notes that among the Ganda people of Uganda, the parents of the girl had to scrutinize the character (empisa) of a young man intending to marry their daughter before they give her out to him in marriage. 26 Sofola, African Culture and the African Personality, 6. The communal nature of the marriage is exemplified in the way everyone in the extended family gets involved in one way or the other, either in contribution to pay the dowry or performing some rituals as part of one’s responsibility during the marriage ceremonies. 27 Africans’ altruism is based on the “moral belief that all human species exist for one another’s benefit primarily and basically for glorification of the Supreme God and their Maker” (Sofola, African Culture and the African Personality, 69). This adds to the emphasis that African ethics is basically theistic in nature. 24 Sofola,

274 Chapter 4: Appropriating the Virtue-Ethical Perspective of Titus into African Ethics the live-and-let-live philosophy; hospitality, where a visitor or even stranger is always welcome and must not give prior notice of his visit to the host, and once he arrives, whatever meal is available is gladly shared with him/her; the nature of music and artifacts and how they relate to daily life; the meaningfulness and sociological significance of names and their meaning; and character.28 In general, Sofola’s emphasis is that the community is the source of character. A person’s character does not only come from the community but operates more as a shared character than a personal one. e) Character as Hereditary in African Ethics However, some exceptions to considering the community as the source of virtue needs to be made here. For example, some African ethnic groups consider character to be hereditary and not necessarily socially acquired. This is exemplified in situations where an entire clan or tribal group is stereotyped and associated with a particular character, good or bad. Some tribes and clans are normally associated with certain vices such as a hot temper, falsehood, pride, and the like. In this sense, people believe that everyone born from that family, clan, or tribe inherits or at least learns such a character early enough that it constitutes their character, which seems difficult to change. People’s character, in this case, is judged or expected based on their family lineage.29 In summary, we have identified three sources of character as understood by different ethnic groups in Africa: natural (God-given), community, and heredity. However, the dominant notion is that whether it is of divine origin, inherited, or acquired through cultural socialization, the community greatly shapes character and regulates behavior to conform to its expectations. 4.2.2 Senses of Character The two famous African maxims “I am because we are, and since we are, therefore I am”30 and “a person is a person through other persons”31 describe the African individual in his social and communal context and indicate that virtue is viewed more in a communal than individual sense. In this unit, we shall explore the various “senses” of virtue in African ethics. “Senses” of character/virtue here refers to the categories of virtue such as physical, intellectual, and moral virtues. 28 Sofola,

African Culture and the African Personality, 66–123. accounts for why some parents would not accept their children marrying from certain families or tribes. They hardly get convinced that someone from such a tribe could behave differently. From my experience, this is a common case even in some Christian families. 30 John S. Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy (London, Ibadan, and Nairobi: Heine­ mann Educational Books, 1969), 117. 31 Metz, “The Virtue of African Ethics,” 277, citing Kasenene 1994:141; Tutu 1999:35. 29 This

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It also refers to the categorization of virtues into individual and social virtues. What senses of virtue are in African ethics, and which one(s) is dominant? a) Perfectionist and Eudaimonist Nature of African Ethics According to Metz, sub-Saharan African ethics (on the basis of Ubuntu and other similar concepts) is to be seen characteristically as perfectionist and eudaimonist in the same way as the Greek-philosophical and Western notion of selfrealization or flourishing – as a “function of the exhibition of virtue or human excellence.”32 Greek-philosophical, Western, and African ethics all agree on the virtue-ethical central idea that becoming and being a full human being and living as such “is not merely a matter of performing actions that are right because they accord with some principle, but rather is primarily a function of displaying certain character traits relating to one’s beliefs, emotions and feelings, and the actions that express them.”33 The major difference, however, rests in the content of human excellences and the character traits that are at the core of living a flourishing life. While the Greek-philosophical and Western notion sees the capacity to behave rationally as what unifies the virtues and diverse forms of human flourishing as just different ways of realizing rationality, the African notion sees community and vitality as the core of living a flourishing life.34 Two points can be drawn from Metz’s comparison of African ethics with Greek-philosophical and Western ethics, in relation to the “senses” of African ethics. First, African ethics has a communal sense of virtue. Second, the sense of eudaimonia in African ethics is oriented towards community vitality rather than individual excellence. One aspect of perfectionism as a characteristic of virtue ethics is seen in its considering the entirety of life as morally relevant. In this regard, morality in the African context is perfectionist and virtue-ethical because just like religion, ethics permeates every aspect of life. According to John Mbiti, traditional African religions permeate every aspect of an African’s life, which does not leave room for any formal distinction between secular and sacred, religious and non-religious, spiritual and material. This, in turn, shows that an African person’s morality is inherently inseparable from his or her religion since religion permeates all aspects of life.35 The pervasive nature of religion in Africa has been described (with specific reference to the Igbo people but applicable to most others) thusly: Africans “eat religiously, drink religiously, bathe religiously, dress religiously, and sin religiously.”36 32 Metz,

“The Virtue of African Ethics,” 277. “The Virtue of African Ethics,” 277. 34 Metz, “The Virtue of African Ethics,” 278. 35 Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, 2, 103. 36 Odozor, Morality, 77, citing A. G. Leonard, The Lower Niger and Its Tribes (London: Macmillan, 1960; London: Frank Cass, 1968), 429. Odozor says “African Traditional Religion 33 Metz,

276 Chapter 4: Appropriating the Virtue-Ethical Perspective of Titus into African Ethics Similarly, Christopher Ejizu notes that in Africa, religion is diffused in all aspects of life, and all facets of life derive their meaning and significance from religion.37 The social, economic and political aspects of the life of the people are hedged round with sacredness and supernatural sanction, while important interests and phases in the cycle of life and nature are ritualized. The supernatural sheds into the natural, the invisible into the visible, and spiritual beings as well as super-sensible cosmic forces impinge on and influence the affairs of humans.38

b) African Cardinal Virtues? Sofola’s concept of “African cardinal virtues” also give a clue to the sense of character. He describes the following virtues as African cardinal virtues: “emphasis on ‘wholesome human relations’ among people; respect for elders; ‘community fellow-feeling’; ‘a live-and-let-live’ philosophy; altruism; and hospitality.”39 Observably, all these virtues are moral virtues compared to physical and intellectual virtues. If we regard them as “cardinal,” it implies that the moral sense of virtue is more dominant in African ethics than the physical and intellectual senses of virtue. Samuel Johnson, in his brief discussion on “character” among the Yoruba people, also describes the virtues of the Yorubas as “social virtues,” and describes the Yoruba people in ethical terms as “very virtuous, loving and kind.”40 Other virtues upheld by the Yorubas include sincerity in friendship; respect to parents, elders, and superiors; truthfulness (liars could sometimes be expelled from the community, club or peer group); hospitality; patience; forgiveness for the sake of continuity of a relationship; chastity; and politeness. On the negative side, they abhor licentiousness. There were cases where a family member who is integral to the memory of the African – both memory and tradition are inextricably tied to a religious worldview in the African context” (77). Olupona joins other scholars in noting that religion in Africa remains the pulse of life in both private and public spheres, “placing a strong emphasis on moral and social order in families, clans, lineages, and interethnic interactions. As such, it pervades the daily affairs and conduct of African societies.” This point is true both of traditional African societies and those societies dominated by adherents of Christianity or Islam. See Jacob K. Olupona, African Religions: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 2. 37 Christopher I. Ejizu, “Emergent Key Issues in the Study of African Traditional Religions,” in Christianity in Dialogue with African Traditional Religion and Culture, ed. Chidi Denis Isizoh, Seminar Papers 1 (Vatican City: Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue, 2001), 112. 38 Ejizu, “Emergent Key Issues in the Study of African Traditional Religions,” 112–113. See also Stephen Ellis, This Present Darkness; A History of Nigerian Organized Crime (London: Hurst, 2016), 16–17. 39 Amadi, Ethics in Nigerian Culture, citing Sofola, African Culture and the African Personality (Ibadan, 1973), ch.4. 40 Samuel Johnson, The History of the Yorubas (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), 101.

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engaged in a licentious act and brought disgrace to the family could be condemned to slavery by a majority vote.41 The social nature of the virtues and the involvement of the whole community in the judgment and punishment indicates that morality is conceived in a communal rather than an individual sense. c) Communal Sense of African Ethics Regarding the communal sense of African ethics, Kwame Gyeke’s description of what a “community” in the African context is, is relevant here. He says: Communitarianism considers the human person as an inherently (intrinsically) communal being, embedded in a context of social relationships and inter-dependence, never as an isolated, atomic individual. Consequently, it sees the community not as a mere association of individual persons whose interests and ends are contingently congruent, but as a group of persons linked by interpersonal bonds, biological/or non-biological, who consider themselves primarily as members of the group and who have common interests, goals, and values.42

Mbiti’s famous statement “I am because we are, and since we are, therefore I am” describes the communal sense of African ethics. It describes individuals in their communal context with both the living and the dead, and nothing, humanly speaking, can separate them.43 A person’s existence and religion are not primarily for himself as an individual, but for the community to which he belongs. Being human means belonging to the whole community, and that implies also participating in beliefs, rituals, festivals, and ceremonies of the community.44 The “living-dead”45 as members of the community are the guardians of family and community affairs, traditions, ethics, and activities. They still keep com41 Johnson, The History of the Yorubas, 101–102. At other times, especially if it involved incest, the offender was forcefully emasculated. In other extreme cases, such a member was banished from the entire community and had to leave and settle in another community far away, where they may not have known him or the abominable act he had committed. 42 Odozor, Morality, 211, citing Kwame Gyeke, “Person and Community in African Thought,” in The African Philosophy Reader, ed. P. H. Coetzee and A. P. J. Roux, 2nd edition (London: Routledge, 2003), 299. 43 Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, 117. Senghor also aptly describes it this way: African societies place greater emphasis “on the group than on the individuals, more on solidarity than on the activity and needs of the individual, more on the communion of persons than on their autonomy. Ours is a community society.” Leophold Sedor Senghor, African Socialism, trans. Mercer Cook (New York: Praeger, 1964), 93–94, cited in Odozor, Morality, 210. 44 Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, 2. One of the attributes of God or the Supreme Being is judgment, in his capacity as ruler and master. He, therefore, exercises justice, punishment, and retribution among people, which “strengthens traditional ethical sanctions, which in turn upheld community solidarity.” See Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, 46. 45 Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, 44, 83. “Living-dead” in African culture is a description of dead members of the family or community who are believed to still be actively involved in the affairs of the family but at a different level – as ancestors or spirits. They are believed to have the power to reward good behavior and punish bad. In relation to the morality

278 Chapter 4: Appropriating the Virtue-Ethical Perspective of Titus into African Ethics municating with the families and community, especially through the oldest family members.46 The concept of relatedness in African personhood, in this sense, is both horizontal and vertical.47 In such a case, every person, dead or alive, is either a brother or sister to someone, father or mother, grandmother or grandfather, or cousin, or brother-in-law, uncle or aunt, or ancestor, etc. Everyone is, therefore, related to everyone, in one way or the other.48 Jakob K. Olupona’s concept of two morals also helps in understanding the sense of virtue in African ethics. He describes two classes of morals which traditional African societies employ as those pertaining to an individual or private conduct and those relating to social or community relations. Family codes of conduct are determined basically by the community, and they function to maintain a balance between paternal and maternal lineages and clans.49 In this way, religious Africans often believe that the community codes of conduct have supernatural origins, deriving from spirits, gods, and ancestors. The community, therefore, maintains these codes through the observance of taboos and rituals under the guidance of priests, chiefs, and kings.50 d) The Weakness of the African Sense of Community However, while most scholars seem to paint a perfect picture of the African community and its centrality in ethics, Odozor is critical for good reasons. For example, he disagrees with Benezet Bujo that Africans see themselves as ultimately related to all humans irrespective of their ethnic differences, seeing the person from another group as also a “property of the other.”51 Odozor contends that this fact is exaggerated and does not take into account exceptions and contradictions. He, instead, argues that African communitarianism is often limited to the known-other. This is evident in the participation of African ethnic of spiritual powers who are believed to be in constant interaction with people, Stephen Ellis explains that in the pre-colonial African ethics, spiritual powers of the invisible world were ascribed a “morally neutral character,” not intrinsically good or bad. The moral nature of the spirits depends on their relationship with human beings. For one, therefore, to maintain stability in life, one has to keep close attention and good relationship with the spirit beings, just like other social relationships, because the spirits can act good or bad, depending on how one treats them. See Ellis, This Present Darkness, 31. 46 Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, 44, 83. 47 It could be added that it stretches vertically as well because it involves God, gods, and the living-dead. 48 See also Odozor, Morality, 233–234, citing John S. Mbiti, African Religions and Philo­ sophy, 2nd ed. (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1990), 102. Odozor notes that “the African sense of family and family solidarity is one point where African anthropology and Christian theology meet,” and they are in contrast with the concept of family in the West, where it is often viewed in nuclear terms, consisting basically of parents and their children only. Odozor, Morality, 234. 49 Olupona, African Religions, 2. 50 Olupona, African Religions, 3. 51 Odozor, Morality, 212, citing Bujo, Foundations of an African Ethic, 6.

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groups in the heinous history of Atlantic slave trade, selling other Africans they considered not of their stock or kind, and not of equal human status. Odozor considers this discriminatory tendency in the “community” concept of African ethics as a “critical weakness in African traditional moral reasoning.” He thinks, moreover, that this weakness could be a contributing factor in the persistent incessant inter-ethnic violence in Africa today.52 e) Non-Moral Sense of Virtue in African Ethics Even though moral virtues are dominant in the African sense of virtue, we need to note some exceptional cases in which physical (or more generally “nonmoral”)53 virtues are given equal prominence with moral virtues. Such nonmoral virtues have to do with physical, biological, and intellectual categories. They include, among others: a woman’s ability to cook delicious meals; a man’s physical strength; a man’s ability to befriend and marry many wives and his ability to cater for their needs and those of their children; a man or woman’s hard work on the farm, in domestic works, or in trade; a man’s courage in battle and hunting; a woman’s physical beauty; one’s ability to sing, dance, or play musical instruments well; child-bearing (especially for women); the number of skills one has; one’s marital status (a younger married person is assumed to be more virtuous and is accorded more respect and societal benefits than an older non married person); one’s age (the older, the more respectful); etc. Such non-moral “virtues” are sometimes upheld with almost the same or higher status as the moral ones. For example, child-bearing is sometimes conceived as a woman’s virtue. On that basis, even if a woman is morally good in terms of general behavior, she could be divorced or even accused of witchcraft if she does not give birth to a child, and in some cases, a male child; or if she frequently has miscarriages or stillbirth. In this case, her “punishment” is based on a non-moral (perhaps medical) situation, which overrides her good moral behavior. In other words, in such a case, a non-moral virtue prevails over a moral virtue. 52 Odozor, Morality, 212–214. See also Peter Paris, The Spirituality of African Peoples: The Search for a Common Moral Discourse (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), 61. In view of this, Odozor, Morality, 213, suggests that the idea of social relatedness, which has been widely characterized as central to the definition of the human person and ethics in Africa, “needs a boost to take it beyond mere blood ties to universal vision.” And writing as a Christian theologian, Odozor thinks that “this boost can be given through close attention to some key ideas of the human person which are found in Christian scriptures and tradition.” 53 MacIntyre, “The Nature of the Virtues,” in Virtue Ethics, ed. Stephen Darwall (Malden, MA & Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2003), 144–145, while noting the different and conflicting accounts of virtue among classical virtue ethicists and contemporary ones, notes that physical strength as one of the virtues in Homer’s virtue lists, while it is not a virtue in contemporary discussions of virtue.

280 Chapter 4: Appropriating the Virtue-Ethical Perspective of Titus into African Ethics In summary, based on the discussions above, it could be said that the “sense” of African ethics is basically a moral and communal sense. Ethics hardly makes sense outside the purview of community. As to what form of ethical reasoning is more prevalent, Odozor is right by noting that from his knowledge and experience, African ethical methods are generally not utilitarian, but a mixture of many things: “deontologist on some issues, teleological on others, and pragmatist when it matters. The question is to determine in which situations any of these approaches to moral reasoning are considered appropriate and why.”54 This description best fits the community-based nature of African ethics. 4.2.3 Symbols of Character “Symbols” in this context refer to proverbs, metaphors, myths, arts, music, gestures, names, titles, positions, and the like, which signify or represent virtue. They not only signify virtue but play roles in inculcating virtue and in preserving the history, values, and ethos of a community. Such symbols are not virtues in themselves but relate to virtue in many aspects. They serve as virtue identifiers, indicating the presence or absence, acceptability or unacceptability, value or disvalue of virtues and vices in different aspects. In some cases, ordinary day-to-day, commonplace gestures and actions are believed to be symbolic of a person’s character. For example, bending down or prostrating to greet an elderly person in the proper traditional way; not keeping a direct eye contact with an elderly person; a wife covering her hair while cooking and when serving her husband food; a wife not calling her husband by name or generally not calling elderly persons by their personal names, etc. Among the Zaar people55 (and many other tribes in Africa), calling an older person by name is generally regarded as disrespectful, which is why different vocatives are employed to avoid calling one’s real name.56 Ethics in Africa varies according to communities despite their similarities, with each ethnic community claiming to have a superior ethical system. On this basis, Amadi suggests that any attempt to understand the virtues cherished in any 54 Odozor, Morality, 240. See also Gbadegesin, “Individuality, Community, and the Moral Order,” 296–303, for a discussion on the moral foundations of African ethics. He argues against the notion that African morality is founded on religion. Instead, he sees a multiple foundation for morality. He argues that religion shapes morality, but does not precede it, neither is it its foundation. 55 See Ethnologue on Zaar (Sayawa): https://www.ethnologue.com/language/say. 56 For example, a father or mother is addressed by the name of his or her child. A practical example is that, since we had our first child and named him Ambaam, many people now know me as “Baban Ambaam” (Ambaam’s father), so also my wife as “Maman Ambaam” (Ambaam’s mother). Elder brothers or sisters in the Hausa-speaking region of Nigeria are generally called “yaya,” grandparents as “kaka,” uncles as “kawu,” etc. These are not just the Hausa translations of the English words for these groups of people, but how they are actually addressed in daily life to avoid disrespectfully addressing them by name.

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ethnic community should focus on understanding their proverbs, because “proverbs are like horses searching for the truth; when the truth is missing, we ride towards discovery on proverbs.”57 Similarly, Gbadegesin describes proverbs as “signposts” in African ethics.58 Amadi, therefore, compiles a number of proverbs of the three largest and most popular ethnic groups in Nigeria (Hausa, Igbo, Yoruba). In this section, some of those proverbs are selected, with additional ones and brief interpretation for clarity. We shall limit the discussion on symbols of character to proverbs only, for lack of space. a) Love, Help, Care, Community Fellow-feeling, and Altruism Five proverbs express these virtues: First, “he who receives things has others who receive things along with him” (Hausa proverb).59 Second, “the cock that crows at dawn (or the dog that barks at night) belongs to one family, but its voice is the property of the whole neighborhood.”60 Third, “the prosperity of a single person does not make a town rich.”61 Fourth, “no matter how thirsty you are, you can never quench your thirst with your own saliva.” Fifth, “words of wisdom are like perfume, you cannot spill it on others without getting some on yourself.”62 Other similar proverbs promoting communal virtues of mutual help, sharing resources with others, and promoting the virtue of justice and togetherness irrespective of differences are: “Both the eagle and the kite63 should perch. Whichever denies the other the right should suffer a broken wing” (Igbo Proverb).64 “The mouth does not have to bribe the hand to give it food,”65 encouraging fellow-feeling in the sense of being members of “one body.” b) Truthfulness/Honesty “Truth is better than ten goats” (Igbo proverb).66 This proverb symbolizes the value attached to the virtue of truthfulness. To have ten goats is to be rich. There Amadi, Ethics in Nigerian Culture, 52. “Individuality, Community, and the Moral Order,” 302. 59 Amadi, Ethics in Nigerian Culture, 58. 60 Daniel Bitrus, Legacy of Wisdom: Stories and Proverbs from Africa (Bukuru: ACTS, 2007), 23–24. 61 Amadi, Ethics in Nigerian Culture, 56–58. 62 Bitrus, Legacy, 26. 63 See Amadi, Ethics in Nigerian Culture, 58–61, for a discussion of how this proverb applies in an extended family system that basically characterizes traditional Nigerian society. He also discusses the objections to an ethic based on the extended family system, and the justifications, with suggestions on how it could be appropriated in modern societies. In the course of the discussion, Amadi mentions some punishments to be meted on anyone who killed a kinsman and the ritual sacrifices that had to follow for his/her cleansing. 64 Amadi, Ethics in Nigerian Culture, 57. 65 Bitrus, Legacy, 24. 66 Amadi, Ethics in Nigerian Culture, 56. 57

58 Gbadegesin,

282 Chapter 4: Appropriating the Virtue-Ethical Perspective of Titus into African Ethics fore, it implies being truthful is better than riches. Speaking the truth is better than lying to earn riches or fortune. Another similar proverb among the Hausa people says, “truth is stronger than an iron horse,” symbolizing how far and fast truthfulness can take one on the path of success. A similar proverb says, “it is easier to wake a sleeping person up than one who is pretending to be sleeping.”67 This proverb discourages the vice of lying and encourages truthfulness. “A calabash with a flat base needs no support”;68 implying that one whose life is honest and straightforward does not have to swear or lie to support his claims. Lastly, another proverb that discourages false accusation says, “if you accuse a tortoise of fighting a monkey on a treetop, you must judge your own conscience.”69 c) Prudence, Hard Work, and Contentment “A bird that has a long way to go always watches the sun as it sets”70 (the need for prudence). “He who burns down his own house knows where ashes are expensive”71 (the need for prudent and wise management of resources and savings). A similar proverb says, “it is only a lazy ant that goes looking for food when there is flood.”72 Other similar proverbs are: “A miser is not pleasant to live with, but he makes a good ancestor” (the need for prudent saving for one’s children). “A mirror is a liability to a blind man”73 (implying buy and keep only what you need). “Do not assume you can climb a thorn tree just because you have seen a monkey do it”74 (encouraging contentment and discouraging unwise imitation and competition with others). d) Delicacy in Personal Relationships and Considering other People’s Feelings “The fingers of a man who has only nine are not counted in his presence” (Yoruba proverb).75 This proverb teaches that one should consider how a person with disability will feel and avoid talking about or reminding him/her of the disability. If necessary, it should be discussed in his/her absence.

67 Bitrus,

Legacy, 23. Ethics in Nigerian Culture, 25. 69 Amadi, Ethics in Nigerian Culture, 27. 70 Amadi, Ethics in Nigerian Culture, 24. 71 Amadi, Ethics in Nigerian Culture, 27. 72 Amadi, Ethics in Nigerian Culture, 25. 73 Amadi, Ethics in Nigerian Culture, 25. 74 Amadi, Ethics in Nigerian Culture, 21. 75 Amadi, Ethics in Nigerian Culture, 53. 68 Amadi,

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e) Decorum in Relationships “The chameleon says he will not alter his dignified manner of walking just because the forest is on fire” (Igbo proverb). It implies that even if one is in a hurry, he/she should do what courtesy demands, such as greeting an elder and asking about his/her wellbeing and that of the family (because it matters to him/her).76 It also applies in offering cola (a type of nut) and wine to a visitor as a sign of welcome and hospitality, even if one is in a hurry to leave. f) Friendship of Character/Virtue These proverbs indicate the importance of being in peace and good relationship with everyone, not only when you need them. They also express the need for mutual help. “Friendship with the ferryman right from the dry season means that when the rainy season comes and the rivers are filled, you will be the first to cross” (Hausa proverb).77 This proverb is in sync with Aristotle’s concept of “friendship of character” as the truest kind of friendship compared to “utility friendship” and “pleasure friendship.”78 g) Humility and Help to the Needy “Bending down to a dwarf does not prevent you from rising to your full heights afterward” (Hausa proverb).79 This proverb shows that being humble enough to relate with people of less social class or the less privileged does not reduce or take anything away from you in earnest. Instead, it adds positively.

76 Amadi, Ethics in Nigerian Culture, 53, notes that foreigners complain about how Nigerians take a long time to greet and to ask about other members of the family. While it may appear unnecessary to foreigners, it means a lot to Nigerians. It means you care not only about the individual but also about other things the person also cares about such as family, job, health, and so on. 77 Amadi, Ethics in Nigerian Culture, 53. The proverb emerged because of the poor transport system in riverine areas, especially during the rainy season. People have to depend on ferrymen to cross them over on their ferries for them to go to the markets, the neighboring communities, and for special festivals or weddings. Anyone who was already in a good relationship with the ferryman enjoys the favor of being the first to be taken across, implying being the first to make it to the market or the event; and the earlier the better. 78 Aristotle distinguishes three kinds of friendship, using the criteria of the basis of friendship: (1) Character friendship, which is based on virtue. (2) Pleasure friendship (3) Utility friendship. Character friendship is true friendship, because it is altruistic and seeks the friend’s good, while the other two are inferior, unstable, and egoistic. See John T. Fitzgerald, “Philippians in the Light of Some Ancient Discussions of Friendship,” in Friendship, Flattery, and Frankness of Speech: Studies on Friendship in the New Testament World, ed. David Konstan (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 158–159. 79 Amadi, Ethics in Nigerian Culture, 53.

284 Chapter 4: Appropriating the Virtue-Ethical Perspective of Titus into African Ethics h) Respect for Elders “What an elder sees sitting down, the child cannot see even while standing (or when he climbs a tall tree).” This proverb implies that children need to listen to the advice and experiences of elders and learn from them. Respect for elders (any elder in the community) is believed to attract blessings, while disrespect attracts curses and misfortune in life. Different forms of greeting elders signify the virtue of respectability, such as lying prostrate (Yoruba culture), bowing one’s face low, kneeling or squatting down (Hausa culture), kneeling on one’s hands and feet with forehead touching the ground, not looking straight into an elderly person’s eyes when talking80 (it is considered rude and offensive), and not calling elders by their names directly.81 Among the Zaar people, one of the ways to know a young person of good character is by the way he greets people, especially elders. If he greets haphazardly, he is often considered a disrespectful person, while those who take time to greet properly are regarded as respectful. i) Weakness, Odds, and Difficulties While most of the proverbs above relate to the ideals of a society, there is also a recognition of human weaknesses, odds, and difficulties life confronts people with, which are also conveyed in other proverbs such as the ones relating to judgment and retribution. For example, on the need for wisdom in judging cases involving two aggrieved parties, an Igbo proverb says judgment is not given after hearing one side.82 In summary, we can see that most of the proverbs mentioned above are symbolic or representative of different virtues upheld in African ethics. One noticeable feature among the different proverbs and metaphors is that they are mostly social in nature, meant to promote a flourishing communal living. Even the virtue of contentment, which seems to be a personal virtue, is considered from a social or communal point of view because it is believed to promote good neighborliness.83 In conclusion, it is evident that all these proverbs emphasize the “live and let live” golden rule in African ethics, which is “intoned with nearly a religious 80 Amadi, Ethics in Nigerian Culture, 55. Amadi observes that this particular ethical practice has been misunderstood largely by foreigners, who interpret it to mean ‘shiftiness or lack of straightforwardness,’ thinking one is guilty or insincere. But this is not the case in most cases. It often means respect for an elder. 81 Amadi, Ethics in Nigerian Culture, 53–55. Amadi further discusses here the reasons why such respect is accorded elders in Nigeria. 82 See Amadi, Ethics in Nigerian Culture, for proverbs on judgment (56), retribution (p. 57), pleasure and pain going together (61–62), and so on. 83 Amadi, Ethics in Nigerian Culture, 55–56. See here also for proverbs relating to contentment.

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fervor”84 in traditional African societies. While it is true that this principle obtains almost universally, “it is regarded as the acme of good neighborliness” in African communities.85 4.2.4 Services of Character “Service” in this context refers to the benefits of virtue or good character, both to the virtuous person and to the community. How does character benefit the individual and the community? What role does virtue play in promoting good social relations, economic, political, and overall community flourishing? What role is virtue believed to play in the situation of a person after death? What telos does a good character lead to? Here also, some proverbs will provide insight into the services of character in African ethics. a) Personal Benefits of Character The Yoruba people believe that man’s character determines his wellbeing both here on earth and in the life after death. They stress that it is character that distinguishes human beings from animals, hence, implying that a person with bad character is not any better than animals. Therefore, they have a proverb that says, “he who begets a child that has no character is at a great loss.”86 Similarly, Idowu notes that character among the Yorubas is the essence of ethics, and the life of a person even depends on it. This is captured in their proverbs: “Gentle character it is which enables the rope of life to stay unbroken in one’s hand. It is good character that is man’s guard.”87 Good character is expressed in concrete life situations and relations such as in chastity before marriage and faithfulness to one’s spouse(s) in marriage; generosity; hospitality;88 kindness; justice; truthfulness and rectitude (“as essential virtues”); respecting older people, and the like.89 The Igbo proverb “character is a god, it supports you according to your behavior”90 also describes the value attached to a good character and the benefits thereof. Moreover, economic prosperity or acquisition of wealth is, to a large extent, considered in moral and social terms. A good character earns a person business 84 Amadi,

Ethics in Nigerian Culture, 58. Ethics in Nigerian Culture, 58. 86 Sofola, African Culture and the African Personality, 120. He notes that the Yoruba people view character in relation to the supreme God and believe that character “is the very stuff that makes a man’s life a joy simply because it is pleasing to God Almighty.” 87 Sofola, African Culture and the African Personality, 123. 88 Hospitality to a stranger or visitor among some African ethnic groups could even include giving him one’s wife, daughter, or sister to sleep with, and was never considered evil. Instead, it was thought to strengthen friendship and relationship. 89 Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, 212–213. 90 Amadi, Ethics in Nigerian Culture, 50. 85 Amadi,

286 Chapter 4: Appropriating the Virtue-Ethical Perspective of Titus into African Ethics opportunities and fortunes in life. Ellis notes that in pre-colonial Nigeria, a good person who maintained extensively good social relationships in trade or business was believed to grow wealthier, “and the maintenance of those relationships was a key factor in determining the moral value of enrichment.”91 This fact is conveyed in a Hausa proverb which says “halin mutum, jarin sa” (a person’s character is his trade).92 Other benefits of good character in African cultures are rewards in the form of traditional titles and other forms of reward.93 Such rewards include conferment of chieftaincy titles, a “proper” burial ceremony,94 praise names,95 allocating a farmland, marrying the most beautiful and hardworking girl or boy in the  Ellis, This Present Darkness, 32. the Hausa people of Northern Nigeria, one’s “kyan hali” (good character) as opposed to “mugun hali” (bad character) determines his or her credit worthiness in business and even partially determines the amount of dowry to be paid in marriage. See Paul Clouch, Morality and Economic Growth in Rural West Africa: Indigenous Accumulation in Hausaland (New York and Oxford: Berghahn, 2014), 180, 266, 281. 93 See Amadi, Ethics in Nigerian Culture, 62–64. Amadi notes how, like other parts of the world, Nigerian society encourages virtue through reward and recognition. But he laments how almost all the awards at the global level, such as in the Guinness Book of Records, Nobel Prizes, and a host of others, are focused on technical achievements and have little or nothing to do with good behavior, except the Peace Prize. The Nigerian government has also followed after the pattern of its British colonial masters by giving national awards only for technical and professional achievements, and “none of them has any direct bearing on morals” (Amadi, Ethics in Nigerian Culture, 63). He, therefore, suggests instituting national awards for love, peace, or good behavior. While there is some value in Amadi’s suggestion, the problem rests with how to fairly measure such behaviors at national levels. What are the criteria? At what level is it to be considered? How long will it take to get a report of all the acts of love, peace, or “good behavior” shown in families and local communities in order to choose the outstanding one(s)? How or what machineries will be put in place to ensure that the judges choose without sentiments based on family ties and their limited knowledge of all the prospective candidates for the awards? Amadi himself does not answer these queries. A reward system that does not take into account simple moral acts or virtue expressed in daily, local and commonplace life situations falls short of the virtue-ethical kind of perfectionism. Nevertheless, Amadi’s suggestion for institutionalizing reward for virtuous acts at all levels is a valid one, both for local and global awards. Sofola, African Culture and the African Personality, 70, also laments that humanity in the 20th century had made great advances in technology, but not in human social relationships and morality. He describes the crisis of the 20th century as “a crisis of human relationships.” And Africans who have social relational skills and could contribute to the world from that aspect have not been “allowed to give expression to this skill.” Instead, they have been pressured or made to think that their culture and contribution is irrelevant. 94 See Amadi, Ethics in Nigerian Culture, 64. “A good burial is a great incentive for upright behavior in Nigeria.” To a typical Nigerian, the idea of a good burial goes beyond a fine coffin, church service, a decorated grave and a costly tombstone or inscription. “A good burial means the performance of full traditional rites by the age-group and societies to which the deceased belonged. Some of these rites cannot be performed if the deceased led a notably evil life. Furthermore, according to many Nigerian traditions, an improper burial means that the dead man’s spirit cannot rest happily or communicate with other spirits on a basis of equality; above all, reincarnation may be impossible.” These become motivations for ethical behavior. 95 E. g. Usman Dan Fodio’s praise names like “Malamin Malamai” (Teacher of Teachers). Sometimes people chant those names at festive dances to the praise and delight of the bearers. 91

92 Among

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community, and so on. However, the most important reward of having a good character is the privilege of remaining a bona fide member of a community, because in olden days, “continuous bad behavior could lead to ostracism.”96 Assessing a person’s good character transcends merely avoiding grave immoral acts. Amadi notes that merely avoiding bad behavior is even regarded as a negative virtue or at best, a neutral virtue. One has to be able to be helpful to others in order to be regarded as truly virtuous.97 Good character, therefore, primarily ensures good social relations.98 Even though Amadi’s work is not focused on virtue ethics as a theory, two virtue-ethical features of African ethics could be highlighted from his submission above, namely, community and pro-activeness. This also contradicts the general impression that African ethics is more or less a system of primitive rules and abominations. Beyond rules and abominations, African ethical philosophy also “emphasizes positive virtue, which cannot be achieved through legislation or the system of abomination [only],”99 but also through moral education in the form of rites of passage and initiation.100 b) Communal Benefits of Virtue Character does not only benefit the individual. Most importantly, it benefits the community at large. Character is what governs both private and social life, and what makes it possible to be hospitable, altruistic,101 and so on. In other words,  96 Amadi,

Ethics in Nigerian Culture, 64. in Nigerian Culture, 64. Amadi observes that different Nigerian tribes have systems of laws and abominations as a means of controlling behavior, but it is possible for one to be innocent of dramatic moral acts like murder, theft, arson, adultery, and still be considered “an unsatisfactory member of society.”  98 Having discussed the place of community in African ethics above, the services of character further emphasize how the concept of “community” or social relationship is integrally constituted into ethics in many African tribes. The services of character show how African ethics is more of a pro-active system than a retroactive one. See Lucas Chan, Biblical Ethics in the 21st Century, 84, citing Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 39. Kotva describes virtue ethics as a “proactive ethical theory,” especially in the sense that it does not wait for the aftermath of a moral action when judging its rightness or wrongness. Instead, it makes pro-active efforts in building the character of persons so they will consistently do what is right and acceptable.  99 Amadi, Ethics in Nigerian Culture, 50. 100 Amadi’s submission could indicate a dissatisfaction with the deontological and consequential ethical systems in Africa, and a continuous interest in an ethic that focuses on positive character which obeys legislative rules not necessarily for their sake or for the prescribed penalties, but because one is virtuous, and because obedient actions further develop one’s character and lead to “where one is going.” 101 See Sofola, African Culture and the African Personality, 120. One example of African altruism is seen in the “win-and-let-win” principle which was featured in the Yoruba game of ayo (and other games as well). In that case, the person who has consistently won the game deliberately allows, at some point, his opponent to win too so he could enjoy the self-gratification that comes with winning. A proverb emerged from this game, which says “win-and-let-win is  97 Amadi, Ethics

288 Chapter 4: Appropriating the Virtue-Ethical Perspective of Titus into African Ethics without character, one cannot live by the guiding principles of the community. Character is conceived as what makes for good wholesome human relationships in the community and it is therefore expected of everyone to develop good character.102 Truth and rectitude are also believed to be virtues which promote the good of the community. The Yorubas, for example, believe that truth, as an essential element of human relations, has the support of the gods. Therefore, a truthful and upright person enjoys the unfailing support of the gods and the community at large, because his virtue makes the flourishing of the community possible.103 It is observed from the discussions above that virtue in African ethics basically serves the community, but with a reflexive benefit to the individual. Not only does virtue benefit the immediate community and reflexively benefit the virtuous person, it also serves both life now and life after death. A person’s status and “resting in peace” after death is believed to be determined largely by his/her character and behavior in this life. In other words, virtue leads to both communal and individual flourishing in the present life and life after death. In conclusion, it is noteworthy that even though the Four S Schema elaborately discussed above may not directly feature in the actual hermeneutical reflections that follow in the next units of the research, the benefit of considering the sources, senses, symbols, and services of character or virtue in African ethics is that it provides us with cumulative and comprehensive background information on what could count as virtue in African ethics. This background information, therefore, enables us to make sense of the ethical frameworks and the specific virtues that we will bring into direct conversation with the virtue-ethical perspectives of the letter to Titus. The hermeneutical reflections, negotiations, concessions, and appropriations will require a different methodology from the Four S Schema. However, before we get into that, it is helpful at this point to give a summary or recap of the virtue-ethical perspectives of the letter to Titus, in order to keep the flow of thought in perspective.

what makes the game of ayo interesting.” Another proverb shows altruism in economic terms. It says, “a rich man should be the source of success of other would-be rich men.” Other proverbs relating to the usefulness of good character in human relations include whenever a person breaks a stick in the forest, he should consider what it would feel like if he himself were broken in the same manner. This means one should be considerate of other people’s feelings and should not do unto them what he/she would not want to be done to him/her. For cooperation and mutual support, a proverb says: When the right hand washes the left hand and the left hand washes the right hand, that is when the whole hands become clean. 102 Sofola, African Culture and the African Personality, 120–121. 103 Sofola, African Culture and the African Personality, 123.

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4.3 General Summary of the Key Virtue-Ethical Perspectives of the Letter to Titus Chapter three of this study analyzes the virtue-ethical perspectives of the letter to Titus in detail, with emphasis on δικαιοσύνη, εὐσέβεια, σωφροσύνη, καλὰ ἔργα and the “household codes.” In the analysis, the exegethics methodology was employed, which analyzes the linguistic forms of the virtues (intra-textual, inter-textual, and extra-textual); the moral agents of the virtues; the history of tradition of the virtues (Jewish, Greco-Roman, and Early Christian traditions); the ethical argumentation/reflection for the virtues; and their range of application (universal or local). In this section, only a brief summary of the virtue-ethical perspectives of the above-mentioned virtues will be given for two purposes: first, to avoid repetition but to give a meaningful overview; second, to ensure the flow of thought by way of bringing the results of chapter three into close connection with chapter four which seeks to analyze the tandems and tensions between the virtue-ethical perspectives of Titus and African ethics, and to undertake hermeneutical reflections.104 4.3.1 Σωφροσύνη Titus’s account of the σωφρο-cognates significantly bears some key Christian virtue-ethical characteristics. First, it bears a sense of a moral telos. Being one of the three cardinal virtues in Titus 2:12, σωφροσύνη has a sense of moral telos. It is a constituent part of this-worldly telos and at the same time it has relevance for the other-worldly telos in the sense that living a self-controlled life prepares one for the return of Christ and life with him in eternal glory. Second, it conveys the virtue-ethical concept of perfectionism in two ways. On the one hand, it is perfectionist in the sense that one does not attend perfect or full self-control in this life, therefore it keeps calling the believer to growth and more selfcontrol. On the other hand, the use of the σωφροσύνη cognate in Titus requires application or practice in every aspect of life, both in commonplace, day to day life, and in dramatic moral quandaries. Third, the fact that teaching or training is the process of acquiring self-control corresponds with the virtue concept and process of character development. Moreover, the understanding that self-control emanates from one’s character shows its virtue-ethical usage. Fourth, the inherent relation of self-control with internal dispositions and attitudes, rationality, sensibility, and emotions correlate with virtue-ethical concerns. Fifth, the fact 104 It is worth restating that this research seeks to understand the ethics in Titus through the lens of virtue ethics and seeks to compare the ethics of Titus with African ethics through the lens of virtue.

290 Chapter 4: Appropriating the Virtue-Ethical Perspective of Titus into African Ethics that the use of self-control in Titus pays almost no attention to concrete moral actions (“doing”) but pays greater attention to the morality of the moral agents (“being”) corresponds with a virtue-ethical approach to morality. Sixth, the fact that self-control is grounded on the Christ-event, therefore applying only to believers in Christ, is in tandem with virtue-ethical particularism. The place of community in virtue ethics finds representation in the fact that self-control is to be applied in both personal life and social relationships. 4.3.2 Δικαιοσύνη The account of the δικαιοσύνη cognates in Titus has the following virtueethical perspectives, with Christian distinctives: righteousness or justice leads towards the other-worldly telos, namely, being in eternal glory with God when Christ appears (Titus 2:11–14). Justice is perfectionist in the sense that a just or righteous person is expected to continue to grow and aspire for more justice, and he or she is to be just in every aspect of life. Justice is not only a political virtue. Rather, it applies to everyday, commonplace morality instead of dramatic and dilemmatic moral quandaries. Moreover, justice as a virtue is relevant for personal, social, and communal relationships. Justice is related to the virtueethical concept of moral development in the sense that “the grace” teaches and enables living a just life. Justice is used with emphasis on moral persons over moral actions. Titus does not give concrete actions or ethos which constitute justice. The moral agents of justice are particularly believers in Christ, in agreement with the virtue-ethical concept of exclusive or particular moral agency. Pre-conversion righteousness could not save nor make one just (Titus 3:3–7). The Christ-event marks a new identity and moral character of believers. The dual nuances of a declarative and transformative justification/righteousness express a virtue-ethical concept of inner dispositions and moral character of a virtuous person. 4.3.3 Εὐσέβεια The virtue-ethical perspectives of εὐσέβεια in Titus, expressing more the nuance of “godliness” than “piety,” can be summarized as follows. First, being godly involves the entirety of a person’s life, not only specific acts of religious piety. Second, it combines both inner and outer aspects of a person’s moral life. Third, it focuses on the morality of persons more than that of actions. It does not present any concrete ethos, action, or moral dilemma as representative of εὐσέβεια. Instead, people are “to be” godly. Fourth, it presents exclusive moral agents, namely, believers in Christ, whose identity, narrative, and tradition are anchored in the Christ-event. Fifth, it involves an ongoing character development. Because of its grounding on the Christ-event, it features the roles of

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both divine and human agencies in the process of a person’s character development. Sixth, both its deontological and teleological argumentations are virtue-ethical. 4.3.4 Καλὰ ἔργα Even though the norm “good works,” as the name implies, suggests an ethics of “doing” more than “being,” our analysis above shows that it is used in Titus in connection with “being” more than “doing.” Three of the virtue-ethical characteristics of good works in Titus are: first, both its linguistic elements and the theological motifs related to it focus on the morality of persons more than the morality of actions. The text hardly gives concrete examples of, or commands to do any concrete actions that constitute good works. Moreover, nowhere are the believers asked to “do” good works, but to “bring out” good works, in the context of the inner effect of the Christ-event which has effected a change in their moral character, identity, and lives. This indicates that the good works do not exist independently and are not done for their sake, but are outflows of an inner character, attitude, or disposition of a virtuous person. Second, good works is virtue-ethical because doing good works is said to be good in itself, good for the moral agent, and for others. The “goodness” of good works is not derived from some external principle that is disconnected from the personal concerns of the moral agent. Third, the virtue-ethical emphasis on teaching, training, or discipline for character development is represented explicitly in Titus’ discussion of “good works.” Believers are commanded to “learn to bring out good works.” When placed in the context of the several admonitions to teach in Titus, we see that it is aimed at developing character, which will enable an individual to bring out good works. The most important ethical reflection for good works is so that the believer does not become105 unfruitful (Titus 3:14), which also points to one’s “being” more than “doing.” Generally, the virtue-ethical perspectives of the letter to Titus could be summarized to include an emphasis on “being” over “doing” or on the morality of persons over the morality of actions, and emphasis on inner dispositions over outer actions. Others include a kind of perfectionism where commonplace, dayto-day activities and the entirety of a person’s life are morally relevant and a call for continuous growth in the virtues; a sense of this-worldly and other-worldly telos; character development; particularity of moral agents; and moral exemplar. In the next section, this research analyzes how these virtue-ethical perspectives are in tandem or tension with African ethics.

105 Emphasis

mine, accentuating the “being” aspect of it over and against “doing.”

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4.4 A Comparative Analysis of the Two Virtue-ethical Perspectives: Tandems, Tensions, and Appropriations The virtue-ethical perspectives of the letter to Titus and that of African ethics have similarities and dissimilarities. We will refer to the similarities and dissimilarities as tandems and tensions respectively, for heuristic purposes.106 This section analyzes the tandems while the next section analyzes the tensions. 4.4.1 Tandems between the Virtue-Ethical Perspectives of Titus and African Ethics The two virtue-ethical perspectives are in tandem in the following features and elements of virtue ethics theory: Perfectionism; moral exemplar; character development; and a sense of moral telos. We shall discuss these features one after another. However, it is worth noting that there are inherent tensions even in these tandems, which will be noted in the course of the discussion. a) Tandems in regard to Perfectionism The virtue-ethical perspective of the letter to Titus is perfectionist in two ways: first, in presuming the moral relevance of all aspects of life. For example, Titus is to show himself as an example “in all things” (Titus 2:7); slaves to demonstrate trust “in all things” (Titus 2:10), and the believers to demonstrate humility “in all things” and towards “everyone/all people” (Titus 3:2). Second, it is perfectionist in the sense that it lists virtues that are expected to be applied in day-to-day common life, without giving concrete ethos for actions. For instance, virtues like self-control, godliness, hospitality, humility, and being blameless107 (Titus 2:2–6, 12) are “open-ended” and apply in every aspect of life. Self-control, for instance, could apply in aspects of sexual chastity, control of anger, avoiding excessive drinking or drunkenness, and the like. These “open-ended” virtues serve the virtue-ethical perfectionist purpose more than concrete ethos for concrete actions such as “you shall not commit adultery,” or “you shall not drink beer/ get drunk.” Such concrete norms limit the perfectionist possibilities of a virtue. Similarly, in the description of African ethics above, we have noted that religion and ethics permeate the entirety of life, and commonplace everyday 106 I prefer using “tandems” and “tensions” because they have nuances that heighten the seriousness of the points at which the two ethical perspectives agree or disagree more than their synonyms “similarities” and “dissimilarities.” Moreover, since similarities and dissimilarities are most commonly used, I prefer to deviate a little from the conventional at this point, in order to keep the discussion more “lively and tense.” 107 Saarinen, Pastoral Epistles, 171, describes “blameless” (Titus 1:7; cf. 1 Tim 3:10) as a “general virtue that conveys the view that the person cannot be accused of clear moral or other failures.”

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actions are considered morally relevant and used in assessing one’s morality. For example, how one greets people properly and how one respects elders by not addressing them by name are used to judge if one has a humble character or not. These are everyday, non-dilemmatic and non-dramatic aspects of morality which characterize virtue ethics and are similar in both the ethical perspectives of Titus and that of African ethics. b) Tandems in regard to Moral Exemplar and Character Development The concept of moral exemplar finds expression in both the ethical perspectives of Titus and that of African ethics. One aspect in which they are in tandem with each other is in the way they both gender the virtue-ethical concept of “moral exemplar”: older women to teach younger women how to behave in self-control and other virtues (Titus 2:3–5) just as in most African cultures, it is primarily the role of the older women to teach younger women not only how to behave virtuously but how to do general domestic work. However, one minor difference needs to be noted. The author of Titus does not ask older men to teach younger men, instead, he asks Titus (who is presumably also a young man) to teach the younger men self-control. This is not common in African thought of a moral exemplar. It is normally shared based on gender and age in the sense that older women teach younger women while older men teach younger men through the different rites of passage. Both boys and girls have different rites of passage (e. g. puberty rites and marriage rites), which are organized and supervised by older members of each gender respectively as a process of character development. Furthermore, the African and early Christian concepts of the family are in tandem with the concept of the family in Roman antiquity households which had an influence on family structure in early Christianity, where parents, children, relatives, and slaves were considered as family too. However, this is not to say that the nuclear family did not exist. It existed and was recognized, but “did not function as a social unit in isolation.”108 Being in tandem, the hermeneutical reflections, negotiations, and appropriations between the two virtue-ethical perspectives regarding moral exemplar is simple. In an African biblical virtue ethics, women in African communities, just like it has been in the traditional religion, would be encouraged to continue to teach younger women good behavior as encouraged also in Titus 2:3–5, while elderly men also do the same to younger men, in similar ways to the initiation rites in traditional African religion and ethics. However, the content of the instructions or training curricula changes to Christian materials, but the different stages of the rites of passage, such as puberty rites, marriage rites (where the 108 Odozor, Morality, 234, citing Carolyn Osiek, “The Family in Early Christianity: ‘Family Values’ Revisited,” in Sexuality, Marriage and Family: Readings in the Catholic Tradition, ed. Odozor (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), 220.

294 Chapter 4: Appropriating the Virtue-Ethical Perspective of Titus into African Ethics bride and groom are prepared for marriage by the elderly members of both sexes), would be maintained. Initiation as a rite of passage in African ethics marks a decisive point in one’s life. Through initiation rites, one graduates from childhood to adulthood. Many of the virtues needed for personal and social ordering are imparted and acquired through rites of passage. “Creation of moral persons”109 is not left to chance in many African cultures but achieved through initiation rites. By means of such initiation rites, a person acquires new perspectives to life and becomes a “new person.”110 The moral effect of the Christ-event, as described in Titus (e. g. 2:11– 14) could be related to initiation rites in African cultures. Just like the Christevent transforms believers and imparts the right virtues for Christian living such as self-control, justice, and godliness, initiation rites “transform” and impart appropriate virtues for responsible living in an African community. c) Tandems in regard to a Sense of Dualistic Moral Telos The notion of simultaneous this-worldly and other-worldly moral telos towards which one’s behavior moves is found in both the ethical perspectives of Titus and that of African ethics. However, a significant tension exists in the content of the telos of each of the ethical perspectives. We shall now focus on discussing the tensions between the two ethical perspectives. 4.4.2 Tensions between Virtue Ethics/the Virtue-Ethical Perspectives of Titus and African Ethics In this section, we shall discuss the tensions at three levels: tensions between virtue ethics and African ethics, broadly stated; tensions between the virtueethical perspectives of Titus and African ethics generally; and tension between the virtue-ethical perspectives of Titus and African ethics as it relates to the four virtues discussed in chapter three: δικαιοσύνη, εὐσέβεια, σωφροσύνη, καλὰ ἔργα. In the course of the discussion, we will make appropriative reflections and proposals by means of progressive negotiations and concessions. a) Tensions between Virtue Ethics and African Ethics The first tension to note regards the theoretical and foundational structure of virtue ethics and African ethics. The foundational tension between the virtueethical perspective of Titus and that of African ethics, as is the case here, lies in their existential and narrative structures. The virtue-ethical perspective of 109 Michael Jackson, Allegories of the Wilderness: Ethics and Ambiguity in Kuranko Narratives (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 24. 110 Jackson’s term; see Jackson, Allegories, 24.

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Titus is based on the Christian narrative, story, and tradition centered on the Christ-event, while African ethics has its own narrative in its orally transmitted tradition, religion, and culture. This tension will feature frequently in the ensuing discussions. Beside this foundational tension, the second significant tension between the two virtue-ethical perspectives is the community-based orientation of virtue in African ethics and the individual-based orientation of virtue in Western conception of virtue, as reflected in the letter to Titus. The altruistic nature and heavily social concerns of African virtues place it in tension with the Western account of virtue ethics, which has been accused of being narcissistic and selfcentered.111 In this sense, one of the contributions an African account of virtue could make to the global discussion of virtue ethics is that it indicates how the self-regarding, self-centered nature of virtue ethics could be considerably “deselfed.” African virtue ethics could illustrate how individual and social virtues could be dynamically integrated, leading to individual and community flourishing simultaneously.112 These two foundational tensions are the bases of (and therefore evident in) almost all other tensions between the two ethical perspectives under consideration in this research. Moreover, the two foundational tensions presuppose the tension that would be faced in an inter-ethical study and appropriation between African ethics and biblical ethics. Nevertheless, it is in the context of such tensions and an attempt to appropriate biblical ethics into an African context that this section finds validity and relevance to this research. b) Tension regarding the Content of the Telos The significant tension regarding the content of the final telos in the two ethical perspectives lies in the fact that while in Titus there is a hope of a definite time of the “appearance of the glory of our great God and Savior, Jesus Christ,” which the believers are hoping and waiting for (Titus 2:13), there is no such concept in African religion and ethics. Instead of expecting the appearance of a divine 111 See Louden, “Virtue Ethics,” 503–509. Louden discusses the objections to virtue ethics in secular philosophy and the appropriate responses given by virtue ethicists, especially as it relates to applied ethics. See also Justin Oakley and Dean Cocking, Virtue Ethics and Professional Roles (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 31–38. They also discuss the criticisms against virtue ethics in philosophical circles and their appropriate responses. 112 The tension between the two ethical perspectives could further be described in this way: in the African account of virtue, the individual sees himself from the point of view of the community, while in the Western account, the individual sees the community from the point of view of himself. In the African context, one is to first define “who we are” before finding “who I am.” A person finds her/himself through finding the community, tradition, or narrative s/he belongs to and its telos. One’s telos in life is the community’s telos, and flourishing is in terms of the flourishing of the community more than the flourishing of the individual. While in the Western account of virtue ethics the individual first finds her/himself and his telos and then tries to figure out how s/he fits into and could contribute to society.

296 Chapter 4: Appropriating the Virtue-Ethical Perspective of Titus into African Ethics figure in such a manner, Africans think of when they will die and join their ancestors, where life continues at another level. One’s character and attendant behavior here on earth could determine his/her condition in the afterlife, where a person becomes an ancestor.113 In this case, the idea of a telos is not conceived in individual terms, but in terms of the community, which encompasses both the living and the living-dead, since death does not cut one off from the community. c) Tension in regard to the Three Most Important Questions in Virtue Ethics Virtue ethics, as advanced by MacIntyre and Hauerwas, is a narrative ethics. It sees one’s moral situation as not disconnected from the story of the community or tradition one belongs to. MacIntyre argues that the unity of the virtues is intelligible only to the extent that a person’s life is conceived and evaluated as a unitary life. In this case, the concept of selfhood finds its unity in the “unity of a narrative which links birth to death as narrative beginning to middle to end.”114 It is in the context of a narrative that the three important questions in virtue ethics theory emerge and find their essence: Who am I? Who ought I to become? And how do I get there? The tension regarding these three central questions of virtue ethics theory is also related to their community-based and individual-based differences. While these questions in their singular forms are appropriate for the Western conception of virtue as reflected in the virtue-ethical perspective of Titus (with the Christ-event as primarily effecting a new life and identity of individuals), they are in tension with an African account of virtue, being primarily a community or social based ethics. An African account of virtue ethics would, therefore, appropriate these questions from singular to plural forms as follows: From “who am I” to “who are we?” From “who ought I to become?” to “who ought we to become?” And from “how do I get there” to “how do we get there?”115 In this 113 See Ejizu, “Emergent Key Issues in the Study of African Traditional Religions,” 111 for a brief discussion on the debate about the suitability of the expression “ancestor worship” and other related terms in the study of African religion. 114 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 191. In their understanding of humans as created beings, Kunhiyop notes that Africans have mostly taken a holistic view of man, seeing him as a single entity, contrary to a dualistic view which separates body and soul. Samuel W. Kunhiyop, African Christian Ethics (Nairobi: Hippo Books, 2008), 66. 115 For a similar argument but from a different perspective and for a different reason, see Bert Musschenga, ed., Does Religion Matter Morally? A Critical Reappraisal of the Thesis of Morality’s Independence from Religion (Kampen: Kok Pharos, 1995), 201. Musschenga argues that in a pluralistic society of today, each moral tradition is just one among many, and has to take into account other moral traditions. In this light, he criticizes Hauerwas’s narrative ethics of virtue, especially its central questions. He argues that “an ethics which takes the problems of plurality seriously cannot confine itself to the question ‘Who am I/who do I want to be?’ (or: ‘Who are we/do we want to be?’). Another ethical question must be added: Who am I/ do I want to be among/together with others who think and act differently?’” The willingness

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way, an African account of virtue ethics gives due relevance and emphasis to its communal structure and explicates the social relevance of the virtues. The answers to these questions in an African context would be as follows: “Who are we?” We are a certain clan, tribe or community (including the “living dead”), with a certain ancestral history. “Who ought we to become?” We ought to become a community of morally good people, keeping a good relationship with the Supreme Being, gods, spirits, the living-dead, ancestors, and one another.116 “How do we get there?” We get there by doing acts approved by the community, gods, ancestors, and the Supreme Being as conveyed to us through our chief priests, oldest members of our community, and local chiefs. And if we offend the gods or ancestors, we appease them with the prescribed rituals and sacrifices. We get to our telos by transmitting our religion, ethics, values, traditions, culture, and story from one generation to another in order to ensure the continuity of our community.117 Community, in this construal, involves not only the living but also the dead ancestors and the unborn members of the family. Due to the central role of ancestors in African religious and moral life, Bujo argues that Jesus be regarded as the Great Ancestor in constructing the place of the ancestors in African Christian ethics and its narrative structure in which fellowship renews the existence of the ancestors and ethical behavior also involves reestablishing the presence of the ancestors.118 to relate and live with people who think differently should become part of one’s identity too, argues Musschenga. 116 See Odozor, Morality, 207. He notes that the African’s view of the universe is a “layered universe: God, spirits, and human beings, in that order,” and living in peace with each of these components is what leads to individual and community flourishing. 117  In a seeming contrast to Mbiti, Idowu and others, Olupona posits that “African traditional religions typically strive for a this-worldly salvation – measured in terms of health, wealth, and offspring – while at the same time maintaining close contact with the otherworldly realm of ancestors, spirits, and gods who are seen as having strong influence on the events and people in the here and now” (Olupona, African Religions, 3). Every misfortune or natural disaster that befalls an individual or a community is normally ascribed to negative spirits, witchcraft, or failure in ethical obligations on the part of humans (Olupona, African Religions, 3). However, I think that describing African religions and, by implication, ethics as typically striving for “thisworldly salvation” is an overstatement. Rather, I think African religions and ethics strive for both this-worldly and other-worldly salvation at equal levels. The African understanding of the gap between “this world” and “the other world” is very thin because of the belief in ongoing interaction between the two worlds daily. If a person dies, s/he is simply said to have “joined the ancestors” and continues to live and interact with the members of her/his family but at a different level. And one’s situation in the life after death is determined by how one lives before death. Such a belief makes it unaccountable to describe African religions and ethics as typically striving for “this-worldly” salvation. 118 Kunhiyop, African Christian Ethics, 68, citing Benezet Bujo, Foundations of an African Ethic: Beyond the Universal Claims of Western Morality, trans. Brian McNeil (New York: Crossroads, 2001), 35, 71. Based on the idea of a community including the dead ancestors, Africans believe generally that when one dies, s/he simply “joins the ancestors” (a common extant

298 Chapter 4: Appropriating the Virtue-Ethical Perspective of Titus into African Ethics d) Tension in regard to “Being” and “Doing” Due to the many orally transmitted do’s and don’ts which confront a person in an African society from birth to death, Mbiti describes the essence of African morality generally as more “societary” than “spiritual” and that it is a morality of “conduct” rather than of “being.” He further describes it as ‘dynamic’ ethics rather than ‘static’ ethics, “for it defines what a person does rather than what he is.”119 In other words, a person is what he is because of what he does, and not that he does what he does because of what he is. In this light, man is viewed as neither good nor bad, but his association with goodness or evil is solely in terms of what he does or does not do, in conformity with societal values and expectations.120 This description of morality in African context places it in direct tension with the neo-Aristotelian concept of a virtuous person which characterizes contemporary virtue ethics theory, and which is represented in the virtue-ethical perspective of Titus. A virtuous person is first “who he is” before “what he does,” and he does what he does because of who he is. In other words, “being” precedes “doing,” while in Mbiti’s description of African morality, “doing” precedes “being.” From experience as an African, born and brought up in Africa, one could agree with Mbiti’s description of African ethics as generally that of “doing” more than “being,” because of the less emphasis on inner dispositions and character of persons. More emphasis is normally placed, instead, on external gestures and actions in conformity with societal traditions than on the internal qualities of persons.121 Nevertheless, exceptions need to be made to this description of African ethics. For example, among the Zaar people of Bauchi State, Nigeria, one’s behavior is often described in terms of “being” more than “doing,” even though “doing” metaphor for death) at a different level of existence. There is a possibility for one to be rejected by the ancestors if he has a bad character or has lived a bad life in the physical life. This means her/his “soul” will be hanging somewhere in a state of uncertainty and discomfort. This is also the situation when one is not properly buried by the kinsmen here on earth; it is believed in many traditional communities that when one is not properly buried by observing all the burial rites appropriate to one’s status in the society, her/his spirit could even get angry and inflict disaster in form of diseases or other calamities on the kinsmen. The role proper burial is believed to play in one’s condition after death could be traced as the underlying worldview behind expensive and heavily organized and attended funeral services in most African communities. 119 Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, 214. 120 Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, 214. 121 For example, a young man is considered virtuous and of good character if he shows respect to elders or in-laws by greeting them properly, helping to collect luggage from older people, does not talk harshly to an elderly person, and so on, even if he is pretending and does not have an inner attitude of respect to them. He may be showing that respect just to gain certain favor and not as an outflow of his character. By the standard of virtue ethics theory, such a young man is not virtuous even if he does virtuous acts which symbolize humility, because they are not coming out of his “being,” i. e. his inner dispositions, attitude, and character.

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is the yardstick for assessing “being.” It is common to hear a person being described as ci ni Zaar gh mbuni, i. e. “he/she is a good person,” or ci ni kuskh Zaar, i. e. “he is a wicked person.” Such an assessment of a person’s character is normally made when a persistent attitude or pattern of behavior is observed, which earns the person the description of either “being good” or “being bad.” In this case, the virtue-ethical concept of “being” is employed in assessing one’s character. Similarly, we have noted above that among the Yoruba people, iwa “character or existence” is arguably the most important concept in their moral structure.122 e) Tension between the Virtue-Ethical Perspectives of Titus and African Ethics Having noted the structural and theoretical tensions between the two ethical perspectives, the next paragraphs will be committed to identifying and analyzing the tension between the virtue-ethical perspectives of the letter to Titus and African ethics. The goal is to highlight areas where appropriations could be made in any attempt to apply the ethics of Titus to an African context.123 f) Tension regarding the Source of Virtue Tensions exist between the two ethical perspectives regarding the sources of virtue. In African ethics, as noted above, three sources of character or virtue are identified: divine source (God, gods), biological heredity, and community. However, in the letter to Titus, the Christ-event is the source of virtue of the believers. The Christ-event is described as effecting a new life, identity, and character of the believer, which makes it possible to live a virtuous life (Titus 2:11–14; 3:3–7). The ethical perspective of Titus is particularistic in the sense that it limits the possession and practice of the virtues to those who share in the Christian narrative anchored on the Christ-event. Titus describes the opponents (who perhaps he regards as not part of the Christian narrative) as “the ones who have been defiled and are unbelieving … their mind and conscience has been defiled … they do not stand the test of any good works” (Titus 1:15–16). Moreover, the description of who “we were” but now “we are” in Titus 3:3–7 also indicates a conception of the Christ-event as the decisive and essential source of the believers’ character. It demarcates pre-conversion and post-conversion morality significantly. The emphasis on teaching sound doctrine is, therefore, to enable the believers to grow in their new identity and to develop the virtues that this new identity occasions.

122 Gbadegesin,

“Individuality, Community, and the Moral Order,” 303. research does not undertake to make such applications but would be recommended for further research. 123 This

300 Chapter 4: Appropriating the Virtue-Ethical Perspective of Titus into African Ethics In regard to heredity, the way and manner a whole family, clan, or tribe in African ethics could be associated with a particular character could also be described as a narrative view of ethics. While in Hauerwas’ thesis it is the Christian narrative which determines and shapes character,124 it is a biological narrative which is believed to determine and shape character is some African cultures. In Titus, conversely, the Christian narrative is what makes possession and practicing the virtues possible (e. g. Titus 1:15–16; 2:11–12; 3:3–7). This indicates, therefore, a tension between the understandings of narrative in the two virtue-ethical perspectives. g) Tension Pertaining to Moral Agency The concept of moral agency in African ethics is different from that of Titus. African ethics does not have a sense of divine moral agency or co-agency, even though divine or spiritual entities are always in view. Spiritual entities such as gods and the living-dead sanction, reward, or punish moral acts, but do not give special moral capacity.125 However, in Titus 2:11–14, the Christ-event effects a new life, identity, and character in the believer, and “the grace” (referring to the moral transformative effect of the Christ-event) continues teaching (with an implicit nuance of “enabling”) the believer to deny worldly vices and to live a self-controlled, righteous (just), and godly life. Such a continuous divine moral enablement is absent in African ethics. On this account, any attempt to appropriate the ethics of Titus into an African Christian ethics needs to articulate the continuous role of divine agency in character formation and function in everyday life.126 Some of the virtues which are taken seriously in African ethics are also present among the virtues in Titus, for example hospitality, kindness, truthfulness, and the like (Titus 1:7–8). However, the difference lies in the moral agents of the virtues. In Titus, the lists of such virtues often appear as requirements associated with specific leadership or gender roles (e. g. Titus 1:6–9; 2:2–6),

124 See Herdt, “Varieties of Contemporary Christian Virtue Ethics,” 227–228, citing Stanley S. Hauerwas and W. Willimon, Resident Aliens (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1989), 78. 125 See Grätzel, System der Ethik, 224. Grätzel notes that the area of “can” or “able” (German können) in an ethical system is the area of virtues, skills, or competences. He notes that the question of whether these virtues or skills are naturally endowed or acquired is irrelevant and outdated because they, like the whole issue of können, have no ethical meaning. The skills and virtues find ethical relevance only in the context of sollen (German for “ought to” or “should”) and müssen (German for “have to” or “must”). 126 Note that the concept of “dynamic protective spirit” known among the Igbos as chi; the Yorubas as ori; Ewe or the Asante as ka or kre; Ancient Egypt as ka (Odozor, Morality, 209), mentioned above, does not include continuous spiritual enablement for moral living. Instead, it is only a given nature predetermined by God or the Supreme Being. Nevertheless, the moral agent has the free will and possibility of altering it.

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while in African ethics, it is a requirement for everyone127 in the community, including children.128 h) Tension regarding the Individual and Communal Orientations of the Two Ethical Perspectives Comparing Sofola’s list of “cardinal virtues” of African ethics with the cardinal virtues in Titus (and Greek-philosophical ethics)129 reveals some tensions between the two ethical perspectives. Sofola’s African cardinal virtues include wholesome human relations; respect for elders; community fellow-feeling; a live-and-let-live philosophy; altruism; and hospitality.130 Titus 2:12, on the other hand, lists three cardinal virtues as self-control, justice (righteousness), and godliness. One noticeable difference is that the cardinal virtues in Titus are more individual-oriented while African cardinal virtues are more community-oriented. The standard of any virtue in African ethics is the “community.” Therefore, any virtue whose social relevance is not readily evident falls below the standards of African ethics. Even the sense of “personal purity,” which exists in African ethics, is social in the sense that the goal of personal purity is to relate well with the gods, with deceased relations, and to participate in the community. When one breaks a taboo and by implication commits an abomination, he or she is considered impure and cannot relate well with the community, the gods, and the “living-dead.”131 Therefore, such a person has to be “purified” via the prescribed sacrifices, after which one regains his or her purity and social relations are restored. Nevertheless, the “cardinal virtues” of the two ethical perspectives (Titus’s ethics and African ethics) are similar in the sense that to a large extent, they both present moral virtues compared to physical, intellectual, or theological virtues.132 However, the moral nuances of justice/righteousness and godliness/ piety in Titus could be contested. Nevertheless, “just(ice)”133 in Titus 2:12 as a 127 Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, 167, notes that professionals in ATR, for example priests and medicine-men, are also expected to be morally upright, trustworthy, and friendly. 128 However, it is worth noting that humility in African ethics is expected of different genders and age groups with varying degrees or shapes, as will be discussed below. 129 Wibbing, “σωφροσύνη,” 501. The four cardinal virtues are: wisdom, courage, prudence, and justice. Wibbing thinks Plato’s inclusion of “prudence” among the four cardinal virtues is a consolidation of the eudaimonism which had pervaded early philosophical ideas. Luck, “σωφροσύνη,” 1099. 130 Amadi, Ethics in Nigerian Culture, citing Sofola, African Culture and the African Personality (Ibadan: African Resources Publishing, 1973), ch. 4. 131 See Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, 46. 132 See Lovin, An Introduction to Christian Ethics, 199–204. Lovin discusses the different kinds of virtues such as intellectual, moral, and theological virtues. 133 Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 143–147. Kotva mentions “distributive jus-

302 Chapter 4: Appropriating the Virtue-Ethical Perspective of Titus into African Ethics cardinal virtue conveys more the sense of “righteousness” in moral terms than the theological motif of “justification by faith.” Even though there is some disagreement among scholars as to whether εὐσέβεια is a moral virtue, this research argues that as used in Titus, it is a moral virtue.

4.5 Excursus: “Continuity” as a Telos in African Ethics In an attempt to bring virtue ethics into conversation with African ethics, African ethicists have to clearly articulate what sense of moral telos exists in African ethics, because a sense of moral telos is a central feature in virtue ethics. This telos is connected to what would be considered “human flourishing” or eudaimonia of an individual and a community. Therefore, I present here what I understand to be the telos in African ethics and culture at large. In my opinion, the telos of life in African culture(s) is “continuity,” which is understood in two ways: the physical continuity of the family or community lineage in this life on the one hand, and the spiritual continuity of a person in the life after physical death on the other hand. This notion of continuity involves the continuity of life and continuity of communion, fellowship, or good relationship with the community (comprising both the living, the unborn, and the dead members of the community). I regard these two dimensions as the telos of life in African thought (moral, religious, and all aspects of life) because what is normally regarded as a fulfilled, fruitful, happy, and flourishing life is, consciously or unconsciously, construed based on the notion of these dimensions of “continuity,” as explained in the following paragraphs. To begin with, these two dimensions of continuity could be described as vertical and horizontal continuity as the telos of individual and community life in African cultures. This telos is at the heart of ethics and religion, and it is at the background of almost every behavior. For example, it is the underlying worldview behind the high emphasis on marriage and child-bearing (especially male children) in many African cultures. It is also the worldview behind polygamy and divorce of a spouse who is believed to be barren or impotent. Continuity is the underlying worldview behind the different initiation rites because such rites are meant to ensure the transmission of the religion, ethics, values, practices, and traditions of the family and community to the next generation. Concerning the spiritual aspect or life after death, continuity is the underlying worldview for good behavior and the worldview behind rituals and sacrifices to appease ancestors, spirit beings, and gods, because one’s behavior determines his/her condition in the other-world. Such a telos is still community-based betice” in his response to objections against the Christian appropriation of virtue ethics as being self-regarding.

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cause while one seeks the continuity of the community in the physical life, he seeks continuity in the life after death in the sense of joining the community of the “living-dead” ancestors, and still being involved in the two “communities” which are in essence one community. This conception of the telos of life is in tension with the conception of the telos of life in the Western account of virtue ethics and in the virtue-ethical perspective of Titus. Moreover, the moral reasoning of many African cultures is grounded on this conception of “continuity” as the telos of individual and community life. Even the communitarian ordering of society and ethics fundamentally stands on this notion of continuity: continuity of the community and continuity of individuals. It is the prevailing (though sometimes implicit) idea behind sexual relations, marriage, and the utter rejection of same-sex marriage in most African societies, at both personal, family, community, and political (legislative) levels, even at the expense of losing huge financial support from some Western organizations and governments.134 Odozor asserts that African Christian ethics and African traditional ethics share common ground on same-sex marriage in the sense that they agree that sexual differences matter and they also agree on the “connection between the unitive and the procreative aspects of human sexuality.”135 Furthermore, even the continuity of an individual is conceived at two levels: The continuity of one’s “name” or lineage here, and the continuity of one’s life after death, when one “joins the ancestors.” It could be argued that this notion of “continuity” is also behind the pressure parents and grandparents put on their children to marry and give birth before they (parents and grandparents) die, because they want to see their grandchildren and be sure that their lineage will continue before they die, so they would truly “rest in peace.”136 Such a notion of continuity as a telos connected to what it means to have lived a “fulfilled life” has been used a lot of times to provide comfort at funeral 134 See Odozor, Morality, 263–268, for a discussion on how some Western governments and organizations are pushing the agenda for legalizing same-sex sexual relations and marriage in Africa and threatening to withdraw their support if the governments refuse to legalize it. The Nigerian government and most citizens, among others, rejected such imposition outright and passed a legislative bill that prohibits and even criminalizes same-sex marriage. 135 Odozor, Morality, 267. 136 My brother-in-law is the firstborn and the only male child of his parents, who have both died. As soon as his father died, he has been under intense pressure to marry and have children before “anything happens” (such as death or sexual impotency). Other family members and relations are very concerned that being the only male child, if he delays marriage and any tragedy happens to him like death or other factors that could prevent him from childbirth (such as impotence, accident, or disease that renders him sexually inactive), it means there will be no “continuity” of his father’s lineage and his own “name.” The children born by his sisters, such as our sons, are not regarded as those who will ensure the continuity of their “name” or lineage because they bear the names of the families to which his sisters are married. His own children are the only ones who can truly bear and perpetuate the name of their family, hence the pressure (directly or indirectly) on him to get married and have children.

304 Chapter 4: Appropriating the Virtue-Ethical Perspective of Titus into African Ethics services. For example, many African societies generally prohibit pre-marital sex or having a child out of wedlock, and they encourage chastity until one is married. After marriage, adultery is also prohibited. However, in a situation where an unmarried male adult dies, the greatest regret people normally have of losing him is often that he/she has died without leaving a “seed” (child) behind who will continue to bear his/her name or continue his lineage. By implication, one’s “name” is totally gone and will be forgotten. However, if by any chance, after the death of a person, the family finds out that he has impregnated a lady somewhere, or has had a child out of wedlock secretly, they find comfort in the fact that he has at least left behind a “seed.” The family would normally trace the lady who is pregnant or has a child for their deceased brother to take responsibility and if possible, to take the child into their custody. In certain cases, people can even say that the deceased had a prior knowledge of his death, somehow, which is why he went against the moral expectations of premarital chastity just to have a “seed” who will continue to bear his name. The joy in such cases is often higher if the “seed” is male. Because continuity, regarded as the telos connected to a fulfilled life or flourishing is attained in such a case, the moral implications of having a child out of wedlock are taken lightly in favor of the greater telos – the person’s “continuity.” This concept of “continuity” could also be traced as the rationale behind the quest for “proper burial,” where a huge amount of money is spent on funeral services so that the deceased will truly “rest in peace” and continue to relate well with the community and the ancestors. A “proper burial” is one where all the burial rituals are fully and correctly performed in the right place, at the right time, and by the right people. There are lots of myths that suggest that if one is not given a “proper burial,” he or she could get angry and spiritually torment the family with all kinds of disasters. Without a “proper burial,” the person’s soul is believed to be hanging somewhere restlessly, since he or she cannot join the ancestors with a careless burial or no burial at all. This is why he or she could turn evil and torment the community in form of a ghost or other supernatural beings. In understanding the thought patterns and worldviews behind many cultural activities in Africa, such myths cannot and should not be taken for granted, for they reveal deep-seated cultural worldviews that still influence behavior among many Africans today. Based on the aforementioned points and observations, I argue that “continuity” be regarded as the sense of telos connected to living a happy and fulfilled life in African ethics and culture generally.

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4.6 Towards an African Biblical Virtue Ethics? Negotiations, Concessions, and Appropriation We have now come to the point where we will negotiate and appropriate the tensions discussed above in hermeneutical137 reflections. The methodology for this section is the Progressive-Negotiated-Ethics, which involves progressive negotiations, concessions, and appropriations of the tensions between the virtueethical perspectives of Titus and that of African ethics, leading to a new and third virtue-ethical space called African Biblical Virtue Ethics. The discussions will proceed in this sequence. First, we shall discuss the negotiations, concessions, and appropriations related to the structural and theoretical frameworks of the two virtue-ethical perspectives. Second, we shall consider the negotiations, concessions, and appropriations related to specific virtues in Titus, with emphasis on the four selected virtues analyzed in chapter three. The undergirding rationale for such negotiations and concessions is that Africa is or should no longer be regarded as a “dumping ground” of other ethical worldviews. While Westerners have articulated their different ethical concepts, virtue ethics inclusive, Africans are to seek to articulate their own ethical concepts. They are not to denigrate their own ethical worldviews and seek to uncritically copy the Western theories. Instead, Africa is to articulate its own ethical theories and bring them to the global ethical discourses. In this way, it enriches the global ethical discourse and is also enriched from other ethical perspectives. While external influences or gaining ethical insights from other parts of the world enriches the ethical vocabulary and concepts of the Africans, their ethical history and traditions are “not for sale.” Such insights from biblical ethics, Islamic ethics, or Western-culture-inspired ethics have to be negotiated with “eyes wide opened.” The next paragraphs, therefore, engage in such negotiations between African ethics and biblical ethics, with reference to the letter to Titus. 4.6.1 Negotiations, Concessions, and Appropriations Related to Foundational and Theoretical Structure Since the biggest tension between the two ethical perspectives is existential and relates to the place of the individual and the community, it follows also that the greatest negotiations, concessions, and appropriations are in the aspects of the centrality of community and individuality in the two ethical perspectives. The negotiations, concessions, and appropriations shall proceed thusly: 137 Grant LeMarquand describes African biblical ethics, especially in relation to Pauline texts, as “confessional-based hermeneutics.” This section follows in this tradition. See Grant LeMarquand, “African Readings of Paul,” in The Blackwell Companion to Paul, ed. Stephen Westerholm (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2014), 499.

306 Chapter 4: Appropriating the Virtue-Ethical Perspective of Titus into African Ethics For the virtue-ethical perspective of Titus or the Western account of virtue ethics to be relevant to African biblical or Christian ethics, there is a need to concede, to a large extent, the individualistic structure of its virtues or to explicate and articulate the communal function of such virtues over and above their individual functions. However, while it is encouraged that African ethics, on its own part, retains the communal structure of its virtues, it is worth noting that in the progressive negotiation towards African biblical virtue ethics, African ethics also needs to make some concessions or modifications of some of its community-based virtues. This is important because its community structure itself has some ills that have the potential to hinder human flourishing in the virtue-ethical sense. If there is truly to be a community, then the equality and full humanity of each member, irrespective of one’s clan, family history, age, gender, and health status has to be taken more seriously. A community, in the virtue-ethical sense of the word, is not a community if the system works mostly in favor of a certain gender or age, such as males over females, older ones over younger ones, the rich over the poor, the strong over the weak, and so on. A community, in virtueethical terms, is not a community if its structures of power and performance hinders human flourishing of even the smallest, weakest, or poorest member. The exercise of community-awarded power of the males over the females, parents over children, among others, have the potential to hinder the flourishing of the “weaker” ones by promoting, for example, rape and other kinds of sexual violence, domestic violence, child-labor, and so on. Moreover, the African sense of community needs to be broad enough to include members of other ethno-religious groups. Such a broader sense of community will substantially reduce the cases of clan or tribal stereotypes and ethnoreligious crises. In view of this, in asking the virtue-ethical question “who am I?” African biblical and Christian virtue ethics would not only ask “who are we?” but would expand the understanding of “we” from one’s immediate community to a wider sense of human community. In this regard, Odozor contends that African Christian theology must emphasize the universalism of God and his love in the God-language. He finds a good illustration of emphasis in the parable of the Good Samaritan. God through Christ has made himself our neighbor, and has made us all neighbors, irrespective of our different ethnic groups, social classes, gender, and other differences.138 Moreover, an African virtue ethics would need to concede some stereotypes of associating certain groups, families, or clans with certain bad character and treat each person first as an individual before being a member of a family or clan. As noted above, Odozor has also rightly observed that the primary weakness of the sense of community in African cultures is the discriminatory aspects 138 See

Odozor, Morality, 205.

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of it.139 The disadvantages of the community-based virtue ethics, in this regard, is that an entire community could be unjustly and generally stereotyped with certain vices. This affects one’s attitude to people from such communities, as exemplified in the cases of parents or families unanimously hindering their children from marrying a spouse from certain families and tribes because they are stereotyped with certain bad character. An African Christian virtue ethics would, therefore, concede and accept that even if it were true that the individuals in such stereotyped groups share in certain acquired bad character, the power of the Christ-event, as presented in Titus, defines a new identity, character, and entire life of individuals and renders such stereotypes invalid and obsolete (cf. the “we were …” now “we are …” rhetoric of Titus 3:3–7 and 2:11–14). Even if bad character is hereditary or one acquires it by habituation in a certain family or clan, the character of individuals could change and keep developing positively. It is unchristian, therefore, to perpetuate pre-Christian and in some cases, mythinspired stereotypes against certain groups of people without making room for the transforming power of the new life in Christ (Titus 3:3–7; cf. 2 Cor 5:17) or at least for a possibility of individual differences. An African virtue ethics would concede and accept that character or virtue is basically an individual and not community phenomenon, which finds (or should find) expression in the community for human flourishing. Trying to define or understand character first from the communal space without starting from the individual space is unaccountable and detrimental to individual flourishing. Hence, it is not enough to describe African ethics as a communal ethics. An African virtue ethics would need to articulate the place of the character of individual persons in the community, and clearly articulate the boundaries of the community on individual flourishing, and the boundaries of the individual on community flourishing. This is a sure way to ensure the simultaneous flourishing of individuals and the community, irrespective of one’s gender, age, religion, family lineage, health status, financial status, and social class. In the same vein, in the light of the incessant ethno-religious crises and loss of many lives and properties, an African Christian virtue ethics would redefine its boundaries of what a “community” is. African virtue ethics would need to see beyond the local definition of community which restricts itself to one’s ethnic group or family. African Christian virtue ethics would also need to learn to see their sense of community transcending not only the people in their church denomination, ethnic group, or religion, but recognizing everyone, including the unknown other, as part of the human community. In other words, the community fellow-feeling of African ethics would be redefined to include both the faith community and human community, and one’s sense of fellow-feeling would include the two. This agrees with the two-layer sense of community in Titus: faith 139 Odozor,

Morality, 244.

308 Chapter 4: Appropriating the Virtue-Ethical Perspective of Titus into African Ethics community and human community. It is from the two-community perspective that the author encourages the Cretan believers to be subject to authorities, to be ready for every good work “to everyone” (including those outside the faith community) and to live lives that earn the respect of outsiders (Titus 3:1–2). Scholarship is almost in consensus that the letter to Titus and other PE were written to negotiate the place of early Christians in the world (consequent to the delay in the Parousia), but without compromising the central message of their faith. In this way, the letter to Titus becomes a model for African Christians to define their place in Africa, remaining relevant both within their immediate faith community and in the wider human community. In this way, African biblical virtue ethics would encourage respecting the humanity of everyone and relating in love, peace, and justice to all. This is what is truly “useful and profitable to everyone” (Titus 3:8). Jens Herzer adopts a “close reading” of Titus and applies Titus 3:8 to the issue of reconciliation, especially with the former members of the German Communist secret service known as the Statsi, after the political reunification of Germany in 1989.140 Similarly, Grätzel discusses, in the light of the horror of the Holocaust, the possibility of reconciliation (Versöhnung) between the people of Germany and Israel, even though the genocide itself remains “unforgivable.”141 Grätzel shows that reconciliation, in such a situation, is a historical process, which binds the two parties involved (Germany as the actor, Israel as the victim) and keeps them continuously working towards reconciliation and peace with each other from generation to generation.142 African Christian ethicists could appropriate Grätzel and Herzer’s message in an African context to mean reconciliation is possible between ethnic groups or faith groups between which there have been crises and loss of lives and properties. Reconciliation is possible in the light of the new life, character, and identity occasioned in and through the effect of the Christ-event on the life of individuals and communities. This cross-border143 sense of community fellowfeeling will lead to a peaceful and egalitarian co-existence with neighboring communities and people of different faiths. In the central and Northern parts of Nigeria, which are currently characterized by ravaging and persistent ethnoreligious conflicts, this understanding would occasion a new perspective, leading to healing of relationships, love, reconciliation, and peaceful co-existence among 140 See

Herzer, “‘These Things are Excellent and Profitable to everyone,’” 134. Grätzel, Versöhnung: Die Macht der Sprache – Ein Beitrag zur Philosophie des Dialogs (Freiburg, Basel, Wien: Herder, 2018), 189. 142 Grätzel, Versöhnung, 189. 143 A word inspired by the German “Grenzüberschreitendes Ethos” in a title of an article by Michael Theobald. See Michael Theobald, “‘Lauter Milde allen Menschen gegenüber!’ (Titus 3,2): Grenzüberschreitendes Ethos in Pastoralbriefen,” in Biblical Ethics and Application, ed. Ruben Zimmermann and Stephen Joubert, WUNT 384 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2017), 305. 141 Stephan

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people of different organic and faith communities who have fought and hurt each other in the recent past. Another way of negotiating the community-based and individual-based differences of the two ethical systems is to explicate the implicit social aspects of Titus’ ethics and to “de-self” the strong emphasis on “self” in the Western-inspired conception of virtue, in order to be relevant to the African conception of virtue as basically a community-based, other-regarding virtue than an individual one. Such explication could be demonstrated using the virtue-ethical perspectives of “self-control.” Self-control is basically what an individual does, but it is normally done towards or in relation to other people. Hence, if one develops the virtue of self-control in personal issues like selection of food, punctuality, etc., he or she can as well apply such self-control in controlling anger, which, therefore, helps towards a good relationship with family members, neighbors, colleagues at work, and the community at large. Such self-control prevents one from hurting other people out of anger. Therefore, even though the text of Titus does not state clearly the social benefit of the virtue of self-control, it could be explicated in this way, showing that it ensures good social relations. We shall reflect more on the hermeneutical possibilities of self-control below. Another aspect of the negotiations, concessions, and appropriations between African ethics and the Western conception of virtue ethics, which still relates to the community and individuality concerns, is to be illustrated with marriage. In typical African culture and ethics, choosing a spouse is often more of a family decision than an individual one. It is believed that one’s wife does not “belong” to him alone, but to the family, as Mbiti rightly observes.144 But in an African ethic that would be virtue-ethical, a significant level of autonomy needs to be given to the individual. Therefore, as much as marriage is a family or a community affair, an individual would not be put under pressure to marry a certain spouse145 or at a certain time just to conform to societal or family preferences. Similarly, one would not be prevented from marrying a certain person from a certain tribe because the family does not want to build a relationship with that family due to stereotypes. This kind of community ethics, to a large extent, hinders individual human flourishing. In a virtue-ethical African community, individuals would be given significant level of freedom to make marriage choices without doing harm to the wellbeing of the community, while the community partners in other aspects of marriage such as the ceremonies. However, on the other hand, the Western virtue-ethical perspective of “selfflourishing” and the virtue-ethical perspective of Titus with its primary focus on the individual would also need to make concessions and give some room for 144 Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, 108. See also Kunhiyop, African Christian Ethics, 20–21. 145 Nevertheless, this is not to say that parental guidance in choosing a spouse is not needed. Such guidance could be provided without pressure on the individual.

310 Chapter 4: Appropriating the Virtue-Ethical Perspective of Titus into African Ethics community and solidarity. For example, one is to be concerned about the welfare of others and show genuine concern by asking not only about one’s wellbeing but that of his/her family as well (because they matter to the individual). It could also be in the form of willingly giving family and friends a chance to contribute to one’s choice of career, choice of spouse, and so on, without jeopardizing individual freedom. Involving others in one’s life choices in this way widens a person’s perspective, leading to informed decisions and strengthened relationships. This strengthens community fellow-feeling as exemplified in African ethics. In these ways, African ethics interacts with and contributes to Western and biblical conceptions of ethics, and Western and biblical conceptions of ethics also contribute to African ethics. These different ethical traditions enrich each other through the process of negotiations, concessions, and appropriations. 4.6.2 Tandems, Tension and Appropriations of the Two Virtue-Ethical Perspectives with Emphasis on σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, εὐσέβεια, and καλὰ ἔργα a) Negotiating σωφροσύνη Jackson’s description of the concept of self-control among the Kuranko people of Sierra Leone neatly illustrates how self-control is understood in many African cultures. He says through initiation rites, one is taught the virtue of self-control. The person learns to control his/her feelings, thoughts, and actions, which promote “steadiness of mind and body.”146 Unlike in the Western culture where self-control is an individual achievement and excellence, self-control in African cultures is “always regarded as an aspect of social order, not as a means of selfaggrandizement.”147 In this case, self-control is closely associated with upholding communal values and laws.148 The virtue-ethical reading of σωφροσύνη in chapter three above shows how Titus has provided a model of negotiation, concession, and appropriation of the “self” in “self-control.” The Greco-Roman concept of self-control is conceded and appropriated by “de-selfing” the “self,” giving room for both human and divine cooperation (Titus 2:12). African ethics does not have the notion of divine agency in moral agency, as noted above. Hence, the concept of co-moral agency in Titus could be appropriated into African Christian ethics to mean that the Christ-event not only saves but also teaches and enables the believer to continuously live a self-controlled life. In this way, African Christians learn to develop the consciousness of divine enablement for everyday morality. 146 Jackson, Allegories, 24–25. Jackson’s discussions are in particular reference to the Kuranko people of Sierra Leone, but it is similar in many African cultures. 147 Jackson, Allegories, 25. 148 Jackson, Allegories, 25.

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b) Negotiating δικαιοσύνη Among the four Greek cardinal virtues, unlike temperance and courage which are related to controlling various kinds of desires, prudence and justice are related to the habits that an individual develops for making right judgments.149 Justice has to do with giving each person his or her due. It also has to do with the equal or fair distribution of burdens and benefits among individuals and groups in a community.150 In contemporary discourse, justice is often associated with politics and political leaders. However, in virtue ethics, as inspired by its GrecoRoman roots, justice is equally an individual virtue, expected to be applied in everyday life of individuals.151 The concept of justice in Titus conveys both the political and individual aspects. For example, the political aspect is represented in naming justice as a quality required of a leader (Titus 1:8), while the individual aspect is represented in naming justice among the virtues that “the grace” teaches all believers to live (Titus 2:12; cf. 3:3–7). However, when we consider the fact that the bishop is “to be” just (implying “being” more than “doing” and character more than actions), we notice that the individual nuance is more represented in Titus than the political nuance. Therefore, in appropriating the virtue-ethical concept of justice and the idea of justice in Titus into African ethics, both the individual and political nuances of virtue would be equally emphasized. The individual aspect of justice would emphasize how Africans would need to learn to strike a good balance between work and leisure, temperance and courage, and so on.152 It would also seek to strike a fine balance between the place of the community and that of the individual, between respect for elders and hypocrisy, between demanding respect from a wife and younger ones and being a burden to them, between age and respectability, between privileges and humility, and the like. Such balances would have positive implications on the political aspects of justice as well. The political aspect would emphasize judicial and distributive justice in the form of ensuring that human rights are respected, ensuring gender equality, equal access to education, fight against domestic violence and child labor, and fight for freedom of expression and association. Others include an insistence on equal distribution of communal resources such as lands, infrastructure, political appointments, and the fight against ethno-religious discrimination and violence.153 Such a just and balanced life at individual and communal levels is what will lead to both individual and community flourishing in Africa. 149 Lovin, An Introduction to Christian Ethics, 191. See pages 193–196, for a discussion on Aristotle’s idea of the cardinal virtues from a Christian perspective. 150 Lovin, An Introduction to Christian Ethics, 191. 151 Lovin, An Introduction to Christian Ethics, 191. 152 Lovin, An Introduction to Christian Ethics, 191. 153 These individual and political aspects of justice represent the areas in African culture and ethics that need to be transformed by the Christian gospel.

312 Chapter 4: Appropriating the Virtue-Ethical Perspective of Titus into African Ethics c) Negotiating εὐσέβεια The tension related to εὐσέβεια is that while the virtue-ethical perspective of Titus shows that piety or godliness is an inner disposition and attitude effected in the believer’s life through the Christ-event, African ethics views piety as an external action of reverence and trepidation towards the gods, ancestors, and totems in specific consecrated places and times. Piety in African ethics also involves faithfully fulfilling religious rituals. The author of Titus adapts the Greco-Roman concept of piety and widens it to include the nuances of “godliness” as understood in the Christian tradition. He appropriates a concept of εὐσέβεια which realigns faith, knowledge, and corresponding conduct.154 African ethics, however, has a limited concept of piety. It does not include the kind of inner dispositions nuanced in the ethics of Titus, neither does it have a concept that aligns faith, knowledge, and conduct simultaneously. Therefore, an attempt to appropriate Titus’s concept of εὐσέβεια into an African Christian virtue ethics may require a concession on the part of African ethics. African Christian virtue ethics would learn from the author of Titus in the way he adopts the Greco-Roman concept of εὐσέβεια from merely external acts of reverence and piety to an internal one. An African account of virtue would adopt the concept of εὐσέβεια as first of all an inner disposition or attitude of respectability, but which shows itself in corresponding external behavior, grounded in the Christ-event. Generally, for the majority of the adherents of ATR, what constitute the focal issues of their religious consciousness and life are issues of belief in and reverence of the deities, ancestors, fear of spirit beings, ritual sacrifices, ritual symbols, initiation rites and rituals, healing, divination, medicine-making, upright living in adherence to communal values, enhancement of life, continuity, and community living and wellbeing. There is always an existing belief in a (or the) Supreme Being, but the Supreme Being does not feature prominently in everyday life compared to other deities, spirit beings, and the living-dead.155 In other words, African religions focus more on religious acts such as sacrifices and rituals than in a personal relationship with divine beings as found in Christianity. The prevalence of the “rule or law-based” attitude of reverence to God among Christians in Africa could be understood as a carryover of ATR where people think worshiping the gods or reverence to ancestors is basically obeying their instructions or carrying out prescribed sacrifices properly. As a result, people think giving tithes, offerings, or attending church services are ways of “paying God his due,” after which one is “free.” But Titus’s concept of godliness as an internal virtue of reverence with corresponding conduct in daily life calls for concession and appropriation on the part of African ethics. In an African virtue 154 Towner, 155 Ejizu,

The Goal of Our Instruction, 152. “Emergent Key Issues in the Study of African Traditional Religions,” 120.

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ethics, African Christians would learn that unlike their external, rule and sacrifice-based relationship with the God or gods of ATR, the Christ-event effects an inner change of character, and therefore calls for reverence and conduct that is based on a genuine, inner, and spiritual relationship with God through Christ. External activities of piety are virtuous only to the extent that they express an inner attitude of genuine reverence. So also, external conducts of respect for elders, religious leaders, and everyone is only virtuous to the extent that it corresponds with an inner attitude of respect. In this case, one cannot “pay God his due” unless his external actions are commensurate with the inner character. Odozor notes that unlike in Christianity, the relationship between God and human beings in ATR is characterized by fear, which accounts for the notion of a distant and withdrawn God. That fear is often the basis for right order in ATR.156 Christianity and ATR have different perspectives in this regard, in the sense that while Christianity talks about the nearness of God (Emmanuel), ATR sees God as distant and withdrawn.157 This fear factor makes it such that in many African cultures, disasters, diseases, and many other forms of physical evils158 are attributed to God. For this reason, the common wish of African peoples is that God should continue to stay distant;159 they prefer instead to deal with lesser deities and living-dead ancestors who are considered the custodians of morality. However, “even these intermediaries of God, such as Ala in Igbo religion, or the ancestors, are often considered to be moral enforcers, wrathful avengers of transgressions of the moral code.”160 The “fear factor” which characterizes human to divine relationships in African ethics is in tension with the saving and loving God encountered in the letter to Titus (e. g. Titus 3:3–7). This also calls for concessions and appropriations. An African virtue ethics would make concessions for some of its beliefs like finding their ethical argumentation for certain behaviors in the fear of attack from gods, spirits, dead ancestors or witches. Instead, such an ethic would find its argumentation in the fact and effect of the Christ-event, which enables believers to live morally acceptable lives. Living a morally acceptable life, therefore, is not merely a way of appeasing spiritual beings and dead ancestors and avoiding any calamity from them, but an external expression of one’s inner reality; that 156 Odozor,

Morality, 202. Morality, 202. 158 Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, 213, makes a distinction between “moral evil” (what man does against his fellow humans) and “natural evil” (such as accidents and natural disasters, which are always believed to be caused by wicked agents like witches or evil spirits, and not ordinary natural causes) in African societies, and notes that “what lies behind the conception of moral ‘good’ or ‘evil’ is ultimately the nature of the relationship between individuals in a given community or society. 159 Odozor, Morality, 203, citing Emefie Ikenga Metuh, God and Man in African Religion (London: Chapman, 1981), 38–39. 160 Odozor, Morality, 203. 157 Odozor,

314 Chapter 4: Appropriating the Virtue-Ethical Perspective of Titus into African Ethics is, the Christ-event has given the believer a new identity and character. In this way, the African Christian is freed from viewing right behavior as a means of avoiding punishment from God and other spirit beings, but as a grateful response and expression of love to the God who has not only saved but has given a new life that is free from ancestral curses and power of witches and wicked spirits. Furthermore, African religious practices of offering different kinds of material sacrifices to appease the gods, spirits, or ancestors when one breaks their rules are in tension with the once and for all sacrifice of Christ in and through the Christ-event (Titus 2:11–4; 3:3–7). Such practices in African cultures have been carried over into many Christian churches in Africa today, characterized by frequent “sacrifices” in form of “seed-sowing”161 to pastors, prophets, and preachers for prayers of forgiveness and for fortune. Appropriating Titus’s concept of the Christ-event as portrayed in Titus 3:3–7 would encourage African Christians to only repent, ask God for forgiveness, and trust that they are forgiven without having to do or give any material sacrifice for it.162 Nevertheless, a word of caution needs to be made here. When the fear factor is removed from the metaphysical grounding of ethics in ATR without anything filling the void, Odozor notes, it leads to societal breakdown. He traces the amoral life and corrupt practices of politicians in African societies to the disappearance of the sense of instant retribution, which had characterized the precolonial, pre-Christian and pre-Islamic ATR. Such a breakdown of society is not only evident in politics, but also in people’s personal lives and social relationships. In this case, “things have indeed fallen apart, because the center no longer holds.”163 The balance that needs to be made is, therefore, between the fear of God’s punishment and the love of God’s justice. 161 “Seed-sowing” is a common practice in many African churches where people give money or any special offering to the church or the pastor as a “seed,” expecting it to germinate in the form of financial prosperity, securing a job opportunity, healing, blessing of a marriage partner or children, success in an exam, securing admission into schools, safety in travel, and so on. 162 Part of the reasons why practices such as “seed-sowing” in African churches have persisted is one indication of the negative influence of ATR in Christianity or poor appropriation of the biblical message. At the heart of it is the ATR worldview that for one to please the gods or the ancestors and attract their blessings, one has to do something physical in the form of a sacrifice or anything the chief priest prescribes. The pastors who extort their congregations in this way by telling them that God said they should “sow a seed” for their promotion at work, for child-bearing, for finding a marriage partner, for success in exams, for safety in travel, for healing from sicknesses, for protection of family members, for wealth, for prosperity in business, and so on, are simply feeding on the leftovers of ATR or its carry-over into Christianity. They are simply the modern or “Christian” versions of the chief priests in ATR who would normally be the ones to tell the people the prescribed sacrifices of a goat, cow, chicken, or any item required by the gods or the dead ancestors in order to avert a pending calamity, give them material prosperity, health, children, and so on. 163 Odozor, Morality, 203. Odozor blames this situation on the “West,” the so-called First World, which exports its “spiritual toxic waste” to Africa and other continents, such as practical materialism, moral relativism, nihilism, etc. Second, he blames it on religious fundamentalists

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African Christian virtue ethics, therefore, would emphasize the nature of the God Jesus reveals; a loving God, Emmanuel, and not a “vengeful Other.”164 And since God is love, “Christian morality is a responsive ethic. It is a morality of love … it is a morality that responds to love” both to God and to others.165 With this understanding, African Christians, especially those who have the “fear factor,” would take a deep sigh of relief from a religious narrative that has tied them down to fear and restless effort to “win God’s favor over,” into a narrative of a loving, gracious, and forgiving relationship with God, which has been made possible through the Christ-event (Titus 1:1–3; 2:11–14; 3:3–7). d) Negotiating καλὰ ἔργα The virtue-ethical reading of good works shows that even though it is “good works,” Titus does not see it from a “works” or “doing” point of view but from “being.” African ethics, on the other hand, is strong on “doing” and less on “being,” as noted above. Hence, appropriating good works into an African Christian virtue ethics would require raising the standard of what is considered a good work from external observable actions only to the ones that correspond with the inner attitudes behind the works. This shows that assessing a good work is not only by outsiders but the person himself constantly seeking to develop the right inner attitudes from which works flow. The moral agent strives towards “being,” while his “doing” simultaneously expresses and re-affirms his “being.” The virtue-ethical concept of “learning to bring out good works” (Titus 3:14) in Titus expresses the process of seeking to develop inner virtues and dispositions. Moreover, the virtue-ethical concept of good works in Titus as from an inner character, without stating the concrete good works intended, benefits the community and does not put a limit to the goodness one can do. This, therefore, gives room for appropriation into aspects of social and distributive justice such as care for the environment (ecology) as good works; hospitality to strangers as good works; engaging in conflict prevention and resolution as good works; volunteer social services as good works; providing for one’s family needs as good works; relinquishing certain rights and privileges as good works,166 and so on. It also applies in politics, church, or traditional institutions. who mix religion with political and economic interests and external groups who support them, in “God’s name,” resulting in intolerance and violence (Odozor, Morality, 203–204). Third, he blames it on Christianity for its “haphazard evangelization in the area of God-language. In a bid to plant the faith in Africa, Christian missionaries quickly dislodged African divinities from their groves or quickly baptized them with Christian names without a corresponding change in the meaning they mediated.” Odozor, therefore, argues that the place to begin Christian theology in Africa is the area of the God-language. That is where the dialogue with ATR is to start (Odozor, Morality, 204). 164 Odozor, Morality, 204–205. 165 Odozor, Morality, 204–205. 166 See Zimmermann’s forthcoming book on the ethics of relinquishing.

316 Chapter 4: Appropriating the Virtue-Ethical Perspective of Titus into African Ethics In these ways, the implicit social relevance of the virtue-ethical norms in Titus are explicated, thereby meeting the community-based standards of African ethics.

4.7 The Five-fold Exegethical Steps towards an African Biblical Virtue Ethics: Summary It is helpful, at this point of the research, to give a graphic summary of the fivefold exegethical tasks (exegesis and hermeneutics of virtue ethics in biblical and African ethics respectively) this study has undertaken in chapter three and four, which are regarded as the main chapters of this study. The five-fold exegethical steps in their heuristic order include: a virtue-ethical analysis of the Virtue-ethical Analysis of the Letter to Titus

Virtue-ethical ­Perspectives of African Ethics

Identification of Tandems and Tensions

Negotiations and Appropriations of Tandems and Tensions Emergence of an African Biblical Virtue Ethics

Figure 4: Graphic Summary of the Five Exegethical Steps towards an African Biblical Virtue Ethics

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letter to Titus; a description of the virtue-ethical perspectives of African ethics; identification of tandems and tensions; negotiations, concessions, and appropriation of the tandems and tensions; emergence of an “African biblical virtue ethics.”

4.8 Summary and Conclusion The virtue-ethical perspectives of Titus in comparison with African ethics have foundational and narratival differences, yet they share some important similarities. In order to appropriate an ethics that is relevant to African Christians and at the same time accountable to the virtue-ethical perspectives of Titus as a biblical text to which Christians in Africa appeal for ethical guidance, the indicativeimperative model of reading and appropriating biblical ethics is simplistic, inadequate, and unaccountable. Such ethical appropriations involve a myriad of complex structures. Consequently, this chapter has applied a four-layered or four-dimensional methodology that carefully studies, analyzes, compares, negotiates, concedes, and then appropriates the biblical ethics of Titus into African ethics. To this end, the four-dimensional methodologies that have been synthetically engaged are as follows: An analytical methodology (exegethics) has been applied in analyzing the virtue-ethical perspectives of Titus (the summaries extracted from chapter three); a descriptive methodology (the Four S Schema) has been applied in describing African ethics within the purview of the sources, senses, symbols, and services of character. By way of observations and conclusions drawn from a comparison of the two ethical perspectives, a hermeneutical methodology described as “Progressive-Negotiated-Ethics” has been engaged in reflecting on possible ways of appropriating the virtue-ethical perspectives of Titus into African ethics. Through such negotiations, concessions, and appropriations between the virtue-ethical perspectives of African ethics and the virtue-ethical perspectives of the letter to Titus, there emerges a new virtueethical horizon described as African Biblical Virtue Ethics, which is, as accountable as possible, faithful to the virtue-ethical perspectives of Titus as a biblical text, and “at home” to African Christians.

Chapter 5

Summary and Conclusion Seeking to understand the concepts and characteristics of virtue in the letter to Titus, this study primarily reads the letter to Titus from a virtue-ethical perspective. With an inter-disciplinary structure, methodology, and content, the research has sought to understand the implicit and explicit concepts and characteristics of virtue that are embedded in the linguistic elements, theological motifs, and ethical norms and maxims in the text, asking if they are sufficient enough to warrant the description of the whole letter to Titus as a “virtue-ethical text.” To achieve this, the research has applied the exegethics methodology, an adapted version of the “implicit ethics” methodology that addresses and suits the particular features of virtue ethics. Moreover, a sub-section of the research has engaged in a hermeneutical reflection and appropriation of the analyzed virtueethical perspectives into African ethics. The research has been conducted under five chapters, summarized as follows: Chapter one has delineated the concept of virtue ethics and the methodological framework adopted for the research. The chapter has provided a general description or overview of virtue ethics; the historical dimensions of virtue ethics (e. g. Platonic, Aristotelian, Augustinian, Thomistic accounts); virtue ethics in NT studies; and a precise description of what neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics means and what its characteristics are. The research has adopted the contemporary neo-Aristotelian concept of virtue ethics. Virtue ethics, in this construal, is an ethic of character, attending to inner dispositions, motives, moral development, and the morality of persons more than the morality of actions. In other words, it concerns itself with the “being” of moral agents more than their “doing.” The core concepts of this account of virtue ethics are summarized with these three questions: Who am I? Who ought I to become? How do I get there? This account of virtue has the following characteristics: a sense of a moral telos that is connected to human flourishing; emphasis on the morality of persons in regards to inner dispositions, habits, emotions, and character or “being” more than the morality of actions or “doing”; perfectionism in the sense of a call to continuous moral growth and regarding every aspect of life as morally relevant; concern with character development; a sense of particularistic moral agents; an emphasis on moral exemplars; and a commitment to the moral significance of community. Noting how most definitions of virtue ethics omit some aspects that are relevant in African ethics, this research defines virtue ethics in a more com-

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prehensive way as a reflection on the sources, senses, symbols, and services of character in moral formation and function. The main methodology engaged in this research is exegethics, which is an adapted version of Zimmermann’s “implicit ethics.” The research has applied this methodology in seeking to understand the virtue-ethical perspectives of the letter to Titus in relation to five selected ethical norms, namely, σωφροσύνη “self-control,” δικαιοσύνη “justice/righteousness,” εὐσέβεια “godliness/ piety,” καλὰ ἔργα “good works,” and the “household codes.” The virtue-ethical perspectives of these norms have been analyzed through an exegetical consideration of the linguistic elements, theological motifs, and ethical properties under five out of eight models of “implicit ethics” as follows: linguistic levels (intra-textual, inter-textual, extra-textual), moral agents, ethical argumentation, history of traditions, and range of application. The exegethics methodology adapts the “implicit ethics” significantly in such a way that one of the models in “implicit ethics,” namely, ethical norms and maxims, becomes the central model while the other models are applied in reading the identified virtue-ethical norms and maxims virtue-ethically instead of applying the models in reading all the ethical norms in a selected passage. This adaptation has become necessary and has helped to keep the focus on virtue-ethical norms, which are the foci of the research, instead of on ethical norms generally. In chapter two, we have undertaken a review of related literature with a focus on the history of interpretation of the selected norms: σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, εὐσέβεια, and καλὰ ἔργα in the letter to Titus. The review or history of interpretation has shown that none of the scholars has approached his or her interpretation from a particularly virtue-ethical standpoint. However, some of their interpretations that are relevant to our virtue-ethical approach have been identified and discussed. Chapter three is the main chapter of the research, containing the actual application of the exegethics methodology in reading the letter to Titus virtueethically. We shall, therefore, give a summary of the findings of our virtueethical analyses of the selected norms: σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, εὐσέβεια, καλὰ ἔργα and the “household codes.” Titus’s account of the σωφροσύνη cognates significantly correspond to virtueethical perspectives and approaches to morality, but with Christian distinctives, as follows. First, σωφροσύνη is used with a sense of a moral telos that corresponds to the virtue-ethical concept of a moral telos. Being one of the three cardinal virtues in Titus 2:12, σωφροσύνη is a constituent part of the this-worldly telos that a believer moves towards, namely, to live a self-controlled, just, and godly life. Moreover, it is also a constituent aspect of the other-worldly telos because it prepares the believer for the return of Christ. Second, the use of σωφροσύνη corresponds with the virtue-ethical concept of perfectionism in two aspects. In one aspect, it is perfectionist in the sense that one does not attain perfect or full

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self-control in this life. This is why “the grace” keeps teaching the moral agent to live a self-controlled life. Self-control as both a virtue and a constituent part of the telos keeps calling the believer to growth and more self-control. In another aspect, self-control is perfectionist because it is to be applied or practiced in every aspect of life, both in commonplace, day-to-day morality as well as in dramatic moral quandaries. Titus does not give a concrete ethos or cases where self-control is to be practiced. Being a virtue, the virtuous person is expected to develop self-control as a lifestyle or consistent pattern of behavior such that he or she could exercise self-control in every situation and always. Third, σωφροσύνη corresponds with the virtue-ethical concept of character development in the way that one can learn, acquire, and develop σωφροσύνη towards perfection, becoming a pattern of behavior. It is to this end that the author calls on older women to exhort and exemplify self-control to the younger women. It is also to this end that “the grace” teaches believers to live self-controlled lives. Fourth, σωφροσύνη correlates with virtue ethics’s concern with inner dispositions, attitudes, and moral qualities. The use of the σωφροσύνη cluster in Titus shows that from its Greek-philosophical, Jewish, and early Christian roots, the norm has been often regarded as dealing with inner dispositions, sensibility, rationality, and mental balance. Fifth, the emphasis on moral persons over moral actions or “being” over “doing” is in consonance with the virtue-ethical approach to morality. The linguistic elements related to the σωφροσύνη word group, especially the different forms of εἶναι “to be” place more emphasis on the morality of persons more than the morality of actions. Moreover, the frequent occurrence of the virtues in adjectival and adverbial forms also show a focus on describing the qualities of moral persons more than the qualities of moral actions. Beyond the linguistic elements, the theological concepts related to σωφροσύνη which suppose that the Christ-event dramatically transforms the moral character of persons, enabling them to be selfcontrolled, also emphasize the focus on moral “being” over “doing.” The construal of self-control in Titus gives less prominence to the anthropological “self” in favor of a transformed “self” that is continually enabled and taught how to live or behave by “the grace of God” (Titus 2:12). Sixth, the grounding of σωφροσύνη on the Christ-event and the reference to believers as its exclusive moral agents corresponds with the virtue-ethical feature of particularism. One of the characteristics of contemporary virtue ethics is a consideration of the community in moral discourse. However, even though it could be argued out, it is worth noting that the social relevance of σωφροσύνη in Titus is not emphasized explicitly compared to its personal relevance. This suggests that it is used as a personal virtue more than a social or communal virtue. The Greekphilosophical tradition, however, as discussed in the history of tradition above, explicates the social and political relevance of σωφροσύνη. Nevertheless, in our hermeneutical reflections, we have also explicated its social relevance, especially as it relates to African ethics.

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Summarily, the σωφροσύνη word group in Titus has the following virtueethical characteristics: emphasis on moral “being” more than “doing,” a sense of perfectionism, a sense of particularity of moral agents, a concern for character development, the need for moral exemplars, and the particularity of the moral agents. Similarly, the use of the δικαιοσύνη cognates in the letter to Titus has the following characteristics of virtue ethics: a sense of a moral telos, perfectionism, moral development, emphasis on moral persons over moral actions, and particularity of moral agents. Similar to σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη also applies to commonplace, everyday morality and the entirety of a person’s life instead of dilemmatic moral quandaries. Here also, “the grace,” being the ethical representation of the Christ-event, effects a new identity and moral character of the believers. Moreover, “the grace” is both educating and enabling virtuous Christian living. While the relevance of the virtues to the community are not explicated in Titus, its use as a virtue without concrete ethos allows for the possibility of explicating its social relevance. The dual nuances of a declarative and transformative justification/righteousness give δικαιοσύνη in Titus a virtue-ethical concept of inner dispositions and quality of a virtuous person. Our analysis has identified or explicated six virtue-ethical perspectives of εὐσέβεια in the letter to Titus. First, we have argued that the preposition κατά in Titus 1:1 not only plays a linguistic role, but a virtue-ethical one, indicating the moral telos of believers. It introduces the virtue-ethical agendum of the letter to Titus. Second, εὐσέβεια involves the entirety of a person’s life, thereby corresponding with the virtue-ethical perfectionist character. Third, εὐσέβεια combines both inner and outer aspects of a person’s moral life, thereby correlating with the virtue-ethical focus on inner dispositions and character. The use of εὐσέβεια focuses on the morality of persons more than that of actions. It does not present any concrete action or moral dilemma that represents it. Fourth, the use of εὐσέβεια within the purview of belief in Christ is in tandem with virtue-ethical particularism. Fifth, the fact that one has to be continuously trained to live a godly life corresponds with the virtue-ethical concept of character development through training. Because of its grounding on the Christ-event, εὐσέβεια features the roles of both divine and human agencies in the process of a person’s character development. Sixth, both the deontological and teleological argumentations for εὐσέβεια are virtue-ethical, finding their essence in the “being” and the sense of telos of the moral agent, and not in external principles or a sense of moral obligation. However, even though we have analyzed an implicit allusion to a moral exemplar in the use of εὐσέβεια in Titus 1:1, the virtue-ethical concept of a moral exemplar is not prominent in relation to εὐσέβεια in Titus compared to its prominence in relation to καλὰ ἔργα. The virtue εὐσέβεια in Titus describes a life that is generally virtuous in relation to inner character and outer conduct, based on the understanding of the

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Christ-event and its continuous transformative effect. Εὐσέβεια is lived in conformity to the faith community’s perception of virtue, reverence, and respectability. To the extent that all the virtue-ethical features of the norm are grounded in the early Christian understanding of the moral transformative effect of the Christ-event on the believer, εὐσέβεια in Titus can be said to be truly “Godly.” It aligns faith in Christ, knowledge of the truth, and corresponding conduct together (Titus 1:1–2; 2:12–14). In summary, we have argued that εὐσέβεια is the key virtue that defines the ethical framework of the letter to Titus, which makes it the ethical agendum of the letter. Three considerations ground this argument: first, the teleological use of εὐσέβεια as the this-worldly moral telos and a virtue that prepares one for the other-worldly telos; second, the theological grounding and strategic use of εὐσέβεια in relation to the Christ-event; third, the substitutional use of εὐσέβεια in place of ἀρετή, the umbrella term for virtue in Greek philosophy. Εὐσέβεια, understood as a combination of faith, knowledge, and corresponding conduct, becomes the umbrella term for virtue in Titus, and all other virtues express its different aspects and nuances. The norm καλὰ ἔργα “good works” also plays an important role in the ethical structure of Titus. We have argued that in most of its usages in the letter to Titus, good works corresponds significantly with the virtue approach to ethics. The linguistic elements, theological groundings, and ethical nuances all address the same concerns with virtue theory. In particular, good works in Titus expresses the following virtue-ethical characteristics: focus on the character of persons and inner, habitual dispositions more than moral actions; the concept of moral exemplar; the concept of character development through moral education and practicing the virtues; a sense of a moral telos; and virtue-ethical sense of perfectionism. Nevertheless, its grounding on the Christ-event and its moral transformative function presents some Christian distinctives that distinguish it from the secular Aristotelian and neo-Aristotelian virtue concepts. The main virtue-ethical argumentation for good works is that it is “good and useful to the people” (Titus 3:8). The author generates moral significance for good works from the goodness of good works itself, the benefit of good works to the virtuous person, the community of believers, and humanity in general. Virtue ethics, especially in the Aristotelian tradition, is concerned with what is “the good” and leads to human flourishing. In line with Aristotle’s idea of goodness to the virtuous individual, contemporary virtue ethics is negotiating the place of community in virtue ethics. Thus, the statement “these things (good works) are good and useful to the people” (Titus 3:8) represents both Aristotelian and neoAristotelian concern with what is “the good” in itself as the moral telos that is connected to individual and communal flourishing. Regarding the household codes in the letter to Titus, this research has discovered five virtue-ethical perspectives. First, a careful reading of the linguis-

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tic elements of the text suggests that the virtues, unlike popular interpretation shows, are not rules for moral action but virtues for character acquisition, development and creative application. The text focuses more on the “being” than “doing” of the moral agents. Second, the verbs and the virtues all relate to the morality of persons more than the morality of actions. Third, all the virtues are related to inner dispositions more than external actions. Fourth, the means of acquiring and developing the virtues is teaching or training for character development. Fifth, older members of the household serve as moral exemplars to the younger ones. Our analysis recognizes the gender differences in Titus’s “household codes.” However, through the analysis, we have discovered that self-control is given more prominence over all other household virtues. It is the only virtue that is required of all the age groups, genders, and social classes in the household. Moreover, our analysis shows that the highly debated issue of “submission” of wives to their husbands does not receive any prominence in Titus. Nowhere are wives commanded to submit to their husbands. Instead, they are to be taught to acquire the virtue of submission, self-control, and others, just as the husbands are to be taught to acquire the virtue of self-control or “being sensible.” By asking Titus to teach the husbands “to be sensible” and self-controlled, our analysis shows that being sensible involves situations where the husband would be the one to submit to his wife, instead of always expecting submission from her. Since the wife’s submission is to be a virtue to be acquired and creatively applied, not an ethos, moral duty, or a command to be obeyed, the letter to Titus gives a balanced account of a virtuous household where a love-oriented selfcontrol is the central and regulating norm for both the husband and the wife, ensuring a loving and understanding relationship in the household. Considered from this standpoint, the household codes in Titus could be appropriated in contemporary contexts as a “text of honor” instead of a “text of terror,” as indicted by feminist readers. This, therefore, provides a hermeneutical paradigm for other NT accounts of the “household codes.” In sum, chapter three contains the virtue-ethical reading of σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, εὐσέβεια, καλὰ ἔργα, and the “household codes,” using the exegethics methodology. Through the virtue-ethical reading, this research finds that all the characteristics of virtue ethics discussed in chapter one of this study find representation in the ethical perspective of the letter to Titus. In relation to the three most important questions that summarize contemporary neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, the answers in the letter to Titus could be heuristically (noting their overlaps with each other) constructed as thus: Who are we? We are the elect, saved, redeemed, washed, transformed and renewed people of God (Titus 1:1–4; 2:11–14; 3:4–8). Who ought we to become? We ought to become virtuous people “in this present age” (Titus 1:6–9; 2:1–10). How are we to get there? We are to get there by teaching sound doctrine and living self-con-

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trolled, just, and godly lives, demonstrating our inner transformed character in our practical good works to all people, while we wait for the glorious appearance of our great God and Savior and the blessed hope of eternal life (Titus 2:11–14; 3:1, 8, 14). The central argument we have advanced in this chapter, therefore, is that the prevalence and centrality of these virtue-ethical features in Titus, except for a few instances of non-virtue-ethical elements, makes the ethical perspective of the entire letter virtue-ethical. On this basis, it is accountable to describe the letter to Titus as a virtue-ethical text. This discovery, therefore, could significantly contribute to the ongoing scholarly efforts at understanding the concept of virtue in biblical literature and building bridges between biblical ethics and virtue ethics. In chapter four, we have applied the findings of chapter three into an African context. Through the analysis, we have discovered that the virtue-ethical perspectives of Titus, in comparison with African ethics, have foundational and narratival differences, yet they share some important similarities. In order to appropriate an ethics that is relevant to African Christians and at the same time accountable to the virtue-ethical perspectives of Titus as a biblical text to which Christians in Africa appeal for ethical guidance, the indicative-imperative model of reading and appropriating biblical ethics has been found to be simplistic, inadequate, and unaccountable. Such ethical appropriations require a myriad of complex structures. Consequently, this chapter has applied a four-layered or four-dimensional methodology that carefully studies, analyzes, compares, negotiates, concedes, and appropriates the virtue-ethical perspectives of the letter to Titus into African ethics. The four-dimensional methodologies that have been synthetically engaged are as follows: An analytical methodology described as exegethics has been applied in analyzing the virtue-ethical structure of Titus. A descriptive methodology described as the “Four S Schema” has been applied in describing African ethics within the purview of the sources, senses, symbols, and services of character or virtue. By way of observations and conclusions drawn from a comparison of the two ethical perspectives, a hermeneutical methodology described as “Progressive-Negotiated-Ethics” has been engaged in reflecting on possible ways of appropriating the virtue-ethical perspectives of Titus into an African context. Through such negotiations, concessions, and appropriations between the virtueethical perspectives of African ethics and the virtue-ethical perspectives of the letter to Titus, there emerges a new virtue-ethical horizon described as African Biblical Virtue Ethics, which is, as accountable as possible, faithful to the virtueethical perspectives of Titus, and “at home” in African biblical hermeneutics. Chapter five, being the last chapter of the study, summarizes the entire research and states the thesis of the study as follows: The presence and prevalence of virtue-ethical concepts and characteristics embedded in the linguistic elements, theological notions, and ethical norms and maxims in the letter to

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Titus are so central and wide-ranging enough such that they warrant the accountable description of the letter to Titus as a Virtue-Ethical Text. Even though the Greek word for virtue “ἀρετή” does not appear throughout the letter to Titus, the ethical perspectives of the letter correspond significantly to the virtue-ethical approach to ethics. This research, therefore, hopes to make a significant contribution to the ongoing inter-disciplinary scholarly efforts at understanding the concepts of virtue in biblical literature. Until now, other works on virtue ethics in the NT have concentrated mostly on the Gospels, Paul’s authentic letters, and Johannine literature. The PE had not received much attention. This research, therefore, brings the virtue concepts of the letter to Titus and the PE into the scholarly conversation. Moreover, none of the previous scholarly works on virtue in biblical literature has developed a coherent methodology for reading a biblical text virtue-ethically. Therefore, the exegethics methodology of this research, being an adapted version of the “implicit ethics” methodology, provides a coherent methodology for a virtue-ethical, or more generally, ethical reading of biblical texts. The methodology and the results of the virtue-ethical analysis this study has conducted could, therefore, significantly enrich and broaden a scholarly understanding of the concepts of virtue in biblical literature.

Critical Self-reflection Every “reading” of a text is more of a ‘take’ on it from a particular perspective than a definitive and exhaustive treatment of the text.1 This study is a reading, therefore a ‘take’ on the letter to Titus from a particular perspective, namely, a virtue ethical perspective. While this study has read the letter to Titus virtueethically, demonstrating that its ethical perspective fits well within the virtue ethics framework, it is, however, not without its limitations, neither does it mean that there can be no alternative readings of the letter to, or the ethics of, Titus. Hence, I briefly present here seven critical self-reflections on my virtue-ethical construal of the letter to Titus. First, while my approach reads ethics in the letter to Titus more from its early Christian context (emphasizing the moral effect of the Christ-event and the adaptations that have been made to the Greek-philosophical virtues and concepts that occur in the text) than its Greco-Roman context, it is also possible to read the ethics of Titus more against the background of Greek-philosophical ethics than against its early Christian background. If this is the case, the results may differ from those of this study. For example, a reading that places the cardinal virtues in Titus 2:12 more against its Greek-philosophical background than any early Christian adoption and adaption of the cardinal virtues and its related concepts could de-emphasize the moral transformative effect of the Christ-event, thereby not showing how the Christ-event transforms or influences the moral character of believers. Hence, I recognize the possibility, and even validity, of such an alternative reading that locates some of the virtue-ethical norms in Titus more within their Greco-Roman context than their early Christian one. Second, I acknowledge that the concept of a biblical or Christian virtue ethics itself could be problematic in many ways, such as promoting a self-righteous, self-perfectionist, and works-based righteousness. If not carefully and closely read in connection with the moral transformative effect of the Christian that is weaved together with the virtues in Titus, implicitly or explicitly, the frequent occurrences of “self-control” and “good works” in Titus could be read as promoting self-righteousness and self-perfection over and against the NT concept of justification by grace through faith. 1 Deborah Krause, Preface to 1 Timothy; Readings: A New Biblical Commentary (London & New York: T&T Clark, 2004), xi. Krause argues that “even commentaries that assume the posture of comprehensive analyses of the text represent particular perspectives and biases.”

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Third, the four non-virtue-ethical argumentations in Titus, namely, “so that the Word of God will not be blasphemed” (2:5); “so that the opposing one may be put to shame” (Titus 2:8); “to make the teaching of God our Savior attractive” (2:10); and the implicit argumentation that good works to all people would make the Christian faith attractive to outsiders (3:1) could be entry points to a deontological, consequentialist, or utilitarian interpretation of the text as opposed to a virtue-ethical one. Fourth, the whole concept of human flourishing through the acquisition and practice of virtues, which is central to virtue ethics and whose elements have been identified in Titus, could pose the danger of a selfish and self-aggrandizing pursuit of personal happiness rather than the other-regarding and sacrificial nature of NT christological ethics, where Christ is a perfect moral exemplar, especially in his sacrificial life and death.2 Fifth, the particularist or exclusivist nature of the virtue ethics discovered in Titus could pose the danger of a sectarian3 and/or even an elite kind of Christian ethics, which does not see anything ethically good in other people outside the Christian faith, or even those within the Christian faith but of a “different” Christian orientation (cf. Titus 1:10–16). The sixth point, related to point five above, is that the individual-oriented nature of the virtues in Titus, especially the three cardinal virtues in 2:12 (selfcontrol, justice, and godliness) makes the ethics of Titus not readily applicable to cultures that are community-oriented, such as African cultures. Therefore, it became necessary to develop a multi-dimensional methodology that explicates and applies the ethics of Titus into African contexts, which is found in chapter four of the study. The seventh point is that the lack of adequate concrete ethos in Titus, though appreciated in a virtue-ethical construal of the text, if taken as the only or primary ethical approach, could be confusing to individuals and communities who seek to know exactly “what to do”4 or “how to live” in practical daily situ2 See Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 143–147, who responds to this and other objections against Christian virtue ethics. He argues that there is an implicit self-regarding in every other ethical theory, and virtue ethics has only explicated that implicit motif. Nevertheless, his conclusion is that virtue ethics is too other-regarding to be objected as self-centered. For example, some, if not all, virtues themselves are acquired and expressed in the context of relationships and community. E. g. hospitality, courage, “distributive” justice, and so on. And human flourishing as a telos is not defined or achieved exploitatively at the expense of others, but in company and for the common good of all. See also Harrington and Keenan, Paul and Virtue Ethics, 8–12, who also respond to the objections against virtue ethics. It is worth noting, nevertheless, that Kotva is only trying to explicate the social dimensions of virtue ethics. But this does not sufficiently exonerate the virtue-ethical concept of happiness or flourishing from the accusation of being mainly self-regarding rather than other-regarding. 3 See Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 151–153, for a discussion on the objections to Christian virtue ethics, one of which is that, Christian virtue ethics is “sectarian.” 4 Responding to objections raised against virtue ethics as being unable to provide normative

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ations.5 In such a case, the virtues would need to be further broken down into concrete moral actions, not from a deontological point of view, but from a virtueethical one, seeing the moral actions as mainly instrumental to developing the right character. In a final reflection, it is worth noting that, while reflecting on these limitations and problems that could arise from a virtue-ethical interpretation of Titus or any biblical text, I remain an advocate of virtue ethics, as may be inferred from my virtue-ethical analysis of Titus in this study. My reflections, nevertheless, only show that while we advocate for one ethical approach over another, scientific integrity and objectivity requires that we recognize that no single ethical approach or theory is adequate in explaining the phenomenon called ethics or morality, at both its metaethical and lived aspects. Hence, it is appropriate to acknowledge the limitations of each ethical approach even by its exponents, and to recognize its need for other ethical approaches to fill up its gaps.6 In relation to Titus, my critical reflections show that while Titus brings an important voice to NT and Christian ethics, as this study has amply demonstrated, there are other important ethical voices in the NT too, which should be appreciated, studied, and applied in their own rights. Moreover, my selfcritical reflections show that there is no single-lane approach to biblical ethics. Rather, biblical ethics requires a thorough and all-encompassing approach that acknowledges, studies, and harnesses the “moral vision(s)”7 of each text that constitutes the Bible (including the virtue-ethical perspectives of Titus as construed in this study), and seeks to apply its different concepts, notions, and portions within the purview of the entire Scripture. guidance, Harrington and Keenan, Paul and Virtue Ethics, 8–12, have argued that the virtueethical concept of “prudence” provides a normative guidance in almost concrete terms. However, the problem still remains that not everyone possesses the virtue of prudence, so some people still need the concrete ethos for living. 5 See R. B. Louden, “Virtue Ethics,” 503–509, for a discussion on the objections to virtue ethics in secular circles and their appropriate responses, especially as it relates to applied ethics. See also Justin Oakley and Dean Cocking, Virtue Ethics and Professional Roles (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 31–38, for a similar discussion on the criticisms against virtue ethics in philosophical cycles and their appropriate responses. See also Louden, “Virtue Ethics,” 503–509, who discusses the objections to virtue ethics in secular philosophy and the appropriate responses given by virtue ethicists, especially as it relates to applied ethics. 6 Bruch C. Birch et al. assert that “there is no singular Christian perspective on any moral issue.” Moreover, they warn that none of the three major ethical theories  – duty ethics (deontology), virtue ethics (areteology), and consequences ethics (teleology) – alone is sufficient for ethical reflection and praxis. Instead, lived morality is mixed, pluralistic, and complex in a way that no theory or combination of theories can adequately describe. See Bruce C. Birch, Jacqueline E. Lapsley, Cynthia Moe-Lobeda, and Larry L. Rasmussen, Bible and Ethics in the Christian Life: A New Conversation (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2018), 163. 7 My use of the term “moral vision” here is inspired by Hays’s book title The Moral Vision of the New Testament, 193–200, and his three focal points or the “moral vision” of the NT, broadly stated: community, cross, and new creation.

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Verner, David C. The Household of God: The Social World of the Pastoral Epistles. SBL Dissertation Series 71. Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1983. Vine, William E. The Epistles to Timothy and Titus. Grand Rapids: Oliphants, 1965. Vogel, Manuel. “Ob Tugend lehrbar sei: Stimmen und Gegenstimmen im hellenistichen Judentum mit einem Ausblick auf Paulus.” Pages 159–176 in Jenseits von Indikativ und Imperativ. Edited by Friedrich W. Horn and Ruben Zimmermann. WUNT 238. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009. Volp, Ulrich. “Beobachtungen zur antiken Kritik an den Begründungszusammenhängen christlicher Ethik.” Pages 347–365 in Jenseits von Indikativ und Imperativ. Edited by Friedrich W. Horn and Ruben Zimmermann. WUNT 238. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009. –. “Der nachkonstantinische Gottesdienst als ‘Vermahnung zur Tugend’: Überlegungen zur ‘Ethik’ antiker liturgischer Quellen.” Pages 421–439 in Metapher  – Narratio  – Mimesis – Doxologie: Begründungsformen frühchristlicher und antiker Ethik. Edited by Ulrich Volp, Friedrich W. Horn, and Ruben Zimmermann. Contexts and Norms of New Testament Ethics 7. WUNT 356. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2016. Von Lips, Hermann. Glaube – Gemeinde – Amt: Zum Verständnis der Ordination in den Pastoralbriefen. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1979. Votaw, Clyde Weber. “The Epistles of Paul to Timothy and Titus.” The Biblical World 7.2 (1896): 130–38. Wadams, Herbert. A New Introduction to Moral Theology. New York: SCM, 1964. Wainwright, John W. “Eusebeia: Syncretism or Conservative Contextualization?” Evangelical Quarterly 65:3 (1993): 211–224. Wagener, Ulrike. Die Ordnung des “Hauses Gottes”. WUNT 2/65. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1994. Walder, Ernest. “The Logos of the Pastoral Epistles.” The Journal of Theological Studies 24.95 (1923): 310–315. Wall, Robert W. and Richard B. Steele. 1 & 2 Timothy and Titus. The Two Horizons New Testament Commentary. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2012. Ward, Keith. Ethics and Christianity. London and New York: George Allen & Unwin & Humanities Press, 1970. Waters, Kenneth L. “Saved through Childbearing: Virtues as Children in 1 Timothy 2:11– 15.” Journal of Biblical Literature 123.4 (2004): 703–35. Wax, Trevin. “The Rebirth of Virtue: An Interview with N. T. Wright.” Interview on The Gospel Coalition, U. S. Edition, January 5, 2010: https://www.thegospelcoalition.org/ blogs/trevin-wax/the-rebirth-of-virtue-an-interview-with-n-t-wright/. Weatherby, Harold L. Spenser’s Legend of ‘Εγκράτϵια’.” Studies in Philology 93.2 (1996): 207–17. Weidemann, Hans-Ulrich, ed. Ascetism and Exegesis in Early Christianity: The Reception of New Testament Texts in Ancient Ascetic Discourses. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013. Weiss, Meir. The Bible from Within: The Method of Total Interpretation. Jerusalem: Magness, 1984. Weiss, Bernhard. Kritisch exegetisches Handbuch über die Briefe Pauli anTimotheus und Titus. 5th edition. Kritisch-exegetischer Kommentar über das Neue Testament 11. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1886. Weissenrieder, Annette and Robert B. Coote. The Interface of Orality and Writing. WUNT 260. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010.

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Index of Biblical and Extracanonical References Old Testament Genesis 3 6:9 7:1 12:3 15 15:6 17:1–14 18:18 18:23 18:25 20:11

155 179 179 164 164 164 164 164 178 178 205

Exodus 19:5 23:6–8

226 179

Deuteronomy 4:20 226 7:6 226 11:2 155 14:2 226 16:19 179 32:4 178 Joshua 4:2 9:2 10:2 10:3

155 155 155 155

Judges 5:11 16:3

178 155

1 Samuel 12:22 24:18

226 179

2 Samuel 7:24

226

2 Kings 10:9

179

Job 17:8 28:28

178 205

Psalms 7:12 11:7 14:1 62:13 116:5 129:8 135:4 145:17 146:7

178 178 184 178 178 226 226 178 179

Proverbs 1:7 1:8 10:28 12:12 12:17 13:11 15:5 15:10 19:20 29:27

96, 102, 205, 207 155 178 205 178 205 155 155 155 178

Isaiah 11:2 24:16 26:7 26:16 33:6 53:11

96, 102, 205 179, 205 205 155 96, 102, 205 179, 181

Jeremiah 12:1 23:5

178 179, 181

360

Index of Biblical and Extracanonical References

23:5–6 23:6 30:14 33:15

179 179 155 179

Micah 6:8

Ezekiel 23:45 37:23

179 226

Zechariah 9:9

Daniel 12:3

183

155

Habakkuk 2:4 183 179

New Testament Matthew 1:19 5:45 9:13 10:41 13:17 13:43 13:49 20:4 23:28 23:29 23:33 25:37 25:46 27:19 27:24

182 182 181 181, 183 182 183 183 180, 181 183 182 182 183 183 180 180

Mark 2:7 2:17 5:15 6:20

182 181 156 180

Luke 1:6 1:17 1:18 1:75 2:25 5:35 11:48 12:57 15:7 16:15 18:9 18:14 20:20

182 158 140, 252 83 182 182 111 180, 181 182 183 183 183 183

23:41 23:47

83 180

John 5:30 14:12–14 17:15

177, 182 222 182

Acts 2:3 3:12 3:13 3:14 4:19 7:52 10:2 10:7 10:22 14:14 15:1 ff 15:1–11 17:23 21:20 22:14 23:3 24:15 26:25

85 105, 206 182 181 180, 181 181, 182 105, 206 105, 206 182 181 164 165 105, 206 226 181, 182 226 181 156

Romans 1:5 1:17 1:18 2:1–16 2:13 3:10 3:22 3:24

99 165, 183, 184 193 118 183, 184 87, 183, 184 165 113, 185, 186

Index of Biblical and Extracanonical References 3:25 3:26 3:27–28 3:28 3:30 4:2–5 4:2–6 4:3 4:5 4:9 4:11 4:13 5:1 5:6–7 5:7 5:16–19 5:18 5:18–19 5:18–19 ff 5:19 6:7 6:10 6:11 6:18 6:19 6:22 7:12 7:16 7:18 7:21 8:10 8:14 8:15 8:29 9 9:12 9:30 9:30–10:21 10:4 10:6 10:10 11 11:16 11:26 12:3 12:13 12:16 12:17 12:20 13 13:3 13:11–14 14:12

165 165, 181, 182, 184, 185 82, 85, 186 113, 165, 185 165, 185 113 82, 85, 186 165 165 165 165 165 165, 185 183 87 185 184, 186 183, 185 184 185, 186 185 185 185 185 185 118 182, 184 227 227 215, 227 184 184 160 41 230 82, 85, 186 165 230 165, 185 165 165 230 113 193 64, 156, 160 227 156 227 227 118 114 166 227

1 Corinthians 3:13–14 112 5:6 227 6 259 6:11 85 7:1 227 7:8 227 7:17–20 165 7:26 227 9 55 9:22 207 11:1 41 12 230 13 230 14 230 15:34 83 16:11 227 2 Corinthians 3:3 42 3:9 185 5:17 166, 184, 307 9:5 160 9:8 112 13:5–7 212 13:7 215, 227 Galatians 1:14 2:1–10 2:16 2:17 2:21 3:2 3:3 3:5 3:6 3:7–9 3:8 3:11 3:14 3:21 3:24 3:24–25 3:26–28 4:6 4:18 5 5:2 5:5 5:16 5:18 5:22

226 165 82, 85, 113, 163, 165, 185, 186 185 113, 185 23 23 23 163, 164 164 163, 185 163, 183, 184 23 185 163 39 166 23 227 23, 197 163 163, 185 23 184 190

361

362

Index of Biblical and Extracanonical References

5:22–23 5:25 6:1 6:8 6:9 6:12–13 6:15

42, 101 23 23 23 215, 227 163 166

Ephesians 1:8 2:5–10 2:8–9 2:8–10 2:10 4:24 4:31–32 5:9 5:11 5:13 5:21 5:21–31 5:21–6:9 5:24 5:25 5:26 6:1 6:14

158 166 82, 85, 113, 186 117, 211, 227 109, 112, 114, 116, 167, 228 83, 185 42 185 117 158 245, 246 245, 246 51, 236, 245 246, 247 50 246 66, 181, 184 185

Philippians 1:7 2:3 2:12–13 3:9 4:8 4:8–9

181, 184 156 120 165 36, 181, 184, 198, 214 42

Colossians 1:10 3:12–15 3:12–17 3:18 3:18–4:1 3:20 4:1 4:6

112, 117 156 42 66, 247 51, 236, 245 66 180, 181 214

Philemon 9

140, 252

1 Thessalonians 2:10 80, 83, 156, 183 4:3 54 5:18 54

2 Thessalonians 1:6 180, 181 2:17 112 3:13 215 1 Timothy 1:5 1:7 1:9 1:10–11 1:13–14 1:19 2:2 2:3 2:8 2:8–15 2:9 2:9–10 2:10 2:11 2:12 2:14 2:15 3:1 3:1–12 3:2 3:4 3:6 3:8 3:10 3:11 3:12 3:16 4:1–4 4:3–5 4:7 4:7–8 4:8 4:10 4:12 5:4 5:9 5:10 5:10–11 5:14 5:24 5:25 6:2 6:3 6:5 6:5–6 6:6 6:6–10

118 91 78, 170, 184, 185, 207 170 113 118 91, 100, 106, 188, 189, 194, 213 225, 231, 232 239 51, 236, 245 73, 136, 137, 157 64 100, 117, 120, 220, 221, 227 245 252 239 64, 73, 136, 239, 246 221 246 64, 131, 136, 140, 158, 159, 243 213 188 214 292 214 188 76, 81, 91, 97, 98, 100, 106, 194 112 157 100, 101, 106, 188, 194 195 188, 194 90, 91 112, 120, 212 91, 246 239 111, 114, 118, 120, 220, 227 221 239 220 220 120 96, 100, 106, 188, 195 96, 97, 100, 188, 195, 207 93 96, 100, 188, 195 157

Index of Biblical and Extracanonical References 6:11 6:17–18 6:17–19 6:18 2 Timothy 1:5 1:7 1:9 1:14 2:16 2:21 2:22 3:5 3:12 3:14 3:16 3:17 4:4 4:7 4:8 4:14 Titus 1:1

1:1–2 1:1–3 1:1–4 1:1–5 1:1–8 1:2 1:3 1:3–4 1:4 1:5 1:5–8 1:5–9 1:6 1:6–9 1:7 1:7–8 1:7–9 1:8

77, 81, 96, 100, 101, 105, 167, 171, 172, 185, 188, 195 111 119, 157 120, 215, 217, 220 239 64, 137, 159, 160 110, 111, 113, 115, 166, 221 85 193, 207 120, 221 77, 81, 86, 91, 167, 171, 172, 185 93, 96, 97, 100, 188, 195, 196, 207 97, 100, 106 172 77, 81, 86, 167, 171, 172, 185 110, 120, 221 110 185 77, 78, 81, 87, 167, 172, 182, 184 111 11, 79, 83, 87, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 104, 106, 123, 139, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 194, 195, 196, 199, 201, 202, 209, 211, 235, 251, 322 186, 189, 190, 203, 323 101, 193, 224, 315 190, 248, 324 2, 190, 260 168 68, 123, 190, 203 123, 124 65 124, 126, 251 124, 139, 140, 157, 219, 251 239 246 124, 261 300, 324 123, 124, 131, 139, 145, 168, 292 139, 149, 161, 173, 187, 300 168 17, 64, 69, 71, 73, 78, 79, 83, 84, 86, 87, 92, 124, 130, 131, 132, 136, 140, 142, 145, 158, 159, 167, 168, 170, 173, 175, 184, 185, 186, 189, 243, 244, 261, 311

1:9 1:9–16 1:10 1:10–16 1:11 1:12 1:12–13 1:13 1:14 1:15 1:15–16 1:16

2 2:1 2:1–8 2:1–9 2:1–10 2:1–14 2:1–15 2:2 2:2–6 2:2–10 2:3 2:3–4 2:3–5 2:4 2:4–5 2:5

2:6 2:7

2:7–8 2:8

363

123, 124, 125 110 115, 124, 125, 244 216, 328 97, 115, 125, 246, 253 124, 125, 157, 261 259 91, 123, 125, 244, 251, 255, 259 123, 125 125, 126, 148 116, 299, 300 81, 93, 96, 97, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 120, 123, 124, 125, 126, 211, 215, 216, 222, 223, 229, 230, 233 110 124, 125, 241, 242, 243, 249, 251, 256 239 231 51, 56, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 112, 116, 230, 236, 240, 242, 245, 248, 249, 251, 260, 324 68, 230 99, 230 65, 69, 73, 92, 123, 124, 125, 126, 130, 132, 136, 140, 142, 159, 213, 214, 242, 249, 252, 256, 261 17, 67, 72, 146, 149, 152, 157, 161, 247, 251, 261, 292, 300 66, 243 126, 133, 140, 146, 249, 252, 259 140, 146, 256, 261 239, 261, 293 64, 65, 69, 71, 73, 74, 124, 126, 130, 132, 133, 136, 140, 159, 161, 242, 252, 260, 261 141, 239, 249, 257, 260 64, 65, 69, 71, 73, 120, 123, 124, 126, 130, 133, 136, 141, 142, 146, 147, 157, 212, 231, 239, 245, 246, 247, 250, 251, 253, 257, 261, 328 64, 65, 69, 72, 73, 113, 124, 126, 130, 133, 136, 142, 147, 157, 213, 242, 254, 258, 260, 261 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 119, 120, 124, 125, 126, 142, 161, 192, 211, 213, 222, 223, 229, 234, 235, 254, 258, 292 212, 213, 214, 216, 221, 228, 229, 251, 256 112, 123, 126, 199, 200, 214, 251, 257, 258, 328

364 2:9 2:9–10 2:10 2:10–14 2:11 2:11–12 2:11–13 2:11–14

2:11–15 2:11–3:7 2:12

2:12–14 2:13 2:13–14 2:14

2:15 3 3:1

3:1 ff 3:1–2 3:1–8a 3:1–13 3:2 3:3 3:3–5

Index of Biblical and Extracanonical References 66, 67, 123, 125, 126, 161, 242, 250, 255, 261 251, 255, 258 65, 123, 124, 125, 126, 161, 200, 231, 251, 257, 292, 328 63 83, 123, 125, 126, 199 81, 106, 107, 134, 143, 144, 174, 186, 194, 195, 196, 221, 300 195 64, 65, 66, 68, 71, 82, 83, 96, 97, 103, 115, 145, 149, 150, 161, 169, 187, 190, 192, 193, 201, 215, 248, 260, 290, 294, 299, 300, 307, 314, 315, 324, 325 110, 148 68 17, 38, 39, 49, 54, 56, 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 86, 92, 93, 94, 95, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 105, 106, 123, 124, 125, 127, 128, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 140, 142, 143, 144, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 156, 157, 160, 162, 167, 169, 170, 171, 173, 174, 175, 181, 185, 186, 188, 189, 190, 192, 193, 194, 195, 197, 199, 200, 202, 203, 207, 218, 222, 230, 244, 261, 289, 292, 301, 310, 311, 320, 321, 327, 328 36, 102, 175, 187, 189, 323 63, 123, 124, 126, 127, 149, 150, 200, 201, 203, 295 147, 200 63, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 125, 126, 127, 150, 186, 199, 200, 211, 215, 216, 217, 221, 222, 223, 226, 227, 230, 234, 235, 244 124, 125, 126, 127, 196, 241, 251 77, 110, 118 111, 112, 113, 114, 116, 117, 124, 125, 126, 127, 211, 216, 217, 221, 222, 224, 230, 231, 234, 235, 251, 325, 328 230 64, 66, 82, 308 148 67 124, 125, 126, 127, 161, 292 82, 123, 124, 125, 127, 199, 200, 216, 259 166, 167, 230

3:3–6 3:3–7

3:15

77 36, 37, 39, 63, 78, 84, 86, 119, 158, 170, 190, 194, 211, 230, 244, 248, 260, 290, 299, 300, 307, 311, 313, 314, 315 123, 124, 126, 127, 200 65 38, 39, 110, 135, 193, 194 193, 324 38, 76, 77, 81, 82, 83, 85, 110, 111, 114, 115, 124, 125, 127, 167, 169, 170, 171, 173, 185, 186, 199, 200, 221, 222 64, 160 36, 117, 227 221 63, 123, 124, 199, 200 117 63, 68, 76, 77, 81, 82, 83, 85, 123, 126, 127, 150, 167, 170, 171, 172, 173, 185, 186, 190, 199, 221 87, 111, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 158, 166, 167, 199, 211, 217, 218, 222, 224, 227, 231, 232, 235, 244, 308, 323, 325 251 128, 244 216 125, 128 123, 124, 128 124 2 128 111, 112, 113, 114, 116, 117, 119, 120, 123, 124, 125, 128, 189, 190, 200, 211, 217, 218, 219, 221, 222, 223, 233, 234, 235, 291, 315, 325 124, 126, 128

Hebrews 1:14 10:38 12:23 13:2–3

182 184 183 227

James 1:27 2:15 2:16 3:13 5:6 5:16

227 227 227 158 183 183

3:4 3:4–6 3:4–7 3:4–8 3:5

3:5–6 3:5–7 3:5–8 3:6 3:6–7 3:7 3:8

3:8–13 3:9 3:9–11 3:10 3:11 3:12 3:12–15 3:13 3:14

Index of Biblical and Extracanonical References 1 Peter 2 2:9 2:14 2:18–3:7 2:23 3:1 3:7 3:12 3:13 3:18 4:7 4:8 4:9 4:18

118 36 114 51, 236, 245 83, 182 246 254 182 226 181, 182 156, 157 157 227 183

2 Peter 1:3 1:3–8 1:4 1:5 1:5–7 1:6 1:7 1:13 2:6 2:7

36, 105, 206 207 29, 36 36, 41 36 105 105, 207 180, 181 207 182

2:8 2:9 3:11 3:11–13

182 105, 206, 207 105, 206 207

1 John 1:9 2:1 2:29 3:7 3:12

181, 182 182 182 182 182

3 John 5–6

227

Jude 15 18

193 193

Revelation 2:10 2:11 15:3 16:5 16:7 19:2

77 183 182 181, 182 181, 182 181, 182

Apocrypha Baruch 4:4

155

2 Esdras 9:15

178

1 Maccabees 2:24 226 2 Maccabees 4:2 226 3 Maccabees 2:31–32 207 4 Maccabees 2:16 155 2:18 155 2:21–23 155 2:23 155 3:17 155

3:19 5:23 16:14

155 155 140, 252

Sirach 16:3

179

Tobit 3:2 4:17

178 178

Wisdom of Solomon 2:10–18 179 2:18 179 3:1 179 3:10 178 5:1 179 5:15 179 8:7 155 9:11 155 10:12 205

365

366

Index of Biblical and Extracanonical References

Apostolic Fathers 1 Clement 51:2 62:1

83 83

Index of Modern Authors Adewuya, J. Ayodeji ​110 Amadi, Elechi ​271, 276, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 301 Annas, Julia ​9, 11, 12, 13, 32, 92, 101, 200, 201, 203, 263, 264 Anscombe, G. E. M. ​24 Anton, Paul ​1 Aquinas, Thomas ​79, 191, 219, 255 Arichea, Daniel C. ​191 Aune, David E. ​236, 258 Baier, Annette ​33 Balch, David L. ​236, 237, 239, 257 Barclay, John M. G. ​143 Barclay, William ​191, 192, 213, 215, 243, 254 Barrett, C. K. ​68 Bassler, Jouette M. ​63, 70, 71, 81, 112, 113, 114, 213 Bennema, Cornelis ​233 Biermann, Joel D. ​16 Bilezekian, Gilbert ​252 Birch, Bruce C. ​62, 144, 146, 174, 329 Bird, Michael F. ​260 Bitrus, Daniel ​281, 282 Bondi, Richard ​43, 135, 192, 201 Bray, Gerald ​74, 87, 107, 108, 120, 148 Brennan, Tad ​14, 15, 16 Brooten, Bernadette J. ​239 Brown, Colin ​180, 184, 185 Brox, Norbert ​92 Bujo, Benezet ​278, 297 Bultmann, Rudolph ​161 Burridge, Richard A. ​66 Carmody, Denise Lardner ​72 Cessario, Romanus ​44, 232 Chan, Lucas ​3, 4, 5, 7, 41, 44, 45, 46, 47, 101, 121, 133, 134, 189, 192, 195, 253, 258, 287 Charles, J. Daryl ​36 Christensen, Sean ​143 Christman, John ​10 Clouch, Paul ​286 Cocking, Dean ​129, 139, 295, 329

Coffey Tousley, Nikki ​230, 233 Collins, Raymond F. ​229 Conzelmann, Hans ​90, 108, 132, 159243 Cordova, Nelida Naveros ​197 Crouch, James E. ​237 Cunningham, David S. ​161 D’Angelo, Mary Rose ​246 Dechent, H. ​179 Dibelius, Martin ​90, 108, 132, 159, 243 Dodd, C. H. ​63 Donelson, Lewis R. ​1, 62, 92, 96, 109, 135, 142, 150, 153, 156, 193, 203, 209, 212 Ejizu, Christopher I. ​276, 296, 312 Elliot, John E. ​236, 237 Elliott, Matthew ​139 Ellis, Stephen ​278, 286 Engelmann, Michalea ​188, 191 Falconer, Robert ​70 Fascher, E. ​227 Fee, Gordon D. ​38, 207 Fiore, Benjamin ​72, 82, 85, 102, 103, 160, 186, 192, 229, 252, 257, 258 Fitzgerald, John T. ​283 Foerster, Werner ​90, 91, 92, 98, 193, 195, 204, 205, 206, 208 Foot, Philippa ​9, 92, 100 Furnish, Victor Paul ​6, 121, 122 Gbadegesin, Segun ​270, 280, 281, 299 Geisler, Norman ​28 Genade, Aldred A. ​2 Gloer, W. Hulitt ​117, 169, 170, 227 Grätzel, Stephan ​17, 19, 20, 21, 197, 232, 300, 308 Griffin, Hayne P., Jr. ​168, 214 Grudem, Wayne ​41, 42, 271 Grundmann, Walter ​224, 225, 227, 228 Günther, Walter ​95, 96, 193, 206, 207 Guthrie, Donald ​61, 68, 132, 159 Gyeke, Kwame ​277

368

Index of Modern Authors

Hanson, A. T. ​94, 134 Harrington, Daniel J. ​3, 4, 10, 41, 100, 103, 129, 132, 159, 195, 233, 257, 328, 329 Harrison, Percy N. ​1 Hatton, Howard A. ​191 Hauerwas, Stanley ​44, 46, 101, 189, 195, 221, 235, 257, 300 Hays, Richard B. ​66, 100, 144, 201, 329 Hendriksen, William ​214 Herdt, Jennifer A. ​46, 47, 300 Hering, James P. ​236, 237 Herzer, Jens ​37, 38, 64, 69, 137, 196, 308 Höffe, Otfried ​19, 34 Hoklotubbe, T. Christopher ​106, 107 Holtz, Gottfried ​39 Holtzmann, Heinrich Julius ​69, 89 Hooft, Stan van ​10, 31, 32, 41, 61, 109, 257 Horn, Friedrich Wilhelm ​8, 19, 22, 23, 36, 37, 38, 39, 103, 138, 165, 166, 167, 190, 196, 197, 198 Houlden, J. L. ​70, 94 Huizenga, Annette B. ​69, 72, 101, 119, 132, 135, 147, 156, 159, 192, 199, 238, 241, 242, 245, 261 Hultgren, Arland J. ​94, 134, 188, 199 Hursthouse, Rosalind ​34, 139 Hutson, Christopher R. ​40 Idowu, Bolaji E. ​271 Inwood, Brad ​15 Jackson, Michael ​294, 310 Johnson, Andy ​137, 154, 155 Johnson, Luke Timothy ​1, 118, 132, 146, 148, 172, 190, 191, 209, 219, 247, 253 Johnson, Samuel ​276, 277 Jordan, Mark D. ​26 Jülicher, A. ​227 Kallenberg, Brad J. ​230, 233 Karris, Robert J. ​197 Keenan, James F. ​3, 4, 10, 40, 41, 61, 100, 103, 129, 132, 138, 150, 159, 195, 233, 257, 328, 329 Keener, Craig S. ​226 Kent, Homer A., Jr. ​95, 135 Klein, Sherwin ​8 Knight, George W., III  80, 99, 112, 135, 192, 193, 202, 207, 230, 252, 254 Köstenberger, Andreas J. ​2, 73, 105, 106, 120, 212, 213 Kotva, Joseph J. ​9, 31, 41, 44, 45, 46, 47, 62, 63, 66, 101, 121, 122, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133,

140, 143, 144, 149, 150, 151, 159, 168, 174– 175, 210, 236, 244, 287, 301, 328 Krause, Deborah ​327 Kunhiyop, Samuel W. ​297, 309 Kyewalyanga, Francis-Xavier S. ​273 Lappenga, Benjamin J. ​216 Lapsley, Jacqueline E. ​329 Lauster, Jörg ​39 Lea, Thomas D. ​168, 214 LeMarquand, Grant ​305 Leonard, A. G. ​275 Liefeld, Walter L. ​38 Lips, Hermann von ​93, 98, 169, 207 Lock, Walter ​77, 94, 134, 215, 224, 226 Louden, Robert B. ​41, 129, 295, 329 Lovin, Robin W. ​6, 212, 301, 311 Luck, Ülrich ​131, 132, 140, 141, 142, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 243, 301 Lüdemann, Gerd ​64, 69 Luther, Martin ​191, 212 MacDonald, Margaret Y. ​141, 252, 253 MacIntyre, Alasdair ​8, 17, 24, 31, 82, 138, 151, 279, 296 Maier, Harry O. ​86, 200, 239, 240, 246 Malherbe, Abraham J. ​67 Maloney, Linda M. ​239 Manomi, Dogara Ishaya ​238, 246 Marshall, I. Howard ​62, 64, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71, 73, 81, 82, 83, 84, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 96, 97, 99, 100, 101, 108, 114, 137, 139, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 188, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 212, 226 Matera, Frank J. ​68, 70, 94, 100, 194, 195 Mattison, William C., III  4 Mbiti, John S. ​274, 275, 277, 278, 285, 298, 301, 309, 313 McDavid, William ​203 McDonald, Ian J. H. ​37, 38, 49 McInerny, Ralph ​28 Meilaender, Gilbert ​40, 143, 174, 193 Metuh, Emefie Ikenga ​313 Metz, Thaddeus ​5, 10, 272, 274, 275 Midgley, Mary ​22, 23 Miller, James D. ​65 Moe-Lobeda, Cynthia ​329 Mott, Stephen C. ​62, 63, 83, 101 Mounce, William D. ​68, 72, 73, 83, 92, 101, 102, 114, 115, 135, 191, 200, 212, 224, 225, 228, 241, 243, 255, 256 Musschenga, Albert W. ​44, 296 Mutschler, Bernhard ​91, 92

Index of Modern Authors Newman, Barclay M. ​49 Nichols, Aidan ​28 Oakley, Justin ​129, 139, 295, 329 Oden, Thomas C. ​38 Odozor, Paulinus I. ​270, 271, 272, 275, 277, 278, 279, 280, 293, 297, 300, 301, 306, 307, 313, 314, 315 Olupona, Jacob K. ​276, 278, 297 Osiek, Carolyn ​62, 239, 293 Paris, Peter ​279 Parsons, Susan Frank ​72 Perkins, Larry J. ​104 Pietersen, Lloyd K. ​104 Pinches, Charles ​235 Plummer, Alfred ​39, 158 Portefaix, Lilian ​238, 263 Porter, Jean ​25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 42 Porter, Stanley E. ​236 Price, James L. ​68 Primavesi, Oliver ​8, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21 Quell, Gottfried ​75 Quinn, Jerome D. ​65, 66, 67, 68, 79, 80, 83, 110, 111, 132, 135, 139, 140, 141, 142, 151, 156, 159, 160, 173, 205, 207, 212, 213, 230, 245, 247, 248, 250, 251, 252, 254, 255, 257, 261 Rabens, Volker ​143, 174, 193 Rapp, Christof ​8, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21 Rasmussen, Larry L. ​62, 144, 146, 174, 329 Ray, Stephen G., Jr. ​225 Reydams-Schils, Gretchen ​154 Rist, John M. ​25 Roberts, R. C. ​42, 135, 192 Röder, Jörg ​118 Roitto, Rikard ​67 Roloff, Jürgen ​93 Russell, Daniel C. ​9 Saarinen, Risto ​17, 54, 168, 186, 217, 282 Sampson, Peter ​34 Sandbach, F. H. ​15 Sanford, Jonathan J. ​27, 32, 33 Schlatter, Adolf ​89 Schnelle, Udo ​164, 165, 166 Schrage, Wolfgang ​37, 91, 142, 144, 159, 160, 161 Schrenk, Gottlob ​75, 76, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184 Schüssler Fiorenza, Elisabeth ​239, 240

369

Schwarz, Roland ​90 Seebass, Horst ​75, 76, 179, 180 Sell, Jesse ​94 Senghor, Leophold Sedor ​277 Sidgwick, Henry ​25, 26, 27, 30 Slote, Michael ​14, 16, 233 Smith, Claire S. ​68, 79, 80, 134, 135, 192, 196, 241, 250, 261 Smyth, Herbert Weir ​101, 250 Sofola, J. A. ​272, 273, 274, 276, 285, 286, 287, 288, 301 Solevåg, Anna Rebecca ​136 Sparks, Irving Alan ​134 Spicq, Ceslas ​63, 69, 71, 80, 81, 132, 142, 152, 154, 157, 160, 175, 176, 178, 179, 180, 181, 184 Spohn, William C. ​40, 41, 47, 48, 138, 150 Standhartinger, Angela ​37 Statman, Daniel ​8, 9, 11 Steele, Richard B. ​117, 118, 230 Stefaniw, Blossom ​229 Stock, Eugene ​221 Tanner, Kathryn ​150 Taylor, Richard ​33 Theobald, Michael ​165, 308 Thornton, Dillon T. ​170 Towner, Philip H. ​1, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 68, 70, 71, 73, 81, 84, 85, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 105, 108, 115, 116, 117, 135, 137, 140, 142, 155, 189, 192, 194, 196, 200, 202, 224, 226, 227, 228, 242, 260, 312 Uzukwu, Lochukwu ​270 Van Nes, Jermo ​2, 235 Verhey, Allen ​201 Verner, David C. ​258 Vine, W. E. ​99 Vogel, Manuel ​78 Wagener, Ulrike ​69, 70, 146 Wainwright, John W. ​89 Wall, Robert W. ​117, 118, 230 Wax, Trevin ​203 Wells, Kyle B. ​101 Wendland, Ernst R. ​69, 190, 196 Westerholm, Stephen ​36 Westfall, Cynthia L. ​231 Wibbing, Siegfried ​64, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 157, 158, 159, 160, 301 Widgery, Alban G. ​25

370

Index of Modern Authors

Wieland, George M. ​83 Willimon, William H. ​46, 300 Wilson, Douglas ​104, 119 Wilson, Jonathan R. ​43, 44, 49 Wilson, Stephen G. ​2 Winter, Bruce W. ​71, 152, 253, 255, 259, 261 Witherington, Ben, III  1, 99, 238 Wolter, Michael ​163, 164, 165 Wright, Tom ​3, 34, 84 Yarbrough, Robert W. ​73, 74, 87, 107, 120, 144, 172, 189, 213, 214, 216, 219

Yearly, Lee H. ​47 Young, Frances ​1, 100, 119, 135, 201, 238, 242, 245, 248, 255 Zahn, Theodor ​1 Zamfir, Korinna ​178 Ziesler, J. A. ​76, 77, 78, 82 Zimmermann, Ruben, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 57, 64, 121, 123, 139, 168, 172, 199, 222, 236, 245, 246, 248, 249, 251, 258, 259, 315

Subject Index action(s), moral ​25, 45–46, 53–55, 112, 134, 147–48, 151, 162, 169, 192, 208, 213–14, 220–22, 235–36, 243–44, 247–52, 258, 264, 290, 321–24, 329 African ethics ​5, 267–317 African biblical hermeneutics ​5, 325 African biblical virtue ethics ​293, 305–17, 325 African Traditional Religion ​269–76, 297, 301, 312–15 ancestor(s) ​95, 277–78, 282, 296–98, 302–4, 312–14 appropriation ​24, 55, 58, 64, 114, 129, 161, 221, 235, 240–41, 260–65, 292–317 ἀρετή ​36–38, 41, 48–49, 65, 83, 86, 92, 176, 196–198, 208, 242, 323, 326 attitude ​16, 20, 47, 66, 89–91, 93, 95–96, 118, 138, 152, 157, 184, 204–5, 207–8, 272, 289, 291, 298–99, 312–13, 315 authorship, see Titus, letter to barrenness ​302 “being” (vs. “doing”) ​13, 23, 31, 39, 45, 57, 60, 117, 131–32, 138, 140–41, 144–46, 162, 168–69, 174, 188–89, 195, 198, 204, 209– 10, 217, 231, 243–44, 248–50, 252, 257, 264, 290–91, 298–99, 311, 315, 319, 321–24 biblical ethics, see ethics, biblical bürgerliches Christentum ​37, 89–90, 188 burial, proper burial ​286, 298, 304 cardinal virtues ​14–16, 25, 27–29, 56, 62–63, 70, 76, 83–84, 86, 103, 130, 134, 138, 144, 147, 152–55, 158, 163, 167, 176, 190, 197, 242, 261, 301–2, 311, 327–28 – African ​276–77, 301–2 character, see virtue(s) child(ren), childhood ​16, 118, 124, 126, 136, 141, 146, 221, 242, 246, 250, 253, 260, 264, 274, 279–80, 284, 293–94, 301–4, 306 Christ-event ​22, 23, 36–37, 40, 54, 294–96, 299–300, 308, 327

– and δικαιοσύνη ​81–82, 88, 169–74, 181– 82, 187–88, 290 – and εὐσέβεια ​91, 97–98, 100, 103–4, 108, 192–98, 200–203, 208–9, 290–91, 312–15, 322–23 – and household codes ​248, 260 – and καλὰ ἔργα ​108–12, 114–18, 120, 216, 218–19, 221–24, 234–36, 291, 323 – and σωφροσύνη ​63–64, 67, 71, 73, 134– 35, 137, 142–43, 145–46, 162, 290, 310, 321 Christian, early ​109, 134–35, 142, 156–60, 180–186, 206–8, 226–28, 293, 327 Christian ethics, see ethics, Christian commonplace ​46, 75, 88, 111, 160–62, 244, 289–92, 321–22 communal, community (-based, -oriented), communitarianism ​11–12, 23, 43, 129, 138, 161–62, 201–2, 229, 233, 270–81, 284–85, 287–88, 295–97, 301–11, 321–23 concessions ​305–10, 313 conscience ​53, 118, 125 consequentialist/consequential ​12–13, 32–33, 40, 147, 201, 234, 257, 263, 328 continuity ​273, 276, 297, 302–4, 312 Crete ​2, 66, 87, 116, 124, 157, 170, 192, 199, 219, 251, 259, 261 day-to-day ​46, 87, 107, 195, 280, 292, 321 – See also commonplace deontology/deontological ​9, 13, 32–33, 40–41, 53, 58, 145, 147–48, 150, 175, 201–4, 212, 231–32, 257, 263, 271, 280, 328–29 δικαιοσύνη ​14, 38, 75–88, 124, 163–188, 290, 311, 322 – See also cardinal virtues divorce ​262, 279, 302 “doing” (vs. “being”) ​15, 23, 74, 131–32, 162, 168–69, 188, 195, 210, 215, 217, 220, 243–44, 249–50, 264, 290–91, 298–99, 315, 321, 324, – See also action, moral

372

Subject Index

elderly men ​125, 140, 146, 251, 252, 256, 293–94 elderly women ​126, 140–41, 146, 251, 252– 53, 256, 259, 293–94 emotions, emotional, feeling, affective ​8–9, 16–17, 47, 139, 155, 282, 310 – See also fellow-feeling ethical norms, see norms, ethical ethics – African ~, see African ethics – African biblical virtue ~, see African ­biblical virtue ethics – biblical ~ 3–4, 36–43, 52, 108–9, 121, 201– 2, 295, 310, 317, 327, 329 – Christian ~ 25–31, 33, 36–43, 46–47, 84, 129–30, 143, 149–50, 201–2, 271, 327–28 – Eudamian ~ 18–19 – New Testament ~, see ethics, biblical – Nichomachean ~ 7–8, 17–18 – virtue ~, see virtue ethics ethnic/ethnological ​34, 268, 270–71, 274, 278–81, 306–7 εὐδαιμονία ​22, 38, 196, 231, 233–234 Eudamian ethics, see ethics, Eudamian εὐσέβεια ​88–109, 188–210 – See also cardinal virtues excess and deficiency (Übermaß und Mangel) ​8, 18, 22 exegethics ​ 55–60, 128, 289, 319–20, 326 fellow-feeling ​273, 276, 281, 307, 310 – See also emotions flourishing ​10–13, 18–23, 31, 38–39, 45, 88, 122, 128–129, 151, 190, 196, 232–234, 263, 265, 275, 284–285, 288, 295, 297, 302, 304, 306–307, 309, 311, 319, 323, 328 – See also εὐδαιμονία Four S Schema ​267–88, 317, 325 fruit, fruitful ​113–15, 117, 184, 190, 219–20, 227, 233–34 God ​25–30, 39, 41–42, 65, 73, 75, 77, 79–80, 82–84, 89–108, 111, 123, 136–37, 139, 145, 155, 164, 169, 173, 177–87, 203, 205–6, 212, 226, 231, 253, 299, 306, 312–15 god, gods – in Greco-Roman context ​79–81, 90, 92, 104, 204–5 – in African context ​278, 285, 288, 297, 299, 301–2, 312–14 godliness, see εὐσέβεια good works, see καλὰ ἔργα

Greco-Roman ​23, 58, 79, 81, 90, 93, 105, 108, 152–54, 175–78, 204–5, 224–25, 239– 40, 310–12, 327 habit/habituation ​13, 15, 16, 20, 23, 45, 113, 128, 176, 236, 307, 311, 323 happiness, see flourishing Hausa ​280–84, 286, Hellenistic, see Greco-Roman heredity/hereditary ​269, 274, 299–300, 307 holistic ​296 household codes ​236–265 “How do I/we get there?” 10, 13, 44, 195, 204, 296 Igbo ​270, 275, 281, 283–85, 300, 313 implicit ethics ​49–56, 59, 121, 241, 258, 320 impotent, impotence ​302–3 individual, individualism ​10–11, 14, 21–23, 31, 40, 43–45, 47, 52, 55, 153, 160, 167, 180, 201–2, 232–34, 267, 274–75, 277–78, 287–88, 295–96, 301–3, 305–7, 309, 311, 328, initiation rites ​293–94, 302, 310, 312 inner disposition ​41, 60, 119, 128, 140, 146, 150, 160, 168, 170, 200, 209, 211, 218, 264– 65, 291, 298, 312, 319, 321–22 Jewish ​52, 58, 79, 91, 97, 102, 107, 154–56, 163–67, 178–80, 182, 186, 205–6, 225–26, 237 justification, see δικαιοσύνη καλὰ ἔργα ​56, 109–121, 125, 210–236, 291, 315, 322–23 living-dead ​277–78, 296–97, 300–301, 303, 312–13 mean/median ​ 8, 15, 17–18, 22, 153 moral action, see action, moral. negotiations ​ 305–17 New Testament ethics, see ethics, biblical Nicomachean ethics, see ethics, Nicomachean norms, ethical, in Titus ​123–128 – “be/being” (εἶναι), see “being” (vs. “doing”) – abominability/detestability (βδελυκτός) ​ 125, 211, 223 – accusation (κατηγορία) ​124 – adorn, decorate (κοσμείν) ​126

Subject Index – all (“in all things, in every aspect, everything, all”) (πᾶς, πάντα) ​126, 142, 161, 186, 192, 211–13, 216–17, 235, 251, 254, 258, 292 – anger (ὀργίλος) ​124, 131, 292 – apostle (ἀπόστολος) ​54, 95, 99, 123, 139, 161, 189, 192, 199, 202, 235, 251 – authority/command (ἐπιταγή) ​124 – avoid, have nothing to do with (περιΐστημι) ​128 – bath (baptismal) (λουτρόν) ​77, 82, 85, 127, 169 – beyond reproach (ἀκατάγνωστος) ​126, 213 – bishop/overseer (ἐπίσκοπος) ​69, 73, 83, 124, 131–32, 136–37, 139–40, 145, 149, 157– 58, 161, 168, 173–75, 311 – blameless(ness) (ἀνέγκλητος) ​124, 292 – blasphemy (βλασφημέω) ​82, 126, 141, 146–47, 231, 251, 253, 257, 328, – bully/violence (πλήκτης) ​124 – careful/intentional, be (φροντίζειν) ​114, 117, 127, 227 – child-loving (φιλότεκνος) ​126, 146, 242, 250, 253, 256 – children, believing/faithful (τέκνα ἔχων πιστά) ​124, 260 – circumcision (περιτομῆς) ​125 – command/direct (διατάσσω) ​124 – confession/profession, undeniably (ὁμολογείν) ​125, 194 – conscience (συνείδησις) ​125, 215, 299 – Crete/Cretans (Κρήτη, Κρής) ​58, 124, 137–38, 157, 218, 223, 251 – debate, foolish (ζήτησις) ​128 – debauchery (ἀσωτία) ​124, 154 – deceivers (φρεναπάται) ​125 – defilement (μιαίνω) ​125, 299 – denial (ἀρνέομαι) ​68, 125 – desires, sinful (ἐπιθυμίαι) ​37, 68, 82–83, 127, 135, 143, 174, 195, 200–201 – dignity/honorability/seriousness (σεμνός, σεμνότης) ​125, 213–14, 256 – disobedience (ἀπειθής) ​82, 125, 170, 223, 229 – disqualification, being unfit (ἀδόκιμος) ​ 125, 211 – disregard, look down upon (περιφρονείν) ​ 127 – division, schism, factionalism (αἱρετικός) ​ 128 – doctrine/teaching (διδασκαλία) ​98, 125, 213–14, 234, 256, 258, 291, 299, 324

373

– drunkenness/addition to wine (πάροινος) ​ 124, 292 – elder (office) (πρεσβύτερος) ​124, 140, 145, 168, 219 – elderly men (πρεσβύτης), see elderly men – elderly women (πρεσβῦτις), see elderly women – election (ἐκλεκτός) ​79, 83, 87, 123, 161, 191–92, 199, 202–3, 208, 235 – envy (φθόνος) ​82, 127, 170 – evil wild beasts (κακὰ θηρία) ​125, 157– 58, 259 – example, pattern (τύπος) ​110, 126, 212, 229 – exhortation/encouragement (παρακαλεῖν) ​ 124, 133, 142, 254 – faith, faithfulness, belief (πίστις, πιστεύω) ​ 79, 83, 95, 98–99, 101–2, 106, 110, 115, 118, 123, 124, 163–67, 189–92, 242, 249–52 – faithful saying (πιστὸς ὁ λόγος) ​124, 222, 231 – fight, quarrel (μάχη) ​128 – foolishness (ἀνόητος) ​82, 127 – genealogy (γενεαλογία) ​128, 244 – gentleness (πραΰτης) ​82, 127, 170 – glory (of God) (δόξα) ​96, 127, 149–50, 162, 190–91, 198, 203–4, 289–90, 295 – God (θεός) ​77–78, 91, 95, 123, 136–37, 139, 141, 145, 175, 178–81, 187, 202, 205–6, 231–32 – godliness, see εὐσέβεια – going astray, being misled (πλανώμενοι) ​ 82, 127 – good works, works (ἔργον, ἔργον ἀγαθὸν, καλὰ ἔργα), see καλὰ ἔργα – good, goodness (ἀγαθός, καλός) ​126, 224–28, 250 – grace (χάρις) ​64–65, 68, 126, 130, 134–35, 137, 143–44, 147–48, 174–75, 185–86, 199– 200, 300, 321 – greediness (αἰσχροκερδής) ​115, 124 – hatred (στυγητός, μισείν) ​82, 127, 170 – healthy speech (λόγον ὑγιῆ) ​126, 213–14, 256 – healthy/sound (doctrine) (ὑγιαινείν) ​125, 213–14, 249, 299 – heirship/inheritance (κληρονόμος) ​127, 150–51 – holiness, purity (ἁγνός) ​126 – Holy Spirit (πνεῦμα ἅγιος) ​77, 82–83, 85, 127 – home-working (οἰκουργός) ​126, 242–43, 250

374

Subject Index

– hope (of eternal life) (ἐλπίδι ζωῆς αἰωνίου) ​102–3, 123, 150–51, 189–90, 203, – hospitality (φιλόξενος) ​113, 124, 213, 221, 292, 300, 315 – household/home (οἶκος) ​120, 125, 137, 243 – See also household codes – human beings/people (ἀνθρώποι) ​125, 186, 199–200, 231–35, 292 – humility/meekness (ἐπιεικής) ​82, 127, 170 – husband of one wife (μιᾶς γυναικὸς ἀνήρ) ​ 124 – husband-loving (φίλανδρος) ​126, 146, 242, 248, 250, 253, 256 – idle talkers (ματαιολόγοι) ​125 – insistence, speaking confidently (διαβεβαιόομαι) ​127 – integrity, soundness (ἀφθορία) ​126, 213– 14, 229, 256 – Jesus Christ (Ἰησοῦς Χριστός) ​123, 149– 50, 203–4, 295 – knowledge (ἐπίγνωσις, οἶδα) ​79, 92–102, 104–8, 123, 189–95, 198–200, 202–3, 205– 8, 312, 323 – law (pertaining to), lawyer (νομικός) ​128 – lawlessness/iniquity (ἀνομία) ​127, 150, 216, 222, 230 – lazy gluttons (γαστέρες ἀργαί) ​125, 157– 58, 259 – learn (μανθανείν) ​112, 116, 128, 217–19, 221–22, 233 – liar (ψεύστης) ​125, 157, 259 – love (ἀγάπη, φιλέω) ​126, 146, 242, 249– 50, 252, 256 – loving what is good (φιλάγαθος) ​124 – loving-kindness (φιλανθρωπία) ​127 – malice (κακία) ​82, 127, 170 – manifestation, appearance (ἐπιφαίνω, ἐπιφάνεια) ​126 – master (δεσπότης) ​66–67, 126, 136, 138, 144, 250, 255, 258 – memory, to remember (ὑπομιμνῄσκειν) ​ 127 – mercy/compassion (ἔλεος) ​118, 127, 169 – mind/intellect (νοῦς) ​125, 215, 299 – misappropriation (νοσφίζειν) ​126 – myths and commandments, Jewish (Ἰουδαϊκοῖς μύθοις καὶ ἐντολαῖς ἀνθρώπων) ​112, 125 – need, necessity (χρεία) ​128 – opponent (ἐναντίος) ​126, 228–29

– peaceability (ἄμαχος) ​82, 127, 170 – perseverance/endurance (ὑπομονή) ​126, 146, 242, 249–50, 252, 256 – perversion (ἐκστρέφω) ​128 – pleasure (ἡδονή) ​82, 127, 170, 259 – profit/gain (κέρδος) ​125 – profitability/usefulness (ὠφέλιμος) ​128, 231–33, 234–35, 244, 308 – prophet (προφήτης) ​125 – purification, cleansing (καθαρίζειν) ​117, 127, 148, 150, 200, 215–16, 221, 226, 230 – purity/cleanliness (καθαρὰ) ​125, 148 – put forth, bring forth/out, devotion to (προΐστημι) ​128, 217–19, 222 – readiness (for every good work) (ἕτοιμος) ​ 127, 216–17, 221 – rebellion (ἀνυπότακτος) ​124 – rebirth, regeneration (παλιγγενεσία) ​54, 77, 82, 85, 127, 227 – rebuke/convict (ἐλέγχειν) ​113, 125 – redemption (λυτρόω) ​117, 127, 150, 215, 226–27, 230 – reject, refuse (παραιτέομαι) ​128 – renewal (ἀνακαίνωσις) ​54, 77, 82–83, 85, 127 – reverence (ἱεροπρεπής) ​126 – righteousness/justice (δικαιοσύνη), see δικαιοσύνη – rulers/authorities (ἀρχή ἐξουσία) ​82, 113, 127, 148, 308 – satisfaction, well-pleasing (εὐάρεστος) ​ 126, 250 – savior/salvation (σωτήρ, σωτῆρος, σῴζω) ​ 82, 98, 124, 202 – self-condemnation (αὐτοκατάκριτος) ​128 – self-control, discipline (ἐγκρατής) ​64, 71, 124, 130, 139 – self-control/sensibleness/self-discipline (σωφροσύνη), see σωφροσύνη – self-giving (of Christ for us) (δίδωμι ἑαυτοῦ) ​127, 216, 230 – self-will/stubbornness (αὐθάδης) ​124 – set right/correct (ἐπιδιορθόω) ​124, 219 – shame (ἐντρέπω) ​126, 229, 251, 258, 328 – sin, wrong (ἁμαρτάνω) ​128 – slander (διάβολος) ​126, 133, 242, 250, 252 – slave/servant (δοῦλος, δουλεύω) – as calling ​123, 139, 251 – as social status ​66–67, 123, 136, 231, 243, 250–52, 255, 258 – serving desires ​123, 133, 242, 249–50, 252, 259 – speaking against (ἀντιλέγειν) ​125

Subject Index – special, chosen (people) (περιούσιος) ​127, 147, 150, 200 – stewardship (οἰκονόμος) ​124, 145, 175 – strife, discord (ἔρις) ​128 – submission, obedience (ὑποτάσσω) ​67, 126, 146, 239, 245–48, 250, 253–55, 257– 58, 261–63, 324 – teaching what is good (καλοδιδασκάλους) ​ 126, 133, 242, 250, 252 – temperateness, soberness (νηφάλιος) ​73, 125, 146, 242, 250, 252, 255–56 – testimony/witness (μαρτυρία) ​125, 244 – Titus (person) (Τίτος) ​73, 110, 115–16, 124, 142, 161, 212–15, 223, 229, 251, 254, 256, 293 – trustworthiness, faithfulness (πιστός) ​41, 124 – truth (ἀλήθεια, ἀληθής) ​79, 102, 104, 107, 123, 191–95, 202–3 – unbelief/faithlessness (ἀπίστοις) ​125 – unfruitfulness, unproductivity (ἄκαρπος) ​ 128, 190, 233 – ungodliness (ἀσέβεια) ​82–83, 123, 135, 143, 193–94, 200–201 – unprofitability, uselessness, vanity (ἀνωφελής, μάταιος) ​128, 244 – warning, admonition (νουθεσία) ​128 – wine, addiction to (οἴνῳ πολλῷ δεδουλωμένας) ​126, 133, 242, 249–50, 252, 259, 261 – wish, desire (βούλομαί) ​127 – Word (of God) (λόγος) ​123, 141, 146–47, 231, 251, 257 – worthlessness, evil (φαῦλος) ​126, 228– 29 – young men (νέος, νεωτέρος), see young men – young women (νέος , νέας), see young women – zeal, enthusiasm (ζηλωτής) ​110, 127, 215– 16, 223, 225–26, 230 otherworldly ​162, 187, 189–90, 294, 297, 320 παιδεία ​38, 63, 106, 134–35, 156, 219, 221 polygamy ​302 progressive-negotiated ethics ​305–17 righteousness, see δικαιοσύνη self-control, see σωφροσύνη sense(s) of character ​48, 268–69, 274–80

375

service(s) of character ​48, 268–69, 285–88, 299–300 slaves ​66–67, 136, 231, 238, 242–43, 250– 52, 255, 258, 292–93 source(s) of character ​48, 268–69, 269–74 spiritual, spirituality ​158, 206, 230, 275, 313 – See also virtues, spiritual stereotypes ​274, 306–7 Stoics ​14–16, 96, 175, 225 symbol(s) of character ​48, 268–69, 280–85 σωφροσύνη ​61–75, 129–163 – See also cardinal virtues tandem(s) ​113, 119, 209, 244, 254, 290, 292–94 telos ​96 – in African ethics ​294–97, 302–4 – in virtue ethics ​12, 23, 31, 44–45, 47 – with δικαιοσύνη cognates ​187, 290, 322 – with εὐσέβεια cognates ​189–91, 193–95, 197–98, 202–4, 209, 322–23 – with καλὰ ἔργα cluster ​234, 236, 323 – with σωφροσύνη cognates ​131, 148, 149– 51, 162, 289, 320–21 – See also “Who ought I/we to become?” tension(s) ​111, 245, 262, 294–302, 303, 305–16 Titus, letter to ​1–5, 7, 10 – authorship ​1–3 Übermaß und Mangel, see excess and deficiency vice(s) ​10, 25–26, 170, 211, 262, 274, 307 virtue(s) ​7–24, 54 – definition ​47 – in Aquinas ​27–30 – in Aristotle ​16–23 – in Augustine ​25–26 – in Plato ​14 – in the Stoics ​14–16 – moral ​8, 16–18, 29–30, 42, 173, 249, 276 – natural ​27–28, 30, 103 – spiritual ​30, 33, 178 virtue ethics ​6–48 – characteristics of ​44–47 – definition ​48 – historical dimensions ​13–32 – neo-Aristotelian ​6–7, 32–36 – New Testament ethics and ​36–42

376

Subject Index

“Who am I?”/ “Who are we?” 10, 44, 151, 195, 201, 204, 296–97, 306, 324 “Who ought I/we to become?” 10, 44, 151, 196, 204, 296–97, 319, 324 worldly/worldliness ​37, 65, 82, 135, 200, 300 – See also otherworldly worldview ​302, 304–5

Yoruba ​270–71, 276, 282, 284–85, 288, 299 young men ​72–73, 110, 133–34, 142, 147, 162, 229, 242–43, 250, 254–55, 258, 293 young women ​141–42, 146–47, 231, 242, 253, 255–57 Zaar ​280, 284, 298 Zeno ​15

Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament Edited by Jörg Frey (Zürich) Associate Editors: Markus Bockmuehl (Oxford) ∙ James A. Kelhoffer (Uppsala) Tobias Nicklas (Regensburg) ∙ Janet Spittler (Charlottesville, VA) J. Ross Wagner (Durham, NC)

WUNT I is an international series dealing with the entire field of early Christianity and its Jewish and Graeco-Roman environment. Its historical-philological profile and interdisciplinary outlook, which its long-term editor Martin Hengel was instrumental in establishing, is maintained by an international team of editors representing a wide range of the traditions and themes of New Testament scholarship. The sole criteria for acceptance to the series are the scholarly quality and lasting merit of the work being submitted. Apart from the specialist monographs of experienced researchers, some of which may be habilitations, WUNT I features collections of essays by renowned scholars, source material collections and editions as well as conference proceedings in the form of a handbook on themes central to the discipline. WUNT II complements the first series by offering a publishing platform in paperback for outstanding writing by up-and-coming young researchers. Dissertations and monographs are presented alongside innovative conference volumes on fundamental themes of New Testament research. Like Series I, it is marked by a historical-philological character and an international orientation that transcends exegetical schools and subject boundaries. The academic quality of Series II is overseen by the same team of editors. WUNT I: ISSN: 0512-1604 Suggested citation: WUNT I All available volumes can be found at www.mohrsiebeck.com/wunt1

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Mohr Siebeck

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