Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik / Annual Review of Law and Ethics: Bd. 26 (2018). Themenschwerpunkt: Recht und Ethik des Kopierens – Law and Ethics of Copying [1 ed.] 9783428555444, 9783428155446

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Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik Annual Review of Law and Ethics Band 26 (2018) Herausgegeben von Jan C. Joerden

Duncker & Humblot · Berlin

Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik Annual Review of Law and Ethics Band 26

Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik Annual Review of Law and Ethics Im Jahre 1993 begründet von B. Sharon Byrd †, Joachim Hruschka † und Jan C. Joerden

Herausgegeben von J a n C. J o e r d e n

Band 26

Duncker & Humblot  · Berlin

Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik Annual Review of Law and Ethics Band 26 (2018) Herausgegeben von Jan C. Joerden Themenschwerpunkt:

Recht und Ethik des Kopierens – Law and Ethics of Copying Mitherausgegeben von Reinold Schmücker Eberhard Ortland

Duncker & Humblot  · Berlin

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.d-nb.de abrufbar.

Empfohlene Abkürzung: JRE Recommended Abbreviation: JRE Alle Rechte, auch die des auszugsweisen Nachdrucks, der fotomechanischen Wiedergabe und der Übersetzung, für sämtliche Beiträge vorbehalten © 2018 Duncker & Humblot GmbH, Berlin Druck: Das Druckteam Berlin Printed in Germany ISSN 0944 – 4610

ISBN 978-3-428-15544-6 (Print) ISBN 978-3-428-55544-4 (E-Book) ISBN 978-3-428-85544-5 (Print & E-Book) Gedruckt auf alterungsbeständigem (säurefreiem) Papier entsprechend ISO 9706 Internet: http://www.duncker-humblot.de

Vorwort Am 10. Dezember 2017 ist mein akademischer Lehrer, Joachim Hruschka, ­ rdinarius für Strafrecht, Strafprozessrecht und Rechtsphilosophie an der FriedO rich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg im Alter von 82 Jahren verstorben. An seinen Lebenslauf und sein Werk erinnert ein zu Beginn dieses Jahres in der JuristenZeitung erschienener Nachruf.1 Joachim Hruschka war einer der Mitbegründer des Jahrbuchs für Recht und Ethik und bis zu seinem Tode auch dessen Mitherausgeber. Herausgeber und Mitarbeiter/innen werden ihm ein ehrendes Angedenken bewahren. — Der Themenschwerpunkt dieses Jahrbuch-Bandes ist dem Thema „Recht und Ethik des Kopierens – Law and Ethics of Copying“ gewidmet. Der Initiator dieses Projekts, Reinold Schmücker, Professor für Philosophie am Philosophischen Seminar der Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität Münster, führt gemeinsam mit seinem Mitarbeiter Eberhard Ortland in diesen neuen Forschungsbereich und die einzelnen Beiträge dazu am Beginn von Teil A. des Jahrbuchs ein. Erarbeitet wurden diese Beiträge im Rahmen einer von Schmücker in den Jahren 2015/16 geleiteten Forschungsgruppe am Zentrum für interdisziplinäre Forschung (ZiF) der Universität Bielefeld. Im Teil B. des Jahrbuchs werden Fragen aus durchaus heterogenen Themenbereichen erörtert, die aber alle das Spannungsverhältnis zwischen Recht und Ethik beleuchten, und zwar im Hinblick auf das ius puniendi im Völkerstrafrecht; die Problematik des Flüchtlingsschutzes; den Factumbegriff in Kants praktischer Philosophie; das Recht des Whistleblowing; die Schwierigkeiten neuer Verfahren der Pränataldiagnostik; und schließlich den moralischen Status genetisch veränderter Pflanzen. Abgeschlossen wird das Jahrbuch mit der Rezension einer Arbeit zur Begründung von Recht und Staat und zum Widerstandsproblem bei Kant. Für ihre Mitwirkung bei der Herstellung der Druckvorlagen für diesen Band und bei der sorgfältigen Anfertigung der Register danke ich herzlich den Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeitern des Lehrstuhls für Strafrecht und Rechtsphilosophie an der Europa-Universität Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), insbesondere Florina M. Polutta, Carola Uhlig, Susen Pönitzsch, Monique Vollbrecht, Monika Molencka und Dr. Jo­ hannes Bochmann. Für die stets zuverlässige technische Betreuung der Drucklegung im Verlag Duncker & Humblot danke ich einmal mehr Frau Susanne Werner.   Joerden, Nachruf – Joachim Hruschka (1935 – 2017), JuristenZeitung 73 (2018), 201 f.

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Vorwort

Die Internet-Seiten des Jahrbuchs für Recht und Ethik finden Sie wie üblich unter folgender Adresse: http://www.rewi.europa-uni.de/de/lehrstuhl/sr/ intstrafrecht/_projekte/jre/index.html Dort sind auch weitere Informationen zum Jahrbuch erhältlich – insbesondere die englische bzw. deutsche Zusammenfassung der Artikel und Bestellinforma­ tionen. Jan C. Joerden

Inhaltsverzeichnis – Table of Contents A. Recht und Ethik des Kopierens – Law and Ethics of Copying Reinold Schmücker / Eberhard Ortland:Law and Ethics of Copying – Introduction . . . . . 3 Martin Hoffmann:Why There Is an Ethics of Copying. Methodological Considerations . 11 Andreas Bruns: W  hat is Wrong with Copying from Other Cultures? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Thomas Dreier:The Ethics of Citations and Partial Copying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Reinold Schmücker:What is Wrong with Non-substitutional Copying? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Antonia Putzger:The Legitimacy of Substitute Copies in the Visual Arts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 Susan J. Douglas:On Museum Copies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 Grischka Petri: La propriété, c’est le vol?Reproducing Art at the Museum . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 Eberhard Ortland:A Moral Need for Censorship, Access Restrictions, and Surveillance? The Ethics of Copying and the Freedom of Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 Aram Sinnreich:Four Crises in Algorithmic Governance .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181 Pavel Zahrádka:Geo-blocking: Protection of Author’s Rights, of Cultural Diversity, or of an Outdated Business Model? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 Wybo Houkes:Licensed to Share? How (not) to Re-balance Rights for Digital Goods . . . 209 Johannes Grave:Irreplaceable Works. Non-substitutability, Market Failure, and Access Needs .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225 Amrei Bahr:Copying as Compensation. Dispensing the Disadvantaged from Copyright Restrictions .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241 Martin Hoffmann  / Reinold Schmücker: Copy Ethics and Its Implications for Academic Publishing in the Digital Era .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255

B. Weitere Beiträge zu Recht und Ethik – Further Contributions on Law and Ethics Kai Ambos: Strafe ohne Souverän? Zur Frage des ius puniendi im Völkerstrafrecht. Versuch einer Grundlegung des Völkerstrafrechts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267 Paul Tiedemann:Was schulden wir Flüchtlingen? Eine Ethik des Flüchtlingsschutzes .. . 299

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Martin Heuser: „Man kann das Bewußtsein dieses Grundgesetzes ein Factum der Vernunft nennen“. Eine begriffsgeschichtliche Untersuchung zum Gebrauch des Factumsbegriffs in Kants „Kritik der praktischen Vernunft“ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343 Robert Brockhaus: Zwei problematische Aspekte beim Whistleblowing: Abwägungen und der Begriff des öffentlichen Interesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 429 Marcin Orzechowski / Maximilian Schochow / Florian Steger: Current Ethical, Legal, and Social Aspects of Prenatal Diagnostics in Poland and Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 455 Hans Zillmann: Artefakt-Ontologie und der moralische Status genetisch veränderter Pflanzen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 473

Rezension – Recension Philipp-Alexander Hirsch, Freiheit und Staatlichkeit bei Kant – Die autonomietheoretische Begründung von Recht und Staat und das Widerstandsproblem (Ulli F. H. Rühl) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 493 Personenverzeichnis / Index of Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 501 Sachverzeichnis / Index of Subjects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 505 Hinweise für Autoren / Information for Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 513

A. Recht und Ethik des Kopierens – Law and Ethics of Copying

Law and Ethics of Copying Introduction Reinold Schmücker and Eberhard Ortland

The special theme of this issue of the Annual Review of Law and Ethics is the law and ethics of copying. Long before the invention of the Xerox machine and way beyond it, copying has always been a widespread human practice. It is crucial in many ways for the cultural development of any society as well as for administrative purposes, for scientific progress or economic success. Furthermore, copying can support democratization by providing access to important cultural resources and information, and to chances to make one’s voice heard. In which cases and to what degree it might or might not be legitimate to copy an artefact is, however, a question that is more controversial today than ever. This is not merely due to the obvious moral wrong of deceit with fake artefacts, forgeries or plagiarism.1 Copying per se, even if it does not involve any intention to deceive, raises several ethical questions: Who should be entitled to copy a particular artefact? And who should have a right to deny or grant others the right to copy certain artefacts? What kind of relationship between a person or social entity and an artefact should be required and sufficient to claim an exclusive right to copy the respective object? In modern societies, the most important and also the most successful means used for normatively assigning and restricting rights to copy certain artefacts is the law, in particular copyright law,2 patent and trademark law and further laws regulating unfair competition, libel or hate speech. These branches of law have evolved rath­ er recently in modern times, since the 18th, 19th or 20th centuries, and have been substantially expanded in recent decades. However, the limits of regulating copying processes by mere legal means have become obvious. Restricting copying by largely controlling the use of digital media is hardly compatible with a conception of a free, democratic society, in which the freedom of communication is of central importance. In addition, effective technical copy protection and prevention mea­ sures tend to infringe the owners’ property rights of disposal over their property to 1 Cf. Dennis Dutton, Forgery and Plagiarism, in: Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics, ed. by Ruth Chadwick, vol. 3, San Diego, CA 1998, pp. 503 – 510; Thomas Dreier / Ansgar Ohly, (eds.), Plagiate. Wissenschaftsethik und Recht, Tübingen 2013. 2  “Copyright” is used here to denote indiscriminately both Anglo-American copyright and continental European droit d’auteur legislations.

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a degree that is legally problematic. Moreover, many legal restrictions on copying are neither nationally nor globally accepted. The same is true of the legal distinction between private copies and commercially relevant copying activities. On the one hand, many creators of artefacts think that copyright restrictions do not go far enough. On the other hand, many people worldwide use the technical means of copying without thinking that there is anything wrong in what they are doing, even if they violate existing laws (e.g. by illegally downloading music or movies from the internet). Some of them demand a liberalisation or even the abolition of copyright law and intellectual property rights. Some of them contribute to the emergence of new ethical frameworks. Recent survey-based research on new media ethics has shown how and to what degree such new ethical frameworks “have arisen in the absence of a robust and adaptive legal regulatory apparatus, and often in contradistinction to the letter of copyright law itself”.3 The discrepancy between the legal assessment of many copying processes and the widespread lack of a sense of guilt about copying in everyday life points to a normative deficit: major parts of the existing copyright law – and of intellectual property law in general – are not regarded as normatively appropriate by a growing number of people. This discrepancy tends to become even greater given the current shift from owning and copying physical things to merely having access to electronic data.4 One factor adding to this growing discrepancy between the norms of copyright law and widespread normative intuitions certainly is the availability of copying equipment and the effortlessness of producing copies with digital technologies. Another factor might be that the law is often perceived as the result of lobby pressure (from various parties, ranging from Hollywood to Google). But this alone does not explain the remarkable discrepancy between the existing legal situation and common morality, which is also not limited to particular societies – notwithstanding differences concerning the normative treatment of copying based on cultural differences or particular historical circumstances. If the law is supposed to shape reality in a way that can be normatively justified, one should seek to avoid a divergence between positive law and common morality. This, however, requires a profound debate about the rationality and justifia3  Mark Latonero / Aram Sinnreich, The Hidden Demography of New Media Ethics, in: Information, Communication & Society 2013, doi: 10.1080/1369118X.2013.808364, p. 19. See also Aram Sinnreich, Ethics, Evolved: An International Perspective on Copying in the Networked Age, in: Darren Hudson Hick / Reinold Schmücker (eds.), The Aesthetics and Ethics of Copy­ing, New York / London 2016, pp. 315 – 334; Jakub Macek / Pavel Zahrádka, Online Piracy and the Transformation of the Audiences’ Practices: The Case of the Czech Republic, ibid., pp.  335 – 358. 4  Jeremy Rifkin, The Age of Access: How the Shift from Ownership to Access is Transforming Modern Life, New York 2000; Stephanie J. Lawson / Mark R. Gleim / Rebeca Perren / ­ Jiyoung Hwang, Freedom from Ownership: An Exploration of Access-based Consumption, Journal of Business Research 69 (2016), pp. 2615 – 2623.

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bility of normative attitudes that contradict the law, but are nonetheless manifest in common practices and, in particular, in ongoing developments in the arts (e.g. sampling, remixing, digital art and appropriation art) or in social expectations and habits concerning the access to and use of information (cf. the use of computer programs, information contained in databases or internet-based social networks). The law could benefit from an ethics of copying to the degree that the latter can expose the implicit normative premises of the law and, at the same time, question those premises. For instance, the universalistic foundation of copyright law in natural law (going back to Locke’s justification of intellectual property5) has facilitated restrictions of copying processes across borders and states. However, the limits of this paradigm become visible. It prioritizes the interests and claims of copyright owners over the justified claims for access and use made by third parties. This prioritization might no longer be generally acceptable. The study of the normative foundations of (all kinds of) legal restrictions of copy­ing ought to make explicit and critically review the assumptions about the right or wrong of copying they are based on. Pursued in an impartial and rigorous way, such a systematic reflection of the law’s implicit ethics of copying can become the starting point of an explicit ethics of copying that may be conceived as a field of applied ethics, or rather, as a domain-specific branch of normative ethics. Thus, an ethics of copying can expose the implicit normative premises of the existing copyright law. It can question the alleged universal validity of copyright laws, it can provide standards for reviewing and evaluating existing copyright law and other relevant laws, and it can develop suggestions for legal reform that might eventually contribute to reducing the divergences between law and common morality. This approach was developed by an inter-disciplinary research group that brought together scholars coming from eight countries and representing various disciplines

5  Locke did, in fact, not produce a justification of intellectual property (see Ronald V. Bettig, Critical Perspectives on the History and Philosophy of Copyright, in: id. [ed.], Copyrighting Culture: The Political Economy of Intellectual Property, Boulder, CO 1996, pp. 9 – 32: p. 19 et seq.). The concept of intellectual property was unknown to him. The first known use of the term in English dates to 1769 (cf. Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “intellectual property”, citing an article in the Monthly Review 41 [1769], p. 290), and the first example of something like the modern usage seems to have appeared in 1808 (cf. OED, ibid., citing an article in the Medical Repository of Original Essays and Intelligence 11 [1808], p. 303). In fact, the concept was established on an international scale only with the foundation of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in 1967 and did not enter the language of American law before the U.S. Patents and Trademark Act of 1980 (see Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, Texas Law Review 83 [2005], pp. 1031 – 1075: p. 1033 et seq.). – Locke did, however, develop a justification of real property in his Second Treatise of Government (1689), and this classical ‘labor-desert theory’ of property has been often cited as a justification for intellectual property in the modern understanding, too; see Adam D. Moore, Toward a Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property, in: id. (ed.), Intellectual Property: Moral, Legal, and International Dilemmas, Lanham, MD 1997, pp. 81 – 103; Daniel Attas, Lockean Justifications of Intellectual Property, in: Axel Gosseries / Alain Marciano / Alain Strowel (eds.), Intellectual Property and Theories of Justice, London 2008, pp. 29 – 56.

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at the University of Bielefeld’s Center for Interdisciplinary research (ZiF) in the academic year 2015 – 16.6 Drawing on analytical and historical studies on the concept7 and transformative power of the copy,8 on relations between copies and their respective originals, or templates,9 and distinctions between various types of copies,10 copying practices11 and acts of copying,12 the following questions were discussed: (1) The significance of copying processes for the development of the arts and sciences, of human culture and of particular cultures.13 Does copying play a crucial role beyond learning the basic skills required for creating certain forms of art? If this is the case, which forms of art are based directly or indirectly on copy processes, and in what sense is copying constitutive for them?14 In the sciences, technology, administration and jurisdiction, too, the indispensability of copying for purposes of storage and knowledge transfer or for the accessibility of certain data is obvious. For example, norms of good scientific practice often contain rules 6  www.uni-bielefeld.de/(cen+en, en)/ZiF / FG/2015Copying / index.html; see also Eberhard Ortland / Reinold Schmücker, The Ethics of Copying / Ethik des Kopierens, in: ZiF-Mitteilungen 2017, no. 3, pp. 4 – 6. 7  Amrei Bahr, What is an Artefact Copy? A Quadrinomial Definition, in: Hick / Schmücker (eds.), The Aesthetics and Ethics of Copying (supra, n. 3), pp. 81 – 98; Maria Elisabeth Rei­ cher, What Is the Object in Which Copyright Can Subsist? An Ontological Analysis, ibid., pp.  61 – 79; ead., Werk und Autorschaft. Eine Ontologie der Kunst, Paderborn 2018; Pavel Zahrádka, Ontologie díla v autorském zákoně České republiky [The Ontology of a Work in the Copyright Law of the Czech Republic], Filosofický časopis 65 (2017), pp. 739 – 761. 8  Corinna Forberg / Philipp W. Stockhammer (eds.), The Transformative Power of the Copy: A Transcultural and Interdisciplinary Approach, Heidelberg 2017. 9  Antonia Putzger / Marion Heisterberg / Susanne Müller-Bechtel (eds.), Nichts Neues schaffen. Perspektiven auf die treue Kopie 1300 bis 1900, Berlin 2018; Annette Gilbert, Illegitimate Legitimate Copies: A Grey Area in Dealing with Literary Works, in: Hick / Schmücker (eds.), The Aesthetics and Ethics of Copying (supra, n. 3), pp. 135 – 151. 10  Maria Elisabeth Reicher, Vom wahren Wert des Echten und des Falschen, in: Julian NidaRümelin / Jakob Steinbrenner (eds.): Kunst und Philosophie. Original und Fälschung, Ostfildern 2011, pp.  51 – 70; Massimiliano Carrara / Marzia Soavi. Copies, Replicas and Counterfeits of Artworks and Artifacts, The Monist 93 (2010), pp. 417 – 435; Massimiliano Carrara, Are Counterfeits Copies?, in: Hick / Schmücker (eds.), The Aesthetics and Ethics of Copying (supra, n. 3), pp. 99 – 118; Massimiliano Carrara / Stefano Borgo / Pawel Garbacz / Pieter E. Vermaas, The Design Stance and Its Artefacts, Synthese 190 (2013), pp. 1131 – 1152. 11  Dieter Birnbacher, Copying and the Limits of Substitutability, in: Hick / Schmücker (eds.), The Aesthetics and Ethics of Copying (supra, n. 3), pp. 3 – 17. 12  Eberhard Ortland, Kopierhandlungen, in: Daniel Martin Feige / Judith Siegmund (eds.), Kunst und Handlung. Ästhetische und handlungstheoretische Perspektiven, Bielefeld 2015, pp.  233 – 258. 13  Mark Alfino, Deep Copy Culture, in: Hick / Schmücker (eds.), The Aesthetics and Ethics of Copying (supra, n. 3), 19 – 37; Wybo Houkes. Imitation and Replication of Technologies: The Prospects for an Evolutionary Ethics of Copying, ibid., pp. 39 – 57. 14  Darren Hudson Hick, The Nature of Copying and the Singular Literary Work, ibid., pp.  119 – 132.

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about the production and distribution of copies of research-related documents as well as standards of accuracy for various kinds of copying processes in scientific research, archives, etc. Even more urgent in the emerging digital networked research environment is the problem of access to scientific publications and other possibly relevant material, like research data. (2) The relationship between ethics and law, and the status of an ethics of copy­ ing: In modern applied ethics, it is a methodological truism that we cannot simply “apply” traditional ethical theories such as Kantianism or utilitarianism to a given field of moral problems. On the contrary, we have to refer to our pre-theoretical ethical intuitions and the widely accepted rules of our moral practice as a starting point and then gradually revise them in the light of ethical theories, arguments, and legitimate ethical principles. In order to conduct this methodologically complex process, the ethics of copying has to address the meta-ethical question of which normative resources could serve as the justification of such an ethics in pluralistic and democratic societies: Which ethical theories or traditions (e.g., deontology, consequentialism, virtue ethics, narrative ethics, reconstructive ethics) are particularly suitable as the basis for an ethics of copying and for which reasons? If none of these theories prove to be appropriate, on the basis of which other ethical principles or traditions might an ethics of copying be plausibly justified?15 The relationship between the ethics of copying and the positive laws concerning the right to copy is not a unidirectional dependency. Even if certain copyright laws may be justified by certain moral or consequentialist arguments, it would be naïve to assume that the law is, or ought to be, grounded entirely and consistently in certain moral principles. Various interests, normative claims, political powers and compromises have shaped the laws. But every suggestion to change the law will only be sufficiently supported if the decision-makers (legislators, negotiators or judges) are convinced that it would be good to do so – not necessarily good for all, but at least serving some just cause, or what might be regarded as a just cause. On the other hand, our moral intuitions are also shaped and affected by the regulations and expectations that are established in our laws and legal practice, and we notice that they may differ in other countries or cultures, according to their respective laws and practices. How can an ethics of copying account for inter-cultural divergences concerning the evaluation of whether certain types of copying are legitimate? Are there at least some normative claims concerning certain types of copying that could be universally regarded as praiseworthy or objectionable? Is an ethics of copying merely a form of “bargain” between the conflicting interests of the parties involved? Or is it possible to distinguish legitimate and illegitimate claims that an adequate ethics of copying has to take into account?

15  Charles Melvin Ess, Ethical Approaches for Copying Digital Artifacts: What Would the Exemplary Person [junzi] / a Good Person [phronemos] Say?, ibid., pp. 295 – 313; Sinnreich, Ethics, Evolved (supra, n. 3), pp. 328 – 332; Reinold Schmücker, Normative Resources and Domain-Specific Principles: Heading for an Ethics of Copying, ibid., pp. 359 – 377.

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(3) The moral justifiability of existing legal regulations of copying: Current laws prohibit certain copying activities, at least under certain circumstances, and permit, or even demand, others – why? Are the reasons the same, or similar, for all kinds of “intellectual property” rights? If they are not, how can the differences be explained? To what extent is the development of the definition of legally prohibited and legally permitted copying activities triggered or influenced by historical factors or cultural differences? What are the main reasons for conflicts between the current legal rules and common morality or specific cultural or artistic norms or practices? Does the effortlessness and mass-scale of copying in the digital and networked age call for a change in the legal rules governing copying activities? How does the automation of algorithmic copying processes affect the appropriateness of legal rules about copying that were designed with analogue copying technologies in mind? Does existing copyright law reflect a balance between legitimate interests or does it favour certain parties’ interests while neglecting, as it has been claimed, other parties’ interests, e.g., regarding the patent protection of vital medical products? Are existing legal categorizations and regulations of copy phenomena ethically adequate, for instance concerning data streaming on the internet as a way of making digital artefacts accessible? Not all of these questions concerning the law and ethics of copying can be answered within the scope of the present volume. However, a wide range of them are addressed in various ways in the following articles. Most of the papers have been discussed at the closing conference of the research group on The Ethics of Copying at the ZiF in Bielefeld,16 and have been revised and updated for the Annual Review of Law and Ethics. Martin Hoffmann inaugurates the collection with a meta-ethical and methodological discussion of the question why there is, indeed – and why there has to be – an ethics of copying, and how it should be best pursued. A broad variety of conflicts about certain copying practices or individual acts of copying is explored in the following articles, starting with Andreas Bruns’ review of recent debates about ‘cultural appropriation’: what is wrong with copying from other cultures? Thomas Dreier focuses on the ethics of citations and partial copying, taking into account the pertinent legal norms of copyright law, constitutional law and codes of good scientific practice, and argues for a moral rule that citations must be allowed without consent and any form of payment, as long as the source is named. The allocation of rights and duties with regard to various other types of partial copying, however, turns out to be more complicated and controversial in many cases, so that a certain degree of uncertainty and uneasiness with the decisions made may be inevitable.

16  www.uni-bielefeld.de/(en)/ZiF / FG/2015Copying / Events/07-11-Schmuecker.html (last access: 11 October 2018).

Law and Ethics of Copying – Introduction

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Reinold Schmücker asks: what is wrong with non-substitutional copying? He defends and clarifies the principle of permissible non-substitutional copying, which he has previously introduced as a core principle of the ethics of copying,17 and draws a number of practically relevant conclusions concerning, in particular, copyright law and related legal areas. Antonia Putzger takes up the question left open by Schmücker’s principle and examines under which circumstances substitute copies might be regarded as legitimate, focusing on examples from art history and contemporary debates about preservation and exhibition copies in art museums and other contexts of use. Susan Douglas replies to Putzger’s article with a discussion of museum copies in today’s digital media environment. The topic of photographic reproductions of visual artworks from public museum collections is further elaborated in Grischka Petri’s discussion of some recent cases of litigation concerning the alleged exclusive reproduction rights in photographs depicting nothing works that belong to the public domain. Copyright is obviously an important issue for the ethics of copying, but it is certainly not the only field of conflicts and regulations concerning acts of copying. Eberhard Ortland explores the relevance of the “freedom to copy” with regard to our fundamental interest in the freedom of communication – including the freedom of speech and artistic expression as well as the freedom of access to information – and confronts the ‘liberal’ claim for an ideally unrestricted freedom to copy with opposing interests urging for restrictions of the production or circulation of copies of certain signs or images, and thus for censorship. Aram Sinnreich describes how recent and upcoming technological and administrative developments might lead to a new regime of “algorithmic governance” employing automated surveillance and upload filters. Such an algorithmic regime threatens to cut off our chances for ethical deliberation, democratic participation, human rights, due process and the rule of law. Pavel Zahrádka focuses on a question of current political relevance in particular for European copyright policy: is licensing certain copyrighted contents only for particular countries – and blocking access to these contents from other places – nec­essary for protecting authorʼs exclusive rights in their works, or maybe also for cultural policy goals, or does it merely harm consumer’s legitimate interests in order to protect an outdated business model? The shift from ownership in copies to limited access rights to digital copies that are still controlled by the distributor brings about new conflicts about the ethics of copying. Wybo Houkes analyses standardised consumer licenses that typically rule out sharing, for example, of electronic books, and discusses the moral issues that arise with this redefinition of users’ rights. Johannes Grave and Amrei Bahr both address problems caused by access restrictions imposed by owners and exploiters of copyrights, for example by aca17 See Schmücker, Normative Resources and Domain-Specific Principles (supra, n. 15), p. 367 et seq.

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Reinold Schmücker and Eberhard Ortland

demic journals who effectively lock up relevant research results and notoriously charge often excessive fees. Grave analyses the market failure that arises from the non-substitutability of individual works in certain use-contexts like science and scholarly research. Based on ethical considerations, he argues for a readjustment of the relevant limitations and exceptions of copyright law. Bahr addresses the question of whether being in a somehow disadvantaged position (like students or researchers in countries lacking the necessary resources to fund up-to-date research libraries and access to the relevant databases) is a moral justification for violating copyright restrictions pertaining to academic works and other relevant sources. She argues that researchers suffering from structural injustice should be dispensed from liabilities for infringing third parties’ copyrights by using some kind of workaround to get access to scientifically relevant contents from which they would otherwise be excluded by paywalls. In their closing paper, Martin Hoffmann and Reinold Schmücker also discuss the problem how to make research publicly available in the digital era. Starting with a moral analysis of the current system of academic publishing, they point out how this system violates the principle of a fair and impartial balance between the interests of authors, exploiters, users, and the general public. Since readjustments of copyright law alone will not suffice to solve the problem, the authors suggest necessary changes within the academic system. *** The editors of this special theme want to thank, first and foremost, the authors who have contributed their questions, knowledge and insights, drawing in each case on their disciplinary backgrounds – from philosophy, jurisprudence, art history, media studies or sociology –, but also on long standing inter-disciplinary experiences. The work of the research group The Ethics of Copying since 2015, and also the conference on Copy Ethics: Theory and Practice at the ZiF in July 2017, have been made possible by the Center for Interdisciplinary Research (ZiF) in Bielefeld, Germany, and we want to express our deep gratitude for the unique support by this unique institution and the people who made it all happen. We also want to give special thanks to Michael Weh for his translations of papers originally written in German and for his thorough language editing. The Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik / Annual Review of Law and Ethics is the ideal place for presenting this topic and this endeavour. We want to thank the journal’s editor, Jan C. Joerden, for inviting us to curate this special theme section of this year’s issue, for his patience and support, and for his part of the editorial work, shared with Florina M. Polutta who also contributed decisively with the copyediting, proofreading and assembling the index.

Why There Is an Ethics of Copying Methodological Considerations Martin Hoffmann The main subject of this paper is the methodological status of the ethics of copying. That means that I will not discuss specific normative questions of the ethical permissibility of copying. I will rather address a much more general, somewhat preliminary issue. The core question is: is it reasonable or justified to classify the ethics of copying as a domain-specific ethics like, for example, biomedical ethics, research ethics, or animal ethics? In what follows, I will justify an affirmative answer to this question. I will proceed in three steps: first, I will present a rough cartography of the entire area of philosophical ethics. Then I will differentiate between a descriptive and a normative reading of my core question (I) and will present a number of more detailed considerations (II). Finally, I will propose three methodological requirements that every domain-specific ethics must fulfil and examine whether the ethics of copying does fulfil them (III). I. Three Levels of Theorizing in Philosophical Ethics Philosophical ethics is divided into three parts. Normative ethics concerns fundamental questions of moral evaluation and obligation on a relatively general level. Normative ethicists in the philosophical tradition have made many proposals as to how to determine what is morally right and wrong, required, permitted, and prohibited. By developing comprehensive theories, such as deontological ethics, utilitarianism, or virtue ethics, they aim at formulating descriptions, systematizations, and rational reconstructions of our moral language, our moral reasoning, or our normative reasoning in general. Metaethics addresses ethics from a second order level: its main concern is not to answer fundamental normative questions of morality, but to analyze our talking, reasoning and theorizing about normative questions of morality. Core questions of metaethics include: what is the meaning of moral statements like “Stealing is wrong” or “Do no harm”? Do we have any access to moral knowledge? Are there any (mind- or culture-independent) moral facts? Do we refer to these facts when we utter a sentence like “Stealing is wrong” or do we just express attitudes of approval or disapproval? Simply put, metaethics primarily addresses questions of the semantics of moral language, the ontology of moral objects (facts), the epistemology of moral judgments, and the psychology of moral motivation.1

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The third area of ethics is usually called “applied ethics”. It addresses concrete moral questions, problems, and dilemmas concerning individual actions as well as institutional decisions in all fields of human co-existence. Examples include: the questions of which moral rules should govern the relationship between patient and physician, of the legitimacy of biomedical research with human beings and of commercial research using animals (for example for the production of cosmetics), of the moral permissibility of active euthanasia, of the reasons for affirmative action, and of the moral conditions of just war. The label “applied ethics” has often been criticized for its misleading implications.2 It gives the wrong impression that the standard methodical procedure in this area of ethics consists in the mere application of general theories developed in normative ethics, in order to evaluate the moral status of concrete situations, actions, and decisions. This methodological picture of applied ethics is, of course, inadequate.3 Most of the general theories of normative ethics are far too abstract and underdetermined to be informative and to give reliable guidance in concrete decision situations. Most of the overarching theories are unable to account for the numerous and complex circumstances that characterize most moral conflicts and controversial decisions. This is why, since its beginnings in the 1970s, the field of applied ethics has been divided into a plurality of domain-specific ethics with very different research traditions and cultures each. A domain-specific ethics like the ethics of biomedical research has other theoretical orientations and methodological ideas than, for example, clinical ethics, business ethics, or environmental ethics.4 The question I am concerned with here is the following: does it make sense to classify the ethics of copying as a domain-specific ethics like biomedical ethics, animal ethics, and business ethics? This question can be understood in a descriptive and in a normative way. In a descriptive sense, it means: is there in fact a branch of applied ethics that deserves the name “ethics of copying”? This question demands a nuanced answer. On the one hand, there is no such subdiscipline in 1  Richard M. Hare, Ontology in Ethics, in: Ted Honderich (ed.), Morality and Objectivity, London / Boston 1985, pp. 39 – 53; Nico Scarano, Moralische Überzeugungen. Grundli­ nien einer antirealistischen Theorie der Moral, Paderborn 2001, pp. 11 – 16; Martin Hoffmann, Kohärenzbegriffe in der Ethik, Berlin / New York 2008, pp. 14 – 17. 2  Ludwig Siep, Konkrete Ethik. Grundlagen der Natur- und Kulturethik, Frankfurt / Main 2004, pp.  20 – 23; Julian Nida-Rümelin, Angewandte Ethik. Die Bereichsethiken und ihre theoretische Fundierung, 2nd ed., Stuttgart 2005, pp. 57 – 59; Robert Baker / Laurence B. Mc­ Cullough, Medical Ethics’ Appropriation of Moral Philosophy: The Case of the Sympathetic and the Unsympathetic Physician, in: Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 17:1 (2007), pp.  3 – 22. 3  For a definition that takes into account these and other criticisms, see Reinold Schmücker, Natur und Erfahrung. Oder: Wie Ethik vielleicht möglich ist, in: Matthias Hoesch / Sebastian Laukötter (eds.), Natur und Erfahrung. Bausteine zu einer praktischen Philosophie der Gegenwart, Münster 2017, pp. 21 – 38: p. 31. 4  Peter Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics, 2nd ed., Malden, MA 1993 (Part V); Hugh La­ Follette (ed.), Ethics in Practice, Malden, MA 2007.

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applied ethics that is as well-established as, for example, research ethics, animal ethics, bioethics, and medical ethics. On the other hand, three observations should be taken into account. First, there are many morally relevant topics concerning the activity of copying and the adequate use of copies, such as the justified limitation of copying ebooks, limits of cultural appropriation due to respect for the diversity of cultures, and the moral and legal boundaries of the artistic activities of sampling, editing, and mashing up pieces of popular music. Second, there are currently many philosophers, lawyers, historians of art etc. working on questions concerning the moral permissibility of copying in many different contexts. The work of the ZiF research group on The Ethics of Copying and, in particular, the other papers collected in this volume, are evidence of this. Third, in recent years, there have been many moral disputes about questions of copying. One example would be the debates about sampling and pirate copying movies and music. Descriptively – or more precisely: sociologically – speaking, an “ethics of copying” does actually exist as a social practice, constituted by many disputes and also by many shared opinions. However, whereas some people tend to be rather liberal concerning pirate copying, others hold the opposite view. This shows that there is a great variety of commonly held opinions which often contradict each other. For this reason, we must go beyond copy ethics as social practice and reflect on this field of moral reasoning in a more systematic and methodologically justified way. Therefore, a second, normative reading of the question becomes relevant in the present context: should we classify the ethics of copying as a domain-specific ethics like biomedical ethics, animal ethics, or business ethics? Of course, the “should” in this question does not refer to a moral ought. To my mind, it would not make any sense to say that we are morally obliged to acknowledge the ethics of copying as a domain-specific ethics. In order to highlight the kind of normativity that is involved here, the question can be rephrased as: is it heuristically or meth­ odologically useful to classify the ethics of copying as a domain-specific ethics? This normative question does not allow for an easy answer. Therefore, a number of refining considerations concerning the methodological status of the ethics of copying are in order. II. Some Preliminary Remarks Concerning the Methodological Status of the Ethics of Copying As the examples in the previous section have shown, there is actually an “ethics of copying” in the sense of a social practice. But this fact alone does not imply that it is methodologically useful to construe a corresponding subdiscipline of ethics. There are many social practices firmly established in our society, and in western industrialized nations in general, which do not require establishing a corresponding domain-specific ethics: the activity of buying food, for example, is a firmly established social practice within our society. There is an industry that provides a large variety of goods to satisfy our nutritional requirements, and there are many

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public discussions about healthy and sustainable food, about vegetarianism, veganism, and so on. But I do not think that the existence of this social practice alone provides a sufficient reason for developing a “nutrition ethics” or “food ethics”. The related moral problems are already systematized in the subdisciplines of animal ethics (concerning the problem of killing and torturing animals), environmental ethics (concerning the duty to save the resources of our planet while producing our food), health care ethics (concerning the availability and the safety of food for the consumers), and the professional ethics of experts in dietetics (advocated, for example, by organizations like Eat Right Pro). An affirmative answer to the normative question of “Does it make sense to classify the ethics of copying as a domain-specific ethics?” will be based on several normative requirements that any domain-specific ethics must fulfil. At first glance, this project has much in common with other demarcation projects in the philosophy of science and the humanities in general. But a closer look shows that my approach differs from these in at least two important respects. In what follows, I will outline them and point out an important problem for my approach. One paradigmatic subject of the philosophy of science is the “What is science?” debate. Since the 1920s, this debate has been framed as concerning a demarcation problem: what is the criterion (or: what are the criteria) for demarcating science from pseudo-science, science from non-science, and science from everyday knowledge? Following the failure of an approach suggesting several normative criteria (developed by proponents of classical logical empiricism) due to the complex and historical character of science, modern approaches have a primarily descriptive focus.5 The question here is: which criteria describe what science actually is – in contrast to the question: which requirements should scientific research fulfil? However, my project, as I have outlined in the previous section, has a normative focus. A further difference between my approach and the “What is science?” debate is that, in the latter, the relevant contrast is drawn between science and non-science (or more general: between research and non-research), whereas I am looking for in­ ternal criteria that differentiate between several fields within the realm of research. In this respect, my approach is analogous to Jerome Kagan’s project in The three cultures.6 In this book, Kagan develops nine criteria in order to distinguish between three broad research “cultures”, or research paradigms: the natural sci­ences, the social sciences, and the humanities. Kagan investigates the main differences between their theoretical languages, explicates their most important assumptions, and shows their main research contributions. Clearly there is an analogy between Kagan’s project and my idea: Kagan is looking for criteria that allow for differen5  Michael Ruse, Creation Science is not Science, Science, Technology & Human Values 7, no. 40 (1982), pp. 72 – 78; Paul Hoyningen-Huene, Systematicity. The Nature of Science, Oxford / New York 2013, pp. 21 et seq., 148 – 175. 6  Jerome Kagan, The Three Cultures. Natural Sciences, Social Sciences, and the Humanities in the 21st Century, Cambridge / New York 2009.

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tiating between a plurality of “cultures” in research. I am looking for criteria that allow for differentiating between a plurality of domain-specific ethics in the field of applied ethics. Despite this analogy, in the present context, Kagan’s project is of limited relevance for at least two reasons. First, just like modern approaches to the “What is science?” question do, Kagan addresses a primarily descriptive issue.7 Second, Kagan’s considerations and criteria are highly abstract. He does not compare different scientific disciplines or research programmes with each other, but the three overarching “families” of natural science, the social sciences, and the humanities, which structure research in general.8 I, by contrast, focus on one research discipline (philosophical ethics) and am interested in the distinction within this far narrower research area. However, this last point highlights an important problem for my approach. I call it the “level of hierarchy problem”. Even within the (compared to research in general) rather restricted area of applied ethics, one can differentiate between domain-specific ethics on different hierarchical levels. Some of these domain-specific ethics are bigger, others smaller branches of ethics. In some cases, a further differentiation within the field is possible. The field of research ethics, for example, can be divided into the ethics of research with human subjects, the ethics of research with animals, the ethics of good scientific practice (the “professional ethics” of scientists) etc. If we compare, for instance, research ethics or biomedical ethics with the ethics of copying, it becomes obvious that they are “like an elephant and a mouse”.9 This poses a problem for a fair comparison between different sub-fields of applied ethics. Domain-specific ethics like biomedical ethics and research ethics are well-established sub-fields that have proven their methodological fruitfulness in a great many instances. The ethics of copying is not an established branch of ethics and, so far, has not had as many chances to prove its heuristic value. But this imbalance is my main motivation for giving my core question a normative reading: should we classify the ethics of copying as a domain-specific ethics just like biomedical ethics and research ethics? In order to avoid the level of hierarchy problem, I will look for criteria that are applicable independently of the hierarchical level of a sub-field of applied ethics, i.e. independently of its size and its previous heuristic success.

  Id. at p. xi.   Id. at pp. 4 et seq. 9  Margit Sutrop has drawn my attention to this important point. I would like to thank her for her thoughtful and inspiring comments to my talk at the conference “Copy Ethics: Theory & Practice”, 11 – 14 July 2017, at the ZiF, University of Bielefeld. 7 8

Martin Hoffmann

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III. Three Methodological Requirements for any Domain-specific Ethics How could we argue in favour of regarding the ethics of copying as a domain-specific ethics? First, we must formulate several methodological requirements that any domain-specific ethics has to fulfil. Then we must see whether the ethics of copying fulfils these requirements. I will formulate three of these requirements. I will explain why any domain-specific ethics should fulfil them and will answer the question of whether the ethics of copying meets these conditions. Here is my first requirement: (1) The domain that constitutes the area of application for any domain-specific ethics should be characterized in unambiguous and clear terms. This requirement is indispensable in order to provide a clear picture of which actions, decisions, and situations fall within the domain of this branch of applied ethics. Every well-established domain-specific ethics has a clear definition of its area of application: clinical ethics concerns the moral permissibility of how doctors treat patients; the ethics of human research concerns the permissibility of including human study participants in scientific research; animal ethics concerns the morally appropriate treatment of animals etc. However, this is not the case for all research topics that are called domain-specific ethics. Sometimes, a currently controversial social or political issue is also called “ethics”, and it is claimed that this is a new domain-specific ethics. Examples would be “neuroethics”, “virtual ethics”, “future ethics” – expressions that refer to ethically relevant issues, but their area of application is not clearly determined. The ethics of copying, by contrast, does have a clearly specified area of application, because it focuses on a specific type of action – the act of copying. So what distinguishes acts of copying from other actions? Several very detailed conceptual analyses on this question are already available.10 Amrei Bahr, for instance, has provided a concise definition of exemplar copies. As I will show, it allows for distinguishing acts of copying from other actions. (EC) y is an exemplar copy of an exemplar x if and only if

(IC) y was produced with the intention to create something that is similar to x;

and

(SC′) y is similar to x to the degree that experts confronted with y recognize y as strongly resembling x, and in the respect that x and y belong to the same material and perceptual kind;

and 10  Eberhard Ortland, Kopierhandlungen, in: Judith Siegmund / Daniel Martin Feige (eds.), Kunst und Handlung. Ästhetische und handlungstheoretische Perspektiven, Bielefeld 2015, pp.  233 – 258; Amrei Bahr, What Is an Artifact Copy? A Quadrinomial Definition, in: Darren  Hudson Hick / Reinold Schmücker (eds.), The Aesthetics and Ethics of Copying, New York / London 2016, pp. 81 – 98.

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(CCC)  among the causes of the similarity that y bears to x is that the creator of y has intended y’s similarity to x;

and

(ACEC) the creator of y is not an authorized exemplar creator at the time of the creation of y or whose creation of y is outside the bounds of such authorized creation.11

Bahr distinguishes between three further types of copies, but these details are irrelevant in the present context, since it concerns the act of copying and not a classification of different types of products of this action. I will also leave out Bahr’s last condition (ACEC). In this condition, Bahr introduces the distinction between illegitimate copies and authorized, or genuine, exemplars. However, an adequate definition of acts of copying should be neutral with respect to this distinction, because a successful act of copying can result both in the production of a copy and in the production of an authorized exemplar. Given these modifications, it is possible to derive the following proposal for defining acts of copying from Bahr’s definition of exemplar copies: C is an act of copying if and only if (i) C is performed with the intention to produce an artifact y that is similar to another artifact x; and (ii) there actually is a similarity between the artifact x and the artifact y resulting from C; and (iii) the intention of the person who performs C to produce a similarity between an artifact y and the artifact x is among the causes of the similarity between y and x. Even if we were to assume that this suggested definition needs to be made more precise, there can be no doubt that it specifies a certain type of actions in a sufficiently clear way that allows for distinguishing between acts of copying and other actions. So there is indeed a satisfying account of the ethics of copying that specifies its area of application in unambiguous and clear terms. To avoid a possible misunderstanding: requirement (1) does not say that the area of application of any domain-specific ethics must be determined by a certain type of action. As Nida-Rümelin has shown,12 this is also possible by other criteria. Other possible criteria include professions (clinical ethics, ethics of journalism), institutions (social ethics or ethics of jurisprudence), or features or aspects of human life that affect a variety of actions (environmental ethics, gene ethics). I think that these are all legitimate options for determining the areas of application of several domain-specific ethics. However, it is important for the heuristic value and the methodological stringency of an area of philosophical research that these criteria   Bahr, What Is an Artifact Copy? (supra, n. 10), p. 89.   Nida-Rümelin, Angewandte Ethik (supra, n. 2), pp. 61 – 69.

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are stated in clear and unambiguous terms. In the case of the ethics of copying (just like in research ethics), the area of application can be clearly identified by reference to a certain type of action. The second requirement that has to be fulfilled is: (2) The description that defines the area of application should pick out a moral­ ly relevant aspect, i.e. a type of action, profession, institution, or aspect of human life. The unambiguous and clear specification of the area of application is a necessary condition for the ethics of copying to be a domain-specific ethics, but it is not sufficient. A simple example should illustrate this point: action types such as speech acts are also definable in unambiguous and precise terms, but there is no discipline called “speech act ethics” – and rightly so. Also, the action type in question has to feature morally relevant aspects. But what does it mean to ascribe moral relevance to an action type, profession, institution etc.? First, we might think that an action type is only morally relevant if all of its instances are morally relevant. This criterion is not fulfilled in the present context, since there are many acts of copying that do not have any moral relevance at all. But this does not show that the ethics of copying is not a domain-specific ethics. Instead, it suggests that the criterion is far too strict. Even in well-established domain-specific ethics, it is not the case that all actions, institutions, or professions in their respective areas of application are morally relevant. There are numerous research projects which include human subjects that are morally entirely unproblematic – however, research ethics is one of the paradigmatic instances of a domain-specific ethics. The same holds for clinical ethics and animal ethics, although many, perhaps even most, interactions between physicians and patients, and between human beings and animals, are morally neutral. So, talking about moral relevance in the present context cannot mean that all instances of the action type in question have to be morally relevant, but that there are instances of the respective action type which are morally relevant. At this point, we have to address the objection that an existential statement is a rather weak criterion. It is very likely that almost every arbitrarily chosen action type has some instances that are morally relevant for some contingent moral reason. For a plausible reading of the second requirement, we need a specification of the moral relevance criterion that is not unreasonably strict (like the criterion that all instances of the action type in question have to be morally relevant), but also not too weak, either – which would mean that there are only isolated morally relevant cases. I propose the following, more adequate moral relevance criterion: moral relevance is not only grounded in contingent reasons, but also in systematic reasons, which are derivable either from the kind of practice, institution or profession, or from the definition of the action types that determine the area of application. This condition is neither unreasonably strict, nor is it so weak that it is fulfilled for trivial reasons. The question is whether this criterion is fulfilled in the case of acts of

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copying. A common reason for the moral relevance of an area of application is that it consists in a social practice. Clinical ethics, research ethics, and business ethics discuss the moral problems of certain types of social interaction. That seems to be not the case for the ethics of copying, since copying seems to be not necessarily a social practice. For it is possible to perform acts of copying entirely on one’s own. But we could argue that the ethics of copying is “implicitly social”. As Mark Alfino has convincingly shown, “copy behavior” is of fundamental importance for the development of “human history and identity”.13 It plays a fundamental role in language acquisition and also in the development of the social identity of every human individual. Beginning in early childhood, we learn most of the fundamental modes of behavior and interaction patterns by imitating our parents and other custodians. Subsequently, we adopt certain social roles and take part in the reproduction of stereotypes. Although not all of these activities are actions, but rather habits, routines or automated behavior, they involve acts of copying in the sense of the definition given above. For example, artistic activities or scientific research could not take place without the intentional use of a complex system of adopting, transferring, and advancing techniques, methods, theories, and artifacts. All of these activities can be reconstructed as essentially involving acts of copying. Therefore, acts of copying are an indispensable constituent of various social practices. However, this observation alone involves a number of normative implications. It could be objected that this is no evidence for the moral relevance of acts of copying, but at best evidence of their social, cultural, artistic, or scientific relevance. My second consideration shows that the moral relevance of acts of copying can be derived directly from the definition presented above. Let us take another look at the above presented definition of acts of copying: condition (iii) says that the intention to produce a similarity between the copy y and the original artifact x is one of the causes of the similarity between y and x. This condition determines that there are no random or entirely unintended copies. Hence, if a monkey uses a typewriter and thereby generates a sequence of letters that is incidentally identical with an epigram by Martial, the result of this action is not a copy of Martial’s epigram. In the present context, it is not possible to argue in more detail for the conceptual intuitions that justify condition (iii).14 However, this condition obviously indicates the moral relevance of acts of copying: the definition requires that the relevant similarities between original and copy must be intentionally caused. This is a necessary condition for ascribing moral responsibility and – in legal contexts – malice to the producers of copies. These considerations show that the moral relevance of acts of copying can be warranted on the basis of the character of copying as an implicitly social practice and on the basis of the definition of acts of copying itself. Therefore, acts of copy13  Mark Alfino, Deep Copy Culture, in: Hick / Schmücker (eds.), The Aesthetics and Ethics of Copying (supra, n. 10), pp. 19 – 37. 14  For details, see Bahr, What Is an Artifact Copy? (supra, n. 9), pp. 87 et seq.

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ing constitute morally relevant action types, which are distinguishable from other action types in an unambiguous and clear way. Hence, two fundamental requirements for the existence of a domain-specific ethics entitled “ethics of copying” are fulfilled. In what follows, I will discuss a third methodological requirement, which is more difficult to explicate. (3) Every domain-specific ethics should address a separate area of moral problems, which are, to some extent, independent of those of other domain-specific ethics. This requirement is important, because it only makes sense to talk about domain-specific ethics on a mid-level of generality. If the generality is too low, that is, if the area of relevant moral problems is too narrow, the result is not a domain-specific ethics, but a highly specified subdiscipline or subject area. If the level of generality is too high, or too abstract, the relevant field is not methodologically useful, but only consists of a disparate and arbitrarily arranged set of problems. Some people think that the ethics of copying is an instance of the former case. They argue that acts of copying merely constitute a rather narrow subject area that only concerns one set of moral problems, namely the infringement of property rights. Questions of the legitimacy of copying books, films, and music as well as the protection of patents and trademarks are all questions of property rights. Given this presupposition, the ethics of copying seems to be no distinct domain-specific ethics, but a subdiscipline of the ethics of property law. I think that this view presents an inadequate, one-sided description of the area of moral problems that an ethics of copying is concerned with. The ethics of copying is certainly not only concerned with property rights, but covers a much more comprehensive area of moral problems. I will discuss two examples. Let us first take a look at acts of cultural appropriation. Because of the deep entrenchment of copy processes in our individual and cultural development that I have mentioned before, acts of cultural appropriation form a paradigmatic class of acts of copying. The discussion about the moral permissibility of cultural appropriation not only concerns questions of property rights. On the contrary, it is highly controversial whether it is possible to own the relevant parts of cultural heritage. I will illustrate this point with the example of white musicians who appropriated the blues. “Can white people play the blues?”, Joel Rudinow asked.15 It is true: the blues is a style of music that was developed by musicians mostly descended from African-American culture. But even if this style of music was essentially shaped and advanced by musicians such as Bessie Smith, Charlie Patton, Muddy Waters, T-Bone Walker, John Lee Hooker etc., this group of people is merely a part of, but not co-extensive with, the “African-American community.”16 It is therefore unclear 15  Joel Rudinow, Race, Ethnicity, Expressive Authenticity: Can White People Sing the Blues? Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 52 (1994), pp. 127 – 137. 16  Id. at p. 130.

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why the African-American community (and which African-American community exactly) should be seen as the legitimate heirs and exclusive owners of the blues. Moreover, it is questionable whether it is ever possible to own a style of music like blues, reggae, hip hop, and so on.17 After all, a style of music is no concrete composition or work of music that could be protected by copyright. Maisha Johnson gives nine answers to the question: “What’s wrong with cultural appropriation?”18 Only some of these answers have something to do with property claims. Besides, there is the problem of a latent racist attitude against other cultures: some appropriators value the artifacts of other cultures more than the human beings belonging to that culture. Appropriation can also lead to the perpetuation of racist stereotypes. It can result in biased and trivialized reproductions of those parts of cultural heritage that are of great importance and value for the people of the particular culture. To sum up: even if no property claims are violated in cultural appropriation, we should also acknowledge the respect and esteem for other cultures in order to determine the limits of morally permissible and morally desirable acts of appropriation. Andreas Bruns discusses this issue in more detail than I can do at this point.19 In certain contexts of retributive justice, the issue of the legitimacy of copying is also relevant. One example is the common law distinction between slander and libel. Both terms refer to acts of defamation, i.e. acts of uttering falsehoods in order to make people form a negative opinion of another person or institution. But while slander refers to oral or verbal acts of defamation, libel only refers to acts performed in the written form. In the present context, it is crucial that the latter kind of acts are acts of copying, whereas the former are not.20 Apparently, the common law tradition considered it normatively relevant whether an act of defamation involved the production or dissemination of copies of defamatory speech or signs. One reason might be that written texts or other reproducible artifacts could be the basis for further copy processes which enhance the effects of a single act of defamation – especially with the aid of the printing press or modern digital mass media. As the examples of cultural appropriation and slander versus libel show, moral problems in the ethics of copying are not restricted to the protection of property rights. On the contrary, we are facing a great variety of moral problems in this area. The claim that the ethics of copying is merely a highly specified subdiscipline or subject area is therefore easily refuted. The diversity of moral problems associated 17 See Reinold Schmücker, Stil als (geistiges) Eigentum?, in: Julian Blunk / Tanja Michalsky (eds.), Stil als (geistiges) Eigentum, Munich 2018, 287 – 300. 18  Maisha Z. Johnson, What’s Wrong with Cultural Appropriation? These 9 Answers Reveal its Harm, published 14 June 2015, https://everydayfeminism.com/2015/06/cultural-appropria tion-wrong (last access: 23 July 2018). 19  Andreas Bruns, What is Wrong with Copying from Other Cultures?, present volume, pp. 25 – 37. 20 Cf. Eberhard Ortland, A Moral Need for Censorship, Access Restrictions, and Surveillance? The Ethics of Copying and the Freedom of Communication, present volume, pp. 125 –  178.

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with acts of copying rather suggests the following objection: the moral problems that are relevant here are far too diverse to serve as a basis for a sufficiently unified domain-specific ethics. The term “ethics of copying” is more of an ‘umbrella term’ for various problem areas of moral agency. To my mind, a paradigmatic example for an ‘umbrella term’ of this kind is socalled ‘neuroethics’. Neuroethics includes, as Adina Roskies writes in her article “Neuroethics for the new millennium”,21 two intimately connected research areas: the ethics of neuroscience and the neuroscience of ethics. This characterization sounds attractive, but it is misguided for methodological reasons. The slogan refers to research in different subject areas, which have already been discussed in very different scientific disciplines inside and outside of applied ethics. They range from normative questions of neuro-enhancement and the adequate treatment of human beings with psychiatric disorders to question of the moral permissibility of neuroscientific research and the empirical examination of the neurological bases of morally relevant capabilities such as control of the will, moral responsibility, and the status of a person. Fritz Allhoff 22 mentions another example for the rather loose way of talking about certain domain-specific branches of “ethics”: [B]usiness ethics does not exist as a genuine field of study. The stakeholder / shareholder debate is not much more sophisticated than classical questions in distributive justice: who owes what and to whom? Business ethics, then, does not do any serious intellectual work that has not already been executed in this more general theoretical context. Furthermore, these questions certainly cannot be unique to business ethics.23

What is the difference between these examples and the ethics of copying? The crucial difference is that the definition of acts of copying provides a substantial and sufficiently clear-cut characterization describing the area of application of the ethics of copying in a unified way. In contrast to neuroethics or business ethics, the ethics of copying has a unified and informative description of its area of application, which is made explicit by an appropriate definition of the concept of an act of copying. As shown above, it concerns a broad range of moral problems and controversies. This combination is characteristic for any well-established domain-specific ethics – and it is also methodologically fruitful, because it facilitates the application of a two-step heuristics. In a first step, a clear-cut and informative characterization of the area of application allows for determining its definitional conditions and its contingent properties without reference to any specific moral controversies. On this basis, it is possible to, in a second step, explore and analyze the number of moral problems that are characteristic for this unified area of application. This iterative process helps distinguish between the adequate description of the problem area and its m ­ oral evaluation. It allows for discussing even dis  Adina L. Roskies, Neuroethics for the New Millennium, in: Neuron 35 (2002), pp. 21 – 23.   Fritz Allhoff, What are Applied Ethics? in: Science and Engineering Ethics 17 (2011), pp.  1 – 19. 23  Id. at p. 11. 21 22

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parate and complex problem constellations in a methodologically organized and profitable way. As my discussion has shown, the ethics of copying is different from neuroethics and business ethics in this respect and shares methodological features with other well-established domain-specific ethics such as clinical ethics, research ethics, and animal ethics. IV. Conclusion In this paper, I have, first, explicated and justified three methodological requirements that every domain-specific ethics should fulfil. Second, I have presented several reasons for why the ethics of copying fulfills all of these requirements. Admittedly, the three requirements are merely necessary methodological presuppositions; I have given no argument to accept them as jointly sufficient. These requirements certainly need to be further clarified and even supplemented by additional requirements. But the main aim of my argumentation has been reached: even if the requirements do not provide a comprehensive definition of a methodologically justified domain-specific ethics, they provide a criterion of demarcation. This criterion allows for individuating different domain-specific ethics on the basis of their areas of application. It allows for differentiating between domain-specific ethics, more specialized research topics, and mere ‘umbrella terms’ like “neuroethics” or “business ethics”. The reference to the three requirements therefore suffices for answering my core question affirmatively: the requirements provide three methodological reasons for demarcating the ethics of copying from other domain-specific ethics and for acknowledging it as an independent domain-specific ethics. Zusammenfassung Gibt es gute heuristische bzw. methodologische Gründe, die Ethik des Kopierens als eine eigenständige Bereichsethik anzusehen? Der Beitrag gibt darauf eine Antwort, indem er den methodologischen Status der Ethik des Kopierens erörtert und drei Kriterien expliziert, denen jede Bereichsethik in methodologischer Hinsicht genügen sollte: (1) Sie bedarf eines klar abgrenzbaren Anwendungsbereichs, der (2) durch einen moralisch relevanten Aspekt definiert ist und (3) moralische Probleme umfasst, die zumindest in einem gewissen Maß von den moralischen Problemen unabhängig sind, die andere Bereichsethiken bearbeiten. Es wird gezeigt, dass die Ethik des Kopierens alle drei Anforderungen erfüllt und deshalb als eine spezifisch auf Kopierhandlungen bezogene Bereichsethik angesehen werden kann.

What is Wrong with Copying from Other Cultures?1 Andreas Bruns I. Introduction The project of an ethics of copying tends to be broad in scope. It does not seem to be limited to moral problems that arise with regard to the theory and practice of copyright law.2 It rather concerns a wide range of issues, not all of which require comprehensive legal regulations. For instance, practices of copying from other cultures continue to be the subject of social media discussions about the harms of socalled “cultural appropriation”. Generally speaking, persons who copy ideas, symbols, styles, customs, practices, language, or expressions from a culture that is not their own are said to engage in cultural appropriation. Over the past decades, many of these practices of cross-cultural copying have been the subject of sharp criticism. Among the recurring examples are the development and popularization of musical genres, such as rock ’n’ roll, where white musicians appropriated tunes or playing techniques from African culture; the capitalization of the cultural heritage of traditional communities by Western companies like Walt Disney; and the misuse of traditional clothing styles, wearable symbols, cultural expressions, and the like outside of their original cultural context. These are specific examples; but it is obvious that all of us are constantly engaging in cultural appropriation. We practice body exercises and sports that originate from other cultures; we copy foreign expressions of all sorts, be it because we do not have our own expressions of this sort or because we seek for alternative ways to express ourselves; we have customs and traditions that are highly influenced by those of other cultures; we mix our own culinary culture with foreign cuisines; and we adorn ourselves with objects and styles from other cultures. However, critics3 of cultural appropriation have expressed serious concerns about its potential to support historical injustice and asymmetric power relations 1  I would like to thank the members of the ZiF research group on The Ethics of Copying and the participants of the conference “Copy Ethics: Theory and Practice” (for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper, I would like to thank Eberhard Ortland and Michael Weh). 2  See also Martin Hoffmann, Why There Is an Ethics of Copying, present volume, pp. 11 –23. 3  The harms of cultural appropriation have been discussed by a number of scholars in philosophy and other disciplines, but more extensively by writers outside of academic areas. When I talk about criticizing cultural appropriation, I mainly refer to articles in blogs and online magazines that constitute a large part of the public discourse on cultural appropriation. One

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between different cultural groups and to contribute to the ongoing oppression of cultural minorities in post-colonial societies. In contrast to desirable forms of cultural exchange and appreciation, cultural appropriation is said to express colonialist attitudes towards minority cultures and their members. Therefore, actions, such as wearing dreadlocks, practicing yoga or wearing foreign cultural symbols as part of costumes, are considered to be morally objectionable qua cultural appropriation. Philosophers have had comparatively little to say about cultural appropriation as a moral problem. James O. Young, who is one of the few exceptions, has stated that the “many difficult and pressing aesthetic and moral issues raised by cultural appropriation cannot be resolved without the contributions of philosophers”.4 This admittedly strong assumption aside, there are reasons to believe that cultural appropriation is, among other things, a moral issue that requires ethical clarification. Cultural appropriation describes a kind of conduct that has the potential to harm or offend others, to interfere with our moral beliefs on mutual respect, equality or social justice, and that lacks legal regulations. (The latter aspect is not necessary for rendering cultural appropriation a moral problem, but it might be argued that moral considerations become increasingly important as there are no strict legal regulations.) The purpose of this paper is an analysis5 of the concept of cultural appropriation and of what I will call the generalized objection against this type of copying practices. I will argue that, in principle, no conduct is morally objectionable just because it involves an act of cultural appropriation; that is to say, acts of cultural appropriation are not wrong qua cultural appropriation. Instead, the wrong-making features of cultural appropriation are contingent features of individual actions. In section II, I will introduce two different ways of defining cultural appropriation, one of which, the normative definition, gives rise to the generalized objection. I will give an account of this objection and of how individual actions connect to the mechanisms of harmful misrepresentation and trivialization of other cultures and their history in section III. In sections IV and V, I will outline two substantial flaws of the generalized objection: first, that it seems to apply the concept of cultural appropriation in a way that leads to an unacceptable version of cultural essentialism; and, second, that it entails an unjustified transfiguration of the concept of appropriation. To conclude, I will suggest that we give up the idea that the concept of cultural appropriation enables us to pass normative judgements about individual reason for this is that I do not want to discuss the topic in relation to the arts in particular, as some scholars have already done. Another reason is that I believe that, since the public discourse is dominated by non-scholarly sources, these sources should not be ignored. 4  James O. Young, Cultural Appropriation and the Arts, Oxford 2010, p. 2. 5  It should be mentioned here that it seems impossible to provide an analysis that will be accepted as neutral. Due to the special character of the topic, every attempt to provide such a neutral analysis would be criticized for being influenced by the cultural socialization of the authors of such an attempt. Of course, this is not to say that there is no point in attempting to take an impartial view on the topic of cultural appropriation at all.

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actions. Instead, we should focus on the mechanisms and social relations critics of cultural appropriation justifiably refer to. II. The Concept of Cultural Appropriation I will first introduce two ways of defining cultural appropriation. Both definitions continue to appear in academic and non-academic sources, but they motivate rather different views of what cultural appropriation is all about. The first definition was circumscribed above: D NEU People engage in cultural appropriation if they copy elements of a culture that is not their own or if they copy elements of a culture they can be said to have no direct connection to. I call this the neutral definition of cultural appropriation. What appears to be problematic at first sight is the notion of (not) owning or having a (no) direct connection to a particular culture. In fact, one might question the view that cultures are the sort of objects that can be owned or that people can be directly or not directly connected to a culture. The same sort of doubt obviously arises if we refer to people as members (non-members) or insiders (outsiders) of a given culture. The idea that cultures are similar to clubs or nations in there being such a thing as participat­ ing in a culture – described as a form of membership or culture-ship (equivalent to citizenship) – is at least in need of further explanation. I will address this issue in section IV. For now, I will only say that I do not believe that there is any way of expressing the idea of cultural appropriation without making use of phrases such as “C is (not) x’s own culture”, “x is (not) a member of culture C”, or “x is an insider (outsider) of culture C”. The reason is that the concept of cultural appropriation seems to be based on the idea that it is possible to map people or groups of people onto cultures in one way or another. Hence, no definition of cultural appropriation can do without a phrase that is expressive of this very idea.6 There is a reason for using the verb to “copy” instead of to “adopt” or to “borrow”, which are commonly used terms for describing acts of cultural appropriation. Without defining what exactly copying is, I hold that acts of cultural appropriation can be adequately described as instances of copying insofar as an agent establishes a feature of herself, or of something she produces, that is non-accidentally similar to an element of another culture. There might not be a notable advantage in using the term “copy” rather than one of the other terms besides the implication that there is a specific relation between the feature that the agent establishes and the cultural element that it is non-accidentally similar to. Most objections against cultural ap6  Thus, I agree with Young in that the concept of cultural appropriation “has no application unless insiders and outsiders, members and non-members of a culture, can be distinguished”; James O. Young, Profound Offence and Cultural Appropriation, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 63 (2005), pp. 135 – 146: p. 136.

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propriation point us to the fact that what people are appropriating originates from another culture or has originally been used in a different cultural context. Although it would be going too far to speak of this relation as the relation between original and copy – for it cannot be claimed that, in each case, the cultural elements in question are originals in the proper sense – accusations of cultural appropriation usually rely on the claim that the things that are appropriated originally come from another cultural context. The understanding of cultural appropriation as a form of copying seems to be, at least to some extent, suggested by the concept itself. According to the above definition, all of the following are instances of cultural appropriation: (A) Native American cultural symbols, such as the war bonnet, are worn as parts of Native American costumes on Halloween or Carnival. (B) Dreadlocks are a popular hair style among young people in Europe. (C) Indian yoga has become a popular workout technique in many Western countries. (D) Italian pizza is served and eaten all over the world. (E) Traditional German Christmas markets are an essential part of pre-Christmas celebrations in the United Kingdom and elsewhere outside of Germany. (Many of us are likely to have strong intuitions that some of these actions are much less problematic than others. However, it is important to notice that all of them are instances of cultural appropriation under the above definition.) There is a second way of defining cultural appropriation that can be understood as a normative specification of D NEU: D NOR People engage in cultural appropriation if they are members of a dominant culture and copy elements of a cultural group, the members of which have been systematically oppressed or socially marginalized. I call this the normative definition. In contrast to DNEU, D NOR requires an asymmetric relation between the involved cultural groups that is (normatively) characterized as a dominant / dominated relation. According to D NEU, members of different cultures may reciprocally copy elements from each other’s cultures, thereby engaging in a form of cultural exchange. According to D NOR, however, cultural appropriation refers to a particular “power dynamic”7, in which members of dominant cultural groups (constantly) copy cultural symbols, traditions, and the way of life of people who suffer from discrimination and marginalization in the society they live in. Not all of the examples given above are instances of cultural appropriation in the sense of D NOR. Whereas examples A, B, and C would still be instances of cultural appropriation, D and E would not, since the appropriated elements (a traditional Italian dish and a German Christmas tradition) do generally not belong to cultural groups, the members of which have been systematically oppressed.

7 See Maisha Z. Johnson, What’s Wrong with Cultural Appropriation? These 9 Answers Reveal Its Harm, Everyday Feminism 2015, http://everydayfeminism.com/2015/06/culturalappropriation-wrong (last access: 30 January 2018).

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Both definitions of cultural appropriation continue to appear in the relevant discourse. For instance, James O. Young defines cultural appropriation in the sense of D NEU as “the taking of something produced by members of one culture by members of another” and as any act of appropriation that “occurs across the boundaries of cultures”.8 However, non-academic discussions are dominated by the normative definition. Most articles on the topic maintain that cultural appropriation occurs only if members of a cultural majority appropriate elements of oppressed cultural groups. The normative definition gives rise to an objection against cultural appropriation that generalizes actions as morally wrong qua cultural appropriation. III. Misery and Its Costumes Critics take cultural appropriation to refer to unjust historical relations between one culture or cultural group and another. Colonial powers unquestionably used to exploit indigenous peoples not only by taking possession of their territory, natural resources or manpower, but also by appropriating elements of their cultural heritage.9 Cultural appropriation is taken to sustain these asymmetric power relations by establishing “a particular power dynamic” of a similar structure, “in which members of a dominant culture take elements from a culture of people who have been systematically oppressed by that dominant group.”10 In turn, practices of cultural appropriation seem to presuppose historical injustice and the asymmetric power relations they are said to sustain. The connection between cultural appropriation and historical injustice, oppression and asymmetric power distribution is taken to be the distinctive feature of cultural appropriation in relation to cultural exchange, which is a symmetric relation, and to what is often called “cultural assimilation”. If cultural minorities assimilated elements of the majority culture, they would do so in order to survive within the given conditions of the society they live in, as these conditions were determined by the cultural majority. If there was anything to object against cultural assimilation at all, it would be that minorities are forced to assimilate the way of life of dominant cultural groups in the first place.11 In any case, a great deal of the unease about cultural appropriation seems to derive from the historical perspective that many of the things that are appropriated were originally used by cultural minorities as symbols of their struggle against the oppression they suffered from; and that these things are 8  Young, Profound Offence and Cultural Appropriation (supra, n. 6), p. 136, and Young, Cultural Appropriation and the Arts (supra, n. 4), p. 5. 9  See, for example, Geoffrey Scarre, The Repatriation of Human Remains, in: James O. Young / Conrad G. Brunk (eds.), The Ethics of Cultural Appropriation, Oxford 2012, pp. 72 – 92: p. 76. 10  Johnson, What’s Wrong (supra, n. 7). 11 See Eden Caceda, Our Cultures Are Not Your Costumes, in: The Sydney Morning Herald, 14 November 2014, http://www.smh.com.au/comment/our-cultures-are-not-your-costumes20141114-11myp4.html (last access: 30 January 2018).

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sometimes appropriated by people who come from a cultural background similar to that of the oppressors. An example might serve to show how cultural appropriation can be said to harm, offend and discriminate certain cultural groups. For instance, many have criticized the cultural portraits produced by the Walt Disney studios. The movie Pocahon­ tas (1995) has become one of the main references of the criticism against cultural appropriation for turning the real story of the Native American woman, who lived between 1595 and 1617 in Virginia, into a love story that leaves out the violence and mistreatment she and her people had undergone during the English colonialization of America. Earlier, “Disney executives had already faced criticism from Arab American groups for Aladdin’s (1992) offensive song lyrics that depicted Mideastern culture as violent” and from African Americans and Hispanics who “objected to The Lion King’s (1994) three hooligan hyenas that appeared to be thinly disguised inner-city characters”.12 Disney’s portrayal of Native Americans had already been subject to criticism with regard to the appearance of the “Red Men” in Peter Pan (1953). Objections to these and other narratives typically refer to their potential to trivialize the misery suffered by traditional communities in the time of colonialism and beyond, to perpetuate racist cultural stereotypes and to construct offensive misrepresentations of cultural groups.13 All of these can be causes of the ongoing discrimination of a cultural minority, for example, in employment or education.14 If narratives produced by the cultural majority become a society’s main reference to a particular culture, that whole culture is reduced to fancy clothing styles and exotic ways of living. This will eventually result in the “cultural alienation” of people whose cultures are trivialized in the above sense: they risk abandoning their own cultural background.15 However, accusations of cultural appropriation are not necessarily and not even primarily directed at the people who produce and popularize such narratives. It is essential to the recent discourse about cultural appropriation that it particularly concerns the question whether individual actions, such as wearing costumes or hairstyles of a certain kind, are morally wrong because they are inevitably puzzle pieces of a bigger picture concerning how cultural minorities suffer from exploitation and discrimination until today. Consider the question whether it might be ob12  Angela Aleiss, Making the White Man’s Indian. Native Americans and Hollywood ­Movies, London 2005, p. 150. In this light, it might be even more surprising that Disney studios had intended to be more careful when designing Native American characters for “Pocahontas”. 13  See, for example, Johnson, What’s Wrong (supra, n. 7) and Zoya Patel, How to Appreciate a Culture Without Appropriating It, in: i-D 2016, https://i-d.vice.com/en_us/article/zmx5dx/ how-to-appreciate-a-culture-without-appropriating-it (last access: 30 January 2018). 14 See Young, Cultural Appropriation and the Arts (supra, n. 4), p. 25. 15  For an explication of the concept of cultural alienation see Bill Ashcroft / Gareth Griffiths / Helen Tiffin, The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Post-Colonial Literature, London / New York 2002.

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jectionable to wear a Pocahontas costume on Halloween or Carnival. You might not think so. But consider the following analogy: We don’t hear the real stories, and most of us don’t live with a direct connection to their suffering. Does the truth matter, when it comes to a little girl just trying to enjoy a holiday? You might think it does if she wanted to dress up as someone whose tragic truth is more familiar, like Anne Frank. They’re both girls with harrowing stories. But more of us believe that trivialising Anne Frank’s life is in very poor taste. Can you imagine the outcry if Disney tried to romanticise her diary by aging her into a young woman with a love affair with a Nazi officer and a happy ending? Now imagine if that Disney movie was mainstream culture’s primary reference for the Holocaust. And if it was marketed to Germans, who were told that the historical figures who oppressed the Jewish people were their country’s heroes. Creepy, right?16

Another example concerns the question whether it is wrong for white people to wear dreadlocks. Dreadlocks are a popular hairstyle, especially among young people throughout Central Europe and in the United States. However, one might criticize their use of the hair style as a harmful interaction with the cultural her­itage of others. The origin of the style as it is used in Western societies, and its name in particular, seems to lie in the Rastafari movement that emerged in Jamaica in the 1930s. In the context of fighting against the oppression of the black community in Jamaica, dreadlocks were “supposed to indicate the awful and dire conditions of their lives as well as to communicate the fear they wished to generate in the hearts of their oppressors.” They also indicated a “commitment to natural living […], as opposed to what they perceived as the unnaturalness of the proffered European standard of beauty.”17 White people who wear dreadlocks might therefore be criticized for turning a cultural symbol that originally refers to a cultural group’s struggle against oppression into a mere matter of fashion and, eventually, for trivializing the history of that cultural group. From what I have said so far it does not follow that wearing a Pocahontas costume or having dreadlocks are morally objectionable actions in themselves. However, critics appear to agree on the conclusion that, due to the bigger picture of what these actions mean in the context of past and present circumstances of social injustice, all actions that are instances of cultural appropriation in the sense of D NOR are morally objectionable.18 In other words, they appear to agree on the conclusion   Johnson, What’s Wrong (supra, n. 7).   Ennis B. Edmonds / Michelle A. Gonzales, Caribbean Religious History. An Introduction, New York 2010, p. 188. 18  See, for example, Kjerstin Johnson, Don’t Mess Up When You Dress Up: Cultural Appropriation and Costumes, in: Bitch Media 2011, https://www.bitchmedia.org/post/cos tume-cultural-appropriation (last access: 30 January 2018); Caceda, Our Cultures Are Not Your Costumes (supra, n. 11); Maisha Z. Johnson, What’s Wrong (supra, n. 7) and Nadra K. Nittle, Why You Should Avoid Racist Halloween Costumes, ThoughtCo 2017, https://www. thoughtco.com/avoid-racially-offensive-halloween-costumes-2834949 (last access: 30 January 2018). 16 17

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that these actions are wrong qua cultural appropriation. I call this the generalized objection against cultural appropriation. In the following two sections, I will call attention to two major flaws of the generalized objection. IV. A Road to Cultural Essentialism The generalized objection entails that the cultural imprint or background of persons is of vital importance and makes all the difference concerning what they may or may not appropriate. Thus, the concept of culture is obviously relevant to the discussion, though it is non-self-explanatory. In explaining it, many have referred to the anthropologist Edward B. Tylor, who has stated that a culture, in its most fundamental sense, is “that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, arts, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.”19 Similarly, in the 20th century, Thomas S. Eliot has defined culture as “the whole way of life of a people, from birth to the grave”.20 Following these definitions, any given group of people who share such capabilities and ­habits – in short, the same “way of life” – can be said to share the same culture. Accordingly, any other people who do not share these features are outsiders of that culture. I call this the traditional concept of culture. As Wolfgang Welsch has pointed out, the traditional concept is the basis of modern cultural analysis, which proceeds from the idea that cultures are clearly demarcated distinct entities in analyzing the ways in which those entities can communicate and come into contact with one another.21 The traditional concept has long been the dominant understanding of cultures and is still widely employed. For example, Young explicitly refers to Tylor’s definition and holds that cultural appropriation is a subtype of appropriation “that occurs across the boundaries of cultures”.22 This concept, however, is certainly not suitable for cultural analysis today. We experience cultural traits to be blended and shared by people who do not share the same “way of life” or “life form”. Often enough it seems extremely difficult, if not impossible, to describe a given culture by reference to its essential features. The same applies to the identification of the traits that constitute a culture. Individuals are often related to more than one culture in complex ways. The traditional concept takes culture to be a matter of observable behavior by a certain group of people. 19  Edward B. Tylor, Primitive Culture. Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Art, and Custom, vol. 1, London 1871, p. 1. 20  Thomas S. Eliot, Notes Towards the Definition of Culture, London 2010, p. 29. 21 See Wolfgang Welsch, Transkulturalität. Lebensformen nach der Auflösung der Kulturen, Information Philosophie 1992, no. 2, pp. 5 – 20: p. 5. 22  Young, Cultural Appropriation and the Arts (supra, n. 4), p. 5. One does not have to take the term “boundaries” literally to see how it refers to the traditional understanding of cultures as clearly demarcated entities. It is also closely linked to the idea that cultures are somehow spatially located, for the traditional concept is based on what has been called “national” or “regional cultures”.

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However, many of us might think that this is rather a matter of how people feel about their origin or the social context they were born into; or where they believe to belong. Besides, people differ in how relevant aspects of their origin are to them. For some, their cultural identity might be essential to their personal identity; for others, this plays no important role. Young, for instance, is aware of the fact that “cultures are seldom, if ever, static and unchanging”23 and therefore defines culture as a “family resemblance” concept in the Wittgensteinian sense: “A culture is simply a collection of people who share a certain range of cultural traits.”24 It is arguably not very helpful to refer to “cultural” traits in defining what it means that people share the same “culture”. More importantly, the definition of cultures in terms of family resemblance does not differ strongly from the traditional concept. Following Young’s analysis of particular cultural groups,25 it is still necessary to identify at least a small set of traits that constitute the family resemblance, which, in turn, must be sufficient to constitute cultural membership and non-membership, if claims of the sort “x belongs to culture C and y does not belong to culture C” are to make any sense. There are good reasons to be more fundamentally doubtful about the traditional concept of culture. Anthony Appiah has called attention to the fact that the concept of culture itself is an export of Western civilization: These days, in the context of globalization, people have been inclined to fret about the export of Western culture; but among the most successful Western cultural imports has been the concept of culture itself.26

The idea that communities or groups of human beings possess something like a culture emerged rather recently in modern Western civilization. Against this background, the traditional concept of culture faces another problem. It seems that, in order to identify cultural traits, the internal standpoint of the members of that culture is particularly relevant. One flaw of the traditional concept is that it defines cultures from an observer’s perspective. However, if the concept of culture itself is not shared by different groups of people who are considered to be different cultural groups, does it make sense to attempt to identify different cultures at all? Objections of this sort do not necessarily make the discussion about cultural appropriation obsolete. They do, however, show that the concept of cultural appropriation, understood in the sense of D NOR, might easily impose an implausible or even harmful version of cultural essentialism. This essentialism holds that (i) cultures can be demarcated from one another and (ii) form a unity of people who share a common way of life, (iii) that people are born with a direct connection   Young, Cultural Appropriation and the Arts (supra, n. 4), p. 12.   Ibid., p. 15. 25 See Erich H. Matthes, Cultural Appropriation Without Cultural Essentialism?, Social Theory and Practice 42 (2016), pp. 343 – 366: p. 358 et seq. 26  Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Ethics of Identity, Princeton, NJ 2005, p. 119. 23 24

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and bond to their culture and with (iv) a natural claim to their cultural heritage. All of these claims are problematic. Some authors have argued that the concept of cultural appropriation, as it is based on essentialist distinctions between insiders and outsiders, members and non-members, is running the risk of “causing harm of a similar kind to the appropriations to which they are objecting” by constructing “common understandings of ‘real’ and ‘authentic’ group members that serve to disenfranchise those who do not meet all the relevant criteria.”27 If this is true, the concept of cultural appropriation disseminates cultural stereotypes in a similarly objectionable way as the practices of appropriation it tries to mark as harmful. In its most harmful version, cultural essentialism may result in a form of cultural racism that holds that cultures should be kept pure and separate from each other.28 It is hard to see how the concept of cultural appropriation might ever be applied in a non-essentialist way. The dilemma here is similar to what Alan Patten has called the “dilemma of multiculturalism”.29 Either culture is understood in an essentialist way, in which case the concept of cultural appropriation leads to an unacceptable notion of cultures; or culture is understood in a non-essentialist way, in which case the concept of cultural appropriation fails to provide any basis for normative judgments about acts of appropriation from other cultures. The most promising way out of this dilemma seems to be to give up the idea that the concept of cultural appropriation provides any basis for normative judgements about individual actions that require a distinction between members and non-members of certain cultures. V. Copying from Other Cultures as Appropriation The term “cultural appropriation” seems to suggest that there are two concepts, “culture” and “appropriation”, that are central to the discussion. However, while many authors have commented on the concept of culture, much less attention has been paid to the concept of appropriation. In this section, I will examine this concept and raise the question of how acts of copying should be conceptualized as appropriation in the context of cultural appropriation. Besides cultural appropriation as a form of copying, there are also other forms of cultural appropriation, for instance, if colonialists take culturally significant objects and display them in European museums.30 I will argue in this section that a historically shaped understanding of appropriation shows that it is a concept that cannot plausibly be  See Matthes, Cultural Appropriation (supra, n. 25), pp. 346, 355 et seq.   This is also pointed out by Welsch, Transkulturalität (supra, n. 21), p. 8. 29 See Alan Patten, Equal Recognition: The Moral Foundations of Minority Rights, Princeton, NJ 2014, p. 39. 30  In Young’s terms, this would be an instance of “object appropriation” (cf. Young, Cultural Appropriation and the Arts, supra, n. 4, p. 5 – 7). Depending on the circumstances, object appropriation might be regarded theft. 27 28

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applied to all of the types of copying mentioned before. Moreover, the generalized objection against cultural appropriation is based on an implausible application of the concept of appropriation. First some brief remarks about the history of the concept. The term appropriation originated in Stoic teleology and originally referred to the natural inclination of living beings to acquire the essentials of life, such as food. In the modern tradition of liberal philosophy, the concept of appropriation played a major role in explaining the emergence of private property. The best-known theory of appropriation in this context is probably John Locke’s labor theory of private property. However, it is an instructive fact that Locke has also frequently used the term in the context of his theory of personal identity. As John Mackie puts it, Locke’s theory of personal identity could indeed be described as a theory of “action appropriation”.31 For Locke, what constitutes personal identity over time is not that my present self is made up of the same substances as my past self, but that I am “concerned” and “justly accountable” for any past actions that are “appropriated to me” – i.e., that I am able to appropriate past events as actions of mine.32 Apart from that, appropriation has often been understood as directed at the acquisition of immaterial goods such as knowledge, ideas, language, and skills. We talk, for instance, of Marx’ appropriation of Hegel, meaning that Marx has borrowed and internalized some of Hegel’s ideas (before he eventually moved away from them); or of someone who acquires a foreign language or a particular skill, e.g., how to play an instrument. As Rahel Jaeggi puts it: As opposed to the mere learning of certain contents, talk of appropriation emphasizes that something is not merely passively taken up but actively worked through and independently assimilated. In contrast to merely theoretical insight into some issue, appropriation – comparable to the psycho-analytic process of ‘working through’ – means that one can ‘deal with’ what one knows, that it stands at one’s disposal as knowledge and that one really and practically has command over it. And appropriating a role means more than being able to fill it: one is, we could say, identified with it. Something that we appropriate does not remain external to ourselves. […] This suggests a kind of introjection and a mixing of oneself with the objects of appropriation.33

There is a tension here between the concept of appropriation as described in this passage and the way in which the generalized objection against cultural appropriation specifies it. The generalized objection even uses the concept antithetically to the historically shaped concept of appropriation, because it frames cultural ap­ propriation solely as taking something that belongs to, or originates from, another culture. In fact, following the historically shaped concept, I do not appropriate a particular hairstyle when I merely copy it – I just make my own hair look similar to the style.   John L. Mackie, Problems From Locke, Oxford 1976, p. 183.  See John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, London 1836, p. 230. 33  Rahel Jaeggi, Alienation, New York 2014, p. 38. 31 32

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This becomes even more apparent given the argument that cultural appropriation might lead to the alienation of people from their cultural heritage; for alien­ ation can be regarded as the counterpart of appropriation. In this context, alienation refers to a certain state of being, a state of indifference or internal division “with respect to oneself or to a world experienced as indifferent and alien.” Alienation is the inability to (re-)establish a relation to certain things that one should be able to appropriate. The concept allows us “to diagnose various ways in which relations of appropriation are disturbed.”34 Alienation is therefore more adequately understood as a result of disturbed relations of appropriation, and not as a result of appropriation itself. I am not arguing that a given act of cultural appropriation is unproblematic if it is merely an actual act of appropriation in the sense of the historically shaped concept. However, it is remarkable that the generalized objection against cultural appropriation seems to deny that instances where an agent actually appropriates something, i.e., not merely takes it, do not fall under the concept of appropriation at all. The judgement that acts of cultural appropriation are ipso facto morally objectionable seems to be based on the assumption that, in each case, someone merely takes something that one has no right to acquire. Thus, the generalized objection against cultural appropriation is based on an unfounded transfiguration or distortion of the concept of appropriation. If we assess acts of cultural appropriation and make judgements about their ­ oral qualities, it might play an important role whether something is merely adoptm ed in an unreflected way or if it is appropriated. Whether a given action should be considered to be an appropriation is a matter of how something is copied and used. This is a relevant feature of the action in terms of assessing its moral quality as well. There is a normative difference between a person who is indifferent towards, or even dismissive of, members of other cultures and who merely takes and misuses their cultural symbols and a person who appropriates a cultural symbol that is alien to her in order to establish a relation to something that she values.35

  Ibid., pp. 1, 151.   Matthes, Cultural Appropriation (supra, n. 25), p. 366, argues that “reasons to value other cultures should, properly regarded, lead us to take more seriously claims about appropriation, rather than mistakenly elevating such reasons to entitlement concerning use and possession.” But it is not necessarily true that reasons for valuing another culture should make us take accusations of cultural appropriation more seriously. The mere fact that someone accuses someone else of something does not guarantee that the former person has a good reason for doing so. What seems true is that we should take accusations of cultural appropriation seriously, if they generate reasonable claims on what we may or may not do; but this is an entirely different matter. 34 35

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VI. Conclusion Individual acts of cultural appropriation can be morally objectionable if they reveal a lack of respect for members of other cultures, or if they are meant to infringe, abuse or discriminate them. In so far, they do not differ from any other act of discrimination; and, as to its moral qualities, it does not seem to matter whether an act of discrimination involves cultural appropriation or not. We should equally be concerned about supraindividual mechanisms that contribute to the ongoing oppression and marginalization of cultural minorities. However, the concept of cultural appropriation does not provide a suitable basis for normative judgements about individual copying actions. The scandalization of acts of cultural appropriation as being morally wrong qua cultural appropriation relies on the claim that certain elements of a culture’s heritage are so important to the members of that culture that they must not be appropriated by any non-members. Against this background, the scandalisation of cultural appropriation could be described as “a secular version of the charge of blasphemy”.36 It fulfils a gatekeeping function instead of challenging actual systems of oppression. On the contrary, cultural appropriation has become a central concept of the struggle against these systems. The value of this concept, however, does not consist in its capacity to expose individual actions of copying from another culture as morally objectionable, but in its function to reveal and analyze systems of oppression and marginalization and how we potentially live in tacit accordance with these systems. Zusammenfassung ‚Kulturelle Aneignung‘ ist heute ein zentraler Begriff im Kampf gegen Systeme der Unterdrückung und Marginalisierung kultureller Minderheiten in postkolonialen Gesellschaften. Unter ‚kultureller Aneignung‘ wird dabei die Verwendung oder Nachahmung von Artefakten außerhalb ihres ursprünglichen kulturellen Kontexts verstanden, insbesondere von Artefakten kultureller Minderheiten durch Angehörige dominanter Kulturen. Der Beitrag setzt sich kritisch mit der gegenwärtig verstärkt zu beobachtenden Skandalisierung von kultureller Aneignung auseinander. Gezeigt wird, dass individuelle Handlungen nicht schon deshalb als moralisch falsch angesehen werden können, weil sie sich als Akte kultureller Aneignung begreifen lassen. Der Wert des Konzepts kultureller Aneignung scheint vielmehr darin zu bestehen, dass es uns erlaubt, bestimmte überindividuelle Macht- und Diskriminierungsverhältnisse als solche zu identifizieren und in unterschiedlichen sozialen und politischen Kontexten erkennbar und kritisierbar zu machen.

36 See Kenan Malik, In Defense of Cultural Appropriation, The New York Times, 14 June 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/14/opinion / in-defense-of-cultural-appropriation.html (last access: 30 January 2018).

The Ethics of Citations and Partial Copying Thomas Dreier

„Art belongs to everybody and nobody. Art belongs to all time and no time. Art belongs to those who create it and those who savour it.” Julian Barnes, The Noise of Time

Citations and partial copying are both forms of copying which merit special attention when formulating an ethics of copying. This raises questions such as: can the formulation of an ethics of copying benefit from the analysis of the ethics of citations and partial copying? On what grounds can one formulate moral rules concerning the legitimacy or illegitimacy of practices like making citations and partial copies? And how do existing legal rules – that formulate which acts of copying are only allowed with the consent of the copyright holder and which are not – relate to moral rules concerning the acts of citing and partial copying? This paper aims at answering these questions in three steps. First, a descriptive, ontological definition of the terms citation and partial copying will be given (I). Second, the legal rules will be presented which currently regulate acts of citation and partial copying (II). Third, an ethical approach concerning citations and partial copying will be outlined (III). I. Citations and Partial Copying – a Descriptive Account According to the Oxford English Dictionary, a citation is a “quotation from or reference to a book, paper, or author, especially in a scholarly work”. A quotation, in turn, is defined as a “group of words taken from text or speech and repeated by someone other than the original author or speaker”. This sounds almost tautological: a citation is a quotation; a quotation is a citation. However, if one goes back to the Latin sources of both words, one will notice that the word citation primarily refers to the act of calling forth some source or authority in order to support a claim, whereas quotation primarily refers to the act of taking a part – a quota – from the source. Of course, citing can be understood in a broader sense than just copying – i.e., to “make a similar or identical version of; reproduce” –, including forms of reference which are not made by way of copying, but more loosely, e.g. by alluding,

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associating, invoking etc.1 However, if the only difference is the reference made, all partial copies can be understood as some form of reference and hence as citations in a wider sense. According to this understanding, the term citation would be a rath­er broad concept with fuzzy edges, and it would be in need of further internal subdivisions. Therefore, in this paper, the term citation will not be used in such a broad sense, but in its more traditional, narrow sense. By contrast, defining partial copying seems to be less difficult. “Partial” can be defined as “existing only in part; incomplete”. Since the part which characterizes a partial copy refers to the wholeness of a particular entity, one may, of course, only speak of partial copying if it has been ascertained what that entity is. In general, this is the work from which some part has been taken. But there are cases where it might be less clear what constitutes the entity in question, e.g. a whole book, a chapter, a paragraph. Finally, the verb “to copy” is defined as to “make a similar or identical version of; reproduce”.2 These definitions call for some remarks. Firstly, it is apparent that citation is a noun and partial copying a verb. Hence, the title of this paper juxtaposes an object (citation) with an action (copying). It would be more appropriate to either juxtapose two objects (citation and partial copy) or two actions (citing and partial copying). Secondly, a citation does not necessarily have to be limited to partially taking something over. Under certain circumstances, a citation can also consist in a full copy of another work. Hence, a citation might also be a copy and – as long as not the entire work is cited – a partial copy. Moreover, for a partial copy to qualify as a citation, it is not important how much of the original work has been copied. The decisive factor is rather the purpose for which a particular act of partial – or even total – copying is undertaken, i.e. the purpose of quotation. In other words: in the case of citation, what matters is the purpose of the copying – and not whether the cited work has been copied completely or only a part of it. In cases of partial copying that do not qualify as citations, the quantity of the parts that have been copied can be relevant and must be measured in relation to the entire source as well as to other materials incorporated in the new work. Moreover, since the purpose of a citation is to invoke a certain source or authority – and also to avoid any confusion between one’s own words3 and somebody 1  For example, the exhibition “The Hirsch-Index – The Art of Quotation”, held at the Karlsruhe Center for Art and Media (Zentrum für Kunst und Medien, ZKM) in 2011, encompassed all references to quotable source material, from citations in the narrow sense to the various forms of mere referencing; http://on1.zkm.de/zkm/stories/storyReader$7680 (last access: 26 February 2017). 2  https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/citation, …/quotation, …/partial, and …/copy­ ing. 3  Applying a broad sense of “speech”, as it has been established, for example, in American constitutional law concerning the “freedom of speech”, what I say with regard to words applies,

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else’s that are incorporated into one’s own speech – a citation should refer to its source and the name of the person whose speech is reported. However, identifying the source, or the name of the author of the incorporated speech, does not seem to be a necessary condition for a partial copy to qualify as a citation. In some in­ stances – e.g. in popular literature and in cases where the reference can be characterized not so much as a quotation, but rather as a form of adaptation, modification, transformation, or the like – naming the source or author may not be a customary practice. In other instances – e.g. in citing film sequences in one’s own film – it may be impractical, if not impossible, to indicate the source or name of the original author. Conversely, merely adding the source or the name of the author of the ­copied material does not necessarily turn a partial copy into a citation. The potential to distort the original speech is common to both citations and partial copies. Since the part taken from the first speech is the only part brought to the attention of the recipients of the second speech, these recipients might get a false impression of the content and character of the original speech. The risk of distortion is much lower, of course, if the cited work is copied verbatim in its entirety. II. Citations and Partial Copying as Regulated by Law In general, both the acts of citing and of partial copying are regulated by international and national copyright law (1). However, copyright is not the only body of law that defines the boundaries and hence the legitimacy of permitted citations and acts of partial copying. The fundamental freedoms (the freedoms of information, of speech, of science and the arts, but also the protection of intellectual property) granted by international conventions and resolutions on human rights (International Declaration of Human Rights; European Human Rights Convention; Charter of Fundamental rights of the EU) as well as by national constitutions also come into play. Finally, the law of science likewise addresses this issue. It might therefore be useful to examine these legal rules before formulating an ethics of citation and partial copying (2). 1. Copyright a) Citations and Copyright Citations are permitted in most, if not all, jurisdictions without a requirement to ask for permission or an obligation to pay some sort of remuneration. However, what constitutes a citation is hardly ever defined in statutory language.4 Many jumutatis mutandis, not only to verbal but also to printed communications as well as to musical and visual citations and partial – or total – copies. 4  See, e.g., Article 10 (1) and (3) of the Revised Berne Convention (BC), the international instrument governing the rights of foreign authors.

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risdictions do, however, specify the purposes for which citations shall be permitted. For instance, the EU Directive 2001/29/EC on Copyright in the Information Society, privileges “quotations for purposes such as criticism or review, provided that they relate to a work or other subject-matter which has already been lawfully made available to the public, that, unless this turns out to be impossible, the source, including the author’s name, is indicated, and that their use is in accordance with fair practice, and to the extent required by the specific purpose”.5 By contrast, US copyright law deals with citations under the more flexible general concept of fair use, which list as relevant factors “(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”6 The explanatory memoranda of the statutory regulations in general contain surprisingly little, if any, information concerning the reasons why the act of citing should not require the copyright holder’s consent or the payment of any remuneration or compensation. For instance, both the German Copyright Act of 1965 and the recent UK 2014 amendments that extend the right to make lawful quotations are more concerned with the differences between the old and the new law and, in particular, the leeway left by international and, most notably, European law regarding the possibility of extending the citation right. In their judgements, courts are usually a bit more specific. The CJEU mentions the freedom of expression as the reason justifying a limitation of exclusive reproduction rights, provided the author is named in connection with the citation,7 and the German Federal Court of Justice refers to the “interest of general cultural and scientific progress as regards the intellectual debate of other person’s opinions”.8 Even more explicitly, legal literature refers to the general interest regarding free-spirited public discourse and discussion, dialogue, critique and cultural development, which is seen as prevailing over the copyright holder’s proprietary interests.9 Of course, this leaves open questions such as where exactly the demarcation line runs between the use of material for the purpose of citation on the one hand, and of   Article 5 (3) (d) of Directive 2001/29/EC.   Sec. 107, 17 U.S.C. However, there is no mention of citations or quotations, but only “purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research”. 7  CJEU, case C-145/10 – Painer, para. 134: “Article 5 (3) (d) of Directive 2001/29 is intended to strike a fair balance between the right to freedom of expression of users of a work or other protected subject-matter and the reproduction right conferred on authors.” 8  German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH), GRUR 1994, 800, 803 – Museumskatalog, citing BGH, BGHZ 99, 162 – Filmzitat, and BGH, GRUR 1986, 60 – Geistchristentum, with further references (translation by the author). 9 See, e.g., Dreier, in: Dreier / Schulze, UrhG, 6th ed. 2018, § 51 note 1; Spindler, in: Schricker / Loewenheim, Urheberrecht, 5th ed. 2017, § 51 note 6, with further references. 5 6

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illustration on the other hand. How much of an intellectual reference must exist between the work cited and the citation? Does the text that cites have to be explained by the cited text or image, or does the cited text or image have to be explained by the text which contains the citation? 10 Of course, these questions will most likely be answered differently for different jurisdictions.11 As regards the length of a quotation, it seems that jurisdictions that justify copyright protection on the basis of its property aspect tend to interpret limitations and exceptions to the exclusive reproduction right rather narrowly and therefore only allow for shorter citations than jurisdictions that justify copyright protection on a utilitarian balancing of proprietary and access interests. However, it should be noted that if the citation purpose justifies, or even requires, the complete reproduction of a work (as in the case of small works and whole pictures), many jurisdictions would allow for such a practice. The fair dealing provision of UK law, as interpreted by the UK Intellectual Property Office, provides a notable exception by stating that “it would only be in exceptional circumstances that copying a photograph would be allowed under this exception … For example, the ability to sell or license copies of photographs for inclusion in newspapers would be a normal exploitation.”12 The IP Office thus clearly expresses a preference for licensing over a solution based on a statutory limitation and exception. This market-oriented approach seems to reflect a strong utilitarian belief in markets as the preferred regulator. By contrast, continental European jurisdictions tend to base their arguments not so much on the functioning of markets, but rather on an abstract balancing of proprietary interests with the freedoms of access, information, and discussion. b) Copyright Regarding Other Forms of Partial Copying The legal treatment of forms of cultural referencing by partial copying other than citations is, however, much less clear. This might be due to the broad range of possible types of references. It also reflects different national legal traditions and cultural policies. Like before, in the discussion of citations, the following 10  In order to reduce the legal uncertainties, the research group on The Ethics of Copying at the Center for Interdisciplinary Research (ZiF), www.uni-bielefeld.de/(en)/ZIF/FG/2015Copy ing, submitted a legislative proposal for adapting the German statutory language concerning the citation right; for a discussion see below, Part III.2.b. – Another issue which generally receives little attention and which can only briefly be mentioned here is the question of whether the permitted length of a quotation depends on the work in which the citation appears being an academic text or a popular scientific article. 11  It should be noted that, within the EU, the CJEU, in case C-145/10 – Painer, para. 136, has clarified that “the issue of whether the quotation is made as part of a work protected by copyright or, […] as part of a subject-matter not protected by copyright, is irrelevant”. 12  Intellectual Property Office, Exceptions to Copyright: Guidance for Creators and Copyright Owners, p.  7; https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/up loads/attachment_data/file/448274/Exceptions_to_copyright_-_Guidance_for_creators_and_ copyright_owners.pdf (last access: 7 Oktober 2018).

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considerations will be limited to acts which consist of making exact partial copies. They will not take into consideration the purpose for which such partial copies are made. Although not all copyright acts expressly mention partial copying, the permissibility of some acts of partial copying is generally accepted. The question is how, and on what grounds, the boundary is to be drawn between partial copying that requires the right holder’s consent and partial copying that does not. Interestingly, two markedly different approaches to ascertaining the legality of partial coping can be distinguished from each other. On the one hand, in the EU the test to determine a possible infringement of copyright through partial copying is whether or not the copied part would, if seen in isolation, qualify as a protected work. Partial copying is exempt from the right holder’s consent if the part that is copied does not, taken as such, show its author’s own intellectual creation.13 On the other hand, in countries like the US, copyright is only infringed if a person performs an act restricted by copyright – without the permission of the copyright owner – with respect to a whole work or a substantial part of it.14 These different standards can lead to different results if the work that has been partially copied is rather extensive. These diverging standards can perhaps be explained by the rationale that also underlies the special sui generis protection granted in the EU to investment-intensive data bases. Here the exclusive right only covers acts of “extraction and /or re-utilization of the whole or of a substantial part, evaluated qualitatively and /or quantitatively, of the contents of that database”.15 Because the investment made by the maker of a database is protected, the reasoning that leads to affirming or denying the substantiality of the taking is based on an economic argument. Hence, it may be concluded, the test that looks to the substantiality of the copying is generally based on an economic argument and utilitarian in nature. By contrast, the test that is applied in many of the continental European states and that looks at the protectability of the part that has been taken, mirrors the more idealistic approach in these countries. This approach focuses on the abstract object of pro  CJEU, case C-5/08 para. 39 – Infopaq.   See, e.g., Macmillan Co. v. King, 223 F. 862 (D. Mass 1914) (“copyright protects every substantial component part of the book”). 15  However, taking over insubstantial parts of the contents of a database is reserved to the right holder only if it is done in a “repeated and systematic” way and if, in addition, it is an extraction and /or re-utilization of insubstantial parts of the contents of the database implying acts which “conflict with a normal exploitation of that database” or if the copying “unreasonably prejudice[s] the legitimate interests of the maker of the database”; Article 7 (1) and (5) of Directive 9/96/EC on the legal protection of databases, O.J. L 77 of 27 March 1996, p. 20. – Of course, the problem remains what the point of reference is in order to determine whether the part taken is substantial or insubstantial. In its decision C-545/07 – Apis-Hristovich, the CJEU held that if a database is composed of several separate modules, the point of reference is the contents of the module, “if the latter constitutes, in itself, a database which fulfils the conditions for protection by the sui generis right. Otherwise, […] the comparison must be made between the volume of the materials allegedly extracted and /or re-utilised from the various modules of that database and its total contents”. 13 14

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tection rather than on the economic circumstances under which the partial copying takes place. For the so-called neighbouring rights or rights related to copyright proper – i.e. the rights which typically include exclusive copyright-like rights for performing artists, producers of sound records, and broadcasting organizations as well as, depending on national legislation, some other actors involved in the production and dissemination of copyrighted material – the demarcation line between legitimate and illegitimate partial copying also depends on the rationale underlying the respective exclusive rights’ protection. To cite only one example: German courts have interpreted the phonogram producer’s exclusive reproduction right as covering even “smallest fractions” of the music fixed in a phonogram. It protects the producer against any re-use by hip hop artists, because what is protected is the phonogram producer’s “economic, organizational and technical effort”. This effort was necessary for the fixation even of smallest snippets.16 It is of course odd that the standard is stricter with regard to partial copying of phonograms than it is with regard to copyright of the recorded musical composition itself. 2. Citations and Partial Copying in Other Regulatory Schemes a) Constitutional Law In contrast to copyright, which is mainly concerned with the scope of exclusive rights of authors and thus tends to aim at “a high level” of protection of intellectual property,17 generally favouring the interests of authors and right holders over those of users,18 constitutional law defines the general framework for both the legislature and the courts by way of balancing conflicting proprietary and access rights.19 This 16  BGH, GRUR 2009, 403, para. 14 – Metall auf Metall, and again GRUR 2013, 614 – Metall auf Metall II. – The case went further to the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, BVerfG), case 1 BvR 1585/13, GRUR 2016, 690, and from there back to the BGH which referred several questions to the CJEU concerning the scope of the reproduction right for phonographs as harmonized by Article 2 (c) of Directive 2001/29/EC on Copyright in the Information Society, as well as previously in article 7 (1) of the original version of the EU Rental and Lending Directive (92/100/EEC); see BGH, GRUR 2017, 895 – Metall auf Metall III. 17  EU Directive 2001/29/EC on Copyright in the Information Society, Recital 4. 18  For a more detailed analysis of the interplay between proprietary and access interests by way of exclusive rights, limitations, and exceptions, see, e.g., Thomas Dreier, Thoughts on Revising the Limitations on Copyright under Directive 2001/29, Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice (JIPLP) 11 (2016), pp. 138 – 146, https://academic.oup.com/jiplp/article-look up/doi/10.1093/jiplp/jpv224 (last access: 7 Oktober 2018). 19  Articles 14 and 5 (3) of the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz). – For a more detailed discussion see, e.g., Thomas Dreier / Marco Ganzhorn, Intellectual Property in Decisions of National Constitutional Courts in Europe, in: Christophe Geiger (ed.), Research Handbook on Human Rights and Intellectual Property, Cheltenham / Northampton, MA 2015, pp. 219 – 235.

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shall be illustrated by two examples in which the German Federal Constitutional Court had to balance copyright holders’ proprietary rights and the freedom of artistic creation. One of these cases concerned citations from a work of literature20 and the other the partial copying of a phonogram.21 In the first decision, the German Federal Constitutional Court deviated from a one-sided property logic and emphasized that, after publication, a work ceases to be the sole property of its author and becomes part of the intellectual and cultural common property. Therefore, the Court stated, the more a work of art fulfils its role in society, the more it may serve as a point of reference for artistic debate. In particular, if the effect on the proprietary interest is only marginal, proprietary interests have to give way. They are outweighed by the use interests in promoting the arts. In the second decision, the Court highlighted both the economic and artistic dimensions of the issue, stating that it would violate the freedom of the arts if the law were to burden hip hop artists with having to license the samples in question, or if they had to remake the samples. In both decisions, the otherwise tight proprietary framework of copyright law was opened up by the Court with arguments based on the characteristics of artistic creation. However, so far the lower German courts were rather reluctant in applying this kind of balancing to other constitutional freedoms such as the freedom of expression and the freedom of information.22 The recent decision by the Constitutional Court does at least contain some language which could be understood as applicable also to the balancing of proprietary interests of copyright holders and freedoms other than the freedom of the arts. But it is too early to predict the argumentation as well as the outcome in any future cases. b) The Law of Science (Codes of Good Scientific Practice) The law of science is not – at least not primarily – concerned with authors’ individual proprietary interests, but with the integrity of scientific activities and of science as an institution. Hence, there is only a partial overlap with copyright and the rationale behind defining the boundaries of legitimate citations and acts of partial copying. On the one hand, copyright infringement – by overstepping the limits of citations or of partial copying as permitted without the consent of the right holder under copyright law – in general also constitutes a violation of the principles of good scientific practice, because it constitutes a form of misappropriation of some20  German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG), case 1 BvR 825/98, GRUR 2001, 149 – Germania 3. 21 German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG), case 1 BvR 1585/13, GRUR 2016, 690 – Metall auf Metall. 22  This was particularly true after the first of the two cases decided by the Federal Constitutional Court discussed here; see OLG Hamburg, GRUR-RR 2003, 33, 38 – Maschinenmenschen (no application to the freedom of the press) and KG, GRUR-RR 2002, 313, 315 – Das Leben, dieser Augenblick (no application to freedom of science); by contrast, however, LG Munich I, ZUM 2005, 407, 410 (application to the freedom of teaching).

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one else’s intellectual achievements.23 On the other hand, violations of good scientific practice of proper citation and not exceeding the amount of permissible copying of someone else’s text do not necessarily result in copyright infringement, since good scientific practice might allow for a more limited degree of copying than is permitted by copyright law. The latter certainly applies if what is copied has been taken from a work that is already in the public domain, or from an object that was never protected by copyright in the first place.24 From a perspective of good scientific practice, the distinction between what is acceptable and what counts as inacceptable self-plagiarism generally depends on the answer to the question of whether, by self-plagiarizing, the author creates the false impression of having written something new.25 However, whether or not self-plagiarism constitutes copyright infringement depends on the scope of exclusive use rights the author has transferred to the original publisher. III. Citations and Partial Copying – An Ethical Approach 1. Moral and Legal Rules This is, of course, not the place to fully describe the complex relationship between ethical and legal rules. It should suffice to recall that, in societies that distinguish between religious, legal, and moral claims – a distinction that has, of course, not always been made at all times and in all places –, legal rules acknowledge, reflect, and partly overlap with moral rules. It suffices to refer to the legal philosopher H. L. A. Hart, according to whom it can hardly be disputed that legal rules were “at all times and places … profoundly influenced both by the conventional morality and ideals of particular social groups, and also by forms of enlightened moral criticism”. How23  It should be noted, however, that not all codes of good scientific practice expressly mention the infringement of someone else’s copyright as a violation of the principles of good scientific practice; see, e.g., the “Rules for Safeguarding Good Scientific Practice at the Karls­ ruhe Institute of Technology (KIT)”, Announcement 56/2014, p. 6, www.kit.edu/downloads/ gute_wiss_praxis_en.pdf (“violation of intellectual property rights” mentioned), and the Memorandum “Safeguarding Good Scientific Practice” by the German Research Foundation (DFG), 1998/2013, p. 82 (mention of copyright only in relation to name attribution in the case of articles published in scientific journals), www.dfg.de/download/pdf/dfg_im_profil/reden_ stellungnahmen/download/empfehlung_wiss_praxis_1310.pdf (all last accessed: 7 Oktober 2018). – Also, it should be noted that in certain respects such as documenting and publishing open access, the rules of good scientific practices might, if followed, lead to acts of copyright infringement. 24  Haimo Schack, in: Thomas Dreier / Ansgar Ohly (eds.), Plagiate. Wissenschaftsethik und Recht, Tübingen 2013, pp. 81 – 98. 25  In such a case, there is a copyright infringement, but no misleading impression regarding authorship and no misappropriation of someone else’s work. – See Lionel Bently, Self-Copying and Copyright, in: Darren Hudson Hick / Reinold Schmücker (eds.), The Aesthetics and Ethics of Copying, New York / London 2016, pp. 271 – 294.

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ever, we should not assume that moral and legal rules always coincide.26 The legal validity of a certain legal rule or particular legal system is of course not necessarily related to morality or justice. In fact, legal rules can contradict moral rules, particularly if they are intended to change the moral beliefs shared by the legal norms’ addressees and thus the existing ethical rule. At the same time, some legal rules may have no bearing on moral rules at all, since what they regulate is not a moral issue. Despite this fact, it would undoubtedly be unwise to disregard the existing legal rules when discussing moral arguments in cases in which the lawmaker has phrased the arguments that led to the legal rule adopted already in moral terms. In particular, from the perspective of constitutional law – which is based upon the assumption that all of the relevant moral values are addressed by the constitutional freedoms – little, if any, room seems to be left for moral claims that would not have any basis in the constitution itself. Since legal and moral rules are not necessarily identical, it would also be unwise to ignore moral rules just because there are already existing legal rules concerning particular actions. Thus, reconstructing moral rules independently of any existing legal normative regimes can help to test the moral foundation of the latter. 2. Developing Moral Rules for Citations and Partial Copying a) Rules or Exceptions? The starting point for formulating moral rules for citations and partial copying depends on whether the exclusive rights of copyright are regarded as the rule, and privileges such as the citation right and permitted partial copying as the exceptions to it – or whether the freedom to cite and copy is regarded as the rule and any exclusive rights as the exception to it. If copyright protection is accepted as the starting point,27 the question is how a rule that would allow for citations and other forms 26  See, e.g., H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1961), 2nd ed., Oxford 1994, p. 185. – For the German debate in legal philosophy, see, e.g., Héctor Wittwer, Der relative Vorrang des Rechts vor der Moral, in: Martin Hoffmann / Reinold Schmücker / Héctor Wittwer (eds.), Vorrang der Moral? Eine metaethische Kontroverse, Frankfurt (Main) 2017, pp. 231 – 244; Norbert Hoerster, Die moralische Pflicht zum Rechtsgehorsam, in: id. (ed.), Recht und Moral, Stuttgart 2013, pp. 129 – 141; Matthias Mahlmann, Rechtsphilosophie und Rechtstheorie, 3rd ed., Baden-Baden 2015, p. 255 et seq.; for the triangle of legal, ethical and social norms, see Christoph Möllers, Die Möglichkeit der Normen, Berlin 2015, p. 395 et seq. 27  It is, of course, subject to debate whether the copyright system with its exclusive rights is appropriate and whether it can be defended on ethical grounds. Proponents of this view can be found both in the camp of adherents to the theory of natural law – who consider authors’ rights as “la propriété la plus sacrée”– and in the camp of utilitarians who understand the exclusivity granted by copyright law as a necessary instrument for turning a non-tradeable public good into a tradeable private good. Opponents of this view mostly tend to emphasize the negative effects for communication, which, they fear, might be inhibited by other forms of incentives for the creation of works and the remuneration of authors and publishers.

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of partially copying copyrighted material can be ethically justified. If one were to question copyright’s exclusive rights, the task would be to demonstrate that it is ethically correct to extend exclusivity to certain acts of citation and partial copying. In essence, however, the same arguments will be tabled in both cases, and the effects of the difference regarding the issue of which side has to bear the burden of proof shall not be discussed here. b) Moral Foundations of Citations It seems rather easy to formulate an ethical rule for citations of someone else’s copyrighted works and to justify the legal norm that a person making a citation does not have to ask for permission nor pay any remuneration. Although the ethical justification of citations is rarely addressed in the debates between adherents of a natural law theory and adherents of a theory of legal positivism, it is plausible to assume that there is a reference to a fundamental, basic aim of human societies that can be taken for granted. Hume thought that human nature can hardly be imagined to exist outside of groups of individuals.28 These individuals must communicate, because otherwise they could not organize their common undertakings or negotiate their individual activities. In other words, without communication that follows accepted rules, societies could not achieve the aim for which they have initially grouped together,29 in particular the more complex, specialized and labour-divided the organization of a particular society becomes. In order to be able to communicate within any group is thus a “minimal requirement of natural law”.30 Even critics of the natural law approach will have to accept this point. Of course, this is not sufficient in order to argue for an ethical rule that citations ought to be allowed without the consent of the rights holder and without any form of remuneration, compensation, or fee, as long as the source or author of the cited material is named. Additional arguments are required for such a rule. A first argument could be to point out the long-standing tradition of oral communication to refer to the testimony of earlier authorities both in religious (prophets) and philosophical contexts (of Socrates as reported by Plato). Moreover, while serving the purpose of anchoring the present in the past, citations also serve the purpose of holding speakers accountable in the future for what they have said before. In both cases, it is necessary to name the authority referred to in the citation. Another argument is rooted in the need for accurate citations. Referring to past authorities and holding past speakers accountable for what they have said requires that the citation is a true copy of what has been said – truth being understood here 28  David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, III, 2: Of Justice and Injustice, cit. after Hart, The Concept of Law (supra, n. 26), p. 191. 29  Ibid., p. 193: “a minimum of co-operation” without which it would be impossible to “forward the minimum purpose of survival which men have in associating with each other”. 30 Ibid.

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not in a substantive sense (whether what has been said is true), but rather in a formal sense (whether what has been said has truly been said). An exact repetition and passing on of what has initially been communicated by text, image or sound is what is required for the accuracy e.g. of the historic record, for establishing matters of fact in criminal procedures and private litigations, for democratic discussions, and intellectual or artistic debates. Accurate citations also prevent gossip, hearsay, and mere speculation from being considered as reliable information. Of course, the level of accuracy required may vary according to the social field in which the citation is made. For example, passing on gossip follows different rules than the rules of transferring scientific information. For academic purposes, mere paraphrasing would in many cases not be sufficient. What is required is verbatim copying. This need is also highlighted by the general ambiguities inherent in human speech acts. The need for verbatim copying excludes any normative regime that would subject the citation to the consent of the rights owner for the material from which the citation is taken. Otherwise, that person would have control over what can, and what cannot, be passed on and reported. Also, he or she could not be held accountable for this. Moreover, although having to pay for citations might, in the end, not obstruct the purpose of citations, it would nevertheless result in a preferential treatment of those with deeper pockets and thus violate the principle of equal opportunity with respect to participating in social debates. Having thus established the moral rule that citations must be allowed without consent and any form of payment, as long as the source is named, the question remains to what extent it might be morally justified to limit the right to make citations. Here the most notable differences between legal rules and morally motivated limitations of a citation rule are to be ascertained. As indicated above, the reason is that, in the copyright regime, the citation right tends to be seen as an exception to the general exclusive reproduction right. In cases of doubt, it is therefore rather narrowly construed. In some countries, a great deal of perfectly normal, generally accepted everyday quotation practices are not recognized by the law, which leaves a gap between what the law allows and what is perceived as a properly motivated ethical rule.31 In order to remedy this situation – at least to some extent –, the ZiF research group on The Ethics of Copying32 made a proposal for certain legislative changes to the German Copyright Act. The first proposal called for a removal of the requirement that single works can only be quoted in an “independent scientific work” if the purpose of the citation is an “explanation of its contents”,33 with a notorious ambiguity concerning the reference of the pronoun. In practice, the current word31  On a side line, it should be noted that in legal terms, this probably does not exclude contractual restrictions on the right to citation regarding unpublished material which has not yet been released into the public debate, and which in general is not covered by the legal citation right anyway. 32 www.uni-bielefeld.de/(en)/ZIF/FG/2015Copying/. 33  § 51 of the German Copyright Act.

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ing leads to a considerable uncertainty regarding the exact scope of the citation right, which, in turn, has the effect that authors might not make use of the citation right to the full extent that is permitted by law. The Research Group has suggested that the citation purpose should be retained as a necessary and sufficient criterion. The second suggested change – which has subsequently been adopted by the legislature in the recent German act for an adjustment of copyright law to the requirements of the knowledge society34 – addresses the problem that, in cases where objects are cited on the basis of a photograph, strictly speaking the citation purpose would only justify copying the depicted object, but not the photograph depicting the object. This had the rather strange result that, although a citation of the object that can be seen in a photographic reproduction would be perfectly justified, this citation still depended on the photographer’s exclusive right in his or her photograph. Of course, abolishing the photographers’ exclusive rights in these cases curtails, to a certain extent, the photographers’ ability to obtain additional income, but this curtailing seems morally acceptable due to the limited importance of the economic value of such photographs on the one hand, and the importance of the citation right on the other hand.35 c) Moral Rules for Partial Copying Formulating an ethical rule for partial copying that is not a citation or a private copy is, however, a somewhat more difficult task. Again, the reasoning depends on whether one assumes that the exclusivity with regard to acts of copying granted by copyright is well-founded or at least defensible, or that the freedom to make – at least partial – copies is taken as the starting point. In both cases the crucial question is how to define the extent of what may be copied – i.e. the amount of the original work – without the right holder’s consent and / or without payment. This question is not easily to answer. The analysis of the constitutional law and national laws such as the US rule of “fair use”36 suggests that the moral answer must accommodate a variety of conflicting, morally justified interests. In different possible scenarios, a great number of decisive factors must be taken into account. However, in view of the need to balance conflicting proprietary and use interests, it becomes clear that the international legal rule regarding exceptions to copyright’s exclusive reproduction right (the so-called three-step test, according to which 34  Gesetz zur Angleichung des Urheberrechts an die aktuellen Erfordernisse der Wissensgesellschaft (Urheberrechts-Wissensgesellschafts-Gesetz – UrhWissG) of 1 September 2017, BGBl. I, Nr. 61, p. 3347. – It should be noted that the legislature did not limit the proposal to photographs depicting objects that are cited, but extended it to other forms of content carriers such as phonograms and films. 35  This applies particularly to national laws that grant related exclusive rights even for non-original photographs, like, for example, the German Copyright Act (§ 72 UrhG), as permitted by article 6, sentence 2 of EU Directive 2006/116/EC on the term of copyright protection. 36  See above, Part II.1.a).

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WTO-Members may only derogate from exclusive rights in “certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder”37) falls short of a full evaluation of the problem in moral terms. The exclusive focus on the economic criterion of the regular exploitation of the work that has been partially copied makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to balance the economic interests of right holders against conflicting interests in unhindered access for purposes of free communication.38 Moreover, drawing the line between legitimate and illegitimate partial copying is not a black-and-white exercise. There are at least three possible ways to accommodate justified conflicting interests. Partial copying could (1) require the consent of the right holder of the work that is partially copied. The right holder, in turn, may make his or her consent depend on the payment of a license fee. Partial copying could (2) not require the right holder’s consent, but some form of payment, or (3) it could not require the consent of the right holder and no payment. Looking at these three possible rules from an ethical perspective, it is interesting to note that a moral argument can be made for each of them. Without going into further detail, rule (1) could be justified by way of the classical incentive theory and the theory of the “tragedy of the commons”, i.e. that without adequate exclusive rights protection, there would be an over-use, under-investment, and free-riding of immaterial goods. Moreover, permitting substantial partial copying might critically diminish the incentive to invest. Similarly, rule (2) could be justified on the basis that it reduces the transaction costs for licensing and consequently facilitates social communication. At the same time, this rule compensates the right holder for the economic loss due to partial copying activities that take place beyond the right holder’s control. Finally, rule (3) could be justified by pointing out that it most favours the freedom of unhindered communication while, at the same time, it incites right holders, whose economic gain is diminished here – in contrast to rules (1) and (2) – to create even more new works. Which of the three possible rules seems most appropriate from a moral point of view? More specifically, can other criteria be found which would make one of these moral rules more convincing than the others? Of course, going more into detail one might argue that whenever, in a given case, the issue of partial copying is less about controlling market activities by way of selective licensing (or not granting licenses to competitors at all), but about securing some form of remuneration for the individual right holder whose work has been partially copied, solution (2) is preferable to solution (1). In cases where partial copying is of little financial importance to the 37 WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), 1994, Art. 13. 38  This is certainly true for copyright, since Article 13 TRIPS – following Article 9 (2) BC – only refers to legitimate interests of the right holders, whereas according to Articles 17, 26 (2) and 30 TRIPS for trademarks, designs and patents, “legitimate interests of third parties” can also be factored into the equation.

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right holder, solution (3) is preferable to solutions (1) and (2). Additional arguments may be based on the importance of the freedom of unhindered communication in a given case. The more partial copying is necessary for the person using the part copied in order to make a particular argument, the more solution (3) is preferable to solutions (1) and (2). By contrast, if partial copying takes place in a market environment where it is usually licensed, solution (2) seems to be the best solution. In cases where a substitute for the part that would otherwise be partially copied could easily be created, solution (1) is preferable to solutions (2) and (3). A further, more detailed discussion mighty yield morally convincing answers for concrete practical purposes. There is a great number of factors that were taken into account, for example, in the plethora of cases decided by the US courts in ascertaining whether or not a particular activity of partial copying amounted to fair use. It might also be possible to find additional criteria in the cases decided in other jurisdictions. The problem of deciding between these different criteria and the moral weight that should be given to each one of them has to do with the well-known fact that, on a theoretical level, finding the one morally correct solution faces at least three fundamental problems: a relativist, a sceptical, and a categorical problem. First, it seems that the convincingness of an argument supporting a particular rule depends on the depth of modelling. To give just one example: the obligation to obtain a license before an act of partial copying might increase transaction costs and would probably impede intra-social communication. However, a licensing mechanism might create new jobs and also lead to greater legal security concerning partial copying. This would benefit the person engaging in an act of partial copying. It would increase social communication and create additional jobs and income. Second, there is the issue of how much data is available that could serve as the basis for deciding between the possible rules. In most cases, such data is simply not available and, in all likelihood, will never be available – for the simple reason that, in real life, the effects of following different rules can hardly be ascertained under the same surrounding circumstances. It is just not possible to know in advance whether an act of partially copying a protected work will take a bite of the market for the work which has been partially copied and will thus diminish the economic return of the copyright holder, or whether, quite to the contrary, it might increase the demand for the whole work and thus increase the economic return of the copyright holder. In retrospect, it is just not possible to repeat a given situation under the exact circumstances while applying a different moral rule. In short, any moral decision will involve uncertainties. Third, there is the problem of the incommensurability of the effects at stake. How is an increase in royalties to be compared with, or weighed against, a decrease in the ease of communication? How can a differentiated, morally superior rule be weighed against the effects of reduced legal security and the overall cost that reduced legal security imposes on social welfare? How can we assess the relative creative merit of authors if one author made a work that has been sufficiently interesting for another author to partially copy some features of the work for their own (more or less creative) purposes?

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Given these problems on the theoretical level for formulating the morally most convincing answer, the very existence of one morally correct rule might just be an idealistic assumption. If we accept that, in certain cases, different moral answers might be given to a particular problem at hand, the question is how to arrive at a morally sound decision about which of the potentially conflicting rules regarding partial copying should be followed. A similar problem can, by the way, be found in constitutional law,39 where the balancing of fundamental rights in many cases does not lead to only one particular solution, but to several possible ways to define the exact boundary between, e.g., proprietary and access rights guaranteed by the constitution. The constitution allows for a corridor of legal rules in order to come to terms with this situation. Similarly, one might conclude – and live with the answer – that in certain cases, several moral answers can be regarded as equally valid, as long as a rule that is involved in these answers is not clearly unacceptable from a moral point of view. Accepting this conclusion has at least one consequence for the relationship between moral and legal rules. If, for a given problem, more than one moral rule can be maintained, any legal rule which concurs to one of the divergent moral rules can no longer be discarded as immoral. Following Luhmann,40 one might describe this way of reasoning as transferring the issue of moral justification from the level of substantive discussion to the level of procedure – however, without giving up the attempt to formulate the most convincing moral answer. Zusammenfassung Als Teil der Aufgabe einer Ethik des Kopierens stellt sich unter anderem das bislang wenig beachtete Problem der moralischen Begründung von Bestand und Umfang des Rechts des Zitats und der Teilkopie. Im Kern geht es dabei darum, mit welchen moralischen Argumenten sich die Legitimität der Zustimmungs- und gegebenenfalls auch Kostenfreiheit von Zitaten und Teilkopien begründen lässt; wie sich die bestehenden diesbezüglichen rechtlichen Normen zu diesen moralischen Argumenten in Bezug auf Handlungen des Zitierens und des teilweisen Kopierens verhalten; sowie darum, ob sich aus diesem Beispiel allgemeine Erkenntnisse für die Formulierung einer Ethik des Kopierens gewinnen lassen. Der vorliegende Beitrag nähert sich diesen Fragen in drei Schritten. Zunächst geht es eher deskriptiv darum, die Wesensmerkmale eines Zitats und einer Teilkopie herauszuarbeiten (I). Sodann werden die aktuellen rechtlichen Regelungen vorgestellt, die sich mit Aktivitäten des Zitierens und des teilweisen Kopierens befas-

39 See, e.g., the case decided by the German Federal Constitutional Court concerning the portion that may legitimately be taken from someone else’s protected phonogram, above, note 16. 40  Niklas Luhmann, Legitimation durch Verfahren, Neuwied / Berlin 1969.

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sen (II), ehe im abschließenden Teil eine ethische Fundierung und Auslotung des Umfangs legitimen Zitierens und teilweisen Kopierens versucht wird (III).

What is Wrong with Non-substitutional Copying? Reinold Schmücker

I. Introduction One might wonder why no ethics of copying (as a domain-specific ethics or an academic subdiscipline of applied ethics) has been established so far. I think there is an important reason for this. Namely, that the questions raised by an ethics of copying were, for a long time, considered to be questions that have already been answered – and that are therefore uninteresting. It was – and still is – often assumed that there is something like intellectual property and that copying (without the rights holder’s permission) is something akin to stealing someone’s intellectual property.1 Since theft is an action that is already legally sanctioned and morally forbidden, no domain-specific ethics was necessary in order to recognize the moral wrongness of copying without the rights holder’s permission. Hence there was no need for an ethics of copying. Today, the situation has changed in (at least) two respects. Firstly, digitization has led to copying processes of which it would be absurd to call them theft. The equation “copying is obviously – that is, as long as it is not permitted by the law or the copyright holder – theft of intellectual property” cannot be true in these cases.2 Just think of streaming video files or of thumbnails on the internet. Secondly, it has become evident that stringent copy restrictions do not promote, but rather endanger, scientific, technical, and cultural progress. Such restrictions make access to the most recent research and to many cultural goods more difficult. They increase bureaucratic efforts and the legal and financial risks of further developing and improving existing material. The latter always involves more or less extensive adoptions – which might be forms of copying. Moreover, the rights holders of ex1  Certain interested parties have supported this idea, as we can see from a historical perspective. Cf. in particular Eckhard Höffner, Geschichte und Wesen des Urheberrechts, 2 vols., Munich 2010; see also Peter Baldwin, The Copyright Wars: Three Centuries of Trans-Atlantic Battle, Princeton, NJ 2014; Elena Cooper, Art and Modern Copyright: The Contested Image, Cambridge 2018; Aram Sinnreich, The Piracy Crusade: How the Music Industryʼs War on Sharing Destroys Markets and Erodes Civil Liberties, Amherst, MA / Boston 2013. Currently, for example, the FBI describes illegitimate acts of copying as “theft”, “piracy” or “robbery”, see https:// www.fbi.gov / investigate / white-collar-crime / piracy-ip-theft (last access: 15 August 2018). 2  For a more systematic elaboration of this argument, and a reconstruction of copyright doctrine, see Abraham Drassinower, What’s Wrong with Copying?, Cambridge, MA 2015.

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isting material are often not interested in improved versions of what they own the rights for. It seems to me that it is primarily these two factors that have made the development of an ethics of copying possible – and necessary. By this, I do not merely mean a reconstruction of the implicit ethics that a copyright law regime is based on, or an ethics that follows from the assumption that copying without the rights holder’s permission is intellectual theft. I mean a normative scientific and social discourse that is based on three premises that can hardly be contested: first, copying is an elementary cultural technique that can even be observed outside of human culture with non-human beings. Even language acquisition would not be possible without copying other speakers. Without people copying tools and machines, today’s level of technological development and the wealth it enables would never have been achieved.3 Second, someone who has created something has a justified interest that she can use the fruits of her labour first of all to cover the costs of the creation process, including her and her family’s means of subsistence, and that she will appropriately participate in the profits made from that creation.4 She also has a justified interest in having a say in what happens with her creation. Third, the person who has created something new is not the only one who has justified interests in the question whether it is permissible that this creation is – wholly or partly – copied. As a general rule, the people who want to use a copy of her creation also have justified interests that have to be taken into account in ethical considerations. A simple example will illustrate this point: let us assume that someone in Liecht­ enstein has discovered a cure for cancer and has developed a method to produce this cure. I take it that everybody who can expect to be cured by taking this drug also has a justified interest in it. Their justified interest includes the demand that the drug will be produced in such quantities that it will become available to them. It would hardly be morally justifiable if the discoverer were to prevent the formula for producing the drug from leaving Liechtenstein – a very small country whose very limited industrial real estate does not allow for extended production –, because she does not want it to be produced abroad where she cannot control the production process, which would result in only a limited quantity of the drug being produced that does not cover the demand for it. Hence it is usually not the case that only the person who has created an artefact has morally justified interests in that artefact – or that her justified interests would always morally outweigh those of third parties.

3  Cf., e.g., Marcus Boon, In Praise of Copying, Cambridge, MA 2010; Mark Alfino, Deep Copy Culture, in: Darren Hudson Hick / Reinold Schmücker (eds.), The Aesthetics and Ethics of Copying, New York / London 2016, pp. 19 – 37; Wybo Houkes, Imitation and Replication of Technologies: The Prospects for an Evolutionary Ethics of Copying, ibid., pp. 39 – 57. 4  For example, the inventor of blue and green light emitting diodes, Shuji Nakamura, Nobel laureate in physics of 2014, notably sued his former employer, the Japanese manufacturer Nichia, which made billions of his invention, in 2001 because the company refused to award him a fair share of the profits. See https://www.ledinside.com/news/2014/10/the_story_behind_shuji_nakamuras_invention_of_blue_leds (last access: 16 August 2018).

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II. The Principle of Permissible Non-substitutional Copying What can an ethics of copying achieve, given this background? What is the scientific contribution to such an ethics that a research group with normative-ethical interests can provide? It can attempt to justify principles of an ethics of copying. These principles are mid-level principles, since they – on the one hand – specifically relate to acts of copying. This makes them more specific than the norms that general normative ethics are concerned with. On the other hand, they are more general than moral judgements about individual acts of copying. To my mind, one central principle of an ethics of copying is the principle of permissible non-substitutional copying. According to this principle, acts of copy­ ing are morally permissible if they do not result in an entity that could substitute the template with regard to at least one of its principal purposes.5 The principle presupposes that there is no particular reason to protect the template against possible damages caused by the copying process and that the latter does not involve a serious violation of generally accepted moral rules. Let me – in a first step – explain in more detail what the principle says and what its status is. In a second step (in the next section of the paper), I will justify the principle by defending it against a number of possible objections. This will also allow me to offer an insight into the work of the ZiF research group on The Ethics of Copying. Some of the objections that I will address were raised against my view in this research group’s discussions. So what exactly does the principle of permissible non-substitutional copying say? The principle of permissible non-substitutional copying does not imply that there are no moral restrictions for copying. It only permits the production of copies that cannot substitute the template with regard to one of its principal purposes. This does not mean that the production of copies that could be used to substitute the copied object is always morally forbidden. There might be reasons for allowing the production of copies that could be used instead of the template. The principle also does not allow for any production of copies that cannot substitute the template. The principle rather includes two important restrictions: it does not permit acts of non-substitutional copying that would damage the template – and it does not allow acts that would entail a serious violation of generally accepted moral rules. I will come back to these two restrictions shortly when defending the principle. However, first we should address the question of what the status of the principle is. What does the claim mean that the principle of permissible non-substitutional copying is a central principle of an ethics of copying? 5  I have suggested this principle for the first time in: Reinold Schmücker, Normative Resources and Domain-Specific Principles: Heading for an Ethics of Copying, in: Hick / Schmü­ cker (eds.), The Aesthetics and Ethics of Copying (supra, n. 3), pp. 359 – 377: p. 367 et seq. However, the present paper offers a more detailed explication and defense of it than I was able to provide in that context.

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People have moral beliefs and intuitions. This much is uncontroversial. Maybe some of them even belong to our biological setup. But we do not have to discuss this point here.6 Since, over the course of our lives, we develop many – or maybe most – of our moral beliefs and intuitions by interacting with our environment – and, most of all, with other people –, they may differ from person to person. Hence, there is no consensus about what the correct morality is. However, there are many agreements and overlaps between the moral beliefs and intuitions of different people. There are good reasons to assume that this is no mere coincidence. This suggests two things: first, people have moral intuitions and form moral beliefs – or have a bad conscience – because of the fact that morality has an important social function. This function is to coordinate human behaviour in a way that can be anticipated by others and that enables solving conflicts without resorting to violence. Second, conformities in moral beliefs and intuitions are due to the fact that certain rules fulfil this social function of morality particularly well. Many people therefore accept that these rules should be in place. To reconstruct such rules for the area of regulating copying would then be the task of academics working on an ethics of copying. The claim that the principle of non-substitutional copying is a central principle of such an ethics means that this is a rule that a particularly large number of people will accept for good reasons. Thus, it should be recognized as a rule that allows for distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate acts of copying. My thesis is therefore: the principle of permissible non-substitutional copying is one of the ba­ sic rules we should refer to for distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate acts of copying. The principle reflects a balancing between the various interests involved in permitting and banning acts of copying that is based on common moral intuitions and beliefs.7 I will now explain why I am convinced that this principle is compelling by addressing some objections. III. Four Objections Against the Principle of Permissible Non-substitutional Copying I would like to discuss four objections: first, the objection of the indeterminacy of the principle. I will have to explain in more detail what it means that a copy does not substitute the template. Second, the objection of the inadequacy of the princi­ ple. This objection is based on an unrealistic expectation. Third, the objection of the underestimation of the justified interests of authors and owners. Fourth, the objection of the incentive for cultural imitation. This objection is based on a false 6 Cf. Francisco J. Ayala, The Biological Roots of Morality, Biology and Philosophy 2 (1987), pp.  235 – 252; Anke Thyen, Moral und Anthropologie. Untersuchungen zur Lebensform ‘Moralʼ, Weilerswist 2007; Frans de Waal, Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved, ed. by Stephen Macedo & Josiah Ober, Princeton, NJ 2016. 7  The importance of such a balance (and the broad acceptance of it as a normative aim) can be seen by the fact that many copyright legislations explicitly refer to this aim. The fact that they do not reach it and might even contribute to a serious imbalance is another story.

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premise. To conclude, I will indicate what the principle of non-substitutional copying implies for the legal regulation of acts of copying. The objection of the indeterminacy of the principle claims that we cannot derive from the principle whether a certain act of copying is legitimate or not. It remains unclear in which cases one object can substitute another object and whether a purpose that an object fulfils is one of its main purposes. The qualification that refers to widely accepted moral norms is also insufficiently determined. There is no catalogue of such norms, and people’s moral judgements about a given situation will differ. So the principle of permissible non-substitutional copying refers to several concepts that are insufficiently determined. A lawyer would probably categorize them as “undetermined legal terms”.8 This, one might object, is not a suitable basis for distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate acts of copying. It seems to me, however, that there is no problem making the concept of substitution more precise. A copy is a substitution of its template if – from the perspective of a typical user – it could serve as, at least, an almost complete replacement for it. A copy is a substitution of its template in a respect R if and only if it would serve as an almost complete replacement of the template, from the perspective of people who are typical users of the template in respect R. Talking about “typical users of a template” and an “almost complete replacement” will, of course, not satisfy the proponents of the indeterminacy-objection. Whether and when something falls under these categories can also be controversial. However, the fact that the principle of permissible non-substitutional copying cannot do without normative terms that are not completely determined does not speak against the principle – but for it. For it is not as if our moral intuitions and beliefs were available in the form of a catalogue that would allow for deciding, in a concrete case, whether this is a legitimate or illegitimate act of copying. Moral judgements are not made in the same way as, for example, deciding whether a certain object is a wristwatch, a dandelion, or something else. When we morally assess a potential or actual action, we do not verify whether it has certain properties. We decide under which pattern of actions it can most appropriately be subsumed. Such decisions are often influenced by assumptions about the type of state of affairs that a given, concrete state of affairs can be plausibly subsumed under. What the objection highlights as insufficient determinacy is, in fact, necessary for a mid-level moral principle of an ethics of copying. It must reflect the openness of the normative assessment of states of affairs and actions. The majority of people do not have to agree on this, even if they are guided by the same, agreed, evaluative principles or values. It seems to me that we usually consider acts of copying to be le8 Cf. Karl Engisch, Einführung in das juristische Denken, 5th ed., Stuttgart 1971, Chapter VI, p. 106 et seq.

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gitimate – and we perform them without a bad conscience – if we believe that neither author nor owner of the template will be harmed. We assume that neither author nor owner will be harmed if (1) their profit is not significantly reduced, (2) the template is not damaged, and (3) the act of copying does not violate any moral rights – be it rights of the authors or of the owners of the template, or rights of third parties that might somehow be affected. And this is exactly what the principle of permissible non-substitutional copying expresses. We can disagree about whether conditions 1 – 3 are fulfilled in a concrete case, even if we agree on accepting the principle of permissible non-substitutional copying. The principle acknowledges this. It also acknowledges that whether a certain template can be substituted by a certain type of copy may depend on the relation between template and copy, or on specific contexts of use (which might vary over the course of history or between cultures). According to the objection of the inadequacy of the principle, the principle of permissible non-substitutional copying does not go far enough. The objection claims that the principle does not suffice for distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate acts of copying, because not all acts of copying that result in a substitute of the template are illegitimate. However, the principle does not tell us how to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate acts of copying in cases where the results lead to a substitution of the template’s main purpose. However, this objection does not alter the fact that the principle of permissible non-substitutional copying sums up common moral intuitions and beliefs with respect to acts of copying. The objection is based on the assumption that our intuitions and beliefs about copying could be reconstructed in the shape of a single principle of copy ethics. However, this premise is implausible for the reason alone that no such thing exists for any area of applied ethics. Of course, the principle of permissible non-substitutional copying can only be one principle of copy ethics among others.9 The fact that it does not allow for assessing the legitimacy of acts of copying that lead to a substitution of the template only highlights that an ethics of copying requires further principles. The objection of the underestimation of authors’ and owners’ justified interests is more serious. However, is it actually true that the principle of permissible non-substitutional copying does not attribute enough weight to the interests of authors and owners? We could imagine cases where an author has a justified interest in her work not being copied in a way that deliberately tampers with it – to the effect that the public thinks the author had morally wrong intentions – or simply other intentions than she actually had. So what could be the motivation behind the objection? Two arguments are conceivable. It is mostly the second one that plays an important role in public discourse about changing the existing copyright law. But the first should also be mentioned. 9  For others see, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Justifying Intellectual Property, Cambridge, MA / London 2011, p. 8 et passim; Schmücker, Normative Resources and Domain-Specific Principles (supra, n. 5), pp. 366 – 373.

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First, it could be argued that a justified interest of authors and owners also extends to preventing copies from being made that obviously cannot substitute their template. For instance, an author could have an interest in no part of her work – not even a very small one – being copied. Or she might have an interest in there being no better products than hers, which might be achieved by preventing other people from producing them by claiming that they would infringe copyright with respect to certain parts of her own work. Recently, two young furniture designers had developed a very simple way of mounting the shelves but were accused of having copied a relevant part of the shelving system “606”, developed in 1960 by furniture designer Dieter Rams.10 Their way of mounting the shelves is based on a rectangular fixation element that allegedly has been part of the very different fixation element of Rams’ system that also includes a rectangular part. Due to their limited financial resources they agreed to a settlement. The example shows that – even if we grant the authors or owners a justified interest in preventing partial copies from being made – it does not follow that the principle of permissible non-substitutional copying undervalues this interest. It is not morally obvious that the author’s interest to prevent partial copies – which, in practice, is often motivated by the wish to prevent the production of better products by competitors – should be given more weight than the interests of third parties who are trying to make better products. Why should the latter’s interests not be weighed more heavily? This balance seems appropriate to me from a moral point of view, because we must not forget that any artefact is – at least partially – a copy or imitation of a template. A principle of copy ethics that prohibits partial copying that does not lead to a substitution of the template would only protect artefacts that would not exist at all, had their creators respected the principle. I cannot see any moral reason for weighing the interests of authors and owners higher than those of people who produce new artefacts or want to use them. In public discourse about potential changes to copyright law, a second argument plays a more important role. It claims that the principle of permissible non-substitutional copying cheats the template-authors and -owners of the profits from licensing acts of copying. If copyright law were guided by the principle of permissible non-substitutional copying, authors and exploitation rights holders could no longer earn an income from licensing the acts of copying that do not result in a copy that can substitute its template. A lawsuit regarding such a case is the probably never-ending litigation between music group, Kraftwerk, and producer Moses Pelham.11 The argument of the missed income from licensing is also often put forward in other copyright lawsuits that concern non-substitutional acts of copying. 10  See, e.g., Florian Siebeck, Ärger um Redesign: Das Recht am rechten Winkel, Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, 18 June 2017, p. 53. 11  The case has occupied several German courts since 1999; decisions by the regional, higher regional and federal courts of justice in favour of Kraftwerk’s claim of an infringement of their ancillary copyright in the sound recording were repealed by the Federal Constitutional Court in 2016 (1 BvR 1585/13). The Federal Court of Justice (I ZR 115/16) submitted ques-

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However, the popularity of the argument does not change the fact that it is unconvincing. The argument is trying to show the wrongness of a principle of copy ethics by resorting to a reductio ad absurdum: it tries to show that accepting the principle would have absurd consequences, or at least consequences that would be widely regarded as morally wrong. The argument says that the principle entails that someone is deprived of the royalties that he or she is entitled to. However, this line of argument is flawed. It is a petitio principii: the absurdity or morally wrong status of the consequences only follows if we assume that the principle is false – but the argument is supposed to show that the principle is false. Without this assumption, there is no basis for saying that the author of a work is also entitled to royalties for copies that do not substitute the work – for instance, because they are partial copies – and for saying that the author’s profits are therefore significantly reduced. The objection of the incentive for cultural imitation is not convincing, either. Its claim is that the principle of permissible non-substitutional copying opposes the necessary promotion of innovation and originality, because it creates an incentive for the production of epigonal artefacts. This argument, however, is based on false premises. One is that strong copy restrictions will increase the incentive for creating innovative and original artefacts. The idea behind this assumption is that people who are capable of producing innovative and original artefacts will be motivated to be even more productive because of the existence of copy restrictions. Copy restrictions guarantee that creative people can be sure that they will not be deprived of their profits due to shameless copying of their works. However, this is a mere theory, and I doubt that it can be empirically proven. In fact, it rather seems to be the case that strong copy restrictions – at most – motivate some creatives to increase their production. Many creatives, however, will not be motivated to produce innovative and original artefacts. For instance, poster and cover designers increasingly abstain from using even those works that are in the public domain, because they want to avoid disputes with museums about using reproduction photographs – or they do not want to become the slaves of the rights holder’s specifications. The latter might insist on no text being superimposed on the reproduction of a painting, or on no image sections being reproduced. Even those creatives who allegedly benefit from copy restrictions are sometimes not motivated to create innovations, but are tempted to be content with what they have already achieved. This is true in particular for restrictions on copies that cannot substitute their template – especially copies of parts, aspects, or elements of a work. These restrictions make it harder for third parties to produce better products that only resemble others in some respects. This slows down innovation within a culture. It is yet to be proven that copy restrictions would motivate the creation of innovative and original artefacts. tions concerning the interpretation of the relevant provisions in the European copyright directive to the European Court of Justice; the case was argued on 3 July 2018, but the decision is pending at the time of preparing this article for publication (C-476/17).

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IV. What Follows from the Principle of Permissible Non-substitutional Copying? Maybe there are better reasons than the ones that I have just discussed for rejecting the principle of permissible non-substitutional copying. If so, they have to be brought to bear and to be examined. However, the next interesting question for an ethics of copying is: what follows from the principle of permissible non-substitutional copying for the reform of copyright law and related legal areas? I think this primarily concerns four points: (1) Copying, or taking over parts, elements, or aspects of a work, should be possible without a specific permission or payment of a fee – as long as the partial copy cannot substitute the template in one or more of its main purposes. (2) Citations of speech, images, and sound sequences should be possible without any restrictions, permission, and fees, since they are not copies that could substitute their template(s) in one or more of their main purposes. In the case of image citations, a restriction (absolute or relative) of the size of the copy could be discussed. (3) Representations of protected works should be possible without any restrictions, permission, and fees, since they are not copies that could substitute their template(s) in one or more of their main purposes. A restriction (absolute or relative) of the size of the representation could be discussed. (4) If it is legally permitted to circumvent technical copy protections that render copies impossible which cannot substitute their templates, it must also be legally permitted to remove this protection in order to make copies that can substitute their templates in one or more of their main purposes. Otherwise, the result of a moral weighing between the justified interests of the parties affected by the acts of copying would be undermined – and the interests of a certain party would be unjustifiably privileged. However, it seems difficult to me to draw conclusions from the principle of permissible non-substitutional copying concerning the norms for copies that completely – and more or less faithfully – reproduce their template. This is due to the fact that, in many cases, such copies will be suitable for substituting the template with regard to one of its main purposes. Even though producing such copies might be legitimate without the author’s consent, in a given case this cannot be decided on the basis of the principle of permissible non-substitutional copying alone. Nevertheless, the principle indicates that, from a moral point of view, copyright law in Germany (and in other countries) needs to be reformed – and it needs to be reformed more extensively than by the changes that were decided in 2017.12

12  Cf. the German “Gesetz zur Angleichung des Urheberrechts an die aktuellen Erfordernisse der Wissensgesellschaft – Urheberrechts-Wissensgesellschafts-Gesetz (UrhWissG)” (1 September 2017, BGBl I, 3346).

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Zusammenfassung Wenn man unter einer Ethik des Kopierens eine Bereichsethik für das Gebiet der Kopierhandlungen versteht, dann lassen sich drei basale Prämissen einer solchen Kopierethik benennen: Erstens muss sie dem Umstand Rechnung tragen, dass Kopieren eine elementare Kulturtechnik ist. Zweitens muss sie das legitime Interesse von Urhebern berücksichtigen, mit Erträgen, die das von ihnen Hervorgebrachte abwirft, die Kosten von dessen Hervorbringung decken und ihren Lebensunterhalt sichern zu können sowie an einem etwaigen Mehrertrag, der über das dafür Erforderliche hinausgeht, in angemessener Weise zu partizipieren. Drittens muss sie in Rechnung stellen, dass die Frage der Zulässigkeit von (Teil-)Kopien eines Artefakts nicht nur legitime Interessen von dessen Urheber, sondern in der Regel auch legitime Interessen Dritter betrifft. Der Beitrag begründet, warum sich unter diesen Voraussetzungen als eines der elementarsten kopierethischen Prinzipien das Prinzip der Zulässigkeit nichtsubstitutionellen Kopierens ergibt, dem zufolge Kopierhandlungen grundsätzlich legitim sind, solange durch sie nichts hervorgebracht wird, das geeignet wäre, die Kopiervorlage in Bezug auf einen oder mehrere ihrer hauptsächlichen Verwendungszwecke zu ersetzen. Vier grundlegende Einwände gegen das Prinzip – (1) der Einwand der Unbestimmtheit und (2) der der Inadäquatheit des Prinzips sowie (3) der Einwand der Untergewichtung der legitimen Interessen von Urhebern und Rechteinhabern und (4) der Einwand der Incentivierung der Produktion epigonaler Artefakte – werden entkräftet, und es wird nach den Konsequenzen gefragt, die sich aus dem Prinzip der Zulässigkeit nichtsubstitutionellen Kopierens für die Ausgestaltung des Urheberrechts und verwandter Rechte ergeben.

The Legitimacy of Substitute Copies in the Visual Arts Antonia Putzger

One of the guiding principles that have been suggested for an ethics of copying concerns the issue of substitutability: according to Reinold Schmücker’s principle of permissible non-substitutional copying, copies that cannot “substitute the template with regard to at least one of its principal purposes” should not be considered a danger to the economic, functional, or aesthetic value of their template.1 But what about copies that have the potential to substitute their respective model and actually do so – physically, aesthetically, and with respect to certain functions? In what follows, I will present a number of established practices of substitution by copies in the visual arts. This will allow me to analyze what follows from those practices for the question of whether substitution by copies can be legitimate – and under which circumstances. My aim is also to explore how aesthetic arguments may inform the ethical argument, and how art-historical discourse can help to clarify certain aspects of this debate. Assuming that copying material artifacts is a different process than copying digital artifacts, I will focus on material art objects. I. Established Practices of Substitution by Copies Even though irreplaceability is sometimes claimed to be an intrinsic feature of works of art (as opposed to economic goods or commodities),2 many of them have become subject to physical replacement in the course of history. Being a copy is not a necessary feature of a substitute in the simple sense of being a replacement or surrogate. For example, an altarpiece may be replaced by another painted or sculpted altarpiece which fulfills the same liturgical function. It may even display the same iconography, e.g. the Virgin Mary with the infant Jesus, without being a copy of the piece it replaces. 1 Cf. Reinold Schmücker, Normative Resources and Domain-Specific Principles: Heading for an Ethics of Copying, in: Darren Hudson Hick / Reinold Schmücker (eds.), The Aesthetics and Ethics of Copying, NewYork / London 2016, pp. 359 – 377: p. 367 et seq. 2  George Kubler neatly expressed this assumption: “In short, a work of art is as useless as a tool is useful. Works of art are as unique and irreplaceable as tools are common and expend­ able.” George Kubler, The Shape of Time: Remarks on the History of Things (1962), New Haven, CN / London 2008, p. 14.

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The substitution of an artwork by a faithful copy within a given context is a more specific practice of substitution, which has manifested itself on several occasions and for different reasons. In general, these substitute copies resemble their models closely. The intention behind their making is, in all likelihood, not to create something new, but to preserve the visual appearance of the model in its given context and to secure its availability for a certain function – assuming a wide definition of function which includes cultural practices, such as religious rituals.3 Five typical cases of substitution by copies can be distinguished from each other: 1. Direct Compensation From the 16th to the 18th century, the practice of substituting paintings by copies enabled princes and dukes to withdraw paintings from their – mostly sacred – locations and to add them to their own collections.4 A substitute copy was either provided by the duke, or it was commissioned by the owners prior to the withdrawal of the painting. The act of substitution was thus triggered by the imminent removal of a work firmly situated in a specific context. Michiel Coxcie’s copy (1548) of Rogier van der Weyden’s Deposition of Christ (before 1443) is the earliest example of this practice known to me.5 These copies and others of the same kind are highly faithful to the original – some of them were even confused with the originals at a later point in time. 2. Late Compensation A substitution by a copy can also occur long after the withdrawal of an original from a certain site in order to complete or reconstruct a historical context. The case of Veronese’s Marriage at Cana, which was copied in 2007 by the Madrid workshop Factum Arte for display in the original setting of the painting in the refectory of San Giorgio Maggiore, Venice (fig. 1), is a good example.6 The original 3  Still relevant for a discussion of the functions of art is Werner Busch (ed.), Funkkolleg Kunst. Eine Geschichte der Kunst im Wandel ihrer Funktionen, Munich 1987. 4  I explore and analyse this practice in depth in my PhD thesis on “Kult und Kunst, Kopie und Original. Fallstudien zu Aneignung, Wiederholung und Ersatz von Altarbildern in der Frühen Neuzeit” (Technische Universität Berlin, 2016). 5  Although the circumstances of this substitution were known, and commented on, by art historians before, the first publication focusing in detail on the multiple transfers of the Depo­ sition and the resulting copies was Amy Powell, The Errant Image: Rogier van der Weyden’s Deposition from the Cross and its Copies, Art History 29 (2006), pp. 540 – 562. 6  In fact, the creation, exhibition, and reception of this facsimile was very purposefully discussed and marketed in a number of publications, including Pasquale Gagliardi / Bruno La­ tour / Pedro Memelsdorf (eds.), Coping with the Past: Creative Perspectives on Conservation and Restoration, Florence 2010; Pasquale Gagliardi (ed.), The Miracle of Cana: The Originality of the Re-production. The Wedding at Cana by Paolo Veronese. The Biography of the Painting, the Creation of the Facsimile and its Theoretical Implications, Venice 2011; Bruno La­

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Pasquale Gagliardi (ed.), The Miracle of Cana: The originality of the re-production, The Wedding at Cana by Paolo Veronese, Venice 2011, p. 6, Fig. 1.

Figure 1: The P alladian refectory of San Giorgio Maggiore with the facsimile of Veronese’s Wedding at Cana by Factum Arte, 2007, Venice.

painting was taken to France by Napoleon’s troops in 1797 and has remained in the Louvre since then. It took more than 200 years until it was replaced in its native setting by a full-scale replica. tour / Adam Lowe, The Migration of the Aura, or How to Explore the Original Through its Facsimiles, in: Thomas Bartscherer / Roderick Coover (eds.), Switching Codes: Thinking Through Digital Technology in the Humanities and the Arts, Chicago 2011, pp. 275 – 297.

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3. Musealisation Another form of substituting cherished originals by copies began with the rise of monument preservation measures. It complemented the establishment of museums and their growth in size and influence since the 19th century – the transfer of outdoor statues to museums for conservation purposes and their replacement, in situ, by full-scale copies. Michelangelo’s statue of David is a prominent example. It was relocated to the Florentine Accademia and replaced by a marble copy in the Piazza della Signoria in 1910. The same was process was carried out for many other statues in Florence and elsewhere. 4. Facsimile or Exhibition Copy Musealisation may be sufficient for significantly increasing the life span of ­ ieces of marble or bronze sculpture. However, it does not ensure the survival of p more fragile objects such as drawings or medieval manuscripts, which are sometimes substituted by facsimiles in a museum or archival context for the purpose of maintaining their readability or visibility.7 Moreover, certain more recent sculptures and installations, despite being made to be displayed in the museum or gallery space, have started to crumble or fade due to disintegrating materials. In some cases, disintegration can even be an intentional, intrinsic feature of an artwork, such as the chocolate objects by Dieter Roth (fig. 2).8 For other artworks, such as the early sculptures by Naum Gabo, this does not apply.9 Exhibition copies are 7  By comparison, the facsimile caves of Altamira and Lascaux can be considered to be similar in kind to the exhibition copies and facsimiles discussed here, although these cases represent yet another form of substitution, because the copies do not substitute the paintings in their context, but replicate an entire context which, to use Baudrillard’s term, “simulates” the experience of being inside the caves. Cf. Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation (1981), transl. by Sheila Glaser, Ann Arbor, MI 1995. 8 Cf. Heide Skowranek, Die Bewahrung des Verfalls im Werk von Dieter Roth, in: Angela Matyssek (ed.), Wann stirbt ein Kunstwerk? Konservierung des Originalen in der Gegenwarts­ kunst, Munich 2010, pp. 87 – 104. Skowranek suggests taking only very restrained conservation measures to make sure that this central quality of Roth’s work will not be compromised. She also takes the possibility of replicating Roth’s work into account, albeit rather reluctantly, asking: Should We Reproduce the Beauty of Decay? A Museumsleben in the Work of Dieter Roth, in: Inherent Vice: The Replica and Its Implications in Modern Sculpture, Tate Papers 8 (2007), http://www.tate.org.uk/research/publications/tate-papers/08/should-we-reproduce-thebeauty-of-decay-a-museumsleben-in-the-work-of-dieter-roth (last access: 13 March 2018). Similar conservation problems arise for some of Joseph Beuys’ works; for a critical view on this type of ephemeral art and conservation efforts, see Walter Grasskamp, Das Kunstmuseum. Eine erfolgreiche Fehlkonstruktion, Munich 2016, pp. 111 – 138 et passim. 9  According to Alex Potts, in the case of Naum Gabo, “issues of ephemerality did not play a significant role in the artist’s conception of his work. Plastic was chosen for practical reasons, but also because at the time, it was a material that seemed to represent an almost timelessly present modernity.” Alex Potts, The Enduringly Ephemeral, Tate Papers 8 (2007), http://www. tate.org.uk/research/publications/tate-papers/08/the-enduringly-ephemeral (last access: 13 March 2018). Also cf. other contributions to this issue of the Tate Papers by Matthew Gale,

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Exh. cat. Kunst und Kalter Krieg, ed. by Stephanie Barron & Sabine Eckmann, Berlin 2009, p. 21 (cat. no. 314).

Figure 2: Exhibition copy (2008) of Dieter Roth, Selbstturm / Schokoladenlöwenturm (1969/1993), 203 x 103,5 x 103,5 cm, Dieter Roth Foundation, Hamburg http://www.tate.org.uk/research/publications/tate-papers/08/amazement-and-uneasiness-early-​ thoughts; Jackie Heuman & Lyndsey Morgan, http://www.tate.org.uk/research/publications/ tate-papers/08/tate-sculpture-replica-project, and Stephen Hackney, http://www.tate.org.uk/​re search/publications/tate-papers/08/degradation-of-naum-gabo-plastic-sculpture-catalyst-​forthe-workshop. For arguments against the replication of Gabo’s works see Margaret Iversen, http://www.tate.org.uk/research/publications/tate-papers/08/resistance-to-replication; for the copyright holders’ view, see the contribution of Nina & Graham Williams, http://www.tate.org. uk/research/publications/tate-papers/08/replicas-of-constructions-by-naum-gabo-a-statementby-the-copyright-holders.

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sometimes made in order to substitute these works. These copies either serve as traveling objects for international exhibitions while the fragile original remains in situ, or even as museum replicas while the original is archived in storage (and may eventually completely fall apart).10 5. Forgery Substitute copies have often been made as forgeries in order to cover up the illicit withdrawal of a work. In 1674, the painter and writer Giovan Battista Volpato lifted two altarpieces by Bassano from churches in rural northern Italy and replaced them with copies. Allegedly, nobody in the village noticed any difference.11 He managed to take the originals under the pretense of wanting to restore them. Later, when he had financial problems, he sold them. Although the exchange was discovered in the end, the original paintings were never returned to their former sacred settings.12 These five types of cases comprise different motivations, aims, and results of a substitution by copies.13 I deliberately do not count the reconstruction of lost works as belonging to these cases, since a reconstruction of something that has more or less vanished does not allow for the kind of close copying that is constitutive for the practices described above.14 While any kind of manual or material copy (as opposed to the multiplication of digital files, for example) retains an aspect of interpretation of the copied work, a reconstruction based on plans, drawings, photos, and other documents will always diverge from the lost model, since the latter cannot serve as a reference object for the copy. I will therefore argue that a timely duplication may prevent the need for a later reconstruction and thus help retain a more faithful representation of a given artwork. Of course, there are also many other situations that may require or encourage manufacturing and exhibiting copies. Since any copy could potentially act as a 10 Cf. Helmut Börsch-Supan, Schauwert und originale Substanz, Deutsche Kunst und Denk­ malpflege 45 (1987), pp. 173 – 179, for a defense of the Berlin print room’s practice of showing a facsimile of Albrecht Dürer’s famous drawing of his mother without labeling it as such – allegedly, only visitors who noticed they were looking at a facsimile received access to the original. On the topic of various types of exhibition copies cf. Annette Tietenberg (ed.), Die Ausstellungskopie. Mediales Konstrukt, materielle Rekonstuktion, historische Dekonstruktion, Cologne / Weimar / Vienna 2015. 11  Massimo Ferretti, Fälschungen und künstlerische Tradition, in: Luciano Bellosi (ed.), Italienische Kunst. Eine neue Sicht auf ihre Geschichte, Munich 1991, vol. 1, pp. 233 – 303: p. 264 et seq., including a citation of the source by G. B. Verci (1775). 12  The two Bassano paintings, both showing a Madonna with child and several saints, have since made their way to the Munich Pinakothek. 13  Naturally, there are certain areas of overlap between the cited cases in terms of intentions and outcome. 14  For some insights and adverse arguments regarding reconstructions in architecture, see Adrian von Buttlar, Gabi Dolff-Bonekämper et al. (eds.), Denkmalpflege statt Attrappenkult. Gegen die Rekonstruktion von Baudenkmälern, Berlin 2013.

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substitute with respect to certain functions or modes of reception of a given work, we cannot evaluate the legitimacy of substitute copies in general. An enquiry of this kind would have to discuss the legitimacy of any potential substitute copies and ultimately of all copies. Also, there is no point in applying ethical evaluations to the objects themselves, which in the course of time may serve several different functions. For an ethical evaluation, we should rather look at the assumed intentions, actions, and results that constitute such practices. II. Withdrawal and Replacement As the cases introduced above show, there are usually two sides to the coin of substitution: the withdrawal or loss of a work – whether it has already happened or not – triggers the need or wish for a replacement. The question of legitimacy seems to be easiest to answer in the forgery case, as both the withdrawal as well as the replacement exhibit moral wrongdoing. The withdrawal of the Bassano altarpieces meant that the paintings were taken without permission, which constitutes the moral (and indeed criminal) offense of taking someone else’s property. For the replacement, the painterly skill of copying a work was used to cover up the crime and to deceive the owners and viewers into thinking that the replacement was the original painting. One could, of course, object that, for the farmers who went to these churches, it might not have mattered much whether they saw an original Bassano painting. The painting probably only gained in value as an original artwork by Bassano once it entered the art market after having been removed from the church.15 But even if one wanted to argue that the proposed ethical evaluation wrongly presupposes a certain modern day understanding of originality for 17th century church-going farmers, the outright pretense of doing a good thing (restoration) with the intention of theft would still be considered a straightforward lie. If Volpato had revealed his intentions to the regional church community and shared his financial gain with the farmers, our evaluation of this case might be different. But as we have seen, the intention of forgery and betrayal is by no means a constitutive feature of all practices of substitution by copies. In fact, it is rather the exception to the rule, and most cases are not as straightforward: the moral questions raised by the withdrawal of a work concern the legitimacy of the corresponding motivation. Possible motivations range from immoral enrichment (by selling the original the value of which was not known to its previous owners) to the desire to own the original and to have exclusive access to it (as in the case of the early modern collectors mentioned above), the wish to reclaim one’s property (e.g. when a piece on longterm loan to a museum is taken back to a private context), and the desire or public mandate to preserve the original (in the case of musealisation and archiving).16 15 16

  Cf. the discussion of the relative understandings of originality further down in this paper.   This is a list of examples and does not aim to be exhaustive.

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From today’s perspective, the legitimacy of withdrawing a work from a sacred or public context has to be evaluated on a case by case basis. As the cases of dukes appropriating famous altarpieces show, the power balance between the person demanding the work and the institution that is left with the substitute copy can be an important factor in this equation. In any case, the potential result of a withdrawal is either the limited accessibility of a work (e.g. when it is in a museum or collection) or the complete lack of access (when it is in private ownership or in a museum storage space). An illegitimate withdrawal does therefore not necessarily presuppose the illegitimacy of a substitution by a copy – in fact, if an ethically questionable withdrawal cannot be prevented, this may even be a strong argument in favor of creating a substitute that maintains access to the work, or at least to certain aspects of it, in the form of a copy. The replacement of artworks may lead to the following concern: a common fear of owners is that the duplication of an artwork might decrease its economic value because of the resulting lack of singularity.17 However, it seems that in cases where the original was illegitimately withdrawn (or the legitimacy of the withdrawal is at least questionable) or lost, the reasons for making a substitute copy outweigh the concern that it might decrease the original’s economic value. From the perspective of public interest, the accessibility of the artwork and the preservation of its cultural value are more important than the preservation of its economic value for the art market. But from the viewer’s perspective, the potential – intended or unintended – deception by means of a substitute copy could be an issue of ethical relevance: even if the aim of a substitution is not to produce a forgery, the copy may still deceive its viewers into thinking it is the real thing. Therefore, the potential of deception and the relation between copy and original present multi-layered problems that are relevant to the question of the legitimacy of substitution. III. The Ethical and Aesthetic Evaluation of Deception In his 1930 defense of facsimiles, Erwin Panofsky claimed that the aim behind a facsimile is not to substitute the original in the sense of taking over its “aesthetic place”.18 If the facsimile were to usurp the “aesthetic place” of the original, this might be considered a moral problem. But according to Panofsky, facsimiles do not replace the originals in the sense of providing the same aesthetic enjoyment as the originals. They rather provide an aesthetic experience in their own right, namely the experience as a facsimile. “Echtheit” (authenticity or originality) is not an ele17  On the assumed relation between replication and market value, cf. Henry Lydiate, Posthumous Legal and Ethical Issues, Tate Papers 8 (2007), http://www.tate.org.uk/research/publi​ cations/tate-papers/08/posthumous-legal-and-ethical-issues (last access: 13 March 2018). 18  Erwin Panofsky, Original und Faksimilereproduktion, Idea 5 (1986), pp. 111 – 123 (first in: Der Kreis 7 [1930], pp. 3 – 16).

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ment of that aesthetic experience.19 This view presumes that a) viewers know that they are seeing a copy, and that b) their aesthetic experience is influenced by this knowledge. So, if a) is not fulfilled, a copy that is sufficiently similar to its model and replaces it in its given context may easily have its viewers believing that it is identical with the original. And if b) is also fulfilled, viewers might feel deceived upon finding out they saw a mere copy. Of course, not all forms of deception are equally immoral or even immoral at all.20 And there may be different types of motives involved in substitution: some can be identified as immoral, some are questionable, and some are quite the opposite of immoral. The issue of intention, however, is hard to pin down in cases other than forgery: if I replace something with an equivalent without specifically and obviously pointing to the fact that I have done so, I accept, or even provoke, the possibility that I deceive viewers. Moreover, I deceive them regarding the identity of the object (as original), but also regarding its status as art (presuming that being an original is considered by many as constitutive of art status). Does not the fact that we usually see only one of the two objects at a time – original or copy – increase the potential of deception, as there is no way of directly comparing them? And would a small label for the substitute actually prevent this effect? Thus, while it may not be the explicit intention to deceive in a given case, deception could still be the result – an effect that might be regarded as wrong by viewers who expect to see an original. However, if we were prepared to read the potential for deception as a positive feature we should first state that a criterion for a successful substitute copy is whether an experienced viewer, familiar with the model, would find it credible as an instantiation of the work in question – or would even believe that this is the work. To quote Adam Lowe, the mastermind behind Factum Arte’s Veronese copy: “If the first thing one notices is that the painting is a copy, the facsimile will have failed.”21 This criterion of a convincing similarity to the original and the seeming identity with it is related to the fact that one important quality of visual art, at least in Western painting and sculpture, is its potential for mimetic illusion: creating appearances of spaces, objects, and figures that are not actually there.22  Ibid.   On the philosophical definitions of deception and lying see James Edwin Mahon, The Definition of Lying and Deception, in: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (winter 2016 edition), ed. by Edward N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/lying-​ definition/ (last access: 29 November 2017); on various modes and ethical implications of ­deception cf. Alan Strudler, Deception Unraveled, The Journal of Philosophy 102 (2005), pp.  458 – 473 (I am grateful to Wybo Houkes for pointing me to this article). 21  Adam Lowe, Giving Birth to the Facsimile, in: Gagliardi (ed.), The Miracle of Cana (­supra, n. 6), pp. 73 – 92: p. 92. 22  For an overview of illusionistic mimesis in the visual arts cf. Frank Büttner, Illusion (ästhetische), in: Metzler Lexikon Kunstwissenschaft. Ideen, Methoden, Begriffe, ed. by Ulrich Pfisterer, Stuttgart 2011, pp. 201 – 204. 19 20

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Pliny the Elder tells the famous story of the ancient painter Zeuxis who mistook a curtain painted by Parrhasius for a real one. The 16th century artist biographer Giorgio Vasari praises the mimetic quality of a copy in his story of Andrea del Sarto’s copy of Raphael’s portrait of Pope Leo X and two cardinals:23 the copy was given to the Marquis of Mantua instead of the requested painting by Raphael. Allegedly, the deception was not discovered until some years later when Vasari himself uncovered the truth. According to Vasari, at first neither the marquis nor his court painter Giulio Romano, Raphael’s former assistant, believed that the painting was not actually by Raphael’s (or Giulio Romano’s) hand. When they were finally convinced, however, they praised Andrea del Sarto’s exceptional painterly talent instead of accusing him of forgery. Thus, Vasari’s narrative adds another layer to mimesis tales: by reproducing the image of the pope and his cardinals, Andrea del Sarto produced not just another credible image of them but, more importantly, a credible copy of the painting itself. The myth of an illusionistic imitation of nature is thus shifted to the illusionistic imitation of another painting. However, there is a crucial difference concerning these two forms of imitation: on closer inspection, a life-like portrait or trompe-l’oeil painting reveals its fundamental difference from what it depicts. The deceptive (or illusionistic) copy, however, does not obviously exhibit any difference to its model. Instead, it suggests that the original is actually present. In Vasari’s tale, the illusion was uncovered by a sign that the copyist had applied to the back of the copy. This telling anecdote illustrates an intrinsic feature of aesthetic pleasure that is derived from a deceptive illusion, namely that the aesthetic experience presupposes that the illusion is resolved in due time and that it then turns into admiration for the quality of the illusionistic depiction. Otherwise, the viewers remain deceived and cannot take pleasure in the illusion. They may never learn about the illusion and may therefore not mind, but in a society that values artworks for their origins, i.e. their direct, physical link to their creator, most art lovers and art historians would not like the idea of being deceived. The following paradoxical situation is therefore relevant for the success and legitimacy of substitution by copies: on the one hand, substitute copies are doing a bad job of substituting unless they are convincing duplicates of the model. On the other hand, viewers must know that they are seeing a substitute so they do not feel deceived. On the one hand, deception can only be appreciated as an aesthetic quali23  Vita d’Andrea del Sarto, in: Giorgio Vasari, Le Vite de’ più eccellenti pittori scultori e architettori, 1550 (Edizione Torrentiana) and 1568 (Edizione Giuntina), http://vasari.sns.it/con​ sultazione/Vasari/indice.html (last access: 22 June 2017), vol. 4, pp. 378 – 380. This case has been frequently discussed, cf. Jeffrey M. Muller, Measures of Authenticity: The Detection of Copies in the Early Literature on Connoisseurship, in: Kathleen Preciado (ed.), Retaining the Original: Multiple Originals, Copies and Reproductions, Washington, DC 1989, pp. 141 – 149, and Lars Blunck, Wann ist ein Original?, in: Julian Nida-Rümelin / Jakob Steinbrenner (eds.), Original und Fälschung, Ostfildern 2011, pp. 9 – 29. On the ancient topos of the deception of humans and animals through painterly mimesis, see Pliny the Elder, Natural History, XXXV, 36.

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ty if the illusion is not complete, or if it does not last for too long. On the other hand, the undoing of the illusion inhibits the capacity of the substitute to fully replace the substituted object. The second tension, however, can be easily resolved if it is presented as a matter of unraveling a deception in the successive stages of a reception process: when initially perceived as the thing one expects or hopes to see (i.e. the original), the substitute copy may be successful. Upon closer examination of the object, its label, and any further information, the potential disappointment (of not seeing the original) may turn into the enjoyment of the copy’s qualities. Concrete examples show that this process is not just fictional or anecdotal. Similar to Vasari’s praise of Andrea del Sarto, aesthetic pleasure and praise on behalf of the recipients was evoked by certain early modern substitute copies: Michiel Coxcie was admired for his skill in reproducing a model. It was considered an artistic talent in its own right.24 A more current example is the Veronese case: Factum Arte’s copy is praised by critics as an embodiment of knowledge and technological progress as well as a deep engagement with the artwork.25 Hence there might be a third way of experiencing substitute copies which combines the authentic experience of the copy as the thing itself with the unraveling knowledge about, and aesthetic experience of, the copy.26 One condition for this would be a correct but unobtrusive practice of irreversible labeling and other means of information making it clear that this is a substitute.27 A further condition would be that, in the process of unraveling, no harm should result from initially falling for the illusion. It would be unfair, for example, to raise certain expectations and then to expose and ridicule a viewer’s honest belief before the unraveling could take place. Resolving the illusion might diminish the experience of the substitute 24  Cf. for example Karel van Mander, Het schilder-boeck (facsimile of the first edition, Haarlem 1604), Utrecht 1969, http://www.dbnl.org/tekst/mand001schi01_01/ (last access: 18 June 2017), fol. 207r: “En in de plaets van dit, hadden die van Loven een, dat van Michiel Coxie nae dit ghecopieert was: waer by te bedencken is, wat een uytmuntigh stuck dit was.” – In my PhD thesis (supra, n. 4), I analyse the different understandings of, and attitudes towards originality, authorship, and the value of religious painting as art in these historical cases of substitution and in the discourses which accompanied them. 25  Cf. supra, n. 6. 26  In fact, this seems to be implied by Adam Lowe, since the passage quoted above continues as follows: “If one first engages with the space and then starts to unravel the history and transformations of the painting, then the facsimile will have succeeded. The aim is not falsification. Rather it is in line with all study before the twentieth century in which the role of the copy was to deepen understanding of specific works within the canon of accepted masterpieces.” Lowe, Giving Birth to the Facsimile (supra, n. 21), p. 92. 27  In fact, all parties involved (owners of the original, artists, viewers, museum officials, restorers, art historians) seem to agree on the fact that it is mandatory to label the exhibited copies. This conforms with the ICOM Code of Ethics, § 4.7 (Reproductions): “Museums should respect the integrity of the original when replicas, reproductions, or copies of items in the collection are made. All such copies should be permanently marked as facsimiles.” However, big lettering with the term “replica” written across the whole copy would undermine the substitute copy’s specific potential to aesthetically stand in for an original.

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copy as the original, but it opens up the possibility, described by Panofsky, of taking aesthetic pleasure in the quality of the copy. Thus, unraveled deception can be considered a gain rather than a loss, not only from an ethical, but also from an aesthetic point of view.28 IV. Does it Even Matter Which One is Which? Concepts of Originality and Authenticity When the sociologist and cultural philosopher Bruno Latour proclaims that the “aura of the original” has been transferred from the Louvre to the Veronese facsimile, now in the place where the original used to be installed, this seems, at first, diametrically opposed to Panofsky’s facsimile claim.29 Latour maintains that an authentic experience of Veronese’s Marriage at Cana can now be had in front of the facsimile, rather than in the Louvre, where the original is exhibited vis-à-vis Leonardo’s Mona Lisa. The implication is that the original context is constitutive for the correct reception and for the value of originality as such. He does not seem to doubt, however, that only one of the two objects in question may have that aura. One of them has to come prior to the other. In fact, this praise of the substitute fixes the dichotomy between original and copy just as much as the fetish of authentic materiality does. The Veronese case shows that this split is particularly symptomatic of works that have been transferred into museums but maintain a strong historical or contextual link to the location they were originally made for. Without going into further details of various ways of defining the concepts of originality, authorship, authenticity, and aura, it is therefore important to note that we (still) live in an age where the assumed or perceived difference between original and copy matters to many people. It is, however, not a given fact that originality and authorship are always and everywhere relevant for an understanding of art and the reception of art objects. For the early modern period in the Western history of art, Alexander Nagel and Christopher Wood have claimed a gradual shift from what they call a substitutional model to an authorial model.30 Interestingly, the practice of substitution as discussed in this paper appears to be a phenomenon related to the authorial model, which connects the authorship of a given artifact to its status as art, as it implies an interest in the specific formal and stylistic features of a work as art and, at the same time, it maintains one aspect of the substitutional model, i.e. that one artifact can stand in for another. A contrasting concept is the veneration of relics which 28  It is not within the scope of this paper to decide whether this enriches or transforms the experience of the work as such. 29  Latour / Lowe, The Migration of the Aura (supra, n. 6); on the concept of aura, see Walter Benjamin, Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit (1936), ed. by Burkhardt Lindner, Berlin 2013. 30  Alexander Nagel / Christopher Wood, Anachronic Renaissance, New York 2010.

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presumes the actual material identity of an object with a saint’s body, or at least a material link to his or her physical touch.31 The appreciation of original artworks initially shared a feature with the veneration of relics – the importance of the material substance. This feature lives on in the Western concepts of authenticity and cultural heritage.32 At the same time, there are examples, especially from Chinese and Japanese art history, that reveal a very different understanding of art and authorship. This understanding lacks the idea that every first version of a work must be credited with the status of singularity and that it must be attributed to a certain author and a point in time, as is the case with Western originals.33 This brief excursus should suffice to demonstrate that our ways of seeing and evaluating art are the result of historical and cultural processes. They can be contextualized and contrasted with other conceptions. Contemporary artistic practices sometimes deliberately try to broaden and challenge a common understanding of art and originality. This is legitimate, given that the latter are not fixed entities but rather fluid concepts. This background, which has already become part of the international guidelines on monument preservation,34 should also inform the legal understanding of authorship, intellectual property, and originality in copyright regulations, especially when it comes to questions of conservation and contemporary artistic practices. Returning to the question of the legitimacy of practices of substitution by copies, we do have to recognize that, however fluid the concepts of originality, authenticity, and authorship (let alone aura) may be, they still greatly influence the way we see, value, and study art, at least in some parts of the world. The higher value many people attach to an original as opposed to its copies, however faithful they may be, has been defined and interpreted in different ways. In fact, there seems to be more than one value involved here: Firstly, as an art historian (and admirer of copies) I would claim that the historical origin of a painting or sculpture is relevant for my academic interest in the object. Knowing where an object comes from and who made it under which circumstances might tell me something important about it. The object itself, in31  On the general role of relics in art and worship, see Anton Legner, Reliquien in Kunst und Kult. Zwischen Antike und Aufklärung, Darmstadt 1995. 32 See Putzger, Kult und Kunst, Kopie und Original (supra, n. 4), chapter II.3: “Form und materielle Substanz: Die Kreuzabnahme und ihre Kopien in Spanien”. 33  This is of course only a rough sketch of different conceptions of originality and authenticity. Asian concepts of art and authenticity feature many intricacies and differences. See, for example, Eberhard Ortland, Copies of Famous Pictures in Tadao Andōʼs “Garden of Fine Art” in Kyōto, in: Corinna Forberg / Philipp W. Stockhammer (eds.), The Transformative Power of the Copy: A Transcultural and Interdisciplinary Approach, Heidelberg 2017, pp. 205 – 239; Ru­ pert Cox (ed.), The Culture of Copying in Japan: Critical and Historical Perspectives, London / New York 2008. 34 Cf. Nara Document on Authenticity (1994); Markus Tauschek, Kulturerbe. Eine Einführung, Berlin 2013, pp. 109 – 114.

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cluding all aspects of its materiality, might also tell me something about its origin, author, function, and history. Mistaking a substitute for its model might therefore put me on the wrong track when examining an object. Moreover, research results based on the “wrong” object might falsify future research and interpretations concerning that object and its assumed maker.35 It follows that, however faithful the Veronese facsimile may be, if I wanted to study the painting techniques of the Veronese workshop, I would rather go to the Louvre for that purpose (whereas I might study the facsimile in Venice if I wanted to research the painting’s visual effect in its original context; so indeed both have their value for art historical research). Secondly, if you do not accept that the historical materiality constitutes an essential difference between copy and original, you might interpret the perceived value difference as matter of fetish, which probably captures a good part of what aura and our love of originals is about.36 However, if this perceived value difference is a concern shared by most people, it has to be taken seriously as a legitimate mode of art reception. Indeed, in “Copying and the limits of substitutability”, Die­ter Birnbacher has argued that substitutability ends where personal affection comes into play.37 The desire for authenticity that might, at least partially, be considered a fetish can be understood as an emotional value attached to an object: even though we may not know the difference between original and copy unless we are told, we would not want to be mistaken about the identity of the object of our affection. It therefore seems legitimate that people have an interest in whether what they see is in fact what they think they see. This does not preclude the legitimacy of substitution, but it shows that, under current cultural and intellectual conditions, we should avoid the consequences of a complete deception and allow for the illusion to unravel in due time, as suggested above. Thus, substitute copies could have a complementary status to the original object rather than having to be judged as being either identical with it or challenging its singularity.

35  This is related to the problem of art historical delineations of artistic oeuvres based on wrong or questionable attributions. Such descriptions might then also serve as the basis for further attributions, and so forth. 36  ‘Fetish’ refers to a magical or emotional quality that is projected onto a thing without there being an essential basis for this in the thing itself. On this aspect of the cult of originality, see Maria E. Reicher, Vom wahren Wert des Echten und des Falschen, in: Nida-Rümelin / Steinbrenner (eds.), Original und Fälschung (supra, n. 23), pp. 51 – 70. 37  “[…] the absence of substitutability in love and friendship is strictly relative. An object of love or friendship is irreplaceable not in the impersonal sense of a philosophical axiology but only with respect to the individual emotionally related to it.” Dieter Birnbacher, Copying and the Limits of Substitutability, in: Hick / Schmücker (eds.), The Aesthetics and Ethics of Copying (­supra, n. 1), pp. 3 – 17: p. 16.

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V. Substitution and Conservation: the Public Mandate of Museums Versus Copyright? Museums as we know them are, to a large extent, dependent on concepts of originality and authenticity. There are exceptions (copy museums, for instance), but on the whole, people going to museums expect to experience tangible “real” objects, be it dinosaur bones, Beatles paraphernalia, or works of art.38 So in this day and age, most art museum visitors expect to see originals – and due to this expectation, they could be more easily tricked if faced with a copy that is not labeled as such and that is displayed among a number of originals. This expectation largely follows the logic of touch and physical identity. Since this logic depends on historically grown and emotionally confirmed distinctions, it is not to be taken for granted and may change over time. In the future, such a development may also change the character and function of the museum and ultimately challenge its role as an institution “which acquires, conserves, researches, communicates and exhibits the tangible and intangible heritage of humanity and its environment”.39 This current ICOM definition means that museums have an interest in maintaining the values of originality and authenticity. At the same time, the substitution of fragile or decaying art objects by exhibition copies has become a pressing issue. This concerns the conservation of works on paper and parchment, but also of modern and contemporary sculptures and installations that are made of problematic materials or depend on outdated technologies.40 Making copies is a particularly sensitive topic when it comes to modern and contemporary art: it is not only the moral 38 A certain fear of losing a sense of reality, especially in our age of ever more complex medialities, may play a part in this wish for the “real” and the related criticism of “simulation” – a view defended by Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation (supra, n. 7). Helpful contributions to the discussion about values of the “real thing” in the museum context, as well as modes of its conservation and replication, can be found in Rebecca Gordon /Erma Hermens / Frances Lennard (eds.), Authenticity and Replication: The ‘Real Thing’ in Art and Conservation. Proceedings of the International Conference Held at the University of Glasgow, 6 – 7 December 2012, London 2014. 39  The full ICOM definition is: “According to the ICOM Statutes, adopted by the 22nd General Assembly in Vienna, Austria on August 24th, 2007: A museum is a non-profit, permanent institution in the service of society and its development, open to the public, which acquires, conserves, researches, communicates and exhibits the tangible and intangible heritage of humanity and its environment for the purposes of education, study and enjoyment./This definition is a reference in the international community.” http://icom.museum/the-vision/museum-defini​ tion/ (last access: 5 June 2017). For a very critical recent view on art museums which questions their purpose as ever-growing storage spaces of care-intensive originals, cf. Grasskamp, Das Kunstmuseum (supra, n. 8). 40  Modern and contemporary works threatened by decay or dysfunctionality include sculptural pieces by Naum Gabo, Dieter Roth, Damian Hirst, and film installations by Nam June Paik and Wolf Vostell, to name but a few. A range of problematic (and therefore interesting) cases is gathered in Tate Papers 8 (2007) and in Matyssek, Wann stirbt ein Kunstwerk? (supra, n. 8); for severe criticism of museums accepting the task to preserve works that are not actually made to last, see (again) Grasskamp, Das Kunstmuseum (supra, n. 8).

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issue of deception and authenticity that has to be considered here, but also the legal issue of copyright.41 In fact, the heirs of long deceased artists can legally prohibit any kind of copy and decide to rather have a work disintegrate and disappear than allow for it to be replicated.42 The motivations behind this may be manifold: the heirs could believe that copies detract from the aura and economic value of a unique original or wish to maintain the artist’s will or to control her œuvre and prevent it from expanding after her death. Some of these reasons seem more legitimate than others; some may be in the interest of the deceased artist, others not. Some artists leave very specific instructions on how to restore their works and on whether, and how, their works should be replicated. Other artists are notoriously ambivalent about this.43 Restorers have taken on the task of interviewing living artists to find out about their attitudes towards conservation and copying in order to avoid acting against an artist’s will or against the nature of a work.44 A further aim is, presum­ably, to have documented arguments available against potential copyright claims by artists’ heirs. The need for substitute copies usually arises because an artwork is in danger of decaying. It becomes particularly urgent if the artwork in question belongs to a museum collection or is on long-term display in a museum. Such works are publicly accessible and have entered a certain canon of art. Against this background, the legally imposed difference between works that are protected by copyright and older works that are no longer protected seems odd. In some cases, the protection period of 50 or even 70 years after the artist’s death might be precisely the time it takes for a work to decay beyond recognition (especially in the case of early career works by artists who had a long life). When studying art history, one frequently experiences how painful the complete loss of a work and how unsatisfactory its reconstruction can be: one example is Kurt Schwitters’ posthumously famous Merzbau, known primarily through a reconstruction that is more of an approximation than a copy of the original room. The original room seems to have been an installation work in progress over several years and has not been completely documented. Only a number of black and white photographs preserve an impression of certain aspects of the installation at the time 41  The Tate Legal and Copyright Department has issued the “Replication of Sculpture / Works of Art: Legal Guidelines”, also published in Tate Papers 8 (2007), http://www.tate.org.uk/re​ search/publications/tate-papers/08/replication-of-sculpture-works-of-art-legal-guidelines (last access: 13 March 2018), which reveal the effort of a museum to avoid legal issues with copyright holders, and hence illustrate the extent of the power of copyright holders to prevent or influence any kind of reproduction or replication in a UK museum context. 42  The copyright holders of Naum Gabo’s work, for instance, pulled around, when some of Gabo’s sculptures were already beyond repair. Since then they have been working together with the Tate Gallery on defining a replication strategy (the “Tate Sculpture Replica Project“), see Williams / Williams, Replicas of Constructions by Naum Gabo (supra, n. 9). 43  See examples cited by Tietenberg, Die Ausstellungskopie (supra, n. 10) and Matyssek, Wann stirbt ein Kunstwerk? (supra, n. 8) in their respective introductions. 44 Cf. Lydia Beerkens (ed.), The Artist Interview: For Conservation and Preservation of Contemporary Art. Guidelines and Practice, Heijningen 2012.

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these photographs were taken. The room was destroyed in World War II.45 Hence, the argument in favor of substitution in cases where a work is facing an imminent loss or withdrawal is supported by the fact that there are artworks that are only preserved in the form of copies. Another example is Albrecht Dürer’s Heller Altar­ piece: if the middle panel showing the Assumption and Coronation of the Virgin had not been substituted by a very accurate copy in 1614, we would have no clear idea today of what it looked like, since the original was lost in a fire in the 18th century.46 For many works of modern and contemporary art, however, copying and substituting might be impeded by copyright holders. This is due to the fact that three different legal areas exist that concern the ownership and preservation of artworks in the museum context: property rights and copyright, as two distinct areas of private law, as well as the public laws covering the protection and conservation of cultural heritage. These three areas can act at cross purposes.47 Considering the status of musealised works, one could argue that they have been at least partially transformed from objects that can be individually owned – be it in terms of material or intellectual property – into artifacts of public interest and ownership. Their value of belonging to a privileged group of objects that we call art is confirmed and, to a certain extent, conditioned by their display in this institutional context.48 So if substitution and copying can be ethically acceptable or, in the case of older works, even mandatory, this should also apply to modern and contemporary works. Hence I propose that, in cases where it can be convincingly argued that a work has acquired the status of artistic cultural heritage, the public (and also scholarly) interest in its preservation – and in certain acts of copying – ought to outweigh the right of copyright holders to control and restrict any reproduction or adaptation of the respective works.49 This could be a basis for tackling the problem 45  On the reconstruction of Kurt Schwitters’ Merzbau cf. Karin Orchard, Kurt Schwitters: Reconstructions of the Merzbau, Tate Papers 8 (2007), http://www.tate.org.uk/research/pub​li cations/tate-papers/08/kurt-schwitters-reconstructions-of-the-merzbau (last access: 13 March 2018), as well as Ulrich Krempel, Kurt Schwitters’ Merzbau und El Lissitzkys Kabinett der Abstrakten: Zwei Rekonstruktionen von zerstörten Räumen der Moderne im Sprengel Museum Hannover, in: Tietenberg (ed.), Die Ausstellungskopie (supra, n. 10), pp. 115 – 128. 46  I explore the substitution of the middle panel of the Heller Altarpiece in the Dominican church of Frankfurt and the relative historical values of originals by Dürer and copies of his works in my PhD thesis (supra, n. 4). 47  An overlap of legal areas in the museum context was stated by Thomas Dreier, Copyright Aspects of the Preservation of Nonpermanent Works of Modern Art. Paper Presented at a Conference of The Getty Conservation Institute (Los Angeles, March 25 – 27, 1998), in: Miguel Angel Corzo (ed.), Mortality – Immortality: The Legacy of 20th-Century Art, Los Angeles 1999, pp. 63 – 66. Many thanks to Thomas Dreier for giving me access to this paper. 48  Of course, any object’s value as art that ought to be preserved can be questioned, but the argument here is that post mortem copyright is not the right instrument for deciding what should and what should not survive or remain accessible, and in what shape or form. 49  Eberhard Ortland reaches a similar conclusion in his essay on post mortem moral rights fixed by copyright regulations: Eberhard Ortland, Wie überlebt ein Kunstwerk seinen Urheber? Das postmortale Urheberpersönlichkeitsrecht und die Kontrolle über die Werkidentität, in:

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of authority and authorization with respect to substituting artworks in order to conserve them. Once the question is decided whether making a copy is permissible and appropriate, further issues need to be discussed. These include the question of which materials to use (the same as in the original or more durable ones), which historical state of the object should be copied (its current state or a more reconstructive “original” state), and what to do with the original (display it in its decayed state, carefully store it, or dispose of it after its decomposition). Just like with restorations, every copy requires decisions about what the essential features of a work are, because we are technically not (yet?) able to produce perfect reproductions of complex art objects. The result may or may not reflect the author’s intentions. Especially in the case of disintegrating or technically dysfunctional works, many decisions must be made that ultimately affect the copies’ material constitution and aesthetic reception. Should crumbling plastics be replaced by more modern, durable material? Can old tube televisions be replaced by flat screens, without changing the meaning or the aesthetic appeal of the work? Unless the artist has left very detailed and unambiguous instructions on how to maintain and copy her works – which is seldom the case – these decisions must be made by people other than the artist. From the perspective of the preservation of cultural heritage, it seems sensible that restorers and independent experts should authorize a copy (or any necessary intervention in the work) rather than the heirs of the artist. Of course, in many cases it might be helpful to include the artist’s heirs in a decision-making committee. This happened when the Tate was discussing replication strategies for Naum Gabo’s works. However, the veto privilege granted to copyright holders by the majority of existing copyright laws topples the balance of authority in the favor of the heirs rather than the public interest. The latter, however, should weigh more if the museums are to take their public mandate seriously. Finally, what about works that resist being copied in the traditional sense, for instance works that are subject to constant change? One could argue in favor of substitution by pointing out that the worst thing that could happen if a copy is made while the model still exists is that a substitute copy somewhat misses the point of the artwork. On the other hand, if a work is completely lost, a later reconstruction might change the appearance and meaning of the work. This might be preferable Matyssek (ed.), Wann stirbt ein Kunstwerk? (supra, n. 8), pp. 61 – 76. I do not call for automatically producing and installing copies of every fragile or endangered artwork. The latter seems to be a recent strategy in the musealisation of contemporary art. Here, artists are asked by the museum that buys their works to deliver an exhibition copy as well as the original work, thereby needlessly filling up their storage spaces with the “originals”. Cf. Grasskamp, Das Kunst­ museum (supra, n. 8), p. 136 et seq. The strategy envisaged here is rather that (just as in the case of older works of art) museums need to carefully consider the options and the importance of a work as cultural heritage, even if this may strongly depend on momentary and, in part, idiosyncratic decisions.

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to a total loss of the work – but this is another question and should be discussed elsewhere.50 I have thus argued for the legitimacy of substitution by copies if a work that belongs to the public – a condition that may be subject to some debate – is in danger of being lost or permanently withdrawn, provided that the viewer is enabled to look beyond the illusion. It becomes clear that an ethics of copying cannot (and indeed should not) provide predetermined decisions for all potential cases of loss or withdrawal. It can, however, show that copying and substitution should not be categorically ruled out on ethical or aesthetic grounds, but may be the right choice after carefully considering the material state and nature of an artwork as well as the public and academic interest in preserving it. In cases where the original is subject to disintegration and decay, especially when its integral formal appearance or technical functioning is an important element of the work, substituting it with a copy could even be considered a mandatory action of preservation. Zusammenfassung Ausgehend von der Annahme, dass nichtsubstitutives Kopieren moralisch zulässig ist, fragt der Beitrag nach der Legitimität von Praktiken der Substitution durch Kopien. Diese Praktiken werden zunächst exemplarisch kategorisiert und auf ihren jeweiligen historischen Anlass hin geprüft. Als zentrales ethisches Problem der Substitution wird die Gefahr der Täuschung herausgestellt. Ästhetische Argumente sprechen jedoch für die Zulässigkeit substitutiven Kopierens. Zudem können rechtzeitig angefertigte Substitutkopien im musealen Kontext zur Erhaltung des Zugangs zu zerbrechlichen und zerfallenden Werken beitragen. Doch muss eine Ethik des Kopierens auch kulturell etablierte Einstellungen wie das – besonders in westlichen Kontexten vorhandene – Bedürfnis nach Originalität und materieller Authentizität berücksichtigen. Entwickelt wird deshalb eine mehrteilige Begründung für museale Substitutionspraktiken, die das öffentliche Interesse an Zugänglichkeit und Erhalt von kulturellem Erbe höher gewichtet als die Interessen der Inhaber urheberrechtlicher Nutzungsrechte.

50 One possible strategy was devised for Dieter Roth’s so-called Selbstturm / Löwenturm (1969/1993) in the 2009 exhibition “Kunst und kalter Krieg. Deutsche Positionen 1945 – 89”. The work was represented by an exhibition copy (fig. 2) which, in turn, was allowed to disintegrate in the course of the rather long, traveling exhibition, thus pointing to the processual quality of the original work and allowing for a sensual experience of it rather than showing a photographic documentation. Cf. Kunst und kalter Krieg: Deutsche Positionen 1945 – 89 (exh. cat. Los Angeles, Nürnberg, Berlin 2009/2010), ed. by Stephanie Barron / Sabine Eckmann, Berlin 2009, cat. no. 314, pp. 21 et seq., 373.

On Museum Copies Susan J. Douglas Antonia Putzger has summarized the historical substitution of copies of material objects of art in an attempt to explore the circumstances under which such substitution might presently be viewed as legitimate.1 The ethics of information ownership remains a subject barely scratched by the majority of the art world, so this is a useful paper. Putzger raised the idea that conservators and independent experts rather than living artists or the heirs of recently deceased artists should determine what to do with vulnerable or fragile art works. “Making copies is a particularly sensitive topic when it comes to modern and contemporary art: it is not only the moral issue of deception and authenticity that has to be considered here, but also the legal issue of copyright. In fact, the heirs of long deceased artists may prohibit any kind of copy and would rather have a work disintegrate and disappear than allow for it to be replicated.”2 Of course, we know that museums are interested in preservation, truth and access and that they have a mandate to act ethically as far as cultural property is concerned.3 As of June 2014, conservators in the United Kingdom have been able to create preservation copies without obtaining express permission from copyright holders. In the United Kingdom, moral rights of artists to their work are protected by Chapter IV of the Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988.4 Also, artists contractually give or license the copyrights of their work to a buyer, museum, or other owner of their work. Unlike their economic rights, their moral rights remain with the artist for 70 years after their death unless they have chosen to waive them, which they are able to do via contract in both the UK and the USA, but not under most continental European copyright laws. Since these rights remain with the creators, the owners of works may not have any cause of action should they object to steps taken to conserve art works. Potential for actionable claims often rests on conservation action being damaging to the reputation of the artist and can therefore potentially extend from copyright into torts like defamation.5 The duty institutions have to 1  Antonia Putzger, The Legitimacy of Substitute Copies in the Visual Arts, present volume, pp. 67 – 85. 2  Ibid., p. 81 et seq. 3  ICOM, Running a Museum. A Practical Handbook, Paris 2004; http://unesdoc.unesco. org / images/0014/001410/141067e.pdf (last access: 20 June 2018). 4  Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c48/Chapter V: Moral Rights; http://www.legis lation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/48/contents (last access: 20 June 2018).

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copyright owners can be carefully thought through at the contracting stage. Agreements regarding the artist’s intentions for the work, its lifespan, and insurance can be adjusted to be acceptable by both parties. As a further note, should an artist object to the actions taken to conserve their work after the fact, they have several avenues that can be pursued: One is to de-authenticate the work by dissociating themselves / their name from it6 and possibly take on board any associated decreases to the market value of the art works. Alternately, they might sue for violation of their moral rights, which requires they demonstrate that the conservation efforts mutilated or destroyed the work in a way that is detrimental to their honour, integrity or reputation, including any unauthorised additions, amendments, deletions, or alterations of their works.7 The reproduction of real objects as well as the creation of born digital objects is the subject of some debate in the museum community. Research demonstrates that museums already have the capacity to take full advantage of digital replicas and they extend the museum’s core values: caring, protecting and educat5  Peter Adelman, Conservator Overreaching and the Art Owner: Contractual Protections Against the Overzealous Restoration of Fine Art, Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal 12 (1994), pp. 521 – 544, esp. pp. 525 – 527. 6  Richard Prince provides an example. Cady Noland, Richard Prince, Protesting Trump, Returns Art Payment, The New York Times, 12 January 2017; http://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/12/ arts/design/richard-prince-protesting-trump-returns-art-payment.html (last access: 20 June 2018). 7  As per the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 1886, Article 6bis (1): “Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of their work and to object to any distortion, mutilation, or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honour or reputation.” WIPO, Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works; http://www.wipo.int / treaties / en / ip / berne/; https://www.law.cornell.edu / treaties / berne/6bis.html (last access: 20 June 2018). Adelman, as above. Moral rights include the right of attribution; the creator will be identified as the source of a work that is copied or shared; the right to object to false attribution; the right to integrity and to object to derogatory treatment and the creator can control the form of their work. American cases worth noting in this connection are Tobin v. The Rector, Church Wardens, and Vestrymen of Trinity Church in the City of New York, 17 Civ. 2622 (LGS) (SDNY 14 November 2017); Kelley v. Chicago Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290 (2011); and Noland v. Michael Janssen Gallery Pte, Ltd et al, 1:17-cv-05452 (SDNY 18 July 2017), a suit for copyright infringement and VARA violation wherein the defendants requested the work be destroyed and images of it be taken out of circulation following claim that a conservator, hired to restore Log Cabin (1990) without consulting the artist, severely altered the work to the point that it is now a copy of the original hence a representative work. For discussion see Teresa Calonje (ed.), Live Forever: Collecting Live Art, London 2014; Nathan M. Davis, As Good as New: Conserving Artwork and the Destruction of Moral Rights, Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal 29 (2011), pp. 215 – 250; Sinclaire Marber, They Can’t Take that Away from Me: An Indemnification Solution to Unmerited VARA Claims, Columbia Journal of Law & Arts 41 (2018), pp. 319 – 339; Eduardo M. Peñalver / Sergio Muñoz Sarmiento, Law in the Work of Félix González-Torres, Cornell Journal of Law & Public Policy 26 (2017), pp. 449 – 457; Marc J. Randazza, Freedom of Expression and Morality-Based Impediments to the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, Nevada Law Journal 16 (2015), pp.107 – 142.

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ing.8 Digital objects are independent creations as well as products of digital technology that expand understanding of material authenticity and exhibiting cultural objects. Virtual copies are inseparable from visual culture; in fact, they help us to decode our culture. New questions arise in the context of digital reproductions and 21st century processes. This is important because all manner of copies are being made in the cultural heritage world and this is the context in which legal experts will be operating in future. In fact, to all intents and purposes we are dealing in it now.9 I think it is worthwhile to explore this notion further. I suggest that discussion of museum standards and ethical practices regarding art should extend to all the uses of copies in museums including: (1) gift shop replicas, which are part of the commercial art economy; (2) pastiches and restorations;10 (3) facsimiles, both modern and old; (4) artist’s multiples and editions; (5) reproductive engravings; (6) works in reproductive media such as photographs; (7) visualizations and artistic representations; (8) and digital surrogates of tangible historic objects. This is because, ranging from the banal to the most critical for administrative purposes, in contemporary museums copies serve a range of complex and interrelated functions from collecting and conservation to exhibition, interpretation and education. The essential idea behind copying is that copying has social value whether practical, commercial or aesthetic. Copying in museums is considered acceptable when the production of exact copies contributes to our understanding of a culture or a style, for example, in the world’s leading museums where the galleries are filled with Roman copies in marble after antique Greek bronzes. Reproductions for display purposes, for observation and handling and for research are also deemed acceptable, especially when their production contributes to the understanding of the artifact being copied.11 Copies are sometimes considered culturally significant, valuable or expendable when there is a perceived financial or moral benefit or when copies address a perceived lack or need. Sometimes it’s all three. Posthumous bronze casts of plasters in Rodin’s estate are a perfect example: these copies are still being made today first, because they are indistinguishable from the originals; second, because there is an identified gap in the art market for works by Rodin; and third, because proceeds from the sale of these copies support the Rodin Museum 8  Ramesh Srinivasan / Katherin M. Becvar / Robin Boast / Jim Enote, Diverse Knowledges and Contact Zones within the Digital Museum, Science, Technology & Human Values 35 (2010), pp.  735 – 768. 9  Neil Asher Silberman, From Cultural Property to Cultural Data: The Multiple Dimensions of ‘Ownership’ in a Global Digital Age, International Journal of Cultural Property 21 (2014), pp.  365 – 374. 10  Thomas P. F. Hoving, The Game of Duplicity, The Metropolitan Museum of Art Bulletin. New Series 26 (1968) [Art Forgery], pp. 241 – 246. 11  Sally M. Foster / Neil G. W. Curtis, The Thing About Replicas – Why Historic Replicas Matter, European Journal of Archaeology 19 (2016), pp. 122 – 148: p. 123.

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in Paris.12 Appreciation of value in these works provides a plausible argument for adoption of these practices, and legal scholars and practical philosophers should recognize this. Perhaps this point needs further development, I want now to look at the connection between the reality of an object and its virtual or electronic representation. A modern museum is one that exists in real space and presents its information in diverse forms as a way of creating a connection and dialogue. Virtual replicas of museum objects, digitized images stored in museum archives, simulated artefacts in virtual reality applications and displays on the Internet associated with museum websites or exhibits all represent the expansion of museum exhibition practices into a new environment linked to the notion of making museum experience accessible to all visitors. In this context, digital reproductions and tangible historic objects, whether in the form of replicas, plaster casts or exhibition copies made by fabricators, conservators, material experts and / or artists, all perform the same function: namely, to maintain the real object experience. According to Klaus Müller: “The transformation from the physical domain to the digital has blurred the distinction between authentic and virtual: They increasingly overlap. […] In the case of the digital copy [and photographic works] the lines between originals and copies have been blurred and partially eliminated.”13 Such substitute copies are frequently discovered nestled amongst other valued cultural objects in various galleries without eliciting remark. They are frequently recognized for what they are and consumed almost without exception.14 In 1963, the Mona Lisa travelled from Paris to the United States for a celebrated tour that served as a catalyst for questioning the aura of elite status associated with the art world. Upon its arrival in America, two of the most celebrated icons of the time, John F. Kennedy and his wife Jackie Kennedy, greeted the painting together with hundreds of press photographers. During its visit to the United States, over a million people travelled to see the Mona Lisa. This surreal event created a new expectation about art. The Mona Lisa had drastically changed the atmosphere of art, shifting it from being an important representative of High Renaissance painting to a celebration of mass consumption. As Robert Hughes explains: “They didn’t come to look at the Mona Lisa, they came in order to have seen it […] in America the Mona Lisa turned into its own facsimile.”15 Perhaps this is why, in Bruno Latour’s analysis, art reproductions are implicitly a form of

12  Rosalind Krauss, The Originality of the Avant-garde, in: ead., The Originality of the Avant-garde and other Modernist Myths, Cambridge, MA 1986, pp. 151 – 170. 13  Klaus Müller, Museums and Virtuality, Curator. The Museum Journal 45 (2002), pp.  21 – 33. 14  For discussion see John Falk /Lynn D. Dierking, The Museum Experience, Washington, DC 1992; iid., The Museum Experience Revisited, Walnut Creek, CA 2013. 15  Robert Hughes, The Mona Lisa Curse (UK 2008: Oxford Film and Television). The author would like to thank Carole Hickey for bringing this reference to her attention.

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marketing.16 It may well be that the aesthetic value of the iconic work has been replaced by commodity value. Élise Dubuc’s analysis of the way in which replica artefacts are presented in museums goes some way in explaining how such institutions have traditionally been careful to distinguish authentic from inauthentic works in stating that historically a museum’s core mandate has been the saving and protection of objects (by collection and conservation), interpreting the past (by research), and disseminating knowledge (by exhibition-interpretation and education). Until recently, many failed to recognize collecting as a social practice or that reproductions have a history. In her analysis, Dubuc acknowledges the difficulties surrounding the acquisition of representative works as well as the latent discourse of authenticity that informs museum display.17 Calling to mind the fact that modern museums are commonly referred to as places of learning and discernment and that the social valuation of cultural objects in their authentic state evokes notions of truth, she reminds us that, in museological thought, “the use of reproductions jeopardizes the fundamental mission upon which museums are founded – that of collecting authentic objects.”18 It is true that museum directors and others have historically perceived copies and reproductions of original works as detrimental to the reputation of the collection. And yet, paradoxically, the physical collection of every museum obtains immense value through the information that copies convey. Interestingly, modern museums are filled with faithful copies of artworks: We know that substitute copies made from photographs of destroyed originals, artist’s remakes of their own work, copies of works made by artists derived from other artists’ work, works in the style of another, copies made in the studio of the master or perhaps imitating the master’s style, appropriation art19 and, of course, false copies made with the intent to deceive, are to be found in museum collections everywhere. In this connection, we might look at the key role the curators play as brokers, translators and cultural agents, because they bridge the gap between global and local concerns, negotiating cultural precedents and emerging trends.20 Some hold that if the issue of whether museums should display replicas in their collection is contentious, it is because curators and museum directors make judgements when they acquire or display works as to what constitutes good, appropriate 16  Bruno Latour / Adam Lowe, The Migration of the Aura, or How to Explore the Original through Its Facsimiles, in: Thomas Bartscherer / Roderick Coover (eds.), Switching Codes: Thinking Through Digital Technology in the Humanities and the Arts, Chicago 2011, pp.  275 – 297. 17  Élise Dubuc, Reproductions and Museums: A Question of Ethics?, Muse 9 (1991), pp.  56 – 61. 18  Ibid., p. 56. 19  The term ‘appropriation art’ refers to the practice of creating new works by copying elements of or entire existing ones. 20  Sarah Cook, Context-specific Curating on the Web (CSCW), in: Tom Corby (ed.), Network Art: Practices and Positions, London / New York 2006, p. 40 et seq.

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and authentic art.21 Critics hold that museums have always had a permissive attitude towards imitative works because they have accepted large bequests to satisfy the demands of their curators. Indeed, they have sometimes been duped and failed to distinguish fakes from originals. In many instances, inauthenticity emerges as a concern for connoisseurs and art historians because copies reportedly make up an estimated 40 percent22 of what a public museum holds and this has implications for museums that are in the process of enthusiastically pushing forward towards sharing and expanding public access to their collections. So experts in the field debate copies and copying in terms of ethical principles and norms at professional meetings and conferences.23 Drilling in, substitute copies can be divided into (1) replicas, made either by the original artist or by studio assistants under their supervision (these have also been termed art replicas); (2) reproductions, which vary in quality depending on the techniques and materials used to create them; and (3) facsimile reproductions, which aim to be good likenesses of texts or images.24 Some critics, for example, Alfred Lessing, have argued that there may be copies and reproductions of works of art that are aesthetically indistinguishable from one another and from genuine or authentic works.25 Copies of work are different from the original work, which means the copy is not a forgery but rather an original. A work may be considered to be a forgery only when it is made with fraudulent intent. As Kennick reminds us, “an original N is a real, authentic, or genuine N; it is possible for a painting to be a real, authentic or genuine N without being an original N.”26 However, John H. Merry­man, the late law professor and art collector, pointedly states that all reproductions hold the potential to falsify art’s history.27 Again, the concern is that 21  John W. Bohn, Museums and the Culture of Autography, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 57 (1999), pp. 55 – 65. 22  Based on his experience as director of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, Thomas Hoving estimated that 40 percent of all art in museums was either a forgery or fake in 1996. The figure may be higher. Switzerland’s Fine Art Expert Institute has reported that 50 percent of art on the market is either forged or misattributed. W. A. Demers, Q & A: Jennifer L. Mass, Antiques and the Arts Weekly, 29 May 2018, http://www.antiquesandthearts.com / qa-jennifer-l-mass/ (last access: 20 June 2018). I analyze this data systematically and the implications for art institutions in a paper currently under review at a university press. 23  For an illustrative example of these ongoing debates and discussions see Peter Kampits, Museum Ethics: Is it Necessary or Superfluous? in: Conference Proceedings of the 21st ICOM General Conference, Vienna, Austria (2007), http://icom.museum / fileadmin / user_up load / pdf / ICOM_2007/2007_Proceedings_eng.pdf (last access: 13 June 2018). 24  Erwin Panofsky, Original and Facsimile Reproduction [originally published in German 1930], Anthropology and Aesthetics 57/58 (2010), pp. 330 – 338: p. 332. 25  Alfred Lessing, What is Wrong with a Forgery?, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 23 (1965), pp. 461 – 471. 26  William E. Kennick, Art and Inauthenticity, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 44 (1985), pp. 3 – 12: p. 4. 27  Albert E. Elsen /John Henry Merryman, Art Replicas: A Question of Ethics, in: ARTnews 78:2 (1979), p. 61.

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copies produce a devaluing effect on the other objects whose symbolic value lies in their authenticity.28 According to Merryman, “A cultural object embodies or expresses or evokes some aspect of the culture of its time and place.”29 Paradoxically, this description also extends to copies, but a persuasive copy may also “vandalize the human record.”30 A related concern expressed in connection with replicas is that they do not and cannot perform the same aesthetic function as original objects.31 Even exact copies are of a lesser quality than the originals, the argument goes, and therefore copies are believed to pose a threat.32 At the same time and elaborating on the history of exhibition copies, the authoritative voice of the museum curator and the presentation of meaning through an imposed linear narrative has come under scrutiny. Since the late eighties and early nineties, many curators have been interested in the interactivity of works and fluctuating meanings that depend on the collaboration between audiences and artists, audience members and works.33 Accompanied by an interest in socially engaged practices, social networks and Web 2.0, cultural experience has been redefined and interest continues to grow around curatorial practice that is automated or part-automated, dynamic, collaborative and / or functions to redistribute control over art works, their meanings, and power relations inherent in the curatorial and artistic institutional systems.34 Of course, museums have been undergoing major changes over the last 50 years. Some argue that the authoritative voice of the museum has been transformed from a collection of singular expert accounts into multiple narratives reflecting the variety and integration of different source communities into the museum complex.35 Many agree that museums are environments offering visitors a variety of experiences from the personal to the public. The process of transmitting ideas and knowledge contributes to the success of modern museums. Key changes in museum culture took place as of the mid-1970s, when an alternative understanding of museum objects emerged in relation to culture. At this point, artists, curators, critics and spectators began to experiment with narrative, critical or alternative interpreta Ibid.   John Henry Merryman, Counterfeit Art, International Journal of Cultural Property 27 (1992), pp. 27 – 77: p. 27. 30 Ibid.; Bohn, Museums and the Culture of Autography (supra, n. 21), p. 58. 31  Bohn, Museums and the Culture of Autography (supra, n. 21), p. 61; Merryman, Counterfeit Art (supra, n. 29), p. 27. 32  Bohn, Museums and the Culture of Autography (supra, n. 21), p. 62. 33  For discussion cf. Douglas Crimp, On the Museum’s Ruins, October 13 (1980), p. 41 – 57: p. 49; Sharon Macdonald / Paul Basu (eds.), Exhibition Experiments, Oxford 2007. 34  Joasia Krysa, Distributed Curating and Immateriality, in: Christiane Paul (ed.), New Media in the White Cube and Beyond: Curatorial Models for Digital Art, Berkeley, CA 2008, pp. 87 – 105: p. 90. 35  Srinivasan et al., Diverse Knowledges and Contact Zones within the Digital Museum (supra, n. 8). 28 29

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tions of material objects. For example, in 1985, Jean-François Lyotard curated Les Immatériaux, a poststructuralist exhibition that brought together art, industry, information technology, software coding, video, sound, Usenet (a precursor of the Internet), fax, documents and visual display in order to examine information flow.36 The key elements of the exhibition were interactivity, computability, connectivity, variability, the virtual as opposed to a physical reality, participation and time-based works.37 The exhibition was conceived to allow visitors to “run a program”: a curatorial model that aligned the function of the curator with that of a computer programmer.38 This exhibition for the information age attempted to create an immersive environment; it was designed to make the borders between individual exhibits fade and for information to flow such that, taken in as a whole, Les Immatériaux would reveal itself as a metaphor for postmodern experience. The aim was to present dematerialized works in order to reveal the systems of communication, value and power that they existed within. This exhibition had a far reaching consequence in that it opened up a space for discursive engagements with aesthetic objects. I am not suggesting that it alone produced a paradigmatic shift in museum culture, but it is important to understand that the traditional image of a museum as an academic gatekeeper had begun to dissolve and, emancipated from the pressure of outmoded value systems, it had begun to be redefined. A new ethics for communicating with objects developed, for watching over, for looking after and communicating about them. In 1984, Wilcomb E. Washburn suggested that the emphasis of museum work should be put on information rather than on objects.39 Soon afterwards, George MacDonald and Stephen Alsford described the museum as an information utility arguing that museums need to think of information rather than of material objects as their basic resource.40 The importance of objects was being questioned in favor of the importance of information.41 Finally, museums were no longer thought of as being repositories of objects only but as “storehouses of knowledge as well as storehouses of objects.”42

  Cook, Context-specific Curating on the Web (supra, n. 20), p. 26.   Id. at p. 27. 38  Jorinde Seijdel, The Exhibition as Emulator, Mediamatic Magazine 2000, http://www.media matic.nl/magazine/10_1/seijdel_exhibition/seydelem_2gb.html (last access: 11 June 2018). 39  Wilcomb E. Washburn, Collecting Information, Not Objects, Museum News 62:3 (February 1984), pp. 5 – 15. 40  George F. MacDonald / Stephen Alsford, A Museum for the Global Village, Hull 1989; iid., The Museum as Information Utility, Museum Management and Curatorship, 10 (1991), pp.  305 – 311; George F. MacDonald, Change and Challenge: Museums in the Information Society, in: Ivan Karp / Christin Mullen Kreamer / Steven D. Lavine (eds.), Museums and Communities: The Politics of Public Culture, Washington, DC 1992, pp. 158 – 181. 41  Susan M. Pearce, Thinking About Things: Approaches to the Study of Artefacts, Museums Journal 85 (1986), pp. 198 – 201. 42  Peter Cannon-Brookes, The Nature of Museum Collections, in: John M. A. Thompson (ed.), Manual of Curatorship: A Guide to Museum Practice, 2nd ed., London 1992, pp. 500 – 512. 36 37

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As social institutions, museums afford information and educational opportunities. In Learning in the Museum, author George Hein suggests that museums are not learning institutions, but rather environments in which learning through exploration and wonder leads to the acquisition of new knowledge.43 Museums offer valuable social opportunities that create a stronger and closer-knit community. Opportunities for visitors to explore the museum space and connect with the objects in new ways allows for the generation and transmission of knowledge throughout society. Thus museums are not just about one individual interacting with an object but rather they enable visitors to interact with one another while experiencing objects in the museum setting. The executive Director of the Santa Cruz Museum of Art & History, Nina Simon, discusses how museum objects can act as the content around which meaningful social experiences are formed. Focusing on this idea, she argues “social objects are the engines of socially networked experiences, the content around which conversation happens.”44 This interaction with various artefacts in a social context and with other community members leads to the forming of bonds and the exchange generates the creation of knowledge through experience. Museum collections have the power to stimulate conversation and meaningful social interactions that may not otherwise be prompted in day-to-day life. The museum and its objects can therefore be seen as facilitating knowledge in both a symbolic and practical sense. Altogether, the curator’s role is to manage and organize the social consumption of curated works. The immateriality of curatorial practice can be seen in its facilitation of the production of informational, cultural and affective content.45 Miwon Kwon, writing on site specificity, argues that the site itself also becomes dematerialized, and works are anti-visual and immaterial in order to resist institutionalization and commodification.46 Many maintain hope that information technology will allow for the inclusion of the voice of the participating audience, forming a social relationship with them rather than dictating to them.47 All this goes some way towards suggesting that while there may be some disagreement as to the precise role cultural objects play in this expanded definition of what the museum is, the general consensus in the museum community is that in a digital environment digital copies are here to stay. Experts have long discussed and debated the nature of the relationship between original and copy. The definition of a museum as a repository of physical objects prized for their value based on authenticity or originality has recently led into two distinct explanatory models: either as a safe haven for memory and material items, or as a dying, anachronistic cultural structure that will eventually fall to the in  George Hein, Learning the Museum, London 1999.   Nina Simon, The Participatory Museum, Santa Cruz, CA 2010. 45  Krysa, Distributed Curating and Immateriality (supra, n. 34), p. 91 et seq. 46  Miwon Kwon, One Place after Another: Site-specific Art and Locational Identity, Cambridge, MA 2002, p. 37. 47  Seijdel, The Exhibition as Emulator (supra, n. 38). 43 44

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formation society.48 Curators are subject to the related push and pull, as well as to pressures from many quarters including trustee boards (which may also include collectors with their own agendas / concerns / tastes), the desire to maintain stable relationships with artists, their dealers and collectors. They must maintain expectations of taste within the institution and their peer groups. Lawrence Alloway, in his article “The Great Curatorial Dim-Out” believes that more often than not, these pressures maintain conformity.49 Summing up, Putzger’s paper reviews historical practices of substitution by copies in the visual arts and from those practices seeks to determine whether substitution by copies is legitimate and under what circumstances. Although her restriction of focus to material artifacts enables her to simplify her exploration, it does limit analysis of some of the important current influences on the questions she poses. I have therefore chosen to focus more upon current issues and have limited my discussion to copying in museums. I do so for a number of reasons. First, the questions asked in Putzger’s paper are potentially extremely large and the many aspects raised by them cannot be adequately addressed within a relatively short response paper. Second, I focus more on the current context where both the forces for (or encouraging) copying and the techniques used to produce and subsequently use various forms of copies for a broad range of purposes has increased significantly over the past three decades and will no doubt continue to expand in the future. Finally, museums and similar institutions have expanded both their functions and their use of copies for a variety of purposes in recent years. Although early views on the function of copies in museums and similar institutions envisioned exhibiting reproductions as contradictory to the museum’s early mandate, indeed to the mandate upon which many had been founded, more recent critics indicate that museums have undergone a significant evolution involving a change from research, holding and display of artifacts to a far broader function of cultural education. This change has stimulated interest and the creation of tangible and intangible historic objects. Hence the use of copies in a variety of forms to display information may be analyzed alongside electronic media for information dissemination both within and outside institutions. Nowhere is the subject of representative identical works and their appropriate use more absorbing than in art institutions, where the construal of what an original work extends to often touches questions of originality for copy­ right purposes in the context of digitally created images. I argue that copies should be examined systematically and rigorously by the knowledge community, and I say that because the digital environment is changing traditional image-licensing models set by museums.50 Concerns have been reported   Ross Parry, Museums in a Digital Age, London / New York 2010, pp. 58 – 61, 210.   Lawrence Alloway, The Great Curatorial Dim-Out, in: Bruce W. Ferguson / Reesa Greenberg / Sandy Nairne (eds.), Thinking About Exhibitions, London 1975, p. 159 – 165. 50  Enrico Bertacchini / Federico Morando, The Future of Museums in the Digital Age: New Models of Access and Use of Digital Collections, International Journal of Arts Management 15:2 (2013), pp. 60 – 72. 48 49

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in the museum community about securing the rights of images, rights management and maintaining rights over information products.51 How this affects museum culture in the long run remains to be seen. At the present moment it is difficult to assess how museums will manage and benefit from digital copies while remaining ethical.52 Zusammenfassung Museen gelten als Ort der Sammlung, Erhaltung, Erfahrung und Erforschung authentischer, in vielen Fällen einmaliger historischer Artefakte. Man erwartet, dort vor allem oder ausschließlich Originale zu sehen, keine Kopien. Doch bei einem erheblichen Teil der Artefakte, die in Museen zu sehen sind, handelt es sich um Kopien: erkannte oder unerkannte Fälschungen, Multiples und Auflagenobjekte, fotografische Abzüge, Repliken von der Hand des Künstlers selbst oder aus seiner Werkstatt, Reproduktionsstiche, Ausstellungskopien, Faksimiles, Imitate, Modelle, Kataloge, Geschenkartikel und zunehmend auch digitale Surrogate. Der Gebrauch von Kopien in Museen und die Auswirkungen des vielfältigen Einsatzes von Museumskopien auf gesellschaftliche Vorstellungen von der Aufgabe und Funktion von Museen bedürfen fortgesetzter gründlicher Erforschung. Gegenwärtig ist es nämlich noch unklar, wie Museen den Einzug digitaler Kopien und deren zunehmende Nutzung gestalten und dabei den ethischen Erwartungen an die Institution des Museums gerecht werden können.

51 For discussion see Susan J. Douglas / Melanie K. Hayes, Ethical Databases: Case Studies and Remaining Gaps in Cultural Heritage Information Sharing, in: Alessandro Chechi / Marc-André Renold (eds.), Cultural Heritage Law and Ethics: Mapping Recent Developments, Geneva 2017, pp. 143 – 170. 52  The author expresses her sincere thanks to Melanie Hayes and John Fitzsimons for their encouragement and help with this article.

La propriété, c’est le vol? Reproducing Art at the Museum Grischka Petri I. Introduction: Slaves and Children In 1840, the French socialist philosopher, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809 – 1865), wrote a book-essay on the question “What is property?” In its famous first paragraph, he compared slavery to murder and property to theft, or, depending on the translation, robbery: Si j’avais à répondre à la question suivante, Qu’est-ce que l’esclavage? et que d’un seul mot je répondisse, C’est l’assassinat, ma pensée serait d’abord comprise. Je n’aurais pas besoin d’un long discours pour montrer que le pouvoir d’ôter à l’homme la pensée, la volonté, la personnalité, est un pouvoir de vie et de mort, et que faire un homme esclave, c’est l’assassiner. Pourquoi donc à cette autre demande, Qu’est-ce que la propriété? ne puis-je répondre de même, C’est le vol, sans avoir la certitude de n’être pas entendu, bien que cette seconde proposition ne soit que la première transformée?1

When Proudhon died, his friend, the painter Gustave Courbet (1819 – 1877), painted a posthumous portrait of the thinker and his children (fig. 1). The works of Courbet and Proudhon provide us with two metaphors to which we will return later: slaves and children. A concrete question arises from the presentation of a reproduction of the portrait, which has been exhibited at the Musée du Petit Palais, the municipal art museum of the city of Paris, since 1900. Courbet died in 1877, which puts his oeuvre in the public domain under all jurisdictions.2 The painting can be freely reproduced for all purposes – commercial, academic, private – in a derivative form or as an exact copy, with parodist intent or as a straightforward homage. In order to do this, a printable image is required – a model for the reproduction.3 One could simply go to the museum and take a photograph, provided that the painting is not glazed; that the technical equipment is suitable; and that the lighting conditions are favourable – and that the institution permits taking photographs in 1  Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Qu’est-ce que la propriété? Recherches sur le principe du droit et du gouvernement, Paris 1840, p. 1. 2  For a comprehensive overview see the “List of countries’ copyright lengths” on Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries%27_copyright_lengths (last access: 24 September 2018). 3  Unsurpassed on the practical intricacies of the problem remains Susan M. Bielstein, Permissions: A Survival Guide, Chicago / London 2006.

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Photo: Archives of the Department of History of Art, University of Bonn.

Gustave Courbet: Portrait of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and His Children, 1865, oil/canvas, 147 × 198 cm, Musée du Petit Palais, Paris.

their exhibition galleries, which is a question that will require separate consideration. If an immediate reproduction of this type is not an easy option, the museum itself might provide a digital image. At the website of the Musée du Petit Palais – the owner of the Courbet painting – the researcher is directed to a professional image agency, La Parisienne de Photographie, who offer a high-resolution image file.4 After a short exchange of correspondence, however, the customer will be directed to a Germany-based agency, Ullstein, when it comes to German publishing projects such as the Annual Review of Law and Ethics. For a reproduction of a half-page image in a journal, a fee of € 80 is incurred. Other commercial image archives such as Alamy and Bridgeman offer similar files for editorial use in books and journals at € 50 (Alamy) or € 75 for a reproduction taking up to a fourth of a page, or € 150 for a full page in a periodical publication (Bridgeman). Access to the image under the more generous terms and conditions of Bridgeman Education website is ruled out, since the use involves the reproduction in a printed medium. At the top end of the price range are Getty Images, who charge a € 317 fee for the reproduction of the 4  http://www.petitpalais.paris.fr / professionnels / commande-de-reproduction, inventory number PPP00034. All internet URLs referred to in this article except Wikipedia / Wikimedia links have been archived at archive.org.

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painting taking up to half a page in a journal. The German Bildagentur Preußischer Kulturbesitz (bpk) also offers two versions of the painting, one of which seems to be of slightly higher quality.5 The fees have to be agreed on a case-by-case basis. An apparently less complicated solution would be to scan a good print or a postcard of the painting and to use that file for the reproduction. Especially if the printed image is large enough and the reproduction is black and white only, this is a technically feasible solution. A very practical solution would be to find a digital reproduction that is freely available. For educational and scholarly purposes, public digital image archives provide access to a considerable stock of scanned reproductions.6 Even more easily accessible is Wikipedia, whose Commons might host an image that is good enough to be printed.7 Regardless of the chosen path of reproduction, the question arises whether the producer of the model reproduction can also claim her or his own copyright. II. Prominent Precedents: Bridgeman v. Corel and the Unresolved Case of the National Portrait Gallery Images Two prominent disputes about reproduction rights come to mind in this context: Bridgeman v. Corel (1998/99) and the conflict between Wikimedia and the National Portrait Gallery in London (2009). The case of Bridgeman v. Corel, which was decided by the District Court of the Southern District of New York in 1998/99, is perhaps the internationally best-known precedent.8 The Bridgeman Art Library is an important private and commercially run archive for reproductions of works of art. Corel is a Canadian software company. In the UK, the US, and Canada, it sold a CD-ROM containing digital images of paintings by European masters, all of which were in the public domain. Bridgeman claimed that it held the copyright to these images, arguing that its own digital images were the only possible source of the images distributed by Corel, and that these copies were infringements of Bridgeman’s copyright. Corel denied that there was any copyright pertaining to the Bridgeman photographs. The case is interesting in several respects that cannot all be addressed within the limits of this paper, such as the question of whether US or UK law was the correct choice of law. In the end, Judge Kaplan applied the originality test set forth in section 1, subsection 1 (a) CDPA (UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988), which protects “original literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works” to the Bridgeman photographs. For a   Inventory number 50154114 at http://www.bpk-images.de.  www.prometheus-bildarchiv.de/. 7  https://commons.wikimedia.org / wiki / File:Proudhon-children.jpg (last access: 24 September 2018). 8  The Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 421 (SDNY 1998) and 36 F. Supp. 2d 191 (SDNY 1999). 5 6

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definition of originality, Kaplan cited the UK case Interlego AG v. Tyco Industries Inc & Ors (Hong Kong), which had ruled that, in order to be original, works “need not be original or novel in form, but it must originate with the author and not be copied from another work”.9 It was concluded that the Bridgeman photographs “lacked sufficient originality to be copyrightable under United Kingdom law”.10 Indeed, they were meant to be faithful reproductions of the works of art that they represented. One could argue that such images – the infamous “slavish copies” – are a priori not originals, as the Privy Council had pointed out in the Interlego case: Take the simplest case of artistic copyright, a painting or a photograph. It takes great skill, judgment and labour to produce a good copy by painting or to produce an enlarged photograph from a positive print, but no one would reasonably contend that the copy painting or enlargement was an “original” artistic work in which the copier is entitled to claim copyright. Skill, labour or judgment merely in the process of copying cannot confer originality. […] [C]opying, per se, however much skill or labour may be devoted to the process, cannot make an original work.11

The case was re-argued and reconsidered after the court had been – in the words of Judge Kaplan – “bombarded with additional submissions” by Bridgeman. In a second decision, the court exclusively applied American law, but ultimately affirmed the earlier decision, dismissing the case for the same reasons.12 In 2009, a similar case, which, however, never came before the law courts, unfolded in the UK. The British National Portrait Gallery provided high-resolution images of their collection on their website that were accessible through the Zoomi­ fy interface. This software tool saves bandwidth by displaying selected “tiles” of the hosted high-resolution image at a particular zoom level. An American graduate student had programmed a script to download the image tiles of more than 3,000 images from the National Portrait Gallery’s website and re-assembled them into the complete, high-resolution images, which he then uploaded to the Wikimedia Commons repository on the Internet. In this case, too, all images were reproductions of works safely in the public domain. The National Portrait Gallery (NPG) claimed that these photographic reproductions were copyrighted works in their own right and that their uploading infringed both its database rights and its copyrights. Both parties eventually agreed to disagree and left it at that.13 The NPG changed its image rights policy and offered academic licenses and easier downloading and image licensing options.   UKPC 3 (5 May 1988), RPC, 343; 25 F. Supp. 2d 421 (SDNY 1998), p. 426.   25 F. Supp. 2d 421 (SDNY 1998), p. 427. 11  UKPC 3 (5 May 1988), RPC, 371. 12  36 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 13  For a discussion of this “fascinating dispute” see Simon Stokes, Art & Copyright, 2nd ed., Oxford 2012, pp. 156 – 164, and the Wikipedia article “National Portrait Gallery and Wikimedia Foundation copyright dispute”, en.wikipedia.org / wiki / National_Portrait_Gallery_and_ Wikimedia_Foundation_copyright_dispute (last access: 24 September 2018). 9

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III. Recent Developments and Cases since 2015 I have extensively discussed these precedents and their underlying questions in an Open Access article published in 2014 by the Journal of Conservation and Museum Studies.14 Since the publication of that article, further related cases have unfolded, two of which will be presented in the following paragraphs. 1. Harvard Museums v. Steve Elmore A case involving prominent parties was the dispute between the Santa Fe-based dealer and expert in Native American art, Steve Elmore, and the Peabody Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology at Harvard University (2016).15 The intricacies of the case would merit a closer examination, in particular with a view to academic elitism, peer review procedures, and scholarly culture. For the purposes of dis­ cussing copyrights for reproductions of works that belong to museums, however, a short summary will suffice. Steve Elmore had researched the Peabody Museum’s collections and attributed a number of ceramics to the Hopi potter Nampeyo (1859 – 1942). Plans to publish his findings in a museum publication eventually evaporated. He then self-published a book, “In Search of Nampeyo: The Early Years 1875 – 1892” in 2015. The book contained photographs by Steve Elmore showing artefacts from the Peabody Museum’s collections. Elmore also reproduced photographs taken from an older publication by the museum press – the book “Historic Hopi Ceramics” from 1981. In June 2015, Harvard Museums sued Elmore for copyright infringement and temporarily obtained an injunction to stop the distribution of Elmore’s book. The museum also asserted that the image quality and the captions in Elmore’s publication were not up to high museums standards and would cause the museum irreparable harm. In 2010, Elmore had signed a “Permission to Photograph Collections”, agreeing not to reproduce and publish his photographs. He was not explicitly made aware of the museum’s official policy on photographs, which can be found on the institution’s website, when he signed the agreement. In the formal notification letter from the Peabody Museum Press, terminating the reviewing process for the planned book, Steve Elmore had been offered to use 10 to 15 photographs for an alternative publication in the American Indian Art Magazine. No use of his own images was mentioned at all. The court was of the opinion that, while Harvard Museums were unable to claim copyright for the photographs and the objects,16 Elmore had violated the “Permis14  Grischka Petri, The Public Domain vs. the Museum: The Limits of Copyright and Reproductions of Two-dimensional Works of Art, in: Journal of Conservation and Museum Studies 12:1 (2014), doi:10.5334/jcms.1021217. 15  The case was conducted before the District Court for the District of New Mexico (file no. 1:15-CV-00472-RB-KK). The court papers can be accessed at www.govinfo.gov/app/details/ USCOURTS-nmd-1_15-cv-00472/context. The case is extensively discussed by Linda Wiener in her blog, freenampeyo.blogspot.com. She includes further documentary sources such as the legal papers and correspondence.

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sion to Photograph Collections”.17 The case was finally settled out of court in September 2016. The injunction on the book was lifted under the provision that every sold copy contained an additional page stating that the photographs were “published without the Peabody’s permission or review, in violation of the author’s contractual obligations”. 2. Reiss-Engelhorn Museums v. Wikimedia More recently, the question of the copyrightability of reproductive photographs has become highly topical in Germany.18 The municipal Reiss-Engelhorn Museums in Mannheim have sued a Wikipedia user who, in 2006 and 2007, had uploaded reproduction photographs scanned from one of the museum’s catalogues as well as several of his own photographs of objects from the museum’s collections. In October 2015, the Wikimedia foundation was sued for hosting these images. Other individuals were sued for reusing on their websites images provided by Wikimedia. Several court decisions have so far confirmed the museums’ claims. Only the Local Court (Amtsgericht, AG) in Nuremberg decided against the museum, arguing that copyrighting the faithful reproduction of an artwork in the collection of a public museum would circumvent the idea of the public domain.19 By contrast, the Regional Court of Berlin (Landgericht, LG) decided against the Wikimedia Foundation and maintained that the public domain remained unharmed by protecting reproductive photographs of works in the public domain.20 The Regional Court of Stuttgart argued similarly against the user who had uploaded the scanned images to the Wikimedia Commons repository.21 Its decision was confirmed by the Higher Regional Court of Stuttgart (Oberlandesgericht, OLG) in May 2017.22 These cases 16  District Court for the District of New Mexico, Memorandum opinion and order, 19 May 2016, www.govinfo.gov/app/details/USCOURTS-nmd-1_15-cv-00472/USCOURTS-nmd-1_ 15-cv-00472-5. 17  District Court for the District of New Mexico, Sealed memorandum opinion and order, 22 August 2016, www.govinfo.gov/app/details/USCOURTS-nmd-1_15-cv-00472/USCOURTSnmd-1_15-cv-00472-6. 18 The case has received international attention, see e.g. Nicolás Bello Lagos, Museo ­Reiss-Engelhorn contra Wikimedia: La protección de reproducciones fotográficas, Revista chilena de derecho y tecnología 5 (2016), pp. 211 – 223. 19  Local Court (AG) Nürnberg, 28 October 2015 – 32 C 4607/15, ZUM-RD 2016, pp. 615 –  616 (court decision after simplified proceedings), confirmed after full proceedings 22 February 2016 (unpublished). 20  Regional Court (LG) Berlin, 31 May 2016 – 15 O 428/15, GRUR-RR 2016, pp. 318 – 324. The decision is currently under appeal at the Higher Regional Court (Kammergericht, 24 U 126/16). 21 Regional Court (LG) Stuttgart, 27 September 2016  – 17 O 690/15, ZUM-RD 2017, pp.  201 – 207. 22  Higher Regional Court (OLG) Stuttgart, 17 May 2017 –  4 U 204/16, GRUR 2017, pp. 905 – 912. The Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) will reconsider the case on points of law (I ZR 104/17).

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await their next round of decisions. Instead of analysing their legal details, the following subsections will take a closer look at some of the underlying categories that ultimately inform the previously mentioned legal decisions – and those to come. IV. Photographs: Between Slavish Copies and Original Works The common question underlying these cases is: are photographic reproductions of works of art protected by copyright? This is what many museums still claim. The question cannot be answered by means of an ontology of the photographic image. A photograph is not an original or non-original work per se, just as a painted canvas and a text are not. The decisive category is originality. In its regulation of photographs, Art. 6 of the European Council Directive 93/98/EEC, which was later succeeded by Directive 2006/116/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 December 2006, including the identical provision, specifies the normative requirements for originality and thus for a work that can be protected by copyright under European law. It provides that “photographs which are original in the sense that they are the author’s own intellectual creation shall be protected […]. No other criteria shall be applied to determine their eligibility for protection”.23 Within US jurisdiction, the rationale of the Bridgeman decision has so far never been overturned by a federal court. As to UK law, its case constellation has never been tested before a court. However, the UK Intellectual Property Office states, in a copyright notice published in 2015, that according to the Court of Justice of the European Union which has effect in UK law, copy­ right can only subsist in subject matter that is original in the sense that it is the author’s own “intellectual creation”. Given this criterion, it seems unlikely that what is merely a retouched, digitised image of an older work can be considered as “original”. This is because there will generally be minimal scope for a creator to exercise free and creative choices if their aim is simply to make a faithful reproduction of an existing work.24

Even in Germany, the basic idea behind copyright is to protect original works of art. Reproductions are protected if they are made and used by the copyright holder of the original. Even here the basic idea is not to protect copies. One consequence of this is that works of Appropriation Art have been denied copyright protection, because they were considered to be un-original copies, unworthy of the status of an original work of art.25 23  The Directive allows for national measures to protect “other photographs”, which is discussed below in the context of the German Copyright Act, at pp. 110 – 113. 24  Copyright Notice: digital images, photographs and the internet, Copyright Notice 1/2014, updated November 2015, p. 3, available at www.gov.uk/government/publications/copyrightnotice-digital-images-photographs-and-the-internet. 25  This seems to be the leading opinion within German legal scholarship, see e.g. Haimo Schack, Kunst und Recht, 3rd ed., Tübingen 2017, para. 353. Schack reports how the Beuys

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It is a common consensus that merely mechanical reproductions resulting in slavish copies are non-original and not copyrightable.26 The flatbed scan of an etching is an example of this category. In contrast, there are original reproductions of works of art such as engravings. Here the reproducing person finds herself in a hybrid position. On the one hand, the reproduction must be true and faithful to the original; on the other hand, the medium requires artistic knowledge and creativity. Such a derivative work is based on the earlier work, but is ultimately a new creation.27 A photograph seems to be situated between the two extremes. The view that photography is a purely mechanical, automated medium is no longer sustainable, but it was prevalent in the nineteenth and most of the twentieth century – a view that has informed the legal idea of the photograph as something non-original.28 Further distinctions are necessary in order to resolve the question of photographic reproductions of works of art: the impact of creative decisions on the eventual photograph and the purpose of the photograph. Different kinds of reproductions call for different kinds and degrees of creativity. At one end of the spectrum, a two-dimensional print can be put on a scanner to be faithfully rendered into a digital reproduction. This is a mechanical rather than a creative task. At the other end, the reproduction of three-dimensional works of art and architecture requires truly creative photographic decisions in order to achieve a convincing compromise between the three-dimensional quality of the object and the two-dimensional aspect of the reproduction. The result is a photograph, which is protected as an original work by copyright law. Thus, the distinction between two- and three-dimensional works is significant.29 Of course, all objects are three-dimensional, and the distinction can be difficult to assess in particular cases.30 In most cases, prints and the majority of paintings can be regarded as two-dimensional. The reason is that photographs of their visible main surface will constitute satisfactory visual substitutes.31 This assumption works estate prevented the exhibition of Elaine Sturtevant’s appropriations of works by Joseph Beuys in Hamburg in 1992. 26  OLG Stuttgart, 17 May 2017– 4 U 204/16, GRUR 2017, p. 907; see also Higher Regional Court (OLG) Düsseldorf, 13 February 1996 – 20 U 115/95, GRUR 1997, pp.  49 – 52, at pp.  49, 51. 27  It is instructive to compare the cases of photographic reproductions with scholarly editions; see Thomas Margoni / Mark Perry, Scientific and Critical Editions of Public Domain Works: an Example of European Copyright Law (Dis)Harmonization, Canadian Intellectual Property Review 27 (2011), pp. 157 – 170: p. 164 et seq. 28  Anne McCauley, “Merely Mechanical”: On the Origins of Photographic Copyright in France and Great Britain, Art History 31 (2008), pp. 57 – 78. For a critical evaluation of the status of photography under German jurisdiction in the nineteenth century, see Gerhard Plum­ pe, Der tote Blick, Munich 1990, pp. 53 – 95; Stefan Ricke, Entwicklung des rechtlichen Schutzes von Fotografien in Deutschland unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der preußischen Gesetzgebung, Münster 1998. 29 Cf. Antiquesportfolio.com plc v. Rodney Fitch & Co, [2001] E.C.D.R., 51, p. 59. 30  In the case of the Mannheim reproductions, the museum claimed that their paintings were three-dimensional, although the Higher Regional Court of Stuttgart bypassed the question.

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well enough so that it has become quite usual to refer to such reproductions as if they were the actual object depicted in them, in spoken and written language. We rarely say: this image of a painting shows how cracked the surface is. We rather say: this painting is cracked, and when we do so, we point at the photograph. Indeed, if the photographs were presented as works of Appropriation Art, they would not be considered as original works. The success of this substitution is mainly the result of decades of technological progress and not of any individual photographer’s creativity or originality. The case is different for sculpture, architecture, and other three-dimensional objects. Here, three dimensions have to be transposed into the two dimensions of the printed or displayed photograph. This process gives the photographer creative space and artistic license. Certain perspectives, light conditions, or frames may yield a better, or more accurate, photographic depiction of a given sculpture than others, but none a perfect or complete reproduction, and it is impossible to determine which one would be most adequate.32 This decision, however, is usually possible for photographic reproductions of two-dimensional objects. The whole argument confirms the fact that the subject of a photograph makes a difference for assessing its originality, because it affects the component of individuality. In fact, the European Court of Justice has emphasised very clearly in Painer v. Standard Verlags-GmbH and others that “copyright is liable to apply only in relation to a subject-matter, such as a photograph, which is original in the sense that it is its author’s own intellectual creation”.33 This aspect – the dependence of copyright on a work’s subject matter – is rarely discussed.34 Reference is often made to the labour-intensive production of a photograph, which is supposed to make the reproduction somehow original.35 For reproductions of two-dimensional works of art, the argument concerning the individuality of a given reproduction would make no sense, since the reproductions are not meant to be individual.36 These slavish copies are meant to be reproductive. A good, aesthetically successful reproduction makes the viewer forget about its reproductive status. If it fails to do so, there is 31 Cf. Eberhard Ortland, Kopierhandlungen, in: Daniel Martin Feige / Judith Siegmund (eds.), Kunst und Handlung. Ästhetische und handlungstheoretische Perspektiven, Bielefeld 2015, pp. 233 – 258, at p. 240 et seq. 32  This touches on the broader question of a typology of similarities; cf. Ortland, Kopier­ handlungen (supra, n. 31), pp. 236 – 239. 33  Case C-145/10, [1 December 2011] ECR I-12594, para. 87. Here the court reiterates its phrasing from Case C-5/08 Infopaq International [16 July 2009] ECR I-6569, para. 35. 34  But see Petri, The Public Domain vs. the Museum (supra, n. 14), at 2.5: “Why the subject matters: characteristics of photographic copies of works of art”. 35  For the so-called “sweat of the brow” doctrine, see e.g. Walter v. Lane [1900] AC 539. For a discussion of the demise of this doctrine in the UK see Andreas Rahmatian, Originality in UK Copyright Law: the Old ‘Skill and Labour’ Doctrine under Pressure, IIC 44:1 (2013), pp. 4 – 34. 36  Wilhelm Nordemann, Lichtbildschutz für fotografisch hergestellte Vervielfältigungen?, GRUR 1987, pp. 15 – 18: p. 18; cf. Lionel Bently / Brad Sherman, Intellectual Property Law, 4th ed., Oxford 2014, p. 116.

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something wrong with the reproduction. “Artistic” or “original” photographic reproductions would not be marketable, because they would not fulfil their purpose of being a substitution. The commercial value of photographic reproductions is based on their non-originality. Consequently, copyright is not an appropriate means of protecting their market. Here the Mannheim case takes a significant turn, since the Wikipedia user had clearly indicated where he had taken his scan from, i.e. a catalogue published by the Reiss-Engelhorn Museums.37 As the case proves, it is unwise to reveal one’s s­ ources when it comes to public domain reproductions. If the reproductions cannot be traced back to the owner of the original, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to prove what their sources are.38 This is due to the fact that reproductions serve as substitutes for the originals. Their lack of originality is due to their lack of individuality. This means that they cannot be traced back to their origins. One of the disputed reproductions of paintings from the Reiss-Engelhorn Museum depicts a portrait of Richard Wagner by Caesar Willich, which was painted in 1862. A commercial image library offers two different reproductions of this portrait, with unclear origins.39 Moreover, a reproduction purportedly by the Richard-Wagner-Society Hong Kong has surfaced that can also be found on Wikimedia Commons.40 It is part of the museum’s burden of proof to demonstrate the origin of the reproductions. Indeed, in Bridgeman v. Corel, the source of the reproductions could not be determined.41 The reproduction of Courbet’s portrait of Proudhon and his children (fig. 1) on Wikimedia Commons, however, was possibly taken from the Bridgeman Art Library.42 If non-original reproductions were protected by copy­r ight, it would constitute a legal risk to use this image of Courbet’s painting.43

37  The source was Karin von Welck (ed.), Sammelleidenschaft, Mäzenatentum und Kunst­ förderung. Kostbarkeiten aus dem Museum für Kunst-, Stadt- und Theatergeschichte im Reiß-Museum der Stadt Mannheim, Heidelberg 1992; see also OLG Stuttgart, 17 May 2017– 4 U 204/16, GRUR 2017, p. 905. 38  Felix Stang, Freie Verwendung von Abbildungen gemeinfreier Werke?, Zeitschrift für Geistiges Eigentum 1 (2009), pp. 167 – 219: p. 200 et seq. 39  Image ID D8172X and G6NNWR at www.alamy.com. One of these reproductions features a long vertical scratch mark near the left margin, which is distinctive of the scanned image (still) available on Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org / wiki / File:Richard_ Wagner_by_Caesar_Willich_ca_1862.jpg. 40  https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Portrait_of_Richard_Wagner.png. This version lacks certain characteristics of the image scanned from the museum catalogue. 41  The Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 421 (SDNY 1998), p. 428. 42  The site indicates http://www.bridgemanart.com/en-GB/asset/19189 as the source of the image on Wikimedia Commons; see https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Proudhon-children.jpg. However, that URL is defunct, and the image sizes on offer on Bridgeman’s website do not match the image size of the file on Wikimedia Commons. Then again, the image file’s metadata point to www.bridgemanart.com. 43 Cf. Stang, Freie Verwendung von Abbildungen gemeinfreier Werke? (supra, n. 38), at p. 196 et seq., on legal risks for users of images from the Wikimedia Commons repository.

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V. Limiting the Public Domain: Protection for Non-original Photographs in Germany A German peculiarity44 requires further discussion, namely § 72 German Copyright Act (UrhG), which distinguishes between photographic works and (simple) photographs. Photographic works (“Lichtbildwerke”) enjoy the same level of protection under § 2 German Copyright Act as works in other media, such as prints, paintings, compositions, and works of literature. By contrast, § 72 protects simple photographs (“Lichtbilder”) for only 50 years, if they do not qualify as original works of authorship according to the criteria established in § 2 UrhG. The regulation was introduced into the then new German Copyright Act of 1965. The lawmakers wanted to protect technical images. At the time, artistic photographs were only protected for 25 years, and non-artistic technical photographs were treated the same.45 Twenty years later, in 1985, photographic works were finally accepted as potentially artistic works and therefore included in the list of works of authorship protected for 70 years after the death of the author, just like paintings, sculptures and other works of art. The “simple” photographs were still protected for a shorter period. Therefore it had to be decided whether a given photograph was a “work” in the sense of copyright law or a “simple” photograph.46 A common distinction is made between an artistic photograph and the everyday snapshot. An example would be the photographic rendering of the Louvre gallery by Candida Höfer and an arbitrarily chosen tourist uploading his images on Flickr. The former is a photographic “work”; the latter a “simple” photograph. Non-original photographic reproductions of two-dimensional works of art have repeatedly been assigned to the category of simple photographs protected by § 72 UrhG.47 Referring to the parliamentary drafts for the 1965 legislation, as the Higher Regional Court of Stuttgart in its decision in Reiss-Engelhorn Museen v. Wikimedia did,48 is not convincing: the main reason for the introduction of the category of simple photographs was so that they could be treated in the same way as photographic works are treated, even though they lack the quality of an original intellectual creation required for a work of authorship. The legislation draft argued that it 44 See Bello Lagos, Museo Reiss-Engelhorn contra Wikipedia (supra, n. 18), p. 219: “una situación bastante particular”; cf. Haimo Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, 7th ed., Tübingen 2015, para. 720. 45  See BT-Drucks. IV/270, p. 81. 46  See BT-Drucks. 10/837, p. 11. 47  OLG Düsseldorf, 13 February 1996 – 20 U 115/95, GRUR 1997, p. 51; OLG Stuttgart, 17 May 2017 – 4 U 204/16, GRUR 2017, p. 906 et seq.; see also Stang, Freie Verwendung von Abbildungen gemeinfreier Werke? (supra, n. 38), p. 180; Henrik Lehment, Das Fotografieren von Kunstgegenständen, Göttingen 2008, p. 36 et seq. Lehment also applies § 72 German Copy­right Code to reproductions of three-dimensional objects, ibid., p. 51. 48  OLG Stuttgart, 4 U 204/16, GRUR 2017, p. 908.

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would be complicated to distinguish between both categories.49 However, since the reform of 1985, these considerations have become obsolete. At the time, the legislator decided to treat photographic works in the same way as works in other media. The status of the simple photograph remained unchanged, and the diverging treatment of photographs and photographic works was no longer considered to be an unsurmountable problem.50 Arguably, the 1985 reform of German copyright law is when an unforeseen regulatory gap appeared that requires a re-interpretation of the scope of § 72 UrhG, and not the introduction of that section in 1965. Hence the Stuttgart decision is methodologically debatable, because it ignored the changing legislative perspective since, at least, 1985. As a consequence, there has no longer been a specific scope for § 72 UrhG since the European jurisdiction lowered the originality standard for photographic works in the paramount case of Eva Maria Painer v. several Austrian and German news­ papers. The European Court of Justice confirmed the principle that a photograph is protected only if it is the author’s own intellectual creation.51 This applies to snapshots as well as elaborated portraits or landscape scenes. Since copyright law officially abstains from making aesthetic judgments about the quality of a protected work,52 this does not come as a surprise. It means that the tourist snapshot may be a bad photograph, but regardless of its low aesthetic quality, it is still a photographic work that merits full copyright protection. It is the photographer’s own intellectual creation. From this perspective, the difference between Candida Höfer’s rendering of the Louvre interior and a tourist’s snapshot of the same interior cannot be maintained: both are individual intellectual creations and therefore photographic works. Mobile phones with integrated cameras have made it easy to manipulate photographs in a creative way. The cultural practice of photography has changed since the 1960s, and also since the 1990s. While the European standard of originality can accommodate for this development, from a European perspective, § 72 German Copyright Act is outdated. However, in its last sentence, Art. 6 of Directive 2006/116/EC of 12 December 2006 stipulates the option for national exceptions from the originality standard: “Member States may provide for the protection of other photographs”. The preceding European Council Directive 93/98/EEC had articulated the same provision, which was probably a consequence of the fact that compromises concerning the issue were impossible among the EU member states.53 After its implementation, the status of photographs was subject to legal discussions in the UK. Could the tradi  BT-Drucks. IV/270, p. 81.   BT-Drucks. 10/837, p. 11. 51  Case C-145/10, [1 December 2011] ECR I-12594, at para. 87; see also Thomas Dreier / Gernot Schulze, Urheberrechtsgesetz. Kommentar, 5th ed., Munich 2015, § 2, para. 195. 52  Schack, Kunst und Recht (supra, n. 25), paras. 6, 223. 53  Thomas Margoni, The Harmonisation of EU Copyright Law: The Originality Standard, in: Mark Perry (ed.), Global Governance of Intellectual Property in the 21st Century: Reflecting Policy Through Change, Cham 2016, pp. 85 – 105: p. 93; Ramón Casas Vallés, The Require49 50

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tional UK standard of protecting photographs, which covered reproductions that were now non-original under European interpretation, be understood as the protection of “other photographs” in the sense of the Directive?54 After Temple Island v. New English Teas and Nicholas John Houghton,55 the prevailing view seems to be that there is only one standard for the protection of photographs in the UK and no distinct protection of “other photographs” with a related right like in Germany and Austria.56 Is § 72 UrhG therefore a permissible example of the protection of “other photographs”? At first sight, the answer seems to be obviously positive. However, even the simple photograph as protected by § 72 UrhG requires a minimum of personal creativity.57 Consequently, German courts have firmly established that purely mechanical reproductions such as photocopies or scans do not fall under § 72.58 So § 72 UrhG still covers images that are the result of a human intervention, but neither original nor intellectual creations. It is easy to understand why one would think that reproductions fall into this category. In fact, one main application of the regulation seems to concern photographs of objects in sales catalogues or web shops.59 If these objects are three-dimensional and their representation requires creative decisions, however, they are now protected as photographic works under the European originality standard. For the reproduction of two-dimensional objects, on the other hand, no personal creativity is required, because the reproduction aims at an impersonal, accurate representation. As a result, the class of non-original “other” photographs has dropped out with the introduction of the lower European standard of originality and the minimum standard of personal creativity as determined in § 72 German Copyright Act.60 More importantly, and beyond the scope of EU copyright law, the Directive 2003/98/EC on the re-use of public sector information, also known as the PSI Diment of Originality, in: Estelle Derclaye (ed.), Research Handbook on the Future of EU Copyright, Cheltenham / Northampton, MA 2009, pp. 102 – 132: p. 125. 54 See Lionel Bently / Brad Sherman, Intellectual Property Law, 3rd ed., Oxford 2009, p. 110 et seq. 55  [2012] EWPCC 1. For a commentary see Eleonora Rosati, Originality in EU Copyright: Full Harmonization Through Case Law, Cheltenham / Northampton, MA 2013, pp. 189 – 192. 56  See now Bently / Sherman, Intellectual Property Law, 4th ed. (supra, n. 36), p. 116; but cf. Copinger and Skone James on Copyright, 17th ed., London 2016, s.3 – 263, claiming that “the point remains to be tested”. 57  Dreier / Schulze, Urheberrechtsgesetz, § 72, para. 9. 58 Federal Court of Justice (BGH), 7 December 2000 – I ZR 146/98, ZUM-RD 2001, pp. 322 – 325: p. 325. Arguably, the Google Art Camera, which is used to photograph artworks at an extremely high resolution, would be an example of this category. 59 Cf. Artur-Axel Wandtke / Winfried Bullinger, Praxiskommentar zum Urheberrecht, 4th ed., Munich 2014, § 72, para. 6. 60 Also arguing for the abolition of § 72 UrhG Haimo Schack, Weniger Urheberrecht ist mehr, in: Winfried Bullinger et al. (eds.), Festschrift für Artur-Axel Wandtke, Berlin 2013, pp.  9 – 20.

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rective, attempts to remove barriers that hinder the re-use of public sector information.61 The directive, which also concerns public museums and archives as public sector bodies (Art. 2.2), subsumes photographs of paintings under the term “documents” (Art. 2.3). Art. 3 provides that member states must ensure that documents are re-usable for commercial or non-commercial purposes, including the documents for which these public bodies hold intellectual property rights. Moderate fees should be charged for the use of these documents (Art. 6). As a consequence, reproduction photographs of works of art in the public domain must be supplied by public museums for commercial uses. It is doubtful whether they can qualify as “other photographs” that are subject to national copyright laws, if they are documents under the provisions of the PSI Directive. Interestingly, the German implementation of the PSI Directive, the Information Re-use Act (Informationsweiterverwendungsgesetz) of 2006, stipulates in § 2a that the re-use of public documents that are protected by copyright or a related right (which would include § 72 German Copyright Act) is only allowed by consent of the public sector body in question that holds these rights. This is a constricting modification of the principles set forth in the PSI Directive and possibly contravenes European law. It has therefore been submitted that the application of § 72 UrhG to reproductions of works of art in the public domain that are part of public collections contravenes the PSI Directive. On the whole, the question cannot be examined in isolation. Extending the scope of § 72 UrhG to non-original photographic reproductions of works in the public domain has consequences for the extent of the public domain. The protection of the reproduction is a further barrier that prevents access to the original.62 The typical use of works of art is the use of their reproductions in publications and on the web. If these reproductions are restricted by copyright, the use of the original work is obstructed.63 This is why the proposal was made to exclude this group of cases from the application of § 72 UrhG, without even considering the European ramifications of copyright, since it would undermine the expiration of copyright after the standard period of 70 years after the author’s death.64 The Higher Regional Court of Stuttgart’s line of reasoning in Reiss-Engelhorn Museums v. Wikimedia is not particularly helpful. The court does not answer the question of what it means for the public domain if a photograph reproducing a free painting is no longer free to use. It assumes that the museum photograph was made   The Directive has been amended by Directive 2013/37/EU.   Bello Lagos, Museo Reiss-Engelhorn contra Wikipedia (supra, n. 18), p. 220; Stang, Freie Verwendung von Abbildungen gemeinfreier Werke? (supra, n. 38), p. 209. 63  This is candidly recommended as a strategy for museums by Ekkehard Gerstenberg, Fototechnik und Urheberrecht, in: Georg Herbst (ed.), Festschrift für Rainer Klaka, Munich 1987, pp. 120 – 126: p. 126. 64  Alexander Peukert, Die Gemeinfreiheit: Begriff, Funktion, Dogmatik, Tübingen 2012, p. 110; Schack, Kunst und Recht (supra, n. 25), para. 219; Stang, Freie Verwendung von Abbildungen gemeinfreier Werke? (supra, n. 38), pp. 212 – 215. 61 62

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with a creative purpose in mind. The main problem with this decision is its exclusive focus on the resources that were spent on the production of the (indeed reasonably good) museum photographs and its, unfortunately, absolute ignorance of the kind of subject matter these photographs represent. One would expect a court to take this issue into account – for example, portraits or street photography bring with them questions of personality rights.65 In a similar manner, the representation of works of art implies a different set of conditions, which concern the public domain and its integrity as well as the distinct status of a reproduction. The field of intellectual property is informed by intellectual categories, following a certain logic of the original and the reproduction that dates back to before modern copyright. It is unfortunate to ignore these cultural facts.66 The Higher Regional Court of Stuttgart explicitly claims that the museum photograph of a painting is not a reproduction of the painting.67 This is obviously nonsense and dishonours the court and its decision.68 VI. Properties: Intellectual and Physical Whereas the public domain concerns the intellectual sphere of artefacts, physical property seems to constitute a different category. The relationship between copy­ right as intellectual property and ownership of the reproduced object was recently reconsidered. A historical perspective on this correlation might therefore be helpful. In Roman law, there was nothing like intellectual property in any form. Only the manuscript as a thing, as an object, was subject to ownership.69 This successively changed with the introduction of the printing press, which technically separated the text from its hand-written medium. This led to the distinction between typo­ graphia and literatura. In his literary history of plagiarism, Philipp Theisohn has shown how, by the end of the 16th century, the “furtum ingenii literarii”, or theft of literary genius, had become part of the law of tort.70 For the visual arts, this category did not exist before – ownership was firmly rooted in the possession of the ma65  Under German jurisdiction, the problem is regulated in §§ 22 – 24 KunstUrhG. For a compelling case analysis of personality rights in opposition to claims of copyright, see Yxta Maya Murray, From Here I Saw What Happened and I Cried: Carrie Mae Weems’ Challenge to the Harvard Archive, Unbound 8:1 (2013), pp. 1 – 78. 66 Cf. Fiona Macmillan, Is Copyright Blind to the Visual? Visual Communication 7:1 (2008), pp.  97 – 118. 67  OLG Stuttgart, 17 May 2017– 4 U 204/16, GRUR 2017, p. 908. 68  It is not necessary to discuss ontological questions in detail (see Reinold Schmücker, Was ist Kunst? Eine Grundlegung, 2nd ed., Frankfurt [Main] 2014, p. 195) to understand the genealogical and mimetic dependence between original and reproduction. 69  Josef Kohler, Autorrecht, Jena 1880, p. 325. 70  Philipp Theisohn, Plagiat. Eine unoriginelle Literaturgeschichte, Stuttgart 2009, p. 136 et seq. He refers to the “Theatrum Humanae Vitae” by Theodor Zwinger, which was published in its third edition in 1586.

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terial object. With the copperplate came the right to print it. With the painting came the right to engrave its composition for reproductive prints. With the advent of photography as an effective means of reproduction, dematerialisation – which had informed the literary business for some four hundred years – also became paradigmatic within the visual arts. However, in contrast to literature, copyright in the visual arts has always tended to be linked to the works’ physical properties.71 Since the Renaissance, authors, collectors and artists have endeavoured to elevate the status of the formerly mechanical arts of painting, sculpture, and architecture by infusing them with intellectual substance. Philosophy, mathematics, and literature served as role models for this intellectualisation.72 The French revolutionary decree of 1793 acknowledged this intellectual history by protecting works of art as “œuvres d’esprit”.73 This marks an early instance of nineteenth-century developments in copyright law, which separated intellectual property from material ownership. In 1839, a French draft for a new copyright law came under attack by artists, because it was meant to assign copyright to the owner of a work of art. In a pamphlet against this conception, the painter Horace Vernet lucidly distinguished between the “objet intellectuel consistant dans le droit de reproduire le tableau” and the “objet matériel consistant dans la toile que son pinceau a su animer”.74 In Prussia, the Copyright Act of 1837 provided in § 28 that copyright was transferred in conjunction with the ownership of the work in question, if that work had not yet been reproduced.75 Almost forty years later, the situation in the German Empire changed in 1876 with a specific law on copyright in works of visual art. According to this law, copyright remained exclusively with the artist.76 Today, this separation between intellectual property and ownership of the work of art is, in theory, the legal consensus.77 There are good reasons to assume that, with respect to general property law, this constitutes a case of lex specialis derogat legi generali, or the special law overrides the general law.78 71 This relationship will be discussed in more detail in my forthcoming book: Künstler­ ethos – Kapital – Kontrolle: Eine Kunstgeschichte des Urheberrechts. 72  Stephen J. Campbell has characterised this development as an “ideological investment”; Stephen J. Campbell: Vasari’s Renaissance and its Renaissance Alternatives, in: James El­ kins / Robert Williams (eds.): Renaissance Theory, New York / London 2008, pp. 47 – 67: p. 47. The protagonists of this evolution are, among others, Leon Battista Alberti, Giorgio Vasari, and Lodovico Dolce. 73  See French Literary and Artistic Property Act, Paris (1793), in: Primary Sources on Copy­ right (1450 – 1900), ed. by Lionel Bently & Martin Kretschmer, www.copyrighthistory.org. 74  Horace Vernet, Du droit des peintres et des sculpteurs sur leurs ouvrages. Paris 1841, p. 8. 75  Prussian Copyright Act, Berlin (1837), Primary Sources on Copyright (supra, n. 73). 76  Gesetz betreffend das Urheberrecht an Werken der Bildenden Künste vom 9. Januar 1876, §§ 1 and 8. 77  This is even the starting point of the considerations of the OLG Stuttgart, 17 May 2017 – 4 U 204/16, GRUR 2017, p. 909. 78  For a discussion see Lehment, Das Fotografieren von Kunstgegenständen (supra, n. 47), pp.  102 – 104.

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Fiona Macmillan has pointed out that the idea of the intellectual domain is heavily dependent on an analogy with physical space, which increases the risk of conflating copyright with concepts associated with physical property.79 Indeed, in 2010, the separation between intellectual and physical property has come under attack by the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) in an infamous decision granting the Prussian Palaces and Gardens Foundation the exclusive right to control the commercial use of photographs taken on their premises. The plaintiff in this case is a heritage foundation that owns and manages several of the former Prussian palaces and estates. The Federal Court of Justice confirmed that a photograph in itself does not affect material property, but it also found the exception of this rule: if a person enters somebody else’s premises, that person affects the other person’s property, and if the intruder enters the premises in order to take a photograph of the building or the gardens, the photograph affects the landowner’s exercise of ownership. The court regarded the photograph as a fruit of the land.80 It considered taking photographs as a form of harvesting. Consequently, the commercial use of such photographs was the exclusive right of the Prussian Palaces and Gardens Foundation. The decision has sparked a stream of criticism by legal scholars and copyright experts. One of the more subtle considerations brought forward against the Federal Court of Justice was that there could not possibly be a difference between taking a picture of a cherry blossom, a squirrel, or a palace on another person’s premises.81 Critics have expressed concerns that the principle of extrapolating copyright from real estate property would spill over to property of moveable objects, or paintings and sculpture.82 In a later decision (2014), also concerning a copyright claim pursued by the Prussian Palaces and Gardens Foundation, the German Federal Court of Justice ruled that the principle could also apply to moveable objects, but refrained from deciding the case on the basis of that principle. The Prussian P ­ alaces and Gardens Foundation had sued a company selling reproductions of Old Masters’ paintings from the foundation’s collections. Since it could not be determined what the sources of these reproductions were, the case was dismissed.83 As noted before, in the current case of Reiss-Engelhorn Museums v. Wikimedia, the source of the scan that was uploaded to Wikimedia Commons is well-documented. 79  Fiona Macmillan, Many Analogies, Some Metaphors, Little Imagination: The Public Domain in Intellectual Space, in: Pólemos 2010, no. 2, pp. 25 – 44, at p. 26. See also William Patry, How to Fix Copyright, Oxford 2011, p. 140, who warns of the “heavy hand of property rhetoric”. 80  Federal Court of Justice (BGH), 17 December 2010 – V ZR 45/10, NJW 2011, pp. 749 –  753: p. 750. 81  Haimo Schack, Anmerkung zu BGH v. 17. 10. 2010 – V ZR 45/10, JZ 2011, p. 375 et seq.: p. 376. 82  Erik Jayme, Reproduktionsrechte an Kunstwerken – Gibt es ein Recht am Bild der eigenen Sache?, Bulletin Kunst & Recht 2 (2011), pp. 11 – 27: p. 24, argues exceptionally for a copyright based on physical property. 83  Federal Court of Justice (BGH), 19 December 2014 – V ZR 324/13, NJW 2015, p. 2037 et seq.

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Here the recent decision by the Higher Regional Court of Stuttgart takes hold. It translates the violation of real estate property rights into the sphere of moveable assets. Whereas the intellectual substance of a painting in the public domain is free, the object itself is not. Following the museum’s claims, the court also ruled that the museum’s property rights are already violated by the act of taking a photograph.84 The decision, however, does not explain how this can be the case. The museum can use the reproduction of its painting as ever. No instance intrudes in its activities. Harm is not done to the museum and its collection, but to a perceived monopolistic position.85 In fact, this may be one of the key problems. The museum wants to control the way their collections are reproduced and distributed.86 Once copyright regulations no longer serve as a means to achieve this goal, regulations of ownership and property are invoked instead. A main reason for this approach is that the museum wants to safeguard its rev­enue from image rights. The re-monopolisation of works in the public domain, which has been termed “copyfraud”87 or, slightly more politely, “copyright overreaching”, is a strategy for achieving this aim. However, copyright is not the way to secure revenue for image reproductions of paintings, prints, photographs, and drawings in the public domain.88 Neither is the law of property. Only copyright law regulates the constellation of image use and reproduction. Museum representatives have been quoted saying that they want to decide who uses “their” images for commercial purposes and when. This is effectively a claim for a monopoly. Copyright law does not provide museums with such a monopoly, and neither does ownership, unless you happen to be a landowner in Germany – or a French museum.89 A recent verdict by the French Conseil d’État is interesting in this context. After ten years of litigation, the Conseil d’État confirmed the existence of two public domains, one for copyright and one for objects in public custody (“domaine public mobilier”). Taking photographs in a museum of (material) objects in the (intellectual) public domain was considered to constitute a private use of the “domaine public mobilier”, which required a prior autho­   OLG Stuttgart, 17 May 2017 – 4 U 204/16, GRUR 2017, p. 909.   On harm as a moral standard to assess copyright conflicts, see James O. Young, Cultural Appropriation and the Arts, Malden, MA / Oxford 2008, pp. 93 – 97. 86  See press release, Reiss-Engelhorn-Museen, 8 July 2015; on this typical position cf. Ken­ neth D. Crews, Museum Policies and Art Images: Conflicting Objectives and Copyright Overreaching, Fordham Intellectual Property Media & Entertainment Law Journal 22 (2012), pp. 795 – 834: p. 806. 87  Jason Mazzone, Copyfraud, New York University Law Review 81 (2006), pp. 1026 – 1100, who later developed this concept further in a monograph: Copyfraud and other Abuses of Intellectual Property Law, Stanford, CA 2011. See also Chris Needham, Understanding Copyfraud: Public Domain Images and False Claims of Copyright, Art Documentation 36 (2017), pp.  219 – 230. 88 See Petri, The Public Domain vs. the Museum (supra, n. 14), p. 3. 89  The situation in France would merit a specific analysis; for a survey, see Marie Cornu, L’image des biens culturels: les limites de l’appropriable, in: Pascale Bloch (ed.), Image et Droit, Paris 2002, pp. 511 – 550. 84 85

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risation. The museum refused such authorisation on the grounds that it feared a decline in visitor numbers if images of their collections were available on the internet.90 A second reason is that museums want to safeguard the status and public image of their collections. In the case of the Peabody Museum, Kara Schneiderman, Director of Collections at the Museum, testified how Harvard seeks to ensure that any photographs of artefacts in the Museum “reflect positively” on the Museum.91 On 26 October 2017, the Tribunal of Florence, in a similar vein, ruled that images of Michelangelo’s David cannot be used for commercial ends without the permission of the Galleria dell’Accademia.92 Of course, almost anything seems possible within the framework of contracts,93 and consequently, museums set up their terms and conditions to prevent people from taking photographs, or even from making sketches. The Peabody Museum’s Photography Agreement was deemed valid.94 The Higher Regional Court of Stuttgart confirmed the existence of a “visitor’s contract” (“Besichtigungsvertrag”), which included a provision not to take photographs on the premises of the museum.95 However, whereas private museums can do as they like, this might not apply to public museums. If they are funded with public money, they should ensure that their collections are publicly available.96 This is a line of reasoning that has led to the implementation of open access policies for academic literary output. It could easily be applied to objects from a public collection.97 So far, however, the Higher Regional Court of Stuttgart has dismissed any ethical considerations of this kind, arguing that proper90  Conseil d’État, 23 December 2016, N° 378879, ECLI:FR:CECHR:2016:378879.20161223, www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriAdmin.do?oldAction=rechJuriAdmin&idTexte=CETATEX T000033684999&fastReqId=467675901&fastPos=1. 91  District Court for the District of New Mexico, Sealed memorandum opinion and order, 22 August 2016, p. 8, www.govinfo.gov/app/details/USCOURTS-nmd-1_15-cv-00472/US COURTS-nmd-1_15-cv-00472 – 6. 92 Tribunale di Firenze, 26 October 2017 – RG. n° 13758/2017, www.aedon.mulino.it/ archivio/2017/3/ordinanza.pdf. 93 Cf. Schack, Kunst und Recht (supra, n. 25), para. 206 et seq. 94  District Court for the District of New Mexico, Sealed memorandum opinion and order, 22 August 2016, p. 20: “Mr. Elmore agreed to obtain permission and follow certain policies before publishing photographs he took at the Museum. He did not do so, and no contract or other document releases him from that obligation.” (www.govinfo.gov/app/details/US COURTS-nmd-1_15-cv-00472/USCOURTS-nmd-1_15-cv-00472-6). 95  OLG Stuttgart, 17 May 2017 – 4 U 204/16, GRUR 2017, p. 911. 96 Cf. Winfried Bullinger, Kunstwerke in Museen – Die klippenreiche Bildauswertung, in: Rainer Jacobs / Hans-Jürgen Papier / Klaus-Peter Schuster (eds.), Festschrift für Peter Raue, Cologne 2006, pp. 379 – 400: p. 395 et seq.; Ronan Deazley, Photographing Paintings in the Public Domain: A Response to Garnett, European Intellectual Property Review 23 (2001), pp. 179 – 184: p. 183. Lehment, Das Fotografieren von Kunstgegenständen (supra, n. 47), p. 152, draws a line between private and non-commercial and commercial uses of photographs, leaving open the question of scholarly publications. 97 Cf. Stang, Freie Verwendung von Abbildungen gemeinfreier Werke? (supra, n. 38), p. 210 et seq.

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ty is property98 – not unlike William Blackstone’s famous characterisation of property as “that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.”99 However, a work of art is not merely an external thing. It is unfortunate that a publicly funded museum is evidently underfunded to such a degree that it feels compelled to revert to dubious litigation. Moreover, this mea­ sure does not take the Streisand effect or economic realities into account. Several studies have shown that rights management is an unreliable source of revenue.100 The restrictions put on the reproductions also obstruct the museums’ core mission of education.101 Those museums that have opened up their collections, have made images available, and do not claim any copyright for un-original, un-individual reproductions – in other words, those museums that have abstained from the strategy of using copyrights in order to fund themselves – are thriving. The growing list of these museums includes the Rijksmuseum in Amsterdam, the Walters Art Museum in Baltimore, and the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York, but also smaller museums such as Skokloster in Sweden. They all have made their high-resolution images freely available.

VII. Defending the Public Domain: Copyright, Property, Monopoly As a final point, it is worth reflecting on some basic principles of copyright, its history, its relationship to property at large, and the contractual alternatives. Copyright. The recent court cases do not offer convincing arguments against the claim that there is no copyright for photographic reproductions of two-dimensional works of art in the public domain.102 Even though in Harvard Museums v. Steve   OLG Stuttgart, 17 May 2017– 4 U 204/16, GRUR 2017, p. 912.   William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 2, Oxford 1768, p. 2. 100  Very clear: Alain Marciano / Nathalie Moureau, Museums, Property Rights, and Photographs of Works of Art: Why Reproduction Through Photograph Should Be Free, Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues 13:1 (2016), pp. 1 – 28: p. 24: “none of the justifications put forward to prevent photography of works of art in museums are acceptable in terms of economic analysis”. See also, for example, Kenneth D. Crews, Copyright, Museums and Licensing of Art Images (2012), www.kressfoundation.org/research/Default.aspx?id=35409; Kristin Kelly, Images of Works of Art in Museum Collections: The Experience of Open Access. A Study of 11 Museums Prepared for The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation (2013), www.clir.org/ pubs/reports/pub157. 101  Marciano / Moureau, Museums, Property Rights, and Photographs of Works of Art (supra, n. 100), p. 12 et seq. Museums often claim the opposite; see, e.g., Naomi Korn / Peter Wienand, Public Access to Art, Museums, Images, and Copyright: The Case of Tate, in: Daniel McClean / Karsten Schubert (eds.), Dear Image: Art, Copyright and Culture, London 2009, pp.  226 – 238, at pp.  231 – 233. 102 Cf. Petri, The Public Domain vs. the Museum (supra, n. 14), at 2.7. 98 99

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Elmore, it was, in the end, correctly assumed that reproductive photographs are not copyrightable, German courts still tend to rigorously apply § 72 UrhG, largely ignoring the collateral damage for the public domain that arises from the protection of reproduction photographs. An underlying problem might be that the public domain is treated more as an exception to copyright than as the area where copyright no longer applies. In the balance between copyright positions, the public domain occupies a defensive position.103 However, copyright is a monopoly, and as such, a monopoly should be the exception to the rule of free trade. Indeed, before the age of copyright law, reproduction rights were awarded as a privilege.104 Early modern legal treatises had to argue for printing privileges as an exception to the long-standing ban on monopolies.105 From a broader perspective, it may again prove to be the fairer solution to take this balance as a starting point and to recover the exceptional status of copyright for our postmodern realities. In the context of an alternative balance of this kind, the use of reproductions would be free, and a museum would have to prove its exceptional position of holding the copyright for the model of the reproduction. The public domain would thus be reinforced. Property. The ongoing conflict between the Reiss-Engelhorn Museums and Wikimedia and its users, in particular, illustrates that property laws seem to offer an alternative to copyright when it comes to enforcing control over the distribution of a collection’s reproductions. As a result, the fine line between property and intellectual property is slowly disappearing. The interaction between intellectual property and material property needs to be reconsidered. Otherwise, the concept of intellectual property would fall back into the shadow of ownership – which would constitute a return to the early nineteenth-century. Property alone is not sufficient to support the idea of absolute autonomy in the treatment of a work of art. In fact, a public collection is arguably not even the mu­ seum’s property but the public’s. It is merely under the museum’s custody. (This is 103  This is a common trait of copyright exceptions; cf. Lewis Hyde, Common As Air: Revolution, Art and Ownership, London 2012, p. 241. See also James Boyle, Fencing Off Ideas: Enclosure & the Disappearance of the Public Domain, Daedalus 131:2 (2002), pp. 13 – 25: pp.  14 – 17. 104  Literature on this topic is abundant; see e.g. Joanna Kostylo, From Gunpowder to Print: the Common Origins of Copyright and Patent, in: Ronan Deazley (ed.), Privilege and Property: Essays on the History of Copyright, Cambridge 2010, pp. 21 – 50; Lisa Pon, Prints and Privileges: Regulating the Image in 16th-Century Italy, Harvard University Art Museums Bulletin 6 (1998), pp.  40 – 64; Christopher L. C. E. Witcombe, Copyright in the Renaissance: Prints and the Privilegio in Sixteenth-Century Venice and Rome, Leiden 2004. 105 See Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective, Nashville, TN 1968, pp. 84 – 86 on the “Case of Monopolies” (1602) and the ensuing Statute of Monopolies (1624). Another example is the Spanish legal scholar Juan de Lugo, who discussed the legitimacy of the printing privilege in spite of the fact that it constituted a monopoly; see Juan de Lugo, De iustitiae et iure, Lyon 1642, vol. 2, p. 342. It was Josef Kohler who first referred to de Lugo in a lengthy article: Die spanischen Naturrechtslehrer des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts, Archiv für R ­ echts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie 10 (1917), pp. 235 – 263: p. 250. A similar line of reasoning to de Lugo can be found in Benedikt Carpzov, Iurisprudentia Ecclesiastica, Leipzig 1649, Def. 414.

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different for private museums, of course.) This state of trusteeship is more noticeable in cases of private bequests and their associated terms. Donor-imposed restrictions might include a photography ban. The Barnes Foundation in Philadelphia is a prominent example of the practical difficulties arising from restrictive terms of bequest.106 A contrary example is the Turner Bequest. Joseph Mallord William Turner gave his art to the British nation, expressing his wish “to keep my Pictures together so that they may be seen known or found” and “be viewed gratuitously”.107 Making pictures viewable and accessible in the 21st century means more than storing them in a building: it means making them accessible at a low threshold in a digital environment. To “be viewed gratuitously” also means not re-monopolising their reproductions. This possibly contradicts the practice of Tate Images, who act as a licensing agency for the Tate collections, including their Turners. The degree to which museums feel dependent on the terms of their donors obviously differs. Highlighting this relationship, however, serves to reinforce awareness of the role of trusteeship that museums fulfil for the public. The public is, ultimately, a kind of donor, and this trusteeship comes with an obligation to allow the public to access its entrusted collections. Contract. If both copyright and property considerations fail to secure an absolute right for the museum to manage reproductions of its collections, the freedom of contract seems to be a welcome instrument, as the recent cases of the Harvard Museums and the Reiss-Engelhorn Museums have shown. If, however, museums arbiter the public domain for “their” works of art – how free are they in formulating their terms and conditions? Is it in in their absolute discretion to contravene existing balances of copyright against the public domain? Within the European Union, contracts bypassing essential principles of copyright law can be problematic in view of the Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (cf. s.6 (1)). The Directive has been implemented in national legislations such as the UK’s Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 or § 307 German Civil Code (BGB).108 Is there an alternative beyond this form of legal ring-fencing around art reproductions? All parties concerned are interested in the highest possible image quality for their purposes. If the reproductions are free, a museum can compete by offering an exclusive surplus value.109 It should not, as the Reiss-Engelhorn Museums 106 See, for example, Turney Berry / Edward F. Martin, Restrictions on Charitable Gifts: Conditions or Suggestions, Tulane Law School Annual Institute on Federal Taxation 57 (2008), pp. 10.1 – 38, with further references to the lawsuits evolving around the Barnes Foundation on pp.  10.13 – 14. 107  Turner’s will is documented in Walter Thornbury, The Life of J. M. W. Turner, R.A., 2 vols., London 1862, vol. 2, pp. 409 – 422: p. 413. 108  The problem is not discussed by Lehment, Das Fotografieren von Kunstgegenständen (supra, n. 47), p. 113 et seq., who therefore concludes that a contractual photography ban in a museum is permissible. 109  The “Apfelmadonna” decision of the Federal Court of Justice (BGH), 13 October 1965 – BGHZ 44, pp. 288 – 303, at pp. 298 – 300, is instructive with a view to competition law in

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have proudly stated, refuse to sell merchandise,110 but offer the best merchandise, which can profit from the aura of the original. It could offer the original digital image in a better quality than the scan on Wikipedia, so that enterprises who are interested in printing Richard Wagner on a book cover or a tea towel can easily access printable files suitable for their purposes. The museum should not operate a policy of censorship here. The director of the Rijksmuseum in Amsterdam famously said: “If they want to have a Vermeer on their toilet paper, I’d rather have a very high-quality image of Vermeer on toilet paper than a very bad reproduction”.111 The Michelangelo decision by the Tribunal of Florence should have been one on competition law, not on copyright. The ethics of law should reflect on the limitations of the fields of legal application – not every case involving the reproduction of a work of art is a copyright case, at least not exclusively. Indeed, this is what copyright overreaching is about. Ultimately, it affects the freedom of expression, since it withdraws means and materials from a potential communicator. From this perspective, it touches on human rights.112 Museums may disagree about the commercial use of the objects in their custody. The right initiative would be to take part in such a communication, not to attempt to censor it. Admittedly, this means getting one’s hands dirty. Sadly and ironically, museums that re-monopolise objects in the public domain by claiming copyright for their reproductions act like corporate companies and contribute to the commodification of culture.113 They promote the fragmentation of the public domain, but they are, in fact, not in a position that will pay off in the long run, because eventually they will realise that they themselves need access to reproductions for their own work.114 In the context of appropriating commons, the American poet and cultural critic, Lewis Hyde, speaks of “cultural aphasia”.115 In a cultural economy that increasingly focuses on attention, digital availability, and copyright cases. See also Stang, Freie Verwendung von Abbildungen gemeinfreier Werke? (supra, n. 38), p. 216. 110 See press release, Reiss-Engelhorn-Museen, 8 July 2015, p. 5: “Wir verkaufen keine Merchandise-Artikel zu Richard Wagner” (“We do not sell any merchandise related to Richard Wagner”). 111  Nina Siegal, Masterworks for One and All, New York Times, 29 May 2013, p. C1. 112 Cf. Macmillan, The Public Domain in Intellectual Space (supra, n. 79), pp. 38 – 40. 113 Cf. Fiona Macmillan, Public Interest and the Public Domain in an Era of Corporate Dominance, in: Birgitte Andersen (ed.), Intellectual Property Rights Innovation, Governance and the Institutional Environment, Cheltenham / Northampton, MA 2006, pp. 46 – 69. 114  This affects even major institutions such as the Getty Museum that encountered unsurmountable difficulties in realising a digital publishing project of a symposium on Gustave Courbet (www.getty.edu / museum / symposia / courbet_modernism.html), see Maureen Whalen, What’s Wrong with This Picture? An Examination of Art Historians’ Attitudes About Electronic Publishing Opportunities and the Consequences of Their Continuing Love Affair with Print, Art Documentation 28:2 (2009), pp. 13 – 22: p. 13 et seq. Further examples are provided by Needham, Understanding Copyfraud (supra, n. 87), p. 225 et seq. 115  Hyde, Common As Air (supra, n. 103), p. 241.

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exposure, museums that hide their collections behind photography bans and copyright pretensions will have to defend their right to exist.116 Re-arranging collections into a monopoly for reproductions means stealing reproduction rights from the public domain. The Roman poet Martial was the first to apply the term “plagiar­ ius”, which originally meant kidnapper / a person guilty of improper enslavement, to the appropriator of another poet’s verses.117 Metaphorically, the museums that kidnap works of art from the public domain are our contemporary “plagiarii”. We should not treat our cultural children as slaves. La prétention de propriété, c’est en effet le vol du domaine public. Zusammenfassung Eingedenk der These Proudhons, Eigentum sei Diebstahl, geht der Beitrag der Frage nach, inwiefern die Anerkennung von Eigentum an Reproduktionsvorlagen bereits gemeinfreier Werke einen Diebstahl an der Gemeinfreiheit darstellt. Am Beispiel eines Gemäldes von Gustave Courbet werden verschiedene Möglichkeiten, an geeignete Reproduktionsvorlagen zu gelangen, vorgestellt, und es wird erörtert, ob an diesen Vorlagen trotz der Gemeinfreiheit des abgebildeten Werkes neue Urheberrechte bestehen. Dabei werden die wenigen einschlägigen Rechtsfälle erörtert: Bridgeman v. Corel (1998/99), der Konflikt zwischen der britischen Na­ tional Portrait Gallery und Wikipedia, der US-amerikanische Fall Harvard Mu­ seums v. Steve Elmore (2016) und die noch anhängigen Verfahren, welche die Mannheimer Reiss-Engelhorn-Museen gegen Wikimedia und einzelne Nutzer angestrengt haben. Ausgangspunkt der Betrachtung ist der Originalitätsbegriff, den der EuGH und die Richtlinie 2006/116/EC für den urheberrechtlichen Schutz von Fotografien voraussetzen. Diese Originalitätsstufe ist sehr niedrig, so dass Schnappschüsse, aber auch fotografische Reproduktionen dreidimensionaler Kunstobjekte ausreichend schöpferisch sind, um den europäischen Werkbegriff zu erfüllen. Demgegenüber sind fotografische Reproduktionen zweidimensionaler Objekte selbst kein Original, sofern sie ihren Gegenstand erfolgreich reproduzieren, denn hier ist nicht die freie Kreativität der relevante Maßstab, sondern die Qualität der Reproduktion. Entsprechend lassen sich Reproduktionen bei der weiteren reproduktiven Verwendung in der Regel nicht identifizieren, es sei denn, die Quelle wird angegeben. Die europäischen Normen erlauben es, auch andere als originale Fotografien gesetzlich schützen zu lassen, so dass für Deutschland der Anwendungsbereich für den einfachen Lichtbildschutz nach § 72 UrhG prinzipiell eröffnet ist. Die histori116  It has, in fact, been claimed that even bad and unauthorised photographs have positive consequences on the visibility of a museum; Marciano / Moureau, Museums, Property Rights, and Photographs (supra, n. 100), p. 19. 117  For a discussion of Martial’s legalistic figures of speech, see Mira Seo, Plagiarism and Poetic Identity in Martial, American Journal of Philology 130 (2009), pp. 567 – 593.

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sche Auslegung der Vorschrift ergibt indes, dass sie sich von den 1965 geltenden Erwägungen aus betrachtet erledigt hat und vor dem Hintergrund der fotografischen Praxis wie der europarechtlichen Entwicklung veraltet ist. Der Anwendungsbereich der Vorschrift hat sich deshalb bereits stark reduziert. Darüber hinaus setzt die PSI-Richtlinie (2003/98/EG) der Anwendung des § 72 UrhG Grenzen, da Reproduktionsfotografien von Gegenständen in öffentlichen Sammlungen Dokumente im Sinne dieser Richtlinie sind. Schließlich beeinträchtigt die Anwendung des § 72 UrhG auf Reproduktionen von gemeinfreien Kunstwerken die Teilhabe am kulturellen Erbe. Die aktuelle Rechtsentwicklung in mehreren Rechtsordnungen folgt Bestrebungen, nach Ablauf der Urheberrechte die Bildverwertungsrechte an das Sach- und Grundstückseigentum zurückzubinden. Dies ist eine dogmatische Konstruktion, welche die europäischen Gesetzgeber eigentlich im Verlauf des 19. Jahrhunderts überwunden hatten. Aktuell stellt sich die Frage, ob die Überlagerung der Regelung von Kommunikationsrechten, zu denen auch das Reproduktionsrecht für gemeinfreie Kunstwerke gehört, durch Eigentumsrechte und Vertragsklauseln mit grundrechtlichen Rechtspositionen immer im Einklang steht. Unabhängig davon ist die Remonopolisierung der Abbildung gemeinfreier Werke durch ihre Eigen­ tümer keine ökonomisch nachhaltige Lösung, von der unterfinanzierte Kultureinrichtungen profitieren. Vielmehr untergräbt sie unter den Bedingungen der Me­ diengesellschaft deren kulturelle Relevanz. Im Ergebnis gilt es, die Gemeinfreiheit im Sinne eines fairen Interessenausgleichs gegen urheberrechtliche, eigentumsrechtliche und vertraglich begründete Positionen abzuwägen.

A Moral Need for Censorship, Access Restrictions, and Surveillance? The Ethics of Copying and the Freedom of Communication Eberhard Ortland Copying is pervasive in contemporary culture – indeed in any human culture.1 It is essential for the development of our cognitive, emotional, communicative and practical capacities, for the growth of culture and knowledge in general, for the flourishing of freedom and democratic political processes, and even for the formation of our identities.2 Hence, copying is, essentially, a good thing. In many cases, it is commendable or even mandatory. However, everybody would also agree that copying is not always a good thing. Copies can be boring, shallow, slavish, inaccurate, superfluous or just out of place. Some copying practices3 or acts of copying4 can be objectionable, for various reasons. They can violate private, common or public interests. Some of these violations are simply annoying, but others are deeply disturbing. Some may involve financial disadvantages or interfere with the integrity of works of authorship. Under certain circumstances, some copies or acts of copying can damage the social standing of the affected persons or groups. Copying can inflict serious harm on the affected individuals or groups or cause social unrest.

1 See Marcus Boon, In Praise of Copying, Cambridge, MA 2010; Gabriel Tarde, Les lois de l’imitation, Paris 1890 (English translation: New York 1903). 2 Cf. Mark Alfino, Deep Copy Culture, in: Darren  Hudson Hick / Reinold  Schmücker (eds.), The Aesthetics and Ethics of Copying, 2nd ed., New York / London 2017, pp. 19 – 37: p. 21; Gustavo Lins Ribeiro, What’s In a Copy?, in: Corinna Forberg / Philipp W. Stockhammer (eds.), The Transformative Power of the Copy, Heidelberg 2017, pp. 21 – 36. 3  For the purpose of the following discussion, “copying practices” will refer not only to the production of copies of certain images, texts, tunes, signs, data, tools, or patterns of behaviour, but will also mean distributing such copies or making permanent or transient copies accessible to third parties or to the general public. 4  For a discussion of what might count as an “act of copying”, see Eberhard Ortland, Ko­pierhandlungen, in: Daniel Martin Feige / Judith Siegmund (eds.), Kunst und Handlung. Ästhetische und handlungstheoretische Perspektiven, Bielefeld 2015, pp. 233 – 258.

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Notwithstanding widespread commitments to the freedom of communication,5 or speech6 and artistic expression,7 or, more generally, the freedom of opinion8 and information9 – which includes the freedom to hold opinions, to express ourselves and the freedom to develop and change opinions and hence the right “to receive and impart information and ideas without interference”10 – every legislation that I know of contains various norms that limit the range of permissible usage and reproduction of signs, images or words in some way. They rule out certain acts of copying or the display, making accessible or use of certain types of copies. We have laws against various types of harm attributed to certain acts of copying or problematic ways of dealing with copies. In order to better understand the relevance and scope of the ethics of copying, it is instructive to explore and compare such laws and to analyse the relevant copying practices. With the emergence of digital data processing, copying and communication technologies, and – in particular – with the widespread use of social media, copying has become much easier for large and rapidly growing parts of the world population. Despite the positive effects this development has unquestionably brought about for most of us, it has also led to a significant increase in complaints about 5 As early as in 1789, Art. XI of the Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen, passed by the French National Constituent Assembly, stated that “the free communication of thoughts and of opinions is one of the most precious rights of man: any citizen thus may speak, write, print freely, except to respond to the abuse of this liberty, in the cases determined by the law.” – The Council of Europe has updated these principles in the “Declaration on the freedom of communication on the Internet” adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 28 May 2003, www.osce.org/fom/31507?download=true (last access: 21 June 2018). For a systematic discussion, see also Tom D. Campbell / Wojciech Sadurski, Freedom of Communication, Dartmouth 1994. 6  Most notably stated in the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America (1791): “Congress shall make no law […] abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press”. For the ongoing political debate on the freedom of speech, see Timothy Garton Ash, Free Speech. Ten Principles for a Connected World, New Haven, CT / London 2016, and the accompanying website freespeechdebate.com. 7  The freedom of artistic expression is protected as part of the general freedom of expression in many jurisdictions; some also acknowledge particular privileges for the freedom of artistic expression, like in Art. 5 (3) of the German “Basic Law” (Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, GG) of 23 May 1949, www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/eng lisch_gg.html (last access: 15 June 2017). The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Euro­pean Union (2010/C 83/02) also commits the member states of the European Union to protecting the “freedom of the arts and sciences” (Art. 13). 8  Art. 19, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); Art. 19, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966). 9  Art. 11, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2010/C 83/02). 10  Ibid.; cf. also Ash, Free Speech (supra, n. 6), p. 119. – For the philosophical background of this essential right, see, most notably, John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, 2nd ed., London 1859, pp. 31 – 99; for the relevance of unrestricted access to any potentially relevant information, Joshua Cohen, Freedom of Expression, Philosophy and Public Affairs 22 (1993), pp. 207 – 263: p. 229.

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copying practices that are regarded as detrimental, immoral or unacceptable for other reasons. Against this background, many people have argued that there ought to be even more laws against certain copying practices, which, they claim, cause more serious harm than is acknowledged so far. Liberals and other advocates of the freedom of speech object that the overall harm caused by imposing further restrictions on the circulation or accessibility of certain kinds of information or expression would be worse than the harm that can be attributed to the existence and accessibility of the incriminated copies. Not all of the arguments brought up in these debates are convincing, but they are certainly relevant for our understanding of the ethics of copying as a normative discourse about the legitimacy of certain types of copying practices – and of restrictions of the freedom to copy that some people consider to be necessary. This article explores the relevance of such debates and of existing laws for our understanding of the ethics of copying. It focuses on the ongoing debate about moral and political reasons for restricting the freedom of speech, the dissemination of copies of certain signs, images, texts or tunes, and the freedom of access to such materials and objectionable contents. I will begin my survey of laws concerning copying practices and the harm that may be caused by acts of copying, or by certain ways of dealing with copies, (I.) with two brief remarks about offences that typically, or even essentially, involve acts of copying, where the measures to control or prevent such acts are not regarded as censorship: counterfeiting of money, official stamps or documents, and the disclosure of state secrets. I will then discuss (II.) censorship and the freedom of information and expression, (III.) the most widely accepted reasons for installing censorship measures, and (IV.) different regimes of enforcement of censorship decisions. I. Some Acts of Copying Regarded as Particularly Harmful 1. Counterfeiting Money or Other Official Signs or Documents Signs that are used as stamps or currencies are, technically speaking, copies. It is essential that every individual instance of a particular type that represents a certain value – say, a coin or a banknote – looks exactly the same as every other legitimate instance of the same type. And it is equally important that nothing may be produced that might be mistaken for an instance of some kind of currency. There are laws to make sure that such signs can only be legally copied by the official suppliers working for the national treasury, the postal service etc. The illegitimate copy­ing of such signs is a felony.11 The law treats such acts of copying and the 11  See, for example, §§ 146 –149 and 152a – b of the German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch, StGB). An English translation of the German Criminal Code is available at www. gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/index.html (last access: 3 June 2018). For an overview

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deceitful use of such copies as a particular offence.12 It is not simply regarded as a copyright infringement. The penalties are more severe than for ordinary fraud. In these cases, the victim is not only the person or corporation who is paid in counterfeit money, but also the general public. Trust in the currency is a public good and this trust is damaged by the illegitimate copying and circulation of counterfeit money. Likewise, counterfeiting official identity documents13 violates the interests not only of the persons deceived by counterfeit documents in any instance, but also more generally everybody’s trust in the reliability of official documents, and in decisions based on such documents.14 The offense in these cases is deception, but the deception could not be accomplished without copying. 2. Disclosure of State Secrets The disclosure of state secrets and breach of special duties of confidentiality15 are treated as criminal offences in most countries.16 Although such acts may sometimes be committed without copying anything – i.e. by simply passing on some classified information – it is more than a mere coincidence that, in most cases, they involve acts of copying and of making copies available to third parties or the public. Of course, the legal assessment of the acts of copying or of dealing with copies regarded as a disclosure of state secrets or as a breach of confidentiality by the prosecutors or the courts will not necessarily concur with the moral or political assessment of the respective acts by the general public or political interest groups. Depending on the circumstances, an act of copying that is prosecuted as a disclosure of a state secret may be regarded as morally wrong or as perfectly legitimate – and perhaps even as praiseworthy. If the alleged disclosure of a state secret took place in a news publication, the suppression of that publication and any ensuing sanctions against the media organisations responsible for such a publication would count as censorship.17 of laws concerning unauthorised copying of currency, see the Central Bank Counterfeit Deterrence Group website, https://rulesforuse.org/ (last access: 17 July 2018). 12  § 263 StGB. 13  § 275 StGB. 14  See also § 267 StGB (forgery). 15  §§ 95, 97, 109g and 353b StGB. 16  For a recent comparative discussion of state secrets law, see Hitoshi Nasu, State Secrets Law and National Security, International and Comparative Law Quarterly 64 (2015), pp.  365 – 404. 17  In a German case, two journalists working for the internet magazine, Netzpolitik.org, and their anonymous source were prosecuted for suspicion of treason (§ 94 StGB), because they had reported classified budget figures for the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz) related to an internet surveillance programme in 2015; see https://netzpolitik.org/2015/suspicion-of-treason-federal-attorney-general-an nounces-investigation-against-us-in-addition-to-our-sources/ (last access: 26 June 2017). The investigation was dropped after massive protests in the German public, see the AP report: Ger-

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II. Censorship and the Freedom of Information and Expression 1. What is Censorship? Censorship is not only the suppression of speech, public communication, or o­ ther kinds of expression or information that is considered objectionable for political, moral or religious reasons by the government or church authorities. Censorship occurs whenever people, institutions or organizations succeed in imposing their political or moral values or particular interests on others by suppressing the circulation of certain words, images, or ideas that they find offensive or otherwise objectionable.18 The basic situation of censorship is that some third party, the censor, interferes with an ongoing, attempted or desired communication between people.19 One example is postal censorship.20 The censor tries to prevent or limit the recipient’s access to a particular kind of expression, either by deterring the speaker from speaking or the hearer (or reader) from receiving such speech.21 The most effective way to do the latter is to prevent or restrict the production, distribution or circulation of copies of the expression deemed objectionable. If the stuff regarded as dangerous cannot be eliminated altogether, the censor might try to control and restrict the potential recipient’s access to such copies. Censorship is a deeply ambivalent issue. It was considered indispensable in most literate societies that we know of, from the Hebrew Bible22 or Ancient China23 to large parts of 20th century Europe,24 and continues to thrive throughout many drops treason inquiry into Netzpolitik journalists, The Guardian, 10 August 2015, www. theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/10/germany-drops-treason-inquiry-netzpolitik-journalists (last access: 26 June 2017). 18 Cf. Marjorie Heins, Sex, Sin, and Blasphemy: A Guide to the Censorship Wars, New York 1993, p. 3. 19 Cf. Kay Mathiesen, Censorship and Access to Information, in: Kenneth  E. Himma / Herman T. Tavani (eds.), Handbook of Information and Computer Ethics, New York 2008, pp. 573 – 587: p. 574 et seq. 20  Josef Foschepoth, Überwachtes Deutschland. Post- und Telefonüberwachung in der alten Bundesrepublik, Göttingen 2012, has shown how postal censorship of civil mail and surveillance of private communication was practised extensively in Germany not only by the Nazi regime (1933 – 1945), the post-war military government (1945 – 1949) and the East-German secret service (Staatssicherheitsdienst, 1950 – 1989), but also by Allied and West-German authorities in West-Germany from 1949 at least until 1968, despite an official ban of censorship and a guarantee for the privacy of correspondence, posts and telecommunications in West-German constitutional law (Art. 5 and 10 GG). 21  Mathiesen, Censorship and Access to Information (supra, n. 19), p. 575. 22  See, for instance, Exodus 20, 4; Deuteronomy 4, 16 – 18. 23  For example, in the thirty-fourth year of the Qin-era (213 BC), chancellor Li Si 李斯 urged the Qin emperor to order the burning of most books of poetry, history and philosophy, as reported by Sima Qian 司馬遷 in: Shǐjì 史記 (94 BC), ch. 6 (English translation by David K. Joradan, The Basic Annals of the First Emperor of Qin, http://pages.ucsd.edu/~dkjordan/chin/ Symaa/Symaa25.html, last access: 9 July 2017); see also Michael Strähle, Bücherverbrennun-

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the world.25 However, since the European enlightenment, censorship has, for good reasons,26 largely fallen into disrepute. Censorship by government authorities – or at least the law that required government approval prior to printed publications – was abolished in Sweden27 as early as 1766 and prohibited in the United States of America in 1791 by the first amendment to the constitution.28 The abolishment of censorship and the protection of the freedom of speech were sooner or later adopted by most modern constitutions – at least by the letter of the law.29 Even if there is ample reason not to be satisfied with the existing censorship policies in many countries,30 it does make a difference whether governments and courts are bound by official proclamations that prohibit censorship, or whether it is explicitly acknowledged as constitutional.31

gen und Zensur im alten China und ihre Folgen, Mitteilungen der Vereinigung Österreichischer Bibliothekarinnen & Bibliothekare 56:1 (2003), pp. 41 – 47. 24 See Derek Jones, Censorship. A World Encyclopedia, London / New York 2001. An impressive (albeit not at all comprehensive) list of some 60,000 titles of books that have been banned by a censorship authority during the past 400 years was assembled by faculty and students from the University of Kassel in relation to the installation “The Parthenon of Books” by the Argentinian artist Marta Minujín at the documenta 14 exhibition in Kassel 2017, http:// blogs.ubc.ca/documenta/files/2016/10/documenta-14-List-of-Banned-Books-2016-10-18.pdf (last access: 24 June 2017). 25 Recent aggregated data at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Censorship_by_country (last access: 7 June 2018). 26 An influential critique of censorship was expressed by John Milton, Areopagitica: A Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing, to the Parliament of England (1644), in: id., Complete Poems and Major Prose, ed. by Merritt Y. Hughes, Indianapolis, IN 2003, pp. 716 – 749. 27  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Censorship_in_Sweden (last access: 25 May 2018). 28  Supra, n. 6. 29  Even in Russia, where censorship is reportedly common (see https://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Freedom_ of_the_Press_(report); https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Media_freedom_in_Rus sia, with further references; last access: 25 May 2018), Art. 29 (5) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation as adopted by national referendum on 12 December 1993 states, “The freedom of the mass media shall be guaranteed. Censorship shall be prohibited”, https://web. archive.org/web/20101016230423/http://archive.kremlin.ru:80/eng/articles/ConstEng2.shtml (archived 16 October 2010; last access: 25 May 2018). – The constitution of Turkey of 1982, as amended on 10 May 2007, dedicates several articles to the freedom of communication (Art. 22), the freedom of thought and opinion (Art. 25), the freedom of expression and dissemi­ nation of thought (Art. 26), the freedom of the press (Art. 28), the right to publish periodicals and non-periodicals (Art. 29), the protection of printing facilities (Art. 30) and the right to use media other than those owned by public corporations (Art. 31); for an English translation see www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/tu00000_.html (last access: 25 May 2018). For recent reports on the current censorship practices in Turkey, see www.indexoncensorship.org/campaigns/turkey/ (last access: 25 May 2018). 30  Reports on censorship are collected, for example, by “Reporters Without Borders” who publish (among others) an annually updated “world press freedom index” https://rsf.org/en/ ranking, by “Index on censorship” at www.indexoncensorship.org/, as well as at www.ifex.org/ censorship/ and www.article19.org/ (last access: 25 May 2018).

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2. What is the Problem with Censorship? The negative impact of censorship is undeniable. Censorship stifles self-expression and thus an essential part of human flourishing.32 It suppresses people’s ability to make up their minds, voice protest and, if need be, to organize resistance.33 Moreover, those who find it necessary to silence the voices of opposition are, in many cases, not content with stopping the circulation of copies of newspapers, books and pamphlets, or with interrupting the operation of media infrastructures. They also intimidate writers or journalists, disrupt their careers, force them to go into exile, imprison or even kill them for speaking their opinion.34 This is abominable and unacceptable in every single case. But the harm inflicted by censorship is not limited to the people who are silenced. It concerns also, or even primarily, those who cannot hear what they might want to.35 With censorship, everybody is deprived of numerous opportunities for relevant insights and stimulating debates that might benefit our personal and communal development. Censorship interferes with people’s right to make their own choices and form their own opinions. This is negative for the people affected by the restrictions of a censorship regime, but also for society as a whole.36 If relevant information about certain matters is suppressed and withheld from the public, people are misled and deceived. They will make bad choices and fall headlong towards ruin. People can, of course, also be misled and deceived by fake news and disinformation, in particular if it is broadly disseminated on numerous influential media channels.37 A plurality of opinions concerning controversial questions can, of course, be 31  Art. 39 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, adopted by Royal decree of King Fahd in 1992, reads: “Information, publication, and all other media shall employ courteous language and the state’s regulations, and they shall contribute to the education of the nation and the bolstering of its unity. All acts that foster sedition or division or harm the state’s security and its public relations or detract from man’s dignity and rights shall be prohibited. The statutes shall define all that.” (English translation from Berne University International Constitutional Law collection: www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/sa00000.html [last access: 5 July 2017]). 32 Cf. Cohen, Freedom of Expression (supra, n. 10), p. 224. 33  For Hobbes, this was actually the reason to endorse censorship: “it is annexed to the Soveraignty, to be Judge of what Opinions and Doctrines are averse, and what conducing to Peace; and consequently, on what occasions, how farre, and what, men are to be trusted withall, in speaking to Multitudes of people; and who shall examine the Doctrines of all bookes before they be published.” (Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan [1651], ed. by Richard Tuck, Cambridge 1996, p. 124). 34  The international network “Reporters without Borders” regularly publishes information about journalists, media assistants and netizens imprisoned or killed for publishing unwelcome news; see https://rsf.org/en/ (last access: 25 May 2018). 35 Cf. Mathiesen, Censorship and Access to Information (supra, n. 19), p. 574 et seq. 36  Even for “the human race”, as John Stuart Mill emphatically put it; cf. id., On Liberty (supra, n. 10), p. 33. 37 See Craig Silverman, This Analysis Shows How Viral Fake Election News Stories Outperformed Real News On Facebook, BuzzFeed, 16 November 2016, www.buzzfeed.com/

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a symptom or source of social divisions. Nonetheless, we should regard diverging opinions as inherently valuable, because even false views contribute to deepening our understanding of the relevant matter, and eventually of the truth, as Milton has argued.38 If controversial opinions are silenced, the truth might be lost and prevailing falsehoods may remain unquestioned. If criticism is stifled, everybody’s chances to find out the truth will be diminished. These are classic and undeniably relevant arguments.39 But what follows from these arguments for our present debate about the regulation of public communication in our emerging hyperconnected digital media environment? Are there cases where the damage inflicted on people, or on society at large, due to the public circulation and accessibility of certain kinds of images, signs or speech actually outweighs the harm done by censorship? Can the harm done by people who feel encouraged to commit felonies or to riot because of the hateful or demeaning messages they have been received justify censorship? Even John Stuart Mill would agree that we are morally obliged to do our best to reduce such harm, as long as the prevention does not cause even greater harm.40 Thus, if we agree that the circulation and distribution of copies of certain kinds of images, signs, words or speech acts can indeed cause severe harm – more severe than the harm caused by censorship –, we might have to admit, at least in a consequentialist framework, that there is, indeed, a moral need for censorship and the corresponding surveillance and access restrictions.41 craigsilverman/viral-fake-election-news-outperformed-real-news-on-facebook?utm_term=. kfAazmMDj#.qkNP7xW46 (last access: 30 June 2017); Mary Pascaline, Facebook Fake News Stories: China Calls For More Censorship On Internet Following Social Media’s Alleged Role In US Election, International Business Times, 20 November 2016, www.ibtimes.com/ facebook-fake-news-stories-china-calls-more-censorship-internet-following-social-2448774 (last access: 4 July 2017); Jim Waterson, MI6 Chief Says Fake News And Online Propaganda Are A Threat To Democracy, BuzzFeed, 8 December 2016, www.buzzfeed.com/jimwaterson/ mi6-chief-says-fake-news-and-online-propaganda-is-a-threat-t?utm_term=.sx9qYm40a#.jm MEYp9J7 (last access: 4 July 2017); Jacob Soll, The Long and Brutal History of Fake News, Politico, 18 December 2016, www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/12/fake-news-historylong-violent-214535 (last access: 4 July 2017). 38 See Milton, Areopagitica (supra, n. 26), p. 727: “all opinions, yea errors, known, read, and collated, are of main service & assistance toward the speedy attainment of what is truest”. 39 Cf. Ash, Free Speech (supra, n. 6), pp. 73 – 79. 40  Such an obligation seems to follow from the utilitarian principle of morals, see John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, London 1863, pp. 9 et seq., 16 et seq. – Clare McGlynn / Erica Rackley, Criminalising Extreme Pornography: A Lost Opportunity, Criminal Law Review 4 (2009), pp. 245 – 260, have argued, in particular, that Mill would have supported censorship of certain kinds of extreme pornography. Against this view, Nick Cowen, Millian Liberalism and Extreme Pornography, American Journal of Political Science 60 (2016), pp. 509 – 520, has objected “that a case for censorship is hard to sustain within a recognizably Millian framework” (p. 518). For a discussion of utilitarian (or “goals-based”) and rights-based strategies to decide about necessary and acceptable restrictions of the freedom of speech, see also Ronald Dworkin, Do We Have a Right to Pornography? in: id., A Matter of Principle, Cambridge, MA 1985, pp.  335 – 372: pp.  336 – 338.

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3. What Should be Censored? But what exactly should be censored, and what should remain uncensored under any circumstances? How should censorship decisions be made and implemented? What are the relevant criteria, or, what should they be? And how can conflicts about censorship criteria be decided? Who should have a right to demand censorship? Who should decide about such requests? What qualifications should be required of persons entrusted with censorship tasks? Should it be possible to appeal against censorship decisions? Who should the censors be accountable to? These questions are at the heart of the ongoing controversies about censorship and the freedom of speech. There will be no easy, universally acceptable answer. These are crucial political issues. Deciding these questions – and accepting, rejecting or challenging those decisions – is constitutive for the society we live in. We do not have to make up the rules concerning censorship and the freedom of expression from scratch, and we are not in a position to. We are living under such rules and are trying to figure out whether they must be revised and how they might be improved. There can be little doubt that they need careful, critical revision in order to adjust them to the ongoing development of our society and culture, to the conflicts that upset or engage us, and to our rapidly changing media technologies. Wherever we are going to draw the lines, we have to acknowledge the necessity to strike a balance between the greatest possible freedom of opinion and artistic expression, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, security concerns, economic interests, the protection of privacy and other personality rights, as well as the indispensable requirements for social coexistence. 4. Who Should be Allowed to Decide? General, more or less far-reaching decisions about censorship and the conditions of free speech have been laid down in the form of laws and multilateral agreements. These laws are applied by courts and official42 or semi-official agencies43 in deci-

41  For similar arguments against radical defences of unlimited free speech, which are still quite popular in the US, see Jeremy Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech, Cambridge, MA 2012; Thane Rosenbaum, Should Neo-Nazis Be Allowed Free Speech?, The Daily Beast, 30 January 2014, www.thedailybeast.com/should-neo-nazis-be-allowed-free-speech (last access: 4 July 2017). 42  Like, for instance, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission, www.fcc.gov/about/ overview (last access: 8 July 2017); or the German Federal Review Board for Media Harmful to Minors, www.bundespruefstelle.de/bpjm/Service/english.html (last access: 8 July 2017). 43  For example, industry based institutions like the Classification and Rating Adminis­ tration (CARA) of the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), www.mpaa.org/ film-ratings/, or in Germany the organisations of voluntary self-control of the motion picture industry, Freiwillige Selbstkontrolle der Filmwirtschaft GmbH (FSK), www.fsk.de/?seitid=

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sions concerning the copying, distribution or accessibility of certain types of signs, texts or images deemed objectionable by people who feel offended by them. In some countries, or with regard to the followers of a particular faith, religious authorities can issue orders concerning questions of censorship.44 For centuries, until not too long ago, the Roman Inquisition was probably the most influential censorship agency in the world.45 Wherever they had the power to enforce it, the Inquisition engaged in prior restraint. The penalties carried out by the Inquisition were not limited to excommunication of readers and owners of prohibited books and the confiscation and destruction of the works deemed offensive.46 Under the Spanish, Portuguese and Roman Inquisition in the 16th and 17th centuries, thousands of people were expropriated, imprisoned, tortured or even executed for here­ sy or infidelity charges.47 Ecclesiastical courts of the Church of England also had, by authority of the crown, jurisdiction over censorship issues including blasphemy, defamation and acts regarded as moral transgressions, like incontinence.48 Religious censorship is not merely a matter of the unenlightened past, of societies that we might regard as somehow backward. Even recently, Evangelical Christian pressure groups have – with some success – campaigned to ban evolution theory from the science curricula of schools in several American states.49 In many cases, media outlets, universities, schools, museums, theatres and other organisations that are usually regarded as champions of free speech, or as victims of censorship, have also been more or less actively involved in censorship practices and have pursued their own censorship policies.50 480&tid=480, and of the entertainment software industry, Unterhaltungssoftware Selbstkon­ trolle (USK), www.usk.de/en/ (last access: 18 July 2018), cf. infra, n. 244 et seq. 44  For example, the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar is regarded as a relevant authority who can issue fatwas to effectively ban certain books or movies in large parts of the Muslim world. It is, however, not altogether impossible to repeal such a fatwa, and in some cases such censorship decisions have been challenged or ignored. In recent years, the Muslim Brotherhood seems to have been a more influential force urging for ‘grass roots’ censorship in the name of Islam. (I am indebted to Basel Myhub for instructive conversations on this issue at the ZiF in Bielefeld in May, 2017.). 45 See Jonathon Green / Nicholas J. Karolides, Encyclopedia of Censorship (new edition), New York 2005, pp. 257 – 260. 46  Cf. “Ten rules concerning prohibited books drawn up by the fathers chosen by the Council of Trent and approved by Pope Pius” (1564), rule X, in: H. J. Schroeder (ed.), The Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent, St. Louis, MO 1955, p. 275. 47 See Edward Burman, The Inquisition: The Hammer of Heresy, 2nd ed., New York 1992; Helen Rawlings, The Spanish Inquisition, Malden, MA / Oxford 2006. 48 Cf. Robert Maugham, Outlines of the Jurisdiction of All the Courts in England and Wales, London 1838, p. 84. 49  National Coalition Against Censorship, Censoring Science: Battle over Creationism, n. d., http://ncac.org/resource/censoring-science-battle-over-creationism (last access: 8 July 2017). 50  For example, the online music distribution company Spotify filters “explicit content” (whatever that might be) and “hate content”, i.e. “content that expressly and principally pro-

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5. What Kind of Censorship? There are several types and methods of censorship: one paradigmatic model is prior restraint, as practiced in the early modern licensing systems which required special permits in advance for any publication of books or journals and before staging plays in public theatres. This is the type of censorship from which modern liberal states claim to desist. Other perhaps less restrictive types of post-censorship executed by the government or religious authorities, or by private or semi-official agencies,51 are applied to some degree in most countries. Post-censorship aims at more or less far-reaching control over the circulation of objectionable books, journals, films, television programmes or web sites. A comparatively moderate form of pre-censorship practiced and widely accepted in contemporary liberal democracies is the content rating systems that regulate the accessibility of movies and other types of audio-visual content for certain audiences depending on their age. The development of more or less automated electronic data processing machines and artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms have brought about new possibilities for technically advanced surveillance and extensive prior restraint or filtering measures.52 I will come back to these (IV). Prior restraint and postal censorship severely impede the freedom of speech and basic aspects of social life. People can never be sure whether some relevant information might have been withheld from them, for any reason. They are deterred from freely expressing their thoughts. Inspection and decision procedures motes, advocates, or incites hatred or violence against a group or individual based on characteristics, including, race, religion, gender identity, sex, ethnicity, nationality, sexual orientation, veteran status, or disability”; https://artists.spotify.com/faq/music#what-content-is-prohibit ed-on-spotify (last access: 8 June 2018). Recently, music by the controversial singer R. Kelly was removed from Spotify – not entirely, but from their recommendation playlists. This was criticised by some as censorship, see Aram Sinnreich, What Spotify’s Alarming R. Kelly Censorship Means for the Future of the Internet, The Daily Beast, 11 May 2018, www.thedai lybeast.com/what-spotifys-alarming-r-kelly-censorship-means-for-the-future-of-the-internet (last access: 8 June 2018). For a critical discussion of corporate censorship, see Lawrence Soley, Censorship, Inc: The Corporate Threat to Free Speech in the United States, New York 2002. 51  These might include industry-based rating agencies (cf. supra, n. 43; infra, n. 242 – 246) or vigilance committees such as the New York Society for the Suppression of Vice, founded in 1873 by Anthony Comstock (cf. infra, n. 74) and members of the YMCA as a follow-up of its earlier British namesake (1801 – 1880). Under a special act passed by the New York State legislature, this society was given “a monopoly of vice, and its agents the rights of search, seizure and arrest”. It was granted 50 percent of all fines levied on those successfully prosecuted by the society or its agents, and continued to police theatres, news-stands, and book publishers until 1950. See Green / Karolides, Encyclopedia of Censorship (supra, n. 44), p. 522; Jones, Censorship (supra, n. 23), vol. I, p. 566. 52 See Te-Ping Chen, China Owns ‘Great Firewall,’ Credits Censorship With Tech Success, The Wall Street Journal, Jan 28, 2015, http://on.wsj.com/1z9QXhl (last access: 9 June 2018); Maayan Perel / Niva Elkin-Koren, Black Box Tinkering: Beyond Disclosure in Algorithmic Enforcement, Florida Law Review 69 (2017), pp. 181 – 221; Aram Sinnreich, Four Crises in Algorithmic Governance, present volume, pp. 181–189.

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of the censors delay the circulation of all kinds of information, regardless of how harmless or urgent they might be. The huge advantage of post-censorship regimes (and even more so of free speech regimes) is that they allow people to decide for themselves what they want to say or show to others and when. Censors, prosecutors or tort lawyers only intervene if something is reported as objectionable. The price of liberty is a slackening of control and an absence of perfect security against the harms of offensive, seditious, indecent or obscene speech, defamation and unrestrained trolling as well as the spreading of information that should have remained confidential. The majority of citizens in liberal democracies are quite happy to pay this price, and the subjects of totalitarian regimes would doubtlessly prefer this alternative to the distorted picture forced upon them by their heavily censored media. III. Unspeakable Words, Unbearable Images It is instructive to study the laws, decisions and enforcement practices regarding censorship and the freedom of expression in a synchronic approach in order to see the complex pattern of regulations of certain copying practices or ways of dealing with copies that exist in our society. And it is even more instructive to study such patterns from a historical or comparative perspective, for the particular character of a given regime of copying regulations emerges only through comparison. The following observations about of a number of topics that have been subject to moral claims calling for restrictions of the freedom to copy and for legal regulations do not provide a comprehensive overview. They are merely meant to point out topics worthy of further investigation to deepen our understanding of the ethics of copy­ ing. 1. Depictions of Violent Crimes, Sexual Abuse Certain images, signs or speech acts are almost unanimously regarded as offensive, for example videos showing violent crimes53 or sexual abuse of children. Criminal law in Germany – as in most, if not all, other countries – prohibits the production, copying, possession, display, dissemination or making accessible of “written materials”, images or other representations depicting violence,54 bestiality, or sexual activities performed by, on or in the presence of, children or minors.55 The copying or making accessible of certain offensive signs, images, words, or texts can be harmful in various ways: seeing or reading them might do some53  Some examples are displayed in a video on the problem of “digital bystanders”, that was recently posted by the New York Times in their online edition: www.nytimes.com/video/ us/100000005144290/the-digital-bystander.html (last access: 10 July 2018). 54  § 131 StGB. 55  §§ 184a –184c StGB.

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thing to the person exposed to them. What has been seen cannot be unseen again. Some kinds of images, words or sounds can deeply affect us, at least under certain circumstances. Not all of these experiences are wanted by the persons perceiving them,56 or by those who care about the well-being and development of such persons – for example the parents of children. Copying or making accessible contents like this contributes to the risk of exposure or other ways of inflicting harm. In fact, the persons exposed to the possibly disturbing or corrupting influence of such material are not the only people who might suffer some injury from the respective acts of copying. People can also be harmed by the spreading of certain information or misinformation about them or about certain matters of fact, because such information might change the views of other people and the way they interact with them or with third parties. A highly relevant example in this context is the harm inflicted on persons who have been sexually abused as children. If such abuse has been recorded on videotape, and copies of these tapes or video files were circulated as child pornography, the victims of such abuse are indefinitely abused again. The victims may not even be aware of what is happening, but they may still be affected. When grown-up victims of abuse later realise that they can never be sure who might possess copies or who might have seen the appalling tapes, this knowledge adds to the trauma caused by the abuse and further spoils their chances to ever develop trust in anybody or live a normal life.57 2. Universal and Particular Norms Some of the laws that limit the range of legally permitted copying activities state more or less universally supported norms, such as the ban on all forms of expression that advocate national, racial or religious hatred,58 or the prohibition of child pornography.59 Provisions for the protection of minors60 are common,61 although 56  For an exemplary account of the traumatic consequences of massive exposure to depictions of violence and other offensive material, see Till Krause / Hannes Grassegger, Inside Facebook, SZ-Magazin, 15 December 2016, http://international.sueddeutsche.de/post/ 154513473995/inside-facebook (last access: 9 July 2017). 57 See Michael A. Kaplan, Mandatory Restitution: Ensuring that Possessors of Child Pornography Pay for Their Crimes, Syracuse Law Review 61 (2011), pp. 531 – 556, citing relevant cases and research. 58  According to Art. 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), “(1) Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law. (2) Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.” 59  Laws that ban the production, reproduction and circulation of pornographic materials displaying sexual abuse of children have been enacted in almost every country that has ratified the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989, with the Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography of 2000, signed and ratified by 121 of the currently 193 member-states of the UN.

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there are differences concerning the legal status of teenagers between different cultures and legal systems. Some states have laws that mention violations of “human dignity”,62 “decency” or “morality”63 as justification for restricting the freedom of expression. Who would deny that there are indeed moral reasons for not putting up with just anything somebody might want to say or show in public, and for not allowing people to copy and spread obviously harmful, reprehensible or disgusting contents via mass media? There is a problem with (blatantly) indeterminate legal concepts64 like “human dignity”,65 “decency” or “morality”. If abstract and essentially contested concepts66 60  For example, the already mentioned §§ 184, 184b and 184c StGB; see also §§ 12, 15 of the German Protection of Young Persons Act (Jugendschutzgesetz) of 23 July 2002. 61  Since 2008, the Child Online Protection (COP) Initiative of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) works to coordinate approaches taken in different countries with varying legal systems and produces guidelines designed to help member states achieve their goals. See www.itu.int/en/cop/Pages/about_cop.aspx (last access: 5 May 2018). Country profiles documenting the relevant national laws and institutions and international policy commitments of 193 states are hosted at www.itu.int/en/cop/Pages/country-profiles.aspx. 62  For example, in 2011 the Hungarian Constitutional Court ruled that the requirement of respect for the constitutional order makes it unacceptable and officially sanctionable if the press continuously or recurrently commits violations against “human dignity” or conducts its activities on the basis of views that deny the equal dignity of human beings (No 165/2011 [XII. 20.] AB). The Constitutional Court remarked that human dignity also forms the basis for the limitation of the freedom of the press in another respect, since persons suffering violations against their rights and dignity may institute proceedings according to the rules of civil and criminal law in the interest of the enforcement of their individual rights. See Szabina Berkényi, Hungary. (V) Restriction of the Freedom of the Press in the Interest of the Protection of Human Dignity, in: András Koltay / Andrej Školkay (eds.), Comparative Media Law Practice. Media Regulatory Authorities in the Visegrad Countries, vol. II, Budapest 2016, pp. 124 – 150. 63  For example, § 19 (2) of the Constitution of India restricts the freedom of speech and expression granted in § 19 (1 [a]) under the following conditions: “Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence.” – See Lawrence Liang, Free Speech and Expression, in: Sujit Choudhry / Madhav Khosla / Pratap Bhanu Mehta (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution, Oxford 2016, pp. 814 – 833. 64 The problem of the “indeterminacy of legal concepts” and the underlying (general) difficulty of applying general concepts to individual cases has been a frequently discussed topic in legal philosophy; see Lawrence B. Solum, Indeterminacy, in: Dennis Patterson (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, Oxford 1999, pp. 488 – 502. However, as far as I can see, in the common law tradition no distinction seems to have been made between rather “determinate” and conspicuously “indeterminate legal concepts”, in the same way as in continental European jurisprudence and legal philosophy. For a discussion of this distinction in German administrative law, see Hans-Joachim Koch, Unbestimmte Rechtsbegriffe und Ermessensermächtigungen im Verwaltungsrecht. Eine logische und semantische Studie zur Gesetzesbildung der Verwaltung, Frankfurt (Main) 1979; Matthias Jestaedt, Maßstäbe des

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like these appear as legal terms, the law allows, and calls for, a considerable amount of discretion of administration officers and judges in applying the law, which makes it difficult for the subjects of the law to know in advance how the administration or a court will decide. Several laws limiting the range of legally permitted copying activities respond to specific problems that are regarded as warranting a limitation of the freedom of speech in a particular state or a smaller number of states. In other states, these cases are regarded as less relevant or even perfectly legitimate. For example, the swastika and other Nazi symbols have been banned by German67 and Austrian68 law as well as in Poland, Lithuania, Hungary and Brazil, but an attempt to ban the swastika across the EU failed in 2005 after objections by the British government and others.69 The public display of the hammer and sickle and other Communist symbols such as the red star is a criminal offence or misdemeanour in Ukraine, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and Indonesia.70 Denial of the so-called ‘holocaust’71 is illegal in 14 countries,72 but considered a legitimate, albeit Verwaltungshandelns, in: Dirk Ehlers / Hermann Pünder (eds.), Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht, 15th ed., Berlin 2015, § 11, pp. 325 – 345. 65  The concept of “human dignity” also assumes a crucial position in German constitutional law (Art. 1 [1] GG). German courts, in particular the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) have established a tradition of interpreting the normative implications of this term in numerous decisions; see Hans-Georg Dederer, Die verfassungsrechtliche Garantie der Menschenwürde, in: Birgit Beck / Christian Thies (eds.), Moral und Recht, Passau 2011, pp.  125 – 148. 66  Walter B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56 (1956), pp. 167 – 198. 67  § 86a StGB. 68  Bundesgesetz vom 5. April 1960, mit dem bestimmte Abzeichen verboten werden (Abzeichengesetz 1960), as revised 2012. 69  See the article “Swastika” in the English language Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Swastika# Legislation_in_other_European_countries (last access: 5 May 2018). 70  See the article “Hammer and sickle” in the English language Wikipedia, https://en.wiki pedia.org/wiki/Hammer _and_sickle#Legal_status; see also https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Bans_on_Communist_symbols (last access: 5 May 2018). 71  ‘So-called’ not because I think that the historical fact of the organized mass murder of large parts of the Jewish population and other groups of people in the Central and Eastern European countries committed by German troops and local aides during the Second World War can be reasonably doubted, but simply because the ancient Greek term for a completely burnt offering was ill-chosen to designate these atrocities. For a historical account see Christian Gerlach, The Extermination of the European Jews, Cambridge 2016, with his discussion of why the term ‘holocaust’ should be avoided (p. 14); see also Jon Petrie, The Secular Word ‘Holocaust’: Scholarly Myths, History, and Twentieth Century Meanings, Journal of Genocide Research 2:1 (2000), pp. 31 – 63. 72  Austria (National Socialism Prohibition Law [1947, as amended 1992], Art. 3h), Belgium (Negationism Law [1995, amendments of 1999]), Czech Republic (Law Against Support and Dissemination of Movements Oppressing Human Rights and Freedoms [2001], §§ 260 – 261a), France (Law No 90 – 615 to repress acts of racism, anti-semitism and xenophobia [1990]), Ger-

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controversial, expression in most countries. Restrictions of copying, circulating or displaying certain signs are considered necessary in several countries in order to secure peace and political stability, but they are also widely criticised because they can be used by authoritarian governments to suppress opposition movements. 3. Pornography Most states have laws that restrict the production, copying and distribution or accessibility of written materials, images or phonorecords regarded as ‘pornographic’,73 ‘indecent’ or ‘obscene’.74 The standards for this classification, however, vary over time and from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The underlying assumptions about

many (§ 130 StGB), Greece (law of 8 Sept. 2014), Hungary (law of 23 Feb. 2010), Israel (Denial of Holocaust Prohibition Law, 5746 – 1986), Liechtenstein (§ 283 [5] StGB [2000]), Lithuania (§ 170 [2], Lietuvos Respublikos Baudžiamasis Kodeksas), Poland (Art. 55, Act of 18 December 1998 on the Institute of National Remembrance – Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation [Dz.U. 1998 nr 155 poz. 1016]), Romania (Emergency Ordinance No. 31 of 13 March 2002), Russia (Law of 4 May 2014), Slovakia (Law 485/2001). – For a critical discussion of memory laws, see Josie Appleton, Freedom for history? The case against memory laws, in: Free Speech Debate, April 3, 2013, http://freespeechdebate.com/dis cuss/freedom-for-history-the-case-against-memory-laws/ (last access: 7 June 2018). 73 An (incomplete) overview is provided in the English language Wikipedia: https:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pornography_by_region (last access: 4 June 2018). 74  In the United States, the Comstock Act of March 3, 1873, for the “Suppression of Trade in, and Circulation of, Obscene Literature and Articles of Immoral Use” (17 Stat. 598) made selling or offering or otherwise publishing or offering to publish in any manner, or even the possession of “an obscene book, pamphlet, paper, writing, advertisement, circular, print, picture, drawing or other representation, figure, or image …, or any cast instrument, or other article of an immoral nature” a misdemeanour (and also, with the same act, “any drug or medicine, or any article whatever, for the prevention of conception, or for causing unlawful abortion”, as well as any kind of advertising for such articles). In Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), the U.S. Supreme Court decided, “speech that is obscene and thus lacking First Amendment protection must be without serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. It also must appeal to the prurient interest in the view of an average person according to community standards, and it must describe sexual conduct or excretory functions in an offensive way.” The Comstock law was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 103 S. Ct. 2875, 77 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1983). For current federal laws concerning obscenity, see 18 U.S. Code ch. 71. On the difficulty of defining “obscenity” in U.S. law, see William A. Huston, Under Color of Law: Obscenity vs the First Amendment, ­Nexus (2005), pp. 75 – 82, archived at: https://web.archive.org/web/20060928002640/http://www. nexusjournal.org/2005obscenity/75 – 82.pdf (last access: 25 June 2017). – For similar difficulties in Japan, concerning the application of Article 175 of the Japanese Penal Code (わいせ つ物頒布等 Waisetsu butsu hanpu tō / Distribution of obscene objects), see Joaquín da Silva, Obscenity and Article 175 of the Japanese Penal Code: A Short Introduction to Japanese Censorship, in: Eiga Nove (24 October 2006; revised and updated 22 December 2015), http://eiga9. altervista.org/articulos/obscenity.html; Amanda Dobbins, Obscenity in Japan: Moral Guidance Without Legal Guidance (2009), https://works.bepress.com/amanda_dobbins/1/ (both articles last accessed: 5 June 2018).

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who needs to be protected against which kind of harm also differ greatly from each other. In the common law tradition, “obscenity” was prosecuted as a “breach of the King’s peace” on the assumption that an obscene book “tends to corrupt the morals of the King’s subjects”.75 According to this assumption, sexually explicit texts or images might corrupt the morals. This moral corruption might then spread and affect even those who have not read an ‘obscene’ book or seen ‘obscene’ pictures. Censorship was therefore regarded as necessary in order to protect the minds or souls of potential readers from reading a “filthy, wicked, and obscene libel”,76 but also to protect “the moral fabric of a decent and stable society” from the threat of “sexual promiscuity, deviant sexual practices and other attitudes and behaviour that threaten traditional family and religious institutions”.77 Current British law follows a more limited approach. It still somewhat paternalistically censors “obscene” articles and tries to limit or block their reproduction and circulation because “persons who are likely […] to read, see or hear the matter contained or embodied in (the article deemed obscene)” might become ‘depraved’ or ‘corrupted’ by them.78 However, authors, publishers or dealers of sexually explicit or otherwise ‘obscene’ materials can no longer be held accountable for an overall change of family values or public morality. According to this law, for banning a book or a movie it is not sufficient that it is regarded as deeply offensive to a signifi­ cant number of citizens who adhere to more traditional, or more repressive, moral or religious values. The chapter of the German criminal code concerning sexual offenses, prostitution and pornography was thoroughly revised around 1969 (and successively updated), eliminating the older assumption that criminal law was meant to defend ‘morality’ or ‘decency’ in general, and replacing it with the concept of “offences against sexual self-determination”.79 Consequently, the law concerning possible   Sir Philip Yorke, Attorney General, in: Rex v. Curll (1727).  Ibid. 77 See Caroline West, Pornography and Censorship, in: Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013 Edition), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/por nography-censorship/ (first published: 5 May 2004; substantive revision: 1 October 2012; last access: 5 June 2018), ch. 2.1. 78  UK Obscene Publications Act, 1959, 7&8 Elizabeth II, ch. 66, sect. 1 (1). – The British Home Office committee on obscenity and film censorship chaired by Bernard Williams recommended a revision of legal restrictions regarding pornographic representations and suggested that terms such as ‘obscene’, ‘indecent’ and ‘deprave and corrupt’ should be abandoned (Bernard Williams [ed.], Report of the Committee on Obscenity and Film Censorship, London 1979). The legislation did not follow this recommendation; the Obscene Publications Act of 1959, as amended in 1964 (Elizabeth II 1964, c. 74) is still in force. 79  Chapter 13 of the German Criminal Code (StGB). – For a similar development in Italian criminal law around 1996, see Rachel Anne Fenton, Rape in Italian Law: Towards the Recognition of Sexual Autonomy, in: Clare McGlynn / Vanessa E. Munro (eds.), Rethinking Rape Law. International and Comparative Perspectives, London 2010, pp. 183 – 195. 75 76

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harms arising from the distribution of copies of pornographic literature or images (“indecent written materials”, as they had previously been labelled) was restated with a focus on the protection of minors or other persons who are regarded as particularly vulnerable in their (gradually emerging) sexual self-determination. They must be protected against all kinds of abuse80 as well as the exposure to stimuli or incitements that might interfere with their sexual autonomy.81 A leftover of the older approach, which assumed that some things are just too obscene to be allowed (and probably depraving and corrupting), can be found in the laws prohibiting the reproduction and distribution of pornographic materials depicting or describing violence or sexual acts of persons with animals.82 The ban against depictions of bestiality is apparently not meant to protect the sexual self-determination of the persons who feel attracted to such practices,83 but rather to suppress this kind of sexual self-determination for the sake of some other, superior good. The purpose of this law is not the protection of animal rights, either.84 The law is considered necessary in order to protect human dignity, i.e. the right of innocent people not to be disturbed by depictions of bestiality or tortured bodies, but also the dignity of those who might otherwise try to engage in such kinds of sexual behaviour or in the production or consumption of such materials. Threats to the people involved in making images or videos of violent sexual practices are a serious concern, but existing laws against bodily harm,85 sexual assault, and rape86 might suffice to address these issues. Laws against the dissemination of depictions of violence87 and extreme kinds of pornography88 are primarily   §§ 174, 176 – 176b, 180, 182, 184b – e StGB.   § 176 (4), No.s 3 – 4, §§ 184, 184d, 184g StGB. 82  § 184a StGB. 83  In the United States, only a minority of states currently seem to have laws against the sale and distribution of zoophilic pornography, while in other states this seems to be regarded as a legitimate use of the freedom of speech; possession of such material is legal in most states (except Oregon and the Virgin Islands), see the Wikipedia article on “Legality of bestiality in the United States”, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legality_of_bestiality_in_the_United_States (last access: 6 June 2018). 84  This would be subject to a law for the protection of animals, in Germany: Tierschutzgesetz of 18 May 2006. 85  §§ 223, 224, 226, 227 StGB. 86  §§ 177, 178 StGB. 87  § 131 StGB. 88  §§ 184a, 184b StGB. – For England and Wales, Section 63 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 made not only the distribution, but even possession of an “extreme pornographic image” an offence, and specifies the relevant images as showing “in an explicit and realistic way, any of the following –  (a) an act which threatens a person’s life,  (b) an act which results, or is likely to result, in serious injury to a person’s anus, breasts or genitals,  (c) an act which involves sexual interference with a human corpse, or 80 81

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supposed to protect society against possible threats from people who consume such images. Perhaps not all forms of sexually explicit material, but at least certain kinds of extreme pornography celebrating rape, violence, child abuse or the degradation of women could be regarded as incitement to crime,89 and should be banned, if that is what they are. But are they incitement? Several studies have affirmed that the aggressive potential of some people can be reinforced or disinhibited due to a repeated or habitual exposure to depictions of violence.90 Does this establish a causal dependency between crimes committed by some people and their prior consumption of violent images?91 The same is true of alcohol: the aggressive potential  (d) a person performing an act of intercourse or oral sex with an animal (whether dead or alive), and a reasonable person looking at the image would think that any such person or animal was real.” (sect. 63 [7], Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008). Subsection 7A adds depictions of actual rape. – For a liberal critique of this law, see Nick Cowen, Nothing to Hide: The Case Against the Ban on Extreme Pornography, Briefing Paper, Adam Smith Institute, 25 May 2016, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/56eddde762cd9413e151ac92/t/57442b4a 62cd949c844d4ee5/1464085330939/Nicholas+Cowen+-+Nothing+to+hide+FINAL.pdf (last access: 21 June 2018); for a recent assessment of the law and the development of the kinds of pornography regarded as most disquieting, see Alexandros K. Antoniou / Dimitris Akrivos, The Rise of Extreme Porn: Legal and Criminological Perspectives on Extreme Pornography in England and Wales, London 2017. 89  § 111 StGB. – Incitement used to be common law offence but was abolished in England and Wales as of 1 October 2008 and replaced by the offence of “encouraging or assisting a crime” (Sections 44 – 58, Serious Crime Act 2007). In the US, boundaries for prosecuting incitement are more narrowly defined (cf. infra, n. 135). 90  The report of the US Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography (Meese report; Washington, DC 1986, part 4, ch. 3) found evidence that “arousal to rape depictions appears to correlate with attitudes of acceptance of rape myths and sexual violence and both these mea­ sures likewise correlate with laboratory observed aggressive behaviors. Depictions of sexual violence also increase the likelihood that rape myths are accepted and sexual violence toward women condoned. Such attitudes have further been found to be correlated with laboratory aggression toward women. Finally, there is also some evidence that laboratory aggression toward women correlates with self-reported sexually aggressive behaviors.” http://porn-report. com/integration-research-findings.htm (last access: 6 June 2018). Some later studies seem to support these findings, see James V. P. Check / Ted H. Guloien, The Effects of Repeated Exposure to Sexually Violent Pornography, Nonviolent Dehumanizing Pornography, and Erotica, in: Dolf Zillmann / Jennings Bryant (eds.), Pornography: Research Advances & Policy Considerations, Hillsdale, NJ, 1989, pp. 159 – 184; Monica G. Weisz / Christopher M. Earls, The Effects of Exposure to Filmed Sexual Violence on Attitudes Toward Rape, Journal of Interpersonal Violence 10 (1995), pp. 71 – 84; Drew A. Kingston / Paul Fedoroff / Philip Firestone / Susan Cur­ ry / John M. Bradford, Pornography Use and Sexual Aggression: The Impact of Frequency and Type of Pornography Use on Recidivism among Sexual Offenders, Aggressive Behavior 34 (2008), pp.  341 – 351. 91  In a recent case in Denmark, the evidence for a strong interest of self-taught submarine engineer Peter Madsen in hardcore sex films and ‘snuff’ movies played a key role in his conviction for murder of the Swedish journalist Kim Wall. See Anne Mette Lundtofte, The Peter Madsen Guilty Verdict Leaves Lingering Questions and Pain, The New Yorker, 4 May 2018, www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/peter-madsen-guilty-verdict-leaves-lingering-ques tions-and-pain (last access: 6 June 2018).

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of some people is reinforced or disinhibited due to their consumption of alcoholic drinks. Should this be a reason for a general prohibition of alcohol? The empirical findings and the consequences that might follow from research on the correlations between the consumption of pornography and abusive sexual behaviour are fiercely contested.92 The ongoing controversies about the permissibility of certain kinds of sexually explicit material show how difficult it is to establish empirical evidence and causal dependencies and also how moral convictions, fears, desires, and gender can prevent people from listening to arguments. 4. Defamation Reputation is a crucial dimension of social life. In a world of strangers, crooks and bunglers, nobody might dare to enter any interaction or relationship without having reasons to consider their adversary as trustworthy. Real confidence will only grow from personal experience, but members of modern societies frequently need to interact with and rely on many people or organisations that they do not (yet) know from personal experience. How can we decide whom we may trust and where we should be on our guard? We have to rely on the judgment of others, ideally that of friends we trust and who know the other person very well. But in many cases, no such good advice is available, so we have to decide based on hearsay or gossip. We may extend our hearsay networks and search the internet for the people in question. Since almost everybody bases their decisions on such publicly available information, reputation is indeed central for many dimensions of social and economic interaction. Reputation is a product of social processes and a collective phenomenon, not just an impression in the head of a single individual.93 It grows slowly and can be de92  Christopher J. Ferguson / Richard D. Hartley, The Pleasure is Momentary … the Expense Damnable? The Influence of Pornography on Rape and Sexual Assault, Aggression and Violence Behavior 14 (2009), pp. 323 – 329, studied data about pornography consumption and rape rates in the U.S. and found actually an inverse relationship. Milton Diamond, Pornography, Public Acceptance and Sex Related Crime: A Review, International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 32 (2009), pp. 304 – 314 (corrected with Corrigendum: International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 33 [2010], pp. 197 – 199), confirms these findings with similar developments in other countries (Japan, Croatia, Finland, Poland and the Czech Republic). Correspondingly, Michael S. Kimmel / Annulla Linders, Does Censorship Make a Difference? An Aggregate Empirical Analysis of Pornography and Rape, Journal of Psychology and Human Sexuality, 8:3 (1996), pp. 1 – 20, found that a decrease in the availability and consumption of pornography was not correlated with a decrease in rape rates. – A British meta-study by Catherine Itzin /Ann Taket / Liz Kelly, The Evidence of Harm to Adults Relating to Exposure to Extreme Pornographic Material: A Rapid Evidence Assessment, London 2007, confirmed “the existence of some harmful effects from extreme pornography on some who access it. These included increased risk of developing pro-rape attitudes, beliefs and behaviours, and committing sexual offences” (p. iii). This study, commissioned by the British Home Office during the legislation process of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, has been criticised, however, for methodological shortcomings; see Antoniou / Akrivos, The Rise of Extreme Porn (supra, n. 88), pp. 99 – 102.

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stroyed with a single (alleged) incident. We can ruin our own reputation by a stupid mistake, or it might be marred by someone making false allegations with malicious intent. Once a good name has been lost, the victim has to overcome a wall of scepticism and mistrust in order to earn it back. A good reputation is a highly valuable good, similar to a property right. In fact, for many people or enterprises, reputation is the most valuable asset for any business operations, employment opportunities, political or erotic aspirations. Reputation should therefore not be harmed without good reasons based on the demands of justice and the common welfare.94 The protection of reputation is a human right95 and universally acknowledged as an important social purpose. Defamation laws generally aim at suppressing or redressing harms to reputation that result from false statements intended to lower the esteem of the person or party defamed, whether spoken aloud, distributed in print, broadcast or otherwise publicly communicated. The common law tradition distinguishes between libel and slander. A defamatory speech made publicly in some merely fleeting form, as by spoken words or sounds, sign language, gestures, and the like, is slander. If other media such as printed words, images, broadcasting or digital storage technologies are used – i.e. if copies and acts of copying are involved – it is libel.96 In most jurisdictions, libel and other forms of defamation are torts or causes for civil action. In many states defamation can also be prosecuted as a criminal offence.97 Defamation laws inevitably interfere with the freedom of expression. This interference can be justified to the degree that is necessary to protect citizens in 93  Nicholas Emler, A Social Psychology of Reputation, European Review of Social Psychology (1990), pp. 171 – 193. 94  David S. Oderberg, The Morality of Reputation and the Judgment of Others, Journal of Practical Ethics 1:2 (2013), pp. 3 – 33; www.jpe.ox.ac.uk/papers/the-morality-of-reputa tion-and-the-judgment-of-others-2/ (last access: 8 June 2018). 95  Art. 12, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); Art. 17, International Cove­ nant on Civil and Political Rights (1966). 96  For a comprehensive treatment of the British law of defamation, see Patrick Milmo et al. (eds.), Gatley on Libel and Slander, 12th ed., London 2015; in particular concerning the distinction between slander and libel: pp. 92 – 97, 139; for American law: Bruce W. Sanford, Libel and Privacy, 2nd ed., Boston 2004; for a global overview: Charles J. Glasser, Jr., International Libel and Privacy Handbook, 3rd ed., Chichester 2013. For a critical discussion of the impact of the law of defamation on the (late 20th century) media, see Eric Barendt / Laurence Lust­ garten / Kenneth Norrie / Hugh Stephenson, Libel and the Media: The Chilling Effect, Oxford 1997. 97  German criminal law (StGB) contains several laws against defamation (üble Nachrede, § 186), intentional defamation (Verleumdung, § 187), false accusations uttered with the intention of harming third parties (§ 164) or violating the memory of the dead (§ 189 StGB). Special laws apply to defamation against persons in the political arena (§ 188), defamation of the President of the Federation (§ 90) and defamation of representatives of foreign states (§ 103 StGB). – An overview over defamation laws in Europe, together with statistical information about their application in recent years, can be found at the International Press Institute’s Media Law Database, http://legaldb.freemedia.at/defamation-laws-in-europe/ (last access: 7 June 2018).

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their legitimate rights. At the same time, defamation laws can be used, and have been used, to silence legitimate speech.98 Defamation laws thus have to be carefully balanced with the human right to freedom of expression. In order to strike such a balance, lawmakers must make sure that any sanctions for protecting someone’s reputation are appropriate and do not discourage future utterances. The global campaign for freedom of expression, Article 19, has suggested a catalogue of “Principles on Freedom of Expression and Protection of Reputation”.99 According to this international group of experts, as well as the United Nations Human Rights Committee,100 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe,101 and other relevant institutions of international law, “all criminal defamation laws should be abolished […]. They should be replaced, where necessary, with appropriate civil defamation laws.”102 In particular, “the State, objects such as flags or symbols, government bodies, and public authorities of all kinds should be prevented from bringing defamation actions”.103 Criminal offences concerning the defamation of the state or its symbols104 should be abolished.105 According to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, “the reputation of a nation, the military, historic figures or a religion cannot and must not be protected by defamation or insult laws”.106 Current 98  Article 19 – Global Campaign for Freedom of Expression, Background paper: Defining Defamation (2016), p. 3, www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/38641/170228-FinalBackground-paper-Revised-Defamation-Principles.pdf (last access: 7 June 2018). 99  Article 19, Defining Defamation: Principles on Freedom of Expression and Protection of Reputation, revised and updated, London 2017, www.article19.org/data/files/media library/38641/Defamation-Principles-(online)-.pdf (last access: 8 June 2018). 100  U.N. Human Rights Committee, 102nd session, General comment No. 34 on the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, 12 September 2011, p. 12, § 47 www2.ohchr.org/ english/bodies/hrc/docs/GC34.pdf (last access: 10 June 2018). 101  Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1577 (2007), § 10 http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/ XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-EN.asp?fileid=17588 (last access: 10 June 2018). 102  Article 19, Defining Defamation (supra, n. 99), p. 10, Principle 4.a. 103  Joint declaration by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media and the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression: International Mechanisms for promoting freedom of expression, 2000, www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/showarticle.asp?artID=142&lID=1 (last access: 7 June 2018). See also Article 19, Defining Defamation (supra, n. 99), p. 9, Principle 3. 104  For example, §§ 90a and 90b StGB, or Section 301 of the Turkish Penal Code. – A recent survey of laws concerning defamation of states or state symbols (as well as of other defamation and insult laws), is documented in: Scott Griffen et al., Defamation and Insult Laws in the OSCE Region: A Comparative Study (Commissioned by the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media), March 2017, www.osce.org/fom/303181?download=true (last access: 7 June 2018). 105 U.N. Human Rights Committee, Concluding Remarks on Mexico, CCPR/C/79/ Add.109, 27 July 1999, available at www.univie.ac.at/bimtor/dateien/mexico_ccpr_1999_con cob.pdf (last access: 7 June 2018). 106  Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1897 (2010), § 8.

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laws in many countries (including Germany) diverge significantly from these requirements and should be revised. 5. Blasphemy Like state authorities, religious institutions have long sought to direct and control the minds and souls of the people through spiritual welfare work, preaching, and spreading copies of holy scriptures, pictures and devotional objects, and also by banning or burning copies of texts, images or symbols they regarded as impious, pagan, heretic or blasphemous. The Greek word, βλασφημία, was originally equivalent to the Latin defamatio, meaning slander or insult. In the Bible, it was used more specifically in the sense of speaking evil of God. Summing up a long, somewhat controversial tradition, the Spanish Jesuit legal philosopher Francisco Suárez defined blasphemy as “any word of malediction, reproach, or contumely pronounced against God”.107 This religious understanding of blasphemy as a direct insult or defamation of God is difficult to understand, or at least difficult to see as an indictable offence. Did the divine person ever complain about being insulted or defamed, or appear in court to file a lawsuit? In every case of blasphemy, it is faithful believers, religious police agents or maybe people pursuing some other interest who have brought a charge against somebody who has, in their view, insulted or defamed the object of their worship in a way they feel or say cannot be tolerated.108 Laws to protect certain types of religious belief and religious institutions against defamation or blasphemy exist in many countries.109 These laws often focus on the distribution, public display, or making accessible of copies deemed blasphemous or otherwise defamatory against protected religious denominations or congregations. But their application is not restricted to censoring the circulation of copies of blasphemous texts or images. In many cases, in particular in the Christian and in the Muslim world, people have been accused of blasphemy, indicted and even convicted for blasphemy without actually having said, written, copied or distributed anything that might be regarded as impious. In many cases, the mere accusation or suspicion that these people were unbelievers seemed sufficient.110 107  Francisco Suárez, Operis de religione, vol. I, Leiden 1639, Tract. iii, Lib. I, cap. iv, n. 1: “Est verbum maledictionis convitis, seu contumelis in Deum” (p. 291). 108 See Jacques de Saint-Victor, Blasphémie: Brève histoire d’un ‘crime imaginaire’, Paris 2016. 109 See Brian J. Grim, Laws Penalizing Blasphemy, Apostasy and Defamation of Religion are Widespread, Pew Forum, 21 November 2012, www.pewforum.org/2012/11/21/laws-pe nalizing-blasphemy-apostasy-and-defamation-of-religion-are-widespread/ (last access: 7 June 2018). In Germany, the relevant law is § 166 StGB (defamation of religions, religious and ideological associations). In England and Wales, the common law offence of “blasphemous libel” was abolished by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. 110 See Michael A. Sherlock, Blasphemy in the Muslim World (2017), https://michaelsher lockauthor.wordpress.com/2017/05/21/blasphemy-in-the-muslim-world-a-research-essay/ (last access: 10 June 2018); Burman, The Inquisition (supra, n. 47).

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According to the Penal Code of the Islamic Republic of Iran, anyone who swears at or commits ‫ فْذ َق‬qazf [false accusation of adultery] against the Great Prophet (peace be upon him) or any of the Great Prophets, shall be considered as ‫ يبنلا بس‬Sābb ul-nabi [a person who swears at the Prophet], and shall be sentenced to the death penalty.111 Anyone who insults the sacred values of Islam or any of the Great Prophets or [twelve] Shi’ite Imams or the Holy Fatima, if considered as Sābb ul-nabi, shall be executed; otherwise, they shall be sentenced to one to five years’ imprisonment.112

This law is broadly applied to suppress political dissent and calls for reform within the established tradition of Shi’a Islam and to persecute religious minorities. Recent blasphemy sentences included five years imprisonment for a singer who ridiculed the Qur’an in a song (2009), three years for a Shi’a history professor and Iran-Iraq war veteran who called for political reforms (2004), and a death sentence – later commuted to 11 years of imprisonment – for a senior cleric who advocated a greater separation between religion and the state (2009).113 In 2015, a 19-year-old army conscript was arrested and after being tricked into signing a written confession, sentenced to death for allegedly having insulted the Prophet in an encrypted messenger post.114 In 2017, a mobile phone repairman was arrested for allegedly having insulted the Prophet Mohammad and Shi’a Muslim imams on a Telegram app channel. The channel which he had managed had approximately 3000 users, and anyone could post their views. “The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps held him responsible for everything others had written and when he told the investigator that he did not write those things, he was told that his channel and 111  Sect. 262, New Islamic Penal Code (2013), English translation of Books I & II provided by Iran Human Rights Documentation Center (2014), www.iranhrdc.org/english/ human-rights-documents/iranian-codes/1000000455-english-translation-of-books-1-and-2of-the-new-islamic-penal-code.html#45 (last access: 10 June 2018). See also International Coalition Against Blasphemy Laws, Iran (2015) https://end-blasphemy-laws.org/countries/ middle-east-and-north-africa/iran/ (last access: 10 June 2018). 112  Sect. 513, Islamic Penal Code of the Islamic Republic of Iran, approved on 30 July 1991, amended on 11 May 1996, Book 5; translation provided by Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, http://iranhrdc.org/english/human-rights-documents/iranian-codes/1000000351-islam ic-penal-code-of-the-islamic-republic-of-iran-book-five.html#2 (last access: 10 June 2018). See also Kamran Hashemi, Religious Legal Traditions, International Human Rights Law and Muslim States, Leiden / Boston 2008, pp. 31 et seq. and 85. 113  Georgetown University, Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs, National Laws on Blasphemy: Iran (n.d.), https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/essays/nation al-laws-on-blasphemy-iran (last access: 10 June 2018). 114  Center for Human Rights in Iran, Twenty-Year Old On Death Row After ‘Confessing’ on Promise of Freedom, September 14, 2016 www.iranhumanrights.org/2016/09/sinadehghan-death-sentence-for-sabb-al-nabi/ (last access: 11 June 2018); Rachel Roberts, Iranian Man Sentenced to Death for ‘Insulting Islam’ Through Messaging App, The Independent, 30 March 2017, www.independent.co.uk/news/world/iranian-man-sina-dehgham-death-sen tence-insult-islam-muslim-line-messaging-app-arak-prison-amnesty-a7658466.html (last access: 11 June 2018).

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related groups had been shut down and therefore the IRGC could accuse him of anything they want.”115 Similar laws and enforcement practices, based on Sharia traditions, exist in a number of Muslim countries.116 Current blasphemy laws in Europe are not used to similarly terrorise the population. According to the Irish Defamation Act 2009, a person publishes or utters blasphemous matter if – (a) he or she publishes or utters matter that is grossly abusive or insulting in relation to matters held sacred by any religion, thereby causing outrage among a substantial number of the adherents of that religion, and (b) he or she intends, by the publication or utterance of the matter concerned, to cause such outrage.117

According to this law,118 the crucial point is not the insult or abuse against God but a social phenomenon – the outrage among a substantial number of adherents of a particular religion, and the intention to cause such outrage by uttering or publishing certain types of expression deemed blasphemous. It is more of a law againt hate speech than a law concerning blasphemy in the traditional sense. An example of the kind of harm that such laws seek to prevent is the outrage that flared up in large parts of the Muslim world in late January and February 2006119 in reaction to the cartoons published by the Danish newspaper Jyllands Posten in September 2005 under the title “The Face of Muhammad”.120 Denmark at that time had a law that prohibited disturbing the public order by publicly ridiculing or insulting the dogmas of worship of any lawfully existing religious communi115  Center for Human Rights in Iran, Telegram Channel Admin Could Get Death Penalty for ‘Insulting the Prophet’, June 7, 2018 www.iranhumanrights.org/2018/06/telegram-channeladmin-could-get-death-penalty-for-insulting-the-prophet/ (last access: 20 July 2018). 116 Cf. Sherlock, Blasphemy in the Muslim World (supra, n. 110). 117  Irish Defamation Act 2009, sect. 36 (2). 118  The German § 166 StGB is quite similar in this respect, although it does not refer to the concept of ‘blasphemy’ at all and focuses exclusively on the insult against the religion or ideology of others, or on defamation of a church or other religious or ideological associations. The crucial point is whether the insult or defamation of other people’s religious beliefs, religious behaviour or congregations is “capable of disturbing the public peace”. 119  Patricia Cohen. Danish Cartoon Controversy, The New York Times, 15 February 2006, www.nytimes.com/topic/subject/danish-cartoon-controversy; Isolin Jorgensen, Timeline: How the Cartoon Crisis Unfolded, Financial Times, 21 March 2006; www.ft.com/content/d30b0c2296ee-11da-82b7-0000779e2340 (last access: 18 June 2018). 120  Jytte Klausen, The Cartoons that Shook the World, New Haven, CT 2009. For a digital image of the original newspaper publication under the Danish title ‘Muhammeds ­ansigt’, see https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/7/75/Jyllands-Posten-pg3-article-in-Sept-302005-edition-of-KulturWeekend-entitled-Muhammeds-ansigt.png; for better resolution digital reproductions of the cartoons, see https://web.archive.org/web/20080209153538/http://blog. newspaperindex.com/2005/12/10/un-to-investigate-jyllands-posten-racism/ (both last accessed: 10 June 2018).

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ty.121 However, the Jyllands Posten editors could be quite confident that Danish courts would dismiss any charges that might be brought against them by Muslim organisations who felt offended, and that the conservative-liberal government would support their deliberately offensive insistence on the freedom of speech. The Muslim community was indeed outraged. Danish law did little to curb it. The conflict spread when newspapers around the world re-printed the offending cartoons. Satellite TV, mobile phones, blogs and online chat rooms meant that Danish print journalism was globally accessible.122 Infuriated mobs and, in some cases, organised terrorist groups attacked Danish and other European states’ embassies, media outlets and Christian churches in various countries with Muslim majorities; more than 200 people lost their lives in violent protests. Whereas the Danish prosecutors dismissed charges against the cartoonists and the publishers of Jyllands Posten, numerous people in other countries were sanctioned for re-publishing the cartoons. Newspapers were closed, editors and journalists were fired or arrested – or both.123 The contrast is telling in more than one way: it reflects the significant differences between the applicable laws of the respective countries and also shows that the ‘Danish cartoon crisis’ was indeed not a single event but, rather, an accumulation of interrelated events – interrelated by numerous acts of copying. 6. Hate Speech ‘Hate speech’ is an umbrella term. It is used to address – and rule out – various forms of expression, speech acts and acts of copying that express hatred or threats against a particular person or a group singled out for their race, religion, ethnicity, sex or sexual orientation. These speech acts or acts of copying are meant to insult, harass or intimidate the addressees and are believed to be capable of stirring up further hatred, violence or discrimination.124 Expressions of hatred can inflict “feelings of humiliation, isolation, and self-hatred”,125 in particular if they are tar-

121  Danish Straffeloven kap. 15, § 140 (archived October 2016), https://web.archive.org/ web/20161006195618/http://www.themis.dk/synopsis/docs/Lovsamling/Straffeloven_kap_15. html (last access: 11 June 2018). The law was repealed in 2017. 122  Klausen, The Cartoons that Shook the World (supra, n. 98), p. 4; see also pp. 49 – 53. A (probably not complete) overview of reprints of some or all of the cartoons in newspapers around the world can be found at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_newspapers_that_re printed_Jyllands-Posten%27s_Muhammad_cartoons (last access: 14 June 2014). 123  Details and sources at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_newspapers_that_reprint ed_Jyllands-Posten%27s_Muhammad_cartoons (last access: 14 June 2014). 124  For a discussion of the notorious difficulties in defining hate speech, see Susan Be­ nesch, Defining and Diminishing Hate Speech, in: Minority Rights Group International, State of the World’s Minorities and Indigenous Peoples 2014, pp. 19 – 25, http://minorityrights.org/ wp-content/uploads/old-site-downloads/mrg-state-of-the-worlds-minorities-2014-chapter02. pdf (last access: 29 June 2018).

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geted at members of a marginalized and vulnerable group who are, to a certain degree, already traumatized by past experiences of discrimination and violence. “Racist hate messages, threats, slurs, epithets and disparagement all hit the gut of those in the target group”, Mari Matsuda has argued.126 It is important to consider the experience of victims of hate speech, and the reasons why they perceive certain situations, signs or speech acts the way they do – which may be remarkably different from the way similar situations and the same signs or speech acts would be perceived by members of a dominant group.127 The picture would be incomplete and the effect of seemingly minor acts like calling names or displaying scornful caricatures would remain incomprehensible without the broader social context.128 Hate speech seeks “to compromise the dignity of those at whom it is targeted, both in their own eyes and in the eyes of other members of society”.129 Such speech acts or copies of hate signs typically send multiple messages: members of a targeted group are deliberately insulted; they are told or shown that they are not wanted and that they should expect to be attacked. Those who are not directly addressed are informed about the presence of people who are willing and prepared to take action against the targeted group. They are invited to join the fight or warned to reckon with the power of those who dare to speak up, and not to interfere.130 Spreading and public display of copies make expressions of hate tangible, permanent, pervasive, and therefore more damaging. On the internet in particular, hateful speakers encourage and incite one another and cause extra pain to their targets, who are now often privy to hate speech that they would not have seen or heard if it had been shared among haters offline, as was common in the past.131 Hate speech “creates something like an environmental threat to social peace”, as Jeremy Waldron has put it: “a sort of slow-acting poison, accumulating here and 125  Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name Calling, Harvard Civil Rights – Civil Liberties Law Review 17 (1982), pp. 133 – 183: p. 137. 126  Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victims Story, Michigan Law Review 87 (1989), pp. 2320 – 2381: p. 2332. 127  Cf. ibid., pp. 2326 – 2340. See also Mari J. Matsuda et al. (eds.), Words that Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment, Boulder, CO 1993; Ishani Maitra / Mary K. McGowan (eds.), Speech and Harm: Controversies over Free Speech, Oxford 2012; Katherine Gelber / Luke J. McNamara, Evidencing the Harms of Hate Speech, Social Identities 22 (2016), pp. 324 – 341. 128 See Alexander Tsesis, Destructive Messages. How Hate Speech Paves the Way for Harmful Social Movements, New York 2002; Michael Herz / Peter Molnar (eds.), The Content and Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses, Cambridge 2012. 129  Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech (supra, n. 41), p. 4. 130  Cf. ibid., pp. 1 – 4. 131  Abraham H. Foxman / Christopher Wolf, Viral Hate: Containing its Spread on the Internet, London 2013, p. 31.

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there, word by word, so that eventually it becomes harder and less natural for even the good-hearted members of the society to play their part in maintaining the public good” of social peace, inclusion, security and equal rights for everybody.132 It does, therefore, not suffice to treat hate speech as a cause for civil action, like insult or defamation, nor is it merely “group libel”.133 Insofar as hate speech is an assault on a public good, it requires a public response. Threats to public peace are prohibited by criminal law almost everywhere.134 But what, exactly, is a threat to public peace? Does it require incitement to “imminent lawless action”?135 Or would this be too late for an intervention to effectively secure public peace? Advocacy of or public incitement to violence or hatred on the basis of certain characteristics, including race, colour, religion, descent and national or ethnic ori­ gin,136 are banned by criminal law in most countries and subject to international conventions.137 There are, however, significant differences between the range and scope of applicable laws and the respective understanding of ‘hate speech’.138 The Council of Europe has established a definition of ‘hate speech’ as “covering all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism or other forms of hatred based on intolerance, including: intolerance expressed by aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility against minorities, migrants and people of immigrant origin”. In 1997,   Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech (supra, n. 41), p. 4.   Some hate speech is definitely group libel; a notorious example is anti-Semitic blood libel, see Alan Dundes (ed.), The Blood Libel Legend: A Casebook in Anti-Semitic Folklore, Madison, WI 1991. On group libel, see also Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech, pp. 34 – 64. 134  See, for example, §§ 126, 130, 140, 166 StGB. Laws concerning “crimes against the public peace” exist in most states. In the U.S.A., they are enacted not in federal law but at state level, e.g., in Nevada (NRS. 203) and in Ohio (ORC 2917), and they typically include provisions against “publishing matter inciting breach of peace or other crime” (e.g. NRS. 203.040). 135  In Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969), overturning the conviction of a Ku Klux Klan member for violating a law against advocacy of violence, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that “freedoms of speech and press do not permit a State to forbid advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action” (395 U.S. 444). 136  According to Art. 4 (a) of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1966), 660 U.N.T.S. 195, “State parties […] shall declare as an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist activities”. 137  Art. 20 (2) ICCPR (supra, n. 58). For the EU: Council Framework Decision 2008/913/ JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law. 138 Cf. Kenan Malik, in: Herz / Molnar (eds.), The Content and Context of Hate Speech (supra, n. 128), p. 81; Benesch, Defining and Diminishing Hate Speech (supra, n. 124), p. 21 et seq. 132 133

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it has recommended that all “member states should establish or maintain a sound legal framework consisting of civil, criminal and administrative law provisions on hate speech which enable administrative and judicial authorities to reconcile in each case respect for freedom of expression with respect for human dignity and the protection of the reputation or the rights of others”.139 Critics of hate speech regulations have argued that hate speech laws are “at best ineffective and at worst counterproductive”.140 Hate speech laws are not very effective because they are notoriously difficult to enforce. Even worse, in several cases they have been used by governments to discriminate on the basis of race, ethnicity, or religion, rather than to prevent such discrimination.141 As David Cole, the Legal Director of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), has argued, “it is virtually impossible to articulate a standard for suppression of speech that would not afford government officials dangerously broad discretion and invite discrimination against particular viewpoints.”142 This is a structural problem: “Ultimately, what constitutes ‘hate speech’ will be decided by majorities, which means that it is minority views that are vulnerable to suppression.”143 At the same time, “nothing strengthens hate groups more than censoring them, as it turns them into free speech martyrs, feeds their sense of grievance, and forces them to seek out more destructive means of activism”.144 7. Privacy Privacy is essential for individual autonomy and meaningful social relationships145 – to a certain degree. Personal privacy must be weighed against the privacy of everybody else and other rights and vital interests like personal liberty, the freedom of information, the freedom of expression, the freedom of movement, the freedom to acquire and possess property (and hence the requirements of viable 139  Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, Recommendation No. R [97] 20, Appendix; https://rm.coe.int/1680505d5b (last access: 25 June 2018). 140  Nadine Strossen, Hate: Why We Should Resist It With Free Speech, Not Censorship, Oxford 2018, p. 133. 141  Several examples are mentioned by Glenn Greenwald, In Europe, Hate Speech Laws are Often Used to Suppress and Punish Left-Wing Viewpoints, in: The Intercept, 29 August 2017, https://theintercept.com/2017/08/29/in-europe-hate-speech-laws-are-often-used-to-sup press-and-punish-left-wing-viewpoints/ (last access: 1 July 2018). 142  David Cole, Why We Must Still Defend Free Speech, in: New York Review of Books, 28 September 2017, www.nybooks.com/articles/2017/09/28/why-we-must-still-defend-freespeech/ (last access: 1 July 2018). 143  Greenwald, In Europe, Hate Speech Laws are Often Used to Suppress and Punish LeftWing Viewpoints (supra, n. 141). 144 Ibid. 145 See Beate Roessler, The Value of Privacy, Cambridge 2005; Adam D. Moore, Privacy Rights. Moral and Legal Foundations, University Park, PA 2010.

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business operations), security, justice, health care, political liberty, and the common good of public space.146 Appearing and acting in common or public spaces is as essential to human flourishing147 as privacy, and it entails limitations of both individual discretion and the privacy of those taking part in social interactions. However, privacy is not just subject to certain inevitable trade-offs along these lines. It is often violated by individuals, organisations, authorities, and increasingly by invasive technologies. The normative concept of privacy was developed in order to address and fight violations of privacy. There is no reason to assume that this might cease to be relevant in the near future. Not all violations of privacy involve acts of copying. Trespassing, peering through windows into private homes, overhearing private conversations, searching a customer’s shopping bag, testing for drugs or intrusions into private spaces by unsolicited phone calls for telemarketing purposes, to name but a few examples,148 do not. But acts of copying often contribute decisively to violations of privacy. C ­ opies and acts of copying are in many cases essential to disclosing something to third parties or a wider public that was meant to be kept private by the person or persons primarily concerned.149 Also relevant in this respect, albeit controversial,150 is the “right to be forgotten” by internet search engines and publicly available records,151 as part of a privacy right to “informational self-determination”.152 146 See Amitai Etzioni, The Limits of Privacy, New York 1999; Annabelle Lever, On Privacy, Abingdon 2012; Beate Roessler / Dorota Mokrosinska (eds.), Social Dimensions of Privacy: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Cambridge 2015. 147 See Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, Chicago 1958; Marcel Henaff / Tracy B. Strong (eds.), Public Space and Democracy, Minneapolis, MN 2001; Raymond Geuss, Public Goods, Private Goods, Princeton, NJ 2001. 148  Many examples from earlier 20th century American case law are discussed in: William L. Prosser, Privacy, California Law Review 48 (1960), pp. 383 – 423; for an up-to-date discussion, see also Judith DeCew, Privacy, in: Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (supra, n. 77) (first published: 14 May 2002; substantive revision: 18 January 2018), https:// plato.stanford.edu/entries/privacy/ (last access: 7 July 2018). 149  For discussions about the relevance of a certain degree of control over information about certain aspects of one’s personal life and relationships for securing privacy, see DeCew, Privacy (supra, n. 148); Judith Wagner DeCew, In Pursuit of Privacy: Law, Ethics, and the Rise of Technology, Ithaca, NY 1997, pp. 63 – 79; Prosser, Privacy (supra, n. 148); William A. Parent, Privacy, Morality and the Law, Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (1983) pp. 269 – 288; Ferdinand D. Schoeman, Privacy and Intimate Information, in: id. (ed.), Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy, Cambridge 1984, pp. 403 – 418. 150  Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, Stanford Law Review 52 (2000), pp.  1049 – 1124. 151  Recitals 65, 66, and Art. 17, Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ L 119, 04. 05. 2016; cor. OJ L 127, 23. 5. 2018; see also CJEU C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, Mario Costeja González (13 May 2014); Rolf H. Weber, The Right to Be Forgotten. More than a Pandora’s Box?, ­JIPITEC 2 (2011), pp. 120 – 130; Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, Delete: The Virtue of Forgetting in the Digital Age, Princeton, NJ 2009.

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Making audio recordings of other persons’ privately spoken words without explicit authorisation, as well as making such a recording accessible to a third party certainly violate that person’s privacy and can be prosecuted as a criminal offence.153 But violations of privacy may be legitimate under certain conditions, since privacy can be used to conceal activities that are illegal and might harm other people. If there is good reason to think that somebody has committed a serious crime, the technical means for surveying the suspect’s home may be used pursuant to judicial order for prosecuting the offence, provided that alternative methods of investigation would be disproportionately difficult or unproductive.154 If a bank clerk copies files with confidential information about customers’ tax evasion and sells them to the tax authorities, such an act of copying is clearly a breach of workplace confidentiality, a violation of banking secrecy and an invasion of the privacy of the exposed tax evaders, but the information thus obtained may be helpful for restoring justice and the rule of law.155 A German writer was found liable for violating the privacy and other personality rights156 of his ex-girlfriend. She complained that a novel published by the writer after their separation had intruded into her private affairs because the two central female characters in that novel resembled her and her mother, disclosed private information about them and publicized them in a false light. This allegedly impaired the free development of her personality.157 The fact that the literary value of the work was not disputed did not help the author.158 The sale and distribution of copies of the novel was prohibited shortly after its publication159 and the author and the 152  According to the German Federal Constitutional Court, “the protection of the individual against unlimited collection, storage, use and disclosure of his / her personal data is encompassed by the general personal rights of the German constitution. This basic right warrants in this respect the capacity of the individual to determine in principle the disclosure and use of his / her personal data. Limitations to this informational self-determination are allowed only in case of overriding public interest.” (BVerfGE 65, 1 – Volkszählung; 15 December 1983; English translation: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Informational_self-determination [last access: 5 July 2017]). 153  § 201 StGB. 154  Art. 13 (3) of the German Basic Law (GG). 155  The German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) decided on 9 November 2010 (2 BvR 2101/09) that violations of foreign banking secrecy do not preclude the use of information acquired from such a source for the prosecution of tax evaders in Germany. 156  For an overview of the German law of personality rights which covers central topics of the law of privacy, too, see Horst-Peter Götting / Christian Schertz / Walter Seitz (eds.), Handbuch des Persönlichkeitsrechts, 2nd ed., Munich 2018. 157  Federal Court of Justice (BGH) VI ZR 122/04, 21 June 2005; Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) 1 BvR 1783/05, 13 June 2007. 158 Cf. Remigius Bunia, Fingierte Kunst. Der Fall Esra und die Schranken der Kunstfreiheit, Internationales Archiv für Sozialgeschichte der Literatur 32 (2007), pp. 161 – 182; Chris­ tian Reichel, Grenzen der Kunstfreiheit durch den Persönlichkeitsschutz. Zur ‘Esra’-Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, Kunst und Recht 10:5 (2008), pp. 125 – 128. 159  Regional Court (LG) Munich I, decision of 15 October 2003 – 9 O 11360/03.

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publisher were sentenced to pay substantial damages to the plaintiff.160 The latter order was later repealed, but the novel remains prohibited.161 In several countries, including Germany, legal provisions concerning the ‘freedom of panorama’ guarantee the right to take photographs in and of public spaces. This includes the visible surface of copyrighted buildings or works of art located in public space and – with some restrictions – people encountered in public space. Such photographs may be used for personal or commercial purposes.162 Street photographers, photojournalists, social documentary photographers, photo amateurs, and countless smartphone users frequently capture people and property visible within or from public places. They often publish some of their photographs for commercial or non-commercial purposes in print- and online media. If these photos are shown to the public in exhibitions or publications, the photographers have to be aware of potential conflicts with the privacy demands of persons who can be recognised on them.163 The freedom of artistic expression164 does not exempt photographers or other artists from liabilities under privacy law165 and other norms of criminal law or intellectual property law that restrict their choice of legally permissible contents of their works. The systematic canvassing of the public space in considerable parts of the world for Google’s “Street View” service, an invaluable instrument for discovering the inhabited world, has massively infringed privacy and other personality rights and data protection laws.166 Since 2008, Google has installed an algorithm that automatically detects and blurs the faces of persons who were captured by the camera,   LG Munich I, decision of 13 February 2008 – 9 O 7835/06.   Higher Regional Court (OLG) Munich 18 U 2280/08, 8 July 2008; BGH VI ZR 219/08, 24 November 2009. 162 See Bryce Clayton Newell, Freedom of Panorama: A Comparative Look at International Restrictions on Public Photography, Creighton Law Review 44 (2011), pp. 405 – 428. 163  According to § 22 of the German Art and Photography Copyright Act of 1907 (KUG), the likeness of a person may not be disseminated or displayed to the public without consent of the depicted person. A violation of this right is a civil cause of action and a misdemeanour (§ 33 KUG). – In contrast, the right to privacy of certain photographs and films granted in sect. 85 of the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA) can be claimed only in controversies about photographs or films that were commissioned by the person depicted in them, leaving most persons depicted in photographs without a right not to have copies of the work issued to the public. – For an account of the relevant American laws, see Samantha Barbas, Laws of Image: Privacy and Publicity in America, Stanford, CA 2015. 164  Cf. supra, n. 7. 165  BVerfG, decision of 8 February 2018, 1 BvR 2112/15; see also Andrea Diener, Eben noch auf der Straße, jetzt in der Kunstgalerie, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 7 April 2018, www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/debatten/verfassungsgericht-neues-gesetz-fuer-strassenfo tografen-15529676.html (last access: 8 July 2018). 166  For a systematic discussion of legal aspects of “Google Street View” under German law, see Thomas Dreier / Indra Spiecker gen. Döhmann, Die systematische Aufnahme des Straßenbildes. Zur rechtlichen Zulässigkeit von Online-Diensten wie „Google Street View“, Baden-Baden 2010. 160 161

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and also blurs auto license plates. Hundreds of thousands of home owners have requested that their property be blurred in the image database because they were concerned that the tool might encourage and help burglars. Privacy concerns about Google’s camera cars intensified when it became known that the specially equipped cars were also collecting unencrypted Internet data from wireless networks along the way – snippets of e-mails, photographs, passwords, postings on web sites, and other private information.167 Video surveillance of public spaces and private property spaces, such as banks, stores, and railway stations, is increasingly common in many countries. It has generated significant debate about balancing its use with the right of individuals to privacy.168 Concerns intensify with advances of facial recognition technology169 and other features170: “Do we want the authorities installing high-resolution cameras that can read a pamphlet from a mile away? Cameras equipped to detect wavelengths outside the visible spectrum, allowing night vision or see-through vision? Cameras equipped with facial recognition …? Cameras augmented with other forms of artificial intelligence …?”171 One of the problems of facial recognition technology and other automated pattern recognition features is misidentifications. To a certain degree, they seem to be inevitable.172 Facial recognition is no longer an exclusive asset of police-controlled CCTV systems but available to everybody. It is also increasingly common for smartphones.173 167  Kevin J. O’Brien / David Streitfeld, Swiss Court Orders Modifications to Google Street View, The New York Times, 8 June 2012, https://nyti.ms/2lxunR0 (last access: 9 July 2018). 168 The ACLU, for example, has criticised CCTV for being susceptible to abuse and difficult to control, as well as for its chilling effect on public life, see www.aclu.org/other/ whats-wrong-public-video-surveillance (last access: 9 July 2018). 169  BBC, Chinese man caught by facial recognition at pop concert, 13 April 2018, www. bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-43751276 (last access: 9 July 2018). 170  James Vlahos, Surveillance Society: New High-Tech Cameras Are Watching You, Popular Mechanics, 1 October 2009, www.popularmechanics.com/military/a2398/4236865/ (last access: 9 July 2018). 171  ACLU, What’s Wrong with Public Video Surveillance? (supra, n. 168). 172  David White / James D. Dunn / Alexandra C. Schmid / Richard I. Kemp, Error Rates in Users of Automatic Face Recognition Software. PLoS ONE 10:10 (2015): e0139827, https:// doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0139827; Alexander J. Martin, Police Facial Recognition ­Trial Led to ‘Erroneous Arrest’, Sky News, 7 September 2017, https://news.sky.com/story/po lice-facial-recognition-trial-led-to-erroneous-arrest-11013418 (both last accessed: 9 July 2018); Brad Smith, Facial Recognition Technology: The Need for Public Regulation and Corporate Responsibility, Microsoft On the Issues, 13 July 2018, https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-theissues/2018/07/13/facial-recognition-technology-the-need-for-public-regulation-and-corpo rate-responsibility/ (last access: 16 July 2018). 173 See Michelle Starr, Facial Recognition App Matches Strangers to Online Profiles, CNet, 7 January 2014, www.cnet.com/news/facial-recognition-app-matches-strangers-to-on line-profiles/; Clare Garvie, Facial Recognition Is Here. The iPhone X is Just the Beginning, The Guardian, 13 September 2017, www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/sep/13/fa cial-recognition-iphone-x-privacy; Rayna Hollander, Here’s When Facial Recognition Will

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People walking past you on the street or playing with their smartphone during an underground train ride now can easily find your social network profile by sneaking a photograph of you. Shops, advertisers and the police can pick your face out of crowds and track you down via social networks.174 If you want to remain anonymous in public space or in your encounters with strangers, you might be well-advised to make sure that no photograph of your face is ever released on the internet175 and to mask your face in public spaces. Recently, the president of Microsoft has warned: Governments may monitor the exercise of political and other public activities in ways that conflict with longstanding expectations in democratic societies, chilling citizens’ willingness to turn out for political events and undermining our core freedoms of assembly and expression. Similarly, companies may use facial recognition to make decisions without human intervention that affect our eligibility for credit, jobs or purchases. All these scenarios raise important questions of privacy, free speech, freedom of association and even life and liberty.176

Therefore, the developer of facial recognition technology urged for a government initiative to regulate its legally admissible use. Creating unauthorised pictures of another person in a private space and transmitting or making available such pictures to third parties amounts to felony, insofar as the “intimate privacy” of the depicted person is violated.177 Making a photographic image of another person that might harm her reputation available to third parties without authorisation, is also a felony.178 The latter offence is becoming more relevant with the emergence of new kinds of sometimes intrusive photographic activities facilitated by the widespread availability of smartphones and computer networks. Several jurisdictions had difficulties dealing with complaints about so-called ‘upskirt’ photos. The Highest court of Massachusetts ruled in 2014 that a law which prohibited secretly photographing or videotaping a person who is “nude or partially nude” was not applicable in the case of a man who had taken ‘upskirt’ photographs on the Boston subway in 2010, because the women who put forward the complaint had not been nude but dressed Be Standard on Smartphones, Business Insider, 12 February 2018, www.businessinsider.de/ facial-recognition-standard-on-smartphones-2018 – 2?r=US&IR=T (all last accessed: 9 July 2018). 174  Shaun Walker, Face Recognition App Taking Russia by Storm May Bring End to ­Public Anonymity, The Guardian, 17 May 2016, www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/may/17/ findface-face-recognition-app-end-public-anonymity-vkontakte (last access: 9 July 2018). 175  Darlene Storm, Face Recognition App FindFace May Make You Want to Take Down All Your Online Photos, Computerworld, 18 May 2016, www.computerworld.com/article/ 3071920/data-privacy/face-recognition-app-findface-may-make-you-want-to-take-down-allyour-online-photos.html (last access: 9 July 2018). 176  Smith, Facial Recognition Technology (supra, n. 172). 177  § 201a (1) StGB. 178  § 201a (2) StGB.

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in skirts.179 The law was subsequently changed to rule out this type of violation of privacy in public spaces.180 Sect. 9 of the Scottish Sexual Offences Act 2009 was amended in 2010 and now states very precisely that any person (“A”) who “­records an image beneath another person`s (“B”) clothing of B’s genitals or buttocks (whether exposed or covered with underwear) or the underwear covering B’s genitals or buttocks, in circumstances where the genitals, buttocks or underwear would not otherwise be visible,” “without B consenting, and without any reason­ able belief that B consents,” for “obtaining sexual gratification” or for “humiliating, distressing or alarming B”, shall be liable for an “offence of voyeurism” and may be sent to prison or fined.181 So-called ‘sexting’ – “the electronic communication of non-professional images or videos portraying one or more persons in a state of nudity or otherwise in a sexual manner“182 – might be an actionable invasion of privacy at least in cases „where images or videos are captured without the knowledge and / or consent of the victim; and / or where images or videos are distributed, or re-distributed, without the knowledge and / or consent of the victim“.183 Besides the person or persons depicted in such images – who may feel violated in their privacy if they learn that their image has been spread in this way – the addressees of unsolicited ‘sexting’ messages may also complain about an intrusion of their privacy. If the addressee is a minor, sending such images might be a crime of sexual abuse.184 179  Haimy Assefa, Massachusetts Court Says ‘Upskirt’ Photos Are Legal, CNN, 6 March 2014, https://edition.cnn.com/2014/03/05/us/massachusetts-upskirt-photography/index.html (last access: 27 June 2018). – Similarly, the Georgia Court of Appeals ruled in 2016 that “the state’s invasion of privacy laws didn’t prohibit taking a photo up a woman’s skirt (or an ‘upskirt photo’) unless she’s ‘behind closed doors,’ like in a bathroom stall or dressing room”. Leigh Cuen, It’s Now Perfectly Legal to Take Upskirt Photos in Georgia, Mic, 22 July 2016, https:// mic.com/articles/149497/it-s-now-perfectly-legal-to-take-upskirt-photos-in-georgia#.FkY9O YhMb (last access: 27 June 2018). 180  Haimy Assefa / Lawrence Crook / Ray Sanchez, Massachusetts Legislature Passes ‘Upskirting’ Ban, CNN, 7 March 2014 https://edition.cnn.com/2014/03/06/us/massachusetts-up skirt-ban/index.html (last access: 24 June 2018). 181  Sect. 48, schedule 2, Scottish Sexual Offences Act 2009. – Recent attempts to establish a similar law also for England and Wales were not successful in parliament in June 2018; see Adam Bienkov, These Two Conservative MPs Have Blocked a Law to Ban Upskirting in the UK, Business Insider, 15 June 2018, www.businessinsider.de/two-conservative-mps-christo pher-chope-philip-davies-block-law-to-ban-upskirting-in-the-uk-2018 – 6?r=US&IR=T (last access: 26 June 2018). 182  Dan Svantesson, ‘Sexting’ and The Law: How Australia Regulates Electronic Communication of Non-Professional Sexual Content, Bond Law Review 22:2 (2010), pp. 41 – 57: p. 41. 183  Ibid., p. 51. 184 See Lindsey Bever, Anthony Weiner, Disgraced Former Congressman, Pleads Guilty in ‘Sexting’ Case Involving Minor, Washington Post, 19 May 2017, www.washingtonpost.com/ news/post-nation/wp/2017/05/19/anthony-weiner-disgraced-former-congressman-expectedto-plead-guilty-today-in-sexting-case-involving-minor/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.29bc 936f0e0e (last access: 7 July 2018).

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Even if a picture was created with the consent of the depicted person, unautho­ rised transmitting or otherwise unlawfully making available copies of such a picture to third parties can violate the “intimate privacy” of the depicted person and is, therefore, not only a civil cause of action, but also a felony – at least in Germany185 and several other countries. Many other states still seem to have no laws against “image-based sexual abuse”.186 ‘Revenge porn’ is an interesting example for discussing the ethics of copying. In most of these cases, what the images in question depict presumably were consensual activities, and taking the photos may have been consensual, too – but subsequently posting these images on internet platforms for explicit content is obviously a violation of privacy and is meant to harm someone. The harm is done by an act of copying and making accessible these images. According to a lawyer specialised in victims of this kind of abuse, “cases involving children are the worst. When a video or picture of an adolescent is circulating around the middle school and she becomes the sexual entertainment of her peers, in every case we’ve had to be on suicide watch. […] They stew in isolation because they’re ashamed to tell their parents. They are in a life stage of being so self-conscious and dependent on peer acceptance and it is just crushing.”187 Another increasingly common form of image-based abuse is that images of (typi­ cally, but not necessarily) celebrities’ faces are copied (for example) from movies, Instagram or other sources and then ‘photoshopped’ or fed into a deep learning artificial intelligence algorithm (‘deep fake’188) that perfectly fits these images into a completely different image of, for example, sexually explicit content. The effect is that the celebrity can be ‘seen’ in scenes that never happened. This does not directly seem to violate the privacy of the person whose likeness has been copied in order to manipulate the other material – at least not do the degree proscribed in existing privacy laws. But it obviously infringes on that person’s right to control the use of   § 201a (3) StGB.  See Clare McGlynn / Erika Rackley / Ruth Houghton, Beyond ‘Revenge Porn’: The Continuum of Image-Based Sexual Abuse, Feminist Legal Studies 25:1 (2017), pp. 25 – 46; Clare McGlynn / Erika Rackley, Image-Based Sexual Abuse, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 37 (2017), pp.  534 – 561; Nicola Henry / Anastasia Powell / Asher Flynn, Not Just ‘Revenge Pornography’: Australians’ Experiences of Image-Based Abuse, Melbourne 2017, www.rmit. edu.au/content/dam/rmit/documents/college-of-design-and-social-context/schools/global-ur ban-and-social-studies/revenge_porn_report_2017.pdf (last access: 25 June 2018). 187  Rohan Smith, Lawyer Carrie Goldberg Used Ex-Boyfriend’s Revenge Porn Threat to Take Down Those Just Like Him, The Courier Mail, 8 December 2016, www.couriermail. com.au/technology/lawyer-carrie-goldberg-used-exboyfriends-revenge-porn-threat-to-takedown-those-just-like-him/news-story/ab9f107750806695470fa10f321429f0 (last access: 10 July 2018). 188  About the technology, see www.deepfakes.club/ (last access: 10 July 2018); BBC Click: Deepfakes and the Technology Behind It, 26 February 2018, www.youtube.com/watch?v=8LhIe2B8Lg; Izzy Nobre, What Are DEEP FAKES, and Should You Worry?, 1 February 2018, www.youtube.com/watch?v=RL-wyUEqXYM (both last accessed: 10 July 2018). 185 186

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copies of their likeness,189 and raises serious defamation issues if copies of such forged images are made accessible online.190 Of course, this face-swapping technology can also be used (and will be used) for purposes other than image-based sexual abuse – for example by making public representatives appear to have said or done something they haven’t actually said or done. The aim is then to create outrage and it might be difficult to prove that such a recording is not genuine.191 At the same time, now this technology is available, every photo or video document can be suspected of being forged, and it might be difficult to prove otherwise.192 Hany Farid, an expert in digital forensics, stressed that this was perhaps the greatest near-term danger: “Think about Donald Trump. If that audio recording of him saying he grabbed a woman was released today, he would have plausible deniability. He could say ‘someone could have synthesized this’ and what’s more, he would have a fair point.”193 8. Copyright, etc. Copyright (as a subjective right) is the right to copy a particular work of authorship – for example, a book, song, play, dance, image, movie, CD or MP3 file, building or computer program –, to perform a work in public, to display a work or to make it otherwise accessible, or to prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted work.194 The crucial decision of copyright law (as a legal regime), however, is to frame the right to copy as an exclusive right of authors (or other copyright holders who have inherited or acquired this exclusive right from the authors or from other legitimate rights holders): the law assigns to copyright holders the right to deny the right to copy certain works of authorship to everybody else,195 unless  Cf. Barbas, Laws of Image (supra, n. 163), ch. 6.  See Samantha Cole, AI-Assisted Fake Porn Is Here and We’re All Fucked, Motherboard, 11 December 2017, motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/gydydm/gal-gadot-fake-aiporn (last access: 10 July 2018). 191 See Michele Drolet, Why We Need to Be Worried About Deepfake Videos, CSO, 25 June 2018, www.csoonline.com/article/3284507/cyber-attacks-espionage/why-we-need-to-beworried-about-deepfake-videos.html; Kevin Roose, Here Come the Fake Videos, Too, The New York Times, 4 March 2018, https://nyti.ms/2FVUA3O (both last accessed: 10 July 2018). 192  Cold Fusion, Deep Fakes – Real Consequence, 28 April 2018, www.youtube.com/ watch?v=dMF2i3A9Lzw (last access: 10 July 2018). 193  Quoted in: James Vincent, Why We Need a Better Definition of ‘Deepfake’, The Verge, 22 May 2018, www.theverge.com/2018/5/22/17380306/deepfake-definition-ai-manipulationfake-news (all last accessed: 10 July 2018). 194  §§ 2 and 15 – 23 of the German Act on Copyright and Related Rights (Urheberrechtsgesetz, UrhG) of 9 September 1965, last amended 1 September 2017; English translation available at: http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_urhg/englisch_urhg.pdf. Cf. Sections 1 – 5B and 16 – 21 of the British CDPA, and 17 U.S. Code, Sections 102 and 106. 195  In comparison to the language of the German UrhG, British law is more explicit in stating that “Copyright in a work is infringed by a person who without the licence of the copyright 189 190

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certain conditions are met. Violation of this exclusive right is a tort,196 and under certain conditions also a criminal offence.197 There are (basically198) two arguments to justify this restriction on copying: on the one hand (“ex ante”), it seems only fair to give due reward to the authors, since the very works, which others now want to use and to copy, would not be there for anybody else to copy without the effort and intellectual endeavours of their respective authors.199 On the other hand (“ex post”), the expectation of a chance to benefit from exclusive copyright may be a strong incentive for potential authors to create as much as they can. It is widely assumed that authors will be able to continue to create works and the creative industries will be able to provide the necessary investments for often costly productions only if such exclusive rights and the prospect of incurring royalties or license fees to cover their needs and expenses are guaranteed.200 Copyright protection and the moral right of authors to prevent any distortion of their work 201 are widely considered essential for protecting the freedom of speech.202 At the same time, they also impose considerable restrictions on the freedom of speech.203 In order to balance the requirements of communicative and owner does, or authorises another to do, any of the acts restricted by the copyright” (sect. 16 [2], CDPA). 196  § 97 UrhG; see also sect. 96 – 103 CDPA. 197  § 106 UrhG; sect. 107 CDPA. 198 For more thorough discussions of justifications for copyright and other intellectual property claims, see Lionel Bently / Brad Sherman, Intellectual Property Law, 4th ed., Oxford 2014, pp.  35 – 40; Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante versus Ex Post Justifications of Intellectual Property, University of Chicago Law Review 71 (2004), pp. 129 – 149; William W. Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in: Stephen R. Munzer (ed.), New Essays in the Legal and Political Theory of Property, Cambridge 2000, pp. 168 – 199; Peter Drahos, A Philosophy of Intellectual Property (1996), Acton (Québec) 2016; Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry Into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent and Encouragement Theory, Stanford Law Review 41 (1989), pp. 1343 – 1469. 199 Cf. Robert P. Merges, Justifying Intellectual Property, Cambridge, MA 2011; Adam D. Moore, Intellectual Property and Information Control: Philosophic Foundations and Contemporary Issues, New Brunswick, NJ 2001; Christian G. Stallberg, Urheberrecht und moralische Rechtfertigung, Berlin 2006. 200 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985), 558; Wil­ liam M. Landes / Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, The Journal of Legal Studies 18 (1989), pp. 325 – 363. 201  Cf. § 14 UrhG; sect. 80 CDPA. 202 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003), 219; Anne Barron, Kant, Copyright and Communicative Freedom, Law and Philosophy 31 (2012), pp.1 – 48. 203 See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright’s Paradox, Oxford 2008; Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, UCLA Law Review 17 (1970), pp. 1180 – 1204; Mark A. Lemley / Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, Duke Law Journal 48 (1998), pp. 147 – 242; E. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, Vanderbilt Law Review 55 (2001),

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expressive freedom for everybody against author’s rights and desirable incentives to encourage the production of new works for the benefit of everybody, it is crucial that exclusive rights are granted merely for “original works of authorship”,204 not for isolated parts of works that are, as such, not original at all. Moreover, it is important that exclusive rights are only granted for a limited period of time,205 so that, after that term has expired, works of authorship can be copied and used by anybody without restrictions.206 Furthermore, copyright laws contain limitations and exceptions such as, in American law, the “idea / expression” dichotomy207 and the “fair use” exception.208 European copyright laws state several more specific exceptions209 such as the right “to reproduce public speeches relating to current affairs in newspapers, periodicals or other printed matter or other data carriers which mainly record current events”,210 or the right “to reproduce, distribute and compp.  891 – 951; Pamela Samuelson, Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Historical Per­ spective, Journal of Intellectual Property Law 10 (2003), pp. 319 – 344; Patricia Aufderheide / Peter Jaszi, Untold Stories: Creative Consequences of the Rights Clearance Culture for Documentary Filmmakers, Washington, DC 2004. 204  17 U.S.C. sect. 102 (a). The U.S. Supreme court has decided in 1991 that “original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity” (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc. 499 U.S. 340 [1991], 345). – For a brief discussion of British and European criteria for originality, see Bently / Sherman, Intellectual Property Law (supra, n. 198), pp. 93 – 117; for a systematic analysis of originality standards in European copyright law, see Eleonora Rosati, Originality in EU Copyright: Full Harmonization Through Case Law, Cheltenham 2013. 205  Cf. §§ 64 – 67, 69, 76, 82 UrhG; sect. 12 – 15 CDPA; 17 U.S.C. sect. 301 – 305; for scholarly arguments concerning the limitation of copyright terms, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Balancing Copyright Protections and Freedom of Speech: Why the Copyright Extension Act is Unconstitutional, Loyola Los Angeles Law Review 36 (2002), pp. 83 – 97; Alan E. Garfield, The Case for First Amendment Limits on Copyright Law, Hofstra Law Review 35 (2007), pp.  1169 – 1209. 206 See James Boyle, The Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons of the Mind, New Haven, CT 2008; Alexander Peukert, Die Gemeinfreiheit. Begriff, Funktion, Dogmatik, Tübingen 2012. 207  17 U.S.C. sect. 102; cf. Harper & Row, Publishers., Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985), 555; see also Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the Idea / Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work’s “Total Concept and Feel”, Emory Law Journal 38 (1989), pp.  393 – 436. 208  17 U.S.C. sect. 107; see Edmund T. Wang, The Line Between Copyright and the First Amendment and Why Its Vagueness May Further Free Speech Interests, Journal of Constitutional Law 13:5 (2011), pp. 1471 – 1498: pp. 1476 – 1481; Patricia Aufderheide / Peter Jaszi, Reclaiming Fair Use: How to Put Balance Back in Copyright (2011), 2nd ed., Chicago 2018; but note the sceptical argument of Lee Ann W. Lockridge, The Myth of Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine as a Protector of Free Speech, Santa Clara High Technology Journal 24 (2007), pp. 31 – 103. For a comparative overview over fair use / fair dealing regulations in 40 countries, see Jonathan Band / Jonathan Gerafi, The Fair Use / Fair Dealing Handbook, 2013, http://info justice.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/band-and-gerafi-2013.pdf (last access: 14 July 2018). 209  Art. 5 of the ‘Infosoc’-Directive 2001/29/EC. 210  § 48 UrhG.

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municate to the public news items of a factual nature and news of the day which has been published via the press or broadcasting”,211 “fair dealing with a work for the purpose of criticism or review, of that or another work or of a performance of a work”,212 quotation,213 caricature, parody or pastiche.214 Further exceptions apply to educational purposes,215 scientific research or private study,216 parliamentary and judicial proceedings,217 and personal copies for private use.218 Notwithstanding these exceptions and limitations, which are readjusted from time to time and might need further adjustment,219 it is widely regarded as nec­ essary that the rights of authors to decide about how they want to see their work published are acknowledged and respected, just as the rights of authors and other legitimate rights holders to a fair share of the profits from their works, and that these rights can, according to applicable law, be enforced against infringement. Copyrights are not the only rights that can be infringed by third parties’ use of protected forms of expression. Trademarks, too, can lead to claims that the production, use or dissemination of articles that allegedly copy a protected sign must be stopped and that possible damages must be compensated. Again, in a given case courts might have to decide whether constitutional rights concerning the freedom of speech or artistic expression might warrant an exception to the exclusive rights of the trademark owner.220 ***   § 49 UrhG.   Sect. 30 (1) CDPA. 213  Sect. 30 (1ZA) CDPA; § 51 UrhG; see also Thomas Dreier, The Ethics of Citations and Partial Copying, present volume, pp. 39 – 54. 214  Sect. 30A CDPA, see also the French Code de la propriété intellectuelle, Art. L122 – 5, No. 4. 215  § 60a UrhG; sect. 32 – 36A CDPA. 216  § 60c UrhG; sect. 29 CDPA. 217  § 45 UrhG; sect. 45 CDPA. 218  § 53 UrhG; sect. 28B CDPA. 219  For a discussion of American copyright law and a need to readjust it to constitutional requirements, see Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the Construction of Third-Party Copyright Liability, Boston Law Review 50 (2009), pp. 1481 – 1501; for a Euro­ pean perspective, Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Urheberrecht und Grundrechte, Zeitschrift des Bernischen Juristenvereins 153 (2017), pp. 365 – 394: pp. 390 – 394, blaming the apparently too rigid framework of legally stated copyright exceptions (Art. 19 – 28 of the Swiss Urheberrechtsgesetz of 9 October 1992, URG, harmonised according to Art. 5, ‘Infosoc’-Directive 2001/29/ EC) for some recent, futile attempts of German or Austrian courts to ‘cure’ the insufficiencies of copyright law by drawing on constitutional rights. 220  For a recent case in Belgium, see Olivier Vrins / Jeroen Muyldermans, Trademarks versus Artistic Freedom of Expression: Milestone Referral for Preliminary Ruling, International Law Office, Newsletter, 9 July 2018, www.internationallawoffice.com/Newsletters/Intellec tual-Property/Belgium/ALTIUS/Trademarks-versus-artistic-freedom-of-expression-milestonereferral-for-preliminary-ruling# (last access: 13 July 2018). 211

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To sum up: there are many kinds of reasons – moral, political, religious, economic, or security-related – why certain acts of copying or ways of dealing with copies are subject to restrictions in some or all countries. Not all of the existing laws that restrict the freedom to copy are beyond criticism, but they were made for some reason and supported by a significant amount of people. The law may be changed if judges or a relevant majority of lawmakers are convinced that certain issues should be regulated differently. We have seen profound changes over the last thirty years since the invention of the internet. But the overall tendency of public debates and governance decisions seems to be deeply ambivalent. On the one hand, “information wants to be free”,221 accessible for anybody without restrictions, free to use, to copy and disseminate. Indeed, today much more information is freely available to a greater number of people than ever before. In a hyper-connected world, people can now communicate and share information – or disinformation – instantaneously and to a greater extent than previously possible. We all enjoy the benefits of this development. But it comes at a price. Our hyperconnected world also makes the rapid viral spreading of information possible that may be misleading, provocative, or dangerous.222 The risk of “digital wildfires” is increasing,223 while reliable journalism is on the wane.224 – On the other hand, current debates and policy decisions are dominated by initiatives that aim at establishing new or tighter restrictions of certain copying practices rather than abolishing existing restraints.

221  Stewart Brand, The Media Lab: Inventing the Future at M.I.T., New York 1987, p. 211; See also R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of Control, Columbia Law Review 103 (2003), pp. 995 – 1034. 222  For example, in a context of terrorist threats, there is a strong public interest to disencourage the spreading of terrorist propaganda, threats to the public, or support for terrorist organisations, §§ 129a, 129b StGB. Spreading of information about the construction or use of explosives or weapons of mass destruction can be too dangerous to be allowed, §§ 89a, 91 StGB. Certain types of fake news might seriously damage foreign political relations or even put the security of a country at risk, § 100a StGB. 223  World Economic Forum, Global Risks 2013, 8th ed., ed. by Lee Howell, sect. 2, ch. 2: “Digital Wildfires in a Hyperconnected World”, http://reports.weforum.org/global-risks-2013/ risk-case-1/digital-wildfires-in-a-hyperconnected-world/#read (last access: 16 July 2018). 224 See Andrew Gelman, The Decline of Journalism and the Rise of Public Relations, The Washington Post, 11 March 2015, www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/ wp/2015/03/11/the-decline-of-journalism-and-the-rise-of-public-relations/; Derek Thompson, The Scariest Thing About the Newspaper Business Isn’t Print’s Decline, It’s Digital’s Growth, The Atlantic, 19 December 2012, www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/12/the-scariestthing-about-the-newspaper-business-isnt-prints-decline-its-digitals-growth/266482/ (both last accessed: 15 July 2018).

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IV. Enforcement of Censorship Decisions The laws, court orders or other authorities’ decisions that rule out the reproduction, distribution, broadcasting or making accessible to the public of certain kinds of contents that are considered offensive would not make any sense if they were not eventually enforced. There are many ways to do this, some are more disruptive, others rather inconspicuous. 1. Public Prosecutors Some acts of copying are offences for which proceedings are brought directly by the public prosecutor’s department.225 However, not every act of copying that might constitute one of these offences will be prosecuted. The police or the prosecutor’s department must first learn about them. It must be established whether a case at hand falls under the jurisdiction of the prosecutor. In many cases a decision must be made whether it is necessary and worthwhile to pursue them. The law requires prosecutors and judges to decide on the basis of the available information about a given case whether a particular provision is applicable. For example: did an act of copying or dissemination of certain materials that seem hate-filled actually incite hatred against a particular nationality, an ethnic or religious group or individual members of such a group?226 Or can the expectation that it might incite hatred warrant prosecution and censorship? Such decisions are not easy to make, and it is crucial that they are subject to judicial review. 227 225  Under the German Criminal Code, this would be at least the offences of StGB §§ 146 (counterfeiting money), 147 (circulation of counterfeit money), 148 (counterfeiting official stamps), 149 (preparing to counterfeit money or stamps), 152a (counterfeiting of debit cards, etc.), 152b (counterfeiting of credit cards, etc.), 94 (treason), 95, 97 (disclosure of state secrets), 100a (treasonous forgery), 86a (using symbols of unconstitutional organisations), 90a (defamation of the state and its symbols), 103 (defamation of organs and representatives of foreign states), 89a (preparation of a serious violent offence endangering the state), 91 (encouraging the commission of a serious violent offence endangering the state), 109g (taking or drawing pictures etc. endangering national security), 111 (public incitement to crime), 126 (breach of the public peace by threatening to commit offences), 130 (incitement to hatred), 130a (attempting to cause the commission of offences by means of publication), 131 (dissemination of depictions of violence), 140 (rewarding and approving of offences), 166 (defamation of religions, religious and ideological associations), 184 (distribution of pornography), 184a (distribution of pornography depicting violence or bestiality), 184b (child pornography), 184c (juvenile pornography), 184d (distribution of pornographic performances by broadcasting, media services or telecommunications services), 275 (tampering with official identity documents), 353b (breach of official secrets and special duties of confidentiality). 226  § 130 (2) StGB. On the criteria applied by German courts to establish incitement of hatred, see Rackow, StGB § 130, Rn. 18, in: BeckOK StGB, ed. by Bernd von Heintschel-Hei­ negg, 38th ed., Munich 2018. 227  Numbers of convictions for all kinds of offences in Germany in 2016 can be found at the Federal Statistics Bureau, Fachserie 10, Reihe 3 (2017): www.destatis.de/DE/Publika tionen/Thematisch/Rechtspflege/StrafverfolgungVollzug/Strafverfolgung2100300167004.

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Not all copying activities prohibited by the law can be subject to censorship measures. Offences like tampering with identity documents or treasonous forgery involve acts of copying, but the result is typically an individual artefact or a collection of artefacts that are used to deceive and to pursue an illegal goal – to support false claims on a private or political scale. The forger can only be indicted after the fraud has been discovered. Counterfeiting money or official stamps is not an act of publication either, although bringing copies of banknotes into circulation is essential to this offence. The offence consists in deceiving people who take the fake for real. It might be noteworthy in this context that certain technical protection measures have been integrated into the design of modern banknotes to prevent them from being copied with digital copying machines, scanners or image processing software.228 This does not prevent counterfeits,229 but it makes it more difficult to produce them. A disclosure of state secrets or encouragement of serious violent offences that could endanger the state can be committed in private communication or in a publication, e.g. by publishing information about the construction of weapons of mass destruction. Any publication suspected of constituting such an offence is censored as soon as possible, but in most cases the intervention of the censor comes too late. Once a secret has been disclosed, it is virtually impossible to control its spread. The censorship measures rather seem to be meant as a punishment for media collaborating in the offence in order to deter journalists from taking such a risk on the next occasion. In order to protect the freedom of the press, it is essential that decisions that restrain the right to publish and that impose financial burdens on news outlets are subject to judicial review.

pdf?__blob=publicationFile (last access: 18 July 2018). There were 1,296 convictions for dissemination of propaganda material of unconstitutional organisations (§ 86 StGB) and 1,191 for using symbols of unconstitutional organisations (§ 86a StGB), 907 cases of incitement to hatred (§ 130 [1] StGB), 194 convicitons for seditious libel (§ 130 [2] StGB), only 11 convictions for dissemination of depictions of violence (§ 131 StGB), 284 cases of unlawful distribution of ‘ordinary’ pornography, 8 convictions for extreme pornography (violence / bestiality, § 184a StGB), but 1905 convictions for child pornography (§ 184b StGB) and only 8 for unlawful distribution of pornographic performances by broadcasting, media services or telecommunications services (§ 184d StGB), which seems to indicate that the latter offence is hardly ever prosecuted, while the phenomenon seems to be more or less pervasive on the internet. 228  For example, Adobe Photoshop software includes a counterfeit deterrence system (CDS) that prevents the use of the product to illegally duplicate banknotes, see https://helpx.adobe. com/photoshop/cds.html (last published: 22 August 2016). One of the protection measures in this CDS seems to be the “Eurion” constellation found on most contemporary banknotes, see http://datagenetics.com/blog/september12015/index.html (both last accessed: 17 July 2018). 229  Der Spiegel, 17 July 2015: Geschäft der Geldfälscher floriert, www.spiegel.de/ wirtschaft/soziales/bundesbank-falschgeldaufkommen-2015-deutlich-gestiegen-a-1044190. html; Deutsche Bundesbank, Weniger falsche Banknoten in Deutschland, 26 January 2018, www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/DE/Themen/2018/2018_01_26_falschgeld.html (both last accessed: 17 July 2018).

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Censorship can be more effectively implemented against generic copying practices that are ruled out, for example, by hate speech laws or bans on (certain types of) pornographic images or ‘obscene’ expressions. Traditional mass-media, like newspapers, radio or TV broadcasters, can be liable under criminal law, copyright and other media laws.230 They are also subject to supervision and possible sanctions under industry-based ethics codes.231 It is thus in their own interest to make sure nothing is published that might cause problems for them. Bigger publishing companies have legal departments and in-house counsel who are responsible for preventing conflicts with the law. 2. Regulation of Broadcasting Radio and TV broadcasts are subject to specific regulations, for example, in the U.S. by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), an agency of the U.S. government that regulates interstate communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable. The FCC’s enforcement powers include fines and broadcast license revocation.232 The FCC may not engage in censorship or infringe on First Amendment rights of the press. However, there are limits to the freedom of the press, and it is the duty of the FCC to enforce these limits. The FCC sanctions the broadcasting of false information, for example about a crime or a catastrophe, “if the broadcaster knows the information is false and will cause substantial ‘public harm’ if aired”.233 Broadcasting ‘obscene’ content is prohibited by federal law in the U.S.234 In order to protect minors from facing ‘indecent’ or ‘profane’235 contents,   For example, § 19 Berliner Pressegesetz of 15 June 1965 (GVBl. Berlin, p. 744 et seq.).   See, for instance, the German Press Code, issued by the German Press Council; an English translation is available at www.presserat.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Downloads_Datei en/Pressekodex2017english.pdf (last access: 18 July 2018). 232  47 U.S.C. §§ 501 – 503 and 47 U.S.C. § 510 with 47 U.S.C. § 301. 233  FCC Consumer Guide: Broadcasting False Information (5 January 2018), https://tran sition.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/falsebroadcast.pdf; see also the FCC Consumer Guide: Complaints about Broadcast Journalism (5 January 2018), https://transition.fcc.gov/cgb/consumer facts/journalism.pdf (both last accessed: 18 July 2018). 234  18 U.S.C. § 1464; 47 CFR 73.3999 (a). For the definition of ‘obscenity’, see the FCC Consumer Guide: Obscene, Indecent and Profane Broadcasts (last reviewed: 30 June 2016; https://transition.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/obscene.pdf; last access: 18 July 2018): “Obscene content does not have protection by the First Amendment. For content to be ruled obscene, it must meet a three-pronged test established by the Supreme Court: It must appeal to an average person’s prurient interest; depict or describe sexual conduct in a ‘patently offensive’ way; and, taken as a whole, lack serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.” These criteria for obscenity applied by the FCC have been established by the Supreme Court in Miller v. California (1973), cf. supra, n. 74. 235  For the FCC, “profane language includes those words that are so highly offensive that their mere utterance in the context presented may, in legal terms, amount to a nuisance. In its Golden Globe Awards Order the FCC warned broadcasters that, depending on the context, it would consider the F-Word and those words (or variants thereof) that are as highly offensive as the F-Word to be profane language that cannot be broadcast between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m.”, 230 231

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programming such contents is prohibited from 6 a.m. to 10 p.m.236 According to the FCC rules, “indecent speech” is any “material that, in context, depicts or describes sexual or excretory organs or activities in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium”,237 but “that does not meet the three-prong test for obscenity”.238 In Germany, there is currently no general prohibition of ‘obscene speech’, as we have seen (III.3), but laws against making ‘pornography’ and other potentially harmful content accessible to a person under the age of 18.239 The former censorship agency has been transformed into the Federal Review Board for Media Harmful to Minors240 and is now tasked with protecting children and adolescents from media contents that are considered harmful to minors. An indexing procedure is carried out upon request of youth authorities (youth welfare offices, ministries for youth affairs), the Commission for the Protection of Minors in the Media, or other authorities (e.g. police, customs offices or schools). Books and other media found potentially harmful to minors are legally prohibited from being offered to minors. Violating this restriction is a misdemeanour and may also constitute unfair competition.241 Boards comprising members from various disciplines decide https://www.fcc.gov/reports-research/guides/obscenity-indecency-profanity-faq#TheLaw (last access: 25 June 2017). The comedian George Carlin notoriously poked fun about “Seven Words You Can Never Say on Television” in 1972. When a performance of his skit entitled “Filthy Words” was broadcast by the Pacifica station WBAI in 1973, a listener complained to the FCC. (A transcript of the broadcast was accessible under: http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/pro jects/ftrials/conlaw/filthywords.html [last access: 25 June 2017].) The FCC issued a declaratory order against the radio station. Pacifica appealed against this decision, which was overturned by the Court of Appeals on the grounds that the FCC’s definition of “indecency” violated the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech. The FCC in turn appealed to the Supreme Court, which ruled in a 5 – 4 decision in 1978 that the FCC’s Declaratory Ruling did not violate either the First or Fifth Amendments. This decision has become the cornerstone case for the regulation of “indecent speech” and “profanity” in the US; see R. Wilfred Tremblay, FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, in: Richard A. Parker (ed.), Free Speech on Trial: Communication Perspectives on Landmark Supreme Court Decisions, Tuscaloosa, AL 2003, pp. 218 – 233. 236  47 CFR 73.3999 (b). 237 https://www.fcc.gov/general/obscenity-indecency-and-profanity (last access: 18 July 2018). 238  FCC Consumer Guide: Obscene, Indecent and Profane Broadcasts (supra, n. 233). – In 2015, the FCC fined a TV station from Virginia with $ 325,000 for broadcasting on 12 July 2012, at 6 p.m., a time at which children were likely to be in the viewing audience, a news report that included an image of a website which showed “extremely graphic and explicit sexual material“, https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-15-32A1.txt (last access: 18 July 2018). 239  § 184 (1) No.s 1, 2, 3a and 5 StGB; Protection of Young Persons Act, supra, n. 60. 240  Bundesprüfstelle für jugendgefährdende Medien (BPjM), www.bundespruefstelle.de/ (last access: 18 July 2018); according to § 18 (1) Jugendschutzgesetz. 241 See Konrad Lischka, Abmahnwelle überrollt Buch-Verkäufer, Der Spiegel, 17 December 2007, http://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/web/neue-online-masche-abmahnwelle-ueber rollt-buch-verkaeufer-a-523843.html (last access: 20 July 2018).

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in quasi-judicial proceedings on the potential danger to minors posed by a book, journal, cartoon, song, video or game. Within the scope of a non-public hearing, the parties to the proceedings (e.g. publishers, authors, manufacturers, distributors) have the right to be heard and may also obtain legal representation.242 Decisions of the commission can be appealed in administrative courts. The censorship of broadcasting differs slightly for public and private broadcasting stations. Public radio and TV stations are monitored by public councils that are elected by the regional parliaments and typically consist of members of parliament and representatives of religious congregations, guilds, trade unions and other non-governmental organisations.243 These councils are not able to control the entire programme, but they are informed about complaints from viewers and may demand sanctions. For private TV stations, a semi-official, industry-financed self-regulatory body244 rates programmes and determines the time of the day (or night) at which particular programmes may be broadcast. This agency is not completely voluntary, but subject to a rather complicated framework of administrative law.245 Similar rating agencies have also been established for films,246 computer games247 and websites.248 Depending on market specifics and the relevant regulatory framework, the economic impact and disciplinary power of the indexing decisions, ratings or recommendations of these agencies varies considerably. Cases that constitute criminal offences will be prosecuted by the police. 3. Civil Action Some acts of copying are offences that will only be prosecuted upon a request by the victim.249 Criminal prosecutions of defamation or violations of privacy can only   www.bundespruefstelle.de/bpjm/Service/english.html (last access: 18 July 2018).   See, for instance, the North-Rhine-Westphalian Gesetz über den ‘Westdeutschen Rundfunk’ (WDR-Gesetz) as amended on 25 April 2018, §§ 13 – 15. 244  Freiwillige Selbstkontrolle Fernsehen, https://fsf.de/ (last access: 18 July 2018). 245  § 16, Staatsvertrag über den Schutz der Menschenwürde und den Jugendschutz in Rundfunk und Telemedien (Jugendmedienschutz-Staatsvertrag – JMStV) of 10 September 2002, as revised by Art. 5, Neunzehnter Staatsvertrag zur Änderung rundfunkrechtlicher Staats­verträge (Neunzehnter Rundfunkänderungsstaatsvertrag) of 3 December 2015. 246  FSK (supra, n. 43), www.spio-fsk.de; independent information about the FSK at: www. medienzensur.de/FSK-Infos-Pruefverfahren-Selbstkontrolle-Freigabe.html (both last accessed: 18 July 2018). 247 USK (supra, n. 43), www.usk.de/; see also www.medienzensur.de/USK-Infos-Pruef verfahren-Selbstkontrolle-Freigabe.html (both last accessed: 18 July 2018). 248  Freiwillige Selbstkontrolle Multimedia-Diensteanbieter (FSM), https://www.fsm.de/de. 249  Under the German Criminal code, this would be the offences of StGB §§ 90 (defamation of the President of the Federation), 90b (anti-constitutional defamation of constitutional organs), 185 – 194 (Defamation), 201 (violation of the privacy of the spoken word), 201a (violation of intimate privacy by taking photographs), 202 (violation of the privacy of the written word), 203 (violation of private secrets). 242 243

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be pursued after the harm was done. Since the victims of these offences have a right to claim compensations for the damages they have suffered, these cases are also causes of civil action. As we have seen (III.4), it is a matter of dispute to what extent criminal prosecution is necessary in cases of defamation or violations of privacy and whether it should better be abolished in cases where claims for damages might provide sufficient remedy for the harms incurred by the victims of a tort.250 In response to experiences with new kinds of harm caused by image-based abuse on the internet (III.7), the predominant tendency among lawmakers in several countries recently seems to be to specify new criminal offences in order to allow for a more efficient and hopefully also more deterring prosecution.251 The first step in civil actions concerning cases of defamation or violations of privacy is, like in cases concerning infringement of copyright or other relevant laws, a cease-and-desist letter.252 The alleged infringer can either acknowledge the claim and comply or contest it.253 The latter might be successful or lead to costlier legal proceedings. In cases where a plaintiff claims that imminent danger is posed by certain information or defamation being publicly available, a court may issue a preliminary injunction, ordering the relevant information to be removed from print or online publications.254 If the complaint is found to be substantial, a permanent injunction may follow suit; existing copies may be ordered to be seized and destroyed. 4. Notice and Take-Down According to the EU E-commerce directive, online service providers (OSP) cannot be held liable for the transmitted information, as long as the provider (a) does not initiate the transmission, (b) does not select the receiver of the transmission, and (c) does not select or modify the information contained in the transmission.255 Similar provisions have been enacted for the U.S. in the Digital   Supra, n. 100 – 102.   Supra, n. 177 – 185. 252 About the procedure under German law (“Abmahnung”), see www.abmahnung.org (last access: 16 July 2018); for the procedure under American law, see Eizabeth Potts Wein­ stein, What To Do If You Get a Cease & Desist Letter: Have a Cup of Tea, 6 September 2012, www.elizabethpottsweinstein.com/tea/ (last access: 21 July 2018); Marketa Trimble, Setting Foot on Enemy Ground: Cease-and-Desist Letters, DMCA Notifications and Personal Jurisdiction in Declaratory Judgment Actions, IDEA – The Intellectual Property Law Review 50 (2010), pp.  777 – 830. 253  For an instructive example of such a response, see Staci Zaretsky, A Great Response to a Cease and Desist Letter, Above the Law, 18 June 2013, https://abovethelaw.com/2013/06/ how-to-write-a-great-response-to-a-cease-and-desist-letter/ (last access: 22 July 2018). 254  For a recent example, see Jennifer Medina, Judge Orders Los Angeles Times to Delete Part of Published Article, New York Times, 15 July 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/07/15/us/ judge-los-angeles-times-delete-article.html (last access: 16 July 2018). 255  Art. 12 – 14, Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic 250 251

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Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).256 It is crucial that OSPs cannot be held liable for violations of existing laws committed by third party users copying certain information onto their servers and websites. Without such a ‘safe harbour’ provision, nobody could take the legal risk of running an OSP; there would be no internet. The case of a moderator of a messenger app in Iran who was charged for blasphemy allegedly posted by some third-party user257 shows what can happen if ‘safe harbour’ provisions for ISP are not in place. The exemption of OSPs from liability for violations committed by third-party users – who may be hard to track – does not mean, as some have lamented, that the internet is an unlegislated space.258 Under the DMCA, as well as under European law and in most other countries, rights holders who claim that their rights have been infringed by some allegedly unlawful act by a user on a third-party website can notify the provider and demand that material be removed immediately, or that access to that material be disabled (“notice and take-down”).259 The user may comply by agreeing to a license fee for using the copyrighted material or by desisting from continuing to use it. If, however, the alleged infringer is convinced that the material he has put online does not infringe any of the rights that have been claimed in the notification by the (self-proclaimed) rights holder,260 he may react with a counter-notice to the OSP stating his good faith belief that the content did not violate any copyright. The rights holder, in turn, can then file a lawsuit. If the rights holder does not file such a suit within a fortnight, the OSP must put the content back online (“notice and put back”).261 As far as I can see, no similar procedure seems to be available for internet users in Germany whose posts have been blocked (in some cases without sufficient justification) by their host providers upon notification by a rights holder.262

commerce, in the Internal Market. In Germany, this provision has been enacted in the TeleMedia Act (Telemediengesetz, TMG) of 26 February 2007, §§ 8 – 10. 256  17 U.S.C. sect. 512 (a)–(d). 257  Supra, n. 115. 258 See Konrad Lischka, Das Internet ist kein rechtsfreier Raum, Der Spiegel, 26 June 2009, http://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/web/phrasen-kritik-das-internet-ist-kein-rechtsfreierraum-a-632277.html (last access: 20 July 2018). 259  17 U.S.C. sect. 512 (c) (1) (C); for Germany: § 9 (5) TMG. 260  Some examples of spurious or outright criminal take-down notices are discussed by Mostafa El Manzalawy, Bad Reviews: How Companies Are Using Fake Websites to Censor Content, Lumen Blog, 7 August 2017, https://lumendatabase.org/blog_entries/798 (last access: 22 July 2018). 261  17 U.S.C. sect. 512 (g) (2) (C). For an informative discussion of the ‘notice and takedown’ procedures according to the DMCA, see Jennifer M. Urban / Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or ‘Chilling Effects’? Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Santa Clara Computer & High Technology Law Journal 22 (2006), pp.  621 – 693; Trimble, Setting Foot on Enemy Ground (supra, n. 252), pp. 800 – 809.

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5. Upload Filters The latest proposal by the Council of the EU concerning a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in the Digital Single Market contains a suggestion to reverse the law on the liabilities of OSPs. The Council of the EU suggests that “online content sharing service providers” shall no longer be allowed the safe harbour granted to them by Art. 14 of the E-Commerce directive 2000/31/EC. They shall be held liable for “an act of communication to the public or an act of making available to the public” if they “give the public access to copyright protected works or other protected subject matter uploaded by their users”.263 An online content sharing service provider shall obtain an authorisation from the rightholders referred to in Article 3(1) and (2) of Directive 2001/29/EC in order to communicate or make available to the public works or other subject matter. Where no such authorisation has been obtained, the service provider shall prevent the availability on its service of those works and other subject matter. 264

In order to avoid liability for copyright infringements committed by users who upload copyrighted works without the necessary permission by the respective rights holders, online content sharing service providers shall be required to demonstrate that they have “made best efforts to prevent the availability of specific 262  Perhaps a step into the direction of the American “notice and put back” procedure can be found in a decision of the German Federal Court of Justice concerning a defamation lawsuit (BGH VI ZR 93/10, 25 October 2011), although that case was mainly about the conditions of the safe harbour for the OSP and not about the rights of the blogger who was blocked and may have been violated by overblocking; see Thomas Hoeren, Internetrecht, Münster 2018, p. 517 et seq. – Reto M. Hilty / Valentina Moscon, Contributions by the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition in Response to the Questions Raised by the Authorities of Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Ireland and the Netherlands to the Council Legal Service Regarding Article 13 and Recital 38 of the Proposal for a Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, 8 September 2017, www.ip.mpg.de/fileadmin/ipmpg/content/stellungnahmen/ Answers_Article_13_2017_Hilty_Moscon-rev-18_9.pdf (last access: 22 July 2018), p. 2, have also suggested that European copyright laws should adopt a “counter notice procedure” similar to the model of 17 U.S.C. sect. 512 (g) (2) (C) or section 192 of the Finnish Information Society Code (917/2014). 263  Presidency, Council of the EU, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, 2016/0280 (COD), Doc. 9134/18 (25 May 2018), p. 56, Art. 13 (1). Note the somewhat different wording in the Report of the European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs (Rapporteur Axel Voss) on the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (COM(2016)0593 – C8-0383/2016 – 2016/0280(COD)), Doc. A8-0245/2018 (29 June 2018), www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+RE PORT+A8-2018-0245+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN (last access: 22 July 2018), p. 148 (Amendment 52). Nevertheless, the Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs have adopted a similar reframing of the service of online content sharing service providers in their proposed Amendment 42 to Recital 38 of the Commission proposal, ibid., p. 35. 264  Presidency, Council of the EU, Doc. 9134/18, p. 56, Art. 13 (1); cf. Committee on Legal Affairs, Doc. A8-0245/2018, p. 148 (Amendment 52).

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works or other subject matter by implementing effective and proportionate mea­ sures […] to prevent the availability […] of the specific works or other subject matter identified by rightholders”.265 According to the Commission proposal, and also according to the Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs, the required “measures […] to prevent the availability […] of the specific works or other subject matter identified by rightholders” shall include “effective content recognition technologies”.266 “Information society service providers that store and provide to the public access to significant amounts of works or other subject-matter uploaded by their users”267 or certain “online content sharing service providers”268 shall be required to monitor all content uploaded by users in order to prevent them from uploading any copyrighted contents that are not covered by a license for communication to the public and reproduction rights which the service provider has obtained from the respective rights holders, or are permissible under an applicable copyright exception. Critics have objected that the proposed directive “would mandate Internet platforms to embed an automated infrastructure for monitoring and censorship deep into their networks”.269 “Requiring providers of intermediary services to use automated means, such as Content ID-type technologies, to detect systematically unlawful content is forcing providers of intermediary services to actively monitor all the data of each of their users and thereby is imposing a general monitoring obligation on these providers.”270 “By requiring Internet platforms to perform au265  Presidency, Council of the EU, Doc. 9134/18, p. 57, Art. 13 (4); cf. Committee on Legal Affairs, Doc. A8-0245/2018, p. 148 (Amendment 52). 266  European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on copyright in the Digital Single Market, 2016/0280 (COD), 14 September 2016, p. 29, Art. 13 (1), see also p. 20, Recital 38; Committee on Legal Affairs, Doc. A8-0245/2018, p. 149 (Amendment 52) and p. 36 (Amendment 42). 267  Committee on Legal Affairs, Doc. A8-0245/2018, p. 146 (Amendment 48). 268  Presidency, Council of the EU, Doc. 9134/18, p. 31, Recital 37a; see also Committee on Legal Affairs, Doc. A8-0245/2018, pp. 34 – 35 (Amendment 41): “The definition of an online content sharing service provider under this Directive shall cover information society service providers one of the main purposes of which is to store and give access to the public or to stream copyright protected content uploaded / made available by its users and that optimise content, including amongst others promoting displaying, tagging, curating, sequencing the uploaded works or other subject-matter, irrespective of the means used therefor, and therefore act in an active way. The definition of online content sharing service providers under this Directive does not cover service providers that act in a non-commercial purpose capacity such as online encyclopaedia, and providers of online services where the content is uploaded with the authorisation of all rightholders concerned, such as educational or scientific repositories. Providers of cloud services for individual use which do not provide direct access to the public, open source software developing platforms, and online market places whose main activity is online retail of physical goods, should not be considered online content sharing service providers within the meaning of this Directive.” 269  Vint Cerf, Tim Berners-Lee et al., Article 13 of the EU Copyright Directive Threatens the Internet, Open Letter to Antonio Tajani MEP, President of the European Parliament, 12 June 2018, www.eff.org/files/2018/06/13/article13letter.pdf (last access: 22 July 2018).

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tomatic filtering all of the content that their users upload, Article 13 takes an unprecedented step towards the transformation of the Internet from an open platform for sharing and innovation, into a tool for the automated surveillance and control of its users.”271 Such a general monitoring obligation is incompatible with Art. 8 and 11 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights and also with Art. 15 of the E-Commerce Directive 2000/31.272 Moreover, the European Copyright Society voiced concern the proposal would backfire against the policy objectives proclaimed by the Commission: The obligation for content platforms to implement ‘effective content recognition technologies’ will privilege large incumbent platforms that have already successfully implemented such measures (such as YouTube), whereas entry to this market for newcomers may become all but impossible. The unforeseen effect of the provision may, therefore, be locking in YouTube’s dominance in the EU.273

The European Parliament Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection also criticized the Commission proposal as “incompatible with the limited liability regime provided for in Directive 2000/31/EC (Electronic Commerce Directive)”.274 The Committee suggested to solve the problem with a number of amendments to the Commission proposal, including helpful clarifications on the applicability of the new regulation for online platforms in relation to the existing rules concerning the liability of OSP according to the E-commerce and Infosoc Directives. According to the opinion of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection, content recognition technologies should not be mandated.275 270  Sophie Stalla-Bourdillon et al., Open Letter to the European Commission – On the Importance of Preserving the Consistency and Integrity of the EU Acquis Relating to Content Monitoring Within the Information Society, 30 September 2016, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=2850483 (last access: 22 July 2018). 271  Cerf, Berners-Lee et al., Article 13 of the EU Copyright Directive Threatens the Internet (supra, n. 269). 272  Stalla-Bourdillon et al., Open Letter to the European Commission (supra, n. 270); Christina Angelopoulos, EU Copyright Reform: Outside the Safe Harbours, Intermediary Liability Capsizes into Incoherence, Kluwer Copyright Blog, 6 October 2016, http://copyrightblog. kluweriplaw.com/2016/10/06/eu-copyright-reform-outside-safe-harbours-intermediary-liabili ty-capsizes-incoherence/; Reto M. Hilty / Andrea Bauer, Position Statement of the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition on the Proposed Modernisation of European Copyright Rules, Munich 2017, www.ip.mpg.de/fileadmin/ipmpg/content/stellungnahmen/MPI_Po sition_Statement_PART_G_incl_Annex-2017_03_01.pdf (last access: 22 July 2018), p. 8. 273  European Copyright Society, General Opinion on the EU Copyright Reform Package, 24 January 2017, https://europeancopyrightsocietydotorg.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/ecsopinion-on-eu-copyright-reform-def.pdf (last access: 22 July 2018), p. 7. 274  European Parliament Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (Rap­ porteur: Catherine Stihler), Opinion on the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (COM(2016)0593 – C80383/2016 – 2016/0280(COD)), 14 June 2017, Doc. PE599.682v02-00, p. 4. 275  Ibid., pp. 42 – 44 (Amendments 69, 73).

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Upload filters would indeed establish a prior-restraint censorship regime on an unprecedented scale. This is not merely a question of enforcing copyright claims of large players in the entertainment industry. Apparently, the EU Commission already plans “to present a legislative proposal to improve the detection and removal of content that incites hatred and to commit terrorist acts”.276 The debate about the proposal is not yet settled. The suggestions that have been submitted from various participants in the law-making process still differ from each other in crucial respects. 6. Moderation Policies of Social Media Platforms Social media platforms run by private corporations, like Youtube, Facebook or Twitter, have emerged as an increasingly important forum for public discourse and opinion-forming. They operate under terms of service which contain detailed provisions about admissible and prohibited types of content.277 They are legally bound to monitor user-generated contents.278 Sometimes these policies are not perfectly congruent with the legal norms in some of the countries where the services of the respective platforms are used. Platforms may impose restrictions that are not based on applicable law of the country of residence of the user who uploaded the objectionable content, and might thus violate that user’s free speech rights.279 Therefore, it is im276  European Council conclusions, 28 June 2018, Recital 13, http://www.consilium.europa. eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/06/29/20180628-euco-conclusions-final/ (last access: 23 July 2018). 277  See, for example, the Facebook Community Standards, www.facebook.com/commu nitystandards. Similarly elaborate policies are proclaimed by Youtube: https://support.google. com/youtube/topic/2676378 (last access: 23 July 2018). “Hate speech” won’t be permitted, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2801939; “content that makes threats of serious physical harm against a specific individual or defined group of individuals will be removed”, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2801927. “Sexually explicit content like pornography is not allowed. Videos containing fetish content will be removed or age-restricted depending on the severity of the act in question. In most cases, violent, graphic, or humiliating fetishes are not allowed to be shown on YouTube. A video that contains nudity or other sexual content may be allowed if the primary purpose is educational, documentary, scientific, or artistic, and it isn’t gratuitously graphic. For example, a documentary on breast cancer would be appropriate, but posting clips out of context from the same documentary might not be”, https:// support.google.com/youtube/answer/2802002?hl=en&ref_topic=2803176. “Similar to movie or television ratings, our age-restrictions help viewers avoid watching content that they may not feel is acceptable for themselves or for their children”, https://support.google.com/youtube/ answer/2802008 (last access: 23 July 2018). 278  For example, under the German Act to Improve Enforcement of the Law in Social Networks (Network Enforcement Act, NetzDG) of 1 September 2017, English translation available at: www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Gesetzgebungsverfahren/Dokumente/NetzDG_engl. pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2 (last access: 23 July 2018). 279  See the Report of the United Nations Human Rights Council, Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, 6 April 2018, A/HRC/38/35, p. 14.

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portant that platforms can be held accountable for their censorship measures and that they provide a way to appeal against incorrect or controversial takedown decisions. At the same time, platforms often fail to take down content that violates applicable law.280 Incongruences between the applicable law and the decisions of content supervisors to allow or remove certain contents may be due to inconsistencies in the rules that these content supervisors have to apply, or simply due to a temporary lack of attention in applying these rules.281 Content moderators at multi-million-entry platforms like Facebook remove user-generated content only if somebody reports.282 So far, the content of Facebook and other social media platforms is primarily moderated by employees – not software. They have to decide about thousands of complaints every day.283 Their work is burdensome. They see things that really nobody should have to see. They serve as guardians of free speech, enabling the active participation of large parts of the population in public or semi-public conversation and opinion-forming processes. At least it is desirable that these employees understand their role like this, because they have considerable power to manipulate public discourse and the law enforcement authorities cannot control their work. Facebook and other large social media platforms are currently preparing to replace or at least assist their human content moderators with artificial intelligence programs trained to recognise and classify most of the obvious cases of objectionable content. The aim is to delete the relevant posts automatically.284 If this works,285 it could relieve the persons who are currently doing the moderating. It 280  A certainly not representative collection of samples of apparently illegal material published by Facebook users (all kinds of insults, glorification of violence, breach of the public peace by threatening to commit offences, even images depicting the sexual abuse of children) and not censored by Facebook at the time of reporting, juxtaposed with numerous posts that were censored by Facebook, although they apparently did not violate any law, can be studied at the website “Facebook-Sperre – Wall of Shame”, https://facebook-sperre.steinhoefel.de/ (last access: 30 June 2017). 281 See Nick Hopkins, Facebook Moderators: A Quick Guide to Their Job and Its Challenges, The Guardian, 21 May 2017, www.theguardian.com/news/2017/may/21/facebook-moderators-quick-guide-job-challenges (last access: 23 May 2017). 282  According to Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg, millions of posts are reported as offensive or probably violating community standards every week. See Mark Zuckerberg on Facebook, 3 May 2017, www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/10103695315624661 (last access: 2 July 2017). 283 See Krause / Grassegger, Inside Facebook (supra, n. 56); Olivia Solon, Underpaid and Overburdened: The Life of a Facebook Moderator, The Guardian, 25 May 2017, www.theguardian.com/news/2017/may/25/facebook-moderator-underpaid-overburdened-ex treme-content (last access: 3 June 2017). 284 See Zuckerberg (supra, n. 282); Sam Schechner, “Facebook Boosts AI to Block Terrorist Propaganda”, Wall Street Journal, 15 June 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebookboosts-a-i-to-block-terrorist-propaganda-1497546000. Report of the United Nations Human Rights Council, Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression (supra, n. 279), p. 6. 285  On the development of artificial intelligence systems for monitoring hate speech, see, for example, Nanjira Sambuli, Umati’s Tech Evolution, iHub Research, 19 August 2014, https://

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would also be more effective, faster, more pervasive, and it might improve the monitoring results, because algorithms never get tired or sick, and it might be easier to avoid certain kinds of human bias. For the first time in history, digital media technology allows for virtually complete surveillance and censorship – not only of mass media content but more or less of the entire communication between people. In this digital media environment, censorship is not limited to upload filters or to blocking access to certain websites. Algorithms that decide what we can see and read bring about a new kind of censorship regime, subtler and also more effective than burning books, blackening confidential information, blurring obscenity or ‘bleeping’ profanity.286 *** Copying is pervasive. So is censorship. But that does not mean that either might be indifferent. There are reasons why we want certain acts of copying to stop and why we can accept restrictions on our freedom of speech and information only under certain, narrow conditions. The ethics of copying is concernend with investigating these reasons, making their implications explicit, exploring conflicts about copying practices and copy restrictions, and developing solutions for these conflicts. Zusammenfassung Kopierhandlungen oder bestimmte Verwendungsweisen von Kopien können in vielfältiger Weise Interessen Dritter oder auch der Allgemeinheit verletzen. Deshalb unterliegen sie normativen Ansprüchen, die Einschränkungen des Kopierverhaltens oder des Umgangs mit Kopien fordern. Solche normativen Ansprüche ihub.co.ke/blogs/20152 (last access: 15 October 2018). Technically, the task is rather ambitious, see Annalee Newitz, Facebook Fires Human Editors, Algorithm Immediately Posts Fake News, arstechnica, 29 August 2016, https://arstechnica.com/business/2016/08/facebook-fires-humaneditors-algorithm-immediately-posts-fake-news/ (last access: 10 July 2017); Emily Dreyfuss, AI Isn’t Smart Enough (Yet) to Spot Horrific Facebook Videos, Wired, 18 April 2017, www.wired. com/2017/04/ai-isnt-smart-enough-yet-spot-horrific-facebook-videos/; Samantha Cole, Gfycat’s AI Solution for Fighting Deepfakes Isn’t Working, Motherboard, 19 June 2018, https://mother board.vice.com/en_us/article/ywe4qw/gfycat-spotting-deepfakes-fake-ai-porn; Raghav Bharad­ waj, AI for Social Media Censorship – How It Works at Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter, Tech­ emergence, 29 March 2018, www.techemergence.com/ai-social-media-censorship-works-face book-youtube-twitter/ (all last accessed: 23 July 2018). 286  Paul Lewis, ‘Fiction is Outperforming Reality’: How YouTube’s Algorithm Distorts Truth, The Guardian, 2 February 2018, www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/feb/02/ how-youtubes-algorithm-distorts-truth; Caitlin Johnstone, Assange Keeps Warning of AI Censorship, And It’s Time We Started Listening, Medium, 17 January 2018, https://medium. com/@caityjohnstone/assange-keeps-warning-of-ai-censorship-and-its-time-we-started-lis tening-e05d371ef120 (all last accessed: 23 July 2018).

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gewinnen ihr Profil in gesellschaftlichen Auseinandersetzungen und verändern sich unter anderem im Zuge der Weiterentwicklung der Kopier- und Medientechnologien. Der Beitrag erörtert die Relevanz von weithin anerkannten, unter anderem menschenrechtlich, verfassungsrechtlich und medienrechtlich verbrieften Ansprüchen auf möglichst uneingeschränkten Zugang zu Informationen und Artikulationsmöglichkeiten im Spannungsverhältnis zu ihnen entgegenstehenden moralischen, rechtlichen, politischen, religiösen oder wirtschaftlichen Gründen für Einschränkungen der Äußerungs- oder Informationsfreiheit. Neben der klassischen Zensur durch staatliche Aufsichtsbehörden kommen dabei auch Belange des Jugendschutzes und des Schutzes gegen verschiedene Formen sexuellen Missbrauchs sowie Unterlassungsansprüche gegen Rufschädigungen, Eingriffe in Persönlichkeitsrechte, Urheber- und Markenrechte in Betracht. Neben den einschlägigen Normen des Strafrechts werden kursorisch auch zivilrechtliche Ansprüche, außergerichtliche Streitbeilegungsverfahren sowie technische Verfahren zur Einschränkung der öffentlichen Verbreitung bestimmter Inhalte sowie des Zugangs zu bestimmten Inhalten im Internet diskutiert.

Four Crises in Algorithmic Governance Aram Sinnreich One of the hallmarks of the present era is the increasing centrality, power and authority of algorithms as arbiters and facilitators of social action. These sophisticated equations and logical processes, most of them completely opaque to the casual observer, and some even beyond the understanding of their own creators and maintainers, are responsible for a broad range of tasks both online and off-line, determining the nature and source of the news articles we read, the identity and disposition of the people we date, and the value of the commodities we buy and sell. It would not be an exaggeration to say that, at the end of the second decade of the twenty-first century, nearly every vital aspect of human culture and society is to some degree reliant on algorithms, and that the algorithms, in turn, are reliant upon an ever-expanding ocean of data produced through our interactions with them and with one another by way of them. In short, our markets, our governments, and even our intimate relationships are now fundamentally shaped and circumscribed by computer code. Within the scholarly fields of legal studies, media studies, and normative ethics, one small but important dimension of this broader trend that has received increasing attention over the past few years is the algorithmic regulation of copyright, and therefore, of public expression and creativity. As Maayan Perel and Niva Elkin-Koren have argued, “Algorithmic enforcement by online intermediaries reflects a fundamental shift in our traditional system of governance,”1 away from a system rooted in legislation and enforced through the courts, and towards a system rooted in computer code and enforced by private gatekeepers. The definitive example of such a process is YouTube’s Content ID system, which identifies copyrighted works through a form of mathematical fingerprinting, checking uploaded videos against a database of works uploaded by (putative) owners, and proactively censoring anything identified by the software as unauthorized redistribution or adaptation. This “fundamental shift” in our regulatory mechanisms does not represent merely the automation or translation of existing principles and practices from one platform to another. Rather, it requires a radical renegotiation of social and institutional power, and a rethinking of our basic assumptions about the function of copyright law in the context of the marketplace and the public sphere. This renegotiation, in turn, engenders a series of crises – decision points that, in their essential 1  Maayan Perel / Niva Elkin-Koren, Accountability in Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement, Stanford Technology Law Review 19 (2016), pp. 473 – 533: p. 473.

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irreconcilability, reveal long-dormant tensions at the heart of our legal, ethical and cultural systems. In the present article, I will briefly discuss four specific crises engendered by the rise of algorithmic governance of copyright, and discuss not only how they challenge our approach to laws and markets, but also how they reflect back on the larger social issues related to the sudden rise in prominence and power of the algorithm writ large. These crises may be described as: (I) the quantization of culture; (II) the convergence of institutions; (III) the expansion of scale; and (IV) the destabilization of ontology. I. The Quantization of Culture The first crisis posed by the algorithmic governance of copyright has to do with the orthogonal relationship between computer code and social institutions. Algorithms are, by definition, quantitative and inflexible (even when they are adaptive and dynamic, those adaptations and dynamics are circumscribed by the parameters of their code). They are no more or less than logical operations, stated as a set of mathematical abstractions. By contrast, legal systems are reliant entirely upon judgment, nuance, culture and context. The very purpose of a judiciary is to interpret statute, an institutional affordance that exists explicitly to acknowledge the limitations of any code – whether human or machine – as a framework for the arbitration of social interaction. Thus, there is not only a fundamental incompatibility, but a logical irreconcilability between algorithmic governance and the structure of our legal systems. This circle may never be squared (though we may approach “curvature” through increasingly refined codes). In a recent survey of artificial intelligence (AI) researchers, 41 percent of respondents said that machines will never be able to “simulate learning and every other aspect of human intelligence,” and another 41 percent said it would take more than 50 years to reach such a milestone.2 Without an achievement such as this, providing what AI researchers refer to as “artificial general intelligence”, it is unlikely that an algorithm could bring to bear the wealth of cultural and contextual judgment required to interpret statute and precedent in the manner that today’s human judges routinely do for copyright litigations and other related disputes. Without a major breakthrough in AGI, any algorithmic oversight of copyright enforcement carries a serious cost: It undermines the primacy of culture as the basis for the regulation of social action and personal expression, reducing the accrued nuance of millennia and the ineffable dimensions of human judgment to a series 2  Vincent C. Müller / Nick Bostrom, Future Progress in Artificial Intelligence: A Survey of Expert Opinion, in: Vincent C. Müller (ed.), Fundamental Issues of Artificial Intelligence, Berlin 2016, pp. 553 – 571.

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of rudimentary scores and rankings. In essence, this process “quantizes” culture at large in the same way that a dating application may evaluate your fitness as a potential mate or a streaming movie site predicts your tastes. This quantization is not only morally repugnant to those who believe that human culture loses value as it loses complexity; it also flies in the face of the philosophy of law, which holds that “legal theory attempts to capture the essential features of law, as encapsulated in the self-understanding of a culture”.3 This premise – that culture must exist prior to, and inform, our conception of the law – is accepted (in different ways) by legal theorists on both sides of the infamous Hart-Devlin debate4 regarding the legal enforcement of morality. To the many legal scholars and philosophers who accord culture a place of primacy over law, the premise of an algorithm determining copyright questions of fair use, the de minimis principle, or secondary liability independently of human oversight must be anathema; once an algorithm functionally supersedes legal judgment, it has ceased to serve the law itself. Even if it were possible for a sufficiently “intelligent” algorithm to exercise legal judgment in the sense we typically ascribe to human actors, the quantization crisis would still loom. As Joseph Raz argues, “the self-understanding of cultures is forever changing.”5 How could an algorithm built in one cultural milieu adapt to the changes in that culture over time? For instance, even if American coders had created an intelligent “fair use” algorithm after the 1984 Supreme Court “Betamax” ruling,6 it would have been ill-equipped to make such judgments in the years to come. To be sure, the algorithm could have been updated to reflect Pierre Leval’s subsequent analysis of fair use in 1990,7 along with relevant case law. But it would have been a much more difficult – perhaps impossible – challenge for the algorithm to absorb and apply the radical normative and cultural changes that emerged with the rise of the internet and cut-and-paste digital culture over the following decade. Therefore, even if an algorithm were intelligent enough to make nuanced, context-specific judgments relative to the cultural moment in which it was crafted, this applicability would wane over time. There are only two possible outcomes from this scenario: either the algorithm would no longer be able to perform its function, or social and cultural evolution would slow or freeze as a result. The former situation is easier to imagine; at a certain point, algorithmic judgments would simply diverge enough from that of an expert human observer to warrant the elimination or complete retooling of the software. This process would require continuing human oversight, undermining the function and value of the algorithm in the first place. 3  Joseph Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation: On the Theory of Law and Practical Reason, Oxford 2009, p. 98. 4  Robert P. George, Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality, Oxford 1995. 5  Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation (supra, n. 3), p. 98. 6  464 U.S. 417 (1984). 7  Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, Harvard Law Review 103 (1990), pp.  1105 – 1136.

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The latter situation, however, is more concerning. Because algorithms are not merely arbiters, but active agents of copyright enforcement, shaping the cultural landscape through selective promotion and censorship of expressive materials, the risk would be that the cultural moment encoded into the algorithm would become determinative of all future cultural expression and practices. To put this in more straightforward terms: in the 1970s, homosexuality was routinely pathologized and criminalized in the United States. At the time of writing, same sex couples can marry legally in every state in the nation. If an algorithm written 40 years ago were still regulating laws pertaining to marriage, sexual behavior, workplace protection, or even public speech on the issue of sexual identity, would America have seen the same progress during that span of time? Or would the algorithm’s role in shaping and constraining social action and public speech have reproduced 1970s-era cultural values, slowing or preventing these progressive changes? II. Institutional Convergence Algorithmic governance of copyright combines many different functions into one fluid, automated system. Algorithms crawl the internet, searching for works that have been distributed or adapted without permission of the nominal owners. Algorithms generate databases of allegedly infringing files, and send those databases to both the rights holders and online intermediaries. Algorithms match those databases to files hosted by intermediaries and remove them from their servers (in the context of America’s Digital Millennium Copyright Act [DMCA], this is typically referred to as “notice and takedown”). And, in some cases, algorithms use those databases to proactively scour and censor servers and networks against the future unauthorized sharing and / or adaptation of protected works (sometimes referred to as “notice and staydown”). This combination of functions is fairly standard for software operations; through the use of application programming interfaces (APIs) and software development kits (SDKs), the automated dovetailing of algorithmic processes is one of the defining characteristics of digital systems. Yet, from an institutional perspective, the collapsing of responsibilities entailed by algorithmic copyright governance is both novel and highly problematic. In searching for potentially infringing materials and removing them from their servers, algorithms serve a function historically reserved for the executive branch of government, ranging from local police forces to federal agencies like the Department of Justice. In setting the terms for what counts as infringing and non-infringing, as well as proper penalties for infringement, algorithms serve a role more akin to that traditionally played by the legislature. And by interpreting these terms and evaluating the infringing or non-infringing status of a given work, algorithms play a role typically reserved for the judiciary. When a single algorithm or fixed system of connected algorithms performs all of these functions simultaneously, it

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is essentially serving as accuser, police, prosecutor, judge, jury, and lawmaker all at the same time. In political contexts, the collapsing of function is considered a hallmark of authoritarianism – as when the lines blur between the police and the military, or when the judge and prosecutor are one and the same. No “checks and balances” or “separation of powers” may exist to limit the power of authority, or to ensure fairness under the law, without these institutional divisions between the ability to make, interpret, and execute the law, and without the representation of multiple social stakeholders in the process. Is the threat of unchecked power any less in cases where it is wielded by an algorithm (or its corporate owner) than in cases where an autocratic leader is holding the reins? In both cases, the right of a citizen to have his or her interests represented by lawmakers, and to face his or her accuser before an impartial judge and jury, is compromised. In both cases, the potential for self-dealing, anti-competition, and unilateralism is equally great. Furthermore, because algorithmic governance is largely invisible and opaque to the end user, the erosion of the separation of powers within an algorithmic context additionally serves to normalize this collapsing of function culturally. If citizens can be convinced that it is natural and right for a software program or the company that operates it to serve as judge, jury, and executioner, they may be less likely to oppose a political regime that claims the same unchecked scope of power. In short, the institutional convergence represented by the algorithmic regulation of copyright serves as a microcosm for the broader authoritarian threat inherent in our increasing reliance on code as a substitute or prosthetic for traditional legal and institutional functions throughout society at large. III. The Expansion of Scale Another aspect of algorithmic copyright regulation that destabilizes our existing cultural compact and reflects a broader social challenge comes in the violation of scale represented by these software systems. Our laws and cultural practices were developed with the tacit acknowledgment that the limits of the human body and mind circumscribed our responsibilities to, and expectations of, one another. Walking across the street while the light is red might be a misdemeanor, but it would be absurd to expect that every single person who does it will be arrested. There simply aren’t enough police to nab every jaywalker. More to the point of this chapter, reproducing a painting without authorization may technically be a violation of copyright, but we would never expect tourists to stop taking snap shots and selfies in galleries and museums. The fog of our ignorance has historically shrouded these casual violations of statute, and a degree of tolerance for low-level rule-breaking is inherent in our overall approach to justice.

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Some legal scholars have even argued that our existing laws and penalties are balanced deliberately against this unstated tolerance for widespread rule-breaking and rule-bending. As Eduardo Moisés Peñalver and Sonia K. Katyal argue, enforcement of laws may vary selectively, not simply as a result of limited policing and prosecuting resources, but as a tacit mechanism for the redistribution of power and capital in an unequal society – especially in the case of intellectual property.8 The rise of algorithmic enforcement changes this dynamic, clearing away the blissful fog of ignorance and exposing every corner of our cultural environment, and every spot on the globe, to continual surveillance and legal accountability. While a museum guard can make sure that thirty people in a room stay a proper distance from a great artwork, an algorithm can identify every single use (and misuse) of a protected work across the internet at large. While a single beat cop can police a busy intersection, watching a thousand people cross the street every hour, an algorithm is unfettered by geographic or even political boundaries, and may operate on any server in any location or jurisdiction, as long as it is not actively prevented from doing so. Yet despite this increased capacity for policing and enforcement, there has been no commensurate reconsideration of laws and penalties to counterbalance this escalation. As a consequence, those of us living in maximalist copyright regimes (arguably, any citizen of a WIPO member state) have become subjects of what John Tehranian calls “Infringement Nation,”9 a surveillance-based regime that has the capacity to bankrupt or even imprison people who are technically lawbreakers, but engaged in normal, widespread behaviors.10 Ultimately, the expansion of scale introduced by algorithmic governance of copy­ right produces the conditions for a self-perpetuating system that subverts two principal mechanisms of functional democracy: sovereignty and self-determination. Ceding control over enforcement and prosecution of infringement enables commercial processes to eclipse elected and appointed state officials as the principal shapers and executors of policy, undermining the primacy of the state over the corporation. This shift in the balance of power echoes longstanding fears (exemplified in futuristic dystopian narratives such as William Gibson’ Snow Crash11 and Mike Judge’s Idiocracy) of creeping “corporatocracy”, the commensurate dissolution of the liberal state and the violation of its basic social contract. Critics’ objections to these shifts in power are not merely a matter of principle, nor is the pivot from state to corporate regulation of social action an abstraction above the notice of everyday citizens (and consumers). The costs of corporatocracy are many, and immediate. In the case of algorithmic copyright regulation and en8  Eduardo Moisés Penalver / Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws: How Squatters, Pirates, and Protesters Improve the Law of Ownership, New Haven, CT 2010. 9  John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright 2.0 and You, Oxford 2011. 10  Aram Sinnreich, The Piracy Crusade: How the Music Industry’s War on Sharing Destroys Markets and Erodes Civil Liberties, Amherst, MA 2013. 11  Neal Stephenson, Snow Crash, New York 1993.

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forcement, free speech and privacy are routinely sacrificed in the interest of maximizing corporate profitability. To put it even more bluntly, companies like Google and Facebook have a fiduciary duty to their shareholders to overprotect intellectual property on their platforms, sacrificing fair use and the public domain, as well as the security of their users’ personal data, in order to minimize potential exposure to secondary infringement liability. The laws were crafted this way intentionally to necessitate this outcome, based on the standards established under the global “TRIPS plus” treaty regime, which in turn was engineered, bought and paid for by the chief executives of twelve large corporations with valuable worldwide intellectual property portfolios.12 The profit motive of liability risk aversion is even further compounded in the case of algorithmically-based digital information platforms like Google and Facebook, both of which present the veneer of access to knowledge and the promise of social connectivity while basing their profit models on the exact opposite principles. Google’s primary revenue strategy is search engine marketing, selling premiere placement on its search engine interface to the highest bidders. Facebook’s primary revenue strategy is contextually-targeted advertising and paid placement on users’ timelines. In both cases, the companies are restricting businesses’ access to their customers via the “organic”, algorithmically-driven user interfaces, and exacting a toll for providing more efficient, direct, higher volume access to those same customers. To put it simply, opacity and censorship are not merely epiphenomena of internet business practices; they are the business of the internet. In short, while state actors bound to the social contract are required legally to uphold principles of justice, equality, fairness and freedom, the corporate actors behind algorithmic governance (of copyright and many other processes that were previously the exclusive domain of the state) not only lack these mandates, but have directly conflicting ones, which contribute directly to injustice, inequality, unfairness, and loss of agency among the citizenry. IV. The Destabilization of Ontology In addition to the cultural, material, and institutional risks of algorithmic copyright governance, there is an ontological risk as well. This crisis threatens to destabilize some of the basic definitional parameters of modernity, further undermining human agency, autonomy, and sovereignty. The vision of copyright enshrined in our laws, economies and institutions continges on a largely uninvestigated categorical distinction between “original” and “copy.” This a priori distinction, though it may seem natural and inevitable to many in our contemporary culture, is in fact rooted in historical, cultural, and political 12  Susan K. Sell, Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights, Cambridge 2003.

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specificities, especially industrialization and the Enlightenment.13 The primacy of the originator over the copyist is a conceit that reifies the industrialist division of labor, the elevation of the bourgeoisie to economic superiority, and the irreducibility of the “modern individual” as the fundamental unit of social action and power.14 The rise of algorithmic copyright governance, and the networked digital creation, distribution and consumption infrastructure that surrounds it, undermines the relations of production that inform the original / copy binary. This is true at both the human and the technological scales. Internet users who participate in “configurable culture” such as memes, remixes, and mashups occupy a space of indeterminacy between production and consumption.15 And newer delivery platforms for digital information, such as streaming and peer-to-peer file sharing, dispense with the architectural conceit of originals and copies, using technological features such as “ephemeral” copies and “bittorrents” to deliver a coherent experience for the end user. Thus far, the law has not effectively caught up with these new infrastructural models, and continuing litigations and debates surround the application of their technological features to legacy definitions of “copying” and “distribution”, as well as legal terms of art like “de minimis” and “public display”. The rearticulation of original and copy engenders a rearticulation of social power relations. In the classic modern, industrialist model, as instantiated in contemporary copyright law, the original has primacy over the copy, and the owner of the original possesses rights to control the speech and behaviors of those who possess copies. In the context of algorithmic regulation, these decisions and distinctions are largely made by private entities, according to opaque mechanisms, with little or no recourse for correction or renegotiation. In essence, social power relations are realigned to subject all users to the tyranny of the database, and thus to subjugate them to the tyranny of the corporation or state that controls the database. The database, then, becomes a codified social ontology, whose dictates are enforced both technologically and institutionally. The implications for this dynamic extend well beyond copyright, and even beyond issues of free speech and censorship. In the United States, algorithms determine vital issues such as the credit rating of a borrower, the legal surveillability of a communicant, and, even more recently, the domestic security of an immigrant. Elsewhere, algorithms play an even deeper role in determining social standing. For instance, China is in the midst of building a “social credit system” which will assign each citizen a “trustworthiness score” based on a variety of factors, and 13  Martha Woodmansee, The Author, Art, and the Market: Rereading the History of Aesthetics, New York 1996; Peter Decherney, Hollywood’s Copyright Wars: From Edison to the Internet, New York 2013. 14  Aram Sinnreich, Mashed Up: Music, Technology and the Rise of Configurable Culture, Amherst, MA 2010. 15  Axel Bruns, Blogs, Wikipedia, Second Life, and Beyond: From Production to Produsage, New York 2008.

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then permit or deny them individual freedoms based on that score for perpetuity. As these systems become normative (and accepted as such), they will not only continue to undermine individual agency, but may also “interfere with the sovereignty of other nations”, according to a recent report published by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.16 In short, there is a direct line between YouTube’s Content ID system and China’s social credit infrastructure. The realignment of the original / copy dichotomy and automation of the ontological system behind it is both metaphorically and functionally an instrument of the erosion of modernity, and the legal subjugation of the liberal individual by technocratic, often corporatist systems that are opaque, unaccountable, and global in the scope of their authority. V. Conclusion As I have argued briefly in this article, algorithmic copyright governance engenders a series of overlapping crises which collectively threaten to destabilize the Western liberal state. The quantization of culture, typefied by the reduction of nuanced aesthetic judgment to a standardized system of scores and rankings, undermines the autonomy of individuals and communities as vital contributors to, and arbiters of, cultural meaning. The convergence of institutions, typefied in the algorithm’s unified role as legislator, executor, and judge of copyright, betokens the dissolution of the democratic separation of powers, opening the door for authoritarian rule. The expansion of scale creates and normalizes the conditions under which traditional means of interpreting and executing the law appear woefully inadequate, and private algorithms become the logical and necessary solution to this failure by the state. Finally, the destabilization of ontology erodes the very conceptual foundations of liberal democracy, replacing an already imbalanced system of power relations with a much steeper hierarchy in which nearly every member of society is relegated to the inferior (and posterior) position of copyist and consumer. Collectively, these developments suggest that we must radically reimagine our copy­ right system if we are to preserve the individual agency and collective autonomy that have served as the foundational principles of liberalism and modernity. Zusammenfassung Die Durchsetzung urheberrechtlich begründeter Rechtsansprüche wird im Internet von Inhabern umfangreicher Rechtekataloge sowie von Social-Media-Plattformen, die Haftungsansprüche vermeiden wollen, zunehmend an automatisierte, 16  Samantha Hoffman, Social Credit: Technology-enhanced Authoritarian Control with Global Consequences, ASPI International Cyber Policy Centre Policy Brief No. 6/2018, Canberra 2018.

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algorithmengestützte Kontrollmechanismen delegiert. Der Artikel benennt vier Probleme, die die Einführung derartiger Kontrollmechanismen mit sich bringt, und wirft die Frage auf, inwiefern diese Entwicklung die Bedingungen des liberalen, demokratischen Rechtsstaats in Frage stellen könnte. (I) Die ‚Quantifizierung‘ der Kultur untergräbt die Autonomie von Einzelnen und Gemeinschaften, auf deren Beiträgen und Urteilen kulturelle Bedeutung wesentlich beruht. (II) Insofern die Algorithmen (bzw. deren Autoren) selbst die Regeln bestimmen, nach denen bestimmte Inhalte zugelassen oder blockiert werden, fungieren sie zugleich als gesetzgebende, ausübende und urteilende Gewalt sowie als Kläger und Entscheidungsinstanz in einem. Darin liegt eine gefährliche Auflösung der für den modernen Rechtsstaat grundlegenden Gewaltenteilung. (III) Aufgrund des enormen Anwachsens der Größenordnung, in der im Internet heute Handlungen der Nutzung und Verbreitung unter anderem von urheberrechtlich geschützten Inhalten massenweise vorgenommen werden, erscheinen die klassischen Methoden der Interpretation und Anwendung geltenden Rechts als hoffnungslos überfordert, weshalb algorithmengestützte Kontrollmechanismen Abhilfe schaffen sollen. (IV) Angesichts der hochgradig vernetzten Infrastruktur der digitalen Produktion, Verbreitung und Nutzung kultureller Güter erscheint die dem Urheberrecht zugrundeliegende und in den algorithmengestützten Kontrollmechanismen vorausgesetzte Unterscheidung von ‚Original‘ und ‚Kopie‘ zunehmend als fragwürdig. Die Destabilisierung der Ontologie des Immaterialgüterrechts rührt an die begrifflichen Grundlagen der liberalen Demokratie. Ein unausgewogenes System von Machtbeziehungen wird abgelöst durch eine unvergleichlich rigidere Hierarchie, die fast allen Mitgliedern der Gesellschaft nur die untergeordnete Rolle des Kopisten und Konsumenten fremder Werke zuweist. Aus dem Zusammenwirken dieser vier Probleme ergibt sich die Notwendigkeit, das Urheberrecht grundlegend neu zu regeln, wenn individuelle Handlungsfreiheit und gemeinschaftliche Selbstbestimmung erhalten bleiben sollen, die der modernen, liberalen Gesellschaft zugrunde liegen.

Geo-blocking: Protection of Author’s Rights, of Cultural Diversity, or of an Outdated Business Model? Pavel Zahrádka The audiovisual industry is currently marked by conflicts between the conduct of internet users and social structures such as market and law. This tension is due to the dynamic progress of digital technology and the associated change in consumer habits and expectations that conflict with the static nature of the law and of business models.1 This paper will focus on one of the many conflicts between consumer behaviour and market structure, namely on the blocking of access to specific types of audiovisual content (namely films as well as television films and series) in digital media services within the EU based upon the location (i.e., the member state) from which the user connects to the internet. I. Setting the Stage: Restricting Access to Audiovisual Content as a Moral Dilemma I have been interested in German culture since my undergraduate studies and I would love to see the comedy Fack ju Göthe 3. Wir sind die Neuen, but I am unable to do so in the Czech Republic, because this film is not distributed in my home country. My wish to watch the film is rejected by the German video-on-demand (VoD) provider as an unsolicited request; my access to the content offered by a German VoD platform is blocked by a virtual wall. All I could do is to travel to the closest German film venue playing – if I am lucky – the movie, or to buy it on DVD via Amazon. I could also download it from an online platform with illegally distributed content. How can it be, though, that I am unable to access a film online because of the place from where I connect to the internet (i.e. from where I live), but in the offline world, the distributor does not check my nationality or permanent residence when I purchase a cinema ticket or DVD?2 What causes this asymme1  See e.g. Jakub Macek / Pavel Zahrádka, Online Piracy and the Transformation of the Audiences’ Practices: Case of the Czech Republic, in: Darren Hudson Hick / Reinold Schmü­cker (eds.), The Aesthetics and Ethics of Copying, New York / London 2016, pp. 335 – 358; Paul Stepan, Urheberrecht und Digitalisierung: Eine Zwischenbilanz, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft 39 (2013), pp. 405 – 420. 2  The statement above on the free movement of goods concerns the EU region. The geographic segmentation of the global audiovisual market is caused by, for example, selling physi-

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try between accessing culture online and offline? The cross-border availability of author’s works in the offline world of the European Union is warranted by the principle of rights exhaustion. It provides that rightholders lose control over the distribution of the copies of their work on their first sale by the copyright owner or with his consent.3 Due to this principle, authors are unable to prevent the cross-border parallel sales of the copies of their work within the EU. This principle, however, only applies to intellectual property in a physical form, i.e. to printed books, music and audiovisual works recorded on physical media, etc. There is no similar legal standard regulating the distribution of author’s works in digital format.4 This paper aims at an ethical analysis of geo-blocking in the European audio­ visual sector. My question is: is restricting access to digital audiovisual content based on the consumer’s geographical location morally justifiable? Existing research on geo-blocking has primarily focused on describing subversive strategies used by consumers to circumvent digital barriers, explaining the economic reasons behind these barriers, and estimating the economic impact that their removal would have on the audiovisual industry.5 Ethical reflection is integral to this discussion as geo-blocking affects moral claims of individual interest groups. Ethical reflection should thereby precede any political decision-making and proposals for changing the relevant legal norms. I think that, instead of defending the status quo or determining the boundaries of legitimate conduct based on what is technologically feasible, the purpose of (ethical) research in this area should be to contribute to the solution of conflicts such as the presently escalating conflict between the demand of consumers to legally access online audiovisual content and the territorial fragmentation of the European audiovisual market. One preliminary question is whether geo-blocking still needs to be discussed at all. After all, as part of the EU Digital Single Market strategy, the European Commission has suggested a number of measures that will eliminate unjustified blocking of consumers based on their nationality or country of residence. However, not a single one of the three European Commission proposals for legislative reform concerning geo-blocking will ensure barrier-free cross-border access to cal content carriers on different continents with different DVD region codes. They must correspond with the region code of the DVD player. 3  See Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, OJ L 167, art. 4. 4  One exception is the decision of the European Court of Justice on the sale of used software downloaded legally from the internet by the user. In the dispute of Oracle International Corp. and Used Soft GmbH, the court ruled that the principle of exhaustion of IP rights also applies to computer programme copies that are not part of a physical medium (such as a CD). See Judgment of the Court dated 3 July 2012: UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle International Corp, C-128/11. 5  Roman Lobato / James Meese, Geoblocking and Global Video Culture, Amsterdam 2016; Gregor Langus / Damien Neven / Sophie Poukens, Economic Analysis of the Territoriality of the Making Available Right in the EU, Brussels 2014; J. Scott Marcus / Georgios Petropoulos, Extending the Scope of the Geo-blocking Prohibition: An Economic Assessment, Brussels 2017.

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audiovisual content offered by audiovisual online services operating in a different EU member state than the one where the internet is accessed.6 The regulation on the portability of digital online services across the EU ensures that consumers who have purchased audiovisual online services in their country of residence will be able to use the services while visiting another EU country. Critics of geo-blocking therefore sometimes ironically refer to this legal regulation as “roaming for Netflix”. The proposal for a regulation of unjustified geo-blocking between member states explicitly excludes audiovisual online services. The proposal for a regulation of online broadcasting, which extends the scope of the country of origin principle from satellite broadcasting to broadcasters’ ancillary online services (such as catch-up TV or simultaneous online broadcasting) is basically impotent as it does not include all audiovisual online services (such as VoD services). It is also accompanied by a contractual freedom clause allowing producers and distributors to contractually agree on introducing geo-blocking measures which will restrict the availability of online content to select member states. Moreover, members of the key committees of the European Parliament have proposed limiting the applicability of the country of origin principle to news and current affairs (ITRE) or excluding cinematographic works and sports events (CULT) from its scope.7 Geo-blocking therefore remains an important issue in the audiovisual sector. The method selected for this ethical research is a wide reflective equilibrium.8 This method consists of the following steps. 1) It strives to take the moral attitudes of all stakeholders affected by the given moral problem into account, i.e. in this case, the moral attitudes of the value chain actors (the authors, producers, and distributors) and also of the consumers of audiovisual content. The set of relevant interest groups is defined on the basis of a shared and explicitly formulated m ­ oral 6  See Regulation (EU) 2017/1128 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on cross-border portability of online content services in the internal market. Text with EEA relevance, OJ L 168, pp. 1 – 11; Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on addressing geo-blocking and other forms of discrimination based on customers’ nationality, place of residence or place of establishment within the internal market, 25 May 2016, COM(2016) 289; Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down rules on the exercise of copyright and related rights applicable to certain online transmissions of broadcasting organizations and retransmissions of television and radio programmes, 14 September 2016, COM(2016) 594. 7  Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, Draft Opinion on the Proposal for a regulation the European Parliament and of the Council laying down rules on the exercise of copyright and related rights applicable to certain online transmissions of broadcasting organisations and retransmissions of television and radio programmes, PE604.610v01-00; AM\1124955EN, amendment no. 119, 3 May 2017; Committee on Culture and Education, Draft Opinion on the Proposal for a regulation the European Parliament and of the Council laying down rules on the exercise of copyright and related rights applicable to certain online transmissions of broadcasting organisations and retransmissions of television and radio programmes, PE599.845v01-00; AM\1118130EN, amendment no. 3, 14 March 2017. 8  Norman Daniels, Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics, Journal of Philosophy 76 (1979), pp. 256 – 282.

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interest that leads to a moral conflict.9 2) It is anchored in common morality, resting on moral intuitions shared by all relevant (morally-minded) stakeholders. Moral intu­ition is a belief which stakeholders advocate without any argumentative support and in whose legitimacy they have the highest levels of confidence. 3) The shared moral intuitions will obviously be too general to serve as guidelines for acting in specific situations that are often highly complex. The next step of my ethical analysis will therefore involve their specification, i.e., the definition of specific conditions that need to be met for the moral norms to be binding. 4) In the event of a conflict between two moral norms or their specifications, the two are weighed against each other: their advantages and disadvantages are taken into account. This weighing is governed by the following rules: 4a) the researcher needs to be impartial; 4b) no morally preferable alternative action is available; 4c) there are good reasons to act on the overriding norm; 4d) negative consequences caused by the violation of the weaker moral norm will be minimized; 4e) there is a realistic prospect of achieving the moral objective justifying the infringement of the weaker norm. 5) The final step of the ethical analysis is to test the coherence of balanced and specified norms with both basic moral intuitions and the available relevant facts.10 The resulting coherence between moral intuitions, specified moral norms and available knowledge results in a wide reflective equilibrium. My thesis is that the geo-blocking of online audiovisual services and contents involves a clash between two elementary moral intuitions. Consumers do not want to be restricted in their access to cultural content because of their respective place of residence. They may also claim to have a moral right not to be discriminated against based on their nationality or place of residence. At the same time, authors have a perfectly legitimate interest in an adequate remuneration for their creative work. This conflict is clearly illustrated by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, where the first paragraph of Article 27 says: “Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits”, while the second paragraph of the same 9  Given that the conflict is not defined as a conflict between the requirement to protect the economic interests of rightholders and the requirement of fair competition, namely protection of the economic freedoms of the European single market (free movement of goods and services between member states), the category of relevant stakeholders does not include politicians or policy makers representing the interests of the public, national states, or the European Union. However, the conflict managed to draw the attention of the European Commission, which has investigated a licensing agreement between six US major film studios and pay TV provider Sky UK since 2014. According to the European Commission, said agreement possibly breaches the rules of free competition as it contains clauses which require that 1) Sky UK, within its paid internet services and satellite services, blocks consumers from outside the UK and Ireland from access to films; (2) studios prevent broadcasters from other member states from making their pay TV services available to consumers in the UK and Ireland. This guarantees absolute territorial exclusivity to national broadcasters, as both active and passive cross-border sales are ruled out. See Commission Decision of 26 July 2016 in Case AT.40023 – Cross-border access to pay-TV. 10  For a methodological discussion, see Tom Beauchamp  / James Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 7th ed., New York / Oxford 2013, p. 23.

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article claims: “Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.”11 These rights are obviously contradictory in the case of geo-blocking. In order to balance them and to decide which one is more significant, we first need to focus on the reasons that justify these rights. II. Why Should We Abolish Geo-blocking? What are the reasons put forward by particular interest groups in the audiovisual field for abolishing geo-blocking? 1. Geo-blocking confines audiences within the national borders of their countries: it discriminates against language and cultural minorities, language learners, long-term and short-term migrants, and exchange students with respect to access to their culture or to a culture they are interested in.12 2. Geo-blocking confines creators and national culture to the national borders of the member states. For instance, the statistics of the European Audiovisual Observatory reveal that, in the EU, European films are available on VoD platforms in 2.8 countries on average (co-produced films are distributed at slightly higher levels in 3.6 Member States on average), while US films are available on VoD platforms in 6.8 EU countries on average.13 3. A large proportion of European films are co-financed from public funds supporting cinematographic productions, including European funds (such as MEDIA and Eurimages programme). The European public should therefore have legal access to them and should not be discriminated against, based on geographical location. 4. Geo-blocking can hurt the economy because it berieves the value chain actors of potential profit from currently excluded consumers from other Member States. They might be interested in purchasing a given service or content but have no legal options to do so. Current consumer behaviour studies show that consumers are willing to pay for content if they have legal access for a reasonable price. The studies also show that the primary reason for internet piracy is the unavailability of content, and not the amorality of consumers who do not want to pay for the content.14 5. Qualitative consumer behaviour studies also demonstrate that consumers perceive the relationship between authors and consumers as reciprocal: consumers 11  UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (217 [III] A), Paris 1948, art. 27. 12  See, e.g., NPLD / EFNIL, Joint NPLD / EFNIL Position Paper on the Multilingual Digital Single Market, dated 27 April 2015, http://www.meta-net.eu/events/meta-forum-2015/talks/ npldefnilpositionpaper.pdf (last access: 7 March 2018). 13  Christian Grece, How Do Films Circulate on VOD Services and in Cinemas in the European Union? A Comparative Analysis, Brussels 2016, p. 4. 14  Macek / Zahrádka, Online Piracy (supra, n. 1), p. 347 et seq.

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are obliged to pay the authors for the outputs of their creative work and the authors are obliged to enable consumers to access their works.15 Consumers think that authors failing to meet this reciprocal responsibility lose their right to a financial reward: “We should be allowed to access it [content] anyhow, and if they’re not going to let us access it you’re going to go round and find another port of entry to get it.”16 6. Consumers and rightholders within the audiovisual market should have equal options. Producers, or more precisely distributors, are free to decide on which market or in which Member State they want to make their work available to the public. Consumers, however, are unable to freely decide on which market or in which Member State they want to purchase the services of the audiovisual provider. This asymmetry is also notable in the relationship between the value chain actors and the EU single market. If producers and distributors benefit from the fundamental freedoms of the single market, such as the free movement of services, capital, goods, and persons, they should contribute back to the digital single market, for example by enabling cross-border access to audiovisual works for customers from other member states. 7. Finally, abandoning of geo-blocking would provide consumers with access to a broader range of online cultural content, improving their access to the cultural diversity of Europe. III. Why is This Video not Available in Your Country? What are, on the other hand, the reasons for maintaining geo-blocking in the audiovisual online services sector, according to value chain actors? 1. According to the representatives of the film industry, there is no reason to remove geo-blocking, as there is no sufficient cross-border demand for access to audiovisual content that would exceed the costs of the localization and the relevant territorial license. This argument, however, ignores the demand of linguistic and cultural minorities, foreign students, and those interested in a foreign language and culture for the cross-border availability of audiovisual content. Regardless of this aspect, given the current copyright regime – based on which the right to communicate the work to the public is subject to the country of destination principle17 – it 15 See Macek / Zahrádka, Online Piracy (supra, n. 1), p. 352 et seq.; Paula Dootson / Nicolas Suzor, The Game of Clones and the Australia Tax: Divergent Views about Copyright Business Models and the Willingness of Australian Consumers to Infringe, University of New South Wales Law Journal 38 (2015), pp. 206 – 239. 16  Dootson / Suzor, Game of Clones (supra, n. 15), p. 224. 17  This means that a work is communicated to the public in each member state in which the work is received, i.e. in order for the distributor to make the work available in particular member states to the public, the distributor must have the relevant territorial license for each of the targeted states or the rightholder’s permission to distribute the work in the territories.

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can be economically disadvantageous to obtain a license to distribute the work in a territory where the demand does not exceed the costs of its localization and promotion, or where the territory is an unknown market environment. Although the current copyright regime allows for multi-territory licensing of rights for the online distribution of films, business practices are predominantly governed by the principle of territorial exclusivity due to the local presence of most European distributors, differences in local audience demand, and the protection of the commercial value of exclusive mono-territorial licenses. The cross-border accessibility of a work is thus hindered, primarily, by the business practices of splitting property rights into partial rights, the scope of which is territorially defined. The economic advantages and disadvantages of the demand for a film are, however, relative to the particular copy­r ight regime: in the current model of exclusive territorial licensing in the audiovisual industries, it may indeed be economically disadvantageous and therefore unreasonable for a local Czech distributor to acquire a license for the distribution of a Portuguese sitcom in the Czech Republic and to invest in its localization and promotion, because presumably not many Czech viewers will be interested in this film. In a hypothetical scenario of abolishing geo-blocking by permitting “passive sales”, a Czech customer could purchase the film from a Portuguese VoD service provider without the service provider having to buy a license for the Czech territory.18 2. Banning geo-blocking measures would significantly affect the value of territorial licenses, because such licenses would lose their exclusivity; they could no longer guarantee a distribution monopoly to their holders for the relevant market.19 This could result in a decline of the amount of produced audiovisual works and thus a limited availability. An important part of the production of films as complex and financially demanding projects is the pre-sale of the rights to investors – the future distributors. These investors are only willing to invest in the production of a film in exchange for the exclusive rights to the distributing the film within a given territory. If these rights were not exclusive, this would obviously decrease the motivation of the future distributor to participate in the development of the film by purchasing the relevant right in advance. 3. Another reason for the potential decline in cultural production in the audio­ visual sector following the removal of digital barriers that separate national markets is the risk of a revenue cannibalization across release windows. This could, again, decrease the value of the territorial license due to the loss of its exclusivity 18  The difference between active sales and passive sales is acknowledged by European law, see, for example, Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to Categories of Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices; European Commission, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, SEC(2010) 411. 19  EFADs, Cannes Declaration: Preserving Territoriality to Improve the Circulation of European Films and Access to European Culture, dated 22 May 2017, http://www.efads.eu/wp-con​ tent/uploads/EFADs-Cannes-Declaration.pdf (last access: 7 March 2018).

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and hence result in a decrease in the extent of available financial resources for audio­visual productions. Films are released through individual distribution channels (windows), which open subsequently in set time intervals. The standard process is that a film is first released in a window capable of generating the highest marginal revenue in the shortest possible time (cinema). Television is at the end of the distribution chain. However, this chain is not synchronized across all member states, because legislations differ from country to country (e.g. in France, a film can only be offered through a VoD service 36 months after its cinematic release). Another reason is that public holidays differ between countries, which is crucial for key movie premieres. The distribution channels available to the local owner of the relevant territorial license also differ. Cinemas have different screening schedules in some countries. Some buy the license for distributing a movie only after the it has been successful in the country of its origin or at an international festival. In combination with abolishing geo-blocking, different time slots for the release of audiovisual content across EU countries can therefore lead to the revenue cannibalization from the primary release window (such as theatrical release) due to parallel availability of the same audiovisual content in other windows (such as home entertainment) in another member state. This economic uncertainty concerning the exploitation of the audiovisual content in a given territory may be reflected in the lower price the distributors are be willing to pay for a license that does not guarantee a distribution monopoly on the relevant market. Less money for producers means less money for the production of cinematographic works. 4. The abolition of digital borders will motivate producers and distributors to produce content primarily in major languages of the EU (English, German, and French). This will impair cultural diversity.20 5. The loss of territorial exclusivity will discourage distributors from investing in the localization and promotion of content and will eventually lead to shorter time windows for showing movies in cinemas. High-risk content (that is available across borders) might also be replaced by a different, less risky title. The abolition of territorial exclusivity can lead to a free-rider problem where the local advertising campaign of the distributor will benefit another provider of the same content. Lower amounts of content localization and promotion for films – which inform consumers as to the likelihood that a particular film is going to match their personal tastes – may lead to a lower consumer awareness of the audiovisual production and eventually to a decline in the overall revenues in the audiovisual industry and higher information costs for the consumer. 6. The cost of licenses for the distribution of audiovisual content in widely spoken languages (primarily English) may grow disproportionately due to the removal of digital barriers and the expansion of the market segment. The content will thereby become unaffordable for local distributors who do not aim at becoming a European service and do not have an established business partnership with Hollywood   EFADs, Cannes Declaration (supra, n. 18).

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stu­dios. This will, again, lead to a decrease in audiovisual content for consumers and to a decline of versions localized in ‘minor’ languages. 7. License chain actors should be free to decide under which conditions they want to enter into license agreements. If primary rightholders decide to territorially restrict the exercise of the IP rights, for example by geo-blocking, this is perfectly legitimate. IV. Who is Right? Balancing Conflicting Moral Norms It should be noted that the reasons for maintaining geo-blocking are based on the intuition that authors are entitled to a fair and adequate remuneration for their creative work and the intuition that consumers have a right to access cultural wealth and diversity – but that this diversity could be severely damaged if geo-blocking were abolished. The right to access cultural wealth thus seems to legitimise both the removal and preservation of geographical blocking. In order to discuss these contradictory arguments that refer to the same moral intuition, we have to assess, first of all, the normative impact of the moral claims on either side. However, we must also take into account relevant facts and the related hypotheses in order to assess the likelihood of the predicted consequences of abolishing geo-blocking. The question of which of the conflicting norms is more relevant requires a weighing of the reasons supporting these norms. The question of the impact of abolishing geo-blocking requires taking the available facts into account and specifying the moral norms. So what are the available facts in this context? 1. The demand for audiovisual content is fragmented throughout the EU due to its cultural and linguistic diversity. Europe’s linguistic diversity requires distri­ butors of audiovisual works to adapt to the specific needs of the national markets (dubbing the work, translating adverts, taking cultural differences such as humour, local stories, and the history of the country into account). Moreover, according to the findings of the 2015 opinion poll, the majority of Europeans (62 %) only watch films or series that are either dubbed in their own language or feature the corresponding subtitles.21 Over a quarter of the respondents (26 %) in EU member states whose official language is not English say that they watch films or series with English audio tracks or subtitles (see Eurobarometer 411). 2. Copyright in the EU is fragmented based on the principle of territoriality.22 Due to this legal fragmentation, the right to a single copyrighted work can be divided into 28 national rights, which can be individually sold to 28 different entities in 28 member states. 21  TNS Political & Social, Flash Eurobarometer 411: Cross-border Access to Online Content, August 2015, p. 81 et seq. 22  Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 9 September 1886, art. 5.

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3. The audiovisual industry’s business models are fragmented due to the principle of copyright territoriality and the territorial fragmentation of the demand. However, the current fragmentation of national markets within the EU is not due to remaining differences in national copyright laws, but rather motivated by the economic rationales. Although copyright enables producers to sell multi-territorial licenses for all EU member states to a distributor, in practice, producers mostly sell exclusive mono-territorial licenses, because (3a) it guarantees that the licensed audiovisual content will not be offered by anyone else in the respective territory than by a licensee, i.e. mostly by a local distributor. (3b) The pre-sale of exclusive territorial rights is also important in terms of financing audiovisual content. Territorial exclusivity motivates the distributor to invest in the production or co-production of a cinematographic work in exchange for the distribution monopoly in the given territory. (3c) Territorial exclusivity also eliminates the negative externalities of the market: it prevents inconsistent marketing campaigns for an audio­visual work offered by different local distributors; it prevents the free-rider problem that typically occurs if competing content providers benefit from the marketing campaigns of their competitors for one and the same audiovisual content; it also prevents disruptions of the sequential distribution chain [theatres → DVD → VoD → pay TV → FTA]. At the same time, it enables local distributors to buy a license allowing them to distribute audiovisual content in the territory in which they provide services at a reasonable price, whereas the price of a pan-European license would be too high for them (e.g., for Hollywood blockbusters).23 4. The distribution of audiovisual content based on exclusive territorial licenses allows for a discriminatory pricing policy that is based on the different value of the content in different EU member states (or on the different demand for it) and the varying purchasing power of the population of that member state. 5. What does geo-blocking protect? Geo-blocking does not protect copyright but the business models of the audiovisual industry. Copyright law does not grant authors the right to permit or prohibit inhabitants of only one particular country or of several countries access to their works.24 Using tools that enable “cybertravel” therefore does not violate the copyright but the license agreement between the producer and distributor, or the user agreements.25 Purchasing an exclusive territorial license typically obliges the digital content distributor to offer the content only in the relevant member state, but it does not oblige the distributor to verify the geographical location of a customer. Producers and distributors therefore add clauses to the license agreements that grant absolute territorial exclusivity through the obli  Langus /Neven /Poukens, Economic Analysis (supra, n. 5), pp. 52 – 61.   Czech Copyright Act: Law No. 121/2000 Coll. of 7 April 2000 on Copyright, Rights Related to Copyright and on the Amendment of Certain Laws, http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/ text.jsp?file_id=126154. 25  Marketa Trimble, The Future of Cybertravel: Legal Implications of the Evasion of Geo­ location, Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 22 (2012), pp. 567 – 657: p. 619. 23 24

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gation of the digital audiovisual content provider to prevent interested parties from other member states from accessing the respective online service. As reported in the current Final Report of the European Commission on the E-commerce Sector Inquiry, the vast majority of digital content providers (68 %) restrict access to their online digital content services from other member states, and 59 % of them do so because of contractual restrictions in the agreements with rightholders. Geo-­ blocking is most prevalent in agreements for TV series (74 %), films (66 %), and sports events (63 %).26 With respect to balancing the conflicting moral claims, the key question is ­ hether the circumvention of geo-blocks is morally wrong. It violates the contracw tual clauses of license agreements or user agreements and may lead to an illegal activity, namely to a copyright infringement. Does this criminalize the legitimate claim for legal access to cultural contents? Qualitative studies of consumer behaviour reveal that many consumers believe that circumventing geo-blocks is not morally wrong if the respective content is not otherwise accessible.27 Consumers argue that the unavailability of digital content justifies the circumvention of the service provider’s licensing terms. The moral claim is that violating the terms of service (gaining access to a legal service abroad via VPN, despite geo-blocking) or infringing on copyright (acquiring an illegal copy) is not wrong if rights holders fail to meet the consumers’ demand. If we accept the cross-border availability of audiovisual content as a legitimate consumer interest and the consumers’ right to culture, the question is not “How to prevent legislative reforms that would harm the ecosystem of audiovisual industry?”, but “How to change the current business models and enable the cross-border availability of digital audiovisual content without hurting the legitimate interests of the value chain actors in fair remuneration and profit”? Greater weight of the moral claim to access culture over the claim for a fair remuneration in the debate on geo-blocking of audiovisual digital content is also supported by the following asymmetry in the causal relationship between geo-blocking and its proclaimed benefits or detriments for each party. Whereas geo-blocking directly leads to a lesser amount of available cultural content and therefore restricts consumers’ right to access culture and their right not to be discriminated against, the causal link between geo-blocking and a fair remuneration for content creators is not clear. The application of geo-blocks does not automatically guarantee the rightholders’ remuneration. It only decreases their economic uncertainty by securing a distribution monopoly in the respective territory. A fair remuneration, however, can also be achieved without blocking consumers from other member states. From this point of view, geo-blocking appears to be an inappropriate tool to ensure adequate remuneration for the rightholders, which leads to negative side-effects. 26  Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Final Report on the E-commerce Sector Inquiry, COM(2017) 229 final, Brussels, 10 May 2017, p. 15, http:// eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52017DC0229&from=EN. 27  Dootson / Suzor, Game of Clones (supra, n. 15).

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Given that there is a demand to legally access audiovisual content, why are rightholders unable to meet this revenue-generating demand? The reason is simple: in some cases, a wider online access to audiovisual content does not economically benefit rightholders more than the territorial or temporal exclusion of selected consumer segments with a lower purchasing power. For rightholders, excluding certain consumers through exclusive territorial licenses that allow for content to be only disseminated in selected distribution channels or in economically less attractive territories with a holdback, is a strategy to maximize their profit. This strategy pays off despite the fact that it can increase internet piracy among less engaged or wealthy consumer groups. Moreover, since geo-blocking restricts consumers’ access to culture, there is a need to complement the four economic freedoms of the single (digital) market with the freedom of access to information and culture. The social function of copyright and its reform has to be recognized as a means of balancing the interests and needs of social actors, i.e. the authors and distributors of works as well as their con­ sumers. From this perspective, copyright as a subjective right does not arise from the creative work of the author, but is conferred on the author by society through a social agreement. It is a temporary monopoly that protects the exploitation of the work created by the author in exchange for providing legal access to the work to the widest possible range of consumers (under the condition that the relevant fee is paid).28 No right is an absolute right, and the aim of copyright is to balance its exclusive component – which ensures the protection of creative labour and the control over the exploitation of its results – and its inclusive component which ensures access to creative works. If we look at, for example, the Czech copyright law, we find that fundamental rights (including the right to access to culture) are only taken into account in terms of exceptions from, and limitations of, copyright – such as permission to copy the work for personal use or to cite the work without author’s permission. The Copyright Act itself does not, however, include a right of con­ sumers to access culture.29

V. What Shall We Do? Generating Action-guiding Rules by Specifying Moral Norms Let us revisit the key question arising from the balancing of contradictory moral intuitions: how can current business models be adapted to improve the cross-border 28  For more on the social function of copyright as a principle for organizing access to culture and as a guarantee for the protection of the economic interests of authors, see Christophe Geiger, Copyright as an Access Right: Securing Cultural Participation through the Protection of Creators’ Interests, in: Rebecca Giblin / Kimberlee Weatherall (eds.), What If We Could Reimagine Copyright? Acton 2017, pp. 73 – 109. 29  See Czech Copyright Act: Law No. 121/2000 Coll. of 7 April 2000, http://www.wipo.int/ wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=126154.

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availability of digital audiovisual content without undermining the economic foundations that the audiovisual industry is built on? The efficiency of the proposed solution will depend on the behaviour of the value chain actors in response to a specific reform of the legal framework that regulates the distribution and consumption of audiovisual production. What are the possible reform scenarios? What could be the reactions of individual interest groups and the possible implications for the audiovisual industry on the basis of our existing knowledge about the production, distribution, and consumer practices of audiovisual stakeholders? 1. In the review of its Satellite and Cable Directive, the European Commission has proposed extending the application of the country of origin principle to online services ancillary to broadcast.30 This means that when a broadcaster buys a license for the online rights in the member state in which it has its principal establishment, this will allow for the pan-European dissemination of audiovisual content via catch-up and simulcasting services. This means that, even if you access content provided by ancillary online services from another member state, according to legal fiction, the content is accessed in the member state where the organization primarily provides its services. This reform proposal, however, provides producers and distributors with the contractual freedom to territorially restrict the exercise of the right to make audiovisual content available to the public. Therefore, this is not a step towards balancing the interests of rightholders and consumers, as the license chain actors can continue to apply geo-blocks restricting online access to audio­ visual content on the basis of contractual arrangements. 2. The opposite extreme would be to apply the country of origin principle to all audiovisual online services (including VoD) and to limit the contractual freedom in the sense of banning any contractual arrangements that oblige distributors to block access to audiovisual content for consumers from other countries.31 This solution would most likely disproportionately boost the price of premium content in major EU languages, so that local distributors could no longer afford to purchase the respective licenses. Moreover, many local distributors are not interested in buying pan-European licenses. In the case of public service televisions, they also lack the mandate to extend their services beyond the borders of the country in which they operate. The reform measure would thus grant them a tool they do not need or want. At the same time, this measure gives providers of European VoD platforms with global (or European) ambitions the means to improve their competitiveness against global players such as Netflix or Amazon. One of the competitive advantages of 30  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down rules on the exercise of copyright and related rights applicable to certain online transmissions of broadcasting organizations and retransmissions of television and radio programmes, 14 September 2016, COM(2016) 594. 31  This proposal was put forward by Bernt Hugenholtz and has been politically promoted by, for example, BEUC, a consumer protection organization, and by MEP Julia Reda. See Bernt Hugenholtz, Extending the SatCab Model to the Internet, Brussels 2015.

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global VoD platforms lies namely in an extensive legal service through which they are able to overcome the high transaction costs associated with the settlement of online rights for individual territories, which are often sold to local distributors in individual member states.32 The loss of territorial license exclusivity may, however, lead to a decline in the distributors’ willingness to pay for content (i.e. a decrease in the license price). This, again, may lead to fewer investments in audiovisual productions, which may negatively affect the quantity and quality of the produced works. In response to a geo-blocking ban, producers and distributors who are concerned about the revenue cannibalization across release windows or the lack of funding for cinematographic productions due to the loss of territorial exclusivity could still employ contractual arrangements to minimise the negative impact on their revenue stream, for example license the content by language market and re32  Unlike the Oxera author team, hired by the European Film Agency Directors (EFADs) to produce a study on the impact of territoriality elimination on the EU audiovisual industry and markets, I do not believe that applying the country-of-origin principle, combined with banning territorial restrictions on the exercise of the rights to online transmissions of audiovisual media ser­vices, will lead to (1) a homogenization of the supply of audiovisual services; (2) an increase in the cost of services for residents of EU member states with lower incomes as a result of the price alignment of services offered across the Member States; (3) a decrease in the quality of services offered as a result of a massive migration of consumers to global platforms with premium – albeit non-localized – content, and a decline of local online distribution that will not have the economic capital required to purchase “pan-European” premium content licenses. See Oxera, The Impact of Cross-border Access to Audiovisual Content on EU Consumers, May 2016, https://www.oxera.com/getmedia/dfe44fac-c028-4eb3-bb56-71bdfa79b2f9/2016-05-13Cross-border-report-(final).pdf.aspx; Oxera, Paying More for Less: The Impact of Cross-border Access Initiatives on Consumers in Eastern European and Baltic Countries, October 2017, https://www.oxera.com/getmedia/4482cd7c-7c0c-4dc3-87c4-3c4f88981e30/Oxera-reportPaying-more-for-less_rev7.pdf.aspx?ext=.pdf. (ad 1) A homogenization of content is unlikely because the specificity of the interests and preferences of local (national) audiences create a sufficiently strong demand for specific content that is economically attractive to producers and distributors (investors). Moreover, global platforms have begun to invest in content localization for the relevant national audience and in the production of culturally and linguistically specific audiovisual content that reflects the diversity of cultural demand across territories. Supply also remains diverse thanks to the existence of national public service broadcasters. (ad 2 – 3) Maintaining or breaking the territorial fragmentation of the market has no impact on driving smaller local distributors out of the audiovisual market, which is a current practice caused by a poorer or limited supply by local players. Local distributors face increased competition pressure from multinational VoD platforms that are able to provide their services at the same or similar costs across all EU territories and have, thanks to their economic capital and broad consumer base, a wider range of premium content. The survival strategy of smaller local distributors primarily consists in developing their own content, curating purchased content for a specific consumer group, and integrating their services into other release windows (festival, cinema), collaborating with transnational online platforms (iTunes, Google Play) or strategic partners – the so-called secondary online rights users (online media libraries of telecom operators or internet-based retailers) – in the online distribution of specific language versions of content. See Petr Szczepanik, Localize or Die: Intermediaries in a Small East-Central European On-Demand Market, Cinéma & Cie. International Film Studies Journal (special issue: Re-intermediation: Distribution, Online Access, and Gatekeeping in the Digital European Market) 17 (2017), no. 29, forthcoming in autumn 2018.

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quire dubbing (rather than subtitling), license the content for the entire European market in order to preserve exclusivity, or rights-based holdbacks precluding the film distribution on certain platforms until a certain period of time has passed. Furthermore, producers could impose restrictions on the availability of content on over-the-top media services that threaten the sales of content in particular territories with their cross-border reach. 3. A compromise could consist in the abolishing of geo-blocking with respect to audiovisual works after a certain standard period of time or after their release on free-to-air TV (FTA). The latter only generates a marginal share of total revenue. The potential cannibalization of this market by allowing access to foreign FTA broadcasting should therefore not pose any significant threat to the audiovisual production funding and should not diminish the total revenue from the sales of licenses.33 But could this reform measure lead to the cross-border cannibalization of release windows due to their different timing in different member states and thus to a decline in the value of the license? A look at the actual timing of release windows shows that this concern is unfounded. The FTA window is, on average, two years after the theatrical release. Two years are usually long enough for the content to be sold and distributed across other territories. Usually, the cross-border content distribution is launched several days or weeks after the work’s distribution in its country of origin. With the digitization of cinemas and changing consumer expectations, this time gap decreases year after year. Some movies are even released in cinemas at the same time world-wide.34 Nonetheless, this timing of the distribution concerns studio films, not art films whose cross-border distribution is not standardized. Hence there are also films that reach international audiences over a considerably longer time span. Still, this proposal would probably have no advantages, because one of the reasons for internet piracy is that audiovisual works are not available in many countries immediately after their release in primary distribution channels offered in the country of their origin.35 The technical feasibility of this measure is also dubious: how would the subscription video-on-demand (SVoD) service providers distinguish between audiovisual works that are subject to the measure and audiovisual works that are not? 4. What would be the consequences of a different compromise – to ban geo-blocking only for transactional video-on-demand (TVoD) services, which offer individual films and series for a one-time payment? This solution would enable 33  This proposal was presented by J. Scott Marcus / Georgios Petropoulos, Extending the Scope of the Geo-blocking Prohibition: An Economic Assessment, Brussels 2017, p. 47. 34  For example, on average, US films premiered in Czech cinemas 24 days later than in the US in 2017 (in 2010, it was 73 days). See the Kinomaniak website, http://kinomaniak.cz/ posuny-premier. 35  Simultaneous offline and online releases of films (day-and-date release) are still an exception in film distribution and limited to the area of art house productions and global video libraries’ own production. The standard practice is that films become available on VoD platforms three months after their theatrical release.

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European consumers to purchase any title available on a TVoD service based in any EU country. However, the risk here is that producers – worried that the exclusive territorial license for the distribution of audiovisual works in other release windows might lose in value – could avoid this distribution channel or could demand that the TVoD service provider must dub the licensed content. This would raise the costs of the content localization and restrict consumer choice. Moreover, this measure would also be unsystematic, and also discriminatory against other business m ­ odels by audiovisual online services (mainly SVoD services). The industry therefore needs a measure that will be non-discriminatory towards consumers and that will ensure equal conditions (the same rules) for all value chain stakeholders within the audiovisual sector.36 5. Last not least, one might preserve the territoriality principle, which is crucial to existing audiovisual business models, but allow for passive sales. No clearance of rights would be required for non-targeted territories where the content might still be accessed. Thus, the distribution of audiovisual works would continue to be primarily based on the sale and purchase of exclusive territorial licenses, but digital content distributors would no longer be allowed to reject an unsolicited request to purchase their audiovisual online services by a consumer from a territory not targeted by their services, i.e. the content is for instance not localized or promoted with respect to that territory This solution consists in banning contracts that commit distributors to block the access to the online content for users from unlicensed territories with the aim of ensuring absolute territorial exclusivity. The value of a territorial license will be maintained under these conditions, because the exclusive territorial license holder will remain the only party able to actively offer licensed audiovisual content within a particular member state. Moreover, the demand for audiovisual content is fragmented due to cultural and linguistic differences in Europe. If there are any consumer groups that are interested in purchasing content offered by an audiovisual online services provider from a different member state, these will be the so far excluded groups, i.e. cultural and linguistic minorities, exchange students, and parties interested in foreign language and culture. Cross-border purchases may, however, also be desired by consumers if the price of the content varies across member states to such a degree that the motivation to purchase cheaper audiovisual content will outweigh the transaction costs associated with opening a user account, purchasing in the local currency, and communicating in a foreign language. However, existing consumer behaviour surveys suggest that 36  This does not mean that, in order to enforce this objective, it would for political reasons not be feasible to gradually apply the reform measure to certain audiovisual online services. This strategy seems to be currently pursued by the European Commission. As part of its concept for the Digital Single Market, the European Commission has proposed that the scope of the country of origin principle should be extended from satellite television broadcasting to the ancillary online services of broadcasting organizations. Cf. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down rules on the exercise of copyright and related rights applicable to certain online transmissions of broadcasting organizations and retransmissions of television and radio programmes, 14 September 2016, COM(2016) 594.

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language barriers will continue to play a decisive role for the audiovisual market segmentation: firstly, the majority of consumers (in the Czech Republic, for example, 62 %) only view films or TV shows in their national language.37 Secondly, consumers prefer convenient and fast access to the required cultural content.38 Territorial arbitrages are therefore likely to occur for Hollywood blockbusters that are unavailable from the local distributor’s or that are significantly more expensive compared to the price of the same content offered by another provider in a different member state.39 Allowing for passive sales could also decrease the commercial value of a territorial license in markets with the same, or a similar, official language but different numbers of potential consumers (Belgium vs. France, Austria vs. Germany, etc.) – in particular, if the local distributor offers the audiovisual content in the respective language version earlier or at a significantly lower price. Although, for example, the German distributor pays much more for a license to release an Austrian film in Germany than the Austrian distributor for its release in Austria, German consumers can easily find through social networks an Austrian VoD provider who offers the same film earlier or cheaper. The provider does not even have to actively promote its services in Germany. Broadcasts of sport events, where the linguistic component is not as important as, for example, in a movie, may also run this risk. Finally, permitting passive sales could also threaten co-productions of audiovisual works because investors (distributors) from countries with the same or similar official language might not be interested. Geo-blocking could therefore be permitted under certain conditions and in justified special cases. This justification ought to be based on evidence that not being able to territorially limit the right to communicate a work to the public would significantly violate the copyright holder’s right to use the work and threaten the sales of a license, impair its commercial value, or prevent future co-productions of audiovisual works. At the same time, the role of the audiovisual market actors should be to develop new mechanisms that can determine the approximate value of the license, eliminate negative market externalities and thereby increase the economic security of the licensee, even if the latter can no longer be guaranteed by absolute territorial exclusivity. Proposals for addressing the issue of geo-blocking in the audiovisual sector and the corresponding discussions may seem too in-depth to some readers. They might claim that ethics should merely define a general moral principle for the direction of potential legal reforms. Should a moral philosopher leave the concrete technical solution up to politicians and legal experts, or the value chain actors? The devil is, as often, in the detail. If a moral standard is to become a practical tool for solving   TNS Political & Social, Flash Eurobarometer 411 (supra, n. 21), pp. 81 – 85.   Intellectual Property Office, Online Copyright Infringement Tracker: Latest Wave of Research (March 2017), July 2017, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/online-copy ­right-infringement-tracker-survey-7th-wave; Macek / Zahrádka, Online Piracy (supra, n. 1), p. 355. 39  However, the dominant providers of VoD services in Europe (such as Netflix) seem to apply homogenous pricing policies across the EU member states. 37

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conflicts and problems, it must be sufficiently specific. Only then will we be able to assess whether it is feasible to achieve the desired end by adhering to the norm in question – and what the extent of potential negative consequences of giving this norm preference over others might be.40 Zusammenfassung Der Zugang von Verbrauchern zu urheberrechtlich geschützten audiovisuellen Werken wie Musik und Videos, die durch Online-Mediendiensteanbieter zum Abruf über das Internet bereitgehalten werden, wird durch die Diensteanbieter in vielen Fällen differenziert gestaltet, wobei der Zugriff von bestimmten Ländern aus blockiert werden kann („Geoblocking“). Der vorliegende Beitrag widmet sich der ethischen Analyse der aufenthaltsterritoriumsbezogenen Sperrung des Zugangs zu solchen Angeboten; er sucht die bisher weitgehend durch ökonomische und rechtliche Gesichtspunkte beherrschte Diskussion über die Rolle und Legalität von Geoblocking im Bereich von audiovisuellen Online-Diensten durch eine ethische Reflexion der Legitimität von Geoblocking zu vertiefen. Für die ethische Analyse empfiehlt sich eine Methode des (von Rawls so genannten) „Überlegungsgleichgewichts“, wobei moralische Intuitionen für oder gegen die Verwendung von digitalen Barrieren, die den Zugang zu kulturellen Inhalten im Internet beschränken, zunächst hinsichtlich der Bedingungen ihrer Geltung spezifiziert und konfligierende Normen methodisch kontrolliert gegeneinander abgewogen werden. Dabei werden, soweit verfügbar, empirische Erkenntnisse über das Verbraucherverhalten und über Geschäftspraktiken und -interessen der Produzenten und Anbieter von audiovisuellen Werken einbezogen. Der Beitrag stützt sich insbesondere auf eine qualitative Studie über das Verhalten unterschiedlicher Akteure im Feld der Produktion, Distribution und Konsumption audiovisueller Werke, die 2015 bis 2018 zur Erforschung der Auswirkungen der Strategie der EU-Kommission für den digitalen Binnenmarkt in Europa auf die Kulturindustrie in der Tschechischen Republik durchgeführt wurde. Induktiv werden so ethisch relevante Aspekte von Konflikten um Rechte und Möglichkeiten des Zugangs zu urheberrechtlich geschützten Werken herausgearbeitet.

40  This work was supported by the Czech Science Foundation project Practices and Moral Politics of Copying and Downloading in the Czech Republic: Audiences, Authors, Producers and Distributors (GA18-19278S) and by the Center for Interdisciplinary Research (ZiF) in Bielefeld (Germany) who funded and hosted a one-year research group on The Ethics of Copy­ ing (2015/16).

Licensed to Share? How (not) to Re-balance Rights for Digital Goods Wybo Houkes I. Non-shareability Imagine that you love crime novels. You buy and read a few each month and share your enthusiasm by lending the novels that you have finished to others, in particular to your mother. At some point, you switch to buying digital books to save shelf space. Apart from this aspect, you are indifferent between digital and physical books: you find them equally pleasant to read, easy to purchase, etc. After buying a Kindle e-reader, you continue to purchase and read crime novels at your usual pace. However, you find that you can no longer share your digital books with others. The standard interface does not allow you to transfer a book to your mother’s e-reader; lending her yours would prevent you from using it; giving your mother the password of your Amazon account may be illegal1 and would give your mother undesired insight into your purchasing behaviour. Consulting consumer platforms and the Kindle terms of use that you have agreed to, you find that you do not, in fact, own your digital books, but instead have a perpetual non-exclusive license to access them, and cannot assign to third parties any of the rights associated with the license.2 This is an instance of ‘non-shareability’ in economic transactions: legal and /or technological obstacles prevent consumers from providing other consumers with temporary access to under-utilized goods. Non-shareability is not limited to the lending of e-books by individual consumers. Those buying ‘digital music’ on Ama­ zon, Google Play or Apple Music face similar obstacles, and so do university li­ braries in interlibrary lending of digitized research papers and public libraries that acquire e-books.3 Conversely, on the basis of the characterization just given, 1  Jason Koebler, Password Sharing Is a Federal Crime, Appeals Court Rules, Motherboard, 6 July 2016, https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/password-sharing-is-a-federal-crime (last access: 17 February 2018). 2  Amazon, Kindle Store Terms of Use (last updated: 5 October 2016), https://www.amazon. com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=201014950 (last access: 17 February 2018). 3  Matthew Chiarizio, An American Tragedy: E-Books, Licenses, and the End of Public Lending Libraries?, Vanderbilt Law Review 66 (2013), pp. 615 – 644.

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non-shareability can be distinguished from other, related features of transactions that involve digital content, e.g., that Kindle crime novels cannot be offered on Ebay (issues regarding digital re-sale); or that it is difficult to purchase novels from other companies (consumer lock-in). The central question of the paper is whether non-shareability – as characterized above – is a morally acceptable side-effect of digitization or a wrong-making feature that should be corrected. In more personal terms: if the non-shareability of your crime novels triggers a negative moral sentiment (disappointment, indignation, outrage) in you, is that sentiment justified? In what follows, the answer will be a cautious ‘yes’. Neither this answer, nor most of the individual elements of the analysis that lead to it, are new. There is widespread concern and debate about the effects of digitization. Many of these discussions have focussed on some of the many interrelated aspects and immediate effects of the digitization of goods. However, when discussing the phenomenon of non-shareability, economic, legal, and moral aspects must be considered, with due attention to the technological infrastructure of digital transactions.4 Interference with an intended action does not, in itself, constitute a moral wrong-doing. The fact that sharing physical books is an established practice or a legally permissible action is in itself non-decisive. Conversely, the terms of use do not automatically settle the issue. They might state that, after purchasing it, you do not own a book, but only have a license to access it. However, upholding this just because one party describes it as such has been called, by others involved in the debate, a “magic-word approach” that fails to consider the “nature of the economic transaction”.5 The interconnections between moral, legal, and economic considerations, the involvement of multiple parties, and the intricacies of the technological infrastructure make arguments concerning the moral (un)acceptability of non-shareability vulnerable to charges of oversimplification or partisanship. In order to avoid this charge as much as is possible in a short paper, the phenomenon is first – in Section II – placed against the background of a larger shift in the framework for evaluating transactions between multiple parties: a shift from the sale of privately owned work-instantiating copies to the licensed end-use of club goods. This shift raises complications for arguing against non-shareability, as is shown in the discussion of three unsuccessful strategies (Section III). Elements of these may be incorporated into two more promising approaches (Section IV), which take into account the altered nature of transactions and associated standards, but still find wrong-mak4  Advocated for the regulation of cyberspace by Lawrence Lessig, Code: Version 2.0. New York 2006, Ch. 7, pp. 120 – 137. 5 Cf. Brian Carver, Why License Agreements Do Not Control Copy Ownership: First Sales and Essential Copies, Berkeley Technology Law Journal 25 (2010), pp. 1887 – 1954; Aaron Perzanowski / Jason Schultz, Reconciling Intellectual and Personal Property, Notre Dame Law Review 90 (2015), pp. 1211 – 1263: p. 1227.

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ing features. Section V concludes that, on the basis of these arguments, existing forms of temporary sharing should, under certain conditions, also be made possible after digitization. Under morally acceptable terms of use for digital content, we should be licensed to share. II. A Shift of Standards In this section, the non-shareability of digital content is placed against the larger background of the digitization of consumer goods. This shows that there is more than just a mismatch between a consumer’s mental model of a transaction and its description in the terms of use: both the mental model and the description contain conceptions of the transaction and the good involved in it, as well as a set of relevant evaluative – economic, legal, and moral – standards. In the mental model referred to above and described in the introduction, the consumer6 believes that access to a work (e.g., a crime novel) has been obtained by purchasing a digital copy.7 Simply put, the consumer conceives of the transaction as the sale of a private good, over which she obtains a traditional bundle of rights:8 she may access the good at will, re-sell it, destroy it, but also display and lend it to others. These rights originally accrued to the author9 of the work, but are exhausted in the transaction. Partitioning rights in this way is supposed to provide authors and consumers with a sufficient incentive to create works and purchase work-instantiating copies, respectively. For instance, the right to re-sell goods is part of what makes these goods valuable to consumers. This balance of incentives has moral connotations: preventing someone from, for instance, accessing their privately owned goods is considered to be an interference with property-rights and a violation of duties of non-interference.10 A consumer who (justifiably) expects to have purchased a workinstantiating copy has reason to resent the inability to undertake certain actions: in this sense, the mental model of the Kindle content explains – without thereby justifying – moral sentiments regarding the non-shareability of this content. 6  ‘Consumer’ applies to any individual who purchases or gains utility from using a work-instantiating good, irrespective of her own involvement in creating such works, distributing goods to others, etc. 7  Here, the analysis focuses on design-plan-based artefact copies as defined by Amrei Bahr, What Is an Artifact Copy? A Quadrinomial Definition, in: Darron Hudson Hick / Reinold Schmücker (eds.), The Aesthetics and Ethics of Copying, New York / London 2016, pp. 81 – 98, p. 89 et seq.: human-made goods that realize a design plan and that are created on the basis of a manifestation of this plan (e.g., a blueprint or set of assembly instructions). 8  ‘Right’ means an enforceable authority to undertake particular actions in specific domains; cf. John Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism, Madison, WI 1968. 9  ‘Author’ applies to any individual who creates a work, irrespective of their own involvement in consuming other works, distributing them to others, etc. 10  ‘Duties of non-interference’ limit the moral analysis to negative individual freedom – where ‘individual’ refers to anyone with moral status.

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This sketchily described model or ‘regime’ that regulates access to works through privately owned work-instantiating copies does not amount to a fully developed, temporally stable set of rules for balancing legal rights, economic incentives, and moral duties. There is a constant need for fine-tuning and expert judgement.11 The model does, however, come with a set of concepts (e.g., “copy”, “sale”, “ownership”) and what might be called an evaluative ‘comfort zone’: as long as access is provided by selling copies, it is more or less clear how to provide authors and consumers with sufficient incentives, how to settle legal disputes, and how to respect duties of non-interference. However, privately owned work-instantiating copies are not the only economically viable way of providing access to works. Attending a festival, for instance, involves buying a ticket – often later exchanged for another item (e.g., a wristband) – that provides temporary access to works through attending performances. Most consumers know, and accept, that access-granting tokens may not be re-sold or transferred to others, and that access to the works will not be permanent. For these goods, non-shareability apparently does not trigger negative moral sentiments. Underwriting the idea that genuinely different consumer and author incentives are at work for, say, for crime novels and concerts, economists distinguish between ‘clubgoods’ and private goods. Unlike private goods, club goods are non-rivalrous, i.e., the access of one consumer does not detract from that of another; but like private goods, they are excludable, i.e., consumers can be (cost-effectively) denied access. Although economists do not agree on all aspects of club goods or ‘toll goods’,12 it is broadly accepted that private parties might still have sufficient incentive to produce them, as they do for private goods.13 Thus, an economic balance might be had for club goods, albeit through different mechanisms. In purchasing access to a club good, a consumer should not – on pain of upsetting the economic balance – obtain the same bundle of rights as in purchasing a private good: the right to access is included but, typically, it may not be transferred. For some goods, such as festivals and film screenings, consumer expectations match this alleged economic and legal balance. The narrative at the start of this introduction suggests that, for Kindle content, there is no such match. Amazon’s terms of use for digital content on your e-reader effectively limit consumer rights to that of access (permanently, and at will, unlike the token for a festival; but, like the token for a festival, non-transferrable). Thus, an e-book sold under an end-user license is – at least the way it is described in the terms of use – more accurately understood as a club good than as a private good like a paperback copy. Yet as described earlier in this section, the mental model of the aver11 See Aaron Perzanowski / Jason Schultz: Digital Exhaustion, UCLA Law Review 58 (2011), 889 – 946, Section II.B.3 for examples of such fine-tuning, e.g., concerning ‘display’. 12  Vincent Ostrom / Elinor Ostrom, Public Goods and Public Choices, in: Emanuel S. Savas (ed.), Alternatives for Delivering Public Services. Towards Improved Performance, Boulder, CO 1977, pp.7 – 49. 13  Richard Cornes / Todd Sandler, The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods and Club Goods, Cambridge 1996.

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age consumer of Kindle content conceives of this content as a work-instantiating copy much like a paperback, which ought to be sharable: here we have the difference between evaluative standards and conceptions of the good. Now there are reasons why e-books are offered, through the terms of use, as club goods. From an economic perspective, a central problem with the digitization of consumer goods is that they become virtually non-rivalrous: reproduction is almost perfect and transferring a digital copy has negligible costs in terms of direct transaction costs and in terms of giving up access. This ensures that digitization ­changes incentives for authors and consumers with economic consequences that are po­ tentially highly disruptive but still ill-understood.14 End-user licenses such as that for Kindle, combined with digital rights management (DRM) and various technological protection measures (TPMs)15 seek to mitigate these consequences by making digital content excludable. Without these measures – so the reasoning goes – digitization would make content public, i.e., both non-rivalrous and non-excludable; and public goods are notoriously subject to freeriding problems, leading to underproduction without government interventions. In order to guarantee excludability, access is offered through a partly proprietary infrastructure. The infrastructure makes it difficult for consumers to manipulate the content on their reader and easy for those controlling the infrastructure to monitor consumer behaviour. Access is ‘lumped’, so that it can be denied entirely rather than per accessed work; and it is ‘accounted’, so that individual consumers can be monitored. The potentially disruptive economic effects of digitization are thus prevented by submitting digital content to the regime of club goods. If one follows the line of reasoning just given, this is something that consumers might simply have to accept, as they have already for festival tickets. Importantly, this amounts to a precautionary strategy: end-user licenses and TPMs are primarily means to prevent the potentially disruptive effects that digitization might have for the production of creative works. The effects of digitization have been described as creating a “bifurcated universe”16 or “two worlds apart”.17 According to this bifurcation image, access to creative works is offered under two entirely different evaluative regimes – either through the purchase of private goods or through club goods. Increasingly, privately owned work-instantiating copies are a thing of the past: access in digital environ14  Martin Peitz / Joel Waldfogel (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Digital Economy, Oxford 2012. 15  Henceforth, I refer indiscriminately to both as “TPMs”, following the claim that “Common to all these technologies is that their ultimate goal is to enable rightholders to exercise precise control over who may access and use which content on which devices and under which conditions” (Natali Helberger / Marco Loos / Lucie Guibault / Chantal Mak / Lodewijk Pessers, Digital Content Contracts for Consumers, Journal of Consumer Policy 36 [2013], pp. 37 – 57: p. 45). 16  Perzanowski / Schultz, Reconciling (supra, n. 5), p. 1252. 17  Christiane Wendehorst, Sale of Goods and Supply of Digital Content – Two Worlds Apart? Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department C, In-Depth Analysis PE 556.928 (2016).

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ments occurs in a different evaluative “universe” or “world”. In many ways, this overstates the case: it suggests that there are insurmountable boundaries between a ‘tangible’ and a ‘virtual’ realm; that these realms are ‘out there’; and that they are relatively stable. However, ‘digital good’ and ‘tangible good’ do not refer to natural kinds of objects. The digital realm gradually expands, not only by the full digitization of consumer goods such as books and recorded music, but also by tangible goods (such as cars, thermostats, refrigerators) becoming hardware for sophisticated software products (‘embedded content’). This means that end-user licenses and associated TPMs may, in the not-too-distant future, also be imposed on access to cars or – more speculatively – smart houses and cities. Manufacturing company John Deere has therefore filed a comment stating that the software installed on tractors entails that farmers who think they own their vehicles do in fact receive “an implied license for the life of the vehicle to operate the vehicle”.18 This development has prompted the EU Directorate for Internal Policies to analyse how the rights of consumers can be protected in an era of ‘connected’ or ‘smart’ physical goods with ‘embedded’ digital content.19 Most relevantly for this paper, the “bifurcation” discourse suggests that there is no (viable) middle ground between offering non-sharable digital content and traditionally sharable, physical work-instantiating copies; and that there is no way to determine the moral permissibility of non-shareability without assuming either the regime associated with consumer’s mental model or that described in the terms of use – and effectively begging the question against objections that depend on the other regime. The issue discussed in the remainder of this paper is whether it is merely complicated or outright impossible to find such a middle ground in a moral evaluation of non-shareability. III. Misplacing the Moral Wrong The identification of an evaluative mismatch may make resentments on the part of the consumer intelligible, but it also reveals reasons why digital content is non-sharable, related to economic viability. Still, the idea that e-books are ‘in a different place’ than consumers expect them to be can be developed into a moral argument – but the evaluative mismatch or ‘bifurcation’ does create complications. To illustrate the latter, I discuss three strategies in this section that misplace the moral wrong in non-shareability – although each of them, as will become clear in Section IV, is not altogether on the wrong track. 18 https://copyright.gov/1201/2015/comments-032715/class%2021/John_Deere_Class21_ 1201_2014.pdf. 19  E.g., in a proposed Directive on the supply of digital content (Document 8672/15, submitted 9 December 2015). To illustrate again the legal difficulties posed by digitization, note that the compromise package submitted, on 8 June 2017, for approval as the European Council’s general approach excludes embedded digital content from the scope of the proposed Directive, finding more appropriate the rules applicable to goods (Document 9901/17).

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A first strategy is to argue that offering access to information through a club good constitutes a wrong-doing. This generic distrust of club goods is problematic, since there seems to be nothing intrinsically wrong in offering access in this form. Selling tickets to a film screening or a festival, for instance, is morally unproblematic as a general activity: instances might be problematic, but only because of features specific to those instances. Still, all club goods have features that call for scrutiny. Economically, the provision of club goods is less well-studied than that of private and public goods – but there is general agreement that they might involve artificial scarcity and natural monopolies, i.e., a lack of competition due to high fixed, infrastructure-related costs. This calls for a careful analysis in order to establish whether the means of offering only license-based access is justified by the end of preventing underproduction, or whether the latter might be equally, or more effectively, prevented by other means. Moreover, it is relevant that club goods can only be offered by controlling consumer behaviour and enforcing exclusion. Such control has no wrong-making features in and of itself; and even if there were any, these would not be exclusive to the digital era: access to reading materials through purchased copies also involves control by intermediaries. Digitization has, how­ ever, not simply introduced a new type of intermediary – digital-technology giants that are ‘dis-intermediating’ traditional publishing houses. It has also outfitted them with powers of control with few precedents in scope and intensity. These powers are partly exercised through the design of the technological infrastructure. This creates a strong knowledge asymmetry between the new intermediaries and virtually every other party involved. Still, to state the obvious, exercising power, having more knowledge, and making money are not wrong-doings in and of themselves. Showing that they are in the case of digital content, again, requires specific arguments rather than general mistrust. A second strategy is to seek wrong-making features in the presentation of the transaction. The experience described in Section I is not atypical: many con­ sumers mistake purchasing a Kindle novel for buying a copy – arguably not because of a lack of attention on their part. On Amazon’s websites, there is as little distinction between a paperback copy and the Kindle edition as between a paperback and a hardcover copy. Kindle editions show up when searching the category of “Books” (although they are actually ‘in’ the Kindle store); the length of Kindle content is (also) expressed in pages of a printed copy; and transactions are elicited by a “Buy” button. On the Kindle itself, content is presented as a set of books in a “library”, in which new “collections” can be made; little suggests that access is lumped. Consequently, one might suspect that consumers are deceived, i.e., impermissibly misled: a club good is presented to them as a private good they are familiar with. This “deception” argument is appealing, but – like the previous argument – unsuccessful. Giving inaccurate or incomplete information in negotiations and commercial transactions does not necessarily constitute a wrong-doing; it may be moral­ ly justified as long as it unavoidably defends legitimate interests without a breach

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of trust.20 Relevant moral principles – such as Scanlon’s Principle M – also have relatively strong conditions:21 “In the absence of special justification, it is not permissible for one person, A, in order to get another person, B, to do some act, X (which A wants B to do and which B is morally free to do or not do but would otherwise not do), to lead B to expect that if he or she does X then A will do Y (which B wants but believes that A will otherwise not do), when in fact A has no intention of doing Y if B does X, and A can reasonably foresee that B will suffer significant loss if he or she does X and A does not reciprocate by doing Y.”

Substantiating that this principle is violated requires, first, an argument that consumers (B) would not have bought Kindle content (done X) if the provider (A) had not presented this content as if it were a physical copy (done Y); and, second, that consumers have thereby suffered a foreseeable significant loss. Neither argument is straightforward. Regarding the first argument, the success of marketing efforts is generally difficult to determine, for lack of randomized trials in realistic settings. Moreover, the presentation of content in the Kindle store is not plausibly understood as a means to tempt consumers into purchases that they would otherwise not even have considered or would have no intention to make: they are merely presented with various options. Regarding the second argument, one might have the intuition that consumers are seduced to give up some of their rights in return for mere convenience, or that they suffer a loss that is not easily compensated through individual utility. Yet the condition does not specify the significance of the loss in those terms. Thus, if there is an argument to be had along these lines, as will be suggested in Section IV, it can be developed irrespectively of considerations concerning deception – any deception involved would constitute an additional wrong-doing by concealing this wrong-making feature.22 A third strategy is to focus on the nature of the work to which access is provided and to argue that – at some fundamental ontological level – “e-books are books”. One problem with this strategy is that the connection with rights to shared access is tenuous at best; it is unclear what it is about books, or any cultural good, that makes it morally impermissible to prevent readers from granting each other access. Even if there were a basic right of access to cultural goods, this would need to be balanced against author rights – which require protection to ensure an adequate supply of cultural goods – and therefore does not translate into a right to a specific form of access, and does not necessarily confer other rights, such as that of loaning, display, or re-sale.23 Another problem with the strategy is that it might assume too   Alan Strudler, Deception Unraveled, The Journal of Philosophy 102 (2005), pp. 458 – 473.   Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe Each Other, Cambridge, MA 1998, p. 298. 22  Regardless of the acceptability of non-shareability, one might maintain that consumers ought to be more accurately and effectively informed about limitations to usage and access rights, TPMs etc., see Helberger et al., Digital Content Contracts (supra, n. 15), p. 49 et seq. 23  Peter K. Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests in a Human Rights Framework, UC Davis Law Review 40 (2007), pp. 1039 – 1149, discusses in detail the problems with incorporating general access to cultural goods in a human-rights framework. 20 21

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much continuity in the type of good to which access is offered. It fails to acknowledge – as per the economic reasoning in Section II – that digital content is not a work-instantiating copy. Insisting that it is would therefore be mistaken, and insisting that it ought to be would run the risk of imposing an outdated model of the good for balancing consumer and author rights and incentives. This would ignore how digitization is likely to have upset this balance.24 Thus, it reverses the precautionary strategy implemented through end-user licenses and TPMs: instead of minimizing risks of underproduction through revoking most consumer rights, it insists on all traditional consumer rights associated with the ownership of work-instantiating copies and imposes most of the risks of digitization on authors.

IV. Two Promising Routes In this section, I explore two more promising routes for identifying wrong-making features of non-shareability, where both ways incorporate elements of the unsuccessful strategies discussed in the previous section. A first route is an explicitly piecemeal evaluation, in contrast to the wholesale approach suggested by the “e-books are books” strategy. The starting point is to consider rights and incentives not through the lens of monolithic notions such as ‘ownership’ or ‘consumption’, but to distinguish between all of the rights that are traditionally exhausted after the sale of tangible goods.25 On this basis, one might apply to each of these rights a relatively undemanding moral principle, namely that one needs a compelling reason to disrupt or no longer facilitate existing harmless activities – as part of one’s general duty of non-interference. This principle is a less demanding form of Mill’s familiar No Harm Principle and has, to the best of my knowledge, not been made explicit in the literature. Here, I call the principle that of “Minimal Interference with Existing Practice” (MIEP). MIEP establishes a ‘baseline’ for arranging commercial transactions through a new medium, or just offering access to information in a new form. In newly arranging transactions, one should not pre-emptively revoke all traditional consumer rights, i.e., discontinue central practices or possibilities of use. It should rather be considered whether, and to what extent, continuing to facilitate these practices would threaten author’s rights and incentives. Then the existing balance is shifted as little as necessary in order to account for the altered nature of the good. Clearly, MIEP assumes that there is a balance of rights, incentives, and duties in the exist24  Likewise, applying to the present issue domain-specific principles for an ethics of copying as proposed by Schmücker might presuppose that digital content is foremost a work-instantiating copy; see Reinold Schmücker, Normative Resources and Domain-Specific Principles, in: Hick / Schmücker (eds.), The Aesthetics and Ethics of Copying (supra, n. 7), pp. 359 – 377. 25  Similar ‘bundles of rights’ approaches are found in Elinor Ostrom / Charlotte Hess, Private and Common Property Rights, School of Public & Environmental Affairs Research Paper No. 2008 – 11 – 01, Bloomington 2007, and Perzanowski / Schultz, Reconciling (supra, n. 5).

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ing practice; and it suggests a strategy of conservation, i.e., to make the new ‘form’ of this practice as similar to the existing one as possible in order to preserve the (allegedly) existing balance. Thus, although the principle appears morally undemanding, it has strong empirical presuppositions, both about the present form and about the new form of the practice. With respect to sharing practices, MIEP requires considering whether con­ sumers may retain the rights to share the good with others without thereby inter­ fering with authors or causing underproduction. Such a right would involve temporarily giving up one’s own access rights in favour of others of one’s own choosing, voluntarily and without compensation. Here, MIEP’s presupposition regarding the present form of the practice appears to be satisfied: existing forms of voluntary sharing have only a very limited impact on the demand for the good. The reason is the limited scope of the sharing practice: you grant access only temporarily, for at most a few books at a time, and only to people with whom you have regular faceto-face contact. The sharing is often an aspect of your friendship or kinship. Even if such practices had an economic impact, authors could factor – and probably have factored – this into the price of the good, and they can continue to do so. Any negative effects might even be offset by positive ones, such as generating incentives for purchasing other works. The presupposition regarding the new form of the practice seems problematic. Digitization certainly opens the possibility of other, more disruptive sharing schemes. One could, for instance, design electronic libraries, which consumers make available during their regular sleeping hours to other consumers who are still awake or in another time zone. This would require algorithms to coordinate supply and demand between total strangers. Lending crime novels to your mother is not a sharing of this anonymous, algorithm-based type. Applying MIEP favours investigating whether, in the technological infrastructure, some form of sharing novels can be arranged that emulates your lending of crime novels to your mother. Such arrangements should be suitably piecemeal: they must only enable ‘digital loans’, not other actions such as resale; each such action needs separate consideration regarding its effects. Arguing against the applicability of MIEP carries a burden of ‘technological proof’: there is only a compelling reason to interfere with existing practices if they can no longer be facilitated without undue harm. Moreover, MIEP entails the undesirability of TPMs that have non-shareability as a foreseeable and avoidable side-effect, and of terms of use that forbid this form of sharing if there are ways of arranging it. These implications of MIEP echo a view by Maciej Szpunar, advocate general to the Court of Justice of the European Union, regarding the lending of e-books by public libraries: if lending e-books is arranged in a similar way as lending physical books, it falls under the existing exception for public lending as its “modern equivalent”.26 However, whereas this view is grounded in the vital role played by public 26 Advocate General’s Opinion in Case C-174/15: Vereniging Openbare Bibliotheken v. Stichting Leenrecht, 16 June 2016, https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/ 2016-06/cp160064en.pdf.

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libraries in providing access to cultural goods and is consequently restricted to institutions playing this role, MIEP extends to all and any practices that are harmless: it requires facilitating digital equivalents of existing practices as long as the present balance of rights and incentives is retained. Additionally, MIEP would provide a way of benchmarking and morally grounding a set of reasonable expectations27 that consumers may have regarding possibilities of use – it seeks continuities not in features of the good, but in the practices in which goods play a role. One might well doubt whether the digitization of cultural goods such as novels occurred in a state of balance, as presupposed when applying MIEP. Then, one might still consider whether sharing practices ought to be facilitated regardless of the status quo. An argument to this effect can also guide the implementation of MIEP, since it would recommend that sharing rights be prioritised among the several consumer rights that could be retained. Evidently, this requires a stronger, more specific argument. The second route is to develop such an argument for shareability ‘from scratch’. This identifies a right-making feature in the limited forms of sharing exemplified by the practice described in Section I. The difference with the first, MIEP-based route is that it regards sharing not (primarily) as an economically harmless practice, but as a morally desirable one. The argument revolves around the role of reciprocal relations in moral agency. Duties of non-interference only exist with regard to those having moral status. In peeling the bark off a fallen branch with a knife, one does not need to consider the interests of the branch or the knife: neither of them can be wronged. By contrast, there are strong moral reasons against interfering with, or causing harm to, an entity with (full) moral status. In many discussions, ‘harm’ and ‘interference’ involve killing the entity or directly causing it to suffer. However, other duties of non-interference concern attempts at compromising the entity’s moral status. Thus, if one takes sophisticated cognitive capacities such as self-awareness or the capacity to care28 as necessary for moral status, one imposes a general duty not to interfere with those capacities. Other, more inclusive conditions for moral status have been proposed in the literature.29 One is that of having the capacity for reciprocal relations or mutual accommodation between members of a social community.30 The importance of reci27  Natali Helberger, Standardizing Consumer Expectations in Digital Content, Info 13 (2011), pp.  69 – 79; Helberger et al., Digital Content Contracts (supra, n. 15), and Marco Loos / Natali Helberger / Lucie Guibault / Chantal Mak, The Regulation of Digital Content Contracts in the Optional Instrument of Contract Law, European Journal of Private Law 19 (2011), pp. 729 – 758. 28  Maintained by, respectively, Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of Killing, Oxford 2002, and Ag­ nieszka Jaworska, Caring and Full Moral Standing, Ethics 117 (2007), pp. 460 – 497. 29  Agnieszka Jaworska / Julie Tannenbaum, The Grounds of Moral Status, in: Edward Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2013, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ grounds-moral-status (last access: 22 September 2018).

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procity in human morality is broadly acknowledged. Evolutionary anthropologists have hypothesized31 that the sophisticated cognitive capacities that are regarded as typical for humans have evolved to facilitate survival in large social groups; and moral psychologists and evolutionary ethicists have suggested that moral sentiments themselves are adaptations in complex social life.32 Moreover, anthropologists have gathered ample empirical evidence that giving gifts and returning small favours are culturally universal forms of behaviour that foster community-building and long-term relations between individual humans.33 To be sure, the relations between “gift cultures”, market economies, property rights, and moral sentiments are disputed among those who recognize reciprocity and gift-giving as cultural universals and pivotal social mechanisms. Moreover, some forms of reciprocity – such as vendettas, gang solidarity, and one-sided obligations – are morally problematic. However, the importance of reciprocity to moral status offers moral reasons not to interfere with the very capacity for building and maintaining otherwise morally unproblematic reciprocal relations. Such social relations form an indispensable background for economic transactions such as purchasing books. Thus, in assessing the moral status of a transaction, the right to share access with friends and family may be highlighted in the larger bundle of rights – in contrast to, for instance, that of a re-sale – as an aspect of a morally commendable existing social practice: interference with this practice merely to protect one’s commercial interests is morally objectionable. Likewise, knowingly giving up one’s existing possibilities of sharing merely for the sake of personal convenience is not a morally desirable course of action. And finally, the loss of sharing options and the consequent interference with reciprocal relations between consumers would constitute a wrong-making feature that may be concealed in some presentations of the transactions – partly saving the intuition behind the deception argument of Section III. This ‘sharing-is-caring’ argument does not warrant all sharing practices: fully anonymous or algorithm-driven forms available in contemporary digital infrastructures apparently do little to foster reciprocal relations;34 thus, there is no moral demand to facilitate these. The argument is strongest for goods that are known to play an important role in fostering long-term reciprocal relations, and that are not easily substitutable for other goods in this role; these goods in particular ought (to be continued) to be offered in a suitably sharable form. Evidently, applying this 30  Elizabeth Anderson, Animal Rights and the Values of Non-Human Life, in: Cass Sunstein / Martha Nussbaum (eds.), Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions, Oxford 2004, pp.  277 – 298. 31  Robin Dunbar, The Social Brain Hypothesis, Evolutionary Anthropology 6 (1998), pp.  178 – 190. 32  Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind, New York 2012. 33  Richard Wilk / Lisa Cliggett, Economies and Cultures: Foundations of Economic Anthropology, 2nd ed., Boulder, CO 2007, Chs. 5 and 6. 34  Stephanos Androutsellis-Theotokis / Diomides Spinellis: A Survey of Peer-to-Peer Content Distribution Technologies, ACM Computing Surveys 36 (2004), pp. 335 – 371, Section 8.

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idea to the crime-novel-sharing practice again has several strong empirical presuppositions, including the possibility of facilitating an appropriate digital equivalent. The specifically moral complications raised by the ‘sharing-is-caring’ argument can be illustrated by a brief discussion of one currently available digital equivalent. In contrast to the impression that might have been given in the introduction, Amazon offers its clients the option to share licensed access with others of their choice, where anyone involved can opt out of sharing at any desired time, and the sharer determines what is shared. Using this possibility requires creating a ‘Household’ (which also allows sharing other benefits) and a ‘Family Library’.35 This seemingly sets up a suitable digital equivalent of local sharing practices. Yet on closer inspection, Households have some curious features. They can be composed of, at most, two adults and four children, all identified as such through their Amazon accounts. No one can be a member of multiple Households, and those who leave a Household cannot join another for half a year. Moreover, although there may be personal sections in each member’s library, adult Household members have access to each other’s credit-card details. These terms set high standards for the reciprocity between adult members of the Household. Relations of trust necessarily involve vulnerability by giving the trustee certain discretionary powers36 and requiring ongoing commitment.37 Yet whereas this previously amounted to having your book damaged or not returned, you would now trust your mother with your credit-card details – and Amazon, rather than you, has set the level of trust and mutual commitment. Thus, through Households, Amazon has predetermined in whom a high level of trust is justified, managing the intensity and extent of the reciprocal relations that account holders can foster by means of exchange of access. Amazon Households are therefore morally problematic arrangements for facilitating temporary sharing activities. The strong interference with reciprocal relations is due to the exclusion and surveillance mechanisms in the technical infrastructure. Households reveal the power of these mechanisms by putting them partly at the discretion of consumers. Thus, the line of argumentation that seeks wrong-doing in interference with reciprocal relations incorporates, in a specific form, the general distrust of club goods discussed in Section III. V. Conclusion: Towards Licenses-to-Share In this paper, I have identified two routes for arguing that transactions involving digital content ought to leave room for local, temporary sharing practices. One argument requires minimal interference with existing practices, given their econom35  Amazon, About Amazon Households and Family Library, https://www.amazon.com/gp/ help/customer/display.html?nodeId=201620400 (last access: 17 February 2018). 36  Annette Baier, Trust and Antitrust, Ethics 96 (1986), pp. 231 – 260. 37  Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, New York 2002.

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ic harmlessness. Another argument maintains that hindering sharing practices undermines capacities for reciprocal relations, and thereby constitutes a morally objectionable form of interference. Both arguments have limited scope: they support facilitating those and only those forms of sharing that are currently facilitated through the exchange of work-instantiating copies, without thereby necessarily making the case for other forms of sharing, like file-sharing software, or other associated rights, such as that of re-sale. The arguments also have strong – but not indefensible – presuppositions regarding the moral status and economic effects of current sharing practices. Even within their limited scope, they presuppose that precisely these sharing practices can be facilitated in the digital infrastructure – that there can be effective, and effectively circumscribed, ‘licenses to share’. This would require a suitable legal framework and technological infrastructure to replace – within appropriate boundaries – the legal and technological obstacles that now give rise to non-shareability. The arguments suggest that the burden of proof regarding technical feasibility may be placed on the supply side, in particular the intermediaries who control and maintain the digital infrastructure. This would tap into the largest available knowledge base and facilitate a redesign of the (proprietary) infrastructure; and it would create an incentive for making sure that no additional consumer rights have been effectively retained or created without prior evaluation regarding their moral desirability. Through their ‘ought-implies-technological-can’ presupposition, the arguments also call for reconsidering the relation between technology and evaluative standards, and for correcting the deterministic overtones of statements such as “copyright law is, and has always been, a creature of technology”.38 This correction is only hinted at in this paper and would make a worthwhile topic for future work in what might be called an ‘ethics of access’. Similarly, the arguments presume that a suitable legal framework can be found that would facilitate sharing practices for digital content. One approach, which was merely hinted at above, would be to include such practices among the possibilities of use that can be reasonably expected by consumers. It has been claimed that, because of the lack of an objective benchmark, “traders can gradually reduce the general standard of what consumers ought to be able to expect from digital content”, which “can result in a creeping degradation of traditional user freedoms”.39 This paper provides ways of explicating the ‘ought’ and the appeal to freedoms and thus suggests that there are credible moral reasons why consumers may reasonably expect to be licensed to share.

38  Leanne Wiseman / Brad Sherman, Facilitating Access to Information: Understanding the Role of Technology in Copyright Law, in: Susy Frankel / Daniel Gervais (eds.), The Evolution and Equilibrium of Copyright in the Digital Age, Cambridge 2014, pp. 221 – 238: p. 221. 39  Helberger et al., Digital Content Contracts (supra, n. 15), p. 44.

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Zusammenfassung Der vorliegende Aufsatz diskutiert die moralische Akzeptabilität einer eher marginal erscheinenden Nebenfolge der Digitalisierung von Konsumgütern: der Schwierigkeit, solche Gegenstände mit Dritten zu teilen. Zunächst wird diese verhinderte Teilbarkeit (non-shareability) im Zusammenhang einer umfassenderen Verschiebung der Bewertungsmaßstäbe für Transaktionen, die mehrere Partner involvieren, untersucht. Daran anschließend wird anhand von drei nicht überzeugenden Ansätzen gezeigt, welche Schwierigkeiten für die moralische Bewertung der verhinderten Teilbarkeit sich aus dieser Verschiebung ergeben. Schließlich werden zwei aussichtsreichere Argumentationen vorgestellt, die einerseits von der Unschädlichkeit bestehender Praktiken des Teilens ausgehen, andererseits davon, dass wechselseitiges Miteinanderteilen grundsätzlich etwas Wünschenswertes ist. Transaktionen, die digitale Güter betreffen, sollten demnach die Möglichkeit einer Fortsetzung bestehender und eingeführter Formen des zeitweisen Teilens durch leihweise Überlassung einräumen.

Irreplaceable Works Non-substitutability, Market Failure, and Access Needs Johannes Grave A well thought-out, convincing ethics of copying and a firmly grounded, balanced copyright law must satisfy not only the interests of authors and exploiters, but also the legitimate concerns of potential users.1 However, in practice, this obvious requirement leads to a number of substantial problems. Authors and exploiters are closely related to concrete works due to their involvement in the creative process, refinements, and investments. Potential users are facing an enormous market that is difficult to oversee. One could think that the users’ interests do not have to be taken into account to the same degree as those of authors and exploiters – or that there is an asymmetry between authors and exploiters, who are tied to individual works, and users, who can freely choose between numerous works. If a particular novel seems too expensive to a reader, she can decide to buy a different book. But it is easy to forget that, in some contexts and situations, works can prove to be irreplaceable. In this case, potential users have to acknowledge that there is no alternative that they can resort to. Such cases of irreplaceability deserve closer analysis.2 It could reveal the necessity – and this will be my claim in this paper – that in weighing the interests of copyright owners and license holders against those of users, greater weight must be placed on questions of the accessibility of works.

1  Cf., for instance, Reinold Schmücker, Normative Resources and Domain-specific Principles: Heading for an Ethics of Copying, in: Darren Hudson Hick / Reinold Schmücker (eds.), The Aesthetics and Ethics of Copying, New York / London 2016, pp. 359 – 377, esp. p. 371 et seq. The above reference to copyright owners, exploiters, and users is obviously incomplete, since it does not cover everyone affected by copyright regulations. There are also the owners and users of technical devices – who are affected by copyright due to copyright – as well as potential users who do not appear as actual users of certain copyrighted works since they remain excluded from using the respective works for some economic, political or technical reasons, and tax payers in general who contribute to the fact that, in many cases, public institutions can be users. Tax revenues are also used for funding the production of certain copyrighted works. The interests of all of these people must also be taken into account. 2  The problem of potential non-substitutability has by no means been ignored; cf., e.g., Reto M. Hilty, Das Urheberrecht und der Wissenschaftler, in: GRUR Int 2006, pp.  179 – 190, esp. pp. 185 et seq. A related problem concerns the criterion of indispensability, which is important to define the limits of the exploitation of copyrighted works; cf. Lionel Bently / Brad Sherman, Intellectual Property Law, 4th ed., Oxford 2014, pp. 321 et seq.

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I. Extrinsic and Intrinsic Non-substitutability A fictitious example can illustrate that it is frequently the case that using a work, especially in a scientific context, involves irreplaceability. Let us imagine that a philosopher is working on a basic work on the ethics of copying. She develops a new argument about limitations in the marketability of copyright-protected works and relates these considerations to the existing literature on the issue. While reading a recent paper, she stumbles upon a bibliographic reference that draws her attention to another, obviously highly relevant article. However, she does not manage to obtain this paper, because access to the article would require an unusually expensive fee. If the philosopher has neither the private nor institutional means to pay this fee, she is forced to abandon working on her promising project. If she were to write her paper without acquainting herself with the earlier paper, she would risk violating the rules of good academic practice. At the very least, she would jeopardize her reputation by not taking the relevant latest research into account. In many European, North American, and some East Asian countries, a situation like this is currently unlikely to occur, because public libraries guarantee access to scholarly literature with their interlibrary loan system. The problem is more urgent in regions with less developed, if not wanting, academic systems. Researchers in those countries potentially face insurmountable obstacles in the form of very costly remunerations. This is by no means an unrealistic scenario. Just recently, I received an inquiry from a Turkish philosopher of art who wanted to read my monograph on Caspar David Friedrich for her work on Kant’s aesthetics and its importance for Romanticism. She wrote to me because she could not find the book in any Turkish library, nor was she able to buy it for the – admittedly not exactly cheap – price of $ 120. The problem is even more serious with respect to digital works, regardless of the allegedly infinite access that the internet provides. Technical copy protection mechanisms and measures to regulate access prove to be particularly effective instruments for enforcing the copyrights of authors and exploiters. In these cases, the question of what is permissible in the context of copyright law does not even arise, since the accessibility and usability of a given work is already determined by technical means. At the same time, these protection measures ignore regulations that are thought to lift or limit copyright protection for specific privileged uses.3 For accessing digital works, special limiting preconditions often apply. For instance, individual documents only become available as part of larger packets, e.g., in the form of so-called consortial licenses. But even if one takes account of the fact that, in many countries, this problem hardly arises by virtue of their well-equipped libraries, an unpleasant aftertaste remains. The supposed solution obviously comes at the price of public authorities anticipating and averting the problem by paying the, sometimes very high, license 3  Hilty, Das Urheberrecht und der Wissenschaftler (supra, n. 2), p. 180, with further refs., pp. 186 et seq.

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fees. In such cases access is secured at the price of a displacement of the problem. There always has to be an authority that has already paid the sales price, user fee, or license fee in order for others to avoid the problem. What might initially seem to be a rare difficulty that only concerns access to some rather specialist scientific works, is in fact not that isolated. The problem tends to concern all copyright-protected works, as any protected work can become the subject of scientific research. A second fictitious example can demonstrate how, in particular, scientifically dealing with works that are not genuinely scientific can lead to a number of questions and problems. Imagine an art historian in Germany4 who is working on a monograph about Candida Höfer. In a central chapter, she analyzes the photograph Museum of Modern Art New York XII, 20015 (fig. 1). The photograph is particularly telling, because it is rather unusual for Höfer’s oeuvre, as it does not deliberately show the room parallel to the picture plane and from the front. The picture of a New York Museum of Modern Art exhibition room stands out for

Fig. 1: Candida Höfer, ‘Museum of Modern Art New York XII 2001’, 2001, C-print, 121 x 152 cm. Reproduced from: Michael Krüger, Candida Höfer. A Monograph, transl. by Jeremy Gaines, London 2003, p. 121. 4  As the legal problem outlined in what follows is treated differently in each national legislation, it is necessary to discuss the matter with reference to one particular copyright law – in this example, German copyright law. 5  Michael Krüger, Candida Höfer. A Monograph, transl. by Jeremy Gaines, London 2003, p. 121; Maren Polte, Klasse Bilder. Die Fotografieästhetik der ‘Becher-Schule’, Berlin 2012, pp. 163 – 165. For a legal point of view, see Celia Kakies, Kunstzitate in Malerei und Fotografie, Köln 2007, pp. 19 – 21, 72, 118, 129.

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its tilted view, a scena per angolo, as it were, which shows the room from a special perspective and enables viewers to experience it a way that is unusual for Höfer. Based on this observation, our art historian develops the argument that, with her work, Candida Höfer addressed and criticized the modern critique against the traditional easel painting and the linear-perspectival depiction of space – a critique that is particularly articulated in works of the avant-gardes in the 20th century. In an extensive analysis that takes into account a number of individual picture elements (the, overall, four paintings by Claude Monet, Henri Matisse and Jackson Pollock,6 the wall arrangement and distribution of the works of art, the round grids of the air conditioning, the benches, the light distribution, as well as the arrangement of all these motifs in the photograph’s composition), the art historian develops her thesis that Höfer responded to the high standards of the modern avant-gardes, subtly ironizing their pathos. She points out, among other things, the skillfully chosen angle and field of vision that makes the viewer involuntarily relate both the benches in the picture to the Pollock painting covering the wall – which makes the museum space appear to be furnished with church pews. However, in what follows we will not be concerned with this art-historical argument, but with the problems that the scholar could encounter when publishing her book. For example (this idea is also purely fictitious), it is conceivable Candida Höfer would only allow for printing the picture if she were able to read the manuscript beforehand.7 The art historian, however, wants to avoid this, because she makes some critical statements about Höfer’s works. After taking a look at German copyright law (Urheberrechtsgesetz, UrhG), she abandons asking Höfer for permission to reproduce the image and decides instead to refer to the citation right according to § 51 of the copyright law, which allows for printing an image, “if, subsequent to publication, individual works are included in an independent scientific work for the purpose of explaining the contents”.8 However, upon rereading her analysis, our art historian is alarmed. She realizes that the Höfer image affects at least three other works that could fall under 6  Höfer’s photograph shows the following paintings that belong to the collections of the MoMA New York (from left to right): Henri Matisse, ‘The Piano Lesson’ (1916); Henri Ma­ tisse, ‘Goldfish and Palette’ (1914); Jackson Pollock, ‘One: Number 31, 1950’ (1950); and Claude Monet, ‘Water Lilies’ (1914 – 1926). 7  On the phenomenon of artists trying to influence texts about their artwork by granting or denying permission to reproduce it, see Wolfgang Ullrich, Siegerkunst. Neuer Adel, teure Lust, Berlin 2016, p. 93 et seq., as well as idem, Stellungnahme des Autors zu den Abbildungsverboten in „Siegerkunst. Neuer Adel, teure Lust“, accessible at https://ideenfreiheit.files.wordpress. com/2016/01/siegerkunst-stellungnahme1.pdf (last access: 20 May 2017). 8  Official English translation by the German Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection, https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de / englisch_urhg / englisch_urhg.pdf (last access: 25 May 2018). For the problem discussed here, see also Thomas Dreier / Gernot Schulze / Loui­ sa Specht, Urheberrechtsgesetz. Kommentar, 6th ed., Munich 2018, § 51 para. 22 – 25; Timo Prengel, Bildzitate von Kunstwerken als Schranke des Urheberrechts und des Eigentums mit Bezügen zum Internationalen Privatrecht, Frankfurt (Main) 2011.

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copyright protection: according to her own interpretation, none of the four paintings appearing in the picture could be arbitrarily substituted. They unfold a visual art-historical argument that Höfer’s choice of perspective seems to directly respond to. Now, three of these works, the two paintings by Henri Matisse and the one by Jackson Pollock, are not yet in the public domain. The art historian is convinced that these works are highly relevant for Höfer’s work and therefore also for her own line of reasoning. Hence she could not refer to § 57 UrhG, which permits the reproduction of works “if they are to be regarded as works incidental to the actual subject-matter being reproduced, distributed or communicated to the public”.9 On the other hand, she does not analyze these works individually and in detail in her text. She therefore now even doubts whether the quotation provision applies at all, since her text only concerns Höfer’s photograph, so only this photograph, but not the other works depicted in it, are cited in the sense required by the law. Measured against the practice of the German copyright collecting society for pictures and art, VG Bild-Kunst, she would indeed have to fear that rights holders could contest the quotation right in this case. The list of unsolved legal issues is not at all exhausted yet. Our art historian’s analysis suggests that the curatorial achievement of assembling and spatially arranging the four paintings might constitute a work of its own (in the sense of an exhibition as a “compilation” [Sammelwerk] according to § 4 no. 1 UrhG).10 Independently of the question of whether quotation law could be applied to each of these works, the art historian therefore has to fear that the reproduction of Höfer’s photograph affects up to six copyright-protected works and that, for her argumentation, none of these works could be substituted by anything else. For the question at hand, it is not relevant how the art historian might eventually arrive at a legally correct solution, and at what expense. The example rather highlights a frequently ignored but indeed common constellation in which works can prove to be irreplaceable: when protectable works are “contained” within another work and do not merely appear as “incidental to the actual subject-matter” in the sense of § 57 UrhG, use of a work containing the third party works inevitably also concerns the incorporated works.11 The integration of works into other works (collages, compilations, anthologies, photographs, exhibitions, etc.) can hence have 9  “[…] wenn sie als unwesentliches Beiwerk neben dem eigentlichen Gegenstand der Vervielfältigung, Verbreitung oder öffentlichen Wiedergabe anzusehen sind.” On the tendency to interpret the concept of an “inessential accessory” (“unwesentliches Beiwerk”) narrowly, see Dreier / Schulze / Specht, Urheberrechtsgesetz. Kommentar (supra, n. 8), § 57 para. 2 – 4. 10  Clemens Waitz, Die Ausstellung als urheberrechtlich geschütztes Werk, Baden-Baden 2009. 11 As far as I can see, juridical research on such works-within-works constellations has focused rather on their production and less on questions of the subsequent use of such works; cf., e.g., Kakies, Kunstzitate (supra, n. 5); Ilja Czernik, Die Collage in der urheberrechtlichen Auseinandersetzung zwischen Kunstfreiheit und Schutz des geistigen Eigentums, Berlin 2008; Wolfgang Maaßen, Plagiat, freie Benutzung oder Kunstzitat? Erscheinungsformen der urheberrechtlichen Leistungsübernahme in Fotografie und Kunst, in: Matthias Weller / Nicolai Kem-

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the consequence that the use of the overall work inevitably entails the use of the works contained within it. The incorporated work then proves to be irreplaceable in a specific way (differently from the first example). This second example is by no means unusual or far-fetched. Producers of documentary films or photographs, in particular, are constantly struggling with fundamental problems as their works often contain a large number of other copyrighted works. Many documentaries contain – accidentally or deliberately – copyrighted material when showing interiors or communicating a certain atmosphere. Even within the framework of the fair use doctrine of US copyright law, for a long time producers of documentaries carefully avoided integrating copyrighted material into their works. They were, as Patricia Aufderheide and Peter Jaszi put it, “trapped within a culture of fear and doubt”12. In order to minimize the risk of law suits, they excluded popular music or films from their projects. Since the fair use-doctrine has become well-known among US documentary producers, the situation has changed significantly.13 However, the situation is different in other countries, where producers of documentaries still face considerable obstacles.14 Both examples do not outline the problem of potential irreplaceability in its entirety. But they show that potential users can be confronted by the non-substitutability of a work in various ways. In the first example, the non-substitutability is caused solely by external constraints – the rules of scientific practice. In the second example, there is an irreplaceability already rooted in the work itself. The first case can be characterized as an extrinsic non-substitutability; the second example, by contrast, features an intrinsic irreplaceability. Of course, in many cases, both forms of non-substitutability are involved. Beside this distinction, our examples also allow for a second fundamental observation. Works are not irreplaceable by themselves. They are always irreplaceable with respect to specific situations, contexts, and practices of use. The circumstances of the intended use decide whether a different work could be used instead, after all, or whether use of the work can be dropped. This also applies to cases of intrinsic non-substitutability. It follows from the incorporation of a work x into another work y that use of y implies access to x (albeit not necessarily full access). However, in such a case, work x is only non-substitutable if y has already proven to be irreplaceable for the user’s purposes. Non-substitutability therefore does not depend merely on properties of works (quality, originality, etc.), but on contexts of use. le / Thomas Dreier (eds.), Raub – Beute – Diebstahl. Tagungsband des Sechsten Heidelberger Kunstrechtstags am 28. und 29. September 2012, Baden-Baden 2013, pp. 191 – 246. 12  Patricia Aufderheide / Peter Jaszi, Reclaiming Fair Use. How to Put Balance Back in Copyright, Chicago 2011, p. 3. 13 See Patricia Aufderheide / Aram Sinnreich, Documentarians, Fair Use and Free Expression: Changes in Copyright Attitudes and Actions with Access to Best Practices, Communication, Information and Society 19:2 (2016), https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2015.1050050. 14  See, e.g., Patricia Aufderheide, Artistic Licence, The Saturday Paper, No. 160 (10 June 2017), p. 9.

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Cases of non-substitutability may occur particularly often in fields and social subsystems that have developed a high degree of routines, institutionalized practices, and rules for the production and use of works. This is primarily the case within the area of creative and artistic practice as well as in the sciences, i.e. in contexts where, in the production of new works, reference is usually made to already existing works. The problem is certainly even more serious under the current working conditions in science. Beside the standard of following the rules of good scientific practice, the endeavor to sufficiently acknowledge the relevant state of research is equally important.15 However, it would be shortsighted to regard this problem as limited to the use of scientific or artistic works. The challenge posed to ethics and law by the potential non-substitutability of works is rather of a fundamental nature and cannot be restricted to particular types of works. For any given work, situations and contexts are conceivable in which it cannot be substituted. Any work (as defined by copyright law), for example, can become the subject of scientific investigation or artistic intervention. The irreplaceability of works is not a clearly delimited minor problem that could be resolved by solutions that are limited to particular types of works. II. Unduly High Remunerations as a Consequence of Non-substitutability One person’s loss is another’s gain. If authors and exploiters know that a work can be irreplaceable in certain situations and for particular users, they are able to demand fees that are disproportionally higher than their own expenses (for development, production, and distribution) or the profit they could otherwise legitimately expect.16 Of course, nobody would deny that the economic interests of authors and exploiters should be taken into account for the use of works eligible for protection – even if these works cannot be substituted. Nobody will take possible cases of irreplaceable protected works as a reason to question appropriate remunerations in general. However, it is ethically problematic if the predicament of a user – who requires the work and is, at the same time, legally obliged to comply with the financial demands of the author or exploiter – is used to demand disproportionally high fees. 15  Unfortunately, the present text, ironically, cannot fully meet this demand. As an art historian, I lack the expertise and familiarity with ethical and legal discourses in order to embed my considerations within the relevant state of research. My paper outlines the thoughts that have been occupying me over the past few years in practice (i.a. as coeditor of an academic journal and as a member of the interdisciplinary ZiF research group on The Ethics of Copy­ ing). 16  This is, of course, not a new insight. See, for instance, Andreas Degkwitz, Grundlegende Konflikte und Kontroversen beim Umgang mit ‘geistigem Eigentum’ in der Wissens- und Informationsgesellschaft, in: Stiftung Deutsches Forum für Kriminalprävention (ed.), Internet-Devianz, Berlin 2006, pp. 33 – 40: p. 34; Rainer Kuhlen, Erfolgreiches Scheitern. Eine Götterdämmerung des Urheberrechts?, Boizenburg 2008, p. 218 – 241.

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The examples to illustrate this point are not fictitious. At least two incidents over the past few years have drawn attention to the aggressive pricing policy of large, globally active academic publishers – namely, Elsevier, Springer Nature, and Wiley. In 2011, the Kazakh academic Alexandra Elbakyan founded the internet platform Sci-Hub – a “shadow library”.17 By now, more than 60 million academic articles are accessible on this platform, bypassing the claims of the authors and exploiters. Elbakyan, who in 2016 was voted among the “ten people who mattered this year”18 by the journal Nature, justified this massive infringement of copyrights as a reaction to the pricing policies of leading academic publishers that, according to Elbakyan, do harm to science. A similar argument is also put forward by the German association of professional science organizations, the Allianz der Wissenschaftsorganisationen. In the context of the project DEAL, the association tries to negotiate nationwide licenses with the most important academic publishers. Since its beginning in 2014, the project DEAL tries to limit the financial burdens for German libraries and academic institutions and to enhance access to scholarly literature for academics. In 2016, the negotiations with the Elsevier publishing group led to an escalation in the relations between the company and academic organizations, causing numerous academic libraries in Germany to cancel their subscriptions for journals published by Elsevier. The Allianz der Wissenschaftsorganisationen stated: “Despite the current returns on sales of 40 percent, the publisher continues to rely on increasing prices beyond the license fees that have been paid so far.” Elsevier was accused of exploiting “its dominant position on the market.”19 The main indicator of the academic publishers’ inappropriate pricing is their exceptionally high returns, which have kept rising over the past decades.20 The returns reliably show that the high prices for subscriptions to renowned academic journals cannot be solely – and not even primarily – attributed to the publishers’ expenses for refinements (such as catalogue design, quality control, editing, typesetting, dis17  Klaus Graf, Sci Hub, Fernleihe und Open Access, in: Archivalia, 9 April 2016, https:// archivalia.hypotheses.org/55814 (last access: 20 May 2017). 18  Richard van Noorden, Paper Pirate. The Founder of an Illegal Hub for Paywalled Papers Has Attracted Litigation and Acclaim, in: Nature 540 (22/29 December 2016), p. 512, http://www.nature.com / polopoly_fs/1.21157!/menu/main/topColumns/topLeftColumn/pdf/ 540507a.pdf (last access: 20 May 2017). 19 Press statement by the Allianz der Wissenschaftsorganisationen, 2 December 2016: https://www.leopoldina.org / fileadmin / redaktion / Publikationen / Allianz/2016_12_02_DEAL. pdf (last access: 20 May 2017). 20  For the development of the returns on sales, see Vincent Larivière / Stefanie Haustein / Philippe Mongeon, The Oligopoly of Academic Publishers in the Digital Era, in: PLoS ONE 10:6 (2015), p. 10 – 12, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0127502 (last access: 20 May 2017); Niels Taubert / Peter Weingart, Wandel des wissenschaftlichen Publizierens. Eine Heuristik zur Analyse rezenter Wandlungsprozesse, in: iid. (eds.), Wissenschaftliches Publizieren zwischen Digitalisierung, Leistungsmessung, Ökonomisierung und medialer Beobachtung, Berlin 2016, pp. 3 – 38: pp. 12 – 14.

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tribution, and marketing – steps that have been increasingly delegated to authors and editors, anyway) or higher-than-average economic risks. The journal prices are due mainly to the particular intrinsic dynamics of the academic publishing sector and to a specific common trait of copyright-protected works, i.e. that these works are unique in at least one respect and therefore potentially irreplaceable. Another reason for the high prices is the internal dynamics of academic publishing. Both factors need to be examined in more detail. 1. Work Concept and Non-substitutability The potential non-substitutability of protectable works consequently follows from the concept of work on which copyright itself is based. According to § 2, subsection 2 of the German Copyright Act (UrhG), “only the author’s own intellectual creations” enjoy protection by copyright. The term “creation” signals that something new has been produced that had not previously existed in the same way.21 Only something that somehow, and significantly, differs from other, previously existing things is therefore eligible for protection. This difference, which is the basis of a work’s specificity, may – depending on the context and intended use – turn into a property that makes the work irreplaceable. If the properties, characteristics, or qualities that characterize the work as an original creation are at the focus of a potential user’s interest, the work becomes indispensable for her. The concept of the work of authorship contained in copyright law implies the potential non-substitutability as a main defining element. Copyright can be justified as a subjective exclusive right, because – among other reasons – it makes works that count as so-called intellectual property marketable in the first place. It is essential to solving the problem that such works cannot be exhausted and are thus not, by nature, scarce, since multiple – even simultaneous – uses of the same work are entirely possible. Copyright law responds to this problem by generating – and this is by no means an unintended side-effect – an artificial ‘scarcity’ of protected works in order to guarantee that a remuneration can be demanded for these works. One common argument in favor of such remuneration is that it creates an incentive for further creative activities.22 The legally established ‘scarcity’ that is required for this, however also means that a situation involving the non-substitutability of a work can turn into a manifest problem if that work is not available to a user due to high fees.

 Cf. Dreier / Schulze / Specht, Urheberrechtsgesetz. Kommentar (supra, n. 8), § 2 para. 16.   Cf., e.g., Gerd Hansen, Warum Urheberrecht? Die Rechtfertigung des Urheberrechts unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Nutzerschutzes, Baden-Baden 2009, pp. 107 et seq. For a critical reflection on an empirical basis, see Arian Nazari-Khanachayi, Rechtfertigungs­ narrative des Urheberrechts im Praxistest. Empirie zur Rolle des Urheberrechts, Tübingen 2016. 21 22

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2. Science as a Catalyst of Non-substitutability Mechanisms of reputation in the sciences can be a particularly effective factor in the generation of non-substitutability. Science has, in its practice, so far tolerated the predicaments caused by unfair pricing on the part of major publishers. The primary reason for this is the way publishing organs function within science. The “oligopoly”23 of journals and publishing houses with strong reputations, prestige, and considerable impact on career advancement substantially contributes to the monopolistic control of exploiters over particular works. An academic who wants to make an innovative research contribution and successfully publish it must acknowledge those contributions that address the relevant issue – or related issues – in the major journals. To take our earlier example, an art historian would hardly manage to place an article on Candida Höfer in the renowned Art Bulletin if she ignored in her argument, for financial reasons, any of the relevant previous research about Höfer, which partly might have been published in the very same journal. The oligopoly of leading professional journals is based primarily on the earlier achievements of scholars who contributed to the development of the journals’ reputation either as authors, editors, or referees. The fact that the good reputation of a publishing organ is not primarily due to publishing accomplishments is already grounded in the internal logic of science. Its basic commitment to scientific merit excludes any extra-scientific factors as irrelevant. It goes against the nature of the scientific system to acknowledge any non-scientific accomplishment – such as refinement through a publisher – as particularly relevant for the scientific evaluation.24 The role of publishers is indeed largely limited to aggregating the achievements made by individual scholars or research groups in terms of building reputation and securing its lasting continuity. Nonetheless, this generates considerable capital for the publisher – and not just symbolical capital. The reputation earned through previous authors and referees binds later authors and users (that is, readers) to particular publication organs and hence to publishers, which can thereby attain the position of an oligopoly. The importance of this reputation makes it difficult, if not impossible, to resist the monopoly exercised by the exploiter in granting access to individual concrete works. The potential user simply cannot afford to 23  I use this term in a rather imprecise and figurative manner with reference to the internal logic of the science system and its “economy” of reputation. The tendency towards the development of an oligopoly in the economic sense of the word is, however, closely related to this. See, e.g., Taubert / Weingart, Wandel des wissenschaftlichen Publizierens (supra, n. 20), p. 13, and Niels Taubert, Open Access und digitale Publikation aus der Perspektive von Wissenschaftsverlagen, in: Taubert / Weingart (eds.), Wissenschaftliches Publizieren (supra, n. 20), pp. 75 – 102: p. 78; on the continual concentration of the academic publishing market, see also Larivière / Haustein / Mongeon, The Oligopoly of Academic Publishers in the Digital Era (supra, n. 20). 24  It is therefore consistent that no independent protection is granted to publishers – in contrast to, e.g., producers of sound recordings, films, or databases. I thank Thomas Dreier for this point; see also Hilty, Das Urheberrecht und der Wissenschaftler (supra, n. 2), p. 181.

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ignore a paper in a journal of high repute because of its exorbitant charges. The reputation-based oligopoly of powerful exploiters supports the possibility to exploit the non-substitutability of works like a monopoly in order to demand exorbitant fees. (The present DEAL initiative by the Allianz der Wissenschaftsorganisationen demonstrates exactly this point.) Although scholars are suffering from this situation, they are also contributing toward its continuation with their reputation-enhancing work. One main reason for this is that publishing in the leading academic journals is decisive for an academic career. III. Ethical Considerations The tendency toward an oligopoly of a few market-dominating exploiters sketched above, which is supported and intensified by, in particular, the interplay between the potential non-substitutability of particular works and the internal logic of mechanisms of scholarly reputation, can hardly be considered satisfactory from an ethical point of view. I will briefly outline three ethical considerations that suggest that, when it comes to developing sensible and consensual copyright regulations, conflicts about potential non-substitutability must be properly taken into account. (1) Cases in which the non-substitutability of works goes along with disproportionately high charges mark one of those critical moments in which the intention of copyright law to facilitate and promote creativity and innovations25 threatens to turn into the opposite, that is, the restriction and prevention of new works. The fictitious example of an academic who cannot complete and publish her study following the rules of good scientific practice because she cannot get access to a potentially relevant source indicates how the potential non-substitutability of protected works and the associated “market failure” can prevent innovations. In such cases, an essential ethical argument – which supports the acceptance of copyright by asserting that it is in the interest of society as a whole – does not apply. A copy­ right law that is perceived as an obstacle to scientific or artistic innovation may well still be justified as a protection of ownership, but the price for the latter would be disproportionally high. (2) The intrinsic non-substitutability of works in particular – i.e., cases where a work contains or affects further protectable works – can confront interested users with impenetrable, legally complex states of affairs and thus potentially with a high 25  US copyright law refers to the aim of promoting “the progress of Science and useful Arts”; The U.S. Constitution, art. I, sect. 8; see Jack N. Rakove, The Annotated U.S. Constitution and Declaration of Independence, Cambridge, MA 2009, p. 147. Although German copyright law does not explicitly articulate its purpose, it is generally thought to support and stimulate creativity and innovation by securing the subsistence of creators (“Alimentations­ prinzip”) and the amortization of investments (“Amortisationsprinzip”); see, e.g., Manfred ­Rehbinder / Alexander Peukert, Urheberrecht, 17th ed., Munich 2015, § 6 para. 123 et seq.

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degree of legal insecurity. For laypersons, it is easy to get confused about whether the citation right applies in such cases or whether the incorporated work can count as “incidental” (in the sense of § 57 UrhG). In such cases, the user is either forced to invest a considerable amount of time and money to arrive at a legal solution or accept risks that are almost impossible to calculate. This is also a case where creative innovations that are potentially in the interest of society as a whole run the risk of being prevented. In view of such complexity and insecurity concerning the legal assessment, promising talents or scientists could be shut out because they do not think they can answer the open legal questions and also do not have sufficient means to seek professional advice. The experience of legal insecurity could undermine trust in the legal system in general. (3) The initiative by Alexandra Elbakyan has highlighted a third problem: so far, our strategies to circumvent (and not solve) the problem of the potential non-substitutability of works in the area of science intensify and exacerbate an already profound lack of equal opportunities. Whereas in European, Anglo-American and East Asian countries, access to even excessively expensive journals is largely guaranteed by a system of public and university libraries, the scientific communities in many other countries – indeed on entire continents – are cut off from these sources. On a smaller scale, such inequalities could indeed also arise in European and Anglo-American knowledge societies if the interlibrary loan system – an instrument that is by no means to be taken for granted – should ever be called into question. The result would be that junior academics at a comparatively poor university would soon face worse career opportunities than their colleagues at well-funded universities. An equally inevitable consequence would be that scientists at publicly funded institutions or well-equipped company research centres would have considerably better access to scientific publications than so-called independent scholars. A system that, in practice, hardly poses any problems for most scientists working in comparatively privileged academic institutions and relying on a functioning network of libraries is still not fair as long as countless scientists in other countries do not have the same opportunities. The potential non-substitutability of scholarly publications, in combination with existing copyright and the reputation oligopolies of some publishing organs, contribute to sustaining and deepening the academic inequality between the so-called developed countries and many other regions of the world. The excessive fees charged by eminent academic publishers – which could only be established on the basis of potential situational non-substitutability – add to the consolidation of a Western and European hegemony in the sciences, because it makes it much more difficult for scholars from economically less prosperous countries to become competitive. Such a development cannot be reconciled with deeply rooted notions of justice; it has to be deemed extremely unfair. Moreover, the ethical considerations outlined above are not the only reasons that make this fact appear problematic. It cannot be in the interest of the sciences, either. On the one hand, the prospects for numerous innovative contributions are minimalized this way, simply because fewer researchers are able to contribute to scientific

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discourse “at eye level”. On the other hand, the opportunity for cultural and social diversity from different regional contexts to productively contribute to challenging existing academic discourses, concepts, practices, and paradigms becomes limited. If the European-American hegemony in science continues to largely exclude a substantial part of other countries’ academic intellectual elite by means of the high fees charged by the exploiters, it is acting in a way that is deeply hostile to science and also against its own interests. In view of such consequences, the potential non-substitutability of individual works becomes a factor that has structural effects beyond individual situations. Certain protectable works are only irreplaceable with respect to a concrete context of use and a particular concern. At the same time, non-substitutability gains systemic relevance if one must always expect the potential irreplaceability constantly to raise real, concrete problems. IV. Solutions? On the Relevance of Potential Non-substitutability for the Improvement of Copyright Regulations Neither the market nor criminal or competition cartel law seem to be able to effectively prevent authors or exploiters from taking advantage of the potential non-substitutability of works in order to demand excessive remuneration. In situations and contexts in which a work cannot be substituted, the market can no longer contribute to a regulation of prices. Where there are in fact no alternative offers, no competition among suppliers can take place. Not only does the market turn out to be a blunt sword, but so too does the ban on usury or other kinds of profiteering prescribed by criminal law.26 Since the user’s weak position does not usually imply a predicament (that is, a compelling need in the sense of criminal law), the requirements for the existence of usury pursuant to the criminal code are not met. But what about competition law?27 Any attempt to find a legal solution based on cartel legislation would encounter the problem that the area of application of the issue described above can hardly be fixed to a specific industry or subject matter. Moreover, the dominant market position of particular exploiters is not the result of collusion or coordinated actions. It is rather based on the reputation logic of the sciences and the non-substitutability of works in a given research context. Publishing houses have gained their privileged position automatically, as it were, if they have succeeded in prudently aggregating the reputation-enhancing efforts of numerous scientific authors, editors, and referees. 26  See, for instance, § 291 of the German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch, StGB); En­ glish translation provided by the German Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection available at: https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de / englisch_stgb / englisch_stgb.pdf (last access: 25 May 2018). 27  See also Hilty, Das Urheberrecht und der Wissenschaftler (supra, n. 2), p. 186, who points out that “the path of cartel proceedings is long and stony” and would have to be taken again every time there is a new infringement.

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As far as I can see, the legal literature and the discussions on reforming copy­ right law suggest three main approaches toward a solution: the establishment of ­arbitration boards or regulatory authorities; far-reaching changes within the sciences concerning the practices of publishing and granting access to works; and a re­ adjustment of the limitations and exceptions of copyright law. Let us examine these three options again in light of our considerations about potential non-substitutability. Establishing arbitration boards or regulatory authorities could help to clarify claims for remuneration in a reliable and legal way28 if the latter are regarded as excessive by potential users. However, a regulation of this kind would lead to numerous time-consuming case-by-case reviews. Moreover, it would hardly have any effect on granting users access to a work in a timely manner and at an acceptable price.29 It would therefore not solve the problem of non-substitutability, at least not within science, because the amount of time that a legal resolution would take is, again, disproportionate and incompatible with scientific research practice. In many scientific disciplines, it is not just the quality of the research that is highly important, but also the time it takes to quickly publish the research results. Lengthy negotiations with arbitration boards (including possible objections, appeals, and strategic delays) could mean that other researchers publish similar results elsewhere before the board has settled the issue, or that the results need to be revised due to new insights that were gained in the meantime. Academic publications reflect the state of knowledge at a particular point in time. This internal temporal logic of academic publishing would be seriously disturbed by such time-consuming clarification processes. A science-internal regulation,30 i.e. an extensive commitment to publishing under the conditions of “open access,” could at best only partially solve the problem. Such a commitment could possibly be enforced through details in employment contracts (albeit probably only for publicly funded scientific institutions) and the conditions for public funding.31 However, there would still be unavoidably large areas of academically relevant works that could not be covered by this measure: apart from the 28  Existing regulatory authorities in telecommunications, the energy sector, and rail transportation could serve as models here. 29  This problem could be mitigated to a degree by the option of advance payment: in this case, the interested user would provisionally pay the (in his view, excessive) fee into an escrow account of some form and immediately gain access to the work. If she later were to win the lawsuit, the excessive fee would be reimbursed. Such a procedure would presumably mainly benefit institutional users. 30  See, e.g., the recommendations by Aileen Fyfe / Kelly Coate / Stephen Curry et al., Untangling Academic Publishing. A History of the Relationship Between Commercial Interests, Academic Prestige and the Circulation of Research, St Andrews 2017, pp. 18 – 20, https://doi. org/10.5281/zenodo.546100 (last access: 22 July 2018). 31  Cf. the controversial attempts by the University of Constance to force its scientists to make publications available on an open-access server, in line with the Berlin declaration on open access to scientific knowledge of 20 October 2003.

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works of researchers attempting to evade such a commitment, this applies in particular to the majority of previously published works. Even if – contrary to expectations – such a regulation internal to science could be broadly implemented, most works published to date would remain excluded from this. As long as the sciences remain dependent on access to such works, situations of non-substitutability will continue to occur regularly. They could, at least potentially, continue to be used by exploiters. A science-internal solution would also face another barrier: if at all, it would merely alleviate cases of non-substitutability concerning scientific works. Non-scientific works that are taken as the subject of a scientific analysis would thus not be covered. Numerous cases, particularly of intrinsic non-substitutability, would remain unresolved.32 The art historian working on a complex work of art incorporating other works, for example, would not benefit from such a regulation at all. In order to effectively avoid that the potential non-substitutability of works is used for demanding excessively high fees or that these demands prevent the creation and publication of further works, a solution is needed that acknowledges the possibility of extrinsic non-substitutability and potential cases of intrinsic irreplaceability. Moreover, the solution must acknowledge that this does not only apply to specific works, but to all works affected by purpose of the intended use. The easiest way to reach such a solution would probably be a comprehensive statutory exception to copyright, compensated by an obligation to pay remuneration. Such a regulation would not deny that a remuneration can be demanded for access to protected works. It would, however, leave the amounts charged not up to the exploiters alone. Exploiters would no longer be able to use the potential non-substitutability of works for demanding disproportionately high fees. They would be bound by an authority – such as a collecting society – to prevent a potential non-substitutability from being unduly exploited in pricing. The applicability of such a statutory exception should not be defined by reference to the character of individual types of works but by reference to the context of use. What the German legislator recently attempted – although not very boldly – with the latest copyright reform bill flagged out as serving to adjust our copyright law to the requirements of the knowledge society33 points a little bit in this direction. At least it contains explicit reference to specific purposes of use for which the rights of authors and license holders are to be limited. But the debates about this law amendment alone have shown that not all of the potential problems are addressed by this focus on the sciences and education. Similar questions also arise for the arts.34 An exhaustive determination and precise demarcation of those areas of uses 32  The problems outlined above will also remain if – as Hilty, Das Urheberrecht und der Wissenschaftler (supra, n. 2), p. 185, suggested – scientific works generated in public institutions are considered public goods that are no longer protectable by copyright. 33  Gesetz zur Angleichung des Urheberrechts an die aktuellen Erfordernisse der Wissensgesellschaft (Urheberrechts-Wissensgesellschafts-Gesetz – UrhWissG) of 1 September 2017. 34  In February 2017, the ZiF research group The Ethics of Copying published a statement on the draft of the “Gesetz zur Angleichung des Urheberrechts an die aktuellen Erfordernisse

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where instances of non-substitutability can occur and raise serious problems, is still lacking. It should not be prematurely restricted to the (for us) obvious example of science. However, the latter clearly demonstrates that any regulation that does not take into account the problem of the potential non-substitutability of works, is unlikely to be accepted in the long run. Zusammenfassung Der Beitrag nimmt Fälle in den Blick, in denen sich urheberrechtlich geschützte Werke für einen Nutzer als unersetzlich erweisen. Neben Situationen, in denen die Absichten des Nutzers oder externe Regeln (beispielweise der Wissenschaft) die Unersetzlichkeit eines bestimmten Werkes zur Folge haben, sind auch Fälle intrinsischer Unersetzlichkeit zu berücksichtigen, die sich dem Umstand verdanken, dass urheberrechtlich geschützte Werke Teile eines bestimmten anderen Werkes sind. Der Beitrag analysiert die Schwierigkeit, den Zugang zu unersetzlichen urheberrechtlich geschützten Werken all denen zu gewährleisten, die daran ein legitimes Interesse haben, von den Inhabern urheberrechtlich begründeter Nutzungsrechte daran jedoch unter Umständen durch prohibitiv hohe Nutzungsgebühren gehindert werden. Der Beitrag analysiert das Problem unter anderem am Beispiel des Zugangs zu den Inhalten vieler wissenschaftlicher Fachzeitschriften und wägt abschließend mögliche Lösungswege gegeneinander ab.

der Wissensgesellschaft” (UrhWissG) by the Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection. In this statement, the group favoured explicit reference to the arts in defining quotation rights; see Stellungnahme der Forschungsgruppe Ethik des Kopierens am Zentrum für interdisziplinäre Forschung (ZiF) zum Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Angleichung des Urheberrechts an die aktuellen Erfordernisse der Wissensgesellschaft (UrhWissG), Bielefeld 2017, p. 8: https://www.bmjv.de / SharedDocs / Gesetzgebungsverfahren / Stellungnahmen/2017/Down loads/02222017_Stellungnahme_zif_RefE_UrhWissG.html?nn=6712350 (last access: 25 May 2018); see also Thomas Dreier, Bilder im Zeitalter ihrer vernetzten Kommunizierbarkeit, Zeitschrift für geistiges Eigentum 9 (2017), pp. 135 – 148.

Copying as Compensation Dispensing the Disadvantaged from Copyright Restrictions Amrei Bahr Legal copyright restrictions aim at protecting the interests of those who author and publish works1 by regulating the use of these works. They regulate acts of copying since these acts and their results are potentially harmful to the authors and publishers of works. When it comes to acts of copying that aim at accessing works, the potential damage primarily relates to the fact that the emerging copies can most often satisfy the demands that would otherwise be satisfied by original exemplars of the respective works.2 Hence, acts of copying can pose a serious threat to authors and publishers. I take it that authors and publishers generally have a morally justified interest in hindering certain acts of copying that would result in a limitation of their options to profit from the works they have authored or published.3 From an 1  In legal contexts, the works that are relevant here are referred to with terms such as “original work of authorship” (in US copyright law, see 17 US Code § 102, identifying original works of authorship as the subject matter of copyright law and also comprising a non-exhaustive list of different categories of works, e.g. sound recordings and architectural works), “copyright work” (in British copyright law – 1 (1) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 exhaustively lists the categories that copyright works can belong to, namely original, literary, dramatic, musical, or artistic works, sound recordings, films, broadcasts, and the typographical arrangement of published editions), or “Werk” (in German copyright law – § 2 UrhG exemplarily and non-exhaustively mentions seven categories of works protected by copyright law, namely literary works including speeches [even if they are not fixed in any tangible medium], academic publications and computer software, musical works, pantomimic works including works of dance, artistic works including works of architecture and of applied art and drafts of such works, photographic works, cinematographic works, and illustrations of a scientific or technical nature). 2  In English, the word “copy” is often used in a broad sense in which it can also refer to original exemplars of a work, such as in the sentence “I bought a copy of her recent book”. However, this is not the sense of “copy” that is relevant here: in this paper, I will use the word “copy” in a narrow sense in which it only refers to non-original objects, like in the sentence “The painting I bought is not an original, it is just a copy”. In this narrow sense, the word “copy” coincides with the German word “Kopie”. For a definition of “copy” in this narrow sense, see Amrei Bahr, What Is an Artefact Copy? A Quadrinomial Definition, in: Darren Hudson Hick / Reinold Schmücker (eds.), The Aesthetics and Ethics of Copying, New York / London 2016, pp. 81 – 98. 3  I have argued elsewhere that authors have a moral entitlement to profit from their works insofar as these works are the results of achievements that merit rewards. In the absence of other rewards, e.g. in the form of monetary compensation, authors should be rewarded for these achievements by being in charge of their works at their discretion, see Amrei Bahr, Was heißt: ‚ein Artefakt illegitim kopieren‘? Grundlagen einer artefaktbezogenen Ethik des Kopierens,

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ethical point of view, copyright restrictions that serve these interests therefore seem to be justified in principle. Nonetheless, a violation of copyright restrictions can be morally permitted if, by such a violation, fundamental moral goods are protected. It should be obvious that this is the case if, by violating copyright restrictions, the lives of people can be rescued or their health can be significantly improved. Consider the following, fictional example by Simon Carley, described from the perspective of an emergency physician: It’s 3am in [resuscitation] and you are trying to save the life of a young man. He has been brought to the ED after collapsing in a nightclub and he is sick, BIG sick. Hyperthermic, tachycardic, hypotensive, muscular rigidity, acidotic and comatose. You think this is serotonin syndrome, you wonder if dantrolene is indicated, whether chlorpromazine or olanzipine might help and whether cyproheptadine is of any benefit. You’ve read about it somewhere and as your team prepares to intubate the patient you look [online] for some advice on this rare but life threatening situation. You google. You find a paper. It’s behind a paywall. You don’t have access when you ([and] your patient) [need] it most.4

I take it to be utterly convincing that in a case like the one outlined by Carley, the physician is morally allowed to violate the respective copyright restrictions by gaining access to the paper in order to obtain the relevant information for saving the patient’s life.5 Therefore, in individual cases in which fundamental goods are at stake, the violation of copyright restrictions might well be morally justified.6 Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 61 (2013), pp. 283 – 299. Being in charge of their works at their discretion enables authors – among other things – to designate others, e.g. publishers, to exploit these works. 4  Simon Carley, Sci-Hub. The Pirate Future of Medical Publishing?, http://stemlynsblog. org / sci-hub-the-pirate-future-of-medical-publishing-st-emlyns/ (last access: 3 April 2018). 5  It could even be claimed that it is not only allowed, but a moral imperative for the physician to gain access to the paper and obtain the information pertinent to the treatment of the patient: the respective act could be regarded as an act of emergency aid. Thus, the ethical evaluation of such an act would also have to take into account considerations from an ethics of emergency, such as the catalogue of five conditions that determine whether an action is morally permissible in an emergency situation, developed by Reinold Schmücker, see Reinold Schmücker, Wozu berechtigt Not? Ein Plädoyer für eine Notethik, Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 62 (2014), pp. 1090 – 1105. However, I will not pursue this line of thought here because I take it that, despite their severity, describing situations in which the copyright-infringing acts that are of main interest in this paper take place as emergency situations would be an overstatement. 6  It is plausible to assume that the same holds for restrictions of patent law: suppose that a pharmaceutical company develops a drug that cures HIV. The company decides to sell this drug for an extortionate price so that most of those whose lives could be saved by the drug are not able to afford it. Moreover, the company prohibits the production of generics. In this case, too, I take it that it is morally allowed to violate the respective copyright restrictions by creating generics of the drug in order to save the people whose lives depend on receiving this drug. For a discussion of this issue, see Ellen ‘t Hoen / Jonathan Berger / Alexandra Calmy / Suerie Moon, Driving a Decade of Change: HIV / AIDS, Patents and Access to Medicines for All, Journal of the International AIDS Society 2011, doi:10.1186/1758-2652-14-15 and Jessica Lynn Ellis, The Cost of AIDS Drugs: A Moral Imperative, Georgetown University Journal of Health Sciences 3:1 (2006).

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However, the question remains whether there are compelling reasons apart from saving someone’s life or significantly improving someone’s health that can moral­ ly justify a violation of copyright restrictions. In particular, this question arises with regard to copying academic works: in discussions about the platform SciHub,7 it has frequently been claimed that the violations of copyright restrictions due to producing copies of the scientific publications available on the platform are justified because they grant less privileged researchers access to those very publications.8 This is an argument that Alexandra Elbakyan herself has put forward.9 Leaving aside the fact that Sci-Hub is actually not exclusively used by less privileged researchers10 for now, the argument presented by the proponents of Sci-Hub still raises the question of whether being in a less privileged position might be a justification for violating copyright restrictions pertaining to academic works: can being subject to disadvantages indeed morally justify the violations of copyright restrictions that result from copying academic works? This is a general question insofar as it does not only concern Sci-Hub and its use: it also concerns single acts of illegally copying individual works from other sources that are performed by researchers who need access to these works for their own research. I will therefore focus on the general question, but will come back to the moral evaluation of SciHub later on. As an answer to the general question, I will show that there are certain economic disadvantages of researchers that can serve as a moral justification of 7  The platform is currently hosted at: http://sci-hub.tw/. On the relevance of this shadow library, see Lindsay McKenzie, Sci-Hub’s cache of pirated papers is so big, subscription journals are doomed, data analyst suggests, Science, 27 July 2017, doi:10.1126/science.aan7164, http:// www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/07/sci-hub-s-cache-pirated-papers-so-big-subscription-jour nals-are-doomed-data-analyst (last access: 13 February 2018). 8  In his plea for legalizing small-scale physical copyright piracy, Volker Grassmuck draws on a similar argument with regard to cultural goods in general. Since this kind of piracy allows audiences which cannot afford global culture products to participate in the global information society (and, according to Grassmuck, it is also beneficial to several other groups such as native authors), it should be regarded as justified and hence be legalized: “[I]f copyright piracy has such significant advantages for the access to knowledge and creative works as well as for creativity and innovation, and the negative sides arise from its illegality – why not simply legalize it?” (Volker Grassmuck, On the Benefits of Piracy, in: Lars Eckstein /Anja Schwarz [eds.], Postcolonial Piracy: Media Distribution and Cultural Production in the Global South, London/ New York 2014, p. 94). 9  Elbakyan presents this argument in a letter that she wrote to the judge in response to the suit filed against her, see https://www.unitedstatescourts.org/federal/nysd/442951/50 – 0.html (last access: 1 February 2018). 10  The fact that Sci-Hub also benefits privileged researchers (see John Bohannon, Who’s downloading pirated papers? Everyone, Science 352 (2016), pp. 508 – 512) is often presented as an argument against the claim that the platform is operated for the benefit of less privileged researchers. Marcia McNutt, among others, has articulated this tension between intended purpose and actual benefit: “I recognize the underlying motivation of bringing global research content to the developing world. However, I also recognize that much traffic to Sci-Hub is from researchers who already have access to the articles they seek through mechanisms such as site licenses, open access, or other means” (Marcia McNutt, My love-hate of Sci-Hub, Science 352 [2016], p. 497).

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violating copyright restrictions. By permitting such acts of copying, researchers who are disadvantaged in this way can be compensated for their disadvantages. I will proceed as follows: in the first part of this paper, I will argue that, from the perspective of an ethics of copying, it can be morally justified to violate copyright restrictions pertaining to academic works in order to compensate for certain economic disadvantages, namely disadvantages that are due to structural injustice. In the second part, I will defend this claim against two substantial objections. The first objection concerns the moral appropriateness of permitting the violation of copyright restrictions that protect the interests of academic authors and publishers for the benefit of others: do we unjustifiably deprive these authors and publishers of their rights if we exempt the disadvantaged from copyright restrictions? The second objection concerns the leverage point that we choose in order to account for the justified interests of the disadvantaged: Shouldn’t we engage in changing the current academic publication system instead of suggesting a cure for mere symptoms that go along with it? I. Copying as Compensation for Economic Disadvantages due to Structural Injustice The question that I want to answer in the first part of this paper is whether or not disadvantages can serve as a moral justification for violating existing copyright restrictions by producing copies of academic works. As the case of the emergency physician who needs access to an academic paper in order to save a patient suggests, it is plausible that protecting fundamental moral goods – e.g. saving someone’s life – can serve as a moral justification for violating copyright restrictions. But cases in which producing copies of academic works is a means to save people’s lives are not the ones that I am primarily interested in here, since it seems quite clear how to deal with them from an ethical point of view. Instead, I am interested in cases in which acts of copying that violate copyright restrictions pertaining to academic works are first and foremost performed for the sake of conducting research.11 Let us first take a look at an example that substantiates the prima facie plausibility of the claim that violating copyright restrictions by copying academic works for the primary purpose of research can be morally justified if the copyist is subject to certain disadvantages. Suppose that a sociologist is conducting research on migration and integration: she investigates the preconditions of a successful social coexistence of people from different cultural backgrounds and is close to publishing a theory that could be ground-breaking. If it is indeed as compelling as it appears to be, her theory could be of great value to her discipline and also to related disciplines dealing with the same topics. Moreover, her theory might even 11  Note that this does not necessarily exclude cases in which the research results have positive effects regarding fundamental moral goods such as people’s health in the long run.

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have a huge impact beyond academia, because it could improve the ways in which societies deal with cultural diversity. However, our sociologist hesitates to publish her theory, because she still lacks access to a number of academic publications which might be relevant to her topic. At least this is suggested by quotes that our sociologist has found in publications she has access to and in abstracts that, as opposed to the publications themselves, could be accessed for free. The lack of access to the respective academic works is due to the fact that the sociologist is affiliated to a university in a poor country that cannot afford the usual expensive subscriptions for academic publications. The sociologist is aware that gaining access to these publications could be important for either discarding or substantiating her theory. Since her university does not provide her with access and she cannot afford to pay for the publications with her private money, and she does not find any other reasonable legal way to gain access to these publications, the sociologist decides to engage in illegal copying in order to gain access to the publications she needs for completing her research. Prima facie, situations like the one just outlined appear to be much less serious than situations in which someone’s life is at stake. But still, it is not at all unreasonable to ask whether what our sociologist did is morally objectionable: whereas the legal evaluation of the case should be quite straightforward, the moral evaluation is not. Even though the legal copyright restrictions that are violated here might very well be morally legitimate as such, it stands to reason that the particular situation of the sociologist has to be factored into the moral evaluation: unlike privileged researchers affiliated to universities in wealthy countries who have access to most of the publications they need for their research thanks to well-resourced libraries, our sociologist is in a fundamentally different position. She is confronted with massive difficulties in exercising her profession. This does not only amount to a personal disadvantage because it hinders her career – it also constitutes a more global disadvantage, namely for the entire community of researchers in the respective country. As they frequently lack access to academic works that are of significant importance and often even necessary for conducting their research in accordance with common academic standards, these researchers are prevented from competing with privileged researchers in other countries. Hence they are barred from participating in the academic discourse on an equal footing. Judged on the ethical principle of fairness,12 this imbalance between researchers in rich countries and researchers in poor countries is clearly intolerable. Even so, 12  For a substantiation of the understanding of fairness as an ethical principle, see Annema­ rie Pieper, Fairneß als ethisches Prinzip, Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 39 (1991), pp. 890 – 900. Pieper’s approach to the notion of fairness differs from John Rawls’ famous conception of justice as fairness (see John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, Cambridge, MA 2001) insofar as she suggests a weaker understanding of fairness: according to Pieper, the ethical principle of fairness is not a fundamental ethical principle, but rather a midlevel principle that regulates actions within a framework of more basic principles, one of which is justice (see Pieper, ibid., p. 893).

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in many constellations of this sort, it appears to be impossible to identify individuals or institutions that can be held directly responsible for the existing imbalance. It can be the result of complex processes that involve several protagonists, all of which somehow contribute to producing or maintaining it, with none of them being individually liable for it. Hence, if we want to develop an ethics of copying that accounts for such unjust constellations, an approach based on a liability model of responsibility is not satisfactory: if we cannot identify any liable protagonist and responsibility amounts to nothing more than liability, then nobody is responsible for adjusting the imbalances. With regard to the unjust situation of our sociologist, this means that neither the authors of the academic works she has illegally copied nor the publishers that have published these works are responsible for the situation that drove her to resort to illegal copying. A liability account can therefore not illuminate why academic authors and publishers should have any kind of moral obligation to permit violations of their copyrights caused by our sociologist’s acts of copying. But releasing academic authors and publishers entirely from any responsibility as suggested by the liability model is unconvincing: it should be clear that, while many academic authors and publishers have the privileges that re­searchers like the sociologist in our example lack, they also profit immensely from the research that is conducted by these economically disadvantaged researchers. For instance, much of the medical research carried out in developing countries benefits researchers in the developed world. This research is carried out in developing countries because with diseases such as AIDS, the disease prevalence is much higher, because researchers are facing fewer ethical constraints, and because conducting research in these countries is significantly cheaper.13 Given that privileged academic authors and publishers at least profit from their privileges and, in many cases, even profit from the work of less privileged researchers in addition, it seems only fair to demand that they contribute to leveling out the inequalities by permitting acts of copying that can enable less privileged researchers to engage in research as equals. By permitting such acts, academic authors and publishers have a reasonable share in compensating less privileged researchers for their disadvantages. In the light of similarly imbalanced constellations, Iris Marion Young has presented an alternative account of responsibility that provides us with a theoretical framework that can account for these considerations.14 Young provides us with a 13 See Richard Smith, Publishing research from developing countries, Statistics in medicine 21 (2002), p. 2869. 14  It goes without saying that, just as any other philosophical proposal, Young’s account of responsibility has been subject to several lines of criticism. However, I will not discuss the critique of this account in detail here. My aim is not to prove that Young’s account is ironclad, but rather to establish that it is theoretically fruitful to draw on it in our context, especially since it is apt to capture the considerations just outlined. Besides, despite the critique that has been raised against it, I consider the account to be a plausible and powerful theoretical framework that also illuminates problematic inequalities beyond the scope of an ethics of copying, e.g. in the context of education. Still, there is one point of criticism that I take to be especially troubling for Young’s account, which is why I will address it here. Martha Nussbaum has prominently

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theory that allows for ascribing responsibility to academic authors and publishers, even though they are not liable for the existing inequalities. Young describes constellations like the ones just outlined as structurally unjust: Structural injustice exists when social processes put large categories of persons under a systematic threat of domination or deprivation of the means to develop and exercise their capacities, at the same time as these processes enable others to dominate or have a wide range of opportunities for developing and exercising their capacities.15

As Young points out, a distinctive feature of structural injustice is that it cannot be traced back to morally questionable actions of individual agents or institutions: “Structural injustice is a kind of moral wrong distinct from the wrongful action of an individual agent or the willfully repressive policies of a state. Structural injustice occurs as a consequence of many individuals and institutions acting in pursuit of their particular goals and interests, within given institutional rules and accepted norms.”16 According to Young, agents who are involved in these processes can indeed be held responsible for structural injustice in a certain sense: “All the persons who participate by their actions in the ongoing schemes of cooperation that constitute these structures are responsible for them, in the sense that they are part of the process that causes them. They are not responsible, however, in the sense of having directed the process or intended its outcomes.”17 Young’s concept of structural injustice does not only help us to theoretically illuminate cases like that of our sociologist. It also enables us to distinguish between cases in which academic authors and publishers have a moral responsibility to permit acts of copying that violate their rights and cases in which these authors and publishers are not responsible, and therefore not obliged, to permit violations argued that separating responsibility from liability (in the sense of guilt) the way Young does ultimately results in the impossibility to blame those who fail to fulfil their responsibility: “If we take that line, preserving the clean distinction between retrospective guilt (which we’re not supposed to be assigning to participants in structural injustice) and prospective responsibility (which we are supposed to be assigning to them), well, then people get a free pass indefinitely, since no task they have failed to shoulder ever goes onto the debit or guilt side of their ledger, and the new task always lies ahead of them” (Nussbaum, Foreword, in: Iris Marion Young, Responsibility for Justice, Oxford 2011, pp. IX – XXV: p. XXI). As a reply, I think that two things should be noted: first, as I understand Young, her account is not negligent of the past – instead, it is just the focus of her account that lies on the future rather than on the past: “[B]oth the liability and the social connection models refer both to the past and the future. They differ, however, in temporal emphasis and priority” (Iris Marion Young, Responsibility for Justice, Oxford 2011, p. 108). It is, second, an empirical question whether this theoretical emphasis on the future might go along with either a lack of incentives for people to fulfil their responsibility or a lack of deterrence for failing to do so. From a theoretical point of view though, such an emphasis on the future can yield valuable insights, as will become apparent in what follows. 15  Iris Marion Young, Responsibility and Global Justice: A Social Connection Model, Social Philosophy and Policy 23 (2006), pp. 102 – 130: p. 114. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid.

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of their copyrights: if the economic disadvantages that drive researchers to violate copyright restrictions are due to structural injustice, this is a sufficient moral reason for academic authors and publishers to permit such violations. But if, by contrast, the economic disadvantages researchers suffer from are caused by other factors than structural injustice – e.g., if a university in a wealthy country reduces the budget of a particular institute –, academic authors and publishers cannot be required to permit violations of their copyrights. Economic disadvantages due to structural injustice justify being compensated in the form of a permission to violate copyrights held by academic authors and publishers. However, two provisos are called for: on the one hand, researchers have to be in a position in which no other reasonable legal option can be pursued in order to qualify for such a compensation of their respective economic disadvantages. Reasonable legal options will, in all likelihood, include inter-library loans and requests for preprints of the needed works, directed at the authors of those works. In most cases, traveling to another country in order to legally read a book at a university library that provides a printed copy will probably not count as reasonable. On the other hand, academic authors and publishers can only be asked to grant individual researchers a permission to violate their copyrights if these researchers copy the respective academic works for their personal academic use (or at most for the academic use of equally disadvantaged colleagues). Hence, there is apparently no moral obligation to permit the violation of copyrights by copying academic works if the beneficiaries are not just disadvantaged researchers, but also researchers who are not disadvantaged at all. It would be disproportionate to demand that authors and publishers permit such acts of copying if, by doing so, they would run the risk of jeopardizing their entitlement to profit from their works. Hence, the arguments presented here do not apply to Sci-Hub: the beneficiaries of Sci-Hub are clearly not limited to disadvantaged researchers. Since everyone can use the platform, no one needs to pay for the publications it comprises. We would ask too much of authors and publishers if we were to demand that they tolerate this and thereby waive their rights to a large extent.18 This leads to the following conclusion: a compensation of economic disadvantages can serve as a sufficient moral reason for violating copyright restrictions by copying academic works if the respective disadvantages are due to structural 18 An objection to this reasoning would be that it is far from clear how exactly Sci-Hub affects the authors’ and publishers’ options to profit from works. One could claim that, since academic authors rarely get paid for their publications anyway and the effects of Sci-Hub on the economic situation of publishers have yet to be unfolded in detail, there is no clearly recognizable loss that these parties suffer from. But even if it turned out that tolerating the practices of Sci-Hub would indeed not result in any financial disadvantages for authors and publishers, they would find themselves on a slippery slope: by tolerating their works being copied without their permission, authors and publishers would seriously degrade the importance of granting permissions in other contexts.

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injustice. The preconditions for such a compensation to serve as a sufficient moral reason are that violating copyright restrictions is the ultima ratio in terms of reasonable options, and that the person who violates these copyright restrictions is an individual researcher who requires the copied works for her research. II. Two Objections Against Permitting Copyright Violations as a Means of Compensation The position I have just presented has the advantage of ethically supporting the initial intuition that, in some cases, economic disadvantages can call for permitting copyright violations. But it is challenged by two objections: The first objection concerns the responsibility of academic authors and publishers; the second concerns the leverage point for addressing the imbalance between privileged and less privileged researchers. In the second part of this paper, I will discuss both objections and show how to overrule them. 1. Are we Unjustifiably Depriving Authors and Publishers of Their Rights if we Dispense the Disadvantaged from Copyright Restrictions? According to the first objection, it would still be too much to ask from academic authors and publishers to exempt researchers from copyright restrictions by permitting to copy their works because these researchers suffer from economic disadvantages due to structural injustice. Even if we accept that academic authors and publishers have a share in the responsibility for the structurally unjust constellations in which disadvantaged researchers find themselves, we are not committed to demanding this particular kind of contribution from them: Young says that, even though a responsibility is undoubtedly obligatory, it remains open with regard to what counts as carrying it out.19 In addition, Young also acknowledges that, even though several individuals and institutions may be involved in the complex processes that have led to structural injustice, this does not mean that each participant is responsible in the same way and to the same degree.20 According to the position presented here, academic authors and publishers are required to bear an eminently large share of this responsibility. Is this a reasonable assumption? We can reply to this objection by drawing on Young’s considerations about kinds and degrees of responsibility. She asks, how should one reason about the best way to use one’s limited time and resources to respond to structural injustices? In a world with many and deep structural injustices, most of us, in principle, share more responsibility than we can reasonably be expected   Young, Responsibility and global justice (supra, n. 15), p. 125 et seq.   Ibid., p. 125.

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to discharge. Thus, we must make choices about where our action can be most useful or which injustices we regard as most urgent.21

It should be obvious that the actions of academic authors and publishers can be useful in constellations in which structural injustice affects academia: if less privileged researchers depend on academic authors and publishers to accommodate them by dispensing them from copyright restrictions, these authors and publishers can have a considerable impact. By permitting copyright violations alone, authors and publishers can bring about one of the main prerequisites of equal participation for their otherwise severely worse-dispositioned colleagues. Hence, as for the kind of contribution that we can demand from academic authors and publishers, a permission to copy appears to be especially reasonable. Even if the authors and publishers were to confine themselves to this kind of contribution, they could make all the difference regarding equal access to required publications for researchers regardless of their background. The negative effects that structural injustice can have on academia are particularly pressing from the perspective of academic authors and publishers. I have already pointed out that there are different ways in which privileged researchers can profit from the work of less privileged researchers, e.g. in cases of medical research.22 But apart from that, there is an additional, more global argument that shows the urgency of the problem of inequality – which also concerns privileged researchers. If we hinder less privileged researchers from participating in the academic discourse on an equal footing, this will result in privileged researchers, mostly from Western countries, dominating the discourse. Hence, alternative approaches from different cultural backgrounds will only play a minor role. It is entirely plausible that all disciplines would profit immensely from such alternative approaches: for instance, Western practices and discourses could be questioned in the light of new perspectives, and viable alternatives could be presented. Since academic authors have a clear interest in the development and flourishing of their disciplines, they are also required to act according to this interest, i.e. by supporting less privileged researchers to enrich discourses by presenting their approaches in a way that complies with common academic standards. Academic publishers also have an interest in an academic landscape that is as diverse as possible. As institutions that profit from previously conducted academic research while at the same time making future research possible, they play an important role for the further development of academic discourse. In order to main  Ibid., p. 126.   We can even assume that in another respect, privileged researchers will profit from medical research conducted by less privileged researchers irrespective of their discipline, namely insofar as contemporary advanced medicine relies at least partly on this particular medical research: As members of affluent societies, privileged researchers will in many cases also benefit from treatments of contemporary advanced medicine that are being made available to them owing to their health insurance. 21 22

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tain this important role that is indispensable for their raison d’être, publishers are required to present their readers with a diverse publishing program that provides them with a plurality of positions and methods. By doing this, they can make an invaluable contribution to the development and flourishing of future research. The special position of academic authors and publishers also helps explain why it is justified to ascribe to them a large share of the responsibility for the structural injustices that affect less privileged researchers. As Young points out, the kind and degree of responsibility depend on four different parameters, namely power, privilege, interest, and collective ability.23 As we will see, all four parameters indicate that academic authors and publishers do indeed carry a significantly large share of responsibility. With respect to power, we have already seen that it is reasonable to assume that academic authors and publishers are often in a position that enables them to have a considerable effect on structurally unjust constellations that affect less privileged researchers. Because of this significant power, academic authors and publishers carry a significant amount of responsibility. This applies particularly to privileged researchers and publishers. Young says that, due to the fact that privilege secures that engaging in fighting structural injustices is not a huge risk, privileged agents have special moral responsibilities: “Persons who benefit relatively from structural injustices have special moral responsibilities to contribute to organized efforts to correct them, not because they are to blame, but because they are able to adapt to changed circumstances without suffering serious deprivation.”24 With respect to the parameter of interest, it has already been pointed out that aca­ demic authors and publishers share a special interest in the abolishment of structural injustice that affects academic research. This entails a special responsibility to engage in its abolishment. The latter is in the interest of the privileged, but also of the less privileged agents involved. According to Young, victims of injustice share responsibility with others for cooperating in projects to undermine the injustice. Victims of injustice have the greatest interest in its elimination, and often have unique insights into its social sources and the probable effects of proposals for change.25

Hence, it is not only privileged researchers who have a responsibility that requires them to permit less privileged researchers to copy their works. Less privileged researchers share this responsibility; they too are required to permit the copying of their works by other less privileged researchers.26 This is a reasonable  Cf. Young, Responsibility and global justice (supra, n. 15), p. 127.   Cf. ibid., p. 128. 25  Cf. ibid. 26  Note that by accepting that there is a moral obligation to permit the copying of a work by disadvantaged researchers, we are not committed to doubts regarding the appropriateness of copyright regulations as such. Analogously, we can accept that a boat owner has a moral 23 24

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demand since researchers usually do not receive any remuneration for the legal use of their works anyway. By permitting the copying of their works, less privileged researchers would not face additional financial disadvantages that would put them in an even worse position. Their financial situation would remain unaffected by their permission to copy their works. At first glance, the situation of publishers seems to be different. Their concern about possible losses seems to be justified, given that their business model consists in earning money with the respective works. But on closer examination, it becomes apparent that the publishers would not be worse off financially, either. Since their obligation to allow the copying of their works only extends to less privileged researchers who would, in most cases, not be able to afford buying the works in question or gaining access to them anyway, the financial drawbacks would at most be marginal. The fourth parameter, collective ability, also supports the claim that academic authors and publishers have a special responsibility. Since these authors and publishers are often a part of elaborate, well-functioning academic networks, this amounts to a collective ability to take effective measures against the structural injustices that cause disadvantages for certain researchers. As we have seen, there are several reasons for attributing a special responsibility to academic authors and publishers when it comes to abolishing existing struc­t ural injustices that manifest themselves in economic disadvantages for researchers. Thus the objection that we are unjustifiably depriving authors and publishers of their rights by demanding that they let less privileged researchers copy their works is not convincing. 2. Is an Ounce of Prevention Better than a Pound of Cure? Still, there is a second objection against the idea that academic authors and publishers should permit less privileged researchers to copy their works. According to this second objection, the leverage point that I have chosen here is not adequate. Instead of trying to cure the symptoms that go along with a problematic publication system, shouldn’t we instead work towards changing the system as such? Many academic publications have become increasingly expensive, which seems to be a main cause of the inequalities between researchers. If even a university like Harvard can no longer afford their journal subscriptions,27 how is a university in a poor country supposed to provide its researchers with the publications they need? Instead of demanding a cure for the symptoms, shouldn’t we instead prevent them altogether by changing the current system? obligation to accept that someone steals her boat to save someone else from drowning, without being committed to raise doubts regarding property rights as such. 27  Ian Sample, Harvard University says it can’t afford journal publishers’ prices, The Guardian, 24 April 2012, https://www.theguardian.com/science/2012/apr/24/harvard-university-journal-​ publishers-prices (last access: 14 February 2018).

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There are two replies to this second objection. Firstly, even though changing the academic publication system seems reasonable – also for reasons beyond the ones discussed here –, this will not prevent all of the problems that we are concerned with here. If less privileged researchers lack access to the publications they need just because of their extremely high prices, the disadvantages that these re­searchers are subject to can indeed be rectified by a change of the system. But even with lower prices, the disadvantages of less privileged researchers might remain. The inequalities between researchers are not necessarily caused by high prices alone. Universities in poor countries might even lack the financial means to grant their researchers access to more affordable publications. Hence, changing the publication system will not suffice to ensure the academic participation of all researchers on an equal footing. Secondly, even though changing the publication system in order to avoid disadvantages due to extremely high prices for academic publications might be required from an ethical perspective, the account that I have presented here can serve as an interim solution to the problems posed by extremely high prices. Thus, even if the disadvantages of certain researchers that are due to high prices for academic publications might be removed at some point in the future, we can, for now, take measures against the current structural injustices by dispensing with copyright restrictions for disadvantaged researchers. One question that remains to be answered is how we should legally implement the ethical considerations presented here. One way could be to draw on certain limitations of copyright restrictions, similar to the limitations of the Marrakesh treaty.28 These limitations compensate the visually impaired for the disadvantages they are subject to. Analogously, we could implement limitations that compensate researchers who are economically disadvantaged due to structural injustice.29 Zusammenfassung Ist die Verletzung von Urheberrechten an wissenschaftlichen Publikationen moralisch gerechtfertigt, wenn benachteiligte Wissenschaftler_innen dadurch einen Zugang zu für ihre Forschung unumgänglichen Forschungsergebnissen erlangen, der ihnen anderenfalls verwehrt bliebe? Im ersten Teil des Beitrags lege ich eine Antwort auf diese Frage vor: Ich zeige auf, dass die Verletzung von Urheberrech28  Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled, adopted by the diplomatic conference to conclude a treaty to facilitate access to published works by visually impaired persons and persons with print disabilities in Marrakesh, on June 27, 2013. 29  This approach would raise the question of who should qualify for such a compensation: who is a less privileged researcher in the sense described here? Since the financial issues that matter in this context are quantifiable, one way of answering this question would be to develop benchmarks that account for the different economic aspects that determine a researcher’s position.

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ten an wissenschaftlichen Publikationen aus Sicht einer Ethik des Kopierens als moralisch gerechtfertigt erscheint, wenn dadurch Nachteile ausgeglichen werden, die sich struktureller Ungerechtigkeit verdanken. Diese Antwort verteidige ich im zweiten Teil des Beitrags gegen zwei gewichtige Einwände. Der erste Einwand betrifft die moralische Angemessenheit einer Erlaubnis von Urheberrechtsverletzungen zulasten der Interessen wissenschaftlicher Autor_innen und Verlage: Berauben wir Autor_innen und Verlage ungerechtfertigterweise ihrer Urheberrechte, wenn wir benachteiligten Wissenschaftler_innen die Verletzung dieser Rechte zugestehen? Der zweite Einwand stellt den von mir gewählten Ansatzpunkt zur Berücksichtigung der gerechtfertigten Interessen benachteiligter Wissenschaftler_innen in Frage: Sollten wir nicht das gegenwärtige wissenschaftliche Publikationssystem als solches überdenken, statt uns bloßen Symptomen dieses Systems zuzuwenden?

Copy Ethics and Its Implications for Academic Publishing in the Digital Era Martin Hoffmann and Reinold Schmücker

What are the implications of the controversy about the ethics of copying for the question of how to make research publicly available in the digital era? Do copy-ethical insights have any impact at all on this question? We think they do indeed, because many research publications (those publications that make research results publicly available) are precisely the kind of publications that cannot be replaced by others – i.e., by a different essay or book. A reason for trying to replace an original publication might be its high cost.1 This emphasizes the necessity for an ethics of access. An ethics of access cannot be limited to taking into account the interests of researchers living and working in countries which can afford their research institutions access to the vast majority of academic publications.2 From a moral point of view, excluding people in less fortunate countries from gaining knowledge about the current state of research cannot be justified. However, can it be morally permissible to provide the morally required general access to current research at the expense of others who have generated previous research results, have shared results or have bought exploitation rights for their publications? This sounds unjust. One could argue that lifting copyright restrictions on access to state of the art research amounts to dispossession and is therefore not morally permissible. In Germany, the 2017 law for alignment of copyright to the current demands of knowledge-based society (“Gesetz zur Angleichung des Urheberrechts an die aktuellen Erfordernisse der Wissensgesellschaft”) has been accused of leading to dispossession. This accusation has been raised in the media and also in a series of statements during the consultation hearing. Critics found fault in changing the existing copyright law in Germany to allow for numerous copyrighted works to be used, to a certain extent, free of permission and, in some cases, free of charge for purposes of teaching and research. The Neue Zürcher Zeitung, for example, commented on 4 July 2017 that the German government had just legalized the dispossession of authorship. 1 See Johannes Grave, Irreplaceable Works. Non-substitutability, Market Failure, and Access Needs, present volume, pp. 225 – 240. 2 See Amrei Bahr, Copying as Compensation. Dispensing the Disadvantaged from Copyright Restrictions, present volume, pp. 241 – 253.

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The goal of our paper is two-fold. First, we will discuss the charge of dispossession from the perspective of copy ethics and show that it turns the actual situation on its head. In fact, we will claim, the current system of publishing research results puts those who have generated research results at a disadvantage and also those who have financed the results. Our first thesis is that this is a system that undervalues the interests of people who want to learn about the academic state of the art, of the authors of academic publications, and potentially also of the people who carry out the research. This situation cannot be adequately described solely from the perspective of an ethics of access, and – this is our second thesis – it cannot be rectified merely by modifying copyright law. In our view, a fundamental change within the academic system itself is necessary. Without this, no statutory exceptions in copyright law, however well-meant, will bring about any noteworthy improvement of equity and fairness. Thus, an ethics of access – as well as an ethics of copying – points beyond the area it is primarily concerned with. The aim of this paper is to emphasize this and to stress the implications of copy-ethical insights for the academic system in the digital era. I. Authors’ Rights Must be Weighed Against the Justified Rights of Others We will use the label “accusation of dispossession by the law” for the claim that the limitation of copyright by law in favor of teaching and research purposes would mean a dispossession of authors or exploitation rights holders and therefore be illegitimate. Can this accusation be justified either from a legal or from an ethical perspective? If one assumes that an author’s ownership is based on a positive legal norm, it is unconvincing to claim that the respective legal norm could not also limit the ownership it ascribes to an author. Since from a legalistic point of view, determining the extent of an author’s property right is the responsibility of the legislators alone. Therefore, the dispossession claim cannot be justified without reference to any pre-positive reason. If, on the other hand, one assumes that there is a pre-positive, ethical reason for attributing property to an author, the author’s right must be weighed against other rights that are also ethically justified. There is no ethical reason for decreeing an author’s property rights a priori above other rights. The ethical weighing between an author’s moral right and the moral right of third parties – who must be taken into account when it comes to limiting the legitimacy of copying activities – cannot disregard the fact that authorship never applies to a creatio ex nihilo: the creation of any work is based on ideas and achievements of third parties insofar as its precondition is that the author went through learning processes. This includes the ideas of third parties and the achievements of others. They played a role in the artist’s education as well as in her inspiration. Failing to

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recognize this would mean to ignore the contributions made by earlier artists and contradict the rule of equal consideration. II. The Blatant Disregard for the Principle of a Fair and Impartial Balance Concerning the permissibility of acts of copying in education and academia, two important issues must be taken into consideration. (1) The creation of works in the sense of copyright presupposes knowledge, skills, models and reference points that would not exist in a society where they are not continually generated, passed on, and further developed through education and science. In a society that is not concerned with a high level of education and science, there would also be no significant interest in works protected by copyright. This is why education and science and their promotion through governmental or subsidiary institutions are generally desirable in the interest of society as a whole. At the same time, however, they are indispensable prerequisites for the creation of works capable of being protected by copyright and for a broad social interest in their use; without this interest, there would be no market for such works. (2) Most of the works used for educational and research purposes are not substitutable by other works: anyone wanting to learn about the issues presented in a particular paper has to read precisely that paper and cannot turn to a different text instead. This is why the legal guarantee of exclusive rights for such works leads to a monopoly position for the copyright holder. If legislators grant such exclusive rights, they must also take the interests of the people affected by these rights into account, so that the monopoly position does not impair teaching and research. This has two implications: (a) The use of published copyrighted works for purposes of education and science must not be dependent upon the copyright holder’s discretion. Otherwise, it would be possible for the right holders to prevent their published works from being used in research or teaching, or they could decide that only certain individuals can use their works. This would, inter alia, run the risk of disrupting research progress and of preventing researchers from acquiring knowledge about other researchersʼ results and from evaluating them. The attribution of rights to authors entails this risk and is insofar at odds with necessary conditions of research. (b) The use of copyrighted works for purposes of education and science must not be obstructed by prohibitively high costs or other measures that would make them available only for certain students and researchers (who have the required financial means). Concerning the payment for copies made for purposes of teaching or research, the fact must be taken into account that the authors of academic studies are typically able to carry out their research in academic institutions – which means that there are no personal research expenses neither for the authors nor for the publishers, the so-called exploiters. Even more, the salaries of the researchers are also paid by

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the academic institutions. For this reason, fairness demands that these institutions are charged for access to publications that were made possible through their own academic staff’s work, without any costs, only in proportion to the efforts invested by the author or exploiter to “refine” the publication (which means to increase its quality), e.g., by copy-editing. Since it is obvious that in most cases of academic publishing today, the costs saved through the free use of education and research exceed the value-increasing investments of copyright holders, claiming that the German legislator has dispossessed copyright holders by the 2017 copyright reform is inappropriate. Quite the contrary is true. In the previous legal situation, as well as today, in particular the exploiters had and have a big advantage over the parties interested in learning about cutting-edge research because they have a monopoly but disproportionately low costs. In Germany, the 2017 copyright law reform has, for the first time, taken into account – however rudimentarily – the expenditures that exploiters have saved through their free use of research results and the editorial work of researchers which typically allowed the exploiters to save the costs for qualified copy-editors or own editorial offices. Given the current standard practices of publishing research results, not only the justified interests of those wanting to learn about cutting edge academic research are marginalized. In fact, the interests of the authors of academic publications are also not adequately taken into account. Unless they are particularly well-known, or their publications are remarkably successful, the authors of academic articles usually have no bargaining power to ensure that their interests are appropriately taken into account by the leading exploiters. This is because the reputation of academic researchers today greatly depends on the reputation of the publishing houses and journals publishing their research results. Academics who want to apply for jobs or funding in today’s system are often forced to accept the conditions set by respected publishing houses and particularly high-ranking journals. This frequently includes a lack of author’s fees – which are very rarely paid for academic publications anyway – and the irrevocable and unrestricted relinquishment of all global exploitation rights to the publishing house. The monopoly position of academic publishing houses, in combination with recent technical means of copy protection, results in a somehow paradox situation: Access to research results that were enabled by public institutions (which are supported by public funds) for members of these institutions (researchers as well as students) is only possible at a price that cannot be justified by the publishers’ investments or the service performed by them, not to mention the expenses saved by the publishing house by using research results and acquiring exploitation rights often completely free of charge. There is a blatant disregard for a key principle of copy ethics. It was one focus of the ZiF research group on The Ethics of Copying in 2016: the principle of a fair and impartial balance. According to this principle, which is also the explicit or implicit basis of most copyright regimes around the world, limitations of the admissibility

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of acts of copying are only legitimate if they are governed by rules that establish a fair and impartial balance between the interests of authors, exploiters, users or consumers, people who potentially copy works, and the general public.3 III. How to Use Peer Review – That is the Question! How can this blatant disregard for the principle of a fair and impartial balance be addressed? As to academic publishing, we must look beyond copy ethics for a solution, since the problem at hand cannot be solved by copy ethics – i.e. cannot be solved via a change in the existing legal restrictions for acts of copying. It is not sufficient to oppose the obvious disregard for the most fundamental principle of an ethics of copying by simply pleading for a change of copyright law. This would be insufficient not only because the problem at hand is a global phenomenon that can hardly be effectively tackled by changes on the level of national legislatures. In fact, a different aspect seems decisive: the extremely strong monopoly position of the publishing houses in the area of academic publication is not only based on legislators granting authors exclusive rights to works which they can hand over to exploiters. It is also due to a fatal development in the academic system itself. It goes without saying that peer review is an important instrument for evaluating research results. In many cases, the quality and significance of research results can only be recognized and wholly appreciated by someone who is familiar with the research area and its current development. However, in order to avoid a one-sided or inaccurate evaluation of research results, it is crucial that nobody who is clearly a peer due to her professional competence is excluded from this evaluation: it contradicts the original idea of peer review to restrict the evaluation by peers to a selected number of persons because this could lead to a biased result of the review process due to specific beliefs, presuppositions, or perspectives of the selected reviewers; and it is also crucial that nobody who would like to comment on other researchers’ results is prevented from this. Currently, peer review is much more often used for the evaluation of research projects outlined in proposals, and for the decision on whether a research result will be published in a certain journal or by a certain publishing house, than for the critical evaluation of research results. At the same time, the original idea of peer review has been modified in crucial respects. First, peer review today is limited to peers who are selected by a certain authority – for example, by the editor of an academic journal. Second, the peers usually remain anonymous. One advantage of peer review is thus thwarted, for only the 3  For a more detailed comment on the principle of a fair and impartial balance see Reinold Schmücker, Normative Resources and Domain-Specific Principles: Heading for an Ethics of Copying, in: Darren Hudson Hick / Reinold Schmücker (eds.), The Aesthetics and Ethics of Copying, New York / London 22017, pp.  359 – 377: pp.  371 – 373.

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judgments of peers who are privileged by the selecting authority have any weight. The peer review process therefore does not primarily benefit the scientific prog­ ress – for which it would be important not to exclude any professionally competent peers – but rather benefits decision-makers who need advice. The editor of a journal and its publisher are typically the decision-makers for the publication of research results. This is an important point, because it cannot be the responsibility of public authorities to finance peer review activities of researchers – given that the beneficiaries of these activities are primarily private publishing houses that save money due to the free use of academic consultants. Third, the rule that academic peer reviewers remain anonymous has negative consequences in several ways. In fact, the rule protects the reviewers from being liable for the consequences of their conduct in the case of gross negligence and from a loss of reputation. It also provides the selected peers with the opportunity to prevent someone else from making research results public as soon as possible, or from publishing them in a journal of his choice. Furthermore, the rule provides some peers with privileged access to a third party’s research results which they themselves can then use for their own research projects. It is very difficult for the author of a peer-reviewed paper to provide evidence for this infringement. Today, a double-blind review process is often used to counteract reviewers abusing their power. It is not only the reviewer who remains unknown to the submitting author, also the author of the paper remains unknown to the reviewer. However, this can merely serve to exclude some personal emotions and interests from the reviewing process. It cannot counteract the other disadvantages of the modified peer-review process described above. There are at least three medium-term negative effects of the double-blind peer review process on the research process. Today, they become more and more obvious in particular with regard to the humanities.4 First of all, fruitful and innovative consequences of some research results could be thwarted because their publication is prevented. There are, however, two further effects which are even more serious. A double-blind peer review process leads to excessive specialization, on the one hand, and to academic stagnation, on the other. It rewards two strategies of authors who want to see their papers published in a journal of their choice: one is to focus on research topics on which only a very small number of researchers worldwide – all of whom know one another personally – are working. It is then relatively easy to anticipate who the reviewers will be. The other strategy is to choose topics and methods for which the authors can expect approval from the greatest possible number of potential reviewers. However, this would lead to more and more 4  See, e.g., Joel Katzav / Krist Vaesen, Pluralism and Peer Review in Philosophy, Philosophersʼ Imprint 17 (2017), no. 19, pp. 1 – 20, https://philarchive.org/archive/KATPAP-5 (last access: 24 September 2018); Timothy Gowers, The End of an Error?, The Times Literary Supplement, 24 October 2017, https://www.the-tls.co.uk/articles/public/the-end-of-an-error-peerreview/ (last access: 24 September 2018); Caspar Hirschi, Wie die Peer Review die Wissenschaft diszipliniert, Merkur 72 (2018), no. 832, pp. 5 – 20.

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mainstream-oriented articles being published. Each of these strategies will, in the middle-term, harm the quality, progress, and originality of research. This is definitely true for the humanities and social sciences; we believe, however, that similar effects will be observed even in the natural sciences. For this reason, it is worth considering how the disregard for the principle of a fair and impartial balance of interests that is prevalent in the area of academic publishing can be counteracted so that the monopoly position of a palmful number of major academic publishers can be weakened and the negative consequences of those current peer review processes that foil the original idea of peer review can be corrected. Before we make three concrete suggestions as to how these negative consequences could be avoided or at least limited, we should reply to an objection that is often raised: don’t we need the filter effect of publishing houses and journals because it is impossible to read everything? One could argue that this filter is a benefit because otherwise we would have to read even more. The answer to this objection is very simple: it is not research that benefits from this filter effect. For research does not need it. No serious researcher will ever disregard respective literature found in archives, in libraries, or on the internet just because it did not appear in a renowned journal with a high impact factor or reputation. The filter effect with regard to journals and publishing houses is only beneficial for someone who wants to – or has to – rank researchers according to their reputation without having to read too much written by them. IV. Three Concrete Suggestions There are concrete options for avoiding or limiting the negative effects of the peer review system for academic publishing in the digital era. The following suggestions aim at employing the principle of peer review where it makes sense, without having to accept the disadvantages of a double-blind peer review system. Implementing these suggestions would reduce the number of academic publications whose authors do not have a strong bargaining position due to their obligation to publish. It is also important to generate incentives for universities to develop – on their own or in co-operation with other universities – an electronic repository system for academic publications through which scholarly work could be downloaded for free, without any exploiter receiving payment for access to it. Especially young researchers have an extremely weak bargaining position because they lack publicity as an author and they are in need of taking the most prestigious publisher for their first book in order to improve their chances of getting an academic job. Therefore, our first suggestion concerns the question how the original idea of peer review could be made fruitful in favor of the evaluation of PhD theses. To delegate the assessment of PhD theses to anonymous referees distinct from the supervisors, as it has often been suggested in the last years, would be a step in the wrong direction. For this would mean to transfer the above mentioned

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disadvantages of the currently used double-blind peer review procedure to the evaluation of PhD theses which perhaps are the most important contributions to scientific progress. What should be done instead? PhD theses should not be assessed by professors first. Instead, they should be presented open access to the interested public as manuscripts on a platform for one year, for example on the university library’s website. This makes sure that everybody who is interested to comment on a thesis is able to do so. Readers of the manuscript should give the university written feedback containing any objections, for example with respect to the scholarly content of the work and the academic skills of the author. Following the year of public presentation, the thesis should be assessed, as usual in most European countries, by the supervisors who can reasonably be expected to assess the theses in the light of the external criticisms but well-balancedly so that the candidates will not be harmed by criticism beside the point. Rather, their achievements will be officially recognizable for everyone immediately after the submission of their theses – the reviewers or others would no longer be able to illegitimately take over results of not-yet-published works. The candidates will be able to improve their work in light of any criticism of the manuscript if they want to publish their theses either as an article or as a book. Publishing houses that produce, and want to profit from, books based on dissertations will concentrate on selecting the best works and would need to make their authors good offers for a contract. Public research funding would save the expenses for supporting printing costs, and the half of the income from the fee for copies that is currently deducted in advance from the royalties, e.g. in Germany for the “Förderfonds Wissenschaft” of the collecting society “VG Wort”, would be available for authors. Currently, these substantial funds are almost exclusively used for paying publishing houses subsidies for printing costs. Our second suggestion: it must become a fixed element of good scholarly practice that nobody in academic life is discriminated against due to the place of publication of their works. In academic life, we have numerous mechanisms for preventing discrimination against scholars due to non-academic reasons. We should add a very clear rule against discrimination in relation to publications. This is necessary in order to enhance the free communication of research results. It should be anchored in the professional code and other rules that concern the employment of scholars and the allocation of subsidies. For example, it must no longer be permissible to base decisions on the fact that an applicant has published articles in journals with a higher impact-factor, or that are higher-ranking than others. The place of publication alone is no guarantee for the quality of a text. Even prestigious journals occasionally publish less-than highly innovative contributions (not to mention forgeries and plagiarism). Experience shows that it is useful to quote other texts that have been published in the journal where you want your paper published. The impact factor of a journal is also not a guarantee of the high quality of every paper appeared in the journal. More importantly, a publication in a journal that does not belong to the highest-ranking ones does not necessarily indicate that the paper is of lower quality. It is therefore essential that commissions making decisions about hiring staff and providing grants must be committed to making their own judg-

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ment – instead of relying on the place of publication and the impact factor alone as indicators for academic quality. Apart from recognizing achievements in academic teaching and supervision, such decisions should be based on the quality of research results and scholarly publications solely. If an employment committee has to determine this quality by itself and is no longer allowed to avoid it by, for instance, simply noting that one applicant has a “habilitation” and the other one does not, it should also become a matter of course that the committee must not leave reading the texts to anonymous peers or the editors of a journal. Our third suggestion concerns undermining the business model of the globally operating academic publishing houses at their most sensitive point: in the future, publicly paid scholars should only be allowed to do reviews for academic journals published by commercial, profit-making publishing houses if they notify a form of university collecting society about their work and if this collecting society charges the publishing houses accordingly. The thus generated income should be shared between the reviewers and the academic institutions employing them. Of course, publishing houses should not be prevented from performing their own assessments of academic manuscripts. And if they decide to hire editors with a broad knowledge of their respective academic fields who can make their own decisions and only have to ask academics for a peer review in very difficult cases or in order to improve a promising paper that is worth the effort – so much the better. Scholars would then no longer be obliged to act as slaves of global publishing houses and could spend more time on their research. The worry might be that implementing this suggestion could lead to German scholars being used as expert reviewers less often in the future. Again, we can only say: so much the better! We would then have more time for research. Journals that would discriminate against excellent research in Germany could simply be unsubscribed by our libraries without a second thought. But we can be certain that Elsevier, Springer & Co. will not let this happen. So, let us dare be just a little bit courageous! Zusammenfassung Gegen die Beschränkung des Urheberrechts zugunsten von Bildung und Forschung durch das UrhWissG vom 1. September 2017 ist verschiedentlich eingewandt worden, dass sie eine Enteignung der Rechteinhaber darstelle. Die Autoren zeigen, dass dieser Einwand unberechtigt ist und im Bereich des wissenschaftlichen Publizierens vielmehr nach wie vor ein fundamentales kopierethisches Prinzip, das einen fairen und unparteilichen Ausgleich der durch Kopierhandlungen berührten Interessen gebietet, in eklatanter Weise missachtet wird. Die Beachtung dieses Prinzips kann im Bereich des wissenschaftlichen Publizierens allerdings nicht allein durch eine Reform des Urheberrechts gewährleistet werden. Um dem

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Gebot eines fairen und unparteilichen Ausgleichs der durch Kopierhandlungen berührten Interessen Rechnung zu tragen, bedarf es vielmehr der Korrektur einer fatalen Fehlentwicklung innerhalb des Wissenschaftssystems selbst, die dazu geführt hat, dass das Prinzip des peer review in einer Weise eingesetzt wird, die dessen ursprünglichen Sinn verfehlt und in wissenschaftsschädlicher Weise monopolistische Verwerter begünstigt, indem sie es ihnen ermöglicht, einen Großteil der mit einer wissenschaftlichen Publikation verbundenen Kosten auf die in Europa zumeist aus öffentlichen Mitteln finanzierten wissenschaftlichen Institutionen abzuwälzen. Die Autoren unterbreiten drei konkrete Vorschläge, wie dieser Fehlentwicklung begegnet werden kann.

B. Weitere Beiträge zu Recht und Ethik – Further Contributions on Law and Ethics

Strafe ohne Souverän? Zur Frage des ius puniendi im Völkerstrafrecht Versuch einer Grundlegung des Völkerstrafrechts Kai Ambos* ius puniendi

 I. Vorbemerkungen 1. Defizite des Völkerstrafrechts Das geltende Völkerstrafrecht (VStR) leidet unter mindestens vier theoretischen Defiziten. Zunächst bedarf es seiner genaueren inhaltlichen Bestimmung mit Blick auf die anderen Teilgebiete des internationalen Strafrechts. Wir können dies als das „Bedeutungsproblem des VStR“ bezeichnen. Zweitens muss die Frage, ob Strafgewalt auf einer supranationalen Ebene ohne Souverän überhaupt existieren kann, beantwortet werden (das „ius puniendi Problem“). Drittens muss die Funktion des VStR im Vergleich zum nationalen Strafrecht überzeugender erklärt werden (das „Funktionsproblem“). Viertens müssen die völkerstrafrechtlichen Strafzwecke im Vergleich zu den traditionellen Strafzwecken des nationalen Strafrechts besser ausgearbeitet werden (das „Strafzweckeproblem“). Zwischen diesen Problemen besteht teilweise eine horizontale und teilweise eine vertikale Verbindung. So ist es etwa unmöglich, über ius puniendi, Funktion und Strafzwecke nachzudenken, ohne zuvor die Bedeutung des VStR geklärt zu haben. Ebenso scheint die Befassung mit der Funktion und den Strafzwecken die Rechtfertigung des ius puniendi zur Voraussetzung zu haben.1 *  Der Beitrag geht auf eine Untersuchung zurück, die der Verf. während eines Forschungsaufenthalts am Institute for Advanced Studies (IAS) der Hebräischen Universität Jerusalem im WS 2011/12 durchgeführt hat. Frühere Fassungen wurden u. a. auf einem internationalen Seminar des IAS (21./22. 12. 2011) und auf der Konferenz der deutschen Sektion der Internat. Vereinigung für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie (Münster, 27 – 29. 9. 2012) vorgetragen. Ich danke den Teilnehmern für wertvolle Hinweise. Ferner danke ich meinen (ehem.) Mitarbeitern S. Kern und T. Schlüter für Unterstützung sowie J. Sander für die Hilfe bei der Aktualisierung des englischen Originals (OxJLS 33, 2013, 293). 1  Zur Funktionsfrage s. Ambos, „Rechtsgutsprinzip und harm principle: theoretische Ausgangspunkte zur Bestimmung der Funktion des Völkerstrafrechts“, in: Zöller / Hilger / Küper / Roxin (Hrsg.), Gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft in internationaler Dimension. Festschrift für Jürgen Wolter zum 70. Geburtstag am 7. September 2013, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2013, S.  1285 – 1310; zur Strafzweckfrage ders., Treatise on International Criminal Law Vol. I, Oxford: Oxford University Press (OUP), 2013, S. 67 ff.

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Tatsächlich stellt wohl das Fehlen einer befriedigenden Antwort auf die Frage nach dem ius puniendi die größte theoretische Schwäche des heutigen VStR dar. Deshalb soll hier eine Antwort auf diese Frage gesucht werden. Es soll gezeigt werden, dass ein supranationales ius puniendi aus der Kombination einer beginnenden supranationalen Weltordnung (normativ verstanden als gemeinsame Werteordnung) und dem Konzept einer Weltgesellschaft abgeleitet werden kann. Die Weltgesellschaft besteht aus Weltbürgern, deren Recht (das Weltbürgerrecht) aus universellen, unteilbaren und interkulturellen Menschenrechten – auf dem kantischen Konzept der Menschenwürde gründend – hervorgeht. Die beginnende Weltordnung und die Weltgesellschaft werden von der internationalen Gemeinschaft (verstanden als Wertgemeinschaft) repräsentiert, die damit zugleich auch zum Träger des ius puniendi wird. 2. Noble Ziele und hohe Erwartungen Die Ziele des Völkerstrafrechts sind nobel und die damit verbundenen Erwartungen hoch. Die Präambel des Gründungsdokuments des Internationalen Strafgerichtshofs (IStGH), des sog. Römischen oder Rom-Statuts, legt fest, dass die „schwersten Verbrechen, welche die internationale Gemeinschaft als Ganzes2 berühren, nicht unbestraft bleiben dürfen und dass ihre wirksame Verfolgung durch Maßnahmen auf einzelstaatlicher Ebene und durch verstärkte internationale Zusammenarbeit gewährleistet werden muss“. Sie erkennt an, „dass solche schweren Verbrechen den Frieden, die Sicherheit und das Wohl der Welt bedrohen“ und drückt die Entschlossenheit der beteiligten Staaten aus, „der Straflosigkeit der Täter ein Ende zu setzen und so zur Verhütung solcher Verbrechen beizutragen“. Somit haben das Völkerstrafrecht und sein erster ständiger Gerichtshof eine gemischt individuell-kollektive Mission: Auf individueller Ebene zielt das Völkerstrafrecht darauf ab, grundlegende Menschenrechte zu schützen, indem es internationale Verbrechen, die diese Rechte verletzen, verfolgt und bestraft; auf kollektiver Ebene strebt es danach, „den Frieden, die Sicherheit und das Wohl der Welt“ durch die effektive Verfolgung internationaler Verbrechen, die diese Werte bedrohen, zu fördern.3   Siehe auch Art. 5 (1) IStGH-Statut.   Der Zweck der Friedensschaffung und -sicherung geht schon auf Nürnberg und Tokyo zurück, vgl. etwa International Military Tribunal Nuremberg, Trial of the Major War Criminals Vol. 1, 1947, S. vii („Recognizing the importance of establishing for history an authentic text of the Trial of major German war criminals [...]“); ibid. S. 223 ( „[…] only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.“); s. auch Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council No 10 Vol. I, US v Karl Brandt et al. (‚The Medical Case‘), 1947, S. 27 ( „The mere punishment of the defendants […] can never redress the terrible injuries the Nazis visited on these unfortunate people. For them it is far more important that these incredible events be established by clear and public proof, so that no one can doubt that they were fact and not fable: and that this Court […] stamp these acts, and the ideas which engendered them, as barbarous and criminal.“). Bzgl. des 2 3

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Allerdings ist seit der effektiven Errichtung des Gerichtshofs im Jahr 20034 deutlich geworden, wie schwer es ist, diese Mission zu erfüllen. So fehlt es nicht an kritischen Stimmen, die vor zu hohen Erwartungen, insbesondere mit Blick auf die kollektive Ebene der Friedenssicherung, warnen, weil dies über die klassische Funktion eines Strafgerichts – individuelle Verantwortlichkeit festzustellen – hinausgehe.5 Zudem wird sich die Wissenschaft mehr und mehr der theoretischen Defizite des Völkerstrafrechts, wie sie schon oben benannt wurden, bewusst.6 Ich werde mich hier auf das ius puniendi-Problem konzentrieren, zuvor bedarf es aber einiger klarstellender Bemerkungen zum Bedeutungsproblem. Damit wird der Boden für eine spätere Abhandlung zum Funktionsproblem bereitet. Darin werde ich auch – gleichsam als logische Folge – auf das Problem der Strafzwecke eingehen.7 3. Begriffsklärung: Internationales Strafrecht vs. Völkerstrafrecht Georg Schwarzenberger nennt in seinem grundlegenden Aufsatz „The Problem of an International Criminal Law“ sechs Bedeutungen des Internationalen StrafTokio Tribunals vgl. J. Keenan, Opening Statement for the Prosecution, International Military Tribunal for the Far East (‚The Tokyo Trial‘), 1948, S. 3 ( „Our purpose is one of prevention or deterrence. It has nothing whatsoever to do with the small meaner purpose of vengeance or retaliation. But we do hope in these proceedings that it is neither impossible nor improbable that the branding of individuals who visit these scourges upon mankind as common felons, and punishing them accordingly, may have a deterring effect upon aggressive warlike activities of their prototypes of the future, should they arise.“). 4  Das IStGH-Statut ist am 17. 7. 1998 in Rom verabschiedet worden und am 1. 7. 2002 in Kraft getreten (Ambos, Internationales Strafrecht, 5. Aufl. München: Beck, 2018, § 6 Rn. 22), arbeitsfähig war der IStGH aber erst mit der Wahl des Chefanklägers, der ersten 18 Richter und des Leiters der Geschäftsstelle im Frühjahr 2003. 5  Siehe insbesondere Damaška, „What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?“, Chicago-Kent Law Review 83 (2008), S. 329 – 365 (S. 331 ff.), der vor zu hohen Erwartungen warnt (S. 340 ff.); ebenso ders., „The International Criminal Court between Aspiration and Achievement“, UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 14 (2009), S. 19 – 35 (S. 19 ff.), wo er eine Lücke zwischen den Zielen und der Realität („aspiration and realization“) ausmacht, weil der IStGH seine selbstgesetzten Erwartungen nicht erfüllen könne und dies letztlich seine Legitimität untergrabe. Kritisch in Bezug auf die „security function“, welche aus dem IStGH zwei Gerichte in einem mache („two courts in one“) Fletcher / Ohlin, „The ICC – Two Courts in One?“, Journal of International Criminal Justice („JICJ“) 4 (2006), S. 428 – 433; kritisch bzgl. der nur teilweise realistischen Erwartungen an internationale Straftribunale Dig­ gelmann, „Staatsverbrechen und internationale Justiz“, Archiv des Völkerrechts („AVR“) 45 (2007), S. 382 – 399 (S. 383 ff., 399). Zur gemischten Bilanz des IStGH nach (fast) 10 Jahren auch Ambos, NJW-Editorial Heft 32/2012. 6  Für eine generelle Kritik siehe Stuckenberg, „Völkerrecht und Staatsverbrechen“, in: Menzel / Pierlings / Hoffmann (Hrsg.), Völkerrechtsprechung, München: Beck, 2005, S. 768 – 773 (S. 772). 7  Vgl. schon Ambos / Steiner, „Vom Sinn des Strafens auf innerstaatlicher und supranatio­ naler Ebene“, Juristische Schulung („JuS“) 2001, S. 9 – 13; Ambos, Treatise ICL I (Fn. 1), 2013, S.  67 – 73.

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rechts und bezieht sich dabei auf die unterschiedlichen Arten internationaler Verbrechen.8 Seine zweite, dritte und vierte Gruppe9 können aus heutiger Sicht zu einer gemeinsamen Gruppe „vertragsgestützter transnationaler“ oder „internationaler“ Verbrechen zusammengefasst werden, denn sie betreffen Verbrechen, die aufgrund internationaler Verträge oder allgemein anerkannter Rechtsgrundsätze in nationales Recht umgesetzt wurden.10 Damit bleibt es bei vier Bedeutungen des Internationalen Strafrechts, die Claus Kreß überzeugend wie folgt zusammengefasst hat:11 • Internationales Strafrecht als Strafanwendungsrecht • Internationales Strafrecht als Recht der internationalen Zusammenarbeit (Rechtshilfe) in Strafsachen • Internationales Strafrecht als transnationales Strafrecht • Internationales Strafrecht als (supranationales) Völkerstrafrecht i. e. S. Die ersten beiden Gruppen sind in unserem Zusammenhang nicht von Interesse;12 die dritte Gruppe betrifft die – schon oben genannten – transnationalen Verbrechen und ist hier nur insoweit bedeutsam, als die Abgrenzung zwischen dieser Gruppe und den völkerrechtlichen Kernverbrechen (vierte Gruppe) mitunter schwerfällt. Die innovative Terrorismusentscheidung des Sondertribunals für den Libanon mag insoweit angeführt werden.13 Jedenfalls ist die Unterscheidung zwischen diesen 8  Schwarzenberger, „The Problem of an International Criminal Law“, Current Legal Problems 3 (1950), S. 263 – 296 (S. 264 – 274). 9  Ibid., S. 266 – 271 („internationally prescribed municipal criminal law“, „internationally authorized municipal criminal law“ und „municipal criminal law common to civilised nations“). 10  Dies trifft auf die vierte Gruppe insoweit zu, als sie „principles of municipal criminal law which civilised States have de facto in common or consider it opportune to assimilate to a common standard by means of international conventions or by parallel municipal legislation“ miteinschließt (a.a.O., S. 271). Näher zu diesen „treaty-based crimes“ Ambos, Treatise on International Criminal Law Vol. II, Oxford: OUP, 2014, S. 222 ff.; ders., Internationales Strafrecht (Fn. 4) § 7 Rn. 275; ders./Timmermann, „Neue transnationale Verbrechen für das VStGB?“, in: Safferling / Kirsch (Hrsg.), Völkerstrafrechtspolitik, Berlin / Heidelberg: Springer, 2013, S. 306. 11 Vgl. Kreß, „International Criminal Law“, in: Wolfrum (Hrsg.) The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 2008 fortl., Online-Ausgabe, abrufbar unter www.mpepil.com, Rn. 1 – 14. Kreß spricht wörtlich von „1. International Criminal Law as the Law Governing the Prescriptive Criminal Jurisdiction of States [...] 2. [...] as the Law of International cooperation in Criminal Matters [...] 3. [...] as Transnational Criminal Law [...] 4. Supranational Criminal Law and International Criminal Law stricto sensu“. 12 Zum Strafanwendungsrecht: Schwarzenberger (Fn.  8), S.  264 – 266; Kreß (Fn. 11), Rn. 2 f.; siehe auch Ambos, Internationales Strafrecht (Fn. 4), §§ 1 – 4; zur Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen: Schwarzenberger (Fn. 8), S. 271 f.; Kreß (Fn. 11), Rn. 4 f. 13  Special Tribunal for the Lebanon („STL“), Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, Appeals Chamber, STL-11 – 01/I, 16 February 2011. Für eine kritische Analyse s. Ambos, „Judicial Creativity at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Is there a Crime of Terrorism under International Law?“, Leiden Journal of International Law („LJIL“) 24 (2011), S. 655 – 675; noch kritischer Saul, „Legislating from a Radical Hague: The United Nations Special Tribunal for Lebanon Invents an International Crime of Transnational Terrorism“, LJIL 24 (2011), S. 677 – 700; Kirsch / Oeh­

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beiden Gruppen allgemein akzeptiert.14 Als Beispiele für die vierte Gruppe sind die Kernverbrechen der Art. 5 – 8bis IStGH-Statut zu nennen,15 während die transnationalen Verbrechen der dritten Gruppe in der Regel vertragsgestützte Verbrechen der „suppression conventions“16, etwa der UN-Anti-Folterkonvention,17 des Übereinkommens zur Bekämpfung terroristischer Bombenanschläge18 oder der UN-Drogenkonventionen19 sind.

michen, „Judges gone astray – The fabrication of terrorism as an international crime by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon“, Durham Law Review 1 (2011), S. 32 – 55. 14  Kreß (Fn. 11), Rn. 6 – 14 (transnational and supranational international criminal law stric­ to sensu); Cryer / Wilmshurst, „Introduction“, in: Cryer et al. (Hrsg.), An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure, Cambridge: CUP, 3. Aufl. 2014, S. 1 – 16 (S. 4 ff., transnationale und internationale Verbrechen); Gaeta, „International Criminalization of Prohibited Conduct“, in: Cassese (Hrsg.), The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice, Oxford: OUP, 2009, S. 63 – 74 (S. 69: international crimes proper and treaty-based crimes); Luban, „Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of International Criminal Law“, in: Besson / Tasioulas (Hrsg.), The Philosophy of International Law, Oxford: OUP, 2010, S. 569 – 588 (S. 572: treaty-based transnational and pure international criminal law); Mi­ lanović, „Is the Rome Statute Binding on Individuals? (And Why We Should Care)“, JICJ 9 (2011), S. 25 – 52 (S. 28 mit Fn. 7). Siehe auch Ambos, Internationales Straf­recht (Fn. 4), § 7 Rn. 117 vs. 275; ders., Treatise ICL II (Fn. 10), S. 222 ff., ders./Timmermann (Fn. 10), S. 306 – Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law, 2003, S. 114 f., nennt 28 verschiedene Kategorien von internationalen Verbrechen und teilt sie in weitere Gruppen ein („International Crimes“, „International Delicts“, „International Infractions“). Bzgl. internationalem Strafrecht im engeren und weiteren Sinne siehe auch Schröder, „Verantwortlichkeit, Völkerstrafrecht, Streitbeilegung und Sanktionen“, in: Vitzthum (Hrsg.), Völkerrecht, Berlin: de Gruyter, 7. Auflage 2016, S. 545 – 595 (S. 545 f.); Stuckenberg (Fn. 6), S.  2 – 4; Pastor, El poder penal internacional, 2006, S. 80 ff. 15 Siehe Ambos, Internationales Strafrecht (Fn. 4), § 5 Rn. 3, § 7 Rn. 117; Werle / Jeßberger, Principles of International Criminal Law, Oxford: OUP, 2014, Rn. 89 ff.; Kreß (Fn. 11), Rn. 15; Cryer / Wilmshurst (Fn. 14), S. 4; Gaeta (Fn. 14), S. 66 ff. – Cassese, International Criminal Law, Oxford: OUP, 3. Aufl. 2013, S. 12, erweitert diese Liste um Folter und internationalen Terrorismus (restriktiver aber noch ders., 2. Aufl. 2008, S. 12: „some extreme forms of international terrorism“ [Herv. K.A.]). Kolb / Scalia, Droit international pénal, Basel: Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2. Aufl. 2012, S. 68 f., nennen zusätzlich zu den Kernverbrechen des IStGH „internatio­ nale Verbrechen“ aufgrund ihrer „nature intrinsèque“ und unterscheiden zwischen öffentlichen (staatlichen) und privaten (gewöhnlichen) Verbrechen; allerdings liefern sie keine Kriterien, um diese von den transnationalen Verbrechen abzugrenzen. 16  Eine interessante Untersuchung zum britisch-US-amerikanischen Jay-Vertrag von 1794 und dem Internationalen Vertrag zum Schutze unterseeischer Telegraphenkabel von 1884 liefert Clark, „Some Aspects of the Concept of ICL: Suppression Conventions, Jurisdiction, Submarine Cables and The Lotus“, Criminal Law Forum („CLF“) 22 (2011), S. 519 – 530 (S. 523 – 528). Für eine aktuelle Kritik des in diesen Konventionen vorgesehenen aut dedere aut iudicare Grundsatzes s. Boister, „International Tribunals for Transnational Crimes: Towards a Transnational Criminal Court?“, CLF 23 (2012), S. 295 – 318 (S. 300 – 302). 17  Übereinkommen gegen Folter und andere grausame, unmenschliche oder erniedrigende Behandlung oder Strafe, BGBl. 1990 II, S. 246 ff. 18  Internationales Übereinkommen zur Bekämpfung terroristischer Bombenanschläge, BGBl. 2002 II, S. 2506 ff.

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Das hier alleine interessierende VStR i. e. S. („Droit pénal international“, „De­ recho penal internacional“, „Diritto penale internazionale“, „International Cri­ minal Law“)20 beschränkt sich natürlich nicht auf die oben genannten Verbrechen. Es besteht – gemäß einer anerkannten Definition von Otto Triffterer – aus der „Gesamtheit aller völkerrechtlichen Normen strafrechtlicher Natur, die an ein bestimmtes Verhalten – das internationale Verbrechen – bestimmte, typischerweise dem Strafrecht vorbehaltene Rechtsfolgen knüpfen, und die als solche unmittelbar anwendbar sind.“21 Damit kombiniert das VStR also strafrechtliche und völkerrechtliche Grundsätze.22 Der Gedanke der individuellen Verantwortlichkeit und die Verfolgung von Einzelpersonen aufgrund eines bestimmten (makro-kriminellen) Verhaltens23 werden aus dem Strafrecht abgeleitet, wohingegen die „klassischen“ (Nürnberger) Straftatbestände24 Teil des Völkerrechts sind; so kann das tatrele19  Einheits-Übereinkommen von 1961 über Suchtstoffe, BGBl. 1973 II, S. 1353 ff.; Über­ einkommen der Vereinten Nationen gegen den unerlaubten Verkehr mit Suchtstoffen und psy­ chotropen Stoffen, BGBl. 1993 II, S. 1136 ff. 20  Bzgl. der manchmal unklaren Terminologie siehe – aus deutscher Sicht (hier wurde traditionell der weitere Begriff „Internationales Strafrecht“, zuerst von Ernst Beling, benutzt) – Gardocki, „Über den Begriff des Internationalen Strafrechts“, ZStW 98 (1986), S. 703 – 719; Jescheck / Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts – Allgemeiner Teil, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 5. Aufl. 1996, S. 119; Neubacher, Kriminologische Grundlagen einer internationalen Strafgerichtsbarkeit, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005, S. 31 ff. Aus einer anglo-amerikanischen Perspektive Cryer / Wilmshurst (Fn. 14), S.  3 – 5. Aus einer spanischsprachigen Perspektive Pastor (Fn. 14), S. 28 – 33. 21  Triffterer, Dogmatische Untersuchungen zur Entwicklung des materiellen Völkerstrafrechts seit Nürnberg, Freiburg i. Br.: E. Albert, 1966, S. 34. Siehe auch Cassese (Fn. 15), S.  11 – 14 und Safferling, Internationales Strafrecht, Berlin / Heidelberg: Springer, 2011, S. 37; zusammenfassend Jesse, Der Verbrechensbegriff des Römischen Statuts, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2009, S. 58 ff. Eine zu weite und unpräzise Definition („any number of obligations impacting criminal law“), die zudem den Aspekt individueller strafrechtlicher Verantwortlichkeit vernachlässigt, verwendet Greenawalt, „The Pluralism of International Criminal Law“, Indiana Law Journal 86 (2011), S. 1063 – 1130 (S. 1071). 22 Vgl. van Sliedregt, Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Law, Oxford: OUP, 2012, S. 8 („another meeting of worlds“); ebenso Höpfel / Angermaier, „Adjudicating International Crimes“, in: Reichel (Hrsg.), Handbook of Transnational Crime and Justice, Thou­ sand Oaks: Sage, 2005, S. 310 – 345 (S. 310); Stuckenberg, Vorstudien zu Vorsatz und Irrtum im Völkerstrafrecht: Versuch einer Elementarlehre für eine übernationale Vorsatzdogmatik, Berlin: De Gruyter, 2007, S. 2; Zahar / Sluiter, International Criminal Law, Oxford: OUP, 2008, S. 4; Cryer / Wilmshurst (Fn. 14), S. 13 („both bodies of law“); Borsari, Diritto punitivo sovranazionale come sistema, Padova: CEDAM, 2007, S. 88; Kindt, Menschenrechte und Souveränität, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2009, S. 51 f. Bzgl. der Komponenten des internationalen Strafrechts siehe Bassiouni (Fn. 14), S. 1 – 8, der von einem System sui generis spricht (a.a.O., S. 53). 23  Über politisch motivierte Makrokriminalität, die bereits Gegenstand des VStR ist, Am­ bos, Der Allgemeine Teil des Völkerstrafrechts, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2. Aufl. 2004, S. 50 ff.; Neubacher (Fn. 20), S. 18, 24, 30, 240 – 243, 479; Borsari (Fn. 22), S.  442 – 444. 24  Vgl. Art. 6 Statut für den Internationalen Militärgerichtshof vom 8. August 1945 (abgedruckt in: Internationaler Militärgerichtshof Nürnberg, Der Prozess gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher vor dem Internationalen Militärgerichtshof: Nürnberg, 14. November 1945 – 1. Ok-

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vante Verhalten direkt nach VStR bestraft werden (Prinzip der individuellen Verantwortlichkeit für völkerrechtliche Verbrechen).25 Die starke Verankerung im Strafrecht führt zusammen mit der tatsächlichen Durchsetzung des Völkerstrafrechts durch internationale Straftribunale und den IStGH zu seinem Verständnis als Strafrecht auf supranationaler Ebene, welches die wohlbekannten Grundsätze rechtsstaatlichen Strafrechtsdenkens, insbesondere Legalität, persönliche Schuld und Fairness, als unverfügbar in sich aufnimmt.26 Mit der Institutionalisierung des Völkerstrafrechts durch die Errichtung des IStGH wurde ein gemeinsames Strafrechtssystem der internationalen Gemeinschaft27 – verstanden als eine größere, durch gemeinsame Werte verbundene Gruppe von Staaten 28 – geschaffen, welches sich über die Kerngebiete von materiellem und prozessualem Recht hinaus auch tober 1946, Bd. 1, 1947, S. 10 ff.): Verbrechen gegen den Frieden, Kriegsverbrechen und Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit. 25  Generell bei Dahm, Zur Problematik des Völkerstrafrechts, Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1956, S. 14 – 17; auch Werle, „Die Zukunft des Völkerstrafrechts“, in: Grundmann et al. (Hrsg.), Festschrift 200 Jahre Juristische Fakultät der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010, S. 1219 – 1239 (S. 1225); Jesse (Fn. 21), S. 57. 26 Diese Ansicht setzt sich in der internationalen Literatur mehr und mehr durch, siehe Robinson, „The Identity Crisis of International Criminal Law“, LJIL 21 (2008), S. 925 – 963 (S. 925 f., 961 f.), wo er von einem liberalen System der Strafjustiz spricht („liberal system of criminal justice“; allerdings warnt er auf S. 927 ff. vor zu liberalen Tendenzen im Völkerstrafrecht aufgrund eines einseitig an Menschenrechten und Opfern orientierten Diskurses); vgl. auch Sander, „Unravelling the Confusion Concerning Successor Superior Responsibility in the ICTY Jurisprudence“, LJIL 23 (2010), S. 105 – 135 (S. 125 ff.), der Respekt für die strafrechtlichen Grundsätze, insb. das Schuldprinzip, fordert; Ambos, Treatise ICL I (Fn. 1), S. 86 ff. 27  Triffterer, „Universeller Menschenrechtsschutz auch durch das Völkerstrafrecht?“, in: Politische Studien, Die universale Geltung der Menschenrechte, Sonderheft 1/1995, S. 32 – 55 (S. 38); siehe auch Zahar / Sluiter (Fn. 22), S. vii (Vorwort: „criminal law of the international community“); Jescheck, „Schlußworte“, in: Sieber / Albrecht (Hrsg.), Strafrecht und Kriminologie unter einem Dach, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2006, S. 152 – 160 (S. 160: „das allgemeine, gleiche Völkerstrafrecht und die internationale Strafgerichtsbarkeit als Kontrollsystem“); Reuss, Zivilcourage als Strafzweck des Völkerstrafrechts, Berlin: LIT, 2012, S. 54 f. 28  Ich folge hier der Unterscheidung von Andreas Paulus zwischen internationaler Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft: „The term ‚international community‘ is sometimes used interchangeably with the term ‚international society‘. As a more extensive inquiry has shown, the usage is far from uniform. Nevertheless, one may say – with the necessary caution – that a community adds a normative element, a minimum of subjective cohesion to the social bond between its members. Whereas society emphasizes factual interconnections and interrelations, community looks to values, beliefs and subjective feelings.“ (Paulus, „International Law and Internation­ al Community“, in: Armstrong (Hrsg.), Handbook of International Law, London: Routledge, 2009, S. 44 – 54, 45 [Nachweise weggelassen]); gründlicher ders., Die Internationale Gemeinschaft im Völkerrecht, München: Beck, 2001. Ein liberales Konzept der internationalen Gemeinschaft beruht auf den universellen Menschenrechten als gemeinsame Werte (a.a.O., S. 45 und 48). Für einen ähnlichen, wertbasierten Ansatz siehe Fisher, Moral Accountability and International Criminal Law, London: Routledge, 2012, S. 5 f. (bezogen auf gemeinsame liberale Werte, aber auch auf gemeinsame Bedrohungen). Kritisch bzgl. der Privilegierung mächtiger (westlicher) Staaten Koskenniemi, „Between Impunity and Show Trials“, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 6 (2002), S. 1 – 35 (S. 10); teilweise zustimmend Fisher, a.a.O., S. 60 f.

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auf andere Bereiche des Strafrechts (wie z. B. Sanktionsrecht, Strafvollstreckung, Rechtshilfe) erstreckt. Dieses neue Strafrechtssystem repräsentiert allerdings nur ein – das supranationale – Element des neuen „Internationalen Strafjustizsystems“ (International Criminal Justice System),29 welches wiederum durchaus als Instrument von global governance durch Verrechtlichung angesehen werden kann.30 II. Das ius puniendi-Problem: Versuch einer wertbasierten, individualistisch-kollektiven Begründung Dem Völkerstrafrecht fehlt eine eigene konsolidierte (supranationale) Strafgewalt, die diesen Namen verdient; daher wird es mitunter mit kritischem Unterton als „Strafsystem ohne Staat“ und somit „ohne Souverän“ bezeichnet.31 Aber bedeutet dies auch, dass dem Völkerstrafrecht Macht und Legitimität fehlen, um Strafrecht durchzusetzen und Täter zu bestrafen? Fehlt es dem Völkerstrafrecht also an einem eigenen ius puniendi? Im Ergebnis ist dies zu verneinen, aber die Begründung des völkerstrafrechtlichen ius puniendi erfordert einigen Aufwand. 1. Völkerstrafrecht und die normative Begründung der entstehenden internationalen Ordnung Die internationale Gemeinschaft befindet sich heute dort, wo der Nationalstaat zu Beginn seiner Entstehung stand: beim Aufbau und der Konsolidierung eines Gewaltmonopols, d.h. bestenfalls im Stadium des Entstehens einer staatsähnlichen Ordnung. So obliegt es weiterhin den Nationalstaaten als den klassischen Völkerrechtssubjekten, nicht nur ihr nationales, sondern auch das internationale 29  Es handelt sich hierbei um ein dreigliedriges System, welches dem Territorialstaat Priorität einräumt (erste Ebene) und dem IStGH (zweite Ebene) sowie Drittstaaten aufgrund des Weltrechtsprinzips (dritte Ebene) subsidiäre Kompetenzen zur Strafverfolgung überantwortet; näher Ambos, The International Criminal Justice System and Prosecutorial Selection Policy, in: Ackerman / Ambos / Sikiric (Hrsg.), Visions of Justice: Liber Amicorum Mirjan Damaška, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2016, S. 23 ff. Zum IStGH als „miniature (criminal) justice system“ mit drei Funktionen (normales Strafgericht, „watchdog“ und „security“-Gericht) Jessberger / Geneuss, „The many faces of the International Criminal Court“, JICJ 10 (2012), S. 1081 – 1094 (S. 1085). 30 Grundlegend Burchard, „Völkerstrafrecht als global governance“, Die Friedens-Warte 83 (2008), S. 73 – 113, für den VStR „Regieren bzw. Steuern jenseits des Nationalstaats“ ist und so dazu dient, „nationalstaatliche governance-Defizite bzw. -Fehler zu evaluieren, gegebenenfalls präventiv durch deren Adaptierung zu korrigieren und gegebenenfalls repressiv durch deren Substituierung zu sanktionieren“ (74). 31 Vgl. Gless, „Strafe ohne Souverän?“, Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Strafrecht („ZStR“) 125 (2007), S. 24 – 43 (S. 34); ähnlich Dubber, „Common Civility – The Culture of Alegality in ICL“, LJIL 24 (2011), S. 923 – 936 (S. 928: „penal regime without a state, and more generally without a sovereign“); kritisch wegen mangelnder Demokratie und Rechtsstaatlichkeit Pastor (Fn. 14), S. 99 ff.

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Strafrecht durchzusetzen.32 Sie mögen diese Befugnis durch völkerrechtlichen Vertrag (­IStGH)33 oder durch eine Sicherheitsratsresolution gemäß Kapitel VII der UN-Charta (ICTY, ICTR)34 delegieren, wobei allerdings dadurch nicht automatisch eine neue supranationale Hoheitsgewalt entsteht.35 Ferner existiert unter einem Besatzungsregime die Möglichkeit, dass die Besatzungsmacht Strafgerichte errichtet, wie dies in Nürnberg, Tokio und im Irak geschehen ist.36 Jedoch können Formen oder Theorien staatlicher Delegation von Strafgewalt ein supranationales ius puniendi lediglich rein formal begründen, sie haben keinen eigenständigen, normativen Erklärungswert zur Begründung supranationaler Strafgewalt.37 32  Dies spiegelt sich auch in den maßgeblichen internationalstrafrechtlichen Verträgen wider, welche regelmäßig keine direkt anwendbaren Vorschriften enthalten, sondern die Vertragsstaaten nur zur Umsetzung in ihr nationales Strafrecht anhalten. Ein klassisches Beispiel für die dezentrale Umsetzung einer Verfolgungspflicht findet sich in Art. V, VI Konvention über die Verhütung und Bestrafung des Völkermordes, BGBl. 1954 II, S. 729 ff. 33  Siehe bzgl. des IStGH Cryer, „International Criminal Law vs State Sovereignty: Another Round?“, European Journal of International Law („EJIL“) 16 (2005), S. 979 – 1000 (S. 985 f.); Melandri, „The Relationship between State Sovereignty and the Enforcement of International Criminal Law under the Rome Statute (1998): A Complex Interplay“, International Criminal Law Review („ICLR“) 9 (2009), S. 531 – 545 (S. 534, 536, 542 f., 544 f.: Souveränität durch den IStGH); Milanović (Fn. 14), S. 45 – 47 (wonach Staaten Einzelpersonen durch Verträge zwar direkte Verpflichtungen auferlegen können, dies aber nicht immer wollen). Bezüglich eines „Transnational Criminal Court“ Boister (Fn. 16), S. 312 – 314. 34  Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić (IT-94 – 1), 2 October 1995, §§ 26 – 48; Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction, Prosecutor v. Joseph Kanyabashi (ICTR-96 – 15-T), 18 June 1997, §§ 17 – 29. Siehe statt vieler de Wet, The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council, London: Hart, 2004, S. 340 – 342; Schabas, The UN Criminal Tribunals, Cambridge: CUP, 2006, S.  47 – 53; King, „Sensible Scrutiny: The Yugoslavia Tribunal’s Development of Limits on the Security Council’s Powers under Chapter VII of the Charter“, Emory International Law Review 10 (1996), S. 509 – 591; Schweigman, The Authority of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, Leiden: Brill / Nijhoff, 2001, S. 108 – 111, 131 – 136; kritisch Davis, “Two Wrongs Do Make a Right: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia was Established Illegally – but it was the Right Thing to Do ... So Who Cares?“, North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation 28 (2002), S. 395 – 419 (S. 403 ff.); kritisch bzgl. der Legislativgewalt des Sicherheitsrates Fremuth / Griebel, „On the Security Council as a Legislator: A Blessing or a Curse for the International Community?“, Nordic Journal International Law 76 (2007), S. 339 – 361. 35  Vielmehr behalten die delegierenden Staaten immer die Kontrolle über diesen Prozess; vgl. Meyer, Strafrechtsgenese in internationalen Organisationen, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2012, S. 650 f. 36 Vgl. Art. 66 Genfer Konvention IV von 1949, abrufbar unter http://www.icrc.org/ihl. nsf/full/380 (englisch) und http://www.ichr.de/files/Genfer-Abkommen-Zivilpersonen-0.518. 51.de.pdf (deutsch), zuletzt aufgerufen am 27. September 2018. Siehe allgemein Schwarzen­ berger (Fn. 8), S.  289 – 291; Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation, Cambridge: CUP, 2009, S. 46. Bzgl. Tokio Fujita Hisakazu, „The Tokyo Trial: Humanity’s Justice v Victors’ Justice“, in: Tanaka / McCormack / Simpson (Hrsg.), Beyond Victor’s Justice? The Tokyo War Crimes Trial Revisited, Leiden: Nijhoff, 2011, S. 3 – 21 (S. 5 f.). 37  Dieser formelle / materielle Gegensatz existiert auch im europäischen Strafrecht: Wird man sagen können, dass es mit der gestärkten Position des Europäischen Parlaments durch den

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Ein normativer Ansatz muss sich mit den Theorien auseinandersetzen, für die der Gebrauch von Strafrecht die Existenz einer staatsähnlichen Ordnung voraussetzt, die es wert ist, von diesem (supranationalen) Strafrecht überhaupt verteidigt zu werden. Dieser Einwand ist im deutschsprachigen Schrifttum vor allem von Günther Jakobs gegen das Völkerstrafrecht vorgebracht worden.38 Für Jakobs basiert Strafe auf einer bestehenden normativen Ordnung, d.h. einer Ordnung, in der Normen von der gesamten Gesellschaft anerkannt werden und den Inhalt der gesellschaftlichen Verständigung bestimmen.39 Fehle eine solche Ordnung oder ist sie, wie auf internationaler Ebene, gerade erst im Entstehen begriffen, zerstöre gewalttätiges menschliches Verhalten „keine Wirklichkeit der Normen“, sondern stelle „schlicht Gewaltunternehmungen eines mächtigen Individuums gegen ohnmächtige Opfer“ dar. Wenn diese sich gegen den Despoten erhöben oder ihn sogar töteten, hätten derartige Reaktionen nichts mit Strafe im gewöhnlichen Sinne zu tun, selbst wenn sie von einem Gerichtshof verhängt würden. Im Falle der Gefährdung einer noch gar nicht bestehenden, sondern bestenfalls im Entstehen begriffenen (normativen) Ordnung von „Strafe“ zu sprechen, bedeute „die Freiheit der nicht durch eine wirkliche Ordnung gebundenen Individuen“ zu verkennen. Dies führe dazu, dass „Strafe im Staat“ mit „Strafe im Naturzustand“, „Strafrecht“ mit „bloßer Strafgewalt“ und „Rechtsstrafe“ mit „Machtstrafe“40 verwechselt würde. Jakobs Argumentation ist unwiderlegbar, sofern man seine – im rechtsphilosophischen Schrifttum verbreitete41 – Prämisse teilt, dass nämlich die Geltung,42 ja die Vertrag von Lissabon kein Demokratiedefizit mehr gibt, so bleibt doch die normative Legitimität eines solchen supranationalen Rechts kontrovers (siehe Mylonopoulos, „Strafrechtsdogmatik in Europa nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon – Zur materiellen Legitimation des Europäischen Strafrechts“, ZStW 123 [2011], S. 633 – 650 [S. 636 f.]). 38  Jakobs, Norm, Person, Gesellschaft, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 3. Aufl. 2008, S. 118 („zerstören die Taten keine Wirklichkeit der Normen“, „schlicht Gewaltunternehmungen eines mächtigen Individuums gegen ohnmächtige Opfer“; Strafrecht „verkennt die Freiheit der nicht durch eine wirkliche Ordnung gebundenen Individuen“). Siehe auch ders., „Das Selbstverständnis der Strafrechtswissenschaft vor den Herausforderungen der Gegenwart“, in: Eser / Hassemer / Burkhardt (Hrsg.), Die deutsche Strafrechtswissenschaft vor der Jahrtausendwende. Rückbesinnung und Ausblick, München: Beck, 2000, S. 47 – 56 (S. 54 – 56; 55: „Es mag gute Gründe dafür geben, einen anderen in einen Rechtszustand zu zwingen, aber bevor das geschehen ist, fehlt eben der Rechtszustand. Strafrecht vor einem funktionierenden Gewaltmonopol ist ein bloßer Name, kein Begriff.“). Bereits früher Jakobs, „Untaten des Staates – Unrecht im Staat“, GA 141 (1994), S. 1 – 19 (S. 13: „Ohne staatliche Gewalt gibt es kein staatliches Recht.“). 39  Jakobs, „Strafrechtliche Zurechnung und die Bedingungen der Normgeltung“, in: Neumann / Schulz (Hrsg.), Verantwortung in Recht und Moral. ARSP-Beiheft 74, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2000, S. 57 – 72 (S. 58 f.); ders. (Fn. 38), „Selbstverständnis“, S. 49. 40  Jakobs (Fn. 38), „Selbstverständnis“, S. 55 (Hervorhebungen i.O., K.A.). 41  Vgl. klassisch Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie. Studienausgabe (hrsg. von R. Dreier und S. Paulson), Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 2. Aufl. 2003, S. 151 ff. (auf S. 152 feststellend: „Die staatsfremde Rechtfertigung der Strafe gehört in ihren beiden Formen der Vergangenheit an. [...] Die Lehre vom Grunde der Strafe geht also auf in der Lehre von der Rechtfertigung des Staats und übrig bleibt nur die Lehre vom Zwecke der Strafe, d.h. von der Notwendigkeit

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Existenz von Recht überhaupt, eine staatliche Ordnung mit einem entsprechenden Gewaltmonopol voraussetzt. Dies entspricht in der Tat der klassischen Ansicht von Hobbes, wonach das „Recht“ nicht ohne den Staat als Leviathan, der es überhaupt erst setzt und seine Durchsetzung (und damit letztlich seine Anerkennung) garantiert, existieren kann.43 Kant hat die gleiche Auffassung vertreten und die Existenz des Rechts auf seine Durchsetzbarkeit durch eine öffentliche Gewalt, welche über die dazu notwendige Macht verfügt, gestützt.44 In gewisser Weise sympathisierte auch Kelsen in seiner Reinen Rechtslehre mit dieser Sichtweise,45 doch erkannte er im Rahmen der entstehenden internationalen Ordnung seiner Zeit, hauptsächlich durch den Völkerbund und später die Vereinten Nationen repräsentiert, an, dass (internationale) Normen durch Sanktionen durchgesetzt werden können und dass diese auch von anderen Institutionen als Staaten verhängt werden können, z. B. im Rahmen des kollektiven Sicherheitssystems gemäß Kapitel VII der UN-Charta.46

der Strafe für den Staat, oder, genauer gesprochen, für den Staat, die Gesellschaft oder die Rechtsordnung.“ [Hervorhebung i. O., K.A.]); aus jüngerer Zeit etwa Mir Puig, „Die Funktion der Strafe und die Verbrechenslehre im sozialen und demokratischen Rechtsstaat“, ZStW 95 (1983), S. 413 („axiologische Verknüpfung zwischen Straf- und Staatsfunktion“). 42  Man kann mit Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 1. Aufl. 1934 (Studienausgabe hg. von Matthias Jestaedt, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), S. 72 f., 83, „Geltung“ von „Wirksamkeit“ unterscheiden und in dieser eine Voraussetzung jener sehen. Ihm folgt z. B. Alexy, Begriff und Geltung des Rechts, Freiburg i. Br.: Alber, 1. Aufl. 1992, S. 203 („Voraussetzung der Geltung einer Verfassung ist, daß diese im großen und ganzen sozial wirksam ist.“). 43  Hobbes, Leviathan, 1651 (Nachdruck Oxford: Blackwell, 1960), Part II, S.  112  f., 172 – 176. 44  Kant, Handschriftlicher Nachlass / Reflexionen zur Rechtsphilosphie – Ius publicum universale in genere (c. 1772 – 1775), in: Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften (Hrsg.), Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. XIX, Berlin / Leipzig 1934, S. 482, abrufbar unter http://www.korpora. org/Kant/aa19/482.html („Demnach ist kein Recht ohne eine Unwiederstehliche Gewalt“); ders., Metaphysik der Sitten (1797), in: ibid., Bd. VI, 1907, S. 231, abrufbar unter http://www. korpora.org/Kant/aa06/231.html. („… mithin ist mit dem Rechte zugleich eine Befugniß, den, der ihm Abbruch thut, zu zwingen, […] verknüpft.“) – beide zuletzt abgerufen am 27. September 2018. 45  Kelsen (Fn. 42), S. 290: „Wird der Staat als eine soziale Gemeinschaft begriffen, kann diese Gemeinschaft, wie schon früher dargelegt, nur durch eine normative Ordnung konstituiert sein. Da eine Gemeinschaft nur durch eine solche Ordnung konstituiert sein kann (ja, mit dieser Ordnung identisch ist), kann die den Staat konstituierende normative Ordnung nur die relativ zentralisierte Zwangsordnung sein, die wir als staatliche Rechtsordnung erkannt haben.“ (Hervorhebung i.O., K.A.). Kelsens Konzept von Recht zustimmend Alexy (Fn.  42), S.  139 – 141, 201 – 206 (er legt dar, dass Normen, die befolgt werden und deren Nichtbefolgung sanktioniert wird, einen höheren Wirksamkeitsgrad haben als Normen, auf die dies nicht zutrifft). 46 Vgl. Kelsen, „Sanctions in International Law under the Charter of the United Nations“, Iowa Law Review 31 (1945/46), S. 499 – 543 (S. 500 – 502, z. B. S. 500: „International law is law in the true sense of the term, for its rules, regulating the mutual behavior of states, provide sanctions to be directed against the state which has committed an international delict …“). Vgl. auch zum Staat „als ein von der Rechtsordnung verschiedenes Wesen“ Kelsen, Der soziologische und der juristische Staatsbegriff. Kritische Untersuchung des Verhältnisses von Staat und Recht, Aalen: Scientia 1922, S. 208 (Hervorhebung i.O., K.A.).

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Jüngere Positionen knüpfen an diese klassischen Positionen an, wenn sie irgend­ eine Institutionalität zur Voraussetzung von Völkerstrafrecht machen.47 Nun wird man zwar zugeben müssen, dass soziologische Positivisten wie Jakobs über einen staatenzentrierten Ansatz hinausgehen, indem sie die soziale Anerkennung von Normen verlangen;48 doch müssen auch diese Normen als Ausdruck von wirklicher Geltung durch staatsähnliche Durchsetzung gesichert oder zumindest vervollständigt werden.49 Diese staatszentrierte Sichtweise muss dem internationalen Recht den Status als (öffentliches) „Recht“ versagen.50 Danach kann es – in letzter Konsequenz – auch kein Völkerstrafrecht geben, weil es an einer konsolidierten, staatsähnlichen internationalen Ordnung fehlt, die es durchzusetzen in der Lage wäre und die es überhaupt zu verteidigen gilt. Ganz in diesem Sinne hat auch Schwarzenberger Völkerstrafrecht nicht als lex lata, sondern lediglich als lege ferenda verstanden und es im Übrigen als „Widerspruch in sich“ bezeichnet.51 Die Jakobssche Argumentation vernachlässigt aber die Besonderheiten des Völkerstrafrechts als Teil des Völkerrechts und operiert mit einem zu engen Ansatz hinsichtlich der Geltung (völkerrechtlicher) Normen. Um mit Letzterem zu beginnen: Die Geltung von Normen kann zum einen auf ihrer wirklichen Existenz in einer bestimmten Gesellschaft beruhen, sie kann aber auch aus der materialen (normativen und moralischen) Grundlage ihres Verbindlichkeitsanspruchs abgeleitet sein. In diesem Sinne kann man zwischen sozialer und materialer Geltung oder, 47 Vgl. etwa Binder, „Authority to Proscribe and Punish International Crimes“, Univ. of Toronto LJ 63 (2013) S. 278 (die Wichtigkeit einer institutionalisierten „punishing authority“ betonend); Chehtman, „The extraterritorial scope of the right to punish“, Law and Philosophy 29 (2010) S. 127, auf S. 131 („necessary link between a legal system being in force and a particular body holding the power to punish offenders.“). 48  Jakobs (Fn. 39), S. 58 („Eine Norm gilt, wenn sie den Inhalt möglicher Kommunikation bestimmt, wenn also die an eine Person gerichtete Erwartung stabil ist.“; Hervorhebung i.O., K.A.). Ein ähnlicher Ansatz findet sich bei Hart, Concept of Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2. Aufl. 1994. Sogar Kelsen (Fn. 42), S. 11 anerkennt (im Gegensatz zu Jakobs’ Kritik, a.a.O.) die Wichtigkeit von sozialer Anerkennung: „Wirksamkeit“ beziehe sich nicht nur darauf, „daß die Sanktion in einem konkreten Fall angeordnet und vollstreckt wird, sondern auch […], daß diese Norm von den der Rechtsordnung unterworfenen Subjekten befolgt […] wird“. Ebenso Alexy (Fn. 42), wenn er von „sozialer Wirksamkeit“ spricht. 49  Siehe die Zitate in Fn. 38. 50 Vgl. Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden (1795), in: Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften (Hrsg.), Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. VIII, 1912, S. 383, abrufbar unter http://www.korpora.org/ Kant/aa08/383.html (zuletzt abgerufen am 27. September 2018), wo er zwischen öffentlichem Recht und seiner Durchsetzung sowie Privatrecht unterscheidet und in Bezug auf Völkerrecht feststellt: „Nur unter Voraussetzung irgend eines rechtlichen Zustandes (d. i. derjenigen äußeren Bedingung, unter der dem Menschen ein Recht wirklich zu Theil werden kann) kann von einem Völkerrecht die Rede sein“. – Eine eingehende Erörterung und Kritik von Kants Konzeption von Völkerrecht (auch unter Bezugnahme auf Hobbes und Kelsen) findet sich bei Mer­ kel, „Lauter leidige Tröster“? Kants Friedensschrift und die Idee eines Völkerstrafgerichtshofs, in: Wittmann / Merkel (Hrsg.), „Zum ewigen Frieden“. Grundlagen, Aktualität und Aussichten einer Idee vom Immanuel Kant, Berlin: Suhrkamp, 1996, S. 309 – 350 (S. 312 – 327). 51  Schwarzenberger (Fn. 8), S. 293, 295.

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was in unserem Zusammenhang das Gleiche ist, zwischen (faktischer) Geltung und (materialer) Legitimation von Normen unterscheiden.52 Die Legitimationsfrage spielt praktisch in allen Theorien zur Normgeltung eine wichtige Rolle, wobei die Theorien von (Recht als) Gewalt eher die Ausnahme als die Regel darstellen.53 Selbst für (moderate) Positivisten wie Kelsen,54 Hart55 oder Alexy56 ist das positive (empirisch existierende) Recht letztlich mit einem Legitimationsvorbehalt versehen, d.h. es bedarf eines plausibel begründeten Anspruchs auf materiale (moralische) Geltung. Die Radbruch’sche Formel, die von der grundsätzlichen Geltung des positiven Rechts ausgeht,57 unerträglich „unrichtiges Recht“ aber durch Erwägungen der „Gerechtigkeit“ verdrängt sieht,58 ist nur eine weitere Konsequenz dieses Legitimationsvorbehalts. Im Völkerrecht ist die „power of legitimacy“ spätestens seit Thomas Francks wegweisender Untersuchung anerkannt.59 Gibt es also 52  Eine gute Zusammenfassung der Diskussion findet sich bei Mahlmann, Rechtsphilosophie und Rechtstheorie, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 4. Aufl. 2017, S. 268 ff. Vgl. auch zur dreifachen Unterscheidung zwischen Positivismus (gesetztes Recht), Realismus (praktische Anwendung, Faktizität) und Moralismus (Gerechtigkeit, Naturrecht) Neumann, „Rechtspositivismus, Rechtsrealismus und Rechtsmoralismus in der Diskussion um die strafrechtliche Bewältigung politischer Systemwechsel“, in: Prittwitz et al. (Hrsg.), Festschrift für Klaus Lüderssen, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2002, S. 109 – 126 (S. 112 – 114); ihm folgend Young-Whan Kim, „Vergangenheitsbewältigung durch das Strafrecht?“, ARSP 84 (1998), S. 505 – 516 (S. 515). 53  Mahlmann (Fn. 52), S. 299 – 302 mit detaillierten Nachweisen. Ein überpositives Konzept von Wirksamkeit in Bezug auf Menschenrechte findet sich bei Reuss (Fn. 27), S. 8 f. 54  Kelsen (Fn. 42), S. 7 f., 196 f., 200 – 209, argumentiert auf der Grundlage seiner „juristischen Geltungstheorie“, dass die objektive Geltung einer jeden Norm auf eine höhere „Grundnorm“ zurückgeführt werden kann (deren eigene Rechtmäßigkeit bleibt jedoch unklar); krit. dazu Funke, „Rechtstheorie“, in: Krüper (Hrsg.), Grundlagen des Rechts, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 3. Aufl. 2016, S. 45 – 64 (S. 52). 55  Hart (Fn. 48), S. 211 f. Allerdings vermisst Hart im Völkerrecht, ganz Positivist, der er ist (ausgezeichnete Zusammenfassung bei Mahlmann [Fn. 52], S. 175 ff.), eine „unifying rule of recognition specifying ‚sources‘ of law and providing general criteria for the identification of its rules“ (S. 214); immerhin sieht er aber das Völkerrecht in einer Etappe des Übergangs hin zu einer Annahme von generell anerkannten Regeln („in a stage of transition towards acceptance“, S. 236). 56  Alexy (Fn. 42), S. 70 – 117, 201 – 206, diskutiert das „Unrechtsargument“ auf der Grundlage des Radbruch’schen Ansatzes von unrichtigem Recht (siehe Fn. 58) und begrenzt sein Konzept einer „im großen und ganzen sozial wirksamen Verfassung“ durch das Kriterium der „extremen Ungerechtigkeit“. 57  Bzgl. der Einordnung Radbruchs als Positivist siehe Adomeit, Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie II. Rechtsdenker der Neuzeit, Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 2. Aufl. 2002, S. 148, 161; demgegenüber krit. Mahlmann (Fn. 52), S. 181. 58  Danach habe „das positive [...] Recht auch dann den Vorrang […], wenn es inhaltlich ungerecht und unzweckmäßig ist, es sei denn, daß der Widerspruch des positiven Gesetzes zur Gerechtigkeit ein so unerträgliches Maß erreicht, daß das Gesetz als ‚unrichtiges Recht‘ der Gerechtigkeit zu weichen hat.“ (Radbruch, „Gesetzliches Unrecht und Übergesetzliches Recht“, Süddeutsche Juristenzeitung 1946, S. 105 – 108 [107]). Vgl. dazu etwa Neumann (Fn. 52), S. 115 f. m. w. N. in Fn. 24. 59  Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations, Oxford: OUP, 1990, S. 24 – 26 (auf S. 25 erklärt er, Staaten befolgten Regeln, „[b]ecause they perceive the rule and its institutional

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ein Spannungsverhältnis zwischen Geltung und Legitimation, so macht letztere, in den Worten Koskenniemis, „room for something grander“60. Pluralistische Theorien gehen sogar noch weiter und erkennen – im Gegensatz zum staatszentrierten, top-to-bottom-Ansatz der sogenannten realistischen, interessenorientierten Theorien – unterschiedliche Quellen von Völkerrecht auch unabhängig von staatlicher Autorität mit „varying degrees of impact“ an.61 Die „rechtserzeugende“ Macht nichtstaatlicher, gesellschaftlicher Prozesse62 hängt insbesondere von der moralischen Autorität der betreffenden Normen ab,63 also von deren Legitimität, und diese garantiert zugleich den normativen Fortschritt. Aus dieser materialen, ganzheitlichen Sicht kann man Jakobs entgegenhalten,64 dass er materiale (moralische) Geltung und Ordnung gleichstellt65 und somit das normerzeugende Potenzial legitimatorischer Begründungen unabhängig von formaler Geltung ignoriert. Darüber hinaus negiert ein Konzept rein formaler Normgeltung nicht nur die Möglichkeit der Existenz von Recht auf internationaler, sondern auch auf innerstaatlicher Ebene, nämlich mit Blick auf Staaten, denen es an einem voll funktionierenden Gewaltmonopol fehlt und / oder in denen die formal geltenden Normen keine soziale Anerkennung genießen. Das Strafrecht solcher Staaten wäre nach dieser Ansicht, aufgrund des Fehlens einer mit effekpenumbra to have a high degree of legitimacy“). Siehe ebenfalls Koskenniemi, „Legal Cosmopolitanism: Tom Franck’s Messianic World“, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 35 (2003), S. 471 – 486 (S. 480: „common sense of values“). 60  Koskenniemi (Fn. 59), S. 480. 61  Anstatt vieler siehe Berman, „A Pluralist Approach to International Law“, YJIL 32 (2007), S. 301 – 329 (S. 302 [„varying degrees of impact“], 307, 311 – 322, wo er die „neue“ New Haven School der Yale University und die verschiedenen Operationsgebiete des Pluralismus diskutiert, insb. beim Zerfall eines Staates). Auf der Basis eines rechtlichen Pluralismus befürwortet Greenawalt (Fn. 21), S. 1064, 1122 – 1227, eine vierstufige pluralistische Theorie des VStR. Sein Ansatz erfasst allerdings nicht die ganze Vielfalt der (nichtstaatlichen) Normsetzung im VStR und stellt sich bzgl. der Parallelität zwischen internationalem und innerstaatlichem Strafrecht nur als Ergebnis der Anerkennung traditioneller allgemeiner Rechtsgrundsätze (abgeleitet aus dem nationalen Recht), wie sie in der Auffangregel des Art. 21 (1)(c) IStGH-Statut niedergelegt sind, dar. Mit Greenawalt hat die Pluralismusdebatte jedenfalls auch das VStR erreicht, für einen Überblick s. van Sliedregt, „Pluralism in International Criminal Law“, LJIL 25 (2012), S. 847 – 856 (die u. a. auf Pauwelyns Metapher eines Universums untereinander verbundener Inseln Bezug nimmt, S. 850). 62  Berman (Fn. 61), S. 322. Zur Erzeugung von „Rechtstreue“ durch konsensorientierte Verhandlungen im Rahmen von Friedensprozessen siehe Kastner, „Towards Internalized Legal Obligations to Address Justice and Accountability? A Novel Perspective on the Legal Framework of Peace Negotiations“, CLF 23 (2012), S. 193 – 221 (S. 218 f.). 63  Berman (Fn. 61), S. 324 – 326. 64  Krit. im Zusammenhang mit VStR Stahn / Eiffler, „Über das Verhältnis von Internationalem Menschenrechtsschutz und Völkerstrafrecht anhand des Statuts von Rom“, Kritische Vierteljahresschrift 82 (1999), S. 253 – 277 (S. 254); krit. in Bezug auf Hobbes Bielefeldt, Philosophie der Menschenrechte, Darmstadt: Primus, 1998, S. 153 ff., 156. 65  Jakobs (Fn. 38), „Selbstverständnis“, S. 54. Ähnlich ders. (Fn. 39), S. 57, 58 f., über Kelsens These einer „Grundnorm“.

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tiven Durchsetzungsinstrumenten ausgestatteten staatlichen Ordnung, überhaupt kein Recht. Was nun die völkerrechtliche Qualität des Völkerstrafrechts angeht, so stellt sich die grundsätzliche Frage, inwieweit sich vor dem Hintergrund des klassischen Nationalstaates entwickelte Normgeltungstheorien, die nationalstaatlichen Organisationsregeln unterliegen, überhaupt auf eine supranationale Ordnung übertragen lassen. Von Jakobs und anderen Kritikern des Völkerstrafrechts wird diese Frage nicht gestellt, vielmehr ignorieren sie die komplexen Regelungszusammenhänge der sich entwickelnden internationalen Ordnung und der damit einhergehenden Vergerichtlichung des internationalen Rechts.66 Weder untersuchen sie die Rolle und die Kompetenz des UN-Sicherheitsrates im UN-System kollektiver Sicherheit, insbesondere mit Blick auf die Errichtung internationaler Straftribunale und die Durchsetzung von deren Entscheidungen, noch beschäftigen sie sich mit der Möglichkeit der dezentralen Verfolgung von internationalen Kernverbrechen durch Drittstaaten. Damit übersehen sie jedoch, dass bereits eine – freilich noch im Aufbau begriffene – supranationale Ordnung existiert.67 Sie ist Ausdruck der Institutionalisierung oder gar Konstitutionalisierung des Völkerrechts,68 aufgrund derer 66  Zu dieser Vergerichtlichung und einem ‚international constitutional judiciary‘ Broude, „The Constitutional Function of Contemporary International Tribunals, or Kelsen’s Visions Vindicated“, Goettingen Journal of International Law (GoJIL) 4 (2012), S. 519 – 549 (528 ff.; beispielhaft auf S. 536 ff. den IGH, das Streitschlichtungssystem der WTO und den EGMR diskutierend). 67  Siehe z. B. Höffe, Demokratie im Zeitalter der Globalisierung, München: Beck, 2. Aufl. 2002, S. 279 („globaler Ultraminimalstaat“); Koskenniemi (Fn. 59), S. 485 (eine entstehende globale Gemeinschaft sei „irresistibly under way“ [Hervorhebung i. O., K.A.]); Habermas, Zur Verfassung Europas. Ein Essay, Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2011, S. 34 („in Bruchstücken institutionalisierte Weltordnung“). Siehe auch Merkel (Fn. 50), S. 327 (er erkennt, nach seiner Kritik am zu „rigiden“ Kantischen Konzept von „Recht“ und „Souveränität“, Völkerrecht als „unvollkommene […] defizitäre, aber […] doch Rechtsordnung“ an; Hervorhebung i. O., K.A.). 68  Natürlich gibt es unterschiedliche Ansätze des Konstitutionalismus. Als vielleicht wichtigster Vorläufer kann Verdross, Die Verfassung der Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft, Wien / Berlin: Springer, 1926 genannt werden; für eine moderne Version dieser (zu) legalistischen Position s. Fassbender, The UN Charter as the Constitution of the International Community, Leiden: Brill, 2009, der Verdross auf S. 28 ff. diskutiert (s. auch Kleinlein, „Alfred Verdross as a Found­ing Father of International Constitutionalism“, GoJIL 4 [2012], S. 385 – 416 und O’Do­ noghue, „Alfred Verdross and the Contemporary Constitutionalization Debate“, Oxford J Legal Studies 32 [2012], S. 799 – 822). Für eine umfassende Behandlung des Themas Kleinlein, Konstitutionalisierung im Völkerrecht, Heidelberg: Springer, 2012, insbes. S. 5 – 97 und das Sonderheft des GoJIL 4 (2012), S. 343 – 647 mit einer instruktiven Einführung von Tomer Broude und Andreas L. Paulus, S.  349 – 362 Kleinlein, a.a.O., unternimmt eine gründliche Erörterung der Voraussetzungen einer „Konstitutionalisierung“ (im Gegensatz zur „Fragmentierung“) des Völkerrechts und unterscheidet zwischen einer (autonomen) „Werteordnung“ (im Sinne des Konzepts der internationalen Gemeinschaft wie es hier vertreten wird, o. Fn. 28) und der Institutionalisierung in internationalen Organisationen. Er führt die Schriften von Kelsen, Lauterpacht, Verdross und Scelle (S. 157 – 234, 694 – 695, 708) als Wegbereiter der Idee der Konstitutionalisierung an und sieht ihre Wurzeln in den Naturrechtstheorien (spanische Spätscholastik und deutsche Philosophie des Rationalismus) sowie in Kants Philosophie der

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Gemeinschaftsinteressen Vorrang vor unilateralen oder bilateralen Staatsinteressen eingeräumt wird.69 Mit Blick auf das Völkerstrafrecht stellt ja die Existenz des bereits erwähnten internationalen Strafjustizsystems,70 das die unterschiedlichen Mechanismen strafrechtlicher Verantwortlichmachung auf nationaler und internationaler Ebene in sich aufnimmt, nicht mehr nur eine Idee einiger gedankenverlorener Idealisten, sondern eine Realität dar. Und dieses System kann durchaus als Produkt einer bestimmten normativen Strafrechtsordnung oder sogar selbst als eine solche Ordnung verstanden werden.71 2. Die Durchsetzung von fundamentalen Menschenrechten durch das Völkerstrafrecht Die Idee der völkerstrafrechtlichen Verteidigung einer auf bestimmten Werten beruhenden normativen Ordnung lässt sich auf die kantische Idee der Menschen­ würde als Quelle elementarer Bürger- bzw. Menschenrechte, die letztlich durch ein supra- oder transnationales (Straf-)Recht durchgesetzt und gesichert werden müsAufklärung (S. 235 – 314, 695 – 696, 709). Der rote Faden in diesen Theorien sei die Entwicklung einer supranationalen Ordnung (totus orbis, communitas humani generis, civitas dei, civitas maxima), welche bis auf die Individual(menschen)rechte zurückgeführt werden könne und damit die Entwicklung des Völkerrechts vom neutralen, zwischenstaatlichen Recht hin zu einem Recht für die Menschen kennzeichne (S. 311, 314, 686). Kleinlein schlussfolgert jedoch, dass man eher von einer „Konstitutionalisierung im“ als von einer „Konstitutionalisierung des“ Völkerrechts sprechen sollte. Die Konstitutionalisierungsdebatte bietet vor allem Kriterien für die Legitimität des Völkerrechts (S. 685). Für eine Anwendung des konstitutio­ nellen Denkens auf die pluralistische internationale Ordnung s. Ulfstein, „The relationship between Constitutionalism and Pluralism“, GoJIL 4 (2012), S. 575 – 583; ähnlich von einem „constitutional pluralism“ sprechend Viellechner, „Constitutionalism as a Cipher: On the Convergence of Constitutionalist and Pluralist Approaches to the Globalization of Law“, GoJIL 4 (2012), S. 599 – 623 (S. 620); für einen funktionalen Ansatz bei der „Konstitutionalisierung“ des Völkerrechts Kotzur, „Overcoming Dichotomies: A Functional Approach to the Constitutional Paradigm in Public International Law“, GoJIL 4 (2012), S. 558 – 597. Krit. zum „global constitutionalism“ Volk, „Why Global Constitutionalism does not Live up to its Promises“, GoJIL 4 (2012), S. 551 – 573 (für den es sich um einen „de-politicized mode of global governance“ handelt, der die „contingency of political processes“ und den „political character of international law and decision-making“ ignoriere, weshalb er „a version of constitutionalism“ fordert, „which gives place to dissent and political struggle“ [S. 567], „a republicanism of dissent“ [S. 570]). Krit. bzgl. der Konstitutionalisierungsidee auf europäischer Ebene Grimm, Die Zukunft der Verfassung II – Auswirkungen von Europäisierung und Globalisierung, Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2012, S. 239 f., 261. 69 Zusammenfassend Simma, „Universality of International Law from the Perspective of a Practitioner“, EJIL 20 (2009), S. 265 – 297 (S. 267 f., allerdings krit. bzgl. der Notwendigkeit einer „constitutionalization“, S. 297). 70  Siehe Fn. 29. 71  Interessanterweise haben sich die französischen Gerichte im Verfahren gegen Barbie auf die Existenz einer völkerstrafrechtlichen Ordnung berufen (Crim., 6 oct. 1983, Gaz. Pal. 1983, S. 710, 711 f.; abrufbar unter https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?idTexte=JURI TEXT000007060867 (zuletzt abgerufen am 27. September 2018).

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sen, zurückführen.72 Kant stellt die Würde dem Preis gegenüber: Alles was ersetzbar ist, hat einen relativen Wert oder Preis, alles was nicht ersetzbar, einen inneren Wert und somit eine Würde. Dementsprechend haben bloße Mittel zur Bedürfnisbefriedigung einen Preis; „das aber, was die Bedingung ausmacht, unter der allein etwas Zweck an sich selbst sein kann, hat Würde.“73 Somit ist Würde immanent, deontologisch und nicht verhandelbar (ersetzbar); auf ihr beruhen Individualität und gegenseitige Anerkennung der Mitglieder einer Gesellschaft.74 So verstanden, ist die Menschenwürde ein unabhängiges, humanistisches Konzept, welches Beachtung und Respekt für und zwischen Menschen auf der Grundlage ihrer Stellung als Individuen mit gemeinsamen besonderen Merkmalen (z. B. Vernunft) beansprucht.75 Jeder Person kommt aufgrund ihres Menschseins ein Rechtsstatus zu, unabhängig 72  Es ist aber zu beachten, dass für Kant ein solches (internationales) Recht unter der Voraussetzung der Existenz einer öffentlichen Gewalt, die dieses durchsetzen kann, stand (Fn. 50 und Haupttext). 73  Kant, „Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten“ (1785), in: Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften (Hrsg.), Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. IV, 1903, S. 435 abrufbar unter http://kor pora.org/kant/aa04/435.html (zuletzt abgerufen am 27. September 2018). 74  Kant (Fn. 44), Metaphysik der Sitten, S. 462: „Die Menschheit selbst ist eine Würde; denn der Mensch kann von keinem Menschen (weder von Anderen noch sogar von sich selbst) blos als Mittel, sondern muß jederzeit zugleich als Zweck gebraucht werden, und darin besteht eben seine Würde (die Persönlichkeit), dadurch er sich über alle andere Weltwesen, die nicht Menschen sind und doch gebraucht werden können, mithin über alle Sachen erhebt. Gleichwie er also sich selbst für keinen Preis weggeben kann (welches der Pflicht der Selbstschätzung widerstreiten würde), so kann er auch nicht der eben so nothwendigen Selbstschätzung Anderer als Menschen entgegen handeln, d. i. er ist verbunden, die Würde der Menschheit an jedem anderen Menschen praktisch anzuerkennen, mithin ruht auf ihm eine Pflicht, die sich auf die jedem anderen Menschen nothwendig zu erzeigende Achtung bezieht.“; ders. (Fn. 73), S. 428 – Allerdings passt seine frühere Rassentheorie, die zwischen einer „Stammgattung“ („Weiße von brünetter Farbe“) und vier hierarchisch geordneten Rassen („Erste Race, Hochblonde [Nordl. Eur.] von feuchter Kälte.... Vierte Race, Olivengelbe [Indianer] von trockner Hitze.“) unterscheidet, nicht zu seinem Verständnis der Menschenwürde (Kant, „Von den verschiedenen Rassen der Menschen“ [1775], in: Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften (Hrsg.), Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. II, 1905, S. 427 – 443, abrufbar unter http://www.korpora. org/Kant/aa02/441.html [zuletzt abgerufen am 27. September 2018]). Allerdings hat Kant diese hierarchische Rassenordnung in seinen späteren Werken, in denen er dann Menschenrechte als Rechte aller Menschen anerkannte, überwunden (vgl. Kleingeld, „Kant’s second thoughts on race“, Philosophical Quarterly 57 [2007], S. 573 – 592). 75 Vgl. Mahlmann (Fn. 52), S. 363 ff. Über die religiösen (theologischen) und philosophischen (Kantischen) Quellen des Konzepts Dan-Cohen, „A Concept of Dignity“, IsLR 44 (2011), S. 9 – 23 (S. 10 – 17; er legt dar, dass es mehrere Konzepte von Würde gibt); über Würde als einen „foundational value“ Kleinig, „Humiliation, Degradation, and Moral Capacity: A Response to Hörnle and Kremnitzer“, IsLR 44 (2011), S. 169 – 183 (S. 179 – 182). Über die Auswirkungen des Konzepts auf das materielle Strafrecht Kremnitzer / Hörnle, „Human Dignity and the Principle of Culpability“, IsLR 44 (2011), S. 115 – 141; dies., „Human Dignity as a Protected Interest in Criminal Law“, IsLR 44 (2011), S. 143 – 167; über die Auswirkungen auf das Strafverfahren Hassemer, „Human Dignity in the Criminal Process: The Example of Truth-Finding“, IsLR 44 (2011), S. 185 – 198; Weigend / Ghanayim, „Human Dignity in Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Overview of Israeli and German Law“, IsLR 44 (2011), S.  199 – 228.

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von und auch vor der Existenz einer als Staat konstituierten Gemeinschaft. Dieses Konzept begreift den Staat eher als „Rationalstaat“ denn als Nationalstaat, dessen Autorität sich ausschließlich auf Rechtsstaatlichkeit gründet.76 Kants Vorstellung von der Menschenwürde wird um seine Idee vom „ewigen Frie­ den“ ergänzt.77 Um „ewig“, d.h. dauerhaft und nachhaltig zu sein, müssen, so Kant, für einen solchen Frieden mindestens zwei Voraussetzungen erfüllt sein: Vor allem müsste der Staat eine republikanische Verfassung haben, die Freiheit und Gleichheit der Bürger als „unveräußerliche Rechte“ garantiert;78 darüberhinaus bedürfe es eines Weltbürgerrechts, welches das Recht der Hospitalität beinhaltet,79 demzufolge kein Bürger durch einen anderen Staat feindselig behandelt werden darf.80 Daraus kann man mit Klaus Günther81 zwei Folgerungen ziehen: Erstens setzt ein gerechter und langanhaltender Frieden die Anerkennung und effektive Beachtung der Bürgerrechte – in moderner völkerrechtlicher Terminologie: Menschenrechte – voraus. Zweitens müssen Verletzungen dieser Rechte als schweres Unrecht geächtet und bestraft werden. Eine wichtige Rolle in Kants Idee eines Weltbürgerrechts spielt auch die Anerkennung einer Reihe von (Mindest-)Rechten, die jeder Person zustehen und damit die klassische Mediatisierung des Einzelnen innerhalb der staatlichen Ordnung und im zwischenstaatlich-völkerrechtlichen Bereich aufheben.82 Auf dieser (kantischen) Grundlage ist das moderne Verständnis von Menschenwürde und Weltfrieden gewachsen. Das Konzept der Menschenwürde wurde im 19. Jahrhundert auf nationaler Ebene83 und im 20. Jahrhundert auf internationaler Ebene positivrechtlich verankert.84 Es wurde zwischenzeitlich auch als Rechtsbe76 Vgl. Zaczyk, „Die Notwendigkeit systematischen Strafrechts – Zugleich zum Begriff ‚fragmentarisches Strafrecht‘“, ZStW 123 (2011), S. 691 – 708 (S. 694 f., der sich neben Kant auch auf Locke und Rousseau bezieht). 77  Kant (Fn. 50), S. 341 – 360. 78  A.a.O., S. 350. 79  A.a.O., S. 357. 80  Die Beschränkung auf das Recht der Hospitalität kann mit der historischen Tatsache erklärt werden, dass zu Kants Zeiten der Besuch in einem anderen Land der einzige Berührungspunkt mit einer fremden, souveränen Macht war (Kleinlein [Fn. 68], S. 302). 81  Günther, „Falscher Friede durch repressives Völkerstrafrecht?“, in: Beulke et al. (Hrsg.), Das Dilemma des rechtsstaatlichen Strafrechts, Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2009, S.  79 – 100 (S.  83 – 85). Ähnlich sieht auch Merkel (Fn. 50), S. 348 f. Argumente für einen internationalen Strafgerichtshof bereits in Kants Arbeit zum ewigen Frieden. 82  Kleinlein (Fn. 68), S. 301 – 303, 695 f., 709. 83  Siehe den französischen Décret d’abolition de l’esclavage du 27 avril 1848 (welcher Sklaverei als „attentat contre la dignité humaine“ bezeichnet; zitiert von McCrudden, „Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights“, EJIL 19 [2008], S. 655 – 724 [664]) und § 139 der Paulskirchenverfassung von 1848 (sogar Respekt für die Menschenwürde von Verbrechern; zitiert von Habermas [Fn. 67], S. 15). 84  Auf internationaler Ebene am bekanntesten in Art. 1, 1948 Universal Declaration of Hu­ man Rights (verweist auf „human beings […] free and equal in dignity and rights“); vgl. Mc­ Crudden (Fn. 83), S. 665 f.

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griff anerkannt und bildet Grundlage und moralische Quelle jeder späteren Kodifizierung von Menschen- und Bürgerrechten. Es dient als Schnittstelle zwischen Sittengesetz und positivem Recht und ermöglicht den Übergang von bloßer Moral zu (subjektiven) Rechten.85 So ist es wenig überraschend, dass vor allem deutsche Autoren, ganz in kantischer Tradition, den strafrechtlichen Schutz der Menschenwürde durch den Staat und die internationale Gemeinschaft propagieren.86 85 Vgl. Habermas (Fn. 67), S. 15 – 38 (S. 16: „moralische Quelle, aus der sich die Gehalte aller Grundrechte speisen“; S. 21: „Scharnier, welches die Moral der gleichen Achtung für jeden mit dem positiven Recht […] so zusammenfügt, dass […] eine auf Menschenrechte gegründete politische Ordnung hervorgehen konnte.“; S. 23: „Verbindung […] über das begriffliche Scharnier der Menschenwürde […]“; S. 26: „überträgt den Gehalt einer Moral der gleichen Achtung für jeden auf die Statusordnung von Staatsbürgern, die […] als Subjekte gleicher einklagbarer Rechte anerkannt werden.“ [Hervorhebung i. O., K.A.]; S. 37: „Moral, deren Gehalte über die Idee der Menschenwürde längst in die Menschen- und Bürgerrechte […] Eingang gefunden haben.“); zustimmend jüngst Reuss (Fn. 27), S. 43, 66 f., 69. 86  Siehe – neben den folgenden Autoren – z. B. Wolter, „Menschenrechte und Rechtsgüterschutz in einem europäischen Strafrechtssystem“, in: Schünemann / de Figueiredo Dias (Hrsg.), Bausteine des europäischen Strafrechts – Coimbra Symposium, Köln: Heymann, 1995, S. 3 – 34 (S. 4 ff., 13); de Figueiredo Dias, „Resultate und Probleme beim Aufbau eines funktionalen und zweckrationalen Strafrechtssystems“, a.a.O., S. 357 – 366 (S. 358). Zum gleichen Ergebnis kommt Roxin, „Die Strafrechtswissenschaft vor den Aufgaben der Zukunft“, in: Eser et al. (Fn. 38), S. 369 – 395 (S. 389 f., wo er die Notwendigkeit betont, völkerstrafrechtliche Verbrechen vorbehaltlos zu bestrafen). Siehe auch Stahn / Eiffler (Fn. 64), S. 267 ff. (S. 268, 277), die einen „Wertekonsens der internationalen Gemeinschaft“ ausmachen und Paulus, Gemeinschaft (Fn. 28), S. 260 – 262, der Völkerstrafrecht als „Ausdruck eines Minimalkonsenses“ (S. 260) der internationalen Gemeinschaft in Bezug auf die elementaren Menschenrechte ansieht. Eine Kombination der Kantischen Idee des Weltfriedens mit der Bestrafung von ernsthaften völkerstrafrechtlichen Verbrechen findet sich bei Zaczyk (Fn. 76), S. 705; ähnlich Melloh, Einheitliche Strafzumessung in den Rechtsquellen des ICC-Statuts, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2010, S. 84 und Heinze / Fyfe, „Prosecutorial Ethics and Preliminary Examinations at the ICC“, in: Bergsmo / Stahn (Hrsg.), Quality Control in Preliminary Examination: Vol. 2, Brüssel: Torkel Opsahl, 2018, S. 17 f. – Fletcher / Ohlin, Defending Humanity, New York: OUP, 2008, wenden die Kantische Theorie zur Selbstverteidigung im Strafrecht – nicht nur zur eigenen Verteidigung, sondern auch zu der der Rechtsordnung als Ganzer (S. 76, 79, 83 – 85) – auf die internationale Ordnung an und befürworten auf dieser Grundlage das mögliche Recht eines jeden Staates, gegen einen Angriff vorzugehen (bis der Sicherheitsrat gem. Kapitel VII handelt, S. 44 f., 76 – 78, 84 f.), und – was hier noch wichtiger ist – das Recht zur humanitären Intervention zur Verteidigung nationaler Gruppen (jedoch nicht zum Schutz der Menschenrechte von Individuen, S. 129, 133 f., 145 – 147). Für eine sehr reflektierte, kritische Besprechung siehe Binder, „States of War: Defensive Force Among Nations“, Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 7 (2009), S. 439 – 461, der darlegt, dass die Analogie zu Kant schon deshalb fehlerhaft ist, weil es überhaupt keine internationale Rechtsordnung im Kantischen Sinne eines liberalen, republikanischen Staates gibt (S. 442 – 446, 461). Krit. bzgl. eines rein menschenrechtlichen Ansatzes auch Köhler, „Zum Begriff des Völkerstrafrechts“, Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik 11 (2003), S. 435 – 467 (S. 451 – 454), für den das (wahre) „universale Verbrechen“ in der „Negation der Verfassungs- und zugleich Völkerrechtsfähigkeit […] eines Verbandes (Volkes) bzw. Staates“ (S. 457) besteht; demgemäß kann das „universale Verbrechen“ nur dann gerechtfertigt sein, wenn es das „Völkerrechtsverhältnis“ berührt, d.h. nicht nur zu einer einfachen Rechts(guts) verletzung führt, sondern „schuldhaft-tätig“ fremde Rechtsfähigkeit, also eine „Fundamentalbedingung der selbständigen Existenz eines anderen Rechtssubjektes“ („nicht unmittelbar der

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Nach Max Weber ist die Menschenwürde der Ursprung eines jeden Strafrechtssystems und eine Voraussetzung, um seine Funktionalität und Effektivität in der Verbrechensbekämpfung zu gewährleisten.87 Katrin Gierhake versucht eine Grundlegung des Völkerstrafrechts mittels der Kantischen Rechtslehre zur Autonomie des freien und vernünftigen Subjekts.88 Sie unterscheidet zwischen einer individuellen und allgemein-universellen Ebene. Auf jener kompensiere die internationale Strafe das materielle Unrecht, das ein internationales Verbrechen in der inter-personalen Beziehung der Bürger untereinander erzeuge; auf der allgemein-universellen Ebene hingegen bewirke die internationale Strafe eine Wiederherstellung des Weltrechts und -friedens, die durch das internationale Verbrechen gleichermaßen verletzt wurden.89 Folglich muss das internationale Unrecht durch die (internationale) Strafe aufgehoben oder ausgeglichen werden.90 In ähnlicher Weise verlangen Reinhard Merkel91 und Klaus Günther92 Ächtung und Strafe schwerer Menschenrechtsverletzungen, um grundlegende Menschenrechtsnormen zu bestätigen und zu stärken. Auch Frank Neubacher begründet die Legitimität von internationalen Straftribunalen mit der Schwere der verfolgten Verbrechen und somit dem Schutz universeller, rechtlicher Interessen.93 Andere Autoren vertreten einen stärker kosmopolitischen Ansatz, der aber ebenfalls auf die kantische Idee des Weltbürgerrechts94 und auf sein Konzept der staatsangehörigen Individuen – denn deren Verletzung betrifft zunächst allein das interpersonal-verbandsförmige (staatliche) allenfalls zwischenstaatliche Rechtsverhältnis, sondern der in sich verfassten Verbände (Völker) und Staaten“), negiert, wie dies z. B. beim Völkermord und gewissen (universalen) Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit geschieht. Wird durch das entsprechende Verbrechen dieses „Völkerrechtsverhältnis“ aber nicht berührt, wie z. B. bei Verbrechen im nicht internationalen bewaffneten Konflikt, wird das Völkerstrafrecht durch einen „existenziell[en] Souveränitätsvorbehalt“ begrenzt (a.a.O. S. 454 – 463). Gegen Köhler wiederum Jesse (Fn. 21), S. 66 f. 87  Weber, Gesamtausgabe Max Weber – Abteilung 1, Bd. 22, Teilbd. 3: Recht, Berlin: Mohr Siebeck, 2010, S. 599 ff. Zustimmend Soeffner, „Individuelle Macht und Ohnmacht in formalen Organisationen“, in: Amelung (Hrsg.), Individuelle Verantwortung und Beteiligungsverhältnisse bei Straftaten in bürokratischen Organisationen des Staates, der Wirtschaft und der Gesellschaft, 2000, S. 13 – 31 (S. 27). 88 Ähnlich, die Selbstbestimmung des autonomen Individuums als Ausgangspunkt einer jeden rechtmäßigen Grundlage eines öffentlichen Strafrechts betonend, Meyer (Fn. 35), S.  653 – 656, 694 – 696, 930 – 932. 89  Gierhake, Begründung des Völkerstrafrechts auf der Grundlage der Kantischen Rechtslehre, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2005, S. 165 f., 297, 299 u. passim. 90  A.a.O., S. 287. 91  Merkel (Fn. 50), S. 348 f. (sich auf Kants Ewigen Frieden beziehend), S. 344 f. (wo er eine normative Hierarchie zwischen [ius cogens-] Normen der weltweiten Staatengemeinschaft und der rechtlichen Macht eines ihrer Mitglieder erkennt) und S. 349 f. (Bestätigung von Normen durch das Völkerstrafrecht). 92  Siehe Fn. 81. 93  Neubacher (Fn. 20), S. 415 ff. 94 Siehe auch Garapon, „Three Challenges for International Criminal Justice“, JICJ 2 (2004), S. 716 ff. (einen kosmopolitischen, menschenrechtsbasierten Ansatz vertretend); Reuss

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Menschenwürde zurückgeführt werden kann, wenn man den Schwerpunkt auf Personen statt auf Staaten als Subjekte der internationalen Ordnung legt.95 Auch insoweit wird die Menschenwürde als moralische Quelle der subjektiven Rechte aller Menschen,96 also der universell anerkannten Menschenrechte verstanden,97 die in letzter Konsequenz von einem universellen, interkulturell anerkannten98 Strafrecht geschützt werden müssen.99 Es handelt sich um einen kosmopolitischen (Fn. 27), S. 18 – 20, 54 f. (ein Recht der Weltbürger zur Selbstverteidigung gegen staatliche Gewalt und das ius puniendi der zivilen Welt[bürger]gesellschaft fordernd). Zu Kants Endziel einer „cosmopolitan republic“ (statt einer Mehrebenenordnung als Vorläufer eines Staatenbunds mit supranationalen Befugnissen) s. Hirsch, „On the (Im)Possibility of a Constitutionalization of International Law from a Kantian Point of View“, GoJIL 4 (2012), S. 479 – 518 (S. 483 ff., 500 ff.). 95 Vgl. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999, S. 23 ff. u. passim. Ähnlich vertritt auch Allen E. Buchanan „a conception of international law grounded in the ideal of protecting the basic rights of all persons“ (Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law, New York: OUP, 2004, S. 290). Siehe auch Koskenniemi (Fn. 59), S. 473, der „cosmopolitans“ von „internationalists“ insofern unterscheidet, als die Ersteren „had little faith in States and saw much more hope in increasing contacts between peoples.“ Eine (pluralistische) Auffassung von Völkerrecht, die sich auf rechtliche Mikrovorgänge („micro legal processes“) auf der untersten Ebene („grassroots level“) konzentriert, setzt ebenfalls bei den Menschen (unten) statt beim Staat (oben) an, siehe Berman (Fn. 61), S. 306 (auf Michael Reismans Ansatz verweisend). Für einen solchen „bottom-to-top“ Ansatz auch Reuss (Fn. 27), S. 68 f. („horizontale“ Menschenrechte zwischen und von den Menschen), der weiter darlegt, dass die Rechte, die mit der Stellung der Einzelperson als Völkerrechtssubjekt verknüpft sind, auch Pflichten mit sich bringen (S. 71 – 78). 96  Siehe Fn. 85. 97  Waldron, „How to Argue for a Universal Claim“, Columbia Human Rights Law Review 30 (1999), S. 305 – 314 (S. 313: „some human rights standards [...] upheld everywhere in the world.“). Diese Auffassung wird auch von einigen bedeutenden Praktikern vertreten, siehe z. B. Arbour, „The Rise and Fall of International Human Rights“, (International Crisis Group lecture, 27 April 2011), abrufbar unter https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/rise-and-fall-international-human-rights, zuletzt aufgerufen am 27. September 2018 („So we see at play in North Africa, and increasingly more broadly in the Arab world, what their authoritarian masters had always been hard at work to deny: the universality and indivisibility of human rights.“). 98  Siehe z. B. Kommentar von Rössner, „Kriminalrecht als Kontrollinstitution“, in: Höffe (Hrsg.), Gibt es ein interkulturelles Strafrecht? – Ein philosophischer Versuch, Berlin: Suhrkamp, 1999, S. 121 – 139 (S. 137: „Bei einer menschenrechtlichen Rechtfertigung und Inhaltsbestimmung des Kriminalrechts ist eine kulturübergreifende Strafbefugnis [...] zweifellos gegeben.“); Kommentar von Hassemer, „Vielfalt und Wandel. Offene Horizonte eines interkulturellen Strafrechts“, a.a.O., S. 157 – 180 (S. 174 f., 179 f.: Übereinkommen bzgl. der „Ächtung grundlegender Rechtsverletzungen“, Strafrecht als „menschenrechtsschützende Antwort“ [beide Zitate S. 179]), aber zurückhaltender auf S. 173 („Anfang einer Entwicklung [...], in welcher der ‚große Fremde‘ sich uns anverwandelt und wir uns ihm“). Kritisch bzgl. der Vorstellung eines interkulturellen Strafrechts Pastor (Fn. 14), S. 116 ff.; auch Scheerer, „Die Kriminalstrafe als Kulturerbe der Menschheit?“, in: Eser et al. (Hrsg.) (Fn. 38), S. 345 – 355 (S. 347: Universalität des Strafrechts nur ein „Mythos“). Für eine theoretische Grundlegung s. Demko, „‚Strafrechtskulturen‘ im Kontext von Europäisierung und Internationalisierung des Strafrechts“, in: Ackermann / Bommer (Hrsg.), Liber Amicorum für Dr. Martin Vonplon, Zürich: Schulthess, 2009, S. 95 – 113 (S. 95 ff.); Vogel, „Transkulturelles Strafrecht“, GA 157 (2010), S. 1 – 14.

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Ansatz, der auf Vernunftprinzipien beruht und einen universellen Geltungsanspruch erhebt.100 Er verbindet, teilweise als Ergebnis postmoderner Theorien des Rechtspluralismus,101 eine konkrete Überlegung mit einem abstrakten Anspruch, wodurch er jedem generellen Kulturrelativismus eine Absage erteilt.102 Die konkre­ te Überlegung nimmt auf konkrete Verletzungen grundlegender Menschenrechte Bezug, welche völkerstrafrechtlich als schwere Verbrechen gegen grundlegende Werte der Menschlichkeit übersetzt werden können und als völkerstrafrechtliche Kernverbrechen in Art. 5 – 8bis IStGH-Statut kodifiziert wurden, weshalb sie schwerlich von irgendeiner Kultur gebilligt werden können.103 Der abstrakte Anspruch hingegen bezieht sich auf den zugrunde liegenden moralischen Standpunkt der universellen Reichweite dieser grundlegenden Menschenrechte und die Bestrafung ihrer Verletzungen als völkerstrafrechtliche Kernverbrechen.104 Als ein 99 Hieraus folgt als logische Konsequenz die im menschenrechtlichen Diskurs oft angeführte Verfolgungs- und Bestrafungspflicht (siehe anstelle vieler Orentlicher, „Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime“, YLJ 100 [1991], S. 2537 – 2615 [S. 2537 ff.]). 100  Koskenniemi (Fn. 59), S. 475 – 477, unterscheidet zwischen drei Formen von Weltbürgertum („deep-structural“, „rational / principled“ und „postmodern / legal pluralist“). 101 Dies ist in gewisser Weise die Kehrseite des oben angesprochenen, pluralistisch-demokratischen „grassroots“-Ansatzes (Fn. 61 und Haupttext): Rechtspluralismus ist eine deskriptive und keine normative Theorie; er sieht keine Normenhierarchie vor, sondern weist, im Grundsatz, allen anerkannten Normen und Quellen den gleichen Rang zu; siehe Berman (Fn. 61), S. 327 f. Natürlich muss es auch hierbei zumindest eine gewisse Ordnung geben; siehe in diesem Sinne eines „ordnenden Pluralismus“ Delmas-Marty, Ordering Pluralism – A Conceptual Framework for Understanding the Transnational Legal World, Oxford: Hart, 2009 [Übersetzung aus dem Französischen]); lehrreiche Besprechung von Kubiciel, „Book Review: Mireille Delmas-Marty, Ordering Pluralism – A Conceptual Framework for Understanding the Transnational Legal World, Hart Publishing, Oxford 2009“, CLF 22 (2011), S. 433 – 438. Außerdem: Wenn man an die moralische Autorität von Normen als solche glaubt (Fn. 63 und Haupttext), gibt es eine Grenze des Relativismus mit Blick auf elementare Menschenrechte und völkerstrafrechtliche Kernverbrechen (vgl. Delmas-Marty, a.a.O., erörtert auf S. 104: „[C­]­riminalisation seems to be imposed by the universalism of values, which leads to punishing the ‚worst‘ international crimes.“; zustimmend Kubiciel, a.a.O., S. 438). 102  Gegen Kulturrelativismus zugunsten eines universellen Konzepts der Menschenrechte auch Perry, „Are Human Rights Universal? The Relativist Challenge and Related Matters“, Human Rights Quarterly 19 (1997), S. 461 – 509 (S. 471: „Human beings are all alike in some respects that support generalizations both about what is good and about what is bad, not just for some human beings, but for every human being“) und Bielefeldt (Fn. 64), S. 10 ff. (S. 12 f.), 17, 115 ff., 145 ff.; (erkennt hier „Menschenrechte als Kern eines interkulturellen ‚overlapping consensus‘“: S. 145); ähnlich Fisher (Fn. 28), S. 61; Mahlmann (Fn. 52), S. 372 ff. 103 Auch islamische Gelehrte erkennen „a sufficient degree of cultural consensus regard­ ing […] the protection and promotion of human rights“ (An-Na’im, „Toward a Cross-Cultural Approach to Defining International Standards of Human Rights: The Meaning of Cultural, In­ human, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment“, in: ders. (Hrsg.), Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives, Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1992, S. 19 – 43 [S. 27]). 104  Die Gründe der fehlenden Bestrafung solcher Verbrechen liegen eher in den nationalen Machtverhältnissen als einer grundsätzlichen (offenen) Ablehnung des zu Grunde liegenden Wertesystems.

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philosophischer Standpunkt hat er keine beschränkte geographische Geltung und kann auch nicht rechtskulturell in Frage gestellt werden, denn die Art und Weise der Bildung moralischer Urteile und ihr universeller Anspruch lässt eine solche Beschränkung nicht zu.105 Mit anderen Worten: Die Geltung eines moralphilosophischen Arguments ist unabhängig von seinen geschichtlichen und geographischen Wurzeln.106 Es würde ja auch beispielsweise niemand ernsthaft behaupten, dass Einsteins Relativitätstheorie nur in der Schweiz gelte, weil er sie hauptsächlich dort entwickelt hat. Im Einklang damit hat Otfried Höffe eine philosophische Rechtfertigung einer völkerstrafrechtlichen Ordnung vorgeschlagen, die auf Menschenrechten und Gerechtigkeit als universell und interkulturell anerkannten Prinzipien beruht. Seiner Ansicht nach ist der Schutz der Menschenrechte die höchste Pflicht der komplementären Weltrepublik, und dieser Schutz müsse letztendlich durch ein Weltstrafrecht sichergestellt werden.107 Schutz durch Strafrecht ist somit die Kehrseite des Verbots menschenrechtsverletzenden Verhaltens.108 Die Legitimität dieses Weltstrafrechts kann sichergestellt werden, indem seine Anwendung auf den Schutz der wichtigsten Menschenrechte – eine Art Minimalmoral – beschränkt wird.109 Ein solches Strafrecht, welches auf den Menschenrechten basiert und universell jenseits kultureller Grenzen anerkannt ist, ist selbst interkulturell und kann somit grenz- und kulturüberschreitend mit universellem Geltungsanspruch angewendet werden.110 In ähnlicher Weise versteht auch Jürgen Habermas die Menschenwürde als moralische Quelle durchsetzbarer (subjektiver) Bürger- und Menschenrechte.111 Er ergänzt sie um eine Theorie einer Weltgesellschaft mit Bürgern und Staaten als Rechtssubjekten, deren Hauptanliegen die Sicherstellung des Weltfriedens und ele-

105  Waldron (Fn. 97), S. 307 („nothing about the way in which moral judgments are formed [...] which restricts the range of their appropriate application“), der ferner auf dieser Grundlage zwischen ehrenwert konkreten (relevanten) und unehrenhaft generellen (irrelevanten) „relativist challenges“ unterscheidet (S. 307 – 309). 106 Vgl. Mahlmann (Fn. 52), S. 376. 107  Höffe (Fn. 67), S. 296 ff. 108  Ders. (Fn. 98), S. 78 f. 109  Ders. (Fn. 67), S. 35, 368 f. („Die Rechtfertigung eines weltstaatlichen Strafrechts verbindet sich mit dessen Einschränkung auf den Schutz der Menschenrechte“). 110  Ders. (Fn. 98), S. 107 f. („Rechtskulturen, die so grundsätzlich anders sind, daß sie die menschenrechtlich begründbaren Delikte gar nicht kennen, sind schwer zu finden; eher dehnt man den Umfang der Strafbefugnis aus. [...] Das, wofür wir uns nachdrücklich einsetzen, finden wir in anderen Kulturen auch; insbesondere über das, worüber wir uns empören, empören sich die Menschen anderswo ebenfalls“); ders. (Fn. 67), S. 370. 111  Siehe (Fn. 85) mit Haupttext. Siehe auch bereits Habermas, „Bestialität und H ­ umanität“, Die Zeit (29. April 1999), S. 1 (S. 6 f., 7: Menschenrechte als subjektive Rechte „die im juristischen Sinne implementiert werden müssen“; jedoch erst wenn die Menschenrechte ihren „Sitz“ in einer globalen Rechtsordnung gefunden haben, ähnlich den Grundrechten in unserer Verfassung, „werden wir auch auf globaler Ebene davon ausgehen dürfen, daß sich die Adressaten dieser Rechte zugleich als deren Autoren verstehen können“).

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mentarer Menschenrechte als minima moralia ist.112 Dabei werde die „angestrebte Etablierung eines weltbürgerlichen Zustandes“ zur Folge haben, dass „Verstöße gegen die Menschenrechte [...] wie kriminelle Handlungen innerhalb einer staatlichen Rechtsordnung verfolgt werden.“113 Zu ähnlichen Ergebnissen gelangen auch anglo-amerikanische Autoren, allerdings mit stärker völkerrechtlichen Begründungsansätzen. Einige gehen von einer staatlichen Pflicht des Schutzes grundlegender Menschenrechte aus und leiten daraus eine Bestrafungspflicht bei Verletzungen dieser Rechte ab. Kommt ein Staat dieser Pflicht nicht nach, ist es ihm verwehrt, einer (internationalen) humanitären Intervention in Form supranationaler Strafverfolgung und Bestrafung zu widersprechen. Er verliert das Recht, sich auf den Einwand entgegenstehender (absoluter) Souveränität zu berufen.114 Letztlich beruht diese Argumentation auf dem Verständnis der internationalen Gemeinschaft als einer Wertegemeinschaft115 und der Existenz einer auf eben diesen Werten beruhenden internationalen konstitu­ tionellen Ordnung (Konstitutionalisierungsthese).116 Eine solche wertbasierte internationale Gemeinschaft steht nicht nur für „staatliche Werte“ ein, sondern auch für „Gemeinschaftswerte“, die die Menschheit als solche betreffen, z. B. den weltweiten Frieden und den Schutz grundlegender Menschenrechte. Insoweit existiert ein „overlapping“ Konsens im Rawlsschen Sinne117 in Bezug auf die universelle Geltung der grundlegenden Menschenrechte.118 Aus ihm kann die internationale Gemeinschaft zumindest eine Befugnis ableiten, gegen Verantwortliche völkerrechtlicher Kernverbrechen strafrechtlich vorzugehen.119 Sie wird damit auch zum 112  Ders. (Fn. 67), S. 82 – 96 (S. 86, 92 f.). Natürlich räumt Habermas ein, dass seine Theorie angesichts des derzeitigen Standes der internationalen Ordnung (siehe bereits Fn. 67) und der kulturellen Kontingenz einer Transnationalisierung der Volkssouveränität durchaus utopische Züge trägt (S. 89, wo er anerkennt, dass das Fehlen einer gemeinsamen Kultur eine Transnatio­ nalisierung als schwierig gestaltet); siehe auch ders., (Fn. 111), wo er von einer „Unterinstitutionalisierung des Weltbürgerrechts“ spricht. 113  Ders. (Fn. 111). 114 Ähnlich Paulus (Fn. 28), Community, S. 49; van der Wilt, „War crimes and the requirement of a nexus with armed conflict“, JICJ 10 (2012), S. 1113 – 1128 (S. 1114 f., 1127). – Das Souveränitätsargument setzt natürlich voraus, dass man das zugrundeliegende Konzept der absoluten Souveränität überhaupt anerkennt; ein flexibleres, relatives Konzept findet sich mit Diskussion bei Cryer (Fn. 33), S. 981 f. 115  Siehe bereits Fn. 28 und Haupttext. 116  Siehe Fn. 68. 117  Genauer: Im Sinne seines Konzepts eines „overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines“, d.h. zwischen verschiedenen politischen oder moralischen Auffassungen in einer pluralistischen, liberalen Gesellschaft (Rawls, Political Liberalism, New York: Columbia University Press, 2005, S. 133 f.). 118  Paulus (Fn. 28), Gemeinschaft, S.  254 – 260. 119 Siehe Triffterer, „Der ständige internationale Strafgerichtshof – Anspruch und Wirklichkeit“, in: Gössel / Triffterer (Hrsg.), Gedächtnisschrift für Heinz Zipf, Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 1999, S. 493 – 558 (S. 511 ff.). Siehe auch Paulus (Fn. 28), Community, S. 53, wo er darlegt, dass die supranationale Verfolgung von völkerstrafrechtlichen Verbrechen „is a shortcut for

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Träger des völkerstrafrechtlichen ius puniendi, als Repräsentant der dieses begründenden Weltordnung und Weltgesellschaft. Die Konstitutionalisierungsthese mit der ihr immanenten Forderung des Schutzes grundlegender Menschenrechte wiederum führt zu der gerade erwähnten Beschränkung der klassischen staatlichen Souveränität (im Sinne einer echten domaine réservé), weil Staaten den Souveränitätsschutz verlieren, wenn sie ihren menschenrechtlichen Schutzpflichten nicht nachkommen oder Menschenrechte sogar aktiv verletzen.120 Die Legitimität der Ausübung von Staatsgewalt hat damit ihren tieferen Grund in der Achtung der grundlegenden Menschenrechte.121 Die Missachtung dieser Rechte durch Unrechtsstaaten führt zu einer Einschränkung von deren Souveränität. Einen solchen kombinierten Ansatz von individuellen Rechten und einer konstitutionellen Weltordnung verfolgen etwa Altman und Wellman, wenn sie ein Konzept funktionaler Souveränität geltend machen, wonach Staaten, die ihre Schutzfunk­ tion gegenüber der eigenen Bevölkerung nicht erfüllen, keinen legitimen Einwand gegen den gegen sie gerichteten Einsatz des Völkerstrafrechts geltend machen können.122 Eine ähnliche Auffassung vertritt Allan Buchanan, für den die Legitimität eines Staates von dessen Fähigkeit und Bereitschaft des effektiven Menschenrechtsschutzes abhängt; nur dann sorge der Staat für Gerechtigkeit und könne als eine rechtsschützende Institution angesehen werden.123 Versage der Staat aber bei dieser Aufgabe, müsste die so entstehende Schutzlücke von anderen (internationalen) Institutionen geschlossen werden. Auf derselben Idee beruht auch Larry May’s „security principle“, wonach die Souveränität eines Staates legitimerweise eingeschränkt werden kann, wenn dieser die Rechte seiner Bürger gröblich verletzt und damit ernsthaften internationalen Schaden („international harm“) verursacht.124 Andere angloamerikanische Autoren berufen sich auf die schon erwähnte kosmopolitische Idee einer Weltgesellschaft, die aus Bürgern als eigenständigen Subthe direct and indirect dealings of state authorities, non-state organizations and businesses, as well as individual citizens, beyond state boundaries, and for the endeavor to tackle common problems, from the protection of the environment to the prevention of genocide and famine, for which states alone are unwilling, incapable, or illegitimate to act unilaterally.“ 120  Kleinlein (Fn. 68), S. 689, 703, 705 f. Im gleichen Sinne für eine volle (gerichtliche) Überprüfung nationaler Menschenrechtsprobleme Broude (Fn. 66), S. 526 (unter Bezugnahme auf Kelsens restriktive Auslegung von Art. 2 Abs. 7 UN Satzung). 121  Kleinlein (Fn. 68), Kap. 7 (insb. S. 511 – 537, 613 f., 699 f., 712 f.). 122  Altman / Wellman, „A Defense of International Criminal Law“, Ethics 115 (2004), S. 35 – 67 (S. 46 f., 51: „states that do not sufficiently protect the basic rights of their people have no legitimate objection to the imposition of international criminal law on them“). 123  Buchanan (Fn. 95), S. 87 f. 124  May, Crimes against Humanity, Cambridge: CUP, 2005, S. 63  – 79 (insb. 68 – 71), S. 80 – 95 (Sicherheits- und Schadensprinzip fungieren somit als zweifache Rechtfertigung bei der Verfolgung völkerstrafrechtlicher Verbrechen). Krit. in Bezug auf das Schadensprinzip, aber dem Sicherheitsprinzip zustimmend, Greenawalt (Fn. 21), S. 1096 f. (der dieses Prinzip allerdings auf das Versagen der inländischen Rechtsdurchsetzung, welche durch Völkerstrafrecht kompensiert werden müsse, bezieht).

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jekten mit ihrem eigenen Recht, dem „Weltbürgerrecht“, besteht. Die auch völkerstrafrechtliche Verteidigung dieses Rechts, also der ihm zugrundeliegenden Menschenwürde und der darauf beruhenden grundlegenden Menschenrechte, sei legitim und geboten.125 So macht z. B. Mark Osiel geltend, die strafrechtliche Verfolgung staatlich geförderter Massenverbrechen sei ein Beitrag zur Förderung der gesellschaftlichen Solidarität, in der sich der zunehmende Respekt gegenüber den (andersdenkenden) Mitbürgern zeige.126 Nach David Luban liegt in Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit ein Angriff auf den Kernbereich der Menschlichkeit, der uns allen eigen ist und uns von anderen Menschen unterscheidet;127 überdies verletzten Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit sukzessive sowohl die Individualität als auch die „Gesellschaftlichkeit“ ihrer Opfer.128 Die Qualität dieser Angriffe machten den Täter zu einem Feind der Menschheit – einem hostis humani generis – und damit zu einem legitimen Ziel.129 In seiner „Vergeltungstheorie“130 des Völkerstrafrechts führt Adil Ahmad Haque die (staatliche) Schutzpflicht131 mit dem Gruppencharakter internationaler Verbrechen132 und der Menschenwürde des schutzwürdigen Individuums zusammen.133 Für ihn beruht die Bestrafungspflicht auf der relationalen 125  Ein ähnlicher Ansatz, mit Schwerpunkt auf dem nationalen Recht, wird von der Theorie des „legal republicanism“ verfolgt, nach welcher das Recht im Allgemeinen und das Strafrecht im Speziellen die Idee einer Bürgergesellschaft mit Bürgerwerten und -tugenden stärken und fördern soll (eine Zusammenfassung der unterschiedlichen Ansätze findet sich bei Dagger, „Republicanism and Crime“, in: Besson / Martí (Hrsg.), Legal Republicanism. National and International Perspectives, Oxford: OUP, 2009, S. 147 – 166 [(157)]; für eine Diskussion und einen Transfer zum Völkerstrafrecht vgl. Reuss [Fn. 27], S.  42 – 52). 126  Osiel, Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory and the Law, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1997, S. 22 f. („embodied in the increasingly respectful way that citizens can come to acknowledge the differing views of their fellows“), S. 293. 127  Luban, „A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity“, YJIL 29 (2004), S. 85 – 167 (86: „the core humanity that we all share and that distinguishes us from other human beings“). 128  A.a.O., S. 120 („the individuality and sociability of the victims in tandem“). 129  Krit. bzgl. der unklaren Terminologie Duff, „Authority and Responsibility in International Criminal Law“, in: Besson / Tasioulas (Hrsg.) (Fn. 14), S. 589 – 604 (S. 602 – 604); Ambos, „Crimes Against Humanity and the International Criminal Court“, in: Sadat (Hrsg.), Forging a Convention for Crimes Against Humanity, Cambridge: CUP, 2011, S. 279 – 304 (282). Die Nähe zur deutschen, spanischen und italienischen feindstrafrechtlichen Diskussion (vgl. Am­ bos, „Feindstrafrecht“, ZStR 124 [2006], S. 1 – 30) ist eher zufällig. 130  Haque, „Group Violence and Group Vengeance: Toward a Retributivist Theory of International Criminal Law“, Buffalo Criminal Law Review 9 (2005), S.  273 – 328. 131  A.a.O., S. 305 („bear the same duty of equal justice to their citizens, and this duty requires the prosecution and punishment of non-state actors.“), S. 328 („response to a failure to protect.“, „ground of the duty to punish […] in an earlier dereliction of duty [to protect]“). 132 A.a.O., S. 302 – 304 (crimes against humanity as „committed by politically organized groups“ and „inflicted on victims based on their group membership“; auch wenn er auf S. 308 das Gruppenelement eher als einen erschwerenden Faktor ansieht), S. 326 f. („Group perpe­ tration and group victimization challenge the legitimacy of the state, and thereby explain and justify international intervention.“).

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Struktur von Vergeltung, d.h. die Verletzung der Rechte des Opfers durch den Täter löst die dem Opfer geschuldete Pflicht des Staates zur Bestrafung aus.134 Folglich gründet sich die staatliche Bestrafungspflicht auf ein Dreiecksverhältnis zwischen Täter, Opfer und Staat als Vermittler.135 Komme der Staat seiner Strafpflicht nicht effektiv nach, sei ein internationales Einschreiten geboten.136 Mark Drumbl will das reine Strafrecht durch ein weiterreichendes, allerdings hochabstraktes Konzept von Gerechtigkeit ersetzen: Eine „cosmopolitan pluralist vision“, die aus einem pflichtbasierten, präventiven Modell besteht, welches von unten organisiert und koordiniert auf jede Gewalttat abgestimmte Sanktionen vorsieht.137 Kirsten Fisher schlägt, in Anlehnung an May und Luban, eine zweifache Anwendungsschwelle des Völkerstrafrechts vor.138 Die erste Schwelle („severity“) setzt voraus, dass die grundlegenden Menschenrechte, die dem Schutz der körperlichen Unversehrtheit dienen und eine Voraussetzung für die Wahrnehmung anderer Rechte sind, durch das in Frage stehende Verhalten gefährdet wurden, d.h. sie bezieht sich auf die Schwere des angerichteten Schadens im Hinblick auf die körperliche Unversehrtheit.139 Die zweite „assoziative“ Schwelle repräsentiert das Gruppen- oder Organisationselement in völkerstrafrechtlichen Verbrechen im doppelten Sinne, d.h. zum einen bezugnehmend auf die politische Organisation / Gruppe als den Aggressor 133  A.a.O., S. 320 („reassert the primacy of shared humanity over group difference and dismantle regimes founded on the premise of unequal moral worth.“), S. 322 („conception of human beings as members of a single moral community in virtue of their shared status as persons“, „broader moral community founded […] on shared humanity“; bzgl. des Weltrechts­ prinzips). 134 A.a.O., S. 278 („relational structure of retributive justice“, was bedeute, dass „an offender’s violation of the victim’s right gives rise to a duty of the punishing agent, owed to the victim, to punish the offender.“); bzgl. der dem Opfer geschuldeten Pflicht siehe auch S. 288. 135  A.a.O., S. 283 die Pflicht zur Bestrafung „[is] grounded in the relationship between the three actors“. 136  A.a.O., S. 297, 304 („Once the moral authority of the state is so thoroughly compromised, the task of meting out retributive justice falls to the international community“), 306 („danger of state indifference or co-option posed by organized groups and the resulting need for a legal basis for international intervention“). Haque steht der internationalen Gemeinschaft als der ggf. intervenierenden Einheit jedoch kritisch gegenüber, weil ihre Aufwertung zu „our fundamental moral and political unit“ eher „an aspiration rather than a social fact“ bleibe (S. 296 f.). 137  Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law, Cambridge: CUP, 2007, S. 207 („an obligation-based preventative model, operationalized from the bottom-up through diverse modalities that contemplate a coordinated admixture of sanctions calibrated to each specific atrocity“); genauer und konkreter S. 181 ff. und 206 ff. 138  Fisher (Fn. 28), S. 17 – 26, 30 f., 186. 139  A.a.O., S. 17 – 22, 26, 30 f. Kritisch zum Merkmal der Schwere („gravity“) Greenawalt (Fn. 21), S. 1089 – 1095 (wonach dieses Merkmal alleine nicht ausreichend sei, um Völkerstrafrecht mit all seinen Aspekten zu erklären, insb. nicht, warum bestimmte Verbrechen als internationale kodifiziert seien, andere jedoch nicht); dadurch wird allerdings zu viel in dieses Element hineingelesen, das doch lediglich einen wichtigen Faktor zur Abgrenzung von Völkerstrafrecht und inländischem Strafrecht darstellt (wie später, S. 1122 f., richtig von Greenawalt erkannt).

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(„travesty of political organization“) und / oder zum anderen als das Objekt der Aggression, wobei die Opfer Angehörige dieser Organisation sind.140 Letztlich zeigt ein Ansatz, der auf den fundamentalen Menschenrechten der Weltbürger beruht, dass eine universelle Rechtsordnung, d.h. die Ordnung der Weltgesellschaft bestehend aus Weltbürgern, „auch ohne zentrale Gesetzgebung und Gerichtsbarkeit“ (Luhmann)141 und „auch ohne das Gewaltmonopol eines Weltstaates und ohne Weltregierung“ (Habermas)142 möglich ist und zwar durch die Überzeugungskraft der ihrem Recht zugrundeliegenden Werte, die sich im Handeln verschiedener, häufig staatsferner Akteure auf verschiedenen Ebenen wiederspiegeln.143 Dieser Ansatz verbindet Menschenwürde und Menschenrechte mit der Konzeption einer wertbasierten internationalen (Rechts-)Ordnung. Das schon erwähnte internationale Strafjustizsystem stützt sich auf diese Ordnung, wenn es nicht schon selbst eine solche Rechtsordnung darstellt; sein ius puniendi leitet sich von den autonomen Individuen ab, die in der Weltgesellschaft vereint sind: ubi societas ibi ius puniendi.144 Anders ausgedrückt: das ius puniendi ohne Staat lässt sich nur individualistisch bzw. personalistisch rechtfertigen, als Antwort auf Rechtsverletzungen der Bürger der globalen polity, die (insoweit) von ihren Staaten nicht repräsentiert und zugleich in ihrem gegenseitigen Anerkennungsverhältnis verletzt werden.145 Das internationale Strafjustizsystem ist der Ausdruck eines Werturteils zugunsten der rechtlichen und moralischen Notwendigkeit der Bestrafung makrokriminellen Verhaltens.146 Das Recht dieses neuen Strafjustizsystems,   Fisher (Fn. 28), S. 22 – 25, 26, 30 f.   Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft, Berlin: Suhrkamp, Nachdruck 1997, S. 574 („Weltgesellschaft auch ohne zentrale Gesetzgebung und Gerichtsbarkeit eine Rechtsordnung hat“, „Indikatoren eines weltgesellschaftlichen Rechtssystems“). Luhmanns Ansatz beruht, ganz im Sinne seiner Systemtheorie, auf (weltweiter) gesellschaftlicher Kommunikation innerhalb des einen (globalen) gesellschaftlichen Systems, dessen Subsysteme durch bestimmte Grundwerte, insbesondere grundlegende Menschenrechte, zusammengehalten werden; vgl. Mattheis, „The System Theory of Niklas Luhmann and the Constitutionalization of the World Society“, GoJIL 4 (2012), S. 625 – 647 (S. 637 – 638, 643, 644 – 645). 142  Habermas (Fn. 111), 6 (normative Regelung „auch ohne das Gewaltmonopol eines Weltstaates und ohne Weltregierung zu erreichen“). 143  In diesem Sinne zur global governance als „jurisdiktionell-stratifiziertes Mehrebenensystem“, „komplexes Weltregieren“ und das „aggregierte Resultat der Tätigkeiten verschiedenster Akteure“ Burchard (Fn. 30), S. 77, 79, 81. 144  Meyer (Fn. 35), S. 695, 931. 145 Ähnlich Duff (Fn. 129), S. 595 („… defendants are answerable to their fellow citizens … for public wrongs that they commit, in virtue of their shared membership of the political community. Crimes are ‚public‘ wrongs, not in the sense that they harm ‚the public‘ as distinct from any individual victims, but in the sense that they are wrongs that concern the ‚public‘, i.e. all members of the polity, in virtue of their shared membership; the criminal trial is the forum in which we formally call each other to account, as citizens, for such wrongs.“ [Fn. weggelas­ sen]). 146 Vgl. Bassiouni (Fn. 14), S. 31 ff.; David, „Les valeurs, politiques et objectifs du droit pénal international à l’heure de la mondialisation“, Nouvelles Études Pénales 19 (2004), S.  157 – 169. 140 141

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das Völkerstrafrecht, kann als zivilisatorischer Fortschritt147 und, in diesem Sinne, auch als ethisches Projekt angesehen werden.148 Die völkerrechtlichen Verbrechen, die mit diesem Recht verhindert oder gegebenenfalls bestraft werden sollen, verletzen die fundamentalen Werte unserer internationalen Ordnung und der Weltgesellschaft; teilweise kann man sie zum zwingenden, unveräußerlichen Völkerrecht (ius cogens) zählen.149 All das hat zur Folge, dass ein Staat, auf dessen Staatsgebiet derartige Verbrechen begangen werden, sich nicht hinter dem aus dem Westfälischen Frieden150 hervorgegangenen grotianischen Souveränitätsmodell verschan147  Ambos, „International Criminal Law at the Crossroads“, in: Stahn / van den Herik (Hrsg.), Future Perspectives on International Criminal Justice, Den Haag: T.M.C. Asser, 2010, S.  161 – 177 (S.  165 ff.). 148  Insoweit stimme ich mit Dubber (Fn. 31), S. 923, überein, der jedoch zu weit geht, wenn er behauptet, Völkerstrafrecht sei kein Recht, sondern eher ein ethisch-administratives statt ein rechtliches Unternehmen („ethical-administrative enterprise“). Dubber präsentiert seine Kritik in einer etwas aufgeblasenen Rhetorik, der aber leider die inhaltliche Entsprechung fehlt, ganz zu schweigen von Bezügen zum konkreten, häufig technisch-diffizilen Völkerstrafrecht. Tatsächlich argumentiert Dubber unbeeindruckt von den Gegebenheiten und rechtstechnischen Problemen des praktischen Völkerstrafrechts und verfehlt damit diejenigen, die entweder als Praktiker oder als Wissenschaftler Völkerstrafrecht anwenden und formen. 149 Siehe die Definition in Art. 53 Wiener Übereinkommen über das Recht der Verträge (BGBl. 1985 II, S. 926 ff.). Es ist jedoch umstritten, wie weit dieser ius cogens-Anspruch vernünftigerweise gehen kann, also ob er über die in Art. 5 IStGH-Statut kodifizierten Kernverbrechen hinausgeht oder überhaupt alle diese Verbrechen, einschließlich der in Art. 8 enthaltenen Kriegsverbrechen, umfasst. Eindeutige Rechtsprechung gibt es insoweit nur in Bezug auf Völkermord (Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the ­Crime of Genocide [Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro], I.C.J. Rep. 2007, 43, § 161; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo [New Application: 2002] [Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda], Jurisdiction and Admissibility, I.C.J. Rep. 2006, 6, § 64; Reserva­ tions to the Convention on Genocide, I.C.J. Rep. 1951, 15, 23; Judgment, Radoslav Brdanin [IT-99-36-T], Trial Chamber, 1 September 2004, § 680; Judgment, Goran Jelisic [IT-95-10-T], Trial Chamber, 14 December 1999, § 60; Judgment, Radislav Krstic [IT-98-33-T], Trial Chamber, 2 August 2001, § 541; Judgment, Milomir Stakic [IT-97-24-T], Trial Chamber, 31 July 2003, § 500) und Folter (erst kürzlich Othman Abu Qatada v. UK, no. 8139/09, § 266, 17 Janu­ ary 2012, ECHR 56; siehe auch Judgment, Anto Furundzija [IT-95-17/1-T], Trial Chamber, 10 December 1998, §§ 153 – 157; Judgment, Zejnil Delalic et al. [IT-96-21-T], Trial Chamber, 16 November 1998, § 454). Die Zoran Kupreskic et al. Verfahrenskammer (IT-95-16-T, Judgment 14 January 2000, § 520) hat einen weiterreichenden Ansatz gewählt („Furthermore, most norms of international humanitarian law, in particular those prohibiting war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, are also peremptory norms of international law or jus cogens“); ebenso Bassiouni (Fn. 14), S. 178. Des Weiteren nennen die ILC Draft articles on Responsibil­ ity of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/ commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf (zuletzt abgerufen am 27. September 2018), S. 112 die Verbrechen der Aggression, Sklaverei, Sklavenhandel, Rassendiskriminierung und Apartheid als ius cogens-Verbrechen. Einige Autoren lassen auch die Vergewaltigung hierunter fallen (siehe Mit­ chell, „The Prohibition of Rape in International Humanitarian Law as a Norm of Jus Cogens: Clarifying the Doctrine“, Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 15 [2004 – 2005], S.  219 – 257; Sungi, „Obligatio Erga Omnes of Rape as a Ius Cogens Norm: Examining the Jurisprudence of the ICTY, ICTR and the ICC“, European Journal of Law Reform 9 [2007], S. 113 – 144 [S. 127, 140 ff.]).

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zen kann, sondern sicherstellen muss, dass die Verantwortlichen zur Rechenschaft gezogen werden; ansonsten müssen sich die internationale Gemeinschaft oder Drittstaaten (mittels des Weltrechtsprinzips) dieser Aufgabe annehmen. III. Ergebnis Ein supranationales ius puniendi kann aus einer Kombination zweier Konzeptionen abgeleitet werden: der im Entstehen begriffenen Supranationalität einer wertbasierten Weltordnung und dem Konzept einer Weltgesellschaft, bestehend aus Weltbürgern, deren Recht – das Weltbürgerrecht – auf den universellen, unteilbaren und interkulturellen Menschenrechten beruht, deren moralische Quelle wiederum die kantische Menschenwürde ist. Dieser kollektiv-individualistische Ansatz ergibt sich auch aus der Präambel des IStGH-Statuts, auf die schon zu Beginn dieses Beitrags hingewiesen wurde: Sie bezieht sich einerseits auf die kollektive Ebene – „die internationale Gemeinschaft“, „den Frieden, die Sicherheit und das Wohl der Welt“ – und andererseits auf die individuelle Ebene – Verbrechen, Täter, Opfer. Bezüglich der kollektiven Ebene wurde hier die Auffassung vertreten, dass völkerstrafrechtliche Kernverbrechen die internationale Gemeinschaft als Ganzes berühren und dass daher diese Gemeinschaft das Recht hat, strafrechtlich gegen die Täter solcher Verbrechen vorzugehen.151 Sie ist also der Träger des ius puniendi. Die Kehrseite davon ist das der Konstitutionalisierungsdiskussion entstammende Argument, dass die Rechtfertigung von Autorität im Völkerrecht, d.h. die Legitimität der Ausübung von Staatsgewalt, die Beachtung der grundlegenden Menschenrechte zur Voraussetzung hat.152 Aus individualistischer Perspektive ist zunächst von einem Verständnis des Völker(straf)rechts auszugehen, das den Menschen als Rechtssubjekt in den Mittelpunkt stellt und seine Rechte ernst nimmt.153 So verschiebt sich der Fokus vom Kollektiv – dem Verbund souveräner Staaten – zum Individuum – den Weltbürgern als Rechtssubjekte – und das ius puniendi lässt sich als Antwort auf die Verletzungen ihrer universellen, transnationalen und interkulturellen Menschen- und Bürgerrechte ableiten.

150  Eine inspirierende, kritische Abhandlung zum Westfälischen System (welches angeblich die Grundlage für die Gemeinschaft der souveränen Staaten und damit auch der derzeitigen internationalen Rechtsordnung, in der politische Autorität vorrangig Staaten zukommt, geschaffen hat) stammt von Strange, „The Westfailure System“, Review of International Studies 25 (1999), S. 345 – 354 (die vor allem auf seine Schwächen im Hinblick auf weltweite Finanz- und Umweltkrisen verweist). 151  Siehe bzgl. dieses wertbasierten Verständnisses der internationalen Gemeinschaft Fn. 115, 117 – 119 und Haupttext. 152  Siehe Fn. 116, 120, 121 und Haupttext. 153  Siehe Fn. 95.

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Summary Current International Criminal Law (‚ICL‘) suffers from at least four fairly serious theoretical shortcomings. First, as a starting point, the concept and meaning of ICL in its different variations must be clarified (‚the concept and meaning issue‘). Second, the question of whether and how punitive power can exist at the supranational level without a sovereign (‚the ius puniendi issue‘) must be answered in a satisfactory manner. Third, the overall function or purpose of ICL as opposed to national criminal law (‚the overall function issue‘) must be explained more con­ vincingly. Fourth, the purposes of punishment in ICL, as opposed to the traditional purposes discussed in national criminal law, must be elaborated (‚the purposes of punishment issue‘). There is a partly vertical and partly horizontal relationship between these issues. It is, for example, of course impossible to reflect upon ius puniendi, overall function and purposes of punishment without having clarified the concept of ICL in the first place. Also, a treatment of overall function and purposes of punishment seems to be predicated on the justification of the ius puniendi. Indeed, the lack of a satisfactory answer to the ius puniendi issue is maybe the most important theoretical weakness of current ICL. This paper therefore seeks to demonstrate that a supranational ius puniendi can be inferred from a combination of the incipient supranationality of the world order (understood normatively as an order of values) and the concept of a world society composed of world citizens whose law – the ‚world citizen law‘ (‚Weltbürgerrecht‘) – is derived from universal, indivisible, and interculturally recognized human rights predicated upon a Kantian concept of human dignity. The incipient world order and the world society are represented by the international community (to be understood as a community of values) which becomes the holder of the ius puniendi.

Was schulden wir Flüchtlingen? Eine Ethik des Flüchtlingsschutzes Paul Tiedemann I. Einleitung In diesem Aufsatz soll versucht werden, die Grundlagen einer Moral des Flüchtlingsschutzes zu entwickeln. Flüchtlingsschutz wird gewöhnlich als eine öffentliche Aufgabe betrachtet, die von Staaten erfüllt wird. Es geht also um einen Gegenstand der Politik. Der Bezug zur Politik legt es nahe, eine Flüchtlingsethik nicht als Tugendethik, sondern als Pflichtenethik zu konzipieren. Es geht also darum, ob und ggf. welche moralischen Pflichten wir gegenüber Flüchtlingen haben und inwieweit diesen Pflichten entsprechende Rechte der Flüchtlinge korrespondieren. Ethik befasst sich mit moralischer Verantwortlichkeit, die ein Gewissen voraussetzt. Ein Gewissen haben aber nur natürliche Personen und keine Kollektive, also auch nicht der Staat. Eine Flüchtlingsethik wendet sich deshalb nicht an den Staat, sondern an die Menschen, die im und für den Staat tätig sind.1 Das sind nicht ausschließlich „die da oben“, die die Politik eines Staates machen, sondern alle einzelnen Bürgerinnen und Bürger, die durch ihre Teilnahme an politischen Prozessen auf diese einwirken können. Im Text wird trotzdem bisweilen von der Verantwortlichkeit „des Staates“ oder „der Behörden“ die Rede sein. Das ist jedoch nur metaphorisch zu verstehen und ändert nichts an der eigentlichen Verantwortlichkeit der jeweils konkret handelnden natürlichen Personen. Jede ethische Konzeption folgt einer bestimmten grundlegenden Theorie, die für die Inhalte der Moral bestimmend ist. Ich werde deshalb zunächst die in Betracht kommenden Moraltheorien diskutieren (II.). Dabei werde ich den kontraktualistischen Ansatz ignorieren, weil er zur Grundlegung einer Flüchtlingsethik von vorneherein ungeeignet ist. Denn Flüchtlinge sind definitionsgemäß Fremde (aliens, alieni, Elende), also solche, mit denen wir auch in der Welt der Ideen den Gesellschaftsvertrag gerade nicht geschlossen haben und die deshalb aus einem solchen Vertragsverhältnis auch keine Rechte ableiten können. Ich werde die Gründe herausarbeiten, weshalb ich einen deontologischen Ansatz verfolgen werde. Dies wird zwanglos zu der Frage führen, welche Arten von Schaden flüchtlingsethisch relevant sind und die Schutzwürdigkeit von Menschen begründen können (III.). Die 1  A. A. Andreas Funke, „Das Flüchtlingsrecht zwischen Menschenrecht, Hilfspflicht und Verantwortung“, JZ 72 (2017), 533 [537] m. w. N.

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Schutzwürdigkeit provoziert die Frage nach Schutzpflichten und Schutzrechten, beantwortet diese Frage jedoch noch nicht. Eine Antwort auf diese Frage soll in den Abschnitten IV., V. und VI. entfaltet werden. Dabei lasse ich mich vom so genannten Asylparadox leiten.2 Das bezieht sich auf die Merkwürdigkeit, dass nach geltendem Recht ein Schutzanspruch nur für Flüchtlinge besteht, die sich bereits auf dem Boden des Aufnahmestaates befinden, und nicht für solche, bei denen das noch nicht der Fall ist. Die Untersuchung folgt dieser Unterscheidung und versucht aufzuklären, ob und inwieweit sie moralphilosophisch bestätigt werden kann.3 II. Die maßgebliche Moraltheorie 1. „Gesinnungsethik“ versus „Verantwortungsethik“ Konrad Ott hat darauf hingewiesen, dass die Identifikation der für eine Flüchtlingsethik maßgeblichen moralischen Normen wesentlich von der Wahl der grundlegenden Moraltheorie abhängt.4 Ott sieht den Moralphilosophen insoweit vor die Wahl gestellt zwischen Gesinnungsethik und Verantwortungsethik. Nach dem, was Ott unter Gesinnungsethik versteht, seien Staaten moralisch verpflichtet, alle Flüchtlinge aufzunehmen, soweit sie es bei Aufbietung aller Kräfte vermögen.5 Die Gesinnungsethik fordere insoweit ein „moralisches Heldentum“.6 Jedem müsse Schutz gewährt werden, der irgendwie in Not sei. Das betreffe nicht 2  Ich übernehme diesen Begriff von Pauline Endres de Oliveira, „Legaler Zugang zu internationalem Schutz“, KJ 49/2 (2016), 167 ff. [171]. 3  Diese Untersuchung geht stillschweigend von dem Axiom aus, dass Staaten kein moralisches Unrecht tun, wenn sie generell die Einreise von Ausländern in ihr Staatsgebiet von einer formellen Erlaubnis abhängig machen und sich dabei die Freiheit nehmen, nach Maßgabe der eigenen Interessen und politischen Zielvorstellungen souverän zu bestimmen, nach welchen materiellen und formellen Kriterien die Einreiseerlaubnis erteilt oder verweigert wird. Dieses Axiom ist eine Absage an die so genannte No-Border-Theorie, die sich in jüngerer Zeit zunehmender Beachtung und Zustimmung erfreut. Vgl. dazu Joseph H. Carens, „Aliens and Citizens. The Case for Open Borders“, The Review of Politics 49/2 (1987), 251; deutsch: „Fremde und Bürger, Weshalb Grenzen offen sein sollten“, in: Andreas Cassee /Anna Goppel (Hrsg.), Migration und Ethik. Münster: mentis 2012; s. a. Joseph H. Carens, Ethics of Immigration. Oxford: OUP 2013, S. 225 ff.; s. a. Bridget Anderson / Nandita Sharma / Cynthia Wright, „Why No Borders?“, Refuge 26 (2009), 5; Martino Mona, Das Recht auf Immigration. Rechtsphilosophische Begründung eines originären Rechts auf Einwanderung im liberalen Staat. Basel: Helbing Lichtenhahn 2007; Andreas Cassee, Globale Bewegungsfreiheit. Ein philosophisches Plädoyer für offene Grenzen. Berlin: Suhrkamp 2016. Ich habe mich mit dieser Theorie aus ethischer Sicht kritisch auseinandergesetzt in Paul Tiedemann, „Migration im Naturzustand. Überlegungen zum No-Border-Postulat“, JRE 25 (2017), 125. Zu einer eher pragmatischen Kritik dieses Ansatzes vgl. auch Julian Nida-Rümelin, „Zur Legitimität von Staatlichkeit: Eine kosmopolitische Kritik offener Grenzen“, DZPhil 65/4 (2017), 709. 4  Konrad Ott, Zuwanderung und Moral, Stuttgart: Reclam 2016. 5  Ott (Fn. 4), 20. 6  Ott (Fn. 4), 23.

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nur politische Verfolgung, sondern jede Art von Stigmatisierung, Armut, prekären Lebensumständen, Perspektivlosigkeit, Suizidgefährdung etc.7 Schließlich sei es ein spezifisches Merkmal von Gesinnungsethik, dass moralische Gesichtspunkte stets Vorrang vor anderen Gründen hätten wie z. B. vor Gründen der kulturellen Tradition, des ästhetischen Geschmacks oder der ökonomischen Kosten.8 Verantwortungsethik bestimmt Ott als „nicht gesinnungslos, aber stärker konsequentialistisch“.9 Eine Flüchtlingspolitik halte schon dann verantwortungsethischen Erfordernissen stand, wenn sie mit dem gerade geltenden positiven Völkerrecht vereinbar sei.10 Nach Ott gilt es also nicht, das positive Recht am Maßstab der Moral zu bewerten, sondern umgekehrt die Moral am Maßstab des positiven Rechts. Aus der Tatsache, dass es völkerrechtlich kein subjektives Recht auf Asyl gibt, leitet er folgerichtig ab, dass Staaten das moralische Recht haben, Asylgesuche unabhängig davon abzulehnen, ob die Asylgründe wirklich bestehen oder nur vorgetäuscht sind.11 Dabei ist für Ott klar, dass Staaten nicht verpflichtet sind, Feriensiedlungen, Hotels, Jugendherbergen, Zweitwohnungen oder Tagungszentren für Flüchtlinge zur Verfügung zu stellen. Verantwortungsethiker müssten auch die Angst der Bürger berücksichtigen, die um den Wertverlust ihrer Immobilien in der Nähe von Flüchtlingsheimen fürchten.12 Auch die in der Bevölkerung faktisch vorhandene Xenophobie sei zu berücksichtigen. Xenophobie sei zwar an sich unmoralisch, aber Moral genieße bei der Abwägung aller Gründe des Für und Wider von Flüchtlingsschutz keinen Vorrang.13 Schließlich appelliert Ott an die „moralische Größe“, die der Verantwortungsethiker dadurch zeige, dass er tapfer „über die Schatten der eigenen moralischen Impulse“ springe „und sich in der schwierigen Kunst des Nein-Sagens“ übe.14 Die Ott’sche Unterscheidung zwischen einer Moraltheorie der Gesinnungsethik und einer Moraltheorie der Verantwortungsethik ist indessen nicht zielführend. „Gesinnungsethik“ ist schon gar keine Moraltheorie.15 Im Hinblick auf die Verantwortungsethik verdreht Ott komplett deren Bedeutung.   Ott (Fn. 4), 26 f.   Ott (Fn. 4), 32. 9  Ott (Fn. 4), 52. 10  Ott (Fn. 4), 61. 11  Ott (Fn. 4), 61. 12  Ott (Fn. 4), 63. 13  Ott (Fn. 4), 65. 14  Ott (Fn. 4), 89. Dieser Appell erinnert in fataler Weise an die Posener Rede Heinrich Himmlers, der seine SS-Gruppenführer ebenfalls vor die Aufgabe stellte, ihre moralischen Impulse heroisch zu überwinden und tapfer und aufopferungsvoll den Massenmord an den europäischen Juden zu vollziehen, vgl. Heinrich Himmler, „Rede bei der SS-Gruppenführertagung in Posen am 4. Oktober 1943“, in: Sekretariat des Internationalen Militärgerichtshofs (Hrsg.), Der Prozess gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher vor dem Internationalen Militärgerichtshof, Nürnberg 1948, Bd XXIX, Dokument 1919-PS, S. 110 ff. 15  Vgl. dazu: Paul Tiedemann, „‚Gesinnungsethik‘ und ‚Verantwortungsethik‘ in der Debatte um Flüchtlingsschutz. Zur Dechiffrierung des machiavellistischen Codes“, KJ 51 (2018), Heft 4. 7 8

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Die Unterscheidung von Gesinnungs- und Verantwortungsethik geht auf Max Weber zurück.16 Der Gesinnungsethiker ist danach ein Mensch, der sich an moralische Normen deshalb hält, weil sie moralisch gut sind, und nicht deshalb, weil sein Handeln nach diesen Normen gute Folgen hat. Für die Folgen seiner Handlung fühlt sich nach Weber der Gesinnungsethiker nicht verantwortlich. Gesinnungsethik in diesem Weber’schen Sinne kommt in der abendländischen Ethik indessen nicht vor. Sie hat zu keinem Zeitpunkt existiert.17 Webers Analyse beruht vielmehr auf einem Missverständnis. Anlass zu diesem Missverständnis bietet ein aus dem Zusammenhang gerissener Halbsatz aus Kants Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten: „… das Wesentlich-Gute […] besteht in der Gesinnung, der Erfolg mag sein, welcher er wolle.“18 In seiner Polemik gegen diese Äußerung Kants war es Max Scheler, der drei Jahre vor Webers Vortrag den Ausdruck „Gesinnungsethik“ wohl erstmals verwendet hat. Er hält diese „falsche Gesinnungsethik“ für absurd, weil sie für moralisch allein relevant einen Willen halte, dem an keinem Erfolg, also an nichts gelegen sei und bei dem es sich demnach um den Willen handeln müsse, nichts zu wollen.19 Schelers und damit auch Webers Kritik geht indessen an dem vorbei, was Kant hier mit Gesinnung gemeint hat. Hintergrund der Kantischen Äußerung ist die Idee, dass das Wesen der Moral darin besteht, nur solchen Handlungsmaximen zu folgen, die man zu einem allgemeinen Gesetz machen, also universalisieren kann („kategorischer Imperativ“). Es spielt für Kant keine Rolle, ob und warum jemand welche Folgen anstrebt oder zu vermeiden sucht. Entscheidend ist allein, ob die Handlungsmaxime, der er folgt, sich nach Maßgabe des Kategorischen Imperativs rechtfertigen lässt. Darauf muss die moralische Gesinnung gerichtet sein. Im Sinne dieser Gesinnung mag der Erfolg sein, welcher er wolle, solange das Universalisierungsprinzip beachtet wird. Ob man allerdings eine bestimmte Handlungsmaxime als allgemeines Gesetz wollen kann, hängt natürlich von nichts anderem als den Folgen ab, die ein solches Gesetz hätte. Ethik ist für Menschen nur dann interessant, wenn sie eine ethische Gesinnung haben, wenn sie also aus moralischen Gründen handeln wollen. Allein diese Gesinnung sagt aber nichts darüber aus, welche Art von Handeln die Moral verlangt, was also der Inhalt der Moral ist. Deshalb gibt es keine Moraltheorie namens Gesinnungsethik. Die Gesinnung sagt uns nicht, was wir tun sollen, sondern allein, warum wir es tun sollen, nämlich aus moralischen Gründen. Schon deshalb geht 16  Max Weber, „Politik als Beruf“ (1919), in: ders., Gesammelte politische Schriften, hrsg. v. Johannes Winckelmann, Tübingen, Mohr 5. Aufl. 1988, S. 505 ff. [550] – http://www.zeno. org/Soziologie/M/Weber,+Max/Schriften+zur+Politik/Politik+als+Beruf. 17  Jörg Schroth, „Deontologie und die moralische Relevanz der Handlungskonsequenzen“, ZphilForsch 63/1 (2009), 55 ff. [62]. 18  Immanuel Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, Riga: Hartknoch, 2. Aufl. 1786, S. 43. 19  Max Scheler, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, Halle: Niemeyer 1916, S. 120.

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der Versuch Konrad Otts, der Gesinnungsethik moralische Inhalte zuzuschreiben, von vorneherein fehl. Die Gegenüberstellung von Gesinnungsethik und Verantwortungsethik als konkurrierende Moraltheorien ist deshalb moralphilosophisch gänzlich unbrauchbar.20 2. Konsequentialismus Was nun die Verantwortungsethik angeht, so bestimmt sie Weber in seinem Vortrag dahin, dass sie für die voraussehbaren Folgen einer Handlung verantwortlich macht. Dabei denkt er weniger an die Folgen für diejenigen, denen gegenüber eine besondere Verantwortung übernommen wurde oder für diejenigen, die ein Interesse daran haben, nicht geschädigt zu werden. Vielmehr hat er die Folgen für den Weltzustand im Allgemeinen im Auge. Das deckt sich mit Otts Einschätzung, dass die Verantwortungsethik „stärker konsequentialistisch“ sei.21 Konsequentialismus ist eine Sammelbezeichnung für die verschiedenen Varianten des Utilitarismus.22 Der Utilitarismus strebt nach der Maximierung des Guten in der Welt. Handlungen, die dazu beitragen, das maßgebliche Gut herbeizuführen oder zu maximieren, sind gut, Handlungen, die das Gegenteil bewirken, sind schlecht. Es gibt keine Handlungstypen, die an sich und unabhängig vom Kontext der Folgen moralisch gut sind. Vielmehr kann eine bestimmte Handlungsweise in einer Situation moralisch relativ optimal und daher geboten sein, während sie in einer anderen Situation suboptimal und daher verboten ist.23 Die Beurteilung der Folgen als gut oder schlecht hängt von dem Gut ab, das letztlich erreicht werden soll. Welches dieses Gut ist, beantworten die verschiedenen Varianten des Utilitarismus verschieden. Die heute wohl herrschende Variante des Konsequentialismus ist der Präferenz­ utilitarismus. Eine Handlung ist danach moralisch gut, wenn sie im Hinblick auf die Verwirklichung der Präferenzen aller betroffenen Subjekte einen Weltzustand bewirkt, der besser ist als der Weltzustand, der durch jede alternative Handlung herbeigeführt werden könnte.24 Der Konsequentialismus („Verantwortungsethik“) ist also in der Tat eine Moraltheorie, die als Kandidat für die Grundlegung einer Flüchtlingsethik in Betracht kommt. Allerdings führt er zu gänzlich anderen Handlungsmaßstäben als jenen, die Konrad Ott aus ihm entwickeln will. Entscheidend sind hier nämlich nicht, wie   Funke (Fn. 1), 536 m. w. N.   Ott (Fn. 4), 52. 22  Den Ausdruck Konsequentialismus mit dieser Bedeutung ist 1958 von E. Anscombe eingeführt worden, vgl. Elisabeth Anscombe, „Moderne Moralphilosophie“, in: G. Grewendorf /  G. Meggle (Hrsg.), Seminar: Sprache und Ethik, Frankfurt / M: Suhrkamp 1974, 217, Anm. 7 zu S. 228. 23  Rainer W. Trapp, „Systematische Klassifikation und vergleichende Betrachtung der wichtigsten Ethiktypen unter dem Gesichtspunkt ihrer Eignung als allgemein akzeptable Handlungsrichtlinien“, Grazer Philosophische Studien 35/1 (1989), 123 [124]. 24  Trapp (Fn. 23), 132. 20 21

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Ott meint, allein die parteiischen Interessen der Aufnahmegesellschaft, sondern die beste zu erreichende Gesamtbilanz bei Berücksichtigung der Präferenzen aller betroffenen Subjekte. Diese resultiert aus den aggregierten Präferenzen derjenigen, deren Partikularinteressen von dem in Frage stehenden und ggf. anzustrebenden Weltzustand betroffen würden.25 Es geht also darum, zunächst die subjektiven Präferenzen aller Betroffenen festzustellen. Dazu gehören nicht nur die Präferenzen der Mitglieder der Aufnahmegesellschaft, sondern natürlich auch die Präferenzen der Flüchtlinge. Auch die Präferenzen Dritter sind zu berücksichtigen, soweit sie betroffen sind. Alle diese Einzelpräferenzen müssen aggregiert, d.h. verrechnet werden. In diese Verrechnung gehen die Einzelpräferenzen nicht mit gleichem Gewicht ein, sondern sie sind nach dem Maß der Betroffenheit zu gewichten. Das führt dazu, dass dem Interesse am nackten Überleben auf jeden Fall ein stärkeres Gewicht zukommt als dem Interesse an der Verfügbarkeit von Zweitwohnungen oder Jugendherbergen. Die gewichteten Präferenzen sind schließlich so miteinander zu verrechnen, dass ein Weltzustand erreicht wird, der als solcher besser ist als jener, der durch ein Weniger oder ein Mehr an Engagement für Flüchtlinge erreicht werden könnte. Beispiel: Nehmen wir an, es steht das Interesse von 1.000 Flüchtlingen an der Rettung ihres Lebens zur Verrechnung mit dem entgegenstehenden Interesse von 1.000 Einheimischen am Erhalt ihrer Arbeitsplätze im Niedriglohnsektor. Die Aufnahme der Flüchtlinge würde zum Verlust der Arbeitsplätze führen, weil die Flüchtlinge bereit sind, zu noch niedrigeren Löhnen noch härter zu arbeiten. Die Interessen der Flüchtlinge und der Einheimischen an den Arbeitsplätzen kann man gegeneinander aufrechnen. Es bleibt das Interesse am Schutz des nackten Lebens der Flüchtlinge, dem mangels entsprechender Gefährdung kein entsprechendes Interesse der einheimischen Bevölkerung gegenübersteht. Daraus folgt: Die Flüchtlinge sind unter Zugang zum Arbeitsmarkt aufzunehmen und die Arbeitslosigkeit der einheimischen Bevölkerung ist in Kauf zu nehmen. Denn unter dem Strich ist ein Weltzustand, in dem 1.000 Menschen Arbeit haben und niemand um sein Leben fürchten muss, besser als ein Weltzustand, in dem 1.000 Menschen Arbeit haben, aber zugleich 1.000 Menschen um ihr Leben fürchten müssen.26 Wie das Beispiel zeigt, kann der Konsequentialismus einen weitgehenden Verzicht auf partikulare Einzelinteressen verlangen, wenn dies im Interesse des Gesamtwohls erforderlich ist. Nicht die Gesinnungsethik ist es, die nach Ott moralisches Heldentum bis hin zur völligen Selbstlosigkeit verlangt, sondern die konsequentialistische Verantwortungsethik. Die hohen Anforderungen des Konsequentialismus im Hinblick auf den Altruismus und die individuelle Aufopferungsbereitschaft zugunsten einer optimalen   Trapp (Fn. 23), 133 f.   Eine konkretere Variante dieser konsequentialistischen Flüchtlingsethik am Beispiel Australiens liefert Peter Singer, „Die drinnen und die draußen“, in: Frank Dietrich (Hrsg.), Ethik der Migration. Philosophische Schlüsseltexte, Berlin: Suhrkamp 2017, S. 60 [69 ff.]. 25 26

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Gesamtbilanz stehen unseren gewöhnlichen Neigungen sehr entgegen. Deshalb bedarf es zur Rechtfertigung des altruistischen Konsequentialismus sehr starker Argumente. Der bloße Hinweis auf unser Mitgefühl mit anderen und auf die grundsätzliche Bereitschaft zur Sorge für andere reicht hier nicht aus. Die Vertreter des Konsequentialismus bringen insoweit durchweg Gründe vor, die wenig überzeugen. John Stuart Mill hat sein utilitaristisches Moralprinzip auf „das Gefühl der Einheit mit unseren Mitgeschöpfen“ zurückgeführt: „Das gemeinschaftliche Leben ist dem Menschen so natürlich, so notwendig und so vertraut, dass er sich niemals – es sei denn in einigen ungewöhnlichen Fällen oder durch einen bewussten Akt der Abstraktion – anders als das Glied eines Ganzen denkt …“.27 Diese These ist philosophisch schwerlich nachzuvollziehen. Denn jede philosophische Reflexion, einschließlich der über Ethik, muss notwendigerweise und unhintergehbar von dem ausgehen, was Dietmar von der Pfordten normativen Individualismus genannt hat.28 Philosophieren ist nämlich immer „Selbst-Denken“ und lässt deshalb nur solche Argumente zu, die vor dem Gerichtshof des einzelnen denkenden Menschen bestehen können. Es genügt daher nicht darauf hinzuweisen, jeder sei Glied in einem Ganzen. Vielmehr muss jedes Individuum aufgrund eigener Erwägungen und Reflexionen zustimmen, Glied eines Ganzen sein zu wollen. Ein solcher Wille beruht, wenn er gebildet wird, nicht auf dem Streben nach Selbstaufgabe, sondern vielmehr auf dem Streben nach einem als sinnvoll erfahrenen eigenen Leben. Mill bringt jedoch keine Gründe für ein moralisches Gebot vor, der „Eingliederung“ zustimmen zu müssen. Peter Singer begründet seine utilitaristische Position einfach mit Hinweis darauf, dass die Ethik von uns verlange, dass wir über ‚Ich‘ und ‚Du‘ hinausgehen zu einem universalen Urteil, das vom Standpunkt des unparteiischen Betrachters zu fällen sei.29 Seine Moraltheorie ist also rein analytisch begründet. Er leitet sie aus einem sehr speziellen Begriff der Ethik ab: Ethik ist die Einnahme des unparteiischen Standpunkts. Damit ist ein parteiischer, auf das einzelne Individuum rekurrierender Standpunkt ex definitione unethisch. Das ist offensichtlich keine Begründung, sondern ein bloßer Zirkelschluss. An anderer Stelle greift er zur Begründung des Utilitarismus auf eine Analogie mit dem Fall der allgemein anerkannten Pflicht zur Hilfeleistung für ein Kind zurück, das in einem Teich zu ertrinken droht.30 Diese Analogie ist schon deshalb unzulässig, weil es keine Strukturgleichheit gibt zwischen einer einmaligen, sehr begrenzten Hilfe für ein einziges Kind und der dauerhaften, letztlich unbegrenzten Pflicht, die Welt zu retten. Im ersten Fall wird der Helfer nur kurz bei der Verwirklichung seiner Lebensprojekte aufgehalten, im   John Stuart Mill, Der Utilitarismus, Stuttgart: Reclam 1976 [1871] S. 54.  Vgl. Dietmar von der Pfordten, „Normativer Individualismus“, Information Philosophie 2014/3, S. 5 ff. 29  Peter Singer, Praktische Ethik, Stuttgart: Reclam 1984, S. 22. 30  Peter Singer, „Famine, Affluence, and Morality“, Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1972), 229 [231]. 27 28

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letzten Fall muss er auf solche Projekte gänzlich verzichten. Singer selbst scheint den Unterschied durchaus zu sehen, verschweigt ihn aber und verhilft ihm nur mittelbar dadurch zu seinem Recht, dass er den eigentlichen utilitaristischen Pflichten mildere Pflichten zur Seite stellt, die durch das Kriterium der Zumutbarkeit beschränkt sind.31 Er liefert aber keine prinzipiellen Gründe, die diese Einführung milderer Pflichten rechtfertigen könnten.32 Andere Utilitaristen begründen ihren Ansatz mit einem universellen Prinzip der Gleichheit.33 Ich habe diesen Ansatz an anderer Stelle kritisch analysiert und aufgezeigt, warum er nicht überzeugen kann. Darauf muss hier aus Raumgründen verwiesen werden.34 Wenn man nach einer echten Begründung für konsequentialistische Selbstlosigkeit sucht, muss man schon zu religiösen Texten greifen. „Niemand hat eine größere Liebe“, sagt Jesus im Johannesevangelium, „als wer sein Leben hingibt für seine Freunde.“35 Im Gleichnis vom reichen Jüngling empfiehlt Jesus, auf alles irdische Gut zu verzichten und es den Armen zu geben, um das ewige Leben zu erlangen.36 Diese Art der Begründung hat allerdings den Nachteil, nur jene überzeugen zu können, die an das ewige Leben und den Schatz im Himmel glauben, ohne dafür empirisch belastbare Gründe zu haben. Allerdings lassen sich die Begriffe des ewigen Lebens und des Schatzes im Himmel auch metaphorisch deuten und dann verlieren sie ihre metaphysische Anstößigkeit. Religiöse Haltungen und Praktiken haben die wesentliche Funktion, die Angst der Existenz (im Sinne Kierkegaards) zu bewältigen. Es geht um die Herstellung von Resilienz gegen das Trauma der Existenz.37 Wenn man sich die Bedrohung, die es hier zu bewältigen gilt, wie einen starken Sturm vorstellt, der alles zu zerstören droht, was eine allzu große Starre aufweist und Widerstand leistet, dann wird klar, worum es bei den religiösen Praktiken geht, nämlich biegsam zu werden wie der Bambus und weich wie das Wasser. Das erreicht der religiöse Mensch dadurch, dass er all das, was im normalen Leben als unverzichtbar gilt und um jeden Preis verteidigt werden muss, nicht mehr ganz   Singer (Fn. 30), 235.   Zudem genügen seine Zumutbarkeitsstandards auch nicht den Anforderungen, die im Interesse eines selbstbestimmt autonomen Lebens zu stellen wären; vgl. dazu: Ulrich Steinvorth, „Globalisierung – Arm und Reich“, in: Franz Josef Wetz (Hrsg.), Kolleg Praktische Philosophie Bd. 4: Recht auf Rechte, Stuttgart: Reclam 2008, 170 [181]. 33  Beiträge zu dieser Auffassung findet man in Alfredo Märker / Stephan Schlothfeldt (Hrsg.), Was schulden wir Flüchtlingen und Migranten? Grundlagen einer gerechten Zuwanderungspolitik, Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag 2002. 34  Tiedemann (Fn. 3), 157 ff. Zum so genannten Glücks-Egalitarismus nehme ich dort (S. 164 Fn. 109) nur am Rande Stellung. Das entscheidende Gegenargument gegen diesen Ansatz findet sich bei Funke (Fn. 1), 536. 35  Evangelium nach Johannes Kap. 15, Vers 13. 36  Evangelium nach Matthäus Kap. 19, Vers 16 – 21. 37  Paul Tiedemann, Religionsfreiheit  – Menschenrecht oder Toleranzgebot?, Heidelberg /  Berlin: Springer 2012, S. 65 ff. 31 32

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so wichtig nimmt. Er soll deshalb als Verheirateter leben als sei er nicht verheiratet, als Weinender so als weinte er nicht, als Fröhlicher so als wäre er nicht fröhlich, als Kaufender so als behielte er nichts, und überhaupt bei allem, was er liebt oder was er tut, als müsse er ohne es auskommen.38 Diese Form der Askese ist zweifellos lebensklug und zeugt von Weisheit. Wenn sie allerdings so weit geht, das sich der religiöse Mensch selbst aufgibt und sich zum bloßen Instrument für die Zwecke anderer macht, wenn er nicht nur die anderen liebt wie sich selbst, sondern mehr als sich selbst, dann bewältigt er die Existenzangst durch Existenzvernichtung. Extremer Altruismus ist also auch dann keine Option, wenn man religiöse Praktiken ernst nimmt und ihren praktischen Wert anerkennt. Die Suche nach einer Begründung des altruistischen Konsequentialismus bleibt ergebnislos. Es gibt keinen Grund dafür, warum Menschen bereit sein sollten, sich im Interesse optimaler Weltzustände verrechnen zu lassen.39 Der Grund dafür, dass sich diese Moraltheorie gleichwohl unter utilitaristischen Philosophen so großer Beliebtheit erfreut, scheint mir darin zu liegen, dass sie die (moralische) Welt immer nur von außen betrachten. Sie sehen sich selbst nicht als moralische Akteure, sondern als außenstehende Beobachter und unbeteiligte Manager der Weltverhältnisse.40 Es handelt sich also um eine akteursneutrale Moraltheorie.41 Aus der Perspektive eines Menschen, der sich selbst als Teilnehmer, also Akteur und Betroffener des moralischen Lebens versteht, ist diese Moraltheorie nur plausibel, wenn er an objektive Werte glaubt, die irgendwie vorgegeben sind und unter deren Herrschaft er steht. Das geht nicht ohne sehr starke metaphysische Annahmen. Deshalb empfiehlt Thomas Nagel, „dem Heißhunger nach Objektivität zu widerstehen“ und eine subjektive Sichtweise einzunehmen.42

  Paulus, 1. Brief an die Korinther Kap. 7, Vers 29 – 31.   David McNauthton / Piers Rawling, „On Defending Deontology“, Ratio 11 (1998), 37 ff. [42]. 40  Trapp (Fn. 23), 140. Anders ist es nicht zu erklären, warum konsequentialistische Philosophen gesund und munter ein hohes Lebensalter erreichen können, obwohl eine nüchterne Kalkulation des besten Weltzustandes sie doch hätte dazu bringen müssen, schon in jungen Jahren ihre lebenswichtigen Organe an eine Vielzahl von Menschen zu spenden, die aus Mangel an diesen Organen haben sterben müssen. Der prominente australische Utilitarist Peter Singer soll unter hohem finanziellen Aufwand seiner dementen Mutter ein gutes Leben in einer vorzüglichen Pflegeeinrichtung ermöglicht haben. In einem Interview darauf angesprochen, soll er eingeräumt haben, dass dieses Verhalten nach dem Maßstab des Utilitarismus falsch war. Das spricht dafür, dass Singer den konsequentialistischen Ansatz nur dann vertritt, wenn er nicht selbst betroffen ist – vgl. hierzu Ulrich Schnabel, „Die Würde des Affen“, ZEIT-Online v. 11.11.1999, S. 4 [http://www.zeit.de/1999/46/Die_Wuerde_des_Affen/]. 41  Die Unterscheidung zwischen akteursneutralen und akteursrelativen Ethiken geht zurück auf Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, Oxford: OUP 1984, S. 143. 42  Thomas Nagel, Die Grenzen der Objektivität. Philosophische Vorlesungen. Stuttgart: Reclam 2015, S. 124. 38 39

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3. Eudämonismus Es gibt also keine guten Gründe für eine konsequentialistische Grundlegung der Flüchtlingsethik. Bei der Suche nach einer Alternative zu diesem altruistischen Ansatz liegt es nahe, einen Ansatz ins Auge zu fassen, der gerade durch das Gegenteil weitgehender Selbstlosigkeit gekennzeichnet ist. Das wäre eine Moraltheorie, der es nicht um die Maximierung des Guten in der Welt geht, sondern um die Maximierung des Guten für den moralischen Akteur.43 Die Alternative zum Altruismus ist also der Egoismus. Unter Egoismus versteht man in der Umgangssprache allerdings eine selbstsüchtige Haltung, die dem eigenen Interesse absoluten Vorrang einräumt und auf das Wohl der anderen keinerlei Rücksicht nimmt. Eine solche Haltung wird gewöhnlich nicht mit einer bestimmten Moraltheorie identifiziert, sondern eher für das Gegenteil von Moral gehalten, also schlicht für unmoralisch. Diese Sichtweise wird aber erschüttert, wenn man das Wort „Egoismus“ vermeidet und stattdessen von Eudämonismus spricht. Denn diese Bezeichnung bringt sofort in Erinnerung, dass es um Moraltheorien geht, die eine lange Tradition haben und insbesondere in der Antike alternativlos waren. Das Ziel der antiken Ethik war das Glück eines guten und gelingenden eigenen Lebens, griechisch: eudaimonia.44 Wer gegenüber den Menschen und gegenüber den Göttern tut, was sich gebührt, wer also gerecht und fromm ist, der wird nach Auffassung Platons ein glückseliges Leben führen.45 Der antiken Ethik geht es also letztlich nicht um das Wohl der anderen oder um den besten Weltzustand, sondern es geht um den besten Zustand des handelnden Subjekts. Dieser stellt sich ein, wenn das Subjekt Glückseligkeit erlangt. Allerdings kann dieser Zustand nur erreicht werden, wenn die Person religiösen ebenso wie moralischen Standards genügt. Das Wohl der anderen ist dem nach Glückseligkeit strebenden antiken Menschen also nicht gleichgültig. Er weiß vielmehr, dass er im Interesse seiner eigenen Glückseligkeit auch Rücksicht auf andere nehmen muss und deren Schicksal nicht gleichgültig gegenüberstehen darf. Trotzdem geht es letzten Endes nicht um die Interessen der anderen, sondern je um mein Leben.46 Mit einer solchen Zielsetzung ist die Forderung der Selbstaufopferung oder der Status des Subjekts als bloße Verrechnungseinheit unvereinbar. Die Sorge um das eigene gelingende Leben ist auch gegenwärtig (wieder) ein wichtiges Thema der philosophischen Ethik. Im Unterschied zur Sichtweise der Antike geht man heute davon aus, dass die eudaimonia nicht durch Assimilation an ob43 Auch eine solche Ethik kann konsequentialistisch genannt werden, denn sie stellt auf die Folgen ab, wenn auch nicht auf die Folgen für die Welt, so doch auf die Folgen für den Handelnden. 44  Elvira Obermayer, Glück. Konzept und Aktualität der aristotelischen Eudaimonia, Nordhausen: Bautz 2017. 45  Platon, Gorgias 507 b – e; Politeia 353d – 354a. 46  Kurt Bayertz, Warum überhaupt moralisch sein? München: C. H. Beck, 2. Aufl. 2014, S. 35.

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jektiv vorgegebene Werte und Prinzipien des Gebührlichen erreicht werden kann, sondern vielmehr durch Autonomie.47 Eudaimonia erreicht ein Mensch durch die zutiefst empfundene Erfahrung, sein eigenes Leben selbst zu führen.48 Nur wer sich selbst als Autor seines Lebens erfährt, kann sein Leben als sinnvoll erfahren.49 Er nimmt sich selbst nicht bloß als ein Etwas (= selbstentfremdet), sondern als Jemand (= authentisch) wahr. Autonomie setzt die Freiheit voraus, seine eigenen Lebensprojekte verfolgen zu können. Lebensprojekte sind alle Vorhaben, Pläne, Beziehungen oder Verpflichtungen, die sich ein Mensch selbst gewählt hat.50 Die Wahl selbst ist authentisch, wenn sie auf eigenen Gründen beruht, also auf eigenen Reflexionen und Überlegungen, und nicht auf der Erpressung oder Manipulation durch andere.51 Mit der Idee der Autonomie ist es nicht vereinbar, wenn ein Mensch sein Leben weit überwiegend oder gar vollständig nicht den eigenen Lebensprojekten widmen kann, sondern vielmehr den Lebensprojekten anderer dienen muss.52 Schon Kant hielt eine solche Aufgabe des Eigeninteresses zugunsten eines Fremdinteresses für unmoralisch, weil der Mensch sich auch selbst nicht zum Mittel für die Zwecke anderer machen darf.53 Der Mensch hat nach Kant also Pflichten nicht nur gegenüber anderen, sondern auch gegen sich selbst.54 Zu diesen Pflichten zählt die moralische Selbstschätzung, die es verbietet, in falscher Weise demütig zu sein und sich „kriechend“ und „knechtisch“ zu verhalten.55 „Werdet nicht der Menschen Knechte.“56 Das aber ist der Fall, wenn man sich ganz in den Dienst der Interessen anderer stellt, also eine altruistische Lebenshaltung einnimmt. Auch die zeitgenössische Ethik des gelungenen Lebens betrachtet Autonomie als einen normativen Begriff, also als eine Pflicht, die sich selbst gegenüber erfüllt werden muss.57   Beate Rössler, Autonomie. Ein Versuch über das gelungene Leben, Berlin: Suhrkamp 2017.   Die Idee der Autonomie geht auf Kant zurück, nämlich auf seinen Gedanken, dass der Mensch nach Gesetzen leben soll, die er sich selbst gegeben hat. Für Kant ist der Mensch aber nur dann autonom, wenn er moralisch handelt, d.h. nach Maximen, von denen er wollen kann, dass sie ein allgemeines Gesetz werden (moralische Autonomie). John Stuart Mill hat die Idee der Autonomie über diese rein moralische Bedeutung hinaus dahingehend erweitert, dass es um die Freiheit geht zu tun und zu lassen, was man will, solange man dabei niemandem schadet (personale Autonomie). Diesen Gedanken hat Mill von Wilhelm von Humboldt übernommen und dessen Idee der freien Entfaltung der Persönlichkeit. Dazu vgl. Kant (Fn. 18), 79; John Stuart Mill, Über die Freiheit [1859], Stuttgart: Reclam 2. Aufl. 1991, S. 79. 49  Rössler (Fn. 47), 96 ff. 50  Rössler (Fn. 47), 43. 51  Rössler (Fn. 47), 50. 52  Julian Nida-Rümelin, Über Grenzen denken. Eine Ethik der Migration, Hamburg: Körber-Stiftung 2017, S. 36. 53  Immanuel Kant, Metaphysik der Sitten. Tugendlehre Königsberg: Nicolovius 1797, S. 26, 30. 54  Kant (Fn. 53), 42 f. 55  Kant (Fn. 53), 94 f. 56  Kant (Fn. 53), 96. 57  Rössler (Fn. 47), 237. 47 48

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Es gibt also eine Gegenposition zum konsequentialistischen Altruismus, die die moralische Pflicht des Menschen betont, sich nicht für die Projekte anderer instrumentalisieren zu lassen, sondern die eigenen Projekte zu betreiben. Natürlich sollten diese eigenen Projekte auch die Sorge um andere umfassen. Aber es muss eine Sorge sein, die selbst gewählt ist, und nicht eine solche, die moralisch vorgeschrieben wird. Denn das gelingende Leben im Sinne eines autonomen Lebens hat selbst einen moralischen Wert.58 Nach dem eudämonistischen Ansatz kann daher nicht verlangt werden, dass ein Mensch von seinen eigenen Interessen vollständig absieht und sich selbst als Verrechnungseinheit betrachtet. Selbstlosigkeit in diesem Sinne ist danach keine moralische Tugend, sondern im Gegenteil Ausdruck einer unmoralischen Haltung der Selbsterniedrigung. Dieser moraltheoretische Ansatz legt nur sehr schwache Rechtsfertigungslasten auf. Denn wir haben schon immer den naturwüchsigen Wunsch nach Selbstbehauptung und Selbstverwirklichung, der uns motiviert, eigene Projekte zu verfolgen und unseren Lebenssinn in einem gelingenden Leben zu suchen. Diese Projekte schließen normalerweise auch ein gewisses Engagement für das Wohl anderer ein. Dieses Interesse an den anderen geht aber gewöhnlich nicht so weit, dass wir es als unsere moralische Pflicht betrachten, uns für andere selbstlos aufzuopfern und uns in einer Kalkulation des besten Weltzustandes verrechnen zu lassen. Radikaler Egoismus kann allerdings moraltheoretisch ebenso wenig verteidigt werden wie radikaler Altruismus. Die Wahrheit liegt irgendwo zwischen diesen beiden extremen Positionen. In diesem Zwischenraum der Möglichkeiten sind vielerlei Lebensformen vorstellbar, die in unterschiedlicher Weise die Gewichte auf Selbstbezogenheit oder Fremdbezogenheit legen. Alle diese Lebensformen sind moralisch vertretbar. Das Streben nach Autonomie einerseits und das Streben nach einem Charakter andererseits, der durch Wohlwollen gegenüber anderen Menschen geprägt ist und mit dem starken Impuls ausgestattet ist, Menschen in Not zu helfen, sind Ziele einer Ethik, der es um die Vervollkommnung des jeweils handelnden Subjekts geht. Dieses Streben hat Kant als eine Pflicht gegenüber sich selbst beschrieben und als Tugendpflicht bezeichnet.59 Er unterscheidet diese Art von Pflichten von den 58  Letztlich geht es um diesen intrinsischen Wert des gelingenden Lebens. Der Eudämonismus ist also keine Pflichtenethik, sondern eine Wertethik. Allerdings lassen sich aus den maßgeblichen Werten durchaus Pflichten ableiten. Zum Primat der Werte und ihrem Verhältnis in einer axiologischen Ethik im Unterschied zu einer Pflichtenethik vgl. Christoph Lumer, „Vom Primat der Werte – Wertethik versus Pflicht- und Tugendethik“, in: M. Mokrosch / E. Franke (Hrsg.), Wertethik und Werterziehung. FS Arnim Regenbogen, Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht 2004, 39 ff. – http://www.lumer.info / wp-content / uploads/2012/04/A062_Lumer_Vom​ PrimatDerWerte.pdf. 59  Kant (Fn. 53), 26 ff. Der Ausdruck „Tugendpflicht“ ist insofern irritierend, als es in der Tugendethik gerade nicht um Pflichten geht, sondern um Werte und Werthaltungen. Werthaltungen bestehen in der Einstellung, dass bestimmte Handlungen, wie etwa die des Strebens nach Autonomie oder die des Wohlwollens und der Wohltätigkeit als wertvoll, sinnvoll, verdienstlich und lobenswert angesehen werden. Werthaltungen motivieren deshalb auch zu bestimmten Handlungen. Aus Werthaltungen folgt aber nicht schon normative Verbindlichkeit. Sie haben einen teleologischen, aber keinen deontologischen Charakter, vgl. Thomas Zoglauer, Normenkon-

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Rechtspflichten. Damit sind nicht notwendig juridische Pflichten gemeint, sondern vielmehr auch moralische Pflichten, die gegenüber anderen bestehen und deren Verletzung deshalb auch von anderen sanktioniert werden kann. Diesen (moralischen) Rechtspflichten korrespondieren entsprechende (moralische) Rechte, die auf die Erfüllung der Pflichten gerichtet sind. Wie zu Anfang mitgeteilt, geht es in dieser Untersuchung um pflichtenethische Überlegungen und nicht um tugendethische. Tugendpflichten spielen hier deshalb keine Rolle. Denn die Tugendethik kann nichts zu einer Ethik des Flüchtlingsschutzes beitragen, in der es darum gehen soll, was wir Flüchtlingen schulden, und was Flüchtlinge von uns verlangen dürfen. 4. Deontologie In der heutigen moralphilosophischen Debatte ist es eher selten, dass der Eudämonismus als Alternative zum Konsequentialismus betrachtet wird. Stattdessen gilt die deontologische Moraltheorie als maßgebliche Alternative. Unter Deontologie (von to deon griech. = die Pflicht) versteht man eine Moraltheorie, nach der die moralischen Normen nicht Zielvorgaben für bestimmte anzustrebende außermoralische Werte enthalten (subjektive Autonomie / Verbesserung der Welt), sondern konkrete imperative Handlungsanweisungen in Form eines Verbotes oder eines Gebotes.60 Danach soll man beispielsweise ein Versprechen allein deshalb halten, weil es intrinsisch richtig ist, ein Versprechen zu halten, und nicht, weil dadurch die Weltzustände verbessert werden. Auch hier geht es natürlich um die Folgen von Handlungen. Relevant sind aber nicht die Folgen für den Weltzustand oder das gelungene Leben des Akteurs, sondern ausschließlich die Folgen für diejenigen, die aus den jeweiligen Verboten oder Geboten berechtigt und verpflichtet sind.61 Im Zentrum der deontologischen Moraltheorie steht eine einzige generelle Regel: Regel 1: Schädige niemanden! (Es ist verboten, jemanden zu schädigen.)

Wer gegen diese Regel verstößt und einem anderen dadurch eine Schädigung zufügt, generiert dadurch eine besondere Pflichtenstellung gegenüber dem Geschädigten, kraft deren er von nun ab für bestimmte Interessen des Geschädigten einzustehen hat. Diese besondere Pflichtenstellung wird Garantenstellung genannt. Das sich aus einer Schädigung ergebende besondere Interesse des Geschädigten, für das der Schädiger einzustehen hat, ist die Beseitigung des Schadens oder, falls flikte. Zur Logik und Rationalität ethischen Argumentierens, Stuttgart: Frommann & Holzboog 1998, S. 28 f. Allerdings können Werthaltungen für das Subjekt, welches sie hat, in eine Pflicht gegen sich selbst übergehen, wenn Handlungen, die damit nicht vereinbar sind, zu starken psychischen Sanktionen führen, vor allem zu dem Gefühl der moralischen Scham oder der Reue. 60  Die Unterscheidung zwischen deontologischen und teleologischen Moraltheorien wurde 1930 von Charlie Dunbar Broad eingeführt – vgl. C. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory [1930], Reprint London: Roudledge 2001, S. 206. 61  McNauthton / Rawling (Fn. 39).

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das nicht möglich ist, die Kompensation des Schadens. Daraus ergibt sich eine zweite Regel der deontologischen Moraltheorie: Regel 2: Leiste Kompensation, wenn du gegen Regel 1 verstoßen hast! (Es ist geboten den Schaden zu kompensieren, wenn gegen Regel 1 verstoßen worden ist.)

Der Vollständigkeit halber sei erwähnt, dass eine Garantenstellung nicht nur durch einen Schädigungsakt generiert werden kann. Sie kann sich auch aus dem Akt freiwilliger Übernahme ergeben. Das ist der Fall beim Abschluss eines Vertrages, durch den die Vertragspartner in eine Garantenstellung versetzt werden, kraft derer sie dem anderen gegenüber verpflichtet sind, das vertraglich Geschuldete zu leisten. Garantenpflichten ergeben sich ferner auch durch entsprechende moralische Zuschreibungen. So haben Eltern gegenüber den eigenen Kindern bestimmte Garantenpflichten.62 Im Rahmen einer Flüchtlingsethik spielen diese besonderen Arten von Garantenpflichten aber normalerweise keine Rolle und können deshalb im Folgenden vernachlässigt werden. Es genügt, die genannten zwei Regeln weiter im Blick zu haben. Diese beiden Regeln sind noch sehr unbestimmt, denn sie lassen offen, was unter einer Schädigung zu verstehen ist. Trotz dieser Unbestimmtheit lassen sie aber schon erkennen, dass die deontologische Moraltheorie sich in einer wichtigen Hinsicht von den bisher untersuchten Moraltheorien unterscheidet. Sie sagt uns nur in einem sehr speziellen Fall, was wir tun sollen, nämlich in dem Fall, dass wir die Regel 1 verletzt haben. In diesem Fall ist klar, was zu tun ist, nämlich Schadensersatz leisten. Im Übrigen sagt diese Moraltheorie aber nicht, was wir tun sollen oder in welche Richtung unser Leben gehen soll. Sie sagt uns nur, was wir nicht tun dürfen, nämlich andere schädigen. Der Witz der deontologischen Moraltheorie zeigt sich erst, wenn man sie nicht als eine Alternative zu Eudämonismus und Konsequentialismus auffasst, sondern als eine Art der Modifikation.63 Als solche ist sie geeignet, sowohl das Engagement für eigennützige Projekte als auch das Engagement für fremdnützige Projekte zu begrenzen. Der kategorische Imperativ des deontologisch modifizierten Eudämonismus lautet dann: Führe Dein eigenes Leben, aber schädige dabei niemanden! Der kategorische Imperativ des deontologisch modifizierten Konsequentialismus lautet hingegen: Verbessere die Welt, aber schädige dabei niemanden! 62  § 323c StGB stellt die unterlassene Hilfeleistung allerdings gerade in Fällen unter Strafe, in denen keine Garantenstellung besteht. Dabei handelt es sich aber um eine Norm des positiven Rechts, die moralisch nicht ohne weiteres zwingend ist. Die europäische Tradition, unterlassene Hilfeleistungen außerhalb einer speziellen Garantenpflicht unter Strafe zu stellen, dürfte mit einem spezifischen Verständnis von Gemeinschaft (im Sinne von Tönnies) und daraus resultierender solidarischer Verbundenheit zusammenhängen. In Rechtskulturen, die wie die USA eher individualistisch geprägt sind, gibt es diesen Straftatbestand eher selten. Vgl. dazu Thane Rosenbaum, The myth of moral justice. Why our legal system fails to do what’s right, New York: HarperCollins 2011, S. 246 ff. 63  Diese Sichtweise verdanke ich Jörg Schroth, „Deontologie und die moralische Relevanz der Handlungskonsequenzen“, ZphilForsch 63/1 (2009), 55 ff.

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Nach Maßgabe der deontologischen Moraltheorie steht im Hinblick auf den Umgang mit Flüchtlingen das Schädigungsverbot im Vordergrund und nicht etwaige Hilfspflichten.64 Mit anderen Worten: Wir können im Umgang mit Flüchtlingen tun und lassen, was wir wollen, solange wir niemanden schädigen. Das klingt zunächst harmlos. Es wird sich jedoch noch zeigen, dass das Schädigungsverbot in der Flüchtlingsethik von größter Relevanz ist. Bevor sich diese Relevanz erfassen lässt, muss aber zunächst geklärt werden, was unter einer (moralisch relevanten) Schädigung zu verstehen ist. III. Die relevante Not Das Schädigungsverbot bleibt inhaltsfrei, solange nicht bestimmt ist, was unter einer Schädigung zu verstehen ist. Nicht jede Zufügung eines Nachteils (z. B. Sieg über die gegnerische Fußballmannschaft) ist eine Schädigung, weil sie nicht in der Zufügung eines moralisch relevanten Schadens besteht. Von einer Schädigung können wir daher nur sprechen, wenn die Zufügung des Nachteils in der Beeinträchtigung moralisch relevanter Güter besteht. Ein Gut ist moralisch relevant, wenn zwei Bedingungen erfüllt sind: (1.) Es muss sich um ein Gut handeln, dass nicht nur für den potentiell Geschädigten, sondern auch für den potentiellen Schädiger wertvoll ist. (2.) Es muss sich um ein Gut handeln, hinsichtlich dessen es für uns wertvoll ist, dass die anderen in ihren Genuss kommen. Andernfalls handelt es sich um Güter, die auf bloß subjektiven Präferenzen beruhen, um die wir uns nicht kümmern müssen. Es geht also um Güter, für die uns daran liegt, dass gerade die anderen sie haben. Ist die missliche Lage, in der sich eine fremde Person befindet, dadurch ausgezeichnet, dass sie keinen (hinreichenden) Zugang zu Gütern hat, die in diesem Sinne für uns moralisch relevant sind, dann sollen diese Personen im Folgenden als schutzwürdig bezeichnet werden. Es gibt im Hinblick auf eine Flüchtlingsethik drei verschiedene Kategorien von Gütern, die moralisch relevant sind. Das sind zunächst jene Güter, die durch die Menschenrechte oder zumindest durch einen Teil der Menschenrechte („grundlegende“ Menschenrechte) geschützt werden. Diese Güter sollen im Folgenden MR-Güter heißen. Die zweite Kategorie von Gütern betrifft solche, im Hinblick auf die wir eine solidarische Verbindung mit Personen empfinden (Solidargüter). Schließlich gibt es eine dritte Kategorie von Gütern, im Hinblick auf die wir die moralische Überzeugung haben, dass andere Menschen Zugang zu ihnen haben sollten, obwohl es sich nicht um MR-Güter handelt und es auch keine Solidarbe64 Ebenso: Jan Brezger, „So viele wie nötig und möglich! Die Pflicht zur Aufnahme von Flüchtlingen und die Spielräume politischer Machbarkeit“, in: Thomas Grundmann / Achim Stephan (Hrsg.), Welche und wie viele Flüchtlinge sollen wir aufnehmen? Philosophische Essays, Stuttgart: Reclam 2016, S. 57 [61]; a. A. Matthias Hoesch, „Allgemeine Hilfspflicht, territoriale Gerechtigkeit und Wiedergutmachung: Drei Kriterien für eine faire Verteilung von Flüchtlingen – und wann sie relevant werden“, in: Ebd. S. 16; Funke (Fn. 1), 539.

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ziehung im Hinblick auf diese Güter gibt. Es handelt sich um Güter, auf die wir die Goldene Regel anwenden, also glauben, dass wir andere deshalb darin nicht schädigen dürfen, weil wir auch selbst im Hinblick auf Güter dieses Typs nicht geschädigt werden wollen. Diese Güter nenne ich Gerechtigkeitsgüter. Zu ihnen gehört typischerweise der Zugang zu Ressourcen, die Menschen dazu nutzen, um ihren Lebensunterhalt und einen angemessenen Wohlstand zu erwirtschaften, ohne dass der Verlust dieser Ressourcen schon zum Wegfall des Existenzminimums und damit zu einem menschenrechtlich relevanten Schaden führt. 1. Die Relevanz der Menschenrechte Zunächst muss begründet werden, warum der fremde Mangel an MR-Gütern für uns moralisch relevant ist. Ich kann dies hier nur skizzenhaft leisten und muss im Übrigen auf andere Veröffentlichungen verweisen.65 MR-Güter sind ausschließlich solche, die zur Entwicklung und Aufrechterhaltung von Personalität erforderlich sind. Die kodifizierten Menschenrechtskataloge enthalten zwar auch zahlreiche Rechte, deren Schutzbereich sich nicht auf MR-Güter in diesem Sinne beziehen (z. B. Recht auf Freizügigkeit, Recht auf Eigentum, Recht auf bezahlten Jahresurlaub). Indessen lassen sich nur solche Rechte als Menschenrechte moralphilosophisch begründen, die sich auf den Schutz der Bedingungen von Personalität beziehen. Personalität ist die Fähigkeit eines Subjekts, auf der Grundlage eigener Überlegungen und Reflexionen einen eigenen (authentischen) Willen zu bilden, der die Maximen vorgibt, nach denen das Subjekt sein eigenes Leben führen kann. MR-Güter beziehen sich daher auf die Freiheit des Willens von Unterdrückung, Selbstentfremdung und Manipulation. Sie beziehen sich dagegen nicht auf die Freiheit der Handlung (z. B. die Freiheit, eine Bank zu überfallen, links statt rechts zu fahren, im Walde zu reiten). Beschränkungen der Handlungsfreiheit bedrohen normalerweise nicht die Personalität des Menschen. Die Personalität ist dagegen bedroht, wenn jemand in Todesangst versetzt wird, wenn er gefoltert wird oder in vergleichbarer Weise einem körperlichen oder seelischen Leiden ausgesetzt wird. Solche Beeinträchtigungen entziehen einer Person die Fähigkeit, aus eigenen Überlegungen und Reflexionen einen eigenen Willen zu bilden. Personalität ist weiterhin bedroht, wo die Willensbildung von außen durch Manipulation der Information oder durch die Unterdrückung von geistiger Artikulation fremdgesteuert wird. Personalität ist auch bedroht, wo das Subjekt mangels privater Rückzugsmöglichkeit unter permanenter Fremdkontrolle steht und daher nicht zu sich selbst kommen kann. 65  Paul Tiedemann, Menschenwürde als Rechtsbegriff. Eine philosophische Klärung, Berlin: BWV 3. Aufl. 2012, S. 223 ff.; ders., „Johann Gottlieb Fichte und die Identitätstheorie der Menschenwürde“, ARSP 103 (2017), 337 ff.; ders., „Human Dignity as an Absoluter Value“ und „The Relation between Human Dignity and Human Rights“, in: Winfried Brugger/ Stephan Kirste (Hrsg.), Human Dignity as a Foundation of Law, ARSP-Beiheft 137, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner 2013.

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Personalität als der Fähigkeit, einen eigenen authentischen Willen zu bilden, hat für jede Person einen absoluten Wert. Denn sie ist die Bedingung der Möglichkeit jeglichen Wertens. Für eine Person kann deshalb unter keinen Umständen irgendetwas wertvoller und vorzugswürdiger sein als die eigene Personalität. Immanuel Kant hat für den Begriff des absoluten Wertes den Ausdruck Würde eingeführt, die er vom Preis als dem Ausdruck für relative Werte unterscheidet.66 Würde in diesem Sinne kann nur der Personalität zugesprochen werden.67 Menschen leben unter menschenunwürdigen Lebensumständen, wenn diese durch Bedingungen bestimmt sind, die die Entwicklung und Aufrechterhaltung von Personalität wesentlich erschweren oder gar unmöglich machen. Die Personalität anderer Menschen ist nicht nur für diese, sondern für jede andere Person ein absoluter Wert. Das folgt nicht daraus, dass sich jede Person empathisch in die Lage anderer Personen versetzen kann.68 Der eigentliche Grund ist vielmehr, dass die Personalität der anderen die Bedingung der Möglichkeit der eigenen Personalität ist. Aus diesem Prinzip der Gleichursprünglichkeit eigener und fremder Personalität ergibt sich, dass wir die eigene Personalität weder wahrnehmen noch wertschätzen können, wenn wir nicht zugleich die Personalität der anderen wahrnehmen und absolut wertschätzen. Dabei bezieht sich diese Anerkennung und Wertschätzung nicht nur auf den engen Kreis der Bezugspersonen, ohne den die eigene Entwicklung zur Person notwendigerweise defizitär verlaufen und in schwerwiegenden Deformationen und Störungen enden muss. Die Anerkennung muss sich vielmehr auf alle Personen beziehen, die überhaupt existieren, weil es unmöglich ist, die Personalität der Bezugspersonen absolut wertzuschätzen, ohne zugleich die Personalität aller Menschen absolut wertzuschätzen.69 Deshalb nehmen wir den Verlust oder den drohenden Verlust der Personalität anderer Menschen als moralisch relevanten Schaden wahr und jede Handlung, die einen solchen Verlust zur Folge hat, als eine Schädigung. Das Gleichursprünglichkeitstheorem der Menschenwürde lässt keine relevante Unterscheidung zu zwischen menschenunwürdigen Lebensumständen, die an­ thropogen verursacht sind, und solchen, die physiogen verursacht sind. Vielmehr ist das Schutzbedürfnis aller Menschen, die menschenunwürdigen Umständen entfliehen wollen, moralisch von gleichem Gewicht, ganz gleich, ob sie auf anthropogener Verfolgung oder Behandlung beruhen oder auf Naturkatastrophen, für die kein Mensch verantwortlich gemacht werden kann. Entscheidend sind allein der Verlust oder die Beeinträchtigung der Personalität und nicht die Ursachen für diese   Kant (Fn. 18), 77.  Sofern Menschenwürde als absoluter Wert verstanden wird, kann es sich daher nur um Personwürde handeln. 68  So aber die Argumentation auf der Basis des sog. Fähigkeitenansatzes, wie in etwa Martha Nussbaum vertritt. Vgl. dazu: Martha Nussbaum, Die Grenzen der Gerechtigkeit: Behinderung, Nationalität und Spezieszugehörigkeit, Frankfurt / M.: Suhrkamp 2010. 69  Diese Zusammenhänge können hier nicht im Einzelnen entfaltet werden. Zu verweisen ist daher auf die Literaturangaben in Fn. 65. 66 67

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Beeinträchtigung. Von diesem Ansatz aus ist es moralisch irrelevant, ob Personen vor einer (anthropogenen) „Verletzung“ von Menschenrechten fliehen. Relevant ist allein, ob sie im Falle ihrer Rückkehr Gefahr laufen, einen Mangel an einem MRGut zu erleiden. Alle menschenrechtlich geschützten Güter (Leben, Unversehrtheit, Gedankenfreiheit, Privatsphäre etc.) sind Teilaspekte jenes Gutes, um das es letztlich bei den Menschenrechten geht, nämlich die Personalität. Dieses Ergebnis weicht grundlegend von den Vorgaben des herkömmlichen Flüchtlingsrechts ab. Danach werden nur solche Flüchtlinge als schutzwürdig betrachtet, die vor gezielten Verfolgungsmaßnahmen oder wenigstens vor der ernsthaften Gefahr einer unmenschlichen Behandlung geflohen sind, also vor einem Schaden, der anthropogen verursacht worden ist. Entsprechend groß ist das Unverständnis für den Vorschlag einer Flüchtlingskonvention für Klimaflüchtlinge.70 Weil der Personalität ein absoluter Wert zukommt, hängt die flüchtlingsethische Relevanz allein davon ab, ob eine schwerwiegende Beeinträchtigung in MR-Gütern vorliegt. Es müssen weder weitere Umstände dazukommen, noch sind Vorbehalte möglich oder Verwirkungstatbestände zu prüfen. Es gibt daher keine moralphilosophische Rechtfertigung für die Regelung in Art. 1 F der Genfer Flüchtlingskonvention (GFK), der u. a. Kriegsverbrecher vom Flüchtlingsschutz ausschließt. Wenn ihnen andernfalls der Verlust von MR-Gütern droht, sind sie schutzwürdig.71 Andererseits bedeutet das aber, dass missliche Lagen unterhalb des Niveaus einer schwerwiegenden Beeinträchtigung grundlegender Menschenrechte flüchtlingsethisch nicht relevant sind, sofern sie nicht in eine der beiden noch zu erörternden Kategorien moralisch relevanter Güter fallen. Dieser Befund steht in einem bemerkenswerten Kontrast zu der Beschreibung von Verfolgungshandlungen im positiven Recht. Die einschlägige EU-Richtlinie kennt nämlich neben der schweren Menschenrechtsverletzung auch die „Kumulierung unterschiedlicher 70  Md. Shamsuddoha, Climate Change Induced Forced Migrants. In need of a dignified recognition under a new Protocol, Dhaka: Equity and Justice Working Group 2009 – http://www. glogov.org / images / doc / equitybd.pdf; Norman Myers, „Environmental Refugees: a grow­ing phenomenon in the 21st century“, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 357 (2002), 609 – http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org / content/357/1420/609; Shari Collins-Cho­ banian, „Twenty Million Environmental Refugees and Counting: A Call for Recognition or a New Convention“, Environmental Ethics 32/2 (2010), 149; Hildegard Bedarff / Cord Ja­ kobeit, Klimawandel, Migration und Vertreibung. Die unterschätzte Katastrophe, Hamburg: Greenpeace 2017 – https://www.greenpeace.de / sites / www.greenpeace.de / files / publications/​ 20170524-greenpeace-studie-klimawandel-migration-deutsch.pdf. 71  Nach Art. 1 F GFK sind Personen vom Flüchtlingsschutz ausgeschlossen, die Kriegsverbrechen oder Verbrechen gegen den Frieden und gegen die Menschlichkeit sowie allgemeine schwere Verbrechen im Ausland begangen haben oder Handlungen sich haben zuschulden kommen lassen, die den Zielen und Grundsätzen der Vereinten Nationen zuwiderlaufen. Dass das Schutzbegehren auch solcher Menschen moralisch relevant ist, hindert jedoch nicht daran, sie im Aufnahmestaat strafrechtlich zur Verantwortung zu ziehen.

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Maßnahmen“ als Verfolgungshandlung an, die ganz ohne Menschenrechtsverletzungen auskommen können, aber so „gravierend [sind], dass eine Person davon in ähnlicher […] Weise betroffen ist“.72 Das wird dann in drei Variationen näher konkretisiert. Alle diese Varianten handeln im Kern von bestimmten Weisen der Diskriminierung durch staatliche Maßnahmen und von der Unverhältnismäßigkeit der Strafzumessung.73 Diskriminierung ist die benachteiligende Ungleichbehandlung von Menschen im Vergleich zu anderen Menschen. Sie ist die andere Seite der Privilegierung. Diskriminierung und Privilegierung rekurrieren nicht auf objektive Standards der Gewährleistung von MR-Gütern, sondern nur auf die relative Gleichbehandlung. Nach diesem Maßstab ist Folter unproblematisch, solange nur alle gleichermaßen gefoltert werden. Das ist indessen ebenso abwegig wie es verfehlt ist, die nationalsozialistische Verfolgung der Juden als einen Fall von Diskriminierung aufzufassen.74 Es gibt keinen moralischen Grund andere Menschen allein deshalb für schutzwürdig zu halten, weil sie diskriminiert werden. Das gilt auch dann, wenn einige Menschen im Unterschied zu anderen aus sachfremden Gründen keine akademische oder politische Karriere machen können, mehr Steuern zahlen müssen, öfter Polizeikontrollen und behördliche Schikanen erleiden müssen oder nicht Auto fahren dürfen. Was für die Diskriminierung gilt, das gilt auch für die Unverhältnismäßigkeit von Strafen. Es gibt keine objektiven Standards für eine sachlich begründete Relation zwischen Straftat und Strafmaß. Deshalb ist allein danach zu fragen, ob eine Bestrafung menschenrechtlich relevant ist. Das ist der Fall, wenn sie im Entzug des Lebens besteht, in der Zufügung nachhaltiger körperlicher Leiden und Behinderungen oder in einer Freiheitsstrafe, die im Hinblick auf ihre Art und Dauer dazu geeignet ist, die Personalität der betroffenen Menschen nachhaltig zu beschädigen oder zu zerstören. Aus diesen Überlegungen ergibt sich zugleich, dass Freiheitsstrafen denkbar sind, die nach Art und Dauer zu keiner Gefährdung der Personalität führen und folglich als solche flüchtlingsrechtlich nicht relevant sind. Drohende Unterbringung in einer ausländischen Haftanstalt liefert schon deshalb keinen evident moralisch relevanten Grund zur Flucht, weil die Haft auch in den Aufnahmeländern zum Arsenal legitimer staatlicher Machtmittel gehört. Der Freiheitsentzug gilt als vereinbar mit den moralischen Standards der Menschenrechte, solange die Haftanstalt nicht die Merkmale einer totalen Institution aufweist, in der die Per72  Art. 9 Abs. 1 lit. b RL 2011/95/EU v. 13.12.2011 – ABl. EU Nr. L 337, S. 9 = § 3a Abs. 1 Nr. 2 AsylG. 73  Art. 9 Abs. 2 lit. b), c), d) RL 2011/95/EU = § 3a Abs. 2 Nr. 2 – 4 AsylG. Lit. e) und f) befassen sich nicht mit der Beschreibung von Verfolgungshandlungen, sondern mit besonderen Verfolgungsgründen. Lit. a) konkretisiert partiell schwere Menschenrechtsverletzungen als Anwendung physischer und psychischer Gewalt, einschließlich sexueller Gewalt. 74 So aber: Klaus Rennert, Hannah Arendt, das Asylrecht und die Menschenwürde, Baden-Baden: Nomos 2017, S. 27.

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sonalität der Insassen zerstört wird, und solange auch sonst alle Bedingungen für ein menschenwürdiges Leben gesichert sind.75 Man kann natürlich in Zweifel ziehen, ob solche Würde-kompatiblen Haftbedingungen in einem Gefängnis überhaupt erfüllbar sind. Dieser Frage muss hier aber nicht nachgegangen werden, weil sich daraus keine spezifischen Folgen für eine Flüchtlingsethik ergeben. Entweder sind Gefängnisse immer menschenrechtswidrig, dann sind sie es auch im Inland und die Haftstrafe muss abgeschafft werden. Oder aber inländische Gefängnisse erlauben eine menschenwürdige Haft, dann ist dies grundsätzlich auch im Ausland möglich. Nicht plausibel wäre es dagegen, Menschen, die vor einer ausländischen Haft geflohen sind, ohne Rücksicht auf die Art und Weise der Haftbedingungen Zuflucht zu gewähren, und Straftäter im Inland weiter in Haft zu halten. Wenn also Herrn Puigdemont in Spanien oder Herrn Snowden in den USA eine Haftstrafe droht, wäre allein dieser Umstand noch kein Grund, ihnen Asyl zu gewähren. 2. Die Relevanz der Solidarität Im klassischen positiven Flüchtlingsrecht wird eine Person nur dann als Flüchtling anerkannt, wenn sie aus begründeter Furcht vor Verfolgung „wegen der Rasse, Religion, Nationalität, Zugehörigkeit zu einer bestimmten sozialen Gruppe oder wegen ihrer politischen Überzeugung“ geflohen ist.76 Diese so genannten Verfol­ gungsgründe sind für die Frage der Gewährung von Flüchtlingsschutz weit bedeutender als die Art und Schwere der misslichen Lage, der die Betroffenen entfliehen wollen. Deshalb wird eine Verletzung grundlegender Menschenrechte flüchtlingsrechtlich für irrelevant angesehen, wenn die Verfolgung in keinem Zusammenhang mit den besagten Gründen steht. Drohende Folter allein begründet beispielsweise keinen Flüchtlingsschutz nach der GFK, wenn die Folter nicht wegen der politischen Überzeugung oder der Religion etc. droht. Andererseits ist der Flüchtlingsschutz aber auch schon dann eröffnet, wenn die drohenden Beeinträchtigungen nur in einer Diskriminierung oder in einer Gefängnishaft unter menschenwürdigen 75  Zu den Merkmalen totaler Institutionen vgl. Erving Goffman, Asyle. Über die soziale Situation psychiatrischer Patienten und anderer Insassen. Frankfurt / M: Suhrkamp 19. Aufl. 2014; allgemein zu menschenwürdigen Haftbedingungen vgl. Robert Krammer, Menschenwürde und Art. 3 EMRK: Grundrechtsverletzungen in Form von Polizeigewalt und Haft, Wien: Jan Sramek 2012; Simone Strohmayr, Menschenwürde und Strafvollzug, Cottbus: Diss 1998. 76 Vgl. Artikel 1 A 2 des Abkommens über die Rechtsstellung der Flüchtlinge („Genfer Flüchtlingskonvention“) vom 28.07.1951 – BGBl 1953 II 560. Die Geschichte des klassischen positiven Flüchtlingsrechts beginnt mit dem englischen Aliens Act von 1905 und findet heute seinen universalen Ausdruck in der Genfer Flüchtlingskonvention von 1951. Zur Geschichte des Flüchtlingsrechts vgl. Paul Tiedemann, „The Ambivalence of Current Refugee Law Be­tween Solidarity with ‚Friends‘ and Solidarity with ‚Human Beings‘“, JHRW 1/4 (2016), 175 ff. Zur Geschichte des Flüchtlingsrechts in Deutschland vgl. Paul Tiedemann, „Das konstitutionelle Asylrecht in Deutschland. Ein Nachruf“, ZAR 29 (2009), 161 ff.; ders., „Sechzig Jahre Grundgesetz. Sechzig Jahre Asylrecht in Deutschland“, JoJZG 3 (2009), 101 ff.

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Umständen bestehen, aber ein Zusammenhang mit den genannten Verfolgungsgründen gegeben ist.77 Aus flüchtlingsethischer Sicht können Verfolgungsgründe keine Rolle spielen, wenn es um eine schwerwiegende Beeinträchtigung in MR-Gütern geht. Denn in diesen Fällen rechtfertigt bereits der drohende Schaden als solcher die moralische Relevanz des Schutzbegehrens. Soweit das positive Flüchtlingsrecht die Schutzgewährung trotz eines menschenrechtlichen Schadens dann verweigert, wenn keine Verfolgungsgründe vorliegen, ist dies, wie im 1. Abschnitt dargelegt, ethisch nicht zu rechtfertigen.78 Zu prüfen ist dagegen noch die Frage, ob es ethische Gründe dafür gibt, die Schutzbegehren von Menschen für moralisch relevant zu halten, denen keine Beeinträchtigung in MR-Gütern droht, die aber wegen eines der genannten Gründe verfolgt werden. Als Referenz diene der Fall einer Person A, die in ihrem autoritär regierten Heimatstaat wegen ihres Einsatzes für Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Demokratie zwar nicht in MR-Gütern beeinträchtigt, aber von einer (menschenwürdigen) Haftstrafe bedroht wird und deshalb geflohen ist. Warum sollte das Schutzbegehren von A ethisch relevant sein, wenn doch eine menschenrechtliche Bedrohung von A nicht im Raum steht? Ein Bedingungszusammenhang der Gleichursprünglichkeit, wie er bei der Achtung fremder Personwürde und den Menschenrechten vorliegt, spielt hier keine Rolle. Zwar sind Demokratie und Rechtsstaatlichkeit auch für uns hohe Werte und deshalb liegt es auch nahe, gewisse Sympathien für Menschen zu entwickeln, die sich in anderen Ländern für diese Werte einsetzen. Die Frage ist aber, ob diese Werthaltung anderer Menschen uns nötigt, ihr Schutzbegehren moralisch ernst zu nehmen. Eine Antwort auf diese Frage kann über den Begriff der Solidarität gewonnen werden.79 Nach Simon Derpmann ist Solidarität der Grund bestimmter moralischer 77  Hinsichtlich der Frage, welcher Art der Zusammenhang zwischen Verfolgungsakt und Verfolgungsgrund sein muss, gibt es einen dogmatischen Streit. Nach der Motivationstheorie kommt es darauf an, ob der Verfolger von dem Motiv geleitet wird, die „Rasse“, Religion, politische Meinung etc. der Opfer zu bekämpfen. Nach der finalen Theorie kommt es darauf an, ob eine Maßnahme tatsächlich zu einer Beeinträchtigung der Religion oder politischen Meinung führt, bzw. ob dadurch tatsächlich bestimmte Ethnien etc. besonders betroffen werden. Vgl. dazu Paul Tiedemann, Flüchtlingsrecht. Die materiellen und verfahrensrechtlichen Grundlagen, Berlin / Heidelberg: Springer 2. Aufl. 2018, S. 50 f. 78  Dieser Gedanke ist dem positiven Recht nicht mehr gänzlich fern. Er findet Ausdruck in sehr komplizierten und häufig kaum voneinander abgrenzbaren Schutzstatūs, die irgendwie minderrangig sein sollen. Dieser mindere Rang kommt u. a. darin zum Ausdruck, dass die Betroffenen nicht als „Flüchtlinge“ im Rechtssinne anerkannt werden, sondern entweder verdruckste Bezeichnungen tragen wie „subsidiär Schutzberechtigter“ oder aber überhaupt keine Bezeichnung haben. 79  Zum Stand der Diskussion über Solidarität mit zahlreichen Literaturhinweisen vgl. Paul Tiedemann, „Solidarity“, in: Mortimer Sellers / Stephan Kirste (Hrsg.), Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, Dordrecht: Springer 2018, https://doi.org/10.1007/97894-007-6730-0_151-1.

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Verpflichtungen, die sich aus Zugehörigkeit ergeben. Das Bewusstsein der Zugehörigkeit geht von dem jeweiligen normativen Selbstverständnis der Person aus, insofern diese etwas an sich selbst als für sich selbst wesentlich ausmacht, das sie gleichzeitig mit anderen teilt, und sie zum Angehörigen einer Gemeinschaft macht. Dieses gemeinschaftsbezogene Selbstverständnis erzeugt besondere Handlungsgründe in Bezug auf die Angehörigen dieser Gemeinschaft, die von allen Mitgliedern der Gemeinschaft als Pflichten aufgefasst werden, denen entsprechende Rechte korrelieren.80 Anhand ihrer Solidaritäten vergewissern sich Personen, wofür sie stehen und was sie nicht aufgeben können, ohne damit ihr Selbstverständnis zu beschädigen. Solidarität setzt das Bewusstsein für eine gemeinsame Sache aller Mitglieder der Solidargemeinschaft voraus. Diese gemeinsame Sache kann auch in einer gemeinsamen Geschichte oder in einer übereinstimmenden Vorstellung von einer anständigen Gesellschaft bestehen.81 Wie aber können übereinstimmende Vorstellungen von einer anständigen Gesellschaft eine gemeinsame Sache in diesem Sinne sein? Hierauf bietet das Theo­ rem der kognitiven Dissonanz eine adäquate Antwort. Auch den überzeugtesten und engagiertesten Demokraten beschleichen bisweilen Zweifel an der Werthaftigkeit der Demokratie, etwa wenn er beobachtet, wie leicht es populistischen Demagogen gelingt, die demokratischen Institutionen zu missbrauchen. Ähnlich steht es mit Zweifeln am Wert der Rechtstaatlichkeit, die uns bisweilen beschleichen können, wenn wir etwa ertragen müssen, dass offensichtliche Verbrecher aus formellen Gründen (z. B. Verjährung) davonkommen. Solche Zweifel an Werten, die für einen überzeugten Demokraten identitätsbildend sind, lösen das aus, was Leon Festinger kognitive Dissonanz genannt hat.82 Dabei handelt es sich um ein spezifisches psychisches Unwohlsein, das durch die Unsicherheit ausgelöst wird, ob wir uns überhaupt mit den richtigen Werten identifizieren. Solche Zweifel machen Angst, weil sie mit einem drohenden Verlust der Orientierung für die Zukunft verbunden sind. Der leise Zweifel ist der stete Begleiter unserer grundlegenden Werthaltungen. Wir könnten ihn nur um den Preis des fundamentalistischen Wahns und der ideologischen Verblödung vermeiden. Daher greifen wir dankbar nach allem, was unsere Werthaltungen bestätigt und die Zweifel vertreibt. Genau diese Funktion erfüllen andere Menschen, die unsere Werte teilen und vor allem jene, die für diese Werte persönliche Risiken oder gar Verfolgung in Kauf genommen haben und damit bestätigen, dass unsere Werte weiterhin der Identifikation wert sind. Daraus erwächst der Impuls, Menschen, die unsere Werthaltungen teilen und deshalb verfolgt werden, auch dann Schutz zu gewähren, wenn die Art und Intensität der Verfolgung noch nicht den Grad einer Menschenrechtsverletzung erlangt hat. Dieser Impuls hat durchaus moralische Qualität. Denn wir würden uns gewissermaßen als Ver  Simon Derpmann, Gründe der Solidarität, Münster: mentis 2013, S. 12.   Derpmann (Fn. 80), 29. 82  Leon Festinger, Theorie der kognitiven Dissonanz, Bern / Stuttgart / Wien: Hans Huber 1978. 80 81

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räter an unseren eigenen Idealen empfinden, also moralisch abqualifizieren, wenn wir gleichgesinnten Menschen, die verfolgt werden, gleichgültig gegenüber stünden. Und auch die Verfolgten würden uns moralisch abqualifizieren, wenn wir ihr Schutzbegehren ignorierten. Die moralische Relevanz der Solidarität mit Gleichgesinnten hat allerdings auch eine Kehrseite. Sie liefert keinen flüchtlingsethischen Grund, das Schutzbegehren von Menschen moralisch ernst zu nehmen, die wegen einer politischen Überzeugung verfolgt werden, die wir nicht teilen oder die gar im Widerspruch zu den eigenen politischen Überzeugungen steht.83 Es gibt daher nicht nur eine soziologische Erklärung, sondern auch eine ethische Begründung dafür, warum belgische Separatisten sich verpflichtet fühlen, den Anführer der katalonischen Separatisten zu schützen, während die Befürworter der staatlichen Einheit Spaniens keinen Anlass sehen würden, in diesem Fall Asyl zu gewähren.84 Ebenso wenig dürften überzeugte Demokraten und Verteidiger des Rechtsstaats die moralische Relevanz des Schutzbegehrens iranischer Monarchisten erkennen können, wohl aber die solidarische Pflicht zur Schutzgewährung für Edward Snowden.85 Was für die Begrenztheit von Solidarpflichten ausschließlich auf Vertreter geteilter politischer Überzeugungen gilt, das gilt grundsätzlich auch im Hinblick auf die moralische Relevanz von Schutzbegehren derjenigen, die aus rassistischen Gründen, wegen der Religion, Nationalität, dem Geschlecht oder der sexuellen Orientierung verfolgt werden. Solange die Verfolgung nicht in der Verletzung grundlegender Menschenrechte besteht, gibt es keinen universalen moralischen Grund zur Rechtfertigung der Schutzwürdigkeit. Gründe aus Solidarität können immer nur in einem partikularen Rahmen gerechtfertigt werden. So ist es ohne weiteres   A. A. Funke (Fn. 1), 538.   Unter der Führung des Regionalpräsidenten Carles Puigdemont verabschiedete das katalanische Regionalparlament am 27.10.2017 eine Unabhängigkeitserklärung. Darauf erließ die spanische Justiz einen Haftbefehl gegen Carles Puigdemont, dem sich dieser durch Flucht nach Belgien entzog (vgl. dazu https://de.wikipedia.org / wiki / Carles_Puigdemont). Im Falle seiner Inhaftierung drohte ihm die Haft in einem spanischen Gefängnis. Ausweislich der ­HUDOC-Datenbank des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte gab es in den letzten 10 Jahren kein einziges Verfahren gegen Spanien, in dem es um menschenrechtswidrige Unterbringung in spanischen Gefängnissen gegangen wäre. Es ist also davon auszugehen, dass Herrn Puigdemont nur eine Diskriminierung im Hinblick auf seine Bewegungsfreiheit droht, aber keine Menschenrechtsverletzung. Deshalb kommt es für die Frage, ob ihm Asyl gewährt werden sollte, allein darauf an, ob man sich mit seinen politischen Überzeugungen identifizieren kann oder nicht. 85  Monarchisten droht im Iran allerdings eine menschenrechtswidrige Behandlung und allein deshalb ist ihr Schutzbegehren moralisch relevant. Im Falle Edward Snowdons geht es darum, dass dieser rechtsstaatswidrige Praktiken des amerikanischen Geheimdienstes NSA öffentlich gemacht und damit die Gelegenheit eröffnet hat, gegen administrativen oder politischen Machtmissbrauch vorzugehen (vgl. https://de.wikipedia.org / wiki / Edward_Snowden). Snowdon erhielt Asyl in Russland. Im Falle seiner Rückkehr in die USA droht ihm eine langjährige Gefängnisstrafe. Ob US-Gefängnisse menschenrechtlichen Standards entsprechen, ist nicht unumstritten. 83 84

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nachvollziehbar, dass Christen eine Solidarpflicht gegenüber verfolgten Christen empfinden, Muslime gegenüber verfolgten Muslimen und Atheisten gegenüber verfolgten Atheisten. In einem demokratischen Staat ist es statthaft und zulässig, wenn die Bürger ihre eigenen solidarischen Gebundenheiten ebenso wie alle anderen persönlichen Präferenzen in den Prozess der politischen Willensbildung einspeisen und dafür werben, dass die Angehörigen jener Gruppen, mit denen sie sich solidarisch verbunden fühlen, auch dann Aufnahme in Deutschland finden sollen, wenn die Art und das Maß der Verfolgung keine menschenrechtswidrige Qualität erreicht. Indessen entscheidet in diesem Fall letztlich die demokratische Mehrheit, wer in den Genuss des entsprechenden Flüchtlingsschutzes kommt und wer nicht. 3. Die Relevanz von Gerechtigkeitsgütern In der Armutstheorie wird bekanntlich zwischen absoluter und relativer Armut differenziert.86 Absolute Armut liegt vor, wenn ein Mangel an Mitteln der elementaren Bedürfnisbefriedigung vorliegt, der zu einer physischen und psychischen Existenzgefährdung des betroffenen Menschen führt. Relative Armut liegt dagegen vor, wenn die sozioökonomische Lebenslage eines Menschen im Vergleich zum durchschnittlichen Lebensstandard der Bevölkerung, der er angehört, so niedrig ist, dass er zwar die Befriedigung der biologisch-physiologischen Existenzbedürfnisse gestattet, nicht oder nur in geringem Maße aber die Partizipation an der Kultur und dem gesellschaftlichen Leben. Es ist offensichtlich, dass es Menschen, die von absoluter Armut betroffen sind, an den grundlegenden Bedingungen eines menschenwürdigen Lebens mangelt und dass sie deshalb wegen eines Mangels an MR-Gütern als schutzwürdig zu betrachten sind. Allerdings wird es diesen Menschen oft schon an den erforderlichen Mitteln fehlen, um eine Flucht nach Europa finanzieren zu können. Sie treten deshalb bei uns als Flüchtlinge kaum in Erscheinung.87 Relativ arme Menschen leben definitionsgemäß nicht unter Bedingungen, die als menschenunwürdig bezeichnet werden können. Denn die Mittel zur Ausbildung und Aufrechterhaltung von Personalität stehen ihnen zur Verfügung. Aber sie haben gute Gründe, auch unter Aufbietung großer Anstrengungen ihre Lebenssituation zu verbessern. Deshalb können sie motiviert sein, ihre letzten Ressourcen zu mobilisieren, um ihr Glück anderswo zu suchen. Sie treten dann als so genannte Wirtschaftsflüchtlinge in Erscheinung. Die flüchtlingsethische Relevanz der Schutzbegehren von Menschen diesen Typs lässt sich nicht mit der Deprivation von MR-Gütern begründen und auch nicht aus dem Gesichtspunkt der Solidarität. Grundsätzlich ist relative Armut kein flücht86  Lazlo A. Vaskovics, „Armut“, in: Görres-Gesellschaft (Hrsg.), Staatslexikon Bd. 1, Freiburg: Herder 7. Aufl. 1995, S. 342. 87  Thomas W. Pogge, „Migration und Armut“, in: Alfredo Märker / Stephan Schlothfeldt (Fn. 33), 110 [112 f.]. Absolute Armut als Fluchtgrund sieht aber Ralf Gnüchtel, „Das Potential der Armutsmigration aus den afrikanischen Staaten südlich der Sahara“, ZAR 36 (2016), 172.

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lingsethisch relevanter Grund.88 Wir müssen es nicht zu unserer Sache machen, anderen Menschen zu besseren Lebensverhältnissen und zu mehr Wohlstand zu verhelfen. Etwas anderes gilt nur dann, wenn wir ebenso wie diese derselben Solidargemeinschaft angehören. Das aber ist bei Menschen, die nicht zur eigenen politischen oder religiösen Gemeinschaft gehören, in der Regel nicht der Fall. Anders liegen die Dinge allerdings, wenn die prekäre ökonomische Lage, der Menschen zu entfliehen trachten, Folge einer Schädigungshandlung jener ist, von denen sie Schutz begehren. Dann stellt sich das Schutzbegehren nämlich als Forderung nach Kompensation des Schadens dar, worauf die Geschädigten gegenüber dem Schädiger nach der zweiten Regel der deontologischen Ethik ein Recht haben. Relative Armut kann nur dann als ein zu kompensierender Schaden betrachtet werden, wenn sie nicht auf Fehlentscheidungen beruht, die die Betroffenen selbst zu verantworten haben, oder auf sozialen, politischen oder Umweltbedingungen, die in keinem Verantwortungszusammenhang zu dem Verhalten jener stehen, von denen Kompensation gefordert wird. Es muss sich vielmehr um einen Schaden handeln, der ursächlich mit einem irgendwie gearteten unfairen Verhalten der in die Pflicht genommenen Personen oder Staaten verbunden ist. Unter diesem Aspekt wird auf Schutzsuchende, die vor relativer Armut geflohen sind, noch zurückzukommen sein. IV. Pflichten gegenüber Flüchtlingen im Inland In diesem und den folgenden zwei Abschnitten geht es um die Frage, unter welchen Bedingungen der in Frage stehende Aufnahmestaat welche konkreten flüchtlingsethischen Pflichten gegenüber Personen hat, die nach Maßgabe der vorstehenden Überlegungen als schutzwürdig anzusehen sind. Hierbei wird es sich als nützlich erweisen, zwischen jenen Schutzsuchenden zu unterscheiden, die sich bereits auf dem Territorium des in Frage stehenden Aufnahmestaates befinden, und solchen, die sich außerhalb des Territoriums befinden. In diesem Abschnitt geht es um die erstgenannte Gruppe. Das sind Menschen, die entweder legal (z. B. mit einem Touristenvisum) oder illegal in das Staatsgebiet eingereist sind und nun Schutz begehren. Das positive Flüchtlingsrecht in Deutschland kennt nicht nur einen, sondern zahlreiche abgestufte Schutzstatūs. Aus flüchtlingsethischer Perspektive spielen diese Unterscheidungen keine Rolle. Der asylrechtliche Schutzstatus, um den es in einer Abhandlung zur Flüchtlingsethik allein gehen kann, ist ein einziger. Er beinhaltet grundsätzlich zwei Aspekte. Zum einen umfasst er ein Aufenthaltsrecht, so dass die Inhaber des Schutzstatus nicht genötigt werden können, das Aufnahmeland wieder zu verlassen und in die Lebensumstände zurückzukehren, aus denen 88  Die gegenteilige Auffassung beruht auf einer Idee universeller Gleichheit, die ich an anderer Stelle grundsätzlich kritisiert habe, vgl. Tiedemann (Fn. 3), 157 ff. Affirmative Beiträge zu dieser Auffassung findet man in Märker / Schlothfeldt (Fn. 33).

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sie geflohen sind. Zum anderen umfasst der Schutzstatus die Ermöglichung von Lebensumständen im Aufnahmestaat, die den Anforderungen der grundlegenden Menschenrechte genügen. Nur dann stellt sich die Flucht in den Aufnahmestaat als echte Alternative zum Ausharren im Heimatland dar. Ob und inwiefern der Aufnahmestaat aus moralischen Gründen zu einer darüber hinausgehenden Ermöglichung von Integration der Geflüchteten in die Aufnahmegesellschaft verpflichtet ist, soll im Rahmen dieses Aufsatzes nicht thematisiert werden. Der Schutzstatus im Sinne dieser Abhandlung impliziert, dass seine Versagung die Ausreisepflicht der betroffenen Menschen zur Folge hat, die notfalls auch mit den Mitteln des Verwaltungszwangs (Abschiebung) durchgesetzt werden kann. Dabei wird der Regelfall unterstellt, wonach ein Ausländer normalerweise nur in den Staat abgeschoben werden oder zurückkehren kann, dessen Staatsangehörigkeit er besitzt. Das ist in der Regel der Herkunftsstaat, aus dem er geflohen ist. Im Unterschied zur positiven Rechtslage ist die moralische Last der Verantwortung also allein auf die Entscheidung zwischen Gewährung und Nichtgewährung des Schutzstatus konzentriert.89 Ich werde die Erörterung auf den Fall begrenzen, dass die Schutzwürdigkeit auf einem Mangel an MR-Gütern im Heimatstaat beruht. Für die Asylgewährung aus Solidarität gilt Entsprechendes. Auf den Fall der Asylgewährung aus Schädigung durch Unfairness komme ich im nächsten Abschnitt zurück. Die moralische Beurteilung einer Versagung des Schutzstatus für Personen, die schutzwürdig sind, hängt entscheidend davon ab, ob diese Versagung als Unterlassung einer Hilfsleistung interpretiert werden muss oder ob es sich vielmehr um eine aktive Schädigung handelt. Im erstgenannten Fall wäre dies moralisch nur dann relevant, wenn ein Gebot besteht, Hilfe zu leisten. Das setzt eine besondere Garantenstellung voraus, die im Hinblick auf Flüchtlinge aus anderen Staaten normalerweise schwerlich zu begründen ist. Handelt es sich dagegen um eine aktive Schädigung, dann liegt, wie oben im II. Abschnitt geklärt worden ist, eine Verletzung des deontologischen Schädigungsverbotes vor. Ob die Handlung, die darin besteht, schutzwürdigen Personen im Inland den Schutzstatus zu verweigern, als Unterlassung einer Hilfsleistung oder als aktive Schädigung zu interpretieren ist, ist wesentlich von der Reichweite des zugrunde gelegten Handlungsbegriffs abhängig. In der deutschen philosophischen und juristischen Handlungstheorie ist es vor allem Hegel gewesen, der den modernen Handlungsbegriff nachhaltig geprägt hat.90 Für den angelsächsischen Bereich ist insoweit auf die Handlungstheorie Jeremy Benthams zu verweisen, die große Ähn89  Insbesondere soll also eine Abfederung dieser Entscheidung durch im Nachgang erteilte Duldungen, Härtefallentscheidungen oder anderweitige Aufenthaltstitel außer Betracht bleiben. 90  Josef Derbolav, „Handeln, Handlung, Tat, Tätigkeit“, in: Joachim Ritter (Hrsg.), Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, Bd. 3, Darmstadt: WBG 1974, Sp. 992 f.; Zu Hegels Handlungstheorie eingehend: Michael Quante, Hegels Begriff der Handlung, Stuttgart: Fromann Holzboog 1993.

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lichkeiten mit Hegels Konzeption aufweist.91 Hegel rekonstruiert den Begriff der Handlung als Äußerung des Willens, also auf der Grundlage der Idee des freien Subjekts, dessen subjektiver Wille der Maßstab der Zurechnung von Handlungen und moralischer Verantwortlichkeit sein muss.92 Die erste Voraussetzung, die erfüllt sein muss, damit eine Handlung überhaupt in Betracht kommt, ist nach Hegel die Tat.93 Eine Tat ist jedes aktive Verhalten einer Person (Akteur), durch das auf Zustände in der Welt eingewirkt wird. Um eine Tat als Handlung qualifizieren zu können, ist es nötig, dass der Akteur die durch die Tat verursachte Veränderung der Welt als das Seinige erkennen kann.94 Dieser Ansatz verbietet es, jene Folgen einer Tat dem Akteur als Handlung zuzurechnen, die außerhalb seiner möglichen Kontrolle liegen. Dazu gehören alle zufälligen und in keiner Weise voraussehbaren Folgen. Zuzurechnen sind ihm daher nur die Folgen, von deren zu erwartendem Eintritt er wusste als er den Willen fasste, so zu handeln wie er gehandelt hat. Von seinem Willen erfasst sind zunächst einmal alle Folgen, die in der Absicht des Akteurs lagen als er die Tat vollzog. Die Absicht bezieht sich auf die Folgen, die der Akteur durch die Handlung realisieren will.95 Eine Absicht liegt nicht vor, wenn der Akteur mit seiner Tat, also mit seinem Verhalten, mit dem er auf die Welt einwirkt, überhaupt keine Folgen realisieren will. In diesem Fall lässt sich die Tat nicht als Handlung beschreiben. Eine auf irgendetwas gerichtete Absicht ist also konstitutiv für das Vorhandensein einer Handlung. Für Hegel sind allerdings nicht nur jene Folgen einer Tat dem Akteur als Handlung zuzurechnen, die er in seine Absicht aufgenommen hat, sondern auch jene, von denen er wusste, dass sie aufgrund seiner Tat eintreten werden, ohne sie zu beabsichtigen. Diese Folgen werden von dem erfasst, was Hegel Vorsatz nennt.96 Sie werden vom Akteur in Kauf genommen, um das Ziel der Handlung zu erreichen. Insoweit sind sie von seinem Willen umfasst und ihm deshalb zuzurechnen. Hegel hat in seiner Handlungstheorie jene Folgen einer Handlung nicht berücksichtigt und erörtert, die wir gewöhnlich dem handelnden Subjekt zurechnen, obwohl sie weder von dessen Absicht, noch von seinem Vorsatz erfasst werden. Wir sprechen in diesen Fällen von Fahrlässigkeit.97 Deren Problem besteht in der Zu91  Peter M. S. Hacker, „Benthams Theory of Action and Intention“, ARSP 62/1 (1976), 89 ff. 92  Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts [1821], Hamburg: Meiner 4. Aufl. 1955, §§ 113, 114. 93  Hegel (Fn. 92), § 115. 94  Hegel (Fn. 92), § 114. 95  Hegel (Fn. 92), § 114. 96  Hegel (Fn. 92), § 117. 97 In Hegel (Fn. 92), § 116 klingt die Zurechnung aus mangelnder Aufmerksamkeit allerdings an, vgl. dazu Giulia Battistoni, „Die Möglichkeit des Wissens als Grundlage der Zurechnung“, RphZ 2017/4, S. 380 [384].

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rechnung von Folgen, die vom Willen des Akteurs nicht umfasst sind. Denn die moralische Verantwortlichkeit für fahrlässige Handlungen beruht gerade nicht auf dem Willen, den der Akteur gefasst hat, sondern auf der Unterlassung einer sorgfältigen Prüfung der zu erwartenden Folgen der Handlung. Karl Larenz hat vorgeschlagen, die Verbindung zwischen Fahrlässigkeit und Willen darin zu sehen, dass die Unterlassung der gebotenen Sorgfalt bei der Betrachtung der zu erwartenden Folgen selbst auf einem Willensakt beruht, nämlich auf dem Willen des Akteurs, die notwendige Sorgfalt nicht aufbringen zu wollen.98 Insofern ist die wesentliche Verknüpfung von Wille und Handlung hergestellt und auch die fahrlässige Handlung lässt sich als „Äußerung des Willens“ verstehen.99 Die Verweigerung des Schutzstatus wird von der Absicht bestimmt, den unerwünschten Aufenthalt eines Ausländers zu beenden und seine Heimreise zu organisieren. Der Vorsatz geht aber weit darüber hinaus. Dieser umfasst alle Folgen, deren Eintritt im Wissen der zuständigen Behörden liegen. Die Handlung umfasst ferner alle Folgen, von denen die Behörden nur infolge der Unterlassung der gebotenen Sorgfalt (Fahrlässigkeit) nichts wissen. Wenn die Behörden also wissen oder fahrlässig nicht wissen, dass die betroffene Person im Falle der Rückkehr ins Heimatland zu Tode kommen wird, dann lässt sich die Handlung, die vordergründig nur als Aufenthaltsbeendigung erscheint, als Tötungshandlung beschreiben. Wenn der betroffenen Person Folter droht, dann lässt sich die Abschiebung als Folter beschreiben. Wenn die Zwangsehe droht, dann handelt es sich bei der Abschiebung um die Handlung der Zwangsverheiratung. Kurzum: Wenn die handelnden Behörden wissen oder fahrlässig nicht wissen, dass die betroffene Person im Falle der Rückkehr ins Heimatland in eine menschenunwürdige Lebenssituation gerät, dann handelt es sich bei der Versagung des Schutzstatus um einen Akt, durch den Menschenrechte verletzt werden. Die Versagung des Schutzstatus für schutzwürdige Personen im Inland stellt somit einen Schädigungsakt dar und nicht bloß die Unterlassung einer Hilfeleistung. In Fällen von Kriegen, Bürgerkriegen oder Naturkatastrophen, aber auch in Fällen so genannter Gruppenverfolgung100 ist es allerdings nicht hinreichend sicher, dass der Schaden tatsächlich eintreten wird. Es besteht nur eine gewisse Wahrscheinlichkeit dafür. Mit den Menschenrechten unvereinbar ist aber nicht nur eine Handlung, die im Wissen um die daraus folgende Schädigung vollzogen wird, sondern auch eine Handlung, durch die ein Mensch der ernsthaften Gefahr einer solchen Schädigung ausgesetzt wird (Ingerenz).101 Dadurch erwächst dem Handelnden nämlich eine Garantenstellung mit der Folge, dass ihm die Realisierung der Gefahr 98  Karl Larenz, Hegels Zurechnungslehre und der Begriff der objektiven Zurechnung [1927], Neudruck Aalen: scientia 1970; Battistoni (Fn. 97), 393. 99  Hegel (Fn. 92), § 113. 100  Zu diesem Begriff vgl. Tiedemann (Fn. 77), 46. 101  Vgl. zur Dogmatik des Ingerenzdelikts BGH, Urt. v. 20.06.2000 – 4 StR 162/00 –, http:// juris.bundesgerichtshof.de / cgi-bin / rechtsprechung / document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=en&nr​ =20442&pos=0&anz=1.

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als eigene Tat zugerechnet wird. Setzt der Staat also beispielsweise einen Ausländer im Wege der Verweigerung des Schutzstatus der hinreichend konkreten Gefahr des Todes im Heimatland aus und realisiert sich diese Gefahr schließlich, dann handelt es sich um eine Tötungshandlung des Staates, der den Schutzstatus versagt hat.102 Hegels Handlungstheorie impliziert (ebenso wie die Benthams) die moralische Verantwortlichkeit nicht nur für Handlungsfolgen, die beabsichtigt sind, sondern auch für jene, die nicht beabsichtigt, aber voraussehbar sind. Diese Rigidität scheint im Kontrast zur Tradition der so genannten Lehre von der Doppelwirkung zu stehen, die ursprünglich auf Thomas von Aquin zurückgeht.103 Danach gibt es bestimmte Situationen, für die gilt, dass der Akteur nur für die Handlungsfolgen verantwortlich ist, die er beabsichtigt hat, nicht aber für jene, deren Eintritt er zwar vorausgesehen, aber nicht beabsichtigt hat. Die Lehre von der Doppelwirkung dient also der Rechtfertigung von Handlungen, die voraussehbar schlechte Folgen haben. Vier Voraussetzungen müssen dafür erfüllt sein: Erstens muss es sich um eine Handlung handeln, die nicht schon hinsichtlich ihrer Absichten verwerflich ist. Die Abschiebung von Personen, die kein Aufenthaltsrecht im Aufenthaltsstaat haben und deshalb verpflichtet sind, denselben zu verlassen, erscheint als solche nicht moralisch verwerflich. Sie dient vielmehr der Herstellung eines moralisch zulässigen Zwecks, nämlich der Durchsetzung der staatlichen Souveränität über Einreise und Aufenthalt von Nichtbürgern. Zweitens darf der Akteur den voraussehbaren Schaden auch nicht als Mittel beabsichtigen, um den eigentlichen Zweck der Handlung zu erreichen. Die im Falle der Abschiebung voraussehbare Schädigung der betroffenen Person im Zielstaat der Abschiebung ist zweifellos kein Mittel zur Herbeiführung des eigentlich angestrebten Zwecks. Das kann man daran erkennen, dass es nicht widersprüchlich oder irrational ist, wenn die mit der Abschiebung befassten Behörden und Beamten hoffen und wünschen, dass der voraussehbare Schaden nicht eintreten möge. Sie brauchen diesen Schaden nicht, um den eigentlichen Zweck der Handlung, nämlich die Beendigung des illegalen Aufenthalts, herbeizuführen. Drittens darf es keine Möglichkeit geben, das Gute zu erreichen, ohne die schädlichen Wirkungen zu verursachen. Auch diese Voraussetzung ist im Falle des Verwaltungsvollzugs der Ausreisepflicht erfüllt. Es ist nicht möglich, den illegalen Aufenthalt zu beenden, ohne dass die betroffene Person den zu erwartenden Schädigungen ausgesetzt wird. Viertens dürfen die schädlichen Wirkungen schließlich nicht unverhältnismäßig groß sein im Verhältnis zu dem 102  Zu der Frage, wann die Gefahr hinreichend groß ist, ist in der deutschen Rechtsprechung der Grundsatz entwickelt worden, dass die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer Schädigung mehr als 50 Prozent betragen muss, um die Schutzwürdigkeit zu begründen. Vgl. dazu kritisch: Paul Tiede­ mann, „Gefahrendichte und Judiz –Versuch einer Rationalisierung“, ZAR 36 (2016), 53. Berlit hat die heutige Geltung dieses Dogmas bestritten, dazu vgl. Uwe Berlit, „Die Bestimmung der ‚Gefahrendichte‘ im Rahmen der Prüfung der Anerkennung als Flüchtling oder subsidiär Schutzberechtigter“, ZAR 37 (2017), 110. 103  Thomas v. Aquin, Summa Theologica 2 – 2, q. 64 a.7; zur Lehre von der Doppelwirkung allgemein: Christoph Horn, „Güterabwägung“, in: Marcus Düwell / Christoph Hübenthal / Micha H. Werner (Hrsg.), Handbuch Ethik, 2. Aufl. Stuttgart / Weimer: Metzler 2006, S. 393 f.

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angestrebten „guten“ Zweck. Spätestens an dieser Stelle erweist es sich, dass sich eine Abschiebung, die schwerwiegende Schädigungen im Zielstaat zur Folge hat, mittels der Lehre von der Doppelwirkung nicht rechtfertigen lässt. Denn das erreichbare „Gute“, die Beseitigung des illegalen Aufenthalts, wiegt weit weniger schwer als die im Zielstaat zu erwartende schwere Menschenrechtsverletzung. Bei Thomas von Aquin dient die Lehre von der Doppelwirkung der Lösung moralischer Dilemmata wie etwa dem Problem, ob man sein eigenes Leben gegen einen Angreifer verteidigen darf, wenn die Verteidigung notwendigerweise mit dem Tod des Angreifers verbunden ist. Im Falle der Beendigung eines illegalen Aufenthalts besteht kein vergleichbares moralisches Dilemma. Das gilt selbst dann, wenn es sich bei der abzuschiebenden Person um einen „Gefährder“ oder einen terroristischen Straftäter handelt. Denn die Abwehr von Terrorismus ist nicht nur mittels eigener Menschenrechtsverletzungen möglich. Deshalb ist die Lehre von der Doppelwirkung hier nicht anwendbar. Dabei kann offen bleiben, ob diese Lehre in den Fällen, für die sie gedacht ist, überzeugend ist oder nicht. Dieser Frage muss hier nicht näher nachgegangen werden. Das vorstehende Ergebnis der moralphilosophischen Analyse spiegelt sich im so genannten Refoulementverbot wider, das über entsprechende Kodifizierungen hinaus heute – zumindest im Falle drohender Folter – als Völkergewohnheitsrecht gilt.104 In der Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte (EGMR) ist die Auslieferung oder Abschiebung von Personen in ein Land, in dem ihnen die Verletzung von Menschenrechten droht, seit 1989 als aktive Schädigungshandlung anerkannt.105 Wie die philosophische Rekonstruktion des Refoulementverbotes zeigt, ist das Refoulementverbot kein Ausdruck von Solidarität.106 Es handelt sich vielmehr um ein Element, das den Menschenrechten inhärent ist. Daraus ergibt sich, dass es jedenfalls für Menschen, die sich im Aufnahmeland aufhalten und denen im Falle der Abschiebung ins Heimatland eine Beeinträchtigung in MR-Gütern droht, ein eigenständiges Menschenrecht auf Asyl nicht geben kann, aber auch nicht geben braucht. Denn der dem Asylrecht wesentliche Aspekt des Refoulementverbotes ist bereits integraler Bestandteil der Menschenrechte. Ein selbständig daneben stehendes Asylrecht ist deshalb redundant.107 Ein spezielles 104  Bianca Hofmann, Grundlagen und Auswirkungen des völkerrechtlichen Refoulementverbotes, Potsdam: MRZ o.J. – https://publishup.uni-potsdam.de / opus4-ubp / frontdoor / de​ liver / index / docId/4857/file / SGM03.pdf; Dagmar Richter, „Quasi-Asyl als Menschenrecht“, in: Marc Bungenberg / Thomas Giegerich / Torsten Stein (Hrsg.), Asyl und Migration in Europa – rechtliche Herausforderungen und Perspektiven, ZEuS Sonderband 2016, 51. 105  EGMR, Urt. v. 07.07.1989 – 1/1989/161/217 –, „Soering v. UK“, EuGRZ 16 (1989), 314. 106  A. A. Uwe Volkmann, „Der Flüchtling vor den Toren der Gemeinschaft“, KJ 49/2 (2016), 180 [187]. 107  In der Literatur wird das Refoulementverbot teilweise als wesentlicher Inhalt oder als Mindeststandard eines eigenständigen Asylgrundrechts betrachtet, vgl. Rainer Keil, „Asyl als Menschenrecht“, in: Markus Krajewski / Mathias Reuß / Tarik Tabbata (Hrsg.), Gesellschaftliche Herausforderungen des Rechts, Gedächtnisschrift Rittstieg, Baden-Baden: Nomos 2015, S. 163 [191 f.]; Richter (FN 103), 53. Andere halten Asylrecht und Refoulementverbot aus-

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positives Recht auf Asyl kommt deshalb nur für Fälle von Asylgewährung aus Solidarität in Betracht, in denen keine Beeinträchtigung in MR-Gütern droht, sondern nur eine geringere Beeinträchtigung (z. B. Diskriminierung). In der politischen Debatte wird gelegentlich gegen das Refoulementverbot geltend gemacht, es sei inakzeptabel, Flüchtlinge schützen zu müssen, die sich durch ihre illegale Einreise gleichsam aufgedrängt hätten und der Aufnahmegesellschaft damit die Freiheit genommen hätten, selbst zu entscheiden, ob und in welchem Umfang sie Flüchtlinge schützen will. Dieses Argument folgt einem Muster, das aus der moralphilosophischen Debatte um Abtreibung bekannt ist. So hat Judith Javis Thomson die Auffassung vertreten, dass der Embryo, der sich ungewollt im Uterus der Mutter einnistet, von ihrem Körper einen unzulässigen Gebrauch macht, weil die Mutter ihm kein Recht auf den Gebrauch ihres Körpers eingeräumt habe. Allein dadurch, dass die Mutter durch unverhüteten oder schlecht verhüteten Geschlechtsverkehr die Möglichkeit der Schwangerschaft ermöglicht habe, folge nicht, dass sie dem Embryo ein Recht über ihren Körper eingeräumt hätte, ebenso wenig wie jemand, der vergisst, seine Fenster zu schließen, dem Einbrecher das Recht einräume, sich seiner Wohnung zu bedienen. Deshalb stünde der Abtreibung nichts entgegen. Nach Thomson haben wir nämlich keine Verantwortung gegenüber anderen Personen, wenn wir sie nicht ausdrücklich und freiwillig übernommen haben.108 Hinter Thomsons Argument steht die Auffassung, dass es keine unbedingten Menschenrechte gibt, sondern nur Pflichten, die unter dem Vorbehalt freiwilliger Übernahme stehen.109 Diese Haltung ist mit der im III. Abschnitt dargestellten Idee der Menschenrechte unvereinbar. Thomson versucht ihr Argument mit Hilfe eines Gedankenexperiments („bewusstloser Geiger“) plausibel zu machen. Dieses Gedankenexperiment verfehlt jedoch das Problem, denn es beschreibt die Situation einer erzwungenen Hilfeleistung und handelt nicht von der Frage, ob es zur Wahrung der eigenen Autonomie erlaubt sein kann, andere aktiv zu töten. Indessen gilt: Jeder darf alles tun, um sein Leben autonom zu gestalten, aber er darf dabei niemanden schädigen.

einander, klären aber nicht den Unterschied, vgl. Wissenschaftlicher Dienst des Bundestages: Völker- und menschenrechtliche Vorgaben für Abschiebung von straffällig gewordenen Flüchtlingen, Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag 2016 – WD 2-3000-002/16 – S. 4. https://www.bundestag. de / blob/408768/e5632bc349bdd5722303c06481316d7f / wd-2-002-16-pdf-data.pdf. Funke (Fn. 1), 533 f. versteht unter einem Recht auf Asyl das Recht auf Zugang zu einem Aufnahmestaat, während das Refoulementverbot Rechte von Menschen betrifft, die sich bereits im Aufnahmestaat aufhalten. 108  Judith Javis Thomson, „Eine Verteidigung der Abtreibung“, in: Anton Leist (Hrsg.), Um Leben und Tod. Moralische Probleme bei Abtreibung, künstlicher Befruchtung, Euthanasie und Selbstmord, Frankfurt / M: Suhrkamp 1990, S. 108 ff. 109  Thomson (Fn. 108), 119.

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V. Pflichten gegenüber Flüchtlingen im Ausland Damit kommen wir zu den Pflichten, die gegenüber schutzwürdigen Menschen zu erfüllen sind, welche ihre Heimat verlassen haben, um anderswo Schutz zu suchen, aber sich bisher außerhalb des möglichen Aufnahmestaates befinden. Welche Pflichten hat beispielsweise Deutschland gegenüber Flüchtlingen, die ihr Heimatland Eritrea verlassen haben und sich jetzt irgendwo in Äthiopien, dem Sudan oder Libyen befinden und dort in Lebensgefahr sind? Spielen in dieser Situation strikte Verbotspflichten eine Rolle oder eher etwaige Hilfspflichten? Die Antwort setzt zunächst die Klärung der Frage voraus, ob das Verhalten Deutschlands, wenn es in Bezug auf die besagten Flüchtlinge keine Aktivitäten entfaltet, einfach als Nichtstun zu deuten ist oder als eine Handlung, die in einer Unterlassung besteht. Ist die Situation mit „Nichtstun“ korrekt beschrieben, dann lässt sich, wenn die Flüchtlinge zu Tode kommen, nicht sagen, dass Deutschland sie getötet hätte. Deutschland verletzt bei dieser Deutung keine Verbote. Es käme dann nur eine mögliche Hilfspflicht in Betracht. Ist das Verhalten Deutschlands dagegen als „negative“ Handlung oder Unterlassungshandlung zu deuten, dann könnte sich der etwaige Tod der Flüchtlinge ähnlich wie in der Refoulement-Situation als vorsätzlicher oder fahrlässiger Tötungsakt darstellen, für den Deutschland verantwortlich ist. Wendet man Hegels Handlungstheorie auf diese Situation an, ist zunächst festzustellen, dass es an einer Tat fehlt, also an einer aktiven Einwirkung auf den Zustand der Welt. Das Nichtstun wird in der Jurisprudenz einer Tat gleichwohl dann gleichgesetzt, wenn man es nicht hinwegdenken kann, ohne dass der Erfolg entfiele (conditio sine qua non).110 Das Hinwegdenken des Nichtstuns besteht im Hinzudenken einer Tat. Die ganze Operation beruht somit auf Fiktionen, nämlich auf einem Nichtstun, das tatsächlich nicht entfallen ist, und auf einer Tat, die tatsächlich nicht stattgefunden hat. Diesem Problem muss hier aber nicht weiter nachgegangen werden.111 Denn selbst wenn man in einer plausiblen Weise ein Surrogat für die fehlende Tat finden kann, wird aus diesem Tat-Surrogat keine (negative) Handlung, denn es fehlt an einer Absicht. Selbst wenn Deutschland ein Bewusstsein davon hat, welche Folgen sein Nichtstun haben wird, verfolgt es mit seinem Unterlassen keine Absichten. Deshalb liegt keine Handlung vor. In einer Handlung kann nämlich zwar der Vorsatz ersetzt werden durch fahrlässige Außerachtlassung der erforderlichen Sorgfalt. Die Absicht aber ist konstitutiv und kann nicht wegfallen, ohne dass damit auch die Handlung entfiele.112 Liegt somit keine Handlung vor, stellt sich auch nicht die Frage, wie weit sie reicht und ob sie möglicherweise als Verletzung von Menschenrechten zu interpretieren wäre.  Ebenso: Quante (Fn. 90), 177.  Vgl. dazu Dieter Birnbacher / David Hommen: Negative Kausalität, Berlin: De Gruyter 2012; Ingeborg Puppe, „Negative Kausalität und Jurisprudenz. Ein Diskussionsbeitrag zu Birnbacher und Hommen“, ZphilForsch 67/4 (2013), 632. 112  Quante (Fn. 90), 205. 110 111

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Verstößt Deutschland durch sein Nichtstun somit nicht gegen moralische Verbote, so stellt sich die Frage, ob die Unterlassung einer Hilfeleistung vorliegt, die moralisch geboten ist. Das ist der Fall, wenn es eine Pflicht gibt, die erforderliche Hilfe zu leisten. Von einer moralischen Pflicht, die nicht Tugend-, sondern Rechtspflicht ist, kann nur dann die Rede sein, wenn dieser Pflicht ein Recht korrespondiert. Das ist nur dann der Fall, wenn es möglich ist, die Erfüllung der Pflicht irgendwie „einzuklagen“. Die Einklagbarkeit setzt voraus, dass sich für jeden beliebigen Sachverhalt eindeutig feststellen lässt, ob die Pflicht erfüllt oder verletzt worden ist. Das wiederum setzt voraus, dass die Pflicht im Hinblick auf die folgenden fünf Bedingungen hinreichend bestimmt ist: Es muss eindeutig bestimmt sein, (1.) wer die Pflicht zu erfüllen hat und wer nicht, (2.) wem gegenüber sie zu erfüllen ist und wem gegenüber nicht, (3.) in welcher Art von Handlung die Erfüllung besteht und in welchen Arten nicht, (4.) zu welchem Zeitpunkt die Pflichterfüllung fällig wird und (5.) an welchem Ort die Erfüllung zu erfolgen hat.113 Gegenüber den eritreischen Flüchtlingen in der sudanesischen Wüste ist schon nicht klar, dass ausgerechnet Deutschland die Hilfe leisten muss und nicht vielmehr andere Länder. Selbst wenn Deutschland prinzipiell zur Hilfeleistung verpflichtet ist, steht aber nicht fest, dass diese gegenüber jenen Menschen zu leisten ist, die sich gerade jetzt an einem bestimmten Ort in der sudanesischen Wüste aufhalten. Deutschland könnte seine Ressourcen auch in anderen Teilen der Welt zum Einsatz bringen. Es fehlt für eine moralische Pflicht also bereits an der hinreichenden Bestimmtheit. Für Jaako Kuosmanen ist diese Unbestimmtheit allerdings kein hinreichender Grund, um die Staaten der Welt aus ihrer moralischen Verantwortlichkeit zu entlassen. Zwar gäbe es keine moralische Pflicht jedes einzelnen Staates, jedem einzelnen hilfsbedürftigen Flüchtling individuell zu helfen. Es gäbe aber die moralische Pflicht, die notwendigen globalen Institutionen zu schaffen, die mit den nötigen sächlichen und persönlichen Mitteln ausgestattet seien, um allen Menschen, die sich aus moralisch relevanten Gründen auf der Flucht befinden, den erforderlichen Schutz zu gewähren.114 Gegen diese Überlegung ist aber einzuwenden, dass es eine auf einen konkreten Staat bezogene Pflicht zur Schaffung überstaatlicher Institutionen nicht geben kann. Denn Pflichten können nicht weiter reichen als das Vermögen, sie zu erfüllen (ultra posse nemo obligatur). Ein einzelner Staat kann keine globalen Institutionen schaffen, weil es dazu der Kooperation mit wenigstens einigen anderen Staaten bedarf. Kein einzelner Staat ist fähig, globale Institutionen zu schaffen, wenn nie113  Andreas Wildt, „Milde Pflichten. Moralische Verpflichtungen ohne korrelative moralische Rechte anderer“, DZPhil 55/1 (2007), 41 hat auf eine besondere Art von („milden“) Pflichten hingewiesen, von denen er behauptet, dass ihnen keine Rechte korrelieren, obwohl sie hinreichend bestimmt und sanktionierbar sind. Diese Pflichten spielen aber hier keine Rolle. 114  Jaakko Kuosmanen, „Perfecting Imperfect Duties: The Institutionalisation of a Universal Right to Asylum“, Journal of Political Philosophy 21/1 (2013), 24; zur Diskussion von Lastenverteilung s. a. David Miller, Fremde in unserer Mitte. Politische Philosophie der Einwanderung, Berlin: Suhrkamp 2017, S. 136 ff.

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mand mitmacht. Ob die anderen mitmachen, liegt außerhalb der Kontrolle des einzelnen Staates. Was außerhalb der eigenen Kontrolle liegt, kann nicht Gegenstand einer Pflicht sein. Gewöhnlich entstehen soziale Institutionen im Allgemeinen und globale Institutionen im Besonderen nur in seltenen historischen Momenten, oft im Anschluss an eine von Menschen gemachte Katastrophe (Krieg, Bankencrash, Wirtschaftskrise) innerhalb eines sehr kleinen zeitlichen Fensters der Gelegenheiten. In dieser Situation bedarf es der intuitiven Erfassung des Kairos und des nötigen Geschicks, um entsprechende Impulse an die internationale Gemeinschaft auszusenden, die Initiative zu ergreifen und überzeugende Vorschläge zu unterbreiten. Es kann aber keine Pflicht geben, diese Intuition und dieses Geschick zu haben. Erst wenn der Prozess der Institutionenbildung bereits in Gang gesetzt ist, kann es eine moralische Pflicht geben, sich diesem Prozess nicht zu verweigern, die neue Institution nicht zu schwächen und zu ihrer Wirksamkeit nach Kräften beizutragen. Solange es keine globale Institution des Flüchtlingsschutzes gibt, gibt es also weder eine direkte, noch eine indirekte Pflicht der Staaten zur Hilfeleistung für Flüchtlinge außerhalb ihres Herrschaftsbereichs. Nicht nur die Unbestimmtheit möglicher Hilfspflichten, sondern auch das Fehlen einer Garantenstellung steht der ethischen Begründung staatlicher Hilfspflichten gegenüber Flüchtlingen im Ausland entgegen. Die deontologische Moraltheorie verlangt für aktive Leistungspflichten stets das Bestehen eines darauf gerichteten besonderen Garantenverhältnisses. Daran fehlt es hier. Deshalb bleibt letztlich nur der Appell an eine generelle humanitäre Haltung der Staaten in der Hoffnung, dass sie wenigstens etwas tun, wenn sie schon nicht alles Erforderliche zu tun verpflichtet sind.115 Anders verhält es sich allerdings, wenn ein bestimmter potenzieller Aufnahmestaat in Bezug auf bestimmte oder individuell bestimmbare Flüchtlinge eine Garantenstellung innehat. Solche besonderen Beziehungen können sich aus einer Politik gegenüber dem Herkunftsstaat der Flüchtlinge ergeben, die eine konkret nachvollziehbare Schädigung der Flüchtlinge und daher eine Kompensationspflicht zur Folge hat.116 Besondere Pflichten dieser Art bestehen allerdings nicht gegenüber 115  Ebenso im Ergebnis: Ernst Tugendhat, „The Moral Dilemma in the Rescue of Refugees“, Social Research 62/1 (1995), 129 [136, 140]. 116  Solche Kompensationspflichten können sich beispielsweise aus den Freihandelsabkommen ergeben, die die EU gerade mit fünf afrikanischen Staatengruppen verhandelt, bzw. bereits abgeschlossen hat. Diese Abkommen sehen vor, dass Rohwaren ebenso wie Halbfertig- und Fertigprodukte zollfrei in die jeweiligen Vertragsstaaten exportiert werden können. Das bedeutet faktisch, dass Europa beispielsweise durch den Export hoch subventionierten Weizens in afrikanische Staaten die dortige Maniok- oder Sorgum-Bauern in den Ruin treibt, weil deren Preise wegen der höheren Produktionskosten deutlich über denen der europäischen Importware liegt. Wenn diese Bauern dadurch ihre Lebensgrundlage verlieren und sich deshalb auf den Weg machen, um in Europa ihr Auskommen zu finden, dann haben sie einen Anspruch auf Einreise, Aufenthalt und Arbeitserlaubnis aus dem Gesichtspunkt des deontologischen Kompensationsgebots. Vgl. zu dieser Problematik: Isabel Pfaff / Nikolaus Piper, „Ursache oder Lösung“, Süddeutsche.de v. 23.11.2016 – http://www.sueddeutsche.de / wirtschaft/2.220/

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allen Flüchtlingen aus der so genannten Dritten Welt und auch nicht gegenüber allen, die (relativer) Armut entfliehen wollen. Schädigungen aus der Kolonialzeit führen beispielsweise nicht zu Kompensationspflichten für Staaten, die gar nicht als Kolonialmacht in dem Herkunftsgebiet des jeweiligen Schutzsuchenden aufgetreten sind. Und selbst den früheren Kolonialstaaten gegenüber muss noch ein hinreichender Kausalzusammenhang zwischen der damaligen Schädigung und dem heutigen Kompensationsanspruch nachgewiesen werden. Schutzsuchende können sich nicht unbegrenzt auf Schädigungen berufen, die Jahrhunderte zurückliegen. Thomas Pogge vertritt die Ansicht, dass sich ein Kompensationsanspruch auch aus jenen Schädigungen ergibt, die durch die gegenwärtige Struktur der globalen Wirtschaftsordnung herbeigeführt werden.117 Diese Ordnung trägt wesentlich zu Armut, Korruption und Tyrannei in zahlreichen Staaten des globalen Südens bei. Nach Pogge wirkt jeder Mensch an dieser Schädigung mit, der (z. B. durch Steuerzahlung, Konsum, politische Teilhabe und Wahlverhalten) an der Aufrechterhaltung dieser Ordnung mitwirkt.118 Aus dieser Verstrickung in ungerechte Strukturen erwächst nach Pogge zwar keine moralische Pflicht zu einer aktiven Weltverbesserung, wohl aber die negative moralische Pflicht, die strukturelle Mitwirkung an Schädigungen zu unterlassen. Wer gegen dieses Verbot verstößt, beteiligt sich an der Schädigung und macht sich kompensationspflichtig. Um an den Schädigungen des Systems der globalen Wirtschaftsordnung nicht mehr beteiligt zu sein, bedarf es indessen mehr als einer bloßen Unterlassung. Menschen können ihrer Verantwortung, so wie sie Pogge versteht, nur dann entgehen, wenn sie etwa aufhören, Steuern zu bezahlen, was aber nur möglich ist, wenn sie aufhören, versteuerbares Einkommen oder versteuerbaren Konsum zu generieren.119 Das geht nicht ohne Aufgabe der bürgerlichen Existenz. Ein solches Verhalten geht über bloßes Nichtstun deutlich hinaus. Auch wenn man auf die Teilnahme an politischen Wahlen verzichtet, weil z. B. alle zur Wahl stehenden Parteien entweder die ungerechte globale Wirtschaftsordnung unterstützen oder es sich um politische Hasardeure handelt, nützt das tendenziell nur den radikalen Parteien und trägt freihan​delsabkommen-ursache-oder-loesung-1.3262864; Hafsat Abiola-Costello, „Europa erzeugt die Flüchtlinge selbst“, Zeit.de v. 1.8.2016 – http://www.zeit.de / kultur/2016-07/westafri​ ka-freihandelsabkommen-eu-fluechtlinge-hafsat-abiola/; Annette Groth / Theo Kneifel, Europa plündert Afrika. Der EU-Freihandel und die EPAs, Hamburg: VSA 2007. 117  Thomas W. Pogge, Weltarmut und Menschenrechte. Kosmopolitische Verantwortung und Reformen, Berlin: de Gruyter 2011, S. 172; eine ähnliche Ansicht vertritt auch Iris Marion Young, „Verantwortung und globale Gerechtigkeit. Ein Modell sozialer Verbundenheit“, in: Christoph Broszies / Henning Hahn (Hrsg.), Globale Gerechtigkeit. Schlüsseltexte zum Streit zwischen Kosmopolitismus und Partikularismus, Berlin: Suhrkamp 2010, S. 329; dazu auch Henning Hahn, „Globale Gerechtigkeit. Das Prinzip kosmopolitischer Verantwortung“, in: Clemens Sedlak (Hrsg.), Gerechtigkeit. Vom Wert der Verhältnismäßigkeit, Darmstadt: WBG 2014, S. 185. 118  Pogge (Fn. 117), 88. 119  Das ist die Tragik der Steuerverweigerung aus Gewissensgründen. Vgl. dazu Paul Tie­ demann, Das Recht der Steuerverweigerung aus Gewissensgründen, Hildesheim: Olms 1991.

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nichts zur Abschaffung ungerechter Strukturen bei. Strukturelle Ungerechtigkeit ist für das einzelne Individuum unentrinnbar. Pogge weist an mehreren Stellen seines Buches darauf hin, dass sich seine moralischen Appelle an die „beständigen und einflussreichen Teilnehmer“ des Systems oder „zumindest“ an „die privilegierten und einflussreicheren Bürger“ richten, die zudem nur „in manchen Fällen“ sich für die Reform des Systems einsetzen oder seine Opfer schützen sollen.120 Das spricht eben gerade nicht für strikte Unterlassungspflichten, sondern für positive, aber eben nur „unvollkommene“ Pflichten zur Weltverbesserung, die zudem nur wahrnehmen kann, wer über ungewöhnlich viel Einfluss und Macht verfügt. Es stellt sich zudem die Frage, ob die Aufnahme von Flüchtlingen überhaupt die geeignete Kompensation für Schädigungen wäre, welche durch die strukturelle Ungerechtigkeit der globalen Wirtschaftsordnung hervorgerufen werden.121 Nach Pogge ist diese Ordnung vor allem durch das internationale Rohstoffprivileg und das internationale Kreditprivileg gekennzeichnet. Ersteres besteht darin, dass jedem faktischen Machthaber in den armen Staaten die rechtliche Befugnis zugebilligt wird, global gültige Eigentumsrechte an den Ressourcen des Landes zu übertragen und sich auf diese Weise auf Kosten der Bevölkerung zu bereichern.122 Das internationale Kreditprivileg erlaubt es den Machthabern in den armen Ländern, im Namen und zu Lasten der Bevölkerung Kredite aufzunehmen und damit zur Erhaltung ihres tyrannischen und ausbeuterischen Systems dem ganzen Land rechtsgültige Zahlungsverpflichtungen aufzubürden, die auch dann noch bestehen, wenn es gelingt, die tyrannische Herrschaft zu beseitigen.123 Die Schäden, die durch diese beiden Privilegien den armen Ländern zugefügt werden, können durch die Aufnahme von Flüchtlingen indessen nicht kompensiert werden. Wenn man mit Pogge davon ausgeht, dass jeder Konsument oder Steuerzahler in den reichen Ländern durch sein Verhalten zu den Schädigungen faktisch beiträgt, so würde – jenseits der individuellen moralischen Verantwortlichkeit – die Aufnahme von Flüchtlingen aus den betroffenen armen Ländern dazu führen, dass auch diese künftig durch Konsum und Steuerzahlung die ungerechten Verhältnisse aufrecht erhalten, unter denen sie zuvor selbst gelitten haben. Der Schaden würde also nicht beseitigt, sondern nur die Zahl der Täter vermehrt. Das zeigt, dass systemische Ungerechtigkeiten und die darauf beruhenden Schädigungen nur sehr bedingt durch die Aufnahme von Flüchtlingen kompensiert werden können. Pogge selbst schlägt diese Art der Kompensation auch nicht vor, sondern fordert die Reform der globalen Wirtschaftsordnung. Eine solche Reform hätte freilich zur Folge, dass sich zahlreiche Motive zur Flucht und Emigration erledigten.   Pogge (Fn. 117), 170, 217.   So aber Hoesch (Fn. 64), 21; Stephan Schlothfeldt, „Ökonomische Migration und globale Verteilungsgerechtigkeit“, in: Märker / Schlothfeldt (Fn. 33), 93  ff.; Veit Bader, „Praktische Philosophie und Zulassung von Flüchtlingen und Migranten“, in: Märker / Schlothfeldt (Fn. 33), 143 ff. 122  Pogge (Fn. 117), 144 f. 123  Pogge (Fn. 117), 145. 120 121

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Im Wesentlichen bleibt es also dabei, dass die Hilfeleistung für Flüchtlinge außerhalb des Territoriums des Aufnahmestaates nicht Gegenstand einer Pflicht ist, sondern nur die Tugend der Humanität anspricht. Mit dieser Tugend lässt es sich allerdings nicht vereinbaren, auf das Elend der Flüchtlinge in aller Welt mit Gleichgültigkeit zu reagieren. Vielmehr bleibt der anständige Staat auf Grund seiner humanitären Haltung aufgefordert, ernsthafte und sorgfältige Überlegungen darüber anzustellen, in welchem Umfang er welche Flüchtlinge im Rahmen von Resettlement-Programmen in das eigene Territorium holt, um ihnen hier Schutz zu gewähren. Dabei müssen alle Gesichtspunkte berücksichtigt werden, die sachgerecht sind. Zugleich muss die Berücksichtigung aller unsachlichen Gesichtspunkte vermieden werden. Im Zentrum der sachgerechten Erwägungsgründe stehen Überlegungen zur objektiven Leistungsfähigkeit des Aufnahmestaates. Bei der objektiven Leistungsfähigkeit kommt es auf die Fähigkeit an, in angemessener Zeit für eine menschenwürdige Unterkunft zu sorgen und die Menschen zu versorgen. Soweit die Leistungsfähigkeit insoweit von den zur Verfügung stehen Haushaltsmitteln abhängt, ist die politische Unbeliebtheit einer erforderlichen Steuererhöhung kein Argument bei der Einschätzung der Leistungsfähigkeit. Selbst die zumindest zeitweise Einweisung von Flüchtlingen in private Wohnungen ist nicht zwingend eine unzumutbare Überforderung und muss daher notfalls in Betracht gezogen werden.124 Dagegen hängt die objektive Leistungsfähigkeit jedenfalls nicht von der Xenophobie oder den irrationalen Ängsten der Bevölkerung125 und dem Risiko des politischen Erfolgs rechtsradikaler Parteien ab.126 Auch der Gesichtspunkt eines drohenden Sogeffekts im Falle hinreichend großzügiger Aufnahme von Flüchtlingen ist kein sachgerechter Erwägungsgrund. Denn Menschen in Not haben das moralische Recht, dort um Asyl nachzusuchen, wo sie sich den größten Erfolg versprechen. Schließlich darf man auch die reale Not der schutzwürdigen Flüchtlinge nicht abwägen gegen bloß vermutete negative Effekte in der Aufnahmegesellschaft.127 Denn Realität wiegt schwerer als bloße (pessimistische) Phantasie. Einige Autoren vertreten die Auffassung, dass bei den Erwägungen zum Umfang der humanitären Hilfe gegenüber Flüchtlingen nicht nur die eigene objektive Leistungsfähigkeit berücksichtigt werden darf, sondern auch das Kriterium der fairen Lastenverteilung unter allen humanitär gesinnten und leistungsfähigen Staaten. Die Berücksichtigung dieses Kriteriums soll dabei unabhängig davon 124  Hier wohl a. A. Andreas Fisch, „Skizze einer Migrationsethik für die Reduktion der Zahl von Flüchtlingen“, JRE 25 (2017), 24 [37]. 125  Vgl. R+V Versicherung: Die Ängste der Deutschen – https://www.ruv.de / presse / aengsteder-deutschen / downloads. 126  Politiker werden solche Erwägungen dennoch in die Entscheidung einfließen lassen. Das ist nachvollziehbar, aber gleichwohl moralisch kritisierbar. Von Bürgern muss daher moralisch verlangt werden, die Politiker dazu zu ermutigen und dabei zu unterstützen, sich nicht von solchen Gesichtspunkten leiten zu lassen. Siehe dazu auch Fisch (Fn. 124), 39. 127  Singer (Fn. 30), 74.

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gelten, ob eine solche Lastenverteilung tatsächlich stattfindet.128 Danach ist es also sachgerecht, im Wege einer fiktiven Berechnung festzustellen, wie viele Flüchtlinge jeder einzelne Staat übernehmen müsste, wenn eine gerechte Lastenverteilung stattfände. Ausgehend von einem solchen Schema muss der Staat dann nur so viele Flüchtlinge aufnehmen, wie der eigenen Quote entsprechen. Ein solches fiktives Lastenverteilungsschema ist indessen nicht sachgerecht. Entscheidend für die Frage der Höchstgrenze, bis zu der Flüchtlinge aufgenommen werden sollten, sind nicht fiktive Rechenspiele, sondern allein die objektive Leistungsfähigkeit.129 Die sachgerechten Erwägungen über die Art und Zahl der aufzunehmenden Flüchtlinge lassen keinen gleichsam mathematischen Schluss auf die Zahl der Flüchtlinge zu, die tatsächlich aufgenommen werden müssen. Insoweit gibt es vielmehr einen politischen Spielraum, innerhalb dessen verschiedene Entscheidungen möglich sind, von denen keine moralisch verwerflich ist. Deshalb gibt es keine moralische Pflicht zur „richtigen Berechnung“. Es bleibt aus moralischer Sicht vielmehr bei dem Appell an das humanitäre Selbstverständnis des jeweiligen Staates und seiner Bürgerschaft. Die politische Entscheidung muss jedoch auf der Basis einer realistischen Einschätzung der objektiven Leistungsfähigkeit erfolgen, also im klaren Bewusstsein davon, was wir können und was wir wollen. Das schließt ein klares Bewusstsein davon, was wir können, aber nicht wollen, mit ein. Eine Informationspolitik, die zu einer verzerrten Wahrnehmung der objektiven Leistungsfähigkeit führen soll, ist moralisch verwerflich, weil sie auf Manipulation und kollektiven Selbstbetrug hinausläuft. VI. Die Grenze zwischen „Innen“ und „Außen“ Die moralischen Pflichten gegenüber Flüchtlingen, die sich bereits im Inland befinden, unterscheiden sich also sehr grundlegend von dem, was gegenüber Flüchtlingen im Ausland moralisch verlangt werden kann. Die einen können sich auf moralische Ansprüche berufen, die anderen können nur an die humanitäre Gesinnung möglicher Aufnahmestaaten appellieren. Peter Singer hat diese Unterscheidung deshalb als willkürlich kritisiert: Diejenigen, die sich die Reise leisten könnten, würden geschützt, die anderen blieben sich selbst überlassen.130 Dieses Asylparadox ist gleichwohl gut begründet. Denn die scheinbar anstößige Zufälligkeit ist dem Wesen von Garantenpflichten geschuldet. Ein Arzt hat eine Garantenstellung 128  Jonathan L. Cohen, „Who is Starving Whom?“, Theoria 47/2 (1981), 65 [73]; Pogge (Fn. 117), 346 Fn. 267. 129  Jaako Kuosmanen, „Global protection of the right to asylum and partial compliance“, Global Justice 5 (2012), 46. 130  Peter Singer, „Escaping the Refugee Crisis“ – https://www.project-syndicate.org / com​ mentary / escaping-europe-refugee-crisis-by-peter-singer-2015-09. In Singer (Fn. 25), 68 vermutet er, dass die Unterscheidung auf irrationalen Gründen beruht, nämlich etwa auf der Unterscheidung zwischen denen, die man kennt, und jenen, die man nicht kennt.

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nur gegenüber den Patienten, die zufällig in sein Krankenhaus eingeliefert worden sind, und nicht gegenüber allen Menschen, die unter derselben Krankheit leiden. Eltern schulden ihre Sorge nur gegenüber den Kindern, die zufällig die eigenen sind, und nicht gegenüber allen, die der Obhut bedürfen. Der große moralische Unterschied zwischen „drinnen“ und „draußen“ lässt die Frage relevant werden, wo genau die Grenze dazwischen verläuft. Bisher habe ich insoweit einfach nur zwischen einem Aufenthalt von Flüchtlingen innerhalb und außerhalb des Territoriums des Aufnahmestaates unterschieden. Diese Unterscheidung ist aber viel zu unscharf. Entscheidend ist vielmehr, ob sich die Flüchtlinge in einer Situation befinden, für die ein bestimmter Verpflichteter festgestellt werden kann, der gegenüber bestimmten schutzbedürftigen Individuen bestimmte Handlungen ausführen kann, die sich als konkrete moralische Rechtsverletzungen deuten lassen. Es müssen also alle Bestimmtheiten vorliegen, die für eine Pflicht gegenüber anderen erforderlich sind und das Verbot konstituieren, anderen nicht zu schaden. Es liegt zunächst nahe, diese Bedingungen nicht nur für Personen erfüllt zu sehen, die sich bereits im Inland befinden, sondern auch für jene, die unmittelbar an der Grenze stehen und dort um Asyl nachsuchen. Denn allein mit der Äußerung eines Schutzbegehrens versetzt der Flüchtling den Staat, demgegenüber er es äußert, in eine Situation, in der jener nicht mehr nur einfach nichts tun kann. Er steht vielmehr unausweichlich in der Situation, über dieses Gesuch entscheiden zu müssen, indem er entweder die Einreise gestattet, d.h. geschehen lässt, oder indem er den Asylsuchenden zurückweist, d.h. aktiv an der Einreise hindert. Diese Entscheidung ist, unabhängig davon wie sie ausfällt, in jedem Fall eine positive Handlung, die unentrinnbar mit der Verantwortung für alle Folgen verbunden ist, von denen die staatlichen Behörden wissen oder fahrlässig nicht wissen. Der Staat kann sich dieser Verantwortlichkeit auch nicht dadurch entziehen, dass er Maßnahmen ergreift, die es den Flüchtlingen unmöglich machen, gegenüber einem Beamten ein verbales oder schriftliches Asylgesuch zu äußern. Denn solche Maßnahmen setzen bereits voraus, dass der Staat um die Existenz von Flüchtlingen weiß, deren förmliche Antragstellung er verhindern will. Dieses Wissen zwingt zu einer Entscheidung und damit zu einer positiven Handlung. Die moralische Verantwortlichkeit des Staates gegenüber Flüchtlingen an seiner Grenze generiert die Pflicht, Abwehrmaßnahmen gegen die Einreise zu unterlassen, wenn andernfalls gegen das Verbot einer Verletzung von Menschen- oder Solidarrechten verstoßen würde oder gegen das Kompensationsgebot im Falle vorgängiger Schädigung.131 Wird die Einreise gleichwohl verweigert, dann stellt sich diese Handlung als aktive Zufügung eines Schadens dar.132   Ebenso die juridische Deutung des Art. 16a GG bei Keil (Fn. 106), 179.   Dieser Logik würde es eigentlich entsprechen, wenn die Einreiseverweigerung vor Gericht mit der Anfechtungsklage angegriffen werden müsste und nicht, wie es positivem Recht entspricht, mit der Verpflichtungsklage. 131 132

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Man zögert indessen, diesen Überlegungen auch für den Fall zuzustimmen, dass an der Grenze Millionen Menschen stehen, von denen wir wissen, dass sie alle in MR-Gütern bedroht und deshalb schutzwürdig sind. Julian Nida-Rümelin hat (nicht nur) für diese Situation die Goldene Regel auf das Flüchtlingsthema angewandt und formuliert: „Verlange von der Migrationspolitik nichts, was Du nicht auch in deinem sozialen Nahbereich akzeptierst, und praktiziere im sozialen Nahbereich, was Du von der Migrationspolitik erwartest.“133 In der Tat sind theoretisch Szenarien denkbar, in denen ein moralisch korrektes Verhalten zum Untergang unseres Staatswesens führen könnte. Bei 65 Mio. schutzwürdigen Flüchtlingen an unseren Grenzen wäre das wahrscheinlich der Fall. Indessen stünden wir dann vor der Wahl, uns notfalls gewaltsam, aber in moralisch verwerflicher Weise selbst zu behaupten oder aber moralisch zu bleiben und unterzugehen. Aus ethischer Sicht ist es auch in dieser Situation allemal besser, Unrecht zu erleiden als Unrecht zu tun.134 Vor dem Forum der Geschichte müssten wir uns aber in jedem Fall der Dummheit bezichtigen lassen, die darin besteht, untätig geblieben zu sein, als es noch möglich gewesen wäre, etwas gegen drohende Kriege, Klimakatastrophen und wirtschaftliche Verelendung in der Welt zu tun. Die reale Lage in Europa zeichnet sich allerdings nicht durch solche Phantasmata aus.135 Das reale Problem besteht vielmehr darin, dass wir wissen oder annehmen können, dass nur ein Teil der Menschen an unseren Grenzen schutzwürdig ist und ein anderer Teil nicht, ohne dass sich jedes einzelne Individuum der einen oder der anderen Gruppe prima facie zuordnen ließe.136 Aus diesem anfänglichen Nichtwissen folgt aber nicht etwa, dass die Rechtsträger, denen gegenüber Verbotspflichten zu erfüllen sind, nicht identifizierbar wären. Moralische Pflichten bestehen nicht nur gegenüber den schutzwürdigen Menschen, deren Identität sich geradezu aufdrängt oder ohne jeden Prüfungsaufwand festgestellt werden kann. Zwar ist anerkannt, dass derjenige, der ein Recht geltend machen will, die Darlegungs- und Beweislast für die Existenz des Rechts trägt. Aber von der anderen Seite wird jedenfalls verlangt, dass sie die vorgelegten Darlegungen und Beweise zur Kenntnis nimmt und prüft. Der Staat darf sich nicht künstlich „dumm“ stellen, sondern muss den Betroffenen die Gelegenheit geben, das moralische Pflichtenverhältnis darzulegen und plausibel zu machen. Er muss deshalb effektive Maßnahmen ergreifen, um die schutzwürdigen von den nicht schutzwürdigen Einrei  Nida-Rümelin (Fn. 52), 154.   Platon, Gorgias 469c. 135 Ende 2016 gab es ca. 22,5 Mio. registrierte Flüchtlinge und 2,5 Mio. Asylsuchende weltweit. In Deutschland wurden 720.000 Asylanträge registriert, vgl. IOM, World Migration Report 2018, S. 32, 71 – http://publications.iom.int / system / files / pdf / wmr_2018_en.pdf?lan​ guage=en. 136  Die Schutzquote des BAMF betrug im Jahre 2016 62,4 % und im Jahre 2017 43,4 %. Selbst wenn man berücksichtigt, dass gegen viele ablehnende Bescheide Klagen erhoben wurden, die erfolgreich waren, bleibt ein beträchtlicher Teil erfolgloser Asylanträge – vgl. BAMF (Hrsg.), Jahresgerichtsstatistik 2017 – http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Meldungen/ DE/2018/20180223-klagezahlen-gegen-asylentscheidungen.html. 133 134

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sewilligen zu unterscheiden. Aus moralphilosophischer Sicht lässt sich in diesem Zusammenhang nichts dagegen einwenden, wenn alle Asylsuchenden zunächst in eine Aufnahmeeinrichtung dicht an der Grenze aufgenommen werden, die sie nicht verlassen dürfen, bevor ihre Schutzwürdigkeit festgestellt worden ist, und von der sie, wenn die Schutzwürdigkeit zu verneinen ist, direkt in ihr Heimatland abgeschoben werden können. Das Problem solcher Aufnahmeeinrichtungen besteht allerdings darin, dass der Staat, der solche Einrichtungen betreibt, damit auch die Verantwortung dafür übernimmt, dass dort ein menschenwürdiges Leben möglich ist, auch wenn für eine überschaubare Übergangszeit gewisse Einschränkungen zumutbar sein mögen. Diese Pflicht erwächst einem Garantenverhältnis, das der Staat mit jenen Menschen eingeht, die er in Einrichtungen aufnimmt, denen sie nicht entgehen können und in denen sie nur unzureichend für ihr eigenes Leben sorgen können. Die Grenzen dessen, was der Staat leisten muss, um die schutzwürdigen Personen zu identifizieren, sind aber erreicht, wenn der Aufwand, den er mit dem Aufnahmeverfahren betreiben muss, unverhältnismäßig hoch wird. Von einem schwach organisierten, ressourcenarmen und überhaupt eher fragilen Staatswesen kann insoweit weniger verlangt werden als von gut funktionierenden, stabilen und wohlhabenden Staaten.137 Indessen ist es zumindest theoretisch vorstellbar, dass auch starke Staaten irgendwann an die Grenzen verwaltungstechnischer Beherrschbarkeit kommen. Das würde es aber nicht rechtfertigen, den schutzwürdigen Menschen an der Grenze die Einreise zu verweigern, nur weil man keinen weiteren Identifizierungsaufwand treiben will oder kann. Es bliebe dann nur, die Grenzen zu öffnen und jeden einreisen zu lassen, der einreisen will, solange die reale Wahrscheinlichkeit besteht, dass sich darunter Menschen befinden, denen gegenüber das moralisch Schädigungsverbot zu beachten ist. Ein solches Vorgehen würde auf Dauer die Funktion der Staatsgrenze gänzlich beseitigen und letztlich auf den Verzicht des Anspruchs auf territoriale Integrität hinauslaufen. Das wäre zwar aus der nationalen Perspektive politisch unerwünscht, aber kein moralisches Fehlverhalten. Staaten haben nämlich nicht das moralische Recht, einen an sich legitimen Status Quo mit dem Mittel der Menschenrechtsverletzung aufrechtzuerhalten.138   Funke (Fn. 1), 541.  Aus diesen Überlegungen ergibt sich, dass sich die Entscheidung von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel vom 14. September 2015, die Grenzen zu öffnen und alle Menschen, die an der ungarischen und österreichischen Grenze standen, ungeprüft einreisen zu lassen, moralisch durchaus rechtfertigen lässt. Frau Merkel selbst hatte nie vor, die Öffnung der Grenzen zum Dauerzustand werden zu lassen. Es ging nur um einen zeitlich beschränkten Kontrollverlust, der hingenommen werden musste, um eine aktuelle drohende Verletzung von Menschenrechten zu vermeiden. Kritisch zu der damaligen politischen Entscheidung aus rechtlicher Sicht aber Udo Di Fabio, Migrationskrise als föderales Verfassungsproblem, Bonn 2016 – http://www. bayern.de / wpcontent / uploads/2016/01/Gutachten_Bay_DiFabio_formatiert.pdf; vgl. auch die Erwiderung von Jürgen Bast / Christoph Moeller, Dem Freistaat zu gefallen: Über Udo Di Fabios Gutachten zur staatsrechtlichen Beurteilung der Flüchtlingskrise, VerfBlog 2016/1/16 – 137 138

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Eine besondere Betrachtung verdient die Situation von Flüchtlingen, die sich auf dem Weg an die Grenzen eines möglichen Aufnahmestaates auf dem Meer befinden. Bestehen auch diesen Menschen gegenüber menschenrechtliche Verbotspflichten? – Hier ist zu unterscheiden zwischen dem Aufenthalt im Küstenmeer (12-Meilen-Zone) und dem Aufenthalt auf Hoher See. Für beide Bereiche gilt zunächst, dass kein Staat das Recht hat, Flüchtlinge an der Fortsetzung ihrer Seereise zu hindern. Das gilt auf Hoher See schon wegen der dort geltenden Freiheit der Schifffahrt.139 Im Küstenmeer übt der Küstenstaat zwar seine volle Souveränität aus. Hier gilt aber, dass er keine Flüchtlinge daran hindern darf, eine Grenzübergangsstelle zu erreichen, wo sie ein Asylgesuch vorbringen können. Wenn die Flüchtlinge jedoch, wovon uns fast täglich schreckliche Nachrichten aus dem Mittelmeer unterrichten, in Seenot geraten, zu ertrinken drohen und deshalb auf Rettungsmaßnahmen angewiesen sind, können sie sich nicht auf flüchtlingsethische Pflichten eines Staates oder auch von Privatpersonen berufen. Dafür fehlt es an einer entsprechenden Garantenstellung. Zwar gibt es eine Pflicht zur Rettung Schiffsbrüchiger aus Seenot. Dabei handelt es sich aber nicht um eine moralische Pflicht, die auf einem entsprechenden Garantenverhältnis beruht, sondern um eine positiv-rechtlich anerkannte Pflicht des Völkerrechts. Danach sind Kapitäne verpflichtet, jeder Person, die auf See in Lebensgefahr angetroffen wird, Hilfe zu leisten, soweit dies ohne ernste Gefährdung des Schiffes, seiner Besatzung oder der Fahrgäste möglich ist.140 Die zu rettenden Personen sind in jedem Fall an Bord zu nehmen und an einen sicheren Ort zu bringen. Es gibt aber keine Pflicht, sich zu dem Zweck aufs Meer zu begeben, um Schiffsbrüchige zu retten. Die Pflicht zur Seenotrettung begründet auch keine über die unmittelbare Lebensrettung hinaus gehenden Ansprüche, wie etwa dauerhaften Aufenthalt oder die Gewährung von Asyl.141 Flüchtlingsethisch relevant ist also nicht die Seenotrettung, sondern vielmehr der Umstand, dass gerettete Menschen an Bord eines Schiffes sich unter der faktischen Macht des Kapitäns dieses Schiffes befinden. Wenn der Kapitän sich entschließt, sie in den Hafen eines Landes zu bringen, wo sie Menschenrechtsverletzungen ausgesetzt sind, dann verletzt er selbst die Menschenrechte. Um das zu vermeiden, bleibt ihm nur übrig, die Flüchtlinge in einen Hafen zu bringen, wo sie sicher sind.142 v­ erfassungsblog.de / dem-freistaat-zum-gefallen-ueber-udo-di-fabios-gutachten-zur-staats​ rechtlichenbeurteilung-der-fluechtlingskrise/. 139 Art. 58 Abs. 1 i. V. m. Art. 87 Abs. 1 UN-Seerechtsübereinkommen (SRÜ) – BGBl. 1994, Teil II, S. 1799. 140 Art. 98 I SRÜ; der Grundsatz ist als Völkergewohnheitsrecht anerkannt, vgl. Wissen­ schaftlicher Dienst des Bundestages, Rechtliche Konsequenzen einer Behinderung von Seenotrettern, Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag 2016 – WD 2-3000-138/16 –, S. 6 – https://www.bundes​ tag.de / blob/485804/fa7d773621d961efb70477f8f114c715/wd-2-138-16-pdf-data.pdf. 141  Wissenschaftlicher Dienst (Fn. 140), S. 8. 142  Diese Auffassung entspricht in etwa auch der Rechtslage, wie sie vom EGMR festgestellt wurde, vgl. Urteil vom 23.02.2012 – 27765/09 –, „Hirsi Jamaa v. Italien“, https://hudoc.echr.

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Wie dieser Fall zeigt, verschiebt sich die Grenze zwischen „drinnen“ und „draußen“ mit der Ausweitung des faktischen Machtbereichs sowohl von Individuen als auch von Staaten. Diese flüchtlingsethische Einsicht wird künftig immer bedeutsamer werden, versucht die Europäische Union doch, bis tief nach Afrika hinein die dortigen Staaten in technischer und administrativer Hinsicht zu befähigen, Flüchtlinge effektiv an der Durchreise Richtung Europa zu hindern. Wenn afrikanische Despoten mit der Aufrüstung von Armee und Polizei und höheren Entwicklungshilfezahlungen dafür entlohnt werden, dass sie Flüchtlinge in Internierungslager sperren oder durch ein effizientes Grenzregime an der Weiterreise hindern, dann erweitert das die Verantwortlichkeit Europas bis an die Grenzen, die so geschaffen oder gesichert werden.143 VII. Ergebnis Die Ethik des Flüchtlingsschutzes ist keine Ethik der Hilfeleistung für bedürftige Menschen, sondern eine Ethik des Verbotes unerlaubter Handlungen, nämlich insbesondere der Verletzung von Menschenrechten. Das spiegelt sich im positiven Flüchtlingsrecht nur unzulänglich, weil hier nicht der Schaden im Vordergrund steht, vor dem Menschen fliehen, sondern die Gründe, weshalb sie von ihren Verfolgern misshandelt werden. Der schadensorientierte Ansatz zeigt die Gründe dafür auf, warum schutzwürdige Personen, die bereits das Territorium des Zufluchtlandes erreicht haben, sich auf ein subjektives Recht berufen können, nicht den Gefahren ausgeliefert zu werden, vor denen sie geflohen sind, während Flüchtlinge, die das Territorium noch nicht erreicht haben, grundsätzlich nur an die Barmherzigkeit und Humanität möglicher Helfer appellieren können. Allerdings verschiebt sich die Grenze zwischen „drinnen“ und „draußen“ nach Maßgabe der Ausweitung des faktischen Machtbereichs eines Staates. Daraus kann sich eine Rechtsposition auch für Menschen ergeben, die von Schiffen auf dem Meer gerettet werden oder deren Lebens- und Reisebedingungen wesentlich durch Umstände bestimmt sind, welche von einem Staat außerhalb seines Territoriums geschaffen worden sind.

coe.int. Der US Supreme Court vertritt hier eine andere Auffassung, vgl. US Supreme Court 509 U.S. 155 (1993) „Sale v. Haitian Centers Council“ – http://caselaw.findlaw.com / us-supremecourt/509/155.html. 143  Dazu vgl. Christian Jakob / Simone Schlindwein, Diktatoren als Türsteher Europas. Wie die EU ihre Grenzen nach Afrika verlagert, 2. Aufl., Berlin: Ch. Links 2017; Anne Koch / An­ ette Weber / Isabelle Werenfels (Hrsg.), Migrationsprofiteure. Autoritäre Staaten in Afrika und das europäische Migrationsmanagement, SWP-Studie 3, Berlin: SWP 2018 – https://www. swp-berlin.org / fileadmin / contents / products / studien/2018S03_koc_web_wrf.pdf.

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Summary The ethics of refugee protection is not an ethics of assistance to needy people, but an ethics of the prohibition of tort, namely in particular the violation of human rights. This is reflected in the positive refugee law only inadequately, because here is not the damage in the foreground, from which people flee, but the reasons why they are mistreated by persecutors. The damage-oriented approach clarifies the reasons why persons in need for protection who have already reached the territory of the country of refuge can rely on a subjective right not to be exposed to the dangers they have fled from, while refugees outside the territory can in principle only appeal to the compassion and humanity of possible helpers. However, the boundary between “inside” and “outside” shifts according to the expansion of the de facto sphere of power of the acting person or state. This may also create a legal position for persons who are rescued by a ship at sea or whose living and travel conditions are essentially determined by the power of a state outside its territory.

„Man kann das Bewußtsein dieses Grundgesetzes ein Factum der Vernunft nennen“ Eine begriffsgeschichtliche Untersuchung zum Gebrauch des Factumsbegriffs in Kants „Kritik der praktischen Vernunft“ Martin Heuser Von einem historisch gewordenen Text der Geistesgeschichte versteht die Nach­ welt zwangsläufig und allenfalls nur so viel, wie sie mit den darin vorfindlichen Begrifflichkeiten einen bestimmten Begriffs- und Sinngehalt im Abstand ihrer Zeit noch zu verbinden weiß. Vor diesem Hintergrund untersucht die vorliegende Ar­ beit die von Immanuel Kant in der „Kritik der praktischen Vernunft“ (1788) zur Erläuterung seiner Freiheitslehre gebrauchte Wendung vom „Factum der Ver­ nunft“: Nachdem sich der Factumsbegriff zur Jahrhundertwende des ausgehen­ den 18. Jahrhunderts allerdings von einer ursprünglich zurechnungstheoretischen Bedeutung der Rechtssprache (Factum als Tat eines Willenssubjekts) auf eine wis­ senschaftstheoretische Bedeutung im gewöhnlichen Sprachgebrauch (Faktum als Tatsache für das erkennende Verstandessubjekt) verengte, unterliegt wohl auch die moderne Kantinterpretation eben dieser Bedeutungsverkürzung um das Tä­ tigkeitsmoment, wenn sie das kantische „Factum der Vernunft“ durch eine schon sprachlich sehr modern anklingende „Faktizität der Vernunft“ in ihrem begriffli­ chen Verständnis der kantischen Freiheitslehre ersetzt. Durch den ursprünglichen Bedeutungsgehalt des Wortes wird mit dem kantischen „Factum“ nämlich keine ir­ gendwie geartete Faktizität moralischer Verbindlichkeit für die Vernunft, sondern eine „Tat der Vernunft“ (genitivus subjectivus) selbst begriffen, und zwar ihre an und für sich selbst ausgeübte Gesetzgebungstätigkeit in ihrem reinen praktischen Selbstverhältnis (d.  h. Autonomie). Die begriffsgeschichtliche Reflexion gelangt somit zu neuen Einsichten in die begriffliche Verfassung der kantischen Freiheits­ lehre, die sodann auch Aufschluss über das Verhältnis der nachkantischen Idealis­ ten zu eben dieser Freiheitslehre geben, denn es ist demnach wohl kaum als bloßer Zufall anzusehen, dass nur wenig später (1794) die fichtesche „Thathandlung des Ich“ die Bühne der Philosophie betritt.

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I. Bemerkungen zu einem bloß erläuternd und fakultativ eingeführten Begriff In der Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (KpV)1 hat Immanuel Kant, und zwar mit der in der Überschrift der hiesigen Arbeit zitierten Wendung der bloß erläuternden „Anmerkung“ zu § 7, das Bewusstsein des obersten moralischen Gesetzes, das die Freiheit des Willens rational begründet, erstmals als ein „Factum der Vernunft“ bezeichnet.2 Dabei handelt es sich offenbar um eine bloß fakultative Bezeichnung3 für den zuvor (§§ 1 – 7) exponierten4 Zusammenhang von Gesetzes- und Freiheitsbewusstsein, demgemäß das moralische Gesetz „ratio cognoscendi“ (Idealgrund) des Freiheitsbewusstseins und die Freiheit wiederum „ratio essendi“ (Realgrund) des moralischen Gesetzes ist.5 Der Begriff „Factum der Vernunft“ diente Kant also – in gewisser und noch weiter zu erhellender Weise – lediglich zur erläuternden Verdeutlichung dieses wechselwirksamen Bewusstseinszusammenhangs und so kommt ihm in der rationalen Begründung der Freiheit des Willens selbst keine konstitutive Bedeutung zu, sodass sich auch die wenigen diesen Begriff wiederum selbst erläuternden Äußerungen zwanglos erklären. 1. Der Stand moderner Kantforschung: Kapitulation vor einer unverständlichen Faktizität der Vernunft Gleichwohl gilt es insbesondere seit den einflussreichen Überlegungen Dieter Henrichs6 unter den Interpreten der kantischen Moralphilosophie als ausgemacht, 1  Die Werke Immanuel Kants werden im Folgenden unter Angabe von Band, Seite und ggf. Zeile / n nach der Akademieausgabe (= AA): Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, hrsg. von der Königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1900 ff. zitiert, wobei die von den Kant-Studien vorgegebenen Siglen verwendet werden; die KrV wird abgekürzt auch nur nach ihrer ersten bzw. zweiten Auflage (A / B) zitiert. Die in den Werken Kants im Sperrdruck gesetzten Passagen sind in den wörtlich wiedergegebenen Zitaten im Kursivdruck gesetzt. 2  KpV, AA V: 31.24. – Methodologisch handelt es sich bei solchen „Erläuterungssätzen“ um „Scholien“ (Log, AA IX: 112 [§ 39]). 3  Wolff, „Warum das Faktum der Vernunft ein Faktum ist“, in: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 57 (2009), S. 511 (513). 4  KpV, AA V: 46.16 – 20 spricht mit Blick auf §§ 1 – 8 von einer „Exposition des obersten Grundsatzes der praktischen Vernunft“. 5  Darauf blickt die berühmte Anmerkung in der Vorrede zur KpV, AA V: 04.28 – 36 bekanntlich voraus. 6  Siehe besonders Henrich, „Der Begriff der sittlichen Einsicht und Kants Lehre vom Faktum der Vernunft“, in: Henrich / Schulz / Volkmann-Schluck (Hrsg.), Die Gegenwart der Griechen im neueren Denken – Festschrift für Hans-Georg Gadamer zum 60. Geburtstag, Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1960, S. 77 – 115 (wieder abgedruckt in: Prauss [Hrsg.], Kant – Zur Deutung seiner Theorie von Erkennen und Handeln, Köln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1973, S. 223 – 254; ins Englische übersetzt in: Velkley [Hrsg.], The Unity of Reason – Essays on Kant’s Philosophy, Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1994, S. 55 – 87); dens., „Das Problem der Grundlegung der Ethik bei Kant und im spekulativen Idealismus“, in: Engelhardt (Hrsg.), Sein und Ethos,

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dass Kant seiner Begründung der Freiheit des Willens mit seiner „Lehre vom Faktum der Vernunft“ (1788) erstmals eine ganz neue Wendung gegeben habe, nachdem er habe einsehen müssen, dass seine – wie sich mitunter herausstellen wird: bloß vermeintlichen – Versuche bis dato (1785), das Freiheitsbewusstsein aus dem reinen theoretischen (!) Selbstbewusstsein zu deduzieren, gescheitert seien. Nach dieser begrifflich möglicherweise nicht immer sehr textnahen Perspektive philosophiehistorischer Geschichtsschreibung,7 der ein gedanklicher Fehlschlag mitunter auch ein positiver philosophischer Qualitätsausweis zu sein scheint,8 steht die „Lehre vom Faktum der Vernunft“ bis zum heutigen Tag folglich – seltsam genug – für einen sich selbst bis zuletzt nicht so recht verstehenden Denker von absolutem

Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag, 1963, S. 350 – 386; dens., „Die Deduktion des Sittengesetzes – Über die Gründe der Dunkelheit des letzten Abschnittes von Kants ‚Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten‘“, in: Schwan (Hrsg.), Denken im Schatten des Nihilismus – Festschrift für Wilhelm Weischedel zum 70. Geburtstag, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1975, S. 55 – 112. – Siehe ferner ergänzend die frühen Kantstudien Dieter Henrichs: „Das Grundprinzip der Kantischen Ethik“, in: Philosophische Rundschau 2 (1954/1955), S. 20 – 38; „Hutcheson und Kant“, in: Kant-Studien 49 (1958), S. 49 – 69; „Über Kants früheste Ethik“, in: Kant-Studien 54 (1963), S. 404 – 431; „Über Kants Entwicklungsgeschichte“, in: Philosophische Rundschau 13 (1965), S. 252 – 263. 7  So gilt nach Henrich, „Der Begriff der sittlichen Einsicht …“ (oben Fn. 6), S. 77 ff. nicht etwa das Bewusstsein des obersten moralischen Gesetzes als „Factum der Vernunft“, sondern das „Sittengesetz“ selbst (82 f.), das „Bewusstsein des kategorischen Imperativs“ (93), die „sittliche Einsicht“ (98), die „sittliche Forderung“ (110), der „Anspruch des Guten“ (110), oder auch der „Gegenstand der sittlichen Einsicht“ (113). Wenig später, nämlich in seiner Arbeit „Das Problem der Grundlegung der Ethik …“ (oben Fn. 6), S. 350 (371) ist dann der kategorische Imperativ das Faktum der Vernunft und in einer weiteren Arbeit, nämlich „Die Deduktion des Sittengesetzes …“ (oben Fn. 6), S. 55 ff. ist sodann die Rede von der Faktizität des „sittlichen Bewusstseins“ (58/104) oder es gilt die „Vernunft“ selbst als Faktum (111). – Unlängst erst ist Henrichs Deutung der kantischen Begründung der Moralphilosophie, und zwar aufgrund einer in seiner Interpretation kaum vorhandenen „Textarbeit“, von einer jüngeren Interpretengeneration (hier repräsentiert durch Puls, Sittliches Bewusstsein und kategorischer Imperativ in Kants Grundlegung, Berlin / Boston: De Gruyter, 2016, S. 8 f. Fn. 16) kritisiert worden. 8 Der bekanntlich auf den Deutschen Idealismus spezialisierte Konstellationsforscher Henrich, „Weitere Überlegungen zum Programm der Konstellationsforschung“, in: Mulsow / Stamm (Hrsg.), Konstellationsforschung, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2005, S. 207 (215) hegt nach eigener Auskunft nämlich überhaupt „ein Unbehagen gegenüber der Form, in der die idealistischen Systembegründer sich selbst propagiert haben“, und meint damit den spezifisch mit dem idealistischen Selbstverständnis verbundenen Systemanspruch endgültiger philosophischer Einsicht („Endzeiterkenntnis“), den Philosophen vom Format eines Kant, Fichte und insbesondere Hegel bekanntlich für sich beansprucht haben: „Wer sich Kant wirklich angeeignet hat und wer in den philosophischen Debatten unserer Zeit einigermaßen zu Hause ist, dem können die Defekte der Argumentationen in den idealistischen Texten schwerlich entgehen.“ Siehe dazu ferner auch den Historiographen Henrich, Konstellationen – Probleme und Debatten am Ursprung der idealistischen Philosophie (1789 – 1795), Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1991, S. 30 ff: „Da nun aber die klassische Deutsche Philosophie selbst in die Geschichte des Denkens übergegangen ist, kann dieses ihr Selbstverständnis nicht weiter fortgeschrieben werden.“

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Weltrang9 oder gar für das von Immanuel Kant offen zur Schau getragene Scheitern an seinen eigenen zuvor noch hochgehaltenen Begründungsansprüchen.10 Denn mit der Resignation bzw. Kapitulation vor einem als unleugbare „Faktizität“ für die Vernunft verstandenen sittlichen Anspruch des Guten – als „Factum der Vernunft“ – ist offenbar ein Verzicht auf rational einsichtige Begründung des Freiheitsbewusstseins verbunden. Henrich glaubt deshalb sogar, mit Blick auf den Gedanken der zweiten Kritik, von einer „Theorie von der unverständlichen Faktizität des vernünftigen ‚Sittengesetzes‘“ sprechen zu können.11 Dementsprechend findet sich spätestens seit diesen Überlegungen Dieter Henrichs die weithin allgemein anerkannte These in der Kantliteratur, dass Immanuel Kant in der Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (GMS – 1785) noch eine „Deduktion“ des obersten moralischen Gesetzes beabsichtigt habe, während er ihre Unmöglichkeit in der Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (1788) mit dem Begriff vom „Factum“, etwas verschämt und 9  „Der Text der ‚Grundlegung‘ lässt leicht erkennen, daß Kant Schwierigkeiten hatte, die Argumente einer ‚Kritik der reinen praktischen Vernunft‘ nach einem klaren, durchsichtigen Konzept zu entfalten. […]. Der Text der ‚Grundlegung‘ ist nicht nur deshalb schwierig, weil er eine These formuliert, die den Formulierungen der ‚Kritik der praktischen Vernunft‘ direkt entgegensteht. Den genauen Sinn und die Begründung dieser These zu verstehen, erfordert nämlich große Anstrengung, und die besondere Schwierigkeit der ‚Grundlegung‘ ergibt sich nicht primär aus den Besonderheiten ihrer Position, als vielmehr daraus, daß Kants Darlegungen unklar und unübersichtlich verschlungen sind und daß die Entschiedenheit seines Tons einer Konzeption zum Vortrag verhilft, die noch nicht vollständig bestimmt und entschieden ist und über deren eigentlichen Charakter Kant schon allein deshalb auch noch nicht in einer Weise sprechen konnte, die von theoretischen Unklarheiten und Zweideutigkeiten frei ist. […] Die Unbestimmtheit muß im übrigen eine solche sein, die für Kant selbst […] tolerabel und so wenig auffällig erschien, daß sie ihn jedenfalls nicht von der Publikation der ‚Grundlegung‘ hat abhalten können. Auch dieser Zusammenhang muß aufgeklärt werden, und es wird sich dabei zeigen, daß solche Aufklärung nur gelingen kann, wenn dabei zugleich einige Aspekte der kantischen Moralphilosophie sichtbar werden, die sich Kant selber niemals, auch nicht in der ‚Kritik der praktischen Vernunft‘, deutlich zu machen vermochte.“ (Henrich, „Die Deduktion des Sittengesetzes …“ [Fn. 6], S. 55 [62 – 64], ferner auch [99, 104 ff., 112]). 10  Siehe für diesen Abfall im Begründungsanspruch die durchaus prominent vorgetragenen Polemiken gegen das kantische „Factum der Vernunft“ bei Prauss, Kant über Freiheit als Autonomie, Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 1983, S. 68/115 („Unding“), 67 („Verzweiflungstat“), 68 („Ausdruck bloßer Not“), 231 („Scheitern von geradezu einzigartigem, ja fast schon kuriosen Charakter“); ferner Bittner, Moralisches Gebot oder Autonomie, Freiburg / München: Alber, 1983, S. 142 (der meint, dass Kant mit dem Factum, „als es mit ehrlicher Arbeit nicht gut fortwollte, zum Diebstahl Zuflucht nahm“); Böhme / Böhme, Das Andere der Vernunft, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1985, S. 345 („Skandal“), 346 („papierner Drache Kantischer Moralphilosophie“), 347 („Bankrotterklärung“/„tief ins Nichts geschlagene[r] Nagel“/„Es ist so, als sei jemand notgelandet und fliege gleichwohl weiter“); Guyer, „Naturalistic and Transcendental Moments in Kant’s Moral Philosophy“, in: Inquiry 50 (2007), S. 444 (462: „foot-stamping“); Wood, Kantian Ethics, Cambridge: University Press, 2008, S. 135 („moralistic bluster“). – Eine erste Kritik an einer solchen interpretatorischen Herangehensweise findet sich dagegen bei Reibenschuh, „Über das Faktum der Vernunft“, in: Funke (Hrsg.), Akten des 7. Int. Kant-Kongresses II/1, Bonn / Berlin: Bouvier, 1991, S. 365 ff. 11  Henrich, „Der Begriff der sittlichen Einsicht …“ (Fn. 6), S. 77 (82 f.) – wobei offen bleibt, womit die „unverständliche Faktizität“ den Ehrennamen der „Theorie“ verdient haben sollte.

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letztlich doch unverhohlen, allerdings ohne ausdrückliche Kennzeichnung seiner geistigen Umkehr, erklärt habe.12 12  Freilich ist Henrichs Gewährsmann der schottische Kantinterpret Herbert James Paton, und zwar mit seiner 1947 erstmals erschienen Studie „The Categorical Imperative. A Study in Kant’s Moral Philosophy“, darin er Henrichs wirkmächtig gewordene Umkehrthese, allerdings mit größerer Vorsicht, schon vorweggenommen hat (siehe dafür in der deutschen Übersetzung: Der kategorische Imperativ – Eine Untersuchung über Kants Moralphilosophie, Berlin: De Gruyter, 1962, S. 251 ff., 304 ff.). Ebenso findet sich diese These auch schon bei dem schottischen Kantinterpreten Ross, Kant’s Ethical Theory – A Commentary on the Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954, S. 86 ff. Gegen diese beiden Autoren mit ihrer Inkompatibilitätsthese hat später wiederum McCarthy, „Kant’s Rejection of the Argument of Grundwork III“, in: Kant-Studien 73 (1982), S. 169 – 190 in der Sache wohl nicht ganz zu Unrecht opponiert und so handelt es sich bei den wirkmächtig gewordenen Interpretationen Dieter Henrichs in gewisser Weise auch um einen Import von Verständnisproblemen, die – wie sich zeigen wird – ihre Ursache mitunter in der höchstproblematischen Übersetzung der kantischen Wendung vom „Factum der Vernunft“ mit dem englischen Ausdruck „fact of reason“ haben. Allerdings ist Henrich im Jahre 1960 auch im deutschen Sprachraum längst nicht der erste Kantinterpret, der den Begriff vom „Factum der Vernunft“ für sich selbst gegen den einer „Faktizität der Vernunft“ eintauscht. – In der gedanklichen bzw. begrifflichen Tradition Henrichs (Paton / Ross) stehen dann aber mit Blick auf die Umkehrthese bzw. das Factumverständnis (jedenfalls in Teilen und neben den in Fn. 10 genannten Autoren) gleichwohl u. a. letztlich auch Allison, „Justification and Freedom in the Critique of Practical Reason“, in: Förster (Hrsg.), Kant’s Transcendental Deductions, Stanford: University Press, 1989, S. 114 – 130; ders., Kant’s theory of freedom, Cambridge: University Press, 1990, S. 201 f., 227 ff., 230 ff.; Ame­riks, „Kants Deduction of Freedom and Morality“, in: Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (1981), S. 53 – 79; ders., „‘Pure Reason of Itself Alone Suffices to Determine the Will‘“, in: Ameriks, Interpreting Kant’s Critiques, Oxford: Clarendon Press 2003, S. 249 (256 ff.); Beck, Kants „Kritik der praktischen Vernunft“ – Ein Kommentar (ins Deutsche übersetzt von Karl-Heinz Ilting), München: Fink, 3. Aufl. 1995, S. 158 ff. (165); Bojanowski, Kants Theorie der Freiheit, Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 2006, S. 70 ff., 185 ff., 208 ff., 245 ff.; Brandt, Die Bestimmung des Menschen bei Kant, Hamburg: Meiner, 2007, S. 351 ff.; Düsing, Subjektivität und Freiheit, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann Holzboog, 2002, S. 211 – 235; Ebeling, Die ideale Sinndimension – Kants Faktum der Vernunft und dies Basis-Fiktionen des Handelns, Freiburg / München: Alber, 1982, S. 35; Engstrom, „Introduction“, in: Pluhar (Hrsg.), Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, Indianapolis / Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 2002, S. XV (XXV f.); Fleischer, „Das Problem der Begründung des kategorischen Imperativs bei Kant“, in: Engelhardt (Hrsg.), Sein und Ethos, Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag, 1963, S. 387 (397  ff.); Forschner, Gesetz und Freiheit, München / Salzburg: Pustet, 1974, S. 226, 250 ff.; Frank, Auswege aus dem Deutschen Idealimus, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2007, S. 165; Hermann, The Practice of Moral Judgment, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993, S. 85, 87; Hiltscher, „Kants Lehre vom ‚Faktum der Vernunft‘“, in: Schönrich (Hrsg.), Normativität und Faktizität, Dresden: Thelem, 2004, S. 163 – 177; Himmelmann, „Factum der (reinen praktischen) Vernunft“, in: Willaschek / Stolzenberg / Mohr / Bacin (Hrsg.), Kant-Lexikon  I, Berlin / Boston: De Gruyter, 2015, S. 596; Ilting, „Der naturalistische Fehlschluß bei Kant“, in: Riedel (Hrsg.), Rehabilitierung der praktischen Philosophie I, Freiburg: Rombach, 1972, S. 113 (121 ff.); Kain, „Practical Cognition, Intuition, and the Fact of Reason“, in: Lipscomb / Krueger (Hrsg.), Kant’s Moral Metaphysics, Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010, S. 211 (217 ff.); Klein, Gibt es ein Moralgesetz, das für alle Menschen gültig ist? Eine Untersuchung zum Faktum der Vernunft bei Immanuel Kant, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann 2008, S. 40 ff., 80 ff., 98 ff., 215 ff., 278 ff.; Konhardt, „Faktum der Vernunft?“, in: Prauss (Hrsg.), Handlungstheorie und Transzendentalphilosophie, Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 1983, S. 160 (172 ff.);

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Vor diesem gedanklichen Hintergrund erklären sich dann die zahlreich in der neueren Sekundärliteratur geäußerten Abfälligkeiten gegenüber der darin oftmals Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends, Cambridge: University Press, 1996, S. 170; Krie­ger „‚Factum der Vernunft‘ – Zu einer Parallele zwischen Kant und mittelalterlichem Denken (Johannes Buridan)“, in: Bacin / Ferrarin / La Rocca / Ruffing (Hrsg.), Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht III, Berlin / Boston: De Gruyter, 2013, S. 343 – 354; Loidolt, Husserl und das Faktum der Vernunft: Anstoß und Herausforderung einer phänomenologischen Ethik der Person, in: Ierna / Jacobs / Mattens (Hrsg.), Philosophy – Phenomenology Sciences, Dord­ recht: Springer, 2010, S. 483 – 486; Ludwig, „Die „consequente Denkungsart der speculativen Kritik“ – Kants radikale Umgestaltung seiner Freiheitslehre im Jahre 1786 und die Folgen für die Kritische Philosophie als Ganze“, in: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 58 (2010), S. 595 (598 ff., 608, 613 ff.); ders., „Die Freiheit des Willens und die Freiheit zum Bösen. Inhaltliche Inversionen und terminologische Ausdifferenzierungen in Kants Moralphilosophie zwischen 1781 und 1797“, in: Puls (Hrsg.), Kants Rechtfertigung des Sittengesetzes in Grundlegung III – Deduktion oder Faktum?, Berlin / München / Boston: De Gruyter, 2014, S. 227 – 268; Luków, „The Fact of Reason – Kant’s Passage to Ordinary Moral Knowledge“, in: Kant-Studien 84 (1993), S. 204 – 221; Noller, Die Bestimmung des Willens, Freiburg / München: Alber, 2015, S. 138 ff., 148; O’Neill, „Autonomy and the Fact of Reason in the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft“, in: Höffe (Hrsg.), Immanuel Kant – Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 2. Aufl., Berlin: Akademie, 2011, S. 71 ff.; Rawls, „Themes in Kant’s Moral Philosophy“, in: Förster (Hrsg.), Kant’s Transcendental Deductions, Stanford: University Press, 1989, S. 81 (102 ff.); Sala, Kants „Kritik der praktischen Vernunft“ – Ein Kommentar, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2004, S. 97 ff.; Schmucker, Die Ursprünge der Ethik Kants, Meisenheim am Glan: Hain, 1961, S. 373 ff.; Schönecker, Kant: Grundlegung III – Die Deduktion des kategorischen Imperativs, Freiburg / München: Alber, 2. Aufl. 2016, S. 309  ff.; ders., Kants Begriff transzendentaler und praktischer Freiheit, Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 2005, S. 128; ders., „Das gefühlte Faktum der Vernunft“, in: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 61 (2013), S. 91  ff.; Stangneth, „Das Faktum der Vernunft – Versuch einer Ortsbestimmung“, in: Gerhardt / Horstmann / Schumacher (Hrsg.), Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung  III, Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 2001, S. 104 – 112; Sturma, „Kants Ethik der Autonomie“, in: Ameriks / Sturma (Hrsg.), Kants Ethik, Paderborn: Mentis, 2004, S. 160 (167 ff.); Timmermann, „Reversal or retreat? Kant’s deductions of freedom and morality“, in: Reath / Timmermann (Hrsg.), Critique of Practical Reason, Cambridge: University Press, 2010, S. 73 ff.; Trampota, Autonome Vernunft oder moralische Sehkraft?, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2003, S. 11 ff., 23 – 122 (besonders 23 ff., 40 ff., 47 ff.); Wildfeuer, Praktische Vernunft und System, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann Holzboog, 1994, S. 335 ff.; Willaschek, Praktische Vernunft, Handlungstheorie und Moralbegründung bei Kant, Stuttgart / Weimar: Metzler, 1992, S. 171 ff.; Zimmermann, „Faktum statt Deduktion“, in: Puls (Hrsg.), Kants Rechtfertigung des Sittengesetzes in Grundlegung III, Berlin / München / Boston: De Gruyter, 2014, S. 103 – 131. – Eine Ausnahme von diesem gedanklichen bzw. begrifflichen Konsens bilden neben der genannten Studie McCarthys die Arbeiten von Freudiger, Kants Begründung der praktischen Philosophie, Bern / Stuttgart / Wien: Haupt, 1993, S. 23 f., 34 ff. 39 ff.; Steigleder, Kants Moralphilosophie, Stuttgart / Weimar: Metzler, 2002, S. 96 ff.; Franks, All or Nothing, Cambrigde / London: Harvard University Press, 2005, S. 278 ff.; Kaufmann, „Autonomie und das Faktum der Vernunft“, in: Stolzenberg (Hrsg.), Kant in der Gegenwart, Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 2007, S. 227 (237 ff.); Wolff (Fn. 3), S. 511 ff.; ders., „Warum der kategorische Imperativ nach Kants Ansicht gültig ist“, in: Schönecker (Hrsg.), Kants Begründung von Freiheit und Moral in Grundlegung III, Münster: Mentis, 2015, S. 257 ff. und Ware, „Kant’s deductions of morality and freedom“, in: Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (2017), S. 116 ff. – Eine Zwischenstellung dürften in gewisser Weise die Arbeiten von Gunkel, Spontaneität und moralische Autonomie, Bern / Stuttgart: Haupt, 1989, S. 167 ff., 201 ff., 213 ff. und Wyrwich, Moralische Selbst- undWelterkenntnis, Würzburg:

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kurzerhand nur als ‚Ethik‘ bezeichneten kantischen Moralphilosophie,13 die allesamt darüber hinweggehen, dass Kant seine demnach wohl widersprüchlichen Gedanken seinem philosophischen Publikum gleichwohl noch 1797 in unveränderten Neuauflagen beider Schriften (GMS4/KpV4) abermals und noch dazu fast zeitgleich zugänglich machte.14 Man müsste hier in der letzten Konsequenz dieser Geschichtsschreibung, die Kant aus einer anderen (hier im Folgenden vertretenen) begrifflichen Perspektive heraus, wenngleich gewiss unfreiwillig, zumindest stellenweise mitunter auch als ausgesprochenen philosophischen Trottel in der Geistesgeschichte auftreten und dastehen lässt, also eigentlich böswillige Verwirrungsabsichten15 oder geistige Umnachtung des Autors unterstellen; und letzteres galt ja im Anschluss an Schopenhauer bekanntlich immerhin einige Zeit sogar als probates Mittel der rechtsphilosophischen Kantexegese.16 Dem aus der 1788 publizierten Schrift erkennbaren Selbstverständnis ihres Autors, der an zahlreichen Stellen um die Versicherung gedanklicher Kontinuität seines kritischen Gesamtwerks bemüht ist,17 entsprechen all diese Unterstellungen der mit ihrem Autor jedenfalls in einigen Hinsichten offenbar fremdelnden Interpreten jedoch nicht. 2. Das Anliegen einer begriffsgeschichtlichen Vergewisserung: Factum anstatt Faktizität der Vernunft Gegen diese somit alles andere als harmlose, sondern weitreichende und das gegenwärtige Kantverständnis durchaus bezeichnende Revisions- oder Umkehr­ these („reversal reading“), der zur Folge der letztlich vergebliche und darum schließlich abgebrochene Begründungsversuch der kantischen Moralphilosophie in einer unverständlichen sowie vermeintlich unleugbaren Faktizität des sittlichen Königshausen & Neumann, 2011, S. 119 ff., 125 ff., 177 ff. einnehmen, denn beide Autoren verneinen eine geistige Umkehr Kants, obgleich sie in ihrem Begriffsverständnis zugleich uneingeschränkt von der „Faktizität“ des moralischen Bewusstseins ausgehen. 13  Vgl. oben in Fn. 10. 14  Vgl. dazu auch den Brief an Hartknoch, v. 28. 01. 1797, AA XII: 146. 15 Ohne gedankliche Berücksichtigung dieser späten Neuauflagen zu Lebzeiten Kants spricht beispielsweise Ludwig, „Die Freiheit des Willens …“ (Fn. 12), S. 227 (262 Fn. 58) im Hinblick auf die von ihm vermeinten Revisionen der Gedankengänge Kants dann immerhin von einem „notorischen Unvermögen / Unwillen, über die Revisionen seiner Lehren angemessen Auskunft zu geben“. 16  Für diesen Zustand moderner Kantforschung im Anschluss an H. J. Paton (oben Fn. 12) hat bereits vor 60 Jahren Duncan, Practical Reason and Morality – A Study of Immanuel Kant’s Foundations for the Metaphysics of Morals, London: Nelson, 1957, S. IX deutliche Worte gefunden: „The following study is the outcome of years of dissatisfaction with an interpretation of Kant’s teaching in the Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (…) which has been widely accepted among English-speaking philosophers. In consequence of this interpretation a number of philosophers have been led to make statements about Kant’s ethical views which would imply either that he was foolish or that he was an unusually incompetent philosopher. […].“ 17  Man vergleiche nur die bis heute noch nicht rezipierten Abschnitte der KpV, AA V: 50 ff., 89 ff., 119 ff., 134 ff.

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Bewusstseins gipfelt, und darauf sich bis heute weitgehend unkritisch auch das philosophiehistorische Gegenwartsverständnis des auf Kant mit Fichte nachfolgenden Deutschen Idealismus maßgeblich stützt, soll in der vorliegenden Arbeit – bei allem notwendigen Respekt vor der historiographischen Lebensleistung Dieter Henrichs und auf die Gefahr hin, zum ‚orthodoxen Kantianer‘18 gestempelt zu werden – gezeigt werden, dass ein Verständnis vom „Factum der Vernunft“ als einer „Faktizität“19 an einer neuzeitlichen Wortverkürzung leidet, die es unmöglich macht, das mit dieser Wendung ursprünglich bezeichnete reine praktische Selbstbewusstsein eines freien Willens als solches begrifflich zu identifizieren. Demnach handelt es sich mit dieser in der zweiten Kritik lediglich zu Erläuterungszwecken bloß fakultativ eingeführten Begrifflichkeit auch nicht um einen – andernfalls in einer erläuternden Anmerkung  (!) zu dem System apodiktischer Lehrsätze des Haupttextes daherkommenden – Verzicht auf rationale Begründung, der noch dazu erstmals ausgerechnet von Geisteswissenschaftlern des 20. Jh. bemerkt worden sein soll.20 Vielmehr leidet die bei konstatierter Dunkelheit eher   Henrich, Konstellationen (Fn. 8), S. 31.   Siehe dafür nur Henrich, „Der Begriff der sittlichen Einsicht …“ (Fn. 6), S. 77 (82 f./ 85  f./93  f./110 – 115). 20  Oben Fn. 9, 10. – Dass die Wendung vom „Factum der Vernunft“ (1788) nicht immer als eine delikate Abkehr Kants von den maßgeblichen Grundgedanken seiner GMS (1785) aufgefasst wurde, hat jüngst aber Owen Ware (Fn. 12), S. 116 (117 ff.) zutreffend kritisch gegen den im Gefolge Henrichs bestehenden Konsens eingewandt. – Vgl. etwa die affirmativen sowohl als kritischen zeitgenössischen Auseinandersetzungen zur KpV, die keinen Anstoß am „Factum der Vernunft“, jedenfalls im heute üblichen Maße, nahmen und auch keinen Bruch mit der Argumentation in der GMS konstatierten: Beck, Erläuternder Auszug aus den critischen Schriften des Herrn Prof. Kant auf Anrathen desselben I, Riga: Hartknoch, 1793, S. 395, 405 ff., 415 ff., 446 f.; Bendavid, Vorlesungen über die Critik der practischen Vernunft, Wien: Stahel und Compagnie, 1796, S. 17 ff., 31 ff.; Brastberger, Untersuchungen über Kants Kritik der practischen Vernunft, Tübingen: Cotta’sche Buchhandlung, 1792, S. 53 ff., 57 ff., 71 ff., 140 ff.; Feder (anonym), Rezension zur KpV, in: Göttingische Anzeigen in gelehrten Sachen (1788), S. 609 – 611; ders. (anonym), Rezension zur KpV, in: Philosophische Bibliothek I (1788), S. 182 – 218 (195 ff., 199); Jenisch, Ueber Grund und Werth der Entdeckungen des Herrn Professor Kant in der Metaphysik, Moral und Aesthetik, Berlin: Vieweg, 1796, S. 334 ff.; Michae­ lis, Ueber die sittliche Natur und Bestimmung des Menschen – Ein Versuch zur Erläuterung über I. Kant’s Kritik der praktischen Vernunft I, Leipzig: Beigang, 1796, S. 44, 52 f., 114 f., 118 f., 138 ff., 168 f., 354 f., 360 f.; Pistorius (anonym), Rezension zur KpV, in: Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek  117 (1794), S. 78 – 105; Rehberg (anonym), Rezension zur KpV, in: Allgemeine Literaturzeitung 188a / b (1788), Sp. 345 – 360; Zwanziger, Commentar über Herrn Professor Kants Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft, Leipzig: Hilscher, 1794, S. 44, 53 ff.; ferner die nicht mehr zuzuordnenden anonym erschienenen Rezensionen der KpV in: Gothaische gelehrte Zeitungen (1788), S. 353 – 358/361 – 366; Erlangische gelehrte Anmerkungen und Nachrichten 1788, S. 323 – 327; Gemeinnützige Betrachtungen der neuesten Schriften welche Religion, Sitten und Besserung des menschlichen Geschlechts betreffen, Beylage XIX (1788), S. 289 – 301; Oberdeutsche allgemeine Literaturzeitung (1788), Sp. 1785 – 1797; Tübingische gelehrte Anzeigen (1788), S. 641 – 647; Wirzburger gelehrte Anzeigen (1789), S. 737 – 742. Siehe überdies auch die Verhältnisbestimmung zwischen beiden kantischen Schriften bei Mel­ lin, Encyclopädisches Wörterbuch der kritischen Philosophie III/1, Jena / Leipzig: Frommann, 18 19

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schillernde Revisionsthese Dieter Henrichs – wie ebenfalls noch zu zeigen ist – an einer weiteren begrifflichen Verkürzung, denn einen Deduktionsversuch des obersten moralischen Gesetzes gibt es weder in der GMS, noch in der KpV. Dagegen findet sich in der Sache so etwas wie die „Deduktion des kategorischen Imperativs“ in beiden Schriften. Allerdings ist „der“ kategorische Imperativ, als eine praktische Handlungsregel unter dem moralischen Gesetz, nicht vollständig mit diesem letzteren, als einem obersten praktischen Grundsatz, der praktische Handlungsregeln (d. h. kategorische Imperative) unter sich hat, identisch, wie Henrich dagegen konstatieren muss, wenn er an diesem Punkt nicht weiter differenziert.21 Allerspätestens damit wird dann auch die von ihm lediglich auf einige nachgelassene Reflexionen Kants gestützte und auch im Übrigen bereits überaus verdächtige These, dieser habe letztlich noch bis ins Jahr 1785 hinein die praktische Freiheit des Willens aus dem reinen theoretischen Selbstbewusstsein des bloß denkenden (und d. h.: nicht auch wollenden) Subjekts zu deduzieren versucht, selbst zweifelhaft; möglicherweise ist dies vielmehr lediglich ein von Henrich persönlich verfolgter Begründungsanspruch.22 Bei aller voraussichtlichen Differenz weiß sich Verf. jedoch einig mit Henrich in dem Punkt, dass die intellektuelle Welt zur ‚Sattelzeit‘ des ausgehenden 18. Jh., und zwar mitsamt ihrer Sprache sowie der Bedeutung ihrer Grundworte, einem tiefgreifenden Wandel unterliegt.23 Die jetzt anzustellende Untersuchung, die vermittelst einer methodologisch-kommentarischen Interpretation (unter III.) gleichsam makroskopisch verständlich machen soll, wie der von Immanuel Kant im Jahre 1788 mit der Wendung vom „Factum der Vernunft“ bloß erläuternd bezeichnete Sachverhalt bereits aus den Hauptsätzen der §§ 1 – 7 KpV selbst hervorgeht, hat ihren Ausgang (unter II.) folglich von einer begriffsgeschichtlichen und etymologischen Erörterung des Factumsbegriffs zu nehmen, die mit dem darin aufzuzeigenden Bedeutungswandel nicht zuletzt einigen Aufschluss über die begriffliche Unterscheidungsfähigkeit gegenwärtiger Kantinterpretation zu geben verspricht.24 1800, S. 171 – 175 sowie Feder, der in seiner o.g. Göttinger Rezension sogar die gedankliche Kontinuität in der Hauptsache gleich vorweg betont. 21 Dazu maßgeblich Wolff (Fn. 3), S. 511 – 549 sowie dens. (Fn. 12), S. 257 – 330; neuerdings auch Ware (Fn. 12), S. 116 (124 ff.). 22  So gibt sich Henrich, „Das Problem der Grundlegung der Ethik …“ (Fn. 6), S. 350 (366) sowie wortgleich ders., „Ethik der Autonomie“, in: ders., Selbstverhältnisse – Gedanken und Auslegungen zu den Grundlagen der klassischen deutschen Philosophie, Stuttgart: Reclam, 1982, S. 6 (28) selbst davon überzeugt, es müsse auf der Basis der von Kant erarbeiteten Grundlagen der Versuch gemacht werden, „das sittliche Bewusstsein in seinem ganzen Umfang theoretisch zu rekonstruieren“. 23  Henrich, Grundlegung aus dem Ich I, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2004, S. 9. 24  Die nicht weiter begründete Behauptung Schrimpfs, „Zum Begriff der geschichtlichen Tatsache“, in: Dilthey-Jahrbuch 5 (1988), S. 100 (117), nach der die Geschichte des Wortes „Tatsache“ noch weitgehend unerforscht sei, dürfte mit Blick auf die folgenden Nachweise in ihrer Strenge jedenfalls mittlerweile kaum noch aufrecht zu erhalten sein. Siehe zur Begriffsgeschichte auch Lehmann, „Faktum, Anekdote, Gerücht – Zur Begriffsgeschichte der ‚Thatsache‘ und Kleists Berliner Abendblättern“, in: Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft

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II. Etymologisch-begriffsgeschichtliche Annäherung an den Begriff Factum / Tatsache / Faktum Das Wort „Faktum“ bedeutet im heutigen Sprachverständnis so viel wie: „etwas, was tatsächlich, nachweisbar vorhanden, geschehen ist; [unumgängliche] Tatsache“ und hat daher die bildungssprachliche Bedeutung von etwas Gemachtem („lat. factum = das Gemachte“).25 Ein Unterschied zwischen einem Fakt (von Faktum) und einer Tatsache besteht insoweit im Gegenwartsverständnis des Wortes nicht mehr,26 sodass „Faktum“, „Fakt“ oder „Faktizität“ weitgehend synonym für das mittlerweile geläufige Wort „Tatsache“27 gebraucht werden können.28 Der Begriff der Tatsache bzw. des Fakts wird dabei oft adverbial („tatsächlich“/„faktisch“) und bestärkend für ein (historisch) Gegebenes gebraucht. Geht der Begriff des Faktums („das Gemachte“) dabei allerdings ursprünglich auf den Begriff der „Tat, Handlung“ zurück,29 da er sich von dem lateinischen Wort „facere“ ableitet, dessen substantiviertes Partizip Perfekt Passiv das Wort „Faktum“ (factum) vorstellt,30 so ist in seinem Gegenwartsverständnis von der an sich handelnden bzw. tätigen Verursachung, die erst sodann für sich ein (historisch) Gewirktes im Bewusstsein isoliert vorzustellen vermag, gründlich abstrahiert.31 Auf und Geistesgeschichte 89 (2015), S. 307 ff. Für eine begriffsgeschichtliche Annäherung an den englischen Begriff „Fact“ von angloamerikanischer Seite der Kantinterpretation siehe nunmehr auch Ware, „Rethinking Kant’s Fact of Reason“, in: Philosophers’ Imprint 32 (2014), S. 2 ff. 25  Duden, Das große Wörterbuch der Deutschen Sprache III, Mannheim / Leipzig / u. a.: Dudenverlag, 3. Aufl. 1999, S. 1163; Brockhaus / Wahrig, Deutsches Wörterbuch in sechs Bänden II, Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1981, S. 655. 26  Carstensen / Busse, Anglizismen-Wörterbuch  II, Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 1994, S. 457 f. Das Wort „Fakt“ war vor allem in der DDR gebräuchlich und stammt aus dem Russischen, das diese Form wiederum aus dem Englischen entnommen hat (Kluge / Seebold, Etymologisches Wörterbuch der Deutschen Sprache, Berlin / Boston: De Gruyter, 25. Aufl. 2011, S. 273). 27 Dazu Duden, Das große Wörterbuch der Deutschen Sprache IX, Mannheim / Leipzig / u. a.: Dudenverlag, 3. Aufl. 1999, S. 3861. 28  Duden, Sinn- und Sachverwandte Wörter, Mannheim / Leipzig / u. a.: Dudenverlag, 2. Aufl. 1997, S. 699 f. 29  Brockhaus / Wahrig (Fn. 25), S. 655. 30  Kluge / Seebold (Fn. 26), S. 273; Duden, Das Herkunftswörterbuch, Berlin: Dudenverlag, 5. Aufl. 2014, S. 269. 31 In Grimm / Grimm, Deutsches Wörterbuch, XI I/1, Leipzig: Hirzel, 1935, S. 307 ist auf diesen ursprünglichen Tätigkeitszusammenhang des Gewirkten (d. h. des Getanen) und somit auf die Ambiguität im Begriff der Tat / Handlung noch hingewiesen: „That, Tat, f. das verbal­ nomen zu thun: […] in ahd. glossen wird mit tât das lat. actio, actus, actum, effectus, factum, gestum übersetzt […], die that ist also im allgemeinen eine handlung (das thun sowohl als das gethane) und zwar eines wesens, das freien willen hat, sie ist das verwirklichte wort, der ausgeführte gedanke, plan, vorsatz, entschlusz oder rat: […].“ Daher werden ebd. (S. 332) auch zwei Bedeutungsebenen des Begriffs der „Thatsache“ unterschieden: „1) sache der that […] 2) eine vorgefallene, wirklich geschehene sache, etwas feststehendes, das nicht bezweifelt werden kann“.

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diese vom subjektiven Ursprung abstrahierende Weise gewinnt das Factum („als Sache der Tat“) im Bewusstsein des Begriffs die moderne Wortbedeutung eines für sich objektiv bestehenden Fakts bzw. Ereignisses, d. h. die Bedeutung einer objektiv nachweisbaren (geschichtlichen) Tatsache oder gegebenen Tatsächlichkeit. Das bereits skizzierte Begriffsverständnis Dieter Henrichs („Factum“ als „Faktizität“) entspricht demnach offensichtlich jedenfalls nicht der ursprünglich-etymologischen, sondern tendenziell dieser modernen Wortbedeutung seiner eigenen Zeit. 1. Begriffsgeschichtliche Skizze des Wortes „Factum“ bzw. „Tatsache“ und „Faktum“ Nachdem das Wort „factum“ („Tat / Handlung“) in der lateinischen Literatur, und zwar als „Tat“ in einem neutralen oder als „Delikt“ in einem moralischen Sinne, gelegentlich auch als „Ereignis“, bereits in frühester Zeit eine substantivische Funktion übernahm,32 wurde es im 16. Jh. in der Bedeutung von „Tat / Delikt“ zunächst in die deutsche Rechtssprache übernommen.33 Bis ins 19. Jh. hinein bedeutete es also „einen Verstoß gegen das Recht, einen Rechtsbruch beinhaltende Tat, Handlung, relevanter Tatbestand“.34 Diese etymologisch-ursprüngliche Anknüpfung des Begriffsgebrauchs im rechtssprachlichen Zusammenhang, danach das „Factum“ eine zurechenbare Tat als Verstoß gegen das Recht bedeutete, dürfte dem heutigen Sprachgebrauch des – mitunter positivistischen Tendenzen erheblich unterliegenden – Rechtsbewusstseins der Gegenwart dagegen kaum noch geläufig sein.35 Die Wortbedeutung einer „Tatsache“, von der aus sich das moderne Verständnis dieses Wortes zu entwickeln beginnt, kommt dagegen erst im 18. Jh., nämlich in einem zunächst theologischen Zusammenhang auf, als der pommersche Landpastor Johann Joachim Spalding (1714 – 1804) die englische Wendung „matter of facts“ aus Joseph Butlers The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Cons­ titution and Course of Nature (London, 1736/17504) im Jahre 1756 erstmals mit 32  Siehe dazu Halbfass, „Tatsache I“, in: Ritter / Gründer (Hrsg.), HWPh X, Basel: Schwabe, 1998, Sp. 910 (911 m. w. N.). 33  Siehe dazu Schulz / Basler, Deutsches Fremdwörterbuch V, Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 2. Aufl. 2004, S. 658 – 660 m. w. N.; Halbfass (Fn. 32), Sp. 910 f.; Pfeifer, Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Deutschen I, Berlin: Akademie, 1989, S. 403. Einen authentischen Überblick über die möglichen Wortbedeutungen zu Beginn des 18. Jh. gibt Zedler, Grosses vollständiges Universallexicon aller Wissenschaften und Künste IX, Halle / Leipzig: Zedler, 1735, S. 65 – 67. 34  Schulz / Basler (Fn. 33), S. 658 f. mit zahlreichen Verwendungsnachweisen (S. 660). 35  Der Begriff „Factum / Faktum“ wird in den verfügbaren Rechtswörterbüchern nicht verzeichnet (vgl. etwa selbst ein von der Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften herausgegebenes „Deutsches Rechtswörterbuch [Wörterbuch der älteren deutschen Rechtssprache]“, Band  III, Weimar: Böhlau, 1935 – 1938). Zum Begriff der „Tatsache“ vgl. im Übrigen etwa Manigk, „Tatsachen, juristische“, in: Stier-Somlo / Elfter (Hrsg.), Handwörterbuch der Rechtswissenschaft  V, Berlin / Leipzig: De Gruyter, 1928, S. 847 – 857; Grüneberg, „Tatsache“, in: Tilch / Arloth (Hrsg.), Deutsches Rechts-Lexikon, München: Beck, 3. Aufl. 2001, S. 4099; Creifelds, Rechtswörterbuch, München: Beck, 22. Aufl. 2017, S. 1290 f.

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der Wortneubildung „Tatsache“ übersetzt.36 Als „matter of facts“ bzw. „Tatsachen“ (von Spalding gelegentlich mit „res facti“ paraphrasiert)37 gelten Butler / Spalding – noch dem ursprünglich-etymologischen Sinn des Wortes „factum“ verhaftet – „Sachen der Tat“, nämlich der Tat Gottes. Da es Butler in seiner Analogy of Religion dabei um das belohnende bzw. strafende Wirken Gottes in der Geschichte zu tun ist, bedeuten ihm „Tatsachen“ schließlich empirische (d. h. natürlich wahrnehmbare) Hinweise auf die Identität von Welt- und Heilsgeschichte.38 Insofern deutet der theologische Begriffsgebrauch des Wortes „Tatsache“ („res facti“) hier zugleich auch schon auf die moderne Wortbedeutung desselben im Sinne eines nachweisbaren „Fakts“ voraus, obgleich er damit keineswegs bereits identisch ist.39 Der von Spalding in die Theologie eingeführte Begriff der „Tatsache“ wird sodann zunächst von Johann Georg Hamann und Johann Gottfried Herder begeistert 36  Joseph Butlers Bestätigung der natürlichen und geoffenbarten Religion aus ihrer Gleichförmigkeit mit der Einrichtung und dem ordentlichen Laufe der Natur, Leipzig: Weidmann, 1756. – Diese heute weithin anerkannte Urheberschaft der Begriffsbildung bemerkt ausdrücklich als erster wohl Heynatz, Versuch eines Deutschen Antibarbarus II, Berlin: Verlag der königlich preußischen Akademie Kunst und Buchhandel, 1797, S. 467 f., wohingegen Eisler, Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe III, Berlin: Mittler & Sohn, 4. Aufl. 1930, S. 214 ohne weiteren Quellenbeleg Herder als Urheber des Wortes „Tatsache“ behauptet hat. – Nach einem in der Literatur wohl vereinzelt gebliebenen Hinweis von Stammler, Spätlese des Mittelalters I, Berlin: Schmidt, 1963, S. 73/112, handelt es sich bei dem Wort „tatsach“ bereits um eine früher belegte Nachbildung des lateinischen Juristenwortes „res facti“, nicht erst um eine Nachbildung des englischen Terminus „matter of fact“. 37  Siehe den Stellenvergleich bei Walz, „Tatsache“, in: Zeitschrift für Deutsche Wortforschung 14 (1912/1913), S. 9 (10 ff.), der gegen Heynatz’ Behauptung (in: Fn. 36), S. 467 f., Spalding übersetze das Wort „res facti“ mit „Tatsache“, geltend macht, dass „res facti“ für diesen lediglich eine paraphrasierende Verständigung der Wortneuschöpfung „Tatsache“ für „matter of facts“ darstellt. 38  So zusammengefasst von Halbfass (Fn. 32), Sp. 910. – „Der theologiegeschichtliche Hintergrund des Begriffes »Tatsache«“ wird eingehend im gleichnamigen und instruktiven Aufsatz von Staats, in: Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 70 (1973), S. 316 – 345 beleuchtet und in einer Selbstanzeige, in: Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 17 (1973), S. 145 f. kurz zusammengefasst. Am erstgenannten Ort (S. 325) kommt er zu folgender Einschätzung: „Das Wort Tatsache wurde […] nicht exklusiv als Heilstatsache verstanden, wie sie in späterer Theologie bedeutsam wurde. […]. Auch umschreibt das Wort nicht den heute zumeist beigegebenen Sinn von isolierter Geschichtstatsache oder naturgesetzlichem Faktum. Das positivistisch Gesetzliche ist ihm – noch – fern. Der Sinn des Wortes in Spaldings Übersetzung geht aus dem Kontext hervor: Wo menschliches Handeln endlich belohnt oder bestraft wird, wo endlich das einst Verheißene eintritt und wo dies alles in der Gegenwart verstanden wird, dort erleben wir eine Tatsache. Eine eschatologische und somit geschichtliche Komponente ist dem Wort wesenhaft beigelegt. Die durch solcherart Tatsachen wirklich verstandene Welt in ihrer Geschichte ist etwas völlig anderes als die »abstrakte Wahrheit« vergangener Faktizitäten oder gültiger Naturgesetze, welche vom menschlichen Erkennen unabhängig in Kraft sind.“ 39  Vor diesem Hintergrund wäre es einer genaueren Untersuchungen wert, was Butler (in der Vorrede zur zweiten Auflage seiner „Sermons“, in: Gladstone [Hrsg.], The Works of Joseph Butler II, Reprint der Ausgabe Oxford 1896, Bristol: Thoemmes, 1995, S. 5 f.) genau meint, wenn er auch seine moralphilosophischen Überlegungen von einem „matter of fact, namely, what the particular nature of man is“, anheben lässt.

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aufgegriffen.40 So schreibt Letzterer in seiner „Aelteste[n] Urkunde des Menschengeschlechts“ (I, 1774): „Komm’ hinaus, Jüngling, aufs freie Feld und merke. Die urälteste herrlichste Offenbarung Gottes erscheint dir jeden Morgen als That­ sache, grosses Werk Gottes in der Natur.“41 Als sehr wahrscheinlich gilt nach Reinhart Staats, dass das Wort „Tatsache“ durch diese Vermittlung Herders „zum Kernbegriff der späteren Geschichtswissenschaft und der historischen Theologie“ sowie fernerhin „zum Ausdruck einer neuen Epoche wurde“.42 Denn obgleich der Tatsachenbegriff zunächst noch seinen ursprünglichen Bedeutungsrahmen wahrt, verengt sich in seiner anfänglichen Entwicklungsgeschichte zugleich sein Bedeutungssinn, wie man einer in den Zeitraum 1777 – 1781 zu datierenden Glosse Lessings „Über das Wörtlein Tatsache“ entnimmt:43 „Mit Recht sage ich Wörtlein; denn es ist noch so jung. Ich weiß mich der Zeit ganz wohl zu erinnern, da es noch in Niemands Munde war. Aber aus wessen Munde oder Feder es zuerst gekommen, das weiß ich nicht. Noch weniger weiß ich, wie es gekommen sein mag, daß dieses neue Wörtlein ganz wider das gewöhnliche Schicksal neuer Wörter in kurzer Zeit ein so gewaltiges Glück gemacht hat; noch, wodurch es eine so allgemeine Aufnahme verdient hat, daß man in gewissen Schriften kein Blatt umschlagen kann, ohne auf eine Tatsache zu stoßen. Man fand in Lateinischen und Französischen Büchern bei wackern Männern, die an der Grundfeste des Christentums flicken, daß es ganz unwandelbar gegründet sei, weil es auf Facta, sur des faits, beruhe, die kein Mensch bezweifeln könne. Nun heißen Facta und des Faits weiter nichts, als geschehene Dinge, Begebenheiten, Taten, Ereignisse, Vorfälle, deren historische Gewißheit so groß ist, als historische Gewißheit nur sein kann. Diese Deutschen Ausdrücke bedeuten alle etwas Besonderes mit, und man müßte nach Schicklichkeit bald diesen, bald jenen brauchen –“ (in: Barner [Hrsg.], Gotthold Ephraim Lessing Werke und Briefe in zwölf Bänden X, Frankfurt a.M. 2001, S. 320 f.).

Der einstmals bei den „wackern“ Theologen im Gebrauch stehende Begriff der Tatsache beginnt also nach diesem Zeugnis offenbar bereits zu Spaldings Lebzeiten den tendenziell modernen Bedeutungssinn einer isolierten Geschichtstatsache größtmöglicher Gewissheit anzunehmen, sodass die begriffliche Spannung zwischen der ursprünglichen Vorstellung einer moralischen bzw. göttlichen Tat im Wortsinn (Lessing) und der „in gewissen Schriften“ angeführten historischen Tatsache im neueren Wortsinn (J. M. Goeze / J. D. Schumann) im berühmten „Fragmentenstreit“ eine unübersehbare Rolle zu spielen scheint.44 Nach Reinhart Staats 40 Dazu Staats, „Der theologiegeschichtliche Hintergrund …“ (Fn. 38), S. 316 (326 f. m. w. N.). 41 In: Suphan (Hrsg.), Herders Sämmtliche Werke VI, Berlin: Weidmann, 1883, S. 193 (258). 42  Staats, „Der theologiegeschichtliche Hintergrund …“ (Fn. 38), S. 316 (326 f.). 43  Auch dazu ausführlich ebd., S. 316 (327 ff.); ferner Walz (Fn. 37), S. 9. 44  Dazu ausführlich Staats, „Der theologiegeschichtliche Hintergrund …“ (Fn. 38), S. 316 (327 – 345 m. w. N.), der darauf hinweist, dass moralische Kraft und Gewissheit für Lessings

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lässt sich wohl sogar belegen, dass jenem Schumann (1714 – 1787) in diesem Rahmen der Begriff der „Tatsache“ zum „Faktum“ im modernen Wortsinn wird, das nämlich unabhängig von menschlicher Erfahrung als an und für sich bestehend gilt, sodass sich bei ihm erstmals der synonyme und damit zeitgeschichtlich wegweisende Gebrauch der beiden Worte „Faktum / Tatsache“ finden dürfte.45 Das moderne Wort „Tatsache“ scheint also mit diesem geistesgeschichtlichen Datum geläufig zu werden und erfreut sich alsbald zunehmender Verbreitung,46 wobei es sich im Deutschen sehr schnell ohne den theologischen bzw. rechtssprachlichen und ursprünglichen Bezug auf das Gerichtswesen („factum“/„res facti“/ „matter of fact“) durchsetzt.47 Auf diese Weise erlangt schließlich auch das Wort „Faktum“, zunächst vor allem in gelehrten Diskursen, sodann auch allgemeiner, die zur „Tatsache“ synonyme Bedeutung: „etwas, das tatsächlich vorhanden oder geschehen ist, nachweisbare, unabweisbare (empirische) Tatsache“ oder auch „historisch beglaubigtes (einzelnes) Ereignis, Vorgang“.48 Gegen diesen unaufhaltbar auch in der Sprache aufkommenden Tatsachenpositivismus polemisiert dann beNathan nicht aus der Geschichte herrühren, sondern dieser ihn vielmehr ausrufen lässt: „Hier brauchts That!“ 45  Staats, „Der theologiegeschichtliche Hintergrund …“ (Fn. 38), S. 316 (334 ff. Fn. 50). 46  Adelung, Grammatisch-kritisches Wörterbuch der Hochdeutschen Mundart IV, Leipzig: Breitkopf und Härtel, 2. Aufl. 1801, S. 567 bemerkt zum Begriff der „Thatsache“ allerdings kritisch: „[…] ein von einigen Neuern versuchtes Wort, das lat. Factum, eine geschehene Sache, eine gewirkte Veränderung außer sich zu bezeichnen. […] Andere gebrauchen dafür Thathandlung. Beyde Wörter sind nicht nur unschicklich und wider die Analogie zusammen gesetzt, sondern auch der Mißdeutung unterworfen, indem ein Oberdeutscher sich bey Thathandlung und Thatsache bey dem ersten Anblicke sich vermuthlich nichts anders als eine Gewaltthätigkeit, eine Thätlichkeit denken gedenken wird, welches das erstere daselbst wirklich bedeutet.“ Ganz in diesem Sinne hatte sich ders. auch bereits in: Umständliches Lehrgebäude der Deutschen Sprache II, Leipzig: Breitkopf, 1782, S. 220 geäußert: „Es müssen die Wörter nicht zusammen gesetzt werden, welche einander nicht wirklich bestimmen. […] Thathandlung, […] für factum, [ist] verwerflich, weil hier der erste Theil den andern nicht bestimmt, sondern eigentlich nur eben so viel sagt, als der andere; […] Handlung und That sind im Grunde […] nicht sehr verschieden, wenigstens nicht so sehr, daß That die nähere Art und Weise der Handlung hinlänglich bestimmen könnte; Thatsache läßt sich daher eher vertheidigen.“ – Siehe gegen Adelungs Tadel wiederum Heynatz (Fn. 36), S. 467 f. sowie Campe, Wörterbuch der Deutschen Sprache IV, Braunschweig: Schulbuchhandlung, 1810, S. 801 f. zu „Thathandlung“ und „Thatsache“ (= „eine Sache, welche in einer That bestehet, eine wirklich geschehene, vorgefallene Sache [Factum]“). 47 Worauf Kluge / Seebold (Fn. 26), S. 908 hinweisen. In Krug, Allgemeines Handwörterbuch der philosophischen Wissenschaften II, Leipzig: Brockhaus, 2. Aufl. 1833, S. 5 heißt es daher nur: „Factum (von demselben) ist alles Geschehene oder jede Thatsache, die sich zu irgendeiner Zeit begeben oder eignet hat – also auch Begebenheit, Ereigniß. Alle Facta fallen daher der Geschichte zu. […]. Davon kommt her faktisch = thatsächlich oder geschichtlich. […].“ 48  Schulz / Basler (Fn. 33), S. 659 mit zahlreichen Verwendungsnachweisen. – Schon 1781 rekurriert Musaeus in seinem Werk „Der Deutsche Grandison – auch eine Familiengeschichte“ (1. Band, Eisenach: Wittekindt, 1781) auf die moderne Wortbedeutung von Tatsache, wenn er (S. 119) schreibt: „Wenn Sie in London angelangt sind, so lassen Sie es Ihr erstes Geschäfte seyn, sich unter der Hand zu erkundigen was man von der Geschichte des Grandisons urtheilt,

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reits der wortmächtige Hegel, wenn er 1827 unter entgegengesetzter Verwendung der Worte „Tatsachen“ und „Faktum“ schreibt: „Aus dem Mißverstande, daß die Unzureichendheit der endlichen Kategorien zur Wahrheit die Unmöglichkeit objektiver Erkenntnis mit sich bringe, wird die Berechtigung, aus dem Gefühle und der subjektiven Meinung zu sprechen und abzusprechen, gefolgert, und an die Stelle des Beweisens treten Versicherungen und die Erzählungen von dem, was sich in dem Bewußstsein für Tatsachen vorfinden, welches für umso reiner gehalten wird, je unkritischer es ist. […] Das schlimmste Schicksal hat dabei die Philosophie selbst unter jenen Händen zu erfahren, wenn sie sich mit ihr zu tun machen und sie teils auffassen, teils beurteilen. Es ist das Faktum der physischen oder geistigen, insbesondere auch der religiösen Lebendigkeit, was durch jene es zu fassen unfähige Reflexion verunstaltet wird. Dieses Auffassen hat jedoch für sich den Sinn, erst das Faktum zu einem Gewußten zu erheben, und die Schwierigkeit liegt in diesem Übergange von der Sache zur Erkenntnis, welcher durch Nachdenken bewirkt wird.“49 Ganz im Sinne eines solchermaßen kritisierten und unkritischen Begriffsgebrauchs ist seit Mitte des 19. Jh., damals noch selten, sodann seit Mitte des 20. Jh. häufiger, das Wort „Fakt“ nachweisbar, das, unter Verkürzung des lateinischen „Faktum“, aus dem Englischen stammt und – modewortartig gebraucht – gegenwärtig so viel wie „unumgängliche Tatsache, mit der man sich abfinden muss“, bzw. gleichsam auch nur eine gegebene „Faktizität“ bedeutet.50 Im Gegensatz zu Hegel wird allerdings schon Schopenhauer der ursprüngliche Bedeutungsgehalt des Tatsachen-/Faktumsbegriffs mit dieser Verkürzung in seiner Preisschrift über die Grundlagen der Moral (1840) nicht mehr geläufig sein.51 Der philosophische Begriffsgebrauch des Wortes „Tatsache“ unterlag insofern unübersehbar der geistesgeschichtlichen Entwicklung, die vom eigentlichen Subob sie das Publikum für eine wirkliche Begebenheit (was für ein schleppender Ausdruck! Thatsache ist hier das rechte Wort) oder für Fiktion nimmt.“ 49  Vorrede zur zweiten Ausgabe der „Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse“, in: Moldenhauer / Michel (Hrsg.), Hegel, Georg Friedrich Wilhelm, Werke in zwanzig Bänden VIII, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1986, S. 13 (16 f.). – Übrigens bezieht sich die zum kantischen „Factum der Vernunft“ in der Sekundärliteratur oftmals zitierte Polemik Hegels in: „Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie III“, in: Moldenhauer / Michel (Hrsg.), Hegel, Georg Friedrich Wilhelm, Werke in zwanzig Bänden XX, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1986, S. 369 genau genommen gar nicht auf das „Factum“, sondern auf die „kalte Pflicht“, denn sie sei „der letzte unverdaute Klotz im Magen, die Offenbarung gegeben der Vernunft“. 50  Schulz / Basler (Fn. 33), S. 659 f.; siehe schon oben Fn. 26. – Das Wort „faktisch“ wird nach Heyne, Deutsches Wörterbuch I, Leipzig: Hirzel, 2. Aufl. 1905, S. 853 in der Wortbedeutung von „thatsächlich, in der That; zuerst in Studentenkreisen aus lat. factum gebildet“ und sei „jetzt in der Sprache des täglichen Lebens bis in tiefere Volksschichten sehr gewöhnlich geworden“. 51 „Was soll man bei diesem seltsamen Ausdruck sich denken?“ (fragt Schopenhauer, „Preisschrift über die Grundlage der Moral“, 2. Aufl. 1860 [18401], in: Hübscher [Hrsg.], Ar­ thur Schopenhauer – Zürcher Ausgabe – Werke in zehn Bänden VI, Zürich: Diogenes, 1977, S. 184 rhetorisch mit Blick auf Kants „Factum der Vernunft“, siehe ferner auch S. 170, 178 f., 180, 184 ff, 208).

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jekt aller (Willens- oder Geistes-)Tätigkeit fortan in der Tendenz zunehmend abstrahierte,52 sodass der Verlust des ursprünglichen Tätigkeitsmoments im Begriff der Tatsache, der lediglich ein in der Wirklichkeit abstrakt an sich Gegebenes im Bedeutungssinn des Wortes zurücklässt, nicht weiter verwunderlich ist. Insoweit spielte dieser auf ein irgendwoher an sich wirklich Gegebenes reduzierte Tatsachenbegriff für den Positivismus des 19./20. Jh. eine wesentliche Bedeutung,53 dessen reduktionistische Tendenzen bis zum gegenwärtigen Tage auch durch die analytische Philosophie bzw. die Sprachphilosophie nicht wieder eingefangen werden konnten.54 Verengt sich der ursprüngliche Wortsinn im Tatsachenpositivismus nämlich auf das empirisch Gegebene, das absolut und unabhängig vom erkennen  Siehe dazu überblicksartig Halbfass (Fn. 32), Sp. 910 (911).   Siehe dazu die selbst aus einem positivistischen Standpunkt geführte Untersuchung Gru­ nickes, Der Begriff der Tatsache in der positivistischen Philosophie des 19. Jahrhunderts, Halle: Niemeyer, 1930, insbesondere zum Tatsachenbegriff bei Comte, Mill, Spencer, Laas, Schuppe, Avenarius und Mach (S. 16 – 107). – Selbstredend hat sich der positivistische Tatsachenbegriff auch im übrigen Geistesleben seiner Zeit Wirklichkeit verschafft, weshalb Mielke, Der Deutsche Roman des 19. Jahrhunderts, Braunschweig: Schwetschke und Sohn, 1890, S. 265 für den seinerzeitigen „Roman der Gegenwart“ konstatieren muss: „Die sogenannten „Zeitfragen“ werden nach wie vor die Themata und Probleme des Romans; […]. Das große Schlagwort der Zeit ist: Thatsachen, und die Fachwissenschaften schleudern immer neue Thatsachen auf den Markt der Öffentlichkeit, […]. Aber wie es auch sei, der tiefe Drang des Zeitalters geht darauf hinaus, mit eisernen Armen sich an die Wirklichkeit zu klammern und mit ihr zu ringen, mögen darüber die alten Ideale zu Grunde gehen.“ – Man wird mit diesem ersten Höhepunkt des begriffsgeschichtlich-vergessenen und synonymen Gebrauchs des Tatsachen- bzw. Faktumsbegriffs auch keinen bloßen Zufall darin zu erblicken haben, dass mit Hermann Cohen („Kants Theorie der Erfahrung“ [nach der 3. Aufl. 1918], in: Holzhey [Hrsg.], Hermann Cohen – Werke I/1, Hildesheim / Zürich / New York: Olms, 1987, S. 79 ff., 93 ff., 104/108) im 19. Jahrhundert (1871) eine intensive Rezeption der kantischen Erkenntnistheorie einsetzt, deren Grundprämisse letztlich darin besteht, Kant sei im Ausgang vom „Faktum“ der vorgefundenen Wissenschaften (Mathematik) mit seiner „transzendentalen Methode“ darauf ausgegangen, die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit dieser Wissenschaften auszufinden: „[…] so müssen wir den festen Punkt näher bestimmen, von welchem Kant ausgegangen ist, und von welchen die Rekonstruktion seiner Gedanken zu beginnen hat. Dieser feste Punkt ist die Tatsache der durch Newton in dem Systeme der Prinzipien begründeten Wissenschaft; deren Prinzip zu bestimmen, gilt ihm als die erste Aufgabe der Philosophie. Und an der Bestimmung dieses Begriffes, wie dieselbe in Kants Darstellung sich entwickelt, entwickelt sich zugleich seine ganze theoretische Philosophie. […] Wenn wir daher sagen, dass Kant von dem Faktum der Newtonschen Wissenschaft ausgegangen sei, so ist damit in dem Sinne der entscheidende Grundzug seines Philosophierens angegeben, dass er die Vernunft als die wissenschaftliche Vernunft, und zwar aufgrund ihrer stetigen Geschichte denkt. Es hat sich ihm der Begriff der Erkenntnis fixiert.“ – Dass der von Cohen (wohl mit Blick auf Prol, AA IV: 274.27 – 275.19) hier synonym gebrauchte Tatsachen-/ Faktumsbegriff allerdings nicht der kantischen Verwendungsweise dieser Begrifflichkeiten entspricht, wird sich im weiteren Verlaufe der hiesigen Untersuchung noch herausstellen. – Vgl. ferner dens., „Kants Begründung der Ethik“ (nach der 2. Aufl. 1910), in: Holzhey (Hrsg.), Hermann Cohen – Werke II, Hildesheim / Zürich / New York: Olms, 2001, passim. 54  Vgl. dazu Simons, „Tatsache II“, in: Ritter / Gründer (Hrsg.), HWPh X, Basel: Schwabe, 1998, Sp. 914 f. Immerhin aber wurde in neuerer Zeit (etwa von Patzig, „Satz und Tatsache“, in: ders., Tatsachen, Normen, Sätze, Stuttgart: Reclam, 1980, S. 8 – 44) die Sprachabhängigkeit von Tatsachen herausgestellt. 52 53

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den Subjekt an und für sich bestehen soll,55 so lässt sich insbesondere im Bereich der notwendigen Wahrheiten (d. h. zumindest in der Logik und Mathematik, wohl aber auch – wie noch zu zeigen ist – in der Moral) nicht länger sinnvoll von Tatsachen sprechen.56 Nach dieser begriffsgeschichtlichen Skizze besteht also zur Zeit der Aufklärung offensichtlich ein dringendes und durch Spaldings Wortschöpfung des Tatsachenbegriffs befriedigtes sprachliches Bedürfnis, die absolut-tätige Verursachung einer geschichtlichen Wirklichkeit auf den Begriff zu bringen; ein Umstand, der allerdings kaum verwunderlich sein dürfte, ist doch absolute Tätigkeit ein die Aufklärungszeit maßgeblich prägendes Thema, wovon auch die schöngeistige Literatur beredtes Zeugnis ablegt, etwa wenn Goethe seinen Faust im Studierzimmer die Schöpfung nach dem Johannesevangelium in diesem ursprünglichen Sinne einer Sache der Tat Gottes interpretieren lässt: „[…] Doch dieser Mangel lässt sich ersetzen,/wir lernen das Überirdische schätzen,/wir sehnen uns nach Offenbarung,/die nirgends würd’ger und schöner brennt / als in dem Neuen Testament./Mich drängt’s, den Grundtext aufzuschlagen,/mit redlichem Gefühl einmal / das heilige Original / in mein geliebtes Deutsch zu übertragen./Geschrieben steht: „Im Anfang war das Wort!“/Hier stock’ ich schon! Wer hilft mir weiter fort?/Ich kann das Wort so hoch unmöglich schätzen,/ich muß es anders übersetzen,/wenn ich vom Geiste recht erleuchtet bin./Geschrieben steht: Im Anfang war der Sinn./Bedenke wohl die erste Zeile,/daß deine Feder sich nicht übereile!/Ist es der Sinn, der alles wirkt und schafft?/ Es sollte stehn: Im Anfang war die Kraft!/Doch, auch indem ich dieses niederschreibe,/ schon warnt mich was, daß ich dabei nicht bleibe./Mir hilft der Geist! auf einmal seh’ ich Rat / u nd schreibe getrost: Im Anfang war die Tat!“ (in: von der Hellen [Hrsg.], Goethes Sämtliche Werke XIII, Stuttgart / Berlin: Cotta, 1902, S. 50 [I 1215 – 1237]).

Mit dem im Anschluss an die Aufklärung aufkommenden und bis heute anhaltenden Relativismus verliert dieses ursprüngliche Tätigkeitsmoment in der Begriffsbildung allerdings erheblich an Bedeutung, sodass sich – anhaltend bis zum heutigen Tag – zunehmend der moderne Wortgebrauch durchsetzt, der isoliert auf das Moment einer für sich gegebenen Wirklichkeit in der Bedeutung des Begriffs der Tatsache abstellt. 2. Der kantische Begriffsgebrauch von Tatsache und Factum / factum Die hier hinsichtlich ihres philosophischen Bedeutungsgehaltes noch weiter aufzuhellende kantische Begrifflichkeit vom „Factum der Vernunft“ (1788) fällt nun zeitlich noch in die Schöpfungszeit des deutschen und schließlich durch Spaldings   Vgl. dazu ergänzend auch Schrimpf (Fn. 24), S. 100 (117 – 120).   Siehe dazu den Artikel „Tatsache“ in: Mittelstraß (Hrsg.), Enzyklopädie Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie IV, Stuttgart: Metzler, 2004, S. 209 f., danach Wittgenstein einen solchen Standpunkt in seinem „Tractatus“ konsequent vertreten habe. 55 56

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Schöpfung sehr schnell modern gewordenen Wortes „Thatsache“ bzw. „Faktum“ (ab 1756). Eben darum verspricht aber eine Untersuchung des etwaigen Gebrauchs der Begriffe „Thatsache“ und „Factum / factum“ in den übrigen Schriften Immanuel Kants einen ersten Anhaltspunkt für das Verständnis seiner moralphilosophischen Wendung vom „Factum der Vernunft“ in seiner zweiten Kritik zu liefern. Tatsächlich standen der vor allem durch sein Frühwerk Betrachtung über die Bestimmung des Menschen (17481/179411) für sein Zeitalter wirkmächtig gewordene Theologe sowie Wortschöpfer Spalding (1714 – 1804) und der Philosoph Kant (1724 – 1804) in reger Korrespondenz miteinander.57 Daher ist es kaum verwunderlich, dass sich in der kritischen Philosophie Kants sowohl ein wissenschaftstheoretischer Gebrauch des Begriffs der „Thatsache“, als auch ein rechtssprachlicher und insofern ursprünglicher Gebrauch des Begriffs vom „Factum“ finden: a) Wissenschaftstheoretischer Gebrauch des Begriffs der „Thatsache“ (als Wissbares) In § 91 KU (1790), d. h. im allerletzten Paragraphen und mithin zum Abschluss seines ganzen „kritischen Geschäfts“, hat Kant den Begriff der „Thatsache“ für seine Philosophie definiert, und zwar in einem derart umfassenden Sinn, dass ein angemessenes Verständnis dieses Begriffs, vor dem Hintergrund der vorstehenden begriffsgeschichtlichen Skizze, wohl bis zum heutigen Tage erst noch aussteht.58 57 Kant ließ Spalding 1766 über Mendelssohn seine „Träume eines Geistersehers“ (vgl. Brief v. 07. 02. 1766, AA X: 67 f.), sodann wohl auch die GMS sowie die KpV zukommen (vgl. Brief von Grunert v. Dez. 1787, AA X: 506; Brief von Spalding v. 08. 02. 1788, AA X: 527). Darüber hinaus standen Spalding und Kant seit 1783 – veranlasst durch Garves Rezension der KrV – in brieflichem Kontakt miteinander (vgl. AA X: 333 f., 347 f., 527 f.; AA XII: 271). – In den kantischen Vorlesungen finden sich einige affirmative Verweise auf die Predigten sowie Schriften Spaldings (V-Lo / Wiener, AA XXIV: 808, 945; V-Anth / Collins, AA XXV: 9; V-Mo / Collins, AA  XXVII: 244) und den von Spalding mit seiner gleichnamigen Schrift maßgeblich geprägten Terminus „Bestimmung des Menschen“ (abgedruckt in: Beutel (Hrsg.), Johann Joachim Spalding – Kritische Ausgabe I/1, Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 2006, S. 1 ff.) hat Kant an vielen Stellen seines eigenen Denkens aufgegriffen (vgl. u. a. KrV, A 840/B 868; KpV, AA V: 146 ff.; RGV, AA VI: 26 ff.; Anth, AA VII: 328 ff.; V-PP / Powalski, AA ­XXVII: 233 – 235; V-PP / Collins, AA XXVII: 470 f.; V-Mo / Mron, AA XXVII: 1581). Vgl. zum kantischen Beitrag zur Geschichte dieses Terminus Macor, Die Bestimmung des Menschen (1748 – 1800) – Eine Begriffsgeschichte, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann Holzboog, 2013, S. 199 ff., 248 ff.; zum Verhältnis der beiden Denker dies, „Das Erbe der Aufklärungstheologie bei Kant“, in: Fischer / Sirovátka / Vopřada (Hrsg.), Kant und die biblische Offenbarungsreligion, Prag: Karolinum, 2013, S. 107 – 121. 58  Verf. ist im Übrigen bisher noch keine Abhandlung bekannt geworden, die den kantischen Begriff der „Thatsache“ ausführlich auseinandersetzen würde (so finden sich dann schließlich auch keinerlei Literaturhinweise in dem von Kilinc besorgten Artikel „Tatsache“, in: Willaschek / Stolzenberg / Mohr / Bacin [Hrsg.], Kant-Lexikon III, Berlin / Boston: De Gruyter, 2015, S. 2248). – Sogar die Untersuchung Weils, „Sinn und Tatsache“, in: ders., Probleme des kantischen Denkens, übersetzt von Wittwer, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2002, S. 63 – 100, die sich selbst immerhin wenigstens den „Versuch“ größtmöglicher Textnähe bescheidet, kommt gänzlich ohne Auseinandersetzung der kantischen Definition des Tatsachenbegriffs in § 91 KU

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„Thatsachen (scibile)“ gehören als Objekte für ein menschliches Erkenntnisvermögen demnach, gemeinsam mit den „Sachen der Meinung (opinabile)“ sowie den „Glaubenssachen (mere credibile)“, zu den erkennbaren Dingen überhaupt,59 sodass ihre Definition für ein entsprechendes Erkenntnisvermögen wie folgt lautet: „Gegenstände für Begriffe, deren objective Realität (es sei durch reine Vernunft, oder durch Erfahrung und im ersteren Falle aus theoretischen oder praktischen Datis derselben, in allen Fällen aber vermittelst einer ihnen correspondirenden Anschauung) bewiesen werden kann, sind (res facti) Thatsachen*)“.60 Mit dem gewöhnlichen Begriff der Tatsache, durch den eine empirisch wirkliche und daher objektiv nachweisbare Gegebenheit als solche bezeichnet wird, hat der kantische Tatsachenbegriff also gemein, dass „Tatsachen“ des Bewusstseins (genitivus objectivus) überhaupt zum Bereich des Wissbaren gehören. Allerdings zieht Kant die Sphäre des Wissbaren mit seinem kritischen Tatsachenbegriff erheblich weiter, als es heute üblich geworden ist oder gewöhnlicher Weise auch nur denkbar scheint.61 Denn mit seiner Kritik des menschlichen Erkenntnis(1781/1787) bzw. Begehrungsvermögens (1788) hatte er sich zuvor über die vernunft- bzw. verstandesbegrifflichen Bedingungen der Möglichkeit von wirklicher Erkenntnis eines Subjekts in Ansehung (s)einer sinnlich gegebenen Erfahrung gründlich aufgeklärt, sodass er den dementsprechenden Tatsachenbegriff nicht – wie hingegen allerdings ein unaufgeklärter Tatsachenpositivismus – auf ein in den Anschauungsformen von Raum und Zeit sinnlich wirklich gegebenes Erfahrungsdatum beschränken muss, das dann noch dazu an und für sich selbst vermeintlich auch unabhängig vom menschlichen Erkenntnisvermögen (als Ding an sich selbst) Dasein haben soll.62 Vielmehr behauptet sich im Rahmen seines kritischen Tatsachenbegriffs, insofern unabhängig von einem im Einzelnen wirklich gegebenen sinnlichen Datum, bereits die bloße (begrifflich-gründende) Möglichkeit einer wirklichen Erfahrung für ein Subjekt in diesen Anschauungsformen als für den (AA V: 468.12 – 16) aus. Ebenso setzt Grunicke (Fn. 53), S. 180 ff. den kritischen Tatsachenbegriff in dem auf Kant bezogenen Teil der vorgesetzten Untersuchung nicht auseinander. – Die verdienstlich um die Historie des englischen Begriffs „Fact“ und um eine Einordnung des kantischen Begriffsgebrauchs bemühte Studie Wares (Fn. 24), S. 5 ff. leidet – ohne den kritischen Tatsachenbegriff der KU hinreichend auseinanderzusetzen (S. 14 f.) – zuletzt noch daran, dass sie den Begriffsgebrauch Kants in der KpV tendenziell mit dem modernen / wissenschaftstheoretischen Bedeutungsgehalt von „Tatsache“ identifizieren zu können glaubt (S. 7/15). 59  KU, AA V: 467.12 – 14. 60  KU, AA V: 468.12 – 16. Vgl. im Übrigen den Gebrauch des Tatsachenbegriffs u. a. in KrV, AA  III: 30.06 (=  B  5), 99.17 (= A  84/B  116); MSRL, AA  VI: 371.29 – 34; MSTL, AA  VI: 400.31; ÜGTP, AA VIII: 176.23; FM, AA XX: 275.05 – 11. 61  Insofern kann man mit Blick auf die Tatsachendefinition Immanuel Kants gerade nicht von einer „geradezu klassische[n] Formulierung“ sprechen, wie Kiefner, „Zur Sprache des allgemeinen Landrechts“, in: Dölemeyer / Mohnhaupt (Hrsg.), 200 Jahre Allgemeines Landrecht für die preußischen Staaten, Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 1995, S.  23 (72) dies hier jedoch unternimmt. 62  Das übersieht die ansonsten hervorragende Studie Wolffs (Fn. 3), S. 511 (537), die ohne Auseinandersetzung des Tatsachenbegriffs der KU behauptet, es könne in der kantischen Terminologie keine nicht empirisch gegebenen Tatsachen geben.

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Tatsachenbegriff hinreichend, denn diese rein begriffliche Möglichkeit der tatsächlichen Erfahrung / Erkenntnis einer gewirkten Gegebenheit hat ihren erkenntnistheoretischen Grund mit den Kategorien des Verstandes63 im menschlichen Erkenntnisvermögen und mithin in der denkenden Spontanität des insofern in einem ursprünglichen Sinne tätigen Erkenntnissubjekts.64 Auf eben diesen maßgeblichen Umstand verweist schließlich auch die *Anmerkung in der zitierten Definition der „Thatsache“: „*) Ich erweitere hier, wie mich dünkt, mit Recht, den Begriff einer Thatsache über die gewöhnliche Bedeutung dieses Worts. Denn es ist nicht nöthig, ja nicht einmal thunlich, diesen Ausdruck bloß auf die wirkliche Erfahrung einzuschränken, wenn von dem Verhältnisse der Dinge zu unseren Erkenntnißvermögen die Rede ist, da eine bloß mögliche Erfahrung schon hinreichend ist, um von ihnen bloß als Gegenständen einer bestimmten Erkenntnißart zu reden.“ (KU, AA V: 468.31 – 36).

Diese in das Jahr 1790 zu datierende Anmerkung Kants gibt also in mehrerlei Hinsicht begriffsgeschichtlichen Aufschluss über den deutschen Begriff der Tatsache: Zum einen bestätigt sie die Beobachtung, dass der Begriff der Tatsache bereits kurz nach seinem Aufkommen eine „gewöhnliche Bedeutung“ angenommen hat, nach der mit diesem Begriff ein empirisch wirkliches und daher nachweisbares Datum in Raum und Zeit bezeichnet sein soll. Zugleich zeigt sie aber auch auf, dass der kritische Tatsachenbegriff – insofern in Kenntnis des gewöhnlichen Wortverständnisses sowie ausdrücklich über dieses hinaus und mithin insoweit auch gegen dieses – darauf ausgeht, das tätige Moment der ursprünglichen Verursachung dieses schon gewirkten und daher sinnlich wahrnehmbaren Datums, wie es ursprünglich im Begriff der Tatsache bzw. des Faktums liegt, jedenfalls insoweit zur Geltung zu bringen, als diese gewirkte Tatsache des Bewusstseins (genitivus objectivus) ihrer eigenen Möglichkeit nach nur eine solche für das spontan erkennende – d. h. für das sie als solche begrifflich tätig bestimmende – Erkenntnisvermögen ist. Tatsachen des empirischen Bewusstseins können für dieses also nur vorkommen, insofern es solche Tatsachen spontan erkennend (d. h. ursprünglich selbst tätig) in sich zu setzen vermag. Eine empirische Tatsache hat für Kant folglich niemals die mittlerweile gewöhnliche Bedeutung einer für sich subsistierenden Existenz eines vom Bewusstsein insofern vermeintlich unabhängigen Dinges an sich selbst, d. h. die positivistische bzw. naiv-realistische Bedeutung einer abstrakten (Geschichts-) Tatsache.65 Eine Tatsache ist für das begrifflich aufgeklärte Erkenntnisvermögen nämlich nicht schon ein Gegenstand, dessen rohe Existenz bewiesen werden kann, 63  Siehe dazu besonders die §§ 10, 20 – 26 KrV, AA III: 90 ff., 115 ff. (= A 76 ff./B 102 ff. bzw. B 143 ff.). 64 Zur Spontanität des denkenden Subjekts siehe besonders die §§ 15, 16 KrV, AA III: 107 – 110 (= B 129 – 136). 65  Siehe dazu auch Eisler (Fn. 36), S. 214: „Der (sensualistische) Empirismus (…) hält die „Tatsachen der Erfahrung“ für schlechthin gegeben, der Kritizismus hingegen betont, daß erst das Denken (Urteilen) es ist, welches (auf Grund von Erlebnissen) bestimmte Tatsachen als solche allgemeingültig feststellt (…).“

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sondern nach der Tatsachendefinition in § 91 KU alleine ein solcher Gegenstand für einen Begriff, dessen objektive Realität (d. h. die des Begriffs) bewiesen werden kann. Indem zwischen einem als solchen tatsächlich erkannten sinnlichen Gegenstand selbst und seiner Erkenntnis dabei das menschliche Erkenntnisvermögen mit seiner ursprünglich spontanen Bestimmungstätigkeit in Begriffen vermittelt, kann es also sowohl eine Erkenntnis als auch eine Tatsache lediglich für dieses Erkenntnisvermögen bzw. für sein Bewusstsein geben: „Wenn wir bloß auf die Art sehen, wie etwas für uns (nach der subjectiven Beschaffenheit unserer Vorstellungskräfte) Object der Erkenntniß (res cognoscibilis) sein kann: so werden alsdann die Begriffe nicht mit den Objecten, sondern bloß mit unsern Erkenntnißvermögen und dem Gebrauche, den diese von der gegebenen Vorstellung (in theoretischer oder praktischer Absicht) machen können, zusammengehalten; und die Frage, ob etwas ein erkennbares Wesen sei oder nicht, ist keine Frage, die die Möglichkeit der Dinge selbst, sondern unserer Erkenntniß derselben angeht.“ (KU, AA V: 267.04 – 11).

aa) Tatsachen des Bewusstseins im theoretischen Begriffsgebrauch Im theoretisch beabsichtigten Gebrauch des Erkenntnisvermögens sind die reinen Verstandesbegriffe (Kategorien) dementsprechend sowohl auf die reinen sinnlichen Anschauungen überhaupt (Raum und Zeit), als auch auf die empfindlich darin wahrnehmbaren Gegenstände in empirischen Anschauungen bezogen.66 Folglich vermag das Erkenntnisvermögen zunächst im Verhältnis seiner reinen Verstandesbegriffe zu seinen reinen sinnlichen Anschauungen überhaupt „Erkenntnisse a priori von Gegenständen (in der Mathematik) [zu] bekommen, aber nur ihrer Form nach als Erscheinungen; […]“.67 Dabei ist im Rahmen einer mathematischen Erkenntnis vorausgesetzt, dass es tatsächlich Dinge gibt, die sich für das begrifflich bestimmende Erkenntnisvermögen nur in der Form dieser reinen sinnlichen Anschauungen darstellen lassen. Dies aber setzt voraus, dass solche in Raum und Zeit darstellbaren Dinge sinnlich wahrnehmbar sind und mithin in empfindlichen Sinneseindrücken materiell auch gegeben werden können. Darum muss dem Erkenntnisvermögen im Verhältnis seiner reinen Verstandesbegriffe zu sinnlich gegebenen Vorstellungen in Raum und Zeit eine empirische Erkenntnis von Gegenständen möglich sein.68 Dass nun die reinen Verstandesbegriffe des erkennenden Subjekts in diesen beiden möglichen Relationen zu entsprechenden Anschauungen auch tatsächlich objektive Realität haben, beansprucht bekanntlich die „Transzendentale Deduktion der reinen Verstandesbegriffe“69 nachzuweisen und folglich gibt es für das menschliche Erkenntnisvermögen in beiden möglichen Ver  Siehe besonders § 22 KrV, AA III: 116 f. (= B 146 – 148).   KrV, AA III: 117.13 – 20 (= B 147). 68  KrV, AA III: 117 (B 147 f.). 69  Siehe dazu §§ 15 ff. und besonders die §§ 24, 26 KrV, AA III: 107 ff. bzw. 119 ff. (= B 129 ff./150 ff.). 66 67

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hältnissen – ganz im Sinne der kritischen Definition des Tatsachenbegriffs70 – tatsächlich „Gegenstände für Begriffe, deren objective Realität ([…] vermittelst einer ihnen correspondierenden Anschauung) bewiesen werden kann, […]. Dergleichen sind die mathematischen Eigenschaften der Größen (in der Geometrie), weil sie einer Darstellung a priori für den theoretischen Vernunftgebrauch fähig sind. Ferner sind Dinge, oder Beschaffenheiten derselben, die durch Erfahrung (eigene oder fremde Erfahrung vermittelst der Zeugnisse) dargethan werden können, gleichfalls Thatsachen.“71 Mit dem kritischen Tatsachenbegriff lässt sich also im theoretischen Gebrauch des Erkenntnisvermögens bzw. seiner Begriffe und über den gewöhnlich gewordenen Wortgebrauch hinaus mithin auch mit Blick auf die Mathematik von „Thatsachen“ für das Bewusstsein sprechen. Damit aber ist der Umfang des kritischen Tatsachenbegriffs noch nicht vollständig erschöpft. Denn neben dem theoretischen Gebrauch des Erkenntnisvermögens und seiner reinen Begriffe ist zugleich auch ein praktischer Gebrauch des- bzw. derselben vorstellbar: Indem die reinen Verstandesbegriffe aufgrund der transzendentalen Idealität von Raum und Zeit72 nämlich – wie in der Kantinterpretation nicht selten unverstanden geblieben ist – auch auf nicht-sinnliche Vorstellungen bezogen werden können, obgleich in diesem Bezug freilich keine theoretische Gegenstandserkenntnis möglich ist, eröffnet sich dem Erkenntnisvermögen mit der Begriffssphäre des Noumenalen ein Freiraum im Denken,73 der unter gewissen Umständen einen praktischen Gebrauch der reinen Verstandesbegriffe im reinen praktischen Vernunftbezug, d. h. im Bestimmungsverhältnis des reinen Denkens zum freien Willen zur Folge haben kann. Aus diesem Grund gehört unter die kantischen Tatsachen des Bewusstseins (genitivus objectivus) auch der im theoretischen Gebrauch des Erkenntnisvermögens unerweisliche, im praktischen Gebrauch desselben jedoch offensichtlich praktisch gewisse Vernunftbegriff der Freiheit:74 „Was aber sehr merkwürdig ist, so findet sich sogar eine Vernunftidee (die an sich keiner Darstellung in der Anschauung, mithin auch keines theoretischen Beweises ihrer Möglichkeit fähig ist) unter den Thatsachen; und das ist die Idee der Freiheit, deren Realität als einer besondern Art von Causalität (von welcher der Begriff in theoretischem Betracht überschwenglich sein würde) sich durch praktische Gesetze der reinen Vernunft und diesen gemäß in wirklichen Handlungen, mithin in der Erfahrung darthun läßt.“75   Siehe oben Fn. 60.   KU, AA V: 468.12 – 21. 72  Dazu die §§ 3, 6 KrV, AA III: 54 – 57/59 – 61 (= A 26 ff./B 40 ff. bzw. A 32 ff./B 49 ff.). 73  Siehe dazu maßgeblich § 23 sowie den Abschnitt über die Unterscheidung aller Gegenstände des Denkens überhaupt in „Phaenomena“ und „Noumena“ in der KrV, AA III: 117 f. bzw. 202 ff. (= B 148 f. bzw. A 235 ff./B 294 ff.). 74  Ein Vernunftbegriff (d. h. eine Idee) – mithin auch der Vernunftbegriff der Freiheit – besteht aus „Notionen“, d. h. aus reinen Verstandesbegriffen (KrV, AA III: 250.07 – 11 = A 320/B 377). 75  KU, AA V: 468.21 – 28. – Demnach lässt sich dann beschließen: „Alle Thatsachen gehören entweder zum Naturbegriff […] oder zum Freiheitsbegriffe […]“ (ebd., 475.14 – 19). 70 71

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bb) Tatsachen des Bewusstseins im praktischen Begriffsgebrauch Die Freiheit ist (als Gegenstand des Begriffs der Freiheit) nach der kantischen Definition des Tatsachenbegriffs (§ 91 KU) also nur deshalb eine Tatsache des Bewusstseins, weil die objektive Realität des Begriffs der Freiheit bewiesen werden kann, denn mit einem solchen Beweis wäre Freiheit im Begriff der Freiheit tatsächlich real. Im praktischen (moralischen) Begriffsgebrauch des Erkenntnisvermögens muss der Vernunftbegriff (d. h. die Idee) der Freiheit, als eine mögliche Tatsache für dieses Erkenntnisvermögen, demnach nicht nur denkmöglich, sondern auch objektiv real, d. h. praktisch sein: Die bloße Denkmöglichkeit des Begriffs der Freiheit als Kausalität in Ansehung einer empirischen Wirklichkeit ist einem menschlichen Erkenntnisvermögen dabei bereits durch die transzendentale Idealität von Raum und Zeit hinreichend versichert, denn dadurch kann eine Wirklichkeit unter dem reinen Verstandesbegriff der Kausalität in Raum und Zeit einerseits sinnlich bedingt vorgestellt werden, während ihre Ursache zugleich andererseits ursprünglich unabhängig und mithin spontan (d. h. im transzendentalen Sinne „frei“) verursacht vorstellbar ist.76 In der Idee transzendentaler Freiheit wird also ein nicht sinnlicher Gebrauch vom reinen Verstandesbegriff der Kausalität gemacht: „Ich begreife bald, daß, da ich nichts ohne Kategorie denken kann, diese auch in der Idee der Vernunft von der Freiheit, mit der ich mich beschäftige, zuerst müsse aufgesucht werden, welche hier die Kategorie der Causalität ist, und daß, wenn gleich dem Vernunftbegriffe der Freiheit als überschwenglichem Begriffe keine correspondirende Anschauung untergelegt werden kann, dennoch dem Verstandesbegriffe (der Causalität), für dessen Synthesis jener das Unbedingte fordert, zuvor eine sinnliche Anschauung gegeben werden müsse, dadurch ihm zuerst die objective Realität gesichert wird. Nun sind alle Kategorien in zwei Classen, die mathematische, welche blos auf die Einheit der Synthesis in der Vorstellung der Objecte, und die dynamische, welche auf die in der Vorstellung der Existenz der Objecte gehen, eingetheilt. Die erstere (die der Größe und der Qualität) enthalten jederzeit eine Synthesis des Gleichartigen, in welcher das Unbedingte […] gar nicht kann gefunden werden; […]. Die Kategorien der zweiten Classe (die der Causalität und der Nothwendigkeit eines Dinges) erforderten diese Gleichartigkeit (des Bedingten und der Bedingung in der Synthesis) gar nicht, […] und da war es erlaubt, zu dem durchgängig Bedingten in der Sinnenwelt […] das Unbedingte, obzwar übrigens unbestimmt, in der intelligibelen Welt zu setzen und die Synthesis transscendent zu machen; daher denn auch in der Dialektik der reinen speculativen Vernunft sich fand, daß beide dem Scheine nach einander entgegengesetzte Arten das Unbedingte zum Bedingten zu finden, z. B. in der Synthesis der Causalität zum Bedingten in der Reihe der Ursachen und Wirkungen der Sinnenwelt die Causalität, die weiter nicht sinnlich bedingt ist, zu denken, sich in der That nicht widerspreche, und daß dieselbe Handlung, die, als zur Sinnenwelt gehörig, jederzeit sinnlich bedingt, d. i. mechanisch nothwendig ist, doch zugleich auch, als zur Causalität des handelnden Wesens, so fern es zur intelligibelen Welt gehörig ist, eine sinnlich unbedingte Causalität zum Grunde haben, mithin 76  Siehe dazu besonders die dritte Antinomie: KrV, AA III: 308 ff., 362  ff. (= A 444 ff./B 472  ff. bzw. A 532 ff./B 560 ff.).

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als frei gedacht werden könne. Nun kam es blos darauf an, daß dieses Können in ein Sein verwandelt würde, d. i., daß man in einem wirklichen Falle gleichsam durch ein Factum beweisen könne: daß gewisse Handlungen eine solche Causalität (die intellectuelle, sinnlich unbedingte) voraussetzen, sie mögen nun wirklich, oder auch nur geboten, d. i. objectiv praktisch nothwendig sein.“ (KpV, AA V: 103.28 – 104.36).

Die objektive Realität des somit denkmöglichen Vernunftbegriffs der Freiheit im praktischen Gebrauch des reinen Verstandesbegriffs der Kausalität im bloßen Bezug zur praktischen Vernunft (d. h. zum Willen) erfordert demnach mit Kant nun aber zu ihrem tatsächlichen Nachweis einen Deduktionsgrund für sich selbst, der es rechtfertigt, den Begriff des Willens – als einer vernünftigen Kausalität – mit dem Begriff der Freiheit tatsächlich synthetisch a priori zu verbinden. Bekanntlich erfüllt das oberste moralische Gesetz – als ratio cognoscendi (Idealgrund) – diese wichtige Funktion im kantischen Nachweis der Realität des Vernunftbegriffs der Freiheit, denn durch das wirkliche und daher schon wirksame Bewusstsein eines obersten moralischen Gesetzes muss das vernünftige Bewusstsein dieses moralischen Gesetzes die Realität der Freiheit des Willens für sich selbst voraussetzend schließen, da andernfalls, nämlich ohne die objektive praktische Realität der Freiheit des Willens schlüssig vorauszusetzen, dieses Bewusstsein des moralischen Gesetzes für denselben freien Willen schon nicht denkbar wäre. Dies ist bekanntlich auch der Bedeutungsgehalt des eingangs dieser Arbeit angesprochenen und unten noch weiter zu beleuchtenden Verweisungszusammenhangs zwischen dem Bewusstsein des moralischen Gesetzes und der Freiheit des Willens.77 Das Bewusstsein des moralischen Gesetzes bildet demnach den Deduktionsgrund für die synthetische Verknüpfung des Begriffs des Willens (als Kausalität) mit dem Begriff der Freiheit a priori, d. h. für den reinen synthetischen Satz von der Freiheit des Willens in seinem Begriff.78 Indem das moralische Gesetz somit die Freiheit des Willens in der Tat und folglich auch in Ansehung der durch sie praktisch möglichen Handlungsfolgen in der anschaulichen Sinnenwelt als unmittelbar gewiss und praktisch (a priori) unbedingt notwendig vorstellt, d. h. postuliert,79 lässt sich praktische Freiheit schließlich 77  Siehe zu Fn. 4. – KpV, AA V: 04.28 – 36, 29.24 – 30.21, 42 ff.: das moralische Gesetz dient in diesem Verweisungszusammenhang also als „Creditiv“ (d. h. als Beglaubigungsschreiben) der Freiheit des Willens (47.21 – 37/48.01). Zu diesem rechtssprachlichen Begriff sehr erhellend Timmermann, „Das Creditiv des moralischen Gesetzes“, in: Studi Kantiani 20 (2007), S. 111 – 115. 78  „Hier erklärt sich auch allererst das Räthsel der Kritik, wie man dem übersinnlichen Geb­ rauche der Kategorien in der Speculation objective Realität absprechen und ihnen doch in Ansehung der Objecte der reinen praktischen Vernunft diese Realität zugestehen könne; denn vorher muß dieses nothwendig inconsequent aussehen, so lange man einen solchen praktischen Gebrauch nur dem Namen nach kennt.“ (KpV, AA V: 05.24 – 29). 79  KU, AA V: 470.11 – 31, 475.14 – 19. – In diesem Sinne erfüllt sich hier die Bedingung des kritischen Tatsachenbegriffs, demgemäß die objektive Realität des Begriffs (hier: der Freiheit) durch eine ihm entsprechende Anschauung (hier: a priori aus reiner praktischer Vernunft) bewiesen werden kann, denn in dem – die Realität des Freiheitsbegriffs kreditierenden – moral-

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als „Folge“ in wirklichen Handlungen und folglich auch – wie für eine Tatsache typisch – in der Erfahrung praktisch dartun: „Daß es [sc. die Erkenntnis] dagegen auf dem moralischen [Weg] (des Freiheitsbegriffs) gelingt, hat diesen Grund: daß hier das Übersinnliche, welches dabei zum Grunde liegt (die Freiheit), durch ein bestimmtes Gesetz der Causalität, welches aus ihm entspringt, […] als Thatsache seine Realität in Handlungen darthut, aber eben darum auch keinen andern, als nur in praktischer Absicht […] gültigen Beweisgrund abgeben kann. Es bleibt hiebei […] sehr merkwürdig: daß […] die […] Freiheit der einzige Begriff des Übersinnlichen ist, welcher seine objective Realität (vermittelst der Causalität, die in ihm gedacht wird) an der Natur durch ihre in derselben mögliche Wirkung beweiset […] und daß wir also in uns ein Princip haben, welches die Idee des Übersinnlichen in uns, […] zu einer, obgleich nur in praktischer Absicht möglichen, Erkenntniß zu bestimmen vermögend ist, […]: mithin der Freiheitsbegriff (als Grundbegriff aller unbedingt-praktischen Gesetze) die Vernunft über diejenigen Gränzen erweitern kann, innerhalb deren jeder Naturbegriff (theoretischer) ohne Hoffnung eingeschränkt bleiben müßte.“80 gesetzlichen Postulat der freien Bestimmung des Willens ist unmittelbar gewiss vorausgesetzt, dass die Freiheit durch Handlungen auch Wirklichkeit in Raum und Zeit haben kann, d. h. dass ihre tatsächlichen Wirkungen in den reinen Anschauungsformen von Raum und Zeit möglich sind. 80  Siehe dazu schon den Kanon des praktischen Vernunftgebrauchs in KrV, AA III: 517 – 522 (= A  795  ff./B  823  ff.); sodann das berühmte Galgenbeispiel in KpV, AA V: 30.21 – 35 und schließlich die das kritische Geschäft beschließenden Ausführungen am Ende von § 91 KU, AA  V: 474.11 – 34, denen das vorstehende Zitat entnommen ist. – Wenn es im „Kanon der reinen Vernunft“ (KrV, AA III: 521 = A 802 f./B 830 f.) daher heißt: „Die praktische Freiheit kann durch Erfahrung bewiesen werden. […] Wir erkennen also die praktische Freiheit durch Erfahrung als eine von den Naturursachen, nämlich eine Causalität der Vernunft in Bestimmung des Willens, […]“, so ist die praktische Freiheit als Tatsache des moralischen Bewusstseins eines freien Willkürsubjekts (d. h. einer mit gesetzlichem = oberem und sinnlichem = unterem Begehrungsvermögen gleichermaßen ausgestatteten moralischen Person) angesprochen, in dessen Handlungen sich daher seine praktische Freiheit in ihren Folgen verwirklicht. Praktische Freiheit beweist sich also tatsächlich praktisch (nicht: theoretisch) an der Natur in möglichen Wirkungen, die in dieser natürlichen Welt in Raum und Zeit real denkbar und kraft des moralischen Gesetzes praktisch-notwendig bestimmt sind. In diesem praktischen Verständ­ nis des Freiheitsbegriffs ist der freie Wille als Kausalität durch seine Handlungsfolgen zugleich eine Naturursache, denn jede praktische Handlung, darin Freiheit wirklich ist, ist als Wirkung zugleich in der Natur und mithin selbst – in ihrer Wirklichkeit – auch wiederum eine Naturursache. Die Ausführungen Kants zur praktischen Freiheit im „Kanon der reinen Vernunft“ (in ihrem praktischen Gebrauch) sind also ohne Widerspruch zu seinen sonstigen Ausführungen zur (transzendentalen bzw. praktischen) Freiheit begreiflich, sofern man nur hinreichend in Rechnung stellt, dass es hier nicht um einen theoretischen (bzw. spekulativen), sondern praktischen (d. h. moralischen) Gebrauch der reinen Vernunft (in ihrem In-sich-Verhältnis zur praktischen Vernunft) zu tun ist (worauf ebd.: 518. 06 – 10 ausdrücklich hingewiesen wird), sodass auch nicht von einer theoretischen, sondern einer praktischen Erfahrungserkenntnis der praktischen Freiheit die Rede ist. Dementsprechend wird die transzendentale Freiheit im Kanonkapitel auch nur in ihrem spekulativen Sinne ‚beiseite gesetzt‘ (ebd.: 521.03 – 07), obgleich die Denkmöglichkeit derselben für den praktischen Gebrauch des Freiheitsbegriffs stillschweigend vorausgesetzt bleibt.

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Die Freiheit des Willens ist in der kantischen Moralphilosophie als „res facti“ mithin eine „Thatsache“ für das Bewusstsein und fällt damit für dieses Bewusstsein („scibile“) unter die Objekte der Erkenntnis („res cognoscibilis“), die hier nur eine praktische sein kann. Da sie dabei als Tatsache aus dem Bewusstsein des moralischen Gesetzes geschlossen werden musste, letzteres somit als „ratio cognoscendi“ der Freiheit fungierte, bleibt im Fortgang noch die von Kant formulierte und mit dem Begriff „Factum der Vernunft“ beantwortete Frage zu klären: „Wie ist aber auch das Bewußtsein jenes moralischen Gesetzes möglich?“81 cc) F  reiheit als „Thatsache“ des Bewusstseins und das „Factum der Vernunft“ als ihre freie Tat? Soll die jetzt erstmals vom kritischen Tatsachenbegriff her erhellte und auf die (selbst-)tätige Spontanität des Erkenntnisvermögens zurückgeführte Rede von der Freiheit als objektive „Thatsache“ für das Bewusstsein des freien Willens in Beantwortung der Frage nach der objektiven Realität des Freiheitsbegriffs allerdings ihren guten subjektiven Sinn behalten, dann müsste das Bewusstsein des moralischen Gesetzes – als Deduktionsgrund der objektiven Realität des Begriffs der Freiheit des Willens – ursprünglich tätig vom Bewusstsein des freien Willens an und für sich selbst gewirkt vorgestellt werden. Die spontane (Selbst-)Vorstellungstätigkeit des moralischen Gesetzes durch den freien Willen und mithin auch sein schon gewirktes Bewusstsein vom moralischen Gesetz beruhten dann in der Tat gleichermaßen auf der Freiheit des Willens höchstselbst, und so wäre das ursprünglich tätige Bedeutungsmoment im Begriff der „Thatsache“, wie es im frühen rechtssprachlichen Gebrauch des Factumsbegriffs überhaupt noch sehr geläufig war,82 in dem von Kant exponierten Bewusstseinszusammenhang von Freiheit und moralischem Gesetz aufgehoben, sodass das selbsttätig gewirkte Bewusstsein des moralischen Gesetzes selbst im ursprünglichen Sinne des Begriffs eine Tat, d. h. ein „Factum der Vernunft“ bzw. eine „Tatsache der Vernunft“ (genitivus subjectivus) zu nennen sein könnte. Das Bewusstsein des moralischen Gesetzes ruhte so ursprünglich und letzthin – unmittelbar an sich selbst gewiss – auf der freien Tat der reinen praktischen Vernunft an sich selbst auf, und reine Vernunft wäre folglich an sich selbst praktisch. Dass dieser jetzt einstweilen hinreichend exponierte wissenschaftstheoretische Gebrauch des Begriffs der Freiheit des Willens als Tatsache für das Bewusstsein auf dem rechtssprachlichen Gebrauch des insofern zurechnungstheoretischen Begriffs des Factums dieses Bewusstseins aufruht, soll im Folgenden (unter III.) ausführlich beglaubigt werden. Zuvor ist allerdings noch eine Auseinandersetzung des rechtsprachlichen Gebrauchs des Begriffs „Factum“ durch Immanuel Kant vorauszuschicken, denn dieser war nicht nur mit der begriffsgeschichtlichen Entwicklung des Tatsachenbegriffs seiner Zeit, sondern auch mit den zurechnungstheoretischen Hintergründen des überkommenen Factumsbegriffs bestens vertraut:   KpV, AA V: 30.03. – Dazu ausführlich sogleich noch unten unter III.   Siehe oben eingangs der begriffsgeschichtlichen Skizze unter II. 1.

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b) Rechtssprachlicher Gebrauch des Begriffs vom „Factum / factum“ (als Tat) Der Begriff „factum“ findet sich als lateinisches Wort für den deutschen Begriff „Tat“ in der Definition des Zurechnungsbegriffs der kantischen „Philosophia practica universalis“83, also dem begriffsbestimmenden Teil der Metaphysik der Sitten (MS), der sowohl für die Rechts-, als auch für die Tugendlehre gleichermaßen und mithin für die gesamte Moralphilosophie Gültigkeit beansprucht: „Zurechnung (imputatio) in moralischer Bedeutung ist das Urtheil, wodurch jemand als Urheber (causa libera) einer Handlung, die alsdann That (factum) heißt und unter Gesetzen steht, angesehen wird; […].“ (MS, AA VI: 227.21 – 23).

Indem sich ein Zurechnungsurteil hier auf die von einem tätigen Urheber frei verursachte Handlung unter moralischen Gesetzen bezieht, setzt die Zurechnung in der Moralphilosophie Kants den Begriff einer freien „That (factum)“ voraus, wie er aus dem Lateinischen ursprünglich in die deutsche (Rechts-)Sprache übernommen wurde und wie er in dem später von Spalding neu gebildeten Wort der „Tatsache“ einstweilen noch vorausgesetzt war. Der zurechnungstheoretische Begriff der Tat bzw. des Factums84 setzt also eine freie Verursachung der Handlung in ihrer sinnlichen Wirklichkeit und mithin den transzendentalen Begriff der Freiheit für sich selbst in seiner objektiven praktischen Realität voraus.85 Der Tatbegriff bezeichnet 83  MS, AA VI: 221 ff. – Zur „Zurechnung bei Kant“ siehe ausführlich die gleichnamige Studie Blösers, Berlin / Boston: De Gruyter, 2014; den Zurechnungsbegriff begriffsgeschichtlich einordnend Hruschka, „Zurechnung I“, in: Ritter / Gründer / Gabriel (Hrsg.), HWPh XII, Basel: Schwabe, 2004, Sp. 1445 – 1447; rechtsphilosophisch vertiefend Joerden, „Zurechnung“, in: Anderheiden / Gutmann / Jakel / u. a. (Hrsg.), Enzyklopädie zur Rechtsphilosophie, online abrufbar unter: http://www.enzyklopaedie-rechtsphilosophie.net/inhaltsverzeichnis/19-beitraege/99-zu rechnung (Erstpublikation 07. 04. 2011). 84 Weitere Verwendung findet der zurechnungstheoretische Begriff des Factums in theoretischen oder praktischen Zusammenhängen u. a. auch in KrV, AA  III, 100.10, 106.04; Prol, AA IV: 274.34, RGV, AA VI: 22.02, 23.15, 31.32 – 34, 158.17; MSRL, AA VI: 252.29, 270.04, 312.05, 318.29, 371.16 – 34; SF, AA  VII: 66.35; MpVT, AA  VIII: 255.11 – 19; ZeF, AA VIII: 376.36; TP, AA VIII: 297.08, 302.16; WDO, AA VIII: 146.10; OP, AA XXI: 21.11, 25.11/22, 36.02/20; VARL, AA XXIII: 220.25, 229.13, 236.32, 239.30, 240.07, 241.14, 264.17, 279.32, 287.06, 311.23, 316.06, 318.16; VATL, AA  XXIII: 378.10 – 11, 379.24; V-PP / Powalski, AA ­XXVII: 152 – 161; V-PP / Collins, AA  XXVII: 288 – 298; V-MS / Vigil, AA  XXVII: 558 – 575; V-Mo / Mron, AA  XXVII: 1437 – 1445; V-Mo / Mron  II, AA  XXIX: 641 f.; V-Mo / Kaehler(Stark): 108 – 132 (der Originalpaginierung). 85  In der positiven Rechtswissenschaft ist im Jahr des Erscheinens der Rechtslehre Kants (1797) freilich bereits die Gleichsetzung von wirklicher „Handlung“ und „Thatsache“ unter Verdrängung des Begriffs der freien „That“ zu bemerken. So notiert Gründler, System des Preussischen Rechts, Erster Theil, Bayreuth: Lübecks Erben, 1797, S. 59: „Unter dem Ausdruck Sache begreift man im weitläufigern Sinn auch die Handlung eines Menschen. Unter Handlungen verstehen wir das Prädikat, welches einem Wesen zukommt, in so ferne es eine Veränderung hervorbringt. Wird die Handlung wirklich, so ist es eine Thatsache (factum).“ Dagegen war der Tatsachenbegriff nach Kiefner (Fn. 61), S. 23 (73) um das Jahr 1780 noch kein anerkannter Begriff in der Juristensprache.

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folglich die Verursachungsrelation eines freien Subjekts der Kausalität zu ihrer Wirkung in Raum und Zeit unter moralischen Gesetzen.86 Er setzt – seiner Etymologie entsprechend – mithin Kausalität aus Freiheit, d. h. ursprünglich freie Tätigkeit in sich voraus. Die kantische Definition des Begriffs der Tat, die übrigens Eingang in das Grimmsche Wörterbuch gefunden hat87 und gegenwärtig gleichwohl weitgehend wieder in Vergessenheit geraten zu sein scheint, lautet dementsprechend: „That heißt eine Handlung, sofern sie unter Gesetzen der Verbindlichkeit steht, folglich auch sofern das Subject in derselben nach der Freiheit seiner Willkür betrachtet wird. Der Handelnde wird durch einen solchen Act als Urheber der Wirkung betrachtet, und diese zusammt der Handlung selbst können ihm zugerechnet werden, […].“ (MS, AA VI: 223.18 – 23).

Da die moralischen Gesetze für ein willkürliches und mithin freies, jedoch zugleich auch sinnlich-affizierbares Begehrungsvermögen Pflichten und somit Verbindlichkeiten statuieren, der Begriff einer Handlung nach Verbindlichkeiten aber Freiheit im Subjekt der Handlung unter den moralischen Gesetzen voraussetzt, findet sich in diesem Begriff der Tat ein Wechselverhältnis des Begriffs der Freiheit (der Willkür) und des Begriffs des moralischen Gesetzes vorausgesetzt: Denn die Freiheit (der Willkür) ist nur denkbar unter Voraussetzung moralischer Gesetze, und moralische Gesetze für die Willkür sind wiederum nur denkbar unter Voraussetzung ihrer Freiheit. Heißt eine unter moralischen Gesetzen stehende Handlung nun „That“, so „auch sofern das Subjekt“ der Handlung in der Tat nach der Freiheit seiner Willkür beurteilt wird. Weil nun aber die freie Willkür, als ein sinnliches und unteres Begehrungsvermögen, nur durch den freien Willen, als gesetzliches und oberes Begehrungsvermögen, moralgesetzlich bestimmbar ist,88 verweist dieses begriffliche Wechselverhältnis von Freiheit der Willkür und moralischen Gesetzen hinsichtlich der vernünftigen Bedingung seiner eigenen Möglichkeit auf das bereits eingangs erwähnte Wechselverhältnis vom obersten moralischen Gesetz und der Freiheit des Willens überhaupt, wobei das Bewusstsein des obersten moralischen Gesetzes als „ratio cognoscendi“ der Freiheit des Willens und diese ihrerseits als „ratio essendi“ des moralischen Gesetzes fungieren. Der Begriff der (freien) Tat einer Person setzt demnach diesen vernünftigen Verweisungszusammenhang für sich selbst in seiner objektiven Realität schon und noch voraus, d. h. er ist selbst nur denkbar unter der Voraussetzung der autonomen Bestimmung des obersten moralischen Gesetzes, d. h. der ursprünglichen Selbstgesetzgebung des Willens aus seiner Freiheit. Die zurechnungstheoretische Definition des Personenbegriffs in der kantischen Moralphilosophie bestätigt diesen Rekurs (1797) auf den 86  Im Begriff der „Tat“ ist also die Verstandesprädikabilie der „Handlung“ (KrV, AA III: 94 = A 82/B 108) sowohl in ihrem reinen Vernunftbezug, als auch zugleich in ihrem sinnlichen Anschauungsbezug, im Subjekt der Tat vorausgesetzt, denn „Handlung bedeutet […] das Verhältniß des Subjects der Causalität zur Wirkung“ (ebd.: 177.04 – 05 = A 205/B 250). 87  Grimm / Grimm (Fn. 31), S. 307. 88  MS, AA VI: 213.14 – 26.

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zuvor in der KpV (1788) exponierten Bedingungszusammenhang innerhalb der Freiheit eines autonomen Willens: „Person ist dasjenige Subject, dessen Handlungen einer Zurechnung fähig sind. Die mo­ ralische Persönlichkeit ist also nichts anders, als die Freiheit eines vernünftigen Wesens unter moralischen Gesetzen […], woraus dann folgt, daß eine Person keinen anderen Gesetzen als denen, die sie (entweder allein, oder wenigstens zugleich mit anderen) sich selbst giebt, unterworfen ist.“(MS, AA VI: 223.24 – 31).

Setzt die empirische Tat einer Person als einem freien Willkürsubjekt in Raum und Zeit die autonome Gesetzgebung ihrer Persönlichkeit, d. h. ihres freien Willens nämlich ursprünglich für sich selbst voraus, so setzt sie die autonome Gesetzgebungstätigkeit eines freien Willens, d. h. seine Gesetzgebungsselbsttätigkeit ursprünglich voraus. Ist diese autonome Selbsttätigkeit des Willens aber ursprünglich alleine diesem selbst zurechenbar, so muss sie als eine intelligible Tat des frei­ en Willens im bloßen Selbstverhältnis angesehen werden und kann folglich ganz vortrefflich ein „Factum“ desselben heißen.89 Also setzt der rechtssprachliche Begriff der „That (factum)“ einer Person den moralphilosophischen Begriff der Tat („Factum“) des freien Willens an sich selbst überhaupt für sich selbst voraus.90 In diesem letzteren und gänzlich intelligiblen Sinne macht daher die KpV Gebrauch vom Zurechnungsbegriff „Factum der Vernunft“ als ihrer intelligiblen „That“ an und für sich selbst:91 89  Diese Differenz unter dem Begriff der Tat, danach eine intelligible Tat (des Willens) von einer empirischen Tat (der Willkür) zu unterscheiden ist, findet sich mit gedanklichem Bezug auf die Verkehrung der Freiheit im Begriff des Bösen auch in RGV, AA VI: 31.07 – 34. Ein ganz ähnliches Verhältnis dürfte dort (MSRL, AA VI: 371.29 – 34) bezeichnet sein, wo Kant das „Factum (Thatsache)“ als „Gegenstand in der Erscheinung (der Sinne)“ dem, „was nur durch reine Vernunft vorgestellt werden kann, was zu den Ideen gezählt werden muß“, d. h. dem „Ding an sich selbst“ entgegenstellt. 90  An dieser Differenz zwischen einer empirischen und einer intelligiblen Tat (als „factum“) unter dem reinen Begriff der Handlung lässt sich bei Proops, „Kant’s Legal Metaphor an the Nature of a Deduction“, in: Journal of the History of Philosophy 41 (2003), S. 209, 224 ff. (227 f.) studieren, wie diese Momente in der Einheit des Handlungsbegriffs in einen unaufhebbaren Gegensatz zueinander treten: Das „Factum der Vernunft“ als „Fact of Reason“ kann nach Proops nämlich keine „Handlung der Vernunft“ als „act of reason“ sein, weil Ersteres ein reines („pure“) und nicht ein empirisches („empirical“) Datum sei. – Doch der Begriff der Handlung ist bei Kant – eben als freie Tat (eines Willens- oder Willkürsubjekts) – nicht notwendig mit dem Begriff einer empirischen Handlung (eines Gegenstandes als Substanz in der Erscheinung) gleichzusetzen; ebenso wenig wie der Begriff vom „Factum“ mit einem „Fact“ im Sinne einer „Tatsache“ zu verwechseln ist. 91  Es ist einesteils das Verdienst Willascheks („Die Tat der Vernunft“, in: Funke [Hrsg.], Akten des 7. Int. Kant-Kongresses II/1, Bonn / Berlin: Bouvier, 1991, S. 455 – 466; ders. [Fn. 12], S. 177 ff.) auf den zurechnungstheoretischen Hintergrund des Factumsbegriffs in der KpV hingewiesen zu haben. Anderenteils findet sich in demselben (Teil-)Band der genannten Kongress­ akten (S. 323 – 331) auch „Eine These über das Faktum der reinen Vernunft“ von Kitaoka, der mit seinen weithin nicht rezipierten Bemerkungen auf genau jenes bisher vermisste und für das Begreifen desselben entscheidende Tätigkeitsmoment im Factumsbegriff aufmerksam machen wollte. So scheint selbst Willaschek (Fn. 12), S. 352 die ihm eigentlich in die Karten spielende

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III. Bewusstsein des Grundgesetzes als „Factum“ und Freiheit des Willens als „Thatsache“ Bevor nun im Folgenden (1. – 5.) in einer gleichsam makroskopischen Interpretation der §§ 1 – 7 KpV der gänzlich intelligible Gebrauch des Factumsbegriffs der kantischen Freiheitslehre auseinanderzusetzen ist, ist hier zunächst zu erinnern, dass in der Philosophie Kants mit dem rechtssprachlichen Begriff der „That (factum)“ und dem wissenschaftstheoretischen Begriff der „Thatsachen (scibile)“ zwei unterschiedliche Momente in der Einheit einer jedenfalls möglichen Handlungswirklichkeit bezeichnet sind. Denn während im Begriff der Tatsache (scibile) das objektive Moment eines durch eine Tat (factum) möglichen Gewirkten (Factum) für sich begriffen liegt, geht der Begriff der Tat (factum) selbst an sich auf die tätige Verursachung dieser Wirklichkeit (Factum) durch ein Subjekt in dem beide Begriffe verbindenden Handlungsbegriff. Innerhalb dieser notwendigen begrifflichen Einheit findet für Kant also kein unvermittelt synonymer Gebrauch der insofern voneinander unterschiedenen Begriffe der Tat und der Tatsache statt. Wollte man Factum / Tatsache im kantischen System gleichwohl (und über den Begriffsgebrauch der veröffentlichten Schriften hinaus) in gewisser Weise synonym gebrauchen, so müsste die Tatsache des Bewusstseins (genitivus subjectivus) von einer solchen für das Bewusstsein, d. h. von einer Tatsache des Bewusstseins (genitivus objectivus) gründlich unterschieden werden. Folglich steht der moderne und unvermittelt synonyme Gebrauch beider Begrifflichkeiten (Factum bzw. Faktum / Tatsache), der in seiner verkürzenden Tendenz lediglich isoliert auf das Moment des irgendwie an und für sich schon Gewirkten abzustellen vermag, außerhalb der Einheit des kantischen Handlungsbegriffs und mithin auch außerhalb des begrifflichen Begründungszusammenhangs der kanThese Kitaokas ausweislich seines Literaturverzeichnisses nicht zu kennen. – Der Verständnisvorschlag Willascheks ist hingegen von der Kantforschung teilweise (allerdings noch längst nicht mit hinreichender Konsequenz) aufgegriffen worden, etwa affirmativ von Bojanowski (Fn. 12), S. 60 ff.; ders., „Kant on the Justification of Moral Principles“, in: Kant-Studien 108 (2017), S. 55 (72 ff.); Engstrom, The Form of Practical Knowledge, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009, S. 121; Franks (Fn. 12), S. 278 ff.; Kaufmann (Fn. 12), S. 227 (237 ff.); Kleingeld, „Moral consciousness and the ‚fact of reason‘“, in: Reath / Timmermann (Hrsg.), Critique of Practical Reason, Cambridge: University Press, 2010, S. 55 (61 – 65); Schadow, „Tat“, in: Willaschek / Stolzenberg / Mohr / Bacin (Hrsg.), Kant-Lexikon III, Berlin / Boston: De Gruyter, 2015, S. 2246 f.; Steigleder (Fn. 12), S. 98, 102 ff.; Timmermann, Sittengesetz und Freiheit, Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 2003, S. 38 Fn. 1; Zimmermann, „Faktum statt Deduktion“, in: Puls (Hrsg.), Kants Rechtfertigung des Sittengesetzes in Grundlegung III, Berlin / München / Boston, De Gruyter, 2014, S. 103 (115 ff.); Zöller, „Am Anfang war … die Tat.“, in: Mülder-Bach / Schumacher (Hrsg.), Am Anfang war … – Ursprungsfiguren und Anfangskonstruktionen der Moderne, Paderborn / München: Fink, 2008, S. 91 (103  ff.); unentschieden dagegen Löhrer, „Kants Problem einer Normativität aus reiner Vernunft“, in: Schönrich (Hrsg.), Normativität und Faktizität, Dresden: Thelem, 2004, S. 180 (185 ff.); sowie skeptisch Klein (Fn. 12), S. 215 ff.

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tischen Philosophie überhaupt. Mit der letztlich unkantischen Behauptung, das Bewusstsein des moralischen Grundgesetzes, das nach Kant ein „Factum der Vernunft“ heißen kann, könne ebenso auch eine „Tatsache“ der Vernunft (genitivus objectivus) genannt werden,92 lässt sich folglich der eigentliche Bedeutungsgehalt der kantischen Wendung vom „Factum der Vernunft“ in der kritischen Begründung der im Subjekt selbsttätigen Freiheit des Willens – als eine objektive „Tatsache“ für eben diesen freien Willen – nicht angemessen begreifen.93 Vor diesem Hintergrund 92  Die begriffliche Gleichsetzung „Factum der Vernunft“ und „Tatsache des Bewusstseins“ findet sich – ohne jedoch damit, wie mittlerweile üblich, das Moment der ursprünglichen Selbsttätigkeit reiner praktischer Vernunft zu verkennen – bereits sehr früh, nämlich beispielsweise bei Michaelis (Fn. 20), S. 44, 52 f., 114 f., 118 f., 138 ff., 168 f., 354 f., 360 f.; unter Verkennung dieser Differenz liegt sie allerdings auch bei anderen namhaften zeitgenössischen Interpreten vor (siehe unten III. 5. c) bb) m. w. N.). 93  Der Begriff „Factum“ (der Vernunft) ist (als zugleich intelligible Tat der Vernunft) also – worauf auch Wolff (Fn. 3), S. 511 (534) hingewiesen hat – nicht mit dem wissenschaftstheoretischen Begriff einer zu wirkenden bzw. einer schon gewirkten „Tatsache“ ohne Verkürzungen primär einfach gleichzusetzen, wie allerdings Ware (Fn. 24), S. 9/15 tendenziell noch dafürzuhalten scheint (ähnlich auch Höffe, Kants Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, München: Beck, 2012, S. 148 ff. oder Ilting [Fn. 12], S. 113 [125 ff.]). Wollte man nämlich nicht nur mit Blick auf die Freiheit, sondern auch mit Blick auf das Bewusstsein des moralischen Gesetzes von einer „Tatsache“ der bzw. für die Vernunft sprechen, so müsste der Begriff dieses Bewusstseins – gemäß dem kritischen Tatsachenbegriff (oben Fn. 60) – vermittelst einer Anschauung beweisbar sein. Gerade dies ist aber nicht der Fall, denn als ein oberster Grundsatz der Moral (d. h. als ein praktisches Postulat der praktischen Vernunft) ist das Bewusstsein des obersten moralischen Gesetzes selbst keines weiteren Beweises fähig (KpV, AA V: 46 ff.). Die von ihrem begriffsgeschichtlichen Ansatz her verdienstliche Studie Wares leidet somit noch daran, dass sie den rechtssprachlichen Bedeutungsgehalt des kantischen Begriffs des „Factums“ im Sinne einer freien „Tat“ (der Vernunft an sich selbst) nicht hinreichend in Rechnung stellt. – Sofern dagegen Zöller (Fn. 91), S. 91 (103 – 105) im Rahmen einer „tiefensemantisch[en]“ Deutung das Tatmoment im Begriff „Factum der Vernunft“ zutreffend herauszuheben versteht, auf dieser Grundlage den Factumsbegriff allerdings sodann gleich wieder mit einem (nicht-kantischen) Tatsachenbegriff gleichsetzt, den er – historisch wohl unzutreffend – für den damals zeitgenössischen Tatsachenbegriff ausgibt, trifft seine tiefensemantische Deutung eben derselbe Einwand aus der kritischen Warte der Definition des kantischen Tatsachenbegriffs. – Im Übrigen scheint dieser zuvor benannte Befund einer das Tatmoment im Bewusstsein des moralischen Gesetzes eliminierenden Gleichsetzung von „Factum“ und „Tatsache“ bereits aus sprachlichen Gründen überhaupt für den angloamerikanischen bzw. englischen Interpretationsraum zu gelten, wo sich diese Gleichsetzung im Wort „fact“ („using the term analogically“) regelmäßig findet. Vgl. etwa Caygill, A Kant Dictionary, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, S. 189 f.; Smith, A Commentary on Kant’s ‚Critique of pure Reason“, Reprint der 2. Aufl. 1923, New York: Humanities Press, 1962, S. 572 ff. Auf diese Weise will beispielsweise auch Ameriks, „Status des Glaubens (§§ 90 – 91) und Allgemeine Anmerkung über Teleologie“, in: Höffe (Hrsg.), Immanuel Kant – Kritik der Urteilskraft, Berlin: Akademie, 2008, S. 331 (337), offensichtlich gegen den eindeutigen Textbefund (KU, AA V: 468.28 – 30, 474.20 – 34), feststellen können, Kant ordne im oben (Fn. 75) zitierten § 91 der „Kritik der Urteilskraft“ nicht nur die Freiheit, sondern auch ihre „ratio cog­ nescendi“ (sic!), d. h. das moralische Gesetz bzw. das Bewusstsein desselben „in die Rubrik der „Tatsache“ […] ein“. Im Anschluss hieran ebenso Goy, „Die Deduktion des Sittengesetzes in den Jahren 1785, 1788 und 1788 – 90 und der Wandel in Kants Naturbegriff“, in: Puls (Hrsg.), Kants Rechtfertigung des Sittengesetzes in Grundlegung  III, Berlin / München / Boston: De Gruyter, 2014, S. 167 (181 ff.); Klein (Fn. 12), S. 221, 224 ff. (226).

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erscheint dann auch bereits die gängige Übersetzung der kantischen Wendung vom „Factum der Vernunft“ ins Englische mit „fact of reason“94 als höchstproblematisch, sofern mit diesem „fact“ nicht ursprünglich auch eine „Tat“ (factum) der Vernunft („act“ bzw. „deed“)95 und so auch eine „Tatsache“ derselben (genitivus subjectivus) an sich selbst, sondern eben nur ein „Fakt der Vernunft“ (genitivus objectivus) zum Ausdruck gebracht wird. Dieser Vorerinnerung entsprechend, muss sich in der folgenden Interpretation der §§ 1 – 7 KpV zeigen, wie der von Kant mit der Wendung vom „Factum der Vernunft“ erläuternd bezeichnete Sachverhalt, und zwar im Bedeutungssinne einer „Tatsache des Bewusstseins“ (genitivus subjectivus), bereits methodologisch aus den Haupt- oder Lehrsätzen der §§ 1 – 7 KpV hervorgeht. Denn für Kant besteht die bestimmende Form einer Wissenschaft und mithin die ihrer wissenschaftlich bestimmbaren materiellen Erkenntnis in ihrer Methode,96 sodass im Rahmen einer gedanklichen Erschließung der schon bestimmten (Begriffs-)Erkenntnis der §§ 1 – 7 KpV ein erstes Augenmerk auf die sie bestimmende Methode zu legen ist: Die „Analytik der reinen praktischen Vernunft“ nimmt ihren Ausgang im ersten Hauptstück nämlich mit einer Auseinandersetzung „Von den Grundsätzen der reinen praktischen Vernunft“ und hebt dabei in § 1 von einer „Erklärung“ des Begriffs praktischer Grundsätze des Willens an.97 Über „Lehrsatz“ I – III (§§ 2 – 4)98 und „Aufgabe“ I – II (§§ 5 – 6)99 führt sie schließlich zur Feststellung des hier interessierenden „Grundgesetz[es] der reinen praktischen Vernunft“ in § 7,100 in dessen „Anmerkung“ sich die Wendung vom „Factum der Vernunft“ findet. – Doch was hat es mit dieser Methode auf sich? Dieser Frage gelten die folgenden Überlegungen:

94 Siehe dafür etwa Abbott (Hrsg.), Kant’s Critique of practical Reason, London / New York / Bombay: Longmans, Green and Co., 5. Aufl. 1898, S. 120; Beck (Hrsg.), Critique of Practical Reason, Nachdruck der Ausgabe Chicago 1949, New York / London: Garland, 1976, S. 142 f.; Gregor / Reath (Hrsg.), Immanuel Kant – Critique of Practical Reason, Cambridge: University Press, 2015, S. 28; Pluhar (Hrsg.), Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, Indianapolis / Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 2002, S. 46. 95 Vgl. schon zuvor Fn. 93. Siehe im Übrigen die Überlegungen bei Engstrom (Fn. 12), S. XV (XLI f.) sowie Sussmann, „From Deduction to Deed“, in: Kantian Review 13 (2008), S. 52 (67 f.). 96  Log, AA IX: 139 (§§ 94, 95). 97  KpV, AA V: 19 ff. 98  KpV, AA V: 21 – 28. 99  KpV, AA V: 28 – 30. 100  KpV, AA V: 30 – 33.

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1. Zur Methode der willkürlichen Erklärung („Declaration“) praktischer Grundsätze in § 1 KpV Wenn die objektive Realität des Vernunftbegriffs der Freiheit des Willens im ersten Hauptstück der „Analytik der reinen praktischen Vernunft“ durch eine analytische „Exposition“ des Begriffs praktischer Grundsätze des Willens sukzessiv, d. h. klar und deutlich bewusst gemacht werden soll,101 dann muss das sich so selbst über die Realität seiner Freiheit aufklärende Willenssubjekt praktischer Grundsätze ursprünglich bereits ein dunkles, d. h. (noch) nicht (klar) bewusstes Bewusstsein des Begriffs praktischer Grundsätze in sich haben. Die „Erklärung“ des Begriffs praktischer Grundsätze zu Beginn der exponierenden Verdeutlichung in § 1 KpV dient alsdann in einem ersten Aufklärungsschritt der Bewirkung eines klaren Bewusstseins des Begriffs praktischer Grundsätze, bevor dieses klare Bewusstsein des ganzen Begriffs schließlich in den §§ 2 – 7 KpV zu größerer Deutlichkeit exponiert werden kann, denn die Deutlichkeit des ganzen Bewusstseins des Begriffs ist nur ein größerer Grad an Klarheit hinsichtlich dieses im Ganzen schon klar bewussten Begriffs.102 Vor diesem Hintergrund verspricht eine genauere Klassifizierung des methodologischen Begriffs der „Erklärung“ weitere Erhellung des gedanklichen Zusammenhangs der „Analytik der reinen praktischen Vernunft“: a) Analysis und Synthesis eines freien Willens Soll das „Grundgesetz der reinen praktischen Vernunft“ in § 7 methodologisch bruchlos aus der „Erklärung“ des § 1 zu einem deutlichen Bewusstsein (des Begriffs eines freien Willens) „exponiert“ werden, so muss es in dieser Erklärung synthetisch bereits wirklich zur Einheit des Bewusstseins eines freien Willens an und für sich selbst verbunden sein, denn nur eine im Bewusstsein bereits wirklich synthetisch zur Einheit verbundene Vorstellung lässt sich schließlich auch analytisch exponieren: „Vor aller Analysis unserer Vorstellungen müssen diese zuvor gegeben sein, und es können keine Begriffe dem Inhalte nach analytisch entspringen. Die Synthesis eines Mannigfaltigen aber (es sei empirisch oder a priori gegeben) bringt zuerst eine Erkenntniß hervor, die zwar anfänglich noch roh und verworren sein kann und also der Analysis bedarf; allein die Synthesis ist doch dasjenige, was eigentlich die Elemente zu Erkenntnissen sammlet und zu einem gewissen Inhalte vereinigt; sie ist also das erste, worauf wir Acht zu geben haben, wenn wir über den ersten Ursprung unserer Erkenntniß urtheilen wollen.“103 101  Oben Fn. 4. – Die Methode der „Exposition“ kommt beispielsweise auch in der „Transzendentalen Analytik“ zur Anwendung, um die a priori gegebenen Vorstellungen von Raum und Zeit in ihrem Begriff als solche zu einem deutlichen Bewusstsein zu bringen (KrV, AA III: 51 ff. [§§ 2, 4]). Zur Methodik der KpV siehe dann auch Refl. Nr. 7201, AA XIX: 275.21 – 276.02. 102  Siehe dazu auch Log, AA IX: 33 ff., 58 ff. 103  KrV, AA III: 91.18 – 27 (= A 77 f./B 103).

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Ist das „Grundgesetz der reinen praktischen Vernunft“ des § 7 allerdings bereits in der „Erklärung“ des Begriffs praktischer Grundsätze des Willens in § 1 wirklich synthetisch zur Einheit der reinen praktischen Vernunft verbunden (d. h. objektiv real), so lässt sich aus seinem späterhin analytisch exponierten und damit deutlich gemachten Bewusstsein in § 7 auch mit gutem Grund auf die in ihrer ursprünglichen Einheit spontane Synthesis- oder Vorstellungstätigkeit der reinen praktischen Vernunft an sich selbst schließen, denn ohne diese ursprüngliche Selbstvorstellungstätigkeit der reinen und an sich selbst praktischen Vernunft (d. h. eines freien Willens) wäre das analytische Bewusstsein dieses Grundgesetzes in § 7 selbst nicht denkbar.104 Also muss das in sich schlüssige Verhältnis von Gesetzesbewusstsein als „ratio cognoscendi“ (Idealgrund) der Freiheit des Willens und dieser selbst als „ratio essendi“ (Realgrund) des moralischen Gesetzes bereits methodologisch in den §§ 1 – 7 angelegt, d. h. daraus entwickelbar sein. Dementsprechend muss schon in der „Erklärung“ des Begriffs praktischer Grundsätze in § 1 wirklich ein willentliches Moment ursprünglich synthetisch enthalten sein, das eben diesen Rückschluss aus einem im Einzelnen bereits analytisch verdeutlichten Bewusstsein des Grundgesetzes der reinen praktischen Vernunft auf das im Allgemeinen ursprünglich synthetisch gründende Bewusstsein desselben ermöglicht. b) Die vier Arten möglicher „Erklärung“ und die „Declaration“ eines freien Willens Nun gibt es gemäß der „Transzendentale[n] Methodenlehre“ jedoch vier voneinander zu unterscheidende Formen methodologisch möglicher Erklärungen, von denen nur eine die hier spezifisch gestellte Anforderung zu erfüllen vermag, denn: „Die deutsche Sprache hat für die Ausdrücke der Exposition, Explication, Declara­ tion und Definition nichts mehr als das eine Wort Erklärung; […].“105 (1) Für die „Erklärung“ des § 1 scheidet hier allerdings die Erklärungsform der „Exposition“ selbst von vorneherein aus, denn die synthetische Erklärung des a priori durch die reine und an sich selbst praktische Vernunft zu gebenden Begriffs praktischer Grundsätze eines Willens in § 1 soll ja gerade die sodann analytisch zu exponierende Vorstellung eines Grundgesetzes der reinen praktischen Vernunft überhaupt erst zur Exposition geben. (2) Ferner gilt dies für die Erklärungsform der „Definition“ im eigentlichen Sinne, denn es kann „kein a priori gegebener Begriff definirt werden, z. B. Substanz, Ursache, Recht, Billigkeit etc. Denn ich kann niemals sicher sein, daß die deutliche Vorstellung eines (noch verworren) gegebenen Begriffs ausführlich entwickelt worden, als wenn ich weiß, daß dieselbe dem Gegenstande adäquat sei.“106 104  Siehe zu diesem maßgeblichen Moment des Gedankens der §§ 1 – 7 auch noch unten unter III. 4. 105  KrV, AA III: 478.31 – 479.02 (= A 730/B 758).

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(3) Schließlich bezieht sich die nominale Erklärungsform der „Explication“ nicht auf a priori, sondern nur auf a posteriori, d. h. empirisch gegebene Begriffe.107 Der Begriff des freien Willens mitsamt seiner praktischen Grundsätze ist jedoch kein empirisch, sondern ein a priori gegebener Begriff. (4) Somit bleibt als Erklärungsform des a priori gegebenen Vernunftbegriffs praktischer Grundsätze des Willens in § 1 nur noch die „Declaration“, bei der es sich in der Tat auch um eine Erklärung bzw. eine nicht eigentlich so zu nennende Definition handelt, die die Synthesis eines willkürlich und mithin vorsätzlich gedachten Begriffes enthält, der für sich nicht mathematisch in einer reinen Anschauung konstruiert und mithin für Kant eben darum auch nicht im eigentlichen Sinne synthetisch definiert werden kann:108 „Meinen Begriff kann ich in solchem Falle [sc. des willkürlich gebildeten Begriffs, M. H.] jederzeit definiren; denn ich muß doch wissen, was ich habe denken wollen, da ich ihn selbst vorsetzlich gemacht habe, und er mir weder durch die Natur des Verstandes, noch durch die Erfahrung gegeben worden, aber ich kann nicht sagen, daß ich dadurch einen wahren Gegenstand definirt habe. Denn wenn der Begriff auf empirischen Bedingungen beruht, z. B. eine Schiffsuhr, so wird der Gegenstand und dessen Möglichkeit durch diesen willkürlichen Begriff noch nicht gegeben; ich weiß daraus nicht einmal, ob er überall einen Gegenstand habe, und meine Erklärung kann besser eine Declaration (meines Projects) als Definition eines Gegenstandes heißen. […].“ (KrV AA III: 478.18 – 33 [= A 729/B 757]).

In der willkürlichen und mithin durch das sinnliche bzw. untere Begehrungsvermögen verfassten „Declaration“109 des a priori durch die Vernunft gegebenen Begriffs praktischer Grundsätze des Willens des § 1 ist nach dieser Charakterisierung zunächst ein „Projekt“ des freien Willens, und zwar das seiner rationalen Selbsterklärung aufgehoben, d. h. das Projekt der Aufklärung seiner objektiven Realität. Dieser gerade nicht auf eine empirische Bedingung abhebende Projektcharakter plausibilisiert dabei methodologisch nicht nur die ihm entsprechend als „Aufgabe“ verfassten §§ 5 – 6, sondern auch den kantischen Schluss aus dem analytisch exponierten Gesetzesbewusstsein (als „ratio cognoscendi“) auf die darin vorausgesetzte synthetische Wirklichkeit der Freiheit des Willens (als die allgemeinste Vernunftrealbedingung der Möglichkeit dieses Gesetzesbewusstseins und mithin als seine „ratio essendi“). Denn wenn das analytisch exponierte Gesetzesbewusstsein in § 7 nur unter Voraussetzung der spontanen Synthesisselbsttätigkeit eines freien Willens in der willkürlichen Erklärung des Begriffs praktischer Grundsätze des § 1 wirklich denkbar ist, weil der Wille (als rationales, d. h. rein begriffliches bzw. oberes Begehrungsvermögen) die Willkür (als rezeptives, d. h. sinnliches bzw. unteres Begehrungsvermögen) ursprünglich bereits zu dieser willkürlichen Erklärungstätigkeit (d. h.   KrV AA III: 478.05 – 09 (= A 728/B 756).   KrV AA III: 477.19 – 478.05 (= A 727 f./B 756 f.). 108  Siehe dazu auch Wolff (Fn. 3), S. 511 (514 ff.). 109  Vgl. ferner auch Log, AA IX: 142.03 – 09 (Anm. zu § 103), 143.08 – 10 (Anm. zu § 105). 106 107

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zu einer empirischen „That [factum]“) grundgesetzlich bestimmt, so hat der freie Wille auch in dieser vorsätzlichen Erklärungstätigkeit der sodann freien und nicht nur bloßen Willkür seine objektive Realität. Der sich ursprünglich durch die freie Willkür selbst erklärende freie Wille hat seinen Vernunftbegriff praktischer Grundsätze des Willens in diesem Fall nämlich offensichtlich „denken wollen“ und so beweist sich seine objektive Realität auch in dieser grundgesetzlichen Bestimmungstätigkeit, d. h. in seiner intelligiblen „That (factum)“. Die zunächst als bloße Nominalerklärung erscheinende Begriffsgabe des § 1 erweist sich mit dieser vernunftschlüssigen Aufklärung ihres inneren Realbedingungszusammenhangs somit letztlich als synthetischer Erklärungsgrund zu einer schließlich analytisch gewonnenen Realvorstellung bzw. -definition des Begriffs des freien Willens.110 Auf diese ursprünglich synthetische oder progressive Vorgehensweise, die nach der Logik Kants einer wissenschaftlichen und systematischen Ausarbeitung einer Erkenntnis angemessen ist,111 plausibilisieren sich schließlich auch die jeweils als „Lehrsatz“ gleichsam nach mathematischer Art erscheinenden §§ 2 – 4, denn sie beziehen ihre damit zum Ausdruck gebrachte und andernfalls gänzlich unerklärliche Apodiktizität bzw. praktische Notwendigkeit aus der ursprünglich gesetzlichen Bestimmungstätigkeit des freien Willens in der willkürlich gemachten, jedoch von empirischen Bedingungen unabhängigen Erklärung seines Begriffs praktischer Grundsätze (§ 1).112 2. Zur „Declaration“ praktischer Grundsätze in § 1 KpV selbst „Praktische Grundsätze“ des Willens werden in der willkürlich gemachten Begriffserklärung des § 1 als „Sätze“ zur weiteren analytischen Exposition in den §§ 2 – 7 gegeben, „welche eine allgemeine Bestimmung des Willens enthalten, die mehrere praktische Regeln unter sich hat“113. a) Begriffliche Bestimmung in praktischen Grundsätzen des Willens Innerhalb von praktischen Grundsätzen sind demnach zwei einander subordinierte Vorstellungsebenen zu unterscheiden: Einesteils enthalten sie eine allgemeine (d. h. begriffliche) Bestimmung des Willens in sich und anderenteils sind unter   Zur Einheit und Differenz von Nominal- und Realdefinition Log, AA IX: 143 f. (§ 106).   Siehe zur synthetischen (progressiven) im Gegensatz zur analytischen (regressiven) Methode, welche letztere eher einer populären Darstellung einer Erkenntnis zuträglich ist, Log, AA IX: 149 (§ 117). 112  Siehe zu dieser gleichsam nach mathematischer Art erscheinenden „synthetische[n] Methode in der Analytik der reinen praktischen Vernunft“ instruktiv auch Wolff (Fn. 3), S. 511 (513 – 534). 113  KpV, AA V: 19.07 – 08. 110 111

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dieser allgemeinen (d. h. begrifflichen) Willensbestimmung praktische Regeln (d. h. Handlungsregeln) subordiniert enthalten (d. h. bestimmt bzw. bestimmbar). Praktische Grundsätze des Willens haben somit in intellektueller Hinsicht die logische Struktur von Begriffen,114 deren bestimmende Form ihre inhaltliche Allgemeinheit in ihnen und deren bestimmbare Materie ihr Vorstellungsgegenstand unter ihnen selbst als Erkenntnisgrund ist.115 So wie demnach „Inhalt“ und „Umfang“ an Begriffen zu unterscheiden sind,116 so sind gemäß der Begriffserklärung des § 1 auch „Inhalt“ (Willensbestimmung) und „Umfang“ (bestimmbare Handlungsregeln unter einer schon vorausgesetzten Willensbestimmung) praktischer Grundsätze zu unterscheiden. Denn in einer rein vernünftigen Bestimmung des Willens ist es – wie nicht vergessen werden sollte – um eine Bestimmung desselben durch sein reines Denken und mithin um eine rein rationale Bestimmung des von sinnlichen Anreizen unabhängigen Willens durch reine Begriffe zu tun. Insofern steht in den §§ 1 – 7 KpV in der Sache selbst das Selbstverhältnis der reinen zur praktischen Vernunft im Vernunftbegriff (der Idee) einer reinen und an sich selbst praktischen (d. h. spontan tätigen) Vernunft zur Aufklärung, sodass in praktischen Grundsätzen eines freien Willens (d. h. in Gesetzen) auch nur der reine Begriff der Freiheit des Willens als spontane Kausalität an und für sich selbst praktisch sein kann. b) Empirische Bestimmung in subjektiven und reine Bestimmung in objektiven Grundsätzen des Willens Der auf vorgenannte begriffliche Art willkürlich gemachte und insofern zur weiteren Exposition gegebene Begriff praktischer Grundsätze des Willens teilt sich nun in seiner Sphäre begrifflich wiederum nach dem Satz vom Widerspruch logisch ein117 in subjektive und objektive praktische Grundsätze, d. h. in „Maximen“ und „Gesetze“ als seine begrifflichen Glieder.118 Die Begriffe „Gesetz“ und „Maxime“ sind demnach zwei nicht weiter rückführbare Grundbegriffe in der Sphäre des übergeordneten Begriffs praktischer Grundsätze, d. h. sie sind zwei begrifflich notwendige Momente im Begriff einer jeden Willensbestimmung überhaupt. Da sie als Begriffe mit diesem übergeordneten Begriff praktischer Grundsätze des Willens überhaupt ihre Allgemeinheit, nämlich als jeweils logisch bestimmen114  Log, AA IX: 91.06 – 11 (§ 1): „Alle Erkenntnisse, das heißt: alle mit Bewußtsein auf ein Object bezogene Vorstellungen sind entweder Anschauungen oder Begriffe. Die Anschauung ist eine einzelne Vorstellung […] der Begriff eine allgemeine […] oder reflectirte Vorstellung […]. Die Erkenntniß durch Begriffe heißt das Denken (cognitio discursiva).“ 115  Log, AA IX: 91.23 – 24 (§ 2). 116  Log, AA IX: 95 f. (§§ 7, 8). 117  Zur logischen Einteilung eines Begriffs in seine voneinander unterschiedenen Glieder siehe Log, AA IX: 146 f. (§§ 110 – 113). 118  KpV, AA  V: 19.09 – 12.

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de Begriffsform teilen, müssen die von ihnen begriffenen Grundsätze hinsichtlich ihres Gegenstandes, nämlich der in ihnen begrifflich bestimmten und daher ihrerseits allgemeinen Willensbestimmung, sachlich voneinander unterschieden sein: Weil dabei allerdings die Bedingung (d. h. die Bestimmung) einer Maxime – als einem subjektiven praktischen Grundsatz – nur für den Willen des Subjekts der Maxime als gültig angesehen wird, kann die den Willen in der Sache bestimmende Allgemeinheit einer Maxime – die ja ausweislich der willkürlichen Begriffserklärung eine allgemeine Bestimmung des Willens enthält – begrifflich nur eine auf dieses Willenssubjekt beschränkte und daher endliche Allgemeinheit vorstellen. Die eine Maxime innerlich bestimmenden Begriffe sind folglich endlich-allgemeine und mithin empirisch durch die Sinnlichkeit gegebene Begriffe. Die begriffliche Willensbestimmung in subjektiven Grundsätzen des Willens (Maximen) ist folglich selbst empirisch. Dagegen müssen Gesetze – als objektive praktische Grundsätze – innerlich durch a priori aus dem Verstand bzw. der Vernunft gegebene und mithin unendlich-allgemeine (reine) Begriffe in der Sache selbst bestimmt vorgestellt werden, wenn sie in ihrer allgemeinen Bestimmung des Willens nicht nur für den Willen des einzelnen Subjekts des Gesetzes, sondern objektiv und ganz allgemein für den Willen eines jeden vernünftigen Willenssubjekts als gültig erkannt werden sollen. Gesetzen als praktischen Grundsätzen eignet somit in ihrer begrifflichen Bestimmung die bestimmende Form einer unendlichen Allgemeinheit, die als bloße Quantitätsvorstellung der reinen Vernunft mithin rein denk-formend über die dadurch in der Folge an und für sich selbst vernünftig bestimmte Qualität der praktischen Willensbestimmung darin bestimmt. Die begriffliche Willensbestimmung in objektiven Grundsätzen des Willens (Gesetzen) ist folglich selbst völlig rein. Weil nun alle endlich-allgemeinen und daher empirischen Begriffe für Kant subjektiv aus den Sinnen entspringen,119 vermögen subjektive Maximen inhaltlich-objektiv keine gesetzliche Willensbestimmung zu leisten. Sie stellen insofern also nicht praktische Grundsätze des rein begrifflich bestimmenden (rationalen bzw. oberen) Begehrungsvermögens (d. h. des reinen Willens), sondern lediglich solche des sinnlichen (bzw. unteren) Begehrungsvermögens (d. h. der Willkür) vor. Dagegen vermögen objektive Gesetze inhaltlich keine bloß subjektive Willensbestimmung zu leisten und stellen insofern auch nicht praktische Grundsätze des sinnlichen, sondern des rein begrifflichen Begehrungsvermögens vor, weil die sie als praktische Grundsätze innerlich bestimmenden reinen Begriffe inhaltlich aus der reinen Vernunft bzw. dem reinen Verstand und nicht aus den Sinnen entspringen. Daher heißt es in der MS: „Von dem Willen gehen die Gesetze aus; von der Willkür die Maximen.“120

  Zur Unterscheidung empirischer und reiner Begriffe siehe Log, AA IX: 92 f. (§ 3).   MS, AA VI: 226.04 – 05.

119

120

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3. Zur Analyse des in § 1 deklarierten Verhältnisses von Gesetz / Maxime und Handlungsregel (Imperativ) Als praktische Grundsätze der Willensbestimmung schließen sowohl subjektive Grundsätze (Maximen) als auch objektive Grundsätze (Gesetze) „praktische Regeln“ gemäß der willkürlichen Begriffsbestimmung des § 1 nicht in sich, sondern subordiniert unter sich. Dabei handelt es sich um durch Vernunft bzw. Urteilskraft reflektierte Handlungsregeln, die nämlich jeweils eine Handlung als Mittel zur schon darüber in der Maxime bzw. im Gesetz vorausgesetzten Absicht der Bestimmung vorschreiben.121 Da nun jedoch ein nicht bloß durch seine Vernunft, sondern zugleich auch durch seine Sinnlichkeit in seinen Handlungen bestimmbares Willkürwesen – wie der Mensch es nach Kant tatsächlich ist – allerdings nicht automatisch gemäß diesen bloß reflektierten und ihm intellektuell einsichtigen Handlungsregeln unter Maximen oder Gesetzen tätig ist, stellen sie ihm in seiner bloß intellektuellen Einsicht lediglich ein „Sollen“, d. h. einen Befehl bzw. einen „Imperativ“ vor, der die jeweilige Handlung unter dem schon vorausgesetzten praktischen Grundsatz insoweit als für sich „objektiv“ notwendig vorstellt.122 Nun sind Imperative bzw. Handlungsregeln bereits wegen ihrer untergeordneten Stellung unter der subjektiven bzw. objektiven Willensbestimmung einer Maxime bzw. eines Gesetzes von diesen letzteren jeweils an sich selbst unterschieden, obgleich sie jeweils für sich selbst auch einen untergeordneten Bestandteil derselben unter ihrer Willensbestimmung bilden. a) Einheit und Differenz von Gesetz und kategorischem Imperativ in ihrer Subordination Mit Blick auf ihre objektive Handlungsbestimmung sind Imperative allerdings auch für sich selbst gänzlich von den Maximen unterschieden, denn diese enthalten – insofern diametral entgegengesetzt – lediglich eine subjektive Willensbestim­ mung in sich.123 Dagegen können Imperative in ihrer objektiven Handlungsbestimmung zwar nicht an, jedoch für sich selbst zugleich auch praktische Gesetze sein,   KpV, AA V: 20.06 – 08.   KpV, AA V: 20.08 – 13. – Die zwischen „Grundsatz“ und „Regel“ ausgedrückte subordinative Differenz von Willens- und Handlungsbestimmung geht verloren, wenn man etwa mit Stange, Die Ethik Kants, Leipzig: Dieterich, 1920, S. 24 ff. annehmen wollte, es handele sich sowohl bei „Grundsätzen“ als auch „Regeln“ um Willensbestimmungen, die sich lediglich in quantitativer Hinsicht, nämlich im „Umfang des Gebiets“ unterschieden. Die praktischen „Grundsätze“ (Gesetze und Maximen) sind also qualitativ nicht identisch mit den praktischen „Regeln“ und mithin auch nicht völlig einerlei mit den (hypothetischen oder kategorischen) „Imperativen“, wie jedoch Stange (ebd., S. 26) konstatiert. Zur weiteren Ausdifferenzierung siehe sogleich im Text. 123  KpV, AA V: 20.13 – 14. 121 122

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insofern sie nämlich zugleich eine objektive Willensbestimmung in sich haben. In einem solchen Fall der für sich bestehenden Teilidentität von Imperativ und Gesetz ist die für sich begrifflich objektive Notwendigkeit der Handlungsbestimmung eines Imperativs tatsächlich zugleich in der begrifflich objektiven (unendlich-allgemeinen) Notwendigkeit der Willensbestimmung eines Gesetzes vorstellbar. Unter der bereits vorausgesetzten Absicht des Gesetzes und ihrer unendlich-allgemeinen Willensbestimmung aber gebietet ein Imperativ für den Willen eines jeden vernünftigen Subjekts gleichermaßen unbedingt-bedingt und mithin „kategorisch“, wohingegen ein Imperativ unter der vorausgesetzten Absicht einer bloßen Maxime und ihrer endlich-allgemeinen Willensbestimmung lediglich für den Willen des Subjekts der Maxime und mithin nur endlich-bedingt, d. h. „hypothetisch“ gebietet. Weil dabei die endlich-allgemeine Willensbestimmung einer Maxime als Bedingung eines hypothetischen Imperativs von einer sinnlich schon vorgestellten und daher im unteren Begehrungsvermögen bereits – insofern heteronom – gesetzten Wirklichkeit im Subjekt der Willkür abhängt, geht die objektive Handlungsbestimmung hypothetischer Imperative lediglich auf die Zulänglichkeit der Handlung als Mittel zur sinnlich schon vorausgesetzten Wirklichkeit als dem subjektiv im Begehrungsvermögen gesetzten Zweck, d. h. auf die bloße Zweckmäßigkeit der Handlung. Dagegen geht die objektive Handlungsbestimmung kategorischer Imperative unter der unbedingten Bedingung praktischer Gesetze nicht von einer sinnlich – und insofern für den reinen Willen im oberen Begehrungsvermögen heteronom – bereits vorgestellten Wirklichkeit im willkürlichen Begehrungsvermögen aus, sondern von der rein gesetzlichen Bestimmung des Willens in diesen Gesetzen über ihnen als kategorischen Imperativen selbst.124 b) Das oberste praktische Gesetz ist nicht der kategorische Imperativ Demnach können kategorische Imperative in ihrer objektiven Handlungsbestimmung zugleich mit der objektiven Willensbestimmung in praktischen Gesetzen für sich identisch sein, obgleich ein Gesetz in seiner objektiven Willensbestimmung nicht schon an und für sich selbst identisch mit einem solchen sein kann, da andernfalls das Subordinationsverhältnis zwischen Imperativ und Gesetz (§ 1) aufgehoben wäre. Das in § 7 festgestellte „Grundgesetz der reinen praktischen Vernunft“125 ist folglich – als das oberste praktische Gesetz überhaupt – nicht schon an und für sich selbst mit einem sittengesetzlichen kategorischen Imperativ für freie Willkürwesen identisch, obgleich ein solcher für sich mit diesem Grundgesetz teilidentisch ist, und mithin unter ihm für einen Menschen notwendig zu folgern sein und daher   KpV, AA V: 20.14 – 21.08.   KpV, AA V: 30.36 – 39.

124 125

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insofern auch deduziert werden kann.126 Also ist für ein zutreffendes Verständnis der Begründung kantischer Moralphilosophie die in § 1 KpV begrifflich angelegte Einheit sowie Differenz von „Grundgesetz der reinen praktischen Vernunft“ für einen freien Willen überhaupt und „Sittengesetz“ für ein menschliches Willkürwesen dringend zu beachten. Denn das „Grundgesetz“ hat als oberstes praktisches Gesetz eines freien Willens überhaupt, anders als das lediglich für Menschen gültige „Sittengesetz“, nicht nur praktische Geltung für ein sinnlich affizierbares Begehrungsvermögen unter ihm, sondern auch für ein völlig reines und daher an und für sich selbst heiliges Begehrungsvermögen, d. h. für den göttlichen Willen in ihm. Mit anderen Worten: Der kategorische Imperativ der Moral ist – entgegen einem beinahe ausnahmslos in der Sekundärliteratur vorfindlichen Missverständnis und wie späterhin noch deutlicher werden wird – nicht an und für sich selbst schon mit dem obersten moralischen Gesetz identisch vorzustellen.127 Er bildet daher auch nicht den höchsten Punkt der kantischen Moralphilosophie. Dieter Henrich dürfte somit richtig liegen, wenn er konstatiert, der kategorische Imperativ könne nicht das einzige und oberste Prinzip der Moralphilosophie (‚Ethik‘) sein; er dürfte sich jedoch irren, wenn er glaubt, diese in der Sache selbst zutreffende These kritisch gegen die kantische Moralphilosophie wenden zu können, denn auch darin hat der kategorische Imperativ diese höchste und einzigartige Stellung nicht.128 c) Die folgenwirksame Verkennung dieser Differenz in der modernen Kantforschung Allerdings beruht auf dieser undifferenzierten und dadurch in der Sache reduktionistischen Identifizierung des kategorischen Imperativs mit dem von Kant bereits in der GMS gesuchten „obersten Princips der Moralität“129 maßgeblich die spätestens seit Henrichs wirkmächtigen Untersuchungen kanonisch gewordene Annahme, in der GMS von 1785 habe Kant eben mit der „Deduktion des kategorischen Imperativs“130 die „Deduktion des obersten moralischen Gesetzes“ versucht, während er drei Jahre später in der KpV von diesem vermeintlichen Vorhaben mit der vermeintlichen Kapitulation vor einer „Faktizität“ des moralischen Gesetzesbewusstseins abgekommen sei, weil er die Unmöglichkeit dieses Deduk126  KpV, AA V: 31.35 – 37. – Es dürfte sich also beispielsweise Beck (Fn. 12), S. 120 f. geirrt haben, als er wider die von ihm bemerkte kantische Unterscheidung von Gesetz und Imperativ im Hinblick auf dieses „Grundgesetz“ notierte: „Tatsächlich handelt es sich aber nicht um ein Gesetz, sondern um einen Imperativ.“ 127  So im Ergebnis auch schon Wolff (Fn. 3), S. 511 (517 Fn. 12, 524 ff.); ders. (Fn. 12), S. 257 ff. 128 Siehe jedoch Henrich, „Das Problem der Grundlegung der Ethik …“ (Fn. 6), S. 350 (363); ders. (Fn. 22), S. 6 (24). 129  Vorrede zur GMS, AA IV: 392.03 – 06 sowie 440.14 – 15. 130  GMS, AA IV: 453 ff.

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tionsvorhabens im Hinblick auf den als obersten Grundsatz missverstandenen kategorischen Imperativ zwischenzeitlich habe einsehen müssen (‚great reversal‘).131 Richtigerweise findet sich der Versuch einer „Deduktion des obersten moralischen Gesetzes“ aber weder in der Schrift von 1785, noch in der von 1788, sodass insofern auch überhaupt gar keine gedankliche Umkehr im Denken Immanuel Kants eingetreten sein kann. Vielmehr findet sich in beiden Schriften eine Deduktion des kategorischen Imperativs subordiniert unter diesem stets gesuchten und auch gefundenen obersten Prinzip der Moralität, nämlich dem „Grundgesetz der reinen praktischen Vernunft“. Die ausbleibende Differenzierung zwischen dem praktischen Gesetz und dem kategorischen Imperativ verstellt demnach ein zutreffendes Verständnis nicht nur der KpV, sondern auch der GMS, wie im Folgenden sukzessive noch deutlicher werden soll. Erst unter hinreichender begrifflicher Differenzierung ist es nämlich nicht als missliche Abkehr vom nur vermeintlichen Leitgedanken der GMS (1785), nämlich einer (transzendentalen) Deduktion des obersten Prinzips der Moralität, noch dazu aus der theoretischen Vernunft, in verschämt selbstkritischer Absicht zu verstehen, wenn Kant nur wenig später in der KpV (1788) mit Blick auf den obersten Grundsatz der praktischen Vernunft schreibt: „Mit der Deduction, d. i. der Rechtfertigung seiner objectiven und allgemeinen Gültigkeit und der Einsicht der Möglichkeit eines solchen synthetischen Satzes a priori, darf man nicht so gut fortzukommen hoffen, als es mit den Grundsätzen des reinen theoretischen Verstandes anging“132, und in diesem Zusammenhang wenig später fortfährt: „Auch ist das moralische Gesetz gleichsam als ein Factum der reinen Vernunft, dessen wir uns a priori bewußt sind und welches apodiktisch gewiß ist, gegeben, […]. Also kann die objective Realität des moralischen Gesetzes durch keine Deduction, durch alle Anstrengung der theoretischen, speculativen oder empirisch unterstützten Vernunft, bewiesen und also, wenn man auch auf die apodiktische Gewißheit Verzicht thun wollte, durch Erfahrung bestätigt und so a posteriori bewiesen werden, und steht dennoch für sich selbst fest. Etwas anderes aber und ganz Widersinnisches tritt an die Stelle dieser vergeblich gesuchten Deduction des moralischen Princips, nämlich daß es umgekehrt selbst zum Princip der Deduction eines unerforschlichen Vermögens dient, […] nämlich das der Freiheit, von der das moralische Gesetz, welches selbst keiner rechtfertigenden Gründe bedarf, nicht blos die Möglichkeit, sondern die Wirklichkeit […] beweiset, […].“133 131  Siehe schon oben Fn. 6 und besonders Henrich, „Die Deduktion des Sittengesetzes …“ (Fn. 6), S. 55 (84 ff./91). 132  KpV, AA V: 46.20 – 24. 133  KpV, AA V: 47.11 – 30. – Unter der nicht etwa mit einem Fragezeichen versehenen Überschrift „Deduktion des Gesetzes oder Deduktion der Freiheit“ unterscheidet Henrich, „Die Deduktion des Sittengesetzes …“ (Fn. 6), S. 55 (84 ff.) die damit als möglich bezeichneten und voneinander unterschiedenen Deduktionsgegenstände nicht weiter, um später zu erklären: „Die Deduktion der ‚Grundlegung‘ ist somit primär eine Deduktion des Bewußtseins der Freiheit.“ (87). Da aber ausweislich GMS, AA IV: 447.20 – 25 nur der Begriff der Freiheit (hinsichtlich seiner objektiven Realität) und mit ihr die Möglichkeit eines kategorischen Imperatives dedu-

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d) Die Aufhebung bestehender Verständnisschwierigkeiten Als oberster Grundsatz überhaupt lässt sich das „Grundgesetz der reinen prak­ tischen Vernunft“ nämlich in seiner praktischen Gebrauchsbefugnis für ein freies Willenssubjekt überhaupt nicht aus noch höheren oder anderen Prinzipien herleiten, sondern er steht für ein solches Subjekt – als oberstes „Prinzip“ seines Willens – eben ganz am „Anfang“ seines praktischen Selbstbewusstseins. Möglich ist methodologisch tatsächlich lediglich – wie nun noch weiter zu zeigen ist – eine analytische Exposition der objektiven Realität desselben, und zwar im analytischen Bewusstsein des mit der Spontanität der reinen und dadurch an sich selbst praktischen Vernunft bereits wirklich synthetisch verfassten Grundgesetzes. Lässt sich im Rahmen dieser Exposition eben aus diesem Grund aber zeigen, dass es sich beim obersten Prinzip der Moralität ursprünglich allerdings nicht um eine bloß willkürliche, sondern gesetzlich notwendige (Selbst-)Setzung des freien Willens handelt, so hat dieser oberste Grundsatz eines freien Willens seinen absoluten sowie unwiderleglichen Grund seiner selbst – an und für sich selbst – in (und nicht außer) sich selbst.134 Die vorstehende kantische Formulierung zum Verhältnis von „Factum“ und „Deduction“ im Hinblick auf das oberste moralische Prinzip, d. h. zum reinen praktischen Selbstverhältnis der Vernunft wäre dann gewiss nicht „als ein ‚dogmatischer Restbestand‘ oder das Zeugnis eines noch zu geringen Vertrauens der Vernunft in sich selbst“ anzusehen.135 4. Zur Realität eines praktischen Gesetzes und seiner analytischen Exposition im moralischen Bewusstsein (§§  1 – 7 KpV) Handelte es sich bei der willkürlichen Erklärung („Declaration“) des Begriffs praktischer Grundsätze der Willensbestimmung und mithin auch des Begriffs objektiver praktischer Gesetze der Willensbestimmung in § 1 um eine bloß willkürlich erdachte Begriffserklärung, so wäre mit diesem bloßen Gedankending völlig unklar, ob dem Begriff (objektiver) praktischer Grundsätze der Willensbestimmung und mithin auch dem des durch (objektive) praktische Grundsätze bestimmbaren (reinen) Willens überhaupt auch nur irgendwo objektive Realität zukommt. ziert werden sollen, muss die These Henrichs von einem Wandel im kantischen Denken mit Blick auf eine vermeintliche „Deduktion des Gesetzes“ wohl fehlgehen. Im Übrigen kommt der Begriff „Sittengesetz“ in GMS nicht vor, sodass letztlich unklar bleibt, was Henrich (90) unter der Überschrift „Die Deduktion des Sittengesetzes“ untersucht. 134  Der freie Wille würde sich sodann in seiner eigenen Bestimmung gerade nicht „fremd“ bleiben, wie aber hingegen insbesondere Henrich (Fn. 22), S. 6 (49) und Prauss (Fn. 10), S. 125 konstatieren. 135  Henrich, „Der Begriff der sittlichen Einsicht …“ (Fn. 6), S. 77 (113) geht an dieser Stelle mit einer ambivalenten und leicht missverständlichen Formulierung um, wenn er schreibt, diese kantische Terminologie sei „nichts weniger als ein ‚dogmatischer Restbestand‘ […]“ und (teils affirmierend, teils kritisch) fortfährt, sie sei „Ausdruck der spätesten und reifsten Antwort“.

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Der „Anmerkung“ zu § 1 ist es daher von Beginn an nicht bloß um analytische Begriffszergliederungen zum schon erklärten Verhältnis von Gesetzen bzw. Maximen zu Imperativen, sondern vor allem auch um das gedanklich stets mitzuführende Bewusstsein der objektiven Realität objektiver praktischer Gesetze zu tun, wo doch niemand die objektive Realität subjektiver praktischer Maximen seiner Willkür ernsthaft bestreiten wird: „Wenn man annimmt, daß reine Vernunft einen praktisch, d. i. zur Willensbestimmung hinreichenden Grund in sich enthalten könne, so giebt es praktische Gesetze; wo aber nicht, so werden alle praktische Grundsätze bloße Maximen sein.“136 a) Die objektive Realität praktischer Gesetze als Implikation der willkürlichen Erklärung des § 1 aa) Was wäre, wenn es praktische Gesetze (nicht) gäbe? Denn wenn das reine Denken in reinen und daher unendlich-allgemeinen Be­ griffen, also die „reine Vernunft einen praktisch, d. i. zur Willensbestimmung hinreichenden Grund“ in sich enthält, d. h. das reine Denken vermittelst Vernunftbegriffe tatsächlich in einem Bestimmungsverhältnis zu dem Willen als der prak­ tischen Vernunft steht, so gibt es eine rein intellektuell-praktische Willensbestimmung und mithin auch objektive praktische Gesetze als praktische Grundsätze, die eine unendlich-allgemeine Willensbestimmung vermittelst reiner Begriffe in sich schließen.137 Das aber würde zugleich bedeuten, dass es auch einen reinen und durch objektive praktische Gesetze bestimmbaren, d. h. einen freien Willen gäbe, denn praktische Grundsätze des freien Willens setzen einen freien Willen nicht nur als Objekt der Bestimmung, sondern vielmehr auch als Subjekt dieser den Willen praktisch bestimmenden Grundsätze für sich selbst voraus. Aus der Realität praktischer Gesetze dürfte folglich mit Recht auf die praktische Realität eines freien Willens, damit aber auch auf die praktische Realität des Begriffs der Freiheit des Willens geschlossen werden, denn der Begriff der Freiheit wäre dann als reiner Vernunftbegriff der Kausalität des Willens in praktischen Gesetzen praktisch, d. h. er wäre als den freien Willen kausal bestimmend tätig. Mit einem Wort: Der freie Wille bestimmte sich durch seinen reinen praktischen Begriff selbst. Gäbe es solche praktischen Gesetze der reinen praktischen Vernunft hingegen überhaupt nicht, so wäre die Erklärung des Begriffs praktischer Gesetze unter dem willkürlich erklärten Begriff praktischer Grundsätze in § 1 bloß willkürlich, d. h. vom Subjekt der Erklärung zwar vorsätzlich, allerdings völlig grund- und willenlos   KpV, AA V: 19.14 – 16.   In KpV, AA V: 55.11 – 15 wird Kant schreiben: „Außer dem Verhältnisse aber, darin der Verstand zu Gegenständen (im theoretischen Erkenntnisse) steht, hat er auch eines zum Begehrungsvermögen, das darum der Wille heißt, und der reine Wille, so fern der reine Verstand (der in solchem Falle Vernunft heißt) durch die bloße Vorstellung eines Gesetzes praktisch ist.“ 136 137

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ohne einen schon vorausgesetzten praktischen Zweck erklärt worden. Der Begriff objektiver praktischer Gesetze wäre dann vorsätzlich bloß erdacht worden, obwohl das Subjekt der Erklärung ihn zuvor gar nicht „habe denken wollen“. – Das kann nicht sein. bb) Die Implikation der objektiven Realität praktischer Gesetze des freien Willens Die tatsächlich erfolgte willkürliche Erklärung in § 1 impliziert im hier vorliegenden Selbsterklärungsverhältnis des Willens also letztlich auch dessen objektive Realität in seiner Selbsterklärung und mithin in praktischen Gesetzen; damit aber zugleich auch die objektive Realität des späterhin benannten Wechselverhältnisses des moralischen Grundgesetzes und der praktischen Freiheit des Willens. Ist dieses Wechselverhältnis jedoch objektiv real (nicht bloß logisch denkmöglich), so hat der Schluss aus dem Bewusstsein des praktischen Gesetzes auf die objektive Realität der Freiheit des Willens selbst objektive Realität, sodass sich der freie Wille unter praktischen Gesetzen durch nichts anderes selbst bestimmt, als durch seinen reinen praktischen Begriff von sich selbst, d. h. durch den reinen praktischen Begriff der Freiheit des Willens in einem positiven Verstande des reinen Begriffs der Kausalität. Hierin liegt schließlich die reine praktische Selbsterkenntnis eines freien Willens in praktischen Gesetzen, der sich durch seinen reinen praktischen Begriff von sich selbst an und für selbst praktisch begreift. Diesen für die weitere Exposition maßgeblichen methodologischen Zusammenhang müssen dagegen diejenigen Interpreten bereits aus methodologischer Verlegenheit übersehen, die im ersten Satz der „Anmerkung“ zu § 1 lediglich eine „probeweise“ oder „hypothetische“, d. h. eine tentativ bleibende Voraussetzung der Wirklichkeit reiner praktischer Vernunft erblicken wollen,138 denn alsdann wird das aus der willkürlichen Begriffserklärung des § 1 zu erweisende Wechselverhältnis von Freiheit des Willens und moralischem Gesetz in seiner objektiven Realität zwangsläufig als ein bloß logischer Verweisungszusammenhang missverstanden werden müssen, sodass es in der Konsequenz so scheinen muss, als werde die Behauptung der objektiven Realität der Freiheit des Willens durch einen „Zirkel“ im bloßen Gedanken erschlichen.

138  So unter vielen etwa Allison, Kant’s theory (Fn. 12), S. 203; Beck (Fn. 12), S. 158 ff.; Höffe (Fn. 93), S. 86; Loock, Idee und Reflexion bei Kant, Hamburg: Meiner, 1998, S. 49, 51; Messer, Kants Ethik, Leipzig: Veit, 1904, S. 65; Willaschek (Fn. 12), S. 205. – In der Sache selbst hat Henrich, „Die Deduktion des Sittengesetzes …“ (Fn. 6), S. 55 (83) übrigens einmal sogar ausdrücklich erklärt: „Mehr als die Hypothese einer Idee kann und muß die Freiheit aber im praktischen Gebrauch der Vernunft nicht sein.“

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cc) D  ie objektive Realität praktischer Gesetze im moralischen Pflichtbewusstsein eines Menschen Bevor sich jedoch die rein rationale Gewissheit der objektiven Realität praktischer Gesetze und der Freiheit des Willens (§ 7) durch gedankliche Abstraktion im moralischen Pflichtbewusstsein eines menschlichen Willenssubjekts auf methodologische Weise nicht nur klar, sondern auch deutlich einstellen kann,139 knüpfen die weiteren und auf den Ersteren folgenden Sätze der „Anmerkung“ zu § 1 an eben dieses moralische Pflichtbewusstsein eines jeden menschlichen Willenssubjekts an, indem sie auf die tatsächlich darin wahrnehmbare Wirkung und mithin auf die tatsächliche Wirklichkeit praktischer Gesetze im Falle eines moralischen Gewissenswiderstreits im praktischen Bewusstsein hinweisen, der eben nicht alleine aus bloßen Naturtatsachen oder sinnlich gewirkten Maximen schon erklärbar ist: „In einem pathologisch-afficirten Willen eines vernünftigen Wesens kann ein Widerstreit der Maximen wider die von ihm selbst erkannte praktische Gesetze angetroffen werden. Z. B. es kann sich jemand zur Maxime machen, keine Beleidigung ungerächt zu erdulden, und doch zugleich einsehen, daß dieses kein praktisches Gesetz, sondern nur seine Maxime sei, dagegen als Regel für den Willen eines jeden vernünftigen Wesens in einer und derselben Maxime mit sich selbst nicht zusammen stimmen könne. […].“140 Das menschliche Vernunftsubjekt der willkürlichen Begriffserklärung praktischer Grundsätze der Willensbestimmung des § 1 hat somit, wenn es nur sein eigenes Gewissen einmal zu Rate zieht, bereits an diesem Punkt seiner praktischen Selbstvergewisserung guten Grund zu der Existenzannahme eines bzw. seines freien Willens, und die weitere nun lediglich noch folgende gedankliche Exposi­ tion des obersten Grundsatzes der reinen praktischen Vernunft (§§ 2 – 7) aus dieser willkürlichen Erklärung heraus hat alleine ein noch deutlicheres Bewusstsein dieser ohnehin schon jederzeit notwendig völlig klar bewussten (Selbst-)Gewissheit zu ihrer methodologischen Absicht. Mit einem Wort: Die Grundlegung der gesamten kantischen Moralphilosophie ist in der „Declaration“ des § 1 bereits vollständig auf den Begriff gebracht. b) Die Verdeutlichung dieser Implikation des § 1 in den §§ 2 – 7 durch abstrahierende Exposition Soll die Realität einer in praktischen Gesetzen bereits wirklichen Willensbestimmung im moralischen Pflichtbewusstsein eines menschlichen Willkürwesens deutlicher bewusst werden, so muss von allen übrigen und mithin subjektiven Momenten der Willensbestimmung gedanklich abstrahiert werden. Also muss das sich selbst vergewissernde Willenssubjekt der willkürlichen Erklärung des § 1 KpV 139 Den methodischen Hinweis gibt Kant selbst ausdrücklich, siehe u. a. KpV, AA  V: 21.08 – 11 sowie 30.03 – 07. 140  KpV, AA V: 19.17 ff.

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fortan von der Willensbestimmung in Maximen sowie der dazugehörigen willkürlichen Handlungsbestimmung in hypothetischen Imperativen unter der bereits vorausgesetzten Absicht von Maximen absehen, will es sich seiner selbst nur deutlich bewusst werden. Weil aber alle Maximen in ihrer subjektiven Bestimmung des Willens eines einzelnen Subjekts einen bereits sinnlich vorgestellten Gegenstand (d. h. ein Objekt) des Willens (als des Begehrungsvermögens) voraussetzen, und den Willen damit in ihrer Bestimmung auf etwas von ihm Verschiedenes und somit für ihn Heteronomes verweisen, folgt an dieser Stelle der gedanklichen Selbstvergewisserung die apodiktische Gewissheit des: „§ 2. Lehrsatz I Alle praktische Principien, die ein Object (Materie) des Begehrungsvermögens als Bestimmungsgrund des Willens voraussetzen, sind insgesammt empirisch und können keine praktische Gesetze abgeben.“141 Die gesetzliche Bestimmung des Willens ist also, wie mit §§ 2 – 3 KpV deutlicher wird, von aller empirischen Bestimmung des Willens durch eine bereits sinnlich vorgesetzte und dadurch begehrte Handlungswirklichkeit gründlich unterschieden. Das Prinzip gesetzlicher Bestimmung des Willens besteht demnach nicht im Prinzip der Heteronomie des Willens. Denn sofern der Willensbestimmung die sinnliche Vorstellung eines tätig zu verwirklichenden Handlungsgegenstandes in der Zeit vorausgeht, bestimmt dieser sinnliche Gegenstand den Willen und nicht dieser sich ursprünglich (noch vor aller erst durch ihn zu setzenden Handlungswirklichkeit) selbst. Alle sinnliche Gegenstandsvorstellung wirkt aber im menschlichen Begehrungsvermögen subjektiv ein Gefühl der Begierde (Lust) oder der Verabscheuung (Unlust) der Verwirklichung des vorgestellten Gegenstandes und bestimmt den Willen auf diese Weise nach dem Prinzip seiner eigenen sinnlichen Annehmlichkeit, die er sich von der Verwirklichung verspricht. Anders gesprochen: Der sinnliche Reiz des je subjektiven Wohlbefindens bestimmt in diesem Fall über den Willen. Also lässt sich von den materialen Grundsätzen der Willensbestimmung (d. h. von den bloß subjektiven Maximen) apodiktisch gewiss urteilen: „§ 3. Lehrsatz II Alle materiale praktische Principien sind, als solche, insgesammt von einer und derselben Art und gehören unter das allgemeine Princip der Selbstliebe oder eigenen Glückseligkeit.“142 Nach diesem gedanklichen Prozess des Absehens von allen subjektiven Momenten in der Willensbestimmung gemäß bloß subjektiven Maximen lässt sich vom Prinzip gesetzlicher Bestimmung des Willens jetzt auch eindeutig sagen, dass dieses – im Gegensatz zum Prinzip der Heteronomie – im Prinzip der Autonomie (d. h. der Selbst-gesetz-gebung) bestehen muss. Deshalb setzte bereits die GMS von 1785 „[d]ie Autonomie des Willens als oberstes Princip der Sittlichkeit“,143 und nicht die Handlungsregel des kategorischen Imperativs, der eben – wie gesehen –   KpV, AA V: 21.12 – 16.   KpV, AA V: 22.04 – 08. 143  GMS, AA IV: 440.14 ff., 433.09 – 11, siehe außerdem 441.01 ff. zur Heteronomie des Willens. 141 142

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an und für sich selbst kein „Gesetz“ ist und schon darum nicht zum obersten Prinzip einer Selbstgesetzgebung des Willens taugt. Nicht eine Gegenstandsvorstellung bestimmt den Willen demnach gesetzlich, sondern eine Selbstvorstellung des Willens, d. h. seine Repräsentation seiner selbst, die nichts anderes als das praktische Gesetz des freien Willens selbst sein kann.144 Eben dieses Repräsentationsverhältnis einer gesetzlichen Selbstvorstellung des freien Willens entwickelt deshalb auch die weitere Exposition fortan (in den §§ 4 – 7 KpV) zu größerer Deutlichkeit des Bewusstseins. Nun kann und muss ein für sich einzelnes Willenssubjekt in seiner Willensbestimmung – ohne Selbstverleugnung – nicht vollständig von seiner Subjektivität absehen, denn die Form seiner subjektiven Willensbestimmung durch Maximen vermag es – als ein Willenssubjekt überhaupt – nicht abzulegen, da sowohl der Begriff der Maxime als auch der des Gesetzes gemäß obiger Erklärung jeweils ein unhintergehbares begriffliches Grundmoment in einer jeden Willensbestimmung vorstellen. Soll sich ein einzelnes Willenssubjekt gleichwohl durch allgemeine Gesetze im Willen bestimmen können, so muss seine subjektive Maxime im Einklang mit der objektiven gesetzlichen Bestimmung des Willens stehen können. Steht die Maxime sodann tatsächlich im Einklang mit der gesetzlichen Bestimmung des Willens, so kann der Bestimmungsgrund des Willens in diesem Fall nicht in dem Gegenstand (d. h. der Materie) der Maxime liegen, denn die darin liegende Heteronomie begründet nicht das Prinzip gesetzlicher Willensbestimmung. Da aber außer dem Gesetz kein weiteres Moment an der Willensbestimmung beteiligt ist, kann nur das Gesetz selbst, nämlich seine allgemeine Form für den Willen eines jeden Willenssubjekts den Bestimmungsgrund des Willens enthalten. Also lässt sich mit der gegebenen willkürlichen Erklärung des § 1 an dieser Stelle der gedanklichen Selbstvergewisserung in § 4 ein weiterer „Lehrsatz III“ mit apodiktischer Gewissheit formulieren: „Wenn ein vernünftiges Wesen sich seine Maximen als praktische allgemeine Gesetze denken soll, so kann es sich dieselbe nur als solche Principien denken, die nicht der Materie, sondern blos der Form nach den Bestimmungsgrund des Willens enthalten.“145 Diese gesetzlich bestimmende Form der bloßen Allgemeinheit des Willens ist nun allerdings nichts anderes als eine reine praktische Vernunftvorstellung (unendlicher Allgemeinheit eines Willens) im Begriff des Gesetzes, und zwar eine den freien Willen in seiner Einzelheit qualitativ als bestimmend gedachte reine Größenvorstellung von einem freien Willen überhaupt (d. h. von einem an und für sich allgemeinen Willen). Ein durch diese reine Größenvorstellung der Vernunft gesetzlich bestimmbarer Wille kann nun aber kein bloß endlich-bestimmbarer (rein sinnlicher) Wille sein, denn dieser wäre einer solchen unendlichen Größenbestimmung der reinen Vernunft von einem freien Willen nicht zugänglich. Folglich muss der 144  Deswegen sind moralisches Gesetz und Prinzip der Autonomie des Willens in GMS, AA IV: 449.24 – 27 auch einerlei. 145  KpV, AA V: 27.01 – 06.

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gesetzlich bestimmbare Wille qualitativ ein unendlich-allgemein-bestimmbarer und mithin nicht rein sinnlicher, sondern eben im transzendentalen Sinne freier Wille sein. Sich über diesen Zusammenhang deutliche Gewissheit zu verschaffen, ist dem Willenssubjekt der willkürlichen Begriffserklärung des § 1 nun in § 5 eine „Aufgabe I“: „Vorausgesetzt, daß die bloße gesetzgebende Form der Maximen allein der zureichende Bestimmungsgrund eines Willens sei: die Beschaffenheit desjenigen Willens zu finden, der dadurch allein bestimmbar ist. […] Also ist ein Wille, dem die bloße gesetzgebende Form der Maxime allein zum Gesetze dienen kann, ein freier Wille.“146 Gelingt es dem Willenssubjekt der willkürlichen Erklärung des § 1 nach der bisherigen Exposition nunmehr schließlich noch, sich dasjenige (oberste) praktische Gesetz inhaltlich vorzustellen, das alleine einen freien Willen zu bestimmen vermag, so hat es sich den obersten praktischen Grundsatz eines freien Willens im Rahmen seiner praktischen Selbstvergewisserung selbst gedacht. Ist ihm das „Grundgesetz der reinen praktischen Vernunft“ (§ 7) am Ende seiner analytischen Exposition der willkürlich-synthetischen Begriffserklärung praktischer Grundsätze (in § 1) aber auf diese Weise deutlich bewusst vorstellbar, so nur deshalb, weil es die gedankliche Einheit dieses obersten Grundgesetzes eines freien Willens in seiner willkürlichen Erklärung zuvor bereits wirklich synthetisch zur Einheit seines eigenen Bewusstseins verbunden hatte. Ein analytisches und deutliches Bewusstsein dieses Grundgesetzes zu haben, ist demnach nur unter Voraussetzung eines ursprünglich sich dieses oberste Grundgesetz synthetisch vorstellenden und dadurch an sich selbst tätigen Bewusstseins möglich. Damit aber ist ein ursprünglich synthetisches und zunächst lediglich klares Bewusstsein dieses Grundgesetzes bereits in der willkürlichen Begriffserklärung in § 1 vorhanden, das nur aus der Tätigkeit eines freien Willens, der sich selbst seine Bestimmung in praktischen Grundsätzen erklären will, ursprünglich herrühren, und aus diesem Grund auch nicht bloß willkürlich erdacht sein kann. Sich das „Grundgesetz“ selbst auch nur vorzustellen (und dies ist die maßgebliche Einsicht in die methodologische Leistung der kantischen Freiheitslehre in den §§ 1 ff. KpV), ist an diesem Punkt der gedanklichen Selbstvergewisserung mithin identisch damit, einen solchen obersten praktischen Grundsatz der Willensbestimmung selbst ursprünglich auch zu haben.147 D. h. diese grundgesetzliche Vorstellung ist identisch mit dessen objektiver Realität und sohin auch identisch mit der daraus zu schlussfolgernden objektiven Realität des freien Willens des Subjekts der willkürlichen Erklärung des § 1. Aus diesem methodologischen Grund macht es § 6 diesem Willenssubjekt der willkürlichen Erklärung nun auch zur „Aufga­ be II“, sich das „Grundgesetz der reinen praktischen Vernunft“ (§ 7) selbst zu den  KpV, AA V: 28.29 – 29.09.  So (nur) scheinbar auch schon verstanden von Rehberg (Fn. 20), Sp. 345 (346), der schließlich im weiteren Verlaufe seiner Rezension selbst nämlich das gerade Gegenteil der damit verbundenen Implikationen behaupten wird. Siehe weiterführend zu „Rehbergs Opposition gegen Kants Ethik“ die gleichnamige Schrift von Schulz (Köln: Böhlau, 1975), S. 11 – 42. 146 147

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ken: „Vorausgesetzt, daß ein Wille frei sei, das Gesetz zu finden, welches ihn allein nothwendig zu bestimmen tauglich ist.“148 Die Auflösung dieser für den methodologischen Bewusstmachungsprozess zentralen Aufgabe einer Selbstvorstellung des Grundgesetzes eines freien Willens durch diesen selbst geschieht folgendermaßen: In einem Gesetz ist nach bisheriger Überlegung kein Gegenstand (Materie) des Willens als sein Bestimmungsgrund vorgestellt, sondern lediglich dieses Gesetz selbst. Folglich kann nur die gesetzliche Form der Allgemeinheit willensbestimmend in praktischen Gesetzen wirken,149 sodass diese gesetzliche Form der Allgemeinheit in der subjektiven Maxime des zu bestimmenden Willens enthalten sein muss, wenn er und damit auch die Maxime ursprünglich gesetzlich bestimmt vorgestellt werden sollen. Die gesetzlich unbedingte und dadurch kategorische Handlungsregel (d. h. der kategorische Imperativ), die als Gegenstand gesetzlicher Willensbestimmung objektiver praktischer Grundsätze subordiniert unter dem obersten praktischen Gesetz eines freien Willens steht, muss dem willkürlich handelnden Subjekt (Mensch) also präskriptiv vorschreiben, nur nach solchen Maximen seines Willens zu handeln, die zugleich auch in der Form eines allgemeinen Gesetzes für einen jeden freien Willen (d. h. als allgemeiner Wille) vorstellbar sind. Da diese (späterhin noch als kategorischer Imperativ deduzierte) praktische Handlungsregel subordiniert unter dem obersten praktischen Grundsatz aber – gemäß der Erklärung des § 1 – Gegenstand der in ihm enthaltenen reinen Willensbestimmung, und diese grundgesetzliche Willensbestimmung wiederum Gegenstand des sie vermittelst reiner Begriffe formenden (d. h. bestimmenden) obersten Grundgesetzes ist, muss die grundgesetzliche Form der gesetzlichen Willensbestimmung dem freien Willen (und zwar nicht nur dem des Menschen, sondern dem eines jeden freien Willenssubjekts überhaupt) eben diese praktische Handlungsregel mit unendlicher Allgemeinheit als objektiv praktisch notwendig vorstellen. Das in seiner Geltung nicht auf menschliche Willenssubjekte eingeschränkte, sondern für alle freien (heiligen und unheiligen) Willenssubjekte gleichermaßen gültige „Grundgesetz der reinen praktischen Vernunft“ (§ 7), das dem Menschen den kategorischen Imperativ darunter mittelbar erst praktisch-notwendig vorstellt, lautet daher: „Handle so, daß die Maxime deines Willens jederzeit zugleich als Princip einer allgemeinen Gesetzgebung gelten könne.“150

  KpV, AA V: 29.10 – 13.   KpV, AA V: 29.14 – 22. 150  KpV, AA V: 30.36 – 39. 148 149

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5. Zum analytisch exponierten Bewusstsein dieses Grundgesetzes als synthetischem Bewusstseinsgrund der Freiheit Das Willenssubjekt der Deklaration des § 1 hat sich nun den obersten Grundsatz der reinen praktischen Vernunft erstmals selbst klar (ursprünglich synthetisch) und zugleich auch deutlich (analytisch) bewusst vorgestellt. Diese willentliche Selbst­ vorstellung des Grundgesetzes ist nach den bisherigen Überlegungen aber identisch damit, ursprünglich das in der Gesetzesvorstellung an sich selbst tätige Willenssubjekt dieses obersten moralischen Prinzips real zu sein,151 d. h. dieses oberste moralische Gesetz eines freien Willens durch sich selbst auch in seinem eigenen Bewusstsein seines freien Willens real zu haben. Da der hier interessierende Begriff vom „Factum der Vernunft“ von Immanuel Kant nun erstmals in der erläuternden Anmerkung zu § 7 eingeführt wird,152 wird dieser Begriff erst jetzt, und zwar nach hinreichender methodologischer Auseinandersetzung der §§ 1 – 7 selbst, einer verständigen Interpretation zugänglich.153 Dabei ist schon aufgrund seiner Positionierung in einer lediglich erläuternden Anmerkung zu konstatieren, dass er alleine ein Moment des bis hierher entwickelten Gedankens zu bezeichnen und über das schon Gesagte nicht hinaus zu gehen vermag. Da er überdies bloß fakultativ eingeführt wird („man kann … nennen“), wird ihm richtigerweise auch keine konstitutive Bedeutung zugesprochen werden können;154 andernfalls er die vorhergehenden §§ 1 – 7 selbst überflüssig machen würde.155 Die Rede156 von einer die kantische Moralphilosophie begründenden „Faktumslehre“ oder einem „-theorem“ verbietet sich somit bereits unter bloßer Berücksichtigung systematisch-methodologischer Implikationen des zu interpretierenden Werks. Alle jetzt diesbezüglich folgenden Überlegungen sind daher lediglich noch als – eben darum mitunter möglicherweise auch redundant erscheinende – Erläuterungen des bis hierher schon vorgetragenen Grundgedankens zu verstehen:

151 Indem Beck (Fn. 12), S. 158 ff. meinte, die §§ 1 – 6 enthielten lediglich analytische Gedankenspiele, musste er sich über den vermeintlich mit § 7 bei Kant plötzlich einsetzenden Tonfall absoluter Gewissheit verwundern. 152  Und zwar mit der als Überschrift des hiesigen Aufsatzes zur Auseinandersetzung gewählten Wendung (KpV, AA V: 31.24); weitere Stellen finden sich ebd.: 06.12 (Vorrede), 32.02, 42.04 – 19, 43.04 – 09, 47.11 – 15, 55.15 – 19, 91.24 – 29, 104.33. 153  In den einflussreichen Interpretationen Henrichs (oben Fn. 6) finden sich keinerlei diesbezügliche Überlegungen und so bleiben darin auch der methodologische Status nicht nur der Erklärung des § 1, sondern auch der objektiven Realität von Gesetz und Freiheit im Rahmen einer praktischen Selbstvergewisserung des Subjekts der genannten Erklärung im Dunkeln. 154  Zutreffend in diesem Punkt Luków (Fn. 12), S. 204 (210). 155  Über Letzteres verwundert sich auch Ameriks, „Kants Deduction …“ (Fn. 12), S. 53 (68). 156  Henrich, „Der Begriff der sittlichen Einsicht …“ (Fn. 6), S. 77 (94).

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a) Die spontane Selbstvorstellung des Grundgesetzes der reinen praktischen Vernunft Durch die Auflösung der beiden Denkaufgaben in den §§ 5/6 ergibt sich ein wechselseitiger Rückverweis von Freiheit und unbedingtem praktischen Gesetz:157 Ein schon an sich frei bestimmter Wille unter dem moralischen Gesetz setzt eben dieses moralische Gesetz seiner Bestimmung in seiner Bestimmung für sich selbst voraus und die Vorstellung(stätigkeit) dieses Gesetzes setzt ihrerseits wiederum die Freiheit des zu bestimmenden Willens positiv für sich selbst voraus bzw. ist diese Spontanität selbst. aa) D  er negative Begriff der Freiheit des Willens als bloße Unabhängigkeit von anderen Kausalursachen Dabei ist der gesetzlich zunächst noch unbestimmte freie Wille aber nicht auch schon durch seine insofern noch nur negativ – nämlich als Unabhängigkeit von ihm fremden Kausalursachen – verstandene Freiheit auch in einem positiven Verstande des Begriffs der Kausalität frei bestimmt vorstellbar; und ebenso ist das moralische Gesetz noch nicht mit diesem bloß unbestimmten freien Willen schon selbst vorgestellt. Das moralische Gesetz folgt also nicht alleine aus diesem hinsichtlich seiner kausalen Bestimmung noch unbestimmten Freiheitsbegriff und lässt sich daher auch schlechterdings nicht aus diesem deduzieren. Folglich ergibt sich die objektive Realität des Vernunftbegriffs der Freiheit des Willens, als einem den Willen positiv bestimmenden und sohin auch selbst in seiner Realität positiv bestimmten (Vernunft-)Begriff, insofern nicht alleine aus sich selbst.158 Diese positive Bestimmung (d. h. Kausalität) und objektive Realität des Freiheitsbegriffs für ein Willenssubjekt ergibt sich vielmehr erst aus der Vorstellung eines in sich durch das moralische Gesetz bestimmten Willens:159 bb) Der positive Begriff der Freiheit des Willens als Kausalität des Willens an und für sich selbst Soll der Begriff der Freiheit des Willens also ein freies Willenssubjekt durch das moralische Gesetz real bestimmen, so muss sich das Willenssubjekt ursprünglich dieses moralische Gesetz erst selbst real vorstellen, denn nur in dieser Vorstellungstätigkeit seines spontanen Denkvermögens in reinen Begriffen (hier: der Kausalität) liegt ein positiv bestimmter Begriff von seinem Willen als einer spontanen Kausalität an und für sich selbst. Folglich hebt das Bewusstsein der objektiven Realität der Freiheit erst durch diese ursprüngliche und daher spontane Selbstvorstellung des moralischen Gesetzes durch das freie Willenssubjekt selbst   KpV, AA V: 29.24 – 25.   KpV, AA V: 29.25 – 33. 159  Dieser Gedanke findet sich ebenfalls in GMS, AA IV: 446.13 – 21. 157 158

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an. Erst in dieser spontanen Selbstvorstellungstätigkeit liegt nämlich das positive (Tätigkeits-)Moment des Begriffs der Freiheit des Willens als Autonomie (d. h. als tätige Selbst-gesetz-gebung): „Also ist es das moralische Gesetz, dessen wir uns unmittelbar bewußt werden […], welches sich uns zuerst darbietet und, indem die Vernunft jenes als einen durch keine sinnliche Bedingungen zu überwiegenden, ja davon gänzlich unabhängigen Bestimmungsgrund darstellt, gerade auf den Begriff der Freiheit führt.“160 Nichts anderes als dieser Satz aus der Anmerkung zu § 6 KpV besagt auch die bereits mehrfach bemühte Redewendung vom moralischen Gesetz als „ratio cognoscendi“ (Idealgrund) der Freiheit des Willens und dieser selbst als „ratio essendi“ (Realgrund) des moralischen Gesetzes.161 Die reine Vernunft ist also durch die bloße Vorstellung(stätigkeit) des moralischen Gesetzes an und für sich selbst praktisch,162 denn „was kann denn wohl die Freiheit des Willens sonst sein als Autonomie, d. i. die Eigenschaft des Willens, sich selbst ein Gesetz zu sein?“163. cc) D  er scheinbare Zirkel im positiven Begriff der Freiheit des Willens nach der GMS (1785) Auffällig genug erscheint es nun an diesem Punkt, dass auch die GMS bereits eine solche „Reziprozität“ von Freiheit und moralischem Gesetz kennt.164 Dort soll das moralische Gesetz methodologisch allerdings nicht – wie in der KpV – zum Zwecke praktischer Selbstvergewisserung selbst gedacht werden, sondern es findet sich ein dieses Verhältnis schon erläuternder Hinweis auf das unter einem gewissen Umstand sich selbst frei Denken eines vernünftigen Willenssubjekts, dadurch   KpV, AA V: 29.33 – 30.03.   Siehe zu dieser von Crusius herkommenden und von Kant angeknüpften Identifikation begriffsgeschichtlich Majetschak, „Realgrund“, in: Ritter / Gründer (Hrsg.), HWPh VIII, Basel: Schwabe, 1992, Sp. 135 ff. – Eidam, „“Das einzige Faktum der reinen Vernunft““, in: Eidam, Kausalität aus Freiheit, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2007, S. 261 (278) erinnert an dieser gedanklichen Stelle zu § 6 KpV, dass Fichte seinen kritischen Idealismus in seiner „Wissenschaftslehre“ von 1794 durch die Identität von Ideal- und Realgrund „im Begriffe der Wirksamkeit“ definiert hat. 162  Siehe schon oben Fn. 137 („[…] der reine Verstand (der in solchem Falle Vernunft heißt) durch die bloße Vorstellung eines Gesetzes praktisch ist.“). D. h. die praktische Spontanität liegt ursprünglich im reinen Verstandesbegriff der Kausalität, der hier in der Vorstellung des moralischen Gesetzes als Freiheitsbegriff der praktischen Vernunft durch den Willen real vorgestellt wird. 163  So ja schon GMS, AA  IV: 446.24 – 447.02. – Man vergleiche dagegen aber einmal in der Sache die abweichenden Vorstellungen Henrichs vom Begriff der Autonomie (in: „Das Problem der Grundlegung der Ethik …“ [Fn. 6], S. 350 [356, 372 ff.]), die er folglich in die Interpretation der kantischen Freiheitslehre schon mithereinbringt und die „Kant nicht immer mit hinreichender Deutlichkeit ausgesprochen“ habe, sodass es ihm (Kant) letztlich auch „mißlingt“, diese Ansprüche (Henrichs) zu befriedigen. 164 Das bemerkt beispielsweise Allison, „Justification …“ (Fn. 12), S. 114 sowie ders., Kant’s theory (Fn. 12), S. 201 ff., der den in der Sekundärliteratur geläufigen Begriff der „Reciprocity Thesis“ geprägt hat. 160 161

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dann auch der scheinbare „Circel“ im Vorstellungsverhältnis von Idee der Freiheit und moralischem Gesetz (als dem Prinzip der Autonomie) gehoben werden kann, nachdem es zuvor einstweilen so aussehen musste, als könnte die objektive Realität und praktische Notwendigkeit des moralischen Gesetzes als Prinzip der Autonomie nicht für sich bewiesen werden:165 „Wir nehmen uns in der Ordnung der wirkenden Ursachen als frei an, um uns in der Ordnung der Zwecke unter sittlichen Gesetzen zu denken, und wir denken uns nachher als diesen Gesetzen unterworfen, weil wir uns die Freiheit des Willens beigelegt haben; denn Freiheit und eigene Gesetzgebung des Willens sind beides Autonomie, mithin Wechselbegriffe, davon aber einer eben um deswillen nicht dazu gebraucht werden kann, um den anderen zu erklären und von ihm Grund anzugeben, […].“166 Nimmt sich ein menschliches Wesen nämlich in der Reihe der wirkenden Ursachen als frei an, so denkt es sich selbst völlig spontan als bloßes Vernunftwesen und muss sich folglich auch als einen von dieser Naturordnung unabhängigen und mithin für sich selbsttätigen Urheber seiner Prinzipien ansehen. Also ist mit diesem Vernunftgedanken der Freiheit (d. h. der Idee der Freiheit) zugleich eine Selbstvorstellung(stätigkeit) seiner intelligiblen Prinzipien verbunden, sodass sich ein solches menschliches Wesen in seinem Denken der Ordnung der Zwecke (d. h. seines willensbestimmten Handelns) als unter selbstgegebenen sittlichen Gesetzen stehend vorstellt. In dieser Selbstvorstellung sittlicher Gesetze aber besteht objektiv real seine vernünftige Spontanität und mithin seine sittengesetzlich bestimmte Freiheit.167 Also ist das wirkliche Haben der Idee der Freiheit in der selbsttätigen Vorstellung moralischer Gesetze identisch mit der Tatsache, frei zu sein.168 Hierin169 besteht schließlich die in der GMS gegebene „Deduction des Begriffs der Freiheit aus der reinen praktischen Vernunft“170. Was also nach analytischer Methode der GMS unter Voraussetzung der Freiheit zunächst noch als Zirkel im Gedanken erscheint, nämlich die Realität des moralischen Gesetzes als dem obersten Prinzip der Moralität, ist im Lichte der synthetischen Methode der KpV in der ursprünglichen und synthetischen Einheit dieses Gedankens bereits aufgehoben, weil die analytische Entgegensetzung und damit Entzweiung von Freiheit und Gesetz in der Einheit der spontanen Selbstvorstellung des moralischen Gesetzes durch den freien Willen ursprünglich aufgehoben ist: Freiheit und Gesetz sind in der Tat nämlich ursprünglich eins und ebendasselbe.171   GMS, AA IV: 449.24 – 27.   GMS, AA IV: 450.18 – 29. 167  GMS, AA IV: 448.25 – 453.15 (besonders 452.23 – 453.02) i.V.m. 448.09 – 22. – In diesem Gedanken will Henrich, „Die Deduktion des Sittengesetzes …“ (Fn. 6), S. 55 (64 ff., 68 f., 70 ff., 84 ff., 105 f.) übrigens die Reste einer „Grundlegung“ der Freiheit des Willens aus der theoretischen Vernunft kraft eines Parallelschlussarguments erblicken, das von dem Gedanken anhebt: „Die Annahme der Urteilsfreiheit ist unvermeidbar, weil es ohne sie kein Denken gibt“ (70). 168  GMS, AA IV: 448.04 – 09. 169  GMS, AA IV: 448.04 – 22 mit 448.23 – 453.15; 457.04 – 24. 170  GMS, AA IV: 447.20 – 25. 165 166

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b) Das spontan gewirkte Bewusstsein des Grundgesetzes als „Creditiv“ des Freiheitsbewusstseins Nach dieser Anmerkung zu § 6 rechtfertigt erst das reale und somit schon wirkliche Bewusstsein des moralischen Gesetzes den bestimmenden Gebrauch des Gedankens der objektiven Realität des reinen Vernunftbegriffs der Freiheit des Willens. In diesem praktischen Rechtfertigungssinne mit Blick auf einen reinen Vernunftbegriff spricht Kant dann später auch in der zweiten Kritik von einer De­ duktion der Freiheit nach dem „Creditiv des moralischen Gesetzes“172: „Etwas anderes […] tritt an die Stelle dieser vergeblich gesuchten Deduction des moralischen Princips,173 nämlich daß es umgekehrt selbst zum Princip der Deduction eines unerforschlichen Vermögens dient, […] nämlich das der Freiheit, von der das moralische Gesetz, welches selbst keiner rechtfertigenden Gründe bedarf, nicht blos die Möglichkeit, sondern die Wirklichkeit an Wesen beweiset, die dies Gesetz als für sie verbindend erkennen.174 Das moralische Gesetz ist in der That ein Gesetz der Causalität durch Freiheit […].“ (KpV, AA V: 47.21 – 37).175

Denn indem das moralische Gesetz durch die spontane (d. h. freie) Selbstvorstellungstätigkeit des freien Willens ursächlich in seinem moralischen Bewusstsein gewirkt wird, ist es in dieser Tätigkeit, d. h. „in der That ein Gesetz der Causalität durch Freiheit“. Reine Vernunft ist damit an und für sich selbst praktisch (d. h. tätig) und „so beweiset sie ihre und ihrer Begriffe Realität durch die That, und alles Vernünfteln wider die Möglichkeit, es zu sein, ist vergeblich“.176 Folglich ist die „Freiheit als Eigenschaft des Willens aller vernünftigen Wesen […] als zur Thätigkeit vernünftiger und mit einem Willen begabter Wesen überhaupt gehörig“177 bewiesen, wie es auch bereits die GMS forderte und einlöste178.

171  Das übersieht Bojanowski (Fn. 91), S. 55 ff., wenn er meint, mit dem „Faktum“ als „Tat“ (“deed”) der Vernunft sei in der KpV eine radikale Abkehr („radical incompatibilism“) vom vorherigen Gedanken der GMS verbunden. 172  KpV, AA V: 48.01 – 05. Das „Creditiv des moralischen Gesetzes“ (oben Fn. 77) ist hier nicht im Anschluss an zahlreiche Interpreten (u. a. Beck [Fn. 12], S. 166 f.) widersinnig als genitivus objectivus zu verstehen (Bojanowski [Fn. 12], S. 77 ff. m. w. N.). 173  Diese „vergeblich gesuchte[] Deduction des moralischen Princips“ dürfte sich werkimmanent auf die schon zuvor behandelte Überlegung der Anmerkung zu § 6 beziehen, nämlich „wovon unsere Erkenntniß des unbedingt Praktischen anhebe, ob von der Freiheit, oder dem praktischen Gesetze“, da aus dem bloßen Freiheitsbegriff keine Deduktion des moralischen Gesetzes folgt. 174  Wie gezeigt, „erkennt sich“ das Subjekt der willkürlichen Erklärung des § 1 durch seine Beantwortung der beiden Aufgaben in den §§ 5/6, d. h. durch seine willentliche Selbstvorstellung des moralischen Gesetzes als durch dieses „verbunden“. 175  Sachgleich auch nochmals 93.30 – 94.07. 176  KpV, AA V: 03.10 – 13. 177  GMS, AA IV: 447.30 – 448.04. 178  Oben Fn. 169, 170.

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c) Gesetzesbewusstsein als „Factum“ der Vernunft und Freiheit als „Thatsache“ des Willens Nach dieser Überlegung ist „reine, an sich praktische Vernunft […] hier unmittelbar gesetzgebend“179, und so kann das schon wirkliche Bewusstsein des obersten moralischen Gesetzes der reinen praktischen Vernunft ein „Factum der Vernunft“ heißen, weil es durch die von der reinen an der praktischen Vernunft spontan geübten Vorstellungstätigkeit des moralischen Gesetzes ursprünglich gewirkt vorgestellt werden muss; oder in den Worten Immanuel Kants zu sprechen: „weil man es nicht aus vorhergehenden Datis der Vernunft, z. B. dem Bewußtsein der Freiheit (denn dieses ist uns nicht vorher gegeben), herausvernünfteln kann, sondern weil es sich für sich selbst uns aufdringt als synthetischer Satz a priori“180. Das „Factum der Vernunft“ trägt diese zurechnungstheoretische Bezeichnung also naheliegender Weise, weil es auf einer ursprünglich intelligiblen „That (factum)“ der reinen und dadurch an sich selbst tätigen Vernunft beruht.181 Mithin bezeichnet es nichts anderes als die in dieser spontanen (d. h. freien) Selbstvorstellungstätigkeit zurechenbar gelegene Selbst-gesetz-gebung (d. h. tätige Autonomie) des dadurch im gleichen Ursprung freien Willens.182 Insofern das oberste moralische Gesetz dabei dem moralischen Bewusstsein des freien Willens durch seine eigene Vorstellungstätigkeit ursprünglich gegeben ist, ist das moralische Gesetz ein erstes der Vernunft gegebenes „Datum“,183 das aber mit dem Bewusstsein des Gesetzes und also mit dem „Factum“ der Vernunft insofern nicht einfach identisch ist.184 Das „Factum der Vernunft“ ist selbst nämlich kein (und sei es auch a priori gegebenes)   KpV, AA V: 31.09 – 10.   KpV, AA V: 31.24 – 31; siehe ferner die sachgleiche Verwendung des Factumsbegriffs in MSRL, AA VI: 252.26 – 30. 181  Klein (Fn. 12), S. 219 ff. hält eine solche Deutung des Factumsbegriffs als Tat dagegen für eine „Sackgasse“. Ähnlich dürfte auch Stangneth (Fn. 12), S. 104 (109 f.) zu verstehen sein, wenn sie notiert: „[…] denn wenn Vernunft überhaupt nur als Gesetz faktisch ist, muss jeder Versuch scheitern, das Gesetz seinerseits als Produkt oder Tat der Vernunft zu erweisen“. – Doch was sollte Selbstgesetzgebung (Autonomie) eines freien Willens noch anderes sein, wenn schon das Gesetz in (s)einer Vorstellungstätigkeit für den freien Willen nicht selbst gegeben werden könnte? 182  Selbstgesetzgebung ist als (freie) Tätigkeit mit der spontanen Selbstvorstellung des Gesetzes identisch. Nach Hiltscher (Fn. 12), S. 163 (164 ff.) hat Kant dagegen „mit dem Faktum der Vernunft zwar die Autonomie des Willens, nicht aber dessen Freiheit dargetan“. 183  Das Wort „Datum“ leitet sich ursprünglich vom lat. „dare (datum) ‚geben, ausfertigen‘“ ab (Kluge / Seebold [Fn. 26], S. 182). – In KpV, AA V: 91.29 – 33 spricht Kant in diesem Sinne von praktischen Grundsätzen (nämlich vom Grundgesetz sowie vom Sittengesetz), die als „erste Data“ aller moralischen Wissenschaft schon zugrunde gelegt werden müssen. 184  „Doch muß man, um dieses Gesetz ohne Mißdeutung als gegeben anzusehen, wohl bemerken: daß es [sc. das Bewußtsein des Grundgesetzes] kein empirisches, sondern das einzige Factum der reinen Vernunft sei, die sich dadurch als ursprünglich gesetzgebend (sic volo, sic jubeo) ankündigt.“ (KpV, AA V: 31.31 – 34). – In der Sache wie hier auch Willaschek (Fn. 12), S. 182; genau anders beispielsweise Eidam (Fn. 161), S. 261 (276, 281) oder auch Schönecker, „Das gefühlte Faktum …“ (Fn. 12), S. 91 (97). 179 180

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„Datum der Vernunft“,185 denn das Hauptmoment der Vorstellung des Gesetzesbewusstseins – als ein intelligibles „Factum der Vernunft“ – liegt in der ursprünglich an sich selbst vorstellend tätigen Verursachung dieses Bewusstseins durch die Vernunft (factum), während dasjenige der Vorstellung des moralischen Gesetzes als „Datum der Vernunft“ in der für sich tatsächlich bestehenden Wirklichkeit dieses Gesetzes liegt. aa) K  ritik der reduktionistischen Tendenzen der modernen Kantforschung Hält man dagegen mit Henrich186 die unter dem obersten praktischen Grundsatz des freien Willens bloß subordinierte Handlungsregel des kategorischen Imperativs, die lediglich für menschliche Willenssubjekte nötigende Verbindlichkeit besitzt, irrigerweise schon für das moralische Gesetz an sich selbst, und dieses zudem für ein „Factum der Vernunft“ in der Bedeutung des modern gewordenen Faktumsbegriffs, so hat es zwangsläufig den Anschein, als bezeichne Kant mit dem „Factum“ eine der Vernunft irgendwie unausweichlich von irgendwoher gegebene Wirklichkeit moralischer Verbindlichkeit, eben eine rational unausdenkliche und somit „unverständliche Faktizität“.187

185  So aber Baum „Sittengesetz und Freiheit – Kant 1785 und 1788“, in: Puls (Hrsg.), Kants Rechtfertigung des Sittengesetzes in Grundlegung III, Berlin / München / Boston: De Gruyter, 2014, S. 209 (211); Kain (Fn. 12), S. 211 (220 ff.). 186  Oben Fn. 6. 187  Diese verkürzende Gleichsetzung findet sich allgegenwärtig in der modernen Kantforschung. Siehe dementsprechend nur die sehr unterschiedlichen Bezugspunkte des Factumsbegriffs beispielsweise bei Brandt (Fn. 12): „der Imperativ ist ein selbsterzeugtes Faktum des Bewusstseins“ (S. 352), „das Faktum des Bewusstseins“ (S. 352), „[e]s wird an ein unbedingtes intelligibles Faktum des sog. Bewusstseins appelliert, […]“ (S. 354), „das Faktum des Sittengesetzes“ (S. 355), „Faktum des kategorischen Imperativs“ (S. 356), „das uns als Faktum gegebene bzw. selbstgemachte Vernunftgesetz“ (S. 364), „Man kann das Selbstbewusstsein dieses Grundgesetzes ein Factum […] nennen“ (S. 364), „das Bewusstseinsfaktum des Sittengesetzes“ (S. 364 f.), „das Faktum des sittlichen Bewusstseins“ (S. 365), „das unleugbare Faktum des Selbstbewusstseins des Sittengesetzes“ (S. 366), „das Faktum des sittlichen Selbstbewusstseins“ (S. 367), „der kategorische Imperativ [ist] ein fragloses Faktum des Bewusstseins“ (S. 384), „Faktums des moralischen Bewusstseins“ (S. 385). Allerdings findet sich die entsprechende Verkürzung beispielsweise auch bereits bei Cohen, „Kants Begründung der Ethik“ (Fn. 53), S. 255, sodass gegenwärtig kaum begründete Hoffnung bestehen dürfte, dass man sie zugunsten einer Beförderung des Verständnisses der kantischen Freiheitslehre in naher Zukunft einmal überwinden wird. So hat mit Schönecker (Fn. 12), S. 91 (93 Fn. 8) auch bereits ein Wortführer in der Debatte um die Deutungshoheit der kantischen Moralphilosophie erklärt, weiterhin von der Gleichsetzung von „Grundgesetz“ und „KI“ ausgehen zu wollen. – Übrigens lassen sich gegen die hiesige Interpretation und damit für eine Gleichsetzung von Grundgesetz und Factum auch nicht diejenigen Textstellen einwenden, darin Kant mit Blick auf das oberste moralische Gesetz schreibt, dieses sei „gleichsam als“ (KpV, AA V: 47.11 – 15 bzw. 91.24 – 29) bzw. „gleichsam durch ein Factum“ (ebd.: 55.15 – 19) gegeben, denn mit dem Wort „gleichsam“ wird hier nicht eine subjektive Verlegenheit in der Berufung auf eine moralgesetzliche

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Auf diese begrifflich-reduktionistische Weise verkehrt sich jedoch der Gedanke der Autonomie eines freien Willens als tätige Selbst-gesetz-gebung zwangsläufig in sein Gegenteil (d. h. in Heteronomie), sodass die mit dem zurechnungstheoretischen Factumsbegriff ursprünglich unmissverständlich bezeichnete Autonomie eines freien Willens in der Selbstvorstellungstätigkeit des moralischen Gesetzes durch die reine und dadurch an und für sich selbst praktische Vernunft für den modernen Leser schlechterdings völlig unbegreiflich wird. Mit dieser gleichsam dialektischen Verkehrung, die nicht nur die ursprüngliche Wortbedeutung des Factumsbegriffs, sondern auch die begrifflichen Bezüge des Textes nicht ausreichend beachtet, plausibilisiert sich für das moderne Publikum schließlich unschwer auch das letztlich vernichtende Verdikt Henrichs, der immerhin meinte, eine „Theorie von der unverständlichen Faktizität des vernünftigen ‚Sittengesetzes‘“188 bei Kant vorgefunden zu haben. Ebenso gilt dies für die breite Gefolgschaft, die Henrich mit seinem Begriffsund Verständnishorizont auf sich vereinigt hat. So meint z. B. Reinhard Brandt, es werde hier „eine Bewusstseinsrealität an den Anfang gestellt, die sich aus keiner Verstandesüberlegung gewinnen lässt und insofern irrational ist“189. Man tut der solchermaßen nicht gerade eben sehr vorsichtig gegen ihren Autor urteilenden Kantrezeption dann aber wohl kein Unrecht, wenn man sie an diesem Punkt deutlich darauf hinweist, dass es eine „Faktumslehre“ mit den angezeigten begrifflichen Unterscheidungen in der Moralphilosophie Kants schlechterdings gar nicht gibt. Das Interpretenartefakt einer „Faktizität der Vernunft“ beruht nämlich bei Lichte besehen lediglich auf der Überinterpretation einer bloß erläuternden Anmerkung, die ihrerseits wiederum in einer empfindlichen Unterbestimmung der darin verwendeten Terminologie besteht, sodass der Hauptmangel einer solchen Herangehensweise schon darin zu sehen sein dürfte, den Text überhaupt mit bestem Gewissen gegen seine methodologische Anlage verstehen zu wollen. In der aufwendig vorgetragenen methodologischen und gedanklichen Ausdifferenzierung zeigt sich also, wie wichtig eine genaue Beachtung der begrifflichen Bezüge innerhalb einer methodologisch-systematischen Interpretation des kantischen Werks für ein angemessenes Begreifen desselben ist, soll das Resultat schließlich nicht in einer gedanklichen Entgleisung bestehen.190 Man kann die Wendung vom „Factum der Vernunft“ aus eben diesem Grund daher auch nicht ohne weiteres mit einer „Tatsache der Vernunft“ identisch setzen.191 Zwar ist das als „Factum“ „Faktizität“ zum Ausdruck gebracht, sondern auf das Tätigkeitsmoment rekurriert, dadurch das Gesetz im Bewusstsein als ein Factum gegeben ist. 188  Oben Fn. 11. 189  Brandt (Fn. 12), S. 368, der ferner meint, Kant rede damit einem „irrationale[n] Machtwort der Pflicht“ das Wort. – Siehe aber für das (rationale) Verhältnis von reinem Verstand (reiner Vernunft) und reinem Willen oben den Textnachweis in Fn. 162/137. 190 Gegen Beck (Fn. 12), S. 160 ist also zu konstatieren, dass sich Kant mit dem „Factum der Vernunft“ sehr wohl hat entschließen können, „wie er es am besten formulieren sollte“. 191  Siehe zu dieser Tendenz auch schon besonders oben Fn. 92, 93.

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bezeichnete Bewusstsein des obersten moralischen Gesetzes eine getätigte Wirkung und mithin für sich auch ein Gewirktes der ursprünglichen Vorstellungstätigkeit der reinen praktischen Vernunft. Alleine die Bezeichnung dieser Wirkung als „Factum“ stellt das dieses wirkliche Bewusstsein an und für sich selbst maßgeblich begründende Moment der intelligiblen „That (factum)“ der Vernunft und damit seine reale Vernunftqualität selbst angemessen vor. Schon deshalb unterfällt das „Factum der Vernunft“ nicht dem modernen – lediglich auf das Wirklichkeitsmoment abstellenden – Tatsachenbegriff, der dieses etymologisch ursprüngliche Moment der Tat in seinem Bedeutungshorizont längst vergessen hat. Aber auch unter den kritischen Tatsachenbegriff Kants lässt sich das „Factum der Vernunft“ nicht eigentlich fassen, denn dieser begreift – wie gesehen – von den Tatsachen (scibile) des Bewusstseins lediglich die Tatsachen für das Bewusstsein (genitivus objectivus) und nicht auch die Tatsache des Bewusstseins (genitivus subjectivus) an und für sich selbst unter sich.192 In diesem Sinne ist dann nach Kant die aus dem ursprünglichen Bewusstsein des moralischen Gesetzes gefolgerte Freiheit des Willens in ihrer objektiven Realität eine Tatsache für das Bewusstsein des Willens, nicht aber das unmittelbare Bewusstsein dieses moralischen Gesetzes selbst.193 Dieses unmittelbare Bewusstsein des moralischen Gesetzes ist nämlich als die Tatsache des Bewusstseins überhaupt (genitivus subjectivus) an und für sich selbst der Grund aller Tatsachen (scibile) für das Bewusstsein (genitivus objectivus): Das „Factum der Vernunft“ begründet subjektiv ursprünglich die objektive „Thatsache“ der Freiheit des Willens für denselben. bb) Kritik der reduktionistischen Tendenzen der zeitgenössischen Kantrezeption Wenn dagegen C. L. Reinhold in der kantianischen Phase seines zeitlebens sehr bewegten Denkens nicht nur die Freiheit, sondern auch die „Handlung“ des „Selbst­ bewußtsein[s]“ selbst, daraus auf die objektive Realität der Freiheit geschlossen werden muss, d. h. das „Factum der Vernunft“, als „Thatsache des Bewußtseyns“ 192  Die hier vom Verf. zum Zwecke der Erläuterung gemachte Unterscheidung zwischen „Tatsachen für das Bewusstsein“ (genitivus objectivus) und der sich selbst konstituierenden „Tatsache der Vernunft“ (genitivus subjectivus) ist keinesfalls zu verwechseln mit der von Beck (Fn. 12), S. 161 f. sowie dems., „Das Faktum der Vernunft“, in: Kant-Studien 52 (1961), S. 271 (279 ff.) getroffenen Unterscheidung von „Faktum für die Vernunft“ und „Faktum der reinen Vernunft“. Denn in beiden Fällen handelt es sich eigentlich um „Tatsachen für die Vernunft“ (genitivus objectivus), da Beck den Factumsbegriff mit dem (positivistisch verkürzten) Tatsachenbegriff (in der modernen Wortbedeutung) identifiziert und daher unter der ersten Wendung eine von der Vernunft direkt als Gegenstand erkannte Tatsache versteht, während er unter der zweiten Wendung die von der reinen Vernunft erkannte Tatsache, dass es sie selbst gibt (und mithin eigentlich wohl eine Art intellektuelle Selbstanschauung), verstehen will. Dass letzteres aber von Kant nicht gemeint sein kann, arbeitet Allison, Kant’s theory (Fn. 12), S. 233 heraus. 193 So meinen beispielsweise Willaschek (Fn. 12), S. 180 f. sowie Steigleder (Fn. 12), S. 102 ff., das Factum der Vernunft in seinem Tätigkeitsmoment unter den (kantischen) Begriff der Tatsachen für das Bewusstsein fassen zu können.

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(genitivus objectivus) anspricht,194 so verkennt er mit dieser Verobjektivierung die mit der kantischen Begrifflichkeit vom „Factum der Vernunft“ eigentlich bezeichnete Selbsttätigkeit in ihrem reinen und absoluten Moment an und für sich selbst. Und in der Tat bleibt die Freiheit für Reinhold mit seinem unkantischen Willensbegriff in einem unaufhebbaren Gegensatz zur autonomen Gesetzgebungsselbsttätigkeit der reinen praktischen Vernunft befangen, da er sich unter einer moralischen (sittlichen oder unsittlichen) Handlung überhaupt die Handlung der absoluten Freiheit denkt, die von aller Selbsttätigkeit der Vernunft in ihrer Gesetzesvorstellung wesentlich verschieden sein soll.195 Mit seiner insgesamt verkürzenden Grundannahme, das Dasein des Sittengesetzes sei mit dem „Factum der Vernunft“ eine Tatsache des Bewusstseins (genitivus objectivus), steht Reinhold allerdings schon zu seiner Zeit nicht alleine da. So findet sich diese wohl durch die kantische Begrifflichkeit provozierte Grundannahme in der Sache etwa auch in den Skeptische[n] Betrachtungen L. Creuzers.196 Interessanterweise teilt nun auch J. G. Fichte diese unkantische Gleichsetzung vom „Factum der Vernunft“ mit einer Tatsache des Bewusstseins (genitivus objectivus) in seiner Rezension der Betrachtungen Creuzers im Jahre 1793. Denn der seit seiner Lektüre von Kants KpV in einer „neuen Welt“ lebende und von seinem einstmaligen Determinismus erst kürzlich abgerückte Rezensent197 unterscheidet dort „zwischen dem Bestimmen, als freyer Handlung des intelligiblen Ich; und dem Bestimmtseyn, als erscheinendem Zustande des empirischen Ich“, wobei die „Aeußerung der absoluten Selbstthätigkeit des menschlichen Geistes […] in einer Thatsache: in dem Bestimmtseyn des obern Begehrungsvermögens“, d. h. in der selbsttätig gegebenen „Form […] als Sittengesetz erscheint“.198 Nun stört sich Fichte allerdings überhaupt nicht an der (begrifflich und sachlich unkantischen) Rede Reinholds von einer „Thatsache des Bewußtseyns“ (genitivus objectivus) mit

194  Reinhold, Briefe über die Kantische Philosophie II, Leipzig: Göschen, 1792, S. 262 (283 f.); noch deutlicher ders., Beyträge zur Berichtigung bisheriger Missverständnisse der Philosophen II, Jena: Mauke, 1794, S. 232. 195  Reinhold, Beyträge II (Fn. 194), S. 230 f. sowie ders., Briefe II (Fn. 194), S. 262 ff. – Siehe zu den gedanklichen Differenzen zwischen Reinhold und Kant, die auch Reinhold nicht verborgen geblieben waren, Fabbianelli, „Die Theorie der Willensfreiheit in den ‚Briefen über die Kantische Philosophie‘ (1790 – 92) von Karl Leonhard Reinhold“, in: Philosophisches Jahrbuch 107 (2000), S. 428 (429 ff. m. w. N.). – Zu den tatsächlichen Umständen und Hintergründen von Reinholds Kantstudium informiert sehr erhellend Onnasch, „Einleitung“, in: ders. (Hrsg.), Karl Leonhard Reinhold – Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögens, Teilband 1, Hamburg: Meiner, 2010, S. LVIII ff. 196  Creuzer, Skeptische Betrachtungen über die Freyheit des Willens, Gießen: Heyer, 1793, S. 5 f., 131. 197  Fichte in einem Brief (Nr. 63) an F. A. Weisshuhn vom Aug./Sept. 1790, in: Lauth / Jacob (Hrsg.), J. G. Fichte – Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften ­(= ­GABAdW), Band III/1, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann, 1968, S. 167. 198  Fichte, „Rezension Creuzer“, in: Lauth / Jacob (Hrsg.), GABAdW  I/2, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann, 1965, S. 9 bzw. 7 – 9.

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Blick auf das Dasein des „Sittengesetzes“,199 sondern lediglich im Hinblick auf die Freiheit. Denn die „absolute Selbstthätigkeit“ als freie Tätigkeit „im Bestimmen des Willens“ an sich selbst „erscheint nicht, und kann nicht erscheinen“; vielmehr sei sie als ein „Postulat“ des „Sittengesetzes“ anzunehmen und „demnach nicht Gegenstand des Wissens, sondern des Glaubens“ (!).200 Spreche man nun mit Blick auf die Freiheit von einer Tatsache des Bewusstseins, so ziehe „man ein Intelligibles in die Reihe der Naturursachen herab; und verleitet dadurch, es auch in die Reihe der Naturwirkungen zu versetzen; ein Intelligibles anzunehmen, das kein Intelligibles sey“201. Für Fichte bezeichnet der von ihm schon ganz im modernen (und damit nicht im kantischen Sinne) gebrauchte Begriff der Tatsache demnach stets nur einen empirischen Gegenstand für das Bewusstsein, wobei es ihm nicht verborgen geblieben ist, dass er den anderslautenden Worten Immanuel Kants, der auch die Freiheit des Willens ausdrücklich als wirkliche Tatsache des Bewusstseins in einem kritisch-aufgeklärten Sinne dieses Begriffs anspricht, mit dieser Verengung begrifflich nicht Rechnung zu tragen vermochte; was Fichte in seinem euphorischen Frühkantianismus freilich nicht hinderte, seine eigene begriffliche Sicht der Dinge als „Kants wahre Meynung“202 zu apostrophieren. Wenngleich dabei auch Fichte ganz im Geiste Kants richtigerweise die reine Selbsttätigkeit (an und für sich selbst) von ihren tatsächlichen Wirkungen in den Erscheinungen bestimmter Bewusstseinszustände unterscheidet,203 so hat sich ihm im vierten Jahr seines Kantstudiums (1793) zwar insofern der kantische Gedanke, nachweislich jedoch noch nicht auch die kantische Begrifflichkeit vom Bewusstsein des Grundgesetzes der reinen praktischen Vernunft als „Factum der Vernunft“ erschlossen; von der Freiheit des Willens als einer wissbaren „Tatsache“ des Bewusstseins dagegen auch in der Sache ganz zu schweigen.204 Dass dieser Umstand insgesamt aber für die stürmi199  Vgl. auch Fichtes „Theorie des Willens“ selbst, und zwar in der zweiten Auflage seiner Offenbarungskritik (1793), in: Lauth / Jacob (Hrsg.), GABAdW  I/1, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann, 1964, besonders S. 140 (Zeilen 29 – 35). 200  Fichte (Fn. 198), S. 9 f. (konfundiert hier das schon als „Sittengesetz“ verstandene „Grundgesetz der reinen praktischen Vernunft“, welches ein praktisches Postulat der praktischen Vernunft ist, mit den theoretischen Postulaten der praktischen Vernunft, darunter auch die Freiheit gehört (KpV, AA V: 132.19 – 21), aber eben nicht als bloße Glaubenssache und notwendige Hypothese eines freien Willens, sondern gleichsam als wirkliche Tatsache eines sich selbst bewussten freien Willens). 201  Ebd., S. 10. 202  Ebd., S. 11. 203  Siehe auch nochmals Fichte (Fn. 199), S. 147.08 – 14: „Die Vernunft giebt sich selbst, unabhängig von irgend etwas außer ihr, durch absolut eigene Spontaneität, ein Gesetz; das ist der einzig richtige Begriff der transscendentalen Freiheit: […].“ 204 Dass es sich auf diese Weise verhält, zeigt auch Fichtes „Rezension Gebhard“, in: Lauth / Jacob (Hrsg.), GABAdW I/2, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann, 1965, S. 26 – 28, darin er sich überzeugt gibt, es müsse erst „bewiesen werden, daß die Vernunft praktisch sey“, und dies könne nicht einfach „für eine Thatsache“ ausgegeben, noch zur Folge einer solchen postuliert werden. – Dagegen hatte Kant allerdings in der Vorrede zur KpV (AA V: 03.10 – 13)

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sche Denkentwicklung des nachkantischen Idealismus und das Selbstverständnis Fichtes als Autor einer Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre (1794), die in ihrem Bestreben, über Kant hinauszuwachsen, eine intelligible „Thathandlung“ von einer empirischen „Thatsache“ des Bewusstseins unterscheiden wird, nicht folgenlos bleiben konnte, bedarf hier keiner Erörterung. d) Das Selbstbewusstsein des freien Willens in der spontanen Selbstvorstellungstätigkeit des Grundgesetzes Hatte Kant die Frage nach dem einheitlichen (d. h. identischen) Verhältnis von Freiheit und Gesetz in der Vorstellungstätigkeit der reinen praktischen Vernunft, d. h. die selbstbewusstseinstheoretisch interessante Frage, „ob sie auch in der That verschieden seien, und nicht vielmehr ein unbedingtes Gesetz blos das Selbstbewußtsein einer reinen praktischen Vernunft, diese aber ganz einerlei mit dem positiven Begriffe der Freiheit sei“205, zugunsten der Frage nach dem unmittelbaren Bewusstseinsgrund beider Momente in der Anmerkung zu § 6 einstweilen noch zurückgestellt, so lässt sie sich nun – nach hinreichender Beantwortung dieser primären Frage – unschwer beantworten. Denn durch die unmittelbare Selbstvor­ stellung des moralischen Gesetzes der reinen praktischen Vernunft als dem freien Willen hat diese bzw. dieser „in der That“ ein tatsächliches Bewusstsein ihrer bzw. seiner Freiheit. Das moralische Gesetz ist mit dieser Selbstvorstellung nämlich nicht nur Bewusstseinsgrund eines in seiner objektiven Realität positiven Begriffs von Freiheit des Willens, sondern – im Bewusstsein seines tätigen Ursprungs – zugleich auch realer Bewusstseinsgrund der Realität der reinen praktischen Vernunft selbst. Diese reine und an sich selbst vermittelst ihrer Vorstellungsspontanität praktische Vernunft aber ist begrifflich identisch mit einem freien Willen im positiv bestimmten Verstande des Freiheitsbegriffs,206 d. h. mit einem übersinnlichen und praktischen Gebrauch der Kategorie der Kausalität im Selbstverhältnis reiner praktischer Vernunft. Dies bedeutet: Das oberste moralische Gesetz ist mit dieser ursprünglichen Selbstvorstellung (d. h. Selbstrepräsentation) des freien Willens das reine prak­ tische Selbstbewusstsein dieses freien Willens. Im „Grundgesetz der reinen prak­ tischen Vernunft“ erkennt der freie Wille in seiner ursprünglichen Selbsttätigkeit also sich selbst, und zwar als spontan tätig.207 Er hat darin folglich eine reine prakti­ bereits wohl etwas völlig anderes erklärt: „[…] wenn […] reine Vernunft wirklich praktisch ist, so beweiset sie ihre und ihrer Begriffe Realität durch die That, und alles Vernünfteln wider die Möglichkeit, es zu sein, ist vergeblich.“ 205  KpV, AA V: 29.25 – 29. 206  Ausdrücklich bekundet Kant diese Identität („einerlei“) selbst in KpV, AA V: 55.15 – 19. 207  Darauf scheint auch Hägerström, Kants Ethik im Verhältnis zu seinen erkenntnistheoretischen Grundlagen systematisch dargestellt, Upsala: Almqvist & Wiksells, 1902, S. 231, 276 f. (m. w. N. zu den nachgelassenen Reflexionen Kants) zu insistieren.

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sche Selbsterkenntnis,208 und zwar, weil in diesem Grundgesetz alleine der Begriff der Freiheit des Willens praktisch ist, sodass sich der freie Wille im Grundgesetz vermittelst dieses Begriffs der Freiheit – der nichts anderes als der allgemeine Wille in der den freien Willen bestimmenden Form des praktischen Gesetzes ist – in seiner eigenen Bestimmung praktisch selbst tätig begreift. Eben diesen leicht zu folgernden und wichtigen Umstand hebt der methodologische Rückblick „Von der Deduction der Grundsätze der reinen praktischen Vernunft“209 gleich anfangs nochmals ausdrücklich hervor, wenn es heißt: „Diese Analytik thut dar, daß reine Vernunft praktisch sein, d. i. für sich, […], den Willen bestimmen könne und dieses zwar durch ein Factum, worin sich reine Vernunft bei uns in der That praktisch beweiset, nämlich die Autonomie in dem Grundsatze der Sittlichkeit, wodurch sie den Willen zur That bestimmt. – Sie zeigt zugleich, daß dieses Factum mit dem Bewußtsein der Freiheit des Willens unzertrennlich verbunden, ja mit ihm einerlei sei, wodurch der Wille eines vernünftigen Wesens, […] sich […] im Praktischen […] als Wesen an sich selbst, seines in einer intelligibelen Ordnung der Dinge bestimmbaren Daseins bewußt ist, […].“ (KpV, AA V: 42.04 – 19 – Hervorhebungen M. H.).

Nach dieser kantischen Theorie vom reinen praktischen Selbstbewusstsein irrt sich Henrich möglicherweise wohl auch in der Sache selbst, wenn er meint, infolge seiner begrifflichen Differenzierungen könne Kant eine „positive Beziehung des Selbst auf sein sittliches Wesen nur noch behaupte[n]“210 und so müsse eben auf der Basis der von Kant erarbeiteten Grundlagen der Versuch gemacht werden, „das sittliche Bewusstsein in seinem ganzen Umfang theoretisch zu rekonstruie­ ren“211. 208  Siehe auch schon GMS, AA IV: 458.19 – 25, 461.03 – 04. – Dagegen war dem bloß denkenden Subjekt eine theoretische (d. h. gegenständliche) Selbsterkenntnis in seinem reinen theoretischen Selbstbewusstsein bekanntlich fremd und der Versuch einer solchen führte dasselbe daher zwangsläufig in Paralogismen. Es erscheint somit wenig plausibel, Kant noch zwischen den Jahren 1781 und 1785 den Versuch der „Deduktion“ auch nur eines einzigen „praktischen“ Prinzips aus der „theoretischen“ Vernunft zu unterstellen. Der Autor der KrV und der GMS hätte sich in einem solchen Fall schlechterdings selbst nicht verstanden und genau das ist die (oben Fn. 9) von Henrich sowie (unten Fn. 265) von anderen Autoren vertretene These. 209  Es ist hier wohl zu bemerken, dass dieser Abschnitt „Von der Deduction der Grundsätze der reinen praktischen Vernunft“ (KpV, AA: 42.02 – 03) nicht „Die Deduction der Grundsätze der reinen praktischen Vernunft“ oder gar „Die Deduction des obersten Grundsatzes der reinen praktischen Vernunft“ ankündigt und eben darum solche Deduktionen auch nicht in sich schließt. 210  Henrich, „Das Problem der Grundlegung der Ethik …“ (Fn. 6), S. 350 (385). Dem entspricht es, dass nach Henrichs Kantverständnis (in: „Der Begriff der sittlichen Einsicht …“ [Fn. 6], S. 77 [110]) das Selbstbewusstsein in einem unaufhebbaren Gegensatz zur Sittlichkeit befangen bleiben soll: „Wenn es unmöglich ist, aus der ersten Gewißheit alles Denken, aus dem Selbstbewußtsein, die sittliche Forderung zu verstehen, so muß sie als reine Faktizität hingenommen werden.“ (siehe ferner auch dens., „Die Deduktion des Sittengesetzes …“ [Fn. 6], S. 55 [92 ff.]). 211  Siehe schon oben Fn. 22.

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Dagegen hat einzig Jürgen Stolzenberg212 einige verhaltene Überlegungen zum reinen praktischen Selbstbewusstsein bei Kant, insbesondere für die GMS von 1785 angestellt, wobei er allerdings den vorstehenden Textbeleg übersehen zu haben scheint, sodass es ihm im Anschluss an L. W. Beck so scheinen musste, als habe Kant den in der Anmerkung zu § 6 diesbezüglich in den Raum gestellten „Hinweis“ nirgendwo weiter erläutert.213 Nach Stolzenberg, der im Übrigen auch die Methodik praktischer Selbsterkenntnis in den §§ 1 – 7 nicht in Rechnung stellt und so den Begriff praktischer (Begriffs-)Erkenntnis wohl letztlich noch unterbestimmt, bleiben die Überlegungen Kants zum Selbstverhältnis der reinen praktischen Vernunft folglich bloß problematisch, sodass in seiner Geschichtsschreibung schließlich erst Fichte den großen philosophischen Siegeszug in Sachen realer Freiheit und reinem Selbstbewusstsein antritt, obgleich Stolzenberg in dem von ihm gesehenen kantischen Hinweis der Anmerkung zu § 6 bereits eine der wenigen Stellen gefunden zu haben glaubt, „an denen die Kluft überbrückbar erscheint, welche die Philosophie Kants von ihren idealistischen Nachfolgern […] trennt“214. Tatsächlich dürfte die Philosophie Kants allerdings nicht durch eine derart tiefe gedankliche Kluft von der seiner idealistischen Nachfolger getrennt sein, wie uns dies die modernen Geschichtsschreiber der Philosophie mit ihrem begrifflich höchstwahrscheinlich reduzierten Verständnishorizont glauben machen möchten. Vielmehr dürften diese idealistischen Nachfolger (Reinhold / Fichte) ihrerseits hingegen bereits durch eine sprachliche Kluft von den Begrifflichkeiten der Philosophie Kants getrennt gewesen sein, denn anders als dieser (1724 – 1804) gehörten sie (1757 – 1823 bzw. 1762 – 1814) schon nicht mehr der Generation des Wortschöpfers des deutschen Begriffs der Tatsache, nämlich der Generation Spaldings (1714 – 1804) an, sodass sich die Verengung ihres Tatsachenbegriffs auf objektiv gegebene Wirklichkeitsdaten im unkritischen Anschluss an die damalige Entwicklung der Wortbedeutung im allgemeinen Sprachverständnis des ausgehenden 18. Jh. erklärt (s. o.). e) Das oberste moralische Gesetz als praktisches „Postulat“ der praktischen Vernunft Das nicht weiter erklärbare und gleichwohl apodiktisch gewisse „Grundgesetz der reinen praktischen Vernunft“ des § 7,215 das in der GMS unter der Bezeichnung 212  „Das Selbstbewußtsein einer reinen praktischen Vernunft“, in: Henrich / Horstmann (Hrsg.), Metaphysik nach Kant?, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1988, S. 181 – 186. Ein erster und undeutlicher Hinweis findet sich möglicherweise auch schon bei Kadowaki, „Das Faktum der reinen praktischen Vernunft“, in: Kant-Studien 56 (1965), S. 385 (394 f.) und vielleicht auch bei Ebeling, „Selbstkonstituierung als Selbstkontinuierung in der praktischen Philosophie Kants“, in: Funke (Hrsg.), Akten des 4. Int. Kant-Kongresses II, Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 1974, S. 507 (508). 213  Beck (Fn. 12), S. 161. 214  Stolzenberg (Fn. 212), S. 181 f. 215  Vgl. dazu mit Blick auf das „Factum der Vernunft“ KpV, AA V: 32.02, 43.04 – 09, 47.11 – 15.

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des „obersten Princips der Moralität“ aufgesucht und in der „Autonomie des Wil­ lens als oberstes Princip der Sittlichkeit“ schließlich auch ausfindig gemacht wurde, konstituiert also das reine praktische Selbstbewusstsein eines freien Willens und fungiert demnach als oberstes Prinzip und mithin oberster Anfangsgrund(satz) einer darunter in reinen Vernunftbegriffen a priori praktisch erkennbaren Meta­ physik der Sitten (1797/1798), die ihrerseits in Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre sowie in solche der Tugendlehre zerfällt.216 aa) S inn und Unsinn der Deduktion oder des Beweises eines „obersten Grundsatzes“ Es erfüllt damit aber die logischen Bedingungen, die begrifflich an einen „Grundsatz“ zu stellen sind, der ausweislich seines Begriffs ein unmittelbar gewisses und daher auch nicht weiter beweisbares Urteil in sich enthält, denn: „Unmittelbar gewisse Urtheile a priori können Grundsätze heißen, sofern andre Urtheile aus ihnen erwiesen, sie selbst aber keinem andern subordinirt werden können. Sie werden um deswillen auch Principien (Anfänge) genannt.“217 Sofern nämlich die Sätze einer „Metaphysik der Sitten“ ausweislich des Titels bereits der Schrift von 1785 („Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten“) unter dem und mithin durch das oberste Prinzip der Moralität „grundgelegt“ werden sollen, müssen diese metaphysischen Sätze der Moral aus dem selbst schon unmittelbar gewissen „Grundgesetz der reinen praktischen Vernunft“ über ihnen erwiesen werden können.218 Dann aber ist in der Sache überhaupt gar kein Anstoß an der kantischen These von 1788 (und 1785) zu nehmen, nach der dieser oberste Grundsatz selbst keiner weiteren Ableitung und Deduktion zugänglich ist, sondern durch die Selbsttätigkeit eines freien Willens ursprünglich am Anfang aller Moralphilosophie in einem „Factum“ des freien Willens durch ihn selbst gesetzt und sohin für diesen auch apodiktisch gewiss sein muss. Träfe mit der kantischen Rede von einem „obersten Princip[] der Moralität“ im Jahre 1785 gleichwohl die – nicht zwischen der Handlungsregel des kategorischen Imperativs unter dem obersten praktischen Grundgesetz und diesem obersten Grundgesetz selbst differenzierende – Geschichtsschreibung zu, nach der Kant in der GMS 1785 eben eine solche Deduktion des obersten moralischen Grundsatzes noch (vergeblich) gesucht und sich bis 1788 in der KpV zur gedanklichen Umkehr   MS, AA VI: 203 ff., 375 ff.   Log, AA IX: 110 (§§ 34, 33). 218  Das hier in der Sache allerdings möglicherweise noch ausbaufähige Verständnis der modernen Kantforschung zeigt sich folglich (als Symptom) auch in der Bestimmung des Verhältnisses von GMS und MS (insbesondere 1. Teil: RL), wo mit den entsprechenden begrifflichen Verkürzungen seit Jahr und Tag – gegen die offensichtliche Gesamtanlage dieser Schriften – die vermeintliche „Unabhängigkeit“ des Rechts von dem positiv bestimmten Begriff der Freiheit als Autonomie ernsthaft diskutiert wird (vgl. weiterführend dazu etwa Mosayebi, Das Minimum der reinen praktischen Vernunft, Berlin / Boston: De Gruyter, 2013). 216 217

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gezwungen gesehen habe, so hätte sich der Autor in diesem von seinen Interpreten vermeinten Tun, und mit Blick auf den logischen Grundsatzbegriff, im Jahr 1785 schlechterdings selbst und völlig unbemerkt widersprochen, weil er einen unmittelbar gewissen obersten Grundsatz von irgendwoher (nach einigen Interpreten: der theoretischen Vernunft,219 jedenfalls nur nicht aus seiner unmittelbaren praktischen Gewissheit selbst) habe ableiten wollen.220 Da es sich auf diese eher unschlüssige Weise allerdings in der Tat nicht verhält,221 findet sich eine solche vermeintliche Deduktion des obersten Grundsatzes nicht nur in der KpV von 1788, sondern auch in der GMS von 1785 nicht. bb) Das Grundgesetz des freien Willens als praktisches Postulat Die logische Einordnung des „Grundgesetz[es] der reinen praktischen Vernunft“ als „Grundsatz“ überhaupt lässt sich mit diesem einmal bemerkten Umstand allerdings noch weiter spezifizieren. Denn indem dieser oberste Grundsatz der reinen praktischen Vernunft überhaupt eine Handlung bestimmt, macht er seiner logischen Form nach einen praktischen Satz vorstellig, von denen die bloße Logik zwei mögliche Sätze unterscheidet: Während der in einem bloßen „Problem“ bestimmte Satz einer Handlung hinsichtlich der Art ihrer Ausführung nicht unmittelbar gewiss ist, ist die Art der Ausführung einer im praktischen Satz eines „Postulats“ bestimmten Handlung kraft der logischen Form dieses Grundsatzes als unmittelbar gewiss vorausgesetzt.222 Dementsprechend handelt es sich beim obersten Grundsatz der reinen praktischen Vernunft um ein Postulat, denn er bestimmt inhaltlich die vom Willen praktisch notwendig vorzunehmende Bestimmungshandlung an 219 So etwa Paton (Fn. 12), S. 270 ff.; Ameriks, „Kants Deduction …“ (Fn. 12), S. 53 (65 ff.); Rawls (Fn. 12), S. 81 (102 ff.). 220  Paton (Fn. 12), S. 304 nimmt dies in der Tat an und erachtet dies daher für „schon an sich vernichtend“. Sein Irrtum beruht auf der Annahme (ebd., S. 246 ff., 250 ff., 302 ff.), Kant wolle eine „transzendentale Deduktion des kategorischen Imperativs“ leisten. Von einer solchen gehen für die GMS bzw. KpV ferner u. a. folgende Autoren aus: Beck (Fn. 12), S. 74, 158 ff.; Kim, „Kant’s ‚Supreme Principle of Morality‘“, in: Kant-Studien 59 (1968), S. 296 (307); ­Ilting (Fn. 12), S. 113 (121 ff.); Funk, „The Transcendental Deduction of the Second Critique“, in: Funke (Hrsg.), Akten des 4. Int. Kant-Kongresses II, Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 1974, S. 516 – 524; Genova, „Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the Moral Law“, in: Kant-Studien 69 (1978), S. 299 – 313. Dagegen hat Grünewald, „Praktische Vernunft, Modalität und transzendentale Einheit“, in: Oberer / Seel (Hrsg.), Kant: Analysen – Probleme – Kritik, Würzburg: Kö­nigs­ hau­sen & Neumann 1988, S. 127 ff. zutreffend gesehen, dass es eine solche Deduktion in der kantischen Philosophie nicht gibt, um sich auf ihrer Grundlage sodann selbst daran zu versuchen. 221  Dies beweist schon die Schlussanmerkung zur GMS, AA  IV: 463.21 – 33: „Es ist also kein Tadel für unsere Deduction des obersten Princips der Moralität, sondern ein Vorwurf, den man der menschlichen Vernunft überhaupt machen müßte, daß sie ein unbedingtes praktisches Gesetz (…) seiner absoluten Nothwendigkeit nach nicht begreiflich machen kann; denn daß sie dieses nicht durch eine Bedingung, nämlich vermittelst irgend eines zum Grunde gelegten Interesse, thun will, kann ihr nicht verdacht werden, weil es alsdann kein moralisches, d. i. oberstes Gesetz der Freiheit sein würde. […].“ 222  Log, AA IX: 112 (§ 38) i.V.m. 110 (§ 32).

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und für sich selbst, wobei die grundgesetzliche Art dieser intelligiblen Selbstbestimmungstätigkeit im Postulat als unmittelbar gewiss vorausgesetzt ist. Da auf diese grundgesetzliche Weise aber auch dem Inhalt des Grundgesetzes gemäß ein freier Wille bestimmt wird, handelt es sich bei diesem Grundsatz nicht bloß seiner logischen Form, sondern auch seiner Materie nach um einen praktischen Satz. Das „Grundgesetz“ (§ 7) stellt als oberster Ausgangspunkt der gesamten kantischen (Moral-)Philosophie mithin ein praktisches Postulat der reinen praktischen Vernunft223 vor und ist in seiner unmittelbaren Gewissheit somit auf praktischen (Selbst-)Vollzug hin angelegt, d. h. ein jedes freies Willenssubjekt ist sich in seinen praktischen Handlungen dieses Grundgesetzes seiner selbst unmittelbar bewusst; es stellt schließlich sein reines praktisches Selbstbewusstsein vor. f) Die Deduktion des kategorischen Imperativs im grundgesetzlichen Subordinationsverhältnis Die bereits angesprochene und in der willkürlichen Begriffserklärung des § 1 angelegte Differenz zwischen dem „Grundgesetz“ (§ 7) und dem „kategorischen Imperativ“ unter einem praktischen Gesetz kommt nun in einer „Folgerung“ des § 7 zu ihrer vollständigen Aufklärung:224 aa) Grundgesetz und kategorischer Imperativ Das Grundgesetz enthält in sich vermittelst des in ihm praktischen Vernunftbegriffs der Freiheit nämlich eine unendlich-allgemeine Willensbestimmung für den freien Willen eines jeden vernünftigen Willenssubjekts. Die praktische Handlungsregel unter dieser Willensbestimmung, die vorschreibt, nur nach solchen Ma223  Zur Bezeichnung des Grundgesetzes als (praktisches) Postulat KpV, AA V: 31.02 – 34, 46.11; KU, AA V: 470.11. Vgl. dazu instruktiv auch Wolff (Fn. 3), S. 511 (522 ff.). – Die the­ oretischen Postulate der reinen praktischen Vernunft (die Unsterblichkeit der Seele und das Dasein Gottes = KpV, AA V: 122 ff., 124 ff., 132 ff.) stellen dem Willen dagegen inhaltlich keine Willensbestimmung als praktische Handlung, sondern eine in seinem Denken notwendige Annahme und mithin alleine einen theoretischen Satz als gebotene Denkhandlung vor. Sie sind folglich nur der Form, nicht aber auch der Materie nach praktische (Grund-)Sätze. In diesem bloß logisch-formellen Sinne ist das oberste Grundgesetz der reinen praktischen Vernunft dann „kein Postulat, sondern ein Gesetz […], durch welches Vernunft unmittelbar den Willen bestimmt“ (KpV, AA V: 132.09 – 13). 224  KpV, AA V: 31.35 – 33.05. – Die sachgedankliche Differenzierung zwischen oberstem Gesetz und allen übrigen praktischen Gesetzen bzw. Imperativen findet sich mit Betonung ihrer methodischen Notwendigkeit selbstverständlich auch bereits in GMS, AA IV: 408.12 – 27, 412.26 – 414.11, 426.22 – 427.18, 428.34 – 429.13, 430.28 – 431.18, 434.07 – 19, 437.05 – 13, 439.24 – 34, 440.14 – 32, 444.28 – 34, 447.08 – 25, 447.26 – 448.04, 449.07 – 22 und ist dort ebenso maßgeblich für das zutreffende Verständnis der darin geleisteten Deduktion des kategorischen Imperativs sowie der des Begriffs der Freiheit. Der zweite Abschnitt der Grundlegung führt nämlich unter dieser begrifflichen Differenzierung im analytischen Regress auf das höchste moralische Gesetz, bevor der dritte Abschnitt die Annahme eben dieses Gesetzes als praktisch notwendig ausweist.

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ximen des Willens zu handeln, die zugleich in der Form eines allgemeinen Gesetzes vorstellbar sind, adressiert dann zunächst das intelligible Subjekt eines freien Willens überhaupt. Ist der Wille des von der grundgesetzlichen Handlungsregel adressierten Subjekts dabei keiner dem Gesetz widerstreitenden Maxime fähig, weil er bereits kraft intellektueller Einsicht tätig und also seiner Vernunftnatur nach ein heiliger Wille ist, so hat das „Grundgesetz der reinen praktischen Vernunft“ für einen solchen heiligen Willen die Vorstellungsform eines unwiderstehlich bestimmenden Naturgesetzes. – Ist der Wille des von der grundgesetzlichen Handlungsregel adressierten Subjekts allerdings auch solcher dem Gesetz widerstreitender Maximen fähig und mithin kein heiliger Wille, weil das Subjekt nicht bereits alleine kraft intellektueller Einsicht ins moralische Gesetz tätig ist, so hat das „Grundgesetz“ im Verhältnis zu diesem unheiligen Willenssubjekt dagegen nicht die Vorstellungsform eines unwiderstehlich bestimmenden Naturgesetzes, sondern die eines die Handlung der Willensbestimmung praktisch-notwendig befehlenden kategorischen Imperativs. Das „Grundgesetz“ (§ 7) hat in diesem Fall also die Form eines kategorischen Imperativs und das „moralische Gesetz ist daher bei“ diesen unheiligen Willenssubjekten „ein Imperativ, der kategorisch gebietet, weil das Gesetz unbedingt ist“.225 Nun ist der Mensch gewiss kein heiliges Willenssubjekt, weil seine freie Willkür zugleich sinnlicher Bestimmung und mithin nicht ausschließlich grundgesetzlicher Bestimmung zugänglich ist. Also ist das moralische Gesetz für den Menschen ein solcher Imperativ, der kategorisch gebietet, weil das ihn ursprünglich bestimmende Gesetz unbedingt ist; und hierin liegt eine Deduktion des kategorischen Imperativs aus der vernünftigen Realbedingung seiner eigenen (grundgesetzlichen) Möglichkeit.226 Erst in diesem subordinativ angelegten Bestimmungsverhältnis des obersten Grundgesetzes der reinen praktischen Vernunft zu einem willkürlich und gleichwohl gesetzlich bestimmbaren menschlichen Begehrungsvermögen unter ihm, wird deshalb die „Folgerung“ des § 7 verständlich: „Reine Vernunft ist für sich allein praktisch und giebt (dem Menschen) ein allgemeines Gesetz, welches wir das Sittengesetz nennen.“227 Sie wäre tautologisch und gänzlich sinnlos, wäre dieses „Sittengesetz“ der „Folgerung“ des § 7 mit dem eingangs zu § 7 schon te­ norierten „Grundgesetz der reinen praktischen Vernunft“ identisch, denn:

  KpV, AA V: 32.21 – 23.   Diese (als solche nicht ausdrücklich so bezeichnete) Deduktion des kategorischen Imperativs in KpV, AA V: 32.21 – 23 ist dem Gedanken nach identisch mit der (so bezeichneten) Deduktion desselben in GMS, AA IV: 453.16 – 455.09 (besonders 454.06 – 19) unter dem Titel: „Wie ist ein kategorischer Imperativ möglich?“ (siehe rückblickend auch nochmals GMS, AA IV: 461.07 – 35). 227  KpV, AA V: 31.36 – 37. 225 226

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bb) Grundgesetz, kategorischer Imperativ und Sittengesetz sind zu unterscheiden Im reinen In-sich-Bestimmungsverhältnis des gesetzlichen Begehrungsvermögens des freien Willens stellt das „Grundgesetz der reinen praktischen Vernunft“ alleine das reine praktische Selbstbewusstsein eines freien Willens vor.228 Dagegen stellt dieses oberste praktische Gesetz dem Menschen in dem in ihm vorstellbaren subordinativen Bestimmungsverhältnis zu seinem zugleich auch sinnlich-bestimmbaren Willkürvermögen das „Sittengesetz“ vor, darunter dem Menschen eine grundgesetzliche Willensbestimmung kategorisch geboten und mithin zur Pflicht gemacht wird: „[…] das Verhältniß eines solchen Willens zu diesem Gesetze ist Abhängigkeit, unter dem Namen der Verbindlichkeit, welche eine Nöthigung, obzwar durch bloße Vernunft und deren objectives Gesetz, zu einer Handlung bedeutet, die darum Pflicht heißt, weil eine pathologisch afficirte (obgleich dadurch nicht bestimmte, mithin auch immer freie) Willkür einen Wunsch bei sich führt, der aus subjectiven Ursachen entspringt, daher auch dem reinen objectiven Bestimmungsgrunde oft entgegen sein kann und also eines Widerstandes der praktischen Vernunft, der ein innerer, aber intellectueller Zwang genannt werden kann, als moralischer Nöthigung bedarf.“229 Erst mit der „Folgerung“ des § 7, die eine spezifische Differenz zwischen dem „Grundgesetz“ und dem „Sittengesetz“ in ihrer Einheit zum Ausdruck bringt, findet also in der Exposition der §§ 1 – 7 eine erneute Rückanknüpfung an das moralische Pflichtbewusstsein eines menschlichen Willenssubjekts statt. Hatte dieses menschliche Subjekt bereits mit den ersten Sätzen der Anmerkung zur willkürlichen Erklärung des Begriffs praktischer Grundsätze des Willens in § 1 einen guten Grund zur Annahme praktischer Gesetze seines freien Willens, so hat es nun ein deutliches Bewusstsein dieses guten Grundes: Das moralische Pflichtbewusstsein eines menschlichen Willenssubjekts (im subjektiven Gefühl der Hochachtung des Gesetzes selbst) hat die Vorstellungsform eines kategorischen Imperativs, der für sich die Bewusstseinsform des Sittengesetzes hat, insofern er zugleich objektives Gesetz unter dem Grundgesetz der reinen praktischen Vernunft ist. Dieses Grundgesetz der reinen praktischen Vernunft ist also nicht schon an und für sich selbst identisch mit jenem kategorischen Imperativ unter seiner sittengesetzlichen Vorstellungsform für menschliche Willenssubjekte.230 228  Von diesem reinen praktischen Selbstverhältnis ist auch in GMS, AA IV: 426.22 – 427.18 die Rede. 229  KpV, AA V: 32.21 – 31. 230  Gleichwohl ist die in der Kantforschung ohne weiteres behauptete Identität von Grundgesetz und Sittengesetz bzw. kategorischem Imperativ gegenwärtig derart unumstritten, dass sie beispielsweise Klemme – in seiner in das Werk einleitenden Funktion als Mitherausgeber der „Kritik der praktischen Vernunft“ in der Philosophischen Bibliothek (Nr. 506) des Meiner-Verlags (neben Brandt, Hamburg 2003, S. XXIV f.) – als offizielle Lesart auszugeben und die anderslautende kantische Auskunft kurzerhand als „etwas verwirrend“ abzutun vermag. – An diesem Punkt behauptet sich mit der Gleichsetzung von Grund- und Sittengesetz also ein

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cc) G  rundgesetz, kategorischer Imperativ und Sittengesetz in der modernen Kantinterpretation Dementsprechend wird der Grundgedanke der kantischen Moralphilosophie unverständlich, wenn infolge einer Gleichsetzung nicht das Bewusstsein des Grundgesetzes selbst, sondern das Bewusstsein des kategorischen Imperativs bzw. das Bewusstsein des Gefühls der Achtung für das Gesetz im moralischen Pflichtbewusstsein als intelligibles „Factum der Vernunft“ aufgefasst werden sollen.231 Denn in diesem Bezugsverhältnis kann das „Factum“ keine intelligible (Vorstellungs-)Tat des freien Willens an und für sich selbst bedeuten und so muss es dann den falschen Anschein haben, als werde die bloße (in Wahrheit: empirische) Tatsache oder Faktizität des moralischen Bewusstseins zu dessen Rechtfertigung angerufen.232 Der kategorische Imperativ bzw. das Sittengesetz – ihrerseits gleichsam im kritischen Sinne Tatsachen des moralischen Bewusstseins eines menschlichen Willenssubjekts – erschienen alsdann irrigerweise als das höchste Prinzip der kangedanklicher Fehler, dem bereits namhafte Interpreten der ersten Stunde aufgesessen sind (etwa oben Fn. 198). So meinte beispielsweise schon Reinhold, Briefe II (Fn. 194), S. 262 (276) in seinem achten Brief zur „Erörterung des Begriffes von der Freiheit des Willens“, der Begriff der Freiheit habe seine objektive Realität nach der KpV durch das Bewusstsein des „Sittengesetzes“; ebenso deutlich „Grundgesetz“ und „Sittengesetz“ identifizierend ders., Beyträge II (Fn. 194), S. 214 (Nr. 16). Möglicherweise, ja sogar sehr wahrscheinlich – was hier jedoch nicht weiter ausführlich untersucht werden kann – erklärt sich mitunter auch aus dieser begrifflichen Verkürzung Reinholds heraus die von Kant (MS, AA VI: 226.12 – 227.09) schließlich zurückgewiesene Ansicht Reinholds (ebd., S. 262 [279 ff.]), die Freiheit der Willkür bestünde positiv im bloßen Vermögen der Wahl, für oder wider das Gesetz zu handeln. Denn bei dieser Wahlfreiheit bleibt die Selbsttätigkeit der reinen praktischen Vernunft in ihrer Bestimmung an sich selbst, und zwar vermittelst der Selbstvorstellung ihres „Grundgesetzes“, gänzlich außen vor. Allerdings entsteht das von Reinhold vermittelst seiner Konstruktion vermeintlich abgewehrte Schreckgespenst eines alle Schuldzurechnung zum bösen Willen aufhebenden „intelligiblen Fatalismus“ (C. C. E. Schmid) gedanklich gar nicht erst, sofern man mit Kant (§ 7 KpV) die in der spontanen Vorstellung des „Grundgesetzes“ aufgehobene Selbsttätigkeit reiner praktischer Vernunft von der (freien) Willkürtätigkeit einer menschlichen Person unter dem für diese Person grundgesetzlich zu folgernden „Sittengesetz“ hinreichend unterscheidet. – Von einer ‚genaueren Bestimmung der Grundbegriffe kantischer Ethik in ihrem Zusammenhang‘ in Reinholds „Briefen“, die einer bloßen Wahlfreiheit das Wort reden, kann daher bei Lichte besehen und entgegen Henrich, „Das Problem der Grundlegung der Ethik …“ (Fn. 6), S. 350 (377) in der Sache selbst nicht ernstlich die Rede sein. Vgl. ferner auch dens., „Die Deduktion des Sittengesetzes …“ (Fn. 6), S. 55 (97 Fn. 26). – Einen kritischen Überblick über die moderne Kantforschung im Anschluss an die Kantinterpretation Reinholds gibt Bojanowski (Fn. 12), S. 230 ff. 231  Vgl. dazu Henrich, „Der Begriff der sittlichen Einsicht …“ (Fn. 6), S. 77 (112 f.); Wil­ laschek (Fn. 12), S. 182 ff., 184 ff.; Schönecker, „Kant’s Moral Intuitionism: The Fact of Reason and Moral Predispositions“, in: Kant Studies Online 2013, S. 1 ff. 232  Henrich, „Die Deduktion des Sittengesetzes …“ (Fn. 6), S. 55 (90) spricht von der „sittlichen Erfahrung“. – Einen Überblick über den „Status quo der Forschung“ gibt Klein (Fn. 12), S. 90 ff. (m. w. N.), der folgende Deutungen ausgemacht hat: „Faktum als Wendung ins Dogmatische“, „als Erkenntnis“, „als Motiv“, „als moralisches Alltagsbewusstsein“, „als Appell der Vernunft“.

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tischen Moralphilosophie, sodass es einstweilen tatsächlich auch so scheinen muss, als habe Kant mit der vermeintlichen Berufung auf diese Tatsachen von der in der GMS tatsächlich gegebenen Deduktion des kategorischen Imperativs233 geistigen Abstand genommen.234 Allerdings wird die eigentliche Grundlage der kantischen Moralphilosophie im „Grundgesetz der reinen praktischen Vernunft“ durch diese mittlerweile kanonisch gewordene Lesart gänzlich unter ihren fehlenden begrifflichen Differenzierungen verschüttet.235 Die fehlende begriffliche Unterscheidungsfähigkeit ist aber die Ursache für den gegenwärtigen Zustand der modernen Kantauffassung, die nicht müde werden will, sich an der wohl nur selbstgemachten Dunkelheit des dritten Abschnitts der GMS abzuarbeiten.236 g) Methodologische und nicht geistige Umkehr im Verhältnis von „Grundlegung“ und „Kritik“ Tatsächlich gelangt die KpV mit ihrer „Folgerung“ in § 7 zu der „gemeinen sittlichen Vernunfterkenntnis“ im Begriff der Pflicht, von der aus die GMS, und zwar zur Bestimmung des obersten Prinzips aller Moralität, analytisch ausging (GMS  I / II), um sodann von diesem obersten Prinzip über eine Kritik des praktischen Vernunftvermögens synthetisch wieder zurück zum moralischen Pflichtbewusstsein zu gelangen (GMS III).237 Die GMS verfolgt also eine „analytische Methode“238, die zunächst vom Bedingten (nämlich den Tatsachen des moralischen Bewusstseins) regressiv zum Unbedingten (nämlich der Vorstellung des obersten   Siehe dazu schon oben den Nachweis in Fn. 226.  Maßgeblich Henrich, „Die Deduktion des Sittengesetzes …“ (Fn. 6), S. 55 (84 ff.); zur dementsprechenden Instruktion des Lesers der KpV etwa Klemme (Fn. 230), S. XXXI – XXXIII. 235  So sehr sogar, dass Ludwig in seinem gleichnamigen Aufsatz die zunächst plausibel erscheinende Frage stellen konnte: „Was wird in Kants Grundlegung eigentlich deduziert?“, in: Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik 16 (2008), S. 431 – 463. Nach seinen Überlegungen (434 ff.) gibt es dann übrigens gar keine „Deduktion des kategorischen Imperativs“ in der GMS, sodass er sich (vgl. 441 f. Fn. 17) in der Folge offenbar gezwungen gesehen hat, eine eigene Geschichte der Revision kantischen Denkens zu schreiben (dazu noch unten Fn. 265). Siehe jüngst auch wieder dens., „Über drei Deduktionen in Kants Moralphilosophie – und über eine vierte, die man dort vergeblich sucht“, in: Kant-Studien 109 (2018), S. 47 ff. 236  Hierin wohl einen Gedanken Henrichs, „Die Deduktion des Sittengesetzes …“ (Fn. 6), S. 55 (110) aufgreifend: Puls (Hrsg.), Kants Rechtfertigung des Sittengesetzes in Grundlegung III, Berlin / München: De Gruyter, 2014; ders. (Fn. 7); Schönecker, Kant: Grundlegung III (Fn. 12); ders. (Hrsg.), Kants Begründung von Freiheit und Moral in Grundlegung III, Münster: Mentis, 2015. 237  Siehe methodologisch GMS, AA  IV: 392, 397.01 – 10, 403.34 – 37, 406.05 – 08, 412.15 – 25, 419.12 – 13, 419.36 – 420.11, 420.12 – 23, 425.01 – 11, 426.22 – 427.18, 428.03 – 06, 428.34 – 429.13, 430.28 – 431.18, 431.32 – 432.04, 432.12 – 24, 433.09 – 11, 433.26 – 33, 434.07 – 19, 437.05 – 13, 439.24 – 34, 440.14 – 32, 444.35 – 445, 446.05 – 06, 447.08 – 25, 447.26 – 448.04, 448.25 – 449.27, 450.18 – 34, 453.03 – 15, 461.07 – 35, 463.21 – 33. 238 Zur analytischen im Gegensatz zur synthetischen Methode siehe Log, AA IX: 149 (§ 117). 233 234

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moralischen Prinzips des freien Willens) aufsteigt und erst sodann progressiv wieder zum Bedingten zurückkehrt. Methodisch eignet sich diese analytische Methode mit ihrem Ausgangspunkt darum besonders dazu, die Popularität der vorzutragenden Erkenntnis zu befördern, und eben dies ist erklärtermaßen ein Ziel239 der GMS. Die KpV verfolgt nun aber nicht den Zweck populärer, sondern den wissenschaftlicher sowie systematischer Vorstellung einer praktischen Erkenntnis, und sie bedient sich daher auch nicht der „analytischen“, sondern der „synthetischen Methode“, denn diese letztere ist für diesen Zweck angemessener.240 Dementsprechend steht am Anfang der KpV nicht der Begriff der Pflicht als eine Tatsache für das moralische Bewusstsein, dessen Prinzip (d. h. den kategorischen Imperativ) sie im Übrigen nur bereits durch die GMS als vorläufig bekannt voraussetzt,241 sondern eine willkürliche Erklärung des Begriffs praktischer Grundsätze des Willens (§ 1), die eine Synthesis eben dieses Willens – wie zuvor erläutert – bereits ursprünglich in sich schließt. Im Rahmen einer Analyse dieser ursprünglichen Synthesis des Willens werden sodann der ursprüngliche Grund des moralischen Bewusstseins im „Factum der Vernunft“ und die Tatsachen dieses Bewusstseins selbst deutlich bewusst. Die KpV stellt also keinen anderen Gedanken vor als die GMS.242 Allerdings verfahren beide Schriften methodisch entgegengesetzt.243 Dementsprechend findet im Verhältnis beider Schriften auch keine geistige, sondern lediglich eine metho­ dologische Umkehr Immanuel Kants statt244 – und so kommt es dann im „Opus Postumum“ auch nicht abermals zur geistigen Rolle rückwärts eines vermeintlich   GMS, AA IV: 391.34 – 392.02.   Siehe schon Fn. 238. – Dagegen geht Beck (Fn. 12), S. 111 ff. auch für die zweite Kritik von der analytischen Methode aus. 241  KpV, AA V: 08.08 – 12. 242  So im Ergebnis auch Wolff (Fn. 3), S. 511 (533 Fn. 39, 546 f.). 243  Das bemerkte beispielsweise bereits Rehberg (Fn. 20), Sp. 345 zutreffend; in neuerer Zeit ebenso Freudiger (Fn. 12), S. 23 f., 39 ff., 61 ff. – Der mit Blick auf die kantische Wendung vom „Factum der Vernunft“ im Anschluss an Henrich, „Die Deduktion des Sittengesetzes …“ (Fn. 6), S. 55 (85 ff.) in der Kantliteratur seither scheinbar endlos um sich selbst drehend geführte Streit, ob die GMS bereits eine „Factumsthese“ enthält oder eben nicht, ist also nur relativ müßig zu führen. Siehe dazu ausführlich etwa jüngst (2014) den aus einer Hamburger Expertentagung (Geleitwort) hervorgegangenen und von Puls herausgegebenen Sammelband (Fn. 236); aus früherer Zeit siehe dazu etwa schon Hägerström (Fn. 207), S. 618 ff. 244  In dieser Deutung liegt für Henrich, „Die Deduktion des Sittengesetzes …“ (Fn. 6), S. 55 (59 f./90) allerdings nur „ein voreiliger Schluß“, denn auch die GMS enthalte in ihrem dritten Abschnitt „einen in synthetischer Methode verfaßten Teil, weil sie eine Kritik der praktischen Vernunft einschließt“. Doch dementgegen hat auch die „Kritik der praktischen Vernunft“ – wie gesehen – einen analytischen Teil, und ist gleichwohl insgesamt in synthetischer Methode abgefasst. Dass erst der dritte Teil der GMS synthetisch verfasst ist, spricht daher nicht für, sondern gerade gegen ihre synthetische Gesamtanlage, denn wenn der synthetische Teil nicht am Anfang, sondern am Schluss steht, dann leitet der Anfang der Schrift analytisch auf den höchsten und zuletzt synthetischen Punkt des Gedankens hin. 239 240

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zeitlebens herumtappenden Philosophen, wie Henrich dies offensichtlich annehmen muss, wenn er urteilt, es sei dort dann der Standpunkt der GMS wieder eingenommen.245 In der Vorrede zur KpV findet sich die hier nachgewiesene methodologische Verhältnisbestimmung beider Schriften mit Blick auf einige kritische Stimmen zur GMS der Sache nach dagegen sogar ausdrücklich, wenn Kant darin notiert: „Wenn es um die Bestimmung eines besonderen Vermögens der menschlichen Seele nach seinen Quellen, Inhalte und Grenzen zu thun ist, so kann man zwar nach der Natur des menschlichen Erkenntnisses nicht anders als von den Theilen derselben, ihrer genauen und (so viel als nach der jetzigen Lage unserer schon erworbenen Elemente derselben möglich ist) vollständigen Darstellung anfangen. Aber es ist noch eine zweite Aufmerksamkeit, die mehr philosophisch und architektonisch ist: nämlich die Idee des Ganzen richtig zu fassen und aus derselben alle jene Theile in ihrer wechselseitigen Beziehung auf einander vermittelst der Ableitung derselben von dem Begriffe jenes Ganzen in einem reinen Vernunftvermögen ins Auge zu fassen. Diese Prüfung und Gewährleistung ist nur durch die innigste Bekanntschaft mit dem System möglich, und die, welche in Ansehung der ersteren Nachforschung verdrossen gewesen, also diese Bekanntschaft zu erwerben nicht der Mühe werth geachtet haben, gelangen nicht zur zweiten Stufe, nämlich der Übersicht, welche eine synthetische Wiederkehr zu demjenigen ist, was vorher analytisch gegeben worden, und es ist kein Wunder, wenn sie allerwärts Inconsequenzen finden, obgleich die Lücken, die diese vermuthen lassen, nicht im System selbst, sondern blos in ihrem eigenen unzusammenhängenden Gedankengange anzutreffen sind.“ (KpV, AA V: 10.03 – 22).

Es verhält sich folglich mit diesen beiden publizierten Schriften praktischen Inhalts genauso, wie es sich auch schon mit den beiden vergleichbaren Schriften theo­retischen Inhalts, nämlich der KrV und den Prolegomena verhielt. Denn auch die auf bessere Verständlichkeit abzweckenden Prolegomena verfolgen eine Darstellung nach „analytischer Methode“, während die wissenschaftlich-systematische Darstellung der KrV nach „synthetischer Lehrart“ abgefasst ist.246 Dementsprechend erscheint den Interpreten die kaum einmal reflektierte methodologische Umkehrung im Verhältnis beider Schriften in ihrem eigenen Zugriff als geistige Umkehr des Autors in der Sache selbst.247 Mit einem deutlichen Bewusstsein dieser methodologischen Verhältnisbestimmung der beiden Schriften zur Grundlegung der Moralphilosophie248 aber erweist sich dann hingegen nicht nur die von Henrich verschiedentlich geäußerte und mitunter wohl auch dem ana  Henrich, „Die Deduktion des Sittengesetzes …“ (Fn. 6), S. 55 (112).   Prol, AA IV: 263.20 – 32, 274.27 – 275.19. 247 Schon Messer (Fn. 138), S. 95 – 105 diskutiert das Verhältnis beider Schriften unter Referat von uns heutigen Ohren ganz bekannten Argumenten. Nach diesem hat offenbar bereits Lehmann, Über Kants Prinzipien der Ethik, Diss. Greifswald 1880, S. 34 ff. eine frühe Form der heutigen „Umkehrthese“ vertreten. 248  Dadurch wird aber – anders als Bojanowski (Fn. 12), S. 208 ff. dies meint – nicht etwa eine von beiden Schriften „überflüssig“. 245 246

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lytischen Zeitgeist geschuldete Erwartungshaltung, Kant bediene sich zur Grundlegung seiner Moralphilosophie (lediglich) einer „Analyse des sittlichen Bewusstseins“, von vorneherein methodologisch als verfehlt,249 sondern auch seine These, in der GMS von 1785 seien noch gedankliche Reste des Versuchs einer Deduktion des obersten moralischen Gesetzes aus der theoretischen Vernunft anzutreffen.250 IV. Abschließende Bemerkungen zur Rezeption des Factumsbegriffs Mit den vorstehenden Überlegungen dürfte nun hinreichend begründet nachgewiesen sein, dass das Verständnis der kantischen Wendung vom „Factum der Vernunft“ als eine „Faktizität der Vernunft“ an einer positivistischen Reduktion in der sprachlichen Wortbedeutung leidet. Denn indem der mit dem „Factum“ bezeichnete Sachverhalt mit einer modernen „Faktizität“ im Sinne einer (wie auch immer gearteten und bloß gegebenen) „Tatsächlichkeit“ identifiziert wird,251 verkürzt er 249  So aber Henrich, „Das Problem der Grundlegung der Ethik …“ (Fn. 6), S. 350 (351 u. ö.). 250  Henrich, „Der Begriff der sittlichen Einsicht …“ (Fn. 6), S. 77 (82 f., 94, 98 ff.); sowie schon oben Fn. 167 (kritisch dazu Klemme, „Freiheit oder Fatalismus?“, in: Puls [Hrsg.], Kants Rechtfertigung des Sittengesetzes in Grundlegung III, Berlin / München / Boston: De Gruyter, 2014, S. 59 [74 – 87]; Wood [Fn. 10], S. 134). – Ob und ggf. in welchem Umfang es solche Deduktionsversuche der Sittlichkeit aus der theoretischen Vernunft vor der GMS von 1785 tatsächlich gegeben hat, wie Henrich (ebd., S. 98 ff. sowie in: „Die Deduktion des Sittengesetzes …“ [Fn. 6], S. 55 [84 ff.]) meint, bedarf hier keiner weiteren Erörterung mehr (kritisch ablehnend insofern bereits Schmucker [Fn. 12], S. 391 ff.; neuerdings Ware [Fn. 12], S. 116 [131 ff.]). 251  „Faktizität bezeichnet die Tatsächlichkeit von etwas in seinem (nicht-notwendigen) bloßen Gegebensein.“ (Fahrenbach, „Faktizität“, in: Ritter [Hrsg.], HWPh II, Basel: Schwabe, 1972, Sp. 886). Philosophisch kommt dieser Begriff offenbar – wie man den Nachweisen ebd. entnehmen kann – erst mit Heidegger / Sartre, nicht aber bereits mit Kant in einen bestimmten Gebrauch. Die diesbezügliche Entwicklung zwischen „Faktum, Faktisch, Faktizität“, und zwar über Fichte, Kierkegaard, Husserl und Heidegger, zeichnet dementsprechend auch Quesne, in: Cassin (Hrsg.), Dictionary of Untranslatables, Princeton / Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2014, S. 1116 f. nach. – Hat in Henrichs begriffsbildender Kantinterpretation auf der Suche nach einer „sittlichen Einsicht“ also nicht vielleicht auch der von 1923 – 1927 in Marburg als außerordentlicher Professor wirkende Heidegger gedanklich Pate gestanden? In seiner Freiburger Vorlesung zum Sommersemester 1930 „Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit“ (in: Tietjen [Hrsg.], Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe, II. Abteilung: Vorlesungen 1923 – 1944, Bd. 31, Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 1982, S. 292 – 297) äußerte sich Heidegger zum kantischen „Faktum des Sittengesetzes“ nämlich selbst wie folgt: „Kant hat die Eigenart des willen­ tlichen Wirklichen als Tatsache zentral erfahren und aus dieser Erfahrung die Problematik der praktischen Vernunft wesentlich bestimmt, in den Grenzen, die er für möglich und notwendig hielt. Die Tatsächlichkeit der Tatsache einer reinen praktischen Vernunft steht jederzeit bei uns selbst und je nur bei uns selbst. Dieses in der Weise, daß wir uns für das gesollte reine Wollen entscheiden, […]. Diese Tatsächlichkeit des Wollens ist selbst nur zugänglich in einem Erfahren und Wissen, das aus solchem Wollen und Nichtwollen erwächst, besser, in solchem gerade besteht.“ – Jedenfalls setzte vor Henrich, seines Zeichens 1927 in Marburg geboren

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sich um den ursprünglichen Bedeutungsgehalt dieses Begriffs – im Sinne einer Tatsache des Bewusstseins (genitivus subjectivus) – auf die moderne Wortbedeutung einer noch dazu an und für sich selbst bestehenden „Tatsache für das Bewusstsein“,252 wobei auf die darin liegende gedankliche Nähe zu einem neukantianischen Begriffsverständnis Marburger Provenienz (Cohen) nur hingewiesen sei.253 1. Etymologische Wende im Verständnis des Factumsbegriffs Das alles ahnt Henrich vermutlich wohl auch selbst, wenn er aus seiner begrifflichen Warte mit Blick auf das kantische „Factum der Vernunft“ schreibt: „Solch ein Begriff enthält scheinbar einen Widersinn in sich. Wenn die Vernunft als Vermögen von Erkenntnissen apriori definiert ist, so kann man nicht einsehen, wie sie soll Faktisches enthalten können. Das Faktische scheint in den Bereich der Erfahrung zu gehören, während die Vernunft die reine Durchsichtigkeit einer Einsicht fordern muß.“254 Doch selbst wenn er also kaum geneigt ist, das „Factum der Vernunft“ bei seiner Suche nach einer „sittlichen Einsicht“ unter die bloß empirischen Tat-

sowie nach seiner Schulzeit am Marburger Philippinum auch Student der dortigen Universität, bereits der Marburger Privatdozent Gerhard Krüger – seinerseits ein dortiger Schüler Heideggers und Kollege Gadamers – den Begriff des „Factums“ in seiner Habilitationsschrift (Philosophie und Moral in der kantischen Kritik, Tübingen: Mohr, 1931, S. 192 ff.) mit demjenigen der „Faktizität“ kurzerhand gleich und könnte in dieser ‚Marburger Konstellation‘ (dazu Hen­ rich, „»Was ist verlässlich im Leben?« Gespräch mit Dieter Henrich“, in: Bormuth / v. Bülow [Hrsg.], Marburger Hermeneutik zwischen Tradition und Krise, Göttingen: Wallstein, 2008, S. 13 – 64) folglich als begrifflicher Vermittler gedient haben. Wie auch für Henrich (oben Fn. 134, 210) ist für Krüger (ebd., S. 193) bei Kant nämlich das „sittliche Bewußtsein […] primär nicht Selbstbewußtsein, sondern Bewußtsein von etwas der Menschheit Fremden, […].“ Immerhin schätzte auch Gadamer, Philosophische Lehrjahre, Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 1977, S. 226 – akademischer Lehrer Henrichs – die Wirkung der Schrift Krügers nicht gerade gering ein: „[…] ein glänzendes Buch. Krüger rief Kant zum Zeugen dafür auf, daß die Schöpfungsordnung, eine hinzunehmende Gegebenheit, allein eine Philosophie der Moral begründen könne, in der Freiheit nicht so sehr Selbstbestimmung als Selbstbindung an das Sittengesetz bedeute […]. Was war das für ein neuartiger Kant! Wir haben wohl alle viel aus diesem Buch, insbesondere aus der Auslegung der Moralphilosophie Kants gelernt.“ 252 Siehe Henrich, „Der Begriff der sittlichen Einsicht …“ (Fn. 6), S. 77 (113), wo er „das Faktum, den Gegenstand der sittlichen Einsicht“, ausdrücklich mit einer „‚Tatsache‘ der Vernunft“ (im modernen Wortsinne) identifiziert. 253 Siehe Cohen, „Kants Begründung der Ethik“ (Fn. 53), S. 169 ff., 255 ff., 373 ff. – Übrigens bezieht sich Henrich in seinen Studien zur frühen Ethik Kants (Nachweise Fn. 6) maßgeblich auf die Untersuchung Schmuckers (Fn. 12), darin es diesem (S. 373 ff.) um den Nachweis zu tun ist, dass die Moralphilosophie Kants sachlich unabhängig von seiner kritischen Erkenntnislehre ist. Auf dieser argumentativen Basis hat dann wiederum Ritter, Der Rechtsgedanke Kants nach den frühen Quellen, Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 1971, passim den vermeintlich weithin unkritischen Charakter des kantischen Rechtsdenkens nachweisen wollen und so schließlich der bekanntlich von dem Marburger Philosophen Ebbinghaus vertretenen „Unabhängigkeitsthese“ des Rechts vom „transzendentalen Idealismus“ Vorschub geleistet. 254  Henrich, „Der Begriff der sittlichen Einsicht …“ (Fn. 6), S. 77 (93).

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sachen des Bewusstseins (im modernen Wortsinne) zu mischen 255 und auf diese Weise durch seine Verwendung eine für den modernen Wortgebrauch des „Faktischen“ im Unbestimmten liegende Begriffssphäre zu eröffnen scheint,256 wird er dem damit bezeichneten Sachverhalt vernünftiger Subjektivität, die sich selbst ein objektives Gesetz gibt, nicht gerecht.257 Denn da das etymologische Ursprungsmoment im Begriff des nicht bloß irgendwie gegebenen „Factums“ einem – von ihm angeknüpften – modernen Verständnis des Tatsachenbegriffs längst nicht mehr bewusst ist, reduziert Henrich das von ihm gleichsam ins Bewusstsein der Gegenwart gezerrte „Factum der Vernunft“ in seiner Begriffsbedeutung um genau dasjenige Tätigkeitsmoment, das hiermit vernünftigerweise ursprünglich hatte bezeichnet 255  Offenbar hat Cohen, „Kants Begründung der Ethik“ (Fn. 53), S. 260 angenommen, es handele sich um eine psychologische Tatsache. Messer (Fn. 138), S. 66 f. hat dies dagegen schon früh (unter Berufung auf Hägerström [Fn. 207], S. 230 ff.) abgewiesen. 256  Das scheint für die vermeintliche Position Kants auch Scheler, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die Materiale Wertethik, Halle: Niemeyer, 3. Aufl. 1927, S. 41 f. bemerken zu wollen, um seiner „materialen Wertethik“ eine freie Bahn zu verschaffen: „Aber so richtig diese Behauptung Kants ist, daß die ethischen Sätze »a priori« sein müssen, so schwankend und unbestimmt sind seine Aussagen darüber, wie dieses Apriori solle aufgewiesen werden. […] Bald ist es dann die Analyse einzelner Beispiele des sittlichen Urteils des gesunden Menschenverstandes, […]; bald ist Behauptung, das Sittengesetz sei ein »Faktum der Vernunft«, das einfach – ohne jede weitere Stütze auf etwas anderes – aufzuweisen sei, was diesen Weg darstellen soll. Aber so sehr diese letzte Behauptung ins Rechte weist: Kant vermag uns doch in keiner Weise zu zeigen, wie die »Fakten«, auf die sich auch eine apriorische Ethik stützen muß […], sich von den Tatsachen der Beobachtung und Induktion scheiden, […]. Was ist der Unterschied zwischen einem »Faktum der reinen Vernunft« und einem bloß psychologischen Faktum? Und wie kann ein »Gesetz« […] ein »Faktum« genannt werden? Da Kant eine »phänomenologische Erfahrung«, […], nicht kennt, so hat er auch auf diese Frage keine Antwort. Dadurch gewinnt hier in der Ethik sein Verfahren einen rein konstruktiven Charakter, […]. Dies kommt in Wendungen wie: Das Sittengesetz entspringe einer »Selbstgesetzgebung der Vernunft« oder: die Vernunftperson sei der »Gesetzgeber« des »Sittengesetzes« […] häufig zum Ausdruck. Kant sieht offenbar den Tatsachenkreis nicht, auf den sich eine apriorische Ethik – wie jede Erkenntnis – zu stützen hat. Aber wie hätte Kant auch nur nach solchen »Tatsachen« richtig suchen können, da er es ja für einen Wesenszusammenhang hält: Nur eine formale Ethik könne jener richtigen Forderung, Ethik dürfe nicht induktiv sein, genügen. Es ist ja klar: Nur eine materiale Ethik wird sich – ernsthaft – auf Tatsachen, im Unterschiede zu Willkürkonstruktionen stützen können.“ Folglich (S. 66) ist Kant, nach dem Dafürhalten Schelers (anders als dem Henrichs), „die Tatsache der »sittlichen Einsicht« völlig unbekannt.“ 257 Indem Henrich, „Der Begriff der sittlichen Einsicht …“ (Fn. 6), S. 77 (110) seine (unkantische) Vorstellung einer „Faktizität“ der „moralischen Forderung“ gegenüber dem Subjekt derselben mit dem (nicht weniger unkantischen und vielmehr von Scheler möglicherweise wohl im Anschluss an Husserl geprägten) Begriff der „sittlichen Einsicht“ (siehe vorige Fn. 256) in Verbindung zu bringen versucht, lässt sich seiner Interpretation des kantischen Gedankens – jedenfalls aus der hier vertretenen begrifflichen Perspektive – nur noch schwerlich ein bestimmter Sinn entnehmen, wenn er schreibt: „Sie [sc. die Faktizität] kann nicht faktisch im üblichen Sinne sein, der dem von ‚empirisch‘ gleichkommt. Denn das Grundphänomen des Sittlichen, die Verbindlichkeit des Anspruches, die gerade dazu nötigte, von allen Deduktionen Abstand zu nehmen, ist nur in der sittlichen Einsicht gegenwärtig. Kant sagt, sie enthalte Notwendigkeit. Deshalb kann sie nur der Vernunft zugeschrieben werden. Der Anspruch des Guten ist also das einzige Faktum der Vernunft, das einzig denkbare zugleich.“

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werden sollen, sodass ihm das darin begrifflich aufgehobene Selbstverhältnis der Autonomie eines freien Willens, der sich aus sich selbst heraus sein moralisches Gesetz ursprünglich selbst vorstellt und somit selbst tätig gibt (nicht mehr, aber auch nicht weniger), kurzerhand entgangen ist. Was aber sollte die Autonomie des Willens anderes sein, als die tätige Selbstvorstellung des moralischen Gesetzes, darauf der Begriff vom „Factum der Vernunft“ hier überdeutlich hinweist?258 Mit anderen Worten: Der Begriff der Selbsttätigkeit des Willens und mithin auch der vom „Factum der Vernunft“ sind analytisch im Begriff seiner Autonomie enthalten. Ersetzt man den Factumsbegriff jedoch kurzerhand durch den Faktizitätsbegriff, so verdunkelt sich dieser Begriffszusammenhang beinahe vollständig, sodass das Nächstliegende, nämlich die Freiheit des eigenen Willens, intellektuell in weite Ferne rückt, weil sie im Begriff der „Faktizität“ nicht als Selbststand, sondern vielmehr als Gegenstand des Willenssubjekts gedacht wird.259

258  Kaufmann (Fn. 12), S. 227 (239), der den Factumsbegriff selbst ebenfalls mit der Vorstellung der Selbstgesetzgebungstätigkeit in Verbindung bringt, antizipiert auch gleich den hiergegen zu befürchtenden Standardeinwand: „Eine von vielen Kant-Kennern benutzte Antwort-Strategie auf derartige Interpretationsanläufe lautet: »Das wäre vielleicht schön so, aber es ist nicht Kant.«“ 259  In dieser begrifflich möglicherweise noch nicht ganz zielführenden Hinsicht unterscheidet sich Henrichs Vorstellung einer „Faktizität“ des moralischen Bewusstseins im Jahre 1960 also übrigens überhaupt nicht von derjenigen Schopenhauers im Jahre 1840 bzw. 1860, wenn dieser (Fn. 51), S. 184 – mit seinem schon ganz empirisch verengten Tatsachenbegriff seiner Zeit – bei der kantischen Wendung vom „Factum der Vernunft“ einen unerklärlichen Wider­ sinn ausgemacht haben will: „Was soll man bei diesem seltsamen Ausdruck sich denken? Das Faktische wird sonst überall dem aus reiner Vernunft Erkennbaren entgegengesetzt. […] Dabei nun sei man eingedenk, daß er [sc. Kant] jede anthropologische Begründung, jede Nachweisung des kategorischen Imperativs als einer Tatsache des Bewusstseins in der Grundlegung ausdrücklich und wiederholt ablehnt, weil sie empirisch sein würde.“ Denn Schopenhauer ist mit seiner Faktizitätsvorstellung begrifflich weit davon entfernt, die vom Subjekt ausgehende Selbst­tätigkeit im Factumsbegriff vernünftig zu erschließen. Es seien hier darum nur einmal einige merkwürdige und zu Bedenken gegebene gedankliche Ähnlichkeiten in der Kantinterpretation Schopenhauers sowie Henrichs ausdrücklich vermerkt, die wohl auf ihrer gemeinsamen begrifflichen Ersetzung von „Factum“ durch „Faktizität“ beruhen: In der Sache bemerken nämlich sowohl Schopenhauer (ebd., S. 195) als auch Henrich (oben Fn. 128) zunächst (1.), dass der kategorische Imperativ nicht eigentlich das oberste Prinzip der kantischen Moralphilosophie sein könne, obwohl sie davon ausgehen, dass er von Kant als solcher gedacht sei. Sodann (2.) schätzen beide Denker die Systematik der beiden Grundlegungsschriften zur kantischen Moralphilosophie mit Blick auf Kants geistige Verfassung auffällig eigentümlich ein. Während Henrich (oben Fn. 131) von einer (allerdings nicht schon der letzten) geistigen Umkehr des reifen Kant im Progress von der GMS (1785) hin zur KpV (1788) ausgeht, sieht Schopenhauer hier eine fortschreitende geistige Umnachtung des Meisters am Werk (ebd., S. 158 f.). Überdies sieht Letzterer bereits in der methodologisch populär angelegten Schrift von 1785 die wissenschaftlich strenge Form umgesetzt, die eigentlich erst die Schrift von 1788 verfolgt. Ferner (3.) meint Schopenhauer (ebd., S. 181), die praktische Vernunft sei für Kant ohne weiteres mit der theoretischen Vernunft identisch, während Henrich (oben Fn. 211) auf der Grundlage der kantischen Philosophie eine Rekonstruktion des sittlichen Bewusstseins aus der theoretischen Vernunft für sachlich weiterführend hält. Schließlich (4.) fungiert Fichte in der praktischen Philosophie für Schopenhauer (ebd., S. 220 ff.) als „Vergrößerungsspiegel“ der vermeintlichen

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Soll gegen solche Verkehrung ein philosophisch belastbares Verständnis der kantischen Moralphilosophie und ihrer Grundlegung künftig allerdings überhaupt erst wieder möglich sein, so bedarf es einer gründlichen etymologischen Wende im Verständnis des Factumsbegriffs, und zwar vom Paradigma der eigentlich gar nicht intelligibel bestimmbaren „Faktizität“ des sittlichen Bewusstseins hin zum reinen praktischen Selbstbewusstsein eines freien Willens im Grundgesetz der reinen praktischen Vernunft. So manche wortreich beklagte Dunkelheit im bisher leidenschaftlich umstrittenen Verständnis der Grundlegung kantischer Moralphilosophie dürfte alsdann in nicht allzu ferner Zukunft gehoben werden. In ungebrochener Kontinuität existenter Erzählperspektiven bewahrheitete sich dagegen lediglich weiterhin die von Bittner / Cramer einmal in einem Vorwort zu einer Materialsammlung zu Kants KpV eingestellte Prophezeiung: „Aber diese ununterbrochene Wirksamkeit bringt es auch mit sich, daß sich Interpretations- und Beurteilungsschemata, einmal entwickelt und weitergegeben, bei der Flucht der Zeit stereotypisieren und zu Meinungen über Inhalt und Wert einer Theorie gerinnen, deren Verfestigung mit der Abnahme der Bereitwilligkeit zu genauer Analyse der Texte parallel geht. Man versteht von einer philosophischen Theorie genau nur so viel, wie man von der internen Struktur ihres Begründungsganges wahrgenommen hat; was aber diese Struktur ist, wird durch solche Meinungen überdeckt oder vielmehr in eine Ferne gesetzt, in der nicht mehr wahrgenommen werden kann.“260 Ist die vermeinte Faktizität der Vernunft allerdings in der Tat das letzte Wort des sittlichen Bewusstseins, wird man schnell über Kant hinauszuwachsen meinen261 und so steht die kantische Philosophie insgesamt zum (übereilten) Abschuss bereit: „Umso deutlicher wird aber auch, daß der Grund zur Kritik nur entfällt, wenn man zugleich die Grundzüge der gesamten Kantischen Philosophie und ihrer Theorie der Subjektivität in Frage stellt“,262 denn es „ist die Haltbarkeit dieser Bewußtseinseinstellung zu prüfen, in der Vernunft rein nur als Spontaneität und zugleich Fehler Kants, während derselbe Fichte für Henrich (unten Fn. 262) in der praktischen Philosophie eher die Rolle eines seinerseits selbstredend defizitären Vollenders Kants darstellt. 260  In: Materialen zu Kants ‚Kritik der praktischen Vernunft‘, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1975, S. 9. 261  Siehe nur Henrichs Zusammenfassung seines gedanklichen Zugriffs (in: „Die Deduktion des Sittengesetzes …“ [Fn. 6], S. 55 [108 ff.]): „Das Ergebnis der Interpretation der ‚Grundlegung‘ aus den Quellen der Unklarheit in Kants Gedanken kann man nun so zusammenfassen: Kant hat insgesamt sieben Unterscheidungen nicht gemacht, die allesamt nötig sind, um seiner praktischen Philosophie eine sichere systematische Form zu geben. [1. … 7.].“ – „Denn Kant hat den wahrlich komplexen Zusammenhang der Argumentation […] zur Zeit der Niederschrift der ‚Grundlegung‘ ebensowenig durchschaut wie die Struktur der Argumente und des Textes, die er in dieser Schrift wirklich ausgearbeitet hat.“ (99). 262  In diesem Sinne Henrich, „Das Problem der Grundlegung der Ethik …“ (Fn. 6), S. 350 (372), wo es (374 f.) weiter heißt, eine „überzeugende Theorie der Subjektivität im Vollzuge des Faktums der Vernunft“ setze voraus, dass „eine Vernunft angenommen werden könnte, die in sich Faktizität zu vollziehen imstande ist“, und eine solche Theorie sei schließlich von Fichte ausgearbeitet worden (375 ff., 383 ff.): „Fichtes Beweis würde, wenn er zwingend wäre, der Kantischen Theorie über die Achtung fürs Gesetz und das Faktum der Vernunft die Begründung

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als unausdenkbare Faktizität gedacht und gelebt sein soll. Obgleich dabei Kants philosophische Position im ganzen in Frage stünde, können aber solche Überlegungen nicht mehr von Begriffen und Theoremen geleitet werden, die Kant selber formuliert hat.“263 Tatsächlich dürfte sich dieses Anliegen, über Kant hinausgehen zu wollen, jedoch als ein schmerzlicher Rückfall hinter den bereits mit Kant erreichten Stand im Denken ausnehmen. 2. Ausblick auf Fichtes „Thathandlung“ Mit der gegenwärtig kanonisch gewordenen Verzeichnung der kantischen Wendung vom „Factum der Vernunft“ steht die moderne und in ihrer Geschichtserzählung besonders um Originalität bemühte Kantforschung, die nicht selten jede zeitlich spätere Äußerung Kants zum Freiheitsbegriff als gedanklich-aktionistische Abweichung von seinen zeitlich früheren Äußerungen in mehr oder weniger selbstkritischer Absicht verstanden wissen will,264 in ihrem sohin durchaus als ambivalent zu bezeichnenden Aneignungsbemühen um diesen scheinbar bis zuletzt sich selbst nicht so recht verstehenden Philosophen von Weltrang, zugleich in einer lange geübten Tradition. So ging (vermutlich) mit Hermann Andreas Pistorius – seines Zeichens ein gemäßigter Skeptiker und Übersetzer der Schriften David Humes – beispielsweise bereits ein zeitgenössischer Rezensent der KpV von einer „Deduction der Grundsätze reiner praktischer Vernunft“ aus und äußerte erste Zweifel an der von ihm vermeinten Auffassung Kants, die gesamte Moralphilosophie sei mit dem „Factum der Vernunft“ auf einer bloßen und noch dazu kontingenten Tatsache des Bewusstseins (in der modernen Bedeutung dieses Wortes) zu gründen.265 Kann man einem solchen dem Lager des Empirismus zuneigenden geben, die ihnen fehlt.“ (385). Da er dies aber tatsächlich nicht sei, habe „Hegel das Prinzip der Deduktion erneut verändern müssen“ (385). 263  Henrich, „Die Deduktion des Sittengesetzes …“ (Fn. 6), S. 55 (112). 264  Siehe in einer solchen Tendenz beispielsweise Ludwig, „Die Freiheit des Willens und die Freiheit zum Bösen. Inhaltliche Inversionen und terminologische Ausdifferenzierungen in Kants Moralphilosophie zwischen 1781 und 1797“ (Fn. 12), S. 227 – 268. 265  In: (Fn. 20), S. 78 (79, 89 ff., 94 ff.). – So ist es in der Sache übrigens wenig verwunderlich, dass „Kants vergessener Rezensent“ (so der Titel des von Gesang herausgegebenen Bandes, Hamburg: Meiner, 2007) in jüngerer Vergangenheit von der modernen Kantforschung neu entdeckt wurde: Ludwig hat nämlich in seinem sehr originellen Aufsatz „Die „consequente Denkungsart der speculativen Kritik“ – Kants radikale Umgestaltung seiner Freiheitslehre im Jahre 1786 und die Folgen für die Kritische Philosophie als Ganze“ (in: oben Fn. 12, S. 595 ff.) – wie schon dieser Titel verrät – eine „etwas weiter ausgreifende und […] noch nicht erprobte Antwort vorgestellt“, nach der gedanklich kein Stein auf dem anderen bleibt. Denn gemäß seiner Erzählung, deren Prämisse (ebd., 603, 609, u.ö.) die von ihm wohl auf den Marburger Cohen-Schüler und Neukantianer Natorp (AA V: 493 f.) gestützte Annahme eines spekulativen Beweisversuchs der Freiheit in der GMS darstellt, soll sich der folglich bis ins Jahr 1785 in praktischen Fragen vermeintlich noch unkritische Autor der KrV durch eine Rezension Pistorius’ von „Schulzes Erläuterungen zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft“ im Jahre 1786 gezwungen gesehen haben, seine „Moralepistemologie des Dritten Abschnitts der Grund­

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Kritiker der ersten Stunde allerdings noch zugutehalten, dass der Factumsbegriff mit der synonymischen Wortneuschöpfung des Begriffs der Tatsache gerade zur Zeit dieses Rezensenten einem erheblichen Bedeutungswandel unterworfen war, so gilt dies für die gegenwärtigen Aneignungsbemühungen im zeitlichen Abstand von mehr als 200 Jahren wohl nicht ohne weiteres.266 Vielmehr offenbart sich in diesen Bemühungen ein nicht ganz unerheblicher Rezeptionsmangel, durch den es verborgen bleiben musste, dass sich mit Fichte ein unmittelbarer idealistischer Nachfolger Kants nicht bloß zufällig einer ganz ähnlichen Terminologie zur Bezeichnung des philosophischen Anfangs im Selbstbewusstsein bediente. O. Schwemmer hat hingegen einmal darauf hingewiesen, dass Kant den Tätigkeitsbegriff des „facto“ einmal in einer nachgelassenen Reflexion mit dem später von Fichte benutzten Begriff der „Tathandlung“ synonym gebraucht hat.267 Eine gedanklich naheliegende Anknüpfung Fichtes, der sein ihm mitunter unverständig erscheinendes Publikum bekanntlich zum Verstehen zwingen wollte,268 mit diesem gleichsam auch eine Gewaltsamkeit ausdrückenden Begriff der „Tathandlung“269 an den kantischen Begriffsgebrauch vom „Factum der Vernunft“ wäre daher in einer künftigen Arbeit einmal genauer zu untersuchen. Der Begriff der Tatsache – in all seinen möglichen und gewiss nicht stets hinreichend unterschiedenen Bedeutungsebenen – wäre dann möglicherweise ein bislang noch überhaupt gar nicht als solcher angesehener legung […] vollständig zu verwerfen und durch etwas gänzlich Neues zu ersetzen“. Doch auch für die Tatsache, dass der mit der idealistischen Philosophie fremdelnde Pistorius auf diese vermeintlichen Änderungen Kants in späteren Rezensionen zur zweiten Auflage der KrV sowie zur ersten Auflage der KpV nicht zu sprechen kommt, ist Ludwig (ebd., 612 Fn. 31) nicht um die nächstliegende Erklärung verlegen, denn es sei „Pistorius vollständig entgangen, was er angerichtet hatte“. – Tatsächlich dürfte Pistorius allerdings gar nichts angerichtet haben, sondern in seiner erstgenannten Rezension lediglich die das Paralogismenkapitel betreffende und von Kant für die Vernunft im theoretischen Gebrauch (1781/1787) unerklärliche sowie für dieselbe im praktischen Gebrauch (1785/1788) schon positiv beantwortete Frage (siehe oben III. 5. d) sowie g)) aufgeworfen haben, wie denn ein reines Selbstbewusstsein positiv zu denken sei. Dass aus bloßen Begriffen (d. h. Gedankenformen) vom Ich bzw. bloßen Verstandeskategorien keine positive Gegenstandserkenntnis (d. h. das Bewusstsein der Realität des Begriffsgegenstandes) und mithin auch keine theoretische Selbst- oder Freiheitserkenntnis folgt, war Kant mit der ersten Auflage seiner KrV (1781) in allen Konsequenzen völlig klar, und so zeichnet auch Ludwigs Geschichte – jedenfalls aus der hier vertretenen Perspektive betrachtet – wohl lediglich den Umriss eines zeitlebens unreifen Denkers von absolutem Weltrang. 266  Es ist vielleicht auch bezeichnend für das Gegenwartverständnis des Deutschen Idealismus, dass Ameriks, Kant and the Fate of Autonomy, Cambridge: University Press, 2000, S. 187 ff. erst seine Ausführungen zu dem im fichteschen Begriff der „Tathandlung“ zum Ausdruck kommenden Primat der praktischen Vernunft mit dem oben im Text zitierten Goethewort („Im Anfang war die Tat!“) in Verbindung zu bringen weiß, nicht aber das kantische „Factum der Vernunft“. 267  Schwemmer, Philosophie der Praxis, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1971, S. 198 Fn. 27 (Hinweis auf Refl. Nr. 7747, AA XIX: 506). 268  Fichte, „Sonnenklarer Bericht […] über das eigentliche Wesen der neuesten Philosophie – Ein Versuch, die Leser zum Verstehen zu zwingen“ (1801), in: Lauth / Gliwitzky (Hrsg.), GABAdW I/7, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann, 1988, S. 183 ff. 269  Vgl. schon oben Fn. 46.

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Schlüsselbegriff in der geistesgeschichtlichen Einordnung der Konstellationen des nachkantischen Idealismus:270 Denn in seiner – für sein eigenes Denken ganz maßgeblichen – Rezension (1794) von Gottlob Ernst Schulzes „Aenesidemus“ (1792) gibt sich Fichte – dessen Empirismuseinwand 271 gegen Reinholds Satz des Bewusstseins272 modifizierend – gegen den von ihm so aufgefassten Reinhold davon überzeugt, dass der Satz des Bewusstseins als oberster Grundsatz aller Philosophie nicht in einer zwar analytisch-regressiv höchsten, aber doch zuletzt bloßen Tatsache des Bewusstseins, sondern vielmehr in einer dieser noch vorgängigen Tathandlung bestehen müsse:273 „Der 270  Siehe für eine erste Untersuchung der ursprünglich allesamt juristisch geprägten Begriffe „Factum / Tatsache / Tathandlung“ für die Zeit um 1800 einstweilen Holland, „Facts Are What One Makes of Them: Constructing the Faktum in the Enlightenment and Early German Romanticism“, in: Lehleiter (Hrsg.), Fact and Fiction, Toronto: University Press, 2016, S. 33 (35 – 37), wo es resümierend auch heißt: „The proliferation of the fact and its potential confusion does not abate by the late eigtheenth century, […]. At the same time, however, the fact in its multiple forms becomes a key term in philosophy, […]: yet the degree to which Kant, Fichte, and their followers ultimately subjugate the Factum (as well as the Tatsache and the Tathand­ lung) to their philosophical projects for their own purposes varies greatly.“ 271  Schulze (anonym), Aenesidemus oder über die Fundamente der von dem Herrn Prof. Reinhold in Jena gelieferten Elementarphilosophie, ohne Ort und Verlag, 1792, S. 70 ff. 272  Reinhold, Beyträge zur Berichtigung bisheriger Mißverständnisse der Philosophen I, Jena: Mauke, 1790, S. 142 ff. charakterisiert die Tatsache (d. h. das Faktum) im Satz des Bewusstseins wohl als eine Tatsache des Bewusstseins (genitivus objectivus), wenn er in seiner „Erörterung“ des „Begriffes vom allgemeingeltenden Grundsatze der Philosophie“ notiert, dieser Grundsatz müsse „durchaus keines Raisonnements bedürfen um wahr befunden zu werden, und in wieferne ein solcher Satz nur ein Faktum ausdrücken kann, muß er selbst ein Faktum ausdrücken.. […] Dieses Faktum muß allen Menschen zu allen Zeiten und unter allen Umständen […] durch die bloße Reflexion einleuchten. […] Dieses Faktum muß in uns selbst vorgehen, und da es, wenn es allgemein einleuchtend seyn soll, weder an eine bestimmte Erfahrung noch an ein gewisses Raisonnement gebunden seyn darf, muß es deshalb alle möglichen Erfahrungen und alle Gedanken, deren wir uns bewußt seyn können, begleiten können. […] Dieses Faktum kann eben darum in nichts anderm als Im Bewußtseyn selbst bestehn, und der Satz, durch den es ausgedrückt wird, muß dieß Bewußtseyn, soweit dasselbe vorstellbar ist, ausdrücken. […] Dieser Satz heißt: Die Vorstellung wird im Bewußtseyn vom Vorgestellten und Vorstellenden unterschieden und auf beyde bezogen.“ – Zur näheren Charakterisierung dieser Tatsache siehe auch ebd., S. 218 f. sowie Bondeli, Das Anfangsproblem bei Karl Leonhard Reinhold, Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 1995, S. 55 f.: „Der Satz des Bewußtseins steht weder für die Tatsache, daß es Bewußtsein gibt, noch für irgendeine ausgezeichnete Tatsache, die uns vermöge des Bewußtseins gegeben wird. Vielmehr bringt er nichts anderes zum Ausdruck als die Tatsache des Bewußtseins, d. h. diejenige Struktur, die schon vorliegt, wenn wir uns etwas bewußt sind; diejenige Struktur, die mit all unseren Bewußtseinsakten gegeben ist. Daß es überhaupt Bewußtseins gibt, wird damit freilich vorausgesetzt. Aber diese Tatsache wird nicht durch die gemeinte Tatsache des Bewußtseins selbst gerechtfertigt. […] Das Bewußtsein wird als Bewußtsein von etwas gefaßt. […].“ Vgl. ebd., S. 56 ff. auch die verschiedenen Fassungen des Satzes vom Bewusstsein im gedanklichen Progress Reinholds. 273 Zu dieser „Doppelrolle“ Fichtes „in statu nascendi“ seiner eigenen „Wissenschaftslehre“ kritisch weiterführend Bondeli, „Zu Fichtes Kritik an Reinholds »empirischem« Satz des Bewußtseins und ihrer Vorgeschichte“, in: Fichte-Studien 9 (1997), S. 199 (206 ff.); ders. (Fn. 272), S. 190 – 202.

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Satz des Bewustseyns, an die Spitze der gesammten Philosophie gestellt, gründet sich demnach auf empirische Selbstbeobachtung, und sagt allerdings eine Abstraction aus. Freylich fühlt jeder, der diesen Satz wohl versteht, einen innern Widerstand, demselben bloß empirische Gültigkeit beyzumessen.274 Aber eben das deutet darauf hin, daß er sich noch auf etwas anderes gründen müsse, als auf eine bloße Thatsache. […] Die erste unrichtige Voraussetzung, welche seine Aufstellung zum Grundsatze aller Philosophie veranlaßte, war wohl die, daß man von einer Thatsache ausgehen müsse. Allerdings müssen wir einen realen, und nicht bloß formalen, Grundsatz haben; aber ein solcher muß nicht eben eine Thatsache, er kann auch eine Thathandlung ausdrücken; […].“275 Da Fichte den Begriff der Tatsache hier und anderenorts276 zwar nicht an, jedoch für sich offenbar im schon ganz modernen Sinne einer empirischen „Thatsache“ des Bewusstseins (genitivus objectivus) verstehen will,277 die lediglich Objekt für das Bewusstsein ist, setzt er ihm folgerichtig seinen Begriff der „Thathandlung“, ohne die dem Subjekt keine empirische Tatsache als Gegenstand seines Bewusstseins objektiv möglich ist, entgegen und in dieser Entgegensetzung schon voraus. Die fichtesche Tathandlung fängt also begrifflich das – in dem von ihm und Reinhold bereits in moderner Verkürzung gebrauchten Tatsachenbegriff 278 insofern für sich nicht mehr vorhandene – spontane Tätigkeitsmoment (‚facere‘) des Bewusstseinssubjekts selbst auf; die „Thathandlung“ fungiert mithin als an sich völlig 274 Hierzu Fichte, „Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre“, in: Lauth / Jacob (Hrsg.), GABAdW I/2, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann, 1965, S. 258.18 – 24: „Es ist demnach Erklärungsgrund aller Thatsachen des empirischen Bewußtseyns, daß vor allem Setzen im Ich vorher das Ich selbst gesezt sey. – (Aller Thatsachen, sage ich: und das hängt vom Beweise des Satzes ab, daß X. die höchste Thatsache des empirischen Bewußtseyns sey, und in allen enthalten sey: welcher wohl ohne allen Beweis zugegeben werden dürfte, ohnerachtet die ganze Wissenschaftslehre sich damit beschäftigt, ihn zu erweisen.“ 275  Fichte, „Rezension Aenesidemus“, in: Lauth / Jacob (Hrsg.), GABAdW I/2, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann, 1965, S. 46. 276  Sodann (1794) zunächst in: „Ueber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre“, in: Lauth / Jacob (Hrsg.), GABAdW I/2, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann, 1965, S. 112 ff., wo er „Thatsache“ und „Faktum“ im empirischen Sinne synonym verwendet; und schließlich in (Fn. 274), besonders S. 255 ff. (§ 1). 277  Fichtes empirisch reduzierter Gebrauch des Tatsachenbegriffs deckt sich insofern nicht mit dem kantischen Gebrauch des kritischen Tatsachenbegriffs; zu dieser Feststellung schon oben unter III. 5. c) bb). 278  Vgl. für Reinholds unkritischen Begriffsgebrauch schon oben zu Fn. 194, 195. Allerdings schreibt Reinhold, der 1785 für die kritische Philosophie sich zu interessieren beginnt, schon zu einer Zeit, als die KU 1790 mit ihrer ausdrücklichen Definition des kritischen Tatsachenbegriffs zum Ende des „kritischen Geschäfts“ erst im Erscheinen begriffen ist. Zu Reinholds mitunter auch eher selektiven Interpretation der kantischen Moralphilosophie siehe daher sehr erhellend auch Onnasch (Fn. 195), S. LV ff., der (S. LVII) resümiert: „Man darf es für bemerkenswert halten, daß große Teile, auch der modernen Reinhold-Forschung Reinholds Philosophie immer noch als Kantianismus handeln, obwohl ein bereits flüchtiger Blick in die Briefe über die Kantische Philosophie jemanden eines Besseren belehren müßte.“ Dazu auch Zöller, „Von Reinhold zu Kant“, in: Archivio di filosfia 73 (2005), S. 91 ff.

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intelligible Tatsache des Bewusstseins (genitivus subjectivus) im ursprünglichen Selbstverhältnis: „Also das Setzen des Ich durch sich selbst ist die reine Thätigkeit desselben. – Das Ich sezt sich selbst, und es ist, vermöge dieses bloßen Setzens durch sich selbst; und umgekehrt: Das Ich ist, und sezt sein Seyn, vermöge seines bloßen Seyns. – Es ist zugleich das Handelnde, und das Produkt der Handlung; das Thätige, und das, was durch die Thätigkeit hervorgebracht wird; Handlung, und That sind Eins und eben dasselbe; und daher ist das: Ich bin, Ausdruck einer Thathandlung; aber auch der einzigen möglichen, wie sich aus der ganzen Wissenschaftslehre ergeben muß.“279 Mit diesem begrifflichen Geniestreich, der das kantische „Factum“ vergleichbar als „Thathandlung“ ansetzt und damit eine gewiss bestehende Dunkelheit in Reinholds unkritischem Gebrauch des Tatsachenbegriffs280 zur gänzlichen Klarheit aufhebt, vermochte es der junge Fichte schließlich, aus seiner schon modernen deutschsprachlichen Warte heraus und doch zugleich ganz in den gedanklichen Bahnen kantischen Denkens, das eine Spontanität und mithin einen Anfang im Bewusstsein wohl kaum aus einer bloß empirischen Tatsache heraus begreiflich zu machen suchen würde, den insofern berechtigten Einwand des „Aenesidemus“ – nach anfänglicher Verwirrung281 – kritisch aufzunehmen, ohne zugleich auch von seinem mit Reinhold in der Sache geteilten Begründungsanliegen einer wahrhaft kritischen bzw. idealistischen Philosophie Abstand nehmen zu müssen.282 Dieses Kant- und Selbstverständnis Fichtes kommt schließlich auch bereits in einem Brief vom 06. 12. 1793 an Niethammer zum Ausdruck: „Kant stützt das Sittengesetz auf eine Thatsache (richtig, wenn es richtig verstanden wird) und seine Nachfolger glauben sich dadurch berechtigt, allenthalben, wo ihnen das Beweisen und Erklären etwas sauer ankommt zu einer Thatsache foi d’auteur ihre Zuflucht zu nehmen, ohne zu bedenken, daß das gleiche Recht auch ihren Gegnern zukommen müsse, und daß mithin jeder Unsinn aus irgend einer angeblichen Thatsache, für die kein weiterer Beweis gegeben wird, sondern bei der sich jeder auf sein Bewußt279  Fichte (Fn. 274), S. 259.03 – 10; ebd., S. 293.07 – 14 heißt es weiter: „Es ist sehr nöthig, sich den Begrif der Thätigkeit sich hier ganz rein zu denken. Es kann durch denselben nichts bezeichnet werden, was nicht in dem absoluten Setzen des Ich durch sich selbst enthalten ist; […]. Es ist demnach klar, daß […] auch von allem Objekte der Thätigkeit völlig zu abstrahieren ist.“ 280  Bondeli (Fn. 272), S. 57 spricht mit Blick auf die zunächst „unproblematisch scheinende Tatsache des Bewußtseins“ von einem „Vexierbild“, das sich einstellt, „sobald sie in eine gemeinverständliche sprachliche Form gefaßt werden soll“. Vgl. ebd., S. 196. 281  Fichte, Brief (Nr. 171) vom Dezember 1793 an Stephani, in: Lauth / Jacob (Hrsg.), ­GABAdW III/2, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann, 1970, S. 27 (28): „Haben Sie den Aenesidemus gelesen? Er hat mich eine geraume Zeit verwirrt, Reinhold bei mir umgestürzt, Kant mir verdächtig gemacht, und mein ganzes System von Grund aus umgestürzt.“ 282  Fichte, Brief (Nr. 178) vom 15. Januar 1794 an Anna Henriette Schütz (in: Fn. 281), S. 49 (50): „Ich denke seit einiger Zeit gar sehr darauf, der Philosophie […] eine geschmeidigere und besonders eine teutsche Mundart zu verschaffen. Neue Worte bilden, schon vorhandene für eine besondere Bedeutung ausschließend bestimmen, – das wird unumgänglich nothwendig seyn.“

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seyn beruft, bewiesen werden könne; ohne darthun zu können, warum sie mehr Glauben verlangen als ihre Gegner. – Es giebt nur Eine ursprüngliche Thatsache des menschlichen Geistes, welche die allgemeine Philosophie […] begründet. Kant weiß sie gewiß, aber er hat sie nirgends gesagt; wer sie finden wird, wird Philosophie als Wissenschaft darstellen.“283 3. Fazit der Untersuchung Der begriffsgeschichtlich nachweisbare, reduktionistische Bedeutungswandel im Begriff der Tatsache (Factum bzw. Faktum), wie er sich in der zweiten Hälfte des 18. Jh., nämlich unmittelbar nach Schöpfung dieses deutschen Wortes im Jahre 1756 durch Spalding, zu ereignen beginnt, darf in seiner Wucht, damit er die jüngere Generation der zeitgenössischen Kantinterpreten, und zwar mitunter noch vor Veröffentlichung der dritten Kritik (1790), die einen kritischen Tatsachenbegriff gegen diese reduktionistische Tendenz erst ausdrücklich definiert, offenbar bereits im Jahre 1789284 erfasst hat, in der Beurteilung des kantischen sowohl als nachkantischen Idealismus wohl kaum unterschätzt werden. Wahrlich nicht ohne Grund bereitet nämlich beispielsweise der englischsprachigen Rezeption und Edition der Werke Fichtes die dort notwendige Übersetzung des Begriffs der „Tatsache“, und zwar im Verhältnis zum Begriff der „Tathandlung“, nicht unerhebliche und insgesamt an die Wendung vom „Factum der Vernunft“ („fact of reason“) erinnernde Probleme, wie Paul Franks285 schon vor einiger Zeit berichtete.286 Der moderne Begriff der Tatsache ist aber weder identisch mit dem fichteschen Begriff der „Thathandlung“, noch mit dem kantischen Begriff vom „Factum der Vernunft“, sodass die zum ausgehenden 18. Jh. sich ereignende Bedeutungsverschiebung vom ursprünglichen Factum zum modernen Faktum im Begriff der Tatsache in Rechnung zu stellen ist, wenn die kantische Freiheitslehre im Verhältnis zu ihren idealistischen Nachfolgern zutreffend begriffen sein will. Denn mit dem ursprünglichen Bedeutungsgehalt des Begriffs vom „Factum der Vernunft“ dreht sich das moderne Begriffs- und Kantverständnis an diesem Punkt der Freiheitslehre um ziemlich genau 180 Grad.

  Fichte, Brief Nr. 169 (in: Fn. 281), S. 19 (21).  Vgl. Reinhold, Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögens, Prag / Jena: Widtmann & Mauke, 1789. 285  Franks, „Freedom, Tatsache and Tathandlung in the Development of Fichte’s Jena Wis­ senschaftslehre“, in: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 79 (1997), S. 310 (318 ff.), der (320) auch auf die mögliche Gemeinsamkeit von Kants „Factum der Vernunft“ und Fichtes „Tathandlung“ hinweist. 286 Vgl. dazu Thomas-Fogiel, „Tatsache, Tathandlung“, in: Cassin (Hrsg.), Dictionary of Untranslatables, Princeton / Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2014, S. 1113  ff., die Kants kritischen Tatsachenbegriff allerdings zu eng und Fichtes Tathandlungsbegriff irrigerweise als Neologismus ausweist. 283 284

„Man kann das Bewußtsein dieses Grundgesetzes ein Factum der Vernunft nennen“ 427

Summary A text of intellectual history can only be understood in the time following in so far as the readers are still able to ascribe a certain meaning and content to the historic terms that are used within. With that in mind, this paper examines a notion used by Kant to explain his doctrine of freedom in the “Critique of Practical Reason” (1788), namely the one of the “factum of reason”. Since the notion of “factum” changed at the turn of the 18th to the 19th century from an imputation based meaning in legal terminology (factum as deed by the subject of the will), to an epistemological meaning used in everyday language (factum as fact for the perceiving subject of the mind), the modern interpretation of Kant’s doctrine of freedom misses this element of activity in the Kantian notion of the “factum of reason” and reduces its meaning to a mere and quite modern sounding “facticity of reason”. However, based on the original meaning of the term, the concept of the Kantian “factum” is not comprehended as some kind of facticity of moral obligation, but as a “deed of the reason”, namely its legislative activity performed in and for itself within its pure practical self-relation (i.e. autonomy). An interpretation that takes into account conceptual history therefore leads to new insights into the conceptual constitution of the Kantian doctrine of freedom, also enlightening its relation to post-Kantian idealists, since it makes it seem less coincidental that only a few years later (1794), Fichte introduces his “Thathandlung” of the subject.

Zwei problematische Aspekte beim Whistleblowing: Abwägungen und der Begriff des öffentlichen Interesses Robert Brockhaus

Einführung Kaum ein anderes Phänomen der jüngsten Geschichte illustriert Kollisionen zwischen Informationsinteressen der Öffentlichkeit und staatlichen oder privaten Geheimhaltungsinteressen kontrastreicher als das Whistleblowing. Das Recht wird mit ihrer Auflösung konfrontiert, wenn gefordert wird, Whistleblower wegen der Verletzung arbeitsrechtlicher, beamtenrechtlicher oder strafrechtlicher Verschwiegenheitspflichten zu sanktionieren. In verschiedenen Rechtsordnungen und auf der Ebene des internationalen Rechts wird versucht, die Interessenkollisionen durch Abwägungen aufzulösen, wobei man sich häufig des Topos des überwiegenden öffentlichen Interesses bedient. Die damit einhergehende Unvorhersehbarkeit gerichtlicher Entscheidungen gerät dabei leicht aus dem Blickfeld. Gerade im Strafrecht stellt sich schon wegen des Gesetzlichkeitsprinzips die Frage, ob der im internationalen Trend liegende Lösungsansatz das Mittel der Wahl sein kann. Im Folgenden wird im ersten Teil zunächst auf den Begriff der Geheimhaltungsund Informationsinteressen, ihren rechtlichen Schutz und die sich zwischen ihnen einstellenden Kollisionen eingegangen. Anschließend werden im zweiten Teil nach geltendem Recht bestehende oder denkbare Ansätze aufgezeigt, die Kollisionen mittels Interessenabwägung aufzulösen. Im dritten Teil wird auf der Grundlage des im Verfassungsrecht geführten Diskurses zur Rationalität rechtlichen Abwägens wegen methodologischer Vorbehalte eine auf das Strafrecht zugeschnittene Abwägungskritik herausgearbeitet, die in zwei abwägungsskeptische Postulate mündet. Alsdann wird im vierten Teil der Vexierfrage nachgegangen, ob öffentliche Interessen aus der Perspektive der Rechtsanwendenden erkannt oder bestimmt werden können, was zu zwei weiteren kritischen Postulaten führt. Abschließend werden, ausgehend von den aufgestellten vier Postulaten, mögliche Auswege aus den mit den Abwägungen und dem Begriff des öffentlichen Interesses verbundenen Problemen vorgeschlagen.

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I. Kollisionen rechtlich geschützter Geheimhaltungsund Informationsinteressen Die Begriffe des Geheimhaltungs- und des Informationsinteresses lassen sich aus einer Analyse des Begriffs „Geheimnis“ entwickeln. Ein Geheimnis konstituiert sich regelmäßig durch zwei faktische Beziehungen. Die eine faktische Beziehung ist notwendig und zeichnet sich durch die Unkenntnis einer Personenmehrheit oder aller Personen von dem Geheimnisgegenstand aus. Die andere faktische Beziehung wird durch die Kenntnis eines oder mehrerer Subjekte von dem Geheimnisgegenstand begründet, sie ist für den Geheimnisbegriff allerdings nicht notwendig, da es Geheimnisse gibt, die allen Menschen unbekannt sind. Kennen mehrere Subjekte den Geheimnisgegenstand, darf ihr Kreis nicht zu groß werden, denn ab einem bestimmten Punkt gilt der Geheimnisgegenstand nicht mehr als geheim, sondern als allgemein bekannt oder offenkundig. In der Regel wird ein Geheimnis jedoch auch durch ein Interesse, d. h. eine normative Beziehung geprägt. Unter einem Interesse kann eine „Anteilnahme (positive Bezogenheit) eines Subjekts an einem Gegenstand“ verstanden werden.1 Ein tatsächliches Geheimhaltungsinteresse besteht dann, wenn der wissende Personenkreis den Geheimnisgegenstand geheim halten will, d. h., wenn sein Wille darauf gerichtet ist, die faktischen Beziehungen aufrechtzuerhalten. Von einem hypothetischen Geheimhaltungsinteresse ist auszugehen, wenn der wissende Personenkreis die faktische Beziehung mutmaßlich aufrechterhalten will, wodurch sich schon abzeichnet, dass es auch ein vom Subjekt gelöstes objektives Interesse geben könnte. Demgegenüber besteht ein Informa­ tionsinteresse, wenn der unwissende Personenkreis von den ihm verborgenen Tatsachen Kenntnis erlangen will, wobei auch hier ein hypothetisches Informationsinteresse vorliegen kann, etwa wenn der unwissende Personenkreis nicht einmal ahnt, dass ihm bestimmte Informationen vorenthalten werden. 1. Rechtlicher Schutz von Geheimhaltungsinteressen Es lassen sich zwei Arten von Rechtsnormen zum Schutz von Geheimhaltungsinteressen unterscheiden. Die Rechtsnormen der einen Art begründen Verschwiegenheitspflichten, die als positiv geheimnisschützend bezeichnet werden können, da sie primär den Schutz der Geheimnisse vor ihrer Aufdeckung bezwecken. Dazu zählen etwa die geheimnisschützenden Strafvorschriften §§ 93 ff.; 203; 353b; 355 1  Winfried Kluth, in: Wolff / Bachof / Stober / Kluth, Verwaltungsrecht I, 13. Aufl., München 2017, § 29 Rn. 3. In der Philosophie finden sich ähnliche Begriffsbestimmungen, s. etwa Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Urtheilskraft, § 2, Akademieausgabe, Bd. 5, Berlin 1913, S. 204: „Interesse wird das Wohlgefallen genannt, was wir mit der Vorstellung der Existenz eines Gegenstandes verbinden.“ – Etymologisch lässt sich ein persönlicher Interessenbegriff und ein unpersönlicher, also vom Subjekt gelöster, Interessenbegriff, der sich im Recht entwickelt hat, nachweisen, Friedrich Kluge, Etymologisches Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache, 25. Aufl., Berlin / Boston 2011, „Interesse“.

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StGB; § 17 UWG usw.2, die beamtenrechtlichen Verschwiegenheitspflichten nach § 67 BBG bzw. § 37 BeamtStG und die aus der Loyalitätspflicht abgeleitete Verschwiegenheitspflicht der in einem Arbeitsverhältnis Beschäftigten nach § 241 Abs. 2 BGB. Ein Geheimhaltungsinteresse wird durch diese Normen regelmäßig indiziert, sodass es auf das Vorliegen eines tatsächlichen Geheimhaltungsinteresses zumeist nicht ankommt.3 Problematisch ist an den Verschwiegenheitspflichten allerdings, dass sie sehr weit reichen und ihre Grenzen oft unscharf sind, weil sich aus ihnen grundsätzlich nicht oder nicht hinreichend klar ergibt, in welchen Fällen ein rechtlich schützenswertes Geheimhaltungsinteresse besteht oder zu verneinen ist.4 Die Rechtsnormen der anderen Art können als negativ geheimnisschützend bezeichnet werden, da sie den Schutz von Geheimnissen nur sekundär bezwecken, indem sie einen an sich bestehenden Informationsanspruch bzw. ein an sich bestehendes Auskunftsrecht ausnahmsweise ausschließen.5 2. Rechtlicher Schutz von Informationsinteressen Informationsinteressen ihrerseits, werden negativ geschützt, wenn gesetzliche oder auf Rechtsprechung beruhende Ausnahmen von den oben genannten Verschwiegenheitspflichten bestehen. Andererseits werden sie positiv und unmittelbar durch Informationsansprüche bzw. Auskunftsrechte geschützt. Dabei kommen gegenüber Privatpersonen zivilrechtliche Ansprüche in Betracht und gegen staatliche Stellen vor allem die sich aus den Informationsfreiheitsgesetzen ergebenden Ansprüche. Ob sich ein allgemeiner Informationsanspruch auch aus Art. 5 Abs. 1 GG ableiten lässt, ist umstritten.6 Daneben werden Informationsinteressen positiv auch   Im Nebenstrafrecht gibt es noch zahlreiche andere geheimnisschützende Straftatbestände.   Bei § 17 UWG wird zwar nach h. M. ein Geheimhaltungswille vorausgesetzt, an ihn werden aber keine strengen Anforderungen gestellt. 4  Ein Ausnahmetatbestand ist in § 93 Abs. 2 StGB geregelt, durch den sog. „illegale“ Staatsgeheimnisse vom strafrechtlichen Schutz grundsätzlich ausgenommen werden (beachte aber § 97a StGB). Schwierigkeiten bereitet der in dem Ausnahmetatbestand verwendete Begriff der freiheitlich demokratischen Grundordnung. Klarer sind die Ausnahmen in § 67 Abs. 2 BBG und § 37 Abs. 2 BeamtStG formuliert, die aber nur auf wenige Fälle Anwendung finden. Bei § 17 UWG ist umstritten ist, ob sich die strafrechtliche Verschwiegenheitspflicht auch auf Gesetzesverstöße bezieht (sog. „illegale“ Geschäftsgeheimnisse). 5  Zu nennen sind hier insbesondere die Ausnahmetatbestände in den Informationsfreiheitsgesetzen, s. etwa §§ 3 – 6 IFG-Bund. 6  Eingehend zu dieser Frage etwa Bernhard W. Wegener, Der geheime Staat, Göttingen 2006, S. 480 ff. – Die Rechtsprechung hat das bisher nur bezüglich von Informationsansprüchen der Presse gegen Bundesbehörden bejaht, da presserechtliche Auskunftsansprüche in den Landespressegesetzen geregelt sind, ein entsprechendes Bundesgesetz aber bisher fehlt, ­BVerwGE 146, 56 (56). – Nach der Watchdog-Rechtsprechung des EGMR kann sich jedoch unter bestimmten Voraussetzungen ein gegen staatliche Stellen gerichteter Informationsanspruch eines Bürgers, der kein Journalist im klassischen Sinne ist, aus der durch Art. 10 Abs. 1 EMRK geschützten Informationsfreiheit ergeben, s. etwa EGMR, Magyar Helsinki Bizottság ./. Ungarn, Urt. v. 08.11.2016 – Az. 18030/11 – Abs. 149 ff. 2 3

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mittelbar geschützt, wenn bei der Bestimmung des sachlichen Schutzbereichs der Meinungsfreiheit auf Informationsinteressen der Öffentlichkeit rekurriert wird. Der Bundesgerichtshof ist etwa in einer Entscheidung bezüglich der Aufdeckung eines Überwachungsprogramms des Bundesamtes für Verfassungsschutz davon ausgegangen, dass Art. 5 Abs. 1 S. 1 GG das Recht umfasse, Missstände, insbesondere Gesetzesverstöße, öffentlich mit dem Ziel ihrer Abstellung zu rügen.7 Im Zusammenhang mit der Spiegel-Affäre legte das Bundesverfassungsgericht die geheimnisschützenden Landesverratsvorschriften im Lichte der Meinungsfreiheit aus und meinte, es könne sich aus Art. 5 Abs. 1 S. 1 GG ein Anrecht der Öffentlichkeit auf Information ergeben.8 Der EGMR geht in seiner Whistleblowing-Rechtsprechung zu der durch Art. 10 Abs. 1 EMRK geschützten Meinungsfreiheit auf die Frage ein, ob die Offenlegung der jeweiligen Informationen im „öffentlichen Interesse“ war.9 Als normativer Anknüpfungspunkt einer beim Whistleblowing in Richtung allgemeiner Informationsinteressen zielenden Auslegung der Meinungsfreiheit bietet sich das aus dem Demokratieprinzip abgeleitete und inzwischen verfassungsrechtlich anerkannte10 Publizitätsprinzip an, dessen theoretische Grundlagen während der Aufklärung – dialektisch zur sich im Absolutismus ausprägenden umfassenden staatlichen Geheimhaltungspraxis – insbesondere von Jeremy Bentham und Immanuel Kant gelegt wurden.11 Der Grundgedanke des Publizitätsprinzips besteht darin, dass Informationen bezüglich staatlicher Handlungen grundsätzlich öffentlich zugänglich sein müssen. Dafür werden verschiedene Gründe angegeben; z. B. müsse das Volk als Souverän in einer Demokratie das Handeln seiner Repräsentanten 7  BGHSt 20, 342 (342 f.). Der Gerichtshof ging jedoch davon aus, dass die Aufdeckung nicht gerechtfertigt war, da es sich – was kontrovers beurteilt wurde – um ein legales Überwachungsprogram gehandelt habe, ibid. (351). 8  BVerfGE 20, 162 (181). 9  S. etwa EGMR, Heinisch ./. Deutschland, Urt. v. 21.07.2011 – Az.: 28274/08 – Abs. 66. 10  S. etwa Bernd Grzeszick, in: Herzog / Herdegen / Scholz / Klein (Hrsg.), Grundgesetz Kommentar, Bd. 3, Art. 20 Rn. 27, 82. El., München 01/2018. 11  Jeremy Bentham, „An Essay on Political Tactics” (Chapter II: Of Publicity), in: John Bowring (Hrsg.), The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Vol. 2, London 1843, S. 310 ff. (Erstveröffentlichung 1791); Immanuel Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, in: Akademieausgabe, Bd. 8, Berlin 1923, S. 341 (381 ff.) (Erstveröffentlichung 1795). – Auf eine denkbare Verbindung zwischen dem philosophisch begründeten Publizitätsprinzip und dem Whistleblowing wurde bereits hingewiesen: Johannes Thumfahrt, „Immanuel Kant 2.0, Mit Wikileaks wird eine alte Utopie der Aufklärung Wirklichkeit. Im Umgang mit der Affäre zeigt sich die Überlegenheit von Demokratien“, in: Die Tageszeitung v. 12.12.2010; Julian Nida-Rümelin, „Demokratie will Öffentlichkeit. Hat Immanuel Kant von Wikileaks geträumt? Der Philosoph hielt radikale Publizität für eine Bedingung des Friedens“, in: Die Zeit v. 16.12.2010; ders., „WikiLeaks und Whistleblowing – oder: Kann Verrat gerecht sein?“, Sternstunde Philosophie, Sendung des Schweizer Fernsehens Kultur v. 20.02.2011. – Die Verbindung zur strafrechtlichen Bewertung hat Jan C. Joerden, „WikiLeaks, Kants ‚Princip der Publicität‘ Whistleblowing und ‚illegale Geheimnisse‘“, in: Byrd / Hruschka / Joerden (Hrsg.), JRE 19, Berlin 2011, S. 227 – 239 hergestellt. In einem ähnlichen strafrechtlichen Kontext hat Werner Maihofer, „Pressefreiheit und Landesverrat, Teil 1“, in: Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 1963, S. 26 (30) auf Kants Publizitätsprinzip hingewiesen.

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evaluieren können und dazu alle relevanten Sachverhalte kennen, zumindest aber erfahren können, damit es auf dieser Grundlage eine fundierte Wahlentscheidung treffen könne. 3. Interessenkollisionen im Recht Zu Kollisionen zwischen Geheimhaltungs- und Informationsinteressen kommt es, wenn sich beide auf denselben Gegenstand beziehen. Das Recht wird vor allem in zwei Konstellationen mit der Auflösung derartiger Kollisionen konfrontiert:12 Entweder eine Person aus dem Kreis der Unwissenden erhebt einen rechtlichen Anspruch auf bestimmte Informationen, über dessen Bestehen entschieden wird, oder aus dem Kreis der Wissenden entschließt sich eine Person, dem unwissenden Personenkreis bisher geheime Informationen zu offenbaren, deren Sanktionierung anschließend gefordert wird. Letztgenannte Personen werden als Whistleblower bezeichnet, wenn sie in einer Organisation (etwa einem Unternehmen oder einer Behörde) arbeiten, von Missständen innerhalb der Organisation Kenntnis erlangen und diese Informationen an andere weitergeben.13 Während die Anzeige der Missstände innerhalb der Organisation (internes Whistleblowing) rechtlich regelmäßig unproblematisch ist, wirft die Weitergabe an außenstehende Personen (externes Whistleblowing) verschiedene Probleme auf.14 Sowohl die faktische als auch die normative Beziehung spitzt sich dabei in besonderer Weise zu, denn die Person gehört einerseits zum Kreis der Geheimnisträger und andererseits entscheidet sie autonom, die Interessenkollision zu Gunsten von Informationsinteressen der Unwissenden aufzulösen. II. Abwägungsmodelle beim Whistleblowing Zur Auflösung der skizzierten Interessenkollisionen wird in verschiedenen Rechtsordnungen und -bereichen auf das Instrument der Abwägung zurückgegrif12  Dabei kann es schwierig sein, einen Interessenausgleich herzustellen, denn was einmal allgemein bekannt ist, kann nicht mehr geheim sein. Ein Interessenausgleich muss aber nicht ausgeschlossen sein, denn ein Informationsinteresse kann ggf. auch gestillt werden, wenn nicht alle geheimen Tatsachen aufgedeckt werden (es wurde etwa nur ein sehr kleiner Prozentsatz der von Edward Snowden an Journalisten weitergegebenen Informationen auch veröffentlicht. Entscheidend war, dass die Öffentlichkeit über den Umstand der massenhaften anlasslosen Überwachung informiert wurde; dazu war die Kenntnis der sich aus den Dokumenten möglicherweise ergebenden technischen und persönlichen Details nicht nötig). 13  So die gemeinhin verwendete Definition nach Janet P. Near / Marcia P. Miceli, „Organizational Dissidence: The Case of Whistle-Blowing”, in: Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 4 (1985), Iss. 1, 1 (4). – Wobei man sich uneins ist, ob ihr Motiv auf eine Abstellung der Missstände gerichtet sein muss oder der Beweggrund gänzlich unbeachtlich ist. 14  Die am weitesten reichende Form ist dabei der Gang an die Öffentlichkeit, der häufig, mittelbar, durch die Weitergabe von Informationen an Journalisten beschritten wird.

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fen. Vor der Untersuchung der damit einhergehenden grundlegenden Schwierigkeiten werden zunächst die Straftatbestände und Rechtfertigungsgründe dargestellt, die beim Whistleblowing in Betracht kommen und die eine Interessenabwägung vorsehen. 1. Landesverrat und Wechselwirkungslehre Zu einer Abwägung von Geheimhaltungs- und Informationsinteressen kann es bei der Frage kommen, ob ein Staatsgeheimnis im Sinne des § 93 Abs. 1 StGB vorliegt. Ein Staatsgeheimnis setzt voraus, dass die jeweiligen Tatsachen bei ihrer Veröffentlichung die „Gefahr eines schweren Nachteils für die äußere Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland“ begründen würden. Die zu befürchtenden Nachteile können jedoch durch etwaige Vorteile im Rahmen einer „Gesamtabwägung“ saldiert werden.15 In seiner Entscheidung zur Spiegel-Affäre, hat das Bundesverfassungsgericht im Rahmen einer Abwägung bezüglich der Geheimhaltungsbedürftigkeit der in Rede stehenden Tatsachen auf Informationsinteressen der Öffentlichkeit Bezug genommen. Es ging davon aus, dass die Landesverratsvorschriften als allgemeine, die Meinungsfreiheit beschränkende Gesetze im Sinne des Art. 5 Abs. 2 GG ihrerseits verfassungskonform im Lichte der Meinungsfreiheit auszulegen seien (sogenannte Wechselwirkungslehre). Dabei sei „im Einzelfall die Bedeutung der mitgeteilten Tatsachen usw. sowohl für den potentiellen Gegner wie für die politische Urteilsbildung des Volkes zu berücksichtigen; die Gefahren, die der Sicherheit des Landes aus der Veröffentlichung erwachsen können, sind gegen das Bedürfnis, über wichtige Vorgänge auch auf dem Gebiete der Verteidigungspolitik unterrichtet zu werden, abzuwägen.“16 Vier der acht Verfassungsrichter, die der Verfassungsbeschwerde des Spiegels stattgegeben hätten, formulierten noch deutlicher: „Vielmehr ist diesem gewiß sehr wesentlichen Interesse17 gegenüberzustellen das sich aus dem demokratischen Prinzip ergebende Anrecht der Öffentlichkeit an der Information und Diskussion der betreffenden Fakten.“18 2. Whistleblower-Rechtsprechung des EGMR Der EGMR hat schon mehrere Entscheidungen zum Whistleblowing getroffen. Es ging dabei teils um arbeitsrechtliche,19 teils um beamtenrechtliche20 und auch um 15  Wobei umstritten ist, ob bei dieser Abwägung nur außenpolitische (so die h. M.) oder auch innenpolitische Vorteile berücksichtigt werden können, s. etwa Detlev Sternberg-Lieben, in: Schönke / Schröder, StGB, 29. Aufl., München 2014, § 93 Rn. 18. 16  BVerfGE 20, 162 (178). Das Urteil bezieht sich auf die §§ 99, 100 StGB a. F. 17 Gemeint war das Interesse an der Geheimhaltung des Zustands der Bundeswehr gegenüber dem Ausland. 18  BVerfGE 20, 162 (181). 19  EGMR, Heinisch ./. Deutschland, Urt. v. 21.07.2011 – Az.: 28274/08. 20  EGMR, Guja ./. Moldawien, Urt. v. 12.02.2008 – Az.: 14277/04.

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strafrechtliche Sanktionen.21 Der Gerichtshof prüfte dabei jeweils, ob die Sanktion einen ungerechtfertigten Eingriff in die Meinungsfreiheit darstellte. Diese umfasse auch das Recht, Missstände anzuzeigen und gelte auch am Arbeitsplatz, selbst wenn das Arbeitsverhältnis privatrechtlich ausgestaltet ist.22 Nach der in Art. 10 Abs. 2 EMRK vorgesehenen Schrankenregelung muss der Eingriff (1) gesetzlich vorgesehen sein, (2) eines der in Art. 10 Abs. 2 EMRK genannten berechtigten Ziele verfolgen und (3) in einer demokratischen Gesellschaft notwendig sein. Sofern die ersten beiden Merkmale bejaht werden, erfolgt beim letzten Merkmal eine Verhältnismäßigkeitsprüfung, in deren Rahmen eine Abwägung vorgenommen wird. Dabei sei das öffentliche Interesse an den offengelegten Informationen besonders zu berücksichtigen, die Authentizität der Informationen, der mögliche Schaden für den Arbeitgeber, die Motivation des Whistleblowers und die Sanktion sowie die mit ihr verbundenen Folgen.23 Die Whistleblower-Rechtsprechung des EGMR wurde von Luxemburgischen Gerichten in Entscheidungen zur LuxLeaks-Affäre bereits als strafrechtlicher Rechtfertigungsgrund sui generis angewendet und führte zum Freispruch eines Angeklagten von verschiedenen Tatvorwürfen.24 Es wäre durchaus denkbar, dass sich auch deutsche Strafgerichte, in einem künftig zu entscheidenden Fall, für eine an den vom EGMR aufgestellten Grundsätzen orientierte Abwägungslösung entscheiden könnten. 3. Rechtfertigender Notstand Eine Interessenabwägung wäre auch vorzunehmen, wenn durch Whistleblowing ein geheimnisschützender Straftatbestand verletzt würde und eine Rechtfertigung wegen Notstands gemäß § 34 StGB in Betracht käme, der im frankophonen Rechtsraum als l´état de nécessité und im anglophonen Rechtsraum unter dem Begriff necessity oder defence of necessity bekannt ist. Damit es zu einer Interessenabwägung käme, müsste allerdings eine Notstandslage gegeben sein, d. h. es müsste eine gegenwärtige, nicht anders abwendbare Gefahr für ein notstandsfähiges Rechtsgut vorliegen. Bei einer nachträglichen Anzeige von Fehlverhalten, die für das Whistleblowing typisch ist, dürfte es häufig schon an einer solchen Gefahr feh21  EGMR, Bucur und Toma ./. Rumänien, Urt. v. 08.01.2013 – Az.: 40238/02. In diesem Fall sah der EGMR in der Verurteilung eines rumänischen Geheimdienstmitarbeiters zu zwei Jahren Freiheitsstrafe (die zur Bewährung ausgesetzt wurden) eine Verletzung der Meinungsfreiheit. Der Mitarbeiter hatte in einer Pressekonferenz aufgedeckt, dass der Geheimdienst seine Befugnisse zur Telefonüberwachung häufig zur Überwachung von Politikern, Journalisten und Unternehmern missbraucht hatte. 22  EGMR, Heinisch ./. Deutschland, Urt. v. 21.07.2011 – Az.: 28274/08 – Abs. 63 f. 23  S. etwa EGMR, Heinisch ./. Deutschland, Urt. v. 21.07.2011 – Az.: 28274/08 – Abs. 66 – 70. – In diesem Zusammenhang ist das öffentliche Interesse, als Interesse der Öffentlichkeit an der Information zu verstehen und nicht im Sinne eines Interesses des States im Namen der Öffentlichkeit an der Geheimhaltung der Informationen. 24  Berufungsgericht des Großherzogtums Luxemburg, Urt. v. 15.03.2017 – Az.: 117/17 X; Kassationsgericht des Großherzogtums Luxemburg, Urt. v. 11.01.2018. – Az.: 3912.

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len, es sei denn, die Missstände dauern noch an oder es besteht eine akute Wiederholungsgefahr.25 Auch wenn eine Notstandsgefahr bejaht wird, kann beim Whistle­ blowing das Merkmal der Nichtandersabwendbarkeit der Gefahr Schwierigkeiten bereiten, denn den Enthüllenden wird regelmäßig entgegengehalten, sie hätten die Missstände auch durch eine interne Rüge, also durch ein relativ milderes Mittel, effektiv beseitigen können.26 Liegen allerdings gleichwohl alle Voraussetzungen einer Notstandslage vor, kommt es gemäß § 34 S. 1 StGB zu einer Interessenabwägung, bei der das geschützte Interesse, das beeinträchtigte Interesse wesentlich überwiegen müsste.27 4. Ziviler Ungehorsam Die These, Whistleblowing könne eine Form des zivilen Ungehorsams darstellen, erfreut sich aktuell, vor dem Hintergrund einer sich im Internet ausprägenden digitalen Widerstandskultur, (wieder28) großer Beliebtheit.29 Ob die im Einzelnen umstrittenen Voraussetzungen des zivilen Ungehorsams erfüllt sind und ob der zivile Ungehorsam überhaupt als strafrechtlicher Rechtfertigungsgrund anerkannt werden sollte, kann hier nicht abschließend beantwortet werden.30 Wird ziviler Ungehorsam aber als gewaltloser, öffentlicher und politisch-moralisch motivierter Akt verstanden,31 liegt es nahe, diese Voraussetzungen beim Whistleblowing als 25  Im LuxLeaks-Fall wurde etwa eine vorausgesetzte tatsächliche, drohende Gefahr („danger réel et imminent“) verneint (s. ibid.). So auch in einem britischen Fall, in dem es um die nachträgliche Anzeige von Überwachungen von Labour-Abgeordneten durch Geheimdienstmitarbeiter ging, R v Shayler [2001] All ER (D) 99 (Sep), Abs. 65. 26  Ob das zutrifft, dürfte aber in vielen Fällen fraglich sein, insbesondere, wenn die Missstände systemischen Charakter haben. 27  Ob beim Whistleblowing nicht eine an § 228 BGB orientierte Interessenabwägung vorzunehmen ist, wird weiter unten erläutert (V.). 28  Die These wurde bereits im Zusammenhang mit dem Strafverfahren gegen Daniel Ellsberg geäußert, s. etwa Charles R. Nesson, „Aspects of the Executive’s Power Over National Security Matters: Secrecy Classifications and Foreign Intelligence Wiretaps“, in: Indiana Law Journal, Vol. 49 (1974), Iss. 3, 399 (406). Ellsberg hatte die sogenannten Pentagon Papers (geheime US-Dokumente, die die Aussichtslosigkeit des Vietnamkrieges dokumentierten) an die New York Times weitergegeben, die 1971 von der Zeitung teilweise veröffentlicht wurden. 29  S. z. B. Manohar Kumar, For Whom the Whistle blows? Secrecy, Civil Disobedience, and Democratic Accountability, Rom 2013; Karl Kröpil, „Ziviler Ungehorsam und Whistleblow­ ing”, Recht und Politik 4/2013, S. 193 – 198; Theresa Züger, „Re-thinking civil disobedience”, in: Internet Policy Review, Vol. 2 (2013), Iss. 4, S. 1 – 10; Dieter Deiseroth, „Whistleblowing und ziviler Ungehorsam im demokratischen Verfassungsstaat”, in: Neue Gesellschaft / Frankfurter Hefte 1/2|2014, S. 4 – 9; William E. Scheuerman, „Whistleblowing as civil disobedience: The case of Edward Snowden”, in: Philosophy and Social Criticism, Vol. 40 (2014), Iss. 7, 609 – 628. 30  Als Rechtfertigungsgrund wird der zivile Ungehorsam etwa von Horst Dreier, „Widerstandsrecht und ziviler Ungehorsam im Rechtsstaat“, in: Glotz (Hrsg.), Ziviler Ungehorsam im Rechtsstaat, Frankfurt a. M. 1983, S. 54 – 75 anerkannt. 31  Diese Voraussetzungen nennt Horst Dreier, ibid., S. 60 in Anlehnung an Rawls Definition: „public, nonviolent conscientious yet political act contrary to law usually done with

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erfüllt anzusehen. Wird auch die zweite Frage bejaht, würde man nach Ansicht verschiedener Autoren auch im Rahmen des zivilen Ungehorsams zu einer Interessenabwägung gelangen. So verlangt etwa Jürgen Habermas, der „Regelverletzer müsse (…) skrupulös prüfen, ob die Wahl spektakulärer Mittel der Situation wirklich angemessen ist und nicht doch nur elitärer Gesinnung oder narzißtischem Antrieb, also einer Anmaßung entspringt.“32 Horst Dreier setzt eine grundrechtliche Verhältnismäßigkeitsprüfung voraus,33 bei der es i. R. d. Angemessenheit zu einer Abwägungsentscheidung kommen kann. Allgemeiner formuliert es Howard Zinn: „In jedem einzelnen Fall müsste die Wichtigkeit des gebrochenen Gesetzes gegen die Wichtigkeit der Angelegenheit abgewogen werden.“34 5. Wahrnehmung berechtigter Interessen und Interessenabwägung nach allgemeinen Grundsätzen Teilweise wird auch davon ausgegangen, dass der Rechtfertigungsgrund der Wahrnehmung berechtigter Interessen gemäß § 193 StGB analog auf geheimnisschützende Straftatbestände angewendet werden sollte. Wie bei den Beleidigungsdelikten gibt der Täter Informationen über eine andere Person bzw. Organisation gegenüber Dritten kund, und bei beiden Deliktsarten stellt sich die Frage, ob die jeweiligen Tathandlungen nicht eventuell von der Meinungsfreiheit geschützt werden. Die Analogie wird damit begründet, dass die Voraussetzungen von § 34 StGB bei Geheimnisverletzungen regelmäßig nicht erfüllt seien (vgl. o. II. 3.) und damit der „Bereich strafloser Offenbarungsmöglichkeiten unvertretbar weit beschränkt“ werde.35 Teilweise wird auch davon ausgegangen, es handele sich bei der Wahrnehmung berechtigter Interessen um einen über § 193 StGB hinausgehenden allgemeinen Rechtfertigungsgrund, der auch auf geheimnisschützende Straftatbethe aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of the government” John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Revised Edition, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1999 (Erstveröffentlichung 1971), S. 320. 32  Jürgen Habermas, „Ziviler Ungehorsam – Testfall für den demokratischen Rechtsstaat. Wider den autoritären Legalismus in der Bundesrepublik“, in: (Fn. 30), S. 29 (42). Habermas lehnt allerdings eine rechtliche Rechtfertigung des ungehorsamen Verhaltens ab, da die moralische Grundlage des regelverletzenden Protests fragwürdig werde, wenn jedes persönliche Risiko entfalle, ibid., S. 43. 33  Dreier (Fn. 30), S. 54 (60). 34  Howard Zinn, „Ungehorsam und Demokratie“ (1968), in: Braune (Hrsg.), Ziviler Ungehorsam. Texte von Thoreau bis Occupy, Stuttgart 2017, S. 159 – 185 (181). 35  Klaus Rogall, „Die Verletzung von Privatgeheimnissen (§ 203 StGB) – Aktuelle Probleme und ungelöste Fragen“, NStZ 1983, 1 (6) m. w. N. – Auch die zivilrechtliche Rechtsprechung hat bei § 203 StGB den Rechtfertigungsgrund der Wahrnehmung berechtigter Interessen geprüft, BGH, NJW 1993, 2371 (2372). Dabei ging es um die Offenbarung von Behandlungsdaten eines Patienten zur gerichtlichen Geltendmachung einer ärztlichen Honorarforderung. – Ablehnend (fehlende Regelungslücke wegen § 34 StGB) etwa Carolin Lutterbach, Die strafrechtliche Würdigung des Whistleblowings, Bremen 2010, S. 119.

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stände wie § 203 StGB und § 17 UWG Anwendung finde.36 Die Wahrnehmung berechtigter Interessen war zudem schon in verschiedenen früheren Gesetzesentwürfen als Rechtfertigungsgrund für die geheimnisschützenden Straftatbestände der Verletzung von Privat-37 und Amtsgeheimnissen38 vorgesehen. In der Schweiz ist die Wahrnehmung berechtigter Interessen etwa bei der Verletzung des Dienstgeheimnisses (Art. 320 SchweizStGB) als übergesetzlicher Rechtfertigungsgrund anerkannt.39 Die deutsche Strafrechtsprechung hat bei § 203 StGB in mehreren Entscheidungen statt einer analogen Anwendung von § 193 StGB eine von § 34 StGB losgelöste Interessenabwägung nach allgemeinen Grundsätzen vorgenommen.40 6. Rechtfertigung aufgrund überwiegender öffentlicher Interessen Ein Rechtfertigungsgrund der Wahrnehmung berechtigter Interessen läge im internationalen Trend, denn derzeit erlebt der ebenfalls auf einer allgemeinen Interessenabwägung beruhende, vom anglophonen Rechtsraum ausgehende Ansatz eines Rechtfertigungsgrundes überwiegender öffentlicher Interessen Hochkonjunktur. Eine derartige Regelung enthält etwa der Kanadische Security of Information Act, der in Sect. 15 eine public interest defence vorsieht, die unter anderem voraussetzt, dass das öffentliche Interesse an der Veröffentlichung das Interesse an der Nicht-Veröffentlichung überwiegt. In Großbritannien wird seit Anfang 2017 über eine Novellierung des Official Secrets Act und über die Aufnahme einer public interest defence in dieses staatliche Geheimnisse schützende Strafgesetz diskutiert, da eine defence of necessity in vielen Konstellationen nicht einschlägig sein dürfte (vgl. o. II. 3.).41 Auch die Tshwane Principles, deren Umsetzung der Europarat in zwei Resolutionen gefordert hat, sehen eine public interest defence vor.42 Danach 36  Martin Tuffner, Der strafrechtliche Schutz von Wirtschaftsgeheimnissen im Staatsschutzrecht und Wettbewerbsrecht, Erlangen / Nürnberg 1978, S. 61 f. m. w. N. – Grundlegend dazu: Albin Eser, Wahrnehmung berechtigter Interessen als allgemeiner Rechtfertigungsgrund, Bad Homburg v. d. H./Berlin / Zürich 1969. 37  § 354 Abs. 2 E 1913 und § 355 Abs. 3 E 1919. 38  § 133 Abs. 2 E 1922/1925. 39  Urteil des Kassationshofes v. 24.05.1968, BGE 94 IV 70, E. 2; spezifisch zum Whistle­ blowing s. BGer, Urt. v. 12.12.2011, 6B_305/2011 und die Entscheidungen der vorhergehenden Instanzen Obergericht Zürich, Urt. v. 11.01.2011, SB090757/U / kw / ls; Bezirksgericht Zürich, Urt. v. 17.09.2009, fp 2010, 134 ff. 40  BGH, NJW 1952, 151 „Abwägung widerstreitender Pflichten oder Interessen“; so auch OLG Köln, NJW 2000, 3656 (3657); in OLG Karlsruhe, NJW 1984, 676 ist nur von „einer Interessenabwägung“ die Rede. 41  S. dazu Law Commission, Consultation Paper No 230, Protection of Official Data, London 02/2017, S. 160 ff. 42  An dem Entwurf der Globalen Prinzipien Nationaler Sicherheit und dem Recht auf Information waren 22 Organisationen über einen Zeitraum von zwei Jahren beteiligt und es wurden

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sollen Sanktionen bei einer Weitergabe von Informationen an die Öffentlichkeit unter anderem ausgeschlossen sein,43 wenn Whistleblower in dem vernünftigen Glauben handeln, dass das öffentliche Interesse an der Veröffentlichung der Informationen etwaige mit der Offenlegung einhergehende Beeinträchtigungen anderer öffentlicher Interessen überwiege.44 In Frankreich ist Ende 2016 mit Art. 122-9 Code pénal eine vergleichbare Regelung in Kraft getreten, nach der ein Whistleblower (lanceur d´alerte), der ein geschütztes Geheimnis verletzt, strafrechtlich nicht verantwortlich ist, wenn die Veröffentlichung notwendig und gegenüber dem geschützten Interesse verhältnismäßig war. Zudem geht der EGMR in seinen Abwägungsentscheidungen zum Whistleblowing (s. o. II. 2.) davon aus, dass öffentliche Interessen im Rahmen der von ihm vorgenommenen Abwägung „besonders zu beachten“ seien.45 Es überrascht daher nicht, dass auch in Vorschlägen zur Einführung eines Whistleblowerschutzgesetzes in Deutschland gerne auf den Topos des überwiegenden öffentlichen Interesses zurückgegriffen wird.46 III. Probleme der Abwägungen im Kontext des Whistleblowings Mit rechtlichen Abwägungen ist eine Reihe von Schwierigkeiten verbunden, welche die Frage aufwerfen, ob sie das richtige Instrument sind, um über die Legalität des Whistleblowings zu entscheiden. Vor allem im Verfassungsrecht hat sich – ausgehend von der Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, in der Abwägungen im Rahmen der Verhältnismäßigkeitsprüfung eine zentrale Stellung einnehmen – ein Streit über die rationale Begründbarkeit von Abwägungsentscheidungen entzündet.47 Während eine Strömung bemüht ist, eine rationale Abwägungsmethodik zu entwickeln, beschäftigt sich die Gegenauffassung mit ihrer Dekonstruktion und kritisiert Abwägungsentscheidungen als unvorhersehbar und irrational, als subjektivistisch und dezisionistisch sowie als letztlich willkürlich und politisch.48 über 500 Experten aus mehr als 70 Ländern konsultiert, s. The Global Principles on National Security and the Right to Information (Tshwane Principles), New York 2013, S. 1. – Der ­Europarat hat die Mitgliedstaaten und damit auch Deutschland in zwei Resolutionen aufgefordert, die Tshwane Principles umzusetzen, Europarat, Resolution 1954 (2013) Abs. 8 und 9.5 sowie Resolution 2060 (2015) Abs. 3 und 9. 43  Tshwane Principle 41 A. 44  Tshwane Principle 40 (c). 45  EGMR, Bocur und Toma ./. Rumänien, Urt. v. 08.01.2013 – Az. 40238/02 – Abs. 93; EGMR, Heinisch ./. Deutschland, Urt. v. 21.07.2011 – Az.: 28274/08 – Abs. 66.; EGMR, Guja ./. Moldau, Urt. v. 12.02.2008 – Az. 14277/04 – Abs. 74. 46  Entsprechende Klauseln sieht der Entwurf der Bundestagsfraktion Bündnis90/Die G ­ rünen (BT-Drs. 18/3039) für § 97c StGB-E, § 353c StGB-E, § 612b III BGB-E, § 67a II BBG-E und § 37a II BeamtStG-E vor. 47  Bernhard Schlink, Abwägung im Verfassungsrecht, Berlin 1976, S. 127, bezeichnet die beiden Positionen als Abwägungsenthusiasmus und Abwägungsskepsis.

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1. Alexys Abwägungsmethodik Den wohl am häufigsten rezipierten Ansatz bildet die von Robert Alexy entwickelte Abwägungsmethodik. Alexy geht zunächst davon aus, dass es Regeln und Prinzipien als mögliche Normen gibt.49 Im Gegensatz zu Regeln seien Prinzipien (z. B. Grundrechte) Optimierungsgebote.50 Regeln können nur erfüllt oder nicht erfüllt sein, Prinzipien können demgegenüber nach unterschiedlichen Graden erfüllt werden.51 Bei der Kollision von Regeln und der Kollision von Prinzipien unterscheide sich die Art ihrer Auflösung.52 Die Kollision von Regeln könne nur durch Ausnahmeklauseln gelöst werden oder indem eine Regel für ungültig erklärt werde, etwa durch den Grundsatz, dass das neuere dem älteren Gesetz vorgeht.53 Bei der Kollision von Prinzipien dagegen könne ein Prinzip in einem Fall hinter ein anderes Prinzip zurücktreten, während es in einem anderen Fall dem anderen Prinzip ggf. vorzuziehen sei. Durch die Auflösung der Kollision entstehe eine bedingte oder relative Vorrangrelation.54 Welches Prinzip im Einzelfall überwiege und damit den Vorrang genieße, könne durch eine „Gewichtsformel“ festgestellt werden,55 die in ihrer vollständigen Fassung drei Variablenpaare enthält: Den Grad der Nichterfüllung oder Beeinträchtigung des einen Prinzips bzw. die Wichtigkeit der Erfüllung des gegenläufigen Prinzips, die auch als Eingriffsintensitäten bezeichnet werden (I),56 die abstrakten Gewichte (G) der kollidierenden Prinzipien sowie der Grad (S) der Sicherheit der empirischen Annahmen über die Auswirkungen der in Frage stehenden Maßnahme für die Prinzipien.57 Die Eingriffsintensitäten und die abstrakten Gewichte ließen sich in drei Grade, leicht, mittel und schwer einteilen.58 Auch die Gewissheit der den Eingriff tragenden Prämissen lasse sich in drei Stufen angeben: gewiss bzw. sicher, vertretbar bzw. plausibel und nicht evident falsch. Sofern es zu einer Abwägung kollidierender Prinzipien komme, könne das Abwägungsergebnis aus dem Quotienten des folgenden Terms abgelesen werden:59 Aus 48 Eine recht aktuelle Übersicht zum Diskussionstand findet sich bei Renata Camilo de Oliveira, Zur Kritik der Abwägung in der Grundrechtsdogmatik. Beitrag zu einem liberalen Grundrechtsverständnis im demokratischen Rechtsstaat, Berlin 2013. 49  Robert Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte, 7. Auflage, Berlin 2015 (Erstveröffentlichung 1985), S. 72. 50  Ibid., S. 75 ff. 51  Ibid., S. 76. 52  Ibid., S. 77. 53  Ibid., S. 78. 54  Ibid., S. 81. Im Gegensatz zu absoluten Vorrangrelationen, ibid., S. 82. 55  Alexy, „Die Gewichtsformel“, in: Jickeli / Kreutz / Reuter (Hrsg.), Gedächtnisschrift für Jürgen Sonnenschein, Berlin 2003, 771 – 792. 56  Ibid., S. 777 f. 57  Ibid., S. 785. 58 Ibid., S. 778 f. 59  So das „zweite Abwägungsgesetz“, ibid., S. 789. – Kollidieren mehr als zwei Prinzipien miteinander, sei die Formel zu erweitern, ibid., S. 791 f.

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der Multiplikation von Eingriffsintensität (Ii), Gewicht (Gi) und der Sicherheit der empirischen Annahmen bezüglich des beeinträchtigten Prinzips (Si) ergibt sich der Dividend. Der Divisor wird seinerseits aus der Multiplikation der drei Variablen des geschützten Prinzips gebildet. Wenn der Dividend einen höheren Wert als der Divisor aufweist, ist der Quotient größer als eins und die Abwägung geht zu Gunsten des beeinträchtigten Prinzips aus.60 2. Kritik an der Abwägungsdogmatik Gegen den Vorgang des rechtlichen Abwägens im Allgemeinen und die arithmetische Abwägungsmethodik im Besonderen werden verschiedene Einwände erhoben. Im Folgenden wird nicht auf die spezifisch mit den Grundrechten verbundenen Probleme, sondern in erster Linie auf die auch im Strafrecht bestehenden methodologischen Vorbehalte eingegangen. Zweifeln begegnet schon der mit dem Symbol der Waage erweckte Anschein der Rationalität des Abwägungsvorgangs. Durch das Bild der Waage wird suggeriert, der Vorgang des rechtlichen Abwägens sei mit dem durch die Gravitation determinierten Vorgang des Wiegens physischer Gegenstände vergleichbar.61 Es lässt sich jedoch rational kaum begründen, wie die Gewichte von gegeneinander abzuwägenden Prinzipien im Einzelfall bestimmt werden können.62 Anhaltspunkte für die Gewichtsbestimmung können sich zwar aus der Rechtsordnung ergeben – so wird etwa das Leben gegenüber anderen Rechtsgütern besonders geschützt –, in vielen Konstellationen fehlt es aber an einer eindeutigen Rangordnung.63 Wie schwer etwa Geheimhaltungs- und Informationsinteressen im Einzelfall wiegen, wird sich häufig nicht aus der Rechtsordnung ergeben. Vergleichbare Schwierigkeiten bereitet die Bestimmung der Intensität eines Eingriffs als leicht, mittel oder schwer, da nicht klar ist, nach welchen Maßstäben 60  Für die triadische Skalierung kann die arithmetische Folge 1 – 3 verwendet werden, ibid., S. 778 f. 61  So schon Stavros Tsakyrakis, „Proportionality: An assault on human rights?“, in: International Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 7 (2010), 468 (475): „impress on us an illusion of some kind of mechanical weighing of values similar to that of weighing apples and oranges.“ – Das Bild der Waage wird etwa vom Europäischen Gerichtshof und vom Internationalen Strafgerichtshof als Insignie verwendet und wird den Besuchern eines Gerichtsgebäudes durch Justitia-Statuen entgegengehalten. Es wird im Zusammenhang mit Recht und Gerechtigkeit schon seit Jahrtausenden gebraucht. Schon im alten Ägypten fand es im Totengericht Verwendung, das unter dem Vorsitz von Osiris, dem Gott des Jenseits, und 42 Totenrichtern über den weiteren Fortgang der Seelen befand. Auf die eine Seite der Gerechtigkeitswaage wurde das Herz des Toten gelegt, auf die andere Seite die Feder der Göttin Maat, die Harmonie und Gerechtigkeit personifizierte. 62  So etwa Schlink, „Freiheit durch Eingriffsabwehr – Rekonstruktion der klassischen Grundrechtsfunktion“, in: EuGRZ 1984, 457 (461); Matthias Jestaedt, „Die Abwägungslehre – ihre Stärken und ihre Schwächen“, in: Depenheuer / Heintzen / Jestaedt / Axer (Hrsg.), Festschrift für Josef Isensee, Heidelberg 2007, 253 (267); Camilo de Oliveira (Fn. 48), S. 209 m. w. N. 63 Zur Unmöglichkeit einer kardinalen oder ordinalen Skala der Verfassungsnormen, s. Schlink (Fn. 47), S. 134 ff.

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die Zuordnung zu einer der Stufen erfolgt.64 Durch die Abwägungsformel wird auch nicht erklärt, welche tatsächlichen Umstände des Einzelfalls die Rechtsanwendenden bei der Abwägung einzubeziehen haben und welche nicht.65 Wegen der mit der Bestimmung der Abwägungsparameter verbundenen Unsicherheiten sind Abwägungsentscheidungen (darin ist sich die Kritik einig) – jedenfalls dann, wenn über einen bisher nicht eingetretenen Kollisionsfall entschieden wird – in hohem Maße beliebig und nicht vorhersehbar.66 Angesichts ihrer Begründungsdefizite und ihrer Intransparenz seien Abwägungsentscheidungen eher von willkürlichem Charakter und mit politischen Entscheidungen vergleichbar.67 Da sich Abwägungen nach der Abwägungsmethodik stets auf Einzelfälle beziehen, könne ein einziger berücksichtigter oder nicht berücksichtigter Umstand zu einem gänzlich anderen Abwägungsergebnis führen.68 Damit werde der Weg in einen unüberschaubaren rechtlichen Partikularismus geebnet, der sich generalistischen Lösungen entzieht69 und auf eine unvorhersehbare Einzelfallgerechtigkeit hinausläuft. Ein Modell, das maßgeblich auf Abwägungen beruht, gerät daher leicht mit dem Rechtsstaatsprinzip in Konflikt, denn Willkür, Beliebigkeit und Unvorhersehbarkeit sind dem Gebot der Rechtssicherheit, das die Aspekte der Rechtsklarheit und Rechtsbestimmtheit einschließt, diametral entgegengesetzt.70 Dementsprechend wurde auch die Abwägungspraxis des EGMR im Rahmen seiner Whistleblowing-Rechtsprechung als unvorhersehbar und vage kritisiert. Sie bleibe für Außenstehende ein „Mysterium“, da sich der Gerichtshof hinter den Begriff der Interessenabwägung zurückziehe, ohne die Einheiten der Abwägung zu thematisieren oder zu erklären, wie sich der Begriff des öffentlichen Interesses bemessen lasse.71 Der Vorwurf der Unvorhersehbarkeit kann von den Stimmen, die an eine ratio­ nale Abwägungsmethodik glauben, im Kern nicht entkräftet werden. Sie weisen   José Juan Moreso, „Alexy und die Arithmetik der Abwägung“, in: ARSP 2012, 411 (415).   Moreso (Fn. 64), 415. 66  S. etwa Camilo de Oliveira (Fn. 48), S. 216 f. m. w. N.; Moreso (Fn. 64), 415. 67  Vgl. etwa Jürgen Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung, 6. Auflage, Berlin 2017 (Erstveröffentlichung 1992), S. 315 f.; Camilo de Oliveira (Fn. 48), S. 216 f. m. w. N. 68  Moreso (Fn. 64), 415. 69  Moreso (Fn. 64), 419. 70  Vgl. etwa Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, „Schutzbereich, Eingriff, verfassungsimmanente Schranken: Zur Kritik gegenwärtiger Grundrechtsdogmatik“, Der Staat, Bd. 42, H. 2 (2003), 165 (190): „rechtsstaatswidrige Wucherung“. Neben Friktionen mit dem Gebot der Rechtssicherheit können sich Spannungen mit dem Gewaltenteilungsprinzip ergeben, da die abwägenden Rechtsanwendenden im Einzelfall wie ein Quasi-Gesetzgeber selbst rechtsgestaltend in Erscheinung treten. Teils wird daher im Verfassungsrecht der Übergang vom Rechtsstaat zum Verfassungsjurisdiktionsstaat befürchtet, Camilo De Oliveira (Fn. 48), S. 223 ff. m. w. N. Diese Spannungen werden verringert, wenn den Gerichten die Befugnis zum Abwägen, etwa im Verwaltungsrecht, ausdrücklich gesetzlich und damit demokratisch legitimiert übertragen wird, Schlink, „Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit“, in: Badura / Dreier (Hrsg.), Festschrift 50 Jahre Bundesverfassungsgericht, Bd. 2, Tübingen 2001, S. 456 (460). 71  Andreas Fischer-Lescano, „Mäßigung der Verhältnismäßigkeit – Whistleblowing im transnationalen Recht“, in: Callies (Hrsg.), Transnationales Recht, Tübingen 2014, 435 (440). 64 65

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selbst darauf hin, dass sich mittels der Gewichtsformel nur die Frage der internen Rechtfertigung beantworten lasse, d. h. ob sich das Abwägungsergebnis aus den gegebenen Prämissen ableiten lasse.72 Dadurch wird aber noch nichts über die Wahrheit oder die Richtigkeit der Prämissen selbst, d. h. insbesondere die konkreten Gewichte und die Eingriffsintensitäten ausgesagt, deren Bestimmung als externe Rechtfertigung bezeichnet wird, die nicht ohne Rekurs auf moralische Erwägungen auskomme und durch die rein formale Gewichtsformel nicht beantwortet werden könne.73 3. Kritik an Abwägungen im materiellen Strafrecht Einige der im verfassungsrechtlichen Diskurs erhobenen Einwände sind auch den Abwägungen im materiellen Strafrecht entgegenzuhalten.74 Hier werden zwar in erster Linie Interessen und Rechtsgüter gegeneinander abgewogen, es handelt sich bei ihnen – sofern man dem Dualismus von Regeln und Prinzipien folgt – aber wie bei den Grundrechten um Prinzipien. Zudem kann es auch im Strafrecht zu einer Abwägung mit Grundrechten kommen, wenn etwa im Rahmen des § 193 StGB Meinungs- bzw. Kunstfreiheit und Ehrschutz gegeneinander abgewogen werden. Wegen des in Art. 103 Abs. 2 GG und § 1 StGB verankerten Gesetzlichkeitsprinzips, das, um die Vorhersehbarkeit der Strafbarkeit eines Verhaltens zu gewährleisten, strengere Anforderungen an die Bestimmtheit von Gesetzen stellt, wiegt der Einwand der Unvorhersehbarkeit von Abwägungsentscheidungen im Strafrecht im Vergleich zu anderen Rechtsgebieten am schwersten.75 72  Matthias Klatt / Moritz Meister, „Verhältnismäßigkeit als universelles Verfassungsprinzip“, in: Klatt (Hrsg.), Prinzipientheorie und Theorie der Abwägung, Tübingen 2013, S. 62 (75). 73  Ibid., S. 76. – Auch Alexy räumt implizit ein, dass eine rationale Bestimmung von Intensität und Gewicht nicht in allen Fällen möglich sei, Alexy, „On Balancing and Subsumption. A structural Comparison”, in: Ratio Juris, Vol. 16 No. 4, 12/2003, S. 433 (439): „The Tobacco and Titanic Judgments show that rational judgments about degrees of intensity and importance are possible at least in some cases, and that such judgments may be set in relation to each other for the sake of justifying an outcome.” 74 Vgl. Andreas Meißner, Die Interessenabwägungsformel der Vorschrift über den rechtfertigenden Notstand (§ 34 StGB), Berlin 1990, S. 64 ff. 75  Das Bestimmtheitsgebot gilt nicht nur für Straftatbestände, sondern auch für Rechtfertigungsgründe wie § 34 StGB, wobei nach h. M. die Anforderungen an die Bestimmtheit bei ihnen geringer sein sollen, was durchaus bezweifelt werden kann, da die Frage, ob ein Rechtfertigungsgrund erfüllt ist, für die Vorhersehbarkeit einer Bestrafung gleich wichtig ist. – Zur Vereinbarkeit von § 34 StGB mit dem Bestimmtheitsgebot s. Meißner (Fn. 74), S. 59 – 63. – Peter Noll, „Die Rechtfertigungsgründe im Gesetz und in der Rechtsprechung“, in: Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Strafrecht, Bd. 80 (1964), S. 160 (168) meint, die Rechtfertigungsgründe müssten wegen des Gesetzlichkeitsprinzips zumindest typisiert werden; unzulässig wäre es etwa, wenn der Gesetzgeber „in einem einzigen Artikel das Prinzip der Wertabwägung aufstellen und umschreiben würde“ (so aber die in Fn. 40 zit. Rechtsprechung; zudem läuft die Klausel eines überwiegenden öffentlichen Interesses auf einen derartigen Rechtfertigungsgrund hinaus).

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Die Bestrebungen hin zu einer rationalen strafrechtlichen Abwägungsmethodik reichen kaum weiter als im Verfassungsrecht und können den Vorwurf der mangelnden Vorhersehbarkeit kaum ausräumen.76 Teilweise wird davon ausgegangen, dass das Strafrecht wegen der unterschiedlichen Strafrahmen der Delikte eine kardinale Skalierung der abzuwägenden Rechtsgüter bzw. Interessen ermögliche.77 Zudem könne der Aufzählung in § 34 S. 1 StGB eine Rangordnung der Rechtsgüter entnommen werden. Dabei wird aber eingestanden, dass beiden Merkmalen letztlich nur eine „begrenzte Tauglichkeit“ für die Bestimmung des Rangverhältnisses zukomme. Das konkrete Strafmaß etwa, hängt von vielerlei Gesichtspunkten wie dem Ausmaß der Schuld (die ihrerseits durch verschiedene Aspekte bestimmt wird, s. § 46 StGB) ab.78 Zumindest die Quantität der Interessen lasse sich im Strafrecht, beispielsweise bei einem Vermögensschaden, häufig besser bestimmen als bei einer Grundrechtsabwägung, bei der lediglich auf die o. g. triadische Skalierung (leicht, mittel, schwer) verwiesen wird.79 In vielen Konstellationen dürfte die Gewichtung der Interessen und der Eingriffsintensitäten jedoch nicht einfacher sein als im Verfassungsrecht. Wie beim Whistleblowing Geheimhaltungs- und Informationsinteressen zu gewichten sind, ergibt sich auch aus dem Strafrecht nicht. Die Quantität der Interessen ist hierbei auch nicht ohne Weiteres bestimmbar, da es in der Tatsituation häufig nicht absehbar ist, wie sich die Weitergabe der Informationen tatsächlich auswirken wird. Bei der in § 34 StGB vorgesehenen Interessenabwägung wird der Abwägungsvorgang zumindest durch das Merkmal des „wesentlichen Überwiegens“ in Richtung auf die Erhaltung des Eingriffsgutes orientiert, wodurch die Abwägungsentscheidung in einigen Konstellationen vorhersehbarer sein dürfte als bei einer auf ein bloß „einfaches Überwiegen“ abstellenden Klausel.80 Mit der Beliebigkeit der Abwägungsentscheidungen ist zudem das Problem verbunden, dass Abwägungsklauseln das Risiko einer schleichenden Politisierung des Strafrechts bergen, die mit repressiven Tendenzen einhergehen kann. Insbesondere bezüglich des staatlichen Geheimnisschutzes können vage Abwägungsklauseln und Tatbestandsmerkmale, die auf eine Interessenabwägung hinauslaufen, einer­ 76  Die spezifisch verfassungsrechtliche Diskussion ist vermutlich deshalb weiter entwickelt, weil Abwägungsentscheidungen im Verfassungsrecht i. R. d. Verhältnismäßigkeit im engeren Sinne bzw. der Angemessenheit alltäglich sind, während sie im materiellen Strafrecht eher selten vorkommen (es gibt etwa nur wenige Entscheidungen zu § 34 StGB). 77  Schlink (Fn. 47), S. 134: das Strafrecht biete eine „kardinalskalenfähige Vorlage“. Er verweist auf die folgenden Beiträge: Heinrich Hubmann, „Grundsätze der Interessenabwägung“, in: AcP, 155. Bd., H. 2 (1956), S. 85 (102) hält im Strafrecht eine kardinale Ordnung für möglich; dagegen äußert Karl Haag, Rationale Strafzumessung, Saarbrücken 1969, S. 73, Zweifel gegenüber einer derartigen Skalierung, da schon hinsichtlich der Bestimmung eines „Durchschnittsfalls“ oder einer „Normalstrafe“ der zu vergleichenden Delikte keine Einigkeit bestehe. 78  Meißner (Fn. 74), S. 230 m. w. N. 79  S. zur Quantität auch Meißner (Fn. 74), S. 237 ff. 80  Wobei es im Grenzbereich eines „wesentlichen Überwiegens“ genauso schwierig ist, ein Überwiegen festzustellen, wie bei einer Klausel, die nur auf ein einfaches Überwiegen abstellt.

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seits dazu verleiten, dass von der Justiz als geheimnisschutzwürdig angesehen wird, was nach der Vorstellung der Exekutive geheim sein soll. In der Weimarer Republik wurden die Landesverratsvorschriften etwa als Mittel der Unterdrückung missliebiger Berichterstattungen über Wiederaufrüstungsbestrebungen der Reichswehr eingesetzt, indem tausende Ermittlungsverfahren gegen sogenannte „publizistische Landesverräter“ und Whistleblower eingeleitet wurden.81 In den diesbezüglichen Urteilen des Reichsgerichts, in denen es oft um die Frage ging, ob die Geheimhaltung der jeweiligen Informationen „einer anderen Regierung gegenüber für das Wohl des Deutschen Reichs“ (§ 92 Nr. 1 RStGB) erforderlich war, kam den Einschätzungen von Sachverständigen aus dem Kreis der Exekutive eine wesentliche Bedeutung zu, was neben weiteren Faktoren zu einer übermäßigen Gewichtung der Geheimhaltungsinteressen der Exekutive führte. Zudem blieb der Umstand, dass in mehreren Fällen rechtswidrige, weil gegen den Versailler Vertrag verstoßende, Verhaltensweisen aufgedeckt wurden, unberücksichtigt oder wurde als unerheblich eingestuft. Andererseits kann durch Ermittlungsverfahren, selbst wenn sie nicht zu einer Verurteilung führen, ein chilling effect verursacht werden, der durch die von den Staatsanwaltschaften auf Anweisung politischer Amtsträger eingeleiteten Verfahren bewusst forciert werden kann.82 81  Der bekannteste Fall ist der des Publizisten Carl von Ossietzky. Er wurde wegen Landesverrats verurteilt, weil in dem von ihm herausgegebenen Magazin „Weltbühne“ ein Artikel über ein illegales, da gegen den Versailler Vertrag verstoßendes, Wiederaufbauprogramm der Luftwaffe in Berlin Adlershof aufgedeckt wurde. Ossietzky wurde für die Enthüllungen 1936 der Friedensnobelpreis verliehen. Der ebenfalls angeklagte Whistleblower und Autor des Artikels, Walter Kreiser, der als Flugzeugkonstrukteur auf dem Flugplatz gearbeitet hatte, konnte einer Verurteilung durch eine Flucht ins Ausland entgehen. – Die Urteile wurden damals wie heute als Unrechtsurteile kritisiert, vgl. etwa Adolf Arndt, „Umwelt und Recht“, NJW 1966, 25 (25); Ulrich Klug, „Der Ossietzky-Prozeß 1931 – Strafrechtsschutz für illegale Staatsgeheimnisse einst und jetzt“, in: Prütting (Hrsg.), FS Baumgärtel, Köln / Berlin / Bonn / München 1990, S. 249 (252); Joerden, Anmerkung zu BGH, Beschl. v. 03.12.1992 – StB 6/92 (KG Berlin), JZ 1994, S. 582 (582); Mathias Hanten, Publizistischer Landesverrat vor dem Reichsgericht, Frankfurt a. M. 1999, S. 252. 82  Das wird für die Weimarer Zeit vermutet, s. Hanten (Fn. 81), S. 249. – Der Einfluss der Exekutive hat sich jüngst (2015) z. B. im Fall Netzpolitik.org gezeigt, in dem das Bundesjustizministerium auf einer Einstellung des Ermittlungsverfahrens gegen Journalisten des Blogs, die Informationen zum Ausbau der Überwachung von internetgestützter Individualkommunikation durch das Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz aufgedeckt hatten, bestand, weil kein Staatsgeheimnis vorgelegen habe. Es könnte aber auch zum umgekehrten Fall kommen, d. h., die Politik könnte auf Ermittlungsverfahren bestehen, die die Staatsanwaltschaften eigentlich mangels eines Tatverdachts ablehnen. – In den vergangenen Jahren wurden in den USA vermehrt Strafverfahren auf Grundlage der vagen Straftatbestände des Espionage Acts gegen Whistle­ blower eingeleitet, die rechtswidrige Praktiken aus dem militärischen und geheimdienstlichen Komplex aufgedeckt hatten, etwa die anlasslose Massenüberwachung von US-Bürgern, die von US-Gerichten schon für verfassungswidrig erklärt wurde, die euphemistisch als enhanced interrogation techniques bekannt gewordenen, als Folter zu bewertenden Methoden wie water­ boarding oder die Einsätze von US-Drohnen zur Tötung von Terrorverdächtigen in Ländern wie Pakistan, die als Kriegsverbrechen eingestuft werden. Zum plötzlichen Anstieg der Anklagen gegen Whistleblower wegen Spionage in den USA, s. Richard Moberly, „Whistle­

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Gustav Radbruch kritisierte die Anwendung der Landesverratstatbestände daher als „politisches Kampfmittel“ und lehnte von Zeitgenossen vorgeschlagene gesetzliche Interessenabwägungsklauseln ab, da sie dem Reichsgericht lediglich eine gesetzliche Grundlage für die repressive Ausrichtung seiner Rechtsprechung bieten, sie aber nicht ändern würde.83 Anstatt der Judikative die Interessenabwägungen zu überlassen, müsse der Gesetzgeber sie selbst vornehmen, indem er „hanebüchen deutliche Bestimmungen“ zur Auflösung der Interessenkollisionen schaffe.84 Nicht wegen Landesverrats bestraft werden sollte seiner Ansicht nach, „wer gesetzwidrige Tatsachen bekannt gibt, um ihre Abstellung durch deutsche Behörden herbeizuführen“.85 Auch in der aktuellen Literatur wird auf die Verfahren aus der Weimarer Zeit Bezug genommen und in der gegenwärtigen Abwägungspraxis der Gerichte zum Whistleblowing ein subtiles Repressionsinstrument vermutet,86 das durch die Entwicklung „generalisierungsfähige[r] Kollisionsnormen“ gemäßigt werden müsse.87 4. Schlussfolgerungen: zwei abwägungsskeptische Postulate Die mit Abwägungen verbundenen Schwierigkeiten lassen sich eindämmen, wenn die folgenden zwei rechtspolitischen bzw. rechtspraktischen abwägungs­ skeptischen Postulate berücksichtigt werden: Erstens ist eine Regel (R1), mittels der eine rechtliche Interessenkollision unter den jeweils gegebenen Umständen ohne eine Abwägung aufgelöst werden kann, einer Regel (R2) vorzuziehen, die eine Abwägung vorsieht. Zweitens ist eine Regel (R1), die unter den jeweiligen Umständen nicht ohne eine Abwägung auskommt, die aber verschiedene, den Abwägungsvorgang konkretisierende Merkmale enthält, einer Regel (R2) vorzuziehen, die keine oder weniger solcher Merkmale enthält.88 Diese abwägungsskeptischen aber Abwägungen nicht absolut negierenden Postulate richten sich an die Gesetzgebung und die Rechtsprechung. Beide müssen darauf hinarbeiten, Interessenkollisionen durch möglichst klare und generalisierende Entscheidungen aufzulösen, nur in wenigen Fällen auf Abwägungen zurückzugreifen und zumindest das dabei angewendete Abwägungsregime auszudifferenzieren. blowers and the Obama Presidency: The National Security Dilemma“, in: Employee Rights and Employ­ment Policy Journal, Vol. 16 (2012), 51 (53). 83  Gustav Radbruch, „Der Landesverrat im Strafgesetzentwurf“, Deutsche Justiz, Bd. 3 (1927/1928), 103 (109), abgedruckt in: Kaufmann (Hrsg.), Gustav Radbruch Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 9, Heidelberg 1992, S. 262 (268 f.). – Die Äußerungen beziehen sich nur auf die Landesverratsvorschriften, denn § 353b StGB trat erst 1936 in Kraft. 84  Ibid., 268. 85  Ibid., 269. 86  Fischer-Lescano (Fn. 71), 438. 87  Fischer-Lescano (Fn. 71), 452. 88 Vgl. Alexy, „Die Gewichtsformel“ (Fn. 55), 771: „Je rationaler die Abwägung ist, desto legitimer ist das Abwägen“.

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IV. Ein Rechtsbegriff des öffentlichen Interesses? Ein Rechtfertigungsgrund überwiegender öffentlicher Interessen würde, neben den oben erläuterten Vorbehalten gegenüber Abwägungen, noch ein anderes Problem aufwerfen. Der eingangs erwähnten Definition zufolge, ist unter einem Interesse eine positive Anteilnahme eines Subjekts bzw. eines Interessenträgers an einem Gegenstand zu verstehen. Bei einem öffentlichen Interesse konstituiert sich der Interessenträger jedoch aus einer Vielzahl von Subjekten, was aus der rechtsanwendenden Perspektive die Frage aufwirft, ob sich das im Einzelfall gesuchte öffentliche Interesse überhaupt erkennen bzw. bestimmen lässt.89 1. Artikulation öffentlicher Interessen durch demokratische Verfahren Ein von Günter Dürig entwickelter Ansatz besteht darin, die in demokratischen Verfahren zustande gekommenen Entscheidungen, analog zur Gemeinschaftswillensbildung im Sinne Jean-Jaques Rousseaus, als Artikulation öffentlicher Interessen zu verstehen.90 Ein einheitliches öffentliches Interesse könne sich nicht aus der Addition der Einzelinteressen einer Gemeinschaft ergeben, denn in ihrer Mannigfaltigkeit decken sie sich nur selten, weichen häufig voneinander ab oder widersprechen sich sogar. Die Summe der Einzelinteressen sei mit der volonté de tous im Sinne Rousseaus vergleichbar. Demgegenüber ergebe sich der Gemeinschaftswille, die volonté générale, erst aus dem von der Mehrheitsregel bestimmten demokratischen Verfahren. Der Wille der Mehrheit repräsentiere die ganze Gemeinschaft, da die Stimmen der Minderheit keine Geltung entfalten, die Minderheit aber nach der Abstimmung Teil der Gemeinschaft bleibt.91 Mit der Artikulation des Gemeinschaftswillens komme auch das Gemeinschaftsinteresse, das interêt général, das öffentliche Interesse zum Ausdruck.92 Am unmittelbarsten geschehe dies bei Plebisziten. In repräsentativen Demokratien würden die öffentlichen Interessen durch Legislativakte der Volksvertreter artikuliert. Auf diese Weise würden die öffentlichen Interessen stets auf die faktischen Interessen der die Gemeinschaft konstituierenden Subjekte zurückgeführt und nicht unabhängig von ihnen betrachtet. Da öffentliche Interessen demnach eigentlich nur in demokratischen Verfahren artiku89  Diese Frage stellt sich auch bei der Ermittlung der Interessen der Allgemeinheit i. R. d. § 34 StGB (sofern man sie mit der h. M. für nostandsfähig erachtet, a. A. etwa Andreas Hoyer, in: Wolter (Hrsg.), Systematischer Kommentar zum StGB, Bd. 1, 9. Auflage, Köln 2017, § 34 Rn. 9); bei ihr stößt man auf dieselben im folgenden Haupttext erläuterten Probleme, die an der hinreichenden Bestimmtheit von § 34 StGB zweifeln lassen können (s. dazu schon Fn. 75). 90  Günter Dürig, Die konstanten Voraussetzungen des Begriffes „Öffentliches Interesse“, München 1949, S. 40 ff. 91  Ibid., S. 42. 92  Ibid., S. 45. Ähnlich: Walter Klein, Zum Begriff des öffentlichen Interesses, Köln 1969, S. 49 ff.

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liert werden können, sollte der Begriff des öffentlichen Interesses möglichst nicht als Tatbestandsmerkmal in Rechtsnormen verwendet werden.93 2. Keine Erkenntnis öffentlicher Interessen bei der Rechtsanwendung Die Rechtswirklichkeit sieht jedoch anders aus, denn der Begriff wird sehr häufig als Tatbestandsmerkmal verwendet.94 Die Gesetzgebung geht daher implizit davon aus, dass die öffentlichen Interessen schon bestehen und durch die Rechtsanwendenden erkennbar sind, bevor sie in demokratischen Verfahren artikuliert werden.95 Diese Erkennbarkeit voraussetzend, meinen verschiedene Stimmen, die (mehrheitlichen) Anschauungen und Wertungen der Interessenträger, d. h. etwa aller Bürger einer Gebietskörperschaft, müssten bei der Rechtsanwendung als allgemeinverbindliche Auslegungsregeln berücksichtigt werden.96 Dabei wird jedoch nicht das epistemologisch Unmögliche erklärt, nämlich, wie Rechtsanwendende, etwa Richterinnen und Richter, imstande sein sollen, diese Interessen, bezüglich der jeweiligen Entscheidungssituation, zu erkennen. 3. Bestimmung der öffentlichen Interessen bei der Rechtsanwendung Andere meinen deshalb, die Rechtsanwendenden müssten, anstatt Mehrheitsauffassungen nachzuvollziehen, selbst normative Entscheidungen treffen.97 Durch die Konkretisierung öffentlicher Interessen würden Richterinnen und Richter als „Gemeinwohlgesetzgeber“ tätig.98 Diese Gemeinwohljudikatur sei von den anderen Staatsfunktionen wegen der integrierenden Wirkung der öffentlichen Interessen weit weniger getrennt, als gemeinhin angenommen.99 In manchen Rechtsbereichen mag dieses Gewaltenteilungsverständnis vertretbar sein, etwa wenn sich die Gesetzgebung im Verwaltungsrecht durch die Verwendung des Rechtsbegriffs öffentlicher Interessen bewusst dazu entscheidet Gerichten weite normative Spielräume   Dürig (Fn. 90), S. 47.   Robert Uerpmann, Das öffentliche Interesse, Tübingen 1999, S. 3 hat ermittelt, dass der Begriff in über 400 Vorschriften verwendet wird; bezieht man Synonyme wie „öffentliche Belange“, „Wohl der Allgemeinheit“ und „Gemeinwohl“ ein, sind es sogar mehr als 4.000 allein im Bundesrecht. 95  Dürig (Fn. 90), S. 65. 96  Dürig (Fn. 90), S. 66. – Ähnlich: Wolfgang Martens, Öffentlich als Rechtsbegriff, Berlin / Zürich 1969, S. 194; Walter Jellinek, Gesetz, Gesetzesanwendung und Zweckmässigkeitserwägung, Tübingen 1913, S. 71. 97  Uerpmann (Fn. 94), S. 15. 98  Peter Häberle, Öffentliches Interesse als juristisches Problem, Bad Homburg 1970, S. 720, 244. 99  Ibid., S. 722. 93 94

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einzuräumen.100 Im Strafrecht ist dieses Verständnis verfassungswidrig, da es mit dem Bestimmtheitsgebot unvereinbar ist, denn die Strafbarkeit eines Verhaltens muss vor der Tat feststehen und kann nicht erst durch ein als „Gemeinwohlgesetzgeber“ agierendes Strafgericht festgelegt werden.101 4. Objektive oder wahre öffentliche Interessen bei der Rechtsanwendung Andere vertreten die Ansicht, öffentliche Interessen ließen sich objektiv, d. h. unabhängig von einer faktischen Beziehung zwischen den Interessenträgern und dem Affektionsgegenstand, bestimmen.102 Auf diese Möglichkeit deuten die an verschiedenen Stellen der Rechtsordnung verwendeten Begriffe „berechtigtes Interesse“103 oder „schutzwürdiges Interesse“104 hin, denn die Rechtsanwendenden müssen hierbei das jeweilige Interesse mit einem objektiven Wertmaßstab abgleichen. Es stellt sich dann die Frage, woraus sich dieser objektive Wertmaßstab ergibt und welchen Inhalt er aufweist. Leonard Nelson meinte, es gebe ein „wahres“ oder „ideales“, a priori durch Vernunft erkennbares Interesse in Gestalt einer objektiven Regel der Vorzugswürdigkeit der Zwecke.105 Auch im Verwaltungsrecht wird teils davon ausgegangen, dass es neben den „faktischen“ auch „wahre“ öffentliche Interessen gebe, die irrtumsfrei erkannt werden könnten. Bei den „wahren“ Interessen handele es sich um „Interessen der Gemeinschaft zur Schaffung oder Bewahrung eines den  Vgl. Schlink, Fn. 70.   Jedenfalls soweit sich dieses Verständnis zulasten des Angeklagten auswirkt. Dennoch findet sich der Topos des öffentlichen Interesses auch im materiellen Strafrecht, etwa in dem 1936 eingeführten § 353b StGB, der voraussetzt, dass der Täter wichtige öffentliche Interessen durch die Offenbarung gefährdet. – Ein vergleichbares Tatbestandsmerkmal hat der Bayerische Verfassungsgerichtshof in einer Entscheidung für zu unbestimmt gehalten. Es ging um das Tatbestandmerkmal der „Interessen der alliierten Streitkräfte oder eines ihrer Mitglieder“. Für den Staatsbürger sei nicht erkennbar, was gegen diese Interessen verstoße, die sich „auf die verschiedensten Lebensgebiete“ erstrecken und „nach den jeweiligen außenpolitischen und innenpolitischen Verhältnissen (…) weitgehend einem Wandel unterworfen“ sind, BayVerfGH, BayGVBl. Nr. 12/1953, S. 76. 102  Ein objektives Interesse kann es nach der eingangs genannten Definition eigentlich nicht geben, denn ein Interesse besteht ja in einer affektiven Beziehung eines Subjektes oder mehrerer Subjekte zu einem Gegenstand. Passender erscheint daher der Begriff des hypothetischen oder mutmaßlichen Interesses. 103  S. etwa § 193 StGB „Wahrnehmung berechtigter Interessen“; § 201 Abs. 2 S. 3 StGB „…  wenn die öffentliche Mitteilung geeignet ist, berechtigte Interessen eines anderen zu beeinträchtigen“; § 201a Abs. 4 StGB „… Handlungen, die in Wahrnehmung überwiegender berechtigter Interessen erfolgen“; s. auch §§ 32f, 58a Abs. 2, 81d Abs. 1, 406d Abs. 2 Nr. 2, Nr. 4 StPO etc. 104  Siehe z. B. §§ 48 Abs. 3 S. 1 Nr. 2, 58a Abs. 1 Nr. 1, 68b Abs. 2, 131a Abs. 4, 147 Abs. 4, 155b Abs. 2 StPO etc. 105  Leonard Nelson, Die Theorie des wahren Interesses und ihre rechtliche und politische Bedeutung, Göttingen 1913; ders., System der philosophischen Rechtslehre und Politik, Leipzig 1920, § 43, S. 105. 100 101

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jeweiligen Verhältnissen entsprechenden, materiellen Rechtszustandes, wie er in den rechtlichen Wertvorstellungen und Zielsetzungen zum Ausdruck“ komme.106 Wie die wahren Interessen irrtumsfrei erkannt werden können, wird dabei nicht erklärt. In Wahrheit handele es sich nicht um eine Erkenntnis, sondern vielmehr um einen wertenden und damit subjektiven Vorgang, der keine objektive Gültigkeit beanspruchen könne.107 Die „wahren“ Gemeinschaftsinteressen würden zudem demokratische und rechtsstaatliche Verfahrensregelungen entwerten, da wegen des erhobenen Wahrheitsanspruchs ihre Superiorität gegenüber den in Wahlen und Abstimmungen artikulierten faktischen öffentlichen Interessen behauptet werde.108 Teilweise wird auch davon ausgegangen, die öffentlichen Interessen ließen sich objektiv durch eine eigene Auslegungsmethodik bestimmen. In einem ersten Schritt sei das jeweilige öffentliche Interesse zu ermitteln, das sich aus der verfassungsmäßigen Rechtsordnung ergeben müsse.109 Anschließend sei zu prüfen, ob dieses Interesse von der jeweiligen Vorschrift erfasst werde. Dabei sei insbesondere zu berücksichtigen, in welchem Zusammenhang die Vorschrift stehe und welche Güter der Gesetzgeber mit der Vorschrift schützen oder fördern wollte.110 Zudem sei auch der Zuständigkeitsbereich des Organs zu berücksichtigen, das zum Vollzug der jeweiligen Norm berufen ist.111 Ob die öffentlichen Interessen dadurch präziser bestimmt werden können als mittels der klassischen Auslegungsmethoden, die – neben der beim Begriff des öffentlichen Interesses wohl semantisch fruchtlosen Interpretation – ohnehin die historische, systematische und teleologische Interpretation vorsehen, ist fraglich. 5. Kritik und Schlussfolgerungen Die mit dem Begriff der öffentlichen Interessen bei der Rechtsanwendung verbundenen Schwierigkeiten legen, sofern die Interessen nicht bereits in einem demokratischen Verfahren artikuliert wurden, den Schluss nahe, dass sie sich nicht objektiv bestimmen, sondern allenfalls vermuten lassen. Luhmann geht etwa davon aus, dass es öffentliche Interessen im Sinne normativ feststehender, durch die Rechtsanwendenden erkennbarer Sachverhalte nicht gebe. Das sogenannte öffentliche Interesse, sei „gar kein Interesse (…), sondern ein Programm gewordenes Mißverständnis.“112 Der Staat als ein zur Anfertigung von Entscheidungen orga  Kluth (Fn. 1), § 29 Rn. 8. – Ähnlich, Klein (Fn. 92), S. 64.   Uerpmann (Fn. 94), S. 11. 108  Ibid., S. 11 f. 109  Martens (Fn. 96), S. 196, 193. – Bei widerstreitenden Ansichten der Interessenträger ­solle das Interesse maßgeblich sein, für das eine Mehrheit besteht, ibid., S. 194. 110  Martens (Fn. 96), S. 196, 197. 111  Martens (Fn. 96), S. 196. 112  Niklas Luhmann, Recht und Automation in der öffentlichen Verwaltung, Berlin 1966, S. 89. 106 107

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nisiertes System könne seine eigene Identität nicht selbst reflektieren, jedenfalls nicht in dem Sinne, dass er den Sinn seiner Existenz in ein spezifisches Interesse kleide und als Entscheidungsfaktor in einer Abwägung anderen Interessen gegenüberstelle. Kein System sei „imstande, die eigene Identität, die sich im Erleben einer Vielzahl von Individuen, in einer Vielzahl von Sachverhalten und im Aushalten der Zeit konstituiert, voll zu reflektieren.“113 Das öffentliche Interesse könne daher nur einen „Orientierungsbegriff des täglichen Lebens“ abgeben, eigne sich aber nicht „als Leitbegriff wissenschaftlicher Analyse und Kritik“.114 Der Versuch seiner Bestimmung möge eine ähnliche Anteilnahme erwecken wie das Erklimmen der Eigernordwand, habe aber geringere Erfolgschancen.115 Aus den Zweifeln bezüglich der Erkenn- und Bestimmbarkeit der öffentlichen Interessen zeichnet sich, neben dem schon oben erwähnten Konflikt mit dem Grundsatz der Gewaltenteilung, noch eine andere Friktion mit dem Rechtsstaatsprinzip ab. Denn es droht eine Verletzung des Bestimmtheitsgebotes, wenn Strafgerichte öffentliche Interessen als „Gemeinwohlgesetzgeber“ bestimmen und dadurch die Strafbarkeit eines Verhaltens ex post festlegen. Die Verwendung des Topos des öffentlichen Interesses lässt vermuten, dass die Gesetzgebung ihre legislative Verantwortung auf die Judikative abwälzen will, anstatt die grundrechtswesentliche Frage der Legalität des Whistleblowings selbst zu beantworten. Bezüglich der Verwendung der öffentlichen Interessen als Rechtsbegriff sollten daher, analog zu den abwägungsskeptischen Postulaten (vgl. oben), die folgenden beiden Postulate beachtet werden: Erstens sollte der Topos der öffentlichen Interessen, gerade in Normen, von denen die Strafbarkeit einer Person abhängt, als Rechtsbegriff vermieden werden. Sofern er sich ausnahmsweise als unverzichtbar erweist, etwa in einem Rechtfertigungsgrund, sollten die öffentlichen Interessen schon durch die Legislative spezifiziert werden, damit sich die Rechtsanwendenden auf ihre im demokratischen Verfahren artikulierte Gestalt stützen können. V. Fazit Zu klären bleibt, mit welchen Mitteln sich die aufgestellten abwägungsskeptischen und dem Rechtsbegriff des öffentlichen Interesses kritisch gegenüberstehenden Postulate entfalten lassen. Das erste abwägungsskeptische Postulat, abwägungsfreie Regeln vorzuziehen, lässt sich einerseits in einigen Konstellationen durch absolute Vorrangrelationen erfüllen. Bestimmte Geheimnisse könnten mangels eines schutzwürdigen Geheimhaltungsinteresses von vornherein vom  Ibid., S. 90.   Luhmann, „Schubert, Glendon, The Public Interest. A Critique of the Theory of a Political Concept. The Free Press of Glencoe, New York 1960. 244 S.” (Buchbesprechung), in: Der Staat, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1962), S. 375 (377). 115  Ibid., 375. 113 114

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straftatbestandlichen Schutz ausgenommen werden, etwa wenn die verdeckten Informationen gravierende Missstände wie Verletzungen der Menschenwürde, Kriegsverbrechen und andere Straftaten oder andere Menschenrechtsverletzungen betreffen.116 Ein Beispiel stellt die Regelung über die „illegalen“ Geheimnisse in § 93 Abs. 2 StGB dar, die jedoch nur sehr wenige Informationen vom Geheimnisschutz ausnimmt und sich angesichts ihrer vagen Merkmale auch nicht als Vorbild künftiger Ausnahmetatbestände eignet. Weiter reichende und präzisere Ausnahmetatbestände sollten auch bei anderen geheimnisschützenden Straftatbeständen wie § 353b StGB und § 17 UWG eingeführt werden.117 Andererseits gibt es Fälle, in denen ein zwar schutzwürdiges Geheimnis weitergegeben wird, die Handlung aber evident nicht strafwürdig ist, weshalb sie eindeutig von der Tatbestandsmäßigkeit ausgenommen werden sollte. Gemeint sind dabei insbesondere die Fälle, in denen Arbeitnehmer oder Beamte durch die Weitergabe strafrechtlich geschützter Geheimnisse nicht gegen ihre arbeits- bzw. beamtenrechtlichen Verschwiegenheitspflichten verstoßen, etwa weil die innerdienstliche Weitergabe der Informationen im Rahmen des Beschäftigungsverhältnisses geboten ist118 oder die Informationen im Rahmen eines eingerichteten Hinweisgebersystems weitergegeben werden.119 In diesen Fällen sollte, um einander widerstreitende Pflichten in der Rechtsordnung nach Möglichkeit zu vermeiden, auch keine strafrechtliche Verschwiegenheitspflicht bestehen. Was das zweite abwägungsskeptische Postulat, den Abwägungsvorgang durch gesetzliche Vorgaben möglichst weit zu rationalisieren, anbelangt, könnte die In116 Gegen eine strafrechtliche Geheimhaltungspflicht bezüglich von Informationen über Straftaten spricht das Grundrecht zur Anzeige von Straftaten aus Art. 2 Abs. 1 GG i. V. m. Art. 20 Abs. 3 GG (BVerfG, NJW 2001, 3474 ff.). – Für eine positivrechtliche Erlaubnis evtl. sogar bei „nur“ moralisch inakzeptablem Verhalten, Joerden (Fn. 11), S. 227 (238); für nicht schutzwürdig hält Fischer-Lescano (Fn. 71), S. 453, Kriegsverbrechen und Menschenrechtsverletzungen; nach Radbruchs Absichtslösung (s. o. Fn. 83) wären Informationen bezüglich Gesetzesverstößen durch die Landesverratsvorschriften nicht geschützt, wenn in der Absicht der Abstellung der Verstöße gehandelt wird. – Eventuell könnte der rechtliche Geheimhaltungsschutz auch analog zur Radbruch´schen Formel negiert werden, wenn er unerträglich ungerecht erschiene. Ggf. wäre die Pflicht zur Geheimhaltung dann bei „nur“ einfacher Ungerechtigkeit grundsätzlich zu bejahen. Diese These kann hier nur angedeutet werden; sie scheint allerdings wegen der Undeutlichkeit des Merkmals der unerträglichen Ungerechtigkeit mit den hier vertretenen, auf Rechtssicherheit bedachten Postulaten nur schwer vereinbar. – Hinzuweisen ist noch auf § 203 StGB, bei dem kein Ausnahmetatbestand bezüglich „illegaler“ Geheimnisse eingeführt werden sollte, denn dort bestehen wichtige Gründe für eine nahezu uneingeschränkte Geheimhaltungspflicht, etwa das in einem Rechtsstaat besonders schutzwürdige Vertrauensverhältnis zwischen Mandant / in und Rechtsanwalt / anwältin. 117 Nach umstrittener, aber richtiger Ansicht werden sogenannte „illegale“ Geschäftsgeheimnisse bereits de lege lata nicht durch § 17 UWG geschützt; zur Klarstellung und Beendigung des insoweit schwelenden Streits würde sich ein Ausnahmetatbestand anbieten, der Informationen bezüglich Gesetzesverstößen vom tatbestandlichen Schutz ausnimmt. 118  Vgl. § 67 Abs. 2 S. 1 Nr. 1 BBG bzw. § 37 Abs. 2 S. 1 Nr. 1 BeamtStG. 119  Vgl. für das Arbeitsrecht Simona Kreis, Whistleblowing als Beitrag zur Rechtsdurchsetzung, Tübingen 2017, S. 124.

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teressenabwägungsformel eines Whistleblowing-Rechtfertigungsgrundes derjenigen beim Defensivnotstand entsprechend gestaltet werden.120 Während bei dem in § 34 StGB geregelten Aggressivnotstand eine Gefahr abgewendet wird, indem in die Rechtsgüter eines an der Gefahrverursachung unbeteiligten Dritten eingegriffen wird, richtet sich die Defensivnotstandshandlung gegen die Rechtsgüter desjenigen, „aus dessen Rechtssphäre die Gefahr herrührt“.121 Die Duldungspflicht des durch die Notstandshandlung Verletzten ist beim Defensivnotstand stärker, da er auf irgendeine Weise rechtlich für die Gefahr verantwortlich ist.122 Diese Situation ist beim Whistleblowing regelmäßig gegeben, da die aufgedeckten Missstände aus der Sphäre der Organisation stammen, die durch die Offenlegung des Geheimnisses betroffen wird. Wegen der deshalb stärkeren Duldungspflicht, wäre die Weitergabe der Informationen daher nur dann als rechtswidrig anzusehen, wenn die Geheimhaltungsinteressen die Informationsinteressen wesentlich überwiegen. Zur Umsetzung des ersten bezüglich des Begriffs des öffentlichen Interesses aufgestellten Postulats, den Rechtsbegriff des öffentlichen Interesses im materiellen Strafrecht zu vermeiden, sollte in Straftatbeständen gänzlich auf die Verwendung des Begriffs verzichtet werden. Was das zweite Postulat anbelangt, den Begriff, sofern er sich ausnahmsweise, etwa i. R. e. Rechtfertigungsgrundes, als unerlässlich erweist, zu spezifizieren, sollten die mannigfaltigen öffentlichen Interessen, wie schon oben vorgeschlagen, durch den Gesetzgeber typisiert und in einem nicht abschließenden Katalog geregelt werden,123 womit zugleich auch dem zweiten abwägungsskeptischen Postulat gedient wäre.

120 Bei geheimnisschützenden Straftatbeständen wie § 203 StGB wird schon länger davon ausgegangen, dass in der Situation, in der die Gefahr vom Geheimnisträger ausgeht, der Rechtsgedanke des § 228 BGB zu berücksichtigen sei, s. etwa die Nachweise bei Rogall (Fn. 35), 6 Fn. 118, aktuell etwa Hoyer, in: Wolter (Hrsg.), Systematischer Kommentar zum StGB, Bd. 4, 9. Auflage, Köln 2017, § 203 Rn. 88 m. w. N. – Für eine wegen der Notstandssituation modifizierte Interessenabwägungsklausel i. R. d. § 34 StGB beim Whistleblowing Volker Erb, „Inwieweit schützt § 17 UWG ein ausländisches ‚Bankgeheimnis‘?“, in: Heinrich /  Jäger / Achenbach / Amelung / Bottke / Haffke / Schünemann / Wolter (Hrsg.), FS für Claus Roxin zum 80. Geburtstag, Berlin / New York 2011, Bd. 2, 1103 (1113); für eine analoge Anwendung von § 228 BGB beim Whistleblowing, Armin Engländer / Till Zimmermann, „Whistleblowing als strafbarer Verrat von Geschäfts- und Betriebsgeheimnissen? – Zur Bedeutung des juristisch-ökonomischen Vermögensbegriffs für den Schutz illegaler Geheimnisse bei § 17 UWG“, in: NZWiSt 2012, 328 (331). 121  Joerden, Logik im Recht, 3. Auflage, Berlin 2018, S. 141. 122 Ibid. 123  So ist die Gesetzgebung auch in anderen Regelungsmaterien vorgegangen, etwa bei der Frage, in welchen Fällen ein das Steuergeheimnis durchbrechendes „zwingendes öffentliches Interesse“ i. S. d. § 30 Abs. 4 Nr. 5 AO besteht, indem mit lit. a) bis c) drei Fallgruppen in Nr. 5 aufgenommen wurden, bei deren Vorliegen ein derartiges Interesse bestehen soll. Allerdings werden die Fallgruppen wegen der Verwendung mehrerer unbestimmter Rechtsbegriffe als zu vage kritisiert, Philipp Besson, Das Steuergeheimnis und das Nemo-tenetur-Prinzip im (steuer) strafrechtlichen Ermittlungsverfahren, Frankfurt a. M. 1997, S. 60. – Ernst Benda, „Steuergeheimnis: Kann der Bürger noch darauf vertrauen?“, in: DStR 1984, 351 (355), hält die Rege-

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Summary This paper deals with balancing tests and the related legal concept of “public interest” in potentially criminal whistleblowing cases. At first, it outlines the conflicts between secrecy interests and information interests that occur through whistleblowing. In the following, it shows approaches in national and international law trying to resolve these conflicts with balancing tests. Then, with reference to the discussion about balancing as a method in constitutional law, the author points out general methodological problems with legal balancing. Considering the principle of legal certainty, he states that these problems weigh even heavier in criminal law. Thus, he argues, on the one hand the scope of balancing clauses in criminal law and in the context of whistleblowing should be restricted when possible, and on the other hand the balancing process should be structured as rational as possible in the remaining cases. In the following, the author discusses problems associated with the legal concept of public interest, which is popular in national and international law and used in several balancing clauses. The author posits that the term should be used in criminal law only if it is indispensable and that the legislator should specify it in these cases. Finally, the author proposes different means to overcome the described difficulties with balancing clauses and the legal concept of public interest.

lung zwar bezüglich der drei Fallgruppen für hinreichend bestimmt, im Übrigen aber, was die unbenannten Fälle anbelangt, für verfassungswidrig.

Current Ethical, Legal, and Social Aspects of Prenatal Diagnostics in Poland and Germany Marcin Orzechowski, Maximilian Schochow and Florian Steger

I. Introduction The emergence of non-invasive prenatal testing (NIPT) in recent years substantially broadened the potential and use of prenatal diagnostics.1 Cost-effective, fast, and safe detection of genetic defects in the fetus led to the quick prevalence of NIPT.2 Yet, it rapidly became clear that the introduction of NIPT anew raised questions about ethical, legal and social aspects of prenatal diagnostics.3 Although these discussions can be observed worldwide,4 two recent developments in Poland and Germany showed that this topic in both countries is still an object of contention.5 In Poland, a novel proposal for tightening legal regulations on abortion and access to prenatal diagnostics led to a fierce discussion about the ethical, legal and social consequences of genetic prenatal diagnostics in general and NIPT in particular.6 In 1  Hui, Lisa / Bianchi, Diana W, Noninvasive prenatal DNA testing: the vanguard of genomic medicine, in: Annual Review of Medicine 68 (2017), pp. 459 – 472. 2  Norton, Mary E. / Jacobsson, Bo / Swamy, Geeta K. et al., Cell-free DNA Analysis for Noninvasive Examination of Trisomy, in: The New England Journal of Medicine 372 (2015), pp.  1589 – 1597. 3  Steger, Florian / Joerden, Jan C./Kaniowski, Andrzej M., “Einleitung”, in: Steger, Florian / Joerden, Jan C./Kaniowski, Andrzej M. (eds.), Ethik in der Pränatalen Medizin, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2016, pp. 85 – 96; Minear, Mollie A./Alessi, Stephanie / Allyse, Megan et al., Noninvasive prenatal genetic testing: current and emerging ethical, legal, and social issues, in: Annual Review of Genomics and Human Genetics 16 (2015), pp. 369 – 398. 4  Vanstone, Meredith / King, Carol / de Vrijer, Barbra et al., Non-invasive prenatal testing: ethics and policy considerations, in: Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology Canada 36 (2014), pp.  515 – 526; Alexander, Elizabeth / Kelly, Susan / Kerzin-Storrar, Lauren, Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing: UK Genetic Counselors’ Experiences and Perspectives, in: Journal of Genetic Counseling 24 (2015), pp. 300 – 311; Lewis, Sharon M./Cullinane, Fiona M./Carlin, John B. et al., Women’s and health professionals’ preferences for prenatal testing for Down syndrome in Australia, in: Australian and New Zealand Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology 46 (2006), pp.  205 – 2011. 5  For an extensive discussion of current aspects of prenatal diagnostics in Germany and Poland see: Steger, Florian / Orzechowski, Marcin / Schochow, Maximilian (eds.), Pränatal­me­ dizin. Ethische, juristische und gesellschaftliche Aspekte, Freiburg / München: Karl Alber, 2018.

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this debate, the supporters of wider access to prenatal diagnostics stressed the right to information and the right to reproductive autonomy of pregnant women. The opponents concentrated their argumentation on social threats that these methods entail. In contrast, in Germany, recent discussion on prenatal diagnostics concentrated on the widening of the access to prenatal testing.7 Proposals for implementation of NIPT as a part of routine prenatal care have been put forward. Similarly as in Poland, these proposals led to debate about the benefits and hazards of genetic prenatal diagnostics. Against this backdrop, we present the key ethical, legal and social issues that currently dominate the debate on prenatal diagnostics in Poland and Germany. The aim of the research is to summarize and discuss current ethical and legal debate on genetic prenatal diagnostics as well as recent political and societal developments in this area in both countries. To do so, we conducted a thematic analysis of the lite­ rature on the topic. Additionally, legal regulations, opinion polls, and news releases pertaining to the topic of prenatal diagnostics in both countries were identified and included in the analysis. The paper consists of four parts, in which we present the main current aspect of prenatal diagnostics in Poland and Germany. First, we provide an overview of the discussion on genetic prenatal diagnostics and termination of pregnancy in both countries. In the following step, we concentrate on the issue of routinization of prenatal diagnostic procedures. In the subsequent third part, we analyze the subject of informed decision-making from the perspective of both countries. Fourth, we focus on the question of access to prenatal diagnostics. Closing remarks and some recommendations for the praxis conclude the paper. II. Termination of Pregnancy Currently, the issue of pregnancy termination after prenatal diagnostics dominates the discussion on the topic in Poland. In the center of the discussion lies the question of precise regulation of aims and procedures of prenatal diagnostics.8 Current legal regulations do not explicitly limit the use of this method to therapeutic purposes but also allow termination of pregnancy based on results of prenatal diagnostics. The main regulations on prenatal diagnostics are provided by the Act on Family Planning, Protection of the Human Fetus, and the Provision of Abortion of 1993.9 According to the article 2 of the Act, the organs of the state and district ad6  Reych, Zofia, A Polish abortion ban would turn women back into childbearing instruments, in: The Guardian, 25 April 2016, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/ 2016/apr/08/polish-abortion-ban-law-poland, last accessed on: 23 February 2018. 7  N.A., Nicht invasive Pränataldiagnostik: G-BA beginnt mit Methodenbewertung, in: Deutsches Ärzteblatt, 18 August 2016, available at: https://www.aerzteblatt.de/nachrichten/700 90/Nicht-invasive-Praenataldiagnostik-G-BA-beginnt-mit-Methodenbewertung, last accessed on: 23 February 2018. 8  Boratyńska, Maria, Informacja i swobodny dostęp do genetycznych badań prenatalnych a klausula sumienia i przywilej terapeutyczny, in: Etyka 47 (2013), pp. 34 – 49.

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ministration are obligated to provide pregnant women with medical, social, and legal care. This legal act binds the abovementioned institutions to provide unconstrained access to information and prenatal diagnostics, especially if there is a high risk of genetic or developmental defects of the fetus or suspicion of untreatable disease that endangers the life of the fetus. Furthermore, the article 4a of the Act regulates that abortion can be performed when: “(…) 1. The pregnancy constitutes a danger to life or health of the pregnant women, 2. Prenatal diagnosis or other medical premises indicate with high probability a severe and irreversible defect of fetus or an untreatable disease that endangers the life of fetus, 3. There is a justified suspicion that the pregnancy is a result of a criminal action.”10

Because the regulations on prenatal diagnostics are embedded within the codification on abortion in the Polish law, the successive discussion on the utility and use of this method has been moved into the background of the socially festered dispute on women’s reproductive rights and termination of pregnancy.11 This debate resulted in polarization of social and political positions. Supporters of these methods promote benefits for the pregnant woman’s health, which stem from the widespread and easy access to modern methods of prenatal diagnostics. They also stress the central role of women in the decision-making process, resulting from their right to reproductive autonomy.12 In opposition to this, contenders concentrate on the increased number of abortions in Poland that are conducted after a prenatal diagnosis. In the debate, this argument is being used to label genetic prenatal diagnostics as a “eugenic practice”.13 In this, the opponents refer to a systematic elimination of humans with specific physical and mental characteristics. This argument disregards the point that this so-called “eugenic practice” is unsubstantiated by the empirical evidence. Official statistics show that in the year 2000, the number of legal abortions in Poland after a prenatal diagnosis totaled 55 (9.4 % of all legal abortions). This figure rose to 996 in 2015 (95.7 % of all legal abortions).14 Therefore, the connection between the use of prenatal diagnostics and 9  Ustawa o planowaniu rodziny, ochronie płodu ludzkiego i warunkach dopuszczalności przerywania ciąży z dnia 7 stycznia 1993 roku, in: Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z 1993 roku, numer 17, pozycja 78. 10 Ibid. 11  Żuk, Piotr / Żuk, Paweł, Women’s health as an ideological and political issue. Restricting the right to abortion, access to in vitro fertilization procedures, and prenatal testing in Poland, in: Health Care for Women International 38 (2017), pp. 689 – 704; Graff, Agnieszka, Report from the gender trenches: War against “genderism” in Poland, in: European Journal of Women’s Studies 21 (2014), pp. 431 – 435. 12  Boratyńska (Fn. 8). 13  Midro, Alina T., “Konflikt sumienia w poradnictwie genetycznym”, in: Sinkiewicz, Władysław / Grabowski, Rafał (eds.), Medycznie, etyczne i prawne aspekty sprzeciwu sumienia w praktyce medycznej, Bydgoszcz: Margrafsen, 2015, pp. 125 – 141. 14  Rada Ministrów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Sprawozdanie Rady Ministrów z wykonania ustawy o planowaniu rodziny 2017, available at: https://bip.kprm.gov.pl/kpr/bip-rady-ministrow / informacje-i-sprawozda/4505,informacje.html 8, last accessed on: 23 February 2018.

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abortion is observable in recent years; however, it does not meet the characteristics of a widespread, eugenic approach. The number of legal abortions after a prenatal diagnosis in Poland currently is less than 0.25 % of live births. Similarly, as in Germany, the argument of “eugenic selection” does not mirror current societal practice. In 2016, the number of legal terminations of pregnancy in Germany totaled 98,721.15 Visible in this country is a decreasing tendency in termination of pregnancy. In 2009, a total of 110,694 legal abortions were conducted. Only a small proportion (about 3 %) of abortions occurred because of medical indication, including results of prenatal diagnostics.16 Furthermore, individual termination of pregnancy does not fulfill conditions of a eugenic program. The personal decision of the pregnant woman for the “embryopathological” abortion does not constitute a political or societal statement against people with disabilities. It is a representation of individual life choices.17 Such decisions lack organizational, ideological, and political characteristics of historically well-known eugenic programs.18 Concentration on the “eugenic” argument leads to neglecting the issue of access to information about health status of the fetus and of pregnant women’s reproductive autonomy. Moreover, formulation of the Polish law on abortion on grounds of prenatal dia­ gnostics shows problematic legal ambiguity. The article 4a of the Act on Family Planning, Protection of the Human Fetus, and the Provision of Abortion does not define what is meant by a high probability of aberration, what is a severe and irreversible defect, and to what degree should an illness be a threat to the life of the fetus. Even at first glance, it is visible at this point that the criteria for abortion are imprecise and allow wide interpretation. Due to the lack of linguistic and substantive precision, the state transfers responsibility for the interpretation of prenatal diagnostics results to physicians. Since their decision may lead to abortion, some physicians might choose to conceal the results of prenatal diagnosis or refuse to conduct the procedure altogether.19 15  Statistisches Bundesamt, Schwangerschaftsabbrüche, available at: https://www.destatis. de/DE/ZahlenFakten/GesellschaftStaat/Gesundheit/Schwangerschaftsabbrueche/Tabellen/ ­RechtlicheBegruendung.html, last accessed on: 23 February 2018. 16  Luttkus, Andreas, “Anspruch an Pränataldiagnostik in einem klinischen Setting: Erfahrungen aus Ostwestfalen”, in: Cremer, Marit / Wewetzer, Christa (eds.), Pränatale Diagnostik. Beratungspraxis aus medizinischer, psychosozialer und ethischer Sicht, Frankfurt am Main / New York: Campus, 2017, pp. 51 – 57, here p. 54. 17  Rubeis, Giovanni, “Das Konzept der Eugenik in der ethischen Debatte um nichtinvasive Pränataltests (NIPT)”, in: Steger, Florian / Orzechowski, Marcin / Schochow, Maximilian (eds.), Pränatalmedizin. Ethische, juristische und gesellschaftliche Aspekte, Freiburg / München: Karl Alber, 2018, pp. 100 – 125. 18  Bashford, Alison / Levine, Philippa (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of Eugenics, Oxford / New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. 19  Kaniowski, Andrzej M., “Naturrecht oder Machtanspruch? Pränatalmedizin als Kampffeld”, in: Steger, Florian / Joerden, Jan C./Kaniowski, Andrzej M. (eds.), Ethik in der Pränatalen Medizin. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2016, pp. 85 – 96.

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III. Routinization of Prenatal Diagnostic Procedures Recent advances in the detection of fetus DNA, especially the introduction of NIPT, have contributed to the expansion of methods of prenatal diagnostics. Likely, the process will lead to further increase in the provision of new and more extensive tests and to increased demand. However, this development is strongly associated with routinization and medicalization of the test procedures.20 With increased availability of genetic prenatal diagnosis methods raises social and individual pressure to use them.21 Although prenatal diagnostics provide the benefits for the pregnant woman in form of information about the health status of the fetus, the disadvantages for the fetus can turn severe.22 Likelihood of a genetic defect can lead to premature abortion, even though there is a possibility of false positive results. It has been maintained that, due to limited therapeutic possibilities for the fetus, prenatal genetic testing primarily aims at providing reasons for termination of pregnancy. The establishment of prenatal genetic test leads to a systematic search for trisomy 13, 18 or 21 and equals a screening for chromosome deviations.23 This, in turn, could lead to decreased societal diversity, as the number of people with certain conditions will systematically drop. Moreover, the widespread access to prenatal diagnostics can be interpreted as a social bias against people with disabilities.24 This could signal that the life of a fetus with genetic aberration is less valued than the life of a healthy fetus. This point has especially been emphasized in Germany and Poland in the positions of the Catholic and the Evangelic Church.25 According to these viewpoints, prenatal diagnostics should be conducted only with a therapeutic goal. The life of a 20  Deutscher Ethikrat, Die Zukunft der genetischen Diagnostik – von der Forschung in die klinische Anwendung, Berlin 2013, available at: http://www.ethikrat.org/dateien/pdf/stellung nahme-zukunft-der-genetischen-diagnostik.pdf, last accessed on: 23 February 2018. 21  Domaradzki, Jan, Genetyczne badania prenatalne. Retoryka wyboru a prawo do ignoran­ cji, in: Nowiny Lekarskie 80 (2011), pp. 139 – 146. 22  Frączek, Patrycja / Jabłońska, Magdalena / Pawlikowski, Jakub, Medyczne, etyczne, prawne i społeczne aspekty badań prenatalnych w Polsce, in: Medycyna Ogólna i Nauki o Zdrowiu 19 (2013), pp. 103 – 109. 23  Gen-ethisches Netzwerk e.V., Offener Brief an den Gemeinsamen Bundesausschuss aus Anlass von Tagesordnungspunkt 8. 2. 1 der öffentlichen Sitzung des G-BA 18 August 2016, available at: https://www.gen-ethisches-netzwerk.de/files/16_08_12 %20Offener%20Brief%20 G-BA.pdf, last accessed on: 23 February 2018. 24  Różyńska, Joanna, Etyka i diagnostyka przedurodzeniowa, in: Różyńska, Joanna / Chańska, Weronika (eds.), Bioetyka, Warszawa: Wolters Kluver, 2013, pp. 345 – 361. 25  Kramer, Anne-Marie, Defending Biomedical Authority and Regulating the Womb as Social Space. Prenatal Testing in the Polish Press, in: European Journal of Women’s Studies 17 (2010), pp.  43 – 59; Żuk / Żuk (Fn. 11); Klinkhammer, Gisela, Kirchenwort zur pränatalen Diagnostik: Entschieden gegen eugenischen Tendenzen, in: Deutsches Ärzteblatt 94 (1997), p. 1485; Bundesverband evangelische Behindertenhilfe e.V., Präna-Test. Eine Stellungnahme des Bundesverbands evangelische Behindertenhilfe e.V., 2013, available at: http://www.ev-medizinethik.de/pages/themen/lebensanfang/themenfelder/praenatal-_und_praeimplantations-diagnostik/index.html, last accessed on: 23 Februar 2018.

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child has precedence over quality of life or autonomy of women. However, on the other hand, both positions stress the need for financial, social and psychological support of the people with genetic disabilities and their families. As a result, a network of perinatal hospices has been established in Poland.26 The aim of these institutions is to provide palliative care for children with congenital untreatable dis­ eases until the moment of their death as well as spiritual support for the parents. Moreover, as an effect of pressure by conservative circles, Polish government decided in November 2016 to provide financial incentives for pregnant women not to conduct an abortion of fetuses with genetic defects. The Act on Support of Pregnant Women and Families “Pro-life” of 2016 regulates that women should receive: “(…) financial support for giving birth to a child who has been diagnosed in the prenatal phase with a severe and irreversible disability or with an untreatable life-threatening disease”.27

This financial support, non-recurring, currently amounts to 4,000 PLN (approximately 1,000 EUR). However, this policy needs to be critically assessed. A single, non-recurring financial payment does not provide help for lifelong care, rehabilitation and therapy for people with disabilities. The policy goal should rather be a better inclusion and support for people with long-term disabilities. In addition, such regulation can lead to situations in which the pregnant woman – especially in circumstances of financial troubles – is put under pressure by her relatives to undergo full-term pregnancy and receive financial assistance. Furthermore, with respect to the rights of disabled people, a contentious issue in both countries constitutes the question of admissibility of prenatal diagnostics with regard to fundamental human rights.28 In particular, the introduction of NIPT triggered the legal debate on individual rights of citizens.29 Notably contested is the perceived contradiction between diagnostic aim of the testing and the constitutional right to live as well as prohibition of discrimination. An analysis of the aims and 26  Karwacki, Marek W., “Pediatric Palliative Care in Poland”, in: Knapp, Caprice / Madden, Vanessa / Fowler-Kerry, Susan (eds.), Pediatric Palliative Care: Global Perspectives, Dordrecht: Springer, 2012, pp.  251 – 258; Korzeniewska-Eksterowicz, Aleksandra / Respondek-Liberska, Maria / Przysło, Łukasz et al., Perinatal Palliative Care: Barriers and Attitudes of Neonatologists and Nurses in Poland, in: The Scientific World Journal (2013), doi:10.1155/2013/168060. 27  Ustawa o wsparciu kobiet w ciąży i rodzin “Za życiem” z dnia 4 listopada 2016 roku, in: Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z 2016 roku, pozycja 1860. 28  Drozdowska, Urszula, Wykładnia art. 4a ust.1 ptk 2 ustawy o planowaniu rodziny, ochronie płodu ludzkiego i warunkach dopuszczalności przerywania ciąży w świetle orzecznictwa Sądu Najwyższego i poglądów doktryny prawa, in: Miscellanea Historico-Iurdica 15 (2016), pp.  301 – 316; Heinrichs, Bert / Spranger, Tade M./Tambornino, Lisa, Ethische und rechtliche Aspekte der Pränataldiagnostik. Herausforderungen angesichts neuer nicht-invasiver Testverfahren, in: Medizinrecht 30 (2012), pp. 625 – 630. 29  Gärditz, Klaus Ferdinand, Gutachtliche Stellungnahme zur Zulässigkeit des Diagnostikprodukts “PraenaTest” 2012, available at: http://www.cdl-online.de/uploads/pdf/praenatest. pdf, last accessed on: 23 February 2018; Hufen, Friedhelm, Verfassungsrechtliche Bedenken gegen frühe Pränataldiagnostik?, in: Medizinrecht 35 (2017), pp. 277 – 288.

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methods of NIPT and constitutional guarantees shows that it does not violate fundamental human rights written down in the German constitution.30 Use of prenatal diagnostics does not stand against the rights of people with disabilities. It does not present any deteriorative treatment of the fetus or a person with genetic disability. The results serve only for detection of circumstances that could lead to possible discrimination.31 The use of prenatal diagnostics also does not violate the constitutional right to live. The decision to abort the pregnancy is taken by the involved woman and within the legal framework of current regulations. Prenatal diagnostics only provides an information that could constitute an additional reason for abortion.32 In addition, NIPT provides knowledge about possible defects without hazard to the fetus, and thus reduces the risk of miscarriage. On the other hand, the use of prenatal diagnostics strengthens the rights of pregnant women. Especially in the case of NIPT, the diagnostics do not infringe the right to physical integrity; rather, it provides physical and mental protection of the pregnant woman.33 Even if the determination of a genetic anomaly in fetus does not directly relate to the health of the pregnant woman, it can have an important influence on possible psychological problems during the pregnancy and after the birth. Prenatal diagnostics encompasses several relevant information about the health status of the pregnant woman, the fetus, and its development. In addition, NIPT sheds light on possible anomalies from the starting weeks of pregnancy with relatively low risks for the woman and the fetus. In Poland, the question of constitutional admissibility of genetic prenatal diagnostics remains highly contentious.34 On the one hand, it is argued that abortion on grounds of the “embryo-pathological” premise considerably limits the legal protection of disabled people. Comparison between the legal situations of a fetus without a genetic abnormality and with genetic aberration shows bias towards the former. Such situation is deemed inadmissible from the point of view of the democratic rule of law.35 On the other side, other authors accentuate the necessity for balancing benefits and rights of pregnant women and unborn children.36 In the case of severe, lethal disability of the fetus, the psychological and emotional health of the pregnant woman, as well as costs of ineffective actions for improving the quality of life of a 30  Hufen, Friedhelm, Zur verfassungsrechtlichen Beurteilung frühzeitiger pränataler Diagnostik. Dargestellt am Beispiel des Diagnoseprodukts PraenaTest®. Rechtsgutachten erstattet im Auftrag der Firma LifeCodexx AG, available at: https://lifecodexx.com/wp-content/up loads/2015/03/Jan-2013_PraenaTest_Zur_verfassungsrechtlichen_Beurteilung_fruehzeitiger_ praenataler_Diagnostik_Friedhelm_Hufen.pdf, last accessed on: 23 February 2018. 31  Tolmein, Oliver, Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Frau, Pränataldiagnostik und die UN-Behindertenrechtskonvention, in: Kritische Justiz 45 (2012), pp. 420 – 434. 32  Hufen (Fn. 29). 33  Heinrichs / Spranger / Tambornino (Fn. 28). 34  Drozdowska (Fn. 28). 35  Nawrot, Oktawian, Demokratyczne państwo prawa wobec rozwoju biologii i medycyny, in: Forum Prawnicze 2 (2012), pp. 23 – 36. 36  Boratyńska, Maria, Wolny wybór. Gwarancje i granice prawa pacjenta do samostanowienia, Warszawa 2012.

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child with chromosome aberration after the birth, speak for admittance of the “embryo-pathological” abortion.37 A further apprehension with regard to routinization of genetic prenatal diag­ nostics in Germany concerns limitation of the parental right to “not to know”.38 With expanded availability of invasive and, especially, non-invasive methods of genetic prenatal diagnostics, comes increased social pressure on parents and physicians to apply these. The pressure reflects a common social idea of parental responsibility for the best future and opportunities of their offspring.39 In this context, a recent position paper of the German Medical Women’s Association expressed opposition against the inclusion of NIPTs in the routine prenatal care and against funding of such tests from the public funds. It should be within the limits of the informed decision of every pregnant woman or parents to refuse genetic testing.40 In this debate, some voices even called for the right for informational autonomy that should be assigned to every individual, even unborn children.41 According to these, each individual has the right to independently decide about his or her knowledge on the health status. Parental concerns about the health and future of their children should not allow them to test genetic characteristics of the offspring without its consent. IV. Informed Decision-making An argument forwarded in favor of genetic prenatal diagnostics in both countries stresses its influence on the reproductive autonomy of pregnant women and future parents.42 This aspect closely connects with the issues of informed decision-making and nondirective counselling.43 Yet, in Poland, recent incidents show pressing conflict with regard to the issue of informed consent. Some physicians have repeatedly circumvented the rights to information and to the autonomous de37  Królikowski, Michał, “Problem interpretacji tzw. przesłanki eugenicznej stanowiącej o dopuszczalności zabiegu przerywania ciąży”, in: Bosek, Leszek / Królikowski, Michał (eds.), Współczesne wyzwania bioetyczne, Warszawa: C.H. Beck, 2010, pp. 175 – 183. 38  Zerres, Klaus, Nicht-invasive genetische Pränataldiagnostik – eine gesamtgesellschaftliche Herausforderung, in: Zeitschrift für Geburtshilfe und Neonatologie 219 (2015), pp. 69 – 72. 39  Sierawska, Anna K., Prenatal diagnosis: do prospective parents have the right not to know?, in: Medicine, Health Care, and Philosophy 18 (2015), pp. 279 – 286. 40  Deutscher Ärztinnenbund e.V.-Ethik-Ausschuss, News Release, 25 May 2017, available at: https://www.aerztinnenbund.de/DAEB-Ethik-Ausschuss.2674. 0. 2.html, last accessed on: 23 February 2018. 41  N.A., Ethikrat-Vorsitzende für Recht auf Nichtwissen über Erbgut, in: Deutsches Ärzteblatt, 2 March 2014, available at: https://www.aerzteblatt.de/nachrichten/57807/Ethikrat-Vorsit ­zende-fuer-Recht-auf-Nichtwissen-ueber-Erbgut, last accessed on: 23 February 2018. 42  Ohnhaeuser, Tim / Schmitz, Dagmar, Non-invasive Prenatal Testing (NIPT): Better Meet an Expert!, in: Geburtshilfe und Frauenheilkunde 76 (2016), pp. 277 – 279; Boratyńska (Fn. 8). 43  Domaradzki (Fn. 21).

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cision. Because of their moral reservations, they refused to provide prenatal counselling in the period of pregnancy during which legal abortion could be conducted. In addition, they also refused to refer patients to unopposed providers. As a justification of their actions, they invoked the so-called “conscience clause”.44 This statute allows physicians to refuse medical service if it conflicts with his or her moral convictions.45 “Conscience clause” is guaranteed by the article 39 of the Act on Professions of Doctor and Dentist of 1996, which reads as follows: “A doctor can withdraw from the medical services that are contrary to his conscience (…), except in case of emergency; however, he or she has the obligation to indicate feasible possibilities for acquiring such service from another doctor or in another medical facility and to register this fact in the medical documentation of the patient.”46

Evidently, a conflict exists between the regulations of the “conscience clause” and the praxis of refusal to provide prenatal counselling. Such praxis has been recognized as inadmissible by jurisprudence47 and criticized in a position statement of the Polish Gynecologists’ Society.48 According to these, authorization of the physician does not constitute the possibility of interference into the patient’s autonomous decision. In case of moral conflict, the attending physician should offer a referral to an unopposed provider. Furthermore, a patient should deliberately participate in the selection of the best diagnostic method. The privilege of the “conscience clause”, which was invoked in these recent incidents, clearly stays in opposition to the right to know of the pregnant woman and her reproductive autonomy.49 Prenatal diagnostics constitutes an aspect of the right to information; abortion, on the other hand, concerns the issue of conscious family planning. Provision of the knowledge about the medical state of a patient does not conflict with moral values and conscience of a physician. Information about possible genetic disease allows expecting parents to avoid shock at the moment of birth, prepare for increased personal and financial challenges in the future, and arrange for medical care. The right to know also allows pregnant women to get to decide, depending on results of prenatal diagnosis, whether to terminate or to continue the pregnancy.50 This occurs within the legal limits provided by the law.

  Kaniowski (Fn. 19).   Graff (Fn. 11); Żuk / Żuk (Fn. 11). 46  Ustawa o zawodach lekarza i lekarza dentysty z dnia 5 grudnia 1996 roku, in: Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z 1996 roku, numer. 28, pozycja 152. 47  European Court of Human Rights, Case of R.R. v. Poland, Application no. 27617/04 (26. 5. 2011), available at: http://www.globalhealthrights.org / wp-content / uploads/2016/05/ CASE-OF-R.R.-v.-POLAND.pdf, last accessed on: 23 February 2018; Drozdowska (Fn. 28). 48  Polskie Towarzystwo Ginekologiczne, Stanowisko Polskiego Towarzystwa Ginekologicznego w sprawie debaty publicznej dotyczącej postulowanych zmian w zakresie prawnej dopuszczalności wykonywania zabiegu przerywania ciąży, in: Ginekologia i Perinatologia Praktyczna 1 (2016), pp. 91 – 99. 49  Boratyńska (Fn. 8). 44 45

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In Germany, current discussion concerning informed decision-making concentrates on the provision of effective counseling for patients. Recent rapid developments in character, methods of testing, and a population of women that make use of prenatal diagnostics put an increasing pressure on health professionals.51 Sustained education on the possibilities and limitations of genetic prenatal diagnostics becomes an indispensable requirement for genetics, physicians, and other health professions. Furthermore, it needs to be clarified, what requirements such genetic counseling must meet and how to design an adequate information process.52 Such procedures are especially important in case of fetal abnormalities and subsequent existential crisis for the parents. Regulations pertaining to genetic counseling are included in the §10 of the Human Genetic Examination Act.53 According to it, consultation should take place in a manner that is generally comprehensible and non-directive. It shall include a thorough explanation of possible medical, psychological, and social issues that result from conducting, or rejecting to conduct, the test. In case of a predictive genetic test, counseling should be offered to the subject person before and after the examination. The reasons for such procedure are twofold.54 First, it provides the pregnant woman with a possibility to decide responsibly whether to undergo the genetic test or not. Second, it allows individual evaluation of the results. Yet, specific legal guidelines for an effective counseling do not exist. It has been argued that successful counseling should involve multidisciplinary expertise, especially taking into account psychological and social aspects.55 Due to a large number of potentially detectable diseases, it has been proposed that counseling should not concentrate on a specific disease. Rather, the focus should be on consequences of abnormal results. A combination of personal consultation and written information could provide the most effective results.56 Special attention requires the issue of the counselor’s own moral concepts.57 Health professionals should have guaranteed the possibility of a refusal to provide genetic counseling that could end in termination 50  Szefczyk-Polowczyk, Lucyna / Wengel-Woźny, Karina / Respondek, Malwina et al., Opieka prenatalna nad matką dziecka niepełnosprawnego, in: Journal of Education, Health and Sport 5 (2015), pp.  321 – 332. 51  Heinrichs / Spranger / Tambornino (Fn. 28). 52  Wassermann, Kirsten / Woopen, Christiane / Rohde, Anke, Pränataldiagnostik und psychosoziale Beratung. Kooperationsmodelle und praktische Erfahrungen, in: Gynäkologe 43 (2010), pp.  179 – 186. 53  Gesetz über genetische Untersuchungen bei Menschen (Gendiagnostikgesetz – GenDG) vom 31. 7. 2009, in: Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I, S. 2529. 54  Schindelhauer-Deutscher, H. Joachim / Henn, Wolfram, Genetische Beratung bei Pränataldiagnostik, in: Medizinische Genetik 26 (2014), pp. 374 – 381. 55  Woopen, Christiane, Beratung bei Präimplantantions- und Pränataldiagnostik. Interdis­ ziplinär und multiprofessionell, in: Bundesgesundheitsblatt 56 (2013), pp. 269 – 276. 56  Burkhardt, Tilo / Zimmermann, Roland, Schwangerenberatung vor Pränataldiagnostik. Ein konsequenzbasiertes Konzept, in: Gynäkologe 51 (2018), pp. 32 – 36. 57  Schindelhauer-Deutscher / Henn (Fn. 54).

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of pregnancy; however, without impairing the pregnant woman’s right to an auto­ nomous decision. Both in Poland and in Germany, it has been argued that restrictions on access to genetic prenatal diagnostics clearly stay in opposition to the issue of women’s reproductive rights. Results of the diagnostics provide information on the health status of the fetus. Therefore, they allow an informed decision that not only concerns the child to be born but also the parents. Genetic examinations should be provided on the basis of the individual wish of the pregnant woman or the parents. It includes informed consent and refusal as well as other choices reached before and after testing. Reproductive autonomy can only be achieved if the pregnant woman has an opportunity to obtain adequate information to reach a decision about the further course of the pregnancy. Exertion of influence on the decision or non-disclosure of the results by the attending physician would display a drastic restriction of women’s autonomy.58 The process of information that lies at the basis of informed decision-making is still problematic in both countries. This issue has two important dimensions: education of parties taking part in genetic counseling and setting of such counseling.59 First, with expansion of the information provided by the genetic diagnostics, increasingly challenging becomes provision of accurate and reliable information for patients. Effective counseling needs to concentrate on delivery of relevant facts about the testing procedure in a way that facilitates informed decision making in a specific diagnostic situation and for a variety of conditions. Essential is that informed consent should occurs in a context which guarantees a dialogue between health professional and the pregnant woman or expecting parents. In this framework, the role of companies manufacturing prenatal tests should not be diminished.60 Aggressive marketing strategies, especially done by direct-to-consumer testing, tend to concentrate on benefits for users and disregard ethical dilemmas. Reliance on only written material, or information provided by companies offering genetic prenatal tests, does not provide a sufficient basis for decision-making. Edu­ cation of both health professionals and patients about potentials and limitations of prenatal diagnostics becomes indispensable. Such education allows health professionals proper communication about the aims and pitfalls of this method. For patients, it provides a realistic view of what can they expect from the tests. In addi58  Dondord, Wybo / de Wert, Guido / Bombard, Yvonne et al., Non-invasive prenatal testing for aneuplidy and beyond: challenges for responsible innovation in prenatal screening, in: European Journal of Human Genetics 23 (2015), pp. 1438 – 1450; Deans, Zuzana / Newson, Ainsley J., Should non-invasiveness change informed consent procedures for prenatal diagnosis?, in: Health Care Analysis 19 (2011), pp. 122 – 132. 59  Heider, Ulrike / Steger, Florian, „Die Inanspruchnahme vorgeburtlicher Diagnostik – Ent­ wicklungen, Motive und Emotionen“, in: Steger, Florian / Ehm, Simone / Tchirikov, Michael (eds.), Pränatale Diagnostik und Therapie in Ethik, Medizin und Recht, Berlin / Heidelberg: Springer, 2014, pp. 113 – 132. 60  Minear / Alessi / Allyse, et al. (Fn. 3).

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tion, it allows them to prepare for unfavorable results. Accurate information may mitigate concerns about possible genetic aberrations of the child and decrease the rate of pregnancy terminations after a genetic test. Second, a proper setting in which genetic counseling occurs needs to be assured. Provision of information should take place in a non-directive way, in a relationship in which health professionals and patients have guaranteed equal positions. Up to date, disproportionality in knowledge about the scope of genetic prenatal diagnostics provides health professionals with the dominant role during consultations. As the recent incidents in Poland show, such setting can be misused. Paternalistic attitudes of health professionals based on their moral objections could restrict informed decision-making. Although in Germany such situations were not observable, the discussion on how to provide effective genetic counseling is still not resolved. Hence, in both countries, there is a need for the development of reliable best practice guidelines on prenatal counseling for all providers involved in prenatal care. V. Equity of Access While recent developments in genetic prenatal diagnostics provide the possibility for fast and uncomplicated testing, visible in both countries are issues regarding equity of access to these methods. In this context, especially interesting are social attitudes towards prenatal diagnostics in Poland and Germany. In Poland, according to one regional opinion poll, 95 % of the interviewees answered that pregnant women should have a guaranteed access to prenatal diagnostics.61 Countrywide opinion polls show similar results.62 88 % of the respondents supported the right to prenatal diagnostics for every woman, only 3 % of interviewees were against it. Even in case of danger to fetus’ life during an invasive genetic test, 81 % of respondents said that every woman should have a possibility to assert whether the fetus has genetic defects. Furthermore, an overwhelming majority of the interviewees endorsed the right of the pregnant woman to information provided through prenatal diagnostics.63 73 % of the respondents were against the situation, in which a physician refuses a referral for genetic prenatal diagnostics because of his or her moral objections.

61  Wroński, Konrad / Bocian, Roman / Dziki, Łukasz et al., Czy każda kobieta w ciąży powinna mieć swobodny dostęp do badań prenatalnych? Prawne aspekty wykonywania badań prenatalnych w Polsce, in: Medycyna Rodzinna 1 (2009), pp. 2 – 10. 62  Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, Opinie o badaniach prenatalnych. Komunikat z badań, 1999, available at: http://www.cbos.pl / SPISKOM.POL/1999/K_108_99.PDF, last accessed on: 23 February 2018. 63  Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, Klauzula sumienia lekarza i farmaceuty. Komunikat z badań, 2014, available at: http://www.cbos.pl / SPISKOM.POL/2014/K_094_14.PDF, last accessed on: 23 February 2018.

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Similarly, social attitudes among women in Germany towards prenatal diagnostics strongly support this procedure. An opinion poll demonstrated that prenatal diagnostics is considered as a part of standard medical care during the pregnancy.64 85 % of the women in the poll made use of at least one prenatal diagnostic procedure and only 15 % refused any kind of prenatal diagnostics. The results of this poll showed that prenatal testing in Germany is also viewed as a source of information about the health status of the fetus and not a rationale for terminating the pregnancy. 61.6 % of the respondents answered, that the main motivation for a prenatal diagnostics is to ensure the health of the fetus and to discover any abnormalities that could have an impact on the development of pregnancy. By comparison, prenatal diagnostics is viewed as an aid in deciding whether to terminate the pregnancy in the event of a genetic defect by only 44 % of the interviewees. Among women in the study that refused prenatal diagnostics, the main mentioned reasons for the refusal were: normal development of the fetus (68.2 % answers) and the argument that the results would not provide any change in their decision about termination or continuation of the pregnancy (42 %). Only 13.6 % of the respondents refused prenatal diagnostics based on ethical reasons. An analysis of social attitudes shows strong support for widespread access to prenatal diagnostics in both countries. These procedures are recognized as a source of information about the health status of the pregnant women and the fetus. However, current political developments in Poland aim towards the restriction of access to this examination. A recent proposal from April 2016 for sharpening of the current regulations on abortion deemed genetic prenatal diagnostics as the first step towards termination of pregnancy.65 These proposals, forwarded by “Pro-life” organizations with the support of conservative government, foresaw curtailment of governmental measures for facilitation of genetic prenatal diagnostics.66 In consequence of widespread manifestations against this amendment, the proposal has been rejected by the Polish Parliament. Yet, a new draft proposal, from October 2017, explicitly calls for fight against abortion that is motivated by genetic defect or irreversible malformation of the fetus.67 Justification of the proposal argues that making it legal to abort fetuses affected by a genetic defect, regardless of its nature, 64  Bundeszentrale für gesundheitliche Aufklärung, Experience of Pregnancy and Prenatal Diagnosis: Representative Survey of Pregnant Women on the Subject of Prenatal Diagnosis, 2006, available at: https://www.bzga.de / botmed_13319270.html, last accessed on: 23 February 2018. 65  Draft legislation is available at: http://www.ordoiuris.pl/sites/default/files/inline-files/pd1 _0.pdf, last accessed on: 23 February 2018. 66  Płatek, Monika, Wstępne uwagi do opinii prawnej na temat projektu ustawy o zmianie ustawy o planowaniu rodziny, ochronie płodu ludzkiego i warunkach dopuszczalności przerywania ciąży, in: Instytut Spraw Publicznych. Opinie Prawne 147 (2016), available at: http:// www.isp.org.pl/uploads/pdf/26043646.pdf, last accessed on: 23 February 2018. 67 Draft of this legislation can be accessed from: http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Druki8ka.nsf/0/ F18A213C98C5BDC0C125820B005793D9/%24File/2146.pdf, last accessed on: 23 February 2018.

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is tantamount to letting kill people because of their health condition. Preliminary work on this proposal for its implementation into law started in the Polish Parliament in January 2018. Further issue constitutes the question of equal access to prenatal testing. In Poland, the cost-free prenatal examination is guaranteed for pregnancies of the socalled high-risk group.68 This category includes pregnancies of women older than 35 years, pregnancies with a considerably higher risk of a genetic defect or pregnancies in which ultrasound or a biochemical examination determined a high risk of a genetic defect. Yet, current statistics show that this procedure is still only marginally used.69 Data show that in 2015 only 19 % of pregnant women in Poland underwent a prenatal diagnostics. In some regions, this number was as low as 8 %. The reasons for this situation are manifold. A decisive role here plays the chronic underfunding of this area of healthcare. Although the state funds for prenatal diagnostics are raised on the yearly basis, up to 10 million EUR in 2014, the budget is too scarce to provide a comprehensive network of prenatal centers.70 In some regions, only two such centers were available for more than 9.000 pregnant women. Therefore some women had to travel to other regions or forego medical examination altogether.71 Additionally, pressure from conservative groups or social circles has an impact on the decision for implementing genetic prenatal diagnostics on an individual basis. Some physicians tend not to inform their female patients about the access to or benefits of these methods. In other cases, because of the social pressure, pregnant women waive their right to prenatal examination. Further concerns regard the issue of psychological support for pregnant women with observed aberration of their fetus. According to one study, most women in such situation in Poland do not receive any psychological care. Moreover, they are not informed about the possibility of help in treatment and rehabilitation of the child.72 In Germany, recently proposed was the inclusion of NIPT in Germany into the standard prenatal care, notwithstanding the age or genetic preconditions of the pregnant woman.73 Critics of the inclusion regard such policy as discriminatory 68  Rozporządzenie Ministra Zdrowia w sprawie świadczeń gwarantowanych z zakresu programów zdrowotnych z dnia 6 listopada 2013 r. Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z 2013 r., pozycja 1505 [Executive Act of the Minister of Health on guaranteed services within the programs of healthcare of 6. November 2013. In: Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland of 2013, position 1505]. 69  Najwyższa Izba Kontroli, Informacja o wynikach kontroli 2016, available at: https://www. nik.gov.pl/plik/id,10793,vp,13126.pdf, last accessed on: 23 February 2018. 70 Ibid. 71  Więckiewicz, Karol, Czy w Polsce istnieje prawo kobiety do badań prenatalnych?, in: Prawo i Medycyna 4 (2011), pp. 94 – 106. 72  Szefczyk-Polowczyk / Wengel-Woźny / Respondek et al. (Fn. 50). 73  Gemeinsamer Bundesauschuss, Methodenbewertung. Nicht-invasive Pränataldiagnostik bei Risikoschwangerschaften – G-BA beginnt Verfahren zur Methodenbewertung – Beratungen zur Erprobung ruhend gestellt, 18 August 2016, available at: https://www.g-ba.de/down

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against people with disabilities.74 It has been argued that widespread access to NIPT would constitute a political statement against the inclusion of disabled people into society. Diagnostic benefits and medical necessity of NIPT, the argument goes, do not constitute neutral criteria for the assessment of such methods. Rather, they provide justification for the socio-political praxis of prevention of disabled children from being born. Without improved therapeutic measures, testing for genetic aberrations means a selective search for undesired deviations.75 On the other hand, supporters of such policy change argue that the integration of NIPTs into the routine prenatal care will improve the reliability of detection of genetic defects. Widespread use of the procedure will constitute a factor in strengthening women’s autonomy.76 It will also decrease the number of invasive procedures, and therefore, reduce the number of miscarriages. In view of the discussion on access to genetic prenatal diagnostics in both countries, it is important to state that this procedure provides significant benefits. Therefore, the equity of access to this procedure should be guaranteed for all patients. Exclusion from the access means that pregnant women are prevented from earlier access to other services, such as counseling or early-term therapy.77 This results in more complications and more difficult rehabilitation. Moreover, the inclusion of NIPT into regular care constitutes an important factor for the low-risk access to prenatal diagnostics. At the same time, although steadily decreasing, still relatively high costs of NIPTs affect the question of equal access to medical service.78 Currently, in Germany, invasive prenatal tests are funded by health insurance companies, whereas NIPT has to be paid privately. Pregnant women that cannot afford NIPT need to avail themselves of invasive tests, and therefore, risk a miscarriage. In Poland, a scant network of prenatal diagnostics centers and restriction of genetic prenatal diagnostics only to the high-risk groups of women result in a limited number of conducted procedures. Costs of genetic tests that have to be paid privately in many cases exceed financial means of patients. Commitment to equity should guarantee widespread funding of this area that would allow unlimited and low-cost access to all methods of genetic diagnostics, including NIPT. However, within this entitlement, autonomous decisions of pregnant women, such as refusal to conduct a prenatal testing, should be respected. l­ oads/34 – 215 – 635/32_2016 – 08 – 18_Methodenbewertung%20NIPD.pdf, last accessed on: 23 February 2018. 74  Gen-ethisches Netzwerk (Fn. 23). 75  Joerden, Jan C./Uhlig, Carola, “Vorgeburtliches Leben – rechtliche Überlegungen zur genetischen Pränataldiagnostik”, in: Steger, Florian / Ehm, Simone / Tchirikov, Michael (eds.), Pränatale Diagnostik und Therapie in Ethik, Medizin und Recht, Berlin / Heidelberg: Springer, 2014, pp.  93 – 110. 76  Rolfes, Vasilija / Schmitz, Dagmar, Unfair discrimination in prenatal aneuploidy screening using cell-free DNA?, in: European Journal of Obstetrics & Gynecology and Reproductive Biology 198 (2016), pp. 27 – 29. 77  Vanstone / King / de Vrijer et al. (Fn. 4). 78  Minear / Alessi / Allyse et al. (Fn. 3).

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VI. Summary and Recommendations for Praxis Current debates on prenatal diagnostics in Germany and Poland show controversies that encompass that particular field of medical praxis. Although the majority of women in both countries support widespread access to prenatal diagnostics, our analysis shows that this procedure in both countries is still contentious. The recent implementation of NIPT did not resolve the ethical, legal and social controversies, but much more contributed to further exacerbation of conflict. The development and application of genetic prenatal diagnostics are to a vast degree shaped by political constellations that influence accessibility and aims of these procedures. Yet, the debate is conducted with different focal points. In Poland, the discussion on the topic mainly concentrates on the connection between prenatal diagnostics and legal abortion. Recent political actions of the government and allied conservative orga­ nizations distinctly aim at the limitation of the access to genetic prenatal diagnostics. In the debate, the argument of “eugenic selection” is often raised; with disregard for the point that such assertion is unsubstantiated by the empirical evidence and lacks characteristics of a “eugenics program”. Concentration on this argument leads to neglecting the issue of access to information about the health status of the fetus and of reproductive autonomy of pregnant women. Moreover, problematic in Poland is the legal regulation of prenatal diagnostics and access to legal abortion. It is characterized by legal ambiguity and linguistic imprecision. Such situation results in a limitation of pregnant women’s right to information and to an autonomous decision. Political and social pressure on gynecologist often compels them to instrumentally use the privilege of “conscience clause” and restrict access to the procedure or its results. Therefore, a novel regulation that is not embroiled in the morally contentious area of abortion should be introduced. On the one hand, it should guarantee wide, unlimited, and low-cost access to all methods of prenatal diag­ nostics, including NIPT. On the other hand, it should protect individual, autonomous decisions of the pregnant woman. The debate in Germany is dominated by the ethical issues of routinization and medicalization of prenatal diagnosis, provision of effective counseling for patients, and equal access to this procedure. Further expansion of the scope and access to genetic prenatal testing connects with social pressure to undergo such tests. This requires adjustment of the legal and professional regulations. Binding best practice guidelines on prenatal counseling need to be developed. They should comprise the art and process of information provided, potential ethical issues ensuing from making use of genetic diagnostics, and the need for constant education. Principles of informed consent and reproductive autonomy should play the central role in such guidelines. The regulations should not be limited to health professionals but also cover information provided by companies offering prenatal genetic tests. In addition, the inclusion of non-invasive prenatal diagnostics into the standard health care should be considered. Exclusion of certain groups of pregnant women from access to this procedure because of its financial costs prevents these women from ear-

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ly-term counseling and therapy. Yet, such regulation needs to protect the individual right of “not to know”. Zusammenfassung Der vorliegende Beitrag analysiert einige ethische, juristische und gesellschaftliche Aspekte der Pränataldiagnostik in Polen und Deutschland. Aktuelle Vorschläge zur Änderung des Zugangs zu Pränataldiagnostik in den beiden Ländern zeigen deutlich, dass diese Thematik weiterhin Gegenstand intensiver Debatte ist. Der Beitrag zeigt, wie unterschiedlich die Schwerpunkte in der polnischen und deutschen Diskussion gelagert sind. In Polen wird die Debatte vor allem durch die Verbindung der Pränataldiagnostik mit dem Zugang zur legalen Abtreibung dominiert. Die derzeitigen rechtlichen Regelungen sind unpräzise und lassen viele Interpretationsmöglichkeiten zu. Aktuelle Vorschläge zur Verschärfung des geltenden Rechts können zur Begrenzung von Patientenrechten und zur Einschränkung des Rechts auf Selbstbestimmung führen. Der beschränkte Zugang zur pränatalen Diagnostik stellt ein zusätzliches Problem dar. Die Diskussion in Deutschland ist besonders durch ethische Aspekte geprägt. Beachtung finden vor allem Fragen zu den Zielen der Pränataldiagnostik, der Selbstbestimmung der Patientinnen und Patienten oder der Qualität der Patientenaufklärung. Darüber hinaus spielt die Frage der Aufnahme von NIPT in die Regelversorgung eine zunehmend zentrale Rolle. Deutlich ist, dass die immer stärker fortschreitende Verfügbarkeit von invasiven und nicht-invasiven Methoden der Pränataldiagnostik Anpassungen der gesundheitspolitischen Rahmenbedingungen in Deutschland erfordert.

Artefakt-Ontologie und der moralische Status genetisch veränderter Pflanzen* Hans Zillmann

I. Einleitung Die beiden Ordnungsprinzipien belebt / unbelebt und natürlich / k ünstlich können sich überschneiden. Nicht nur Maschinen oder andere anorganische Entitäten stellen Artefakte dar. Es kann auch belebte künstliche Entitäten geben, denn die Eingriffe des Menschen in die organische Welt sind nicht nur äußerlicher Natur.1 Neben einer gezielten Veränderung der Umweltbedingungen von Pflanzen und Tieren finden auch Eingriffe des Menschen statt, die sich auf die Pflanzen und Tiere selbst, d.h. die intendierte Veränderung der biologischen Eigenschaften dieser Pflanzen und Tiere, beziehen. Neben anderen Techniken der Genom-Editierung hat besonders das Aufkommen des CRISPR / Cas-Systems dafür gesorgt, dass das, was bis vor einigen Jahren nur durch komplizierte und langwierige Kreuzungsverfahren bzw. ungerichtete Mutageneseverfahren möglich war, nun durch die gezielte Veränderung des Genoms schneller, preiswerter, einfacher und vor allem exakter erreicht werden kann. Dies führt zu Verbreitung und Anwendung dieser Techniken. Eine Besonderheit des CRISPR / Cas-Systems liegt darin, dass zumindest bestimmte molekulargenetische Eingriffe in die jeweiligen Organismen mit diesen Verfahren im Nachhinein molekulargenetisch nicht nachweisbar sind und sich daher auch nicht von tatsächlich oder möglicherweise in der Natur vorkommenden molekulargenetischen Zusammenstellungen unterscheiden lassen könnten. II. Rechtliche Fragen Dies hat in rechtlicher Sicht Folgen für die Definition von genetisch veränderten Organismen (GVO) im Sinne des Gentechnikrechts, denn es stellt sich die Frage, ob die Produkte der Anwendung des CRISPR / Cas-Systems unabhängig ihrer mo*  Dieser Beitrag entstand im Rahmen des vom BMBF geförderten Verbundforschungsprojekts „GenomELECTION: Genomeditierung – Ethische, rechtliche und kommunikationswissenschaftliche Aspekte im Bereich der molekularen Medizin und Nutzpflanzenzüchtung“, Förderkennzeichen 01GP1614A. 1 Vgl. Lueger, Manfred / Froschauer, Ulrike, Artefaktanalyse. Grundlagen und Verfahren, Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2018, S. 121.

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lekulargenetischen Zusammenstellung rechtlich als genetisch verändert begriffen werden. Diesbezüglich wird um die Auslegung von Art. 2. Nr. 2 der EU-Richtlinie 2001/18/EG sowie in Deutschland von § 3 Nr. 3 GenTG gestritten.2 Rechtlich ist der Begriff GVO nur auf Tiere, Pflanzen und Mikroorganismen anwendbar. Der Mensch kann, unabhängig von naturwissenschaftlichen Betrachtungen, im deutschen Rechtssinne niemals ein GVO sein (vgl. § 1 Abs. 3 GenTG). Allerdings weisen auch einige Stimmen darauf hin, dass nicht die Definition im Ganzen der durch Genom-Editierung entstandenen GVO strittig ist. Es ginge hier vielmehr nur um die Definition des GVO, wenn mittels der Genom-Editierung gezielt Punktmutationen erzeugt werden. Dieser letzte Punkt überlagert die Gesamtdefinition. Die entsprechenden Eingriffe mittels Genom-Editierung unterscheiden sich von bisherigen Mutageneseverfahren, wie z. B. durch Bestrahlung mit Gammastrahlen hervorgerufen, durch die Gerichtetheit des Eingriffs, die CRISPR / Cas im Gegensatz zu den bisherigen Verfahren ermöglicht. Das Produkt einer Anwendung von CRISPR / Cas zur Transgenese würde nach der aktuellen Rechtslage immer zu einem GVO führen (vgl. GenTG & Richtlinie 2001/18/EG). Die Verfahren der Genom-Editierung selbst, neben CRISPR / Cas sind hier vor allem noch die Zinkfingernukleasen und das TALEN-System zu nennen, sind nach aktuellem Rechtsstand in Deutschland und der EU im Wissenschafts- bzw. Forschungsbereich und auf der Anwendungsebene rechtlich erlaubt, weil die neuen Verfahren in den entsprechenden EU-Richtlinien bzw. im deutschen Gentechnikgesetz nicht explizit verboten sind.3 Die Zulässigkeit der Verfahren ist gegeben, solange die existierenden Vorschriften berücksichtigt werden. Dennoch sind Unklarheiten bezüglich der Rechtslage im Anwendungsbereich der Genom-Editierung zu konstatieren.4 Verfassungsrechtlich stellt sich die Frage, wie in Zukunft mit der durch Art. 5 Abs. 3 GG zugesicherten Freiheit der Wissenschaft und der Wissenschaftler5 umgegangen werden soll, wenn der entsprechende Rechtsrahmen teilweise unklar ist und einige Akteure die Aussetzung der Forschung für bestimmte Bereiche der Genom-Editierung fordern, z. B. weil sie der Natur einen nicht-instrumentellen Eigenwert zuschreiben und die Eingriffe in die Natur durch die Genom-Editierung in ihren Augen grundlegend anders bewertet werden müssen.6 Wissenschaftliche Innovationen haben häufig das Potenzial zu gesamt-gesellschaftlichen Verände2 Vgl. Faltus, Timo, „Genom- und Geneditierung in Forschung und Praxis. Rechtsrahmen, Literaturbefund und sprachliche Beobachtungen“, in: ZfMER Heft 1, Jg. 8, Halle: Meris e.V., 2017, S. 61. 3  Vgl. ebd. S. 59. 4  Vgl. ebd. S. 59. 5  An dieser Stelle wird darauf aufmerksam gemacht, dass auf eine durchgehend geschlechtsneutrale Schreibweise zugunsten der Lesbarkeit des Textes verzichtet und im Folgenden das generische Maskulinum genutzt wird. 6 Vgl. Kluth, Winfried, „Genomeditierung – Perspektiven des Verfassungsrechts“, in: Z ­ fMER Heft 1, Jg. 8, Halle: Meris e.V., 2017, S. 26.

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rungen. Im Falle von CRISPR / Cas werden im Diskurs nicht nur umwelt-ethische Fragen gestellt, welche vor allem die Grüne Genom-Editierung betreffen und sich z. B. um Freisetzungsversuche von genetisch veränderten Pflanzen (GVP) drehen. Auch der Mensch erscheint manchen Akteuren der Gefahr ausgesetzt, zum Verfügungsgegenstand einer Technik zu werden, deren langfristige Folgen nicht ausreichend geklärt sind. Es ist denkbar, dass hier auch die Gründe dafür zu finden sind, warum CRISPR / Cas und ganz generell die Genom-Editierung nicht nur in den Fokus der geisteswissenschaftlichen Forschung, sondern auch in den öffentlichen Diskurs gelangt sind. Eingriffe in das menschliche Erbgut können in positiver Weise als Chancen begriffen werden, verschiedene Erbkrankheiten sowie HIV oder Krebs erfolgreicher zu behandeln (therapeutische Anwendung), sie können, dann aber in eher skeptischer Weise, auch als Türöffner einer neuen Gesellschaftsform begriffen werden, in der es einigen Menschen möglich ist, sich selbst oder ihre Nachkommen mittels Genom-Editierung verbessern zu lassen, und anderen Menschen eben nicht. Über die langfristigen gesamt-gesellschaftlichen Folgen eines solchen Szenariums wird bereits diskutiert und der Gesetzgeber scheint gezwungen, hier Stellung zu beziehen und für einen klaren Rechtsrahmen bezüglich des human enhancement zu sorgen. Ein weiteres rechtliches Problem ergibt sich beispielsweise, wenn bestimmte Gentherapien nicht unter die in Deutschland geltende Arzneimittelzulassung fallen, weil sie direkt in Arztpraxen oder Kliniken hergestellt und benutzt werden. In diesem Fall gelten die betreffenden Therapien in rechtlicher Sicht als nicht in den Verkehr gebracht. Die Zulassungspflicht besteht jedoch nur für Arzneimittel, die in rechtlicher Sicht in den Verkehr gebracht werden.7 Generell lässt sich sagen, dass die Genom-Editierung das geltende Recht vor Probleme stellt und die Rechtsprechung daher gänzlich neuer oder zumindest angepasster legislativer Regulierungen bedarf.8 Dies betrifft sowohl die Rote als auch die Grüne Genom-Editierung. Neben diesen rechtlichen werfen die neuen Verfahren auch ethische Fragen auf. III. Ethische Fragen Die Grüne Gentechnik wird von einigen Akteuren als Heilsbringer angesehen. Neben der Bekämpfung des Welthungers sollen z. B. Pflanzen gezüchtet werden, die nützliche Eigenschaften haben bzw. nützliche Stoffe produzieren. Dies könnte in den Augen der Befürworter maßgebliche Fortschritte im Bereich der Humanmedizin mit sich bringen, wenn etwa Albumin, das für zahlreiche medizinische Anwendungen benötigt wird, statt wie bisher aus Spenderblut künftig aus transgenen Reissamen gewonnen werden könnte.9 Die Argumentation der Befürworter beruht  Vgl. Faltus, Timo (Fn. 2), S. 53.  Vgl. Kluth, Winfried (Fn. 6), S. 26.

7 8

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an dieser Stelle auf dem Anspruch, den Menschen eine optimale Versorgung zu ermöglichen. Eine Fortführung der entsprechenden Forschungen ist aus dieser Perspektive gefordert, weil sie unzähligen Menschen ein Überleben bzw. ein besseres Leben ermöglichen könnte. Die Diskussion um die Grüne Genom-Editierung wird nicht so intensiv und breit geführt wie um die Rote Genom-Editierung oder die genetische Veränderung von Tieren. Jedenfalls geht es bei diesen Diskussionen selten um den Eigenwert von Pflanzen und die Frage nach der Bewertung menschlicher Eingriffe in die Pflanze, sondern um die möglichen Potenziale und Risiken, die die genetische Veränderung von Pflanzen für den Menschen bedeuten könnten. Die scheinbare Leichtfertigkeit, mit der der Mensch die Welt der Pflanzen seinen Bedürfnissen anpasst, d. h. den Pflanzen lediglich einen instrumentellen Wert zuschreibt, kann durch ideengeschichtliche Bezüge erklärt werden:10 Aristoteles schreibt den Pflanzen in seiner Seelenlehre nur das vegetative Seelenvermögen zu. Sie stehen damit auf der untersten Stufe seiner Lehre von den drei Seelenteilen und damit auch seiner hierarchischen Einteilung der belebten Welt. Der Mensch wiederum steht über Pflanzen und Tieren, da ihm alle drei Seelenteile zukommen. Es ist der rationale Seelenteil, der es dem Menschen überhaupt erlaubt, intentional in die Natur einzugreifen. Daraus wird mitunter geschlossen, dass für Aristoteles die Pflanzen für die Tiere und beide wiederum für den Menschen da sind.11 Ebenso kann es Interpretationen der christlichen Schöpfungsgeschichte geben, die eine derartige Haltung des Menschen gegenüber der Natur und insbesondere den Pflanzen nahelegen. Auch aus präferenz-utilitaristischer Sicht können Pflanzen wohl niemals der Gegenstand moralischer Reflexionen in dem Sinne sein, dass ihnen bestimmte moralische Rechte und dem Menschen damit bestimmte Pflichten gegenüber den Pflanzen zugeschrieben werden. Die Menschen gehen davon aus, dass Pflanzen keine Präferenzen haben können, unter anderem weil ihr Nervensystem nicht über die Organisationshöhe des menschlichen oder dem einiger Tiere verfügt, und sie schlicht aus diesem Grund weder Schmerzen noch Lust empfinden und auch keine Präferenzen haben, das eine zu vermeiden und zum anderen hinzustreben. Ein Pathozentrismus, d.h. die Überzeugung, dass alle Wesen mit Präferenzen einen moralischen Eigenwert haben, scheint auf Pflanzen nicht anwendbar. Eingriffe des Menschen in die Welt der Pflanzen sind daher selten Gegenstand moralischer Reflexionen. Dennoch finden Diskussionen um die moralische Bewertung der Grünen Genom-Editierung statt: Gegner befürchten vor allem soziale Auswirkungen, etwa 9 Vgl. He, Yang / Ning, Tingting / Xie, Tingting et. al., „Large-scale production of functional human serum albumin from transgenic rice seeds”, in: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 108, 2011, S. 19078. 10 Vgl. Ingensiep, Hans Werner, „Pflanzenchimären als klassische und moderne Biofakte“, in: Karafyllis, Nicole C. (Hrsg.), Biofakte. Versuch über den Menschen zwischen Artefakt und Lebewesen, Paderborn: mentis-Verlag, 2003, S. 164 f. 11  Vgl. ebd. S. 166.

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die Stellung von Kleinbauern gegenüber internationalen Konzernen betreffend (soziale Einwände), oder ökologische Risiken, da nicht klar sei, welche langfristigen Auswirkungen die Freisetzung von genetisch veränderten Pflanzen auf die Ökosysteme haben kann und ob Freisetzungen rückgängig gemacht werden können (epistemische Einwände). Hier sind nicht die Pflanzen Gegenstand moralischer Reflexionen, sondern die Interessen des Menschen. Aber auch prinzipienbezogene Argumente werden von Gegnern der Grünen Genom-Editierung vorgebracht. In diesem Zusammenhang werden z. B. die Kategorien natürlich und künstlich als für eine moralische Bewertung relevant angesehen. In diesem Artikel soll die Frage nach dem moralischen Status genetisch veränderter Pflanzen gestellt werden. Genauer gesagt soll geprüft werden, ob künstliche Pflanzen aufgrund ihrer Künstlichkeit normativ anders zu bewerten sind als natürliche Pflanzen. Im Bereich der Pflanzenzucht begegnet uns Künstliches oder Artifizielles auf zwei Ebenen.12 Zum einen sind ganze Landschaften als artifiziell zu bezeichnen, geprägt durch intentionale menschliche Handlungsweisen. Zum anderen können einzelne Pflanzen Artefakte sein, weil ebenfalls intentionale Eingriffe des Menschen stattfinden, um derartige Pflanzen zu erschaffen. Aufgrund bestimmter Überzeugungen darüber, was wir aus welchen Gründen als natürlich bezeichnen, wird Pflanzen zugesprochen, natürlich bzw. artifiziell zu sein. Wie wirkt sich diese Zuweisung auf unsere moralischen Urteile bezüglich solcher Entitäten aus? Diese Frage setzt zwei andere Fragen voraus: 1) Auf welcher Grundlage bezeichnen wir bestimmte Entitäten als natürlich und andere als artifiziell?, 2) Sind die Natürlichkeit bzw. Künstlichkeit einer Entität für eine moralische Beurteilung selbiger relevant? Die Analyse des moralischen Status artifizieller Pflanzen wird anschließend vor dem Hintergrund der drei an anderer Stelle bereits dargestellten ethischen Dimensionen der Genom-Editierung stattfinden.13 IV. Was sind Artefakte? Die Begriffe künstlich oder artifiziell werden alltäglich verwendet und auf bestimmte Entitäten bezogen. Jeder hat eine Vorstellung davon, welche Entitäten in der Welt er als Artefakte und damit als künstlich begreift. Ontologisch ist die Frage danach, unter welchen Umständen oder aus welchen Gründen wir Entitäten als Artefakte bezeichnen können, jedoch nahezu ungeklärt.14 Die Frage ist hier, inwieweit die von uns verwendeten Begriffe sich auch tatsächlich auf belastbare Kategorien beziehen. Es erscheint nicht ausreichend, den Standpunkt zu vertreten, dass alle  Vgl. Lueger, Manfred / Forschauer, Ulrike (Fn. 1), S. 122.  Vgl. Zillmann, Hans / Kaufmann, Matthias, „Die ethischen Dimensionen der Grünen Gentechnik. Herausforderungen der Genom Editierung“, ZfMER 1, Jg. 8, Halle: Meris e.V., 2017, 14 f. 14 Vgl. Poser, Hans, Homo Creator. Technik als philosophische Herausforderung, Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2016, S. 51. 12 13

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natürlichen Entitäten ohne menschliches Handeln in der Welt sind und dass artifizielle Entitäten wiederum nur durch das Handeln von Menschen in der Welt sind. Bereits bezogen auf die Tierzucht erscheint eine solche Perspektive nicht unproblematisch. Welche Anteile der domestizierten Kuh sind natürlich, welche erst durch menschliches Handeln entstanden? Die einzelne Kuh müsste als Mischwesen verstanden werden, mit natürlichen und artifiziellen Anteilen. Es wird sich zeigen, dass die anthropozentrische Perspektive innerhalb der Diskussion um die ontologische Bestimmung von Artefakten an ihre Grenzen stoßen kann. Bei Ameisenhaufen oder Biber-Staudämmen lässt sich z. B. die Frage stellen, ob wir diese Dinge als natürlich begreifen, weil sie nicht auf menschliches Handeln zurückgehen, oder ob wir sie als artifiziell begreifen, weil diese Dinge dennoch erschaffen worden sind, nur eben nicht von Menschen. Wenn die Begriffe natürlich und artifiziell über eine unbegründete und intuitive Zuweisung hinausgehen sollen, dann bedarf es einer Definition des Seins von Artefakten. 1. Kleine Geschichte der Ontologie Ontologien arbeiten mit Vorannahmen und haben daher den Charakter eines „Ordnungs- oder Orientierungsangebots“15. Letztlich können die Kategorien natürlich und artifiziell nur als kultur-historisch kontextuelle Setzungen begriffen werden. Sie stellen keine abschließenden bzw. unumstößlichen Schablonen der Welterkenntnis dar, denn es ist keinesfalls klar, welche Bereiche der Welt wir natürlich und welche wir artifiziell bzw. künstlich nennen können. Es ist nicht einmal klar, ob es Natürlichkeit bzw. Künstlichkeit in Reinform gibt. An dieser Stelle kann es nur darum gehen, eine Definition zu erarbeiten, die für die in diesem Artikel verfolgten Ansprüche nutzbar gemacht werden kann. Die philosophische Disziplin der Ontologie, ausgehend vom griechischen to on und logos als Lehre vom Sein zu übersetzen, durchlief im Laufe ihrer Geschichte viele Veränderungen: Mit seiner Metaphysik unternimmt Aristoteles den Versuch, die dem Seienden zugrundeliegenden Prinzipien und Ursachen zu ergründen, stößt dabei auf die Frage nach dem ersten Grund des Seienden und beantwortet diese Frage mit Gott bzw. dem Göttlichen. Die Zweiteilung der Metaphysik in Theologie und Ontologie, die bei Aristoteles angelegt ist, wird in der mittelalterlichen Philosophie durch Thomas von Aquin fortgesetzt: Auch wenn sich Ontologie und Theologie bei ihm im Gegensatz zu Aristoteles gegenüberstehen, bilden sie dennoch gemeinsam die allgemeine Metaphysik, welche für ihn die Voraussetzung für alle anderen metaphysischen Disziplinen darstellt.16 Der in der neuzeitlichen Philosophie vollzogene Bruch zwischen Theologie und Wissenschaft führt aber letztlich dazu, dass theologische Fragen von metaphysischen und damit auch ontologischen   Ebd. S. 53.  Vgl. Bräuer, Holm, „Ontologie“, in: Rehfus, Wulff D. (Hrsg.), Handwörterbuch Philosophie, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2003, S. 512. 15 16

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Fragen getrennt behandelt werden, und in Folge dessen wird die Ontologie bei Wolff zur Grundwissenschaft erhoben.17 In Kants Verständnis schließlich und kritisch gegenüber der bisher verbreiteten Ansicht von den Erkenntnismöglichkeiten der ontologischen Betrachtung kann die Ontologie lediglich auf den Bedingungen und Möglichkeiten menschlicher Erkenntnis fußen und damit nicht mehr als eine Analyse der Begriffe und der sinnlichen Eindrücke leisten.18 Hartmann entwickelt eine Ontologie, deren Aufgabe es ist, die sinnlich erfahrbaren empirischen Gegenstände einer kategorialen Analyse zu unterziehen.19 Und es waren für Hartmann Descartes und Kant, die die Frage nach dem Seienden als solchem als „anstößig“20 verworfen haben. Dennoch, so Hartmanns Schluss, habe der Idealismus von Kant über Fichte bis Schelling die Seinsfrage gestellt, denn die Realität als Projektion des Subjekts bzw. wie bei Kant als transzendental ideal zu beschreiben, setzt die Frage nach dem Sein voraus.21 Ontologische Fragen sind für Hartmann daher in Bezug auf alle Theorien relevant, da Theorien immer ontologische Annahmen über die Beschaffenheit der Welt zugrunde liegen. Im Gegensatz zur idealistischen Philosophie geht Hartmann davon aus, dass es eine Realität außerhalb menschlicher Projektion bzw. geistiger Aktivität gibt.22 Über die Erkenntnismöglichkeiten des Menschen bezüglich dieser Realität ist damit vorerst nichts gesagt. Neben einem realen Sein existiert für Hartmann auch ein ideales Sein. Hier finden sich z. B. die mathematischen Gesetzmäßigkeiten, deren Gültigkeit für ihn unabhängig von menschlicher Existenz besteht – dies besonders nachdrücklich dadurch, dass sich Gesetze der Mathematik in der Realität wiederfinden.23 Auch die menschlichen Wertsetzungen gehören für Hartmann der Sphäre des idealen Seins an, sie determinieren aber das Reale nicht wie die mathematischen Gesetze, denn es kann Dinge in der Welt geben, die den menschlichen Wertsetzungen nicht entsprechen. Eine durch Anwendung der Genom-Editierung erschaffene Pflanze würde für Hartmann demnach unabhängig unseres Erkennens oder Nicht-Erkennens existieren und der realen Welt angehören. Eine ethische Bewertung dieser Pflanze kann wiederum nur mit Bezug auf Werte stattfinden, welche dem idealen Sein zugeordnet sind. Die Frage nach dem moralischem Wert einer künstlichen Pflanze beträfe in der Lehre Hartmanns also sowohl das reale als auch das ideale Sein. Sofern reales Seiendes unabhängig menschlicher Erkenntnis oder Zuweisung existiert,   Vgl. ebd. S. 513.   Vgl. ebd. S. 513. 19  Vgl. ebd. S. 514. 20  Hartmann, Nicolai, Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie, Berlin: de Gruyter, 1965, S. 1. 21  Vgl. ebd. S. 4. 22 Vgl. Kanthack, Katharina, Nicolai Hartmann und das Ende der Ontologie, Berlin: de Gruyter, 1962, S. 1. 23  Vgl. ebd. S. 2. 17 18

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ist nach der ontologischen Verortung derjenigen Kategorien zu fragen, mit deren Hilfe Menschen das reale Sein strukturieren und kategorisieren. Für Hartmann sind die Kategorien in den Gegenständen enthalten und werden dem menschlichen Bewusstsein über Begriffe zugänglich – Begriffe sind für ihn das Instrumentarium der ontologischen Arbeit.24 Die kategoriale Erfassung des realen Seins mithilfe der Begriffe durchläuft für Hartmann einen Prozess der zunehmenden Übereinstimmung von Kategorie und Begriff.25 Dieser Prozess beschreibt eine fortwährende Analyse der ontologischen Kategorien an den realen Gegenständen. Eine solche Analyse soll auch in diesem Artikel unternommen werden und es soll geprüft werden, inwieweit die Kategorien natürlich und artifiziell tragfähig sind. 2. Artefakt-Ontologie Gemäß der funktionalistischen Artefakt-Theorie sind die Intentionen des Erschaffers sowie desjenigen, der das Artefakt benutzt, von Bedeutung, wenn es darum geht, zu bestimmen, welche Entitäten wir gerechtfertigterweise als Artefakt bezeichnen können. Artefakte sind nach dieser Definition Entitäten, die intentional erschaffen werden, um eine bestimmte vom Erschaffer zugeschriebene Funktion zu erfüllen, und intentional gebraucht werden, um eben diese dem Artefakt zugeschriebene Funktion zu erfüllen.26 Sowohl die Intention des Erschaffers als auch die Intention im Gebrauch stehen mit der dem Artefakt zugeschriebenen Funktion in Verbindung: Ein Artefakt wird demnach 1.) intentional erschaffen, um eine bestimmte Funktion zu erfüllen, und 2.) intentional gebraucht, um eine bestimmte Funktion zu erfüllen.27 In der Grünen Genom-Editierung werden Pflanzen intentional erschaffen, sie sollen eine bestimmte Funktion erfüllen. Anschließend werden die Pflanzen intentional genutzt, sei es innerhalb der Medizin oder der Landwirtschaft, um eben diese Funktion, die vom Erschaffer zugeschrieben wurde, zu verrichten. Diese Artefakt-Definition ist ihrem Grundcharakter nach anthropozentrisch. Es sind Menschen, die Artefakte intentional in die Welt bringen und sie anschließend intentional gebrauchen. Dass andere Wesen Artefakte erschaffen, ist klassischerweise kein Bestandteil von Artefakt-Theorien. Letztlich muss diese Frage aber an dieser Stelle nicht vertieft werden, da es für eine moralische Bewertung von Artefakten nicht relevant erscheint, wer das Artefakt intentional in die Existenz gebracht hat, bzw. wer es intentional benutzt. Es könnte sein, dass es Welten gibt, in denen andere Wesen mit Intentionalität Artefakte erschaffen und verwenden. Es könnte auch sein, dass wir bestimmte Werkzeuge, die Tiere verwenden, als intentional erschaffen bzw. intentional verwendet, d.h. als artifiziell, begreifen müssen.   Vgl. ebd. S. 8.   Vgl. ebd. S. 8. 26 Vgl. Jansen, Ludger, „Artefact kinds need not be kinds of artefacts”, in: Johanssonian Investigations. Essays in honour of Ingvar Johansson on his seventieth birthday, Frankfurt: Ontos-Verlag, 2013, S. 321. 27  Vgl. ebd. S. 321. 24 25

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Die für die Bestimmung vorausgesetzte Intentionalität des Erschaffers und desjenigen, der das Artefakt gebraucht, berührt die Frage nach dem Verhältnis von Geist und Materie, da hier angenommen werden muss, dass mentale Phänomene (die jeweiligen Intentionen) auf die physische Welt wirken können.28 Diese Annahme erscheint als notweniger Bestandteil einer Artefakt-Definition. Andernfalls müsste man erklären, wie Artefakte in die Welt kommen. Da die Intention des Erschaffers zudem auf eine bestimmte Funktion des Artefakts abzielt, stellt sich die Frage, was genau Funktionen sind. Funktionen gibt es aufgrund menschlicher Zuschreibung, kein Ding trägt seine Funktion in sich.29 Die Samen des genetisch veränderten Reises werden gezielt für die Gewinnung von Albumin eingesetzt. Die Produktion von Albumin ist die vom Menschen zugeschriebene Funktion der Reissamen. Nicht nur, dass diese Reissamen ohne menschliche Intentionen nicht existieren würden, sie hätten auch keine Funktion, wenn Menschen ihnen nicht eine solche zuschreiben würden. Würden diese durch intentionales menschliches Handeln entstandenen Reissamen in eine Welt gelangen, in der keine intentionalen Wesen leben, dann wären sie zwar in einer anderen Welt intentional erschaffen, hätten aber dort, wo sie sind, keine Funktion, da sie eine solche erst durch Zuschreibung erhalten. Artifiziell blieben die Reissamen auf gewisse Weise dennoch. Es kann also gesagt werden, dass die intentionale Verwendung des Artefakts nicht vorliegen muss, damit wir die Entität als artifiziell begreifen. Nun stellt sich die Frage, ob das in-der-Welt-Sein dieser Entitäten aufgrund menschlicher oder anderer Intentionen geschehen sein muss. Eine Artefakt-Ontologie muss auch das Verhältnis zwischen Individuum und Art bzw. die Bedeutung dieser beiden Ebenen für eine Zuschreibung berücksichtigen. Diesbezüglich ergeben sich Probleme, wenn Artefakte durch menschliche Intentionen in die Welt gekommen sein müssen. Es ist erstens möglich, dass eine Entität zu einem Artefakt-Typ gehört, aber selbst kein Artefakt ist, und zweitens, dass eine Entität ein Artefakt ist, ohne dass sie einem Artefakt-Typ angehört: So stellt ein Stein, der von einem Menschen intentional als Hammer verwendet wird, selbst kein Artefakt dar, gehört aber für die Zeit seiner intentionalen Nutzung als Hammer zum Artefakt-Typ Hammer.30 Im Reich der belebten Welt kann es Entitäten geben, die keinem Artefakt-Typ angehören, selbst aber Artefakte sind, wie z. B. in-vitro-Babys.31 Der Typ Baby gehört zur natürlichen Welt. Der Einzelfall des in-vitro-Babys ist intentional erschaffen und wird intentional benutzt. Er stellt daher ein Artefakt dar – und dies natürlich auch, wenn der Embryo nicht benutzt, sondern verworfen wird. Es wird in diesem Zusammenhang auch von genetischer Natürlichkeit bzw. Künstlichkeit gesprochen. Ein s.g. natur-identischer Aroma-Stoff ist gemäß seiner Entstehungsgeschichte als künstlich bzw. gemacht  Vgl. Poser, Hans (Fn. 14), S. 69.   Vgl. ebd. S. 70. 30 Vgl. Jansen, Ludger (Fn. 26), S. 328. 31  Vgl. ebd. S. 333. 28 29

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zu begreifen, seine Existenz geht auf intentionales Handeln zurück, auch wenn der Stoff selbst sich qualitativ in keiner Weise von dem in der Natur vorkommenden Stoff unterscheidet.32 Das Beispiel des Aroma-Stoffes zeigt eine weitere Möglichkeit: Künstlichkeit kann auch aufgrund der Eigenschaften zugeschrieben werden, die die Entität hat. Es kann Entitäten geben, die Eigenschaften tragen, welche so nicht in der Natur vorkommen. Es können also verschiedene Gründe angegeben werden, warum wir einer Entität zuschreiben, natürlich bzw. artifiziell zu sein. 1.) Es kann sein, dass wir einer Entität aufgrund ihrer Entstehungsgeschichte eine genetische Künstlichkeit zuschreiben. 2.) Ebenso ist es möglich, dass eine Entität aufgrund ihrer Nutzung und für die Zeit ihrer Nutzung zumindest als zugehörig zu einem Artefakt-Typ begriffen wird. 3.) Und es ist möglich, einer Entität aufgrund ihrer Eigenschaften eine qualitative Künstlichkeit zuzuschreiben Innerhalb der belebten Welt können zwei mögliche Fälle gefunden werden, wie das Verhältnis zwischen Typ und Individuum auf die Einteilung in Natürliches und Artifizielles wirken kann:33 Es kann nicht-selbstreproduzierende Artefakte geben. Alle Einzelfälle wären diesbezüglich als Artefakte zu bezeichnen. Die Techniken der Grünen Genom-Editierung bringen aber auch Pflanzen hervor, die dazu in der Lage sind, sich selbst durch natürliche Prozesse fortzupflanzen. Es kann auch selbstreproduzierende Artefakte geben. Die Mitglieder der ersten Generation einer transgenen Maissorte können ihrer Entstehungsgeschichte gemäß und qualitativ als Artefakte beschrieben werden. Alle späteren Generationen kommen nicht mehr durch menschliches Handeln in ihre Existenz, sondern durch eben jene Prozesse, die auch bei natürlichen Maissorten die Grundlage ihrer Fortpflanzung sind. Sie werden möglicherweise weiterhin intentional genutzt. Dies muss aber, wie oben beschrieben, nicht der Fall sein. Es ist möglich, dass ein Feld mit einer zweiten Generation transgenen Maises einfach nicht geerntet wird. Die Pflanzen wären weder intentional in ihre Existenz gebracht, noch würden sie gemäß ihrer Funktion intentional genutzt. Würden wir diese Pflanzen dann nicht als artifizielle, sondern als natürliche Entitäten begreifen? Sofern die Kategorien natürlich und künstlich für eine moralische Bewertung relevant sein sollten, müsste es auch einen moralischen Unterschied zwischen der ersten und späteren Generationen einer transgenen Maissorte geben. Als Lösung erscheint an dieser Stelle eine Zuschreibung als qualitativ künstlich. Qualitativ blieben die Maissorte und alle ihre einzelnen Vertreter künstlich, da sie, hervorgerufen durch Transgenese, d.h. die Übertragung genetischer Informationen aus einem Organismus in das Genom eines anderen Organismus, bestimmte Eigenschaften tragen, die natürlichen Maissorten nicht zukommen können. Aber auch die Zuweisung einer qualitativen Natürlichkeit bzw. Künstlichkeit birgt Probleme. Es könnte sein, dass eine Maissorte erschaffen wird, welche sich  Vgl. Birnbacher, Dieter, Natürlichkeit, Berlin: de Gruyter, 2006, S. 8.  Vgl. Jansen, Ludger (Fn. 26), S. 333.

32 33

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in ihren Eigenschaften, d.h. qualitativ, nicht von einer natürlichen Maissorte unterscheidet. Zum Beispiel um die Existenz einer vom Aussterben bedrohten Maissorte zu sichern. Die zweite Generation dieser Maissorte wäre weder genetisch noch qualitativ als artifiziell zu bezeichnen. Würden die entsprechenden Maispflanzen da­ rüber hinaus nicht geerntet, würden sie keine der drei oben genannten Bedingungen dafür erfüllen, als künstlich bezeichnet werden zu können. Dies führt zu der Frage, ob eine Unterteilung in natürliche und artifizielle Pflanzen möglich ist und überhaupt einen Beitrag für eine moralische Bewertung dieser Pflanzen leisten kann. Wir müssen unsere Vorstellung vom Gegensatz zwischen artifiziell und natürlich nicht aufgeben. Auch an dieser Stelle ist eine Unterscheidung zwischen Typ und Individuum hilfreich, denn die beschriebenen Maispflanzen wären allem Anschein nach keine Artefakte mehr, würden aber weiterhin zu einem Artefakt-Typ gehören. Denn die Maissorte wäre ohne menschliches intentionales Handeln nicht in der Welt. Unabhängig davon, welche Eigenschaften die einzelnen Pflanzen dieser Maissorte haben. Unabhängig davon, ob wir die individuellen Pflanzen als artifiziell oder natürlich begreifen würden. Es könnte dann eben nur sein, dass im Falle einer Anwendung von CRISPR / Cas ohne bestimmtes Wissen keine Unterscheidung zwischen der natürlichen und der artifiziellen Maissorte möglich wäre. Dies könnte auch Licht auf das oben erwähnte Problem mit den Kühen auf unseren Weiden werfen. Der Typ Hausrind wäre ohne intentionales Handeln nicht in der Welt. Er ist damit ein Artefakt-Typ und die Einzelfälle, unsere Kühe auf den Weiden, würden diesem Artefakt-Typ angehören. Eine Klärung, ob die einzelne Kuh natürlich oder artifiziell ist, bzw. zu welchen Anteilen sie dies ist, berührt dann ontologisch eine grundlegend andere Ebene. An dieser Stelle stellt sich die Frage, ob innerhalb der Diskussionen um die moralische Bewertung der Grünen Genom-Editierung die Sorten oder die individuellen Pflanzen zum Gegenstand gemacht werden. Eine Auswertung der entsprechenden Debatte zeigt, dass sowohl die neuen Sorten als auch die individuellen Pflanzen, die Vertreter dieser neuen Sorten sind, Zielscheibe der Argumente von Befürwortern und Gegnern sind. Es sei aber vorerst davon ausgegangen, dass es möglich ist, bestimmten Entitäten eindeutig zuzuschreiben, dass sie natürlich bzw. artifiziell sind. V. Natürlichkeit und Künstlichkeit Selbst wenn geklärt wäre, unter welchen Umständen wir Entitäten zuschreiben können, natürlich oder artifiziell zu sein, bzw. zu einem natürlichen bzw. artifiziellen Typ zu gehören, wäre noch nicht geklärt, welchen moralischen Status diese Entitäten haben und ob ihre Natürlichkeit bzw. Künstlichkeit, auf individueller oder auf Typ-Ebene, Einfluss auf die moralische Bewertung haben kann. Ganz davon abgesehen, dass es vor dem Hintergrund des bisher Gesagten kaum möglich erscheint, die Zugehörigkeit bestimmter Entitäten zur natürlichen bzw. artifiziellen Welt plausibel und abschließend zu bestimmen.

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Die Unterscheidung in natürliche und artifizielle Entitäten kann neben der Unterscheidung zwischen Angehörigen unserer Art und den Angehörigen anderer Arten als wichtigste menschliche Kategorisierung angesehen werden.34 Beide Bestimmungen des Seins ermöglichen es dem Menschen, sich die Welt geistig zugänglich zu machen, indem er diese strukturiert Auch für unsere moralischen Urteile erscheinen derartige Zuschreibungen relevant. Wie Birnbacher festhält, zeigt sich die moralische Relevanz der Unterscheidung zwischen Angehörigen unserer eigenen und anderer Arten in den Argumenten der Tierethiker.35 Auch wenn aus diesen Argumenten nicht immer normative Orientierungen gewonnen werden können, zeigen sie doch eine gewisse moralische Ungleichbehandlung zwischen Tieren und Menschen aufgrund der jeweiligen Spezieszugehörigkeit.36 Auch die Unterscheidung zwischen natürlichen und artifiziellen Entitäten bzw. Entität-Typen kann zum Maßstab einer moralischen Bewertung gemacht werden. Unsere Einstellungen gegenüber bestimmten Entitäten können sich grundlegend und vielschichtig ändern, je nachdem, ob wir der Entität zuschreiben, natürlich oder artifiziell zu sein.37 Hier handelt es sich letztlich um eine alltägliche Beobachtung: Zahlreiche Produkte werben mit ihrer Natürlichkeit bzw. damit, möglichst wenige künstliche Stoffe zu enthalten – die jeweiligen Produzenten versprechen sich mit diesem Hinweis offensichtlich einen verbesserten Absatz. Es gibt Untersuchungen, die zeigen, dass Risiken, die von der Natur ausgehen, als geringer und akzeptierbarer angesehen werden als Risiken, die auf vom Menschen Gemachtes zurückgehen.38 Mitunter wird Natürlichkeit mit einem normativen Vorschuss begegnet, der als schwer begründbar bezeichnet werden kann. Es sind im Wesentlichen zwei Argumentationsfiguren, die sich gegen eine derartige Überbewertung von Natürlichkeit richten:39 1.) Es wird der Einwand erhoben, dass eine normative (Über-)Bewertung von Natürlichkeit auf einen naturalistischen Fehlschluss zurückgeht. Hier wird schlicht gesagt, dass aus dem Sein kein Sollen abgeleitet werden kann. Es gibt nichts, in dem die Natur dem menschlichen Handeln in der Art moralisch überlegen wäre, dass dies eine entsprechende normative Bewertung aufgrund der Zuschreibung natürlich bzw. artifiziell begründen könnte. Vor diesem Hintergrund kann die Natürlichkeit oder Künstlichkeit einer Entität keinen Einfluss auf ihre moralische Bewertung haben. 2.) Darüber hinaus erscheint es, so die zweite Argumentationsfigur, schlicht unmöglich, Natürlichkeit bzw. Künstlichkeit eindeutig und abschließend zuzuweisen. Mit diesem Problem beschäftigte sich das vorhergehende Kapitel. Und sofern diese Unterscheidung

 Vgl. Birnbacher, Dieter (Fn. 32), S. 1.   Vgl. ebd. S. 1. 36 Vgl. Singer, Peter, Praktische Ethik, Stuttgart: Reclam, 1994, S. 86. 37 Vgl. Birnbacher, Dieter (Fn. 32), S. 2. 38  Vgl. ebd., S. 22. 39  Vgl. ebd., S. 18. 34 35

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nicht eindeutig getroffen werden kann, kann sie auch für eine moralische Bewertung nicht hilfreich sein. Unabhängig von diesen Argumentationen gibt es eine Vielzahl von Menschen, deren Kosmologie bzw. Weltanschauung eine andere Haltung gegenüber der Natur fordert. Das andine indigene buen vivir legt ein Verhältnis des Menschen zu der Natur und der organischen Welt nahe, das jenseits instrumenteller Erwägungen auf eine harmonische Koexistenz zwischen Mensch und Natur ausgerichtet ist. Auch wenn dies aus vielerlei Gründen wünschenswert zu sein scheint, lässt sich auch hier nicht ableiten, dass Künstlichkeit gegenüber Natürlichkeit immer als schlechter bzw. gefährlicher angesehen werden müsste. Ganz im Gegenteil, intentionale Eingriffe des Menschen in die Natur könnten aus einer ökologischen bzw. umwelt-ethischen Perspektive gefordert sein. Wären Natürlichkeit und Künstlichkeit tatsächlich relevante Kategorien für eine moralische Bewertung bzw. wäre Natürlichkeit Künstlichkeit grundsätzlich moralisch vorzuziehen, dann könnten alle medizinischen Eingriffe in den menschlichen Körper, das Anlegen von Naturschutzgebieten und vielleicht sogar das Bauen von Häusern moralisch problematisch sein. Es ist einfach nicht ersichtlich, aufgrund welcher Argumente natürlichen Entitäten ein prinzipiell anderer moralischer Status zukommen sollte, als es bei artifiziellen Entitäten der Fall ist. Es ist nicht klar, ob die Gifte, die der Mensch produziert, gefährlicher sind als diejenigen, die er in der Natur vorfindet. Die Bewertung der Gefährlichkeit eines Giftes muss sich auf die Eigenschaften und Auswirkungen des Giftes selbst beziehen und nicht auf die Frage, ob es sich dabei um etwas Gegebenes oder etwas Gemachtes handelt. An dieser Stelle sei daher vorgeschlagen, dass Natürlichkeit bzw. Künstlichkeit keine belastbaren Maßstäbe für die moralische Bewertung einer Pflanze darstellen können. Eine moralische Bewertung muss vielmehr für Entitäten beider Kategorien gleichermaßen erfolgen. Dies sei im nächsten Abschnitt versucht.

VI. Die ethischen Dimensionen der Grünen Gentechnik Wenn Natürlichkeit bzw. Künstlichkeit keine Richtschnur für eine moralische Bewertung darstellen, weil weder geklärt ist, welchen Entitäten wir zuschreiben können, künstlich zu sein, noch ersichtlich ist, aus welchem Grund natürliche Entitäten gegenüber künstlichen Entitäten moralisch als besser zu betrachten sind, dann muss eine moralische Bewertung artifizieller Pflanzen bzw. der Grünen Genom-Editierung anders gelagert sein. Die innerhalb der Debatte vorgebrachten Argumente lassen sich 1.) einer prinzipienbezogenen, 2.) einer epistemischen und 3.) einer sozialen Dimension zuordnen. Der moralische Status der Produkte der Grünen Genom-Editierung kann daher vor dem Hintergrund dieser drei Dimen­ sionen ertragreicher bewertet werden, als dies durch eine Fokussierung auf die Fragen nach Zuweisung und Bewertung von Natürlichkeit und Künstlichkeit möglich wäre.

486

Hans Zillmann

1. Prinzipienbezogene Dimension Neben weltanschaulichen Argumenten nimmt die in diesem Artikel bereits behandelte Frage nach einer Bewertung von Natürlichkeit bzw. Künstlichkeit eine wichtige Position auf der prinzipienbezogenen Dimension ein. Wie aber gezeigt werden konnte, scheint die Zweiteilung der Welt in natürliche und künstliche Entitäten keiner rationalen Argumentation zugänglich und damit auch kein Bestandteil einer moralischen Bewertung zu sein. Wir können schlicht nicht sagen, dass artifizielle Pflanzen aufgrund ihrer Künstlichkeit einen prinzipiell anderen moralischen Status haben als natürliche Pflanzen. Weltanschaulich-metaphysische Argumente drehen sich um den Status des Menschen gegenüber der Natur und umgekehrt. Die Ansichten liegen hier zwischen einer rein instrumentellen Betrachtung der Natur als Ressourcen-Spender und Grundlage des Überlebens aktueller und kommender Generationen, wie sich dies z. B. im deutschen Grundgesetz (Art. 20a GG) widerspiegelt, und einer Vorstellung von der Natur als Rechtssubjekt. Im zweiten Fall werden der Natur dann konkrete Rechte zugeschrieben, die sie, auch wenn bisher nicht klar ist, wie so etwas vonstattengehen kann, in einigen Ländern Südamerikas auch vor Gericht einklagen können muss.40 Wie an anderer Stelle dargestellt,41 kann nicht geklärt werden, ob ein moralischer Physiozentrismus rational begründet werden kann. Buen vivir und die tiefenökologische Bewegung sehen es als prinzipiell gut an, die Natur in ihrer Form zu erhalten bzw. deren Interessen zu berücksichtigen. Das hieße konkret, die gesamte belebte Welt und nicht nur den Menschen zum Gegenstand moralischer Erwägungen zu machen. Jedoch ist in keiner Weise klar, welche Interessen die Natur hat, bzw. in welchem Zustand sie zu erhalten ist. Alle Überlegungen über die möglichen Interessen der Natur und deren moralischen Status müssen sich dem anthropozentrischen Dilemma stellen, dass es immer Menschen sein werden, die über die Natur und ihre Interessen spekulieren. Die Natur selbst wird niemals vor einen Richter treten. Auf der prinzipienbezogenen Dimension werden letztlich häufig Argumente vorgebracht, die einer rationalen Begründung nicht zugänglich sind. Es handelt sich hierbei weniger um moralische Analysen als um weltanschauliche Positionierungen. Weder können Befürworter noch Gegner erklären, warum Anthropozentrismus oder Physiozentrismus mehr sein sollten als kontextuelle und temporäre Konzepte mit jeweils strittigen Vorannahmen.

40 Vgl. Vialova, Silvana, Pachamama und Buen Vivir. Unterschiede des verfassungsmäßig bestimmten Umweltschutzes in Ecuador und Deutschland, München: GRIN Verlag, 2016, S. 3. 41 Vgl. Zillmann, Hans / Kaufmann, Matthias, „Ethische Dimensionen der Genom-Editierung, buen vivir und die tiefenökologische Bewegung“, in: Müller, Susanne / Rosenau, Henning (Hrsg.), Stammzellen – IPS-Zellen – Genomeditierung, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2018, 313 f.

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2. Epistemische Dimension Auf der epistemischen Dimension stellen sich Fragen nach vorhandenem bzw. fehlendem Wissen in Bezug auf die Grüne Genom-Editierung. Hier werden Fragen danach gestellt, wie viel wir über mögliche Wechselwirkungen bestimmter artifizieller Pflanzen innerhalb der Ökosysteme wissen und ob Freisetzungsversuche rückgängig gemacht werden können. Es wird aber auch die Frage aufgeworfen, wie viel wir über Wechselwirkungen wissen müssen, bevor Freisetzungsversuche zu rechtfertigen sind. Sofern weiteres Wissen über Potenziale und Risiken der Grünen Genom-Editierung produziert werden soll, sind Fortsetzung der Forschung und Freisetzungsversuche unumgänglich. Zudem sind unvollständiges Wissen und Nicht-Wissen nicht gleichzusetzen. Es kann nicht gesagt werden, dass kein Wissen über Chancen und Risiken der Grünen Genom-Editierung existiert. In diesem Zusammenhang sind z. B. Versuche zu verzeichnen, Freisetzungen kontrollierbar zu machen.42 Hier werden letztlich sowohl artifizielle Arten bzw. Sorten als auch individuelle künstliche Pflanzen zum Gegenstand der moralischen Bewertung. Eine nur teilweise kalkulierbare Wechselwirkung mit der Umwelt geht letztlich nur die einzelne Pflanze ein, es sind aber Arten bzw. Sorten, die sich verbreiten und ihren Platz in den entsprechenden Ökosystemen suchen. Die Auswirkungen dieser Pflanzen auf die Ökosysteme können dann Gegenstand einer moralischen Reflexion sein. Diese Reflexion basiert aber nicht auf der Frage nach der Natürlichkeit bzw. Künstlichkeit der jeweiligen Pflanzen, sondern auf deren kalkulierbaren und unkalkulierbaren Folgen für die Natur und den Menschen. Diese Folgen wiederum können nur durch Fortsetzung der entsprechenden Forschungen und Freisetzungsversuche sowie durch die intensive und umsichtige Auseinandersetzung mit den entsprechenden Ergebnissen bewertet werden. In diesem Zusammenhang müssen die Umstände der Wissensproduktion sowie entsprechende Asymmetrien zwischen Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Wissenschaft und Wirtschaft sowie Wissenschaft und Gesellschaft berücksichtigt werden. Dies führt uns zur sozialen Dimension. 3. Soziale Dimension Auf der sozialen Dimension geht es um die direkten oder indirekten Folgen der Grünen Genom-Editierung für den Menschen. Auf der einen Seite soll es möglich sein, Landwirtschaft ertragreicher zu gestalten und auf diese Weise die Nahrungsknappheit in einigen Regionen dieser Welt zu lindern, auf der anderen Seite befürchten bestimmte Akteure einen unwiederbringlichen Verlust der Unabhängigkeit von Kleinbauern, wenn sie das patentierte genetisch veränderte Saatgut Jahr für Jahr neu kaufen müssen. Die sozialen Folgen dieser Praxis sind in einigen 42 Vgl. Taube, Friedhelm, „Grüne Gentechnik im Anbausystem bewerten“, in: Schartl, Manfred / Erber-Schropp, Julia Maria (Hrsg.), Chancen und Risiken der modernen Biotechnologie, Wiesbaden: Springer, 2014, S. 105.

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Hans Zillmann

Regionen Indiens verheerend.43 Diesbezüglich sind die Produkte der Grünen Genom-Editierung moralische Aktanten auf einer Ebene, die nichts mit der Frage nach ihrer Natürlichkeit bzw. Künstlichkeit zu tun hat. Auch an dieser Stelle kann nur empfohlen werden, die moralische Bewertung von artifiziellen Pflanzen vor dem Hintergrund ihrer Auswirkungen vorzunehmen. Die Frage, ob diese Pflanzen artifiziell oder natürlich sind, kann, muss sich aber nicht auf deren moralische Bewertung auswirken. Neben dieser Asymmetrie zwischen Gesellschaft und Wirtschaft existiert auch eine Asymmetrie zwischen Wissenschaft und Wirtschaft. Niemand wird bestreiten wollen, dass innerhalb der landwirtschaftlichen Nutzung der Genom-Editierung erhebliche wirtschaftliche Interessen auszumachen sind. Damit ist die Wirtschaft in diesem Bereich ein relevanter Akteur. Kritische Stimmen wenden gegen eine Partnerschaft zwischen Wissenschaft und Wirtschaft ein, dass Unabhängigkeit und Unparteilichkeit der Wissenschaft gefährdet seien, wenn Forschung zunehmend in gewinnorientierte Privatunternehmen ausgelagert wird.44 Es wird auch kritisch vorgebracht, dass unabhängig finanzierte Studien häufiger von realen oder potenziellen Risiken berichten, als dies bei Studien der Fall ist, die von wirtschaftlichen Akteuren unterstützt werden.45 Implizit oder explizit werden Vorwürfe erhoben, dass die Einflussnahme der Wirtschaft auf die Forschung zur Verzerrung wissenschaftlicher Ergebnisse führen kann. Befürworter einer Partnerschaft zwischen Wirtschaft und Wissenschaft sehen vor allem in der Finanzierung wissenschaftlicher Forschungen ein großes Potenzial, welches letztlich dazu führen könnte, dass intensiver und aussichtsreicher geforscht werden kann. Für beide Positionen lassen sich auch moralische Argumente finden. Die Asymmetrie zwischen Wissenschaft und Gesellschaft zeichnet sich im Wesentlichen durch einen problematischen Wissenstransfer aus. Sofern ein gesamt-gesellschaftlicher und aufgeklärter Diskurs über die Grüne Gentechnik bzw. Grüne Genom-Editierung und die damit verbundenen legislativen und moralischen Fragen erwünscht ist,46 muss dieser auch angestoßen bzw. ermöglicht werden. Hier könnten kommunikationswissenschaftliche Arbeiten dazu beitragen, der Öffentlichkeit die Möglichkeit zu bieten, eine entsprechende Diskussion zu führen. Hier könnte dann beispielsweise transportiert werden, dass die Natürlichkeit bzw. Künstlichkeit bestimmter Pflanzen keinen ersichtlichen Beitrag zu ihrer moralischen Bewertung leisten kann.

43  http://www.spiegel.de / wirtschaft / selbstmord-serie-tausend-indische-bauern-gehen-inden-tod-a-446922.html. 44 Vgl. Sunder Rajan, Kaushik, Biokapitalismus. Werte im postgenomischen Zeitalter, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2006, S. 14. 45 Vgl. Pusztai, Arpad / Bardocz, Susan, Potential Health Effects of Food Derived from Genetically Modified Plants: What Are the Issues?, Penang: Third World Network, 2011, S. 4. 46 Vgl. Fritsch, Johannes / Steinicke, Henning (Hrsg.), Chancen und Grenzen des genome editing. Stellungnahme, Halle / Bonn / München / Mainz: 2015, S. 13.

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VII. Der moralische Status genetisch veränderter Pflanzen Vor dem Hintergrund dieser drei ethischen Dimensionen können Grüne Genom-Editierung und artifizielle Pflanzen bewertet werden. Für eine moralische Bewertung relevant ist erstens die Frage, welches Verhältnis wir zwischen Mensch und Natur annehmen und wie Eingriffe in die Natur bzw. Veränderungen der Ökosysteme zu bewerten sind. Da aber keine Entscheidung zwischen Physio- und Anthropozentrismus getroffen werden kann, scheinen beide Konzepte keine Hilfestellung bei einer moralischen Bewertung bieten zu können. Bezüglich der zweiten Frage, wie viel Wissen existieren muss, damit Forschung und Freisetzungsversuche rechtfertigbar sind, kann letztlich nur ein Kompromiss eingegangen werden: Weiteres Wissen kann nur durch Fortsetzung der entsprechenden Forschungen erlangt werden, gleichzeitig muss dieses Wissen differenziert bewertet und eine Übereinkunft darüber getroffen werden, ab welchem Wissensstand uns Unwägbarkeiten kalkulierbar erscheinen. Letztlich war der Mensch wohl nie in der Situation, dass er bei Aufkommen neuer Technologien über vollständiges Wissen bezüglich der möglichen Folgen dieser Technologien verfügt hat. Der bloße Verweis auf die Unvollständigkeit unseres Wissens ist erstens trivial, da nicht davon ausgegangen werden kann, dass der Mensch über irgendetwas vollständiges Wissen haben kann, und zweitens kann er nicht dazu dienen, eine Aussetzung der Forschung und der Freisetzungsversuche zu begründen. Moralische Argumente, die für eine Fortsetzung der Forschung sprechen, wie z. B. die Bekämpfung des Welthungers, sind genannt worden. Auch Gegner der Forschung können moralische Argumente vorbringen und sich dabei auf physiozentristische oder umwelt-ethische Argumente berufen. Nur eine dezidierte Analyse der jeweiligen Argumente kann dazu führen, die selbigen zu systematisieren und anschließend hierarchisch zu ordnen. Das Argument, Natürlichkeit sei Künstlichkeit normativ vorzuziehen, konnte in diesem Artikel entkräftet werden. Bezogen auf die sozialen Folgen der Grünen Gentechnik müssen die genannten Asymmetrien beachtet werden. An dieser Stelle können legislative Regulierungen auf der Basis moralischer Erwägungen empfohlen werden. Es ist keinesfalls so, dass Kleinbauern den internationalen Konzernen schutzlos ausgeliefert sein müssen. Denn das Handeln derartiger Konzerne muss an die Rechtslage der jeweiligen Länder angepasst sein. Vor diesem Hintergrund ist es auch möglich, dass politische Akteure auf die vorgezeichnete Asymmetrie zwischen Gesellschaft und Wirtschaft reagieren. Dies können sie durch legislative Regulierungen erreichen. Die Asymmetrie zwischen Wissenschaft und Gesellschaft ist ein kommunikationswissenschaftliches Problem, auch wenn die Forderung nach einer Abschwächung dieser Asymmetrie moralisch begründet werden kann. Bezogen auf die Partnerschaft bzw. das Missverhältnis zwischen Wissenschaft und Wirtschaft wiederum können ebenfalls legislative Regulierungen weiterhelfen. Es ist nicht auszuschließen, dass eine Partnerschaft zu einer Progression der entsprechenden Forschungen führen könnte. Ebenso ist nicht ausgeschlossen, dass Gewinnorientierung zu Verfälschungen wissenschaftlicher Daten und Ergebnissen führt.

490

Hans Zillmann

Summary The moral states of artificial entities become relevant when it comes to the normative evaluation of green genetic engineering. Is there any fundamental moral difference between natural and artificial plants? To answer this question there are two questions presupposed: 1.) What kinds of entities are natural respectively artificial? In this case this paper will show some way to define the ontological state of artefacts. But this seems very difficult and in some way a distinction between naturalness and artificiality seems even impossible. 2.) Are naturalness and artificiality credible moral arguments? The reply to this question will be no and therefore the paper will show some way to evaluate the moral state of plants without to referring to question one or two. This will be done by discussing three ethical dimensions of green genetic engineering: 1.) fundamental dimension, 2.) epistemic dimension and 3.) social dimension. On fundamental dimension some so called world viewings can be discussed. Even a normative over-evaluation of naturalness can be identified here. On epistemic dimension the long term uncertainties are important. Here the question must be solved on which level of knowledge research and release experiments are calculable. In this case it is argued that more knowledge seems to be important and that more knowledge only can be produced by continuation of research. On social dimension, the consequences of green genetic engineering for mankind will be discussed. Three asymmetries are important here: Asymmetry between science and economy, between society and economy and between science and society. By discussing these three dimensions a moral evaluation of green genetic engineering can be done.

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Philipp-Alexander Hirsch, Freiheit und Staatlichkeit bei Kant – Die autonomietheore­ tische Begründung von Recht und Staat und das Widerstandsproblem. Berlin / Boston 2017 (de Gruyter). 477 Seiten. 

Ulli F. H. Rühl

Das Werk, das hier vorgestellt werden soll, beruht auf einer Dissertation, die unter der Betreuung von Bernd Ludwig an der Universität Göttingen entstanden ist. Sein Thema ist das Verhältnis von Freiheit und Staatlichkeit bei Kant. Das ist ein weites Feld, und so nimmt der Autor auch zu fast allen substantiellen Verständnis- und Auslegungsfragen der Kant’schen Rechtslehre Stellung. Der Stand der Kant-Forschung zur Rechtslehre wird aufgearbeitet, die Sekundärliteratur wird auf dem aktuellen Stand vollständig dokumentiert und die jeweiligen Positionen aus der Kant-Literatur werden in den Fußnoten klassifiziert und kommentiert. Gegliedert ist das Buch in 8 Kapitel, wobei die beiden ersten den Charakter von Einführungen haben: Kapitel 1 zum Forschungs- und Problemstand und zur Methode der Untersuchung, Kapitel 2 zur Entwicklung des moralischen Rechtsbegriffs in Kants Moralphilosophie. Kapitel 3 (Warum überhaupt Recht?) nimmt die Debatte über Abhängigkeit oder Unabhängigkeit der Rechtslehre vom kategorischen Imperativ auf und begründet ausführlich die These von der Alternativlosigkeit der Abhängigkeitsthese. In diesem Kapitel entwickelt der Autor zudem den ersten Ansatz für sein ‚Autonomietheorem‘, das dann im Folgenden weiter ausgebaut wird. Kapitel 4 hat die innere Rechtspflicht und das angeborene Freiheitsrecht zum Thema, wobei der Schwerpunkt aber eindeutig bei Fragen der Einordnung der inneren Rechtspflicht in die Systematik der Rechtslehre liegt. Kapitel 5 ist von zentraler Bedeutung, weil dort die autonomietheoretische Staatsbegründung im Detail entwickelt wird. Kapitel 6 dient der Überprüfung, ob sich die autonomietheoretische Begründung von Staat und Recht aus Kants Rechtslehre belegen lässt. Kapitel 7 zum Widerstandsrecht hat den Charakter eines selbständigen Anhangs. Kapitel 8 ‚Resümee und Ausblick‘ bietet eine gute Zusammenfassung der wesentlichen Thesen und Positionen des Autors. Im Ausblick gibt es zum Menschenrecht auf Staatsangehörigkeit die einzige Stellungnahme zu einem aktuellen Problemfeld; das ist aber die Ausnahme. Vom allgemeinen Ansatz her beabsichtigt der Autor eine immanente Interpretation von Kants Rechtslehre, die sich am Maßstab der Kohärenz im System von Kants praktischer Philosophie orientiert. Wichtiger und interessanter als die formelle Gliederung ist das, was man die Tiefenstruktur des Werkes nennen könnte. Darunter verstehe ich das Vorverständnis, mit dem Hirsch Kants Rechtslehre interpretiert und das die Arrangements der Kant-Zitate bestimmt. Dieses Vorverständnis, das Hirsch als die „rekonstruierte Konzeption“ (248) bezeichnet, und das auch die Originalität des Ansatzes ausmacht, besteht (wenn ich recht sehe) im Wesentlichen aus den folgenden Elementen bzw. Prämissen: Erstens, Kants Charakterisierung des Rechts als das moralische ‚Vermögen, andere zu verpflichten‘ wird interpretiert im Sinn von „Recht als Inbegriff der Fremdverpflichtung“ (221, 246). Zweitens, die These, es gebe einen Begriff der Rechtsgeltung in einem „genuin Kantischen Sinn“ (211), d. h. die Begriffe Gesetzgebung und Gesetzgeber beziehen sich nur auf die (formale) Begründung der Verbindlichkeit bzw. den Urheber der Verbindlichkeit (126 f.), weil die Inhalte der moralischen Gesetze (material) keinen Urheber haben. Schließlich drittens die autonomietheoretische Begründung von Recht und Staat, die schon im Titel des Buches benannt wird. Im Zentrum des Werkes steht das sog. Autonomietheorem, das, was der Autor an einer Stelle als den „übergreifenden autonomietheoretischen Interpretationsansatz“ bezeichnet (335). – Nun ist eine autonomietheoretische Begründung von Recht und Staat zumindest für alle Anhänger der These von der Abhängigkeit der Rechtslehre vom kategorischen Imperativ nicht nur konsensfähig, sondern grundlegend und konstitutiv für das Verständnis von Kants

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Rechtslehre; diese setzt als Grundbegriffe Person, Pflicht, Verbindlichkeit usw. voraus, die wiederum auf dem Begriff der Autonomie beruhen. Hirschs Verständnis einer autonomietheoretischen Begründung von Recht und Staat geht aber darüber hinaus. Das Autonomietheorem gibt es bei Hirsch gleichsam in mehreren Ausbaustufen: Den Anfang bildet die These, dass die sog. Zweckformel des kategorischen Imperativs („Handle so, daß du die Menschheit sowohl in deiner Person, als in der Person eines andern jederzeit zugleich als Zweck, niemals bloß als Mittel brauchst.“) das „moralische Ordnungsprinzip“ (78, 80) und die „Blaupause“ (85) für Recht und Ethik ist. Die finale Ausbaustufe des Autonomietheorems lautet in der authentischen Version aus der Zusammenfassung:

„Als autonome Person bin ich notwendig Zweck an sich und habe insofern materiali­ ter unveräußerliche, angeborene Rechte gegenüber anderen Personen. Gleichzeitig kann ich als autonomes Vernunftwesen den Anspruch erheben, formaliter nur im Wege der Selbstverpflichtung moralisch obligiert werden zu können. Nun ist das Recht laut Kant „das Vermögen, andere zu verpflichten“, mithin der Inbegriff der Fremdverpflichtung. Will ich nun unter Naturzustandsbedingungen mein Recht gegenüber anderen geltend machen, also ihnen gegenüber eine entsprechende Verbindlichkeit deklarieren, so können diese die rechtliche Verpflichtung nicht als autonome Selbstverpflichtung begreifen. Im Naturzustand ist rechtliche Fremdverpflichtung immer heteronom und damit moralisch defizitär. Die Lösung dieses Problems sieht Kant in der Etablierung eines bürgerlichen Zustands, insofern Kant den Staat in der Idee als den „vereinigten, a priori aus der Vernunft abstammenden Volkswillen“ vorstellt. Als Teil dieses vereinigten, gesetzgebenden Willens aller legt sich das verpflichtete Rechtssubjekt stets mittelbar selbst die rechtliche Verbindlichkeit auf …“ (425 f.) Das Zitat macht deutlich, dass das Autonomietheorem im Wesentlichen darauf beruht, dass Hirsch das ‚moralische Vermögen, andere zu verpflichten‘ interpretiert im Sinn von: das Recht ist der Inbegriff der Fremdverpflichtung (246, 426) bzw. „Rechtsverpflichtung ist für Kant begrifflich immer Fremdverpflichtung …“ (221). – Eine alternative Interpretation wäre, dass ein ‚Vermögen‘ lediglich die Möglichkeit zur Fremdverpflichtung beinhaltet: Einige Rechtspflichten können durch Fremdverpflichtung erzeugt werden – das wäre der Unterschied zwischen alle und einige. Welche Fälle das genau sind, wird von Kant später – im ersten und im zweiten Teil der Rechtslehre – entwickelt. Auf Verträge passt es nicht, denn Verträge erzeugen Rechtspflichten (§§ 18, 19 Privatrecht), die aber sicher nicht auf einseitiger Fremdverpflichtung beruhen. Die beiden hervorstechendsten Fälle von Fremdverpflichtung wären Erstbesitznahme von Boden und beweglichen Sachen sowie positive, staatliche Gesetzgebung. – Hirsch interpretiert die Passage im Sinn von Inbegriff, was dann bedeutet, dass alle Rechtspflichten auf Fremdverpflichtung beruhen. Er erläutert seine These, dass schon jede Geltendmachung eines Anspruchs im Naturzustand eine Fremdverpflichtung darstellt, anhand des folgenden Beispiels:

„Eine andere Person nötigt mich unter Androhung von Strafe, seine körperliche Integrität zu wahren. Materiell betrachtet (d. h. mit Blick auf den Inhalt des Rechtsverhältnisses), hat der andere bereits im Naturzustand dieses angeborene Recht auf körperliche Unversehrtheit und ich habe eine korrespondierende Rechtspflicht zur Wahrung derselben. Formell betrachtet (d. h. mit Blick auf das Nötigungsverhältnis), ist dies im Naturzustand jedoch ein Akt heteronomer Fremdverpflichtung. Die äußere Gesetzgebung – d. h. die Nötigung Unterlasse es, mich zu verletzen! durch mein Gegenüber – ist für mich unilateral und heteronom, insofern die Nötigung zur Befolgung des Gesetzes nicht auf meinen

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495

Willen zurückführbar ist. Rechte, d. h. die Befugnis, andere zu verpflichten, erfordern daher eine Instanz, deren Urteile auf den Willen der rechtsgesetzlich Verpflichteten zurückgeführt werden können und daher legitim sind.“ (227) Aus dieser Textstelle wird ersichtlich, dass Hirsch seine These ‚Rechtsverpflichtung ist immer Fremdverpflichtung‘ auch auf das angeborene Freiheitsrecht anwendet. Der Anspruch Unterlasse es, mich zu verletzen! wird interpretiert als Akt heteronomer Fremdverpflichtung und als äußere Gesetzgebung. Hirsch betont, dass dies nur für die Nötigungsrelation (formell) gelte. Und das beruht wiederum auf der Prämisse, es fehle im Naturzustand an der formalen Rechtsgeltung (211 Fn. 2, 297 f.), worunter Hirsch Bestimmung, Geltendmachung und Durchsetzung eines Rechts versteht (264, 271). Nach Hirsch ist es im Naturzustand moralisch unzulässig, dem Angreifer mit den Worten entgegenzutreten ‚Unterlasse es, mich zu verletzen!‘, weil der Angreifer das nicht als autonome Selbstverpflichtung und Selbstnötigung begreifen kann. – Dazu ist kritisch anzumerken: Dass man andere Personen nicht am Körper verletzen oder misshandeln darf, sollte das vernünftige Wesen mit dem Kompass des kategorischen Imperativs (Zweckformel) in der Hand schon im Wege der Selbstgesetzgebung wissen; und die Nötigung, gemäß der moralischen Erkenntnis zu handeln, sollte sich aus der Selbst-Nötigung aus Achtung vor dem moralischen Gesetz ergeben. Anders als bei ‚äußeren‘, beweglichen Sachen gibt es zwischen Person und Körper kein Problem der rechtlichen Zuordnung; es bedarf keines rechtlichen Aktes in Form einer Deklaration (Dies sei mein!) in Bezug auf den eigenen Körper. D. h. die Aufspaltung des Begriffs der Verbindlichkeit und die Unterscheidung materiell / formell ebnet den Unterschied zwischen dem angeborenen Recht und den erworbenen Rechten ein. In Hirschs Konzeption (formelle Betrachtungsweise) ist das Recht auf körperliche Unversehrtheit nicht ursprünglich, sondern vom Staat verliehen, weil es ohne Staat nicht verbindlich ist. In letzter Konsequenz ist das angeborene Freiheitsrecht bloß „provisorisch“ (291). Das angeborene Recht muss aber nicht erst durch eine Deklaration bzw. eine Art von äußerer Gesetzgebung zur Geltung gebracht, d. h. erworben, werden. Wäre dem so, dann wäre es nicht ursprünglich. Der Interpretationsansatz bei der These vom Recht als Inbegriff der Fremdverpflichtung ist auch für die Staatsbegründung die Haupt-Prämisse, von der alles abhängt. Das Autonomietheorem fordert nämlich auch, dass ein vernünftiges Wesen nur durch Selbstgesetzgebung verpflichtet werden kann: „Durch andere kann eine äußere Verbindlichkeit nach Rechtsgesetzen nur begründet werden, sofern ich dies als Selbst-Verpflichtung (Auto-Nomie) begreifen kann. Nur dann gebe ich mir das Rechtsgesetz selber.“ (226) Es ist evident, dass sich daraus ein kontradiktorischer Widerspruch ergeben muss: Einerseits muss Recht immer eine Fremdverpflichtung sein. Andererseits kann das vernünftige Wesen immer nur durch Selbstgesetzgebung verpflichtet werden (vgl. S. 248). Dieser Widerspruch ist immanent-systembedingt – und wird nicht erst durch anthropologische Anwendungsbedingungen verursacht. Dies bildet den Ansatzpunkt für die Staatsbegründung, die der Autor als Kants eigentliche und wahre Staatsbegründung deklariert. Danach besteht die Lösung darin, dass es einer vermittelnden Instanz bedarf, welche die Fremdverpflichtung in eine Selbstverpflichtung transformiert. Diese Vermittlung leistet der vereinigte Wille aller bzw. der Staat in der Idee: „Wenn der Souverän als der allgemeingesetzgebende Wille mich verpflichtet, dann bin ich es letztlich selbst, der mich nötigt. Daher lässt sich Auto-Nomie als Selbst-Ver­ pflichtung in rechtlicher Hinsicht erst unter Bedingungen der Staatlichkeit realisieren.“ (245) Materielle Rechte gibt es nach Hirsch zwar schon im Naturzustand, Rechtsgeltung gibt es aber erst im Staat – Rechtsgeltungsstaat und nicht bloß Rechtssicherungsstaat (242). Hirsch spricht von „externalisierter“ (245) oder auch mittelbarer Selbstverpflichtung (246). – Die

496

Rezension – Recension

Staatsbegründung ergibt sich also bei Hirsch gleichsam logisch aus dem Gegensatz von Recht als Fremdverpflichtung vs. Anspruch des vernünftigen Wesens auf Autonomie. Es ist deshalb nur konsequent, wenn Hirsch anthropologisch-epistemische Staatsbegründungen für verfehlt, im besten Fall für überflüssig hält (214 ff.). Ob er sich dabei darauf berufen kann, dass Kant sich explizit gegen eine Staatsbegründung aus einer anthropologischen Tatsache wende (217), wird man mit gutem Grund bezweifeln müssen. Denn die „Erfahrung“, von der Kant RL § 44 spricht, kann durchaus im Sinn einer konkreten Erfahrung im Gegensatz zur Anthropologie interpretiert werden, wie die „traurige Erfahrung“ in § 42 RL zeigt. Es muss aber noch grundsätzlicher gefragt werden, ob selbst ein Idealstaat die von Hirsch vorausgesetzte Transformation von Fremdverpflichtung in Selbstverpflichtung leisten kann. Das Problem erwächst aus der Unterscheidung zwischen empirischer Person und dem noumenalen Selbst. Wie Hirsch durchaus sieht (79), kommt es nicht auf die tatsächliche Einwilligung der empirischen Person, sondern auf das autonome Vernunftwesen an. Entsprechend kommt es darauf an, ob das autonome Vernunftwesen die Fremdverpflichtung vermittelt über den Idealstaat als Selbstverpflichtung begreifen kann. Wenn das so ist, dann liegt aber folgender Einwand nahe: Beim autonomen Vernunftwesen ist die Vermittlung überflüssig, weil es seine Pflichten (z. B. Körperverletzungen unterlassen) selbständig erkennt und befolgt – ein autonomes Vernunftwesen ohne die Achtung fürs Gesetz als Triebkraft ist bei Kant undenkbar. Bei einer empirischen Person, die uneinsichtig ist, ist die Vermittlung über den Idealstaat nutzlos. Sie ist nutzlos, weil der Idealstaat zwar die Unterlassung durch moralisch legitimen Zwang durchsetzen kann; der Idealstaat kann aber bei der empirischen Person nicht die innere Einsicht erzwingen, dass die Unterlassungspflicht und der Zwang auf der Selbstverpflichtung ihres wahren, noumenalen Selbst beruhen. Die Transformation von Fremd- in Selbstverpflichtung über den Idealstaat kann nicht gelingen. Im einen Fall ist sie überflüssig, im anderen Fall ist sie nutzlos. Im 6. Kapitel muss Hirsch zeigen, dass Kants Rechtslehre auch wirklich seiner autonomietheoretischen Begründung von Recht und Staat folgt. Insoweit gibt es Probleme auf mehreren Ebenen: Wenn die Kant’sche Staatsbegründung eigentlich „in nuce“ (254) schon in den Pseudo-Ulpianischen Formeln steckt, dann ist der gesamte Erste Teil der Rechtslehre, d. h. das Privatrecht vom äußeren Mein und Dein mit allen drei Hauptstücken, und dann sind insbesondere die §§ 1 – 9 des Privatrechts eigentlich überflüssig. Dass es sie trotzdem gibt, erklärt Hirsch wie folgt: Kant habe die Begründung des Eigentumsrechts gleichsam eingeschoben (252) und dadurch habe sich eine Architektonik der Rechtslehre ergeben, „welche die grundlegende autonomietheoretische Staatsbegründung verschleiert.“ (252) Insbesondere das Erlaubnisgesetz (Privatrecht § 2) zusammen mit der Befugnis zur Erstbesitznahme von Boden und beweglichen Sachen ist von zentraler Bedeutung, weil es geeignet ist, die Grundlagen von Hirschs Autonomietheorem zu erschüttern. Denn es erlaubt, einseitig anderen eine Unterlassungspflicht aufzuerlegen, die sie ohne diese Deklaration der Erstbesitznahme nicht hätten – also: Heteronomie in Reinform. Deshalb kann und darf es nicht sein, dass dadurch – wenn auch nur komparativ und provisorisch – eine solche Erwerbung als wirklich (§ 9 Privatrecht) anerkannt wird. Denn nach Hirsch fehlt die moralische Verbindlichkeit, die nur der Idealstaat qua Transformation von Fremd- in Selbstverpflichtung verschaffen kann. Daraus ergibt sich das Problem, ob es im Rahmen des Autonomietheorems im Privatrecht (Naturzustand) überhaupt ein äußeres Mein und Dein geben kann: „Erkennt Kant mit dem provisorischen Besitz also doch bereits ein äußeres Mein und Dein im Naturzustand an? Nein, denn eine moralische Verbindlichkeit in Ansehung äußerer Gegenstände kann es erst im bürgerlichen Zustand durch die Gesetzgebung des vereinigten Willens aller geben.“ (282)

Rezension – Recension

497

Das ist aber nicht die Position, die Kant in § 9 des Privatrechts vertritt, wenn er das provisorische Mein und Dein als wirklich bezeichnet. Dem provisorisch-rechtlichen äußeren Mein und Dein fehlt es nicht an der moralischen Verbindlichkeit. Kants Staat ist ein Rechtssicherungsstaat und kein Rechtsgeltungsstaat, der moralische Verbindlichkeit erst begründet. Deutlich wird das aus Kants Stellungnahme zum Kolonialismus und dem Besitzrecht der indigenen Völker (AA 6:266): Es ist verwerflich, durch „Gewalt oder […] durch betrügerischen Kauf Colonien zu errichten und so Eigenthümer ihres Bodens zu werden und ohne Rücksicht auf ihren ersten Besitz Gebrauch von unserer Überlegenheit zu machen“. Dem provisorischen Landbesitz der indigenen Völker fehlt nach Kants Auffassung sicher nicht die moralische Verbindlichkeit. 

Ulli F. H. Rühl

Autoren- und Herausgeberverzeichnis – Index of Authors and Editors Ambos, Kai, Univ.-Prof. Dr. Dr. h. c., RiLG, Universität Göttingen, Professur für Strafrecht, Strafprozessrecht, Rechtsvergleichung und internationales Strafrecht, Platz der Göttinger Sieben 5, D-37073 Göttingen E-Mail: [email protected] Bahr, Amrei, Dr. des., B.A., Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, Institut für Philosophie, Universitätsstraße 1, D-40225 Düsseldorf E-Mail: [email protected] Brockhaus, Robert, Europa-Universität Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Lehrstuhl für Strafrecht, insbesondere Internationales Strafrecht und Strafrechtsvergleichung, Rechtsphilosophie, Große Scharrnstraße 59, D-15230 Frankfurt (Oder) E-Mail: [email protected] Bruns, Andreas, M.A., University of Leeds, School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science, Woodhouse Lane, Leeds, LS2 9JT, United Kingdom E-Mail: [email protected] Douglas, Susan, Dr., Asst. Prof., University of Guelph, College of Arts, School of Fine Art and Music, 50 Stone Road, Guelph, ON, N1G 2W1, Canada E-Mail: [email protected] Dreier, Thomas, Univ.-Prof. Dr., M.C.J., Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT), Zentrum für angewandte Rechtswissenschaft (ZAR), Institut für Informations- und Wirtschaftsrecht – Dreier, Postfach 6980, D-76128 Karlsruhe E-Mail: [email protected] Grave, Johannes, Univ.-Prof. Dr., Fakultät für Geschichtswissenschaft, Philosophie und Theologie, Arbeitsbereich Historische Bildwissenschaft/Kunstgeschichte, Universitätsstraße 25, D-33615 Bielefeld E-Mail: [email protected] Heuser, Martin, Universität Regensburg, Lehrstuhl für Strafrecht, Strafprozessrecht, Internationales Strafrecht und Rechtsphilosophie, Universitätsstr. 31, D-93053 Regensburg E-Mail: [email protected] Hoffmann, Martin, Priv.-Doz. Dr., Dipl.-Psych., Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Philosophisches Seminar, Domplatz 23, D-48143 Münster E-Mail: [email protected] Houkes, Wybo, Prof. Dr., Eindhoven University of Technology, Philosophy & Ethics, School of Innovation Sciences, De Zaale, NL-5600 MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands E-Mail: [email protected]

500

Autoren- und Herausgeberverzeichnis – Index of Authors and Editors

Joerden, Jan C., Univ.-Prof. Dr. Dr. h. c., Europa-Universität Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Lehrstuhl für Strafrecht, insbesondere Internationales Strafrecht und Strafrechtsvergleichung, Rechtsphilosophie, Große Scharrnstraße 59, D-15230 Frankfurt (Oder) E-Mail: [email protected] Ortland, Eberhard, Dr., Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Philosophisches Seminar, Domplatz 23, D-48143 Münster E-Mail: [email protected] Orzechowski, Marcin, Dr., Universität Ulm, Institut für Geschichte, Theorie und Ethik der Medizin, Parkstraße 11, D-89073 Ulm E-Mail: [email protected] Petri, Grischka, Priv.-Doz. Dr. Dr., Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, Kunsthistorisches Institut, Regina-Pacis-Weg 1, D-53113 Bonn E-Mail: [email protected] Putzger, Antonia, Dr. des., Universität Bielefeld, Fakultät für Geschichtswissenschaft, Philosophie und Theologie, Arbeitsbereich Historische Bildwissenschaft/Kunstgeschichte, Universitätsstraße 25, D-33615 Bielefeld E-Mail: [email protected] Rühl, Ulli F. H., Univ.-Prof. Dr., Universität Bremen, Fachbereich Rechtswissenschaft, Universitätsallee, GW1, D-28359 Bremen E-Mail: [email protected] Schmücker, Reinold, Univ.-Prof. Dr., Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Philosophisches Seminar, Domplatz 23, D-48143 Münster E-Mail: [email protected] Schochow, Maximilian, Dr., Universität Ulm, Institut für Geschichte, Theorie und Ethik der Medizin, Parkstraße 11, D-89073 Ulm E-Mail: [email protected] Sinnreich, Aram, Prof., Ph.D., School of Communication, American University, 4400 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington, DC 20016, USA E-Mail: [email protected] Steger, Florian, Univ.-Prof. Dr., Universität Ulm, Institut für Geschichte, Theorie und Ethik der Medizin, Parkstraße 11, D-89073 Ulm E-Mail: [email protected] Tiedemann, Paul, Univ.-Prof. Dr. Dr., Richter a. D., Hon.-Prof. an der Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen, Professur für Öffentliches Recht und Europarecht (Bast), Licher Str. 64, D-35394 Gießen E-Mail: [email protected] Zahrádka, Pavel, doc., Ph.D., Mgr., Univerzita Palackého, Filozofická fakulta, Katedra divadelních a filmových studií, Univerzitní 3, CZ-77147 Olomouc, Tschechien E-Mail: pavel.zahrá[email protected] Zillmann, Hans, Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg, Seminar für Philosophie, Emil-Abderhalden-Str. 26a, D-06108 Halle E-Mail: [email protected]

Personenverzeichnis / Index of Names Alexy, Robert  279, 440 f., 443 Alfino, Mark  19, 58 Allhoff, Fritz  22 Alloway, Lawrence  96 Alsford, Stephen  94 Andrea del Sarto  76 Appiah, K. Anthony  33 Aristoteles  476, 478 Ash, Timothy Garton  126 Aufderheide, Patricia  230 Ayala, Francisco J.  60 Bahr, Amrei  9 f., 16 f. Baldwin, Peter  57 Barnes, Julian  39 Bassano (Jacopo da Ponte)  72 f. Beck, Lewis White  347, 350, 374, 383, 387, 393, 397, 400 f., 406, 408, 414 Bentham, Jeremy  324 f., 327, 432 Birnbacher, Dieter  80, 484 Bittner, Rüdiger  420 Boon, Marcus  58 Brandt, Reinhard  400 Bruns, Andreas  8, 21 Butler, Joseph  353 f. Cohen, Joshua  126 Cole, David  153 Comstock, Anthony  135, 140 Cooper, Elena  57 Courbet, Gustave  99 f., 108, 122 Coxcie, Michiel  68, 77 Cramer, Konrad  420 Creuzer, Leonhard  402 DeCew, Judith Wagner  154 Descartes, René  479 Douglas, Susan J.  9 Drassinower, Abraham  57 Dreier, Thomas  8, 83, 234 Dubuc, Élise  91 Dürer, Albrecht  83

Dworkin, Ronald  132 Elbakyan, Alexandra  232, 236, 243 Eliot, Thomas S.  32 Elkin-Koren, Niva  181 Elmore, Steve  103 f., 119, 122 Elsen, Albert E.  92 Engisch, Karl  61 Farid, Hany  161 Festinger, Leon  320 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb  343, 350, 402 ff., 421 ff., 479 Fischer-Lescano, Andreas  442, 452 Franks, Paul  426 Gabo, Naum  70, 81 f., 84 Gaius Plinius Secundus Maior  76 Gibson, William  186 Giulio Romano  76 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang v.  359, 422 Goeze, Johann Melchior  355 Gowers, Timothy  260 Grave, Johannes  9 f. Habermas, Jürgen  289 f., 294, 437 Hamann, Johann Georg  354 Hart, Herbert Lionel Adolphus  47 ff., 278 f. Hartmann, Nicolai  479 f. Hegel, Georg Friedrich Wilhelm  35, 324 ff., 330, 345, 357, 421 Hein, George  95 Heins, Marjorie  129 Henrich, Dieter  344 f., 346 f., 350 f., 353, 383 ff., 399 f., 405, 415 ff. Herder, Johann Gottfried  254 f. Hick, Darren Hudson  4, 6 Hirsch, Philipp-Alexander  493 ff. Hirschi, Caspar  260 Hobbes, Thomas  131, 277

502

Personenverzeichnis / Index of Names

Höfer, Candida  109 f., 227 ff., 234 Hoffmann, Martin  8, 10 Höffner, Eckhard  57 Houkes, Wybo  9, 75 Hoyningen-Huene, Paul  14 Hughes, Robert  90 Hume, David  49, 421 Hyde, Lewis  121

Nelson, Leonard  449 Netanel, Neil W.  162 Nida-Rümelin, Julian  17, 338 Niethammer, Friedrich Immanuel  425

Jaszi, Peter  230 Jesus von Nazareth  67, 306 Johnson, Maisha Z.  21 Judge, Mike  186

Panofsky, Erwin  74, 78 Parrhasius 76 Patten, Alan  34 Pelham, Moses  63 Peñalver, Eduardo Moisés  186 Perel, Maayan  181 Petri, Grischka  9 Pfordten, Dietmar von der  305 Pistorius, Hermann Andreas  421 f. Platon  49, 308 Pogge, Thomas  333 f. Pollock, Jackson  228 f. Prince, Richard  88 Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph  99 f., 108, 122 Putzger, Antonia  9, 87, 96

Kagan, Jerome  14 f. Kant, Immanuel  226, 277 f., 283 ff., 302, 309 f., 315 ff., 432, 479, 493 f., 496 f. Katyal, Sonia K.  186 Katzav, Joel   260 Kennedy, Jackie  90 Kennedy, John F.  90 Kennick, William E.  92 Kraftwerk  63 ff. Kuosmanen, Jaakko  331 Kwon, Miwon  95 Latour, Bruno  78, 90 Lessing, Alfred  92 Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim  355 Leval, Pierre N.  183 Locke, John  5, 35, 284 Lowe, Adam   75, 77, 198 Luhmann, Niklas  54, 294, 450 Lyotard, Jean François  94 MacDonald, George  94 Macmillan, Fiona  115 Mathiesen, Kay  129, 131 Matisse, Henri  228 f. Matsuda, Mari  151 Merges, Robert P.  62 Merryman, John Henry  92 f. Mill, John Stuart  132, 217, 305, 309 Milton, John  132 Monet, Claude  228 Müller, Klaus  90 Nagel, Thomas  307 Nakamura, Shuji  58

Ortland, Eberhard  9, 83 Ossietzky, Carl von  445 Ott, Konrad  300 f., 303 f.

Radbruch, Gustav  279, 446, 452 Rams, Dieter  63 Raphael (Raffaello Sanzio da Urbino)  76 Rawls, John  208, 245, 287, 290, 436 Raz, Joseph  183 Reinhold, Carl Leonhard  401 f., 406, 412, 423 ff. Rodin, Auguste  89 Rogier van der Weyden  68 Roskies, Adina  22 Roth, Dieter  70 f., 81, 85 Rudinow, Joel  20 Scheler, Max  302, 418 Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph  479 Schlink, Bernhard  439, 441 f., 444, 449 Schmücker, Reinold  9 f., 67, 217, 225, 259 Schopenhauer, Arthur  349, 357, 419 Schulze, Gottlob Ernst  421, 423 Schumann, Johann Daniel  355 f. Schwemmer, Oswald  422 Schwitters, Kurt  82 f.

Personenverzeichnis / Index of Names Sell, Susan K.  187 Simon, Nina  95 Singer, Peter  305 ff., 336 Sinnreich, Aram  9 Smith, Brad  157 f. Spalding, Johann Joachim  353 ff., 359 f., 369, 406, 426 Staats, Reinhard  354 ff. Stolzenberg, Jürgen  406 Suárez, Francisco  147 Tehranian, John  186 Theisohn, Philipp  113 Thomas von Aquin  327 f., 478 Thomson, Judith Jarvis  329 Thyen, Anke  60 Turner, Joseph Mallord William  120 Tylor, Edward B.  32

503

Vaesen, Krist  260 Vasari, Giorgio  76 f., 114 Vernet, Horace  114 Veronese, Paolo Cagliari  68 f., 75, 77 f., 80 Volokh, Eugene  154, 162 Volpato, Giovanni Battista  72 f. Waal, Frans de  60 Waldron, Jeremy  151 f., 287, 289 Washburn, Wilcomb E.  94 Weber, Max  286, 302 f. Williams, Bernard  141 Wolff, Christian  479 Young, Iris Marion  246 f., 249, 251, 333 Young, James O.  26 f., 29, 32 ff. Zahrádka, Pavel  9 Zeuxis 76

Sachverzeichnis / Index of Subjects Abortion  455 ff., 467, 470 Abwägungskritik  443 ff. Abwägungsmethodik  440 ff. Academic authors and publishers, responsibility of  246 f., 249, 252 Academic publishing  10, 233, 238, 255, 258 f., 261 Academic publishing houses  258 f., 261, 263 Academic works  10, 243 ff., 248 Access  4 f., 7, 43, 45, 52, 54, 209 ff., 225 ff., 255 f., 258, 260 ff. Access restrictions  9, 125, 127, 131 f., 165, 176, 178 Accountability  50 ff., 186 Act of copying  6, 8 f., 16 ff., 22, 34, 39, 51, 59 ff., 65, 83, 125 ff., 137, 145, 150, 154 f., 160, 165 ff., 170, 178, 241, 244, 246 ff., 257, 259 Act on Familiy Planning, Protection of the Human Fetus and the Provision of Abortion  456 ff. Act on Professions of Doctor and Dentist 463 Act on Support of Pregnant Women and Families „Pro-life“  460 Aesthetics  26, 67, 74 ff., 84 f., 89, 91 ff., 107, 110, 189, 226 Albumin  475, 481 Algorithmic enforcement  181 Algorithmic governance of copyright  182, 184, 186 Alienation  30, 36 Allianz der Wissenschaftsorganisationen  232, 235 Applied ethics  5, 7, 12 f., 15 f., 22, 57, 62 Appropriation  34 ff. Appropriation art  5, 91, 105, 107 Arbitration boards  238

Armut  301, 322 f., 333 Art replica  92 Art reproduction  90, 105, 120 Artefakt-Ontologie  477 f., 480 f. Artificial intelligence  135, 157, 160, 177, 182 Artistic norms  8 Asylparadox  300, 336 Aura  78 ff., 82, 90, 121 Authenticity  74, 78 ff., 87, 89, 91 ff., 95 Author rights  211, 216 f. Authorship  78 f., 109, 125, 161, 163, 233, 255 f. Autonomie  286, 309 f., 329, 389, 395 f., 398, 400, 405, 407, 419, 493 ff. Autonomietheorem  493 ff. Balancing moral norms  194, 199 ff. Bargaining position of authors  258, 261 Begriffsgebrauch, praktischer  365 ff. Begriffsgebrauch, theoretischer  363 ff. Bestiality  136, 142 Bestimmtheitsgebot  443, 449. 451 Blasphemy  37, 134, 147 ff., 172 Bridgeman Art Library v. Corel Corp. (1998/99)  101 f., 105, 108 Catholic Church  459 Censorship  9, 121, 125, 127 ff., 141, 166 ff., 174, 176 ff., 184, 187 f. Child pornography  137 Citation  39 ff., 65, 228, 236 Club good  210, 212 f., 215, 221 Colonialism  26, 29 f., 34 Common morality  4 f., 8, 194 Compensation  42, 49, 68, 171, 218, 241 ff. Competing moral rules  52 ff. Configurable culture  188 Conscience clause  463, 470 Constitutional law  8, 45 f., 48, 51, 54 Consumer rights  212, 217, 219, 222

506

Sachverzeichnis / Index of Subjects

Content rating  135, 168 ff. Copies of material objects  87 ff. Copy / Copying  3 – 264 Copy restrictions  57, 64 Copyfraud 116 Copying regulations  136 Copyright  3 – 264 Copyright contracts  117, 120 f. Copyright exceptions  202, 238 f. Copyright holder  39, 42, 46, 53, 57, 83 f., 87, 105, 161, 207, 257 f. Copyright law  3 ff., 25, 41 f., 46 f., 51, 58, 62 f., 65, 84, 87, 106, 109 ff., 116, 119 f., 161, 163, 181, 188, 200, 202, 222, 225 f., 228, 230 f., 233, 235, 238 f., 255 f., 258 f. Copyright owner  5, 44, 88, 192, 225 Copyright restrictions  4, 10, 241 ff., 248 ff., 253, 255 Corporatocracy 186 Counterfeiting  127 f., 166 f. Country of origin principle  193, 203 f., 206 Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)  42 ff. Creation of works, presuppositions of the 257 Criterion of demarcation  14, 23 Criterion of indispensability  6, 225 Cross-border access  192, 194, 196 Cross-border portability  193 Cultural appropriation  8, 13, 20 f., 25 ff. Cultural diversity  196, 198, 245 Cultural essentialism  26, 32 ff. Cultural good  57, 216, 219 Curatorial practice  93, 95 Danish cartoon crisis (2006)  149 f. Decay, decaying artworks  70, 81 f., 84 f. Deception  74 ff., 80, 82, 87, 128, 215 f., 220 Deduktion des Begriffs der Freiheit  366, 368, 384, 397 Deduktion des kategorischen Imperativs  351, 383 f., 409 ff. Deduktion des obersten moralischen Gesetzes  346, 351, 383 f., 407 f., 416,

Deep fake  160 Defamation  21, 87, 134, 136, 144 ff., 149, 152, 161, 170 f. Defensivnotstand 453 Deontologie  311 ff. Destabilization of ontology  187 ff. Digital content  200 f., 206, 210 ff., 221 f. Digital copy  90, 167, 211, 213 Digital good  209, 214 Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)  171 f., 184 Digital object  88 f. Digital reproduction / replica  89 f., 101, 106 Digital Single Market  173, 192, 194, 196 Digitization  57, 205, 210 f., 213 ff., 217 ff. Direct-to-consumer testing  465 Disadvantaged researchers  246, 248 f., 253 Disclosure of state secrets  127 f., 167 Diskriminierung  317 f., 329 Dispossession  255 f. DNA 459 Documentary  156, 230 Domain-specific ethics  11 ff., 20, 22 f., 57 Doppelwirkung, Lehre von der  327 f. Double-blind peer review process  260 ff. Education  30, 89, 91, 95 f., 100 f., 239, 256 ff., 464 f., 470 Embryo-pathological premise  461 Enforcement  136, 149, 166, 168, 177, 181 ff. Erklärung, Begriff der  375 ff. Erklärung, Definition  376 Erklärung, Deklaration  376 ff., 385, 388, 393 Erklärung, Explikation  376 f. Erklärung, Exposition  375 f., 378 f., 385, 387, 388 ff., 411 Ethical intuitions  7 Ethical theory  7 Ethics codes  168 Ethics for communicating with objects  94 Ethics of access  222, 256 f.

Sachverzeichnis / Index of Subjects Ethics of copying  3 ff., 11 ff., 67, 85, 125 ff., 136, 160, 178, 225 f., 255 ff. Ethics of copying (as a social practice)  13 f., 19 Ethics of information ownership  87 Eudämonismus  308 ff. Eugenic  457 f., 470 Evangelic Church  459 Exhibition copy  70 f., 84 f., 89 f., 93 Expansion of scale  182, 185 f., 189 Facial recognition  157 f. Facsimile  68 f., 70, 72, 74 f., 77 f., 80, 89 f., 92 Fact of reason  374, 426 Factum der Vernunft  344 ff., 350 f., 359 f., 368, 371, 373 f., 393, 398 ff., 412, 414, 416 ff., 421 f., 426 Fair dealing  43, 164 Fair use  42, 51, 53, 163, 183, 187, 230 Fairness  185, 187, 245, 256, 258, 273 Fake  3, 92, 167 Fake news  131, 165 Faktizität  346, 349 f., 352 f., 357, 383, 399 f., 412, 416, 419 ff. Faktum  352 ff., 356 f., 360, 362, 372, 393, 399, 426, s. a. Factum der Vernunft False light  155 Flüchtlingskonvention 316 Forgery  3, 72 ff., 92, 167 Forschungsfreiheit 474 Freedom of artistic creation  46 Freedom of artistic expression  9, 126, 133, 156, 164 Freedom of communication  3, 9, 125 f., 162 f. Freedom of expression  42, 46, 121, 133, 136, 138, 145 f., 153 Freedom of information  41, 43, 46, 127, 129, 153 Freedom of panorama  156 Freedom of science and the arts  41 Freedom of speech  9, 41, 126 f., 130, 133, 135, 138 f., 150, 152, 162, 164, 178 Freedom to copy  9, 127, 136, 165 Freiheit, Begriff der  364 ff., 369, 379, 386 f., 394 f., 405 Freiheit, praktische  351, 366 f., 387

507

Freiheit als Tatsache  368, 373 f., 397 f., 403 Freiheit der Willkür  370 f. Freiheit des Willens  344 f., 351, 366, 368, 370, 372 f., 375 ff., 379, 386 ff., 394 ff., 401, 403 ff. Garantenstellung  311 f., 324, 326, 332, 336, 340 Geheimhaltungsinteresse  430 ff., 445, 451, 453 Genom-Editierung  473 ff. Gentherapie 475 Geo-blocking  191 ff. German constitution  461 German Medical Women’s Associa­ tion 462 Germany  109 ff., 455 ff. Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte – Urheberrechtsgesetz  109 ff., 119, 122 f., 228 f., 233, 236 Gesetz zur Angleichung des Urheberrechts an die aktuellen Erfordernisse der Wissensgesellschaft  51, 65, 239, 255, 258 Gesetzlichkeitsprinzip  429, 443 Gesinnungsethik  300 ff. Goldene Regel  314, 338 Good scientific practice  6, 8, 15, 46 f., 231, 235 Google Street View  156 f. Grundgesetz der reinen praktischen Vernunft  373, 375 f., 378, 382 ff., 391 f., 394 ff., 403 ff., 407 ff., 420 Grundsätze, praktische  374 ff., 378 ff., 385 f., 388, 391 f., 411, 414 Handlungsfreiheit  190, 314 Hart-Devlin debate  183 Hate speech  3, 133, 149 ff., 168 Heritage (cultural)  20 f., 25, 29, 31, 34, 36, 79, 83 f., 89 Heteronomie  389 f., 400, 496 Hilfspflichten  313, 330, 332 Holdback  202, 205 Holocaust denial  139 Human Genetic Examination Act  464 Human rights  41, 121, 194, 297, 460 f. Hypothetischer Imperativ  382, 389

508

Sachverzeichnis / Index of Subjects

Image licensing  96, 102 Image-based sexual abuse  136, 159 ff., 171 Impact factor  261 ff. Imperativ, hypothetischer  382, 389 Imperativ, kategorischer  302, 312, 351, 381 ff., 389, 392, 399, 407, 409 ff., 493 ff. Inauthenticity 92 Incitement to crime  143, 152, 166 Indecent speech  136, 141 f., 168 f. Indeterminate legal concepts  138 Informational self-determination  154 Informationsinteresse  430 ff., 441, 444, 453 Informed consent  462, 465, 470 Informed decision-making  456, 462 ff. Ingerenz 326 Inquisition 134 Institutional convergence  184 f. Intangible objects  96 Intellectual property  57, 79, 83, 113 f., 119, 186 f., 233 Irreplaceability  67, 225 f., 230 f., 237, 239 Ius puniendi  267 ff., 274 f., 287, 291, 294 Justified interest(s)  58, 60, 62 f., 65 Jyllands Posten – Aftenbladet  149 f. Kantianism  7, 403 Kants Rechtslehre  286, 493 f., 496 Kategorischer Imperativ  302, 312, 351, 381 ff., 389, 392, 399, 407, 409 ff., 493 ff. Kausalität, Begriff / Kategorie der  365 f., 370, 386 f., 394 f., 404 Kognitive Dissonanz  320 Konsequentialismus  303 ff., 311 f. Kriegsverbrechen  316, 452 Künstlichkeit  483 ff. Landesverrat  434, 446 Law of science  41, 46 f. Legitimation  279 f. Lending  209, 218 Libel  3, 21, 141, 145, 152 License  43, 46, 52 f., 87, 102, 107, 157, 162, 168, 172, 174, 196 ff., 209 ff., 221 f., 225 ff., 232, 239 License, end user  9, 212 ff., 217

Licensing 63 Lichtbild i. S. v. § 72 UrhG  109 ff. Lichtbildwerk i. S. v. § 2 UrhG  109 Limitations of copyright  202, 226, 238, 253 Luxleaks-Affäre 435 Marrakesh treaty  253 Maxime  379 f., 381 ff., 386, 388 ff., 410 Mechanical reproductions  106, 111 Menschenrechte  268, 282 ff., 313 f., 326, 328 ff., 340 Metall auf Metall-Urteil (BVerfG 1 BvR 1585/13)  45 f. Minimal Interference with Existing Prac­ tise (MIEP)  217 ff. Mona Lisa  78, 90 Monopoly  116, 118 f., 122, 234 f., 257 ff. Monopoly position of rights hold­ ers  257 ff., 261 Moral intuition  7, 60 ff., 194, 199, 202 Moral permissibility  12 f., 16, 20, 22, 210, 214, 216 Moral relevance criterion  18 f. Moral rights  62, 87 f. Moral rules  12, 39, 47 f., 51 f., 54, 59 Morally permitted copyright violations 242 Musealisation  70, 73, 84 Museum  9, 34, 64, 70, 72 ff., 81 ff., 87 ff., 99 f., 103 ff., 108, 112 f., 115 ff., 120 f., 134, 185 f., 227 f. −− Harvard Museums  103 f., 117 f., 120 −− Metropolitan Museum of Art 118 −− Museum of Modern Art New York  227 −− Reiss-Engelhorn-Museen, Mannheim  104, 108 f., 112, 115, 119 f. −− Rijksmuseum  118, 121 −− Skokloster 118 −− Walters Art Museum  118 Natural law  5, 49 Natürlichkeit  483 ff. Neuroethics  16, 22 f. New media ethics  4 Nondirective counselling  462 Non-discrimination (due to the place of publication of an academic work)  262 f.

Sachverzeichnis / Index of Subjects Non-interference, duties of  211 f., 217, 219 Non-invasive prenatal testing (NIPT)  455 ff. Non-shareability  209 ff., 214, 217 f., 22 Non-substitutability  10, 57 ff., 225 f., 230 f., 233 ff. Non-substitutability, extrinsic  226, 230, 239 Non-substitutability, intrinsic  226, 230, 235, 239 Normative ethics  5, 11 f., 59, 181 Norms of good scientific practice  6 f., s. a. Rules of good academic practice Obscenity  140 f., 168 f., 178 Öffentliches Interesse  448 ff. Online service provider  171 ff., 175 Open access publishing  238 Original  6, 19, 28, 39 ff., 51, 64, 68, 70, 72 ff., 89 ff., 95 f., 102, 105 ff., 121, 163, 187 ff., 233, 241, 255, 259, 261 Originality  64, 73 f., 78 ff., 95 f., 101 f., 105, 107 f., 110 f., 230, 261 Ownership  9, 74, 83, 87, 113 ff., 119, 212, 217, 235, 256 Painer v. Standard Verlags-GmbH (EUCJ)  107, 110 Partial copying  39 ff., 63 Passive sales  197, 206 f. Pastiche  89, 164 Peer review  103, 259 ff. Personalität  314 ff., 322 PhD graduation process  261 f. Photographs  9, 43, 51, 64, 82 f., 89 ff., 99 ff., 156 ff., 227 ff. Plagiarism  3, 47, 113, 262 Plaster cast  90 Poland  455 ff. Polish Gynecologists’ Society  463 Polish Parliament  467 f. Pornography  140 ff., 169 Positive law  4, 7 Postulat, praktisches  408 f. Prenatal diagnostics  455 ff. Preservation copy  9, 87 Principle of a fair and impartial bal­ ance  257 ff., 261

509

Principle of permissible non-substitutional copying  9, 59 ff., 67 Principle of territoriality  199, 206 Privacy  133, 153 ff., 170 f., 187 Private good  211 ff., 215 Pro-life organizations  467 Property, cultural  87 Property, intellectual  4 f., 8, 41, 43, 45, 57, 79, 83, 105, 112 ff., 119, 156, 186 f., 192, 233 Property, physical  83, 113 ff. Property law  4, 20, 114, 156 Property rights  3 f., 8, 20 f., 83, 112, 116, 197, 211, 220, 256 Public domain  9, 47, 64, 99, 101 f., 104, 108 f., 112 f., 116, 118 ff., 187, 229 Public good  128, 152, 213, 215 Public interest defence  438 Publizitätsprinzip 432 Purpose (of a work)  59 Quantization of culture  182, 189 Quotation  39 ff., 50, 164, 229 Rechtfertigender Notstand  435 f. Reconstruction  11, 58, 72, 82 ff. Reflective equilibrium  193 f. Refoulementverbot  328 f. Regel, praktische  378 ff., 381 Release window  197 f., 204 ff. Relics  78 f. Religion  306 ff., 318, 321 Remake  46, 91 Remuneration  41 f., 49, 52, 194, 199, 201, 226, 231 ff., 237 ff., 252 Replica  72, 77, 88 ff. Representations of copyright-protected works 65 Reproduction  9, 43, 51, 64, 83 f., 88 ff., 99 ff., 126, 141 f., 166, 213, 229 Reproductive autonomy  456 ff., 462 f., 465, 470 Reproductive engraving  89 Reputation  144 ff., 153, 158 Research Group „Ethics of Copying“  8, 10, 13, 50 f., 59, 258 Resilienz 306

510

Sachverzeichnis / Index of Subjects

Restoration, restorers  72 f., 82, 84, 88 f., 155 Restrictions of copying  5, 140 Revenge porn  160 Revisionsthese  349 f., 351, 383, 407 Right for informational autonomy  462 Right to be forgotten  154 Right to information  456, 463, 470 Right to live  461 Right to not to know  462 Right to physical integrity  461 Rights management  97, 118, 213 Rights of images  97 Rules of good academic practice  226, s. a. Norms of good scientific practice

Tathandlung  s. Thathandlung Tatsachenbegriff  355, 358 f., 361 f., 364 f., 368, 401, 406, 418, 424 ff. Technical copy protection  3, 65, 167, 226, 258 Technical protection measures (TPMs)  213 f., 217 f. Template  61 f. Template, protection of the  59 Termination of Pregnancy  456 ff. Territorial exclusivity  194, 197 f., 200, 204, 206 f. Thathandlung  404, 421 ff. Trademark  3, 20, 164 TRIPS treaty  187

Same sex marriage  184 Schutzstatus  323 f., 326 f. Sci-Hub  232, 243, 248 Sculptures, Roman and Greek  89 Secondary liability  183, 187 Selbstbewusstsein, reines praktisches  350, 385, 404 ff., 409, 411, 420 Selbstbewusstsein, theoretisches  345, 351, 404 Self-plagiarism 47 Separation of powers  185, 189 Sexting 159 Sharia 149 Sharing  92, 175, 184, 188, 210 f., 218 ff. Sittengesetz  285, 346, 383, 400, 402 f., 410 ff., 425 Slander  21, 145, 147 Social credit system (China)  188 Social media platforms  176 f. Solidarität  292, 318 ff., 322, 324, 328 f. Specifying moral norms  194, 199, 202 ff. Spiegel-Affäre  432, 434 Structural injustice  10, 244, 247 ff. Substitute copy  68, 74 f., 77, 82 ff., 87, 90 ff. Substitution (of a protected work)  257 Substitution (practices)  67 ff. Surveillance  9, 125, 132, 135, 157, 175, 178, 186, 221

Undetermined legal terms  61 U.S. Supreme Court  183 Upload filter  9, 173, 176, 178 „Upskirt“ photographs  158 UrhG (Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte – Urheberrechtsgesetz)  109 ff., 119, 122 f., 228 f., 233, 236 UrhWissG (Gesetz zur Angleichung des Urheberrechts an die aktuellen Erfordernisse der Wissensgesellschaft)  51, 65, 239, 255, 258 User-generated content  176 f. Usury 237 Utilitarianism / Utilitarismus  7, 11, 43 f., 303, 305

Tat (factum)  352 ff., 359 ff., 366, 369 ff., 372, 374, 378, 398, 401

Value, aesthetic  67, 89, 91 Value, commercial  89, 108, 197, 207 Value, practical  89 Verantwortungsethik  300 ff. Verfolgungsgründe  318 f. VG Bild-Kunst  229 Virtual copy / replica  89 f. Völkerrecht  270, 272 ff., 278 ff., 295 f., 301, 328, 340 Völkerstrafrecht  267 ff. Volonté générale  447 Wahrnehmung berechtigter Interessen  437 f. Whistleblower 433

Sachverzeichnis / Index of Subjects Whistleblower-Rechtsprechung des EGMR  434 f. Wikimedia  101 f., 104, 108 f., 112, 115, 119 Wikipedia  101, 104, 108, 121 Willensbestimmung  379 ff., 385 f., 388 ff., 409 ff. Work of authorship  109, 161, 233, 237

511

World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 186 Würde  283, 315, 318 YouTube  175 f., 181, 189 Ziviler Ungehorsam  436 f. Zurechnung  368 ff.

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