Space Fostering Latin American Societies: Developing the Latin American Continent Through Space, Part 2 (Southern Space Studies) 303073286X, 9783030732868

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Southern Space Studies Series Editor: Annette Froehlich

Annette Froehlich   Editor

Space Fostering Latin American Societies Developing the Latin American Continent Through Space, Part 2

Southern Space Studies Series Editor Annette Froehlich

, University of Cape Town, Rondebosch, South Africa

Associate Editors Dirk Heinzmann, Bundeswehr Command and Staff College, Hamburg, Germany André Siebrits, University of Cape Town, Rondebosch, South Africa Advisory Editors Josef Aschbacher, European Space Agency, Frascati, Italy Rigobert Bayala, National Observatory of Sustainable Development, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso Carlos Caballero León, Peruvian Space Agency, Lima, Peru Guy Consolmagno, Vatican Observatory, Castel Gandolfo, Vatican City State Juan de Dalmau, International Space University, Illkirch-Graffenstaden, France Driss El Hadani, Royal Center for Remote Sensing of Morocco, Rabat, Morocco El Hadi Gashut, Regional Center For Remote Sensing of North Africa States, Tunis, Tunisia Francisco Javier Mendieta-Jiménez, Mexican Space Agency, Mexico City, Mexico Félix Clementino Menicocci, Argentinean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Buenos Aires, Argentina Sias Mostert, African Association of Remote Sensing of the Environment, Muizenburg, South Africa Val Munsami, South African National Space Agency, Silverton, South Africa Greg Olsen, Entrepreneur-Astronaut, Princeton, NJ, USA Azzedine Oussedik, Algerian Space Agency, Alger, Algeria Xavier Pasco, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris, France Elvira Prado Alegre, Ibero-American Institute of Air and Space Law and Commercial Aviation, Madrid, Spain Alejandro J. Román M., Paraguayan Space Agency, Asunción, Paraguay Fermín Romero Vázquez, Fundacion Acercandote al Universo, Mexico City, Mexico Kai-Uwe Schrogl, International Institute of Space Law, Paris, France Dominique Tilmans, YouSpace, Wellin, Belgium Jean-Jacques Tortora, European Space Policy Institute, Vienna, Austria Robert van Zyl, Cape Peninsula University of Technology, Bellville, South Africa

The Southern Space Studies series presents analyses of space trends, market evolutions, policies, strategies and regulations, as well as the related social, economic and political challenges of space-related activities in the Global South, with a particular focus on developing countries in Africa and Latin America. Obtaining inside information from emerging space-faring countries in these regions is pivotal to establish and strengthen efficient and beneficial cooperation mechanisms in the space arena, and to gain a deeper understanding of their rapidly evolving space activities. To this end, the series provides transdisciplinary information for a fruitful development of space activities in relevant countries and cooperation with established space-faring nations. It is, therefore, a reference compilation for space activities in these areas. The volumes of the series are peer-reviewed.

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/16025

Annette Froehlich Editor

Space Fostering Latin American Societies Developing the Latin American Continent Through Space, Part 2

123

Editor Annette Froehlich SpaceLab University of Cape Town Rondebosch, South Africa

ISSN 2523-3718 ISSN 2523-3726 (electronic) Southern Space Studies ISBN 978-3-030-73286-8 ISBN 978-3-030-73287-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73287-5 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Contents

Peruvian Government Spending on Satellite Communications. Foundations for a Communications Satellite Project for Peru . . . . . . . . Carlos Caballero León and Wilfredo Fanola Merino Satellites for the Benefit of Mexican People: Past, Present and Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Jose Alberto Ramirez-Aguilar, Dulce Carolina Sanchez-Hernandez, Jorge Ferrer-Perez, Rafael Chávez-Moreno and Carlos Romo-Fuentes

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The University Space Program: A Bet to Reach the Future . . . . . . . . . . José Francisco Valdés Galicia and Juan Antonio Sánchez Guzmán

37

The Footprint of Latin America in International Space Law . . . . . . . . . Laura Jamschon Mac Garry

45

Use of Open-Source Satellite Data to Combat Organized Crime Case Study: Detection of Vessels Associated with Drug-Trafficking . . . . . . . . Jairo Becerra, Alexander Ariza and Laura C. Gamarra-Amaya Launch Management of a Nanosatellite for Bolivia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rosalyn Puma-Guzman and Jorge Soliz

67 87

Mission Design for University Research Satellite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 Carlos Romo-Fuentes, Jorge Ferrer-Pérez, Rafael Chávez-Moreno, Jose Alberto Ramírez-Aguilar and Lisette Farah-Simón Electric Propulsion Technology Development in Mexico by UNAM . . . . 119 Jorge Ferrer-Pérez, Ernesto Reynoso-Reyes, Carlos Romo-Fuentes, Rafael G. Chávez-Moreno, Jose Ramírez-Aguilar and Lisette Farah-Simón

v

Peruvian Government Spending on Satellite Communications. Foundations for a Communications Satellite Project for Peru Carlos Caballero León and Wilfredo Fanola Merino

Abstract

Peruvian Government contracts satellite communication services to private foreign companies. Public entities contract independently, depending on their resources and priorities. This way of contracting turns out to be inefficient; it prevents achieving economies of scale and indicates a lack of communications policy for public institutions. The study shows that currently, satellite communication services are contracted by 45 public organizations, with an estimated capacity consumption of 511 MHz and with an effective spending per year that amounts to US$21,7 million. Over fifteen years, this level of aggregate yearly expenditure raises to US$325,25 million, enough for Peru to acquire a communications satellite. With the acquisition, Peru could stop its dependency on foreign providers, significantly improve the quality of spending, reduce the monthly MHz cost of satellite capacity, meet the government’s demand, and reduce the country’s connectivity gap. This study presents a strong argument to initiate activities leading towards the acquisition of a communications satellite for Peru and establishes guidelines for this project.

C. Caballero León (&) CEO of CP Consult, Lima, Peru e-mail: [email protected] W. Fanola Merino General Manager of Sociedad Tecnológica del Perú SAC, Faculty of Electronic and Electrical Engineering of the National University of San Marcos, Lima, Peru e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 A. Froehlich (ed.), Space Fostering Latin American Societies, Southern Space Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73287-5_1

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Introduction

The main facilities of long-distance communication are radio-relay systems, fiber optic cables, and communication satellites.1 All these means are necessary, complementary, and not exclusive. For a long time, Peru has public and private radio and fiber optic networks. It is pertinent to highlight the effort made by the government to implement broadband, within the framework of Law No. 29904 for Broadband Promotion and National Optical Fiber Backbone Network Construction2 (RDNFO), as well as the 21 regional projects that will be connected to the RDNFO. The planned investment, amounting to US$2.136 million3, will allow broadband internet access to more rural localities. It should be noted that there are no fiber optic network projects for the provinces located in the Amazon rainforest: Loreto, Madre de Dios and Ucayali.4 Peru registers a total of 25.009 villages with at least one public entity. As seen in Fig. 1, by 2018, 95% of these localities had at least one public entity without fixed internet access. This is expected to decline to 77% in 2020 and 65% by 2022, as current regional broadband projects get completed. For this reason, it is expected that within two years, the Internet access gap for public entities will be reduced to 16,180 villages.5 The connectivity gap in Peru is explained by the dispersion and distance among the localities of the territory. It is aggravated by the complexity of the country’s geography, which makes access to them difficult. Also, since their populations live in poverty or extreme poverty, they are not served by private fiber optic networks and radio links, as they are not commercially profitable. However, one of the main factors that contributing to this situation is that Peru does not have the third means of long-distance communication: the communications satellite.

John Lewis, “Space Procedures”, International Telecommunication Union, 2009, www.itu.int/ itunews/manager/display.asp?lang=es&year=2009&issue=02&ipage=26&ext=html (all websites cited in this publication were last accessed and verified on 30 July 2020). 2 Act for Broadband Promotion and National Optical Fiber Backbone Network (RDNFO) Construction, Official Journal “El Peruano”, Lima, Peru, 28 July 2012. 3 Nadia Villegas, “Peru Connected Through Broadband: Connected to the Bicentennial”, 29 April 2020, Cycle of Videoconferences on Telecommunications Matters of the Ministry of Transport and Communications, Lima, Peru. 4 Carlos Lozada, “Internet Access to Rural Areas to Guarantee Education Through the Aprendo en Casa Program”, 19 July 2020, presentation at the Eighth Virtual Ordinary Session of the Transports and Communications Commission of the Congress of the Republic, Lima, Peru. 5 Office of Multiannual Investment Programming, “Gap Indicators: Percentage of Localities with at least one Public Entity without Fixed Internet Access Service Coverage”, Ministry of Transport and Communications, 17 January 2019, http://portal.mtc.gob.pe/estadisticas/inversiones/ Indicadores-de-Brechas-2019.pdf. 1

Peruvian Government Spending on Satellite Communications 100%

95% 81%

80%

% of Localities

3

77% 69% 65%

60% 40% 20% 0% 2018

2019p

2020p Years

2021p

2022p

Fig. 1 Percentage of localities having at least one public entity without access to fixed internet Source Own research based on gap indicators data obtained from Ministry of Transports and Communications MTC

In the face of this problem, a communications satellite is essential in order to connect the population in the vast national territory. A system of this type can be strategic for commercial development, national defense, and progress across all sectors. Over the years, efforts have been made to put the communications satellite’s issue on the national agenda, without success. Proof of these efforts are the legislative initiatives presented since 2009, in the form of five bills to declare the formulation of a satellite development plan of public necessity and national interest that contemplated having a sovereign communications satellite as the key component. The contradiction between the need for a Peruvian communications satellite and the absence of concrete actions to achieve its implementation raises a series of questions: What is the real magnitude of demand in Peru in the field of satellite communications? How much money is spent on satellite communications? Which public entities use this type of service? What are the modalities of the contracted services? Is it more convenient to continue contracting services to third parties or to execute a sovereign communications satellite project for Peru? If developing a sovereign satellite is more convenient, what general criteria should guide this project? These issues gave rise to the present investigation on the spending of satellite communications services for public entities in Peru. It should be specified that the study is oriented exclusively to contracts made by the public institutions, excluding arrangements made by private users.

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Methodology

Public procurement in the Peruvian government is regulated by the State Contracting Law6. This law establishes that the Electronic System of State Procurement (SEACE) is the official system for exchanging, dissemination, and registration of all documents related to the contracting processes. For this reason, this electronic system became the primary source of information for the present investigation. The first step was a search in SEACE7 of the satellite communications contracting processes that public entities have carried out between 2015 and 2020. The official documents registered in the system, as technical requirements and contracts, have been reviewed. The level of detail of the investigation exposed issues related to the discrepancy between the reference values of the listings in the first search and the contracted amounts, hence the importance of reviewing this data in the contracts. Despite the legal requirement to register all the contracting processes’ documents in SEACE, some are not accounted in the system. For this reason, and, based on the Law of Transparency and Access to Public Information8 a second source was used to request the information. This law promotes transparency in the actions of public administration entities and establishes the principle of publicity. Given the gaps in the information available in SEACE, this legal right was used to request technical requirements information from the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of the Interior, and the National Registry of Identification and Civil Status (RENIEC). With the information obtained from technical documents and selected contracts, a record of the satellite communications services effectively contracted was compiled. This new record included the following elements: the name of the public entity, date and nomenclature of the procurement process, contract objective, period of the contract, amount in soles or dollars, bandwidth contracted in MHz9, satellite and band of operation, mode of service, number of Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) fixed, mobile or telephone stations, contracting company, number of pages of technical requirements and contracts and technical data of the contracted links.

Law No. 30225, State Contracting Law, Official Journal “El Peruano”, Lima, Peru, 12 March 2019. 7 Supervisory Agency of State Procurement, “Electronic System of State Procurement”, https:// prodapp2.seace.gob.pe/seacebus-uiwd-pub/buscadorPublico/buscadorPublico.xhtml#. 8 Law No. 27806, Law of Transparency and Access to Public Information, Official Journal “El Peruano”, Lima, Peru, 10 December 2019. 9 International Telecommunication Union, Nomenclature of the Frequency and Wavelength Bands Used in Telecommunications, (Geneva: International Telecommunication Union, 2015), 4. 6

Peruvian Government Spending on Satellite Communications

3

5

Results

The studied procurement processes corresponded to 45 public entities using satellite communications services in any of its modalities. The record of satellite communications services contracted collects the information from 121 technical requirements and 119 contracts from public entities throughout Peru, coming to a total of 5.897 reviewed pages.

3.1 Contracted Modalities The satellite communications contracted by the aforementioned public institutions correspond to the following modalities

3.1.1 Satellite Segment Satellite Segment consists of contracting a specific bandwidth in MHz to satisfy the needs of the user entities. Through a certain bandwidth, users can establish their own communication networks and transmit internet, telephone, television (TV) or data services. It is the basic modality of satellite communications service. 3.1.2 Satellite Telephony Satellite Telephony is the provision of telephony services for users who operate in environments not served by the commercial telephone network. It can be fixed or mobile satellite telephony. The service provider uses a certain bandwidth to transmit the public telephony signal or an IP extension of a customer’s private network through a communications satellite. If it is fixed satellite telephony, the receiving station can be a VSAT or Broadband Global Area Network (BGAN). If it is mobile, the service can come from global providers, who supply the telephone equipment, a package of minutes or seconds for calls, transmission of messages and Internet access. 3.1.3 Satellite Internet Satellite Internet is the provision of Internet signal through a certain communications satellite bandwidth. The receiving station can be a VSAT or BGAN. 3.1.4 Data Transmission Data Transmission is the interconnection service of equipment with data acquisition capacity (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition—SCADA type) or networked computers, located in remote locations, with a satellite link, which requires a certain bandwidth. 3.1.5 Satellite TV Satellite TV is the transmission of domestic and international channels through a satellite link. It corresponds to direct to home or Direct To Home (DTH) services.

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Table 1 Modality and quantity of contracted services. Source Prepared by the authors

N°

Modality

Quantity of contracts

1 2 3 4 5 6 Total

Satellite segment Satellite telephony Satellite internet Data transmission Satellite TV Combined modalities

22 31 38 11 10 9 121

8% 8%

Satellite Segment

19%

Satellite Telephony

8%

Satellite Internet Data Transmission

25% 32%

Satellite TV Combined ModaliƟes

Fig. 2 Modality of contracted satellite communications services Source: Own research

The public contracts studied include at least one or a combination of the aforementioned modalities. Table 1, outlines the number of services contracted by modality for the study period: The three most frequent modalities are satellite Internet (32% of cases), satellite telephony (25%) and satellite segment (19%) (Fig. 2).

3.2 Contracted Amounts Regarding the contracted amounts, the 121 studied processes amount to US $68.930.755,00 after adjusting for inflation. The processes studied correspond to the period from October 2015 to July 2020 (four years and ten months). It has been verified that public entities contract in periods ranging from less than one year up to a total of five years. Entities contract

Peruvian Government Spending on Satellite Communications

7

in any of the twelve months of the year and contracts are made both in national currency (sol) or in foreign currency (US$). Likewise, it has been verified that each sector or institution makes these contracts independently, depending on the available resources and their own priorities. While outside the scope of this analysis, it should be noted that this form of contracting turns out to be very inefficient since it prevents access to economies of scale, to which the government should strive for through a policy of integration of contracting in general and of the services of satellite communications, in particular. At this point, the collected information needed to be standardized to facilitate analysis. Firstly, the amount of each contract was divided by the contracted period in years. This allowed to understand the amount that the public entity pays for the contracted service each year. The sum of all contracts in force each year amounted to US$25.290.624,35 as total annualized spending. However, it was determined that several processes were repeated for the same item when they were hired every year. In the same way, it was necessary to identify those processes that, despite being contracted for periods of less than a year, are permanent services in order to include them in the calculation, unlike those that were temporary services. By analyzing case by case and applying the corrections, the so-called effective spending per year was obtained. This item adds the amounts of the contracts in force every year, regardless of the contract period or date. In this case, the effective spending per year amounts to the sum of US$21.683.142,51. The effective spending per year for satellite communications services is considered a fundamental result of this study since it represents the effective outflow of funds from the public treasury that is carried out each year, for all the institutions included, on a permanent basis, and allows a projection of the expenditure that the government will carry out in a given number of years.

3.3 Contracted Bandwidth Another important piece of data to consider in this study is the bandwidth contracted by public entities, since it allows for calculating the cost per MHz per month effectively paid. To do this, the bandwidth contracted in the satellite segment modality is added to the estimated bandwidth used in the other contracted satellite communications services. Regarding the satellite segment, the aggregate bandwidth contracted annually by all public institutions is 171,128 MHz. This information is explicitly presented in the technical requirements and contracts. Concerning satellite Internet services, telephony, data transmission and their combinations, an estimate of the bandwidth used in each contract has been made, since this information is not presented in the consulted documents. To do this, the

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following formula10 has been used to convert the contracted data speeds in Mbps to MHz, considering a spectral efficiency of 2,5 Bits/Hz in data download and 2 Bits/Hz in upload. Bandwidth ðMHzÞ ¼

Download Speed ðMbpsÞ Upload Speed ðMbpsÞ þ 2; 5 bps=Hz 2 bps=Hz

Thus, the total estimated bandwidth in the contracted satellite communication services is 340,03 MHz. The total estimated bandwidth used in the services contracted by public entities is 511,158 MHz. This information is also a fundamental result of the study, which will allow for further analysis and comparisons to better understand the meaning of this value.

3.4 Contracting Public Entities Since the studied satellite communications procurement processes correspond to 45 public entities, this means that only 1,53% of 2.94011 public entities retain this type of service.

4

Special Case Analysis

The results of the investigation and the standardized information in the form of effective spending per year and total estimated bandwidth used by public entities, have been analyzed. However, the following special cases should also be discussed.

4.1 Most Expensive Contracts The analysis of the most expensive contracts shows ten of the 121 studied contracts total US$19.263.733,72, which represents 89% of the annual effective spending. The way these numbers behave follows the Pareto principle12, as shown in Fig. 3. This means that even if, from now on, the analysis focused only on these ten contracts (from the National Bank, National Police, Ministry of Education, National Institute of Radio and Television, Joint Command of the Armed Forces, Army, 10 International Telecommunication Union, Definition of spectrum use and efficiency of a radio system, (Geneva: International Telecommunication Union, 2017), 33. 11 National Agency of Electronic Government and Information Technology, “List of Entities of the Peruvian State”, Presidency of the Council of Ministers, 6 October 2016, www.datosabiertos.gob. pe/dataset/lista-de-entidades-del-estado-peruano. 12 Richard Koch, The 80/20 Principle. The Secret to Achieving More with Less, (New York: Doubleday, 2008), 6.

US$ Millions

Peruvian Government Spending on Satellite Communications 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0

9

19,26 (89%)

2,42 (11%) 10 (8%)

111 (92%)

Contracts Fig. 3 Most expensive contracts Source Own research

Navy and Air Force), the conclusions would be effectively equal to the conclusions corresponding to the study of all the contracts. This situation will be reviewed later in the sensitivity analysis.

4.2 Entities Demanding More Bandwidth Although the total estimated bandwidth used by public entities amounts to 511,158 MHz, the analysis shows that only seven institutions (National Police, Ministry of Education, National Institute of Radio and Television, Joint Command of the Armed Forces, Army, Navy and Air Force) employ 441,278 MHz, 86% of the total contracted bandwidth. In this case, the Pareto principle is also verified, as shown in Fig. 4. As in the case of the most expensive contracts, if the bandwidth analysis focused solely on these seven institutions, the conclusions would be practically the same as the analysis of the total.

4.3 Public Entities Situated in the Same Locality Several cases of different institutions using satellite communications within the same locality have been identified. For instance, in Lima, Piura, Arequipa, Iquitos and Pucallpa, there are offices of the National Bank, Joint Command of the Armed Forces, Army, Navy, Air Force, National Police and Peruvian Airports Corporation (CORPAC). With this organization, each entity must implement dedicated infrastructure, systems for maintenance and operation, communications equipment and antennas (Satellite Hub, VSAT’s). If not, entities must contract this service along with communications service.

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Bandwidth (MHz)

500

441,278 (86%)

400 300 200 69,88 (14%)

100 0 7 (16 %)

38 (84 %)

Public Entities Fig. 4 Public entities demanding bandwidth Source Own research

The organization of communications by sector or public entity turns out to be very inefficient, since it forces each institution to look only for its own connectivity and focus on activities outside the scope of its core competencies. Additionally, the demand and capacities of entities cannot be aggregated, thus incurring in higher costs for the government as a whole. Within in the same locality, other public entities that have fewer resources and capabilities, do not access satellite communications, which furthers inequity between public entities, reducing their effectiveness, as a result of not having a single communications standard. These findings along with those in Sect. 3.2 Contracted Amounts, provide evidence of the lack of a public policy for communications within public organizations. One of the pillars that should constitute this policy is the territorial organization of government communications instead of the current functional or institution-based approach. This territorial approach should consider that every national, regional, and district systems and networks, must be utilized by all public institutions installed in each locality. Great advances have already been made in this regard with the RDNFO and regional networks, which could be utilized more broadly by the entities. A satellite communications component should be added, to constitute a single public communications system. To achieve that, efforts should not be implemented by each institution individually, rather, capacities should be integrated, since communications are transversal to all sectors.

4.4 Contracts to Face Crisis, Emergency or Disaster Situations It has also been verified that various institutions contract satellite telephone and Internet services to face emergencies, crises or disasters. There is no doubt that satellite communications are perfectly suited to these situations. In numerous cases, as a result of an earthquake, flood or landslide, disruptions in the terrestrial

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connectivity networks have occurred, leaving authorities and large sectors of the population without communications. Therefore, there is no questioning of the need for this type of service. However, a serious problem has been identified in the way the contracts are carried out, and this lies in the same independent way of contracting by sector or entity. Only five sectors or institutions contract satellite services for crises or disasters: the Presidential Office, the Ministry of Transports and Communications, the Central Reserve Bank, the Bank Superintendence, and the National Institute of Civil Defense. In this scenario has been verified that the institutions contract in periods of less than one year up to three years. At the same time, there is no evidence that other authorities, sectors, institutions, regional, provincial and district governments contract emergency communication systems. Considering that a disaster can occur at any time and place in the territory, all national, regional, provincial authorities, public entities and the population must have a single emergency satellite communication system. This system should be mandatory, permanently available and with national coverage, to adequate address these situations. It does not make sense that only five authorities, sectors or institutions have satellite communication systems while the rest of the country does not, since when the emergency occurs it will affect vast areas of the country if not the government as a whole.

5

Countries with Communication Satellites in the Region

In contrast with Peruvian government contracts for satellite communication services with foreign providers, other countries in the region have established public policies to acquire or develop their own communications satellites. Within South America, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Venezuela have previously developed such systems to satisfy their needs, detailed further below. Argentina has two communications satellites manufactured by its state-owned space industry INVAP.13 The ARSAT-1 satellite was developed at a cost of US $280 million and put into orbit in 2014, with a useful life of 15 years and a capacity of 1.156 MHz. The ARSAT-2 cost US$250 million, it was launched into space in 2015, should last 15 years and has a capacity of 1.584 MHz. The payload of satellites was provided by the Thales Alenia Space from France. Both satellites are operated by the state company ARSAT and are considered conventional communications satellites. Argentina has plans to develop a future ARSAT-3 communications satellite.

INVAP, “ARSAT Satellites”, www.invap.com.ar/es/espacial-y-gobierno/proyectos-espaciales/ satelite-arsat.html.

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Bolivia acquired its Túpac Katari communications satellite from the China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC) at a cost of US$302 million14. Operated by the state-run Bolivian Space Agency (ABE), the Túpac Katari was launched into orbit in 2013, has a 15-year lifespan, a capacity of 1.086 MHz and is classified as a conventional satellite. Brazil acquired its SGDC-115 geostationary defense and strategic communications satellite from Thales Alenia Space of France at a cost of US$770 million. With a lifespan of 18 years, the SGDC-1 was launched into space in 2017. With a capacity of 58 Gbps, it is the only satellite in the region with High Throughput System (HTS)-type technology, which gives it a capacity far superior to conventional communications satellites. SGDC-1 is operated by the Brazilian Air Force and the state-owned company Telebras. Brazil has plans to develop its next SGDC-2 satellite. Finally, in 2008 Venezuela put its Simón Bolívar or Venesat-1 satellite into orbit, at a cost of US$406 million. Despite having an expected life time of 15 years, this satellite was deactivated in 2020, due to apparent technical problems.

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Concrete Meaning of the Effective Spending of Satellite Communications in Peru

As previously stated, two fundamental results of the present investigation are the effective spending per year and the total bandwidth, resulting from the contracts for satellite communications services in Peru. The effective spending per year represents the actual outflow of funds made each year by the Peruvian government, all the institutions included, permanently, to pay for the contracted satellite communications services, which amounts to around US $21,7 million. The total bandwidth used in the satellite communications services contracted by the public institutions, estimated at 511,158 MHz, is the bandwidth received in return for the effective spending per year. These results should not remain only as a theoretical concept. As such it is important to discuss alternatives for better use of the related public resources. To illustrate this analysis, the experiences of Bolivia with the Túpac Katari satellite and Argentina with the ARSAT-2, will be used as a reference. Both satellites have been designed and manufactured for a useful life of 15 years (180 months), which is a standard for communication satellites, and they are considered conventional communication satellites.

Bolivian Space Agency, “Space Agency raises US$90 million from Túpac Katari satellite services”, www.abe.bo/agencia-espacial-recauda-us-90-millones-servicios-del-satelite-tupac-katari/. 15 Telebras, “Geostationary Defense and Strategic Communications Satellite – SGDC”, www. telebras.com.br/telebras-sat/conheca-o-sgdc/. 14

Peruvian Government Spending on Satellite Communications

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The effective spending of almost US$21,7 million that Peru expends every year, projected over a period of 15 years, amounts to a total of US$325,25 million. That amount far exceeds the investment made by Argentina to build the ARSAT-2 and by Bolivia to acquire the Túpac Katari. This means that Peru is currently expending enough resources to acquire an own satellite. On the other hand, knowing the total amount of resources to spend, the total bandwidth received and the period of employment, the cost of MHz per month can be calculated to be compared. For the Peruvian case, considering US$325,25 million spent in 15 years for 511,158 MHz, the cost is: Cost MHz per month Peru ¼

US$325; 25 million 511;158 MHz 180 months

¼ US$3:535; 00=MHz=month

Resulting in a cost of US$3.535,00 per MHz per month for Peru. The same cost in the Bolivian case and the Tupac Katari would result from considering US$302 million spent in 15 years, with a satellite capacity of 1.086 MHz: Cost MHz per month Bolivia ¼

US$302 million 1:086 MHz 180 months

¼ US$1:544; 91=MHz=month

The cost is US$1.544,91 per MHz per month for Bolivia. Finally, the same estimate for Argentina, in the case of ARSAT-2, results from calculating US$250 million spent in 15 years, with a capacity of 1.584 MHz: Cost MHz per month Argentina ¼

US$250 million 1:584 MHz 180 months

¼ US$876; 82=MHz=month

This means a cost of US$876,82 per MHz per month for Argentina. The calculations show that Peru pays per MHz per month a rate more than double the cost of Bolivia and more than four times the cost in the case of the Argentine satellite ARSAT-2. That said, the state-of-the-art in communications satellites are HTS satellites. As previously mentioned, Brazil has the only HTS satellite in the region. Referential costs on HTS satellites are around US$400 per MHz per month, and going as low as US$200 per MHz per month, depending on the size of the project. If a HTS system were projected with the aggregate amount in 15 years of Peru’s annual effective spending, would be the following: Capacity MHz Peru HTS project ¼

US$325; 25 million US$400=MHz=mes 180 months

¼ 4:517; 36 MHz

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This means that an HTS project for Peru with the resources currently committed to contract services from third parties, would have a capacity of 4.517,36 MHz, calculated conservatively. That capacity is equivalent to nine times what public institutions currently receive, considering the same amount of money spent. Concretely, this means that with the same level of annual spending, but with better use of resources, Peru could have a sovereign communications satellite, to meet the current demand of user institutions, at an estimated 511,158 MHz, and would still have more than 4,000 MHz, to serve other public entities and close the connectivity gap of the less favored populations.

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A Parallel with PerúSAT-1

PerúSAT-1 is the first Earth observation satellite of the Peruvian government. Acquired within the framework of a Government to Government agreement with the French Republic and built by Airbus Defense and Space with a useful life of ten years, this satellite was put into orbit in 2016. Although PerúSAT-1 is not a communications satellite, it is interesting to discuss the conditions established before the decision to acquire the system and compare them with the situation around the contracting of satellite communications services in the public entities discussed in this research. Before PerúSAT-1, public entities acquired satellite images from foreign providers, in an aggregate average sum of US$570.000 per year16. This sum, projected over the ten-year life span of the satellite, represented an amount of US$5,7 million. Given that the system cost US$185 million, the decision to buy PerúSAT-1 required an additional allocation of public funds in the amount of US$180 million for this purpose, which implies that for the authorities responsible for the investment this was the best possible use of public resources. A representation of the situation is presented in Fig. 5. Regardless of the considerations prior to making the purchase decision, PerúSAT-1 turned out to be a strategic decision. The satellite represents the most advanced technology in the country and, it has been a disruptive solution. It has radically transformed the provision of spatial information to public entities, has given greater power to the government in the framework of international relations and has been extremely profitable. In just two years the investment made has been fully recovered. An analogous evaluation can be carried out in the case of satellite communications. Effective spending per year over a 15-year horizon, as already indicated, shows a projection of US$325,25 million that will be compulsorily spent, given the needs of public entities. This amount is enough to buy a satellite with a higher cost,

Carlos Caballero, “Annual Report”, 5 December 2017, Workshop PerúSAT-1: Lessons Learned of the Peruvian Space Agency CONIDA, Lima, Peru.

16

Peruvian Government Spending on Satellite Communications

15

200

185

180

US$ Million

160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0

5,7 Spending during Ten Years

Cost of PerúSAT-1

Fig. 5 Comparison between spending on images before the satellite and cost of the PerúSAT-1 optical earth observation satellite Source Own research

350

325,25

325

US$ Million

300 250 200 150

Cost of a Communications Satellite from US$180 Million

100 50 0

Effective Spending per Year US$21,7 Million over 15 Years

Cost of a Communications Satellite

Fig. 6 Comparison between effective spending over 15-year and cost of a communications satellite Source Own research

and consequently better performance, than the current Túpac Katari from Bolivia, ARSAT-1 and ARSAT-2 from Argentina, as outlined in Fig. 6. This means that there is a significant difference between the conditions prior to the acquisition of PerúSAT-1 and those that are present today regarding the contracting of satellite communications services in public entities. Indeed, being the first Peruvian satellite, the investment of PerúSAT-1 was surrounded by many risks, required enormous political will and, afterwards, has been confirmed as a very good acquisition for the government.

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On the contrary, in the case of satellite communications, the conditions presented are very favorable for an initiative aimed at developing a sovereign communications satellite for use by public entities, the project being practically self-financed for this purpose, requiring an operation of financial engineering of a relatively simple complexity and a wide dissemination of this issue among the different actors, in order to achieve adherence and political support for this initiative.

8

Sensitivity Analysis

It is important to analyze to what extent the analysis carried out would be affected if the effective spending were less than US$21,7 million per year, which in a 15-year horizon is equivalent to the financing to acquire a communications satellite of US $325,25 million. To do this, a sensitivity analysis can be carried out considering the annual effective spending as a single variable17. In this regard, given that current systems are available from US$180 million, as indicated in Fig. 6, it is enough that the effective spending per year exceeds US$12 million to maintain the possibility of utilizing these resources in the financing of a communications satellite. This means, for example, that if the analysis were to focus solely on the ten most expensive contracts, whose aggregate amounts to US$19.263.733,33, equivalent to 89% of the effective spending per year, it would still be justified to use these resources in the development of a sovereign communications satellite for Peru, at an approximate cost of US$289 million, an amount greater than that invested by Argentina in each of its two satellites and close to that invested by Bolivia for its Túpac Katari. Based on all that has been analyzed, it can be said that the current situation of satellite communications contracting is absolutely unsustainable, since it is much more convenient for Peru to develop a project for a sovereign satellite.

9

Solid Foundations for a Communications Satellite Project for Peru

Based on what has been stated above, it can be affirmed without a doubt that there are solid bases to begin the formulation of a public investment project aimed at developing a communications satellite for Peru. Although the detail of this project must be determined in the official technical-economic studies, a preliminary list of the foundations and requirements that must accompany its formulation are the following: 17

Ignacio Vélez Pareja, Business Decisions under Risk and Uncertainty, (Bogotá: Norma S.A., 2003), 240.

Peruvian Government Spending on Satellite Communications

17

– There is an estimated financing of US$325,25 million, which is spent by 45 public entities over a 15-year horizon. Financial engineering work must be carried out to direct these resources to funding a sovereign communications satellite for public entities. – The communications satellite must be of HTS type, which is the most advanced technology today. – The communications satellite should become the main telecommunications delivery method for Loreto, Ucayali and Madre de Dios, which are the only three regions for which a regional fiber optic network project has not been carried out. – The satellite must become the national emergency system, which provides service to public entities and populations affected by the lack of communications in cases of crisis or natural disasters. – A public communications policy for public entities must be formulated, which integrates the RDNFO, the regional fiber optic networks and the communications satellite to form a single system to serve all public entities, with a territorial approach, to allow access to economies of scale and to leverage the enormous bargaining power of the government. – Likewise, given the HTS technology, and the capacity available after meeting the needs of the public sector, the excess resources can be reoriented towards closing the connectivity gap for disadvantaged populations.

10

Conclusions

Every year the Peruvian government makes a significant spending of US$21,7 million for the contracting of satellite communications services for 45 public entities. The total estimated bandwidth received in return is 511,158 MHz. This level of spending sustained in 15 years amounts to US$325,25 million, an amount sufficient to acquire a sovereign communications satellite for Peru, which would be a better use of public resources. The contracting of satellite communication services by public entities in an independent way is very inefficient, prevents access to economies of scale and highlights the absence of a public communications policy for public institutions. There is sufficient support to officially start the technical-economic studies to formulate of a public investment project for the development of a communications satellite for Peru.

Carlos Caballero León Engineer of Aeronautical Constructions from the École Nationale Supérieure d’Ingénieurs de Constructions Aéronautique (ENSICA) of Toulouse, France. Graduate in Aerospace Administration Science from the Peruvian Air Force Officers Academy. Master of Science in Defense and Inter-American Security Sciences from the Inter-American Defense College of Washington DC, USA. Master in Defense and Security Studies of the Americas from the National Academy of Political and Strategic Studies of Chile. Specialist in Maintenance of Radio electronic Systems of the MIG-29 aircraft from the Air Force of Belarus. Peruvian Air Force

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Electronic Engineer Major General retired. He has served as Visitor Professor in the Faculty of Engineering of the Università degli Studi di Salerno, Italia in 2005, and as Professor in the Faculty of Economic Sciences of the Ricardo Palma University of Lima, Peru in 2016. He has held the positions of Director of the Aeronautical Technological Higher Education Institute (ESOFA), Director of Telematics at Peruvian Air Force, General Director of Material Resources of the Ministry of Defense of Peru, CEO of the Armed Forces Purchasing Agency (ACFFAA), CEO of the Peruvian Space Agency (CONIDA). Founder of CP Consult. Wilfredo Fanola Merino Electronic Engineer from the Faculty of Electronic and Electrical Engineering of the Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos (UNMSM), with completed studies of Master’s Degree in Management with a Mention in Senior Management, Defense and Aerospace Development, by La Molina Agrarian University and the Peruvian Air Force Air War College. Master in Strategic Management of Telecommunications from the UNMSM. Post-graduate studies in Digital Communications Engineering by the National Institute for Research and Training in Telecommunications (INICTEL) and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). Diploma in Telecommunications and Information Technologies with a mention in Satellite Communication Systems and its importance in Disaster Situations. University Professor from 1994 to the present. Professor in the School of Telecommunications of the UNMSM. Director of the Chapter of Electronic Engineering of the College of Engineers of Peru. Lecturer at private and national universities in Peru. Author of the book “Digital Communications by Satellite and VSAT Networks”. He has participated in various international events on satellite communications, mobile networks and satellite broadcasting. General Manager of Sociedad Tecnológica del Perú S.A.C.

Satellites for the Benefit of Mexican People: Past, Present and Future Jose Alberto Ramirez-Aguilar, Dulce Carolina Sanchez-Hernandez, Jorge Ferrer-Perez , Rafael Chávez-Moreno , and Carlos Romo-Fuentes

Abstract

We all remember with great enthusiasm the first active communications satellite Telstar 1. The satellite was successfully released in orbit on 10 July 1962 with the mission of transmitting television and voice signals across the Atlantic Ocean from space. The Telstar 1 weighed about 77 kg and it revolutionized the history of communications around the world. The satellite was famous for transmitting the first television signal from an artificial satellite. This technological achievement served as the basis to start the vision of a geostationary satellite system for Mexico. The Government planned a satellite system that would offer vital telecommunications services for the country, national security, global connectivity, and function as a facilitator for daily life. Finally, in the 1980’s a system of geostationary satellites called Morelos I and Morelos II were acquired from foreign companies. In the 1990s, institutions and research centers began the development their own satellites. A satellite project was born at the National Autonomous University of Mexico known as UNAMSAT. These events fostered the development of a Mexican space agency and the birth of new J. A. Ramirez-Aguilar (&)
J. Ferrer-Perez
R. Chávez-Moreno
C. Romo-Fuentes Advanced Technology Unit, School of Engineering, UNAM, Juriquilla, Queretaro, Mexico e-mail: [email protected] J. Ferrer-Perez e-mail: [email protected] R. Chávez-Moreno e-mail: [email protected] C. Romo-Fuentes e-mail: [email protected] D. C. Sanchez-Hernandez Autonomous University of Querétaro, UAQ, Juriquilla, Queretaro, Mexico e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 A. Froehlich (ed.), Space Fostering Latin American Societies, Southern Space Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73287-5_2

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low-cost satellite initiatives for the benefit of the Mexican people. Currently, there are several satellites projects developed by universities and government agencies. This article presents past present and future of satellite technology used by the Government of Mexico to aid people across the nation.

1

Introduction

The first artificial satellites resulted from research fields of communications and space, completing terrestrial communications networks that used only radio and cable. The space age began in 1957 with the launch of the first artificial satellite called Sputnik, developed by the former Soviet Union. Later, in 1958, the American satellite Explorer-1 and SCORE (Signal Communication by Orbiting Relay Equipment) appeared, being the first American communications satellite in history. The reflective satellite Echo also appeared and in 1960 the transmission, storage and sending of information was carried out through the Courier satellite. In 1962 the Telstar-1 and Relay satellites appeared, which had power retransmission capacity. In 1963 a technology breakthrough was made when the first geostationary satellite called Syncom appeared. In 1965, the first commercial geostationary satellite called Intelsat-1 (Early Bird) was put in service. In the same year, Telstar 1 marked a great leap in the history of communications and started the path to satellite communications, which were focused on military projects and the space race, to commercial operations. Telstar 1 is still in the space, but out of service due to internal component failure. Arthur C. Clarke’s 1945 vision was of a system of three “manned” satellites located over the major land masses of the Earth and providing direct-broadcast television. The inherent “broadcast” nature of satellite communications has made direct broadcast a recurrent theme. In 1981 India placed its first communications satellite called APPLE into geostationary orbit. On 17 June 1985, in order to provide connectivity in rural and urban areas, the Federal Government of Mexico, through the Ministry of Communications and Transportation (SCT), decided to launch the first Mexican communications satellite, Morelos I; aboard NASA’s DISCOVERY Space Shuttle (STS-51G) from the Kennedy Space Center, Cape Canaveral, Florida (USA).1 Later, on 26 November 1985, the STS-61B mission started from the ATLANTIS Space Shuttle where Morelos II satellite was launched and completing the first satellite system from 1985 until 1998 (Fig. 1).

1

Gobierno de México, (s.f), Se cumplen 33 años del Morelos I, primer satélite mexicano. 29 de mayo de 2020, https://www.gob.mx/sct/prensa/se-cumplen-33-anos-del-morelos-i-primer-satelitemexicano.

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Fig. 1 First Mexican Geostationary satellite. Morelos I (artistic image)

The high demand for communications services in Mexico, motivated in the 1990’s to launch a second generation of Mexican satellites known as Solidaridad 1 (1993) and Solidaridad 2 (1994). With these satellites, Mexico increased the capacity of its satellite infrastructure to provide fixed and mobile satellite services (Fig. 2).2 On 26 June 1997, with the support of the Federal Agency Telecomm, the company called “Satélites Mexicanos S.A. de C.V.” (Satmex) was conceived. Among the modernization strategies of the satellite system, on 5 December 1998, Satmex placed into orbit the first satellite of the third generation of the Mexican fleet, Satmex 5, which would replace the Morelos II satellite. Within this generation, the Satmex 6 and Satmex 7 were launched in 2006 and the Satmex 8 in 2013. Moreover, in the 1990’s Federal government and the National Autonomous University of Mexico began the development of two research microsatellites UNAMSAT-1 and UNAMSAT-B. With the launch of UNAMSA-B, the university became one of the first academic institutions on Earth to have a scientific instrument of this type.3 With the university microsatellite in space, one of the main objectives of the National University was to promote the development of space technology in Mexico and the training of human resources in the space sector. The UNAMSAT project was a cube type shape of 23 cm each side with digital communications SCT, (2015). El sistema satelital mexicano “Mexsat”: pilar fundamental de la reforma de telecomunicaciones, México: SCT. 01 de junio de 2020, https://www.sct.gob.mx/desplieganoticias/article/el-sistema-satelital-mexicano-mexsat-pilar-fundamental-de-la-reforma-detelecomunicaciones/. 3 Gaceta Digital, UNAM (1996), https://www.acervo.gaceta.unam.mx/index.php/gum90/article/ view/39668. 2

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Fig. 2 Mexican Geostationary satellites: Solidaridad 1 and 2 (artistic image)

capabilities like a BBS (Bulletin Broadcasting Service), as well as a scientific experiment to measure meteorites entry speed into Earth’s atmosphere. There are good perspectives for the development of Mexican satellites. These satellites projects are under development at UAT-FI-UNAM.4 The satellites are for research and for the training of human resources. One of the nanosatellites is KuauhtliSAT5,6 and the other is K’OTO. These projects will seek to strengthen the development of satellite technology in Mexico and to promote research and student participation in real applications and projects.

2

Development of Artificial Satellites

On 4 October 1957, the Soviet Union launched the first artificial satellite, Sputnik 1. This event began the era of artificial satellites. Satellites are used for many purposes, they can be used to make to obtain images of the Earth and planets, communication, navigation, meteorological, etc. Communications satellites include those used to relay signals from one point on Earth to another, facilitating communications and broadcasting. This is the most commercial use of satellites and includes coverage of radio, television, internet, telephony, and other uses. The International Space Station (ISS) and any other spacecraft in orbit are also satellites. 4

Advanced Technology Unit (UAT), School of Engineering (FI) at National University Autonomous of México (UNAM). 5 Gaceta Digital, UNAM (1996), https://www.acervo.gaceta.unam.mx/index.php/gum90/article/ view/39668. 6 Ramírez Aguilar J.A., et. al., “Nanosatélite KuauhtliSAT el Ulises 2.0 México en el Espacio”, Ciencias. Academia Mexicana de Ciencias, CDMX 2020.

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Satellites can operate independently or in constellations. The orbits of satellites vary considerably based on the mission, for example Low Earth Orbit (LEO), Polar Orbit, and Geostationary Orbit (GEO). Initially, the satellites that were commonly used for communications can be classified as large satellites (weight more than 1.000 kg). Today with the advancement of electronics, it is possible to build microsatellites (weight between 10 and 100 kg) and nanosatellites (weight 1 and 10 kg). Nano- and microsatellites are cheaper, relatively quick to build and often launched as secondary payloads on larger launch vehicles. Many universities around the world have initiated projects on nanosatellites with scientific objectives and training of human resources in the space area.

3

Morelos Satellite System

The Government of Mexico, through the Secretary of Communications and Transportation (SCT), delivers the Morelos Satellite System to the nation to obtain a place in space and to be able to communicate to the country in a reliable and global way. The signals via satellite served to support the socioeconomic programs of the regions and benefit from efficient means of communication, recreation and culture. In the 1960’s there is a transcendental change in telecommunications in Mexico, when the national microwave system was installed and international links were established via satellite. In 1968 the first station for international communications via satellite began to operate, allowing Mexico to be part of the artificial satellite’s era. In 1981 the communication needs in the country increased exponentially. To help, a network of Earth-bound stations was installed and part of the available capacity of one of the INTELSAT consortium's satellites was rented. It can be said that in the 1980’s there were many population centers, located in areas of difficult access, which did not have the most essential services, such as telephony. The situation made it necessary to contemplate the strategy of introducing a satellite communications system in Mexico. Finally, in 1981, the SCT worked out the specifications that the Mexican satellites had to meet, and subsequently several satellite manufacturers were summoned to present proposals where the company HUGHES Communication International was selected. Finally, NASA Space Transportation System (STS) was chosen. Subsequently, the company Mc Donell Douglas (MDD) was also selected to manufacture the orbit transfer rockets, which would allow the satellites to be elevated to an altitude of almost 36.000 km, after the STS released them in a near LEO (352 km high7).

7

Sistema de Satélites Morelos, México, SCT—Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Transportes, Noviembre (1985).

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Fig. 3 Mexican Geostationary satellite Morelos I and deployed from the Space Shuttle SCS

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Technical Aspects of the Morelos Satellite System

The satellites Morelos were geostationary HS-376 type spacecraft. The satellites used integrated propulsion, position control, thermal power and telemetry and command subsystems. The satellites had a cylindrical shape with a diameter of 216 cm, their height, with the antenna and the telescopic solar panel deployed was 660 cm, a weight of 666 kg at the beginning of the operation, of which 145 kg corresponded to the fuel that would be used to hold them in the assigned orbital positions (Fig. 3). The SCT supervised and controlled all stages of the program for the satellites Morelos I and Morelos II, which, in addition to their design and manufacture, included the construction of a control, telemetry and command center (Fig. 4). All artificial satellites are subject to gravitational forces mainly from the Earth, the Moon, and the Sun, for this reason a control center was necessary to control the satellites Morelos I and II. The main control center was installed in the telecommunications complex (CONTEL) made up of an azimuth and elevation tracking antenna, two parabolic antennas for communications, radio frequency and base band equipment, telemetry and command equipment, control console of operations and monitoring, and finally the computer equipment and the orbital dynamics analysis section. The communications subsystem consisted of an antenna and a 22-channel repeater or transponders to operate in the C-band (6/4 GHz) and Ku-band (14/12 GHz). An important aspect is that the C-band considered the frequency

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Fig. 4 Original satellite control center and ground station for Morelos I and II

reuse technique to provide twelve narrow band channels of 36 MHz bandwidth. The Ku-band section would provide four channels of 108 MHz bandwidth. The communications antenna subsystem of the Morelos I and II was a set of several antennas which would create six different communication beams. The most important part of the antenna system was the double parabolic reflector located at the upper end of the non-rotating platform of each satellite, nominally oriented to the center of Mexico. The 6 GHz signals would be received through the parabolic reflector antenna and transferred to the 4 GHz band in two of the four redundant broadband receivers. In the Ku-band payload, the 14 GHz uplink signals would be received by a planar antenna and would be transposed into the 12 GHz band on one of the two redundant broadband receivers (Fig. 5). On board the Morelos I and II satellites there was a planar antenna that would provide reception of the Ku-band communications signals, the antenna had 32 identical slotted elements. The system was protected from the space environment by a germanium sunscreen, which was commonly used in the parabolic reflectors of the HS-376 geostationary satellites (Fig. 6). The transponders used for the Morelos I and II satellites specifically for the C-band considered traveling-wave tube (TWT) amplifiers, six operational and one backup. The transponders in the Ku-band also used TWT amplifiers, four operational and two backups. These types of amplifiers were considered because they met the linearity requirement (Fig. 7).8 A TWT is a vacuum tube device consisting of an electron gun and an associated permanent magnet system that fires an electron beam through a slow wave structure to a collector. The slow wave structure typically takes the form of a metallic helix. The radio emission requiring amplification is induced into the slow wave structure near the source of the beam. The radio wave and the electron beam travel along the 8

See https://www.britannica.com/technology/traveling-wave-tube.

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Fig. 5 The parabolic antenna and main payload systems (transponders) of Morelos I and II

Fig. 6 Planar antenna for the reception of communications signals in Ku-band of Morelos I and II

vacuum tube at about the same speed and electromagnetic interaction between them induces a velocity modulation of the beam (Fig. 8). Electrons coming from the beam flow, which increases with the distance travelled along the beam, and this feeds energy back into the wave, to be extracted near the collector. TWTs are available providing a maximum output power for a single emission of up to several hundred watts with gains of about 55 dB and an efficiency

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Fig. 7 The main elements of the traveling-wave tube (TWT)

Fig. 8 Example of TWT amplifier for C-band

Fig. 9 Typical block diagram of satellite communication with TWT

of up to 40 to 50%, efficiency being defined as the ratio of the radio emission output power to the electric power input (Fig. 9).9,10 9

See https://electricaltopics.blogspot.com/2015/09/block-diagram-of-satellite-communication-syst em.html. 10 Stephan, C. P. and David, J. W. (1997), Commercial Satellite Communications, Focal Press, Boston.

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Fig. 10 Examples of typical TWT amplifiers for Ku-band

Solid state power amplifiers are manufactured using field effect transistors. They have some limitations of output power and operating frequency but provide high reliability, compactness, and low mass. As their limitations are being overcome by technological advances, SSPAs are increasingly replacing TWTs, especially in the lower frequency bands and where low to medium power outputs are required (Fig. 10).

5

Solidaridad Satellite System

The Solidaridad Satellite System was the second generation of communications satellites for Mexico. The Solidaridad satellites were HS-601spacecraft type, manufactured by HUGHES Aircraft Company, with triaxial stabilization and payload in the C-, Ku- and L-bands. The Solidaridad 1 satellite replaced the Morelos I. The orbit occupied by the satellite Morelos I (113.5 West) was considered to be occupied by Solidaridad 2 with a half-degree adjustment (113.0 West) to comply with the international agreement between Canada and the United States of America for the use of the orbit. The use of solidarity satellites made it possible to increase the availability of services four times greater transmission power, which made it possible to reduce the size of the antennas to receive signals in Mexico, regional coverage in the American continent.11 The Ku-band was completely

11

David Ziman, IMC (1994), Proc. Of the second Euro-Latin American Space Days, (ESA-SP 363).

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Fig. 11 Physical dimensions of the satellites Solidaridad 1 and 2

Fig. 12 Projection of the orbital position for Solidaridad 1 and 2 (degrees West)

redesigned for greater bandwidth capacity and frequency reuse with vertical/horizontal and horizontal/vertical polarization. For C-band, twelve transponders of 36 MHz and six of 72 MHz were considered operating in both polarizations. A third band was integrated. The L-band was included in the satellite system for mobile communications via satellite. The frequency range considered for the use of the L-band was from 1.525 to 1.559 MHz (Space—Earth) and 1.626,5 to 1.660,5 MHz (Earth—Space) according to international agreements. Right circular polarization (RHCP) was considered (Fig. 11). The projection of the orbital position of the satellites Solidaridad 1 and 2 is illustrated in Fig. 12.

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Fig. 13 Mexican Microsatellite UNAMSAT-B.

6

UNAMSAT Satellite Project

The UNAMSAT project was support by AMSAT (Amateur Radio Satellite Corporation) through an open technology package; later the AT&T Company donated economic resources to finance the construction of the second satellite, the preliminary tests and the cost of the rocket docking. One of the missions of UNAMSAT-B (Fig. 13) was to determine the speed of meteorites that encounter the Earth's atmosphere. In addition to collecting data from sensors placed at strategic points in volcanoes and oceanographic balls. UNAMSAT-B had on board a type of radar that would emit a radio frequency pulse and receive the echoes that bounce off the ionized trails produced by meteorites flying within the atmosphere. In this way, it would be possible to know how many meteorites enter the atmosphere per day, in addition to knowing if they come from inside the solar system or from outside it, according to their speed.

7

New Mexican Satellites Initiatives

7.1 KuauhtliSAT The nanosatellites are systems developed to carry out various missions from space. This term is used to identify artificial satellites whose mass ranges between 1 and 10 kg. Advances in microelectronics, nanotechnology and electromechanical microsystems have made possible for nanosatellites to have some comparable performance today with bigger satellites. A widely adopted standard by universities is the CubeSat, a 10  10  10 cm cube. Multiple 1U CubeSat (1 Unit) can be combined to form large systems, known as 2U, 3U, and so on. The nanosatellite KuauhtliSAT (Fig. 14), has a TubeSat type configuration, that is, a sixteen-sided tube that fits inside a 1U CubeSat type structure; this will release its capabilities to

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Fig. 14 Insignia of Mexican nanosatellite KuauhtliSAT

the test once in orbit. There is no standard for this type of structure, but in countries such as Brazil and Colombia space missions have been developed with this type of nanosatellites and they have obtained really encouraging results. The objective of the KuauhtliSAT (Fig. 15) is to take images from space, as well as to collect telemetry information to inform the ground station (ECXSAT-B) about the health status of the various subsystems of the nanosatellite. The station is located at the Advanced Technology Unit (UAT-FI-UNAM) on the Campus Juriquilla in Querétaro.

7.2 Nanosatellite K’OTO For Mexico, it is essential to have satellite technology that contributes to the solution of the country’s challenges such as the prevention of natural disasters, which allows immediate and well-planned actions to be taken, in addition to developing disaster prevention programs. The role of aerospace technology in security applications is central and can be understood through its three great capabilities: to communicate, to observe, and to locate. The UAT-FI-UNAM in conjunction with the Secretariat for Sustainable Development (SEDESU) of the state of Querétaro, are developing the project called K’OTO, a name that, in the Otomí language, means Grasshopper, alluding to the great technological leap that the development of this project will bring to México, while maintaining the cultural roots of the state of Querétaro (Fig. 16).

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Fig. 15 Artist impression of Mexican nanosatellite KuauhtliSAT

Fig. 16 Insignia of Mexican nanosatellite K’OTO

This project considers design, manufacture, integration, testing, launch, deploy and operation of a nanosatellite under the CubeSat standard (satellite with dimensions of 10  10  10 cm and a weight no greater than 1,3 kg). K'OTO main objective is remote sensing. As soon as it will be placed in orbit over the Mexican territory it will take images and later transmit them to the ground station located at the UAT-FI-UNAM facilities (Fig. 17).

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Fig. 17 Projected structure of Mexican nanosatellite K’OTO

The development of this project also aims to be a technological demonstrator through which the students participating will have the opportunity to develop, integrate and carry out the pre-certification tests of the subsystems within the UAT-FI-UNAM facilities in Querétaro, which houses the National Laboratory for Space and Automotive Engineering (LN-INGEA). This Laboratory has state-of-the-art facilities with the ability to perform pre-certification tests under spatial standards, placing Querétaro as a key point not only in the country, but also at the Latin American level regarding the development of space systems and pre-certification tests. Currently, the project has the collaboration of students from different universities in the state of Querétaro, promoting the training of human resources in the space area through teamwork, in a multidisciplinary and multi-institutional environment. It is expected that K’OTO nanosatellite will be launched and deploy for mid-2021 from the International Space Station (ISS), through the KIBO module.

8

Benefits of Using Artificial Satellites to Mexico

With the acquisition of the Morelos and Solidaridad Satellites Systems, it was possible for Mexico to provide data, telephone, telegraphy, telex, facsimile and television to areas of the country with difficult access. The satellites supported and complemented the National Network of Earth Stations distributed throughout the country. Satellites did not replace the terrestrial bound telecommunications systems and networks that were operating, they contributed to a better operation. With the satellites Morelos and Solidaridad, the door was opened to implement programs for

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the development of new telecommunications services, such as videoconferences, cable television, systems for data transmission for private companies, educational television, networks for private and government agencies, telemedicine, and national security. With the development of micro and nanosatellites in Mexico, it is feasible to venture into the development of high technology for the benefit of the country and its population with very low costs compared to the investments made to develop and operate a large satellite.

9

Conclusions

Today satellites provide great benefits to humanity in support of communications, navigation, remote sensing and meteorology. With satellites it is possible to provide services such as voice, data and television to rural zones with difficult access. The satellites open the possibility to start new telecommunications services, mainly for populations far from big cities, private companies, schools, hospitals, industries and government agencies. With the development of the scientific microsatellite UNAMSAT-B it represented the possibility and ability of developing satellite technologies in Mexico once again. Technical, logistic and administrative aspects were learned. Today, two new initiatives of nanosatellites KuauhtliSAT and K’OTO have been born and the first results can already be seen mainly in the training of human resources in the space area. Thus, we are convinced that soon these nanosatellites will be part of the thousands of celestial objects surrounding our blue planet.

Ph.D. Jose Alberto Ramirez-Aguilar is associate professor of National Autonomous University of Mexico-School of Engineering. He received his Ph.D. in Technical Sciences in Radio receivers and microsatellites from the Moscow Aviation Institute - MAI, Russian Federation. He is the head of the Aerospace Engineering Department and responsible of the Earth Station Laboratory and Vice chair of the GRULAC of the International Astronautical Federation - IAF. His current research areas are Radio Frequency and microwave Systems, GNSS, Antennas, TT&C, Nano and Microsatellites. Likewise, in 2020 was selected for the first Latin American manned space mission ESAA-01EX SOMINUS AD ASTRA. M.Eng. Dulce Carolina Sanchez-Hernandez 1998 She obtained the title of Communications and Electronics Engineer from UNAM. Collaborated as an assistant professor of the subject. Worked at Philips Mexicana in the Consumer Electronics area as a supervisor of service centers nationwide. She worked for the television station TV AZTECA as Maintenance Supervisor of the National Network of repeater stations and later as Project Manager of the National Network. She traveled to the country of the Russian Federation where she studied for a master’s degree in Mobile System Engineering at the Faculty of Radiocommunications of the Moscow Aviation Institute with honors. She currently serves as Coordinator of the Telecommunications and Network Engineering career at the Autonomous University of Querétaro. Dr. Jorge Ferrer-Perez is associate professor of National University Autonomous of Mexico-School of Engineering. He received his Ph.D. in Aerospace and Mechanical Engineering

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from the University of Notre Dame, South Bend in United States. He is part of the Aerospace Engineering Department and responsible of the Space Propulsion and Thermo-vacuum lab. This facility belongs to the Space and Automotive Engineering National Laboratory located at Juriquilla. His current research areas are nano-heat transfer in solid state devices, thermal control, space propulsion, small satellites and development of space technology. Dr. Rafael G. Chávez-Moreno is assistant professor of National University Autonomous of Mexico-School of Engineering. He received his Ph.D. in Mechanical Engineering from the School of Engineering-UNAM. He is part of the Aerospace Engineering Department and responsible of the Model Based on Design lab which belongs to the Space and Automotive Engineering National Laboratory located at Juriquilla. He is an active member of the Mexican Society of Mechanical Engineering and the Space Science and Technology Network. His current research areas include space systems, embedded systems and control systems. Dr. Carlos Romo Fuentes is associate professor of National University Autonomous of Mexico-School of Engineering. He received his Ph.D. in Technical Sciences in the Design of Space Systems considering electromagnetic compatibility criteria from the Aviation Institute of Moscow, Russia. He is part of the Aerospace Engineering Department and responsible of the Electromagnetic Compatibility Laboratory. His current research areas are electromagnetic compatibility, certification tests, space systems and space technology development. Likewise, is the technical responsible of the Space Science and Technology Theme Network from the National Council of Science and Technology from the Government of Mexico.

The University Space Program: A Bet to Reach the Future José Francisco Valdés Galicia

and Juan Antonio Sánchez Guzmán

Abstract

The University Space Program (USP) of UNAM in Mexico City (University Space Program (USP) or Programa Espacial Universitario (PEU), of the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM).) promotes the execution of Space Science and Technology (SST) projects. It promotes and works in the construction of an adequate environment for multidisciplinary training of scientists, engineers and social scientists in the space area, proposes strategic studies to elaborate on an adequate prospect of National growth that contributes to decision making and the elaboration on public policies to meet needs of strategic sectors. Additionally, the Program is in charge of space science and technology communication to the general public to contribute to the knowledge and culture of society in this area. “Ah, but a man’s reach should exceed his grasp, or what’s a heaven for?”, Robert Browning (Woolford, J., (Ed.), et al. 2013, Robert Browning: Selected 22 Poems, Routledge, ISBN-10: 1405841133, p. 386.)

1

Introduction

In the second half of the 20th century the development of space science and technology opened a new scientific, economic, political, social and cultural horizon. The possibility of reaching places only imagined by science fiction aroused the J. F. Valdés Galicia
J. A. Sánchez Guzmán (&) Programa Espacial Universitario, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Ciudad Universitaria, Mexico City 04510, Mexico e-mail: [email protected] J. F. Valdés Galicia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 A. Froehlich (ed.), Space Fostering Latin American Societies, Southern Space Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73287-5_3

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Fig. 1 UNAMSAT-B being integrated (1996)

interest of many countries and their institutions to generate knowledge and technological development. The exploration of space surrounding the Earth and the development of technologies, have resulted in a multitude of changes and benefits for humanity, which have been integrated into our daily life in such an organic way that we hardly recognize where they come from. The use of cell phones and many other means of communication, the prediction and development of cyclones and atmospheric storms, the monitoring of forests, jungles, crops, urban growth, different aspects of volcanic phenomena and a large amount of human activities are currently possible thanks to the development of SST. Different fields of space research and technology have been cultivated in Mexico for at least seven decades.1 Space activities at UNAM have been present both in scientific and technological aspects and in branches of the Humanities and Social Sciences. The two important milestones in the past were firstly, the development of the first Mexican microsatellite,2 launched successfully into space in 1996 (UNAMSAT-B, Fig. 1); and secondly the active participation of a large group of UNAM members in contribution to the draft legislation of the law that mandates the creation of the Mexican Space Agency.3

1

Ruth Gall, et al. (1987), Las Ciencias Espaciales en México, FCE. ISBN: 9789681624590. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-16318-0_32. 3 Mexican Space Agency (Agencia Espacial Mexicana, AEM), the national space agency of Mexico, established in July 2010. 2

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Fig. 2 Mexican scientists working on UNAMSAT-B (1996)

At the end of 2017 the UNAM established the USP (Programa Espacial Universitario, PEU) as a coordinating entity to promote the realization of proposal for the development of SST at UNAM, to boost a comprehensive education in the space area and to propose strategic studies in order to elaborate a suitable scenario of national growth that contributes to decision-making and the development of public policies in order to meet the needs of strategic sectors that benefit from the SST. One of the first activities of the USP has been the generation of the Mexican Satellite Workshop in accordance with the purpose of convening, integrating and coordinating efforts of the scientific and technological community, encouraging the participation of multidisciplinary and inter-institutional teams to generate knowledge and execute innovative projects.

2

Mexican Satellite Workshop

An important purpose of the Mexican Satellite Workshop (Taller Satelital Mexicano, TSM) is to reduce the technological gap in the space area and taking advantage of the framework of a new paradigm, where the miniaturization of electronics and the reduction of its costs allows countries, that previously were behind in the space race, now be part with their own abilities of new technological developments. The first objective of the TSM is to construct a satellite providing experience, knowledge and development of capacities to replicate and create its own technology. To join the workshop, relevant institutions in the sector have been

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Fig. 3 Example of Mexico fire hotspot satellite image (Image courtesy of NASA)

invited (Fig. 2), such as the Centro de Desarrollo Aeroespacial of the Instituto Politécnico Nacional, Instituto Nacional de Astrofísica, Óptica y Electrónica, and the Mexican Space Agency. An important motivation for the creation of the TSM was the UNAM-NASA workday, where both institutions presented some of their projects in the field of nanosatellites and NASA offered to help out with the launch of a satellite made in Mexico.4 The mission definition and the potential applications of the first TSM project was developed in meetings and interviews, creating the knowledge basis about the requirements for satellite images of Government entities, such as the National Center for Disaster Prevention, National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Informatics and the National Institute of Ecology and Climate Change. Based on these prospects it was possible to specify the mission that the TSM will develop to achieve a satellite capable to provide imagery in the electromagnetic region of the visible spectrum (red band) and near infrared (NIR) to support the assessment and analysis of the health of the vegetation and soil. At the same time, it allows monitoring specific human and geological activities. Another project focus of the mission will be to develop the required instrumentation to monitor the density of vegetation including the maturity of crops in agricultural areas and study the floating vegetation near the coasts, to evaluate the damage from toxic algae or the status of wetlands. With the on-board instruments it 4

At the beginning of 2018, the University Space Program and NASA organized at UNAM, in collaboration with the Mexican Space Agency, a workday to exchange experiences, present projects and agree on collaboration mechanisms. The meeting was also attended by Instituto Politécnico Nacional and the National Instituto Nacional de Astrofísica, Óptica y Electrón.

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should be possible to build capacities to monitor the growth of irregular human settlements in risk areas (i.e. floods, active volcanoes).5 The data to be obtained should be capable of providing verifiable information about the reduction, increase or modification of bodies of water that represent a risk for the population, such as changes in the course of rivers or droughts (Fig. 3). Moreover, it is thought that the instruments to be developed could be capable of evaluating the effects of the dispersion of pyroclastic materials and ashes in volcanic eruptions. The obtained images would be mainly for use of Mexican Civil Protection Agencies and those dedicated to environmental issues. The proposed camera and lens adaptations will operate in frequencies of red light and NIR, able to complement those images obtained from satellites such as LANDSAT 8, operated by NASA and the United States Geological Survey, but with greater spatial resolution and higher recurrence times over Mexican territory. The Mexican agencies involved would develop the satellite control systems necessary for navigation and orientation. The TSM project is of national relevance (see above) and supports the needs for a better growth planning and protection against natural risks. At the same time, the respective nanosatellite technologies will serve to validate the various systems to be integrated, strengthen the space laboratories for construction and ground tests, support education of research groups, and train specialized human resources in SST. Through the development of this national CubeSat it is intended to validate indigenous technology, which includes the various subsystems that integrate a satellite (image capture, telemetry and control, orbit and attitude stabilization, on-board computer, terrestrial station and control operations, thermal control and energy sources).6 To build and operate a satellite that captures images for social welfare and common benefit will have the additional goal of generating experience and technology. This is the basis for more ambitious projects, both in the field of Earth Observation and in other areas that can be developed through space related activities. Undoubtedly, the design, construction and potential launch of a Mexican satellite will provide our country with relevant capabilities and knowledge which can lead to less technological dependence in the SST field. Further on, a national space project will be the stepstone for a more goal-oriented National Space Plan where sovereign national contributions are substantive to encounter and solve Mexican challenges.

5

See: Salamon, P., Casagli, N., Cloke, H., Horsburgh, K., 2017, Understanding disaster risk: hazard related risk issues - Section II. Hydrological risk, In: Poljanšek, K., Marín Ferrer, M., De Groeve, T., Clark, I. (Eds.), Science for disaster risk management 2017: knowing better and losing less. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, Chapter 3 Section II, https://doi.org/ 10.2788/688605. 6 Achieving Science with CubeSats, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C.,130 pp., https://doi.org/10.17226/23503, 2016.

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CanSat Contest

One of the priorities of the PEU, where substantial efforts have already been made, is the continuous development of students’ skills. In this context, CanSat describes a simulation of a real satellite, integrated into the dimensions and shape of a canister, approximately the size of a soda can. In the university CanSat Contest 2017–2018, the challenge was to incorporate all the main subsystems found in a satellite (Fig. 4). The participating student teams are responsible for achieving mission objectives, from designing the satellite, integrating all necessary components, preparing for the launch, and analyzing received data. Each team was mentored by an advisor who must be from the academic staff of UNAM. The PEU organized this Contest with the intention of providing university students with the opportunity to gain practical experience in a space technology project. In the CanSat Contest 2018–2019 a national call was made, where enrolled undergraduate students from 23 different universities located in eleven different States of the country. Extra requirements were added to the previous Contest to bring it closer to the characteristics of an international competition of this kind. For the CanSat Contest 2019–2020 the call was Ibero-American. In addition to national teams, groups from twelve other Latin American countries were registered and the CanSat’s mission layout was even more complicated than in previous years.

Fig. 4 A CubeSat built by a UNAM student in the CanSat Contest

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Fig. 5 Workshop of UNAM with a lecturer from the University of Arizona, USA

The winning teams participate in an international CanSat Contest which is held in Stephenville, Texas (USA). In 2018 the SIQUEIROS TEAM representative of UNAM took the seventh place among more than one hundred competing teams from 95 universities around the world. This result highlights the importance of maintaining a support program for students involved in SST projects.

4

Promotion, Science Communication and Education

The PEU compiled a Catalog of Spatial Projects as an instrument to have a diagnosis and decisions making tool and a fundamental basis in the SST area,7 which allows easing data dissemination and the updating process. As an example of how science can contribute to decision making and public policy development in the space and other related sectors (i.e. civil defense, exploitation of natural resources, demography, telecommunications), the Program has been part of the Space Weather Committee8 headed by CENAPRED.9 Members of it repeatedly held work interviews with various Mexican Government Agencies.

7

PEU has published a digital version on its website, https://peu.unam.mx. See https://www.sciesmex.unam.mx/. 9 See https://www.gob.mx/cenapred/articulos/cenapred-la-agencia-espacial-mexicanay-el-institutode-geofisica-de-la-unam-concretan-importantes-logros-de-clima-espacial-en-mexico?idiom=es. 8

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In order to strengthen the training of human resources in the space sector in Mexico, different kinds of efforts have been made, such as the participation as advisory entity in the Bachelor of Aerospace Engineering, recently created in the Faculty of Engineering at UNAM10; the National Congress on Spatial Health in 2019; a Summer Seminar of Mexican students at the University of Arizona (USA, Fig. 5) and studies of visiting students from different nations in order to write their undergraduate thesis at UNAM. An important distinction to the PEU was given in the United Nations Convention for the Exploration and Pacific Uses of Outer Space (UNISPACE+50), where it participated 2018 as a representative entity of UNAM.11

5

Conclusions

In the short time that has elapsed since the creation of the PEU in 2017 a wide range of space related activities and topics have occupied the faculty program. UNAM has begun to meet the demand of the university community to use and exploit a tool through which academic and scientific space interests are supported, channeled and promoted. With this, an active and collaborative community was founded which was looking for opportunities to conduct its initiatives or interact with other actors in the same field. We envision that from the work of the PEU a harmonious development of the existing capacities in UNAM in the SST can be generated. Thereby a comprehensive University Plan is formed that tries to take advantage of the different opportunity niches and trends to consolidate a Mexican Space Science of quality and autonomous technological development. Thus, working as a catalyst and collaborator with other National Agencies, while taking advantage of the capabilities of international institutions with whom relationships are established.

10

See https://www.ingenieria.unam.mx/programas_academicos/licenciatura/aeroespacial.php. See https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/unispaceplus50/index.html.

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The Footprint of Latin America in International Space Law Laura Jamschon Mac Garry

Abstract

Latin American countries were involved in the multilateral discussions of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) since its very inception. Their participation in the negotiations of the five United Nations treaties contributed to drafting the final texts that currently regulate space activities since their entry into force. The travaux préparatoires of these international instruments are a valuable source to elucidate and document the role that the countries of the region played in the formation of international space law. The evolution of COPUOS membership reflects the considerable increase of Latin American and Caribbean countries that are engaging in space activities and are willing to continue contributing to the global governance of space in a constructive spirit.

1

Introduction

The history of international space law is about 60 years old now. Although at the dawn of the space age only two space powers concentrated the technological capacity to produce, launch and operate satellites, the United Nations (UN) provided an appropriate venue for the international community to discuss a regime that would govern space activities for the decades to come until the present day.

L. Jamschon Mac Garry (&) Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Italy e-mail: [email protected] This article is written in the author’s personal capacity. The opinions expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Argentine Republic. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 A. Froehlich (ed.), Space Fostering Latin American Societies, Southern Space Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73287-5_4

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Since the setup of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) in 1958 as an ad hoc body with 18 members, the Latin American region was involved in its work (at that time, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico were the only Latin American members). Then, COPUOS became a standing body of the UN in 1959, established its two Subcommittees, and commenced its treaty-making process, which contributed significantly to the space governance. Only in 1973 did new Latin American countries become members of COPUOS (Chile and Venezuela), and then again in 1977 Ecuador and Colombia increased representation of the region. Although COPUOS concluded a treaty-making phase in December 1979, further countries from Latin American and the Caribbean continued to join COPUOS afterwards (Uruguay, Cuba, Nicaragua, Peru, Bolivia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Paraguay and the Dominican Republic became full members as well). The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief overview of the active participation of Latin American countries in the formation of space treaty law. At the outset, a preliminary differentiation of space law, space policy and global governance will be delineated to set the stage. Since Latin American countries may participate in COPUOS both in their national capacity and as members of a regional or political group, a distinction will be made between the Group of Latin American Countries and the Caribbean (GRULAC) and the Group of the 77 and China (G77 +China). Finally, an outline of positions in the negotiations of the five UN space treaties will endeavour to provide a clear picture of core issues for the region and their reflection in current space law.

2

Space Law, Space Policy and Space Governance: Setting the Stage

At the outset it might be useful to clarify three concepts that should not be considered interchangeable: space law, space policy and space governance. Yet, this does not mean that they are not interlinked; to the contrary, they influence each other. a) Space policy: although it has been defined as “a nation’s strategy regarding its civilian space program and the military and commercial utilization of outer space”,1 it should be borne in mind that certain intergovernmental stakeholders

1

Fabio Tronchetti, Fundamentals of Space Law and Policy, (Harbin: Springer, 2013), Overview Section.

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like the European Union,2 the African Union3 and NATO4 have also developed a space policy. b) Space law: This concept refers to all the rules aiming at the regulation of the activities of States and other subjects, including private operators, in outer space.5 It covers not only activities in outer space but also those directed towards outer space.6 Some commentators refer also to activities relating to outer space.7 There is a wide consensus that the wording ‘activities in outer space’ in the Outer Space Treaty (OST) includes activities linked to the launching, operation, or the return of space objects.8 In lato sensu, space law is a system that comprises rules, norms and principles9 of different types: international, domestic, private and public; political and legal; binding and non-binding. Public international space law, for its part, has a couple of features that make it particular: It is a fragmented system with elements agreed upon in different fora by delegations that are sometimes integrated by different experts.10 It is a young area of

2

Resolution on the European Space Policy, Council of the EU 10,037/07, Brussels, 25 May 2007. African Space Policy Towards Social, Political And Economic Integration, https://au.int/ (all websites cited in this publication were last accessed and verified on 29 July 2020). 4 Kestutis Paulauskas, “Space: NATO’s Latest Frontier”, 13 March 2020. Available at https:// www.nato.int/. 5 Sergio Marchisio, “Space Law and Governance”, 10th United Nations Workshop on Space Law “Contribution of Space Law and Policy to Space Governance and Space Security in the 21th Century”, 5–8 September 2016, Vienna, p. 2. 6 See also Michael Gerhard, “Article VI”, in Cologne Commentary on Space Law (Vol. 1), eds. Stephan Hobe, Bernhard Schmidt-Tedd and Kai-Uwe Schrogl, (Cologne: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2009), 107 (para 21). 7 Francis Lyall and Paul Larsen, Space Law. A Treatise, (Farnham-Furlington: Ashgate, 2009), 2. 8 Olivier Ribbelink, “Article III”, in Cologne Commentary on Space Law (Vol. I), eds. Stephan Hobe, Bernhard Schmidt-Tedd and Kai-Uwe Schrogl, (Cologne: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2009), 66 (para. 9). 9 See Frans Von der Dunk, “International Space Law”, in Handbook of Space Law, ed. Frans Von der Dunk, (Cheltenham-Northampton:Edward Elgar, 2015), 121–122. Vladimir Kopal speaks about a “wider concept of space law” that comprises the UN space treaties and principles; other international agreements relating to space, including the relevant parts of the statutes of international intergovernmental space organisations; and domestic laws implementing and completing the international norms. See Vladimir Kopal, “Origins of Space Law and the Role of the United Nations”, in Outer Space in Society, Politics and Law, eds. Christian Brünner and Alexander Soucek, (Vienna: Springer, 2011), 232. 10 See Gennady Danilenko, “International Law-making for Outer Space”, Space Policy 37 (2016), 182. See also Katrin Metcalf, “A Legal View on Outer Space and Cyberspace: Similarities and Differences”, (Tallinn: NATO CCD COE Publications, 2018), 6. 3

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international law,11 although the first traces can be found in the beginning of the last century with writings of Konstantin Tsiolkovsky and Vladimir Mandl.12 In addition, public international space law is not yet a complete system;13 rather it is a developing one14 that needs further elaboration. Intentional lacunae have given a particular flexibility to it, and the vague language bestows adaptability upon it.15 Moreover, international space law is State-centred16 because at the time of its original formation space activities were conducted only by States. c) Global Space governance: In 2014 the Second Manfred Lachs International Conference on Space Global Governance (an initiative of the McGill University of Canada) concluded with the so called Montreal Declaration on the matter. One of its preambular paragraphs reads: “the concept of global governance is comprehensive and includes a wide range of codes of conduct, confidence building measures, safety concepts, international institutions, international treaties and other agreements, regulations, procedures and standards”.17 It has also been defined as a “movement towards integration of space actors” to negotiate responses to space-related problems.18 At this juncture, it is possible to conclude that this is the most encompassing of the three concepts, since not only does it include domestic and international instruments, but also institutions and processes.

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GRULAC, Group of 77+China and Developing Countries

Regional groups are an important element in the UN system of geographical distribution principle created in 1963. Although they were established for electoral and ceremonial purposes, regional groups coordinate on substantive issues and deliver Armel Kerrest, “Space Law and the Law of the Sea”, in Outer Space in Society, Politics and Law, eds. Christian Brünner and Alexander Soucek, (Vienna: Springer, 2011), 254. 12 Fabio Tronchetti, Fundamentals of Space Law and Policy, supra note 1, 4, Vladimir Kopal and Mahulena Hofmann, “Vladimir Mandl”, in Pioneers of Space Law, ed. Stephan Hobe, (Leiden-Boston: Martinus-Nijhoff, 2013), 62; Vladimir Kopal, “Origins of Space Law and the Role of the United Nations”, in Outer Space in Society, Politics and Law, eds. Christian Brünner and Alexander Soucek, (Vienna-New York: ESPI, 2011), 221. Lyall and Larsen also mention earlier harbingers, such as Emile Laude (1910), V.A. Zarzar (1926), Herman Potočnik (1928). 13 See Fabio Tronchetti, Fundamentals of Space Law and Policy, supra note 1, 3. 14 Vladimir Kopal, “International Legal Regime on Outer Space: Outer Space Treaty, Rescue Agreement and the Moon Agreement”, in Proceedings of United Nations/Nigeria Workshop on Space Law, Vienna (2006), 17. 15 See Percy Blount, “Renovating Space: The Future of International Space Law”, Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 40, (2011), 524–525 and 527. 16 See Gurbachan Sachdeva, “Outer Space Treaty: An Appraisal”, in 50 Years of the Outer Space Treaty. Tracing the Journey, ed. Ajey Lele, (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2017), 25. 17 Second Manfred Lachs International Conference on Global Space Governance, held at McGill University, Montreal, 29–31 May 2014, https://www.mcgill.ca/ 18 See Olga Stelmakh, “Global Space Governance for Sustainable Development”, Presentation during UNISPACE+50 HLF, Dubai, 2016. Available at www.oosa.org 11

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statements in several UN bodies.19 As to the geographical distribution for the composition of the bureaux, COPUOS agreed that as from its 2004 sessions, the term of each of its five offices and of its Subcommittees would be for a period of two years, establishing a pattern of equitable geographical rotation in the following order: (a) Group of African States; (b) Group of Asian States; (c) Group of Eastern European States; (d) Group of Latin American and Caribbean States; and (e) Group of Western European and Other States.20 Regarding the coordination of positions at COPUOS, there are traces of statements made by a GRULAC representative in both the Legal Subcommittee21 and the Committee22 since 1997, and in the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee since 1998.23 An earlier trace is a statement made by the Mexican delegate to the Legal Subcommittee in 1966 “on behalf of the South American delegations”;24 however, that was only a message of congratulations to the Chair for the work conducted on the OST draft and not a statement on a substantive matter. The G77+China is one of the main political groups at the UN, composed of developing countries and designed to promote the collective economic interests of its members and create an enhanced joint negotiating capacity in the UN. It was established in 1964 by seventy-seven developing countries signatories of the ‘Joint Declaration of the Seventy-Seven Developing Countries’,25 issued at the end of the first session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Geneva. In 1994 China joined the group, and Mexico (one of its founding members) left the group and joined the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).26 Statements made by the G77+China at COPUOS can be found regularly in the Legal Subcommittee since 2011,27 also in the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee in the same year,28 and in the Committee since 2010.29

Sam Daws, “The Origins and Development of UN Electoral Groups”, in What is Equitable Geographic Representation in the Twenty-first Century, ed. Ramesh Takhur, (Tokyo: The United Nations University, 1999). 20 Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (2003), UN Doc. A/58/20, Annex II. paras. 5–6. 21 Report of the Legal Subcommittee of COPUOS (1997), UN Doc. A/AC.105/674, para. 9. 22 Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (1997), UN Doc. A/52/20, para. 55. 23 Report of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee (1998), UN Doc. A/AC.105/697, para. 13. 24 Legal Subcommittee of COPUOS Summary Records - 5th Session, UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.73, p. 13 (hereinafter “LSC Summary Records”). 25 Joint Declaration of the Seventy-Seven Developing Countries, Geneva, 15 June 1964. The complete text is available at https://www.g77.org/ 26 Background document available at https://www.g77.org/ 27 Report of the Legal Subcommittee of COPUOS (2011), UN Doc. A/AC.105/990, para. 13. 28 Report of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of COPUOS (2011), UN Doc. A/AC.105/987, para. 12. 29 Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (2010), UN Doc. A/65/20, para. 15. 19

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In 1995, upon the submission of a working paper by Colombia to the Working Group on agenda item 4 of the Legal Subcommittee (regarding the geostationary orbit),30 some delegations requested the Secretariat to clarify the term ‘developing countries’ included in paragraph 9 of the Colombian proposal. That paragraph recommended the regulation of the equal right between developing and developed countries to access the same orbital position.31 On that opportunity, the Secretariat stated that neither the General Assembly (GA) nor the Economic and Social Council had drawn up any formal definition or a list of developing countries; hence, no officially recognised definition existed within the UN.32 In a nutshell, political and regional groups at the UN are a considerable means of fostering joint positions at a multilateral level and leveraging negotiation capacity. Today, the groups described above carry more weight in COPUOS due to its increased membership. A clear example of that is the role of GRULAC in the negotiations of the Guidelines on the Long-Term Sustainability of outer space activities.33

4

UN Space Treaties: The Origin of the Space Treaty-Making Process

It is worth recalling that the UN Space treaties are notably the result of the agreement between the two space powers at the time of negotiations. Several concepts are vague or imprecise probably due to the need for an agreement on the overall text. This poses a problem since only a meeting of the parties might fill the absence of legal definitions of imprecise concepts such as ‘national activities’, ‘peaceful purposes’, ‘damage’ or ‘fault’ under the treaties,34 yet they do not provide any ‘built-in system’ for such consultations.35 Nowadays, gaps and lacunae tend to be filled by national legislation that sometimes reinterprets fundamental principles in the national interest, disregarding the special balance achieved at the time of negotiation.36 The complete agenda item title was “Matters Related to the Definition and Delimitation of the Geostationary Orbit and to the Character and Utilization of the Geostationary Orbit, including Consideration of Ways and Means to Ensure the Rational and Equitable Use of the Geostationary Orbit without Prejudice to the Role of the International Telecommunications Union.”. 31 Working document (Colombia), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.192, para. 9. 32 Report of the Legal Subcommittee of COPUOS (1995), UN Doc. A/AC.105/607, Annex I, para. 46. 33 See Laura Jamschon Mac Garry, “Long-Term Sustainability of Space Activities: Achievements and Prospects”, in Space Fostering Latin American Societies (Part. I), ed. Annette Froehlich, (Cham: Springer, 2019),139–145. 34 Sergio Marchisio, “Space Law and Governance”, supra note 5, 8–9. 35 Sergey Batsanov, “The Outer Space Treaty: Then and Now”, in Celebrating the Space Age. 50 Years of Space Technology, 40 Years of the Outer Space Treaty, ed. Jason Powers, (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2007), 54. 36 See Philip De Man, “State Practice, Domestic Legislation and the Interpretation of Fundamental Principles of International Space Law”, Space Policy (2017), 2. 30

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4.1 The Outer Space Treaty The OST was adopted by GA Resolution 2222 (XXI),37 upon the agreement of the United States and the Soviet Union on the draft text sponsored by 43 States.38 Some commentators consider that the treaty has created a new branch of public international law.39 Furthermore, Argentinean Ambassador Aldo Cocca argued that the provisions of the OST mean an advance in the legal sciences because of their precursory nature.40 The principles enshrined in this treaty are the pillars of the current system of international space law.41 The OST has been labelled by legal experts as ‘the cardinal instrument’,42 the ‘Charter of outer space’,43 the ‘Bible of space law’,44 the ‘constitution for space’,45 the ‘Grundnorm of space law’46 or ‘the hallmark of global space governance’,47 just to mention a few. It was also described as “one of the outstanding law-making treaties of contemporary international law as a whole”,48 as “fundamental and reflective of jus naturale”,49 as an “outstanding and very progressive treaty”,50 as 37

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, adopted on 16 December 1966, and entered into force on 10 October 1967, 610 UNTS 205; UN Doc A/RES/2222 (XXI), 19 December 1966. 38 Bin Cheng, Studies in International Space Law, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). Version published for the Oxford Scholarship Online, 202. 39 Peter Jankowitsch, “The Background and History of Space Law”, in Handbook of Space Law, ed. Frans Von der Dunk, (Cheltenham-Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2015), 2, See also Von der Dunk, “International Space Law”, supra note 9, 29, Thomas Neger and Edith Walter, “Space Law -an Independent Branch of the Legal System”, in Outer Space in Society, Politics and Law, eds. Christian Brünner and Alexander Soucek, (Vienna-New York: Springer, 2011), 234–235. 40 Aldo Cocca, “The Advances in International Law through the Law of Outer Space”, Journal of Space Law 9, (1981), 20. 41 Vladimir Kopal, “Origins of Space Law and the role of the United Nations”, in Outer Space in Society, Politics and Law, eds. Christian Brünner and Alexander Soucek, (Vienna-New York: Springer, 2011), 231. 42 Fabio Tronchetti, “Fundamentals of Space Law and Policy”, supra note 1, 8. 43 Detlev Wolter, “The Peaceful Purpose Standard of the Common Heritage of Mankind Principle in Outer Space Law”, ASILS Journal of International Law 9, (1985), 133. 44 Alexander Soucek, “International Law”, in Outer Space in Society, Politics and Law, eds. Christian Brünner and Alexander Soucek, (Vienna-New York: Springer, 2011), 298. 45 Percy Blount, “Renovating Space: The Future of International Space Law”, supra note 15, 517; Yvonne Schmidt, “International Space and Developing Countries”, in Outer Space in Society, Politics and Law, eds. Christian Brünner and Alexander Soucek, (Vienna-New York: Springer, 2011), p. 693. 46 Gurbachan Sachdeva, “Outer Space Treaty: An Appraisal”, supra note 16, 25. 47 Ram Jakhu, “The future of the Outer Space Treaty”, in 50 Years of the Outer Space Treaty. Tracing the Journey, ed. Ajey Lele, (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2017), 185. 48 Sergio Marchisio, “International Legal Regime on Outer Space: Liability Convention and Registration Convention”, in Proceedings of United Nations/Nigeria Workshop on Space Law, Vienna, 2006, 18. 49 Ekta Rathore and Biswanath Gupta, “Emergence of Jus Cogens Principles in Outer Space Law”, Astropolitics 18, no. 1, (2020): 17. 50 Sergey Batsanov, “The Outer Space Treaty: Then and Now”, supra note 35, 51.

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“the foundation of all space law”,51 as “the most important and comprehensive international convention governing outer space”,52 as “an arms control treaty”53 or even as “the most important arms control development since the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963”.54 These expressions reveal how much respect this instrument inspires within the specialised literature. As a starting point, it is worth recalling that in Resolution 1963 (XVIII) the GA had recommended including the principles contained in the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (hereinafter, Declaration of Principles)55 in the form of an international agreement, and requested that a draft treaty on rescue and liability be prepared.56 Against this backdrop, COPUOS engaged in negotiations to give rise to the first space treaties. From the 3rd session of the Legal Subcommittee of COPUOS in 1964 until its 5th session in 1966, the Legal Subcommittee met several times and established a working group to draft the OST. As a usual practice, the discussion began on the need for an international instrument including the principles contained in GA Resolution 1962 (XVIII), and then moved on to more substantial aspects. Initial negotiations built upon a draft treaty proposal from the United States57 and one from the Soviet Union.58 As to the need for a binding instrument, Brazil recalled that indeed it was the mandate of the Legal Subcommittee to incorporate those principles into an international instrument, and in the event that the Subcommittee deemed it inappropriate, it should give the reasons for such a conclusion.59 In the same line, the delegate from Argentina proposed that the idea of exploration and use of outer space carried on for the betterment of mankind and for the benefit of States irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development (placed in the preamble of GA Resolution 1962) should become a legal formulation as was the case for atomic energy.60 His forward-looking approach

Frans Von der Dunk, “International Space Law”, supra note 9, 49. Ram Jakhu, “Evolution of the Outer Space Treaty”, in 50 Years of the Outer Space Treaty. Tracing the Journey, ed. Ajey Lele, (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2017), 13. 53 Kai-Uwe Schrogl and Julia Neumann, “Article IV”, in Cologne Commentary on Space Law (Vol. I), eds. Stephan Hobe, Bernhard Schmidt-Tedd and Kai-Uwe Schrogl, (Cologne: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2009), 72 (para. 6). 54 Statement of President Johnson, reproduced in Francis Lyall and Paul Larsen, Space Law. A Treatise, supra note 7, 514 and also in Kai-Uwe Schrogl and Julia Neumann, “Article IV”, supra note 53, 74 (para. 11). 55 Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, UN Doc A/RES/1962 (XVIII), 13 December 1963. 56 International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, UN Doc. A/RES/1963 (XVIII), 13 December 1963. 57 Draft Treaty Governing the Exploration of the Moon and other Celestial Bodies (United States), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.12, 17 June 1966. 58 Draft Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration of the Outer Space, the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Soviet Union), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.13, 16 June 1966. 59 LSC Summary Records- 3rd Session (1964), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.29–37, p. 75. 60 Ibid., p. 98. 51 52

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made him recommend caution in the drafting work on a binding instrument to avoid it becoming obsolete due to the rapid pace of technological progress.61 Although both delegations were of the view that a binding treaty with principles was the right way to proceed, they also agreed that the issue deserved a careful examination. In effect, Argentina emphasised that new principles should be added and that others should be improved since the Declaration of Principles should not be considered final.62 For its part, the Brazilian delegate recalled that GA Resolution 1962 (XVIII) had been adopted with reservations from his country and, in that vein, he considered that the Subcommittee should study and revise those principles.63 Mexico was of the view that there was undoubtedly a need for an international agreement with the principles of the already referred resolution, but also with those contained in GA Resolution 1884 (XVIII).64 Argentina was a fervent supporter of a formulation of art. I providing that outer space shall be used ‘exclusively’65 or ‘solely’66 for peaceful purposes. Brazil proposed replacing the famous formulation of current art. I that reads “and shall be the province of all mankind” with the text “irrespective of their state of scientific development”.67 The “province of all mankind” was not deleted, and the Brazilian draft text was incorporated just before the former with a slight amendment (“irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development”). It should be recalled that the “province of all mankind” is a wording that is also found in the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,68 and in the Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of all States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries.69 Brazil attached great importance to the inclusion of a provision on liability into the future OST, regardless of a specific instrument regulating the issue.70 On that matter, Argentina supported the draft proposal by the Soviet delegation on the understanding that it was based on the principle of objective liability.71 This principle became enshrined in art. VII of the OST and was later developed further in the relevant convention.

61

Ibid., pp. 42–43. Ibid. 63 Ibid., p. 4. 64 Ibid., pp. 65–66. 65 LSC Summary Records - 5th Session (1966), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR. 65, p. 4. 66 LSC Summary Records - 5th Session (1966), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR. 66, p. 3. 67 LSC Summary Records - 5th Session (1966), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR. 64, p. 9. 68 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, adopted on 5 December 1979, entered into force on 11 July 1984, 1363 UNTS 3. 69 Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries, UN Doc A/RES/51/122, 13 December 1996. 70 LSC Summary Records - 5th Session (1966), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR. 62, p. 8. 71 LSC Summary Records - 5th Session (1966), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR. 67, p. 10. 62

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Argentina strongly rejected72 the American proposal for a clause envisaging the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice,73 which was finally not included in the final text treaty. It should be recalled that such type of clauses also encountered difficulties in the negotiations in the Conferences on the Law of the Sea, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Regarding a disarmament clause, Mexico called upon States to seize the opportunity to adopt a legal instrument to prevent turning outer space into a testing ground for deadly weapons.74 From the travaux préparatoires of the OST, it is apparent that the Mexican delegation attached great importance to what became art. IV of the OST.75 Another provision that the Mexican delegation supported was the inclusion of the right to visit the installations with the obligation to communicate the date in advance76 (current art. XII of the OST). Brazil supported the inclusion of a text stating the obligation to provide information to other parties and to the scientific community77 (an idea encapsulated in current art. XI of the OST). A final point of note in this section is that the Brazilian delegate was the Rapporteur of the Committee at the session when the decision was made to hold an international conference on the exploration and use of outer space, in Vienna.78

4.2 The Rescue Agreement Only one year after the adoption of the OST, the GA unanimously commended the Rescue Agreement (ARRA).79 The reasons behind the expeditious negotiation of such a treaty may be found in two tragic incidents at the time: Firstly, the fire in the Apollo I capsule that would take the first three American astronauts to the Moon on 27 January 1967, which ended with that mission and their lives. Secondly, the accident of the capsule Soyuz I with a similar fate for its Soviet commander Vladimir Komarov on 24 April 1967.80

72

UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.29, supra note 59, p. 73 and LSC Summary Records - 5th Session (1966), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.68, p. 16. 73 Draft Treaty Governing the Exploration of the Moon and other Celestial Bodies (United States), A/AC.105/32, 17 June 1966. 74 UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.62, supra note 70, p. 8. 75 See LSC Summary Records - 5th Session (1966), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.71 and add. 1, p. 19. 76 Ibid., p. 20. 77 Ibid., p. 17. 78 COPUOS Verbatim Records - 8th Session (1966), UN Doc.A/AC.105/PV. 45, p. 96. 79 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, adopted on 19 December 1967, and entered into force on 3 December 1968, 672 UNTS 119; UN Doc A/RES/2345 (XXII), 19 December 1967. 80 See Vladimir Kopal, “International Legal Regime on Outer Space”, supra note 14, 12, Bin Cheng, Studies in International Space Law, supra note 38, 203.

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Simultaneously with the negotiation on the OST, COPUOS was conducting discussions on two draft initiatives: a treaty on rescue of astronauts and space objects, and an instrument on liability for damage. However, the method of working concomitantly on more than one instrument proved to be ineffective. In that context, Mexico expressed the view that priority should be given to the initiative that would raise fewer difficulties.81 By the same token, Argentina recalled that GA resolution 1802 (XVII) had noted with regret that COPUOS had not made progress on legal issues.82 Finally, agreement was reached on addressing rescue and assistance issues first. The Rescue Agreement builds upon art. V and VIII of the OST, and its underlying spirit is marked by humanitarian considerations.83 The scope of the Convention is limited to astronauts in distress on Earth (after landing), not in space. Unfortunately, the treaty does not provide any definition of ‘astronaut’, although the issue was discussed during the negotiations. In effect, it is worth recalling that Argentina proposed the following definition: “An astronaut is a civilian explorer, exclusively for peaceful purposes, who is carrying out his duties as a representative of mankind in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies.”84 A definition of astronaut becomes even more necessary nowadays in the face of space tourism opportunities. Three draft proposals were submitted then: one by the United States, another by the Soviet Union and finally a joint proposal by Canada and Australia. Argentina, Brazil and Mexico concurred that any formulation should avoid restrictions in the assistance that would be provided in accordance with the first provision of a future treaty.85 Furthermore, once again with a forward-looking approach, Argentina emphasised that the Subcommittee should create an instrument with a “lasting character” that would not become obsolete with time (this in relation to the enumeration of certain means of rendering assistance).86 At a certain point in time, negotiations deadlocked in art. I. At that juncture, the Mexican delegate proposed separating the principle of assistance based on humanitarian considerations (to which everybody agreed) from the return of astronauts and space objects.87 Argentina supported Mexico and added that the obligation to assist astronauts existed as such independently of the Declaration of Principles and was not subject to it.88

81

LSC Summary Records - 4th Session (1965), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR. 41, p. 7. Ibid., p. 8. 83 Vladimir Kopal, “International Legal Regime on Outer Space”, supra note 14, 12; see also Alexander Soucek, “International Law”, supra note 44, 333, and Stephan Hobe, “Space Law- an Analysis of its Development and its Future”, in Outer Space in Society, Politics and Law, eds. Christian Brünner and Alexander Soucek, (Vienna-New York: Springer, 2011), 477. 84 Proposal on Agreement on Assistance to and Rescue of Astronauts (Argentina), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.23. 85 See LSC Summary Records - 4th Session (1965), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.42, pp. 6–7-11. 86 LSC Summary Records - 4th Session (1965), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.43, p. 4. 87 LSC Summary Records - 4th Session (1965), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.44, p. 5. 88 Ibid. 82

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The proposal made by the United States to allow the State on whose territory the space object or its personnel had landed to reject assistance from the launching State was another issue that raised much debate. Mexico firmly supported the proposal made by the Soviet Union that rescue operations should be carried out in accordance with the technical recommendations of the launching State on the understanding that otherwise it would be contrary to the principle on international cooperation enshrined in GA Resolution 1962.89 Brazil indicated that any instrument for the rescue of astronauts should be guided by humanitarian considerations and that the rescue operations should be undertaken by the State where the astronaut landed.90 For its part, Argentina was of the view that in the case of hazardous objects, the launching State should have the duty to remove them91 (art. 5(4) of the ARRA provides that it should take steps to eliminate possible danger or harm). The Brazilian delegate supported the formulation that envisaged close and continuing cooperation between the launching authority and the State of landing.92 He took on board that assistance of the launching State might create serious problems on national sovereignty and the control that a State exercises over its territory.93 With the same concern, Argentina and Mexico finally concurred that the final decision on rescue would lie with the State of landing to safeguard its sovereignty.94 This issue was finally settled with a proposal made by France along the following lines: “the launching authority shall cooperate with the Contracting Party”,95 which is the text of art. 2 of the ARRA. Since controversies between the launching State and the State of landing might arise as to the compliance with the Declaration of Principles, the Mexican delegate proposed providing for a tripartite arbitration commission to deal with such issues if they could not be settled by the parties themselves.96 Notwithstanding that, no clause for dispute settlement was incorporated in the ARRA.

4.3 The Liability Convention After quite long and difficult negotiations, the Liability Convention (LIAB) was finally adopted by GA Resolution 2777 (XXVI).97 This instrument is a further elaboration of a provision of the OST, namely, art. VII. Initial exchanges on the matter started in 1962 upon a proposal submitted by the United States. Mexico was of the view that an instrument governing liability 89

LSC Summary Records - 4th Session (1965), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.45, p. 7. UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.29–37, supra note 59, p. 75. 91 Report of the Legal Subcommittee of COPUOS (1964), UN Doc. A/AC.105/21 (Annex I), p. 6. 92 UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR. 45, supra note 89, p. 8. 93 LSC Summary Records - Special Session (1967), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.86, p. 14. 94 LSC Summary Records - Special Session (1967), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR. 87, p. 9 and 10. 95 LSC Summary Records - Special Session (1967), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR. 89, p. 3. 96 LSC Summary Records - 4th Session (1965), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR. 46, p. 5. 97 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, adopted on 29 November 1971, and entered into force on 1 September 1972, 961 UNTS 187; UN Doc. A/RES/2777 (XXVI), 29 November 1971. 90

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matters should be in the form of a treaty,98 and that any instrument should provide the greatest protection possible to the victim, i.e. an adequate, prompt and fair compensation.99 As negotiations advanced, three proposals were on the table: one by the United States,100 another by Belgium101 and a third by Hungary.102 Argentina expressed the opinion that space law was changing international law quite radically since only States and international organisations were recognised as undertaking space activities under the OST, and States were responsible for activities of their nationals and for any damage those activities might cause.103 That delegation proposed at the 6th session of the Legal Subcommittee in 1967 that the arbitration commission be also competent on issues regarding interpretation and application of the Convention.104 Two years later, Brazil argued that there should not be a compulsory mechanism of settlement but one based on amicable methods under international law.105 Moreover, the Brazilian delegate considered that a liability convention without a compulsory arbitration clause might prove effective; however, in a spirit of compromise, his delegation was willing to accept such a clause under certain conditions (only for disagreement on the determination of the amount of damage).106 Regardless of such concessions, he highlighted that the efficacy of a final and binding decision by an arbitral commission depended on the good faith of the parties since, in the absence of a coercive power, there would be no possibility of enforcement.107 Liability of international organisations was another of the issues under discussion. At that time, the Argentinean delegate expressed that it was necessary to bear in mind the increasing participation of international organisations in space activities; in fact, it was the exception for space activities to be carried out by a single State.108 In the same vein, Mexico submitted a working document regarding claims of and against international organisations, which provided that they should make a declaration accepting the rights and duties of the Convention. In such a case, claims 98

LSC Summary Records-1st Session (1962), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.14, p. 2. LSC Summary Records-8th Session (1969), UN Doc. A/AC.105/AC.2/SR. 137, p. 19. 100 Convention Concerning Liability for Damage Caused by the Launching of Objects into Outer Space (United States), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.19, 21 June 1967. Art. X and XII of this proposal provided for the settlement of disputes regarding the interpretation and application of the Convention before the ICJ. 101 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Governing Liability for Damage (Belgium), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.7/Rev.3, 26 June 1967. Art. 4 of this proposal provided for the establishment of an arbitration commission for claims for compensation. 102 Revised Draft Convention Concerning Liability for Damage (Hungary), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.10/Rev.1, 24 September 1965). Art. XI of the proposal provided for the compensation via a committee of arbitration and, in case this committee did not arrive to a decision, the parties would be able to agree upon either arbitration or any other settlement procedure. 103 LSC Summary Records - 6th Session (1967), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.82, p. 4. 104 Convention Concerning Liability for Damage (Argentina), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.25. 105 LSC Summary Records - 8th Session (1969), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR. 118, p. 80. 106 LSC Summary Records - 8th Session (1969), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/RS. 124, pp. 138–139. 107 LSC Summary Records - 9th Session (1970), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR. 147, p. 54. 108 LSC Summary Records - 8th Session (1969), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR. 120, p. 98. 99

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of an international organisation should be made by its organ or by any Member State which is also party to the Convention; claims against international organisations should be raised against them, and in case of failure of payment of compensation within 6 months, claims might be directed against Member States which were parties to the Convention.109 Art. XXII encapsulates these ideas regarding claims from and against international intergovernmental organisations in paragraphs 3 and 4. One of the two most difficult issues to settle was the one relating the applicable law to the claim for compensation (the other one was the dispute settlement clause),110 which divided the waters into those who supported the application of domestic law (either of the claimant or the respondent), those in favour of international law, and those backing the law agreed by both parties. Argentina was of the view that international law was undoubtedly applicable unless the parties had agreed that a national law should apply; and for arbitration settlement, justice and equity should be primarily considered.111 In a later session, the Argentinean delegate reiterated this consideration and added that besides international law, the law of the place of damage should apply because that law was certain and unquestionable.112 Similarly, Brazil supported the application of the law of the claimant, which usually coincided with the law of the place where damage had occurred (lex loci delicti commissi).113 When consensus on that view could not be reached, Brazil agreed to co-sponsor a text that ensured the principle of full compensation.114 Argentina –in line with its position during the OST negotiations- favoured the objective liability, i.e. based on the results of the event that caused damage.115 In that context, that delegation supported a full compensation for the victim of damage and backed the idea that no difference should be made between nuclear and non-nuclear damage.116 By the same token, Brazil agreed with Argentina that there should be no limitation on the compensation and that nuclear damage should not be excluded from the convention.117 The final treaty text does not set any limit based on the type of damage. On the basis of the language used in art. VII of the OST, France proposed to include the damage in air (contamination or pollution) in absolute liability. Both

109

Working Paper (Mexico), PUOS/C.2/70/WG.1/CRP.8 (available in the Report of the Legal Subcommittee (1970), UN Doc. A/AC.105/85, Annex I, p. 11). 110 These two issues were indeed recognised in GA Resolution 2733B (XXV) as the main obstacles to an agreement. International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, UN Doc A/RES/2733B (XXV), 16 December 1970, op. 4. 111 LSC Summary Records - 8th Session (1969), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.121, p. 105. 112 LSC Summary Records - 9th Session (1970), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.134, p. 10. 113 UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.121, supra note 111, p. 110 and UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR. 147, supra note 107, p. 54. 114 LSC Summary Records-10th Session (1971), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.164, p. 104. 115 UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.29–37, supra note 59, p. 72. 116 LSC Summary Records - 8th Session (1969), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.116, p. 64. 117 LSC Summary Records - 8th Session (1969), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L. 118, p. 80.

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Mexico and Argentina supported that proposal,118 but the final treaty text did not include that amendment. As in the negotiation of the ARRA, Argentina submitted a draft definition to include in the LIAB. This time, the proposal was a definition of ‘space object’ which read as follows: “any device launched by man, exclusively for peaceful purposes, for the exploration or use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, as well as the equipment used for launching and propulsion and any parts detached therefrom”.119 There was also a joint proposal by Argentina, France, and Belgium.120 For its part, Mexico proposed the following definition: “any physical body, manufactured or natural, including the launch vehicle, its components and accessories, which man may launch or attempt to launch into outer space.”121 Another proposal by Argentina, Mexico, Belgium, France and Italy indicated that “damage caused by a space object” should not only include damage caused by the space object, but also by any person on board and by any part thereof (including part of the launch vehicle).122 Unlike the ARRA, the LIAB includes a set of definitions for the purposes of the convention in its first provision. An issue that particularly concerned Argentina was joint liability, since -as explained by its delegate- the country had set up the CELPA launch base in Mar del Plata under the sponsorship of the United Nations in 1969, offering launching services to the UN Members. The Argentinean delegation thus proposed to include in the draft text a provision along the lines that agreements apportioning the financial obligation in case of joint launchings should be registered with the UN Secretariat as required by art. 102(2) of the UN Charter (a necessary premise to be invoked before a UN body).123 Art. XXIII deals with international agreements but no reference is made to their registration. The second problematic issue was the clause on dispute settlement. The need for a convention on liability was pressing; the appeal made by the General Assembly in its Resolution 2733B (XXV) confirmed that. The Brazilian delegate manifested that his government had decided not to sign the ARRA until another text for compensation had been adopted. He explained this position stating that whereas the ARRA benefited space powers, a convention on liability would protect the rights and interests of the non-space powers.124

118

LSC Summary Records - 9th Session (1970), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.150, pp. 85–87. Agreement on Liability for Damage (Argentina), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.22, 23 June 1967. 120 See Working Paper (Argentina, Belgium, France), PUOS/C.2/70/WG.1/CRP. 16 in the Report of the Legal Subcommittee (1970), UN Doc. A/AC.105/85, Annex I, p. 16. 121 Working Paper (Mexico), PUOS/C.2/70/WG.1/CRP.14 (available in the Report of the Legal Subcommittee (1970), UN Doc. A/AC.105/85, Annex I, p. 15). 122 Working Paper (Argentina, Belgium, France, Italy, Mexico), PUOS/C.2/70/WG.1/CRP. 18/Rev.1 (Available in the Report of the Legal Subcommittee (1970), UN Doc. A/AC.105/85, Annex I, p. 16). 123 LSC Summary Records - 9th Session (1970), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.143, p. 40. 124 UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.164, supra note 114, p. 104. 119

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In 1971, in the last track towards a final draft text, and urged by the already referred GA Resolution 2733B (XXV),125 Brazil submitted a joint wording with Belgium and Hungary for draft art. XX providing that the decision of the Claims Commission would be final and binding if the parties had so agreed, otherwise, it would render a final and recommendatory award.126 This proposal contributed to overcome the stalemate in the negotiations, although it was not the preferred solution for several States, including Argentina and Mexico.127 To that proposal, Argentina suggested adding that the parties should comply with it in good faith.128 The combination of both proposals is reflected in current art. XIX(2) of the LIAB. After eight years of deliberations, in the words of the Indian delegate “the draft convention on liability was by no means perfect, nor was it wholly satisfactory”.129 However, he acknowledged that no final text would have been possible without the agreement of the main space powers.130 When the final text was agreed, the delegate of the Soviet Union expressed his gratitude particularly to the representatives of Brazil, Hungary, India, Belgium and Argentina “whose tireless efforts and spirit of conciliation and collaboration had finally ensured the success of the Sub-committee efforts”.131 The United States delegate expressed his satisfaction with the outcome; he considered that the text of the convention was victim-oriented but likewise fair and considerate of the challenges that States engaging in space activities faced.132

4.4 The Registration Convention The Registration Convention (REG) was adopted by GA Resolution 3235 (XXIX)133 and entered into force on 15 September 1976. Its registration regime co-exists with the one implemented by GA Resolution 1721B (XVI),134 although the latter is not binding but voluntary. For those States that are not parties to the 125

In its o.p. 6, the General Assembly urged the Committee to reach an agreed text embodying the principle of payment of a full measure of compensation to victims and effective procedures which would lead to the prompt and equitable settlement of claims. 126 Draft Convention on Liability for Damage (Belgium, Brazil and Hungary), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.79, 21 June 1971, in Report of the Legal Subcommittee (1971), A/AC.105/94, Annex I, p. 16. 127 See the statement made by Mexico: LSC Summary Records - 10th Session (1971), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.168, p. 138. 128 See Working Document (Argentina), PUOS/C.2/WG(X)/L.2/Rev.1 (Available in the Report of the Legal Subcommittee (1971), A/AC.105/94, Annex I, p. 18). 129 LSC Summary Records - 10th Session (1971), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR. 166, p. 118. 130 Ibid. 131 LSC Summary Records - 10th Session (1971), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR. 167, p. 125. 132 UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.168, supra note 127, p. 141. 133 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, adopted on 12 November 1974, and entered into force on 15 September 1976, 1023 UNTS 15; UN Doc. A/RES/3235 (XXIX), 12 November 1974. 134 International co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space, UN Doc. A/RES/1721 (XVI), 20 December 1961.

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Registration Convention and also for the registry of launches carried out before the entry into force of this convention, registration is governed by the resolution. Resolution 1721B calls upon States to furnish information promptly to COPUOS, via the Secretary-General, for the registration of launchings, and requests the Secretary-General to maintain a public registry of this information.135 While national registration is implicit in art. VIII of the OST,136 that provision is further complemented by lex specialis contained in the REG, which introduces the binding obligation to register space objects launched.137 France had already brought the issue to the attention of the Legal Subcommittee in 1968. At its 8th session in 1969, Argentina proposed including the issue on registration of space objects in the following session, pointing at two incidents of space debris falling on its territory, where the fragments did not have any identification mark that would have allowed a claim for compensation.138 Brazil shared the same assessment as to the relevance of a registration treaty and marking. The Brazilian delegate considered that a compulsory system of registration would help dispel the apprehensions of the world regarding certain military uses of outer space and its implications in international peace and security.139 Mexico was also vocal about the importance of registration for developing countries, and in that context, of prior notification of launchings in order to be able to determine if their territories were observed and whether natural resources were detected therein.140 That delegation was in favour of registration prior to launching.141 It should be recalled that the final text does not set a time limit for the registration and only limits itself to providing that such registrations should be “as soon as practicable” (art. IV of the REG). In this case, the basis for negotiations in the Working Group II (Working Group I was devoted to the Moon and its natural resources) was provided by draft proposals submitted by France, the United States, and a joint draft by France and Canada.142 For Argentina, there was a clear connection between registration and the application of the other space treaties.143 Regarding the information to be provided to the Secretary-General, Argentina built upon the proposal made by Canada and 135

Ibid., op. 1 and 2. Bernhard Schmidt-Tedd and Stephan Mick, “Article VIII”, in Cologne Commentary on Space Law (Vol. 1), eds. Stephan Hobe, Bernhard Schmidt Tedd, Kai-Uwe Schrogl (Cologne: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2009), 148 (para. 6). 137 Ibid., 148 (paras. 3, 7, 8). Bernhard Schmidt-Tedd, Nataliya Malysheva, Olga Stelmakh, Leslie Tennen and Ulrike Bohlmann, “Article II” (REG), in Cologne Commentary on Space Law (Vol. II), eds. Stephan Hobe, Bernhard Schmidt-Tedd and Kai-Uwe Schrogl, (Cologne: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2013), 260 (para. 66). 138 LSC Summary Records - 8th Session (1969), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR. 115, p. 49. 139 LSC Summary Records - 12th Session (1973), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.195, p. 3. 140 LSC Summary Records - 12th Session (1973), UN Doc. A/AC.10/C.2/SR.197, p. 7. 141 LSC Summary Records - 13th Session (1974), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR. 212, p. 36. 142 Draft Convention Concerning the Registration of Objects (France), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.45; (United States), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.85 and (Canada and France), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.86. 143 See LSC Summary Records - 12th Session (1973), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR. 201, p. 3. 136

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France, and suggested that such information should be open not only to State Parties, but to all States (an idea which is captured in current art. III(2) of the REG). Marking of space objects was one of the thorny issues to settle in the negotiations. Argentina, Brazil and Mexico submitted a joint proposal co-sponsored by India, Nigeria and Sudan, establishing a mandatory marking “if technically practicable and economically feasible”,144 in order to accommodate the concerns of the United States, the Soviet Union and France, and bearing in mind the conclusions of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee. Regarding the final clauses, Argentina proposed amending art. VII of the American proposal that provided for States as depositaries of ratification and accession instruments. Instead, Argentina believed that the depositary should be the Secretary-General145 (and this is in fact what art. VIII(2) of the treaty establishes). It should be underscored that this is the first of the five UN space treaties that does not provide for the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom as depositories.

4.5 The Moon Agreement The Moon Agreement (MOON) was adopted by consensus by GA Resolution 34/68.146 The United States had proposed to work on a draft treaty relating the Moon in 1966147 but the issue remained frozen until 1969. Then, at the 8th session of the Legal Subcommittee, Argentina expressed that part of the progressive development of space law required also a study on the legal status of resources of the Moon, particularly in the face of the forthcoming Moon landing expected for July that very same year.148 In that context, in 1969 Argentina submitted a draft treaty which included the concept of ‘common heritage of mankind’ (CHM).149 This proposal stated in art. 1 that: “The natural resources of the Moon and other celestial bodies shall be the common heritage of all mankind”. Furthermore, draft art. 5 provided that 144

Draft Convention on Registration of Objects (Argentina, Brazil, India, Mexico, Nigeria and Sudan), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.94 (Available in the Report of the Legal Subcommittee (1974), A/AC.105/133, Annex II, p. 3). 145 LSC Summary Records - 12th Session (1973), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR. 197, p. 3. 146 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, adopted on 5 December 1979, entered into force on 11 July 1984, 1363 UNTS 3; UN Doc. A/RES/34/68, 5 December 1979. 147 See Report of the Legal Subcommittee of COPUOS (1966), UN Doc. A/AC.105/35, Annex I, p. 6. Cfr. Carl Christol, “The Common Heritage of Mankind Provision in the 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies”, The International Lawyer 14, no. 3 (1980): 432–433. 148 UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR. 115, supra note 138, p. 49. 149 Draft Treaty on the Moon and other Celestial Bodies (Argentina), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.54, 13 June 1969. Cfr. Carl Christol, “The Common Heritage of Mankind Provision in the 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies”, The International Lawyer 14, no. 3 (1980): 432–433.

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distribution of such resources should take into consideration the need to attain higher standards of living pursuant to art. 55(a) of the UN Charter “in the light of the interests and requirements of the developing countries and the rights of those undertaking these activities.” The latter idea found reflection in art. 11(7)(d) of the MOON. The Argentinean delegation differentiated between natural resources on the spot, and those brought back to Earth which should be shared.150 In that regard, Argentina considered that there should be an authority which, in the name of mankind would resolve possible conflicts.151 The Soviet Union submitted another draft treaty that did not contain any reference to the CHM. The Brazilian delegate argued that any instrument regulating the topic should be an additional protocol or a complementary agreement to the OST due to its administrative or technical content.152 Regardless of the title of the new instrument, that delegation expressed that if the international community was to regulate the activity of the space powers on the Moon, those decisions should not prejudge the actual or potential interest of other States.153 Since the proposal of the Soviet Union omitted a clause defining the Moon and its natural resources as the CHM, the Argentinean delegate requested to incorporate it.154 Mexico fully supported it on two counts: to recognise the right of the mankind as a whole to develop lunar resources, and the right of every country to benefit from the results of scientific research.155 In effect, to Argentina the CHM meant the recognition of mankind as a subject of international law and a possessor of a common heritage.156 The Argentinean delegate reiterated several times that he had been responsible for introducing this concept himself on 19 January 1969 in the Legal Subcommittee (many delegates pointed to the Committee of the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-bed as its origin) and, in that line, he also referred to a document he had submitted to the Fifth Astronautical Congress held in Austria in 1954.157 He explained that the expression had in fact been borrowed from space law by specialists in sea-bed law. Brazil strongly supported not only the expression of CHM in the text, but a clear, definite and unequivocal statement of commitment regarding the establishment of a regime for the resources, and to have a clear picture of the procedure to be followed until the regime is fully implemented.158 The Brazilian delegate argued that there was no reason to defer the establishment of the regime until exploitation becomes feasible.159

150

LSC Summary Records-11th session (1972), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR. 190, p. 42. Ibid. 152 UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.195, supra note 139, p. 2. 153 Ibid., p. 3. 154 UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR. 197, supra note 145, p. 3. 155 Ibid., p. 7. 156 LSC Summary Records-10th Session (1971), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.154, p. 19. 157 LSC Summary Records-13th session (1974), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.215, p. 45. 158 LSC Summary Records-14th session (1975), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.231, p. 42 and again in LSC Summary Records-17th session (1978), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.20/SR. 290, p. 5 and LSC Summary Records-18th session (1979), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR. 308, p.4. 159 Ibid. 151

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In 1975, Chile (already a COPUOS Member since 1973) added its support to the declaration of the natural resources of the Moon and the celestial bodies as CHM and to the establishment of a regime for equitable distribution.160 That delegation assessed that the provisions concerning the legal status of the Moon and its natural resources were the cornerstone of the draft treaty, and expressed the preference of his delegation for the establishment of the regime as soon as the treaty entered into force and not to defer that task.161 Furthermore, the Chilean delegate was of the view that the CHM had originated in the OST, was embodied in GA Resolution 2749 (XV) and could also be found in the Vancouver Declaration on Human Settlements.162 He argued that since this concept was deeply rooted in legal conscience, it should appear in the draft treaty.163 He also manifested that exploitation of the resources of the Moon should not only benefit those States with the necessary technological capabilities, but all States of the international community, in particular the developing countries.164 Like Chile, Argentina considered that the 10-year period following the entry into force of the convention for convening a conference on the regime would be acceptable providing that a conference could be convened earlier with the request of two thirds of the parties.165 Venezuela (also a COPUOS Member since 1973) supported the CHM and the establishment of an international regime as well, and emphasised how important it was for the developing countries to have a regime that guarantees access to space technology.166 Colombia (COPUOS Member since 1977) backed the idea of solidarity implicit in the CHM as an opposite of the rule ‘first come, first served’.167 The Colombian delegate argued that the treaties should ensure that all States achieve scientific standards instead of increasing the gap between developing and developed countries, and considered that the main purpose of the discussions was the establishment of a new international economic order (NIEO).168 It is worth recalling that the NIEO was a concept enshrined in GA Resolution 3201 (S-VI), which defined international cooperation as a shared goal and a common duty of all countries,169 and would play an important role in the background of the GA Resolution 51/122.170 The Soviet Union considered that the CHM did not have a real or practical meaning at the technological stage of the time; however, that delegation expressed 160

LSC Summary Records-14th session (1975), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR. 232, p. 47. LSC Summary Records-15th session (1976), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/249, p. 9. 162 LSC Summary Records-17th session (1978), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.289, p. 4. 163 Ibid. 164 Ibid. 165 LSC Summary Records-15th session (1976), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR. 250, p. 5. 166 LSC Summary Records-16th session (1977), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR. 269, p. 4. 167 LSC Summary Records-17th session (1978), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR. 291, p. 6. 168 Ibid. 169 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 3201 (S-VI), 1 May 1974, A/RES/3201 (S-VI). See o.p. 3. 170 Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries, A/RES/51/122, 13 December 1996. 161

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to be willing to accept it in the interest of fulfilling the preparation of the draft treaty.171 For its part, the United States was in favour of that concept and in fact had proposed that the natural resources of the Moon and celestial bodies should be the CHM, that their use for scientific research and their utilisation in situ should be protected, and that in the event that their exploitation became feasible, States should negotiate arrangements for the international sharing of benefits.172 What the United States was not prepared to accept was a prohibition of exploitation until the regime was in place. Negotiations remained deadlocked for some time due to the inclusion of the CHM wording and the establishment of a regime, but finally Austria turned up as a broker submitting a proposal which paved the way to the final text. The treaty has been dubbed a ‘second generation space treaty’173 or also the ‘wallflower’ of space treaties due to the reduced number of ratifications. Unlike the sea regime (including its 1994 complementary agreement), the Moon Agreement does not establish any international mechanism for the exploitation of resources; it only postpones its establishment. In effect, the fifth paragraph of art. 11 provides for a pactum de contrahendo174 to establish an international regime for the exploitation of resources in the future, when this becomes feasible and in accordance with art. 18 of the MOON.175 Rüdiger Wolfrum explained that the principle of CHM reflects the spirit of a given historic period (Zeitgeist),176 characterised by the convergence of early developments in the law of the sea, space law, and -to a lesser degree- the regime protecting the environment of the Antarctica.177 Future developments in the technological arena will certainly provide further elements in the discussion regarding the necessity and desirability of a clause enshrining that principle.

5

Conclusions

During the negotiations of the UN space treaties, Latin American countries were guided by a spirit of compromise, consensus and cooperation. They endeavoured to accommodate national positions into the collective aim of adopting international instruments that would give rise to and shape international space law. Sometimes supporting elements of wide acceptance, such as the humanitarian consideration embedded in the ARRA; the victim-oriented approach of the LIAB; the 171

LSC Summary Records - 13th Session (1973), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.204, p. 6. LSC Summary Records - 13th Session (1973), UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR. 205, p. 19. 173 Alexander Soucek, “International Law”, supra note 44, 358. 174 Bin Cheng, Studies in International Space Law, supra note 38, 207. 175 Art. 11 (5) of the MOON. 176 See Rüdiger Wolfrum, “The Principle of the Common Heritage of Mankind”, Zeitschrift für Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, (1983), 312–313. Available at https://www. zaoerv.de/ 177 Wolfrum makes express reference to Recommendation XI-I of the Antarctic Consultative Parties, which refers to the interests of mankind in the Antarctica. 172

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transparency purpose enshrined in the REG, the peaceful settlement of disputes and the guiding tenet of international cooperation throughout the five treaties. On other occasions, advocating for the needs and interests of developing countries and non-space powers, notably in the OST, the LIAB and the MOON. And yet others with a visionary and forward-looking mindset, of the utmost importance in the task of treaty-making. This is the way the region contributed to the delicate balance achieved in the space treaties: making its voice heard in the heart of multilateralism.

Laura Jamschon Mac Garry holds a Law Degree (University of Buenos Aires), a LL.M. (University of Vienna, Faculty of Legal Sciences) and is a Ph.D. student at the Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Political Sciences, International Law and Human Rights. Her current areas of research are international law and multilateral discussions on space matters and cybersecurity.

Use of Open-Source Satellite Data to Combat Organized Crime Case Study: Detection of Vessels Associated with Drug-Trafficking Jairo Becerra , Alexander Ariza , and Laura C. Gamarra-Amaya

Abstract

Undoubtedly the importance of acquiring Earth Observation satellite information for a country is a priority since these images can have different uses such as cartography, disaster, climate change impact, border control, or in general to sustainable development, even more for developing countries. Continually, a large volume of global coverage satellite data is collected and supplied. However, availability of open-source data remains under-leveraged. For this reason, this research is focused on the study of the radar satellite images that are useful for monitoring and drug trafficking control support, through the detection of vessels used by organized crime that do not have tracking systems on board, for example, small fishing boats or those dedicated to trafficking illicit substances. Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) data can currently be processed from full catalogs on cloud servers (as Google Earth Engine) available to researchers who process vessel detection algorithms with optical or radar images. Today’s satellite SARs data that can be used for maritime surveillance include TerraSAR-X (Germany), Cosmo-SkyMed (Italy), Radarsat-2 (Canada), Alos-Palsar-2 (Japan), Kompsat-5 (Korea), Risat (India) and Sentinel-1 of European Space Agency (ESA, Europe). What sets Sentinel-1 apart from all these other systems is that it is routinely collecting images which are available J. Becerra (&)
L. C. Gamarra-Amaya Center for Socio-Legal Research – CISJUC, Research Group on Public Law and ICT, Universidad Católica de Colombia, Bogotá, Colombia e-mail: [email protected] L. C. Gamarra-Amaya e-mail: [email protected] A. Ariza Remote Sensing Faculty of Engineering and Architecture, Universidad Católica de Manizales, Manizales, Colombia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 A. Froehlich (ed.), Space Fostering Latin American Societies, Southern Space Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73287-5_5

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for free due to the open data policy of the European Union (EU) Copernicus Program. This research seeks to develop a methodology that supports the detection of illegal marine vessels, such as small fishing boats or those dedicated to trafficking illicit drug substances, by using Sentinel-1 available SAR data, applied in a pilot area over the coastal regions of Pacific Colombian. By utilization of the Constant False Alarm Rate (CFAR) algorithm provided by Sentinel Application Platform (SNAP) software from ESA, the rapid detection of ships is proven and thus provides sufficient results for a future implementation to support the combat of organized crime.

1

Introduction

The great challenge faced by the international space sector is the conversion of its technology for practical uses in society, making it possible for all humanity to understand the importance of developing and investing in space appliances and related research, making it accessible not only for developed countries but for all nations. Thus, the use of space-based technology to combat transnational organized crime for example by monitoring oceans is one of those examples that has managed to demonstrate the importance of having systems that provide data from outer space. This article presents the development of an initiative for the use of open-source satellite data to detect vessels engaged in the drug trafficking business. Currently, there are various systems aimed at maritime surveillance that detect and monitor vessels. In cooperative systems, ships report their identities and positions to other vessels and to the authorities. The three most common automatic systems are the Automatic Identification System (AIS), the Long-Range Identification and Tracking System (LRIT) and the Vessel Monitoring System (VMS). The AIS prevents collision hazards between users, LRIT performs long-range identification and monitoring of vessels for safety at sea and the VMS is designed for monitoring of fishing activities.1 These systems allow different national, regional and global networks from receiving satellites. While AIS is available continuously and globally, LRIT and VMS systems cover only limited parts of significant ship traffic and their availability is restricted.2 On the other hand, non-cooperative surveillance systems are observation mechanisms that detect, track and/or identify vessels without the help of information actively generated on board of ships. These surveillance systems include 1

Attema, Evert, GMES Sentinel-1 Mission Requirements, (Noordwijk: European Space Agency, 2005), www.earth.esa.int/documents/247904/249142/ES-RS-ESA-SY-0007+issue+1.4+S1+Missi on+Requirements+Document.pdf/0de09d6c-5e96-406c-a5b6-db24ed733ed0, (accessed 22 August 2020). 2 Li, Tao, Liu, Zheng, Xie, Rong, & Ran, Lei, An Improved Superpixel-Level CFAR Detection Method for Ship Targets in High-Resolution SAR Images (IEEE: Journal of Selected Topics in Applied Earth Observations and Remote Sensing, no. 1, vol. 11, 2018), pp. 184–194.

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Fig. 1 Example for spectral and temporal resolution for some common platform and satellite constellations (own elaboration). Data from: https://www.itc.nl/research/research-facilities/labsresources/satellite-sensor-database/ (accessed 20 August 2020)

radars or optical cameras that can be located on shore, on a ship, plane, or satellite. Satellite platforms, such as Sentinel-1, fall into the non-cooperative category as it allows detection of vessels that do not carry (are exempted) or intentionally do not use AIS or other on-board tracking systems, such as smaller fishing boats or illegally utilized vessels. In addition, SAR technology has the advantage of being independent from daylight and most weather conditions, which facilitates an all-day permanent surveillance. SAR Earth Observation satellites can detect vessels that do not have tracking systems on board, for example small fishing vessels or those engaged in illicit drug trafficking. SAR data can currently be processed from full catalogs on cloud servers (as Google Earth Engine) available to researchers who process vessel detection algorithms with optical or radar images. Today’s satellite common platform and satellite constellations for SARs data that can be used for maritime surveillance include TerraSAR-X (Germany), Cosmo-SkyMed (Italy), Radarsat-2 (Canada), Alos-Palsar-2 (Japan), Kompsat-5 (Korea), Risat (India) and Sentinel-1 (ESA, Europe).3 A representative exemplification for the spectral and temporal resolution for some common platform and satellite constellations is shown in Fig. 1. What sets Sentinel-1 apart from all these other systems is that it is routinely collecting a large number of images and the data are available for free due to the open data policy of the European Union (EU) Copernicus Program. In accordance with the aforementioned, the design and development of a prototype of an Integrated Geographic Information System (GIS) that integrates different technologies (Perception, Remote, GIS, among others) is necessary for the detection of ships associated with drug trafficking that is scalable to different parts of national territories. Santamaria, Carlos, “Sentinel-1 contribution to monitoring maritime activity in the arctic”, 13 May 2016, Green Planet Symposium 2016, Prague, Czech Republic.

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The main objective of this chapter of Part 2 Space Fostering Latin American Societies is a case study for the detection of vessels associated with drug trafficking. The aim is to contribute to the development of a maritime monitoring system that allows tracking a variety of vessels, exemplified within the study region of the Colombian Pacific coast. The system must allow the capture of data from and with different devices that guarantee richness and granularity to generate readily information for monitoring and decision making.

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Transnational Organized Crime

In the first place, we must acknowledge the global dynamics that have allowed the development of transnational crime in recent times and that has a devastating effect especially in many Latin American countries, including Colombia. From a legal perspective the international community agrees that this problem must be addressed multinational and jointly and with all possible cooperation tools, amongst which space technology must be included. The worldwide opening of markets and the globalization phenomena has brought along the spread of crime across national borders. Transnational Organized Crime is the type that is committed across several countries or nations, and it is different from international crime, as the second category includes the conducts typified in the Rome Statute: genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes and refers specifically to the type of crime that is so heinous that it must be prosecuted even if domestic justice cannot or will not act.4 The term Transnational Crime was coined by the UN Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch “in order to identify certain criminal phenomena transcending international borders, transgressing the laws of several states or having an impact on another country”.5 It traditionally includes many different types of crime, including organized, corporate, professional, and political crime. It is worth noting that in 1998, the European Commission defined organized crime as “a structured association of more than two people, established and acting in a manner concerted, in order to commit offenses punishable by custodial sentences or a harsher penalty”.6 However, in the year 2000, the Palermo Convention or the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime defined this type of organization as: “a structured group of three or more persons that exists for a certain time and that acts in concert with the purpose of committing one or more serious crimes or offenses established in accordance with this Convention

4

International Criminal Court, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, (The Hague: International Criminal Court, 2011), https://www.icc-cpi.int/resource-library/documents/rs-eng.pdf. 5 Boister, Neil, “Transnational Criminal Law?” European Journal of International Law 14 No.5 (2003), pp. 953–976, doi:https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/14.5.953. 6 Council of the European Union, 1998, 98/733/JAI: Acción común de 21 de diciembre de 1998, (Brussels: Council of the European Union, 1998).

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with a view to obtaining, directly or indirectly, an economic benefit or another material benefit”.7 The level of transnational organized crime, specifically drug trafficking, has become increasingly sophisticated as a product of the massive amounts of resources poured into by governments across the world. The use of satellites to collect evidence for international crimes has become one of the tools in the fight against Transnational Organized Crime by aiding in the collection of otherwise unattainable evidence, amongst others.

2.1 Transnational Crime—International Framework The main international legal instrument in the fight against transnational organized crime is the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by General Assembly Resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000. It entered into force on 29 September 2003. It is supplemented by three Protocols: (1) The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children; (2) the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air; and (3) the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition. Countries must become parties to the Convention itself before they can become parties to any of the Protocols.8 Colombia became a party to the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime through its signature on 12 December 2000 and subsequent ratification on 4 August 2004. Article 1 of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime states that its purpose is “to promote cooperation to prevent and combat transnational organized crime more effectively”.9 The term “organized criminal group” is defined in the Convention as a “a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention in order to obtain, directly or indirectly a financial or other material benefit”. According to this definition, drug trafficking cartels fit into the description of organized criminals, who commit serious crimes in accordance with the Convention, because their crimes are punishable by prison of four or more years.

2.2 Drug Trafficking as a Transnational Organized Crime Illegal drug trafficking is the Transnational Organized Crime that most profoundly affects Latin America because it is the region of the world where the coca plant, the 7

United Nations—Office on Drugs and Crime. United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto, (New York: UN Office for Drugs and Crime, 2018), https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/intro/UNTOC.html#Fulltext. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid.

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raw material for cocaine, originates. This, together with phenomena of social inequality and lack of law enforcement have delivered a proliferation of this criminal industry for over 40 years. This situation has crossed the borders of many Latin American countries, looking for the consumer of this drug in other regions of the world such as the United States, Europe or Asia, creating a circle where the producing countries send the drug to the consuming countries and these in turn, send the proceeds back. This productive circle, which, due to its illegality, applies different means of communication to hide its movements, uses the ocean as its main means of transport, due to its breadth and complexity, which makes it easier to hide these illegal operations. South America is known by the national, international and security entities of the United States and Europe, as the part of the world with the highest rate of cocaine production and coca cultivation. This consolidates the region as the main reference point for the threat that transnational drug trafficking poses to the West (“First World Countries”) and all connecting countries, among them those in West Africa and Europe. The transnationality of drug trafficking is evidenced by its global dimensions, in which globalization aids in the interconnectivity of the crime.10 The relationship between Latin America and its two main allies, the United States and Europe, has been shaped by the common goal of fighting drug trafficking as a Transnational Organized Crime. The effects of drug trafficking are varying across the spectrum: from the violence that indigenous communities suffer because of the lack of state presence and criminal gang activity, to the human cost suffered at the expense of those in the United States and Europe. While overdoses remain a concerning factor in statistics, they are not the only indicator worthy of consideration: In Europe, the indicators of cocaine-related hospitalizations increased threefold since the end of the 1990s.11 While consumption has declined in some countries, it has increased in others, and the markets have adjusted the supply chain making sure there is always a stable production of the drug. The ‘war on drugs’ has moved coca production partially away from Colombia to Peru and Bolivia. In efforts to avoid detection and fumigation, coca growers have also relocated into the Amazon jungle in the border regions, contributing to deforestation and contamination of nature reserves. Repressive policies in the ‘war on drugs’ have led to push drug processing and trafficking into new areas rather than to contain it. They have caused criminal groups and structures to fragment, diversify, and find new alliances.12

Arias-Vera, Adriana María, “El narcotráfico, un agente voraz que amenaza la Amazonía”, In Inseguridad en la región amazónica: Contexto, Amenazas y Perspectivas, (Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2010), pp. 45–89, https://gisde.files.wordpress.com/2012/05/inseguridaden-la-regic3b3n-amazc3b3nica1.pdf. 11 Stambøl, Eva Magdalena, “Governing Cocaine Supply and Organized Crime from Latin America and the Caribbean: The Changing Security Logics in European Union External Policy.”, European Journal of Criminal Law, (2016), pp. 1–18, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10610-015-9283-9. 12 Ibid. 10

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Analyzing Satellite Data in Latin America

Two Latin American countries stand out in the use of spatial data: both Brazil and Mexico have implemented programs that use spatial data for environmental protection and climate monitoring, two of the main problems that Latin American countries will face in the coming years, due to climate change, demonstrating the usefulness of the space systems. In 2001 Brazil started using satellite imaging at Mato Grosso to track the transformation of rainforest into farmland and support the attempt to understand the impact of environmental policies on the expansion of tropical agriculture and balance its production with environmental protection.13 By gathering satellite maps with information about crop and pasture expansion over natural vegetation, the researchers were able to acquire new and relevant information to understand the impact of environmental policies on the expansion of tropical agriculture in Brazil. This data aids in making informed assessments of the interplay between production and protection within three of the largest zones in Mato Grosso jungle.14 Mexico has stated to use satellite imaging to track and manage the occurrence of severe storms produced by the combination of atmospheric instability conditions, uneven landscape characteristics due to the orographic barrier created by mountains and different types of climates. The goal is to generate preventive measures and mitigation actions against the effects of these extreme rainfalls. It is necessary to characterize this weather phenomenon more precisely, thus allowing the prediction with some time in advance about the amount of rain that is expected.15

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Analyzing Satellite Data in Colombia

The 21st century has been one of major successes for Latin America when it comes to space. Venezuela and Bolivia have large communication satellites manufactured and launched by China and Argentina manufactured a satellite launched by Arianespace. Several smaller ‘cube-sats’ were produced in Brazil, Ecuador, Colombia and Peru, and orbited by different launch service providers.16 While the use of satellite data to fight crime is a relatively new concept, the presence of freeware and open-source data makes it easier for authorities in generating information to target and fight crime in remote areas traditionally chosen by groups outside the law. Simoes, Rolf and Picoli, Michelle, C. A, Camara Gilberto, et al. “Land use and cover maps for Mato Grosso State in Brazil from 2001 to 2017.” Sci Data 7, no. 34 (2020), pp. 1–4, https://doi. org/10.1038/s41597-020-0371-4. 14 Ibid. 15 Arellano-Lara, Fabiola and Escalante-Sandoval, Carlos, “Estimación del potencial de tormentas vía la combinación de imágenes satelitales e información meteorológica: caso de estudio al noroeste de México” Tecnología y Ciencias del Agua 5 (2014), pp. 39–61, https://search-proquestcom.ucatolica.basesdedatosezproxy.com/docview/1655880837?accountid=45660. 16 Ospina, Sylvia, “Latin American Space Activities in the 21st Century: an update.” Novum Jus 11 (1): (2017), pp. 15–38, https://doi.org/10.14718/novumjus.2017.11.1.1. 13

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4.1 Historic Background As part of the United States’ ‘war on drugs’, there has been a policy of prohibition, military aid and military intervention in Colombia. Satellite images have been used widely in the elimination of coca crops and as early as 1999. The Colombian Police Department was challenging CIA imagery that showed the spread of coca plantations, claiming that it was impossible to tell a dead coca plant from a live one.17 Colombia’s implementation of satellite imagery and the analysis of satellite data to detect geographical changes is began in the 21st century. Since 2015, Colombia has been using satellite imaging to monitor activities related to small eruptions at ice-capped volcanoes, considering the limitations of the severe weather conditions experienced at altitudes.18

4.2 Space Law Tools Beyond the traditional Corpus Juris Spatialis made up of the five UN Treaties on Outer Space, of which Colombia has ratified the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (LIAB) and Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (REG) Colombia is currently ratifying the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (OST).19 There are some legal instruments at the international level that could allow Colombia to integrate them with national regulations and fight against Transnational Organized Crime through space technology. This fight against drug trafficking could then become a point of reference for other countries in similar situations. The Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1963.20 While not legally binding on states, this fundamental Principle provides a path for all States to explore outer space by proclaiming that International Law and the Charter should govern all activities of States in space. It also addresses the issue of responsibilities of States and International Organizations for activities in outer space, jurisdiction and control of objects launched, re-entry, landing and return of Johnson, Tim, “Colombia Assails CIA Coca Report -Satellite Images Called Inadequate” Seattle Times, (1999), https://search-proquest-com.ucatolica.basesdedatosezproxy.com/docview/3835836 64?accountid=45660. 18 Castaño, Lina Marcela, Ospina, Carlos Alberto, Cadena, Oscar Ernesto, et al., “Continuous monitoring of the 2015–2018 Nevado del Ruiz activity, Colombia, using satellite infrared images and local infrasound records”, Earth Planets Space 72 (2020), p. 81, https://doi.org/10.1186/ s40623-020-01197-z. 19 Becerra, Jairo, El principio de libertad en el Derecho Espacial. (Bogotá: Universidad Catolica de Colombia, 2014), pp. 54–55, https://publicaciones.ucatolica.edu.co/pdf/el-principio-de-libertaden-el-derecho-espacial-digital.pdf. 20 United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, International Space Law: United Nations Instruments (Vienna: United Nations 2017). 17

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astronauts and vehicles, and liability for injury or damage caused by space vehicles.21 Colombia and the rest of Latin American countries have found recognition through the Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the benefit and in the interest of all states, taking into particular account the needs of developing countries, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1996.22 This Declaration recognizes the importance of international cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space for the benefit and interest of all states, in particular the needs of developing countries. It also emphasizes fairness and cooperation between countries with major space capabilities and those who are just starting out with incipient space programs. Colombia has shown its commitment during the last years to strengthen its space capabilities, reflected in the ratification of different international instruments in relation to the peaceful use of outer space. Such was the Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (REG), approved by Law 1569 of 2012,23 and the Convention on International Responsibility for Damage Caused by Objects (LIAB), approved by Law 1591 of 2012.24 Other countries in Latin America, by comparison, have advanced further in their quest to join in space activities and exploration, included, but not limited to, satellite surveillance and crime prevention. Argentina and Brazil, shifted the field of space activity developments from the military to civilian agencies: in Argentina through Decree 995/91, which created the National Commission for Space Activities (CONAE),25 and in Brazil by establishing the Brazilian Space Agency, created by Law 8.854 of 1994, taking the control of space exploration away from the military.26 Mexico established their own Space Agency in 2010, with the aim of promoting and executing space policies to further develop science and technology for the country.27 Paraguay established its Space Agency through Law 5151 of 2014 “to understand, design, propose and execute policies and programs in space and

Matignon, Louis de Gouyon, “The 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles”, Space Legal Issues (2019), www.spacelegalissues.com/space-law-declaration-of-legal-principles-governing-the-activi ties-of-states-in-the-exploration-and-use-of-outer-space/. 22 United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, International Space Law: United Nations Instruments (Vienna: United Nations 2017). 23 Republic of Colombia, Law 1569 of 2012 “Diario Oficial No. 48.510 de 2 de agosto de 2012”. (Bogota: Congress of the Republic of Colombia, 2012). 24 Republic of Colombia, Law 1591 of 2012 “Diario Oficial No. 48.620 de 20 de noviembre de 2012”. (Bogota: Congress of the Republic of Colombia, 2012). 25 Republic of Argentina, Decreto 995/91 (Buenos Aires: Poder Ejecutivo Nacional de Argentina, 1991), https://www.argentina.gob.ar/normativa/nacional/decreto-995-1991-6295/texto. 26 Federated Republic of Brazil, LEI Nº 8.854, De 10 De Fevereiro De 1994 (Brasília: Presidência da República Brasil, 1994). http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/L8854.htm. 27 Gobierno de México. Agencia Espacial Mexicana (2020), https://www.gob.mx/aem/es/#2182. 21

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aerospace. It will depend in an administrative and functional way on the Presidency of the Republic”.28 In relation to the other multilateral treaties that incorporate and develop concepts on the legal principles that should govern the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space, it is important to point out that Colombia has signed, but not ratified, the Agreement on the Rescue and Return of Astronauts and the Restitution of Objects Launched into Space Outer; as well as the Outer Space Treaty (OST). Finally, Colombia has not signed the Moon Agreement (MOON) that should govern the activities of states on the Moon and others celestial bodies (Cancillería de Colombia 2020).29 The following chapter will explain how the use of open-source satellite data can be developed to combat Transnational Organized Crime, in the search for vessels at sea, which may be associated with drug trafficking in Colombia.

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Space Systems in Support of New Security and Defense Concepts

The evolution of new concepts of security and defense has favored the strategic use of Earth Observation satellites and their various domains of application that may arise in the short term. Today, space technologies are an indispensable tool because of their ability to obtain and disseminate information repeatedly, anywhere, and non-aggressive with freedom to operate independently, discreetly and in strict compliance with international law. From the perspective of exploiting the capabilities that space is able to provide for security and defense, the term can be used in a broad sense that includes the physical environment, the actual space systems and their components (including those located and used on the ground), as well as the applications and services that can provide support for common strategies and the task of achieving objectives. In this context, the space contribution to security and defense is composed of the components space systems, data infrastructures and value-added applications and services. They all offer a wide range of opportunities for the development of technologies applied in the defense industry and services, particularly in developing countries.

28

Republic of Paraguay, Ley Nº 5151 de Agencia Espacial del Paraguay. (Asuncion: Congreso de Paraguay, 2020), https://www.bacn.gov.py/leyes-paraguayas/4652/ley-n-5151-de-agencia-espacia l-del-paraguay. 29 Republic of Colombia, Comisión de Naciones Unidas para el uso pacífico del Espacio Ultraterrestre (Copous) (Bogota: Cancilleria de Colombia. 2020), https://www.cancilleria.gov.co/ en/internacional/politica/economico/copous.

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In this chapter, the use and application of digital spatial data processing technologies for ship detection (marine surveillance) in Colombia’s Pacific Ocean using Sentinel-1 SAR is elaborated. Marine surveillance can be made with different methodologies. The first option is to use cooperative systems in which the vessels themselves actively report its identities and positions. The three most common systems are Automatic Identification System (AIS), Long-Range Identification and tracking (LRIT) and the Vessel Monitoring System (VMS).30 While the former is continuously available, free to use and overall (global), the other two are not. Another means for vessel detection are non-cooperative systems that do not require cooperation on the ship’s side. These systems most commonly use cameras and radars on a variety of platforms (ships, drones, satellites, etc.) to locate vessels. Ship detection with Sentinel-1 falls into the non-cooperative category and enables detection of vessels not carrying AIS or other tracking systems onboard such as smaller fishing boats or ships that are in the surveyed area illegally (narcotic, illegal fishing, piracy, etc.). Moreover, SAR is not reliant on daylight (solar illumination) and is rather independent of weather conditions, therefore enabling frequent monitoring.31

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Materials and Study Area

The prioritized geographic area for this research is in the Colombian Pacific Sea to the southwest of the national territory in the Sanquianga National Park to the north of Tumaco city. The details of the delimitation and area of the study region will be defined with the project sponsors (Fig. 2). In the present study, the Sentinel-1A and Sentinel-1B dual polarization horizontal-horizontal (HH) and horizontal-vertical (HV) subsets are SAR images of the maritime region (acquired 15 September 2019). The HV of the SAR images from the study area is used for the detection of ships as marine objects. The data properties of the SAR images used are shown in Table 1.

30

International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities, IALA complementary lighthouse use manual edition 2, (St Germain en Laye: International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities, 2017), p. 176. 31 Grover, Aayush, Kumar, Shashi, & Kumar, Anil. Ship detection using sentinel-1 SAR data, (ISPRS Ann. Photogram. Remote Sens, 2018), pp. 317–324.

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Fig. 2 Study areas: geographic location of SAR radar images used in the region of interest on the Pacific Ocean, Colombia (own elaboration)

Table 1 Data properties for Sentinel-1A and B dataset used in the study Data properties

Sentinel-1A

Sentinel-1B

Product ID Spatial resolution Acquisition mode Image format Ellipsoid PASS Sensor orientation SAR mode

S1A_IW_GRDM_1SVV 9m Interferometric Wide—GRDH GeoTIFF WGS84 Descending Left Dual-Pol (VH VV)

S1B_IW_GRDM_1SVV 9m Interferometric Wide—GRDH GeoTIFF WGS84 Ascending Right Dual-Pol (VH VV)

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Methodology and Flow of Algorithm

The object detection operation consists of the four main operations, namely pre-processing, land-sea masking, pre-selection and discrimination. The pre-processing steps include calibration of the SAR images to make the pre-selection process easier and more accurate. Land-sea masking is applied using

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the Digital Elevation Model (DEM) with self-downloading data needed for the study area to keep the detection focused only on the Pacific sea. After this process, the objects are discriminated with a Constant False Alarm Rate (CFAR) detector, where false alarms are rejected based on the size of the object (Fig. 3).

7.1 Pre-processing For this study, we pre-processing Sentinel-1 High-Resolution Ground Range Detected (IW GRDH) images. The first step was radiometric correction applied to reduce the SAR effect such as orbit errors or mottled noise. Then the Sentinel-1 images data are updated with available orbit file data calibrated for quantitative use or SAR images and multiple filters were applied. After this preprocessing step the Sentinel-1 data image will be ready for the ship detection process.

7.2 Ocean Illegal Vessels Detection The object detection operator Ocean Illegal detects objects such as ships on the sea surface from SAR images. The following are the main processing steps of this operation: Here, we describe a concept of “Ocean Illegal Vessels Detection” using SAR satellite imagines32 to monitor ships’ illegal activities in remote areas, trough Ocean Object Detection (OOD) tool in SNAP. On SAR images the ships made of metal with sharp edges appear as bright dots and edges, therefore they can be well distinguished from the water. The following are the main processing steps of this operation.

7.2.1 Land-Sea Masking Land mask with buffering to the sea for a few meters may give the detection result of ships present at sea, but for detection of those anchored off the coast, the user must select the land mask with minimal cushioning from the sea to keep the shoreline so close to the actual point of distinction. However, there are other structures on land associated with the movement of ships that may be interesting to analyze, therefore the choice of a DEM is an option.

32

Geller, Mattyus. Near real-time automatic marine vessel detection on optical Satellite images, (International Archives of the Photogrammetry, Remote Sensing and Spatial Information Sciences, Volume XL-1/W1, ISPRS Hannover Workshop 2013, 21–24 May 2013, Hannover, Germany), p. 233.

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Fig. 3 Flow chart for the methodology used in the study (own elaboration). Adapted from Grover, A., Kumar, S., & Kumar, A. Ship detection using sentinel-1 SAR data. (ISPRS Ann. Photogram. Remote Sens, 2018), pp. 317–324. https://www.isprs-ann-photogramm-remote-sensspatial-inf-sci.net/IV-5/317/2018/. (accessed 20 August 2020)

7.2.2 Pre-screening and Threshold The processing method proposed by the CFAR algorithm was used for the detection of ships in SAR images.33 That algorithm was then applied in Sentinel Application Platform (SNAP)34 tools for ocean object detection. Through this study, we will explore Sentinel-1 data for rapid ship detection in study areas using those SNAP tools. At the same time, we also try to extract objects from the ship by manual 33

Park, Kyung-Ae, Park, Jae-Jin, Jang, Jae-Cheol, Lee, Ji-Hyun, Sangwoo Oh & Lee, Moonjin, “Multi-spectral ship detection using optical, hyperspectral, and microwave SAR remote sensing data in coastal regions”, Sustainability 10, no. 11 (2018), p. 11. 34 See ESA, “The Sentinel Application Platform: SNAP”, www.step.esa.int/main/toolboxes/snap/, (accessed 24 August 2020).

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threshold extraction. The CFAR threshold (amplitude) or #FA and can be calculated as follows: Z PFA ¼

1

#FA

ðfkðaÞ:daÞ;

when X(#FA) is the pixel under test and #FA is a given threshold. Then PFA (Probability of False Alarm) was given by the formula below. f k(x) is ocean clutter probability density function and X is range through the possible pixel values. This local statistic determines the background clutter to calculate the estimation of the threshold value, above which any pixel value has a probability of being part of a ship.35 And the above detection criterion is equivalent to the criterion below: Z if ;

1 #FA

ðfkðaÞ:daÞ  PFA , TARGET

The above detection criterion can be further expressed as formula below, if Gaussian distribution is assumed for the ocean clutter36: X#FA [ lb þ rb #FA , TARGET where µb is the background mean, rb is the background standard deviation and t is a detector design parameter which is computed from PFA, with a valid value range between [0, 1]. In general, the CFAR detector object is performed in an adaptive manner by the Adaptive Thresholding operator. For each pixel under test, there are three windows, namely target window, guard window and background window, surrounding it (see Fig. 4). where the target window size should be about the size of the smallest object to detect, the guard window size should be about the size of the largest object, and the background window size should be large enough to accurately estimate the local statistics.

Vespe, Michael, & Greidanus, Harm, “SAR image quality assessment and indicators for vessel and oil spill detection”, IEEE Transactions on Geoscience and Remote Sensing 50, no. 11 (2012), pp. 4726–4734. 36 Bioresita, Filsa, Puissant, Anne, Stumpf, André, Malet, J-M, “A Method for Automatic and Rapid Mapping of Water Surfaces from Sentinel-1 Imagery”, Remote Sensing 10, no. 217 (2018), p. 6. 35

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Fig. 4 Window setup for adaptive thresholding in CFAR. Own elaboration. Adapted from Cui, Yi., Yang, Jian., & Yamaguchi, Yoshio, CFAR ship detection in SAR images based on lognormal mixture models (APSAR, 2011), pp. 1–3, https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/6087012/ similar#similar, (accessed 20 August 2020)

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Target Detection

The discrimination operation is composite by the false detections that are eliminated based on simple target measurements. In this study, 20 m and 60 m were determined for minimum and maximum target size. Those values were selected based on size estimation of illegal ship activity and some preliminary tests. The terrain correction process was the last step applied to make representations geometry of the image will be close to the truth and to minimize the influence of the local incident angle to the image.

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Results and Discussion

In the ship detection process using OOD, a vessel was extracted from two sigma-nought images, VV and VH. The results show difference, some objects are not detected in sigma-nought VV, only detected in sigma-nought VH and vice versa. However, there is a false alarm estimate that is approximately forty-five percent (45%) of the extraction result of all objects. In fact, many objects are detected from both of them, sometimes with a slightly different position. Figure 5 reflects the comparison between those two results. The results show the detection of ships that have dispersed on the coast of Tumaco and Sanquianga. In that figure, ship detection was a combination of the VV and VH results without any sigma. From this method, the length of the boat can be calculated automatically. The longest boat detected is approximately 90 m and the smallest boat is approximately 20 m (Table 2).

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Fig. 5 SAR image from Sentinel-1: The image shows target detections in red circles; two in the Pacific Ocean, Colombia (T-06 and T-07) and five in the interior of the continent (T-01 to T05, see Table 2) on the rivers and meanders of the ocean Pacific of Colombia (own elaboration). Image retrieved from ESA, “The Sentinel Application Platform: SNAP”, www.step.esa.int/main/ toolboxes/snap/, (accessed 20 August 2020)

Table 2 Data properties of ship detection using Sentinel-1A and B dataset Identifier target

Geometry X position on the image

Y position on the image

Detected latitude north

Detected longitude west

Width (m)

Length (m)

T-00 T-01 T-02 T-03 T-04 T-05 T-06 T-07

Point Point Point Point Point Point Point Point

264 1685 3151 4914 4389 4715 4611 4665

2.979 2.848 2.665 2.514 2.550 2.519 2.582 2.577

−77.867 −77.874 −77.659 −77.721 −77.662 −77.658 −77.910 −77.913

50 30 40 20 50 30 90 60

60 20 60 30 70 30 60 60

3457 3251 486 798 247 132 3018 3043

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Fig. 6 The figure shows the detection of secondary targets, (up right) artificial channels over the rivers, (down right) landing strip in the middle of the thick forest. Own elaboration. Image retrieved from ESA, “The Sentinel Application Platform: SNAP”, www.step.esa.int/main/ toolboxes/snap/, (accessed 20 August 2020)

In this method, the secondary targets (other than vessels) have potential use for the identification of other artificial structures such as airstrips and inter-oceanic channels, which indicate extraction. Extraction of illegal goods using the manual method without DEM filtering, what can be considered secondary targets. Using this method, other potential targets were detected, but it is difficult to determine a threshold for vessel removal. Figure 6 shows the estimation of artificial structures using the manual extraction method. Sentinel-1 has many useful advantages because it covers wide areas, weather independent (‘cloud-free’), and has short revisit time. However, its original technical resolution is about 20 m. After resampling, it can become 10 m by calculation but the information inside the pixel cannot be changed into more detail. Thus, it cannot detect a very detailed object. In the ship extraction, for rapid method, the smallest ship which can be detected has a length of 30 m. It means about one and a half pixels. In the manual extraction, the smallest ship has a length of 14 m but also with a higher false alarm result. Yet, the result of rapid detection mapping in SNAP using Sentinel-1 has already represented the presence of ships in the study area. Therefore, it can be used in wider areas for vessel detection.

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Conclusions

Ship detection as part of national security maritime surveillance can be used as examined in this study using Sentinel-1 SAR data. The Colombian Pacific coast at Tumaco and Sanquianga are areas that have high illegality sea activity and several ports. Increasing activity that occurs in these ports can enlarge the ship volume around the Pacific coast. Sentinel-1 uses C-band SAR which is generally not hindered by atmospheric effects (capable to pass through tropical clouds and rain showers) and is independent of daylight, thus identification ship on sea surface will be easier. In this study, ship detection using the Constant False Alarm Rate (CFAR) algorithm provided by the Sentinel Application Platform (SNAP) for ocean object detection, which is originally a rapid ship detection method, was tested. The results indicate that some ports or man-made objects along the coastal areas are detected as ships, indicated by a false alarm estimate of thirty-five percent (35%) after visual analysis and observation. Based on the false alarm percentage, rapid ship detection produces fewer false alarm results with a minimum consumption time process than manual vessel removal, but cannot detect all ships in the study areas. The quick pull method can calculate the length of a ship automatically but is limited to the resolution size for objects of approximately 20 m. Generally, both methods can be used to assist the automated and independent detection of vessels and give sufficient results. However, in the case of Sentinel-1, ocean object detection in the SNAP tools is adequate for rapid mapping. The results indicate that the detection of oceanic objects in the SNAP tools is suitable as an open-source tool to support the combat of drug trafficking. Thanks to the characteristics of the examined radar images (SAR of Sentinel-1), this technique is presented as an alternative supporting means for countries in climatologically complex and difficult to access areas. Since the main objective of this chapter of Part 2 of Latin American Societies for the Promotion of Space is a case study for the detection of vessels associated with drug trafficking, we can see that the case study fully evidences this possibility, contributing to the development of a maritime monitoring system to allow tracking different vessels, by identifying key elements from open data for the construction of the system, such as: Due to the environmental characteristics of the region, the SNAP system can be used with a relative easy implementation and use. Likewise, the data obtained indirectly (secondary targets) allow for supplementing the information for decision-making and actions within a legal framework that will allow the authorities to carry out specific actions, with the guarantee of quality in terms of richness and granularity. This is the way in which decision makers would have a tool that provides quality data, with a relatively low cost and easy access, essential elements for decision making and the development of plans that mitigate this type of crime, within a legal framework that allows its implementation. Finally, within the framework of the application of space technology by Latin American countries, it must be highlighted that this development and implementation must adapt to the needs of the region, in the search for benefits focused on

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concrete and successful results that make the biggest impact possible. Developing nations must optimize available resources and budgets, unlike richer countries, which by having more extensive resources, can create laxer trial and error procedures. This may be one of the main obstacles when it comes to space implementation and development in the region, due to the lack of assimilation by decision makers and neglect in the societies in general of the benefits of the space appliances, such as academic research, technical development and industrial support.

Jairo Becerra is an attorney with a postgraduate degree in Political Science from the Universidad de Barcelona, Spain. DEA in international Law from the Universidad de Barcelona, Spain. Director of the Center for Socio-Legal Research CISJUC of Universidad Católica de Colombia. Member of the International Institute of Space Law, IISL. Former advisor to the Executive Secretary of the Colombian Space Commission, CCE. Member of the research group on Public Law and ICT. This chapter is part of the research project: Phase II. Law, Climate Change and Big Data. Research Line in ICT Law. Alexander Ariza is an engineer with a Geographic, SIG and Remote Sensing MBA from the Technical Universidad de Madrid, Spain and a Ph.D in Technologies of the Geographical Information from the Universidad de Alcala, Spain. He has been the director of the Research Center (CIAF) of the Geographical Institute of Colombia (IGAC, Colombia). Adjunct Professor of the Faculty of Engineering and Geography of the Universidad Catolica de Manizales UCM, and UPTC University of Colombia. As well as, visiting professor at the Universidad Politecnica de Madrid, Spain and Jagiellonian University of Krakow, Poland. The actuality is visiting Scientist of the UN-SPIDER Program of the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) in Bonn, Germany. Laura C. Gamarra-Amaya is an international attorney, Holds an LL.M in International Legal Studies from Georgetown University, EEUU. Admitted to practice in Colombia and New York, professor of public and private international law at Universidad Católica de Colombia, Executive Editor of Novum Jus Law Journal. Member of the research group on Public Law and ICT. This chapter is part of the research project: Challenges and resilience in 21st century law.

Launch Management of a Nanosatellite for Bolivia Rosalyn Puma-Guzman and Jorge Soliz

Abstract

In Bolivia as in other countries in the South American region, the field of aerospace technology is growing mainly due to the use of satellite platforms such as CubeSats, TubeSats, etc. These platforms are known as low cost satellites and, among the most common, is the so-called CubeSat. These platforms allow developing countries to build their own satellites. Therefore, being able to rent launchers to send these satellites into space is becoming more of a priority. This research aims to help satellite developers on the management of the acquisition of a launcher for their satellites. This article shows the important aspects to take into account for the selection of a launcher and a launch site, according to the requirements and application of the space mission. This chapter also shows the types of launches that are currently available and which is the appropriate one according to cost, and lists the companies that offer rocket rental services, including the launch cost and schedule. This research focuses on the launch management for a nanosatellite, since this type of satellites are currently the most commonly developed in South America.

R. Puma-Guzman (&) Industrial Engineering and Systems, Universidad Privada Boliviana, Cochabamba, Bolivia J. Soliz (&) Exact Science Department, Universidad Privada Boliviana, Cochabamba, Bolivia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 A. Froehlich (ed.), Space Fostering Latin American Societies, Southern Space Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73287-5_6

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Introduction

Nanosatellites are loosely defined as any satellite weighing less than 10 kg. CubeSats must comply with a series of specific criteria that control factors such as their shape, size and weight. CubeSats can come in various sizes, but they are all based on the standard CubeSat unit, namely a cube-shaped structure measuring 10
10
10 cm3, with a mass of somewhere between 1 and 1,33 kg. This unit is known as 1U. After the first few years, this modular unit was multiplied and larger nanosatellites are common (1, 5U, 2U, 3U or 6U), currently new configurations are under development. Nanosatellite development based on CubeSat standards guarantees ongoing and relatively inexpensive access to space, as well as a wide range of launch and rocket options. CubeSat standardization opens up the possibility of using commercial electronic parts and the choice of numerous technology suppliers, thereby considerably reducing the costs of engineering and development in comparison with other types of satellites. A nanosatellite in the CubeSat standard is a CubeSat of 3 units (between 4 to 8 kg of weight) (Fig. 1). Around the world, the number of projects for the design and construction of small satellites is increasing, especially the nanosatellites, since the nanosatellite has larger dimensions than a CubeSat of 1 Unit, it can house a greater number of components, and has more potential applications, as can be seen in Fig. 2. Fig. 1 Cubesats 1U, 2U y 3U (Alen Space, “A basic guide to nanosatellite”, Vigo, España 2020)

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Fig. 2 Type of cubesats sent to space (Kulu Erik, “Nanosats Database”, 19 April 2020, https:// www.nanosats.eu/#figures, accessed 10 July 2020)

Fig. 3 Placing satellites on the head of the Dnepr rocket (eoPortal, “Sharing Earth Observation Resources”, no date, https://directory.eoportal.org/web/eoportal/satellite-missions/content/-/article/ unisat-2, accessed 20 July 2020)

Rockets have a storage space for many satellites (obviously depending on their size). For this reason, the spaces inside the rocket are sold by different companies. These companies market many launches with various types of rockets at different sites, and on the basis of certain rocket reliability studies, they guarantee that the satellite will be optimally put into orbit. Figure 3 shows an example of placement of the satellites in a rocket.

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Fig. 4 Nanosatellites launches (Kulu Erik, “Nanosats Database”, 19 April 2020, https://www. nanosats.eu/#figures, accessed 10 July 2020)

With the incursion in recent years of new actors in the aerospace field, such as universities, research centers and private companies—due to the points already mentioned—, an exponential increase in the number of small satellites sent into space has occurred, especially those of the Nano category. This can be seen in Fig. 4. There exist companies (mainly of European and American origin) that not only sell satellite components, but also offer the rental of rockets to send satellites into space. Since almost all entities developing these satellites are universities or research centers, which do not have launch capacities, these consulting companies take into account the mission of the satellite and collaborate with the developers to find an adequate rocket and a suitable launch site, for the placement of the satellite in space. For this reason, the management for the acquisition of a launcher and a launch site appropriate to each mission has become a fundamental and necessary issue in recent times. These companies have become an essential part of the space project.

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Research

With nanosatellites, the benefits that were traditionally exclusively reserved for large companies or space agencies with vast financial resources, have been democratized and have become accessible to companies of all types and sizes. Once

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the nanosatellite has been developed, tested and is ready for operations, it must be placed in orbit. There are currently multiple launch options, including the shared use of government agency rockets, private company launchers, or logistic links with the International Space Station (ISS).1 CubeSats take up reduced amounts of volume and have low mass, making of them easy to load onto a spacecraft as well as being a low-cost solution. Furthermore, the emergence of micro-launchers around the world, dedicated exclusively to placing small satellites in orbit, has forced the market to lower launch prices.

2.1 Common Orbits of Nanosatellites The applications intended for the satellites are that what determine their orbits. Figure 5 shows the orbits of the nanosatellites launched to date. As can be seen there, the most common orbit used by nanosatellites is the so-called Sun-synchronous orbit (SSO). SSO is a particular kind of polar orbit (and thus, it is also simply called polar orbit). Satellites in SSO, traveling over the polar regions, are synchronous with the Sun, which means they are set to always be in the same ‘fixed’ position relative to the Sun. This implies that the satellite always visits the same spot at the same local time, for example, passing over the city of Paris every day at noon exactly. Consequently, the satellite will always observe the same point on Earth, as if it was invariably the same time of the day. This, of course, serves a number of applications; for example, it means that scientists and those who use the satellite images can compare how some region changes over time.2 Indeed, in order to monitor an area of the world by taking a series of images across many days, weeks, months, or even years, it would not be very helpful to compare that region at midnight and then at midday. It is necessary to take each picture as similarly to the previous picture as possible. Therefore, scientists can use series of images like these to investigate how weather patterns emerge in order to help predict weather or storms; when monitoring emergencies like forest fires or flooding; to accumulate data on long-term problems like deforestation or rising sea levels. Often, satellites in SSO are synchronized so that they are in constant dawn or dusk. This is because, by constantly riding a sunset or sunrise, they will never have the Sun at an angle where the Earth shadows them. A satellite in a Sun-synchronous orbit would usually be at an altitude of between 400 to 800 km. At 800 km, it will be traveling at a speed of approximately 7,5 km per second. Optimal conditions for Earth observation or communications are ensured if the satellite orbits close to the Earth (low altitude) (around 300 to 500 km). The launchers currently used to put the nanosatellites into orbit are shown in Fig. 6.

A. Space, “A Basic Guide to Nanosatellites”, Alén Space, p. 14, Vigo, España (2019). Ibid.

1 2

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Fig. 5 Nanosatellite approximate orbits after launch (Kulu Erik, “Nanosats Database”, 19 April 2020, https://www.nanosats.eu/#figures, accessed 10 July 2020)

Fig. 6 Nanosatellite launches by launchers (Kulu Erik, “Nanosats Database”, 19 April 2020, https://www.nanosats.eu/#figures, accessed 10 July 2020)

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2.2 Launch Sites The launch sites of the launchers for nanosatellites are shown in Table 1. Table 1 Launch sites (J. Hopkins, S. Isakowitz, “International Reference guide to space launch systems”. AIAA, 4th Edition, USA, 2004) Launcher

Country

Launch site

Antares

EEUU

Wallops Flight Facility, Delmarva Peninsula, Virginia

EEUU

Vandenberg Air Force Base, California

EEUU

Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Florida

Atlas V Delta II

EEUU

Vandenberg Air Force Base, California

EEUU

Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Florida

EEUU

Vandenberg Air Force Base, California

EEUU

Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Florida

Dnepr

Kazakhstan

Baikonur Cosmodrome, Tyuratam

Falcon 9

EEUU

Wallops Flight Facility, Delmarva Peninsula, Virginia

EEUU

Vandenberg Air Force Base, California

EEUU H-IIA, H-IIB Japan Long March

Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Florida Tanegashima Space Center, Tanegashima Island

China

Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center

China

Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center

China

Wenchang Satellite Launch Center

China

Xichang Satellite Launch Center

Minotaur

EEUU

Vandenberg Air Force Base, California

EEUU

Mid-Atlantic Regional Spaceport

PSLV

India

Satish Dhawan Space Centre (Sriharikota), Andhra Pradesh

Soyuz

Kazakhstan

Baikonur Cosmodrome, Tyuratam

Vega

Guayana Francesa Guiana Space Centre, Kourou

Table 2 Orbits according to Launchers (J. Hopkins, S. Isakowitz, “International Reference guide to space launch systems”. AIAA, 4th Edition, USA, 2004)

Launcher

Orbits

Antares Atlas V Delta II Dnepr Falcon 9 H-IIA, H-IIB Long March Minotaur PSLV Soyuz Vega

LEO LEO - GTO – GEO LEO - GTO – HCO LEO - ISS – SSO LEO - GTO – ISS LEO - GEO – ISS LEO - GEO – GTO LEO - GTO - TLI – SSO SSPO – GTO LEO LEO – HEO

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The meanings of the acronyms are3: LEO: Low earth orbit (200 to 1.000 km above Earth’s surface). HEO: Highly elliptical orbit. GTO: Geosynchronous transfer orbit or geostationary transfer orbit (GTO) is a Hohmann transfer orbit. GEO: Geostationary orbit, also referred to as a geosynchronous equatorial orbit. (35.786 km above earth’s surface, inclination 0°). ISS: Orbit of International Space Station (circular orbit, 330 km to 410 km, inclination of 51,6°). TLI: Translunar Injection SSO: Sun-synchronous orbit SSPO: Sun-synchronous polar orbit HCO: Heliocentric orbit The dates of launches are never exact, due to various conditioners, such as weather or limitations of the mission. Therefore, the launch schedule of a satellite is determined in function of: H1 H2 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4

-

First half of the year from January to June. Second half of the year from July to December. First quarter of the year from January to March. Second quarter of the year from April to June. Third quarter of the year from July to September. Fourth quarter of the year from October to December.

Note: Some companies discriminate more their launch dates indicating the first part or second part of the respective quarter of the year, for example, Q1 # 1 to indicate the first half of the first quarter of the year, i.e., between the month of January and the middle of the month of February. Based on the launchers used for nanosatellites, the launch sites and their coordinates are identified as shown below, in Table 3.

Wertz, James R., Larson, Wiley, “Space Mission Analysis and Design”, Space technology library, Third edition, USA (1999).

3

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Table 3 Launch sites and coordinates (J. Hopkins, S. Isakowitz, “International Reference guide to space launch systems”, AIAA, 4th Edition, USA, 2004) Country

Launch site

Coordinates

EEUU

Wallops Flight Facility, Delmarva Peninsula, Virginia

37,84621°N 75,47938°W

EEUU

Vandenberg Air Force Base, California

34,77204°N 120,60124°W

EEUU

Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Florida

28,46675°N 80,55852°W

Kazakhstan

Baikonur Cosmodrome, Tyuratam

45,95515°N 63,35028°E

Japan

Tanegashima Space Center, Tanegashima Island

30,39096°N 130,96813°E

China

Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center

40,96056°N 100,29833°E

China

Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center

39,14321°N 111,96741°E

China

Wenchang Satellite Launch Center

19,61444°N 110,95113°E

China

Xichang Satellite Launch Center

28,24646°N 102,02814°E

EEUU

Mid-Atlantic Regional Spaceport

37,833378°N 75,483284°W

India

Satish Dhawan Space Centre (Sriharikota), Andhra Pradesh 13,73740°N 80,23510°E

Guayana Francesa Guiana Space Centre, Kourou

5,23739°N 52,76950°W

2.3 Orbit Launch and Insert Ratio The launch site influences the orbit as shown in Eq. (1), and choosing the launcher influences the height of the orbit as shown in Tables 2 and 4.

2.3.1 Effect of the Launch Site Both the latitude of the launch location and the allowable launch azimuth range have a profound effect on orbital parameters. In general, southerly launches allow polar orbits, and easterly launches take advantage of the Earth’s rotation and produce low-inclination orbits. The nearer to the Equator the launch site is, the greater the range of orbit inclinations that can be achieved.4 Figure 7 shows a launch site at latitude La and a launch azimuth Az. Latitude is measured on a great circle through the north pole, perpendicular to the equatorial plane. Azimuth is measured from true north, which is a vector in the latitude circle, to the launch direction vector. The launch direction vector is in the orbit plane. On the first orbit after launch, the spacecraft crosses the equatorial plane at the orbit inclination angle i. A right spherical triangle is formed by the side La and by the two angles Az and i. From spherical trigonometry, cos i ¼ cosðLaÞsinðAzÞ

ð1Þ

Charles D. Brown, “Elements of Spacecraft Design”, AIAA Education series, Reston – Virginia, USA (2012).

4

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Fig. 7 Launch azimuth and altitude (Charles D. Brown, “Elements of Spacecraft Design”, Reston – Virginia, AIAA Education series, 2012)

where La ¼ the latitude of the launch platform Az ¼ the launch azimuth, the angle from true north to the departure trajectory i ¼ the orbit inclination Equation (1) assumes a non-rotating Earth. The rotating Earth correction of the azimuth is usually small enough to be neglected.5 Launch latitude: The latitudes of selected launch sites are listed in Table 3. Launch azimuth: Given a launch site, the desired orbit inclination is obtained by selection of a launch azimuth in accordance with Eq. (1). However, the usable range of launch azimuths is restricted by safety considerations. The area underneath a departing launch vehicle is clearly unsafe if the vehicle malfunctions, and even a normal launch sheds spent stages. Considering the values in Table 3, the minimum and maximum limits of inclination of the orbit that the satellite can reach are calculated according to its launch site and the rocket used, as shown in Table 4. All launch azimuth values (min and max) were obtained from “Solar System Exploration History - Launch Centers” NASA, July 2020, https://ofrohn.github.io/ seh-doc/list-lc.html (accessed 10 July 2020).

5

Ibid.

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Table 4 Range of orbital inclination Launch sites

Latitude north (Degrees)

Launch azimuth (mín.) (Degrees)

Wallops Flight Facility, Delmarva Peninsula, Virginia Vandenberg Air Force Base, California Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Florida Baikonur Cosmodrome, Tyuratam Tanegashima Space Center, Tanegashima Island Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center Wenchang Satellite Launch Center Xichang Satellite Launch Center Mid-Atlantic Regional Spaceport Satish Dhawan Space Centre (Sriharikota), Andhra Pradesh Guiana Space Centre, Kourou

37,84621

90

160

37,85

74,33

34,77204

147

201

63,42

107,12

28,46675

35

120

59,72

40,42

45,95515

347

65

99,00

50,94

30,39096

0

180

90,00

90,00

40,96056

134

153

57,10

69,95

39,14321

175

192

86,12

99,28

19,61444

90

190

19,61

99,41

28,24646

94

104

28,51

31,27

37,833378

90

160

37,83

74,33

13,7374

0

140

90,00

51,36

5,23739

349

90

100,95

5,24

Launch azimuth (máx.) (Degrees)

Inclination La-min (Degrees)

Inclination La-máx. (Degrees)

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Table 5 Launchers success rate Launcher

Country

Total number of launches

N° of successful launches

Coeff. of success

Antares Atlas V Delta II Dnepr Falcon 9 H-IIA, H-IIB Long March Minotaur PSLV Soyuz Vega

EEUU EEUU EEUU Kazakhstan EEUU Japan

12 83 156 22 88 8

11 82 154 21 86 8

0,916666667 0,987951807 0,987179487 0,954545455 0,977272727 1

China

54

49

0,907407407

EEUU India Kazakhstan Guayana Francesa

11 50 1.293 15

11 49 1.225 14

1 0,98 0,947409126 0,933333333

2.3.2 Coefficient of Success (e) It is a value that indicates the launch success ratio of the launchers: e ¼

No: of successful launches Total number of launches

ð2Þ

Applying Eq. (2) to the launchers mentioned in Table 2, the success coefficient of each of the launchers is obtained, as shown in Table 5. Total number of launches and number of successful launches were obtained from “International Reference guide to space launch systems,” J. Hopkins, S. Isakowitz, AIAA, 4th Edition, USA (2004).

2.4 Current Launch Opportunities The low availability of launch opportunities for small satellites is often regarded as the most significant threat to the continued growth of this sector. As the cost of small satellite development is driven down through the use of COTS components, standardized commercially available bus designs, and simplified manufacturing processes, the impact of launch cost becomes increasingly significant compared to the total mission budget. The current opportunities for launch of small satellites to LEO are distributed among the categories of dedicated launch by a small vehicle provider, launch as part of a rideshare agreement or cluster launch, and by piggyback, where the satellite is classed as secondary or tertiary payload and takes advantage of additional capacity on a scheduled launch. In each case, a compromise

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between the cost of the launch, date of launch, and access to the desired orbit is required.6

2.4.1 Dedicated Launch For payloads in the minisatellite and microsatellite class with a higher budget, a number of vehicles are available for dedicated launch. However, the typical specific launch cost of these vehicles is often greater than their medium and intermediate lift counterparts, and the payload may not use up the full capacity of the vehicle. Therefore, the payload operator may not be able to economically justify the use of the launch vehicle. The clear advantage of a dedicated launch however, is that the destination orbit of the payload can be selected to best fit the mission, and the date of launch can be chosen to coincide with the payload development and mission operation schedule. The added value that can be attributed to a dedicated launch however is highly variable, and dependent on the mission requirements and the flexibility of the spacecraft bus and subsystems, which in turn has an effect on the cost of development and manufacture of the spacecraft itself. For nanosatellite and picosatellite systems in particular those designed and built by educational institutions, the cost of dedicated launch usually far exceeds what can be afforded by the system budget. They are therefore generally restricted to rideshare or piggyback launch. 2.4.2 Rideshare and Cluster Launch Rideshare missions are a type of multiple-manifested launch, where a number of similarly sized payloads share a single vehicle, launched to a mutually agreeable orbit. These missions are typically offered by launch service providers, or can be arranged by launch brokers in order to reduce the launch cost of each individual payload. In the case of rideshare launches, the total payload capacity of the vehicle can be used up, reducing the launch cost for each satellite. However, due to the multiple-manifestation of payloads, the date is subject to the proposed development schedule of all the payloads, and as such, can be affected by delays from multiple sources. The destination orbit will be similarly determined by the satellite operators, likely resulting in a non-optimal inclination and/or altitude for all the payloads. A common use of rideshare missions is the launch of satellite constellations, where multiple satellites of similar form or specification require transportation to the same orbit for deployment (e.g. Orbcomm on Pegasus XL, RapidEye on Dnepr). For these launches, the optimum orbit and launch date can be chosen as the launch has only one effective payload and customer.7

N. Crisp, K. Smith, and P. Hollingsworth, “Small Satellite Launch to LEO: a Review of Current and Future Launch Systems”, University of Manchester, Manchester, United Kingdom (2006). 7 Ibid. 6

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2.4.3 Piggyback Launch A piggyback launch opportunity allows for the launch of a satellite as a secondary payload, using up available excess volume and mass on a commissioned vehicle. The destination orbit and launch schedule are determined by the requirements of the primary payload. As a result, to be launched by piggyback, the payload must either be agnostic to the destination orbit (e.g., some technology demonstration or microgravity and other space-science missions), and be flexible in design to allow for operation in all LEO environments, or be prepared to wait for a suitable piggyback opportunity to become available. In a piggyback mission the deployment of the primary payload will not be compromised by the secondary payload. This is a risk for secondary payloads which may not be deployed as planned in the event of a launch anomaly. Additionally, the insurance costs for secondary payloads may require additional cover for damage to the primary payload. If the primary payload is much more valuable than the secondary one(s), then the cost of this insurance may be prohibitive. These costs can be somewhat mitigated by using certified launch adapters, as previously discussed, to isolate the secondary payloads from the launch vehicle and primary payload.8

2.5 Companies With the increase in demand to rent launchers for the delivery of satellites, the number of companies that manage these launches for small nano- and microsatellites also increased. Some of the main companies that manage this type of launch (ridershare launch mainly) are: RocketLab, Spaceflight, Nanoracks, ISISpace, Virgin Orbit etc.

2.6 Launch Schedule The schedule helps the planning of the space mission, offering data such as dates and available orbits. With this information, satellite developers can select in a more appropriate way the optimal launch, according to the satellite mission, considering the points already mentioned above. The acronyms of the launch schedule were already mentioned at the beginning of Sect. 2.2. Next Table 6 shows the schedule of the Spaceflight company as an example.

8

Ibid.

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Table 6 Launch schedule of Spaceflight (rideshare launch) Obtained from “Spaceflight services,” Spaceflight, https://missioncontrol.spaceflight.com/book-my-launch/all-launches (accessed 1 August 2020) Year

Launch schedule

Launchers

Orbits

2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 2021 2021 2021 2021 2021 2021 2021 2021 2021 2021 2021 2021 2022 2022

Q2 Q2 Q2 Q2 Q2 Q2 Q2 Q3 Q3 Q3 Q3 Q4 Q4 Q4 Q4 Q4 Q4 Q4 Q1 Q1 Q1 Q1 Q2 Q2 Q2 Q4 Q4 Q4 Q4 Q4 Q1 Q1

Falcon 9

550–600 km 6° 630 km SSO 550 km SSO 525 km SSO 220
385 km
53° 400 km & 450–500 km 51.6° 400 km 51.6° 220
385 km
53° 575 km SSO 10:30 550–600 km SSO 550 km SSO 12:00 400 km & 450–500 km 51.6° 400 km 51.6° 500–600 km SSO 08:00–10:00 500–600 km SSO 400–480 km & 530–600 km SSO 500–600 km SSO 23:00 500–600 km SSO 09:00–11:00 500–600 km SSO 00:00–01:00 450 km SSO 10:15 500–600 km SSO 400 km 51.6° 500–600 km SSO 13:30 500–600 km SSO 22:30–23:00 GTO 500–600 km SSO D/D 500–550 km 38° 475 km 50° 450 km SSO D/D GTO 500–600 km 0–10° 475 km 50°

Minotaur

Soyuz

PSVL

Vega

Electrón

Launcher One

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2.7 Pricing Information The prices offered by the main companies are shown below. While a great part of the launch price corresponds to the cost associated with booking a reservation, generally all companies include the following services as part of their prices: procurement of separation system, physical integration of the spacecraft to the launch vehicle, management of the launch campaign, ITAR guidance, and support for spacecraft registration, FCC & NOAA licensing.

2.7.1 Standard Payment Structure In general, these companies require to reserve the launch an average of 24 months ahead. A Standard Payment Structure commonly used in the mentioned companies is. • • • • • •

10% at launch 30% at launch 20% at launch 20% at launch 15% at launch 5% at launch

reservation minus 24 months minus 19 months minus 13 months minus 7 months

Table 7 Launch price CubeSat (1U and 3U) (rideshare launch) Company

Type of satellite

Orbit

Launch price (US$)

RocketLab

1U 3U 1U 3U

SSO

50.000–90.000 180.000–250.000 95.000 145.000 915.000 35.793,45 153.400,5 210.000 270.000 250.000

Spaceflight

Nanoracks ISISpace Virgin Orbit

1U 3U 3U 3U

LEO LEO GTO ISS 50° de inclinación 500–600 km SSO LEO, ISS 450 y 700 km SSO 230 km 0° de inclinación LEO 500 km SSO

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Conclusions

With the increase in space projects in the South American region, the need for low-cost launchers is increasing. The incursion of private companies in launch management creates a new market niche. The satellite developers must include the launch price in the mission budget because often the launch price is comparable to the cost of the nanosatellite. The management of the launcher rental is very important because, as seen in Sect. 2.3, the location of the launch site and the selection of the appropriate rocket condition the orbit of the satellite, thus directly influencing the mission to be carried out. The range of the orbital inclinations according to the launcher and the launch site was calculated, as seen in Table 4. By means of this table, satellite developers can choose the best option, according to the orbit and mission they want for their satellite. The success coefficient of each rocket was also calculated to indicate which is the most reliable, as seen in Table 5. Finally, the rideshare launch type is recommended since it is the cheapest and most accessible for CubeSats—in our case, a 3U CubeSat (nanosatellite)—, as shown in Tables 6 and 7.

Ms. Rosalyn Puma-Guzman is a undergraduate student of Industrial Engineering and Systems at “Universidad Privada Boliviana” (UPB), Bolivia. She works in Sur Aerospace (space and aeronautics projects company in Bolivia) on the event organization and project management section. She has experience in space outreach events. She worked in the organization of the first CanSat Bolivia Contest and in CubeSat satellite projects for different universities. She is currently working on her final degree project at UPB, concerning space systems, focused on satellite subsystems and the management of space projects. Jorge Soliz is a Mechanical Engineer with a PhD degree in “Aerospace Science and Technology,” and a MSc degree in “Aerospace Engineering” from Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya, España. He worked in projects such as Galactic Suite (space hotel), on space mission analysis; UPCSAT 1, first satellite of the Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya (picosatellite, cubesat 1U); SSETI, “Student Space Exploration and Technology Initiative”, on design and construction of satellites (sponsored by European Space Agency), as well as several research projects in Astrodynamics, and design of nano- and picosatellites. Currently, he is professor at Universidad Privada Boliviana (UPB), Bolivia, at the Exact Science Department.

Mission Design for University Research Satellite Carlos Romo-Fuentes, Jorge Ferrer-Pérez , Rafael Chávez-Moreno , Jose Alberto Ramírez-Aguilar, and Lisette Farah-Simón

Abstract

This article presents the conceptual mission design for the microsatellite Quetzal Mission as a research initiative of the National University Autonomous of Mexico (UNAM) for monitoring greenhouse gases that contribute to global warming. The concept followed is divided in four stages: to define mission purpose, to determine orbital parameters, to analyze launcher options and to set initial technical specifications. Mexico has not done any space project by local researchers in the past 20 years to fulfill social space applications from indigenous developed satellite technologies. This contribution represents an excellent opportunity to support all the elements needed for an original space project with social impact. Since Mexico is faced with important volcanic activities, rich agricultural dynamic processes, huge factory clusters and colossal number of vehicles in urban regions, especially the air pollution sources need to be studied. Current approaches are established on terrestrial techniques with a given, ground based narrow scope. The benefits derived from the satellite

C. Romo-Fuentes (&)
J. Ferrer-Pérez
R. Chávez-Moreno
J. A. Ramírez-Aguilar Advanced Technology Unit, School of Engineering, UNAM, Juriquilla Querétaro, Mexico e-mail: [email protected] J. Ferrer-Pérez e-mail: [email protected] R. Chávez-Moreno e-mail: [email protected] J. A. Ramírez-Aguilar e-mail: [email protected] L. Farah-Simón School of Management and Accountancy, UNAM, Mexico City, Mexico e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 A. Froehlich (ed.), Space Fostering Latin American Societies, Southern Space Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73287-5_7

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Quetzal Mission would help Government Agencies in Mexico to assess the necessary nationwide actions to achieve pollution gasses reductions.

1

Introduction

The Mexican Government is facing several challenges reducing pollution emitted into the atmosphere because of the commitments to global agreements signed on 2012 and 2017. The 20% emission reduction was targeted for 2020. Currently, the National Agency of Environment and Natural Resources from Mexico (SEMARNAT) has focused major efforts on the measurement of carbon particles with less than 10 microns for their documented damage to human health. Although particle emission assessment seems feasible from emissions gauging of vehicles with combustion engines and pollutants sources coming from human activities, the country still faces a paramount task. The three main sources for air pollution in Mexico are: a) Volcanic emissions b) Factory and vehicle emissions c) Agricultural emissions In recent years, several Mexican cities have shown their pollution indexes growing up. Nevertheless, a correlation between restrictive and preventive measurements vs. the actual pollution level is not ascertained. The lack of robust pollution data and non-existing satellite photography capabilities for making such correlations are a main reason. Moreover, the Word Health Organization (WHO) estimates that air pollution kills an estimate of seven million people every year.1 Furthermore, there is not a clear understanding of flow patterns and air pollutants migration happening within the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) region to identify sources and create policies to foster a sustainable way of economic activity. Since the country depends on satellites, currently in operation and free access data, correlation analysis is not possible yet. This work proposes Quetzal microsatellite as an alternative to gather the necessary data to study pollution dynamics on Mexico. This project is part of the nation efforts to honor the Paris agreements to fight global warming signed on 2016.2,3

1

See Word Health Organization (WHO) on air pollution (https://www.who.int/health-topics/airpollution#tab=tab_1). 2 Carlos Romo et al., “Academic Aerospace Programme at the UNAM”, 61th IAC, 201, Prague, Czech Republik. 3 Saúl Santillán, Carlos Romo et al., “Developing a Space program for México”, RAST 2013, Istanbul, Turkey.

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107

Method for Quetzal Mission Definition

The Quetzal Mission definition for the project considered the following points: • • • •

Purpose of the mission Orbital parameters Launch platform analysis Initial product design specification

The Quetzal Mission is focused on a microsatellite structure with a mass less than 50 kg. The main mission focuses on pollution monitoring of air contaminants (greenhouse gases), over the Mexican territory, Mexico City, and other major Latin-American cities. Greenhouse gases can be monitored by a UV spectrometer, weighting less than 8 kg. The operative lifespan for the Mission is expected to last from 2 to 5 years and is based on using common of the shelf (COTS) technologies and systems with space heritage or certified and tested at UNAM’s facilities.4

2.1 Purpose of the Quetzal Mission The primary purpose is to develop a space mission for data collection on greenhouse gases over Mexico and several exclusive Latin-American cities to identify pollutant origins and dispersal patterns. This main purpose comprises the following secondary objectives: • To increase the presence of Mexico in the aerospace international arena for developing collaborative projects with other countries. • To develop indigenous space technologies for future needs in the study of greenhouse gases and other pollutants in Latin-American cities. Furthermore, extend or join a global network for monitoring such gases. • To foster space infrastructure for academic research and private purposes. The satellite detailed requirements are summarized in Table 1.

Carlos Romo Fuentes et al., “Space Project Quetzal UNAM MIT”, RAST 2013, Istanbul, Turkey.

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Table 1 Satellite high level requirements Requirement

Requirement description

Performance

Scientific payload, size, orbit, and navigation accuracy

Quetzal mission

Greenhouse detection sensors (spectrometer UV); electric power consumption < g0 ¼ P T gb ¼ IIdb > : g ¼ Vb V Vd

ð22Þ

where Pd is the discharge power and PT is the thruster total power. Thus, total efficiency can be calculated as: gT ¼ c 2 gb gV g0 gm :

ð23Þ

2.3 Design Process To develop a preliminary (or conceptual) design of a space propulsion system, the mission requirements have to be pre-defined. The main objective is to propose a base configuration for a propulsion system that considers an estimate of performance and mass. This base configuration should have enough information to further develop detailed requirements for designers of individual system components. A basic process for developing a preliminary design is presented below (Table 2).20 It should be noted that the design process is iterative and can be conveniently modified. 20

Humble, R. W. and Henry, G. N. and Larson, W. J. (1995), Space propulsion analysis and design, McGraw-Hill, New York.

Electric Propulsion Technology Development…

131

Table 2 Propulsion system preliminary design process Step

Description

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Define mission requirements Develop criteria for evaluating and selecting systems Develop alternative mission concepts Define the vehicle system & select potential technologies Develop preliminary designs for the propulsion systems Assess designs and configurations Compare designs and choose best option(s) Iterate and document reasons for choices

For the step one, the mission considered to develop an electric thruster was for a microsatellite called Quetzal which has the purpose to perform pollution monitoring of air contaminants (greenhouse gases), over the Mexican territory, Mexico City, and other main Latin American cities. Greenhouse gases can be monitored by a UV spectrometer, which is weighing less than 8 kg. It is expected an operative lifespan from two to five years using common of the shelf (COTS) technology and systems with space heritage or tested at UNAM’s facilities.21 From the Quetzal Mission requirements, it was determined the need of a low-power propulsion system (