In Physicam Aristotelis 0197262740

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RICHARDUS RUFUS CORNUBIENSIS IN PHYSICAM ARISTOTELIS

AUCTORES BRITANNIC! MEDII AEVI · XVI

RICHARD RUFUS OF CORNWALL

IN PHYSICAM ARISTOTELIS

EDITED BY REGA

WooD

Published for THE BRITISH ACADEMY by OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP Oxford New York Auckland Bangkok Buenos Aires Cape Town Chennai Dar es Salaam Delhi Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kolkata Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi Sao Paulo Shanghai Singapore Taipei Tokyo Toronto Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York

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The preparation of this volume, and the costs associated with its production, were supported in part by grants from the Editing Program of the NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE HUMANITIES

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'

Table of Contents

Abbreviations ..... . ......................................... vii Introduction ................................................. 1

In Physicam ................................................ 83 Prooerruum ............................................... 85 Liber I ................................................... 95 Liber II ................................................. 114 Liber III ................................................. 137 Liber IV ................................................. 152 Liber V ................................................. 183 Liber VI ............ . .................................... 189 Liber VII ................................................ 200 Liber VIII ............................................... 216 Indices ..................................................... 245

Abbreviationes Sigla Codicum Manuscriptorum E AL.Go = AL.1'1i = AL.Nq =

Erfordiensis, bibl. Univ., Amploniana, Quarto 312 Cantabrigiensis, bibl. Coll. Gonv. et Caii 452/379 Monacensis, bibl. Bavar. publ. Clm. 22308 Neapolitanus, bibl. Nat. VIII.F.12

Abbreviationes in Variantibus add. antic. cane. corr. del. exp. fol.

= = = = = =

=

addit, addunt anticipat, anticipant cancellat, cancellant corrigi t, corrigunt delet, delent expungi t, expungunt folium

hom. lac. mg. p. praem. rep. s. lin.

= = = =

= = =

homoeoteleuton lacuna marginalis pagma praemittit, praemittunt repetit, repetunt supra lineam

Parentheses [ ... ] < ... > 1- .. 1

I ... o ... I=

includunt verba ab editoribus addita includunt lectiones variantes nova columna in co dice nova columna in co dice cum foliatione veteri

viii

ABBREVIATIONES

Codices Assisi. Sacra Convento di S. Francesco. Codex 138 Assisi. Sacra Convento di S. Francesco. Codex 176 Oxford. Balliol College Library. Codex 62 Praha. Archiv Prazskeho hradu, Knihovna metropolitni kapitoly. Codex M.80 Erfurt. Universitatshihliothek. Codex Ampl. Quarto 290 Q290 Erfurt. Universitatshibliothek. Codex Ampl. Quarto 312 Q312 (in notis) T737 Toulouse. Bihl. municipale. Codex 737 V 4538 Vatican. Bihl. Apostolica Vaticana. Codex Vat. Lat. 4538 V12993 Vatican. Bihl. Apostolica Vaticana. Codex Vat. Lat. 12993

A138 A176 B62 PM80

Series AL:

Aristoteles Latinus, 1961-.

ADHL:

Archives d 'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen age, Paris 1926-.

BFS:

Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, Quarar,chi & Grottaferrata 1922-.

BGPTM:

Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters (1891-1927). Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters ( 1928-1970). Munster in W., Neue Folge, 1970-.

CIMAGL: Cahiers de l 'Institut du moyen-age grec et latin, Copenhagen 1969-. CCL: Corpus Christianorum Series Latina, Turnholt 1953-. CCM: Corpus Christ?:anorum Continuatio AIediaevalis, Turnholt 1971-. 00: Opera Omnia. OHi: Opera Hactenus Inedita Rogeri Baconi, ed. Robert Steele, Oxford [1909)-1941.

PL:

Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Latina, ed. J.-P. Migne, 221 vols., Paris 1844-65.

ABBREVIATIONES

ix

Opera scripta a Richardo Rufo CAv

Contra Averroem, Q312, fol. 8Fa_35ra _

DD DMet

IDiv

De Deo, A138, fol. 273rb_281va_ Dissertatio in Metaph. Aristot., V 4538, fol. 1-102 & Q290, fol. i ra_4ovb _ Lambda citatur partim a Timothy B. Noone, "An Edition and Study of the Scriptum super Metaphy­ sicam, bk. 12, dist. 2: A Work Attributed to Richard Rufus of Cornwall," Ph.D. diss., University of Toronto, 1987. De mutatione, ed. R. Plevano, in "Richard Rufus of Corn­ wall and Geoffrey of Aspall: Two Questions on the Instant of Change,'1 Medioevo 19 (1993) 167-232. De intellectu divino, A138, fol. 252va_253ra _

In APos

In Analytica posteriora Aristotelis, Q312, fol. 29va_32vb _

In DAn In DGen In Phys.

In De anima Aristotelis, Q312, fol. 19rb_28vb _ In De generatione Aristotelis, Q312, fol. 14ra_19ra _ In Physicam Aristotelis, Q312, fol. 1 ra_14ra _ Citatur per librum, capitulum, et quaestionem, e.g. 4.3.16. Prooemium citatur per quaestionem: Pl-PU. De materia in angelis, A138, fol. 253ra_254va _

DMut

MAn

RSem

Miserabilis humana condicio, A138, fol. 27ra-278rb . Memoriale quaestionum Richardi Rufi in Metaphysicam Aristotelis, Q290, fol. 45ra_55vb _ Citatur per librum et quaestionem, e.g. 7.4. De rationibus seminalibus, T737, fol. 158va_15o rb_

SAn

Speculum animae, Q312, fol. 10ra-11o rb _

Sin SOx

De speciebus intelligibilibus, A138, fol. 292 ra- vb _ In Sententias Petri Lombardi, Lectura Oxoniensis, B62, fol. 1-248. Citatur per librum et distinctionem. In Sententias Petri Lombardi, Lectura Parisiensis, V12993, fol. 1-320 & Al76, fol. 1-125. Citatur per librum et distinctionem.

MHC MMet

SPar

Opera Dubia De statu in patria, Al38, fol. 25g ra_27o rb _ SPat Abstractiones Abstractiones Magistri Richardi Sophistae, ed. P. Streveler, M. Sirridge, K. Tachau, et C. Normore, nondum impressum.

ABBREVIATIONES

X

Auctoritates Abaelard:

Petrus Abaelar intelligendum est, ordine supposito in omni genere causarum, quod sit primum et quod < quid E > sit ultimum in eis. Et primo in causis formalibus, quia diffusius tactum est super secundum Phy­ sicorum. . . . Quid autem sit primum et ultimum in causis efficientibus, finalibus et < om. E > materialibus dictum est in secundo super capitulum de causis" < super . . . causis om. E > ( Q29Q _ 4r b; V 4538.6v b_ 7r a). , These seem to be chiefly references to Rufus claim that the first cause is the form on which all other causes depend. As the first formal and efficient cause and the ultimate final cause, it belongs to the three classes of cause: formal, final, and efficient. In Phys. 1.1.3: "Et quia causa Prima est in triplici genere causae, ideo eius proprium est cognoscere per illas tres cau­ sas. lntelligendum quod Prima causa est forma omnium sive exemplar sicut sigillum est forma cerae. " The first cause is the first formal and efficient cause, in that it is the superior form in which all other forms participate and to which they owe their unity. 126 In the second book of the Physics, Rufus claims further that the first cause is not only the first efficient cause but the ultimate final cause. 1 2 7 The first cause orders inferior causes and makes them causally efficacious. In Phys . 2.5.1: "Causa enim superior est ordinans omnes causas inferiores. Ut complete educat causalitatem inferio­ rum causarum, facit ipsas esse causas non tantum per se sed etiam per accidens . . . Et aliter . . . unum solum est 1 25

Gedeon Gal found two of these citations in 1950. See G . G al, "Com­ mentarius in ' Metaphysicam' Aristotelis cod. Vat. lat. 4538, fans doctrinae Richardi Rufi ," A rchivum Jranciscanum historicum 43 ( 1 950) 230. A. Pattin noted another in a review of Peter Raedt 's Richard Rufus that appeared in Franziskanische Studien 71 ( 1 989) 97. 1 26 Infra, 1 .8 . 1 . 1 27 Infra, 2.4.3.

INTRODU CTION

43

ens bonum ut finis, scilicet ipsum Primum, ergo casuale est bonum ut ens ad finem. Ergo est ordinatum ad finem, scilicet ad Primum." :tvlaking the connection to material causes in book two, Rufus says that matter entirely depends on form. 1 28 In his commentary on Physics 2, Rufus also states another view about matter as a cause which he may have had in mind - namely, a distinction between prime matter and ultimate matter. Prime matter is not found in nature; what we find are only composites of matter and potential forms. 1 29 The subject of natural change is not prime matter but this aggregate matter. In D Gen 1.2.3: "Propterea debemus dicere quod materia, quae subiecta est in transmutatione naturali, non est sola substantia materiae sed est aggregata ex substantia materiae cum suis potentiis" (Q312. 1 4va) Rufus has more to say about the first cause as the ultimate ordering principle and as the superior form to which other causes owe their causal efficacy in the first two books of the Physics than in DMet. As the DMet reference indicates, Rufus claims in Physics 2 that the first cause is the first efficient and the ultimate final cause. Since many medieval self-citations are approximate at best, we may consider these references verified. Rufus' next allusion to what has been shown in the Physics lectures is a proof that the single unified first agent can be a cause of multiplicity and that it is the cause of the multiple potentials of matter. He says that this has been shown in book 1 . DMet. 2: "Ad aliud: quod causa multiplicitatis < rnaterialis V > potentiarum in materia est agens Primum; etsi enim eius essentia sit una, tamen ipsa potest esse causa multitudinis in < in . . . rnultitudinis om. hom. V > rebus, non inquantum una. Uncle nori tenet illud argumentum 'essentia una non est causa multitudinis; essentia Primi agentis est < est . . . agentis om. hom. v > essentia una; ergo essentia Primi agentis non est causa etc., ' sed est fallacia accidentis, et hoc < hoc . . . prirno] illud declaraturn fuit diligentissirne super prirnurn V > fuit ostensum in primo Physicorum" ( Q290. 6va ; V 4538.13 va) 128 1 29

Infra, 2 . 8. 1 . Infra, 2 . 2 . 1 .

44

INTRODUCTION

We have already seen Rufus' discussion of the first cause as the universal first efficient cause in books one and two of the Physics. In Physics 1, Rufus explains the sense in which the first cause is the cause of unity in the multiplicity of created things, as he looks forward to a further discussion, holding that the subject is properly discussed by the metaphysician. 1 30 More helpfully for the modern reader, book 2 provides a me­ taphor which compares the first cause or universal form to light. Like light the universal form is multiplied only in matter, but what drives this multiplication, its entire causality, is form alone. Here Rufus explicitly makes the claim that the cause of matter's potential multiplicity is the universal form. 1 3 1 Perhaps because this metaphor comes from a discussion of the role of unified forms generally in producing multiplicity, rather than a discussion restricted to the superior or universal form, Rufus preferred to refer to book 1. Rufus' fourth reference to his Physics is to a discussion of natural transmutations - or instantaneous natural changes. No book is specified, and the only thing Rufus tells us about the position is that it excludes intermediates between contradictories:

DMet 1: "Septima contradictio [est] talis: Qui ponit trans­ mutationem naturalem [aliam] ab his de quibus nos dixi­ mus in Physicis, male ponit; sed qui aestimat medium inter contradictorie opposita sic facit; ergo talis aestimatio falsa'' (V4538. 26ra ; Oxford New College 285, fol. 2 1 8ra). As we shall see later in this section, Rufus holds a characteristic position about such change, which he defends in several works - namely, that instantaneous natural change implies that it is simultaneously true that a thing is changing and that it has changed. It is a position at the opposite extreme from the position critized in the Scriptum - namely, that there could be something half-way between being, say, fire and not fire. It was not uncommon to hold that natural change was between opposites 1 30 131

Infra, 1 . 3. 1 . Infra, 2 . 8 . 1 .

INTRODU CTION

45

and that such changes were accomplished by moving through intermediate states; subsequently, Duns Scotus maintained this view , for example. 1 32 Rufus considered this position untenable, but denying it meant affirming instantaneous change . To employ a color metaphor: Instead of moving from white to grey to black , the subject of change moves directly from white to black. W hen the change occurs, as soon as a subject begins to be black , it is entirely black , not partly white and partly black. It is simultaneously true that · A is changing' and 'A is changed' , or as Rufus puts it: "simul mutatur et mutatum est." Roberto Plevano provided a lengthy discussion of the reception of the Corpus vetustius, with specific reference to the problem when physical questions were first treated from a logical perspective. Plevano considered a list of authors, including Alfred of Sareshel, Robert Grosseteste, Adam of Buckfield, William of Sherwood, and Robert Kilwardby. He concluded that Rufus and Geoffrey of Aspall (arts master 12541257) were the first to treat problems of time and motion from the perspective of medieval treatises on fallacies. 133 As Plevano puts it, Rufus' position is that "the 'changing' and the 'having been changed' are true at the same instant." 134 Plevano did not find this view stated by any of Rufus' contempora­ ries; indeed he found no discussions applying incipit/desinit rules to discussions of "Aristotelian notions of time, instant and change" before 1254 except Rufus'. So, as far as we know, from about 1235 to about 1255, 1 3 ·5 Rufus was the only scholastic master to base his treatment of instantaneous change on the principle: simul mutari et mutatum esse. The principle behind Rufus' position is the denial that there can be intermediates between contradictory opposites - a principle as characteristic of the Physics as the Metaphysics commentary. 1 32

Scotus, In Metaph. 5 . 1 2- 14 . 1 00, OPh 3: 638. R. Plevano, "Richard Rufus," p. 213. 1 34 R. Plevano, "Richard Rufus," pp. 2 1 7-218. 135 Though Plevano does not note it, Rufus' successor Geoffrey of Aspall also held this view (Aspall, In Metaph. 4. 2 1 , ed . R. Plevano, "Richard Rufus," p. 232) : "in subito mutato simul [sunt] mutari et mutatum esse ." According to Plevano, Aspall made this claim between about 1254 and 1 257. Rufus did philosophy before 1 238, the date he became a Franciscan. To the best of my knowledge, no one has ever claimed that Rufus and Aspall were contemporaries, but see Plevano, "Richard Rufus," pp. 197- 198. 1 33

46

INTRODUCTION

In Phys. 6.1.8: "Dubitatur super hoc quod habet pro impos­ sibili, quod simul mutatur et mutatum est. . . . Dicendum quod in transmutatione quae est indivisibilis non est incon­ veniens, immo est necessarium quandoque. Sed in illa quae divisibilis est, ut in motu, est inconveniens < sui add. E > simul moveatur et motum sit . . . " The fifth reference from DMet to the Physics concerns motion in the genus of substance. Aristotle sometimes admits motion in the category of substance ( Phys. 3. 1 . 200 6 33-34; Metaph. 1 2 . 2 . 1069 6 10); sometimes he denies it (Phys. 5. 1 . 225 a25-27; .5. 2. 225 6 10- 1 1; Metaph. l l .1 2. 1068a 10). As Rufus puts the problem for his students: In Metaphysics 10.4. 1055 a8-9, Aristotle says that generation is from a contrary. But he should not have said that, since each of two contraries is something positive, a subject. Contraries are not like a privative contradictory and its positive counterpart, since unlike its positive counterpart, a privative opposite is not a subject; it does not exist. So since generation is between a subject and its non-existent privative contradictory, it does not arise from a contrary, and generation is not motion. For motion is from subject to subject; there is no motion from a non-subject to subject. as Aristotle establishes at Physics 5. l.225a l-27. DMet 1: "Dubitatur circa hanc propositionem, 'generatio­ nes sunt < fiunt E > ex contrariis'. Videtur enim quod non. Solum motus est ex contrario in contrarium , quia motus solum est ex subiecto in subiectum. Contraria autem sunt subiectum et subiectum. Ergo generatio non est ex contrariis; generatio enim est ex non subiecto in subiectum . . . Item, generatio est ex privatione et forma , non ergo ex contrariis Nota quod privatio est negatio proprio recipienti . . . Negatio autem quae opponitur affirmationi non determinat sibi subiectum proprium, sed aequaliter se habet ad ens et non-ens" ( Q290. 33 ra-r 6 ; PM80. 2s va , V 4538. 87r a). Rufus replies by distinguishing two senses of contrariety and between motion strictly speaking and broadly speaking.

lNTRODll CTION

47

DMet 1: "Ad hoc dicendum quod generatio uno modo est

motus, et sic est ex contrariis. Alio modo ex forma et ex privatione, et sic non est motus, neque ex contrariis. Illud autem magis determinatum est super librum Physicorum" ( Q290. 33 ra ; PJ\'180. 28 va , V .-1 538. 87r a).

But neither of these distinctions is explicit in his reply. As Rufus indicates, the reply he intends is more clearly explained in his Physics commentary:

In Phys. 5.1.3: ''Sciendum quod est contrarietas formarum respectu eiusdem subiecti, et haec non est in substantiis, quia non est subiectum idem manens sub diversis formis sub­ stantialibus; et est contrarietas formarum respectu eiusdem materiae, et haec est in substantia. " 1 36 In one sense , there is no contrariety in substance; nothing is contrary to substance . In another sense, there is contrariety, since the same matter can be the substrate for contrary forms. In the first sense, some subject can be informed by contrary forms; the same thing, say a house, can be first white and then black. In the extended sense, the subject is not constant, but the same matter can be informed by contrary substantial forms - fire and water, for example . So though Rufus doubtless thinks it is more accurate to speak of contradictories in generation, it can also be described in terms of contraries. Similarly, there is a sense in which there is motion in the category of substance, but it is motion in the broad sense, since properly speaking motion is between contraries.

In Phys. 1.4.2: "Ad secundum dicendum quod motus dici­ tur communiter et proprie. Communiter dicitur secundum quamcumque mutationem a non tali in tale, a non sedente in sedens, et sic verum est quod in omni genere sit motus. Pro­ prie dicitur motus transmutatio quae debetur ipsis extremis quae sunt tale et tale . . . " In this broader sense, where motion is between contradictories, there is motion in every category. Substantial change, however, 1 36

Cf. Rufus, Phys. l .4 . 3 .

48

INTRODUCTION

more closely resembles motion than relational change. Since matter underlies substantial change, something like a subject changes in generation. Contraries, or at least contradictories, succeed one another in matter, and Aristotle's statement can be interpreted correctly. Given what we know about the imprecision of self-reference by medieval authors generally, and by Rufus in particular, we can conclude with reasonable confidence that all of the references from the principal Metaphysics commentary to the Physics have been verified. In the case of the references to his theories of change, what Rufus intends is clear, but that is not so clear in the case of the references to discussions of cause. W ith the possible exception of the fifth reference, no verification is precise enough to be an indubitable proof. So though we have shown that it is likely that the two works are by the same person, more evidence is desirable. Four other kinds of evidence suggest themselves. lvfost obviously there is the manuscript evidence: In the Ave lvlaria Aristotle quires the Physics commentary (AMA quires 49-50, OF 45-58) immedi­ ately follows Rufus' Metaphysics commentary (AMA quires 44-48, 0F 1-44). The two commentaries are indexed together as a single work. 1 37 Second, a citation from Francis of Marchia shows that it was written by someone named Richard. :tvlarchia cites "Ricardus" in support of a distinctive account of projectile motion, according to which the action of the projector makes an impression both on the projectile and on the medium through which it moves. 1 38 Finally, we will show that the Physics commentary espouses so many views characteristic of Richard Rufus of Cornwall that it could scarely be by anyone else. 4. References to Rufus' Physics Lectures by Other Authors References to Rufus' Physics lectures in the works of others are not infrequent. C. 'Irifogli has found one citation of Rufus' views on number described as the position of "quidam magnus." 1 39 137

See above in section 2 . Marchia, Sent. 4. 1 . 1 , ed. A. Maier, p. 17 4. 139 Cf. C. Trifogli, "Le questioni sul libro IV della 'Fisica' in alcuni commenti inglesi intorno alla meta del sec. XII I," Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 7 ( 1996) 64, 11 . 9 1 . 1 38

INTRODUCTION

49

Principally interested in the early Oxford tradition which followed Rufus and Bacon, Trifogli has also found a number of other citations. 140 E. Karger has found a number of citations of Rufus' Physics lectures by Bacon, including an especially striking one about how other thinkers suppose that nature avoids a vacuum. 141 C. Burnett has located in the redaction of the Glossa anglicana associated with Henry of Renham a close parallel with Rufus' views on the distinction between knowledge of conclusions and understanding of first principles. 142 I have also found references to Rufus on Aristotle's Physics by Bacon and by an anonymous De anima commentator. 143 Ordinarily, however, even when the po­ sitions are distinctive enough to refer without much ambiguity to Rufus' Physics commentary, they are anonymous, since medieval authors very seldom cite their contemporaries by name. The mention of Rufus' given name, "Ricardus," in a marginal note to Francis of :rviarchia 's defense of a controversial account of projectile motion does not constitute an exception to this rule. 144 Nlarchia flourished almost a hundred years after Rufus. Marchia (or his auditor) refers to Richard, as to Bonaventure, as a deceased authority from a different century. The account of projectile motion to which Francis of Marchia appeals comes from book 8 of Rufus ' lectures on the Physics. In Phys. 8.3. l: "Et videtur mihi quod hoc est verum, quod aliqua qualitas et forma sive aliquid ei imprimatur a proici­ ente, et non apparet quod aliud possit facere in ipsum nisi solum transpositionem partium. . . . " 14

° C . Trifogli, Oxford Physics in the Thirteenth Century, Leiden 2000. For Bacon's response to Rufus, see pp. 1 18, 198, 224, 243, 247, and 255. 141 Infra, 4 . 2 . 1 , 4 . 3 . 18, and 7. 2 . 3 . 1 42 C. Burnett & A . Mendelsohn, "Aristotle and Averroes o n Method in the Middle Ages and Renaissance," in Method and Order in Renaissance Philosophy of Nature, ed. D . DiLiscia, E. Kessler, & C. Methuen, Aldershot 1 997, p. 68. Burnett tentatively dates Renham in the late 13 t h century; see his "The Introduction of Aristotle's Natural Philosphy into Great Britain," in A ristotle in Britain during the Middle Ages, ed. J. Marenbon, Turnhout 1996, p. 40. 1 43 R. Wood, "Roger Bacon," pp. 222-250. Cf. infra, 8.3. 1 and the Anonymus Magister Artium ( 1 245- 1250) , Lectura in librum de anima 1 .8.2, ed. R. Gauthier, Grottaferrata 1 985, p. 102. 1 44 Marchia, Sent. 4 . 1 . 1 , ed. A. Maier, Zwei Grundprobleme der scholastischen Naturphilosophie, Rome 1 968, p. 1 80, note 28.

50

INTRODU CTION

Despite years of research at the Vatican library and elsewhere, Anneliese Maier found no medieval author who held the· position before 1320, when Marchia wrote. Since Maier's time other authors have been found. 1 45 But finding them would not have satisfied Maier; she needed a Richard. In the margin of the text where Franciscus discusses projectile motion, there is a note: "Bonaventura, Ricardus. '' 1 46 Bonaventure seems to assume impetus theory; he explains the role of the male in human generation in terms of a force like the force in projectile motion. But since Bonaventure does not attempt to explain the analogy, 1 4 7 Maier turns to Richard of Middleton . The few lines she finds in Middleton are no more satisfying than the two sentences she found in Bonaventure. Jvliddleton is explaining in what sense the heavens move themselves, and in what sense they are moved by an intelligence. Their motion is determined by the will of the commanding intelligence or angel which actualizes the heaven's aptitude for motion. Heavenly aptitude is the instrumental motor, moved by the principal angelic motor. The motion continues as long as the intelligence's power preserves heaven's power and ceases when it stops. 1 48 This is entirely different from J\Iarchia who is explaining why the celestial spheres might continue to move when the intelligences ceased to move. That is why he compares the motion of the heavens to the wheel turned by a potter which moves after the potter ceases to move_ 1-1 9 As noted above, projectile motion is a problem for theories of natural motion because it is violent motion in the absence of 1 45 See

above section 1 . 1 . Sent. 4 . 1 . 1 , ed . A. Maier, p. 180, note 28. 1 4 7 A. Maier, Zwei Grundprobleme, pp. 134, 190- 1 9 1 . 1 48 Mediavilla, Sent. 2 . 14.6: ''Dico ergo quod caelum movetur ab intelligentia per hoc quod aliqua potentia ipsius intelligentiae , intellectu dirigente et voluntate imperante, aliquam virtutem educit de potentia caeli ad actum, qua caelum determinatur ad motum determinatum imperatum ab intelligentiae voluntate , et per illam virtutem ipsum caelum movet se. Sunt ergo ista sic ordinata in movendo caelum, quod angelus sub Deo est caeli principalis motor: virtus causata in ca.elo ab ipso a.ngelo modo praedicto est quasi instrumentalis motor. Forma a.utem naturalis, tam a.ccidenta.lis quam formalis ipsius caeli est illud quod est in caelo naturalis aptitudo, ut sic moveatur. Et quamdiu haec virtus continuabitur in caelo per ipsius intelligentiae potentiam, tamdiu caelum movebitur, et cum desinet praedictam influentiam causare et c,o nservare in caelo, caelum quiescet." Quoted by A. Maier, Zwei Grundprobleme, pp. 190- 1 9 1 . 1 49 Marchia, Sent. 4. 1 . 1 , ed . A . Maier, p. 1 77. 1 46 Marchia,

I NT RO D U CTION

51

contact with the mover. Heavenly motion i s a problem because i t is natural motion produced by an external mover , and in Aristotelian physics only an intrinsic form produces natural motion. Marchia solves that problem by saying that , though heavenly motion is not natural in the strict sense, but only in a qualified sense, neither is it violent , since it is not contrary to the natural inclination of the heavens . 1 50 Like his account of proj ectile motion , Francis of lVIarchia took this definition of violent motion from Richard Rufus , not Richard of J\'I iddleton . :rv1iddleton simply asserts that the Intelligences act on the heavens by means of a natural form. Unlike Richard Rufus , Richard of Middleton does not explain how being moved by a form for which an external agent is responsible can be characterized as natural . Though it is not stated explicitly in the Physics commentary, Francis of Marchia's revised definition of violent motion is found in Rufus ' indubitably authentic early Metaphysics commentary. 1 5 1 Strictly speaking , natural motion is produced intrinsically, but ·'natural" is used equivocally in refe­ rences to earthly and heavenly bodies . In the case of the celestial spheres , what we call violent motion is not only produced by an external mover , but it is contrary to the body's natural motion.

MMet 1 1 . 1 1 : "Uncle potest dici, sicut ipsius A fuit sanus, sed C est aliquid ipsius A , ergo in C est sanus. Similiter ex alia parte in toto tempore B erit aeger, ergo in qualibet parte temporis B , ergo in quolibet < quodlibet Pl > ipsius B , sed C est aliquid ipsius B, ergo in C erit aeger. Et ita simul sanus et aeger" (ed. R. Plevano, p. 222). Both works offer the same solution to the problem: the instant of change must be assigned either to the terminus a quo or to the terminus ad quern. In the Physics, Rufus affirms that there is a first instant at which fire exists, but no last moment at which it does not exist. 1 7 5 The initial aim of DMut is to show that the instant of change must be assigned to the prior not the posterior state, where the change is from a permanent to a successive state. So for Rufus, it would be mistaken to suggest that when Socrates goes from being healthy to being ill, there is a first moment of illness. Instead there is a last instant of health , which is assumed to be a permanent not a successive state. 1 76 But whereas in In Phys. the technical terminology distinguishing permanent from successive states does not appear, in DMut the distinction explains the appropriateness of the different expositions. W hether 1 74

DMut, ed. R. Plevano, "Richard Rufus of Cornwall ," pp. 222-223. Infra, 6. 1 . 10. 1 76 DMut, ed . R. Plevano, "Richard Rufus of Cornwall," pp. 222-224 . 1 75

l N T RO D llCTION

69

the change is from a permanent to a successive state, or from a successive state to a permanent one, the instant of change is always assigned to the permanent state and never to the successive state. That is why when we start to move after previously not moving, the instant of change is assigned to the previous state. Since, according to Plevano, the terminology of DMut with its explicit reference to permanent and successive states is a sign of modernity, 1 7 7 its absence suggests that the Physics is older than "De mutatione." Another sign that DMut is the more finished work is the presence of a general rule explaining the procedure for assigning the instant of change. The dividing instant is always assigned to what is in act and never to what is in potential or to a privation such as unwellness or non-equality. 1 78

DMut: "Ecce generaliter de illo quod sic mutatur, sicut

est ipsum C, quando ipsum est in actu, dicendum est quod C nunc primo est, et C nunc ultimo est quia simul cum est desinit esse, et hoc est natura instantis" (ed. R. Plevano, p. 226). Moreover, parts of this discussion in the Physics are confusing and difficult to follow. Thus the likelihood is that it is an earlier work than DMut. 1v1ore certain is that the two works are both by the same author, Richard Rufus. Other authors assign instants, but they do not state or solve the problem of instantaneous change in these terms before 1238. 5.7. The Beginning of the World in In Phys. and SOx The next argument we will examine shows that past time must be finite. It is not as distinctive as the one we have just been considering. It was advanced first in the ancient world by Phi­ loponus and first in Western Europe by William of Auvergne. 1 79 After Rufus, as was noted earlier, it was employed by Roger Bacon R. Plevano, "Richard Rufus of Cornwall /' p. 2 1 2 . DMut, ed. R. P levano, "Richard Rufus of Cornwall, " pp. 223-224. 1 7 9 A uvergne, De Trinitate 10, ed. B. Switalski, pp. 68-69. I owe this reference to Neil Lewis. 1 77

1 78

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and St. Bonaventure. 180 It is stated in its most basic form in the Physics commentary : The definitions of the infinite and the past are incompatible. By definition the past is traversed and the infinite cannot be traversed, so the past cannot be infinite: In Phys. 8.1.8: "Item, contra rationem infiniti est esse per­ transitum, ut patet in capitulo de infinito. Sed de ratione praeteriti est esse pertransitum. Ergo contra rationem infi­ niti est esse praeteritum." Citing the definition of the infinite from Aristotle's Physics 1 8 1 is the appropriate form for the argument to take in a Physics commentary. Had the argument appeared elsewhere it would probably have taken a different form. In a Posterior analytics commentary, for example, it might have cited the definition of the infinite found in that work ( 1.22.82 b 38-39). But more importantly, since the definition of the infinite is not controverted, in later statements of the same argument frequently the major premise goes unstated. Such statements concentrate instead on the proof of the minor premise, the claim that past time has been traversed. In Bacon and Bonaventure, the claim is that all past revolutions of the earth terminate at the now and hence have been traversed. When Rufus restates the argument, he reinforces the minor in a different way: All time up to now is past , but whatever is past has been present. The aim of this strategy is to force the opponent to admit that if there is past time which has not been traversed, then there is a past which has never been present.

SOx 2.1: "Sequitur contra aeternitatem motus et temporis aliquid dicere. Dico ergo quod totum tempus usque nunc, praeteritum est . Sed quidquid est praeteritum, aliquando fuit praesens; nihil igitur temporis est praeteritum quod non fuit praesens. Ergo praesens fuit antequam aliquid esset praeteritum, et ita praeteritum finitum est" (B62. 105rh). This more distinctive form of the argument is quoted and attri­ buted to Magister Richardus by Robert Grosseteste. 1 82 Though it 1 80

Bonav. , Sent. 2 . 1 . 1 , 00 2: 2 1 . Bacon, QBPh 8, ed. F . Delorme & R. Steele, OHi 13: 377-378. 181 Aristot . , Phys. 3.4.204 a 3. 182 The attribution is to uMagister Richardus de S . Victore ." But the argu­ ment in question is not by Richard of St. Victor (d. 1 1 73) . Grosseteste 's editor,

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INTRODUCTION

cannot b e said that the form of the argument found in the Physics is unique to Richard Rufus, it is at least true that the argument itself, the inference that past time must be finite because it has been traversed, is associated with '·Magister Richardus,'' as Rufus was known before he became a Franciscan. 1 83 So we may take it that the presence of the argument in the Physics is at least part of a pattern of agreement we would expect to find in works of the same author. 5.8. Heaven's Place and its Outermost Surface in In Phys.

&

SOx

Holding that heaven's place was the farthest surface of the outermost sphere and that unchanging relation of the parts of that surface fixed its place was also not a position unique to Rufus. Since, however , his Physics lectures apparently introduced it in the \Vest, 1 84 we should not be surprised to find it echoed in his theology lectures. And we do. Like other problems, Rufus presents the location of the celestial spheres as a subject on which philosophers and theologians disagree. He tries, as he normally does, to achieve a compromise. In this case, the extreme position of the philosophers is that of Averroes, according to which heaven's place is the center of the earth, since that is what fixes the position of the heavenly spheres. S Ox 1.37 H: "Et fingitur in philosophia quod terra sit locus caeli. 1 8 ·5 Sed esto quod esset unum solum corpus, et illud esset sphericum, simpliciter fixum et nullo modo moveretur, quomodo esset tale corpus in loco? Nunquid eius centrum esset locus eius?" (B62. s3va) By contrast, the theologian Peter Lombard holds that all bodies are located just in virtue of having three dimensions; they need not be fixed: Richard C . Dales, recognized the citation as a reference to a contemporary author. But he accepted the mistaken reading "of St. Victor," commenting in t he note only that he could not find the argument in Richard of St . Victor's works. Grosseteste, In Phys. 8, ed. R. Dales, pp. xx, 1 54. 1 83 Since Grosseteste died in 1 253, it cannot refer to Rufus' subsequent position as a master of theology. 1 84 R. Wood, "Richard Rufus: Physics at Paris before 1 240," pp. 87- 1 27. 1 85 Averroes, In Phys. 4.43, lunt. 4 : 66.

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72

SO:r 1.37h: "Dicit hie Magister in littera quod corpus in loco est ideo quia 'longitudinis, altitudinis, latitudinis distahtiam fa.cit in loco\ et quia dimensionem habet" (B62. 83va) The compromise position is essentially Rufus' own position as stated in the Physics lectures. Its own outermost surface is heaven's place, not in so far as it is its surface, but in so far as it is a dimension having a uniform fixed distance from the center. 1 86 As Rufus correctly remarks, this position can be seen as a version of Lombard's position, since it makes having dimensions crucial to place: 187

SOx 1.37h: "Sed secundum modum Magistri et theologorum forte dici posset quod tale corpus, extra quod scilicet non est aliud corpus, in loco est et locale est et sibi locus est. lpsum est suus locus - ipsum, dico, dimensionem habens et distantiam faciens vel habens in partibus suis locus est et locatum est in se ipso et a se ipso. Vel si locum talis corporis dicamus extimam suam superficiem, corpus autem substantiam dimensionibus subiectam , locatum et contentum hac superficie extima, sic aliquo modo distinctius dicetur" (B62. s3va) From a theological point of view, however, the chief problem was not: Where is it? But rather: Is heaven an exception to the rule that every body has a place? On this point, the position Rufus states in the Physics is less helpful, since it concedes that heaven is not strictly speaking in a place.

In Phys. 4. 1 . 7: "Dicendum quod cum sic definitur locus, defi­ nitur locus proprie dictus. Et deficit locus caeli a proprietate loci in duobus . . . Deficit similiter a continentia loci; conti­ nens enim