Space Fostering African Societies: Developing the African Continent through Space, Part 2 (Southern Space Studies) 3030591573, 9783030591571

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Southern Space Studies Series Editor: Annette Froehlich

Annette Froehlich   Editor

Space Fostering African Societies Developing the African Continent through Space, Part 2

Southern Space Studies Series Editor Annette Froehlich

, University of Cape Town, Rondebosch, South Africa

Associate Editors Dirk Heinzmann, Bundeswehr Command and Staff College, Hamburg, Germany André Siebrits, University of Cape Town, Rondebosch, South Africa Advisory Editors Josef Aschbacher, European Space Agency, Frascati, Italy Rigobert Bayala, National Observatory of Sustainable Development, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso Carlos Caballero León, Peruvian Space Agency, Lima, Peru Guy Consolmagno, Vatican Observatory, Castel Gandolfo, Vatican City State Juan de Dalmau, International Space University, Illkirch-Graffenstaden, France Driss El Hadani, Royal Center for Remote Sensing of Morocco, Rabat, Morocco El Hadi Gashut, Regional Center For Remote Sensing of North Africa States, Tunis, Tunisia Francisco Javier Mendieta-Jiménez, Mexican Space Agency, Mexico City, Mexico Félix Clementino Menicocci, Argentinean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Buenos Aires, Argentina Sias Mostert, African Association of Remote Sensing of the Environment, Muizenburg, South Africa Val Munsami, South African National Space Agency, Silverton, South Africa Greg Olsen, Entrepreneur-Astronaut, Princeton, NJ, USA Azzedine Oussedik, Algerian Space Agency, Alger, Algeria Xavier Pasco, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris, France Elvira Prado Alegre, Ibero-American Institute of Air and Space Law and Commercial Aviation, Madrid, Spain Alejandro J. Román M., Paraguayan Space Agency, Asunción, Paraguay Fermín Romero Vázquez, Fundacion Acercandote al Universo, Mexico City, Mexico Kai-Uwe Schrogl, International Institute of Space Law, Paris, France Dominique Tilmans, YouSpace, Wellin, Belgium Jean-Jacques Tortora, European Space Policy Institute, Vienna, Austria Robert van Zyl, Cape Peninsula University of Technology, Bellville, South Africa

The Southern Space Studies series presents analyses of space trends, market evolutions, policies, strategies and regulations, as well as the related social, economic and political challenges of space-related activities in the Global South, with a particular focus on developing countries in Africa and Latin America. Obtaining inside information from emerging space-faring countries in these regions is pivotal to establish and strengthen efficient and beneficial cooperation mechanisms in the space arena, and to gain a deeper understanding of their rapidly evolving space activities. To this end, the series provides transdisciplinary information for a fruitful development of space activities in relevant countries and cooperation with established space-faring nations. It is, therefore, a reference compilation for space activities in these areas. The volumes of the series are peer-reviewed.

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/16025

Annette Froehlich Editor

Space Fostering African Societies Developing the African Continent through Space, Part 2

123

Editor Annette Froehlich University of Cape Town Rondebosch, South Africa

ISSN 2523-3718 ISSN 2523-3726 (electronic) Southern Space Studies ISBN 978-3-030-59157-1 ISBN 978-3-030-59158-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59158-8 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Dedication

Dedicated to the Dama gazelle—Critically endangered desert and semi-desert dweller of North Africa Poaching Steals from Us All Sia Kolisi1 (South African Springbok Rugby Captain)

Illustration of N. d. ruficollis (left) and N. d. mhorr (right) (Philip Sclater, The Book of Antelopes, 1894)

As part of the Space Fostering African Societies series, it has become custom to introduce each volume with a dedication to one of the many endangered or threatened species found on the African continent. In this way, the plight of the diverse wildlife treasures endemic to Africa can be honoured and highlighted, and Sia Kolisi, “Poaching Steals from Us All”, WildAid, 10 May 2016, https://twitter.com/ wildlifeatrisk/status/1191259067681005568 (websites cited in this dedication were last accessed and verified on 29 July 2020).

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recognition can be given to the fact that “[t]here is a deep interconnectedness of all life on earth, from the tiniest organisms, to the largest ecosystems, and absolutely between each person”.2 Consequently, this publication is dedicated to the Dama gazelle, which can be located in North Africa and which recently went extinct in Tunisia.3 Three subspecies of the Dama gazelle can be found in extremely limited numbers (100–200 mature individuals in the wild4), with N. dama rufficolis or the Addra gazelle found in the eastern distribution area, N. dama mhorr or the Mhorr gazelle towards the far west of the distribution area, and N. dama found in between.5 The range of the species is mainly concentrated in Mali, Niger, and Chad. The species is noted for its physiological, ecological, and behavioural adaptations to arid environments.6 As such the gazelles are able to obtain their water predominantly from plants, with their diet including desert shrubs, acacias, and rough desert grasses.7 The species is highly nomadic, migrating to the Sahara in the wet season and to the Sahel in the dry season. They can “often be observed bouncing into the air with all four hooves off the ground at the same time”, a behaviour called stotting.8 After a 5–6.5 month gestation period, a single calf is born and coupled with natural predators such as cheetah, lion, leopard, hyena, and jackal; along with human activities, the species faces an uncertain future. With the extinction of the species in Tunisia, the Tunisia Wildlife Conservation Society “voiced discontent at the silence of authorities” and requested “clarification on failure to reintroduce this extremely scarce species”.9 The species is also listed as extinct in Burkina Faso, Libya, Nigeria, Mauritania, Senegal, Sudan, and Western Sahara, with possible extinctions in Algeria and Morocco.10 Until relatively recently the Dama gazelle was still found in quite large numbers, such that in the “early 1970s [the] population in Ouadi Rimé Ouadi Achim Faunal Reserve in Chad, one of the former strongholds of the species, was estimated at 10,000–12,000 individuals, but today the species is very rare in this reserve”, and the overall

2 Bryant McGill, “Voice of Reason”, Goodreads, Inc., 2020, https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/ tag/natural-world. 3 Tunis Afrique Presse, “Tunisia’s Last Mohrr Gazelle Dies, Species Goes Extinct”, AllAfrica, 18 April 2020, https://allafrica.com/stories/202004190028.html. 4 IUCN SSC Antelope Specialist Group, “Nanger dama”, The IUCN Red List of Threatened Species 2016: e.T8968A50186128, 2016, https://www.iucnredlist.org/species/8968/50186128. 5 Teresa Abáigar, Emilio Rodríguez-Caballero, and Cristina Martínez, et al., “The first reintroduction project for mhorr gazelle (Nanger dama mhorr) into the wild: Knowledge and experience gained to support future conservation actions”, Global Ecology and Conservation 19, (2019). 6 Argos System, “Reintroducing Mhorr gazelles into the wild”, 3 July 2019, https://www.argossystem.org/mhorr-gazelles/. 7 Fossil Rim Wildlife Center, “Dama gazelle”, 2020, https://fossilrim.org/animals/dama-gazelle/. 8 Ibid. An excellent example can be seen in a Smithsonian’s National Zoo video: https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=dwkbo46ltGU. 9 Tunis Afrique Presse, “Tunisia's Last Mohrr Gazelle Dies, Species Goes Extinct”. 10 IUCN SSC Antelope Specialist Group, “Nanger dama”.

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Geographic range of Nanger dama (International Union for Conservation of Nature, “Nanger dama”, The IUCN Red List of Threatened Species, 2016, https://www.iucnredlist.org/species/ 8968/50186128)

numbers of the gazelle have “declined drastically since the 1950s and 1960s”.11 Specifically, the threats to the species have been identified as agriculture and aquaculture, livestock farming and ranching, biological resource use, hunting and trapping terrestrial animals, human intrusions and disturbance, recreational activities, and war, civil unrest, and military exercises.12 Efforts have been under way since at least the 1970s to save the Mhorr gazelle in particular from extinction, which is noted to be the “most colored” of the Dama gezelles.13 These efforts have taken the form of a: captive breeding programme [which] was initiated in 1971 in the Sahara Rescue Center at the Estación Experimental de Zonas Aridas (EEZA-National Spanish Research Council) in Almeria (SE Spain). In May 2015, local Moroccan authorities (Haut-Commissariat des Eaux et Forêts et à la Lutte Contre la Désertification) in collaboration with a local NGO (“Nature Initiative”) decided to start, for the first time, a project to reintroduce Mhorr gazelle into the wild, using gazelles kept under semi-wild conditions in a fenced protected area in the Safia Natural Reserve.14

In 2019, it was reported that the species was being reintroduced into the wild in southern Morocco through captivity-bred individuals, since the Mhorr gazelle in particular is considered by locals to be “part of their cultural wealth”.15 This effort

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Ibid. Ibid. 13 Argos System, “Reintroducing Mhorr gazelles into the wild”. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 12

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Dama gazelle (BIOPARC Valencia, https://www.bioparcvalencia.es/ via Zooborns, “Endangered Dama Gazelles Arrive with the Spring”, 27 March 2017, https://www.zooborns.com/zooborns/ 2017/03/endangered-dama-gazelles-arrive-with-the-spring.html)

was supported by Argos satellite telemetry, through the use of satellite telemetry collars. Unfortunately, dogs attacked the first group of 24 gazelles, resulting in seven deaths, compounded by the reaction of the gazelles to flee back to the fenced reserve area, which trapped them. Afterwards, they were hunted by poachers, who broke into the gazelle’s area illegally, causing the animals to flee with “exceptional long distances (up to 60 km) travelled in a single day”.16 Nevertheless, the effort was considered a success given the “fact that they found a favorable escape route by the oueds, identified the mountains as a safe haven and managed to return to their territory once the danger had passed [which] shows their ability to adapt to living in the wild, even when bred in captivity”.17 However, it also emphasised that poaching and dogs are the main threat to the gazelles in the area. Other conservation efforts in Chad, via the scimitar-horned oryx reintroduction project, have produced hopeful results for the gazelle populations in the Ouadi 16

Ibid. Ibid.

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Rimé-Ouadi Achim Wildlife Reserve since its implementation in 2016, particularly due to the “increased control on some poaching activities in the area”.18 Together, these projects emphasise two particular points. First, as Siya Kolisi argued, it is important to recognise that poaching is stealing Africa’s natural heritage from everyone, and second, that space technology through tracking wildlife populations and movements is playing a critical role in conservation efforts. Data gathered through space technologies can also provide clarity on movements and range of a wide variety of threatened species to monitor human impacts more carefully. Currently, it is unknown what the future of this magnificent animal is, especially in its wild habitat where it has roamed for countless centuries. Some of the Dama gazelles will survive with between 35019 and 1.00020 in captivity at various zoos and breeding centres in North America, Europe, and Arabia, but what of the iconic desert dwellers? Cape Town, South Africa

André Siebrits

Fossil Rim Wildlife Center, “Dama gazelle”. Abáigar, Rodríguez-Caballero, and Martínez, et al., “The first reintroduction project for mhorr gazelle (Nanger dama mhorr) into the wild”. 20 Argos System, “Reintroducing Mhorr gazelles into the wild”. 18 19

Contents

Towards a Competitive African Space Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Julia Selman Ayetey Remote-Sensing Applications for Mineral Mapping: Boosting Zimbabwe’s Foreign Direct Investment Potential Through Sustainable Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ruvimbo Samanga

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The Final Frontier: Considering the Right to Privacy in the Context of Remote Sensing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tebello Mosoeu

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Application of Low to Medium Resolution Data for Hydrological Modeling in Malawi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Natalia Dambe and Julian Smit

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Egypt’s Remote Sensing Land Use Classification Using Deep Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Salma Youssef, Mayar A. Shafaey, and Mohammed A.-M. Salem

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Reflective Practice in the African Space Sector: The Importance of Cadre Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . André Siebrits

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Democratising the Signal: A Conceptual Beneficiation Model of Space Technology for Lesser Privileged Communities in Sub-Saharan Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Christoffel Kotze

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A Technical Policy and Technological Analysis of a Satellite-Hosted Blockchain System for Sustaining African Development . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 David Lindgren, Victor Hertel, and Asha Coutrier On the Feasibility of Landing the Dream Chaser Space Vehicle in South Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 Luke Colvin

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Contents

Africa’s Emerging Satellite Activities and the Registration of Its Satellites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 Annette Froehlich An Exploration of the User Concept in Satellite Design and Its Implications for Social and Economic Development in Africa . . . . . . . . 181 Kechil Kirkham Outer Space Resources and African Perspective: Why International Law Needs a Regulatory Framework for Outer Space Resources, What It Should Look like and What the Pope Has to Do with It . . . . . 217 Simon David Botha Appendix: Mensa, the Table Mountain Star Constellation . . . . . . . . . . . 249

Towards a Competitive African Space Industry Julia Selman Ayetey

Abstract

Experts and media outlets have noted the recent growth of the African space industry. However, the continent’s production and utilisation of space science, technology and services remain amongst the lowest in the world. The African Union (‘AU’) has recognised that enhanced utilisation of outer space is a crucial means of furthering socio-economic development. A vibrant space industry across the continent is therefore needed. This chapter will first outline the AU’s blueprint for space utilisation which includes its 2063 Agenda, Space Policy and Space Strategy as well as the impending African Space Agency. It will then examine five elements necessary for a successful African space industry: (i) Law, policy & a regulatory framework (ii) capacity-building (iii) public awareness of the advantages and disadvantages of outer space utilisation (iv) avoidance of capture and (v) the establishment of an African-owned, African-based spaceport. The chapter concludes by suggesting that a globally competitive African space industry is feasible with, inter alia, the implementation of the five elements discussed.

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The African Union’s Outer Space Blueprint

Agenda 2063 is a 50-year plan, approved by African Heads of State and Government, to foster the economic, industrial and technological development of the continent. It was first adopted by the African Union Summit in 2013. The final J. S. Ayetey (&) Faculty of Law, University of Cape Coast, Ghana and Doctoral Candidate, Institute of Air and Space Law, McGill University, Montreal, Canada e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 A. Froehlich (ed.), Space Fostering African Societies, Southern Space Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59158-8_1

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document, published in 2015, sets out many aspirations, one of which is for Africa to utilise its 'rightful share’ of outer space1. Agenda 2063 asserts that ‘Africa’s access to space technology products is no longer a matter of luxury’2. However, the budgetary constraints of most African countries make any aspiration of a competitive space industry in all 55 African states a difficult and perhaps unrealistic objective to achieve in the near future3. Whilst some African states, Nigeria and South Africa for instance, are able to pursue their own space programmes, a centralised approach to space utilisation via the African Union could expedite development of the continent’s space industry for the benefit of all its nations. This was perhaps the thinking of a contingent of African Ministers of Communication and Information Technologies when, in 2012, through the Khartoum Declaration, they recommended the development of a continental space policy by the African Union in collaboration with relevant stakeholders.4 Following the Khartoum Declaration, the AU Commission established a Working Group on Space Science. The Working Group, which included members of the African Leadership Conference and national space agencies, published a draft of the African Space Policy, which outlines the objectives of a continent-wide space programme, in October 2013.5 The final version was published in 2016 together with the African Space Strategy which explains some of the benefits space utilisation can have for the continent, undertakes a SWOT analysis and details an implementation plan for the African Space Policy and AU space activities.6 Subsequently, the Statute of the African Space Agency entered into force and established the African Space Agency (‘ASA’).7 The Statute of the African Space Agency explicitly recognises the ‘importance of science, technology and innovation as tools and enablers for socio-economic transformation of the continent’.8 1

Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want, Final Edition (Popular Version) (African Union, 2015) at 10; See also, African Union, “Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy for Africa (STISA-2024)”, (June 2014), online: https://au.int/sites/default/files/newsevents/workingdocuments/33178-wdstisa-english_-_final.pdf. 2 Agenda 2063: The Key Agenda 2063 Flagship Programmes Project (African Union, (undated)) at 2. 3 The AU recognises 55 African States including the Western Sahara. The UN does not recognise the Western Sahara as an independent state, it therefore only recognises are 54 African states. 4 Para. 16, Ministers of Communication and Information Technologies, “Khartoum Declaration”, African Union (September 2012), online: https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/30935docdeclaration_khartoum_citmc4_eng_final_2.pdf. The Ministers particularly highlighted the importance of remote sensing applications and satellite imagery processing. 5 African Space Policy: Towards Social, Political and Economic Integration, Second Ordinary Session for the Specialized Technical Committee Meeting on Education, Science and Technology HRST/STCEST/Exp./15 (II) (Cairo, Egypt: African Union, 2017). 6 African Space Strategy: Towards Social, Political and Economic Integration, Second Ordinary Session for the Specialized Technical Committee Meeting on Education, Science and Technology HRST/STC-EST/Exp./16 (II) (Cairo, Egypt: African Union, 2017); African Union, “African Union Heads of State and Government Adopts the African Space Policy and Strategy”, Press Release (31 January 2016), online: https://au.int/fr/node/19677. 7 African Union, “Statute of the African Space Agency”, (29 January 2018), online:https://au.int/ sites/default/files/treaties/36198-treaty-statute_african_space_agency_e.pdf. 8 See, Preamble, ibid.

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The ASA aims to harness the expertise and financial resources of all AU Member States to aid the development of regional capacity. Agaba notes that the establishment of the African Space Agency, together with the African Space Policy and African Space Strategy create, a pan-African space programme through which African States can synergise their fragmented and inefficient space programmes across the continent and create a window of opportunity for the non-spacefaring African nations to participate in outer space and collectively benefit from outer space activities, space infrastructure and space applications.9

The adoption of this institutionalised approach is the beginning of a long-term technology-based effort to ‘address the continent’s challenges and develop an African space market and industry’ to maximise benefits and minimise the complexities and impediments involved in establishing a successful space industry.10

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Elements Necessary for a Competitive African Space Industry

According to Morgan Stanley, by 2040 the global space industry will be worth more than one trillion dollars.11 The African space industry is currently valued at $7 billion and by 2024 estimates suggest it will be worth more than $10 billion.12 Africa is home to a small but expanding private commercial space industry, which currently employs approximately 2,000 individuals.13 The increase in national space agencies from four in 2000 to fourteen as of May 2019 demonstrates that African public sector space initiatives have also occurred. Despite these advancements, the African space industry is not yet able to compete with other regional space industries. For example, the cost to manufacture and launch large satellites continues to be prohibitive for many African countries. By contrast, small satellites provide an attainable entry point to the global space industry. As Balogh observes, small satellites ‘open the door for developing countries and countries with limited space budgets to participate in space activities, enabling them to establish basic capacities for the development of space technology tailored to their specific needs and objectives’.14 This is an area the AU, individual African nations and entrepreneurs may consider focusing on. Arnold Agaba, “Transfer of Space Technology in the African Space Agency” (2018) 43 Annals of Air and Space Law 253–272 at 255. 10 See, Preamble, African Union, supra note 7. 11 Morgan Stanley, “Space: Investing in the Final Frontier”, (2 July 2019), online: https://www. morganstanley.com/ideas/investing-in-space. 12 “Executive Summary: African Space Industry Annual Report”, Space in Africa (June 2019), online: https://africanews.space/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Space-in-Africa-Extract-New-Final2.pdf. 13 Ibid at x. 14 Werner Balogh, “Capacity Building in Space Technology Development: The Role of the United Nations” in (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill | Nijhoff, 2016) at 34. 9

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To date, there has been limited centralized continental space ventures and those which have been undertaken, such as PAeN—the AU-Indian telemedicine and teleeducation initiative—have either been sub-optimal or failed.15 Thus, much needs to be done to transform the African space industry from embryonic to advanced. Discussed below are five elements which can facilitate the achievement of this objective.

2.1 Law, Policy & Regulatory Frameworks In 2009, Gbem contended that the most significant challenge to the advancement and effective use of space science and technology on the continent was the ‘lack of clearly defined policy and legal frameworks’.16 The publication of the AU’s Space Policy and Strategy considerably alleviates the historic lack of well-defined policy frameworks observed by Gbem over a decade ago.17 Whilst the Statute of the African Space Agency is commendable, adequate legislation or the existence of space legislation remains outstanding across most of Africa.18 Further regional and domestic legislation is necessary. Haanappel suggested that appropriate laws are necessary for a successful space industry.19 Relatedly, Jakhu rightly noted that space law and policy ‘determine the scope, nature, pace, possibility and development of space undertakings’.20 It is therefore important that the African Union and individual states create suitable regulatory agencies and engage employees, experts, partners and stakeholders who possess the requisite knowledge and ability to influence, draft, implement and enforce laws which govern space science technologies.

Julia Selman Ayetey & Harold Ayetey, “Health from Above: Space-Based Healthcare Services in Africa” in Annette Froehlich, (ed) Space Fostering African Societies: Developing the African Continent Through Space, Part 1 (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020) p. 135. 16 Anastasia A Gbem, “Space Developments in African Countries: An Overview” (2009) 34 Annals of Air and Space Law 845–894 at 886. 17 Gbem, supra note 16. 18 Nigeria and South Africa, for example, are two exceptions. See, Tare Brisibe, “Law and Regulation of Activities Related to Outer Space in Nigeria / Weltraumrecht in Nigeria / Droit Spatial en Nigeria” (2006) 55:4 Zeitschrift fur Luft- und Weltraumrecht - German Journal of Air & Space Law 554–566; Luthando S Mkumatela, Review of the South African Regulatory Framework in the Context of International Space Regulation (54, 2011); Lulekwa Makapela & Jo-Ansie Van Wyk, The Legal Framework for South African Space Activities: An Analysis of the Legal Rules Governing Launching, Operation of a Satellite and Applications by Private Actors (2011). 19 PPC Haanappel, “A Competitive Environment in Outer Space - The Vision for Space Exploration: A Dedicated Issue” (2006) 32:1 Journal of Space Law 1–14. 20 Ram Jakhu, “Capacity Building in Space Law and Space Policy” (2009) 44:9 Advances in Space Research 1051–1054 at 1052. 15

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2.2 Capacity Building The AU acknowledges that ‘Africa does not have the full technical know-how to participate independently in…’ space and space-related activities.21 The African Space Strategy highlights the need for African countries to harness their ‘collective capacity [...] to build and expand indigenous space capabilities and state-of-the-art infrastructure, and to minimise the duplication of effort’.22 The African Space Policy underscores the role of young people in this regard and suggests the Pan African University Space Science Institute be strengthened to address the ‘space-related human resource requirements on the continent’.23 By the next century, almost half of the global youth population will be African and by 2050 half of the continent’s population will be less than 24 years of age.24 Estimates indicate that by 2030, young people will account for 375 million people in the African job market.25 Young people are therefore a key ingredient for a successful African space industry. Unfortunately, there is a major gap between the number of available skilled workers and the number of skilled workers necessary to sustain and improve the African space industry. African states have begun to address this deficit through the implementation of various remedial measures. There is a significant campaign to encourage young people, particularly girls and women, to embark upon careers in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (‘STEM’). For example, since 2016, the Ghana Education Service, with the assistance of the UNESCO-HNA Partnership for Girls and Women’s Education in Ghana, has held several ‘STEM-Clinics’ throughout the country. The clinics have enabled more than 1,300 girls to participate in STEM activities to have them consider studying STEM subjects at secondary school and university.26 Over the last few years several hackathons, summits and other initiatives have been held on the continent to facilitate knowledge acquisition and provide a platform for African youth to showcase their talents.27 Events, such as the Ghana Tech Summit, promote technology generally. There have also been initiatives, such as the African Space Generation Workshop, which concentrate on space science and technology.28 Another example is Space 2020 Ghana, which is a competition run 21

note 5 at 5. note 6 at 12. 23 note 5 at 10, para 4.2(c) as well as page 6. 24 Mo Ibrahim Foundation, “Africa Ahead: The Next 50 Years”, 2013 Ibrahim Forum Facts & Figures (November 2013), online: http://static.moibrahimfoundation.org/downloads/publications/ 2013/2013-facts-&-figures-an-african-conversation-africa-ahead-the-next-50-years.pdf. 25 Mastercard Foundation, “Young Africa Works: Mastercard Foundation Strategy 2018-2030”, online: https://mastercardfdn.org/research/young-africa-works/. 26 (UNESCO) United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, “Education for Girls and Women in Ghana: UNESCO-HNA Partnership for Girls’ and Women’s Education in Ghana”, online: https://en.unesco.org/fieldoffice/abuja/educationforgirls. 27 “NASA International Space Apps Challenge (Accra)”, (2018), online: https://2018. spaceappschallenge.org/locations/accra. 28 “Ghana Tech Summit”, online: http://ghanatechsummit.com/; Space Generation Advisory Council, “2nd African Space Generation Workshop 2018”, online: https://spacegeneration.org/ 22

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by the African Aeronautics & Space Organisation, the University of Ghana Physics Department and the French Centre National D’Études Spatiales (‘CNES’). The contest aims to develop satellite applications using CNES patents, satellite data or technologies.29 Additionally, the African Leadership Conference on Space Science and Technology for Sustainable Development, civil society organisations such as the Ethiopian Space Science Society and various African chapters of the Space Generation Advisory Council are increasing grassroots participation in the field.30 These efforts have been vital in sparking interest, generating public awareness and creating capacity in STEM. Such efforts must be intensified in order to form a competitive African space industry. Given that expertise in STEM knowledge is a fundamental component of any successful space industry, it is understandable that there has been a focus on increasing the number of scientific and technological personnel such as space medicine experts, machinists, and engineers. However, a vibrant space industry requires a diverse set of actors, including ‘entrepreneurs, investors of all stripes, insurance companies, standards organizations, university professors and their students, small business, artists’ and others.31 Space-related training programmes must incorporate a diversity of professions and implement courses which teach innovation, management, leadership and team-working skills. It is also important that capacity-building plans make adequate provision for training in space law and policy, subjects which have been underappreciated in developing nations.32 The African Space Governance Contest, a collaboration between the Interplanetary Initiative Space Advisory Project at Arizona State University, the Lagos Court of Arbitration, the Outer Space Institute and Space in Africa provided a forum for young people to become aware of the gaps in space law and policy and generate innovative solutions to present and future problems.33 The creation of similar programmes on the continent would be beneficial.

event/af-sgw-2018; See also, Space Generation Advisory Council, “The 4th African Space Generation Workshop: Ghana 2021”, online: https://spacegeneration.org/af-sgw2021-home. 29 “CNES And AASO Join Forces – Africa Enters The ActInSpace Fold”, Spacewatch Africa, online: https://spacewatch.global/2020/03/cnes-and-aaso-join-forces-africa-enters-the-actinspacefold/; “ActInSpace”, online: https://opportunities.africanews.space/register-for-actinspace-contestnow/. 30 For further information see, Peter Martinez, “The African Leadership Conference on Space Science and Technology for Sustainable Development” (2012) 28:1 Space Policy 33–37; “Ethiopian Space Science Society”, online: https://www.ethiosss.org/; “Space Generation Advisory Council”, online: https://spacegeneration.org/. 31 Sandra H Magnus, “The space industry: A closer look at the new ecosystem”, Space News (14 October 2019), online: https://spacenews.com/op-ed-the-space-industry-a-closer-look-at-the-newecosystem/. 32 There are only a handful of universities in Africa which offer degrees or courses in space law and policy. See, Julia Selman Ayetey, “Ghana is looking to space. It needs the law to match”, The Conversation (13 August 2018), online: https://theconversation.com/ghana-is-looking-to-outerspace-it-needs-the-law-to-match-100200. 33 “Space Governance Innovation Contest”, online: https://africanews.space/space-governanceinnovation-contest/.

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2.3 Increased Awareness Public support of national space programs and private space ventures is crucial to political, legal and financial support for space industry development. Several institutions and organisations have recognised the importance of raising awareness of the benefits of space science and technology amongst the public and policy-makers.34 For example, The Guidelines for the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities, adopted by the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in June 2019, encourages states and international intergovernmental organisations to ‘raise general public awareness of the important societal benefits of space activities and of the consequent importance of enhancing the long-term sustainability of outer space activities’.35 Similar sentiments are expressed as specific objectives in both the African Space Policy and African Space Strategy. Enhanced public awareness may be achieved in various ways, including through outreach programmes conducted by or with relevant non-state entities.Public support of national space programs and private space ventures is crucial to political, legal and financial support for space industry development. Several institutions and organisations have recognised the importance of raising awareness of the benefits of space science and technology amongst the public and policy-makers. For example, The Guidelines for the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities, adopted by the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in June 2019, encourages states and international intergovernmental organisations to ‘raise general public awareness of the important societal benefits of space activities and of the consequent importance of enhancing the long-term sustainability of outer space activities’. Similar sentiments are expressed as specific objectives in both the African Space Policy and African Space Strategy. Enhanced public awareness may be achieved in various ways, including through outreach programmes conducted by or with relevant non-state entities. Various African and international civil society organisations have engaged with students and the wider public regarding the benefits of space science and technology to daily life. However, concerted governmental efforts at increasing awareness of the benefits of space utilisation are lacking amongst most African states. Oyewole notes that some observers have deemed ‘public spending on space in Africa as misplaced public priority’.36 Addressing issues such as unemployment, poor health indicators, poverty and armed conflict are claimed by some, often opposition political parties, to be a more appropriate use of public funding than 34

See, for example, Annual Report 2018 (Vienna, Austria: United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 2019). 35 Guideline C.4, Guidelines for the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Sixty-second session (United Nations, 2019). 36 Samuel Oyewole, “Space Research and Development in Africa” (2017) 15:2 Astropolitics 185– 208 at 196; See also, Linda Nordling, “Africa Analysis: Does Africa need to be in space?”, SciDev. net (29 September 2010), online: https://www.scidev.net/global/technology/columns/africaanalysis-does-africa-need-to-be-in-space-.html.

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space utilisation. Similar doubt has been raised in other developing countries. For example, the Bangladeshi government borrowed $205 million to facilitate the manufacture and launch of its first satellite in 2016.37 The satellite launch faced criticism for not being a national priority given that the annual household income in Bangladesh was, at the time, approximately $600.38 Such disapproval makes it vital that the merits of space utilisation, such as the mitigation of climate change, management of disease outbreaks and improvement of governance, agricultural production, telecommunication, education and national and regional security, are widely publicised. Relatedly, there ought to be increased transparency of both public and private space-related activities being conducted continent-wide. This will reduce duplication of efforts, promote efficient use of limited resources, aid co-operation and integration of space science applications and further research and development. Maximum utilisation of space technologies will be impeded until there is transparency regarding space activities and its benefits are common knowledge amongst policymakers and the general public. Equally, concerns arising from increased global utilisation of space, such as space debris, damage to the environment and the weaponization of space, must be made known to the general public and subject to public debate. This will facilitate the implementation of sustainable and socially acceptable practices, norms and laws pertaining to the use of outer space. It will also enable the AU and individual African countries to identify and express disapproval of non-sustainable practices conducted by other countries, regional organisations and non-state actors.

2.4 Capture Generally, ‘capture’ may be understood as the manipulation of a state’s policies, laws, economy or industry by private individuals, groups, companies or institutions to the benefit of private interests and the disadvantage of the public interest. The notion of ‘capture’ has been well studied in the international relations and regulatory context. However, capture may also occur in other contexts.39 For example, there is currently a significant debate in the UK regarding the provision of 5G Abu Sufian Shamrat, “Bangladesh Joins the Space Age”, Yale Global Online (5 July 2018), online: https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/bangladesh-joins-space-age. 38 Ibid. 39 Michael R Potter, Amanda M Olejarski & Stefanie M Pfister, “Capture Theory and the Public Interest: Balancing Competing Values to Ensure Regulatory Effectiveness” (2014) 37:10 International Journal of Public Administration 638–645; Kevin L Young, “Transnational Regulatory Capture? An Empirical Examination of the Transnational Lobbying of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision” (2012) 19:4 Review of International Political Economy 663– 688; RG Walker, “Australia’s ASRB. A Case Study of Political Activity and Regulatory ‘Capture’” (1987) 17:67 Accounting and Business Research 269–286; Rod Alence & Anne Pitcher, “Resisting State Capture in South Africa” (2019) 30:4 Journal of Democracy 5–19; Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, State Capture: How Conservative Activists, Big Businesses, and Wealthy Donors Reshaped the American States - and the Nation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019). 37

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phone networks by Chinese company Huawei. Opponents of Huawei service provision fear a potential surveillance threat which arises from the ‘presence of a Chinese supplier at the heart of Britain’s digital infrastructure’.40 Similarly, concerns will arise if foreign entities become and remain the heart of the African space industry. African nations must therefore be cautious when entering space agreements with foreign non-state actors (or foreign states). Although such partnerships can be mutually beneficial, the disadvantages of contracts between African states or companies and foreign companies (or foreign states) have very often been heavily borne by the African party. In the late 1980’s to early 1990’s, South Africa had made notable advances in both its launch and satellite programmes. However, during the transition from apartheid to a government led by the ANC party, the country was subjected to ‘foreign pressure to dismantle its launch and space capabilities, which it did as a precondition to joining the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1995’.41 Whilst there may no longer be external pressure for African nations to cease their space programmes, if hitherto typical agreements with foreign parties are any indication, there exists the potential for African-international space partnerships to result in a significant share of the African space industry being controlled by foreign entities. Several African space projects have been undertaken abroad where the majority of those involved were non-Africans and where space projects have been undertaken on the continent, they have often been led by non-Africans. Consequently, another form of ‘capture’, may occur, namely where decision-making power concerning the direction of scientific development and determination of knowledge acquisition is held by others. This in turn detracts from capacity-building efforts to produce the skilled workforce necessary to create and sustain an independent and competitive space industry. The avoidance of this form of capture requires, at minimum, all African states to recognise the immediate and long-term value of space assets, which includes scientific and technical experts as well as the collection, analysis and production of data. Effective measures to understand, protect, control and enhance those assets must be instituted. Further to the issues of law, policy and regulation discussed above, it is important to note that the avoidance of capture also requires African countries, both individually and collectively via the AU, to continue to ‘develop, implement, promote and invest in innovation and industrial policies, plans and strategies that will lead to the creation of industries that can collaborate (and eventually compete) with western suppliers’.42 Thus, a thorough regulatory regime—including legislation—which, inter alia, manages foreign investment, protects national security and Dan Sabbagh, “Government majority cut as almost 40 Tories rebel over Huawei”, The Guardian (10 March 2020), online: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/mar/10/government-winshuawei-vote-despite-tory-rebellion. 41 Peter Martinez, “The Development of Space Law in South Africa” (2015) 64:2 Zeitschrift fur Luft-und Weltraumrecht - German Journal of Air & Space Law 353–360 at 354. 42 Timiebi Aganaba-Jeanty, “Precursor to an African Space Agency: Commentary on Dr Peter Martinez ‘Is there a need for an African Space Agency?’” (2013) 29:3 Space Policy 168–174 at 170. 40

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governs export controls will be a necessary aspect of an African space industry seeking to avoid capture.

2.5 An African Spaceport Spaceports are a key sector of the space industry.43 The term ‘spaceport’ may be understood as ‘a place at which spaceships take off and land’.44 In simplest terms, it is an airport for spacecraft. Currently, nothing can enter outer space without being launched. Air and sea-based launches are rare. By contrast, ground-based launches constitute roughly 99% of all objects launched into space to date.45 The number of objects launched into space has increased significantly over the last decade. Research indicates that 75% of space industry sales in 2016 were satellite-related and this growth continues unabated.46 Commercial spaceports providing ground-based launch services are therefore a key part of the space industry value chain. Subject to certain exceptions, countries or regions with one or more spaceports will have a considerable advantage over those without. There are at least two spaceports on the African continent known to have reached orbital altitude: the Hammaguir Test Centre in Algeria and the Luigi Broglio Space Centre, also referred to as the San Marco Equatorial Mobile Range, in Kenya.47 Both of these centres are inactive and controlled by foreign states alone or in partnership with foreign organisations. It appears that the African continent has neither an active nor African-owned spaceport. Thus, public and private space actors are restricted to launching their spacecraft from a non-African owned, foreign-based spaceport. This deficiency is a significant limiting factor in the advancement of the African space industry. Launches from ground-based spaceports are maximised when the spaceport is optimally geographically located. The Spaceports of the World Report, published by the Centre for Strategic & International Studies, explains that optimum launch locations include ‘proximity to the equator, opportunities for eastward or near-eastward launch, and favorable environmental factors’ such as not being prone to natural disasters such as earthquakes, hurricanes or tsunamis.48 There are several

Three of the major space industry sectors include: ‘(1) Launch Vehicle Manufacturers, (2) Launch Site Operators (i.e., Spaceports), and (3) Launch Service Providers’, see Michael C Mineiro, “Law and Regulation Governing U.S. Commercial Spaceports: Licensing, Liability, and Legal Challenges” (2008) 73:4 Journal of Air Law and Commerce 759–806 at 760. 44 “Spaceport”, Oxford English Dictionary (Online), online: https://www.oed.com. 45 Space-Track.org, online: https://www.space-track.org. 46 The Annual Compendium of Commercial Space Transportation: 2018 (Federal Aviation Administration, 2018). 47 South Africa’s Overberg Test Range conducted three sub-orbital test flights but has not been in operation since 1990. See, Martinez, supra note 42. There have been other African launch sites but reliable data regarding these operations are scarce. 48 Spaceports of the World, by Thomas G Roberts, CSIS Aerospace Security Project (Washington, D.C.: Centre for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), 2019) at 2. 43

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African countries with locations that meet these criteria.49 A minimum of one, possibly two spaceports on the continent, including one with African Union oversight either alone or in partnership with an African-owned private entity would be favourable to the African space industry. Admittedly, too many spaceports worldwide would render some of them economically unviable. However, it appears the market has not yet reached saturation. According to the Space Foundation, as of 2019, there were 10 spaceports in development across the globe and 13 others had been proposed.50 This includes plans approved by Canadian authorities for a commercial spaceport near Canso, Nova Scotia.51 Further, a 2017 study on the proposed spaceport for Camden County in the American state of Georgia estimates that the spaceport would add more than $22 million per year to the local community.52 There is no reason why Africa should not benefit from the gains to be made through ownership of a spaceport and provision of launch services. Several factors hinder the establishment of spaceports generally.53 The establishment of an African owned and located spaceport is likely to be even more challenging given shortcomings with infrastructure and finance. Thus, the call for an African spaceport may be opposed by some, as was the case with the call for an African space agency.54 However, the challenges are not insurmountable. In 2013, Aganaba-Jeanty identified various means of overcoming purported grounds against the creation of an African space agency. Under a decade later, there is now statutory backing for the ASA which is due is to become operational in 2023 at its new home in Egypt.55 It is therefore suggested that challenges facing the establishment of African spaceport are also capable of being overcome.56 Though a spaceport alone will not immediately transform the African space industry into one of equal status 49

For example, Dodi Island in the Eastern Region of Ghana is relatively close to the equator and has few inhabitants. It has been suggested by Dr Benjamin Bonsu, leader of the GhanaSat-1 engineering team, as a suitable site for mini-rocket launches carrying nanosatellites. Similar suggestions were made in discussions with experts at the 8th African Space Leadership Congress (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia), 1–14 December 2019. 50 Space Foundation, “The Space Report 2019 - Quarter 4”, (2019), online: https://www. thespacereport.org/register/the-space-report-2019-4-quarterly-reports-pdf-download/. 51 The spaceport is to be operated by Maritime Launch Service Ltd, a private company. See, Government of Nova Scotia, “Minister’s Decision”, Canso Spaceport Facility Project (4 June 2019), online: https://www.novascotia.ca/nse/ea/canso-spaceport-facility/Decision-Jun-4.pdf. 52 “Georgia Southern University Study Confirms Spaceport Camden an Economic Boon for Coastal Georgia”, Business Innovation Group, Georgia Southern University (25 September 2017), online: https://parker.georgiasouthern.edu/big/2017/09/25/georgia-southern-university-studyconfirms-spaceport-camden-an-economic-boon-for-coastal-georgia/. 53 Roger Handberg, “Chicken or the egg: space launch and state spaceports” (2020) The Space Review, online: https://www.thespacereview.com/article/3858/1. 54 Peter Martinez, “Is There a Need for an African Space Agency?” (2012) 28:3 Space Policy pp. 142–145. 55 African Union Development Agency, “First Continental Report on the Implementation of Agenda 2063”, (February 2020), online: https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/38060-docagenda_2063_implementation_report_en_web_version.pdf. 56 Aganaba-Jeanty, supra note 43.

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with the major space powers, the establishment of an African owned and located spaceport can reap many benefits.57 With strategic planning, inter-regional cooperation, investment in human resources, infrastructure and maintenance, an African spaceport can become a reality and make a positive contribution to the African space ecosystem.

3

Conclusion

The African space industry is currently expanding at an unprecedented rate. Sustained development of the African space industry necessitates many things but it will certainly be hindered by the absence of the five elements discussed above. A clear capacity-building plan in which youth participation is maximised would address the lack of skilled manpower. Efforts at raising public awareness about the advantages and disadvantages of the space industry need to be intensified and decision-makers need to be cognizant of the possibility of capture and implement laws, policies and regulatory structures which avoid the African space industry from being significantly controlled by foreign investors. Finally, the establishment of at least one active African-owned spaceport on the continent is an important means by which African states and non-state actors can decrease its dependence on foreign providers for the launch of their space objects and begin to offer launch services to foreign clients. Consideration of these factors will foster an African space industry that is better equipped to compete with its Western counterparts, providing Africa with the opportunity to obtain a bigger share of the global space for the benefit of African citizens.

Julia Selman Ayetey is a Barrister called to the Bar of England and Wales (Middle Temple) and is a Solicitor and Barrister of the Supreme Court of Ghana. She has an M.Phil from the University of Cambridge and is a Senior Lecturer at the Faculty of Law, University of Cape Coast. Julia has a longstanding interest in the intersection between law, ethics, science and technology and has been an advisor to the government of England and Wales as a former member of the National DNA Database Ethics Group. Currently she is pursuing her doctorate at the Institute of Air and Space Law, McGill University where her research examines the relationship between non-state actors and international space law and governance.

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Selman Ayetey & Ayetey, supra note 15.

Remote-Sensing Applications for Mineral Mapping: Boosting Zimbabwe’s Foreign Direct Investment Potential Through Sustainable Technology Ruvimbo Samanga

Abstract

Zimbabwe has abundant mineral resource reserves, and like most other countries on the African continent, it is mainly dependent on primary productions for exports as well as economic growth. In fact, much of Zimbabwe’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is hinged on the mineral sector, though vast mineral reserves are yet to be quantified and exploited due to a lack of capital and infrastructure. While Zimbabwe is well-endowed, the location, variety and quantities of these reserves is unknown, as the last, comprehensive geological survey occurred at the time of independence in 1980. This has hindered new and current interest in the mining sector, resulting in the nation losing out on potential foreign direct investment. Seeking a solution to this, on the 26th of July 2018, the Ministry of Higher Education and Technology established the Zimbabwean National and Geo-Spatial Space Agency (ZINGSA), intended to use satellite Geospatial Information Services (GIS) technology to monitor the country’s large, unmapped mineral reserves, focusing on lithium and graphite, through its Mineral Mapping Programme. The author pays particular focus to the potential socio-economic benefits of a satellite mineral-mapping programme for Zimbabwe, and presents it as a feasible option to good natural resources management within Zimbabwe’s borders and beyond.

R. Samanga (&) National Point of Contact (Zimbabwe) Space Generation Advisory Council and Research Fellow at Open Lunar Foundation, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 A. Froehlich (ed.), Space Fostering African Societies, Southern Space Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59158-8_2

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Introduction

Zimbabwe is a country with rich history and even richer attractions. Home to Victoria Falls, one of the Seven Wonders of the World; Great Zimbabwe, the stone city dating back to the eleventh century, and ‘The Great Dyke’, which appears to be entirely unique to the nation.1 The latter phenomenon is a 4-mile wide, 320-mile long channel of minerals running along the same fracture line as that of the Great Rift Valley of Africa, and is considered to contain the highest grades of chrome and asbestos in the world.2 To date more than 100 minerals have been discovered there, and this highly-mineralized zone has been responsible for boosting much of Zimbabwe’s burgeoning mining industry.3 Not only are Zimbabwean attractions diverse, but within the mining sector itself, the full allocation of mineral reserves, though at present unknown, are still equally valuable and varied. Apart from the exploitation of chrome and asbestos; gold, diamond, coal, emerald, lithium, graphite and platinum group metals are all precious resources found within the country’s mineral deposits. Zimbabwe can also boast of being the second largest producer of platinum rivalled only by South Africa,4 producing a high quality ‘stone’, known to contain up to 14 mineral by-products.5 These platinum reserves are expected to last for at least another 400 years.6 The Great Dyke is neither an isolated nor the only diversified geological feature; Zimbabwe is also host to other highly-mineralized zones such as the Greenstone belts (also known as the ‘gold belts’), the Metamorphic belts as well as the Precambrian and Karoo basins.7 Yet despite all of these discoveries there is no accurate or consistent quantification of Zimbabwe’s vast mineral resources as they stand today, which has led to poor monitoring and natural resource management and resultantly, poor Foreign Direct Investment attraction (FDI) in recent decades. The author proposes that a great amount of foreign revenue slips out of the grasp of the Zimbabwean mining industry, which would otherwise have a tremendous stimulus effect on the economic growth of the country as a whole. Mineral reserves, if they were to be accurately quantified and determinable through regular geological surveys, would have the capacity to attract potential foreign investors. These geological studies attract interest because foreign investors are invariably concerned with sustainable and long-term mining opportunities with high potential for returns. Zimbabwe’s mineral capacity is yet unknown and does not provide much certainty to potential investors seeking longevity of reserves. Mineral mapping is thus a Chakamwe Chakamwe, “Zimbabwe the richest country in the world”, The Patriot, 31 October 2013, https://www.thepatriot.co.zw/old_posts/zimbabwe-the-richest-country-in-the-world/ (accessed 4 October 2019). 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. 1

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challenge facing the growth of Zimbabwe’s mining sector and in turn hinders Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), a challenge which, amongst others, is exacerbated by a lack of technical equipment and expertise to develop comprehensive maps of different mineral zones. To this end the author proposes satellite technology as the magic bullet to Zimbabwe’s mineral mapping conundrum.

1.1 Establishment of the Zimbabwean National and Geospatial Space Agency In an attempt to address what can only be deemed as a technological gap in mineral mapping, the Minister of Higher Education and Technology, Professor Amon Murwira, established,8 in terms of Section 24(1) read with Section 24(3), 25 and 26 of the Research Act [Chapter 10:22],9 the Zimbabwean National and Geo-Spatial Space Agency (ZINGSA) in July of 2018. ZINGSA was intended to use satellite Geospatial Information Services (GIS) technology to monitor the country’s large, unmapped mineral reserves, focusing primarily on lithium and graphite.10 The space agency will thus be used to map, monitor and identify areas where the prevalence of these particular minerals is high, as an initial project goal, before subsuming the rest of the mining sector.11 As with most policy documents developed by governments, the aim was to stimulate economic diversification particularly in the mining, health, agriculture and tourism sectors. Commenting on this development, H.E. President Emmerson Mnangagwa noted how vital the project was and the extent to which it would serve as a catalyst for competitiveness and growth in the economy.12 This is a pertinent development in light of the fact that Zimbabwe has lagged behind its regional counterparts and the world at large in terms of technological development. Commenting on the need for technological transfer as a developmental tool in Zimbabwe, the President further mentioned that the space agency would be instrumental in building the necessary technical expertise and institutional capacities in key sectors such as weather, climate services, wildlife management and tourism, life sciences, agriculture, and most importantly for this present discourse, mineral mapping and quantification.13 By tapping into these technological

Agency Staff, “Zimbabwe launches space agency to enhance its use of space technology for sustainable development”, Business Day 11 July 2018, https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/ africa/2018-07-11-zimbabwe-launches-space-agency-to-enhance-its-use–of-space-technology-forsustainable-development/ (accessed 17 May 2019). 9 Research Act [Chapter 10:22]. 10 Namely Platinum, Diamonds and Chrome; Sharon Munjenjema “Space Age Dream Takes Shape”, The Zimbabwe Situation, 18 November 2018, https://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/ space-age-dream-takes-shape/ (accessed 17 May 2019). 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 8

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advancements, the country’s industrial agenda would be strengthened in line with the country’s strive towards ‘Vision 2030’, that is, to attain a middle-income economy by 2030.14 The World Bank Group (WBG) has commented on the challenges that have contributed to the adoption of this agenda, citing that the country’s economy had reached a crossroads and was facing various challenges relating, inter alia, to stimulating investment and growth to increase revenue collection as well as foreign exchange generation.15 Recognizing this bottleneck in mining industry growth, satellite technology was proposed as a possible solution to Zimbabwe’s economic and development woes. Zimbabwe’s solution may thus lie in space applications, namely satellite technology, which until quite recently, was limited to use in broadcasting, weather forecasting and Global Positioning Systems (GPS). Now, satellites have taken on more sustainable development uses in regional and town planning, disaster management, water and disease-mapping and even wildlife tracking. The author believes that in light of the advancements made through space innovation in the preceding decades, financing and investing in space technologies will yield socio-economic benefits in the mining industry which will in turn positively affect the economic growth of the country. These complexities will be discussed in greater detail infra.

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Mining Sector in Zimbabwe

At present Zimbabwe’s mining sector is characterized by both small to medium mining operations, the most important minerals being gold, asbestos, coal, chromite, lithium, graphite and base metals.16 The mining sector currently contributes towards 8% of Zimbabwe’s total GDP.17 The sector is regulated by the Zimbabwean Mines and Minerals Act, chapter 21 Section 5,18 with exploration to date being deemed to have only scratched the surface of Zimbabwe’s full potential, which is known to lie in two main areas namely the Great Dyke as well as the Greenstone Belts.19 Both the Great Dyke and the Greenstone Belts Zimbabwe’s geological environment can be categorized as heterogeneous, and has rock ages which span for a period of more than 3 billion years.20

14

Ibid. The World Bank Group, “The World Bank in Zimbabwe”, World Bank, 31 October 2018, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/zimbabwe/overview (accessed 21 September 2019). 16 Ministry of Mines & Mining Development, “‘Mining in Zimbabwe”, 2019, https://www.zim. gov.zw/government-ministries/ministry-mines-and-mining-development (accessed 17 May 2019). 17 Ibid. 18 Mines & Minerals Act [Chapter 21:05]. 19 Ministry of Mines & Mining Development, “‘Mining in Zimbabwe”, 2019, https://www.zim. gov.zw/government-ministries/ministry-mines-and-mining-development (accessed 17 May 2019). 20 Ibid. 15

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The Great Dyke is described by the Zimbabwe Mineral Potential Booklet as “a layered igneous complex” which stretches from North to South along a 550 km plane.21 It is considered the largest base for chromite deposits and also houses the largest platinum reserves as well as considerable copper and nickel deposits.22 Thee Greenstone Belts are several zones, measuring a dozen to several thousand kilometres long, of metamorphosed mafic and ultramafic sequences, that is, areas of igneous rock rich in minerals including iron, magnesium and gold.23 To date, despite being the most vital mining zones in the country, the current state of their mineral deposits is uncertain. As a result, foreign investment has stalled in this area due to a lack of certainty over the longevity and monitoring of the two zones. The lack of mineral regulation has also spurred the rise of artisanal mining which has raised difficulties in health and safety, child labour as well as revenue generation.

2.1 Early Mining in Zimbabwe Early forms of modern mining were largely artisanal, the earliest recorded in 1892. By the year 1990, over 40 minerals were being exploited in Mashonaland East, where artisanal gold mining was considered a ‘great antiquity’ and various mining sites were producing high-grade gold for export.24 During that same period in the 1890’s, it was discovered by the Chamber of Mines that much of the information relating to mineral reserves was not being accurately recorded especially pertaining to mines established during the occupation of the British South Africa company.25 To combat this the Zimbabwe Geological Survey (ZGS) was instituted in Bulawayo in 1910 and later relocated to the capital city, Harare, in 1918.26 The ZGS was tasked with mapping regional reserves and identifying the most important economic minerals by creating a map that detailed the geology of the area as well as a description of the mine sites and mineral deposits.27 The first general geological map was published at a 1:1 000 000 scale in 1921 by synthesizing geological information gathered through mapping.28 As more data was collected

Mining Potential Booklet, “Procedures & Requirements of Acquiring Licenses and Permits In Terms Of the Mines and Minerals Act (Chapter 21:05)”, 2018, https://www.mines.gov.zw/sites/ default/files/Downloads/Zimbabwe%20Mineral%20Pontential%20Booklet.pdf (accessed 4 October 2019). 22 Ibid. 23 Kosmas Goriat Chenjerai, “Geological setting of gold deposits in the Mutare Greenstone Belt, Zimbabwe”, African Mining, (1991). 24 Adu Boahen, Topics in West Africa history (California: Longman Group, 1996). 25 Ministry of Mines & Mining Development, “‘Mining in Zimbabwe”, 2019, https://www.zim. gov.zw/government-ministries/ministry-mines-and-mining-development (accessed 17 May 2019). 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 21

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these maps were published more frequently with editions being released during the years 1928, 1936, 1946, 1961, 1971 and 1977.29 Through these methods the ZGS was able to identify more than 500 deposits of base metal and other industrial minerals all over Zimbabwe through traditional drilling programmes. Its findings aided in cementing Zimbabwe as a major producer of gold, lithium, chrome, asbestos and caesium as well as certain high-quality emeralds.30 ZGS was known to produce comprehensive reports and maps representing the nation’s geology and mineral resources which helped to stimulate mineral exploration interest and lead to discoveries such as the Hwange coal fields, Shabanie and Mashava asbestos mines and Sandawana emerald mine, amongst others. The discoveries, coupled with the relative efficiency of the ZGS, prompted various technical cooperation partnerships between Zimbabwe and developed nations such as Canada, Japan, the USA, the UK, Germany, France and North Korea. It was only upon the institution of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme that the ZGS began to buckle under the weight of a collapsing economy, such that by 1997, all technical projects had ceased.31 Why was this such a devastating development? Geological and mineral resources maps are considered vital tools for mining investment decision-making requiring up-to-date mechanism to do so. It is no surprise then that the Zimbabwean mining sector witnessed a decline in growth parallel to the decline in the geological services rendered by the ZGS. Citing technical incapacitation and outdated equipment coupled with a lack of funding and expertise, the ZGS rendered its last geological survey in 1997 and has largely stagnated since. Each of these three challenges will be examined in the context of satellite technology to uncover the capacity building steps taken by the Zimbabwean administration and ZINGSA to mitigate these before investigating the socio-economic benefits expected to ensue.

2.2 Capacity Building Through Technology Infrastructure As the world moves towards the 4th Industrial Revolution (4IR), increased innovation is expected in mineral exploration technologies.32 To this end satellites are considered useful, particularly in the reconnaissance or prospecting phase of 29

Ibid. United Nations Development Programme, “Working Paper 1: The mining sector in Zimbabwe and its potential contribution to recovery”, 24 July 2009, presentation at the Recovery and Reconstruction Seminar, New York, USA; T Corporations, “United Nations Conference on Trade and Development World Investment Report”, 2008, https://unctad.org/en/Docs/wir2008_en.pdf (accessed 4 May 2020). 31 Zimbabwe Economic Policy Analysis and Research Unit, “Reconfiguration of the Zimbabwe Geological Survey”, 2016, www.zeparu.co.zw/sites/default/files/2018-03/Reconfiguration%20of% 20the%20Zimbabwe%20Geological%20Survey%20web.pdf (accessed 3 April 2020). 32 Arie Naftali Hawu Hede et al, “How Can Satellite Imagery Be Used for Mineral Exploration in Thick Vegetation Areas”, Journal of Geochemistry, Geophysics and Geosystems (2017). 30

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exploration, wherein optical remote-sensing is used to detect mineralized zones with relative time and cost efficiency, as compared to traditional excavation techniques.33 The normal depreciation rates for a satellite in the Geosynchronous Orbit (GSO) is approximately 13.33% and has a lifespan of about 15 years. This means that any satellite launched will have long-term capacity potential and, notwithstanding any possibility of damage resulting in loss of function, would not require any routine maintenance costs. For this reason remote-sensing has long been the tool of choice for mineral mapping in recent decades. Mineral mapping is conducted via aerial surveys, through satellite sensor technology relying on radar and infrared cameras, of areas of pieces of land where known mineral deposits are situated. These images would then be compared against other locations with similar terrain.34 Using this, geologists and analysts can extrapolate, with relative ease, the probabilities that the new location would be as mineralized as the previous zone, prior to conducting an in-situ expedition to explore and evaluate said zone.35 Regrettably the country has not invested in exploration in the last 20 years because machinery has been rendered redundant. The ZGS became defunct largely as a result of a lack of equipment. Satellite technology would provide a much needed technological upgrade to Zimbabwe’s outdated technical services. The Space Agency’s MMP thus seeks to equip the ZGS with the information and resources it needs, namely a satellite, in order to effectively fulfill its mandate in delivering consistent and reliable mineral quantifications. Without these Zimbabwe has lagged several years behind in comparison to other countries like Canada that have a similar terrain but have been able to adequately map the geographical and mineral environment through GIS.36

2.3 Capacity Building Through Government Support and Funding ZINGSA is expected to promote large-scale, capital-intensive projects not only in mineral exploration, but also wildlife conservation, disease surveillance, agriculture as well as infrastructure management and mapping.37 To fund this initiative the process began with an agreement signed between ZINGSA and South Africa’s Space Advisory Group to kick start operations, after which the Minister announced 33

Ibid. Jim Baumann, “Mineral Exploration from Space”, Airwatch, 31 January 2020, https://www.esri. com/about/newsroom/arcwatch/mineral-exploration-in-the-hyperspectral-zone/ (accessed 3 April 2020). 35 Ibid. 36 Heba Soffar, ‘What are the importance and uses of satellites in our life?’ Online Sciences, 5 June 2015), https://www.online-sciences.com/technology/what-are-the-importance-and-uses-ofsatellites-in-our-life/ (accessed 10 June 2019). 37 Sharon Munjenjema “Space Age Dream Takes Shape”, The Zimbabwe Situation, 18 November 2018, https://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/space-age-dream-takes-shape/ (accessed 17 May 2019). 34

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that the government had pledged U.S.$1 million towards the agency’s pilot programme,38 and a further U.S.$10 million by the Ministry of Finance.39 The Minister made it known that despite the costs involved with the establishment of the agency, the benefits would far outweigh any doubts in the investment of the space agency’s initiatives.40 In fact, he further commented that government was expected to invest a further U.S.$3 million in the agencies activities, which will rely heavily on the satellite industry that will, in the Minister’s words “enable us to discover resources, construct early warning systems and create immense business for the country.”41 In his words satellite technology could not be considered a luxury given that it is a multi-trillion dollar industry worldwide and a billion dollar industry on the continent at present.42 Much of African space endeavours are only limited to due to a lack of access to funding, understandably owed to the fact that space activities were, until quite recently, costly and barely a priority for most States, especially developing countries. Recognizing this, the financing initiatives by the Zimbabwean administration are a welcome step towards supporting the work of the underfunded ZGS in collaboration with ZINGSA in order to bring about economic turnaround in the mining sector.

2.4 Capacity Building Through Human Capital Development Zimbabwe has also lacked the necessary technical and professional know-how in Information and Communication technologies (ICT), not just from the unprecedented migration of skills but also the relative decline in the country’s education sector, coupled with the system’s inability to retain and regenerate new skills at a local level.43 It must always be bourne in mind that activities such as mining, though having the capacity for growth, are in essence a consumption of a finite resource which must be managed appropriately and in a sustainable manner to ensure the country can benefit for generations to come.44 38

Ibid. Ministry of Higher & Tertiary Education and Science & Technological Development, “Geospatial, Aeronautical and Space Science Capability Programme”, 2018, https://www. mhtestd.gov.zw/2018/11/14/geospatial-aeronautical-and-space-science-capability-programme/ (accessed 17 May 2019). 40 Tonderayi Mukeredzi, “Minister unveils ambitious plans for higher education”, University World News, 5 October 2018, https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20200204080154649 (accessed 4 May 2020). 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid. 43 Blessing Zulu,” Zimbabwe Fails to Enforce Compliance to Indigenization Law”, Zimplus, 6 January 2016, https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/zimbabwe-fails-to-enforce-compliance-withindigenization-law/3132506.html (accessed 4 May 2020). 44 Mining Potential Booklet “Procedures & Requirements of Acquiring Licenses and Permits In Terms Of the Mines and Minerals Act (Chapter 21:05)”, 2018, https://www.mines.gov.zw/sites/ default/files/Downloads/Zimbabwe%20Mineral%20Pontential%20Booklet.pdf (accessed 4 October 2019). 39

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This necessitates a skill base of qualified experts particularly in ICT. In addressing this, and with the establishment of ZINGSA came also the concomitant pledge from government to develop tech hubs amongst the country’s technical universities, in addition to the commissioning of industrial parks, which are intended to stimulate research and development. Commenting on this, the Minister again reiterated the need for skills that are useful to the development of the country, ones which would be competitive and beneficial both presently and in future. The Minister has since also made a commitment to increase capacity in the educative field of sciences to support the work of the space agency and produce more graduates who would be able to contribute their skills set to the proper functioning of the ZGS, the Space Agency, and the Zimbabwean economy at large.

2.5 Challenges Facing the Mining Sector in Zimbabwe Despite these positive steps, there are a host of macro-economic challenges that must still be addressed in order to pave the way for technological and sustainable development in the country. Zimbabwe is at a further disadvantage that in the period of time that the mining sector has been at a standstill since early 2000 nearly a decade of hyperinflation and the general disintegration of infrastructure especially those used to generate and provide power, water and transport has only served to undermine the cost-competitiveness right across the economy’s different sectors.45 Zimbabwe is not typically considered a mineral economy like the DRC, Zambia or even Botswana, however, since the crisis period witnessed during the 2000s, it has become increasingly dependent on foreign revenues stemming from a very narrow range of mineral exports.46 Following this hit, major sectors in agriculture and manufacturing likewise stagnated. But despite a resort to mining revenue to sustain economic development, official statistics show that Zimbabwe is active in only 10 out of a possible 60 minerals in the mining sector. As discussed above, mineral exploration data is scant owing to a grave technological and financial incapacitation as discussed above.47 But not only then does Zimbabwe lack the necessary infrastructure and resources to fund surveys, but also a stable macro-economic structure, which triggers a lack of FDI. Defined narrowly, Foreign Direct Investment is the act of acquiring assets outside one's home country. These assets may be financial, such as bonds, bank deposits and equity shares or

45

Blessing Zulu,” Zimbabwe Fails to Enforce Compliance to Indigenization Law”, Zimplus, 6 January 2016, https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/zimbabwe-fails-to-enforce-compliance-withindigenization-law/3132506.html (accessed 4 May 2020). 46 Mining Potential Booklet “Procedures & Requirements of Acquiring Licenses and Permits In Terms Of the Mines and Minerals Act (Chapter 21:05)”, 2018, https://www.mines.gov.zw/sites/ default/files/Downloads/Zimbabwe%20Mineral%20Pontential%20Booklet.pdf (accessed 4 October 2019). 47 Raj Bhala, International Trade Law: Interdisciplinary Theory and Practice, (New York: LexisNexis, 2007), ix.

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they may be so called direct investment and involve the ownership of means of production such as factories and land.48 In an attempt to channel increased FDI flows and foster stability within the economic environment, the government submitted an application for support from the African Development Bank (AfDB), the United Nations (UN) as well as the WBG amongst other parties to make an assessment of the scale of its challenges, which organizations subsequently instituted a Joint Assessment Phase, which collated data and analyzed existing information sources in 24 different sectors across different thematic areas in Zimbabwe.49 Approved in May of 2014, The Zimbabwe Reconstruction Fund (ZIMREF) was described as a multiple donor, country specific trust fund, as approved by the Board of Executive Directors, and was expected to subsist until December 2019.50 ZIMREF was considered instrumental in implementing the World Bank Third Interim Strategy Note for Zimbabwe and was expected to contribute to strengthening Zimbabwe’s reconstruction and systems development with the aim of promoting stabilization and reform through development and the alleviation of poverty.51 However due to economic constraints this programme was abandoned while Zimbabwe attempts to clear its U.S.$2 million debt to ZIMREF within the next 12 months.52 Since then Zimbabwe has been barred from accessing international credit and has struggled to tackle the causes of grave political and economic crisis which has stifled the country’s development since 1997.53 The boom in exploration witnessed prior to 1996 before reaching its peak in that same year has quickly dwindled and declined since that time and Zimbabwe has unfortunately failed to lure exploration dollars from international investments since 1999.54 There is substantial backlog in investment in the mining sector and capital stock is not

Hossein Jalilian and John Weiss, “Foreign Direct Investment and Poverty in the ASEAN Region”, ASEAN Economic Bulletin 19, (2002), 231. 49 Mining Potential Booklet “Procedures & Requirements of Acquiring Licenses and Permits In Terms Of the Mines and Minerals Act (Chapter 21:05)”, 2018, https://www.mines.gov.zw/sites/ default/files/Downloads/Zimbabwe%20Mineral%20Pontential%20Booklet.pdf (accessed 4 October 2019). 50 The World Bank, “The Zimbabwe Reconstruction Fund”, 2019, https://www.worldbank.org/en/ programs/zimbabwe-reconstruction-fund#2 (accessed 22 September 2019). 51 Ibid. 52 Nelson Banya, “Zimbabwe aims to clear World Bank arrears in 12 months” IOL, 22 October 2018, https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/zimbabwe-aims-to-clear-world-bank-arrears-in-12-months17581563 (accessed 22 September 2019). 53 OECD, “Report on Zimbabwe”, 2020, https://www.oecd.org/countries/zimbabwe/ (accessed 22 September 2019). 54 Mining Potential Booklet, “Procedures & Requirements of Acquiring Licenses and Permits In Terms Of the Mines and Minerals Act (Chapter 21:05)”, 2018, https://www.mines.gov.zw/sites/ default/files/Downloads/Zimbabwe%20Mineral%20Pontential%20Booklet.pdf (accessed 4 October 2019). 48

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only reduced but, due to low investment levels prevailing over the past 20 years, equipment has also depreciated and has lamentably become obsolete, which has a direct bearing on the efficiency of mining extraction and minerals processing.55 It is thus proposed that earth science data collected and distributed from commercial small-satellite constellations will supplement initiatives spearheaded by the space agency and mining sector programmes. To bolster these there will in future be a greater need for regional integration even with strategic partners abroad who can provide space agencies like ZINGSA with the necessary technical assistance to push the development of the national and supranational space industry forward, the latter which, as of March 2020, was valued at a whopping U.S.$7.37 billion annually.56 To-date 41 satellites have been launched by 11 nations, there are currently 19 regional space agencies/centres on the continent, and of late, the rise of NewSpace actors has been encouragingly marked. In keeping with the progressive democratization of outer space for developing and emerging nations this would be an opportune time for Zimbabwe to throw down the metaphorical satellite gauntlet. A common continental approach will thus allow for risk and cost sharing.57 The African Space Agency, tentatively named ‘AfriSpace’, will bring a much-needed regulatory framework and implement a long-term African Space Policy, recommend space objectives to member states as well as coordinate space situational awareness and equitable allocation of orbital slots and radio frequency and other space resources in a way that will foster collective development on the African continent. Being the bread-basket of the world, Africa, with its vast mineral wealth, will accordingly stand to gain from what can, for this present discourse, be dubbed the ‘Zimbabwean method’ for mineral and economic prosperity through space applications.

3

Satellite Technology for Sustainable Development

It is forecast that by the year 2040, the global space industry will be worth upwards of U.S.$1 trillion.58 What is clear from these figures is that the economic impact of investing in space applications is huge! But even further than that, despite not having a numerical quantification, the social impact worth of space applications is

55

Bharat Dhar, Mining Policy Initiatives, (New Delhi, Srishti, 2001) 41. Temidayo Oniosun, “African Space Industry generating $7 billion annually, to exceed $10 billion by 2024”, Space in Africa, 7 June 2019, https://africanews.space/african-space-industrynow-generating-over-usd-7-billion-annually-to-exceed-usd-10-billion-by-2024/ (accessed 14 June 2019). 57 Ian Timberlake, “Africa eyes joint space agency”, PhysOrg, 4 September 2012, https://phys.org/ news/2012-09-ministers-african-Space-Agency.html (accessed 14 February 2019). 58 Temidayo Oniosun, “African Space Industry generating $7 billion annually, to exceed $10 billion by 2024”, Space in Africa, 7 June 2019, https://africanews.space/african-space-industrynow-generating-over-usd-7-billion-annually-to-exceed-usd-10-billion-by-2024/ (accessed 14 June 2019). 56

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equally valuable, if not more. Thus, this chapter is concerned not only with transforming Zimbabwe into a tech hub for trade in services through space applications and the attraction for foreign direct investment, but also how satellite technology can be used to advance social aims. Space technologies for mineral mapping will assist in generating employment opportunities for Zimbabweans, both at home and abroad, according to the Minister, and will encourage Zimbabweans living in the diaspora to return to the country and assist in building the industry.59 Satellites are also environmentallyfriendly and help to preserve the terrain while still gathering useful data for mining, GPS, weather and others. In fact, regarding weather forecasting, and in the context of climate change, disaster management has become a hot topic on the African continent, which is expected to be climate change’s most vulnerable target. Climate change is expected to have an impact on personal and food security on the continent which is why satellites will be useful in boosting disaster mitigation techniques. A venture towards investing in space systems is thus also one of national pride as noted by the South African Space Advisory Company Official Turcia Busakwe, who has praised the recent establishment of ZINGSA, as a development that her company was willing to support in order to one day see Zimbabwe launching its own satellite.60 The Minister of Technology, speaking to national radio station Star FM on the 1st of October 2019, during a segment called “The Minister’s Desk”, also succinctly stated ZINGSA’s role in this developmental aim of the established agency citing: ZINGSA’s core mandate will be to design and promote research and innovation in geospatial science, as well as to regulate any other related activities which would be constructed in a series of phases.61

As well, because sustainable development has become a global ideal in terms of the SDG goals Zimbabwe will also be in a position to coordinate national and international collaborations to foster space for sustainable uses. It is hoped that a number of businesses with specialized space-related capability in research, engineering, manufacture and design will seek to collaborate through strategic partnerships. Zimbabwe would be looking towards partnerships with the private sector to develop space initiatives that would most impact the lives of ordinary citizens. Zimbabwe has a keen interest in engaging in outer space activities to cement its position as a competent player in international space not only for economic gain, but societal gain at large, as reiterated by the President Emmerson Mnangagwa:

Mu Xuequan, “Zimbabwe Launches Space Agency ZINGSA”, Xinhuanet, 11 July 2019, https:// www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-07/11/c_137315340.htm (accessed 21 September 2019). 60 Mu Xuequan, “Zimbabwe Launches Space Agency ZINGSA”, Xinhuanet, 11 July 2019, https:// www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-07/11/c_137315340.htm (accessed 21 September 2019). 61 See Footnote 40. 59

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It is expected that this initiative will enhance Zimbabwe’s capacity to engage in global policy discourses on generation, access, use and regulation of theapplication of space technologies and innovations for sustainable development.62

The actions taken by ZINGSA and the government of Zimbabwe are a clear commitment to explore technological alternatives in the hopes that keeping abreast with 4IR will attract foreign investors and new trading partners to help revive Zimbabwe’s ailing economy. More than this, the commitment extends to a deeper expectation to extend services, through this programme, that enhance the quality of life of Zimbabwean citizens. On the verge of economic and social collapse, it is posited that a technological upgrade may be Zimbabwe’s breath of fresh air and an opportunity to look beyond the frontier to the realm of developed country status.

3.1 Conclusion and Reccomendations As we perch on the cusp of 4IR, Zimbabwe has a real opportunity to restore the ailing mining industry using an ingenious resort to satellite technology, to assist in bridging the infrastructural and technological gap that has so adversely affected mineral exploration in the region.63 Not only does satellite technology provide a more efficient and precise way of mapping mineral reserves it also generally considered more sustainable in a multitude of other sectors for smart farming, disaster mitigation and even tracking of wildlife for conservation.64 Satellite technology is also forward focused, and may even drive Zimbabwe to begin to consider even more innovative processes to address local challenges. To drive the 4IR mining potential even further might include pegging and marking of potential mineral sites remotely, to be collected digitally and stored on a cloud or database making use of sophisticated block chain technology that will allow real-time data that is readily accessible to all potential investors and prospectors alike.65 Investors would be in a position to engage in peer-to-peer lending of mining zone or financial and capital assets. The database would also allow for easy distinction between occupied and untapped mineral zones. This would bring a welcome level of certainty to a system that for the most part has been impaired and undermined by the failure, even of bodies such as the ZGS, to reliably and adequately collate and store information pertaining to Zimbabwe’s Mu Xuequan, “Zimbabwe Launches Space Agency ZINGSA”, Xihuanet, 11 July 2019, https:// www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-07/11/c_137315340.htm (accessed 21 September 2019). 63 Natural Resource Governance Institute, “State participation and state-owned enterprises: The benefits and challenges”, NGRI, March 2015, https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/ nrgi_State-Participation-and-SOEs.pdf (accessed 4 May 2020). 64 Temidayo Oniosun, “African Space Industry generating $7 billion annually, to exceed $10 billion by 2024”, Space in Africa, 7 June 2019, https://africanews.space/african-space-industrynow-generating-over-usd-7-billion-annually-to-exceed-usd-10-billion-by-2024/ (accessed 14 June 2019). 65 Carl Christol, “Human Rights in Outer Space”, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA), 16 August 2012, https://arc.aiaa.org/doi/abs/10.2514/6.1968-910 (accessed 4 May 2020). 62

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vast mineral reserves. Satellite technology is a feasible option for Zimbabwe given the commitments already made by the government in establishing the much needed Space Agency to be the driver of these operations. The author finally restates that the mapping of mineral reserves is vital in any conception of the revival of Zimbabwe’s ailing mining industry and must be leveraged if foreign investment is to be attracted.66 Given the information that has been submitted above, foreign investors would be highly interested in diverting their funds towards Zimbabwe’s mining sector based on what is presently known about its rich geographical landscape alone. What more, then, if Zimbabwe’s full mineral capacity were recorded and certain?67

Ruvimbo Samanga is a graduate of Law from the University of Pretoria. She currently serves as the National Point of Contact (Zimbabwe) for the Space Generation Advisory Council and is a Research Fellow at the Open Lunar Foundation. Her role as a space law and policy analyst, focuses her research towards developing frameworks that address regulatory challenges in sustainable and equitable uses of outer space, trade and investment related aspects of space applications as well dispute resolution mechanisms for outer space disputes.

Natural Resource Governance Institute, “State participation and state-owned enterprises: The benefits and challenges”, NGRI, March 2015, https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/ nrgi_State-Participation-and-SOEs.pdf (accessed 4 May 2020). 67 Gavin Bridge, “Contested Terrain: Mining and the Environment”, Annual Review of Environmental Resources, 2004, https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.energy.28.011503.163434 (accessed 4 May 2020). 66

The Final Frontier: Considering the Right to Privacy in the Context of Remote Sensing Tebello Mosoeu

Abstract

The issue of remote sensing raises a number of important questions of international law. It is understood that remote sensing activities are in themselves legal, as provided for by both the Outer Space Treaty as well as the Principles on Remote Sensing. This has, therefore, resulted in a wide variety of applications for remote sensing from using the data to predict extreme weather conditions, and evacuate would-be victims, to detecting desertification on previously arable land. This wide variety of applications, however, can be seen as the basis for concern surrounding remote sensing data violating the right to privacy. The right to privacy therefore needs to be analysed very carefully, and with consideration while bearing in mind the benefits which can be derived from remote sensing technology. This chapter therefore explores the nature and development of satellite technology and weighs that against the righto privacy as it is protected in terms of international law.

This work has been adapted from the dissertation prepared by Tebello Mosoeu in partial fulfilment of her LLB degree at the University of Pretoria. T. Mosoeu (&) University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 A. Froehlich (ed.), Space Fostering African Societies, Southern Space Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59158-8_3

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Introduction

The idea of earth observation (“EO”) technology violating one’s right to privacy seems like a very far away, esoteric, theoretical discussion. But then, so did the idea of a human-being walking in outer space until the 18th of March 1965.1 Therefore, this Chapter will carefully weigh up the right to privacy as it exists in international law, with the freedom of States to participate in remote sensing activities. Firstly, the nature and development of satellite data will be discussed. Satellite technology is developing at a rapid pace. As such, it is conceivable that the technology could be used to violate people’s right to privacy. Then, the use of satellites as being particularly problematic with regards to the right to privacy will be explored. To this end, the legal regime with regards to the right to privacy will be explored. Lastly, it will be concluded that the existing legal regime governing remote sensing is insufficient to deal with violations to the privacy of people.

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Nature and Development of Satellite Information

2.1 The Democratisation of Satellites and Remote Sensing For as long as there has been remote sensing, there has been concern about the information which could be acquired through its use. Cho argues that ‘[t]he need to develop a legal framework to govern EO and privacy has been hastened by the rapid developments in the application of geospatial technology.’2 According to the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (“UNOOSA”), over 8.000 space objects have been launched into outer space.3 This number is rising steadily with the birth of ‘nano’ and ‘micro’ satellites. The traditional satellite can cost around U.S.$300 million (depending on the nature of the satellite), and requires a further amount of between U.S.$10 million and U.S.$400 million to launch into space, depending on what vehicle they use.4 Nowadays, however, there are nano-satellites which can be built and launched into space for around €500.000 (U.S.$550.000).5 To put this into perspective, when Isis raided the city of Mosul in 2014, they looted around £250 million (U.S.$315 Space.com Astronauts ‘Mourn Alexei Leonov, the World's 1st Spacewalker, While On a Spacewalk of Their Own’ https://www.space.com/spacewalking-astronauts-mourn-cosmonautalexei-leonov-death.html (accessed: 13 October 2019). 2 G Cho ‘Privacy and EO: An Overview of Legal Issues’ in R Purdy & D Leung (eds) Evidence from Earth Observation Satellites: Emerging Legal Issues (2013) 260. 3 United Nations Office for Outer Space ‘Online Index of Objects Launched into Outer Space’ http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/osoindex/search-ng.jspx?lf_id= (accessed: 11 October 2019). 4 How Stuff Works ‘How Satellites Work’ https://science.howstuffworks.com/satellite10.htm (accessed: 10 October 2019). 5 Alén ‘A Basic Guide to Nano Satellites’ https://alen.space/basic-guide-nanosatellites/ (accessed: 11 October 2019). 1

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million) from Mosul’s Central Bank.6 It is clear that the invention of the nano-satellite is democratising access to space objects, which were previously out of reach to the average person.

2.2 Towards a New Type of Remote Sensing: Key Technological Developments in the Field While it is clear that access to satellites has increased and gained momentum over time, it is important to understand the exact capabilities of satellites today, in order to understand how they might develop in time. The functions of satellites are many and varied, from image data acquisition and storage, to satellites used to assist in communication.7 What needs to be elaborated on, however, is how satellites are getting smarter as well. Cho explains that “[a]dvertently or otherwise, all activities on the ground are captured on a regular and cyclical basis.”8 When this information is analysed and coupled with other spatial and thematic information, the images expose far more about the subject matter than the original image on its own.9 Consequently, linked network information about people is becoming an increasing reality, and such information can reveal a lot about a person which, in turn, violates their right to privacy.10 This is particularly problematic in light of ‘automated data processing.’11 De Jong explains that satellites are producing images which are clearer, and that they are capable of taking images more frequently as well.12 He explains that, where the human eye is only capable of seeing three types of light (ie. red light, blue light, and green light), satellites are capable of observing ten different types of light, many of which are infrared and invisible to the naked eye. All these different colours which are available to the satellite, show different information about the Earth.13 More and more, however, this information is being analysed by computers which are being programmed for ‘machine learning’. Essentially, what this means is that human beings are teaching computers how to learn; how to take existing data sets and use them to extrapolate further information by determining their own rules Huffington Post ‘ISIS Loots £250 m from Mosul’s Central Bank and Rockets Them Up Terror Watch List’ https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2014/06/13/isis-terror-rich-bank-ira_n_5491156. html? (accessed 11 October 2019). 7 E Chuvieco Fundamentals of Satellite Remote Sensing (2010) 1. 8 G Cho ‘Privacy and EO: An Overview of Legal Issues’ in R Purdy & D Leung (note 5 above) 260. 9 G Cho ‘Privacy and EO: An Overview of Legal Issues’ in R Purdy & D Leung (note 5 above) 260. 10 G Cho ‘Privacy and EO: An Overview of Legal Issues’ in R Purdy & D Leung (note 5 above) 261. 11 G Cho ‘Privacy and EO: An Overview of Legal Issues’ in R Purdy & D Leung (note 5 above) 261. 12 Jakko de Jong ‘A New Perspectve on Earth’ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WBSTzbj5ouQ (accessed: 01 October 2019). 13 de Jong (note 15 above). 6

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and patterns.14 The result of this is that computers are being given their own intelligence. This technology is capable of expanding the manner in which personal data is analysed, and creating connections which otherwise would have gone undiscovered.15 To be clear, this is true for any information in the Digital Age, but has the potential to be specifically malignant where a person isn’t aware that this data exists, as is the case with remotely sensed data. It seems important to note that the technology being referred to by De Jong is not future technology which scientists are on the brink of discovering; it already exists. How this technology is honed, however, is by giving computers satellite images for them to analyse and ultimately, make observations with.16 De Jong illustrates this by explaining the technology that the Dutch Police are using to detect cannabis fields. He explains that using satellite images, law enforcement agencies can input data into a computer which can recognise patterns in the production of cannabis. Using machine-learning, the same computer can use that pattern to discover thousands more cannabis fields around the world. A problem, however, emerges, if this data was to be used against people. De Jong explains that in future, a satellite might be able to take images of your home, your vehicle, when the lights come on and off, what can be found in your garden, and what neighbourhood you live in. This seemingly innocuous information may lead to artificial intelligences being able to extrapolate data about your financial well-being.17 This information might then find its way to a bank which, using the same technology for predictive analytics, may deny you a home loan. According to De Jong, the technology has not developed to that extent; yet. It must be noted that the possibility of satellites being hacked has become a matter of increasing concern recently.18 One author notes that “[s]everal States, including less advanced ones, have been able to develop cyber warfare capabilities that could interfere with outer space systems and satellite functioning.19 This would be in contravention of Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty which states that where a State Party believes that any activities it performs in outer space may lead to ‘harmful interference’ with the activities of other States, it must undertake the necessary international consultations before it can proceed with its activity.20

14

de Jong (note 15 above). G Cho ‘Privacy and EO: An Overview of Legal Issues’ in R Purdy & D Leung (note 5 above) 261. 16 de Jong (note 15 above). 17 de Jong (note 15 above). 18 Washington Post ‘Our satellites are prime targets for a cyberattack. And things could get worse.’ https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/our-satellites-are-prime-targets-for-a-cyberattack-andthings-could-get-worse/2019/05/07/31c85438-7041-11e9-8be0-ca575670e91c_story.html (accessed 10 October 2019). 19 United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research ‘Electronic and Cyber Warfare in Outer Space’ https://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/electronic-and-cyber-warfare-in-outer-spaceen-784.pdf (accessed: 10 October 2019). 20 Outer Space Treaty, Article IX. 15

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However, it is doubtful that a State would consent to its satellite being hacked. It is conceivable, however, that the information acquired during a cyber-attack might further be used to violate people’s right to privacy.

3

Legal Regime Governing the Right to Privacy

3.1 The Right to Privacy and the Outer Space Treaty The Outer Space Treaty applies to all activities which take place in outer space.21 The problem with this, however, is that it is extremely vague and doesn’t even mention remote sensing. It guarantees every State Party to the Treaty the right to use and explore outer space. However, the only way to limit the rights granted by the Outer Space Treaty would be to conclude new treaties or establish international customary law to that effect.22 This is extremely problematic, however, since the development of space law and, indeed, any international law depends on the willingness of States to co-operate.23 States have shown an unwillingness to co-operate where such co-operation doesn’t correlate with their economic and political needs. An example of this would be President Donald Trump’s insistence on creating a so-called ‘Space Force to serve as the sixth branch of the United States (“U.S.”) military, which will protect the interests of the United States in space.’24 This, in spite of the fact that military activities in space are explicitly prohibited by Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty.25 Similarly, in 2015, US President Barack Obama signed into US law legislation which would enable US citizens to own resources mined in space.26 This was done by the US even though Article 2 of the Outer Space Treaty states quite unequivocally that “outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of national sovereignty.”27 It is therefore, doubtful that those benefitting materially from the existing legal framework as it pertains to remote sensing would be overcome with altruism and the political willpower to develop any limitation on the existing status quo. Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty provides that a State Party to the Treaty is internationally liable for damage to another State Party or its natural or juristic persons.28 The Liability Convention elaborates on the State Parties liability with 21

Outer Space Treaty, Article I. F von der Dunk ‘Outer Space Law Principles and Privacy’ in R Purdy & D Leung (eds) Evidence from Earth Observation Satellites: Emerging Legal Issues (2013) 245. 23 F Tronchetti Fundamentals of Space Law and Policy (2013). 24 NY Times ‘NY Times—Trump authorises a Space Command’ https://www.nytimes.com/2019/ 08/29/us/politics/trump-space-command-force.html (Accessed on 30 August 2019). 25 Outer Space Treaty, Art IV. 26 Mining Dot Com ‘Obama boosts asteroid mining, signs law granting rights to own space riches’ https://www.mining.com/obama-boosts-asteroid-mining-signs-law-granting-rights-to-own-spaceriches/ (Accessed: 01 October 2019). 27 Outer Space Treaty, Article II. 28 Outer Space Treaty, Art VII. 22

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regards to space activities.29 If one State Party is responsible for ‘damage’ to another State Party, the offending State Party is liable to compensate the injured State for the damage.30 ‘Damage’ can be defined as the loss of life, personal injury, or loss of or damage to the property of States and the people, both natural and juristic.31 This essentially means that ‘damage’ is understood to mean some type of physical damage. Therefore, it would appear that even if one was to prove the violation of their privacy through remotely sensed data, it is unlikely that they will be able to rely on the Liability Convention to claim relief. Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty provides that a State Party will retain ownership of their registered space object.32 The registration of space objects makes them easier to identify, and therefore, makes it easier to hold their launching States accountable. Article 4 of the Registration Convention states that launching State must inform the Secretary General of the UN “…as soon as it is practicable “…of certain information about the space object itself, such as its name, the date and location of its launch, and the “…general function of the space object.”33 This is problematic in that it places a very vague obligation on States to give the UN some information about their space object at any time that the State deems appropriate.34 Interestingly, von der Dunk argues that finding out the ‘general function’ of the space object might allow someone who is privacy-conscious to be alerted to the possibility of a ‘potentially privacy-infringing satellite.’35 Such information is readily available on the UN Website,36 meaning that any person with access to the internet possessing even moderate computer literacy skills would be able to acquire that information. One recent application listed the general function of the space object as being ‘experimental satellite and earth observation.’37 It is submitted that the newly registered satellite is exactly the type of satellite envisioned as being affected by this chapter. The general function of the satellite is too vague to provide any clarity on what exactly the State which owns the satellite is doing with it, and more importantly, how that usage may affect other States adversely. Moreover, von der Dunk argues that the requirements of Article 4 are so vague that it is often F von der Dunk ‘Outer Space Law Principles and Privacy’ in R Purdy & D Leung Leung (eds) Evidence from Earth Observation Satellites: Emerging Legal Issues (2013) 249. 30 F von der Dunk ‘Outer Space Law Principles and Privacy’ in R Purdy & D Leung (note 32 above) 249. 31 F von der Dunk ‘Outer Space Law Principles and Privacy’ in R Purdy & D Leung (note 32 above) 249. 32 Outer Space Treaty, Article VIII. 33 Registration Convention, Article IV. 34 F von der Dunk ‘Outer Space Law Principles and Privacy’ in R Purdy & D Leung (note 32 above) 252. 35 F von der Dunk ‘Outer Space Law Principles and Privacy’ in R Purdy & D Leung (note 32 above) 252. 36 United Nations Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space (unoosa.org/oosa/en/ spaceobjectregister/index.html) (accessed 01 October 2019). 37 United Nations Office for Outer Space ‘Registration data on space object launched by Mexico’ http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/osoindex/data/documents/mx/st/stsgser.e903.html (accessed on 01 October 2019). 29

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ignored in practice.38 Therefore, even if a person who values their privacy, is aware of the existence of the registry for space objects, accessing information about exactly what those satellites are doing and how exactly they may violate one’s privacy seems unworkable.

3.2 The Right to Privacy and the UN Principles on Remote Sensing The Remote Sensing Principles (“the Principles”) are not binding in themselves as a legal instrument. However, they have the force of customary law to make them applicable. Von der Dunk argues that much like the Outer Space Treaty, these Principles offer very little in the way of protecting or regulating the issue of privacy in remote sensing.39 In fact, the Principles limit themselves in the scope of their application to remote sensing used “for the purpose of improving natural resource management, land use, and the protection of the environment.”40 This is obviously quite problematic as they don’t consider the multitude of uses for remote sensing in outer space. Therefore, they provide very little guidance on the issue of how remote sensing might violate people’s privacy rights in outer space.41 Furthermore, they are largely focused on the interests of States and not individual persons.42 It is conceivable that the interests of States and their governments might differ dramatically from those of their citizens, particularly in relation to the right to privacy. The Principles come close to articulating a need for privacy with regards to Principle IV. Principle IV states that remote sensing activities should be carried out taking into consideration “the full and permanent sovereignty of all States and peoples over their own wealth and natural resources, with due regard for the rights and interests […] of other States and entities under their jurisdiction”.43 Furthermore, the activities may not be “detrimental to the legitimate rights and interests of the sensed State.”44 Von der Dunk explains that this clause creates a principled protection for the privacy of States but this is immediately undercut by limiting it to the wealth and natural resources of the States concerned.45 This clause was inserted because at the time of drafting, developing nations were concerned that developed nations would use remote sensing technology to locate valuable mineral resources F von der Dunk ‘Outer Space Law Principles above) 252. 39 F von der Dunk ‘Outer Space Law Principles above) 253. 40 Remote Sensing Principles, Principle I(a). 41 F von der Dunk ‘Outer Space Law Principles above) 253. 42 F von der Dunk ‘Outer Space Law Principles above) 253. 43 Remote Sensing Principles, Principle IV. 44 Remote Sensing Principles, Principle IV. 45 F von der Dunk ‘Outer Space Law Principles above) 254. 38

and Privacy’ in R Purdy & D Leung (note 32 and Privacy’ in R Purdy & D Leung (note 32

and Privacy’ in R Purdy & D Leung (note 32 and Privacy’ in R Purdy & D Leung (note 32

and Privacy’ in R Purdy & D Leung (note 32

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in their territories, and that the developed States would use that information to their advantage.46 Therefore, this clause was an attempt at establishing a regime for remote sensing which gave the sensed State a measure of protection against the actions of a sensing State.47 In an ideal scenario, this would, for example, prohibit sensing of a State’s territory without explicit consent from that State; or, that the data generated from the sensing activities would only be accessible to the sensed and sensing States unless the former agreed that the latter may distribute the data to a wider audience.48 This, however, is not what happened.49 Instead, the handicapped version of this intention was concretised in Principle IV. Principle XII of the Remote Sensing Principles provides that a sensed State has a right to access primary and processed data about its territory “on a non-discriminatory basis and [at a] reasonable cost.”50 This essentially means that the sensed State does not have the right to open access of the sensing State’s data, but also, that the sensed State cannot prevent the generation of data in the first place.51 The only exceptions to this are where this data is essential to the protection of the Earth’s natural environment, or protecting humankind from natural disasters.52 It is important to note that this right exists in conjunction with the fact that a sensed State has no right to prevent another State from undertaking remote sensing activities above their territory, and that the sensed State has no right to prioritised access to the information of a sensing State.53 In practice, the Principles are implemented at the discretion of the sensing parties without necessarily adhering to the original intentions behind them.54

3.3 The Right to Privacy and the Right to Freedom of Expression The freedom to explore outer space as protected by the Outer Space Treaty is not the only problem. Article 19(2) of the ICCPR states that everyone has the right to freedom of expression, and that such right includes the freedom to ‘seek, receive 46 F von der Dunk ‘Outer Space Law Principles and Privacy’ in R Purdy & D Leung (note 32 above) 254. 47 F von der Dunk ‘Outer Space Law Principles and Privacy’ in R Purdy & D Leung (note 32 above) 254. 48 F von der Dunk ‘Outer Space Law Principles and Privacy’ in R Purdy & D Leung (note 32 above) 254. 49 F von der Dunk ‘Outer Space Law Principles and Privacy’ in R Purdy & D Leung (note 32 above) 254. 50 Remote Sensing Principles, Principle XII. 51 F von der Dunk ‘Outer Space Law Principles and Privacy’ in R Purdy & D Leung (note 32 above) 255. 52 Remote Sensing Principles, Principle X. 53 G Cho ‘Privacy and EO: An Overview of Legal Issues’ in R Purdy & D Leung (note 5 above) 266. 54 F von der Dunk ‘Outer Space Law Principles and Privacy’ in R Purdy & D Leung (note 5 above) 256.

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and impart information of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.’55 This ostensibly means that not only does the Outer Space Treaty guarantee the right to participate in almost any possible activity in outer space with the exclusion of those specifically mentioned in the Treaty, Article 19(2) underpins this right by further allowing the freedom to ‘seek, receive, and impart information and ideas.’56 The only limitations listed in Article 19(3) are in respect of the rights or reputations of others, or for the protection of national security or of public order, public health or morals.57 However, these limitations will only apply if they are ‘provided by law and are necessary.’58 The Human Rights Commission has observed that the limitation of these rights cannot be assessed based on a “margin of appreciation” but requires strict adherence to the internal limitations stated in Article 19(3).59 The result of this is that a State wanting to limit the rights of a party which collects data via remote sensing, might be rendered toothless in trying to limit that right on the basis that it violates citizen’s rights to privacy.

3.4 The Right to Privacy and International Law Not all remote sensing data is as unencumbered as remote sensing via earth observation. It has been established that remote sensing entails observing the Earth from a distance. This can be done using almost any technology. Article 1 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Chicago Convention’) guarantees that States maintain territorial sovereignty over their own national airspace.60 This empowers any State Party to the Chicago Convention to prohibit any unauthorised activities in their airspace.61 Von der Dunk cites the example of the U-2 spy plane being shot down over Soviet airspace in 1960 as an example of a State forcibly removing a party which was observing them without permission.62 This essentially means that a State may in every other possible way prevent another State from observing it without permission. Therefore, there is a clear distinction between observation inside of a territory, and observation from outer space, even though the information acquired might be exactly the same.

55

ICCPR, Article 19. F von der Dunk ‘Outer Space Law Principles and Privacy’ above) 246. 57 ICCPR, Article 19(3). 58 ICCPR, Article 19(3). 59 General Comment 34 at para 8. 60 Convention on International Civil Aviation (herein referred Article 1. 61 F von der Dunk ‘Outer Space Law Principles and Privacy’ above) 246. 62 F von der Dunk ‘Outer Space Law Principles and Privacy’ above) 246. 56

in R Purdy & D Leung (note 22

to as ‘the Chicago Convention’), in R Purdy & D Leung (note 32 in R Purdy & D Leung (note 32

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Essentially, what this means is that if a person wanted to defend their right to privacy based on the information generated about them through remote sensing, they would have to do so at a national level.63 That being said, “[n]o international regime has yet emerged whereby the privacy protection afforded by one national legal regime would be generally recognised.”64 Consequently, if, for example, South Africa created national legislation protecting South African citizens from the harms of remote sensing, this would not be sufficient to preclude sensing countries from violating the personal privacy of South African citizens. Von der Dunk sums up the crux of the issue as follows: …there is a lack of relevant and precise guidance in the [Outer Space Treaty] on issues of privacy related to VHR [very high resolution] satellite data, particularly in the area of privacy in its classical sense, referring to private individuals (and subsidiary legal entities such as companies). The four follow up treaties on space could be described, at best, as tangentially relevant in such context. They confirm that, at the time these major space treaties were drafted (during the 1960s and 1970s), no serious consideration was given to real privacy protection.65

This goes to the heart of this chapter: if we are looking to allay our concerns that our rights to privacy are protected or that the infringement of those rights can be ameliorated in terms of space law, the unfortunate reality is that that is simply not the case. Therefore, it is incumbent on States who participate in space activities to develop a legal regime which places the protection of people’s privacy at the heart of its concerns.

4

Conclusion

George Cho has observed that “[w]hereas in the past, the invasion of privacy required the physical crossing of social and property boundaries, with the advent of outer space technology, there may be no such need.”66 It has been suggested that the ‘combined effects of new generation high resolution imagery, the privatisation of the remote sensing industry, and the development of the global information infrastructure have inadvertently conspired to produce significant legal and ethical challenges for the remote sensing community.’67 According to Cho, ‘[i]n future, the

63 F von der Dunk ‘Outer Space Law Principles and Privacy’ in R Purdy & D Leung (note 32 above) 257. 64 F von der Dunk ‘Outer Space Law Principles and Privacy’ in R Purdy & D Leung (note 32 above) 257. 65 F von der Dunk ‘Outer Space Law Principles and Privacy’ in R Purdy & D Leung (note 32 above) 252. 66 G Cho ‘Privacy and EO: An Overview of Legal Issues’ in R Purdy & D Leung (note 5 above) 254. 67 G Cho ‘Privacy and EO: An Overview of Legal Issues’ in R Purdy & D Leung (note 5 above) 261.

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technology may become so sophisticated that facial recognition may become possible.’68 Therefore, ‘given these erosions to privacy, there are some who believe that governments have a responsibility to ensure that the infrastructure they deploy contains privacy protections.’69 ‘[T]echnical experts in EO systems need to be responsive to the rapid progress in information technology. Legal practice and law, on the other hand, are, by design, both reactive and slow to evolve.’70 As a result, lawyers and scientists often operate insularly of one another, resulting in patent disparities between the existing technology, and the protection of people’s rights. One author makes it clear that ‘[w]e simply do not know all the positive and negative impacts these new technologies will bring, which makes it difficult to make informed decisions in the present.’71 The exact nature of the threat to privacy posed by remote sensing seems elusive right now as it is nearly impossible to know how far the technology will have advanced five, fifteen, or even fifty years from now. What is clear however, is that everyone has the right to privacy, and space law, as it stands today, can do very little to assist people to protect that right.

Tebello Mosoeu graduated from the University of Pretoria with an LLB in 2020, after completing her BA Law degree from the same university in 2018. She currently works as a Candidate Attorney in Johannesburg. Tebello has a particular interest in the legal regime governing various aspects of space exploration and other space activities. She has also participated in the Manfred Lachs Space Law Moot Court. Tebello advocates for the democratisation of space and the benefits of its exploration, and that these should be made accessible to all humankind. A particular focus area is the application of Space Law concepts to the South African context.

G Cho ‘Privacy and EO: An Overview of Legal Issues’ in R Purdy & D Leung (note 5 above) 260. 69 G Cho ‘Privacy and EO: An Overview of Legal Issues’ in R Purdy & D Leung (note 5 above) 268. 70 G Cho ‘Privacy and EO: An Overview of Legal Issues’ in R Purdy & D Leung (note 5 above) 261. 71 M Latonero & Z Gold Data, Human Rights & Human Security (2015) [SSRN Electronic Journal] https://www.datasociety.net/pubs/dhr/Data-HumanRights-primer2015.pdf (accessed: 14 October 2019). 68

Application of Low to Medium Resolution Data for Hydrological Modeling in Malawi Natalia Dambe and Julian Smit

Abstract

Malawi, a developing country in Sub-Saharan Africa declared 15 of its 28 districts flood prone areas. Based on the review done by the Department of Disaster Management in Malawi, the country faces the challenge of inaccurate or unreliable flood monitoring and warning services. Lack of high-resolution data contributes to this challenge. Therefore, this research has analysed the extent of applying low to medium resolution data (DEM, soil, land use) in Hydrologic Engineering Center-Hydrologic Modeling System (HEC-HMS) by the Hydrologic Engineering Center of the Army Corps of Engineers in the United States of America. The HEC-HMS hydrological model was simulated to provide the following outputs: the peak discharge (m3/s); total flow (m3/s); and volume (m3) per given drainage area (km2) for all the subbasins, reaches, and junctions. The statistical analysis of the model outputs presented the Standard Deviation Ratio (RSR) of 0.458, Percent Volume Bias (PEV) of 0.10%, and, Percentage Error in Peak Flow (PEPF) of 2.89%. The overall Nash-Sutcliffe Efficiency (NSE) coefficient, that measures the accuracy of the model prediction with respect to mean of the observed values, was 0.79. The coefficient of 0.79 was more than 0.75 which means it was a very good model prediction. According to the standard general performance ratings for recommended statistics, the model was rated very good.

N. Dambe (&)
J. Smit Geomatics Division, University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] J. Smit e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 A. Froehlich (ed.), Space Fostering African Societies, Southern Space Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59158-8_4

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N. Dambe and J. Smit

Introduction

Over the years, the advancement in satellite remote sensing has provided better means of acquiring terrestrial conditions and hydrological data that are useful in hydrological model development.1 The remote sensing data has been mainly utilized in three main areas: designing hydrological observation networks; extraction of the catchment physical characteristics such as topography and land cover; and estimation of hydrological parameter properties like soil moisture, precipitation and river discharge.2 Satellite remote sensing data with low (over 60 m per pixel) to medium (10 m to 30 m per pixel) resolution solves data collection and analysis problems faced by developing countries, for example, multispectral images like Landsat allow a vast range of analytical opportunities including time series analysis, land use classification, and wide area coverage, which compensate for the coarse spatial resolution.3,4 Hydrological modeling is important in flood risk modeling to answer the question of “how much water is there?”.5 Hence, the hydrological models represent precipitation-runoff modeling to compute the amount of water that translates into runoff for a given rainfall event.6 On the other hand, the hydraulic models determine the quantity, speed, depth, water coverage (extent), and the shape of the landscape and the stream channel.7 Various hydrological models utilized by researchers, governments and organisations include: Stormwater Management Model (SWMM) by United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).8 European Hydrological Prediction for the Environment by Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute (SMHI); the Hydrologic Engineering Centre-Hydrologic Modeling System (HEC-HMS); MIKE SHE; Hydrologiska Byrans Vattenavdelning (HBV) model; Variable 1

Yoshino,F, 1999, World Meteorological Organization Operational Hydrology Report No. 44: Areal Modelling in Hydrology using Remote Sensing Data and Geographical Information Systems, Geneva-Switzeland, ISBN: 92-63-10885-4, 1 – 29, https://library.wmo.int/doc_num.php? explnum_id=1706. 2 Ibid., 13. 3 Earth Observing Systems, 2019, Satellite Data: What Spatial Resolution is Good for you? https:// eos.com/blog/satellite-data-what-spatial-resolution-is-enough-for-you/. 4 Kite, G, W, Pietroniro, A,1996, Remote sensing applications in hydrological modelling, Hydrological Sciences Journal, 41:4, 563-591, DOI: 10.1080/02626669609491526, https://doi. org/10.1080/02626669609491526. 5 Djokic, Dean, 2015, Hydrological and Hydraulic Modeling with ArcGIS, Esri, Redlands: http:// proceedings.esri.com/library/userconf/proc15/tech-workshops/tw_382-228.pdf. 6 Alaghmand Sina, Rozi Abdullah, Ismail Abustan, and Md Azlin, Md Said, 2012, Gis-based river basin flood modelling using HEC-HMS and MIKE11 - Kayu Ara river basin. Malaysia. Journal of Environmental Hydrology 20: 1-16, http://www.researchgate.net/publication/263351311_Gisbased_river_basin_flood_modelling_using_HEC-HMS_and_MIKE11_Kayu_Ara_river_basin_ Malaysia. 7 Djokic, Hydrological and Hydraulic Modeling with ArcGIS. 8 Pretorius Hanlie, 2011, Flood modelling using data available on the Internet, Cape Town: MSc Thesis, University of Cape Town, https://open.uct.ac.za/bitstream/handle/11427/10680/thesis_ ebe_2011_pretorius_m.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

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Infiltration Capacity (VIC) model by University of Washington, TOPMODEL; Soil and Water Assessment Tools (SWAT) model; and Identification of Unit Hydrographs and Component Flows from Rainfall, Evaporation, and Streamflow (IHACRES) model.9 This research developed and analysed a hydrological model for Malawi, specifically Chikwawa District, using low to medium resolution data as inputs in HEC-HMS software. HEC-HMS software is a physically based, distributed, continuous and watershed model.10,11 The model was developed by the Hydrologic Engineering Center of the Army Corps of Engineers in the United States of America.12 The model’s software is freely available and widely used to simulate and forecast streamflow or rainfall-runoff of watershed systems and is applicable in large river basin water supply.13,14 The basic sources of hydrological modeling data are field observations and remote sensing.15 The case study area (Fig. 1) is faced with many data challenges because of malfunctioning systems such as non-operational meteorological stations in the Shire Basin area and poor data storage. For instance, only two gauging stations are available to provide reliable data, and rainfall and gauge station data are incomplete because some gauge stations are not fully functional.16 High quality resolution data for floodplains in most parts of developing countries, including Malawi, are captured using high-resolution sensors, however the data is mostly inaccessible due to high costs.17 Some of the freely available data in Malawi include sentinel-1 and sentinel-2 radar data, the Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM) data, Climate Hazards Group InfraRed Precipitation with Station Data (CHIRPS), Landsat data, Dartmouth Flood Observatory stream data, soil type data (Malawi Department of Surveys), and rainfall data (Malawi Meteorological Services). This research has utilized the freely available data which is mostly categorized as low to medium resolution data. 9

Ibid., 8. Abushandi, E, & Merkel, B, 2013, Modelling Rainfall-Runoff Relations Using HEC-HMS and IHACRES for a single Rain Event in an Arid Region of Jordan, Jordan: Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht. 11 Al-Abed N, Abdulla F, and Khyarah A, A, 2005, GIS-hydrological models for managing water resources in the Zarqa River basin, Environmental Geology 47(3), 405-411. 12 Cabral, Samuellson Lopes, José B Nilson, Cleiton da Silva Silveira, and Francisco Alberto de Assis Teixeira, 2015, Hydrological and Hydraulic Modelling Integrated with GIS: A Study of the Acarau RiverBasin-CE, Journal of Urban and Environmental 8 (2), 167-174. 13 Abushandi and Merkel, Modelling Rainfall-Runoff Relations Using HEC-HMS and IHACRES for a single Rain Event in an Arid Region of Jordan. 14 Al-Abed, et al, GIS-hydrological models for managing water resources in the Zarqa River basin. 15 Dimet, F-X Le, C Mazauric, and W Castaings, 2000, Models and data for flood modelling, Cedex, http://www.ljk.imag.fr/membres/Cyril.Mazauric/html_fr/Doc/paper.pdf. 16 Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Water Development (MoAIWD), 2015, Shire River Basin Management Programme-Modernising Hydrolological and Meteorological Monitoring Systems in the Shire River Basin, Volume 3, https://www.pdffiller.com/jsfillerdesk12/?projectId= 489646125#9db5b0b34f129ebcac58eeb5d359c5cb. 17 Emerton, et al, Continental and global scale flood forecasting systems. 10

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Fig. 1 a Study area, Chikwawa District, Malawi, b land cover, c catchment

2

Data and Methodology

2.1 Data and Software This research used the following computer software: (a) ArcGIS 10,5 for visualization, analysis, and provide interface of the model parameters. (b) HEC-GeoHMS and ArcHydro tool extension installed in ArcGIS 10,5 for delineation of basin characteristics to create a model. (c) HEC-HMS model software to simulate, calibrate and validate the model. (d) Envi software to carryout land cover classification.

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The following data was used as input into the model: (a) DEM The SRTM DEM covering the Shire river catchment in Chikwawa was downloaded in raster format from the United States Geological Survey (USGS) data portal.18 The DEM was acquired on 11 February 2000 at a resolution of 1 arc-second and was published on 23 September 2014. This was the latest DEM available online by USGS. The DEM was the main data input to delineate the subbasins and drainage lines, analyse the area hydrology and compute slope and elevation. (b) Soil type data (polygon shapefile) The soil data was sourced from National Spatial Data Center at Malawi Department of Surveys through the online data portal called MASDAP.19 The soil data was digitized from a Topographical Map with scale of 1:150.000. This data was used together with land use data to compute runoff Curve Numbers (CN). (c) Land cover data The land cover data in Fig. 1b was created using the Maximum Likelihood Classifier (MLC) method of classification in Envi Software.20 Training sites were digitized from the mosaicked Landsat image to supervise the distinguished themes. The land cover themes included: i. Agricultural land: herbaceous and vegetation planted or cultivated thus presented as tillage, harvest, and irrigation. ii. Built-up area: artificial construction including buildings and roads. iii. Dense vegetation: high, closed, continuous, multi-layered, and broad-leaved trees and shrubs. iv. Waterbodies: water covered surfaces like rivers, dams, reservoirs. v. Bare areas: surfaces not covered by any artificial or natural features, examples are bare rock areas and soil. Barren and sparsely vegetations were also categorized in this theme. (d) Channel data River channel data was obtained from Malawi Department Surveys, which the department digitized from a 1:50.000 Topographical Map.21 The channel data was

18

U.S. Geological Survey, USGS Science for a changing World. EarthExplorer, (accessed 3 June 2019), https://earthexplorer.usgs.gov/. 19 National Spatial Data Center, “MASDAP,” (accessed 29 May 2017), http://www.masdap.mw/ layers/?limit=20&offset=0&type_in=vector. 20 Envi software http://www.harrisgeospatial.com/Software-Technology/ENVI. 21 National Spatial Data Center, “MASDAP”.

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used to hydrologically correct the DEM called ‘Hydro DEM’ during subbasins delineation. (e) Rain Gauge data The rainfall data, observed at meteorological stations within the catchment of interest, was acquired in Excel format from Malawi Meteorological Services. The data, measured in millimetres (mm), was dated from year 1946 to 2016, and recorded as average daily rainfall observation at different meteorological stations. The Chikwawa and Nchalo met stations within the study catchment were adopted for this research. (f) River Discharge data The Surface Water Division under the Department of Water Resources, within the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, Water Resources Monitoring (MoAIWD) in Malawi, is responsible for hydrological observations of water level and discharge. This study could not make use of MoAIWD data due to inadequacy of up-to-date observations.22 As an alternative, the study used satellite river discharge data as observed flows to validate and calibrate the hydrological model. The satellite obtained the river discharge data using Advanced Microwave Scanning Radiometer-Earth Observing System (AMSR-E) by Dartmouth Flood Observation (DFO) and the Global Flood Detection System (GFDS).23 Each river discharge data point is an average of the mean annual flows for five consecutive years of the record at a time.24 The satellite gauging site within the study area is indicated in Fig. 1.

3

HEC-HMS Modeling

The flood event focused in this research was from 1 January 2015 to 31 March 2015. However, the simulation was run two years before the flood event to understand the discharge trends. The time interval for the rainfall data was one day and the units were incremental millimeters. The simulation interval was set at five minutes (lower than 0.29  Muskingum K) to ensure stability in the routing model.25 22

MoAIWD, 2015, Modernising Hydrolological and Meteorological Monitoring Systems in the Shire River Basin. Volume 3. 23 De Groeve, Tom, Robert G Brakenridge, and Stefano Paris, 2015, Global Flood Detection System: Data Product Specifications, Ispra (VA): European Union, http://floodobservatory. colorado.edu/Technical%20Note%20GFDS%20Data%20Products%20v1.pdf. 24 Dartmouth Flood Observation (DFO), River and Reservoir Watch Version 3,6, Satellite River Discharge and Reservoir Area Measurements (accessed 24 June 2017), http://floodobservatory. colorado.edu/DischargeAccess.html. 25 Fleming Arlen D, 2000, Hydrologic Modeling System HEC-HMS: Technical Reference, Davis, CA: US Army Corps of Engineers, p. 38 http://www.ce.utexas.edu/prof/maidment/CE365KSpr16/ HEC/HEC-HMS_Technical%20Reference%20Manual_(CPD-74B).pdf.

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The hydrological model assumed that the land and water were categorized in two surfaces: direct connected impervious surface, where there was no infiltration and all precipitation became runoff; and pervious surface, where volumes of water infiltrated the soils and became losses.26 Essentially, runoff was computed as follows: Runoff volume ¼ Precipitation volume  Losses volume

ð1Þ

The following parameters were determined to form the model:

3.1 Losses The losses for a specific period were determined using loss model and were subtracted from the Mean Annual Precipitation (MAP) depth. The MAP depth represents runoff volume and is assumed to be evenly distributed over the watershed. This research applied initial and constant (loss rates?), because it is simple and predictable using ranges of constant loss rates (mm/h) based on subbasin’s soil groups.27 Equation 4 expresses initial loss Ia (mm) as: Ia ¼ k  S

ð2Þ

where: k is initial abstraction ratio which ranges from 0.05 to 0.2. Valle recommended the use of 0.05 instead of 0.2.28 S is the maximum retention (mm) and is solved using the Eq. 3: S¼

25; 400  254 CN

ð3Þ

Curve Number (CN) values for each subbasin are expressed in Eq. 4: CNcomposite ¼

P A CN Pi i Ai

ð4Þ

where: CNcomposite is the composite CN used for runoff volume computations, i is an index of watersheds subdivision of uniform land use and soil type, CNi is the CN for subdivision i, Ai is the drainage area of subdivision i. 26

Ibid., 38. Ibid., 39. 28 Luiz Claudio Valle Junior, Dulce, B, B Rodrigues, Paulos Tarso, Sanches Oliveira, 2019, Initial abstraction ratio and Curve Number estimation using rainfall and runoff data from a tropical watershed, DOI: https://org.doi/10.1590/2318-0331.241920170199 http://www.researchgate.net/ publication/330540980_Initial_abstraction_ratio_and_Curve_Number_estimation_using_rainfall_ and_runoff_data_from_a_tropical_watershed (Accessed 2 January 2019). 27

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3.2 Transform Transform model simulates the movement of precipitation that has not infiltrated (on impervious surfaces) and not stored (pervious surfaces) called excess precipitation, and the process is called transformation.29 Equation 5, Lag time, tP , is the main parameter for representing time in minutes in the transform model, from the center of mass of excess rainfall to Unit Hydrograph peak for each subbasin.30  0:7 L0:8 1000 CN  9 tP ¼ 19; 000y0:5

ð5Þ

where: y is average watershed slope (%), L is length (m).

3.3 Routing The routing models simulate one-dimensional open channel flow, thus predicts the time series of downstream flow, stage, velocity, and upstream hydrographs.31 The Muskingum routing model was used to estimate two parameters: K and X, which represent storage-time constants.32 Originally, Muskingum routing model for a river reach was derived in the Eqs. 6 and 7.33,34 K¼

L 3600Vc

ð6Þ

where: Vc is the flood wave celerity which was estimated as 7 m/s, L is the reach length. X represents storage-time constant that considers flood peak attenuation and hydrograph shape flattening in motion which can be estimated using the kinematic wave equation35: 1 D X¼  2 VC L

29

ð7Þ

Fleming, Hydrologic Modeling System HEC-HMS: Technical Reference. Ibid., 40. 31 Fleming, Hydrologic Modeling System HEC-HMS: Technical Reference. 32 Song, Xiao-meng, Fan-zhe Kong, and Zhao-xia Zhu, 2011, Application of Muskingum routing method with variable parameters in ungauged basin, Water, Science and Engineering 4 (2): 1-12, (accessed 10 January 2019) https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S167423701530137X. 33 Ibid., 3. 34 Fleming, Hydrologic Modeling System HEC-HMS: Technical Reference. 35 Song, Kong, and Zhao-xia, Application of Muskingum routing method with variable parameters in ungauged basin, p. 4. 30

Application of Low to Medium Resolution Data …

47

D is the diffusion coefficient of a diffusion wave; X ratio values can range from 0.0 to 0.5; the standard is 0.2.

3.4 Computation of Discharge Volume and Flow Based on the above parameters, the models computed the discharge volumes and flow of water which were presented as hydrographs or time series data in tables. The volume of direct runoff is expressed in Eq. 836: Vol ¼

QP TR þ QP B 2

ð8Þ

B is given by: B ¼ 1:67TR

ð9Þ

where: B is time of fall (h). By making QP , peak flow in Eq. 10 and 11 the subject of the formula, QP is calculated37: 2vol 0:75vol ¼ TR þ B TR

ð10Þ

0:75ð640ÞAð1008Þ 2:08A ¼ TR TR

ð11Þ

QP ¼ QP ¼

where: 2.08 is conversion constant, A is area of basin (m2).

4

Results

The hydrological model was simulated in the HEC-HMS model and provided the following outputs: the peak discharge (m3/s), total flow (m3/s) and volume (m3) per given drainage area (km2) for all the sub-basins, reaches, and junctions. Table 1 shows peak volumes and flows for sub-basins W380, W370, W360 and the outlet on specific dates.

36

Indian Institute of Technology, 2006, Module 3, Lecture 6: Synthetic Unit Hydrograph, National Programme on Technology Enhanced Learning (NPTEL), (accessed 10 January 2019), https:// nptel.ac.in/courses/105101002/downloads/module3/lecture6.pdf. 37 Ibid., 7.

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Table 1 Flows and volumes at subbasins Basin elements

Area (km2)

Date

Flow (m3/s)

Volume (m3)

W380 W370 W360 Outlet1

13.6 13.6 36.4 494.6

24 Feb 2015, 09:15 31 Jan 2015, 03:45 24 Feb 2015, 04:45 5 Feb 2015, 23:50

1058.43 964.34 2835.43 13,134.27

165,338.252 160,692.084 164,754.052 150,774.654

Simulated Vs Observed, 1 Jan 2012 - 1 Apr 2015

River Discharge, m3/s

14000 12000 10000 8000 6000 4000 2000 0

Simulated

Observed

Fig. 2 Graph of channel flow at the outlet for 1 Jan 2012 to 1 Apr 2015

The simulated flows at the outlet were represented as a graph in Fig. 2 from 1 January 2012 to 1 April 2015. The peak discharge at the outlet was 13,134.27 m3/s on 6 Feb 2015, with the volume of 150,774.7 m3 covering the area of 494.6 km2.

4.1 Validation of Hydrological Model The validation was done to assess the accuracy of the results to match, or closely match, the observed flows at subbasin outlet. The computed results were accepted based on the goodness of fit. Feldman measured the goodness of fit using the sum of absolute errors, sum of squared residuals, percent error in peak, peak-weighted root mean square error, and other graphical representations like scatter plot and residual plot. This study used the absolute error index expressed as Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) to Standard Deviation Ratio (RSR), and Percent Volume Bias (PEV) percentage error in peak flow. The computed statistics were rated using general performance ratings for recommended statistics to accept the parameters or not, as shown in Table 2.

Application of Low to Medium Resolution Data …

49

Table 2 General performance ratings for recommended statistics Performance rating

PEPF (%)

NSE

PEV (%)

Very good