Signs of Humanity / L’homme et ses signes. Proceedings of the 4th International Congress. International Association for Semiotic Studies

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Gerard Deledalle (Ed.) et al.

SIGNS OF. HUMANlli;Y, /4 L'HOMME Eli SES SIGNES

VOLUMEl

APPROACHES TO SEMIOTICS [AS]

Approaches to Semiotics 107

Editorial Committee

Thomas A. Sebeok Roland Posner Alain Rey •

Mouton de Gruyter Berlin New York

Signs of Humanity L'homme et ses signes Edited by/Edites par Michel Balat and Janice Deledalle-Rhodes General Editor: Gerard Deledalle Volume I Proceedings of the IVth International Congress Actes du IVe Congres Mondial International Association for Semiotic Studies Association Internationale de Semiotique Barcelona/Perpignan, March 30- April 6, 1989

Reading Commiuec/Comitc de lecture (Nominated by the Executive Board of the IASS/Nomme par le Bureau Directeur de l'AIS): Manfred Bicrwisch, Berlin; Massimo Bonfantini, Naples; Oagfin Follcsdal, Copenhagen; Beatriz Garza tel. Une demi~re question theorique que soul~ve la metaphore consideree sous l'angle de la scmiologic. question qui est particuli~rement a propos quand on parle des faits the.4traux. Les cas qu'on vient d'evoquer incitcnt a s'interroger si toute transposition de signes verbaux en signes non verbaux n'est pas une operation mc!taphoriquc? Une telle extension du concept de metaphore ne me parail pas justiliec. Si le mot "chaise" sc trouve materialise dans un spectacle par l'objet "chaise•, ii y a transcodage qui nc suppose a priori aucune operation metaphorique. Le signe linguistique est simplement remplace par le signe scc!nogrclphique et s'il y a changement de signifiant, le signific! (idee de la chaise) reste le m~mc. Ceue remarque nous am~ne a preciser la fonnule dc!finissant la metaphore (v. supra). Si tout p ~ mc!taphorique implique un transfert par substitution analogique. tout transfert par substitution analogiquc n'aboutit pas neccssaircment a une metaphore. Cela est surtout valablc pour ce que nous avons defini commc metaphorisation hetc!rosemioti~ue ou transsemiotique. Sans ceue restriction. toute misc .en sc~nc, toute r~hsation thc!atralc d'un texte liueraire serait, a priori, une metaphore. Et ce terme perdrait sa pertinence. On aurait pu meure sur l'affiche: La po11dre a11x ye11x de Labiche metaphorisc!e par Pierre Mondy et la troupe de la Comedic Fran~ise. Ce qui serait encore plus insolite que: le so11Jier de satin mis en signes par Antoine Vitez.

Note I. J'ai CAamint ce dilcnunc clans l'arliclc "Avan1-earde, modcmi1e. cru1ivi1t: Jeu insolilc cn1rc signifianis, signifits et rermois au lha1rc" (Kow1.llll 1986).

La mflaphorc est-die un signc?

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References Aris1occ ( 1965). Poltique. trad. par J. Hardy. Paris: Les Bcllcs l.etltCS . • ( 1973). Rhltorique, trail. par M. Dufour et A. Wartdlc. Paris: Les Belles Lcu.rcs. Groupeµ (1982). Rhitorique ginlrale (= Points 146). Paris: Seuil. Jakobson, Roman ( 1963). &sais de lingulstique ginirale, lrad. par 1'. Ruwet Paris: f..d. de Minuil. • (1973). Queslio11s de poitique. Paris: Scuil. Kow1.an, Tadeusz (1986). "Avant-garde. modcmi1~. crulivil~: Jcu insolilc cnlrc signilian1s. signili~ cl ~fmnts au 1batrc". Semiolica 59 (1·2). 69-91. Metz, Christian (1977). u signifiant imaginaire. Psycha,10/yse et cini111a. Paris: Union Gaiaalc d'Edilions. Rilfalcm:, Michael (1979). /.,a production du lexle. Paris: Seu.ii.

Semiotics of Words and Actions Andre Delobelle

Abstract The present tendency in semiotics is to lhink of it and use it as if it were a physical science. This has 1he advantage of formulating semiotics in Peircean terms. However, ii has the disadvantage of ruling ou1 the psychological aspect of semiotics, which is prevalent in semiosis, i. c. the attribution of significance.

Semiotique du dire et semiotique du faire Au scns strict, ii nc peut evidcmmcnt y avoir de signcs qu'au regard d'un quclconquc sujct-obscrvateur, done psychique, capable de les percevoir ou de lcs utiliser, voire memc de lcs crccr. Le tcrme re~it cependant aujourd'hui une acception de plus en plus large. dcpassant de 1r~ loin le scul domaine des sujets doucs de psychisme. Ainsi, on considcre quc •ta proprictc la plus fondamentale de la vie, c'est prcciscment le phenomene scmiotique• (Scbcok 1974: 65-6), et ii est mlmc desormais question de •scmiophysiquc• (Thom 1988). Par effet de retour, le sujct psychique n'apparait plus que commc l'un de.,; nombreux "utilisateurs• de signes se rcncontrant dans la nature. Pareille extension de la notion de signc est parfaitcment lcgitime. Elle est surtout tr~s caractcristique d'une science positive dont les progrcs ont ~te intimcmcnt lies (et le sont encore) ll une misc entre parentheses du probleme du sujet-obscrvatcur. Elle oblige tou1cfois ll specifier avec d'autant plus de precision cc qui peut distinguer le signe utilise par un tcl sujet psychiquc, de tout autrc 1ype de signes fonc1ionnan1 hors d'un 1el domaine. En bref, ccla rcvient ii tenter de dislingucr en1re le signe •psychologiquc• ou "in1en1ionnel" (conscient ou non), et cclui qui ne l'cst ll aucun titre. La misc en evidence de critcrcs distinc1ifs, r~futables et falsifiables (Popper 1972), foumira par le fait m@me une contribution esscntiellc a la definition des phcnomcncs proprcmcn1 humains. Ces cri1crcs, inscpar.1blcs de logiques egalcmcnl diffcrcnlcs, rcvclenl en effe1 la presence de processus quc lcs sciences physiques (au sens large de cc lerme) pretendent pouvoir cxclure de leurs propres phenomcnes en en cxcluant la presence d'un sujct-obscrvatcur. Mais la notion de psychisme deborde celle de l'humain. En inlroduisant la distinction, deja d'origine semiotiquc (Dclobcllc 1987), cntre le "faire· et le

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"dire• (a defaut de pouvoir fonder ici davantage ceue distinction), nous avons un point de depart pour separer, parrni les sujets psychiques, ceux qui sont r~uits au seul "faire" de ceux qui, comme l'Homme, peuvent se servir cgalement du "dire". Ceue distinction presente, en outre, l'avantage de pouvoir l!tre aisc!mcnt trans~ dans le vocabulaire sc!miotique de Peirce.

I. L'iconique et le symbolique Partons d'un exemple simple, !'impact d'un projectile sur un mur. Un tel phenom~nc etant de nature •artificiclle", l'action de depart. celle de tircr avec une arme a feu, comporte deux aspects. ii la fois differcnts et complemcntaires: les motivations de l'actcur maniant l'arrne (aspect psy), d'unc part, et la sequence physique commen~ant au moment oil celui-ci appuie sur la detcnte et allant jusqu'a l'instant de l'impact du projectile sur le mur (aspect non psy ou physique), d'autre part. Cependant, ii l'arrivee, cet impact n'est plus lui-meme, en tant que tel, qu'un phenom~ne purement physique (non psy). II en va ainsi comme pour "un moulage avec un trou de balle dedans comme signe d'un coup de feu; car sans le coup de feu ii n'y aurait pas cu de trou; mais ii y a un lrou Iii, que quelqu'un ait l'idce de l'allribuer ii un coup de fcu ou non" (Peirce 1978: 140). Dans la terminologie de Peirce. un tcl phenom~ne. done purement physique. en !'absence de tout obscrvatcur, est appcle represe11tame11 ( 1978: 148). ~s lors, l'aspcct psychologique est reintroduit, ii l'arrivce (moment B), par la perception qu'a de !'impact un individu-observateur passant par Ill. Par cet acte de perception, toujours scion Peirce, ce representamen prend la qualite de sig11e: "un signc est un reprcsentamcn qui a un intcrpretant mental•. car "ii est possible qu'il y ail des representamens qui ne soient pas des signes" (Peirce 1978: 148). Representamen et signe constituent done, ensemble, !'equivalent de !'action de depart, au moment du tir (moment A). l'un repr~entant !'aspect physique et l'autre !'aspect psychologiquc. En tant qu'enscmble simplcment physique, !'impact est a la fois forme et maticrc, l'un sc definissant par l'autre (contenant/contenu) et pouvant sc presenter d'une manicrc plus ou moins composite. Ainsi, un clement chimiquc se definit par une formule indiquant la fa~on dont la forme (rclationnellc) intcgrc les materiaux (atomes). etant donnc qu'il existc un rapport entre les propriet~ de ceux-ci (valence) et la f~on dont ils s'int~grent au sein de la moh!cule. Ces dcux intcgr.ttions ctant rcciproques entre elles (forme-mati~re et mati~re-forme), les elements chimiques se distinguent entre cux par (curs formulcs d'cnsemblc. Quel quc soil lcur degrc de complexite interne, lcs objcts physiques ou naturels sont done toujours descriptibles en tcrmcs de formc et de maticre se conditionnant ou se diter111i11a111 l'un l'autre (unc "loi" scientifiquc n'etant jamais qu'une cxplicitation de la forrne). En rempla5ely for why it works so well for so many people for so much of the time. An emphasis on the pragmatic elements of learning is supported by pragmatic philosophy and semiotic theory. According to the second of Charles Peirce's three trichotomies (cf.• Buchler 1955; Mertz 1985), signs may be distinguished in terms of their different relationships with objects. That is, "a sign can refer to an object by virtue of an inherent similarity between them (icon). by virtue of an existential contextual connection between sign and object (index), or by virtue of a general law that permits sign and object to be interpreted as connected (symbol)" (Mertz 1985: 3). A supermarket noor (Lave et al. 1984). a milk case (Scribner 1984), and the word 'chair' constitute examples of an icon, an index, and a symbol respectively. Although it is generally assumed that most symbols are acquired in semantic, or context-free. situations. indexes depend on context and, in fact, cannot exist without context. Pragmatic meaning of the kind derived from indexes is meaning that is context-dependent. The everyday thinking that tends to be done well by most members of a given society tends to be pragmatic in form and thus relies heavily on contextual cues. This line of thought has substantial implications for the school's curriculum. If, as argued here, each ability system has its own sign system, then it should be possible to describe the signs of each intelligence and to apply these descriptions in syntactic, semantic, and especially pragmatic realms. Learners can be encouraged to function in their preferred or stronger sign systems and to perform pragmatically as well as semantically in these systems. To conclude, four arguments have been presented to underline, and 10 support further development in, the semiotic foundations of modern schooling. It is hoped that, by viewing schooling as a means of educating society's members in the signs of that society, schooling will be seen as far more engaging, relevant, and purposeful to the consumers than it is presently.

References Buchler, Ju.s1u.s ( 19SS). Philosophical Writings of Peirce. New York: Dover. f:ps1ein, Terry (1988). •crea1ing Curricula rrom Con1cmpo,wy Concc:ptions or Cognition". Paper prcscnlcd at lhc mcc1ing or lhc American Educalional Rcscardl A$$()Qation, New Orleans, LA. Gardner, Howard (1983). frames of Mi11d: The T11eory of Multiple l11tel/ige11ces. New York: Basic. Lave, Jean, Murtaugh, Michael, and de la Rocha. Olivia ( 1984). "The Dialcc1ic or Arithmclic in Grocery Shopping". In Everyday Cognition: Its De,~lopment in Social Context. Barbara Rogoff and Jean Lave (eds.), 67-94. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Unh·ersity Press.

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Me11i, Eli7.abelh (1985). "Beyond Symbolic Anlhropology: lnltoducing Semio1ic Mediation". In Semio1ic Mediation: Sociocultural and Ps)'chological Perspectives. 6izabe1h Mertz and Richard J. Parmentier (cds.).1-19. Orlando: Academic Press. Reeve. Roberl A .• Palinscar. Annmarie S .. and Brown. Ann L. (1987). "Everyday and Academic Thinking: lmplica1ions for learning and Problem Solving•. Journal of Curriculum Studies, 19. 123-133. Resnick, Lauren B. (1987). "Leaming in School and ou1". Educa1iona/ Researcher,16(9), 13-20. Rogoff. Barbara (1984). "ln1roduc1ioa: Thinking and Leaming in Social CoalCJll". lo Everyda)' Cognilion: Its Devrlopme11t i11 Social Contol. Barbar.a Rogoff and Jean Lave (eds.). 1-8. Cambridge. MA: Harvard Universi1y Press. Scribnet, Sylvia (1984). •s1udyine Workine lo1elliecncc•. In Everyday Cognition: lls Developme111 in Social Con1u1. Barbara Rogoff and Jean Lave (eds.), 9-40. Cambridge. MA: Harvard Univenily Press. Siegel. Marjorie ( 1985). "The Heuristic Power of Transmedialion". Paper presemed al 1hc mcc1ing o( 1he Amcricon Educational Rescatcll Associa1ion. Chicago. S1ernbere. Rober1 J.• and Waener. Ridiard K. (eds.) (1986). Practical /111el/ige11ee: Na1ure a11d Origi,,s of Competence i11 tl~ Ewtryday World. Cambridge: Cambridge Uoiversily

Press. While. Robct1 W. ( 1959). "M01iva1ioo Rconsidered: The Conccpl of Compe1encc•. Ps)'chological Review. 66. 297-333.

The Newspaper's Discourse: Enunciation and Construction of Reality in the Speech of Journalism Gerard Imbert

Abstract From a corpus of elite newspapers, we shall analyse the discursive process of enunciation, actoralization and typification of the news in the daily discourse of the newspapers. The method is inspired by the semiotic of A.J. Greimas and we shall study the production of a discourse that tends to represent reality objectively but besides builds up the reading skills of the reader. We shall study more particularly tllo.$e strategics through the visual modalities of the newspaper El Pafs in the infonnational discourse and in the editorials: the pouvoir-dire (be able to say) and its reverse: non-dit (understood) and pouvoir ne pas dire (be able not to say) as the emissive competenoe of the newspaper. The newpaper is a textual actant which builds up reality discursively.

Le discours du journal: mise en discours et construction de la realite dans la presse quotidienne

Introduction: On donnera ici un bref aper~u sur lcs procedures d'i11stitutio11 de la realite dans le discours du journal dans une perspective deliberement syncretique en cmpruntant A la fois ala ~miotique et ala sociologie. Le concept peut l!tre en cffet envisage comme •construction de la r~lite• au sens o~ l'entend la sociologie de la connaissance (Berger, Luckmann 1967; Tuchman 1978), mais aussi la semiotique pour laquelle le sujet se construit dans le discours, et renvoie par ailleurs a ce que Pierre Bourdieu (1982) appclle les rites d'institution: toute pratique socio-discursive qui contribue A instituer symboliquement le reel et va au-dela de la simple reproduction d'un referent pretendument objectif (oe qu'on appelle communement l'actualite)I.

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II y a en effet un di.scours du journal (Imbert 1988) qui se dessine derrierc toute infonnation, qui rcleve d'une compete11ce formelle: Un pouvoir d'instituer le reel, de crecr sa propre rcalitc rc!fc!rentielle ii travers lcquel le journal s'institue lui-meme comme rc!fc!rent pour le public, la classe politique et Jes autres m6dias, jusqu'll parfois d61oger le referent objec1if (ce "rc!el" qui fail c!cran Ala reprc!sentation). Le rOle des journaux que nous avons qualifies dans le cadre d'une recherche collective comme "journaux de rc!fc!rence dominante" est fondamental ii cet c!gard (Imbert, Vidal-Bcneyto 1986). On partira ici de deux prc!supposc!s mc!thodologiques amplement dc!montrc!s dans les analyses de sc!miotique appliquc!e menc!es par ailleurs: I. La rc!alitc! offerte par le journal (!'information) est un objet co,istruit, dent la construction obc!it ii des operations qui font intervenir des sous-codes propres au langage journalistique, relevant ii la fois du verbal et du nonverbal, mais dont la composante visuelle est indc!niable (l'c!crit lui-meme, dans le titrage par cxemple, est passible d'une lecture iconique). II y a par ailleurs a l'intc!rieur du verbal diffc!renlS types de discours qui rcpondent ii des genres diffcrenlS (argumentatif pour l'l!ditorial, narratif pour le reportage, dialogique pour !'interview, etc.). 2. Derrierc toute infonnation, meme la plus "objective•, ii y a un sujet ma11ipula1e11r. un sujet modal doll! d'une certaine competence particulierement perceptible dans les stratc!gies visuclles des grands quotidiens, surtout lorsqu'ils utilisent la photographic, comme c'est le cas pour le journal El Pals sur lcquel nous avons centre! notre l!tude. La question finale sera de savoir si l'on peut ramener ce.~ discours dc!veloppes par le journal ii diffcrents types de presse, ii des "modelcs" (idc!aux, virtucls) que chaque quotidien rc!aliserait de fa~on graduelle. C'cst poser la possibilitl! d'une typologie de la presse en c!vitant de tombcr dans une vision trop dichotomique. C'est pourquoi lorsque je distinguerai deux grands modeles (qui fonctionncnt ici comme invarianlS, pOles, extremes pas toujours intc!gralement rc!alisc!s): - presse de reference (la prcssc dite sl!rieuse. la prcssc d'c!lite), et - presse populaire (qui peut tomber dans la presse a sensation), je le fcrai en termes graduels, prefc!rant parter de "degrc! d'objectivitc!", de "polc!micitl!", de "populisme•, de •scnsationnalisme•, (.'Omme autant de composantcs qu'on pourra trouver de fa~on plus ou moins panachl!e, c'est-ildire rarement 11 l'c!tat pur. Enfin on pourra se demander dans quelle mesure ces grands modele.~ impliquent un rapport diffl!rent Ala Loi (et ii son infraction), au Pouvoir et a ses reprcsentants... C'est done ici un parcours mc!thodologique qui va des l!noncc!s ii l'c!nonciation, des discours produits 11 leur production, de l'infonnation aux modeles journalistiques qu'elle sous-tend, ii partir d'une approche fonnelle que je m'efforccrai de poser en termes de modal ill!: le pouvoir-voir du journal ii uavers ses suatc!gies visuelles.

Lcducoursdujoumal...

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I. L'information comme code Le mode d'inslitution de la realitt dans le journal n!pond a un code qu'on peut dtcomposer en trois grandes ~rations:

I. LA categorisatio11: C'est une opt!ration logique qui renvoie l'tvtnement a un classement conceptuel, d'ordre paradigmatiquc: cattgorie politique, sociale, tconomique, culturelle, etc.• qui dans l'espace du journal correspond a la misc en rubrique et ren~te le faire dichotomique du journal. 2. LA "stmulardisatio11•:

C'cst cc que Gaye Tuchman appclle "typification"; une representation de la nouvelle fonction: I) d'une hitrarchisation propre au code journalistique (informations vs fail divers, nouvellcs "importantes• vs nouvellcs "inttressantes•. d'inttret politique vs d'inttret humain ...), 2) du destinataire: c'est ainsi qu'un journal de n!ftrence commc El Pafs tend a offrir une vision conceptualist!e de l'tvtnemcnt alors que la prcssc populaire (Diorio 16 par exemple) off re du meme t!vt!nement une vision actantialisee (Imbert 1989). La standardisation est une ~ration symboliquc (de misc en discours) qui offre une vision plus ou moins digt!n!e de l'actualitc! en fonction de la compc!tence du lecteur, qui dtterminc par consc!qucnt lcs stratc!gies informationnellcs et communicationnellcs du journal, en par1iculier dans les c!ditoriaux. J. LA tllimatisatio11:

C'est la sc!lection d'un th~me et son inclusion dans l'univcrs thc!matique du journal: opt!ration sc!mantique qui consiste a rc!duire le dcgn! de oomplexi tc! de la rtalitt socialc et a crter des th~mes communs; opt!ration arbitraire, done, excluantc, discriminante, qui contribue a mettrc en place un univers de n!fc!rence ("age11da-setti11g").

II. L'infonnation comme discours L'information offerte par le journal est un objet complexe: I - C'est un objet double quant a sa nature: - ensemble d'tnoncts (lcs contenus de l'actualitc!), • mode d'c!nonciation dont le sujet est diffus, offrant un "point de vue• (une vision plus ou moins idc!ologisc!e de l'actualitc!).

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2 - C'cst un objet composi tc quant a son articulation et a ses supports (oil altcrnent le tcxtuel et l'iconiquc). 3 - C'est un objet Mterog~ne: qui utilise diffc!rcnts sous~cs. C'est un discours syncretique, lieu de convergence de plusieurs discours et de differen1s types d'1foonciation oil coexistent une enonciation objective (l'inforrnation) et des enoncialions subjectivcs (!'opinion). II obl!it ccpendant a unc organisation textuellc (globale) et rc!pond a 1rois types d'isotopies: - chronologique: c'esl un discours en diachronic qui, par la pc!riodicite. convertit le deroulcmcnl acciden1el de l'his1oire en ordonnancemcnt familier de l'ac1uali1e, crc!ant des sc!qucnces narra1ivcs, procc!dant ainsi a une certaine domcs1ica1ion de l'imprevisible. - logique: ii repond a un mode d'organisation specifique qui met en place un atlas informationncl, une encyclopc!die cognitive. - formelle: ii obl!il a un mode de reprtscnta1ion du rc!el qui transcrit la rc!alitc! en fonction d'un certain nombre de r~gles consignc!cs dans lcs manucls de style de la profession.

Ill. Strategies visuelles de la presse: le cas de El Pais J'en1cnds par strategies visuelles la fa~on donl le journal donnc a voir l'actualite a travcrs son discours mo11stratif. dont les principaux supports sont: - la unc, les pages de deba1. le sys1~me des ti ires et bicn sOr, la pholo mais dont on trouve des traces dans la composi1ion de la page. le rappon tcxle/image, 1ex1e/article, unc/pagcs intericurcs. II y a la tout un 1ravail demise e11 espace qui csl fondamental dans le journal et rcl~vc d'un code propremcnt journalisliquc. Les s1ra1egies visuelles du journal de1ermincn1 le degrl de jigurativite du discours joumalislique. II esl certain que celui-ci sera plus fort dans la prcssc populaire, encore que la pressc de refc!rence peut 1omber dans la tentalion d'une visualisa1ion quclquefois excessive (c'est le cas de El Pais qui accordc unc grc1ndc part a la photo en prcmi~rc page), voire m!me ou1ranci~re. Les stratc!gics visuelles delimitent un parcours qui va de la dc!noiation a Ia connotation (qui varic en fonction du degrc! de redondancc du discours iconique) en passant par la modalisalion et pcut alter outrc la refcrenciation pure pour tombcr dans le "rcvcrs du voir". - Exemple de monstration pure (degrc! :rero de denotation): les canes. graphiques, dcssins ou photos purement rc!ferenticllcs (portrc1its de leaders politiques par exemple) qui accompagnent un article d'inforrnation (cf. doc. n°1).

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• Mais le journal pcut jouer sur les connoiations et doriner A voir l'aura d'un personnage public, le statut symbolique d'un objet par d«ontextualisation/reconte,uualisation. Tc!moin cette photo de Felipe Oonulez et de son ombre qui cherche l visualiser le dilernme qui se pose l lui dans son double r61e de pr~ident du gouvernement et membre du parti socialiste pour affronter la ~ion du syndiait socialiste (doc. n• 1)... Ou cc cbiffre du numc!ro gagnant de la loterie nalionale public! l la unc qui prend valeur emblc!matique (par dell la simple rc!fc!renciation) et dit plus, d'une certaine f~n. qu'une information montrant les gagnants, vc!ritables hc!rossujets de !'action (doc. n•2)... • La monstration pcut aussi jouer sur le paradoxe, c'est-l-dire la nonraolution de la figure: voir vs ne pas voir, oomrne clans la une informant de la gr~ve Jc!nc!rale du 14 dc!cembre 1988 (doc. n°3) OI) le journal joue sur l'oppos1tion vidc/plein pour signifier le su~ de la gJtve, c'est-l-dire le vide clans les rues de Madrid et les manifestations des acceurs sociaux aillcurs.

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Document n°3 • Cettc visibilisation de !'invisible, l laqudle eitoelle un journal oomme El Pais peut aboutir l une transgression du voir, ici le nt pas vouloir ilrt vu (doc. n•4) qui peut aller jusqu'au viol symbolique de l'intimi~ du sujet rcprt:se11~. C'est Ragrant dans le document n•s qui mon~ un gagnant de loco prcffmnt conserver l'anonymat et que le journal parvient A photographier ~ une poursu.ite mouvement6e dans les rues de Madrid: le pouvoir-voir du journal qui se heurte ici au droit l l'intimill de la personne priv6e. EM .,., t•.~

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• Autre exemple: la visibilisation des aspeclS priv~. presque intimes, de la personne publique: le insident du gouvernement dont le regard est surpris dans le secret (il son insu) dans le renet d'un miroir lors d'une ceremonie en l'bonneur de l'arm~ (doc. n°6)... La photo de Marisa Florez figure symboliquement l'envers de la militd, elle chercbe il figer la personne publique hors reinsentation, comme un acteur dans sa loge, l l'kart de la cdrdmonie, dans une attitude introspective. Le journal s'attardc ici complaisammcnt sur le hors-~nc. sur l'bomme privd de ses auributs syrnboliques, privd de son statut public (quoi de plus humain • trivialement humain • que ce geste de la main se grattant le crine face il une statuette de

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bronze rcpr~ntant la force, l'~uilibre et la beau~ des hc!ros de la mythologie classique...?). "

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Faut-il voir IA, de la part d'un journal qui s'est fait. pendant les annm d'apprcntissagc de la dc!mocratic, le mentor de la parole politiquc, une tentative de ~struire un discours qui tend l la complaisance, voirc meme l l'anoganoe (ccue "pn!potence• qu'on reprocher auit socialistes espagnols depuis quclques temps)? Mais le journal ne produit-il pas l son tour unc nouvelle saturation, cellc d'un pouvoir-voir qui institue l son tour un rituel, oclui de sa propre c:apacitt l s'immiscer partout? II y a, de toule fa~n ici, intervention d'un sujet modal (le journal) qui opm: commc conscie110e regardantc et interpdtante et se pose comme pouvoir qui interf'~rc dans le disoours public, c'est-l-dirc sc situc lui-~me comme pouvoir factuel au ~me titre que le pouvoir politique...

IV. Le journal comme pouvoir-voir Comment eitpliquer ceue propension de El Pals ft la complaisance, l l'outrance, voirc meme l l'eit~. cc trop-montrcr qui peut verser dans l'obsc«!ni~? Simple voyeurisme qui marquerait une "dc!viation" per rapport au m~le (oelui de la presse dite xrieuse)? Ou volontt d'affirmer un certain pouvoir (formel), une compc!tence modale qui passe outrc l'interdit, transgrcssc la loi? Cela va-t-il jusqu'l\ un ~fi dans l'Ordre, une fascination pour !'anomie? Cela entre-t-il en com~tition avec le pouvoir (politique) et conduit-ii lune forme d'lrrev~? II est frappant de constater que dans le quotidien El Pals cette tendance s'accentue depuis quelques anMes (en particulier dcpuis l'arriv~ au pouvoir des socialistes) et n!v~le une fascination pour "l'enven• de la rulitc! sociale: les figures de l'altc!ritc! (le diffc!rent, le marginal, l'anomique), les manifestations de dc!sordre, le privc!, le secret, !'invisible... instituant ce que j'ai appelc! un dlscours plrlphlrique. Ce regard s'applique c!galement aux

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lmbat,Gmrd

sujets de pouvoir, et s'en prend lout s~alemenl Ala classc politique. C'est sur eel aspect que je voudrais m'am!ter bri~vemenL El Pafs se oomplait de plus en plus clans les photos montranl les dirigeants poliliques A revaer les lies des hommes publics, des ~ insolites, des manquements aux rtgles de biel\SQIICC (doc. n• tO). Faut-11 voir, par dell ceue volon~ de les prendre en dc:!faut, un reprd qui vise le dl/alll de pouvoir (des bommcs qui, par un dc:!tail privc:!, rc:!v~lent qu'ils ne sont pas l la hauteur de leur ~e public...)? II y all en tout cas, un discours critique (ne serait- Y or X -/·> Y, will be used 10 denote such an atomic communication process, called transmission of a message, X representing the sender, Y the receiver, and f the content of the message. A communication process will consist of a given set of entities X, Y, Z ,... and a given set of messages/, g, u, v, ... being passed among (some of) them. In (Maicus - Tataram 1987b) the mathematical structure of digraph is proposed as a formal model for a communication process as above, with the entities being the vertices of the digraph, and the messages its arrows. We will concentrate on the "arrows-only" aspect of such a communication process, i.e. our unspecified entities will only play the role of "delimiting• the messages, being interpreted either as senders, or as receivers of a given message, depending on whether they appear as the domain or as the

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codomain of the corresponding arrow. In the following, we will allow such entities to be either actual persons engaged in message-exchange circumstances, or behavioral instances (stages) of actual persons, or even mental models created by such persons. The only requirement 1ha1 our formal model imposes upon such an entity X, will be the existence of an "identity• message, Ix: X -> X, granting 10 each entity X a minimal on1ological status, which reads: •x is thal which ii communicates itself to be". The selfreferential capacity, i.e. X's ability of acting as a receiver for messages sent by itself are hinted al In order to pass from the digraph structure to the more complex categorial structure on a given set of messages, we have to provide for the possibility of composing two •consecutive• messages, X •/·> Y and Y -g-> Z. The composite message. gf: X -> z. can be interpreted either as concatenation of the two given messages, or as a logical implication: if •x Y and g: X - >Y.". etc. Here again the way we define the •content• of a message will play an essential role in answering all these questions. We have introduced the notion of •erasing a given message• to play the part of an inconspicuous messenger between the realm of empirical communication phenomena (in which cancelling messages, or rendering their content irrelevant is an every-day game). and the realm of our formal model, with its high degree of abstraction. (It may seem paradoxical being nevertheless true, that the abstract definition of addition as a binary operation would nol have been possible without the •number zero" concept, roughly denoting "nothingness·, in spite of the fact that "adding nothing• seemed. and still seems a futile exercise...). Three ways of erasing a given message/: X -> Y will be emphasized: with a "simultaneous• message g: X - > Y (i.e. such that f + g Oxv the null message from X 10 Y). with a "prior• message u: U -> X (i.e. such that fu = 01,;y), or with a "posterior• message v: Y -> V (i.e. such Iha! vf = Oxv ).

= =

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Apan from the null messages and the erasing messages, another theoretical construct, whose interpretation in a model has to be carefully checked, is the bi product of two entities, X and Y. That is, our model must allow us 10 speak of an entity X ® Y, related to iL~ components X and Y by canonical messages as depicted belows

and which satisfy some axioms requiring that both components can be retrieved from X ® Y (p1 it= Ix and P2 i2 = l y), that X and Y remain independent, unaffected by their coupling (pz it = Oxv and Pt i2 = Ovx). and also the fact that X ® Y is precisely the coupling of X and Y and nothing more (i1 Pt+ i2 P2 = lx@Y>· At this point, having a basic category of messages which has an additive structure, we can introduce the notion of a triang11lable message, and connect triangulation with significance, by introducing another component of a communication process into the picture - the observer and his therapeutic function. We will consider a message/: X -> Y to be meaningful (or significant) and call ii triangulablc, if and only if there exists a third entity Z. the ob5ervcr, and messages u: Y ->Zand v: Z -> T(X), through which the observer excrciccs his therc1peutic function. To explain the unexpected notation T(X). standing for "another hypostasis of X", we make the following remarks: In modcling actual communication phenomena, one has 10 account also for changes in the communication potential of a given entity / person X. We can formally represent such changes with the aid of a trmulatio11 fi111ctio11 ')ll the set of entities. T. defined such that an actual person engaged in a communication process becomes depicted not as a single entity, but as a finite or infinite sequence of entities, each representing the same person but endowed with a different communication potential, and related to one another by some •canonical" messages, as depicted below: X -> T(X) -> T2(X) -> ... The messages in such a sequence can be regarded as the agents for the change in the communication potential, and, as such. they will be innucnccd by the existence of other messages sent or received by X (or another one of his hypostases). If f: X -> Y is a significant message (i.e. triangulable). then the detailed picture relating X and T(X) becomes f

U

X--Y.-➔Z

or, depicted as a triangle,

V

li1(X)

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X

------>

y

The definition of triangulation given above is not complete. Some additional requirements are made, such as "meaning enhances meaning•, formally expressed as requiring u to be in tum triangulable. i.e. each shift to the right will generate new triangles, such as

u

V

T(f)

v - z - T ( X ~ T(Y), etc... A further requirement is that the set of triangles has to have itself a categorial structure (for technical definitions and details on triangulable arrows and triangulated categories sec Hartshorne 1966). We will need in the following a standard construction of a triangulated category, whose main steps are (see again Hanshome 1966): take a basic category of messages which is an abelian category; construct out of it another category, and whose arrows are families of arrows from the base-category. modulo some equivalence relation; make sure that the category of chains is an additive category. Some of its arrows (still interpreted as messages. like those in the base-category) are triangulable. A next step would be to select only these arrows, and produce a third category. that of the triangles associated to the significant messages. We will exemplify this construction with Mead's co11versatio11 of gestures as discussed by R. Posner in 1979. The point we want 10 make is that the definition and formal description of the geslual interaction with significance (a description using arrows. chains, etc.) was already in Posner's paper. where we found ii, and what we report is the mere observation that his description and the one provided by our formal model fit. We will have a basic category of messages, and some of the arrows of this category will be gestures. According lo Posner, a gesture is a stimulus which releases an action of the receiver, notifying him of a future action of lhe sender. Thus. an arrow f: X ... Y could be lhe message •x raises his fist menacingly towards me• as deoodified by Y (and the same action could be dccodified by some Zin a completely different manner). Each panner X in a gestual interaction is split into a sequence of •aetional stages•, Xt ... X2 ...... - Xn, each Xi being •x performing action i". and these will be lhe objects of our category of chains A gestual i11teractio11 between partners X and Y is depicted below

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the presence of arrows indicating messages, i.e. some dccodification process. In case each partner dccodifics the other's gestures independently of his own, as clews to the continuation of the action but nothing more, and a sender does not decodify his own gestures. the interaction is called without sig11ifica11ce. In our fonnal model this means that only the horizontal (continous) arrows are accepted as mcs.o;agcs. If, on the contrary. message X 1 •·> Y 1. Y 1 ··> X2. etc. (the dolled arrows) arc accepted. that is the partner's reaction helps the sender to give meaning to his own gestures, then we have sig11ificant gesmal i11teractio11 (and the families of vertical and the oblique arrows above will be arrows in our category of chains). We will define the translation function T as carrying a panner X (split as above in as sequence of actional stages) X: X 1... X2 ......... Xa, to its "next action• hypostasis. T(X): X2 ... X3 - ... - Xn, a sequence of aetional stages which "forgets• the first step of X's history. At this point we can introduce a third (virtual) partner in our interaction, as bein(; the mental model Y crca1es in representing his relalion 10 X and antic1pa1ing X's reac1ions. In our formal selling the mental model will be the bi product T(X) 0 Y. splil into stages like the other partners. The oblique arrows will become composites v1 Ut, v2 u2, etc.. accounting for the interference of the mental model (whose messages Vi and Ui arc 1101 of a gestual nature). and the diagram representing gestual interac tion with significance will unfold as below.

X

f

l

X1

r.

l

y

T(X)@Y From the point of view of our fonnal model. this last diagram simply shows that f: X -> Y is a triangulable arrow in the category of chains, its associated triangle being X f=(~)y u=(ui)T(X)®Y v=(vb) T(X)

References Cc1crchi. Rodica and Mihacla Malitza (1987). "A semiotic approach 10 knowledge processing sys1ems" in Procttdings of tht Vth /11ttrna1ional Congress of Cybtrnttics

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a11d Syslenrs, London. 7,1 I Sept 1987, J. Rose ed. Vol.2: 941-944; Lycham Sc. Annes, England: Thales Publ. lid. Hanshome, Robin (1966). "Rcsiducs and duali1y", lNM20. Springer. Maclane, S8Wlders (1976). •eacegories for Ille wonting rualhcmatician", Springer. Marcus. Solomon and Monica Tawam. (1987a). "The (ccd,back as antinomy: lbe example of human communicacion• in Proceedings of rite Vilt ln1erna1io11al Congress of Cyberne1ics and Sysrems, London, 7-11 Sepl. 1987. J. Rose ed. Vol.2: 962-965; Lytham S1. Annes, England: Thales Publ. lid. - ( 1987b). "Human communication: a g,aph-lhcoretic approach•. Revue Roumaine de Unguistique, C.lAT.A. 24. 2: 129-137. Marty. Robcr1. L'AlgHJre des signes. Amsterdam: Benjamins (to appear). Peirce. Charles Sanders (1931-1958). Col/«1et1 Papers, eds. G. Hartshorne, P. Weiss and A.W. Bulks. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press. Posnu, Roland (1979). "Morris Wld die Vcrhaltcnsthcorctische Grundlcgung dcr Scmiotik". ailscltrif1 far ~111101ik.. vol. I.

Communicative and Non-Communicative Language Roland Harweg

Competence, performance, langue, and parole Nonnally, language is considered to be communicative. But this view is only true in part: besides communicative language there is also non-communicative language. A first hypothesis is that non-communicative language is language as competence and communicative language is language as performance, i.e. language use. When, e.g., Chomsky (1957: 13) considers a language to be a set of sentences, the form of language he has in mind is language as competence, and the sentences which he thinks to fonn this form of language are, at least in their overwhelming majority, non-communicative. This, I think, is intuitively clear if we consider sentences whose only function is to serve as examples of certain features of language. Such sentences are, e.g., the sentences Have you a book 011 modem music? and The book seems i11teresti11g referred 10 as examples of grammatical sentences of English by Chomsky ( 1957: 15) in an argumentation about grammaticalness. Considering the two sentences within this oon1cx1, it is clear that, though they have meaning and, for thal mailer, are fully understandable. lhcy nevertheless have no communicative slatus. Neither the pronoun you nor the nominal expression the book in these sentences have • what seems to be a condition for communicativi1y • a definite reference in the outside world. On the other hand, however, these sentences will gain such a reference in the outside world and, for that matter. a communicative status as soon as they arc put to actual use or, in other words, to perfonnance in an actual conversation. By this actual use such a reference and communicative status will be added to the semantic content they already possess on the level of language as competence. The pronoun you and the nominal expression the book, respectively, will then refer 10 definite entities in the outside world. Thus, one might be led to think that lhe sen1cnces of a language as competence are non-communicative and that the sentences of language use or language as performance are communicative in nature. But on closer inspeclion it turns out 1ha1 a slricl correlation of language as compelcnce with non-communicative language and language as use or performance with communicative language would be false. We need only lhink of the sentences and conversations in a phrase-book destined to serve as a colloquial guide to a foreign language. All these senlences and

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conversations are, in a way, products of language use, of language performance, for they manifest performances of language on the part of the writer of the phrase-book. But they nevenheless have no reference in the outside world and, for that mauer, no communicative status. They only gain such a reference and status when they are used in actual situations. We arc therefore led 10 disentangle and render independent of each other the opposition between language as competence and language. Calling language as competence and language as performance simply competence and performance, respectively, and. panly deviating from Saussurian as well as post-Saussurian traditional usage (cf. Hjelmslev 1943:59; Coscriu 1952:62; Heger 1969) • non-communicative language and communicative language langue and parole , respectively (cf. Harweg 1980: 25S ff. 1981: 124 ff. ; 1984), I use these four familiar terms 10 differentiate not just two, but four different forms or levels of language. These are those which may be designated by the four possible combinations of lhc four terms, namely oompctencc l(IJ1gue competence parole performance la11gue pcrfonnanceparo/e The two levels on the left side of this scheme are levels of communicative language, the two levels on the right side of the scheme arc levels of communicative language. In the framework of this four level scheme, the normal and most widespread way of pulling language to use consists in transferring units (and constructions) from the level of competence la11gue 10 the level of performance parole, and it is the normality and wide-spreadncss of this procedure that accounts for the fact that normally competence is identified with la11gue and performance with parole. But units of performance parole may be obtained not only by copying (and combining) units (and constructions) of the level of competence la11gue, they may also be obtained by copying units of competence parole and even • as in the case of using a phrase-book as a colloquial guide• by copying units of performance langue. On the other hand, units of competence la,1gue may not only be transferred to the level of performance parole, but also to the level of performance la11gue and even to the level of competence parole. II even seems that there is in the last analysis, no path in our scheme which is totally blocked. Ncvenheless, what I will auempl 10 do in this anicle is not so much 10 sketch the possible paths between the different levels, but rather to characterize the levels themselves. The possible paths between them will be hinted at only in pan.

Competence langue, performance /angue, and performance parole Units of the level of competence /a11gue and its diametrically opposed level of performance parole may be, as has already been suggested, the sentences Have you a book 011 modem music? or The book seems i11teres1i11g. They are units of the level of competence la11gue when they are referred to in meta-

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linguistic uuerances like The se111e11ces 'Have you a book 011 modern mu.sic?" a11d 'The book seems interesti11g' are gra11unatical se11te11ces of £11glish, and they arc units of the level of performance parole when they or more precisely. their constituents you and the book, respectively, are used with definite reference to entities in the outside world in a nonnal conversation. Bui the same two sentences may also be used as units of the level of performance langue. They are used as such in situations where they have no reference to derinite entities in the outside world, and this is, e.g., the case when they are uuered in pronunciation or oral translation tests or merely in order to test one's own husky voice or when they are wriuen down in orthography or wriuen translation tests or merely in order 10 lest a fountainpen one is about to buy. In these situations such sentences have the same non-communicative status as the units of competence la11g11e which they repeat. From these they differ only in that they are units of performance. The non-communicativity of such sentences in such performantial situations might be evident without further comment, and the same might be true of the sentences in a phrase-book and of the texts in a letter writer's guide or perhaps even, though for somewhat different reasons, of jokes.

The reference of lyrical poems If one does not take into account symbolically used language, one might also think of fictional texts as lacking reference and communicativity and thus belonging to the level of performance lang11e. but this would be partly erroneous. For rictional texts, at least fictional texts in a narrow sense of term, i.e. narrative and dramatic texts, are not wholly devoid of referentiality and communicativity. True, they are, symbolic language set apart, noncommunicative in our real, non-fictive world, since in this world they do not have reference. but they do not lack communicativity in that fictive world which they presuppose and into which we are forced to place ourselves by way of imagination and self-fictivization, for in that fictive world they do have reference (cf. Harweg 1979a; 1979b; Tschaudcr 1989). What is true of narrative and dramatic texts seems to be true 9f lyrical texts, i.e. of songs and poems, as well. Bui this, too, is only true in part. Many songs and poems arc 1101 fictional in the sense in which novels and dramas are, i.e. they are 1101 fictional in the sense that they would not only create, but, at the same time, also presuppose a fictive world, a world 10 which they would refer as already existing; unlike novels and dramas, these poems do not presuppose such a fictive world. On the other hand, however, these poems do not belong to those non-fictional texts which have reference in our real, non-fictive world either. They rather form a class of non-fictional texts, which, just like jokes. but unlike most other non-fictional types of texts, lack reference 10 definite entities in the outside world. They form a class of non-fictional texts that, lyrical in nature, might be characterized as poetical in a narrow, i.e. quasi-etymological sense.

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Consider, as an example of such texts, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow's poem The nde Rises, The Tide Falls. The poem runs as follows. The tide rises, the tide falls, The twilight darkens, the curlew calls; Along lhe sea-sands damp and brown The lraveller hastens toward 1he town, And lhe lide rises, lhc lidc falls. Darkness seules on roofs and walls, Bui lhe sea in lhe darkness calls and calls; The linle waves, with lheir sofl while hands, Efface 1hc footprints in lhe sands, And lhe tide rises, 1he tide falls. The morning breaks; lhe sloeds in their stalls Stamp and neigh, as lhe hostler calls; The day returns, but nevermore Returns 1hc traveller to the shore, And 1he tide rises, the tide falls. As many lyrical poems, this poem evokes concrete, particular si1ua1ions in generic or more precisely. pseudo-generic terms. True, the use of generic terms is no1 confined 10 poems, we find this use even in ordinary language so, e.g.. when we say / go 10 the doctor or LJs1e11. the curlew calls and thus apply lhe pseudo-generic terms the doctor and the curlew to a particular person or a panicular bird, respectively. But whereas in ordinary language this use is restricted to cenain well-definable cases, it is in poems extended 10 states of affairs or situations of nearly every kind. In our poem, e.g., this pseudo-generic use is extended from such expressions as the tide, the twilight, the c11rlew, darkness, the sea, the waves. the momi11g, the hostler, and the day - which may be used pseudo-generically even in ordinary language - 10 such expressions as the traveller, the 1ow11, roofs. walls, 1/ze foo1pri111s. the steeds, and the shore and moreover, panly in connection with this extension, 10 all the predicates. Whal lhe present tense forms in such a poem denote is not a stretch of time coextensive with a particular real or fictive uuerancc time, but rather a sort of pseudo-generic lime. This extension of pseudo-generic language use 10 the whole range of a 1ex1 • which seems 10 be characteristic of many poems - creates, as ii were, a certain tension between the panicular and the generic, a tension based on a sort of clash, and what follows from such a clash is the absence of any reference 10 states of affairs or situations in an outside world. be ii non-fictive or fictive. True, there is reference even in such poems, but this reference is only that sort of reference that, e.g. in our poem, accounts for the coreference between the 1wo occurrences of the expression the 1raveller in their specific in1erpre1a1ion, a son of reference which is 10 be found in any text whatsoever and which might be characterized as la11g11e-specific instead of

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parole-specific. As parole-specific, then, I designate, the reference to entities

in an outside non-fictive or fictive world. The absence of any parole-specific reference in the above poem implies that the succession of the two seemingly particular situations ii evokes, the evening scene and the scene of the following morning, can in no way, no( even in an indeterminate one, be conceived of as located in space and time. We cannot even imagine a natural non-fictive or fictive situation in which such a text, even if it were in pure prose, might parole-referentially and communicatively be uuered. So. the absence of parole-specific reference in this and many other poems implies their being non-communicative - at least on a non-symbolic level. Such poems are not nothing but a sort of picture, nothing but mere constructions of imagination. As such they only have meaning and, as a basis of relations of co-reference, reference of the lat1g11especific kind. The writing of such poems is language use on the level of performance lat1g11e. The basis of this use arc elements of the level of competence lat1g11e, but it is difficult 10 say which these elements precisely are, i.e. which parts of the poem, apart from the mere words, may be regarded as copies of prefabricated units of the competence lat1g11e.

Competence parole After having given examples of units of the levels of competence lat1g11e, performance parole and performance langue. we still have to furnish examples of units of the level of competence parole, that level in our four level scheme which might seem the most difficult 10 exemplify. The question is: Arc there really. on the level of competence, language units with reference in the outside world? It seems 10 me. there arc such units. Some of them seem to belong to certain types of texts. These are, e.g., theorems, such as the Pythagorean theorem, proverbs, and certain conventional prayers, namely those conventional prayers which use the •commonal" pronoun we instead of the individual pronoun/. All these units have reference in the outside world. i.e. parole-specific reference and, for the mailer, a communicative status. not only in actual use. say in a text-book on geometry. in an actual conversation. or in actual praying, respectively - where they would belong to the level of performance parole -. but also as internalized elements of persons' memories. Theorems and proverbs seem 10 have such a reference and communicative status as internalized elements by virtue of their general validity, i.e. by virtue of their generic reference, a property which does not seem to allow them to give up their parole-specific references and communicative status even if they are not put to actual use. In contradistinction, conventional prayers, even •commonal" conventional prayers, do not have such generic reference, since they contain a non-generic pronoun. namely the addressing pronoun of the second person. But in contradistinction to occurrences of this pronoun in

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la11gue-sentences (used in a text-book on linguistics or in a language guide) like Have you a book on moder11 music? or in many songs and poems, the occurrences of this pronoun in conventional prayers have a text-typologically motivated inherent reference to a definite being in an outside world, and it is, among other things, by virtue of this inhercnl reference that 'commonal' conventional prayers, such as the Lord's Prayer, seem to have parole-specific reference and, for the matter, communicative status even as internali;,.ed entities of our memories, i.e. of our competence. Whereas proverbs and conventional prayers before entering into competence parole seem to have first been formulated on the level of performance parole - such as is seen particularly clearly in the case of the Lord's Prayer-, theorems like the Pythagorean theorem seem to belong 10 the level of competence parole, as it were, a priori. True, insofar as competence parole, in the case of such theorems, is to be identified with our explicit knowledge of these theorems, their being part of competence parole is certainly due to their prior formulation by certain men, such as Pythagoras in the case of the Pythagorean theorem, on the level of performance parole, but in the case of such theorems competence parole might comprise not only the layer of our explicit knowledge, but also that deeper layer where such theorems, as a kind of eternal truths, existed - implicitly as it were - before their first detection and formulation. Theorems, proverbs and conventional •commonal" prayers do not seem to be the only units of competence parole. Other such units, units that do not belong to certain text-types. might be meta-linguistic examples - examples in the form of sentences - that have reference in the outside world. Metalinguistic examples may have reference to the outside world by virtue of two kinds of properties: internal and external ones. Sentence- internal properties of this kind may be generic expressions (which are also responsible for the competence parole character of theorems and proverbs) or proper nouns; sentence-external use, i.e. of performance parole. Sentences that may be interpreted as meta-linguistic examples with internal parole-specific reference and communicative status are sentences like Rome 111as founded i11 753 B.C., even if they are embedded in a meta-linguistic context which does not describe a situation of language use, such as the metalinguistic context The seme11ce 'Rome was founded in 753 B.C. • is a passive se11te11ce. Even in such a context the sentence Rome was founded i11 753 8.C. can be assigned parole-specific, i.e. outside world reference and, for that matter, a communicative status. It belongs therefore not to the level of competence la11g11e, but to the level of competence parole. This is, however. not true of a sentence like There is a draught here as part of a meta-linguistic context like The sentence There is a draught here' is a situatio11-depe11dem sentence. It has no parole-specific reference and, for that matter. no communicative status and belongs therefore to the level of competence langue. But if we embed the sentence There is a draught here in a meta-linguistic context like Whe11 a father while havi11g supper 111ith his family testily says: 'There is a drauglll here•, this 111tera11ce may implicitly co11tai11 tire request or order to put a11 e11d to tire said state of affairs. i.e. in a meta-

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linguistic con1ex1 which does nol fail 10 describe 1he situation of the utlerance, the embedded sentence gains such parole-specific reference and communicative status and is thereby transferred to the level of competence parole. True, the described situation is not a real, but a hypothetical one, but this is a fact that is in harmony with the status of potentiality that charac1erizes the two competence levels, both that of competence langue and that of competence parole.

Higher levels of performantial language From the potential status which is characteristic of the units of the two competence levels it follows thal these units can only be presented in an indirect way, i.e. through citation. Thus, in 1he sentence The selllence 'There is a draught here' is a sit11atio11-depende111 se111ence it is not lhe expression "There is a draught here•, i.e. the expression included in quotation marks, which belongs 10 the level of compe1ence langue. bu1 1he sentence which is designated by this expression. The expression designating this sentence, i.e. lhe expression included in quotation marks, belongs 10 a level of performance la11g11e, nol to the firsl level of performance langue, but to a second level of performance la11g11e; for what belongs to the first level of performance langue is, as we have argued, such non-communicative units of language use as, e.g., sentences in a phrase-book or in certain kinds of poems. Analogously, if the expression 'There is a draught here' forms, by way of citations, pan of 1he situational meta-linguistic description When a father while having supper wi1h his family testily says: 'There is a draught here•, this utterance may implicitly contain the request or order to put an end to lhe said stale of affairs, then the citational expression 'There is a draught here' belongs to a second level of performance parole. And the unit belonging to 1he level of competence parole is, analogously, again the sentence which is designated by 1he cita1ional expression, a sentence which actually docs no1 occur, but which is to be imagined as occurring within 1he described hypothetical situation. What belongs 10 the level which is intermediate between 1he level of competence parole, i.e. to the first level of performance parole is, e.g., 1he actual ut1er.1nce There is a draught here in a concrete si1ua1ion. If we enlarge our four level scheme by including lhe second-degree levels of performance, we obtained the following scheme: first-level s«>ond-levd

compctcncc languc performanc:c langue performanc:c languc:

first-level

scconc.1-tC\·d

competena: parole perfonnaoce parole perfonntllCe parole

In this six level scheme 1he levels of the left column are again levels of non-communicative language, whereas 1he levels of the right column are again levels of communicative language.

I94

I larweg, Roland

References Chomsky, Noun (1957), Syntaclic S1ruc1ures (= Janua l.inguarwn, 4). The Hague: Mouton. Coseriu, Eugenio (1952162). "Sistema. nonna )' habla" (1952). In Teorfa del /enguaje y lingiJfstica general, E. Coseriu, 11-113. Madrid: Editorial Grcdos (1962). Harweg, Roland ( 1979a). "lnhaltsentwurr, Enllblung, lnhaltswicdcrgabe. Zum fiktionstheorc1ischcn Doppelstatus fiktionalcr Erzllhlungcn•. In Grundfragen der Tutwissenschajr. (= Amstcrdamcr Reitriige zur ncucrcn Gumanistik, 8), Wolrgang Frier and Gad Labroisse (eds.). 111-130. Amslcrdam: Rodopi . • (1979b). "Sind Richardsons Pamela und Ficldings Shamcla cin urn! dicsclbc ~son? Ein Bcitrae 1.wn Problem dcr Ani.ahl fiktivcr \Velten". f>oetica 11, 343-368. • (1980). "Mctasprache und Objcktsprachc als Laneue und Parole". Acta Unguistica Acade111iae Sciemiarwn Hungaric~ 30, 247-273 . • (1981). "Struk1uren und Problcmc linguistischcr Rede. Zcicben- und abbildungslhcoretische Ocmerkungcn zur Sprachc dCf Linguistik". In Wissenscho/tssprache, 1bco Bungarten (cd), 111-139. Mllnchcn: Fink . • (1984). "I tcsti come unitA di parolee di langue". In linguisticn testua/e (= Pubblicazioni dclla Socic!A di linguistica ilaliana, 22), Lorenzo Covcri (ed.), 5-18. ROGl8: 81117.ooi. Hcacr, Klaus (1969). "Die Scmantik und die Dichotonlic von l.anguc und Parole". '/~ltschrift ftJr ro1naJ1isc/~ Philologie85, 144-215. lljclmslcv, Louis (1943159). "l..anguc et Parole" (1943). In Essais linguistiques (= Travaux du ccrclc linguis1iquc de Copcnhaguc, 12), L Hjclmslcv, 69-31. Copcnhaguc: :-:ordisk Sprog- og Kulturforlag ( 1959). Tschaudcr, Gerhard ( 1989). Tu1,•erbill(/w1gen. A11s1J1:e :u ei11er Makro1u10/ogie, unrer 8eracksich1ig1u1g ftklionoler Tex1e (Bochumcr Ocilrligc 1.ur Scnliolik. 22). Oochum:

Orocluncycr. l.ongrcllow's poem '1'hc Tide Rises, The Tide !'alls" is cilcd rrom lhc following cdilion: The Poetical Works of /,ong/ellow. l.ondon: Oxfoid Univcni1y Press 1904/ 1961, p.

766.

196

Parrct, Herman

vent modalisee ii est vrai. comme en logique des mondes possibles. L'hypostase de la veritc!, dans les theories de la signification, reste un fardeau lourd ll porter. C'est comme si le sujet-acteur n'elait qu'un veridicteur, mais un veridictcur vide de scs propres motivations et modalisations, un veridicteur qui e11registre le sens, e'cst-ll-dire qui cnrcgistrc la dc!pcndancc des valeurs enoncives (rl!duites ll de pures valcurs verifonctionnelles) ll l'egard de leurs conditions ontologiques. La sl!miotique contemporaine a accuse! de plcin droil l'idl!e de la transparence du sens, en insislant sur le fait que le sujet vc!ridicteur n'esl pas un sujet vidc mais une com~tence qui veut dire la vc!rite, ou ne le veut pas, crc!ant ainsi des espaces de mensonges et de secrets; que ce vo11/oirdire-la-verite est modific! par un pouvoir, un savoir et meme par un devoir, conglomc!rat de modalitc!s responsables d'une misc en sc~nc de simulacres et d'une thc!litralisation generalisee des interactions discursives. Et c'esl, paradoxalemcnt sans doutc, l'intclligencc artificicllc qui, de par son prestige, de• vrait nous liberer d'une conception scion laquelle le sens des paroles s'identifie ll une valeur de verite, ou selon laquelle toute axiologie discursive se rl!duit ll unc axiologic verifonctionncllc. L'ordinatcur, programme avec des phrases tarskiennes, du genre "I.A neige est blanche" si et se11/e111ent si la neige est blancl,e, ne produirajamais aucune signifiance. La pragmatisation integralc du sens en intelligence artificielle. est correlative de !'indifference des machines pour les ontologies. Un autrc aspect du meme paradigmc sou.~ discussion, plus pcrnicicux puisque moins visible et moins oonscnti, oonsisle ll red11ire le sujet social et communautaire au co111111u11icate11r, et, ensuite, A l'i11/ormare11r, commc si l'intcrsubjcctivitc! (ou la co-subjcctivite) c!quivalait Ala communicabilitc!, et, ensuite, toute communication ll un transfert d'information. La communication, ll notre c!poque, est une veritable hantise. Elle est devenue un devoir social, certes, mais aussi un principc de reconstruction de n'importe quel phenom~nc analysable en sciences sociales. La plupart des pragmatiques etablies ne sont en effct ricn quc des pragmatiques de la communication, comme si l'l!tre-enscmble des sujets dans les communautc!s c!lait globalement gouvcrne par les r~gles de la communication. Je soutiendrai qu'il faut distingucr et ml!mc dissocier la structure de l'l!trc-ensemble ou de l'intersubjcctivitc!, de la structure de la communication. C'est deja une spc!cification. et en fait un factcur de complexite croissante, que d'affirmer quc le sujct en communautc! est un co11u1u111icate11r. On voit mal, par cxemple, comment evitcr l'i111e111io111,a/iti dans unc thoorie de la communication• le concept-pivot dcvenant ainsi cclui d'intentio11 de com1111111icatio11, dans sa dialectique avcc la reco111raissai1ce de cette intention, reconnaissanoe qui rc!alise toujours un mini-cycle communicatir - et on voit mal, par contre, comment injectcr l'intentionnalitc! dans le deft• nie,is minimal de l'i ntcrsubjcctivitc! ou de l'l!tre-ensemble, qui sc colorerait ainsi dangcrcuscmcnt de trop de transparencc. trop de conscience. trop d'idealite. Le sujet-en-communautc!, mcmc et surtout au nivcau de son discours, est pl11s qu'un communicateur, ii est plus qu'un informateur. L'intention de communiquer est, en cffet, d'unc tout autre nature que !'intention d'informer. la transaction de contenus propositionnels ne determine en rien !'intention de communiquer, et toute !'intention d'informer. Mais d'un

L'C$lhiuque de la communication

197

point de vuc plus general, la paradigme dominant el~vc la communication au rang de principe ultime de la structure interne de l'intersubjectivite ou de l'etre-ensemble en communautc!, pour la reduire ensuite a unc transaction d'informations. Cettc projection d'unc lnformatique Generalisee commc mod~le de la communaute des sujets nc me tente pas, et ii faut se mefier de ceue idolc. Le sujet parlant, dans le paradigmc dcnonce, est done un veridicteur et un communicateur-informateur; sommeille, en plus, dans ce sujet un Homo Oeco110111icus, atome a-social, auto-suffisant, dcgagc! de toute dc!termination communautaire. En schc!matisant, j'opposerais l'Homo Oeco11omicus, scion les contours sculptes par Adam Smith, a l'Homo Sociologicus. statufic! par Emile Durkheim. Homo Oeco11omicus s'auto-dc!termine en vue de la maximisation de scs fins: ii est "lire!" en avant par la perspective d'avantages a vcnir. Dans ce paradigme "c!conomique", ii n'y a aucune transcendance du social, ii n'y a rien •au-dessus" des acteurs individucls. Le collectif. pour l'c!conomistc, est transparent, le central social ou la solidaritc! humaine n'l~tant rien d'autre que !'accord spontanc! des intcrats individuels. Eliminc!e comme tiers ind~irable est 1ou1e midia1io11 par le collectif. l'opaciri du social, l'extirioriri de l'objet collectif qui dcvrait bloquer le jeu spt!culairc des identifications mutuelles contractuelles. En plus, Homo Oeco11omic11s se rc!v~le etre un }011e11r. La rationalitc! c!conomique en situation de jeu est, ii est vrai. reflexive: Elle cxige du joueur qu'il se meue a la place de l'aulre pour examiner le monde de son point de vue. Ce jeu des miroirs est potentiellement illimilc!, mais, comme on le verra, le propre de l'c!quilibre c!conomique consiste dans le blocus a1111 nivea11 ji11i de ceue misc en abime. Le jeu spt!culaire doil s'arreter. Le jeu de l'Homo Oeco11omic11s est un jeu ji11i. La thc!orie des jeux bien prestigicuse en sciences humaincs et la conception de la soi-disant "c!conomic des c!changes linguistiques" a c!tc! prc!pondc!rante de Locke a Bourdicu, en passanl par Saussurc. Reste que les thc!oriciens des jeux cl, d'un point de vue plus gc!nc!ral, les dt!fenseurs du paradigme t!conomiquc. ont c!normc!menl de difficullc!s a penser adc!quatemenl la contrac1uali1c! et la solidaritc! selon d'autres lignes que celles de la simple coordination des interets individuels. La communautc! elle-mcmc pour l'economistc, n'cst qu'un horizon indc!cidable, nou et fantasmatiquc. Voila done les composantes saillantes du paradigmc dominant, et les contours d'une architecture qui nc peut provoquer que des rc!cits de lc!gitimation suspects et intcnsemcnt ideologises. Determiner l'objcl pragmatique - plus particuli~rement le sujel parlant en communaulc! - par le conglomc!rat viridicrio11lcon11111111icario11-i1,jor111ario11lje11 ico11omiq11e. c'est se cantonner dans un panidigme qui n'est coherent que par l'oubli inquic!tanl de tant de marges denscs de signifiance. Vous me permcurcz de me 1oumer d~ a pr~ent vcrs quclqucs "petites ontologies" qui devraient mettrc en cause la "grande" ontologic du paradigme dominant. La gra11de ontologie de la communautc! des humains, cclle qui est recupc!ree par cc paradigme. reconstruit l'clre-cnscmble comme un systl:mc d'in1crac1ions et de transactions soumis aux rl:gles de la rationalitc! c!conomique cl, par consequent, comme un ensemble de jeux stratc!giquesfinis. La

198

Pam:t, Herman

fiducie sous-jacente consiste Aexploiter une axiologie bien simple. La valeur primordiale, c'cst la circulation de !'information, done la communication motiv~ informationnellement - meme s'il faut constatcr que les strategies economiques peuvent dissimuler provisoirement cette valeur primordiale jusqu'A ce qu'on aboutisse au contrat, puisqu'aboutissemcnt ii y a necessairement vu laji11itude des jcux economiques. Cette valeur primordiale de la circulation informatioMelle se oonjugue facilement avec l'autre valorisation d(!jA evoqu1fo: la communicabilite id~le est favorisee par le statut viridictoire de nos discours. Ce que l'on enonce, scion cette •grande" ontologie, acquicrt du sens A partir de la trm1spare11ce des enon~: un discours signiriant est un discours renetant les etats de choscs et les ev(!ncments du mondc. Tou1cfois, cette •grande" ontologie exhibe des fissures. Et les "petites• ontologies font irruption, instaurant ci et IA lcurs clins d'oeil, ebranlant le fantasme economique, communicationnel et veridictoire, diss(!minant le champ de l'etre-ensemble, le fragmentanl. Les "petites" ontologies s'installent selon l'isotopie de l'eclosion, de la rupture et de la fracture, et done des seuils et du discontinu. Leur effet esthesique est celui de l'eblouissement, du fremissement, du tressaillement, de la secousse, de la syncope tensive. C'est bien de ccs "peti1cs" on1ologies que je voudrais evoquer maintenant quelques etincellcs. "II y a, somme toute, deux sortes de jeux. Les uns peuvent i!trc dits finis, les autres infinis. Un jeu fini se joue pour gagner, un jcu infini pour continuer Ajouer• (Carse 1988: 11). La finitude du jeu economiquc exigc, en effet, qu'il y ait un gagnant, quc le jcu soit deli mi table non seulement dans le temps et l'espace mais egalemcnt selon la soi-disant "economic" des desirs, des motifs, des intentions du joueur. "Les itgles d'un jeu fini sont les tcnnes d'un contra! qui pcrmet aux joucurs de s'accorder sur un gagnant" (Carse 1988: 17). Les joueurs du fini jouent a l'illlirieur de Ii mites; les joucurs de l'infini avec les limites. Jouer un jcu fini est s(!rieux, les joueurs de l'infini sont frivoles. Le scricux, etant la pcur de !'issue impr(!visiblc d'une ouvcrture, exigc une conclusion d(!termin(!c; le frivolc consent au J>O$ible. En effct, ii est impossible de dire dans quel monde se joue le jcu infini, toutes sortcs de mondes pouvant y entrcr. Frivole. le jcu infini est (!galcment paradoxal: Le but des joucurs de l'infini (!tant de co11ti1111er Ajoucr, ils ne jouent pas pour eux-mi!mcs, et le paradoxc d'un jeu infini est que les joueurs desiren1 continuer le jeu dans les autres. II se revele ainsi que la culture entiere, quc !'art, est un jeu infini, et que c'cst !'infinitude des jcux dans la communau1e des humains qui produil la transcendance du Sllllllunication

20 I

puisqu'on parle d'odyssre, je voudrais placer ceue troisi~me "petite• ontologie - la mt!moire nostalgique - sous le signe de Pt!nt!lope qui, au bout de chaque odyssee, dt!lricote le n!cit vcridictoirc et, par con~quent, tout rt!ft!rent ultime. Voici done mes trois i~nes installt!es. Le raisonnable Antiloque, h. Torino: Einaudi lr. John Mcddcmmcn as StruCIUl'C$ and Time. Chicago: The Univ. of Chicago Press, 1979. Shklovsky. Victor (1917). "Arl as Technique" in Arl as Technique. Lincoln: Univmity of Nebraska Press, 1965. S1rawson, P.F. (1959). "On RcfCl"ring". in Mi11d, UX , 320-344. Val try, Paul ( 1957). Oeuvres Complttes. ed. Jean Hyticr. Paris: Gallimard. • (1933) • Au sujCI du Cimeli~re 1narin" in N.R.F. Mar. I. • (1939) "Potsic cl pcnste abs1rai1c• The Basil ZAhorof L«1ure or Oxford. Oxford: Oaraidon Press.

Poetic Discourse and Enunciative Distance Helena Usandizaga

Abstract This analysis of three poems dealing wi1h the same theme throws light upon the fact of esthetic experience being revealed as if lhrough a "tone". The aim of this paper is to describe the tone by means of an analysis of the play of discourse and enunciative distance.

Discours poetique et distance enonciative Le

"100

11

du poeme

L'analysc des 3 ~mes que l'on propose ici • la "Rima XLII" de 8(!cqucr, "TriIce. Xl" de Vallejo et •Aromas• de Parra •. et qui defic le probl~me t!pineux de la comparaison, nous interessc dans la mesure oil elle nous situe face a un probl~me commun aux trois tcxtes. Les trois parlent en effct d'un mj!mc evenemen1. enonce de fa~n scmblable: ellc (ou toi), c'est•a-dire la femme • nous devoile un "je" poetiquc plus ou moins blesse scion les cas • est partie, ou s'est mariee, avec un autre; ceue nouvelle a ete transmise au personnage qui parle par un autre sujet. Cc qui nous interessc c'est ce qui fail de ceuc anecdote plutOt banale, pr(!sentee avec une structure narrative et discursive asscz. scmblables, une experience esthetique; en d'autres mots, qucls sont lcs elements qui sont selcctionnes dans chaque cas et de qucllc f~n jettent-ils de la lumi~re sur les conditions csthetiques de la saisie de la nouvelle de l'infid(!lite. Ccs conditions sont differcntes dans chacun des trois po~mes et, de fa~on intuitive, se presentent a nous comme un ton caracteristique. Or, comment decrire le ton? Apparcmment, celui-ci se manifeste a partir d'une seric de positions cognitives et passionnelles de l'enonciatcur par rapport a son enonce, cc qui, parall~lcmcnt, propose cenaines positions pour l'enonciataire: ii faudrait done le decrire moyennant une analyse des jeux discursifs ct de la distance enonciativc. Dans une premi~re approche, on poumut considerer l'objet cognilif (le contenu de la nouvelle qu'on annoncc au sujet) comme un programme de depossession de l'objet (la femme) qui etait en conjonction avec un sujct (le "jc") par !'action d'un anti-sujet (l'autrc). Mais !'analyse des pocmcs et

216

Usandimga, lldcna

l'ctude des passions peut nous tclairer un peu plus sur cc point. Pour ctudier les passions, nous partons de l'idt!e greimassiennc scion laquelle un lexeme de contenu passionnel (par exemplc, la col~re ou la nostalgie) constitue unc "ctiqueuc• qui condense des panncaux discursifs en expansion, et qui contient de ce fait certaines modalisations du sujct d'l~tat qui presupposcnt ou annoncent des programmes narratifs (Greimas 1986: 11). lnvcrsemcnt, nous pouvons lire certaines series de programmes et de modalisations autour d'un sujet donnc! en les condcnsant dans le lexeme-passion qui souticnt ceue narrativitc!. Cela revient A"postuler !'existence d'une dimension thymiquc de la narrativitt, autonomc et syntactiqucmcnt articulable". qui pcrmet A la st!miotique "d'cntreprendre la description de ccs ac1ivitc!..,; particulicrcs qui constituent 'la vie inttrieure' de l'homme• (Greimas 1986: 11). On pcut dire que, dans Jes trois pocmcs, la rl!ccption de la nouvelle donne lieu Aun ttat fonemcnt dysphoriquc. II s'agit de ce quc Grcimas (1989: 15: 16) appcllc insatisfactio11, et qui est le produit du choc cntrc le •vouloir elre conjoint• et le "savoir ne pas etre conjoint•. Mais ii nc s'agit pas sculement de l'insatisfaction due ii la non-auribution ou depossession de l'objet-valcur; ii y a aussi unc dl!ccption qui est le fruit d'une •auentc• frustrec. Dans lcs trois cas, ii sc produit un mecome11teme111, considere par Greimas ( 1989: 15-16) comme une sorte de pivot narratif, qui pcut donner lieu .) difftrcntcs series passionnclles (resignation, amertume. rancoeur, colcre...). Nous allons essayer de montrcr comment la position cognitive et passionnclle de l'observateur est diff~ente dans chaquc poeme, et cela Apartir d'une analyse des debrayages actoriels, tcmporels et spatiaux ct de leurs c!ventuels cmbrayages ulterieurs. On pourrait penser, Aprcmierc vue, qu'il y a une prise de distance progressive de la pan d'un obscrvatcur de plus en plus lucide; mais on verra qu'il s'agit plut0t d'unc multiplication des voix ct d'unc oomplexilication de la ~ne c!nonciative.

Le desespoir dans la "Rima XLII" de G. A. Becquer Dans le poeme de Btcquer (1871), l'cvcnemcnt est introduit par un acteur, un anonymc •quclqu"un• qui le raconte au sujet qui parlc ("cuando me lo contaron"). Nous assistons ii une scric de debrayages actoricls, temporels et spatiaux qui nous rcnvoicnt au moment de rcccvoir la nouvelle. S'ensuit alors unc sequence passionnellc focalisce sur le "jc" qu'on peut identifier comme mc!contcntcmcnt et doulcur A cause de la confiance de~uc. Le contenu passionnel abstrait est fonement figurati vise par !'isotopic somatique de la blessurc: le froid du contcnu dans les cntr.1illcs correspond .) la connaissance subite de cctte deception de la contiancc. La position equivalcnte d'"entrailles• et "rune• illustre bicn la corrcspondancc mclfricd Herder. Fr/Jhe Schriften 17641772. Hrsg. von Ulrich Gaier. Frankfwt: Deutscher Klassikcr Vcrlag. pp. 813ss. Goethe, Johann Wolfgang (1818). "Philostrals Gemllldc. Nachtrllgliches". In: J.W.G.• Werke. Hrsg. im Auftragc dcr Grossherzogin Sophie von Sachsen. Bd. 49,1. Weimar: Hcnnann 136hlaus Nachfolgcr 1898, pp. 136-148. Herder, Johann Gonfried (1768169). "Zurn Sinn des GefUhls". In: J.G.H .• Slin1m1lic/1e Werke. Hrs&, von Bcmhatd Suphan. Bd. VIII. Berlin: Weidmann 1892. p.96. • (1785). "Bride an Wieland und Socmmcring. Weimar. Ende Januar und 28.2 . 1785". In: J.G.H., Briefe. 8carb. von Wilhelm Dobbck und Giintcr Arnold. Bd. S. Weimar: 136hlaus Nachfolgcr. S. 103 und 112. - (1787). "ldecn zur Philosophic dcr Geschich1c dcr Mcnschhcit". 3. Teil. In: J.G.H.• SHmm1liche Werke. Hrsg. von Bernhard Suphan. Bd. XIV. Bertin: Weidmann 1909, pp.3-254. Kant, Immanuel (178S). !Critique des) "ldcen zur Phil0$ophic der Geschichlc der Menschheit". I. Teil. In: I.K .• Gesammelle Schrifte11. Hrsg. von dcr Kc$niglich Preussischcn Akademie dcr Wissenschaf1en !plus 1ard: Akadcmic dcr Wissenscbaftcn dcr DDRIAkadcmie dCI Wisscnscbaften zu Gitlingcn). Bd. lss. Berlin: Reimer, Bd. 8. pp.

43-SS. - ( 1790). Kritilt der Urteilskraft. Div. 6dilions. Leibniz. Go11fricd Wilhelm (1684). Meditationes de Cog11itione, Veritate et ldeis. In:

G.W .L, Die philosophischen Schrifte11. Hrsg. von C.J. Gc1hard1. Rcproduclion de l'tdition Bertin 187S-1890 Hildcshci1n: Olms 1978, Bd. IV, pp. 422-426. Moritz, Karl Philipp (1785). "Versuch ciner Vcrcinigung allcr schoncn Klinste und Wisscnschaftcn unlcr dcm Begriff des "in sich sclbsl Vollcndctcn'". In: Moriti ( 1989), pp. 7ss. - ( 1788). "Ober die bildcndc Nachahmung des Scboncn". In: Moritl (1989), pp. 27ss. - (1989). Beitrlige iur Asthe1ilc. Hrsg. und Kommcnticrt von Hans Joachim Schrimpf und Hans Adler. Mainz: Dietcrichschc Vcrlagsbucl!handlung (= Excerp1aclassica Ill). Schrimpf, Hans Joachim (1980). Karl Philipp Moriu. Stullgart: Me11Jcr (= Sammlung Metzler 19S). Wolff. Christian (1738). Psychologia empirica (i:d. prcmitrc 1732). f:didil et curavit Joanncs Ecole. Reproduction de 1'6dition Frankfurt cl Leipzig 1738. HildeslK.im: Olms 1968 (=Chr. W., Gesammelle Werke. Hrsg. und bcarb. von Jean Ecole. II. Abl. Bel. S). - (1740). Phi/osophia rationalis sive Logica. Pars I [Ed. prcrnitn: 1728). Edilion criliquc avcc introduclion, notes cl index par Jean llcolc. Rcprod!Klion de 1'6dition Frankfwt cl l..cip-ag 1740. Hildesheim: Olms 1983 (=Chr. W., Gesanunelte Werke. llrs&. und bearb. von Jean Ecole. II. Abl., Bd. I.I).

On the Semiotics of Silence and Sameness in Art Laszlo Tarnay

A semi-fonnal introduction Due to 1he concise ronn of lhis paper, in what follows I auempt only 10 give a preliminary account of an inquiry into the semiolic stalus of silence and its relevance for the creation of art. Thus, my aim here is 10 adumbrate a theoretical framework for lhe proper trealmenl of silence, lo fonnulale, and 10 exemplify, certain principles for the identification and calegorii.ation of its cases, and finally, 10 lrace its relevance for an approach to the history of an. Firsl I gi ve certain conceptions and definitions. 1 start with lhe rather uncontroversial generalization, on which one of today's popular seman1ic approaches, namely situalion semanlics, is based, lhal whal we would need 10 charac1erize a given use of language is a set of variable aspects of its situation, which is a subset of 1he possible ways to describe the total pragmatic situation. The crucial move, on my part, provocative as it is, consists in correla1ing this premise with lhc Wiugensteinian idea of language-game, the variabili1y of aspects representing the claim of 1he essential difference of any two such games. I cannol argue any further here for 1he descriptive polenlial of lhe correlation againsl lhc lhesis of non-comparability of language-games. I proceed to the semi-fonnal pan of lhe situation description. Suppose there is a definable set P of aspects of the total situation in which a given ilem of language is being used i11 order to make a move in a corresponding language-game: 1 lhen assume there is a characteristic partitio11i11g of P inlo a subscl R of relevant aspects 10 be specified, and a subse1 11011-R of irrelevant aspects nol being specified by the participants in lhe game, 1he two subse1s varying from game 10 game. The idea of spccificalion remains, however, lo be clarified. Suffice lo say here lhal by "specifica1ion• it is meant 1ha1 participants, by some verbal act, or otherwise. render public lhosc aspects of their language use which arc necessary for the playing of their language-game. I cannot go into the discussion of lhe ways aspects can be rendered public. direcl, non-direct, willed, non-willed, inferred, etc. The idea is that wi1hou1 elements of R being public the given language-game would lose its iden1i1y, in 01her words, it makes way for some failure in the play. The fa, more in1eresting question, however, is whether lhe specifica1ion of any of the aspects belonging to 11011-R should be seen also so fatal for the identity of the game. It will be examined in the second part, which concerns the ways the problem of silence can become conspicuous in, and relevant for. the playing of language-games.

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Next, I introduce the idea of fu11ctionality. by this, I mean a certain ordering relation among the relevant aspects characteristic of a particular language-game. Without much further ado, I would project that ordering relation onto the set of language-games having a common ranking for the subset of relevant aspects in question. Let me show the point of these distinctions by means of examples, now. I think it needs no further support that the ways of using language are hardly enumerable, they range from the over-empha2iscd role of communicating some idea to the discharging of social-physical connict, from the purpose of initiation 10 the storing of socially important information. Thus, the wellknown criteria of truth will apply to those ullerances only which are issued forth in language-games essentially concerned with what happened, happens, or should happen in the extemal world of their participants. More precisely, the poi11t of these games lies in the assessment of the ulleranccs by means of some correspondence criteria. Yet, there may be no other aspect any two such language-games have in common: whether an ullcrance is issued forth by a shaman or some telecom system docs not matter as long as it is seen in terms of truth validity, but they will appear otherwise totally dissimilar in terms of what aspects of the total pragmatic situation enter the corresponding validity criteria. These latter aspects I would consider as fu11ctio11a/ with respect to the point of the game. These aspects, such as the social status of the speaker. or the actual state of /part of/ the world respectively, have become functional with respect to how the so-called 111ea11i11g-i11-11se of the ullerance is being constituted in the corresponding language-game. In general, functionality orders the relevant aspects of the total situation in a characteristic way in which their contributions to the point of the given game are weighed. To identify a language-game is, then, to decide the functionality of relevant features; but since language use tends to change, there might appear a grade of conventionality to allow for the non-specification of a given feature. If so, however. I would say that the language-game is no longer the same as it used 10 be; if the identity, and special aspects, of the shaman no longer contribute to the assessment of his ullerance, but it is rather the divine c·haracter of whom it is about, or from whom it is said to originate, that plays that validity role, one does not have the same language-game. Finally, we may want to speak about functionality of language-games, :101 of aspects of situation specified in the playing of them; to do that, we need some criteria 10 play the role or the point of games. It is going to be another grading as 10 which language-games realize better the given point; it is a value-assessment, then, 10 say, e.g. that telccom systems and the languagegames they play with us realize a belier picture of the world, past, present, and future, around us than the language-games of a shaman do. With respect to the representation of the world the former fare much belier than the laller. One might want 10 inquire into the criteria upon which such a value judgement is based, but I once again have to remain content with the anticipation of the problem of the availability of similar criteria. For me it is enough, now. 10 observe that language-games are weighed with respect 10 the degree of rcalizjng a given point with which they are supposed to be played.

Oa the Scmi01ics of Silence and Samcocss io Arl

23 I

How can silence enter the field of our language-games? There exislS a very cogent argument proposed by the distinguished literary critic, Frank Kennode, in which we all are devout interpreters because we want to become insiders in a world and a book. All our effons. however. whereby 1he unfollowable is constanlly being turned into, or reduced to, lhe sayable are doomed to fail. There is no single valid way of in1erpretation since the objeclS 10 be interpreted escape man's henneneutic aclS, i.e. they remain unsayable, or simply, silent. Confronl this with the following arguments taken from the wrilings of Wiugenstein and his interpreters: (i) any questioning has 10 slop al some point which is, then, called lhe rock-bonom of our linguis1ic practices; (ii) ye1, our linguistic practices. being in1erwoven as lhey are, with nonlinguislic ones. bridge lhe gap between backroom thinking. private or communal, and the actual fields of life. According 10 (i) and in the spirit of Kermode's observations I would draw a basic dis1inction in 1he treatment of the problem of silence: first, it may be agreed that the object of silence is at most the source, or the stimulating cause. of our ges1ures bu1 is never totally captured by 1hem. !IS meanings, if there are any, are forever hidden from us. This is a rather radical stance. which is in neat contrast lo wha1 has been underlying my theoretical remarks furlher above, namely. lhat the object of silence enters 1he domain of our geslures, language-games in tenns of relevance and functionality. In this second stance silence is adequately grasped at least in its role within our practices. I see this role as s11bsti1Utio11al in the sense that it calls for or forbids the supplementation from R (or 11011-R) of some aspect which somehow has not been specified in the game. Nalurally. any such 1rea1ment of silence is conditioned by the ac1ual partitioning of aspeclS into R and 11011-R but this boils down to the consciousness of which language-game one is playing. Once 1he game has been identified, the crucial ques1ion is whether a silent aspect from a subset may or may not be supplemented by the participants without the overt flouting of the rules of the game. The answer turns on the idea of conventionality, already mentioned, which, if present, can semioticize lhe absence of the specification of a panicular aspect into its very sign; now. there seem to be three choices: (a) conventionality of an aspect rules that silence, a situation aspect• equivalent, should be subslituted with a particular form of the signified aspect, (b) conventionalily rules 1hat a situa1ion aspect-equivalent may be subs1ituted with the given type of the signified aspect, (c) conventionalily forbids any similar substitu1ion wi1hout the type of the language-game being changed. Since it is lhe case (c) which is in 1he focus of 1his paper, let me have a few pairs of examples accompany 1hc basic principles above; pairs whose second

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element points at a type of game (mostly of art) in which silence plays a primary, non-subslitullonal role, while the first clement will fall under case (b) if considered as part of some work of art and will fall under case (a) if considered as part of language-games of ordinary lifo. I. Object of silence (hence: silent aspect): syntactic subject indicating agent i. utterances such as "gone with the wind"; ii. utterances such as "thunder", or "lightning" 2. silent aspect: linguistic context: presuppositions i. any uueranoe from ordinary conversation; ii. ambiguities in some poetical language (poem, or prose); 3. silent aspect: an element of the sign-vehicle (text-equivalent) i. any metrical unit like a measure, line, stanza. etc. in oral poetry, distant rhymes in free verse; ii. the romantic idea of fragment: stanza-equivalents in Pushkin; 4. silent aspect: the identity of some dialogue participant (mentioned, or not having spoken yet) i. identity of females of family when a riddle is being posed in the Northern Athapaskan tradition; ii. the identity of dramatis personae mentioned in the Epilogue 10 All's Well That Ends Well;

5. silent aspect the supposed intentional meaning of the author of a poem i. a reading according to general conventions of literary criticism; ii. a reading according to structuralist standards; 6. silent aspect: the supposed meaning of a poem tol/l court i. a reading of a symbolist poem; ii. a Mallarmean reading of the same poem, or the reading of some ornamental fonns originating from the culture of declined or disappeared communities. The list is by no means exhaustive; there can be given as many pairs or triples as many different aspects of the total pragmatic situation can be identified. What mailers in the first place is the prior qualification of the $i ven case of silenoe: if it is put into the category of non-specified but specifiable aspects, it is seen from the standpoint of what I called the second stance: silence assumes meaning in terms of our gestures 10 supplement what has not been given, but may virtually be given; whereas, if silence is qualified as my case (c) above, it is seen as ultimately non-graspable, as something that prompts us to act and to question, yet there is a bedrock beyond which we cannot go (first stance). What I would term as a fallacy is when somebody auempts to dig deeper by, say, asking for the actual paintings in the oontexl of an exhibition of concept art.

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233

To what degree will art forms communicate the same idea? In the rest of the paper my concern will be with this question: ie. if communication is rightly seen and ranked as a possible point for a set of language-games together with other different aims to realize, in what sense and to what degree can language-games, which fall under my case (c) above from the point of view of silence. be said to communicate an idea? Provided that meaning remains the crucial target of artistic criticism, the question hints at the eventual functionality of games of art with respect to the degree of sameness of particular ideas which participants reproduce in each other by mea11s of playing thooe games. This sense of functionality of games should be kept distinct from the functionality of aspects, different as they are, which respectively contribute to the realization of the given aim within the different games. In other words, the question this time is: Is there a set of aspects which would result in an optimal realization: the ide111ical replica1io11 of the given ideas? These two questions, one would want to say, interfere with the general framework of the inquiry by introducing the paradigm of system instead of the paradigm of language-game, to which I can only answer that if it is conceded that at least from a historical perspective language-games are seen as means to realize an aim, thooe fare better. and hence survive, which give a more perfect reali7.ation. Undoubtedly. such a selectional process will raise the degree of functionality and to an extent that what once seemed to be radically dissimilar forms of life now are more adequately described as seljreg11la1i11g systemr.l cannot pursue the whole argument here, I can only refer to the characterization of such - highly functional - "forms• propooed by the Hungarian biologist, Vilmoo Csanyi, who extended his approach to language and culture phenomena, as well. But it should be kept in mind that the extension is dependent on the existence of an external perspective from which the forms can be seen as means 10 the end of communicating an idea. The latter is then transformed into the problem of replicating the same idea. Whether this is a justifiable perspective is another matter. Yet, my final claim here is that history provides us evidences for a de I

signatum s1gnans

~ Figure 1 Such a differentiated approach lO the verbal sign and 10 the relations which constitute its essence, envisaging the linguistic sign jointly in the semantic and syn1ac1ic aspects, eliminates a number of objections put fonh against the thesis of the arbitrariness of the sign. The Saussurean thesis is incomplete in the sense that it specifies only the venical relations between the two components of the sign, disregarding the nature of the hori:ronlal relations. Since the verbal sign is a linguistic entity determined by both these types of relationships. any specification of the sign solely by one type leaving out of account the other type. is inoomplete3. At the same time, the opposite thesis of the motivated, iconic nature of the ties between the signans and its signatum. as advanced against the Saussurean doctrine of arbitrariness, involves exclusively the sphere of the horizon1al relations between the signs. h cannot refer 10 the venical relationship, which is charactcri1.ed in principle by the conventional, arbitrary nature of the bond between the components of the sign: a concrete signatum may be expressed by any phonemic sequence admissible by the phonolactic rules of a given Janguage4. This specific property of the vertical relationship between the components of the sign is one of the factors of multilingualism - furthering, among other things. phonetic variability of language in diachrony. Allempls at discovering in natur.ll languages certain correspondences between sound and meaning. between the phonetic symbolism and the phonemic form of words, do not in general yield positive results. II is possible 10 establish, under experimen1al conditions, definite universal pauerns of correspondences of sounds to meaningsS; but these sounds are not distributed in the concrete words of natural languages according 10 the

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symbolic meanings expressed by them in isolation, under experimental conditions6. In this respect especially, the vertical relations are different in principle from the horizontal relations between the components of the verbal sign. A specific feature of the horizontal relations, as ou11ined above, is their twofold character implying parallel series of interdependencies, i. e. the relationships at the level of the signata as well as at the level of the corresponding signantia of the interrelated signs. Between these two series of horizontal relations a certain correlation exists, finding its expression in the fact that specific relations at lhe level of the signata are re nected in the character of lhe relationships between the corresponding signantia. Thus, diverse relations between the signata on the plane of content (e.g. the relation of quantity: 'single' vs. 'many'; of proximity in space and lime: 'near' vs. 'far', 'early' vs; 'late'; of size: 'large' vs. 'small'; the relation of similarity-dissimilarity; the relations of contiguity, kinship, etc.7) are expressed in the corresponding signantia by specific correlations of phonemic similarity, by phonemic alternations (juxtapositions), by phonemic length of the interrelated words, by certain syntactic features pertaining to the order of the elements, and by other universal properties of the plane of expression of language. Such relations at the level of the signata give rise to the specific character of the relations between lhc corresponding signantia. These properties of the plane or expression show the dependence of the formal relations between the signanlia on the relations between the corresponding signata; we may accordingly speak of a motivation of one series of relationships as being motivated by the other in lhe content plane of language. Such a dependence of the relations between the signantia on the relations between the corresponding signata does not, however, have the character of a diagrammatic correlation in Peirce's sense, in which the relations between the signata are iconically renected in the nature or relations between the corresponding signantia. II is rather manifested in the shape of conventional ties between lhese two series of relationships, which is expressed in a motivated appearence, caused by the character of the relations at the level of signata, of certain formal features specific for the level of signantia and not in principle characteristic of semantic entities (such as phonemic similarity, phonemic length, phonemic alternations, etc.). The relations at the level of the signata are thus specifically projected onto lhc level of the corresponding signantia8. It is just in this sense lhat we must interpret the linguistic data adduced by Jakobson and other scholars (cf. Wescou 1971) maintaining lhe motivated character of lhe linguistic sign illustrating lhc existence of inner, iconic connections between the signans and signatum - in particular, between grammatical concepts and their phonological expression - as opposed to the Saussurean thesis of the arbitrariness of lhe sign. Thus the phonetic similarity or such paired numerals as Russ. dcvjat 'nine' - desjat '1en', Svan wostxw 'four' _ woxwisd 'five', Ger. zwci _ 'two' _ drei 'three', Tigriila so ' alle 'seven' - sommonte 'eight', which came about as a result of an assimilation

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361

of one fonn to the other, is caused by the existence of a certain relationship at the level of the signata: the relation of immediate ncighborhood between numerals is renected in a partial phonetic resemblance between the corresponding signantia The phonetic closeness of such kinship as Eng. father - mother - brother, or Fr. ~re~ m~re ~fr~re. is a phonemic allusion to the semantic proximity of the corresponding signata standing in definite relationships to each other. Thus certain relations at the level of the signata are manifested at the level of the corresponding signantia by definite relationships of phonetic character specific for the plane of expression; 1he plane of signata calls forth a specific charac1er of lhe fonnal relations on lhe plane of signan1ia. In lhis sense alone can we speak of the mo1ivation of one series of relations through lhc other, of the dependence of 1he rela1ions between the signan1ia on those between 1he corresponding signata. Very charac1eris1ic in this respect are groups of words with assonance pertaining to a definite semantic field, e.g. Gcr. Bube, Bursche, Bengel, Baby, Baig, Blage, in which certain semantic relations among signata arc exhibited in 1hc corresponding signantia in a mono1onous repetition of concrete phonemic units, establishing a specific phonetic relationship at the level of the signantia9. Linguistic facts from the realm of morphology, as dealt with by Jakobson ( 1965), must be interpreted in lhe same sense. Of particular interest in this respect is the correlation between singular and plural forms. There are languages in which the plural fonns arc distinguished from the corresponding singular by an additional morpheme, whereas there is no language with a reversed corrcla1ion, i.e. with a specific morpheme for singular vs. absence of an affix in the plural forms (Greenberg 1963b: 74). This correlation in phonemic length between singular and plural forms (shorter singular vs. longer plural forms) is a specific manifestation of the relationship of quantity ('single' vs; 'many') on the plane of signata. Such correlations between the signata and corresponding signantia underlie 1he whole morphological structure of language (cf. the correlation of different degrees of adjectives in lndo-European and other languages, as outlined by Jakobson). In such forms, the relation of the growing intensity of a quality is renected at the level of the signantia by a gradual increase in phonemic length of the corresponding adjectives: Lat. altus ~ altior _ altissimus: Eng. high ~ higher_ highest: Georg. majali 'high'~ uma lcsi 'highest' etc. (cf. Jakobson 1965: 30). These and similar examples, the number of which could be considerably increased by instances from diverse languages, testify 10 the existence of a specific dependence in the sphere of the horizontal relations, i.e. the dependence of the relations between the signantia on those between the corresponding signa1a. Such a dependence is, however, not of an iconic nature (iconicity is characteristic of various 1ypes of diagrammatic representations). It is in principle conventional, in the sense that the specific fonnal relations between the signantia, though conditioned and motiva1ed by 1hc charnc1er of the relations between the corresponding signata, do not renect them iconically; on the one hand, we have relations of quantity, of the

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intensity of a quality, of immediate neighborhood, etc.; on the other, we have relations of phonemic length and phonetic similarity between the corresponding signantiatO. We may consequently conclude that the dependence of the plane of expression on the plane of content as regards linguistic signs is confined exclusively to the sphere of horizontal relations, which arc characterized in principle by arbitrariness and lack of motivation. Along these lines, apparently, we must interpret the famous experiments with figures designated by the words 'takcte' and 'maluma' (Kcjhler 1947: 224-5). The motivated character of the link between the signans and signatum, as revealed in this and similar psychological experiments• 1, does not involve the vertical relationship; it must be referred exclusively to the horizontal relations between the signs (Tsuru & Fries 1933; Davis 1961; Baindurasvili 1971). In pathology such horizontal relations between signs may be disrupted and, as a result, we get "diagonal" relations out of the nonnal "horizontal" ones, upon the elimination of "vertical" relations (Buachidze 1984): Sign A Sign B signatum

signatum signans

Figure II Such "diagonal" relations may illustrate also semantic shifts in historical development of languages. What is manifested as pathology in synchrony may renect the process of historical semantic development in diachrony. Thus the thesei-p/111sei problem of the verbal sign, when envisaged separately on the plane of the vertical or on the plane of the horizontal relations, is characterized by incompleteness, and leads necessarily to contradictory conclusions as to the nature of the linguistic sign and the character of the relations between the signans and signatum; When the linguistic sign is conceived of as a unity of the vertical and the horizontal relations, the opposed propositions concerning the nature of the relations between the signans and signatums present themselves not as contradictory. but as complementary to each other, specifying with necessary completeness the essence of the verbal sign.The.~ propositions • each true, but partial when considered in isolation with respect to the entity under consideration are in the type of correlation called complementarity by Niels Bohrt t.

Notes I. For probable influences on the fonnation of Sall$Surc's views. sec Coseriu (1967). wbo gives a compl'chcnsivc critical aocount of the origin and historical dc,·clopmcnts, in diverse

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philosophical and linguis1ic 1hcorics, or the 1hcsis of 1hc arbi1rary and convcn1ional linguis1ic 1hcorics. or 1hc 1h.

J.J 011e-111ay 111appi11g Whether or not generative grammar in addition embodies assumptions about the way different stages in derivations arc directionally related is the subjoct of a longstanding conuovcrsy. Without going into details, let us simply observe that quite a few considerations indicate that generative derivations do, in effect, now in the direction from deeper to more superficial reprc.~ntations and that gcncr.itivc models must accordingly be taken to involve a distinct directionality'. The most recent model a.'ISumes the configurdtion in Fig. I. Phrase structure rules Lexicon

-t

D-structurc

l

S-structure

✓~

Phonetic form Logical form Fig. I. Chomsky's Extended Standard Theory. (The terms D- and Sstructurc correspond to the old "deep structure• and "surface structure•, respectively). Sec, e.g. Chomsky (1986: 67f., 155f.) or Lightfoot (1982: 39). In particular, the directionality issue remains, albeit in a different garb, even as most rules have been eliminated from generative grammars (note also Chomsky 1988: 3f). J.4 Distinct parser

The generative position on directionality and on the organization of grammar is intimately connected with the idea that the grammar cannot be used directly in parsing linguistic structure. If the grammar is, in fact, built up in Fig. 1, it is all too evident that "language• design appears to be problematic from a

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parsing-theoretic perspective• (Chomsky 1988: 27). Aware of this difficulty, ~enerativists have of old been leaning towards lhe supposi1ion that an independent parser is needed, the grammar being bu1 one componen1 of such a parser. Thus, LighlfOOI (1982: 198) succinc1ly concludes 1ha1 •grammars and parsers are dis1inc1 entitics"8. The postulalion of elaborale parsers, distinct rrom grammars, is a linle unexpected in view of a remark made by Chomsky ( 1979: 71)9. Chomsky menlions !here 1ha1 the philosopher he feels closest to wi1h respecl to epistemological issues is Peirce and as a point of convergence he specifically ciles Peirce's notion of abduc1ion (cf. also Chomsky 1972: 9lf.). The sta1emen1 seems surprising insofar as Chomsky's lechnical linguistic models are always formulated as pure one-way deductive sys1ems without intrusion of inductive or abductive procedures. Apparently, Chomsky has seized upon the fact thal Peirce in his work above all discusses abduction in relation to the discovery of scientific hypotheses. As Rl!thor~ (1989: 4) puts it, "Chomsky semble dissocier radicalcment !'abduction, d'un c6tl!, commc justification du fondcment biologique du langage, et la dl!duction, de l'autre, comme r~gles de la grammaire inll!riorisl!e et red~verte par le linguiste•. Hence, Peircean abduction has no role 10 play in the in1emal sysiem of a generative grammar, and the grammar as such cannot take on lhc major responsibility for structural parsing.

4. The design of language 4.1 Co11strai111S 011 /a11guage

We may now proceed to a lopic which is at the very cen1er of all the ques1ions we have 1ouched on thus far. Lei us begin by recalling thal there are severe biological limilations on the structure of language. Linguistic s1ruc1ure must be adap1cd 10: (a) the production mechanism (b) the perception mechanism (c) the cogni1ive processing system, and (d) the memory (or storage) sys1em. All 1hesc components have imponani consequences for 1he design of language, but we will focus primarily on certain mailers of production and cognilion. 4.2 Ne111raliw1io11s

A feature of language, roo1ed in productive and cognitive conslraints on the individual components of the grammar, is neutralization. This is a property even more importan1 1han appears from mosl linguistic treatises and

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textbooks. Eminently qualified for being regarded as an essential design feature of human language, neutralization pervades all components of grammar, i.e., semantics, syntax and morphology as well as phonology. Neutralizations may be either system-governed (paradigmatic), as in morphological syncretism, or context-determined or rule-induced (syntagmatic). A case of rule-induced neutralization from phonology is regressive devoicing in Polish, rendered in a simplified form in (I): 10 ( I) voiced

-l{ [ sonoran~

PAUSE

BOUNDARY) voicel

J

voiceless This rule accounts. for instance, for the prc-pausal devoicing of the final stop in the Polish word rab' slave, servant' which thereby becomes homophonous with rap' (kind of) cyprinid', both being pronounced (rap) before a pause. Comparable examples can be adduced from morphology, syntax, and semantics. 4.3 /111erpre1a1io11al lati111de Ncutrali1.a1ions (and near-neutralizations) abound in languages, and at first blush they would seem extremely detrimental 10 linguistic structure. But this is not necessarily so. As indicated in (2), there are many structural and lexical factors that constrain the range of interpretation quite considerably: 11 (2) (a) The 1ra11sd11ctio11 rttles themselves (e.g., assimilation. reordering, insertion, deletion) (b) /de11tifyi11g or disa111big11ati11g features in structural ~-ontexl (c) Fixed i11ve11tory of linguistic 1111its (e.g., distinctive features, phonemes) (d) Co111bi11atorial rules (e.g., phonotactics, phrase-structure rules) (c) The set of lexical e11rries Hence it is often said that redundancy in the linguistic code compensates for structural lacunae and the suspension of oppositions. 4.4 Ne11traliwtio11 a11d cog11itio11

But redundancy in itself does not suffice. There is an unstated premise here. What Peirce, Morris, Eco and many others imply is that the interpreters of signs bring 10 their task their mental skills. This insight is particularly significant in linguistics in that ii might prompt us to account for the discrepancy between neutralized portions of sentences and underlying structure by having recourse 10 cognitive machinery. Such cognitive-

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structural retrieval is actually possible and can be pictured as taking place in several distinct steps. Consider the case of regressive devoicing in Polish 12. (3) (i) Initial question: Does [p) in a given pre-pausal occurrence of the Polish phonetic form (rap] represent a phonemic /pi or aJb/? (ii) Assume that the extraction of grammatical and I or semalllic features associated with the phonetic form [rap) turns up the semantic feature [human); the form is then frap/""'"' (iii) Lexical scanning subsequently turns up a noun with a potentially appropriate phonological form and with the feature [human), namely lrabl1uu,,. (iv) Ccmpariso11 of the pllo11etic item [rap)11um a11d the lexical item /rab/hum reveals that they arc the same except for a difference in the value of the phonetic feature [voice) in the final scgmenL (v) Another type of comparison establishes that this phonetic differe11ce is idemical to the phonetic differe11ce described by the regressive devoicing mle (rule ( I) above). (vi) The procedure concludes that the given occurrence of [rap) is a case. not of /rap: 'cyprinid', but of /rab/ 'slave'. We thus realize that rule-induced neutralizations can, in fact, be neatly disambiguated, provided we allow general cognitive capacity to supplement purely structural linguistic knowledge. What we have here arc the basics of a formal cognitive calculus (steps (ii)-(vi)) that interacts in precise ways with the lexicon and the rule.~ of grammar. The miscellaneous considerations briefly outlined here lead up 10 an overall conception of language along the lines sketched in Fig. 2. GRAMMAR Meaning - > ~ > OONITION Sound Fig. 2. The over,111 organi1.ation of a cognitively-aided grammar. (The double-headed arrow indicates two-way and the single-headed downwards arrow one-way, or neutralizing, 1ransduc1ion through the grammar. The retrieval of neutralized structure is achieved by a cognitive calculus together with lexical scanning). It is obvious that in several respects language constitutes an independent entity in the realm of human cognition. Nevertheless, in other respects - and even in its very structure - ii is inseparably intertwined with non-linguistic cognitive capacity. There is, as we have noted, an essential division between two types of mapping through the grammar, two-way mapping which allows unimpeded recovery of underlying structure within the grammar itself, and

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one-way or neuualizing mapping. The latter hinges crucially on the existence of a general (not language-specific) cognitive calculus. Cognitive principles, like those in (3), intersect with the internal system of the grammar and the lexicon in such a way that structural neutralization can often be taken care of. To this extent, there will no longer be a need to construct elaborate structurebase4 parsers in addition to the grammar itself. The discovery that a cognitive calculus is feasible is of utmost importance to the whole of ling~istic theory.

5. Linguistic theory in a semiotic perspective With the understanding that semiotics in panicular is quite diverse and that not all semiotic tenets may be represented in one author, the main points of the preceding sections can be schematized as in Table I.

Table J. Three positions 011 code a11to11omy, 1/ie direction ofmappi11g i11 signs or rules, a11d lhe rela1ion of the parser 10 the code. (The i11formatio11 in the second cofwnn refers to signs in ge,reral, that of the two following columns specifically 10 language). Semiotics

Generative Rrommar

Cog11i1ively aided

h I. Relation of code to Related Autonomous Integrated cosmition Two-way as well as 2. Direction of mapping Two-way Exclusively one-way one-way 3. •Analytic" dimension Parser Parsing handled by of code (in structural Atxluction distinct from grammar in conjunction retrieval parsing, or with a cognitive grammar comorehcnsion) calculus

It thus emerges that, while semioticians such as Morris and linguists such as Saussure tended to relate the sign function more directly to the interpreter as a cognitive (and social) agent, generative linguists have insisted that grammars are independent of other cognitive faculties. Secondly. most generativists take a stand on the issue of the directionality that is grossly at variance with the position found in Saussurc's Cours and the tradition inspired by that work. Finally, whereas semioticians like Eco assign a crucial role to atxluction in speech comprehension, many generativists prefer to set up distinct linguistic parsers to account for structural parsing13. In sum. it is clear that generative theory construction embodies. in some ways, a rather unintuitive view of language design. Chomsky (1988: 27f.) acknowledges this, although he attributes these unintuitive properties to language itself: language design as such appears to be in many respects • i a •. v· el i l! o ooert' 1 re 01 we I a otc to t e

Semiotic Faocu of Linguistic Modds

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functions language is called upon to perform. There is no real paradox here; there is no reason to suppose, a priori, that the general design of language is conducive to efficient use. It is presumably features such as these that have made many commentators feel uneasy about the basic architecture or generative grammatical models. Perhaps, Shaumyan (1984: 238) has also design reatures in mind when he says that •transformational generative grammar... disregards the rundamental runctional properties or language as a sign-system used as an instrument or communication and cognition•. Al any rate. semioticians and scmioticallyoriented linguists have not espoused the extreme stands on these issues taken by generative grammarians. The drift of much semiotic thinking would be to favor grammatical models which are far more closely tailored to communicative and cognitive ends.

Notes • This is a parcly condensed. revised version of a paper read a1 1hc 4Ch Coniress of lhe ln1cma1ional Association for Semio1ic S1udies in Barcelona / Perpignan in 1989. The revision was canied ou1 wi1hin lhe Researdi projec1 Phonology and Cognition. supporlcd by the Swedish CoWlcil for Research in I.be Humani1ies and Social Sciences (HSFR) and lhe Linguistic Division of Uppsala Univcrsi1y. The Univcrsi1y o( Min.ocso1a granted me lhc neocssary leave 10 pursue 1hc firs1 phase o( lhc projecl. Thanks arc due, furthermore, 10 J~lle R~1hort, Univcrsi1y of Pcrpignao, for a stimulating diSQJSSion of abduc1ion. Also. Umberto Eco kindly answered some queries. I. As usual , rcfacnocs to Peirce (1931-58) arc by lhc abbreviation (CP followed by volume and section number. The reservation alluded to is moliva1cd by a remark made by Peirce in a letter from 1908 to Lady Welby. There, as before, Peirce provides a definition which specifics that 1hc sign "determines an effect upon a puson. which effect I call ils ln1crprctan1•, adding, however, that "my insertion o( "upon a person• is a sop to Cerberus, because I despair of making my own broader conception understood" (in Hardwick I'177: 80f.). Wilh this compare, however, CP 4.43 1 (p. 348) on the in1crprc1a1ion of graphs as one kind of signs. As 10 lhc relation of Pcirccan semiolics 10 1he analysis of communication, d . also Oclcdalle (1919: 87-94). 2. Also recall Morris' (1938: 6fl'.) uipanite division of semiotics into syntac:tics, semantics and pragmatics, where the latter borders on lhc in1crpre1ers. On Morris' bebavioral semiotics, see Posna (1979). 3. Sec Eliasson ( 1978: S3-55) for some diSQlssion o( this point 4. On abduction, sec further Eco (1984: 39-43). A convenient summary of Pcircc's views of lhe modes o( reasoning is given by Dclcdalle (1987: 77-80). S. Abduction in code idcn1ification is also touched on in Eoo (1984: 40-41). 6. On external autonomy, also nOle Cbomsky in lluybn:gts & Ricmsdijk ( 1982: 114'.) as well as Rieber & Voya1 (1983: 33-36). Recall, besides. lhat early gcncra1ive posi1ions excluded semantics as a component of tbe total grammar and 1ha1 pragmalics cnlacd generative 1hinking only rclativdy late (d. fn. 2). 7. A popular meta1hcore1ical supposi1ion in generative circles has been that the dircc1ionali1y issue is merely notational. Nevcnhdess. a dose cxaminalioa of gcoeralive

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theory construction and practice shoW$ lhal there •e severe difficulties with such an i nlCfJ!fdalion. 8. For some funher COIIUIICJllS on the nature of parsers. see CholllSky (1986: 151) and (1987: 3). 9. Joi!Jle Rroducidos: de B. Trnka, "M«hode de comparaison analyliquc et grammairc com~ historiquc•: 68:74, y de Vilfm Mathesius. "ZUr synchronischcn Analyse frcmdcn Sprachguts": 398-412. 3. Vtase las panes "r'OllOlogfadiacronica": 112- 1-IO, y "Fonologra diacronica dd cspailol": 209-281. 4. "coonotaci6n". I.a delinici6n cs de Thomas Gr«nwood. 5. El pasajc cilado cs~ en la esocna VJ de la Jomada primcra. 6. en esta comcdia de eagaoos, como en 01ros lugara, pucdc entcnderse por cl coatCllto el significado de la palabra. El Rey, en cl acto primcro, trama lo siguientc: "Yo he de lingir quc no estu / ya en mi gracia. y he de haccr I quc picDffll quc tc aborrezco I y cste cnojo mosuan! / de mancra que cncmigo/ mcjui:ucn tuyo [... ) I Vcndnl.smcde nocbc aver:/ sm! tu aro.igo de nochc; / y aunquc sicmp,c lo sc:n!. / cngallarcmos de d(a Id hwnano parcc,cr. I con csta / ascgurarmc: podrc I en cstc reino; sabras / quc cnc:migo 1cngo. quicn / sc conjura contra mf, ...•. 7. Corominas identilica el sienificado de viola con "violcta•, y documcnta la palabra como un latinismo usado en los Siglos de Oro por G6neora y otros poctas: Diccionario crilico elimologico de la lengua cas1ellana (1974). Madrid: Grcdos. s.v. viole10. Al mismo ticmpo, viola cs una alu.si6n al nombrc de la dama, l)oila Violante Sanseverino, a quien Garcilaso dcdico cl poto and from to . The decision requires a judgment as to whether the reader (native Old Saxon or second language learner) cognizes the noun as belonging to a par.1digmatic class or whether he perceives the graphic and/or phonological variation, and thus iconism, in the innection. The answer is quite independent of the teleological explanation offered by Sievers ( 1878: 503 n. 106) of the scribal iconically produced embedded in syntagm with (Ne silll) ,n ina (11oh).. .cuma11a, "my times (are not yet) come•. Remarkably Holthausen (1921 : §283.4) maintains that the Q The principle of relevance is then reformulated as follows: (5) The speaker's utterance is relevant because: (a) the intended foll interpretation of the utterance (P & Q) in the communicative act is guaranteed in so far as the availability of the necessary context (Cl) for the hearer is guaranteed: (b) the utterance is the most errective one in that it oonveys the intended interpretation with a minimal processing effon (its context (C I) is the most accessible one for the hearer from the utterance, and the utterance linguistically represents everything that cannot be obtained from the combination of the uttcran1.-e's interpretation with the context). Let us suppose that speaker and hearer may obtain different interpretations, by drawing different conclusions Qs and Qh: (6) Qs = deduction calculated, intended by the speaker. Qh = deduction auained to by the hearer.

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Ganido Gallatdo, Joaquin

Communication succeeds if Qs =Qh =Q; it doesn't if there is more than one Q or if Qh = Qs (that is, conditions (7a) or (7b) are not met): (7) Conditions for successful communication: (a) There is only one Cl to relate P and Co. (b) There is only one Q to P & Co & Cl. (c) P is enough to get Cl given Co. (d) All of P is necessary to get Cl given Co. Note that in condition (7b), with a different Co or C I, there will be other Q's. Conditions (7c) and (7d) amount to the principle of relevance (5) as reformulated above.

Towards a fonnat for entries in a discourse dictionary A precious repository of information in order to gain access to the appropriate context is the information stored in the lexical entries used in the uueranoe. In our previous example, the lexical entry for 'tired' must give access to the information that being tired one is generally n()( in a position to wish to do things, so that the necessary context Cl, (le), is accessed. Generally speaking, entries have either to be available so that they render the necessary information, or they have to be reanalyzed in order to give it. The procedure to carry out the reanalysis is a search for coherence (Garrido 1981: §4.12): the hearer tries to make sense of everything he finds in the text, and, when something apparently does not make sense on the first impression, it must be reconsidered until it does make sense. (The problem for the speaker is to decide what he can leave 10 be inferred without making his text incoherent.) It is a maximization procedure (Goguen 1975: §2): for each lexical meaning (defined in terms of fuu.y representations) the hearer chooses the interpretation that maximizes the overall sense of the uuerance. In this process, the appropriate context is constructed or selected; the maximization of sense is measured on terms of relevance as defined above. The processing of lexical items thus requires a processing hypothesis of the higher-level units where the items lit, up to the text unit, and even higher up, until the text information is integrated into wider information units stored in the hearer's memory (scripts, fr.1mes). From the processing point of view, every lexical entry can be taken to be a net that requires parallel processing (cf. Rumelhart and McClelland 1986), where different components (nodes) in the net place mutual restrictions on each other. Every (lexical) net is the node of a higher-level information unit, corresponding, in a compositional approach, to meaning of phrases, then to meaning of sentences, up to the text level. The highest-level net, that of general encyclopaedic knowledge, can be accessed from the highest-level linguistic unit (the text interpretation), but also from the lower-level units (such as phrase units or lexical units), with the possibility of returning to the nodes from which access took place during the prlderling; c'cst-a-dirc le moment qui, dans l'cspace et le temps. est vide de sens et oil tout devient possible. Ceuc rupture se fcrait A partir de quelque chose de connu, re-comm et quelque chose qui ad-vielll. En l'occurrence, la rupture n'a pas lieu sur unc lignc qui se briscrait en deux, dessinant ainsi dcux choscs distinctes matc!rialisees par un manque. Mais la rupture sc materialisera comme le moment oil. de quelque chose qui est connu et reconnu, done privisible, apparait l'imprivisible. En ce sens, c'est la parodic qui est donnee comme rupture, qui ad-vicnt au reel en tanl que rupture. I·································· 2 •······································ prc!visible

f •·················

imprc!visible

rupture-parodie A ussi et c'est un point qui meritcrait d'etre developpe. la parodie nc s'oppose pas, ne sc hcurtc pas A l'objct qu'elle vise, elle ne nic pas ce sur quoi clle porte. Mais elle le dc!nonce commc la chose au sens unique, ellc perturbc la ligne du parti pris. Elle s'immiscc dans le trafic du bien pensc! et du bien pensant. dont les r~gles peuvent Etre rapportces Ala loi de I'offre et de la demande. En ce sens, la parodie est avant tout tra11sformatio11, du prelixe • trans: par delA la forme; et seulemenl ensuitc tra11sgressio11, selon l'endroit d'ou l'on parle. Elle est transformation de l'idc!c auenduc et transgression puisqu'clle est inaucndue. Et. afin de conclure cet expose! en observant cc a quoi Barthcs invite le lecteur.je prcnds sur moi d'apparailre comme cene "personnc d~invohe" que d'aucuns qualirieront de figures malsaines de la contrc-revolution; et jc plagicrai ce que Regis Debray (I 989: 193) a parodie dans un article de l.iblrlllio11 du 12 janvier 1989, alors quc l'cnscmble de nos P~res Politiques encenscnt Bicentcnairc et Droits de l'homme et j'ecrierais: Drouad/0111. Avcc pour seul commentaire qu'en France de ccuc cpoquc. si la declaration des Droits de l'hommc est faitc le 4 aoOt 1789, cc n'cst qu'cn 1794 que lcs esclaves de Saint-Domingue, parcc qu'ils se revolteront, obtiendront !'abolition de l'esclavage. Par consequent. la parodie des Droits de l'hommc ne saurait fire le produit d'un malin genie et l'oeune d'un esprit perverti, mais elle s'anachera a rendrc

D'un scns de la pwodie

487

l'humanismc, de cc projct d'une constitution civile parfaite, dans son cheminement historiquc. C'est-a-dire quc la parodie sc devra de retrouvcr le scns du mot humanisme, qui n'est pas vidc de sens. mais prive du sens objectif m!ccssaire ll toutc misc en place d'un syst~mc qui veul Stre universe!. Ainsi et de la meme fac;on quc nous souhaitons rendre son sens au mot humanisme, par la qu'il est im~ratif de de-terminer a nouveau le sens de cc mot, la parodic dont le sens est rest6 cach6, si cllc pcul clrc cc tcxtc -personne d~involte- qui montre son derri~re ll la litterature autori~. est aussi cellc qui indique acette litterature cc sur quoi ellc est edifiee. C'est la le double sens de la proposition de Barthes, qui par cette ambigunc a rendu comptc de la non-pertinence du contre-scns quand ii est signilie comme sens unique, et qu'il nous indiquc, par cct indicc, que la parodic semble bien etrc le para-ode, qui signilic comme l'ecrit Jean-Luc Nancy: "le cha/II dlcale" ( 1979: 95).

References Barthcs, Roland (1973). ,~ pfaisir du rexte. Paris: ooll.Poin1s. Scuil. Debray. R~gis (1989). Que vive fa Ripubfique. Paris: Odile Jacob. Dcscar1cs, Reuf (1966). Oiscours de fa 111irhode. 3~mc panic: R~gles de la morale. Paris: librairie philosophique J. Vrin. lleidegger. Martin (1964). Le11res sur l'humanisme. !rad. Roger Munier. Paris: Aubict. Hugo. Viaor ( 1973). Les co11re111pfarions. suite. St-Amand: 91~mc 61. Gallimard. Millier. Heiner ( 1985). Hmnfer-1nochi11Ciltl 1110derM. Paris: Daloel/Gonthicr. Grcimas. Algirdas Julien (1966). Slrnamique structurale. Paris: Larousse. • (1970). Du uns. Essais slmiotiqun. Paris: Saul. • (1976). Slrniotique et scle11ces sociales. Paris: Seuil. Grcimas. AJ. (al.) (1972). Essais de slmiotique poltique. Paris: l...arOU$Se. Grcimas. AJ. et Cour16. J. ( 1979 1986). Simiotique. Dictionnaire raiso11ne de la tlrlorie du langage. tome I. 2. Paris: Hachette. Grcimas. A.J. et Landow$ki. E. (61.) ( 1979). /11troduc//011 d /'analyse du discours en sciences sociales. Paris: Hachette. Hamon. P. (1984). Texte et idlologie. Paris: P.U.f. Houdcbinc, J.-1 •. (1977). /.a11gage et marxisme. Paris: Klincksicdt. Kapsomenos. Eratosth~ne (1986). "The Relationship of Hero-Authority-God in 1hc Actanlial Model of Heroic Folk Song•. ~miotica 59-314. 281-301. Kris1cva.Julia (1969). Recherches pour unesemanalyse. Paris: Seuil. • (1974). la Rl\-olutio11 du /angage poltique. Paris: Seuil. Lagopoulos. A.-Ph. et autres (61.) (1986). "Domaincs et m~1hodcs d'une sociosaniotiquc•. Actes du 2anc Cong~ de !'Association Hdl~nique de Saniotiquc. Salooiquc: Paratiritis (en 11rcc). Lotn1811. Juri ( 1973). la structure du texte artistique. Paris: Gallimard. Lotman. J. cl Ouspcnski, Boris (al.) (1976). Tra>'OWC sur les systlmes de sig11es. Ecole de TarllL Bruxdles: &li1ions Complcxc. Machcrcy. Pierre ( 1966). Pour u,,e thlorie de la productio11 lilllraire. Paris: Maspcro. • ( 1977). "Problems of Reflcxion". In Literature, Sociely a11d Sociology of literature. University of Essex. Machercy. P. and Ralibar. F.. (1978). -On 1.iM·aturc as an ldcolo11icaJ Form: Some Marxist Propositions•. Oxford Literary Review 3. no I. Mukarovsky. Jan (1974). S111die11 :ur struc1uralistische11 Asthetik wrd Poetik. Milnchcn: Hanser. Priclo. Luis (1975). Perti11e11ce et pratiqi,e. Essais de slmiologie. Paris: Miuuit. Rasticr. Fran~ois ( 1972). •Syst~matiquc des isotopics·. In essais de slmiotique poltique. A.J. Grcinias (6d.). Paris: Larousse. Todorov. T1.,·ctan (6d.) (1965). Thloriede la li11bawre. Twes des for,na/istes russes. Paris: Scuil. Todoro•. Tzvctan (1981). Michait 8akhti11e: le pri11cipe dialogiqi,e. suivi de: l::crits du Cercle de Bakhti11e. Paris: Seuil. Williams. Raymond ( 1977). Marxism a11d Uterature. Oxford: O.U. Press. 7jma. Pierre ( 1978). Pour w,e sociologie du texte li11haire. Paris: 10118. • (1982). l'/11differe11ce ro111a11esq1ie. Sartre. Moravia. Camus. Paris: Le Syoomore. • (1985). Ma111,el de Sociocritique. Paris: Plovd/Coll. Counaissancc des Lancucs.

Narrative Logic and Temporality Emilio Ruiz Granda

Abstract Temporality is an aspect which must be considered in the study of narrative paradigms. Narrative consists mainly in the affirmation that certain transformations have taken place; it is essentially the record of a succession of events ordered and organised by time. The analysis of temporaiity in a narrative, in all its modes and at all levels, enables us to comprehend the text as a dynamic whole in evolution.

Logique narrative et temporalite Dans la perspective de Newton, le temps est une entite physique, independante des objets materiels. II nous parle ainsi d'un temps infini et absolu, etranger au mondain, cxistant par droit propre. Selon la formule tres connue "le temps s'ecoulc a son rythme regulicr": le temps, dans sa mc!canique, n'cst pas unc variable A considerer; passc! et futur sont parfaitemcnt prc!dictibles des le moment present. Kant a continue! avcc cene pen~ qui conceptualise le temps commc formc pure de !'intuition sensible, dc!tcrminante de la structure du mondc et de notre experience de celui-ci et totalement indc!pendante des evc!nements. Ces idc!es font du temps un "individualisateur" des c!vc!ncments (rappelons-nous les "pri11cipia i11dividuatio11is" de Schopenhauer), mais ii reste hors des objectifs de la science, orientc!e dc!finitivemcnl vcrs la dc!couverte d'une legalitc! qui permene de comprcndrc le monde par-dessus ccs specifications temporellcs. Dans la narratologie, probablcment A cause de ceue pensc!e, le temps s'intcgrc dans le "Cadre" de !'"Episode". Cela fail du temps un individualisateur d'c!venemcnts, mais on le place comme objet d'une science du rc!cit qui doil rcchcrcher lcs structures communes sous-jacentcs au-dessous de la surface. Selon Greimas, le temps apparatt au niveau discursif, correspondant A la grammaire narrative de surface et aux representations proccssuelles et aspectuelles. II resterait absent du nivcau logico-sc!mantique ou se situent lcs operations logiques qui rcndent oompte de la manipulation du texte (Greimas 1976: 24-26). En consequence, le temps se trouverait dans la structure de surface et ii nous renverrail A deux niveaux du 1ex1e: le niveau discursif et le niveau de la representation. Au premier niveau la figure du

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temps narre denoncc la pr~cnce de l'enonciatcur, instaure dans un temps de l'enoneiation different du temps de la narration, qui, generalcmcnt, propose un discours des choses pass (Rxy v Ryx)) Qu'cst-cc a dire, sinon que le couple problematique (LC. S) est ordonne a condition qu'il y ait, pour ses variables respectives (x. y). une connexite lcgitime. En d'autres termcs: pour tout x (la lim!rature comparce et gt!nerale) et pour tout y (la semiotique gencralc) la disparite (x,. y) est impliquee par les couples relationncls (R) disjonctifs. soil: (Rxy v Ryx). Or, dans l'etat actuel des connaissanccs litteraires et scmiologiques ii nc saurait etrc question de postuler le fondement d'une tcllc quantification universcllc. Tout au plus pcuton parter (Robert 1987: I 11). lcgitimement, d'cxistentialisation de singulieres (i). (j). soit: I- rxi yj

:::> 3 x 3 y

(rxy)

Cela veut dire qu'on pcut affirmer une variable de relation (rxy) sur lcs singulicres. a savoir tcl compar.int / compare ainsi que tellc scmiotique-objet etant impliques par !'assertion ( 1- ) qu'il existe au moins une activite

S~miotiquc et co111par.11ismc littmiin:: pertinence des universaW