Semiotic Theory and Practice, Volume 1+2: Proceedings of the Third International Congress of the International Association for Semiotic Studies Palermo, 1984 [Reprint 2016 ed.] 9783110868883, 9783110099331

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Semiotic Theory and Practice Volume I

Semiotic Theory and Practice Proceedings of the Third International Congress of the IASS Palermo, 1984

Volume I Editors Michael Herzfeld Lucio Melazzo

Mouton de Gruyter Berlin • NewYork • Amsterdam 1988

Mouton de Gruyter (formerly Mouton,The Hague) is a Division of Walter de Gruyter& Co., Berlin.

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data International Association for Semiotic Studies. Congress (3rd : 1984 : Palermo, Sicily) Semiotic theory and practice. English, French, and Italian. 1. Semiotics-Congresses. 2. Discourse analysis-Congresses. I. Herzfeld, Michael, 1947II. Melazzo, Lucio, 1950. III. Title. P99.I57 1984 001.51 88-12991 ISBN 0-89925 5302 (alk. paper)

Deutsche Bibliothek Cataloguing in Publication

Data

Vol. 1 (1988) Semiotic theory and practice : Palermo, 1984 / ed. Michael Herzfeld ; Lucio Melazzo. - Berlin ; New York ; Amsterdam : M o u t o n de Gruyter. (Proceedings of the . . . international congress of the IASS ; 3) ISBN 3-11-009933-0 NE: Herzfeld, Michael [Hrsg.]; International Association for Semiotic Studies: Proceedings of the . . . congress of the International Association for Semiotic Studies

Printed on acid free paper. © Copyright 1988 by Walter de Gruyter & Co., Berlin 30. All rights reserved, including those of translation into foreign languages. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form - by photoprint, microfilm, or any other means - nor transmitted nor translated into a machine language without written permission f r o m Mouton de Gruyter, a Division of Walter de Gruyter & Co., Berlin. Printing: Proff G m b H & Co. KG, Starnberg. Binding: Peter Mikolai, Berlin. - Printed in Germany.

EDITORIAL NOTE The papers in this collection are arranged in the alphabetical order of their authors, except that the round table material has been gathered together at the end for convenience. While this approach has entailed the separation of papers that were conceptually linked to each other and that in some cases appeared together in the context of special panels, the rich texture of many papers defied unilinear arrangement of any but this rather arbitrary kind. The present mode of presentation seems less invidious, and allows each reader to explore in independent fashion the complex intertext that this semiotic enterprise represents. We would like to thank all the authors who sent in their papers for inclusion in this record of the IASS Congress held in 1984 in Palermo. We believe that the resulting collection offers a truly global perspective on current directions and developments in the various domains of semiotically inspired theory and research. We would like to thank Rita Crouch for her help with typing several manuscripts. We would also like to express grateful personal thanks to Connie Adams, Ruth Fishel, and Janis Kearney-Williams, whose heroic technical assistance in Bloomington throughout the final stages enabled us to present a far more orderly and presentable volume than such a complex international venture could otherwise have aspired to become. Michael Herzfeld Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, U.S.A.

Lucio Melazzo Università degli Studi, Palermo, Sicilia, Italia.

CONTENTS Volume I

1.

EDITORS' NOTE

V

2.

M a r i a A m b r o s i n i , L'OPACITA REFERENZIALE

1

3.

G i a n F r a n c o A r l a n d i , THEORIE STATISTIQUE DU TEXTE: T A X I N O M I E DES PARCOURS TEXTUELS ARCHITECTONICO-URBANISTES

4.

M a r i a - A u g u s t a B a b o , L'INSCRIPTION S O M A T O L O G I Q U E DES PRATIQUES SIGNIFIANTES:

5.

Michel

LES METAPHORES DE LA M A L A D I E

B a l a t , DE PEIRCE A LACAN:

L'ACCES A U 6.

11

LE STADE DU MIROIR ET

LANGAGE

ziva Ben-Porat,

33

41 LYRICAL POETRY A N D THE LYRICS OF POP:

A U T U M N SONGS AS AN E X A M P L E OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE "POPULAR SONG POLYSYSTEM" A N D THE LITERARY POLYSYSTEM 7.

J e f f B e r n a r d & G l o r i a W i t h a l m , THEORY OF SIGNS PRACTICE OF SIGNS:

8.

— 59

CONTOURS OF A CONCEPTION

M a r c B e r t r a n d , SEMIOTIQUE LITTERAIRE:

UNE UTILISATION

DE PEIRCE 9.

Andrzej

51

69 BogusJTavski, THE PROBLEM OF IFS VS. LOGICAL

IMPLICATION REVISITED

81

10. J.S. B o r d r e u i l & S. O s t r o w e t s k y , SOCIOLOGIE ET S E M I O T I Q U E 2:

IDENTITE SOCIALE ET MEDIATION SYMBOLIQUE:

DE LA PUBLICITE AUX M O U V E M E N T S SOCIAUX 11. S a n d r o B r i o s i , IL LETTORE MODELLO E IL LETTORE REALE. S E M I O T I C A E INTERPRETAZIONE DEL TESTO LETTERARIO. PROPOSITO

DI U. ECO

A 99

Vili 12. J a m e s H. Bunn, ON LAWS OF INVERSE PROPORTION

105

13. W e r n e r Burzlaff, LA PERCEPTION CHEZ PEIRCE

,n

14. German Carvajal & Lucrecia Escudero, SEMIOTICS:

THEORETICAL

THE CONCEPT OF ISOTOPY IN THE CONTEXT OF A

SEMIOTIC THEORY OF SPATIAL DELIMITATION

117

15. Franca Mariani Ciampicacigli, PER UNO STATUTO DELLA DIGRESSIONE

m

16. A l a i n J.-J. Cohen, MICRO-CONVERSATIONS EN SEMIOTIQUE APPLIQUEE:

DU "SQUELCH"

,31

17. A m e d e o G. C o n t e , SEMIOTICS OF CONSTITUTIVE RULES

143

18. L u c i a C o r r a i n , IL PUNTO DI VISTA NELL'ANNUNCIAZIONE DI LEONARDO DA VINCI

,51

19. H u b e r t D a m i s c h , LE TRAVAIL SEMIOTIQUE

l61

20. Marcelo Dascal, TOWARDS PSYCHO-PRAGMATICS

,73

21. A m e d e o De D o m e n i c i s , QUALCHE OSSERVAZIONE SULLE STRUTTURE DISCORSIVE NELLE SEMIOTICHE VISUALI

177

22. J a r m i l a D o u b r a v o v à , DENOTATION AND CONNOTATION OF FUGUE IN MUSIC AND VISUAL ARTS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 23. U m b e r t o Eco, WHODUNIT?

|89

THE CASE OF DENOTATION AND/OR

SIGNIFICATION

197

24. P a o l o Facchi, ABSENCE OF EVENT AS CAUSAL EXPLANATION: LINGUISTIC FORMULATIONS

213

25. L u c r é c i a D'Alessio Ferrara, LE TEXTE EN SILENCE

221

2 6. M a u r o F e r r a r e s i , NARRATIVE HYPOTHESES

231

27. Ignazio Filippi, IL RUMORE DEL TEMPO

239

IX

28. Jean-Marie Floch, UN TYPE REMARQUABLE DE SEMIOSIS:

LES 249

SYSTEMES SEMI-SYMBOLIQUES 29. Barbara Folkart, OPACIFICATION AND SEMIOSIS:

ULYSSES AS 259

DOUBLE STRUCTURE 30. Luanne Frank, HERDER, MUKAROVSKY, AND THE HISTORY OF

269

SEMIOTICS 31. Erika Freiberger-Sheikholeslami, GUSTAV G. SPET:

279

PHENOMENOLOGICAL SEMIOTICS AND HERMENEUTICS 32. Miguel E. Garrido Gallardo, SEMIOTIQUE ET HISPANISME

293

33. Adrian S. Gimate-Welsh, ANALYSIS OF THE RELIGIOUS PROCESS THROUGH DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

301

34. W i e s ^ a v Godzic, SOME REMARKS ON "AESOPIAN COMMUNICATION" 313

IN FILM 35. Dinda L. Gorlée, ANTONIO GALA'S AVIARY:

A SEMIOTIC

PERSPECTIVE ON BIRD SIGNS IN EL CEMENTERIO DE LOS PAJAROS

325

36. Maciej Grochowski, ON THE PROBLEM OF ANALYTIC SENTENCES FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF NATURAL LANGUAGE SEMANTICS

337

37. Claudio Federico Guerri, SEMIOTIC CHARACTERISTICS OF ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN BASED ON THE MODEL BY CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE

347

38. Riccardo Guerri, CONTENUTO SEMANTICO DEGLI AUSILIARI NEI TEMPI COMPOSTI DEI VERBI ITALIANI

357

39. Gàbor Hajnòczi, COME SI LEGGONO GLI ARTICOLI DI ARCHITETTURA NEI GIORNALI

365

X 40. A n d r é H ë l b o , LE TEXTE SEMIOTIQUE:

L'OEIL, LA VOIX, LA

SCENE 41. Michael Herzfeld, THE POETICITY OF THE COMMONPLACE

371 383

42. E l i z a b e t h K e n n e d y Hewitt, RHYME AS METAPHOR IN THE WASTE LAND

393

43. A n d r é v a n Hoik, TOWARDS A SEMIOTIC THEORY OF LITERARY THEMES

401

44. H u g u e s H o t i e r , CODES ET TRANSGRESSIONS DES CODES AU CIRQUE

409

45. G e r a r d l a b e r t , POUR UNE SOCIO-SEMIOTIQUE DE LA PRESSE A PROPOSE DE EL PAIS

419

46. Patrick Imbert, CONTEXTE ET ABSENCE DE CONTEXTE DANS LES QUOTIDIENS

429

47. G e n n a r o D'Ippolito, SEMIOLOGIA E QUE LLENFORS CHUNG : ORIGINE, SVILUPPO, APPLICAZIONI DEL CONCETTO DI INTERTESTUALITÀ

441

48. M a r c o J a c q u e m e t , ENTRE TOPOLOGIE ET ASPECTUALISATION: RECHERCHES SUR LA GESTUALITE SONORE

455

49. j a c e k J u l i u s z Jadacki, ON SEMIOTIC FUNCTIONS OF CONDITIONALS

469

50. C e s a r J a n n e l l o , FONDEMENTS POUR UNE SEMIOTIQUE SCIENTIFIQUE DE LA CONFORMATION DELIMITANTE DES OBJETS DU MONDE NATUREL

483

51. J o r g e n D i n e s Johansen, THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ICON, INDEX, AND SYMBOL IN THE STUDY OF LITERATURE

497

XI

52. J e a n P i e r r e K a m i n k e r , LA NOTION DE RAPPORT AU LANGAGE, ELEMENTS POUR UNE APPROCHE SEMIOTIQUE

505

53. Andrew Kennedy, SEMIOTICS AND THE STUDY OF DRAMATIC DIALOGUE

511

54. Boni K i r s t e i n , ON REFERENCE IN PRAGMASEMIOTICS

519

55. J e a n - M a r i e K l i n k e n b e r g , STRUCTURE DU SIGNE ICONIQUE

541

56. L e o n Koj, A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING

555

57. T a d e u s z K o v z a n , SUR LE REFERENT DU SIGNE AU THEATRE

561

58. Martin Krampen, SEMIOTICS AND THE ONTOGENESIS OF INTELLIGENCE

571

59. Wladimir Krysinski, SEMIOLOGIE, SEMIOTHEORIES:

SEMIOTIQUE,

CONFLIT DES INTERPRETATIONS OU APORIES DES

OBJETS DE CONNAISSANCE

577

Volume II

60. F r i e d r i c h L a c h m a y e r , SEMIOTIC STRUCTURES OF PROVOCATION

585

61. Shelagh Lindsey, Robert Buchan, & J a m e s S. Duncan, THE RESIDENTIAL LANDSCAPE AS A SYSTEM OF COMMUNICATION:

A

SEMIOTIC APPROACH

591

62. A l e x a n d r o s Lagopoulos, MARXISM, SEMIOTICS, AND URBAN SPACE:

THE SOCIAL SEMIOTIC TYPOLOGY OF URBAN TEXTS

601

63. Annemarie Lange-Seidl, THE IDEAL SIGN

611

64. svend E r i k Larsen, URBAN CODES AND LITERATURE

619

65. L u i g i L e n t i n i , AN EXPERIENCE IN NON VERBAL LANGUAGE AND ARCHITECTURE

631

XII

66. Jaap Lintvelt, ANALYSE NARRATO LOGIQUE ET THEMATIQUE DE L'AUBERGE DE GUY DE MAUPASSANT

641

67. Gisele Losier, CONVENTIONS DE REFUTATION

651

68. Pasquale Lovero, SOME ASPECTS OF SEMIOTICS OF RE-USED ARCHITECTURE:

THE CASE OF LA TOURETTE MONASTERY

659

69. John Lyons, THEORETICAL SEMIOTICS AND THEORETICAL LINGUISTICS

671

70. Juan Angel Magarinos de Morentin, CONTRIBUTIONS OF SEMIOTICS TO ANTHROPOLOGICAL RESEARCH

689

71. Marco De Marinis, ASPETTI SEMIOTICI DELL'EMOZIONE TEATRALE (CONTRO ALCUNE MITOLOGIE POSTMODERNE)

701

72. Gianfranco Marrone, PROPOSITIONS POUR UNE REDEFINITION 711

SEMIOTIQUE DE LA NOTION DE 'PERSONNAGE' 73. Francesco Marsciani, IL NEUTRO E LA NEUTRALIZZAZIONE IN

721

HUSSERL 74. Robert Marty, CHAMPS D'INTERPRETANT:

UN MODELE

FORMALISE DE LA SEMIOSIS

™

75. Marcello La Matìna, ISOTOPIA E PRAGMATICA DEL TESTO TRA A.J. GREIMAS E U. ECO

739

76. Geraaine Matosslan, LA DEMANDE CLINIQUE ET SON 747

INTERPRETATION 77. Giuseppe Mininni, THE DEVELOPMENT OF A DIALOGIC SUBCOMPETENCE:

A PSYCHO-SEMIOTIC APPROACH

753

XIII 78. P i e r r e - Y v e s M o c q u a i s , SCIENCE ET S E M I O T I Q U E DANS LE ROMAN

—

SAVOIR, NON-SAVOIR ET T R A N S F O R M A T I O N DANS

L'ANTIPHONAIRE

763

DE HUBERT AQUIN

79. J O r g e n K. M ö l l e r , ECRITURE ET LECTURE FILMIQUES, PROLEGOMENES A UNE THEORIE DE L'INTERMEDIALITE A L'EXEMPLE DES LIAISONS DANGEREUSES DE CHODERLOS DE LACLOS

773

80. J o s e M a r i a N a d a l , L'HISTOIRE C O M M E DISCOURS SECRET

789

81. M i h a i N a d i n , SIGN A N D VALUE:

799

THE AUTHORITY OF AUTHORITY

82. L u d w i g N a g l , SIGN A N D SIGN USE:

IS P R A G M A T I C S IN NEED

OF A PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY W H I C H EXPLAINS OUR ABILITY TO 805

ACT? 83. M a r i a n a Net, S C H E M E —

TEXT —

DISCOURSE:

TENSIONS 813

WITHIN, PROJECTIONS BETWEEN 84. A d o l p h e N y s e n h o l c , POUR UNE SEMIOLOGIE DU HEROS COMIQUE

821

85. A a t o s O j a l a , THE APOPHANTIC FUNCTION OF NARRATIVE DEIXIS

829

86. C i d m a r T e o d o r o Pais, POUR UNE S Y N T A X E - S E M A N T I Q U E DES 835

S Y S T E M E S DE SIGNIFICATION 87. H e r m a n P a r r e t , POUR UNE SEMIOTIQUE DE LA SUBJECTIVITE

847

88. J e r z y Pelc, A PLEA FOR SEMIOTICS

855

89. P i e r r e P e l l e g r i n o , SEMIOTIQUE, ARCHITECTURE ET SCIENCES HUMAINES:

873

NOTES EPISTEMOLOGIQUES

90. C r i s t i n a P e n a - M a r i n , L'IRONIE:

LA M A S Q U E DE L'AUTRE

883

XIV

91. M a s s i m o Pesaresi, THE SUN AND THE CITY:

SYMBOLOGICAL

ASPECTS OF CITY PLANNING IN CAMPANELLA'S UTOPIA 92. Jerzy Pogonovski, SEMANTIC ENGINEERING

893 899

93. Roland Posner, BALANCE OF COMPLEXITY AND HIERARCHY OF PRECISION:

TWO PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMY IN THE NOTATION OF

LANGUAGE AND MUSIC 94.

909

Aurelio Principato, THEORIES DE L'EXPRESSION IMPUDIQUE

AU GRAND SIECLE

921

95.

Giorgio Prodi, LA BIOLOGIA COME SEMIOTICA NATURALE

929

96.

G i a m p a o l o Proni, ARISTOTLE'S ABDUCTION

953

97.

Walburga von Raffler-Engel, LA RELAZIONE DELLE

COMPONENTI VOCALI E NON-VOCALI NELLO SVILUPPO DELLA COMMUNICAZIONE UMANA

963

98. François Rastier, MICROSEMANTIQUE ET SEMIOTIQUE 99.

969

Rosa Maria Ravera, NOTE PER UNA TEORIA DEL TESTO

PITTORICO

981

100. Monica Rector, INTERACTION AND DECODING OF VERBAL AND NONVERBAL SIGNS:

ORCHESTRA CONDUCTING

993

101. Carlos Reis, POUR UNE SEMIOTIQUE DE L'IDEOLOGIE

1005

102. Joëlle Rethoré, LES CONDITIONS DE L'APPROCHE D'UN TEXTE LITTERAIRE DANS LE CONTEXTE PEDAGOGIQUE:

LECTURE ET

INTERPRETATION COMME PROCESSUS COGNITIFS 103. Alain Rey, WHAT DOES SEMIOTICS COME FROM?

1013 1023

XV 104. A d r i a n o D u a r t e R o d r i g u e s , L'IMAGINAIRE SOCIAL DU CORPS: POUR UNE SEMIOTIQUE DES MODES D'INCARNATION DE LA LOI

1037

105. K a t a r z y n a Rosner, THE ROLE OF SEMIOTICS IN THE CHANGE OF AESTHETICS PARADIGM IN THE 20th CENTURY

1045

106. F e r r u c c i o R o s s i - L a n d i , A FRAGMENT IN THE HISTORY OF ITALIAN SEMIOTICS

1053

107. N a n c y F e l s o n Rubin, A MODEL FOR THE ANALYSIS OF CHARACTER IN ANCIENT GREEK LYRIC:

THE POET FIGURE IN

PINDARIC ODES

1065

108. M a r i a T e r e s a Russo, ROLAND BARTHES ET LA FORCLUSION DU SENS

1073

109. T h o m a s A. Sebeok, COMMUNICATION, LANGUAGE AND SPEECH: EVOLUTIONARY CONSIDERATIONS 110. Tatiana Slaaa-Cazacu, PSYCHOLOGIE, ET SEMIOTIQUE:

1083 PSYCHOLINGUISTIQUE

LA METHODE CONTEXTUELLE-DYNAMIQUE EN TANT

QU'ANALYSE SEMIOTIQUE DU TEXTE LITTERAIRE

1093

111. A n t o n i n o Di Sparti, VERBALE vs NON-VERBALE, EMISFERO SINISTRO vs EMISFERO DESTRO 112. C.W. Spinks, SEMIOTICS AND DREAMS:

1105 PEIRCE'S SIGN POSTS

TO THE UNCONSCIOUS

1115

113. Constantin Spyridonidis, APPROCHES SEMIOTIQUES AU PROCESSUS DU DESIGN 114. Malina Stefanova, COMMUNICATION IN THE THEATRE

1125 1135

XVI

115. G i d e o n T o u r y ,

SURNAMES AND THEIR SUBSTITUTES

116. E l e o n o r a T r a f i c a n t e , 117. S i n i k k a T u o h i m a a ,

1143

LA METAFORA I N BORGES

1153

THE IMAGE THEME AS AN ISOTOPIE LEVEL:

THE SHADOW IMAGE THEME I N T.S.

ELIOT'S THE WASTE LAND AND

THE HOLLOW MEN

1159

118. S i r k k a - L i i s a T u o m i n e n , LA SEMIOTIQUE DU BONHEUR:

LES

EFFETS SEMANTIQUES DE STYLE DANS LES POEMES DE JOSIANE GEORGE

1165

119. T h u r e v o n Uexkfflll & M a r t i n Krampen,

BIOLOGICAL SYSTEMS,

SIGN PROCESSES AND THE OBSERVER 120. P a t r i z i a

Violi,

121. S a n d r o V o l p e ,

1177

A TEXTUAL APPROACH TO PRESUPPOSITION

UNE HYPOTHESE INFORMATIONNELLE SUR LE

POINT DE VUE AU CINEMA 122. Roy W i l l i a m s ,

1197

A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF MACBETH

123. F. E u g e n e Y a t e s , SIGNIFICANCE:

SIGNS, SINGULARITIES,

1205

AND

A PHYSICAL MODEL FOR SEMIOTICS

1217

124. R i c h a r d Z a k i a & M i h a i N a d i n , VISUAL ADUCATION 125. M a s s i m o A. B o n f a n t i n i , Deledalle, 126.

1187

J o r g e n D i n e s Johansen,

1237 Gerard

PANEL ON ABDUCTION

Gerard Deledalle,

Jean-Pierre

1245 Kaminker,

Joftlle

Réthoré,

Marc Bertrand,

Herner B u r z l a f f , Robert Marty,

TABLE RONDE —

DEVELOPPEMENTS DE LA SEMIOTIQUE INSPIREE DE •

PEIRCE:

SEMINAIRE DE SEMIOTIQUE —

PERPIGNAN,

Index of N a m e s

FRANCE

Michel

Balat,

UNIVERSITE DE 1265

1285

Volume I

2 L'OPACITA' REFERENZIALE

Maria Grazia Ambrosini

Un problema di ampio dibattito nell'ambito logicolinguistico contemporaneo è costituito dall'esistenza di quelli che si sogliono denominare i contesti referenziai mente opachi. E' una questione che serge, sul piano formale, dal noto problema della scstitutività. Il principio di sostitutività garantisce la verità di una asserzione quando un termine viene sostituito con un altro in una asserzione vera. W.V.O. Quine asserisce (1971): Uno dei principi fondamentali che regolano l'dentità è quello della òo^tMuiÀv-utà. o, come si potrebbe anche dire, della indiscernibilità degli identici. Data una asserzio ne vera di identità, uno dei suoi termini può essere sostituito all'altro in ogni asserzione vera, e il risulta to sarà ancora vero...ietc.)...due termini di una asserzione di identità vera sono reciprocamente sostituibili in ogni contesto, óaiva vzfutate. .

I contesti nei quali viene meno la sostitutività so no detti referenzialmente opachi. L'opacità referenziale interessa i contesti ove compaiono le espressioni "neces sariamente" e "possibilmente", intese nel senso della ne cessità e possibilità strette come nella logica modale di Lewis (1918, 1932) . Essa si riscontra nei contesti ove compaiono termini singolari e dice Church (1972:100): 'deve riflettersi sul la quantificazione come sui termini singolari' in quanto ' gli oggetti cui ci si riferisce in una teoria devono es sere considerati non come le cose nominate dai termini singolari, ma come i valori delle variabili di quantificazione '. Per Quine il principio di sostitutività vige allorché il termine da sostituire si riferisce all'oggetto no minato e non può essere esteso a quei contesti nei quali

2

il termine da sostituire è presente senza riferirsi allo oggetto nominato. Il venir meno della sostitutività mostra soltanto che l'occorrenza da sostituire non è puramente referenziale: è in tal caso che compare il fenomeno dell'opacità referenziale. Questo tipo di opacità referenziale, relativa ai ter mini singolari, presenta una difficoltà di non piccolo rilievo, come è dimostrato dalla sua ricorrenza lungo tut ta la storia del problema logico-semantico, da Leibnz in poi. La sua impostazione di base risale, infatti, al noto principio dell'indiscernibilità degli identici, quale fu appunto formulato da Leibniz, ove per identici si intendono i termini singolari. Si tratta di un problema che trascina con sé la stessa definizione dell'identità. Già Leibniz (1840: 94) aveva definito l'identità proprio attraverso il principio di "indiscernibilità degli identici", che stabilisce come oggetti identici non possano differire qualitativamente. Col sorgere della logica formalizzata questa formulazione dell'identità si rivela assai utile a sgombrare il campo del formalismo logico dalla scomoda presenza di una singolarità irriducibile degli oggetti (da essa trasformati in referenti), sancendo il non senso di una distinzione degli oggetti identici e impiantando, con ciò stesso, il principio di sostitutività e quindi la loro intercambiabilità. Russell nei Vnlnclpla mathematica esprime l'identità con la formula seguente: (1) (x=Y) = df () (x= y) La formula di Russell significa non solo che, se so no identici, x e y hanno in comune tutte le loro proprie tà ma anche che gli oggetti non possono differire, secon do l'espressione di Leibniz, ÒOZO NUMERO . Come dice Wittgenstein (1922), l'identità qualitativa non implica la identità numerica ma non si può pensare in modo coerente che l'identità numerica non implichi quella qualitativa. Che i termini di una asserzione d'identità vera sia no ovunque intercambiabili, ¿alva vex-utate. , comporta che i termini singolari abbiano un riferimento singolare. Dice Linsky (1971):

3

Sostituendo con una variabile appropriata un qualsiasi termine singolare in una o in più delle sue occorrenze, in ogni asserzione che contenga almeno un termine singolare, costruiamo una classe di predicati (a un posto). Ogni termine singolare così sostituito in una asserzione vera si riferisce a un oggetto che soddisfa il predicato costruito in questo modo. Un oggetto soddisfa un tal pre dicato solo se (ma non se) sostituendo la variabile libe ra del predicato con un qualsiasi termine singolare che si riferisca all'oggetto in questione il predicato si trasforma in una asserzione vera. Pertanto, il risultato della sostituzione di un ter mine singolare in una asserzione vera con un altro qualsiasi termine singolare che si riferisce allo stesso oggetto lascia immutato il valore diverità dell'asserzione stessa, poiché i termini di una asserzione vera di identità si riferiscono alla stessa cosa. Per Frege (1891) non è corretto parlare di contesti referenzialmente opachi; piuttosto essi producono un mutamento nel riferimento per cui egli li chiama obliqui. Pertanto, se utilizziamo dice Linsky (1971), la distinzione tra designazione e significati già adottata da Qui ne ed applichiamo ad essa la concezione fregiana in modo che le designazioni dei nomi nei contesti obliqui siano i loro significati, 'abbiamo una dimostrazione della non esistenza di contesti opachi'. In tal caso, se con Quine ' prendiamo il venir meno della sostitutività come criterio dell'opacità referenziale, allora non ci sono più con testi referenzialmente opachi'. Ma'se consideriamo i sen si (o significati) come oggetti, dobbiamo anche fornire loro delle condizioni di identità '. E' a questo punto che bisogna intervenire se si vuo le superare la difficoltà insita nell'opacità referenzia le nei contesti quantificati. Infatti, se vogliamo elimi nare la causa dell'opacità dobbiamo usare una formula dell'identità adeguata a tali contesti. Riteniamo che la formula russelliana dell'identità dei termini singolari debba essere sostituita con una formula diversa. In (1) (x=y) = df (x)

8

In conclusione, il criterio di identità per le funzioni proposizionali, risulterebbe più adeguato. Esso con sente, infatti, la sostitutività dei termini singolari ma anche delle proprietà corrispondenti alle funzioni pro posizionali. La referenzialità viene così garantita dalla sostitutività delle funzioni proposizionali le cui con dizioni di verità assolvono a quelle condizioni di identità richieste da Quine. Nell'ambito semantico la stessa cosa vale allorché, secondo l'ipotesi di Linsky, al posto delle funzioni prò posizionali mettiamo i significati come referenti dei no mi designanti. Istituto di Filosofia Unlvet-iltà di Palermo Paletmo, Italia

NOTE 1. Tale problema ha costituito l'oggetto specifico di esame dei saggi raccolti a cura di Linsky (1971).

BIBLIOGRAFIA Aristotele, Topica. VII. 152 b. 25. Barcan Marcus, Ruth (1971). Extensionality. In L. Linsky R e^etence and Modality. Oxford ¡University of Oxford Press (tr.it.; 56-66). Carnap, Rudolf (1937). The logical Syntax, ol Language . New York: Harcourt Brace. (1956). Meaning and Necessity . Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Church, Alonzo (1972). JouAnal symbolic Logic . Frege, Gottlob(1892 ) . Über Sinn und Bedeutung. leltscivtlit ¿üt Philosophie und philosophische Kiltlk , 100. Leibniz, Gottfried W. (1840), Opeta PhiZosophlca . E-idmann. Lewis, C.I. (1918), A Suxvejiy o£ Slmbollc Logic . Berkeley: University of California. and Langford, C. Symbolic Logic . New York: The Century Company ( 1932 ).

9

Linsky, Leonard (1971), (a cura di). Re^e^ence and. Modality. Oxford: University of Oxford Press (tr.it. di E. Ben civenga. R¿¿ejumento e Hodalvta. Milano: Bompiani. 1974). (1971). Reference, Essentialism and Modality. In L. Linsky (1971) (tr.it. 112-128). Quine, W.V.O. (1971). Reference and Modality. In L. Linsky (1971) (tr. it; 25-46). Russell, Bertrand (1962). Piincipia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1922), IKactatm Loqiao - Vkil.oiopkic.ui6. London:Kegan Paul. Lukasiewicz, J. (1958). Aiiitotzlz'-4 Syllogistic.. Oxford: University of Oxford Press.

3

THEORIE STATISTIQUE DU TEXTE: TAXINOMIE DES PARCOURS TEXTUELS ARCHITECTONICO-URBANISTES Gian Franco Arlandi

TEXTES ET POLYTEXTE ARCHITECTIONICO-URBANISTES Le problème sémiotique du texte (testo, text, Text) dans le champ architectonico-urbaniste, se pose en tant que savoir (sapere, knowing, Wissenschaft) de la signification de ce type de système signique. Dans la récente histoire architectonico-urbaniste, les conceptions du texte sont les suivantes : 1. texte "P" du Projet déssiné-plastique.... (dimension syntactique a-priori) 2. texte "C" de la Construction bâtie-édifiée (dimension dimension syntactique a-posteriori) sémantique) 3. texte "E" de l'Expérience d'espace-temps (dimension pragmatique) La dimension sémantique de la sémiotique architectonicourbaniste, ne rend compte en manière exhaustive d'une unité entre texte 1"P", texte 2"C" et texte 3"E" qu'ils s'excluent réciproquement . Le paradigmes 1"P", 2"C", 3"E", doivent être combinés dans les syntagmes suivants : texte "PC" combinatoire du Projet déssiné-plastique "P" et de la Construction bâtie-édifiée "C" (dimension syntactique exhaustive); 5. texte "CE" combinatoire de la Construction bâtie-édifiée "C" et de l'Expérience d'espace-temps "E" (dimension syntactique a-posteriori et pragmatique); 6. texte "PCE" combinatoire du Projet déssiné-plastique "P", de la Construction bâtie-édifiée "C", et de l'Expérience d'espace-temps "E" (dimension syntactique exhaustive et dimension pragmatique). Le texte V'PC" a la valeur positive d'unifier la dimension syntactique, et la valeur négative d'exclure la dimension pragmatique, donc il est un text insuffisant. Le texte 5"CE" ne combine pas suffisament la dimension pragmatique à la dimension syntactique et est incomplet dans la dimension sémantique: donc lui-même est insuffisant. Le texte 6"PCE", en étant un polytexte qui combine les textes 1"P", 2"C" et 3"E", et en satisfaisant la dimension sémantique, peut être considéré comme le texte qui décrit les parcours textuels architectonico-urbanistes.

12

La graphication du texte 6"PCE" visualise le rapport entre sa sémiosis textuelle architectonico-urbaniste et sa sémiotique, si la semiosis se symbolise "a" et la sémiotique "E" — et selon Ch. Morris (1938: II, 3) — la dimension sémantique "Dsém", la dimension syntactique "Dsyn" et la dimension pragmatique "Dp": a Dsém.

—3

texte 6"PCE"

texte 4"PC" texte 1"P"

texte 5"CE"

texte 2"C"

Dsyn.

texte 3"E"

D p

Cette graphication relève que, dans l'économie de la typologie des textes et la taxinomie des parcours textuels architectonicourbanistes, l'équilibre de tel système sémiotique se développeVa dans des procédures d'organisation systématique des donneés observées et décrites, selon lesquelles il y a: a. la sémiotique "ï" de la sémiosis "ci" des textes de base, localise la dimension pragmatique "Dp" seulement au texte 3"E" : b. et localise la dimension syntactique "Dsyn" aux textes 1"P" et 2"C", où le bâti 2"C" est un ensemble plus vaste des procédures de textualisation, respect au projet 1"P"; c. la sémiotique "S" de la sémiosis "o" des textes combines 4"PC" et 5"CE" se charge de mettre en évidence la partialité de ces combinaisons; d. la sémiotique "2" de la sémiosis "a" du polytexte 6"PCE", peut développer la plus vaste dimension sémantique "Dsém" du langage construit architectonico-urbaniste. THEORIE DU TEXTE ET TYPOLOGIE DES TEXTES Dans le cadre de la sémiotique de l'esthétique (semiotica dell'estetica, Semiotics of Aesthetics, ästhetische Semiotik) de Ch. Morris (1939) et F. Rossi-Landi (1967), un texte est une oeuvre d'art linguistique lorsqu'il transmet une information esthétique sur base statistique, en sélectionnant et en distribuant les fréquences des classes des éléments (Bense 1965). Parmi les problèes fondamentaux de la theorie statistique du texte (teoria statistica del testo, Statistical Theory of the Text,

13

statistische Theorie des Textes) de Max Bense (1965), celle de l'information (séquence des signes) qui se constitue en texte dans le langage, se distingue en information esthétique (procès àbâtir: fabbricativo, building, baulich; singulier s'il est inventif, général s'il est stylistique) et en information sémantique (procès communicatif, codifié en convention) (Wiggins). Cette modalité constructive de poser le texte, est valable pour l'esthétique expérimentale de nature verbale (Tynjanov 1921*; Jakobson 1928), et nécessairement valable pour le bâtir de nature non-verbale architectionico-urbaniste (Doesburg 1923, 1921*; Gropius

1925; Arlandi 1980).

Dans l'économie de la sémiotique textuelle, le filtrage de la théorie du texte — dans la théologie de la théorie statistique du texte — passe à travers la critique du groupe Tel Quel (Derrida 1967; Kristeva 1 9 6 9 ) , de laquelle il s'ensuit une trichotomie des orientations textuelles, où la re-production du langage (verbal) "Rp" se déroule en texte-communication "Te" vs texte-représentation "Tr", dichotomie vs à la production du langage (scripturale) "Ps" qui produit le texte-productivité "Tp":

^-Tr Le texte-communication de la re-production du langage verbal, est constitué par l'analyse de la fonction signique. C'est un système connotatif en rapport à un autre système de signifiés (Hjelmslev 19'+3)> ou méthodiquement segmenté en éléments syntagmatiques groupés en classes d'équivalence (Jakobson 1958), ou séquence ordonnée de signes linguistiques entre deux interruptions marquées de la communication (Weinreich 1 9 6 6 ) , ou une perspective

de la communication (Carpov 1 9 8 2 ) .

Dans le contexte de re-production du langage, de ces définitions de pré-textualisation se développe l'orientation descriptive du texte-représentation. Une représentation se distingue essentiellement par le sens d'un signe, qui peut être la propriété commune de plusieurs individus (Frege 1 8 9 2 ) . La construction d'un langage de description d'une sémiotique-objet, est représentée moyennant divers systèmes de représentation (arbre, matrice, parenthésisation, règles de réécriture,...) homologables au même niveau métalinguistique (Greimas et Courtés 1979: 315)• Nous sommes déjà au-delà de la pure verbalité. Et dans l'homologation d'outils et d'énoncés chez F. Rossi-Landi ( 1 9 6 8 : I, II, III) le comparatisme entre la production linguistique et production matérielle pose des "relations intelligibles "significatives" et des "véritables homologies" (Rey 1976: 322). L'autre comparatisme des canaux des systèmes signiques chez T.A. Sebeok (197^: table 3) conduit à la distinction des textesreprésentations .

14

Le changement critique de la production du langage du verbal au scriptural (Derrida 1967), dans le texte-productivité (Kristeva 1969), devient le lieu de l'homologation de la production materielle des "outils" textuels à la production linguistique des "énoncés" textuels (Rossi-Landi 1968). Le texte-productivité assume une fonction transgréssive d'un texte-écriture qu'instaure la signifiance et la productivité du travail textuel (Whal 1972) dans la multiplicité des textes au niveau de la modèlation intertextuelle (Polydisziplinarverfahren: Wittgenstein 191^-16, 1921, 1939; Arlandi 1984; théorie des formants: Hjelmslev 1939, 1971; Floch 1979; intertexte extra-verbal: Greimas et Nef 1977; Ruprecht 1981; intertexte épistémique: Delattre 1982). Du texte-productivité se développera une quatrièe orientation textuelle, où la production du langage (graphicationnel) "Pg" produit le texte-inventivité "Ti":

Donc nous avons la progression: Te • Tr • Tps • Tig Le texte-inventivité a une histoire toute à "inventer". Pour premième matrice, il a la "mathématique logique": des Pytagoriciens à Viete, de Leibniz à Lobacevskij, et Peano, de Peirce à Carnap et Wittgenstein, de Boole à Bourbaki. Pour deuxièe matrice 1'"esthétique rationnelle": de Vitruve à L.B. Alberti, de Leonardo à Pacioli, de Wren à Eiffel, de Helmholtz à Birkhof, de Propius à Max Bill, de Doesburg à Luigi Veronesi. La troisième matrice est celle de la "sémiotique graphicationnelle": de Leibniz (characteristica universalis) à Lukasiewicz, de Euler (Graphik) à Hamilton, de Peirce (Graphs) à Hilbert, de Kandinskij à Doesburg (polytopos), de Wittgenstein à Goodman (graphs), la catégorie: Vasarely (graphisme)/(graphique) Bertin, de Solomon Marcus à Jerzy Pelc, de T.A. Sebeok à Eugene Yates, de Waddington à René Thom (morphogénèse), Petitot et Giorello, Martin Krampen et Giorgio Prodi, Moreton Moore et Jaczek Swiçcki, Gabriela Ghioca et Arlandi (graphication, avec des possibles corrélations à la Chomskyenne graphieization: Griffiths and Harris 1985: 206; à la Koestlerienne teoriei grafurilor: Marcus 1985: 327; et aux Priestleyens signed graphs: Harary 1985). Nous appliquerons la théorie statistique de texte à la typologie des textes architectionico-urbanistes. TAXINOMIE DES PARCOURS TEXTUELS ARCHITECTONICO-URBANISTES En tenant compte des "textes-inventivités" paradigmatiques de la logique mathématique: Dissertatio de arte combinatoria (Leibniz 1666), Architecture des mathématiques (Bourbaki 1962); de l'esthétique rationnelle: Vers un'architecture plastique et Art

15 Concret (Doesburg 192!+, 1930); et de la "sémiotique graphicationnelle": Verso un trattato di semiotica della graficazione (Arlandi 1983); s'annonce une taxinomie des parcours textuels architectonico-urbanistes: A. Texte-communication architectonico-urbaniste A l . e x t r a t e x t e de l'ameublement urbain (Koenig 1964) et de l'espace vert dans le texte édile (Gresset 1973)> métalangage planimètrique (Groupe 107); A2. pragmatique de l'urbanisme: sensation de l'espace arch. (Goldfinger 194l) et espace vécue (Watson 1970), espace collectif et espace personnel (Raymond 1 9 6 6 ; Lautier 1973; Ostrowetski 197*0, ur-textualité sociosémiotique (Klapp 197^) et systèmation urbaine; A3, psychologie de la perception (Arnheim 195*0 et psychoanalyse du sens arch. (Moley 1970), perspective de l'espace vue (Alberti 1435; Knudsen 1973; Dal Canton 197^). B. Texte-représentation architectonico-urbaniste 31. dépendance du texte arch. des extratextes: de l a géométrie (Zevi 1967, 1968; E c o 1 9 6 8 ) ; de l'anthropologie et sociologie (Ostrowetsky 1972, 197*0; de l a production industrielle (Cohay 1972; Ostrowetsky 1973); et de la politique (Jenks 197*+; Ottokar/Muck 1979; Castelnovi

1980; Blomeyer 1 9 8 1 ) ;

B2.

B3.

B4.

B5.

Bô.

épistémologie de la représentation visive (De Fusco 1971; Provoost 197^ ; Arlandi 197*+, 1984); et structure de la perception urbaniste-arch. (Hesselgren 197*+; Bois 1984); comparaison avec des modèles appliqués: comme "parole" du langage arch. (Gamberini 1959; Ledrut 1973; Benoist 1973; Gresset 1973; Renier 1974, 198l); recours à "modèles" peirceens (Broadbent 1974; Wittig 1974), à modèles hjelmsleviens (Groupe 107; Hammad 1974; Scalvini 1974), à modèles benséens (Dreyer 1979), à l a théorie de la science bolzanienne (Arlandi 1980a), comparaison entre modèle sémiotique et modèle arch. pour définir le modèle avantextuel des formes textuelles (Odinot 1970; Boudon 1984); fonction sémantique: critique sémantique et diachronie arch. (Bettini 1958); structures autopiques (Cohay 1973; Marin 1974); projet topologique (Cohay 1 9 6 7 , 1971; Greimas 1974: Hammad 1974); tendances idéologiques (Hauvette 1971) et symboliques (Palmade 1973; Muratore 1974; Widdovson 1979); tendances méthodologiques (Kepes 1961; Argan 1965; Rapoport 1 9 6 7 ; Maldonado 1970, 1974; K r a m p e n 1974; Preziosi 1979; Ottokar/Muck 1979; Scalvini 1979; Frascari 1979, 1981; Zevi 1980; Tafuri I98O; Facilla 1980; Bresler 1984); syntaxe arch. — urb.: segmentation analytique (Gamberini 1953, 1961; Koenig 1964; Eco 1971; D e Fusco

16

C.

D.

1973); méthodologie syntaxique (Caxtex 1970, 1974; Groupe Syntaxe 1972/Panerai 197*0; procédures computeristiques (Haumont 1972; Sarfati 1981+; Zeitoun 1984); et quadridimensionnelles (De Stijl 1923-24; Doesburg 1924; Zevi 197^; Arlandi I98O; Nerdiger 1984). Texte-productivité architectonico-urbaniste Cl. "écriture" et "lecture" de l'espace, de l'initial contrôle critique (Bettini 1958) vers l'urbanisms comme "pittoresque" langage qui tombe dans l'assemblage analogique en perdant l'analogie proportionnelle (Barthes 1971); et flou "existentiel" d'espace (Gandelsonas 1974; Fauque 1974; Lovero 1979); C2. pragmatique de la diligence "laborieuse" de la constructivité des bâtiments (Iktinos; Hippodamos; Magistri Cumacini; bâtiments indigènes; Brunelleschi; Bramante; Palladio, Michelange; Mansart; Borromini; Guarini; Viollet-le-Duc; Eiffel; Gropius; Aalto; Wright; van der Rohe; Le Corbusier; Pier Luigi Nervi; Kenzo Tange; Industriai Design; Victor Gruen; Arata Isozaki; Marco Zanuso). Texte-inventivité architectonico-urbaniste Dl. -modelages de structures graphicationnelles de l'avantgarde: tendance pragmatico-expérimentale-tectonique (de Eiffel 1 8 8 9 à Tatlin 1919; Gropius 1921; Rietveld 1924, Aalto 1957); -tendance sémantico-philosophique-utopique (Arnolfo di Cambio XIV s., 1975; Sant'Elia 1914; Malevic 1924, 1 9 8 0 ; Gropius 1925; Doesburg 1928; Giedion 1955; Bloch 1959; Ragon 1967); -tendance syntactico-logico-relationnelle (Vitruve 25-23 a.C., I960; L.B. Alberti 1452-85; Wittgenstein 1926, 1973; Gropius 1925-50; Terragni 1936; Wachsmann i960; De Fusco 1973; Greimas et Courtès 1979; Arlandi 1980; Ungers 1982; Preziosi 1983). -tendance textuelle-objective-constructive (Rietveld 1926; van der Rohe 1926, 1927; Hilberseimer 1924, 1926, 1931, 1950; Aalto 1928; Le Corbusier 1922, 1935, 1942, 1948; Wright 1928; Kahn 1943, 1968; -tendance intertextuelle-intersubjective-interspatiale (Doesburg 1923, 1924; Gropius 1 9 2 5 - 5 6 ; Le Corbusier 1922, 1 9 2 3 , 1 9 2 5 , 1932, 1933, 1 9 6 5 ; Argan 1951, 1984; Bill 1952, 1955; Maldonado 1959, 1964, 1974; Krampen 1974; Metsch 1 9 6 9 ; Rossin 1976; Arlandi 1 9 8 2 , 1 9 8 3 , 1 9 8 6 ; D2. -textualité architectonico-urbaniste: une série de phases : -sémiogénèse des textes verbaux des bâtiments (Cohay et Adrianbolamana 1973); -codification des traités (Alberti 1952, 1782; Leonardo XVI s.; Palladio XVI s.: malevic 1920, 1924; McLuhan 1964; De Fusco 1968; Arlandi 1 9 8 0 a ; Savignat 1984);

17

-modelages des projets (Le Corbusier 1928, 1930, 1942, 1944, 1945, 1947; Otto 1959; Vignai 1970; Provoost 1974; Bois 1984); -fonctionnalisme modèlant (Nervi 1945, 1954; Mumford 1949; Muck 1981; Dreyer 1981); -pluridimension pour l'unité textuelle et temporalité textuelle (Wright 1953; Le Corbusier 1947-49; Gruen à Fort Worth 1956; Wurster et Skichmore au Golden Gateway of San Francisco 1961; Fitch 1962; von Branca et LubicsNycz à Tel Aviv 1963; Aalto 1964; De Carlo à Urbino I96380; Holford au Piccadilly Center of London 1 9 6 8 ; Tange à Osaka 1970 and Hiroshima 1946-56; Marcus 1974; Krampen 1974; Bernard 1 9 8 1 , 1 9 8 5 ; Lagopoulos 1 9 8 3 , 1 9 8 5 ; Arlandi

1986).

En résumé la problématique textuelle architectonico-urbaniste, nous obtenons la graphication suivante: théorie statistique du texte architectonico-urbaniste

. dimension sémantique .

lexle 6 "PCE"

1uXcu> e x t r a t e s t u a l e , fuori d e l tem p o e d e l l o s p a z i o d e l t e s t o , u n a auctoiÀtaò indiscutibile c h e a r g o m e n t a c o n a c c e n t o di i n c o n f u t a b i l e v e r i t à s u l l e c o n d i z i o n i d e l l ' u o m o . R i a p p r o p r i a n d o s i di q u e l l e a r g o m e n t a z i o n i , l ' e n u n c i a t o r e , i n v e s t i t o di q u e l l ' auctcutai, può irridere alle opinioni dell'avversario.

Non è certo casuale che

^olo dopo la cUgiuòiom

1 ' av-

versario è introdotto nel testo come enunciatore in prim a p e r s o n a ; s o l o q u a n d o l ' a u t o r e s e n t e c h e la v i t t o r i a a r g o m e n t a t i v a è s u a , che l ' u m i l i a z i o n e d e l l ' a v v e r s a r i o è s i c u r a c e d e l a p a r o l a . M a la p a r o l a c h e l ' a v v e r s a r i o a s s u m e è o r m a i u n a p a r o l a i m b e l l e , c o m p l e t a m e n t e devalorijj z a t a n e l m o m e n t o t e s t u a l e in cui gli v i e n e c e d u t a . La forza della digressione non consiste dunque

nel

130

contenuto semantico delle argomentazioni, non molto diverse da quelle espresse precedentemente, ma consiste so prattutto nell'organizzazione formale intratestuale che assolutizza quelle argomentazioni nella dimensione dell' ineluttabilità e dell'eternità, una dimensione nella quale naufragano le opinioni personali e gli affanni dei piccoli uomini della storia. L'azione argomentativa ha proceduto implacabile ver so il suo obiettivo: l'annientamento dell'avversario; ed ha proceduto proprio attraverso una figura retorica che, nella tradizione classica, è letta come una pausa ornamentale. C.R.S.

Ce.ntA.0 Romano di Roma, ItaJLia

Semiotica

NOTE

1. Particolarmente significativa a questo riguardo è la lettera del 24 luglio 1828 indirizzata a Pietro Giordani: In fine mi comincia a stomacare il superbo disprezzo che qui si professa di ogni bello e di ogni let teratura: massimamente che non mi entra poi nel cervello che la sommità del sapere umano stia nel saper la politi^ ca e la statistica. Anzi considerando filosoficamente la inutilità quasi perfetta degli studi fatti dall'età di Solone in poi per ottenere la perfezione degli stati civili e la felicità dei popoli, mi viene un poco da ridere di questo furore di calcoli e di arzigogoli politici e legislativi; e umilmente mi domando se la felicità dè popoli si può dare senza la felicità degli individui. I quali sono condannati alla infelicità dalla natura, e non dagli uomini né dal caso: e per conforto di questa infelicità inevitabile mi pare che vagliano sopra ogni cosa gli studi del bello, gli affetti, le immaginazioni, le illusioni . BIBLIOGRAFIA Leopardi, Giacomo (1835), Palinodia al Marchese Gino Capponi. In Canti . Napoli: Starita. Ora in: Tutte le opexe di Giacomo Leopardi ( a cura di Francesco Flora) (1940), Le poesie e le prose (1:109-116). Milano: Arnoldo Mondadori.

16 MICRO-CONVERSATIONS EN SEMIOTIQUE APPLIQUEE: DU "SQUELCH"

Alain J.-J. Cohen

I.

METHODE

l'illustration qui suit se situe dans 1'entredeux de la réflexion de la séraiotique greimassienne (et de l'Ecole de Paris) et de la microanalyse américaine en sociolinguistique (dans des démarches telles que celles de Goffman, de Sacks ou de Labov). Elle prend pour base la pratique de l'analyse de conversations et de sa théorisation, sans chercher pour l'instant à opposer un enregistrement de la quotidienneté conversationnelle à un extrait de dialogique littéraire , et sans avoir à prendre ici parti sur l'opposition sémiotique/pragmatique, suivant, ainsi la prudence de Greimas (1983b). Cette recherche sur l'interaction conversationnelle port sur la notion "d'avoir le dernier mot", dans une interaction d'ordre polémique, de nature agonistique, les 6ujets S.^ et S„ se positionnant dans les rôles d'adversaires. Dans cette interaction, "le dernier mot" peut être soit le dernier mot d'une conversation (si S 2 est écrase par la dernière répartie de S^ et admet, ou implique qu'il admet, la supériorité de S^ dans cet échange — ou même une supériorité existentielle et générale de S^ relative à l'échange particulier), soit "le dernier mot" dans un sens plus large que celui de la discursivité de l'échange conversationnel (dans le cas où S^ sort du registre discursif et l'emporte sur S^ par un acte de violence). Là-dessus les recherches de Labov (1982) sont essentielles. Elles portent sur une action discursive qui provoquerait une réaction de violence méta-discursive allant jusqu'au meurtre, et telles que ces actions et réactions sont rapportées. Le fait qu'il y ait "rapport", c'est-à-dire aussi "récit", permet d'unifier méthodologiquement les perspectives de la sociolinguistique qui s'attache au "reportage" de la quotidienneté, et celles de la littérarité qui s'attache plutôt à la simulation de ce reportage. L'intérêt de ce "rapport" tient à ce qu'il retrace, dans le dénivellement de la discursivité et de la violence physique, les points de rupture interactionnels qui crée le jeu de tout modèle prédictif sur la violence. L'incidence de la violence dans un échange verbal pourrait être marqué, paralinguistinquement ou méta-linguistiquement, à partir de n'importe quoi: tel haussement de voix ou telle insulte seraient des conditions suffisantes (mais pas nécessaires) à un acte de

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violence. Cependant, on pourrait tout aussi bien envisager que la violence est déjà enclenchée par la menace, verbale, de violence avant même l'insulte provocante. En outre, le dénivellement sera d'autant plus extrême au sien de la discursivité quand il y a menace, aussi bien qu'insulte, et que S^, par une provocation de n'importe quel ordre, met en Jeu un dispositif réactionnel qui ne permet pas à S^ de "sauver la face" — sinon par la violence. SunT6é (de meme que Machiavel, von Clausewitz, ou Napoléon inter alios redoutait tout particulièrement 1'archarement de l'adversaire is au pied du mur. Dans l'analyse de séquences conversationnelles qui finissent par devenir violentes, et indépendamment de Labov ( 1 9 8 2 ) , il peut être utile de se souvenir de ce que Goffman (1969 & 197*0 appelait des "keys" ou des "modes" dans le sens musical. En effet, le cycle de violence et de rupture sera-t-il marqué dès que les premiers coups de feu sont échangés, ou bien avant, dans une menace dissuasive qui évoquerait la possibilité de ces premiers coups de feu, ou avant encore, quand les coups de feu de l'énoncé dissuasif seraient euphémlsés en évocation abstraite de "contre-mesures"? Ou, faut-il remonter plus loin, et penser à l'instant où une action quelconque de S^ mene S à évoquer ces possibilités? Ne faudrait-il pas plutôt voir que la déstabilisation est intrinsèque à tout équilibré jouant sur l'ordre polémico-contractuel (Greimas, 1983a:ll), puisque la déstabilisation nécessitera la reprise de nouvelles négotiations qui n'aboutiraient qu'à un autre moment polémico-contractuel? Et combien de variables et d'invariants contextuels et interactionnels permettraient-ils de découvrir les clefs de la grammaire prédictive et inductive, co-présente à toute interaction? On le voit, l'analyse de type "macro", dans son souci de contextualisation, mène toujours au labyrinthe de la problématique des origines, tandis que, d'autre part, l'analyse de type "micro" remet toujours à plus tard la construction d'une grammaire générale de l'interaction. 1.1. Précaution Dans cette recherche, moyennement "micro", il sera question de marquer les points de rupture d'une repture amoureuse. Je ne m'attarderai pas davantage sur l'opposition micro/macro, ni même sur sa subsomption occasionnelle en tactico/stratégique, afin de procéder dans le sens d'une recherche appliquée, selon les coups d'un échange révélant les points de ruptures interactionnels. Pour apprécier le calcul des coups, mais sans chercher à rendre compte d'un contexte, il suffira de dire que S^ et S£ avaient projeté leur mariage, et d'adjouter que S^ amene ici son amant Sp à une vente aux enchères d'objets qui ont appartenu a S.. — S, que S^ s'imagine avoir été la maîtresse de S^. Nous sommes donc dans l'exécution d'un projet de Vengeance (Greimas, 1 9 8 1 ) . Notons que le choix d'une scène dialoguée de Flaubert — que mes lecteurs avertis ont d'ailleurs tout de suite reconnue — plutôt que l'analyse d'un

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enregistrement de conversation extraite de la quotidienneté, est autant une préférence toute personnelle qu'un hommage au maître de la simultation magnétophonique avant la lettre: ce choix n'implique nullement pour moi un parti pri6, dans l'analyse de Discours, pour le privilège (ou la sacralisation) de la littérarité dans une typologie quelconque de la discursivité. Il s'agit d'abord et avant tout d'un choix expéditif visant à corroborer Labov ( 1 9 8 2 ) et Labov et Fanshel (1977) dans une réflexion sémiotique. Comme la question a été amplement discutée, disons très vite, et sans hiérarchiser, qu'un document dit "littéraire" est un document, pour l'instant du moins, plus universellement accessible, que la transcription (toujours discutable) d'un texte enregistré de la quotidienneté. I.2. Appendice sur l'Intention Un mot sur l'intention (et il ne s'agit pas, bien sûr, de l'intension dans le sens logique), ou sa formalisation en compétence modale, critiquée par Greimas et Courtès (1979:190) comme "se situant entre la virtualité et sa réalisation", avant de commencer notre calcul sur "le dernier mot". L'intention, si difficile à apprecier dans la théorie des actes de paroles, tout en étant la question fondamentale posée par la notion d'effets "perlocutionnaires", est à prendre au départ, sémiotiquement, comme l'affrontement entre deux programmes attribués au même S^: par exemple, ce que S. doit faire, mais ne peut et/ou ne neut pas faire. Ou encore, dans le calcul d'intentions dans l'affrontement entre S^ et S„, ce que Sg croit/devine du désir de S 1 (ou, a partir du faire de S^), c'est-à-dire la face cachée de l'action de S 1 pour S - (et même pour S^ lui-meme quand, en parfait obsessionnel, S^ ne 6ait pas au juste ce qu'il veut, et ne connaît donc même pas ses propres intentions/mobiles/motifs/désirs). Le problème du calcul d'intentions est particulièrement précis lorsqu'intervient la violence dans l'interaction puisque'elle démontrera soit la mauvaise lecture du calcul interactlonnel, soit, au contraire, la réponse ponctuelle à un défi ou à une provocation (Greimas, 1982; Labov et Fanshel, 1977), en sortant ainsi du cadre immédiat de la discursivité présente et/ou rapportée. Ainsi l'intention supposée, attribuée, projetée, est à la fois le programme de S 1 dans sa relation à l'exécution du programme, et le fait que Sg prédise, anticipe, ou veuille interdire le faire dans son exécution. Il n'y a donc pas de problème plus lourd de conséquence pour une théorie de l'action et de l'interaction. A fortiori si s'y adjoint celui de la violence. II.

PROGRAMME ET CONTRE-PROGRAMME

Le "squelch" (intraduisible) est défini figurativement dans le Oxford English Dlctlonary comme "a disconcerting surprise". Et le verbe est également défini figurativement comme "to squash or crush; to put down or suppress thoroughly or completely". C'est aussi un

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terme de B.D., onomatopéique, à la limite Goffmanien dans la faculté que déployait Goffman d'élaborer une conceptualisation à partir de termes pris de la banalité. Le "squelch" a aussi intéressé Sacks (l9T^a). 11.1.

Protocoles

Dans ce parcours, rapidement "micro", de quelques échanges de cette conversation, le modèle de présentation de Labov et Fanshel sera utilisé (et détourné) et adapté. Il permet de visualiser en tableaux: (a) le texte dialogué lui-même présenté en italiques; (b) le cas échéant, la mention des éléments "parallnquistiques" — ceuxci seront nécessairement adaptés, ou présents au niveau d'une enonciation énoncée, puisqu'il s'agit d'un dialogue littéraire, plutôt que du vidéotexte d'une conversation; (c) une syntaxe minimale de caractérisation de l'interaction: par exemple, demand d'information ou demande d'action, défi d'action, ou défi quant au statut existentiel, suivi de retraite et/ou de surenchérissement, ou de mitlgation du défi, de même que de remise à plus tard de l'action demandée, ou encore de contre-défi; (d) la partie du modèle la plus contestée est l'expansion: c'est-à-dire la reprise et la "traduction" pragmatique des éléments dialogués — l'expansion jouant sur 1'implicitation, elle dépassera souvent le cadre descriptif pour mettre en lumière les aspects pluri-programmatiques. A ceci s'adjouteront nécessairement quelques éléments d'analyse tactique, dans la polémique de l'interaction, de même que quelques éléments greimassiens sur la compétence modale et le factitif. Avec quelques références au jeu de l'explicite et de la présupposition, dont les présupposés seront antithétiques à l'explicite. Dans cette illustration, une série presque continue de quinze répliques sera présentée: S^ = Mme Dambreuse; S^ = Frédéric et S, (l'absente) Mme Arnoux. 11.2.

Vengeance aux enchères

•3

11.2.1. "Tiens! je vais l'acheter", [dit S 1 à propos d'un coffret] Interaction: S^ joue, dans un déclaratif, à transmettre une information banale. Initiation de l'action dans un défi voilé adressé à s

2Expansion: (l) Cet objet me plaît. (2) Partagez-vous mon goût? (3) L'appreciez-vous autant que moi? (4) Devinez-vous déjà où je veux en venir? 11.2.2. "Mais ce n'est pas curieux". Interaction: S^, même jeu que S^, commentant par contre-assertion sur la transmission d'information, et jouant à ne pas voir le défi voilé par une demande d'information supplémentaire. Expansion: (1) Ce coffret n'en vaut pas la peine, et ne mérite pas votre attention. (2) Je ne vois pas ce que vous y voyez, ou ce que

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vous pouvez bien y voir. voulez-vous en venir?

(3) Je vous prie de me le dire.

(4)

Où

11.2.3. "Quelle singulière idée!" [continue Sg] Interaction: Extension de "curieux" qui était volontairement pris à contresens par S^ et S g. Commentaire réduisant à un caprice l'action de S., et refus de faire face à l'extraordinaire défi que S 1 est en train de lui adresser. S g joue donc à maintenir l'échange sur un plan qu'il peut encore contrôler sans faire face au défi. Expansion: Je maintiens que vous avez tort de vouloir acheter cet objet. (2) Vous n'oserez pas me défier jusqu'au bout. 11.2.4. "Cela vous fâche?" Interaction: Demande d'information innocente et agressive. Expansion: (l) Si cela vous fâche, je m'en désintéresse, et vous n'avez qu'un mot à dire, car je ferai tout ce que vous voudrez. (2) J'espère que cela vous fâche, car c'est exactment là l'effet de ma vengeance. Vous souffrirez autant que j'ai souffert (Greimas, 1982). Note: Les deux lectures sont pour l'instant compossibles. L'aiguillage de (2) introduit décisivement l'attaque, mais cette attaque avait déjà été lancée dès II.2.1. En effet cette réplique comportait dans le défi voilé les prémisses de la violence. Selon la lecture nous sommes soit dans le ping-pong traditionnel de la conversation (Cohen, 1985), soit au point de rupture qui, partant de l'inchoatif passionnel (se fâcher) introduit la violence. On le sait, la lecture rétroactive (ou a posteriori) ne laissera aucun doute: il ne s'agit que de (2). Mais la première lecture possibilise l'ambiguïté. C'est dans cet effet rétroactif de "lecture" que se joue la violence. Dans son programme de vengeance, S^ teste la compétence modale de S g : dans line synchronie des deux faire, Sg ne sachant pas encore que S. l'a mené dans ce piège, pour se venger — en ce qu'elle croit devoir se venger — afin d'observer l'effet de sa vengeance lorsque Sg comprehendra finalement que S^ se venge de lui. Il y a donc vengeance, anticipation de vengeance, compréhension de vengeance. Il y a aussi le topos vengeance, et son chronotope, et tout simplement le déroulement temporel lorsque S^, du fait de son programme, est en avance sur Sg. S^ est voyeur de l'effet de vengeance. Car le plaisir sera accru pour S^ de ce que Sg ait pris le temps (lacanien) de comprendre, et qu'il finira par savoir (mais trop tard) en quoi consistait le programme du faire de S 1 . Selon ce type de considérations, il y aurait deux vengeances: (Schématiquement) (a) S^ "tue" [squelches] Sg sans prendre la peine de le lui laisser savoir; (b) S^ "tue" Sg, en le lui laissant savoir [exemple du tragique dans la péripétie avec/sans reconnaissance]. 11.2.5. "Non! Mais que peut-on faire de ce bibelot?" Interaction: Injonction sous forme de demande d'information. Défi voilé, teinté de mépris. S_ nie être affecté par le projet d'action de S 1 . Lexicalement, "bibelot" réduit le statut du coffret, et par son insignifiance pointe vers la nature du déplacement: car la ba-

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taille aura lieu, même Bi elle se déclenche symptômatiquement. E n même temps maintien du ne pas vouloir-savoir quant au faire de S^. Tactiquement: il n'est pas possible pour S^ que S^ soit si Jalouse qu'elle veuille se venger de S_, et par S-, dont le déplacement métonymique est le fait de ce coffret exposé au plaisir de tout un chacun dans une vente aux enchères. L'écart pronominal "on" évite encore l'affrontement final. Expansion: (l) Je ne me fâche pas. (2) Je ne me mettrai pas en colère. (3) Mais quel est votre programme, quand vous dites vouloir acquérir cet objet ridicule? (h) Je ne peux pas admettre que vous soyez d'une telle bassesse que vous voulez faire ce que Je devine. (5) Et Je vous en empêcherai. II.2.6. "Qui sait? Y mettre des lettres d'amour, peut-être!" Elle eut un regard qui rendait l'allusloi) fort claire. Paralinguistiquement: Du regard, S ^ montre à S 2 que pouvoir-faire et vouloir-faire coïncident dans son projet. Interaction: défi avec information minimale, en dissociation avec 1'énonciation qui en rend l'information maximale. Injonction à S 5 de relever le défi. Ironie accentuée par le "peut-être" qui, attribué au croire de S^ quant au faire de S,, est une certitude. Expansion: (1) Je sais tout de votre relation avec S.. (2) Et Je me venge. (3) Osez relever le défi. II.2.7- "Raison de plus pour ne pas dépouiller les morts de leurs secrets." Interaction: Brillante tactique de S_. Feinte littérale de pas voir d'allusion à S^ dans les propos de S^, en restituant au "peutêtre" toute son ambiguïté. Tactique du déplacement et, ce faisant, de dépassement: appel au sacré, au de mortlbus. Refus persistant de se lancer dans la bataille avant de ne plus avoir de choix. De même aussi peur d'une bataille dont 11 ne connaît pas encore les enjeux. S^ se maintient dans l'échange encore prudent (même si le ton peut "monter") tout en essayant de recalibrer la conversation afin de retrouver l'ascendant dans un contrat conversationnel déséquilibré. II.2.8. "Je ne la croyais pas si morte." Elle ajouta distinctement: "Huit cent quatre-vingt francs!" Paralinguistiquement: "Distinctement" dans la second partie de la réplique implique que la première partie était murmurée. Celle-ci a S^ pour destinataire privé. Celle-là s'adresse à S , c'est-à-dire a u crieur, et à toute la salle de la vente aux enchères, dont en particulier, et particulièrement, S^. Tactique: La bataille est maintenant inévitable. Il n'y a plus de doute possible pour S p et, hormis le nom de S.,, S, est physiquement présente entre S, et Sg. Interaction: "8o0 Francs!" est un défi multiple (1) aux autres acheteurs dans le jeu codé de la surenchère, (2) a u crieur pour signaler qu'elle est dans la course, (3) à S_ en particulier, pour

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poursuivre vengeance et provocation dans le défi, en se portant au jeu de l'acquisition de la "dépouille" de sa rivale. L'aspect le plus sémiotique de ce défi serait sa multi-dimensionnalité: il s'adresse à Sg par S, interposée. Lexicalement le pronom "la" ne laisse plus de doute, mais "la" en rajoute anaphoriquement en faisant comme s'il avait toujours été question de S,. Expansion: Inutile de faire appel au sacré! (2) Je connais votre secret. (3) Je sais que vous la voyez toujours. C O Que vous l'aimez. (5) Et que c'est pour elle que vous m'avez emprunté 12000 Frs en prétendant qu'il s'agissait de quelqu'un d'autre, et pour lui épargner justement cette vente aux enchères. II.2.9- "Ce que vous faites n'est pas bien", murmura Frédéric. Tactique: S_ reconnaît à présent le jeu de son adversaire, et admet 1'inévitabilîté de la bataille. Interaction: Evaluation de l'action, et condamnation par sanction morale. Sg reconnaît le défi et cherche à faire-ne-pas-faire par la manipulation de la supériorité morale. En outre, injonction faible à la fois de ne pas continuer la bataille et de changer le cadre du défi. La compétence de S^ n'est ainsi pas mise en question: C'est la sanction de Sg qui lui fera défaut. Or, dans le programme de vengeance de S^, c'est précisément cette sanction négative qui est recherchée. Expansion: (1) Ce que vous faites, et ce que vous voulez faire est possible. (2) Mais ne le faites pas! (3) [un peu infantilisant] Et vous savez que ce n'est pas bien. Paralinguistiquement: Un murmure de Sg, intéressant dans sa correspondance à la première partie de II.2.8. Murmure, car Sg, asymétriquement à S , est loin de défier toute la salle. A ce murmure de Sg répondra un rire de plus grand défi encore de S^. 11.2.10. "Mais, chère amie, c'est la première grâce que Je vous demande." Interaction: demand d'action — actior de ne pas faire. Changement de cadre, après l'appel au sacré, puis celui de la sanction morale, Sg passe maintenant à l'appel personnel dans 1'interation. En même temps, très vague menace (qui sera amplifiée très vite) de non continuité de leur interaction. Expansion: (1) Ne faites pas, ne continuez pas à faire, ce que vous avez l'intention de faire. (2) Je vous le demand. (3) Et c'est la première fois que je vous demande quelque chose. 11.2.11. "Mais vous ne serez pas un mari aimable...900 Francs!" Interaction: Ironie, et mise en question de leur futur mariage, donc défi quant au statut existentiel et futur. Contre-menace avec injonction d'accepter la définition existentielle de S^. Poursuite du défi initial, et du défi de la vente aux enchères. Expansion: (l) Vos objections me laissent indifférente. (2) Vous n'arriverez pas a m'empêcher de me venger de vous. (3) J'ai l'intention de toujours faire ce que Je veux.

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11.2.12. "Prouvez-moi que ma femme est raisonnable", dit Frédéric. Il l'entraîna doucement vers la porte. Interaction: Ping-pong lexical "mari"/"femme". Reprise de la mise en question du statut futur, mais dans le sens de quelque status quo, avec contre-défi mitigé. Paralinguistiquement: Coercition, toute douce qu'elle soit. Expansion: (1) Je sais, malgré ce moment de caprice que vous êtes raisonnable. (2) Je vous forcerai à être raisonnable. (3) Ne me forcez pas à répondre à votre défi. (4) C'est à vous de prouver si notre programme commun peut encore se réaliser. Tactique: Apres l'échec de l'appel personnel, dernière tentative de dissuasion en passant au méta-discursif dans une violence physique qui se masque dans un geste de douceur. 11.2.13. Mme Dambreuse, qui était errivée sur le seuil, s'arrêta; et, d'une voix haute: "Mille Francs!" Interaction: la réponse de S^ à l'injonction de raison, et à la tentative de coercition, sera de surenchérir dans le défi. "Mille Frs!" doit être considéré comme un énoncé-défi poly-interactionnel: (1) Défi au public (S ) comme destinataire, en montant considérablement la mîse de façon à faire taire l'adversaire dans le jeu très codé de la vente aux encheres. (2) Refus de partir a u moment où S 2 l'entraînait vers la porte, donc contre-défi à II.2.12. et à l'injonction, avec refus simultané de céder à la force physique en faisant revenir l'interaction, pour une dernière fois, à la discursivité et au cadre de la vente aux enchères. (3) Donc triomphe dans le défi adressé à S^, et également triomphe contre S,, par l'achat aux enchères du coffret polysémique, et métonymique de l'humiliation de S- aux yeux de S^, et sous le regard de S^l et de S n conjugués; de mime, pour S^, triomphe sur la relation amoureuse Tactlquement: S , qui obtient l'adjudication, a le dessus sur S , le public des acneteurs, de même que sur S^ et S,. C'est bien le cas du dernier mot, dans la direction d'un "squexch" interactionnel, S^ ayant réduit S^ à néant. Après ce triomphe de S^, S^ et Sg quittent en silence la salle, et se rendent jusqu'à la voiture de S^. (L'expansion, dont nous ferons l'économie, correspondrait perlocutionnairement à chacun des éléments de l'interaction — bien que d'autres présuppositions puissent toujours être évoquées pour enrichir le calcul de l'interaction; par définition l'expansion n'est jamais exhaustive.) II.2.11+. "Vous ne montez pas?" Interaction: Demande d'information avec injonction d'action. Autre demande d'information quant au statut présent (et futur) de leur interaction. Aboutissement final, et avatar, du grand défi. Expansion: (1) Vous sentez-vous suffisamment vaincu? (2) Etes-vous vraiment fâché? (3) Suis-je allée trop loin? (4) Pourriez-vous maintenant vivre avec moi — victorieuse?

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II.2.15. "Non, Madame 1" Interaction: Contre-"squelch", et réponse retardée au "squelch" des raille Francs. Refus de l'action demandée. Contre-défi à 11.2.14. Expansion: (polysémiquement) très riche: (1) Apres ce que vous avez fait, je ne peux plus monter dans votre voiture. (2) Je mets ainsi fin à notre projet de mariage. (3) Et vous m'y avez forcé. (4) Ce refus est à prendre comme un adieu. Lexicalement "Madame" est l'aspect phatique de la distance dans l'interaction, l'équivalent Adieu. III.

CONCLUSION ET PROSPECTIVE

L'admirable modèle de Labov et Fanshel (1977) a été, on le voit, adapté, pour inclure surtout des éléments tactiques. L'expansion surtout est virtuellement impressionnante si elle permet d'inclure le calcul (et la force) de la présupposition. Ailleurs (Cohen, 1985) nous avons montré que l'expansion pouvait être inclusive du monologue interiéur. Nous nous sommes ainsi intéressés à un problème différent de celui de Labov (1982) puisque la violence reste ici maîtrisée (quoiqu'extrême), tout en constituant le seuil de la diseursivité. Par ailleurs, tout en nous inspirant largement du modèle de Greimas (1982), c'est plutôt le dire de la vengeance, dans son effet "squelch" que nous avons voulu illustrer et décrire. Nous sommes déjà loin de l'analyse des Tours, et du temps de ces Tours dans la prise de parole, qui inaugurait autrefois avec Sacks et al. (197^b) les études spécifiques à l'analyse de conversations dans les écoles d'ethnométhodologie aussi bien que d'Interaction Symbolique. C'est en étudiant un cas extrême, celui de la violence et de la contre-violence, que Labov (1982) dépasse la démarche d'acquisitions de données concentrées, de façon divertissante, sur des débuts de conversations téléphoniques (Schegloff, 1972). Dans notre exemple la violence physique est évidemment absente, bien que la rupture soit en elle-même extrêmement violente. Quand S^ acquiert le coffret de 4-S,, en offrant à S_ le spectacle de sa propre impuissance, et sans cesser de faire allusion à leur mariage future qu'elle met en question, S^ écrase ("6quelches") S2, l'insulte, et venge jalousement de la liaison qu'elle attribuait à S„/S,. S, accepte le risque de son programme, et l'énoncé "Mille FrsT" est le défi que nous avons décrit, de même que la réponse à une situation inacceptable pour S^. Ce faisant, S^ ne laissait aucune place à S 2 pour "sauver la face", et n'euphémisait même plus défis et insultes voilés. Dans ce défi maximal les conséquences sont sans importance par rapport à l'humiliation que S^ fait subir à son adversaire. S^ joue le tout pour le tout dans un jeu exceptionnellement à somme zéro. De même, le contre-"squelch" "Non, Madame!" n'évalue pas plus les conséquences: S^ se retire du jeu immédiat (en ne montant pas en voiture), et du jeu à plus longue échéance (en mettant fin à un projet de mariage). Témoin de son propre im-pouvoir, S^ par 6on contre-dernier mot réagit au programme de S,; et dans son contre-

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programme, il découvre en filigrane son programme à lui: en faisant ce qu'il ne pouvait pas ne pas faire, il fait ce qu'il ne savait pas ne plus pouvoir faire. Humilié, et reconnaissant son Maître, S^ ôte en même temps et par la même occasion à S^ la reconnaissance (hégélienne) qu'il lui accordait jusqu'à présent. Si Goffman risque de nous faire revenir (minimalement) à Hegel, Hegel, en revanche, nous fait revenir à Goffman, par voie de Greimas. Notons que la sémiotique de l'interaction, et avec elle la fatasmatique, l'imaginaire et les présupposés de cette interaction, représente une immense prospective, et un renouvellement. Car l'énigmatique de l'interaction et de son calcul est un sujet plus vieux que le monde. Et sans doute une sémiotique qui prendrait l'interaction pour objet risquerait d'offrir un nouveau métalangage: loin de la thick description geertzienne, une "hyperdescription" (Parret, 1985) dans un monde fragmenté. La Jolla-Palerme, Mai-Juin 1984 Comparative Llterature & Sociology Universlty of California, San Diego La Jolla, California 92093 NOTES 1. 2.

3.

C'est un problème qui est particulièrement traité dans mes Problématiques Paranoïaques (A paraître). Si "l'interaction" est universelle, les nuances de la réflexion sur l'interaction sont infinies. Dans ce texte je chercherai (méthodologiquement) à rapprocher les réflexions européennes et américaines, au lieu d'en souligner les divergences — chose qui se prêterait à une recherche considérable. Toutes les répliques sont extraites de Flaubert (1964: 4l4415).

REFERENCES Cohen, A.J.J. (19Ö5). Prolégomènes à une sémiotique du monologue. In Mélanges A.-J. Greimas, Parret, H. and Ruprecht, H.-G. (eds.). Amsterdam : John Benjamins. Flaubert, G. ( 1 8 6 9 ) . L'Education Sentimentale. Paris: Garnier (1964). Goffman, E. ( 1 9 6 9 ) . Strategie Interaction. Philadelphia: Universlty of Pennsylvania Press. (1974). Frame Analysls. New York: Harper Colophon Books. Greimas, A.-J. ( 1 9 8 I ) . De la Colere. Documents 111(27). (1982). Le défi. Bulletin V(23). (1983a). Du Sens II. Paris: Seuil. ( 1 9 8 3 b ) . Observations épistémologiques. Documents V(50). Greimas, A.-J. & Courtès, J. (1979). Sémiotique. Dictionnaire raisonné de la Théorie du Langage. Paris: Hachette.

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Labov, W. (1982). Speech actions and reactions in personal narrative. In Analyzing Discourse: Text and Talk, Tannen, D. (ed), 219-21+7. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. Labov, W. and Fan6hel, D. (1977)• Therapeutic Discourse. New York: Academic Press. Parret, H. (1985). La sémiotique: hyper-description. In Sémlotique—A partir et autour de l'Oeuvre de A.-J. Grelmas, Arrive, M. & Coquet, J.-C. (eds). Paris: ADES Seuil. Sacks, H. (197^a). An analysis of the course of joke's telling in conversation. In Explorations in the Ethnography of Speaking, Bauman, R. and Sherzer, J. (eds), 337-353, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. Sacks, H., Schegloff, E. and Jefferson, G. (1974b). A simplest systematics for the organization of turn-taking in conversation. Language 6k: 696-735• Schegloff, E. (1972). Sequencing in conversational openings. In Directions In Soclollngulstlcs, Gumperz, J.J. and Hymes, D. (eds), 3^6-380. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

17

SEMIOTICS OF CONSTITUTIVE RULES

Amedeo G. Conte

0. INTRODUCTION 0.0. In this paper I am going to present some hypotheses that I have formulated during my research in the semiotics of constitutive rules (konstitutive Regeln, règles constitutives, regole costitutive). My paper is divided into three parts. 0.1. In the first part (Typology) I will sketch a typology of eideticconstitutive rules (eidetisch-konstitutive Regeln, regole eidetico-costitutive). 0.2. In the second part (Phenomenology) I will try to establish the specific behaviour of eidetic-constitutive rules by conducting two Gedankenexperimente. 0.3. In the third and last part (Epistemology) I will discuss two epistemological questions concerning eidetic-constitutive rules. 1. TYPOLOGY 1.1. The insight that there are eidetic-constitutive rules has a long history: it is an old idea that the rules of a praxis like the game of chess are constitutive both of the praxis itself and (in the praxis) of its praxemes. (The term 'praxeme', 'Praxem', which I have used here has been modelled on 'phoneme', 'Phonem', and stands for 'unit of praxis', 'Praxiseinheit'.) 1.1.1. Here are some documents I have traced in my research in the history of the semiotics of eidetic-constitutive rules. 1.1.1.1. The oldest intuition of the eidetic constitutivity of eidetic-constitutive rules goes back to anj essay written in 1898 by the German mathematician Johannes Thomae. Thomae affirmed that in the praxis called chess, the identity of each piece (bishop, king, rook, ...) is determined by the rules. In a more explicit form, the thesis that the rules of chess constitute the identity of the pieces reappears (without any reference to Thomae) in the works of several philosophers, such as Edmund Husserl, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Ernst Mally. (As far back as 1934 Wittgenstein even makes express use of the verb 'to constipate', when he writes that 'the rules constitute the idea' of the king in chess.) 1.1.1.2. The idea that the rules of chess constitute the pragmemes (the Pragmeme, i.e. the types of the moves) of chess has t^pen foreshadowed in 1924 by Czestaw Znamierowski ('norma konstrukcyjna'). 1.1.1.3. The idea that the experience (Erfahrung) of a praxis presupposes its constitutive rules was formulated as far back as 1907 by Max Weber. It was

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restated in 1953 by Alf Ross and in 1955 by John Rawls. The tokens of a pragmeme (for example, of the pragmeme castiing) are perceptible (are recognizable as such) only with reference to the rules which constitute that pragmeme. It is only by reference to the rules that the phenomena of chess be-come phenomena of chess ('Skakfaenomenerne bliver f^rst skakfaenomener i relation til skaknormerne'). 1.2. During my research on eidetic-constitutive rules, I have elaborated two definitions of this concept: an ontological one (in terms of condition, Bedingung) and a semiotic one (in terms of connotation, Konnotation). 1.2.1.1 am going to present my definitions of this concept. 1.2.1.1. The first definition (the ontological one) is in terms of condition: the eidetic-constitutive rules are in a threefold relationship of condition with the praxis and the praxemes they constitute: they are their (eidetic) condition of conceivability (Denkbarkeitsbedingung), their (alethic) condition of possibility (Moglichkeitsbedingung), and their (noetic) condition of perceptibility (Wahrnehmbarkeitsbedingung). In the eidetic-constitutive rules there is a paradoxical inversion of the relationship between the rule and the ruled. For instance, the rules of chess are the necessary condition both of the praxis called chess and of its praxemes (in particular, of the pieces, for example the bishop; of the pragmemes, for example castling; of the game situations, for example check) in the sense that neither this praxis nor its praxemes exist independently of (prior to) the rules. 1.2.1.2. The second definition (the semiotic one) is in terms of connotation: the eidetic-constitutive rules are those that determine the connotation of those terms that (in the formulation of the rules) designate the praxemes (the units of praxis) which are governed by the rules. For example, the rules of chess are eidetic-constitutive because (and in the sense that) they determine the connotation of the terms ('bishop1, 'castling', 'check', ...) which designate the praxemes (pieces, pragmemes, game situations) of the game. 1.2.2. Within the set of eidetic-constitutive rules I have distinguished two subsets: first, deontic eidetic-constitutive rules (for instance: 'The bishop has to move diagonally'; 'Castling is not allowed if the king is under check'); second, ontic eidetic-constitutive rules (for instance: 'A checkmate is made when the king is attacked in such a way that no move will leave it unattacked'). Within the first subset (deontic eidetic-constitutive rules) I have made a distinction (the distinction of paradigmatic rules and syntagmatic rules). With regard to the second subset (ontic eidetic-constitutive rules) I have noted in some papers by John R. Searle the structural heterogeneity of his 'constitutive rules' and the unaccountable presence both of 'constitutive rules' which are eide|ic-constitutive and of 'constitutive rules' which are not eidetic-constitutive. 1.2.2.1. Within the subset of deontic eidetic-constitutive rules I have made a distinction between paradigmatic rules (for example: 'The bishop has to move diagonally') and syntagmatic rules (for example: 'The king ought to be removed from the check'). 1.2.2.1.1. Paradigmatic rules vs. syntagmatic rules.

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1.2.2.1.1.1. Paradigmatic rules (such as 'The bishop has to move diagonally1) determine the paradigm of the possible alternative forms in which the game can be conducted at each stage. Since such rules order the paradigmatic axis of the game, I have called them paradigmatic rules, paradigmatische Regeln (referring to Louis Hjelmslev's use of 'paradigmatic', 'paradigmatisk'). 1.2.2.1.1.2. Syntagmatic rules. On the other hand, a rule such as 'The king ought to be removed from the check' is not a rule that contributes to determining a paradigm of possible forms of development of the play. What it prescribes is a specific^ continuation of the play (namely, that the king is removed from the check). Since such rules order the syntagmatic axis, 1 have called them syntagmatic rules, syntagmatische Regeln (referring to Louis Hjelmslev's use of 'syntagmatic', 'syntagmatisk'). 1.2.2.1.2. The heterogeneity between paradigmatic rules (prescribing forms of action) and syntagmatic rules (prescribing norms of action) explains a possibility that could otherwise appear paradoxical, that is, that one move takes place according to two rules. That is what happens, for instance, when a player, whose king is under check, removes the king from the check by moving it by one square. In this case, the player acts simultaneously according to two rules. He acts according to both the syntagmatic rule 'The king ought to be removed from the check' and the paradigmatic rule 'Except in castling, the king has to move exactly by one square'. 1.2.2.2. Ontic eidetic-constitutive rules. Two remarks on John R. Searle's ontic eidetic-constitutive rules: first, they are not homogeneous; second, some of them are not eidetic-constitutive rules. 1.2.2.2.1. First remark: Searle's 'constitutive rules' are not homogeneous. The idea of a test to detect the heterogeneity of Searle's 'constitutive rules' was (paradoxically enough) suggested to me by a reading of Searle's own writings. As is well-known, for Searle, 'constitutive rules' can be reduced to the standard form 'X counts as Y' ('X gilt als Y'). Now, it is the very reduction to the standard form that shows that Searle's 'constitutive rules' are not homogenous: some are X-rules, others are Y-rules. (Maria-Elisabeth Conte was the one to point out this heterogeneity; mine has been the proposal of the terms 'X-rule', 'X-Regel', and 'Yrule', 'Y-Regel'.) 1.2.2.2.1.1. Searle's 'constitutive rule' of promise ('To make a promise is to undertake an obligation') expresses the sense of the act of promise. Its paraphrase in the standard form ('X counts as Y') is 'The promise counts as the undertaking of an obligation'. In this paraphrase, the term 'promise' occupies the X-position. That is why I have proposed the term 'X-rule'. 1.2.2.2.1.2. On the other hand, Searle's 'constitutive rule' of checkmate ('A checkmate is made when the king is attacked in such a way that no move will leave it unattacked') determines not what checkmate is (als was das Schachmatt gilt, was Schachmatt ist), but what counts as a checkmate (was als Schachmatt gilt). Its paraphrase in the standard form is 'Each check from which the king

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cannot be removed through any move counts as a checkmate'. In this paraphrase, the term 'checkmate' occupies the Y-position. That is why I have proposed the term 'Y-rule'. 1.2.2.2.2. Second remark: some of Searle's 'constitutive rules' are not eidetic-constitutive rules. As Maria-Elisabeth Conte remarked in 1982, Searle's X-rule of promise (like any 'essential rule' of a speech act) is not an eideticconstitutive rule. It is not so whatever we mean by 'eidetic-constitutive'. 1.2.2.2.2.1. Firstly, it is not eidetic-constitutive if 'eidetic-constitutive' is interpreted in the ontological sense. In fact, this rule is not a necessary condition of conceivability and/or possibility and/or perceptibility of (the act o f ) promise. 1.2.2.2.2.2. Secondly, it is not eidetic-constitutive if 'eidetic-constitutive' is interpreted in the semiotic sense. In fact, this rule does not determine the connotation of the term 'promise'. On the contrary, it just makes explicit what is implicit in the connotation of 'promise'. In short, Searle's alleged 'constitutive rule' of promise is not a 'konstitutive Regel', but a 'konstitutionsanalytische Regel'. 2. PHENOMENOLOGY 2.0. In order to find out and elicit the specific behaviour of eideticconstitutive rules, in earlier papers I have proceeded experimentally with two Gedankenexperimente which I will show here. 2.1. The idea for the first of the two Gedankenexperimente came to my in 1977 when I read a passage in Wittgenstein style by Herbert L. A. Hart. 2.1.1. Let us consider 'a rule forbidding any one to write down the successor in the series of natural numbers to the largest number previously written down by any one'. Let us suppose that this rule is (as Hart seems to assume) a regulative rule. Now what happens if, at a certain moment, somebody writes down (in disagreement with the rule) the successor to the largest number which has ever been written down before? The answer is simple: at that moment the largest number which has been written down changes. Correlatively (as Hart writes), 'another new way of breaking this rule becomes possible'. (As Alf Ross puts it, 'every violation of |lje rule changes the specific content of the rule', alters its specific content.) 2.1.2. For the alteration of the specific content of a rule by the action regulated by it I have proposed the term 'metanomy', in German 'Metanomie'. ('Metanomy', from 'metct' and 'nomos', is obviously modelled on the word 'metonymy', from 'met6' and '6nyma'.) At this point I asked: is there a possibility of metanomy by the action in disagreement with the rule even on the hypothesis that that rule is no longer regulative, but eidetic-constitutive? My reply was negative: metanomy is not possible. In fact, if the rule is no longer regulative, but eidetic-constitutive,

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then the act of writing down (in disagreement with the mie) the successor to the largest number that has been written down previously is not a move of the praxis constituted by that rule. Therefore, the largest number remains u n a l t e ^ d , and consequently the specific content of the rule remains the same. 2.2. The second Gedankenexperiment concerned not the possibility of (diachronic) metanomy of one eidetic-constitutive rule, but the possibility of (synchronic) antinomy beween two eidetic-constitutive rules. 2.2.1. Let us suppose that there are both the rule 'If the king is under check, castling is forbidden' and the rule 'If the king is under check, castling is obligatory'. 2.2.2. Is there antinomy between these two rules? Paradoxically, there is not, if they are eidetic-constitutive rules. Indeed, if they are eidetic-constitutive rules, each one of them determines one connotation of 'castling', one connotation of 'king', one connotation of 'check'. Therefore, neither 'castling', nor 'king', nor 'check' have in the first of the tw^j rules the same connotation that 'castling', 'king', 'check' have in the other. 3. EPISTEMOLOGY 3.0. The founder of the modern deontic logic, Georg Henrik von Wright, affirms that^there are 'rules which define various social practices and institutions'. These rules, according to von Wright, 'play no characteristic or important role in the explanation of beh^iour. 1 'But they are of fundamental importance to understanding behaviour.' This passage brought to my mind two epistemological questions concerning eidetic-constitutive rules: the first question concerns knowledge of eidetic-constitutive rules; the second one concerns knowledge through eidetic-constitutive rules. 3.1. The first question concerns knowledge of eidetic-constitutive rules. 3.1.1. Can the eidetic-constitutive rules of a praxis be inferred from the action in agreement with them? (For example, can the rules of chess be read off by observing a sequence of moves?) 3.1.2. The answer is unequivocal. The eidetic-constitutive rules of a praxis cannot be inferred from the experience of the action in agreement with them (for example, by the observation of a sequence of moves) since the rules themselves are the constitutive condition of that experience. It is neither possible to recognize that a certain movement (Bewegung, Versetzung) in space is a move (Zug) in a game, nor to recognize which move it is, if we do not already know the rules which constitute the type of that move. (For example, it is only by reference to the eidetic-constitutive rules of chess that castling can be perceived.) 3.2. The second question concerns knowledge through eidetic-constitutive rules. 3.2.1. Do the eidetic-constitutive rules of a praxis make possible knowledge of the action in agreement with them? 3.2.2. The answer is not straightforward.

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The eidetic-constitutive rules of a praxis make it possible to recognize tokens of the types constituted by them (for example, to see the movement of two pieces on a chessboard as a token of the type: castling), but they do not make possible knowledge of the individual, of the fdion, in its own individuality. (To use the play on words suggested to me in 1983 by HansGeorg Gadamer, they do not make it possible to recognize das Individuelle in se ine m eigenen Individualsein.) With a play on words based on the assonance of two ^ r e e k words: 'fdion' (from where Wilhelm Windelband's 'idiographisch' comes ) and 'eidos' (from where 'eidetic' comes), we can say: the eidetic-constitutive rules make possible knowledge according to an eidos, but not knowledge of the id ion. They are not an instrument of idiographic understanding (idiographisches Verstehen) of the id ion; they are only an instrument of eidographic interpretation (eidographisches Deuten) according to an eidos constituted by them. Università degli Studi 27100 PaviaTPV), Italy NOTES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

6. 7.

8. 9. 10. 11.

Cf. Thomae, 1898: i , Cf. Husserl, 1 1901; 1913: 69; Wittgenstein, 1979: 4; Mally, 1971: 189. On L. Wittgenstein's contribution to the theory of eidetic-constitutive rules cf. Conte, 1981b; Conte, 1983. Cf. Znamierowski, 1924: 72-73. Cf. Weber, 1907; Ross, 1953: 26 and 210; Rawls, 1955. 'Token' and 'type' are here used in the sense defined by Charles Sanders Peirce. 'The relationship between tokens and types will be referred to as one of instantiation; tokens (...) instantiate their type.' Cf. Lyons, 1977: 13. Cf. Conte, 1978a; Conte, 1981a; Conte, 1983; Conte, 1984. I have given two definitions of 'eidetic-constitutive rule': an ontologica! definition (in terms of condition) and a se miotic definition (in terms of connotation). There are anticipations in philosophical literature of both of them. I will cite only six of the oldest documents. There are anticipations of the ontological definition in Weber, 1907; in Znamierowski, 1924; in Ross, 1953. There are anticipations of the semiotic definition in Thomae, 1898; in a lecture by Wittgenstein given in 1934 (Wittgenstein, 1979); in a posthumous essay by Mally written in 1943 (Mally, 1971). Cf. Searle, 1964a; Searle, 1964b; Searle, 1969. Removing the king from the check is not a pragmeme of chess. It is made by realizing (by instantiating) a pragmeme, but it is not itself a pragmeme. Cf. Hart, 1964. Cf. Ross, 1970; Ross, 1975: 122.

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12. 13. 14.

15. 16. 17.

Cf. Conte, 1978b. Cf. Conte, 19S3. Cf. von Wright, 1971: 151-152 and 204. G.H. von Wright characterizes these rules in terms close to those in which I have characterized eidetic-constitutive rules. (At one point, he even uses the verb 'to constitute': 'rules which define institutions or constitute practices': von Wright, 1971: 204.) However, von Wright's examples are not instances of eidetic-constitutive rules. Firstly, von Wright's rules on the validity of the act of getting married are (anankastic-constitutive) rules that (in as much as they set necessary conditions of validity on the act of getting married) presuppose (and therefore do not constitute) a connotation of the term designating the act to which they refer. Secondly, von Wright's rule: 'one greets (...) by doffing one's hat or by making a bow' determines not what greeting is, but what counts as a greeting. Since it is a rule that determines under what conditions a greeting is made, it is not an eidetic-constitutive rule which 'defines a practice' (namely 'the practice of greeting'). Cf. von Wright, 1971: 152. Cf. Windelband, 1894. Cf. von Wright, 1971. Several passages of this paper have been discussed with Tecla Mazzarese and Giampaolo M. Azzoni.

REFERENCES Conte, Amedeo G. (1978a). Deux questions en réponse à une critique de Georges Kalinowski. Logique et Analyse 21: 79-88. —(1978b). Parerga leibnitiana. In Logica, Informatica, Diritto, Costantino Ciampi e t al. (eds), tomo primo, 217-255. Firenze: Le Monnier. —(1981a). Konstitutive Regeln und Deontik. In Ethik. Akten des 5. Wittgenstein-Symposiums (Kirchberg 1980), Edgar Morscher and Rudolf Stranzinger (eds), 82-86. Wien: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky. —(1981b). Variationen über Wittgensteins Regelbegriff. In Sprache und Erkenntnis als soziale Tatsache. Beiträge des Wittgenstein-Symposiums von Rom 1979, Rudolf Haller (ed), 67-78.Wien: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky. —(1983). Paradigmi d'analisi della regola in Wittgenstein. In Wittgenstein. Momenti di una Critica del Sapere, Rosaria Egidi (ed), 37-82.Napoli: Guida. —(1984). Phénoménologie du langage déontique. In Les Fondements Logiques de la Pensée Normative, Georges Kalinowski (ed). Roma: Universita Gregoriana Editrice. Hart, Herbert L. A. (1964). Self-referring laws. In Festskrift tillägnad Karl Olivecrona, 307-316. Stockholm: Nordstedt. Husserl, Edmund (1901). Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Band, I. Teil. Halle an der Saale: Niemeyer. 2. Auflage 1913. Lyons, John (1977). Semantics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mally, Ernst (1971). Logische Schriften. Dordrecht: Reidel.

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Rawls, Dohn (1955). Two concepts of rules. The Philosophical Review 64: 3-32. Ross, Alf (1953). Om Ret OR Retfaerdighed. Ktfbenhavn: Busck. —(1970). Skyld, Ansvar OR Straf. K^benhavn: Berlingske Forlag. —(1975). On Guilt, Responsibility and Punishment. London: Stevens. Searle, Oohn R. (1964a), How to derive 'ought' from 'is'. The Philosophical Review 73: 43-58. —(1964b). What is a speech act? In Philosophy in America, Max Black (ed), 221-239. London: Allen and Unwin. —(1969). Speech Acts. London: Cambridge University Press. Thomae, Johannes (1898). Elementare Theorie der analytischen Functionen einer complexen Veränderlichen. Halle an der Saale: Nebert. Weber, Max (1907). R. Stammlers "Überwindung" der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung. Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 24: 94-151. Windelband, Wilhelm (1894), Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft. StrassburRer Rektoratsrede. Strassburg. Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1979). Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge, 19321935, Alice Ambrose (ed). Oxford: Blackwell. Wright, Georg Henrik von (1971). Explanation and Understanding. London: Routledge. Znamierowski, Czesfaw (1924). Podstawowe Pojgcia Teorji Prawa. I. Warszawa: Hoesick.

18

IL PUNTO DI VISTA NELL'ANNUNCIAZIONE DI LEONARDO DA VINCI

Lucia Corrain

L'Annunclazione degli Uffizi, attribuita a Leonardo da Vinci, offre la possibilità, attraverso il recupero della griglia geometrica di costruzione, di formulare un'ipotesi di attribuzione avvalorata da elementi verificabili in maniera oggettiva. E* questo il primo nucleo tematico che vorrei sviluppare nel corso della esposizione, per poi passare, in un sescondo momento, ad una serie di riflessioni sulla valenza teorica della griglia geometrica in sè, strumento per l'atto di produzione e per l'atto di lettura del fatto pittorico. La prima attribuzione, della tavola, à Leonardo e stata ipotizzata nel 1877 ad opera del critico tedesco Von Liphart. Con questa attribuzione prende vita una lunga vicenda critica che, sostanzialmente, vede gli esperti schierati su due fronti: lo schieramento a favore di Leonardo (Bode, 1882: 259; Miiller-Walde, 1889: 40; Berenson, 1896: 60; ecc.) e quello a lui contrario (Morelli, 1886: 335-358; Cavalcasene, Crowe, 1896: 53) che propende per l'attribuzione a Domenico o Ridolfo Ghirlandaio. Tuttavia le ipotesi di attribuzione che la critica ha formulato e a cui si faceva riferimento in precedenza, si fondano sull'analisi di quegli elementi che la superficie pittorica esibisce, o, nel migliore dei casi, sull'analisi degli indizi, iscritti in piccole parti dell'opera, da cui emerge l'impronta dell'artista. In questo tipo d'analisi, però, lo stile, in quanto effetto di superficie, non può rendere conto dei processi sotterranei, delle fondamenta di costruzione dell'enunciato iconico. La critica stilistica, così concepita, non è in grado di varcare la soglia del visibile per addentrarsi nell'implicito, nei meccanismi costruttivi, al fine di definire l'oggetto astratto. Giungere siila definizione del progetto teorico significa leggere il quadro come il luogo di costruzione tecnico e scientifico dell'artista. In questo contesto il prodotto pittorico può essere letto come una stratificazione di livelli significativi sottesi sii livello ultimo: il visibile. Il quadro, in questo approccio di indagine, si presenta, metaforicamente, come una serie di fogli sovrapposti/inglobati nel foglio/quadro finito. Il testo pittorico, infatti, così come si offre, è il risultato di un lavoro teorico-pratico che costituisce il supporto di tutto l'elaborato pittorico. Il lavoro di

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preparazione è contenuto, a livello di indizi, nel prodotto finito. Il testo, quindi, nasconde un segreto che con l'aiuto delle tracce, rilevabili al suo interno, può essere svelato. Con questa premessa è possibile procedere ad analizzare il quadro in questione, 1'Annunciazione, tentando di far emergere gli stessi indizi che la tavola offre. L'indizio che si presenta con maggior rilevanza è quello offerto dalla sequenza, con intervalli molto simili, dei cipressi collecati dietro la figura dell'angelo. Questa sequenza è ottenuta dalla stessa costruzione geometrica della tavola, attraverso l'ausilio di un quadrato che può essere ricavato esattamente al centro della tavola. Questo quadrato è diviso in due parti uguali, nel senso verticale, in modo tale da tracciare le diagonali, di entrambe i semiquadrati, divergenti dallo stesso vertice. L'incontro di queste diagonali con le diagonali della tavola genera un quadrato di ampiezza uguale a quella tra un cipresso e l'altro.

Figura 1 Leonardo da Vinci, Annunciazione, Firenze, Uffizi. Individuazione della costruzione geometrica: 1 quadrato ricavato nel centro della tavola; 2 spazi ottenuti dalla rotazione della diagonale OA; 3 spazio ottenuto dall'incrocio delle diagonali OA e OB La superficie dell'intero quadro oviene scandita da cinque quadrati, nel lato maggiore, con agli estremi due spazi uguali, e due quadrati nel lato minore, con uno spazio doppio di quello verticale all'estremità inferiore.

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Figura 2

Individuazione della struttura portante

All'interno di questo sommario reticolo, completato con mediane diagonali, rientrano vari elementi costitutivi la sceneggiatura del quadro stesso: l'angelo è inginocchiato seguendo l'inclinazione che ricalca quella della diagonale del quadrato, anche l'avambraccio è impostato sulla base di un'inclinazione di quarantacinque gradi. Le diagonali del quadrato centrale stabiliscono l'andamento delle montagne, la cui cima sfiora il loro incrocio. La grìglia geometrica di costruzione può essere assottigliata fino ad ottenere un modulo quadrato di circa cinque centimetri di lato. Sulla base di questa ricostruzione, ultima sequenza del processo geometrico globale, e possibile procedere al recupero delle parti che sottostanno ali progetto teorico primario. La base dell'ara marmorea, il bocciòlo reggileggio, la linea di separazione tra il prato fiorito e il sentiero, sono elementi determinati dall'impalcatura geometrica. La figura dell'angelo, inoltre, è iscritta in una minutissima griglia che registra con estrema precisione ogni piega della veste e ogni particolare del viso.

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Figura 3 Restituzione grafica della griglia di superficie — Linea di delimitazione del campo Un problema analogo, pur su un piano diverso, è riscontrabile nella costruzione dell'ammattonato del pavimento, nel settore destro della tavola. Questo è ricavato da una griglia modulare uguale a quella impiegata per proporzionare gli spazi in superficie.

Figura k Restituzione prospettica della griglia di prospettiva E', quindi un processo di trasferimento: dalla griglia bidimensionale alla griglia di profondità. L'analogia fra queste due impalcature è un indizio sufficiente per sostenere che il pavimento è stato impostato dallo stesso artista che ha eseguito le partì della tavola strutturate nel rispetto della costruzione modulare.

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Figura 5

Restituzione prospettica del pavimento

Attraverso questa ricognizione, operata all'interno del testo, sulla base della restituzione dell'intelaiatura geometrica, è possibile constatare che il settore destro del quadro, quello comprendente la madonna e le architetture, non è stato realizzato nel rispetto dell'ordito geometrico. UN'IPOTESI DI ATTRIBUZIONE In base alle considerazioni precedenti e, anche attraverso il recupero delle ipotesi formulate dalla critica stilistica, si può sostenere che alla realizzazione dell'opera ha contribuito più di un artista. L'autore intervenuto in una fase successiva non ha accettato l'impostazione primaria del dipinto, non si è espresso nell'osservanza della struttura che soggiaceva a quanto già eseguito, e soprattutto ha dimostrato di non conoscerla. E' questo un aspetto di rilievo; infatti la geometria di costruzione, nel contesto in esame, assume valore di marca, di modalità di produzione che, tra l'altro, permette di formulare un'ipotesi di attribuzione. Per avvalorare il presupposeto che l'impostazione primaria sia opera di Leonardo si rende necessario confrontare elementi, sia stilistici sia di costruzione geometrica, recuperabili nella rimanente produzione leonardesca. Alcuni disegni possono essere ricondotti ali'Annunciazione tra cui il disegno di Windsor n 12Ul8 raffigurante un giglio. Questo ripropone lo stesso motivo floreale dell'Annunc iaz ione sebbene l'inclinazione dei due fiori sembra una la riflessione speculare dell'altra. Anche il disegno di Oxford, raffigurante il braccio dell'angelo rientra nella ricognizione non solo per rilevarne le consonanze stilistiche ma, più precisamente, per evidenziare l'inclinazione a quarantacinque gradi, esattamente come in quello della travola degli Uffizi (Colvin, 1907: Ih).

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L'Ultima Cena, opera autografa, è stata realizzata con il supporto di una griglia di moduli quadrati : dodici nel senso orizzontale e sei in quello verticale. La griglia di costruzione, da sola, non può essere considerata come firma interna all'opera. Solamente con il recupero di indizi esterni, anche stilistici, la geometria segreta assume valore di firma autografa assegnabile ad un preciso autore. La geometria segreta ha, pero, un'altra potenzialità. E qui si inserisce, spostando collateralmente l'asse del discorso, la riflessione sulla portata teorica di una ricognizione così articolata. La griglia è un sistema astratto che, in quanto tale, può venir comunicato ad una ristretta cerchia di persone: la scuola. E', in questo senso, senhal , alla maniera dei poeti provenzali, presenza ammiccante che parla ad una élite di persone accomunate dallo stesso segreto. La possibilità di essere trasmessa, se da un lato non dà sufficienti informazioni per formulare un'ipotesi di attribuzione, dall'altro offre la possibilità di stabilire, con un buon grado di approssimazione, la scuola di produzione del dipinto. La lgriglia diventa, quindi, il codice cifrato, astratto di un ambito ristretto di persone. E' necessario, però, fare una precisazione. La geometria segreta dell'Annunciazione si avvale dell'impiego di una figura geometrica, sfruttata nelle sue molteplici possibilità combinatorie. Una forma di segreto, quest'ultima, leggermente diversa dalla geometria segreta, che soggiace anch'essa alla realizzazione finita, ma che basa la sua costruzione prevalentemente sull'impiego delle scale musicali e sulla messa in pratica dei rapporti aurei. La trasposizione delle armonie metrico-musleali, all'interno dell'ambito pittorico, rientra in una forma di conoscenza dell'epoca; la musica, infatti, strettamente connessa alla matematica costituisce il supporto teorico della pittura che, solo in questo modo, può essere annoverata tra le arti liberali. Due forme di segreto: una di corpus e una d'epoca, entrambe trovano la loro forma di concretizzazione, nella geometria. La griglia musicale ha i suoi fondamenti nelle conoscenze enciclopediche del periodo. Distribuisce armonicamente le parti del quadro stabilendo, a livello di misure, gli spazi entro cui la scena e le figure sono inserite. Non obbliga, però, il tutto all'interno di una struttura rigida, inflessibilmente rispettata. LA GRIGLIA COME SISTEMA RETORICO Nello stadio precedente alla fase di realizzazione l'autore si costruisce, a livello mentale, una scena prima, un fantasma di pittura, che nella sua qualità di scena del mondo, per essere trasposta in forma pittorica, ha bisogno di uno strumento che ne permetta la sua ri-costruzione precisa. Questo strumento, nel caso

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in questione, è la stessa struttura geometrico-lineare che, nella fase di ideazione mentale, riveste il luogo di funzione normativa dell'idea fantasma, mentre nello stadio di progettazione pratica diventa essa stessa la sceneggiatura che attualizza, in forma condensata, il lavoro che il pittore svolgerà successivamente. Ma si può rilevare, ancora, un'altra possibilità della griglia. Essa, in quanto strumento attraverso il quale l'enunciatore ha elaborato il suo progetto, 6i offre come elemento strutturante per quanto concerne l'atto di produzione e, al tempo stesso, medium di una decodifica, nell'atto di lettura. La griglia è, quindi, il cardine intorno al quale ruota l'opera d'arte in questione, dal momento che essa dà vita ad una forma di circolarità per cui nell'atto di produzione riveste la funzione di alfa che, per mezzo di passaggi consequenziali, permette di generare omega. Nell'atto di lettura del prodotto realizzato è omega che permette di risalire ad alfa, attraverso un processo a ritroso, speculare a quello di realizzazione. La griglia, nel momento precedente all'atto di realizzazione, ni fieri, è il reticolo di una lettura spaziale alla ricerca di un oggetto da definire, ancora teorizzazione di uno spazio (strumento per la ricognizione). In re diventa l'enunciazione di una lettura spaziale avvenuta, formalizzata: diventa un 'definito' spaziale, diventa il mezzo selezionato dall'enunciatore per 'costruire' la scena spaziale. L'enunciatore, infatti, attraverso la strutturazione e l'impiego della griglia effettua una lettura dello spazio, una lettura che equivale ad una meta-lettura dal momento che la griglia funziona come un discorso sullo spazio, come un condensato delle problematiche spaziali, parla di sè come strumento spaziale. Griglia, quindi, come condensato della sceneggiatura ma anche come sintesi della messa in scena dello spazio, aintesi di una conoscenza/sperimentazione delle problematiche otticoprospettiche. La griglia, in questo percorso di lettura, si offre ad una duplice interpretazione: sul piano della produzione e sul piano della lettura. Essa è, infatti, il mezzo che ha permesso il passaggio dall'invisibile al visibile, è lo strumento attraverso il quale restituire la superficie come profondo: è la messa in scena della teoria. La griglia è, ancora, una figura retorica che permette un'articolazione di figure. E' espediente, è topos, ovvero motivo ricorrente, seriale, che permette attraverso la tecnica della sovrapposizione, la proliferazione di donazioni di senso. Come figura retorica, ovvero come modulo alla base dell'operazione dell'atto comunicativo, imprime, infatti, un'ordine, organizza i segni. Il quadro è alfabeto di segni scoperti, focalizzati dalle griglie. Alfabeto che viene organizzato in insiemi dalla stessa griglia: lo strumento grafico della dispositio in quanto organizzatrice della compositio. Codice di canoni e di forme che assolve ad una funzione multipla: è metafora perchè sta 'per' lo spazio e, contemporaneamente, ne è un traslato. E', anche, nella

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originaria accezione di metafora, similitudine abbreviata, in quanto vive in rapporto di analogia con lo spazio realizzato del quadro. E' metonimia in quanto una parte (una porzione di reticolo) è in funzione del tutto, ma, ancora, è il contenente che opera per il contenuto. E' sineddoche perchè il tutto focalizza il particolare. E' ellissi che rimanda ad uno spazio sottinteso, che trasborda dai lìmiti del quadro aprendosi nella direzione dell'enunciatore/enunciatario. La griglia di profondità, infatti, non è contenuta/delimitata dalla cornice del quadro: lo scorcio della prima fila della scacchiera di base si completa nello spazio dell'enunciazione. Anche la struttura geometrica di superficie, nello stadio di massima saturazione, presenta una soluzione analoga a quella dell'ordito geometrico di profondità, in quanto anch'essa non si propone in forma finita. Nei lati destro, sinistro e inferiore i moduli dell'armatura geometrica di superficie si completano nello spazio fuori dal quadro. Le intelaiature geometriche, di profondità e di superficie, così strutturate, offrono la possibilità di inferire, da parte dell'enunciatario, la continuità dello spazio, spazio che il quadro mette a fuoco in una porzione delimitata. La griglia è, dunque, struttura modulare, che veicola un progressivo trasferimento di significato, persino dall'interno all'esterno dello spazio della tela. E' uno dei tramiti per l'immissione dell'enunciatario nel testo, proprio come precedentemente è stato mezzo per l'atto di enunciazione. L'ordito geometrico è un procedimento volto alla rappresentazione, è struttura di superficie, strumento grafico che dispone e compone, facendo della sua modularità il presupposto per un successivo decoupage. Tramite, per la realizzazione di quanto sosteneva Leon Battista Alberti; 'composizione è quella ragione di dipingere con la quale le parti delle cose vedute si pongono in pittura' (Alberti, 1^35: iW). Dipartimento di Arti Visive Università di Bologna Bologna, Italia NOTE 1.

2.

Le dimensioni della tavola (cm 217 * 98) sono in rapporto proporzionale tra di loro: il lato di cm 217 è dato dalla rotzione sulla base di un rettangolo formato da due quadrati aventi lato di cm 98 (l *5). Senhal è il termine fittizio con cui, i poeti provenzali, denominavano la donna alla quale la lirica sì indirizzava.

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REFERENZE AA. W . (1979). Catalogo generale degli Uffizi. Firenze: Centro Di. Alberti, L.B. (1975). De Plctura. (a cura di Grayson, C.) Bari: Laterza (prima pubblicazione 1^35). Benveni6te, E. (1966). Problfemes de llngulstique générale. Paris: Gallimard. Berenson, B. (1896). The Florentine Painters of the Renaissance. Nev York-London: Putnam's Sons. Bode, W. (1882). Italianische Skulpturen der Renaissance in den Königlichen Museen. In Jahrbuch der K.K. Preussichen Kunstsammlungen : III. Bouleau, C. (1963). Carpentres. La géométrle secrete des pelntres. Paris: Seuil. Brachert, T. (1971). A Musical Canon of Proportion In Leonardo da Vinci's Last Supper. Art Bulletin: XIII (4). C a v a l c a s e n e , G.B. e Crowe, J.A. (1896). Storia della pittura italiana, XI, Firenze: Le Monnier. Colvin, S. (1907). Drawings of the Old Master in the University Galleries and in the Libraries of Christ Church. Oxford: Clarendon Pres6. Genette, G. (1972). Figure III, Paris: Seuil. Greimas, A.J. e Courtes, J. (1979). Semlotlque. Dlctlonnaire raisonnée de la theorie du langage. Hachette: Paris. Morelli, G. (Lermolleff, I.). (1886). Le opere del maestri italiani nelle Gallerie di Monaco, Dresda e Berlino. Bologna : Zanichelli. Muller-Walde, P. (1889). Leonardo da Vinci. Monaco: Hirth. Segre, C. (1979). Semiotica filologica. Torino: Einaudi.

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LE TRAVAIL SEMIOTIQUE

Hubert Damisch

C'est un honneur redoutable que celui qui m1échoit d'avoir à ouvrir cette journée consacrée aux rapports entre la sémiologie et les sciences humaines. Un honneur, croyez-le, que je mesure d'autant mieux que le domaine où j'ai choisi d'opérer, celui de l'art et de ses oeuvres, a longtemps été tenu, dans les dites sciences humaines, pour secondaire, ou marginal. Il n'en va plus de même aujourd'hui, du fait, pour partie, du travail accompli dans le champ sémiologique. Mais l'intérêt que les sémiologues portent désormais à l'analyse des oeuvres de l'art, à cotmencer par celles de la peinture, est, simultanément, l'indice d'une évolution de la sémiologie elle-même, et d'un changement d'attitude qui pourrait bien correspondre à la fin de la maladie infantile dont cette discipline pâtit, depuis trop longtemps : le dogmatisme. Il me faut donc payer d'exemple : et plutôt que de vous infliger un discours théorique abstrait, m'essayer à vous fournir ion échantillon de la ressource dont l'analyse des oeuvres de peinture peut être pour la sémiologie. La meilleure façon de m'acquitter de ma tâche m'a paru de faire retour avec vous sur un texte célèbre, et qui a pris dans nos études valeur de paradigme : j'ai ici en vue 11 analyse des Ménlnes de Vélasquez sur laquelle s'ouvrent Les mots et les choses de Michel Foucault. Je me suis souvent étonné que cette analyse n'ait pas connu de développements conséquents et que, loin d'ouvrir la voie aux recherches qui s'imposaient sur la part prise par l'art dans la constitution du système classique de la représentation, elle ait fonctionné d'emblée comité une fable, ou un mythe. Sans doute l'intérêt pour les questions de perspective y aura-t-il trouvé un aliment en dehors du champ étroitement disciplinaire de l'histoire de l'art. Mais je ne vois pas que ce texte justement célèbre ait connu de suites, mise à part la tentative de John Searle pour reconsidérer la thèse de Foucault dans les termes qui sont ceux de la philosophie du langage (Searle, Jchn, 1980). Quant aux historiens de l'art, leur réaction aura été celle qu'on pouvait attendre: abstraction faite de quelques remarques sournoises, le silence, ou m e réserve prudente que justifie après coup la platitude des critiques qui ont été opposées par les spécialistes à une interprétation qui, outre le talent, présentait un défaut majeur: celui de donner à penser. L'analyse de Foucault, si elle est aussitôt devenue classique, c'est - bien sûr - que du classicisme elle porte la marque. Et plus

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que la marque, dès lors qu'elle prétend livrer accès, à travers le tableau de Vélasquez, à ce qui fait le fond de 1 ' épistémé classique: la théorie de la représentation. Les Ménines seraient, peut-être (ainsi parle Foucault), la représentation de la représentation classique et de l'espace qu'elle ouvre (Foucault, Michel, 1966 : 31). Mais une représentation - canne il se doit - elle-même suspendue, dans l'intervalle "entre la pointe du pinceau et l'acier du regard", et sans qu'on puisse décider s'il s'agit pour le peintre d'ajouter à son oeuvre une dernière touche, ou si le premier trait n'a pas encore été tracé. Représentation de la représentation, et non représentation d'une représentation, carme Searle le dira, pour en dénier la possibilité, - la représentation dont le tableau énumère chacune des formes et chacun des signes, images (les tableaux dans le tableau, mais dont la fonction est détournée puisqu'on en est réduit à deviner ce qu'ils représentent à partir d'indices qui n'ont de sens que pour \in savoir très érudit), portraits, regards, gestes, etc., tandis que la scène qu'il donne à voir ne se soutient, dans son existence de scène, que du renvoi qu'elle impose à une autre scène, établie en vis-à-vis, et celle-là invisible, mais dont la trace ou l'écho se retrouve au centre du tableau, sous l'espèce du miroir et des deux figures qui s'y reflètent. Avec, de l'une à l'autre, un jeu incessant de renvois, mais aussi bien d'esquives, par lequel le spectateur est tout à la fois impliqué dans le tableau et reconduit à son envers, dont la toile pour lui retournée sur laquelle travaille le peintre est la métaphore pour ainsi dire littérale. Le spectateur - comme parle Foucault - "papillote", sollicité qu'il est, simultanément, par le regard que le peintre porte sur lui, par le miroir qui lui ferait face, et par la porte ouverte au fond du tableau et sur le seuil de laquelle se tient, un peu en retrait, un autre spectateur, à demiretoumé, dont on ne sait s'il est sur le point d'entrer ou de sortir (pas plus qu'on ne sait, dans les perspectives urbinates, si la représentation vient de s'achever ou si elle n'a pas encore conmencé), et qui ne voit lui-même que l'envers de la scène que le tableau nous découvre. Pour ne rien dire de tous les yeux qui nous regardent de la plupart des points du tableau occupés par des figures, et jusqu'à ce chien, au premier plan, qui ne regarde ni ne bouge, et qui est là, couché à terre comme le sont, dans les batailles de Piero délia Francesca, les cadavres épars sur le sol ou cette tête coupée, aux yeux cependant grand ouverts, qui s'inscrit au départ de la Défaite de Cosroès. Lié à la représentation, le spectateur l'est donc par tout un réseau de lignes qui naissent du tableau, qui le traversent et qui paraissent converger vers un point que Foucault qualifie de "douteux" parce qu'invisible. Point idéal, et en même temps parfaitement réel, puisque c'est à partir de lui que la représentation devient possible, et dont le tableau lui-même doit proposer l'écho sous l'espèce de l'image tout à la fois réfractée et diffractée des trois fonctions dont il est tour à tour le lieu: les figures réflétées dans le miroir des modèles qui se tenaient là et qui font, peut-être, le "sujet" du

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tableau que le peintre est occupé à peindre; celle du peintre lui-même, qui a dû se placer en ce point, au moins idéalement, pour peindre les Ménines; et celle enfin du spectateur qui est par principe de trop dans le dispositif, sauf pour lui à y ouvrir sa propre lumière et le prendre pour ainsi dire à revers. La conclusion dès lors s'impose: "Le tableau dans son entier regarde une scène pour qui il est à son tour une scène" (Foucault, 1966 : 29). L'espace qu'ouvre la représentation est donc clivé: pour qu'il y ait tableau, dans l'acception classique du terme, il faut tout à la fois que l'espace qu'il instaure se prolonge en avant du plan de projection vers le spectateur qui se trouvera ainsi de plain-pied avec les personnages qui l'occupent (et de plain-pied, aussi bien, avec le maître qui représente et les souverains qui sont représentés, à quoi se résume la signification que l'histoire de l'art reconnaît à ce tableau), et que la scène peinte soit coupée de son vis-à-vis: le tableau est tout ensemble le produit et l'instrument de cette coupe, de ce clivage qui fait la condition de son existence en tant que tableau, et auquel la théorie perspective a justement donné son ncm: l'intersection. De la représentation classique, le sujet est donc élidé sur lequel elle se fonde cependant, en son principe. Et triplement élidé, puisque "sujet" doit s'entendre ici dans tous les sens classiques du mot, qu'il s'agisse de celui qui fait la matière du tableau dont nous ne voyons que l'envers, de l'auteur des Ménines et qui n'a pu les peindre qu'à s'absenter de la place qu'il occupe dans le tableau qui nous est donné à voir, ou du spectateur lui-même, devant qui la scène se déploie sans qu'il y trouve sa place marquée, au moins projectivement. Sans doute cette illusion est-elle nécessaire, conme le dit Foucault, pour que la représentation se donne camie représentation pure, mais qui n'exclut pas qu'une fois disjoints de celui du sujet, les points de vue ne se multiplient, ou les points de mire, dans le champ du tableau. Pour qu'élision il y ait, cependant, encore faut-il que le terme qui en fait 1'-objet ait d'abord été posé en tant que tel, selon la remarque dont s'autorise John Searle pour contester l'analyse de Foucault: comment parler de représentation là cù ferait défaut, où manquerait à sa place ce qui en fait la condition, soit - dans les tentes qui sont ceux de la théorie des actes de langage - le fait pour la peinture d'être doublée d'un performatif explicite sur le mode d'un "je vois" ? Loin que les Ménines soient la représentation de la représentation classique, elles mettraient ainsi en place un ensemble de paradoxes qui seraient un véritable défi lancé à la théorie de la représentation. En fait, le raisonnement de Searle se fonde sur le présupposé emprunté à Léonard de Vinci (mais Alberti ne disait pas autre chose) qui veut que le spectateur se situe, pour considérer un tableau construit en perspective, au lieu correspondant à celui où le peintre s'est:tenu, au moins idéalement, pour le peindre. L'illusion reposant dans la peinture classique sur la ressemblance, et

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n'y ayant de ressemblance, selon Searle, que relative à un point de vue (Searle, 1980 : 481) , le fait que le point d'où les Ménines demandent à être vues soit semble-t-il déjà occupé par le couple royal, équivaut à une aporie qui ne trouvera sa solution que si l'on accepte que le point de vue où Vélasquez s'est placé pour les peindre n'est pas celui que la perspective assigne (et qui ne se situe pas où l'on croit) mais celui que montre le tableau; ce qui revient à dire que le tableau que le peintre est occupé à peindre n'est autre que celui que nous voyons, auquel cas nous n'aurions en effet plus affaire à la représentation d'une représentation, ni à connaître d'une autre scène que celle que le tableau met en place. Mais le paradoxe n'est pas celui que dit Searle. Dans le dispositif parfaitement clos qu'il a construit, le miroir est de trop, dont le raisonnement emprunte cependant son sens: sauf à vouloir que Vélasquez se soit représenté en train de peindre les Ménines sous l'oeil de ses maîtres, ce qui nous reconduit en fait à la thèse de Foucault ^. Une autre façon de considérer les Ménines,celle-là qu'on aurait été en droit d'attendre de l'un des tenants de la théorie des actes de langage, consisterait à s'interroger non pas tant sur ce que le tableau représente que sur ce qu'il fait, et d'abord sur ce qu'il transforma. A cet égard, nous disposons d'un document à peu près sans équivalent dans l'histoire de l'art, la série des études peintes par Picasso, dans son atelier de Cannes, entre le mois d'août et le mois de décembre 1957, sur la matière que lui offrait le chef-d'oeuvre de Vélasquez. La suite de transformations qu'elles proposent constituent sans aucun doute la meilleure introduction à l'opération dont les Ménines sont le théâtre. Sur quoi a travaillé Picasso ? Entre autres choses sur le rapport entre le miroir où se reflètent les figures des souverains, que Foucault situe au centre du tableau, et la porte qui le jouxte, ouverte canine une "lumière" au fond de la chambre. Ce motif (et c'est bien en effet un motif, récurrent dans la peinture du temps, que celui du personnage dans la porte, et qui demanderait à être reconsidéré dans cette optique), Foucault est bien éloigné de le tenir pour secondaire puisqu'il y voit l'écho de l'une des trois fonctions qui se concentreraient au point que la perspective est censée assigner. Mais il ne lui reconnaît pas peur autant une puissance égale à celle du miroir, lequel aurait pour rôle d'attirer à l'intérieur du tableau, sous l'espèce d'un reflet, ce qui lui est intimement étranger: le regard qui l'a organisé et celui pour lequel il se déploie (Foucault, 1966 : 30) . En ce sens, mais en ce sens seulement, le miroir occupe bien le centre de la composition, au moins son centre imaginaire - car pour ce qui est de la géométrie, il en va, came an va voir, tout autrement. Curieusement, partie du travail de Picasso aura consisté à réduire le miroir à la portion congrue, au point qu'il ne soit finalement plus rien qu'un signe sans aucune apparence de spécularité, une manière de tableau aveuglé, ion simple cadre, un carré blanc, voire à l'éliminer purement et simplement pour faire advenir sans partage, au centre du tableau, le motif de la porte et de la silhouette sombre qui s'y en-

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cadre, et gui s'inscrit là corme une trouée blanche, une fissure parfois minuscule mais d'autant mieux visible, d'autant plus active qu' elle s'inscrit dans une composition très compacte et chargée (voir les deux "vues d'ensemble" des 2 et 3 octobre 1957, Museo Picasso, 1975 : n°70.465 et 70.466). Sans doute la transformation Picasso prend-elle place dans un tout autre contexte que le tableau sur lequel elle porte: la peinture n'en était plus, en 1957, à l'âge de la représentation, ni du jeu de miroirs qui le caractérise. Mais que dire, alors, de la place désormais faite à cette ouverture à laquelle, sur la scène du tableau, nul ne prête attention ? Que dans le tableau de Vélasquez le miroir et la porte soient en concurrence, c'est l'évidence, à laquelle Foucault ne s'est pas refusé: de cette "lumière" qui n'éclaire qu'elle-même, ne dit-il pas qu'elle récuse le reflet que renvoie le miroir, ces deux figures falotes corme la flaitme d'une chandelle? Mais cette concurrence est d'autant mieux perceptible qu'elle est strictement programmée, le miroir et la porte se distribuant de part et d'autre de l'axe vertical du tableau, lequel passe par le chambranle gauche de celle-ci. Et il n'est pas jusqu'au rideau que le visiteur tient en suspens qui ne fasse écho, symétriquement, à celui qui surplombe les deux figures royales. Sans compter qu'à y bien regarder (car la chose est loin d'être manifeste), le point de fuite se situe là, en termes strictement géométriques,quelque part sur l'avant-bras du personnage qui s'encadre dans la porte, et non dans le miroir censé faire face au spectateur, non plus que dans les yeux du peintre, dont Foucault fait cependant partir une ligne, perpendiculaire au tableau, et dont le pointillé conduirait à ce point ou nous nous tenons. Un personnage - il faut le dire, sans pour autant voir dans le nom propre, coirme nous en avertit justement Foucault, autre chose qu'un artifice déictique, et qui permet de passer de l'espace où l'on regarde à celui où l'on parle, corme s'ils étaient adéquats (Foucault, 1966 : 85) - qui porte le même patronyme que le peintre, puisqu'il s'agit de don José Nieto Vélasquez, aposentador, ou maréchal du palais au service de la reine (Sanchez Canton, F.J., 1943, p. 14-27). La similitude des ncms propres confère plus de virulence encore à l'écart qui sépare les deux figures entre lesquelles prend place le miroir: dans les Ménines, il n'y a pas un, mais deux Vélasquez, le même et l'autre. Et l'autre se situe, comme par hasard, à la place même, dans le tableau, où le spectateur, le "regardant" trouve, par projection, son lieu géométrique. A la différence de celle de Searle, l'analyse de Foucault ne se règle cependant pas sur l'organisation perspective du tableau, et la référence qu'il fait au réseau des lignes censées naître du tableau et converger vers le point qu'il assigne n'est en définitive que métaphorique. En ce sens, Foucault est parfaitement justifié à voir dans le miroir le "centre" du tableau, mais son centre - canne je l'ai dit - imaginaire. Il est donc inexact de prétendre, par facilité de langage, que le paradigme perspectif nous fournisse du modèle

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le mieux approprié à la représentation du système classique de la représentation. Si représentation il y a, en ce sens-là du mot, l'analyse des Ménines révèle qu'elle se constitue d'un écart calculé entre l'organisation géométrique du tableau et sa structure imaginaire. Or c'est là ce que n'a pas vu Searle, et qu'il ne pouvait voir, la lecture qu'il propose des Ménines (et c'est bien d'une lecture qu'il s'agit, à la différence de l'analyse de Foucault) étant parfaitement anachronique dès lors qu'elle se fonde sur la définition la plus stricte du paradigme renaissant, dont Léonard a repris la formule d'Alberti. Mais si l'on veut bien comprendre l'opération du tableau, encore convient-il de convoquer le matériel qu'il transforme pour le faire concourir à l'interprétation. Quant au couple constitué par le miroir et la porte, j'observerai que Vélasquez a disjoint deux termes, ou deux motifs, qui étaient au contraire strictement conjoints, et même emboîtés l'un dans l'autre, dans m tableau qui a de toute évidence un rapport avec les Ménines, conine l'a bien vu Searle. Un tableau peint plus d'un siècle avant celles-ci, et que Vélasquez n'aura pas manqué de voir, qu'il aura pu étudier, puisqu'il figurait alors dans les collections du roi d'Espagne. Ce tableau n'est autre que le Portrait des Arnolflni de Jan van Eyck, que nous avons évoqué à propos de la première expérience de Brunelleschi, et dans lequel la porte sur le seuil de laquelle se tiennent, en retrait, les deux témoins (deux, comme le sont dans les Ménines le roi et la reine, ou les deux Vélasquez) s'encadre dans le miroir circulaire et convexe qui en retourne le reflet, par un jeu de renvoi en circuit fermé qui donne au tableau force de témoignage: par rapport à quoi la subscription manuscrite est simplement redondante qui n'a d'autre fonction que de faire passer le tableau de l'espace de la visibilité à celui de la lecture. Mais là encore, ce dispositif qu'on dira d'implication n'était pas sans précédents, au moins objectifs. Une décennie ou deux avant le Portrait des Amolfini, la première expérience de Brunelleschi avait déjà mis en circuit une porte et un miroir: et c'est dans l'encadrement d'une porte, encore, selon l'hypothèse que j'en ai faite (une hypothèse un peu forcée, j'en conviens, mais que toute cette "histoire" vient justifier a posteriori), que s'inscrivait le point qui, par le relais du miroir, se situait au droit de lbeil. Cette porte s'ouvrant, en l'occurrence, dans un temple à plan central, corme le veut l'imago sur laquelle se règle la Città ideale d'Urbino et, avec elle,nombre de compositions très diverses dont le Spasalizio de Pérugin et celui de Raphaël sont les exemples les plus éminents. Soit un lieu, comte je l'ai dit, symboliquement connoté, et que la démonstration Brunelleschi confondait avec le lieu géométrique du sujet, ainsi qu'il en va du miroir des Amolfini. Si Vélasquez, dans les Ménines, a disjoint les deux termes, ou les deux lieux, c'est par une opération qui s'inscrit dans le droit fil de celle, déjà, de Carpaccio, laquelle prend rétrospectivement tout son sens, par delà l'anecdote. Ainsi en va-t-il, encore, du

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point marqué dans le fenêtre de 1'Annonciation de Ghirlandajo, ce point tangent au volet fermé comme l'est, dans la Città ideale, le point de fuite tangent au battant de la porte, mais un point en l'espèce purement symbolique, dépourvu de toute fonction géométrique, quand bien même il se situe sur le même axe vertical que le point de fuite, à l'intersection de la ligne horizontale qui passe par la colombe du Saint Esprit, laquelle ligne prend dès lors figure d'horizon imaginaire. Ce jeu, en son fond métonymique, revêt chez Vélasquez plus de relief encore, du fait de l'aspect autoréférentiel du tableau, que Searle a justement souligné. Nous ne saurons jamais ce que le peintre des Ménines est occupé à peindre: mais la toile retournée est comme l'enseigne de l'opération inaugurale de la peinture moderne, celle-là qui aura fait Brunelleschi percer d'un trou son panneau pour, le retournant, le considérer au miroir. C'est dire que si le paradigme perspectif ne suffit pas à définir le système de la représentation classique, il n'en fait pas moins sa condition. L'écart que ménage le peintre entre l'organisation géométrique du tableau et sa structure imaginaire n'est en effet concevable que si celle-ci se règle sur celle-là, et en mime le fonctionnement, comme le révèle implicitement l'analyse de Foucault. Les Ménines sont-elles construites en perspective ? La question semble n'avoir pas de sens, tant la réponse est évidente. Et pourtant les indices sont bien peu nombreux, et surtout peu manifestes, qui permettent de localiser le point de fuite: la ligne oblique qui marque la jonction entre le plafond et le mur de droite, et cette autre, sur le même mur, qui passe par le linteau des fenêtres, les crochets fixés au plafond pour y suspendre des lustres, etc... Si l'illusion perspective joue cependant à pléin, c'est bien plutôt au registre imaginaire, par l'accumulation des traits que mobilise la représentation, le miroir, les regards, les gestes, les images, et jusqu'à ce châssis retourné, disposé obliquement et qui forme un angle droit avec la porte entrouverte. Le point qu'assigne d'emblée le tableau n'est pas le point géométral, lequel demandera à être déduit, ou plutôt inféré, mais un point douteux, comme le dit si bien Foucault, un point qui papillote, qui clignote, et se fixe tantôt au droit du regard du peintre, tantôt au droit du miroir, et tantôt (conme le veut la construction perspective) au droit du bras de l'autre Vélasquez, celui-là qui retient le rideau et mime, par métonymie, le dévoilement du tableau. Un point,si l'on prend à la lettre l'analyse de Foucault, qui devrait être rejeté à l'infini. Un point, en tout cas, qui n'est pas plus assuré de sa position que ne l'est le peintre lui-même, lequel doit prendre recul pour considérer son modèle, ni la suivante qui s'incline vers l'infante, non par déférence (elle n'a d'yeux que pour nous), mais pour se rapprocher le plus qu'il est possible de l'axe du tableau, à la manière de ces fâcheux qui tâchent à s'encadrer dans le champ de l'appareil photographique. L'opération du tableau se traduit, au registre de l'analyse, par la concurrence, qui va jusqu'à l'interférence, entre deux jeux

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de langage, l'un technique et l'autre phénoménologique: dans un cas le sujet est conme produit, mis en place par le système; dans l'autre il se définit par sa visée, mais non sans se laisser alors captiver par le miroir, où il cherche en vain son reflet. Qu'il y ait du Narcisse en tout spectateur, en tout amateur de peinture, en le sait de reste. Le grand marchand Duveen prenait soin de vernir à l'excès les tableaux qu'il avait en magasin, après qu'il eût observé que les clients aimaient à voir leur propre image se refléter à la surface du tableau tandis qu'ils le contemplaient (Behrman, N.S., 1951 : 134). La représentation classique en appelle à ce même désir sous l'espèce autrement perverse, et qui s'accorde mieux avec le mythe d'origine de la peinture, d'un leurre calculé pour tenir ce désir en éveil, et le multiplier. Si son analyse des Ménines n'a pas ouvert jusqu'ici la voie à une recherche conséquente sur la part qui revient à l'art dans la genèse et l'économie de 1'épistémé classique, Foucault en porte la responsabilité, dans la mesure ou cette analyse n'a pas d'autre fonction, dans Les Mots et les Choses, que celle d'un exergue ou d'un frontispice, quelque chose conme un emblème. Ainsi qu'il en va régulièrement dans les livres d'histoire, la peinture n'est ici convoquée qu'aux fins d'illustrer un texte qui n'a pas besoin d'elle pour se construire et se développer. Or s!.il est une leçon qu'on peut tirer de ce qui précède, c'est qu'elle est bien un objet historique, au sens le plus fort du terme. A la différence des opérations dont connaît le mythologue, celles dont l'art est le théâtre s'inscrivent dans la dimension d'une histoire qui n'a pour autant rien de continu, ponctuée qu'elle est de toutes manières de reprises, de relèves, mais aussi bien de détours qui peuvent s'échelonner sur plusieurs siècles. Une histoire à laquelle on ne saurait assigner a priori de terme, ni contenir dans des limites géographiques ou temporelles. Quatre siècles après Vélasquez, Picasso devait entreprendre de réactiver la question que posaient les Ménines, de la même façon que Vélasquez avait disposé, à un siècle de distance, de l'appareil mis en place par Van Eyck. Pour ce qui est du peintre des Ménines, en sait que c'était là pratique courante de sa part, et qu'un bon ncrribre de ses oeuvres, parmi les plus importantes, reprennent en la transfornant et l'enrichissant la donnée d'une peinture du siècle précédent (Angulo, Diego, 1947). Mais peut-être faut-il aller plus loin: à travers le miroir des Arnolfini, les Ménines renoueraient objectivement avec le dispositif Brunelleschi, pour en jouer, dans le contexte qui était celui du temps, ainsi que Brunelleschi en aurait joué lui-même, ccxrme le dit son biographe, dans les limites d'extension du bras. Et peut-être doit-on accepter que les perspectives urbinates aient elles-mêmes leur histoire, une histoire plurielle, et mène collective, à laquelle auraient été associés, par leurs remarques, leurs conseils, leurs suggestions, et éventuellement par les schémas ou les modèles qu'ils auraient fournis aux peintres (comme déjà Brunelleschi l'avait fait pour Masaccio), des hcnmes venus d'horizons très divers, ce qui serait bien dans la no-

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te du temps et de la cour d'Urbino en particulier. Une histoire qui s'étendrait sur plusieurs années, peut-être sur plusieurs décennies, et dont le panneau d'Urbino aurait ouvert le champ, qui reprenait la donnée du prototype, que les deux autres panneaux auraient ensuite transformée pour constituer le groupe qu'on a dit. Des expériences de Brunelleschi aux Ménines de Vélasquez, sinon à celles de Picasso, en passant par les Amolfini, les perspectives urbinates, le Sposalizio de Carpaccio, l'analyse structurale dessine le parcours d'une histoire que l'historien dira improbable, et qui est pourtant celle même de l'art. Il serait vain pour autant de reprendre un débat devenu fastidieux: l'analyse structurale pose à l'histoire des problèmes qu'il appartient à celle-ci de résoudre par les moyens qui sont les siens, des problèmes, en l'occurrence, qui ne sont pas seulement de datation, de localisation ou d'attribution, ni non plus de carmande, mais qui portent sur la visée historique de pareilles productions autant que sur leur impact culturel. Mais l'histoire, à son tour, confère un sens à des jeux qu'on pourrait être tenté de tenir pour purement formels et redondants, carme on l'a dit de la conception lévi-straussienne du mythe (Sperber, Dan, 1974 : 19). Un langage ne parlerait-il que de lui-même, qu'il aurait beaucoup à dire. On en tient ici la preuve, puisqu'il en va de rien moins, en l'espèce, que de la position du sujet, de 1'émergence d'une science, et éventuellement de sa déconstruction. Or c'est là m autre enseignement qu'on peut tirer de ce long cheminement à travers des oeuvres qui s'échelonnent sur deux siècles et plus. Contrairement à l'idée de Benveniste qui voulait que seule la langue ait le pouvoir de s'interpréter elle-même en même temps qu'elle serait l'interprétant de tous les autres systèmes sémiotiques le travail de Picasso sur les Ménines, et les Ménines elles-mêmes, si l'on accepte que le dispositif en soit autoréférentiel, attestent que la peinture, à défaut d'interpréter les autres systèmes, dispose en tout cas des moyens de s'interpréter elle-même, du point de vue et dans les formes qui sont les siennes. Ce que Benvéniste entend par relation d'interprétance, par quoi il désigne celle qui s'institue entre un système interprétant et un système interprété, ce rapport fondamental qui départagerait à l'en croire les systèmes en systèmes qui articulent, parce qu'ils manifestent leur propre sémiotique, et systèmes qui sont articulés et dont la sémiotique n'apparaît qu'à travers la grille d'un autre mode d'expression, une telle relation, un tel partage n'ont de sens, cctrme il l'indique lui-même, que du point de vue de la langue (Benvéniste, Emile, 1974 : 61). Le paradigme perspectif en offre l'expérience cruciale, dès lors qu'il réfléchit, dans son fonctionnement, les concepts qui y sont effectivement au travail, sans que l'analyse ait à introduire des catégories arbitraires ou importées. Point de vue, point de fuite, horizon, etc., ce sont là autant de constituants intrinsèques du dispositif, et non des créations de l'analyse. Le contradicteur (le même ou un autre) dira que ces catégories sont, encore, des catégories

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linguistiques, et que force, là encore, est d'en passer par la langue, pour interpréter le système. Mais ce qui est vrai, du point de vue de la langue, dans l'espace où l'on parle, ne l'est pas du point de vue de la peinture, dans l'espace où l'on regarde. L'horizon, pour le peintre, c'est d'abord cette limite, sans qu'il ait à la nommer, vers laquelle convergent les lignes de fuite du tableau, le lieu des points à l'infini d'un plan conme le dira Porcelet dans m autre langage encore, mais qui se soutient lui aussi d'une intuition primordiale. Et quant au point de vue, il appartient à la perspective, non à la langue, de l'assigner en peinture. Qu'est-ce que penser, en peinture, et par les moyens, du point de vue qui sont les siens ? Et de quelle incidence, cette pensée, sur l'histoire de la pensée en général, et de la pensée sémiotique en particulier ? Il ne m'appartient pas, ici, d'en décider: j'aurai cependant atteint mon but si j'ai réussi à vous persuader, par cette relecture de Foucault en même temps que des Ménines, de l'urgence qu'il peut y avoir pour la sémiologie à se vouloir plus modeste, moins dogmatique, plus réceptive aussi. Avant que d'y appliquer ses grilles, il lui faut se mettre à l'écoute de son objet, ou pour mieux dire: à son école. Si l'art représente à cet égard un bon objet, c'est dans la mesure où il est le lieu d'un travail sémiotique spécifique, un travail proprement réflexif, un travail d'analyse et d'interprétation dont la sémiologie a beaucoup à apprendre, si même il lui appartient finalement d'en opérer la relève dans l'ordre théorique. Cercle d'Histoire/Théorie de l'art Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales Paris, France NOTES 1. L'idée que le peintre des Ménines serait occupé à peindre les Ménines a été émise pour la première fois par Elizabeth du Gué Trapier (1948 : 339). Une autre hypothèse, plus plausible, mais qui suffit à ruîner l'argument de Searle, voudrait que les figures qui se réfléchissent dans le miroir correspondent à la partie centrale de la toile à laquelle travaille Vélasquez (Kubler, Georges, 1966 : 213). REFERENCES Angulo, Diego (1947). Vélasquez, como compuso sus principales cuadros. Séville. Behrman, N.S. (1951), Duveen. New York. Benveniste, Eïnile (1974). Sémiologie de la langue. In Problèmes de linguistique générale, II. Paris : Gallimard. Foucault, Michel (1966). Les mots et les choses. Paris : Gallimard. Gué Trapier, Elizabeth du (1948). Velasquez. New York. Kubler, Georges (1966). Three Remarks on the Meninas. Art Bulletin XLVIII (2) : 212-214.

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Museo Picasso (1975). Catàlogo I. Barcelone. Sanchez Canton, F.J. (1943). Las Meninas y sus personajes. Barcelone. Searle, John (1980). Las Meninas and the Paradoxes of Pictorial Representation. Critical Inquiry VI (3) : 477-488. Sperber, Dan (1974). Le symbolisme en général. Paris : Hermann.

20

TOWARDS PSYCHO-PRAGMATICS

Marcelo Oascal

Pragmatics has been traditionally conceived as that part of semiotics that is explicitly concerned with the users of a semiotic system. The basic trichotomy within which this discipline is defined, which still serves as a standard point of reference, is nowhere better expressed than by Carnap (1961: 9): If in an investigation explicit reference is made to the speaker, or, to put it in more general terms, to the user of a language, then we assign it to the field of pragmatics. (Whether in this case reference to designata is made or not makes no difference for this classification.) If we abstract from the user of the language and analyze only the expressions and their designata, we • ••(etc«j• In practice, such a characterization of pragmatics has been interpreted as requiring an analysis of the use of signs in communication. The user is taken to be a 'speaker' (for semiotic systems other than natural language, a 'sender') ...(etc.). The recognition of the role of context in communication, which in some cases has been exaggerated to the point of making it responsible for the whole meaning of utterances, has opened a broader field of investigation for pragmatics: the contextual conditions for the performance of various speech acts, pragmatic presuppositions ...(etc.)... as well as many other social and cultural variables that affect in a systematic way the act of communication (cf. Lyons, 1977: 574 ff.). From an original concern with the users of a semiotic system, pragmatics was thus led to deal with the whole ...(etc.). There is no doubt that the communicative use of language and other semiotic systems is extremely important. Some authors take it to be so fundamental that it becomes for them definitory of anything that can be properly called a 'semiotic' phenomenon (e.g. Mounin, 1970). Without renewing the debate with these authors, it seems to me that it is necessary to

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a d m i t that languge - as well as other s e m i o t i c s y s t e m s h a v e (nowadays, if not from their origin) another fundam e n t a l t y p e o f u s e ...(etc.)--- t h e n e e d f o r p s y c h o p r a g m a t i c a l assumptions in the account of socio-pragmati cal phenomena. •PURE' PSYCHO-PRAGMATICS Signs (linguistic or other) m a y be used in thought quite apart from t h e i r c o m m u n i c a t i v e uses. Consider t h e foll o w i n g statements: 'The use of class-names enables us to e c o n o m i z e thoughts... class-names enable us t o abbrev i a t e and to connect. 1 (Stebbing, 1945: 15). ...(etc.)... T h e s e c l a i m s h a v e b e e n p u t f o r w a r d b y philosophers. Psychologists too have not r e m a i n e d insensitive t o psycho-pragmatical phenomena. The study of aphasia, w h i c h revealed that general cognitive troubles a l m o s t invariably accompany the specific linguistic disabilities observed, h a s been a source of evidence for t h e m e n t a l u s e of (linguistic) signs. ...(etc.)... M a n y of the arguments in favor of recognizing the role of language in thought have been in fact reductionist-minded. S o m e of them have a distinctly behaviorist motivation... (etc.)... Once the specificity of its point of v i e w is m o r e precisely characterized, it will be able n o t only to offer a better understanding of the v a r i o u s p h e n o m e n a m e n t i o n e d in this paper (phenomena w h i c h other disciplines m a n a g e somehow t o handle), b u t also t o point to a n array of new and important topics for research. D e p a r t m e n t of Philosophy Tel-Avfv U n i v e r s i t y Tel-Aviv, Israel NOTES 1. 2. 3.

Such a tendency, w h i c h I have dubbed 'contextualism', is discussed in Dascal (1980). This q u o t a t i o n w a s suggested to m e by Sara Yaretzky. M e r l e a u - P o n t y (1945: 203-232) h i m s e l f relies o n this k i n d of evidence for m o s t of his conclusions concerning the cognitive role of language.

REFERENCES Carnap, Rudolf (1955). O n s o m e concepts of pragmatics. In M e a n i n g a n d Necessity, 248-250. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (1961) Introduction to Semantics. Cambridge,

Mass.: Harvard University Press (first published in 1942). Dascal, Marcelo (1976). Language and money: a simile and its meaning, in 17th century philosophy of language. Studia Leibnitiana 8(2): 187-218. (1980). Contextualism. In Possibilities and Limitations of Pragmatics, Parret et al. (eds). Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Lyons, John (1977). Semantics. Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press. Merleau-Ponty, M. (1945). Phenomenologie de la Perception. Paris: Gallimard Mounin, G. (1974). Introduction a la Semiologie. Paris: Minuit. Stebbing, L.J. (1945). Logic in Practice. London: Methuen.

21

QUALCHE OSSERVAZIONE SULLE STRUTTURE DISCORSIVE NELLE SEMIOTICHE VISUALI Amedeo De Dominicis

Nel presente lavoro verranno affrontati problemi con nessi con le trasformazioni topologiche di formanti visuali. Si tratta di fenomeni riconducibili alla più gene rale problematica della semiosi semi-simbolica, in cui le medesime categorie semantiche hanno la proprietà di rendere conto sia della trasformazione situata sul piano del. l'espressione, sia di quella corrispondente sul piano del contenuto. La trattazione verrà esemplificata su un dipinto di Dùrer di cui abbiamo già realizzato un'analisi testuale: il Ritratto di Mammltiano I.1 Il testo presenta una duplice relazione- anaforica, eidetica e cromatica, che interessa due attori: Massimiliano e la melagrana. Tuttavia gli stessi attori contraggono un'ulteriore relazione non più di tipo anaforico, ma di tipo contrastivo. Si tratta del contrasto topologico tra il formante dell'endocarpo bianco della melagrana e il formante del colletto bianco di Massimiliano: il primo è rappresentabile come un arco aperto inòo44o , mentre ii secondo come un arco aperto in aJùto • 2 Due stesse unità sono contemporaneamente poste in identità ed in oppo-iiz-ione.. Si tratta di un fenomeno che condurrebbe a delle contraddizioni nella rappresenta zione semantica del testo. Di fronte a tali "irregolari tà" discorsive possiamo intuitivamente pensare a due tipi di "regolarizzazioni": (1) trasformare le identità in opposizioni; oppure (2) trasformare le opposizioni in identità. In realtà queste due soluzioni sono solo in apparen za distinte, perchè ogni comparazione tra due grandezze semiotiche implica alcuni livelli isotopici (figurativi o astratti) sui quali le grandezze stesse possono essere poste in equivalenza, acanto ad altri sui quali esse con traggono relazioni di opposizione.

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TAVOLA 1. RITRATTO DI MASSIMILIANO I (1519)

D'altronde la nozione stessa di equivalenza semioti ca si definisce come un'identità semica paAz-Lale. tra due grandezze.3 Più precisamente in linguistica l'identità tra due unità date si presenta come un pn.one.dU.me.Yito di duzione. dell'una all'altra, piuttosto che come una relazione statica.'' In altri termini la produzione di vanianti sostitutive si sviluppa mediante un meccanismo di tipo sintagmatico che dipende dall'anaiLt-i-t (intesa come a£go fùtmo di trasformazioni inscritto nel livello semiotico detto de.òcJuJJJMO e non nell'oggetto stesso descritto).

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Tale meccanismo presuppone una ¿¿ntagmatica.

competenza

che definiremo

Ma torniamo alle nostre due ipotesi di "regolarizza zione". Entrambe le soluzioni presuppongono la possibili tà di istituire un'omologazione parziale delle grandezze esaminate, a partire dalla quale si producono le trasfor mazioni atte a porre in opposizione le grandezze stesse. I termini del problema dunque si riformulano considerevolmente. Non si tratta più di scegliere tra le due solu zioni, ma piuttosto di rendere conto degli "effetti di senso" prodotti da tali trasformazioni, in quanto trasfcr mazioni di natura semantica. Prendiamo l'esempio del

Riùiatto

di Maòò-ànitLanol. E'

possibile esibire un algoritmo di trasformazioni suscettibile di rendere conto della duplice relazione, anafori ca e contrastiva, contratta dai due attori Massimiliano e melagrana. A livello figurativo, tali trasformazioni generano quella che potremo denominare una rotazione di 180° della testa di Massimiliano intorno al proprio asse verticale. Si tratta di uno sviluppo di analisi autorizzato da una constatazione già avanzata altrove.5 Infatti l'isti tuzione di una relazione anaforica (Massimiliano = melagrana) ha l'effetto di modificare parzialmente il contenuto figurativo e tematico degli attori interessati alla omologazione. In particolare la "testa" di Massimiliano resta esclusa dal dominio della relazione e corrisponden temente la melagrana si presenta come una sorta di Massi miliano "decapitato". In tal senso il picciolo raffigura to sulla parte superiore della melagrana può essere considerato come la manifestazione figurativa di questa "mu tilazione". Parallelamente, all'interno dell'emblema degli Asburgo, collocato in alto a sinistra del quadro, esiste una figura che presenta il tratto della "bi-faccialità". Si tratta dell'aquila imperiale a due teste. Il dipinto esibisce quindi una gerarchizzazione degli attori basata sulla manifestazione rispettivamente del tratto "non-fac cialità" nella melagrana, "mono-faccialità" in Massimiliano e "bi-faccialità" nell'emblema. Quest'ultimo costi tuisce un vero e proprio arcilessema da cui si generano, per derivazione successiva, sia l'attore Massimiliano,

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sia l'attore melagrana. Più precisamente la bi-faccialità dell'emblema rappresenta 1'¿nvaiiantz presupposta a par tire dalla quale, mediante un procedimento di riduzione, si producono due tipi di varianti contestuali, di c\ii una (la non-faccialità) derivata di secondo grado. A queste condizioni la possibile encatalizzazione del tratto "bi-faccialità" sul formante dell'attore deri vato di primo grado (Massimiliano) rappresenta una diret ta conseguenza della relazione stessa di derivazione, esattamente come nel caso precedentemente esaminato della encatalizzazione della "testa" di Massimiliano sul formante della melagrana. L'encatalizzazione qui proposta è suscettibile di manifestarsi figurativamente mediante una duplicazione del viso di Massimiliano, effettuata grazie ad una rotazione di 180° della sua testa. Questa trasfor mazione ha il pregio di ripristinare la coerenza anafori ca della relazione tra gli attori Massimiliano e melagra na, in quanto tale rotazione permette di rovesciare l'o rientamento topologico del formante del colletto di Massimiliano, che diviene quindi rappresentabile come un ar co aperto in baòòo , in assoluto accordo con il formante dell'endocarpo bianco della melagrana. Di conseguenza lo originario contrasto topologico si trasforma in anafora topologica. A questo punto è opportuno fare una precisazione. Le tAaòiomazlowc qui proposte, e ritenute entrare a far parte della competenza sintagmatica, costituiscono un esempio particolare dei cosiddetti atti ¿¿ngu^Lòt^c.L , in quan to sviluppano delle procedure di encatalizzazione a partire da alcune invarianti piz^wppoòtz da cui derivano del le varianti po-òte. Ciò significa che tali trasformazioni non vanno intese come dèlie vere e proprie trasformazioni "materiali" operate sul testo, ma piuttosto come uno dei meccanismi di regolamentazione della cooperazione te stuale attraverso cui l'Enunciatore pone il proprio Enun ciatario nel Kmolo di osservatore, costruendone il simulacro testuale (cf. p.e. il "punto di vista" privilegiato di un dipinto) formulato in termini di competenze sin tagmatiche presupposte. In altri termini potremmo dire che il testo contiene già "in sè" queste trasformazioni, sotto forma di con dizioni della propria "leggibilità".

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Il coinvolgimento della nozione di osservatore ci permette di aggiungere un'ulteriore specificazione alla definizione delle trasformazioni qui esaminate: si tratta di operazioni di natura topoZog-ica . Ih tal senso si schiude la possibilità di formulare qualche considerazio ne più generale sulla collocazione delle categorie topologiche all'interno del peAaoi&o generativo della ¿¿gni&lcaztone.à A differenza delle categorie plastiche eidetiche e croma tiche, le categorie topologiche rappresentano il luogo di manifestazione di grandezze appartenenti al livello della pet' s History of Russian Philosophy (1922b) was published and that the second was banned by the Soviet government. Spet was rehabilitated after Stalin's death in 1956. A.A. Mitjusin contributed an excellent article on Spet to the Bol'Saja sovetskaja fenciklopedija (1978: 469) in which he identifies Spet as an 'idealist' and 'follower of Husserl's phenomenology.' He points out that, according to Spet, universal understanding is connected with the search for the 'first beginnings' and 'principles of being' which Spet identifies as 'meanings,' 'eidos' (essence), and 'ideas.' Reality is not 'given' through sensuous experience; its meaning is discovered through the revelations of the intuitive acts of the human mind. Spet was critical of intuition in the Cartesian, Spinozist sense; in his view, the intuitive grasp of the essence can be fully expressed and communicated through discursive,logical definitions. MitjuSin points to Spet's work Vnutrenniaja forma siova (The Inner Form of The Word, 1927) in which philosophy appears as the basis for a philosophy of culture thereby anticipating hermeneutics as a theory of interpretation. Among Western scholars, philosophers of language and linguists have noted Spet's impact on modern theories of language. E. Holenstein in his book on linguistics, semiotics, and hermeneutics (1976) pointed out that Spet was quite influential among the members of the Moscow Linguistic Circle. The Circle split into a theoretically oriented group and an empirically oriented group around 1920, the followers of the empirical group jokingly calling the theoreticians 'Spetial.' Spet followed Husserl in his attack on psychologism and insisted that language is a social phenomenon, an object sui generis, which was to be examined for its structural laws" Spet recommended that Jakobson read Husserl and A. Marty.^ Holenstein (1976: 14) thinks that Jakobson was the most important transmitter of Husserl's phenomenology in modern linguistics and that, in general, Husserl's contribution and impact has not yet been sufficiently researched. In 1911 Husserl's article 'Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft' had been translated into Russian (see Holenstein 1976: 15). His Logische

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Untersuchungen (1900), which had such a great impact on Russian thinkers, had been translated into Russian as early as 1909. Husserl was discussed in Celpanov's seminars which Jakobson attended in 1915/16. ielpanov, a psychologist and philosopher, had asked Spet as early as 1907 to join him in Moscow and collaborate with him on various projects (see &pet 1915, 1916). From early on, Spet had been interested in the workings of the mind, in problems of consciousness, and consequently in problems of understanding and interpretation. His study trips to Edinburgh (1910) and Güttingen (1911/12) must also have left a strong impression on the young philosopher: Edinburgh was the center of Scottish critical philosophy; Güttingen was a center of Husserlian thought. A. Hansen-Love in his book on Russian Formalism (1978) was the first to outline Spet's reaction to Russian formalist thought as well as 2pet's original contribution to nhenomenological semiotics and structuralist thought. Spet's attempts in ¿steti^eskie Fragment y (Aesthetic Fragments, 1922/23) to determine the structure of the "word" phenomenologically, show Husserl1s influence. In his earlier work, Javlenie i smysl (Appearance and Sense, 1914) Spet had presented his reaction to Husserl's phenomenology, in particular to Ideen I (1913). In Appearance and Sense Spet had aimed at explaining the role of phenomenology and its task as a basic philosophical science which would continue the tradition of 'positive* not 'positivistic* philosophy. He wanted to penetrate the meaning of phenomenology; such naturally involves the question of understanding, and consequently, interpretation. He stressed that where there as no interpretation, there could be no understanding, pet (1914: 21) perceived phenomenology as a science of the essences. The essence is not derived by hypothesis or deductions but is a 'directly given.' He noted the 'special phenomenological shift in the point of view' which is directed towards the 'necessary ideal essences and their intuitive grasp.' This shift takes place not only on the originary, sensuous level but also in 'intentional experiences' (1914: 43). The intentionality of the specific (e.g. aesthetic) consciousness transforms the primary contents into 'objects of consciousness.' The 'intentional experience' leads to the discovery of the essence (eidos). This 'intentional experience' lends meaning to the given facts and constitutes the object of consciousness. For Husserl, understanding was an intentional process. In Investigation V of his Logical Investigations he examined intentional experiences and their contents'. Spet was familiar

f

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with this work. Spet was very interested also in Investigation III (On the Theory of Whole and Parts) and Investigation IV (The Distinction Between Independent and Non-independent Meanings and the Idea of Pure Grammar). Spet's investigations dealt with the relation between concept formation, intentionality, understanding, and interpretation, on the one hand, and hermeneutics, logic, and linguistics, on the other. His underlying concern is to comprehend reality as a text which has a structure. In this regard, Spet may have been influenced also by Dilthey with whose work he was familiar. For Dilthey reality discloses itself like a text which must be interpreted (see Bulhof 1980: 2). In Dilthey's view, the human mind is historically and culturally conditioned. In Aesthetic Fragments I Spet (1922/23, I: 61) blamed philosophers for generally lagging behind the (avantgarde) artists in the understanding of the 'word', by which he meant the whole of reality as a text. i>pet wrote: The word is an illusion said the Naturalists, it is an idol. The word is a symbol, said the Symbolists. The word is neither an illusion nor merely a symbol; the word is reality; the whole of reality--without remainder—is a word which is turned towards us, which is heard by us, awaiting our comprehension, you philosophers, the new artist-realist is summoned to say. The artist is an interpreter of reality. £>pet indicated that art needs a hermeneutic process in order to be conceived as art. Every work of art calls for an interpretation. Besides Platonic and Plotinian aesthetics, Russian avantgarde art and German art criticism (Wolff1 in, Hildebrand, UtitZ', Fiedler, et al, as well as Croce were translated into Russian) also helped to shape the aesthetic and philosophical consciousness in Russia in the beginning of the twentieth century. Spet's discussion is a good example of how these various influences merged. He.(1922/23, I: 62) wrote: The word is sculptured, musical, painterly--; this makes sense when all of these adjectives are predicates applied to the subject of reality. This is philosophical language. Sculpture, music, painting are verbal in this sense. Such is their outer appearance; through their verbal trait, which is inherent in them, they are real. This constitutes realistic-artistic language. Contemplation comes before cognition, Spet explain-

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ed. The artist confirms reality before the philosopher does. The artist's observation is special; the artist sees selectively. Spet connected the crisis of contemporary culture with the crisis of Christianity. He blamed Romantic Christian Realism for having been illusionistic, dwelling only on the 'idea.' It thus deceived itself: 'it announced that the outer was an illusion and thus deceived us' (Spet, 1922/23, I: 62). For him the new realism was a verbal one (slovesnyj), a realism of languages, of peoples, a 'linguistic' one. In this new realism Pan dances in the city which is the sign of man's culture and history. In the beginning of the twentieth century artists turned to the city for their inspiration and settings, to the city as a 'fact'. And 'the fact is history.' Spet (1922/23, I: 63) explained: The time has come to historicize nature and Pan; it is spring time in the city. The new reality is a historical one--the fulfillment of the unfulfilled yearning of the Romantics: 'in interpreting the history of mankind, one will find everywhere only human events and relations' (Novalis). He (1922/23, I: 64) warned that only empty form exists when reality becomes an illusion. Spet assailed Spengler's pessimism. We had no need of all that talk about Goethe's Faust being the European man. What we needed, Spet suggested, was a Renaissance which was a going back to Classical Greece. He did not mean that we should imitate the Greeks, on the contrary; what we can learn from them is to understand reality and history. He pointed to F.A. Wolf, the German philologist and hermeneutician as an example. The new reality is also a historical one. Spet perceived the world as 'structural, cosmic, plastic, organic, solar, consisting of mineral crystal organisms.' 'The organism is a system of structures' and 'every part of the structure is concrete and remains also a structure,' he (1922/23, I: 23) wrote. In his explanation of structure, he followed Husserl (1900, 1970) who wrote: Objects can be related to one another as Wholes to Parts, they can also be related to one another as coordinated parts of a whole (Inv. Ill, Ch. I, paragr. 1) and £pet (1922/23, II: 11-12) wrote: Structure is a concrete structure whose individual parts

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can change in extension and even in quality, but not one part of the whole in potentia can be eliminated without destruction of the whole ! ! . Structure is different from the aggregate . . . The structure can be assembled into new structures which are closed in themselves . . . Intellectual and cultural education have essentially structural character, so that one may say that 'spirit' (mind) or culture is structural. The 'word' as the text of reality whose structure must be understood in order to extricate its meaning(s) is an 'existing given.' One must analyze the forms of its givenness in order to find in its given structure moments (features) which lend themselves to aesthetization. These moments constitute the aesthetic objectivity of the word (Spet, 1922/23, II: 14). 'The word as a cultural-social fact, and particularly, an aesthetic fact lies at the basis of human (and animal) communication,' §pet (1922/23, II: 18) wrote. Sympathetic understanding plays a role here. Each structural member of the word is a 'complex interweaving of acts of consciousness'. Spet (1922/23, II: 28) discussed the sensuous qualities of form (Gestaltsqualitclt), explaining that the isolated word is not a word of communication although it is a means of communication. 5pet differentiated between logos (sound with meaning) and lexis (articulated sound). Meaning arises through intentionality and Spet distinguished two kinds of meanings: nominative meaning and interpretative meaning. The 'dicibile' does not mean but only 'refers to something'; it 'names' a thing. This kind of meaning is not interpretative meaning but 'indicative,' explicative, nominative meaning (Spet, 1922/23, II: 28). Meaning should here not be juxtaposed with sense but with intention, with some purpose, or aim. The word is here only the means, the instrument which one can make use of in the transmittal of the sense of the communis cation in the most diverse directions and numerous methods (Spet, 1922/23, II: 28-29). Meaning is here a 'pragmatic' one and 'not a poetic or cognitive one.' 'One can use it for communication, but also for giving an order, for prayer, for questioning, etc.' Spet (1922/23, II: 28-29) noted that he would not go into detail but that the 'communicative function of

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the word is not only the most important but also provides the foundation for the others.' Spet (1922/23, II: 32) also distinguished between the naming (nominative) function and the semiotic function. Nomen, the name, as such is an empirical, sensuously perceived thing. It is a sign, signum, which is connected with the named thing not in the act of thinking but in the act of perception and imagination. He suggested that one may call this connection an associative one, an 'automatic-sensuous' connection. A nonthinking subject, i.e., an animal, can experience it. It includes association by continguity and similarity. Beyond the sensuous aspect of the 'word' as sign, Spet discussed the intellectual aspect of the 'word'. The 'word' also points to intellectual intuition, to what 'we have in mind.' In addition the 'word' is selfreferential, independent of the perceiving subject. The 'object' (predmet) is real, the 'thing' is ideal (Spet, 1922/23, II: 39). Since the object can be realized, filled with content, made into a thing, and even be supplied with sense through the word, it is the formal creative principle of this sense. The object groups and forms the word, as information and as proposition (vyskazyvanie) generally. The 'object' is the carrier of sense; it transforms nominal forms (Spet, 1922/23, II: 39). The 'object' is object and subject together' 'it is formally materia circa quam as well as materia in qua' (Spet, 1922/23, II: 40). The pure object (in thought) is free from any sensuous content, and/or from verbal form or formulation It is an abstraction (Spet, 1922/23, 11:41). Husserl (1900, 1970) discussed the complexity of meanings and the complexity of the concrete act of meaning. He pointed out that we must distinguish two senses of simplicity and complexity (Inv. IV, paragr. 3). 'Simplicity in one sense does not exclude complexity in another.' Husserl wrote that . . . even the most intuitively vivid and rich presentation of a real thing (Dingrealen) must be in principle onesided and incomplete—can never be entirely void of content. Its essence plainly involves possibilities of further determination . . . He further elaborated:

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The concept of the expression. . ., or, as we may say more pointedly, its syntactical parts. . ., can only be fixed by recurring to a distinction among meanings. . . . the analysis of expressions as mere sensuous phenomena also always yields mere sensuous parts, ones that no longer signify (Inv. IV, paragr. 7). The acts of meaning pertain to the signifying process which can be complex. An act of meaning. . . can as such be complex, be made up of acts of meaning. . . A meaning . . . may be called, 'independent when it can constitute the full, entire meaning of a concrete act of meaning, 'non-independent,' when this is not the case (Inv. IV, paragr. 7). Spet (1922/23, II: 44) believed that there is no thinking without words: "Wordless thinking is a thoughtless word. Concretely, he argued, the object is given us only in verbal, logical form. Between the ontological forms (together with the formulated content) and the morphological forms, there is a chain of new forms, of logical forms, which expresses the relation between the first two forms. In connection with W. v. Humboldt's definition of form, which will be discussed later on, §pet (1922/23, II: 48) called the logical forms the inner forms of speech. Spet (1922/23, II: 51-52) discussed assertion and negation as a fundamental form of logic. He explained that the inner logical form is different from the pure ontological one, as the predicative function of the word is on the whole different from its nominative function on the whole. Properly speaking, naming, as well as ascertainment (Setzung)--where the name serves as a predicate, is formally already a logical function. Naming (designating) is therefore not simply a sensuous act. . . but an act of reason--that of meaning, implicating (podrazumevanie). 'The definition of the word,' Spet (1922/23, II: 52) wrote, 'embraces every linguistic phenomenon, autosemantic as well as synsemantic. Logic tells us that a judgment is a 'concept' explicitly and that a concept is a judgment implicitly (2pet, 1922/23, II: 53). The 'word' is a sign: not only a 'semantic or nominative one,' but also a 'symptomatic one.' He (1922/23, II: 56) explains that the same phoneme or morpheme is a sign of the meaning and of the thing and functions 'as a sign that it is this sign'; (that it is the name of the thing

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and at the same time the name of the name--nomen nominis). He (1922/23, II: 57) refers to this cross-referential, function of the sign in Chinese, and especially in Raymond Lull(us)' Ars Magna (1609 edition), as well as in Leibniz' Ars characteristica combinatoria (1690), in symbolic logic, and in mathematical symbolism, where we find not only signs of 'things' and the relations between them but also signs of their effect (actions). The word is significative and ontological in its ideal relationship. Syntax itself is a word about the word . . . 'as a wordthing'. . . Syntax is nothing other than the ontology of the word,--a part of semiotics, the ontological theory about signs generally (Spet, 1922/23, II: 61-62). &pet anticipated some of Heidegger's thought as expressed in Sein und Zeit (Time and Being, 1927). And, as we know, Heidegger dedicated Sein una Zeit to Husserl while transforming Husserl's transcendental phenomenology into a hermeneutical one as Spet had also done. Logos has the meaning of laying bare, of revealing, according to Heidegger. Logos stands for intentionality (see Hufnagel 1976: 18). Logos implies to make visible; it implies 'speech' (Heidegger 1967: 32). According to Heidegger (1967: 35) ontology is possible only as phenomenology. In his discussion of understanding as laying bare various possibilities of being, Heidegger distinguished interpretation (Auslegung) as formation of understanding, from what is said (Aussage). He (1967: 153) talked about an 'ontological circle' which forms the basis for the 'philological circle' in hermeneutic interpretation. Both of them are differentiated from the 'logical circle' which assumes presuppositions. Heidegger understood the 'hermeneutical circle' as a 'pre-structure of understanding.' In Hermeneutics and Its Problems Spet traced the historical roots of hermeneutics from the Hellenic period to the 1910's, offering a critique of various historical developments in hermeneutical principles. He was famil iar with Dilthey's (1900) short work on the origin of hermeneutics and like Dilthey, he examined the hermeneutical aspect of the methodology of history. He followed Dilthey in his demand that historical consciousness be objective. Like Dilthey, Spet found understanding the most important feature of historical knowledge. Both agreed that understanding (for Dilthey also inner experience) was the prerequisite for determining the possibility and the limits of universal knowledge for the human sciences.

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In his dissertation, History As A Problem of Lo^ic, Spet had discussed history as the knowledge of what is known. From early on he was concerned with separating knowledge from mere opinion. He approached hermeneutical principles on the basis of A. Boeckh's •(1877) ideas: i.e., the correlation of concept and representation, of sign and image; the problem of communication, which includes the problem of the other person, and of course, the problem of understanding. Spet insisted on precision, on a logical component, which is not experienced directly in immediate understanding, and which he also found lacking in Schleiermacher's (1838) analysis of understanding. Spet stressed that one must keep the two-sidedness of the act of understanding in mind: a speaker, or transmitter of messages, and a hearer, or receiver. He insisted that hermeneutics is more than a 'mere resonance chamber for logic and grammar'. He independently introduced the term 'special hermeneutical logic,' which was used later by G. Misch and H. Lipps, which would include external (e.g., aesthetic) and internal (logical) forms. The extrapolation of these methodological forms is central to the philosophical foundation of hermeneutics; the analysis of these forms serves the aim which is 'to understand what is given for understanding.' In this regard, Spet went beyond Dilthey's onesided approach to the object of the human sciences: the human sciences must not only consider the one who communicates 'but also what it is that is communicated.' Spet found Dilthey's insistence on 'inner experience' insufficient even for knowledge of one's own individuality. We must examine the logical expression of interpretation and of understanding; this would lead us to the question about the nature of signs 'by means of which we express not only our personal selves, but also something that is not personal, through objects.' Spet was thus the first in the twentieth century to connect problems of hermeneutics with problems of semiotics. He called for a deeper analysis of the problem of understanding which he perceived to be threefold: a) an independent, psychological, empirical one; b) a logical, methodological one; and c) in principle a philosophical one. Spet regretted that questions of semiotics are overshadowed by other problems in Husserl's Logical Investigations . He insisted that the place of semiotics in the systems of philosophical thought can be defined only in terms of its place within the organization of the human sciences. He pointed to the 'excessively static character' of semiotics, 'which cannot find a place in the

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midst of philosophical knowledge' and its 'excessive dryness which cannot feel the importance of its closeness to the life spirit of the human sciences.' He called for a combination of semiotic and hermeneutic logic, so that reality can become history, for history contains a record of the human mind, of human activity. According to Spet, our understanding of reality and history must be free of preconceptions and opinions. Humboldt, Schleiermacher, Dilthey, and Husserl contributed to the shaping of Spet's ideas, Spet's concept of a verbal, linguistic reality, which was discussed earlier, finds further elaboration in his book The Inner Form of The Word (1927), which is a tribute to W. v. Humboldt (1836) and which I have discussed in detail elsewhere (Freiberger, 1983a). Plotinian and Humboldtian aesthetics influenced Spet's thinking on inner form as a primary, invariant meaning structure. According to Humboldt, inner forms of language constitute not only a social thing (ergon) but also a cultural act (energeia); in his view, language mirrors not only thinking but also culture. Spet (1922/23, II: 68-69) understood the concept of inner form as an actualization of the 'potential power of the word'. In his book on Inner Form, the word emerges as a basic building-block of the semiotic web of language which contams man's essence, history, and culture. Spet believed that Humboldt's theory of inner form contained the theory of the forms of understanding. Understanding is formed with the help of language; its orm or structure must be further investigated. In pet's view, the ruling principle in the development of meaning is rooted in the laws of inner form. In his essay, 'The Hermeneutics of Suspicion,' Gadamer (see: Shapiro & Sico 1984: 54) asked whether every form of hermeneutics is not a form of overcoming an awareness of suspicion; for what is involved is the 'whole question of the foundations of our insights into truth.' Spet shared this concern. He insisted that the task of philosophy is ultimately to protect the freedom from mere opinion. Kant had been concerned with the limits of human knowledge; Spet was more concerned with the limits of human freedom. Unfortunately, Spet's philosophy was suppressed in the Soviet Union for a long time. Department of Foreign Languages and Literatures Glassboro State College Glassboro, NJ, USA NOTES

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Methodolog ische Rekonstruktion. Wien: Verlag d. österr. Akademie d. Wissenschaften. Heidegger, Martin (1927). Sein und Zeit. Halle a.S.: Niemeyer. (1967). 1Ith unchanged ed. Tübingen. Holenstein, Elmar (1976). Linguistik, Semiot'ik, Hermeneutik. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp. Hufnagel, Erwin (1976). Einführung in die Hermeneutik. Stuttgart, Berlin, Köln, Mainz: Kohlhammer. Humboldt, Wilhelm von (1836, 1880, 1974). Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues. Ed. by A.F. Pott. Hildesheim, New York: Olms. (Reprint of the 1880 Berlin edition). (1971). Linguistic Variability and Intellectual Development . Transl. by G.C. Buck and F.A. Raven. Philadelphia : Univ. of Pa. Press. Husserl, Edmund (1900). Logische Untersuchungen. Vol. I. Halle a.S.: Niemeyer. (1913). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. (1913). Logical Investigations. Transl. by J.N. Findlay from the 2nd German edition of Log. U. (Vol. II, Pt. I, 1913), Vol. II. London: Routledge & Paul. New York: The Humanities Press. Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm (1690). Ars characteristica combinatoria. Frankfurt. Lossky^ Nicolai 0. (1951). History of Russian Philosophy. New York: International Universities Press. Lull(us), Raymond d. 1315 (1609). Ars Magna. In: Raymundi Lulli Opera. . .: L. Zetzner. Marty~ Anton (1908). Untersuchungen und Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, I. (1916-1920). Gesammelte Schriften! Ed. by J. Eisenmeier, A. Kastil and 0. Kraus. Halle a.S.: Niemeyer. Mitjusin, A.A. (1978). G.G. Spet In: Boi'¡gaia sovetskaja encyclopedia. 3rd ed. Vol. 29: 469. Moscow. Rodi, Frithjof (1969). Morphologie und Hermeneutik. Zur Methodik von Diltheys Ästhetik. Stuttgart, Berlin, Köln, Mainz: Kohlhammer. Schleiermacher, Friedrich (1838). Hermeneutik und Kritik. Sämtliche Werke. I. Abt., VII. Bd. Aus Schleiermachers handschriftlichem Nachlasse und nachgeschr. Vorlesungen, ed. by F. Lücke. Berlin. Shapiro, Gary & Sico, Alan, ed. (1984). Hermeneutics. Questions and Prospects. Amherst: Univ. of Mass. Press. v Spet, Gustav G. (1914). Javlenie i smysl. Moscow. (1915). Kriti^ieskie zametki k probleme psixi£eskoj pricinnosti. Voprosy filosofii i psixologii. Kn.

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1.

2.

3.

4.

Presentation of this paper at the Third Congress of the International Association for Semiotic Studies in Palermo, Italy, June 25-29, 1984, was made possible through a travel grant from Glassboro State College which is gratefully acknowledged. I thank Spet' s heirs for having given me access to Spet's private archive in Moscow. I acknowledge receipt of a Fulbright/Irex grant and a sabbatical leave from GSC in 1979/80 as well as a grant from the German Academic Exchange Service in 1983 which made this research possible. A translation into English has been prepared by me and a translation into German by me is under way. Javlenie i smysl has been translated by Thomas Nemeth. A publication of both volumes is planned under the joint editorship of George L. Kline. He recommended Marty's Gesammelte Schriften (1916-20), in particular the articles 'über Sprachreflex, Nativismus und absichtliche Sprachbildung' and 'Uber subjektlose SMtze und das Verhältnis der Grammatik zu Logik und Psychologie,' and also Marty's main work Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie (1908) (See Holenstein (1976:17-21). Holenstein points out that both Marty and Husserl were students of Brentano (1838(1917).

REFERENCES Boeckh, August (1877). Encyklopädie und Methodologie der philologischen Wissenschaften. E-Bratuscheck, ed. Leipzig: Teubner. Bulhof, Ilse N. (1980). Wilhelm Dilthey. A Hermeneutic Approach to the Study of History and Culture. The Hague, Boston, London: Nijhoff. Dilthey, Wilhelm (1900). Die Entstehung der Hermeneutik. In: Philosophische Abhandlungen. Christoph Sigwart su seinem 70. Geburtstage gewidmet. Tübingen, Freiburg i. B., Leipzig. Freiberger-Sheikholeslami, Erika (1980). Forgotten Pioneers of Soviet Semiotics. In: Semiotics 1980 Plenum. (1983a). W. v. Humboldt and G. G. Spet (A Semiotic Theory of Inner Form). Penn Review of Linguistics Vol. 7: 95-105. (1983b). Gustav G. Spet. In: Semiotics 1983. Plenum (forthcoming). Gadamer, Hans-Georg (1984). The Hermeneutics of Suspicion. See Shapiro & Sico, ed. (1984). Hansen-Löve, Aage (1978). Der russische Formalismus.

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126: 61.

(1916a). Soznaiiie i ego sobstvennik. Stat'ja v sb. posvj a ennom G. I. Celpanovu. (1916b). Istorija kak problema logiki, t. 1. materialy. Moscow. (1918). Germenevtika i ee problemy. Unpublished typescript. Moscow. (1922a). OEerk razvitija russkoj filosofii, t. I. PetrogracTi Kolos. (1922b). Istorija russkoj filosofii, t. 1. Petrograd:^ Kolos. (1922/23). Estetigeskie fragmenty. t. I, II, III. Peterburg: Kolos. (1927). Vnutrennjaja forma siova: Etjudy i variacii na temu Gumbol'ta. Moscow: GAXN. Zenkovsky, Vasilii V. (1953). A History of Russian Philosophy. Vol. II. Trans1. by George L. Kline. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. London: Routledge & Paul.

32 SEMIOTIQUE ET HISPANISME

Miguel A. Garrido Gallardo

Du 20 au 25 juin 1 9 8 3 s'est réuni à Madrid un Congrès de Sémiotique qui établit, a mon avis, l'intégration de la communauté des sémiologue6 hispanistes en tant que tels au courant de la recherche sémiologique mondiale. L'Association Espagnole de Sémiotique que certains ont promue à la faveur de ce congrès et qui vient de tenir son assemblée constituante semble consolider une situation irréversible. L'objet de ces pages n'est autre que d'apporter cette information a l'historié de la sémiotique, tout en précisant quelques détails de ce congrès et en faisant quelques commentaires a propos de la situation de la sémiotique dans le monde hispanique a partir de ces Actes, qui ne sont pas encore publiées. LE CONGRES DE MADRID Il faut signaler tout d'abord que le Congrès de Sémiotique de Madrid — intitule congres de Sémiotique et Hispanisme — avait été organisé principalement par et pour des philologues: ses résultats doivent, donc, être nuancés, compte tenu de ce fait. Quoi qu'il en soit, ceux qui ont répondu a cet appel sont, bien entendu, des hispanistes (c'est à dire, des spécialistes de langue castillane ou de littérature écrite en espagnol) venants d'Espagne, d'Amérique hispanique et de différents Départements d'espagnol du monde entier, mais aussi des spécialistes, soit d'autres textes, soit d'autres domaines discursifs non forcément littéraux, avec lesquels, dans le monde hispanique, les philologues — et même les philologues sémioticiens — n'avaient guère eu de contact, contrévenant ainsi de façon manifeste l'interdisciplinarité que toute option sémiotique entraîne obligatoirement. En tout cas, le nombre de sémiologues (disons cela pour nous comprendre) non linguistes qui sont venus était significatif, bien qu'absolument minoritaire par rapport a la proportion générale: environ vingt pour cent. Bien sûr, d'un autre coté, sous cette etiquette se sont abrités des travaux qui ont peu de choses a voir avec la semiotique, même s'ils ont des rapports avec la philologie hispanique sauf si nous appelions sémiotique n'importe quelle méthode ou technique de n'importe quelle science humaine du moment qu'il pretend "déchiffrer des signes". On pourrait, peut-être, classer en trois familles les rapports des philologues au Congrès :

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A) Propositions ou analyse avec un fondement théorique sémiotique explicité. B) Propositions ou analyses rhétoriques, psychanalytiques, structuralistes, etc. dont l'ouverture a l'interdisciplinarité etc, donc, a une strategie sémiotique — si j'ose dire — correspondait, au moins, au voeu exprime et a une empreinte sur le modèle employé. C) Analyses conventionnelles (stylistiques, sociologiques, etc.) de textes littéraires, se reclamant de la sémiotique uniquement parce que tout texte est un symptôme de la société, ou parce que telle poésie est fortement symbolique etc. En termes absolus, la section B est la plus nombreuse et la C la moins nombreuse, si l'on tient compte du continuum entre la première et la deuxième avec un critère "semiologiquement" indulgent. Les textes du type C sont, bien entendu, semiologiques eux-aussi a cause d'une trace pragmatique indélible: ils apparaissent dans les Actes d'un Congrès de Sémiotique. CONFERENCES PLENIERES Une deuxième référence significative peut ressortir de la selection des conférences plenières et de leur rapport (ou manque de rapport) avec les pratiques récurrentes dans les différentes sections. La selection, dans l'esprit des organisateurs, a été presque entièrement" "innocente": il s'agissait de demander a certains spécialistes, plus ou moins connus de la communauté philologique, de faire connaître leur propre état de la question a propos, grosso modo, de la recherche semiologique des genres traditionnels: le genre narratif et la poésie lyrique, ainsi que le spectacle qui depuis toujours a été un problème pour les poétologues. J'ai dit "presque" entièrement innocente, parce que le choix de Todorov a été commandé par le désir d'éviter que nous tombions tout d'un coup dans le mythe de la sémiotique alors que nous n'avons même pas en Espagne une sémiotique du mythe. On s'attendait a ce qu'il dise — et il l'a dit — que "craignant de ne pas nous faire reconnaître par nos pairs, nous avons la fâcheuse tendance a multiplier les signes extérieures de la science (formules, diagrammes et autres "térrorèmes") et a effacer pratiquement toute trace d'intervention personelle ou d'élaboration littéraire". De l'ensemble, se sont dégagés un dénominateur commun évident et (sans parler des absences personelles d'Eco, Greimas, Lotman, Sebeok et autres) deux carences manifestes. Le dénominateur commun concerne la nécessité de souligner la composante pragmatique de la stratégie sémiotique. Todorov et Lázaro Carreter se sont occupés du versant de l'émetteur. Pour le premier, "la présence de l'auteur dans son discours se mesurera non au nombre des ¿e dont il persémera ses pages, mais à la distance entre sa pensée et l'opinion commune" et, en outre, "tout auteur est conduit a généraliser et a exemplifier, a pratiquer la symétrie, la gradation et le contraste, a affronter d'avance les objections qu'il

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pourrait susciter (...)" L"exigence d'harmonie a valeur d'idée et le sens des proportions rélève du souci du sens". Lázaro, de son coté, soutient dans le domaine de la poésie lyrique, que "le poème a été créé pour signifier quelque chose de très précise, que la mesure de cette signification — de son sens — se trouve dans l'intention du poète: et, par conséquent, quelque chose qui serait encore plus difficilement accepté par un radicalisme sémiotique: l'historié ne peut pas être oubliée dans cette recherche". En fin, Gianfranco Bettetini, parlant des communications qui — selon sa terminologie—requièrent une "mise en scène", souligne que "la sémiotique, a l'heure actuelle, est surtout appliquée a la communicabillté d'un texte: a sa configuration en réseau de distribution d'un savoir qui se propague dans ses parcours de sens et qui se place dans l'échange communicatif entre énonciateur et énonciataire". Il affirme plus loin la necéssité d'élaborer de façon precise ces deux notions, celle du sujet énonciateur et celle du sujet énonciataire, ce dernier étant "l'image du récepteur que le texte construit". Brémond et Weintrich se sont occupés de ce qui concerne le genre narratif. Claude Brémond s'est posé un problème technique qui peut être extrêmement important pour les philologues et les ethnologues: "la question de savoir si l'unité narrative fondamentale est caractérisée par une structure interne invariante et par une fonction contextuelle variable, ou au contraire par une structure interne variable et par une fonction contextuelle fixe". Il a proposé que "la structure interne et la fonction contextuelle comportent toutes deux des éléments relativement stables, qui peuvent servir à definir le motif dans sa généralité, et des éléments plus variables qui peuvent, soit servir a definir des sousmotifs qui spécifient le motif dans les sous-corpous, soit caractérisse des variantes uniques, des apax, a la périphérie du motif". Weinrich a présénté une communication qui n'avait rien à voir avec la démarche narratologique, tout en étudiant son objet. D'après lui, dans l'histoire de la culture europeènne on peut réléver "un croisement de deux mouvements sémiologiques, l'un, descendant, de dénarrativisation et l'autre, ascendant, de roman trionphant": et a l'intérieur de ces deux mouvements l'on observe — poursuit-il — "des déplacements secondaires en direction opposée, c'est a dire, de temporalisation dan6 les sciences, de spatialisation dans le romans dans le but, d'un coté comme de l'autre, de dominer ensemble le grand problème de la mémoire culturelle moderne, c'est a dire, l'abondance des données disponibles". Même si la thèse de Weinrich est très riche de conséquences et acceptable dans ses présupposés, l'option que répresente cette orientation donne lieu particulierment aux deux carences du Congrès dont J'ai parlé tout à l'heure.

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CARENCES La première e6t le silence qui se produit dans ces conférences plénlères à propos de la dénommée École de Paris : Brémond s'est surtout occupé, on l'a déjà dit, d'une question de détail, périphérique par rapport a la narratologie elle-même: .et Weinrich a entendu narration ou récit dans le sens restreint de genre, laissant ainsi de coté la possible fertilité du "programme narratif" qui, comme chacun sait, n'a rien à voir, à strictement parler, avec "roman", "conte" ou autre chose de semblable. Ce dégré zéro s'avère d'autant plus remarquable que Greimas a été l'auteur le plus employé pour les analyses de textes signaleés par les philologues que J'ai classés plus haut dans le groupe B, et son Dictionnaire (1979) est, peut-être, l'ouvrage la plus cité. L'autre carence en rélation avec la précédente, concerne le manque de représentation de la Linguistique du Texte dans le programme des conférences générales. Certainement, si toute sémiotique n'est pas linguistique du texte, toute linguistique du texte, rigoureusement parlant, est une sémiotique: plus encore, elle souligne l'élément pragmatique dont le besoin a été mis en évidence dans ce Congrès. On espérait aussi dans ce sens que Weinrich — l'auteur d'une grammaire textuelle du française publiée à peine une année auparavant (Weinrich, 1982) — suposerait une représentation de ces orientations. Par ailleurs, C. Segre qui s'occupait de la conférence intitulée "La nature sémiotique du texte" s'est borné a rappeler a ce propos "l'union biunivoque de la compétence linguistique et de la compétence textuelle: la deuxième ne peut s'accomplir qu'à travers la première, la premiere n'admet pas toute seule l'union de phrases dans un énoncé (...). Plus complète — et elle a déjà été tentée — serait une représentation de tous les éléments en Jeu qui aboutirait a un modelé de la production d'unités communicatives". Nous nous retrouvons devant un appel générique de l'attention vers la pragmatique. Il va sans dire que, comme dans le cas précedént, la linguistique textuelle a trouvé aussi sa place dans les commissions respectives. Qu'on me permette, à ce sujet, une remarque statistiquement fondée: le maniement d'une sémiotique discursive explicite (ou sémiotique dans le sens fort) a été plus courant parmi ceux qui se sont occupés de discours ou de textes non littéraux (bande dessinée, cinéma, télévision, texte de théâtre) que parmi les spécialistes de ce que nous appelons littérature. La cause est probablement banale: un congrès d'hispanistes (dans le sens conventionnel déjà noté) n'a pu accueillir que les non-hispanistes strictement sémiologues, de la même façon qu'un congrès de Bémiologues ne peut accueillir, peutêtre, que les philologues strictement semioticiens. Malgré tout, le congrès a atteint dans une bornne mesure à mon avis, les objectifs fixés:

297 OBJECTIFS 1) mettre en contact pour la première fois ces chercheurs hispanistes (que nous avons appelés philologues sémioticiens) ayant des intérêts communs, mais souvent isoles et inconnus les uns pour les autres. 2) soumettre à une critique la viabilité des travaux qu'on plaçait sous l'étiquette de séraiotique qui, parfois, n'étaient que 1'ignorance masquée par un terme pédant. 3) mettre en rapport les philologues et ceux que nous avons appelés sémiologues non linguistes, communautés scientifiques, toute les deux, qui généralement travaillaient chez nous dans une ignorance mutuelle autant que méfiant. Le premiere point a été confirmé par la réponse massive que cet appel a trouvé: 5^0 spécialistes du monde entier est un chiffre certainement remarquable. Le deuxième, par les fortes discussions scientifiques qui ont eu lieu au cours de la quasi-totalité des séances tenues dans presque toutes les salles qui accuellirent les 217 communications présentées. Le troisième par la présence d'un groupe nombreux de semlologues non linguistes. Il ne sera pas question ici des divers apports qui ont été faits sur des points théoriques précis qui concernent la Linguistique, les instances sociales et psychologiques de la production du sens, la théorie littéraire générale, la théorie des genres, la détermination de certaines typologies dans le corpus littéraire hispanique par l'application du parcours génératif de la théorie greimassienne, les questions ouvertes sur le texte dramatique et le texte théâtral (par exemple, les notions de personnage, point de vue et unités théâtrales), l'insertion sémiotlque de la stylistique, etc. Plus inabordable encore est l'apport plus modeste (théoriquement) mais, peut-être, dans l'ensemble, plus substantiel des Actes en tant que contribution large à une lecture actualisée des textes hispaniques (littéraux et non littéraux); à cela s'ajoute le fait que le contraste avec des textes aussi particuliers que ceux des cultures de la découverte de l'Amérique peut apporter, d'après ce qu'on voit dans les études de motifs qui ont été lus au Congrès, des enrichissements importants qui vont au-delà de ceux que Todorov avait entrevus dans certains de ses ouvrages les plus récents (Cfr. Todorov, 1982). Le rétard relatif dans les sources bibliographiques de certaines communications ne contredisent même pas la valeur générale dont je parle. On peut espérer, en eatre, que les contacts favorisés par le Congrès permettent des échanges féconds dans ce sens.

298 CONCLUSIONS Je ne ferai que signaler une caractéristiques dominante commune aux communications et aux conférences littéraires: le caractère d'obsolescence du paradigme jakob6onien. Peu d'années avant, dans les textes courants en Espagne entre 1970 et 1980, les philologues qui s'intéressaient à ces questions faisaient appel — ne serait-ce que pour préconiser son dépassement — au classique "Linguistique et Poétique" de la conférence tenue au printemps de 1958: il apparait comme fondement, par exemple, dans les écrits de Wienold (1972), Corti (1976), Di Girolamo (1978) et dans mes propres écrits (Garrido Gallardo, 197'+, 1982). Eh bien, en juin 1983, même si à un moment donné de quelque communication il est cité, il n'est pourtant pas fréquemment présent, ni a valeur de fondement, ni pratiquement n'existe. On peut dire, comme donnée historique, que la sémiotique littéraire du Congrès de Madrid se trouve déjà dans un autre paradigme. Il est pourtant problématique, le déroulement pragmatique qui, selon toutes les insistences signalées, doit advenir comme programme. Chez ces philologues semioticiens dont je parle, aucune conférence et presque aucune communication n'a proposé de développements tréoriques ni d'applications pratiques d'une certaine importance. Malgré tout, j'oserais dire que l'état actuel de la sémiotique dans le monde hispanique n'est pas très différent de celui des autres groupes linguistiques ayant une tradition institutionelle depuis des années. Sans doute on ne compte pas encore de plusieurs groupes connus par les apports et par la divulgation de leurs études par l'intermédiaire de la traduction, comme c'est le cas pour les EtatsUnis, la France et l'Italie par exemple. D'autre part, bien que la vulgarisation de quelques données, par exemple de la Sémiotique de Greimas, souffre d'une certaine banalisation dans l'enseignement secondaire, le phénomène ne semble pas différent de celui qui pour la France a été signalé par Greimas lui-même dans le dernier numéro de Langue Française (cfr. Greimas, 1981+: 123-121+). Certes, il faut que dans nos établissements académiques on insiste sans cesse pour éloigner les craintes que l'introduction de l'activité sémiotique peut provoquer, en expliquant qu'il n'existe pas danger de totalitarisme scientifique, parce que la Sémiotique, n'étant qu'un "point de vue", ne remet pas en question les sciences humaines, mais les confirme. Mais cette situation ne se produit pas (il me semble) uniquement chez nous. Enfin, les 140 textes réunis dans les Actes du Congrès revèlent — autant dans les cas d'analyses sémiologiques de textes espagnols et hispanoaméricains, que dans le cas d'apports théoriques — une qualité scientifique moyenne aucunement négligeable, même s'il subsiste toujours un reste marginal, en dépit du choix opéré.

299 Nous finissons comme nous avons commencé. A partir du Congrès de Madrid, mais pas seulement à cause de lui, la communauté hispanique des philologues séraioticiens et celle des semiologues ont témoigné d'une existence puissante qui s'était formée peu à peu dans des lieux divers et à travers de voies différentes depuis quelques années et qui maintenant apparaît comme une réalité pleine d'espoir dans l'ensemble mondial des études explicites de la production du sens. Instituto "Miguel de Cervantes" de Filología Hispánica Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas Madrid, Espagne NOTES 1.

L a association a initialement environ 200 members fondateurs.

REFERENCES Corti, Maria (1976). Principi della comunicazione letteraria. Introduzione semiotica della letteratura. Milano: Bompiani. Di Girolamo, Constanzo (1978). Critica della letterarietà. Milano: Il Saggiatore. Garrido-Gallardo, Miguel A. (1974). Presente y futuro de la estilistica. R.S.E.L. 4 (2): 207-218. (1982). Estudios de Semiotica literaria. Madrid: C.S.I.C. (1ère édition en 1978). Greimas, Algirdas J. et Courtès, Joseph (1979)- Sémiotique, dictionnaire raisonne de la théorie du langage. Paris : Hachette. Greimas, Algirdas J. (1984). Entretien réalisé par J. Fontanille. Langue Française 6l: 121-128. Todorov, Tzvetan (1982). La conquête de l'Amérique. La question de 1'autre. Paris: Seuil. Weinrich, Harald (1982). Textgrammatik der französischen Sprache. Stuttgart : Klett. Wienold, Götz (1972). Semiotlk der Literatur. Frankfurt: Athenäum.

33 ANALYSIS O F T H E RELIGIOUS PROCESS THROUGH DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

A d r i a n S. G i m a t e - W e l s h

0 . - PREFACE "Parce que n o u s s o m m e s au m o n d e n o u s s o m m e s c o n d a m n e s a u s e n s e t n o u s n e p o u v o n s r i e n f a i r e ni r i e n dire qui ne p r e n n e u n n o m dans l'histoire" (J.C. Coquet et al, 1982:11). It seems pertinent to m e to b e g i n this c o m m u n i c a t i o n w i t h such a reference because "it u n d e r lies the s e m a n t i c d i m e n s i o n of language a n d the relation of the subject w i t h the w o r l d and w i t h history". It o b v i o u s l y has to do w i t h the topic of t h i s paper. T h i s is so because the p r o b l e m of sense goes b e y o n d the linguist i c system. W h a t interests m e at this m o m e n t is t o place the e m p h a s i s on the relationship t h a t language h a s w i t h the subject a n d w i t h history. The latter m e a n s that m y t e x t of analysis w i l l not b e seen as a c l o s e d text, rather as an open text in so far as w e take into account the v i e w of the p r o d u c e r as w e l l a s t h a t o f t h e r e c e i v e r a n d t h e s i t u a t i o n in w h i c h t h e t e x t is generated. W h y discourse analysis? Recalling Foucault's point of view, the structuralist a p p r o a c h t o t h e t e x t m a k e s of i t a " m o u n m e n t " i n s t e a d o f a "document" or sign of another thing; the interpreting e l e m e n t w i l l n o t b e p r e s e n t a s l o n g a s it w i l l n o t s e a r c h the u n d e r l y i n g discourse. Thus, subject a n d discourse should b e placed in w h a t is k n o w n as social formation, a concept t h a t is d i v i d e d into t w o instances: ideological f o r m a t i o n (I.F.) a n d discursive f o r m a t i o n (D.F.). 1.

THEORETICAL

FRAMEWORK.

1.1 Ideology a n d Social Formation. W i t h i n t h e m a r x i s t tradition ideology m e a n s "false consciousness" b u t it also m e a n s a "set of beliefs t h a t are d e t e r m i n e d b y the social relations of production". F r o m the p o i n t of v i e w of social function, ideology is t h e "set of b e l i e f s that g i v e coherence to the m e m b e r s of a group or social class", w h e t h e r it is to exert p o w e r upon t h e individuals or to persuade them. A s a

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system it does not reflect mechanically the interests of the class that produces it, rather, it disguises it. Thus, the particular interest become general. Ideology plays a legitimating function of things. From the althusserian point of view, there is general ideology (and the real ideologies-ideological processes). To Althusser it is not the simple world view but a conception of the existential relationship of men with their world which in the end is determined by the relationships of production. Its materiality takes place in what he calls the Ideological State Apparatus (I.S.A.) or Ideological Instances (I.I.) and constitutes the space in which ideology is produced and reproduced. It is around the I.S.A. that the struggle between classes is centered. He also distinguishes between dominant and dominated ideologies. The expression of the latter is given within the space determiend by the dominant ideology, a position which, as we, know has been refuted by other scholars. His point of view is of interest to me because his lines of thought are present in speech analysis. The aforementioned comments point to two meanings, a) as superestructure-positive meaning; (b) as false conscience or disguising of reality — a negative sense. However, both meanings should not be mutually excluded but mutually complementary. Such complementarity implies a dynamic perspective — its historical becoming. That is, it will not be by definition a false consciousness. It can be defined as a "view of life and of the world, false and true at the same time more or less scientific according to the historical becoming". It constitutes a reference point for social practice and not just for political practice. Insofar as ideology expreses itself in terms of ideas, beliefs, values, symbols and signs, ideology is a synthesis of culture. This would be its positive meaning — the Weltanschauung. What I propose to study, then, is a synthesis of culture in its regional manifestation and particularly a special type — the religious. If my reasoning is correct, ideology is then a type of code, a type of language that permits communication among the members of a class group and enhances their identification as a class different from other classes. If this is correct, the ideological process is a semiotic object. Its study can be inscribed within semiotic studies but in a larger totality. Thus the study of ideological processes could be seen as a study of cultural processes. There are, without doubt, other developments of the

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concept of ideology such as those proposed by Gramsci but this is not the place to develop them. What I want to underline at this moment is that the church — the institution — functions as an ideological apparatus, for with its practices and its discourse form not only its priests but also its parishioners. As such, it is not only an object but also a place where the struggle between classes takes place. It is an ideological instance in which the subject is interpellated as an ideological subject. I assume therefore that there will be ideological formations (I.F.) that are mutually opposed and consequently give rise to types of religious discourse that are also opposed to each other. I take it, then, that a discursive formation (D.F.) will be the crystallization of the confrontation between classes. 1.2 Ideological and Discursive Formations. As we know, the concept of discursive formation was introduced by Foucault in relation to questions of the historical and discursive conditions in which the systems of knowledge are constituted: subject, discourse and ideology. Such a trichotomy seems ideal because it is precisely my purpose to study the position of the subject vis-à-vis its discourse and its ideology. It is in this context that we perceive the relationship between language — as a relatively autonomous system — and history. It is in this framework that linguistics and the theory of history are articulated, and, more particularly, that linguistics and ideological processes are linked. The ideological processes constitute the source of production of the effects of meaning in discourse as an object that has its own specificity; language, on the other hand, constitutes the material space in which sense effects are realized. That is, discourse, is doubly conditioned: a)by the ideological formations that relate such discourse formations; b) by the relative autonomy of language. This double conditioning is essential in reference to the relationship between the linguistic, the ideological and the very materiality of speech. The subject speakers in the same historical cut may coincide or diverge upon the meaning assigned to the terms; that is, they may speak differently in 2spite of the fact that they have the same linguistic base . The differential cut will therefore be in the conditioning of the first level (I.F.) that is defined as the set of aptitudes and representations which are not universal or individual but are related to class positions, and that face each other in a situation

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of conflict in a particular social formation, or in a particular moment of time. Ideological formations do have a regional character, and they do have class positions. This explains why groups may speak of the same objects — liberty, democracy, etc.— from antagonistic ideological formations. In the althusserian view, the IF and DF are related in the ideological instance (I.I.) under the form of contradiction at the heart of the ISA. It is in the II that the subject is interpellated in an ideological subject reproducing in this manner the existing social relations. It must be said that the discursive formations are conditioned by the antagonistic ideological formations and that the subject is interpellated by one or various DF. Now, if we agree with the negative definition of ideology, it can be accepted that the function of the discursive formation is to hide the meaning of what gets constituted within it, that is, the ideological formation. In this respect, we must recall the concept of interdiscourse to which Pecheux assigns a special place, for in its interior the subject's objects are formed in order to generate the objects of his own discourse. We are now faced with the problem of how to do discourse analysis. At this time I wish to recall two concepts proposed by J.J. Courtine (1980:22) :a) the preconstructed; b) repetition. To these notions I must add those of interdiscourse and intradiscourse which must be related to the ideological formation and interpellation of the individual into the subject of his own discourse. The first two concepts consist generally in the construction of equivalent distributional classes of the harrisian type. They refer to the co-ocurrence in a discursive sequence of words, syntagms, etc. They refer to the presence of recurring invariants in a corpus, identified by the conmutation technique. The distributional context is the forms of variance, constant and identical. Thus a variation regulated on the level of sameness and repetition falls on the level of the preconstructed. For the extraction and segmentation operations of subsequences, one must take into account what is called the key forms. These concepts are definately related to the notion of discursive formation and are central for the organic articulation of language and discourse. First, because, insofar as it is defined as that which conditions what can be said by a subject, the DF regu-

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lates the relation of the inter- and intradiscourse and allows the individual to be interpellated by his own discourse and become the subject of his own speech. Secondly, because it in a certain moment allows the speaking subjects to coincide or diverge upon a meaning assigned to a linguistic sequence in spite of the linguistic invariable. At this point I want to underline the importance of interdiscourse, for it is the place of the preconstructed. The effect of interdiscourse gives rise to the intradiscourse and it is the relation of interwith intradiscourse that permits the speaker to be interpellated in the subject of his own discourse. The transformation of the subject into an ideological subject takes place through the identification of the speaker with the universal subject of the discursive formation; in other words, "what everybody knows, sees or understands". In the analysis of the corpus it is important to consider the discontinuity of the discursive forms that produce those forms which are repeated in the discourse. We must consider also the contradiction that may rise in the discursive process and its repetition in a different time and place (the themes and forms). There are two kinds of repetition: a) in extension and b) vertical. The latter deal with the unknown, that which suffers displacement or displaces something else; the former refer to the imaginary identification process of the subject form in the actual discourse, the concrete subject: I believe, etc. with the universal subject — the ensemble of historical actors: the catholic (los catolicos), the poor (lost pobres), etc. If we agree then that discourse is a material instance of ideology, and therefore of religion, we will see the ideological efficacy, not necessarily as the interpellation-identification process but, as a more or less regulated repetition process, an instance that conditions interdiscourse. There are therfore two levels of description, a) the enunciation level which corresponds to the interlocutor — the "I", "now" and "here" of the discourse; b) the utterance level, which is the interdiscourse, the forms that are cited, repeated and paraphrased and which are opposed to one another. It is in this space — the memory space — that the enunciator produces what is uttered. Returning to the study of the text that I am now going to undertake, I want to emphasize that religious discourse exhibits modalities of existance that are similar to political discourse in so far as it relies

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h e a v i l y o n the m e m o r y space. 2 . - L E V E L O F ANALYSIS M y c o r p u s for t h i s s t u d y is t h e s e t of s p e e c h e s t h a t w e r e registered on m a g n e t i c tape in February, 1983, in t w o parishes in the City of Puebla. In particular, I a m r e f e r r i n g to the gospel "Blessed are the poor". The corpus, aside from language, s h o w s three variables: l) the locutor; 2) the topics of discourse; 3) the p r o d u c t i o n conditions, that is, the historical c o n d i tions. B u t such speeches should b e seen in the context of the reception conditions. T h i s is w h y inmediately a f t e r m a s s I tried to get an o p i n i o n about the m e a n i n g of t h e gospel in order to c o m p a r e the different interpretations. A thesis that I sustain is that, in the c h u r c h as an ideological apparatus, y o u are b o u n d to find in its interior mutually antagonistic ideological f o r m a t i o n s that condition the discursive formations. I n so f a r as t h e c o r p u s c o m e s f r o m t h e s a m e t h e m e a n d i t i s p r o d u c e d i n the s a m e p e r i o d of t i m e , t h e s e identities constitute the invariable part of speech. W i t h respect to the variables, I w a n t t o underline the r o l e t h a t the interlocutors develop, for it p r e s u p p o s e s the existence of the t w o c o m m u n i c a t i o n a l actants: t h e sender and the receiver. W i t h this w e are p l a c i n g the emphasis on the role t h a t the interlocutee plays in the production of speech by the interlocutor. T h i s m e a n s that the differences t h a t are m a n i f e s t e d in the s p e e c h e s are deterined by the relations established b e t w e e n these t w o variables. 2.1

Invariables. L i n g u i s t i c invariable: "Blesed are the poor" Synchronic identity G e n d e r identity: the teaching type

2.2

Variables

Interlocutors: ideological d o m i n a n t subject and alternative subject Interlocutee: dominant and dominated classes. To p r o c e e d to the analysis, w i l l classify the speeches in the following way: 1) speech type I c o r r e s p o n d s t o the parish La Paz, an exclusive upper m i d d l e c l a s s residential area; 2) speech type II r e p r e sents El Parral, a popular zone w i t h a market w h o s e inhabitants earn no m o r e than the m i n i m u m salary.

.107

2.3 Speech Type I 2.3.1 "Asi como en el Antiguo Testamento Moisés una vez bajo del monte... y empezd a explicarles a los judíos como deberían cumplir los diez mandamientos, asi una vez cuando el Señor bajó del monte también se sienta a explicarles los ejemplos más importantes de Cristo que fue el de la Bienaventuranzas". 2.3.1 "Bienaventurados los pobres de espíritu porque suyo es el reino de los cielos". Y asi Cristo explica sus ocho Bienaventuranzas. Tienen su explicación y algunas de ellas no las podemos interpretar al pie de la letra. Quisiera en este momento explicarles la primera Bienaventuranza, como nosotros debemos interpretarla". 2.3.3 "Bienaventurados los que ahora tienen hambre, los que lloran porque al fin van a reir. No debemos entender por esta Bienaventuranza a aquellas personas que no tienen nada, a aquellas personas que no tienen bienes, que no tienen cosas materiales, que no tienen dinero". 2.3.4 "Hemos escuchado como dijo el Señor "Bienaventu rados los pobres", los pobres de espíritu dice la Sagrada Escritura...son aquellos que sienten que por encima de todo siempre deben buscar a Dios; porque habrá gente en nuestro mundo que es pobre, que no tiene nada, pero no tiene necesidad de Dios. Y aquellos que se interesan por las cosas de Dios, por su palabra llevada a la práctica, esos son los verdaderos pobres de espíritu". 2.3.5 "Son aquellos que tienen necesidad de Dios. La palabra de Dios significa este domingo que nosotros trabajemos y hagamos todo lo posible porque en nuestro mundo no haya pobres, porque no haya desamparados". 2.4 Speech Type II 2.4.1 "El Evangelio despierta interés. El Evangelio nos debe interesar. El Evangelio es una buena noticia para algunos, para otros es mala noticia. El Evangelio es buena ó mala noticia dependiendo de quien la reciba". 2.4.2 "En la sociedad en la que vivimos vemos que hay pobres y ricos. Es un hecho que existen pobres. Los pobres son una mayoría de la población. Los pobres se vuelven cada vez más pobres. La mayoría padece necesidad de alimentos. La mayoría tiene que alojarse en viviendas inmundas". 2.4.3 "En la sociedad en que vivimos vemos también que existen ricos muy ricos. Existen ricos que viven en

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palacios. Existen ricos que hacen sus compras en Europa. Los ricos son una minoría que se vuelvan cada vez más ricos. Unos se enriquecen a costa de otros". 2.4.4 "Vemos que la sociedad esta construida en pecado. Jesucristo no quería un mundo asi. Jesucristo quería un mundo justo; Jesucristo queria un mundo libre; Jesucristo queria un mundo donde haya paz. 2.4.5 "Dice también, Bienaventurados mis hermanos que est&n luchando en favor del reino de Dios; Bienaventurados los que se esfuerzan y comprometen su vida para que nosotros podamos vivir en un mundo mas feliz, más justo, más digno." 2.4.6 "Pongamos nuestra confianza en el verdadero Dios aunque nos persigan, aunque nos expulsen de nuestra fuente de trabajo". Beginning with the idea that any text has a structure that relates "events" or "facts" and can be inscribed in temporal and spatial axes, I shall concern myself, in the first place, with these disjunctions. 2.5

The Spatial Structure

If we take a look at paragraph 2.3.1 the word "monte" is repeated a couple of times, thus establishing an opposition betwen phrases and the rest of the text. We may have thus the following categories: [monte] vs. [no monte] In the second speech type, the word repeated "sociedad" strikes us immediately. Its appearance gives rise to the opposition with "viviendas" in the following phrases [sociedad] vs. [no sociedad] [englobante] vs. [englobado] 2.6 The Temporal Structure Looking once more at speech I we distinguish in the first place in paragraph 2.3.1 the following distinctions. [past] vs. [present] "Moisés bajd del monte; el Señor bajó del monte; quisiera en este momento" which is opposed to paragraph 2.3.1 and the rest. Notice that the opposition that is established between [monte] vs. [no monte] introduces the opposition [past] vs. [present]. In other words, there is a correlation of class figures. Notice also that in the first paragraph there is an opposition

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[past] vs. [present]; the past introduces the present. The past is the present and this underlying idea is reinforced by "Pablo nos habla de Cristo resusitado, no derrotado y muerto, un Cristo que sigue el ritmo de la historia". In the second speech type we also find a temporal segmentation [past] vs. [present] "Jesucristo no quería un mundo asi" vs. "En la sociedad en la que vivimos". Notice that the segmentatin of space introduces a social segmentation that is quantified and qualified. [ricos] vs. [no ricos] (minoria) (mayoría) (palacios) (viviendas) (mala noticia) (buena noticia) We are now in a position to make some remarks concerning the elements taken into consideration. First, one can distinguish two discursive processes in speech type II: a) a state process which is signaled by "El Evangelio es una buena noticia", "El Evangelio es algo nuevo", phrases which function as preconstructs in the interdiscourse to generate the objects which the subject will utilize to generate his own disourse in the intradiscursive process; b) a performance state which refers to a perception process as can be seen by the phrases "vemos que hay pobres y ricos", "la mayoría padece necesidad de alimento". This process is directed to the determination of the object of discourse which in this case is "pobres y ricos", "los pobres son una mayoría". Second, one can distinguish by the phrase "El Evangelio es buena o mala noticia dependiendo de quien la reciba" how the subject introduces and articulates the determination of the object — "El Evangelio es una buena noticia" without saying yet what it is and a perception process which points to what the object is in terms of the reception context — the historical conditions. The object of desire is a world that is "just", "free", "where there is peace". This is the Bienaventuranza as can be seen in the last lines of speech II. The contemporary world is not just, for "vemos que hay pobres y ricos", so that the first are a majority and are housed in insanitary houses and the second are a minority and live in palaces. The subject

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builds his discourse and therefore his object on the basis of the two processes mentioned above. Looking at what has been said from another angle, the necessary succession of the two processes in the syntagmatic axis turns out to be relavant to the speech and can thus be seen as a sequence P s [state process]

Pp[performance process]

In other words, the recognition of state facts — what we all know, the recurrent mechanismo of ideological discourse — leading to a cognitive or sensorial process ("vemos...") closes with a state process which can be seen graphically by

2.7 Actor's Structure As we know, besides the temporal and spatial structures, the actorialization structure is another discursive component and is based on the engagement and disengagement operations. Thus, concerning the actor's figures, in speech I, Moisés and Jesus are the subjectsender as seen in 2.3.1, while in paragraphs 2.3.2 and 2.3.3, although "we" (nosotros) — the collective subject — is the grammatical subject, it is nevertheless the receiver, phrases in which with the appearance of "debemos" we perceive a deontic type of speech. That is to say the "I" of the utterance immediately transforms itself into the subject "we". The priest, who is the sender, is at the same time the receiver, as are the parishioners, as can be seen by "hemos escuchado..." — a situation that is reinforced by paragraph 2.3.2 where it says "como nosotros debemos interpretarla", Although a passive role is manifested, the phrase indicates an active subject. Here we have a case where there is an identification process between the enunciation subject and the utterance's subject, that is, the speaker's world is identified with that of the utterance. And not only that, but he also persuades his audience to think similarly. In speech II, "Evangelio" is the subject of the state process in paragraph 2.4.1, although in the totality of the discourse it becomes the object of speech and the receiver becomes the "sociedad" which is indeterminate. If we look at "El Evangelio nos debe interesar", we can see how the subject-actor is identified with the receiver, the interlocutee. Again, we have

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a case w h e r e there is an identification process b e t w e e n the enuncication subject and the utterance's subject and the audience, a situation w h i c h m a n i f e s t s itself throughout the entire discourse. In other words, the purpose is not t o point out the "I" and to identify it in the discourse b u t to identify w i t h t h e "I" to w h i c h the s p e e c h is directed, that is, the audience. T h i s is the k i n d of binary relation w h o s e function of recognizance has the form f (x,y), according to Coquet, a situation in w h i c h y o u have a logical conj u n c t i o n of the t w o actants:

xn Y t h a t is, the change of identity into another. The actor's t h e m a t i c role w h i c h e m e r g e s from the invariable "Bienaventurados los pobres" is a denouncem e n t of a prevailing "injustice" amongst the majority of people, as can b e seen by the recurring words: pobreza, injusticia, etc. The interlocutor's identification w i t h the interlocutee is ratified by w h a t a parishioner has to say: "En este t e m p l o se hace sentir a la gente r e a l m e n t e humanizada" -"En esta iglesia n o se sigue la rutina de aplicar el Evangelio" - " Y o s i e m p r e l e d e c í a a m i e s p o s a q u e m u c h a s v e c e s el h e c h o d e escuchar el Evangelio si no es aplicado en una f o r m a r e a l a la é p o c a e n q u e v i v i m o s , c o m o q u e n o t i e n e la trascendencia que se pretende" -"Y p u e s le digo, aquí no existe esa distancia que e n m u c h o s t e m p l o s se hace sentir". -"Sino que aquí nos sentimos m u y integrados con nuestros sacerdotes". 3.

CONCLUSION

These last phrases, in m y opinion, ratify w h a t has b e e n said above, for such utterances exhibit the logical c o n j u n c t i n b e t w e e n the t w o actants, that is, the change f r o m one identity to another in the discursive process a n d therefore in the ideological process. In this case, the enunciating subject as a s e m i o t i c actant is a collective actant: the poor, the exploited classes. The object (of desire) is a "just world". The subject t h a t e m e r g e s is a n alternative ideological subject — a collective actant w h i c h is opposed to the traditional religious subject w h i c h is e x e m p l i f i e d by s p e e c h type I. S p e e c h type II, the expression of a discursive f o r m a t i o n w h i c h is d e t e r m i n e d by an ideological formation, gives

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rise to new ideological tendencies that strive for a place at the heart of the ideological apparatus which in this case is the church. Filosofia y Letras Universidad Autonoma de Puebla Puebla, Mexico NOTES. 1. Linguistic process that functions as a mediator between conscience and reality; here, language functions as a link between the subject and the world. The subject gets hold of the world through language and language through the enunciation process. 2. Material conditions upon which the discursive processes develop or come into being. REFERENCES Benveniste, Emile (1981). Problemas de Lingüistica General. Mexico: Siglo XXI Editores. Coquet, J.C. (1979). Prolegománes a 1'analyse modale. Le sujet énonçantJ Paris: Groupe de Recherche Semiolinguistique. Ecole de Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales. , Arrive', M., Caíame, C., Chabrol, C., Delorme, J., Floch, M.M., Geoltrain, P., and Landowski (1982). Semiotique. L'Ecole de Paris Paris: Classiques Hachette. Courtine, J.J. (1980). Quel objet pour l'analyse du discours. In Matérialités Discursives, 22-33. Lille: Presse Universitaires de Lille. Foucault, Michel, (1982). Arqueología del Saber, Mexico: Siglo XXI Editores.

34

SOME REMARKS ON "AESOPIAN COMMUNICATION"

1

IN FILM

Wies^aw Godzic

I intend to discuss the consequences arising from the examination of a seemingly marginal issue likely to be encountered by the semiotically oriented film theoretician, namely "Aesopian communication". Considerations of this issue focus on the rhetorical, communicational and semiotical aspects and in this sense, by calling for the determination of relations between these aspects, we move the problem of "Aesopian communication" from the periphery of modern film theory into its very center. I will concentrate on relations between communication and rhetorics, and between communication and signification. The analysis of the first pair of notions will help explicate the meaning I attach to the titular concept. A reflection on the alleged distinction between knowledge about communication and semiotics brings to mind — as I believe — the problem of "complementary meaning" in film. I intend to suggest a certain conception of understanding the latter notion closely tied to Aesopian communication — a notion requiring the evaluation of the general model of reception and receiver of film work meanings. It is impossible to equate communication and rhetoric, and one should recognize the existence of differences between them pertaining to at least four issues (Thompson, 1970). Firstly, communication is concerned with the precision of the message, while rhetoric is concerned with its effectiveness. Communication makes use of the denotative aspect of language, avoids redundancy, with the connotative aspect remaining immateral (unless it constitutes interference in the process). Rhetoric, conversely, deliberately exploits connotativity, and an excess of information becomes its strength. Secondly, the conflict between communication and rhetoric is analogous to the dichotomy between the mechanistic or exact and the humanistic — both as regards the point of reference (different scientific attitudes) and the specifically understood social context. Rhetoric is interested in the communication of people in their social environments, whereas the theory of communication concerns itself with the act of commu-

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nication as such in the informational and logical aspects. The third group of differences stems from the vast domains of both the disciplines. Communication embraces all media, while rhetoric is basically confined to words. The former discipline is not interested in, for example, ethical determinants of the message, whereas the latter has always implied "ethical selfconsciousness". More differences arise from the degree of generality of the formulated rules and from the broadly understood usefulness in explaining artistic phenomena. Having presented the differences between the disciplines (considered in isolation) Thompson suggests the possibility of cooperation between the two consisting in mutual intermingling. The openness and progressiveness of method characteristic of the theory of communication could revitalize the traditional and petrified rhetoric which, in its turn, could contribute to the "Humanization" of the quantitative methods of the general theory of information and communication. Such a combination, referred to the specific nature of film communication, appears to me as much closer and in fact downright unbreakable. I accept the model of film communication expounded by the American psycholinguist Sol Worth (1978) according to whom there are two fundamental kinds of meaning: the interactional and the communicational, conveyed by two kinds of strategies — attribution and implication/inference, respectively. Worth's model assumes active senders and receivers: the reception of meaning is a process complementary to its creation and is by no means a mirror reflection of meaning production. The viewer-receiver becomes the principal meaning-formation agent, he extracts only some and only incomplete "transmitted" meanings and constructs a "story organism" different from the one on the sender's end. If we were to proceed in the direction indicated by Worth's model, then we could say that the objects of the researcher's study are not the concrete sender and the conditioning of the concrete receiver but the marks they leave and the intentions of their roles in the text — the preserved message. The question is whether one can distinguish in the film message the respective roles of the sender suggesting things to the receiver and persuading him to involve himself in the meaning-formation process, and of a proposed receiver endowed with suitable dispositions to construct meanings. I have in mind here a certain kind of knowledge about the film concept of rhetoric strategy currently accepted and internalized by all communication participants. This strategy, generally speaking, appears as the resultant of two intentions of the

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sender: the desire to articulate and manifest his opinion, to declare himself on the side of some truth, and the simultaneous wish to indirectly construct (through the text) a receiver reacting to his views in a suitable manner — a receiver who is to spontaneously agree with the sender's opinion and to whom it is necessary to offer irrefutable, rational, univocal arguments. Not infrequently the sender creates in the text dispositions for the emergence of a receiver-opponent, openly disputing the sender's views, reluctantly yielding to persuasion. The diversity of rhetorical strategies in diachrony and in the synchronous cultural-political space, together with the the considerable difficulties in classification, discourage critics from tackling this phenomenon and prompt them to speak in this context of the style, the "mannersim" of artists. In analyses of the diverse functions performed in various communication situations, the most fundamental one is as if omitted. The film work is a physical, material trace of a transaction of two institutions, two social roles, namely of the sender and of the receiver. The former is the producer of the physical form of the work making use in the course of this production of some type of rhetorical persuasion directed at the receiver. The latter is not a passive, "nonreactive" element in this transaction. In his reception of the work the receiver may employ a different kind of strategy (failing to understand the sender's strategy or ignoring it) but he may also meekly succumb to the pressure (from laziness, ignorance or quite consciously with the intent of deriving pleasure from this submissiveness). The creative force of the receiver is an important factor in the sender-receiver game of film communication. Rhetorical strategy appears to be an indispensable element of communication, and its conscious recognition — the first step towards a more rewarding intercourse with a film work (cf. Eco's concept of a "lector", Eco 1979). This strategy may sometimes function as "Aesopian communication", by which I understand a specific senderreceiver situation whereby, for various reasons, the direct presentation of certain events, persons or views is impossible or "dangerous", and is replaced by something else (it remainins possible, however, to recognize the intratextual signals which permit one to see the intended thing in its substitute). Two items seem to be important in this quasidefinition of mine. The first pertains to the "various reasons" in the situation. These are determined at once by the concept of cultural policy, the state of artistic and civil rights together with the related character of

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control institutions, and also by the personality of the artist implying the degree of submissiveness to pressure groups. The element generating such a situation is most often the activity of preventive censorship and the accompanying desire on the part of the artist to anticipate and avoid its rigors (one should not, however, associate "Aesopian communication" solely with political messages). The second issue in the definition concerns the understanding of intratextual signals directing the receiver's attention to concealed intentions. One of the more interesting examples of this strategy is provided by the comparison of two films by Andrzej Wajda - "Man of Marble" (1976) and "Man of Iron" (1981). The script of the former was rewritten several times, it took more than a decade for the film to enter production, and even the completed version was censored. Difficulties in distribution, an effective weapon against the recalcitrant in the hands of the sponsordistributor, duly befell "Man of Marble". Recall that 1976 stands out in the modern history of Poland as the year of a violent outbreak of workers' dissatisfaction that led to the culminative August of 1980. "Man of Iron", the title and subject of which were born during the director's meeting with the striking shipyard workers in August 1980, was ready in just under one year. This unprecedented tempo of production and the overall sense contained in the film resulted from an altogether different political situation: the liberalization of censorship, weakening of state propaganda and the freedom of expression granted to non-governmental opinion and to culture-forming circles. The plot organization of "Man of Marble" is formed by a network of metaphorical tensions. There occur four diegetic orders signalled by the opposition colormonochromatic : a) black-and-white sequence showing events from the period 1949-1956, recreated by posing them as documentary shots; b) black-and-white sequence, genuine newsreels from the years 1949-1956; c) Color sequence presenting the basic diegesis — the history of making a film set in the 1970s; d) color sequence presenting fictitious events from the 1950s. A more detailed analysis (presented by me in 1983 during the Polish-Hungarian semiotic conference in Katowice, see also Godzic, 1982, 1984) confirm that the connotation related to this system and ascribing the value of "truth" to the black-and-white sequences, and

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that of "artificial" narration to the color ones, is frequently disrupted. Also the scheme consisting in the simple reversal of this valuation, established in the opening shot of the film, is suspended. The narration of "Man of Marble" abounds in elements of ironic reversals of sense, and of incoherence which may be unified only through a critical and watchful appraisal of certain seemingly important pieces of information and, consequently, the construction of a different order from elements heretofore unimportant and transparent. The perusal of "Man of Marble" contains moments of illumination destroying the current outlook and creating a new understanding from the "old" elements selected according to a different principle. An important feature of this film is the absence of blatant opinions, one-sided argumentation and categorically held views — one is free to choose from among opinions. "Man of Iron", on the other hand, paradoxically approaches the formula it sets out to criticize. Even the most favorable reviewers of this film could not help noticing abuses and falsifications. The course of events in the final August days, known to millions of viewers from reality, was disrupted and rearranged to serve dramatic purposes. The structure of the hero strikes one as hackneyed and lacking distinctness; they are either crystal clear or totally negative. It would be futile to seek complicated tensions between narration sequences providing additional meaning. In fact the viewer required by such a text is not an intellectual subject deciphering perceptual puzzles but rather a passive object of assault and manipulation, a subject who is expected to Suspend his intellectual judgment and give in to emotions. One could describe this situation with the following metaphor: Aesop the slave delivers his tales before the not so stupid king. Some of the themes do not strike the fancy of the ruler but he allows Aesop to proceed, wearied by his subject's insistence. Aesop's tales are seemingly within the limits drawn by the kind of person who fails to notice the fact that the way in which the slave narrates, what he contrasts and what he combines harmoniously is significant. The king fails to notice this or he does not yet have to react (for a pragmatic agreement of this sort may also take place). Such is the case of "Man of Marble". Aesop, freed from his shackles, forgets his skill and wants to sign the wrongs he had suffered, he is intoxicated with flinging in the face of authority his own insults and the insults of those like him. Imperceptibly he ceases to differ from the court poets he hates so much. This in turn seems to be the case of

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" M a n of Iron". But w o u l d t h i s mean t h a t the oppression and l i m i t a tions inherent in particular political s y s t e m s b e c o m e paradoxical sources of highly artistic w o r k s ? I will p o i n t out here, w i t h all due carefulness, one aspect ovelooked by the narator of "Man of Iron" — t h e fact that "Aesopian communication" is characteristic, complex in reception and needing to b e learned by t h e receiver, by no means implies t h a t t h a t w h i c h is outside it is u n i m p o r t a n t and easily grasped in t h e sending-receiving game. Saying things openly is n e i t h e r the easiest nor the m o s t effective w a y of influencing others. T h e a b o v e e x a m p l e m a y b e u s e d as a n i l l u s t r a t i o n o f different things. According to m e it supports the intuition of Christian M e t z (1975:3-55) t h a t the film signifiant and signifie are equally v a l i d indicators of t h e film's h i d d e n meanings, that "form" tells us m o r e about the actual meaning than the "content". Contrary to Metz, however, I believe that in political c i n e m a the signifiant is n o t always less involved in the i m a g i n e d (the reason for t h i s according to M e t z is the need to m a i n t a i n a direct contact w i t h the public). In m y o p i n i o n the involvement in the imagined m a y also b e c a u s e d by the tension between the various "realities" in t h e presented diegeses. The above e x a m p l e also signals the p r o b l e m of r e l a tions b e t w e e n c o m m u n i c a t i o n and signification. It is n o t m y intention t o judge w h e t h e r one should agree w i t h t h e opinion t h a t semiology of c o m m u n i c a t i o n is not a separate s e m i o l o g y b u t only a small p a r t of semiology t o u t court (Prieto, 1979:31) or w h e t h e r one should e m b r a c e the contrary v i e w regarding c o m m u n i c a t i o n as a b r o a d e r d o m a i n containing n u m e r o u s p a r a s e m i o t i c aspects (see also Bettetini, 1975:76-80). I am convinced that it is impossible to reconcile t h e t w o d i s c i p l i n e s . If w e a s s u m e t h a t J o h n d o e s n o t c o m m u n i c a t e to M a r y and neither does M a r y to John b u t t h a t both are e n g a g e d in communication, t h e n the d e f i n i t i o n of c o m m u n i c a t i o n as t h e act of information conveyance b e c o m e s less important. M u c h m o r e substantial then is the integrating factor such as, for example, the sustenance of the system's operation, control over the process of interaction, or the reference of partial m e s s a g e s to the broader context. The t w o strategies distinguished b y W o r t h (attribution and i m plication inference) now b e c o m e essentially complementary: t h e uncovering of m e a n i n g is coupled w i t h the ascribing of stereotype meanings. Advancing h e r e one's o w n proposition of

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understanding film meaning, one must point out (in agreement with Worth and Metz) the importance of distinguishing the dispositions of the viewer formed prior to the film show and that which he inserts into the film during or after contact with it. As a subject of a film work I am about to see, I am already disposed towards it and prepared. For instance, I treat the screen space as meaningful. I know that the screen's bottom is "heavier" than its top, that the shapes and dimensions will depend on the background, that I regard certain spatial discretions and gradients (of light and lines) as more natural than others; moreover, 1 do not feel central perspective to be artificial, the sequence of elements is by no means unimportant, etc. I know all this but it does not mean I am aware of it; the film screen before projection is filled with meanings. I agree to accept the peculiar cultural role of "voluntary captive" in a darkened room and, equipped with all the contexts of my own culture, of the foreign culture and of the peculiar film subculture, I proceed to watch.... I search for a name, a beginning. I know that "what has a beginning exists", I know that it can model (prefigure, evoke) that which is to follow. 1 thus observe that the manner and the moment in which the film is "named" may be meaningful. And so we can have matters so that: - in the beginning of the film, against an insignificant, dull background we are presented with the data on the film, - the credits come also in the beginning but against a film scene which may be continued after the credits are finished; the lettering may be stylized and the background an ingeniously composed arrangement of geometrical figures; - the film credits appear after some time, after the diegetic exposition; - we enter a film without a name, without title credits, and only after the end of the "action" there appear the names of the contributors; - finally, we get no information whatsoever that what we are viewing is a film; we may be informed about this fact by a cinema poster or by an announcement in the course of the show. Let us see if the application of each of the above types carries with it hidden information: in the case of the first type someone tells me that I am hereby "entering a different world, I am passing the threshold here and now"; the fourth type tells me "1 am now leading you out from the world of illusion, what you have just seen was fiction". The intermediate types

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generate the sense of illusion and at the same time announce its presence. Not only do film credits model and inspire attitudes: the viewer knows that the initial, opening shots inform him about the way in which that which is to follow will be recounted. This system of expectations as to the kind of cutting, preferred means of expression and technical methods is created instantaneously but not, however, through static description. This system may be modified and may fall victim to interference, but it will always be confronted with the initial one. Such a hypothesis makes it possible to look differently at the problem of connotation; that which forms the system of expectations prior to the film and in the first moments of its presentation is in fact a kind of rhetorical strategy, and also, doubtless, a connotation. It creates an "aura", it places me in a suitable context, informs me about the rules of the genre, leads me to the recognition of the applied kind of persuasion. This type of connotation precedes denotation (recognition of the presented world) and models it (I choose to watch objects, characters and their relations that are significant for the strategy — the previous connotation — and confirm it) and conditions a new type of connotation, namely one superimposed on the recognized diegesis. The "second" connotation consists in filling "that which is presented" with some selected matrix of symbolic meanings "taken from the culture". The most important issue here seems to be the fact that such an addition — the superimposition of symbolic relations — takes place, it is important that it occurs, and that there must exist inside the film elements which demand a unifying look from the outside, an application of a specific (or only "blurred") pattern-formula. It is in these nodes that I locate the complementary meaning: it is formed by those elements of the film work which attract a certain peculiar type of connotation in the second sense and film-specific sequences communicating such events or evaluations thereof which are not shown or expressed literally. The peculiarity of this "connotation" lies in the fact that it is created exclusively by syntagmatic systems, harmonies possible only in film communication. The complementary meaning is preceded by a certain model framework which co-creates rhetorical persuasion, whereas all mental operations following it are already an interpretation. Characteristic of the appearance of complementary meanings in a single film is its openness towards other systems of meaning — more or less codified, more or less external with respect to the world of this concrete film parole.

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The complementary meaning is determined by four fundamental factors, the selection criteria of which are the principal structural features of the film message. First, complementary meaning appears between adjacent shots. This type of meaning, overexploited in the history of the cinema and by now largely given up, loses its ability to form additional meaning as a result of, among other things, the use of intraframe cutting, focus depth and the extension in time of shot-sequences. Paradoxically, however, it continues to elude description: John Caroll (1980), who attempted to determine the fundamental rules of film communication according to the pattern of generative grammer in language communication notes with astonishment that successively analysed eminent films fail to obey some law, different in every case. One could say that film is a non-language, that it is not even a practice of communication according to fixed rules, but that it is first of all an individual manifestation of parole. It seems that the strategy of Aesopian communication, being a subtle procedure, avoids this kind of combination. Secondly, the complementary meaning appears inside the image, the shot. This is a special kind of syntagmatics, i.e. diachronic presentation within one shot, one image. In Eisenstein's film "The Old and the New" (1927) a peasant woman is shown against a Hona Lisa portrait hanging on the wall, thanks to which the peasant character is infused with connotation derived from the portrait. It is characteristic that this shocking combination in a single frame was received by viewers as an actual clash of two frames (something the director was also aware of). As film technology progressed and it became possible to apply focus depth, this method became generally used. Thirdly, as a special case of the first method, the complementary meaning may appear between layers — between "that which is shown" and "that which is given to be heard". Probably from its very beginning, film theory pointed out the ease with which audible elements render the meaning of the image unimportant, amplify it or insert their own meanings into it. In their 1928 "Declaration" Eisenstein, Pudovkin and Aleksandrov call for development going in the direction of "separating the sound of a squeaking shoe from its image". Balazs and Arnheim, in their codification of the means of expression of silent film see an inexhaustible source of meanings in the act of simultaneously seeing and hearing. Present-day film does not ignore this natural and specific potency of meaning. It seems that the opposition of that which the viewer contributes from the

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outside of his personality (from the culture) and the viewer's natural preferences, assumed by some theoreticians, is particularly manifest in this instance. Fourthly, complementary meaning is formed over the entire film work. Examples here may be both the "insignificant", "transparent" elements acquiring additional meaning in the context of the whole film, but also a peculiar organization of the work (for example tensions between two diegetic orders in Alain Resnais's "La Providence" or Wajda's "Man of Marble"). It appears that the most suitable kind of rhetorical strategy is developed along these lines, a strategy which replaces the immanent entertainment quality of cinema by the joys of the intellectual game of arranging meanings. It is possible that all I had to say on this subject may be summarised by the definition of sign given by Jerzy Pelc (1980:124), suggesting that we regard as primary the question "what do we mean when we say that at time t someone uses something as a sign of something else?" I regard this formulation as a bridge over the (admittedly rather shallow) rift between semiotics and communication. It also makes it possible to regard film as one of the most semiotic messages demanding not only to be consumed "here and now" but also requiring the activation of all possible contexts in order to be able to solve the puzzle-text and avoid communication noise. This is proved by, among others, the phenomenon of "Aesopian communication" in film. Chair of Film and TV Jagiellonian University Cracow, Poland NOTE 1.

The term "Aesopian communication" is used, among others, by Polish literature theory analysing the disguise of political sense in Polish novels of the Positivist type and in Czech literature.

REFERENCES Bettetini, Gianfranco (1975). Produzione del senso e messa in scena. Milano : Bompiani. Caroll, John (1980). Toward a Structural Psychology of Cinema. The Hague: Mouton Publishers. (See chapter titled "Transformational Generative Cinema Grammar".)

Eco, Umberto (1979). Lector in fabula. Milano: Bompiani. Godzic, Wies^aw (1982). Komunikowanie filmowe a retoryka (Film Communication vs rhetoric). In Film: tekst i kontekst (Film: Text and Context), 61-76, Helman and Godzic (eds.). Katowice: Silesian University Publishers. (1984). Film i metafora. Pojççie metafory w historii mysli filmowe~j. (Film and Metaphor. The Concept of Metaphor in Film Theory). Katowice: Silesian University Publishers. Metz, Christian (1975). La signifiant imaginaire. Communications 23:3-55. Paris: Seuil. Pelc, Jerzy (1980). Anak (Sign). Studia Semiotyczne 10: 123-154. Warszawa. Prieto, Louis (1979). Semiologia, conoscenza, communicazione. Rivista illustrata della comunicazione 0-1:26-31, Milano. Thompson, W.N. (1970). Communication, Communication, Theory and Rhetoric. In Language Behavior. A Book of Readings in Communications, 78-95, Akin and others (eds). The Hague, Paris: Mouton Publishers. Worth, Sol (1978). Man is Not a Bird. Semiotica 23-1/2: 5-28.

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ANTONIO GALA'S AVIARY: A SEMIOTIC PERSPECTIVE ON BIRD SIGNS IN EL CEMENTERIO DE LOS PAJAROS Dinda L. Gorlée

This paper is a by-product of my teaching translation at the University of Groningen, the Netherlands, during the spring term of 1983, and the net result of working on the Dutch version of the contemporary Spanish play El cementerio de los pájaros, by Antonio Gala. The latest Gala play to be produced after his successful Petra Regalada (1980), El cementerio de los pájaros opened in Madrid, at the Teatro de la Comedia, on September 17, 1982, under the direction of Manuel Collado, and both audience and critics received it with warmth and enthusiasm. According to Haro Tecglen's review (1982), the performances of Encarna Paso as Martina and Irene Gutierrez Caba in the leading role of Bnilia received outstanding ovation, and the playwright himself received 'vítores y bravos.' Born in 1936 in Córdoba, Andalusia, Gala has written for theatre, television and film as well as for magazines and newspapers. Partly silenced by frequent frictions with censorship during Franco's regime, Gala gained fame after the dictator's death in 1975. Thematically steeped in the essence of Hispanic history, culture and present-day sociopolitical situation, Gala's dramas are highly verbal; and, merging realism and symbolism, they often employ humor although they deal with such profound human values as love, freedom, democracy and justice. As its title suggests, the play El cementerio de los pájaros 'The Birds' Cemetery' establishes a complex system of signs relating to birds; consequently, in my paper, I approach Gala's multiplex bird imagery and multifarious bird sound from a semiotic point of view, in order to elicit their semiosis, that is the process by which these signs generate meaning. Fusing its poetic and political metaphors, El cementerio de los pájaros, Gala's gripping, allegorical three-act play, concerns the universal themes of the human condition: the freedom to make choices about a meaningful existence; the anxiety of loneliness and the quest for affection and love; the search for independence and power, and the dilemma of sex; the meaninglessness of life and the chaos resulting from lack of values, moral corruption and soul-destroying materialism; furthermore, the injustice and inhumanity of a society controlled by coercion and murder. Though with minimal action and much dialogue, the play focuses on seven grotesque characters—six characters and an implied seventh—caught in a family imbroglio which severely tries their beliefs and morals and threatens to havoc their daily life. In fact, the entire plot revolves around the family of an old man, the onetime epitome of power and prestige, who is slowly

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expiring offstage—a family assembled for the occasion but not brought together at a time of a crisis. The setting is the high-ceilinged, sombre hall of a poorly refurbished seventeenth-century Spanish mansion. It is Saint John's Eve: the merry-night that is celebrated in the nearby village with a vigil during which families and friends gather around bonfires to dance and sing, and to sanctify aromatic herbs which are believed to have magical powers to bring love and fertility. On the night before his saint's feast don Juan Bautista Aguayo, the tyrannical paterfamilias, lies dying in his upstairs bedroom out of the public view. He is nursed by his loving and beloved granddaughter, sixteen-year-old Laria, and he remains offstage throughout the performance. Downstairs the members of his family sit about the stage engaging in vicious quarrels with each other and about their inheritance: "la casa." If the characters are trapped by the ennui of the "celebration," it is this morbid activity which draws them together and makes them need one another. The old man's mediocre eldest son, fifty-nine-year-old Deogracias, spends his time compulsively fitting together the parts of a jigsaw puzzle and eating popcorn. He is reduced to a mere shadow by his castrating wife, Bnilia, fifty-two years of age, the strong-willed female who bosses the demoralized family and domineers with energy and power. Deogracias' younger brother, forty-seven-year-old Nicodemo, idles time away as a fanatical jogger and a sculptor manqué. While he struggles to suppress his homosexual inclinations, his vulgar, lusty wife, thirty-eight-year-old Martina, drowns her troubles in drink. Both middle-aged couples look back in anger and frustration on their loveless, valueless, wasted lives. Ironically, they sacrifice freedom inasmuch as they surrender their dreams and aspirations and act taking into account materialistic emotions rather than moral principles. To be sure, after her grandfather's death, Laria, who is the daughter of Deogracias and Emilia, plans to start a new life with Miguel, the thirty-five-year-old outsider who coincidentally happens to be of Aguayo ancestry, and who presents himself at the family gathering like a dëus ex machina. But the young lovers awaiting the impending liberation do not succeed to break out of the family trap together or to embark upon the kind of life they wish to lead. Characteristically, they never attain the purposeful existence of love and fellowship they fantasize about, because Miguel gets mortally wounded by malicious Emilia who makes her fatal decision to inmólate the jeopardizing rival in order to protect her position of power as well as her vested interest in her father-in-law's estate. Though her insane conduct offends against any law, Emilia, the malcontent woman turned sovereign ruler, claims what she covets. The degree of freedom she professes is purely egotistic, and hazardous to her foes. I propose now to examine closely the visual and sonic bird signs that abound in the play and are pertinent to the characterization and the dramatic structure. When the curtain rises at the beginning of the first act, the audience confronts two showcases filled with numerous stuffed birds

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belonging to the moribund old man. As it turns out this macabre display of naturaleza muerta sickens Einilia and Martina. Martina reveals her discomfort in the following words: 'Qué feísimo es el hijoputa' (Gala 14). Her annoyance emulates Einilia's anxiety and revulsion: 'No, esto no puede ser. La soledad, el polvo y estos pájaros apolillados ,' and 'No puedo soportar más estos pájaros mudos' (Gala 13, 21). Einilia delves into the past and blames her father-inlaw for the bankruptcy of her life; degraded, she employs all her energies to gain self-determination and to boost the familial morale. Einilia, the protagonist, prevails on the others to murder the bedridden family despot who persists to frighten, bewilder and oppress his family, because Einilia conceives of his demise as their 'hora de volar' (Gala 20). She desperately attempts to emancipate herself and her associates: 'No podemos dejar para cuando él se muera ni el gusto de vivir, ni la esperanza. Porque, con él arriba, no hay mañana Seremos libres. Heredaremos y seremos libres' (Gala 22).' Offstage, as if conspicuously warning against Emilia's freedom declaration, birds start to twitter in the garden. Martina calls them swallows, Deogracias—swifts. Emilia ignores the petty controversy and rebukes them instead for being cowards: 'Con la cabeza bajo el ala, así seguís' (Gala 23). Solicitous about the future, Emilia urges joint action to amend their situation; and, mindful of her father-in-law's monstrous menagerie, she opts for 'el arsénico que usa para disecar esta mugre' (Gala 25). Subsequently, Nicodemo recalls that his father developed a knack for killing the birds painlessly: 'Cuando un pájaro está agonizando, se le aprieta con dos dedos debajo de las alas, así, para no estropearlo. Y se hunde, sin sentirlo, en la muerte. Se lo vi hacer a él' (Gala 25). In response, Einilia presents a small bottle containing 'estas pastillas. Un sueño, y ya está' (Gala 25). Death permeates the atmosphere. Now, while Emilia pours the poison into the old man's wineglass, the birds stop chirping in the garden. Laria comes down the stairs and announces that her grandfather has just died. The second act begins some hours later, after supper. The two women on stage, Bnilia and Martina, are tipsy and flushed with sudden victory. Emilia rejoices and drinks to liberty: 'Tocaos el cuello. ¡Veis? Ya no tenéis su pie encima. ¡Vino! Vamos a brindar. ¡Vino!' (Gala 30). Martina, too, declares her happiness: 'Sois libres, hijos de la gran puta' (Gala 30). Nevertheless, she admits that the ghastly stuffed birds still hurt her feelings and continue to upset her: 'Lo que más me molesta es esta bandada de agoreros mirándonos' (Gala 31). Einilia retorts: 'Bah, son los pájaros postumos. Tienen los ojos de cristal y el buche de algodones y pajas. Mira lo que hago yo con tus fantasmas. Hay que despanzurrarlos' (Gala 31); and demonstratively she rips one of the dead birds open. While Einilia furiously messes up the bird's contents, it produces a whistling sound that startles those who witness the scene. Emilia, the heiress apparent, proceeds to redecorate the living room; as they start moving about the furniture they find a chest with old clothes. Einilia and Martina then dress up and enact the seduc-

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tion of fourteen-year-old Martina by her licentious employer, don Juan Bautista Aguayo whose dead body now lies upstairs. Miguel arrives, intervenes and asserts the true nature of freed cm: 'Ahora ya están, señores, libres del abuelo. Desde hoy se tendrán que preguntar para qué. Y se convencerán de que lo importante no es estar libre, sino serlo. Y también lo difícil Por mucho que abramos las vitrinas, ¿creen que estos pájaros romperán a cantar? Y, sin embargo, ni eso es imposible ' (Gala 46). In the third act, we witness the vigil held over the deceased far into the night, and the renewal of speculations and angry arguments about who is going to be heir presumptive. However, Miguel dashes their hopes when he proclaims they are little short of ruined and therefore forced to envisage a major change in their style of living: 'Si han de cambiar, no basta con mudar las cortinas, quemar los muebles viejos, o con que el basurero se lleve este cementerio de pájaros. Hay que plantearse en serio, quiénes somos, cono somos, a qué aspiramos. Y cumplirlo. Si no, esto volvería a ser otro cementerio de otros pájaros' (Gala 53). No one argues with his authoritative message. But after a while Deogracias objects it is too late for him to change: 'Yo ya estoy disecado, metido en una jaula conocida' (Gala 59). The following scene is a love dialogue. Laria reveals to her lover that when She was a little girl she sensed that he was coming because 'todo el día me pasaba oyendo cantar pájaros. Hasta éstos me cantaban. Todo el aire era pájaros' (Gala 60). Miguel answers teasingly: 'A pájaros tienes tú esta cabeza de chorlito', and narrates thereafter the romantic fable of their future life together: Vamos a escuchar el canto de todos los pájaros del mundo. Yo conozco unos que nunca se alcanzan, ni a tiros ni a pedradas, y que, de repente, ellos mismos descienden y se te posan en la mano trinando. Unos pájaros que nadie sabe dónde tienen su nido, y no están muertos como ésos, sino que cualquier mal aire puede herirlos, porque son delicados y mortales. (Gala 61) Like we are, Laria comments. When tneir child she is expecting will be born, Miguel augurs, 'uando lo tengas en los brazos, cuando tengas la vida ya en los brazos, romperán a cantar todos los pájaros, hasta los disecados. Quien puede dar la vida, puede hacer el milagro' (Gala 63). Laria falls asleep, while the birds in the garden start singing again. Miguel informs Nicodemo how much he resembles his father: 'También su padre fue escultor a su modo', and he quotes the old man' s complaint: 'El remedo de vida de los pájaros es lo que me han dejado. En esta silla no puedo ya vivir, sino imitar la vida.' Nicodemo acknowledges shivering: 'Igual que yo' (Gala 65). At that moment Miguel commences another bird parable in which he confesses that in his childhood he tortured decoy-birds, depriving them of their freedom and afterwards destroying them. But Nicodemo's response to the implicit appeal is like his brother Deogracias'. He is unable to become a free person and to make a fresh start in his life.

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Emilia's sneer at Miguel's efforts to awaken Nicodemo's and Martina's self-respect is interrupted by the repeated crowing of an invisible cock, and still another mysterious bird starts singing after Miguel's fierce assault on Emilia's secret plans: 'Usted, en el fondo, admiraba al abuelo porque estaba muy por encima de sus hijos. Usted, en el fondo, no pretende que se altere el orden de esta casa; pretende que todo siga como estaba con un ligero cambio: ocupar usted el puesto del abuelo' (Gala 68). Miguel ignores Emilia's evasive remark about the singing bird being a nightingale: 'No, no es un ruiseñor' (Gala 68). He continues his cold analysis of Emilia's evil nature: 'Deogracias se queda. Usted, que es incapaz de amor, lo ha disecado mucho más que el abuelo a ningún pájaro' (Gala 69). The long, tense silence that follows their argument is brutally torn by a strange croack which scares Einilia whom Miguel has left alone on stage. In the face of real danger, she rallies against Miguel's intrigues to the others: 'Caemos en sus redes aleteando cano pájaros' (Gala 70). When the old man's will is read naming Laria and Miguel as sole heirs, Einilia sighs bitterly: 'El mal ya estaba hecho: antes de morirse, el viejo se había ocupado de matarnos y colocarnos sin remisión en sus estanterías' (Gala 72). But Einilia does not submit to her father-in-law's last will. Pointing to Miguel, who is out in the garden digging a grave for his father, Emilia proclaims, invoking the name of God: 'ay un ave de presa ahí fuera, cernida, con las garras dispuestas a llevarse a tu hija...' (Gala 74). She wants Miguel dead. We may now take a step beyond the surface sign structure. The role of birds in El cementerio de los pájaros is clearly linked with the topic of freedom. Gala avoids cliches and banality; he does not employ conventional bird imagery and does not write of characters who, for example, are free as birds. Instead, Martina sees Miguel as 'libre como la luz'(Gala 37). The playwright introduces a surprising profusion of freshly invented bird images which become the leading structural device of this play. According to von Mering, the life of a "free" individual can be described as a history of binding and freeing oneself socially and emotionally. The essential components of this experience are: . . . an irreducible minimum of (1) external (societal or inter-individual) contention or strife, as well as internal (or inner) conflict, tension, or stress; (2) perceiving and coping with varying degrees of uncertainty (incompleteness or unfinishedness); (3) finding occasions or opportunity to take risks, and to gage consequences in terms of symbolic and tangible cost or price; (4) anticipating change, in general or in the particular, within immediate and distal or future contexts of existence; and an irreducible minimum of (5) being rooted in aloneness within a matrix of relational approximations to others throughout the life-cycle. (117) I apply this criterion of the individual experience of freedom in order to study the dramatis personae of El cementerio de los pájaros.

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Deogracias settles for the immediate: his jigsaw puzzle is his raison d'être as well as his solace. He is not taking any chances, he abdicates his joie de vivre, he resists to gamble on the future; spiritually dead, he needs no longer to assert his own independence or strength, because in his lifetime of intimidation he has killed all real emotions in himself. Deogracias never speaks of freedom: he personifies "unfreedom" which, according to von Mering, results 'from finding oneself in a position where others shape and alter completely one's perception of fact; where others manipulate and gradually modify, uproot or supplant one's images or conceptions of value ; or, where others penetrate, weaken and replace from within the entire social order one lives in' (112, n. 1). Deogracias blames his father for his disgrace: 'Pero si no nos dejaba respirar: era como una losa' (Gala 43). But he allows his father to taunt him and to humiliate him with derogatory remarks, such as 'pollo de granja1 or 'cagada de pavo'; and he tolerates his wife's verbal abuse, for example, 'gallina' (Gala 24, 58). Symbolically, indeed, ironically, he eats popcorn all day, like a real domestic fowl. His life is marked by failure, but he clings to his snug habitual place, because without élan vital he cannot escape from the hermetic confines which allow no space for maneuver. However, when challenged by Miguel, Deogracias comes to recognize some of the danger his docile capitulation and imprisonment in the familial "cage" represents, and he reveals his ambivalent feelings identifying himself with the inert stuffed birds encaged in his father's collection. Deogracias is stranded in a limbo, and, to some degree, of course, his hibernation as a substitute for living meaningfully is the equivalent of death. Like his brother, Nicodemo keeps a low profile. But unlike Deogracias, he is torn by inner conflict. On the one hand he is Martina's lawful husband, and has to accept her extramarital adventures that turn him into an object of ridicule; while on the other hand, his homosexual inclinations, which were drastically tabooed by his father, have become an everlasting torment to him. Middle-aged, lonely and unloved, Nicodemo is brutally confronted with the realistic possibility of freeing himself, when Miguel tells him the poignant story of the tortured decoy-birds: 'El hombre comete contra los pájaros crímenes atroces. De niño, salía yo a cazarlos... Un compañero—Agustín, Tino—para utilizarlos como reclamo, les atornillaba aquí en el esternón, una hembrilla y los ataba a ella. Otras veces, les obligaba a tragar perdigones, y ese peso en el buche los mantenía quietos...' Miguel comes up with an interesting moral lesson in the context of Nicodemo's life situation: Matar es malo, pero hay cosas peores... No dejar libre a la vida es peor que matarla... Usted está ejerciendo su propia represión; usted es su carcelero. Sueña con ser aceptado tal cono es por un grupo comprensivo y semejante, es decir por un gheto. Y en un gheto no se es libre jamás: el gesto de la libertad es el de abrir. Ella fecunda y multiplica, ccmo el amor. (Gala 65)

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But in the final analysis Nicodemo, conditioned by his past experience of "unfreedom," is unable to open freely on the subject and to become into his own. The commitment is too risky for him. And halfheartedly, he settles instead for a future riddled with white lies, ad hoc solutions, daydreaming and small rebellions. Martina pretends to know the meaning of the word freedom. With nostalgic idealization she discourses upon the aura of bohemian freedom, unhindered by bourgeois narrow-mindedness, that surrounded Miguel's mother, who in spite of being don Juan Bautista's lover and the mother of his third son, always remained free, like her free-born son Miguel. But in Martina's own life, freedom is a distant dream, a privilege not enjoyed by have-nots whose main preoccupation is securing day-to-day survival. Martina, who plays the role of family harlot in return for doubtful social and financial security, conceives of freedom as free choice of her sexual partner: 'Nada más entrar por esa puerta, comprendí tras lo que el viejo andaba. Bajé al pueblo y me entregué a un muchacho... Sin pedir nada a cambio, sin aspirar a nada. La única vez en mi vida que he sido libre yo...' (Gala 72). Martina's life is governed by the needs of others. More than anything else she is a servant, and, subsequently, giving up her menial position is too hazardous for her: 'Pero, ¿adonde voy ya?, ¿qué me queda que pueda darle a alguien? Yo quiero ser de alguien' (Gala 56). For Martina, the price of freedom is prohibitive. She compensates for her frustration with pseudofreedom: much free talking, drinking, promiscuous sex and wishful thinking. Deogracias, Nicodemo and Martina are basically unfree persons; neither of them fulfills the requirements for personal freedom formulated by von Mering; neither of them can cope with stress and uncertainty; neither of them is prepared to leap into the dark in order to eventually enhance the quality of their lives; neither of them has sufficient inner resources to live alone or at least to consider functioning outside the family clan, even though the patriarch's death brought about a crisis that could lead to a new configuration of their lives. The two brothers have always lived under the stifling regimes of a tyrannical father and his replica, Emilia, and identify themselves, or are identified with a series of non-flying or even dead birds: stuffed birds, caged birds, birds with broken wings, decoy-birds, tortured birds. Confined to a terrestrial habitat, they subsist as prisoners of confirmed habit and domesticity. Martina is rebellious by nature, but she cherishes freedom merely as a benefit existing beyond her reach: freedom is a dream. With no actual apprehension of freedom, but a life of domestic and sexual servitude, and a lifelong experience of being subject to domination, she is easily manipulated by Einilia's power politics. Bnilia claims first to be a champion of freedom. She holds out bright prospects of spiritual liberation to her fellows, and employs her only positive bird image: flying. But, by contrast, her words and actions reveal that her idea of spreading her wings means financial rather than spiritual emancipation. Her attention is focused on securing the heritage. Miguel's entrance marks a turning-point

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in Emilia's concept of freedom. After having at first been extremely anxious to reach freedom, or her version of it, Miguel makes her change her mind about the desirability of a freedom which may mean loneliness for her. Emilia's fears of becoming lonely mirror Martina's in the sense that Martina wants, more than anything else, to belong and to serve: while Emilia desperately needs the others to be free, i.e. to have the power to enslave them, and to use that power. When Miguel encourages the others to leave the house, Bnilia whines half-drunk: ' -Y qué va a ser de mí? Sola con Deogracias. Yo, aquí, sola. ¿De que mé servirá la libertad? ¿En quién voy a mandar?' (Gala 69). Her version of freedom is power and she is fully aware of the fact that Miguel, with his honeyed discourse, is undermining her authority. Miguel's strange mixture of paradise nostalgia and pragmatism makes him into a perfect object of Laria's unconditional love and idealization as well as a target of Emilia's hate, fear and aggression. Martina's attitude towards him is ambiguous: she greatly admires him for his life of freedom, but his actual message goes beyond the limited scope of her mind. Laria is, as femne à homme, completely identified with her lover. Miguel dedicates his romantic bird-sprinkled fairy-tale to his bride. Their tête-à-tête swarms with singing birds, birds of love and birds of life that will be their companions on the quest that they want to undertake together. These magical birds enjoy communicating with humans and even possess human traits themselves. They contrast sharply with the immobile birds that inhabit the house. In Emilia's distorted perspective, Miguel represents an overt threat to her freedom. He is the "bird of prey" who is scheming to alienate Laria from her parents, and to take the deceased's place as head of the family. Emilia projects her own greed unto Miguel, who, like the old man's avatar, is doomed to die at her hands. The confrontation between Miguel and Bnilia is, in the final analysis, a collision of two mutually exclusive conception of freedom. In this process, the other characters play only subordinate roles. Miguel's cause is supported by Laria; while his opponent, Emilia, fights her way to her freedom by clever manipulation and psychological subdual of the others. They are her accomplices as well as her victims. In terms of their individual freedom, Deogracias, Nicodemo and, to a high degree, Martina, have zero denotations and minimal connotations. As receivers of contrary signs they are, subsequently, in no position to make responsible choices. The absence of a previous non-linguistic experience of freedom, that is shared by all the participants involved in the communication, provides for the generation of non-significant emotional interprétants. Bnilia's as well as Miguel's verbal signs of freedom are based on sign-systems that Deogracias, Nicodemo and Martina are unfamiliar with. Therefore, they fail to make sense of them. Emilia, the "expert" who controls the communicational situation

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in the first half of the play, lures the others with the suggestive force of her father-in-law's stuffed birds. This stratagem induces them to embrace her view on how their humiliating situation may be amended. The negative iconic image of "unfreedom" is made to stand for their collective frustration and victimization. As a result, Emilia's code which implies that the old man's death means freedom, is adopted as their family code by default. Nevertheless, Emilia has Thus maneuvred them into the pitfalls of her private code of freedom, because they implicitly yield to her malicious desire to seize power. Coincidentally, her Machtergreifung will alltogether deprive them of liberty. Emilia realizes that her freedom will be in jeopardy if her new subjects succumb to the seductive power of Miguel's living, singing, humanized birds. The array of positive birds stands for Miguel's freedom which mirrors von Mering's "aloneness." For Emilia, however, these same bird signs mean loneliness, i.e., "unfreedom." From her viewpoint, they are subversive of her recently established authority, as they sabotage her monopoly in producing interpretant signs. The fact is that Miguel's verbal bird signs introduce the alternative possibility of individualized criteria for valid argument against the practice of one leading principle that holds carte blanche and filters all interpretation. In order to secure her one-dimensional axis of freedom as power, Emilia needs to frustrate the embryonic dialogue. Under coercion, Deogracias, Nicodemo and Martina abandon the therapeutic attempt at free and dynamical interpretation of signs. The ultimate paradox that equates freedom with enslavement is illustrated by Emilia's apocalyptic and categorical declaration: 'Hemos salido de una tiranía; no estoy dispuesta a entrar en otra. La tiranía de la libertad es la peor, porque no la conocemos y no estamos en edad de aprenderla' (Gala 74). Einilia's power is counterbalanced by the others' victimization, their paralyzing confusion and distress. In Emilia's private code of values, the sign of freedom disengages itself progressively from its possible referent in reality, and is granted a referential mobility, permitting it even to be used in antithetical semantic contexts like, f.ex., "la tiranía de la libertad:" "freedom" becomes "unfreedom." Emilia's dogjnatic paradox reminds us inevitably of the nightmarish slogan of Oceania in George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-four "Freedom is Slavery." Emilia's totalitarian Newspeak echoes Francisco Franco's fascist rhetorics as he claimed that in a disorganized country, full of idealists and passionate dreamers—as he chose to refer to his fellow countrymen—one mast believe in unity and discipline; and reject "luxuries" like individual freedom which might only lead to anarchy. The Generalissimo's ghost still haunts Spain today in the same spirit as his dramatized double—don Juan Bautista Aguayo— continues posthumously to tyrannize his relatives who outlived his regime. The political overtones of El cementerio de los pájaros are clear. Locked in incommunication, there is no space for maneuver, compromise, or reconciliation. As Emilia's conflict with Miguel becomes

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acute, she relapses into a violent "solution." The elimination of Einilia's second antagonist will restore the status quo to the effect that Einilia gains complete control over the family situation. Their collective murder—perpetrated by Einilia but silently sanctioned by the others—renews the group spirit on a basis of complicity closely welded. In this fashion, the play's dramatic anticatharsis—murder— replaces freedom and dialogue with its monstrous counterfeit portrait. So far this has been a study of El cementerio de los pájaros as a play dealing symbolically with human and non-human—animate and inanimate—birds. I have concentrated upon the semiotic quality of the dialogue and the objects displayed on stage. Among these linguistic and nonlinguistic signs I found a recurrent use of signs relating human beings and human behaviour to birds and bird life. But the play reaches a really polysemic dimension by yet another category of avian signs—the acoustic messages delivered by various birds in the garden. Although they remain offstage, their sonic irruptions into the dramatic situation do not function as mere background sound or even noise, but as significative signs. In the beginning of the play, these birds seem to utter innocent noises that arouse no special attention. The humans—dramatic characters as well as spectators—interpret the twitter indexically, as deictic signs of the hidden presence of some birds. This explains Deogracias' and Martina's brief disagreement about whether the noisemakers are swallows or swifts. Since the birds are as invisible as their sound is audible, it is not probable that Deogracias and Martina refer to the fact both species resemble each other closely in appearance, and usually fly together in mixed flocks. Rather, they do not know the distinction between the swift's 'grito áspero' and the swallow's call, a 'tsuit-tsuit-tsuit,' that, in case of alarm, becomes a piercing 'tsuic' (Heinzel et al.: 206). The denotative response is really a camouflage which only half-conceals the causal connection between the acoustic signs as produced by the birds and. the murderous scheme that has just before been proposed by Emilia. The bird sounds in El cementerio de los pájaros are no accidental natural phenomena, but highly motivated and meaningful signs produced and sent by humanized beings as a device to communicate with the humans. For in literature everything is possible, as nothing is required to have truth value in reality. The only instance in which the birds register a positive vocal referent is when they sing a love song or lullaby for Laria who has fallen asleep on her lover's lap. The singing birds, however, are brutally silenced by Martina's noisy intrusion. The other sonic bird signs mean warning for inminent danger, and chorus the human action on stage. On the moment of the old man's death, for instance, the sudden silence—the abrupt absence of bird noise—suggests horror vacui and becomes more than an index, a glaring icon of life broken off. The increasingly sinister nature of the bird calls compels reaction and attention, and induces the human listeners to search for meaning. According to Greenlee, the same sign may function significatlvely in more ways than one: 'There seems to be no good reason to

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suppose that the same sign may not function both as an icon and as an index; e.g., a footprint may both iconically represent the foot it is a likeness of (in respect of size) and indexically present itself as a sign causally related to its object (86). It follows that the various bird calls in El cementerio de los pájaros may be interpreted to designate their objects both indexically and iconically with the full signification of alarm cries emitted by birds of omen as a repeated warning against Elnilia's murderous hysteria. The effect made on the audience is, indeed, one of impending doom. Emilia remains, or pretends to remain, outwardly unaffected by the general atmosphere of confusion produced by the alarming signs. The iconical meaning of the sonic signs purports to elude her and she chooses to be expediently restrictive in her sense-making. Since she interprets all vocal bird signs strictly as indexes, she remains deaf to the birds' messages. As a result, Emilia does not attend to the ominous crowing of a cock. The pertinent stage direction says intriguingly: 'Un canto de gallo que se repetirá' (Gala 66), a text reminiscent of Christ's response to Peter: 'Verily, verily, I say unto thee, the cock shall not crow till thou hast denied me thrice,' which marks the beginning of Christ's Passion (John 13,38). Emilia identifies the singing of a bird as a nightingale's song, but identifies it falsely. Apparently, she knows this most renowned of songbirds by name, but not by ear. In any case, she ignores the sign's deeper meaning. Neither is Emilia any more than momentarily startled by the ultimate 'graznido extraño' (Gala 69), because her immediate emotional recognition of this croacking sound is not followed by further interpretation in terms of action or reflection, directed towards habit-changing. Emilia has no second thoughts. This interpretive artifice contributes to the mounting of the dramatic suspense which, like in classical Greek tragedy, must end in catastrophe. The death of the hero is a masterstroke of manipulative semiotics. To conclude my bird's-eye view on El cementerio de los pájaros, I have discussed the semiotics of a power struggle among birdlike creatures. One evil bird, her greedy eye on leadership in the aviary, was challenged by a charismatic free bird come from the outside bird, who promised collective liberation to the avian inmates. His advent caused a great fluttering in the bird-cage, but the outbreak was stifled in embryo and the way out was blocked by the evil bird. She maneuvres her fellow birds into obedience and complicity: the "intruder" is slain and autocratic rule firmly established. The bird of liberty has flown. Department of Romance Languages Bergen University Bergen, Norway REFERENCES Bertaux, Pierre (1980-1981). Frei wie die Fittige des Himmels. derlin Jahrbuch 22: 69-97.

Höl-

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Caro Baroja, Julio (1979). La estación del amor: fiestas populares de mayo a San Juan. La otra historia de España, 3. Madrid: Taurus. Cirlot, Juan-Eduardo (1969). Diccionario de símbolos. Nueva ed. rev. y ampliada. Barcelona: Labor. Eco, Umberto (1978). La estructura ausente: introducción a la semiótica. Trans. Francisco Serra Cantarell. Barcelona: Lumen. Feld, Steven (1982). Sound and Sentiment: Birds, Weeping, Poetics, and Song in Kaluli Expression. Publications of the American Folklore Society, New Series, 5. Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press. Gala, Antonio (1982). El cementerio de los pájaros. Colección Escena, 34. Madrid: MK Ediciones. Greenlee, Douglas (1973). Peirce's Concept of Sign. Approaches to Semiotics, Paperback Ser., 5. The Hague: Mouton. Greimas, A.-J. (1966). Sémantique structurale: recherche de máthode. Langue et langage. Paris: Larousse. Haro Tecglen, Eduardo (1982). El cementerio de Benavente. Review of El cementerio de los pájaros, by Antonio Gala. El País, 18 Sept., 23. Heinzel, Hermann, Fitter, Richard, and Parslow, John (1975). Manual de aves de Espana y de Europa, Norte de Africa y Próximo Oriente. Trans. Jaime Xampeny. Barcelona: Omega. Ibitokun, Benedict M. (1979). The image of the bird in modern African poetry. Ba Shiru 10(2): 67-77. Marler, Peter (19787! Affective and symbolic meaning. In Sight, Sound, and Sense, Thomas A. Sebeok (ed), 113-123. Advances in Semiotics. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press. von Mering, Otto (1963). The experience of individual freedom. In The Concept of Freedom in Anthropology, David Bidney (ed), 106130. Studies in General Anthropology, 1. The Hague: Mouton. Thomson, A. Landsboroilgh (ed) (1964). A New Dictionary of Birds. London: Thomas Nelson. Whinnom, Keith (1966). A Glossary of Spanish Bird-names. Colección Támesis, Ser. A. London: Tamesis.

36 ON THE PROBLEM OP ANALYTIC SENTENCES PROM THE VIEWPOINT OP NATURAL LANGUAGE SEMANTICS

Maciej Grochowski

The notion of analytic sentence is, no doubt, used in semantics of natural language (for short: in linguistic semanticsl under the influence of formal logic. However, the mode of dealing with this notion in the branches of science mentioned above is not identical because each one is obviously concerned with different classes of objects. One can assume, in great simplification, that formal logic studies patterns of unfailing argumentations, that is to say, the argumentations leading always from true premises to true conclusions, whereas semantics of natural language explains the meaning structure of expressions belonging to the respective languages; hence, semantics explains interdependences between the meanings of language expressions. ANALYTIC SENTENCES IN LOGIC Analytic sentences are unconditionally accepted or, in other words, necessarily true sentences. One should always refer them to a certain language. This is so since analytic sentences have the features mentioned above only in virtue of interpretative rules (and thus conventions! of the language. A class of analytic sentences comprises (according to current opinionsl: laws of logic fe.g. laws of sentential calculus and laws of functional calculus), substitutions for the laws of logic, meaning postulates of language and the logical consequences of these postulates. Laws of logic are true in virtue of the meaning of

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logical constants occurring there (belonging to the well-defined language of logic); thus, they are true regardless of the natural language to which the expressions used instead of logical constants belong. Sentences of a natural language which are substitutions for the laws of logic, that is to say, the substitutions of non-logical constants for variables are also true in virtue of the meaning of logical constants, thus in virtue of the rules of logical language to which the constants belong. The truthfulness of substitutions for laws of logic is a consequence of the universality of these laws, valid for all languages; it does not depend on the conventions of the respective natural languages. The truthfulness of such substitutions, in particular, does not depend upon the specific values of variables. For example, the English sentence 1. This wall is white or this wall isn't white. is a substitution for the principle of the excluded middle, and the sentence 2. If John is either in Warsaw or in New York and he isn't in Warsaw, then he is in New York. is a substitution for the law called modus tollendo ponens. Sentences which are substitutions for laws of logic are not an object of research in semantics of natural language. MEANING POSTULATES It is assumed in logic that the meaning postulate ("of. Carnap, 1956) of a language J is a sentence which is an arbitrary definition of an expression W belonging to language J and which is true in virtue of terminological conventions of language J. In accordance with such an understanding of the notion of meaning postulate one can assume, on the one hand, that the sentences 3. A predicate is a functor forming a sentence with the aid of the arguments. 4. Karyology is a branch of cytology dealing with the study of cytoblasts. are meaning postulates and, on the other hand, the sentences

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5. A mother is a woman who has given birth to a child. 6. A hand is a part of the body, are meaning postulates as well. The truthfulness of the meaning postulates mentioned above follows from the conventions of different languages ("thus it is not possible to verify the truthfulness empirically ): the truthfulness of sentences 3., 4. is determined by conventions of the languages of specific branches of science CLogic, biology), and the truthfulness of the sentences 5., 6. is determined by conventions of the natural language CJinglish)• Users of every language of science ^investigators above all) give meanings to the expressions of the respective language (the terms 1 in virtue of their arbitrary decisions; therefore the meanings of terms are dependent only on the will of the users. One can say for example: we want the expression a predicate to have such-and-such a meaning. Users of a natural language, however, accept the meanings of expressions of that language; they have no influence on the conventions of the natural language. One cannot say for example: we want the expression mother in English to have such-and-such a meaning; one cannot say either: we don't want the expression mother to have in English the meaning it does have. ANALYTIC SENTENCES IN SEMANTICS Let J represent a certain natural language, and W - an expression of this natural language. Then the truthfulness of the meaning postulate of language J, that is to say, a definition of expression W, depends only on the interpretative rules of language J. Thus, it is possible to say that from the viewpoint jf natural language semantics only meaning postulates are analytic sentences and only in the sense proposed above (that is in the narrow sense 1. Prom the viewpoint of linguistic semantics, its object and scope, the category of analytic sentences comprises partial and complete definitions of meanings of the natural language expressions, that is to say, such sentences in which something is truthfully said

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about the meanings of the natural language expressions used in these sentences, by means of other expressions of the same natural language. Throughout this paper, the notion of analytic sentence will be used only in the sense introduced above. CONTRADICTION, SYNONYMY, HYPONYMY It is not possible to establish (without difficulties) a boundary between the class of analytic sentences and the class of synthetic sentences on the basis of an exact criterion. However, one can point out indisputable examples of both analytic sentences and synthetic sentences. This dichotomy is theoretically convincing and it plays an important part in semantics of natural language (cf. Boguslawski, 1978; Poznaríski, 1966). Despite Quine's 0.953 ) criticism of the notion of analycity Che treated this notion as one of the "dogmas of empiricism" ) it seems to me that it is possible to establish a certain hierarchy of the most important semantic notions, mutually connected, such as, for example, synonymity, contradiction, definition, analytic sentence. In any case it is impossible to remove the notion of analytic sentence from linguistic semantics. The leading notion in semantics of natural language is, to my mind, the notion of contradiction. With the aid of the notion of contradiction, strictly speaking, by the method of inquiring about contradiction (by a method of falsification), one can justify hypotheses concerning semantic relations between language expressions, above all, hypotheses that a relation of synonymy or a relation of hyponymy between language expressions does occur. By hyponymy I mean a relation of unidirectional implication between the meanings of expressions, by synonymy I mean a relation of mutual implication between the meanings of expressions. ANALYTIC SENTENCES AND HYPONYMY If one accepts the notion of analytic sentence proposed above (for semantics of natural language), then

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one can say, in other words, that analytic sentences convey, in particular, the relations of hyponymy and synonymy. It is possible to explain the notion of synonymy with the aid of the notion of hyponymy; synonymy is symmetrical hyponymy. One can assume in great simplification that the elementary, the most general syntactic structure of a sentence of natural language has the form S - P (subject - predicate In this connexion I advance here the following general hypothesis: a sentence which has such a structure is a n analytic sentence if an expression used in the subject position is a hyponym of the expression used in the predicate position. Each sentence satisfying a stronger condition, namely a sentence in which the expression used in the predicate position is also a hyponym of the expression used in the subject position, is of course an analytic sentence, too. It follows from the above considerations that since there is a semantic relation between subject and predicate, the expressions used in the subject and predicate positions must be meaningful units. I assume here that an expression used in the subject position is a lexical unit of a natural language, and an expression used in predicate position is either a lexical unit or a combination of lexical units. Such a general description of sets of values which can be substituted for the variables S and P, does not state the sufficient conditions for making an analytic sentence. There are surely in each natural language expressions that are not hyponyms of other expressions, thus expressions the meanings of which one cannot explain, even partially. There are no doubt many more expressions which can be hyponyms of other expressions but which do not have their synonyms. One can explain the meanings of such expressions only in part. Thus, it is necessary to establish what sets of values of the variable S exclude the possibility of making an analytic sentence. The answer to this question is, I think, of substantial importance for the lexicography of the respective natural languages. Of course, no attempt has been made to give even

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a partial answer to this question in this brief outline. Careful studies are necessary. In addition to raising the question in a theoretical way only (I shall address myself to this problem in the future) , I wish to pay attention to some selected types of sentences in which I think it is impossible to use a sequence synonymous to an expression used in the subject position or even a sequence hyperonymous to the expression used in the subject position. ON THE SCOPE OP ANALYCITY According to the understanding of the notion of analytic sentence in linguistic semantics, proposed above, sentences in which a term belonging to a certain branch of knowledge is used in the subject position cannot be analytic. This follows from the fact that terms cannot be defined by means of expressions of natural language. It is impossible to account for the adequacy of the definition of a term by the method of inquiring about contradiction. Sentences containing a proper napje in the subject position cannot be analytic sentences because the truthfulness of such sentences does not depend on the rules of natural language. Proper names have no meaning, thus one cannot establish synonymous expressions for proper names. Proper names have only a referential function and this function is realized independently of conventions of the natural languages. Moreover, the possibility of making an analytic sentence is excluded too, if in the subject position a unit performing only a referential function is used, for example a pronoun like this, here, I, you. The units performing such a function serve only to identify the individuals; one does not state anything about the objects when one uses such units. Therefore, it is impossible for such units to be hyponyms of other units. No contradiction arises when an attempt is made of denying sentences which contain only referential expressions in the subject position. Interjections and onomatopoeias cannot, of course, be used as subjects of analytic sentences. This results

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from more general restrictions on the use of lexical units belonging to these classes of parts of speech. Onomatopoeias and interjections can be used in the subject position only in the function of quotation. Onomatopoeias are units imitating extralinguistic sounds occurring in nature, therefore they have no meaning in virtue of the conventions of the natural language. The problem of meaning of interjections and their place in semantic systems of natural languages requires detailed studies. If a numeral expression is used in the subject position, then the expression used in the predicate position cannot be a sequence synonymous to this numeral expression. The truthfulness of sentences in which something is said about a certain number does not follow from the interpretative rules of a natural language but is a consequence of quoting the decisions concerning interdependences between shapes of signs. Such decisions belong to semiotic systems other than natural languages. By the method of inquiring about contradiction one cannot account for the correctness of the definition of a numeral expression, that is to say, of an arbitrary decision concerning the shape of such an expression. While attempting to deny for example, the sentence 7. Five is a greater number than four and a smaller number than six. one obtains a false sentence but not a contradictory one. I suppose that only such sentences in which predicates are hyperonyms to numeral expressions used in the subject position can be analytic sentences. In particular, I have in mind, sentences of the type something is a number, cf.: 8. Twenty is a number. If one accepts a methodological conception of semantics according to which the metalanguage of semantics (Language of semantic representation ) is a part of a natural language, then one ought to agree also with the statement that a dictionary of such a metalanguage is a set of indefinable (elementary) lexical units of a natural language . In this connexion one should assume

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that the expressions belonging to a dictionary of such a semantic metalanguage cannot be used in the subject position of an analytic sentence. CONCLUSION

The question of classes of lexical units which, when used in the subject position, make it impossible to form an analytic sentence requires detailed interpretations. Such research is important not only for theorethical semantics but also for the lexicography of respective natural languages. The studies of the kind mentioned above would make it possible, among other things, to answer the question: the meanings of which classes of lexical units one cannot fully explain in monolingual general dictionaries of natural languages and the meanings of which classes of lexical units one cannot explain at all. Institute of Polish Language Polish Academy of Sciences Warsaw, Poland NOTES

1.

2. 3.

The following exemplary sentences are logical consequences of meaning postulates: If John is a bachelor, then John is unmarried. If Mary is a mother, then Mary is a woman. The idea advanced by Searle CL963). Conception of such metalanguage of semantics was proposed by Bogusiawski 0.966 ) and Wierzbicka CL9721.

REFERENCES

Bogusiawski, Andrzej 1966 1. Semantyczne po.-jecie liczebnika i .jego morfologia w jgzyku rosy.iskim. Wroclaw: Ossolineum. C1978I. On Decision Making in Semantics. Linguistische Studien 47: 25-63.

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Carnap, Rudolph (1956). Meaning and Necessity« Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Poznaóski, Edward (1966). Spór o analitycznoéé. In Logiczna teoria nauki, P&wìowski (ed). Warszawa: PWN . Quine, W. V. (1953). Prom a Logical Point of View. Cambridge, Mass.: M. I. T. Press. Searle, J. R. (1963). Proper Names. In Philosophy and Ordinary Language, Caton (ed). Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Wierzbicka, Anna (1972). Semantic Primitives. Frankfurt / M : Athen&um Verlag.

37 SEMIOTIC CHARACTERISTICS OF ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN BASED ON THE MODEL BY CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE Claudio Federico Guerri

1. FROM CHAOS TO LANGUAGE 1.01 Architecture will be chaos until it is structured by its own formal language. 1.02 As a scientific object, architecture must be explained through a specific language in the terms of architectural practice. 1.03 This is the conscious or unconscious requirement reflected in a vast contemporary critical literature dedicated to this subject.1 1.04 The term architecture, what we call architecture today, is still at its archaelogical stage, in the sense Michel Foucault gives to the word; because architecture was always explained in reference to concepts derived from other disciplines or human activities, which as such could only define architecture from the outside. 1.05 Architecture lacked an epistemological space of its own; it had to borrow it from other disciplines. 1.06 Linguistics provides the Theory of Design with a set of basic rules of formalization. 1.07 Design is not a living phenomenon, while architecture is. 1.08 Design is being created as a formal language, arising from a living phenomenon. 1.09 The theory of design is being created as a set or rules which can generate any architectonic form, used or usable. 1.10 Theory of Design linguistics; Design discourse; Architecture speech. 1.11 The history of language is described in synchronic moments; speech is a living phenomenon, in constant evolution. 2. INITIAL PROPOSAL 2.01 Architecture may be considered as the significant effect of a given type of analysis and a given type of language. 2.02 To achieve this, it is necessary to develop a discipline organizing in a coherent system today's set of signs representing archi^ tecture as chaos. 2.03 We hold the hipothesis that this task can be achieved through what Prof. Cesar Jannello calls "The Theory of Design". We propose Charles Sanders Peirce's semiotic analysis as a model to situate the role of design as a language, specific to the structure of the architectonic sign. 2.04 The problem is thus displaced from architecture, a rather ambi^ guous term, to design, which may be rigorously semanticized, giving

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us the starting point for a systematic development of the problem. 2.05 Design thus becomes the specific language of a discipline, and will show, as its final significant effect, what is architectonic in a building or in an architectural drawing. 2.06 This proposal, of providing rigor and specificity to the concept of design can be carried out by organizing it according to its semiotic characteristics: the sistem, the text and the discourse. 2.07 Concerning the sign of the sistem, Peirce's model provides the epistemological basis furnishing design with its own space, in cor^ trast to architecture's amorphous and chaotic whole. 2.08 Considered as text and discourse, linguistics provides the th£ oretical development which grants design the specificity to be a language able to describe the architectonic phenomenon. 3. IDEOLOGY - FORMAL LANGUAGE 3.01 Language is basically a structure which belongs to the ideological sphere: it is an unattainable reality'.2 3.02 The language-design, as a form wich the architectonic fact acquires, or as a form produced by it, is also peculiar of our time the architectonic phenomenon as a consequence of the ideological component of design. 3.03 Stating that this is a theoretical language, and as such purely formal, leaves a side, for the moment, fundamental issues of com munication, such as: production conditions and the social effect of this language. 3.04 Both aspects are part of the whole: construction-habitability, whose historical and socioeconomic aspects assert themselves with strength. 3.05 But the attention we pay to the social aspects must not make us forget the need to formalize, because the knowledge of this formalization process is fundamental to enlighten us concerning its ideological applications. 3.06 Formal logic allows us to avoid the subjective and the metaph^ sical elements to be linked to the discourse. 3.07 A formal language must be capable to be semanticized or translated into another language, with a greater or more concrete semantic content. 3.08 A formal language is a language to which we can attribute a SJJ mantics (a model). 3.09 The fundamental act of a science is to generate the formal lar[ guage which will allow it to produce its own object of knowledge. 3.10 A formal language is consistent when it is impossible to demonstrate in it a contradiction, that is to say, an enunciate and its negation. 3.11 It is complete when it becomes possible to demonstrate whith it, as we do with theoremes, all the formally true enunciates which can be construed with its symbols (except in the case of poetic uses). 3.12 It is deoidable when it becomes always possible to establish, in a definite number of regulated steps, if a given formula or con-

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figuration i s or i s not a theorem of that language. 3.13 I s the language-design consistent, complete and deoidablel 3.14 I f design aspires to achieve self-autonomy as a formal language, i t will have to answer in the affirmative to all these questions (or at least come as near as possible to the affirmative). 3.15 Because i t i s a language, design has to be developed in the three pertinent aspects of a l l languages: semantics, pragmatics and syntactics. 3 4. SEMANTICS 4.01 The semantics of the language-design will account for the poss i b i l i t i e s i t possesses to translate (to semanticize with) the concept of architecture. 4.02 The language-design must be capable to translate concepts outside design i t s e l f , that is to say, concepts of order, economy, func t i o n a l i t y , beauty, poetry, etc., referred to building and habitabil i t y in the case of architecture, and to u t i l i z a t i o n i f we deal with industrial design. 4.03 Design i s the language through which architecture gives shape to the concepts of aesthetics in building or h a b i t a b i l i t y , as social demands, through i t s specific signs. 4.04 Any language i s a component part of the world of objects, and this will depend on the greater or lesser way in which the laws or the values of that language pollute the world i t s e l f . 4.05 All science generates s i g n i f i c a n t facts through a formal language. 4.06 Design is a language which formalizes the relationships e x i s ting in an architectural proposal. 4.07 The language-design allows the pure architectonic form to emerge. 4.08 The limits of semantics in a design text are within the a c t i v i t i e s of building and inhabiting. Nevertheless, there may exist forms which are neither buildable, nor inhabitable (functional). 4.09 Design as a language is limited from the outside (the buildccble and the inhabitable) but i t also has internal restrictions (the morphic and tactic aspects). 4.10 The form of design grasps the relationships between the forms of inhabiting and building. 4.11 Architectonic design existed already, in the Modern Movement, containing functional or constructive s i g n s , but the formal charact e r i s t i c s of this language were not grasped (although some were used i n t u i t i v e l y ) . 4.12 By giving autonomy to the concept of design, we endeavour to explore the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of this language, even before we stop to consider the habitability or constructibility. 4.13 Semantics i s incorporated to the text of design through transformational operations. 4.14 The design says the blueprint, which says the construction; they are different levels of semiosis. 4.15 Design does not translate existents, i t translates another lan^ guage (the b l u e p r i n t ' s ) which accounts for the existent.

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4.16 What design says, i s the way the blueprint says (or describes) the world; i t says the way one says (or describes) the world. 4.17 Design is credible with regard to the blueprint, and the blueprint i s true or false with regard to the world. 5. TRANSFORMATIONAL OPERATIONS 5.01 One question i s design, as a pure language (that i s , as the pro ducer of the s i g n i f i c a n t effect); and another separate question i s the application or the use of that language to recognize or produce an architectonic fact or an object of industrial design. 5.02 The operations of transformation will produce contexts d i f f e rent from design i t s e l f , but which will be linked to the ideology of design. 5.03 To produce architecture, and not something e l s e , transformatio^ nal operations will allow, starting with design, to make concepts such as construction and habitability inseparable from the concept of design i t s e l f . 5.04 They must be defined epistemologically. 5.05 These transformational operations confer to pure design i t s ar chitectonic semantics (which in turn can become an architectural drawing or a blueprint). 5.06 To go from the plan to design i s a task of de-semantization and formalization. 5.07 Design + Rules of transformation: semantization blueprint. 5.08 Blueprint + Rules of transformation: de-semantization design. 5.09 The concept of rules of transformation must be understood with the value granted to them by formal logic or transformational linguis^ tics. 1 1 5.10 Sequence: 5.101 Transformational operations begin with a design configuration. 5.102 Now, begins a semantic substitution. 5.103 The f i r s t significant marks of the architectonic project begin to appear; the mark t e l l s the architectonic truth. 5.104 A re-presentation operation i s performed (drawing): i t entails a semantic content different from the formal design language itself. 5.105 Configurations are the text of design; configuration i s the secret plot of the architectonic project. 5.106 A configuration contains many proyects or secret plots. 5.107 In order for habitability to appear, i t i s necessary to perform algebraic operations of elimination. 5.108 In order for buildability to appear, i t i s necessary to perform algebraic operations of aggregation, to add technical information to the elemental configuration. 5.11 Any construction plan, and even constructive d e t a i l s , can be translated into pure design terms. 5.12 Although this process might be extremely complex in the practi^ ce of manual drawing, a sufficiently complex configuration may be achieved to account for all possible situations. 5.13 In such a case, elimination operations would suffice (the com-

351

puter could help solve this problem). 6. PRAGMATICS 6.01 Speech begins with the architectural drawings or blueprints. 6.02 The linguistics of speech refers to the transformation of the value of an expression according to the context in which it is used. 6.03 Construction: speech as a concrete manifestation. 6.04 Habitation: values to be transmitted through this manifestation. 6.05 Design: manifestation laws (linguistics of speech). 6.06 To paraphrase Frege and Quine: with configurations, we mention the space-sign; with the plans, we use it (in the construction space is). 6.07 Habitation can only occur in a spatial dimension. 6.08 Habitation organizes the syntax of space as the praxis of man's habitation. 6.09 Space is a Kantian category, created by man's mind, which measures the needs of its own dimension and the dimension of its displacement (Heidegger). 7. TRANSLATIONS 7.01 Design, as a formal language, translates the possibility of space. 7.02 The blueprint, as an utilitarian language, translates the representation of a concrete space, it includes signs belonging to other codes. 7.03 In an architectural plan, the graphic language of construction translates the determinants of space, and the graphic language of habitability translates the syntax of space. 7.04 The architectonic work, as an object's language, may be semanticized within the limits of the ideological possibilities of the languages we have at our disposal. 7.05 So, we have three levels of language: the language of natural objects, the language of the representation of these natural objects and the language of the abstract forms which may account for this representation. 7.06 Space manifests itself through different referents in each of these three levels of language. 7.07 We must evaluate what we win and what we loose through these translations. 7.08 Each level has a specific language and a specific semiosis. 7.09 The term tracing designates the set of operations through which we perform a translation which endeavours to be bi-univocal between the language of the architectural plan and the language of design. (Does this produce, in the case of design, a set of problems similar to what Kristeva calls tvanslinguisties?). 8. SYNTACTICS: M0RPHIC CHARACTERISTICS 5 8.01 The paradygmcctia aspect of language-design is a set of genera-

352 tors which produce a continuum of possibilities of substitution. 8.02 The generation of possibilities is continuous, but its use is discreet. 8.03 The atomic in logic: a simple unit; the morphic in design: a simple unit (the figure). 8.04 The morphia aspect in the Theory of Design comprises, as a ne£ cessary category: the delimitation (non-sign in Hjelmslev?); as a possible category: color, texture, brightness, specularity, eta. (su prasegmental in Martinet?). 8.05 In the sphere of the necessary category delimitations, the mor phic dimensions: a) formatrix, b) saturation (planal and corporal), c) size (phonematic structure?; the study of the textual characteristics of the significant material). 8.06 In the sphere of the possible categories color, the morphic dimensions: a) Tint - Rue, b) Chromatiaity - Saturation, c) Clarity (phonematic structure?; the study of the textual characteristics of the significant material). 8.07 Texture, brightness, specularity, etc., a field open to formal research of its morphic dimensions. 8.08 The paradigmatic aspect comprises the procedures to generate forms, but has no prefigured elements or linguistic units; its func tion is to produce the emergence of certain formal categories: morphic patterns. 8.09 Each paradygm has the specificity of the morphic dimension it generates: constant formatrix. 8.10 The whole set of differential paradygms with a constant formatrix, constitutes a theoretically exhaustive system, which can gene^ rate all possible morphic manifestations. 9. SYNTACTICS: TACTIC CHARACTERISTICS 9.01 The syntagmatic aspect of language-design consists of a set of generators of a continuum of integration possibilities. 9.02 The generation of possibilities is continuous, but its use is discreet. 9.03 The molecular in logic: complex unit; the tactic in design: com plex unit (the configuration). 9.04 The tactia aspect of the Theory of Design comprises, concerning delimitation, as a necessary category of the morphic element: the taatia dimensions. 9.041 Elemental set of tactic dimensions, of constancy-variation'. si_ tuation (attitude, separation), ensolving {interiority, penetration, juxtaposition, proximity). 9.05 Peculiarity of the tactic dimension: the possibility of rhetoric operations. 9.051 Rhetoric set of tactic dimensions, of presence-absence: enrazing (allignment, leveling), symmetry (potation, specularity, trans_ lation, dilatation). 9.06 Concerning the possible categories of the morphic element: color, texture, brightness, specularity, etc., the field is open to the formal research of its tactic dimensions.

353

9.07 The syntagmatic aspect comprises the procedures to combine figures, but lacks prefigured elements or linguistic macro-elements; its function is to produce the emergence of certain formal categories: tactic patterns. 9.08 Subjects for resarch: a) Each syntagm must have the specificity of the tactic dimension it generates: constant tactism. b) The whole set of differential syntagms with constant tactism must constitute a theoretically exhaustive system for the generation of all the possible tactic manifestations. 9.09 Rhetorics as a specific subject of research: a) The study of the rhetoric aspect of design is logically or historically linked to the possible tactic manifestations, b) A rhetoric operation four^ ded on logic will consist in a contextual alteration based on the characteristics of the language-design itself, c) A historically ba^ sed rethoric will consist in a contextual alteration based on the characteristics with which the language-design has been used in the specific architectonic styles. 10. DESIGN - ARCHITECTONIC SIGN 10.01 Architecture is a semiotic whole. 10.02 By performing a synchronic analysis of this postulate, we dif ferentiate the following aspects: 10.021 Construction, as an existential aspect (Index), produces its pertinent significant effect in the sphere of the qualities which can be ascribed to the building as a concrete structure. 10.022 Habitating, as a valorizing aspect (Symbol), produces its pertinent significant effect in the sphere of biological, psychology cal and cultural demands of the ideological model in force at a cer^ tain historical time, in relation with the psychological, phi si cal and social requirements of protection supplied by the building. 10.023 Design, as a formal aspect (Icon) produces its pertinent si£ nificant effect in the sphere of the linguistic system, by performing the ideological transformation of the various levels of protec tion which will have to be supplied (or were supplied) by the building. 10.03 Summarizing: The constructive aspect (Index) and the habitation aspect (Symbol) only achieve their theoretical architectonic meaning through their manifestation of expression in design (Icon). 10.04 To express the concept of the architectonic idea using design as its formal language allows us to identify: 10.041 The existence of a formal language: Design", the theoretical aspect. 10.042 The actual existence of an ideological structure: Habitability; the political aspect. 10.043 And the determining frame of production conditions: Construe tion (building); the economic aspect. 10.05 Design thus becomes the structuring language of the quality we call architecture. 10.06 In accordance with Peirce's definition of the Sign, we then have:

354

ARCHITECTURE as a semiotic whole: Ground

Interprétant

Representamen

CONSTRUCTION existence

HABITABILITY value

DESIGN form

10.07 Synthetic development of Peirce's preceding model, applied to architecture as a Sign: 10.071 Ground-. CONSTRUCTION: 10.0711 Sinsign: concrete constructive possibilities: theoretical models, in force and "usable". 10.0712 Index: a) non-sign*:bricks, wood, glass, etc.; b) sign: doors, windows, walls, etc. 10.0713 Dioisign: concrete interrelation of all the Indexes according to the possibilities established in the Sinsign to achieve the desired effect or constructive value required (e.g.: solidity, stab£ lity, thermic or accoustic insulation, etc.) 10.072 Interpretant: HABITABILITY: 10.0721 Legisign: possibilities of the functional values: technical models, in force and "usable". 10.0722 Symbol: a) non-sign: elemental values of habitating in a gi_ ven community and a given historical time. (e.g. sleeping, being pro tected, eating, etc.); b) sign: syntactic values of habitating in a given community and a given historical time. 10.0723 Argument: valorizing interrelation of all the Symbols, accor ding to the possibilities established in the Legisign to achieve the desired effect or habitational value required fe.g.: protection.com fort, status, etc.) 10.073 Representamen: DESIGN: 10.0731 Qualisign: linguistic possibilities of a code of signs adequate to represent and communicate the significant effects of the constructive and habitational aspects (theoretical models in force and "usable"). 10.0732 loon: a) non-sign: morphic dimensions [formccbrix, saturation and size)-, b) sign: syntactic integration of the preceding non-signs, capable of semantic representation: figure. 10.0733 Rheme: discursive interrelation of the preceding loons, according to the possibilities of representation established in the Qualisign to achieve the architectonic effect or value required (e. g.: order, beauty, poetry, etc.): configuration. 11. IN CONCLUSION 11.01 The study of architecture as Sign, according to the structure proposed by Peirce, endeavours to achieve an epistemological rupture in the history of the knowledge of architecture. 11.02 Why an epistemological rupture? Because it produces the archi_ tectonic sign from within his own structure. 11.03 This requires the elaboration of a specific language; there can be no knowledge without a specific language. The specific langua

355

ge of this knowledge is design. 11.04 In this way, the architectonic object does not remain isolated from the world of soienoe and art, but requires the converge of an interdisciplinary vision and approach. 11.05 By specifying each of its components, it sets forth the need of a particular methodological development for each of the new aspects which have been detected in the three fundamental semi otic lj2 vels. 11.06 All the preceding issues find their answer in the Theory of Design, which, as a linguistic form of the integration of the diff^ rent elements of the architectonic sign, offers an answer: to be SJJ re, not a definitive answer, but at least an answer which is innova tive, and possesses enough rigour and systematicity to deserve being explored and carried to its last consequences in order to constitute what i s architectonic. 11.07 The language-design is, on the one hand, formal, and on the other specific to architecture. Its formality supplies the rigour which can transform architecture in a theoretical discipline. Its specificity avoids the banality of the verbal language -often "litterary"- of architecture; furthermore, by grounding itself on the graphic and significant characteristics of design, it supplies the poetry which belongs to architecture, as a discipline representative and constitutive of the construction and habitation activities. 11.08 To develop design as the language of architecture implies freedom from those ideological conditions which have up to now been the standpoint from which the history of architecture has been writ ten. 11.09 To develop design as the language of architecture, allows us to perform the study of the history of architecture from the starting point of the interrelation of its three semiotic aspects, in its own diachronic evolution. 11.10 The history of architecture will have its specific s.tages at each one of the three semiotic levels: construction, habitability and design. All three, and each one of them, will have to be considered in relation to its historical and social conditions, these con ditions not being added in turn as "ideologizing", but as epistemological requirements which can account for the ideology of the specific historical moment. 11.11 To develop design as the language of architecture implies maintaining alertness concerning one's own ideological conditioning, since formalization is always a way to ideologize. 11.12 To develop design as the languare of architecture, implies a dialectical position. The production of its own discourses may drain or exhaust its expressive possibilities as a language, posing theoretical requirements, from which the next scientific moment will emerge. 11.13 The Theory of Design is taking root at this precise moment of the history of thought, seeking to overcome the sterility of the preceding architectonic languages. 11.14 The Theory of Design is a tool to say, or express, what is ar chitecture, as a synthesis of the economic, political and social

356 needs of our day; it is a renewal of the field of historical criticism of architectural theory, and therefore, of architectonic production itself. 11.15 The theorists of Design are quite aware of the role they have to play: to achieve an improvement phase, always to be improved, which can be integrated to the history of architecture. Facultad de Arquitectura y Urbanismo Universidad de Buenos Aires Buenos Aires, Argentina NOTES 1. Supe, Frederick (1974). The Structure of Scientific Theories. Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 2. Pecheux, M. et Gadet, F. (1981). La langue introuvable. Paris: Maspero. 3. Morris, Charles (1971). Foundations of the Theory of Signs. Chicago: University Press. Carnap, Rudolf (1958). Introduction to Simbolic Logic and its Applications. New York: Dover. 4. Chomsky, Noam (1965). Aspects of the Theory of Sintax. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press. 5. Terms referring to the "Theory of Delimitation" in its morphic and tactic aspects must be understood in the sense Prof. Cesar Jannello defines them in his paper contributed to this Congress. 6. Hjelmslev, Louis (1968). Prolégomènes a une Théorie du Langage. Paris: Minuit. REFERENCES Dijk, Teun van (1977). Text and Context. London: Longman. Foucault, Michel (1969). L'Archéologie du Savoir. Paris: Gallimard Frege, Gottlob (1879). Begriffsschrift. Jena Jannello, Cesar (1980). Diseño, Lenguaje y Arquitectura. Buenos Aires: Facultad de Arquitectura y Urbanismo. — (1983). Proyecto de Sistema de Delimitación, Dimensiones y Relaciones Mórficas. Buenos Aires: Facultad de Arquitectura y Urb. Kristeva, Julia (T965). Semiotiké.. Paris: Seuil. Martinet, André (1967). Eléments de Linguistique Générale. Paris: Colin. Peirce, Charles Sanders (1965). Collected Papers. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Quine, Willard van Orman (1963). Set Theory and its Logic. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Sacristan, Manuel (1964). Introducción a la Lógica y al Análisis Formal. Barcelona: Ariel. Saussure, Ferdinand de (1972). Cours de Linguistique Générale. Paris: Payot. Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1921). Tractatus Logico-Philosoficus. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. — ( 1 9 5 3 ) . Philosofische Untersuchungen. Oxford: Blackwell.

38

CONTENUTO SEMANTICO DEGLI AUSILIARI NEI TEMPI COMPOSTI DEI VERBI ITALIANI Riccardo Guerri

Una ricerca sull'uso attuale degli ausiliari nei tempi composti dei verbi italiani si iniziò cercando di stabilire criteri di scelta validi ed utili ai discenti di italiano come lingua seconda. Il seguente schema é stato il primo e fondamentale risultato della nostra indagine che non solo raggiunge l'obbiettivo didattico propostoci inizialmente ma permet te di studiare ben altrimenti tale fenomeno. Da una prima analisi apparve infatti che ESSERE e AVERE danno al verbo significati diversi. Gli ausiliari cioè, come elementi morfo-sintattici, producono effetti semantici che, a volte, dipendono anche dall'intenzione del narratore.

DIREZIONE attiva co n FUNZIONAMENTO

deviata

i ntra nsitivo e SIGNIFICATO

tra nsitivo a b : forme: oggetto :passiva e espresso :pronominali

di MOTO

NON di MOTO

c d descrizione •.direzione o : o : stato conseguenza

^ ESSERE

f AVERE

f ESSERE

f AVERE

e f azvone

azione

involontariavolontaria

+ ESSERE

+ AVERE

358

1. LE COSTANTI Proseguendo la ricerca si é constatato inoltre che gli effetti semantici prodotti da ciascun ausiliare sono costanti- . Seguono cioè precise norme, praticamente senza eccezioni, che tutti i narratori hanno osservato e osser vano, consapevolmente o no, dato che tali regole non sono mai state né rilevate, né codificate completamente fin'o ra. 1.1. Gruppo "A" Se si dice: QueVla notizia è stata letta da pochi. ESSERE denota una direzione DEVIATA verso il soggetto (forme: passiva e pronominali) .

Pochi hanno letto quella notizia.

AVERE denota una direzione ATTIVA con funzionamento TRANSITIVO (oggetto diretto espresso)

Si dice infatti: Ma come, ti sei salita tutte Ma come, .hai salito tutte le scale a piedi! le scale a piedi! Ma ragazze, vi siete guardate allo specchio? Ci eravamo tanto amati ... Quella notizia si é letta poco. 1.2. Verbi Intransitivi Quando il verbo é intransitivo, ossia quando ha direzione attiva e funzionamento intransitivo, appaiono an cor più evidenti le differenze di significato prodotte dagli ausiliari ed anche l'importanza dell'intenzione del narratore in questi cambiamenti. 1.2.1. Gruppo "B" Se si dice: Sono corsi alla stazione. : Hanno corso come pazzi. Sono saltati dal treno. : Ranno saltato tutto il giorno. Sono emigrati in America molti degli europei che hanno emigrato cent'anni fa.

359

c

d

ESSERE dS una DIREZIONE al MOTO o ne indica l'assenza (stato)

AVERE dà solo una DESCRIZIONE del MOTO o di una conseguenza di esso.

Si dice infatti: Erano cadute in mare. Sei tornata tardi? E' rimasta a casa.

Hanno carmtinato a lungo. Avete parlato troppo! Hanno tossito molto.

1.2.2. Gruppo "C" Se si dice: Hanno mancato alla parola. Aveva finito col suo solito gesto Ha fallito alle promesse.

Sono mancati alla riunione. Quell'avventura era finita proprio male. Il commerciante é fallito. e con ESSERE l'azione (non di moto) é considerata INVOLONTARIA o impersonale.

f con AVERE l'azione (non di moto) é considerata VOLONTARIA

Si dice infatti: Sono invecchiate molto! Eravate già guariti. Lo spettacolo non era piaciuto a nessuno.

Hanno dubitato di me! Avevate ubbidito agli .ordini. Dopo che ebbe sostato a lungo di fronte al parco ...

1.2.3. Eccezioni Perché si dice: AVER dimenticato3 AVER sbagliato, AVER sofferto, AVER sognato} se questi verbi si riferiscono ad azioni volontarie?. Si può giustificare l'uso di AVERE ricorrendo alle teorie della psicoanalisi che non considerano veramente involon tario il lapsus e il sogno? Perché si dice anche: AVER sentito3 AVER udito, AVER visto, se queste azioni non sembrano voler indicare una parte-

360

cipazione volontaria del soggetto, specialmente quando sono contrapposte ad ascoltare e guardare? 1.3. Cambio di Significato e Interpretazione Incerta Uno stesso verbo può cambiare di significato passando quindi da un gruppo ad un altro: A

a- si sono saltati, addosso. ^ c- E' saltato sul eavallo. b- Ha saltato l'ostacolo. d- Ha saltato benissimo!

A a- Hanno avanzato una propone f- Il pane é avanzato quasi tutto! sta inacoettabile. Per certi verbi con funzionamento intransitivo, dizionari e grammatiche indicano che si riscontra l'uso d_i ambedue gli ausiliari. Questa incertezza nella scelta dell'ausiliare é, in realtà, solo un riflesso di una dubbia interpretazione del significato. In ultima analisi ci6 d£ al narratore la possibilità di esprimere sottili sfumature di significato. j.

. avevano germogliato tutti ~ descrizione. erano germogliati - moto direzione?

Tutti erano scattati in piedi. - moto direzione. .,_, aveva , ,, - moto descrizione. Il congegno non scattato. _ ^ B era - moto. direzione o „ azione involontaria? A

l

&

'dotàbiamorabbrividito. - moto descrizione. siamo rabbrividiti. - azione involontaria?

Avevano avanzato con enormi per- -ftiotodescrizione o dite. azione volontaria? Erano avanzati durante la notte. - moto direzione. 1.3.1. Verbi Modali - dovere, potere, sapere, volere. Con questi verbi si usa normalmente l'ausiliare che userebbe, da solo, l'infinito del verbo principale. Anche qui sono identici e costanti gli effetti prodotti dagli ausiliari: Mi sono dovuto leggere quel libro. a- direzione deviata. Ho dovuto leggere quel libro. b- direzione attiva, funzionamento transitivo. Sono potuti uscire presto? Tutti hanno potuto parlare.

c- moto direzione, d- moto descrizione

361

Sono potute guarire davvero?! Hai dovuto mentire?

^ e- azione involontaria f- azione volontaria

Coi verbi indicati in B — c e C — e il narratore può sostituire a essere l'ausiliare AVERE trasformando cosi l'evento descritto dal verbo in azione essenzialmente VOLONTARIA; tale sostituzione é ancor piti naturale quando si usa il modale VOLERE: Aveva sempre voluto morire cosi, ha saputo morire ed S morto come ha voluto. Sarebbe voluta uscire con te piti presto ma a quell'ora proprio non ha voluto piti uscire. 1.4. Aspetto Durativo AVERE produce un effetto semantico diverso con certi verbi ai quali dS un aspetto durativo o accentua que^ ta idea di duratività già espressa dal verbo: Era già nevicato sulle montagne vicine. - importa 1 1 evento Aveva nevicato tutta la notte. - importa la durata Il rumore era continuato sempre piti forte. - importa 11 evento Il rumore aveva continuato per ore ed ove. - importa la durata 2. DUE GRANDI INSIEMI Dato che molti verbi possono usare, secondo i casi, sia l'uno che l'altro ausiliare, questi due grandi insie mi sono costituiti, non dai verbi che usano ESSERE o AVE RE, ma dai casi in cui i verbi usano l'uno o l'altro ausiliare . 2.1. Avere Solo con l'ausiliare AVERE l'enunciato pu6 avere direzione ATTIVA espandendosi naturalmente da sinistra a destra mentre il participio resta invariato: - Pochi hanno letto quella notizia. - [noi] Abbiamo carminato troppo. - [lei] Aveva creduto alle sue paiole?

(A - b) (B - d) (C - f)

Anche quando si riscontrano deviazioni dovute alla posizione anormale dell'oggetto queste sembrano voler r_i stabilire l'ordine naturale dell'enunciato richiamando l'oggetto al suo posto: - Hai comprato le fragole?__

362

- Macché, LE ho cercatE

ma non NE ho trovatE !

- Pres \ ALA per i capelli ...

Avendoli visti

a tempo sarebbe stato meglio averLI evitati !

2.2. Essere L'ausiliare ESSERE mantiene il soggetto grammaticale in posizione preminente. Nella forma passiva l'inversione della direzione é completa: - Quella notizia é stata letta da pochi.

verso

Negli altri casi si hanno deviazioni con sinistra:

A-a - [noi] Ci eravamo

ritorno

tanto amati

B-c - I ragazzi erano tornati tardi

C-e - Ma quelle sono impazzitE !

Le forme pronominali mantengono il soggetto in posizione di preminenza anche quando l'oggetto diretto é espresso e permettono al narratore, a volte, anche una scelta della direzione; si possono riscontrare in tali casi perfino due direzioni diverse in uno stesso enunciato :

- Marta SI é compratA

due chili di fragole.

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due chili. - Marta SE ne é compratA

- Marta SE NE é oompvatE due chili.

- Marta SE ne é aompratl due chili, 2.3. Direzione e Deviazioni La direzione con le sue possibili deviazioni ha un effetto semantico su tutto l'enunciato permettendo spesso di porre in special rilievo il soggetto, l'oggetto e, in certi casi> anche ambedue. 3. GLI AUSILIARI IN ALTRE LINGUE Uno studio comparativo meriterebbero gli ausiliari delle diverse lingue. Potremo qui solo accennare che: ESSERE produce, in generale, effetti semantici simili in varie lingue, dal SUM latino; AVERE invece ha acquistato significati ed importanza mol to diversi, dalla spagnolo HABER usato in tutti i tempi composti (anche di SER) eccettuata solo la forma passiva, al francese in cui gli effetti prodotti da ètre e avoir sono variati e complessi come in italiano. Asociación Dante Alighieri Tucumán 1646 1050 Buenos Aires, Argentina

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COME SI LEGGONO GLI ARTICOLI DI ARCHITETTURA NEI GIORNALI Gàbor Hajnòczi

In questa relazione tratterò di alcuni aspetti della critica architettonica. Non si tratta della critica vera e propria pubblicata nelle riviste specializzate ma di quei testi che ogni giorno ci informano del compimento dei nuovi edifici, della ricostruzione di u n quartiere oppure della demolizione di vecchie case, eccetera. Insomma 6i tratta di articoli d'informazione che direttamente non hanno una funzione critica. Abbiamo voluto analizzare questo tipo di pubblicazione perché 1) esso è diretto a tutti i lettori (cioè non soltanto a un gruppo che s'interessa all'architettura) e 2) è veramente letto da tutti, quindi 3) si può giungere a conclusioni generali adatte a caratterizzare il meccanismo della stampa nel formare l'opinione sull'architettura. Tutto quello che ora intendiamo dire sarà un riassunto dei risultati e delle conclusioni di an'indagine realizzata nell'Instituto di Storia e Teoria dell'Architettura dell'Università Politecnica di Budapest. Il suo argomento globale era la teoria e il meccanismo della critica architettonica, e come fenomeno particolare è stata presa in considerazione quella forma della critica che viene trasmessa dai mezzi di collimimicazione di massa. Dobbiamo subito dichiarare che le conclusioni si basano su dati di tre anni fa rappresentanti problemi che in parte non esistono più. Per esempio allora — come vedremo più particolarmente — l'azione nel campo dell'architettura era equivalente a una continua costruzione ex novo, e non si rendeva conto della necessaria manutenzione del patrimonio esistente (escludendo i monumenti di valore storico e d'arte). Ora questa mentalità è in maggior parte cambiata. Non crediamo dunque che la nostra descrizione contenga nuovi elementi; il valore delle conclusioni non va cercato nella loro attualità, ma piuttosto nella loro possibilità di essere generalizzate che le rende adatte a rappresentare — sotto l'aspetto architettonico — il funzionamento dell'attività "direttiva" degli articoli pubblicate nei giornali. Per quanto riguarda 1'"argomento" degli articoli presi sotto esame abbiamo dovuto limitarci a d uno solo per rendere omogeneo l'oggetto. Abbiamo scelto gli articoli che si stanno occupando degli edifici di abitazione sia perché essi attirano il massimo interesse da parte dei lettori soprattutto per motivi di esistenza sia perché, essi costituiscono l'assoluta maggioranza fra gli articoli di argomento architettonico.

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VALORI POSITIVI E NEGATIVI NELLE DESCRIZIONI Il genere di questi articoli per la maggior parte è la semplice descrizione con nomi, dati, termini esatti che offrono al lettore un certo numero di informazioni. Questo potrebbe essere l'aspetto denotativo di queste operazioni. Ma i dati, le quantità a gli altri elementi documentativi hanno altri significati: le grandi cifre (dei nouvi palazzi di abitazione) significheranno "abbondanza", la tecnologia avanzata significherà "modernità" e così via. Questo sarebbe l'aspetto connotativo. Nel corso dell'analisi dei testi osserviamo che le descrizioni contengono delle connotazioni positive, mentre quelle negative sono in assoluta minoranza. Nei testi l'accento cade prima sugli elementi quantitativi ; la monumentalità delle dimensioni in questo contesto riceve una interpretazione positiva, così in molti casi esse si trovano nell'intestazione degli articoli. Le grandi dimensioni (dei nouvi quartieri di abitazione) si uniscono con dei grandi numeri (dei. nouvi appartamenti o delle familglie che vi abiteranno): "Grande" e "molto" sono equivalenti al "buono". Nel campo della qualità la marca più importante è la novità Siccome le descrizioni ci informano in maggior parte delle nuove costruzioni è ovvio che ci incontriamo spesso con questa qualità. Ma essa ha sinché il significato "modernità". Con le nuove tecnologie, con degli elementi prefabbricati essa è antitesi del "vecchio" che è ormai anacronistico. Anche in questo case il "nuovo" è equivalente al "buono". Altri elementi di qualità 6ono le condizioni tecniche e di comodità (acqua, elettricità, gas, l'ascensore e simili) poi l'altezza cioè i molti piani (che rappresenta un carattere di città mentre l'unico piano significa l'arretratezza di campagna). Per quanto riguarda l'interno degli appartamenti possiamo osservare le tendenze già conosciute. Anche qui troviamo marche positive sia nel senso quantitativo che qualitativo: spesso in forma di aggettivi generali, come "voluminoso", "più grande", "con tutte le comodità" e simili. Le condizioni generali di comodità esistenti in un appartamento moderno, come il riscaldamento centrale, l'acqua calda e simili, qui si presentano come "extra" valori. REPERTORIO E SISTEMA DEI MEZZI LINGUISTICI Studiando i testi abbiamo raccolto i mezzi linguistici più importanti e ne abbiamo preparato un repertorio. Si tratta di aggettivi, verbi ed espressioni che sono significativi dal nostro punto di vista. Li abbiamo sistemati in due gruppi : nuovo e vecchio (secondo l'argomento di cui si tratta) ed anche in questi due gruppi ne abbiamo creato altri due, rispettivamente "positivi" e "negativi".

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nuovo aggettivi positivi nuovo moderno munito di riscaldamento centrale a molti piani di alto livello incantevole ideale

aggettivi negativi vuoto

verbi positivi lavoravano bene in cooperazione si cresce si eleva sopra

verbi negativi ritarda non migliora diventa uniforme

espressioni positive oltre il piano prima del termine più di - % condizioni ideali infrastructtura moderna domicilio

espressioni negative vuoto e suggerisce solitudine un po'uniformizzato

vecchio aggettivi positivi

aggettivi negativi senza conforto a pianterreno

verbi positivi

verbi negativi saranno demoliti si continua la

demolizione espressioni positive

espressioni negative demolizione continua

E' difficile ricostruire il repertorio dell'originale ungherese. La vera difficoltà non è quantitativa (si può elencare soltanto una parte degli elementi raccolti) ma piuttosto linguistica. Alcune espressioni ad esempio in italiano non hanno quel significato che nella lingua ungherese: "oltre il piano" e "prima del termine" sono espressioni che evocamo nella mente di un lettore ungherese l'epoca delle gare di lavoro, l'atmosfera degli anni cinquanta. Adoperare queste espressioni all'inizio del nostro decennio è un vero anacronismo. Abbiamo conservato naturalmente le proporzioni degli elementi segnati sulla tabella. E' significativo che non troviamo marche

368 positive nel territorio del vecchio, mentre in quello del nuovo ce ne sono in abbondanza. Non si può costituire una vera opposizione fra gli elementi dei due gruppi perché non v'è una corrispondenza fra di essi. E' da osservare infine che mancano assolutamente i termini estetici il che ci dimostra la parzialità della descrizioni: la mancanza dei fattori dell'ambiente, delle proporzioni, delle dimensioni umane e così via. Dobbiamo esaminare più particolarmente il caso delle marche negative nel territorio del nuovo. E' da costatare subito che esse sono in minoranza rispetto a quelle positive. Osserviamo pure che alcune di esse vogliono minimizzare il peso della dichiarazione: "un po'uniformlzzato", ecc. Resta comunque la tendenza alla negatività che costringe all'esame del problema della critica. VALORI NEGATIVI COME ELEMENTI DELLA CRITICA Abbiamo visto che le descrizioni contengono in maggioranza delle connotazioni positive, creando così un'ideale abitazionemodello . Ora vediamo che rapporto c'è fra l'idealizzazione e le tendenze critiche. Nei testi contenenti marche negative nel territorio nuovo possiamo distinguere due tipi: il primo è quello che accanto alle marche positive contiene anche quelle negative, mentre il secondo contiene solo marche negative cioè è scritto interamente con intenzione critica. Nell'articolo di tipo A la descrizione positiva si integra con osservazioni critiche: ci sono ad esempio alcuni difetti nel nuovo quartiere (non è ancora finita la costruzione della scuola elementare) oppure qualche attrezzatura non è stata bene realizzata. L'articolo di tipo B non tratta che solo dei difetti ed anomalie dei nuovi edifici di abitazione. In un tale testo ad esempio se ne trova un vasto elenco: le finestre non chiudono bene, così il riscaldamento consuma di più, la vasca da bagno non e sistemata bene è neanche i rubinetti funzionano, ecc. La maggior parte dei difetti trattati da questi articoli deriva dalla cattiva qualità dell'opera degli esecutori. Come si vede la critica non ha un ruolo significativo in quanto non esiste una critica globale ma solo quella particolare. Vengono esposti dei difetti che però non disturbano le sentenze idealizzanti delle descrizioni. E queste osservazioni critiche non giungono ai livelli più profondi del fenomeno descritto. Mai si discute la giustezza dei progetti, del sistema dei quartieri moderni, delle dimensioni, delle masse e delle proporzioni. Per quanto riguarda dunque il rapporto tra tendenza di idealizzazione e critica esso è di carattere subordinato : quest'ultima non critica le costatazioni fondamentali della prima. CONCLUSIONE Abbiamo analizzato testi che contengono descrizioni dei quartieri e insediamenti di abitazione costruiti recentemente.

369 Nelle descrizioni per mezzo del significato connotativo degli elementi documentativi e, in forma espressiva, con mezzi linguistici da noi osservati (sono in maggioranza marche positive assolute) si crea un'immagine Irreale. Si tratta di un indiscutibile tendenza di idealizzazione dell'oggetto che è infatti un mezzo operativo nel processo della formazione dell'opinione. In questo processo possiamo distinguere i seguenti campi dove si osserva 6uo influsso. (1) L'idealizzazione serve a rendere attrattivo il fenomeno e cerca di persuadere ad accettarlo. (2) L'idealizzazione esclude oppure almeno aspira ad eliminare o diminuire la critica contro il fenomeno. Le critiche possono toccare solo anomalie particolari che ostacolano la corretta realizzazione delle concezioni e dei progetti. (3) L'idealizzazione cerca anche di uniformizzare le opinioni formatesi sul fenomeno. Istituto di Storia e Teoria dell'Architettura Università Politecnica Budapest, Ungheria

40

LE TEXTE SEMIOTIQUE •

L'OEIL, LA VOIX, LA SCENE.

André Helbo

La sémiotique a longtemps fait figure de "savoir ventriloque". Le treillis de filiations et d'appropriations interculturelles justifie peut-être cette parenté entre le tissage historique propre à notre discipline et celui de la linguistique, de la logique, de la biologie. Si les modèles tutélaires se sont succédé sans se ressembler, plus personne aujourd'hui n'hésite à définir la sémiotique en termes propédeutiques. Moins qu'un partage pédagogique, la sémiotique propose un sav/oir-faire transgressif, une méthodologie coextensive aux champs de la connaissance et dont le moindre mérite n'est pas de s'évaluer en même temps qu'elle juge le regard des autres. Passé le temps des éclectismes aveugles ou des oecuménismes sirupeux, la sémiologie s'ouvre aux voies du comparatisme. Au travers d'approches multiples, de métalangages divers (organisateurs ou créateurs), . conscients des répercussions que les lieux de parole imposent à la méthode, les chercheurs peuvent tenter la rencontre - d'écoles - dans la construction même de leur texte. Le rapprochement se fait plus pertinent encore lorsqu'il favorise le décloisonnement de sémiotiques régionales. Nous plaiderons donc pour une approche réticulaire de la sémiologie; cette conception, la recherche l'a souvent suivie intuitivement : l'hypothèse transphrastique, valide en narratologie, n'a-t-elle pas nourri l'étude des segmentations au cinema? Cependant, la sémiotique du théâtre a pu démontrer l'inanité de pareil transfert dans son propre champ : forcée de réinventer sa démarche, elle a sans doute nourri d'autre viatiques (le modèle spectaculaire), pointé certains silences de la sémiotique générale (l'actant-observateur) et alimenté cette dernière par effet de retour. La réflexion que nous proposons s'inspire de ce type de questionnement et réunit, - sous forme de bilan critique - , les acquis de deux sémiotiques "territoriales", celles de l'image et du théâtre, que nous confronterons dans le "paradigme" visuel.

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PROCES D'UNE

RENCONTRE

La c o m p a r a i s o n entre l ' i m a g e p l a n a i r e (tableau ou d i s c o u r s mixte) et les c o m p o s a n t e s v i s u e l l e s du s p e c t a c l e t h é â t r a l ne peut s'opérer s a n s la j u s t i f i c a t i o n t h é o r i q u e à laquelle nous comptons procéder. L e s a r g u m e n t s de "bon s e n s " m i l i t a n t en faveur du r a p p r o c h e m e n t s o n t aussi n o m b r e u x que les o b j e c t i o n s ; c ' e s t p o u r q u o i les r é p o n s e s de la s é m i o l o g i e p e u v e n t t r a n c h e r en l ' o c c u r r e n c e un d i l e m m e que l ' e m p i r i s m e p o u r r a i t prolonger d o u l o u r e u s e m e n t . S a n s d o u t e , a priori, l ' h i s t o i r e f o u r n i t - e l l e de b o n n e s r a i s o n s p o n c t u e l l e s pour c o n c e v o i r une m é t h o d o l o gie c o m m u n e ; F r a n c a s t e l a m o n t r é les c o n s é q u e n c e s de l ' i n v e n t i o n de la p e r s p e c t i v e en p e i n t u r e : les m i s e s en s c è n e t h é â t r a l e s i m i t a n t les d i s p o s i t i f s p i c t u r a u x sont c o n t e m p o r a i n e s de cette p e r i o d e ; l ' i m p o r t a n c e du v i s u e l ne f a i t pas de d o u t e : du " q u a t r i è m e m u r " que le t h é â t r e n a t u r a l i s t e s o u l e v a i t afin de s a t i s f a i r e le v o y e u r i s m e du p u b l i c , à l ' a c c e n t u a t i o n pure et simple - chez P i s c a t o r - d e s u p p o r t s v i s u e l s (dias, i m a g e s p r o j e t é e s ) , à l ' i n s e r t i o n de la v i d é o . Citons a u s s i ces e x p é r i e n c e s de la l i m i t e s u g g é r é e s par c e r t a i n e s p e r f o r m a n c e s d ' o b s e r v a t i o n : Ben se p r é s e n t a n t immobile p e n d a n t deux h e u r e s au r e g a r d d e s s p e c t a t e u r s de théâtre de N i c e et m u n i d'une a f f i c h e t te p o r t a n t l ' i n s c r i p t i o n " R e g a r d e z - m o i cela s u f f i t " ou Y v e s Klein o r g a n i s a n t des e x p o s i t i o n s de c o r p s v i v a n t s . . . P r a t i q u e c o n s u m a t o i r e qui ne r e p r é s e n t e a u t r e chose q u ' e l l e - m ê m e : pas d ' o e u v r e a u t o n o m e h o r s de ce q u i a lieu m o m e n t a n é m e n t , dans l ' é c h a n g e avec le r e g a r d du spectateur. Ces e x e m p l e s s o n t é v i d e m m e n t p a r c e l l a i r e s et p r i v i l é g i e n t de m a n i è r e o u t r a n c i è r e la m a n i f e s t a t i o n v i s u e l l e ; l ' é t u d e de l ' e s p a c e t h é â t r a l par e x e m p l e s o u l i g n e , au c o n t r a i r e , l ' e x i s t e n c e d'une m u l t i p l i c i t é de t r a d i t i o n s : p r é é m i n e n c e de la vision du s p e c t a t e u r d a n s le t h é â t r e à l ' i t a l i e n n e ou d a n s c e r t a i n e s r é a l i s a t i o n s c o n t e m p o r a i n e s à s c è n e s m u l t i p l e s , le p u b l i c f a i s a n t p a r t i e du t a b l e a u et étant i n t é g r é au s p e c t a c l e ( T h é â t r e du s o l e i l , Plan K à l ' O r a n g e r i e ) , m a i s a u s s i p r é d o m i n a n c e du s o n o r e d a n s le théâtre a n t i q u e , é l i s a b e t h a i n ou d a n s c e r t a i n e s e x p é r i e n c e s c o n t e m p o r a i n e s (Peter Brook aux B o u f f e s du N o r d , Théâtre du c r i ) . Inutile de le p r é c i s e r , les c o m p o s a n t e s v i s u e l l e s au t h é â t r e sont i n t é g r é e s d a n s un d i s c o u r s m i x t e d o n t les s u p p o r t s de m a n i f e s t a t i o n sont n o m b r e u x : corps et voix de l'acteur, récit, lumière, musique, etc. Le m o n t r é s ' a s s o c i e au nommé et t o u t m e s s a g e est s o u m i s au jeu d e s r e d o n d a n c e s ou d e s f o c a l i s a t i o n s : la r é p l i q u e de T a r t u f f e " C a c h e z ce sein que je ne s a u r a i s voir!' se m a n i f e s t e à la fois comme m e s s a g e v e r b a l et comme " i m a g e " r é p e r c u t é e s i m u l t a n é m e n t par le corps de l ' a c t r i c e et la

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g e s t u e l l e du c o m e d i e n . Il est d o n c n é c e s s a i r e de situer et de d é f i n i r l ' i m a g e au t h é â t r e n o n s a n s f a i r e é m e r g e r d ' e m b l é e les o b s t a c l e s à u n e telle t e n t a t i v e o p é r é e sur le m o d e de la s é m i o t i q u e " p l a n a i r e " . Enumérons quelques difficultés : - P e u t - o n i d e n t i f i e r image et c o m p o s a n t e v i s u e l l e , é c r i ture et n o m i n a t i o n ? La v a r i a t i o n t e r m i n o l o g i q u e d o i t , d a n s le m e i l l e u r des cas, ê t r e é t u d i é e . - L ' e s p a c e s c é n i q u e , l o r s q u ' i l est d é f i n i , n'est pas p l a t ; il est t r i d i m e n s i o n n e l , a r a p p o r t au v o l u m e - la m i s e en scène p e u t - ê t r e p i c t u r a l e m a i s a u s s i s c u l p t u r a l e , d é f i n i e par le corps, le m o u v e m e n t , la g e s t u e l l e . - La v i s i o n et la r é c e p t i o n du s p e c t a t e u r s o n t - e l l e s comparables? Le s p e c t a t e u r de t h é â t r e se trouve plongé d a n s un e s p a c e p h y s i q u e et c o g n i t i f d o n t la s e g m e n t a t i o n v a r i e d a n s la d u r é e . La l u m i è r e peut plonger acteur et s p e c t a t e u r d a n s un même é n o n c é ; l ' o b s c u r i t é de la salle p r o v o q u e au c o n t r a i r e un d é b r a y a g e q u i e x p u l s e le s p e c t a t e u r de l ' é n o n c é . Une f o c a l i s a t i o n a n a l o g u e peut se p r o d u i r e sur s c è n e . Le jeu de l ' a c t e u r (en h a u t e u r o u à l ' h o r i z o n t a l e ) peut s u s c i t e r un d é c o u p a g e tout a u s s i a l é a t o i r e (Timon d ' A t h è n e s aux B o u f f e s du Nord s é p a r a n t le b a l c o n et le p a r t e r r e ) . Le c o n t e m p l a t e u r de la t o i l e (image plane) p a r t à la r e n c o n t r e d ' u n r e g a r d é n o n c i a teur ( - p e i n t r e ) a u q u e l il s ' i d e n t i f i e r a ou non (cf. l ' a n a m o r p h o s e ) ; il i n v e s t i r a sa c u l t u r e et sa langue s e l o n les d é t e r m i n a t i o n s (sèmes, t r a i t s o p t i q u e s p e r t i nents) fixées objectivement dans l'instant. - Le poste d ' i n v e s t i g a t i o n de l ' o b s e r v a t e u r d i f f è r e é g a l e m e n t : on peut lire et r e l i r e un t a b l e a u à p a r t i r de son énoncé m a i s la r é c e p t i o n du s p e c t a c l e est é p h é m è r e , vécue c o l l e c t i v e m e n t et i m p r é v i s i b l e ( " p r é c o n s t r u i t e m a i s non p r é m é d i t é e " : U b e r s f e l d ) : les s p e c t a t e u r s ne v o i e n t pas les m ê m e s c h o s e s q u e l l e q u e soit la place où ils se t r o u v e n t et un fou r i r e de la s a l l e peut d é f o c a liser c o m p l è t e m e n t la r é c e p t i o n . - Pour c o n c l u r e , s o u l i g n o n s la s p é c i f i c i t é des c o d e s d é t e r m i n a n t le v i s u e l r e p r é s e n t a b l e sur scène (cf. H e l b o , 1 9 8 3 a : 51) : h i s t o i r e de l ' a r c h i t e c t u r e d é t e r m i n a n t un m o d e h i s t o r i q u e de f o n c t i o n n e m e n t du r e g a r d , m o d è l e s s o c i a u x " i m i t é s " sur s c è n e , s t r u c t u r e s i m a g i n a i r e s ; les o u t i l s du s c é n o g r a p h e sont t o u t a u s s i s p é c i f i q u e s : c o o r d o n n é e s de l ' e s p a c e , m a t i è r e du d é c o r , l u m i è r e , m u s i que, comédien, etc. T e l l e s s o n t d o n c les d i v e r g e n c e s a p p a r e n t e s d o n t ne peut faire litière l'abord des composantes visuelles t h é â t r a l e s et p l a n a i r e s ; p a r - d e l à cette q u e s t i o n p o n c t u e l l e s ' é v a l u e l ' a c q u i s de la s é m i o l o g i e face à la t h é o r i e de l ' i m a g e . Quel est l'arsenal méthodologique o f f e r t par la s é m i o l o g i e ? N o u s p r o p o s o n s un bref b i l a n

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c r i t i q u e centré s u r t o u t sur le d i s c o u r s m i x t e q u i semble le p l u s p r o p i c e à u n e c o m p a r a i s o n avec le s p e c t a c l e (par son i n t r i c a t i o n de codes v e r b a u x e t n o n v e r b a u x ) . S E M I O L O G I E DE

L'IMAGE

Le t e x t e i n a u g u r a l de la s é m i o l o g i e de l ' i m a g e , R h é t o r i q u e de l ' i m a g e , d é t e r m i n e une p a r t i t i o n i l l u s t r e entre le m e s s a g e l i n g u i s t i q u e , l ' i m a g e d é n o t é e (message i c o n i q u e n o n c o d e , le s i g n i f i a n t r e f l é t a n t " p h o t o g r a p h i q u e m e n t " un s i g n i f i é a s s i m i l é au m o d è l e r é f é r e n t i e l ) , l ' i m a g e c o n n o tée ( m e s s a g e i c o n i q u e codé ou s y m b o l i q u e d o n t le cas e x e m p l a i r e s e r a i t le d e s s i n ) . Au r i s q u e d ' e n f o n c e r une p o r t e o u v e r t e , s o u l i g n o n s à q u e l p o i n t la p e r t i n e n c e s é m i o l o g i q u e de l'image est ici d é f i n i e par son c a r a c t è r e a n a l o g i q u e , i c o n i q u e ; le c a r a c t è r e de signe attribué à l ' i c o n e est r é g l é par a v a n c e : une o p p o s i t i o n de n a t u r e entre le m e s s a g e l i n g u i s t i q u e et l ' i m a g e assure leur c o n s t i t u t i o n en o b j e t sémiologique. Si j'ai r a p p e l é la d i v i s i o n c l a s s i q u e entre le m o t et l ' i m a g e , c'est p a r c e que l ' h i s t o i r e de l ' a r t i n t e r r o g e p a r f o i s c e l l e - c i : a n t é r i o r i t é de l'un ou de l ' a u t r e , dépendances respectives, voire subversion réciproque ou o s m o s e : les é c h a n g e s f u r t i f s ( h i é r o g l y p h e s , i n c u n a b l e s ) se m u e n t p a r f o i s en r e c h e r c h e s y s t é m a t i q u e sur le d i s c o u r s mixte (illustrés, bande dessinée). On c o n n a î t des cas q u a s i e x p é r i m e n t a u x d ' é c r i t u r e i c o n i q u e : les c a l l i g r a m m e s en f o r m e de m o n t r e ou de c r a v a t e 1 d e m e u r e n t , c e r t e s , représentatifs d'un référent absent ; certaines recherches de Butor (8.610.000 l i t r e s eau par s e c o n d e ) sont de véritables compositions rythmiques : masses typographiques v i s u a l i s é e s comme un tableau d e Plondrian en f i g u r e s g é o m é t r i q u e s ; " l ' i n t e r p r é t a n t u n i v e r s e l " du l a n g a g e ( B e n v e n i s t e ) b a s c u l e d u côté de l'image : o n songe a u s s i aux l e t t r e s d e s s i n é e s de D o t r e m o n t . L ' i m a g e é c r i t e est tout aussi v i v a c e d a n s la t r a d i t i o n : les t o i l e s d y n a m i q u e s de K l e e o r i e n t a n t la l e c t u r e à l'aide d e f l è c h e s , les l e x è m e s de K a n d i n s k y é v o q u e n t une s y n t a x e ; l ' e s p a c e n a r r a t i f d ' A l e c h i n s k i ( m a r g e s , plages j u x t a p o s é e s ) r a p p e l l e les n i v e a u x d ' a r t i c u l a t i o n , la l i n é a r i t é l i n g u i s t i q u e . De m a n i è r e plus e x p l i c i t e e n c o r e , la bande d e s s i n é e p r a t i q u e d a n s ce d i s c o u r s m i x t e la c o n t a m i n a t i o n s y s t é m a t i q u e : le f i g u r a t i f p e n c h e vers l ' a b s t r a c t i o n t a n d i s que le v e r b a l (les o n o m a t o p é e s ) se r é i f i e : les b a l l o n s i n t é g r é s au d e s s i n font i m a g e et s o n t s a i s i s d a n s le d é c h i f f r e m e n t de l a v i g n e t t e , les lettres s o n t d e s s i n é e s , f o r m e s h y b r i d e s d u p i c t o g r a m m e et de l ' i d é o g r a m m e , c e r t a i n e s p l a n c h e s s o n t t a b u l a i r e s et o b l i g e n t à e x p l o r e r tous les p o s s i b l e s de la f i g u r a t i o n n a r r a t i v e . Il est c e p e n d a n t une t r a d i t i o n e s t h é t i q u e q u i

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r e m e t t r e en c a u s e la d é f i n i t i o n b a r t h é s i e n n e de l ' i m a g e : celle du m o d e a f i g u r a t i f o ù tout r e p é r a g e d i s c u r s i f fait d é f a u t ; on p o u r r a i t citer D o t r e m o n t m a i s s u r t o u t B u t o r d o n t c e r t a i n e s pages n ' o n t d ' a u t r e s p r o p o s que de focaliser un m o u v e m e n t o c u l a i r e (cf. H e l b o , 1975: 7 5 ) ; c i t a n t o u v e r t e m e n t 3 a c k s o n P o l i o c k , Butor é q u i l i b r e les m a s s e s et les l i g n e s ( m o b i l e ) de m a n i è r e telle q u e la seule d é n o t a t i o n l i s i b l e s o i t la c i r c u l a r i t é ou l ' o b l i q u e . Plus question d ' é c r i t u r e c u r s i v e m a i s de m o u v e m e n t d a n s l ' e s p a c e , plus q u e s t i o n d ' i m a g e a n a l o g i q u e m a i s d e g r a p h i s m e , de trace, d'acte performant. On a a f f a i r e à un s i g n i f i é de d é n o t a tion p l a s t i q u e , a b s e n t d a n s la t h é o r i e de B a r t h e s , et qui substituerait donc à l'opposition iconique-linguistique, le c l i v a g e i c o n i q u e - p l a s t i q u e . De p l u s , le c o n c e p t d ' i m a g e é c r i t e c o n t e s t e une d é f i n i t i o n a n a l o g i q u e de l ' i m a g e ; c e t t e c r i t i q u e est c o n f i r m é e par les r e c h e r c h e s p e i r c i e n n e s sur l ' i c o n i c i t é (et par B a r t h e s l u i - m ê m e d a n s La C h a m b r e c l a i r e ) . Il n'y a pas de d é j à - l à de l ' i m a g e (la r e s s e m b l a n c e , l ' a n a l o g i e , o p p o s é e à l ' i m a g e codée, s y m b o l i q u e par e s s e n c e ) c o r r e s p o n d a n t à un d é c o u p a g e d u r é e l ; il f a u t a p p r é h e n d e r l ' i c o n i c i t é (la r e s s e m b l a n c e ) comme une d e s trois f o n c t i o n s t h é o r i q u e s du m e s s a g e ( c f . H e l b o , 1963b: 42), les d e u x a u t r e s é t a n t l ' i n d i c e ( c o n t i g u i t é par r a p p o r t à l ' o b j e t , la photo d ' A l d o ftoro p r é s e n t é e par les B r i g a d e s r o u g e s c o m m e indice de sa m o r t ) et le s y m b o l e (codé ou t r i b u t a i r e d ' u n " i n t e r p r é t a n t " i d é o l o g i q u e ou h i s t o r i q u e o c c u l t a n t p l u s o u m o i n s le d i s p o s i t i f d ' é n o n c i a t i o n , e t c . ) . Il s ' a g i t de c o n s t r u c t i o n s c o n c e p t u e l l e s , en i n t e r a c t i o n , que l'on peut p r i v i l é gier si le p r o b l è m e a b o r d é l'exige m a i s l ' i r r é d e n t i s m e de nature paraît contestable. Tel p l a n du m é t r o de P a r i s b a r r é de l ' i n s c r i p t i o n " Q u e l c i r q u e c e t t e vie de c o n " perd sa v a l e u r i c o n i q u e p r e m i è r e ( i c ô n e du r é s e a u ferré et i n d i c e de l i e u x et d é p l a c e m e n t s ) pour se muer en h y é r o g l y p h e s y m b o l i q u e du c h a o s : l ' i m a g e l é g e n d é e par la p i s t e , le c i r q u e , le d é s o r d r e v i r e à la m é t a p h o r e codée d ' u n e e x i s t e n c e i n s e n s é e ( e x e m p l e cité par F r e s n a u l t - D e r u e l l e ) . CONCLUSIONS 1. R h é t o r i q u e d e l ' i m a g e i g n o r e le s i g n i f i é " p l a s t i q u e " de 1 ' i m a g e . 2 . Les " f r o n t i è r e s " de l ' i m a g e f o n t p r o b l è m e si on les d é f i n i t par la s u b s t a n c e de l ' e x p r e s s i o n ; M e t z : "ce n ' e s t pas parce q u ' u n m e s s a g e e s t v i s u e l que t o u s ses c o d e s le s o n t et ce n ' e s t pas parce q u ' u n c o d e se m a n i f e s t e d a n s les m e s s a g e s v i s u e l s q u ' i l ne se m a n i f e s t e j a m a i s a i l l e u r s . Oe plus, un code (même v i s u e l ) n ' e s t j a m a i s v i s i b l e car il c o n s i s t e en un r é s e a u de r e l a t i o n s l o g i q u e s " . 3 . L ' o p p o s i t i o n de n a t u r e m e s s a g e l i n g u i s t i q u e - m e s s a g e i c o n i q u e a p p a r a î t c o m m e un f a c t e u r de b l o c a g e .

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L ' é t u d e de la c o m m u n i c a t i o n v i s u e l l e t i e n t compte de ces o b j e c t i o n s et tente de d é p a s s e r le d i s t i n g u o m e s s a g e l i n g u i s t i q u e us m e s s a g e i c o n i q u e . D a n s La s t r u c t u r e a b s e n t e , U . Eco s ' i n t é r e s s e aux c o d e s de l'image : sa d é m a r c h é est d o u b l e et concerne d ' a b o r d la p e r c e p t i o n du m e s s a g e (le code d e s codes étant p s y c h o l o g i q u e ) p u i s le f o n c t i o n n e m e n t i n t e r n e où s e r a i e n t d i s t i n g u é s des tropes et des t o p o i ( p r é m i s s e s et lieux a r g u m e n t a t i f s ) . La thèse fait é m e r g e r l ' i d é e d'une logique p r o p r e et d ' u n f o n c t i o n n e m e n t s p é c i f i q u e v i s u a l i s a n t des f i g u r e s r h é t o r i q u e s . R é a l i s a t i o n v i s u e l l e de tropes c l a s s i q u e s (publicité par la litote en f a v e u r de c i g a r e t t e s : un n u a g e de f u m é e et la p h r a s e " n o u s n ' a v o n s que cela à v e n d r e " ; plus ou m o i n s u n i v e r s e l s ( l ' a n t o n o m a s e : chaque unité r e p r é s e n t e le genre ou l ' e s p è c e ) m a i s aussi de t r o p e s s p é c i f i q u e s d é r i vés de la m é t a p h o r e (telle v o i t u r e r a p p r o c h é e d ' u n manoir m é d i é v a l b é n é f i c i e de l'aura de n o b l e s s e ; cas u l t i m e : 1 ' " i c o n o g r a m m e k i t s c h " : l'huile D a n t e , le savon la 3oconde, etc.). T e l l e affiche en faveur de V U (une m i n u scule c o c c i n e l l e sur un v a s t e f o n d b l a n c , l é g e n d é e par l ' i n s c r i p t i o n "Ne v o u s laissez pas e f f r a y e r par la m o d e stie d u p r i x " ) sera i n t e r p r é t é e comme une v i s u a l i s a t i o n d'un t r o p e ( 1 ' e n t h y m è m e ) et le s u p p o r t d ' a r g u m e n t s l o g i ques (les g a d g e t s s o n t inutiles, la v o i t u r e n ' e s t pas un s y m b o l e s o c i a l , e t c . ) . Cette a n a l y s e t e n d r a i t à i l l u strer l ' e x i s t e n c e de s t r u c t u r e s l i n g u i s t i q u e s ou r h é t o r i q u e s s o u t e r r a i n e s à l'image. U n e n o t e du p r e m i e r B a r t h e s s i g n a l e le cas de cette p u b l i c i t é v a n t a n t l'arôme d'un café " p r i s o n n i e r " du p r o d u i t en poudre et f i g u r é e par u n e b o î t e de café entourée d ' u n e chaîne et d'un c a d e nas : la m é t a p h o r e l i n g u i s t i q u e ( " p r i s o n n i e r " ) s'y t r o u v e prise à la lettre de l ' i m a g e . M e t z p r é c i s e et g é n é r a l i s e ce qui c h e z Eco et B a r t h e s c o n c e r n e s u r t o u t la p u b l i c i t é ( d i s c o u r s m i x t e ) en é t a b l i s s a n t un p a r a l l è l e e n t r e l ' i m a g e et le r ê v e : les f i g u r e s de r h é t o r i q u e et le n i v e a u t o p i que r e l è v e r a i e n t des o p é r a t i o n s du r ê v e ; é v o q u a n t la r h é t o r i q u e de l ' i n c o n s c i e n t de B e n v e n i s t e , M e t z r a p p r o c h e le l i n g u i s t i q u e à l'oeuvre dans l ' i c o n i q u e , t r a d u i t par l'iconique , des o p é r a t i o n s f o n d a m e n t a l e s du r ê v e : la f i g u r a b i l i t é ( l a t e n t / m a n i f e s t é ) , la c o n d e n s a t i o n , le d é p l a cement, etc. Il y a u r a i t un n i v e a u p r i m a i r e , u n e r h é t o r i q u e c o m m u n e , une p r é m a n i f e s t a t i o n latente d o n t la p s y c h a n a l y s e d e v r a i t r e n d r e c o m p t e et que l ' i c o n e m a n i f e s terait. La d o u b l e i n t e l l i g i b i l i t é ( l i n g u i s t i q u e / i m a g i naire en m o u v e m e n t ) fait l ' u n a n i m i t é dans la c r i t i q u e p i c t u r a l e : l i s i b l e / v i s i b l e ( M a r i n ) , j o i n t u r e du dit/ perçu ( D a m i s c h ) , t e x t e s i m p l i c i t é s d a n s l ' i m a g e ( S c h e f e r ) . L o u i s M a r i n p a r l e d'un t e x t e f i g u r a t i f dans

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le v i s i b l e et le l i s i b l e se n o u e n t ; texte f i g u r a t i f v e r b a l i s a n t la r e p r é s e n t a t i o n (on dit le t a b l e a u en le lisant) m a i s s i g n a n t a u s s i la f i g u r a b i l i t é ( l ' i n c o n s c i e n t ou le l i n g u i s t i q u e s o u s - j a c e n t au m a n i f e s t e ) . Au p o i n t que l'on "ne peut r i e n d i r e du t a b l e a u " , on "ne p e u t q u e le d i r e " . La l e c t u r e , c o n s t r u c t i o n l i n g u i s t i q u e , r e f l è t e un l i n g u i s t i q u e i m p l i c i t e et un i c o n i q u e , les deux n i v e a u x étant mêlés. La s é m i o t i q u e de la s i g n i f i c a t i o n qui d é l a i s s e le s i g n e perçu (unité de c o m m u n i c a t i o n ) a u p r o f i t du texte p r o d u i t / d u p r o c è s d ' a n a l y s e (unité de d i s c o u r s r é s u l t a n t de la c o m b i n a t o i r e de p l u s i e u r s s t r u c t u r e s / c o d e s , q u e l s que s o i e n t le s u p p o r t de m a n i f e s t a t i o n ou le r é f é r e n t ; i m a g e , s c u l p t u r e , m u s i q u e , b r u i t , parole p e u v e n t être a n a l y s é s et c o n s t r u i t s à partir d e s r e l a t i o n s ) r e p r e n d cette double perspective : processus primaires relevant de la p s y c h a n a l y s e et p r o c e s s u s s e c o n d a i r e s a s s u m é s soit par la l o g i q u e n a r r a t o - d i s c u r s i v e (analyse f o n c t i o n n e l l e , contenu) soit par l ' a n a l y s e t h é m a t i q u e (carré s é m i o t i q u e si la m o r p h o l o g i e ne s e r t aucune s y n t a x e ) . CONCLUSIONS Que l'on s ' i n t é r e s s e au signe perçu ou au t e x t e , l ' a r t i c u l a t i o n i c o n i q u e - l i n g u i s t i q u e prend place d a n s un e n s e m b l e c o m p l e x e où l'on dis t i n g u e de m a n i è r e c o n v e r g e n t e 1 - la m a t é r i a l i t é p l a s t i q u e , 2 - le l i n g u i s t i q u e / l e p r é m a n ifesté à l ' o e u v r e d a n s le figuré, 4 3 - le l i s i b l e v e r b a l i s a b l e , la f i g u r a t i o n n o m m e e , 4 - le v i s i b l e codé à t r a v e r s les m y t h e s , l ' h i s t o i r e , 1 ' idéologie. LE TEXTE

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N o t r e d é t o u r t h é o r i q u e n o u s a d o n c livré q u a t r e f a c t e u r s d e s c o m p o s a n t e s v i s u e l l e s ; cette d é f i n i t i o n de l ' i m a g e c o n s t i t u e - t - e l l e un a d j u v a n t pour la s é m i o t i q u e d u t h é â t r e et d a n s q u e l l e s l i m i t e s ? 1 . La m a t é r i a l i t é p l a s t i q u e . Les s u p p o r t s de m a n i f e s t a t i o n au t h é â t r e sont i n f i n i m e n t p l u s n o m b r e u x que d a n s le cas de l ' i m a g e p l a n a i r e : r é c i t , g e s t u e l l e , c o r p s du c o m é d i e n , p a r o l e , b r u i t , m u s i q u e , l u m i è r e . C h a q u e s u p p o r t s ' i m p o s e d a n s sa m a t é r i a l i t é et son o p a c i t é , le c o m é d i e n , m é d i a s y n c r é t i q u e , est le p e i n t r e et sa t o i l e ; il est à la f o i s p r o d u c t e u r d ' é n o n c i a t i o n et p r o d u i t é n o n c é : corps et p e r s o n n a g e ; la p r i s e en charge de la c o r p o r é i t é du c o m é d i e n est l a r g e m e n t a s s u m é e par la c r i t i q u e ; m a i s si la m a t é r i a l i t é p r e m i è r e est i n é v i t a b l e m e n t r e ç u e , elle se t r o u v e s i m u l t a n é m e n t i n t é g r é e d a n s un t r a v a i l de c o n s t r u c t i o n du s e n s . De tous les a r t s f i g u -

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r a t i f s , le t h é â t r e e s t donc le seul à se d é f i n i r par une p r é s e n c e p h y s i q u e (de l'acteur et s e c o n d a i r e m e n t du d é c o r ) , par un r é e l (qui f a i t signe) p l u t ô t q u e par sa r e p r é s e n t a t i o n ; m a i s en m i m e temps cette m a t é r i a l i t é est " a r t i f i c i a l i s é e " ( C e r c l e de P r a g u e ) , perçue comme i l l u s o i r e , a n a l o gique, s y m b o l i q u e . S i g n e s m a t é r i e l " p l a s t i q u e " et i c o n i q u e sont c o n t e m p o r a i n s . 2. Sur le r a p p o r t p r é m a n i f e s t é - l i n g u i s t i q u e - i c o n i q u e . a . C o n t r a i r e m e n t au d i s c o u r s v i s u e l p l a n a i r e q u i peut présenter p a r f o i s un caractère n o n n a r r a t i f , le d i s c o u r s s p e c t a c u l a i r e c o m p r e n d par d é f i n i t i o n un c a r a c t è r e n a r r a tif. b . De p l u s , on a affaire à un d i s c o u r s m i x t e , r a s s e m b l a n t , comme la b a n d e d e s s i n é e , des m e s s a g e s v e r b a u x et non v e r b a u x ; si ces m e s s a g e s sont en é t r o i t e c o r r é l a t i o n d a n s la c o n t e m p o r a n é i t é du spectacle (telle r é p l i q u e ou tel o b j e t v i s u e l p e u v e n t au m ê m e titre c o n s t i t u e r l'icone d ' u n p e r s o n n a g e , la b a i g n o i r e de M a r a t c h e z U e i s s , les s o u l i e r s chez B e c k e t t ) , il paraît b e a u c o u p plus d i f f i c i l e d ' é v o q u e r une a n t é r i o r i t é du l i n g u i s t i q u e par r a p p o r t aux c o m p o s a n tes v i s u e l l e s de la r e p r é s e n t a t i o n ; sauf d a n s le cas du texte de r é g i e - et e n c o r e - le t e x t e p h o n i q u e f a i t p a r t i e du s p e c t a c l e aux c ô t é s des a u t r e s s y s t è m e s . c. Q u ' e n e s t - i l de la double i n t e l l i g i b i l i t é des p r o c e s sus p r i m a i r e s et s e c o n d a i r e s au t h é â t r e ? Le s p e c t a c l e v i s u a l i s e - t - i l un contenu latent? Le p r a t i c i e n o e u v r e - t il, à la m a n i è r e du r ê v e , à u n e c o n s t r u c t i o n d ' i m a g e s d o n t le t e x t e " d é p l o y é " par le s p e c t a t e u r et la s y n t a x e r e l a y é e par les m o t s g a r a n t i r o n t l ' é m e r g e n c e . La q u e s t i o n est complexe : - le p r o g r a m m e de d é p a r t (contenu latent) des p r a t i c i e n s v a r i e : t e x t e é c r i t (idée), v i s i o n " p i c t u r a l e " de la scène ( s t r e h l e r ) , écoute de la voix (Thomas B e r n h a r d t ) , r a p p o r t au c o r p s (Barba); - les o p é r a t i o n s de la r e p r é s e n t a t i o n r a p p e l l e n t la f i g u r a b i l i t é ; s é l e c t i o n et t r a n s f o r m a t i o n par c o n d e n s a t i o n ou d é p l a c e m e n t : une m ê m e image s c é n i q u e (la f a u s s e r é n o v a tion du d é c o r d e s B o u f f e s du N o r d ) r e n v o i e à p l u s i e u r s u n i v e r s de r é f é r e n c e (des t r a d i t i o n s c u l t u r e l l e s et t h é â t r a l e s d i v e r s e s ) , le c o n t r e - e m p l o i d ' u n c o m é d i e n p e u t jouer le r ô l e d e d o u b l e m é t a p h o r e , e t c . - A la d i f f é r e n c e de l'image p l a n a i r e , la c o n s t r u c t i o n du s p e c t a c l e s ' é t a b l i t à partir de s i g n e s m a t é r i e l s (réels) p e r ç u s c o m m e t e l s a v a n t d ' ê t r e i n s é r é s d a n s la f i c t i o n ; si l ' h i s t o i r e du t h é â t r e i n s i s t e p a r f o i s sur le d é v o i l e m e n t ou l ' e f f a c e m e n t du r é f è r e n t s c é n i q u e et e x t r a s c é n i q u e (théâtre comme i n s t r u m e n t de la c o n n a i s s a n c e ou e n c l e n c h e m e n t pur et s i m p l e d e s f a n t a s m e s ) , il n'en d e m e u r e pas m o i n s que le r a p p o r t envisagé ici a s s o c i e un r é e l " m o n d a i n " et sa r e p r é s e n t a t i o n / v i s u a l i s a t i o n t h é â t r a l e . - A tout m o m e n t , la logique ( s e c o n d a i r e ) i m p l i q u é e par ce

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d o u b l e p r o c è s est celle du "je s a i s bien m a i s q u a n d m i m e " . Le r é g i m e de c r o y a n c e c o m m u n à la scène et à la s a l l e est d o n c celui d'une a d h é s i o n sur le m o d e de la v é r i t é à une r é a l i t é q u i n ' e s t pas p e r ç u e comme t e l l e ; le d é n i du j u g e m e n t de v é r i t é - la d é n é g a t i o n - c o n c e r n e l ' i m a g i n a i r e , l ' i n c a r n a t i o n des f a n t a s m e s - un m ê m e signe est m o n t r é à la f o i s c o m m e r é e l ( m a t é r i e l ) et c o m m e i c o n i q u e ( s i m u l a n t un m o d è l e e x t r a s c é n i q u e a u q u e l il r e n v o i e ) , à la fois comme p e r f o r m a n c e et c o m m e f a b l e , f i c t i o n , r é c i t . C'est p o u r q u o i toute la t r a d i t i o n t h é â t r a l e a d é v e l o p p é des r i t u e l s de t r a n s i t i o n q u i s é p a r e n t le m o n d e n a t u r e l du m o n d e t h é â t r a l : l ' e n t r é e , les t r o i s c o u p s , l ' e n t r a c t e ( p r o p o r t i o n n e l à l ' e f f o r t exigé par l ' i l l u s i o n ) . C'est la c o n v e n t i o n (la f r o n t i è r e entre l ' o b j e t vu et l ' o b j e t r é e l ) qui r è g l e la b o n n e m a r c h e de la p e r f o r m a n c e ( p a r f o i s la t r a n s g r e s s i o n par i n t r u s i o n du m o n d e n a t u r e l b r i s e l ' i l l u s i o n : Muette de P o r t i c i , H e r n a n i , v ê p r e s s i c i l i e n nes). F r o n t i è r e c o g n i t i v e i d e n t i f i a n t l'aller au t h é â t r e au f a i r e du t h é â t r e . 3. Sur la v e r b a l i s a t i o n du f i g u r é . a. Si la toile se d i t , le s p e c t a c l e t h é â t r a l peut se v e r b a l i s e r ; m a i s il ne s ' a g i t que du d é p a r t d'un t r a v a i l de c o n s t r u c t i o n s é m a n t i q u e ; le s p e c t a t e u r t r a n s f o r m e l ' o b j e t v i s u e l en t e x t e , il é l a b o r e sa r é c e p t i o n m a i s il la c o n struit d a n s l ' i n s t a n t ; si le t a b l e a u peut être lu, r e l u , n o m m é de m u l t i p l e s f a ç o n s , il p e r d u r e , a l o r s que le s p e c tacle t h é â t r a l s ' o f f r e par f r a g m e n t s à une c o h é r e n c e éphémère. b . De p l u s , la r é c e p t i o n est à la f o i s l i n é a i r e et t a b u l a i r e , é c a r t e l é e entre u n l i s i b l e et un v i s i b l e c o n t e m p o r a i n s : s u c c e s s i v i t é d ' i m a g e s o f f e r t e s par b r i b e s et m o r c e a u x à un s p e c t a t e u r qui f a i t le tri et r a s s e m b l e , mais nécessité contradictoire d'emmagasiner simultanément des m e s s a g e s r e l e v a n t de codes h é t é r o g è n e s ; à t o u t m o m e n t l ' i n t e r p r é t a t i o n é c h a f a u d e son u n i t é : de n o u v e a u x m e s s a g e s la d é t r u i s e n t , d é f i e n t le pouvoir d ' i n t é g r a t i o n . Il f a u t r e c o n s t r u i r e un sens à c h a q u e s i g n e et c o m p o s e r . c. La m a n i è r e d o n t ce t r a v a i l s ' o p è r e est d é t e r m i n é e - par 1 ' é n o n c i a t a i r e : il s é l e c t i o n n e en f o n c t i o n de ses a t t e n tes, h i é r a r c h i s e selon sa c u l t u r e , - le r é c i t et la g e s t u e l le c o n t r e la l u m i è r e - , m é m o r i s e selon l ' i d é o l o g i e ou la c o r é f é r e n c e q u i lui p e r m e t d ' i n t é g r e r le neuf aux p r é s u p posés a n t é r i e u r s ; - par 1 ' é n o n c i a t e u r qui e s s a i e r a de f o c a l i s e r la c o m p é t e n c e r é c e p t i v e , de s u s c i t e r d e s r è g l e s de l e c t u r e . Ceci se r e m a r q u e a u s s i d a n s c e r t a i n s t a b l e a u x : l ' e s t h é t i q u e de la p e r s p e c t i v e i n c i t e 1 * é n o n c i a t a i r e à a d o p t e r le p o i n t de vue fixé par 1 ' é n o n c i a t e u r ; c ' e s t l ' i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , l ' i l l u s i o n r é f é r e n t i e l l e a n n u l a n t la d i s t a n c e e n t r e l ' u n i v e r s de l ' é n o n c é et celui de l ' é n o n c i a t i o n ; m a i s au t h é â t r e cette p r é c o n s t r u c t i o n e s t t o u j o u r s a l é a t o i r e : elle ne d u r e pas et le s p e c t a t e u r peut f o r t

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b i e n d é f o c a l i s e r ce q u i lui est d o n n é à voir. 4. Sur les c o d e s . C e r t e s , d e s codes e x i s t e n t (histoire de la t h é â t r a l i t é , i d é o l o g i e , m é m o i r e du s p e c t a t e u r ) qui vont o r i e n t e r la réception. F a c u l t é de P h i l o s o p h i e et L e t t r e s U n i v e r s i t é libre de B r u x e l l e s Bruxelles, Belgique. NOTES 1. E n c o r e que la r é f é r e n c e ouvre ici le sens; le c a l l i g r a m m e r é f é r é aussi - t o u t comme Ben - à son propre p r o c è s de r e p r é s e n t a t i o n m é t a p h o r i q u e . 2 . Le code s e r a i t ici 1 1 i n v e n t i o n de r e l a t i o n s s i g n i f i c a t i v e s au sein même de la m a t i è r e , de la s u b s t a n c e de l ' e x p r e s s i o n : codes g é o m é t r i q u e , p s y c h o l o g i q u e p a r f o i s r é i n t r o d u i t s de force à la r é c e p t i o n c e p e n dant. 3 . F i g u r a b i l i t é : o p é r a t i o n qui t r a n s f o r m e la p e n s é e du r ê v e en i m a g e . S é l e c t i o n : t r a n s f o r m a t i o n des p e n s é e s les r e n d a n t r e p r é s e n t a b l e s en i m a g e s s u r t o u t v i s u e l l e s ; la t r a n s f o r m a t i o n en langage p i c t u r a l , c o n f o n d a n t les v e r s u s (plus p r o c h e de la r h é t o r i q u e et d o n c de la c o m m u n i c a t i o n , a l o r s que le rive n ' é c l a i r e pas nos f a n t a s m e s ) serait comparable. Le r é c i t de r ê v e , l a c o n i q u e , s ' o p p o s e à son c o n t e n u l a t e n t , i n t e l l i g i b l e m a i s r e f o u l é ; de telle s o r t e que c h a q u e é l é m e n t m a n i f e s t e (mais o p a q u e ) se t r o u v e d é t e r m i n é par des s i g n i f i c a t i o n s s o u s - j a c e n t e s (les pensées oniriques). L ' é q u i v a l e n t i c o n o g r a p h i q u e de cette s t r u c t u r e invite à c o n c e v o i r l'image comme un r é b u s à d é c r i r e v e r b a l e m e n t pour y déceler des o p é r a t i o n s de c o n d e n s a t i o n (de r e p r é s e n t a n t s i c o n i q u e s d ' i m a g e s v e r b a l e s : r a c c o u r c i d o n t la logique est métaphorique), déplacement (métonymique, transformat e u r d a n s le c o n t r a i r e ) , c o n v e r s i o n ( s u r d é t e r m i n a trice, connectrice d'isotopies), etc. Pour un exemple on se r e p o r t e r a au cas cité par 3 . H . Rey d a n s S a u s s u r e a v e c F r e u d ; H o l b e i n s i g n a n t son t a b l e a u les A m b a s s a d e u r s f i g u r e au b a s de la toile une f o r m e b l a n c h e a l l o n g é e q u i , vue sous un certain a n g l e , r e p r é s e n t e un c r â n e e m b l è m e de son nom (os creux = crâne) . A . A p r o p o s de la n o m i n a t i o n on se s o u v i e n d r a de cette r e m a r q u e m e t z i e n n e d i s q u a l i f i a n t le s p e c t a c l e p h é n o m é n o l o g i q u e a d v e r s e du sujet et de l ' o b j e t : "le m o t , le l e x è m e (et sur l'autre face du p r o b l è m e l ' o b j e t v i s u e l u n e f o i s r e c o n n u ) ne sont que d e s p r o d u i t s t e r m i n a u x , c o m p l e x e de p r o d u c t i o n c u l t u r e l l e au sein d u q u e l le

381 r ô l e c e n t r a l est d é v o l u aux t r a i t s p e r t i n e n t s : t r a i t s d ' i d e n t i f i c a t i o n v i s u e l l e d ' u n côté (Eco), sèmes l i n g u i s t i q u e s de l ' a u t r e ( G r e i m a s ) " . Christian Metz, Essais sémiotiques. Paris, Klincksieck, 1977. p. 140. REFERENCES H e l b o , André ( 1 9 7 5 ) . M i c h e l B u t o r vers une l i t t é r a t u r e du s i g n e . Bruxelles : Complexe. ( 1 9 8 3 a ) . Les m o t s et les g e s t e s . Lille : Presses U n i v e r s i t a i r e s de L i l l e . ( 1 9 8 3 b ) . S é m i o l o g i e des m e s s a g e s s o c i a u x . Paris : Edilig.

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THE POETICITY OF THE COMMONPLACE Michael Herzfeld

A POETICS OF SOCIAL INTERACTION: DIFFERENCE

THE PURSUIT OF

This paper is intended as a contribution to two, necessarily interdependent conceptual issues for semiotic approaches to anthropology. In the first place, it seeks to demonstrate by ethnographic illustration the advantages to be gained by an extension of the Jakobsonian view of poeticity beyond the purely linguistic use to which that model is ordinarily put. Secondly, it provides a comparative study, thereby introducing into semiotic discourse one of its necessary but too often missed components — the comparativism that has always marked good social anthropology, and that for semiotics must constitute the best empirical source of difference, or of what E. Ardener (1971:xvii) has called a "critical lack of fit" (cf. also the Russian Formalist concept of defamiliarization [Hawkes 1977:71-72]). I do not want to claim too much theoretical import for the aggressively everyday examples of idiom that follow; and the compass of a conference presentation such as this is necessarily a physically narrow one. On the other hand, it is precisely because sheer triviality so often does "in little place attest a million" that a short paper on an anecdotal theme may elicit some revealing commonalities — and hence theoretical insights — in the tropes through which members of different societies organize everyday experience. Jakobson's poetic function is "the set (Einstellung) toward the message as such" (1960:356). In verse, to take the most obvious example, it is the extraordinariness and diagrammatic properties of the verbal form that constitute the basis of its poetic "feel." In Prague School terms, the form of the message is foregrounded at the partial expense of a suppositious content, with the result that the content, through its conversion to a more explicitly connotative mode, becomes enriched as well. In social life, such devices have led to a considerable emphasis on the more ritualized aspects of interaction, most notably in the works of Erving

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Goffman. But the emphasis on "frames" and the heavy use of dramaturgical metaphors entails a risk of reification, leading eventually to the separation of the present fluidity of interactional poetics into "performative" and "everyday" aspects. By reuniting these dimensions in the framework of a single poetics of social interaction, we may hope to capture in this area what Jakobson realized for language: that the ordinary and the set-apart are features of a continuum, and that they are what they are in large measure because they focus attention on their being what they are — in other words, through a true "set toward the message." ON THE ORDINARY, THE ORNERY, AND THE REGULAR This is perhaps clearest in a reductio ad absurdum that we in fact perform all the time, and that represents an unreflexive theoretical perception embedded in everyday speech and action. Take, for example, terms like "regular guy" and "ornery bastard" in modern American slang, and reflect on what the respective etymologies of these designations imply. A "regular guy" is remarkable because he is so unremarkable as to deserve comment: to follow the rules (regulae) of everyday sensibility to this extent is actually 'the exception rather than the rule.1 In theory, he might be a *"regular sailor" or a *"regular portrait painter," both of which are designations that, if they existed in everyday usage, would presumably imply a much more literal regularity — a humdrum adherence, in fact, to professional norms. No: the "regular guy" is good at being only one thing, a "guy," and he is so good at it that his performance is considered to deserve comment. Note, too, that he is not a "regular person." The use of the slang term "guy" models in language the ordinariness of the social performance to which it alludes. Substituting a formal term for it subverts the intimations of poeticity. The "ornery bastard," similarly, is not literally a bastard; but the collocation has implications of social parallelism not unlike the kind of verbal parallelism on which Jakobson expatiated so incisively. A bastard is someone, usually male, whose ancestry removes him to the margins of social acceptability. In much the same way, "ornery" people places themselves at odds with their fellow-citizens. Metaphors of marginality are a particularly rich source of insight into the processes of symbolic bounding, since they play on the outer edges of what appear to be a society's constitutive rules (cf.

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Douglas, 1975:90-114, 249-318). This applies w i t h particular aptness to the "ornery bastard," since the latter, like the "regular guy," is acknowledged as an e m b l e m a t i c stereotype, a genuinely A m e r i c a n product, as c a n b e s e e n f r o m t h e f r e q u e n c y w i t h w h i c h h e f i g u r e s in Westerns and spy thrillers. His "orneriness" is indeed a form of "ordinariness." It is, in fact, so ordinary that it excites comment. Here, historical processes h a v e e m b e d d e d into t h e l a n g u a g e a c l e a r u s e of d i s tortion ("slang") in order to underscore the extraordinariness, as it were, of this type of ordinariness. Such usages all fit a larger group of tropes, in w h i c h the metaphoricity of an utterance is foregrounded by m a k i n g a n obviously specious or exaggerated claim for its literalness: 'this car is a real lemon, 1 'we w e r e literally boiling w i t h fury,' and so on. A c o m m o n slang v e r s i o n o f t h i s in B r i t a i n is t h e u s e of t h e w o r d "right," as in: 'He's a r i g h t fool.' (There is m o r e than a h i n t of irony here too, however, since the w o r d "right" prepares the listener for a positive evaluation and then abruptly abuts on a negative one instead!) Such tropes are not purely verbal, although they are predictably m o r e accessible in verbal form. When a certain kind of m a l e speaker w i s h e s to express pleasure at s o m e e x p e r i e n c e d d e l i g h t s u c h a s a g o o d m e a l o r a well designed sports car, h e m a y sketch a busty female figure in the air, emphasizing thereby that the experience w a s virtually indistinguishable from the u l t i m a t e joys of sex in the pleasure it gave. The advantage of presenting a series of such tropes as a distinctive class is the e m p h a s i s that this procedure gives to their cultural specificity. It w o u l d b e too easy, at this juncture, to generalize about the nature of metaphor, or even about its social uses, w i t h o u t taking cross-cultural comparisons into account; and indeed, authoritative s e m i o t i c accounts of tropological devices tend to thrive in just such an empirical vacuum. In pursuing cultural comparisons, however, w e b e c o m e m u c h m o r e acutely a w a r e of the extent to w h i c h the structuring principles of social poetics can only b e realized through the basic forms available in a g i v e n culture and society. C O M P A R A T I V E DATA:

GREECE

In turning from English-speaking societies to m o d e r n Greece, for example, it is true that n o t all the structuring principles of social interaction are entirely different; b u t they are often differently used.

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A s I have tried to demonstrate at length for a particular village (Herzfeld 1985), male social interaction is characterized by a mode of "conventionalized difference." The key value is a concept of eghoismos that, especially given its etymological derivation (i.e., < Class. Gk. ego, "I"), might easily be glossed as "individualism." In practice, the interactions of Greek male villagers are more highly routinized than such an ideologically laden term would lead us to expect. In this context, the man who demonstrates a greater degree of flair (khoui) may gain a correspondingly greater degree of acceptance or admiration. The risks are high. He can easily become ridiculous; and in practice much depends on his preexisting relationships with his co-villagers. If these are cordial, his performance is ipso facto more likely to succeed. Let us consider an example. In a Rhodian village, "Pefko" (a pseudonym), characterized in the main by what for Greece is an unusual degree of outward reserve and sobriety, one man is known for the flamboyance of his gestures. Once, he entered his favorite coffee-house, executing little dance steps and playing to the hilt the full range of conventions that required him to look straight at all the customers already seated there. His greeting was boisterous, his self-presentation strangely contrasted with the quiet mien of the others. Yet they accepted him, and did so despite the fact that his humble origins might have led them to expect a still stiffer code of self-restraint than they imposed upon themselves. The man was a successful entrepreneur. As he had explained to m e in painstaking detail, he was probably the only f a r m e r in the village who had taken full advantage of government policies regarding afforestation and the redistribution of land; and, when the government offered loans for the improvement of agricultural properties, he w a s the only inhabitant to m a k e an effort to get some of the money, which he used to build up his irrigation system. Why, in a paper ostensibly addressed to a problem in the anthropological ramifications of semiotic theory, should I offer so much ethnographic detail? Again we resturn to the twofold thrust of this paper. On the one hand, I want to stress the necessity of contextual knowledge in any application of this theoretical tradition. On the other, the particular case illustrates a major theoretical point. This point concerns the use of social poetics to model or reproduce an individual's position in the

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social nexus. The villager in question was performing his right to be included in the company of his peers -performing, moreover, both in the theatrical sense of a demonstration of skill, and in Austin's [1962] sense of an action that becomes constitutive of its social environment. His dance steps and boisterous greeting were based on the confident knowledge that, when it came to comparing degrees of industriousness (a paramount virtue in this particular community), he could hold his own with the best. Indeed, other villagers were uncharacteristically flattering about his hard work. His manner thus did not so much challenge the village order, as hint that he w a s morally in a position to bend the rules. He was demonstrating a social competence that went beyond the reproduction of mere conventions to the expression of his individual distinctiveness within the larger setting. The model for this already existed, itself a convention of sorts. There is in Greek a device whereby the marginal individual can be politely excluded. The Greek-sepaking foreigner generally encounters it in the form of an ostensible compliment: 'You speak Greek better than we do!' The point of this remark is to exclude the outsider: obviously the statement is untrue; and even in the sense that it could be true (that is, when the outsider speaks an urban or formal variety of the Greek language), it excludes the visitor from the familiar circle of "those who talk like us." The flamboyant villager seized on this convention and m a d e it his own. This is the m e a n s w h e r e b y Greek villagers more generally seem to recognize the creation or generation of meaning — that is, in the exploitation of a suitable moment, usually unpredictable, for creating a special effect that foregrounds the actor's role in generating it. This is the converse of the "regular guy" phenomenon; instead of foregrounding an abnormal normalcy, it emphasizes an individuation that conforms, in its internal articulation, to social conventions. It is also the converse of the Simmelian (1908) stranger, the outsider who claims a measure of insiderhood and thereby becomes a potential threat. The Pefkiot in question overcame his slightly dubious social origins to the point where he could (and did) pontificate about social morality, the importance of hard work, and the rights and privileges of the true Pefkiot. His self-presentation modelled that achievement. By almost ironically prolonging his stare around the room as he entered, for example, he foregrounded the message of social normativeness at the expense of another

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interpretation: that he was perhaps just a little odd. Just as he was not quite an insider, but (since he had lived in Pefko most of his adult life and was in fact of Pefkiot extraction) was not clearly an outsider either, so too his behavior was not quite normative but yet was sufficiently close to the norm to command acceptance. A poetic analysis of social interaction allows for the recognition of precisely this sense of approximation and ambiguity, in a way that more positivistic analytical modes suppress. Such a view of social interaction is, moreover, entirely consistent with an action-oriented approach to human semiosis. Cohen (1975) has succinctly urged the extension of an essentially Austinian perspective on language use to nonlinguistic codes as well. In the case of the Pefkiot entering the coffee-house, for example, w e can see enacted an appropriate diagramming (to borrow another Jakobsonian coinage) of the actor's social relationships. To understand this more fully, let us turn briefly to the social values that are in play in the scene in question. The ethnographic literature on Greece contains extensive discussions of the concept of filotimo (see especially Campbell 1964; du Boulay 1974; Friedl 1962; Herzfeld 1980). The common semantic base of the widely varied realizations of this concept of "social worth" s e e m s to be a sense that the possessor of f ilotimo behaves in accordance with the expectations of his community. Thus, a pauper's filotimo does not entail the same lavish outlay of generosity that a wealthier individual's would. There are also differences linked to sex, age, and degree of closeness of the relationships involved; and the pattern also seems to vary considerably between regions and even between more or less neighboring villages. The Pefkiot whose behavior we have been examining is an intrusive member of an almost totally endogamous community; he was an adopted child, and as such a m e m b e r of a category that Pefkiots associate in cautionary tales with betrayal of parents (e.g., that of the foster son who volunteered to hang his stepfather when no other volunteer could be found); and he was initially poor. His strenuous (and often ingenious) efforts to overcome his poverty, however, presaged a certain "flair" in his management of self. His ability to appear mildly eccentric, yet to do it in a way that simultaneously recalled socially acceptable behavior by deforming it to an inoffensive but still noticeable degree, reproduced that same flair. In other words, his actions formally modelled his social standing, by presenting a virtual diagram of his

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relationship with others: a man strongly attached to the center of village society in spite of circumstances that would have made a less effective player marginal. Through their blending of the creative with the conventional, his actions graphically reproduced the tension betweeb a position of social strength and a history of personal marginality.

IN SEARCH OF EMBEDDED REGULARITIES Presumably the comparative perspective which the two sets of examples briefly outlined here suggest could be developed on an empirical basis. The two ethnographic settings seem to invert each other: the Greek example demonstrates the conventionality of the highly individual (and how hackneyed the image of the individualistic "Mediterranean peasant" has become!), while the American and British examples show how the overtly conventional (or "regular") actually works well only when it becomes eccentrically different. The contrast between the two systems lies at the level of social values; the structural principle involved is the same in both cases. In Greek society, though not to a uniform degree, self-regard is viewed as an appropriate attitude in males; in the Englishspeaking countries, by contrast, a measure of reticence is usually preferred. The structural principle, however, seems not to change. In both cases, an intensification of everyday attitudes sets the individual performer apart. A particularly striking example of this is the custom, found in m a n y cultures, whereby a noted performer denies his own ability to sing or tell tales (see Bauman 1977:21-22); pretensions of false modesty are far from uncommon in the performing arts world of today. What such devices do (compare also: 'not that I want to praise myself, but....') is to "reduce" an artistic performance to the level of the commonplace, since the artist, like Simmel's (1971[1908]:146) stranger, is both an insider and an outsider. Those who are good at self-presentation, my Pefkiot friend for example, are artists precisely because they are able to deploy the necessary ambiguity of social interactions for the enhancement of their own goals. The examples sketched above indicate another, less commonly explored dimension of semiotic ethnography. Performances of this kind encapsulate indigenous concepts of what is meaningful in social life; they therefore presumably also embed some notion of the very

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basic concept of "meaning" itself. Let us return for a moment to "ornery" and "regular" guys. For such stereotypes not only to exist, but to furnish negotiable models for the conduct of social relations, presupposes an embedded concept of normativity. Paradoxically, however, such normativity is not "realized" (i.e., embodied in realia) except through some kind of deformation. At such moments, not only is the identity of the particular actor heightened, but the very principles whereby the actor can deform the normative model become the arena of inquiry into what the embedded theory of meaning is. The notion of the commonplace rests on selfevidence, which is in turn culturally and socially defined. It does not rest on the existence of unrefracted facts existing in a reified universe and furnishing some ultimate yardstick of literality: literality is itself a trope, an ironic trope for the conditionality of all social experience. The rhetoric of self-evidence thus contains the means of its own decomposition; through ironic plays on the vocabulary — gestural as well as verbal — of ordinariness, it allows actors to explore the cultural rules through which they can reconstitute regularity in each situation as it arises. The "regular guy" is rarely so very regular: more often, his regularity ("regularness"?) consists in actively disobeying the laws of the larger society, such as the nationstate, within which his peer group is embedded. But what is irregular for the encompassing, regulative entity becomes instead a positively valued eccentricity — a regular irregularity — for the members of the encompassed group, thereby contributing to the definition of its separate but hypotactic identity. The poetics of the commonplace is thus ultimately an exploration, within a semiotics indigenously generated and indigenously understood, of the collective identity of the social group. Department of Anthropology Indiana University Bloomington, Indiana, U.S.A. REFERENCES Ardener, E.W. (1971). Introductory essay. In Social Anthropology and Language,E.W.Ardener, ed. A.S.A.Monogr. 10 (London: Tavistock), pp. ix-cii. Austin, J.L. (1962). How To Do Things With Words. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bauman, Richard (1977). Verbal Art as Performance Rowley, Mass.: Newbury House. Campbell, J.K. (1964). Honour, Family, and Patronage: A Study of Institutions and Moral Value m a Greek Mountain Community. Oxford: Clarendon Press Cohen, Jonathan (1975). Sopken and Unspoken Meanings. Lisse: Peter de Ridder Press. Douglas, Mary (1975). Implicit Meanings: Essays in Anthropology. London: Rouledge Kegan Paul, du Boulay, Juliet (1974). Portrait of Greek Mountain Village. Oxford: Clarendon Press Friedl, Ernestine (1962). Vasilika: A Village in Modern Greece. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Hawkes, Terence (1977). Structuralism and Semiotics. Los Angeles and Berkeley: University of California Press. Herzfeld, Michael (1980). Honour and shame: some problems in the comparative analysis of moral systems. Man (N.S.) 15:339-351. (1985). The Poetics of Manhood: Contest and Identity in a Cretan Mountain Village. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Jakobson, Roman (1960). Linguistics and poetics. In Style in Language, Thomas A. Sebeok, ed. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, pp. 350-377. Simmel, Georg (1971 [1908]). The stranger. In On Individuality and Social Forms, Donald N. Levine,ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 145-149.

42 RHYME AS METAPHOR IN THE WASTE LAND

Elizabeth Kennedy Hewitt

Literary cartographers having chartered the way through The Waste Land, I urge now that we should investigate the language which, unlike the intuition and personal experience underlying the allusions, is an element we do share with the poet. I will emphasize in my discussion here one of the language features, rhyme, which has so far not been much considered by students of the poem. Not technically a rhymed poem The Waste Land does, nevertheless, contain a significant number of lines which participate in a reasonably sustained rhyme pattern. Eliot has put it this way: There is no campaign against rhyme. But it is possible that excessive devotion to rhyme has thickened the modern ear.... Rhyme removed, the poet is at once held up to the standards of prose.... And this liberation from rhyme might be as well a liberation of rhyme. Freed from its exacting task of supporting lame verse, it could be applied with greater effect where it is most needed. There are often passages in an unrhymed poem where rhyme is wanted for some special effect, for a sudden tightening up, for a cumulative insistence, or for an abrupt change of mood'''. Altogether, there seem to be three primary categories into which these rhythmic rhymes in The Waste Land fall: mimetic, linking and metaphoric. I must content myself here with representative examples of the last two categories. In its most uncomplicated function, as linkage, rhyme seems to suggest a connection between the items participating in the rhyme; and this unifying function is, of course, all the more important when the lines might otherwise seem a pastiche as in lines 193-202. The several allusions to other sources and the seemingly random progression of images from naked bodies, bones, and rat's feet through the sounds of spring and the shining of the moonlight to voices of singing children are all gathered up by their participation in a rather firm pattern of rhyme. But within this unified whole there are lines joined into smaller sets, primarily by rhyme. The result is the welding of a series of disparate images and the provision of continuous transitions within the last of the section which begins in line 182, "By the waters of Leman I sat down and wept...."

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The rhyme pattern suggests the following scheme: two couplets beginning in line 195, a triplet, and a final unrhymed line: White bodies naked on the low damp ground And bones cast in a little low dry garrett Rattled by the rat's foot only, year to year But at my back from time to time I hear The sound of horns and motors, which shall bring Sweeney to Mrs Porter in the spring. 0 the moon shone bright on Mrs Porter And on her daughter They wash their feet in soda water Et 0 ces voix d'enfants, chantant dans la coupole! (193-202) The fragment "Rattled by the rat's foot only, year to year" is actually linked in meaning to the preceding lines, but by means of rhyme it is joined to Sweeney's visit to Mrs Porter who, in turn, becomes, with her daughter, the subject of the triplet; and the entire passage is concluded with the unrhymed, apparent nonsequitur, the children's voices. If the macabre bodies and bones are thus connected with the concupiscent Sweeney's visit to Mrs Porter, then death and lust are joined but are also curiously differentiated by the coordinating conjunction in line 196: "But at my back from time to time I hear." It is this "But" which is responsible for establishing a relationship between the images of death and lust. That is, the concept of death, which was first presented in this stanza in terms of skeletons, now is advanced more subtly through the allusion to John Day's lines which deal with Actaeon's metamorphosis and death as a result of his meeting with Diana. Instead of the mythological and tragic Actaeon, it is the neanderthal-like Sweeney who goes to Mrs Porter, a woman far from devine as the Australian song makes clear. The protagonist, then, hears something different from the rattling bones; he hears "the sound of horns and motors," and it is spring, the time of re-birth, not winter where, behind the gashouse, the protagonist experienced a vision of death. Lust is not death, therefore, but can be seen as a step away from death or nothingness toward love, the vision of the children singing. (Some authority for this somewhat unconventional notion of lust being a positive good over death can be found in something Eliot once said in reference to Baudelaire: "So far as we are human, what we do must be either evil or good; so far as we do evil or good, we are human; and it is better, in a paradoxical way, to do evil than to do nothing; at least, we e x i s t . T h u s the rhyme functions to suggest that the seemingly unrelated images and allusions be considered by the reader as a unified set of lines, which are related in a specific, albeit complex, way. And it is only in such a relationship that the passage has its meaning.

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A similar use of rhyme to mark off lines is exemplified by the longest stretch of surrealism in the poem: A woman drew her long black hair out tight And fiddled whisper music on those strings And bats with baby faces in the violet light Whistled, and beat their wings And crawled head downward down a blackened wall And upside down in air were towers Tolling reminiscent bells, that kept the hours And voices singing out of empty cisterns and exhausted wells. (378-385) There are no rhymes here of the famous Prufrock "ices/crises" type; all but one of the rhymed items serve as nouns and all are monosyllabic. Every line but one—384—is iambic, and the regularity produced from these various prosodic features makes a strictly defined unit of this upside down, nightmarish vision which both brings to a climax and marks an end to the surrealistic images which began in this last part, V, with the invisible presence of a "third who walks always beside you," and which, in addition, gathers images from elsewhere in the poem. The gathering of images—one of a number of devices which concatenate the five parts—in this rhymed, nightmare section is accomplished through a series of correspondences with other sections in the poem. Line 378, for instance, recalls the hair in fiery points. The music could be that which the typist put on the gramophone and which crept by the protagonist upon the waters It also is a whisper music and Phlebas' bones were picked in whispers. The violet light of the typist scene is here, falling towers appear in the previous stanza, and "the bells that kept the hours" bear an explicit relationship to Saint Mary Woolrioth. Finally, "the voices singing out of empty cisterns" find a parallel not only with the grass singing in line 387, but also with the dry grass singing in line 355, and the singing children "dans la coupole." Thus, images previously presented are gathered together and offered as a rhymed unit in this section and illogical relationships are made emotionally and aurally congruent by repetition of similar sounds. But probably the most important thing about this group of tightly rhymed lines is that in bringing to a climax the "unreal" images and in collecting images from each of the other sections of the poem, these lines serve as a catharsis: The horror implicit in the apparitions is dispelled when the phantoms are formalized in rhymed verse. It is fitting that the unwholesome landscape of the waste land should become a cauchemar of strange music, bats, and inverted and deserted towers. A transitional stanza follows describing a chapel which, although empty and ruined, is nevertheless the scene for "a flash of lightning." Then a damp gust/Bringing rain." From this point on in the poem,

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there is reason to hope for the coming of a new order to the arid plane. In what is very possibly a spirit of expectation, the protagonist continues to fish and contemplates setting his lands in order. These eight rhymed lines—the very last rhymes in the poem—prepare for the more positive and pragmatic sections which follow by bringing to a conclusion the unreal, unhealthy part of the journey. The two remaining examples of the use of rhyme in The Waste Land are interesting because it is as rhymes qua rhymes that they derive their importance. That is, the rhyme itself becomes a metaphor,^ a means of defining an action in terms of something else, and it is a vehicle for the tenor Eliot is trying to communicate. In both the boudoir scene and the seduction of the typist scene, the action has occurred so many times as to become tedious ritual. Nothing unexpected happens. To take up the boudoir scene first: In this particular section beginning "My nerves are bad tonight," there is considerable repetition but only one rhyme before that in the closing quatrain: But 0 0 0 0 that Shakespherian RagIt's so elegant So intelligent 'What shall I do now? What shall I do?' 'With my hair down, so. What shall I do tomorrow? 'What shall we ever do?' The hot water at ten. And if it rains, a closed car at four. And we shall play a game of chess, Pressing lidless eyes and waiting for a knock upon the door. (127-138) There are only two rhymes in the last four lines, but the high incidence of assonance, which increases from line to line, supports the rhyme in holding these lines together as a rhythmic unit. This is especially true of the near-rhyme /ces-presin/ which, although acoustic in that it does not make a rhythmic unit, nevertheless provides an unexpected sound match that sustains the unity through the long, trochaic last line. The rhyme, in effect, hints to the reader that he must expect these surprises in a largely unrhymed poem, just as the protagonists themselves are on the qui vive, waiting. But what they expect is as predictable as is the word "door," both as a rhyme for "four,, 'and in its syntactic position after "waiting for a knock upon the ." The scheme in its simplicity and predictability is in accord with the idea implicit in the content; we will do just what we always do; we will, that is, continue the pattern. In the typist scene (216-248), the longest sequence of rhymed lines in the poem, the rhyme scheme is not so strict as we have

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seen it in the previous examples; and such toying with the rhythmic properties of rhyme enables the rhyme to function differently in this episode. That is, the more free the rhyme pattern, the more free the rhyme for special effects. In this episode rhyme is indeed being used for "some special effect" which involves also "cumulative insistence." Fourteen lines of interrupted rhyme begin with line 235, and in its very insistence there is the idea that the rhyme is calling attention to itself as rhyme apart from the context: The time is . . . propirious The meal is ended . . . . . . she is bored . . . Initially the rhyme words are not always of the same part of speech. But as the action continues, the rhyme settles down to a scheme involving monosyllabic nouns, and one suspects that Eliot is deliberately incorporating a kind of banality in the predictability of the grammatical function of the rhyme words. That is, rhyme casts these lines in traditional verse form and thus elevates the sordidness of the young man's assault on the apathetic typist. This elevation through rhyme works somewhat the same way as does the presence of Tiresias; it raises the experience out of the particular into the mythic-universal and, therefore, the timeless, the high degree of predictability of the rhymes being entirely suitable to a traditional (mythic) content. The reader does not really even witness the actual seduction; instead he is taken off by Tireseas1 parenthetical remarks on his own past. The reader, then, goes directly from the assault of the young man and the indifference of the typist to the "final patronizing kiss"; the details of the assault are ob scena. There is the reminder that all this has happened before, and what the reader does observe is framed in surprisingly conventional verse form, broken only to introduce the characters on the scene. Here in the most clearly dramatic scene in the entire poem, Eliot has exploited at least two possibilities available to the poet who sees that "this liberation from rhyme might be as well as liberation of_ rhyme." First, the degree to which the pattern is regular serves to mime the action in that the sing-songy effect of the unrelieved rhyme is analogous to the boredom attendant upon the unremarkable event: the routine, predictable seduction of the lackluster typist by the ordinary clerk. But more importantly, the use of rhyme is responsible for reinforcing the irony in this dumb show, irony which is essential to an understanding of what is—and is not—going on here. Specifically, the contrast between the nobility of the mythic hero Tiresias and the sordidness of the perfunctory activities of a young man—so ordinary as to be distinguishable only by his carbuncle and his assurance—is strengthened by the disparity between the form and the content, between the highly regular and traditional quatrains reminiscent

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of older and more glorious days and the story they tell of the vulgar pursuits of a mediocre pair of characters. Rhyme used in this way is of course metaphoric rhyme. But this relationship is not one of similarity, which we usually think of when we speak of metaphor. Here the vehicle—the traditional, formal rhyme—is too grand for the tenor—the coarse, inelegant copulation—and the disparity is ironic. This irony is given a more complex character when the shadow behind Eliot in these rhymes is recognized as that of Chaucer ("as he guesses," for instance). We now move to the last section of the poem in which we note an important shift in form, a shift from the use of rhyme to produce a disparity between the form and content (or between this content and that one) to its straightforward use to support a close identification of form and content. Such a use as this appears in the very last set of rhymed lines, those in which "A woman drew her long black hair out tight." The metaphoric relation between the incantatory form and its exorcising function is obviously not an ironic one, and unlike previous examples (from the boudoir, typist, and Thames daughters lines) the form here is related to the content in a direct and positive way. From here on Eliot abandons the use of rhyme, and the remaining fifty lines are written without this formalizing feature. Because of the connection Eliot has established between rhyme and irony, it is, I think, possible to conclude from this that the end of the use of rhyme in the poem marks the end of the use of irony. The bizarre images of waterless wells and disembodied voices, presented cumulatively in the nightmare section, no longer are a part of the protagonist's vision of his wasteland. Irony and the rhyme forms which frequently signalled its presence have also been cast out, a raising prepared for by the death (the purification) of Phlebas. When the protagonist returns to the shore to fish, we are no longer aware of the gashouse and we hear no rattling bones. We take seriously and as a positive gesture his efforts to set his lands in order. Looked at in this way, it is impossible to see any irony in the final reference to the peace which passeth understanding. But to say that The Waste Land incorporates a degree of optimism, that "Shantih Shantih Shantih" is not to be seen in the light of the irony which is so much a part of most of the poem, is not to say anything new. What is new is to say that a straightforward interpretation of the final lines—an interpretation which stresses the exhortation to redeem the time—derives support from, indeed is signalled by, a fact coming not from the content but from the structure of the poem. The significance of such a structural reading is that our ultimate identification of the prevailing tone in The Waste Land — despair or hope—is not so dependent on whether we as reader take the shoring of fragments to be a positive or negative gesture. Our conclusions, instead, are more objective since they are in part based on objective structure rather than entirely on

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subjective content. Department of English State University of New York at Binghamton Binghamton, New York 13901 NOTES 1. 2. 3.

"Reflections on Vers Libre." New Statesman, viii (March 13, 1917), 519. Selected Essays of T.S. Eliot (New York, 1965), p. 380. Since the metaphoric use of rhyme emanates from the structure and not the content, it is metaphoric in a special way; it requires—and receives—support from other features, both structural and semantic as well.

43 TOWARDS A SEMIOTIC THEORY OF LITERARY THEMES

André van Hoik

1. In a recent publication called Ram and Billy-Goat. A Key to the Mediterranean Code of Honour (1982) the Dutch anthropologist Anton Blok sketches the social status of figures like the masahio and cornuto in West-Sicilian shepherd culture. Being now at so short a distance from that remarkable spot I find it appropriate to begin my talk about the semiotics of literary themes with a reference to the fact that it is precisely such archetypal structures in society as the ones mentioned which give rise to the existence of literary themes. Thus the hero of Puskin's famous poem The Gipsies offers a classical example of the masahio in aristocratic disguise, who fears to become a cornuto, and in the end commits a double murder in which he revenges himself on his young girl-friend and her lover. Although contemporary text linguistics has considerably deepened our insight into the logico-semantic and pragmatic structure of texts in general, it has failed so far to provide a suitable theoretical framework for the analysis and classification of literary themes. This is the more astonishing as there exist several varieties of so-called 'case-grammar' which might supply the necessary deep relations for a succesful representation of classes of literary themes. In this paper I intend to discuss some of these deep relations in an attempt to lay bare the basic principles of their realization in natural language. 2. The thematic analysis to be proposed here amounts to the assignment of a common underlying construction to textual expressions, using the deep relations of some appropriate variety of case-grammar as primitives.' The primitives of thematics are called elementary constructions (EC's); they are represented at the textual surface by expressions consisting of one central noun and a certain number of attributive and predicative modifiers (cf. Metzeltin & Jaksche 1983, 26). For any given EC, one part of the sentence forms a fixed unit, whereas the remainder of the sentence provides a variable environment. From the standpoint of semiotic function, every EC consists of a characteristic number of class features with referential function, which are normally accompanied by a certain number of lexical features, and together with these make up the nucleus of an EC. The class features (say S + , where S + -» class feature) are normally matched by an equal number of position markers (say s~, where s~ -» position marker), such as desinences and other 'empty' grammatical features, with a 'connective' function. Thus the EC underlying 'intransitive

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verbs of action', e.g. R. gvafinja umyvaetsja 'the countess is washing herself', will consist of a certain number of nominal and verbal class features such as manifested by the root morphemes of grafinja and umyvaetsja, and an equal number of empty connectives, such as 'nominative' and 'feminine' (in grafinja) and '3d person' and 'reflexive' (in umyvaetsja); we do not add any class features for 'transitivity', 'aspect' or 'tense', because these are not pertinent to the class of 'intransitive personal action' expressions. 3. To illustrate the way a literary theme may be represented in terms of EC's and their combinations (CC's) I shall briefly describe three EC's in some detail; these are labelled Collective, Instrumental, and Experiential. The Collective covers sentences arranged about a noun phrase as their common centre, which refers to a character in its relation to a collective environment (people, compatriots, comrades in army or party, etc.), without specifying the character's professional or social status. The nominals under this EC divide into two subsets one referring to the individual hero, the other to his collective environment; the relation between the referents is reflexive in the sense that not only the hero is a member of the group, but also may be judged by it and feel himself an outsider or outcast. Thus we are led to posit two antagonistic relations between subject and predicate: one pointing from individual to group, the other in the opposite direction (cf. Fillmore's 'double case line', applying to the reflexive construction of John moved or John threw himself from the roof; Fillmore 1969, 116-117). I call this type of EC eccentric (Plessner 1950, 45-47; Rokoszowa 1981, 37; Van Hoik 1983, 56). The construction of a sentence under the Collective always features a secondary predicate, which in the case at hand has the status of a numerative adverbial (1). This adverbial modifies both the finite verb and the subject (witness the absurdity o| expressions like *The boy was playing together in the garden; I went the three of us to town, etc.), so that the number of indispensable constituents is to be three; we assign an EC of this description to the third level of coherence. The Collective EC is diagrammed in (1). (1)

sk

s

2—

[np|

Aleko

>

| PREP'

was fleeing from

his fellow noblemen

Legend:'A j -» lexical features; Sk. •* class features; s£ •> connectives; PRED' -i secondary predicate. The Instrumental covers sentences arranged about a construction which normally consists of a personal noun phrase as its agent and an

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instrumental-frequentative verb phrase as a predicate; the latter in turn contains a verb of 'hitting' or 'breaking' as its centre (cf. Fillmore 1970, 120-133), and further features a personal object, a second object of 'inalienable possession', and an instrumental phrase

(2).

(2)

inalienable possession NPej VIns N?2 Judith out off Holofemes' head Legend: NPe £ -t personal noun phrase.

PrepNP3Ins with a sword

The instrumental phrase, which makes explicit the instrumental diathese of the central verb, usually combines with the verb and the subject (the man hit the dog with a stick / the man with the stick hit the dog) or with the same verb in two distinct diatheses (the man hit the dog / the stick hit the dog) and always requires a second predicate (the man hit the dog + the man ... [using] a stick; cf. Fillmore 1968); for this reason the Instrumental EC is assigned the third level of coherence (note the distributional correspondence between the 'plural' feature of the Collective and the 'frequentative/semelfactive' feature characteristic of instrumental verbs: beating vs a single hit; breaking into pieces, etc.). It may be finally noted that the Instrumental includes expressions like (strike a man) in his face, (mix a poison) in a cup, etc., as well as verb phrases of 'motion' included in the causative relation of 'killing', e.g. Driving his car he killed a cyclist; He rode on horseback to meet the enemy, etc. This means, in terms of the present model, that the predicate of an Instrumental EC includes the class features of the 'personal agent' (which it shares with the Collective) and the features of 'location' and 'motion' (occurring as characteristic class markers of the Locative and Vialis, respectively; cf. Van Hoik 1980). We finally note that the function of a verb of 'hitting' (and its cognates) is to indicate the causation of a change in the state of its object (NPei kills NPe2 = NPe['s behaviour causes NPe2 to die), without specifying the agent's involvement in the event (cf. NPej murdered NPe2, which contains additional modal components; see below, § 5); the verb-object relation therefore represents a single 'case line'. An EC of this description is called concentric (Van Hoik 1983, 56). The Experiential is the typical vehicle of modality in thematics. It covers sentences arranged about a construction consisting of a personal noun phrase as its subject and a predicate containing a verb of 'experience' (feel, think, say, listen, ...) or a 'modal' verb (want, wish, may, must, ...) as its centre. The construction includes all modifiers specifying the diathese of the verb as 'agentive' or 'transitive', but does not comprise aspectual and temporal modifiers. The characteristic function of a verb of 'experience' is to indicate an action or event in which a personal noun phrase participates both as a grammatical subject and as an indirect object (interestee, experiencer, etc.), witness the existence of transformations like R. on xocet VInf ** emu xocetsja VInf, on sly&it ee golos emu slysitsja

404

ee golos, etc., or E. I feel sick about it it makes me (feel) sick, etc. Thus the Experiential is a typically eccentric EC. Note also that the Experiential controls a relation between subject and predicate without imposing any further conditions on the subject; so we assign the Experiential to the second level of coherence. Finally, from an analysis of the context situation of Experiential such as shown in (3) we obtain the class features of the nucleus. (3)

NJ? [something]

VTra

NPe Q

VExp

NP'

PrepNP"

[causes]

[me]

[to feel]

[pain]

[in my head]

R. u menja bolit golova u menja rezet v spine ja 5uvstvuju bol' v spine This analysis shows that the Experiential has six class features involved in the sum total of the centre-modifier relations at the second level of coherence.2 A most important characteristic of the Experiential is the possibility to expand its object into an object clause; e.g. R. On auvstvuet priblizenie grozy beside On auvstvuet, kak priblizaetsja groza; E. She sat pondering on the beach beside She sat pondering about what to do next, etc. The subordinative conjunctions or pronouns kak, ctoby, E. that, what, etc. perform a double connective function, insofar as through them (i) the embedded sentence is turned into a subordinate clause, and (ii) this clause is turned into the object of a verb of 'experience' (cf. esli, kogda etc., which perform only a single connective function - joining a clause to its matrix without connecting that clause to a verb of experience). The Experiential in this type of sentences has acquired two connectives, extracted from an embedded sentence which itself does not belong to the matrix; so the Experiential has two excess position markers. Using the notation introduced above (§ 2) we write EXP^ - for this construction; a typical example would be the copula, with its modal adverbials, connecting two noun phrase class markers (4).^ EXP 2 -

(4) NP +

VCop+AdvMod

his brother

was believed to be

NP + the last heir to the Russian throne

As we shall see presently, this connective Experiential also provides the simplest and most adequate representation of the modal relations between the agent of an action and the other persons or objects in the agent's situation. 4. The notions developed so far may be applied for the representation of the theme of the maschio mentioned above. The following examples are taken from Puskin's poem Cygany 'The Gipsies', whose chief hero, Aleko, is a young nobleman who has run

405 away from the oppressing environment of philisters and would-be friends, in a Byronian impulse to start a free life with the nomadic gipsies of Bessarabia. The hero's initial situation is depicted by the poet as a relationship between the individualistic and blase Aleko and his fellow-noblemen in Saint Petersburg; the hero's position is obviously that of an outsider or even outcast (whence the comparison with Ovid the exile). Here are a few lines illustrating the problematic relation between Aleko and his environment (5).^ (5)

Kogda by ty voobrazala Nevolju duinyx gorodov! Tam ljudi v ku£ax za ogradoj3 Ne dy£at utrennej proxladoj Predrassusdenij pvigovor, ToVpy bezvmnoe gonen'e Ili blistatel'nyj pozor (151-163)

Mixed with these expressions are those which convey Aleko's attitude of despise and contempt for the dull crowd; e.g. tolpy bezumnoe gonen'e; elsewhere this attitude is worked out in more explicit form (6). (6)

Unylo junosa gljadel Na opusteluju ravninu I grusti tajnuju prioinu Istolkovat' sebe ne smel z serdce junosi trepesaet? Kakoj zabotoj on tomim? (94-103)

He is indeed an outcast, an exile (7): (7)

I ont izgnannik pereletnyj, Gnezda nadeznogo ne znal I ni k aemu ne privykal. (121-123)

At a later stage of the textual surface's unfolding this attitude becomes disengaged from the initial Petersburg background, to convey the hero's fear of becoming a cornuto (8) (8)

On s trepetom privstal i vnemlet... Vse tixo strax ego ob'^let, Po nem tekut i zar i xlad (446-449)

We represent these passages by means of a combination of the Collective to account for the relation individual-crowd, and the Experiential to account for the hero's modal attitude towards the crowd and the world in general (9).

406

(9) , NPe| fAlekol

1 NPei ' , QieT ego

EXP

1 VExp ' 1 i

COL 1 VP' [suffering from] gonen 'e

[is all fear] strax

ob"emlet

1 Pred' [crowdj tolpy

5. Another very common thematic construction is adduced here to exemplify the representation of dramatic action by means of EC combinations . In Hebbel's play Judith (1841)5, which is based on the apocryphic tale of that name (Rost 1971, 38-41), the main line of action culminates in an act of violence - the decapitation of Holofernes, commander of the Assyrian army, by the beautiful widow from the Judean township of Bethulia, who sacrifices her honour to save her people. The action proper may be adequately represented by an EC covering verbs of 'breaking' and 'hitting', i.e. the Instrumental (§ 3, Fig. 2). As usual in literary texts, the Instrumental does not occur alone, but attracts a modal profile made up of a definite number of Experientials, which indicate the modal attitudes of the Instrumental action's agent - the leading character of the play, Judith towards the animate and inanimate objects of the dramatic situation. In diagram (10) these components are listed together with the corresponding noun phrases of the Instrumental; the examples are from Hebbel's play. Among the noun phrases, NP2 refers to Holofernes' head; the relation of inalienable possession to its owner is abolished by Judith as an act of revenge for the offended honour of herself and her home town. The remote goal of Judith's action, the town of Bethulia, is not included in the Instrumental construction (2), although it definitely figures among the relevant entities of the dramatic situation (cf. also Botticelli's famous painting in the Uffizi); so the modal envelope covers a larger number of dramatis personae than the Instrumental. As appears from our text, the act of decapitation as such is designated only by a stage direction, which means that it is part of the background. If we agree, in accordance with Elam's proposal (Elam, 1980,8),that the Instrumental here indicates the "class" of violent acts, then the backgrounded state of the Instrumental may be captured in terms of our model (§2) by the statement that the Instrumental here participates in the verb-object relation of the third level of coherence with the five class features we were able to assign to it; this state of the Instrumental is symbolized as INS 5 + (five-fold backgrounding of INS). Recalling that the Experiential when functioning as a modal relation between two NP's appears in the double-connective state E X P ^ ~ , the total plot line of Judith's actions will be controlled

407

(10) NPel

[judithj

INS Vins i

I

NPe2

NP2

PrepNP3 NP4 remote goal : Bethulia

1

EXP -i—I—

NPel

EXP 1 NPel

VExp hatred ^ offended honour VExp [vengeance]

EXP i NPel

VExp desperately clasping

EXP —I— , , VExp i die entehrenden Küssen ictorious] 1 feeling I die noch auf meinen [ ' Lippen brennen • i Bete für mich, nun iah mich jetzt thu' ich's... rächen will Tödt ihn An dies Schwert , (sie haut des Holoklcamtern sich meine , fernes Haupt hinunter) schwindelnden Gedanken i i Juble, mein Herz, sieh, der Kopf ist mein Eigentum, den muss ich mitbringen damit man mir 's in Bethulien glaubt.

NPel

f

by a construction of the form with three excess connective markers. We take this to mean that the total construction is foregrounded, in full agreement with the fact that it covers the main line of action (the 'resolution' component of traditional narrative structure). As I have argued elsewhere (Van Hoik 1984) the excess connectives may become compensated for by combination with a background Locative L0C^+ indicating, in the case of Hebbel's play as well as in the apocryphic tale, the state of disturbed harmony in Judith's home town Bethulia. Slavic Institute

Groningen

408

NOTES 1. 2.

3.

See esp. Fillmore (1968, 1969, 1970), Cook (1970), Moskey (1979). The first (lowest) level of coherence is assigned to the construction of the sentence as such, whose word material makes up a single constituent, while the tone profile provides the position-marking connective. Cf. Moskey's representation of this construction in the form

4.

Quotations are from: A.S. Puskins, Polnoe sobvanie socinenij v desjati tomax. Izd. 4-oe. IV. Moskva, Izd. Nauka, 1977. 5. Quotations are from: Friedrich Hebbel, Judith. Eine Tragödie in fünf Akten. Stuttgart, Reclam, 1981.

REFERENCES Blok, Anton (1982). Ram and Billy-Goat. A Key to the Mediterranean Code of Honour.. Nijmegen, UP. Cook, W.A. (1970). 'Case Grammar. From Roles to Rules', Georgetown University Papers in Language and Linguistics I, 14-19. Washington UP. Elam, Keir (1980). The Semiotics of Theatre and Drama. London, Methuen. Fillmore, Charles J. (1968). 'The Case for Case', in: Emmon Bach & Robert T. Harms (Eds.), Vniversals in Linguistic Theory, 1-88. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston. (1969). 'Types of Lexical Information', in: F. Kiefer (Ed.), Studies in Syntax and Semantics, 1Ü9-138. Dordrecht, Reidel. (1970). 'The Grammar of HITTING and BREAKING', in: R.A. Jacobs & P.S. Rosenbaum (Eds.), Readings in English Transformational Grammar., 120-133. Toronto-London. Hoik, André van (1980). 'The Open Message. On the Syntax of Envy in A.S. Puskin's Mozart and SalieviRussian Linguistics 5, 1-54. (1983). 'Thematic Composition in Russian Drama', Essays in Poetics 8, 53-73. (1984). The Semiotics of Patriotism in Slowacki's LILLA WENEDA. Publications of the Slavic Institute in the University of Groningen. Minor Series Nr. 10. Groningen, UP. Metzeltin, Michael & Harald Jaksche (1983). Textsemantik. Ein Modell zur Analyse von Texten. Tübingen, Gunter Narr. Moskey, Stephen T. (1979). Semantic Structures and Relations in Dutch. An Introduction to Case Grammar. Washington, GUP. Plessner, Helmuth (1950). Lachen und Weinen. Eine Untersuchung nach den Grenzen menschlichen Verhaltens. Bern, Francke Verlag. Rokoszowa, Jolanta (1981). 'Über das Problem des Anthropozentrismus in der Sprache (Ein Beitrag zur Untersuchung des Genus verbi)', Juznoslovenski Filolog, 25-54. Rost, Leonhard (1971). Einleitung in die alttestamentischen Apokryphen und Pseudoepigraphen, einschliesslich der grossen QumranHandschriften. Heidelberg, Quelle und Meyer.

44

CODES ET TRANGRESSIONS DES CODES AU CIRQUE

Hugues HOTIER

Admiration de la beauté plastique ou de l'exploit surhumain, peur devant le risque, joie procurée par le comique, les émotions que le spectateur vient chercher au cirque se comptent sur les doigts d'une main. Elles sont simples et spontanées et le plaisir que procurent les arts de la piste s'adresse plus à l'affectif qu'à l'intellect. Il est fait d'images plutôt que d'idées, d'admiration plutôt que de connaissance, de satisfaction immédiate de la curiosité plutôt que de questionnement. C'est, pour reprendre la distinction de Bachelard, un comportement naturel par opposition à l'esprit scientifique. De plus, ce plaisir s'apparente à celui qu'éprouve l'individu en situation d'informé - ou de s'informant - c'est-àdire qu'il procède d'un subtil dosage entre l'imprévisibilité du contenu et la ritualisation du contenant. L'imprévisibilité entretient l'attente tandis que la ritualisation garantit le confort. La forme limite est, dans u n cas, la découverte de l'inconnu et, dans l'autre, le stéréotype. Plus une source est imprévisible, plus son pouvoir informatif est grand ; plus elle est ritualisée, plus son approche est confortable (cf : Escarpit, Théorie générale de l'information et de la communication). Parce qu'il est "naturel", le comportement du spectateur est paresseux et se satisfait b i e n de la forte ritualisation qu'offre la tradition du cirque. Cette ritualisation est supportée par une codification très précise. C'est la transgression du code qui apporte l'imprévisibilité nécessaire au plaisir du public. CODE ET RITUALISATION Le clown belge Victor French protestait, en 1964, contre l'accusation de non-renouvellement que la critique faisait au cirque en général et aux clowns en particulier. Il comparait le cirque à l'Opéra où le public recherche d'abord la qualité ou l'originalité de l'exécution plutôt que la nouveauté de l'oeuvre. On attend de l'interprète une lecture différente, u n supplément de talent particulier, ce que Gaston Crunelle, qui fut le maître de la plupart des grands flûtistes français contemporains, appelle "le chic". Il est clair que les numéros que l'on peut voir au cirque ne diffèrent les uns des autres que par la qualité des artistes qui les présentent mais qu'ils reproduisent, dans leur conception même, des modèles anciens n'ayant évolué que p e u et lentement. Il serait assez aisé

410

de dresser le lexique de la Haute-Ecole (*) ou du trapèze volant. Les figures et les exercices en sont peu nombreux, leurs combinaisons limitées et les apports de leurs exécutants au fil des années se sont situés au niveau du détail. Même si, à un moment donné, une modification essentielle a bouleversé le numéro, la forme nouvelle s'est rapidement figée ; c'est ce qui s'est passé avec l'introduction du porteur au trapèze volant. Mais c'est d'abord le lieu du spectacle qui sacrifie au rituel. Lorsqu'il pénètre sous le chapiteau ou dans le cirque stable (*), le public retrouve un cadre à la fois particulier et familier avec sa disposition en arène, la lumière verticale qui isole les protagonistes du spectacle avec une intensité d'autant plus dramatique qu'on les regarde depuis une position surélevée. Les agrès suspendus à la coupole, la cage souvent montée avant l'ouverture de la salle, les cris des vendeurs de programmes, la musique, les odeurs des animaux, tout cela contribue à aiguiser sa réceptivité, crée un décorum pour l'espèce de cérémonie à laquelle il va assister. Les signes, auditifs, visuels et olfactifs qui contribuent à la mise en condition du spectateur peuvent s'inventorier. Signes visuels Circularité : piste, arène, cage, gradins en amphithéâtre. Permanence : le décor n'est pas ajouté au lieu, c'est le lieu qui est le décor. Appareils et agrès présents pendant toute la durée du spectacle (cordes, trapèzes, perche aérienne) et formant un réseau au-dessus de la piste. Verticalité de la lumière dont les sources sont en hauteur (mâts, plates-formes au sommet des gradins pour les projecteurs de poursuite) . Signes auditifs Orchestre avec dominante des cuivres et des bois. Présence d'instruments à vent à son grave (hélicon, contrebasse, tuba) et à son aigu (piccolo, carillon). Signes olfactifs Odeur des animaux. Excréments, litières. Odeur des confiseries et friteries. Il va de soi que ces signes, qui composent l'ambiance d'accueil, vont être complétés au cours du spectacle par d'autres qui participeront également à la mise en condition du public. Ces signes comportent presque tous une valeur principale, fonctionnelle, en relation directe avec le déroulement du numéro, et une valeur secondaire, d'ordre esthétique ou affectif. Ainsi, par exemple, les costumes ont-ils une coupe destinée à permettre les gestes et mouvements nécessaires à l'exécution des exercices mais, en même temps,

411

contribuent-ils à sexualiser le numéro. Ainsi, les agrès et appareils que l'on installe sous les yeux du public, en cours de spectacle, sont-ils nécessaires à la présentation de l'acte mais renforcent-ils aussi la dramatisation.

MISE EN CONDITION DO PUBLIC PENDANT LE SPECTACLE : SIGNES INDUCTEURS

SOURCE DES SIGNES

FONCTION PREMIERE (exécution du numéro)

FONCTION SECONDE

Exécution des difféInstallation des rentes séquences de agrès et accessoires (piédestal, la routine. cage, filet, plancher).

Renforcement de l'attente. Effet de dramatisation.

Costumes

Exécution des exercices grâce à la coupe (emmanchure s, aisance des formes) et la nature des étoffes (souplesse).

Mise en valeur des musculations masculines et des plastiques féminines. Esthétique et sexualisation.

Maquillages et coiffures.

Absorption des lumières. Correction des pâleurs provoquées par les projecteurs.

Sensualisation par amplification des lèvres, soulignement des yeux. Mise en valeur du mouvement de la chevelure. Esthétique et sexualisation.

Gestuelle

Accomplissement des exercices, indication des ordres, "clés" (*) ou signaux.

"Grâces" : posture soulignant le galbe des jambes féminines, geste rotatif du poignet, doigts tendus ou légèrement plies. Esthétique et sexualisation.

Mimiques

Exhibition des émotions et sentiments supposés des artistes : aisance, effort, douleur, joie ...

412 Ce code est b i e n connu des spectateurs. Il est pratiquement stéréotypé et la moindre de ses composantes est attendue par le public. De la même façon est attendu l'enchaînement des numéros à l'intérieur du programme. Soit qu'il est annoncé explicitement par le programme-papier (*) vendu à l'entrée, soit qu'il obéit à une logique évidente qui est celle des contraintes techniques : un aérien suivra les fauves pour permettre un démontage de cage immédiat et discret, un auguste de soirée (*) occupera le public pendant le montage d u plancher, etc. Quant aux enchaînements internes qui forment la routine (*) - c'est-à-dire le déroulement séquentiel du numéro - ils correspondent à une progression dramatique de type exposition/action/dénouement d'une part et à une progression spectaculaire qu'on pourrait résumer par la formule des bateleurs : "de plus en plus fort". La synthèse de ces deux impératifs produit l'organisation suivante : - Exposition : le décor est planté lorsque sont installés en piste les accessoires et agrès. Les protagonistes se présentent, le faire-valoir (ou assistant) légèrement en retrait par rapport à l'acteur principal. Parfois, un premier exercice permet de classer le numéro dans u n genre (acrobate au tapis, m a i n à main, icarien...) d'une part, à un n i v e a u de valeur d'autre part. - A c t i o n : déroulement linéaire formé par une succession d'épisodes qui sont les exercices, ou "trucs". Ceux-ci sont classés par ordre croissant de difficulté apparente, ou "effet". Le dernier, parfois appelé "emporte-pièce" (*), apparaît comme u n exploit hors du commun, une prouesse. - Dénouement : c'est l'accession de l'artiste au monde des preux, son triomphe, son changement d'état. Il quitte la piste auréolé d'un prestige nouveau. Le numéro apparaît comme une cérémonie, un rituel de transmutation, un office sans prêtre a u cours duquel l'artiste communie directement avec le monde supérieur de l'héroïsme. TRANSGRESSION ET

IMPREVISIBILITE

Le public de cirque connait ce rituel tout comme le public de catch pourrait décrire d'avance le pseudo-drame qui v a se dérouler sous ses yeux. Mais il arrive que les catcheurs feignent de sortir des conventions et donnent l'impression de se battre vraiment comme s'ils cessaient de se donner en spectacle pour vivre réellement l'exceptionnelle situation d'un conflit arrivé au paroxysme de la violence. Le spectateur, ravi, est persuadé d'assister à un événement aussi rare qu'imprévu. La transgression des conventions existe de la même façon au cirque et le public a parfois la conviction que la représentation à laquelle il a assisté était exceptionnelle. Il en trouve la preuve dans ce qu'il considère comme des incidents.

Il y a tKanigJLeAiton ¿oxique t'antlite, volontaJjimmt, enhielnt £ei lèçilu conve.ntionneII.zi qui ¿ont Induite* pan ¿a dénomination de ion emploi ou pax l'annonce qu'en {¡ait le pKéientateuA

413

du. ipicJjOLcJii. P r e n o n s , pour m i e u x nous faire c o m p r e n d r e , trois exemples : 1 ' é q u i l i b r i s t e est supposé réussir les é q u i l i b r e s qu'il se p r o p o s e d ' e x h i b e r ; l'athlète est réputé apte à relever les défis qu'il se lance à lui-même ; le d r e s s e u r a, par d é f i n i t i o n , le contrôle a b s o l u des bêtes qu'il présente. E q u i l i b r i s t e , a t h l è t e , dresseur sont des q u a l i f i c a t i o n s p r o f e s s i o n n e l l e s et o n ne s ' a t t e n d pas plus à v o i r 1 ' é q u i l i b r i s t e m a n q u e r u n é q u i l i b r e que le soliste de l'orchestre s y m p h o n i q u e faire u n e fausse note ... o u le c h i r u r g i e n se tromper d ' o r g a n e lors d ' u n e ablation. Ces artistes sont des p r o f e s s i o n n e l s h a u t e m e n t q u a l i f i é s , d o n c des g e n s qui r é u s s i s s e n t ce qu'ils ont c h o i s i d ' e n t r e p r e n d r e et de p r é s e n t e r a u public. N o u s l a i s s e r o n s de côté la d é m a r c h e , de type p a r o d i q u e , des n u m é r o s dits " b u r l e s q u e s " et dans lesquels l'artiste p r é s e n t e le spectacle de l ' é c h e c p e r m a n e n t sous forme de charges. C'est l ' i l lusionniste m a l a d r o i t , l'acrobate équestre d é g u i s é en s p e c t a t e u r et qui, m o n t é m a l g r é lui, se m a i n t i e n t à cheval dans des p o s t u r e s inesthétiques et d r ô l e s , ou e n c o r e l'auguste de soirée qui t e n t e de copier l'artiste qu'on v i e n t d'applaudir. Il s'agit ici d ' u n e d é m a r c h e s y s t é m a t i q u e , b i e n v i t e reconnue comme telle, et qui constitue la forme d ' u n e classe p a r t i c u l i è r e de n u m é r o s . Très d i f f é r e n t e est celle de cet artiste dit " c l a s s i q u e " qui, à un m o m e n t , m a n q u e aux o b l i g a t i o n s de sa c l a s s i f i c a t i o n a u risque de décevoir son p u b l i c . D a n s les trois exemples p r i s c i - d e s s u s , o n p e u t rapidement d é c r i r e la n a t u r e de la t r a n s g r e s s i o n . M i s s E l k e exerce sur ses p i n s c h e r s une autorité sans p a r t a g e . Ils lui o b é i s sent, c'est le cas de le dire, a u doigt et à l'oeil. Ces p e t i t s chiens o m b r a g e u x j u s q u ' à la h a r g n e et v i f s a u m i l i e u de la p i s t e comme des têtards a u p r i n t e m p s semblent aller e n tous sens m a i s sont, e n r é a l i t é , d o c i l e s d e v a n t leur m a î t r e s s e et son a s s i s t a n t . C e l a se voit. E t p o u r t a n t , sans r a i s o n a p p a r e n t e , l'un d ' e n t r e eux se p r é c i p i t e , à u n m o m e n t d o n n é , sur ledit a s s i s t a n t et s'accroche a u b a s de son p a n t a l o n q u ' o n a b i e n d u m a l à lui faire lâcher. Il r e v i e n d r a d ' a i l l e u r s à la charge à p l u s i e u r s r e p r i s e s sous une form e atténuée : l'aboiement furieux. Guy V e r t s p o r t e , e n é q u i l i b r e sur le m e n t o n , des o b j e t s lourds et e n c o m b r a n t s : u n e b i c y c l e t t e , u n c y c l o m o t e u r , une é c h e l l e , etc. Et m ê m e dix c h a i s e s tubulaires empilées les u n e s sur les a u t r e s . A p e u près à la fin de son n u m é r o , alors qu'il v i e n t de réussir l'exercice des d i x chaises, le p r é s e n t a t e u r d u spectacle a n n o n c e qu'il v a tenter de b a t t r e son propre r e c o r d en e s s a y a n t de p o r t e r onze chaises. Il insiste sur le poids de la p i l e , sur la f a i b l e s e c t i o n d u p i e d qui r e p o s e sur le m e n t o n et sur lequel appuie tout ce poids et sur le sens de l'équilibre qui est n é c e s s a i r e à u n e t e l l e entreprise. V o i l à le p u b l i c mis e n c o n d i t i o n et prêt à a p p l a u dir l'exploit. M a i s l'exploit n ' a u r a p a s lieu. D u m o i n s , p a s tout de suite. Et la p i l e de chaises, trop lourde, s ' é c r o u l e r a l a m e n t a b l e m e n t dans u n s i n i s t r e fracas avant m ê m e de s'être é l é v é e à h a u teur de p o i t r i n e . O n doit à la vérité de dire q u e le p u b l i c a p p l a u d i t q u a n d m ê m e , comme p o u r c o n s o l e r l'artiste. L e q u e l ne se t i e n d r a pas p o u r b a t t u et, après a v o i r p r é s e n t é u n autre e x e r c i c e ,

414 reformera l'échafaudage de chaises, lui ajoutera une douzième et ... réussira à poser le tout sur son menton avant d'esquisser quelques pas de danse sous les acclamations redoublées des spectateurs enthousiastes .

a u y veerç

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O n pourrait presque dire que le cas de Tanis, l'équilibriste sur piédestal, est encore plus dramatique. Car ses échecs, passagers, ne lui sont pas imputables ; ils viennent de l'incompétence de sa partenaire, dont on devine qu'elle est aussi sa compagne dans la vie. Le couple est complété par un adolescent discret, le fils manifestement. Cette imputation que nous faisons, et que le public fait, est induite par un certain nombre de signes qu'il n'est pas nécessaire de relever ici. Bref, comme c'est d'ailleurs souvent le cas au cirque, les partenaires de travail sont aussi partenaires dans leur vie privée. Tanis escalade le piédestal où il se poste en équilibre sur les mains. Là, il forme des piles de briques, lancées une à une depuis le sol par son assistante, et il effectue une impressionnante alternance de planches horizontales et d'équilibres verticaux, se tenant sur une main et attrapant les briques de l'autre pour les poser et élever ses piles. C'est un numéro connu, classique, qui a été maintes fois présenté par d'excellents acrobates. L'ennui est que la partenaire de Tanis n'a pas autant de talent que lui et que ses lancers manquent de précision. A trois reprises, elle met l'artiste dans une position périlleuse, allant jusqu'à faire tomber l'ensemble des briques péniblement entassées et lui imposant une prolongation de postures fatigantes. Il r é u s sira quand même, mais au prix de quels efforts. Et l'hostilité du public à l'égard de la jeune femme sera telle qu'elle comprendra b i e n que les applaudissements qui saluent leur départ de la piste n e sont nullement pour elle. Animal insuffisamment dressé, ratage rattrapé mais ratage quand même, acrobate talentueux mais mal secondé, voilà trois exemples de transgression de la sacro-sainte règle de perfection qui préside au spectacle de cirque. Il v a sans dire que ces manquements sont volontaires et répétés, soigneusement, à chaque représentation. Quelles fonctions peuvent b i e n avoir ces grains d e sable qui, un instant, grippent la mécanique b i e n huilée du spectacle ? Quels effets produisent-ils sur le spectateur et sur la recherche d u plaisir que celui-ci vient chercher au cirque ? Ils montrent d'abord, à l'évidence, que la perfection se mérite, qu'elle ne s'obtient pas par le seul talent et que le cirque est le monde de l'effort. Car, au moins dans deux cas sur trois, la transgression favorise le dépassement de soi et apporte à l'artiste une sorte de plus-value. Tanis rattrapera systématiquement les maladresses de sa partenaire-épouse. Il "redoublera" d'efforts et n'en sera que plus grand. Il passera du monde du spectacle au monde de l'héroïsm e en même temps que le public percevra le double niveau du j e u : le cirque qui exhibe la prouesse, le théâtre qui représente le drame familial. Pour le spectateur, Tanis assume conjointement sa fonction socio-professionnelle d'artiste de cirque et sa fonction socio-familiale d'époux et de chef de famille. Sans conteste, on est loin de la simple exhibition du talent et la transgression enrichit considérablement le numéro de Tanis. De même, la lutte que G u y Verts entreprend avec lui-même pour assurer sa gloire ne peut

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manquer de le grandir aux yeux du public. La motivation est peutêtre obscure et relève sans doute de l'orgueil mais l'athlète nous prouvera qu'orgueil n'est pas vanité et le souci de la gloire chez l'artiste de cirque est bien de même nature que chez le héros cornélien. Trop soucieux de sa réputation, ni l'un ni l'autre ne peut tolérer la défaillance. Et l'on sait bien que chez Corneille il ne s'agit pas seulement d'attitude sociale mais aussi et surtout de conscience de soi. Pourquoi en serait-il autrement chez les héros de la piste ? Cette "conscience professionnelle" que l'artiste de cirque affiche, chacun sait bien qu'elle est réelle et qu'elle constitue une des valeurs fondamentales du milieu. Alors, la simulation que Guy Verts introduit dans son numéro n'en est qu'une preuve supplémentaire et la valeur qu'elle ajoute à l'artiste rejaillit sur l'ensemble de la profession tout comme rejaillissent sur l'institution les nombreux cas d'abnégation et de courage dont le chapiteau est chaque jour le témoin et qui se résument en cette devise bien connue : "Mais le spectacle continue". Quant à la transgression que le dompteur tolère, encourage ou même organise chez l'animal, il apparait que sa fonction est différente. Elle rassure les âmes sensibles en signifiant que les animaux du cirque, contrairement à ce qu'on entend souvent dire, ne sont pas si malheureux. Elle montre la marge de manoeuvre et, pour tout dire, la liberté dont ils disposent aussi bien que les libertés qu'ils peuvent se permettre de prendre avec le dresseur. Elle contribue à créer l'illusion d'un rapport familier, voire familial, entre l'artiste et la bête. Dans un spectacle aussi rigoureux que celui dont il est question, dans un monde où la discipline est une vertu cardinale, la transgression des codes de communication ne peut se concevoir autrement que comme porteuse de signification. Elle est signe et, plus encore, elle est signal car elle appelle une réaction de la part du spectateur. La transgression témoigne, si besoin est, de la richesse des modes communicationnels du cirque,et, au-delà, de la puissance et de l'efficacité du non-verbal dans la communication sociale. Sciences de l'Information et de la Communication Université de Technologie de Compiègne Compiègne, France

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LEXIQUE DES TERMES DE CIRQUE

EMPLOYES

Ces termes sont repérés par un (*) Auguste de soirée Dans la classification des clowns, l'auguste est le personnage comique. L'auguste de soirée est un auguste, travaillant généralement seul, qui assure de courts intermèdes entre les numéros à la fois pour permettre le montage du matériel sans trous dans le programme et pour ponctuer celui-ci de notes gaies. Ces intermèdes sont appelés "reprises". Cirque stable Edifice construit en matériaux durs (pierre, brique) et destiné à abriter des spectacles de cirque. Les trois autres lieux de spectacle étant la construction, de charpente et de planches, le chapiteau de toile et le pale à ciel ouvert. Clé Tout signal, généralement visuel, qui transmet u n ordre à un animal. Cette transmission s'opère généralement à 1'insu du public. Emporte-pièce Dans un programme, le numéro le plus fort et le plus spectaculaire. Dans un numéro, l'exercice ayant les mêmes caractéristiques. Entrée Le numéro que présentent les clowns et qui a une durée nettement plus longue que les "reprises" de l'auguste de soirée. Haute-école Spécialité équestre très ancienne. Rabelais en parle et l'Ecole Espagnole d'Equitation de Vienne qui en a fait sa spécialité a été fondée en 1580. Le cheval, monté, donne l'impression de danser grâce à une musique adaptée à des pas qu'on lui a préalablement appris. Programme-papier Le document qui est vendu à l'entrée d u cirque et qui est plus généralement appelé programme. Routine L'ensemble des exercices enchaînés qui composent un numéro acrobatique. Se dit aussi pour l'un quelconque des exercices d'un numéro de fauves.

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POUR UNE SOCIO-SEMIOTIQUE DE LA PRESSE A PROPOSE DE "EL PAIS"

Gérard Imbert

INTRODUCTION On avancera ici quelques propositions pour une approche sociosémiotique de la presse, extensibles à l'ensemble des discours sociaux, qui sont dérivés d'une série de travaux sur le changement dans les discours sociaux de la Transition espagnole. Je me suis particulièrement intéressé à un type de presse — la presse de référence dominante — qui contribue à la mise en place d'un espace public de communication et de représentation: lieu de production des acteurs sociaux et de polémisation du discours social. La presse de référence (journaux de prestige du type Le Monde, El Pais entre autres) participe ainsi d'un "discours public": elle s'érige en porte parole du public, et médiateur symbolique entre les gouvernants et l'opinion publique. Ce qui est fondamental dams ce genre de presse, c'est que, sous couvert d'objectivité, c'est un univers de référence qui est constitué pour de larges secteurs de la société et les classes diringeantes elles-mêmes, qui peut éventuellement influer sur les décisions de celle-ci. Que ce soit à travers l'information proprement dite ou les espaces réservés à l'opinion, la pressé de référence participe d'une construction de la réalité, et c'est en cela qu'elle est au coeur même de l'interrogation sémiotique: comment est produit le texte (que celui-ci soit littéraire ou social), comment s'y manifeste un sujet parlant (plus ou moins figurativisé en un narrateur), une structure actantielle et logique. Avec cette différence, concernant la presse, qu'il s-agit d'un discours "au 2e degré": une parole sur des paroles et des actions déjà accomplies, mais qu'il s'agit de re-présenter, de réactualiser, dans un discours qui est pur simulacre, étant bien entendu que la "fidèle reproduction" de la réalité n'a qu'un rapport très lointain avec ce qui intéresse ici, sa production même: à travers l'émergence de figures du sujet et la construction des objets dans le discours lui-même. Les figures du sujet éteint multiples dans le journal, on distinguera pour plus de clarté trois niveaux: -1 ) Un niveau actantiel (de surface) qui reproduit en termes de récit les contenus de l'actualité, se fonde sur le couple Sujet/ anti-Sujet et fait l'objet d'une sémiotique de l'action; on pourra l'étudier dans le cadre d'une typologie des énoncés portant sur

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l'actualité en déterminant les positions actantielles des sujets face à l'action par rapport à l'isotopie conflit/consensus. - 2 ) On niveau logique (structure profonde) qui met en jeu les instances antérieures et extérieures à l'action proprement dite: ce qui la motive et la légitime; ce niveau répond au couple Destinateur/anti-Destinateur et fait intervenir une structure modale (les investissements modaux des sujets: leur SavoirPouvoir-Vouloir-Devoir-faire). Ce 2e niveau fait l'objet d'une sémiotique de la manipulation, manipulation double dans la presse dans la mesure où elle met en jeu deux types de compétence: celle, cognitive, du sujet de la presse qui connaît et interprète le faire des acteurs sociaux, et celle, pragmatique, tournée vers l'action, des acteurs sociaux (leur Vouloir-être); sans compter les modalités déontiques (objectives, extérieures aux sujets): le Devolr-faire qui guide leur action. -3 ) On pourra enfin distinguer un 3e niveau: le niveau discursif, par lequel le Journal travaille sur d'autres paroles (rapportées de façon plus ou moins littérale, avec une plus ou moins grande distance d'énonciation) et sa projection: le niveau métadiscursif, c'est à dire la façon dont le Journal se met en scène en tant qu'actant textuel, soi qu'il s'énoncé à la première personne (simulacre énonciatif), soit qu'il s'objective en troisième personne (simulacre énoncif). Qu'on me permette, avant d'aller plus loin, et pour excuser le claractère un peu abstrait de l'exposé, de préciser qu'il repose sur une série d'analyses ponctuelles portant tout spécialement sur le journal El Pais (degré de figurativité à travers la mise en espace, approche formelle de l'idéologie, stratégies éditoriales). Il ne s'agit donc pas ici de l'exposé d'un théoricien, mais de celui d'un analyste du discours pour qui la rencontre avec la sémiotique (la sémiotique greimassienne, faut-il préciser) a été fondamentale de par la grande formalisation de son appareil analytique, dans une recherche qui s'est d'abord intéressée à la production idéologique. Que devient l'idéologie à la lumière de la sémiotique? On reproche souvent à celle-ci de l'évacuer, alors qu'elle ne fait que déplacer l'objet: pour le situer, non plus au niveau des contenus et des programmes idéologiques, mais à un niveau plus formel, cejLui de 1 ' engendrement même du discours et de la production du sens. C'est l'objet même de la sémiotique, et plus particulièrement de la sémiotique sociale issue de "l'Ecole de Paris", que de s'interroger sur la "génération" des textes et la construction du Sujet dans le texte. On considèrara donc l'idéologie comme une opération qui sous-tend la production textuelle. La sémiotique n'évacue pas l'idéologie, elle la dilue en tant qu'objet, elle la ramène moins à la reproduction de "positions" pré-établies qu'a la production de sujets et d'objets dans les processus narratifs et discursifs. Rappelons pour mémoire que Roland Barthes parlait déjà de rechercher l'idéologie dans les formes du discours, à travers ce qu'on pourrait appeler les "idéologies flottantes". Greimas, dans

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le Dictionnaire, présente l'idéologie comme une projection de valeurs virtuelles, actualisées par le sujet à travers sa performance. Par l'intérêt qu'elle porte à l'énonciation, l'école greimassienne s'intéresse depuis quelques années à la réalisation du sujet dans le texte à travers ses manifestations repérables, mais aussi son occultation, ou les phénomènes de masquage.... Enfin, un dernier apport, commun à la sociologie (cfr. Bourdieu) et a certaines recherches récentes sur la dimension figurative du discours social, laisse entrevoir la possibilité d'une sémiotique de la "figurativité",' qui s'intéresserait à la "représentation" dans le discours public: 1) à travers les appareils formels dont s'entoure l'homme public, ce qui répond a une fonction spectaculaire; 2) à travers le "régime de visibilité" des acteurs sociaux: la façon dont ils jouent de leurs rôles publics et privés, dont ils se mettent en scène en tant que sulets parlants, ce que j'ai appelé ailleurs la fonction spéculaire. LE SUJET PARLANT DANS LE TEXTE JOURNALISTIQUE C'est le sujet de l'énônciation dont la présence est directe: généralement manifestée à la premiere personne plurielle ou par des marques directes de la subjectivité (évaluationg de type axiologique à travers des jugements de valeur). Mais le sujet peut se manifester indirectement à travers toute une série de procédures: médiatisation énonciative par "débrayage actantiel" , modalisation "subjective", pourtant sur le Pouvoir-Vouloir-Devoirfaire des acteurs sociaux, modalités "objectives" de type déontique, expression d'un Devoir-faire, d'une nécessité historique, etc. La presse constitue un jalon stratégique de la constitution du sujet public et plus particulièrement de l'homme politique, car elle donne à voir non seulement les performances des acteurs sociaux et des hommes politiques, mais aussi leur compétence. Elle contribue ainsi à l'acquisition de l'être à travers l'actualisation de la compétence: la capacité du sujet en tant que sujet virtuel à Pouvoir-Vouloir-Savoir-dire. Une socio-sémiotique des discours sociaux devra donc s'intéresser à ce stade d'acquisition de la compétence: non seulement à la "mise en discours", c'est à dire dans une perspective greimassienne, aux procédures d'actorialisation, spatialisation et temporalisation, mais aussi à ce que j'appellerai "mise en modalité" (ou modalisation du faire des sujets); modalisation dont fait preuve tout sujet public forsqu'il manifeste son Savoir-faire ("l'expérience politique", "les sources bien informées"...), son Vouloir-faire (la "pureté de ses intentions") et son Pouvoir-faire (la marge d'action laissée par le parti ou l'idéologie). En tant qu'elles sont antérieures à la performance, les modalités participent, au même titre que le distlnateur comme instance transcendante, d'un déplacement des instances du discours. Si le discours de l'actualité traite, en termes sémiotiques, de la réalisation de sujets (de leurs performances pragmatiques),

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l'éditorial renvoie à leur actualisation: à leur compétence qu'il sanctionne (il agit en destinateur final), ou qu'il définite comme projet (destinateur initial) au nom d'un méta-destinateur social (l'intérêt national) ou/et moral (le devoir civique). Une sémiotique sociale appliquée aux discours sociaux devra donc englober tant la manifestation du sujet que les procédures de médiatisation (débrayage actantiel et énonciatif) et de manipulation. L'EDITORIAL COMME SIMULACRE ENONCIATIF C'est une particularité du journal de référence que d'éviter les manifestations de la subjectivité dans le texte, d'où une enonciation aussi neutre que possible, qu'on retrouve aussi bien dans le discours de l'information (mise en espace, structure des titres, fréquence des énoncés nominalisés...) que dans les éditoriaux. Contrairement à la presse à sensation, qui investit plus de subjectivité dans l'écriture journalistique: présence d'un énonciateur polémique, modalisations, appréciations subjectives de type axiologique forte personnalisation des sujets de l'actualité (actantialisation et actorialisation) — f r é q u e n c e des énoncés de parole qui produit un déplacement de l'énonciation et peut provoquer des confusions quant au statut du locuteur. On s'arrêtera sur l'éditorial, seul genre journalistique où le journal se projette comme locuteur (l'éditorialiste représente le journal à tel point qu'il disparaît en tant que sujet nominal: absence de signature) et se met en scène en tant qu'énonciateur: c'est un procédé récurrent dans l'éditorial que de renvoyer, en termes de métadiscours, à la "position" du journal ou à des informations, opinions, antérieurement émises par celui-ci — c'est le discours de l'auto-référence. Paradoxalement, dans cet espace où l'énonciation est soit-disant délimitée à la fois formellement (l'éditorial comme espace clairement différencié de l'information), et discursivement (c'est le journal qui "parle"), on est en présence d'un genre hybride, qui oscille entre l'élocutif (le "je" énonçant) et le délocutif (il tend à effacer du propos énoncé les traces du je). L'éditorial agit comme instance structurante: il opère, pour reprendre l'exptression de Denise Maldidier et Regine Robin, une saisie "sémio-logique" de l'événement, une narrativité au 2e degré si l'on veut, qui travaille sur des signes, des discours déjà constitués. Par là même il renvoie l'actualité (inscrite sur une série syntagmatique) à une série paradigmatique: les grands "thèmes" de la vie nationale et internationale, les références à l'univers culturel, les catégories du savoir collectif. L'éditorial, dans la mesure où il se construit sur des discours déjà constitués, permet une appréhension spécifique de l'événement et contribue ainsi à la production de la réalité dans le journal:

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- production du sens : le journal fonde ses connaissances et produit des normes; il agit par là même sur la compétence cognitive du lecteur; - il procède à une visibilisation des acteurs sociaux par rapport auxquels le journal comme actant entretient une distance plus ou moins grande (rapport d'inclusion/d'exclusion par rapport à l'actant collectif); - il incite à l'action les figures du destinataire (la classe politique, le public...) qu'il construit dans le discours: il se fait l'exposant syntaxique d'un prétendu vouloir collectif. Enfin, l'éditorial instaure une certaine polémicité, mais celle-ci se manifeste moins dans le sujet de l'énonciation (ce qui impliquerait un investissement subjectif de la part de l'énonciateur) qu'au niveau du destinateur. Au couple sujet vs anti-sujet, l'éditorial tend à substituer le couple destinateur vs anti-destinateur. C'est "l'intérêt social" si souvent invoqué, c'est la figure de la citoyenneté comme réalisation nécessaire, c'est la National comme instance suprême. De même, les interventions du sujet sont moins celles, directes, du sujet parlant que les modalités que celui-ci fait intervenir. LES FIGURES DU SUJET DANS L'EDITORIAL Indépendamment du locuteur l'éditorial met en scène d'autres figures du sujet qu'ill intègre à l'appareil formel de l'énonciation: une figure du Lecteur, projetée comme énonciatairedestinataire implicite de l'énonciation, autre représentation, avec l'énonciateur, du sujet de l'énonciation; on le distinguera du narrataire (destinataire explicte de l'énonciation), invocation directe de la figure du lecteur: "En résumé, et pour que le lecteur y voie plus clair, on dira..." écrit El Pais. Le lecteur se voit ainsi actualisé en tant que sujet doté d'une compétencg cognitive, il est mis dans le "secret" de l'éditorialiste.... Un destinataire, plus ou moins figurativisé dans le texte, peut également apparaître à travers les conseils adressés aux gouvernants et aux pouvoirs institutionnels en général. Un certain type de public peut aussi apparaître comme destinataire explicite du discours du journal: c'est l'opinion publique démocratique à laquelle s'adresse un journal comme El Pals par opposition aux secteurs contraires aux réformes démocratiques, soit en position narrative: c'est El Pais parlant des réactions de certains secteurs de l'opinion publique; soit en position discursive: c'est le locuteur entrant en conjonction avec l'actant collectif et adoptant un discours à la troisième personne (ou non-personne, pour reprendre la qualification de Benveniste): "L'Espagne démocratique ne peut que dénoncer, aujourd'hui, dans les années 80...." (El Pals). On constatera par là même des phénomènes de syncrétisme actantiel: des cas où le locteur se confond avec telle ou telle figure actantielle (destinataire ou destinateur); c'est flagrant dans l'utilisation de la personne syncrétique: le nous inclusif à

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vocation consensuelle, mais qui peut être aussi faussement inclusif: après avoir parlé de "l'opinion publique de notre pays", El Pais écrit: "Notre pays qui aspire à s'intégrer à la Communauté europeenne doit se convaincre que..."; et le journal de poursuivre, en utilisant toute une série de verbes modaux: "Nous ne pouvons tolérer", "nous ne voulons pas...nous aspirons", où il prend parti contre d'autres secteurs de l'opinion et une autre représentation de l'actant national (ce que El Pais qualifie d'"espagnolade", se manifestant ainsi comme personne à 1'intérieur d'un nous apparemment inclusif). C'est également le cas de certaines tournures faussement impersonnelles: "On ne peut admettre, il semble nécessaire de souligner, il est intolérable"; ou à travers les déictiques: "Cette nation ancienne qui est la nôtre..." écrit le journal conservateur ABC, s'appuyant sur un préconstruit historique auquel il s'identifie énonciativement par la valeur déictique du démonstratif.... Enfin, les exhortations implicites, sous forme d'énoncés impersonnels du type "On est en droit d'exiger"..., font intervenir des modalités déontiques et actualisent un énonciataire qui traduit au autre type de déplacement (Enonciateur > énonciataire). LA MANIPULATION On parle souvent de manipulation dans le discours social, particulièrement à propose de la presse et du discours politique; ce qu'on voudrait ici, c'est poser le problème en ternies sémiotiques: l) de débrayage actantiel — notamment débrayage énonciatif à travers la projection d'une première personne plus ou moins conventionnelle, plus ou moins fictive, et l'emploi d'énoncés rapportés; 2) de manipulation, au sens greimassien, c'est à dire l'utilisation, en amont de l'instance de 1'énonciation d'un destinateur qui "programme" et légitime le dire du sujet. On appelle manipulation, en sémiotique narrative, "une action de l'homme sur d'autres hommes, visant à leur faire exécuter un programme donné" (Dictionnaire). Transposé du plan des récits à celui des pratiques, et plus particulièrement des pratiques sociales, la manipulation (et la sémiotique qu'elle appelle) se constitue à partir du parcours narratif du Destinateur, c'est-àdire l'instance extérieure et antérieure à l'action du sujet, qui "commande" celle-ci, motive celui-ci et légitime ("sactionne") le faire résultatif. Le destinateur peut être de nature différente: - il peut être de type figuratif, généralement incarné dans un acteur collectif: le peuple ou certaines catégories sociales; - il représente un principe, renvoie à une catégorie abstraite (la démocratie, la paix, l'intérêt général...); - il renvoie à une représentation spéculaire du destinataire luimême ("l'opinion publique", le lecteur, le citoyen...); - il peut enfin être l'expression d'une instance non figurative, le plus souvent de nature modale, et plus ou moins

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objectivée: modalité déontique (Devoir-faire) plus ou moins rapportée à la "morale" de l'énonciateur, qui peut apparaître aussi sous la forme de la nécessité: lorsque le sujet se prétend luimême manipulé, c'est à dire par exemple dominé par, assujetti à des lois économiques, à des réalités objectives. De ces modalités qu'il qualifie d'aléthiques, Eric Landowski écrit: "Rarement sans doute l'énonciateur du discours d'autorité se montre-t-il aussi ouvertement manipulateur que lorsqu'il se prétend ainsi manipulé"; il peut également renvoyer à une figure de l'histoire, sorte de métadestinateur qui incarne une nécessité objective (l'histoire s'impose comme préconstruit); figure Juridique aussi (El Pais invoquant la convenance de s'aligner sur l'ordre juridique européen à propose de thèmes aussi éloignés en apparence que l'avortement ou le Marché Commun...)- Figures identitaires enfin: le vouloir-être démocratique de El Pals par exemple. Dans l'éditorial, la manipulation se joue pour beaucoup dans la représentation de l'actant collectif, c'est à dire un type de manipulation qu'on pourrait qualifier de référentielle: portant ici sur l'actorialisation (la façon dont est incarné cet acteur), et là, en particulier dans le discours de l'information proprement dite, sur la catégorisation des objets, tout ce qui relève de la référençiation, à travers les contenus (mise en rubrique, mise en thème), mais aussi les protocoles formels (mise en page, titrage, léxicalisation...), ce que j'appellerai "l'appareil formel de (représentation" dans le Journal, c'e6t à dire les procédures formelles par lesquelles se manifeste un sujet textuel et que, pjg faute de temps et d'espace il n'est pas possible de décrire ici. On pourra regrouper les différents types de manipulation autour de trois figures: - la manipulation énonciative, dans laquelle on inclura les . procédures de débrayage actantiel, qui englobe le dire et le fairedire (modalités factitives) - la manipulation modale: celle du vouloir collectif et de la compétence des acteurs sociaux et politiques - la manipulation référentielle qui montre que l'opinion publique est une figure à géométrie variable, dont le champ référentiel (l'extension) varie en fonction des strategiés discursives de l'énonciateur et du surgissement de nouveaux acteurs sociaux. On le voit donc, la manipulation est un enjeu central de tout discours public par les simulacres de sujet qu'elle construit (un sujet "pour la galerie"), par la figurativité qu'elle produit — elle visibilise les actants de l'actualité: actorialisant les sujets et actantiali6ant les objets — par les modalités qu'elle investit. Institut d'Etudes Hispaniques Université de Paris IV - Sorbonne Paris - France

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NOTES 1.

2. 3.

I*.

5.

6. 7-

8.

9. 10.

11. 12.

Ne pouvant m'étendre ici, je renvoie pour plus de détails à G. Imbert: "Sujet et espace public dans les discours sociaux de la Transition espagnole. Pour une approche socio-sémiotique" in Mélanges de la Casa de Velazquez, publié avec le concours du CNRS, Tome XIX/I, 1983, Paris. On en trouvera une ébauche appliquée au discours social dans Eric Landowski: "La mise en scène des sujets de pouvoir" in Langages num. b2, 1975* Sur les procédures d'énonciation, de débrayage actantiel, je renvoie à J. Courtes et A.J. Greimas: Sémiotique — Dictionnaire raisonné de la théorie du langage, Paris, Hachette Université, 1979- (Pour les autres références a cet ouvrage, on indiquera désormais: Dictionnaire); et dans Introduction a l'analyse du discours en sciences sociales, Paris, Hachette 1979, l'article de Greimas: "Des accidents dans les sciences dites humaines". C'est ce que les greimassiens appellent le "parcours génératif", c'est a dire, pour ce qui est des structures discursives: l'actorialisation, la temporalisation et la spatialisation (cf. Dictionnaire, pp. 157-160). Eric Landowski: "Jeux optiques — Une dimension figurative de la communication" in Documents de Recherche du Groupe de Recherches sémio-lingulstiques, EHESS-CNRS, Paris, III, 22, Ï9BE Cf Dictionnaire, article: Figurativisation. Gérard Imbert: "Sujeto y espacio publico en el discurso periodístico de la Transición", communication au Congrès International emlotica e hispanismo", Madrid, 20-25 juin 1983, à paraître. Sur la modalisation, les jugements évaluatifs, le statut énonciatif du journaliste, on se référera à Catherine KerbratOrecchioni: L'énonciation: de la subjectivité dans le langage, Paris, Armand Colin, 1980. ' Le débrayage actantiel consiste, nous dit le Dictionnaire, "dans un premier temps, à disjoindre du sujet de l'énonciation et à projeter dans l'énoncé un non-je". La mise en modalité renvoie moins au faire lui-même (à l'action, que ce soit celle du sujet parlant ou des acteurs sociaux), qu'à ce qui la conditionne: un Vouloir, un Pouvoir, \in Savoir-faire ou leur contraire (un ne pas Vouloir, un ne pas Pouvoir-faire, etc.). Denis Maldidier, Régine Robin: "Le récit de la presse: reportages, commentaires, éditoriaux" in Pratiques, num. 14, mars 1977. C'est un destinataire implicite qui est actualisé dans les modalités déontiques, expression d'un Devoir-faire collectif. Le Journal vise alors à récupérer/transformer la compétence modale du destinataire qui peut se manifester même sous forme

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13. 14.

15.

16.

d'énoncés objectifs (expression de la nécessité) du type: "On est en droit d'exiger; ...Il est inadmissible..."; on entre alors dans la manipulation. Cf Eric Landowski: "L'opinion publique et ses porte-parole" in Documents du groupe de Recherches sémio-linguistiques, EHESS-CNRS, Paris, num. 12, I98O. La figure varie selon que l'actant collectif est désigné comme figure à réfèrent socio-politique (la nation, le peuple...), représentation d'une totalité ou figure symbolique, représentation de l'esprit civique, du consensus social plus ou moins réalisé, "l'opinion publique" incarnant une figure syncrétique englobant les deux aspects. Cf à ce propos Gaye Tuchman, Making news. A study on the construction of reality, 1978, en particulier le chapitre 9 sur la nouvelle comme réalité construite; et Louis Quéré, Des miroirs équivoques. Aux origines de la communication moderne, Paris, Aubier-Montaigne, 1982. Pour plus de détails je renvoie à mon article (Casa Velazquez, 1983» op. cit.), en particulier le paragraphe : "La (re)presentation dans le journal: Espace et représentation".

46 CONTEXTE ET ABSENCE DE CONTEXTE DANS LES QUOTIDIENS

Patrick Imbert

Le biaisé des médias, critiqué par les uns ou les autres, est le résultat de la confrontation entre une croyance idéologique en l'objectivité et le fonctionnement de la sémantique des textes. En effet, tout texte est sous-tendu par une isotopie, par un réseau classématique enraciné dans une axiologie diffusée continuellement par tel ou tel journal, au coer même d'une pseudo diversité devant laquelle s'extasie M. McLuhan (1963). Mais, en Amérique du Nord et en particulier au Canada, dans les quotidiens à grande diffusion (dans les grandes villes) dont la plupart sont possédés par deux entreprises multinationales, ce divers de l'information renouvelée s'abolit bien vite dans des contenus classématiques continuellement réactivés. LA PUBLICITÉ ANCRÉE DANS LE CONTEXTE: LA VENTE Un lien net est généralement établi entre la publicité d'un produit quelconque et un contexte immédiat, qu'il se trouve sur la page même ou que ce soit un événe ment important et connu ou encore qu'il s'agisse de 1'ac crochage à des stéréotypes ou à des données culturelles constituant le savoir qu'une société se donne d'elle même . En ce qui a trait au premier point, on retient la pu blicité Johny Walkers dans la page du Report on Business ( Globe and MaX£, Wednesday May ll th 1983 , p. N) directement placée sous une publicité pour des ordinateurs. La publicité pour le whisky est présentée comme si le nom de la compagnie Johny Walkers sortait d'une imprimante avec abréviations et forme particulière des caractères. L'exem pie correspondant au deuxième élément provient d'une grande chaîne d'épicerie affirmant: "Parliament opens today, but the real inflation fighters open Wednesday". ( The. C-iUzen, Monday January 25 th 1982, p. 30 ). Le troisième element peut être tiré aussi bien du premier que

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du deuxième exemple car ces énoncés gui font vendre reprennent un paradigme traversant tous les journaux, aussi bien dans les articles d'information que dans la publicité. C'est le sème ÉCONOMISME qui qualifie le mieux le stéréotype global auquel ces exemples se rattachent. Le deuxième, d'ailleurs, permet de dégager un axe sémantique ECONOMISME se divisant en deux sèmes LIBRE ENTREPRISE (valorisé)/ GOUVERNEMENT ET INTERVENTIONS (dévalorisé). Tout ceci est connu mais rappelle que rien n'est gratuit justement et que l'ancrage contextuel au niveau anecdotique (rejoignant un contexte plus profond défini par les sèmes) est essentiel lorsqu'il s'agit de vendre comme lorsqu'il s'agit de diffuser une idéologie qui ren forcera le contexte sémique fondamental lié à 1'ECONOMISME. PUBLICITÉ ET RENFORCEMENT IDÉOLOGIQUE La publicité ne sert jamais uniquement à vendre. En effet, même si ceux qui annoncent leurs produits n'en sont pas conscients directement, le fait même d'entrer dans le jeu publicitaire renforce quantitativement la croyance en l'Économisme salvateur. Toutefois souvent, de la part des multinationales, la publicité sert plus à renforcer le réseau du petit nombre de croyances fondamentales qu'à vendre. On pourrait vérifier ce fait à-tra vers la publicité de Gulf: "98 cents of every dollars re ceived by Gulf Canada in 1982 went back into running our business". (Globe and Mail, Thursday March 24th 1983, p 5). Il est intéressant de noter que cette annonce forme anti thèse aux informations reprochant les profits énormes des compagnies pétrolières ou le degré assez peu canadien de ces multinationales s' opposant à Pétro-Canada jouant sur les publicités à caractère nationaliste. Mais il est encore plus intéressant de remarquer que la photo principale illustrant ces assertions n'est pas celle d'un laboratoi re, d'une station service ou d'une raffinerie mais celle d'un ours polaire dont on dit:"Polar bears are a frequent danger to workers in the Beaufort Sea area where Gulf is drilling to find some of Canada's oil supply'. Que vient faire cet ours ici? Gulf sent le besoin de réactiver l'opposition technologie/nature en soulignant les bienfaits de la première et la menace que re-

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présente la seconde. Il est vrai que les écologistes de tout poil, depuis ceux qui luttent pour arrêter le massa cre des bébés phoques (campagne de cartes envoyées au Gouvernement canadien au début de l'hiver 1982) jusqu'aux Verts allemands qui sont entrés au Parlement de Bonn le 6 mars 1983, commencent à peser quelque peu dans le jeu du puovoir. Cette publicité reprend une image similaire au bébé phoque. Il s'agit aussi d'un animal blanc de l'arctique, mais Gulf établit l'opposition adulte/bébé. Gulf souligne aussi la menace pour l'homme par opposition aux photos de phoques où un homme ouvre le crâne de 1'animal avec un pic. Chez Gulf, l'image est réinscrite dans un contex te explicatif plus vaste, celui qui a permis à l'homme occidental de dominer la nature à son profit. De surcroît, Gulf, multinationale américaine se donne une image canadienne par le fait qu'elle soutient les travailleurs canadiens de la fourrure. Mais ce n'est pas tout car, si la compagnie Gulf renverse certaines idées, il ne faut pas oublier qu'elle ouvre aussi sur un contexte plus vaste. Elle le fait en montrant une Dhoto d'un trombonne pour attacher les feuilles de papier et rappelle ainsi qu'elle stimule l'économie canadienne dans ses moindres détails. Ainsi, elle fait vraiment oeuvre de bon citoyen, c'est à dire de citoyen qui consomme et facilite la circulation des biens. Elle est donc au-dessus de toute critique qui apparaît alors comme malveillante. Toute entreprise d'état qui joue sur le nationalisme, comme Pétro-Canada et indirectement sur une forme de protectionnisme et de ralentissement des échanges, peut paraître moins bonne citoyenne. La protection des intérêts nationaux semble dore s'opposer au développement continu, à l'accroissement du niveau de vie, à la circulation des biens, apanage de la démocratie libérale. Il y a plus intéressant encore. Dans le Globe and Mail, on lit un article d'information intitulé ' UAW (United Auto Workers) softens stand in Chrysler strike'. Cet article occupe un huitième de page. En face, on découvre une page complète de publicité en rouge et noir payée par Chrysler et qui, entre autre, dit ceci: "STRIKE a good bargain at Dodge and Plymouth dealers... 90% of Chrysler production capacity is unaffected by the

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strike". (Gtobz and Mali, Wednesday November 10th 1982, p 11). Les articles d'information ne sont donc pas l'essen tiel. Entre un huitième de page et une page bicolore la lutte est inégale. La compagnie a de bonnes chances d'écraser les articles d'information gui pourraient lui causer un certain préjudice. Le contexte est donc établi et l'i sotopie de l'entreprise multinationale (ÉCONOMISME+PRODUCTION) prédomine face à un salariat gui n'a gue très peu de voix au chapitre. De plus, le stimulus gui fait mémoriser, provient du double sens de STRIKE. En effet, STRIKE établit un pont entre l'article et la publicité. STRIKE admet deux isotopies, celle de la grève et celle contenant l'idée de faire une bonne affaire, de frapper un bon coup. La lutte est intense entre ceux gui partici pent à cet univers de 1'économisme. Ainsi, le jeu de mot euphorisant met les rieurs du côté de la compagnie, c'est à dire les consommateurs (de ce jeu). Il syntagmatise, par double lecture, un rapport textuel gui, axiologiguement, se trouve branché sur deux paradigmes opposés: Économisme / libéralisme socialisme production refus de production Mais en faisant appel justement à un sujet gui n'est ni le patronat ni 1'employé mais le consommateur du texte gui est aussi le consommateur-acheteur potentiel choisissant intérêt individuel, onparvient à occulter cette contradiction. Ainsi, par le biais d'un troisième terme, d'un système trinitaire gui est le nombre minimun permettant de fonder l'odre social, on légitime une domination récompensant le consommateur et victimisant le producteur. La domination s'installe dans l'euphorigue du système trinitaire valorisant le service au troisième terme alors gu'en fait il s'agit d'un rapport d'exploitation dualiste dont la compagnie profite à plein. L'économisme libé ral joue donc sur cette violence euphorigue reposant sur l'adjonction d'un troisième terme gui n'est gue la résolution économiste d'une aliénation dichotomisant tout un chacun en producteur et consommateur. Chacun, en effet,

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tente constamment d'échapper à la dysphorie productrice par l'euphorie consommatrice et essaye de forcer les autres à produire plus pour pouvoir consommer davantage. L'éco nomisme passe donc par la croyance en un troisième terme, en une troisième voie gui,fondamentalement, réinscrit; de manière permanente, le consensus social échappant ain si aux contradictions antagoniste grâce à cette double isotopie jouant sur le lien contextuel entre article de information et publicité. LES ARTICLES INFORMATIFS: LES PARADIGMES OCCULTÉS Contrairement à la publicité gui affiche les paradigmes euphorigues en promettant la consommation salvatrice et continue, les articles d'information, notamment guand ils envisagent les restrictions économigues nécessaires à la "bonne marche" des affaires, occultent les analogies trop dangereuses. Dans les articles d'information, le contexte "anecdotigue" doit disparaître, ce gui empêche la compréhension du nouveau, l'appréhension du com plexe et la mémorisation: La diète vote la loi contestée sur le parasitisme social en Pologne...Les polémiques à l'assemblée ont été axées sur la notion de "travail obligatoire" gui fait frémir de nombreux polonais. (Le V&VÛÀJI, mercredi 27 octobre 1982, p. 6 ) Universal military duty has advantages... They start to wonder how the Armed Forces can be used to help solve the nation's massive unemployment problem. ( The C-ùtizen, Saturday March 19 t h 1983, p.29). Dans un système comme dans l'autre, on propose de milita riser ceux gui ne travaillent pas en attendant (peutêtre) le moment de les utiliser contre les grévistes. Ce rapprochement d'attitudes autoritaires, face à des problèmes sociaux liés à l'emploi et à la production, permet d'aller au-delà des paradigmes antithétigues bien établis entre le "monde libre" et l'autre, entre la socié té libérale et la société socialiste. Elle permet de plus, de mesurer la coupure dans la rhétorique présentant des solutions similaires en Pologne et au Canada.

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Cette rhétorique souligne l'horreur de la situation en Pologne et présente, par contre, cette militarisation sous des jours attrayants au Canada: 'Young people fresh out of high school could benefit handsomely from the tra des training, the discipline and confidence, and the refinement of leadership qualities'. Une lecture rétablissant des isotopies similaires dans les deux textes (non travail — • service obligatoire à la société) permet dore d'aller au-delà des paradigmes antithétiques jugés immua bles (libéralisme/marxisme) et de prendre conscience de la logique et de la dureté de tout système quand le maté rialisme capitaliste ou stalinien prédominent. Mais, évidemment, ces deux textes sont éloignés dia chroniquement et linguistiquement. Le lectur, dans son quotidien, ne fait pas les rapprochements et continue de lire selon un contexte standard, selon deux isotopies profondes (libéralisme = positif; socialisme = négatif) traversant la presse. Il est d'ailleurs intéressant de voir que lorsqu'une situation similaire se présente en synchronie, des efforts particuliers sont entrepris pour que soient maintenus, dans leurs catégories respectives, les classèmes qui permettent d'interpréter n'importe quel article selon des valeurs antagonistes jouant dans un rapport externe à la société considérée, ce qui permet ainsi de renforcer la cohérence interne de celle-ci. A priori, il est pour le moins étonnant de voir que le fait que le gouvernement polonais interdise les syndicats ne tienne qu'un sixième d'une colonne en première page de The Citizen (Saturday October 9 t h 1982) alors que, moins d'un an auparavant (Friday December 18 th 1981), ce même journal consacrait des photos en couleur et les trois quarts de sa première page aux brutalités du gouvernement polonais face à la population. Usure de l'information dira-t-on. Besoin de renouveau. Non. Au départ, il semble pourtant que rien de particulièrement exception nel ne permette de reléguer,ce samedi 9 octobre, une information qui a l'avantage, d'habitude, de proposer une critique des régimes de l'est et de renforcer, donc, un dualisme nécessaire à la bonne marche des affaires. Toutefois , la réponse nous est fournie "par hasard" en page 6 du Citizen de la même date. On y voit, non pas un arti eie d'information, mais un quart de page de publicité payée par Ontario Confederation of University Faculty

435

Associations protestant contre le gouvernement de l'Ontario qui a supprimé le droit de négocier collectivement et qui, ainsi, suspend des droits inhérents à toute société démocratique. Voilà qui est révélateur. Soudainement les informations concernant les problèmes syndicaux en Pologne ne sont plus mis en valeur. Ceci évite de souligner synchroniquement que des solutions similaires existent de part et d'autre des rideaux de fer idéologiques. Les axes sémantiques communs et les niveaux isotopes du discours (coupure pouvoir / travail) sont donc occultés par une réduction des titres et des articles et par une mise en page qui ne permet pas de faire les rapprochements nécessaires. La "pureté" idéologique de la société libérale est donc sauve et les oppositions paradigmatiques libéralisme/socialisme sont maintenues. Aucune réor ganisation de l'univers n'aura lieu. LES INFORMATIONS CONTRADICTOIRES Mais cette pratique des antagonismes externes qui doit être maintenue en proposant des classâmes antithétiques liés à l'axe sématique ECONOMISME et servant à né gativiser les agents de production pour valoriser propriétaires et consommateurs s'évapore lorsqu'on entre dans les détails du fontionnement du système libéral interne . Alors, à partir du sème libéralisme qui lui même con stitue un axe sématiquese subdivisant en de multiples sè mes Án'¿¿at¿on/dé¿íatÁon,chÓmage/p¿eÁn empío-i etc., jusqu'aux détails dans la manière de conserver son capital, on s'a perçoit que le contradictoire fleurit: Diamonds, gold, silver,houses, offer the best bet against inflation (Ron Blum) Gold does not glitter as edge on inflation ( Dan McGillivray) ( 7Vie C¿tLze.n, January 12 t h 1980, p. 25) Ceci rapelle, sous une forme un peu modifiée, la rubrique Pfio and Con du magazine US New-i and Ü>o>i£d Repoit. Le lecteur non spécialiste est donc laissé sur sa faim. L'information basée sur le dualisme complet ne peut que rendre encore plus perplexes les lecteurs face aux questions traitées. Les experts eux mêmes ne sachant, sem-

436

blet-il, que faire, le lecteur n'a plus la sécurité de se sentir informé par un maître qui, d'ailleurs, peut se tromper, ou, à tout le moins, être éclairé par des discussions multiples et profondes. Il est seul face à un monde incomprenensible où le sommaire règne. Deux voies sont présentées comme également valides. L'individu est désorienté, il est poussé à se replier sur lui même et à se résigner. La vie est tout simplement un jeu, une loteire. Ces contradictions et informations décontextualisées en surface permettant de tout affirmer et n'importe quoi masquent les paradigmes profonds découverts plus haut et ouvrent sur 1'angoisse intense et le malaise latent de populations se raccrochant impulsivement à l'univers de l'euphorique, du jeu de mots publicitaire. L'INFORMATION ANECDOTIQUE Souvent les nouvelles ne peuvent être comprises à l'aide du seul article qui, au mieux, renvoit à un passé flou: 'La junte Argentine veut étouffer les scandales' . (Le Devoir jeudi 4 novembre 1982, p 6). Voilà un titre bien banal pour le lectur habitué depuis longtemps aux violations répétées des Droits de l'Homme par la junte militaire. Il connait même assezbienles 'mères de la place de mai' et il a peut-être vu le film Poité cLcipanu (M-ci-à^rcg) qui évoque une situation similaire dans le Chili du général Pinochet. Toutefois, les dernières lignes sont incompréhensibles pour la majorité des lecteurs: L'amiral Massera (condamné à vingt jours d'arrêts) avait dit récemment que Licio Gelli, grand Maître de la loge maçonnique P-2, objet d'un récent scandale en Italie, avait aidé les militaires argentins à lutter contre la guérilla. Il faudrait qu'on explique qui est Licio Gelli, ce que vient faire une pseudo loge maçonniques dans le problème argentin et se demander pourquoi l'amiral Massera fait ces révélations. Rien n'apparaît dans ce paragraphe de conclusion repris de l'agence Reuter et qui est, avant tout, ouverture sur le néant. Ce qui se passe, toutefois, au cours de l'article,

437

c'est qu'on réactive une isotopie paijò òud amejUccUn dictatc"vcal=

négatif / démocxatle.

£ibe.nale

= positif.

Mais aller au-delà de ces contenus qui donnent la signification globale de ce texte, indépendamment des mystères de l'anecdote, est une autre affaire. Il faudrait en effet dépasser cette isotopie qui permet d'interpréter selon les stéréotypes connus et aller chercher dans Gonzales-Mata (1979) par exemple, le curriculum vitae de ces gens, laliste des membres ou amis des membres du cette pseudo loge maçonnique, découvrir que des noms de hau tes personnalités américaines figurent parmi ces derniers On commencerait alors à saisir (à l'instar de ce que démontre la revue Tx-tcontinentat (1981) pour les amitiés entre l'URSS et la dictature argentine) les intérêts écono miques qui transgressent les tabous idéologiques assurant la cohérence interne d'une société telle que la racontent les articles de la presse ou les nouvelles de n'importe lequel des médias. Il est donc impossible de comprendre vraiment le anecdote ou de discerner ce qui est important de ce qui ne l'est pas. Le lecture consommateur ne fait que lire ce qu'il a déjà lu et selon une même isotopie, articles publicitaires et informatifs, tous pris dans le grand jeu de l'échange. Il interprète, s'il ne va pas fouiller dans les revues spécialisées, selon un fond de créance qui constitue son "identité", c'est à dire le fait qu'il est fondamentalement autre. En effet, le lecteur est mis en place par le désir de l'autre. Son aliénation est son identité baignat dans une auto-censure où ce qui fait problème est bien le mot auto lui même. CONCLUSION À partir du moment où l'on s'aperçoit, comme nous le révèle la presse canadienne de grande diffusion, que des contenus simples réapparaissent en tant que classèmesqui servent à définir le rapport à sens unique information/ consommation, alors un palier normalisé peut servir de point de référence contrastant avec diverses variations possibles. Riffaterre (1971), qui pourtant s'est consacré au cliché, aurait dû souligner que l'essentiel n'est pas dans le figé de la formule qui n'est qu'un indice de

438

vieillissement, mais bien dans la permanence de contenus gui peuvent être lexicalisés sous différentes formes ou être pris en charge par différents paliers de signification, jusgu'au palier du style. C'est ce que suggère H. G. Shands (1977:173): A feature difficult to explain in any system which supposes that basic language is learned in any comprehensive sense is that the speaker shows a remarkable facility in formulating the same meaning in any number of different ways and in inventing new ways of presenting old ideas. C'est ce gui se produit pour les articles de journaux "très divers" dont beaucoup sont fondés sur des événements, une actualité qui se renouvelle sans cesse, mais qui, à un niveau de contenu plus profond, rejoint les certitudes d'un univers axiologique quasi-immuable, fond de créance absolument essentiel pour faire du sens (Grivel, 1981) à partir du morcelé imposé par les détenteurs du pouvoir. C'est ce qu'exploite à fond la presse. Dès lors, à ce niveau doxique, les articles entretiennent un forte ressemblance, une quasi-synonymie, qui fait que le lecteur ne se perd jamais dans le disparate des événement mondiaux car il sait déjà ce qu'il faut en conclu re. La mémoire joue donc à ce niveau et non à celui des nouvelles disparaissant, dès le lendemain, dans un brouil. lard 'salutaire'. L'isotopie, en tant que continuité de sens surdéter mine l'anecdote ou ce qui est présenté comme tel, alors que le décontextualisé oblige à se relier à des paradigmes axiologiques connus. L'isotopie constitue ainsi un niveau censurant beaucoup plus efficace que les mensonges directs, que l'imposition de décisions arbitraires. Il s'agit d'un contenu fondamental qui joue comme substitut identitaire, sinon comme désir de l'autre en tant que tension vers la communauté, vers le trois, inscrite en chaque lecteur, en chaque rédacteur. 1984 de G. Orwell n'a jamais été une utopie. Département des Lettres françaises Université d'Ottawa Ottawa, Canada

439

RÉFÉRENCES Gonzalez-Mata (1979). L < p(c:C) |

FI

R9ure 3

586 Interpretative projections transform facts into images but they dont initiate a procedure. For this purpose a special instrument is necessary and we find this instrument to initiate a procedure in " n o r m s " : A norm n , which prescribes the behaviour a , can be symbolized by n(a). A norm can be a conditional o n e . For instance there is a norm " n ( a / b ) " with a condition " a " and a behaviour " b " . In the context of provocation it is a typical structure that the factual situation a is interpreted as the imaginative situation A , and a norm prescribes that in this situation A the reaction B has to be done. A 4 I

n(A/B)

B

p(a:A) I I

•

Figure 4

There is a certain obligation to perform B because in the case of nonperformance,ofiB, a sanction or punishment C is to be set. A n additional norm n^B/C) exists. A

*

n(A/B)

B

nfrB/C)

».C

I p(a:A) I I | a |

Figure 5

If a subject interprets the fact ' ' a " as the image " A " and if it doesn't comply with norm n ( A / B ) , it must take into account the punishment C . In order to comply to norm n(A/B), it is necessary to perform behaviour " b " . There are additional norms which refer to factual substrata such as a , b , c', for instance the norm n(a/B). The interpretative projections and the norms are two components of the procedure:

587

A

n(A/B)

».

+ I p(a:A) ' ' I a I

B

n(iB/C)

A I p(b:B) I I lb

C

Figure 6

T h e s t r u c t u r a l k e y o f t h e p r o v o c a t i v e p r o c e d u r e consists i n t h e t w o interpretations of the facts a and b . The p r o v o c a t i v e a c t i o n a c a n , h o w e v e r , be i n t e r p r e t e d n o t o n l y as A b u t a l s o as D . I n a s i m i l a r w a y t h e b e h a v i o u r b c a n n o t o n l y b e i n t e r p r e t e d as r e a c t i o n B b u t a l s o as t h e e v e n t E , w h i c h is a q u i t e d i f f e r e n t i m a g e t h a n r e a c t i o n B. T h e r e c a n b e d i f f e r e n c e s n o t o n l y o n t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i v e l e v e l b u t a l s o on t h e n o r m a t i v e l e v e l : In t h e c o n t e x t o f a c o u n t e r l e v e l o f i n t e r p r e t a t i v e p r o j e c t i o n s t h e r e can be also a norm w h i c h forbids a c t i o n E under c o n d i t i o n D: n C D / j E ) . A s e c o n d n o r m n ( E / F ) p r e s c r i b e s t h e p u n i s h m e n t F i n t h e case o f t h e i n e f f e c t i v i t y of t h e first norm. A • I p(a:A) I

0

n(A/B)

B f I p(b:B) I

n(iB/C)

»- C

0

1 i p(a:D) I

m • < p(b:E) I

* D

»

i i p(f:F) I

+ n(D/iE)

> E

* n(E/F)

F Figure 7

The interpretative projections p(a:A) and p(b:B) compete w i t h the interpretative projections p(a:D) and p(b:E). T h e q u e s t i o n is h o w t o i n f l u e n c e t h e a u d i t o r i u m a n d w h o w i l l b e t h e w i n n e r o f t h i s c o m p e t i t i o n . T h e a c c e p t a n c e o f t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i v e p r o j e c t i o n s is m o r e relevant than the e f f e c t i v î t y of norms. I f t h e c o u n t e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is v i c t o r i o u s , t h e r e a l m o t i v a t i o n o f t h e provocated subject differs from the c o l l e c t i v e b i n d i n g i m a g i n a t i o n . The

588

obligatory interpretations and norms are in this case the following:

HI

1

! > p(a:D)

' i p(f:F)

i p(b:E)

I

I

* D

HI

0

I

* n(D/iE)

* n(E/F)

> F Figure 8

The structure of provocation is directly connected with the change of paradigms concerning the field of imagination. A t the first step, the traditional paradigm of interpretation is stressed. But this paradigm changes at the next step. The provocated subject walks into the trap a l o n g the road of traditional interpretation and it awakes with the new and negative interpretation: A t I p(a:A) I

n(A/B) * I np(b:B) I

•

0 I

p(b':E) I E

n(E/F)

> F

Figure 9

The suggested interpretation p(a:A) is a deceptive one and holds only during the first situation. But there are no adequate follow ups. The first and deceptive interpretation remains isolated. A sign A refers to an object, for instance to the image A . W e can symbolize this semiotic reference by A

A

Figure 10

But the sign must be constituted. Therefore an interpretative projection is necessary a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h the factual substratum x is interpreted as a s i g n A concerning the image A .

A

+

589

>A

I p(x:4A) I I | x |

Figure 11

The preparation of a p r o v o c a t i v e procedure is characterized by different and d i v e r g e n t semiotic interpretations. For instance the fact x is interpreted as a s i g n for A . The fact y is interpreted in the same way a s A A , but the fact z is interpreted a s 4 D . In this situation we have divergent signs. The s i g n s 4 A are necessary to provoke the interpretation p(a:A) and the s i g n ^ D is used to legitimate the f o l l o w i n g counterinterpretation of p ( a : D ) . A

A

p(x:AA) I

p(y^A)

*

•

•

i

1

H

•

p(a:A) 1

I

•

p(z4D)

p(a:D)

I

I

* A

I > D Figure 12

The semiotic preparation of a provocation is a m b i v a l e n t . O n the one hand the d e c e p t i v e interpretation p ( a : A ) is prepared) on the other hand the official interpretation is p ( a : D ) . The semiotic legitimation can be a preliminary or a postliminary legitimation. The f o l l o w i n g example includes some d e c e p t i v e preliminary s i g n s A A and characteristic preliminary and postliminary si g n s ^ D .

590

A

A'

p(u:M)

p(v:&A)

•

H

p(a:A)

0

0

I

A

I

0

I

0 I

> D V - ' - ' - A - ' "Figure 13

The real consequences of a provocation must be distinguished from the imaginative consequences. Not only the interpretation of the fact " a " (as A or D) but also the interpretation of the other facts (b, c , d, e, f . . . ) can be accompanied by signs. There are norms concerning interpretative projections. We can symbolize this in the following way: " n ( p ) " or "n[p(a:A)J'.' Such a norm n can regulate the interpretation of the fact x as the signAA

This norm n can also be conditional, for instance Therefore the practical situation can be very complicated. From the theoretical side, however, it is possible to establish instruments which are adequate to the imaginative, normative and semiotic components of the situation. Every formalization breaks the immediate understanding, but it is the only way to computerize the problem and the alternatives for its solution. Such solutions are of course more technical onesj they are only elements for further considerations in the framework of moral and legal standards.

61 THE RESIDENTIAL LANDSCAPE AS A SYSTEM OF COMMUNICATION: SEMIOTIC APPROACH

A

Shelagh Liridsey, Robert Buchan, and James S. Duncan

A number of researchers have demonstrated that the meaning of both the i n t e r i o r and e x t e r i o r elements of housing are s o c i a l l y constructed and i s therefore broadly shared within a social world (such as a s u b - c l a s s or an ethnic group) (Duncan 1973; Duncan and Duncan 1980; Laumann and House 1970; Pratt 1981). Housing a l s o communicates beyond the bounds of the owner's social world but the meaning a t t r i b u t e d to i t may vary depending upon the social d i s tance between the owner's world and that of the outside observer (Duncan and Duncan 1980). Stated s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t l y , r e s i d e n t i a l a r t i f a c t s are interpreted i n everyday l i f e as i n d i c a t o r s of ident i t y , whether i t be social c l a s s , e t h n i c i t y , r e l i g i o n , or social rank (Rapoport 1980). What i s not c l e a r , however, about the social function of r e s i d e n t i a l a r t i f a c t s i s which ones are being used to convey meaning and whether the meaning i s s o c i a l l y shared. The semiotic approach to possessions in the home has shown that some are valued f o r t h e i r s e l f - r e f e r e n t i a l messages about, for example, the p a s t , other family members, or about s o c i a l s t a t u s (Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton 1981). These authors argued that, because of the meaning attached to p o s s e s s i o n s , the personal a r t i f a c t s had a s i g n function for the owner: they were s i g n i f i c a t i v e f o r them. Whether k i n , intimates, or f r i e n d s of those who valued the possessions shared the same meaning was not elaborated. Neither the evidence on the s o c i a l function of the dwelling (Kron 1983) nor those features thought to influence housing choice ( c f . Michelson 1977: Chapter 5) explain how semiosis is functioning with respect to r e s i d e n t i a l a r t i f a c t s . Residents of the dwelling may be conveying messages to those l i k e themselves and those outside t h e i r social group. Elements of the r e s i d e n t i a l landscape, i . e . , s i g n s e t s , may convey messages which are mutually understood w i t h i n a p a r t i c u l a r group. The social judgments may be s u f f i c i e n t l y congruent with respect to the r e s i d e n t i a l s i g n sets to claim that the r e s i d e n t i a l landscape i s communicative as well as s i g n i f i c a t i v e . A p i l o t study was conducted to discover which r e s i d e n t i a l a r t i f a c t s are used the most to convey messages, and to determine whether or not a s i g n i f i c a n t number of persons in the same s o c i a l group agree about the s o c i a l judgments they make from these a r t i f a c t s , i . e . , t h e i r meaning. In addition to the semiotic a n a l y s i s undertaken here, i t i s intended that the f i n d i n g s w i l l a l s o c o n t r i bute to the symbolic i n t e r a c t i o n i s t approach to the b u i l t environ-

592

ment: a theoretical perspective which i s rooted in the t r a d i t i o n of George Herbert Mead. In Mind, S e l f , and Society (1934), Mead d i s c u s s e s the social construction of meaning and the ensuing s i m i l a r i t y of group meaning. Agreement, as understood by Mead, may a l s o include congruency about elements in the r e s i d e n t i a l landscape.

Plate 1. Group A: Rural Enqlish Georgian S t y l e . Copyriaht @ 1981, Knapp Communications Corporation. Photographs courtesy of A r c h i t e c t u r a l Digest. Photography by Derry Moore. RESEARCH METHOD A sample of 50 middle c l a s s women with s i m i l a r income and educational background took part in a study conducted in Vancouver, B r i t i s h Columbia. Three homes were chosen from the monthly j o u r n a l , A r c h i t e c t u r a l Digest. These were a Rural English Georgian, a Contemporary C a l i f o r n i a n Stucco, and an East Coast Shingle (see Plates 1, 2, and 3). All of these were occupied by successful persons in the a r t s , with high incomes. Two of the houses were occupied by s i n g l e male owners and the t h i r d by a couple whose c h i l d r e n no longer reside at home. These houses were chosen because the s t y l e would be f a m i l i a r to the respondent but the house i t s e l f would not be. A group of four colour photographs for each home, i n c l u d i n g two i n t e r i o r and two e x t e r i o r , were used. Through

593

photo e l i c i t a t i o n , each p a r t i c i p a n t was encouraged to make judgments about the p e r s o n a l i t y , occupation, hobbies, and family s t a t u s of the occupants as suggested to them by features in the photographs. Since the m i d - s i x t i e s , anthropologists have used photo e l i c i t a t i o n . Krebs (1975: 284), in her d i s c u s s i o n on the technique, emphasizes that i t r e l i e s heavily on the theoretical o r i e n t a t i o n of l i n g u i s t i c s and ethnoscience. Cognizant of S o n t a g ' s approach to the photograph as frozen r e a l i t y and l i m i t e d by the bias of the photograph (1978), ethnographers are confident that the procedure provides r e l i a b l e s c i e n t i f i c t a n g i b i l i t y to the study of human behavior and social judgments ( C o l l i e r 1975).

Plate 2. Group B: Contemporary C a l i f o r n i a Stucco S t y l e . Cop.yr i q h t @ 1982, Knapp Communications Corporation. Photographs courtesy of Architectural Digest. Photography by Mary E. N i c h o l s . With as l i t t l e d i r e c t i o n as p o s s i b l e , p a r t i c i p a n t s made t h e i r own i n t e r p r e t a t i o n about the occupants. Each conversation was tape recorded in order to l i b e r a t e the interviewer from timeconsuming note-taking, and permit him to engage i n the conversation more f u l l y . Typical questions were: What features i n t h i s photograph suggest something to you about the owner's p r o f e s s i o n ? Could you elaborate on how that was suggested to you? What was the p e r s o n a l i t y of the person l i k e ? Each group of four photo-

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graphs was presented to the subjects separately. F i r s t the exteri o r shots from one group were shown and discussed, and then the i n t e r i o r shots from the same group.

Plate 3. Group C: American East Coast S t y l e . Copyright @ 1982, Knapp Communications Corporation. Photographs courtesy of A r c h i tectural Digest. Photography by Peter V i t a l e . The research procedure was refined during a pre-test in which four people were interviewed. This -ietermined how the photographs should be presented, the way the d i s c u s s i o n should be conducted, and how long to expect the conversation to take. One of the most important q u a l i t i e s of the interviews was that the participants were encouraged to follow their own stream of thought and to pursue tangents not d i r e c t l y related to the topics introduced by the interviewer. Reading the landscape i s not always a conscious process. To access the p a r t i c i p a n t s ' thoughts about the photos, they should be given the opportunity to free a s s o c i a t e . I f t h i s happens, new information can be gathered which had not previously been discovered. DATA ANALYSIS The f i r s t step in the data a n a l y s i s was the t r a n s c r i p t i o n from the tapes by two persons of the social judgments (themes) and

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the a r t i f a c t s (elements) the p a r t i c i p a n t s matched them with. Once the t r a n s c r i p t i o n s were complete, groupings of sub-themes for each house s t y l e became apparent. While these were u s u a l l y s t y l e s p e c i f i c , the cues used to make social judgments f e l l n a t u r a l l y into c e r t a i n categories, i . e . sign s e t s . The categories of elements for the e x t e r i o r are house, landscaping, and landscape objects, and for the i n t e r i o r they are house, f u r n i s h i n g s , and objects. For the ext e r i o r categories: house included such cues as architectural s t y l e and d e t a i l ; landscaping included types of t r e e s , shrubbery and t h e i r c o n d i t i o n ; and, landscape objects included movable a r t i f a c t s such as a ladder, statues, or c h a i r s . For the i n t e r i o r categ o r i e s : house included cues about architectural detail and l a y out; f u r n i s h i n g s included decor and s t y l e of f u r n i t u r e ; and, obj e c t s included a r t i f a c t s such as p a i n t i n g s , s t a t u e s , books, and flowers. A separate table f o r each of the themes (occupation, hobbies, p e r s o n a l i t y and family s t a t u s ) with t h e i r sub-themes was constructed. Each element category - house, landscaping, and landscape objects f o r the e x t e r i o r ; and house, f u r n i t u r e , and objects f o r the i n t e r i o r - was rank ordered on each table to see which was the most frequently used in each sub-theme. MOST USED SIGNIFIERS Table 1 shows how many times each element category ranked f i r s t f o r each theme i n each group of photographs, separately and combined. A strong pattern emergs. Exterior landscape objects and i n t e r i o r objects are used the most, followed by e x t e r i o r landscaping and f u r n i t u r e . The house i s only the most used element twice, and t h i s occurs only f o r e x t e r i o r photographs of the Rural E n g l i s h Georgian house. This may be because that house s t y l e i s more c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the neighbourhood in which the p a r t i c i p a n t s reside than were the other houses. The p a r t i c i p a n t s a l s o expressed an a f f i n i t y for the Rural E n g l i s h Georgian.

House Landscape Landscape Object

Group A 2*

1 1

Exterior Group B Group C 0 0 0 2 4* 2

ABC 2

3 7*

Interior House Furniture Objects * = Highest ranking

0 0 4*

0 1 3*

0 2 2

0 3 9*

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The data, then, s t r o n g l y suggest that people attach more s i g n i f i c a n c e to the smaller elements/objects in a r e s i d e n t i a l landscape when they read i t . Perhaps they assume that people generally have more control over such elements, and, therefore, those which are collected are more c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the owner. A l though t h i s r e s u l t would not be e s p e c i a l l y s u r p r i s i n g for households that have l i t t l e discretionary money for housing, for a sample o f middle- to upper-middle-income housewives the predominand use of smaller object cues i s s u r p r i s i n g . With increased housing choi ce, the importance of the house and i t s s t y l e might be expected to increase. Yet, these data suggest that the house i s not as important as the smaller objects for conspicuous consumption. This i s not, however, to suggest that the house and other large elements l i k e out-buiIdings (Group 2A) are unimportant s i g n i f i e r s . They are important and were frequently used in conjunction with smaller elements to develop a p r o f i l e of the houses' occupants. The r e s u l t s only suggest which category of elements or c l u s t e r of s i g n s are used the most in semiosis. CONSENSUS OF INTERPRETATION Table 2 d i s p l a y s which sub-themes had the highest percentage of mentions f o r the e x t e r i o r and i n t e r i o r photographs of each group. Overall there i s a strong consensus of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n among the p a r t i c i p a n t s with the mean values ranging between 59% to 86%. The scores a l s o indicate a higher degree o f consensus among the p a r t i c i p a n t s ' interpretation of the e x t e r i o r than of the i n t e r i o r . This may suggest that the social messages house owners wish to convey to the general public, i . e . those that may only view the e x t e r i o r , are much more consistent and readable than those in the i n t e r i o r . Viewers of the i n t e r i o r may be reading elements that convey several messages which describe a number of aspects of the owners' social p o s i t i o n and personal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . Consensus of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n would probably not be as consistent as the s t e r e o t y p i c ones of the e x t e r i o r . Another notable feature in Table 2 i s the differences between the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s for each group of photographs. For example, the owner of the house i l l u s t r a t e d in Plate 1 i s judged to be a casual and warm person who enjoys country farm a c t i v i t i e s and i n door c u l t u r a l hobbies, whereas the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the house represented in Plate 2 suggests that the owner i s an e g o t i s t i c a l person who enjoys entertaining and c o l l e c t i n g a r t - two d i s t i n c t l y d i f f e r e n t types of people. This difference and the high degree of consensus indicates that people do indeed read landscapes, and that the messages received are quite c o n s i s t e n t . Further, these messages are p r i m a r i l y being conveyed through the smaller landscape objects - cues which the actors have a great deal of control over and thus are capable of both a greater degree of personal exp r e s s i o n and a c o n s i s t e n t r e f e r e n t i a l i t y .

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Table 2.

Highest percentage of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n agreement

Theme Occupation

Exterior Sub-themes Percentage Agreement Photogroup A B C 90 64 100 Professional

Hobbies

Country farm

94

Outdoors Entertains Personali ty

Family type

Casual warm Re1 axed Egotistical Adult Residence Bachelor

Mean Percentage

41 82 56

84

81 60

76 84 86

61

84

I n t e r i o r Sub-themes Percentage Agreement Photogroup A B C 90 62 Professional 86 Writer Indoor Cultural Travels C o l l e c t s art Casual warm Relaxed Egotistical Contracted Family Bachelor

74 47 73 46

50

32

66

76

81

68

59

59

Although Table 2 indicates that the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s form d i s t i n c t p r o f i l e s of the perceived house owners, in some cases judgments made o f the e x t e r i o r and the i n t e r i o r photographs were not complementary. This was not a function of inaccurate social judgments, however, i t was a function of a real difference in messages between the i n t e r i o r and e x t e r i o r . For example, when interpreting Plate 3 one woman s a i d : 'These pictures d o n ' t go t o g e t h e r , ' and, for the same group, another s a i d : 'These are not c o n s i s t e n t with the outside photos.' The owner of the American East Coast s t y l e house is judged by several of the respondents to be providing cues on the e x t e r i o r which mismatched with those on the i n t e r i o r . The s o c i a l p r o f i l e developed for the owners of the Rural Engl i s h Georgian house i s that they are c a s u a l , warm people who enjoy country l i f e as well as indoor cultural a c t i v i t i e s . They are perceived as a professional household whose children had already l e f t home - an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which i s quite s i m i l a r with the public image of the actual owners, Roald Dahl and P a t r i c i a Neal. The accuracy of the reading of the other two owners - S y l v e s t e r Stallone (Plate 2) and Edward Albee (Plate 3) - was not quite so high as that f o r the occupants of the Georgian house. However, consistency rather than accuracy of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n was thought to be the i n d i c a t o r o f s e m i o s i s .

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SYNTAGMATIC AND PARADIGMATIC RELATIONSHIPS The presenca of syntagmatic and paradigmatic relationships in the responses of the participants was of secondary importance in t h i s p i l o t study. However, one example w i l l be given to indicate the type of connectedness between residential signs and t h e i r referents. When considering the occupation of the owner of the home represented i n Group A, one respondent said: 'For that size of home, I would say a professional, above average income, mainly because of today's real estate p r i c e s , the size of the home, and i f the straw i s there in Plate 1 GrouD A2, maybe there i s a pony there, and there again i t says above average income.' Figure 1 reveals the paradigmatic and syntagmatic relationships which are made in that statement. There are two sets of syntagmatic r e l a t i o n s h i p s . Figure 1. Example of syntagmatic and paradigmatic relationships in Plate 1. Today's real ^ / e s t a t e prices

Size of home

Above Professional «-Average Income •V

^Pony
M Har-5oSanim"; (2) phonetic similarity, which reflects an attempt to retain a greater or a lesser part of the sounds of the original name (with a marked preference for the initial and/or terminal ones, on the one hand, and for the consonants of the replaced name, on the other), on the further condition that a Hebrew word - existing, or at least possible - will ensue (and compare Forster's notion of "surface translation" (1970: 91) and the discussion of this phenomenon in Toury, 1980: 44-45). Thus, for instance, the names "Rosenfeld", "Rosowski", "Reis", "Barzowski", "Rozanski", "Rosenmann", "Reismann", "Rosenbach", "Rosenkopf", "ResnikoviS", "RiSik", and many-many others, were all replaced by the existing Hebrew monosyllable (which is also a stylistically marked element!) "Raz", whereas the names "Bernstein", "Ginzberg" and "Yaroslawski" were replaced by the non-existing though phonotactically possible "Baran", "Gazov" and "Yaros", respectively.^ THE HEBRAIZATION OF SURNAMES AS A CASE OF TRANSLATION For many linguists and philosophers of language, the very association of proper names qua proper names with translation would be unthinkable. There argumentation would essentially be as follows: "the meaning of a proper name is based on an ad hoc convention", for which reason it "has no generalising power and therefore cannot be applied productively", so that, in fact, "any name could be the translation" of any other name (Sciarone, 1967). Since, in other words, all proper names should, by virtue of the logico-semantic traits of the category itself, be conceived of as completely interchangeable. the claim is indeed that the association of proper names and translation is theoretically empty. Towards a Cultural-Semiotic Concept of Translation Even if this line of reasoning is logically valid, its validity is shaken once the perspective is opened up to include the circumstances under which proper names are both used - and substituted. For the main fault with the approach of those linguists and philosophers of language is not that it lacks in logic, but that it shuns the factors which are in a position to actually condition the interchangeability of names (cf. e.g. Neubert, 1973; Glaser, 1976; Zimmer, 1981; Ch. III). In fact, it is not difficult to show that both proper names and translation have undergone gross reductions within the logical approach, probably first and foremost for the sake of "neatness of presentation". Thus, its concept of proper name is completely dissociated from the existence of onomastic codes (cf. supra), whereas translation is conceived of as tantamount to the establish-

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ment of semantic, if not exclusively referential, interlingual relationships . At any rate, one thing that the present paper has clearly demonstrated, on the basis of one type of proper names, is far from confirming the claim made by the logically-oriented theoreticians. On the contrary, it appears that, at least under certain circumstances, namely when the practice of name substitution itself is a cultural institution, many regularities reveal themselves, so that what we do not get (or only marginally) is precisely that overall interchangeability of all names (or even those items which belong in one specific onomastic code) which those scholars are so keen on envisaging. Instead, we get a patterned section of the possible whole which is rule- (or, better still, norm-) governed. To be sure, what the case of the Hebraization of surnames turns out to be is an almost perfect example of translation according to the principles of a particular brand of translation theory, the cultural-semiotic one3 {Toury, in press), which, in turn, offers the best theoretical framework for its description and explanation (and cf. also Bven-Zohar, 1981a). The starting-point for any observation within such a theory, which is functional-relational in nature, is that a translation will be taken to be any utterance which is presented or regarded as such from the intrinsic point of view of the culture in which it is situated, on whatever grounds. Such a target-system-oriented approach is not only justified, but rather unavoidable, once the implications of the teleological nature of the process of translation (Toury, 1980s 15-17) are fully drawn. Accordingly, translations will be conceived of as produced first and foremost in the interests of the prospective receptor culture, and definitely not in the interests of the source entity, let alone the source culture/language, unless, of course - for purposes which are defined within the target system - these too form part of its interests (and cf. the application of these principles for the definition of "literary translation" in Toury, 1984). As we have already argued, the interests catered for by any act of surname substitution are also invariably those of the receptor culture. This in itself, however, is no sufficient justification for counting this type of transfer among the "family" (Toury, 1980s 18) of translations. In order to be able to do that, we must first check and see what the status of the replacing names in the receptor culture is and whether there is any justification for regarding them as translations on the basis of that status. The Status of the Hebraized Surnames as Translations Ve have already pointed out that, on the basis of the unique make-up of a great majority of the Hebraized surnames alone, the members of the emerging Hebrew culture in Eretz Yisrael tended to mark those names as derived entities, replacements of items of the surname type which belonged in another culture and language and had chronological as well as logical priority over them. This, of course,

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brings the Hebraized surnames rather close to the basic definition indeed, virtually any definition - of translations as semiotic entities. The association of these names with the notion of translation as it functioned within the receptor culture was even stronger than that, due to the fact that many of the characteristics of their surface representations (cf. supra) closely matched those of utterances of other text-types which were transferred across cultural/ linguistic boundaries and into the Hebrew culture, most notably those which were openly referred to as "translations" (to which cf. Toury, 1977; English abstract: Toury, 1980: 122-139). Being regarded as two-place predicates is no doubt characteristic of translational phenomena under any observation, in any theoretical framework. This means that the tentative marking of a targetculture entity necessarily entails not only the assumption that there actually is another entity of the primary status described above, but also that some observable relationships obtain between, the two, with an invariant on one level or more than one implied. In other words, from a cultural-semiotic point of view, entities which are regarded as translations, on whatever grounds, are conceived of as "functions which map target-language utterances, along with their position in the relevant target systems, on source-language utterances and their analogous position" (Toury, in press a: Section 3). And, indeed, in many of the cases, the members of the emerging native Hebrew culture could identify the "mapping functions" too, that is, the relationships between the present replacing and the absent replaced surnames, along with the features which were kept intact, and - by applying these functions to the Hebraized names reconstruct, in a reverse fashion, the original names which could have stood behind them; in full, or at least in part. The possibility of such a reconstruction, and of a "correct" one, at that, rested on shared knowledge as to the possible source languages and cultural paradigms, including a hypothetical order of their dominance as source languages/cultures in the period in question, the types of invariant that were preferred during the execution of the act of substitution, and, finally, the norms which governed the surface representations of the replacing surnames and which brought about shifts from "optimal" realization of that invariant, which would have been tantamount to the initial rate of "translatability" of the replaced names under those conditions. The reconstruction of all these items of cultural knowledge is of course part and parcel of any study of the Hebraization of surnames, as is the case with the cultural-semiotic study of any kind of translation. Little wonder then that the order of discovery and .justification procedures too, which were applied to the Hebraized surnames in the previous section, will be found to correspond entirely to that advocated for and justified in our "rationale for descriptive translation studies" established along the lines of the cultural-semiotic theory of translation (last version, so far: Toury, in press a). To conclude: it is my belief that not only has the descriptive-

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explanatory power of the cultural-semiotic theory of translation in accounting for a particular type of cross-cultural transfer been demonstrated, but new light has also been shed on the underlying theoretical framework itself, which is still struggling for recognition. The Porter Institute for Poetics and Semiotics Tel Aviv University Tel Aviv. Israel NOTES 1. For instance, in all two-name personal naming systems (i.e. those which consist of a first, or given name(s) and a surname, or their equivalents), the two members of the paradigmatic pair as well as their (syntagmatic) combination into the "full", or "official" name (regardless of the order of their occurrence in the combination), refer to two basic oppositions which they realize: +/- denoting a member of a family +/- denoting the membership in a family (cf. Blanár, 1969: 84-85). 2. Obviously, there was also a wide range of combinations of, or compromises between, these two basic alternatives; for instance, "Orinowski" — » "Ben-Or", "Fruchtmann" (or "Fruchter") — ^ "Perry" (in Hebrew,Jj3 and 53 are represented by the same grapheme), or "Schwartz" — » "Saxar" (in which case the phonetic similarity is to a mediating referential equivalent such as "Sxori"). 3. Semiotics of culture is conceived of (following Jurij Lotman and his Soviet colleagues) as that discipline which is designed to account for "all human activity (...) concerned with the processing, exchange and storage of information" within culture, where culture itself is taken to be the "functional correlation of different sign systems" at the disposal of a society and its individual members, which renders the production of all those situations that have communicational value for the community in question not merely possible, but first and foremost - significant (Lotman et al., 1975: 57). 4. It should be noted that it is not a factual existence (let alone the actual production) of a "source" entity and/or a set of socalled "translational relationships" which is necessary for the functional establishment of a "receptor" culture entity as a translation. It is only the assumption of their existence which serves as a defining factor from the vantage point of the "target? cultural system. And compare the special case of pseudotranslations where no factual source utterances can ever be produced (Toury, 1983; 1984: Section v ) . Analogously, there is always a possibility of the existence of "pseudo-Hebraized-surnames". REFERENCES Blanár, Vincent (1969). Das spezifisch Onomastische. In Hornung,

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1969, Is 81-87. Bourgeois-Gielen, H. (1969). La motivation dee changements de nom de famille en Belgique au XXe siècle et les dispositions légales en cette matière. In Hornung, 1969, II: 193-200. Even-Zohar, Itamar (1981). The emergence of a native Hebrew culture in Palestine: 1882-1948. Studies in Zionism 4: 167-184. (1981a). Translation theory today: A call for transfer theory. Poetics Today 2(4): 1-7. Förster, Leonard (1970). The Poet's Tongues: Multilingualism in Literature . London: Cambridge UP. Gläser, Hosemarie (1976). Zur Ubersetzbarkeit von Eigennamen. Linguistische Arbeitsberichte 15: 12-25. Hornung, Herwig H. (1969). (ed) 10. internationaler KongreBS für Namenforschung: Abhandlungen. Wiener Medizinischen Akademie. Lotman, J.M., Uspenskij, B.A., Ivanov, V.V., Toporov, V.N. and Pjatigorskij, A.M. C1975)- Theses on the semiotic study of cultures (as applied to Slavic texts). In The Tell-Tale Sign: A Survey of Semiotics. Thomas A. Sebeok (ed), 57-84. Lisse: Peter de Ridder. Neubert, Albrecht (1973). Name und Übersetzung. In Der Name in Sprache und Gesellschaft: Beitrage zur Theorie der Onomastik. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag. Nicolaisen, W.F.H. (1980). Onomastic dialects. American Speech 55(l): 36-45. Sciarone, Bondi (1967). Proper names and meaning. Studia Linguistica 21(2): 73-86. Toury, Gideon (1977). Translational Norms and Literary Translation into Hebrew. 1930-1945. Tel Aviv: The Porter Institute for Poetics and Semiotics, (in Hebrew) (1980). In Search of a Theory of Translation. Tel Aviv: The Porter Institute for Poetics and Semiotics. (1983). Pseudotranslation as a literary fact: The case of Papa Hamlet. Ha-sifrut/Literature 32: 63-68. (in Hebrew) (1984)." Translation, literary translation and pseudotranslation. Comparative Criticism 6: 73-85. (in press). Translation: A cultural-semiotic perspective. In Encyclopedic Dictionary of Semiotics. Thomas A. Sebeok (ed). Berlin: Mouton. (in press a). A rationale for descriptive translation studies. In The Manipulation of Literature: Studies in Literary Translation. Theo Hermans TidTT Croom Helm. Zimmer, Rudolf (1981). Probleme der Übersetzung formbetonter Sprache: Ein Beitrag zur Ubersetzungskritik. Tübingen: Niemeyer*

116 LA M E T A F O R A

Eleonora

IN B O R G E S

Traficante

N e l l a sua S t o r i a d e l l ' e t e r n i t à , J. L. Borges si riferisce a l l a m e t a f o r a e c e r c a n d o di d e f i n i r l a c r i t i c a es p l i c i t a m e n t e A r i s t o t e l e che l ' a v r e b b e f o n d a t a sulle cose e n o n sul l i n g u a g g i o . Per il f i l o s o f o , infatti, metafor i z z a r e è 'percepire b e n e le r e l a z i o n i di s o m i g l i a n z a ' (Poetica, 1 458 a) . 'Metafora è la t r a s p o s i z i o n e del nome di u n a c o s a ad u n ' a l t r a ' (Poetica, 1457 b) . Si t r a t t a dunque di a s s o c i a z i o n i c r e a t e tra n o m i e cose p a r t e n d o da s o m i g l i a n z e che, m a n i f e s t a t e in p a r o l e , si fondano nel r e f e r e n t e . Com 'è b e n s a p u t o , nel c o n t e s t o a r i s t o t e l i c o le c a t e g o r i e l i n g u i s t i c h e ed o n t o l o g i c h e si identificano. S e c o n d o il n o s t r o s c r i t t o r e invece i tropi s a r e b b e ro il r i s u l t a d o di u n a a t t i v i t à m e n t a l e che n o n p e r c e p i sce a n a l o g i e m a che solo combina p a r o l e . Q u e s t e sono, d^i ce, 'oggetti v e r b a l i , p u r i e i n d i p e n d e n t i come u n cristal^ lo o come u n anello d ' a r g e n t o ' . A f f e r m a : 'Qualche giorno si s c r i v e r à la s t o r i a d e l l a m e t a f o r a e s a p r e m o la verità e l ' e r r o r e che q u e s t e c o n g e t t u r e i m p l i c a n o ' . 1 È i n d u b b i o che q u e s t a s t o r i a è c o m i n c i a t a , e s s e n d o ben n o t a la p r o b l e m a t i z z a z i o n e d e l tema. Entro il contesto d e g l i studi s e m i o t i c i e r e t o r i c i è già u n luogo c o m u ne s o t t o l i n e a r e che l ' e g e m o n i a d e l l a m e t a f o r a , in u n a es t e t i c a d e l l a m i m e s i s e d e l l a s o m i g l i a n z a , cede o g g i il posto al p r i v i l e g i o d e l l a m e t o n i m i a , e s t e t i c a d e l l a trac^ eia, del c o n t a t t o , n e l l ' o r d i n e d e l l ' i n d e x e d e l l a contig u i t à . La m e t a f o r a , la a n a l o g i a , 'tropo dei t r o p i ' (Sojc h e r ) , 'figura d e l l e f i g u r e ' (Deguy) p a r e oggi s p i a z z a t a d a l l a m e t o n i m i a . Il r i f i u t o del c e n t r o c e n t r i s m o d e l l a me t a f o r a è s i g n i f i c a t i v o . R i c o r d i a m o p e r ò che R. J a k o b s o n , pur d e n u n c i a n d o q u e s t o suo ruolo c e n t r a l e n e g l i s t u d i lin g u i s t i c i , f i l o s o f i c i ed e s t e t i c i , a v e v a c o m u n q u e a f f e r m a to l ' e f f e t i v a s t r u t t u r a b i p o l a r e del l i n g u a g g i o . Più in là di p r i v i l e g i p r o b a b i l m e n t e e c c e s s i v i - t a n t o in u n senso come n e l l ' a l t r o - si p o t r e b b e p e n s a r e a l l a f u n z i o n e d e l l a m e t a f o r a c o m e ad u n m e c c a n i s m o e s s e n z i a l e n e l l a v i t a dei s e g n i , e p a r t i c o l a r m e n t e , del l i n g u a g g i o a r t i s t i c o . C'è da v e d e r e se è così per B o r g e s . N o n è poco quel che e in g i u o c o , se è v e r o che la m £ t a f o r a , s e c o n d o L a c a n , è v i n c o l a t a a l l ' e s s e r e , e la m e t o n i m i a invece a q u e l l o c h e è i n t e s o c o m e m a n q u e . Dovremm o r i c o r d a r e che per H e i d e g g e r la m e t a f o r a e s i s t e fonda-

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m e n t a l m e n t e n e l l a s t o r i a d e l l a m e t a f i s i c a . Ci si p o n e la d o m a n d a se p o t r e m m o t r a s c e n d e r e q u e s t a storia. F o r s e ci si d o v r à pur sempre r i m e t t e r e ad e s s a , anche aspirando dal suo i n t e r n o a s u p e r a r l a . R i p r e n d i a m o il filo b o r g i a n o che offre v a r i s p u n t i , n e l l ' a m b i g u i t à di u n a v i s i o n e d e l l a l e t t e r a t u r a ricca di i n t e r p r e t a z i o n i p o s s i b i l i . Per B o r g e s l'equazione s o g n o - m o r t e , ad e s e m p i o , è r i n n o v a b i l e permanentemente n e l l a s t o r i c i t à d e i ' d i s c o r s i , con i m m a g i n i solo in appar e n z a n u o v e che f i n i s c o n o per e s s e r e d e l l e ' t r i v i a l i t à ' , ' e t e r n i t à ' , la cui v i r t ù s t a r e b b e solo n e l l e p a r o l e , per sa u n a o r i g i n a r i a u n i t à e s s e n z i a l e . Chi sospetterebbe, si d o m a n d a lo s c r i t t o r e , che 'old r o c k i n g c h a i r ' nei b l u e s , è la m o r t e ? N e l l o s t e s s o m o d o com'è p o s s i b i l e inv e n t a r i a r e gli e l e m e n t i di una l i n g u a , anche così tutte le m e t a f o r e p o s s o n o r i d u r s i , s e c o n d o B o r g e s , ad u n n u m e ro l i m i t a t o - s o g n o / m o r t e , t e m p o / f i u m e , s t e l l e / o c c h i . For m u l e a r c h e t i p i c h e e m i l l e n a r i e s u l l e q u a l i r i t o r n a divol^ ta in v o l t a la l e t t e r a t u r a con v a r i a z i o n i l e g g e r e . 'For se la s t o r i a u n i v e r s a l e è la s t o r i a d e l l e d i v e r s e intona 2 zioni di a l c u n e m e t a f o r e ' . V e d i a m o d u n q u e c o m e la conc e z i o n e d e l l a m e t a f o r a t r a s c e n d e l ' i n t e r e s s e di u n semp l i c e tropo. Nel tempo dei tempi, in u n l i n g u a g g i o auror a l e , q u e l l e ' a f f i n i t à intime e n e c e s s a r i e ' furono avv e r t i t e e s c r i t t e ; li il s i g n i f i c a t o si uni al s i g n i f i c a n t e per p o i r i m a n e r e i m p l i c i t o , q u a s i p e r s o e c a n c e l lato. La m e t a f o r a si o r i g i n e r e b b e s e m p r e da q u e s t a p r i m a u n i o n e che s t a b i l i u n ' a n a l o g i a , n o n d i p e n d e n t e dalle cose. L ' u n i v e r s o di B o r g e s è s c r i t t u r a l e , t e s t u a l e , ed è q u e s t o il s i g n i f i c a t o d e l l a sua b i b l i o t e c a . Il m o n d o eli_ b r o , s c r i t t u r a , t e s t o , non e s i s t e n d o r e f e r e n t i extrates t u a l i . Le a l l u s i o n i di B o r g e s a f i l o s o f i come B e r k e l e y c o n f e r m a n o lo statuto di i r r e a l t à di q u e s t a l e t t e r a t u r a , a m b i t o i m m a t e r i a l e che r i a s s u m e e s o s t i t u i s c e l'universo. 'Il m o n d o , s e c o n d o M a l l a r m é , e s i s t e p e r u n l i b r o ; secondo B l o y , s i a m o v e r s i c o l i o p a r o l e o l e t t e r e di u n libro m a g i c o , e q u e l libro i n c e s s a n t e è l ' u n i c a cosa che c'è al m o n d o , m e g l i o d e t t o , è il m o n d o ' . 3 La s c r i t u r a b o r g i a n a è in p r i n c i p i o c a r a t t e r i z z a t a da u n a ' e n u m e r a z i o n e c a o t i c a ' , che d i s e g n a uno spazio d o v e le p a r o l e si s u c c e d o n o l'una a l l ' a l t r a con u n vincolo che è solo q u e l l o d e l l a p r o s s i m i t à i m m e d i a t a , il r a £ p o r t o c o n t i g u o . S a r e m m o a l l o r a di p i e n o nello s t a t u t o d e l l a m e t o n i m i a , in q u e l l ' e s t e t i c a d e l l ' i n d e x già a c c e n n a t a . È f o r s e l ' e s t e t i c a di u n tempo e di u n ' a t m o s f e r a oggi c o n s i d e r a t a p o s t - m o d e r n a , a s s u n t a da B o r g e s come barocca: 'Io d i r e i che B a r o c c o è q u e l l o s t i l e che d e l i b e r a t a m e n t e e s a u r i s c e le sue p o s s i b i l i t à e che c o n f i n a c o l l a sua prò p i a c a r i c a t u r a . . . io d i r e i che è b a r o c c o il p e r i o d o finéi le di o g n i a r t e , q u a n d o e s i b i s c e e d i l a p i d a i suoi mezzi'.4

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Come dilapidare i propri mezzi? Con parole. 'Quando si av vicina la fine e non rimangono immagini del ricordo, solo ci sono parole. Parole, parole spiazzate e mutilate, parole di altri, e stata la povera elemosina che gli lasciarono le ore e i secoli'5 Fine, rovina, simulacro, pa rola quest'ultima ben conosciuta dallo scrittore argentino . Non a caso uno dei suoi più assidui lettori e stato M. Foucault, che cita nelle Parole e le cose un noto bra no di Borges con una singolarissima e stupefacente classificazione attribuita ad una enciclopedia cinese. La con secuzione di parole senza possibili gerarchie nella loro continuità eterogenea va molto più in la di un semplice tratto di stile, e forse rivela la capacità di segnare i limiti del pensiero occidentale nella misura in cui manca l'ordine e il centro che regola il tutto. La mostruosità che circola nell'enumerazione, pensa Foucault, consiste nel fatto che il luogo di incontro de_l le bestie e pure in rovine, 'le eterotopie, frequenti in Borges, inquietano perche minano segretamente il linguaggio, fermano le parole in se stesse, sfidano ognipo£ sibilità di grammatica, scatenano i miti'. E in che altro posto si troverebbero simili animali se non nelle pa gine che li trascrivono, nella voce immateriale che pronuncia la loro enumerazione, voce che, conviene precisar lo, in Borges no è più quella dell'autore? Egli infatti si sente fondamentalmente lettore, e come tale, voce assieme ed altre, riunite in uno spirito intemporale ed irrrper sonale. Giustapposizioni in una sfera segnata da una pro fonda irrealtà, un non spazio, o lo spazio per eccellenza: il linguaggio. Linguaggio che si disintende dei refe renti esterni e ne prende il posto. Linguaggio, scrittura, parole, voce. Lo scrittore si annulla di fronte all' universo, il mondo, che e libro, col riverbero delle parole, nell'enunciazione. Neil'Aleph, il narratore (Borges, anche personaggio del racconto) mentre si affanna per trasmettere la esperienza di infinitudine della letteratura (insistentemente egli aspira nei sui scritti al Testo totale) dichia ra: 'Arrivo ora ali'inefabile centro del mio racconto ... ' È pero un centro che mentre si problematizza si annulla. 'Il problema centrale e irrisolubile'. Quel che rimane nel centro vuoto, decentrato, sono solo parole: scrittura. 6 Pensiamo però che questa scrittura nel suo continuo slittamento di significanti non annulla i significati, an che se lo si potrebbe credere negli spostamenti metonimici. Ma non è forse così. Nelle rovine metonimiche, le citazioni, i testi sovrapposti, la somiglianza viene sviata, ed è ciò che mette in crisi l'analogia, ma e proprio

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sulla base di questo permanente scivolare del significante dove irrompe la metafora (se vogliamo riprendere Lacan, occuparebbe il posto di una fondamentale mancanza. Il senso emerge, si produce dal non-senso). Si deve dire che l'universo testuale borgiano, accu mulativo ed inconcluso non si comprende se non nello svol gimento di un piano congetturale dove le definizioni e 1' univocità sono asseriti. Si tratterà della concezione di un mondo mitico, aurorale. A n c h e s e l a succesione di parole -letteratura- non sembra altro che il loro eterno ripetersi nell'enumerazione caotica coli'allargarsi del linguaggio nelle associazioni infinite, c'é pure una realta -letteratura- in uno spazio Altro. Ricreare il già letto, scritto e riscritto: qui si iscrive la letteratura, non però senza un modello irrinunciabile, un 'originale 1 per so, irrimediabilmente disperso attraverso le ombre, nelle ombre di ombre, nei succedanei, nelle degradazione delle copie (concetti molto cari a Borges, presentinella lezione degli gnostici). Secondo lo scrittore, i versi, la scrittura, sono la realtà. Infatti egli afferma l'autonomia dell'universo di finzione, al quale riconosce autosufficenza ma anche originarietà, cercando quello che è la Parola. Ed è questa una realta capace di eludere costantemente il 'siste ma di parole umane'. Quando Borges evoca la tigre (quella della sua Biblioteca), 7 la pone come immagine di ombre e di simboli, di tropi. Una seconda tigre si rivela pure una finzione, un simulacro. Aspira ancora ad una terza: Un tercer tigre buscaremos. Este Será como los otros una forma De mi sueño, un sistema de palabras Humanas y no el tigre vertebrado Que, más allá de las mitologías, Pisa la tierra. Bien lo sé, pero algo Me impone esta aventura indefinida. Insensata y antigua, y persevero En buscar por el tiempo de la tarde El otro tigre, el que no está en el verso. Questa terza tigre, nella cui ricerca il poeta persevera nel tempo del tramonto, è un assoluto? Borges non si definisce mai. È un reale/irreale, inaccessibile, presente e assente in un processo di illimitata semiosi ove sempre si apre una dimensione duplice. Da un punto di vista tradizionale, della letteratura come conoscenza, centrata nella 'creazione' -nella quale Borges non crede- si identifica con la meta del poeta. Neil'Aleph questo affannoso tendere è chiaramente esplicitato. Lo

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dimostra la relazione che soggiace come modello all'orga nizzazione del testo: la associazione Borges/Dante, Beatriz Viterbo/Beatrice. 'Il sindrome Beatrice si impone come dominante. Poeti che cercano assoluti intravvisti e persi. Letteratura'. 'Cogli artifici dell'oximoron, ilrac conto parodizza, punto per punto, la traiettoria di Dante nella traiettoria del narratore-personaggio (Borges) che opera già come il suo simulacro: morte di Beatrice, persecuzione delle sue tracce come indizi della sua essenza, invocazione a Beatrice e discesa agli inferi con un Virgilio-Daneri come guida'.8 Coli1 insistenza nel rimaneggio di brani, frammenti e materiali dispersi preesistenti in una sterminata inter testualità, Borges allude permanentemente ad un obbietti vo sfuggente, sempre differito. Questo reale al tempo stesso irreale, letteratura, è scrittura che cresce e si espande nelle copie e nelle ombre, mentre si degrada e prostituisce (Beatrice Viterbo). E quel che rimane nell' interminabile sostituzione di realtà dove non ci sono creatori, dato che Borges esclude nel testo vie 'originali', ma non originarie. Infat ti, c'era nel tempo aurorale dell'Altro, pure letteratura. 'Perchè nel principio della letteratura e'e il mito, ed anche nella fine'. Ed e in questo sfondo non degradato dove le metafore per prima volta emergono. Non è 10 spazio logico dei sillogismi ma quello delle favole e del sogno. 'I sogni costituiscono le attività estetiche più antiche di tutte1. Espressione di emozione intensa, a metà cammino tra il sogno e la vigilia, troviamo la poe sia. 'La radice del linguaggio è irrazionale e di carattere magico. Il danese che articolava il nome di Thor o 11 sassone che articolava il nome di Thunor non sapeva se queste parole significavano il dio del tuono o lo strepito che segue al lampo. La poesia vuole tornare all' antica magia 1 . 9 Nell'universo che è il testo, c'è dunque quest'altra dimensione dove l'antica metafora ebbe luogo. E poesia, letteratura, forse Borges stesso nell1identificazio ne mai avuta. C'è una autentica letteratura come c'è un autentico Aleph nascosto nell' architettura di una moschea del Cairo. Dipartimento di Filosofia Università Nazionale di Rosario Rosario, Argentina NOTE 1.

Borges, Jorge L. (1936:384) Historia de la eternidad. En Obras Completas. Buenos Aires: Emecé.

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2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Borges, Jorge L. (1952:638). Otras inquisiciones. In Obras Completas. Buenos Aires: Emecé. Borges, Jorge L. (1952:716). Otras inquisiciones. In Obras Completas. Buenos Aires: Emecé. Borges, Jorge L. (1935:291). Pròlogo a la edición de 1954 de Historia universal de la infamia. In Obras Completas. Buenos Aires : Emecé. Borges, Jorge L. (1949:544). El Aleph. In Obras Completas . Bueonos Aires: Emecé. Milano, L a u r a (1984:63). Borges: El Aleph como relato desmitificador. In Revista de Estetica, n 3. Buenos Aires : Cayc. Borges, Jorge L. (1960: 824-825). El otro tigre in E l Hacedor. I n Obras Completas. Buenos Aires: Emecé. Milano, Laura (1984:65). Borges: El Aleph como relato desmitificador. In Revista de Estética, n 3. Buenos Aires: Cayc. Borges, Jorge L. (1964: 858). Prologo a El Otro, El Mismo. In Obras Completas. Buenos Aires: Emecé.

RIFERIMENTI Borges, Jorge Luis (1974). Obras Completas. Buenos Aires: Emecë. Genette, Gerard (1964). L a littérature selon Borges. In Jorge Luis Borges. Paris: L'Herne. Lacan~¡ Jacques (198Ö) . Escritos. Buenos Aires : Siglo Veintiuno. Milano, Laura (1984). Borges: El Aleph como relato desmitificador. In Revista de Estética, n 3. Buenos Aires : Cayc.

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THE I M A G E T H E M E AS A N ISOTOPIE LEVEL: THE S H A D O W IMAGE T H E M E IN T.S. ELIOT'S THE W A S T E LAND AND THE HOLLOW M E N

Sinikka T u o h i m a a

The p r o b l e m of interpretation is m o r e difficult in p o e t r y t h a n in m u s i c a n d t h e v i s u a l a r t s b e c a u s e t h e linguistic signs of poetry have a symbolic relation to their object, h o w e v e r m u c h the object is understood as an object of reality (icon) or as a non-verbal m e n t a l picture. The relation b e t w e e n the sign and its object is a contract w h o s e stipulations are open. The dictionary m e a n i n g s chase each other and they are constantly under the determination of the m e a n i n g process. The s y m b o l i z a t i o n process is duplicated in lyric because in h e metaphorical process the denotative m e a n i n g v a r i e s w i t h the connotative. These also c o m e to have relations to each other. J e a n Cohen says that the p o e m is like a great m e t a p h o r w h i c h is based on change of m e a n i n g (changement de sens) (1966:215-216). This background m a k e s the study of meaning in poetry look like a n i m p o s sible task. However, the difficulties of m e a n i n g in p o e t r y as a c o n s c i o u s p l a y w h o s e g o a l is t o p r o d u c e aesthetic satisfaction by revealing h i d d e n isotopies (isotopie). T h i s is the w a y A.J. G r e i m a s sees literature. The revealing of isotopie is simultaneously relevation of the m e a n i n g a n d conception of a poem (1980:116). Isotopie is a redundant group of s e m a n t i c categories w h i c h whose help a text can be read as a coherent whole (Greimas 1980:292). The hierarchic w h o l e n e s s of m e a n i n g s produces an isotopie message. The contexts situated one w i t h i n the other shape a hierarchy and together a m e s s a g e is an entity of m e a n i n g (Greimas 1980:84-87). T h e m a t i s m is one level of a lyrical text w h i c h m a y form isotopie. Isotopie can b e f o r m e d on the basis of any abstract structure or the genre w h i c h acts as a frame. G r e i m a s talks about isotopie t h é m a t i q u e t h a t m a n i f e s t s itself on the deep level (1979:198). T h e c e n t r a l p o s i t i o n o f t h e i m a g e in a p o e m f o r c e the reader to study the m e a n i n g of i m a g e s first. Images are structural e l e m e n t s of a p o e m and carry its meaning. T h e i m a g e is t h e c e n t r e w h e r e t h e p o e m ' s a c t i o n s t a k e place. In poetry everything m u s t be expressed by

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images, while in prose narrative structure and action replace imagery. The lyric draws attention to the sign itself, whereas in pardigmatic prose the attention is focused on the referent. Therefore most of the levels of deep structure are also found in imagery. As a sign the image has at least double dimensions. As a sign it stands in relation to the sender's (the poet's) code signal and to the receiver's (the reader's) decoded message. On the other hand the image as a sign has a relationship to its object (referent) which is not the mental picture of the poet or the reader nor any other object of the outside world although all of these are present in the process of meaning. The object of the image is the icon of the f ictive world created by the poem. Thus it could be said that the poem is itself its object. In peirceam (Peirce) terms the image has iconic relation to itself. Poets are inclined to repeat their most important images and especially their symbols. The repeated images thus form an isotopical level. When the images include central ideas and meanings common to a group of poems the entity of images can be called an image theme. Image themes may act as a code of the worldview of poems when they reflect something of relations between the self of the poem and himself and between the self of the poem and himself and between the self of the poem and the world. As a researcher in the lyric I have been interested in finding the structural element in lyric counterpart to the plot prose which organizes the text. In my study I have seen the repeated image as a structuring element in the mosaic of a poem. Repeated images together form the image theme. It may be seen as a foregrounding element against its context. Image then seems to be more important than plot as iterpreter because it manifests the theme, and sometimes also directs the theme of an individual poem or even an entire oeuvre. I have constructed the concept image theme in my doctoral thesis on Reflection Symbolism in the Poetry of Eeva-Liisa Manner. My work brings out how reflection symbolism is manifested in certain image themes and how it expresses the code of the world-view of the poetry of Manner. The entity of works (oeuvre) must be studied when image themes are selected. The basis of choice can be, for example, a word that represents the image, like shadow or any other word that means the same. Equivalent images are collected in groups of their own. To make the selection one must study the structure of the image. Then the interpretants of individual poems are

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solved by close-reading analysis. Thereafter also the cultural connotations of a poem must be studied especially if the text includes allusions. As it is not possible to set out the results of my doctoral thesis on image themes within the present context, I have chosen for an application of my theory one image theme from T.S. Eliot which, as I hope, will show my method. The shadow image theme is important both in The Waste Land and in The Hollow Men. Eliot uses the shadow image as ambiguity and plays on most meanings of the word shadow, always overriding them. For example, the first poem of the Waste Land (The burial of the dead) uses the shadow image in both euphoric and dysphoric meaning. There is shadow under this red rock, (Come in under the shadow of this red rock), And I will show you something diffrent from either. Your shadow at morning striding behind you Or your shadow at evening rising to meet you; I will show you fear in a handful of dust. The former two shadow images are shades of the red rock which shelter and protect from sunshine. Their quality is euphoric. The two latter are shadows of a man, they are independent of their object which they can stride behind or rise to meet. Those shadows are like double personalities. As in the Doppelganger theme, they may be the souls or the other personalities of a man. The poem includes the implicit idea that a man's own shadow is dangerous, but even more dangerous is the fear that is "in a handful of dust." The Hollow Men poem is divided into five poems. The lines are short and laconism is increased because every line begins with a capital letter (like John Donne's lines) independently of former punctuation marks. Much variation is used, even direct repetition. The fifth poem is the last and most important for an interpretation of the poem. Here we Prickly Here we At five

go round the prickly pear pear prickly pear go round the prickly pear o'clock in he morning.

Between the idea And the reality Between the motion

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A n d the act Falls the Shadow For Thine is the Kingdom Between the conception A n d the creation , Between the emotion A n d the response Falls the Shadow Life is very long Between the desire A n d the spasm, Between the potency A n d the existence b e t w e e n the essence A n d the d e s c e n t Falls the Shadow For Thine is the Kingdom For thine is Life is For Thine is the T h i s is the way This is the w a y This is the w a y N o t w i t h a bang

the the the but

w o r l d ends w o r l d ends w o r l d ends a whimper.

T h e structure of the fifth p o e m is interesting; it b e g i n s a n d ends in w e l l - k n o w n nursery r h y m e (while y o u read t h e t e x t y o u c a n even "hear" the melody). The p o e m starts in the m o r n i n g "At five o'clock in the morning" a n d e n d s w i t h t h e e n d of t h e w o r l d . B e t w e e n t h e m s t a n d s life. Three stanzas include abstract philosophical reflection. The center of these is the shadow image. T h e structure of The H o l l o w M e n is strongly binaric. The contrast g r o w s b e t w e e n life a n d earth. In the initial stanzas there are an abundance of images t h a t e x p r e s s t h e d y i n g of m a n a n d t h e w o r l d . M e n w h o are like d e a d m e n are described as "hollow men," "the s t u f f e d men," "the empty men," a n d "the stone images." The w o r l d is described as "the t w i l i g h t kingdom," "the v a l l e y of dying star," "the d e a d land," "the h o l l o w valley," "this b r o k e n jaw of o u r lost kingdom" a n d "this last of m e e t i n g places." Life as the contrast of death d o e s n o t m a n i f e s t i t s e l f in t h e i m a g e s o f t h e p o e m b u t it is strongly latent in the i m a g e s of death. To the category of earth belong also the images "shape w i t h o u t form," "paralysed force," shade w i t h o u t colour" a n d

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"gesture without motion." They come close to the shadow image which in the fifth poem is situated between those opposites which form the binaric and triadicic essence of life. The opposites of the poem are: idea/reality, motion/act, conception/creation, emotion/response, desire/spasm, potency/existence, essence/descent. These opposites are not situated under the main opposition life/death but all belong to life because of its binaric essence. The main symbol of the poem is shadow, which is dysphoric. It includes qualifications of dizziness, it covers, shades, weakens and exhausts. Thus the shadow image symbolizes exactly that essence which makes life like death. The shadow prohibits clearness and direct contact. It makes for disharmony. The poem has many cultural connotations. One of them is the Holy Bible (allusion: For Thine is the 1 Kingdom), the other is the straw doll of Guy Fawkes Day (the sub-heading: A penny for the Old Guy and the image "Headpiece filled with straw"). One of the allusions is the nursery rhyme at the beginning and the end of the fifth poem. Guy Fawkes1 straw doll seems to be a symbol of the vanity of man. It is difficult to know if the biblical allusion, from the Lord's Prayer, is ironic or whether it expresses hope as it is usually interpreted as doing. The former interpretation seems to be in harmony with the hopeless atmosphere that grows from the stylistic opposition of metaphysical reflection and the nursery rhyme. The shadow image theme manifests in The Waste Land and The Hollow Men the theme of estrangement which acts as an isotopie level of the poem. Department of Literature Tampere University Tampere, Finland REFERENCES Cohen, Jean. (1966). Structure du langage poetique. Paris: Flammarion. Eliot, T.S The Complete Poems and Plays of T.S. Eliot. London. Greimas, A.J. (1979). Semiotique. Dictionaire raisonne de la theorie du langage. Paris: Hachette. (1966). Semantique Structurale. Paris:Larousse. 1980). Structuraalista semantiikkaa. Translated. Eero Tarasti. Tampere.

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LA SEMIOTIQUE DU ÇONHEUR: LES EFFETS SEMANTIQUES DE STYLE DANS LES POEMES DE JOSIANE GEORGE

Sirkka-Liisa Tuominen

Au Fil des Heures, plaquette de poèmes de Josiane George, parut en 19 7 7 sous les auspices de la Réunion Art et Poésie de Touraine, en Indre-et-Loire. La Vallée de la Loire où les rois de France des XVe et XVIe siècles, de Charles VII à Henri III, avaient leur Cour pendant la saison estivale, est réputée pour ses nombreaux et magnifiques châteaux ainsi que pour la douceur de sa nature. Le nom même de la Vallée de la Loire, vallée royale en été, regorge de soleil, de jardins et de vins. En lisant les poèmes de Josiane George, l'intellect s'imbibe de senteurs des jardins et de verdure: les fleurs, les oiseaux et les papillons, meme s'ils ne peuvent pas tous être considérés comme poèmes-paysages car la plus grande partie de l'oeuvre consiste en poèmes traitant de divers individus, sont en tant que poèmes dédiés tour à tour aux enfants, au mari, au père, à la mère, au beau-père, aux petit enfants ainsi qu'aux amis de la famille et de l'auteur. Plusieurs poèmes sont, outre la dédicace, datés. L'un des six enfants de René et Josiane George, Sylvain, l'architecte, morut à l'âge de 2 5 ans dans l'accident de voiture. - 'Il y a avait du verglas sur la route en matin de 9 février' (George 1983) - et bien que de nombreaux poèmes sont écrits avant cette date, entre 1954 et 1976, c'est précisément cette tragédie qui donna son impulsion déterminante à l'oeuvre de notre poétesse. C'est seulement après cette mort tragique du fils que les poèmes furent assemblés, anciens et nouveaux confondus, et qu'une véritable oeuvre poétique tant sur le plan pratique que sur le plan esthétique put voir le jour. L'oeuvre, tout naturellement, comprend deux parties: Au Fil des Heures et Les Heures Sombres. Cette dichotomie rappelle par ailleurs Les Contemplations de Victor Hugo

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en tant qu'intertexte ou que subtexte (cf. Lahdelma, 19 82: 105), de même que le sujet extérieur à l'oeuvre, la mort du fils. La fille ainée de Victor Hugo se noya à 20 ans avec son jeune mari à Villequiers. Le chagrin de père fut immense. En 1856, c'est à dire 13 ans après la mort de Léopoldine, parut le recueil de Victor Hugo, Les Contemplations, qui est divisé en deux parties: Autrefois et Aujourd'hui. Dans la première partie, le poète décrit l'enfance de Leopoldine, et dans la second partie apparaissent des poèmes écrits postérieurment à la mort de celle-ci. Comme allusion littéraire, Les Contemplations projettent un lourd manteau d'obscurité, ainsi qu'un rayon lumineux s'élevant à travers la contemplation vers les cieux, sur l'oeuvre poétique de Josiane George, oeuvre qui reflète dans sa légèreté, dans sa simplicité et dirait-on même sa naïvité des poèmes respirant le soleil et la sérénité de l'âme. Dans la préface, l'auteur prévint que: 'Je porte en moi depuis l'enfance, le désir d'experimer avec les mots "en habits de fête": les joies, les émotions, les bonheurs, mais aussi les souffrances que la vie dispense.' Les poèmes de Josiane George semble être traditionnels tant par leur forme que par les sentiments qu'ils provoquent chez le lecteur. L'interprétant externe de texte travaille en faveur du sentiment poétique. Les poèmes sont relativement courts et répartis sur une page seulement en général; ils sont divisés en vers et en strophes , possèdent un certain schéma rythmique et fréquemment des rimes utilisées dans un contexte de vers libres', certains d'entre eux sont meme écrits entièrement dans une mesure fixe. Tous les poèmes ont un titre, en tant que marque sémiotique un indice, donc un signe renvoyant au texte du poème. (Cf. Ojala, 19 82: 52; Peirce, 1934 V: 32*+). Pour employer la terminologie de Riffaterre, le titre peut également être dans de nombreux cas considéré comme un double signe (double sign) étant donné qu'il peut avoir un contenu qui se réfère soit à la réalité extérieure du poème, soit au poème même ou aussi à la tradition poétique (Riffaterre, 19 83: 130). On pourra considérer également comme un indice l'habitude de Josiane George de diviser les poèmes de son livre en deux parties à la manière de Victor Hugo dans ses Contemplations, ainsi que la mort d'un enfant déjà adulte qui est l'objet extérieur à l'oeuvre. Le livre en lui-même apparait donc comme un monument commémoratif.

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La lecture des poèmes de Josiane George apparaît comme relativement facile et s.imple, les indices univoques de ceux-ci, tels les dédicaces - A Sylvain, a mon mari, à ma mère, à mes amis - ou les dates - mars 1954, 26 avril 1975 - indiquent au lecteur le rapport dinterprétant tout en délimitant et focalisant l'horizon d'interprétation. (Cf. Toivonen, 1981 : 60; Peirce, 1934 V: 325). En plus des dédicaces et des dates, les indications bibliographiques du recueil de poèmes fonctionnent également comme un indice. L'éditeur est la Société Art et Poésie de Touraine, dont le siège est à Tours, centre de la Vallée de la Loire et de ses monuments et chateaux historiques. Outre le rapport d'interprétant externe et le rapport d'indice, la cohésion sémantique des poèmes de Josiane George contribue à donner aux textes une impression de simplicité et de naturel. Les quatre pôles du carré semantique, les différentes isotopies (Greimas Courtés, 19 79: 197), ne prennent pas forme au sein de même poème, ce qui montre la naïvité et l'absence de strates. Les poèmes de Josiane George sont poétiques dans le pur sens du mot, c'est-à-dire que si nous partons du principe que le poème est un produit littéraire obéissant à un schéma rythmique court ou à une versification ou quelque chose de comparable a une versification, et faisant naître dans le lecteur une certaine sensation ou idée, alors le poème lyrique ne peut par lui-même décrire un changement d'état. Vu de l'axe thymique (Greimas - Courtés, 1979: 396; Greimas, 1982: 27), le poème ne contient que des traits euphoriques, et si nous considérons seulement la deuxième partie de l'oeuvre, des traits dysphoriques, ici présentés par euphémismes. Le poème ne devient esthétiquement parlant une oeuvre d'art que lorsque les deux parties sont simultanément présentes à l'esprit du lecteur. Alors cependant apparaissent au premier plan Le Temps du Bonheur ainsi que les traits qui participent à ce Temps du Bonheur comme le printemps, la croissance des plantes, les papillons, les fleurs, les oiseaux, la proximité et la solidarité des membres de la famille et du cercle des amis. Dans la partie intitulée Les Heures Sombres est présentée la négation des traits appartenant au Temps du Bonheur; des lors ces traits soulignent leur rôle dans la formation du bonheur et réitèrent au niveau sémiotique la même information qui fait partie du bonheur. On reconnaît là un trait tout particulier à

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l'oeuvre de Josiane George, qui utilise le vocabulaire du bonheur même pour traiter du chagrin. Le sujet du poème intitulé Poésie, datant de la periode du Bonheur, consiste en les sentiments et pensées de la mère qui se promène en compagnie de son fils dans les bois au début du printemps. Comme interprétant, comme idée à laquelle le signe donne naissance, et qui fournit au lecteur un comparaison avec les autres poèmes, on trouve le printemps, en tant a la fois que mot et concept. Poésie est un interprétant lexèmatique, un double signe, qui renvoie aux autres poèmes et à la poésie en général, tout particulièrement par l'intermédiaire de cette métaphore personnificative dans laquelle 'les violettes chantent le printemps'.

POÉSIE! A Sylvain. Nous allions ce jour-là Tous les deux dans les bois ! ...Pas encor de printemps Plus tout h fait d'hiver L'air que nous respirons Sentait le renouveau Une brume légère, Echarpe arachnéenne, Enveloppait l'étang Au-dessus des roseaux Où tu lançais des pierres Effrayant les oiseaux! Tu faisais de tes pieds Craquer les feuilles sèches Faisait mille remarques Sur le temps, sur les bêtes, Tu n'agaçais un tseu De briser le silence! Je pensais tristement: "Mon fils n'est pas poète" Lorsque prenant ma main Tu dis rêveusement : "Ecoute les violettes, Elles chantent le printemps!" Mars 1954.

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L ' anormalité, 1 1 agrammaticalité est toujours un signe qui oblige le lecteur à chercher les deux dépendances du mot. Dans ce texte le chant de la violette 'propulse le coeur vers les nues', projette le texte du niveau de la description au temps éphémère de l'expérience unique représenté par le poème. La sémiotique littéraire est toujours liée dans le texte aux mots. Les mots et la ponctuation deviennent les 'légisignes'. Les beaux-arts et la musique sont susceptibles d'utiliser des 'qualisignes' et 'sinsignes', et sont donc indépendants de la connaissance de la langue. L'icône retransmise par l'intermédiaire du poème Poésie crée un paysage idyllique. ^—

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Dans l'analyse sémiotique du texte, la connexion des mots est un des facteurs limitants d'une langue à l'autre. Les mots et les expressions, en tant que légisignes, sont ici lies au système linguistique du français, et meme retournés, ils sont avec la ponctuation des légisignes, de type général, et requièrent pour etre compris et appréhendés un certain mode d'existence. Dans un contexte poétique, le texte artistique lui-meme est un 'sinsigne' ou particulier, tout particulièrement en tant qu'existant et représentant de ce qu'il est (Ojala, 1982: Ojala, 5.7.1983; Ducrot-Todorov, 1972: 138; Peirce, 19 32 II). Comme 'qualisigne' du poème, qui indique sa qualité, on peut considérer l'état de légèreté printanière et proche de l'enfance que la mère ressent en se promenant dans le parc avec son fils, ce meme état où la violette "chante", où nait la musique, ambiance imprégnée de poésie: Avec Verlaine, on peut dire De la musique avant tout chose et pour cela préféré l'Impair plus vague et plus saluble dans l'air sans rien en lui qui pèse on qui pose Du point de vue de l'iconisme, le poème a une très forte cohés ion. L'état bienheureux et poetique se concrétise dans un paysage poétique, l'hyperonyme (P.ex. Enkvist, 1975: 43) le plus périphérique - le paysage du début du printemps - renferme tous les détails jusqu'à l'air pur. Le topos est une idylle: un parc, ou bois, avec un étang aux oiseaux, des roseaux, une légère brume qui flotte sur l'étang, et des fleurs, toujours des fleurs. Le sujet consiste en les sentiments de la mère ainsi que son état de bonheur auquel appartient aussi la paix, que l'on retrouve particulièrement clairement dans le poème dédié au mari de notre poétesse, Sérénité Crépusculaire. Le moment calme et statique est un état heureux vers lequel on doit tendre: 'tu m'engaçais un peu De briser le silence.'' Le bonheur apparaît également dans le fait que l'enfant agace en faisant craquer les feuilles sèches et par toutes ses réflexions, mais c'est agacement n'est pas très fortement ressenti par la mère. Parmi ces petits agacements, on trouve les allées et venues du petit garçon, 1'effraiement des oiseaux à son approche; ces petits dérangements

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en tant que moments heureux sont décrits par exemple dans le poème Ton Premier Chagrin, où l'enfant pleure du fait que l'oiseau effarouché s'envoie, ainsi que dans le poème Cerf-volant dans lequel le jouet, à la fin, s'échappe. Tous ces petits dérangements et insignifiants déboires sont précisément des traits de bonheur dans la poésie de Josiane George. Ces petits agacements et énervements font partie du meme sème nucléaire que les petites vapeurs, les brumes légères, le petit enfant en train de grandir, le printemps et les événements de cette saison. A l'aide d'un rapport hypérotactile, on réduit le printemps et l'enfant à un sémème qualificatif, de telle sorte que le sème 'petit' voit s'adjoindre ce qui débute et ce qui croit. La petitesse et le 'petit mais croissant' font partie du sème de l'état de bonheur. Parallèlement au poème Poésie surgissent de la partie postérieure à la mort Plus Jamais et Souvenance. Comme indice du poème Plus Jamais figurent les journées de la vie de Sylvain du 8 Avril 1959 au 9 Février 19 76; Souvenance est daté de Mars 1976 et dédié 20 ans plus tard à Sylvain.

SOUVENANCE A Sylvain, vingt ans plus tard. Nous n'irons plus jamais Tous les deux dans les bois... Le bruit des feuilles mortes Réveillera pour moi Le souvenir très doux D'un tout petit enfant Oui écoutait chanter Les douces violettes Je chercherai en vain Au-delà des roseaux L'ombre d'un pur visage Fuyant au fil de l'eau Et la brume légère Tissera longuement Pour mon coeur douloureux IJn suaire tout blanc

L'oiseau qu'il aimait tant Chantera sur trois notes La mélodie joyeuse Et cent fois répétée, Oui faisait dans sa gorge Monter des rires fous Et enchantait mon âme De chaleur et de paix Les saisons passeront Lentement, une à une Enveloppant d'oubli Sa jeunesse brisée Tandis qu'au fond de moi Brûleront les regrets... Nous n'irons plus jamais Tous les deux dans les bois. Mars 1976.

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PLUS JAMAIS... Il y aura des violettes Désolées d'être solitaires A u pied du vieux mur de pierres Il y aura les pâquerettes Dont tu faisais des bouquets Ronds De ta m a i n de petit garçon Il y aura les primevères Etoilées en tache de miel Sur la nappe de gazon Puis les narcisses odorants Les tulipes que tu aimais Et leurs calices de vermeil Où je déposerai Avec la rosée du matin De larmes de sang Et par-dessus tout cela Il y aura: ironique Et triomphant Un grand soleil Eblouissant 1 Et tu ne verras, plus jamais, Plus jamais "le printemps".

Sylvain, 8 Avril 1950-9 Février 1976.

Plus Jamais est, selon les termes de Riffaterre, un signe double, un interprétant textuel, qui se réfère à la mort d'une manière particulièrement forte.

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Le Sylvain du poème Poésie disait que les violettes chantaient le printemps; celles de Plus Jamais sont dispersées auprès d'un vieux mur de pierres et il est dit du printemps, l'interprétant du poème Poésie que: Tu ne verras plus jamais, plus jamais, 'le printemps'. Comme il a été indiqué plus haut, à l'intérieur des poèmes de Josiane George, aucun tournant décisif n'est pris. Les événements sont le sujet extérieur du poème, qui ne décrit qu'une atmosphère tour à tour triste ou gaie. C'est alors précisément le parallélisme des poèmes, divisés en deux sections se complétant, qui donne forme à la totalité poétique et aux dimensions du carré sémantique. Ce facteur même de la structure est lié au sème du bonheur, de même que le statisme est l'un des traits caractéristiques du moment de bonheur. L'indice du poème Souvenance, '20 ans plus tard', de même que tout le contenu sémantique de celui-ci, renvoie justement à Poésie. L'unité et le rapprochement appartiennent au sème du bonheur et le poème tout empreint de bonheur commence par les vers suivants: 'Nous irons ce jour la tous les deux dans le bois...'. Le poème des Heures Sombres débute par: 'Nous n'irons plus jamais tous les deux dans les bois...'. Comme 1'intertexte les deux poèmes on pourrait entendre les vers d'une vieille chanson enfantine: 'Nous n'irons plus au bois, les lauriers sont coupés.'' La négation, en particulier plus jamais, renvoit très clairement à la mort. Le texte, cependant, ne mentionne pas une seule fois la mort de Sylvain. Après les feuilles sèches de Poésie appraissent les feuilles mortes, l'ombre du visage pur s'enfuie de l'étang aux roseaux et la brume légère trame son linceul qui fait lui aussi partie du sème de la mort. Le sujet ce rapportant à ce sème est la jeunesse interrompue mais on retrouve également un trait typique renvoyant à la vie: l'oubli. La proximité de l'enfant, et la proximité tout court, l'expérience commune sont des traits caractéristiques du sème du bonheur. Dans un poème dédié à son mari, l'état statique comme trait du bonheur est présent. Autrement dit le bonheur existe tant que tu es toi, que je me sens bien ainsi, que nous partageons la joie et le fait d'être ensemble ainsi que les passions, tout ceci participe à cet état de bonheur, mais principalement reste la tendresse infinie.

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Le rire de mes yeux illumine les tiens Ignorons le passé Ce soir nous appartient tu es là... Je suis bien La paix et la tranquillité fonctionnent comme interprétants du poème, comme il est déjà indiqué dans le titre: Sérénité Crépusculaire. Mais il s'agit là encore d'une caractéristique de la poésie de Josiane George: la poétesse décrit un instant unique. Autrement dit, dans un même poème, elle ne décrit pas 'l'attente enflammée, la rencontre extraordinaire et la séparation empreinte de tristesse'. Mais lorsque l'on dispose d'une perspective assez large, comme dans le poème Toute une Vie, dont l'indice est, tel un défi, 3 0 années de vie commune, il apparait que nous avons passé ensemble des journées entières d'attendre, des semaines de souffrance, des mois d'erreur et de compréhension, des années de croissance ensemble, c'est-à-dire tout une période de notre vie durant laquelle nous nous sommes aimés. A part les petits ennuis, les courtes séparations, les amoureux de Josiane George ne sont séparés que quelques jours, ce qui pourrait encore être une marque appartenant au sème du bonheur, comme la petite lueur de l'enfant avançant sur un sentier. Cela implique des rapprochements et des séparations, mais en somme, la route est commune et la connaissance commune fait partie du sème du bonheur. Département des Arts Université de Tampere Tampere, Finland REFERENCES Ducrot, Oswald et Todorov, Tzvetan (1972). Dictionnaire Encyclopédique des Sciences du Langage. Paris. Ducrot, Oswald et Todorov, Tzvetan (1972). Dictionnaire Encyclopédique des Sciences du Langage. Paris: Seuil. Enkvist, Nils Erik (1973). Tekstilingvistiikan peruskasitteitâ. Jyvâskyla: Gaudeamus.

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George, Josiane (1977). Au Fil des Heures. Les Sables-d'Olonne: Pinsion. (Discussion avec Josiane George, Eugène Bizeau, Doyen d'Art et Poésie de Touraine, et l'auteur dans l'Exposition de Réunion d'Art et Poésie de Touraine à la Bibliothèque de ville à Tour Décembre 19 78. (1983). Les lettres de Josiane George à l'auteur le 2. Juin 1983 et le 12. Novembre 19 83. Greimas, A.J. et Courtes, J. (1979). Sémiotique: Dictionnaire Raisonné de la Théorie du Langage. Langue-Linguistique-Communication. Collection dirigée par Bernard Quemada. Paris: Hachette Université. Greimas, A.J. (1982). Olemisen modalisoinnista. Pariisin semioottisen koulukunnan esseitä. Toimittanut Eero Tarasti. Jyväskylän yliopisto. Taidekasvatus. Julkaisu 6. Lahdelma, Tuomo (1 982). Subtekstisyys. Kirjallisuus ja tiede.' Juhlakirja Professor Emeritus Aatos Ojalalle vuonna 1982. Jyväskylä Studies in the Arts 17. English summaries. Ojala, Aatos (1982). Johdatus tekstin teoriaan. Jyväskylän yliopiston kirjallisuuden laitos. Monisteita 7. (1983). "The Peircean Notion of the 'Index' in the Semiotic Analyses of Texts". Papers on the 3rd Annual Meeting of the Semiotic Society of Finland and on The 2nd International Congress on Musical Semiotics. Co-organizers Gino Stefani (Bologna) and Eero Tarasti (Jyväskylä) at the University of Jyväskylä, Finland 5-7 July, 1983. Peirce, C.S. (1932 et 19 34). Collected Papers. Vol.11 (1932). Elements of Logic. Vol V (1934). Pragmatism and Pragmaticism. Ed. C. Hartshorne and P.Weiss. Third Printing 1965. Cambridge: Harward. Riffaterre, Michael (1983). Sémiotique de la Poesie. Traduit de l'anglais par Jean-Jagues Thomas. Titre originai: Semiotics of Poetry 1978. Paris: Seuil. Toivonen, Pirjo-Maija (1981). Johdatus Kirjallisuuden semiotiikkaan. Jyväskylän yliopiston kirjallisuuden laitos. Monisteita 16.

119 B I O L O G I C A L S Y S T E M S , SIGN P R O C E S S E S AND THE

OBSERVER

T h u r e von U e x k Q l l Martin Krampen Preamble T h a t science is a n t h r o p o c e n t r i e

and

adultomorph

In the a p p l i c a t i o n of s e m i o t i c s to the s c i e n c e s of n a t u r e - e s p e c i a l l y in the s e m i o t i c s of the life s c i e n c e s w h i c h s t u d i e s the g e n e s i s and d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of l i ving f o r m s u n d e r the a s p e c t of sign p r o d u c t i o n and sign e x c h a n g e - one p r o b l e m is of utmost i m p o r t a n c e : it is the semiotic f u n c t i o n of the o b s e r v i n g s e m i o t i c i a n or s c i e n t i s t . In t h i s c o n t e x t we often r e a d or a s s e r t , for e x a m p l e , that two d y n a m i c s y s t e m s e x c h a n g e i n f o r m a t i o n . T h i s is p o s t u l a t e d to m e a n that this e x c h a n g e is c a r r i e d out by signs or, m o r e s p e c i f i c a l l y , by s i g n a l s of a code. D o e s t h i s m e a n that w i t h o u t the i n t r u s i o n of any o b s e r ver or w i t h o u t m o d e r n s e m i o t i c s having b e e n d e v e l o p e d by a h u m a n being like P e i r c e the two s y s t e m s e x c h a n g e a c tually signals or have a l w a y s e x c h a n g e d s i g n a l s even b e fore i n f o r m a t i o n theory w a s i n v e n t e d ? Or is this p a r lance a m e t a p h o r - p e r h a p s our m o s t a d v a n c e d , m o d e r n and for our p u r p o s e s m o s t s a t i s f a c t o r y m e t a p h o r p r o j e c t i n g our m u s i n g s a b o u t life onto the inner w a l l of that b u b b l e , the i n d i v i d u a l U m w e l t (J. von Uexkilll, 19B3) surrounding each one of us? Iiihat is an o b s e r v e r l o o k i n g at, w h e n he o b s e r v e s a b u m b l e - b e e p o l l i n a t i n g a s n a p d r a g o n ? Are the two l i v i n g b e i n g s "really out there" or are they and their " o u t t h e r e n e s s " just a c a t e g o r y of our n e r v o u s s y s t e m 1 s a c t i v i t y ? Is our space the same as a b i r d ' s space, or is it s p e c i f i c to our species? Is our time also the time of the snail or the d a y - f l y ? Iiihat do we m e a n when we talk a b o u t the " e v o l u t i o n of a s p e c i e s " ? Iiihat are we s a y i n g when we p r o n o u n c e the w o r d "Pliocene" or the p h r a s e " h i g h e s t d i v i s i o n of the tertiary p e r i o d " ? M o r e o v e r - why do c h i l d r e n have an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t c o n c e p t i o n of the w o r l d (Piaget, 1926/1963) than a d u l t s and s c i e n t i s t s ? H e r e a c o n v e r s a t i o n with J U I L L (7 1/2 years) r e p o r t e d by P i a g e t (1963, p . 2 0 0 ) : Is a lizard a l i v e ? - Y e s . - A nsil? - JV£. - A f l o w e r ? No. - A tree? - JVtj. Is the sun alive? - Y e s . - W h y ? B e c a u s e it m o v e s when it h a s to (parce que quand il faut CI) il m a r c h e ) . - Are c l o u d s alive? - Y e s , b e c a u s e they m o v e and then they hit ( i l s m a r c h e n t , p u i s ils t a p e n t ) . - Iiihat do they hit7 - T h e y m a k e the t h u n d e r when it

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-ra 1 nB. - Is the moon alive? - Yea, becauBe it moves (elle marche). - The fire? - Yea, because it crackles. Is the wind alive? - Yes, because on a uiindy day it's cold, it's alive because it moves (il bouge). - A stream? - Yea, because it is aluiays going faster. - A mountain? - No, because it's always in the same place (elle reste toujours debout). - A motor? - Yes, because it moves," etc. It mould seem then that the scientific observer and the semiotician not only have an anthropocentric but also an adultomorph conception of the world and of life. It is for this reason that the semiotic function of the observer 1B the key problem in applying semiotics to the natural sciences. If tiie study in the spirit of Piaget's psychogenetic epistemology the development of signs in children ue hope to get closer to the possibilities and limits of the human observer. For all he does and knows has undergone the ontogenetic process common to the members of the human species and reflects the stages of this process. We will show that the study of the literature on the ontogenesis of semiosis in children reveils two different aspects which are at first sight contradictory: one school of thought (Piaget, Brunei-) applies semiosis to the cognitive processes of perception, imagination and conceptualization. From this application the e m e r gence of the three wellknown sign aspects results in the sequence index, icon, symbol (corresponding to the Peircean categories "secondness", "firstness" and "thirdness" - in that order). The other approach (Freud, Dinnicott) applies semiosis to the affective development of the child from his initial unity with the mother to a self-sufficient personality. This results in another sequence of emerging sign aspects, namely icon, index, symbol (corresponding to "firstness", "secondness" and "thirdnesB" in Peirce). Whether the two sequences are contradictory or nested one into the other remains a topic of discussion. Literature Piaget, J. La representation du monde chez 1'enfant Paris: Alcan, 1926. English translation: Iomilnson,J. and A. The child's conception of the world. Paterson, New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1963. UexkClll, Th. von (Ed.) Jakob von Uexkiill's "The theory of meaning". 5emioti"ci 1982, £»2-1 (special issue).

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S e m i o t i c s w i t h o u t m y t h o l o g y , the d e l u s i o n simplicity of b i o l o g i c a l sign p r o c e s s e s T h u r e von

about

Uexküll

1. L i n g u i s t i c s and b i o s e m l o t i c B Let me start with a c i t a t i o n : N i e t z s c h e w r o t e : "We alone have i n v e n t e d cause, s u c c e s s i v i t y , r e c i p r o c i t y , r e a l i t y , c o m p u l s i o n , n u m b e r , lau, f r e e d o m , g r o u n d , p u r p o s e ; and if we feign and p r o j e c t this world of signs as something by "itself" ( " a n - s i c h " ) into things, then we b e h a v e a g a i n as we have a l w a y s done, namely m y t h o l o g i cally." ( J e n s e i t s von Gut und Böse) If we don't want to r e p e a t t h i s m i s t a k e w i t h signs, we m u B t c a r e f u l l y e x a m i n e its n a t u r e . Ulhat are s i g n s and from where do they c o m e ? We learn from s e m i o t i c s that signs, a c c o r d i n g to P e i r c e , have a t r i a d i c s t r u c t u r e or a c c o r d i n g to S a u s s u r e , a dyadic o n e . T h e s e are d o u b t l e s s i m p o r t a n t i n f o r m a t i o n s a b o u t " c o n n e c t i n g p a t t e r n s " (Bateson, 1982), but we r e m a i n i g n o r a n t about the r e a s o n of these a r r a n g e m e n t s , the m e a n i n g of the d i f f e r e n c e of the two s t a t e m e n t s and the o r i g i n of the p h e n o m e n a w h i c h we call " s i g n s " . Just a c c e p t i n g the a u t h o r i t y of the two f a t h e r s of s e m i o t i c s m a y be s u f f i c i e n t if we w a n t to find o u r way from one p l a c e to a n o t h e r in the w e l l k n o w n l a n d s c a p e of l i n g u i s t i c s where we have a sign system at hand w h i c h is to be a n a l y s e d . But we are left a l o n e in the case of int e r a c t i o n s b e t w e e n living b e i n g s in b i o l o g y w h e r e we have to f i n d out w h e t h e r these i n t e r a c t i o n s are g u i d e d by sign s y s t e m s and if so, how these sign s y s t e m s may look like. In s i t u a t i o n s of this k i n d we m u s t ask q u e s t i o n s d i f f e r e n t from those in l i n g u i s t i c s . F i r s t of all we are c o n f r o n t e d w i t h the p r o b l e m of the m e a n i n g of living in an a n t h r o p o m o r p h i c and a d u l t o m o r p h i c w o r l d for an o b s e r v e r who w a n t s to o b s e r v e sign p r o c e s s e s in n o n - h u m a n systems, e . g . in c y t o l o g y b e t ween c e l l s of a c e l l - c u l t u r e , in m e d i c i n e b e t w e e n agent and host, in botany b e t w e e n p l a n t s or in zoology b e t w e e n a n i m a l s in free n a t u r e . T h i s l e a d s v e r y soon to a second p r o b l e m , the one about the o r i g i n and the e v o l u t i o n of s i g n s in the course of the p h y l o g e n e t i c and o n t o g e n e t i c h i s t o r i e s of l i f e . 2. The o b s e r v e r - p r o b l e m in the l i g h t of s e m i o t i c s Let u s b e g i n w i t h the first p r o b l e m . The f i r s t exp e r i e n c e of a b i o l o g i s t who w a n t s to examine n o n - h u m a n sign p r o c e s s e s is the p e c u l i a r i t y of h i s s i t u a t i o n .

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T h i s s i t u a t i o n a s k s for at least t h r e e w i t n e s s e s in order to get an a d e q u a t e d e s c r i p t i o n : the two p a r t i c i p a n t s of the o b s e r v e d i n t e r a c t i o n and the o b s e r v e r . T h e s e t h r e e w i t n e s s e s m a y give their t e s t i m o n i a l s in d i f f e r e n t sign s y s t e m s of uihich e v e r y one k n o w s o n l y his o w n . The o b s e r v e r m u s t translate t h e s e t e s t i m o n i a l s into his own sign system a n d in doing so, he m u s t f i n d out the r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n the d i f f e r e n t s y s t e m s . A p r e r e q u i s i t for t h i s job is an e x a m i n a t i o n of h i s own sign system, i t s o r i g i n and its d e v e l o p m e n t . O n l y so he can learn w h a t the term "sign" m e a n s in g e n e r a l , how signs o r i g i n a t e a n d how h i s sign system m a y be r e l a t e d to other ones. Here we are c o n f r o n t e d with a bulk of d i f f e r e n t and d i f f i c u l t q u e s t i o n s from w h i c h I w a n t to e x a m i n e one more c l o s e l y . It c o m e s up with the e v i d e n c e of a queer fact: the f a c t t h a t o u r signs have two d i f f e r e n t and at first sight c o n t r a r y qualities: they have c o g n i t i v e or r a t i o n a l a n d a f f e c t i v e or e m o t i o n a l q u a l i t i e s or a s p e c t s . I think t h a t t h i s s t a t e m e n t may be true not only for hum a n signs, b u t for the signs of all l i v i n g b e i n g s . F r o m t h e s e two a s p e c t s only the c o g n i t i v e one has been e x a m i n e d in i t s g e n e t i c d i m e n s i o n s by P i a g e t in p a i n s t a k i n g and c o n s e q u e n t r e s e a r c h . To him we owe a theory a b o u t the g e n e s i s of c o g n i t i o n and the c o g n i t i v e a s p e c t of h u m a n s i g n s . The a f f e c t i v e a s p e c t of s i g n s has been o n l y an o b j e c t of p e r i p h e r a l i n t e r e s t in p s y c h o a n a l y t i c r e s e a r c h . There e x i s t s - to my k n o w l e d g e no a t t e m p t to c o n s t r u c t a theory w h i c h c o u l d c o m p l e m e n t P i a g e t 1 s d o c t r i n e . B e s i d e s there e x i s t s a general gap in our k n o w l e d g e a b o u t the c o n n e c t i o n s b e t w e e n the c o g n i tive and the a f f e c t i v e aspects of h u m a n e v o l u t i o n in dev e l o p m e n t a l p s y c h o l o g y (Ciompi, 1 9 8 2 ) . M y i n t e r e s t in the e m o t i o n a l a s p e c t of s i g n s o r i g i n a t e s from my s u s p i c i o n that the p r o b l e m of o r i g i n of signs in g e n e r a l as well a s that of the r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n d i f f e r e n t sign s y s t e m s - and t h i s m e a n s also the p r o b l e m of the o b s e r v e r - can be a p p r o a c h e d w i t h a hope of s u c c e s s o n l y from t h i s side. I said that the p r o b l e m of the o b s e r v e r is one of t r a n s l a t i o n . J a k o b s o n (1971) s u g g e s t s a m o r e e x a c t d e f i n i t i o n for t h i s term w h i c h d e s c r i b e s for him the essence of s e m i o s i s . He s t a r t s from an a n t h r o p o c e n t r i c or l i n g u i s t i c p o s i t i o n and d i s t i n g u i s h e s b e t w e e n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n as a t r a n s c r i p t i o n of a w o r d by s i g n s of the same l a n g u a g e ; t r a n s l s t i o n as a t r a n s f e r from one l a n g u a g e into a n o t h e r one; and t r a n s m u t a t i o n as an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of v e r b a l s i g n s by n o n v e r bal o n e s and vice v e r s a . From t h i s p o i n t of v i e w the p r o b l e m of the o b s e r v e r w o u l d t h e r e f o r e be a p r o b l e m of transmutation.

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3. T r a n s m u t a t i o n and p e r c e p t i o n This d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n c l a r i f i e s that t r a n s m u t a t i o n d e s c r i b e e a very general a n d very f u n d a m e n t a l p r o b l e m of b i o l o g y : the p r o b l e m of p e r c e p t i o n . It c o n f r o n t s the observer with the fact that e v e r y t h i n g u h i c h he o b s e r v e s are - signs of h i s oun sensory s y s t e m s and not s i g n s of the o b s e r v e d l i v i n g b e i n g s . If he o b s e r v e s the m o v e m e n t s of an a m o e b a in a drop of w a t e r , the m i g r a t i o n of b i r d s o v e r the sea or the i n t e r a c t i o n betuieen a new b o r n baby and his m o t h e r , e v e r y t h i n g w h i c h he sees or h e a r s are s i g n s of his own sensory s y s t e m s . With the e n v i r o n m e n t w h i c h he sees spread out a r o u n d the o b j e c t s of h i s o b s e r v a t i o n it is the same. It is the e n v i r o n m e n t w h i c h h i s sensory s i g n s show to him, but not that w h i c h the sensory signs of the o b s e r v e d b e i n g s show to them. tilhat w a t e r m e a n s for the amoeba, the sea, the stars or m a g n e t i c f i e l d s for m i g r a t i n g birds, the b r e a s t of the m o t h e r for the baby c o n s t i t u t e s the p r o b l e m w h i c h m u s t be salved by the o b s e r v e r . If he p r e s u p p o s e s t h a t all these t h i n g s are the same for all, then he b e h a v e s m e t a p h y s i c a l l y and c o n c e a l s the p r o b l e m i n s t e a d of s o l v i n g it. So it t u r n s out that the first p r o b l e m w h i c h h a s to be t a c k l e d by the o b s e r v e r is the p r o b l e m of t r a n s m u t a tion into h i s own sensory p e r c e p t i o n : what kind of s i g n s d o e s he r e c e i v e if he sees the m o v e m e n t of an o b j e c t or if he h e a r s the cry of a b a b y ? What do the signs t r a n s f o r m , and how do they a c c o m p l i s h this t r a n s m u t s t i o n ? k. The secret of iconicity Let us c o n c e n t r a t e on the s i t u a t i o n of an o b s e r v e r who w a t c h e s the i n t e r a c t i o n b e t w e e n a new born b a b y and h i s m o t h e r . The signs w h i c h are e x c h a n g e d b e t w e e n the two p a r t i c i p a n t s of this i n t e r a c t i o n are m o r e c o n g e n i a l for a human o b s e r v e r than the signs w h i c h are e x c h a n g e d in o t h e r s i t u a t i o n s which I m e n t i o n e d . B u t already in t h i s s i t u a t i o n we are c o n f r o n t e d with a lot of d i f f i c u l t q u e s t i o n s w h a t every c h i l d p s y c h o l o g i s t k n o w s . He is a w a r e of the fact that every d e s c r i p t i o n of sign p r o c e s s e s w h i c h he o b s e r v e s , r e q u i r e s an a n s w e r to the q u e s t i o n w h a t the baby p e r c e i v e s of h i s e n v i r o n m e n t , how t h e s e p e r c e p t i o n s are r e a l i s e d and w h a t r e l a t i o n e x i s t s b e t w e e n his s e n s u a l signs a n d the e v e n t s w h i c h the o b server perceives. If we c o n s u l t our k n o w l e d g e a b o u t the first two y e a r s of c h i l d d e v e l o p m e n t , we get some i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t the o r i g i n of h u m a n sign s y s t e m s a n d its e v o l u tion in the f i r s t p e r i o d s of l i f e . T h i s i n f o r m a t i o n i s c r u c i s l for the q u e s t i o n to w h a t type we have to a s s i g n

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the s i g n s w h i c h ue receive in form of sense i m p r e s s i o n s , and w h a t the term " t r a n s m u t a t i o n " m e a n s in t h i s r e s p e c t . U s u a l l y we d e f i n e sense i m p r e s s i o n s aB i n d e x i c a l s i g n s w h i c h signify o b j e c t s in the outer uiorld. But the fact i s that for a new born b a b y such t h i n g s as o b j e c t s or an o u t e r w o r l d d o n ' t exist. It is also very u n l i k e l y that such t h i n g s exist for a m o e b a s or for b i r d s of p a s sage. I n d e x i c a l s i g n s of this k i n d are a d u l t o m o r p h i c c o n s t r u c t i o n s of h u m a n b e i n g s and as such r e s u l t s but not b e g i n n i n g s in the e v o l u t i o n of sign p r o c e s s e s . A m o r e a p p r o p r i a t e view d e f i n e s the f i r s t signs a s i c o n s . But t h i s d e f i n i t i o n r e q u i r e s an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of i c o n s in a d y n a m i c a l and not in a static way, in the sense of Kant, who said that no line e x i s t s w h i c h has not b e e n drawn by ourself, or a s P i a g e t h a s f o r m u l a t e d , that r e c o g n i t i o n of a picture m e a n s r e c o g n i t i o n of the s c h e m a t a or p r o g r a m s of sensory m o t o r r e a c t i o n s w h i c h are p e r f o r m e d by the eyes r e g a r d i n g the p i c t u r e . T h e s e s t a t e m e n t s help us to u n d e r s t a n d liJinnicott's d e f i n i t i o n who s a y s that the f i r s t e x p e r i e n c e of the c h i l d i s n o t the relation of a sign with i t s o b j e c t , b u t s u b j e c t - o b j e c t - i d e n t i t y w h i c h he c a l l s in h i s t e r m i n o logy " o b j e c t - r e l a t i o n " . For liJinnicott "being" b e g i n s for the c h i l d in the m o m e n t when he is able to create the b r e a s t of the m o t h e r for h i m s e l f . T h i s " o b j e c t - r e l a t i o n " m e a n s , as liJinnicott e m p h a s i z e s , that the c h i l d i^s the breast. T h i s at the f i r s t glance r a t h e r queer statement h a s got s t r o n g e m p i r i c a l support by V o u g h n (1930) and Z i l l m a n n (1977) who h a v e d e m o n s t r a t e d that the m u s c u l a r r e a c t i o n of the f a c i a l nerve s i m u l a t e s the b e h a v i o u r of an o b s e r v e d face e x a c t l y in q u a l i t y , quantity and time seq u e n c e . They c a l l e d this r e a c t i o n " e m p a t h e t i c r e s p o n s e " . W h a t the o b s e r v e r r e c o g n i z e s i s t h u s not the e x p r e s s i o n of the o b s e r v e d f a c e , but h i s own sensory m o t o r r e a c t i o n w h i c h s i m u l a t e s t h i s e x p r e s s i o n . In short: we don't r e c o g n i z e e x p r e s s i o n s , but i m p r e s s i o n s . Z i c h e n k o et al. (1962) c o u l d d e m o n s t r a t e how the eye - m o v e m e n t s of c h i l d r e n of d i f f e r e n t a g e s scan o b j e c t s of the o b s e r v a t i o n in g r o w i n g d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n . They n o t e : " t h a t f a m i l i a r i s a t i o n w i t h an o b j e c t and the s h a p i n g of its image p r e c e d e s the act of i d e n t i f y i n g . . . " - and t h i s m e a n s that the act of p e r c e p t i o n b e g i n s w i t h s i m u l a t i n g a s t r u c t u r e of the o b j e c t . T h i s act can then be i d e n t i f i e d by c o m p a r i s o n w i t h a sensory m o t o r schema or a " m o t o r copy" w h i c h is s t o r e d in the m e m o r y . Ulhat m a t t e r s is the fact that the b e g i n n i n g of any p e r c e p t i o n of an o b j e c t is an act of s i m u l a t i o n in w h i c h the subject e x p e r i e n c e s identity w i t h the o b j e c t .

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This i d e n t i t y i9 by no m e a n s an affair of s e m i o t i c s , b e c a u s e any sign which b e c o m e s i d e n t i c a l with its o b j e c t h a s ceased to be a sign. But it is the p r e l u d e and the f u n d a m e n t fcr the d e v e l o p m e n t of signs and at the same time the source of their d y n a m i c and e m o t i o n a l q u a l i t i e s . S i g n s emerge in the m o m e n t when i d e n t i t y b u r s t s and c h a n g e s to s i m i l a r i t y . In t h i s m o m e n t iconicity is born. 5. I c o n i c i t y as a source of e m o t i o n a l i t y Let us e x a m i n e this s t a t e m e n t in m o r e detail: the m o t o r i c a c t i o n s in early s i m u l a t i o n s are r e f l e x e s . T h e y are not c o n s e q u e n c e s of v o l u n t a r y i n t e n t i o n s . T h e y are as h e t e r o g e n i o u s to our ego f u n c t i o n s as any reflex o c c u r a n c e in our b o d y . H o f e r (1981) d e s c r i b e s c o m p l e x inb o r n r e f l e x e s in our new b o r n c h i l d r e n u h i c h in the course of l a t e r d e v e l o p m e n t come u n d e r control of higher o r g a n i z e d p a t t e r n s of b e h a v i o u r . A m o n g these s i m p l e r t y p e s of r e f l e x b e h a v i o u r one f i n d s not only r e f l e x e s such as r o o t i n g , sucking and g r a s p i n g , but also s i m u l a tion of e x p r e s s i o n s of a face in f r o n t of the b a b y . So we have to u n d e r s t a n d " t r a n s m u t a t i o n " in r e g a r d to sensory p e r c e p t i o n as an i n d u c e d s e n s o r i m o t o r reflex r e a c t i o n to c e r t a i n e n v i r o n m e n t a l e v e n t s . If we, a c c o r d i n g to Ulinnicott, i n t e r p r e t these e v e n t s as an e x p e r i e n c e of s u b j e c t - o b j e c t - i d e n t i t y w h i c h g i v e s the baby a f e e l i n g of security and s a f e n e s s b e i n g part of the unity w i t h m o t h e r , we b e g i n to u n d e r stand two at the first s i g h t c o n t r a d i c t o r y s t a t e m e n t s : 1. The c o n c e p t that any d e v i a t i o n from the unity in these early s i m u l a t i o n p a t t e r n s h a s the m e a n i n g of alarm and i m m e d i a n t danger to life for the b a b y . 2. The i d e a that d e v i a t i o n s from these p a t t e r n s w h i c h are i n d u c e d by the b a b y ' s b e g i n n i n g self a c t i v i t y are r e w a r d i n g and the k e r n e l for the d e v e l o p m e n t of ego formation. B u i l d i n g up a self a n d ego f u n c t i o n s has to do with m o t o r a c t i v i t y which g i v e s the baby its first e x p e r i e n c e s of a u t o n o m y , but these e x p e r i e n c e s are e m o t i o n a l l y highly c h a r g e d : They are d a n g e r o u s b e c a u s e they destroy the d y a d i c unity of the s u b j e c t - o b j e c t - i d e n t i t y w i t h the m o t h e r . On the other h a n d they are r e d e e m i n g b e c a u s e they can r e store the e n d a n g e r e d u n i t y . M . S . M a h l e r (19B0) h a s d e s c r i b e d this d r a m a t i c a m b i v a l e n c e in the course of the e v o l u t i o n of a u t o n o m y in the c h i l d . 6. I n d e x i c a l i t y and its e m o t i o n a l quality P o i n t i n g to the a m b i v a l e n c e of a u t o n o m o u s m o t o r act i o n s in the early s t a g e s of d e v e l o p m e n t we have a l r e a d y shown the e m o t i o n a l q u a l i t y of a new type of sign w h i c h

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c o m e s into the p i c t u r e : It is the I n d e x i c a l i t y of signs u h i c h are the s u b j e c t ' s c u e s of how he m u s t d i r e c t his m o t o r a c t i o n s . G e n e r a l l y speaking t h i s d i r e c t i o n may lead to the o b j e c t - or away from it. Both of these dir e c t i o n s are e m o t i o n a l l y c h a r g e d w i t h a m b i v a l e n t f e e lings. L e t me try to summarise the c o n s e q u e n c e s for semiotics: 1. The early s u b j e c t - o b j e c t - i d e n t i t y in the acts of s i m u l a t i o n of e n v i r o n m e n t a l e v e n t s is the b a B i s of our r e l a t i o n to o b j e c t s . It b e c o m e s the starting p o i n t and r e m a i n s the m e a s u r e for the i c o n i c i t y of s i g n s . 2. I c o n i c i t y m e a n s s i m i l a r i t y and this m e a n s fading or g r o w i n g i d e n t i t y . T h e r e f o r e i c o n i c i t y h a s aluiays a d y n a m i c quality: the tension t o w a r d or the fear of r e c o n s t r u c t i n g the early i d e n t i t y , that " o c e a n i c f e e l i n g " of R o m a i n R o l l a n d in which every i n d i v i d u a l i t y is diss o l v e d again in the dyadic w o r l d of m o t h e r l i n e s s by w h i c h F r e u d w a s so f r i g h t e n e d t h a t he - c o n t r a r y to his o t h e r w i s e u n t a m a b l e c u r i o s i t y for the deep sea of soulsc l a i m e d like S c h i l l e r ' s diver to b r e a t h e in the rosy light on the surface of the sea. 3. T h i s a m b i v a l e n c e b e t w e e n l o n g i n g for r e g r e s s i o n and s t r i v i n g to p r o g r e s s i o n w h i c h in UJinnicott' s theory o r i g i n a l l y m e a n s a g g r e s s i o n d i m i n i s h e s in i n d e x i c a l signs. U i t h p r e v a i l i n g i n d e x i c a l i t y the p r o g r e s s i v e and a g g r e s s i v e t e n d e n c i e s get the u p p e r h a n d . In W i n n i c o t t ' s terms the o b j e c t r e l a t i o n c h a n g e s u i t h i n d e x i c a l i t y into o b j e c t - u t i l i s a t i o n . In d e s c r i b i n g the d r a m a t i c e x p e r i e n c e of this d e v e l o p m e n t for the child he s p e a k s about the d e s t r u c t i o n of the " s u b j e c t i v e o b j e c t " in o r d e r to find the o b j e c t i v e one. He u n d e r l i n e s w i t h t h i s s t a t e m e n t the a g g r e s s i v e quality of indexicality . To draw the c o n c l u s i o n from t h i s g e n e t i c r e f l e x i o n : In i c o n i c sign r e l a t i o n e the s u b j e c t is still f u s e d w i t h i t s o b j e c t s by s i m u l a t i o n . T h i s state h a s to do uith the p s y c h o a n a l y t i c c o n c e p t s of o r a l i t y - and w i t h P e i r c e ' s c o n c e p t of f i r s t n e s s . In p h i l o s o p h i c a l t e r m s it m e a n s solipsism. In i n d e x i c a l sign r e l a t i o n s the s u b j e c t h a s s e p a r a ted h i m s e l f from the o b j e c t . H i s c o n n e c t i o n to it is o b t a i n e d by space and time - the two e l e m e n t s of m o t o r m o v e m e n t - or by p h y s i c a l c a u s a l i t y w h i c h is a c r e a t i o n of i n d e x i c a l i t y . T h i s state of d e v e l o p m e n t h a s to do u i t h the p s y c h o a n a l y t i c c o n c e p t s of anality and u i t h P e i r c e ' s c o n c e p t of s e c o n d n e s s . In p h i l i s o p h i c terms it means naive realism. F r o m these s t a t e s to s y m b o l i s m (in P e i r c e ' s t e r m i -

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n o l o g y ) is a very long m a y . A c c o r d i n g to P i a g e t it n e e d s the C o p e r n i c a n r e v o l u t i o n of a c h a n g e from sensory motor s c h e m a t a as g u i d e s for b e h a v i o u r to m e n t a l r e p r e s e n t a tion and the c r e a t i o n of m e n t a l i m a g e s as l e a d e r s of b e h a v i o u r . Now language and a b s t r a c t i o n come into the scenery and the c o n s t r u c t i o n of an " o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y " w h i c h r e m a i n s i n d e p e n d e n t of sensory signs. Here seems to be the b o u n d a r y b e t w e e n animal and human d e v e l o p m e n t . In the d e v e l o p i n g a n t h r o p o m o r p h i c and u l t i m a t e l y a d u l t o m o r p h i c w o r l d iconic and i n d e x i c a l s i g n s acquire a new d i m e n s i o n relating m e n t a l i m a g e s to sensual o b j e c t s and vice v e r s a . 7. The p r o f i t for b i o s e m i o t i c s Let us now return to our starting point: the situation of a human o b s e r v e r who w a n t s to observe the i n t e r a c t i o n b e t w e e n living b e i n g s and of living b e i n g s with their e n v i r o n m e n t s as a c y t o l o g i s t , a s a p h y s i c i a n , as a b o t a n i s t or as a z o o l o g i s t . On his way back from this tour t h r o u g h the h i s t o r y of our own e v o l u t i o n he h a s c h a n g e d h i s a t t i t u d e t o w a r d s his w o r l d and the sign p r o c e s s e s w h i c h tell him the d e t a i l s about the t h i n g s which he p e r c e i v e s in this w o r l d . He now u n d e r s t a n d s that in o r d e r to d e s c r i b e the b e h a v i o u r of the o b s e r v e d living b e i n g s in a r a t i o n a l and not m e t a p h y s i c a l - way, he m u s t start w i t h the p r o blem of how the sense o r g a n s of the o b s e r v e d l i v i n g b e ing simulate its o b j e c t s , and how h i s own sense o r g a n s a c c o m p l i s h t h i s s i m u l a t i o n . In o t h e r words, he m u s t start with the c o n c e p t of s u b j e c t - o b j e c t - i d e n t i t y as the b a s i s of any g e n e s i s of signs of w h a t e v e r type and s t r u c ture . By d o i n g so he will be able to p r o t e c t h i m s e l f from the m i s t a k e of c o n f u s i n g hiB signs w i t h the s i g n s which are r e c e i v e d by the o b j e c t s of h i s o b s e r v a t i o n . T h i s is m e a n t with the claim to carry out s e m i o t i c s w i t h o u t metaphysics. REFERENCES B a t e s o n , G. (1979). M i n d and N a t u r e , ft N e c e s s a r y U n i t y . 1982 d e u t s c h : G e i s t u n d N a t u r . E i n e n o t w e n d i g e Einheit. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt C i o m p i , L. ( 1 9 B 2 ) . flffektlogik. K l e t t - C o t t a , S t u t t g a r t F r e u d , S. ( 1 9 3 0 ) . D a s U n b e h a g e n an der K u l t u r . G e s . liJerke XV, U22 u n d U31 H o f e r , M . A . ( 1 9 0 1 ) . The R o o t s of H u m a n B e h a v i o u r . Ii).H. F r e e m a n and CG . , 5sri F r a n u l s u u

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J a k o b s o n , R . ( 1 9 7 1 ) . L a n g u a g e in R e l a t i o n to O t h e r C o m m u n i c a t i o n S y s t e m s . In C o l l e c t e d W r i t i n g s II, M a u t o n , The H a g u e a n d P a r i s V a u g h n , K . B . and L a n z e t t a , J . T . ( 1 9 8 0 ) . V i c a r i o u s Inv e s t i g a t i o n and c o n d i t i o n i n g of facial e x p r e s s i v e and a u t o m a t i c r e s p o n s e s to a m o d e l ' s e x p r e s s i v e disp l a y of p a i n . 3. of P e r s o n a l i t y and Social P s y c h o l o gy, 38, Nb. 6, 9 0 9 - 9 2 3 Z i n c h e n k o , V . P . and V a n C h z h i - t s i n and Tarakafiov, V . V . ( 1 9 6 2 ) . V o p r o s y p s i k h o o g i l , Nr. 3, in S o v i e t P s y c h o logy and P s y c h i a t r y . APN RSFSR P R E S S Z i l l m a n n , D. and C a n t o r , J . R . ( 1 9 7 7 ) . A f f e c t i v e r e s p o n ses to the e m o t i o n s of a p r o t a g o n i s t . J. of E x p e r i m e n t a l S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y , 13, 155-165 S o n n h a l d e 15 D 7B00 F r e i b u r g

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120 A TEXTUAL APPROACH TO PRESUPPOSITION

Patrizia Violi

SETTING THE PROBLEM Despite numerous analyses developed in linguistic circles in recent years, the notion of presupposition continues to be one of the most problematic in linguistic investigation. The difficulty of dealing with presuppositions seems to arise at two different levels: on the one hand, the delimitation of the objects under investigation; on the other, the different kinds of explanation which have been given to the phenomenon. In the literature, a large number of syntactic structures and lexical items have been associated with presupositional phenomena: 1. Definite description. Since the classical works of Frege (1892), Russel (1905) and Strawson (1950), presuppositions of existence were connected with the nature of reference and referring expressions, namely proper names and definite descriptions: John met the man with the red hat, presupposes There is a man with a red hat. 2. Some particular verbs, namely: i. Factive verbs (Kiparsky and Kiparsky, 1971): George regrets that Mary left, presupposes Mary left. ii. Implicative verbs (Karttunen, 1971): Mary managed to leave, presupposes Mary tried to leave (and some other presuppositions concerning the difficulty or improbability of the action). iii. Change of state verbs (Sellars, 1954; Karttunen, 1973): George stopped drinking red wine, presupposes George was drinking red wine before. IV. Verbs of judging, discussed extensively in Fillmore (1971): John accused Mary of being rich, presupposes Being rich is bad (or John thinks that being rich is bad). 3. Cleft sentences (Prince, 1978; Atlas and Levinson, 1981): It was Henry who opened the door, presupposes Someone opened the door. 4. Stressed constituents (Chomsky, 1972): MARY wrote the paper, presupposes Someone wrote the paper. 5. WH-questions: When did Mary see John? presupposes

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Mary saw John. 6. Certain iterative adverbs and verbs: Yesterday John was drunk again, presupposes John has been drunk before. John returned to Rome, presupposes John was in Rome before. 7. Counterfactual conditionals: If John had married Mary, his life would have been happier, presupposes John didn't marry Mary. 8. Temporal clauses: Before he came, the party was over, presupposes He came. 9. Non restrictive relative clauses: The man who is living next door is your father, presupposes A man is living next door. These phenomena are the most typically defined as presuppositions in linguistic theory. However, it should be pointed out that any delimitation of the domain of presuppositional phenomena strictly depends on the definition of presupposition one assumes. Thus the above list is not absolutely agreed, some of the preceding cases being excluded by some authors, and others added. Given the non homogeneous nature of all these phenomena, presupposition appears to be a 'fuzzy' category or an umbrella term covering various semiotic phenomena. EXPLANATORY THEORIES There are two main approaches used to describe presuppositions: the semantic and the pragmatic. Both seem inadequate to fully account for our intuition of presuppositional phenomena. Semantic theory of presupposition is committed to a truth-functional approach, concerned with the logical conditions under which a presupposition can be introduced into a new sentence. The basic hypothesis of this paper is that such a truth-functional approach cannot capture presuppositional phenomena as they occur in actual processes of communication based upon a natural language. From a pragmatic point of view, different explanations have been so far proposed in order to explain presuppositions. Two basic concepts are involved: on the one hand, the felicity conditions governing the use of expressions (and therefore the pragmatic appropriateness of sentences); on the other, the mutual knowledge of participants in the communicative process. (Let us call this ideal couple of Cooperators Speaker and Addressee, hereafter S and A.) The pragmatic approach sounds closer to the nature of presuppositional activity in natural language communication. However, the notion of felicity conditions is not entirely adequate to express the full

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relationship between lexical item and textual insertion. One of the limits of most pragmatic theories is the lack of a textual pert-peel ive: very often presuppositions are tested in ad hoc constructed sentences, out of any context of utterance. Such sentences do not belong to natural discourse and it seems not convincing to base a grammatical theory on such artificial examples. A DISCOURSE PERSPECTIVE I assume that properties of sentences in textual contexts more reliably reflect grammar than sentences in abstraction. I have said that presupposition is a fuzzy category. The term does not seem to define a series of homogeneous grammatical phenomena; it is more an open category which I assume can be explained only inside a theory of discourse. In fact a textual approach based on discourse functions allows a homogeneous explanation, since homogeneity is no longer on the level of formal structure, but. rather on the level of discourse functions, that is, stated in terms of the textual effects that they produce for the Addressee. Thus I will hypothesize a general functioning of information in discourse, which can account — in general terms — for all different presuppositional constructions. Such a textual account is a weaker theory than a grammatical theory for presuppositions: the grammatical constructions traditionally called presuppositions could be defined as the result of both Semantics and Discourse. In other words, I asume that presuppositional constructions are recorded in the lexicon or otherwise encoded in the language-system, but that they are activated — or played down — by means of general Discourse principles. Thus, the level of text theoiy has to be linked to the level of meaning representation. BACKGROUND AND FOREGROUND I assume that one of the very general features of discourse is the hierarchical organisation of information in its structure: items of information cannot all have the same status and relevance. They must necessarily be ordered according to some scale of relevance, and organised, so to speak, at different levels. In a discourse, we always find a textual perspective which obliges us to see events, characters or concepts from a given point of view. This phenomenon can be described as a special kind of textual focalisation: some elements or information are more focalised than others, which are played down. In other words, some items of information are set as the

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background of discourse, while others, w h i c h are in f o c u s , are the f o r e g r o u n d . Generally s p e a k i n g , the f o r e ground is the m o s t r e l e v a n t p a r t of d i s c o u r s e , the one w i t h h i g h e r r e l e v a n c e . In v e r y g e n e r a l t e r m s , t h i s p h e n omenon d e p e n d s o n the fact that it is i m p o s s i b l e n o t to impose an o r d e r of p r i o r i t y on d i s c o u r s e : we are f o r c e d t o 'put' our t h o u g h t s into the linear o r d e r of w o r d s a n d s e n t e n c e s . M o r e o v e r , t h e ' s y n t a c t i c level of o r g a n i s a t i o n of language a l l o w s us — a n d at the same time f o r c e s us - - to s t r u c t u r e w h a t we w a n t to c o m m u n i c a t e in an o r g a n ised system of clauses: main clauses, subordinate clauses and so on. Considered from this perspective, d i s c o u r s e is a m u l t i s t r a t i f i e d s y s t e m and its h i e r a r c h i cal organisation depends on functional considerations, i.e., it is a d e v i c e for o r g a n i s i n g i n f o r m a t i o n d i s t r i bution . As I have said, t h i s is a v e r y g e n e r a l f e a t u r e of discourse, displayed at different levels of t e x t u a l organisation, a n d r e l a t e d to different grammatical s t r u c t u r e s . P r e s u p p o s i t i o n is just one of the l i n g u i s t i c devices t h a t a l l o w s us s u c h a h i e r a r c h i c a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of meaning. In a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h i s s t a t e m e n t , let us a s s u m e that t h e r e is a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n a l p h e n o m e n o n when, in giving some i n f o r m a t i o n by using c e r t a i n e x p r e s s i o n s (be they s i m p l e l e x i c a l i t e m s or s e n t e n c e s ) , one c o n v e y s at the same time two kinds of m e a n i n g w h i c h do not h a v e the same s t a t u s . In s e n t e n c e 1): 1) J o h n r e t u r n e d to N e w Y o r k there are t w o i t e m s of i n f o r m a t i o n c o n v e y e d , w h i c h are, respectively: la) J o h n w a s in N e w York b e f o r e BACKGROUND lb) J o h n w e n t t o N e w York FOREGROUND and they do n o t b e l o n g t o the same level of m e a n i n g . In an intuitive w a y , we c o u l d say t h a t la), w h i c h is t r a ditionally c a l l e d the p r e s u p p o s i t i o n of s e n t e n c e 1), is not the f o c u s of the corimvnication, w h i c h is m o r e a b o u t the fact t h a t John went to New York. T h i s i n t u i t i o n is in fact b r o u g h t o u t by t h e n e g a t i o n test, w h i c h w e will c o m e b a c k to l a t e r . I s u g g e s t c o n s i d e r i n g p r e s u p p o s i t i o n as p a r t of the information given by a text, subject to a mutual agreement by both speaker and hearer, a kind of textual frame which d e t e r m i n e s the p o i n t of v i e w from which the discourse will be d e v e l o p e d . This t e x t u a l frame constitutes the b a c k g r o u n d of the text, distinct from the other i n f o r m a t i o n , w h i c h is t h e f o r e ground. In sentences carrying presuppositions, the background f r a m e c o n s i s t s of the p r e s u p p o s e d m e a n i n g of the s e n t e n c e t h a t b o t h S a n d A s h o u l d take for g r a n t e d , while the a s s e r t e d m e a n i n g c o n s t i t u t e s the f o r e g r o u n d information.

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Such a definition should not be confused with the notion of 'new' and 'old' information. In fact, it is not difficult to imagine a context in which the new information conveyed is precisely what is presupposed by a sentence. Consider for example expressions such as: 2) We regret to inform you that our article has been rejected. In this case, the new information conveyed by the sentence is exactly the factivity of the subordinate clause, presupposed by the factive regiet. Moreover, the concept of background frame is different from the concept of old information because the stress is not on what is already known, but on what is assumed as unchallangeable by the participants. The distinction between background and "foreground should also be kept distinct from the concept of the background knowledge of S and A, since the background frame is a textual element, produced by specific features inside the text. It is crucial for the present definition that both background and foreground information be furnished or conveyed at the same time (as the utterance) by the same expression. In this sense, the background information should not be identified with any previous external knowledge of S and/or A, but is, rather, what S and A take for granted by virtue of the utterance of the expression. (The cases of conflict between the conveyed background knowledge and what S or A previously knew will be a matter for further challenge of the expression employed). The background frame organizes the textual perspective of information distribution, putting some information in the area of 'implicit mutual agreement' between S and A. In this sense, all presuppositions have a function of textual integration, setting different items of information at different levels (background or foreground) within the discourse. PRESUPPOSITIONAL AND POSITIONAL POWER An important distinction that has to be made is the distinction between presuppositional power and positional power of presuppositional expressions. Given sentence 3), according to the current literature, 3a) is presupposed: 3) I accuse Mary of having bought a new dress. 3a) Buying a new dress is bad. It may be that when 3) is uttered, there is no mutual agreement, betwen S and A about the moral evaluation of buying dresses. However, as soon as 3) is uttered (if S and A share the same system of significance and S knows it), by using a p-term such as accuse, endowed with presuppositional power, S 'frames' the following dis-

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course and suggests to A that 3a) should be taken for granted. In other words, by saying 3), the Speaker constructs a background frame in which buying a new dress is considered bad. This presupposition establishes, so to speak, the textual point of view, and in doing so, frames the discourse locating part of the information (an unfavorable value) in the background, and a different part of information (that Mary bought a new dress) in the foreground. From this point on, foreground information should be regarded from the point of view of the imposed background. Once A has accepted the utterance of the expression pioposed by S, A must accept the framing of the further discourse as imposed by S. If A, on the grounds of some previous knowledge, does not accept the background information represented by 3a), then A must challenge the right S had to use the expressions 3. This operation requires some textual effort, as we will see. In other words, sentences such as 3) have what we call a positional power, i.e., the power to impose, in the text in which they are uttered, certain presuppositions. To say that the sentences have a positional power is, nevertheless, an oversimplification. In fact, it is not the sentence that has positional power, but the utterance of that sentence by a speaker. The sentence in itself has only a presuppositional power but, from the moment it is inserted in a given context, the positional power is actualised, and the presuppositions become part of the context that the hearer has to deal with. That is, they form part of the mutual agreement by the participants on the interactions of the discourse. The distinction between presuppositional and positional power enables us to overcome the 'traditional' pragmatic view of presuppositions as felicity conditions or preconditions to be satisfied for the pragmatic appropriateness of the sentences. According to this view, a precondition for the use of a verb such as accuse would be a previous negative statement on the action at issue or an agreement of both S and A on a negative judgement. But we have seen in example 3) that we can easily use a sentence with the p-term accuse in order to impose in the context such a negative assumption which does not need to be taken as a precondition. It could even be a 'false' assumption in a given context; it is the p-term accuse that sets it as 'true'. Considering presuppositions only as preconditions to be satisfied means ignoring the power presuppositions have to create a new context. Pragmatic theory disregards this power because of the reductive way in which it considers the relation between word and context, that is, because it sees the

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relation as a one-way, context word relationship. According to this perspective, it is the previous context which constrains lexical choices and selects appropriate words, defining their conditions of use. But very often, the relationship should be considered in the opposite way, namely as word context. It is the word which sets and defines the context. Therefore, the relationship betwen word and context is a two-way one, from context to word and from word to context. In other terms, since, by virtue of its encyclopaedic representation, every word activates a complex frame of reference, the sememe can be seen as a virtual text (Eco 1979). In the case of presuppositions, we call positional power the power that presuppositional expressions have to impose in the context of discourse a given semantic content (precisely their presuppositional content). This means that the Addressee will assume presuppositions as part of a shared background: what he does — as soon as a presuppositional expression is inserted in the discourse — is contextualize the expression in the appropriate context, which means to create such a context if it not given. The appropriate context is of course one where presuppositions are compatible with other informations, i.e., are assumed as an unchallenged background. On the other hand, it is precisely by using a presuppositional expression that the Speaker makes the Addressee believe in that background frame. Such a semantic frame is encoded in the language system — by virtue of semantic organisation or of grammatical form — and it can be accounted for in the semantic representation . This does not mean, however, that presuppositions are unchallengeable; given certain contextual conditions, they can be canceled, and, in this case, the positional power will not be completely coincident with the presuppositional power represented in the semantic system. However, in order to challenge presuppositions, some particular rhetorical strategy is required: A has to challenge S's right to use the expression he has used, using then a metalinguistic negation. Therefore, presuppositional terms and sentences can only be negated de dicto, never de re. De dicto negation affects textual organisation, as we will see in the next section. PRESUPPOSITION NEGATION I have said that presuppositions can be denied. The problem of presupposition negation has been much discussed in recent literature on presuppositions. For some authors, who try to reduce presupposition relation to

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entailment, the possibility of denying presuppositions is considered an argument against their existence, and a challenge to the validity of the very notion. Kempson (1975) claims that sentences such as 4) do not have presuppositions: 4) Edward didn't regret that Margaret had failed because he knew it wasn't true. It is, however, clear that there is an 'intuitive' difference between 4) and 5), a difference which cannot be explained in Kempson's analysis: 5) Edward didn't regret that Margaret had failed because he didn't like her. The 'intuitive' difference can be explained only from a textual point of view, assuming the concept of presupposition as part of a background frame. In a dialogue, sentences such as 4) can only occur as an objection to assumptions made by some other speaker.In other words, negating the presuppositions means negating the background frame that another speaker has tried to impose on the discourse. These negations are always corrections of the other speaker's words and therefore are really used as a quotation of a previous sentence, since it is impossible for a single subject to utter a sentence which at the same time imposes and denies a textual background frame. Presuppositions as part of the background frame, can be negated only by challenging the frame itself. In this sense, challenging the background, i.e., negating a presupposition, is a metalinguistic negation, because to deny the background frame is to deny the appropriateness of the way in which the information was presented, that is, the appropriateness of the very words used by the speaker in the given context. When the background frame of the speaker is challenged, a new frame can be imposed, and it is possible to have a change in frames. Challenging the speaker's frame always produces textual effects, because changing frame always changes the direction of a discourse. So the challenging of a frame becomes a textual change of topic. After a sentence such as 4),it will not be possible to continue to speak of Margaret's failure, which is, on the contrary, quite possible after 5). Changing the topic of the discourse requires a complex metalinguistic strategy that can be implemented only in the course of a complex textual maneuver. All the cases of counterexamples used to criticize the negation test for presuppositions require, in fact, this kind of complex textual strategy, which has the function of transforming an apparent internal negation into an external one, and of transforming the external negation into a negation de dicto, in order to preserve the felicity con-

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ditions of the communicative intercourse. If we better analyze the counterexamples used by the current literature, we see that they are dominated by a curious mistake, that is, by the confusion between the presuppositional power of the p-term or sentences and the way in which they are actually uttered in discursive strategies in order to exploit, perhaps deceitfully, their power. To sum up, we can say that the two levels of meaning we defined as background and foreground have a different status as regards negation. The foreground is 'information that is open to challenge' and the background, 'information that is shielded from challenge by the hearer'. (Givon, 1982). Saying that background information is 'shielded from challenge' does not mean that it cannot be challenged: the Addressee may of course challenge anything in discourse. I am referring here to general usage and not to grammatical rules. The presupposed content of a presuppositional construction, given its background nature, is less likely to be challenged in an inherently pragmatic scale of probabilities. Putting the information in the background makes the challenge less 'natural'; for this reason, a challenge at the presuppositional level gives rise to specific textual strategies, namely, affects the level of topic continuity in discourse. Thus, presuppositions seem to be characterized by two different features: firstly, they are connected with particular aspects of surface structure; secondly, they are context-sensitive, since they can be challenged under given textual conditions. This double nature of presuppositional phenomena requires the integration of two levels of explanation: the semantic and the textual. On the one hand, presuppositions need to be accounted for at the level of the semantic description, since they are encoded in the system of signification of a given language; at the other, they are linked to textual strategies and discourse constraints. Department of Communication University of Bologna Bologna, Italy REFERENCES Atlas J.D. and Levinson S. (1981). It-cleft, informativeness and logical form: radical pragmatics. In Radical Pragmatics, P. Cole (ed), New York: Academic Press. Chomsky, N (1972). Studies on Semantics in Generative Grammar. The Hague: Mouton.

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Eco, U. (1979). The Role of the Reader. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Fillmore, C. (1971). Verbs of judging: an exercise in semantic description. In Studies in Linguistic Semantics, C. Fillmore and D. Langendoen (eds). New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Frege, G. (1892). Uber Sinn und Bedeutung. Zeitschrifts fur Philosphie und Kritik, 100. Givon, T. (1982). Logic vs pragmatics, with human language as the referee: towards an empirically viable epistemology. Journal of Pragmatics, 6, 2. Karttunen, L. (1971). Implicative verbs. Language 47, 2 (1973). Presuppositions of compound sentences. Linguistic Inquiry, 4.2. Kempson, R. (1975). Presupposition and the Delimitation of Semantics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kiparsky, P and Kiparsky, C. (1970). Fact. In Progress in Linguistics, M. Bierwisch and K. Heidolph (eds). The Hague: Mouton. Prince, E. (1978). A comparison of wh-cleft and it-cleft in discourse. Language, 54.4. Rüssel, B. (1905). On denoting. Mind, 14. Sellars, W. (1954). Presupposing. Philosophical Review, 63. Strawson, P (1950). On referring. Mind, 59.

121 UNE HYPOTHESE INFORMATIONNELLE SUR LE POINT DE VUE AU CINEMA

Sandro Volpe

Le concept de point de vue, dont le rôle essentiel à l'intérieur du discours narratif est aujourd'hui généralement reconnu, a été au cours de ces dernières décennies au centre d'un débat théorique extrêmement vivace. Un n œ u d important dans l'évolution du problème du point de vue est lié à la féconde circulation d ' influences, dans les deux sens, entre cinéma et littérature; ce concept, valorisé dans le domaine littéraire par Henry James et par les épigones néo-jamesiens, trouve au cinéma un excellent domaine d'expérimentation: 'le cinéma devient un véritable laboratoire du point de vue' (Morrissette, 1962: 144). Cette rencontre provoque un premier effet du retour: Robbe-Grillet (1958: 128-130) avait déjà remarqué que, s'il était indispensable de préciser la position de 1' observateur au cinéma, cela comportait une analogue prise de conscience du problème dans le roman; intuition correcte, sans aucun doute, mais que le romancier-metteur en scène imprégnait de dogmatisme perspectif: Genette semble lui répondre, avec une pointe d'ironie, de nombreuses années plus tard, en rappelant que 'à la différence du cinéaste, le romancier n'est pas obligé de mettre sa caméra quelque part: il n'a pas de caméra' (1983:49). Le fait est qu'une plus grande attention à l'aspect perceptif du point de vue est le résultat le plus évident de ce premier effet de retour: la plupart des études sur le point de vue narratif, depuis les premières analyses des néo-jamesiens, à Jean Pouillon (1946), jusqu'aux plus récentes recherches de Mieke Bal (1977) et Pierre Vitoux (1982), restent en effet solidement ancrées à une matrice perceptive. Mais, à partir de la moitié des années soixante avec Todorov (1966) et, successivement, avec Genette (1972), se développe au côté de la ligne d'analyse perceptive une direction de recherche informationnelle (cf. Volpe, 1984: 24-28).Todorov (1973: 59-60) distingue l'angle de vision et sa profondeur, séparation 'que nous retrouverons avec quelques corrections chez Lintvelt (1981: 43) et chez Genette (1983: 84); mais Todorov inaugure, surtout, la tripartition informationnelle narrateur > personnage, narrateur = personnage, narrateur < personnage (1966: 141-143), qui sera successivement perfectionnée par Genette (1972-: 203-213), Füger (1972: 268292), Tacca (1978: 64-112), Lintvelt (1981: 46-49) et encore par Genette (1983: 43-53, 77-89). Dans le domaine cinématographique, les études sur le point de vue ne s'éloignent pas, en général, d'une position perceptive: nous pensons aux intelligentes schématisations de Mitry (1965: 61-79), 6

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quelques intuitions de Pasolini (1972), aux précieuses analyses de Bellour (1969), de Ropars-Wuilleumier (1972) et de Chatman (1977; 1978), à la synthèse d'Aumont (1983). Mais, second effet de retour, à partir du Discours du récit de Genette (1972) la recherche sur le point de vue, enrichie par l'apport informationnel, étend rapidement son nouveau rayon d'action au cinéma: si les premiers approfondissements se ressentent encore de quelques incertitudes déjà présentes dans le discours genettien - c'est le cas d'une note de Magrelli (1980: 72-78) sur le régime du regard dans Rear Window (A. Hitchcock, 1954) et dans The Lady in the Lake (R. Montgomery, 1947) où la terminologie informationnelle genettienne tend à vehiculer une proposition interprétative encore essentiellement perceptive - les récentes contributions de Jost (1983; 1984) attestent l'essor définitif d'une narratologie cinématographique, en développant les potentialités du Discours du récit, ce que Genette même ne manque pas de souligner dans le Nouveau discours du récit (1983: 49). C' est justement dans cette direction, en apportant notre eau au moulin narratologique, que nous voudrions nous engager dans ces pages . CODES Dans un discours comme celui sur le point de vue qui concerne de plein droit le langage cinématographique, pourrait paraître étrange l'absence de l'auteur qui, peut-être plus que tout autre, a contribué aux études dans ce domaine: Christian Metz. Au cours d'une conversation avec Raymond Bellour, Metz avouait avoir négligé le^ problème du point de vue parce que éloigné de sa ligne de recherche; toutefois il ajoutait avec une clarté exemplaire: 'Je crois qu'on a ici deux codes distincts: la grande syntagmatique d'une part, et de l'autre le code des points de vue et des regards' et aussi que 'le 'point de vue', au cinéma, donne lieu à des constructions hautement élaborées et largement spécifiques, dont on peut rendre compte formellement' (Bellour et Metz, 1971: 23, 27). Or, il apparaît évident que le point de vue dont Metz parle avec Bellour est bien le point de vue perceptif: la référence successive aux analyses de Bellour sur les Oiseaux de Hitchcock (Bellour, 1969) élimine le moindre doute sur cet aspect. Il va sans dire que parler du point de vue perceptif, non seulement à propos de la littérature mais aussi du cinéma, soulève automatiquement le problème de l'interférence codique: reprenant les distinctions proposées par Metz dans Langage et Cinéma, nous avancerons l'hypothèse d'une interférence codique accompagnée de transposition sensorielle (1971: 163). Dans le cas du point de vue perceptif la transposition codique présente un caractè re unilatéral et oriente^ on pourrait accepter à ce propos un raisonnement analogue à celui qu'a fait Metz pour le clair-obscur (1971: 164): c'est le point de vue en littérature qui est transposé parce que le point de vue cinématographique 'comme phénomène est intrinsèquement visuel, de sorte que ses représentations visuelles sont plus proches de sa réalité perceptive - et, pour ainsi dire, d'un

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cran moins transposées - que ne le sont ses évocations écrites' (1971: 164). Au contraire, si l'on considère le point de vue informationnel sous l'aspect codique, il faut faire une démarche complètement différente: nous sommes en effet dans le domaine des codes de la narrativité (codes sémantiques) qui se situent entièrement sur le versant du contenu (cf. Vernet, 1976). Les codes du contenu, écrit Metz, sont susceptibles de manifestation universelle; ceux-ci constituent, pour le langage cinématographique, un apport non-spécifique (Metz, 1971: 188). Néanmoins, une fois le code du point de vue informationnel situé parmi les codes du contenu, le problème d'un travail d'ensemble - soulevé par Metz même - reste tout entier: un travail 'qui viserait à formuler de façon théorique, et dans toute son ampleur, le statut 'non-spécifique' de ces codes du contenu et l'exacte nature de leur rapport aux divers langages' (1971: 188). L'étude du point de vue informationnel et de ses réalisations littéraires et cinématographiques n'est peut-être qu'uneminime partie de cet indispensable travail d'ensemble que la narratologie devra affronter. HYPOTHESES

INEORMATIONNELLES

Si le Discours du récit est le point de repère reconnu des plus récentes tentatives de formulation d'une narratologie cinématographique, il faut néanmoins signaler des études qui, bien qu' ayant peu de liens directs avec les analyses genett iennes, se situent dans une ligne de recherche informationnelle: une brève note de la Rhétorique générale (Dubois et al., 1970: 189) ainsi que l'article sur la focalisation de l'ouvrage collectif Lectures du film, lequel par ailleurs peut être relig à un registre mixte perceptifinformationnel (Percheron, 1976). Par contre, c'est bien la tripartition genettienne des focalisations (1972: 206-211) qui est le point de départ des propositions méthodologiques de Jost. Ce dernier apporte une clarification décisive à un résidu d'ambiguïté encore présente dans le terme de focalisation (1983: 195): 'Méthodologiquement, il n'est pas possible d' assimiler puremmt et simplement la question qui voit ? à ce qu'on nomme, en théorie littéraire, la focalisation. En effet, on n'a pas suffisamment remarqué que ce concept recouvre deux réalités narratives distinctes: d'une part, le savoir du narrateur par rapport à ses personnages (en sait-il plus, moins ou autant qu'eux ?); d'autre part, sa localisation par rapport aux événements qu'il raconte'. Jost propose par la suite de conserver le terme focalisation en^ce qui concerne l'information et d'adopter le terme ocularisation pour caractériser la relation entre ce que la caméra montre et la vision (présumée) du personnage (1983: 195-196): avec la distinction entre focalisation et ocuiai-isation la ligne délimitant le point de vue informationnel du point de vue perceptif est enfin définie. En entrant dans le détail des analyses de Jost, il nous semble que 1'ocularisation requière quelques observations. Si l'ocularisa-

1200 tion interne est caractérisée par la coïncidence spatiale entre caméra et personnage (1983: 196) et 1'ocularisation zéro par la non-coïncidence caméra/personnage (1983: 211), dans quel sens peuton parler d'ocularisation externe ? ûost utilise provisoirement ce concept mais il ne peut pas ne pas en reconnaître, en dernier ressort, le caractère contradictoire (1983: 211). Du reste, la brève survivance de la modalité externe peut être rapportée à un flottement perceptif-informationnel encore présent dans Genette (1972). L'affirmation selon laquelle 'toute ocularisation externe peut être transformée en ocularisation interne sans difficulté' (3ost, 1983: 196) dérive directement d'une position genettienne analogue (1972: 208) qui a été à l'origine d'une vivace querelle (cf. Bal, 1977: 19-58; Genette, 1983: 48-52). Il est toutefois intéressant d'observer que la précarité du type externe n'avait pas échappé à Jean Pouillon déjà en 1946: 'la vision 'par dehors' ne peut se soutenir comme un type indépendant et renvoie aux deux types de vision du 'dedans'' (1946: 107-108). Encore une parenthèse avant d'affronter la focalisation. Le caractère instable de 1'ocularisation interne doit être explicité; nous pensons évidemment aux critiques (terminologiqueTOent différentes mais qui vont, croyons-nous, dans la même direction) de Mitry (1965: 66-68) et de Metz (1972: 45-46) entre autres: Marie-Claire Ropars-Wuilleumier observe à juste titre que 'tout point de vue d/un personnage, au cinéma, ne peut prendre sa source que dans un point de vue particulier sur ce personnage, par exemple un plan rapproché de son visage' (1972: 524), précisant ainsi l'essentielle interdépendance de 1'ocularisation zéro et de 1' ocularisation interne. Venons-en donc à la focalisation. La tripartition informationnelle N > P , N = P, N < P ne pose pas de problèmes substantiels dans le domaine littéraire; par contre, elle soolève quelques objections dans le domaine cinématographique: quelle est l'instance qui prend la place du narrateur dans le rapport informationnel ? Il nous semble que l'unique réponse satisfaisante à cette question ne peut venir que d'une référence à la catégorie du sujet de 1'énonciation. Bettetini (1979: 94-98) la définit comme 'un'istanza di coordinamento semiotico T.. J un'origine del discorso svolto dal testo un apparato concettuale assente, ma che ha lasciato le sue tracce'; Casetti (1983:81) observe que 'la trace du sujet de 1'énonciation n ' abandorr» jamais le film: on la perçoit dans le regard qui institue et organise ce qui est montré, dans la perspective qui délimite et ordonne le champ, dans la position à partir de laquelle on suit ce qui tombe sous les yeux. En un mot, dans le point de vue d'où 1' on observe les choses'. L'étude des focalisations, au-delà de la clarification typologique, ^ doit à notre avis se diriger vers une analyse des stratégies informationnelles présentes dans l'articulation énonciative; nous pensons, par exemple, à l'étude du suspense : rappelons l'analyse minutieuse de Karel Reisz (1953) sur deux films de David Lean (Great Expectations, 1946 et The Passionate Friends, 1948) et les brillantes observations de Hitchcock dans sa longue interview à Truffaut (1967: 54) et, dans le domaine sémiotique, les

1201

pages de Chatman (1978) consacrées,elles aussi, a Great Expectations, la rigoureuse analyse de Dial M for Murder de Hitchcock effectuée par Bettetini (1979: 202-239) et une très brève remarque, plus spécifiquement narratologique, de Jean-Paul Simon (1983: 159). Mais le banc d'essai le plus stimulant en ce qui concerne les analyses sur la focalisation cinématographique sera celui, beaucoup moins exploré, des altérations (Genette, 1972: 211-213), le territoire le plus original de la narratologie genettienne : 'Ma contribution consisterait plutôt dans l'étude de ces 'altérations' au parti modal dominant d'un récit que sont la paralipse (rétention d'une information logiquement entraînée par le type adopté) et la paralepse (information excédant la logique du type adopté)' (Genette, 1983: 44). Si la paralepse dans le récit compte un nombre d' exemples pratiquement incalculable, au contraire la paralipse offre un terrain d'observation plus limité: aux exemples, désormais canoniques, tirés de Stendhal et d'Agatha Christie (Genette, 1972: 212), nous pourrions en ajouter un autre provenant de la plume de Borges, l'assassinat du Corralero dans Hombre de la esquina rosada (ou, encore, le cas plus complexe du Voyeur de Robbe-Grillet). Les altérations cinématographiques présentent des caractères encore plus considérables. Un exemple de paralipse - peut-être pas très orthodoxe - pourrait être celui du flash-back mensonger de Stage friqht (Hitchcock, 1954): toutefois, ne s'agissant pas là d' une simple omission, nous ne pouvons pas ne pas en souligner le statut informationnel hybride et les complexes implications codiques (cf. Vernet, 1976). En ce qui concerne l'altération opposée, nous voudrions signaler un cas de paralepse de transposition: la révélation dans Vertiqo (Hitchcock,1958) de la vérité sur l'identité de Judy, anticipée par rapport aux roman duquel est tiré le film (D'entre les morts de Boileau et Narcejac), renverse la stratégie informationnelle du livre (suspense vs^ surprise). Cet aspect de la fidélité informationnelle constitue, à notre avis, un n œ u d essentiel des rapports entre littérature et cinéma: quels résultats produirait, par exemple, une étude sur les transpositions cinématographiques du Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde de Stevenson? Comment Mamoulian et Fleming (entre autres) se sont-ils comportés vis-à-vis de la focalisation sur Utterson ? Nous ne voulons naturellement pas établir des normes de cohérence (par ailleurs absolument arbitraires), mais seulement mettre l'accent sur un aspect qui n'a pas été assez étudié, surtout si l'on considère l'immense production critique sur les rapports entre littérature et cinéma. L'étude narratologique des altérations ne peut négliger en outre (pour reprendre la suggestion de Metz) certaines particularités des divers langages par rapport au problème de la transposition.Prènons le cas d'un autre récit de Borges, La forma de la espada: la quasi totalité de ce récit est constituée par un flash-back mensonger. Par rapport à Stage friqht, cet exemple nous conduit peut-être à l'extrême limite d'un discours informationnel sur la trasposition; le protagoniste raconte l'histoire de sa propre délation, en opérant un simple échange de personne et en s'attribuant l'identité de l'ami qu'il a dénoncé, jusqu'à l'aveu final: 'Le he narrado la

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historia de este modo para que usted la oyera hasta el fin. Yo he denunciado al hombre que me amparó: yo soy Vincent Moon. Ahora desprécieme'. Mais comment rendre cinématographiquement cette giganfeesque paralipse sans tomber dans une paralepse de transposition si évidente ? Le cas de La forma de la espada (comme d'ailleurs celui de Stage friqht) confirme le caractère inextricable des rapports entre focalisation et ocularisation: toute ocularisation possède une valeur informationnelle, et il faudra que l'analyse des focalisations (et surtout de ses correspondantes altérations) en tienne compte. Affirmer qu 1 oculariser est aussi informer, pourrait paraître à première vue une simple lapalissade: toutefois, cela est vrai dans une mesure différente pour le cinéma et pour la littérature. Définir cette mesure consistera à répondre - tout au moins en partie - à la question soulevée par Metz sur les rapports entre les différents langages et les codes du contenu (1971: 188). L'analyse informationnelle, ici seulement ébauchée, doit être considérée, croyons-nous, comme une des tâches les plus importantes d'une narratologie cinématographique. Istituto di Lingue e Letterature straniere Università di Palermo Palermo, Italia NOTES 1.

2.

3.

4.

Dans Langage et Cinéma Metz avait précisé les raisons de son silence vis-à-vis du point de vue: 'On a notamment reproché à l'exposé de la 'grande syntagmatique' de ne pas souffler mot de tels ou tels éléments cinématographiques dont l'importance n'est pas douteuse: le son, les dialogues, le 'point de vue' visuel sous lequel l'action est présentée au spectateur f . . . Et certes, ces configurations signifiantes ressortissent à d' autres codes, dont l'examen d'emblée avait été exclu par la définition même qu'il était donnée de la grande syntagmatique 1 (1971: 142-143). A ce même registre mixte, nous pouvons rapporter l'analyse bazinienne du découpage et de sa connexion avec les différents points de vue pris en tant que systèmes d'analyse possible de la réalité (Bazin, 1959). Jost suggère une étude autonome du point de vue sonore; il propose pour des raisons de symétrie le terme de auricularisation (1983: 210): c'est là une indication opportune qui réclame un approfondissement. Des indications de recherche fort stimulantes dans cette direction dans le numéro 2 de la revue Hors Cadre et notamment les contributions de Gardies (1984: 45-64), 3ost (1984: 67-84) et Lagny, Ropars-Wuilleumier, Sorlin (1984: 99-121).

REFERENCES Aumont, Jacques (1983). Le point de vue. Communications 38: 3-29.

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Bal, Mieke (1977). Narratoloqie. Paris: Klincksieck. Bazin, André (1959). Qu'est-ce que le cinéma ? II. Paris: Cerf. Bellour, Raymond (1969). 'Les Oiseaux': analyse d'une séquence. Cahiers du cinéma 216: 24-38. Bellour, R. et Metz, Ch. (1971). Entretien sur la sémioloqie du cinéma. Semiotica IV (1): 1-30. Bettetini, Gianfranco (1979). Tempo del senso. Milano: Bompiani. Casetti, Francesco (1983). Les yeux dans les yeux. Communications 38: 78-97. Chatman, Seymour (1977). Cinematic Discourse: The Semiotics of Narrative Voice and Point of View in 'Citizen Kane'. Urbino: Working Papers del Centro Internazionale di Semiotica e di Linguistica 69. (1978). Story and Discourse. Ithaca: Cornell U. Press. Dubois, 3. et al. (1970). Rhétorique générale. Paris: Larousse. Füger, Wilhelm (1972). Zur Tiefenstruktur des Narrativen. Prolegomena zu einer generativen 'Grammatik' des Erzählens. Poetica V. Gardies, André (1984). Le su et le vu. Hors Cadre 2: 45-64. Genette, Gérard (1972). Figures III. Paris: Seuil. (1983). Nouveau discours du récit. Paris: Seuil. Jost, François (1983). Narration(s) : en deçà et au-delà. Communications 38: 192-212. (1984). Le regard romanesque. Ocularisation et focalisation. Hors Cadre 2: 67-84. Lagny, M. et al. (1984). Le récit saisi par le film. Hors Cadre 2: 99-121. Lintvelt-, Jaap (1981). Essai de typologie narrative. Le point de vue. Paris: Corti. Magrelli, Enrico (1980). Il regime dello sguardo: 'Punto di vista' e produzione del simbolico. Cinema e cinema 25-26: 72-78. Metz, Christian (1971). Langage et Cinéma. Paris: Larousse. (1972). Essai sur la signification au cinema. Paris:Klincksieck. Mitry, Jean (1965). Esthétique et psychologie du cinéma II. Paris: Editions Universitaires. Morrissette, Bruce (1962). De Stendhal à Robbe-Grillet: modalités du 'point de vue'. Cahiers de l'Association Internationale des études françaises 14: 143-163. Pasolini, Pier Paolo (1972). Empirismo eretico. Milano: Garzanti. Percheron, Daniel (1976). Dans Lectures du film. Paris: Albatros. Pouillon, Jean (1946). Temps et Roman. Paris: Gallimard. Reisz, Karel (1953). The Technique of Film Editing. London-New York: Focal Press. Robbe-Grillet, Alain (1958). Notes sur la localisation et les déplacements du point de vue dans la description romanesque. Revue des lettres modernes 36-38: 128-130. Ropars-Wuilleumier, Marie-Claire (1972). Narration et signification: un exemple filmique. Poétique 12: 518-530. Simon, Jean-Paul (1983). Enonciation et narration. Communications 38: 155-191. Tacca, Oscar (1978). Las voces de la novela. Madrid: Editorial Gredos (1ère éd. 1973]\

1204 Todorov, Tzvetan (1966). Les catégories du récit littéraire. Communications 8: 125-151. (1973). Poétique. Qu'est-ce que le structuralisme ? II. Paris: Seuil (1ère éd. 1968). Truffaut, François (1967). Le cinéma selon Hitchcock. Paris: Laffont. Vernet, Marc (1976). Dans Lectures du film. Paris: Albatros. Vitoux, Pierre (1982). Le jeu de la focalisation. Poétique 51: 359368. Volpe, Sandro (1984). L'occhio del narratore. Problemi del punto di vista. Palermo: Quaderni del Circolo Semiologico Siciliano 20.

122 A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF MACBETH

Roy Wi11iams

This paper will explore a two-dimensional map or chart of the integration of the elements of Shakespeare's Macbeth. The chart is a structure, in a Piagetian sense, as it is a graphic means of exploring the 'whole' of the play. This whole is definitely not an aggregate of its parts, but rather a whole which gives definition to its parts, and not the other way around. The chart or 'map' of the play is a means of exploring the whole, not a representation of the whole. The distinction is crucial. A 'representation' could lead to the misconception that the relations between the elements, and the nature of the elements themselves, are static. This is not the case. This play (and this is true for many other literary texts),is is often approached via a linearly-reductionist methodology. It is then, mistakenly, held that an examination of the 'plot' of the play can lead to a complete understanding of it. Overemphasis on a sequential approach negates the richness of the text. Sequentially, each element has meaning primarily in terms of its immediately preceding and succeeding elements. This is still the case, (although to a lesser extent), if we try to conceptualise how the plot builds-up. Such a 'building-up' is based on relatively fixed and static elements, and the 'way the plot builds-up" has an architectural-constructionist inflexibility to it. To use the chart to explore the structure of the play is to approach it quite differently. Manca (1978:12) has outlined the term 'harmony'.(albeit aesthetic harmony, quite specifically), analogously to 'structure'. Her distinctions are pertinent to the structure of Macbeth. She begins by defining art: "Art expresses the dialectical opposites which constitute the nature of the world and seeks to give some meaning to these tensions, either positive or negative," (1978:12). She outlines two modes of harmony. One is characterised by a transcendental quest for an absolute, the other is a quest "for meaningfulness in and through life", (1978:12). In the first case harmony is achieved as a resolution of the opposites, as in "Dante and in most mystical poetry, where supreme reality is attained by leaving the world ultimately behind. It consists in a resolution of all tensions." In this case "the centre of reality ... is generally seen to reside in an ideal world beyond

1206 the world of becoming. (Manca, 1978:12). Alternatively, as in: the works of Shakespeare and in that of most modern poets, ... the artist tends to seek meaning and order within the context of the tensions of experiential being. The centre of reality is placed within the dialectical flux and change of sense experience... The harmony ... is a balance of unstable opposites., perpetually endangered and destroyed by the forces of becoming. (Manca, 1978:12). This has crucial implications for the way in which we approach the play and the chart of Macbeth. First of all, we must

Figure 1. The three Scottish Castles. SETTINGS The structural analysis of the play is based on the settings of the scenes. The central settings are the settings of the scenes in the three Scottish Castles, as in Figure 1. There is of course some ambiguity about the settings, and whether, for instance, act 3 scene 5 (111:5), the scene in which Hecate takes over control, was written by Shakespeare in the first place. But if one accepts the division of settings in the commonly accepted text, one comes up with seven scenes in each of the Castles: Macbeth's castle at Inverness; Forres, the Royal Palace of King Duncan, and Dunsinane, Macbeth's fortress. If our hypothesis that the play forms a 'whole' is true, then a graphic representation that also forms a balanced 'whole' is needed. The solution to the problem of the graphic representation of the Castle scenes was given in a dream, to the late Ellen Williams, who originally formulated the chart structure. It is,

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appropriately, a C e l t i c c r o s s , see Figure 1. This cross has the precise structure required, I f one takes the central ' b a r ' as Forres, the section below as Inverness, and the section above as Dunsinane, then the chart i s divided into three sets of seven scenes each. The choice of which of the three c a s t l e s should be in which segment was made on the basis of the central scene. The graphic structure has a very obvious central scene, and in the play there i s a scene, 111:4, the Banquet scene, which i s a l s o obviously c e n t r a l . I t i s in the Banquet scene that Macbeth's fortunes change dramatically. Up t i l l t h i s point his power has increased. After t h i s i t w i l l decline to h i s death in the l a s t scene. That places Forres in the centre,which i s appropriate as i t i s the Royal Palace. Inverness i s placed at the bottom, as i t i s Macbeth's own C a s t l e , and his power base, from which he hopes to move upwards. And Dunsinane i s what Macbeth hopes w i l l be h i s unassailable f o r t r e s s . SURROUNDINGS I t i s clear that the scenes on the Heath, ( 1 : 1 , I : 3 a , I:3b & 111:5), are the most immediate in r e l a t i o n to the C a s t l e s . They are placed in the c i r c l e which i s drawn around the points of the c r o s s , and a minor l i b e r t y has been taken in separating 1:3 into parts a & b, as part ' a ' i s a c l e a r ' i n t r o d u c t i o n ' to part ' b 1 . This a l s o supports the thematic l i n k s between the two opposite pairs of scenes, as we w i l l show l a t e r on. (See Figure 2).

Figure 2. The scenes on the Heath.

1208 OUTER SCENES Surrounding the Castles and the Heath are the scenes of Act 4, which are more remote from the centre of action, but which have a deciding influence on the turn of events. There are three scenes given 'in the text: Hecate's Cavern, IV:1; Fife, IV:2; England, IV:3- Birnam Wood has been added as a setting as it is a result of the two opposing forces, Hecate and England, acting via Birnam Wood, which leads so inevitably to Macbeth's death. In terms of the balance of the elements of the play the opposite outer scenes lead from initiating force (IV: 1) to result (IV:2); and in parallel, from initiating force (IV:3) to result Birnam Wood. (See Figure 3).

Figure 3.

The outer scenes.

COLOUR As well as the shape codings for the various settings, the chart uses colour codings. RED is used for the castles, as they are the settings for the bloodshed and the lust for power that characterises the Macbeths. GREY is used for the scenes on the Heath, and in Hecate's cavern and Fife. GREEN is used for England and Birnam Wood, as it is here that the the redemption and liberation of Scotland develops. Characters The characters are also coded using colour and shape.

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Figure 4. The main characters in the play. These symbols for the characters are f i l l e d in on the chart of the settings. This enables one to see at a glance how a particular character f i t s in to the play as a whole. The characters are divided into four main groups, plus the witches. There are four other groups of supporting characters. (See Figure 4). Duncan's family are gold, for Royalty. Duncan has a golden crown, the princes golden coronets. The band at the top of the symbol for Donalbain is green, for his youth. Macbeth's family are blood-red, to indicate their l u s t for power, their passion, and the bloodshed they cause. Their black hearts indicate disloyalty and treason. They have golden crowns as King and Queen, and Macbeth has a helmet as a general. Banquo's family are yellow. This i s used to represent

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balance, personal integration, and integrity. The use of yellow has some basis in religious symbolism, but i t is more importantly based on Shakespeare's use of the symbolism of the yellow Sun in all his work. Macduff's family are royal blue to indicate loyalty. Once again the green band i s used for'youth, and the obvious c i r c l e for the female. Hecate has a crescent moon as Goddess of the Night; the English soldiers are green; the Scottish soldiers are purple as in the purple Thistle of Scotland. The murderers are black, the household are brown, with a scroll added for the messenger, a medicine bottle for the doctor, and a key for the Porter. In this set of characters, (taken from the tape-slide program of the chart), minor characters are not specified. But in f u l l e r versions, (a physical chart of about 1m2), other characters, such as Ross, are indicated by adding an i n i t i a l 1 R' (for instance) in white lettering, in the bottom right-hand corner. STRUCTURAL UNITY When exploring the unity and the integration of the play, one can start at any point, and work in a number of directions. (This makes the chart a structure in a formal, Piagetian, sense). But l e t ' s have a look at the f i r s t three scenes of the play by way of introduction.

Figure 5. The f i r s t three scenes.

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I f you explore the r e l a t i o n of the f i r s t scene to the next two, (see Figure 5 ) , several aspects o f the development can be explored at once. The play s t a r t s in the grey area o f the Heath. T h i s i s o u t s i d e the w a l l s o f the C a s t l e s , and introduces the forces that threaten the C a s t l e s immediately. I t i s a l s o in some ways an i r o n i c p a r a l l e l , in that the r e a l l y c r u c i a l threat in Scotland i s not the immediately apparent m i l i t a r y t h r e a t , but the threat o f ever-present e v i l , even in t h i s 'ephemeral' form! In scene 2 we move to the Royal Palace at F o r r e s , where we see Duncan responding to the m i l i t a r y t h r e a t . For Duncan everything i s c l e a r e d - u p : Cawdor w i l l d i e , and order w i l l be r e s t o r e d . He deals with the external t h r e a t in a manner almost exactly as Manca (see our i n t r o d u c t o r y remarks) formulates the i d e a l i s t view of harmony, where everything i s c l e a r c u t , and the ' i d e a l ' values are imposed to r e s o l v e t e n s i o n s . As the audience knows, the Heath, an i n t e r n a l force (metap h o r i c a l l y ) i s more immediately t h r e a t e n i n g . The play moves back to the Heath. The vector of the movement from scene 1 to scene 3 around the chart i s a t e l l i n g graphic i l l u s t r a t i o n of the (already at t h i s stage) i n e v i t a b l e movement of the i n t r u s i o n of the f o r c e s of d a r k n e s s . The e v i l f o r c e s ' p i n c h ' b o t h scene 1 and scene 4 , and have a l r e a d y entered Duncan's s t r o n g e s t b a s t i o n a g a i n s t external t h r e a t , i . e . Macbeth's mind - he i s already echoing ( i n 1:3b) the words of the witches in t h e i r magical chant in 1:1. These kinds of echoes and symmetries make up the balanced whole of the opposing t e n s i o n s in Macbeth. Although we are confined here to t h i s p l a y , i t i s as well to c i t e another a u t h o r ' s i n v e s t i g a t i o n of another of S h a k e s p e a r e ' s p l a y s , in which he comes to s i m i l a r c o n c l u s i o n s . Brown (1973:11) s a y s : That c e r t a i n a n a l o g i e s e x i s t between the opening and c l o s i n g scenes of Hamlet i s a commonplace o f c r i t i c i s m . . . . But what does not seem to have been g e n e r a l l y recognised i s q u i t e how f a r such apparent symmetries can be traced on f u r t h e r i n t o the play - - c e r t a i n l y f a r enough . . . to make i t u n l i k e l y that in doing so one i s doing nothing but f i n d i n g p i c t u r e s in the f i r e . Accross the centre There are l a y e r s upon l a y e r s of g e o m e t r i c a l l y opposite scenes that are t h e m a t i c a l l y l i n k e d a c c r o s s the central scene, i . e . 111:4, the Banquet scene. We can s t a r t at the scenes c l o s e s t to the c e n t r e . In 111:3 we see Macbeth seemingly s u c c e s s f u l l y d i s p o s i n g o f Banquo and, so he had hoped, Fleance too. The opposite scene, 111:6, shows us how Macbeth has achieved j u s t the opposite - some members of h i s court a l r e a d y openly condemn him as an e v i l t y r a n t .

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The other scenes in the inner c i r c l e show the same kind of change. In 1:5 Lady Macbeth c a l l s upon the powers of darkness to help her, and in the opposite scene, V:5, those same powers have tormented her to her death. In 1:7 Lady Macbeth urges Macbeth to proceed with the murder of Duncan, and in the opposite s.cene, V:1, we find her desperately washing her hands as she sleep-walks, tormented by the stains of Duncan's blood. In the other two scenes the same i s true. In 1:6 and, opposite, V:3, we are shown f i r s t l y Lady Macbeth confidently concealing her intentions, welcoming Duncan to Inverness, and secondly, we hear of her mental breakdown which leads to her suicide. (See Figure 6)

Figure 6. Inner scenes. Another set of opposing scenes i s I I I : 1 & 2 , in which we are introduced to the new King, Macbeth, who is plotting to murder his best and most loyal friend Banquo.onthe one hand, and on the other hand scenes I:2&4, in which we are introduced to Duncan as king, punishing treachery and rewarding loyalty. Yet another example is the contrast between the group of scenes at the base of the cross, 11:1-4, which deal with the murder of Duncan and the public's reactions to it,and the group of scenes at the top of the cross, which lead to the k i l l i n g of Macbeth, and the public reinstatement of the rightful king. (See Figure 7). (Scenes V:2,4,6 & 7).

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Figure 7. In Figure 7 one can see the balance between the Heath scenes 1:1 and I:3b, in Macbeth's echo of ' f a i r is f o u l 1 ; and the other two Heath scenes, 1:3a in which the witches conjure up their own magic to control Macbeth,and l a s t l y 111:5 in which Hecate chastises them for not consulting her, and she takes over. There are layers of relations which all show the same thing all these parallels are balanced accross the central scene. I f we look at the overall picture, we come back to the idea that i t i s the integration of the balance of unstable opposites that creates the a r t i s t i c harmony. On the colour chart this i s depicted forcefully in the four innner scenes, namely V:1 & 5, and 1:5 & 7. These scenes, even though they are inside the Castles, which are coloured red, are in fact coloured grey, as i t is in them that Hecate's influence i s strongest. I t i s also in these scenes that Lady Macbeth figures centrally. For the same reason the central Banquet scene should be grey, as i t i s here that Hecate casts her most powerful spell - the ghost. (See Figure 1 & 6.) HARMONY Manca says that Shakespeare's idea of harmony encompasses discord as an essential part of i t s nature. This implies that 'good' and ' e v i l ' have a similar ontological status. Both are essential parts of r e a l i t y , (1978:6). The evil of Hecate i s not merely a s t a t i s t i c a l l y rare and societally marginal phenomenon. Both Hecate and the positive

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forces in Macbeth's world are unstable. And both are perpetually "endangered by the forces of becoming." (Manca, 1978:12). If we take a structuralist 'step back 1 from the play, we see that Macbeth and Duncan are threatened at the immediate level by the forces of 'evil 1 , but more importantly, they are threatened at the 'deep structure' level by the fundamental threat to Scotland, that of entropy and/or 'evil' (in the sense of instability), of the forces of becoming. Macbeth is not a picture of the unwarranted intrusion of an 'external' evil into the otherwise stable and secure realm of Scotland. The world of Macbeth - and by implication our world too - is a harmony that contains both good and evil, and one might even say in equal and necessary part! A Piagetian conception of the aesthetic harmony of Macbeth must be fleshed out by a consideration of the rules of transformation, (Piaget, 1968). Rules of transformation are themselves stable, but not static. That is, the particular elements of a structure are transformed, and the rules of transformation are transformed. They are stable, but they are also open to change. To extrapolate our argument to the general proposition that 'Shakespeare was a structuralist' is quite unnecessary. Besides, structuralism means different things to different people. What we can do is to make out a case for the value of applying a 'rules of transformation' analysis to Macbeth. Much has been written on Shakespeare's concern for the value of Kingship. Our approach to this obviously central question will, in structuralist terms, be aided by a search for possible rules of transformation. Attempts to pin down Shakespeare's central concerns via conceptual analysis will inevitably focus on isolated values or norms, like 'kingship'. This would, better, focus instead on a process like 'rightful succession'. It is possible to come to grips with the central concerns of the play (and other plays) if we start unpacking the rules of transformation. It is then not kingship/rightful succession/ King Duncan that is threatened, but particular rules of transformation within a structure, i.e. Scottish society. The continual construction of the structure, by individual people, is the locus of another problem. The play can be seen as a conflict between the rules of transformation of succession, and those of military promotion. The dramatic impact of the play starts with the co-incidence of two crucial incidents the transformations of the status of Macbeth and Malcolm. Macbeth revolts against the particular application of the rules of transformation of succession, and decides to extrapolate his own personal transformation instead. Shakespeare, seen as a structuralist, uses Hecate to demonstrate, unmercifully, to Macbeth that the whole is much more than the aggregate of its parts!

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Macbeth i s vanquished. Hecate remains. Dramatically she i s i f anything the more real because we seldom i f ever see her. She does not interact with Macbeth d i r e c t l y , he has only Lady Macbeth, who by the end of the play will be revealed as someone weak in comparison to Hecate. Manca (1978:73) says that the order that Shakespeare depicts i s one ridden by disorder and f l u x . Any harmony envisaged must both emerge from, and contain the opposing tensions that can cause i t s d i s s o l u t i o n . The geometric form of the chart allows one to explore the whole a l l at the same time, and to appreciate the perilous balance of forces. I f we move v e r t i c a l l y or h o r i z o n t a l l y accross the chart, two things happen simultaneously. F i r s t l y , as we have already seen in some d e t a i l , we find ' b a l a n c i n g ' elements in a multitude of cases. This leads to a sense of p l e a s i n g , formal beauty in the construction of the play.

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Simultaneously, any such movement crosses the fulcrum, 111:4, and the real and p o e t i c a l l y and dramatically v i v i d horror of the transformation from one pole to i t s opposite h i t s us. From almost any point on the chart one can move accross to the geometrically opposite s i d e , and find a 'mathematically' beautif u l l y 'balanced' scene. But i t i s always one which points yet again to human d i s s o l u t i o n and tragedy.

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The aesthetic beauty of the balance of opposites which is accompanied by horrific developments is paralleled by the pitiful transformations of particular characters, like Macbeth and Lady Macbeth as well as Lady Macduff, and the poetic beauty of their speeches. The 'whole' of Macbeth is veritably a 'terrible beauty'. Department of Communication University of South Africa Pretoria, South Africa. REFERENCES Brown, K. (1973). Form and cause conjoined. Shakespeare Survey 26: 58-67. Manca, Marie Antoinette (1978). Harmony and the Poet. The Hague: Mouton. Piaget, Jean (1968). Structuralism. London: Routledge.

123 SIGNS, SINGULARITIES AND SIGNIFICANCE: SEMIOTICS1

A PHYSICAL MODEL FOR

F. Eugene Yates

A great problem for the natural sciences i s to account for the apparent intentionality of living systems without reaching outside the frame of the system i t s e l f to get the answer. No deus s i machlna, no e l a n v i t a l , no smart elements a r e welcome - y e t , the s c i e n t i s t as o b s e r v e r - t h i n k e r f i n d s t h a t at a deep l e v e l h i s s c i e n c e always echoes i t s human o r i g i n s . For example, he uses various models of the atom depending on his own intentions at the moment: hard b i l l i a r d ball images w i l l s u f f i c e for some purposes, but vibrating subassemblies are needed for others. There are many convenient " f i c t i o n s " from which to choose i n c o n s t r u c t i n g a s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n ( H a l t e r , 1 980). This situation i s perhaps worsened by the r e c e n t tendency to imagine t h a t the physical universe i s ' a n t h r o p i c ' , t h a t i s , s c a l e d p e c u l i a r l y in time and space to accommodate and emphasize man. In t h i s paper we take the more t r a d i t i o n a l p o s i t i o n of m o d e r a t e (Bunge, 1977) and e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l ( A y a l a , 1975) reductionism, which we expand roughly as follows: 1)

There i s a physical universe t h a t i n c l u d e s man as a physical system, but which existed before man and i s not dependent upon him. I t i s not in any special r e l a t i o n to man, nor i s man to i t .

2)

S c i e n c e i s a community, not a s o l i p s i s t i c , human a c t i v i t y . I t emphasizes repeatability, generalizability, c l a r i t y , v e r i f i a b i l i t y (or f a l s i f i a b i l i t y ) and u t i l i t y of models. The models a r e o f t e n , but not always, c a s t in symbolic l o g i c (that i s , in mathematical form). Models are explanation.

3)

The success of a reduction!stlc program in science (e.g., quantum chemical account of the H 2 0 molecule) does not imply the success of the constructlonistlc program (e.g., prediction of the properties of liquid water from quantum chemical accounts o f hydrogen and oxygen molecular g a s e s K s e e Anderson (1 9 7 2 ) ) . There a r e e m e r g e n t properties.

4)

Science i s parsimonious in i t s explanations, which are to be s t r i p p e d of a l l t h a t i s g r a t u i t o u s or not e s s e n t i a l .

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Nevertheless, a s c i e n t i s t usually has more than one model f o r t h e ' s a m e ' p h y s i c a l s y s t e m , and he w i l l choose a p a r t i c u l a r model i n a p a r t i c u l a r i n s t a n c e a c c o r d i n g t o h i s i n t e n t i o n s a t the moment. 5)

The whole i s (crudely) more than the sum of i t s p a r t s and t h e i r i n t e r a c t i o n s because of emergent p r o p e r t i e s (which emerge out of p a r t s and t h e i r i n t e r a c t i o n s but cannot be f u l l y accounted f o r by d e t a i l e d d e s c r i p t i o n s of the p a r t s and i n t e r a c t i o n s s e p a r a t e l y ) . However, t h e whole i s a l s o l e s s t h a n t h e sum of i t s p a r t s and t h e i r i n t e r a c t i o n s because of c o n s t r a i n t s t h a t a r i s e as emergent p r o p e r t i e s out of p a r t s and t h e i r i n t e r a c t i o n s .

6)

' I n t e n t i o n a l i t y ' i s an e l u s i v e and troublesome property of a system, with r e s p e c t t o s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n .

7)

' C o m m u n i c a t i o n ' and ' i n f o r m a t i o n ' a r e t e r m s t h a t have embedded i n them t h e c u r s e of i n t e n t i o n a l i t y . Therein l i e s the d i f f i c u l t y we wish to address i n t h i s paper, i n d i s c u s s i n g the r e l a t i o n s h i p s among s i g n s , s i g n i f i c a n c e and s i n g u l a r i t i e s .

F o r a p h y s i c a l o b j e c t t o be s i g n i f i c a n c e , i t m u s t , of c o u r s e , s i g n i f i c a t i o n of meaning (semantics). view t h i s requirement i s burdensome,

a s i g n , t h a t i s , t o have c o n n o t e a s p e c i f i c a t i o n or From t h e s c i e n t i f i c point of as noted by Dennett (1978):

Anytime a t h e o r y b u i l d e r p r o p o s e s t o c a l l any e v e n t , state, s t r u c t u r e , e t c . , i n any s y s t e m (say t h e b r a i n of an o r g a n i s m ) a s i g n a l or message or command or o t h e r w i s e endows i t w i t h content, he t a k e s o u t a l&an i n t e l l i g e n c e . . . T h i s l o a n must be r e p a i d e v e n t u a l l y by f i n d i n g and a n a l y z i n g away t h e s e r e a d e r s or c o m p r e h e n d e r s ; f o r , f a i l i n g t h i s , t h e t h e o r y w i l l h a v e among i t s elements unanalyzed manalogues endowed w i t h enough i n t e l l i g e n c e t o read the s i g n a l s , e t c . , and thus the theory w i l l postpone answering the major q u e s t i o n : what makes f o r i n t e l l i g e n c e ? S c i e n t i s t s must account f o r the r i c h n e s s of behavior of organisms, a t a l l t h e i r l e v e l s of organization, by a l e v e l - s t r a d d l i n g physidal theory of i n f o r m a t i o n adequate t o a c c o u n t f o r s e l f - o r g a n i z a t i o n , apparent i n t e n t i o n a l i t y and dynamic s t a b i l i t y t h a t does not r e q u i r e a loan of i n t e l l i g e n c e . Because we b e l i e v e t h a t s c i e n c e i s u n i t a r y a t i t s f o u n d a t i o n , we a r g u e t h a t i t i s a m i s t a k e t o suppose t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n h a s an i n d e p e n d e n t , n o n - p h y s i c a l o r i g i n or r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l b a s i s i n n a t u r a l systems. I t seems t o us t h a t to be c o m p r e h e n s i v e , a r e s e a r c h program f o r t h e s t u d y of s e m a n t i c s needs components t h a t d i r e c t l y pursue the physical, dynamical b a s i s of i n f o r m a t i o n . I t should avoid the computer metaphor: computers a r e not n a t u r a l s y s t e m s , but a r e b i o l o g i c a l a r t e f a c t s whose c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s a r e l a r g e l y i r r e l e v a n t t o a p h y s i c a l a c c o u n t of

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i n f o r m a t i o n and l i n g u i s t i c behavior; they are designed to suppress t h e i r ( s w i t c h i n g ) d y n a m i c s i n f a v o r of a b s o l u t e l y a r b i t r a r y 'dynamics' executed l o g i c a l l y . A theory of n a t u r a l language should not be confused with a theory of a r t e f a c t u a l language. The l a t t e r may r e q u i r e a t h e o r y of ' f i r s t s ' or a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l b a s i s , whereas the former need not. We b e l i e v e t h a t t h e power of d y n a m i c a l a p p r o a c h e s i s b e i n g l o s t or i g n o r e d by i n f o r m a t i o n s c i e n t i s t s and l i n g u i s t s . In i t s p l a c e an i n f o r m a t i o n t h e o r e t i c h a s a r i s e n t h a t t r e a t s n a t u r a l systems without meeting the r e q u i r e m e n t s of physical dynamics. As example of t h e p e r m e a t i o n of an ' i n f o r m a t i o n ' metaphor i n t o s c i e n c e , b i o l o g i s t s o f t e n speak a b o u t t h e i r s y s t e m s i n c a s u a l anthropomorphisms such as: DNA ' c o d e s ' ' i n f o r m a t i o n ' Hormones a r e or provoke 'messengers' The ' f i d e l i t y ' of p r o t e i n s y n t h e s i s i s a s s u r e d by k i n e t i c 'proofreading' Aging and death are the r e s u l t of ' e r r o r ' c a t a s t r o p h e s Animal and plant development f o l l o w s a 'program' The h y p o t h a l a m u s ' r e p r e s e n t s ' c o r e t e m p e r a t u r e and a ' t h e r m o s t a t ' ' r e a d s ' the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n Use of such l i n g u i s t i c metaphors i n science, and e s p e c i a l l y in biology, f r e q u e n t l y r e p r e s e n t s f a i l u r e to solve a fundamental dynamical problem and the sneaking of u n j u s t i f i e d ' s m a r t ' elements i n t o the account. Above we have a c c e p t e d t h e common n o t i o n t h a t a s i g n i s an ' e x t e r n a l ' (but what i s the ' e x t e r n a l ' world e x t e r n a l to?) physical object. Semiotic s t u d i e s are obliged to account for the s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h e p h y s i c a l o b j e c t . We now w i s h t o e x t e n d and m o d i f y t h a t p o s i t i o n and t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t a s p e c l f i c a t i o n a l s e n s e of s i g n i f i c a n c e ( a s a d v o c a t e d by Gibson, 1966, 1979) can a r i s e out of s i n g u l a r i t i e s without t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of ' f i r s t s ' or 'internal representations.' ('Singularity' i s a technical notion from mathematics t h a t r e f e r s t o c o n d i t i o n s or l o c a t i o n s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h an e x c e p t i o n a l r e s u l t - such a s a sudden d i s c o n t i n u i t y , t h e disappearance of a s o l u t i o n , the appearance of a unique point, etc. T h i s m a t h e m a t i c a l n o t i o n , a s i s so o f t e n t h e c a s e , h a s p h y s i c a l c o u n t e r p a r t s . ) We p r o p o s e t o show t h a t t h e n o t i o n f r o m S a u s s u r e t h a t s i g n s have a dyadic s t r u c t u r e , or the notion from Peirce t h a t they have a t r i a d i c s t r u c t u r e does not cover a l l the p o s s i b i l i t i e s , nor even t h e most common o n e s . For S a u s s u r e and P e i r c e s e m a n t i c s e n t a i l e d t h e c o o r d i n a t i o n of a m e a n i n g l e s s s i g n w i t h an o n t o l o g i c a l l y independent e n t i t y , i t s s i g n i f i c a n c e . S a u s s u r e and Peirce viewed s e m i o t i c s as the study of t h i s problem. We s h a l l a d d r e s s t h e f o l l o w i n g q u e s t i o n i n t h i s p a p e r : Can contemporary physical theory provide any i n s i g h t i n t o how to solve t h e c o o r d i n a t i o n problem a s s o c i a t e d w i t h s i g n and s i g n i f i c a n c e , u s i n g i d e a s t h a t do n o t i n c l u d e P e i r c e ' s f i r s t n e s s or i n t e r n a l representation?

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I n t r y i n g t o a c c o m p l i s h t h e s e aims we s h a l l b e g i n by introducing some notions from classical physics that we believe are s u f f i c i e n t to o f f e r a primitive physical basis f o r some aspects of semiotics. Then we s h a l l turn to examples in which signs and significance depend upon singularities in physical f i e l d s . In one case we shall b r i e f l y indicate how i t i s that a color blind person who cannot read can stop a car at an i n t e r s e c t i o n as w e l l as you and I . We s h a l l also consider how a p i l o t lands an a i r p l a n e . He intend these examples to suggest a basis f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g a p r i m i t i v e but, we think, fundamental bond between the natural sciences and semiotics. Our approach i s shaped by a commitment to the p h i l o s o p h i c a l stance of r e a l i s m (see Gibson, 1966, 1979; Kugler and Turvey, 1984; Shaw and Turvey, 1981; Shaw, Turvey and Mace, 1982). We begin by showing what a physical account must have in i t . Here we wish to emphasize only the chief explanatory ideas of the earlier, classical physics. (An excellent source f o r some of the leading concepts of more modern physics f o r the lay person i s Feynman's book lh£ Character of Physical ¿as (1965).) WHAT IS THE CONTENT OF PHYSICS? To A r i s t o t l e , physics was the study of motion and change in a l l things. Except f o r the a d d i t i o n of s t a t i c s to A r i s t o t l e ' s notions, physics i s s t i l l largely about beings and becomings, forms and f u n c t i o n s , s t a t e s and r a t e s ; that i s , about dynamics. The content of dynamics in classical mechanics i s shown in Table 1. I t addresses mass (m), length (1) and time ( t ) in mechanical systems, and the conservations of mv° (mass), mv (momentum - angular and linear, separately) and mv2 (energy), where v i s v e l o c i t y (dl/dt). I t has two main branches - kinetics (causal forces specified) and kinematics (abstract motion without assignment of forces). TABLE 1. C l a s s i c a l Dynamics. Motion and change of matter and energy in space/time manifolds.* Aspect

Pimensipns

Some Chief Related Concepts

Kinetics (Newtonian mechanics)

m, 1, t

Forces - violent interactions; conservations such as mv , mv , mv ; symmetries; potentials; constraints; singularities; X, X phase space

Kinematics

1, t (no mass)

Non-violent interactions; singularities; constraints; symmetries; X, X phase space

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Spatial organization

1

Geometries, forms, boundary conditions

Temporal organization

t

Spectra; f r e q u e n c i e s ; functions

• Omitting charge, s p i n and o t h e r a t t r i b u t e s of i n t e r a c t i o n s i n t h e e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c and quantum physics of the 19th and 20th c e n t u r i e s .

The archetype of physical e x p l a n a t i o n t h a t we s h a l l use a s an example here i s t h e 18th century Newtonian program. So powerful and e f f e c t i v e h a s t h i s program been t h a t i t s t i l l d o m i n a t e s much s c i e n t i f i c t h i n k i n g a b o u t e v e n t s i n t h e n a t u r a l u n i v e r s e , even though we have had t o go f a r beyond t h e N e w t o n i a n program t o a c c o u n t f o r many d i s c o v e r i e s of modern r e l a t i v i s t i c and quantum physics. The Newtonian program c l e a r l y r e v e a l s how physical models of r e a l i t y are c o n s t r u c t e d ; i t r e p r e s e n t s the supreme embodiment of t h e c o n c e p t of n a t u r a l l a w a n d c a u s a l o r d e r . (In i t s r e d u c t i o n i s t i c a s p e c t s t h a t p i c t u r e shows every m a t e r i a l system as c o n s i s t i n g of m a s s p o i n t s whose v e l o c i t i e s and a c c e l e r a t i o n s c o n t a i n the s o l u t i o n of every s c i e n t i f i c problem. To understand any m a t e r i a l system from t h e Newtonian viewpoint, we c h a r a c t e r i z e i t s p a r t i c l e s and t h e f o r c e s a c t i n g on them, f o r m u l a t e t h e n e c e s s a r y e q u a t i o n s of m o t i o n , and i n t e g r a t e t h e m . ) But i t i s t h e p a r a d i g m a t i c a s p e c t of N e w t o n i a n m e c h a n i c s t h a t we w i s h t o e m p h a s i z e h e r e . I t s u p p o s e s t h a t ' t h e l a n g u a g e i n which Newton d e s c r i b e d h i s t h e o r y of s y s t e m s of mass p o i n t s i s t h e u n i v e r s a l l a n g u a g e f o r t a l k i n g about s y s t e m s i n g e n e r a l , even i f t h e y h a v e n o t been, or c a n n o t be, r e d u c e d t o s y s t e m s of mass p o i n t s . . . T h e e s s e n c e of t h i s l a n g u a g e . . . i s t h a t s y s t e m s have s t a t e s , and t h a t t h e i r behaviors a r e r e p r e s e n t e d by dynamical laws superimposed on t h o s e s t a t e s ' (Rosen, 1984b). I n t h e Newtonian p i c t u r e , a l l i n t e r a c t i o n s are forceful. They depend on t h e physical v a r i a b l e s of l e n g t h , time and mass. The product of mass and the second time d e r i v a t i v e of length ( a c c e l e r a t i o n ) g i v e s the mechanical f o r c e of t h e i n t e r a c t i o n . W i t h o u t mass, t h e r e i s no f o r c e ; w i t h o u t f o r c e t h e r e i s no i n t e r a c t i o n . S i n c e Newton, t h e r e h a s been s u b s t a n t i a l g e n e r a l i z a t i o n of m e c h a n i c s i n v o l v i n g s p a c e - t i m e c u r v a t u r e s , g e o d e s i e s , and c l a s s i n t e r a c t i o n s i n f i e l d s i n s t e a d of f o r c e s and p o i n t m a s s e s - but even t h i s expanded modern p h y s i c s w o r k s w i t h v e r y l i t t l e . Its c h i e f e l e m e n t s a r e i d e a s a b o u t s p a c e / t i m e m a n i f o l d s , and a b o u t energy and m a t t e r and t h e i r i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p . I t r e c o g n i z e s only t h r e e general kinds of f o r c e s (nuclear binding, g r a v i t a t i o n a l , and e l e c t r o w e a k f o r c e s ) . Although f o r c e s a r e n o t c e n t r a l t o modern physics, they provide economy of explanation i n many c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n which a l t e r n a t i v e , l o g i c a l l y - e q u i v a l e n t e x p l a n a t i o n s would be

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more clumsy. Physics draws upon the associations and i n f e r e n t i a l r u l e s of mathematics; i t has a few profound concepts such as symmetry, c o n s e r v a t i o n or i n v a r i a n c e , d i s s i p a t i o n , f i e l d s and p a r t i c l e s , and c o m p l e m e n t a r i t i e s . There are a few n a t u r a l c o n s t a n t s such as the v e l o c i t y of l i g h t (in a vacuum), Planck's c o n s t a n t , Boltzmann's constant, the u n i v e r s a l g r a v i t a t i o n a l constant, etc. I t has only two overarching theories: relativistic gravitational theory and quantum electrodynamics. This i s indeed a parsimonious s e t of ideas, yet p h y s i c i s t s have had the hubris to claim that with i t they can explain the entire material universe i t s origin, i t s present state and a l l of i t s happenings. Even with the simpler Newtonian program, they had gone f a r to make good on that claim. PHYSICS AND BIOLOGY - FAILURE OF THE PROGRAM OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT The epitome of the a p p l i c a t i o n of the Newtonian program to b i o l o g i c a l systems can be found i n the work of Ross Ashby. For example, in 1952 Ashby wrote: I t w i l l be assumed throughout that a machine or an animal behaved in a c e r t a i n way at a c e r t a i n moment because i t s physical and chemical nature at t h a t moment allowed i t no o t h e r action...Our purpose i s to e x p l a i n the o r i g i n of behavior which appears to be t e l e o l o g i c a l l y directed. Robert Rosen (1984b) has recently reviewed them flawed because of unduly r e s t r i c t i v e of the Newtonian picture of the universe. physics and biology has not been easy i n theoretical physics and biology have never

Ashby's claims and finds assumptions arising out The relationship between t h i s century. In f a c t , been close:

For a long time, theoretical physics has concerned i t s e l f with the a r t i c u l a t i o n of u n i v e r s a l and of general laws. From t h a t perspective, biology seems limited to a rather small class of very s p e c i a l systems, indeed i n o r d i n a t e l y s p e c i a l systems. C l e a r l y , then, organisms are not the sort of thing that physicists seeking u n i v e r s a l p r i n c i p l e s would look a t . To a p h y s i c i s t , what makes organisms s p e c i a l i s conceived as a p l e t h o r a of c o n s t r a i n t s , i n i t i a l c o n d i t i o n s and boundary c o n d i t i o n s which must be superimposed upon the true, general physical laws, and which must be independently s t i p u l a t e d b e f o r e those laws bear directly upon the organic realm. Physicists rightly f e l t that the determination of such supplementary c o n s t r a i n t s was not t h e i r job. But no p h y s i c i s t has ever doubted t h a t , s i n c e physics i s the s c i e n c e of material nature in a l l of i t s manifestations, the relationship of physics to biology i s that of general to particular. (R. Rosen, 1984a) One of the hopes of the Enlightenment, as seen e s p e c i a l l y i n

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t h e w o r k s of S a i n t Simon and Comte, r e s t i n g on t h e p h y s i c s of G a l i l e o and Newton, was t o a c c o u n t f o r phenomena of man a c c o r d i n g t o t h e l a w s and r e g u l a r i t i e s of n a t u r a l s c i e n c e . This program f a i l e d - c h i e f l y b e c a u s e t h e r e w a s t h e n no p h y s i c s f o r t r u l y complex systems. Such s y s t e m s t y p i c a l l y h a v e h i s t o r i c a l and e v o l u t i o n a r y a s p e c t s as w e l l as i n t e n t i o n a l , informational, l i n g u i s t i c or c o m m u n i c a t i v e f e a t u r e s t h a t seem t o l i e o u t s i d e of physics. Complex p r o c e s s e s seen i n t h e g e o s p h e r e ( f o r example, i n t h e w o r k s of L y e l l ) , i n b i o l o g y ( D a r w i n ) , i n n e u r o l o g y and psychology (Freud and Jung), and i n s o c i a l p r o c e s s e s (Spencer, Marx and Engels) c r u s h e d t h e hopes t h a t t h e p h y s i c s of t h e E n l i g h t e n m e n t m i g h t c o m p r e h e n d man. The p r o b l e m l a y p a r t l y i n a c c o u n t i n g f o r c o m m u n i c a t i o n and i n f o r m a t i o n i n l i v i n g s y s t e m s . Concerning i n f o r m a t i o n , J e r e m y C a m p b e l l ( 1 9 8 2 ) r e c e n t l y made t h e f o l l o w i n g strong claim: E v i d e n t l y n a t u r e can no l o n g e r be seen as m a t t e r and energy alone. Nor can a l l h e r s e c r e t s be unlocked w i t h t h e keys of c h e m i s t r y and p h y s i c s , b r i l l i a n t l y s u c c e s s f u l a s t h e s e two b r a n c h e s of s c i e n c e have been i n our c e n t u r y . A t h i r d c o m p o n e n t i s n e e d e d f o r any e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e w o r l d t h a t c l a i m s t o be c o m p l e t e . To t h e p o w e r f u l t h e o r i e s of c h e m i s t r y and p h y s i c s m u s t be a d d e d a l a t e arrival: a t h e o r y of i n f o r m a t i o n . N a t u r e must be i n t e r p r e t e d a s m a t t e r , energy and i n f o r m a t i o n . We p r o p o s e t o e x a m i n e t h a t c l a i m of C a m p b e l l and s u b s t i t u t e t h e q u e r y : Can any e x t e n s i o n of p h y s i c s a c c o u n t f o r i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h e l i v i n g s t a t e and, t h e r e f o r e , o f f e r a t h e o r e t i c a l b a s i s i n n a t u r a l s c i e n c e f o r s e m i o t i c s ? We s h a l l t r y t o show t h a t t h e a n s w e r i s •yes' and, a s Campbell s u g g e s t s , t h a t m a t t e r , momentum and energy a r e n o t p r o m i n e n t a s p e c t s of i n f o r m a t i o n . But, c o n t r a r y t o Campbell, HS b e l i e v e i i i a i i n f o r m a t i o n l a p a r t physiosLACK OF THEORY IN BIOLOGY Kurt Lewin remarked t h a t ' n o t h i n g i s more p r a c t i c a l th = n a good t h e o r y . ' N e v e r t h e l e s s , i n b i o l o g i c a l w o r k we u s u a l l y make m o d e l s of d a t a r a t h e r t h a n f a s h i o n models a n t h e o r y . To t h a t e x t e n t b i o l o g y i s immature a s a s c i e n c e . P a t r i c k Suppes (1969) h a s argued t h a t t h e m a t u r e programs i n s c i e n c e connect t h e two k i n d s of m o d e l s by some f o r m a l s t r u c t u r e t h a t i s a s e t t h e o r e t i c e n t i t y . M o d e l s on t h e o r y s p e c i f y a t h e o r y and f i t i t f o r t e s t s a g a i n s t data. M o d e l s o f d a t a may s o m e t i m e s s u g g e s t t h e o r y o r c a u s a l relationships, but a l l too o f t e n they a r e l i t t l e more than d e m o n s t r a t i o n s of s t a t i s t i c a l r e g u l a r i t i e s o r .ad hQSi p o s t u l a t i o n s of convenience. They r a r e l y go deep u n t i l they connect t o t h e o r y . They ' c u r v e f i t ' e m p i r i c a l l y . I t i s u n f o r t u n a t e , we t h i n k , t h a t t h e f o r m i d a b l e d i s c o v e r i e s of modern m o l e c u l a r b i o l o g y have weakened a p p e t i t e f o r t h e o r y . By t h e m i d d l e of t h e 1960's many l e a d i n g b i o l o g i s t s a c t u a l l y b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e c e n t r a l problem of e x p l a i n i n g l i v i n g s y s t e m s had a l r e a d y

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been solved and that a l i n e a r array of n u c l e o t i d e s was the most e s s e n t i a l f e a t u r e of the l i v i n g s t a t e . The r e s t was - as Dirac might have said also in this context - 'mere chemistry.1 No appeal to a strategic physical theory was involved in recent spectacular advances in b i o l o g i c a l science. Though physicists participated, their contributions were not of the deeply analytical sort; rather they represented tactical applications of physical methods, such as X-ray crystallography to biological materials. The successes were stunning, but only a minority of b i o l o g i s t s c o r r e c t l y suspected that t h i s rush of d i s c o v e r y would slow when i t encountered the problem of c o o r d i n a t i o n , communication, c o m p e t i t i o n , and cooperativity, which are present at a l l l e v e l s in the hierarchies within and among l i v i n g organisms. This minority thought that the next round of great advance in biological science would occur when DNA and RNA were once again seen as molecules, not as s p i r i t s or even the ¿Lan l i i a l i t s e l f . To t h i s m i n o r i t y , molecular b i o l o g y appeared r i f e with vitalism. Far from showing that l i f e had been reduced to physics, molecular biology widened the gap between them; DNA l o o k e d t o o ' i n t e n t i o n a l ' . As we have remarked above, intentionality i s one of the most elusive of a l l notions. But the appearance of intentionality i s not limited to l i v i n g organisms. PS EU DO INTENTION ALITI OF INANIMATE SYSTEMS I f a l i g h t e d candle i s covered by a t a l l c y l i n d e r , the f l a m e w i l l waver, f l i c k e r , gutter and die - smothered in i t s own exhaust. However, i f just before the death of the flame, a b a f f l e i s lowered down the center of the cylinder u n t i l i t i s j u s t above the f l a m e , the f l a m e s t a b i l i z e s , leans s t e a d i l y to one side and survives, having organized a sustaining downward d r a f t of a i r d e l i v e r i n g oxygen on one side of the b a f f l e and an exhaust of hot gases up the other side. The flame creates both a draft and a chimney. I t acts as i f i t intends to stay ' a l i v e ' . What are we t o make of t h i s ? The modern answer i s that the dynamically unstable candle flame can be restabilized by Introducing geometric constraints impressed upon i t s microcosm from outside. But the candle did not make the b a f f l e that rescued i t . For that there had t o be a ¿fijis machl na. The deepest problem in providing a physical account of l i f e i s t o accommodate the hard-to-believe fact that l i f e self-organizes and s e l f - s t a b i l i z e s and appears t o us t o be ' i n t e n t i o n a l ' as i t does so. INFORMATION AS A PHYSICAL VARIABLE OCCURRING ONLY IN BIOLOGY Varieties of information. Information has many forms; there i s no agreed-upon technical meaning of the term. Information can be s t a t i c and bound up as structure (e.g., as DNA); i t can be found in kinematic flow f i e l d s (the emphasis of this paper). I t lurks in the cooperation between variables and may look l i k e a correlation or l i k e j u s t a patterned dance of some sort with v a r y i n g phase (a loose mutual association).

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Tables 2-5 show (our view) t h a t Information always has .a s t r o n g b i o l o g i c a l dependence. Each t a b l e d e s e r v e s f u l l e r explanation, not possible here; the important point for our present purposes i s that 'information' i s a system attribute only of l i v i n g organisms or t h e i r a r t e f a c t s , and does not apply to any other a s p e c t of the p h y s i c a l universe (a claim with which many would d i s a g r e e - but which we i n s i s t upon s t r o n g l y , to avoid v i t i a t i n g the wordl). TABLE 2. " P h y s i c a l " s e t of ( b i o l o g i c a l ) i n f o r m a t i o n a l forms and processes.» (These c l a s s e s are not disjoint.) Communication Control Measurement Constraints (and complex boundary conditions) Representation Memory • Some terms that r e s t upon the notion of information, t h a t have physical r e f e r e n t s . The t a s k i s t o discover and d e f i n e those referents.

TABLE 3.

Summary of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of information.

Information pertains only to biological systems or their a r t e f a c t s (e.g., computers) I t subserves three processes that, taken together, uniquely define l i f e (Monod): Autonomous morphogenesis (Nearly) invariant reproduction Teleonomic behavior Maintaining Adapting Defending Attacking I t involves both structure (form) and function (process)

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TABLE 4. Types of i n f o r m a t i o n a l l b e l o n g i n g t o t h e b i o l o g i c a l domain - as used: I.

In biology u n i v e r s a l l y A. B.

II.

1.

Somatic

2.

Environmental

In engineering ( b i o l o g i c a l a r t e f a c t s ) A. B. C.

III.

Genetic Epigenetic

Selective (bits) Descriptive (resolution) Procedural (algorithms, r u l e s )

In s e m i o t i c s I n f o r m a t i o n i s found i n m e s s a g e s as o r d e r e d s e l e c t i o n s of s i g n s with t h e i r a s s o c i a t e d codes (the unambiguous r u l e s f o r c o n v e r t i n g m e s s a g e s f r o m one r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t o a n o t h e r ) . Information processes are the generation, encoding, propagation, decoding and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of messages.

IV.

In psychology A. B. C.

Indicative Injunctional S p e c i f i c a t i o n a l (Gibson)

TABLE 5. I n f o r m a t i o n - r i c h components or systems ( a l l a r e found: I.

In v i r u s e s

II.

In both p l a n t s and animals A.

Internal 1. 2. 3. 4.

B.

biological)

Genome Cytoplasmic s p a t i a l c o o r d i n a t e s ( e . g . , in zygotes) Microtubules or c y t o s k e l e t o n s Hormones and t h e i r r e c e p t o r s

I n t e r n a l or e x t e r n a l Cell s u r f a c e r e c e p t o r s and l i g a n d s

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C.

External Pheromones and their receptors

III.

In some animals only A. B.

Immune system Nervous system

Engineering view of information. The most restricted sense of information, as it applies to those biological artefacts we call 'machines', arises in engineering as the selective information of Shannon-Heaver coding theory. There it is just a numerical quantity that measures the uncertainty in the outcome of an experiment or a measurement to be performed. There is no semantic content. This view of information is much too impoverished to account for communication, coordination or competition within and among living systems. More broadly, information is a system attribute consisting of signals or characters representing data. Still more broadly, information arises out of anything physical that, when accessed by a biological system or transmitted from one biological system or biological artefact (machine) to another, chances .the dynamic contingencies or. memory stores second system. (In the case of a human being as a second system, information provokes change in a construct such as an idea, explanation, plan or theory, that represents a physical or mental experience or another construct or evokes memories.) Finally, for many purposes information can be treated as a biological system property in the form of some nonlinear, n-dimensional, mutual correlative measure (not to be confused with Pearson's product-moment, pairwise, linear correlation) among variables. KINEMATICS AS ABSTRACTIONS OF INTERACTION One of the difficulties in applying the extended Newtonian program to living organisms is that information in living systems whether hormonal, pheromonal, or neural; whether optical or acoustical, verbal or nonverbal - is either interaction low in energy, momentum and mass, or it is structure. Either way, it does not fit the Newtonian picture. Interactions in which the mass term is suppressed and only length and time remain as important physical variables still involve positions and velocities, but not forces. As example, Kepler's discovery of 'equal areas in equal times' is a force-free, abstract expression of motion and change (kinematics) involving interactions among planets and the sun. To Kepler's correct account of the motion, Newton added forces of interaction as causes (kinetics) from which Kepler's motions could be derived.

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Kinematics has always been part of physical dynamics (Table 1). The p r o b l e m s t h a t now c o n f r o n t u s a r e t o s e e w h e t h e r or n o t k i n e m a t i c s i s r i c h enough to account f o r communications i n l i v i n g systems and t o make communications p h y s i c a l l y causal i n the absence of N e w t o n i a n f o r c e s . In t h e example of o p t i c a l f l o w f i e l d s we i l l u s t r a t e a s e m i o l o g i c a l s i t u a t i o n i n which a ' f i r s t ' m i g h t be h a b i t u a l l y invoked as t h e explanatory c o n s t r u c t . We claim such an e x p l a n a t i o n i s g r a t u i t o u s ! I n s t e a d , we s h a l l show t h a t no p r i v i l e g e d l a n g u a g e of f i r s t s or i n t e r n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s i s r e q u i r e d , and we o f f e r as s u b s t i t u t e a purely physical d e s c r i p t i o n . The e x a m p l e p r o v i d e s a s i t u a t i o n i n which ' v i r t u a l s i g n s ' a r e t e m p o r a r i l y s e l f - o r g a n i z e d by f l o w f i e l d s . These v i r t u a l s i g n s w i l l account f o r t h e same phenomena t y p i c a l l y accounted f o r by the f i r s t s of P e i r c e o r t h e i n t e r n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of a r t i f i c i a l intelligence theories. I n t h e e x a m p l e t h e s i g n and i t s s i g n i f i c a n c e a r e c r e a t e d ( s e l f - o r g a n i z e d ) s i m u l t a n e o u s l y and jointly. In extending t h e work of Gibson (see Reed and Jones, 1982), we b e l i e v e t h a t s p e c i f l c a t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n can be p h y s i c a l l y defined a s c r i t i c a l f e a t u r e s (e.g., s i n g u l a r i t i e s and s y m m e t r i e s ) of kinematic flow f i e l d s . These f e a t u r e s a r e a f i r s t l e v e l of a b s t r a c t i o n of k i n e t i c systems (see Kugler and Turvey, 1984). Example: Optical Flow Fields. Consider, as Gibson did, how we d r i v e a u t o m o b i l e s . A u t o m o b i l e s and t r a f f i c a r e Newtonian f o r c e systems. One way t o come t o a s t o p a t an i n t e r s e c t i o n i s t o c o l l i d e w i t h a n o t h e r a u t o m o b i l e or a f i x e d o b j e c t such a s a t r e e . Such i n t e r a c t i o n s a r e Newtonian and s t r o n g f o r c e s a r e i n v o l v e d . Conversely, as we approach the i n t e r s e c t i o n we can use the flow of o p t i c a l t e x t u r e on t h e visual f i e l d (i.e., the o p t i c a l flow f i e l d ) a s a s o u r c e f o r i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t s p e c i f i e s p r o p e r t i e s about t h e c a r ' s motion and i t s environment. The o p t i c a l flow f i e l d c o n s i s t s of a widening angle of pseudoflow of t h e environment i n our v i s u a l f i e l d a s we l o o k a t a stopped c a r ahead, or a t r e e . The f l o w ' s p r e a d s out' from our f i x a t i o n point and c r e a t e s a s i n g u l a r i t y in t h e f l o w f i e l d - t h e p o i n t f r o m which a l l o p t i c a l f l o w d i v e r g e s ( F i g u r e 1). From the r a t e of widening of t h a t angle, a purely r e l a t i o n a l , k i n e m a t i c phenomenon, we can e s t i m a t e t i m e t o i m p a c t a t c u r r e n t v e l o c i t y and so change the v e l o c i t y t o avoid impact (see Lee, 1974, 1976; Lee and R e d d i s h , 1981). The j u d g m e n t s we make about how t o slow down our a u t o m o b i l e can be made f r o m t h e p r o p e r t i e s and s i n g u l a r i t i e s of t h e f o r c e - f r e e , k i n e m a t i c o p t i c a l flow f i e l d . The o p t i c a l f l o w f i e l d c a r r i e s t h e i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t s p e c i f i e s such meaningful p r o p e r t i e s as p o i n t - o f - c o n t a c t and t i m e - t o - c o n t a c t . The o p t i c a l flow f i e l d i s a s e l f - o r g a n i z i n g s t r u c t u r e , l a w f u l l y g e n e r a t e d , t h a t i n v o l v e s no m a c r o s c o p i c f o r c e s . The l a w f u l g e n e r a t i o n of t h e f l o w f i e l d s t r u c t u r e i s i n d e p e n d e n t of t h e p a r t i c u l a r , i n d i v i d u a l v i s u a l system t h a t occupies the moving point of o b s e r v a t i o n . The task- of t h e v i s u a l system i s n o t t o g e n e r a t e o p t i c a l s t r u c t u r e , but r a t h e r t o d e t e c t i t . While the d e t e c t i o n

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Figutz 7. Optical {¡low pattern aiiocMit.zd with thz approach Au/i{acz. 2 [HeAz thz AuA{,acz Jj> a t)izz thank.)

to a

o f t h e s e p r o p e r t i e s r e q u i r e s an e d u c a t i o n of a t t e n t i o n or perceptual d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n (Gibson, 1979), i t does not require any c o n s t r u c t i v e assembly processes f o r the c r i t i c a l features of the field. This same situation applies even more dramatically in the case of an a i r l i n e p i l o t who can choose t o f l y over or t o land at a particular airport. I f he i s t o f l y o v e r i t he s e e s t h e s i n g u l a r i t y i n the o p t i c a l flow f i e l d at the horizon - ground points seem to be in divergent motion from that point (see Figure 2).

TiguJio. 2. Thz outflow of, the. optic, zxpa.vni.on on thz horizon.?

awiay {¡lorn thz

{¡OC.UA

O{

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In c o n t r a s t , i f he i s to land at the a i r p o r t the s i n g u l a r i t y i s seen by him on the runway, at the point of impending touch down (see Figure 3)-

Tajquaq. 3.

The. outflow o^ thz optic atifuxy in a ¿ancUng

glide.'

All pseudomotions diverge from there. The p i l o t need not even observe the s i n g u l a r i t y d i r e c t l y to i d e n t i f y a c c u r a t e l y i t s location; any local position of the f i e l d specifies the location of the singularity. Thorn (1975), in recognition of this property, has referred to singularities as 'organizing centers' for gradient flows. The singularity i s a significant sign that specifies for the p i l o t the point of contact. Note that a person standing on the ground sees none of the o p t i c a l flow p r o p e r t i e s . The p r o p e r t i e s are a v a i l a b l e only at the moving point of observation. And i t i s a v a i l a b l e there to any visual system that occupies that point of observation. The p i l o t ' s sign i s i n a c c e s s i b l e to ground-based observers standing s t i l l . The sign e x i s t s only f o r , and i s s p e c i f i c to, a person moving with the airplane and looking out from it. The information and the s i g n i f i c a n c e are bound to the singularity and the relational transformations linking the motion of the pilot to the ground surface. F i r s t s , or i n t e r n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , when introduced as a convenient way to inquire i n t o the organization of systemic a c t i v i t y , very o f t e n assume o n t o l o g i c a l r e f e r e n c e apart from inquiry. The above examples provide i l l u s t r a t i o n s of systems in which the 'between thing' had a v i r t u a l s t a t u s dependent upon singularities in flow fields. We suspect that such singularities play a common role in informational coupling. This point has been previously emphasized by Thom (1975).

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COMPLEX SYSTEMS AND KINEMATIC COMMUNICATION A common c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a l l complex s y s t e m s - t h o s e h a v i n g atomisms with a c t i v e i n t e r i o r s - i s a delay i n equlpartitioning of energy i n t e r n a l l y , t h e r e f o r e b e t w e e n s t i m u l a t i o n and r e s p o n s e ( i n p u t and o u t p u t ) . I n t h e c a s e of- c o m p l e x s y s t e m s much of t h e i n t e r a c t i o n a l e n e r g y t h a t i n a Newtonian s y s t e m would r e m a i n b e t w e e n t h e a t o m i s m s and e x t e r n a l t o t h e m , now e n t e r s i n t o t h e a t o m i s m s and l e a d s t o a whole new s e t of phenomena. Cooperative, c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s , c i r c u l a r c a u s a l i t i e s , dynamic r e g u l a t i o n s , and n e a r - p e r i o d i c b e h a v i o r e m e r g e a t a l l l e v e l s of s t r u c t u r e a n d f u n c t i o n . ( F o r d e t a i l s s e e I b e r a l l , 1977, 1 9 7 8 a , 1 9 7 8 b ; I b e r a l l a n d S o o d a k , 1978; S o o d a k and I b e r a l l , 1978; Y a t e s and I b e r a l l , 1982; Yates, 1982a, 1982b.) A m a j o r f e a t u r e of complex s y s t e m s i s t h a t a l m o s t a l l of t h e i r couplings are ' s o f t 1 . Soft couplings are very d i f f e r e n t from our t e c h n o l o g i c a l d e s i g n s which c o n s i s t of t a k i n g a v e r y t i g h t - c o u p l e d approach through t h e i m p o s i t i o n of such c o n s t r a i n t s a s h a r d w i r i n g , h a r d m o l d i n g , h a r d a l g o r i t h m s , h a r d l e v e r s , h a r d g e a r s and h a r d controls. The t e r m ' h a r d ' i n d i c a t e s t h a t v e r y l i t t l e s l o p i s a l l o w e d and t h a t t h e b e h a v i o r i s made as d e t e r m i n i s t i c a s p o s s i b l e w i t h l i t t l e d e l a y i n t r a n s m i s s i o n s through f i e l d s . S e l e c t e d c a u s e s g u a r a n t e e c h o s e n e f f e c t s ( a c c o r d i n g t o man's i n t e n t i o n s ) . But i n t h e c a s e of complex n a t u r a l s y s t e m s i t i s d i f f e r e n t , because t h e y lack a generalized r i g i d i t y . .The l o n g d e l a y s i n e q u l p a r t l t l o n l n g of e n e r g y I n s i d e t h e a c t i v e a t o m i s m s means i i a t i f l a n o b s e r v e r t h e c a u s a t i o n of an e f f e c t m a i n o t b e a s s i g n a b l e - i t may come f r o m some e v e n t i n t h e p a s t . Such s y s t e m s h a v e m e m o r i e s ( a s s e e n p r i m i t i v e l y in t h i x o t r o p i c m a t e r i a l s ) . Both t h e e x t e r n a l c o n s t r a i n t s f r o m i m p r e s s e d f o r c e s and t h e i n t e r n a l c o n s t r a i n t s f r o m r e a c t i v e f o r c e s a r e u s u a l l y ' s o f t ' and t i m e - v a r y i n g i n c o m p l e x systems. On t h e b a s i s of t h e a b o v e d e s c r i p t i o n , we a r e r e a d y f o r a f i n a l f e a t u r e of c o m p l e x s y s t e m s t h a t t a k e s u s f a r b e y o n d t h e N e w t o n i a n p r o g r a m , y e t o n e t h a t i s s t i l l i n t h e s p i r i t of a c c o u n t i n g f o r m o t i o n and c h a n g e i n a c a u s a l f a s h i o n . He now i n t r o d u c e t h e n o t i o n of command-control p r o c e s s e s t h a t c o n s i s t of low-energy, low-mass i n t e r a c t i o n s . They m o d u l a t e t h e d y n a m i c c o n t i n g e n c i e s of c o m p l e x a t o m i s m s ; t h e y s w i t c h t h e a c t i o n ( c o l l e c t i v e ) modes. To do t h i s , t h e command-control p r o c e s s e s jouat c r e a t e p h y s i c a l - c h e m i c a l , hydrodynamlc f i e l d s t h a t a c t i v e a t o m i s m s £ a n £acsfi. These f i e l d s may be g l o b a l ( a s i n t h e c a s e of e n d o c r i n e hormonal communications), o r they may be l o c a l ( a s i n t h e c a s e of synaptic neural communications). In e i t h e r case the a c t i v e a t o m i s m s a r e c a p a b l e of p a r s i n g t h e f i e l d s by m e a n s of p h y s i c a l chemical sensors located e i t h e r at t h e i r s u r f a c e or i n t e r n a l l y (whenever t h e c h e m i c a l f i e l d can e x t e n d i n t o t h e atomism). Parsing amounts t o i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of s i g n i f i c a n t f e a t u r e s - and t h e s e a r e o f t e n t h e s i n g u l a r i t i e s of a f i e l d . P a r s i n g i s b o t h p h y s i c a l and semiotic. A b e a u t i f u l e x a m p l e of t h e p a r s i n g of a l o c a l ( c h e m i c a l and

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hydrodynamics) f i e l d i s chemotaxis in the single celled organism E. coli. This organism has a t l e a s t 20 c l a s s e s of sensors (receptors) a t i t s s u r f a c e , with about 200 r e c e p t o r m o l e c u l e s in each c l a s s . The organism can simultaneously d e t e c t 20 chemicals needed f o r i t s growth and division; i t can determine whether or not the chemical f i e l d i s adequate f o r growth and c e l l division, and i t accordingly can s t a y or move. I f i t moves, i t behaves in such a way as u l t i m a t e l y t o f i n d a s a t i s f a c t o r y r e g i o n of t h e l o c a l chemical field. I t ' s a t i s f i c e s ' without a c t i o n p o t e n t i a l s , without a nervous system, and even, for a while, a f t e r experimental removal of i t s chromosome. The motion of the organism i s k i n e t i c and involves f o r c e s ; the parsing of the chemical f i e l d i s kinematic and informational - a l l t h i s at a molecular levell The seemingly goal directed behavior that r e s u l t s i s not d i f f e r e n t in principle from t h a t of t e r m i t e s b u i l d i n g t h e i r a r c h e s or of us d r i v i n g our a u t o m o b i l e s toward an unregulated i n t e r s e c t i o n , or of a p i l o t l a n d i n g an a i r p l a n e , i e t at no point was a message communicated saying 'go t o the n o r t h e a s t border of the pond' (E. c o l i ) , or ' s t o p the c a r ' , e t c . . The g o a l - d i r e c t e d behavior i n each c a s e emerged Item kinetic/kinematic dynamical relationships from the physics of the situation. S i n g u l a r i t i e s carried s p e c i f i c a t i o n a l significance into the domain of semiotics. I t must be emphasized that kinetic/kinematic interactions, i f they a r e t o support command-control p r o c e s s e s and g o a l - d i r e c t e d b e h a v i o r , must have the c h a r a c t e r of a generalized sensory-motor mapping t h a t f u n c t i o n s as some kind of ' d e s c r i p t i o n ' . (This may have been the f i r s t function of language, before communication, as suggested by Sebeok.) MONISM VS. RELUCTANT PLURALISM We a r e s t u c k w i t h p l u r a l i s t i c a c c o u n t s - complementarities where we seek u n i t i e s - and with paradoxes. V o l t a i r e ' s Zadig was wise because he saw differences where others saw only uniformity; but the g r e a t power of i n v a r i a n c e s in s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n s s u g g e s t s t h a t he might have been w i s e a l s o t o see u n i f o r m i t i e s where o t h e r s saw only d i f f e r e n c e s . In s c i e n c e the d r i v e f o r monism, and the s e a r c h f o r unity and u n i f i c a t i o n in e x p l a n a t i o n remains strong in s p i t e of repeated shortcomings and f a i l u r e s . He have a hunger f o r s y n t h e s i s . P l u r a l i s m s , even j u s t as d u a l i s m s , a r e only r e l u c t a n t l y accepted in s c i e n c e , and then only when a single frame of reference dramatically f a i l s to account for a l l the relevant experimental data bearing on the answer to an important question, such as the nature of electromagnetic radiation (waves or particles?). Information/dynamics, we have argued here, i s not a dualism in a fundamental sense; but we must warn the r e a d e r t h a t o u r m o n i s t i c p o s i t i o n and s y n t h e s i s i s nsii t h a t of m o s t contemporary s c i e n t i s t s , as far as we can judge.

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SUMMARY In this paper we have attempted to show that there is a useful explanation that is physical, but still robust enough to address man and his communications. To do that, some kinds of information were brought within the reach of dynamics through examining the consequences of suppressing the mass dependence of kinetic systems. Out of that change a new class of interactions (kinematic) arises that provides specificational information. This specificational class of kinematic interactions has singularities, invariances and symmetries that play back out causally into the internal and external kinetic world. This, we claim, is a comprehensive and powerful notion sufficient to provide a primitive physical foundation for semiotics. Crump Institute for Medical Engineering University of California Los Angeles, California 9QQ24 U.S.A. NOTES 1.

A shorter version was presented by F. E. lates at the Third Congress of the International Association for Semiotic Studies (IASS) Palermo, Italy, June 25-29, 1984. A fuller version, with P. N. Kugler, can be found with the same title, in Semiotica (1985, in press).

2.

Figure reproduced, with permission, from Kugler and Turvey (1984).

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT It is a pleasure to thank Peter N. Kugler for his criticisms and discussions that shaped the ideas presented here. REFERENCES Anderson, P. W. (1972) More is different. Sstisass. 177 : 393-396. Ashby, W. R. (1952) Design for a £nain- London: Chapman and Hall. Ayala, F. J. (1975) Introduction. In: Studies In ¿he Philosophy of Biology, F. J. Ayala and T. Dobzhansky (eds.), Berkeley, California: Univ. of Calif. Press., pp. vii-xvi. Bunge, M. (1977) Levels and reduction. Am. J. Physiol./Reg., Int. £omfi>- £hxaifii. 233(3): R75-R82. Campbell, J. (1982) Grammatical Man; Information, Entropy, Language and Life. New York: Simon and Schuster. Dennett, D. C. (1978) Brainstorms, p. 12. Montgomery, Vermont: Bradford Books. Feynman, R. (1965) Ill£ Character Physical LaH. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

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Gibson, J. J. (1Q66) The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. (1979) Ecological Approach Visual Perception. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. Iberall, A. S. (1977) A field and circuit thermodynamics for integrative physiology. I. Introduction to the general notions. Abu jL. Physiol.: Reg., Integ., Physiol. 2: R171-180. (1978a) A field and circuit thermodynamics for integrative physiology. XI. Power and communicational spectroscopy in biology. Am. J. Physiol.: Reg., Integ., Comp. m a l o i . 3: R3-R19. (1978b) A field and circuit thermodynamics for integrative physiology. III. Keeping the books - a general experimental method. Am. J. Physiol.: Reg., Integ., Comp. Physiol. 3: R85-R97. Iberall, A. S. and Soodak, H. (1978) Physical basis for complex systems: some propositions relating levels of organization.

Collect. Phenomena 3: 9-24. Kugler, P. N. and Turvey, M. T. (1984) Information, Natural Law .and Self-Assembly q£ Rhythmical Movements; A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Erlbaum (in press). Lee, D. N. (1974) Visual information during locomotion. In: Perception: Essay in Honor of J. J. Gibson. R. McLeod and H. Pick (Eds.), Cornell Ithaca, New York: University Press. (1976) A theory of visual control of braking based on information about time to collision. Perception 5: 437-459. Lee, D. N. and Reddish, P. E. (1981) Plummeting gannets: A paradigm of ecological optics. Nature 293 : 293-294. Monod, J. (1971) Chance M Necessity. New York: Knopf. Reed, E. and Jones, R. (1982) Reasons £sr. Realism; Selected .Essays of jlames i. Gibson. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Erlbaum. Rosen, R. (1984a) ¿2JS£ Epistomologlcal Issues In Physics and Biology. Contribution to Festschrift for David Bohm (to be published). (1984b) The Physics of Complexity. Ashby Memorial Lecture (to be published) Shaw, R. and Turvey, M. T. (1981) Coalitions as models for ecosystems: A realist perspective on perceptual organization. In: M. Kubovy and J. Pomeranz (Eds.) Perceptual Organization. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum. Shaw, R., Turvey, M. T. and Mace, W. (1982) Ecological psychology: the consequence of a commitment to realism. In: W. Weimer and D. Palermo (Eds.) Cognition .and Symbolic Processes H . Hillsdale, New Jersey: Erlbaum. Soodak, H. and Iberall, A. S. (1978) Homeokinetics: a physical science for complex systems. Science 201: 579. Suppes, P. (1969) A comparison of the meaning and uses of models in mathematics and the empirical sciences. In: Studies in

¿he Methodology and Foundations oL Science, P- 18. New York:

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Humanities Press. Thorn, R. (1975) S t r u c t u r a l S t a b i l i t y a M M o r p h o g e n e s i s ( E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t i o n ) . Reading, Massachusetts: Benjamin Press, Inc. W a l t e r , D. 0. (1980) Choosing t h e r i g h t f i c t i o n s of s c i e n t i f i c l a w . Am. J . P h y s i o l . / R e g . I n t . Comp. P h y s i o l . 8: R365-R371. Y a t e s , F. E. ( 1 9 8 2 a ) S y s t e m s a n a l y s i s of h o r m o n e a c t i o n : p r i n c i p l e s and s t r a t e g i e s . In: B i o l o g i c a l Regulation and Development, Vol. 3A: Hormone A c t i o n , R. F. G o l d b e r g e r and K. R. Yamamoto (eds.), pp. 25-97. New York: Plenum Press. (1982b) Outline of a physical theory of p h y s i o l o g i c a l systems. Canadian sL aL Physiol, .and Pharmacol. 60: 217-248. Y a t e s , F. E. and I b e r a l l , A. S. (1982) A s k e l e t o n of p h y s i c a l i d e a s f o r t h e dynamics of complex systems. Mathematics and Computers JLn S i m u l a t i o n ( S p e c i a l I s s u e on Modeling of B i o m e d i c a l S y s t e m s ) , J . E i s e n f e l d and V. C. R i d e o u t ( e d s . ) , Volume XXIV, pp. 430-436.

124

VISUAL ADUCATION

Richard Zakia and Mihai Nadin

Twenty years ago Marshall McLuhan made this prophetic statement in his book Understanding Media: 'The historians and archeologists will one day discover that the ads of our times are the richest and most faithful daily reflections that any society ever made of its entire range of activities.' (McLuhan, 1964) Semiotics is a useful tool in discovering the sophistication and richness of ads. By deconstructing an advertisement, we learn how it was constructed and discover its underlying message. And by discovering its message, we also discover the way in which words and pictures work together to reinforce the message, how the alphapictorial (word and picture) components utilize gesture, art, myth, and symbol tc give emotional impact. To show how semiotics can be used to analyze an advertisement and how it might be used to aducate the general public to the subtlty and strength of advertisements, we have chosen what at first look appears to be a simple and direct ad. The ad is for Fidj i perfume and has appeared in women's fashion magazines for several years (Plate 1). Some general observations can be made. 1. Only part of the model's face is shown. Because of this omission of the upper half, the viewer can do an insertion--complete the face in his or her image --and participate in the fantasy. 2. The model is face-to-face with the viewer, but there is no eye contact--or is there? 3. Color is symbolic--ambers and yellows are considered warm, tropical, sensuous colors. 4. Note the unique way in which the model holds the elevated bottle of perfume and the finger-weave she uses to support the bottle. 5. The presence of the snake (serpent is a more romantic substitution) is obvious. Not obvious are the other things we can attribute to this symbol of the Garden of Eden. They will be revealed later. 6. Note the yellow flower in the upper left corner of the ad. One would have to look far and wide to find such an exotic flower. Could it be out of the Garden of Eden?

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7.

What might be hidden in the dark abyss to the right of the model's face--if anything? We will never know. Semiotics has been defined as the: 'knowledge science of signs' by Peirce; 'gen.eral theory of representation' by Morris; the 'theory and practice of mediation' by Nadin; and a 'general theory of signs in all their forms and manifestations among man and animals, normal and pathological, linguistic or non-linguistic, social or individual' by Eco. Since we are concerned here with advertisement, we ask, 'How does an ad mediate between the consumer and the product, Fidj i perfume?' A paradigm showing how signs function is helpful as a visual reference (Figure 1). At the left leg of the triangle is the Object to be represented (Fidji perfume). At the apex is the Representaman (advertisement) and on the right the Interprétant (consumer). The function of the ad is to mediate between the product to be sold (Fidji perfume) and the consumer. This approach allows us to evaluate three distinct relationships that constitute the sign: Object/Representaman (How well does the ad represent the product?); Representaman/Interpretant (How well does the ad communicate?); and Interprétant/Object (Was the communication significant; i.e., did the product sell?). For this paper we concern ourselves with only one component of the sign--representation. We now analyze the Fidji ad to discover how the advertising talent which designed the ad represented Fidj i perfume. To assist us, we will use another paradigm--an Interprétant M a t r i ^ (Figure 2) . The alphapictorial components of the Fidj i ad will be identified in terms of three characteristics: iconic, indexic, and symbolic. These three terms can be distinguished by using a car as an example. Iconic refers to likeness (a car looks like a car); indexic refers to imprints left by the car (tire tracks); and symbolic is the abstract convention used to represent the car (the logo). The three identifiers--iconic, indexic, and symbolic --are placed in the vertical column of the interprétant matrix. In the horizontal rows are the descriptors that probe the intended meaning (or what we think is the intended meaning) of the various elements which make up the ad. After carefully and critically studying the Fidj i ad, we begin to assign several possible meanings sucn as EXOTIC, SENSUAL, SOPHISTICATED, ANDROGYNOUS. (The list could continue, but these four meanings are adequate for illustration.) We now search the ad and isolate the © 1981, M. Nadin and T. Ockerse

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alphapictorial elements that we feel support the meanings we have assigned. In a way, we are testing our hypothesis that the ad is exotic, sensual, androgynous, and sophisticated. Exotic refers to something strikingly or excitingly different, something foreign. How is the exotic shown in the Fidj i ad? We identify as iconic a rather unfamiliar, perhaps foreign, flower to the left of the woman's face. We notice the indexic quality of words 'Paris, France' which refer to a familiar yet foreign country and the fantasies it evokes. The fragrance of Fidji is also indexic and can be inferred by the head of the snake that appears to be attracted by the smell. As for the symbolic aspect, the text in the upper right is in French; the model's color and face (partial view) suggest she is Fidjian; and the snake (serpent), of course, relates to the story of the Garden of Eden. We also note the elongated phallic shape of the model's neck and the strange flower to the left. These observations can now be abbreviated and put into the matrix. Exotic Iconic

Foreign flower

Indexic

Paris, France Suggested fragrance (snake smells it)

Symbolic

Text in French (Fidji: le parfum des paradis retrouves) Native woman Serpent (Garden of Eden) Phallic neck and flower

Next we search out the alphapictorial components that suggest the ad (perfume) is sensual. Iconically, there are the partially opened and inviting lips, the long flowing neck line and the long, loose hair. Indexically, a long feminine finger points to Fidj i. Symbolically, there are the unusual interlacing or interlocking of the fingers, which is obviously staged, the warm red, amber, and yellow of the ad, and of course the curving and coiled serpent. Again, we put these into our matrix as before.

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Sensual Iconic

Partially opened lips Long flowing neck line Long loose hair

Indexic

Feminine finger pointing

Symbolic

Interlocking fingers Warm red, amber, yellow colors Curving, coiled serpent

The third meaning assigned to the Fidj i ad is Sophistication . Iconically, the model's face is elevated and we feel that she may be looking down at us as she holds a rather fancy bottle which is laced and sealed to protect its contents. Indexically, there are the Paris address on the bottle and the French spelling of the distant Fiji Island. The placement of the ad in magazines such as Vogue is also an important factor. Symbolically , the golden glow of the bottle and the overall warm colors in the ad suggest richness and warmth. The serpent appears poised as a pet or as a signal for danger and risk. And of course we have the rather sophisticated, stage finger language which broadcasts the promise of Fidj i. Sophisticated Iconic

Elevated face Fancy bottle laced and sealed

Indexic

Paris address Fidji (the Fiji Islands) Placement of ad in Vogue

Symbolic

Rich warm colors in the ad Serpent as danger and risk (take a chance) Finger language

We now test the hypothesis that the ad has both female and male pictorial components that suggest it is androgynous. Iconically, the model's smooth face, extended neck, and slender fingers are very feminine. The flat chest and rather broad shoulders that extend beyond the ad are very masculine. Indexically, the ad is seen as a unity even though it is split down the middle--the left side with very light colors while the right side is dark and heavy. Symbolically, the yellow flower in the

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upper left has both male and female attributes. And the interwoven fingers which form an alter on which the perfume rests suggest both male and female genitalia. Androgynous Iconic

Female: face, neck, fingers Male: flat chest, broad shoulders

Indexic

Ad is half light colored (female) and half dark (male)

Symbolic

Yellow flower and fingers: female/male forms

(To further test the hypothesis that the ad is androgynous, we informally had a number of people smell the fragrance of Fidj i and tell us if it has a feminine or masculine fragrance. Most pondered the question after testing the fragrance and then, a bit puzzled, said it was somewhere in between.) Through the use of a logical, analytical paradigm such as the interpretant matrix, we now have supporting alphapictorial evidence of how the ad was constructed to represent the Fidji perfume as exotic, sensual, sophisticated, and androgynous. By deconstructing this ad, we have constructed its meaning, the meaning to be communicated to the interpreters (the audience). We are but two interpreters, and what we have presented is what we perceive as the message of the Fidji ad. The use of an interpretant matrix to deconstruct or to construct an advertisement has been used in teaching graphic design students. It has been successfully applied by a number of professional designers for various products (extending from ads to product design, communication messages, art and literature, photography, motion pictures, computer-user interface, etc.). It could and perhaps should be used in teaching photography students specializing in advertising photography. Richard D. Zakia School of Photographic Arts and Science Rochester Institute of Technology Rochester, New York, USA Mihai Nadin Liberal Arts Rhode Island School of Design Providence, Rhode Island, USA

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REFERENCES McLuhan, M a r s h a l l ( 1 9 6 4 ) . Understanding New Y o r k : M c G r a w - H i l l , p.13T

Media.

P l a t e 1. F i d j i advertisement ( c o l o r s i n t h e o r i g i n a l ad a r e amber, yellow, and red) .

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FEPRESENIAMEN

Meaning-^

Object of

Meaning2

Advertisement

Iconic

Indexic

Symbolic

Figure 2.

An I n t e r p r é t a n t matrix.

Meaning^

Meaning^

125 PAPER INTRODUCING THE PANEL ON ABDUCTION: FOUR QUESTIONS ON ABDUCTION

Massimo A. Bonfantini

FIRST QUESTION: What is the form of abduction? A. Peirce defines the form of abduction as a logical form, as a form of inference, within the framework of an exhaustive theory of reasoning. B. This theory of reasoning hinges on two fundamental theses: ( I ) that in the process of cognition there are three and only three kinds of reasoning or arguments or inferences, whichever you l i k e (from the logical angle the three terms are synonymous and i n t e r changeable) - abduction, deduction and induction; ( I I ) that in the process of cognition the three kinds of inference succeed one another in a constant and obligate order, making up a sort of "macroargument* or t r i a d i c argumentative macrounit, of which the f i r s t stage is abduction, assumption or premiss, the second deduction, analysis or explanatory mediation, and the third induction, v e r i f i cation and therefore consequent conclusion of the process. C. The f i r s t thesis rests on three kinds of consideration: of general philosophy (gnoseology-ontology-world view), phenomenology ana logical analysis. D. The logical analysis considerations are the simplest and most persuasive, at least at the most immediate level of thought. Indeed, vf the elements that enter into any inferential process are the three propositions of the syllogism o r , in Peirce's terminology, CASE, RESULT, RULE, then an elementary combinatorial calculation shows that these three elements can be ordered in six possible ways, ways that present in twos the same final term, which i s each time one of the three elements. But i t i s the l a s t element, that is the conclusion, that characterises an inferential derivation.

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The order of appearance of the two propositions that together form the basic assumption from which the conclusion derives is of no l o gical importance. E. On this basis therefore Peirce can proceed to the following d e f i nitions: Abduction s i g n i f i e s an argument that f i t s the following formula: (but) (so)

These beans are white; all the beans in this bag are white; these beans are from this bag (perhaps).

RESULT RULE CASE

This is the structure of the hypothesis, which consists in i n f £ ring "backwards" the antecedent from the consequent (here the fact of belonging to the bag from the whiteness), that i s in talking the risky reverse of the direct - and safe but banal - path of the deductive syllogism of the type: (but) (so)

All the beans from this bag are white; these beans are from this bag; these beans are white (necessarily).

RULE CASE RESULT

The induction formula runs: (and) (so)

These beans are from this bag; these beans are white; all the beans from this bag are white (unless proved otherwise).

CASE RESULT RULE

F. These definitions of Peirce do not, however, seem to be consistent with the other basic thesis of his theory of reasoning, which puts abduction at the beginning and in the controlling position in the process of cognition. According to these definitions abduction must necessarily follow and not precede induction, induction being the only amplifying inference, because i t is the only one that produces the assumption of law. G. Let us put these definitions of Peirce into brackets for the moment. And l e t us turn our attention to that famous and correct observation of Boole to the effect that the s y l l o g i s t i c inferences and constitutive elements of s y l l o g i s t i c inferences can be broken down into further and simpler inferential processes. So, i f we take the necessarily constitutive elements of an inference as such, we can repeat Peirce's combinatorial calculation by putting antecedent in place of CASE, consequent in place of RESULT and imp!ication in p l a ce of RULE. Then,|£ an inference must necessarily involve these three elements, which appear to be i n t r i n s i c to i t , i t can only cons i s t in a process in which, given two elements, the third follows.

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Thus: given a possible antecedent and a possible consequent, a connexion of implication is established between the f i r s t and the second (and this i s induction); given an implication and given the being-in-force of the antecedent of the implication, the consequent i s derived by analysis (and this is deduction); given an implication and given the being-in-force of the consequent of the impl ication, the antecedent i s inferred by re-assumptive abstraction (and this i s abduction). H. For a chart that brings out both the formal and automatic aspect and the absolutely void and basic, that i s abstract and prelogical, character of these three types of inference, compared to all possible logical systems with their various specific determinations of constitutive elements and particular r u l e s , we may as well use a symbolism reminiscent of Casari (1959). We shall thus have, for abduction:

H for deduction: H ®

for induction:

H I . The examples of Peirce cited earlier are clearly far more complex than these three formulas. The fact i s that abductions, deductions and inductions of the kind Peirce mentions are not elementary because they pass through generalisation. And generalisation is not the immediate result of an induction. Generalisation i s in essence hypothetical: the outcome of an abduction applied to an inductively inferred conclusion. Even the elementary inferences typified in the three formulas are simple and immediate only in the t r a n s i tion from the premisses to the conclusion, the statement of the premisses being the outcome of inferences, and so on. A generalisation

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l i k e "All the beans from this bag are white" emerges f i r s t of all from an induction, which in turn has a complex history, and then from the application of an abduction to the conclusion of this i n duction. Let us look at the two stages. a.1. The investigation starts with a finding, with a result (res u l t because deduced in i t s turn from the inclusion of an observed case under a rule). Let the finding be started thus: "These beans are white", or, in symbols, Ba. a.2. The question may be: how can I explain the occurrence of these white beans? where do these white beans come from? a.3. I therefore cast around, by means of an abstractive-abduc tive process, for the case that seems to f i t , in the hypothetical past of the beans reconstructed in my memory or on others' informa tion: "These beans come from this bag", or, in symbols, Sa. a.4. By means of a synthetic-inductive process I put the two assertions together: BaSa a.5. By means of an analytical process I have the two assertions in a time sequence (according to the presumed order in which the characters came out): Sa Ba . a.6. I apply the induction formula to the premisses thus order ed and infer the following implicative connexion: Sa->- Ba . ("These beans, by reason of the fact that they come from this bag, are white"). b. But i t is the conclusion of this induction, this connexion, this regulated reference, that now constitutes a problem: how i s i t , why i s i t that these beans, because they come from this bag, by reason of this fact, are white? How can this concomitance be explain-

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ed? Obviously by thinking up a plausible hypothetical condition that accounts for the observed-attributed concomitance, a hypothesis from which this concomitance necessarily r e s u l t s . I can now resort to generalisation, and so I posit one (following a form, a habit of thought that i s scrobvious and automatic as to appear psychologically a simple extension of an induction). I po s i t the generalisation not to sum up but to account for the outcome of the induction (the generalisation, like any law, i s hypothetical and therefore has an explanatory and predictive value). The general i s a t i o n emerges from the following abduction: Sa ->Ba (x) (Sx-> Bx)->(Sa ->• Ba) (x)(Sx + Bx). J. At this point, thinking in terms of the triadic argumentative ma crounit process, we can represent i t on an axis of formal logic in these two ways, the second being obviously more analytical:

!

Result

(Consequent

Rule Case Rule

j Implication (Antecedent /Implication

Case Result Case

|Antecedent (Consequent (Antecedent

¡ i

Result «Consequent K. The disadvantage of these representations i s that they do not Rule (implication show the necessary continuity of the process (that i s the fact that the conclusion of every single inference must at the same time be the starting-point of the next inference) and that they hide the growth of sense that the triadic macroprocess involves (that i s the differences between the acquisitions of meaning of the terms themselves in the transition from one inference to the next). These two requirements are s a t i s f i e d by this other representation - on the epistemological axis:

¡

Surprising fact Implicative connexion Explicative law

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DEDUCTION

INDUCTION

I I

Explicative law Accomplished fact Predicted fact Prediction of fact Finding of fact Confirmatory connexion

L. The schema might be expressed in formulas that are more analytical and j u s t i f i e d by the necessary intermediate steps. However, I need only suggest the following (and last) representation - on the modal axis:

I ¡ I

Existence

ABDUCTION

DEDUCTION

INDUCTION

P o s s i b i l i t y (logical) Necessity (assumed by decision) Necessity (habitual: destination) Existence P o s s i b i l i t y (prediction) P o s s i b i l i t y (ongoing prediction) Necessity (constraint: finding) Existence (precise confirmation)

The conclusion of an abduction, for the reasoner, holds good as from i t s immediate future; the conclusion of a deduction from i t s immediate present; the conclusion of an induction from i t s immediate past. SECOND QUESTION: What and how many kinds of abduction are there? A. I t i s i n t u i t i v e , and f u l l y explained elsexhere (Bonfantini-Proni, 1980), that the "creative orience", that i s creativeness and o r i g i n a l i t y , of abduction hinges on the quality of the mediation law. We shall thus have three degrees or types of abduction: FIRST TYPE OD ABDUCTION - the applicable mediation law for i n f e r r ing a case from a result i s mandatory and automatic or semiautomatic; SECOND TYPE OF ABDUCTION - the applicable mediation law for i n f e r r ing a case from a result i s sought by selection from the available encyclopedia; THIRD TYPE OF ABDUCTION - the applicable mediation law for i n f e r r ing a case from a result i s constituted ex novo, invented.

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B. The third type of abduction comprises three subtypes, according to the modality of constitution of the mediation law. SUBTYPE I - the mediation law i s a mere extension to another semantic f i e l d of a form of implication already present in the available encyclopedia; SUBTYPE I I - the mediation law combines ex novo two (sets of) elements already present in the semantic universe of the available encyclopedia; SUBTYPE I I I - the mediation law introduces a factitious term into i t s logical antecedent. THIRD QUESTION: Are there "laws of hypothesis"? Or rather is i t possible to lay down guiding principles for "guessing right"? A. I t i s f a i r l y obvious that drawing up the logical form of abduction within the logical form of the cognitive-reasoning process on Peircean lines i s not equivalent to laying down a method for d e r i v ing f e r t i l e abductions or arriving at cognitively relevant and effective discoveries. But i s i t possible to specify such a method? The d i f f i c u l t y l i e s in reconciling two requirements that both seem to be necessary and yet contradictory to one another. On the one hand, the assumption of sheer hypothesis, that i s abduction of the third type and outstandingly of subtype I I I , seems to be most rewarding when i t i s most creative and innovative. Hence the impos i t i o n of a method on procedures of excogitation of hypothesis is bound to seem to be a brake on creativity. Indeed, when the method is expressed in a closed corpus of prescriptions, i t must appear to be designed to hinder radical innovations that contest the status quo. But, on the other hand, i f we accept that the productivity of a hypothesis l i e s in i t s effectiveness, that i s in i t s power to p r e dict events and to control the effects of praxis, the essential e c o nomics of s c i e n t i f i c enterprise would seem to demand some sort of guide to or method of selection in order to avoid the dispersion of effort on the endless byways of the improbable. B. Now, bearing in mind the requirement of effectiveness, Peirce in The Logic of Drawing History from Ancient Documents engaged in a b r i l l i a n t attempt to establish the principles that 'should guide us in abduction, or in the process of choosing a hypothesis' (7.219). He wrote: The only way to discover the principles upon which anything ought to be constructed is to consider what i s to be done with the con-

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structed thing after i t is constructed. That which i s to be done with the hypothesis i s to trace out i t s consequences by deduction, to compare them with results of experiment by induction, and to d i ~ scard the hypothesis, and try another, as soon as the f i r s t has been refuted; as i t presumably will be. How long i t will be before we l i g h t upon the hypothesis which shall r e s i s t all tests we cannot t e l l ; but we hope we shall do so, at l a s t . In view of this prospect, i t is plain that three considerations should determine our choice of a hypothesis. In the f i r s t place, i t must be capable of being subjected to experimental testing. I t must consist of e x p e r i ential consequences with only so much logical cement as i s needed to render them rational. In the second place, the hypothesis must be such that i t will explain the surprising facts we have before us which i t i s the whole motive of our inquiry to rationalize. This explanation may consist in making the observed facts natural chance r e s u l t s , as the kinetical theory of gases explains facts; or i t may render the facts necessary, and in the latter case as implicitly a s serting them or as the ground for a mathematical demonstration of their truth. In the third place, quite as necessary a consideration as either of those I have mentioned, in view of the fact that the true hypothesis i s only one out of innumerable possible false ones, in view, too, of the enormous expensiveness of experimentation in money, time, energy, and thought, is the consideration of economy (7.220). Peirce concluded his analysis by supplying a l i s t (7.232) of the re quirements that a hypothesis must have before i t is tested, before i t i s subjected to verification by experimental testing: Experiential character of the hypothesis. as natural concomitants Its explaining all the facts

. . . . fCorollarial as deduction iTheorematic Cheapness . 1T ^ . 1I n t r i n s i c

Economical considerations

,, , (Naturalness Value