Richard Kilvington Talks to Thomas Bradwardine about Future Contingents, Free Will, and Predestination: A Critical Edition of Question 4 from Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum 9789004527737, 9004527737

Citation preview

Richard Kilvington Talks to Thomas Bradwardine about Future Contingents, Free Will, and Predestination

Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters Begrü ndet von Josef Koch

Weitergefü hrt von Paul Wilpert, Albert Zimmermann und Jan A. Aertsen

Herausgegeben von Andreas Speer

In Zusammenarbeit mit Wouter Goris, Kent Emery, Jr. und Georgi Kapriev

band 134

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/stgm

Richard Kilvington Talks to Thomas Bradwardine about Future Contingents, Free Will, and Predestination A Critical Edition of Question 4 from Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

By

Elżbieta Jung and Monika Michałowska

leiden | boston

The research and work on this volume has been supported financially by the National Science Centre, Poland under grant agreement UMO-2017/27/B/HS1/00066. Elżbieta Jung (University of Łódź) Monika Michałowska (Medical University of Łódź) Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Kilvington, Richard, approximately 1305-1361, author. | Jung-Palczewska, Elżbieta, editor. | Michałowska, Monika, editor. Title: Richard Kilvington talks to Thomas Bradwardine about future contingents, free will, and predestination : a critical edition of Question 4 from Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum / [edited] by Elżbieta Jung, Monika Michałowska. Other titles: Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum. Quaestio IV | Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters ; Bd. 134. Description: Leiden ; Boston : Brill, 2023. | Series: Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, 0169-8028 ; Band 134 | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Text in Latin, with introduction in English. Identifiers: lccn 2022044614 (print) | lccn 2022044615 (ebook) | isbn 9789004527669 (hardback) | isbn 9789004527737 (ebook) Subjects: lcsh: Bradwardine, Thomas, 1290?-1349. De futuris contingentibus. | Future contingents (Logic)–Early works to 1800. | God–Omniscience–Early works to 1800. | Free will and determinism–Early works to 1800. Classification: lcc b765.k553 q83 2023 (print) | lcc b765.k553 (ebook) | ddc 165–dc23/eng/20221115 lc record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022044614 lc ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022044615 Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill‑typeface. issn 0169-8028 isbn 978-90-04-52766-9 (hardback) isbn 978-90-04-52773-7 (e-book) Copyright 2023 by Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill nv incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Hotei, Brill Schöningh, Brill Fink, Brill mentis, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Böhlau, V&R unipress and Wageningen Academic. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Requests for re-use and/or translations must be addressed to Koninklijke Brill nv via brill.com or copyright.com. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

Contents Preface

vii

Richard Kilvington’s and Thomas Bradwardine’s Questions on Future Contingents, Free Will, and Predestination 1 The Structure and Sources of Bradwardine’s and Kilvington’s Questions 4 The Structure of Bradwardine’s Question 6 The Structure of Kilvington’s Question 10 The Sources of Bradwardine’s and Kilvington’s Questions 14 God’s Foreknowledge, Predestination, and Human Free Will in Thomas Bradwardine’s Question 19 Bradwardine’s Approach 19 Arguments against the Ninth Opinion 28 Free Acts as Outcomes of Absolute and Ordained Power 30 Predestination and Free Will in Richard Kilvington’s Question 40 The Ontological Status of the Act of Free Will 41 Predestination and Human Free Will 49 God’s Foreknowledge and Human Free Will in the Context of Divine Absolute and Ordained Power 59 Revelation and Predestination in the Context of Future Contingents 78 Conclusion 84 The Manuscripts of Question 4 Utrum quilibet actus voluntatis per se malus sit per se aliquid from Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum 87 The Description of the Manuscripts 87 The Manuscript Tradition

92

Editorial Principles 100 Abbreviations 104 Sigla 105 Bibliographical References

105

Bibliography 113 Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum, Quaestio 4: Utrum quilibet actus voluntatis per se malus sit per se aliquid 119

vi Index Nominum 206 Index Locorum 209

contents

Preface This volume presents a critical edition of question 3, Utrum quilibet actus voluntatis per se malus sit per se aliquid, from Richard Kilvington’s Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum, accompanied by an introduction and a doctrinal analysis of Kilvington’s theological concepts. The scrutiny it offers sheds light on the discussion on future contingents, human and divine wills, and predestination in which Kilvington engaged with Thomas Bradwardine. Future contingents featured among the most extensively debated issues at Oxford in the 1330s, yet Kilvington’s approach still remains understudied. The aim of this volume is to make Kilvington’s theological ideas available to a wider readership and to provide insight into his polemic with Bradwardine. This volume grew out of a research project funded by the National Science Centre (Poland) under grant agreement UMO-2017/27/B/HS1/00066. We are deeply grateful to Edit A. Lukács, Monika Mansfeld, André Goddu, Dariusz Gwis, Andrea Nannini, Chris Schabel, Joanna Sygit, and Patrycja Poniatowska for their comments and suggestions, which have helped us improve the text. This volume sprouted during a very unsettling time, when we were experiencing a coronavirus pandemic. While we are indebted to numerous people for their encouragement and help, our special, heartfelt thank-you goes to our families, and especially to Wojtek, Jędrek, and Marianna for their affection and invariable support during this time. We wish to thank the STGM editorial board, the outstanding team of editors and the staff at Brill, and especially Marcella Mulder for her guidance and patience.

Richard Kilvington’s and Thomas Bradwardine’s Questions on Future Contingents, Free Will, and Predestination In her Ph.D. dissertation entitled Foreknowledge, Free Will, and the Divine Power Distinction in Thomas Bradwardine’s ‘De Futuris Contingentibus’, Sarah Hogarth Rossiter observes that: Bradwardine (…) makes use of the distinction between God’s ordained and absolute power in a key way in his own solution, and in so doing, he is applying this distinction in a context quite unlike that of Scotus. Indeed, it is my contention that Bradwardine is in fact relatively unique among medieval authors in his application of the distinction between absolute and ordained Divine power specifically to the problem of God’s foreknowledge and future contingents. Though others before and after him speak of this distinction in other contexts, I have been unable to discover any that do so directly in the context of the problem of future contingents (at least not beyond the passing mentions in the “damning Peter and saving Judas” discussion (…)). This makes this treatise a particularly interesting piece in the history of the future contingents discussion, being as it is something of an anomaly.1 Subsequently, Hogarth Rossiter poses two important questions: “[H]ow widely read was this treatise, and did it have any broader influence in Bradwardine’s own time, or that immediately after him?”2 Answering these questions, she states: The very fact that Chaucer is mentioning Bradwardine by name—in the same breath, even, as such illustrious greats as Boethius and Augustine— indicates that Bradwardine must have been something of a household name, even a couple of decades after his death. Yet more remarkable, though, is the context in which Chaucer mentions Bradwardine, for the

1 Sarah Hogarth Rossiter, Foreknowledge, Free Will, and the Divine Power Distinction in Thomas Bradwardine’s ‘De Futuris Contingentibus’ (London, ON: The University of Western Ontario, 2017, Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository 4432, https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/cgi/viewconten t.cgi?article=6153&context=etd). 2 Hogarth Rossiter, Foreknowledge, Free Will, p. 155.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2023 | do

2

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

very topic being alluded to is that of the De futuris contingentibus, namely divine foreknowledge and human freedom!3 There can be no clearer evidence than this passing mention in Chaucer’s hugely popular poem that Bradwardine’s attempts to tackle to the problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom were widely known, at least among the educated. Despite this evidence that Bradwardine was famous for his work on the topic, I have found little evidence to suggest that De futuris contingentibus treatise in particular was much read or imitated. Much further textual and paleographic study of Bradwardine’s contemporaries and immediate successors would be necessary to establish with any greater degree of certainty the kind of direct influence the treatise may have had; but the immediate evidence would appear to point to the influence being very slight. There seem to be few surviving manuscripts, for one thing; and for another, I have not so far discovered any evidence of the characteristic elements of the DFC’s solutions—namely, the reliance of the divine powers distinction—being reported or taken up by any subsequent philosophers of the fourteenth century. There are two main possibilities that I can see as to why this might be: it may be the case that this was a text that simply failed to gain a critical-mass following, and so was forgotten about (certainly, its stylistic shortcomings would not have made it an easy, accessible text for students or other masters of arts hoping to read up on current ideas); or perhaps it was read by some, even circulated for a time, but not taken up by anyone because its shortcomings as a coherent account were too apparent.4 This study answers some of Hogarth Rossiter’s queries, since there is at least one textual witness to the profound knowledge of Bradwardine’s question. Richard Kilvington debates the same issues, namely God’s foreknowledge of future contingents ( futura contingentia), human and divine free will, and predestination, in the context of God’s absolute and ordained power in his question Whether Any in Itself Evil Act of Free Will Is in Itself Something (Utrum quilibet actus voluntatis per se malus sit per se aliquid), a critical edition of which is provided in this volume. Kilvington directly references Bradwardine:

3 Geoffrey Chaucer, “The Nun’s Priest’s Tale,” in The Canterbury Tales: “(…) Or Boece, or the bishop Bradwardine, Whether that Godde’s worthy foreweeting* *foreknowledge *Straineth me needly* for to do a thing *forces me* (…).” www.online‑literature.com/chaucer/canter bury/21/. 4 Hogarth Rossiter, Foreknowledge, Free Will, pp. 185–186.

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

3

In response to the third argument Bradwardine says that everything necessarily comes about, and he concedes that God forsakes a human before a human forsakes God.5 (…) The ninth conclusion ⟨says⟩: not everything absolutely revealed by God necessarily comes about speaking of absolute necessity.6 (…) The ninth conclusion is obvious, as Bradwardine argued elsewhere, for otherwise it would follow that God, by God’s absolute and ordained power, could not make Himself unable to lift a straw.7 As research shows, Thomas Bradwardine (ca. 1295–1349) and Richard Kilvington (ca. 1302–1361) were actively involved in the academic life of Oxford and at the same time held positions at the courts of Richard of Bury and King Edward III. Bradwardine became a Bachelor of Arts at Balliol College, Oxford, in 1321. In 1323 he was made a fellow of Merton College, Oxford, where he probably remained for the following twelve years. In the same year, he became a Master of Arts, and in 1340 a Doctor of Theology. Richard Kilvington began his study of the Arts at Oxford around 1317. Most likely, he first entered Balliol College, where he met Bradwardine. However, Kilvington was not Bradwardine’s student, as Annelise Maier has suggested.8 Kilvington studied theology at Oriel College, Oxford. As Elżbieta Jung has shown elsewhere, the landmarks of Kilvington’s academic career were dated as follows: in 1321, he became a Bachelor of Arts, in 1324 or 1325 a Master of Arts, and then a Doctor of Theology ca. 1335.9 5 Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus voluntatis per se malus sit per se aliquid, p. 138: “Ad tertium respondet Bradvardin dicens omnia evenire de necessitate, et concedit quod Deus prius deserit hominem quam homo deserat Deum.” Unless stated otherwise, the translations are ours. 6 Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 170: “Nona conclusio ⟨est⟩ quod non omne revelatum a Deo absolute necessario eveniet necessitate absoluta.” 7 Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 171: “Nona conclusio patet, sicut alias arguebat Bradvardin, quia aliter sequeretur quod Deus de omnipotentia sua tam ordinata quam absoluta non posset se facere impotentem ad elevandum festucam.” 8 See Anneliese Maier, Die Vorläufer Galileis im 14. Jahrhundert, 2nd ed. (Studien zur Naturphilosophie der Spätscholastik 1, Rome: Edizioni di Storia et Letteratura, 1966), p. 174; Anneliese Maier, An der Grenze von Scholastik und Naturwissenschaft, 2nd ed. (Studien zur Naturphilosophie der Spätscholastik 3, Rome: Edizioni di Storia et Letteratura, 1952), pp. 266–267; Anneliese Maier, Ausgehendes Mittelalter. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Geistesgeschichte des 14. Jahrhunderts, vol. 1 (Rome: Edizioni di Storia et Letteratura, 1964), p. 75; Norman Kretzmann, “Richard Kilvington and the Logic of Instantaneous Speed,” in Studi sul XIV secolo in memoria di Anneliese Maier, ed. Alfonso Maierù and Agostino Paravicini Bagliani (Rome: Edizioni di Storia et Letteratura, 1981), pp. 144–145; William J. Courtenay, Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 244. 9 See Elżbieta Jung-Palczewska, “Works by Richard Kilvington,” Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge 67 (2000), pp. 181–223; Elżbieta Jung, “The New Interpretation of Aris-

4

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

Thomas Bradwardine authored several significant works addressing a varied array of scholarly domains. His extant writings include two treatises on mathematics (Arithmetica speculativa and Geometria speculativa), a number of logical treatises (all written before 1328), a famous work on motion (Tractatus de proportionibus velocitatum in motibus, 1328), two theological works (a commentary on the Sentences and De causa Dei contra Pelagium et de virtute causarum ad suos Mertonenses, composed in 1344), and De memoria artificiali adquirenda.10 All of Kilvington’s known works, except a handful of sermons, are related to his teaching at Oxford. These are: the Sophismata and nine Quaestiones super De generatione et corruptione, composed before 1325, which stemmed from his lectures as a Bachelor of Arts; eight Quaestiones super Physicam, written in 1326 at the latest, and ten Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum, both based on his lectures as a Master of Arts; and eight questions on Peter Lombard’s Sentences, produced after Kilvington advanced to the Faculty of Theology.11 More recently, Jung has established that, previously considered the pioneer in medieval mathematical physics, Bradwardine was in fact the greatest beneficiary of Kilvington’s original theory of motion. In Tractatus de proportionibus velocitatum in motibus (1328), Bradwardine used most of arguments from Kilvington’s Questions on the Physics, which predated the Tractatus by two years, to formulate his own famous theory of motion.12

The Structure and Sources of Bradwardine’s and Kilvington’s Questions Bradwardine’s commentary on the Sentences consists of nine questions, which, as a set, have only survived in the Paris manuscript, Bibliothèque nationale de

10 11

12

totle: Richard Kilvington, Thomas Bradwardine and the New Rule of Motion,” in Quantifying Aristotle: The Impact, Spread, and Decline of the Calculatores Tradition, ed. Daniel Di Liscia and Edith Sylla, with the collaboration of Paul J.J.M. Bakker (Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy and Science 34, Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2022), pp. 38–39. For detailed information on Bradwardine’s works, see Jung, “The New Interpretation of Aristotle,” pp. 39–40. See Monika Michałowska “Introduction,” in Richard Kilvington on the Capacity of Created Beings, Infinity, and Being Simultaneously in Rome and Paris: Critical Edition of Question 3 from Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum, ed. Monika Michałowska (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 130, Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2021), p. 6; Jung, “The New Interpretation of Aristotle,” pp. 42–43. Jung, “The New Interpretation of Aristotle,” pp. 48–79.

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

5

la France, lat. 15805, fols. 40ra–49vb. The questions are as follows: 1) Utrum in entibus possit esse aliquod infinitum; 2) Utrum per discursum rationis humanae possit sciri aliqua veritas in divinis; 3) Utrum in Deo sit tantum trinitas personarum; 4) Utrum personalis proprietas sit persona; 5) Utrum scientia Dei sit causa cuiuslibet sciti ab eo; 6) Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam omnium futurorum contingentium ad utrumlibet; 7) Utrum cuiuscumque actionis meritoriae sit caritas principium effectivum; 8) Utrum Christus potuit in merito profecisse; 9) Utrum quodlibet meritum sit debite praemiandum.13 Question 6 has been edited by Jean-François Genest as a separate treatise entitled De futuris contingentibus,14 and questions 7, 8, and 9 have been edited by Severin Kitanov and Chris Schabel.15 Most of Bradwardine’s questions have been preserved in a single copy.16 In the introduction to their edition of Bradwardine’s questions, Kitanov and Schabel argue that Bradwardine read the Sentences in 1332–1333. They also suggest that, it is possible that among Bradwardine’s socii was Richard Kilvington of Oriel College.17 This hypothesis can be confirmed by a discussion presented in Bradwardine’s first question on the Sentences: Utrum in entibus possit esse aliquod infinitum, where Bradwardine quotes Kilvington’s arguments for actual infinity, such as the endless helix line. Kilvington was the first scholar to come up with this exemplification of infinity. He discusses the matter extensively in his questions on the De generatione et corruptione, penned before 1325, where he presents an original construction of a helix line circumvolving on the column, which has its start point at the lower base of the column but does not have an end point, and therefore it is endless, that is infinite.18 Bradwardine argues

13

14

15

16 17 18

For a detailed description of Bradwardine’s questions on the Sentences, see Jean-Françoise Genest’s paper, where a thorough analysis of Bradwardine’s questions on the Sentences is offered, Jean-Françoise Genest, “Les premiers écrits théologiques de Bradwardine: textes inédits et découvertes récentes,” in Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, ed. Gillian R. Evans, vol. 1 (Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2002), pp. 395–421. See also Jean-Françoise Genest and Katherine Tachau, “La lecture de Thomas Bradwardine sur les Sentences,” Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge 57 (1990), pp. 301–306. For an edition of the question Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam omnium futurorum contingentium ad utrumlibet, see Jean-Françoise Genest, “Le De futuris contingentibus de Thomas Bradwardine,” Recherches Augustiniennes et Patristiques 14 (1979), pp. 249–336. See Severin Kitanov and Chris Schabel, “Thomas Bradwardine’s Questions on Grace and Merit from His Lectura on the Sentences at Oxford, 1332–1333,” Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge 89 (2022), pp. 163–236. Kitanov and Schabel, “Thomas Bradwardine’s Questions on Grace and Merit,” pp. 164–166. Kitanov and Schabel, “Thomas Bradwardine’s Questions on Grace and Merit,” pp. 167–168. See Richard Kilvington, “Utrum continuum sit divisibile in infinitum,” ed. Robert Podkoński, Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum 36/2 (2007), pp. 120–175; Robert Podkoński, Ryszard Kilvington: nieskończoność i geometria (Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu

6

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

against this reasoning (he uses the phrase dices) and offers his own imaginable example, saying that it is possible to imagine two lines circumvolving a column in both directions towards its lower and the upper base, which begin in the middle point of the column. He maintains that such lines are of a finite length. In his article 2 of his question 3 Utrum omnis creatura sit suae naturae certis limitibus circumscripta, Kilvington refers to the example of Bradwardine and maintains his view that such a helix line made of two lines is infinite.19 This exchange of arguments shows that Kilvington must have lectured on the Sentences earlier than previously assumed, most likely in 1332–1333. If so, both Bradwardine and Kilvington lectured on the Sentences in the same year, and they could both be each other’s socii. The discussion of infinity nicely supports this hypothesis. As will be shown, the discussions on future contingents, free will and prophecy, which are the main theme of this introduction, also confirm this conclusion. The Structure of Bradwardine’s Question Both Thomas Bradwardine and Richard Kilvington pondered the problems of God’s foreknowledge, God’s and human free wills, and the necessity and contingency of future events. Bradwardine discussed these issues in the question Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam omnium futurorum contingentium ad utrumlibet. Kilvington examined them in the question edited in this volume Utrum quilibet actus voluntatis per se malus sit per se aliquid. Genest and Hogarth Rossiter view Bradwardine’s question, which they call a treatise, as breaking down broadly into two halves. In the first half, Bradwardine examines and criticizes nine opinions on future contingents put forward by other scholars; in the second half, he lays out his own solution, and responds to possible objections.20 As Hogarth Rossiter argues: This confusion is the result of the fact that just prior to the responsio propria, Bradwardine introduces this second portion of the treatise by a restatement of the question at hand. But in restarting the question, the text phrases it in a way that is subtly—but significantly—different

19

20

Łódzkiego, 2016); Michałowska, Richard Kilvington on the Capacity of Created Beings, pp. 16–18; Elżbieta Jung and Robert Podkoński, “Mathematical Imagination in 14th-Century Natural Philosophy: The Case of the Endless Helix Line” (forthcoming). For detailed discussions on the mathematical proofs for the existence of actual infinity in the Late Middle Ages, see Jung and Podkoński, “Mathematical Imagination in 14thCentury Natural Philosophy” (forthcoming). Genest, “Le De futuris contingentibus,” p. 254; Hogarth Rossiter, Foreknowledge, Free Will, p. 99.

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

7

from the question with which the treatise began. The treatise opens the question, “Whether God has foreknowledge of all ad utrumlibet future contingents”; at this point, however, when we expect him to provide his own response to the initial question, he instead restates the question as, “Whether Christ, who is God, has foreknowledge of all ad utrumlibet future contingents.” (…) With the addition of three words (“Christus qui est”), the initial question becomes an entirely different—though related—question: this later question highlights problems relating to the nature of the Incarnation, and the complex relationship between Jesus Christ’s divine nature and human nature, rather than just the puzzles relating to God’s foreknowledge and future contingents.21 She encapsulates her extensive reasoning as follows: On my view, it seems safe (…) to conclude that the second half of the treatise, like the first, is concerned with the question of “Whether God has foreknowledge of all ad utrumlibet future contingents.” On this view, then, the addition of “Christus qui est” in the second instance of the question is an error, whether due to a copyist, or to a student’s faulty transcription (as the work we have does seem to be a reportatio), or perhaps even to Bradwardine’s own slip of the tongue. (…) What does seem clear, however, is that throughout the treatise, Bradwardine is addressing the problem of God’s knowledge of future contingents, and does not seem concerned with the related particulars regarding the knowledge of the Incarnate Jesus Christ.22 This confusion is easily dispelled. In the Paris manuscript (BnF lat. 15805), the second part of the question begins with: “Nunc respondetur ad quaestionem qua quaeritur: utrum Deus, habeat praescientiam omnium futurorum, dicendo quod sic.”23 Thus, Christ is not evoked in this phrase, and consequently both parts of the question are devoted to the problem of God’s knowledge. Genest prepared a critical edition of Bradwardine’s question on the basis of manuscripts preserved in Troyes, Bibliothèque municipale 505, and the Vatican, Bibliotheca Vaticana, Vat. lat. 813. His edition was published in 1979.24 At

21 22 23 24

Hogarth Rossiter, Foreknowledge, Free Will, pp. 100–102. Hogarth Rossiter, Foreknowledge, Free Will, p. 103. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam omnium futurorum contingentium ad utrumlibet, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 46va–b. See Genest, “Le De futuris contingentibus,” pp. 272–278.

8

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

that time, he did not know that the set of nine questions to be found in Paris, BnF lat. 15805, was authored by Bradwardine. In 1990, Katherine Tachau and Genest identified the question on future contingents as the sixth question of this very set of Bradwardine’s nine questions on the Sentences.25 A comparison of the Paris manuscript and Genest’s critical edition indicates that editorial changes were made by the copyists of the Vatican and Troyes manuscripts. For example, the Paris manuscript does not contain “ornaments,” such as sed contra respondetur; instead, there is only contra. Also, a few homoeoteleuta that appear in the Vatican and Troyes manuscripts do not feature in the Paris manuscript. The Paris manuscript contains only one homoeoteleuton, which is not present in the other manuscripts. This may suggest that the Paris manuscript was copied earlier than the Vatican and Troyes ones. Therefore, there should be no confusion about either the structure of Bradwardine’s question or his views. Bradwardine’s question is lucidly structured, at least as compared with Kilvington’s text. In the first half, Bradwardine examines and criticizes the following nine opinions: 1. Nothing is future.26 2. Future things have no power for being or becoming. It is not through a thing’s own power that it comes to be in the first place, but rather by God’s power.27 3. Future contingents are not determined, and thus propositions concerning them have no determinate truth value, so are neither true nor false.28

25 26

27

28

Genest and Tachau, “La lecture de Thomas Bradwardine,” pp. 301–305. Eng. trans., Hogarth Rossiter, Foreknowledge, Free Will, p. 105. Since, as mentioned above, Bradwardine’s question in Paris BnF lat. 15805 predates the copies that were the basis of Genest’s edition, all quotations in this study are from the Paris manuscript. The Parisian text is cited in classical Latin, including the title of Bradwardine’s question. Additionally, the corresponding passages from Genest’s edition are provided. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 45rb: “Nihil est futurum.”; De futuris contingentibus (DFC), ed. Genest, 3a. For Bradwardine’s discussion on this argument, see Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fols. 46rb–46va. Cf. DFC, 3a–8g, pp. 282–287. Hogarth Rossiter, Foreknowledge, Free Will, p. 105. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 45rb: “(…) aliquod est futurum, sed illud non potest esse, quia futurum, cum nihil sit, non habet aliquam potentiam et ita non habet aliquod posse.” Cf. DFC, 9a, p. 287. Hogarth Rossiter, Foreknowledge, Free Will, p. 106. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 45va: “(…) haec est vera: ‘aliquod est futurum ad utrumlibet futurum vel non futurum’ accipiendo istum in sensu composito, sed nec est vera: ‘aliquid est futurum’, nec falsa, nec etiam haec: ‘aliquid non est futurum,’ quia nulla talis de futuro est vera vel falsa.” Cf. DFC, 10–12, pp. 288–289.

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

9

4.

Future things were not going to be from eternity, but only from a certain point in time.29 5. God does not in fact have any foreknowledge of future contingents.30 6. Since God is transcendent of time, past, present, and future are all present to God, and consequently what is future to us is not future to God. Thus, God’s foreknowledge is in fact God’s knowledge of what is present to Him.31 7. Nothing is contingent, but everything happens by necessity.32 8. Future contingent events are contingent, and thus God’s knowledge about them is also contingent.33 9. Future things which God explicitly foretells are necessary, but all other things are not.34 The second part of the question—responsio propria ad quaestionem—begins with Bradwardine’s affirmative answer to his central question whether God has knowledge of all future contingents ad utrumlibet. In his further discussion, in which he offers arguments pro and contra, as well as answers to counterar-

29

30

31

32

33

34

Hogarth Rossiter, Foreknowledge, Free Will, p. 106. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 45va–b: “(…) aliquod vere futurum ad utrumlibet, sed illud non semper fuit vel est futurum, sed quod potest incipere esse futurum, quia aliquod potest ⟨esse⟩ quod non erit, igitur aliquid potest esse futurum quod nunc non est futurum.” Cf. DFC, 13–15, pp. 289–291. Hogarth Rossiter, Foreknowledge, Free Will, p. 107. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 45vb: “(…) aliquid est futurum contingens ad utrumlibet, sed illud non praescitur a Deo, quia sic scientia posset falli et Deus posset decipi, quod est falsum.” Cf. DFC, 16, p. 291. Hogarth Rossiter, Foreknowledge, Free Will, p. 107. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 45vb: “(…) nihil est Deo futurum, licet plura sint futura in propriis naturis; et haec est opinio Anselmi.” Cf. DFC, 17–19, p. 292; Anselm, De casu diaboli, in S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera Omnia, ed. F.S. Schmitt, O.S.B., vol. 1 (Seccovii 1938, reset for Thomas Nelson & Sons Edinburgh: Nelson), cap. 21, p. 267. Hogarth Rossiter, Foreknowledge, Free Will, p. 108. As Hogarth Rossiter notes, “this opinion is attributed by several scholars to Averroes.” Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 45vb: “(…) nihil est futurum contingens ad utrumlibet, sed omnia quae eveniunt, necessario eveniunt.” Cf. DFC, 20, p. 293. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 46ra: “(…) aliquid est futurum contingens ad utrumlibet et praescitum a Deo in instanti isto praesenti, et quod tamen possibile est pro isto instanti praesenti quod nec sit futurum nec praescitum a Deo, immo quod nunquam fuit futurum nec praescitum a Deo.” Cf. DFC, 21–38, p. 293. Hogarth Rossiter, Foreknowledge, Free Will, p. 108. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 46va: “(…) illa sunt necessaria quae Deus praedixit fore, sed alia futura non sunt necessaria.” Cf. DFC, 39–40, pp. 109–110.

10

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

guments, he proposes his own solution to the problem of future contingents, emphasizing the absolute and ordained power of God. Bradwardine’s views are described below. The Structure of Kilvington’s Question As already shown, the Sentences commentaries written at Oxford in the 1330s and the 1340s differed quite considerably from the standard ones in their range of topics, length, and structure. In selecting their thematic concerns, authors did not seek to cover all the four books of Peter Lombard’s Sentences, but rather to discuss en vouge issues and methods, such as the affinity of logic and physics to theology, the problem of future contingents, God’s omnipotence and omniscience, predestination, and human free will, to list just some of them. While the length of commentaries was reduced, their structure became increasingly complex with many sub-questions and subdivisions, as noted by William Courtenay: Some of this reduction in size and scope probably resulted from a reduction in the time of “reading” from two years to one, but the length of individual questions, subquestions and dubia often increased, and the reduction in the range of topics was counterbalanced by an increased intensity of analysis in those questions chosen for treatment.35 While far less lengthy than earlier theological commentaries, they boast a greater structural intricacy, as shown independently by Courtenay and by Paul Bakker and Chris Schabel. They do not replicate the organization of Lombard’s text, and they quite frequently deal with more issues than addressed in the work they discuss. One of the most distinctive features of fourteenthcentury question commentaries is the inclusion of minor problems into major ones, as Bakker and Schabel conclude. They identify four techniques that were employed to introduce less obvious (sometimes not even theological) issues into the question: First, some commentators use the traditional method of subdividing each question into a series of articles. Second, in other commentaries, which follow a practice that had earlier origins, the so-called “conclusiones” and “corollaria” are used to introduce new topics, which do not necessarily have anything to do with the main topic of the question. Third, a com-

35

Courtenay, Schools and Scholars, pp. 253–254.

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

11

mentator may insert a new problem in an almost concealed way, by formulating subordinated questions introduced by expressions such as “Sed nunquid …” or “Diceres …” Fourth, a commentator may put in a series of dubia.36 This style of composition reaches its climax of sophistication in Kilvington’s question 4, whose structure is exceptionally complex. Consistently with his common practice, which is already observable in his Questions on the Ethics,37 in questions Utrum in omni motu potentia motoris excedit potentiam rei motae, from his Physics commentary,38 and Utrum omnis creatura sit suae naturae certis limitibus circumscripta, from his Sentences commentary,39 Kilvington only develops the arguments he finds interesting or useful for his further argumentation, whereas some arguments and opinions are left unanswered. Kilvington discusses some of the arguments and counterarguments without revealing his own opinion or simply in order to reduce the argument to absurdity. He also tends to resume to analyzing certain arguments and opinions not necessarily in the order the reader would expect. In his question commentary, Kilvington employs all of these devices listed by Bakker and Schabel. For example, in question 3, he both divides the question into articles and extends his discussion onto new topics that develop on an earlier argument. At times, he also leaves some arguments unanswered for the sake of pondering problems he finds interesting to investigate.40 The structure of question 4 displays the same shifts and 36

37

38

39 40

Paul J.J.M. Bakker and Chris Schabel, “Sentences Commentaries of the Later Fourteenth Century,” in Medieval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, ed. Gillian R. Evans, vol. 1 (Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2001), pp. 429–430. Richard Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum, ed. Monika Michałowska, in Monika Michałowska, Richard Kilvington’s Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum: A Critical Edition with an Introduction (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 121, Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2016), pp. 62–336. Richard Kilvington, Utrum in omni motu potentia excedit potentiam rei motae, ed. Elżbieta Jung, in Elżbieta Jung and Robert Podkoński, Towards the Modern Theory of Motion: Oxford Calculators and the New Interpretation of Aristotle (Research on Science and Natural Philosophy 4, Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, 2020), pp. 215–266. Michałowska, Richard Kilvington on the Capacity of Created Beings, pp. 7–11. Michałowska, Richard Kilvington on the Capacity of Created Beings, p. 8: “The question starts with six principal arguments, three of which (1, 2, & 3) are fully developed and constitute a separate discussion each. In the first part of the question, Kilvington focuses on the main problem posed in the title of the question, providing arguments against the question (Ad oppositum quaestionis) and arguments in favor of the question (Ad quaestionem). Subsequently, he declares that he will present several conclusions of the first principal argument, but in fact only gives one and discusses it at length. The structure of this part adheres to the standard form of a fourteenth-century question consisting of:

12

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

intricacies. For these reasons, we provide a detailed analysis of the structure of the opinions and arguments formulated in his question Utrum quilibet actus voluntatis per se malus sit per se aliquid. The question begins with two principal arguments, followed by a counterargument. Then, Kilvington presents the order of the question, where he declares that he will first cite some opinions and refute them; subsequently, he will offer his own solution; and finally, he will answer the principal arguments.41 This clear plan, however, is dismantled almost at the outset. Admittedly, at the beginning of the question, two principal arguments are presented, one of them based on Aristotle’s statement in Peri hermeneias, and the other on Anselm’s view in De concordia. They are followed by an opposite argument founded on Aristotle’s statement in the Nicomachean Ethics, after which four opinions are indeed presented, but only the first one is refuted.42 This part is followed by the determinatio quaestionis and the answer to the two main arguments. The rest of the question—almost three quarters of it—is devoted to disputing the third opinion.43 The four opinions are: 1. An evil act of the will is in itself something.44 2. Even if this type of act ⟨i.e., an act of the will⟩ were something, it is not immediately produced by God, since God, as the creator and efficient cause of the will, is only a mediate cause.45 3. Both acts, either good or evil, of free will are first made by free will, and God cooperates with free will to make such acts, and thus God does what free will does, and not the opposite.46

41 42 43 44 45

46

a) twenty arguments in favor of the first (and the only) conclusion (Argumenta pro prima conclusione: I 1–I 20); b) thirty arguments against the first conclusion (Argumenta contra primam conclusionem: 1–30); c) the author’s opinion concurring with the question (…) and d) twenty-nine replies to the arguments contra (Responsiones ad argumenta contra primam conclusionem: Ad 1–29). Noteworthy is the fact that the last (30th) argument contra remains unanswered. The second part of the question is actually a dubium, entitled Utrum unum infinitum potest esse maius alio. It elaborates on the issue formulated in argument 29, i.e., whether removing a part from an infinite thing renders the thing finite or infinite.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 121. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 121. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, pp. 126–205. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 121: “(…) huiusmodi actus per se malus est aliquid.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 122: “(…) licet huiusmodi actus sit res, non tamen immediate producitur a Deo nec Deus est auctor illius nisi mediate, quia Deus est auctor et causa efficiens ipsius voluntatis quae producit actum illum.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 122: “(…) in huiusmodi actibus liberum arbi-

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

13

4.

All meritorious acts are first caused by God, and then by free will; all demeritorius acts are caused the other way around.47 In the next step, Kilvington gives arguments pro the first opinion, which he then convincingly refutes.48 Afterwards, he gives ten arguments pro the third opinion, which is at this point reformulated as “first free will performs its acts, and God contingently cooperates with it.”49 The next part of the question—ad oppositum—contains twelve arguments borrowed directly from Augustine’s mostly anti-Pelagian works. They show that God is the main cause of human free will; eternal reward is given freely by God’s grace; and human free will “follows” God’s choice, because we are rewarded as God’s chosen ones, and not because we make right choices. A person’s good free choice cannot force God to reward the person.50 As Kilvington promised when describing the order of the question, this part is followed by the determinatio quaestionis. He refers to Augustine again, insisting: “I say, therefore, with all due respect for a better judgment, that no act of free will, bad in itself (per se) is something (per se aliquid).”51 Next, Kilvington briefly refutes the principal arguments.52 The following, and large, part of the question begins with arguments against the third opinion: “Both acts either good or bad of free will are first caused by free will, and God cooperates with free will to produce its acts, and thus God does what free will does, and not the opposite.” Kilvington marshals ten arguments that confirm this view, the third of which—“All that comes about, necessarily comes about, and God forsakes man earlier than man forsakes God”—is attributed to Bradwardine.53 This view invites an extensive discussion, with Kilvington thoroughly debating both parts of Bradwardine’s assertion. Besides arguments from authority, Kilvington primarily avails himself of theorems (conclusions), as well as arguments pro and contra these conclusions, to express his views.54 As is his habit, Kilvington does not respond to all the

47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54

trium, sive in bonis actibus sive in malis, prius naturaliter agit actus tales et Deus coagit libero arbitrio ad producendum huiusmodi actum, et sic Deus agit quod liberum arbitrium agit et non e converso.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 122: “(…) in actibus meritoriis prius agit Deus et e contra liberum arbitrium, sed in actibus demeritoriis est e contra.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, pp. 122–126. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 126. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, pp. 130–132. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 132. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, pp. 135–136. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 138. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, pp. 141–154.

14

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

arguments he puts forward, yet his beliefs can mostly can be gleaned from this section. Kilvington does not bother to discuss the second and fourth opinions listed above. The Sources of Bradwardine’s and Kilvington’s Questions In question 4 in his commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences, Kilvington quotes from or refers to all the four books of Lombard’s work, with a visible preference for book I. In line with his general practice, he extensively cites Augustine, which reflects the “Augustinian revival” in fourteenth-century philosophy and theology, a trend that resulted in the increased range, quantity, and accuracy of quotations from Augustine, as aptly observed by Courtenay: One finds a wider variety of Augustinian works being cited, longer quotations that were not part of the previous collections of “memorable sayings,” a concern that the texts quoted should be accurate, based on a reliable textual tradition, of sufficient length to reveal Augustine’s thought, and referenced precisely to the work, chapter (a division which had only been recently added in the thirteenth century), and often a section of chapter, so that the reader could check the quotation for himself.55 Although Kilvington fits in this picture, quite a remarkable style of his own surfaces in question 4 when it comes to quotes. We shall return to it below (see Editorial Principles). Kilvington’s other preferred sources in question 4 include Anselm of Canterbury, Gratian, John Duns Scotus, and Gregory the Great. Discernibly, some quotes reappear in Kilvington’s text on several occasions. All in all, Kilvington’s sources for question 4 comprise: – Alexander of Hales: Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, Summa theologica; – Anselm: Cur Deus homo, De casu diaboli, De concordia, De libertate arbitrii; – Aristotle: Ethica Nicomachea, Physica; – Augustine: Confessionum libri tredecim, Contra Iulianum opus imperfectum, De civitate Dei, De correptione et gratia, De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII, De doctrina christiana, De dono perseverantiae, De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim, De Genesi contra Manichaeos, De gratia et libero arbitrio, De libero arbitrio, De natura boni, De natura et gratia, De perfectione iustitiae hominis,

55

Courtenay, Schools and Scholars, p. 308.

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

15

De praedestinatione sanctorum, De Trinitate libri XV, Enchiridion de fide, spe et caritate, Enarrationes in Psalmos, Epistulae, Retractationum libri II, Sermones; – Averroes: Commentum super libros Physicorum; – Avicenna: Liber de philosophia prima (Metaphysica); – Boethius: De consolatione philosophiae; – Cassiodorus: Expositio psalmorum; – Cyprian: Ad Quirinum; – Glossa ordinaria; – Gratian: Decretum magistri Gratiani; – Gregory the Great: Moralia in Iob; – Henry of Ghent: Quodlibeta; – Hugh of Saint Victore: De sacramentis christianae fidei; – Hypognosticon; – Isidor of Seville: Sententiae; – John Duns Scotus: Lectura, Ordinatio; – John of Damascus: De fide orthodoxa; – Origen of Alexandria: In Epistulam Pauli ad Romanos explanationum libri; – Peter Lombard: Collectanea in omnes Pauli apostoli Epistulas: In epist. ad Hebr., In epist. ad Philipp., In epist. ad Rom., In Psalmos, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae; – Pope Gregory IX: Decretales; – Ps. Augustine: De spiritu et anima; – Ps. Bernard: Meditationes piissimae; – Prosper Aquitanus: Liber sententiarum; – Quaestiones veteris et novi testamenti; – Thomas Aquinas: Catena aurea in Matthaeum, Quaestiones disputatae de veritate; – William of Auxerre: Summa aurea. While engaging in discussion on the concept of future contingents with Bradwardine, Kilvington also refers to his question commentary on the Sentences. Notably, very similar sources can be found in Bradwardine’s question (Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam omnium futurorum contingentium ad utrumlibet), which indicates that certain texts were considered canonical, while others were simply in fashion at that time. The list of works referenced by Bradwardine encompasses: – Anselm of Canterbury: Cur Deus homo, De casu diaboli, De concordia, De libertate arbitrii, Monologion; – Aristotle: Analytica priora, De anima, De bona fortuna, De interpretatione, De mundo, Ethica Nicomachea, Metaphysica, Physica;

16

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

– Augustine: Contra Gaudentium, De civitate Dei, De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII, De dono perseverantiae, De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim, De libero arbitrio, De Trinitate libri XV, Enchiridion de fide, spe et caritate; – Averroes: Commentum in Metaphysicam, Commentum super libros Physicorum, Paraphrasis in De divinatione per somnum; – Avicenna: Liber de philosophia prima (Metaphysica); – Boethius: De consolatione philosophiae; – Glossa ordinaria; – Gratian: Decretum magistri Gratiani; – Gregory the Great: Moralia in Iob; – Hieronymus: Epistola 22 Ad Eustochium; – Peter Lombard: Collectanea in omnes Pauli apostoli Epistulas: In epist. ad Hebr., Sententiae in IV libris distinctae. The array of works listed above affords several insights. Apart from the Bible (which is profusely quoted in the two questions), Augustine, Anselm, and Peter Lombard are the greatest authorities for both authors. Yet, there are significant differences between their citational strategies. The total number of quotations in Bradwardine’s De futuris contingentibus is 159, whereof 20 come from philosophical works by Aristotle, Averroes, Avicenna, and Boethius, and 36 from the Holy Scriptures. In Kilvington’s question the total quotation tally stands at 583, with 299 taken from Augustine’s writings, 23 from the Holy Scriptures, and only 8 from philosophical works. The disparity in the citation reveals the fact that Bradwardine wrote his question first of all to defend his original theory, and to criticize Ockham’s opinions with logical, philosophical, and theological arguments, while Kilvington, seems to have wanted to show off his erudition in defending his views, and to endorse, with the help of theological authorities, his theory, which, as it will be shown, was criticized by Bradwardine. As Schabel additionally observes, two main tendencies concerning quotations from contemporary authors emerged in the fourteenth-century commentary tradition on the Sentences.56 Besides various versions of plagiarism, ranging from summaries of opinions and arguments to pure verbatim “borrowings,” another, more thorough, approach meeting the criteria of research integrity (to use modern terminology) arose. In his examination of this development, Schabel scrutinizes the works of Peter Auriol (ca. 1280–1322), a Parisian philosopher, to highlight Auriol’s proper referencing. Schabel portrays Auriol as a model

56

Chris Schabel, “Haec ille: Citation, Quotation, and Plagiarism in 14th Century Scholasticism,” in The Origins of European Scholarship: The Cyprus Millennium International Conference, ed. Ioannis Taifacos (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2006), pp. 163–175.

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

17

example of the modern practice among Parisian masters. Arguably, Kilvington can serve as Auriol’s counterpart among Oxonian thinkers, as he consistently exhibits academic honesty by crediting other authors. In conformity with the standards in place, he refers to some of their modern authors (moderni) by their titles, providing proper attributions and explicit references to their works and even particular parts of the text. For instance: – Doctor Communis for Thomas Aquinas (once). p. 183: Unde Doctor Communis imaginatur hic, et recitat eum Doctor Subtilis super I Sententiarum distinctione 39 (…). – Doctor Solemnis for Henry of Ghent (once).57 p. 199: Et Doctor Solemnis IV Quodlibet quaestione 19 (…). – Doctor Subtilis for John Duns Scotus (five times).58 p. 130: Et pro parte ista est responsio Doctoris Subtilis super I Sententiarum distinctione 17 quaestione 2 (…). p. 139: Et istud argumentum est Doctoris Subtilis super IV Sententiarum quaestione 1, et ibi respondet. p. 183: Unde Doctor Communis imaginatur hic, et recitat eum Doctor Subtilis super I Sententiarum distinctione 39 (…). p. 184: Deus potest cognoscere futurum sicut praesens, non tamen in toto concludit verum, sicut probat Doctor Subtilis ibidem quaestione 39. p. 199: Quod autem praedestinatio sumatur quandoque pro actu voluntatis patet ex modo loquendi Doctoris Subtilis super Sententias I libro distinctione 40 (…). Kilvington is also careful to credit the contemporaneous authors on whom he draws either by elaborating on their examples or by disputing their arguments. In question 3, he refers to Monachus Niger by name, while upgrading his case of being simultaneously in two places, and in question 4, as already mentioned, he directly names Thomas Bradwardine, when deliberating on future contingents.

57

58

The same method is used in question 3; see Michałowska, Richard Kilvington on the Capacity of Created Beings, p. 110: “Et istud est argumentum Doctoris Solemnis IV libro quaestione 9, et videtur ibi propter hoc tenere quod divina essentia non potest videri ab intellectu creato.” Ibidem, p. 114: “Et, ut non videar hoc solus dicere, ecce quid tenet Doctor Solemnis V Quodlibet quaestione 3, in illa quaestione, ubi quaerit Utrum in Deo sit ponere infinitatem idearum (…).” For examples in question 3, see Michałowska, Richard Kilvington on the Capacity of Created Beings, p. 90: “Non vidi epistulam, sed allegat eam Doctor Subtilis IV Sententiarum distinctione 45 quaestione ultima illius distinctionis (…).” Ibidem, p. 98: “Ad oppositum arguitur primo per ipsum Averroem. Et allegat eum Doctor Subtilis ad hoc probandum, libro I distinctione 22 de augmentatione caritatis (…).”

18

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

– q. 3: Ad tertium principale, quod quaerit utrum aliquod corpus possit simul et semel esse in diversis locis, haec conclusio conceditur a Monacho Nigro, qui probat quod idem homo numero possit esse Romae et Parisiis simul et semel.59 – q. 4: Ad tertium respondet Bradvardin dicens omnia evenire de necessitate, et concedit quod Deus prius deserit hominem quam homo deserat Deum.60 Another recurrent feature of Kilvington’s approach to quoting other authors’ texts appears in his theological commentary. In accordance with the standard practice, he usually introduces a quotation with the “ubi dicit” phrase, and winds it up with “haec ille,” indicating its end: Sed primum consequens est falsum et contra Augustinum De spiritu et anima capitulo 20: semper enim Deus praesentem se exhibet, semper paratum se offert, si me paratum invenerit. Quocumque iero, non me deserit, nisi ego prius deseram eum; haec ille.61 Since a similar method of marking the end of quotations is recognizable in other thinkers of that time, for example in the works of Walter Burley,62 Richard FitzRalph,63 Adam Wodeham,64 and Gregory Rimini,65 it can be reasonably assumed to have slowly entrenched itself as a manner of referencing that paved the way to what are today considered high standards of research ethics.

59 60 61 62 63

64

65

Michałowska, Richard Kilvington on the Capacity of Created Beings, p. 149. Question 4, p. 138. See also, pp. 144, 171. Question 4, p. 127. Marek Gensler and Monika Mansfeld, Walter Burley’s Commentaries on Parva Naturalia (Leiden–Boston: Brill, forthcoming). Richard FitzRalph, Lectura on the Sentences, q. 1, art. 3, Utrum voluntas libere libertate contradictionis fruatur ultimo fine, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 15853 (P), Oxford, Oriel College 15 (O), P fol. 8va, O fol. 8va: “Quarto sic: viator potest velle se non esse, et per consequens potest nolle beatitudinem. Consequentia patet per Augustinum XI De civitate Dei capitulo 27 ubi dicit sic: Porro tam nemo est qui esse se nolit quam nemo est qui non beatus esse velit, haec ille [ibi P].” Adam Wodeham, Lectura secunda, ed. Rega Wood and Gedeon Gál, vol. 1 (St. Bonaventure, NY: St. Bonaventure University, 1990), Prologus, q. 3. 3, p. 69; Distinctio I, q. 6. 4, p. 302; Adam Wodeham, Lectura secunda, ed. Rega Wood and Gedeon Gál, vol. 2 (St. Bonaventure, NY: St. Bonaventure University, 1990), Distinctio II, q. 2. 5, p. 39; Ibidem, Distinctio III, q. 5. 2, p. 210. Schabel, “Haec ille: Citation, Quotation, and Plagiarism in 14th Century Scholasticism,” p. 171.

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

19

God’s Foreknowledge, Predestination, and Human Free Will in Thomas Bradwardine’s Question Bradwardine’s Approach Bradwardine discusses the problem of human free will in the context of God’s foreknowledge ad utrumlibet of future contingent events in his question: Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam omnium futurorum contingentium ad utrumlibet. This discussion situates the problem at the center of debates within the milieu of Oxford theologians, who raise questions about the perfect liberty of God and humans either to perform or refrain from performing an act.66 Still, in this context, as Hogarth Rossiter, notes: [A] dilemma arises when such future contingent actions and events are considered in relation to God’s omniscience, which includes knowledge of all future things: how can an act be truly free, or an event truly contingent, if its outcome is already known by God before it happens? This is the question which Bradwardine sets out to address in his treatise (…).67 As the present introduction focuses on Bradwardine’s concepts of free will and of predestination, the portions of his discussion that enquire into whether God’s foreknowledge predetermines future contingent events, including future meritorious and demeritorious acts of humans will be examined. His inquiry involves three key aspects, which shall be considered in detail. Firstly, it examines how God knows future contingents. Secondly, it ponders whether human free will as God’s gift enables humans to make free choices and to do good. Thirdly, it explores to what extent God’s predestination affects the free decision of human free will. Bradwardine’s question begins with the quod non argument stating that God does not foreknow all future contingents, because it would be possible for God’s knowledge to be erroneous, which is false since then God could be deceived; thus, it follows that future contingents ad utrumlibet are necessary.68 In the 66

67 68

While the literature on the history of the problem of future contingents is extensive, the most elaborate comprehensive studies discussing Bradwardine’s question on future contingents in the context of medieval debates have been offered by Jean-Françoise Genest and Sarah Hogarth Rossiter. For an extensive bibliography, which lists the most important books and papers, see Hogarth Rossiter, Foreknowledge, Free Will, pp. 187–204. Bradwardine’s concepts of predestination as well as of divine and human free will as presented in his De causa Dei have already been addressed by many scholars. Hogarth Rossiter, Foreknowledge, Free Will, p. 6. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 45ra: “Quod

20

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

oppositum, Bradwardine presents eleven arguments supporting the idea that God knows all future contingents ad utrumlibet. The arguments are twofold. Some of them refer to God and insist that God’s knowledge of all events stems from divine unchanging essence, which voluntarily presents to God the existence of all events in eternity and makes divine knowledge perfect. As God is the supremely perfect being, God must have the complete and true knowledge of all the past, present, and future events, because God cannot err or be deceived.69 The remaining arguments concern the relationship between God and humans as God’s creation. Bradwardine believes that if God did not know all future contingent events, a range of consequences would ensue: the number of the elect and the reprobate could change; God would not know humans’ good and evil deeds and, consequently, could not reward and punish us; it would not be rational to pray for the future; and humans would know much more about the events to come about than God.70 The subsequent extensive part of Bradwardine’s question is dedicated to nine opinions advanced by various philosophers.71 They have already been thoroughly researched by Genest72 and by Hogarth Rossiter.73 Bradwardine’s

69

70

71 72

73

non, quia sic posset scientia Dei falli, quod est falsum, quia sic Deus posset decipi; ita sequitur quod illa contingentia ad utrumlibet sunt necessaria. Consequens falsum.” Cf. DFC, 1, p. 281. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 45ra: “(…) essentia sua non repraesentat A fore nec esse, nec esse praeteritum, et post repraesentabit A esse; igitur sequitur quod essentia sua mutatur. Consequens falsum. (…) essentia divina non repraesentat res esse naturaliter, sed voluntarie. (…) sequitur quod aliquando erit magis sciens et aliquando minus, scilicet quando scit rem esse quam prius quando non scivit rem esse; et sic aliquando erit magis perfectus, aliquando minus perfectus. (…) Deus non foret perfectissimus quae potest esse (…) Deus erraret et decipitur credendo illud non esse quod erit, quia non habet scientiam, quando non est, de illo non esse.” Cf. DFC, 2a, c, f, i, pp. 281–282. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 45ra: “(…) sequitur quod aliquis homo potest esse de numero electorum qui ab aeterno non fuit electus. Consequens falsum. Et sic de reprobatis. (…) Deus scit multa futura, quia omnes operationes nostras bonas et malas, quia aliter non sciret illas praemiare et punire, igitur pari ratione scit omnia futura. Antecedens patet, quia multi prophetae sciebant multa futura, igitur a multo fortiori Deus. Similiter sequitur quod non debemus rationabiliter orare Deum pro futuris. Similiter sic sequitur quod homo purus plura scit quam Deus qui non scit futura.” Cf. DFC, 2d–h, pp. 281–282. See above, pp. 8–9. See Genest, “Le De futuris contingentibus,” pp. 261–267; Jean-François Genest, “Théologie et experience spirituelle: Le cas de Thomas Bradwardine,” in What is Theology in the Middle Ages: Religious Culture of Europe (11th–15th Centuries) as Reflected in Their SelfUnderstanding, ed. Mikołaj Olszewski (Archa Verbi 1. Subsidia, Münster: Aschedorff Verlag, 2007), pp. 401–404. Hogarth Rossiter, Foreknowledge, Free Will, pp. 104–128.

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

21

rejection of the first seven opinions leads to the following conclusions: 1) God’s revelation is all about the future; thus future events are “something.”74 2) Future events come about because of God’s potency and not theirs.75 3) God’s knowledge of future contingents is not the “disjunctive” knowledge of the truth or falsity of one of the contradictory propositions: ‘A will be’ or ‘A will not be’, since even a simpleton can judge about the future in this manner.76 God possesses the full knowledge of both parts of the contradiction, but it does not follow that both parts must exist, since some events will necessarily come about in the future (for example, a person’s death in accordance with the absolute necessity of the law of nature), while other events, such as the Last Judgment and the Resurrection, are to come about under relative necessity. For their part, people only know that one of the two opposites is true, but they do not know which of them it is; therefore, their knowledge is only fragmentary and uncertain.77 4) Future events have been planned to come about from eternity and not since a certain point in time. 5) From the very fact that future contingent events are contingent, it does not follow that God has no foreknowledge of them, because if He did, He could fail and be deceived. This claim is based on two views found in Averroes: one in his commentary on the De somno et vigilia:78 “future things are like imaginations in our dreams,” and the other in his commentary on the Metaphysics:79 “God does not have knowledge of singular future contingent events, because they are infinite in number.” Here, Bradwardine only says that he will 74 75 76 77

78

79

See Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 45ra. Cf. DFC, 4, pp. 282–283. See Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 45ra. Cf. DFC, 9, pp. 287–288. See Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 45ra. Cf. DFC, 10, p. 288. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 45ra: “Sic igitur tenetur quod non est dubitandum nec negandum aliqua esse futura, philosophice et hoc necessario vel necessitate absoluta et naturaliter, ut hominem mori, vel de conditione ut iudicium et resurrectionem fore et huiusmodi. Sed cum de quolibet futuro contingenti ad utrumlibet est dubitandum nobis, et illud sit futurum, licet altera pars sit vera et altera falsa in rei veritate, quia aliquid est sic futurum, tunc affirmativa est vera, et si nihil sit futurum, tunc negativa est vera; et sic neutram scimus esse veram, et neutram scimus esse falsam, sed scimus alteram esse veram vel falsam.” Cf. DFC, 12, p. 289. See also Hogarth Rossiter, Foreknowledge, Free Will, pp. 105–106. See Averroes, Paraphrasis in De divisione per somnum, in Aristotelis Opera omnes Averrois Commentarii aliique … in logica, philosophia et medicina libri quorum aliqui sunt … nuper a Jacobo Mantino conversi, vol. 7, Venezia 1560, fol. 171. Cf. DFC, p. 291, n. 12. See Averroes, Aristotelis metaphysicorum libri XIIII cum Averrois Cordubensis in eosdem commentariis et epitome, Theophrasti metaphysicorum liber, Editio Juntina prima. Vol. 8, (Venezia, 1562), lib. XII, com. 51, fol. 351. Cf. DFC, p. 291, n. 13.

22

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

reply to these arguments later.80 6) All things and events, whose existence is known to God, are present to God, but this fact alone does not preclude the existence of future contingents that are known by God as future contingents. This is “the classic Anselmian–Augustinian view (attributed by Bradwardine to Anselm),” as Hogarth Rossiter notes.81 From the point of view of the issues discussed by Kilvington, the two following opinions—the eighth and the ninth—are the most valid ones. Bradwardine’s criticism focuses on the eighth opinion. While his answers to the other views are one to two pages long, his discussion of and objections to the eighth stretch over twenty-three standard pages.82 Although Bradwardine does not explicitly say that this is Ockham’s opinion, Genest’s careful study indicates that Bradwardine already argued with John Duns Scotus, William Ockham, Adam Wodeham, Robert Holcot, and Thomas Buckingham, all of whom he regarded as the Pelagians, in his questions to the Sentences, which predated his famous De causa Dei contra Pelagianum from 1344 by eleven years.83 It begs no question that, in this group, Ockham was the theologian to be most fiercely attacked by Bradwardine in all of his theological works.84 80 81

82 83 84

Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 45va: “Sed ad ista argumenta respondebitur post, dicendo ad quaestionem.” Cf. DFC, 16d, p. 291. Hogarth Rossiter, Foreknowledge, Free Will, p. 107. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 45va: “Respondetur igitur secundum intentionem Anselmi et aliorum dicentium quod omnia sunt Deo praesentia: verum est in esse cognito, et consimiliter dicit Philosophus quod anima est quodammodo omnia, id est omnia sensibilia per sensum comprehendit, et omnia intelligibilia per intellectum, et non excluditur quin aliqua sint futura et quod ista Deus praescit. Nec aliter vult Anselmus dicere quod omnia sunt Deo praesentia, scilicet futura. Sed verum est quod non valet haec consequentia: ‘omnia sunt sibi praesentia in esse cognito, igitur non habet praescientiam’; sed verum est quod valet haec consequentia: ‘igitur non habet praescientiam excludendo scientiam de illis’.” Cf. DFC, 19, p. 292. As Genest claims, this opinion is expressed by Boethius, but Bradwardine attributes it first of all to Anselm of Canterbury (see Genest, “Le De futuris contingentibus,” p. 263). For a detailed discussion of Boethius’s and Anselm’s concepts in the context of the Bradwardine’s question, see Hogarth Rossiter, Foreknowledge, Free Will, pp. 13–40. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fols. 45vb–46rb. Cf. DFC, pp. 293–309. Genest, “Théologie et experience spirituelle,” pp. 278–289. See, for example, Gordon Leff, Bradwardine and the Pelagians: A Study of His De causa Dei and Its Opponents (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1957), pp. 1–7; Heiko Obermann, Archbishop Thomas Bradwardine, a Fourteenth Century Augustinian: A Study of His Theology in Its Historical Context (Utrecht: Kemink & Zoon, 1958); Heiko Obermann, Forerunners of the Reformation: The Shape of Late Medieval Thought (New York: Lutterworth Press, 1967, repr. Cambridge: James Clarke & Co., 2002); Jean-François Genest, Prédétermination et liberté créée à Oxford au XIVe siècle; Buckingham contre Bradwardine (Etudes de

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

23

According to Bradwardine, the eighth opinion holds that: [S]omething is going to come about contingently ad utrumlibet and is foreknown by God in this present instant, but it is possible, for this present instant, that it could not be going to come about nor be foreknown by God—and even more, that at no time was it ever going to come about or was foreknown by God.85 This is undoubtedly Bradwardine’s interpretation of Ockham’s view.86 As Schabel claims: [Ockham] holds that God knows future contingents. Although he admits that he cannot explain exactly how, he does assert that the “divine essence is one intuitive cognition” of everything, so that God even knows “which side of a contradiction will be true and which will be false.”87 According to Hogarth Rossiter, Ockham deems God’s knowledge of future contingent events to be contingent, because they are just that—contingent. There is, however, a substantial difference between the knowledge of future contingents and that of present and past events. While God’s knowledge of future contingents is contingent, God’s knowledge of past and present events is necessary. Being contingent, God’s knowledge of the future is not necessary, so Ockham avoids the objection that there is necessity in God. Given this, as Hogarth Rossiter points out, Bradwardine can summarize Ockham’s view the way he does.88 Even though Bradwardine criticizes Ockham in many ways, below we only address the arguments related to the main theme of this introduction: free will,

85

86 87 88

philosophie médiévale 70, Paris: J. Vrin, 1992). For an extensive discussion on the controversy, see, for example, Hogarth Rossiter, Foreknowledge, Free Will, pp. 58–97, 111–126. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 46va: “Octava opinio est quae ponit quod aliquid est futurum contingens ad utrumlibet et praescitum a Deo in instanti isto praesenti, et quod tamen possibile est pro isto instanti praesenti quod nec sit futurum nec praescitum a Deo, immo quod nunquam fuit futurum nec praescitum a Deo.” Cf. DFC, 21, p. 293. For a detailed presentation of Bradwardine’s critique, see Hogarth Rossiter, Foreknowledge, Free Will, pp. 110–128. For a detailed presentation of Bradwardine’s critique, see Hogarth Rossiter, Foreknowledge, Free Will, pp. 110–128. Chris Schabel, Theology at Paris 1316–1345: Peter Auriol and the Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), p. 226. Hogarth Rossiter, Foreknowledge, Free Will, p. 112.

24

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

free choice, and predestination. In doing this, we primarily focus on those of Bradwardine’s lines of reasoning to which Kilvington also refers in his question. In his criticism of Ockham’s opinion, Bradwardine first points out that if God’s foreknowledge were contingent, “then something must change between the time the thing was not going to be and the time that it came to be, other than the thing itself.” Since such a change-undergoing thing does not exist, the change must take place in God, and this is absurd.89 Bradwardine strongly emphasizes God’s immutability, because if it were otherwise, it would follow that God can know, will, and promise the opposite of what God now knows, wills, and promises (…); consequently, it follows that the future might not be the same as God has promised or willed, and therefore that God could change.90 Bradwardine’s comprehensive discussion that follows this insight yields two important conclusive inferences: 1) From the very fact that divine foreknowledge is not caused by any creature and that creatures’ existence is contingent with regard to both the past and the future, it does not follow that God’s knowledge is contingent; consequently, God’s knowledge of both past and future events is necessary.91 2) All future events are necessary, except those that result from the free choice of people and angels.92 Next, Bradwardine lists a series of objections concerning God’s promises as revealed in prophecies. He argues that if future events could possibly not come about or happen inversely, there would be no true revelation “to be seen in the Word” (in Verbo), which, as Hogarth Rossiter explains, refers to “seeing what is

89 90

91

92

Hogarth Rossiter, Foreknowledge, Free Will, p. 115. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 45vb: “Secundo ad principale sic: si sic, sequitur quod Deus potest scire, velle et promittere oppositum nunc sciti, voliti et promissi ab ipso. Consequens falsum, quia sic Deus potest mutari de scitis, volitis et promissis, quod est contra illud Ego Dominus et non mutor Malachiae 3, et ita sequitur quod non erit sic sicut Deus promisit vel voluit fore, igitur Deus mutatur.” Cf. DFC, 23a, p. 294. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 45vb: “Item scientia sua non causatur ex aliqua creatura, igitur sequitur quod, licet creatura contingenter sit praeterita vel futura, quod ex hoc non sequitur quod scientia sua est contingens; igitur sequitur quod ita necessaria est scientia sua de futuris sicut de praeteritis.” Cf. DFC, 23g, p. 294. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 45vb: “Conceditur quod omnia necessario eveniunt quae sunt futura, praeter illa quae dependent ex libertate voluntatis hominis vel angeli.” Cf. DFC, 23k, p. 295.

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

25

revealed by the second Person of the Trinity, identified throughout Scripture as the Wisdom, Word or λογος of God.”93 Specifically, Bradwardine reasons that, if something that was going to come about, such as God’s revelation of people predestination, did not come about, and if people knew that they were to be saved and the opposite future contingent came about, they would rejoice in something very sorrowful, namely in being condemned.94 He also avers that if something that is going to come about could be not going to come about, and the human will could go against God’s will, there would be two opposing wills in Christ, and he could have sinned when living in the human world. Under such circumstances, Christ’s prayer and plea to the Father for people to be redeemed would have been futile.95 In the final conclusion, Bradwardine insists that all good and evil acts occurring contingently may occur necessarily in the world, because necessity does not contradict either liberty or merits or demerits, and therefore no contradiction inheres in contingent future events necessarily coming about.96 Bradwardine’s following arguments of interest to us make two important points. Firstly, the necessity of divine knowledge, as well as of the divine will, is God’s perfection.97 Sharing Anselm’s position, Bradwardine argues that necessity is absolutely (simpliciter) more perfect than contingency, because contingency is commensurate with potency, and therefore is less perfect than neces-

93 94 95

96

97

Hogarth Rossiter, Foreknowledge, Free Will, p. 116. See Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 46ra. Cf. DFC, 24h, p. 296. See also Hogarth Rossiter, Foreknowledge, Free Will, pp. 117–118. See Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 46rb: “Item eadem ratione voluntas humanitatis potest esse contraria voluntati divinae. Consequens falsum, quia sic peccaret tempore quo stant simul illae duae naturae in una persona. Similiter sic: potest velle illum habere effectum redemptionis qui est damnandus. Consequens falsum, quia sic potest velle suum frustrari et similiter petitio sua ad Patrem; quia si potest hoc velle, sic potest orare Patrem ut ille, qui est damnandus, finaliter salvetur, et per consequens frustraretur eius oratio et petitio, quod est falsum.” Cf. DFC, 25o–p, p. 298. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 46rb: “Item quidquid boni vel mali eveniat cum contingentia in mundo potest evenire cum necessitate, et nec plus nec minus eveniet cum contingentia quam potest evenire cum necessitate, eo quod nec repugnat necessitas libertati, nec merito, nec demerito, ut probatum est; igitur sequitur quod non repugnat alicui futuro ipsum evenire de necessitate.” Cf. DFC, 35s, p. 304. Bradwardine’s makes a similar remark in his De causa Dei. For the recent interpretation of this approach, see Edit A. Lukács, “Calculations in Thomas Bradwardine’s De causa Dei, Book I,” in Quantifying Aristotle: The Impact, Spread, and Decline of the Calculatores Tradition, ed. Daniel Di Liscia and Edith Sylla, with the collaboration of Paul J.J.M. Bakker (Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy and Science34, Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2022), pp. 108–109.

26

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

sity which is commensurate with act. Consequently, God as the most perfect being possesses necessary knowledge and necessary will.98 Secondly, from eternity, God’s will has been the only reason why future events become future events, and God’s nolition has been the only reason why they are not future events. This indicates that God cannot override pre-eternal nolition, because this would entail God’s mutability. Therefore, God continues the pre-eternal divine will for future events to happen.99 Subsequently, Bradwardine scrupulously explains that necessity does not impinge either upon God’s free will or upon internal and external free choice. Like Anselm, Bradwardine stresses that the genuine freedom of free will is not the same as freedom to act in either of two ways, that is to sin or to refrain from sinning; God who does not sin is absolutely free.100 Bradwardine profusely demonstrates that necessity and contingency are not opposed. He asserts: The will is a free cause of its volition, and it is not such either before volition takes place or after volition has not taken place; therefore, the will is only a free cause of its volition in the present time; but when volition is, it necessarily exists now; consequently, it follows that necessity does not contradict liberty. And by the same reasoning, it is clear that it does not contradict either meritorious acts or demeritorius ones.101 98

99

100

101

Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 46rb: “Item necessaria scientia et necessaria voluntas est perfectior scientia contingenti, sicut necessitas est simpliciter perfectior contingentia, ergo necessaria scientia rerum et necessaria voluntas est attribuenda Deo. Antecedens patet, quia contingentia includit potentiam et per consequens imperfectionem, et necessitas includit actum et per consequens perfectior est. Et consequentia patet per Anselmum, etc.” Cf. DFC, 33a, p. 301. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 46rb: “Item causa futuritionis omnium rerum futurarum ab aeterno fuit voluntas Dei, vel volitio eius, et causa non futuritionis omnium rerum futurarum fuit eius nolitio; igitur sequitur quod Deus non potest oppositum actus voliti futuri ab aeterno velle et istam antiquam volitionem dimittere, quia sic mutaretur, quod est falsum; igitur sequitur quod necessario continuabit istam antiquam volitionem et habetur propositum.” Cf. DFC, 34b, p. 301. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 46rb: “(…) quia illa potestas contradictionis non est pars libertatis nec pertinet ad libertatem, secundum quod manifestat Anselmus (…).” DFC, 35a, p. 302. See also Hogarth Rossiter, Foreknowledge, Free Will, p. 121. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 46rb: “Item voluntas est libera causa suae volitionis, et non est libera causa suae volitionis antequam volitio sit, nec postquam volitio non fuerit; igitur tantum est libera causa suae volitionis quando volitio est, sed quando volitio est, necesse est ipsam esse; igitur sequitur quod necessitas non repugnat libertati. Et per idem argumentum apparet quod non repugnat merito nec demerito.” Cf. DFC, 35c, p. 302.

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

27

The following fifteen arguments corroborate this conclusion. They evince that everything that is willed at the present moment is freely and necessarily willed, and that God “wills freely when God necessarily wills.”102 In order to prove his point, Bradwardine cites authorities, possible imaginable cases, and historical “facts.” By his report, Augustine claims that necessity and liberty are not opposed, since God necessarily and freely wills Himself to be; the same concerns the blessed and humans. Only natural necessity, such as death, is the opposite of liberty. In Bradwardine’s view, Augustine also believes that necessity involved in the will does not contradict free choice.103 The examples of situations in which human actions are free and necessary at the same time include the following: 1) God can use a person’s will as an instrument; thus, when God wills somebody to will a meritorious act, they cannot will the opposite, and, therefore, they necessarily will. However, if they do not know that God moves them in this way, they can believe that they can do otherwise; therefore, they perform meritorious acts voluntarily and necessarily at the same time.104 2) God can propel somebody’s will to perform meritorious acts, while they do not know that they are being propelled; consequently, they believe that they are performing these acts induced by their own will, and that it is their good will that propels them act meritoriously.105 Bradwardine’s “historical” example dwells on the Jews, who sinned by killing Christ: while they believed they were doing so of their own accord, they did not know that it was happening by necessity.106

102 103

104 105

106

Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 46rb: “(…) libere vult quando necessario vult.” Cf. DFC, 35e, p. 302. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 46rb: “Contra quos dicit Augustinus ibidem quod necessitas et libertas non repugnant in aliquo, quia necesse est Deum velle se esse et vivere et tantum libere, et sic de beatis, et quod sic potest esse in nobis; sed dicit quod necessitas ex natura, ut est illa qua moriemur, repugnat libertati, sed non illa necessitas qua dicitur necesse est hoc esse vel fore universaliter. Et sic concedit quod necessitas aliqua est in voluntate quae non repugnat libertati arbitrii.” Cf. DFC, 35j, p. 303. See Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 46rb. Cf. DFC, 35l, p. 303. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 46rb: “Item Deus potest ducere hominem ad eundum ad Ecclesiam, quando homo iste vult ire ad Ecclesiam, ut serviat Deo, ipso latente quod sic ducitur a Deo vel alio, et tamen non minus meretur, igitur. Et sic patet, quod Deus potest movere omnes potentias hominis ad operationes meritorias latente homine qui sic movetur, et tamen credente quod sic movetur a seipso, et per consequens meretur illa voluntate bona.” Cf. DFC, 35o, pp. 303–304. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 46rb: “Item dicitur sic in Evangelio: Nonne oportebat sic Christum pati. Et tamen Iudei peccaverunt

28

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

To sum up, Bradwardine convincingly argues that necessity does not contradict contingency with regard to God’s will and foreknowledge of future contingents. People can also act—or, more precisely, they do act—contingently and necessarily at the same time, convinced that they make free choices by their volitionally free acts of free will, while at the same time, their actions are necessary, because God “uses them as instruments.” Bradwardine states that both meritorious and demeritorious acts occur as a result of the human will. However, he firmly believes that all meritorious acts are co-authored by God, while demeritorious acts are produced by humans alone. Arguments against the Ninth Opinion The ninth and final opinion, which Bradwardine does not attribute to anyone in particular, states that only the future events that are foretold by God (such as prophecies, promises, and the like) are necessary, while others are not.107 Bradwardine lists seven arguments contra: 1) On the contrary: because God’s external word, which is known either immediately or mediately, does not bind God to do or not to do anything more than God’s internal word, it therefore follows that, since God said from eternity that all future events would be by God’s internal word, then ⟨either⟩ all future events are necessary or the future events that God said by the external word, mediately or immediately, are not necessary.108 2) Likewise, the external word neither is nor was anything other than what is created, so if by this word a future created thing should be necessary, it would follow that this created thing should necessitate God to make it in the future. The consequent is false for if it were so, it would not be strictly by the divine will that God made whatever God made.109

107

108

109

in ipsum occidendo, quia fecerunt ac si fuisset in tota potestate illorum sine necessitate, igitur.” Cf. DFC, 35r, p. 303. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 46vb: “Nona opinio est, quod illa sunt necessaria quae Deus praedixit fore, sed alia futura non sunt necessaria.” Cf. DFC, 39, p. 309. S. Hogarth Rossiter, p. 108. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 46vb: “Contra: quia verbum Dei extrinsecum, immediate vel mediate dictum, non plus obligat Deum ad aliquid faciendum vel non faciendum quam Verbum eius intrinsecum, igitur, cum Deus ab aeterno dixit omnia futura fore in Verbo intrinseco, sequitur quod omnia futura sunt necessaria, vel quod illa futura non sunt necessaria quae Deus dixit verbo extrinseco mediate vel immediate.” Cf. DFC, 40a, p. 310. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 46vb: “Item illud verbum extrinsecum nec est nec fuit aliud nisi creatura; igitur si propter illud verbum extrinsecum aliqua creatura foret futura necessaria, sequitur quod creatura necessitaret

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

3)

4)

5)

6)

110

111

112

113

29

Likewise, in this way it would be possible to remove all freedom from God in producing an act. The consequent is false, and the consequence is obvious, since by the external word ⟨God⟩ can say and simultaneously affirm through promise that all future events, such as A, B, C, and so forth, will immutably be future events; in this way, what has been assumed, it follows that no future event, which God has foretold, should take place more than any other; and thus, everything should necessarily be by virtue of the necessity of the consequent.110 Likewise, a wayfarer ⟨on Earth⟩ sins exclusively by necessity, and the same ⟨applies to every⟩ single sinner; therefore etc. The consequence is obvious, since it can be said to somebody that Socrates will sin, and the same applies to others, just as ⟨God⟩ foretold ⟨it⟩ to Peter etc.111 Likewise, if it is said of human beings that whatever they do they do it voluntarily, it follows that everything that they will do voluntarily, they will do necessarily.112 Likewise, in De interpretatione ⟨book⟩ I, the Philosopher says that events will take place or fail to take place not because it was so affirmed or denied.113

Deum ad producendum aliquid in futurum. Consequens falsum, quia sic non voluntate sua praecise produceret quidquid produceret. Consequens falsum.” Cf. DFC, 40b, p. 310. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 46vb: “Item sic esset possibile auferre a Deo omnem libertatem in actione sua. Consequens falsum. Consequentia patet, quia potest verbo extrinseco dicere et simul cum hoc iuramento affirmare omnia futura, scilicet A, B, C etc. fore futura immutabiliter; et sic sequitur propositum, quod non magis necessario foret unum futurum sicut ipse praedixit fore quam aliud; et sic omnia erunt necessario necessitate consequentis.” Cf. DFC, 40c, p. 310. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 46vb: “Item solo viator necessario peccabit et sic de singulis peccatoribus, igitur. Consequentia patet, quia potest dicere alicui Socratem peccaturum et sic de aliis sicut praedixit Petro etc.” Cf. DFC, 40d, p. 310. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 46vb: “Item si dicatur quod quilibet homo libere faciet quidquid faciet, sequitur quod omnia quae libere faciet, necessario faciet.” Cf. DFC, 40e, p. 310. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 46vb: “Item Philosophus, I Perihermeneias, dicit quod propter affirmare vel negare non erit res, nec non erit: igitur.” Cf. DFC, 40f, p. 310. Aristotle, De interpretatione, 9, 18b 40–42, Eng. trans. Ella M. Edghill, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random Hause, 2001), p. 47: “For events will not take place or fail to take place because it was stated that they would or would not take place, nor is this any more the case if the prediction dates back ten thousand years or any other space of time.” See also Hogarth Rossiter, Foreknowledge, Free Will, pp. 105–106.

30

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

7)

Likewise, the gloss to the words “the Virgin will conceive” explains that the point was not that Christ should fulfill the prophecies, but, on the contrary, that the prophecies were such because this was what Christ was to do. Therefore, it follows that the prophecies or ⟨God’s⟩ external word are not the cause of future things, but the other way round.114 Bradwardine leaves these arguments without any comments. Free Acts as Outcomes of Absolute and Ordained Power Responsio ad quaestionem, which makes up the second part of Bradwardine’s question, begins with his affirmative answer to the main question, in which he asserts that God possesses the foreknowledge of all future contingents.115 Bradwardine lists four arguments contra, the last of which reads: “if it is so, A can be not going to be and God foreknows that A will be; therefore that A will not be is possible.”116 He insists that in order to properly understand the problem, one needs to grasp a fundamental difference concerning possibility or power. Specifically, Bradwardine clarifies, there are absolute power and ordained power: Absolute power is that [same] ordained power, but it is absolute power insofar as it is undetermined relative to each part of a contradiction. And ordained power is that [same] power, insofar as it is determined relative to one (or the other) part of a contradiction. And absolute power in the superior cause—namely, in God—is God’s ordained one, not insofar as it is ordained relative to one (or the other) part of a contradiction, but as it is infinite and not determined or ordained relative to one (or the other) part. And the ordained power is the absolute—that is, infinite—power, not as undetermined relative to one (or the other) part of a contradic-

114

115

116

Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 46vb: “Item glossa super illo verbo: Ecce virgo concipiet etc., dicit quod hoc non est ut Christus impleret prophetias, sed ideo erant prophetata quia Christus fuit sic facturus, igitur sequitur quod prophetia vel verbum extrinsecum non est causa rerum futurarum, sed econverso etc.” DFC, 40g, p. 310. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fols. 46va–b: “Nunc respondetur ad quaestionem qua quaeritur: Utrum Deus, habet praescientiam omnium futurorum, dicendo quod sic. Et ad principalem rationem, respondetur quando arguitur sic: igitur habet scientiam omnium futurorum contingentium ad utrumlibet—concedo consequentiam et consequens.” Cf. DFC, 41, p. 310. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fols. 46vb: “A potest non fore et Deus praescit A fore, igitur A non fore est possibile.” DFC, 42e, p. 311.

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

31

tion, but as determined by God’s justice, and mercy, and will for producing something outside immediately or mediately, or for saving or damning a person.117 Though viewing the distinction between God’s absolute and ordained powers differently than Scotus,118 Bradwardine is in accord with him and with Ockham119 that the same distinction also applies to humans as God’s creatures: The same can be said about the power of an inferior cause—of God’s creature (such as the human)—which now does not exist but can exist in the future, or which now is and can produce something in the future; namely, that human power is twofold: absolute power which is in itself not determined relative to being or not to being in the future or, if the human exists, to produce or not to produce something in the future; and ordained power which is determined relative to only one part of a contradiction by God or by an inferior cause.120

117

118 119

120

Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 46vb: “Respondetur distinguendo possibile vel potentiam, eo quod duplex est: quaedam est potentia absoluta et quaedam ordinata. Et expono, quod intelligo per potentiam absolutam et ordinatam. Potentia enim absoluta est potentia illa quae est potentia ordinata, sed tamen est illa potentia ut indeterminata est ad utramque partem contradictionis; et potentia ordinata est illa eadem potentia ut est determinata ad alteram partem contradictionis tantum. Potentia enim absoluta in causa superiori, scilicet in Deo, est potentia sua ordinata non ut ordinata est ad alteram partem contradictionis tantum, sed ut est infinita et non determinata vel ordinata ad alteram partem. Et potentia eius ordinata est potentia eius absoluta, scilicet infinita, non ut indeterminata ad alteram partem contradictionis tantum ⟨sed ut determinata⟩ per suam iustitiam et misericordiam et voluntatem, ut ad producendum aliquid extra immediate vel mediate, vel ad salvandum vel ad damnandum.” Cf. DFC, 42d, p. 311. See also Hogarth Rossiter, Foreknowledge, Free Will, pp. 130–131. See below, p. 61. See, for example, Monika Michałowska and Elżbieta Jung, “Scotistic and Ockhamist Contributions to Kilvington’s Ethical and Theological Views,” in 1308: Eine Topographie historischer Gleichzeitigkeit, ed. Andreas Speer and David Wirmer (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 35, Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010), pp. 115–118. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 46vb: “Et consimiliter dicitur de potentia in causa inferiori—scilicet creatura, quae non est, sed potest esse in futurum, vel quae est et potest aliquid facere in futurum—sicut nunc dicitur de potentia in causa superiori, scilicet Deo, quod in causa inferiori duplex est potentia, scilicet absoluta quae de se non est plus determinata ad esse quam ad non esse quamdiu est futurum vel ad producendum aliquid in futurum vel non producendum quamdiu non est productum; et potentia ordinata quae ordinatur ad alteram partem contradictionis tantum per causam superiorem scilicet Deum, vel per causam inferiorem.” Cf. DFC, 42f, p. 311.

32

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

In response to the main argument (“A can be not going to be and God foreknows that A will be; therefore that A will not be is possible”), Bradwardine says that in the case of the absolute power of both—superior and inferior—causes, no contradiction arises from A coming about or not coming about; however, regarding their respective ordained powers, A cannot be not going to come about, for if it could, God could fail and be deceived, and God’s knowledge could be mistaken, and then God could lie and cheat—given that God has predicted that A will come about while it will not.121 Bradwardine speaks here of God’s possible choices, but since, in his view, people can also act by their absolute power, they may, for example, will or not will A until they decide what to choose. People thus seem capable of considering choosing to do either good or evil. If they choose to do good, they follow God’s ordained law; if they choose to do evil, they oppose God and sin. As Hogarth Rossiter puts it: God’s absolute power, with respect to all things created and uncreated, is limited only by logical possibility, while those of any creature operate under considerable physical limitations. (…) The key difference between creaturely power and divine power thus lies in the difference between their relative ordained powers. For God’s ordained power is ordered, or constrained, by God Himself; whereas creaturely ordained power is ordered not by the creature (or at least not primarily by the creature), but by everything around the creature, also: physical laws, the limitation of bodies, and so on, each of which is ordained by God. This renders the ordained power of the creature immeasurably inferior to that of God.122 In order to clarify his position, Bradwardine distinguishes between absolute necessity (necessitas absoluta) and conditional or relative necessity (necessitas comparata vel conditionata).123 First, he presents such reasoning against his own opinion:

121

122 123

Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 46vb: “Nunc ad propositum dico, quod A potest non fore de potentia absoluta tam causae superioris quam inferioris, nam A fore vel non fore in nullo repugnat tali potentiae in causa superiori vel inferiori. Sed loquendo de potentia ordinata causae superioris et inferioris, sic dico quod A non potest non fore nec aliquod futurum, quia si illa potentia A potest non fore, sequitur quod Deus potest decipi et errare, et falli potest sua scientia, et potest falsum dicere et mentiri si Deus praedixit A fore.” Cf. DFC, 42g, p. 311. Hogarth Rossiter, Foreknowledge, Free Will, pp. 133–134. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 46vb: “Respon-

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

33

[I]f it follows that ‘by absolute power, A can be not going to be, therefore A can be not going to be’; therefore, for the same reason ⟨we must accept that⟩ by of superior and inferior ordained power: ‘A cannot be not going to be, therefore A is going to be necessarily’.124 In his replay, Bradwardine argues that, if the necessity in the consequent (‘A is going to be necessarily’) is conceived as relative necessity with regard to God’s ordained power, both the consequence and the consequent are valid, and thus A cannot be not going to be. However, from this it does not follow (nec sic concedo) that if ‘God could will A not to be, God necessarily should will A to be’. Yet if the necessity in the consequent is conceived as absolute necessity, both the consequence and the consequent are denied, because by absolute powers of both superior and inferior causes that ‘A will be’ is contingent and not necessary. In Bradwardine’s view, relative necessity is commensurate with contingency, which safeguards voluntary choice and merits. To support his position, he evokes the authority of Anselm, who states that though Christ died necessarily and immutably, his death was nonetheless voluntary.125 Bradwardine believes that all future contingents that come about by God’s ordained power necessarily come about. He resorts to Boethius and Gratian, who maintain that in such inference: ‘God foreknows this (hoc), where hoc is a future contingent; therefore hoc will necessarily come about’ only the consequence is necessary and the consequent is contingent. Bradwardine insists that also the consequent must be necessary, because if it is contingent, then the opposite to the conclusion (‘hoc will not necessarily come about’) is commen-

124

125

detur distinguendo de necessitate quia quaedam est necessitas absoluta et quaedam necessitas comparata vel conditionata.” Genest translates the term necessitas comparata as hypothetic necessity. See Genest, “Le De futuris contingentibus,” p. 265. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 46vb: “Contra, quia si sequitur: ‘de potentia absoluta A potest non fore, igitur potest non fore’, igitur pari ratione sequitur de potentia ordinata causae superioris et inferioris: ‘A non potest non fore, igitur necesse est A fore’.” Cf. DFC, 43c, p. 312. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 46vb: “Tunc ad propositum dicitur, quod si in consequente accipitur necessitas comparata ad potentiam ordinatam causae superioris, sic conceditur consequentia et consequens, et sic non potest A non fore, nec sic concedo: Deus potest velle A non fore, sed necesse est eum velle A fore. Sed si in consequente accipiatur necessitas absoluta, sic negatur consequentia et consequens, quia de potentia absoluta tam cause superioris quam inferioris contingit A fore et non necesse est A fore. Et sic stat necessitas comparata cum contingentia, sed non absoluta necessitas; et sic stat necessitas comparata cum libertate et merito. Quod patet per Anselmum, qui dicit quod Christus de necessitate et immutabiliter, quae necessitas est necessitas comparata, moriebatur et tamen libere.” Cf. DFC, 43d, p. 312.

34

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

surate with the premise ‘God foreknows this (hoc)’ and, thus, ‘God foreknows hoc; therefore hoc will necessarily not come about’ is also a valid inference; it follows then that the consequence ‘hoc is future; therefore hoc will be’ is not valid. As a result, the necessity of the consequent (necessitas consequentis) must be accepted.126 According to Bradwardine, it is not possible for the consequence to be necessary without the consequent being necessary. If the consequent is contingent, then the consequence cannot be necessary. Bradwardine asserts that: [B]y the absolute power of superior and inferior causes, all future events come about contingently and not with absolute necessity, but by the ordained power of these causes, all future events necessarily come about with relative and not absolute necessity.127 According to Stephen E. Lahey, “Bradwardine felt that necessitas consequentis, or absolute necessity, is commensurate with God’s foreknowledge without leading to a fatalistic determinism.”128 Still, the reasoning outlined above raises several questions, including: Can humans make good choices on their own by their absolute power, or are they dependent on God? How does God judge human actions? Can good deeds earn a person eternal life? Some insights into these issues can be gleaned from arguments pro and contra that Bradwardine advances in relation to his own view. He gives eleven arguments contra, with the fifth argument missing in all manuscripts. He replies

126

127

128

Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 46vb: “Item si non intelligitur de necessitate consequentis sed consequentiae tantum, igitur non solvitur argumentum factum ibidem, quod nititur Gracianus ibidem solvere, quod est tale: ‘hoc est futurum; Deus praescit hoc; igitur hoc ⟨necessario⟩ erit’; quia si conclusio sit contingens, igitur oppositum ⟨consequentis⟩ potest stare cum antecedente, et per consequens non valet haec consequentia: ‘hoc est futurum, igitur hoc erit’. Relinquitur igitur quod vel loquitur littera de necessitate consequentis, vel quod consequentia non valet apud eum; ‘hoc est futurum, igitur hoc erit’; sed patet intuenti litteram, quod secundum est falsum; igitur relinquitur quod primum.” Cf. DFC, 46c, p. 315. See also Genest, “Le De futuris contingentibus,” pp. 265–266. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 46vb: “(…) quoad potentiam absolutam causae superioris et inferioris omnia futura contingenter evenire et evenient et non necessitate absoluta; sed quoad potentiam ordinatam illarum causarum necessario eveniunt omnia futura, necessitate comparata sed non absoluta.” Cf. DFC, 45b, p. 313. Stephen E. Lahey, “Thomas Bradwardine,” in Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy: Philosophy Between 500 and 1500, ed. Henrik Lagerlund (Dordrecht–Heidelberg–London–New York: Springer, 2011), pp. 1292–1293.

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

35

to these arguments, advances additional four more, and discusses them at length.129 The first two counterarguments and Bradwardine’s replies to them are of special interest to us. First argument contra states: If future to be so is necessary with the necessity of the consequent or relative necessity, i.e., by God’s ordained power, it follows that nothing contrary can come about, and thus human can rightly preach in sermons the future events. The consequent is false, because then many humans would despair. The consequence is obvious, since if it is done for the glory of God, it should be performed.130 In his reply to the first argument, Bradwardine emphasizes that only those, who are reprobated will be condemned, and those who are predestinated will be saved. Since the future events necessarily predicted in the prophecy, such as salvation of the predestined and condemnation of the eternally damned, necessarily come about, those who know that they will be saved have a major joy in glorifying God. Quoting the passage from Augustine’s De dono perseverantiae, he asserts that only those, who are reprobated can rightfully despair. He promptly adds that people should not know who is to be saved or condemned, since people may doubt and err, being confused by the complexity of the issue.131 129 130

131

See Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fols. 46vb– 47ra. Cf. DFC, 45c–46d, pp. 314–336. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 46vb: “Contra dicta arguitur primo sic: si futura sic fore sit necessarium necessitate consequentis vel comparata, scilicet de potentia Dei ordinata, sequitur quod oppositum non potest evenire, igitur sic est licitum praedicare in sermonibus cuilibet homini. Consequens falsum, quia hoc esset plures ponere in desperationem. Consequentia patet, quia si ita esset in laudem Dei, deberent sic praedicare.” Cf. DFC, 47a, p. 315. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 47ra: “(…) dicitur quod sic praedicare non est ponere aliquos in desperatione nisi filios perditionis (…). Confirmatur haec responsio, quia constat quod omnis reprobatus finaliter damnabitur et tantum praedestinatus salvabitur; et ideo, si primum dictum non sit licite praedicandum, quia ex tali praedicatione potest accipi a filiis perditionis occasio desperationis, sequitur aequaliter vel magis quod haec doctrina, propter eandem rationem, non sit dimittenda propter electos, et ideo haec doctrina non est dimittenda nisi quia praedicator forte vult eam dimittere. Item confirmatur per illud Augustini libro De perseverantia cap. 8 et ultimo, ubi dicit Augustinus: qualitercumque vivitis hoc tales, scilicet necessario, eritis quales praedestinati estis, et ideo dicit Augustinus in eodem libro: qui habet aures audiendi audiat innuendo quod nullus causam desperationis ex illo verbo debet accipere, nisi filius perditionis. Item ex tali praedicatione praedestinato crescit utilitas, quia potest ex illa scire

36

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

The second counterargument claims that some wayfarers on Earth would despair in this life, because they will not be saved.132 Bradwardine’s answer to this argument indicates that God possesses absolute power to save all people, and all people have passive absolute power to be saved, from that it does not follow, however, that it is in the power of people to force God to save them. Those who know the Scriptures well may rightly will to be meritoriously saved, and they may will God to will them to will in this way, that is, they may will God to will them to will to be saved; consequently, God, by ordained power, can will to save all people, because by ordained power, God can will all people to will in this way. According to Bradwardine, this is best conveyed by an example provided by St. John, who explains that the Jews believed neither the words of Christ nor the signs nor the miracles, because by ordained power, God was able not to give them an active power to believe.133 Once again, Bradwardine quotes Augustine’s passage from De dono perseverantiae and accepts his claim that God hardened hearts of the Jews and made them blind.134 An account of Bradwardine’s discussion with the remaining eight counterarguments follows below. Bradwardine emphasizes that, since God, by ordained power, does not save all people, no one that knows the Scriptures should pray absolutely for every-

132

133

134

quod si sit praedestinatus salvabitur, et ideo habet maiorem materiam laudandi Deum quam si non sciret effectum praedestinationis et reprobationis. Et ita utile est electis hoc praedicare, sed potest tamen licite hoc dimitti propter simplicitatem plurium hominum, eo quod leviter possunt cadere in errorem multum cogitando de ista difficili materia, sive sint reprobati sive electi.” Cf. DFC, 48a–d, p. 317. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 46vb: “Secundo sic: sequitur quod aliqui viatores essent qui non possent salvari. Consequens falsum, quia tunc se desperarent etc.” Cf. DFC, 47b, p. 315. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 47ra: “Ad secundum negatur consequentia et consequens, loquendo de potentia Dei absoluta activa et de potentia illorum passiva absoluta, quia Deus habet potentiam sufficientem ad salvandum omnes homines et omnes habent potentiam absolutam passivam qua possunt salvari. Sed loquendo in consequente de potentia Dei ordinata et damnatorum potentia passiva ordinata per causam superiorem, sic conceditur consequentia et consequens. Et hoc patet per illud verbum Ioannis loquentis de Iudeis qui non crediderunt Christo, nec signis suis, nec miraculis, et dicit quod hoc fuit quia non potuerunt credere nec Deus potuit velle eis dare potentiam activam ad credendum. Sed constat quod non loquitur ibidem de potentia absoluta, sed tantum ordinata; igitur.” Cf. DFC, 49a, p. 317. See J XII, 39. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 47ra: “Item Augustinus in libro De perseverantia c. 12, loquens de eadem materia, dicit quod illi non potuerunt credere, et dicit quod hoc fuit quia Deus excaecavit et induravit corda eorum.” Cf. DFC, 49b, pp. 317–318.

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

37

body; people should only pray absolutely for those who will be saved and conditionally for all.135 Because all future events will necessarily happen by God’s ordained power, only those that are conditionally predestined for eternal salvation can meritoriously want to be saved. This resembles Christ, who only prays for those who are to be saved and not for the entire world. Consequently, although God can will any part of a contradiction to come about by absolute power, God cannot and does not will the opposite part of a contradiction to happen if God chooses the other one by ordained power. This is a testimony to the immensity of God’s power, since God is not changeable and cannot fail, lie, or contradict Himself.136 Bradwardine insists that if everything comes about necessarily, freedom is necessary as well, because many future contingents only occur by virtue of free will and free choice. Future contingents necessarily and freely come about, because liberty is a freely produced outcome of the free choice of free will, since will cannot be forced to do anything. Although a human is an animal, there is a substantial difference between an animal’s desire and a human’s free choice. Specifically, the acts of the latter’s will are free and either meritorious or demer135

136

Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 47ra: “(…) nullus rationaliter instructus debet orare absolute pro omnibus, sed tantum conditionaliter scilicet pro omnibus salvandis absolute, et sic ex consequenti conditionaliter pro omnibus.” Cf. DFC, 49c, p. 318. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 47ra: “Ad tertium respondetur negando primum antecedens, quia nullus homo potest velle aliquem salvari absolute, nisi quem Deus ordinavit ad salutem finalem. Et ideo non quilibet potest meritorie absolute se velle salvari, accipiendo meritorie pro merito vitae aeternae, sed tantum conditionaliter potest meritorie velle se salvare, scilicet si sit de numero praedestinatorum ad vitam.” Cf. DFC, 50a, p. 318. BnF lat. 15805, fol. 47ra: “Negatur antecedens, nisi sic accipiatur ‘posse salvare plures quam salvabit’, scilicet quia potentiam sufficientem habet ad salvandum plures quam salvabit, quia non potest plus velle oppositum voliti futuri quam praesentis voliti; et ideo, sicut non potest velle coelum non esse nunc quando est, nec praeteritum non esse praeteritum quando est praeteritum, ita nec potest velle illud non esse futurum quod est futurum nec aliquid esse futurum quod non est futurum nisi praedicto modo accipiendo ly ‘posse’, scilicet pro potentia sufficienti, modo quo dicit Anselmus quod posset mentiri si vellet.” Cf. DFC, 50h, p. 319. BnF lat. 15805, fol. 47ra: “Ad primum dico, quod dicere quod Deus non potest velle oppositum futuri voliti ab ipso non est praeiudicare potentiae suae, immo magis laudare potentiam suam, in hoc quod sic dicere, est dicere ipsum esse non mutabilem et non potentem dicere falsum nec potentem seipsum negare. Et haec positio patet, quia si contingenter vellet illud quod vult in futurum fieri, sequitur quod in illa volitione non esset summa firmitas. Consequens falsum, quia secundum Anselmum: quidquid dicitur de Deo summe dicitur de eo. Consequentia patet, quia sic sequitur quod volitio sua, qua vult se esse, est firmior illa volitione qua voluit mundum creare vel aliquid in futurum fore, quia illa volitio est necessaria, ita quod non potest nec umquam potuit oppositum velle.” Cf. DFC, 50k, p. 319.

38

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

itorious, whereas the acts of the former’s will are natural and determined by natural law, which precludes animals making any other choice. Hence, an animal’s will is determined by an external object, while a human being’s will may only be determined by reason. Moreover, human free will and possible free choices are necessarily free, because they result from God’s necessarily free ordained power, and, as such, they can only be free. God necessitates and determines people’s free will so that they must make free choices and they do not make moral choices with regard to nature, while this does not concern beasts, which act in accord with their unchangeable desires. The necessity of human free will originates in God’s necessity. The absolute power of their will makes it possible for people to choose one or the other part of a contradiction, and they are not determined to opt for either of these. Nevertheless, they are determined to pick one part of a contradiction by the superior cause—God. Humans do not know which part of a contradiction is chosen by God’s ordained power, and if they choose the other part rather than that chosen by God, they sin. Moreover, they sin voluntarily, because they make this choice by themselves. God is not the cause of sins, and humans alone are responsible for their bad choices.137

137

Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 47ra: “Ad quartum principale negatur haec consequentia: si omnia evenirent de necessitate, igitur periret libertas, quia ex hoc magis sequitur oppositum, scilicet quod necesse est libertatem fore, quia plura evenient ex libertate, et illa non possunt non fieri ex libertate, et ideo necessario fient ex libertate, quia libertas est ex hoc quod voluntas producit cum vult, et quando non vult non producit nec potest producere, quia cogi non potest ad producendum aliquid. (…) brutum non habet libertatem et homo habet, tum quia homo potest mereri et demereri, et non brutum; tum quia equus, quando appetit, naturaliter appetit, ex hoc quod natura sua determinatur ad hoc appetendum, et ita non homo; tum quia equus determinatur ab obiecto naturaliter extra appetendum, et ita non est de homine, quia in volitione voluntas in homine determinat se; tum quia homo operatur per rationem et cum usu rationis, et ita non brutum. (…) illa necessitas est a Deo sic volente voluntatem velle producere, et ab illo determinatur ad hoc producendum libere; et ita non est de bruto, quia brutum non libere producit. Similiter Deus, qui sic necessitat voluntatem et determinat, sic voluntatem non determinat vel necessitat naturaliter voluntatem, sed libere et voluntarie; et ita non est de obiecto quod appetitur a bruto quod necessitat et determinat brutum ad appetitum suum. (…) dico quod illa necessitas voluntatis Dei ad sic volendum non est aliud a Deo, quia omne necesse esse inferius reducitur ad aliquod necesse esse per se, ubi est standum. (…) dico, quod in homine est libertas contradictionis quantum est de se, quia de se non plus determinatur ad unam partem quam ad aliam, sed determinatur ad partem ex causa superiori, sed quia nescit ad quam partem determinat, multotiens peccat eligendo vel volendo illud ad quod volendum est determinatum a Deo; quia nesciunt se esse determinatos plus ad unam partem quam ad aliam, et ideo sic peccant, et ideo ita libere faciunt sicut si non essent determinati ad alteram partem aliquo modo, et sic pec-

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

39

Bradwardine emphasizes that God does not make people sin, since the human will cannot be forced. As God does not command the will of people to sin, they sin because their will makes bad choices. People can avoid mortal sins by their own and God’s absolute power, but not by their ordained power, since their ordained power is not enough for them to sufficiently will to avoid a future mortal sin. If people will to sin, God cannot prevent them from doing so.138 People can also resist temptation if they will to, but God, by ordained power cannot collaborate with resisting people; therefore, rational creatures cannot will to resist by their ordained power, though they can do so by their absolute power. Because God neither wills nor orders people to sin even by absolute power, if people lose grace by mortally sinning, they are the only cause of this fact, without God being involved.139 Bradwardine argues that because everything is past, present, or future only because God wills it to be so, and nobody can oppose God’s will, it follows that if anyone were to sin in the future, they would sin necessarily, though at the same time voluntarily and without coercion. This would be caused neither by the freedom of contradictories simpliciter nor contingently simpliciter, but by the freedom of contradictories secundum quid and contingently secundum quid. Therefore, God does not absolutely will people to sin, but only because of circumstances, since people’s sins are only sins secundum quid and not sins simpliciter, as they are bad for sinners, while being good for the elect and for the established order and arrangement of the world.140

138

139

140

cant. Et sic bruta sunt naturaliter, scilicet per naturam propriam determinata ad unam partem, et non homo.” Cf. DFC, 51a–j, pp. 320–321. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 47ra: “(…) licet possit cavere omnia peccata mortalia de potentia sua absoluta et similiter de potentia Dei absoluta; non potest tamen sic cavere de potentia sua ordinata, quia de potentia eius ordinata non potest ex se sufficienter velle pro quolibet suo tempore futuro vitare quodlibet mortale, nec de ⟨potentia ordinata⟩ potest Deus sibi concedere ad sic volendum et conceditur quod de potentia absoluta utriusque causae talis potest vitare omnia mortalia.” Cf. DFC, 59d, p. 328. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 47ra: “(…) nullus peccabit mortaliter vel perdet suam gratiam nisi voluntarie, et non coacte. Et ideo, si velit resistere cuilibet temptationi, potest resistere; sed de potentia Dei ordinata Deus non potest sibi concurrere ut coagat cum illo ad sic resistendum. Et ideo creatura illa rationalis non potest hoc velle de potentia sua ordinata, licet possit de potentia sua absoluta sui quam Dei, tunc de potentia absoluta sui tantum, quia non est in potentia sua absoluta quod Deus sic coagat cum illo.” Cf. DFC, 60c, p. 329. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 47ra: “Et ideo sequitur quod nullus est praesens, praeteritum vel futurum nisi Deus vult illud esse praesens, praeteritum vel futurum. Et ideo cum nulla creatura possit resistere voluntati suae, sequitur quod si aliquis sit in futurum peccaturus, quod ipse necessario peccabit, et tamen

40

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

Concluding his question, Bradwardine states: And it shows in this way that free power, [in the sense of] freedom of contradictories, is in any wayfarer; and this power is a certain power, not determined to act before it naturally has an act by itself, nor by another created cause, yet naturally determined to its own act in the first place by God—Who is blessed for ever and ever, world without end.141

Predestination and Free Will in Richard Kilvington’s Question The confusing structure of Richard Kilvington’s question forces the reader to look for his views amid the numerous quotations from and references to other theologians and philosophers. His opinions are to be found in the determinatio quaestionis and in discussions with the views cited at the beginning of the question: 1) “An evil act of the will is in itself something.” 2) “Even if this type of act ⟨i.e., an act of the will⟩ were something, it is not immediately produced by God, since God, as the creator and the efficient cause of the will, is only a mediate cause.” 3) “Both acts, either good or evil, of free will are first made by free will, and God cooperates with free will to make such acts, and thus God does what free will does, and not the opposite.” 4) “All meritorious acts are first caused by God, and then by free will; all demeritorius acts are caused the other way around.”142 Kilvington considers the first of these opinions in detail, but devotes far much more attention to discussing the third one. Neither the second nor the fourth opinion is examined because, as will be shown, he agrees

141

142

libere et voluntarie, sed non libertate contradictionis simpliciter, sicut nec contingenter simpliciter, sed libertate contradictionis secundum quid, sicut contingenter secundum quid. Et ita dicendum est de merito futuro et de mediis omnibus ordinatis a Deo ad talem finem bonum vel malum sicut demerenti. Et ita est dicendum quod sicut Deus non vult peccata hominum nisi secundum quid tantum et beatitudinem illorum similiter, ita est dicendum quod peccata hominum non sunt mala simpliciter sed secundum quid tantum, quia sunt mala peccantibus, et bona electis et ordinationi et dispositioni universi.” Cf. DFC, 61b, pp. 329–330. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 47ra: “Et sic patet quod potentia libera libertate contradictionis est in quolibet viatore; quae quidem potentia, licet non determinetur ad actum priusquam habet actum naturaliter per seipsam, nec per aliquam causam creatam, tamen determinatur ad actum suum prius naturaliter per Deum.” Cf. DFC, 63, p. 336. Eng. trans. Hogarth Rossiter, Foreknowledge, Free Will, p. 220. See above, pp. 12–13.

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

41

with these views. As Kilvington’s discussions focus on specific problems, and he revisits the same issues several times, we have rearranged them for the sake of clarity. The Ontological Status of the Act of Free Will At the beginning of his question Whether Any in Itself Evil Act of Free Will Is in Itself Something, Kilvington advances two principal arguments. One of them draws on Aristotle’s statement in the Categories (1b, 25–25), repeated in his Metaphysics (1017a, 25–27), whose Latin version is to be found, for instance, in Thomas Aquinas: “being is divided in ten categories” (ens (…) dividitur ens in decem praedicamenta).143 Kilvington’s argument holds that “to act (agere) is something as one of the categories,” thus “to will to act (velle agere) is also something.”144 The other argument is based on Anselm’s view expressed in De concordia: Indeed, in the case of good deeds He causes what they are [essentially] and the fact that they are good; but in the case of evil deeds He causes what they are [essentially] but not the fact that they are evil.145 Kilvington concludes from this that “evil acts are essentially ⟨caused⟩ by God.”146 The way Kilvington disputes the first opinion, “An evil act of the will is in itself something,” sheds more light on his theological take on the ontological status of volitional acts of free will. He invokes Duns Scotus, who in his Ordinatio I, distinction 17, question 2147 discusses a more general issue concerning the moral habit: Whether it is necessary to posit in a habit the idea of active principle

143

144

145

146 147

Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the “Metaphysics” Book 5, trans. John P. Rowan, lib. 5, lect. 14, n. 1, http://www.logicmuseum.com/wiki/Authors/Thomas_Aquinas/metaphysics/​ liber5. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 121: “(…) ens dividitur in decem praedicamenta quorum unum est agere, igitur agere est aliquid; igitur eadem ratione velle agere est aliquid.” Anselm, The Harmony of the Foreknowledge, the Predestination, and the Grace of God with Free Choice, q. 1, cap. 7, in Complete Philosophical and Theological Treatises of Anselm of Canterbury, trans. Jasper Hopkins, Herbert Richardson (Minneapolis: The Artur J. Banning Press, 2000), p. 544, https://jasper‑hopkins.info/DeConcordia.pdf. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 121: “(…) actus mali sunt per essentiam a Deo.” John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, dist. 17, pars prima de habitu caritatis, q. 2, Utrum necesse sit ponere in habitu rationem principii activi respectu actus, n. 27, in Opera omnia, ed. P.C. Balić et al., vol. 5 (Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1959), pp. 141–231.

42

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

with respect to act. In his discussion, Scotus cites five opinions, the second of which is quoted by Kilvington.

Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, dist. 17, pars Richard Kilvington, prima de habitu caritatis, q. 2, n. 27148 Utrum quilibet actus, p. 121149 In another way it can be said (…) that the act has its substance from the power but has such and such intensity from the habit (…).

And Scotus cites this opinion, though in an opposite way, in book I, distinction 17, question 1, where he assumes that the habit causes the intensity of an act, yet ⟨it is⟩ the will that is responsible for the degree in its substance.

The difference in wording results from Kilvington’s report of Scotus’s critique of this view. Kilvington says: “Scotus cites this opinion, though in an opposite way,” which should be read as “when he refutes it.” When commencing the presentation of arguments for this opinion, Kilvington formulates it differently: “God produces the substance of an act and the will is responsible for the degree of its intensity.”150 Subsequently, he accepts three arguments from authority in support of the first part of the assertion (“God produces the substance of an act”), which state that: a) God produces the substance of the act of free will, because such an act is created by God; b) God’s will is the primary cause of creating the substance of volitional acts; and c) God is the sole creator of all things.151 To prove the second part (the “will is responsible for the degrees of the intensity of its acts”), Kilvington provides merely one argument. This argument points to the main problem discussed in his question, namely, the possible limits to free will. He argues that if free

148

149

150 151

John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, dist. 11–25, trans. Peter L.P. Simpson, p. 111, http://aristotelo phile.com/Books/Translations/Scotus%20Ordinatio%20I%20dd.11‑25.pdf. Cf. John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, dist. 17, q. 2, n. 27, p. 149: “Alia via potest dici (…), quod actus habet suam substantiam a potentia, sed intensionem talem vel talem habet ab habitu (…).” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, pp. 121–122: “Et hanc viam, licet modo contrario, recitat Scotus libro I distinctione 17 quaestione 1, ubi ponit quod habitus facit intensionem actus, sed voluntas ponit gradum in substantia illius.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 122: “Deus agit substantiam actus et voluntas ponit gradum in substantia illius.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, pp. 122–123.

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

43

will were not responsible for the intensity of its act, it could only act with a Godgiven intensity.152 In claiming this, Kilvington modifies Scotus’s reasoning:

Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, dist. 17, pars Richard Kilvington, prima de habitu caritatis, q. 2, n. 29153 Utrum quilibet actus, p. 123154 [T]herefore if a determinate habit in the will give a determinate intensity to the act, then, with the will operating on the substance of the act, the habit will necessarily give the intensity corresponding to itself, and thus, however much the will operates with a modicum of effort, its act would always be equally as intense, because, although the will causes the substance of the act, the habit—because it acts by way of nature—would necessarily cause what is its own.

The second part of the first opinion, namely that the will is responsible for the degree of its act, is confirmed, because otherwise the will could not produce its acts with a less intense degree, if it willed, since it could not make its degree less intense that the degree made by God.

The first four of the thirteen counterarguments against this opinion, which are marshaled afterwards, are formulated in a mathematical vein. Below, we only present the first reasoning, which appears to have been inspired by Scotus:

152 153

154

Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 123. John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, dist. 11–25, p. 112 (trans. Simpson). Cf. John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, dist. 17, q. 2, n. 29, p. 150: “(…) ergo si habitus determinatus in voluntate det intensionem determinatam actui, tunc voluntate operante ad substantiam actus, necessario habitus dabit illam intensionem sibi correspondentem, et ita quantumcumque ex modico conatu voluntas operaretur, semper esset actus eius aeque intensus, quia ipsa causante substantiam actus, habitus—quia agit per modum naturae—necessario causaret quod suum est.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 123: “Secunda pars primae viae, scilicet quod voluntas ponit gradum in actu, probatur, quia aliter voluntas non posset producere sub quocumque gradu remisso, si vellet, quia non posset ⟨producere⟩ in gradum remissiorem quam foret gradus producendus a Deo.”

44

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, dist. 17, pars Richard Kilvington, prima de habitu caritatis, q. 2, n. 30155 Utrum quilibet actus, p. 123156 Further, if the habit give intensity to the act, this would be in some designated degree (that degree will be given the mark a below); therefore the will can, along with this habit, have an act that is intense to that degree. Let there be another will, more perfect than this will in proportion to ‘degree a’ by relation to an act in the lowest degree (to wit, if a is the fourth degree in the act, let there be another will exceeding the first will by four degrees), then this will—without a habit—could have an act as equally intense as the will with the habit. Therefore the substance of the act is not so precisely from the power that the intensity is not from it.

155

156

But against this opinion I argue: Socrates produces an act of his will, which is A, and Plato produces act B, which is twice as good or twice as intense as A ⟨B = 2A⟩. Thus, when B is twice as intense as A, and if, imaginatively, God’s part were subtracted, the proportion would vary, and then the proportion A to B would no more be double or more than double; thus it would be less than double; therefore God acts with the latitude as long as there is a variation in proportion; and consequently, God non only produces the substance ⟨of an act⟩ but also the degree ⟨of its intensity⟩.

John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, dist. 11–25, p. 112 (trans. Simpson). Cf. John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, dist. 17, q. 2, n. 30, p. 151: “Praeterea, si habitus det intensionem actui, hoc esset in aliquo gradu signato (signetur ille gradus); voluntas ergo cum habitu isto potest habere actum intensum in ‘hoc’ gradu. Fiat alia voluntas, perfectior ista voluntate secundum proportionem ‘a gradus’ ad actum in infimo gradu (puta, si a est gradus quartus in actu, fiat alia voluntas excedens primam voluntatem in quattuor gradibus), ista ergo voluntas— sine habitu—posset habere actum aeque intensum sicut illa voluntas cum habitu. Ergo a potentia non est praecise substantia actus ita quod non intensio.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 123: “Sed contra istam viam arguo sic: producat Socrates aliquem actum voluntatis qui sit A et producat Plato B actum in duplo meliorem A sive intensiorem. Tunc sic: B est in duplo intensior quam A, igitur subtracto eodem per intellectum ab utroque, scilicet quod Deus agit, et variabitur proportio, et tunc proportio B ad A non erit dupla nec plus quam dupla, igitur tunc erit minus quam dupla, et ita tantam latitudinem per quantam variatur proportio agit Deus, et per consequens non solum produxit substantiam sed gradum.” Kilvington develops this reasoning, see ibidem, pp. 123–124: “Item, quidquid Deus operatur voluntate coagente posset Deus similiter facere sine voluntate coagente, et ita si Deus operatur solam substantiam in actu voluntatis voluntate coagente, igitur posset facere solam substantiam voluntate non coagente, et ita aliquis actus voluntatis foret sine gradu, et ita aliqua volitio indivisibilis. Consequens falsum, quia tunc excederetur a volitione habente gradum infinite, et ita quaecumque volitio habens gradum foret in infinitum maior, et per consequens infinita.”

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

45

At first glance, Kilvington seems to be merely completing Scotus’s argument. However, on closer scrutiny, Kilvington’s unique ability to use the new calculus of proportions is revealed. The first example explicitly demonstrates that when considering the above case of the proportion of Socrates’s act of will (A) to Plato’s act of will (B), Kilvington calculates the proportion of proportions. For example, if A = 2/1, B, which is twice as intense, equals to 4/1 = (2/1)(2/1). In order to reduce these proportions—for instance, by one—we must “substract” the proportion of 3/1 from both proportions. Thus, the final calculation yields the value of 2/3 as the latitude of God’s act (4/1 : 2/1 = 4/2, and 4/2 : 3/1 = 4/6 = 2/3).157 Since this value is not equal to zero or, as medieval philosophers put it, it is not equal to no-degree, the calculation indicates that God not only produces the substance of an act, but also contributes to producing its intensity.158 This example attests to Kilvington’s methodological position, as he believes that mathematical proofs resolve all doubts and should be applied in all disciplines, including theology.159 From the remaining twelve arguments some explicit conclusions can be drawn.160 First of all, Kilvington reaffirms his statement that God produces the substance of a volitional act, that is, the possibility of making choices, and cooperates with free will in the intensification of its acts by generating a specific degree of the intensity of such acts. Kilvington argues that if free will were solely responsible for the degree of its act, then somebody endowed with grace or not could love God, and somebody without charity could love God above everything else. This claim, as Kilvington says, is against Anselm’s view, who states that without justice the will would be the slave of its affections.161 This claim appears to be directed against Ockham, who maintains that humans can love God above everything else ex puris naturalibus, that is, 157

158 159

160 161

For the standard medieval mathematics of proportions, see John E. Murdoch, Edit D. Sylla, “The Science of Motion,” in Science in the Middle Ages, ed. David C. Lindberg (Chicago– London: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 225–226. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 123. For more details of Kilvington’s methodology, see Elżbieta Jung, “Richard Kilvington,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Edition 2022), ed. Edward N. Zalta, https://plato​ .stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/kilvington/; Monika Michałowska, “Cracking the Code of the Will: Richard Kilvington on the Will and Logic,” in Willing and Understanding: Late Medieval Debates on the Will, the Intellect, and Practical Knowledge, ed. Monika Michałowska, Riccardo Fedriga (forthcoming). Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, pp. 123–126. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 125: “(…) si voluntas sola operetur gradum, tunc ita intense posset aliquis diligere Deum sine gratia sicut cum gratia, et ita sine caritate posset aliquis diligere Deum super omnia—contra: Anselmus De concordia in fine, ubi dicit quod perdita iustitia voluntas fit ancilla suae affectionis, quae est ad commodum.”

46

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

on the basis of their natural capacities alone, without being given grace.162 Specifically, in Ockham’s view: [I]t is possible to separate enjoyment from an act of love as preparatory for immediate encounter and pleasure, and this is true of love both as present in our everyday life, and in religious experience. In this life we can enjoy God, the ultimately perfect object of love, thanks to our natural faculties, even without aid of grace, and thus have enjoyment of God without the pleasure of meeting Him in person.163 As opposed to this idea, Kilvington insists that grace is the conditio sine qua non of performing meritorious deeds. He avers that: [C]reated grace works to produce a meritorious act, as proved, and the will ⟨acts⟩ in the same way, and they ⟨both⟩ produce a more intense act than that brought about by one cause only; therefore they both produce the degree of their act and not only its substance.164 God only contributes to performing good deeds, and evil deeds result from the choices of people’s free will alone, because “truly we are good because of God, and ⟨we are⟩ evil all by ourselves.”165 It is obvious, however, that even if humans perform good deeds, God does not have to take them into account or reward humans for their meritorious acts.166

162

163

164

165 166

See William Ockham, Guillelmi de Ockham scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum. Ordinatio. Prologus et Distinctio prima [Sententiae (Ordinatio) I], in Opera theologica, ed. Gedeon Gál and Stephen Brown, vol. 1 (St. Bonaventure, NY: St. Bonaventure University, 1967), dist. 1, q. 2, pp. 396–397: “Dico primo quod obiecto fruibili ostenso voluntati per intellectum sive clare sive obscure sive in particulari sive in universali, potest voluntas active elicere actum fruitionis, et hoc ex puris naturalibus, circa illud obiectum.” Elżbieta Jung, “William of Ockham on Free Will in God and in Man,” in If God Exists: Human Freedom and Theistic Hypothesis. Studies and Essays, ed. Andrzej P. Stefańczyk and Roman Majeran, trans. Roman Majeran and Barbara Kulicka (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 2019), p. 328, https://tnkul.pl/files/userfiles/files/2019_IfGodExists.pdf. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 126: “(…) gratia creata agit ad productionem actus meritorii, ut probatum est, et ita voluntas, et plus producuntur de actu per utramque quam per unam causam; igitur illae duae efficiunt gradum et non solam substantiam actus etc.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 126: “(…) ex Deo principaliter boni et ex nobis mali sumus.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 188.

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

47

Kilvington’s argument formulated against the third opinion, whose considerable probative power he acknowledges (quae magnam videtur habere evidentiam), is helpful in clarifying his position. At this point, the opinion is phrased as: “first free will performs its acts, and God contingently cooperates with it.”167 Kilvington presents ten arguments supporting this opinion derived from authorities along with his own reasoning.168 In formulating his own view, Kilvington refers to Augustine: “I say, therefore, with all due respect for a better judgment, that no act of the will that is evil in itself is in itself something.”169 Kilvington’s position is based on Augustine’s answer to Celestius, who asks “What is sin,—an act, or a thing?”170 Augustine replies: [S]in no doubt is called an act, and is such, not a thing. But likewise in the body, lameness for the same reason is an act, not a thing, since it is the foot itself, or the body, or the man who walks lame because of an injured foot, that is a thing (…).171 Kilvington quotes five more authorities to buttress his Augustinian opinion that sinning is acting, and acting is not a thing. It is in this spirit that Kilvington interprets Anselm’s view from De concordia, holding that an evil deed, such as sin, essentially “lacks all being” and thus does not exist in itself. Kilvington understands sin’s “lack of being” neither as a pure deprivation nor as non-being, since the proposition “sin is” is true, even though, it does not indicate anything particular, because in saying this, we do not concede any more firmly that sin is

167

168 169 170

171

Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 126: “(…) quae magnam videtur habere evidentiam, quod in omnibus actibus liberi arbitrii prius agit liberum arbitrium et ex contingenti Deus coagit.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, pp. 126–130. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 132: “Dico igitur, salvo meliori iudicio, quod nullus actus voluntatis per se malus per se est aliquid.” Augustin, A Treatise Concerning Man’s Perfection in Righteousness, cap. 2, trans. Philip Schaff, p. 496, http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf105.html. Cf. Augustin, De perfectione iustitiae hominis, ed. Karl F. Vrba and Joseph Zycha (Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, ed. consilio et impensis Academiae Scientiarum Austriacae [olim Academiae Litterarum Caesareae Vindobonensis] 42, 1902), cap. 2, p. 5: “Iterum, ait, quaerendum est, quid est peccatum: actus an res.” Augustin, A Treatise Concerning Man’s Perfection in Righteousness, cap. 2, p. 496. Cf. Augustin, De perfectione iustitiae hominis, cap. 2, p. 5: “Respondemus peccatum quidem actum dici et esse, non rem. Sed etiam in corpore claudicatio eadem ratione actus est, non res, quoniam res pes ipse uel corpus uel homo est, qui pede uitiato claudicat nec tamen uitare potest claudicationem, nisi habuerit sanatum pedem.”

48

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

than that chimera is.172 While Kilvington notes that according to Anselm “willing is not the evil that makes people evil,” in his own view, if desire is directed towards a wrong goal, it can indeed make people evil. Be it as it may, since the vice of the soul, which he refers to as the habit of a defective mind, is not created by God, it is not a thing.173 Kilvington observes that Augustine reiterates the view contrary to the third opinion throughout his anti-Pelagian writings.174 Subscribing to Augustine’s thinking, Kilvington himself claims that while it is true that, in order to find God, people must first perform the volitional act of seeking God, the very capacity to seek God and come to God is God’s gift.175 In his response to the first principal argument, Kilvington explains that “being as a noun is not divided into ten categories, but only being as a participle is divided in this way, and then it is the same as existing being.”176 This explanation elucidates the meanings of “to act” (agere) and “to will to act” (velle agere), as adopted at the beginning of this question. He states that although an act is existing, it does not follow from this very fact that this act “is something.”177 Nor does it follow from this that “willing to act” is nothing other than “using the will,” as Anselm believes.178 Kilvington’s response to the second principal argument relies on another passage from Anselm’s De concordia,

172

173

174

175 176 177 178

Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 134: “Unde ad Anselmum De concordia capitulo 20 quod huiusmodi sunt res, dici potest quod ipse intellegit sic quod actus mali per se non sunt per se non-entia sicut hircocervus vel chimaera. Sed de huiusmodi actibus vere praedicatur esse. Hic enim nunc haec est vera: ‘peccatum est’, quod non deberet concedi de peccato si esset pura privatio et non-ens; non plus concederetur de peccato quod sit quam de chimaera quod sit.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, pp. 134–135: “Et de alio quod dicit quod volitio non est malum quo homines sunt mali dico quod intellegit quod volitio non est tantum malum in quo homines sunt mali, quia per aliquas circumstantias potest fieri homo malus sicut propter finem malum (…) habitus mentis, qui est vitium, non est a Deo, igitur nec actus, et per consequens actus voluntatis non est res.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 130: “Ad oppositum istius opinionis arguitur per Augustinum De praedestinatione sanctorum et in omnibus libris quasi quos edidit contra Pelagianos.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 137. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 135: “(…) ens nomen non dividitur in decem praedicamenta sed ens participium, et tunc idem est quod ens existens.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 135: “Et concedo quod actio est existens, et non sequitur: igitur est aliquid.” Anselm, The Harmony of the Foreknowledge, cap. 2, pp. 544–545: “(…) the act of willing— which is sometimes just, sometimes unjust, and which is nothing other than using the will and the power-to-will which God bestows—is, with respect to the fact that it is, good and is derivative from God.”

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

49

which observes that “God is said to cause (because He permits) evils which He does not cause,”179 but permitting something is not the same as bringing something about.180 To sum up, Kilvington emphasizes his anti-Pelagian views from the very beginning of the question. In the part outlined above, he focuses almost entirely on the key problem of question 4, that is, on whether an evil act is something, and therefore, whether it is produced by God. The arguments listed here start with those offered by Augustine and Anselm, which provide a point of departure for Kilvington’s own interpretation. Kilvington is careful to define his basic concepts clearly and unambiguously in order to explain the ontological status of volitional acts, but he leaves the central problem only partly resolved. This stems from the fact that, as he believes, an evil act is not a God-made something, and it lacks being, but, at the same time, it is not “not-something”—not a “non-being”—and when it is performed, it “exits.” The following parts of his question gives more insight into this issue. Predestination and Human Free Will The problem of predestination and human free will is discussed in detail in the section in which Kilvington polemicizes with Bradwardine’s view. As the manuscript tradition indicates, this view is to be found in the reply to the third argument against the third opinion and is worded as “evil acts, as well as all other acts, are primarily caused by free will.”181 The beginning of this section reads: “In response to the third argument Bradwardine says that everything necessarily comes about, and he concedes that God forsakes a human before a human forsakes God.”182 This view asserts both the necessity of future contingents and God’s forsaking people before they perform evil acts. It is rather obvious that the above statement is a response not only to the third but also to the fourth view previously mentioned by Kilvington.

179

180 181

182

Anselm, The Harmony of the Foreknowledge, cap. 2, p. 547. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 00: “Ad secundum respondeo per Anselmum De concordia capitulo 21, ubi dicit quod Deus dicitur facere mala quae non facit, quia permittit (…).” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 136. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 136: “(…) restat respondere ad argumenta tertiae opinionis quae videntur probare quod actus malus et quilibet actus sit primo a libero arbitrio etc.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 138: “Ad tertium respondet Bradvardin dicens omnia evenire de necessitate, et concedit quod Deus prius deserit hominem quam homo deserat Deum.”

50

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

The third argument holds that: Likewise, if free will did not act before God, at least relative to the acts that deserve punishment, it would follow that God forsook the human before a human sinned. The consequence is obvious, because God can produce the act by which a human forsakes God before a human forsakes God, and such a divine act is the same as forsaking a human.183 The fourth argument reasons: Likewise, if, in making a free choice, free will did not act before God etc., everything would necessarily come about. The conclusion is proved in this way: if God produces all acts before free will, then all such acts are caused by the first cause, namely the unchanging and invariable will of God, just as a sunrise is caused by natural causes; therefore, an effect of free will would be caused as necessarily as the birth of the day is necessarily caused by the rotation of the sun. This is confirmed in this way: if God acted before free will, then free will would only work if divine will naturally preceded free will in acting. But it is not in the power of free will to precede God in acting, for God’s will would then be a servant of the created will, which is impossible, and so forth.184 The following extensive debate that takes up two-thirds of Kilvington’s question is mainly devoted to God’s foreknowledge and divine absolute and ordained powers, problems pondered by Bradwardine and studied in the context defined by him.

183

184

Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 127: “Item, nisi prius ageret liberum arbitrium quam Deus saltem in actibus demeritoriis, sequitur quod Deus prius desereret hominem quam homo peccaret. Patet consequentia per hoc quod Deus posset prius agere actum illum quo homo deserit Deum quam homo deserens, et Deum sic agere est deserere.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, pp. 127–128: “Item, nisi in actibus liberi arbitrii prius ageret voluntas et liberum arbitrium quam etc., omnia evenirent de necessitate. Probatur consequentia, quia si omnes actus producendos producit Deus priusquam liberum arbitrium, igitur omnes huiusmodi actus proveniunt a causa prima, scilicet a voluntate Dei invariabili et immutabili, sicut ortus solis provenit a causis naturalibus etc. Igitur consimili necessitate quilibet talis effectus producetur ea necessitate, qua orietur sol crastina die. Et confirmatur per hoc, quia si Deus prius ageret quam liberum arbitrium, tunc liberum arbitrium non ageret nisi quando voluntas Dei antecederet ipsum naturaliter in agendo. Sed non est in potestate liberi arbitrii quod Deum praecederet in agendo, quia tunc voluntas divina fieret pedisequa respectu volitionis creatae, quod est impossibile, igitur etc.”

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

51

The discussion begins with eighteen arguments in support of the second part of the opinion: “God forsakes a human before a human forsakes God.”185 In all likelihood, Kilvington attributes this view to Bradwardine, since the latter claims that only the reprobate will be condemned, and the predestined will be saved. Bradwardine also indicates that God possesses absolute active power that is sufficient to save all people and gives people absolute passive power that enables them to be saved. However, relative to God’s ordained power, only some people are saved while some others are condemned. A robust support for this view is found in St. John, who stresses that the Jews believed neither the words of Christ nor the signs, nor the miracles, because God did not want to give them an active power to believe, hardened their hearts, and made them blind.186 Bradwardine’s reasoning may be interpreted the way Kilvington does: ‘God forsakes people (i.e., the Jews) before they forsake God’. However, no such phrase is actually to be found either in Bradwardine’s question on future contingents or in any other questions that make up his commentary on the Sentences. There is nothing even vaguely reminiscent of this statement in the text. Therefore, Kilvington’s explicit reference to Bradwardine by name causes a conundrum. One explanation may be that Bradwardine’s question in the Paris manuscript BnF lat. 15805 is not complete (it is known to be a copy of a reportatum),187 and another may be that Kilvington heard this opinion, in the wording he quotes, when attending Bradwardine’s lectures as his socius. At this point, no decisive answer to this riddle can be offered. In the next part of question 4, Kilvington provides fifteen counterarguments, all of which come from various works by Augustine.188 Subsequently, he offers his own refutation of arguments in favor of Bradwardine’s view. What can be inferred from those is that: 1) God is the original cause of good. 2) God does not forsake people, because even if God does not help them improve, God does so for their good. 3) Humans’ sins are the first occasional and immediate causes of God’s forsaking them; therefore, no human is unfairly condemned. 4) A human volitional act is not a thing; therefore, God, who produces only things, is not the primary cause of the free choice of human free will. 5) People cannot be the primary cause of their reward, but they are the primary cause of their punishment, since they are able to perform good 185 186 187 188

Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 138. See above, pp. 27, 36. See above, pp. 7–8. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, pp. 141–144.

52

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

deeds only because God has given them such an ability. The ability to sin testifies to humans’ freedom to make free choices.189 All these conclusions work to reassert that human free will is free to perform evil deeds, but in order to perform good deeds, it must be supported by God.190 They also enclose Kilvington’s reflections within a specific theological context. Hence, another detailed discussion is commenced to focus on predestination, free will and humans’ responsibility for their volitional acts, that is, their choices. Kilvington’s explorations of predestination appear to follow Duns Scotus, who maintains that predestination is simply election for salvation and, as such, it has only positive connotation.191 Kilvington does not accept Bradwardine’s view that God eternally predestines some to salvation and others to reprobation. Reprobation is solely the consequence of people’s evil deeds. In Kilvington’s view, while God is the only cause of predestination from eternity,192 God also takes into account the conduct of creatures, that is, their good or bad use of free will. Like Scotus, Kilvington criticizes the view championed by Henry of Ghent,193 who, as Martyna Koszkało explains, ultimately insists that the reason for election that is present in an elected person is the good use of free will by that person as foreseen by God; the reason for damnation

189 190 191 192

193

Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, pp. 144–152. See above, p. 41. John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, dist. 40, n. 4, p. 310. Cf. Martyna Koszkało, “The Problem of Predestination of Human Beings According to John Duns Sotus,” in If God Exists, p. 190. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 152: “(…) Deus est causa prima praedestinationis ab aeterno, patet per hoc, quia nihil fuit ab aeterno praeter Deum, et Deus ab aeterno praedestinavit hominem.” Cf. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, pp. 150–151: “(…) dico quod ista propositio ‘aliquis potest esse prima causa suae reprobationis’ potest esse constructio transitiva vel intransitiva. Si intransitiva, concedo quod solus Deus etc. Si transitiva, et sumatur causa pro causa culpabili, unde Deus primo reprobat peccatorem etc. Et sic quis potest esse causa prima suae reprobationis, et hoc est verum praecipue in adultis qui habent gratiam qui tamen finaliter reprobantur. (…) Si autem sumatur causa pro causa partiali sine qua non, sic etiam concedo quod aliquis potest esse causa suae praedestinationis, et in tali casu bonus usus liberi arbitrii est causa suae praedestinationis. Et huic concordat Gandavus VIII Quodlibet quaestione 5, ubi quaerit: Numquid duobus aequaliter se habentibus ad receptionem gratiae uni Deus confert gratiam alteri non? Ubi dicit quod ex parte illorum qui sanctificabantur in vita, ut de Ioanni Baptista, Zacharia, de adultis, ut Paulo, quod in eis non fuit aliqua causa nisi usus bonus liberi arbitrii, in praescientia Dei tamen non audeo asserere quod non alia fuit causa nisi usus liberi arbitrii.”

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

53

present in a reprobate is the bad use of free will by the reprobate, that was also foreseen by God.194 Kilvington realizes that Henry’s argument is controversial, because if this indeed were the case, God’s foreknowledge, rather than God’s will, would be the primary cause of predestination.195 This very fact is also recognized by Scotus, as Kilvington points out:

Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, dist. 41, q. unica, n. 37196

Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 151197

Besides, the reason that he posits [n. 32] does not seem common to all the predestined and reprobate: First indeed because not for children, in whom God does not foresee good or bad use of free will.

In the same way, as Scotus argues in his Sentences, distinction 41, question 1, against Henry of Ghent: the reason that he posited, this Henry of Ghent, would not be common to all the predestined, since God did not predestine every human from eternity as a consequence of the good use of free will, which was foreknown ⟨by God⟩ and so forth, that is, of whom God has known from eternity, given that the reason does not refer to children who die

194 195

196

197

Koszkało, “The Problem of Predestination,” pp. 206–207. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, pp. 151–152: “Item, arguo sic, et est commune argumentum contra me sicut contra Gandavum. Si Deus praedestinavit aliquem, quia praescivit ipsum bene usurum liberum arbitrium, igitur, cum praedestinatio sit actus voluntatis Dei, igitur voluntate Dei fuit aliqua causa prior illa naturaliter, quia ⟨sic⟩ praescientia Dei est causa praedestinationis. Consequens falsum et contra Magistrum I libro distinctione 45 capitulo 4 et 5, ubi dicit quod voluntas Dei est prima causa omnium rerum.” John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, dist. 26–48, trans. by Peter L.P. Simpson, p. 337, http://​ aristotelophile.com/Books/Translations/Scotus%20Ordinatio%20I%20dd.26‑48.pdf. Cf. John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, dist. 41, q. unica, n. 37, p. 331: “Praeterea, ista ratio quam ponit, non videtur communis omnibus praedestinatis et reprobatis: Primo quidem, quia non parvulis, in quibus non praevidet Deus usum bonum vel malum liberi arbitrii.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 151: “Item, ut arguit Scotus super I Sententiarum distinctione 41 quaestione 1 contra Gandavum: ratio quam posuit ille Gandavus non fuit communis omnibus praedestinatis, quia Deus non omnem hominem praedestinavit ab aeterno propter bonum usum liberi arbitrii qui fuit in praescientia etc., id est cuius fuit Deus praescitus ab aeterno, quia illa ratio non convenit parvulis qui moriuntur cum gratia baptismali, in quibus nullus fuit nec est nec erit usus liberi arbitrii bonus.”

54

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

(cont.)

Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, dist. 41, q. unica, n. 37

Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 151 with the grace of christening, in whom there neither was, is, nor will be any use of free will.

Kilvington agrees with Scotus that the good use of free will as foreseen by God is not the necessary cause of predestination:

Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, dist. 40, q. unica, n. 4198

Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 199199

‘Predestination’ properly states an act of the divine will, namely ordination by the divine will of a choice of some intellectual or rational creature for grace and glory, although it can be taken for the act of intellect concomitant with that choice.

To the second, I say that predestination, which is a volitional act, as such is not the primary necessitating cause, but God as such is the necessitating cause. That predestination is understood as a volitional act is evident in the manner of Scotus’s speaking in his Sentences I, distinction 40, where he claims that predestination taken in its proper sense is the same as divine volitional act, and predestination commonly speaking is the act of the intellect concomitant.

198

199

John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, dist. 40, q. unica, n. 4, trans. Peter L.P. Simpson, p. 323, http://​ aristotelophile.com/Books/Translations/Scotus%20Ordinatio%20I%20dd.26‑48.pdf. Cf. John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, dist. dist. 40, q. unica, n. 4, p. 310: “‘Praedestinatio’ proprie dicit actum voluntatis divinae, videlicet ordinationem per voluntatem divinam electionis alicuius creaturae intellectualis vel rationalis ad gratiam et gloriam, licet possit accipi pro actu intellectus concomitante illam electionem.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 199: “Ad secundum dico quod praedestinatio quae est actus voluntatis ut sic non est causa prima necessitans, sed Deus ut sic est causa necessitans. Quod autem praedestinatio sumatur quandoque pro actu voluntatis patet ex

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

55

In order to expound his view, Kilvington presents twelve conclusions, which, as he assures, sufficiently explain his position and make it possible to grasp to what extent the free choice of free will depends on God’s predestination. 1) God has been the primary cause of predestination from eternity.200 2) God is the sole cause of predestination, and not the good use of free will, as is clear from the case of John the Baptist or children who died for Christ.201 3) The good use of free will may be the cause of predestination, as in the case of children baptized because of the good decision of their parents.202 4) The good use of free will may be the cause of the predestination of the adults who decide to be baptized.203 5) Not only God is the cause of predestination to death, as is well seen in the case of children who have been condemned solely because of the bad use of free will by the first parents or their biological parents. Thus, the bad use of free will is all the more the cause of reprobation.204 6) The bad use of free will is the primary cause of sin and punishment.205

200

201

202

203

204

205

modo loquendi Doctoris Subtilis super Sententias I libro distinctione 40, ubi dicit quod praedestinatio proprie sumpta est actus voluntatis divinae et praedestinatio communiter dicta est actus intellectus concomitantis.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 152: “(…) quod Deus est causa prima praedestinationis ab aeterno, patet per hoc, quia nihil fuit ab aeterno praeter Deum, et Deus ab aeterno praedestinavit hominem.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 152: “(…) quod aliquorum praedestinatorum solus Deus est causa praedestinationis, non bonus usus liberi arbitrii, patet de Ioanne Baptista et de parvulis innocentibus qui moriebantur propter Christum, quorum nec bonus usus liberi arbitrii parentium suorum nec usus proprius aliquo modo fuit causa praedestinationis.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 152: “(…) quod in aliquibus parvulis praedestinatis bonus usus liberi arbitrii est causa sine qua non tales forent praedestinati, patet de talibus qui baptizantur per usum liberi arbitrii aliquorum, alias moriantur in originali.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 152: “(…) quod aliquorum praedestinatorum adultorum bonus usus liberi arbitrii potest esse causa praedestinationis et causa sine qua non, patet de adultis baptizatis qui sine usu liberi arbitrii non baptizarentur.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, pp. 152–153: “(…) quod nullorum praedestinatorum ad mortem solus Deus est causa sine usu liberi arbitrii, patet de parvulis non baptizatis qui nullo modo fuissent reprobati nisi propter usum liberi arbitrii in primis parentibus vel in proximis parentibus, igitur a multo fortiori de adultis usus liberi arbitrii erit causa sine qua non reprobantur.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 153: “(…) quod omnium reprobandorum prima causa est vel erit malus usus liberi arbitrii propter quem Deus reprobat, patet per hoc, quia cuiuslibet peccati usus liberi arbitrii primo est in causa et ita cuiuslibet poenae peccati, et per consequens reprobationis usus liberi arbitrii est in causa.”

56

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

7)

The bad use of free will by adults who are endowed with grace is the only cause of their condemnation.206 8) Not everyone is necessarily predestined, a person can voluntarily sin and thus make themselves not predestined.207 9) Not everyone who is to be punished must be punished, because God may endow them with grace, and they can then voluntarily not sin and retain God’s grace.208 10) The good use of free will is a condition sine qua non of predestination to eternal life.209 11) God does not predestine people because of the good use of their free will, which they could make good use of if they lived longer.210 12) God does not punish because of the bad use of their free will, which they could make bad use of if they lived longer.211 Two of these conclusions (3 and 4) assert that the good use of free will, which is a concomitant act of the intellect, may be a partial cause of predestination. This concerns the good decision of the parents who decide to baptize their children and the good decision of the adults who decide to be baptized. In both cases, making good use of one’s free will is bound up with baptism, which is a conditio sine qua non of salvation. Such human acts only account for a partial cause of predestination with which God cooperates. At the same time, the bad use of free will is a partial cause of predestination to death (conclusion 5), as exemplified in the unbaptized children who are reprobated because of the bad decision of the first parents or their biolog-

206

207

208

209

210 211

Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 153: “(…) quod aliquorum reprobandorum prima causa et occasio est vel erit malus usus liberi arbitrii, patet de adultis qui habent gratiam et finaliter damnabuntur, quorum prima causa eorum peccatorum est usus proprii arbitrii, et per consequens eorum reprobationis.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 153: “(…) quod non omnis praedestinatus necessario est praedestinatus, patet per hoc quod aliquis praedestinatus potest libere peccare, ut dictum est, et per consequens potest facere quod non sit praedestinatus.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 153: “(…) quod omnis reprobandus non est necessario reprobatus, patet, quia alicui reprobando Deus confert gratiam, et ex tunc potest libere non peccare mortaliter et servare gratiam finaliter.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 154: “(…) quod bonus usus liberi arbitrii est causa sine qua Deus non praedestinat bonos ad tantam gratiam in vita aeterna quam habebunt, patet de his qui libere habent et conservant actus consiliorum ad quos non tenentur.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 154: “(…) Deus non praedestinat aliquem ad vitam iuxta bonum usum liberi arbitrii quem habiturus foret si ulterius superviveret (…).” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 154: “(…) Deus non reprobat aliquem iuxta illud quod demeretur, si ulterius superviveret (…).”

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

57

ical parents. The bad use of free will is the primary cause of God’s reprobation, because any bad use of free will is an act of human free will alone, and it is caused by humans; therefore, the use of free will that deserves condemnation is attributable to decision of humans and not of God. The bad use of free will exercised by adults who are endowed with grace is the only cause of their condemnation. Thus, in general, the primary cause of condemnation is humans’ bad use of free will. As Kilvington states, although God is the first cause of people being accepted without any preceding merit or redemption, God is not the first cause that revokes grace without any preceding demerit. It is so, because justification and acceptance are the same as God’s goodness and clemency (that is, God’s substance), whereas forsaking and rejection are merely acts of God’s righteousness (that is, God’s justice). Therefore, evil deeds of grace-filled adults are the only reason why God, by divine righteousness, abandons people.212 According to Kilvington, not everyone is necessarily predestined, because people can voluntarily sin and, as a result, make themselves not predestinated. It may also happen that not everyone who is to be punished will be punished, because God may bestow grace on them, and they can then voluntarily refrain from sinning and preserve God’s grace. However, the good use of free will is the fundamental condition of predestination to eternal life. This is best exemplified in those who voluntarily act prudently with consistency to which they are not bound. Nevertheless, God can preserve grace in a subject whenever and wherever God wills so, even if the person has sinned infinitely, because grace and sin are not formally opposed; they are only opposed to each other naturally. These ideas once again reverberate with Scotus’s inspiration.

212

Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 148: “Sed forte arguitur sic: Deus est prima causa acceptans hominem sine quocumque merito vel acquisitione praecedente, igitur Deus est prima causa subtrahens gratiam sine omni demerito praecedente. (…) Potest igitur negari prima consequentia, quia iustificare et acceptare sunt bonitatis et clementiae, deserere et reprobare sunt actus solius iustitiae, et sic erit aliquis actus ex parte ipsius circa quem Deus operatur secundum iustitiam deserendo hominem, qui adultus est et in gratia.”

58

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

Duns Scotus, Ordinatio IV, dist. 1, par. 4 Incidentalis, q. 1, n. 357213

Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, pp. 148–149214

I concede, therefore, the conclusions of these last reasons [nn. 351–353], that God could of his absolute power dismiss original guilt without conferring grace, and this above all because grace is not formally opposed to original sin, and because that sin is not now dismissed by conferring of grace save because grace includes, equivalently or prevalently, in divine acceptation the original innocence that is formally opposed to original sin

As to the ninth, I concede that grace and sin are naturally opposed. And I say after Scotus, the Sentences IV, question 1, that grace and sin are not formally opposed, because God can preserve grace in the subject wheresoever God would like, even should the subject infinitely sin.

Characterizing Scotus’s reasoning, Koszkało concludes that: Scotus’s own preferred opinion is the following; there is no reason for predestination in a predestined person, that was prior to the predestination of that person and that somehow motivated that predestination; nevertheless, there is a certain reason prior to and motivating the damnation of a damned person. This reason in a condemned person does not necessitate God’s action as the efficient cause in the act of condemnation of that person, it is simply the reason that makes God’s condemning act apply to that singular person as an object of damnation rather than to any other.215 213

214

215

John Duns Scotus. Ordinatio IV, dist. 1–7, trans. Peter L.P. Simpson, p. 72, https://aristotelo phile.com/Books/Translations/Scotus%20Ordinatio%20IV%20d.1‑7.pdf. Cf. John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio IV, dist. 1, par. 4 Incidentalis, q. 1, n. 357, pp. 127–128: “Concedo igitur conclusiones ultimarum rationum, quod de potentia absoluta Deus posset dimittere culpam originalem non conferendo gratiam, et hoc maxime cum gratia non opponatur formaliter peccato originali, nec modo dimittatur illud peccatum per collationem gratiae nisi quia gratia includit aequivalenter vel praevalenter in acceptatione divina iustitiam originalem, quae formaliter opponitur peccato originali.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, pp. 148–149: “Ad nonum concedo quod gratia et peccatum naturaliter repugnant. Et dico cum Scoto super IV Sententiarum quaestione 1 quod gratia et peccatum non repugnant formaliter, quia Deus potest conservare gratiam quamcumque ubicumque voluerit in subiecto, licet subiectum infinite peccaret.” Koszkało, “The Problem of Predestination,” p. 211.

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

59

At the end of the twelfth conclusion, Kilvington briefly summarizes his view about predestination, saying “All this clearly shows what I claim” (per istud patet quod volo tenere). And yet, he immediately proceeds to counterarguments against the second and third conclusions. To clarify the second conclusion (“God is the sole cause of predestination and not the good use of free will”), Kilvington reiterates the popular view that God predestines irrespectively, and that predestination is not “personalized,” because some people are predestined, while others are not.216 Nevertheless, he does not claim that there is double predestination: one to eternal life and the other to eternal punishment. Kilvington’s position resonates with Scotus’s notion that either there is predestination or there is not. The explanation of doubts about the third conclusion (“The good use of free will may be the cause of predestination, as in the case of children baptized because of the good decision of their parents”) leads to the following claims: 1) The good use of free will, which is foreknown by God, is the necessary cause of predestination, understood as readiness for grace, yet such a use is not its only cause, but a preparatory cause priming the soul for the reception of grace.217 2) A person that commits a mortal sin may be of more benefit to someone else than themselves, like a priest who baptizes a child that would otherwise die in original sin.218 3) By virtue of free will, humans can reject God-granted grace and express their willing not to be baptized.219 This suggests a range of insights. Firstly, according to Kilvington, who draws on Scotus’s position, predestination is determined from eternity, with God’s will being its primary cause. Secondly, the good use of free will, such as having children baptized, may be a partial cause of predestination. Thirdly, humans can reject grace offered to them and decide not to be baptized. Finally, the bad use of free will solely results from humans’ voluntarily made wrong decisions, and it is the primary cause of their condemnation. However, since God is not obliged to follow humans, God can save or condemn people irrespectively to their good or evil acts by virtue of divine absolute power. God’s Foreknowledge and Human Free Will in the Context of Divine Absolute and Ordained Power An extensive part of question 4 is devoted to disputing conclusion eight “Not everyone is necessarily predestined, as a person can voluntarily sin and thus 216 217 218 219

Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 157. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 158. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 158. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 159.

60

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

make themselves not predestined”220 and conclusion nine “Not everyone who is to be punished must be punished, because God may endow them with grace, and they can then voluntarily not sin and retain God’s grace.”221 The assertion “everything that comes about necessarily comes about” lies at the heart of the seventeen counterarguments against these conclusions that Kilvington presents. The claim that “everything that comes about necessarily comes about by God’s ordained power, since God’s foreknowledge is enacted by ordained power, and thus everything that God knows is necessarily going to be” is broadly and meticulously justified by Bradwardine.222 In refuting the counterarguments against his own conclusions, Kilvington adopts the same approach as Bradwardine and clarifies his view by locating the problem in the context of God’s absolute and ordained power. Since Kilvington’s lengthy discussion, which indicates that Bradwardine is the addressee of his allegations, is crucial for the central theme of this introduction, its most important elements are outlined. Structurally speaking, seventeen arguments contra are followed by Kilvington’s definition of God’s powers, his conclusions, and finally his answers to the counterarguments.223 However, for the sake of analytical clarity, the order of Kilvington’s argument will not be followed and his arguments will be grouped by the issues they address. Kilvington begins his opinio propria by professing that “[b]ecause the above arguments are not an obstacle for me, I argue that not everything that comes about necessarily comes about.”224 The reason he cites for this is that merciful God does not forsake humans to force them to sin. If God forced people to sin, they would be less guilty than God, who caused their sins. God has eternal foreknowledge of human sins and forsakes people only because of their sins. Consequently, as Kilvington reasons, those who hold that “everything that comes about necessarily comes about” inevitably excuse humans’ sins.225 This is a very serious accusation, and if it were addressed to Thomas Bradwardine, it would have certainly affronted him. Next, to corroborate his view, Kilvington provides seven arguments based on the authority of Augustine and Gratian.226 Before doing so, Kilvington makes his position clear by rehearsing the distinction between God’s absolute and ordained power, as drawn by Scotus in his Ordinatio I, distinction 44, quaestio unica: 220 221 222 223 224 225 226

See above, p. 56. See above, p. 56. See above, p. 68. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, pp. 160–167. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 167: “His non obstantibus, dico quod non omnia quae evenient de necessitate evenient (…).” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 167. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 168.

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

61

Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, dist. 44, q. unica, n. 3227

Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, pp. 168–169228

In everyone acting by intellect and will, who is able to act in conformity with right law and yet not by necessity in conformity with right law, one must distinguish between ordained power and absolute power; and the reason for this is that he can act in conformity with that right law and so according to ordained power (for the power is ordained insofar as it is the principle of carrying things out in conformity with right law), and he can act without that law or against it, and here there is absolute power, exceeding ordained power. And therefore not only in God but in any agent acting freely—who

To make clear what I want to say in this matter, I will first explain the meaning of these terms, namely “God’s ordained power” and “God’s absolute power.” And lest I seem to be abusing the meaning of these, I say along with Scotus, the Sentences I, distinction 44, that God’s power is called ordained insofar as it is the principle of doing something in conformity with right law with regard to the established order. God’s power is called absolute insofar as it exceeds God’s ordained power, because by virtue of it God can act against the established order. Generally, I say that by virtue of absolute power God can do everything

227

228

John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, dist. 26–48, pp. 361–362 (trans. Simpson). Cf. John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, dist. 44, q. unica, n. 3, pp. 363–364: “In omni agente per intellectum et voluntatem, potente conformiter agere legi rectae et tamen non necessario conformiter agere legi rectae, est distinguere potentiam ordinatam a potentia absoluta; et ratio huius est, quia potest agere conformiter illi legi rectae, et tunc secundum potentiam ordinatam (ordinata enim est in quantum est principium exsequendi aliqua conformiter legi rectae), et potest agere praeter illam legem vel contra eam, et in hoc est potentia absoluta, excedens potentiam ordinatam. Et ideo non tantum in Deo, sed in omni agente libere—qui potest agere secundum dictamen legis rectae et praeter talem legem vel contra eam—est distinguere inter potentiam ordinatam et absolutam; ideo dicunt iuristae quod aliquis hoc potest facere de facto, hoc est de potentia sua absoluta,—vel de iure, hoc est de potentia ordinata secundum iura.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, pp. 168–169: “Ut videatur quod velim dicere in ista materia suppono prius significationem istorum vocabulorum, videlicet ‘potentia Dei ordinata’ et ‘potentia Dei absoluta’. Et ne videar abuti significatione istorum, dico cum Scoto super I Sententiarum distinctione 44 quod potentia Dei dicitur ordinata inquantum est principium exsequendi aliqua quae conveniunt legi recte secundum ordinem iam fixum. Potentia vero Dei dicitur absoluta quae excedit Dei potentiam ordinatam, quia potest per eam agere contra legem ordinatam et praeter legem. Universaliter ergo dico quod Deus de potentia sua absoluta potest facere omne quod non includit contradictionem. Unde iuristae consimiliter utuntur istis terminis ‘de facto’ et ‘de iure’, verbi gratia: rex potest facere de facto quae non erunt secundum legem ordinatam nec conveniunt illi.”

62

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

(cont.)

Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, dist. 44, q. unica, n. 3

Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, pp. 168–169

can act according to the dictate of right law and without that law or against it— one must distinguish between ordained power and absolute power; therefore the jurists say that someone can do something de facto, that is by his absolute power—or de iure, that is by ordained power according to right.

that is not contradictory. Thence jurists use the terms de facto and de iure in a similar manner, for example, a king can do de facto that which is not in accordance with law and does not agree with it.

Kilvington believes that nine conclusions inferable on the basis of this definition make it possible to understand his view properly. These conclusions are: 1) Everything that God wills at this present instant God cannot have not willed before unless, prior to God’s willing, there is a real change in something other than God.229 2) By absolute power, God can not-will something that God wills at this present instant without any change either in the thing or in God.230 3) Everything that truly or interpretively does not depend in being on created free will necessarily comes about with ordained necessity.231 4) Everything that depends on created free will, being free ad utrumlibet, may by God’s ordained power not come about.232 5) Everything absolutely and unconditionally revealed by God, necessarily comes about with ordained necessity.233 229

230

231

232

233

Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 169: “(…) si Deus vult aliquod pro hoc instanti, non potest non velle illud nisi prius naturaliter fiat mutatio in alio a Deo ⟨et⟩ naturaliter prius quam Deus velit.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 169: “(…) illud quod Deus vult pro hoc instanti de potentia Dei absoluta posset non velle illud pro eodem instanti sine omni mutatione facta ex parte alicuius.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 169: “(…) omnia quae non dependent in esse vere vel interpretative a libero arbitrio creato necessario evenient, loquendo de necessitate ordinata.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 169: “(…) omnia quae dependent a libero arbitrio creato, ut liberum est libertate contradictionis, poterunt de potentia Dei ordinata non evenire.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 170: “(…) omne absolute revelatum a Deo sine condicione necessario eveniet, loquendo de necessitate ordinata.”

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

63

6)

Nothing that depends in its being on free will ad utrumlibet can be revealed absolutely by God’s ordained power.234 7) By absolute power, God can absolutely reveal all future events either contingent ad utrumlibet or ad aliud.235 8) Everything absolutely revealed, such as articles of faith, directly depends on God’s will and not on the created will voluntarily choosing one (or the other) element of a contradiction.236 9) Not everything absolutely revealed by God necessarily comes about with absolute necessity.237 Next, Kilvington offers supplementary explanations for some of these conclusions. As to the first conclusion, he states that regarding God’s ordained power, the revelation would not be fulfilled only when there were a change in one of the two parties affected by the revelation, that is, either in God or in the human; there is no change in God, so it takes place in the human.238 In his discussion of arguments for and against this conclusion, he argues: If it is so, by the same reason, God knowing something at this present instant cannot not-know unless, prior to God knowing, there is a real change in the thing known by God. And thus, by the same reason, the opposite ⟨is also true⟩: God not-knowing something future at this present instant can not-know it unless, prior to God not-knowing, there is a real change in the thing known by God; therefore the change in thing would cause God’s knowledge. The consequent is false (…).239 234 235 236

237 238

239

Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 170: “(…) nihil dependens in esse a voluntate libera libertate contradictionis potest de potentia Dei ordinata revelari a Deo absolute.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 170: “(…) de potentia Dei absoluta Deus potest absolute revelare omne futurum, sive contingens ad utrumlibet sive ad aliud.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 170: “(…) omnia revelata a Deo absolute, cuiusmodi sunt articuli fidei, dependent immediate a voluntate Dei et non a voluntate creata et libera libertate contradictionis.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 170: “(…) non omne revelatum a Deo absolute necessario eveniet necessitate absoluta.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 170: “Prima conclusio patet, quia de potentia Dei ordinata revelatio non acquiritur alicui sine mutatione facta in altero revelatorum, nec etiam revelatio cessat in aliquo sine mutatione vel in Deo vel in aliquo; sed non in Deo aliqua mutatio potest esse, igitur in aliquo.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, pp. 185–186: “Si sic, tunc, eadem ratione, Deus sciens aliquid pro nunc non potest non scire illud sine mutatione prius naturaliter facta in aliqua re quam Deus non sciat. Et tunc, eadem ratione, e contra: Deus, non sciens aliquod futurum pro nunc, pro nunc non potest scire illud sine mutatione facta prius naturaliter in aliqua re quam Deus sciat. Et ita huiusmodi mutatio in re foret causa scientiae Dei. Consequens falsum (…).”

64

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

In his reply, Kilvington clarifies the term “cause” which can be used either in a general or in the proper sense. In a general sense, it denotes something necessary, so the conclusion that the existence of a thing causes God’s knowledge must be accepted, because if a thing did not exist, God would not know it. Similarly, if a thing is not going to exist in the future, God will not know that it will be.240 More specifically, God’s knowledge or foreknowledge is only the cause of the existence of something provided that God’s foreknowledge is understood as God’s will of good pleasure (beneplacitum). At this point Kilvington’s avails himself of an analogy woven by Augustine: nobody either remembers all past events or does everything that they remember; likewise, God foreknows everything that God creates, but not everything that God foreknows becomes created, such as, for instance, evil. This does not mean, Kilvington claims, that a future event precedes God’s knowledge of it. As in the case of human sinning: a person first sins and then is in the state of sinning, but one cannot sin if they are not in the state of sinning.241 Kilvington ponders the same issue as Bradwardine, who claims: It is replied ⟨to this argument⟩ by saying that such a consequence: ‘something future can be not future, so either something future changes or God changes’, is not valid, because something future can be not-future without any change either in a thing or in God.242 In responding to this argument, Bradwardine merely comments that the saints say that God’s will is immutable, and therefore God’s promises and revelation are also immutable.243 As we see, Kilvington offers a more elaborate explanation of Bradwardine’s reasoning. The second conclusion (“By virtue of absolute power, God can not-will something that God wills at this present instant without any change either in the

240 241 242

243

Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 188. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 175. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 46vb: “Respondetur uno modo, sic dicendo ad ista quod haec consequentia non valet: ‘futurum potest non esse futurum, igitur futurum potest mutari vel igitur Deus potest mutari’, quia futurum potest non esse futurum sine omni mutatione in aliquo puta Deo vel alio (…).” DFC, 36a, p. 306. Thomas Bradwardine, Utrum Deus habeat praescientiam, BnF lat. 15805, fol. 46vb: “(…) et sic intelligunt sancti quando dicunt quod voluntas Dei est immutabilis vel immobilis, quia non potest mutari. Similiter sic intelligunt sancti, quando dicunt promissa Dei immutabiliter evenire, quia non erit mutatio aliqua sive illud promissum erit sive non erit.” DFC, 36a, p. 306.

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

65

thing or in God”) is explained by Kilvington in detail. He asserts that, by absolute power, God can will and not-will something at the same present instant, and this will requires no change either in something external or in God. God’s will is eternal, so any act of divine volition, such as to will or to not-will at the same present instant, is eternal. God’s will possesses sufficient power to make God not-will, and since this involves solely God’s internal act, it need not cause any changes in God’s external acts. Consequently, by virtue of absolute power, God can undo the past without causing any change in history, such as, for example, Abraham’s non-existence. God, whose absolute power is infinitely infinite, can cause the past not to be the past, because there is no past for God. To say that God cannot undo the past simply means that God has not revealed a given thing, such as the restoration of one’s lost virginity. An obstacle to undoing the past only stems from the world, because time flows from past to future relative to the natural, ordained order; no such obstacle stems from God, since God may undo the past acting absolutely freely by absolute power. There is also non contradiction in creation of the world from eternity, because God could by absolute power create the world from eternity, and the world could be created from eternity without any contradiction. God can annihilate the world by absolute power, while God cannot do so by ordained power, since, even being infinite, ordained power is infinitely less powerful than God’s absolute power. Since God’s justice also comes in ordained and absolute varieties, if God destroyed the world by absolute power, God’s absolute justice and absolute mercy would also be involved in the act, but God would not be any less just anyway.244 Humans can use their will in a similar manner. For example, when performing a sequential action, they can undo their past decision, as exemplified in a person voluntarily stopping before reaching the place at which they have first decided to arrive.245 Kilvington’s explanations accompanying other conclusions are far shorter, except the fifth one, which is examined below.246 Notably, Kilvington reports that the ninth conclusion (“Not everything absolutely revealed by God necessarily comes about with absolute necessity”) is rejected by Bradwardine,247 who purportedly declares that if it were not so, God would not be able to make God

244 245 246 247

Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, pp. 190, 193–194. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 124. See below, pp. 78–84. See above, p. 21.

66

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

unable to lift a straw either by absolute or by ordained power.248 Regrettably, no such wording is to be found in Bradwardine’s questions. Let us move on to Kilvington’s salient arguments and responses to conclusions eight and nine (“Not everyone is necessarily predestined, as a person can voluntarily sin and thus make themselves not predestined” and “Not everyone who is to be punished must be punished, because God may endow them with grace, and they can then voluntarily not sin and retain God’s grace”). As already mentioned, the assertion that “everything that comes about necessarily comes about” lies at the heart of these conclusions.249 Out of the seventeen arguments in support of this view and Kilvington’s responses to them, the following considerations are most relevant to this introduction. The first reasoning that Kilvington offers goes: ⟨If⟩ everything that comes about necessarily comes about, thus whoever is predestined is necessarily predestined. The antecedent is proved, since it follows from any reference to future events: God wills something to be a future event; therefore, it necessarily comes about. The antecedent is necessary, and so is the consequent. The fact that the antecedent is necessary is obvious, since whatever God wills God cannot not-will, because God’s will is immutable (…).250 In his response, Kilvington affirms the following consequence: ‘God wills something to come about; therefore, it will come about’. However, the antecedent is not necessary, if “something” stands for a future contingent ad utrumlibet. He continues that ‘God’s will is immutable; thus, God cannot not-will what God wills’, is a false consequence, because, in this case, God’s will is the same as revelation, which can become not-revelation by a change in external acts, but without any change in God. God’s will cannot be changed by anything except God, since only God can cause God’s will not to will. Thus, if something does

248 249 250

Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 171: “Nona conclusio patet, sicut alias arguebat Bradvardin (…).” See above, p. 60. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 160: “Omnia quae evenient de necessitate evenient, igitur omnis praedestinatus necessario est praedestinatus. Antecedens probatur, quia quocumque futuro demonstrato sequitur: Deus vult hoc esse futurum, igitur hoc necessario eveniet. Antecedens est necessarium, igitur consequens. Quod antecedens sit necessarium patet, quia quidquid Deus vult non potest non velle, cum sua voluntas sit immutabilis (…).”

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

67

not come about, it stems from God not willing it to come about. Kilvington believes that God’s will is necessary solely as the will of good pleasure.251 Kilvington’s following argument, which reinforces the view that God’s will is eternally immutable, has an affinity to Scotus’s reasoning:

Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, dist. 40, q. unica, n. 10252

Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 174253

To the second [n. 2] I say that a created will cannot impede the ordination of the divine will, because there would be no ‘to impede’ unless the purpose of the divine will stood and the opposite came about through another will; but this is impossible, because just as a created will can merit damnation, so too can there concomitantly follow that the divine will would not pre-ordain it to glory. (…) God cannot be deceived, because his intellection with respect to something cannot stand with the opposite of it; so too his will cannot be impeded, because the ordination of it cannot stand with the opposite of what it has ordained.

If you argue in the following way: God wills A to be, and something other than God can cause A not to be; therefore, something other than God can impede God’s will, I reject the consequence, because if A is not going to be, God’s will is that A should not be, and God’s will can only be impeded in the case when God does not have what God wills.

251 252

253

Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, pp. 173–174. John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, dist. 40, q. unica, p. 325 (trans. Peter L.P. Simpson). Cf. John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, dist. 40, q. unica, n. 10, pp. 312–313: “Ad secundum dico quod voluntas creata non potest impedire ordinationem voluntatis divinae, nam ‘impedire’ non esset nisi staret propositum voluntatis divinae et oppositum eveniret per voluntatem aliam; hoc autem est impossibile, quia sicut voluntas creata potest mereri damnationem, sic etiam potest concomitanter sequi quod voluntas divina non praeordinaret ipsam ad gloriam. (…) Deus non possit falli, quia non potest stare intellectio eius respectu alicuius cum opposito illius; ita etiam non potest impediri voluntas eius, quia non potest stare ordinatio sui cum opposito eius quod ordinavit.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 174: “Si tu arguas sic: Deus vult A fore, et aliquid aliud a Deo potest facere quod A non erit, igitur aliquid aliud a Deo potest frustrare voluntatem Dei—nego consequentiam, quia si A non erit, voluntas Dei est quod A non erit, et numquam potest frustrari nisi quod non habet quod vult.”

68

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

Again, Kilvington’s argument appears to refer to Bradwardine, in whose view future contingents necessary happen by God’s ordained power.254 As opposed to this notion, Kilvington concludes that God’s will is the cause of necessary effects exclusively as the will of good pleasure. Therefore, he does not agree with Bradwardine, who claims that both the consequence and the consequent are necessary (necessitas consequentiae and necessitas consequentis) in ‘God wills something to come about; therefore it will come about’.255 Kilvington concurs with Peter Lombard, who maintains that in this piece of reasoning only the consequence is necessary, but the consequent is not.256 Kilvington’s disagreement aside, this is the only occasion in question 4 that Kilvington evokes Bradwardine’s famous concept of necessitas consequentis. The second argument posed by Kilvington states: Likewise, God’s knowledge is indifferent to whether the Antichrist will be or not, because God’s substance, inasmuch as it is substance or knowledge, is God’s knowledge indifferent to whether the Antichrist will be or not; therefore if it ⟨i. e., God’s knowledge⟩ ought to be determined relative to one of the elements ⟨A or not-A⟩; it must be so by God’s will, but nothing can impede the will of God; therefore, that which is going to come about comes about.257 In his reply, Kilvington stresses that God’s essence, knowledge, and will are indifferent, that is, they are contingent, regarding the Antichrist being or not being. This does not mean that God is ignorant about the fact that the Antichrist will be, since God knows which of the two opposite propositions—‘The Antichrist will be’ and ‘The Antichrist will not be’—is true. God’s knowledge is prior to God’s will; God had known that the Antichrist would come about before God willed the Antichrist to come about. Kilvington avers that God’s knowledge is not naturally (naturaliter) determined by God’s will, for if it were

254 255 256 257

See above, p. 32. See above, pp. 33–34. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 174: “Et Magister loquitur de necessitate consequentiae et non consequentis, sicut patet intuenti processum.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, pp. 160–161: “Item, scientia Dei est indifferens ad Antichristum fore vel non fore, quia substantia Dei, inquantum est substantia vel scientia, est scientia indifferens ad Antichristum fore vel non fore, igitur si debeat terminari ad alterum illorum oportet quod sit per voluntatem Dei, sed voluntatem Dei nullus potest impedire, igitur nullus potest impedire quin illud quod erit eveniet.”

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

69

so, God could will what God did not know, and since in God “to know” is the same as “to be,” God would will before God were.258 Again, this reasoning appears to be Kilvington’s interpretation of Scotus’s belief that God’s knowledge of future contingents is contingent:

Duns Scotus, Lectura I, dist. 39, nn. 67–68259

Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, pp. 182–183260

[67] Concerning the fifth question some As to the fourteenth ⟨argument⟩, it can be [thinkers] say that with respect to this said that God not always knows with the proposition: same certainty what came about and that which is going to come about. ⟨It is so,⟩

258

259

260

Richard Kilvington: Utrum quilibet actus, p. 175: “Item, si voluntas determinaret scientiam Dei, tunc Deus Pater fieret sciens per voluntatem suam, et cum idem sit in Deo scire et esse, sequitur quod Deus Pater haberet esse per voluntatem suam, et ita Deus prius naturaliter haberet velle quam esse—quod est manifeste falsum.” John Duns Scotus, Contingency and Freedom: Lectura I 39, translation, introduction and commentary by Antonie Vos Jaczn., Henri Veldhuis, Aline H. Looman-Graanskamp, Eef Dekker, Nico W. den Bok (Dordrecht: Kluwer 1994), n. 67, p. 148, n. 68, p. 150: “[67] Ad quintam quaestionem dicunt aliqui quod haec ‘Deus scit necessario me sessurum’ (vel ‘a fore’) est distinguenda: et in sensu divisionis vera ‘Deus scit necessario, me sessurum’, et significat quod Deus necessario sciat et quod sedebo,—et in sensu compositionis falsa. [68] Sed illud non est dictum secundum logicam. Quando enim est actus transiens supra aliquod obiectum, non est propositio distinguenda per hoc quod actus possit accipi absolute, non ut transiens: tunc enim potest haec esse vera ‘ego video te sedere’, licet non videam te,— haec enim adhuc potest esse vera ‘ego video’, et haec similiter ‘tu sedes’. Et ideo dico quod haec est absolute falsa ‘Deus necessario scit a fore’, quia notatur necessitas actus ut est talis obiecti, quod obiectum non est necessarium; unde necessitas non determinat actum sciendi absolute, sed ut transit in obiectum contingens, quod potest non esse, et ‘non sciri esse’ per consequens. Et ideo propositio absolute falsa.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, pp. 182–183: “Ad decimum quartum potest dici quod Deus non aliter novit facta quam fienda quantum ad certitudinem scientiae suae, quia scientia sua est ita certa respectu futuri contingentis sicut necessarii, sed possibile est quod non sit certa, respectu creaturae verbi gratia, nam creatura potest ita certitudinaliter cognoscere quod ipsa sedet sicut quod homo est animal. Et tamen una certitudo est respectu contingentis et alia respectu necessarii. Unde ulterius negatur consequentia: ‘non aliter novit facta quam fienda’. Sed potest esse quod non novit illa quae facienda sunt, igitur sic potest esse sive nosci de praeteritis, licet conclusio sit vera de potentia Dei absoluta, ut dixi. De potentia tamen Dei ordinata non sequitur: omnia sunt aeque praesentia notitiae suae tam praeterita quam futura quam etiam praesentia.”

70

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

(cont.)

Duns Scotus, Lectura I, dist. 39, nn. 67–68

Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, pp. 182–183

God necessarily knows that I will sit

because God’s knowledge is equally certain with regard to future contingents as with regard to necessary events; however, it is possible for divine knowledge not to be certain with regard to God’s creature, because a creature ⟨i. e., a human⟩ can know that (s)he is sitting with as much certainty as that a human is an animal. Still, one certainty concerns contingents and the other necessary things. Therefore, this consequence is false: ‘⟨God⟩ knows with equal certainty that which happened and that which is going to happen’. Yet, it may happen that ⟨God⟩ does not know the things that are going to happen, and thus ⟨God⟩ may not know the things that happened. This conclusion, however, is true by virtue of God’s absolute power. And by virtue of God’s ordained power it does not follow: all events (past, future, and present) are equally known by God.

(or a will be) the following distinction must be made: in the divided sense the proposition God necessarily knows, that I will sit is true and means that God necessarily knows and that I will sit. In the composite sense it is false. [68] But the way they put it is logically incorrect. When there is an act which is transitive to an object, the distinction with respect to the proposition should not be made in this way that the act can be taken on its own and not as transitive. For then this proposition: I see you sit might be true though I do not see you,— for this proposition: I see can still be true and likewise this one: You sit. And for this reason I say that this proposition: God necessarily knows that a will be is false in an absolute sense, because the necessity of the act is indicated as related to such an object, which is not necessary. Hence necessity does not qualify the act

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

71

(cont.)

Duns Scotus, Lectura I, dist. 39, nn. 67–68

Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, pp. 182–183

of knowing on its own, but as it is transitive to a contingent object that possibly is not and consequently ‘[possibly is] not known’. And for this reason the proposition is false in an absolute sense.

Antonie Vos et al. comment that: To this theory of §67 Scotus answers that logically it is not correct. For it is incorrect to analyse a proposition which is about a transitive act— an act related to an object—in such a way that the decisive modal qualification is related to the isolated act: to the act of knowing separated from its epistemic object (‘absolute’) and not in its relation to the object (‘ut transiens’). If it were not incorrect, I see you sit would be also true when I see and you sit were true separately, even if I do not factually see you sit. So, the act of God’s knowledge and ‘necessary’ as its qualification cannot be isolated from its epistemic object. The act is related to an object which itself is not-necessary, which can also not-be and can be not-known therefore: so God’s knowledge must be not-necessary; God can know a contingent object in a contingent way only. This does not mean, however, that there is no necessity left in God’s knowledge. For, there still is the necessity of the implicative relation between the epistemic act and the epistemic object. In the proposition under consideration, it is not the epistemic act on its own (‘absolute’) which is necessary, but its relation (‘ut transiens’) to the contingent epistemic object.261 Kilvington endorses the idea that God’s knowledge is posterior to God’s will only when God wills something relative to the divine will of good pleasure. As God’s knowledge of future contingents is not prior to God’s will of good

261

John Duns Scotus, Contingency and Freedom: Lectura I, 39, p. 151.

72

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

pleasure, God’s knowledge is not the necessary cause of future contingents, since everything that happens happens because God wills it to happen.262 The fourth argument holds that there are two necessities relative to the Antichrist’s present existence. One of them ensues from God, because if God wills the Antichrist to be, the Antichrist will be. The other origines in the Antichrist, and when the Antichrist exists, the Antichrist necessarily exists, because everything that exists necessarily exists. Since both necessities are reducible to the necessity stemming from God, divine necessity causes the necessary result, that is, the Antichrist’s existence.263 In his reply, Kilvington notes that “being necessary” should also be understood in two different ways: on the part of the Antichrist and on the part of God. However, “to be necessary” is not a thing the way “to be a human” or “to be a wall” is not a thing. Therefore, the necessity on the part of the Antichrist is not the cause of the Antichrist’s necessary being.264 At the end of this discussion, Kilvington states that “[i]f the way of acting of the ⟨secondary⟩ causes depends on the way of acting of the primary cause, then if the first cause necessarily produces its effects, all subsequent causes likewise necessarily produce ⟨their effects⟩.”265 Instead of commenting on this claim, he simply repeats after Scotus:

Duns Scotus, Lectura I, dist. 39, q. 5, n. 41266

Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 176267

For this reason the cause of contingency And this is the reason why Scotus in his in what is stems from the fact that the first Sentences I, distinction 39, says that God’s cause moves contingently, and not neces- will acts contingently. sarily.

262 263 264 265

266

267

Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 175. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, pp. 161–162. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, pp. 175–176. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 176: “Unde si habitudo causarum dependeat in causando a prima causa, si prima causa necessario producit effectum, igitur et omnes sequentes necessario producent.” Eng. trans. Vos et al. Cf. John Duns Scotus, Contingency and Freedom: Lectura I 39, n. 41, p. 102: “Et ideo causa contingentiae in entibus est ex hoc quod prima causa contingenter, et non necessario, movet.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 176: “Et ista est ratio quare Scotus super I Sententiarum distinctione 39 dicit quod voluntas Dei contingenter agit.”

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

73

The fifth argument is most likely formulated against Bradwardine, who states that the number of the saved and redeemed is constant.268 In Kilvington’s rendering, the argument says that if God reveals to the Son the number of souls redeemed through Christ’s passion, and if a person can choose to be redeemed or not, and Christ believes that everybody of whom he knows will be redeemed, then Christ can be deceived (also by God).269 Since Christ cannot be deceived, all future events must necessarily come about. In his reply, Kilvington offers an original solution to the problem by claiming that God the Father does not absolutely reveal the number of the redeemed, even if Christ’s soul absolutely sees them in the Word (in Verbo), meaning that Christ knows them. It is so, because Christ at the same present instant can know that these souls will be redeemed and condemned. Likewise, humans possess the knowledge of opposites, because they know something and at the same present instant they can not-know this. For example, when Socrates believes that proposition A ‘The Antichrist will be’ is true, he knows it as true; but since the Antichrist may not come, proposition A is false, and thus Socrates does not know A as true. The same concerns “to will,” because one can will something to happen tomorrow and at the same instant not-will tomorrow to happen. Therefore, it is possible for Christ to will a person to be redeemed and not to will this person to be redeemed at the same time.270 This reasoning resembles Bradwardine’s argument that it lies in a human’s absolute power to sin and consequently not to be redeemed. However, according to God’s ordained power, the number of the redeemed remains the same, so with regard to natural, ordained order of things a person cannot will and notwill, for instance to sin, at the same time relative to the natural, ordained order of things.271 The sixth argument marshaled by Kilvington affirms: Likewise, the knowledge which is in the word “the creator” is knowledge in its proper genus, and the knowledge of things in the proper genus 268 269

270 271

See above, pp. 25–26. Richard Kilvington: Utrum quilibet actus, p. 162: “(…) verisimile est quod Deus revelet animae Christi numerum animarum istarum, quas salvabit per passionem suam. Hoc patet per Magistrum III libro distinctione 21 in fine: electos suos etc. Sint igitur A, B, C omnes animae, quae salvabuntur per passionem suam; si igitur in potestate cuiuslibet illorum foret quod salvaretur vel quod non salvaretur, et Christus credit quemlibet illorum certitudinaliter salvari, sequitur quod in cuiuslibet illorum potestate foret facere quod Christus deciperetur.” See Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, pp. 176–177. See above, p. 27.

74

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

cannot not have been knowledge; therefore, the knowledge in the word also cannot ⟨be not-knowledge⟩. Yet Christ’s soul possesses such knowledge of future contingents in Verbo; therefore, God’s knowledge cannot not have been knowledge and consequently future events will necessarily be.272 In his answer, Kilvington stresses that knowledge can be considered either relative to the knower or relative to the object known. To explain his position, he resorts to an analogy between true human knowledge from geometric evidence and from experience on the one hand and Christ’s absolute knowledge in Verbo and his knowledge of things in the proper genus on the other.273 Kilvington acknowledges that in the former case, it seems to me that I know the proposition ‘I am sitting’ better than the conclusion resulting from the evidence of a geometric proof. Still, the fact that I am sitting is less certain than the logical conclusion. The latter case, however, is quite different, he claims, since Christ’s knowledge in Verbo is equally certain as his knowledge of things in the proper genus.274 With this reasoning Kilvington confirms his previous claim that God’s—in this case, Christ’s knowledge—is equally certain with regard to both necessary and contingent events and things.275 The seventh argument that Kilvington presents rests on the following reasoning: God orders his Son to predict, as a human, that what he sees in Verbo will happen, for example, that the Antichrist will appear or that Socrates will sin; and should the time pass when the Son of God as a human predicts the

272

273

274

275

Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, pp. 162–163: “Item, scientia quae est in verbo ‘creator’ est illa quae est in genere proprio, sed scientia quae habetur de re in genere proprio non potest non fuisse scientia, igitur nec scientia quae est in verbo non potest etc. Sed anima Christi habet in verbo scientiam de omnibus futuris, igitur scientia Dei non potest non fuisse scientia, et ita necessario erunt.” Bradwardine offers a similar reasoning when he criticizes the ninth opinion: “Only the future events that God foretells [such as prophecies, promises, and the like] are necessary, while others are not”. For Bradwardine’s discussion of “seeing in Verbo,” see above, pp. 28–30. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 177: “Ad sextum dico quod certior est scientia, quae est in verbo quam illa, quae est in genere proprio, hoc potest intelligi dupliciter: vel ex parte scientis vel ex parte sciti.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, pp. 177–178: “Si primo modo, concedo quod ego verius sciam ‘ego sedeo’ quam unam conclusionem quam ego scio demonstrare. Et tamen incertitudo magis residet rei in illa propositione ‘ego sedeo’ quam in illa geometrica, et sic intellegit Augustinus. Si secundo modo, sic nego, quia cognitio non est firmior in verbo quam cognitio in proprio genere.” See above, pp. 69–70.

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

75

Antichrist’s appearance or Socrates’s sinning, then if Socrates does not sin, Christ will have predicted falsehood.276 Kilvington’s reply states that nothing that depends ad utrumlibet on created free will is revealed absolutely relative to God’s ordained power. Therefore, God the Father cannot by the ordained law order God’s Son, as a human, to reveal what he sees in the Word, because, as argued, God the Son does not reveal absolutely future contingents ad utrumlibet. Yet, if God’s absolute power is considered, God can order the Son to reveal that what depends ad utrumlibet on created free will absolutely.277 The ninth argument states that while willing the Antichrist to be at this instant, God can at this instant will the Antichrist not to be or God can not-will at this instant the Antichrist to be. Also, by virtue of divine unconditionally free will, God can will the world not to exist now, or can will the world not to have existed after it has existed.278 In his reply to this argument, Kilvington distinguishes between absolute and ordained freedom, since God’s freedom is the same as God’s power. Thus, as God can by absolute power reward both a sinner and an innocent one, so can God voluntarily will the world, the Antichrist, and the like contingents not to exist, because no contradiction is involved here. However, God cannot by ordained power not want to reward good and punish evil; likewise, God cannot wish that the world or the Antichrist should not exist, although these are contingent events ad utrumlibet, which do not depend on the free choice of a human’s free will.279 276

277 278

279

Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 163: “Item, praecipiat Deus Deo Filio quod praedicat, quidquid in verbo videat, Deus Filius secundum hominem quod Antichristus est futurus vel quod Socrates peccabit, et labatur tempus in quo Deus Filius secundum hominem praedicit et asserit quod Socrates peccabit et Antichristus erit, tunc si non erit ita quod Socrates peccabit, igitur Deus Filius secundum hominem asserit falsum. Maior est necessaria et minor possibilis, igitur conclusio possibilis.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 179. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 164: “Item, voluntas Dei est ita libera respectu unius obiecti sicut respectu alterius, et respectu unius obiecti uno tempore sicut alio, igitur si Deus vult Antichristum fore pro nunc, potest pro nunc velle Antichristum non fore vel non velle pro nunc Antichristum non fore, igitur eadem ratione ita libere potest velle coelum non esse pro nunc; et sic eadem ratione quod coelum non fuisset postquam fuit, quod est contra illud: ‘hoc solo privatur Deus’ ut posset facere de praeterito non praeteritum, Ethicorum VI, et Anselmus capitulo 4 et 5.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, pp. 180–181: “Ad nonum, quando dicitur quod voluntas Dei est ita libera respectu unius obiecti sicut respectu alterius, hic dico quod libertas dicitur ordinata et absoluta sicut potentia, quia libertas Dei est potentia Dei. Unde sicut Deus de potentia absoluta ita libere potest velle praemiare peccantem sicut non peccantem, et ita libere velle coelum non esse sicut Antichristum non esse, vel aliquod tale,

76

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

The fourteenth argument mustered by Kilvington states that God knows both the past and the future events in the same way. By his report, Anselm provides numerous examples illustrating that past events are taken as future events.280 In his response, Kilvington first notes that God knows the past and the future with the same certainty, for God’s knowledge of something contingent is as certain as of something necessary. However, God’s knowledge of necessary events is necessary, and God’s knowledge of contingent events is contingent. The same holds for human knowledge, which is contingent with regard to statements such as ‘I am sitting’ and necessary regarding geometrical theorems.281 To explain that God’s knowledge of the past, the present, and the future is equally certain, Kilvington relies on his standard practice and summarizes selected elements of Scotus’s views as set forth in the Ordinatio I, distinction 39.

Duns Scotus, Lectura I, dist. 39, q. 5, n. 23282

Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, pp. 183–184283

There is another theory which poses God’s Thence, Doctor Communis ⟨i.e., Henry of certain knowledge of contingent proposi- Ghent⟩ believes and the Subtle Doctor tions about the future as follows: Those cites him in his Sentences I, distinction 39,

280 281 282

283

quia non plus claudit contradictionem unum quam aliud, tamen de potentia sua ordinata non potest ita libere velle peccantem praemiare, ceteris paribus, sicut non peccantem, nec ita libere potest de potentia ordinata velle coelum non esse sicut Antichristum non esse posito quod Antichristus foret contingenter futurus contingentia ad utrumlibet.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 166. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, pp. 182–184. See also above, p. 74. Eng. trans. Vos et al. Cf. John Duns Scotus, Contingency and Freedom: Lectura I 39, n. 23, pp. 78, 80: “Alia est opinio, quae sic ponit certam cognitionem Dei de futuris contingentibus: Dicunt enim sic dicentes quod omnia sunt praesenti a Deo in aeternitate secundum eorum actualem exsistentiam. Dieunt enim quod non est imaginandum quod tempus et ea quae fluunt in tempore, sint praesentia in aeternitate sicut baculus est praesens toti fluvio, si figatur in medio fluvio: baculus enim successive est praesens toti fluvio, quia partibus eius; sed aeternitas est simul cum toto tempore et cum omnibus quae fluunt in tempore, ita quod totum tempus et quidquid successive est in tempore, est praesens aeternitati,—ut si ponatur aeternitas sicut centrum et totum tempus fluens sicut circumferentia, tunc licet circumferentia continue moveatur et pars parti succedat, tamen in comparatione ad centrum uniformiter se habet.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, pp. 183–184: “Unde Doctor Communis imaginatur hic, et recitat eum Doctor Subtilis super I Sententiarum distinctione 39 quod Deus

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

77

(cont.)

Duns Scotus, Lectura I, dist. 39, q. 5, n. 23

Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, pp. 183–184

who hold this theory say that everything is present to God in eternity according to its actual existence. For, they say, one should not use the image that time and that which is flowing in time are present in eternity as a stick is present to the entire river if it is fixed in the middle of the river; for a stick is successively present to the entire river, because it is present to its parts. But eternity is simultaneous with time as a whole and with all things flowing in time, so that time as a whole and what successively is in time, is present to eternity. Suppose, for example, eternity to be the centre [of a circle] and flowing time as a whole to be the circumference: though the circumference continuously moves and one part succeeds the other, yet it is uniformly related to the centre.

⟨saying⟩ that God is like the center and all time flowing from the past to the future ⟨is⟩ like the circumference, and no matter how the circumference moves, it is always equally distant from the center, and no matter whether time flows into the past or the future, it is always the present time to God.

Kilvington thus shares Scotus’s position that God’s knowledge of necessary events is absolute and of contingents is contingent. At the same time, Kilvington rejects Bradwardine’s argument that since necessity is absolutely more perfect than contingency, God’s knowledge about all, as the most perfect being, possesses the necessary knowledge of all things, whether necessary or contingent.284 According to Kilvington, God can by absolute power make future and past events unknown to God, but by ordained power, God knows the past, the present, and the future with the same certainty.285

284 285

sit quasi centrum et totum tempus fluens de praeterito in futurum quasi circumferentia, et tunc qualitercumque moveatur circumferentia, semper aeque distans est a centro, et sic qualitercumque fluat tempus in praeteritum et futurum, semper tamen est aeque praesens Deo.” See above, pp. 25–26. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 183: “Unde ulterius negatur consequentia: ‘non

78

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

Revelation and Predestination in the Context of Future Contingents Kilvington settles the issues of revelation and predestination primarily by discussing the fifth conclusion: “Everything absolutely and unconditionally revealed by God, necessarily comes about with ordained necessity.”286 To begin with, Kilvington presents six arguments against this view: 1) If it were so, such an ⟨absolute⟩ revelation, as it appears, would establish necessity in the world. The consequent is false and contrary to the gloss to the words “the Virgin shall conceive,” since necessity in the world is not the outcome of the prophets’ revelations, but only the manifestation of the truth; the revelation in prophecy alone does not necessitate the occurrence of that which is announced.287 2) God the Father absolutely reveals future events to the Son as a human. If all external revelation causes necessity in the world, so does internal revelation.288 3) God the Father knows with absolute certainty that the Antichrist is a future existent and that his future existence is contingent ad utrumlibet, and, if it is so, God can absolutely reveal that the Antichrist will be. From this conclusion it follows, as it appears, that the Antichrist necessarily will be, because the Antichrist’s existence is absolutely revealed. At the same time, the Antichrist’s existence is not necessary, because it is revealed that his existence is contingent.289 4) God can reveal any future contingent, which will remain contingent; God can either absolutely reveal it, and thus it will not be necessary, since it

286 287

288

289

aliter novit facta quam fienda’. Sed potest esse quod non novit illa quae facienda sunt, igitur sic potest esse sive nosci de praeteritis, licet conclusio sit vera de potentia Dei absoluta, ut dixi.” See above, p. 62. Cf. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 195: “Si sic, tunc huiusmodi revelatio absoluta faceret necessitatem in rebus, ut videtur, quia ipsa posita sequitur necessitas in rebus. Consequens falsum et contra glossam 1 capitulo: ‘Ecce virgo concipiet’ etc. ‘Non est necessitas rerum ex eloquio prophetarum, sed sola exibitio veritatis’ in prophetia non facit necessitatem eorum quae dicit sed signum praescientiae Dei.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 195: “Item, Deus Pater revelat Deo Filio secundum hominem omnia futura absoluta revelatione. Si igitur revelatio extrinseca faciat necessitatem in rebus, igitur revelatio intrinseca facit etc.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 195: “Item, Deus Pater absolute novit quod Antichristus est futurus et quod contingenter contingentia ad utrumlibet est futurus, igitur ut sic potest Deus revelare absolute quod Antichristus erit; reveletur igitur. Et sequitur ex conclusione illa, ut videtur, quod Antichristus erit necessario, quia absolute est revelatum. Et quod non erit necessario patet per alteram partem revelationis quae est quod Antichristus contingenter erit.”

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

79

will remain contingent, or God can by ordained power reveal that a future contingent will remain contingent under a certain condition. And then, such a condition is either contingent or necessary; if it is contingent, it is either revealed absolutely or under a certain condition. The process can either go ad infinitum or end at the necessary, absolutely revealed condition. Consequently, the first that will be revealed will be absolutely revealed under the necessary condition.290 5) Let Socrates and Plato be in mortal sin, and let it be revealed to them that, out of the two, only Socrates will be condemned. If Socrates could voluntarily confess his sins and repent after sinning, such a revelation would not be absolute but only conditional, since Socrates was assumed not to regret and thus be condemned. And let us assume the same for Plato, that is, that he will be condemned because he has not repented; therefore, by such a revelation, it is no more certain that Socrates will be condemned than Plato will be.291 6) If God’s external revelation concerning future contingents were absolutely necessary, and if it caused necessity in things, and if it were only a blow of wind, thus the blow of wind could force God to fulfill the revelation by ordained power. The consequence appears false and unreasonable.292 Kilvington makes clear that these arguments do not convey his view. Rather, his position is that there is a certain structure to God’s acts, which build up

290

291

292

Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 196: “Item, Deus potest revelare futurum contingens, ipso manente contingente; aut igitur absolute potest tale futurum contingens revelare, et sequitur quod ipsum non erit necessario, quia manebit contingens, vel solum potest Deus de potentia ordinata ipsum revelare sub condicione. Et tunc condicio aut est contingens aut necessaria. Si contingens, aut igitur revelat ipsum absolute, et sequitur ut prius, aut sub condicione, et sic patet processus in infinitum. Vel erit devenire ad condicionem absolute revelatam, et sic primum erit absolute revelatum quod erit revelatum sub condicione necessaria.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 196: “Item, sint Socrates et Plato in peccato mortali, et reveletur istis quod tantum Socrates de numero illorum damnabitur iuxta rationem illam. Si Socrates posset libere confiteri peccata et poenitere postquam peccaverit, ista revelatio non est absoluta, sed tantum condicionalis, scilicet quod tantum Socrates de numero illorum damnabitur, quia intellegitur quod Socrates non poeniteat. Et consimiliter constat de Platone quod, nisi poeniteat, damnabitur, igitur per illam revelationem non est plus certificatum de Socrate quod damnabitur quam de Platone.” Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 196: “Item, si revelatio ad extra per Deum absoluta faceret et causaret necessitatem aliquam in re futura, cum huiusmodi revelatio sit solum flatus venti, igitur per unum flatum venti necessitaretur Deus de potentia ordinata. Consequens videtur falsum et irrationabile.”

80

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

one upon another to highlight the multifariousness of God’s features. He distinguishes between two kinds of prophecy: one is absolutely necessary and is revealed simpliciter, as exemplified by “the Virgin shall conceive”; the other is conditional and is fulfilled depending on the admonitory wording, as illustrated by the fate of Nineveh. God’s foreknowledge likewise comes in two varieties: one is the same as the knowledge of good and evil; the other is the same as the predestination in its proper or general sense. Predestination is also twofold: either absolutely necessary (predestination in its proper sense) as in “the Virgin shall conceive,” or deriving from divine foreknowledge (predestination in its general sense) and conditional, that is, including signs that guarantee that God’s words come true, as in the case of Nineveh. Consequently, predestination breeds two species of effects: one is temporal deliverance from guilt, and the other is the eternal allocation of grace.293 On this model, God’s foreknowledge of absolute predestination is commensurate with absolute revelation, where whatever is foreknown necessarily comes about with ordained necessity. For their part, prophecies, deriving from divine foreknowledge commensurate with predestination in its general sense, have an admixture of the free choice ad utrumlibet of human free will, and they do not necessarily cause future contingents to come about.294 In human-effected predestination, it is divine and not human free will that is the first cause of a person being rewarded.295 Kilvington relies his view on Henry of Ghent’s idea that people can be the cause of their predestination not because of their acts of free will, but as a result of effects granted to those predestined. Kilvington concludes: That is why I said that predestination is commonly regarded by the doctors as a voluntary act ⟨of free will⟩ in the predestined person; however, in the most proper sense, it stands for God Himself, for it is God that predestines, and thus predestination is the first cause of predestining. But predestination that is an act of volition is an infallible sign of such necessity (…).296

293 294 295 296

Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, pp. 196–197. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 198. See above, p. 13. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, pp. 199–200: “Hoc pro tanto dixi quod praedestinatio sumitur a doctoribus communiter pro actu voluntatis in praedestinato, sed propriissime pro ipso Deo, ut est praedestinans, et ut sic praedestinatio est causa prima praedestinans. Sed praedestinatio, quae est actus voluntatis, est signum infallibile huiusmodi necessitatis (…).”

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

81

This explanation helps dispel the doubts articulated in the arguments against the opinion: “everything absolutely revealed by God necessarily comes about with ordained necessity.” In his replies, Kilvington asserts: Ad 1) In the revelations of the prophets, there is only the necessity of sign (necessitas signi), that is, the necessary sign, since, with regard to the divine internal plan, God adds this necessary sign to things that are going to come about.297 This appears to be Kilvington’s argument against the seventh opinion presented by Bradwardine.298 Ad 2) The necessary signs are only needed with regard to external revelation. God the Father does not reveal future contingents to the Son, because the Son possesses the same eternal foreknowledge as the Father and cannot be deceived by the Father. Still, such an external revelation does not cause necessity in the world, because by virtue of this revelation God does not will to add any necessity, which is what God wills by virtue of absolute revelation simpliciter facta associated with oath and promise.299 Ad 3) Next, Kilvington discusses the third argument, stating that: In response to the third ⟨argument⟩, which is rather difficult, I say that by ordained power, God cannot absolutely reveal that the Antichrist will be or that his existence will be contingent ad utrumlibet, because it is not fitting for God to reveal anything that free will can annihilate, and it also does not befit God, nor is just or possible for God, to cause or to reveal in such a way, since in some sense this is contradictory (…). As a result: I admit that God could say and state something ⟨such as a lie⟩, that would cause God not to be God if it were absolutely revealed by God’s absolute power. Consequently, it must be conceded that, by ordained necessity, the Antichrist will be, and that his existence will be contingent.300

297 298 299 300

Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 201. See above, p. 30. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 201. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 202: “Ad tertium, quod est difficilius, dico quod Deus non potest revelare sic absolute de sua potentia ordinata quod Antichristus erit et quod Antichristus erit contingenter ad utrumlibet, quia non decet eum aliquid revelare quod per liberum arbitrium possit falsifieri, et quod non decet Deum nec convenit sibi, non est possibile per eum fieri nec revelari (…). Et per consequens: si Deus posset illud dicere et asserere, unde alius posset facere quod Deus non esset Deus, si fiat argumentum de revelatione absoluta, et per potentiam Dei absolutam admitto. Et tunc oportet ulterius concedere quod de necessitate ordinata Antichristus erit et quod Antichristus contingenter erit.”

82

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

To justify such a contingency, Kilvington avails himself of an intriguing and sophisticated piece of reasoning: And then I say that it is possible that it should be necessary for someone to beget the Antichrist, but no one in particular should necessarily have to do so. Thus, it becomes clear that the Antichrist will be and that his existence will be contingent ad utrumlibet with regard to his begetting, because whoever begets the Antichrist will beget him contingently. Consequently, the Antichrist’s begetting will be contingent—in that he will either be begotten or not—and thus his existence will be contingent ad utrumlibet; and so the Antichrist will be contingent ad utrumlibet.301 Kilvington then explains the difference between the absolute revelation that must be absolutely fulfilled and the absolute revelation that can be comparatively fulfilled. He puts forwards three probing examples. a) First, if it were absolutely revealed that Plato would sin mortally, Plato would be forced to sin mortally, but such a revelation does not determine what kind of mortal sin Plato would have to commit. b) Second, while Peter’s denial of Christ caused God to forsake him and to take away divine grace, Peter’s denial was revealed with absolute necessity and thus came about necessarily. Consequently, Peter needed to deny Christ; however, he could do so more or less zealously. Given this, because Peter denied Christ three times with a great zeal, he sinned mortally, and this is why God forsook him. Peter had free will ad utrumlibet, so he could have chosen any grade of intensity for his act and sinned less severely. This argument appears to be Kilvington’s reply to the following fourth counterargument against the ninth opinion formulated by Bradwardine as follows: Likewise, a wayfarer ⟨on Earth⟩ sins exclusively by necessity, and the same ⟨applies to every⟩ single sinner, therefore etc. The consequence is obvious, since it can be said to somebody that Socrates will sin, and the same applies to others, just as he foretold ⟨it⟩ to Peter, etc.302

301

302

Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, pp. 202–203: “Et tunc dico quod hoc potest esse per modum illum quo necesse sit quod aliquis generet Antichristum, et de nullo sit necessarium quod generet Antichristum. Et tunc manifestum est quod Antichristus erit, et tunc Antichristus contingenter ad utrumlibet erit, quia ille qui generabit, contingenter ad utrumlibet generabit. Et per consequens eius generatio erit contingens ad utrumlibet, igitur eius esse erit contingens ad utrumlibet, et sic ipse contingenter ad utrumlibet erit.” See above, p. 29.

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

83

c) Third, if God reveals that Socrates will sin tomorrow under circumstances A, B, and C, Socrates will sin tomorrow by ordained necessity necessarily and not contingently exclusively under circumstances A, B, and C. Although by both absolute and ordained power, God absolutely foreknows that Socrates will sin under these circumstances, God can reveal this fact only conditionally by either absolute or ordained power. In the same manner, the appearance of the Antichrist is not absolutely revealed.303 This example also appears to be Kilvington’s response to Bradwardine’s third argument against the ninth opinion.304 Ad 4) In his reply to the fourth argument, Kilvington reaffirms his position by arguing that by virtue of absolute power, God cannot reveal anything that God absolutely knows. While God may absolutely reveal something contingent, this will no longer be contingent. It is only God’s conditional revelation, that is, one spelling out under certain circumstances, that guarantees that future events will remain contingent ad utrumlibet. However, these conditions must be conditionally and not absolutely disclosed, because their number is then infinite, which guarantees that future events may pan out otherwise. Nevertheless, if the condition is fulfilled, a contingent event is no longer contingent.305 Ad 5) Kilvington states that in the case described, both Socrates and Plato will be condemned, even if Socrates does not repent of his sins and Plato does so, because the circumstances are different in the two cases of repentance.306 Ad 6) In his reply, Kilvington surmises that the blow of wind that is God’s promise makes the happening of it necessary not in God but in things. God’s words are doubtlessly to be fulfilled. It is therefore clear that not only the internal but also the external word of God must be fulfilled.307 To conclude, Kilvington believes that not only God’s will but also God’s knowledge is contingent with regard to future contingents. This produces a distinction between types of prophecies, with some of them being absolutely necessary, others being conditionally necessary, and yet others being contingent. The contingency ad utrumlibet of future events is guaranteed by the circumstances under which such future events come about. Although by absolute and ordained power God absolutely foreknows that something will come about, God reveals it absolutely with regard to circumstances, that is, conditionally. That which conditionally comes about does not have to come about absolutely

303 304 305 306 307

Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 203. See above, p. 29. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 204. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 204. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 200.

84

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

necessarily. In conditional revelation, the change of status from being contingent to not-being contingent is warranted by the conditions. When the revealed conditions are fulfilled, the future event will no longer be contingent. The same concerns future contingent deeds. Solely those foretold by God are necessary, and the others are not, because they depend on people’s voluntary choices. Nothing that depends on created free will ad utrumlibet is revealed absolutely relative to God’s ordained power.308 Therefore, God the Father cannot by the ordained law order the Son, as a human, to reveal what the Son sees in Verbo, because, as proved, God the Son does not reveal absolutely future contingents ad utrumlibet. However, God can by absolute power order the Son to reveal absolutely the future event.309 This does not mean that the divine covenant with humans does not cause any necessity in God; the necessity is in the external thing that are to come about. The promise of the covenant does not oblige humans, but, with ordained necessity, that is, necessity with regard to the established natural law, it binds humans to be faithful, helps them, and comforts them as well.310 Even though both theologians—Bradwardine and Kilvington—cite and refer to the same works by Augustine and Anselm to prove that God possesses foreknowledge of all ad utrumlibet future contingents, each of them builds on these authorities to substantiate quite opposite claims. The essential difference between their positions can be noted at the very beginning. First of all, while Bradwardine believes that future contingents necessarily come about by virtue of God’s ordained power, that is, in accordance with the natural order of things, rather than by virtue of absolute power,311 Kilvington believes the opposite.

Conclusion Examined in detail above, the questions penned by Thomas Bradwardine and Richard Kilvington confirm that Kilvington was Bradwardine’s socius when the latter lectured on the Sentences. For one, Kilvington’s question directly references Bradwardine and cites him by name. Additionally, Bradwardine’s list of nine views on future contingents includes one held by Kilvington. Our analysis of Bradwardine’s and Kilvington’s questions identifies an important doctrinal fact. While Bradwardine’s question, as its title suggests, 308 309 310 311

See above, p. 63. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, pp. 176–177. Richard Kilvington, Utrum quilibet actus, p. 198. See above, p. 85.

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

85

focuses on God’s foreknowledge, Kilvington’s question, consistently with its title as well, is devoted to the problem of good and evil deeds as resulting from the choices of human free will. This notwithstanding, both authors eventually address the same issue, in seeking to reconcile God’s foreknowledge and will with the free will of people. As Jean-Françoise Genest and Sarah Hogarth Rossiter convincingly argue, Bradwardine’s question is primarily a polemic against Ockham’s view. Although Ockham is not mentioned by name, Bradwardine extensively argues against his position. Duns Scotus is not mentioned in the question either, which is quite unusual, because almost all of Bradwardine’s contemporaries refer to Scotus, especially when discussing the absolute and ordained power of God. Bradwardine employs another referential tactic since he does not build on Scotus’s theory in any way and, instead, proposes a different notion of divine absolute and ordained power. Like Bradwardine, Kilvington avoids speaking of Ockham by name, as noticeable in his Ethics and in question 3 in his Sentences. However, unlike Bradwardine he quite frequently quotes, refers to, and follows Scotus’s views. Kilvington’s affinity with Scotus’s ideas does not result in a mere slavish acceptance of the entirety of Scotus’s theory. On the contrary, Kilvington only addresses a selected ensemble of Scotus’s notions. This strategy speaks to two important aspects of Kilvington’s thought and analytical approach. First, it proves that he considers Scotus an authority; consequently, when he cites Scotus’s concepts, no justification is required and a mere “according to Doctor Subtilis” suffices. Second, he only avails himself of Scotus’s theories in order to corroborate his own argument. For instance, he neither mentions Scotus’s renowned concept of the instants of nature (instantiae naturae) when arguing for the contingency of God’s will nor explains why God’s foreknowledge is contingent. These differences are further confirmed by Bradwardine’s and Kilvington’s choices of other doctrinal sources to support their own solutions. When Bradwardine argues against the ninth conclusion, which appears to be Kilvington’s, he defends the necessity of the consequent (necessitas consequentis) as originally conceived by Boethius and Anselm. For his part, Kilvington adopts an approach related to Peter Lombard’s view and to the mainstream medieval tradition that assumes the consequence (necessitas consequentiae) to claim that future things which God explicitly foretells are necessary, but all other things are not. As a result of subscribing to disparate theories, Bradwardine and Kilvington propose fundamentally different solutions to the problem of God’s foreknowledge and free will. Bradwardine holds that all future events necessarily come about by virtue of God’s ordained power. Therefore, everything that comes about necessarily comes about. God can do otherwise by virtue of

86

richard kilvington’s and thomas bradwardine’s questions

absolute power. The same concerns people; they can also do otherwise. In contrast, Kilvington claims that only that which is absolutely revealed by virtue of God’s absolute power (such as articles of faith) directly depends on divine will; the future events that depend on human free will do not necessarily come about. For instance, it may happen that a person predestined for salvation will not be saved because of their bad use of free will. While Bradwardine’s concept leaves room for human free will only to perform bad deeds, Kilvington’s framework grants humans considerable freedom, not only to sin but first of all to intensify their good volitional acts.

The Manuscripts of Question 4 Utrum quilibet actus voluntatis per se malus sit per se aliquid from Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum The Description of the Manuscripts1 Question 4 entitled Utrum quilibet actus voluntatis per se malus sit per se aliquid from Richard Kilvington’s Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum is handed down by five manuscripts. Since the description of the manuscripts has been published in Monika Michałowska, Richard Kilvington on the Capacity of Created Beings, below the list of the codices providing their content only is presented. A—Bologna, Biblioteca Comunale dell’Archiginnasio, A. 985 The codex contains a complete set of 8 questions of Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum divided into sub-questions, articles and dubia. Ricardus Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum (fols. 1ra–52ra). Other Contents2 Utrum corpora gravia et levia in suis motibus requirant medium (fols. 53ra–54va); Utrum omne corpus naturale habeat locum naturalem (fols. 54va–55vb); Utrum tempus sit consequens motum (fols. 55vb–56va). B—Brugge, Stedelijke Openbare Bibliotheek, 188 The codex contains questions 1–4 and fragments of questions 5, 7, and 8. The list of contents of Kilvington’s work is identical with those of A. 985 (A), of Paris 14576 (G), and of Paris 15561 (H) with regard to questions 1–6, yet beginning from question 7 it differs from A and from GH; fol. 2v contains the list of Kilvington’s questions. Ricardus Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum (fols. 3ra–54vb; incomplete). 1 The description of the manuscripts has been published in Michałowska, Richard Kilvington on the Capacity of Created Beings, pp. 21–34. 2 In all the descriptions of the codices, the name of the author is given each time if the text has been attributed; if it still remains dubious or anonymous, only the title of the work is provided.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2023 | do

88

the manuscripts of question 4

G—Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Lat. 14576 The codex contains questions 1–6 of Kilvington’s Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum as preserved in the codex of Bologna, A. 985 (A). From question 6 onwards, it offers a different division of the text. Ricardus Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum (fols. 117ra– 199vb; incomplete). Other Contents Robertus Holcot, In quattuor libros Sententiarum Quaestiones (fols. 1ra– 115vb); Solutio plurium axiomatum (fols. 200ra–211ra); Nicolas d’Autrecourt, Quaestio de intensione visionis (fols. 212ra–214ra); Alphonse Vargas, Utrum voluntas fidelis viatoris per gratiam aeternalem possit ad summam gloriam aeternaliter ordinari (fols. 214ra–220va); Johannes Mirecourt, In libros Sententiarum (fols. 224ra–254vb); Thomas Bradwardine, Tractatus de proportionibus (fols. 255ra–261va); Thomas Buckingham, Quaestiones super Sententias (fols. 262ra–264ra); Robertus Halifax, Quaestiones super Sententias (fols. 264ra–269vb). H—Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Lat. 15561 The text of H is strongly abbreviated and highly contaminated. The codex contains questions 1–6 as preserved in the codex of Bologna, A. 985 (A). Then, it gives a different division of the text, identical to G; fols. 228ra–229vb contain the table of contents of Kilvington’s texts, as well as those of Rodington’s and of Halifax’s. The codex also contains a set of 10 complete questions of Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum. They are, however, arranged differently than in other manuscripts.3 Ricardus Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum (fols. 198ra– 228ra); Ricardus Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum (fols. 172ra–197vb). Other Contents Albertus Magnus, De laudibus beatae Mariae Virginis (fols. 1ra–47r); Regulae iuris (fols. 47r–56v);

3 Michałowska, “Introduction,” in Richard Kilvington’s Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum, pp. 22–23.

manuscripts of question 4

89

Albertus Magnus, Lectiones in librum Iob (fols. 56v–82r); Sermo super et pro sedatione moderni scismatis factus per G. Cardinalem Pictavensem in synodo Cameracensi (fols. 82r–102r); Tractatus de XL erroribus reprobatis a Thoma Bradvardin (fols. 102r–110r); Thomas Bradwardine, De causa Dei (fols. 111ra–171vb); Johannes Rodington, Quodlibeta (fols. 230ra–243rb); Robertus Halifax, Quaestiones super Sententias (fols. 230vb, 243va–245vb, 248vb); Guillemus Ockham, Ockham super Sententias (fols. 246ra–248vb); Monachus Niger, Quaestiones seu determinationes super librum Sententiarum (fols. 248vb–268v); Articuli erronei reputati a Thoma Bradvardin quos offert examini ecclesiae (fols. 271ra–273vb). K—Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat. 4353 The codex contains questions 1–4; fol. 60r contains the table of content including the index of Kilvington’s questions. It also contains an article entitled Utrum parvuli decedentes cum originali sentiant aliquam poenam vel solum careant visione Dei that is one of the dubia of question 7 as preserved in the codex of Bologna, A. 985 (A), which in K is presented as one of the articles of question 3. The codex also contains Kilvington’s Expositio super libros Physicorum et quaestio prima and a fragment of his Quaestiones super De generatione et corruptione. Ricardus Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum (fols. 1r–58r); Ricardus Kilvington, Quaestiones super De generatione et corruptione, q. 4: Utrum in omni generatione tria principia requirantur (fol. 124v, frag.); Ricardus Kilvington, Expositio super libros Physicorum et quaestio prima: Utrum omne scitum sciatur per causam (fols. 125r–143v). Other Contents Robertus Holcot, In quattuor libros Sententiarum Quaestiones (fols. 61r– 72v); Thomas Buckingham, Quaestiones in Sententias (fols. 73r–88v); Robertus Halifax, Quaestiones super Sententias (fols. 58v–59r; 89r–124v). Other manuscripts that contain an incomplete set of questions of Kilvington’s Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum are:

90

the manuscripts of question 4

C—Brugge, Stedelijke Openbare Bibliotheek, Hs. 503 The codex contains questions 1 and 2. The codex also contains Kilvington’s Quaestiones super De generatione et corruptione and a complete text of Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum. Ricardus Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum (fols. 80ra– 105rb); Ricardus Kilvington, Quaestiones super De generatione et corruptione (fols. 20vb–50vb); Ricardus Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum (fols. 51ra– 79va). D—Universitäts-und Forschungsbibliothek Erfurt/Gotha—UB Erfurt, Dep. Erf. CA. 2° 105 The codex contains questions 1–3. Question 3 is incomplete. Ricardus Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum (fols. 135rb– 182rb). E—Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale Cod. II. II 281 The codex contains questions 1 and 2. Question 2 is incomplete. Ricardus Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum (fols. 43ra– 50rb). F—Londyn, Harley 3243 The codex contains questions 2 and 3. Question 3 is incomplete. Ricardus Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum (fols. 89ra–b, 111rb–131rb). I—Praha, Národní Knihovna České Republiky, Cod. III B. 10 The codex contains questions 1–3. They are, however, arranged differently than in other manuscripts. Question 3 is incomplete and ends abruptly in the same place as in the codex of Wrocław IV F 198 (L). The codex also contains a part of Kilvington’s Quaestiones super libros Physicorum. Fol. 115va contains the table of content of Kilvington’s questions. Ricardus Kilvington, Kilvington’s Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum (fols. 130ra–139rb, 174vb–212vb); Ricardus Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, q. Utrum qualitas suscipit magis et minus (fols. 140ra–152vb).

manuscripts of question 4

91

J—Tortosa, Biblioteca de la Catedral y del Cabildo de la Sanctísima Iglesia Catedral, Cod. 186 The codex contains questions 1 and 2. Ricardus Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum (fols. 35ra– 66ra). L—Wrocław IV F 198 The codex contains questions 1–3. Question 3 is incomplete and ends abruptly in the same place as the text preserved in the codex of Prague Cod. III B. 10 (I). The codex also contains Kilvington’s Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum. It preserves questions 1–10, however, question 5 is incomplete. Folio 105v contains the table of content of Kilvington’s ethical and theological questions. Ricardus Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum (fols. 15ra– 45ra); Ricardus Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum (fols. 118ra– 132rb; fols. 137ra–147vb).

The Manuscript Tradition Richard Kilvington’s question commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences includes eight questions that are: 1. Utrum Deus sit super omnia diligendus. 2. Utrum per opera meritoria augeatur habitus caritatis quo Deus est super omnia diligendus. 3. Utrum omnis creatura sit suae naturae certis limitibus circumscripta. 4. Utrum quilibet actus voluntatis per se malus sit per se aliquid. 5. Utrum peccans mortaliter per instans solum mereatur puniri per infinita instantia interpolata. 6. Utrum aliquis nisi forte in poena peccati possit esse perplexus in his quae pertinent ad salutem. 7. Utrum omnis actus factus extra gratiam sit peccatum. 8. Utrum aliquis possit simul peccare venialiter et mereri vitam aeternam. Since the manuscript tradition has been analyzed in detail by Monika Michałowska in a critical edition of question 3, entitled Richard Kilvington on the Capacity of Created Beings, Infinity, and Being Simultaneously in Rome and Paris: Critical Edition of Question 3 from Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum with an Introduction,1 and no new evidence has been found since than in that respect, here we will provide only the key comments on the families and relation among the manuscripts giving some examples solely from question 4. Question 4 has been preserved only in five manuscripts, namely in ABGHK. A collation of significant fragments of question 2 (the only question preserved in all the witnesses) and a full collation of questions 3 and 4 revealed that some important witnesses have been lost. Michałowska has established that all the surviving manuscripts of Kilvington’s Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum break into two principal families of ABCGH and of DEFIJKL.

Family 1: ABCGH The manuscripts of ABCGH constitute one family, with H preserving a bad quality of the text due to significant abbreviation and contamination of the

1 Michałowska, Richard Kilvington on the Capacity of Created Beings, pp. 35–49.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2023 | do

the manuscript tradition

93

text, therefore it could serve as a point for comparisons only to a limited extent. For that reason, it has been collated partially and excluded from the critical apparatus. Accidents shared by BCGH, such as variants, additions, as well as longer omissions, including homoeoteleuta, indicate their common ancestor that is not among the surviving manuscripts. A Sub-group of BCG Accidents shared by BCG suggest that they form one sub-group. B and G appeared to be independent witnesses not copied from the other, which has been concluded from the fact that each of them has longer omissions of fragments that are preserved in the other. Since question 4 has been preserved only in BG, below some examples from that question are presented.2 Examples of shared omissions: – q. 4, p. 123: Sed contra istam viam arguo sic: producat Socrates aliquem actum voluntatis qui sit A et producat Plato B actum in duplo meliorem A sive intensiorem. Tunc sic: B est in duplo intensior3 quam A (…). – q. 4, p. 174: (…) hic respondeo et dico quod sicut essentia inquantum essentia4 est indifferens et scientia inquantum scientia est indifferens, sic volitio Dei inquantum volitio est indifferens, quia—sicut dixi—volitio5 Dei respectu Antichristi futuri nunc potest esse non-volitio per mutationem factam in alio a Deo (…). – q. 4, p. 174: (…) quod est verum de numero illorum: ‘Antichristus erit’ ⟨et⟩ ‘Antichristus non erit’. Unde dico quod Deus prius naturaliter scit Antichristum fore quam vult Antichristum fore.6 – q. 4, p. 182: Hic respondeo quod talis potest venire contra votum, vovendo facere contra votum.7 – q. 4, p. 188: Sed contra dicis tu: nec e contra res esset futura, nisi Deus sciret rem esse futuram8 (…).

2 For more details, see Michałowska’s analysis in Michałowska, Richard Kilvington on the Capacity of Created Beings, pp. 38–40. 3 tunc sic b est in duplo intensior] om. (hom.) BG 4 essentia] om. BG 5 est indifferens quia sicut dixi volitio] om. (hom.) BG 6 quam vult antichristum fore] om. (hom.) BG 7 vovendo facere contra votum] om. (hom.) BG 8 sed contra dicis tu nec e contra res esset futura nisi deus sciret rem esse futuram] om. (hom.) G ‖ contra dicis tu nec e contra res esset futura nisi deus sciret rem esse futuram] om. B

94

the manuscript tradition

Examples of shared variants: – q. 4, p. 144: Item, si sic, tunc actum de se malum ageret Deus prius9 quam voluntas et ita Deus primo et principaliter operaretur iniquitatem (…). – q. 4, p. 146: Et de Petro10 dico quod prius peccavit vel venialiter vel mortaliter antequam Deus subtraheret faciem suam, et sic quandoque in casu expedit homini11 ut cadat in aliquo peccato mortali (…). – q. 4, p. 162: (…) sicut patet per Magistrum Sententiarum I libro12 distinctione 45 capitulo 413 (…). The fact that A belongs to this group has been concluded from omissions of large passages in A shared with BG, for example: – q. 4, p. 150: Ad duodecimum similiter dico quod ista propositio ‘aliquis potest esse prima causa suae reprobationis’ potest esse constructio transitiva vel intransitiva. Si intransitiva, concedo quod solus Deus etc. Si transitiva,14 et sumatur causa pro causa culpabili, unde Deus primo reprobat15 peccatorem etc.

Some Comments on B Significant corrections of various kinds (in the superscripts, margins, and the main text) in questions 3 and 4 in B prove that it was corrected from another witness, most likely belonging to family 2. It remains doubtful, however, that the manuscript in question has been preserved. As Michałowska writes: For example, in question 3, the marginal additions (written in a different hand) are identical with the readings as preserved in the manuscripts from family 2: D+IL & K or in D & F. Since the corrections can be found

9 10 11 12 13 14

15

de se malum ageret deus prius] malum de se prius ageret deus BG petro] peccato petri BG in casu expedit homini] expedit homini in casu BG sententiarum I libro] I sententiarum BG 4] 41 BG si intransitiva concedo quod solus deus etc si transitiva] om. (hom.) A et G in marg. al. manu B We would like to thank Chris Schabel for bringing this homoeoteleuton to our attention. reprobat] si add. A si add. del. al. manu B si reprobavit G

the manuscript tradition

95

in all the questions preserved in B, including those which were not preserved in D, F or K, it can be safely assumed that none of them could be the source from which the corrections in B were made.16 Parallel examples, as she notes, are easily recognizable in question 4: “For instance, in the first passage below, K has an addition of the word ‘actus’, G has an omission of the passage, while B has a version identical with A.”17 – q. 4, pp. 123–124: Item, quidquid Deus operatur voluntate coagente posset Deus similiter facere sine voluntate coagente, et ita si Deus operatur solam substantiam in actu voluntatis voluntate coagente, igitur posset facere solam substantiam18 voluntate non coagente, et ita aliquis actus voluntatis foret sine gradu, et ita aliqua volitio indivisibilis. Other examples from question 4 can include: – q. 4, p. 171: Nona conclusio patet, sicut alias arguebat Bradvardin, quia aliter sequeretur quod Deus de omnipotentia sua tam ordinata quam absoluta non posset se facere impotentem ad elevandum festucam.19 – q. 4, p. 184: Unde exemplum illud morale fieri potest ad inducendam imaginationem contingentis: Deus potest cognoscere20 futurum sicut praesens (…).

Family 2: DEFIJKL A Group of DIJL Since DIJL shared accidents in the questions they preserve, it has been concluded that they form a separate group and have the same ancestor. One of the examples Michałowska gives is a longer passage from question 2 where Kilvington reflects on whether meritorious acts increase the habit of love giv16 17 18

19

20

Michałowska, Richard Kilvington on the Capacity of Created Beings, p. 40. Michałowska, Richard Kilvington on the Capacity of Created Beings, p. 41. in actu voluntatis voluntate coagente igitur posset facere solam substantiam] cum voluntate igitur posset facere solam substantiam voluntate in marg. al. manu B om. (hom.) G ‖ substantiam] actus add. K festucam] patet nona posito quod deus revelet absolute quod non levabit festucam ad argumenta add. B (ad argumenta] del. add. in marg.) et patet nona posito quod deus revelet absolute quod non levabit festucam add. in marg. K cognoscere] corr. ex cogitare B cogitare G

96

the manuscript tradition

ing an example based on a comparison of two persons having love of various intensity. While manuscripts of family 1 and K give the names of “Petrus” and “Ioannes,” DIJL use “Socrates” and “Plato” respectively.21 Due to the fact that E and F share some accidents with the group of DIJL, yet on some occasions with K, as well as due to omissions of long fragments in E, their exact position in family remains impossible to identify. Within family 2, a sub-group of IL can be identified, which is noticeable from shared omissions of long experts, and from the fact that question 3 ends abruptly in the same place. The fact that the text in D in the same question ends before allowed the conclusion which excluded it as an ancestor of IL. Also, neither I nor L could have been copied from each other, since either of them has omissions not shared with the other.

Some Comments on K Similarly to the case of B, K is an extensively corrected and contaminated witness. The corrections in the margins are of two-fold character. Some of them supply the main text with omitted passages, in most cases by homeoteleuton, while others complete the text with fragments of quoted texts that were not preserved in other manuscripts. Question 4 differs in the number of concise quotes significantly from other questions, since for instance in question 3, there are only several quotes of this kind, all of them at the very end of the question. Our hypothesis is that at some point either Kilvington or the scribe at the very beginning of the textual transmission decided upon shortening quite well-known quotes from the authorities, giving only the first and the last couple of words from the quoted passage. Given that in his other works (Sophismata, Physics, and Ethics), Kilvington leans towards referencing rather than providing long and direct quotes, we argue that the shortening were his decision. Although at the beginning of his question commentary on the Sentences, he follows the standard procedure of giving direct citations, at some point he palls. This becomes clearly visible when comparing question 3 that has merely three such concise quotes with question 4 which abounds with this style of citing, offering more than twenty examples. Regardless of the fact whom we should attribute this style of quoting to, it has been preserved in all manuscripts and corrected only in K. Therefore, it could be safely assumed that the correction has been done by its scribe(s), who noted their grammatical and syntactical flaws as well as the textual problems

21

Michałowska, Richard Kilvington on the Capacity of Created Beings, p. 42.

97

the manuscript tradition

they created and therefore, he/they marked the places to be supplied with the rest of the citated passage. Below we present several of such instances comparing the quoted text missing in ABGK, yet supplied by K in the margins: – q. 4, p. 140: (3 k) Item, De paenitentia distinctione 4 dicit Decretum sic: Propheta loquens in persona Christi sic ait: “Deleantur de libro viventium.”

Decretum magistri Gratiani, par. 2,33,3 Richard Kilvington, question 4, p. 140 (De paenitentia), dist. 4, p. 1233 K marginal addition “Deleantur de libro uiuentium,” hoc est: subtrahatur eis gratia, qua subtracta hi in profundum uiciorum, deinde in eternam dampnationem precipitentur, “et cum iustis non scribantur,” id est: non apponatur eis gratia, quo fiant digni eterna salute.

viventium] hoc est subtrahatur eis gratia qua subtracta hi in profundum vitiorum deinde in aeternam damnationem praecipitentur et cum iustis non scribantur id est non apponatur eis gratia quo fiant digni salute aeterna

– q. 4, p. 156: Consequens falsum et contra Augustinum De praedestinatione sanctorum cito post medium, itaque dicit Augustinus contra: quae occulte— finis—ut cordis duritia auferatur.

Augustine, De praedestinatione, PL 44, Richard Kilvington, question 4, p. 156 971 K marginal addition

Haec itaque gratia, quae occulte humanis cordibus divina largitate tribuitur, a nullo duro corde respuitur. Ideo quippe tribuitur, ut cordis duritia primitus auferatur.

medium] haec itaque gratia dicit augustinus humanis divina largitate tribuitur a nullo duro corde respuitur ideo quippe tribuitur ut cordis duritia auferatur

98

the manuscript tradition

– q. 4, p. 161: Consequens falsum, ut patet de Sennacherib de quo Isai 10: “vae Assur” etc. Et glossa ibidem.

Alexander of Hales, Glossa in quatuor li- Richard Kilvington, question 4, p. 161 bros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi II, K marginal addition dist. 37, p. 365

Glossa: “Sicut haec inanimata tantum sunt instrumenta nihil per se facientia, sed per eum qui movet ea, sic nec Sennacherib per se, sed Dei virtute operatus est; unde gloriatio eius stulta fuit, sed ultio eius digna fuit.”

ibidem] dicit sic sicut inanimata tantum sunt instrumenta nihil per se agentia sed per eum qui movet sic nec sennacherib per se sed in dei virtute operatus est

In some cases, however, although there is a mark signaling a quote to be completed, we find no marginal addition. For instance, on fol. 55v, two such signaling marks (+) can be identified in the case of highly shortened quotes (see the table for the comparison of one of them) that have not been corrected.

Augustine, De correptione et gratia, PL 44, 937

Richard Kilvington, question 4, p. 181

(…) et posui uos, ut eatis, et fructum afferatis, et fructus uester maneat. quibus uerbis eis non solum iustitiam, uerum etiam in illa perseuerantiam se dedisse monstrauit. christo enim sic eos ponente ut eant, et fructum afferant, et fructus eorum maneat, quis audeat dicere, non manebit? quis audeat dicere, forsitan non manebit? sine poenitentia sunt enim dona et uocatio dei: sed uocatio eorum qui secundum propositum uocati sunt.

Et infra eodem 53 recitat illud Evangelii: “Posui vos ut eatis” etc., “quis audeat dicere non manebit? Quis audeat dicere, forsitan non manebit? Sine poenitentia,” (+) misericordia divina et vocatione Dei.

the manuscript tradition

99

Interestingly, a certain tendency can be noted regarding quotes correction. Whereas at the beginning of question 4, the folios abound with them (having one or more per folio), with time they gradually become rare to vanish completely on the last 4 folios, which may suggest the scribe’s weariness or simply lack of time. Another form of contamination can be noted with especially troubling phrases that in some cases become awkward or even incomprehensible most likely due to errors or strong abbreviations at the beginning of the textual transmission that were copied by the scribes. For instance, in the phrasing below the scribes of ABG kept abbreviated forms of “h” attempting to imitate what they had in their source, that eventually lead to a having a sequence of “h” + vertical or horizontal or slanting line with some attempts to resolve the abbreviation, guess its meaning or substitute it with a more comprehensible word. All those attempts, however, resulted in offering a rather odd phrase. The easiest way to solve the problem was to delete the unnecessary words, the strategy K adopted. – q. 4, p. 134: Hic enim nunc haec22 est vera: ‘peccatum est’, quod non deberet concedi de peccato si esset pura privatio et non-ens (…). 22

hic enim nunc haec] hoc haec nunc A haec est nunc hic G haec enim K

Editorial Principles The study we have carried out regarding the number of isolated and shared accidents, such as omissions, additions, variant readings, and scribal errors revealed that the manuscripts of A, B, and K can serve best as the foundation for the edition. Out of five manuscripts containing question 4, four, namely ABGK, have been fully collated. One of the Parisian manuscripts (H) has been collated partially. However, it has been excluded from the apparatus because of its bad quality. The text of H provides a poor witness as far as textual cohesiveness is concerned, being strongly abbreviated. While A, B, and K remain good witnesses, G quite usually offers non-sensical readings, has the greatest number of omissions of one and of more than one words, and is contaminated with various mistakes due to scribal negligence. For the present edition, A has been adopted as our leading manuscript, however, the readings of either B or K have been quite often chosen, if they appear more comprehensible or provide a better version of the text with regards to tenses or modes. Due to extensive corrections and marginal contamination in B and K, they could not serve as the basis for the edition. The reason for the adopted formula is the fact that question 4 presents Kilvington’s analysis of the problem of the future contingents and frequently bases on subtle distinctions between the past, present, and future possibilities, as well as between various forms of conditionality. An additional reason of taking all the three manuscripts into account lies in the fact that the text is highly technical and abounds with the sentences comprising series of repeated phrases that differ only with the position of words within it, which resulted in a high number of omissions (including homoeoteleuta) or scribe’s confusion as to the meaning of the sentence or coherence of the argument. Several principles regarding the critical apparatus have been adopted. 1) 2) 3) 4) 5)

All variants, omissions, and additions of A have been included in the apparatus. All isolated accidents of one word found in B, G or K have been ignored, unless they are meaningful for the text. All isolated accidents of one word found in B, G or K have been kept, however, if shared by either two of them. All longer omissions and additions (of more than one word) of either B, G or K have been included in the apparatus criticus. The words deleted in any of ABGK or the passages of the text marked as “va … cat” have been excluded from the apparatus criticus.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2023 | do

editorial principles

101

There are some exceptions to the above-mentioned principles. 1)

2)

3)

4)

In those rare cases where in our view neither of the readings of ABGK seems to make sense, conjures have been offered providing the readings of manuscripts in the critical apparatus. In several instances, in the cases of quotes, where the manuscripts vary and either of the reading given by ABKG is wrong making the text incomprehensible, the quotes have been corrected following modern critical editions of the texts. In several instances we have found it necessary to offer conjectures, usually of words that must have been omitted or transcribed incorrectly in λ at the beginning of the transmission. In those cases, the variant readings of all the manuscripts that preserve the passage have been given. Incorrect titles of the quoted works, e.g., De bono perseverantiae instead of De dono perseverantiae, and the concise titles, e.g., De civitate (for De civitate Dei) have also been excluded from the apparatus criticus.

As to minor accidents, the same rules have been employed as in the critical edition of question 3, namely: 1)

2)

3)

Certain variants have been excluded from the critical apparatus: iste/ille, vel/sive/aut/seu, nec/neque, igitur/ergo, ab/a/ex, per/secundum, etiam/ et, scilicet/videlicet. Certain omissions have been excluded from the critical apparatus: et, etiam, etc., sic, est (especially in cases like, e.g., “consequens/antecedens est falsum”), hoc, vel, iste/ista, ille/illa (especially in cases like e.g., “ista consequentia non valet”), quod, quia, tunc, igitur, ergo, per, secundum, in (ablativus temporis), videlicet, scilicet. Certain additions have been excluded from the critical apparatus: et, etiam, etc., sic, est, hoc, vel, ille/illa, iste/ista, quod, quia, igitur, ergo, in (ablativus temporis), videlicet, scilicet.

All of them (1, 2, 3), however, were included in the critical apparatus if shared by at least two of the manuscripts or appear significant for the understanding of the text. Spelling differences, such as intelligere/intellegere have been excluded from the apparatus criticus. The same rule was applied to deletions or corrections of the text included in the main text or margins (with a few exceptions important for the tradition), unless marginal notes constitute additions to the texts, in the latter case, they are kept in the critical apparatus. Since Kilvington’s text is

102

editorial principles

highly technical, sometimes the change of the word order involves the change of meaning, therefore, inversions or the change of word order in phrases of more than two words have been marked in the apparatus criticus even if they are isolated variants. Kilvington’s division of the text has been followed, with respect to questions, arguments and responses to arguments. It should be acknowledged, however, that some arguments remain unanswered. The punctuation of the text is done according to modern conventions. Nevertheless, given the specificity of the text various forms and levels of argument’s numbering, such as I, 1, C, c etc. have been employed. While all Kilvington’s arguments have been numbered, those coming from authority have been left unnumbered. Also, various punctuation marks have been used to make this highly technical text easier to follow and make certain arguments and their replies easier to be identified. In the case of relatively short sentences, commas to separate the arguments from conclusions have been generally used. In those that are long or more complex, also semicolons and em dashes have been used to make the structure of the text more comprehensible. For example, Kilvington frequently provides a series of premises and arguments, sometimes offering interpolations, before offering his final answer or conclusion. 1)

Et de alio quod dicit quod volitio non est malum quo homines sunt mali dico quod intellegit quod volitio non est tantum malum in quo homines sunt mali, quia per aliquas circumstantias potest fieri homo malus sicut propter finem malum—de isto alias diffuse tractabo sic: habitus mentis, qui est vitium, non est a Deo, igitur nec actus, et per consequens actus voluntatis non est res.

2)

Ad quartum dico quod non sequitur etc. Et ad modum arguendi potest dici quod non est argumentum formale, sicut patet per Magistrum eundem distinctione 22, ubi dicit quod non sequitur: Pater diligit per Spiritum Sanctum et idem est Patrem diligere et esse, igitur Pater est per Spiritum Sanctum; quare tamen sequatur de sapientia quod Pater esset sapientia Filii si saperet sapientia Filii—dico cum Magistro ibidem capitulo 10 quoad haec: meae intelligentiae turbatur infirmitas.

As above-mentioned a rather representative feature of Kilvington’s style of quoting becomes visible in question 4. The quotations he uses to support his arguments are composed of many various excerpts from the quoted works and joined with the term “finis.” This can indicate either that some passage of the

editorial principles

103

quote has been left deliberately or that one part of the quote has finished and a quote from another passage of the text begins; they have been separated with an em dash. For example: 1)

Undecima conclusio, quod Deus non praedestinat aliquem ad vitam iuxta bonum usum liberi arbitrii quem habiturus foret si ulterius superviveret, patet in De praedestinatione sanctorum bene post medium, ubi dicitur sic: quis enim audeat dicere quod parvuli—finis—merito parvulorum; et idem De dono perseverantiae capitulo 21. Item, De correptione et gratia capitulo 56: Deus bonos facit ut bona faciant—finis—ipsorum quod promisit.

2)

Item, Deus non aliter novit facta quam fienda, sed Deus sic novit facta quod non potest ea non noscere, igitur sic novit fienda quod non potest etc. Primum assumptum probatur per Augustinum X De civitate Dei capitulo 18, ubi dicit quod “tamquam praeterita”—finis—“quia certa erant.” Et idem quasi dicit Isidorus De summo bono libro I capitulo 19: in scripturis sacris—finis—in praedestinatione divina.

Single inverted commas have been used to mark a hypothesis, premise, consequence, etc. in those instances where it is proceeded by the terms such as “propositio,” “consequentia,” etc. If it is introduced by the expression “it follows” (sequitur), we have either used a colon in the phrase “it follows: …” or no punctuation mark in the phrase “it follows that.” For example: 1)

Item, si bonus usus liberi arbitrii sit causa sine qua non etc., tunc foret hoc maxime verum de adultis qui non baptizarentur, nisi per usum liberi arbitrii sui, et cum illa libertas sit libertas contradictionis, sequitur quod tales possent resistere donationi huiusmodi gratiae praeparatae eis ab aeterno.

2)

Et sic dico quod scientia Dei respectu alicuius futuri ⟨non⟩ est prior naturaliter quam voluntas beneplaciti, quia sequitur: Deus vult hoc fore, igitur Deus scit hoc fore, et non e contra, quia non sequitur: Deus scit Socratem peccare, ergo vult Socratem peccare.

3)

Ad decimum tertium dico negando consequentiam illam: ‘Socrates habet perseverantiam et non potest amittere perseverantiam, igitur necessario tenebit perseverantiam’, quia si talis non perseveraverit, numquam habuit perseverantiam, et tunc iuxta Decretum allegatum: quod nullo modo fuit nullo modo deseri potuit.

104

editorial principles

Only immediate references and quotations have been identified. Only literal quotes have been put between double quotation marks. Inaccurate quotes have been italicized. In those places where the quotes were highly corrupted or strongly abbreviated, the quotes have been added in the apparatus to demonstrate Kilvington’s characteristic style of quoting the texts of other authors and authorities. The orthography of critical editions of medieval philosophical and theological texts remains debatable. In the present edition orthography has been classicized, apart from several occasions to preserve the uniqueness of the text such as ly. Therefore, diphthongs have been used where classical Latin requires. In particular, “ae” and “oe” diphthongs have been used where a medieval manuscripts practice uses “e”. “Ci” to “ti” has also been changed. The Renaissance v/u distinction has been implemented. The full names of Socrates and Plato have been used even though the manuscripts in most cases give “S”, “Sor”, “P”. No abbreviations with the exception of “etc.” have been used.

Abbreviations ] ⟨…⟩ (?) (!) add. al. manu codd. coni. corr. del. hom. in marg. inv. iter. lac. lect. dub. om. superscr.

scripsit textus ab editore suppletus textus dubius sic! addidit alia manu codices conieci correxit delevit homoeoteleuton in margine invertit iteravit lacuna lectio dubia omisit superscripsit

editorial principles

105

Sigla A B G K

Bologna, Biblioteca Comunale dell’Archiginnasio A. 985 Brugge, Stedelijke Openbare Bibliotheek, Hs. 188 Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Ms. lat. 14576 Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Cod. Vat. lat. 4353

Bibliographical References AL Aristoteles Latinus, Brepols Publisher CCSL Corpus Christianorum, series Latina, Turnholti 1953– CSEL Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, ed. consilio et impensis Academiae Scientiarum Austriacae [olim Academiae Litterarum Caesareae Vindobonensis], Wien 1866– PL Patrologiae cursus completus, series Latina, accurante J.-P. Migne, Parisiis 1844–1855 et 1862–1865 Alexander Halensis, Sententiae Alexander Halensis. Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi. Edited by PP. Collegii Sancti Bonaventurae. Vols. 1–4. Quaracchi, Florence: Collegium Sancti Bonaventurae, 1951–1957. Alexander Halensis, Summa theologica IIa–IIae Alexander Halensis. Summa Fratris Alexandri sive Summa universae theologiae— opus Alexandro moderante conflatum: secunda pars secundi libri. Edited by PP. Collegii Sancti Bonaventurae. Vol. 3. Quaracchi Florence: Collegium Sancti Bonaventurae, 1930. Anselmus, Cur Deus homo Anselmus Cantuariensis. Cur Deus homo. In S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera Omnia. Edited by Franciscus S. Schmitt, O.S.B. Vol. 2. Seccovii, 1940, reset for Thomas Nelson & Sons Edinburgh: Nelson. Anselmus, De casu diaboli Anselmus Cantuariensis. De casu diaboli. In S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera Omnia. Edited by Franciscus S. Schmitt, O.S.B. Vol. 1. Seccovii, 1938, reset for Thomas Nelson & Sons Edinburgh: Nelson. Anselmus, De concordia Anselmus Cantuariensis. De concordia praescientiae et praedestinationis et gratiae dei cum libero arbitrio. In S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera Omnia. Edited by Franciscus S. Schmitt, O.S.B. Vol. 2. Seccovii, 1940, reset for Thomas Nelson & Sons Edinburgh: Nelson.

106

editorial principles

Anselmus, De libertate arbitrii Anselmus Cantuariensis. De libertate arbitrii. In S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera Omnia. Edited by Franciscus S. Schmitt, O.S.B. Vol. 1. Seccovii, 1938, reset for Thomas Nelson & Sons Edinburgh: Nelson. Aristoteles, Ethica Nicomachea Aristoteles. Ethica Nicomachea (‘recensio pura’). Edited by René-Antoine Gauthier. AL XXVI.1–3. Leiden–Bruxelles, 1972. Aristoteles, Physica Aristoteles. Physica. Translatio vetus. Edited by Fernand Bossier and Jozef Brams. AL VII.1.2. Leiden–New York, 1990. Auctoritates Aristotelis Les Auctoritates Aristotelis. Un florilège médiéval. Etude historique et édition critique. Edited by Jacqueline Hamesse. Louvain: Publications Universitaires 1974. Augustinus, Confessionum libri tredecim Augustinus Hipponensis. Confessionum libri tredecim. Edited by Lucas Verheijen. CCSL 27, 1981. Augustinus, Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum Augustinus Hipponensis. Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum. Edited by Karl F. Vrba and Joseph Zycha. CSEL 60, 1913. Augustinus, Contra Iulianum opus imperfectum Augustinus Hipponensis. Contra Iulianum opus imperfectum (libri 4–6). Edited by Michaela Zelzer. CSEL 85/2, 2004. Augustinus, De civitate Dei Augustinus Hipponensis. De civitate Dei. Edited by Bernard Dombart and Alfons Kalb. CCSL 47–48, 1955. Augustinus, De correptione et gratia Augustinus Hipponensis. De correptione et gratia. PL 44. Augustinus, De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII Augustinus Hipponensis. De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII. Edited by Almut Mutzenbecher. CCSL 44A, 1975. Augustinus, De doctrina christiana Augustinus Hipponensis. De doctrina christiana. Edited by Joseph Martin. CCSL 32, 1962. Augustinus, De dono perseverantiae Augustinus Hipponensis. De dono perseverantiae. PL 45. Augustinus, De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim Augustinus Hipponensis. De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim. Edited by Joseph Zycha. CSEL 28/1, 1894. Augustinus, De Genesi contra Manichaeos libri duo Augustinus Hipponensis. De Genesi contra Manichaeos libri duo. PL 34.

editorial principles

107

Augustinus, De gratia et libero arbitrio Augustinus Hipponensis. De gratia et libero arbitrio. PL 44. Augustinus, De libero arbitrio Augustinus Hipponensis. De libero arbitrio. Edited by William M. Green. CCSL 29, 1970. Augustinus, De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus Manichaeorum Augustinus Hipponensis. De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus Manichaeorum. Edited by Johannes B. Bauer. CSEL 90, 1992. Augustinus, De natura boni Augustinus Hipponensis. De natura boni. Edited by Joseph Zycha. CSEL 25, 1891. Augustinus, De natura et gratia Augustinus Hipponensis. De natura et gratia. Edited by Karl F. Vrba and Joseph Zycha. CSEL 60, 1913. Augustinus, De perfectione iustitiae hominis Augustinus Hipponensis. De perfectione iustitiae hominis. Edited by Karl F. Vrba and Joseph Zycha. CSEL 42, 1902. Augustinus, De praedestinatione sanctorum Augustinus Hipponensis. De praedestinatione sanctorum. PL 44. Augustinus, De Trinitate libri XV Augustinus Hipponensis. De Trinitate libri XV. Edited by William J. Mountain and Franciscus. CCSL 50–50A, 1968. Augustinus, Enarrationes in Psalmos Augustinus Hipponensis. Enarrationes in Psalmos. Edited by Eligius Dekkers and Jean Fraipont. CCSL 38–40, 1956. Augustinus, Enchiridion de fide, spe et caritate Augustinus Hipponensis. Enchiridion de fide, spe et caritate. Edited by Ernest Evans. CCSL 46, 1969. Augustinus, Epistulae Augustinus Hipponensis. Epistulae. Edited by Al Goldbacher. CSEL 44, 57, 1895– 1898. Augustinus, Retractationum libri II Augustinus Hipponensis. Retractationum libri II. Edited by Pius Knöll. CSEL 36, 1902. Augustinus, Sermones Augustinus Hipponensis. Sermones. PL 38. Ps. Augustinus, De spiritu et anima Alcherus Claraevallensis (dubium) (= Augustinus [pseudo]). De spiritu et anima. PL 40. Averroes, In Physicam Averroes. Commentum super libro Physicorum. Translated by Michael Scotus. Co-

108

editorial principles

logne: Digital Averroes Research Environment (DARE). http://dare.uni‑koeln.de/​ app/sourceviewer?type=text&textid=18. 9 June, 2022. Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima Liber De Philosophia prima, sive, Scientia divina I–IV. Avicenna Latinus. Edited by Simone van Riet. Leiden: Brill, 1977. Biblia Sacra vulgatae editionis (Sixti V Pont. Max. iussu recognita et Clementis VIII auctoritate ed., cura et studio Monachorum Abbatiae Pontificiae Sancti Hieronymi in Urbe Ordinis Sancti Benedicti): Actus Apostolorum (Act) I ad Corinthios (ICor) Apocalypsis (Apc) Colossenses (Col) Ecclesiastici (Ecl) Ephesios (Eph) Hebraeos (Hbr) Iacobi (Iac) Iob (Iob) Iohannes (Io) Isaias (Is) Lucas (Lc) Malachias (IV Reg) Matthaeus (Mt) Marcus (Mc) Ad Romanos (Rm) I Paralipomenon (I Par) II Paralipomenon (II Par) Philippenses (Phil) Psalmi (Ps) Zachariah (Za) Boethius, De consolatione philosophiae Boethius. De consolatione philosophiae. Edited by Ludwig Bieler. CCSL 94, 1984. Cassiodorus, Expositio psalmorum Cassiodorus Carthaginensis. Expositio psalmorum. PL 70. Cyprianus, Ad Quirinum Cyprianus Carthaginensis. Ad Quirinum. Edited by William Hartel. CCSL 3/1, 1868. Decretum magistri Gratiani Decretum magistri Gratiani. Edited by Emil L. Richter and Emil-Albert Friedberg. In Corpus Iuris Canonici. Edited by Emil L. Richter and Emil-Albert Friedberg. Vols. 1– 2. 1879–1881. Photomech. Nachdruck Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, 1959.

editorial principles

109

Duns Scotus, Lectura Ioannes Duns Scotus. Lectura. In Opera omnia. Edited by C. Balić, C. Barbarić, S. Bušelić, P. Čapkun-Delić, B. Hechich, I. Jurić, B. Korošak, L. Modrić, S. Nanni, S. Ruiz de Loizaga, C. Saco Alarcón, and O. Schäfer. Vol. 17. Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1966. [Lectura I, dist. 8–45.] Duns Scotus, Ordinatio Ioannes Duns Scotus. Ordinatio. In Opera omnia. Edited by C. Balić, M. Bodewig, S. Bušelić, P. Čapkun-Delić, B. Hechich, I. Jurić, B. Korošak, L. Modrić, S. Nanni, I. Reinhold, and O. Schäfer. Vol. 4. Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1956. [Ordinatio I, dist. 4–10.] Ioannes Duns Scotus. Ordinatio. In Opera omnia. Edited by C. Balić, M. Bodewig, S. Bušelić, P. Čapkun-Delić, B. Hechich, I. Jurić, B. Korošak, L. Modrić, S. Nanni, I. Reinhold, and O. Schäfer. Vol. 5. Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1959. [Ordinatio I, dist. 11–25.] Ioannes Duns Scotus. Ordinatio. In Opera omnia. Edited by C. Balić, M. Bodewig, S. Bušelić, P. Čapkun-Delić, B. Hechich, I. Jurić, B. Korošak, L. Modrić, S. Nanni, I. Reinhold, and O. Schäfer. Vol. 6. Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1963. [Ordinatio I, dist. 26–48.] Ioannes Duns Scotus. Ordinatio. In Opera omnia. Edited by B. Hechich, B. Huculak, J. Percan, S. Ruiz de Loizaga, W. Salamon, G. Pica. Vol. 11. Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 2008. [Ordinatio IV, dist. 1–7.] Glossa ordinaria Biblia Latina cum Glossa ordinaria. Vols. 1–4, Argentinae 1480–1481, facs. repr. Turnhout, 1992. Gregorius IX, Decretales Gregorius Papa IX. Decretales. Edited by Emil L. Richter and Emil-Albert Friedberg. In Corpus Iuris Canonici. Edited by Emil L. Richter and Emil-Albert Friedberg. Vols. 1–2. Lipsiae 1879–1881. Nachdruck Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, 1959. Gregorius Magnus, Moralia in Iob Gregorius Magnus. Moralia in Iob. Edited by Marci Adriaen. CCSL 143–143A, 1979. Guilelmus Altissiodorensis, Summa aurea Guilelmus Altissiodorensis. Summa aurea. Edited by Jean Ribaillier. Vols. 1–2. Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique; Roma: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1980–1986. Guillemus de Ockham, De connexione virtutum Guillemus de Ockham. Principium Bibliae sive Quaestio de connexione virtutum (De connexione virtutum). Edited by Joseph C. Wey. In Guillemus de Ockham. Quaestiones variae. Edited by Girard I. Etzkorn, Francis E. Kelley, Joseph C. Wey. Vol. 8. St. Bonaventure, NY: St. Bonaventure University, 1984.

110

editorial principles

Henricus de Gandavo, Quodlibet IV Henrici de Gandavo. Quodlibet IV. In Henrici de Gandavo Opera omnia. Edited by Gordon A. Wilson, Girard J. Etzkorn. Vol. 8. Ancient and Medieval Philosophy Series 2. Leuven: University Press 2011. Henricus de Gandavo, Quodlibet V Henricus de Gandavo. Quodlibet V, q. 4. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Ms. lat. 15848. Henricus de Gandavo, Quodlibet VIII Henricus de Gandavo. Quodlibet VIII, q. 5. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Ms. lat. 15847. Hugo de Sancto Victore, De sacramentis christianae fidei Hugo de Sancto Victore. De sacramentis christianae fidei. PL 176. Hypognosticon Hypognosticon (Contra quartum dogma Pelagianorum). PL 45. Ioachim Abbas Florensis, Dialogi de praescientia Dei et praedestinatione electorum Ioachim Abbas Florensis. Dialogi de praescientia Dei et praedestinatione electorum. Edited by Gian I. Potestà. Rome: Istituto storico italiano per il Medio Evo, 1995. Ioannes Damascenus, De fide orthodoxa Iohannes Damascenus secundum translationem quam fecit Burgundius Pisanus De fide orthodoxa. (Traditio certa orthodoxae fidei). Edited by Eligius M. Buytaert. St. Bonaventure, NY: St. Bonaventure University, 1955. Isidorus, Sententiae Isidorus Hispalensis. Sententiae. Edited by Pierre Cazier. CCSL 111, 1998. Origenes, In Epistulam Pauli ad Romanos explanationum libri Origenes. In Epistulam Pauli ad Romanos explanationum libri. Edited by Caroline P. Hammond Bammel. Vols. 16, 33, 34 Vetus Latina, Aus der Geschichte der lateinischen Bibel. 1990–1998. Petrus Lombardus, In epist. ad Rom. Petrus Lombardus, In epist. ad Philipp. Petrus Lombardus, In epist. ad Hebr. Petrus Lombardus. Collectanea in omnes Pauli apostoli Epistulas. PL 191–192. Petrus Lombardus, In Psalmos Petrus Lombardus. Commentarium in Psalmos. PL 191. Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae Petrus Lombardus. Sententiae in IV libris distinctae. Edited by PP. Collegii Sancti Bonaventurae. Vols. 1–2. Rome, 1971–1981. Ps. Bernard, Meditationes piissimae Pseudo-Bernard. Meditationes piissimae de cognitione humanae conditionis. PL 184. Prosper Aquitanus, Liber sententiarum Prosper Aquitanus. Liber sententiarum. Edited by M. Gastaldo. In Prosper Aquitanus.

editorial principles

111

Expositio psalmorum. Liber sententiarum. Edited by P. Callens and M. Gastaldo. CCSL 68A, 1972, pp. 212–365. Richard Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum Richard Kilvington’s Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum: A Critical Edition with an Introduction. Edited by Monika Michałowska. Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 121. Leiden–Boston: Brill 2016. Ricardus Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum Richard Kilvington. Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum. Edited by Monika Michałowska. In Monika Michałowska Richard Kilvington on the Capacity of Created Beings, Infinity, and Being Simultaneously in Rome and Paris: Critical Edition of Question 3 from Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum. Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 130. Leiden–Boston: Brill 2021. q. 3: Utrum omnis creatura sit suae naturae certis limitibus circumscripta, art. 2, Utrum unum infinitum potest esse maius alio, pp. 127–148. Richard Kilvington. Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum. q. 5: Utrum peccans solum per instans mereatur puniri per infinita instantia interpolata. Bologna, Biblioteca Comunale dell’Archiginnasio, A. 985, fols. 29vb–42rb. Thomas de Aquino, Catena aurea in quatuor Evangelia Thomas de Aquino. Catena aurea in quatuor Evangelia. Vol. 1. Expositio in Matthaeum. Edited by A. Guarenti, Turin–Rome: Marietti, 1953. Thomas de Aquino, In I Sententiarum Thomas de Aquino. Scriptum super libros Sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi episcopi Parisiensis. Vol. 1. Edited by Pierre Mandonnet. Lethielleux, Paris 1929. Thomas de Aquino, Summa contra Gentiles Thomas de Aquino. Summa contra Gentiles. Editio Leonina. Vols. 13–15. Rome, 1918, 1926, 1930. Thomas de Aquino, Summa Theologiae Thomas de Aquino. Summa Theologiae. Editio Leonina. Vols. 4–12. Rome, 1888– 1906. Thomas de Aquino, Super Evangelium Iohannis reportatio Thomas de Aquino. Super Evangelium Iohannis Reportatio. Edited by Raphael Cai. Turin–Rome: Marietti 1952. Thomas de Aquino, Super Evangelium Matthaei reportatio Thomas de Aquino. Super Evangelium Matthaei reportatio. Edited by Raphael Cai. Turin–Rome: Marietti, 1951. Thomas de Aquino, Quaestiones disputatae de veritate Thomas de Aquino. Quaestiones disputatae de veritate. Edited by Antoine Dondaine. Vol. 22.1–3. Rome: Commissio Leonina, Editori di San Tommaso, 1970–1976. Thomas Bradvardinus, De futuris contingentibus Thomas Bradvardinus. “Le De futuris contingentibus de Thomas Bradwardine.” Ed-

112

editorial principles

ited by Jean-François Genest. Recherches Augustiniennes 14 (1979), pp. 249– 336. Quaestiones veteris et novi testamenti (opus Ambrosiastri). PL 35.

Bibliography Primary Sources Manuscripts Richard FitzRalph. Lectura super Sententias, q. 10, art. 1, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 15853. Richard FitzRalph. Lectura super Sententias, q. 10, art. 1, Oxford, Oriel College, 15. Thomas Bradwardine. Quaestiones theologicae, q. 6, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 15805.

Editions Adam Wodeham. Lectura secunda. Edited by Rega Wood and Gedeon Gál. Vols. 1–3. St. Bonaventure, NY: St. Bonaventure University, 1990. Anselm. De casu diaboli. In S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera Omnia. Edited by Franciscus S. Schmitt, O.S.B. Vol. 1. Seccovii, 1938, reset for Thomas Nelson & Sons Edinburgh: Nelson, 1938. Augustin. De perfectione iustitiae hominis. Edited by Karl F. Vrba and Joseph Zycha. Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, ed. consilio et impensis Academiae Scientiarum Austriacae [olim Academiae Litterarum Caesareae Vindobonensis] 42, 1902. Averroes. Aristotelis metaphysicorum libri XIIII cum Averrois Cordubensis in eosdem commentariis et epitome, Theophrasti metaphysicorum liber. Editio Juntina prima. Vol. 8. Venezia, 1562. http://capricorn.bc.edu/siepm/DOCUMENTS/AVERROES/Ave rroes_Metaphysica_JuntPrima_08.pdf. September 2, 2022. Averroes. Paraphrasis in De divinatione per somnum. In Aristotelis Opera omnes Averrois Commentarii aliique … in logica, philosophia et medicina libri quorum aliqui sunt … nuper a Jacobo Mantino conversi. Vol. 7. Venezia, 1560. Geoffrey Chaucer. “The Nun’s Priest’s Tale.” In The Canterbury Tales. www.online‑literat ure.com/chaucer/canterbury/21/. June 4, 2022. John Duns Scotus. Ordinatio. In Opera omnia. Edited by C. Balić, M. Bodewig, S. Bušelić, P. Čapkun-Delić, B. Hechich, I. Jurić, B. Korošak, L. Modrić, S. Nanni, I. Reinhold, and O. Schäfer. Vol. 5. Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1959. [Ordinatio I, dist. 11– 25.] John Duns Scotus. Ordinatio. In Opera omnia. Edited by C. Balić, M. Bodewig, S. Bušelić, P. Čapkun-Delić, B. Hechich, I. Jurić, B. Korošak, L. Modrić, S. Nanni, I. Reinhold, and O. Schäfer. Vol. 6. Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1963. [Ordinatio I, dist. 26– 48.] John Duns Scotus. Ordinatio. In Opera omnia. Edited by B. Hechich, B. Huculak, J. Per-

114

bibliography

can, S. Ruiz de Loizaga, W. Salamon, G. Pica. Vol. 11. Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 2008. [Ordinatio IV, dist. 1–7.] Richard Kilvington. Richard Kilvington on the Capacity of Created Beings, Infinity, and Being Simultaneously in Rome and Paris: Critical Edition of Question 3 from Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum. Edited by Monika Michałowska. Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 130. Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2021. Richard Kilvington. Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum: A Critical Edition with an Introduction. Edited by Monika Michałowska. Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 121. Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2016. Richard Kilvington. “Utrum continuum sit divisibile in infinitum.” Edited by Robert Podkoński. Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum 36/2 (2007), pp. 120–175. Richard Kilvington. “Utrum in omni motu potentia motoris excedit potentian rei motae.” Edited by Elżbieta Jung. In Elżbieta Jung and Robert Podkoński, Towards the Modern Theory of Motion: Oxford Calculators and the New Interpretation of Aristotle. Research on Science & Natural Philosophy 4. Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, 2020, pp. 213–266. Thomas Bradwardine. “Le De futuris contingentibus de Thomas Bradwardine.” Edited by Jean-François Genest. Recherches Augustiniennes et Patristiques 14 (1979), pp. 249– 336. William Ockham. Guillelmi de Ockham scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum. Ordinatio. Prologus et Distinctio prima. In Opera theologica. Edited by Gedeon Gál and Stephen Brown. Vol. 1. St. Bonaventure, NY: St. Bonaventure University, 1967.

Translations Aristotle. De interpretatione. Translated by Ella M. Edghill. In The Basic Works of Aristotle. Edited by Richard McKeon. New York: Random Hause, 2001, pp. 40–64. Anselm. The Harmony of the Foreknowledge, the Predestination, and the Grace of God with Free Choice. In Complete Philosophical and Theological Treatises of Anselm of Canterbury. Translated by Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson. Minneapolis: The Artur J. Banning Press, 2000. https://jasper‑hopkins.info/DeConcordia.pdf. June 4, 2022. Augustin. A Treatise Concerning Man’s Perfection in Righteousness, cap. 2. Translated by Philip Schaff. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf105.html. June 4, 2022. John Duns Scotus. Ordinatio I, dist. 11–25. Translated by Peter L.P. Simpson. http://​ aristotelophile.com/Books/Translations/Scotus%20Ordinatio%20I%20dd.11‑25.pd f. June 4, 2022. John Duns Scotus. Ordinatio I, dist. 26–48. Translated by Peter L.P. Simpson. http://​ aristotelophile.com/Books/Translations/Scotus%20Ordinatio%20I%20dd.26‑48.p df. June 4, 2022. John Duns Scotus. Ordinatio I, dist. 40, q. unica. Translated by Peter L.P. Simpson. http://​

bibliography

115

aristotelophile.com/Books/Translations/Scotus%20Ordinatio%20I%20dd.26‑48.p df. June 4, 2022. John Duns Scotus. Ordinatio IV, dist. 1–7. Translated by Peter L.P. Simpson. https://​ aristotelophile.com/Books/Translations/Scotus%20Ordinatio%20IV%20d.1‑7.pdf. June 4, 2022. John Duns Scotus. Contingency and Freedom. Lectura I 39. Introduction, Translation and Commentary by Antonie Vos Jaczn., Henri Veldhuis, Aline H. Looman-Graaskamp, Eef Dekker, and Nico W. den Bok. The Hague: Springer Netherlands, 1994. Thomas Aquinas. Commentary on the “Metaphysics” Book 5, lect. 14. Translated by John P. Rowan. https://www.logicmuseum.com/wiki/Authors/ThomasAquinas/metaphy sics/liber5. June 4, 2022.

Secondary Sources Bakker, Paul J.J.M. and Chris Schabel. “Sentences Commentaries of the Later Fourteenth Century.” In Medieval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. Edited by Gillian R. Evans. Vol. 1. Leiden–Boston–Köln: Brill, 2001, pp. 429–430. Courtenay, William J. Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987. Genest, Jean-François. “Les premiers écrits théologiques de Bradwardine: textes inédits et découvertes récentes.” In Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. Edited by Gillian R. Evans. Vol. 1. Leiden–Boston–Köln: Brill, 2002, pp. 395–421. Genest, Jean-François. Prédétermination et liberté crée à Oxford au XIVe siècle: Buckingham contre Bradwardine. Etudes de philosophie médiévale 70. Paris: J. Vrin, 1992. Genest, Jean-François. “Théologie et experience spirituelle: Le cas de Thomas Bradwardine.” In What is Theology in the Middle Ages: Religious Culture of Europe (11th–15th Centuries) as Reflected in Their Self-Understanding. Edited by Mikołaj Olszewski. Archa Verbi 1. Subsidia. Münster: Aschedorff Verlag, 2007, pp. 277–300. Genest Jean-François and Katherine Tachau. “La lecture de Thomas Bradwardine sur les Sentences.” Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge 57 (1990), pp. 301– 306. Gensler, Marek and Monika Mansfeld. Walter Burley’s Commentaries on Parva Naturalia. Leiden–Boston: Brill (forthcoming). Hogarth Rossiter, Sarah. Foreknowledge, Free Will, and the Divine Power Distinction in Thomas Bardwardine’s ‘De Futuris Contingentibus’. London, ON: The University of Western Ontario, 2017. Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository. September 9, 2022. Jung, Elżbieta. “Richard Kilvington.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edition 2022. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kilvington/. June 4, 2022.

116

bibliography

Jung, Elżbieta. “The New Interpretation of Aristotle: Richard Kilvington, Thomas Bradwardine and the New Rule of Motion.” In Quantifying Aristotle: The Impact, Spread, and Decline of the Calculatores Tradition. Edited by Daniel Di Liscia and Edith Sylla, with the collaboration of Paul J.J.M. Bakker. Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy and Science 34. Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2022, pp. 37–79. Jung, Elżbieta. “William of Ockham on Free Will in God and in Man.” In If God Exists: Human Freedom and Theistic Hypothesis. Studies and Essays. Edited by Andrzej P. Stefańczyk and Roman Majeran. Translated by Roman Majeran and Barbara Kulicka. Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 2019, pp. 221–241. http://bit.ly/If_God​ _Exists_pdf. June 4, 2022. Jung-Palczewska, Elżbieta. “Works by Richard Kilvington.” Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge 67 (2000), pp. 181–223. Jung, Elżbieta and Robert Podkoński, “Mathematical Imagination in 14th-Century Natural Philosophy: The Case of the Endless Helix Line” (forthcoming). Jung, Elżbieta and Robert Podkoński. Towards the Modern Theory of Motion: Oxford Calculators and the New Interpretation of Aristotle. Research on Science & Natural Philosophy 4. Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, 2020. Kitanov, Severin and Chris Schabel. “Thomas Bradwardine’s Questions on Grace and Merit from His Lectura on the Sentences at Oxford, 1332–1333.” Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge 89 (2022), pp. 163–236. Koszkało, Martyna. “The Problem of Predestination of Human Beings According to John Duns Sotus.” In If God Exists: Human Freedom and Theistic Hypothesis. Studies and Essays. Edited by Andrzej P. Stefańczyk and Roman Majeran. Translated by Roman Majeran and Barbara Kulicka. Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 2019, pp. 189–220. https://tnkul.pl/files/userfiles/files/2019_IfGodExists.pdf. June 4, 2022. Kretzmann, Norman. “Richard Kilvington and the Logic of Instantaneous Speed.” In Studi sul XIV secolo in memoria di Anneliese Maier. Edited by Alfonso Maierù and Agostino Paravicini Bagliani. Rome: Edizioni di Storia et Letteratura, 1981, pp. 143– 178. Lahey, Stephen E. “Thomas Bradwardine.” In Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy: Philosophy Between 500 and 1500. Edited by Henrik Lagerlund. Dordrech–Heidelberg– London–New York: Springer, 2011, pp. 1291–1293. Leff, Gordon. Bradwardine and the Pelagians: A Study of His De causa Dei and Its Opponents. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1957. Lukács, Edit A. “Calculations in Thomas Bradwardine’s De causa Dei, Book I.” In Quantifying Aristotle: The Impact, Spread, and Decline of the Calculatores Tradition. Edited by Daniel Di Liscia and Edith Sylla, with the collaboration of Paul J.J.M. Bakker. Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy and Science 34. Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2022, pp. 106–125. Maier, Anneliese. Die Vorläufer Galileis im 14. Jahrhundert. 2nd ed. Studien zur Naturphilosophie der Spätscholastik 1. Rome: Edizioni di Storia et Letteratura, 1966.

bibliography

117

Maier, Anneliese. An der Grenze von Scholastik und Naturwissenschaft. 2nd ed. 3 Studien zur Naturphilosophie der Spätscholastik. Rome: Edizioni di Storia et Letteratura, 1952. Maier, Anneliese. Ausgehendes Mittelalter. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Geistesgeschichte des 14. Jahrhunderts. Vol. 1. Rome: Edizioni di Storia et Letteratura, 1964. Michałowska, Monika. “Cracking the Code of the Will: Richard Kilvington on the Will and Logic.” In Willing and Understanding: Late Medieval Debates on the Will, the Intellect, and Practical Knowledge. Edited by Monika Michałowska and Riccardo Fedriga. Investigating Medieval Philosophy 19. Leiden: Brill (forthcoming). Michałowska, Monika and Elżbieta Jung. “Scotistic and Ockhamist Contributions to Kilvington’s Ethical and Theological Views.” In 1308: Eine Topographie historischer Gleichzeitigkeit. Edited by Andreas Speer and David Wirmer. Miscellanea Mediaevalia 35. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010, pp. 104–122. Murdoch, John E. and Edit D. Sylla. “The Science of Motion.” In Science in the Middle Ages. Edited by David C. Lindberg. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978, pp. 206–264. Obermann, Heiko. Archbishop Thomas Bradwardine, a Fourteenth Century Augustinian: A Study of His Theology in Its Historical Context. Utrecht: Kemink & Zoon, 1958. Obermann, Heiko. Forerunners of the Reformation: The Shape of Late Medieval Thought. New York: Lutterworth Press, 1967. Podkoński, Robert. Ryszard Kilvington: nieskończoność i geometria. Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, 2016. Schabel, Chris. “Haec ille: Citation, Quotation, and Plagiarism in 14th Century Scholasticism.” In The Origins of European Scholarship: The Cyprus Millenium Conference. Edited by Ioannis Taifacos. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2006, pp. 163–175. Schabel, Chris. Theology at Paris, 1316–1345: Peter Auriol and the Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000.

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum Quaestio 4: Utrum quilibet actus voluntatis per se malus sit per se aliquid

∵

⟨Argumenta principalia quaestionis⟩

5

(I) Et videtur quod sic, quia ens dividitur | in decem praedicamenta quorum unum est agere, igitur agere est aliquid, igitur eadem ratione velle agere est aliquid. (II) Item, Anselmus De concordia capitulo 10:a Deus facit in omnibus volitionibus bonis quod essentialiter sint et quod bona sint; in malis autem non facit quod mala sint, sed tantum quod per essentiam sint, igitur actus mali sunt per essentiam a Deo. ⟨Contra⟩

10

Ad oppositum arguitur secundum Philosophum II Ethicorum capitulo 2:b aliqui actus sunt sic convoluti malitia quod non possunt bene circumstantionari. Sed si tunc tales actus forent res, tunc huiusmodi actus possent fieri et creari a Deo sine aliqua malitia, et fieri per consequens ab homine. Consequens est falsum.

15

⟨Ordo quaestionis⟩ Circa istam materiam de actu malo: (I) recitabo aliquas opiniones et eas improbabo; (II) secundo ponam opinionem propriam et eam confirmabo; (III) tertio respondebo ad argumenta. ⟨I⟩ ⟨Opiniones improbandae et viae⟩

20

(1) Prima opinio est quae dicit quod huiusmodi actus per se malus est aliquid. Et hanc viam, licet modo contrario, recitat Scotus libro I distinctione

3 est3] iter. A 6 autem] aut A aliter G 7 sint1] sunt AG 7–8 sint2 … essentiam] om. (hom.) K 10 ad] in A ‖ arguitur] om. BGK ‖ II] 3 AK ‖ 2] dicit quod add. K 11 sic] mali BG om. K ‖ convoluti] iter. A 12 si] om. G 13 creari] terminari G ‖ fieri] et add. A ‖ ab homine] ad honorem A ‖ homine] et per add. K 19 est2] per se add. K

a Recte Anselmus, De concordia, q. 1, cap. 7, p. 259.

b Recte Aristoteles, Ethica Nicomachea, lib. II, cap. 6, p. 171 (1107a8–12). Cf. Guillelmus de Ockham, De connexione virtutum, q. VII, art. 1, p. 339.

B 39ra

122

A 25vb

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

17 quaestione 1,a ubi ponit quod habitus facit intensionem actus, sed voluntas ponit gradum in substantia illius. (2) Secunda opinio est quod, licet huiusmodi actus sit res, non tamen immediate producitur a Deo nec Deus est auctor illius nisi mediate, quia Deus | est auctor et causa efficiens ipsius voluntatis quae producit actum illum. (3) Tertia via et opinio est quod in huiusmodi actibus liberum arbitrium, sive in bonis actibus sive in malis, prius naturaliter agit actus tales et Deus coagit libero arbitrio ad producendum huiusmodi actum, et sic Deus agit quod liberum arbitrium agit et non e converso. (4) Quarta opinio est quod in actibus meritoriis prius agit Deus et e contra liberum arbitrium, sed in actibus demeritoriis est e contra.

5

10

⟨Probatio primae opinionis et viae⟩

G 161va

Probatur prima via, videlicet quod Deus agit substantiam actus et voluntas ponit gradum in substantia illius. | Istud videtur rationale et pono quoad eius primam partem, scilicet quod Deus creat substantiam in huiusmodi actibus voluntatis, quia talis actus, si sit res, aut est creatura aut non. Si creatura, igitur creatorem alium non habet nisi Deum. Si non sit creatura, igitur creator. Utraque consequentia patet per Magistrum III libro distinctione 11 capitulo 1:b omnis substantia quae Deus non est, creatura est, et quae creatura non est, Deus est.

2 illius] illa AG om. K 3 secunda] via et add. BK 4 immediate producitur] inv. A ‖ mediate] metaphorice K 7 est] om. AK ‖ liberum arbitrium] om. K 8 actibus] om. K ‖ prius naturaliter] liberum arbitrium K 9 libero arbitrio] liberum arbitrium BG ‖ huiusmodi actum] actum talem K ‖ actum] actus B om. G 10 quod] quia A ‖ converso] contra BGK 11 meritoriis prius] malis K 12 liberum … contra] om. (hom.) K 14 probatur … videlicet] prima via et opinio probatur scilicet K 15 illius] om. AGK 16 istud] non add. B ‖ videtur] om. A ‖ et] erit G ‖ pono … partem] probo primam eius partem K 19 consequentia] est bona et add. A 19–20 per … libro] III libro per magistrum K 20 11] 1 A 13 BG 21 est4] om. AG

a Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, dist. 17, par. 1, q. 2, nn. 27–30, pp. 149–151: “[27] Alia via potest dici (…), quod actus habet suam substantiam a potentia, sed intensionem talem vel talem habet ab habitu (…). [30] Praeterea, si habitus det intensionem actui, hoc esset in aliquo gradu signato (signetur ille gradus); voluntas ergo cum habitu isto potest habere actum intensum in ‘hoc’ gradu.” b Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. III, dist. 11, cap. 1, p. 77.

15

20

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

5

10

15

20

25

123

Item, Magister I libro distinctione 45:a Dei voluntas causa omnium etc. Si igitur Dei voluntas sit causa omnium et non praeventa, igitur est prima causa creans substantiam talis actus, igitur etc. Item, Enchiridion VI,b et allegat Magister I libro distinctione 4 capitulo 3:c satis credibile est christiano creatarum rerum ⟨causam⟩, omnium visibilium et invisibilium, non nisi bonitatem credere creatoris nullamquae esse rem quae non ipse sit vel ab ipso. Item, II libro distinctione 18 capitulo 1:d et Deus omnibus rebus existit | causa creationis. Et capitulo 6:e angeli nullam possunt creare naturam, solus enim Deus creator est. Infinita talia possunt adduci, quae causa brevitatis omitto. Secunda pars primae viae, scilicet quod voluntas ponit gradum in actu, probatur, quia aliter voluntas non posset producere sub quocumque gradu remisso, si vellet, quia non posset ⟨producere⟩ in gradum remissiorem quam foret gradus producendus a Deo. Sed contra istam viam arguo sic: producat Socrates aliquem actum voluntatis qui sit A et producat Plato B actum in duplo meliorem A sive intensiorem. Tunc sic: B est in duplo intensior quam A, igitur subtracto eodem per intellectum ab utroque, scilicet quod Deus agit, et variabitur proportio, et tunc proportio B ad A non erit dupla nec plus quam dupla, igitur tunc erit minus quam dupla, et ita tantam latitudinem per quantam variatur proportio agit Deus, et per consequens non solum produxit substantiam sed gradum. Item, quidquid Deus operatur voluntate coagente posset Deus similiter facere sine voluntate coagente, et ita si Deus operatur solam substantiam in 1 I libro] inv. A ‖ 45] 11 B 41 G ‖ omnium] est K 2 dei] om. A ‖ sit causa] causa est K 3 actus] actibus GK 5 creatarum] creaturarum B 5–6 rerum … credere] om. (hom.) BG 6 bonitatem] bonitate A ‖ creatoris] creatorum AG creatorem B 7 non] om. A 8 1] om. G ‖ 1 et] om. B 2 K 8–9 existit causa] inv. A 13 non] om. BGK 14 si] om. BGK ‖ vellet] quod est falsum add. B ‖ posset] foret K 15 foret] esset A ‖ producendus] productus A 16 istam] illam BG 16–17 arguo … sit] om. (hom.) G 16 aliquem actum] inv. B ‖ actum] gradum A 18 tunc … intensior] om. (hom.) BG ‖ in … intensior] intensiorem A 19 per … utroque] communi ab utroque per intellectum K ‖ utroque] utraque B 20 et … proportio] om. (hom.) A 21 et ita] igitur K 22 deus] om. K ‖ produxit] producit K ‖ sed] agit add. K 24 similiter] simpliciter BK 25 operatur] operetur AG 25–124.1 in … substantiam] om. (hom.) G

a Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. I, dist. 45, cap. 4, p. 308. b Recte Augustinus, Enchiridion de fide, spe et caritate, cap. III, 9, p. 53. c Recte Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. I, dist. 4, cap. 2, pp. 79–80. d Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. II, dist. 18, cap. 1, p. 416. e Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. II, dist. 18, cap. 6, pp. 419–420. Cf. Augustinus, De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim, lib. IX, par. 15, p. 286.

K 50v

124

B 39rb

G 161vb

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

actu voluntatis voluntate coagente, igitur posset facere solam substantiam voluntate non coagente, et ita aliquis actus voluntatis foret sine gradu, et ita aliqua volitio indivisibilis. Consequens falsum, quia tunc excederetur a volitione habente gradum | infinite, et ita quaecumque volitio habens gradum foret in infinitum maior, et per consequens infinita. Item, posito quod huiusmodi volitio sine gradu foret in Socrate respectu motus localis, tunc Socrates vult moveri localiter, et non impeditur, ut pono, igitur movebitur motu locali infinitae tarditatis cum a voluntate nulla posset remissius moveri. Item, ponatur per imaginationem sive per impossibile sive aliter quod Platoni detur A virtus agendi quam exercet Deus in productione actus voluntatis Platonis, et subtrahat Deus illam virtutem quam habet Plato modo ad producendum gradum. Tunc: cum Plato sit nunc maioris virtutis ad producendum actum dilectionis Dei quam ante, quia nunc potest producere ut Deus et ante non potuit, sed prius potuit producere actum dilectionis sub forti gradu, igitur nunc potest producere sub forti gradu, quod est contra casum. Et probatur consequentia per Anselmum De libertate arbitrii capitulo 7,a ubi dicit quod actus non est fortis nisi quia fortiter fit nec fit fortiter nisi quia voluntas utitur sua fortitudine. Sic in proposito: si ante potuit Plato diligere Deum super omnia et nunc est maioris potentiae quam tunc, igitur nunc potest diligere Deum super omnia. Item, capiatur talis actus voluntatis qui nunc non producitur, sed immediate post hoc producetur et sit A. Tunc Deus aget substantiam actus A aut subito aut successive. Non successive, quia totus actus quoad substantiam immediate post hoc erit, igitur quoad eius productionem | non erit successio. Si subito, igitur continue post hoc aget voluntas quando Deus non aget, nec Deus modo agit, igitur voluntas potest agere sine Deo coagente.

1 voluntate coagente] cum voluntate B ‖ solam] om. K ‖ substantiam] actus add. K 2 coagente] agente K 3 volitio] foret add. B 4 quaecumque] om. A 6 foret] fieret K 8 nulla] non K 10 sive aliter] generaliter K 11 a virtus] inv. K ‖ agendi] augendi A 12 virtutem] voluntatem A 13 nunc] om. A 14 actum] om. G ‖ actum dilectionis] dilectionem B 15 producere] om. BG ‖ dilectionis] voluntatis K 17 anselmum] augustinum G ‖ libertate arbitrii] libero arbitrio AGK 19 ante] autem BG ‖ potuit plato] inv. BG 20 super] ante BG 21 diligere … omnia] etc K 23 hoc] om. BGK ‖ producetur] non bonum modum voluntas potest agere deo non coagente add. in marg. al. manu B ‖ aget] ageret B ‖ substantiam] totius actus quoad substantiam add. G 25 quoad] ad K ‖ eius] eandem BG 25–26 non … successio] om. A 27 coagente] cooperante BG

a Anselmus, De libertate arbitrii, cap. 7, pp. 219–220.

5

10

15

20

25

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

5

10

15

20

25

125

Item, cum Deus operatur actum voluntatis quoad substantiam, aut igitur necessario aget voluntas gradum aut non. Si necessario, tunc necessario voluntas peccaret, quia necessitata ⟨sit⟩ per Deum ad peccandum, quia in quocumque gradu fuerit talis actus, est peccatum mortale sicut adulterandi, occidendi etc. Si non, sequitur necessario quod voluntas aget. Maneat igitur substantia per horam voluntate non producente gradum. Et quaeritur tunc: utrum in secunda hora possit producere voluntas gradum in actu illo aut non? Si sic, igitur cum Deus non agat per illam secundam horam, sequitur quod voluntas possit producere actum sine Deo coagente, quod est contra Magistrum II libro distinctione 27 capitulo 13,a ubi dicit quod in bono aliter operatur Deus aliter homo. Si dicatur quod non potest—contra: in principio primae horae potuit producere gradum in actu, et nunc est tantae virtutis sicut tunc, igitur etc. Item, si voluntas sola operetur gradum, tunc ita intense posset aliquis diligere Deum sine gratia sicut cum gratia, et ita sine caritate posset aliquis diligere Deum super omnia—contra: Anselmus De concordia in fine,b ubi dicit quod perdita iustitia voluntas fit ancilla suae affectionis, quae est ad commodum. Item, si Deus operetur substantiam et non gradum, tunc sic posset ⟨operare⟩ in naturalibus, et ita posset facere substantiam caloris sine gradu, et ita frigidum approximatum ageret et expelleret calorem aut subito aut successive, et neque sic neque sic. Item, si sic, Deus posset remissius aut minus intense agere quam agit in productione huiusmodi actus aut non. Si non—contra: voluntas potest in duplo minus et in quadruplo minus, et sic in infinitum minus quam agit, et Deus non, igitur voluntas foret maioris virtutis quam Deus sit. Si Deus 1–2 igitur … voluntas] voluntas necessario aget K 3 per] ad AG ‖ per deum] a deo B 4 est … mortale] erit in peccato mortali K 5 non] igitur add. BG 5–6 igitur substantia] substantia actus K 6 non] numquam K 7 producere voluntas] inv. K ‖ in2] om. A 8 horam] sed voluntas add. BG 9 possit] potuit B potest GK ‖ actum] vel gradum add. K 10 II libro] inv. A ‖ bono] actu B beato G 11 aliter] quam A ‖ si … potest] om. ABG 13 etc] nunc potest K 14 intense] intenso actu K 15 sicut … gratia2] in marg. A ‖ aliquis] quis BGK 17 fit] sit G ‖ ad] om. G 17–18 ad commodum] commodi AB 20 ita] sic A ‖ caloris] calorum A 22 neque1] nec A ‖ neque2] nec A 25 minus2] om. K 26 virtutis] potentiae et libertatis K ‖ sit si] si sic videlicet quod B

a Recte Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. II, dist. 27, cap. 7, p. 485.

b Anselmus, De concordia, q. 3, cap. 13, p. 287: “Voluntas ergo instrumentum, cum sponte facta sit iniusta, post desertam iustitiam manet, quantum in ipsa est, necessitate iniusta et ancilla iniustitiae; quia per se redire nequit ad iustitiam, sine qua numquam libera est, quia naturalis libertas arbitrii sine illa otiosa est. Ancilla etiam facta est suae affectionis, quae ad commodum est, quia remota iustitia nihil potest velle nisi quod illa vult.”

126

A 26ra B 39va

G 162ra

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

posset remissius agere, tunc Deus posset effectum remissiorem producere, et ita actus primus habuit gradum ut producatur a Deo etc. Item: “velle adiacet mihi; perficere autem ⟨bonum⟩, non ⟨invenio⟩,” Ad Romanos 8;a sed perficere est ponere gradum in actu | et non solam substantiam, igitur si solus Deus perficiat, solus Deus agit gradum. Et confirmatur per illud | Ad Romanos 9:b “cuius vult miseretur, et quem vult indurat,” et Ad Philippenses 2:c “operatur in nobis velle et perficere.” Item, tunc sicut in actibus malis totum est attribuendum voluntati et nihil Deo, ita in bonis actibus e contra; consequens falsum, quia ex Deo principaliter boni et ex nobis mali sumus. Item, si Deus operetur substantiam actus in operibus meritoriis, tunc aequaliter ageret et iuvaret eum qui maxime nititur Deum diligere et qui remisse. Patet consequentia, quia utrobique causat substantiam actus qui non est intensibilis et remissibilis ut est sine gradu, quando Deus eum producit. Item, gratia creata agit ad productionem actus meritorii, ut probatum est, et ita voluntas, et plus producuntur de actu per utramque quam per unam causam; igitur illae duae efficiunt gradum et non solam substantiam actus etc.

10

⟨Argumenta pro tertia opinione et via⟩

20

Tertia via est, quae magnam videtur habere evidentiam, quod in omnibus actibus liberi arbitrii prius agit liberum arbitrium et ex contingenti Deus coagit. (1) Et illa via persuadetur per illud I Paralipomenon 28 capitulo,d ubi dicit dicendo ad Salomonem: “Salomon fili mi scito Deum patris tui” | etc.—

25

2 actus] effectus B ‖ ut] et cum K 3 velle] vel AG ‖ perficere] coni.; codd. proficere ABGK ‖ autem] vel A aut G 4 perficere] coni.; codd. proficere ABGK 5 si] cui B om. G ‖ perficiat] proficiat BG 6 illud] idem A actum add. G 7 et1] om. BG ‖ 2] deus add. K ‖ perficere] coni.; codd. proficere ABGK 8 tunc sicut] inv. A ‖ malis] malum add. A ‖ est attribuendum] inv. K ‖ nihil] non K 9 in … actibus] om. K ‖ consequens] est add. BK ‖ deo2] sumus add. K 10 boni … ex] et A 12 iuvaret] privavit G 13 patet consequentia] inv. BG ‖ causat] solam add. K 14 et] nec K ‖ quando] ut K 16 gratia] om. G ‖ gratia creata] creatura A 17 et1 … voluntas] om. AGK ‖ producuntur] producitur ABG 18–19 et … etc] om. A 18 solam] solum BG 21 est] om. K 24 illa] ista A ‖ per illud] om. G ‖ I … capitulo] paralipomenon I capitulo 28 B ‖ dicit] dixit K 25 mi] om. A ‖ scito] scio AG ‖ tui] om. A

a Recte Rm 7:18. Cf. Petrus Lombardus, In epist. ad Rom., cap. 7 (PL 191, 1424A). Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. II, dist. 25, cap. 9, p. 469. b Rm 9:18. Cf. Petrus Lombardus, In epist. ad Rom., cap. 9 (PL 191, 1462A). c Phil 2:13. d I Par 28:9.

5

15

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

5

10

15

20

127

finis—si quaesieris eum invenies si autem dereliqueris eum proiciet te in aeternum. Ex qua auctoritate patet quod prior est conversio hominis ad Deum quam e converso aversio a Deo. (2) Item, Zachariah 1:a “convertimini ad me” etc., et ego “convertar ad vos.” Et ponitur De paenitentia distinctione 1:b “convertimini,” ubi glossa: si— inquit—standum est huic ordini ut prius, sit nostra conversio sequens Dei arbitrium; ubi dicit glossa 43 distinctione:c “sit rector”; ⟨et recitat Gregorius⟩ articulum De vita et honestate clericorumd capitulo ultimo, ubi dicitur sic: “vigore spiritus praecedente et subsequente divina gratia animus niti debet ad veniam.” Consimile est: “Exsurge qui dormis.”e (3) Item, nisi prius ageret liberum arbitrium quam Deus saltem in actibus demeritoriis, sequitur quod Deus prius desereret hominem quam homo peccaret. | Patet consequentia per hoc quod Deus posset prius agere actum illum quo homo deserit Deum quam homo deserens, et Deum sic agere est deserere. Sed primum consequens est falsum et contra Augustinum De spiritu et anima capitulo 20:f semper enim Deus praesentem se exhibet, semper paratum se offert, si me paratum invenerit. Quocumque iero, non me deserit, nisi ego prius deseram eum; haec ille. (4) Item, nisi in actibus liberi arbitrii prius ageret voluntas et liberum arbitrium quam etc., omnia evenirent de necessitate. Probatur consequentia, quia si omnes actus producendos producit Deus priusquam liberum arbitrium, igitur omnes huiusmodi actus proveniunt a causa prima, scilicet a voluntate Dei invariabili et immutabili, sicut ortus solis provenit a causis

1 finis] om. BG finem A ‖ eum invenies] inv. A ‖ dereliqueris] delinqueris G derelinqueris K 2 ad deum] om. A 3 converso] contra BGK ‖ aversio] conversio A ‖ aversio … deo] et eodem modo de aversione K 4 zachariah] enchiridion A ‖ ad1] a A 5 convertimini] om. K 7 43 distinctione] inv. G ‖ sit] coni.; codd. sic AGK 6 B 8 vita … clericorum] vi et hoc clementinis G ‖ honestate clericorum] hoc in clementinis A ‖ clericorum] in clementinis B 9 animus] actus K 12 sequitur] sequeretur A ‖ deus prius] inv. B ‖ desereret] deseret B 13 peccaret] deum et B deum add. superscr. G om. K ‖ quod] quia A ‖ posset prius] inv. BG ‖ posset … agere] prius ageret K 14 homo1] habito ABG 14–15 quam … deserere] om. K 15 consequens] antecedens AG 17 offert] confert BG ‖ iero] in utero meae matris K 18 ego prius] prius me K ‖ haec ille] om. A ‖ ille] ibi K 19 nisi] in marg. A 20 etc] deus K 21 omnes … producendos] omnem actum producendum K ‖ producendos] productos A ‖ priusquam] antequam K 22 causa prima] inv. B ‖ scilicet] id est BG

a Za 1:3. b Decretum magistri Gratiani, par. 2,33,3 (De paenitentia), dist. 1, p. 1165. c Decretum magistri Gratiani, par. 1, dist. 43, p. 153. d Gregorius IX, Decretales, De vita et honestate clericorum, lib. III, titl. 1, cap. IX, p. 450. e Cf., e.g., Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. IV, dist. 18, cap. 4, p. 357. Cf. Eph 5:14. f Ps. Augustinus, De spiritu et anima, cap. 17 (PL 40, 792).

K 51r

128

B 39vb

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

naturalibus etc. Igitur consimili necessitate quilibet talis effectus producetur ea necessitate, qua orietur sol crastina die. Et confirmatur per hoc, quia si Deus prius ageret quam liberum arbitrium, tunc liberum arbitrium non ageret nisi quando voluntas Dei antecederet ipsum naturaliter in agendo. Sed non est in potestate liberi arbitrii quod Deum praecederet in agendo, quia tunc voluntas divina fieret pedisequa respectu volitionis creatae, quod est impossibile, igitur etc. (5) Item, Augustinus Super Ioannema et ponitur in glossa ad Philippenses 3 capitulo:b qui creavit te sine te etc. Ex quo sequitur quod ille qui est in peccato mortali si non habeat primo actum voluntatis antequam Deus illum efficeret, sed Deus prius naturaliter efficeret actum iustificationis, cum illud quod est prius naturaliter possit esse sine eo quod est posterius naturaliter, igitur Deus posset iustificare illum qui est in peccato mortali sine satisfactione et dimittere peccatum inpunitum—sed totum hoc est falsum, igitur etc. (6) Item, | si non prius ageret liberum arbitrium suum actum voluntatis quam Deus, tunc Deus prius ageret A actum voluntatis quam voluntas. Et tunc eadem ratione Deus prius ageret A actum sub B gradu quam voluntas faceret sub B, et tamen Deus non agit nisi quia vult agere A actum sub B gradu. Et per consequens sive voluntas agat sive non, producetur A actus sub B gradu. Patet consequentia per hoc quod voluntas non potest aliquo modo impedire Dei voluntatem, et per consequens nihil efficiet de actu illo sub B gradu, quia sive aget sive non, producetur aequalis in gradu. Consequens falsum. Falsitas consequentis patet per Augustinum super illud psalmum:c 1 etc] om. A ‖ consimili] cum simili A ‖ producetur] produceretur A 2 ea] eadem K ‖ orietur sol] sol producetur K 3 quia si] quod G ‖ deus] om. B ‖ prius … quam] ageret antequam K 4 tunc] voluntas sive add. K ‖ tunc … arbitrium] om. (hom.) BG ‖ antecederet] antecedet K 5 ipsum … agendo] liberum arbitrium in agendo naturaliter K ‖ sed] si G 6 deum] deus BK ‖ divina] dei K 7 impossibile] om. G 8 ioannem] iob A 9 capitulo] om. A ‖ ex … est] existens gratia K 10 deus illum] inv. BG 11 prius naturaliter] principaliter K 14 sed] secundum GK ‖ hoc] quod B ‖ hoc … falsum] om. GK ‖ etc] om. AG 16 tunc] nunc B ‖ tunc deus] om. G 17 prius ageret] inv. AG 18 faceret … b1] ageret eundem actum sub a gradu AB ageret eadem ratione actum sub a gradu G 19 gradu] om. G antequam voluntas add. K ‖ non] semper add. K 20 quod] quia A ‖ voluntas] deus G 22 aget] agat B ‖ consequens] est add. BK 23 patet] probatur BGK ‖ augustinum] illud augustinus K ‖ illud] illo AG ‖ psalmum] superius K

a Augustinus, Sermones, sermo 169 (PL 38, 923). b Petrus Lombardus, In epist. ad Philipp., cap. 3 (PL 192, 245B). c Augustinus, Enarrationes in Psalmos, ps. 78, par. 12, p. 1106: “Adiuua nos, deus salutaris noster. Hoc uerbo quod ait: salutaris noster, satis exponit quam uoluerit paupertatem intellegi in eo quod dixerat: quoniam pauperes facti sumus nimis; ipsa est quippe infirmitas, cui salutaris est necessarius. Cum uero adiuuari nos uult, nec ingratus est gratiae, nec tollit liberum arbitrium; qui enim adiuuatur, etiam per seipsum aliquid agit.”

5

10

15

20

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

5

10

15

20

25

129

adiuva nos, Deus salutaris noster, adiuvari nos vult Deus, neque ingratus est gratiae, ⟨nec⟩ tollat liberum arbitrium: qui enim adiuvatur, ⟨etiam per⟩ seipsum aliquid operatur. (7) Item, Ecclesiastici 15:a “Deus | ab initio constituit hominem et reliquit eum in manu” etc. Et confirmatur per Damascenum II Sententiarum capitulo 48:b Principaliter sunt in nobis animalia omnia, et de quibus consiliamur; consilium autem eorum quae aequaliter contingunt est quod et ipsum possumus et oppositum illius. Si igitur reliquit Deus hominem in manu consilii sui, ut principaliter sint in nobis illa de quibus consiliamur, igitur non principaliter a Deo. Et confirmatur per eundem Damascenum II Sententiarum distinctione 44 secundum unam quotationem libro 3,c secundum aliam: remunerationes actuum nostrorum ex his quae in nobis habent principia; reliqua autem a divino consilio dependent; igitur aliqua principaliter sunt a nobis et non a Deo. (8) Item, ex significato termini arguitur: coagere est cum aliquo agere, id est secundario agere; sed Deus cooperatur voluntati, super illud Marci 16:d “Domino cooperante et sermonem confirmante etc.”; igitur secundario et mediate agit. (9) Item, Anselmus De concordia capitulo 5:e subdit Deus voluntati humanae, ut si vult, faciat, si non vult, non faciat. Sed illa est prima causa qua posita ponitur effectus et qua remota removetur effectus, igitur voluntas est posita causa qua alia non est fortior illa. (10) Item, arguitur sic: sit Socrates in mortali et tunc iustificetur. Tunc si Deus prius agat actum voluntatis quam liberum arbitrium, sit A tunc talis 1 salutaris noster] etc cum K ‖ adiuvari] adiuvare BK ‖ ingratus] coni.; codd. ingratis ABG ingrati K 1–2 est gratiae] coni.; codd. inviti AB iuncti (?) G praemiti K 2 qui] quia K ‖ adiuvatur] adiuvat AK 4 constituit] cognoscit B 5 in manu] om. ABG 7 sunt in] lac. G ‖ animalia] om. B ‖ animalia omnia] inv. G ‖ consiliamur] consilia videmus AGK 8 et1 … possumus] peccare possunt A peccare possum G 9 illius] om. AGK ‖ si] sic K ‖ reliquit deus] inv. K ‖ manu] lac. G ‖ sui] lac. G 9–10 principaliter sint] principalia sicut G ‖ principaliter … illa] principalia sint in nobis A 10 illa] om. G ‖ consiliamur] videtur A consilia videtur G consilia videntur K ‖ non principaliter] inv. G ‖ principaliter] sunt add. B 12 3] 2 G 43 K 12–13 remunerationes] connumerationes ABG 13 autem] quae ABG 14 principaliter sunt] inv. A 17 super] secundum BGK ‖ marci] magister B matthaei K 18 sermonem] in marg. A ‖ etc] om. A 20–21 humanae] humile G 21 est prima] om. A 22 ponitur] peccatur G ‖ remota … effectus2] non posita non ponitur K ‖ posita] om. K 23 causa] cum B ‖ alia … fortior] non est prior K ‖ est] om. G 24 et tunc] om. K ‖ tunc iustificetur] est non add. G

a Ecl 15:14. b Recte Ioannes Damascenus, De fide orthodoxa, cap. 40, p. 151. c Recte Ioannes Damascenus, De fide orthodoxa, cap. 42, p. 154. d Mc 16:20. Cf. Petrus Lombardus, In epist. ad Rom., cap. 3 (PL 191, 1359D). e Recte Anselmus, De concordia, q. 1, cap. 3, p. 251.

G 162rb

130

A 26rb

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

actus quem Deus prius naturaliter facit quam voluntas—contra: Socrates non disponitur aliter pro modo a parte sui quam ante secundum se, et nunc disponitur ad vitam aeternam. Et pro parte ista est responsio Doctoris Subtilis super I Sententiarum distinctione 17 quaestione 2a ad probandum | quod oportet ponere aliam caritatem quam Spiritum Sanctum, quia aliter consimiliter per omnia disponeretur a parte sui homo quando acceptatur ad vitam aeternam et quando non acceptatur.

5

⟨Ad oppositum opinionis⟩ Ad oppositum istius opinionis arguitur per Augustinum De praedestinatione sanctorum et in omnibus libris quasi quos edidit contra Pelagianos. Unde in libro De praedestinatione fere in principiob dicit Augustinus quod aliquando fuit istius opinionis, quod fides informis sit a libero arbitrio et quod per illam meretur homo aliqua dona. Sed ibi dicit Augustinusc quod convictus erat testimonio Apostoli:d si accepisti, quid gloriaris quasi non acceperis? Et recitat Magister illam retractationem I Sententiarum distinctione 41 capitulo 4e et II libro distinctione 28 capitulo 7.f Et parum post Augustinus De praedestinatione sanctorum,g ubi prius arguit contra eos, qui dixerunt quod fides est 1 quem] quod A ‖ naturaliter] non add. AG 2 pro] om. A 3 est] om. A 4 super] om. K ‖ I] illud A ‖ quaestione] capitulo B 5 aliam] aliquam A 6 per … disponeretur] disponeret per omnia A ‖ disponeretur] disponeret per omnia G disponendo K ‖ a] ex A 9 istius] om. G illius K ‖ opinionis] coni.; codd. quaestionis ABGK 11 augustinus] om. K 12 fuit] om. G ‖ opinionis] opinio BGK ‖ informis] uniformis AG ‖ quod2] om. GK 13 convictus] commotus ABG 14 apostoli] qui dicit add. K ‖ accepisti] accepistis A acceperis G ‖ acceperis] accepisti K 15 4] om. G 16 28] 48 ABG 17 prius] supra K

a Recte Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, dist. 17, par. 1, q. 1, nn. 1–2, pp. 139–140: “Si etiam dicas quod ‘praeter illam dilectionem quae est Spiritus Sanctus, est alia dilectio formalis’, ergo est fallacia consequentis in argumento Augustini, arguendo ‘diligit dilectionem formaliter, ergo hanc’,– quia antecedens potest verificari pro alia. Si ergo argumentum debeat tenere, oportet quod Deus sit formaliter dilectio et omnis dilectio quae est formaliter in diligente respectu proximi. Item, XV De Trinitate cap. 19: ‘Nullum est donum excellentius isto dono, quod est caritas; et nullum est donum Dei excellentius Spiritu Sancto; ergo Spiritus Sanctus est caritas’. Istud argumentum non valeret nisi esset de caritate formali et quod praecise Spiritus Sanctus esset illa.” b Augustinus, De praedestinatione sanctorum (PL 44, 961). c Augustinus, De praedestinatione sanctorum (PL 44, 964): “Si autem et accepisti, quid gloriaris quasi non acceperis? Quo praecipue testimonio etiam ipse conuictus sum, cum similiter errarem, putans fidem qua in deum credimus, non esse donum dei, sed a nobis esse in nobis, et per illam nos impetrari dei dona quibus temperanter et iuste et pie uiuamus in hoc saeculo.” d ICor 4:7. e Recte Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. I, dist. 41, cap. 2, p. 289. Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. I, dist. 41, cap. 3, p. 292. f Recte Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. II, dist. 28, cap. 1–4, pp. 487– 491. g Augustinus, De praedestinatione sanctorum (PL 44, 963–964).

10

15

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

5

10

15

131

ex ambobus, scilicet ex credulitate primo et ex Deo secundario. Ecce—dicit Augustinusa—qualiter componet homo partem cum Deo, et partem fidei sibi vindicet, et partem divino relinquat: et quod elatius est, primam partem tollit, sequentem dat Deo; et in eo quod dicit amborum priorem se facit posteriorem Deum. Non sic—dicit Augustinusb—ille pius ac humilis Doctor Cyprianus,c locutor sapiens, qui dixit quod in nullo gloriandum esset quasi nostrum sit. Item, “omne datum optimum et omne donum perfectum desursum est.”d Item, Magister Sententiarum I libro distinctione 45 capitulo 4:e voluntas Dei nulla est causa praeventa. Item, tunc non foret Deo attribuendum meritum nostrum sed libero arbitrio, contra Magistrum II libro.f Item, tunc voluntas Dei esset quasi liberum arbitrium et non e contra, contra Augustinum 83 quaestionibus quaestione 18,g ubi | dicit Augustinus: ⟨Qui quaerit⟩ quare voluit Deus mundum facere, causam quaerit voluntatis Dei, omnis causa efficiens | maior est eo quod efficitur, sed nihil est maius voluntate Dei, igitur eius causa inquirenda non est. Item, II libro distinctione 46 capitulo 1:h non ideo miseretur Deus alicuius, quia voluit et cucurrit, sed ideo voluit et cucurrit, quia miseretur eius Deus.

1 scilicet] om. GK ‖ dicit] dixit B 2 sibi] om. A 3 elatius] ablatus AG ‖ tollit] om. G 4 sequentem] et add. A secundam K ‖ dat] om. BG 5 pius] primus AG 6 locutor] lect. illegibilis G om. K ‖ sapiens] sapienter AG faciebat vel sapiebat K ‖ dixit] dicit BG ‖ nullo] tali A ‖ gloriandum] gradu B ‖ esset] esse K ‖ nostrum] lect. illegibilis G 8 sententiarum] om. BGK ‖ I] 3 G 9 nulla] nostra A mea G a alia K 12 tunc] om. BG ‖ dei] om. AGK in marg. al. manu B ‖ quasi] quia BK ‖ arbitrium] vult add. in marg. al. manu B add. K 13 contra augustinum] augustinus G ‖ augustinum] augustinus K ‖ ubi] qui quaerit K 14 quare voluit] qualiter G ‖ quare … facere] quaerere quare deus mundum fecit B ‖ voluit deus] inv. K ‖ facere] creare K 15 omnis] cum ABG ‖ est1] sit B ‖ maius] magis A 16 voluntate] voluntatis B ‖ causa … est] iam non est inquirenda causa K 17 miseretur … alicuius] deus miseretur alicui ABG 18 cucurrit1] occurit ABG ‖ sed … cucurrit2] om. (hom.) G ‖ ideo] quia A ‖ cucurrit2] occurit AB ‖ quia2] om. A ‖ miseretur] ruseretur (!) A

a Augustinus, De praedestinatione sanctorum (PL 44, 963): “Et tamen uolens a se ipso sibi esse quod credit, quasi componit homo cum deo, ut partem fidei sibi uindicet, atque illi partem relinquat: et quod est elatius, primam tollit ipse, sequentem dat illi; et in eo quod dicit esse amborum, priorem se facit, posteriorem deum.” b Augustinus, De praedestinatione sanctorum (PL 44, 964): “Non sic pius atque humilis doctor ille sapiebat: Cyprianum beatissimum loquor, qui dixit, in nullo gloriandum, quando nostrum nihil sit. Quod ut ostenderet, adhibuit apostolum testem dicentem, quid autem habes quod non accepisti?” c Cyprianus, Ad Quirinum, lib. III, cap. 4, p. 116. d Iac 1:17. e Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. I, dist. 45, cap. 4, p. 308. f Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. II, dist. 27, cap. 4, p. 483. g Recte Augustinus, De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII, q. 28, p. 35. h Recte Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. II, dist. 26, cap. 1, p. 471.

B 40ra G 162va

132

K 51v

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

Item, tunc homo haberet actum contritionis ex se priusquam a Deo, et ita aliquis ex se resurgeret a peccato. Item, non sumus idonei aliquid cogitare ex nobisa etc. Item, gratia Dei sequeretur voluntatem hominis et non e converso. Consequens est falsum per Augustinum in Epistula ad Sixtum presbyterum:bgratia—inquit Augustinus—regit voluntatem. Item, De correptione et gratia capitulo 56:c Deus bonos facit ut omnia bona faciamus vel faciant, ergo circa eorum opera bona prius operatur Deus quam ipsi. Item, nemo potest venire ad me nisi Pater traxerit eum,d secundum Augustinum: nemo potest continens esse nisi tu dederis.e Et alibi:f omnia opera nostra tu operatus es, domine. Item, De praedestinatione sanctorum per duas columnas ante finem:g Deus operatur in cordibus, vocatione illa secundum propositum suum, de qua multum locuti sumus, | non ut inaniter audiant evangelium, sed ut illo audito convertantur et vivant.

5

10

15

⟨II⟩ ⟨Determinatio quaestionis⟩ Dico igitur, salvo meliori iudicio, quod nullus actus voluntatis per se malus per se est aliquid. Et hoc dicit Augustinus De perfectione iustitiae cito post

1 a] ex AG 2 resurgeret] resurget G 3 ex nobis] om. BGK 4 item … dei] in talibus AG ‖ gratia dei] in talibus deus B ‖ converso] contra K 5 est] om. A 5–6 gratia] terra AG deus B 7 facit] fecit BGK ‖ omnia] om. K 8 faciamus vel] om. K ‖ eorum] om. A ‖ opera bona] inv. BK 10–11 secundum augustinum] sed augustinus loquens deo K 11 nisi] deus add. BG ‖ tu] deus add. A 14 vocatione] voluntarie K 15 multum] multi A multa BG ‖ non] om. A ‖ inaniter] manifeste A ‖ audiant] audiatur B ‖ ut illo] om. A 19 meliori iudicio] inv. K ‖ voluntatis] om. K 19–20 per … est] est per se K 20 et] cum add. A tamen add. G

a Vide, e.g., Augustinus, De dono perseverantiae (PL 45, 1003, 1004, 1013); Augustinus, De praedestinatione sanctorum (PL 44, 963). b Augustinus, Epistulae, epist. 214, par. 3, p. 381. Ibidem, epist. 157, par. 17, p. 466. c Augustinus, De correptione et gratia (PL 44, 938). d Io 6:44. Cf., e.g., Augustinus, De praedestinatione sanctorum (PL 44, 970). e Augustinus, Confessionum libri tredecim, lib. VI, cap. 11, p. 87. Ibidem, lib. X, cap. 31, p. 178. f Is 26:12. Cf., e.g., Thomas de Aquino, Summa contra Gentiles, lib. III, cap. 67, pericopa: 7. Ibidem, lib. III, cap. 89, pericopa:3. Thomas de Aquino, Super Evangelium Iohannis reportatio, cap. 3, lect. 3, p. 95. Ibidem, cap. 5, lect. 2, p. 138. g Augustinus, De praedestinatione sanctorum (PL 44, 989).

20

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

5

10

15

133

medium,a ubi facit argumentum Caelesti, qui quaerebat: quid est peccatum? Aut est res aut non. Si res, auctorem habere necesse est, et si auctorem habet et non Deum, igitur aliquis praeter Deum alicuius rei auctor est; et hoc impium est. Si igitur actus est, vitari potest, quia quilibet actus vitari potest. Respondet Augustinus:bpeccatum actum dico et non rem, sicut claudicatio in Socrate actus est et non res. Unde dicit Augustinus:c sicut claudicatio nec pes est nec corpus nec homo ita ⟨est⟩ vitium quo claudicat homo. Item, arguitur per rationem: si talis actus esset res, Deus posset talem rem creare etc., et ut actus voluntatis sit, et quod potest per se creare, potest rationabiliter praecipere creaturae ad coagendum respectu illius actus; et ita creatura quemcumque actum voluntatis, scilicet blasphemiam et odium Dei, et ita de aliis, posset producere sine peccato. Nec video qualiter actus odiendi Deum posset esse actus non odiendi Deum. Item, si quilibet actus voluntatis esset aliquid et res, nescio quid malitiae adderet peccatum commissionis super peccatum omissionis, cum addat solam circumstantiam illi. Immo, ut videtur, omne peccatum omissionis mundi foret peccatum gravius peccato commissionis, quia peccatum commissionis, si quid foret, solum haberet unam rem qua non augeret peccatum sed minueret.

2 aut non] et ABG ‖ auctorem1 … est2] necesse est quod habeat actorem K 3 auctor] actor AG actorem K 4 est2] igitur add. BG 5 dico] dicitur K 6 unde] sicut add. A 7 corpus] est add. A ‖ nec] non B ‖ ita] nec add. K 8 arguitur … rationem] om. A ‖ rationem] rationes G ‖ talis actus] inv. K ‖ esset] est A 9 ut] nec G ‖ actus … sit] sit actus voluntatis K ‖ sit] sic G ‖ sit et] sic A 11 ita] om. AG 14 si … voluntatis] quilibet actus voluntatis si A ‖ esset] per se add. K 15 omissionis] submissionis G 15–16 cum … omissionis] om. (hom.) G 15–17 cum … mundi] nec aliquot mundi peccatum B 16–17 omissionis mundi] inv. K 17 peccatum1] om. BK 18 quid] quod A quidem G ‖ solum … rem] haberet unam rem solum A ‖ unam] suam G ‖ augeret] ageret A

a Augustinus, De perfectione iustitiae hominis, cap. 2, p. 5: “Iterum, ait, quaerendum est, quid est peccatum: actus an res. Si res est, ut auctorem habeat necesse est; et si auctorem habere dicitur, iam alter praeter deum rei alicuius auctor induci uidebitur; at si hoc dici inpium est, et confiteri necesse est peccatum omne actum esse, non rem. Si igitur actus est, immo quia uere actus est, uitari potest. Respondemus peccatum quidem actum dici et esse, non rem. Sed etiam in corpore claudicatio eadem ratione actus est, non res, quoniam res pes ipse uel corpus uel homo est, qui pede uitiato claudicat nec tamen uitare potest claudicationem, nisi habuerit sanatum pedem. Quod etiam in interiore homine fieri potest, sed gratia dei per iesum christum dominum nostrum. Ipsum sane uitium, quo claudicat homo, nec pes est nec corpus nec homo nec ipsa claudicatio, quae utique non est, quando non ambulat, cum tamen insit uitium, quo fit claudicatio, quando ambulat.” b Augustinus, De perfectione iustitiae hominis, cap. 2, p. 5. c Augustinus, De perfectione iustitiae hominis, cap. 2, p. 5.

134

G 162vb

B 40rb

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

Item, Augustinus I De doctrina christiana capitulo 1,a et ponitur I Sententiarum distinctione 1 capitulo 1:b omnis doctrina rerum vel signorum est, omnis usus est in significando, non iustificando, ut sacramenta legalia sicut combustio vituli extra castra. Ecce quam expresse dividit signa contra res, et per consequens, non sunt res, et quod non est res omnino nihil est, ut patet per Augustinum et per Magistrum ubi prius. Item, Magister II libro distinctione 37c ponit multas auctoritates pro ista nec multum arguit contra eam, sed relinquit eam iudicio prudentis lectoris. Item, illius opinionis fuit Altissiodorensis. Super II | Sententiarum quaestione 49,d ubi glossat istam propositionem: “Omne quod est, inquantum est, bonum est,” dicit Altissiodorensis de substantiis et naturis, non de potentiis. Unde ad Anselmum De concordia capitulo 20e quod huiusmodi sunt res, dici potest quod ipse intellegit sic quod actus mali per se non sunt per se non-entia sicut hircocervus vel chimaera. Sed de huiusmodi actibus vere praedicatur esse. Hic enim nunc haec est vera: ‘peccatum est’, quod non deberet | concedi de peccato si esset pura privatio et non-ens; non plus concederetur de peccato quod sit quam de chimaera quod sit. Et de alio quod dicit quod volitio non est malum quo homines sunt mali dico quod intellegit quod volitio non est tantum malum in quo homines sunt mali, quia per aliquas circumstantias potest fieri homo malus sicut propter finem malum—de isto alias diffuse tractabof sic: habitus mentis, qui est vitium, non est a Deo, igitur nec actus, et per consequens actus voluntatis

1 christiana] om. B 1–2 et … 12] om. (hom.) ABG 2 est] quorum signorum add. K 3 usus] vel add. B nihil add. G ‖ est] om. A ‖ non] vel B 4–5 et … consequens] ergo K 5 sunt] est B 6 et … magistrum] ubi et magister B om. K 7 pro] propter G positione add. K ‖ ista] parte add. B 8 multum arguit] inv. K ‖ prudentis] praecedentis A 9 illius] huiusmodi B om. G ‖ super] om. K ‖ II] 1 K 11 et] non K ‖ naturis] natis G 12 20] 10 K ‖ huiusmodi] actus add. B 13 dici potest] dicit K 15 praedicatur] probatur G ‖ hic … haec] hoc haec nunc A haec est nunc hic G haec enim K ‖ est1] om. A 16 deberet] deberetur K ‖ concedi] concedere A ‖ pura] mera AB una G 16–17 concederetur] conceditur BG tunc add. K 17 sit1] est K ‖ quod sit2] om. K 19 malum] malis G 21 de … sic] item si K ‖ tractabo] ergo BG ‖ qui] quod A

a Augustinus, De doctrina christiana, lib. I, cap. 2, p. 7. b Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. I, dist. 1, cap. 1, p. 55. c Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. II, dist. 37, cap. 2, p. 546. d Alexander Halensis, Sententiae II, dist. 35, pp. 336, 338. e Recte Anselmus, De concordia, q. 1, cap. 7, p. 258. Ibidem, q. 2, cap. 2, p. 261. f Cf. Ricardus Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum, q. 5: Utrum peccans solum per instans mereatur puniri per infinita instantia interpolata, Bologna, Biblioteca Comunale dell’Archiginnasio, A. 985, fols. 41va–42rb.

5

10

15

20

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

5

10

15

135

non est res. Antecedens patet in Decretis, De paenitentia distinctione 3a super illo loco peccatum donatur, ubi dicit quod quidquid, utique a Deo non est ⟨et⟩ peccatum applicatione continetur | ut mortale et vitium animae quod dicitur “habitudo mentis iniustae,” “⟨donatur per gratiam, deletur per sanguinem crucis, tegitur per caritatem; similiter et iniquitas, quae aestimatur habitudo mentis iniustae⟩.” Item, Augustinus De natura boni,b et allegat Magister I libro distinctione 29 capitulo 4:c Cum audivimus “omnia esse ex Deo, omnes utique naturas intellegere debemus, et omnia quae naturaliter sunt. Non enim ex ipso sunt peccata, quae naturam non servant sed vitiant.” Et allegat Magister I libro distinctione 36 capitulo 7.d Item, V De civitate Dei capitulo 9:e mala quippe voluntas ab illo non est, quoniam contra naturam est. Consimiles auctoritates sunt quasi infinitae, scilicet quod Deus non facit peccatum; et per consequens peccata non sunt aliquae res, sed omnino actus vel habitus mali. ⟨III⟩ ⟨Responsio ad argumenta principalia quaestionis⟩

20

(Ad I) Ad primum argumentum principale dico quod ens nomen non dividitur in decem praedicamenta sed ens participium, et tunc idem est quod ens existens. Et concedo quod actio est existens, et non sequitur: igitur est aliquid. 1 decretis] decreto BG 2 loco] verbo A ‖ donatur] donatis ABG 3 est] om. K ‖ peccatum] peccati K ‖ ut] peccatum add. K 3–4 et2 … quod] vitium tamen quia BG 4 quod] quia K ‖ habitudo] habitus K 7 natura boni] vera beatitudine B vera beati G 8 29] 24 BG ‖ esse] facta a deo sive A facta BG ‖ ex] a BG 10 naturam] natura oportet G 11 distinctione] om. G 12 civitate dei] 7 G 19 argumentum principale] inv. B ‖ principale] om. G ‖ nomen] om. K 19–20 nomen … praedicamenta] lac. A 20 participium] positivum K 21 ens] om. K ‖ sequitur] om. G

a Decretum magistri Gratiani, par. 2,33,3 (De paenitentia), dist. 3, p. 1217: “Peccatum aut donatur, aut deletur, aut tegitur. Donatur per gratiam, deletur per sanguinem crucis, tegitur per karitatem; similiter et iniquitas, que estimatur habitudo mentis iniustae, licet Iohannes in epistola eum, qui fecerit peccatum, et iniquitatem fecisse dixerit. Peccatum est iniquitas, quia in peccato ipso iniquitas est. Tamen, ut nobis uidetur, peccatum opus est iniquitatis, iniquitas autem operatrix culpae atque delicti. Prius est ergo, ut ipsa iniquitas deleatur, excidatur radix et seminarium peccatorum. Itaque quemadmodum intrans in animam sapientis disciplina inprudentiam tollit, et scientia ignorantiam: sic perfecta uirtus iniquitatem, et remissio peccatorum delet omne peccatum.” b Augustinus, De natura boni, p. 868. c Recte Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. I, dist. 29, cap. 2, p. 216. d Recte Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. I, dist. 36, cap. 3, p. 262. e Augustinus, De civitate Dei, lib. V, cap. 9, p. 139.

A 26va

136

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

(Ad II) Ad secundum respondeo per Anselmum De concordia capitulo 21,a ubi dicit quod Deus dicitur facere mala quae non facit, quia permittit, sicut dicitur indurare hominem cum non emollit, et inducere in temptationem cum non liberat. ⟨Responsio ad argumenta pro tertia opinione et via⟩

G 163ra

Iam restat respondere ad argumenta tertiae opinionis quae videntur probare quod actus malus et quilibet actus sit primo a libero arbitrio etc. (Ad 1) Ad primum argumentum istius opinionis tertiae respondeo et dico quod non sequitur: si quaesieris, invenies, si dereliqueris, proiciet te,b igitur prius quaerit Deum quam invenit, quia sic posset argui e contra: si invenis Deum, quaeris Deum, igitur prius est invenire Deum quam quaerere Deum. Non valet consequentia. (Ad 2) Ad secundum, quod licet proponat ⟨prius⟩ converti ad Deum quam Deum converti ad illum, prius tamen in ordine proponi debet iuxta illud quod dicit Decretalis de raptis.c Tamen, ut magis theologice loquar, dico cum Augustino De libero arbitrio ad Valentinum Monachumd columna 7, dicit Augustinus quod ab hac auctoritate sumpsit Pelagius exordium ad dicendum quod secundum merita nostra datur gratia. Unde dicit Augustinuse quod nisi esset ipsa conversio aliquod donum Dei, non diceretur “Deus virtutum, converte nos” et cetera | huiusmodi. Et

1 21] 12 K 2 deus dicitur] inv. B ‖ quia] sed B om. G 6 tertiae] secundae AGK 7 actus2] alius add. A 8 argumentum … tertiae] om. K ‖ tertiae] secundae AG 9 dereliqueris] coni.; codd. derelinqueris A delinqueris BG derelinques K 13 secundum] dicendum add. B tertium G ‖ quod … proponat] licet prius ponatur K ‖ licet] prius add. B ‖ deum] dominum BG 14 illum] alium ABG ‖ proponi] postponi K ‖ debet] deberet K 15 illud] om. B ‖ illud quod] om. G ‖ loquar] loquitur G 16 augustino] augustinus K ‖ monachum] quaestione post add. B ‖ 7] om. ABG 19 dicit augustinus] inv. BG ‖ donum] dignum G 19–20 donum dei] dignum deo A 20 diceretur] diceret A ‖ virtutum] virtutis BG

a Recte Anselmus, De concordia, q. 2, cap. 2, p. 261.

b Cf. I Par 28:9. c Decretum magistri Gratiani, par. 2, causa 36, q. 2, p. 1290: “De puellis raptis, necdum desponsatis, in Calcedonensi concilio scriptum est, eos, qui rapiunt puellas sub nomine simul habitandi, cooperantes et conniuentes raptoribus, decreuit sancta sinodus, ut, si quidem clerici sunt, decidant a proprio gradu; si uero laici, excommunizentur. Quibus uerbis datur intelligi, qualiter huius mali auctores dampnandi sunt, quando participes consilii et conniuentes tanto anathemate feriuntur et iuxta canonicam auctoritatem ad coniugia legitima raptam sibi iure uendicare nullatenus possunt.” d Augustinus, De gratia et libero arbitrio (PL 44, 887–888). e Augustinus, De gratia et libero arbitrio (PL 44, 888).

5

10

15

20

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

5

10

15

20

137

sequitur in littera:a nam ire ad Christum quid est aliud nisi ad Deum credendo accedere? Et tamen ait: nemo potest venire ad me, nisi sibi datum fuerit a Patre meo. Et per istam responsionem patet quod ipsa conversio ad Deum ex Deo est. Unde conversio ad Deum prius est quam Deum converti plene ad hominem. Unde Apocalypsi 3:b “Ego sto ad ostium et pulso” etc. Et sequitur:c “intrabo ad illum et coenabo cum illo.” Ad idem est glossa super illud Matthaei:d “petite et dabitur” etc. Ecce quod prius convertitur Deus ad hominem pulsans ad ostium, et cum quis aperuerit, tunc plene et complete intrabit et coenabit cum illo.e Sic igitur patet quod in omni actu bono prius movet ut pulsans ad ostium, et cum aperuerit, intrabit etc. Et sic aperire posterius est naturaliter quam pulsare, et prius est naturaliter aperire quam intrare. Non tamen sequitur necessario necessitate absoluta quod Deus intret si aperiatur ianua, sic enim loquitur glossa in Decreto, De paenitentia distinctione 1: “convertimini.”f Dicit glossa:g si aperiam fenestram, intrabit radius solis, | si claudatur, non intrabit, non tamen possum cogere radium intrare, sicut enim si aperuero fenestram sive ostium, non cogetur Deus intrare et ita, licet quilibet aperiat fenestram per actum voluntatis, non tamen cogitur Deus ad tribuendum gratiam, sicut posuit Pelagius, quod propter hoc quod homo convertit se ad Deum, meretur gratiam Dei.

1 in littera] om. K ‖ est] om. A ‖ est aliud] inv. K ‖ nisi] quam B 2 tamen] cum BK ‖ ait] om. K ‖ venire] accedere G ‖ sibi datum] inv. A 3 istam] ipsam BG illam K 4 deum2] donum K 5 3] 2 G 7 convertitur] conducitur A 8 cum] tunc G tunc si K ‖ quis] om. A ‖ aperuerit] apparuit B 9 coenabit] coenabo AG ‖ sic] consequens K 10 aperuerit] quis apparuit B apparuit G 11 est naturaliter] inv. G 12 quam intrare] in natura G ‖ non tamen] tunc K ‖ necessario] om. K 13 intret] intrat K 14 aperiam] aperiatur B intrabit G aperuero K 15 radius] iter. A ‖ claudatur] clausero K ‖ non tamen] inv. K 16 enim] est K ‖ sive] et K 16–17 sive … fenestram] om. (hom.) BG 18 cogitur deus] deus cogitur ad intrandum vel K

a Augustinus, De gratia et libero arbitrio (PL 44, 888). Cf., e.g., Augustinus, Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum, lib. I, cap. 3, p. 428. Ibidem, lib. I, cap. 19, p. 453. Ibidem, lib. IV, cap. 6, p. 534. Io 6:66. b Apc 3:20. c Apc 3:20. d Glossa ordinaria, In Matthaeum, cap. 7, p. 146E. Cf. Mt 7:7. e Cf. Glossa ordinaria, In Matthaeum, Nicolaus de Lyra comm., cap. 13, pp. 380– 381. Cf. Apc 3:20: “Ecce sto ad ostium et pulso: si quis audierit vocem meam, et aperuerit mihi ianuam, intrabo ad illum, et coenabo cum illo, et ipse me cum.” f Decretum magistri Gratiani, par. 2,33,3 (De paenitentia), dist. 1, p. 1165. g Locus non inventus. Cf. Glossa ordinaria, In Apocalypsis, cap. 3, pp. 1494E–F.

B 40va

138

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

⟨Opinio Bradvardini⟩ (Ad 3) Ad tertium respondet Bradvardina dicens omnia evenire de necessitate, et concedit quod Deus prius deserit hominem quam homo deserat Deum. Et probat multipliciter: (3 a) Primo per Augustinum De dono perseverantiae capitulo 45b et 64:c si qui oboeditis si praedestinati estis reiciendi, subtrahentur vires a vobis, ut oboedire cessetis. (3 b) Et confirmatur per illud:d “non sumus idonei cogitare aliquid ex nobis” etc. Item, De dono perseverantiae modicum ante finem:e qui vero aures non habent, fit in eis quod scriptum est, ut audientes non audiant. (3 c) Item, in De dono perseverantiae capitulo 64:f peccator ideo non surrexit, quia Deus eum non erexit. (3 d) Item, glossa Ad Romanos 1g super illud: tradidit eos Deus in desideria cordis eorum, et dicit sic: igitur Deus apponit gratiam, unde inclinatur voluntas hominis ad bonum, sic subtrahit a quibusdam unde inclinatur voluntas hominis ad malum. Et sic dicit psalmista:h “ceciderunt omnes qui operantur iniquitatem.” (3 e) Item, Isidorus De summo bono libro II capitulo 6:ivult quis bonus esse, et non valet; et vult alius esse malus et non permittitur interire. Unde psalmus 36:j cum ceciderit iustus, non collidetur.

3 hominem] homines AG ‖ hominem … deserat] homines quam homines deserant A 5 multipliciter] et add. A opinio bradvardini de futuris contingentibus add. in marg. K 7 qui] om. BK ‖ oboeditis] oditis AG ‖ si2] ac B et K ‖ reiciendi … vobis] om. AG in marg. K ‖ vires] om. B 9 cogitare aliquid] inv. A 12 in … est] eis in scriptum BG 13 in] om. ABG ‖ de … perseverantiae] eodem K ‖ peccator] non add. A 15 glossa] om. G ‖ eos deus] illos dominus B 16 et] om. BK ‖ apponit] appetit G 17 ad] in ABG ‖ subtrahit … quibusdam] a quibusdam subtrahit gratiam K 18 hominis] om. G ‖ psalmista] psalmus 35 K 21 permittitur interire] permittit introire G ‖ interire] introire B

a Thomas Bradvardinus, De futuris contingentibus, pp. 293, 306, 310, 313. b Augustinus, De dono perseverantiae (PL 45, 1016). c Augustinus, De dono perseverantiae (PL 45, 1030). d Vide, e.g., Augustinus, De dono perseverantiae (PL 45, 1003, 1004, 1013); Augustinus, De praedestinatione sanctorum (PL 44, 963). e Augustinus, De dono perseverantiae (PL 45, 1016). f Augustinus, De dono perseverantiae (PL 45, 1029). g Petrus Lombardus, In epist. ad Rom., cap. 1 (PL 191, 1330D–1332A). Cf. Rm 1:24. Cf. Glossa ordinaria, In Romanos, cap. 1, pp. 26–27. h Petrus Lombardus, In epist. ad Rom., cap. 5 (PL 191, 1384B). Cf. Ps 35:13. Cf. Glossa ordinaria, In Psalmos, ps. 35, pp. 679–680. i Isidorus, Sententiae, lib. II, cap. 6, sent. 4, p. 104. j Ps 36:24.

5

10

15

20

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

5

10

15

20

139

(3 f) Item, potest argui per illud psalmum 103:a avertisti faciem tuam et factus sum conturbatus; super quo dicit Augustinus De correptione et gratia capitulo 35:b avertit a peccato faciem dominus et factus est conturbatus ⟨ita⟩ ut mori metuens eum ter negaret. (3 g) Item, De casu diaboli capitulo 4c dicit Anselmus quod diabolus non accepit perseverantiam, quia accipere noluit. Sed illa volitio fuit una res positiva cuius Deus fuit causa illius volitionis, et eadem ratione prima causa desertionis Dei. (3 h) Item, Deus per suam gratiam est prima causa acceptionis, igitur eadem ratione per subtractionem eiusdem erit prima causa desertionis; et | per consequens non prius homo peccat quam deserat eum Deus. (3 i) Item, si non, | prius peccaret homo quam ⟨Deus⟩ subtraheret gratiam. Cum ergo gratia et peccatum repugnent, sequitur quod si homo posset primo et immediate peccare, posset consimiliter gratiam annihilare. Et istud argumentum est Doctoris Subtilis super IV Sententiarum quaestione 1,d et ibi respondet. (3 j) Item, Hypognosticon capitulo 21:e Ad bonum vero peragendum voluntas mea praesumens de se, non in Deo, nihil proficit: ad malum vero etiam cum non vult, vitiatur ut velit. Sed hoc non esset nisi prius subtraheretur gratia quam peccaret, igitur etc.

1 103] 10 B 2 factus] factum K 3 capitulo] om. K ‖ capitulo 35] om. BG ‖ avertit] om. G ‖ dominus] domini G 4 ut] et AG cum B ‖ metuens] quod add. A ‖ ter] om. BK enim G ‖ negaret] negavit A negavit etc BG 5 capitulo 4] inv. G 6 quia] quam B ‖ accipere noluit] voluit A ‖ noluit] voluntate G ‖ fuit] sicut B 7 fuit] om. G ‖ causa1] et quidquid est causa omne est causa causati igitur deus fuit prima causa add. K ‖ et] om. ABG 9 prima causa] inv. A 11 homo] om. ABG ‖ deserat] deserit K ‖ eum deus] inv. A 12 item] om. BG ‖ prius … homo] immo homo prius peccaret K 12–13 gratiam] suam add. B 13 peccatum] non add. B ‖ repugnent] repugnarent B 14 primo] prius BG ‖ annihilare] et eam annihilare add. in marg. K 15 super] om. A ‖ quaestione] capitulo A ‖ quaestione 1] om. BG ‖ 1] lac. A 19 vitiatur] iuvatur K

a Recte Ps 29:8. Cf. Ps 103:29.

b Augustinus, De correptione et gratia (PL 44, 931). c Anselmus, De casu diaboli, cap. 4, p. 242: “Quamvis igitur bonus angelus ideo accepit perseverantiam quia deus dedit, malus tamen non ideo non accepit quia deus non dedit; sed deus ideo non dedit quia ille non accepit, et ideo non accepit quia accipere noluit.” d Duns Scotus, Ordinatio IV, dist. 1, par. 4 Incidentalis, q. 1, n. 357, pp. 127–128. e Hypognosticon, lib. IV (Contra quartum dogma Pelagianorum), cap. V. 7 (PL 45, 1643): “Ad bonum igitur peragendum voluntas mea de se praesumens, et non de Deo, nihil proficit: ad malum vero etiam quod non vult, aliquoties inclinatur ut velit.”

K 52r G 163rb

140

A 26vb

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

(3 k) Item, De paenitentia distinctione 4a dicit Decretum sic: Propheta loquens in persona Christi sic ait: “Deleantur de libro viventium.” (3 l) Item, si actus peccati prius fieret in nobis quam desertio Dei, tunc huiusmodi peccatum, in quo quis decidet, foret immediate a sic decidente et faciente, et ita huiusmodi peccatum in praescientia Dei foret causa reprobationis. Probatur consequentia per Augustinumb in libello quem edidit: per opera mala et⟨si⟩ caderet, ratione praedestinationis per opera bona ⟨erigeret⟩, | quod est contra Magistrum libro I distinctione 42 capitulo 8, ubic dicit quod Deus nullum elegit talem, quia talem praescivit futurum.d Item, capiatur Socrates, qui sit in gratia, qui finaliter damnabitur. Tunc si Deus non prius subtraheret gratiam ab illo quam ipse peccaret, sed e contra, igitur in libera potestate ipsius foret non peccare mortaliter, et tum sequatur: finaliter iste non peccabit et habet gratiam, igitur finaliter perseverabit in bono. Antecedens est possibile Socrati ex se, igitur ex se potest perseverare in bono et ita aliquis ex se posset habere finalem perseverantiam—contra Augustinum De correptione et gratia 17 capitulo,e ubi declarat quod perseverantia est donum Dei.

1 4] iustitia ibi add. K ‖ dicit] om. G 2 sic] om. K ‖ sic ait] dicit B om. G ‖ viventium] hoc est subtrahatur eis gratia qua subtracta hi in profundum vitiorum deinde in aeternam damnationem praecipitentur et cum iustis non scribantur id est non apponatur eis gratia quo fiant digni salute aeterna add. in marg. K 3 tunc] cum BG 4 decidet] denderet (!) B decideret G decedet K ‖ a] deo add. B 6 edidit] supra apparet ad rationes ubi habetur quod augustinus fuit aliquando illius opinionis quod fides informis fit immediate a libero arbitrio et sic eliceret deus fidelem in praescientia ut quem crediturum esse praescivit eliceret ipsum cui spem scilicet daret quod retractans postmodum dicit fidem non immediate esse a libero arbitrio non tamen ut videtur tractat consequentiam quin sequatur fides est a libero arbitrio igitur propter fidem huiusmodi in praescientia dei deus reprobat eos quos scivit finaliter esse praedestinatos et ita foret causa prima reprobationis add. in marg. K 7 caderet] eadem K caderent G 8 8] 4 BGK ‖ ubi] om. A 9 elegit] eligit K 10 socrates … sit] aliquis K ‖ damnabitur] et sit socrates add. K 11 ab] sub BG ‖ sed … contra] om. K 12 mortaliter] finaliter K ‖ tum] cum AB tamen K 12–13 sequatur] sequitur K 13 finaliter1] formaliter K 14 in bono] et add. G et K ‖ socrati] scilicet K 14–15 perseverare … posset] om. (hom.) B ‖ perseverare … habere] om. G 16 augustinum] augustinus K ‖ correptione] caritate ABG ‖ 17 capitulo] inv. B ‖ capitulo] om. K

a Decretum magistri Gratiani, par. 2,33,3 (De paenitentia), dist. 4, p. 1233. b Cf. Augustinus, De praedestinatione sanctorum (PL 44, 964). Augustinus, Retractationum libri II, I, cap. 22, pp. 107–108. c Recte Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. I, dist. 41, cap. 2, p. 289. d K mutat ordinem argumentationis: prima pars argumenti 3l praecedat 3k. e Augustinus, De correptione et gratia (PL 44, 921, 926).

5

10

15

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

5

10

141

Item, de ista materia dicit Augustinus De correptione et gratia capitulo 22,a ubi loquitur de discipulis Christi: et nunc electi | sunt discipuli Christi, et tamen electi sunt discipuli, et antequam Iudas peccavit. Item, Isidorus De summo bono libro I capitulo 1:b “Nam anima moritur, cum, deserente Deo, de bono in malum mutatur”—finis—desertio praecessit lapsum.c Item, si Deus non deserit hominem ut peccet et antequam peccet, igitur peccantem non magis deserit antequam magis peccaverit ut magis peccet. Consequens falsum et contra Augustinum De gratia et libero arbitriod parum ante finem, ubi ponit exempla infinita quare Deus deserit hominem. Item, Isidorus De summo bono libro II capitulo 8:e “gemina est praedestinatio”—finis—deserendo permittit etc. ⟨Argumenta contra opinionem Bradvardini⟩

15

Contra istam opinionem arguo per Augustinum XIII De civitate Dei capitulo 15:f anima non est deserta ut deserat, sed ut deseretur deseruit. Et hoc probat ibidem.

2 discipuli] illius christi et vere electi sunt discipuli add. A ‖ christi2] om. G 2–3 christi2 … discipuli] om. B 3 et2] finis K ‖ peccavit] peccaret AG peccarunt B 5–6 praecessit] praecedit B 7 ut … et] om. K 9 de … et2] in de A ‖ parum] per secundum folium K 10 infinita] multa K ‖ quare] arguitur G ‖ hominem] etc add. BG ut postmodum magis peccet add. in marg. K 12 finis … etc] sive electorum ad requiem sive reproborum ad mortem utraque divino iudicio agitur ut semper electos superna sequi faciat semper reprobos ut infirma et exteriora deserendo sequi permittit B 14 per] plenius augustinus (?) K ‖ augustinum] de spiritu et anima capitulo 13 semper separatum offert si me invenerit paratum quocumque verto nisi me deserit nisi ego eum prior deseram item augustinus add. B ‖ XIII] 22 A 23 BG ‖ dei] om. BG 15 deserat] deseret AG ‖ deseretur] deseratur B

a Augustinus, De correptione et gratia (PL 44, 929). b Isidorus, Sententiae, lib. I, cap. 1, sent. 2, p. 7. c Isidorus, Sententiae, lib. I, cap. 1, sent. 2, p. 7: “Sic et angelus, dum, deserente Deo, est lapsus.” d Augustinus, De gratia et libero arbitrio (PL 44, 905–906). e Recte Isidorus, Sententiae, lib. II, cap. 6, sent. 1, p. 103. f Augustinus, De civitate Dei, lib. XIII, cap. 15, p. 396.

B 40vb

142

G 163va

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

Item, Augustinus in Exercitationibus suis bene post medium:a Adam et Eva non ederent—finis—nisi prius deseruissent Deum. Item, De correptione et gratia capitulo 47:b Dei adiutorium si homo per liberum arbitrium non deseruisset, semper esset bonus: sed deseruit, et desertus est. Item, in eodem capitulo 67:c ipsi mali gratiam Dei suscipiunt, sed deserunt. Item, Magister II libro distinctione 5 in principio:d boni conversi sunt etc.—finis—ecce quod gratia data non prius subtrahitur quam sit peccatum. Item, Magister I libro distinctione 47 capitulo 8:e quaerit utrum sicut Deus elegit quosdam debeat etiam dici reprobasse quosdam. Item, si Deus prius subtraheret gratiam quam homo peccaret, tunc culpa non foret imputanda. Patet consequentia per Magistrum | II libro

1 eva] non ederent de ligno vitae nisi concupivissent nec concupissent nisi temptati nec temptarentur nisi deserentur nec deserentur a deo nisi prius deseruissent deum add. in marg. K 2 ederent] corr. ex ederant BK ‖ finis] de ligno prohibito ut concupivissent nisi temptati nec temptarentur nisi deserti nec deserentur a deo add. B 3 correptione] concordia ABG ‖ adiutorium] ad intellectum G 6 ipsi mali] proptermmali (!) G ‖ dei] non add. A ‖ sed deserunt] temporales sunt deserunt et deseruntur B 8 peccatum] geremia threnoi primo peccatum peccavit hierusalem propterea instabilis facta est add. B 9 47] 4 BG 44 K 10 elegit] elegisse B ‖ quosdam2] ut boni fierent ut mali essent quod nullatenus concedi potest add. B et dicit quod non add. in marg. K 11 subtraheret] subtraxit K ‖ gratiam] om. AGK ‖ peccaret] peccet K

a Augustinus, Retractationum libri II, I, cap. 9.1, p. 48. b Augustinus, De correptione et gratia (PL 44, 935). c Augustinus, De correptione et gratia (PL 44, 942): “Sed omnes mali, et pro ipsa diuersitate diuersis suppliciis iudicandi. Aut gratiam dei suscipiunt, sed temporales sunt, nec perseuerant; deserunt et deseruntur.” d Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. II, dist. 5, cap. 1, p. 351: “Et illi quidem conversi sunt et illuminati a Deo gratia apposita; isti vero sunt excaecati non immissione malitiae, sed desertione gratiae: a qua deserti sunt non ita quod prius dedita subtraheretur, sed quia nunquam est apposita ut converterentur.” e Recte Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. I, dist. 41, cap. 2, p. 292: “Quaestio. Sed quaeritur utrum sicut dicitur elegisse quosdam ut boni fierent et fideles, ita etiam concedi debeat reprobasse quosdam ut mali essent et infideles et obdurare ut peccent.”

5

10

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

5

10

143

distinctione 24 capitulo 1,a et per Augustinum De correptione et gratia capitulo 42:b si homo ⟨sine⟩ adiutorio etc.—finis—quia sibi defuisset adiutorium. Item, Bernardus in Meditationibus suis capitulo 6:c Deus fidelis socius est, nec deserit sperantes in se, nisi prius deseratur. Item, Augustinus De dono perseverantiae capitulo 8:d voluntate sua quisque deserit Deum ut merito deseratur etc.—finis—quam admodum deseretur. Item, si Deus prius deseret etc., tunc Deus prius foret ultor quam homo peccator—contra Augustinum 11 Super Genesim capitulo 24.e Sequeretur quod miseria praecederet peccatum—contra Augustinum De libero arbitrio capitulo 14,f quia tunc secundum eum deformaretur ordo universi.

1 24] 34 B ‖ per augustinum] est augustinus K ‖ correptione] concordia K 2 42] 41 BGK ‖ adiutorio] adiutor ABG 6–7 etc … deseretur] a deo ideo petimus ne inferamur in temptationem ne hoc fiat videlicet ut sic merito deseramur igitur si deserens deum meretur desertionem dei igitur prius est deserere deum quam nos deserere deum B ‖ finis … deseretur] om. (hom.) K 8 deus1] om. A ‖ deseret] om. A ‖ deus2] om. BG ‖ ultor] om. A 9 peccator] peccaret A ‖ 24] item add. B 10 praecederet] culpam vel add. A ‖ augustinum] augustinus GK 11 14] 24 ABG ‖ deformaretur] formaretur G

a Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. II, dist. 24, cap. 1, pp. 450–451. b Augustinus, De correptione et gratia (PL 44, 935): “Quod adiutorium si homo ille per liberum non deseruisset arbitrium, semper esset bonus: sed deseruit, et desertus est. Tale quippe erat adiutorium, quod desereret cum uellet, et in quo permaneret si uellet: non quo fieret ut uellet. Haec prima est gratia quae data est primo adam: sed hac potentior est in secundo adam. Prima est enim qua fit ut habeat homo iustitiam si uelit: secunda ergo plus potest, qua etiam fit ut uelit, et tantum uelit, tanto que ardore diligat, ut carnis uoluntatem contraria concupiscentem uoluntate spiritus uincat. Nec illa quidem parua erat, qua demonstrata est etiam potentia liberi arbitrii, quoniam sic adiuuabatur, ut sine hoc adiutorio in bono non maneret, sed hoc adiutorium si uellet desereret. Haec autem tanto maior est, ut parum sit homini per illam reparare perditam libertatem, parum sit denique non posse sine illa uel apprehendere bonum, uel permanere in bono si uelit, nisi etiam efficiatur ut uelit. Tunc ergo dederat homini deus bonam uoluntatem; in illa quippe eum fecerat qui fecerat rectum: dederat adiutorium, sine quo in ea non posset permanere si uellet; ut autem uellet, in eius libero reliquit arbitrio. Posset ergo permanere si uellet: quia non deerat adiutorium per quod posset, et sine quo non posset perseueranter bonum tenere quod uellet. Sed quia noluit permanere, profecto eius culpa est, cuius meritum fuisset, si permanere uoluisset: sicut fecerunt angeli sancti, qui cadentibus aliis per liberum arbitrium, per idem liberum arbitrium steterunt ipsi, et huius permansionis debitam mercedem recipere meruerunt, tantam scilicet beatitudinis plenitudinem, qua eis certissimum sit semper se in illa esse mansuros. Si autem hoc adiutorium uel angelo uel homini, cum primum facti sunt, defuisset; quoniam non talis natura facta erat, ut sine diuino adiutorio posset manere si uellet, non utique sua culpa cecidissent: adiutorium quippe defuisset, sine quo manere non possent.” c Ps. Bernard, Meditationes piissimae (PL 184, 497D). d Augustinus, De dono perseverantiae (PL 45, 1000). e Augustinus, De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim, lib. XI, par. 17, p. 350. f Recte Augustinus, De libero arbitrio, lib. III, cap. 9, pp. 290–291.

144

B 41ra

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

Item, si sic, tunc actum de se malum ageret Deus prius quam voluntas et ita Deus primo et principaliter operaretur iniquitatem—contra illud Iob 36:a quis audet ei dicere: Operatus es iniquitatem?; quasi dicit: nullus. Item, 83 quaestionibus quaestione 3:b Deo auctore homo non fit deterior, sed sic fieret si Deus primo desereret sine peccato, igitur etc. Item, si sic, cum hominem deserere foret eum suadere ad peccandum, cum ad huiusmodi desertionem sequatur hominem peccare, sequitur quod Deus sic agendo peccaret. Item, talis sic desertus posset rationabiliter dicere: propter Deum recessi, quod est contra Augustinum De libero arbitrio fere in fine:c ne dixeris: propter Deum recessi—finis—peteris dabitur tibi. Item, si sic, capio duos | quorum unum, scilicet Socratem, Deus deserit et Platonem non deserit. Et sit Socrates in principio magis iustus quam Plato in duplo per gratiam. Sine aliqua mutatione facta in aliquo istorum per seipsum Deus unum deserat et alium non, videtur quod Deus esset acceptor personarum—contra illud Apostoli Ad Colossenses 3,d et Ad Paralipomenon 6,e et Actuum 4:f non est acceptio personarum apud Deum. Respondeo ad argumenta opinionis Bradvardini. Respondeo igitur ad argumenta praecedentis opinionis.

1 de … prius] malum de se prius ageret deus BG ‖ ageret … prius] om. A 3 audet ei] inv. A ‖ operatus] actus B ‖ operatus … iniquitatem] actus es inquies G ‖ dicit] dicat K 4 auctore] adiutore AG actore B ‖ non] del. K 7 sequatur] sequitur K ‖ sequitur] om. ABG 9 posset] potest K 10 augustinum] augustinus K 11 finis] si ipsum A sed si ipsum B sed ipsum G ‖ peteris] coni.; codd. petieris A petitur B petiere G petenti K ‖ tibi] om. A item augustinus de bono perseverantiae capitulo 8 deus neminem temptat temptatione noxia quantum foret unum si deus primo subtraheret gratiam quam homo deseret eum item augustinus de gratia et libero arbitrio deus fecit hominem et reliquit eum in manu consilii sui apponit tibi ignem et aquam ad quodcumque volueris extendens manum tuam quodcumque petieris dabitur tibi add. in marg. al. manu B 13–14 magis … gratiam] in duplo magis gratus per gratiam quam plato cum igitur K 14 aliqua] ulla K 15 deserat] deserit K ‖ deus2] om. A 17 et … 4] om. A ‖ 4] om. K 18 respondeo … bradvardini] in marg. AG (bradvardini] om. G) ad argumenta opinionis in marg. al. manu B ad responsiones bradvardini add. in marg. al. manu K 19 praecedentis] praecedente AG contrariae K

a Iob 36:23.

b Augustinus, De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII, q. 3, p. 12. c Augustinus, De gratia et libero arbitrio (PL 44, 883): “Et liber ecclesiasticus dicit: ne dixeris, quia propter dominum recessi: quae enim odit non facia. Ne dixeris, quia ipse me induxit: non enim opus habet uiro peccatore. Omne exsecramentum odit dominus, et non est amabile timentibus illum. Ipse ab initio fecit hominem, et reliquit eum in manu consilii sui. Si uolueris, conseruabis mandata, et fidem bonam placiti. Apponit tibi ignem et aquam; ad quodcumque uolueris extende manum tuam. In conspectu hominis uita et mors, et quodcumque placuerit dabitur ei.” d Col 3:25. e II Par 19:7. f Act 10:34.

5

10

15

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

5

10

15

20

145

(Ad 3 a) Ad primum concedo consequentiam, scilicet si praedestinati essent reiciendi etc., continuo, tunc subtraherentur vires. (Ad 3 b) Ad secundum quando dicitur: non sumus idonei etc., hic respondet Augustinus De dono perseverantiae capitulo 28,a ubi glossat sic: “ad pietatis viam et verum Dei cultum, non sumus idonei cogitare” etc. Hoc enim nobis expedit credere et dicere: ⟨hoc⟩ pium est, hoc verum est, ut sit sic humilis et submissa confessio, et totum detur Deo.b Haec responsio patet 83 quaestionibus quaestione 4,c et allegat Magister I libro distinctione 46 capitulo 13:d boni enim Deus tantum causa est. Ad aliud consimiliter quod sicut in talibus qui aures non habent, fit in eis quod audientes non audiant, sed hoc non est sine demerito praecedente scilicet in poenam peccati. (Ad 3 c) Ad tertium concedo quod peccator non surrexit, quia Deus eum non erexit. Sed ulterius dico quod Deus eum non erexit, quia noluit elicere actum quem potuit, quo elicito Deus eum erexisset. (Ad 3 d) Ad quartum dico quod glossatur illa,e sicut alias, quod Deus subtrahit gratiam in poenam peccati venialis ex cuius subtractione inclinatur voluntas ad malum. Unde non sequitur ex auctoritate quod Deus prius subtrahat quam homo peccet. Et quando arguitur per illud psalmum, contra quid glossa respondet, vide ibi.f 2 reiciendi] om. AG ‖ continuo] et K ‖ continuo tunc] sed hoc erit propter peccatum quod praecedet huiusmodi subtractionis unde non sequitur B continua G ‖ subtraherentur] subtraheretur G ‖ vires] ut oboedire cessetis igitur non prius peccabit quam subtraheretur vi add. B etc sed hoc erit propter peccatum quod praecedet add. K 3–4 respondet] respondeo sicut respondet B sicut respondet add. G 4 28] 29 B 38 K ‖ glossat] glossatur B ‖ ad] quod accipiendo K aliquod G 4–5 pietatis] praecedentis B 5 viam] et verum dei cultum add. K ‖ et … cultum] om. ABG ‖ enim] est GK 6 credere] concedere ABG ‖ pium] ipsum A ‖ pium est] ipsum esse BG ‖ hoc2 … est2] verum est hoc K ‖ ut … sic] et sic sit G ‖ sit sic] inv. AB 7 submissa] summa ABG ‖ totum detur] deum de ABG 9 boni] et add. BG bono K ‖ tantum] omni K 10 aliud] tertium A secundum BG ‖ consimiliter] sicut ad primum add. in marg. K 10–11 fit … quod] sicut in eis et G 13 peccator] ideo add. B ‖ eum] om. AG 14 ulterius] cum (?) add. K ‖ deus eum] inv. A ‖ elicere] eligere B 14–15 elicere actum] inv. K 15 erexisset] erigeret K 16 quartum] de glossa 15 ad romanos add. K ‖ dico … illa] de glossa dico BG ‖ quod1 … illa] om. K ‖ alias] dixi add. K 16–17 subtrahit] subtraxit K 17 venialis] om. K 19 et … arguitur] iter. B ‖ arguitur] contra add. BG 19–20 contra quid] dico quod B ‖ contra … respondet] dico sicut glossa ibidem K ‖ contra … ibi] quod glossa respondit videtur G 20 vide ibi] om. B ‖ ibi] om. A

a Augustinus, De dono perseverantiae (PL 45, 1013). b Augustinus, De dono perseverantiae (PL 45, 1013). c Augustinus, De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII, q. 4, p. 13. d Recte Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. I, dist. 46, cap. 7, p. 319. e Petrus Lombardus, In epist. ad Rom., cap. 1 (PL 191, 1330D–1332A). Cf. Rm 1:24. f Petrus Lombardus, In epist. ad Rom., cap. 5 (PL 191, 1384B). Cf. Ps 35:13. Cf. Glossa ordinaria, In Psalmos, ps. 35, pp. 679–680.

146

G 163vb

A 27ra

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

(Ad 3 e) Ad quintum respondeo per glossam Psalmi 36:a cum ceciderit iustus, non collidetur. (Ad 3 f) Ad sextum dico quod Deus non avertit faciem suam ab aliquo, nisi peccato praecedente non tempore, sed—ut ita dicam—naturaliter, sicut | patet ibidem in glossa.b Et de Petro dico quod prius peccavit vel venialiter vel mortaliter antequam Deus subtraheret faciem suam, et sic quandoque in casu expedit homini ut cadat in aliquo peccato mortali, ut humilius resurgat, ut dicit Augustinus De civitate Dei libro XIV capitulo 12:c audeo dicere etc. Et consimile dicit Augustinus De correptione et gratia,d et | allegat Magister Sententiarum I libro distinctione 46 capitulo 10:e usque adeo Deus omnia cooperatur in bonum ut si qui sanctorum exorbitant hoc ipsum faciat eis proficere in bonum. Ad idem est Gregorius V Moralium capitulo 28:f saepe contingit ut suis adversitatibus fracti—finis—dolent.

1 quintum] isidori add. K ‖ respondeo] concedo B concedendo respondetur G 2 collidetur] cum ceciderit dicit glossa quod per venialem non permittitur interire sic supra propter veniale et ex alia auctoritate vult quis esse bonus et non videt talis utique qui in peccato mortali habet aequalem displicentiam de peccato sed non sufficientem et efficacem quia non vult quoniam in se est disponere se sicut catus vult piscem etc unde abbas ioachim libro 1 folio 4 nonnumquam dives nititur facere bonum quod non sine difficultate magna consequitur et respondet quod est quia deus superbis resistit et quia divitiae suffocant gratiam dei add. in marg. K 3 ad sextum] om. A ‖ sextum] similiter add. B quintum sicut G 4 ita] om. A 6 petro] peccato petri BG ‖ vel1] om. K ‖ vel venialiter] iter. B ‖ venialiter … mortaliter] mortaliter vel venialiter K 7 subtraheret] subtraxit K 7–8 in … homini] expedit homini in casu BG 8 homini] non add. in marg. A ‖ cadat] cadunt G ‖ peccato] om. A ‖ peccato mortali] peccatum mortale K 9 libro] om. BK ‖ libro … 12] scilicet capitulo 14 et 12 G ‖ XIV] 24 B 10 augustinus] om. BGK 10–11 sententiarum] om. BK ‖ sententiarum … libro] I libro sententiarum G 11 46] 45 K 12 in bonum] om. A ‖ exorbitant] exorberent (!) A exorbitaret G exorbitent K ‖ eis] eos A 14 28] 58 G 14–147.1 saepe … 28] om. (hom.) A 15 dolent] delectet BG

a Isidorus, Sententiae, lib. II, cap. 6, sent. 4, p. 104. Cf. Ps 36:24. b Petrus Lombardus, In Psalmos, ps. 94 (PL 191, 295D). Cf. Augustinus, De correptione et gratia (PL 44, 931). c Recte Augustinus, De civitate Dei, lib. XIV, cap. 13, p. 436: “Et audeo dicere superbis esse utile cadere in aliquod apertum manifestumque peccatum, unde sibi displiceant, qui iam sibi placendo ceciderant.” d Augustinus, De correptione et gratia (PL 44, 930). e Recte Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. I, dist. 46, cap. 6, p. 318. f Gregorius Magnus, Moralia in Iob, lib. V, par. 40, p. 272: “Nam saepe contingit ut ipsis suis aduersitatibus fracti ad mentem redeant et in semetipsis reuersi considerent, quam sint inania quae quaerebant sese que pro tam stulto desiderio protinus ad lamentum uertant. Et tanto ualentius aeterna desiderent, quanto se stultius laborasse pro temporalibus dolent.”

5

10

15

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

5

10

15

147

Item, II Moralium capitulo 28a super illa littera Iob: “tonso capite corruens in terram adoravit,”b “pia conditoris dispensatione agitur” etc. Item, Damascenus II Sententiarum capitulo 45:c conceditur ut si quis incipiens incidat—finis—confiteatur Domino. (Ad 3 g) Ad septimum dico quod volitio quae est actus voluntatis non est res proprie aliqua, sicut supra dixi. Si tamen vis vocare rem sicut Augustinus De perfectione iustitiaed vocat peccatum rem, dico quod talis rei Deus non est auctor, licet cuiuslibet rei proprie dictae potest dici auctor ut patet per Augustinum libro IX capitulo 21 Super Genesim,e et XI De civitate Dei capitulo 113,f et XII De civitate Dei capitulo 5:g neque enim esse posset aliqua essentia etc.h Et ideo tales actus non sunt res proprie, et ideo possunt fieri sine Deo. (Ad 3 h) Ad octavum dico quod ‘Deum esse | primam causam desertionis’ est verum, si sit constructio intransitiva inter illam causam et illum terminum ‘desertionis’, quia tunc denotatur quod Deus sit prima causa deserens; et hoc est verum, nam homo peccans si vere peccet, ipse non est causa deserens hominem, sed est prima causa occasionalis quare Deus deserit hominem. Et sic sumendo | causam pro causa occasionali, concedo quod peccatum est prima causa etc. 1 illa littera] illam litteram B illam G ‖ corruens] torquens ABG 2 terram] terra AK ‖ conditoris] auctorum A ‖ etc] ut de se confidens anima dispensatoria tentatione pulsetur quatenus infirmata etc finis faustum deponat add. K (ut de se confidens anima dispensatoria tentatione pulsetur quatenus infirmata etc] in marg.) 3 si] om. BG 3–4 incipiens incidat] etc K 5–6 actus … res] alicuius voluntatis non est G 6 proprie aliqua] om. K ‖ tamen vis] vis tamen eam K ‖ vocare rem] quaerere voluntatis G ‖ sicut2] vocat add. A 7 peccatum] ipsum G 8 auctor1] actor K ‖ auctor2] viator G om. K 8–9 per augustinum] om. BGK 9 IX] om. G ‖ capitulo1 … genesim] super genesim capitulo 21 BGK ‖ XI] 14 A ‖ dei] om. B 9–10 capitulo2 … XII] et per idem BG ‖ capitulo2 … 5] om. A 10 capitulo] om. B ‖ neque] nec A 12 desertionis] deserationis (!) G 14 quia … deserens] om. (hom.) K ‖ deserens] desertionis G 15 si … ipse] sive peccet ipsum K ‖ vere] vero A 16 hominem] om. B ‖ sed est] sicut AG ‖ est] om. B ‖ occasionalis] occasionaliter K

a Gregorius Magnus, Moralia in Iob, lib. II, par. 52, p. 110. b Gregorius Magnus, Moralia in Iob, lib. II, par. 52, p. 109. c Recte Ioannes Damascenus, De fide orthodoxa, cap. 43, p. 158: “Conceditur quis et in nefariam incidere operationem quandoque, in directionem alterius deterioris passionis, ut puta est quis elatus in virtutibus et directionibus eius, concedit hunc Deus in fornicationem incidere, ut ex casu in sensum veniens propriae infirmitatis, humilietur et procidens confiteatur Domino.” d Augustinus, De perfectione iustitiae hominis, cap. 2, p. 5. e Locus non inventus. f Cf., e.g., Augustinus, De civitate Dei, lib. XII, cap. 1, p. 355. Ibidem, lib. XII, cap. 4, p. 358. Ibidem, lib. XIV, cap. 13, p. 343. g Augustinus, De civitate Dei, lib. XII, cap. 5, p. 359. Ibidem, lib. XII, cap. 6, pp. 360–362. h Augustinus, De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus Manichaeorum, lib. II, cap. 8, p. 97: “Deus uero auctor essentiae est, nec aliqua essentia potest uideri esse, quod in qua fuerit cogit non esse. Dicitur ergo aliquid unde non sit inconuenientia, nam unde sit nihil dici potest.”

K 52v

B 41rb

148

G 164ra

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

Et si arguas: voluntas Dei non est praeventa—hic dico quod Deus qualitercumque sit causa in quocumque genere, omne tamen peccatum est causa occasionalis culpabilis prima et immediata quare Deus deserit hominem, huius causa Deus non potest esse. Sed forte arguitur sic: Deus est prima causa acceptans hominem sine quocumque merito vel acquisitione praecedente, igitur Deus est prima causa subtrahens gratiam sine omni demerito praecedente. Antecedens probatur XVI Moralium capitulo 9:a superna quidem pietas aliquid agit in nobis etc. Hic potest responderi quod prima consequentia non valet, unde abbas Ioachim De praescientia et praedestinatione Dei dicit:b pensandum est neminem damnari a Deo sine aequitate. Potest igitur negari prima consequentia, quia iustificare et acceptare sunt bonitatis et clementiae, deserere et reprobare sunt actus solius iustitiae, et sic erit aliquis actus ex parte ipsius circa quem Deus operatur secundum iustitiam deserendo hominem, qui adultus est et in gratia. Unde II Physicorum capitulo de causis:c nauta per suam praesentiam est causa salutis navis, et per suam absentiam causa est periclitationis eiusdem—quoad formam argumenti patet quod non valet consequentia. (Ad 3 i) Ad nonum concedo quod gratia et peccatum naturaliter repugnant. Et dico cum Scoto super IV Sententiarum quaestione 1d quod gratia et peccatum non repugnant formaliter, quia Deus potest conservare gratiam | 1 praeventa] praeventiva (!) forsitan recitus praevidentia ABG 2 quocumque] quolibet A ‖ omne] fuerit non praevenitur ut sic per aliquid aliud quod causaret consimili genere causae add. in marg. K ‖ tamen] tunc G unde K 5–6 quocumque] cumque (?) K 6 acquisitione] occasione BK 8 XVI] 6 A ‖ superna] super namque AB super nullam G ‖ nobis] sine nobis id est primam gratiam add. in marg. K 10 dei] om. K 11 aequitate] iniquitate B 12–13 et3 … sunt] est K 13 circa] contra B 14 secundum] suam K 15–16 praesentiam] et add. G 16 est2] om. B 17 eiusdem] om. AB navis G ‖ quoad … consequentia] om. K ‖ non … consequentia] consequentia non valet BG

a Gregorius Magnus, Moralia in Iob, lib. XVI, par. 25, p. 816. b Cf. Ioachim Abbas Florensis, Dialogi de praescientia Dei et praedestinatione electorum, lib. I, pp. 66–67: “Cum diceret apostolus: Non ex operibus, set ex vocante dictum est: maior serviet minori adderetque: Sicut scriptum est: Iacob dilexi, Esau autem odio habui, protinus ex persona quaerentium subiuncxit dicens: Quid igitur? Nunquid iniquitas est apud Deum? Quo dicto adiecit et ait: Absit. Moysi enim dicit: miserebor cuius miseror etc., sicut superius mote questioni respondens ipse qui fecerat ait: Nunquid iniquus est Deus, qui infert iram? Secundum hominem dico: absit, alioquin quomodo iudicabit Deus hunc mundum? Quod tale est acsi diceretur: si absque ratione et iudicio reprobatus est et odio habitus Esau et prius etiam reprobatus quam natus, num iniquus est Deus qui irascitur ei, qui iccirco, ut putant illi, non potest bona facere, quia Deus illum et antea quam nasceretur abiecit? Set absit, inquit, ut absque ratione et iudicio irascatur Deus, absit ut absque causa iudicii reprobatus sit Esau antequam natus, etsi homines nequeant capere ipsam equitatem iudicii.” c Aristoteles, Physica, lib. II, cap. 3, p. 58: 7–9 (195a). Cf. Auctoritates Aristotelis, opus: 1 (Metaphysica V), p. 124. d Duns Scotus, Ordinatio IV, dist. 1, par. 4 Incidentalis, q. 1, n. 357, pp. 127–128.

5

10

15

20

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

5

10

15

20

149

quamcumque ubicumque voluerit in subiecto, licet subiectum infinite peccaret. Sed tunc per illam gratiam non foret Deo gratus. Verbi gratia, Deus posset conservare calorem ignis in summo, et obiective ponere in eadem materia frigiditatem in summo vel cum summa caliditate, sed tunc materia foret calida in summo per primam caliditatem, et sic in proposito. Et ulterius nego consequentiam probatam: homo primo et per se peccare potest, igitur potest annihilare gratiam per se et primo, quod sequitur naturaliter ad peccare, igitur a seipso potest esse quod sequitur ad peccare, quia sequitur: iste peccat, igitur iste est subsistendi—finis—concederet. Item, Anselmus De casu diaboli capitulo 1a quod creatura habet primo esse a Deo. (Ad 3 j) Ad decimum de Augustini Hypognosticon respondetur per primam partem auctoritatis cum dicit:b voluntas mea praesumens de se, et non de Deo, nihil proficit, et ita talis voluntas cum non vult, vitiatur, et hoc est in poenam praesumptionis, sicut dictum est superius ad sextum argumentum. Et si arguas: talis praesumens, si sit in gratia, solum peccat venialiter sicut verisimile fuit de Petro, igitur si Deus subtrahit gratiam ipso nolente, tunc invite peccavit mortaliter, et ita non peccavit, per illam auctoritatem Augustini De libero arbitrio libro II:c nemo peccat in eo quod vitare non potest— hic dico quod necessitas et peccatum non repugnant praecipue illi peccato quod est poena peccati praecedentis. Ad auctoritatem dico quod vitare non potest nec potuit, sed in casu isto Petrus potuit non habuisse praesumptionem. 1 voluerit] et add. BK ‖ in] quocumque add. B 1–2 peccaret] peccavit B 2 gratiam] om. B 3 summo] per quem ignis est calidus in summo add. K ‖ obiective] corr. in subiective B om. K 4 materia2] non add. K 5 et] om. BK 6 probatam] om. K ‖ primo … se] per se et primo K 6–7 peccare potest] inv. BK 7 quod] quae AG qui B 8 peccare1] sicut non sequitur homo ex se potest peccare add. K ‖ ad2] ex K 9 subsistendi … concederet] etc K ‖ finis] quis B 10–11 item … deo] om. BG ‖ anselmus … esse] augustinus 4 super genesim capitulo 18 et 5 libro capitulo 19 et capitulo ultimo et anselmus de casu diaboli capitulo 1 et monologion capitulo 12 esse habet primo causa K 10 1] 22 A 12 de] dicto add. K ‖ augustini] augustino AB ‖ hypognosticon] om. K ‖ respondetur] respondet G 16 si1] sic G 17 verisimile fuit] verisimilem G ‖ fuit] est B ‖ subtrahit] subtraxit K ‖ nolente] volente G 18 invite] ante G ‖ peccavit1] peccaret AG ‖ ita … peccavit2] sequitur quod non peccavit patet consequentia K ‖ peccavit2] peccat AG 18–19 augustini] consimilem add. BG augustinus K 19 libro] om. G ‖ peccat] peccavit A ‖ in … potest] etc BG ‖ quod … potest] etc K 20 illi] in tali K 21 quod2] intellegit quod add. K 22 non] habere vel add. A 22–23 praesumptionem] etc add. BG

a Anselmus, De casu diaboli, cap. 1, pp. 233–235. b Hypognosticon, lib. IV (Contra quartum dogma Pelagianorum). Ibidem, cap. V. 7 (PL 45, 1643). c Recte Augustinus, De libero arbitrio, lib. III, cap. 18, p. 304: “Quis enim peccat in eo quod nullo modo caueri potest?”

150

B 41va

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

Et si dicas quod istud videtur esse contra dicta, quia dicitur supra quod Deus non est occasio prima peccati, et modo dicis quod Deus subtrahit gratiam a Petro, unde peccavit mortaliter—hic dico quod Petrus peccavit, eo quod Deus subtraxit gratiam illius, et tamen occasio prima fuit Petrus, et quia fuit prima causa peccati seu actus venialis peccati, et quia Deus non coagit ad actum illum mortalem, quem committit subtracta gratia. (Ad 3 k) Ad undecimum dicendum: certe, licet non sit ad propositum. (Ad 3 l) Ad duodecimum similiter dico quod ista propositio ‘aliquis potest esse prima causa suae reprobationis’ potest esse constructio transitiva vel intransitiva. Si intransitiva, concedo quod solus Deus etc. Si transitiva, et sumatur causa pro causa culpabili, unde Deus primo reprobat peccatorem etc. Et sic quis potest esse causa prima suae reprobationis, et hoc est verum praecipue in adultis qui habent gratiam qui tamen finaliter reprobantur. Sed sic non sequitur: aliquis potest esse prima causa suae reprobationis, igitur praedestinationis, quia actum peccati potest quis habere a seipso, | sed actum bonum non potest sine Deo concurrente ad actum. Si autem sumatur causa pro causa partiali sine qua non, sic etiam concedo quod aliquis potest esse causa suae praedestinationis, et in tali casu bonus usus liberi arbitrii est causa suae praedestinationis. Et huic concordat Gandavus VIII Quodlibet quaestione 5,a ubi quaerit: Numquid duobus aequaliter se habentibus ad receptionem gratiae uni Deus confert gratiam alteri non? Ubi dicit quod ex parte illorum qui sanctifica-

1 dicta] praedicta K ‖ quia] qualiter G 2 occasio prima] inv. B ‖ modo] iam K 3 peccavit1] peccabit BGK 4 prima] om. A 5 prima causa] inv. A ‖ peccati1 … actus] om. K 6 mortalem] om. K 7 dicendum … propositum] de illo decreto de paenitentia 4 patet responsio sicut ad proximum quod eis subtrahere debuit gratiam in poenam peccati sed ibi est dubium de parte ultima auctoritatis quae sequitur et cum iustis non scribantur id est dicit glossa non apponatur eis gratia qua fiant digni salute aeterna B de decretis respondeo sicut ad proximum K 8 similiter] sicut G ‖ ista propositio] in ista propositione BGK (ista] illa K) 10 si1 … transitiva] om. (hom.) A et G 11 unde] qua B ‖ deus primo] inv. A ‖ primo] del. B ‖ reprobat] si add. A si add. del. al. manu B si reprobavit G sic K ‖ peccatorem] peccator A corr. in al. manu in peccatorem B peccator est K 12–13 quis … tamen] deus potest esse prima causa sui peccati et hoc praecipue verum est in adulto habente gratiam qui ABG (habente] habenti A) 13 reprobantur] reprobatur AG reprobabitur B 15 potest quis] inv. A 16 potest] habere add. BG om. K 17 causa1] om. K ‖ qua] quo A 18–19 et … praedestinationis] om. (hom.) A 18 casu] om. BG ‖ liberi arbitrii] liberior G 19 suae] om. K 20 5] 9 BG 21 numquid] non quid A ‖ duobus … habentibus] duos aequaliter se habentes BG 21–22 uni … confert] unus ferat AG uni conferat corr. al. manu ex unus ferat B 22 ex parte] prophetiae K ‖ illorum] om. AGK

a Henricus de Gandavo, Quodlibet VIII, q. 5, Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Ms. lat. 15847, fols. 305rb, 313rb–319va.

5

10

15

20

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

5

10

15

151

bantur in vita, ut de Ioanni Baptista, Zacharia, de adultis, ut Paulo, quod in eis non fuit aliqua causa nisi usus bonus liberi arbitrii, in praescientia Dei tamen non audeo asserere quod non alia fuit causa nisi usus liberi arbitrii. Contra: quia tunc per liberum arbitrium meruisset ut ante haberet quis gratiam quam mereretur illam, et ita posset aliquis mereri primam gratiam. Et ista fuit opinio Pelagii | vel propinqua peccati sui. Unde Augustinus De praedestinatione sanctoruma recitat opinionem Pelagii; vide ibi. Item, ut arguit Scotus super I Sententiarum distinctione 41 quaestione 1b contra Gandavum: ratio quam posuit ille Gandavus non fuit communis omnibus praedestinatis, quia Deus non omnem hominem praedestinavit ab aeterno propter bonum usum liberi arbitrii qui fuit in praescientia etc., id est cuius fuit Deus praescitus ab aeterno, quia illa ratio non convenit parvulis qui moriuntur cum gratia baptismali, | in quibus nullus fuit nec est nec erit usus liberi arbitrii bonus.c Item, arguo sic, et est commune argumentum contra me sicut contra Gandavum. Si Deus praedestinavit aliquem, quia praescivit ipsum bene usurum liberum arbitrium, igitur, cum praedestinatio sit actus voluntatis Dei, | igitur voluntate Dei fuit aliqua causa prior illa naturaliter, quia ⟨sic⟩ praescientia Dei est causa praedestinationis. Consequens falsum et contra Magistrum I

1 in vita] in utro B ‖ baptista] libra B ‖ zacharia] et ieremia in ventre matris et K ‖ adultis] adulto B adulto etiam G ‖ adultis ut] adulto etiam de A 2 causa] om. G ‖ bonus] boni ABG 2–3 dei tamen] inv. K 3 audeo] audetur K ‖ asserere] ego add. K ‖ alia] aliter B ‖ fuit causa] causa sit K ‖ usus] bonus usus huius B om. G 5 mereretur] meruisset A meretur B 6 peccati sui] posui corr. al. manu in ponisurum (!) B 7 pelagii] et reprobat quis sic dixit praesciebat inquit pelagius qui essent futuri facti et immaculati propter liberum arbitrium et eos ante mundi constitutionem et ipsa sua praescientia qua tales futuros esse praescivit elegit add. B ‖ ibi] om. G 8 arguit] arguat G ‖ scotus] om. AG doctor subtilis B 9 1] 5 K ‖ posuit] ponit A 11–12 id … cuius] om. ABG 12 praescitus] praescire A praedestinator in marg. al. manu B praescantius (!) G ‖ non] om. AG superscr. al. manu B 13 moriuntur] meruerant AG meruerint B ‖ cum] in K 13–14 nec erit] om. BG 14 liberi … bonus] bonus liberi arbitrii K 16 praescivit] scivit A ‖ bene usurum] vel habiturum bonum usum K (vel habiturum] in marg.) 17 cum] om. BG ‖ sit] fuit B ‖ sit actus] fuit actio G 17–18 igitur2 … dei] et sic B om. G 18 voluntate … fuit] voluntas dei foret A ‖ fuit] foret BG ‖ causa] sive actum add. G 18–19 prior … causa] om. (hom.) A 18 praescientia] est add. K 19 dei] om. B etiam add. G

a Augustinus, De praedestinatione sanctorum (PL 44, 987). b Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, dist. 41, q. unica, n. 37, p. 331: “Praeterea, ista ratio quam ponit, non videtur communis omnibus praedestinatis et reprobatis: Primo quidem, quia non parvulis, in quibus non praevidet Deus usum bonum vel malum liberi arbitrii.” c Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, dist. 41, q. unica, n. 38, p. 331.

G 164rb

A 27rb

K 53r

152

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

libro distinctione 45 capitulo 4a et 5,b ubi dicit quod voluntas Dei est prima causa omnium rerum. ⟨Conclusiones⟩ Ut igitur melius pateat qualiter teneo partem illam, pono aliquas conclusiones. (I) Prima, quod Deus est causa prima praedestinationis ab aeterno, patet per hoc, quia nihil fuit ab aeterno praeter Deum, et Deus ab aeterno praedestinavit hominem. (II) Secunda conclusio, quod aliquorum praedestinatorum solus Deus est causa praedestinationis, non bonus usus liberi arbitrii, patet de Ioanne Baptista et de parvulis innocentibus qui moriebantur propter Christum, quorum nec bonus usus liberi arbitrii parentium suorum nec usus proprius aliquo modo fuit causa praedestinationis. Et hoc dicit Ioachim De praescientia Dei et de praedestinatione sanctorum.c (III) Tertia conclusio, quod in aliquibus parvulis praedestinatis bonus usus liberi arbitrii est causa sine qua non tales forent praedestinati, patet de talibus qui baptizantur per usum liberi arbitrii aliquorum, alias moriantur in originali. (IV) Quarta conclusio, quod aliquorum praedestinatorum adultorum bonus usus liberi arbitrii potest esse causa praedestinationis et causa sine qua non, patet de adultis baptizatis qui sine usu liberi arbitrii non baptizarentur. (V) Quinta conclusio, quod nullorum praedestinatorum ad mortem solus Deus est causa sine usu liberi arbitrii, patet de parvulis non baptizatis qui

1 4 et] om. A ‖ dei] divina A ‖ prima] om. AG 4 melius pateat] inv. K ‖ pateat] appareat B ‖ teneo] teneam BG 6 prima1] est add. B ‖ causa prima] inv. BG ‖ praedestinationis] semper add. BG 6–7 patet … hoc] per hoc patet K 7 praeter deum] nisi deus K 11 propter christum] om. BG 12–13 aliquo modo] om. A 13 praedestinationis] suae add. ABG 14 sanctorum] libro 1 in primo folio add. BG libro 1 in folio primo K 15 conclusio] est add. A ‖ bonus] om. BG 16 arbitrii] non add. AG 17 qui] praedestinantur vel add. G ‖ aliquorum] om. AG qui B ‖ moriantur] morerentur B moritur G 17–18 moriantur … originali] in originali morituri K 19 conclusio] est add. A 19–20 bonus] om. B 20 usus] proprius add. K ‖ et] id est B 21 baptizatis] baptizandis B ‖ sine] sine qua adultis add. B ‖ non2] om. A 22 conclusio] est add. ABG ‖ quod] alias add. G ‖ nullorum] multorum add. G ‖ praedestinatorum] praedestinator G 23 parvulis non] inv. B ‖ non] om. AG

a Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. I, dist. 45, cap. 4, p. 308. b Petrus Lombardus Sententiae, lib. I, dist. 45, cap. 5, p. 309. c Cf. Ioachim Abbas Florensis, Dialogi de praescientia Dei et praedestinatione electorum, lib. I, pp. 66–67.

5

10

15

20

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

5

10

15

20

153

nullo modo fuissent reprobati nisi propter usum liberi arbitrii in primis parentibus vel in proximis parentibus, igitur a multo fortiori de adultis usus liberi arbitrii erit causa sine qua non reprobantur. Et confirmatur per Augustinum V Contra Iulianum haereticum capitulo 3,a ubi dicit quod si aliqua poena non est poena peccati etc.—finis—nisi peccatum fuisset. Et consimiliter probat Magister II libro distinctione 30 capitulo 6,b ubi probat quod omnis, qui nascitur, trahit poenam et meritum poenae, et meritum poenae peccatum est. (VI) Sexta conclusio, | quod omnium reprobandorum prima causa est vel erit malus usus liberi arbitrii propter quem Deus reprobat, patet per hoc, quia cuiuslibet peccati usus liberi arbitrii primo est in causa et ita cuiuslibet poenae peccati, et per consequens reprobationis usus liberi arbitrii est in causa. (VII) Septima conclusio, quod aliquorum reprobandorum prima causa et occasio est vel erit malus usus liberi arbitrii, patet de adultis qui habent gratiam et finaliter damnabuntur, quorum prima causa eorum peccatorum est usus proprii arbitrii, et per consequens eorum reprobationis. (VIII) Octava conclusio, quod non omnis praedestinatus | necessario est praedestinatus, patet per hoc quod aliquis praedestinatus potest libere peccare, ut dictum est, et per consequens potest facere quod non sit praedestinatus. (IX) Nona conclusio, quod omnis reprobandus non est necessario reprobatus, patet, quia alicui reprobando Deus confert gratiam, et ex tunc potest libere non peccare mortaliter et servare gratiam finaliter.

1 propter] per K 2 vel … parentibus2] om. (hom.) A 3 reprobantur] reprobatur G 4 augustinum] augustinus K ‖ V] libro add. BG 5 etc finis] iniusta est et numquam (?) et iniusti factum dicitur igitur cui reprobatus sit poena non fuisset inflicta igitur peccatum fuit in causa B 6 consimiliter] confirmatur G ‖ II] 1 ABG ‖ 30] 20 B 7 probat] dicit K ‖ trahit] trahitur ad A et add. B trahitur in G ‖ meritum] multis A 7–8 meritum … est] nunc poenae peccatum est nititur (?) in poenae peccatum G ‖ et2 … poenae] om. (hom.) AGK 8 peccatum] peccati A 9 conclusio] est add. BGK ‖ prima] om. K ‖ est] om. AG 10 malus usus] inv. B ‖ reprobat] patet quia per hoc deus reprobat add. iter. A 11 quia] deus reprobat quia add. iter. G quod K 14 conclusio] est add. ABG 15 malus … arbitrii] proprius usus liberi arbitrii malus K ‖ liberi] proprii BG 16 est] erit BG 18 conclusio] est add. ABG ‖ necessario est] inv. BK 18–19 necessario … praedestinatus2] om. (hom.) G 19 aliquis] omnis A 22 conclusio] est add. ABG ‖ omnis … est] non omnis reprobatus est BGK 23 quia alicui] om. G ‖ ex] om. BG

a Augustinus, Contra Iulianum opus imperfectum, lib. V, par. 28, p. 244. Ibidem, lib. V, par. 38, p. 236. Ibidem, lib. V, par. 47, p. 254. Ibidem, lib. VI, par. 17, p. 348. b Recte Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. II, dist. 30, cap. 7, p. 499.

B 41vb

G 164va

154

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

(X) Decima conclusio, quod bonus usus liberi arbitrii est causa sine qua Deus non praedestinat bonos ad tantam gratiam in vita aeterna quam habebunt, patet de his qui libere habent et conservant actus consiliorum ad quos non tenentur. (XI) Undecima conclusio, quod Deus non praedestinat aliquem ad vitam iuxta bonum usum liberi arbitrii quem habiturus foret si ulterius superviveret, patet in De praedestinatione sanctoruma bene post medium, ubi dicitur sic: quis enim audeat dicere quod parvuli—finis—merito parvulorum; et idem De dono perseverantiae capitulo 21.b Item, De correptione et gratia capitulo 56:c Deus bonos facit ut bona faciant—finis—ipsorum quod promisit. (XII) Duodecima conclusio, quod Deus non reprobat aliquem iuxta illud quod demeretur, si ulterius superviveret, patet per conclusionem praecedentem. Ex his patet quod volo tenere. ⟨Argumenta contra secundam conclusionem⟩ Sed contra secundam conclusionem, scilicet quod aliquorum praedestinatorum etc., (II. 1) arguitur, quia tunc omni alia causa amota et cum usu liberi arbitrii amoto, tales fuissent praedestinati. Consequens falsum, quia si non fuissent 1 conclusio] est add. B 2 praedestinat] praedestinavit K ‖ bonos] beatos K ‖ tantam gratiam] tantum gradum BK ‖ gratiam] gradum G 3 conservant] observant K 5 conclusio] est add. B ‖ praedestinat] praedestinavit K 6–7 superviveret] viveret A 7 sanctorum] per augustinum add. K 8 audeat] audet BG ‖ finis] sine K 8–9 parvulorum … idem] etc et K 9 correptione] coni.; codd. concordia ABGK 11 conclusio] est add. BG est K 12 superviveret] semper viveret A 14 ex … tenere] om. K ‖ patet] om. A ‖ quod] quid A 16 contra] arguitur add. K ‖ scilicet quod] si A ‖ quod] om. G 18 arguitur quia] om. AGK ‖ omni] cum A ‖ omni alia] cum aliqua BG ‖ cum] omni K 19 tales] innocentes add. in marg. K ‖ si] om. BG

a Augustinus, De praedestinatione sanctorum (PL 44, 977): “Quis enim audiat, quod dicuntur paruuli pro suis futuris meritis in ipsa infantili aetate baptizati exire de hac uita; et ideo alii non baptizati in eadem aetate mori, quia et ipsorum praescita sunt merita futura, sed mala; non eorum uitam bonam uel malam deo remunerante uel damnante, sed nullam? Apostolus quidem limitem fixit, quem transgredi non debeat hominis, ut mitius loquar, incauta suspicio. Ait enim, omnes astabimus ante tribunal christi, ut referat unusquisque secundum ea quae per corpus gessit, siue bonum, siue malum: gessit, inquit; non adiunxit, uel gesturus fuit. Sed unde hoc talibus uiris in mentem uenerit nescio, ut futura quae non sunt futura, puniantur, aut honorentur merita paruulorum.” b Augustinus, De dono perseverantiae (PL 45, 1004). c Augustinus, De correptione et gratia (PL 44, 938): “Ipse ergo illos bonos facit, ut bona faciant. Neque enim propterea eos promisit abrahae, quia praesciuit a se ipsis bonos futuros. Nam si ita est, non suum, sed eorum est quod promisit.”

5

10

15

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

5

155

martyri nec aliunde baptizati, decessissent in originali, igitur tunc non fuissent praedestinati. (II. 2) Secundo sic: tunc duobus consimiliter dispositis Deus unum praedestinaret et alium non, contra illud Actuum 10:a non est Deus personarum acceptor. ⟨Argumenta contra tertiam conclusionem⟩

10

15

20

Contra tertiam conclusionem: (III. 1) Si bonus usus liberi arbitrii in aliquibus sit causa sine qua non praedestinarentur, cum praedestinatio sit praeparatio gratiae, ut patet De praedestinatione sanctorumb pro tertia forma; si igitur bonus usus etc., sequitur quod aliquo modo saltem partialiter meretur homo primam gratiam, et tunc foret non gratia si eum merito praedestinaret, ut patet De praedestinatione sanctorum. (III. 2) Item, si in talibus parvulis bonus usus liberi arbitrii in parentibus foret causa suae praedestinationis, tunc, ceteris paribus, posset aliquis in spiritualibus meritis alteri mereri ⟨et⟩ plus proficere quam sibi ipsi. Patet consequentia, quia parentes baptizati et existentes in peccato mortali possunt esse causa sine qua non praedestinaretur huiusmodi parvulus, igitur sic potuerint aliis prodesse per huiusmodi usum liberi arbitrii et per eundem actum non potuerint sibi ipsis prodesse. Consequens falsum, igitur etc. (III. 3) Item, si bonus usus liberi arbitrii esset causa sine qua non, igitur esset priusquam praedestinatio. Patet consequentia, quia causa naturaliter prior est causato. Consequens falsum, quia cum praedestinare sit actus

1 baptizati] et sic add. B 1–2 non fuissent] inv. K 2 praedestinati] baptizati A 4 10] 20 K 8 sine qua] om. ABG in marg. K 8–9 non praedestinarentur] praedestinationis B 9 praedestinarentur] praedestinationis G praedestinaretur K ‖ praeparatio] reparatio A 10 pro … forma] per tertium folium BK ‖ tertia] secunda G ‖ forma] et dividendum post principium inter praedestinationem et gratiam hoc tamen intendere quod praedestinatio est gratiae praeparatio gratia vero est ipsa donatio add. in marg. K ‖ si … etc] om. K 11 meretur] om. G 12 eum … praedestinaret] eam merita praedestinarent B eam merita non praedestinarent G eam merita praecederent K 14 bonus] om. ABG 15 foret] iter. A ‖ suae] om. K ‖ tunc] autem add. A ‖ aliquis] om. A 16 meritis] mentis G ‖ meritis … mereri] meritum alicuius posset alteri K ‖ alteri mereri] inv. BG ‖ quam] om. AG 17 mortali] in originali G 18 igitur] om. A ‖ igitur sic] sicut BG 19 liberi] libera A ‖ et] om. BG 20 potuerint] possunt K 21 si] om. BG ‖ esset] erit ABG 22 esset] om. ABG ‖ priusquam] postquam G 22–23 naturaliter … est] prior est naturaliter K 23 causato] sed add. K

a Act 10:34. b Augustinus, De praedestinatione sanctorum (PL 44, 974, 975).

156

B 42ra

G 164vb

K 53v A 27va

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

voluntatis Dei, aliqua foret prior causa—contra Augustinum Contra Manicheos,a et allegat Magister I libro distinctione 45 capitulo 4 etc.b (III. 4) Item, in talibus praedestinatis, quorum praedestinatio aliquo modo dependet ut activa ab ipso libero arbitrio parentum vel sui ipsius, tunc aut possunt hi, qui sunt sic usuri libero arbitrio, resistere aut non habendo usum liberi arbitrii. Unde ⟨parentes⟩ parvuli ⟨qui sic⟩ sunt praedestinati ⟨vel possunt sic uti libero arbitrio⟩ vel non possunt. Si possunt, tunc possunt tales facere de huiusmodi praedestinatis quod non sint praedestinati, | et ita huiusmodi parentes forent causa praecisa praedestinationis. Patet consequentia, quia posita illa causa poneretur effectus, et remota removeretur ille effectus. Si autem non possunt uti libero | arbitrio ut huiusmodi liberum arbitrium est causa sine qua non praedestinarentur, igitur talis praedestinatio non dependeret a primo principio, scilicet a voluntate Dei immutabili et intransmutabili. Et per consequens: tales necessario forent praedestinati, et ita fortiori ratione quilibet alius praedestinatus necessario foret praedestinatus, quod est contra octavam conclusionem. (III. 5) Item, si bonus usus liberi arbitrii sit causa sine qua non etc., tunc foret hoc maxime verum de adultis qui non baptizarentur, nisi per usum liberi arbitrii sui, et cum illa libertas sit libertas contradictionis, sequitur quod tales possent resistere donationi huiusmodi gratiae praeparatae eis ab aeterno. Consequens falsum et contra Augustinum | De praedestinatione sanctorum cito post medium, itaque dicit Augustinus contra:c quae occulte—finis—ut cordis duritia | auferatur.

1 augustinum] augustinus K 2 capitulo … etc] si causam voluntas dei habet etc K (dei habet etc] in marg.) ‖ etc] om. B 4 ut activa] nisi actum G om. K ‖ ipso … arbitrio] usu liberi arbitrii K ‖ parentum] parentis BG 5 usuri … arbitrio] usu liberi arbitrii K 7 si possunt] om. BG 9 causa praecisa] inv. BK prior alia causa G 11 autem] igitur ABG ‖ possunt] non sic add. K 11–12 ut … qua] sine quo K 12 praedestinarentur] praedestinaretur A 13 dependeret] ut add. GK 15 ita … ratione] a multo fortiori ratione BG a multo fortiori K ‖ necessario foret] inv. K 16 octavam] coni.; codd. nonam ABK ‖ octavam conclusionem] consequentiam nonam G 18 foret … maxime] hoc maxime foret B ‖ maxime verum] inv. A ‖ non] om. G ‖ baptizarentur] baptizantur K 19 liberi … sui] proprii liberi arbitrii K 20 possent] possunt AB ‖ donationi] donationis G ‖ donationi huiusmodi] inv. K 22 medium] haec itaque gratia dicit augustinus humanis divina largitate tribuitur a nullo duro corde respuitur ideo quippe tribuitur ut cordis duritia auferatur add. in marg. K 23 auferatur] auferretur AK auferetur G

a Augustinus, De Genesi contra Manichaeos, lib. I (PL 34, 175). b Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. I, dist. 45, cap. 4, p. 308. c Augustinus, De praedestinatione sanctorum (PL 44, 971): “Haec itaque gratia, quae occulte humanis cordibus divina largitate tribuitur, a nullo duro corde respuitur. Ideo quippe tribuitur, ut cordis duritia primitus auferatur.”

5

10

15

20

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

5

157

(III. 6) Item, si sic, tunc tales adulti praedestinati, quorum usus proprii liberi arbitrii erit causa sine qua non praedestinarentur, possunt dicere veraciter: ideo nos praedestinavit Deus, quia tales futuri eramus per usum liberi arbitrii. Consequens falsum et contra Augustinum De praedestinatione sanctorum bene ante finem,a ubi dicit: “sicut elegit nos in ipso ante mundi constitutionem”—finis—“per gratiam eius essemus.” His non obstantibus dico sicut prius. ⟨Responsio ad argumenta contra secundam conclusionem⟩

10

15

20

(Ad II. 1) Ad argumentum primum contra secundam conclusionem, quando dicitur quod cum causa aliqua amota etc., hic posset esse dubium qualiter tales innocentes fuerunt martyres sine usu liberi arbitrii, et numquid martyrium fuit causa suae praedestinationis? Dico quod huiusmodi martyres tamquam martyres recipit et commendat ecclesia, dicente Augustino III De libero arbitrio capitulo 37:b non enim frustra infantes illos sic commendat ecclesia. Unde in talibus parvulis solus Deus est causa non usus liberi arbitrii, id est, Deus sine usu liberi arbitrii fuit causa, et hoc loquendo de causa per se, quia de per accidens non est sermo. (Ad II. 2) Ad secundum dico quod non sequitur quod Deus sit personarum acceptor, quia non est personarum acceptio unum eligere et praedestinare et alium non, quia Deus eligit pauperes in hoc mundo divites in fide, ut patet Iacobi 2;c et deposuit potentes, sed solumd ibi ubi peccatum fieret, dicente Iacobi 2:e si personas accipitis, peccatum est.

1 praedestinati] praecedenti G 2 liberi arbitrii] inv. G 3 deus] om. K 3–4 usum … arbitrii] liberi arbitrii usum K 4 augustinum] augustinus K 5 sanctorum] om. G ‖ sicut elegit] om. ABG in marg. K ‖ ipso] principio K 7 prius] et add. AK 9 primum] om. BGK 10 cum … aliqua] omni alia causa K ‖ causa aliqua] inv. B 12 suae] eorum B 12–13 martyres] innocentes B 14 sic] finis K 15 unde] om. A ‖ non] bonus add. K 16 fuit] est K ‖ causa1] om. A 17 quia … accidens] et desperationis AG ‖ quia … sermo] om. K 19 et praedestinare] om. K 21 iacobi] zacharias AG ‖ sed solum] de sede K 22 iacobi] zacharias A capitulo add. B zacharias capitulo G ‖ 2] capitulo add. K

a Augustinus, De praedestinatione sanctorum (PL 44, 986–987): “Sicut elegit nos in ipso ante mundi constitutionem, ut essemus sancti et immaculati. Non ergo quia futuri eramus, sed ut essemus. Nempe certum est, nempe manifestum est: ideo quippe tales eramus futuri, quia elegit ipse, praedestinans ut tales per gratiam eius essemus.” b Recte Augustinus, De libero arbitrio, lib. III, cap. 23, p. 315: “Non enim frustra etiam infantes illos, qui, cum dominus iesus christus necandus ab herode quaereretur, occisi sunt, in honore martyrum receptos commendat ecclesia.” c Iac 2:5. d Lc 1:52. e Iac 2:9.

158

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

⟨Responsio ad argumenta contra tertiam conclusionem⟩

G 165ra

(Ad III. 1) Ad argumentum contra tertiam conclusionem concedo, ut prius, quod bonus usus liberi arbitrii in praescientia Dei est causa sine qua non etc. Et ulterius nego consequentiam, igitur huiusmodi usus est aliquo modo meritorius primae gratiae, quia huiusmodi usus est solum causa praeparativa sive praeparans animam ad receptionem gratiae. Unde si non fuerit anima praeparata naturaliter, posset Deus libere de potentia absoluta dare vel non dare; verbi gratia: Socrates sciens Platonem fidelem futurum pro A, vult Platoni accommodare pecuniam pro A tempore ad relevandum indigentiam suam sciens Platonem bene usurum pecunia illa pro illo tempore, et tamen Plato propter hoc non meretur quidquid habere de pecunia Socratis. (Ad III. 2) Ad secundum concedo quod aliquis existens in peccato mortali potest alteri in casu plus prodesse quam sibi ipsi, sicut sacerdos baptizans puerum qui alias moreretur in originali. (Ad III. 3) Ad tertium, quando arguitur quod huiusmodi usus liberi | arbitrii foret prior naturaliter quam praedestinatio, nego consequentiam. Unde loquendo de tali causa sine qua non, oportet quod causalitas sit prior causato. Unde Magister I libro distinctione 38 capitulo 5a exponit auctoritatem Origenis,b qui dixit quod, quia aliquod est futurum, ideo scitur a Deo. Et respondet Magisterc quod sic debet intellegi: nisi esset futurum, non sciretur a Deo. Sic igitur patet per Magistrumd quod rem esse futuram est causa sine qua non Deus sciret. Et tamen non concederet Magister quod prius 2 argumentum] argumenta K ‖ tertiam] secundam AB 3 non] om. BG 4 huiusmodi] om. BG 5 meritorius] meritorium ABG ‖ gratiae] causae AG ‖ solum] sola AG 5–6 causa praeparativa] praeparativus K 6 fuerit] fuit BK 7 anima] om. G ‖ praeparata] prius add. K 8 fidelem futurum] inv. K ‖ a] tempore add. K 9 platoni accommodare] inv. K ‖ accommodare] aliquo modo dare BG ‖ relevandum] tollendum A 10 pecunia] pecuniam A 11 tamen] om. A ‖ quidquid] quicumque B ‖ quidquid habere] habere cuicumque K 13 existens … mortali] in casu K ‖ peccato] om. A 14 in casu] om. K 15 qui] om. AGK ‖ moreretur] moritur AG ‖ moreretur … originali] in originali moriturum K 16 arguitur] diceretur BG 17 prior naturaliter] inv. K ‖ quam] huiusmodi add. K 18 non] iter. K ‖ causalitas] tali causae nunc ipsa causa add. K ‖ prior] naturaliter add. K 20 dixit] dicit GK ‖ ideo] non G 23 sciret] et tamen concederet magister quod prius naturaliter foret rem esse futuram est causa sine qua non deus sciret add. iter. A et tamen non concederet magister quod prius naturaliter formae (?) esse futuram est causa sine qua non deus sciret add. iter. G

a Recte Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. I, dist. 38, cap. 1, p. 277. b Origenes, In Epistulam Pauli ad Romanos explanationum libri, lib. VII, cap. 6, p. 591. c Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. I, dist. 38, cap. 1, p. 277. d Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. I, dist. 38, cap. 1, p. 277.

5

10

15

20

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

5

10

15

20

159

naturaliter foret rem esse futuram quam scientiam Dei esse respectu illius. Et consimiliter Thomas | De veritate 2 articulo quaestione 14a glossat quasi consimiliter Origenem dicens quod res ipsae sunt causa sine qua Deus non sciret. Unde dicit sic: scientia Dei non inducit necessitatem rebus, sed e contra res inferunt Deum hoc scivisse. Et sic patet per eum quod res sunt causa sine qua Deus non sciret ipsas esse; et tamen non sequitur quod ut sic sint priusquam scientia Dei. (Ad III. 4) Ad quartum concedo quod aliqui possunt facere praedestinatis aliquibus quod erunt praedestinati, et ⟨sint⟩ prima occasio et prima causa quare erunt ⟨illi⟩ praedestinati; igitur tales sunt primae causae huiusmodi praedestinationis. Dico quod loquendo in minori de causa sine qua non, tunc non sequitur consequens, quia oportet quod aliquid sit causa praecisa quod ipsa posita et omni alia amota sequatur effectus. Si autem amota ⟨esset⟩ causa prima, scilicet ⟨amoto⟩ Deo, qui est praedestinans primo et principaliter, non posset huiusmodi liberum arbitrium esse causa praedestinationis alicuius. (Ad III. 5) Ad quintum concedo quod huiusmodi praedestinati possunt libertate arbitrii sui non velle baptizari et respuere gratiam eis oblatam. Et ad Augustinum patet quod non dicit quod non posset respui gratia, sed quod de facto non respuitur. (Ad III. 6) Ad sextum concedo quod conclusio est vera et quod tales ⟨adulti praedestinati⟩ possunt dicere vere: ideo nos praedestinavit etc., si ly ‘quia’ denotet causam partialem sine qua non; sed Augustinus loquitur de causa principali.

2 2 articulo] inv. K 3 dicens] dicendo K ‖ deus non] inv. K 4 inducit] induit G 5 eum] ipsum K 6 deus … sciret] non sciret deus K 7 priusquam] priores K ‖ dei] naturaliter add. K 8 facere] de add. in marg. al. manu B de add. GK 8–9 praedestinatis aliquibus] inv. K 9 quod] non add. BGK ‖ erunt] erant A ‖ prima2] quod possunt esse BG cum dicitur si possunt esse K 10 sunt] om. G ‖ primae causae] prima et praecisa causa K (et praecisa] in marg. K) 11 in] de A 12 consequens] om. B ‖ oportet] ad hoc add. K 12–13 praecisa] praecise G 13 amota1] remota K ‖ sequatur] sequeretur A sequitur G ponatur K ‖ si] posset add. B sed K 14 causa prima] inv. K ‖ prima scilicet] inv. B ‖ praedestinans] causa praedestinationis K 18 eis] illis A ‖ oblatam] ablatam G 19 augustinum] augustinus K 21 concedo] dico K 23 quia] ideo K ‖ denotet] dicat K

a Thomas de Aquino, Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, q. 2. art. 14, p. 92.

B 42rb

160

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

⟨Dubium: Utrum omnia quae eveniunt de necessitate eveniunt⟩ ⟨Argumenta contra octavam et nonam conclusionem⟩ ⟨Argumenta principalia dubii⟩ Contra octavam et nonam conclusionem arguitur sic: (1) Omnia quae evenient de necessitate evenient, igitur omnis praedestinatus necessario est praedestinatus. Antecedens probatur, quia quocumque futuro demonstrato sequitur: Deus vult hoc esse futurum, igitur hoc necessario eveniet. Antecedens est necessarium, igitur consequens. Quod antecedens sit necessarium patet, quia quidquid Deus vult non potest non velle, cum sua voluntas sit immutabilis, secundum illud Malachem 3:a ego Dominus et non mutor; et Iacobi:b “apud quem non est transmutatio neque ⟨vicissitudinis obumbratio⟩” etc.; et tractat Henricus de Gandavo V Quodlibet quaestione 4 in principio.c Et confirmatur ista consequentia: ‘Deus vult hoc esse futurum, igitur hoc necessario erit’, per Augustinum II De libero arbitrio capitulo 3, ubi dicit sic:d voluntas ipsius necessitatem imponit. Et Cur Deus homo capitulo 17:e si vis omnium—finis—quia necesse est fieri si voluerit. (2) Item, scientia Dei est indifferens ad Antichristum fore vel non fore, quia substantia Dei, inquantum est substantia vel scientia, est scientia indif-

4 octavam et] om. ABG 5 evenient1] eveniunt BGK ‖ evenient2] eveniunt BGK 6 necessario … praedestinatus] om. (hom.) G 6–7 quocumque … demonstrato] demonstrato quocumque futuro K 7 sequitur] om. A 7–8 igitur … eveniet] om. G ‖ hoc2 … eveniet] necessario hoc erit B 8 necessario eveniet] de necessitate erit et K 9 sit] om. K 11 dominus] deus ABG ‖ iacobi] 2 add. BK zacharias 2 G ‖ neque] om. K 11–12 neque etc] om. BG 12–13 et … principio] om. K 12 tractat] om. A ‖ tractat … gandavo] tractatus de gandavo G ‖ henricus … gandavo] gandavus B 14 futurum] om. K 14–15 igitur … per] necessario igitur hoc erit consequentia probatur quod B 15 erit] contra probatur add. G ‖ ubi … sic] om. A 16 ipsius] illius GK 17 et] anselmus add. K ‖ homo] om. B ‖ omnium] omnia A ‖ finis] fieri AB fieri quod necesse fieri add. G ‖ quia] om. A ‖ est] om. ABG 18 voluerit] et 6 super genesim capitulo 20 creatoris voluntas rerum necessitas est et enchiridion 84 rogandus est deus igitur etc add. in marg. K 20 quia] igitur BG 20–161.1 quia … fore2] om. (hom.) A 20 substantia1] etiam add. B autem add. G ‖ est substantia] inv. BG ‖ vel … est2] om. BG ‖ scientia2] et add. superscr. al. manu B

a IV Reg 3:6. b Iac 1:17. c Henricus de Gandavo, Quodlibet V, q. 4, Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Ms. lat. 15848, fol. 122vb. d Augustinus, De libero arbitrio, lib. III, cap. 3, p. 279. e Anselmus, Cur Deus homo, lib. II, cap. 17, p. 125: “Et si vis omnium quae fecit et quae passus est veram scire necessitatem, scito omnia ex necessitate fuisse, quia ipse voluit.”

5

10

15

20

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

5

10

15

161

ferens ad Antichristum fore vel non fore, igitur si debeat terminari ad alterum illorum oportet quod sit per voluntatem Dei, sed voluntatem Dei nullus potest impedire, igitur nullus potest impedire quin illud quod erit eveniet. Confirmatur per Magistrum I libro distinctione 38 capitulo 5,a ubi dicit quod scientia Dei sive praescientia Dei non est causa rerum | quae fiunt nisi nomine scientiae nuncupetur voluntas beneplacita Dei. Et istud argumentum ponitur virtualiter in Scoto Quodlibet V quaestione 4,b ubi recitat opinionem Avicennaec qui ponit necessitatem triplicem in rebus, ita quod Deus necessario agit necessitate essentiae suae; vide ibi. (3) Tertio: si non necessario evenirent omnia, tunc hoc maxime foret propter repugnantiam inter necessitatem merendi et meritum, quia propter necessitatem tollitur omne meritum et peccatum. Consequens falsum, ut patet de Sennacherib de quo Isai 10:d “vae Assur” etc. Et glossa ibidem.e Et istud argumentum ponit Altissiodorensis super II Sententiarum quaestione 49,f ubi quaerit illam quaestionem: Utrum tantum mala actio sit a Deo. (4) Quarto sic: sit nunc primum instans quo Antichristus erit, tunc Deus vult Antichristum esse respectu esse Antichristi. Similiter ex alia parte, omne quod est etc., sed Antichristus est, igitur Antichristum necesse est esse. 1–2 terminari … illorum] determinari ad unum oppositorum K 2 sit] fiat B terminaretur K ‖ dei1] om. G 3 quod erit] om. K 4 I libro] inv. BG ‖ 38] 18 BG 5 scientia] om. G ‖ dei sive] vel K ‖ causa] om. BG 6 nuncupetur] nuncupentur A 7 ponitur] ponit K ‖ in … V] scotus quodlibet suo K ‖ quodlibet … quaestione] 5 quodlibet A 5 7 G 8 avicennae] auctoritatis G ‖ ponit] posuit A 10 hoc] homo A 11 propter] inter AG ‖ inter … meritum] quae est in necessitate merendi et merito K 13 isai] zacharias ABG ‖ ibidem] dicit sic sicut inanimata tantum sunt instrumenta nihil per se agentia sed per eum qui movet sic nec sennacherib per se sed in dei virtute operatus est add. in marg. K 14 istud] idem BG 15 quaerit … quaestionem] quaeritur illa quaestio BG 16 sic sit] inv. G 17 esse1] et omne quod est necesse est esse igitur voluntas dei est add. K ‖ esse antichristi] antichristi necesse K ‖ similiter] sicut G 18 necesse … esse] esse necesse est K

a Recte Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. I, dist. 38, cap. 1, p. 277: “Ita etiam dicimus scientiam vel praescientiam Dei non esse causam eorum quae fiunt, nisi talem, sine qua non fiunt; si tamen scientiam ad notitiam tantum referamus. Si vero nomine scientiae includitur etiam beneplacitum atque dispositio, tunc recte potest dici causa eorum quae Deus facit.” b Recte Duns Scotus, Lectura I, dist. 8, q. unica, n. 234, p. 89: “Unde Avicenna ponit triplicem necessitatem in agente primo ad agendum, sicut patet ex IX Metaphysicae suae. Prima est necessitas essentiae suae, et ideo actio competens essentiae similiter erit necessaria; secunda est necessitas suae scientiae, secundum quam necessario intelligit res secundum meliorem ordinem in esse; et tunc tertia necessitas sequitur, quae est voluntatis suae necessario complacentis in tali ordine, qua voluntate ponit eas in esse. Ex quo patet quod non posuit Deum necessario agere, sicut ignem, sine cognitione.” Cf. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, dist. 8, q. unica, nn. 242–249, pp. 290–293. Ibidem, dist. 8, q. 3, nn. 110–111, pp. 203–204. c Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima, tract. 6, cap. 5, p. 333. d Is 10:5. e Alexander Halensis, Sententiae II, dist. 37, p. 365. f Alexander Halensis, Summa theologica IIa–IIae, tract. 1, q. 3, cap. 1, p. 14.

G 165rb

162

A 27vb

B 42va

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

Tunc hic sunt duae necessitates respectu esse Antichristi: una ex parte Dei, alia ex parte Antichristi, tunc aut una reducitur ad aliam | vel utraque ad tertiam. Patet consequentia, quia in omni genere est devenire ad unum primum ad quod omnia reducuntur. Sed necessitas ex parte voluntatis Dei non reducitur ad aliam, quia tunc voluntas Dei esset pedisequa alterius quod nefas est dicere, sicut patet per Magistrum Sententiarum I libro distinctione 45 capitulo 4,a ubi dicit: si causam habet voluntas Dei, est aliquid quod antecedit etc. Si vero necessitas illa, quae est ex parte Antichristi, reducitur ad aliam, quae est ⟨ex parte⟩ volitionis Dei, igitur tunc voluntas Dei est necessitas et causa huiusmodi necessitatis. Si autem ambae necessitates reducantur ad tertiam, | igitur, sicut prius, voluntate Dei foret aliqua necessitas prior ad quam reducerentur. (5) Quinto sic: verisimile est quod Deus revelet animae Christi numerum animarum istarum, quas salvabit per passionem suam. Hoc patet per Magistrum III libro distinctione 21b in fine: electos suos etc. Sint igitur A, B, C omnes animae, quae salvabuntur per passionem suam; si igitur in potestate cuiuslibet illorum foret quod salvaretur vel quod non salvaretur, et Christus credit quemlibet illorum certitudinaliter salvari, sequitur quod in cuiuslibet illorum potestate foret facere quod Christus deciperetur. Et probatur consequentia per Augustinum De correptione et gratia capitulo 21:c horum praedestinatorum—finis—quia nulla re vincitur. (6) Item, scientia quae est in verbo ‘creator’ est illa quae est in genere proprio, sed scientia quae habetur de re in genere proprio non potest non 1 duae] om. G ‖ esse] om. K 1–2 una … antichristi] om. (hom.) ABG in marg. K 4 voluntatis] om. K 5 esset] foret BGK ‖ alterius] alteri BGK 6 sententiarum … libro] I sententiarum BG 6–7 I … 4] distinctione 45 I libri capitulo 9 K 7 4] 41 BG ‖ dei] tunc add. AK 7–8 antecedit] ancedit (!) G 9 dei2] om. B ‖ est2] erit BG 10 autem] om. K 11 voluntate] voluntas AG ‖ voluntate … aliqua] foret voluntate dei alicuius K ‖ prior] om. A 12 reducerentur] reducetur A reduceretur K 13 revelet] revelavit K 13–14 numerum … istarum] animas illas K 14 animarum istarum] illarum animarum BG 15 21] 2 BG ‖ fine] christus magis add. in marg. K 16 animae] om. K ‖ animae quae] qui BG 17 cuiuslibet] quodlibet A ‖ foret] om. G ‖ vel … salvaretur2] om. (hom.) G 18 illorum] foret quod add. B ‖ in] om. A 18–19 cuiuslibet] cuiuscumque K 19 christus] deus K ‖ deciperetur] sive christus add. K 19–20 probatur consequentia] consequentia patet BG 20 21] 31 B 21 finis] si quisquam perit vitio humano vincitur et fallitur deus sed nullus eorum perit add. in marg. K ‖ quia] quod BG deus add. in marg. K ‖ re] coni.; codd. ratione ABGK 22 illa quae] quasi scientia K 23 de … proprio2] in genere proprio de re A

a Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. I, dist. 45, cap. 4, p. 308. b Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. III, dist. 31, cap. 3, p. 184. c Augustinus, De correptione et gratia (PL 44, 924): “Horum si quisquam perit, fallitur Deus: sed nemo eorum perit, quia non fallitur Deus. Horum si quisquam perit, vitio humano vincitur Deus: sed nemo eorum perit, quia nulla re vincitur Deus.”

5

10

15

20

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

5

10

15

163

fuisse scientia, igitur nec scientia quae est in verbo non potest etc. Sed anima Christi habet in verbo scientiam de omnibus futuris, igitur scientia Dei non potest non fuisse scientia, et ita necessario erunt. Primum antecedens patet per Augustinum Super Genesim capitulo 16:a scientia rerum in verbo praeponi debet scientiae in proprio genere; et XI De civitate Dei capitulo 7:b cognitio quippe creaturae fit quasi in cognitione vespertina. (7) Item, praecipiat Deus Deo Filio quod praedicat, quidquid in verbo videat, Deus Filius secundum hominem quod Antichristus est futurus vel quod Socrates peccabit, et labatur tempus in quo Deus Filius secundum hominem praedicit et asserit quod Socrates peccabit et Antichristus erit, tunc si non erit ita quod Socrates peccabit, igitur Deus Filius secundum hominem asserit falsum. Maior est necessaria et minor possibilis, igitur conclusio possibilis. (8) Item, per Augustinum Super Genesim ad litteram capitulo 21c videtur | probare intentum, unde dicit sic: multa secundum causas inferiores—finis— necessario | futurum est; et idem Magister II libro distinctione 17:d hoc necessario est.

1 non] om. GK 2 christi] om. G ‖ omnibus] om. A ‖ dei] eorum K 3 erunt] et add. BG 5 XI] 5 G 2 B ‖ dei] om. BG 6 fit] finis K 7 deus] pater add. K ‖ filio] suo add. A ‖ praedicat] praedicet K ‖ quidquid] videt add. K ‖ verbo] quae add. G et add. K 8 videat … filius] videt deo filio B ‖ secundum hominem] inquantum homo aut A 9 filius secundum] filium G 10 praedicit … asserit] praedicavit et asseruit K ‖ asserit] asseruit B 11 tunc si] om. A ‖ si] sicut G ‖ erit] est A ‖ secundum] quod add. A 12 asserit] asseruit BK 15 multa] merita G ‖ finis] sic AG 16 est] erit BG erant K ‖ idem] om. A ibidem GK ‖ II libro] inv. B 17 est] futurum quod deus vult et praescit add. in marg. K

a Recte Augustinus, De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim, lib. IV, par. 35, p. 136. b Augustinus, De civitate Dei, lib. XI, cap. 7, p. 327: “Cognitio quippe creaturae in se ipsa decoloratior est, ut ita dicam, quam cum in dei sapientia cognoscitur, uelut in arte qua facta est. Ideo uespera quam nox congruentius dici potest; quae tamen, ut dixi, cum ad laudandum et amandum refertur creatorem, recurrit in mane.” c Augustinus, De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim, lib. VI, par. 17, p. 191: “Hoc enim necessario futurum est, quod ille vult, et ea vere futura sunt, quae ille praescivit; nam multa secundum inferiores causas futura sunt.” d Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. II, dist. 17, cap. 3, pp. 412–413: “In aetate virili factus est homo, et hoc secundum superiores causas, non inferiores. Augustinus, Super Genesim, dicit quod Adam in aetate virili continuo factus est; et hoc secundum superiores, non inferiores causas, id est secundum voluntatem et potentiam Dei, quam naturae generibus non alligavit; qualiter et virga Moysi conversa est in draconem. ‘Nec talia contra naturam fiunt nisi nobis, quibus aliter naturae cursus innotuit; Deo autem natura est quod facit’. ‘Non ergo contra dispositionem suam illud fecit Deus. Erat enim in prima causarum conditione sic hominem posse fieri, sed non ibi erat necesse ut sic fieret. Hoc enim non erat in conditione creaturae, sed in beneplacito Creatoris, cuius voluntas necessitas est.’ ‘Hoc enim necessario futurum est, quod vult et praescit. (…)’.”

K 54r G 165va

164

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

(9) Item, voluntas Dei est ita libera respectu unius obiecti sicut respectu alterius, et respectu unius obiecti uno tempore sicut alio, igitur si Deus vult Antichristum fore pro nunc, potest pro nunc velle Antichristum non fore vel non velle pro nunc Antichristum non fore, igitur eadem ratione ita libere potest velle coelum non esse pro nunc; et sic eadem ratione quod coelum non fuisset postquam fuit, quod est contra illud: “hoc solo privatur Deus”a ut posset facere de praeterito non praeteritum, Ethicorum VI,b et Anselmus capitulo 4c et 5.d (10) Item, si non omnia etc., hoc maxime foret verum in his quae dependent a libero arbitrio voluntatis creaturae, et ita posset deduci quod illi qui merebantur vitam aeternam quod eam numquam merebantur; et consimiliter de his qui damnabuntur. Et ita in potestate liberi arbitrii omnium hominum, qui sunt et qui erunt, foret quod omnes homines, qui sunt et qui erunt, damnabuntur. Et ita in potestate eorum foret verificare oppositum dicti Christi, Matthaei ultimo:e “Ego vobiscum sum” etc. Et ita Deus homines deciperet—contra Augustinum 83 quaestionibus quaestione 14,f ubi arguit sic: “si phantasma” etc.; et 24: summa virtus est neminem decipere;g et XI De civitate Dei capitulo 12:h Deus non omnes instruit, sed neminem fallit. (11) Item, si non sequitur quod posset facere quod ille numerus electorum non foret certus numerus electorum, sed quod erit alius, quia multi enim

1 dei] om. B ‖ ita] om. A ‖ obiecti] subiecti G 2 unius] om. G ‖ alio] alia A ‖ vult] volens K 3 pro nunc1] om. A ‖ velle] om. A 4 pro] om. A ‖ nunc] tunc BGK ‖ antichristum … fore] om. B ‖ non2] om. K ‖ ita libere] om. K 5 potest] pro nunc add. K 7 posset] possit K ‖ praeteritum] praeterito A ‖ ethicorum VI] enchiridion 5 AB enchiridion G ‖ anselmus] de concordia add. in marg. K 8 5] 8 et 8 B 8 GK 10 et] quia BG ‖ deduci] deducitur G 11 eam numquam] inv. K 13 qui1 … foret] foret qui sunt et qui erunt K 14 verificare] divificare (!) G 15 dicti] om. G ‖ sum] om. A 16 14] 24 ABG 17 phantasma] phantasmata ABG corpus christi fuit fefellit et sic veritas non est add. in marg. K ‖ 24] isidorus 4 AB psalmus 4 G 18 XI] 14 K ‖ 12] 22 A 20 posset] possum K 21 electorum] electus A ‖ erit] est ABG ‖ alius] aliorum BG ‖ enim] om. B cum K

a Auctoritates Aristotelis, opus: 12 (Ethica VI), p. 240. Cf. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio IV, dist. 1, q. 1, n. 354, p. 126. Cf. Thomas de Aquino, In I Sententiarum, dist. 42, q. 2, art. 2, arg. 3. b Aristoteles, Ethica Nicomachea, lib. VI, cap. 3, p. 255: 4–5 (1139b10–11). c Recte Anselmus, De concordia, q. 1, cap. 2, p. 249. d Recte Anselmus, Cur Deus homo, lib. II, cap. 17, p. 123. e Mt 28:20. f Augustinus, De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII, q. 14, p. 20: “Si fantasma fuit corpus christi, fefellit christus; et si fallit, ueritas non est; est autem ueritas christus. Non igitur fantasma fuit corpus eius.” g Augustinus, De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII, q. 53, p. 86. h Augustinus, De civitate Dei, lib. XI, cap. 12, p. 333.

5

10

15

20

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

5

10

165

sunt de numero illorum, qui possunt facere quod non essent de numero illorum—contra Augustinum De correptione et gratia capitulo 6a de his qui sunt praedestinati. Item, in Enchiridion XXIIb et in De civitate Dei XXII:c superna Ierusalem; et ponit Magister I libro distinctione 40 capitulo 1.d (12) Item, per Boethium V De consolatione prosa ultima,e et Altissioderensem XXII quaestione 4.f Et confirmatur per illud Augustini VI Super Genesim.g | Et per Anselmum De concordia capitulo 3,h ubi tractat illud Iob:i constituisti terminos eius. (13) Item, arguitur sic: capiatur Socrates, qui habet finalem perseverantiam in bono. Tunc arguitur sic: Socrates habet finalem perseverantiam in bono. Et arguitur per Augustinum De dono perseverantiae capitulo 7:j perseverantiam—finis—amitti non potest. Et confirmatur per hoc De paenitentia distinctione 2 in fine:k “quod enim nullo modo vere est.” Et

1 qui] om. K ‖ essent] erit B 2 6] 63 BGK 3 praedestinati] in regnum dei loquor quorum dicit augustinus ita certus est numerus ut nec addatur eis quisquam nec minuatur ex eis add. in marg. K 4 in1] augustinus K ‖ et in] om. G ‖ in2] om. BK ‖ dei] om. BG capitulo add. K ‖ superna ierusalem] om. BG ‖ ierusalem] nullum A 5–7 capitulo … 4] om. A 7 XXII] 2 B 24 G ‖ 4] etc add. G om. K ‖ illud] 5 add. A add. 8 G ‖ augustini] argumentum AG 7–8 genesim] videtur supra add. in marg. K 8 capitulo] om. B 11 bono] sive aliquid ex libertate sive ex necessitate eveniat dicitur deus constituisse illud apud se immutabiliter etc add. in marg. K ‖ arguitur] om. K 12 et … augustinum] tunc arguitur per argumentum A ‖ arguitur per] non potest adiungere etc igitur necessario perseverabit in bono maior probatur K ‖ augustinum] augustinus K 13 hoc] illud BK 14 vere] venire ABG

a Augustinus, De correptione et gratia (PL 44, 940). b Recte Augustinus, Enchiridion de fide, spe et caritate, cap. IX, 29, p. 65. c Augustinus, De civitate Dei, lib. XXII, cap. 2–3, pp. 807–809. d Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. I, dist. 40, cap. 1, p. 284. e Boethius, De consolatione philosophiae, lib. V, prosa 6, par. 1–48, pp. 102–106 (esp. par. 25–36, pp. 104–105). f Vide, e.g., Alexander Halensis, Summa theologica I, pars. 1, tract. 5 q. unica, cap. 4, pp. 254– 255. Alexander Halensis, Summa theologica IIa–IIae, tract. 8, q. unica, cap. 4, p. 820. Alexander Halensis, Sententiae I, dist. 38, p. 392. Alexander Halensis, Sententiae III, dist. 35, p. 308. g Augustinus, De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim, lib. VI, par. 17, p. 191. h Anselmus, De concordia, q. 1, cap. 5, p. 253: “Si vero per hoc quod de homine dicit Iob deo: ‘constituisti terminos eius, qui praeteriri non poterunt’, vult aliquis ostendere quia nullus potuit accelerare vel differre diem in qua moritur, quamvis aliquando nobis videatur aliquis facere ex libera voluntate unde moritur: non est quod obicitur contra hoc quod supra diximus.” i Iob 14:5. j Augustinus, De dono perseverantiae (PL 45, 999). k Decretum magistri Gratiani, par. 2,33,3 (De paenitentia), dist. 2, p. 1211.

B 42vb

166

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

confirmatur per Augustinum De correptione et gratia capitulo 34, quia “in Dei providentissima dispositione”—finis—quia non potest perire.a (14) Item, Deus non aliter novit facta quam fienda, sed Deus sic novit facta quod non potest ea non noscere, igitur sic novit fienda quod non potest etc. Primum assumptum probatur per Augustinum X De civitate Dei capitulo 18,b ubi dicit quod “tamquam praeterita”—finis—“quia certa erant.” Et idem quasi dicit Isidorus De summo bono libro I capitulo 19:c in scripturis sacris—finis—in praedestinatione divina. Item, Anselmus De concordia capitulo 3,d qui ponit exempla multa quod praeteritum ponitur pro futuro. (15) Item, si non, tunc cum Deus novit omnia quae evenient et ea posset revelare sicut novit, sequitur quod propter huiusmodi revelationem divinam non foret plus credendum Deo revelanti quam alteri cuicumque homini. Consequens falsum et contra Augustinum XV De civitate Dei capitulo 25:e “neque enim sicut hominem ita Deum”—finis—vero quod revelatur a Deo. (16) Item si non, tunc praedestinatus ad vitam libere posset facere quod non esset praedestinatus et e contra. Et ita aliquis posset esse causa suae

1 correptione] coni.; codd. concordia ABGK 1–2 in dei] mundi G 2 dispositione] definitione B deformatione G ‖ non] est add. BG 3 deus1] om. G ‖ sic novit] inv. B 4 noscere] nosse B ‖ novit] facienda vel add. G 5 primum] om. K ‖ X] om. AG 5–6 dei capitulo] om. G ‖ capitulo] 12 et confirmatur per augustinum distinctio 17 de civitate dei capitulo add. K 6 praeterita] narrantur quae futura prophetarantur (!) add. in marg. K ‖ quia] quae AG ‖ erant] erunt BG 7 idem quasi] illud idem K ‖ I] 3 BG 8 in … divina] disponiunt (!) et 15 de trinitate capitulo 13 non aliter novit deus creata etc K 11 tunc] om. A ‖ novit] noverit AG ‖ quae] eveniunt et add. A ‖ posset] posse A 12 novit] noverit et AG 13 credendum] credendo A eodem G ‖ quam alteri] om. G ‖ alteri] om. B 14 XV] 5 BG 14 K ‖ dei] om. BG 15 enim] om. BG ‖ vero] illud K 16 vitam] aeternam add. K 17 esse] om. G

a Augustinus, De correptione et gratia (PL 44, 930): “Quicumque ergo in dei prouidentissima dispositione praesciti, praedestinati, uocati, iustificati, glorificati sunt, non dico etiam nondum renati, sed etiam nondum nati, iam filii dei sunt, et omnino perire non possunt.” b Recte Augustinus, De civitate Dei, lib. XVII, cap. 18, pp. 583–584: “Nam et in quadragensimo multo manifestius id ostenditur, ubi ex persona eiusdem mediatoris more solito tamquam praeterita narrantur, quae futura prophetabantur; quoniam, quae uentura erant, iam in praedestinatione et praescientia dei uelut facta erant, quia certa erant.” c Recte Isidorus, Sententiae, lib. I, cap. 18, sent. 7, p. 63: “In scripturis sanctis, saepe ea quae futura sunt, quasi facta narrantur, sicut est illud: Dederunt in escam meam fel, et in siti mea potauerunt me aceto. Sed cur futura quasi praeterita scribuntur, nisi quia ea quae adhuc facienda sunt in opere, iam facta sunt in diuina praedestinatione.” d Recte Anselmus, De concordia, q. 1, cap. 5, pp. 254– 255. e Augustinus, De civitate Dei, lib. XV, cap. 25, p. 493.

5

10

15

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

5

167

praede|stinationis—contra Magistrum I libro distinctione 41.a Et Scotus tangit super I Sententiarum distinctione 40,b et Gandavus V Quodlibet quaestione 19.c (17) Item, Deus non potest facere nisi quod praescit esse futurum, sed Deus non praescit se facturum nisi quod faciet. Consequentia probatur, quia si posset facere quod non praescit se facturum, ponatur in esse, et sequitur quod Deus faciet aliqua quae nescit se facturum, quod est impossibile.d

G 165vb

⟨Opinio auctoris⟩

10

15

20

His non obstantibus, dico quod non omnia quae evenient de necessitate evenient, et maxime movet me, quia Deus tam iustus, tam pius, tam misericors est ut misericordia eius super omnia opera eius nullum deseret, nullum necessitaret ad peccandum sine culpa | praecedente in praescientia Dei, quia 23 quaestione 4 “Nabuchodonosor” dicit quod ideo Deus hominem non praedestinavit, quia recessurum ab ipsa oboedientia praevidit,e quia si homo necessitari posset ad peccandum, tunc homo necessitatus minus foret in culpa quam necessitans, ut patet De libero arbitrio capitulo 16.f Et per consequens a multo fortiori: si Deus necessitat, excusatur homo a peccato propter huiusmodi necessitatem. Et ideo videtur mihi quod sustinentes hanc opinionem quod omnia eveniant de necessitate excusant peccata—contra illud psalmum:g “Non declines cor meum in verba malitiae, ad excusandas excusationes in peccatis.”h

1 scotus] satis BG 2 gandavus] distinctione add. AG 2–3 quaestione] 5 A 5 non] nihil K ‖ se] esse K ‖ facturum] futurum GK ‖ faciet] et ita eadem ratione necessario faciet omnia quae faciet add. K 6 praescit] praescivit K ‖ facturum] futurum G 7 nescit] nescivit K ‖ facturum] futurum G 9 his] tamen add. K ‖ quae … necessitate] evenient de necessitate quae B ‖ evenient] eveniunt AG 9–10 de … evenient] om. (hom.) G 11 misericordia] misericors est ut misericors divina B 13 23] 22 G ‖ 4] om. ABG ‖ dicit] dicitur B ‖ ideo] non G 14 praedestinavit] praedestinat ABG ‖ quia1] eum add. K ‖ recessurum] eum add. BG 15 necessitatus] necessario A necessitas G 16 necessitans] necessitas BG 18 sustinentes] sustinens K 19 eveniant] evenient K ‖ de necessitate] om. A ‖ excusant] excusat K 20–21 ad … peccatis] etc ABG

a Recte Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. I, dist. 40, cap. 1–3, pp. 284–288. b Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, dist. 40, q. unica, nn. 1–7, pp. 309–311. c Recte Henricus de Gandavo, Quodlibet IV, q. 19, pp. 314–322. d Cf. Thomas Bradvardinus, De futuris contingentibus, pp. 138–139. e Decretum magistri Gratiani, par. 2, causa 23, q. 4, p. 907. f Augustinus, De libero arbitrio, lib. I, cap 16, p. 235. g Ps 140:4. h Cf. Petrus Lombardus, In Psalmos, ps. 140 (PL 191, 1236B–C).

A 28ra

168

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

Item, De paenitentia distinctione 2;a et similiter ⟨Augustinus⟩ “liberi arbitrii nos condidit Deus.”b Item, Augustinus De correptione et gratia capitulo 41:c si adiutorium angelo vel homini defuisset, non sua culpa cecidisset. Item, XIII De Trinitate capitulo 26,d et allegat Magister III Sententiarum distinctione 24 capitulo 2:e modus quo traditus est homo—finis—tantum permiserit. Item, si omnia fierent de necessitate propter voluntatem Dei antecedentem, tunc nihil foret contra voluntatem Dei. Consequens falsum et contra Augustinum XXII De civitate Dei capitulo 2:f multa fiunt in malis—finis— adversa. Item, non est peccatum quod Deus vult velle, lex 26 Decretalium,g allegat glossa 22 quaestione 1: “si peccatum.”h Item, 22 quaestione 4 “Nabuchodonosor”:i nec Deus peccanti homini— finis—culpam. Ut videatur quod velim dicere in ista materia suppono prius significationem istorum vocabulorum, videlicet ‘potentia Dei ordinata’ et ‘potentia Dei

1 2] 1 G ‖ similiter] confide si K ‖ similiter liberi] fide filii A 1–2 liberi arbitrii] de libero arbitrio BG 3 correptione] concordia ABG 3–4 angelo] angelorum A ‖ angelo … homini] homini vel angelo B homini vel angelorum G 4 defuisset] defecisset AB fecisset G ‖ sua] om. A 5 XIII] 16 A ‖ de trinitate] de civitate dei A de civitate BG ‖ 26] 25 K ‖ sententiarum] libri K 6 24] 34 G 14 K ‖ 2] 3 BG 8 fierent] fient G ‖ propter voluntatem] voluntate A 9 foret] fieret A ‖ dei … falsum] om. A 10 dei] om. BG ‖ malis] occultis B 12 quod] iter. A ‖ velle] vel BK ‖ lex] om. G ‖ 26] distinctione add. K 13 glossa] iob ABG ‖ 22] 12 ABG 15 finis] fieri ABG ‖ culpam] homini add. K 16 videatur] videar A 16–17 prius significationem] primo significata K 17 vocabulorum] vel eorum significationem add. K ‖ videlicet] de BG om. K ‖ dei ordinata] inv. BG 17–169.1 dei1 … absoluta] ordinata potentia absoluta dei K 17 dei2] om. BG

a Decretum magistri Gratiani, par. 2,33,3 (De paenitentia), dist. 2, p. 1204. b Augustinus, De natura et gratia, cap. 65, p. 292. c Augustinus, De correptione et gratia (PL 44, 935): “Si autem hoc adiutorium uel angelo uel homini, cum primum facti sunt, defuisset; quoniam non talis natura facta erat, ut sine diuino adiutorio posset manere si uellet, non utique sua culpa cecidissent: adiutorium quippe defuisset, sine quo manere non possent.” d Recte Augustinus, De Trinitate libri XV, lib. XIII, cap. 12, p. 403. e Recte Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. III, dist. 20, cap. 2, p. 126: “Modus autem iste quo traditus est homo in diaboli potestatem non ita debet intellegi, tamquam Deus hoc fecerit aut fieri iusserit, sed quod tantum permiserit, iuste tamen.” f Augustinus, De civitate Dei, lib. XXII, cap. 2, p. 807: “Multa enim fiunt quidem a malis contra uoluntatem Dei; sed tantae est ille sapientiae tantae que uirtutis, ut in eos exitus siue fines, quos bonos et iustos ipse praesciuit, tendant omnia, quae uoluntati eius uidentur aduersa.” g Locus non inventus. h Decretum magistri Gratiani, par. 2, causa 22, q. 1, p. 864. i Decretum magistri Gratiani, par. 2, causa 23, q. 4, p. 907: “Quia nec Deus peccanti homini iuste inferret iram, si homo ex predestinatione Dei cecidisset in culpam.”

5

10

15

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

5

10

169

absoluta’. Et ne videar abuti significatione istorum, dico cum Scoto super I Sententiarum distinctione 44a quod potentia Dei dicitur | ordinata inquantum est principium exsequendi aliqua quae conveniunt legi recte secundum ordinem iam fixum. Potentia vero Dei dicitur absoluta quae excedit Dei potentiam ordinatam, quia potest per eam agere contra legem ordinatam et praeter legem. Universaliter ergo dico quod Deus de potentia sua absoluta potest facere omne quod non includit contradictionem. Unde iuristae consimiliter utuntur istis terminis ‘de facto’ et ‘de iure’, verbi gratia: rex potest facere de facto quae non erunt secundum legem ordinatam nec conveniunt illi. Unde pono aliquas conclusiones in quibus pendet tota responsio in ista materia.

B 43ra

⟨Conclusiones pro opinione auctoris⟩

15

20

(I) Prima conclusio est quod si Deus vult aliquod pro hoc instanti, non potest non velle illud nisi prius naturaliter fiat mutatio in alio a Deo ⟨et⟩ naturaliter prius quam Deus velit. (II) Secunda conclusio est quod illud quod Deus vult pro hoc instanti de potentia Dei absoluta posset non velle illud pro eodem instanti sine omni mutatione facta ex parte alicuius. (III) Tertia conclusio est quod omnia quae non dependent in esse vere vel interpretative | a libero arbitrio creato necessario evenient, loquendo | de necessitate ordinata. (IV) Quarta conclusio est quod omnia quae dependent a libero arbitrio creato, ut liberum est libertate contradictionis, poterunt de potentia Dei ordinata non evenire.

1 videar] videat G ‖ significatione] significatis K ‖ dico] om. G 2 dicitur] om. A 3 recte] om. A 4 iam] om. K ‖ dei dicitur] inv. K ‖ dei1 … absoluta] absoluta dicitur A 4–5 dei potentiam] inv. B 5 legem] dei add. B 5–6 et … legem] quia add. G om. K 6 universaliter ergo] et sic universaliter B ulterius K ‖ ergo] om. G 6–7 de … quod] potest facere de potentia sua absoluta quidquid A 6 potentia sua] inv. K 7 iuristae] communiter (?) add. B 7–8 consimiliter] communiter A communiter vel add. G 8 et] vel A ‖ verbi gratia] sicut de gratia K 9 quae] quod AG ‖ erunt] oriuntur K 13 hoc] om. G ‖ potest] illud add. in marg. K 14 velle … deo] om. AG ‖ illud … deo] om. K ‖ nisi] in marg. al. manu B 14–15 naturaliter prius] inv. B 16 est] om. BG ‖ deus] om. K 17 omni] om. K 19 est] om. K ‖ non] om. ABG 20 a … arbitrio] aliquo arbitrio B aliquo modo G 22 est] om. BK 23 creato] tanto G

a Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, dist. 44, q. unica, n. 3, pp. 363–364.

K 54v G 166ra

170

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

(V) Quinta conclusio est quod omne absolute revelatum a Deo sine condicione necessario eveniet, loquendo de necessitate ordinata. (VI) Sexta conclusio est quod nihil dependens in esse a voluntate libera libertate contradictionis potest de potentia Dei ordinata revelari a Deo absolute. (VII) Septima conclusio est quod de potentia Dei absoluta Deus potest absolute revelare omne futurum, sive contingens ad utrumlibet sive ad aliud. (VIII) Octava conclusio ⟨est⟩ quod omnia revelata a Deo absolute, cuiusmodi sunt articuli fidei, dependent immediate a voluntate Dei et non a voluntate creata et libera libertate contradictionis. (IX) Nona conclusio ⟨est⟩ quod non omne revelatum a Deo absolute necessario eveniet necessitate absoluta.

5

10

⟨Ad conclusiones⟩ (Ad I) Prima conclusio patet, quia de potentia Dei ordinata revelatio non acquiritur alicui sine mutatione facta in altero revelatorum, nec etiam revelatio cessat in aliquo sine mutatione vel in Deo vel in aliquo; sed non in Deo aliqua mutatio potest esse, igitur in aliquo. (Ad II) Secunda conclusio patet, quia Deus potest facere omne quod non includit contradictionem de potentia sua absoluta, sed demonstrato aliquo futuro quod vult, sicut est resurrectio mortuorum, non includit contradictionem sicut est: Deus vult resurrectionem et Deus potest nunc non velle resurrectionem illam, igitur etc.

1 conclusio est] om. K ‖ absolute revelatum] absolutam revelatam B 1–2 sine condicione] om. K ‖ condicione] contradictione AG corr. ex contradictione B 2 eveniet] veniet G ‖ loquendo … necessitate] si est revelatum sine condicione necessitate dei K 3 conclusio est] om. K ‖ est] om. BG 4 potest] om. G 6 conclusio est] om. K ‖ est] om. A ‖ de potentia] om. G ‖ potest] facere sive add. K 7 sive contingens] om. A inv. K 8 conclusio] om. AK 8–9 cuiusmodi] cuius ABK 9–10 a voluntate] absolute G 10 et] etiam est A etiam add. G 11 conclusio] om. A 12 eveniet] veniet A ‖ necessitate] om. G 14 conclusio] om. A 15 facta … revelatorum] in altero exterorum facta K 16 mutatione] facta add. B ‖ vel1 … deo1] om. G 16–17 aliquo2 … esse] alio cum igitur volitio dei respectu alicuius futuri sola revelatione sic in deo sequitur quod non potest esse non volitio sine mutatione vel in deo vel in aliquo sed in deo non potest esse aliqua mutatio B 17 aliqua … esse] potest esse mutatio K 19 includit] claudit K 20 includit] claudit K 21 sicut est] om. B 21–22 sicut … etc] quod deus non vult illam K 21 deus1] non add. A ‖ resurrectionem] om. G 21–22 et … resurrectionem] om. (hom.) A

15

20

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

5

10

15

20

171

(Ad III) Tertia patet, quia omnia quae non dependent a libero arbitrio creato dependent a voluntate Dei ordinante omnia, et omnia talia de necessitate ordinata evenient. (Ad IV) Quarta patet per hoc quod omnia quae dependent a libero arbitrio, ut liberum arbitrium est liberum libertate contradictionis, potest ipsum liberum arbitrium impedire etiam de potentia ordinata ne eveniant, quia aliter voluntas non foret libera libertate contradictionis respectu illorum. (Ad V) Quinta patet per hoc quod nihil a Deo absolute revelari contingit, unde Deus, qui est veritas, fallere posset etiam de potentia ordinata. Sed si Deus revelaret absolute aliquod contingens ad utrumlibet dependens a libero arbitrio, ipsum liberum arbitrium posset facere quod revelatum non foret verum; et ita eadem ratione quod Deus, qui est veritas, falleret. (Ad VI) Sexta conclusio patet sicut proxima. (Ad VII) Septima conclusio patet per hoc quod non includit contradictionem. (Ad VIII) Octava patet sicut sexta. (Ad IX) Nona conclusio patet, sicut alias arguebat Bradvardin,a quia aliter sequeretur quod Deus de omnipotentia sua tam ordinata quam absoluta non posset se facere impotentem ad elevandum festucam. ⟨Responsio auctoris⟩ ad argumentum de Petro His visis respondeo primo ad illud commune argumentum de Petro, ex cuius | solutione patebit responsio ad multa alia. Christus revelavit absolute

1 non] ita add. AG 2 creato] creaturae A tanta G ‖ dependent] dependerent B ‖ ordinante] divina add. G ‖ ordinante omnia] ordinata K 4 quarta] contra B ‖ dependent] dependerent A 5 ut] ante G ‖ potest] dico contra AG 6 impedire] est add. AG ‖ ne] est quod non AG quod non B 8 quod] quia A ‖ a … absolute] absolute a deo K ‖ a … revelari] revelari a deo absolute BG 9 etiam] et ABG ‖ potentia] lege ABG ‖ sed] semper ABG 10 aliquod] futurum add. K ‖ ad utrumlibet] om. K 10–11 a … ipsum] a voluntate creata libera libertate contradictionis K 11 quod] illud quod add. B ‖ revelatum] est a deo add. B est add. G 12 et ita] etc G 13 conclusio] om. BGK 14 conclusio] om. K ‖ per … quod] quia hoc G ‖ quod] quia BK ‖ includit] claudit K 17 conclusio] om. AK 18 sequeretur] sequitur K ‖ omnipotentia] potentia BG 18–19 tam … non] om. K 19 non] om. BG ‖ se] om. ABG ‖ impotentem] impossibilitatem B ‖ elevandum] levandum BG ‖ festucam] patet nona posito quod deus revelet absolute quod non levabit festucam ad argumenta add. B (ad argumenta] del. add. in marg.) et patet nona posito quod deus revelet absolute quod non levabit festucam add. in marg. K 20 ad … petro] om. ABG in marg. K 22 christus] et G ‖ revelavit] revelat AG ‖ absolute] absoluto G

a Locus non inventus.

B 43rb

172

G 166rb

A 28rb

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

quod Petrus foret eum negaturus, sit igitur nunc tempus medium inter revelationem Christi et negationem Petri. Tunc arguitur sic: haec est necessaria: ‘Christus asseruit Petrum negaturum ipsum pro A mensura futura’, et possibile est quod Petrus non neget Christum pro A mensura. Ponatur igitur in esse cum posito necessario, et arguitur sic: Christus revelavit Petro eum negaturum pro A mensura futura, et Petrus non negabit Christum pro A mensura futura, igitur Christus asseruit falsum. Hic posset primo responderi faciliter, si quis vellet, quod haec consequentia non valet: ‘Christus revelavit quod Petrus eum negabit pro A mensura futura, et Petrus non negabit Christum etc., igitur Christus asseruit falsum’, quia non est antecedens verum, posito quod A sit mensura, pro qua Petrus negabit Christum, quia numquam negabit Christum, igitur nec pro A | mensura. Sed quia istud non solvit difficultatem argumenti, ut si arguatur sic: Christus sic asseruit quod Petrus negabit eum pro A, et non erit nec est nec fuit sic quod Petrus negabit Christum, igitur Christus asseruit falsum. Hic dico quod mihi dubium est, an Christus hoc asseruit absolute sine condicione aliqua expressa vel tacita. Ponatur igitur utraque via ut pateat responsio. Et dico quod si Deus revelavit hoc absolute, hoc fuit in poenam | peccati Petri et ideo Petrus necessario negavit Christum, et talis necessitas proveniens ex culpa non excusat, sicut patet per Anselmum Cur Deus homo capitulo 2.a Et dico quod Petrus necessitate quadam ordinata Dei negavit Christum, potuit tamen Deus de potentia absoluta fecisse quod Petrus numquam negavisset, quia non includit contradictionem quod scilicet Petrus numquam negat, negavit vel negabit Christum. 1 sit] sive G ‖ tempus] om. G 2 necessaria] veraciter G 3 asseruit] asserit AG 4 christum] ipsum K ‖ mensura] futura add. B 4–5 ponatur … esse] iter. B 5 posito] primo BG primo lect. dubia K ‖ revelavit] revelans AG revelat B ‖ petro] petrum K 9 revelavit] revelat ABG 10 etc] om. A eum add. K ‖ asseruit] asserit A 11 non] nec BG nunc K 12 negabit1] negavit BGK ‖ christum1] et consequens est falsum add. B ipsum G nunc est verum quod christus asseruit quod petrus etc et nunc est etiam verum quod petrus non negabit christum add. K ‖ quia] petrus add. K 14 argumenti] om. B ‖ si] scilicet ABG ‖ arguatur] arguebatur A 15 negabit] negaret BG ‖ a] mensura add. B ‖ erit … fuit] est nec fuit nec erit K 17 dubium est] inv. K ‖ hoc] om. A 18 expressa … tacita] tacita vel expressa K 19 revelavit] utrum revelatio facta petro finaliter absoluta vel condicionata add. in marg. al. manu B ‖ revelavit hoc] inv. K 20 necessario] om. BG 21 proveniens] om. B non puniendum G ‖ ex] a A 21–22 cur … 2] 2 cur deus homo BGK (2] iter. B) 23 potuit] ponit G 23–24 petrus numquam] inv. K 24 negavisset] negaret eum K ‖ includit] claudit K ‖ petrus] christus A 25 numquam] om. ABG in marg. K ‖ negat negavit] inv. K ‖ negat … vel] negavit et non B negavit et G

a Anselmus, Cur Deus homo, lib. I, cap. 2, p. 50.

5

10

15

20

25

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

5

10

173

Si arguas contra: ponatur de potentia Dei absoluta quod Petrus negat, negavit vel negabit Christum, et arguitur sic: Petrus non negat, negavit nec negabit Christum, igitur Christus non asseruit quod Petrus negaret eum. Concedo consequentiam, et sicut antecedens est possibile de potentia Dei absoluta, ita consequens est possibile de potentia Dei absoluta, scilicet quod Christus hoc asseruit, quia non includit contradictionem quod Christus numquam sic asseruit, quia propositio quae semel fuit vera, numquam claudit contradictionem. Si autem ponatur alia via, scilicet quod Christus non asseruit hoc absolute, sed sub condicione implicita, sicut fuit de Ninive, tunc dico quod Petrus potuit non negasse Christum de potentia Dei ordinata, sed nunc exstat condicio. ⟨Responsio ad argumenta principalia dubii⟩

15

20

25

His visis patet responsio ad omnes communes formas, magis tamen credo quod fuit revelatio absoluta. (Ad 1) Ad primum argumentum respondeo: quando arguitur ‘Deus vult hoc fore, igitur hoc erit’—concedo consequentiam. Et dico quod antecedens non est necessarium, ubi demonstratur aliquod futurum contingens ad utrumlibet. Et quando probatur: ‘voluntas Dei est immutabilis, igitur nihil quod vult potest non velle’—nego consequentiam. Et causa est quia huiusmodi volitio respectu futuri contingentis est sola revelatio quae potest fieri non-revelatio sine mutatione facta in Deo, et per mutationem factam in alio, sicut columna quae est dextra et immutabilis potest fieri sinistra respectu alicuius hominis respectu cuius nunc est dextra sine omni mutatione facta in columna, sic in proposito.

1 contra] praedictum add. B ‖ ponatur] quod add. A ponitur G 1–2 negat negavit] inv. K 2–3 et … christum] om. (hom.) K 2 arguitur] arguatur B ‖ negat … nec] negavit negat vel BG 3 eum] christum K 4 sicut] sic AG ‖ de potentia] om. G 5 ita] igitur BG ‖ ita … absoluta2] om. (hom.) A ‖ scilicet] sed A ‖ scilicet quod] autem B ‖ quod] om. G 6 hoc] homo A non K ‖ includit] claudit K 7 asseruit] asseruerit K 9 autem] om. A vero K ‖ asseruit] asseruerit K ‖ hoc] om. A 10 implicita] implicite AGK 11 exstat] quod stat G 11–12 condicio] cum deo AG 14 communes] om. BG ‖ formas] similes add. B 17 concedo consequentiam] respondeo concedo K ‖ consequentiam] nonam add. B 18–19 ad utrumlibet] om. A 19 probatur] quod add. B arguitur K 22 sine] aliqua add. BG 23–24 respectu … dextra] non est G 24 nunc] non B ‖ nunc … dextra] est A ‖ dextra] sinistra B

174

B 43va

K 55r

G 166va

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

Si tu arguas sic: Deus vult A fore, et aliquid aliud a Deo potest facere quod A non erit, igitur aliquid aliud a Deo potest frustrare voluntatem Dei—|nego consequentiam, quia si A non erit, voluntas Dei est quod A non erit, et numquam potest frustrari nisi quod non habet quod vult. Et ad auctoritatem dico quod Augustinus loquitur de voluntate beneplaciti, et illa est necessaria. Et Magister loquitur de necessitate consequentiae et non consequentis, sicut patet intuenti processum. (Ad 2) Ad secundum, quando arguitur: substantia Dei est indifferens et similiter scientia Dei, igitur si debeat terminari, oportet quod hoc sit per voluntatem Dei, | hic respondeo et dico quod sicut essentia inquantum essentia est indifferens et scientia inquantum scientia est indifferens, sic volitio Dei inquantum volitio est indifferens, quia—sicut dixi—volitio Dei respectu Antichristi futuri nunc potest esse non-volitio per mutationem factam in alio a Deo, sicut scientia quae est in Deo respectu Antichristi futuri potest pro nunc non esse scientia respectu illius. Unde dico quod licet scientia Dei, ut est scientia, sit indifferens ad esse Antichristi et ad non esse Antichristi, ipsa tamen, ut est scientia Dei, nulla permixta ignorantia, terminat se ad illud, quod est verum de numero illorum: ‘Antichristus erit’ ⟨et⟩ ‘Antichristus non erit’. Unde dico quod Deus prius naturaliter scit Antichristum fore quam vult Antichristum fore. Et ideo scientia Dei non determinatur | per voluntatem praecedentem ut sit naturaliter, quia tunc Deus naturaliter prius vellet quam sciret, et ita posset Deus velle quod nesciret, quod est contra Magistrum I libro distinctione 3 capitulo 3:a quod autem ignoro, non volo.

1 si] tamen add. G ‖ aliquid] om. BG ‖ potest facere] inv. BG 2 erit] igitur aliud a deo facere potest quod a non est add. iter. G ‖ deo] facere add. B ‖ potest] posset BG 3 erit1] non add. superscr. al. manu B ‖ voluntas … est] est voluntas dei BK est potentia dei G ‖ a2 … erit2] non sit K ‖ non2] om. BG ‖ et] quia BG 4 potest] om. G voluntas add. K ‖ potest frustrari] inv. B ‖ quod1] quem GK ‖ habet] quod vult B vult G ‖ quod2] et B ‖ vult] et quando non vult add. G et dum vult add. K 5 et] om. A ‖ augustinus] anselmus BG 6 illa] talis K ‖ necessaria] necessitas K 8 arguitur] dicitur BG ‖ indifferens] differens G 9 terminari] determinari K ‖ sit] erit K 10 respondeo et] om. A 11 essentia] om. BG ‖ indifferens1] substantia add. in marg. al. manu B ‖ et] ita A 12 dei1] om. A ‖ volitio2] dei add. K ‖ est … volitio3] om. (hom.) BG ‖ dei2] dicitur A 13–14 factam] om. BGK 15 non esse] inv. K ‖ licet] quaelibet A 16 sit] sic A 17 tamen] autem A 18 illud] om. A 19 deus] christus G ‖ naturaliter] necessario K 20 fore1 … fore2] om. A ‖ quam … fore2] om. (hom.) BG 21 sit] sic A scit B ‖ naturaliter1] prior add. B 21–22 deus … vellet] prius deus vellet naturaliter K ‖ naturaliter2 … vellet] prius vellet naturaliter BG 22 posset deus] inv. B 23 31] 11 ABG ‖ 32] 9 BG 11 K ‖ ignoro] nec memini add. in marg. K ‖ non] nec K

a Recte Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. I, dist. 3, cap. 2, p. 73.

5

10

15

20

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

5

10

15

20

175

Item, si voluntas determinaret scientiam Dei, tunc Deus Pater fieret sciens per voluntatem suam, et cum idem sit in Deo scire et esse, sequitur quod Deus Pater haberet esse per voluntatem suam, et ita Deus prius naturaliter haberet velle quam esse—quod est manifeste falsum. Et consequentia patet, quia sic arguit Magister I libro distinctione 32 capitulo 2,a ubi probat quod Pater non est sapiens sapientia quam genuit etc. Et ad auctoritatem Magistri, quando dicit quod scientia Dei non est causa eorum quae fiunt nisi includatur beneplacitum,b concedo. Et sic dico quod scientia Dei respectu alicuius futuri ⟨non⟩ est prior naturaliter quam voluntas beneplaciti, quia sequitur: Deus vult hoc fore, igitur Deus scit hoc fore, et non e contra, quia non sequitur: Deus scit Socratem peccare, ergo vult Socratem peccare. (Ad 3) Ad tertium dico quod verum est quod necessitas ad peccandum stat cum peccato, sed necessitas ad A peccatum non stat cum A peccato, nisi praecedat culpa. Unde de Sennacherib potest faciliter responderi quod ibi non fuit necessitas in voluntate, sed solum ad actum extrinsecum ut movebat brachium, et quia in voluntate est totum meritum et etiam peccatum— iuxta Hugonem De Sacramentis libro II parte 14 capitulo 6,c unde ad Sennacherib non sequitur aliqua necessitas meriti vel peccati. (Ad 4) Ad quartum dicitur quod in genere contingentium vere evenit necessitas per accidens, prima necessitas est ex parte actus voluntatis nec necessitas illa per quam Deus vult Antichristum esse. Et quando arguitur per Philosophum quod in omni genere est unum primum etc.—dico cum Commentatore (Averroes super VI Physicorum

1 determinaret] terminaret A ‖ tunc] nunc B ‖ pater] prius ABG 2 cum] tantum G 5 32] 5 ABG 6 est] om. A ‖ genuit] gerit A 7 dei] om. BG 9 futuri] contingentis add. K ‖ prior] prius K ‖ beneplaciti] respectu eiusdem add. K 10 scit] sit A 11 scit] sit A hoc fore scilicet add. K ‖ ergo] deus add. BK ‖ socratem2] eum BG 13 stat1 … peccatum] om. (hom.) K ‖ cum peccato] tamen G 14 potest] iter. A 15 non] om. AGB in marg. K ‖ in … extrinsecum] ad actum extrinsecum sed non fuit necessitas in marg. al. manu B ‖ sed … extrinsecum] om. AG in marg. K ‖ ut] coni.; codd. unde ABGK 15–16 movebat] movebit G 17 unde] om. K 19 dicitur] iter. B dico K ‖ vere] ubi K 20 est] om. AG 21 per quam] pro qua A ex qua K ‖ esse] vere est prior illa necessitate qua necesse est antichristum fore B est prior ista necessitate quam necesse est antichristum esse add. in marg. K 22 arguitur] confirmatur BG 23 VI] lac. K

a Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. I, dist. 32, cap. 2, p. 234. b Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. I, dist. 38, cap. 1, p. 277: “Ita etiam dicimus scientiam vel praescientiam Dei non esse causam eorum quae fiunt, nisi talem, sine qua non fiunt; si tamen scientiam ad notitiam tantum referamus. Si vero nomine scientiae includitur etiam beneplacitum atque dispositio, tunc recte potest dici causa eorum quae Deus facit.” c Hugo de Sancto Victore, De sacramentis christianae fidei, lib. II, pars. 14, cap. 6 (PL 176, 561).

176

B 43vb

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

commento 32a) quod in his quae sunt per accidens numquam posuit Aristoteles necesse immo istae sunt necessitates. Et ideo, magis proprie loquendo, deberet dici quod ex parte Antichristi est unum necesse esse et ex parte Dei est aliud necesse esse, sed necesse esse non est aliquid, sicut nec hominem esse sive parietem esse est aliquid, ut alias dixi. Unde si habitudo causarum dependeat in causando a prima causa, si prima causa necessario producit effectum, igitur et omnes sequentes necessario producent. Et ista est ratio quare Scotus super I Sententiarum distinctione 39b dicit quod voluntas Dei contingenter agit. Sed contra: si illa sit necessario agens, et quaelibet alia necessario aget, sed voluntas Dei est prima causa et summa | omnium temporalium spiritualiumque motionum, hic distinguo de causa, scilicet iubente et permittente. Si de iubente intellegit, sic foret Deus auctor mali. Si vero de permittente, sic est auctoritas vera. Unde sequitur ibi: nihil fit verisimiliter etc. (Ad 5) Ad quintum dico quod Deus Pater non revelat absolute numerum etc., licet anima Christi absolute videat in verbo. Sed illos, quos videt in

1 in] om. AG ‖ accidens] actus G 1–2 numquam … necesse] apponitur argumenti A non appositis aristoteli G ‖ numquam … immo] non ponit aristoteles si sic dici debeant necessitatem cuius K (si sic dici debeant] in marg.) 2 necessitates] per accidens et metaphysice valde si debeant dici necessitates add. B 3 necesse] necessario A 4 esse2] est A 4–5 nec … sive] hominem esse nec A 5 parietem] pariectis (!) G ‖ alias] aliud A 6 si1] om. A ‖ causa] om. A 8 producent] produceret G producerent K ‖ ratio] causa BG 9 39] 14 ABG 11 sed] om. K ‖ prima … summa] summa causa et prima A 11–12 spiritualiumque] et spiritualium B spiritualium G 12 motionum] igitur add. B 3 de trinitate capitulo 6 add. in marg. K 13 intellegit] intellegeret BK intellegam G ‖ vero] om. K ‖ sic2] ut K 14 auctoritas] sic est add. K 15 revelat] revelavit K 15–16 numerum] om. A 16 illos] istos A

a Averroes, In Physicam, lib. VI, comm. 32. b Duns Scotus, Lectura I, dist. 39, q. 5, n. 88, p. 508: “Contra praedicta arguitur: Contra hoc quod dicitur ‘contingentia non est in rebus nisi ex voluntate divina, et non per comparationem ad causam proximam’,—contra: secundum hoc videtur quod nihil erit necessarium in universo, sed totum erit contingens, quia posita causa prima et sufficienti, ponitur effectus (si sit mera causa); si igitur contingentia sit in rebus ex voluntate divina et ex eius libertate, cum voluntas divina libere et contingenter— et non necessario—se habet ad aliquid in universo, si haec sit praecisa causa contingentiae, sequitur quod nihil erit necessarium in universo, sed omnia erunt contingentia.” Cf. Ibidem, dist. 39, q. 5, n. 41, p. 492: “Et ideo causa contingentiae in entibus est ex hoc quod prima causa contingenter, et non necessario, movet.” Cf. Ibidem, dist. 39, q. 5, n. 60, p. 499: “Ad tertium, quando arguitur ab insufficiente quia ‘voluntas volens aliquid in a, potest nolle illud in a’: non potentia ante actum tempore, nec potentia cum actu, sed potentia ante actum natura, nam quando causa causans libere et contingenter causat, praecedit natura suum effectum,— et in illo instanti in quo causat, contingenter causat, quia si non pro illo instanti contingenter causaret, non causaret contingenter, quia tunc contingenter non causat pro alio instanti.”

5

10

15

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

5

10

15

20

177

verbo, possibile est quod non videat in verbo salvandos; et illos, quos scit salvandos, potest scire damnari. Nec hoc videtur mihi mirum, quia de creatura est possibile quod sciat aliquid, communiter loquendo de scire, pro nunc et pro nunc non sciat illud. Verbi gratia, pono quod Socrates ⟨scire⟩ sit idem quod firmiter credere A propositionem, dum A est verum, et sit A ista propositio: ‘Antichristus erit’, et tunc A est verum, et possibile est quod pro nunc non scio A, quia possibile est quod pro nunc Antichristus non erit, igitur possibile est quod A non sit verum, igitur possibile est | quod pro nunc non sciam A. Et idem de voluntate, quia pono quod ego velim de omni re quae erit cras quod erit cras. Et possibile est pro nunc quod ego velim quod non erit cras, quia possibile est quod Antichristus non erit cras, et sic iuxta casum non volo quod erit cras. Sic dico quod anima Christi vult aliquos salvari, et possibile est pro nunc quod non velit eos salvari. Et ad Augustinum De correptione et gratia:a horum praedestinatorum etc.—dico quod Augustinus intellexit unam talem propositionem: ‘si aliquis praedestinatorum damnabitur, Christus est deceptus’. Et hoc sequitur in sensu composito sic | sumendo, sed in sensu diviso non sequitur, sicut dicit Magister I Sententiarum distinctione 38 in fine.b (Ad 6) Ad sextum dico quod certior est scientia, quae est in verbo quam illa, quae est in genere proprio, hoc potest intelligi dupliciter: vel ex parte scientis vel ex parte sciti. Si primo modo, concedo quod ego verius sciam ‘ego sedeo’ quam unam conclusionem quam ego scio demonstrare. Et tamen

1 videat] viderat G ‖ scit] sit A 1–2 salvandos] possibile est damnari et add. K 2 potest scire] praescire A 3 aliquid communiter] contingenter aliquid K 3–4 pro … pro] potest et quod G et quod B 3 nunc] large add. in marg. K 4 illud] om. A ‖ pono] ponitur G ‖ socrates] socrati B socratem G scire K ‖ sit] scit AK 5 verum] vera K ‖ a3] om. A ‖ ista] illa BG 6 erit] et sit ita quod antichristus contingenter erit tunc ego scio a quia possibile est quod antichristus erit add. K 7 non scio] nescio K ‖ scio] sit BG ‖ est] om. A ‖ pro … antichristus] antichristus pro nunc BG antichristus nunc K 8 sit] scit K 9 sciam] sit BG scio K ‖ quia] ego add. A ‖ ego] om. G 10 quod1 … cras2] om. (hom.) A ‖ pro … ego] quod pro nunc BG ‖ quod ego] om. K ‖ quod3] antichristus add. B 12 non volo] nolo A ‖ anima] omnia G 13 salvari] et possibile est pro nunc quod non velit aliquos salvari add. iter. G 14 correptione] concordia AK 15 intellexit] intellegit BG 16 hoc] om. A 17 sumendo] sicundo (!) G 18 sententiarum … 38] 1 libro 28 distinctione B ‖ distinctione 38] inv. G 19 certior … scientia] certiorem scientiam A certiorem (?) esse scientiam K 20 genere proprio] inv. A ‖ hoc] om. AK ‖ vel] scilicet A 21 sciti] siti A ‖ primo modo] primum GK ‖ ego verius] est verior A 22 ego sedeo] de deo G ‖ quam1] forte add. BK quod forte G ‖ scio] sciam B ‖ demonstrare] iter. G

a Augustinus, De correptione et gratia (PL 44, 924). dist. 38, cap. 2, p. 279.

b Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. I,

G 166vb

A 28va

178

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

incertitudo magis residet rei in illa propositione ‘ego sedeo’ quam in illa geometrica, et sic intellegit Augustinus. Si secundo modo, sic nego, quia cognitio non est firmior in verbo quam cognitio in proprio genere. ⟨Argumenta contra responsionem⟩ ⟨ad secundum argumentum principale dubii⟩ Contra responsionem ad secundum argumentum principale, quod ibidem dimisi, arguo sic: subducta voluntate omnia quae evenient de necessitate evenient, ut dictum est in tertia conclusione.a Subducta igitur voluntate Dei ab aeterno, quae posterior est naturaliter quam illius scientia, ut sic Deus sciret Antichristum esse futurum, et per consequens Antichristum esse futurum dependet a causa necessaria non contingente, et per consequens Antichristus necessario erit. Istud argumentum facit Scotus super I Sententiarum distinctione 39:b utrum idea in Deo naturaliter repraesentet illud quod repraesentat, quia in intellectu Dei non sunt prius ideae quam voluntas? Et tunc tales ideae aut repraesentant compositionem ⟨aut divisionem aut utrumque⟩ istorum extremorum ‘Socrates est albus’; et tunc illae ideae repraesentant naturaliter quod Socrates est albus, igitur quadam necessitate naturali Socrates est albus; si ⟨repraesentant⟩ divisionem, tunc necessitate naturali foret oppositum, scilicet quod Socrates non erit albus. Unde doctor ille videtur dicere ibi quod loquendo de intellectu divino ut habet actum primum ante actum voluntatis, sic Deus scit necessitate naturali et ideo, si debeat esse aliqua contingentia, oportet illam quaerere in voluntate divina. 1 magis … rei] rei magis residet K 1–2 geometrica] geometriae K 7 voluntate] divina add. K ‖ evenient] eveniunt A 8 evenient] eveniunt A ‖ tertia] secunda G 9 dei] om. K ‖ posterior] praescior AG 13 39] ubi quaerit add. B ‖ utrum] om. K 14 sunt] om. AG ‖ sunt prius] inv. B 15 tales] om. A 16 istorum] illorum ABG 16–17 repraesentant] repraesentat A 17 naturali] naturaliter AK 18 socrates … naturali] om. (hom.) ABG 20 dicere ibi] inv. A 21 ante] non K ‖ voluntatis] utrum A 22 ideo] non G

a Cf. p. 169: “Tertia conclusio est quod omnia quae non dependent in esse vere vel interpretative a libero arbitrio creato necessario evenient, loquendo de necessitate ordinata?” b Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, dist. 38 pars 2 et dist. 39, qq. 1–5, n. 7, p. 407: “Praeterea, ideae mere naturaliter repraesentant illud quod repraesentant, et sub ratione qua aliquid repraesentant, quod probatur ex hoc quod ideae sunt in intellectu divino ante omnem actum voluntatis divinae, ita quod nullo modo sunt ibi per actum illius voluntatis: sed quidquid naturaliter praecedit actum voluntatis, est mere naturale. Accipio ergo duas ideas extremorum quae repraesentantur in eis, puta hominis et albi: quaero aut istae ex se repraesentant compositionem istorum extremorum, aut divisionem, aut utrumque?” Cf. Duns Scotus, Lectura I, dist. 39, q. 5, nn. 20– 21, p. 485.

5

10

15

20

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

5

179

Unde si ista responsio Doctoris foret vera, omnia evenirent de necessitate, quia voluntas divina non mutat, sed determinat scientiam. Si igitur scientia necessitate naturali arguat effectum, sequitur tunc quod omnia evenirent de necessitate. Dico igitur quod tam scientia quam voluntas contingenter arguunt effectum qui immediate dependet a libero arbitrio creato. Unde | sicut scientia mea potest fieri non-scientia | per voluntatem creatam, sic scientia Dei.

B 44ra K 55v

⟨Responsio ad argumenta principalia dubii—continuatio⟩

10

15

20

(Ad 7) Ad septimum argumentum dico quod nihil dependens immediate a libero arbitrio creato, ut est liberum libertate contradictionis, potest revelari a Deo absolute de potentia Dei ordinata—quod non contingit. Ideo nec Deus Pater posset de lege ordinata praecipere Deo Filio secundum hominem quod praediceret quidquid videt in verbo, quia, ut argutum est, non contingit Deo Filio absolute praedicere futurum contingens ad utrumlibet. Si vero fiat argumentum de potentia Dei absoluta, tunc concedo quod possibile foret quod Deus Filius ita praediceret. (Ad 8) Ad octavum de processu Augustini VI Super Genesima qui videtur plane ponere etc., posset dici quod ibi in libro illo procedit disputative et non assertive sicut ipsemet dicit in eodem. Et quia Boethius,b Decretum,c et Augustinus concor|dant in eisdem verbis, dico quod secundum causas

1 evenirent] evenient BG ‖ necessitate] evenient add. G 2 si] sic G ‖ igitur] om. A 3 tunc quod] om. K ‖ evenirent] eveniant B 5 dico] sequitur B ‖ dico … quod] igitur G 5–6 effectum] sequitur add. K 6 creato] creatae G 9 septimum] tertium A ‖ argumentum] del. B om. G principale add. K ‖ quod] sic add. AK ‖ immediate] om. K 10 est] om. A ‖ liberum] libera AG libere K 11 dei] om. BG ‖ contingit] convenit B 12–13 de … praediceret] praecipere deo filio de potentia ordinata quod praediceret secundum hominem K 13 praediceret] praedicet BG ‖ argutum] dictum B 14 contingit] convenit B ‖ filio] secundum hominem add. K ‖ absolute praedicere] inv. K 15 si vero] sed si K ‖ concedo] conceditur K 15–16 possibile … quod] om. (hom.) K 16 filius] secundum hominem posset add. K ‖ ita praediceret] posset sic praedicare K ‖ praediceret] praedicaverit B praedicavit G 17 processu] propositione K 18 dici] om. A ‖ illo] primo BG 19 in eodem] ibidem K ‖ boethius] boethii K ‖ decretum] de trinitate A om. BG 20 concordant] vel boethii decretum cum augustino add. A vel boethii decretum cum augustino concordant add. BG ‖ verbis] verbi gratia A ‖ quod] si add. BG si add. del. K

a Augustinus, De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim, lib. VI, par. 17, p. 191. b Boethius, De consolatione philosophiae, lib. V, prosa 6, par. 31, p. 104. c Decretum magistri Gratiani, par. 2, causa 23, q. 4, p. 908.

G 167ra

180

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

inferiores non vere sciuntur vel cognoscuntur talia futura, sed secundum causas superiores verissime cognoscuntur ac si essent necessaria, sicut in verbo posset scire contingens sicut unum necessarium. Unde Boethiusa dicit quod talia ad intuitum relata divinum necessaria sunt per dispositionem divinae notionis, id est cognitio eorum est necessaria quantum est ex parte scientis, licet non ex parte rei, quae futura est, sit certitudo. Sed contra illum modum ponendi et cum praedictis aliis prout sonant ad litteram videtur concordare Gregorius XVI Moralium capitulo 4:b omnipotens Deus etsi plerumque illud tempus uniuscuiusque ad mortem praescit, quo eius vita terminatur, nec alio tempore quisquam mori potuit, nisi illo quo moritur, quid igitur est, quod dicitur quod iniqui sublati sunt ante tempus, nisi quod omnes qui praesentem vitam diligunt longiora sibi eiusdem vitae spatia promittunt. Hic dico quod aliquod tempus est, ultra quod vivere non potest, sed iniqui putant se vivere ultra tempus illud et ante tempus, in quo sperant vivere, sublati sunt. (Ad 9) Ad nonum, quando dicitur quod voluntas Dei est ita libera respectu unius obiecti sicut respectu alterius, hic dico quod libertas dicitur ordinata et absoluta sicut potentia, quia libertas Dei est potentia Dei. Unde sicut Deus de potentia absoluta ita libere potest velle praemiare peccantem sicut non peccantem, et ita libere velle coelum non esse sicut Antichristum non esse, vel aliquod tale, quia non plus claudit contradictionem unum quam aliud,

1 vel] et K 2 cognoscuntur] cognosceret A cognoscet GK ‖ sicut] sic ita A sed ita B si ista G 3 scire] unum add. K 5 notionis] coni.; codd. necessitatis ABGK ‖ id … cognitio] ita dico negotiatio AG et ita dico quod certitudo B 6 licet] sed K ‖ non] om. G ‖ rei] om. AG ‖ quae … certitudo] scitae futurae K 7 illum] istum BK ‖ aliis] alibi BG auctoritatibus add. in marg. K 9 etsi] in add. K ‖ plerumque] plurique K 10 quo1] quos G ‖ nec] in add. K ‖ quisquam mori] inv. K 12 quod] om. ABG ‖ eiusdem] eius AG ‖ eiusdem vitae] inv. B ‖ spatia] om. A 14 se] om. A ‖ sperant] sperantur G 16 ita] om. A 17–18 ordinata … absoluta] absoluta et ordinata K 18 quia] et BG 20 coelum] peccatum ABG

a Boethius, De consolatione philosophiae, lib. V, prosa 6, par. 31, pp. 104–105: “Atqui deus ea futura quae ex arbitrii libertate proueniunt praesentia contuetur; haec igitur ad intuitum relata diuinum necessaria fiunt per condicionem diuinae notionis, per se uero considerata ab absoluta naturae suae libertate non desinunt.” b Gregorius Magnus, Moralia in Iob, lib. XVI, par. 10, pp. 806–807: “Quamuis omnipotens Deus illud tempus uniuscuiusque ad mortem praesciat quo eius uita terminatur, nec alio in tempore quisquam mori potuit nisi ipso quo moritur. Nam si Ezechiae anni additi ad uitam quindecim memorantur, tempus quidem uitae creuit ab illo termino quo mori ipse merebatur. Nam diuina dispositio eius tempus tunc praesciuit quo hunc postmodum ex praesenti uita subtraxit. Cum ergo ita sit, quid est quod dicitur: Quia iniqui sublati sunt ante tempus suum, nisi quod omnes qui praesentem uitam diligunt longiora sibi eiusdem uitae spatia promittunt?”

5

10

15

20

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

5

10

15

20

181

tamen de potentia sua ordinata non potest ita libere velle peccantem praemiare, ceteris paribus, sicut non peccantem, nec ita libere potest de potentia ordinata velle coelum non esse sicut Antichristum non esse posito quod Antichristus foret contingenter futurus contingentia ad utrumlibet. (Ad 10) Ad decimum negatur consequentia, videlicet quod in potestate omnium, qui sunt et qui erunt, esset quod salvabuntur vel damnabuntur, quia forte aliquis parvulus baptizatus, qui non posset vivere naturaliter nisi per diem, non posset non salvari, quidquid forte alii fecerint. Sed posito quod omnes homines, qui sunt et qui erunt, habuerint usum liberi arbitrii ad bonum et ad malum, tunc concedo quod in eorum potestate esset quod non salvabuntur vel salvabuntur. Et si ponatur in esse, dico quod tunc erit conservatio saeculi, quia sequitur ex revelatione vel promissione et uno possibili posito in esse. Et quod Christus promisit Petro absolute quod fides sua maneret patet De correptione et gratia capitulo 26:a an audebis dicere etiam rogante Christo ne deficeret fides Petri, defecturam fuisse si Petrus eam defuisse voluisset? Quasi aliud Petrus ullo modo vellet quam pro illo Christus rogasset ut vellet. Et infra eodem 53b recitat illud Evangelii: “Posui vos ut eatis” etc., “quis audeat dicere non | manebit? Quis audeat dicere, forsitan non manebit? Sine poenitentia,” misericordia divina et vocatione Dei. (Ad 11) Ad undecimum concedo quod est possibile quod ille qui est numerus electorum, pro nunc non sit numerus electorum. Et ad auctoritates

1–2 peccantem praemiare] inv. K 2 non peccantem] om. A 2–3 potest … ordinata] de potentia ordinata potest K ‖ de … velle] velle de potentia ordinata B 3 coelum] totum G ‖ sicut] sic A ‖ antichristum … esse2] om. A 5 videlicet] om. K 6 qui1 … esset] foret qui sunt et qui erunt A ‖ salvabuntur] salvarentur B ‖ vel damnabuntur] om. A ‖ damnabuntur] damnarentur B 7–8 naturaliter … diem] per diem naturaliter BG 7 nisi] om. A 8 posset] potest ABG ‖ forte] om. G 9 omnes] om. BG ‖ erunt] fuerint A ‖ habuerint] habuerunt GK 10 esset] erit K 11 non … vel] om. G ‖ non … salvabuntur2] salvarentur vel damnarentur B salvabuntur vel quod damnabuntur K 12 conservatio] cum suo A ‖ saeculi] et quod tunc erit conservatio saeculi add. in marg. K ‖ quia] om. AGK 14 maneret] manet G ‖ correptione] coni.; codd. concordia ABGK 15–16 etiam … aliud] quam rogare A arroganter aliud quam B qui rogantis quam aliud G 16 vellet] velle ABG 16–17 quam … christus] qui cum ille christum B 16 pro] om. AG 17 vellet] nollet G ‖ 53] capitulo quod B quod G ‖ evangelii] ego add. ABG ‖ posui] sui G 18 quis2] quo ABG 19 forsitan] forsan A ‖ et] cum ABG 22 sit] fuit B

a Augustinus, De correptione et gratia (PL 44, 926). b Recte Augustinus, De correptione et gratia (PL 44, 937): “Sed ego elegi uos, et posui uos, ut eatis (…). Quis audeat dicere, non manebit? Quis audeat dicere, forsitan non manebit? Sine poenitentia sunt enim dona et uocatio dei: sed uocatio eorum qui secundum propositum uocati sunt.” Cf. Io 15:16.

B 44rb

182

G 167rb

A 28vb

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

concedo quod ita certus est numerus, ita quod nec addatur eis quicumque nec minuatur, ita quod nec addatur eis nisi electus nec ab eis minuetur aliquis electus vel tolletur. (Ad 12) Ad duodecimum de auctoritate Boethii dictum est priusa et glossa in Decretis glossat satis expres|se.b (Ad 13) Ad decimum tertium dico negando consequentiam illam: ‘Socrates habet perseverantiam et non potest amittere perseverantiam, igitur necessario tenebit perseverantiam’, quia si talis non perseveraverit, numquam habuit perseverantiam, et tunc iuxta Decretumc allegatum: quod nullo modo fuit nullo modo deseri potuit. Sed contra: voveat aliquis religiosus quod non franget perseverantiam in religione sua vel quod illam perseverantiam, quam habet in religione, tenebit pro tota vita sua, et exeat talis a religione. Tunc talis non frangit votum, quia non habuit perseverantiam in religione, igitur non frangit votum, et per consequens aliquis posset licite vovere et non peccare omittendo vel frangendo votum quod non potest frangere. Hic respondeo quod talis potest venire contra votum, vovendo facere contra votum. Unde qui sic vovet interpretative vovet perseverare in religione. Et ideo cum exierit, tenebitur reus voti. (Ad 14) Ad decimum quartum potest dici quod Deus non aliter | novit facta quam fienda quantum ad certitudinem scientiae suae, quia scientia sua est ita certa respectu futuri contingentis sicut necessarii, sed possibile est quod non sit certa, respectu creaturae verbi gratia, nam creatura potest

1 ita certus] incertus A ‖ addatur] additur A ‖ eis] ei B 1–2 quicumque … eis1] om. (hom.) G 2 minuatur] minuitur A ‖ addatur] addantur A addetur K ‖ eis1] ei B 2–3 nisi … tolletur] aliquis non electus nec minuetur ab eis aliquis iam electus K 2 electus] electi AG ‖ ab … minuetur] minuetur ab eo B 4 et] om. A 6 dico] dicitur G ‖ dico negando] nego A ‖ illam] istam A 7 amittere perseverantiam] eam amittere B ‖ perseverantiam2] om. G iam add. K 8 non] numquam B 10 nullo] nec G 11 voveat] veniat ABG ‖ quod] qui ABG ‖ franget] frangeret AG 11–12 in … perseverantiam] om. (hom.) A 12 religione sua] ordine suo K 13 tota … sua] toto tempore vitae suae K ‖ exeat … tunc] ex ea A 14 quia] vel add. A vel qui add. G suum qui K ‖ habuit] habet BG ‖ religione igitur] ordine suo et per consequens K 15 posset licite] licite potest K ‖ omittendo] illud licitum add. K 17 vovendo … votum2] om. (hom.) BG 17–18 interpretative vovet] om. A 20 non aliter] inv. A 21 certitudinem … suae] scientiam suam K 22 est ita] inv. A ‖ ita] om. BG ‖ certa] creata G ‖ futuri contingentis] contingenti futuri G inv. K ‖ sicut] respectu add. K 23 certa] creata G ‖ respectu … nam] sicut iam K

a Boethius, De consolatione philosophiae, lib. V, prosa 6, par. 1–48, pp. 102–106 (esp. par. 25–36, pp. 104–105). b Locus non inventus. c Decretum magistri Gratiani, par. 2,33,3 (De paenitentia), dist. 2, p. 1211.

5

10

15

20

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

5

10

183

ita certitudinaliter cognoscere quod ipsa sedet sicut quod homo est animal. Et tamen una certitudo est respectu contingentis et alia respectu necessarii. Unde ulterius negatur consequentia: ‘non aliter novit facta quam fienda’. Sed potest esse quod non novit illa quae facienda sunt, igitur sic potest esse sive nosci de praeteritis, licet conclusio sit vera de potentia Dei absoluta, ut dixi. De potentia tamen Dei ordinata non sequitur: omnia sunt aeque praesentia notitiae suae tam praeterita quam futura quam etiam praesentia. Unde Doctor Communis imaginatur hic, et recitat eum Doctor Subtilis super I Sententiarum distinctione 39a quod Deus sit quasi centrum et totum tempus fluens de praeterito in futurum quasi circumferentia, et tunc qualitercumque moveatur circumferentia, semper aeque distans est a centro, et sic qualitercumque fluat tempus in praeteritum et futurum, semper tamen est

1 cognoscere] in marg. A cogitare BG ‖ quod2] om. A 3 fienda] scilicet quoad certitudinem scientiae suae etc add. K 4 illa … sunt] fienda K ‖ potest2] posset K 4–5 sive nosci] om. K 5 nosci] coni.; codd. nosce A non nosse B nosse G ‖ conclusio] quo G 6 sequitur] unde add. in marg. K ‖ aeque] om. A 7 quam etiam] et K 8 communis … doctor2] om. (hom.) BG 9 super] om. K ‖ 39] dicit add. B 10 tempus] om. G 11 semper] tamen add. K ‖ est … centro] a centro est A 12 tempus … futurum] praesens tempus itaque praeteritum et futurum B praesens tempus in tempore futurum et praeteritum G ‖ in] tempus add. A 12–184.1 est … praesens] aeque praesens est K

a Duns Scotus, Lectura I, dist. 39, q. 5, n. 23, p. 486: “Alia est opinio, quae sic ponit certam cognitionem Dei de futuris contingentibus: Dicunt enim sic dicentes quod omnia sunt praesentia Deo in aeternitate secundum eorum actualem exsistentiam. Dicunt enim quod non est imaginandum quod tempus et ea quae fluunt in tempore, sint praesentia in aeternitate sicut baculus est praesens toti fluvio, si figatur in medio fluvio: baculus enim successive est praesens toti fluvio, quia partibus eius; sed aeternitas est simul cum toto tempore et cum omnibus quae fluunt in tempore, ita quod totum tempus et quidquid successive est in tempore, est praesens aeternitati,—ut si ponatur aeternitas sicut centrum et totum tempus fluens sicut circumferentia, tunc licet circumferentia continue moveatur et pars parti succedat, tamen in comparatione ad centrum uniformiter se habet. Aliud exemplum ponunt de aliquo exsistente in tecto domus.” Ibidem, ad rationes, nn. 85–86, p. 507: “Ad aliud exemplum, de centro in circumferentia, dicendum quod concludit oppositum, quia si protrahatur linea recta, cuius unus punctus faciat centrum, et circumvolvatur alius punctus—secundum imaginationem geometrae—ita quod non derelinquat aliquid stans sed tantum causet circumferentiam in fluxu, illud centrum non est simul cum tota circumferentia, quia non simul est. Sic est de tempore, quod nihil eius est nisi instans; et ideo licet continue fluat, non erit totum simul respectu aeternitatis. Unde circumferentia stans non est tempus, sed est circumferentia fluens; et ideo nihil est praesens aeternitati nisi ‘nunc’ temporis. Ad aliud, quando arguitur quod ‘nunc’ aeternitatis excedit unum ‘nunc’ temporis, et hoc non est nisi quia est praesens cum alio, dicendum quod non est verum; ‘Deus excedit totum universum, ita quod posset esse cum alio (si esset), igitur nunc est cum alio’, non sequitur, quia aliud non est. Unde deficit relatio unius extremi; et hoc non est propter limitationem alterius extremi.” Cf. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, dist. 38 pars 2 et dist. 39, qq. 1–5, n. 35, pp. 441–442.

184

K 56r

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

aeque praesens Deo. Et sic imaginor de notitia praeteriti, praesentis et futuri, et ita certam cognitionem habet Deus de futuro sicut de praeterito quantum est ex parte sui, et tamen sit unum futurum esse contingenter ad necessitatem necessitate ordinata.a Sed contra: Philosophus VII Ethicorum capitulo 1,b et Magister I libro distinctione 8:c Deus “tantum est, qui non novit | ‘fuisse’ vel ‘futurum esse’.” Hic dico cum Magistro quod Deus non novit fuisse, id est, non praeterit Deus. Unde exemplum illud morale fieri potest ad inducendam imaginationem contingentis: Deus potest cognoscere futurum sicut praesens, non tamen in toto concludit verum, sicut probat Doctor Subtilis ibidem quaestione 39.d Vide ibi multa exempla theologiae et multa argumenta Doctoris. (Ad 15) Ad decimum quintum negatur consequentia, quia si Deus revelet absolute, credendum est sibi absolute, quia tunc revelatum eveniet de necessitate ordinata. Si autem condicionaliter, tunc stante condicione certitudinaliter eveniet. (Ad 16) Ad decimum sextum concedo quod ille qui est praedestinatus potest facere quod non sit praedestinatus, sicut ante dixi, quia actum voluntatis malum potest homo habere ex se. Unde meo iudicio potest poni exemplum venerabilis Anselmi De concordia capitulo 22 quaestione 16e secun-

2 et] quia K 3 tamen] cum K ‖ futurum esse] inv. BG ‖ futurum … contingenter] esse contingenter futurum K ‖ contingenter] et add. B 3–4 necessitatem … ordinata] necessarium necessitate ordinata praeteritum B 4 ordinata] praeterita add. K 5 et] allegat add. B 6 distinctione] om. G ‖ 8] 9 G ‖ tantum … non] est qui tantum A ‖ non] om. BG ‖ novit] nihil add. ABG 8 illud] primum gandavi add. in marg. K ‖ fieri potest] fit K ‖ inducendam] inducendum GK 9 contingentis] qualiter B qua K ‖ cognoscere] corr. ex cogitare B cogitare G 10 concludit] continet K ‖ probat] ponit K ‖ ibidem] eadem K 11 39] 29 ABG ‖ ibi] qui G ‖ multa1] recitata K ‖ doctoris] doctorum B 13 eveniet] veniet A deveniet GK 14 condicionaliter] condicionatus A 15 eveniet] evenient K 17 facere] om. AG 18 ex] a A ‖ potest poni] ponit AG bene potest adduci B 19 quaestione] vel K

a Cf. Thomas Bradvardinus, De futuris contingentibus, pp. 329–331. b Recte Aristoteles, Ethica Nicomachea, lib. VI, cap. 3, p. 255: 4–5 (1139b: 10–11). c Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. I, dist. 8, cap. 1, p. 95. d Duns Scotus, Lectura I, dist. 39, q. 5, nn. 27–30, pp. 487–488. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, dist. 38 pars 2 et dist. 39, qq. 1–5, n. 1–3, pp. 402–403. Ibidem, nn. 8– 10, pp. 407–411. Ibidem, n. 35, p. 443. e Recte Anselmus, De concordia, q. 3, cap. 6, p. 270: “Sciendum quia, sicut terra innumerabiles herbas et arbores, sine quibus humana natura alitur aut etiam quibus perimitur, sine omni hominis cura profert, illas vero, quae nobis ad vitam nutriendam maxime sunt necessariae, non sine magno labore atque cultore nec absque seminibus: ita corda humana sine doctrina, sine studio sponte quasi germinant cogitationes et voluntates nihil utiles saluti aut etiam noxias, illas vero, sine quibus ad salutem animae non proficimus, nequaquam sine sui generis semine et laboriosa cultura concipiunt aut germinant.”

5

10

15

185

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

5

10

15

20

dum aliquos libros, ubi dicit quod sicut terra, admirabiles herbas | et arbores, sine quibus natura humana alitur ac etiam quibus perimitur, sine omni cura hominis profert, illa vero, quae nobis ad vitam nutriendam maxime sunt necessariae, non sine magno labore atque cultore | et seminibus; ita corda humana sine studio germinant cogitationes et voluntates nihil utiles ⟨saluti⟩ ac etiam noxias, illas vero, sine quibus ad salutem ⟨animae⟩ non proficimus numquam sine humano semine etc. Et sic dico quod ⟨sic est⟩ causa prima occasionalis quare homo qui non est praedestinatus potest hic esse ex seipso sine semine vel coactione aliqua. Unde 23 quaestione 4 “Nabuchodonosor,” dicit Decretuma quod ideo Deus hominem non praedestinavit, quia ipsum recessurum vel casurum ab ipsa oboedientia praevidit. (Ad 17) Ad decimum septimum respondet Magister libro I distinctione 38;b vide ibi in fine. ⟨Argumenta contra primam conclusionem pro opinione auctoris⟩ Arguo nunc contra primam conclusionem quam posui de futuris contingentibus, quae fuit, quod Deus volens aliquid pro nunc non potest non velle illud, nisi prius naturaliter fiat mutatio in alio a Deo naturaliter quod Deus non velit illud. Contra: (I 1) Si sic, tunc, eadem ratione, Deus sciens aliquid pro nunc non potest non scire illud sine mutatione prius naturaliter facta in aliqua re quam Deus non sciat. Et tunc, eadem ratione, e contra: Deus, non sciens aliquod

1 ubi] om. AG unde B ‖ quod sicut] iter. A ‖ admirabiles] amaras K 2 sine1] om. G ‖ natura humana] inv. A ‖ humana] non add. G ‖ ac] om. BG ‖ cura] coni.; codd. culpa AGK cultura B 3–4 necessariae] coni.; codd. necessaria ABGK 4 cultore] concubitatione (!) B conturbitatione (!) G ‖ corda] natura add. BG 5 nihil] coni.; codd. nulli vel nullis nisi hominibus A multum hominibus ita (?) B nulli vel nisi hominibus G homini add. K ‖ ac] aci (!) A ‖ etiam] om. ABG 6 salutem] salutis AK 7 semine] sit add. K 8 et] om. BG ‖ occasionalis] occasionaliter B occasio naturaliter G ‖ qui] om. K 9 hic … ex] esse homo ex K ‖ seipso] ipso A 9–10 aliqua] om. K 10 unde] bene add. BG ‖ 23] 13 ABG 11 recessurum] praecessurum A praedecessurum G ‖ vel casurum] om. K 13 libro I] inv. BGK 14 vide … fine] in fine vide ibi K ‖ in fine] om. BG 16–17 contingentibus] om. A 18–19 naturaliter2 … illud] om. K 19 illud] om. G 20 si sic] om. BG 21 sine mutatione] mutatione non G ‖ mutatione] aliqua add. K ‖ naturaliter] om. A

a Decretum magistri Gratiani, par. 2, causa 23, q. 4 p. 907. lib. I, dist. 38, cap. 1, p. 277.

b Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae,

B 44va

G 167va

186

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

futurum pro nunc, pro nunc non potest scire illud sine mutatione facta prius naturaliter in aliqua re quam Deus sciat. Et ita huiusmodi mutatio in re foret causa scientiae Dei. Consequens falsum et contra Augustinum XV De Trinitate capitulo 33a de parvis ⟨et⟩ libro XIII de magnis.b Et ⟨dicit⟩ Magister I libro distinctione 38 capitulo 2:c universas autem creaturas, tam corporales quam spirituales, non quia sunt, ideo novit Deus, sed ideo sunt, quia novit. (I 2) Item, velit Deus Antichristum esse futurum vel sciat Antichristum esse futurum; et arguo de scientia, quia ibi magis valet argumentum, et sic: Deus scit Antichristum esse futurum, nec requiritur mutatio in alio a Deo priusquam Deus sciat Antichristum non esse futurum, quia posito per imaginationem quod numquam postea fiat mutatio realis, tunc foret hoc verum quod Deus non scit Antichristum esse futurum, quia sequitur: nihil mutabitur et Antichristus non est, igitur Antichristus non erit. Et antecedens est verum sine omni mutatione ex parte alicuius, igitur consequens. Et confirmatur, quia ad hoc quod sciat Antichristum esse futurum requiritur quod fiat aliqua mutatio vel volitio ad productionem Antichristi, igitur ad hoc quod Deus non sciat Antichristum esse futurum non requiritur aliqua mutatio, sed sufficit non-mutatio alterius rei. (I 3) Item, si sic, tunc, ut videtur, prius naturaliter foret rem esse futuram quam Deus sciret rem esse futuram. Probatur consequentia, quia si Deus nesciens Antichristum esse futurum, potest scire pro nunc Antichristum esse futurum per mutationem prius factam naturaliter in aliquo quam Deus sciat ipsum esse futurum, tunc huiusmodi mutatio prius foret naturaliter quam Deum scire Antichristum esse futurum. Consequens falsum, quia tunc, cum illud quod est prius naturaliter alio possit per divinam potentiam

1 pro2 … potest] non potest pro nunc K ‖ pro nunc2] om. B 1–2 facta … naturaliter] prius naturaliter facta BG 2 re1] om. G 4–5 de1 … 2] om. B 4 libro] vel K ‖ de magnis] om. A et alibi add. G 4–5 I libro] inv. GK 5 38] 36 G 7 antichristum1] vere add. B vere futurum vel add. G ‖ esse] fore AG ‖ esse futurum] futurum fore B 8 valet] patet G ‖ argumentum et] ratio tunc K 9 requiritur] quod add. A 10 esse] fore A 11 numquam postea] inv. A ‖ fiat] aliqua add. K 12 scit] sit A ‖ esse] fore ABG 14 omni] tamen G 15 esse] fore B ‖ fiat] sit K 17 sciat] om. G 20 deus sciret] deum scire K ‖ probatur consequentia] probo consequentiam A 21 antichristum … futurum] rem esse futuram scilicet antichristum K ‖ nunc] tunc A 22 esse] fore BG ‖ prius factam] inv. BGK 23 sciat] fiat A ‖ ipsum] antichristum B 24 esse] fore ABG ‖ consequens] est add. K 25 divinam potentiam] potentiam dei K

a Recte Augustinus, De Trinitate libri XV, lib. XV, cap. 13, p. 495. b Recte Augustinus, De Trinitate libri XV, lib. XV, cap. 5, p. 470. c Recte Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. I, dist. 38, cap. 1, p. 276.

5

10

15

20

25

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

5

10

15

20

187

esse sine posteriori naturaliter, sequeretur quod Deus posset facere naturaliter quod res esset futura, et quod Deus non sciret quod res illa esset futura, et ita Deus non foret Deus, quia alicuius scientiae foret inscius et ignorans. (I 4) Item, ut prius, arguitur: si sic, si Deus sciret rem fore, quia res erit, et cum idem sit Deum scire et Deum esse, igitur Deus est, quia res erit, | et ita creator dependeret in esse a creatura sua—quod est absurdum. Et prima consequentia patet per argumentum Augustini,a ubi probat quod Pater non sapit sapientia quam genuit, quia cum idem sit sapere et esse sapiens, | tunc ⟨si⟩ Pater saperet sapientia quam genuit, igitur Pater esset sapientia quam genuit. Et istud tractat Magister I libro distinctione 32,b ubi allegat auctoritates Augustini, unam XV De Trinitate capitulo de parvisc vel 5 de magnis:d quidquid secundum qualitates in illa simplici natura dici videtur secundum essentiam est intellegendum; et allegat multas auctoritates.

G 167vb

B 44vb

⟨Responsio ad argumenta contra⟩ ⟨primam conclusionem pro opinione auctoris⟩ (Ad I 2) Ad ista dico, ut magis exponam terminum ‘mutationis’. Voco mutationem communiter omne mutatum proprie dictum sive non-factionem rei quae alias fieret, et sic quies opposita motui vocatur mutatio, et rem quiescere sic est rem aliter se habere quam prius. Et per istum modum dico quod si Deus sciat pro nunc Antichristum esse futurum, prius naturaliter erit mutatum quam Deus sciat Antichristum non esse futurum, id est, prius erit non fore futurum Antichristum naturaliter quam Deus sciat ipsum non fore, et sic loquendo | de mutatione communiter, sicut homines loquuntur,

1 sequeretur] sequitur K 1–2 naturaliter] om. K 2 non sciret] nesciret K ‖ esset2] foret AK 4 si1] om. B ‖ rem] om. BG ‖ erit] est K 5–6 erit … ita] est igitur K 6 in … sua] a creatura sua in esse K 7 patet … augustini] per argumentum augustini patet A 8 sapientia] om. G ‖ esse sapiens] deo esse K 9 saperet … pater2] om. (hom.) K 10 tractat] recitat B ‖ 32] 23 B 323 G ‖ ubi] et ibi K 10–11 auctoritates] auctoritatem B 11 unam] om. G ‖ capitulo] 8 add. B ‖ vel] om. A 12 qualitates] qualitatem K ‖ simplici] summa K ‖ dici] dei A ‖ dici videtur] dicitur K 16 dico] primo add. BG ‖ terminum] terminos K 17 omne] omnem K ‖ mutatum] motum BK 18–19 rem quiescere] requiescere A 19 aliter se] inv. G 20 quod] om. A ‖ si deus] inv. K ‖ sciat] scit BG ‖ esse] fore AK 21 mutatum] mutatio K ‖ sciat] scit K 22 sciat] sciet K

a Cf., e.g., Augustinus, De Trinitate libri XV, lib. VII, cap. 1, pp. 248–249. Ibidem, lib. XV, cap. 7, p. 476. b Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. I, dist. 32, cap. 2, p. 234. c Augustinus, De Trinitate libri XV, lib. XV, cap. 13, pp. 494–495. d Augustinus, De Trinitate libri XV, lib. XV, cap. 5, p. 470: “Sed non ita est in illa ineffabili simplici que natura. Quidquid enim secundum qualitates illi dici uidetur secundum substantiam uel essentiam est intellegendum.”

A 29ra

188

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

non posset Deus de potentia ordinata facere quod nulla mutatio foret. Et per hoc solvitur secundum argumentum aliter posito quod effectus futurus non potest impediri nisi per actum volitionis vel nolitionis, sicut alias probabatur.a (Ad I 1) Ad primum argumentum dico quod ‘causa’ sumitur communiter et proprie. Communiter sumitur pro illo sine quo non, et sic concedo conclusionem, scilicet quod rem esse est causa scientiae Dei, quia nisi res aliqua esset, Deus non sciret ullam, ut patet I libro distinctione 35 capitulo 4.b Et consimiliter nisi esset res futura, non sciret Deus rem esse futuram. Sed contra dicis tu: nec e contra res esset futura, nisi Deus sciret rem esse futuram, quare iam dicit Augustinusc quod non quia sunt res, ideo Deus novit, sed ideo sunt, quia novit. Dico quod intellegit sic: non solum, quia sunt, ideo novit, sed etiam, quia novit, ideo sunt, non quia sequatur: ‘novit, ideo sunt’, quia non sequitur, ut patet de Antichristo et huiusmodi futuris quae—ut dicit Augustinus XV De Trinitate ubi priusd—non ex aliquo tempore cognovit Deus, sed sine initio ante praescivit; et ideo ibi non solum vult probare quod res prius sit quam Deus eam cognoscat, sed e contra—prius tempore cognoscit rem quam res sit. Unde non vult Magister dicere quod scientia vel praescientia Dei est causa rerum, ut patet V capitulo istius distinctionis, ubi dicit quod praescientia Dei non est causa eorum quae fiunt, nisi nomine scientiae includatur beneplacitum.e Unde Augustinus De vera innocentia propositione 28:f sicut enim memoria sua nemo cognoscit facta esse

2 aliter] arguitur AG corr. in aliter B ‖ quod] om. B ‖ quod effectus] iter. G 3 potest] possit B ‖ vel nolitionis] om. G 3–4 probabatur] probabitur G 8 deus] om. A ‖ ullam] nullam G illam K ‖ patet] per magistrum add. K ‖ 35] et 5 B 25 G 9 esset res] inv. B ‖ non … deus] deus non sciret B nisi deus sciret G 11–12 sed … futuram] om. (hom.) G ‖ contra1 … futuram] om. B 11 contra2] nec add. K ‖ sciret] nosceret K ‖ rem] ipsam K 12 iam] ideo K ‖ quod] om. BG ‖ deus novit] inv. K 13 dico] deus A 14 sequatur] sequitur BG ‖ ideo2] igitur BG 15 non] om. A 16 XV] 5 ABG 17 sine] tempore vel add. K ‖ praescivit] prae fuit AG ‖ non] fuit add. G 18 sit] in marg. A sint K ‖ eam] eas K 19 cognoscit] cognoscat B ‖ non] om. K 20–21 ut … eorum] om. (hom.) A ‖ V … distinctionis] ibidem BG capitulo V 21 quod] om. BG ‖ eorum] earum G ‖ fiunt] sunt K 22 beneplacitum] beneplacitis G 23 propositione] om. G ‖ 28] 18 K

a Ricardus Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum, q. IV: Utrum voluntas suos actus producat libere, Ad oppositum, pp. 188–189. b Recte Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. I, dist. 38, cap. 1, p. 277. c Augustinus, De Trinitate libri XV, lib. XV, cap. 13, p. 495. Cf. Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. I, dist. 38, cap. 1, p. 276. d Augustinus, De Trinitate libri XV, lib. XV, cap. 13, p. 495. e Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. I, dist. 38, cap. 1, p. 277. f Prosper Aquitanus, Liber sententiarum, cap. 383, p. 360.

5

10

15

20

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

5

10

15

20

189

quae praeterierunt, sic Deus praescientia sua non cognoscit facienda esse quae futura sunt, et sicut homo horum quae facit meminit, nec omnia quae meminit facit, sic Deus omnia quorum ipse auctor est praescit, nec tamen omnium quae praescit ipse auctor est, quorum autem non est malus auctor, iustus est ultor. (Ad I 3) Ad tertium argumentum, quidquid sit de aliis formis, nego consequentiam illam: ‘prius naturaliter est res futura quam Deus sciat ipsam esse futuram, igitur Deus potest facere quod sit res futura et quod non sciat ipsam esse futuram’. | Verbi gratia non sequitur: Socrates naturaliter prius est animal quam sit homo, igitur Deus potest facere quod Socrates sit animal et quod non sit homo. Item, prius naturaliter est artificem aedificare domum quam domus sit in aedificari, et tamen non potest esse quod artifex non faciat domum et quod nulla domus sit in fieri, prius etiam naturaliter est hominem peccare mortaliter quam esse in peccato mortali. Et tamen non potest esse quod homo peccet mortaliter nisi etiam sit in peccato mortali. | (Ad I 4) Ad quartum dico quod non sequitur etc. Et ad modum arguendi | potest dici quod non est argumentum formale, sicut patet per Magistrum eundem distinctione 22,a ubi dicit quod non sequitur: Pater diligit per Spiritum Sanctum et idem est Patrem diligere et esse, igitur Pater est per Spiritum Sanctum; quare tamen sequatur de sapientia quod Pater esset sapientia Filii si saperet sapientia Filii—dico cum Magistro ibidem capitulo 10 quoad haec: meae intelligentiae turbatur infirmitas.b Unde Magister reliquit illud pro lectore, ita relinquo ego alteri volenti.

1 quae2] om. G 2 homo horum] om. K ‖ quae1] qui K ‖ omnia] omnium AG 3 ipse auctor] inv. G ‖ ipse … est] actor est ipse K ‖ est] ipse add. in marg. al. manu B 3–4 praescit … est1] om. (hom.) AG 3 tamen] om. B 4 auctor1] actor K ‖ auctor2] actor K 7 sciat] scit K 8 sit] scit A ‖ sit res] inv. K ‖ quod2] deus add. K 9 ipsam] ipam (!) A eam B 9–10 socrates … est] prius socrates est naturaliter A socrates prius est naturaliter K 10–11 igitur … homo] om. (hom.) G 10 facere] naturaliter add. A ‖ socrates] om. K 11 quod] om. A ‖ artificem] artifitos (!) G 12 quod] domus vel quod add. K 13 non] om. K ‖ etiam] om. A et G 15 non] om. G ‖ etiam sit] fuit etiam BG 19 eundem] in eodem libro K ‖ 22] 21 G 16 K 21 tamen] cum G non K ‖ sequatur] sequitur BGK ‖ sapientia1] filii add. K 22 sapientia] iter. A ‖ quoad] coni.; codd. quod ad ABGK 22–23 haec … turbatur] huius intelligentiam me turbat AB intelligentiam me turbas G 23 magister] sicut B quare G ‖ reliquit] relinquit G 23–24 lectore] lectori BG uti lectori K 24 ego] illud add. BG om. K ‖ volenti] studioso B voluntati K

a Recte Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. I, dist. 32, cap. 1–2, pp. 233–236. Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. I, dist. 32, cap. 6, p. 239.

b Recte Petrus

G 168ra

K 56v B 45ra

190

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

⟨Argumenta contra secundam conclusionem pro opinione auctoris⟩ Contra secundam conclusionem quae fuit quod Deus volens vel sciens aliquid posset de potentia absoluta non scire vel velle illud pro nunc sine omni mutatione. Contra: (II 1) Si sic, tunc Deus posset facere de potentia absoluta quod non vellet illud pro nunc, et tunc vel faceret aliquid in creatura vel in seipso. Si in creatura, tunc foret mutatio in creatura, quod est contra conclusionem. Si in seipso faceret aliquid quod nunc non facit, ipse mutaretur, quod est impossibile. (II 2) Item, si sic, illa potentia, qua Deus potest pro nunc non scire A unum quod Deus scit, aut est activa aut passiva. Si sit passiva, tunc est ad formam quam potest recipere, et ita Deus foret mutabilis. Si sit activa ut sic agit in aliquid, igitur ut sic aliquid patitur, et per consequens aliquid mutatur; et istud fere ponitur in I Sententiarum distinctione 39.a (II 3) Item, tunc esset, quia non claudit contradictionem, quod Deus velit hoc vel non velit hoc. Item, eadem ratione quod non claudat contradictionem, quod Abraham non fuit et quod beata virgo non peperit Christum et quod Christus non redemit genus humanum, et omnia talia quae videntur absurda. Etiam primum consequens est falsum, quia illo solo privatur Deus ut faciat de praeterito non praeteritum, ut patet per Anselmum etc. (II 4) Item, si sic, tunc omne quod vult Deus et scit praeter seipsum, posset eadem ratione non velle et non scire pro nunc, et cum hoc non posset de sua iustitia et misericordia, igitur potentia Dei absoluta foret magis contra eius iustitiam et misericordiam, et ita nec iustitia nec misericordia Dei foret infinita.

2 quae fuit] om. A 2–3 aliquid] pro nunc add. B 3 omni] aliqua K 6 nunc] quod vult pro nunc add. K ‖ tunc] talem non velle add. K ‖ faceret] foret AG ‖ faceret … seipso] foret in deo vel in creatura K 8 est] esset AG 10 si sic] sit AK ‖ deus] non add. AG ‖ pro nunc] om. B ‖ pro … non] om. G ‖ a] om. BG ‖ unum] unid (!) K 11 deus] nunc add. B ‖ scit] sit A ‖ activa … passiva1] passiva aut activa K ‖ aut2] vel BG 12 foret] esset K ‖ sit activa] inv. A activa sic G ‖ in] om. A 14 ponitur] a doctore subtili add. in marg. K ‖ in] om. BK 15–16 velit … vel] om. ABG 16 item] et B et tunc K ‖ quod] cum BGK ‖ claudat] claudas B 17 fuit] fuerit BK 18 humanum] posset deus ista facere add. K ‖ quae] om. K 19 etiam] om. BG et K ‖ illo] hoc K 20 de] ex G ‖ ut2] etiam K ‖ anselmum] augustinum B 21 omne] om. G ‖ deus … scit] et scit deus K 21–22 posset] potest BG 23–24 contra … misericordiam] quam sua iustitia et misericordia K 24 nec2] vel K ‖ dei] sua K

a Duns Scotus, Lectura I, dist. 39, q. 3, nn. 6–9, pp. 482–483. Ibidem, Ad rationes, nn. 73–76, pp. 504–505.

5

10

15

20

25

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

5

10

15

191

(II 5) Item, tunc Deus de potentia sua absoluta potuit aliquid voluisse ab aeterno quod erit, et cum sit tantae virtutis ad creandum sicut ad volendum, igitur illud quod potuit voluisse ab aeterno potuit creasse ab aeterno. Consequens falsum, ut videtur, et claudit contradictionem, quia si aliqua creatura est, igitur non ab aeterno fuit. (II 6) Item, potentia Dei, ut absoluta est, non est maior potentia Dei ut ordinata est, igitur nihil potest facere de potentia sua absoluta ut absoluta est quod non potest facere de potentia sua ordinata ut ordinata est. Antecedens patet, quia potentia Dei, ut ordinata est, infinita est, quod probatur, quia opera quae facit Deus de potentia ordinata arguunt ipsum esse Deum et infinitae potentiae, igitur eius potentia, etiam ut | est ordinata, est infinita. Antecedens probatur per illud Ioannis:a “opera quae ego facio in nomine Patris mei, haec testimonium perhibent de me.” Et ibidem:b si “mihi non vultis credere, operibus credite, ut cognoscatis et credatis,” quia “Pater in me est et ego in Patre.” Unde Magister I libro distinctione 3 capitulo 2:c “accedat— inquit Magister—quaecumque vis creatura et faciat tale coelum et talem terram, et dicam quia Deus est.”

G 168rb

⟨Responsio ad argumenta contra⟩ ⟨secundam conclusionem pro opinione auctoris⟩ 20

25

(Ad II 1) Ad primum istorum dico quod Deus per solum velle suum posset non velle A pro hoc instanti, et tale velle in se habere potest sine omni mutatione vel factione in alio vel in seipso. Et sic sumendo ‘facere’ large pro ‘velle’ sic posset Deus de potentia absoluta facere quod pro hoc instanti non velit A, posito quod A sit unum tale quod | Deus velit pro hoc instanti. Nec tamen noviter non volet A sed ab aeterno, tunc non voluit A pro hoc instanti, vel nunc, cum in Deo non sit nova voluntas—XII Confessionum 1 de … potuit] potuit de potentia sua absoluta A 1–2 ab aeterno] om. A 4 aliqua] om. BGK 6 est1] om. B ‖ maior] minor ABG in marg. al. manu K 7 absoluta1] om. K 8 potentia … ordinata1] sua potentia K ‖ ut … est2] om. A 10 opera] facit add. A ‖ facit] fecit K 12 probatur] patet A ‖ ioannis] om. K 13 haec] ipsa ABG ‖ testimonium] om. AG 14 cognoscatis … credatis] credatis et cognoscatis ABG 14–15 pater … patre] ego in patre et pater in me est K 16 quaecumque] quae A ‖ quaecumque vis] quamvis BGK 17 quia … est] tu es deus ABG 20–21 velle … posset] om. (hom.) A 21 non] superscr. A 22 mutatione vel] om. BGK ‖ alio … seipso] se vel in alio K 23 posset] prodest (?) A potest BG ‖ de … facere] facere de potentia absoluta K ‖ potentia] sua add. B 24 a2] om. BG ‖ a2 … tale] scit unum factibile A ‖ velit2] vult K 25 non1] nunc G 26 instanti vel] om. BG ‖ vel nunc] om. K ‖ non … nova] nulla K

a Io 10:25. b Io 10:38. c Recte Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. I, dist. 3, cap. 1, p. 69.

B 45rb

192

A 29rb

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

capitulo 7:a “invenio Deum meum—dicit Augustinus—Deum aeternum non aliqua nova voluntate condidisse creaturam nec scientiam eius aliquid transitorium pati.” (Ad II 2) Ad secundum concedo quod illa est potentia Dei per quam Deus potest pro nunc non velle A. Et dico quod est activa, quia Deus est potentia activa. Et nego consequentiam: ‘igitur ut sic agit in aliquid extra seipsum’, quia sufficit sola voluntas in Deo, ut dictum est superius.b (Ad II 3) Ad tertium concedo quod possibile est per potentiam Dei absolutam quod Abraham non fuit, nec apparet mihi hoc inconveniens, licet sit | difficile hoc imaginari apud aliquos. Unde creatura potest facere de aliquo successivo, scilicet de motu locali terminaturo ad A qui ante hoc fuit quod ante hoc non fuit, quia potest creatura talis, quae ante hoc movebatur motu terminaturo ad A, facere quod non terminabitur ad A, igitur Deus, cum sit in infinitum, immo infinities ⟨in⟩ infinitum, maioris potentiae quam creatura, potest facere de aliquo mere praeterito non praeteritum, quia apud Deum nihil praeterit, igitur sic potest facere apud eum quod nihil praeterit. Antecedens patet per Augustinum super psalmum 49:c Pulchritudo agri mecum est. Et allegat Magister I libro distinctione 35 capitulo ⟨9⟩: “apud eum nihil praeterit, nihil futurum est.”d Item, Anselmus II Cur Deus homo capitulo 17 fere in principio sic:e cum Deus facit aliquid postquam factum est, iam non potest non esse factum, sed semper verum factum est; nec tamen recte dicitur impossibile Deo esse ut faciat quod praeteritum est non esse praeteritum, nihil enim operatur necessitas non faciendi aut impossibilitas faciendi, sed Dei sola voluntas, quae semper verax 2 nova voluntate] inv. K ‖ nec] non G 3 pati] et magister 1 libro distinctione 43 capitulo ultimo deus potest sempiterna voluntate velle nec tamen voluntate nova add. K 5 potest … nunc] pro nunc potest BG 6 ut] non G ‖ sic] non add. B ‖ extra seipsum] extremum ipsum AG ‖ seipsum] ipsum B 7 voluntas] ipsa add. A ‖ superius] prius A 9 fuit] fuerit A et quod coelum non fuit add. K 9–10 nec … aliquos] om. G 9 sit] esset K 10 difficile hoc] inv. K ‖ unde] apparet una add. G 11 scilicet … terminaturo] ut de motu locali scilicet viator K ‖ terminaturo … qui] viaturo (!) ad quartum quod A ut viator ad septimum quod G 13 terminaturo] terminato AG ‖ in] om. AB 14 immo] primo B ‖ maioris] virtutis et add. B 16 sic] si AG om. B ‖ apud eum] om. B ‖ eum] deum G ‖ nihil2] non B 17 psalmum] psalmus add. K 18 35 capitulo] 25 K ‖ 9] lac. A ‖ eum] deum ABK 19 nihil] quae add. ABG ‖ est] es G 20 sic] sicut BGK 22 semper] propter BG ‖ verum] unum B ‖ factum est] est factum esse K ‖ nec] non B ‖ recte] ratione G 23 praeteritum2] teritum (!) K ‖ operatur] in eo add. in marg. K ‖ non2] om. K 24 faciendi1] in deo add. in marg. K 24–193.1 quae … est1] qui veritatem semper K

a Augustinus, Confessionum libri tredecim, lib. XII, cap. 15, p. 225. b Cf. supra, p. 190. c Augustinus, Enarrationes in Psalmos, ps. 49, par. 18, p. 589. Cf. Ps 49:11. d Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. I, dist. 35, cap. 9, p. 258. e Anselmus, Cur Deus homo, lib. II, cap. 17, p. 123.

5

10

15

20

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

5

10

15

20

193

est, quia ipse veritas est immutabilis sicuti vult est. Unde quod Augustinus ubique loquitur, quando dicitur: quod praeteritum est non potest non esse praeteritum, loquitur de lege ordinata, sicut patet in eodem capitulo 17, et ita impossibilitas est ex parte praeteriti et non ex parte Dei. Item, aliquod praeteritum fuit quod melius esset ipsum non fuisse sicut actum malum per se peccatum. Sed omne quod melius esset Deus posset facere, quia aliter non esset omnipotens. Unde Scotus super I Sententiarum distinctione 46,a dicit quod Hieronymus dicit quod Deus, cum omnia possit, non posset virginem corruptam reparare, ideo dicitur non posse, quia numquam declaravit se posse, et sic dico ego. Item, tantae potentiae est nunc Deus, quantae unquam fuit respectu cuiuscumque, igitur si potuit fecisse de potentia sua quod Abraham non fuit, sic potest modo facere | quod Abraham non fuit. (Ad II 4) Ad quartum dici potest quod iustitia Dei potest tot modis accipi quot potentia, scilicet ordinata et absoluta. Unde si Deus annihilaret mundum de potentia sua absoluta, tunc dico conformiter quod annihilaret mundum de iustitia absoluta et de sua misericordia absoluta, nec ex hoc foret minus iustus si numquam fuisset mundus. Sed contra dices: Deus est magis diligendus sic quam si non creasset mundum, quia propter beneficium creationis aliquid sibi debemus amoris, et alia sunt paria, igitur subtracto beneficio subtrahitur causa amandi, | et per consequens fit minus bonus. Istud transeo usque alias, ubi diffusius tractabo hoc.

1 ipse] om. ABG ‖ immutabilis] immutabiliter ABG ‖ vult] om. B vel G ‖ est3] esse ABG ‖ quod] om. BG 2 ubique] ubicumque B ‖ quando dicitur] om. A ‖ dicitur] dicit K ‖ non potest] impossibile est K ‖ non2] om. G ‖ non esse] inv. B 3 praeteritum] et etiam anselmus add. K ‖ loquitur] om. AG loquatur K 5 esset … fuisse] fuisset si non fuisset A 7 quia] om. A ‖ scotus] magister ABG ‖ I] 3 K 8 distinctione] quaestione K ‖ 46] 64 BG 69 K ‖ hieronymus … quod2] om. (hom.) A ‖ cum] tamen add. A 9 reparare] temptare G 11 nunc deus] inv. K ‖ quantae] sicut BGK ‖ unquam] numquam B 12 igitur] om. G ‖ igitur si] sed sicut B ‖ abraham] sic add. A ‖ fuit] fuerit G 13 potest modo] modo posset ABG ‖ fuit] foret ABG 14–15 dei … quot] tot modis dici potest sicut BGK 16 sua] om. BGK ‖ tunc dico] inv. A ‖ dico] dicendo add. B 17 sua misericordia] inv. BG ‖ foret] fieret K 18 contra dices] inv. K 19 propter] per A 20 amoris] amorum A ‖ alia] cetera K 21 minus] nullus G ‖ bonus] et add. A et per consequens minus iustus add. K 22–194.1 tractabo … quemlibet] quam G 22 hoc] om. A

a Recte Duns Scotus, Ordinatio IV, dist. 1, par. 4 Incidentalis, q. 1, n. 352, p. 125: “Si instetur contra maiorem, secundum Hieronymum, quod ‘Deus non potest de non-virgine facere virginem’, et tamen a principio potuit formare sive creare hominem virginem, respondeo: accepi in maiore ‘qualemcumque secundum formam absolutam’, et ibi non est instantia, quia accipiendo quodcumque absolutum importatum per virginitatem, sive sit perfectio in mente sive dispositio in carne, totum potest Deus reparare (…).”

G 168va

K 57r

194

B 45va

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

(Ad II 5) Ad quintum argumentum dico quod est contra quemlibet sicut contra me, quia quilibet ponit quod Deus ab aeter|no voluit mundum fore vel Antichristum esse futurum. Unde pro materia argumenti dico et concedo quod Deus potest facere quod mundus fuerit ab aeterno, et non solum ab aeterno potuit Deus creasse mundum, sed quod mundum potuit creasse ⟨existentem⟩ ab aeterno, quia ista propositio: ‘mundus fuit ab aeterno’ non claudit contradictionem. Sed contra: si creatura potuit fuisse ab aeterno, aut igitur bona aut mala. Non mala, ut patet per Augustinum XII De civitate Dei capitulo 6,a ubi improbat illam opinionem quae ponit quod potuit esse sempiterna voluntas mala, quia nec in re bona nec sine re bona. Et si dicatur quod potuit fuisse bona voluntas, igitur eadem ratione mala potuit fuisse ab aeterno, ad ista dici potest quod ultima consequentia non valet, licet forte consequens sit verum. Et hoc propter casum Augustini: nam malum, si ab aeterno esset, corrumperet naturam bonam infinitam. Et consimilis repugnantia non invenitur adesse in re bona. Unde ad argumentum Augustini dicitur quod non erit aliqua voluntas mala aeternaliter. Unde sicut respondendum est de volitione mala aeterna a parte post, sic respondeo de volitione mala aeterna a parte ante. (Ad II 6) Ad sextum dico quod non sequitur: potentia Dei, ut ordinata, est infinita, igitur, ut sic, non est minor eadem potentia, ut absoluta est. Unde unum infinitum in potentia potest esse alio potentius, sicut alias dicam in materia de infinito.b Posito etiam quod potentiae omnes infinitae forent aequales, adhuc non sequitur consequens, quia nullus quasi negat quod Deus posset de potentia absoluta annihilare coelum et terram, et tamen de potentia ordinata non posset. 2 deus … aeterno] ab aeterno deus K 3 esse] fore K 4 fuerit] fuit B 8 si] om. BG 9 non mala] iter. B ‖ ut] om. G ‖ ut patet] om. B ‖ 6] 4 ABG 10 quod] non add. ABG 11 nec2] in mala nec add. K 11–12 bona voluntas] inv. K 14–15 corrumperet … infinitam] naturam bonam infinitam corrumperet K 15–16 non … adesse] adesse non invenietur K 17 dicitur] videtur K 18 aeternaliter] naturaliter ABG ‖ volitione mala] voluntate malo K 19 volitione] voluntate K ‖ mala aeterna] inv. K ‖ aeterna] om. B 20 sextum] nonum BG ‖ ut ordinata] sic A ‖ ordinata] sic BG 21 minor] quam add. B 22 in1 … potest] potest in potentia G 23 omnes] om. K

a Augustinus, De civitate Dei, lib. XII, cap. 6, p. 360: “Porro si nocuit, bonum auferendo uel minuendo utique nocuit. Non igitur esse potuit sempiterna uoluntas mala in ea re, in qua bonum naturale praecesserat, quod mala uoluntas nocendo posset adimere. Si ergo non erat sempiterna, quis eam fecerit quaero. Restat ut dicatur, quod ea res fecerit malam uoluntatem, in qua nulla uoluntas fuit.” b Ricardus Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum, q. 3: Utrum omnis creatura sit suae naturae certis limitibus circumscripta, art. 2, Utrum unum infinitum potest esse maius alio, pp. 127–148.

5

10

15

20

25

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

195

⟨Argumenta contra quintam conclusionem pro opinione auctoris⟩

5

10

15

Contra quintam conclusionem, quae fuit quod omne absolute revelatum a Deo necessario eveniet necessitate ordinata, arguitur sic: (V 1) Si sic, tunc huiusmodi revelatio absoluta faceret necessitatem in rebus, ut videtur, quia ipsa posita sequitur necessitas in rebus. Consequens falsum et contra glossam 1 capitulo:a “Ecce virgo concipiet” etc. “Non est necessitas rerum ex eloquio prophetarum, sed sola exibitio veritatis” in prophetia non facit necessitatem eorum quae dicit sed signum praescientiae Dei. (V 2) Item, Deus Pater revelat Deo Filio secundum hominem omnia futura absoluta revelatione. Si igitur revelatio extrinseca faciat necessitatem in rebus, igitur revelatio intrinseca facit etc. (V 3) Item, Deus Pater absolute novit quod Antichristus est futurus et quod contingenter contingentia ad utrumlibet est futurus, igitur ut sic potest Deus revelare | absolute quod Antichristus erit; reveletur igitur. Et sequitur ex conclusione illa, ut videtur, quod Antichristus erit necessario, quia absolute est revelatum. Et quod non erit necessario patet per alteram partem revelationis quae est quod Antichristus contingenter erit.

2 absolute] absolutum ABG 3 eveniet] eveniat AG ‖ arguitur sic] contra AGK 5 consequens] est add. BK 6 glossam] super illud isagogae add. B ‖ 1 capitulo] super illo verbo K ‖ concipiet] om. BG ‖ concipiet etc] om. A 7 eloquio] locutione A ‖ exibitio] exibitione BG 8 signum] est add. K 10 pater] om. A ‖ revelat] revelavit K ‖ secundum hominem] om. K 11 faciat] facit B 14 quod] hoc BG ‖ contingenter … utrumlibet] contingens ad utrumlibet contingenter K ‖ futurus] futurum K 15 revelare absolute] inv. K ‖ reveletur] revelet B

a Guillelmus Autissiodorensis, Summa aurea II, tract. 7, cap. 1, p. 146: “Ecce Virgo concipiet, scilicet cognitionem fidei et cognitionem prophetalem.” Ibidem, p. 147: “Unde dicit beatus Augustinus: ‘Non est necessitas rerum ex eloquio prophetarum, sed sola exhibitio veritatis’, id est sola rerum manifestatio prout venture sunt.” Cf. Thomas de Aquino, Super Evangelium Matthaei reportatio, cap. 1, lect. 5, p. 21: “Praenuntiatio illorum, quae solus Deus facit vocatur prophetia praedestinationis, sicut conceptus virginis; unde illud is. vii, 14: ecce virgo concipiet, est prophetia praedestinationis. Sed ea quae fiunt a causis secundis, possunt dupliciter considerari. Primo, secundum quod sunt in praescientia Dei, verbi gratia de Lazaro; si enim aliquis consideret causas naturales, diceret quod numquam surgeret, et verum diceret: cum tamen deberet resuscitari secundum ordinem divinae praescientiae. Ergo quando prophetia est praenuntiatio secundum quod est in praescientia divina, semper impletur; quando autem secundum ordinem causarum inferiorum, non semper, sicut patet is. xxxviii, v. 1, quando Isaias ad Ezechiam dixit: dispone domui tuae, quoniam morieris tu, et non vives etc. Sed numquid prophetia imponit necessitatem praescientiae? Et dicendum quod non; quia prophetia est quoddam signum divinae praescientiae, quae non imponit necessitatem rebus praescitis, quia considerat futura in sua praesentialitate.”

G 168vb

196

B 45vb

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

(V 4) Item, Deus potest revelare futurum contingens, ipso manente contingente; aut igitur absolute potest tale futurum contingens revelare, et sequitur quod ipsum non erit necessario, quia manebit contingens, vel solum potest Deus de potentia ordinata ipsum revelare sub condicione. Et tunc condicio aut est contingens aut necessaria. Si contingens, aut igitur revelat ipsum absolute, et sequitur ut prius, aut sub condicione, et sic patet processus in infinitum. Vel erit devenire ad condicionem absolute revelatam, et sic primum erit absolute revelatum quod erit revelatum sub condicione necessaria. (V 5) Item, sint Socrates et Plato in peccato mortali, et reveletur istis quod tantum Socrates de numero illorum damnabitur iuxta rationem illam. Si Socrates posset libere confiteri peccata et poenitere post|quam peccaverit, ista revelatio non est absoluta, sed tantum condicionalis, scilicet quod tantum Socrates de numero illorum damnabitur, quia intellegitur quod Socrates non poeniteat. Et consimiliter constat de Platone quod, nisi poeniteat, damnabitur, igitur per illam revelationem non est plus certificatum de Socrate quod damnabitur quam de Platone. (V 6) Item, si revelatio ad extra per Deum absoluta faceret et causaret necessitatem aliquam in re futura, cum huiusmodi revelatio sit solum flatus venti, igitur per unum flatum venti necessitaretur Deus de potentia ordinata. Consequens videtur falsum et irrationabile. His tamen non obstantibus dico sicut prius quod omne absolute revelatum, sicut prophetia simpliciter dicta, quae necesse est quod omnibus modis eveniat, dicente Cassiodoro in Prologo Psalteriia quod: prophetia est inspiratio vel revelatio divina rerum eventus immobili veritate denuntians. Et loquitur ibib de prophetia secundum praescientiam, quae necesse est omnibus modis

1 contingens] contingentis B ‖ ipso] om. ABG 2 contingens] om. K 3 ipsum] ipse A illud K ‖ erit necessario] inv. K ‖ manebit] futurum add. K 3–4 solum … condicione] potest solum ipsum revelare sub condicione de potentia ordinata K 8 erit absolute] inv. K ‖ quod … revelatum2] om. (hom.) B ‖ erit2] absolutum add. G 10 istis] illud A 11 illam] sed add. in marg. al. manu B 12 posset] potest K ‖ peccata] sua add. B 13 est] esset B erit K ‖ tantum] solum K ‖ condicionalis] condicionata B cum deo vel G 14 quod] si B 14–15 quod … non] nisi socrates K 15 constat] fiat B est K ‖ platone] ut constat add. K 16–17 igitur … damnabitur] iter. B 18 causaret] crearet B 19 aliquam] om. K 20 venti1] loci G ‖ unum] solum K ‖ necessitaretur] necessitaret G ‖ deus] om. B 21 videtur] esse add. K 22 dico] om. G ‖ omne] esse AG 22–23 revelatum] etc unde voco absolute revelatum add. K 23 sicut] prophetatum absolute add. B ‖ modis] om. G

a Cassiodorus, Expositio psalmorum, praef., cap. 1 (PL 70, 12B). b Petrus Lombardus, In Psalmos, praef. (PL 191, 59A–B). Cf. Thomas de Aquino, Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, q. 12, art. 12, arg. 1, p. 397.

5

10

15

20

25

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

5

10

15

197

impleri, etiam secundum tenorem verborum, ut: Ecce virgo concipiet etc. Sed alia erit prophetia secundum comminationem, ut: “40 dies ⟨sunt⟩, et Ninive subvertetur, quae non secundum | verborum superficiem, sed tacitae intelligentiae significatione impletur.” Sed contra: (1) Glossa Magistri I,a ubi supra, dicit quod prophetia alia est ex praescientia Dei cui nostrum admiscetur liberum arbitrium, igitur illa quae sic est ex praescientia potest per liberum arbitrium impediri. Item, si necesse sit omnibus modis prophetiam secundum praescientiam evenire, igitur a multo fortiori prophetiam ex praedestinatione vel secundum praedestinationem necesse foret evenire. Consequens falsum et contra Decretum 23 quaestione 4 in “Nabuchodonosor.”b (2) Item, de praedestinatione dicit sic:c “praedestinationem ⟨Dei⟩ sive ad bonum sive ad malum in omnibus operari ineptissime dicitur, ut ad utrumque homines quaedam necessitas videtur impellere.” Item, ibidem 23, quaestione 4, ubi sic dicit Decretum:d non igitur necessitatem facit correctionis vel obdurationis divina praedestinatio sive praescientia, cum boni per gratiam corrigantur, et libero arbitrio mali pereant. Neque 1 impleri … tenorem] impleres et etiam timorem G ‖ tenorem] tumorem A sonum B 2 erit] om. AG ‖ comminationem] commutationem K ‖ ut] post add. A illa add. B in G ‖ 40] 44 B 3–4 tacitae intelligentiae] tacita intellectione A tacita intentione B 4 significatione] significationem K 6 I] capitulo add. BG ‖ supra] om. A quod add. G 9 item] lac. G 10 fortiori] per add. ABG 10–11 vel … praedestinationem] om. A 12 4 in] om. G ‖ in] om. BK 13 de praedestinatione] praedestinationem AK coni.; codd. ubi add. ABGK ‖ dicit] diceretur A dicatur GK 14 dicitur] super AG 14–15 utrumque] utrumlibet A 15 homines quaedam] hominem quod ABG 16 ubi sic] non igitur A non igitur ibi K ‖ ubi … non] om. G ‖ non] om. A 17 correctionis] correptionis A 18 cum] causa A ‖ per … corrigantur] corrigantur per gratiam K ‖ mali] malum G ‖ neque] nec est A

a Thomas de Aquino, Catena aurea in Matthaeum, cap. 1, lect. 13, p. 29: “Prophetia autem alia est ex praedestinatione Dei, quam necessarium est evenire omnibus modis ut sine nostro impleatur arbitrio, ut illa de qua modo agimus: unde dicit ecce, ad demonstrandum certitudinem prophetiae; alia est ex praescientia Dei, cui nostrum admiscetur arbitrium et cooperante gratia consequimur praemium, vel ab ea iuste relicti tormentum; alia non ex praescientia, sed est quaedam comminatio more humano facta, sicut illud: adhuc quadraginta dies et Ninive subvertetur, intelligendo nisi Ninivitae corrigantur.” Thomas de Aquino, Summae theologiae IIa–IIae, q. 174, art. 1, arg. 1: “Videtur quod inconvenienter dividatur prophetia in Glossa super matth. i, ecce virgo in utero habebit, ubi dicitur quod prophetia alia est ex praedestinatione Dei, quam necesse est omnibus modis evenire, ut sine nostro impleatur arbitrio, ut haec de qua hic agitur; alia est ex praescientia Dei, cui nostrum admiscetur arbitrium; alia est quae comminatio dicitur quae fit ob signum divinae animadversionis.” Cf. Petrus Lombardus, In Psalmos, praef. (PL 191, 59A–B). b Decretum magistri Gratiani, par. 2, causa 23, q. 4, p. 908. c Decretum magistri Gratiani, par. 2, causa 23, q. 4, p. 907. d Decretum magistri Gratiani, par. 2, causa 23, q. 4, p. 907.

A 29va

198

G 169ra

K 57v

B 46ra

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

enim, ⟨quia⟩ praedestinatio seu praescientia Dei falli non potest, necessario eveniunt quae praedestinantur vel praesciuntur, sicut nec necessario praedestinantur vel praesciuntur quae futura sunt; haec ille. Ad ista dico quod praescientia | dupliciter sumitur. Uno modo ut distinguitur contra praedestinationem simpliciter, et sic est tam de bonis quam de malis. Alio modo prout includit praedestinationem sive communiter dictam, quae potest non esse praedestinatio, sive proprie dictam. Et ista distinctio ponitur De paenitentia distinctione 4 | in glossa: “si ex bono in malum.”a Ubi dicit glossab quod sub nomine praescientiae includitur praedestinatio, et ideo praedestinationis duplex est effectus, scilicet temporaliter iustificare et aeternaliter gloriam tribuere. Unde si fiat locutio de praescientia, prout includit praedestinationem absolutam, sic idem est revelatio absoluta et praescientia, et sic concedo quod praescita necessario evenient, necessitate scilicet ordinata. Unde glossa Magistri capitulo 1,c ubi sic dicit quod prophetia alia est ex praedestinatione, quam necesse est omnibus modis evenire, ut sine nostro impleatur arbitrio, sicut est illa de qua hic agitur: “Ecce virgo concipiet” etc.; alia est ex praescientia Dei, cui nostrum admiscetur arbitrium, alia quae | comminatio dicitur quae fuit ob signum animadversionis divinae, quae fuit ut fugiant a facie arcus.d Ex qua glossa patet quod praescientia distinguitur uno modo contra praedestinationem. ⟨Responsio ad argumenta contra⟩ (Ad 1) Et per ista patet responsio ad primum quod prophetia quae est ex praescientia, quae distinguitur contra praedestinationem proprie dictam, 1 dei] dicitur K ‖ non potest] potest nec B nec propter hoc K 2 eveniunt] evenient A 3 quae] quia BGK ‖ ille] ibi BGK 4 dupliciter sumitur] inv. K 5 simpliciter] om. K 6 prout] ut K 7–8 praedestinatio … in1] om. G 13 praescita] praescitum K ‖ evenient] eveniant B eveniunt GK 15 magistri] 5 add. B ‖ 1] 4 A ‖ ubi sic] verbi gratia B ‖ sic] supra K ‖ prophetia] praescientia K 16 modis] aliis A om. G 17 sicut … illa] videlicet dicit glossa A ubi dicit glossa G ut hoc dicit glossa K ‖ hic agitur] dicitur B ‖ etc] om. A et periet filium K 18 admiscetur] commiscetur ABG 19 comminatio] comminatoria B ‖ quae1] cum A ‖ signum] in add. A ‖ animadversionis divinae] adversionis diem A ‖ quae fuit2] quo scilicet AG scilicet B 20 arcus] sunt electi sive erecti add. K 21 uno] illo K 23–24 et … praedestinationem] om. (hom.) K 23 est] om. G ‖ ex] om. B 24 dictam] quam add. K

a Decretum magistri Gratiani, par. 2,33,3 (De paenitentia), dist. 4, p. 1230. b Decretum magistri Gratiani, par. 2,33,3 (De paenitentia), dist. 4, p. 1233. c Thomas de Aquino, Catena aurea in Matthaeum, cap. 1, lect. 13, p. 29. Thomas de Aquino, Summae theologiae IIa–IIae, q. 174, art. 1, arg. 1. Cf. Petrus Lombardus, In Psalmos, praef. (PL 191, 59A–B). d Cf., e.g., Petrus Lombardus, In Psalmos, ps. 59 (PL 191, 554).

5

10

15

20

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

5

10

15

199

habet secum admixtum liberum arbitrium contradictionis. Et de tali praescientia non est necessarium quod eveniet effective. Sed nota quod praedestinatio dicitur dupliciter, ut patet De paenitentia distinctione 4:a “In domo patris mei” etc. Una est praedestinatio secundum praesentem iustitiam, alia secundum futuram gloriam; primam potest damnatus habere.b Et exponit bene illam auctoritatem Ioannis 2:c exirent a nobis, sed non erant ex nobis etc. (Ad 2) Ad secundum dico quod praedestinatio quae est actus voluntatis ut sic non est causa prima necessitans, sed Deus ut sic est causa necessitans. Quod autem praedestinatio sumatur quandoque pro actu voluntatis patet ex modo loquendi Doctoris Subtilis super Sententias I libro distinctione 40,d ubi dicit quod praedestinatio proprie sumpta est actus voluntatis divinae et praedestinatio communiter dicta est actus intellectus concomitantis. Et Doctor Solemnis IV Quodlibet quaestione 19,e ubi concedit quod aliquis est causa suae praedestinationis, sed non secundum rationem qua ipsa praedestinatio est actio voluntatis in praedestinante, sed secundum quod denotat effectum receptum in praedestinato. Hoc pro tanto dixi quod praedestinatio sumitur a doctoribus communiter pro actu voluntatis in praedestinato, sed propriissime pro ipso Deo, ut 1 et] om. BG 2 necessarium] necesse K ‖ eveniet effective] eveniat sine defectione B eveniat effectus K 3 dicitur dupliciter] inv. B 4 etc] om. A ‖ una] vitae A vita G ‖ alia] est add. K 6 bene] om. K ‖ exirent] exierunt B 8 est] om. A 9 ut1 … prima] non est causa ut sic K ‖ deus ut] inv. K ‖ causa necessitans] inv. K 10 quod] quia BG ‖ sumatur quandoque] inv. K 11 loquendi doctoris] doctorum doctor K ‖ doctoris subtilis] doctorum A ‖ sententias … libro] I sententiarum BK 12 ubi] om. K 14 doctor solemnis] idem doctor B ‖ solemnis] subtilis G prius add. K ‖ quaestione] distinctione AG ‖ 19] 10 A ‖ concedit] concludit K 16 actio] actus B ‖ voluntatis] divinae voluntatis add. B 17 receptum … praedestinato] in praedestinato receptum K ‖ praedestinato] praedestinando B 18 dixi] om. A ‖ sumitur] sumatur BG 18–19 a … praedestinato] communiter pro actu voluntatis a doctoribus K 19 praedestinato] praedestinante BG ‖ sed] iter. A

a Decretum magistri Gratiani, par. 2,33,3 (De paenitentia), dist. 4, p. 1233. b Cf. Thomas de Aquino, Super Evangelium Iohannis reportatio, cap. 13, lect. 3, p. 334: “Una est ad praesentem iustitiam, et ad hanc electus fuit Iudas; alia electio est ad finalem gloriam, et secundum hanc Iudas non fuit electus.” Cf. Thomas de Aquino, In I Sententiarum, dist. 40, q. 3, art. 1, resp. ad arg. 2: “Ad tertium dicendum, quod praedestinatio est liber vitae secundum quod dicitur in eo aliquid scribi non solum quantum ad praesentem iustitiam, sed etiam quantum ad futuram gloriam (…).” c Decretum magistri Gratiani, par. 2,33,3 (De paenitentia), dist. 4, p. 1234. Cf. I Io 2:19. d Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, dist. 40, q. unica, n. 4, p. 310. e Henricus de Gandavo, Quodlibet IV, q. 19, p. 320: “Secundum hoc ergo descendendo ad quaestionem dico quod in isto singulari praedestinato quocumque est assignare causam et rationem praedestinationis suae non secundum rationem qua ipsa praedestinatio actio voluntatis est in praedestinante, sed secundum rationem qua connotat effectum receptum in praedestinato (…).”

200

G 169rb

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

est praedestinans, et ut sic praedestinatio est causa prima praedestinans. Sed praedestinatio, quae est actus voluntatis, est signum infallibile huiusmodi necessitatis, unde Apostolus Ad Hebraeos 6 dicit sic:a abundantius volens Deus ostendere haeredibus pollicitationis suae immobilitatem consilii interposuit iusiurandum ut per duas res immobiles, quibus impossibile est mentiri Deum, fortissimum solacium habeamus. Ubi glossa:b si homini mendaci creditur per iuramentum, quanto magis Deo credi quis debet, qui mentiri non potest? Et dicit “abundantius,” quia abundantius ostendebat per promissionem immobilitatem consilii sui. Sed abundantius per iuramentum interposuit ut per duas res immobiles fortissimum habeamus solacium. Ex quibus patet quod iuramentum vel promissio non solum deserviunt sicut flatus venti, immo sicut flatus venti talis, quod est: iuramentum, ligat hominem ut sit fidelis consilii, promissio et iuramentum necessario, id est necessitate ordinata, | arguit firmitatem consilii divini. ⟨Responsio ad sextum argumentum contra⟩ ⟨quintam conclusionem pro opinione auctoris⟩ (Ad V 6) Et sic patet responsio ad sextum argumentum contra quintam conclusionem quod flatus venti, qui est promissio Dei, facit necessitatem non in Deo sed in re ut eveniat. Unde Gregorius XVI Moralium capitulo 15c exponens illud Iob: non potest advertere cogitationem eius, semel—inquit Gregorius—fixa iudicia nequaquam mutari possunt. Unde scriptum est: Praeceptum posuit et non praeteribit; et rursum: Coelum et terra transibunt, verba autem mea non transibunt, Lucae 21.dEt rursum—dicit Gregorius—non enim cogitationes meae ut cogitationes vestrae. Unde glossa Lucae 21 ubi prius:e 1 est1] om. A ‖ et … sic] ut si AG ‖ ut] om. B ‖ prima] scilicet deus add. K 2 quae] sic AG ‖ quae … actus] pro actu K ‖ voluntatis] divinae add. B 3 unde] ut AK 4 suae] se A suam K ‖ immobilitatem] et add. G mobilitatem K 5 iusiurandum] mensuras A mensurandum G in marg. K (mensurandum del. in textu in K) 6 solacium] solicium (!) G ‖ si] sed AG 7 credi] credere B ‖ quis debet] inv. K 8 per] om. A 9 iuramentum] immobilitatem add. A 10–11 solacium … non] om. (hom.) G 11 quod] per A ‖ vel] et B ‖ solum] solam G ‖ deserviunt] primo add. in marg. al. manu B serviunt K 12 immo … venti2] om. (hom.) B 13 consilii] consiliis BGK ‖ id est] om. K 17 quintam] om. A hanc B 19 unde] om. BG ‖ XVI] 76 G 20 advertere] augere A 21 iudicia] me … a lect. dubia A in ea B om. G 22 posuit] om. A ‖ praeteribit] etc G 22–23 verba … transibunt] et B etc G 23 transibunt] transiissent K 23–24 et … 21] om. (hom.) A 24 prius] primum G

a Hbr 6:17–18.

b Petrus Lombardus, In epist. ad Hebr., cap. 6 (PL 192, 446A). c Gregorius Magnus, Moralia in Iob, lib. XVI, par. 37, p. 826. d Lc 21:33. e Gregorius Magnus, Moralia in Iob, lib. XVI, par. 36, p. 825: “In sinu etenim cordis uerba oris eius abscondimus, quando mandata illius non transitorie, sed implenda opere audimus.”

5

10

15

20

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

201

verba mea absque dubio sunt implenda. Patet ergo quod verbum non solum intrinsecum sed extrinsecum sit implendum. ⟨Responsio ad tertiam conclusionem pro opinione auctoris⟩ Ad tertiam respondetur ut supra in praecedenti columna. 5

10

15

20

⟨Responsio ad argumenta contra⟩ ⟨quintam conclusionem pro opinione auctoris⟩ Iam respondendum est ad argumenta principalia contra quintam conclusionem. (Ad V 1) Ad primum conceditur quod non est necessitas in eloquio prophetarum de necessitate activa et passiva, quia illa est prima, quae est solus Deus, et sic intellegit glossa ibi allegata.a Sed dico quod ibi est necessitas signi, id est signum necessitatis, non sic quod ante fuerit prophetatum et maneat semper contingens ad utrumlibet, licet ex contingenti fiat necessitas per revelationem, sed quia prius per divinum consilium firmatur intrinsecus et addit signum extrinsecum necessitatis. Et sic conceditur quod revelatio facit necessitatem signi in rebus. (Ad V 2) Ad secundum | dico quod Pater non revelat proprie Filio, quia revelatio est de occulto et ignoto vel minus noto, et sic non oportet quod Pater revelet Filio, quia ab aeterno novit Filius sicut Pater, et revelatio talis, quam habet Filius a Patre, tam clara est quod Filius decipi vel mentiri non potest. Sed propter huiusmodi revelationem non oportet quod sequatur necessitas in re, quia hac revelatione non vult Deus ut iungatur necessitas, sicut vult de revelatione simpliciter absolute facta, ubi intervenit iuramentum vel promissio. 1 verbum … solum] non solum verbum A 4 ut] om. BGK ‖ in … columna] om. B 7 iam] igitur est add. K ‖ est] om. A 10 activa] absoluta add. K ‖ prima … est2] om. (hom.) K 11 dico … ibi2] om. K ‖ est] om. G 12 ante] quam add. in marg. K ‖ fuerit] fuit G ‖ fuerit … et] fuerint prophetata K 13 licet] et BG om. K ‖ necessitas] necessarium B 14 prius … consilium] per divinum consilium prius A 15 extrinsecum] extrinsecis (?) A extra illius BG 17 revelat] revelavit K ‖ proprie] proprio AG 18 de … noto] declaratio ignorati vel minus noti K ‖ noto] loco G 19 revelet] revelavit K ‖ novit] om. G ‖ novit filius] filius cognovit B 20 tam] ta (!) A ‖ vel] et K 20–21 vel … potest] non potest vel mentiri B 22 in … quia] quia in re B ‖ quia] cum add. K ‖ hac revelatione] contra revelationem A 23 intervenit] interveniat K

a Guillelmus Autissiodorensis, Summa aurea II, tract. 7, cap. 1, p. 146. Ibidem, p. 147. Cf. Thomas de Aquino, Super Evangelium Matthaei reportatio, cap. 1, lect. 5, p. 21.

B 46rb

202

A 29vb

G 169va

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

(Ad V 3) Ad tertium, quod est difficilius, dico quod Deus non potest revelare sic absolute de sua potentia ordinata quod Antichristus erit et quod Antichristus erit contingenter ad utrumlibet, quia non decet eum aliquid | revelare quod per liberum arbitrium possit falsifieri, et quod non decet Deum nec convenit sibi, non est possibile per eum fieri nec revelari, sicut patet per Anselmum II Cur Deus homo capitulo 10,a unde Augustinus in Quaestionibus veteris et novae legis,b et allegat Magister I libro distinctione 42 capitulo 1:c omnia “potest Deus, sed non facit nisi quod convenit veritati eius et iustitiae.” Et capitulo 5:d Deus potest omnia facere praeter illa sola quibus eius dignitas laederetur eiusque excellentiae derogaretur; haec ille. Sed multum laederetur eius dignitas, si talia certitudinaliter revelaret, unde mentiri posset. Unde dicit Anselmus I Cur Deus homo capitulo 12:e illud quod dicitur de Deo quod Deus non vult iustum tamen est, non debet sic intellegi quod si Deus vellet quodlibet inconveniens, iustum sit quod ipse velit. Non enim sequitur: si Deus vult mentiri, iustum est mentiri, sed potius Deum illum non esse; haec ille. Et per consequens: si Deus posset illud dicere et asserere, unde alius posset facere quod Deus non esset Deus, si fiat argumentum de revelatione absoluta, et per potentiam Dei absolutam admitto. Et tunc oportet ulterius concedere quod de necessitate ordinata Antichristus erit et quod Antichristus contingenter erit. Et tunc dico quod hoc potest esse per modum illum quo necesse sit quod aliquis generet Antichristum, et de nullo sit necessarium | quod generet Antichristum. Et tunc manifestum est quod 2 absolute] om. A ‖ ordinata] om. G 3 erit … utrumlibet] ad utrumlibet erit contingenter BG contingenter ad utrumlibet erit K 4 quod per] quo BG ‖ per] om. K ‖ falsifieri] glorificari G 5 non … possibile] est impossibile K ‖ per … revelari] om. K ‖ nec2] seu BG 7 veteris … novae] novae et veteris A ‖ I libro] inv. A 8 42] 44 A 9 potest] om. B 10 sola] om. BG ‖ eiusque] eius quia G ‖ excellentiae] excellentia A ‖ derogaretur] derogaret K 11 certitudinaliter revelaret] absolute posset revelare K 12 mentiri … unde2] om. (hom.) G ‖ posset] possit B ‖ unde2] quia ut K ‖ anselmus] augustinus G 13 iustum] coni.; codd. minus ABGK ‖ est] et quod vult iustus add. in marg. K ‖ debet sic] inv. BGK 14 quod1] ut K 15 enim sequitur] esse G ‖ mentiri1] mentitum A ‖ iustum … mentiri2] igitur mentiri iustum est in marg. K ‖ potius] ponit AG hoc ponit B 16 et2] posset illud K 17 alius] om. K ‖ esset] foret B ‖ si] om. G 19 ulterius concedere] inv. A 20 hoc potest] tunc potest hoc K 21 quod aliquis] quamvis A ‖ de nullo] quod deus non sit K 22 generet] eum scilicet add. K

a Anselmus, Cur Deus homo, lib. II, cap. 10, pp. 106–108. b Quaestiones veteris et novi testamenti, q. 97 (opus Ambrosiastri, PL 35, 2291). c Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. I, dist. 42, cap. 1, p. 294. d Recte Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, lib. I, dist. 42, cap. 3, pp. 295–296. e Anselmus, Cur Deus homo, lib. I, cap. 12, p. 70: “Quod autem dicitur quia quod vult iustum est, et quod non vult non est iustum, non ita intelligendum est ut, si deus velit quodlibet inconveniens, iustum sit, quia ipse vult. Non enim sequitur: si deus vult mentiri, iustum esse mentiri; sed potius deum illum non esse.”

5

10

15

20

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

5

10

15

20

25

203

Antichristus erit, et tunc Antichristus contingenter ad utrumlibet erit, quia ille qui generabit, contingenter ad utrumlibet generabit. Et per consequens eius generatio erit contingens ad utrumlibet, igitur eius esse erit contingens ad utrumlibet, et sic ipse contingenter ad utrumlibet erit. Et ulterius, si tu ponas in esse quod Antichristus non erit, quia contingenter erit, conceditur. Sed tunc dico quod illud non fuit revelatum absolute: ‘Antichristus erit’, sicut dixi in argumento facto de beato Petro. Et consimiliter est dicendum: si ponatur quod absolute reveletur de Platone quod peccabit mortaliter, tunc Plato necessitabitur ad peccandum mortaliter, sed non oportet quod ad aliquod mortale necessitetur, sic verisimiliter fuit de Petro, scilicet quod fuit necessitatus ad negandum Christum, ad nullum tamen gradum negationis fuit necessitatus, quia potuit remissius negasse quam negavit, id est cum minori voluntate, id est cum minori fervore, et ita Petrus libere peccavit libertate contradictionis mortaliter illo gradu quo peccavit, quem gradum potuit libere habuisse vel non habuisse. Unde quod Petrus fuit necessitatus ad | peccandum, verisimile est, cum dicat Augustinus De correptione et gratia capitulo 35a quod: avertit ab illo faciem Dominus, et factus est conturbatus, ita ut eum mori metuens ter negaret. Sed haec omnia non solvunt argumentum, quia peccet Socrates A gradu peccati mortalis cras. Tunc Deus scit absolute omnes circumstantias cum quibus Socrates peccabit mortaliter cras, et Deus scit etiam quod Socrates peccabit cras contingenter ad utrumlibet. Revelet igitur Deus de potentia sua absoluta omnes circumstantias peccati mortalis cum quibus cras Socrates peccabit, et quod Socrates peccabit contingenter. Et fiat argumentum primum. Hic dico quod ista repugnant: ‘Deus revelat absolute quod Socrates peccabit cras cum A, B, C circumstantiis praecise’ et ‘quod Socrates peccabit 1 erit1 … antichristus2] om. (hom.) BG 2 qui] om. GK ‖ ad … generabit2] generabit ad utrumlibet B ‖ generabit2] om. K 3–4 igitur … utrumlibet1] sed A et per consequens suum esse K 4 utrumlibet1] sed add. G ‖ contingenter … erit] erit contingenter ad utrumlibet K 6 erit] om. A ‖ conceditur] admittatur K ‖ sed] et K ‖ non] pro nunc G 9 mortaliter1] cras et quod contingenter peccabit mortaliter add. A 10 verisimiliter] verisimile BG ‖ verisimiliter fuit] mihi verisimile videtur fuisse K 11 necessitatus] necessitas G 11–12 ad1 … necessitatus] om. (hom.) B 12 negationis] necessitationis G 13 id est2] et BK om. G 15 quem gradum] quia gradus A 16 fuit] fuerit A ‖ peccandum] mortaliter add. K 17 correptione] coni.; codd. concordia ABGK 18 eum] ei A ‖ ter] coni.; codd. etiam ABGK 20 scit] sit A ‖ scit absolute] inv. G 21 scit] sit A 22 utrumlibet] cras add. BG 23 peccati mortalis] om. BGK ‖ cras] om. BG 23–24 cras … peccabit1] socrates peccabit cras K 25 primum] ut prius B prius G 26 revelat] revelabit BG

a Augustinus, De correptione et gratia (PL 44, 931).

K 58r

204

B 46va

G 169vb

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

contingenter contingentia ad utrumlibet’, quia, ut dixi, sequitur: Deus revelat quod Socrates peccabit cras cum A, B, C circumstantiis, igitur | necessitate ordinata peccabit Socrates cras cum eisdem circumstantiis, et per consequens non contingenter ad utrumlibet. Unde concedo quod Deus absolute novit de potentia sua absoluta et ordinata, et tamen de nulla sua, ordinata vel absoluta, potest illud absolute revelare, sed hoc posset ipse revelare condicionaliter. Et tunc satis faciliter solvitur argumentum, ut patet per prius dicta. (Ad V 4) Ad quartum dico, sicut iam ulterius dixi, quod Deus non potest de potentia sua absoluta revelare quodlibet quod novit absolute, tamen potest aliquod futurum contingens revelare, sed ipsum non manebit contingens. Et ideo ut arguitur in quarto argumento: futurum contingens debet manere contingens ad utrumlibet postquam fuerit revelatum, tunc solum revelabitur condicionaliter, et tunc dico quod condicio erit contingens. Et ulterius est quod reveletur condicionaliter vel non reveletur condicionaliter. Et sic: si reveletur absolute, non manebit post revelationem contingens. Si condicionaliter reveletur, propter condicionem possibile est, et sic in infinitum est possibile. Et sic concedo quod per huiusmodi revelationes infinitas numquam sic erit certum quod non poterit aliter evenire, erit tamen certum quod non aliter eveniet, nec adhuc erit certum nisi quando exstat condicio, et ita tunc virtute revelationis erit illud non contingens quod ante fuit contingens postquam condicio exstat. (Ad V 5) Ad quintum dico quod si reveletur quod tantum Socrates de numero illorum damnabitur, et sit reve|latio condicionalis, talis potest esse condicio adiecta in revelatione quod aequaliter revelaretur de Platone quod damnabitur cum Socrate. Tunc sic concedo quod simul poterunt revelari: 1–2 revelat] revelabit BG revelavit K 2 cras] om. K 3 socrates cras] inv. A 4–5 absolute novit] inv. A 5 absoluta … ordinata1] ordinata et absoluta BK 5–6 nulla … absoluta] potentia sua ordinata vel absoluta non K 6 absoluta] potentia add. B ‖ sed] manifeste contingentia rei licet K ‖ hoc … ipse] posset BG posset illud K 7 satis] om. A ‖ ut … prius] per iam A 9 iam] om. A ‖ ulterius] ultimo K 11 futurum … revelare] contingens futurum K 12 ideo … arguitur] non ideo G ‖ ut … argumento] concedo quod B ‖ contingens] si add. K 13 postquam] priusquam G ‖ revelatum] sed add. B 14 ulterius] contingens add. K 15 est] esto B ‖ condicionaliter2] om. ABG ‖ sic] sit B om. K 16 manebit] remanebit B ‖ post revelationem] primum revelatum K 17 propter condicionem] condicio A condicionis G condicione contradictionis K ‖ est] om. K 18 est possibile] inv. K ‖ per] om. AG propter B ‖ revelationes] revelationem AG 19 sic … certum1] erit certus sic K ‖ certum2] certus K 20 nec] nisi G ‖ adhuc] de hoc add. K ‖ erit] est BG ‖ certum] certus K 21 erit illud] inv. BG ‖ quod ante] ante quod autem G ‖ ante] om. B ‖ fuit] fit B ‖ contingens2] condicio G 24 sit revelatio] sic reveletur BG ‖ esse] adiectio condicionis vel add. K 25 adiecta] altera G 26 cum socrate] om. A ‖ cum … tunc] tantum plato B plato G ‖ tunc sic] et K ‖ poterunt] poterit B

5

10

15

20

25

Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum

5

10

205

tantum Socrates de numero illorum damnabitur et tantum Plato de numero illorum damnabitur, quia variae condiciones adiectae sive intellectae cum uno revelato stant cum altero revelato sub aliis condicionibus ut posito quod Socrates et Plato sint in gratia, et reveletur Socrati quod tantum Socrates de numero illorum damnabitur, et tantum Plato moriatur in gratia, et ex alia parte tantum Plato de numero illorum damnabitur, sed tantum Socrates de numero illorum moriatur in gratia. Et quando quaeritur ad quid valerent huiusmodi revelationes, quae nullam notitiam vel certitudinem declarant, omnino cum sint propositiones hypotheticae per quas, ut dicit Averroes II Physicorum,a nihil declaratur, dico quod valent ad declarationem legis, admissionem timoris ad peccandum.

1–2 et … damnabitur] om. (hom.) K 1 tantum2] tamen A cum G 2 variae] adiectiones sive add. K ‖ sive] sub AK sunt G 3 uno] om. AGK ‖ ut] et A 4 quod … socrates2] om. (hom.) G 5 moriatur] morietur BG 6 sed] si BK 7 moriatur] morietur K ‖ quaeritur] om. G 7–8 valerent] valuerint A 8 notitiam … certitudinem] certitudinem vel ignotum K 9 omnino] dico quod K 10 declaratur] determinatur A ‖ quod valent] om. G 11 admissionem] et ad dimissionem B et dimissionem G incussionem K ‖ timoris] amoris B

a Averroes, In Physicam, lib. II, comm. 3, fol. 27vb.

Index Nominum Adam Wodeham 18, 18n64, 22 Alexander of Hales 14, 98, 105, 134, 161, 165 Alphonse Vargas 88 Anselm of Canterbury 9n31, 12, 14–16, 22, 22n81, 25, 26, 26n98, 26n100, 33, 33n125, 37n136, 41, 41n145, 45, 45n161, 47, 48, 48n172, 48n178, 49, 49n179, 75n278, 76, 84, 85, 105, 106, 121, 124, 125, 129, 134, 136, 139, 149, 160, 164–166, 172, 184, 190, 192, 202 Aristotle 12, 14–16, 29n113, 41, 105, 106, 121, 148, 164, 176, 184 Augustin 1, 13–16, 18, 18n63, 27, 27n103, 35, 35n131, 36, 36n134, 47, 47n170, 47n171, 48, 48n174, 49, 51, 60, 64, 74n274, 84, 97, 98, 103, 106, 107, 123, 127, 128, 130– 147, 149, 151, 153–157, 159, 160, 162–168, 174, 177–179, 181, 186–188, 192–195, 202, 203 Averroes 9n32, 15, 16, 17n58, 21, 21n78, 21n79, 107, 108, 175, 176, 205 Avicenna 15, 16, 108, 161 Bakker, P.J.J.M. 4n9, 10, 11, 11n36, 25n97 Balić, P.C. 41n147, 109 Bernard Ps 15, 110, 143 Bodewig, M. 109 Boethius 1, 15, 16, 22, 33, 85, 108, 165, 179, 180, 182 Brown, S. 46n162 Bušelić, S. 109 Čapkun-Delić, P. 109 Cassiodorus 15, 108, 196 Courtenay, W.J. 3n8, 10, 10n35, 14, 14n55 Cyprian 15, 108, 131 Dekker, E. 69n259 Den Bok, N.W. 69n259 Di Liscia, D. 4n9, 25n97 Edghill, E.M. 29n113 Evans, G.R. 5n13, 11n36, 107 Fedriga, R. 45n159

Gál, G. 18n64, 46n162 Gratian 15, 16, 33, 60, 97, 108, 127 Gregory IX (pope) 109, 127 Gregory Rimini 18 Genest, J.-F. 5, 5n13, 5n14, 6, 6n20, 7, 7n24, 8, 8n25, 8n26, 19n66, 20, 20n72, 22, 22n81, 22n83, 22n84, 33n123, 34n126, 85, 112 Gensler, M. 18n62 Geoffrey Chaucer 1, 2, 2n3 Gregory the Great 14–16, 109, 146–148, 180, 200 Hechich, B. 109 Henry of Ghent 15, 17, 52, 53, 76, 80, 110, 150, 160, 199 Hieronymus 16, 193 Hogarth Rossiter, S. 1, 1n1, 1n2, 2, 2n4, 6, 6n20, 7n21, 7n22, 8n26, 8n27, 8n28, 9n29, 9n30, 9n31, 9n32, 9n34, 19, 19n66, 19n67, 20, 20n73, 21n77, 22, 22n81, 23, 23n84, 23n85, 23n86, 23n88, 24, 24n89, 25n93, 25n94, 26n100, 28n107, 29n113, 31n117, 32, 32n122, 40n141, 85 Hopkins, J. 41n145 Huculak, B. 109 Hugh of Saint Victor 15, 110, 175, 183 Isidor of Seville 15, 103, 110, 138, 141, 146, 166 Joachim of Fiore 110, 148, 152 John Duns Scotus 1, 14, 15, 17, 22, 31, 41, 41n147, 42, 42n148, 42n149, 43, 43n153, 44, 44n155, 45, 52, 52n191, 53, 53n196, 53n197, 54, 54n198, 57, 58, 58n213, 58n214, 59–61, 61n227, 61n228, 62, 67, 67n252, 69, 69n259, 70, 71, 71n261, 72, 72n266, 72n267, 76, 76n282, 77, 85, 107, 109, 121, 122, 130, 139, 148, 151, 161, 164, 167, 169, 176, 178, 183, 184, 190, 193, 199 John of Damascus 15, 110, 129, 147 John of Mirecourt 88 John of Rodington 89 Jung, E. 3, 3n9, 4, 4n10, 4n11, 4n12, 6n18, 6n19, 11n38, 31n119, 45n159, 46n163

index nominum Jurić, I. 109 Kitanov, S. 5, 5n15, 5n16, 5n17 Korošak, B. 109 Koszkało, M. 52, 52n191, 53n194, 58, 58n215 Kretzmann, N. 3n8 Lagerlund, H. 34n128 Lahey, S.E. 34, 34n128 Leff, G. 22n84 Looman-Graanskamp, A.H. 69n259 Lukács, E.A. 25n97 Maier, A. 3, 3n8 Maierù, A. 3n8 Mansfeld, M. 18n62 McKeon, R. 29n113 Michałowska, M. 4n11, 6n18, 11n37, 11n39, 11n40, 17n57, 17n58, 18n59, 31n119, 45n159, 87, 87n1, 88n3, 92, 92n1, 93n2, 94, 95, 95n16, 95n17, 96n21, 111 Modrić, L. 109 Monachus Niger 17, 89 Murdoch, J.E. 45n157 Nanni, S. 109 Nicholas of Autrecourt 88 Obermann, H. 22n84 Olszewski, M. 20n72 Origen of Alexandria 15, 110, 158, 159 Paravicini Bagliani, A. 3n8 Pelagius 136, 137, 151 Percan, J. 109 Peter Lombard 4, 10, 14–16, 68, 85, 92, 110, 122, 123, 125–131, 134, 135, 138, 140, 142, 143, 145, 146, 152, 153, 156, 158, 161–163, 165, 167, 168, 174, 175, 177, 184–189, 191, 192, 196–198, 200, 202 Peter Auriol 16 Pica, G. 109 Podkoński, R. 5n18, 6n18, 6n19, 11n38 Prosper of Aquitaine 15, 188 Reinhold, I. 109 Richard FitzRalph 18, 18n63 Richard Kilvington 1–3, 3n5, 3n6, 3n7, 4, 5, 5n18, 6, 8, 10, 11, 11n37, 11n38, 11n40,

207 12, 12n41, 12n42, 12n43, 12n44, 12n45, 12n46, 13, 13n47, 13n48, 13n49, 13n50, 13n51, 13n52, 13n53, 13n54, 14–18, 22, 24, 40, 41, 41n144, 41n146, 42, 42n149, 42n150, 42n151, 43, 43n152, 43n154, 44, 44n156, 45, 45n158, 45n159, 45n160, 45n161, 46, 46n164, 46n165, 46n166, 47, 47n167, 47n168, 47n169, 48, 48n172, 48n173, 48n174, 48n175, 48n176, 48n177, 49, 49n179, 49n180, 49n181, 49n182, 50, 50n183, 50n184, 51, 51n185, 51n188, 52, 52n189, 52n192, 52n193, 53, 53n195, 53n197, 54, 54n199, 55, 55n200, 55n201, 55n202, 55n203, 55n204, 55n205, 56n206, 56n207, 56n208, 56n209, 56n210, 56n211, 57, 57n212, 58, 58n214, 59, 59n216, 59n217, 59n218, 59n219, 60, 60n223, 60n224, 60n225, 60n226, 61, 61n228, 62, 62n229, 62n230, 62n231, 62n232, 62n233, 63, 63n234, 63n235, 63n236, 63n237, 63n238, 63n239, 64, 64n240, 64n241, 65, 65n244, 65n245, 66, 66n248, 66n250, 67, 67n251, 67n253, 68, 68n256, 68n257, 69, 69n258, 69n260, 70–72, 72n262, 72n263, 72n264, 72n265, 72n267, 73, 73n269, 73n270, 74, 74n272, 74n273, 74n274, 75, 75n276, 75n277, 75n278, 75n279, 76, 76n280, 76n281, 76n283, 77, 77n285, 78, 78n287, 78n288, 78n289, 79, 79n290, 79n291, 79n292, 80, 80n293, 80n294, 80n296, 81, 81n297, 81n299, 81n300, 82, 82n301, 83, 83n303, 83n305, 83n306, 83n307, 84, 84n309, 84n310, 85–92, 95–98, 100–102, 104, 111, 134, 188, 194 Richardson, H. 41n145 Robert Halifax 88, 89 Robert Holcot 22, 88, 89 Rowan, J.P. 41n143 Ruiz de Loizaga, S. 109 Salamon, W. 109 Schabel, Ch. 5, 5n15, 5n16, 5n17, 10, 11, 11n36, 16, 16n56, 18n65, 23, 23n87, 94n14 Schäfer, O 109 Schaff, P. 47n170 Schmitt, F.S. 9n31, 105, 106

208 Simpson, P.L.P. 42n148, 43n153, 44n155, 53n196, 54n198, 58n213, 61n227, 67n252 Speer, A. 31n119 Stefańczyk, A.P. 46n163 Sylla, E.D. 4n9, 25n97, 45n157 Tachau, K. 5n13, 8, 8n25 Taifacos, I. 16n56 Thomas Aquinas 15, 17, 41, 41n143, 111, 132, 159, 164, 195–199, 201 Thomas Bradwardine 1, 2, 2n3, 3, 3n5, 3n7, 4, 4n10, 5, 5n13, 6, 7, 7n23, 8, 8n26, 8n27, 8n28, 9, 9n29, 9n30, 9n31, 9n32, 9n33, 9n34, 10, 13–19, 19n66, 19n68, 20, 20n69, 20n70, 21, 21n74, 21n75, 21n76, 21n77, 22, 22n80, 22n81, 22n82, 22n84, 23, 23n85, 23n86, 24, 24n90, 24n91, 24n92, 25, 25n94, 25n95, 25n96, 25n97, 26, 26n98, 26n99, 26n100, 26n101, 27, 27n102, 27n103, 27n104, 27n105, 27n106, 28, 28n107, 28n108, 28n109, 29n110, 29n111, 29n112, 29n113, 30, 30n114, 30n115, 30n116, 31, 31n117, 31n120, 32,

index nominum 32n121, 32n123, 33, 33n124, 33n125, 34, 34n126, 34n127, 35, 35n129, 35n130, 35n131, 36, 36n132, 36n133, 36n134, 37, 37n135, 37n136, 38n137, 39, 39n138, 39n139, 39n140, 40, 40n141, 49, 49n182, 50–52, 60, 64, 64n242, 64n243, 65, 66, 66n248, 68, 73, 74n272, 77, 81–86, 88, 89, 95, 111, 138, 141, 144, 167, 171, 184 Thomas Buckingham 22, 88, 89 Veldhuis, H. 69n259 Vos, A. 69n259, 71, 72n266, 76n282 Vrba, K.F. 47n170, 106, 107 Walter Burley 18 William of Auxerre 15, 109, 195, 201 William Ockham 16, 22–24, 31, 45, 46, 46n162, 85, 89, 109, 121 Wirmer, D. 31n119 Wood, R. 18n64 Zalta, E.N. 45n159 Zycha, J. 47n170, 106, 107

Index Locorum Adam Wodeham Lectura secunda Distinctio I, q. 6. 4 Distinctio II, q. 2. 5 Distinctio III, q. 5. 2 Prologus q. 3. 3

18n64 18n64 18n64 18n64

Alexander Halensis Sententiae I dist. 38 165 Sententiae II dist. 35 134 dist. 37 161 Sententiae III dist. 35 165 Summa theologica I pars. 1, tract. 5 q. unica, cap. 4 165 Summa theologica IIa–IIae tract. 1, q. 3, cap. 1 161 tract. 8, q. unica, cap. 4 165 Anselmus Cur Deus homo lib. I, cap. 2 lib. I, cap. 12 lib. II, cap. 10 lib. II, cap. 17 De casu diaboli cap. 1 cap. 4 De concordia q. 1, cap. 2 q. 1, cap. 3 q. 1, cap. 5 q. 1, cap. 7 q. 2, cap. 2 q. 3, cap. 6 De libertate arbitrii cap. 7

172 202 202 160, 164, 192 149 139 164 125, 129 165, 166 121, 134 134, 136 184 124

Aristoteles Categoriae Ethica Nicomachea lib. II, cap. 6 lib. VI, cap. 3 Metaphysica Physica lib. II, cap. 3

41 121 164, 184 15 148

Auctoritates Aristotelis opus: 1 (Metaphysica V) opus: 12 (Ethica VI)

148 164

Augustinus Ps. De spiritu et anima cap. 17

127

Augustinus Confessionum libri tredecim lib. VI, cap. 11 132 lib. X, cap. 31 132 lib. XII, cap. 15 192 Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum lib. I, cap. 3 137 lib. I, cap. 19 137 lib. IV, cap. 6 137 Contra Iulianum opus imperfectum lib. V, par. 28 153 lib. V, par. 38 153 lib. V, par. 47 153 lib. VI, par. 17 153 De civitate Dei lib. V, cap. 9 135 lib. XI, cap. 7 163 lib. XI, cap. 12 164 lib. XII, cap. 1 147 lib. XII, cap. 4 147 lib. XII, cap. 5 147 lib. XII, cap. 6 147, 194 lib. XIII, cap. 15 141 lib. XIV, cap. 13 146, 147 lib. XV, cap. 25 166 lib. XVII, cap. 18 166 lib. XXII, cap. 2 168 lib. XXII, cap. 2–3 165

210 De correptione et gratia 14, 98, 103, 106, 132, 139–143, 146, 154, 162, 165, 166, 168, 177, 181, 203 De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII q. 3 144 q. 4 145 q. 14 164 q. 28 131 q. 53 164 De doctrina christiana lib. I, cap. 2 134 De dono perseverantiae 14, 16, 35, 36, 101, 103, 106, 132, 138, 143, 145, 154, 165 De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim lib. IV, par. 35 163 lib. IX, par. 15 123 lib. VI, par. 17 163, 165, 179 lib. XI, par. 17 143 De Genesi contra Manichaeos lib. I 156 De gratia et libero arbitrio lib. I, cap 16 167 lib. III, cap. 3 160 lib. III, cap. 9 143 lib. III, cap. 18 149 lib. III, cap. 23 157 De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus Manichaeorum lib. II, cap. 8 147 De natura boni 14, 107, 135 De natura et gratia cap. 65 168 De perfectione iustitiae hominis cap. 2 47n171, 133, 147 De praedestinatione sanctorum 15, 48n174, 97, 103, 107, 130–132, 138, 140, 151, 154–157 De Trinitate libri XV lib. VII, cap. 1 187 lib. XIII, cap. 12 168 lib. XV, cap. 5 186, 187 lib. XV, cap. 7 187 lib. XV, cap. 13 186–188 Enarrationes in Psalmos ps. 49, par. 18 192 ps. 78, par. 12 128

index locorum Enchiridion de fide, spe et caritate cap. III, 9 123 cap. IX, 29 165 Epistulae epist. 157, par. 17 132 epist. 214, par. 3 132 Retractationum libri II I, cap. 9.1 142 I, cap. 22 140 Sermones sermo 169 128 Averroes In Physicam lib. II, comm. 3 205 lib. VI, comm. 32 176 Paraphrasis in De divisione per somnum 21n78 Avicenna Liber de philosophia prima tract. 6, cap. 5 161 Bernard Ps. Meditationes piissimae 15, 110, 143 Biblia Sacra vulgatae editionis Act 10:34 144, 155 Apc 3:20 137 Col 3:25 144 Ecl 15:14 129 Eph 5:14 127 Hbr 6:17–18 200 I Io 2:19 199 I Par 28:9 126, 136 I Cor 4:7 130 Iac 1:17 131, 160 2:5 157 2:9 157

211

index locorum II Par 19:7 Io 6:44 6:66 10:25 10:38 15:16 Iob 14:5 36:23 Is 10:5 26:12 IV Reg 3:6 Lc 1:52 21:33 Mc 16:20 Mt 7:7 28:20 Phil 2:13 Ps 29:8 35:13 36:24 49:11 103:29 140:4 Rm 1:24 7:18 9:18 Za 1:3

144 132 137 191 191 181 165 144 161 132 160 157 200 129 137 164 126 139 138, 145 138, 146 192 139 167 138, 145 126 126 127

Boethius De consolatione philosophiae lib. V, prosa 6, par. 1–48 165, 182 lib. V, prosa 6, par. 31 179, 180

Cassiodorus Expositio psalmorum praef., cap. 1

196

Cyprianus Ad Quirinum lib. III, cap. 4

131

Decretum magistri Gratiani par. 1, dist. 43 127 par. 2, causa 22, q. 1 168 par. 2, causa 23, q. 4 167, 168, 179, 185, 197 par. 2, causa 36, q. 2 136 par. 2,33,3 (De paenitentia), dist. 1 127, 137 par. 2,33,3 (De paenitentia), dist. 2 165, 168, 182 par. 2,33,3 (De paenitentia), dist. 3 135 par. 2,33,3 (De paenitentia), dist. 4 97, 140, 198, 199 Duns Scotus Lectura I dist. 8, q. unica dist. 39, q. 3 dist. 39, q. 5 Ordinatio I dist. 8, q. 3 dist. 8, q. unica dist. 17, par. 1, q. 1 dist. 17, par. 1, q. 2

161 190 176, 178, 183, 184

161 161 130 41, 41n147, 42, 42n148, 43n153, 44n155, 122 dist. 38 pars 2 et dist. 39, qq. 1–5 178, 183, 184 dist. 40, q. unica 52n191, 54, 54n198, 67, 67n252, 167, 199 dist. 41, q. unica 53, 53n196, 54, 151 dist. 44, q. unica 61, 61n227, 62, 169 Ordinatio IV dist. 1, par. 4 Incidentalis, q. 1 58, 58n213, 139, 148, 193 dist. 1, q. 1 164 Glossa ordinaria In Apocalypsis cap. 3

137

212

index locorum

In Matthaeum, Nicolaus de Lyra comm. cap. 13 137 In Matthaeum cap. 7 137 In Psalmos ps. 35 138, 145 In Romanos cap. 1 138 Gregorius ix Decretales, De vita et honestate clericorum lib. III, titl. 1, cap. IX 127 Gregorius Magnus Moralia in Iob lib. II, par. 52 lib. V, par. 40 lib. XVI, par. 10 lib. XVI, par. 25 lib. XVI, par. 36 lib. XVI, par. 37

147 146 180 148 200 200

Guillelmus Autissiodorensis Summa aurea II tract. 7, cap. 1 195, 201 Guillelmus de Ockham De connexione virtutum q. VII, art. 1 121 Ordinatio I dist. 1, q. 2 46n162 Henricus de Gandavo Quodlibet IV, q. 19 167, 199 V, q. 4 110, 160 VIII, q. 5 110, 150 Hugo de Sancto Victore De sacramentis christianae fidei lib. II, pars. 14, cap. 6 175 Hypognosticon lib. IV (Contra quartum dogma Pelagianorum) 139, 149

Ioachim Abbas Florensis Dialogi de praescientia Dei et praedestinatione electorum lib. I 148, 152 Ioannes Damascenus De fide orthodoxa cap. 40 cap. 42 cap. 43

129 129 147

Isidorus Sententiae lib. I, cap. 1, sent. 2 lib. I, cap. 18, sent. 7 lib. II, cap. 6, sent. 1 lib. II, cap. 6, sent. 4

141 166 141 138, 146

Origenes In Epistulam Pauli ad Romanos explanationum libri lib. VII, cap. 6 158 Petrus Lombardus In epist. ad Hebr. cap. 6 200 In epist. ad Philipp. cap. 3 128 In epist. ad Rom. cap. 1 138, 145 cap. 3 129 cap. 5 138, 145 cap. 7 126 cap. 9 126 In Psalmos, praef. ps. 59 198 ps. 94 146 ps. 140 167 Sententiae lib. I, dist. 1, cap. 1 134 lib. I, dist. 3, cap. 1 191 lib. I, dist. 3, cap. 2 174 lib. I, dist. 4, cap. 2 123 lib. I, dist. 8, cap. 1 184 lib. I, dist. 29, cap. 2 135 lib. I, dist. 32, cap. 1–2 189 lib. I, dist. 32, cap. 2 175, 187 lib. I, dist. 32, cap. 6 189

213

index locorum Sententiae (cont.) lib. I, dist. 35, cap. 9 192 lib. I, dist. 36, cap. 3 135 lib. I, dist. 38, cap. 1 158, 161, 175, 185, 186, 188 lib. I, dist. 38, cap. 2 177 lib. I, dist. 40, cap. 1 165 lib. I, dist. 40, cap. 1–3 167 lib. I, dist. 41, cap. 2 130, 140, 142 lib. I, dist. 41, cap. 3 130 lib. I, dist. 42, cap. 1 202 lib. I, dist. 42, cap. 3 202 lib. I, dist. 45, cap. 4 123, 131, 152, 156, 162 lib. I, dist. 45, cap. 5 152 lib. I, dist. 46, cap. 6 146 lib. I, dist. 46, cap. 7 145 lib. II, dist. 5, cap. 1 142 lib. II, dist. 17, cap. 3 163 lib. II, dist. 18, cap. 1 123 lib. II, dist. 18, cap. 6 123 lib. II, dist. 24, cap. 1 143 lib. II, dist. 25, cap. 9 126 lib. II, dist. 26, cap. 1 131 lib. II, dist. 27, cap. 4 131 lib. II, dist. 27, cap. 7 125 lib. II, dist. 28, cap. 1–4 130 lib. II, dist. 30, cap. 7 153 lib. II, dist. 37, cap. 2 134 lib. III, dist. 11, cap. 1 122 lib. III, dist. 20, cap. 2 168 lib. III, dist. 31, cap. 3 162 lib. IV, dist. 18, cap. 4 127 Prosper Aquitanus Liber sententiarum cap. 383

188

Quaestiones veteris et novi testamenti q. 97 202

Ricardus FitzRalph Lectura in Sententias q. 1, art. 3

18n63

Ricardus Kilvington Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum q. IV 188 Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum q. 3 111, 194 q. 5 111, 134 Thomas Bradvardinus De futuris contingentibus 2, 5, 5n14, 6n20, 7n24, 8n26, 16, 20n72, 22n81, 33n123, 34n126, 111, 138, 167, 184 Thomas de Aquino Catena aurea in Matthaeum cap. 1, lect. 13 197, 198 In I Sententiarum dist. 40, q. 3, art. 1, resp. ad arg. 2 199 dist. 42, q. 2, art. 2, arg. 3 164 In Metaphysicam lib. 5, lect. 14 41n143 Quaestiones disputatae de veritate q. 2. art. 14 159 q. 12, art. 12 196 Summa contra Gentiles lib. III, cap. 67, pericopa: 7 132 lib. III, cap. 89, pericopa: 3 132 Summae theologiae IIa–IIae q. 174, art. 1, arg. 1 197, 198 Super Evangelium Iohannis reportatio cap. 3, lect. 3 132 cap. 5, lect. 2 132 cap. 13, lect. 3 199 Super Evangelium Matthaei reportatio cap. 1, lect. 5 195, 201