Scholastica colonialis - Reception and Development of Baroque Scholasticism in Latin America, 16th-18th Centuries (Textes Et Etudes Du Moyen Age) 9782503552002, 2503552005

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Fédération Internationale des Instituts d’Études Médiévales TEXTES ET ÉTUDES DU MOYEN ÂGE, 72

SCHOLASTICA COLONIALIS: RECEPTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF BAROQUE SCHOLASTICISM IN LATIN AMERICA, 16th-18th CENTURIES

Edited by Roberto HOFMEISTER PICH and Alfredo Santiago CULLETON

FÉDÉRATION INTERNATIONALE DES INSTITUTS D’ÉTUDES MÉDIÉVALES

Présidents honoraires : L.E. BOYLE (†) (Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana et Commissio Leonina, 1987-1999) L. HOLTZ (Institut de Recherche et d’Histoire des Textes, Paris, 1999-) Président : J. HAMESSE (Université Catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve) Vice-Président : G. DINKOVA BRUUN (Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto) Membres du Comité : A. BAUMGARTEN (Universitatea Babeş-Bolyai, Cluj-Napoca) P. CAÑIZARES FERRIZ (Universidad Complutense de Madrid) M. HOENEN (Universität Basel) M.J. MUÑOZ JIMÉNEZ (Universidad Complutense de Madrid) R.H. PICH (Pontificia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre) C. VIRCILLO-FRANKLIN (Columbia University, New York) Secrétaire : M. PAVÓN RAMÍREZ (Centro Español de Estudios Eclesiásticos, Roma) Éditeur responsable : A. GÓMEZ RABAL (Institución Milá y Fontanals, CSIC, Barcelona) Coordinateur du Diplôme Européen d’Études Médiévales : G. SPINOSA (Università degli Studi di Cassino)

Fédération Internationale des Instituts d’Études Médiévales TEXTES ET ÉTUDES DU MOYEN ÂGE, 72

SCHOLASTICA COLONIALIS: RECEPTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF BAROQUE SCHOLASTICISM IN LATIN AMERICA, 16th-18th CENTURIES

Edited by Roberto HOFMEISTER PICH and Alfredo Santiago CULLETON

Barcelona - Roma 2016

COORDENAÇÃO DE APERFEIÇOAMENTO DE PESSOAL DE NÍVEL SUPERIOR

ISBN: 978-2-503-55200-2 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. © 2016 Fédération Internationale des Instituts d’Études Médiévales. Largo Giorgio Manganelli, 3 00142 Roma (Italia)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Roberto HOFMEISTER PICH and Alfredo Santiago CULLETON, Preface and Acknowledgements Roberto HOFMEISTER PICH and Alfredo Santiago CULLETON, Introduction: The Challenge of Investigating Latin American Colonial Scholasticism J. Ramiro PODETTI, Law and Politics in Sixteenth-Century Mexico: Re-Reading Alonso de Veracruz Alfredo Santiago CULLETON, The Moral Dimension of Economics: The Scholastic Doctrine of Value in Tomás de Mercado and Juan de Lugo Luis E. B ACIGALUPO , The Reasonable Ways of Probabilism – A Briefing on its Essentials Luis Evandro HINRICHSEN, The Art of Homiletics according to António Vieira – A Study of his Sexagesima Sermon or On the Power and the Reach of the Word Émilien VILAS BOAS REIS, The Philosophical and Teological Formation of António Vieira Luiz Fernando MEDEIROS RODRIGUES, The «Subterranean University» of the Jesuits Imprisoned in São Julião da Barra and the (Philosophical) Formation of the Society of Jesus’ Missionaries in the Eighteenth Century Paula OLIVEIRA E SILVA, Suárez’s Criticism of Aquinas’ Taxonomy on Emotions: A Step to Modernity? Ángel PONCELA GONZÁLEZ, Metaphysica sive theologia naturalis – The Evidence for the Existence of God by Francisco Suárez Sandro R. D’ONOFRIO, Notes concerning the Ontological Status of the Objective Concept of the ens rationis in Antonio Rubio’s Teaching Roberto HOFMEISTER PICH, Jerónimo Valera (1568-1625) and his Scotist Account of Universals Manuel LÁZARO PULIDO, Notes on Scotism in the Iberian Peninsula: The Case of Fr. Mateo de Sosa O.F.M. (17th Century)

VII

1 35

53 75

87 101

129 161 177

207 231 273

VI

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Roberto Juan KATAYAMA OMURA, Lords of the Sky: The Chief Cosmographers and the World System in Peruvian Vice-Royalty 289 Andrés VIAL, The Philosophical Eclecticism of Juan Egaña Risco (1768-1836): A Comment to his Tractatus de re logica 301 Index nominum antiquorum et mediaevalium Index nominum Secundae Scholasticae Index nominum modernorum Index rerum

309 311 315 321

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The essays published in this volume were originally presented in the «IV Colóquio Internacional de Filosofia Medieval da Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul» / IV International Conference of Medieval Philosophy, at the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul, under the title – homonymous to this collective work – «Scholastica colonialis: Recepção e Desenvolvimento da Escolástica Barroca na América Latina, Séculos 16-18 / Scholastica colonialis: Reception and Development of Baroque Scholasticism in Latin America, 16th-18th Centuries». The Conference occurred in Porto Alegre, November 12-14, 2012, at the Central Campus of the PUCRS. The organization of the meeting was finantially supported by the Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel. Logistically the meeting was only made possible because of the invaluable support by the Superior Administration and the staff of the Graduate Program in Philosophy of the PUCRS. The idea of editing the conference proceedings was one more time strongly supported by Madame Jacqueline Hamesse, président of the Fedération Internationale des Instituts d’Études Médiévales (FIDEM). We would like to deeply thank her for her support. Roberto HOFMEISTER PICH and Alfredo Santiago CULLETON

ROBERTO HOFMEISTER PICH – ALFREDO SANTIAGO CULLETON INTRODUCTION: THE CHALLENGE OF INVESTIGATING LATIN AMERICAN COLONIAL SCHOLASTICISM*

Introduction The research project «Scholastica colonialis1: Reception and Development of Baroque Scholasticism in Latin America in the Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries» launches a long-term, exhaustive investigation of the development of Baroque Scholastic philosophy in Latin America during the colonial period2. The main purpose of the project is to complete *

This Introduction essentially reproduces, under permission, the texts which were published in R. H. PICH and A. S. CULLETON, «Scholastica colonialis», Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale, 52 (2010) 25-45; R. H. PICH and A. S. CULLETON, «Scholastica colonialis – Reception and Development of Baroque Scholasticism in LatinAmerican Countries, 16th-18th Centuries. The Two First Years of a Project», Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale, 54 (2012) 21-42. A few corrections and some additions of information and bibliography were also made. 1 After several presentations of this project to specialized audiences, the only person who contested the expression Scholastica colonialis, particularly the adjective colonialis, was Walter B. Redmond, in an e-mail message sent to Roberto Hofmeister Pich. He is right when he affirms that, following classic Latin vocabulary, the adjective should be colonica, and therefore Scholastica colonica would seem more correct to him. Colonicus, colonica, colonicum means «belonging to a colony» or «coming from a colony», but it can also mean «relating to agriculture» or to the land on which farming activities are developed. We fear that someone could also understand colonica in respect of Colonia Aggripina, the German city of Cologne, which was a medieval center of great significance both in theology and philosophy. Through the neologism colonialis we mean simply to express what relates to a land, territory or nation that is or was in a political sense dependent on a colonizing or imperial power, which was a country or nation that invaded and conquered other lands or nations, thereafter influencing, under that presupposition of political control, its «acquisitions» both culturally and economically. 2 «Second Scholasticism» or «Baroque Scholasticism» emerges from certain Renaissance movements in the Iberian peninsula and consolidates entirely at the end of the sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth century. See, for example, J. A. TRENTMANN, «Scholasticism in the Seventeenth Century», in N. KRETZMANN – A. KENNY – J. PINBORG (eds.), The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy. From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism 1100-1600,

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and in some respects rewrite inventories and catalogues of manuscripts and printed works that record colonial Scholastic thought. Careful analysis and – in due time – edition of important texts are further aims of the project. It has been from the beginning an integrated project of international collaboration among several research groups in Brazil (where the project was conceived), Chile, Peru, Portugal and Spain above all, as well as other groups from other countries both in South America and in Europe. A project concerning Latin American Colonial Scholasticism, which begins without a definite theme of study but with a definite goal that helps to structure specific researches, cannot be accomplished without the co-operation of scholars in Europe. After all, if one presumes that colonial Scholasticism is largely a continuatio Mediae Aetatis philosophiae, one may also presume that the writings of colonial philosophers represent an extension of philosophy and theology in Iberian universities and other institutions of higher learning. Accordingly, the project is focused essentially on colonial materials but, in order to assess them scientifically, will receive the co-operation of research groups especially in universities of Portugal and Spain3. Geographically we understand «Latin America» to mean the whole territory that extends from the Mexican frontier with the United States to the southernmost regions of the continent, including Spanishspeaking Caribbean countries. We understand «Latin American» philosophy in an academic, traditional and «Western» sense, which began in the sixteenth century when the Catholic Church began to establish schools, monasteries, seminaries and universities in the new territories4. We may call the philosophical thought of this period Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1982, pp. 818-837. Although most of the authors referred to by the term «Baroque Scholasticism» have Spanish origin, it is not the same as «Spanish Scholasticism». At any rate, «Baroque Scholasticism» constitutes an important period in the history of philosophy in Spain, which is as such unthinkable without the formation of the Spanish State in 1474; see J. L. ABELLÁN, «Spain, Philosophy in», in E. CRAIG (ed.), The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Routledge, London – New York, Vol. 9, 1998, pp. 70 sqq. 3 We note that in these countries and universities there is currently a similar interest in revisiting the Second Scholasticism. 4 For an illuminating study on Pre-Colombian philosophical ideas, see, for example, L. Á. MARQUES, «Popol Vuh and Chilam Balam de Chumayel: Registers of Pre-Colombian Philosophical Thought», Mediaevalia – Textos e Estudos, 31 (2012) 15-28.

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«Baroque» because it is directly formed by, and strongly dependent on, the «Baroque Scholasticism» that characterizes philosophical reflection in universities on the Iberian peninsula (above all Salamanca, Alcalá de Henares, Coimbra and Évora). Theologians, philosophers and lawyers, who were active in the recently founded colonial universities (and similar educational institutions) from Mexico to Argentina, were for the most part educated in those universities named above and in other universities influenced by them. The renewal of Scholastic philosophy in Spain and Portugal was in no small part the result of Jesuits obtaining chairs in the universities. Colonial intellectuals therefore took part in the tendencies of Iberian Scholasticism in theology and philosophy: (1) the themes, systematic method of exposition, the classical learning and the dialogue between theology and philosophy already established in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Scholasticism, as is evident especially in the reception of the works of Thomas Aquinas, notably the Summa theologiae IIaIIae5; (2) the ideal of a reformation internal to the Catholic Church and in opposition to Protestant movements, which gave a new dimension to the themes of papal and ecclesiastical power and of the mission of converting native peoples to the Catholic faith6; (3) reactions to early modern philosophy in logic, metaphysics, the theory of knowledge, juridical ethics and the critique of religion; (4) the reality of the «New World», which required Scholastic thinkers in ethics, anthropology and law to address the Spanish «conquest», the status of 5

From the sixteenth century on, particularly in Chairs destined for Dominicans and then Jesuits, the work usually commented on by masters of theology was no longer Peter Lombard’s Sentences but rather Thomas Aquinas’ Summa theologiae. Thus, at the beginning of the sixteenth century Thomas de Vio Caietanus commented on the Summa theologiae, and Silvester of Ferrara commented, in turn, on the Summa contra gentiles. Still in the first decades of that century, the first great figure of Baroque Scholasticism and forerunner of the theory of international law, the Spanish Dominican Francisco de Vitoria (1483-1546), likewise commented on the Summa theologiae. See, for instance, the «Introducción: La virtud de la justicia» to Domingo Báñez, El derecho y la justicia. Decisiones de iure et iustitia, J. CRUZ CRUZ (ed.), Eunsa, Pamplona 2008, pp. 11 sqq. As L. A. DE BONI, «Apresentação», Veritas, 54:3 (2009) 5 sqq. (on-line), reminds us, such thinkers as René Descartes and Pierre Bayle studied in Jesuit Schools established in the sixteenth century and were influenced by their curricula. 6 A fine study about this context and subjects found in the work of Francisco de Vitoria is K. E. VAN LIERE, «Vitoria, Cajetan, and the Conciliarists», Journal of the History of Ideas, 58 (1997) 597-616.

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the human individual, the rights of recently discovered and conquered peoples, and the normative relations among nations7.

1. A Surprising Philosophical Landscape and a Remarkable Forerunner of the Project on Latin American Scholasticism According to an established historiography, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries there was little philosophical activity in the Latin American colonies, and existing philosophical writings were largely conservative, repeating an Aristotelian-Thomistic approach in the context of the Counter-Reformation and anti-Protestantism. This tradition perdured until the eighteenth century, when some Jesuits took the first steps towards a break with Scholastic thought and an increasing adherence to modern 7 The work of Francisco de Vitoria, the founder of the Spanish school of natural law, cannot be separated from the reaction to problems originated by the conquest and colonization of America. This is illustrated especially in his De potestate civili (1528), De indis recenter inventis relectio prior (1539) and De indis recenter inventis relectio posterior or De iure belli (1539), in Francisco de Vitoria, Obras de Francisco de Vitoria: Relecciones teológicas, T. URDANOZ (ed.), Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, Madrid 1960. In these works Vitoria developed theories of «just war» and of just entitlements (of natural law of peoples) concerning the conquest and the colonization of the Americas and laid the foundation for what would become «international public law». See the studies by G. TOSI, «Alle origini della modernità: I diritti degli indigeni del Nuovo Mondo», Jura gentium, 3 (2007) on-line; ID., «The Theological Roots of Subjective Rights: Dominium, ius and potestas in the Debate on the Indian Question», in M. KAUFMANN – R. SCHNEPF (eds.), Politische Metaphysik. Die Entstehung moderner Rechtskonzeptionen in der Spanischen Scholastik, Peter Lang: Frankfurt a.M. 2007, pp. 125-154; ID., «Guerra e direito no debate sobre a conquista da América: século XVI», Verba Juris, 5 (2006) 277-320 (on-line); ID., «Raízes teológicas dos direitos subjetivos modernos: o conceito de dominium no debate sobre a questão indígena no séc. XVI», Prim@ Facie, 4 (2005) 42-56 (online); ID., «Gli indios schiavi per natura o uomini con tutti i diritti? La dottrina dei diritti degli indios nel pensiero dei teologi di Salamanca e di Bartolomè de Las Casas», Sacra Doctrina Nuova Serie, 6 (2003) 5-38; ID., «A doutrina subjetiva dos direitos naturais e a questão indígena na Escola de Salamanca e em Bartolomé de Las Casas», Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofia, 30 (2003) 577-587; ID., «La teoria della guerra giusta in Francisco de Vitoria e il dibattito sulla conquista», Jura Gentium, (2002) on-line; ID., La Teoria della schiavitù naturale nel dibattito sul Nuovo Mondo (1510-1573). Veri Domini o Servi a natura?, Edizioni Studio Domenicano, Bologna 2002.

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philosophy (above all French philosophy). In an extreme view, that the Jesuits were not expelled from the Spanish territories until 1767 caused a regrettable delay in the introduction of early modern European philosophy into Latin America8. This opinion, however, is built upon a serious lack of evidence from the historical sources, and it is usually asserted without knowledge of the main themes and debates of Baroque Scholastic thought. After all, surviving Scholastic materials, whether catalogued or not, remain for the most part uninvestigated9. We believe, however, that those authors, periods and academic centers that have been the subject of serious investigation already paint a picture that is quite different from what has been the common opinion. Even historical approaches that are dismissive of the merits of colonial Scholastic thought as a whole10 still express respect for writings and debates that were significant in the areas of ethics and jurisprudence, namely those that reflect on cultural differences, human rights and the law of peoples, even though there are no definitive studies exposing the actual development of these topics in the works of colonial authors. Early on in Mexico, the bishop and humanist Vasco de Quiroga (ca. 1470/14788

See, for example, A. A. OLIVER, «Latin America, Philosophy in», in E. CRAIG (ed.), The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Routledge, London – New York, Vol. 5, 1998, p. 426; H. CERUTTI-GULDBERG, Hacia una metodología de la historia de las ideas (filosóficas) en América Latina, Universidad de Guadalajara: Guadalajara 1986. 9 In an exposition by L. F. RESTREPO, «Colonial Thought», in S. NUCCETELLI – O. SCHUTTE – O. BUENO (eds.), A Companion to Latin American Philosophy, WileyBlackwell, Chichester 2010, thirteen pages (pp. 36-48) are dedicated to the context that concerns us here. Actually, the author devotes pages 42-45 to some indigenous perspectives in the post-conquest period, and in pages 45-48 he attempts to identify some perspectives criollas, and all of those touch much more the literature, the history and the cultural consciousness of those societies, as well as some theological debates of the time (see Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz, ca. 1648-1695, and Carlos de Sigüenza y Góngora, 1645-1700) than philosophy as such. Of course these perspectives have their own significance. 10 We hear frequently that Baroque Scholasticism in its colonial form, that is in its encounter with the New World, tended to reproduce «medieval values»; see E. D. DUSSEL, Filosofia da libertação, Edições Loyola – Editora Unimep, São Paulo – Piracicaba 1977, pp. 16-17, who offers a typical example of this interpretation, and furthermore classifies the colonial philosophical efforts as «mercantilist colonial philosophy», which was characterized by a «spirit of pure imitation», and is just one more repetition of the pervasive «dialectics» of Greek philosophy.

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1565) made use of Thomas More’s Utopia (1516) in order to conceive congregaciones (republicas de indios) for natives who had lost their social establishment. (Quiroga’s conceptions stand at the origin of the actual communities that were created later in Peru, Paraguay and South Brazil, known as reducciones11). But it is surely the polemical works of the Dominican Bartolomé de Las Casas (ca. 1484-1566), epitomized in the Brevísima relación de la destrucción de las Indias (Sevilla, 1552), that have been most appreciated by subsequent scholars. Las Casas defended the natural human rights of the Indians, revealing in many of his writings a close knowledge of the ethical-juridical works of Francisco de Vitoria12 and opposing the thought of Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda (1490-1573), particularly in what concerns the human status of American indigenous peoples13. It is arguable that Las Casas’ polemical works represent the first well articulated «colonial» reception of Francisco de Vitoria’s thought14 11 See E. D. DUSSEL, Caminhos de libertação latino-americana I: Interpretação histórico-teológica, Paulinas, São Paulo 1985, pp. 61-62. 12 As a matter of fact, Vitoria and his followers gave preferential attention to the theoretical problem of «conquest entitlements» and the «law of war», leaving almost entirely untouched in their treatises the practical topic of government relationships; see J. HÖFFNER, La ética colonial española del Siglo de Oro. Cristianismo y dignidad humana, Ediciones Cultura Hispánica, Madrid 1957, pp. 458-507. It is difficult to judge whether Vitoria feared that his practical conclusions concerning the freedom and human treatment of Indians would conflict too much with the reality of the Spanish colonies. However, his work had been already significant enough: departing from Vitoria’s theoretical bases, Las Casas and the missionary party, in their prophetic disputes with the encomienderos, proposed with clarity norms for a more just colonial government; see T. URDANOZ, «De los indios recientemente descubiertos: Introducción a la primera releccion», in Francisco de Vitoria, Obras de Francisco de Vitoria, Ed. T. URDANOZ, Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, Madrid 1960, p. 495. 13 Sepúlveda was the emblematic author of the theoretical-philosophical defense of the Spanish conquest (not necessarily for spurious reasons, but surely because of his questionable position concerning the civilization of the Indians); he was chaplain and historian at the court of Charles V. The Debate of Valladolid in 1550 was a highlight in the disputes between Sepúlveda and Las Casas; see B. J. CANTEÑS, «The Rights of the American Indians», in S. NUCCETELLI – O. SCHUTTE – O. BUENO (eds.), A Companion to Latin American Philosophy, Wiley-Blackwell, Chichester 2010, pp. 30 sqq. 14 On Francisco de Vitoria’s position on polemical issues of his times, see for example R. H. PICH, «Dominium e ius: sobre a fundamentação dos direitos humanos segundo Francisco de Vitoria (1483-1546)», Teocomunicação, 42 (2012) 376-401, and the literature used in that study.

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concerning the status of the human individual, slavery, and the human or simply natural rights of peoples15. Las Casas, who was himself initially an encomiendero settled in Cuba, was moved by the preaching of his Dominican brethren, which denounced injustices against Indians who lived in a condition of slavery. Las Casas’ mind was also changed by his reflections on the Scriptures. Thereafter he defended the rights of Indians and (at least to a certain extent, after correcting his initial views) the rights of African slaves16. Strictly speaking, Las Casas mainly discussed a system of concession in the first period of Spanish colonization, that is, the encomienda, when Spanish lords were allowed to force natives to work in farms and mines, receiving as payment a treatment that hardly enabled their survival17. Surprisingly, the histories of the reception of Francisco de 15

See for example Bartolomé de Las Casas, De regia potestate, transl. and introd. by G. TOSI, Laterza, Bari – Roma 2007; G. TOSI, «Bartolomé de Las Casas y la guerra justa de los indios», in I. MURILLO (ed.), El pensamiento hispánico em América: siglos XVI-XX, Actas del III Simposio Internacional del Instituto de Pensamiento Iberoamericano, en Salamanca del 18 al 21 de octubre de 2006, Publicaciones Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca, Salamanca 2007, pp. 639-649; G. TOSI, «Gli indios schiavi per natura o uomini con tutti i diritti?», Sacra Doctrina. Nuova Serie, 6 (2003) 5-38; ID., «A doutrina subjetiva dos direitos naturais e a questão indígena na Escola de Salamanca e em Bartolomé de Las Casas», Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofía, 30 (2003) 577-587. See also M. BEUCHOT, Los fundamentos de los derechos humanos en Bartolomé de las Casas, Anthropos – Siglo del Hombre Eds., Barcelona – Bogotá 1994; A. P. DE SALES, «Bartolomé de Las Casas e Francisco de Vitoria: filosofia política e moral no debate sobre o direito natural e o direito das gentes no Novo Mundo», Protestantismo em Revista, 28 (2012) 52-59. 16 Concerning the topic of the slavery of black people from Africa, which raises again the Aristotelian topic of slavery in general, the work by the Jesuit Alonso de Sandoval (1576/1577-1652), De instauranda Aethiopum salute (1626), Bishop of Cartagena de Indias, deserves special attention. Studies on the issue of slavery during the colonial period should be a specific emphasis of research in the project Scholastica colonialis. See also the study by J. B. A. de SOUZA, «Las Casas, Alonso de Sandoval e a defesa da escravidão negra», Topoí. Revista de História, 12 (2006) 25-59 (on-line). 17 On the life and thought of Bartolomé de Las Casas, see among other studies G. FERNÁNDEZ, Bartolomé de las Casas, Escuela de Estudios Hispanoamericanos, Sevilla 1953-1960; H. RAUP WAGNER – H. RAND PARISH, The Life and Writings of Bartolomé de Las Casas, University of New Mexico Press, Albuquerque NM 1967; H. RAND PARISH, Las Casas as Bishop: A New Interpretation Based on his Holograph Petition in the Hans P. Kraus Collection of Hispanic American Manuscripts, Library of Congress, Washington D.C. 1980; H. RAND PARISH – H. WEIDMAN, Las Casas en México: Historia y obra desconocidas, Fondo de Cultura Económica, Ciudad de México 1980.

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Vitoria’s ethical-juridical works and – even more significantly – of Thomas Aquinas’ treatises on law, justice and war in the colonial period have never been written. We are aware that contemporary historians, philosophers and theologians in several Latin American countries have attempted to write the history of ideas in the colonial period and have made lists and inventories of works produced in universities and other institutions of higher learning. Most of them have seemingly worked alone and separately, and the scientific standards of these endeavors are neither clear nor uniform. To our knowledge the most ambitious research project concerning the surviving materials and the theoretical merits of Scholastic colonial philosophy was accomplished by Walter B. Redmond18. Redmond produced by himself a remarkable inventory of colonial philosophic works titled Bibliography of the Philosophy in the Iberian Colonies of America, published in 1972. In an intervention at a Workshop held in Santiago, Chile, which was finely organized by Santiago Orrego Sánchez and reported in the Bulletin of the Société Internationale pour l’Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale (SIEPM), Redmond recognized and strongly suggested that his inventory should be improved and completed19. Redmond received his Ph.D. in philosophy from the Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos in Lima, Peru, where he defended the thesis «Philosophia thomistica de Juan de Espinoza Medrano, ‘el Lunarejo’», in 1972. In the same year, he published his Bibliography. In that work he explains the origin and motivations of the project. In 1968, Professor Ignacio Angelelli of the University of Texas at Austin proposed a project concerning Scholastic philosophy in the Latin American colonies to the Institute of Latin American Studies in his University. As we have indicated, according to common scholarly opinion the Second Scholasticism on the Iberian peninsula as well as in colonial Latin America was poorly estimed. 18

See also R. H. PICH, «Recepção e desenvolvimento da escolástica barroca na América Latina, séculos 16-18: notas sobre a contribuição de Walter Bernard Redmond», Scripta Mediaevalia, 2 (2011) 1-22; ID., «Antecedentes à investigação filosófico-historiográfica da escolástica colonial: a contribuição de Mauricio Beuchot», Cauriensia, 6 (2011) 37-64; A. S. CULLETON, «Antecedentes a la investigación filosófico-historiográfica de la escolástica colonial. La contribución de Celina Lértora Mendoza», Cauriensia, 6 (2011) 23-35. 19 See S. ORREGO SÁNCHEZ, «SIEPM Project: The ‘Second Scholasticism’ (XVIthth XVII Centuries)», Bulletin de philosophie médiévale, 51 (2009) 37-39.

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As a consequence, there existed a yawning ignorance of the pertinent literature. For that reason, Angelelli proposed that the first phase of the project should be dedicated to compiling a general bibliography of the basic materials of Latin American Scholastic philosophy. Walter B. Redmond became Angelelli’s collaborator and in 1968-1969 he compiled the basic bibliography which he later published in 197220. Redmond’s Bibliography comprises a «Catalogue of Manuscripts and Printed Works on Philosophy from the Colonial Period in Latin America» and an inventory of «Philosophical Works from Colonial Latin America» (pp. 1-110), a list of «Anonymous Works» (pp. 111-133) with an «Appendix of some Colonial Philosophical Works which have become lost» (pp. 134-136), and a «Bibliography of the Secondary Literature concerning the Philosophy of the Colonial Period of Latin America» (pp. 138-174). According to Redmond, the surviving materials belong to two philosophical trends that are clearly discernible: (1) «pure» Scholasticism, which should be taken as an extension of the revival of Scholasticism in the sixteenth-century Iberian peninsula, and (2) a «modern» Scholasticism, which was influenced by new ideas coming from Europe, usually attempting to connect themes and methods of early modern philosophy with the themes of Scholastic philosophy. If modern Scholasticism appears already in the seventeenth century, it becomes much stronger in the second half of the eighteenth century, so that by the beginning of the following century, after 1810, nonScholastic philosophies have nearly supplanted Scholastic thought21. In his bibliography Redmond included manuscripts and printed works written in the American continent by Americans or foreigners who settled there (even if published in Europe, which happened in many cases), works composed in Europe by men who played an important role in philosophical teaching in America, and «all philosophical manuscripts, American or European, found in American libraries». Although his bibliographical register is extensive, Redmond left aside treatises dedicated purely to the natural sciences, such as the mathematics, those written by «naturalists» or «scientists», and treatises dedicated to the study of languages («linguistics»). He also omitted writings that are strictly juridical or political, such as those related to the political independence of Latin American countries. 20

See W. B. REDMOND, Bibliography of the Philosophy in the Iberian Colonies of America, Nijhoff, The Hague 1972, pp. VII-VIII. 21 Ibid., p. VIII.

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Likewise, regrettably, he omitted works that are essentially theological, which concern «the organization of Indian communities», the literature of early juridical and anthropological controversies (such as the dispute between Las Casas and Sepúlveda), as well as works by «humanists», «polygraphs» and «travelers». These exclusions pertained also to bibliography of secondary literature22. Redmond’s selective bibliography proves that the academic exchange between Europe and the New World produced a remarkable body of writings about logic, metaphysics, the theory of knowledge and ethics, as we know otherwise it did also in the fields of jurisprudence, politics and anthropology23. Redmond did not actually consult the thousands of manuscripts and old printed volumes that he catalogued. He relied on library catalogues and inventories, as well as purely bibliographical works that existed already24. By these means he yet achieved an impressive picture of colonial Scholastic philosophical literature in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia25, Cuba, Guatemala, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela. Curiously, literature pertaining to Bolivia – a wealthy province in colonial times, where in 1624 the Universidad Mayor de San Francisco Xavier de Chuquisaca was founded in Sucre – is scarce. There are no bibliographical items at all pertaining to Uruguay. Redmond cites no items pertaining to any Caribbean country besides Cuba; this is surprising when one considers that the Universidad Santo Tomás de Aquino in Santo Domingo (nowadays the Dominican Republic) founded in 1538 was 22

Ibid., p. IX. In areas such as ethics, legal and political philosophy, as well as anthropology, the important background is constituted by the sharp controversies concerning the relationships between conquerors and indigenous people, which derived from discussions conducted in European centers or by debates required in specific colonial contexts. A remarkable study about the arguments proposed and debated concerning the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the conquest of America, both in the perspective of European thinkers (such as John Mair, Francisco de Vitoria and Domingo de Soto), and in the perspective of thinkers who, although born in European colonizing countries, may surely be taken as «colonial» thinkers (such as Bartolomé de Las Casas, Vasco de Quiroga and Alonso de la Vera Cruz), is the volume by M. BEUCHOT, La querella de la conquista. Una polémica del siglo XVI, Siglo XXI, Ciudad de México 1992. 24 See REDMOND, Bibliography of the Philosophy in the Iberian Colonies, pp. XIII-XIV. 25 Where in 1580 the Universidad Santo Tomás, in Bogotá, was founded. 23

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the first university in the Spanish colonies26. Finally, Redmond’s notes concerning Brazil in his Scholastic inventory are scarce and incomplete; this too is surprising, even if one considers the modest development of institutions of higher learning in the period. In his La lógica en el Virreinato del Perú. A través de las obras de Juan Espinoza Medrano (1688) e Isidoro de Celis (1787), which happens to be the 1998 publication of his doctoral thesis, Redmond summarized his research on Latin American Scholastic philosophy, and affirmed that since the publication of his Bibliography a remarkable advance in the field was evident, especially concerning what he had called the «pure» Scholasticism of the Siglo de Oro (i.e., across the sixteenth and seventeenth century). He remarks a change in attitude regarding colonial philosophy and the existence of a large number of young researchers engaged in the field. A program centered in Caracas designed to rescue the manuscript and printed sources of colonial thought, to promote its study, and to publish critical editions of sources, including introductory studies, in a collection named Biblioteca Iberoamericana del Pensamiento Colonial, seemed especially important to him27. Redmond proposed further what he called a «Gutenberg Project» to transcribe sources in virtual form, as well as a regular program of seminars on colonial philosophy which could guide future collaborators into the technical aspects of the philosophy of the period. He recommended that scholars interested in this project should have a good preparation in contemporary philosophy and in Scholastic «natural philosophy», which allows one to study physics in the perspective of the modern «philosophy of science». In his own studies, Redmond has emphasized the relationship between logic and natural science28. The 26

Actually it began to operate with royal approval only in 1558. We were unable to obtain further information on the conception of this collection. No information about any volumes of this project are found on the Internet. In personal communication with Roberto Hofmeister Pich, Prof. Redmond himself affirms that the project failed. But another series should be mentioned for its conception and achievements until now, namely the «Colección Filosofía Colonial/ Fuentes», supported by the Fundación para el Estudio del Pensamiento Argentino e Iberoamericano (FEPAI), in Buenos Aires, the volumes of which concern mainly Argentinian thinkers, especially those who belonged to religious orders in the second half of the eighteenth century. 28 As a matter of fact, Redmond focused his researches on the logica minor of Alonso de la Vera Cruz and the logica maior of Antonio de la Rueda Rubio. 27

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major part of his studies is dedicated to the formal logic discernible in the summulae. He also created a logical system (by means of contemporary symbolic devices) in order to formalize the «objective language» of logical analysis to be found in colonial texts, simplifying in this way the exegesis of handbooks which were sometimes very complex29. At the end of the work, he offers an extensive bibliography30. According to Redmond, most colonial philosophers were members of religious orders, i.e., Franciscans (mostly followers of Scotus), Augustinians, Dominicans and Jesuits (mostly followers of Thomas Aquinas). The materials produced were mainly textbooks and treatises (cursus) published by teachers, and also lecture notes that survive in manuscript form. There are registers of academic programs and also lists of theses (under the head of a teacher) defended by candidates for specific degrees. Redmond believes that these lists of theses reflect changing philosophical debates in Europe. The works of Aristotle – viewed with an eye towards modern philosophy – served as the basis of the cursus philosophici produced in Iberian universities and in Latin American institutions. Terministic logic and Aristotelian logic were studied continuously: formal or «minor» logic was founded usually – but also very loosely – on the Summulae logicales of Peter of Spain31; the study of the «greater» logic included the Isagoge of Porphyrius, Aristotle’s Categories and Posterior Analytics, and frequently the Topics and Sophistical Refutations32. Some authors mention the regular teaching of Aristotle’s Politics and Poetics33. Needless to say, theological works written by colonial teachers contained relevant philosophical 29

See W. B. REDMOND, La lógica en el Virreinato del Perú. A través de las obras de Juan Espinoza Medrano (1688) e Isidoro de Celis (1787), Fondo de Cultura Económica, Lima 1998, pp. 11-12. 30 Ibid., pp. 375-417: (A) «Obras escritas por Espinoza Medrano»; (B) «Escritos consultados sobre Espinoza Medrano»; (C) «Catálogo de autores mencionados en la lógica de Espinoza Medrano»; (D) «Obras filosóficas de Isidoro de Celis»; (E) «Escritos consultados sobre Isidoro de Celis»; (F) «Algunas obras sobre la ‘Segunda’ Escolástica»; (G) «Bibliografía selectiva de la filosofía colonial latinoamericana». 31 One may thus conceive that a special focus of the project might be the reading and interpretation of terministic logic in Latin American colonial philosophy. 32 The commentary tradition and the study of Aristotle’s works likewise can be a special focus of the project. See also W. B. REDMOND, «Latin America, Colonial Thought in», in E. CRAIG (ed.), The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Routledge, London – New York, Vol. 5, 1998, pp. 421-422. 33 See RESTREPO, «Colonial Thought», p. 37.

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materials. (Students who had obtained their degrees in philosophy at colonial institutions could proceed to theological studies in Iberian universities). Redmond highlights, for example, the Scotist metaphysical assumptions in the theological works by the Chilean Franciscan Alfonso Briceño (15871668)34. Luis Fernando Restrepo reports that at the University of Mexico courses on Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus and Francisco Suárez were offered regularly35.

2. The Logica mexicana and «El Lunarejo» The history of philosophy in the colonial period, mainly in Mexico or New Spain, has also been investigated by Mauricio Beuchot36, who sometimes collaborated with Walter Redmond37. In Mexico (as well as 34 See Alphonsus Briceño, Prima Pars Celebriorum Controversiarum in Primum Sententiarum Ioannis Scoti Doctoris Subtilis Theologorum facile Principis, Ex Typographia Regia, Madrid 1638 (1642). On Alfonso Briceño, see also M. P. CENCI, «Notas Bibliográficas sobre Alfonso Briceño», Cauriensia, 6 (2011) 203-222; R. H. PICH, «Alfonso Briceño (1587-1668) and the Controversiae on John Duns Scotus’s Philosophical Theology: The Case of Infinity», The Modern Schoolman, 89 (2012) 65-94. 35 See RESTREPO, «Colonial Thought», p. 37. 36 Truly, a similar contribution to Mexican colonial philosophy can be found in the studies of Mauricio BEUCHOT; see, for example, his Historia de la filosofía en el México colonial, Herder, Barcelona 1996, a work that covers virtually the whole period of «new-hispanic philosophy», namely the years 1521-1821, discriminating in a very informative way different religious orders and their most important masters in the colony. See also ID., Filósofos dominicos novohispanos. (Entre sus colegios y la universidad), UNAM, Ciudad de México 1987, and ID., Filosofía y ciencia en el México dieciochesco, Facultad de Filosofía y Letras de la UNAM, Ciudad de México 1996. See again PICH, «Antecedentes à investigação filosófico-historiográfica da escolástica colonial», pp. 37-64. 37 See W. B. REDMOND – M. BEUCHOT, La lógica mexicana del Siglo de Oro, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas – UNAM, Ciudad de México 1985; ID., Pensamiento y realidad en fray Alonso de la Vera Cruz, Centro de Estudios Clásicos – UNAM, Ciudad de México 1987; M. BEUCHOT – B. NAVARRO, Dos homenajes: Alonso de la Veracruz y F. X. Clavigero, UNAM, Michoacán 1992; M. BEUCHOT – A. GÓMEZ ROBLEDO (eds.), Fray Alonso de la Veracruz: Antología y facetas de su obra, Gobierno del Estado de Michoacán de Ocampo – Universidad Michoacana de San Nicolás de Hidalgo, Morelia 1992; W. B. REDMOND – M. BEUCHOT, La teoría de la argumentación en el México colonial, UNAM, Ciudad de México 1995.

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in Peru) the Spaniards early on created an university system modeled after those at the Universities of Salamanca and Alcalá de Henares. The Augustinian Friar Alonso de Veracruz (born 1504 in Spain, died 1584 in Mexico) was the first person to teach philosophy in the New World at the Royal Pontifical University of Mexico (today called the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México), which was chartered by a royal decree of Philip II in 1548 and opened on 21 September 155138. Veracruz had studied grammar and rhetoric at the University of Alcalá de Henares and completed his theological education at the University of Salamanca; Francisco de Vitoria and Domingo de Soto were among his teachers at Salamanca. In 1554 he wrote the first work on philosophy in the Americas, a textbook of logic divided in two volumes: Recognitio summularum (1554) and Dialectica resolutio (1554). Shortly afterwards he composed a work on natural philosophy, the Physica speculatio (1557). Veracruz’s course on philosophy or Arts was intended to be a continuation of the program of philosophical education at the University of Salamanca39. Adapting terministic logic, Veracruz made important contributions to the technique of analyzing sentences40. Veracruz and some of his colleagues, who knew well the teachings of late thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century logicians, formulated – around the year 1554 – rules of expansion for general sentences in disjunctions and/or conjunctions (rules of «descent») and rules for the formation of general sentences 38

See M. BEUCHOT, Historia de la filosofía en el México colonial, pp. 124 sqq. See also H. CERUTTI-GULDBERG, «Mexico, Philosophy in», in E. CRAIG (ed.), The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Routledge, London – New York, Vol. 6, 1998, pp. 344 sqq. 39 On this topic, see also J. L. FUERTES HERREROS, «La estructura de los saberes en la primera Escuela de Salamanca», Cauriensia, 6 (2011) 103-145; for a lightly later period in Salamanca, but essential to the idea of the standard form of philosophical education in Baroque scholasticism, see Á. PONCELA GONZÁLEZ, «Aristóteles y los Jesuitas. La génesis corporativa de los Cursus philosophicus», Cauriensia, 6 (2011) 65-101. 40 On the whole, Alonso de la Veraruz adopted an «extensional» logic, wherein the «identity relationship» occupies a central place; see, for example, W. B. REDMOND, «La inferencia cuantificada en la lógica mexicana del siglo XVI», Diánoia – Anuário de Filosofía, 45 (1999) 1-33; ID., «Quantified Inference in 16th Century Mexican Logic», Vivarium 39 (2001) 87-118. See also ID., «Extensional Interpretation of General Sentences in 16th Century Ibero-American Logic», Crítica – Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, 13:39 (1981) 45-73; ID., «Extensionalidad en la lógica asertórica y modal de la Nueva España», Analogía – Revista de Filosofía, 1 (1987) 61-67 (on-line).

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(rules of «ascent» or «induction»). In this way they managed to define the forms of «quantification» (standard or not), making use of them in order to study sentences of different kinds, including «relations» and «modalities»41. According to Redmond’s interpretation, Veracruz’s definitions for conjunctions and disjunctions are «truth-functional», so that the truth of a composed proposition depends on the truth or falsity of its parts. (Conditionals would be a topic of their own, because of the different kinds of implication). This interpretation brings the logic of the «Golden Century» closer to the terministic logic of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and, at the same time, to contemporary logic42. Redmond also studied the logical works of the Jesuit Antonio de la Rueda Rubio (1548-1615). After teaching philosophy in Mexico for sixteen years43, Rubio wrote a standard textbook for university classes in logic, divided into three parts. Rubio’s Commentarii in universam Aristotelis dialecticam, which was first published in 1603 and by 1641 had been printed in eighteen editions, in seven of which it was called the Logica mexicana, eventually became a manual of logic at the Universidad de Alcalá44. Moreover, four works by Rubio on natural philosophy saw more 41

See, for example, W. B. REDMOND, «Modal Logic in 16th Century Mexico», Crítica – Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, 15:43 (1983) 31-49; ID., «La inferencia cuantificada en la lógica mexicana del siglo XVI», pp. 1-33; ID., «Quantified Inference in 16th Century Mexican Logic», pp. 87-118. 42 See, for example, W. B. REDMOND, «Formal Logic in New Spain: The Work of Fray Alonso», International Philosophical Quarterly, 19 (1979) 331-351; ID., «Logic in New Spain», The Review of Metaphysics, 33 (1979) 220-221; ID., «La suposición y el ascenso / descenso en Alonso de la Veracruz», Revista de filosofía (México), 15:42 (1982) 349-393. See also M. BEUCHOT, Antología de fray Alonso de la Vera Cruz, Universidad Michoacana de San Nicolás de Hidalgo, Morelia 1988. W. B. REDMOND, La lógica del Siglo de Oro. Una introducción histórica a la lógica, Eunsa, Pamplona 2002, wrote a textook of logic or of the «lógica del Siglo de Oro», the central theme of which is the «extensional logic of identity»; in which utterances or statements such that a property is predicated of a thing or of a subject, such as ‘John is a human being’, are equivalent to «sets of identity orations», such as ‘John is this human being’, referring to things and only indirectly to properties; see BEUCHOT, Antología de fray Alonso de la Vera Cruz, pp. 13-14; REDMOND, La lógica del Siglo de Oro, pp. 16-17, affirms that the details of the logic that he exposes are found in the works of Vera Cruz. 43 He arrived to Mexico in 1576, when he was 28 years old. 44 See W. B. REDMOND, «La Lógica mexicana de Antonio Rubio: Una nota històrica», Diánoia – Anuário de Filosofia, 28 (1982) 309-330. Antonio Rubio studied in that university. After having being examined by a committee of seven rigorous

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than 35 editions. Rubio’s work on metaphysics was never published and today is thought to be lost. In toto, his works received more than 50 editions and were published in at least six different European countries. Redmond showed how original Rubio’s understanding of logic was, concerning its nature as a science, its object and also the status of logical entities. Logic is a «system of axioms» that includes terms, sentences, inferences, etc., in a necessary structure. It is unique as a science, for its object is the same as the object of every other science, and logic itself has no object45. The «logical entities» that Rubio considers are «relations» and «converse relations», or «construction» and «analysis». In «construction» one moves from terms to inferences to the edifice of a system; in «analysis» the movement is the reverse from the system to the terms. A system is made of inferences, inferences of affirmations, etc. «Relations» and «converse relations» can be exposed in the subject and the predicate of sentences; the latter is the relation of «being affirmed of», the former is the converse relation of «being that of which something is affirmed». Logic studies these relations and identifies them in scientific contexts. Science and logic have different kinds of properties. For Rubio, logical properties are «second intentions»; indeed they are entia rationis («mental constructs») that apply to things only insofar as they are known. Logical properties of a higher level do not really apply to things; logic studies those properties and attributes them to essences and properties that other sciences (concerned with the world as such) pursue46. Redmond and Beuchot laid a strong foundation for the study of philosophy in New Spain (Mexico)47. The state of research concerning the teachers in the area, his textbook became, by university decree, an obligatory text for all professors of logic in that institution. 45 See Cf. W. B. REDMOND, «Lógica y ciencia en la Logica mexicana de Rubio», Quipu – Revista Latinoamericana de Historia de las Ciencias y la Tecnología, 1 (1984) 55-82. 46 See REDMOND, «Latin America, Colonial Thought in», pp. 422-423; ID., «Relations and 16th Century Mexican Logic», Crítica – Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, 22:65 (1990) 23-41. 47 See, for example, M. BEUCHOT, Filósofos dominicos novohispanos: Entre sus colegios y la universidad, UNAM, Ciudad de México 1987; ID., Estudios de historia y de filosofía en el México colonial, Instituto de Investigaciones Bibliográficas de la UNAM, Ciudad de México 1991; ID., Historia de la filosofía en el México colonial, Herder, Barcelona 1996 (English: The History of Philosophy in Colonial Mexico, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 1998).

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study of philosophy in the colonial universities and institutions in other parts of South America is inferior48. On the whole, the inventory of Latin American philosophical works has not been analyzed, and there are no general expositions of colonial Scholastic philosophy. There are, however, many valuable things to be studied, for example, the logic of the Franciscan Jerónimo de Valera (1568-1625), published in Peru 1610 (Commentarii ac quaestiones in universam Aristotelis ac Subtilis Doctoris Ioannis Duns Scoti logicam), the first philosophical book ever published in South America49. Peru was the site of the first university in the Southern Hemisphere (today Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos in Lima) founded by decree of the emperor Charles V on 12 May 1551. Other important examples are the Peruvian Jesuits Alonso Peñafiel (1593-1657), Nicolás de Olea (16351705)50 and José de Aguilar (1652-1708), who published courses on logic, natural philosophy and metaphysics. These Jesuits were clearly engaged in dialogue with authors who taught in Iberian universities. Many of these works were edited in Europe and therefore had some influence on the continent. In terms of the influence of European ideas that received a special treatment in the colonies, Redmond emphasized the logical and metaphy48

Exceptions, though in the end still modest in scope, are M. BEUCHOT – G. M. ARGOTE, La filosofía en la América Colonial, Ed. El Búho, Bogotá 1996, and W. B. REDMOND, La lógica en el Virreinato del Perú, Fondo de Cultura Económica, Lima 1998. 49 About this, see also V. S. CÉSPEDES AGÜERO, «Lógica in via scoti de Jerónimo de Valera (1568-1625)», Logos Latinoamericano, 5 (2000) 12 pp. (on-line); R. H. PICH, «Notas sobre Jerónimo Valera e suas obras sobre lógica», Cauriensia, 6 (2011) 169-202; ID., «Notas sobre a Scholastica colonialis e Jerónimo Valera (1568-1625)», in A. BAVARESCO – M. G. VILLANOVA – T. V. RODRIGUES (orgs.), Projetos de Filosofia II, Edipucrs, Porto Alegre 2012, pp. 172-203; ID., «Scholastica colonialis: Notes on Jerónimo Valera’s (1568-1625) Life, Work, and Logic», Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale, 54 (2012) 65-107; ID., «Jerónimo Valera’s (1568-1625) Scotistic Account on the Nature and Properties of Logic», Mediaevalia – Textos e Estudos, 31 (2012) 187-234. 50 See Nicholas de Olea, Summa tripartita Scholasticae Philosophiae sive cursus philosophicus triennalis, in logicam, physicam et metaphysicam Aristotelis, Pars Prima in Logicam, Iosephus de Contreras (Regius Limanus Typographus), Lima 1693; Id., Summa tripartita Scholasticae Philosophiae sive cursus philosophicus triennalis, in logicam, physicam et metaphysicam Aristotelis, Prima Secundae in Physicam, sive in octo libros physicorum, Iosephus de Contreras (Regius Limanus Typographus), Lima 1694.

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sical theories proposed by the remarkable Peruvian thinker Juan de Espinoza Medrano (ca. 1632-1688) or «El Lunarejo», Professor of Philosophy and Theology in Cusco (Peru). Born in the village of Calcauso (Province of Aymaraes), Espinoza Medrano studied in the Seminário de San Antonio Abad del Cusco51. Engaged both in literary52 and philosophical debates, he was eloquent in Latin, in which he wrote philosophic works (e.g., the Philosophia thomistica seu Cursus philosophicus, published in Rome in 1688), as well as in Spanish and quechua, in which languages he composed dramas, some of which concerning biblical themes and stories, and was a distinguished preacher53. Medrano’s developed a «greater» logic (dialectics) and a «minor» logic (corresponding to the summulae), written in order to defend traditional Thomistic views and in candid refusal of innovative positions advanced in seventeenth-century Spanish philosophy. In the end, his logic represents a particular defense of «Platonic ideas» concerning the problem of universals. In his logical writings, he opposed a relatively well-known group of Iberian Jesuit schoolmen, who had shown nominalistic tendencies in their metaphysical views. «El Lunarejo» believed that his arguments finally put an end to nominalism, which historically was itself in a fourth cycle of revival54. The «problem of universals» concerns the explanation of the nature of the nonindividual characteristics of things55. For Espinoza Medrano, Thomists and Scotists should be viewed as «Peripatetics,» for they adopt (different) forms of realism, according to which «universals» or «essences» are aspects of extramental reality. Peripatetics usually reject Platonism, seeing in it a doctrine that advances the thesis that universals or «ideas» exist apart from particular things. Espinoza Medrano makes the effort of assimilating Plato’s «idea» into the Aristotelian-Scholastic «essence». By investigating what realists understood about «essence», 51

The Seminario San Antonio Abad del Cusco was founded in 1598. Under its influence was founded in 1692 the Universidad San Antonio Abad del Cusco, but both institutions set totally apart in 1863 as a consequence of the politics of the postindependence period. 52 In 1662 he wrote a passionate defence of the Cordoban poet Luis de Góngora. 53 See REDMOND, La lógica en el Virreinato del Perú, pp. 19-23. 54 Ibid., pp. 46, 107-108, 109 sqq. 55 See REDMOND, «Latin America, Colonial Thought in», pp. 423-424; ID., La lógica en el Virreinato del Perú, pp. 109 sqq.

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Espinoza Medrano found common views accepted by them and reached a realist definition that is valid for both Thomists and Scotists. For them universals have real essential being, they do not change, are non-temporal and non-spatial, they differ from concrete things as well as from God. Espinoza Medrano questions then neo-Platonic and Aristotelian accounts of Plato’s ideas, i.e., that ideas are an aspect of God’s essence or else are self-existing and separate from things56. In order to make credible Plato’s understanding of the object of knowledge, Espinoza Medrano had no choice but to describe ideas in the way that Peripatetics understand essences. Plato, then, is said to have included in his notion of ideas something akin to what Aristotelians affirmed about essences; Espinoza Medrano’s exegesis of Plato leaves open the discussion about the separate existence of ideas. Espinoza Medrano’s account has similarities with the views of such authors as Dominic of Flanders O.P. (ca. 1425-1479, a commentator of Thomas Aquinas) and Francisco de Araújo O.P. (15801664)57. The background of this logical-metaphysical conception of essences has not yet been fully studied in respect of the history of Baroque Scholasticism58. For Redmond, the essences described by Espinoza Medrano, who was fully conscious of their ambiguous and diminished ontological status, do not differ significantly from the «abstract entities» of twentieth-century metaphysics59.

3. Second Scholasticism in Brazil? On the one hand, it is fair to say that, at the institutional level at least, the reception of Scholastic thought in Brazil was less intense. On 56

ID., La lógica en el Virreinato del Perú, pp. 120 sqq. Ibid., pp. 122 sqq. 58 See also W. B. REDMOND, «Juan de Espinosa Medrano: Sobre la naturaleza de los universales», Humanidades (Universidad Católica del Perú), 3 (1969) 131-185; ID., «La naturaleza de la lógica según Espinosa Medrano», Humanidades (Universidad Católica del Perú), 4 (1970) 241-294; ID., «Latin American Colonial Philosophy: The Logic of Espinosa Medrano», The Americas – Academy of American Franciscan History, 30 (1974) 475-503. 59 See REDMOND, «Latin America, Colonial Thought in», pp. 424-425; see also ID., La lógica en el Virreinato del Perú, pp. 329 sqq., and ID., «El Lunarejo on Abstract Entities», Concordia – Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 20 (1991) 91-98. 57

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the other hand, the history of scholastic philosophy in Brazil has been studied little, or at least it has not been studied systematically in the perspective of an exchange of ideas and of current Scholastic debates in Iberian centers of learning, especially at the Universities of Coimbra and Évora. The reverse of this could of course reveal a different view about philosophical ideas taught in the Jesuit Colleges of colonial Brazil, even on the simple base of the existing catalogue of remaining works so far60 – although for the purpose of registring historical productions in philosophy and theology by Scholastic thinkers in Brazil it is necessary to expand the knowledge about curricula, treatises, and theses (especialy in manuscript form) still to be found in Brazil and around the world (above all in Portuguese libraries) and for the first time inventoried61. Truly, scholasticism in Brazil will be a particular feature of the project Scholastica colonialis. This will be accomplished in close co-operation with investigators who currently explore the vast domain of Second Scholasticism in Portugal, and above all the legacy of the «Jesuit» scholasticism in the Iberian Peninsula. There is in Brazil a history of Jesuit schools that followed the orientation of the Universities of Coimbra and Évora and mirror in their curricula, among other things, the influence of the Cursus Conimbricensis62. One relevant aspect of the modest development of Baroque Scholasticism in colonial Brazil is the fact that no university was established in the country by Portuguese authorities before 180863, in the period when Brazil (in this case, in the capital of Rio de Janeiro) was the seat of the Portuguese crown, which abandoned Portugal in face of the threat by the armies of Napoleon I. Traditionally Brazilian students who wanted to obtain university degrees were expected to enroll in the Universities of Coimbra and Évora. 60

A fine example of this is the excellent work by Paulo Roberto Margutti Pinto, partially reacting against a traditional historiographical bias in the country concerning the merits of «Jesuit» Scholastic thought in Brazil; see P. MARGUTTI, História da filosofia do Brasil – O período colonial (1500-1822), Edições Loyola, São Paulo 2013. 61 See also L. F. M. RODRIGUES, «As “livrarias” dos jesuítas no Brasil Colonial, segundo os documentos do Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu», Cauriensia, 6 (2011) 275-302. 62 See, for example, S. LEITE, Breve História da Companhia de Jesus no Brasil 1549-1760, Livraria Apostolado da Imprensa, Braga s.d., pp. 39-58. 63 This subject is touched by L. F. MEDEIROS RODRIGUES in his contribution to this volume.

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If religious orders indeed founded schools and seminaries in colonial Brazil, this meant only that students of theology could follow in them a curriculum based entirely – in what concerns philosophy and theology teaching – on the model approved in Coimbra64. At any rate, there is a recognition that the sixteenth century had a place of excellence in the history of Portuguese philosophy, following Portugal’s expansion in commerce and trading as a conquering nation overseas. Truly, humanism experienced a significant reception in Portugal since the foundation of the Royal School of Humanities at the University of Coimbra in 1547. Only eight years later this same school was transferred to the Jesuits, namely to the Collegium Conimbricense65. From 1555 onwards, not least because the entire educational system fell into the hands of the Society of Jesus, there was a powerful revival of Scholastic thought in Portugal. Moreover, indirectly related to the success of the School of Sagres in the technique of navigation and with so many overseas expeditions, the sixteenth century also marked a milestone in the study of the natural sciences in Portugal. Furthermore, those who gave shape to Baroque Scholasticism in Portugal were also active in Spanish universities, and conversely after the unification of Spain and Portugal in 1580, several Jesuit teachers from Spain were sent to the University of Coimbra; this continued through the seventeenth century, so that Portuguese and Spanish scholars together constituted the «schools» of Salamanca and Coimbra66. One should remember that the Cursus Conimbricensis, which brought Scholastic thought into dialogue with early modern philosophy, was conceived in terms of the ideas of such leading Jesuit Scholastics as Pedro da Fonseca (1528-1599), Luis de Molina (1535-1600) and Francisco Suárez (15481617)67. 64

For this see, for example, J. JAIME, História da filosofia no Brasil, Editora Vozes: Petrópolis, 4. Vols., 1997-2002, and also A. PAIM, História das ideias filosóficas no Brasil, UEL, Londrina 19975 (orig. 1967). 65 See F. G. STURM, «Brazil, Philosophy in», in E. CRAIG (ed.), The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Routledge, London – New York, Vol. 2, 1998, p. 8. 66 See CANTEÑS, «The Rights of the American Indians», p. 23. 67 See, among other studies by him, M. S. de CARVALHO, «Aos ombros de Aristóteles (Sobre o não-aristotelismo do primeiro curso aristotélico dos Jesuítas de Coimbra)», Revista Filosófica de Coimbra, 16 (2007) 291-308. The author is the editor of the Commentarii Colegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu.

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Important figures of Brazilian Baroque literature such as Manuel da Nóbrega68, José de Anchieta and António Vieira69 should be investigated anew in the specific perspective of the Second Scholasticism in sixteenthcentury Iberian schools. As an example, one can mention the philosophical reasons that established the priority for the mission among South American Indians within the Society of Jesus since 1548-1549. Without doubt, there was a theological and philosophical consensus, crystallized in the papal Bull Sublimis Deus in 1537 that the natives should be treated as full human beings, so that there were no clear reasons that allowed them to be deprived of their goods and possessions. After that time, debates on the humanity and the basic rights of the Indians was supposed to be resolved – within the Church at least – on the basis of natural law theory. But when in 1556-1557 Manuel da Nóbrega (1517-1570), the Superior General of the Jesuit missions in the New World, published his Diálogo sobre a conversão dos gentios, the central question of which was ‘Do the native peoples have souls like ours?’, such topics as slavery, sovereignty of land and territory, nomadism, cannibalism, the differences among indigenous ‘nations’, acceptable models of social institutions, and the natural basis of ethics are evident and were (still) on the foreground of debates in the Scholastic philosophical literature of those times70. According to a thesis characteristic of the school of Francisco de Vitoria, Manuel da Nóbrega ratified the equality of all human beings and explained the differences between native peoples and Europeans mainly in terms of educational, circumstantial and environmental contingent conditions. How much the works by José de Anchieta (1534-1597) and above all by António Vieira (1608-1697) should be read in the light of Iberian Scholastic culture is something that must be clarified in future researches71. 68

On Manuel da Nóbrega and his role in juridical-philosophical debates in colonial Brazil, see also recently A. C. STORCK, «The Jesuits and the Indigenous Slavery: A Debate over Voluntary Slavery in Brazilian Colonial Period», Mediaevalia – Textos e Estudos, 31 (2012) 69-83. 69 On António Vieira, see in particular the two studies offered in this volume, by L. E. HINRICHSEN and É. VILAS BOAS REIS. 70 See Manuel da Nóbrega, Diálogo sobre a conversão dos gentios (1556/1557); see also Id., Tratado Contra a Antropofagia (1559), and Id., Caso de Consciência sobre a Liberdade dos Índios (1567). 71 Brazilian colonial thought, with roots in Baroque Scholasticism, was also represented in an interesting way by Nuno Marques Pereira (1652-1735). His

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Concluding Remarks From a chronological point of view, the perceptible frontier of the history of colonial thought seems to be reached at the point when authors and texts bespeak a clear assimilation of modern philosophy, in contrast with Scholastic philosophy. In this sense a transitional eclecticism is wellrepresented by the thought of the Franciscan José Elias del Carmen Pereira (1760-1825), who was active in Córdoba (Argentina)72, where the Jesuits had founded na university in 1621, and thereafter had taught an Iberian type of Scholastic philosophy. In Córdoba the Jesuits taught the logic of Antonio Rubio73. Around the middle of the eighteenth century, however, modernist and anti-Scholastic theories as well as modern science, were Compêndio narrativo do peregrino da América, which was reedited several times since its publication in 1728, contains reflections about monastic spirituality and the transitory place of human beings in the world. Similarly to what happened in other colonies in the eighteenth century, in Brazil Illuminist ideas appeared soon before the reformation in education that gave rise to the emergence of universities at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Illuminist and modern ideas also found fertile soil in private societies or associations (especially through the Academy of Sciences of Rio de Janeiro). In Portugal since the second half of the eighteenth century, radical changes in the curriculum of the University of Coimbra were based on Illuminist ideas. This curricular «revolution» had significant educational and political effects in Brazil, as is apparent in writings by such thinkers as Tomaz Antônio Gonzaga (1744-1810) and Francisco Luís Leal (1740-1820). 72 We must keep in mind that the Jesuits in 1767 were suppressed throughout Europe and in the colonies; after that date the so-called «Franciscan age» began at the University of Córdoba, which extended from the expulsion of the Jesuits until 1808. In this context, modern ideas such as those of Descartes were critically discussed. In the thought of the Franciscan José Elias del Carmen Pereira, expressed in his course on natural philosophy or Physica generalis (1784) that survives in manuscripts, it is evident that although he uses a Scholastic vocabulary, his worldview is modern; see REDMOND, «Latin America, Colonial Thought in», pp. 424-425; see also J. C. ZURETTI, «La crisis de la filosofía en el siglo XVIII y los autores conocidos en la Universidad de Córdoba», Estudios, (1947) 128-134; ID., «Fray Elías del Carmen Pereyra, profesor de la Universidad de Córdoba», Itinerarium, 4:11 (1947) 353-371; C. LÉRTORA MENDOZA, «Filosofía en Córdoba colonial. Bibliografía y bibliotecas», in M. ASPELL – C. A. PAGE (eds.), La Biblioteca Jesuítica de la Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, Ed. Eudecor, Córdoba 2000, pp. 103-122. 73 See, for example, J. C. T. ESTRADA, «Argentina, Philosophy in», in E. CRAIG (ed.), The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Routledge, London – New York, Vol. 1, 1998, p. 375.

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being taught74, although in several instances –notably in the Physica generalis (1784) by Carmen Pereira – one may observe the tendency of assimilating modern thought into a Scholastic framework. Because the sources of Scholasticism must first be discovered and surveyed, the project Scholastica colonialis cannot at this point have a specific philosophical theme. The project’s immediate order of research seems clear: (1) There is a need to revise, expand and complete, according to the highest scientific standards, the inventory of colonial Scholastic literature. The project’s long-term aim is to provide a complete catalogue of these materials. As stated this will be executed in co-operation among several research groups – above all – in Latin America, Spain and Portugal. In Spain, moreover, there is a need to prepare a catalogue of literature concerning colonial thought written in the period of Second Scholasticism, preserved for example in the libraries in Salamanca and the archives of the University of Alcalá (now preserved at the Universidad Complutense in Madrid). (2) The research projects on colonial Scholasticism already accomplished by Walter Redmond75, Mauricio Beuchot76, Celina Ana Lértora Mendoza77, José Carlos Ballón Vargas78 and others must be carefully revised. How were they conceived? What did they achieve? (3) It 74

See also RESTREPO, «Colonial Thought», pp. 48 sqq. See again PICH, «Recepção e desenvolvimento da Escolástica Barroca na América Latina», pp. 1-22. 76 See again PICH, «Antecedentes à investigação filosófico-historiográfica da Escolástica Colonial», pp. 37-64. 77 See again CULLETON, «Antecedentes a la investigación filosófico-historiográfica de la escolástica colonial», pp. 23-35. 78 See J. C. BALLÓN VARGAS (ed. and coord.), La complicada historia del pensamiento filosófico peruano, siglos XVII y XVIII (Selección de textos, notas y estudios), Universidad Científica del Sur – Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos / Ediciones del Vicerrectorado Académico, Lima, Tomos I-II (671 pp. and 767 pp., respectively), 2011; see also J. C. BALLÓN VARGAS, «Introducción», in J. C. BALLÓN VARGAS (ed. and coord.), La complicada historia del pensamiento filosófico peruano, siglos XVII y XVIII (Selección de textos, notas y estudios), Universidad Científica del Sur – Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos / Ediciones del Vicerrectorado Académico, Lima, Tomo I, 2011, pp. 13-137. A short description of these two volumes edited by Ballón Vargas is offered by R. H. PICH – A. S. CULLETON – M. LÁZARO PULIDO, «Introducción: Ideas sin fronteras en los límites de las ideas – Scholastica colonialis: status quaestionis», in R. H. PICH – A. S. CULLETON – M. LÁZARO PULIDO (orgs.), Ideas sin fronteras en los límites de las ideas – Scholastica colonialis: status quaestionis, Imprenta Kadmos – Ed. Cáceres, Salamanca – Cáceres 2012, pp. 20-21. 75

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is important to investigate the history of universities in Iberian colonies79, seeking to discover the characteristics of the teaching of philosophy, curricula and provenance of the teachers (Who came from where? Who studied where?), so that the context of the intellectual influence of European centers of learning can better be understood. (4) Finally, we must lay the foundation for the production of critical editions of original works and the production of secondary literature concerning colonial Scholastic thought. In its effort to document the continuatio philosophiae Mediae Aetatis, the project will seek close cooperation with select American and European institutions. Finally, it is only on the basis of steps (1) to (4) that the history of «Western» philosophy in Latin America, together with its merits, weaknesses and perennial potential, at least in what concerns the period from the sixteenth to the beginning of the nineteenth century, can be written according to a scientific methodology. So far such a scientific desideratum has not been yet achieved even to a short extent. ** The first study in this collective work highlights the life, works and political thought of, perhaps, the first «philosopher» in Latin America in the «Western» sense at least, namely Alonso de Vera Cruz O.S.A. (15071584), who in the period 1554-1557 prepared the first course books on the Liberal Arts in the then recently founded University of Mexico. J. RAMIRO PODETTI, in «Law and Politics in Sixteenth-Century Mexico: Re-Reading Alonso de Veracruz», analyzes above all Vera Cruz’s De dominio infidelio et iusto bello, which is actually a relectio of the Aquinas Theological Chair at the Mexican University. For the author, the Augustinian’s texts bear resemblance to those of the Bartolomé de Las Casas, because of his deep interest on the social and political problems of the sixteenthcentury world and militant calling to act towards solutions. If it is true that Vera Cruz’s De dominio is a sharp analysis of most important human situations experienced in America during the first century of the Spanish 79 In this regard, steps have been done and reported, above all in the sense of bringing the history of universities and schools of religious Orders in several important colonial towns forth, especially in Peru and Chile, giving particular emphasis to the mapping of relevant colonial libraries and archives, in PICH – CULLETON, «Scholastica colonialis – Reception and Development of Baroque Scholasticism in Latin-American Countries, 16th-18th Centuries. The Two First Years of a Project», 21-42.

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«conquest» and imperial intentions, J. Ramiro Podetti makes the effort to reconstruct the context that helps to understand the particular sense of the work. Especially, the «political capacities of the natives» were in debate – and to that issue Vera Cruz will explicitly defend the view that the natives had the capacity of vivir en policía or «to live politically». And as a consequence another contextual aspect of Vera Cruz’s treatise is the process of progressive permutation of the original regime of «lordships» by the municipal res-publica organization, i.e. the República de Indios. In this last case, we see the assumption that the natives could live politically and were stimulated to gather in the «towns of Indians» (pueblos de indios). Together with the República de Españoles, so the thesis, those «republics» formed the «social basis of the multicultural Reinos de Indias». In fact, the author shows that Alonso de Vera Cruz’s thought constitutes an intellectual foundation of this last and new form of multicultural political organization. In a contribution to the philosophy of economics in Baroque Colonial Scholasticism, i.e. in «The Moral Dimension of Economics: The Scholastic Doctrine of Value in Tomás de Mercado and Juan de Lugo», A. S. CULLETON discusses the intricate relationship between moral theology and economics in the Scholasticism developed in the Spanish colonies. In particular, the author focuses his study on the theory of just price of Tomás de Mercado O.P. (1223-1575) and Juan de Lugo (1583-1660). Although the topic of just price is not new if compared to treatments of it in traditional scholastic moral theology, we must say that both authors treated the theme in a clear philosophical manner, proposing a particular form of our practical rationality, that is a conciliation of economic reality and a political morality that they claimed to be universal in scope. After that, L. E. BACIGALUPO, in «The Reasonable Ways of Probabilism – A Briefing on its Essentials», explains his agreement with R. A. Maryks’s thesis that «The marriage between rhetoric and casuistry comes to light from the epistemological foundations of the Ciceronian rhetoric – the theory of probability». The author develops the view that «Jesuit spirituality» has particular «epistemological foundations», being one of the most important aspects of it the application of the rhetorical principle that discourse should be «prudently adjusted to circumstances». If «casuistry» basically refers to «a morally neutral accommodation of the mind to concrete circumstances», Cicero’s conceptions on rhetorics were important to their views of epistemology and «art of accommodation» – in fact Cicero helped

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the Jesuits to restore the place of rhetorics as a part of a human rational education program. Probability on its turn has its origins, so the author, in jurisprudence, according to Cicero, where probability appears as one of the six epistemological foundations of a «conjectural cause». It is defined by Cicero through its function, for through probablity «a conjecture about a deed is proven by persuasively showing a motive and the way of life of the person who carried out the deed». What matters is «the quality of the conjecture», which can be described as «probable». Under that property, the conjecture turns to be a motive for «sustaining one opinion and not another with regard to an action». This motive is to be found «in the willingness of certain authorities to sustain it», and such a willingness «in turn implies that it has intrinsic probability or reasonableness». Since practical beliefs or decisions to be taken and courses of human moral conduct are made of opinions, we can understand how important the investigation of opinions for and against a given practical belief, in order to establish both its external and internal probability, became for the Jesuits. This brings the author back to rhetoric, for rhetoric is the art of persuading people to embrace «a probable opinion against the probability of the opposite or the contradictory». Beginning a sequence of two studies on the Jesuit theologian, missionary, remarkable preacher, and master of the Portuguese language – António Vieira S.J. (1608-1697) –, L. E. HINRICHSEN, in «The Art of Homiletics According to António Vieira – A Study of his Sexagesima Sermon or On the Power and the Reach of the Word», analyses a sermon which Vieira chose to introduce the publication of his Homilies. It is a sermon about sermons, a sermon on the art of homiletics in itself, and as such a contribution to a theory of Christian rhetorics, an area of theological, philosophical and linguistic interest within the scope of Iberian and Colonial Scholasticism. Vieira makes an examination, there, of the structure of homilies and discusses their efficacy, and he affirms that, by refraining from offering a false erudition and by supressing any form of vanity, the preacher should sow «the Word of God». The sermon must contain as much as possible «true conversation» in order to announce the «Word». The science of preaching brings as presuppositions the «person» and the «knowledge» of the preacher, the «subject matter» of the discourse, as well as the «style» and the «voice» of the preacher. But the effectiveness of preaching will always depend on the announcement of Christ. The response of listeners towards the acceptance of the Gospel, this is at the

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end a movement of grace, which acts upon the hearts. After that, in «The Philosophical and Theological Formation of António Vieira», É. V. B. REIS brings a historical contextualization of Father António Vieira, describing the characteristics of the Society of Jesus and its founder, Ignácio de Loyola, in order to understand the educational backgroud in which Vieira grew up as a religious person. The Ratio Studiorum is mentioned as a fundamental and official document for Jesuit teaching and learning of philosophy and theology. The author makes the attempt of understanding António Vieira and his background by analyzing two sermons, namely Sermon on the Ash Wednesday (1672) and Semon of Saint Augustin (1648), where Vieira reveals his dialogue with the philosophical tradition and Christian theology, bringing moreover, and again, the main tenets of his particular and highly sophisticated Christian rhetorics. In a further and third study on Jesuit philosophical thought in colonial Brazil, L. F. M. RODRIGUES, in «The «Subterranean University» of the Jesuits Imprisoned in São Julião da Barra and the (Philosophical) Formation of the Society of Jesus’ Missionaries in the Eighteenth Century», puts as his main purpose to analyse the «resistance process» of the Jesuits to the defamatory anti-Jesuit campaign promoted by the European courts in general and the intellectual society. The author mainly aims to illustrate the resistance of the Jesuits imprisoned in São Julião da Barra, who «founded» a Jesuitic «subterranean university» in prison, which showed the solid formation of the missionaries of the Company in the eighteenth century. L. M. F. RODRIGUES mentions that António Vieira, in one of his exhortations, described Grão-Pará and all the territory of the Amazon River as a «university of souls». Through this analogy, the author believes that Vieira somehow anticipated the foundation of the «Course of the Arts» (Curso de Artes) in the State of Maranhão and Pará in 1688. The course began when attempts of founding a Jesuit university in Brazil had failed. The course applied in the schools of the company was subject to the legislation of the Northern state, which differed from the one in Brazil, but was subject to the same internal rules of the Ratio Studiorum and to the external rules of the Statutes of the University of Coimbra. According to L. F. M. RODRIGUES, this was the legal arrangement for the development of the Philosophy course until the Conclusiones Philosophicae, in the golden period of 1730, with the Jesuit master Father Bento da Fonseca. The essay also shows how the Society of Jesus adopted in their schools and «colleges» a scholastic system which reflected the Aristotelian-

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Thomistic studies in the manner of the Conimbricenses, with a content of dogmatic nature. This was done in order to meet the needs of the Jesuits’ education and mitigate an insufficient formation of the regular and the diocesan clergy in the colony. Giving start to a sequence of two studies on Francisco Suárez S. J. (1548-1617), Paula OLIVEIRA E SILVA, in «Suárez’s Criticism of Aquinas’ Taxonomy on Emotions: A Step to Modernity?», tries methodologically to «demystify» texts and authors, here especially Francisco Suárez, i.e. to dissociate him «from preconceived mental structures» of current historiography of philosophy, although defending the influence of Iberian Jesuit Scholastic on the «mental framework» of European ideas in their times. She comparatively analyses and characterizes comments on Aquinas’ Summa theologiae by authors associated to the University of Salamanca – in this case Bartolomé de Medina’s and Francisco Suárez’s commentaries on Summa theologiae IaIIae, qq. 22-48, who show important disagreements on the doctrine of emotions. In particular, P. OLIVEIRA E SILVA exposes provisional results of the study carried out on Suárez’s De passionibus, which is part of his commentary on Aquinas’ text just mentioned. According to her, Suárez’s treatise is not in itself highly revealing, especially when compared with his commentary on Aristotle’s De anima. But it contains passages that are helpful to confirm doctrines of the Doctor Eximius on human nature. This is the case when we talk about Suárez’s exhaustive review on Aquinas’ taxonomy of emotions and his choice for the division proposed by the Scotistic authors. The author pursues a clear view by Suárez of «the structure of life», where the literature both contemporary and influent on the Jesuit thinker, both philosophical (by Luis Vives’ De anima) and medical (Girolamo Frascatoro’s works), is also an object of inspection. In «Metaphysica sive theologia naturalis – The Evidence for the Existence of God by Francisco Suárez», Á. PONCELA GONZÁLEZ focuses on Suárez’s conception of God as primum acsummum ens, which is included in the «object of the metaphysics». Concerning these aspects of his metaphysics, the fundamental criticism to Suárez uses to be directed to the «entitative character» of the conceived «being», and the actual place the first entity should be located. For the author, a satisfactory answer on these questions demands an investigation of each of the 54 Disputationes metaphysicae, with the aim of forging an independent and adequate understanding of the reason for the objectivity of «entity» and its mode

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of attribution to the «first entity». Á. PONCELA GONZÁLEZ wants to achieve an answer to those quaestiones disputatae by means of presenting some «proemial moments» of interpretation. Francisco Suárez’s conception of metaphysics as natural theology contains reasons that can persuade why God can really be included in the metaphysical science. And, necessarily, this investigation must focus on the arguments for the existence of God. Clearly, such a metaphysical study of divine being raises the question about the limits and possibilities of human knowledge. In a section with two studies on logical themes by Latin American Scholastic thinkers, in the first essay, «Notes concerning the Ontological Status of the Objective Concept of the ens rationis in Antonio Rubio’s Teaching», by S. R. D’ONOFRIO, the main topic of analysis is the scholastic backgroud of Descartes’s view of the mental status of ideas «regardless of their possible correspondence to extramental reality». Truly, one must take into account Suárez’s epistemology, asking whether his «objective concepts» can match with Descartes’s «objective realities» or ideas that are ontologically independent mental entities. This would perhaps mean that Suárez opens the door to a «mentalist ontology», putting the bases to overthrow a «realistic epistemology» and promoting a form of «idealism». The author however proposes to examine the question about the mental reality of «ideas» by means of an examination of the entia rationis. This will allow an account of the alleged similarity between objective concepts (Suárez’s tradition) and the objective reality of ideas (Descartes’s point) with reference to the character of entia rationis. For such an appreciation of the ontological status of the entia rationis and the way how it can bring light to question on scholastic sources of Descartes, the author, after characterizing aspects of the discussion by Medieval thinkers and then by Second Scholastic authors, and after emphasizing that the schoolmen never developed properly the specific ontology of mental contents as such, makes the attempt of connecting Descartes’s particular problems and solutions to such an ontology to the views by Antonio de la Rueda Rubio S.J. (15481616) and his explanation of «the mental conception of beings of reason». By so doing, the author follows previous suggestions in the scholarship given by E. J. Ashworth. After her, S. R. D’ONOFRIO restates the topic of the foundation of the objective reality of the Cartesian ideas in the ontology developed by Rubio, focusing more on Rubio’s account of entia rationis. Thus, the goal of the essay is to suggest that Antonio Rubio’s «objective concepts» of beings of reason «constitute a plausible foundation» for

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the explanation of Descartes’s so-called thesis of the «objective reality» attributed to ideas. In «Jerónimo Valera (1568-1625) and his Scotist Account of Universals», R. H. PICH explores one aspect of the reception of Scotus’s thought by the Peruvian Franciscan master of arts, Jerónimo Valera, who, being active in the Convento de San Francisco de Lima from 1588 onwards, during 16 years, was the author of the first philosophical book published in South America, in 1610, i.e. Commentarii ac quaestiones in universam Aristotelis ac subtilissimi Doctoris Ioannis Duns Scoti logicam, Apud Franciscum a Canto. In particular, in Valera’s Commentary ad mentem Scoti on the Isagoge we can see examples of how subjects of metaphysics are treated in Valera’s logical corpus as well, revealing both a deep knowledge of Scotus’s and Scotistic sources and a power of bringing his own contribution to the debates. Although Valera closely follows the order of questions given in John Duns Scotus’s Quaestiones on the Isagoge, his own questions on logical (and metaphysical) matters reveal a different systematization. One of the reasons that explains that is the fact that for the very purpose of writing a Scotist cursus philosophicus Valera had the privilege of discussing in the perspective of the entire work of the Subtle Doctor the topics that appeared originally only in Scotus’s logicalia – not to mention, again, the several previous commentaries by Scotists in the tradition. Accordingly, in the Liber primus of the Commentarii ac quaestiones... Valera divides in his own way the text in distinctions, articles, and questions. If for each distinction he associates questions of the Scotist commentary as a basic reference for the themes of logic that he is elaborating, at any rate his distinctions, his articles and his questions reveal an original appropriation of the topics, where the new methodology and the new concepts of Scotism in 16th-17th centuries will show their potentials. Thematically, R. H. PICH explores one subject of the long Distinction II of the Liber Primus, which deals with «The nature of the universal in common». Doubtless, it is a quaestio famosa to be found in the Introduction by Porphyrius and in all generations of commentaries on it. Here, however, it is fundamental to realize that it illustrates the structural innovation by Jerónimo Valera, that is of visualizing the Scotist corpus as a whole when writing on logic, as well as a room for reviewing characteristic traces of Scotism in 16th-17th centuries and the attempts to systematizing Scotus’s positions in philosophy by means of separating them from views of Thomas Aquinas and Thomism. After all, in the first of the five articles

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of Distinction II Valera discusses the solemn topic of the «real universal» or rather of the «common nature» (natura communis), exploring (in eight questions) the many sides of «the nature in the thing» which is «fundament» and «subject» of universality. M. LÁZARO PULIDO, in «Notes on Scotism in the Iberian Peninsula: The Case of Fr. Mateo de Sosa O.F.M. (17th Century)», presents one of the most important Scotist figures in the Iberian Peninsula in the beginning of the 17th century. The Lisbon-borned Franciscan was professor of theology in Salamanca, where he brought revitalization to the interpretation of John Duns Scotus’s thought as a particular means to reinforce the theological identity of the Order. The author offers detailed circumstances of Fr. Mateo de Sosa’a efforts to expand Scotism. In particular, M. LÁZARO PULIDO describes the role of chairs dedicated to Scotus’ doctrine in universities like Salamanca, but much more the return of the Franciscan Order to its own Studies as the place where Franciscan thinkers could above all dedicate to the study and teaching of Scotus based on direct sources. After all, in many cases the corresponding universitary chairs were not occupied by Franciscans, but by other intellectuals without adequate preparation and even will to understand Scotus. In his role of Provincial Minister, Fr. Mateo de Sosa was particular active in promoting the teaching of Scotist doctrine in Colleges of the Order in Spain – as it was particularly the ase in the Colegio de Alba de Tormes. This spirit of renewing Franciscan identity and promoting the teaching of Scotism above all in the renewal of the Studies of the Order helps also to explain the structure of Franciscan institutions of education in the Spanish colonies and vice-royalties, where Scotism was massively furthered as well. Fr. Mateo de Sosa was, besides, an editor of Scotus’s works, characterizing thus the increasing efforts of preparing a first more or less critical edition of his Opera omnia. Moreover, the author describes topics of particular importance in Fr. Mateo de Sosa’s Articulatio et illustratio libri primi Sententiarum Doctoris Subtilissimi I. D. Scoti, the known work of him, in two volumes, in which the thought of Scotus is presented «de forma fiel». In order to offer an example of Scotist studies in the first quarter of the 17th century in the Iberian Peninsula, M. LÁZARO PULIDO details the question «Whether God can be known by man as his ultimate end». We should not forget that in Fr. Mateo de Sosa’s times the question on the knowledge of God as an ultimate end reaches a special moment, due also to the controversies around the doctrine of the De auxiliis and the

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presence of a theologically based anthropological pessimism, especially incarnated in Miguel Bayo and Jansenism. In a quite original essay on the natural sciences in vice-royal Peru, R. J. KATAYAMA OMURA, in «Lords of the Sky: The Chief Cosmographers and the World System in Peruvian Vice-Royalty», explored the role of navigation technique in the exploration and control of the New World by Spaniards. It is no surprise that «navigation charts» and the «study of the sky» played a very important role in the era of deep sea voyaging. The position of the «Chief Navigator» was created by royal decree in Spain – and it seems that Americo Vespucio was the first appointed Chief Navigator, what happened on March 22, 1507. After describing the main functions of the Chief Navigator, the author mentions that the importance of good maps of the new territories and charts of the sea routes also increased, so that the position of «Master of Charts» was created as well. Over time both positions were unified, creating the position of «Chief Cosmographer and Master of Charts». The techniques and knowledge presupposed in both functions demanded investiment in education, so that an Art of Navigation and Cosmography Course was created in Seville in 1552. Since the demand for skilled navigators increased also in America, in Vice-royalty of Peru the position of «Chief Cosmographer of the Kingdom» was created in the 17th Century, having the same purpose as its Hispanic counterpart. At a certain point, the position was incorporated into that of Principal Professor of Mathematics, because of the obvious theoretical connections between navigation, astronomy and mathematical calculation. It is precisely in this context of the study of cosmography lato sensu that academic researches on astronomy and world system had place in Peru, having as source especially a kind of annual report of cosmography knowledge, which received several names such as «Lunario: Pronostico de temporales, y accidentes particulares de los astros», «El conocimiento de los tiempos», and later «Almanaque peruano y guía de forasteros». In the last essay of the volume, which can also be viewed as an example of authors and works that both reveal some presence of scholastic ideas and point to the transition from the mental framework of modern scholasticism to characteristic ideas of the framework of enlightenment, A. VIAL, in «The Philosophical Eclecticism of Juan Egaña Risco (17681836): A Comment to his Tractatus de re logica», presents an intellectual figure essential in the independence process in Chile, first because of his active participation in the early years of the just founded «Republic of

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Chile», and second because of his important role in the dissemination of new cultural and educational ideas. In that regard, Juan Egaña Risco can be viewed both as one of the key thinkers of the Chilean revolution and a fundamental Latin American theorist of the period of independence(s). An example of Egaña’s educational and philosophical interests is his Treatise on Logic, published in Latin 1827, which was aimed at students of the newly founded National Institute. This work has, according to A. VIAL, obvious historical importance, and therefore the author tries, by means of explaining its main characteristics, to illuminate a little bit more the philosophical ideas that prevailed in Chile at the time of the Independence. Truly, A. VIAL gives reasons to believe that Juan Egaña’s Tractatus de re logica may be identified within an emergent philosophical movement in Latin America during the late 18th and early 19th century, namely the socalled «eclecticism».

J. RAMIRO PODETTI* LAW AND POLITICS IN SIXTEENTH-CENTURY MEXICO: RE-READING ALONSO DE VERACRUZ Obsecro pie lector, omni deposito affectu, considera qua lege, qua ratione poterat Hispanus qui ad istas appulit terras, armis onustus, aggrediens istos non alias hostes, nec alienam terram occupantes, subiugando pro libitu, petere et vi et violentia sua quaeque pretiosa, et eos exspoliare? Ego non video; ¡fortassis in medio sole decutio! De dominio infidelium et iusto bello, 170

Introduction Four hundred years after Augustinian priest Alonso de Veracruz wrote De dominio infidelium et iusto bello, the Jesuit Ernest Burrus published it as part of his 1968 collection The Writings of Alonso de la Vera Cruz. Veracruz wrote De Dominio as the relectio of the Aquinas Theological Chair at the University of Mexico. Most of the author’s writings saw the light between 1554 and 1557, with several editions afterwards in Spain. These texts were the first course books on the Liberal Arts in the then recently founded Mexican university. Veracruz was thus one of the most relevant intellectuals in the context of the sixteenth-century Hispanic scholarly sphere. Burrus’ translation and fixation of a first complete edition of De dominio stimulated the academic interest in Veracruz’s work. Nowadays there are several books, some doctoral theses and numerous articles that thoroughly analyze his work. The importance of Veracruz’s intellectual corpus, as well as his missionary, academic, religious-governance related, and diplomatic actions make this author resemble Bartolomé de Las Casas. The Augustinian’s texts bear resemblance to those of the bishop of Chiapas because of the deep concern on the problems of his sixteenth-century world *

José Ramiro Podetti, Associate Professor of Philosophy at the Universidad de Montevideo, Prudencio de Pena 2514, Montevideo, Uruguay. [email protected]

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and militant calling in both heavenly and earthly cities. However, in spite of the recent attention, Veracruz’s thought is much less-known than Las Casas’. De dominio’s sharp analysis of situations experienced during the first century of Spanish dominion in America motivates a contextual rereading. My intention in this paper is to retrieve the sense of Veracruz’s work as drawn from its historical moment. Therefore, De dominio can be connected with two aspects of the Mexican and Imperial-Spanish world in which Veracruz conceived it. First, the Augustinian wrote it in a time of social, political and intellectual debate about the political capabilities of the natives. The decade that preceded its writing was stained by the conflicts arisen from the promulgation and partial revocation of the Leyes Nuevas between 1542 and 1546. These laws aimed at reviewing the system of the encomienda and attempted a fairer relationship with the natives. In this context, many thought – and expressed – that the Indians were not able to govern themselves. They were not subjects of rights, and consequently they could be subdued to servitude or even enslaved if they rebelled. Veracruz argued in De dominio – as well as in other texts – in favor of the natives’ capability to vivir en policía – to live politically. He also intellectually undermined doctrines which justified a natural or divine-based Spanish rule of the Indies. As a consequence, De dominio gains contextual relevance in the broader process of the progressive permutation of the original regime of lordships – señoríos y cacicazgos – by the municipal organization known as the República de Indios. This form of social and political organization assumed that the natives could live politically, and stimulated – sometimes forcefully – the natives to gather in towns of Indians (pueblos de indios). Together with the República de Españoles those republics formed the social basis of the multicultural Reinos de Indias (Kingdoms of the Indias). During the first half of the sixteenth century, Spanish Crown’s policies fostered the maintenance of cacicazgos. Among other reasons, they wanted to prevent the monopolization of power by a class of Spanish lords that might contest the Monarchy’s power in the future. The way of averting such a phenomenon was either by maintaining the indigenous lordships, by instituting new ones upon the encomienda, or by allowing Spanish men to wed daughters of caciques without male offspring. This first social and political model holds resemblances with the ones prevalent in Medieval Europe. Its substitution began towards half of the sixteenth century and

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reached a culminating point by the end of the century. Normatively, the change structured upon a wide array of rules that began in 1549. In spite of resembling the medieval transition, it was, in fact, a complex process of social engineering with a strong experimental foundation. The process of transitioning from scattered lordships to municipalurban republics can also be framed within the Euro-Atlantic1 changeover from vassalage to citizenship. This fundamental turnover had numerous consequences for Western history: a particularly important one was the redefinition of social bonds and roles, a process itself still open in the twenty-first century. Writing about vassalage and citizenship does not only suggest thinking about their juridical and political consequences, it also means reflecting upon several representations and self-representations of individuals in social life. Veracruz’s concerns in De dominio are symptomatic of the main problems of his own context. As well as Las Casas’ work, the arguments set forward in the Augustinian’s writings constitute a vision of the natives which contested the defenders of servitude and enslavement. Veracruz’s writings are instrumental in arguing for a conception which assumed the possibility of self-organization and self-government in the República de Indios. His thought constitutes an intellectual foundation of this new form of multicultural political organization arisen in the mid and late sixteenth century.

1. A Brief Account of Veracruz’s Life and Works Veracruz’s life and work located within these local and global events which, themselves, constitute preconditions for understanding his thought. Before re-reading De dominio it becomes necessary to deepen in his life and significance. Alonso de Veracruz, born in Spain in 1507, first studied in Alcalá de Henares and posteriorly in the University of Salamanca; in the later institution he was a student of Francisco de Vitoria. He graduated as a Bachelor of Arts and Theology from Salamanca in 1533. In 1536, he 1

A Euro-Atlantic world includes the discovering and settling the new world, which suddenly united the Mediterranean and the Atlantic and created a new, gigantic, Mare Nostrum.

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travelled to America to set up the Studium generale of the Augustinian Order in Mexico. It was during the journey that he decided on entering the Order. Upon disembarking, he changed his last name from Gutiérrez to Veracruz – the name of the port city in the New Spain. Between 1540 and 1551, he lived in Michoacán, first in Tiripetío – the town in which the Order built its Studium – and later in other convents of the region. During his first two decades in America, Veracruz alternated between his teaching and missionary duties. He created five new Augustinian convents during the same time in which Vasco de Quiroga, Bishop of Michoacán, settled the pueblos-hospitales inspired in Thomas More’s Utopia. Quiroga and Veracruz developed a strong bond and, when the first travelled to the Council of Trent he left the Diocese’s government to the later. After the foundation of the University of Mexico, he incorporated the faculty as a professor of Aquinas’ Theology and Holy Scripture. During his five-year tenure (1553-1557), he wrote course-books on Logic and Physics: Recognitio summularum and Dialectica resolutio cum texto Aristotelis on the one hand, and Physica speculatio on the other. In 1556, he also published a treatise on marriage which included a study on the institution in Michoacán product of his own experience within the Tarasco culture. His writings on marriage hold resemblance with De dominio because both treatises show an interest in the native population through the demonstration of the possibility of mix-race marriages from the perspective of natural law. Veracruz left several letters and other writings expressing his views on different topics, most of which Burrus included in his collection. Notably, another relectio, entitled De decimis and written for his Holy Scripture course during the 1554/1555 academic year, argued against charging tithe to the natives. This writing generated scandal in sixteenth-century Mexico. Archbishop Alonso de Montúfar prohibited Veracruz’s exposition, and when he knew the Augustinian friar was about to publish it he filed a complaint before the Inquisition: «The following conclusions I drew from a book, which can only be called an infamous libel, against the bishops and clergy of this New World. The author’s intention is, using laws and canons, to make a new Church against what the Holy Mother Roman Catholic Church mandates […]. I found it eviler than I ever thought of. I drew upon it eighty-four conclusions, so damned, so heretic; some them, other

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schismatic, other erroneous, other false and scandalous, as You shall confirm»2.

The claims of Montúfar against Veracruz heartened a long controversy. The Augustinian even had to travel to Spain – admonished by a Real Cédula – and later to Rome in order to defend his standings. In the Iberian Peninsula, he held positions of ecclesiastical government within the Augustinian Order. Remarkably, Veracruz took part in the defense of his colleague and friend, Fray Luis de León. He also presented and read, before the Consejo de Indias (Council of the Indias), the so-called political will of Bartolomé de las Casas. Moreover, he took part of the Junta Magna de las Indias, held in 1568, important in the process of founding towns of Indians with republican criteria. Certainly the most important part of his European journey was the issue of the Etsi mendicantium ordines papal decree by Pius V in March 24th 1567. This pontifical document finally ruled in favor of Veracruz in the complaint raised by Archbishop Montúfar and had a quick repercussion in the rest of the Spanish Indias. The Pope argued that the conflict was not about charging tithe to the natives, but about the role of the religious Orders in their evangelization. Most importantly, it gave the Orders a fundamental part in the new Latin American church and within the society as a whole. Veracruz returned to Mexico in 1572 where he continued his work as teacher, missionary and administrator.

2. De dominio infidelium et iusto bello De dominio infidelium et iusto bello is the centerpiece of this paper. The relectio’s composition consists of eleven chapters presented as doubts 2

Cf. A. E. RAMÍREZ TREJO, «Fray Alonso de la Veracruz: De decimis o Sobre los diezmos», in H. C. PONCE (ed.), Innovación y tradición en Fray Alonso de la Veracruz, UNAM, México 2007, p. 203: «Las siguientes conclusiones se sacaron de un libro que mejor se puede llamar libelo infamatorio contra los prelados y clerecía de este Nuevo Mundo. Pretendiendo, como pretende, el autor de dicho libro, con cánones y leyes de su cabeza, hacer una nueva Iglesia contra lo ordenado por la Santa Madre Iglesia Católica Romana […]. Hallé en él más mal del que pensaba, del cual saqué las dichas ochenta y cuatro conclusiones, tan endemoniadas, de ellas heréticas unas, otras cismáticas, otras erróneas, otras falsas y escandalosas, como por ellas constará».

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or «questions» (quaestiones). All of them have the same structure: to each interrogation, it follows contrary answers, proofs, conclusions and corollaries. One of the main features of this document is the abundant references to situations of the Mexican society of the time. The first six questions are concerning property and tribute. The text neatly presents a wide array of objections towards appropriation of lands and goods of the natives as well as unfair taxation by the Spanish. It later proposes legitimacy clauses to taxation and expropriation. Probably these initial doubts were the main topic of the relectio itself and Veracruz added the following five later. It is even possible that he wrote the final part to give the whole text the appearance of a treatise, or that they were a relectio itself never published independently. Contextual and textual evidence leads to think of its topic as a commentary and application of the 62nd Question of the Secunda Secundae: De restitutione. In fact, Aquinas’ first two articles are enough to learn, beforehand, the main points and purposes of Veracruz’s relectio: «Whether Restitution Is an Act of Commutative Justice» and «Whether it is always of necessity for salvation to restore that one has taken away». Veracruz puts forward a lengthy list of cases in which he considered restitution in favor of the natives should be mandatory: «It can, therefore, be concluded that all of the King’s officers – accountants, treasurer, the viceroy himself, and all the members of his council – incur in mortal sin. This occurs in all cases when they go into the Indians’ villages, which are under the King’s empire, and they demand them tributes, as well as other debts, which cannot find satisfaction due to illness or another cause. Thus, restitution is mandatory as they are ministers of inequity»3.

Of the last five questions, three are referred to the power of the Emperor and the Pope, and two to the conditions of just war. Both topics 3 Cf. Alonso de Veracruz, Sobre el dominio de los infieles y la guerra justa, trad. of R. HEREDIA CORREA, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, México 2007, p. 44: «Se sigue también que pecan mortalmente todos los oficiales del rey: contador, tesorero, factor, y el mismo virrey, y todos los oidores que entran en el consejo, cuando en los pueblos que están bajo el imperio del rey exigen tributos, así como otras deudas, que no puedan satisfacerse cómodamente, por enfermedad o por otra causa, y ellos mismos están obligados a restituir, como ministros de iniquidad».

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can be directly related with the work of Veracruz’s teacher, Francisco de Vitoria and his Relectio de indis. Remarkably, he did not cite De indis in De Dominio as he did it in his treatise on marriage. De dominio is a thorough account which considers the multiple cases which casted doubt on titles, property, acquisitions, expropriations, labor regime, the encomienda regime, conditions of legitimacy of the tribute, taxation, amounts of tribute, and means of payment, among others. It also offers a precise detachment of responsibilities from the encomiendero to the Emperor, going through all royal officers – including the viceroy. Another remarkable feature is the freedom in which Veracruz expresses himself while referring to this wide range of controversial topics while, at the same time, questioning the most important hierarchical authorities in his utterances. This fact gains importance if we take into consideration that relectiones were academic events attended by many of the officers – ecclesiastical and civil – who Veracruz questioned in his writing. Besides dealing with provocative topics and criticizing the authorities’ conduct, he often turned to his personal experiences or to scandalous facts in order to enlighten the gravity of his subject matters: «Negligence of the native people and the ancient and true lords of these lands before the arrival of the Spanish cannot be invoked to justify dominion. They are not negligent those who would rest if they could do so. They are not negligent those who, if heard, would claim against the tyranny and oppression exerted, not by the emperor, but by those entrusted to take care of villages and people. These, devour them as pieces of bread, dispossessed and hurt them, and certainly have not defended them. These officers claim to do things for the glory of God by increasing tributes and adding all kinds of exactions which afflict the natives. Of all this, I am a witness»4.

4

Ibid., p. 9: «Asimismo no puede invocarse negligencia por parte del pueblo, o del antiguo y verdadero señor antes del arribo de los españoles, porque no son negligentes quienes descansarían si pudiesen, y si fuesen escuchados clamarían contra la tiranía y la opresión que padecen. No por parte del emperador, sino por parte de algunos a quienes les ha encomendado el cuidado de los pueblos, quienes los devoran como pedazos de pan, despojan, hieren, destruyen y casi no los defienden, sino que juzgan que dan gloria a Dios exagerando los tributos y añadiendo toda clase de exacciones con que los afligen. De esto soy testigo ocular».

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«Corollary: Of this eight conclusions can be drawn that the viceroy and the members of the Audience were unfair when they charged tribute to dresses and cloth in the lands that grow cotton; this is against the law and against justice. It is clear why: because, even though there is cotton in the land, there is neither cloth, nor sheets, nor blankets, which women weave with great danger for their soul and body»5. «I have seen it, and not only once: that women work day and night, locked forcefully and violently in a place as if they were in jail, and along with their children to which they are nourishing. If they are pregnant, they suffer miscarriages due to the excessive amount of work. If they are breastfeeding – due to their lack of sleep and poor nutrition – they give their children dreadful milk. The men who run those types of works, they do offend God. I talk because I have experienced it. I have witnessed these things that are so unjust»6.

3. The Revolution of the «Leyes Nuevas» Veracruz’s writing and criticism of authorities should be put in the context of the shocking events that took place in Spanish America between 1542 and 1546. This period saw the promulgation and attempt of implementation of the Leyes Nuevas (New Laws). These pieces of legislation modified the institution encomienda leading to a state of deliberation and subversion in Mexico and Peru. 5

Ibid., p. 46: «Corolario: De esta octava conclusión se sigue que el virrey y los oidores obraron injustamente cuando en tierra donde se cultiva algodón, se imponen los tributos en vestidos, o lienzos elaborados, o tejidos con dicha materia, lo cual es contra el derecho y la justicia. Es claro: porque, aunque en la tierra haya algodón, sin embargo no hay lienzos o sabanas, que llaman mantas, y que las mujeres tejen con enorme trabajo, y gran peligro para su cuerpo y para su alma». 6 Ibid., p. 46: «Yo vi, y no solo una vez, que las mujeres trabajan en esto día y noche, encerradas por fuerza y violencia en un lugar como si estuvieran condenadas a la cárcel y con sus niños que están nutriendo. Y de tal reclusión se sigue que si están embarazadas sufran aborto a causa del excesivo trabajo; si amamantan, debido a que trabajan demasiado y comen mal y fuera de hora, dan a sus hijos una leche pésima y así estos mueren. Y ahí mismo los hombres que dirigen este tipo de trabajos tienen ocasión de ofender a Dios. Hablo por experiencia, porque vi estas cosas que tan injustamente se hacen, pues se les señala la tarea, se les da la medida de ancho y largo, y tejen tan fuertemente y las hiladas deben ser tan apretadas y compactas que difícilmente podría pasar una aguja».

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The reaction towards the Laws in Mexico was also tied to the great rebellion of a group of confederate native nations in 1540-1541 in New Galicia – west of Mexico, the region that nowadays comprises the states of Jalisco, Nayarit, Aguascalientes, Zacatecas and Colima. The viceroy himself suffocated the rebellion in a military campaign. Such a display of forces had only been seen in the conquest of Tenochtitlan (1521). Francisco Tello de Sandoval arrived in 1544 in Mexico as the Visitador Real who would enforce the Leyes Nuevas. The Laws caused such a shock that he suspended their implementation. Juntas (councils) were convoked in different parts of the viceroyalty. The information collected showed that there was a fervent opinion, particularly among elite groups, in favor of preserving the encomienda. Ideas about the natives were very different from the perceptions Veracruz would express a few years later. Those ways of thinking make the Augustinian’s thought even more noteworthy in a disfavorable context towards the natives. Dominican Order’s provincial Domingo de la Cruz stated the following: «Now the Indians understand the war and they do not separate themselves from horses and weapons, and they have already been responsible for uprisings. If it were not for the viceroy taking care of the affair in person, all the land would have been lost»7. Another Dominican friar, Hernando de Oviedo, stated a similar point of view: «There is a need in the New Spain for powerful and rich men to face the interior enemies. Because, otherwise, the Indians will rise and they will have the land for themselves. After the Ordenanzas [of 1542] they made a great rebellion and they had no consideration towards the Spanish. Thus, for any reason they begin uprisings and it would be better if they were enslaved or entrusted [encomendados]; or even be killed knowing that they cannot be taken as slaves. That they will not go to war, even if His Majesty commands them so, if they are not paid, and until know they went for His service and because of the benefits they had»8. 7 Cf. A. CARRILLO CÁZARES, El debate sobre la guerra chichimeca, 1531-1585, El Colegio de Michoacán – El Colegio de San Luis, Zamora 2000, p. 127: «[Y]a los indios entienden de la guerra y no se espantan de caballos ni de armas, y se han probado a levantar, y si no fuera el Virrey en persona a ello, estuvo en punto de perderse la tierra, y así se perderá si los españoles se vienen». 8 Ibid.: «[H]ay necesidad que en la Nueva España haya hombres poderosos y ricos bajo cuyo amparo estén los que poco pueden y puedan resistir a los enemigos

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The treasurer of Mexico City Cathedral expressed a very similar point of view: «The Indians are not afraid of the Spanish anymore. They do not get scared with weapons and are rebellious. […] If they were slaves uprisings would be prevented. Being enslaved is the thing that scares them the most. People heard them say after the Ordenanzas, they will not be slaves from here onwards, even though they rebel themselves, and that they can do anything they want, all of which shows much pride»9.

The Cathedral’s canon stated a similar view: «to make war to Indians when they rebel is matter of just war, and thus they can be made slaves; and if the Spanish could not enslave them, they should kill them. It is better to be a Christian slave, than to die as a heathen»10. Bishop Juan de Zumárraga’s mind, even though coinciding with the position which rendered Spanish as superior, also evidenced coincidence with Veracruz. In Zumárraga’s words, missionaries were «the key to the natives’ secrets because they know their language, they hear their confessions, they bark on and off the pulpit about having a good relationship with the naturals [naturales]»11. interiores, porque de otra manera los dichos indios se alzarán con la tierra. Y que después de las Ordenanzas [de 1542] han tomado muy gran rebelión y no tienen en nada a los españoles, que por cualquier cosa se rebelan, y sería mejor que fuesen esclavos o encomendados, que no que los matasen sabiendo que no los pueden tomar como esclavos; y que no irán a la guerra aunque su majestad se lo mande, si no se lo paga, y hasta aquí iban en su servicio y por el provecho que a ellos se les seguía». 9 Ibid., p. 128: «[L]os indios ya no temen a los españoles ni se espantan de armas, y son belicosos […]. Y que sería mejor si fuesen esclavos, porque así no se levantarían, y es la cosa que más temor les pone, y que les ha oído decir a los dichos indios, después de las Ordenanzas, que no han de ser esclavos de aquí en adelante aunque se rebelen, y que pueden hacer lo que quisieren, y que de esto muestran tener mucha soberbia». 10 Ibid.: «le parece que cuando se rebelasen que se hagan esclavos, siendo la guerra justa, y que no pudiendo hacerlos esclavos los españoles los matarán, y que es mejor que sean esclavos cristianos que no mueran infieles». 11 Ibid., p. 128: «la llave de sus secretos sabiendo la lengua, oyendo sus confesiones, ladrando en los púlpitos y fuera de ellos sobre el buen tratamiento de los naturales».

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Charles V finally, throughout 1546, revoked the harshest parts of the Leyes Nuevas. This implied, partly, the reestablishment of the encomienda regime. Bartolomé de las Casas had a well-known part in getting the Leyes’ approval in the Peninsula. When the time of the annulment came Las Casas himself, by then Bishop of Chiapas, favored two ecclesiastical meetings in 1546 which gave impulse to campaigns in favor of the Indians. One of the main products of the second meeting was a manual for natives’ confessors. This text provoked a similar alarm as the one risen by the Leyes Nuevas due to the vision of the natives it showed. For example, the seventh rule established the following: «All the things done in the Indias, the entrance of the Spanish in each province of them, as well as the servitude and subjection in which they put the natives, with several means and ends […] has been contrary to natural law and ius gentium, and also against all divine law; and consequently, null, invalid, and without any value and lawfulness […]. And consequently, they [the Spanish] are obliged to a full restitution»12.

4. From «cacicazgos» to «repúblicas» Three royal decrees issued the very same day (October 9th 1549), almost identical in their wording, commanded in New Spain, Peru and Guatemala the establishment of elective authorities in all pueblos de indios (towns of natives): «that in all settled towns, and in the towns to be settled, it is good that there be created ordinary mayors [alcaldes ordinarios] to make justice in civil trials and also other members of the Town Hall […] and it is good for the Indians themselves to elect them: so that they have within their competence to look after the common wealth, and in order to do so, they should provide themselves with prosecutors 12 Ibid., p. 135: «[T]odas las cosas que se han hecho en todas las Indias, así en la entrada de los españoles en cada provincia de ellas, como la sujeción y servidumbre en que pusieron a estas gentes, con todos los medios y fines […], ha sido contrario al derecho natural y derecho de gentes y también contra todo derecho divino; y por consiguiente nulo, inválido y sin ningún valor y momento de derecho […] y por consiguiente son obligados a restitución de todo ello».

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and other necessary officers, just as it is customary in the province of Tlaxcala and other parts»13.

The regulation of such elective authorities is compiled in the Recopilación de las Leyes de Indias of 1680, in the laws XV, XV and XVII (Book VI, Title III). A Real Cédula of 1551 addressed to the Governor of Tierra Firme repeated the terms of the 1549 dispositions with certain additions. Among these was the necessity for the towns of Indians to have lands of their own to grow produce. Giving the pueblos their own lands aimed at fostering them to self-sufficiency to pay tribute. A decree similar to that of 1560 mandated that natives who assembled themselves in towns would not lose their previously owned lands. Among the incentives given to the Indians to gather themselves and form towns were: the suspension and prohibition of personal service; temporary exemptions of tribute; preserving their lands when moving themselves towards the new settlement; loans for the first sow and crops. The organization of the native population in towns consolidated in the decades of 1550 and 1560 coinciding with the initial stages of the reign of Felipe II. This new physiognomy gave place, as I stated at the beginning of the article, to an increasing in urbanization. This signified, in turn, the commencement of republican politics among the natives. In similar terms, it indicated the extension of the Hispanic republican model which governed the república de españoles to the Indian population. Consequently, by undermining the power of caciques and cacicazgos – native lords and lordships – a new indigenous society began shaping. Documents show that the motivations of the extension of this model were diverse. Religion was a stimulus, since evangelizing dispersed groups proved difficult. The freedom due to the Indians was a motivation 13

Cf. F. DE SOLANO, Cedulario de tierras. Compilación. Legislación agraria colonial (1497-1820), Biblioteca Jurídica Virtual, México 19912, p. 171. Retrieved January 19th 2012. http://biblio.juridicas.unam.mx/libros/libro.htm?l=387. «Real Cédula para fundar pueblos de indios en el Virreinato del Perú. Valladolid, 9 de octubre de 1549», AGI, Lima 565, Lib. 6, f. 166v. Indiferente General, 532, f. 27v sqq. (quoted by A. MÁLAGA MEDINA, «Las reducciones en el Perú (1532-1600)», Historia y Cultura, 8 (1974) 141-172, y la «Real Cédula por la que se mandó procurasen la formación de pueblos de indios. Valladolid, 9 de octubre de 1949», AGI, Audiencia de Guatemala, Leg. 402, Lib. T. 3. http://www.enriquebolanos.org/coleccion_somoza/AVB-CS-T15DOCUMENTO%20802.pdf. Colección Somoza (Retrieved March 3rd 2012).

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too because scattered living facilitated their submission to servitude or enslavement. The purpose of taxation was also evident, since having their own resources enabled them to pay the tribute. Most importantly, the civicpolitical motivation, which involved the accomplishment of common wealth, required a new form of life summarized in the expression vivir en policía – to live politically. To live politically condensed civic and political order in human relations, but it was also associated with urbanity, or even civility, as the types of habits created in urban life, in contrast to rusticity of rural life. The ideal of the political life as a universal aspiration meant it was convenient both in Spain and the Indias. A 1601 Instruction by the viceroy of New Spain showed this clearly when he mandated the merger of several villages in Michoacán in «the communication of ones with others for the fulfilment of their needs, living together politically, alike all nations of the world»14. The matter of living politically has been a recurrent topic in philosophical and theological debate. Indeed it was one of the just reasons given by political writers to justify Spain’s conquest of America. The linage of this subject-matter can be traced back to Aristotle, as well as to Aquinas, and it refers to the political nature of human being and of politics as a means to «good life» (eudaimonia). Edmundo O’Gorman argues that, once the doubts over the rational nature of the natives were discarded, such distrust lead towards the conviction of their political incapacity: «the inability attributed to the Indians refers specifically to living a political life and not to the general possibility of living rationally, hence, in that case, they would not be men»15. The problem of the natives living politically must be considered as the normative framework in the beginnings of the republican organization 14

Cf. Archivo General de la Nación (México), Tierras, t. 71, Documento 2 (DE SOLANO, Cedulario de tierras, p. 290): «la comunicación de unos con otros para todas sus necesidades, viviendo juntos y en policía, como lo usan todas las naciones del mundo». «Instrucción del Virrey Conde de Monterrey para verificar la concentración de la población indígena dispersa por pequeñas aldeas a los pueblos cabeceras de la Alcaldía Mayor de Valladolid. México, 14 de noviembre de 1601». 15 Cf. E. O’GORMAN, «Introducción», in Bartolomé de Las Casas, Apologética historia sumaria, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, México, 2 vols., 1967, p. LXVIII: «la incapacidad atribuida a los indios se refiere específicamente al orden de la vida política y no en general a la posibilidad de vivir racionalmente, pues en tal caso no serían hombres».

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of towns of Indians. Concerning this matter, Veracruz’s view is the same as the one held by Bartolomé de Las Casas in his Apologética historia: «The final cause for writing this was to get to know all, infinite, nations of this new world, which were slandered by those who did not feared God […] they argued that [the natives] were not people of good reasoning to govern themselves, lacking human polity and ordered republics […] as if Divine Providence, in the creation of such innumerable rational souls would have been careless, allowing the human nature to be wrong, and making in this infinite part of human linage everyone unsociable, and consequently monstrous, contrary to the nature of all people in the world»16.

In chapter XLV, Of the Political Prudence of the Indians, Las Casas made his point using Aristotle’s Politics, Augustine’s City of God, and Aquinas’ De regimine principum, and concluded: «true nature and proper polity […] consists of justice; when each neighbor or citizen and member of the republic is happy with what it is own and has the disposition according to his state and trade, and acts accordingly, living in peace and love with the others». Thus, «although many in this Indies do not have proper towns, enclosed town halls, or precious buildings, and high towers, as long as they live in peace, unity and conformity, they are still their towns, villages, places and cities»17. This new regime endured until the end of Spanish rule. The Bourbon Reforms introduced some limitations to its autarchy in the final part of the eighteenth century. In order to argue about the importance of this 16 Cf. Bartolomé de Las Casas, Apologética historia sumaria, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, México 1967, p. 3: «La causa final de escribirla fue conocer todas y tan infinitas naciones de este vastísimo orbe, infamadas por algunos que no temieron de Dios […] publicando que no eran gentes de buena razón para gobernarse, carecientes de humana policía y ordenadas repúblicas […] como si la Divina Providencia, en la creación de tan innumerable número de ánimas racionales se hubiera descuidado, dejando errar la naturaleza humana, por quien tanto determinó hacer e hizo, en tan casi infinita parte como esta es del linaje humano, a que saliesen todas insociales, y por consiguiente monstruosas, contra la natural inclinación de todas las gentes del mundo». 17 Ibid., p. 241: «aunque por muchas partes de estas Indias las gentes de ellas no tengan los pueblos y ayuntamientos cercados, ni edificios muy preciosos y torres muy levantadas, como vivan en paz, unidad y conformidad, no dejan de ser sus pueblos, villas, lugares y ciudades».

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municipal-republican organization, we must mention that there were 4.188 towns of Indians in 1803. From the qualitative point of view, it implied that several thousand of these towns had already been electing their own authorities during more than two-hundred and fifty years at the time of the creation of the Mexican Republic.

Concluding Remarks: Law and Politics in a Multicultural Society De Dominio should be interpreted bearing in mind the singular context in which Veracruz wrote it. The Augustinian’s position, as well as Las Casas’, was part of the transit from lordships to a new landscape of political communities. Veracruz’s strategy, however, was different to the path undertaken by Las Casas. The Augustinian did not oppose radically to the encomienda. In contrast, his writings set the scene for the Spanish and criollos to live with Indians in a society that would, progressively, abolish servitude and slavery. The views expressed in his writings gain importance in the context of the opposition to the Leyes Nuevas. Particularly, his positive vision of the natives enabled him to argue in favor of preserving the Indigenous society, though reshaped by Spanish institutions. Founding, settling and organizing towns of Indians made possible to model native institutions into the early-republican tradition. This, in turn, allowed these communities to a considerable degree of political and economic autonomy. Veracruz also took the debate to academia. He used the principles already established by Francisco de Vitoria in Salamanca in order to strengthen his own positions. Veracruz’s use of Vitoria’s conceptualization is, however, different. The later coined a concept of global community – communitas orbis – which included the whole world (totus orbis). Veracruz’s sense of community was local, but it resembled the totus orbis in terms of cultural diversity. Holding this position, Veracruz had a different evaluation of the political traditions which preceded the Spanish conquest. When augmenting about tyranny as a just reason for war he commented: «If among the barbarians Moctezuma’s and Caltzontzin’s regimes were tyrannies, there was justice in war, and therefore, there would be no legitimate dominion in the ones who previously had it. But if they governed as if it was a tyranny or in a manner which was good for the republic, I have no notice of either. What might seem

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as a tyranny for another nation could be reasonable and adequate for this barbarian people. Their rulers might have governed them with authority and fear instead of love»18.

Some of Veracruz’s sentences could be characterized as having special resonance for modern political thought. Passages like the one affirming «The domain of the people resides primarily and principally in the people itself. No law, neither natural nor divine, establishes a master in temporal affairs»19 constitute neglected pieces of early-modern political thought. Even more so, if reminded that his reference to «the people» included, equally, both Spanish and natives. Other passages are enlightening of his early-modern conception of republic and its relation with the autonomy of the towns of Indians: «The emperor has no other domain than the one entrusted to him by the republic. Henceforth, if he establishes a tyranny, the republic itself can depose him and deprive him of the throne. […] If the king uses the power entrusted by the republic for his private wealth that makes him a tyrant, and consequently no tribute, whatsoever, will be owed to him»20.

De dominio infidelium et iusto bello is part of an intellectual tradition which should be framed within early-modern scholarship on law. Historiography and conventional wisdom have prevented early-modern Spanish-American authors to be placed within the context of an early political modernity. Consequently, neither Veracruz nor other significant 18 Cf. Alonso de Veracruz, Sobre el dominio de los infieles, op. cit., p. 172: «Y así, si entre estos bárbaros era tiránico el régimen de Moctezuma y Caltzontzin, hubo justicia en la guerra, y así no tendría el legítimo dominio quien antes lo tenía. Pero si fue así, que gobernaran tiránicamente y no para el bien de la república, no me consta. Tal vez lo que parece tiránico con relación a otra nación sería conveniente y adecuado respecto a estos pueblos bárbaros, como que sus señores los gobernaban por la autoridad y el temor y no con amor». 19 Ibid., p. 4: «El dominio del pueblo reside primaria y principalmente en el mismo pueblo; así pues ni por ley natural, ni divina, existe un dueño en cosas temporales, a quien otros estén obligados a dar tributo». 20 Ibid., pp. 18, 162: «El emperador no tiene otro dominio que el que le da la república, de modo que si rige tiránicamente, la misma república podrá deponerlo y privarlo del reino. […] Si el rey utiliza la potestad conferida por la república para el bien privado, es un tirano, y en consecuencia no se le debe tributo alguno».

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authors who shaped the political identity of Latin America hold a relevant place within the imagined communities of the region. My intention with this article was to give Veracruz a place within the early-modern republican tradition. The intellectual task of re-reading and re-discovering these authors is still very much a work to be done.

ALFREDO SANTIAGO CULLETON* THE MORAL DIMENSION OF ECONOMICS: THE SCHOLASTIC DOCTRINE OF VALUE IN TOMÁS DE MERCADO AND JUAN DE LUGO

Introduction Most comments about the philosophical-economic work of IberoAmerican thinkers of the Second Scholasticism, such as Tomás de Mercado (1523-1575), Juan de Matienzo (1520-1579), Luis de Molina (1535-1600), Martín de Azpilcueta (1492-1586), Juan de Mariana (1536-1624) and Juan de Lugo (1583-1660) were written by historians specialized in economics, especially based on the studies performed by Joseph Schumpeter throughout his life and published posthumously in 19541. The erudition of these scholastics and the depth of their reflection fascinated historians of economics, who until then had not really known authors and texts previous to Adam Smith and the English tradition of economics. Indeed, to return to reading these intellectuals it was an invaluable contribution for many reasons. Among them I would like to highlight, first of all, the breaking with the idea that these thinkers, in matters of economics, merely reproduced Catholic doctrines on the subject. Secondly, the opportunity of getting to know the complexity and diversity of ideas that sought to conciliate economic reality with a political morality that claimed to be universal. The main debate among economic historians lies in demonstrating whether those thinkers had a theory of value of their own or not, and whether they were conscious of this. On the other hand, we find many articles that seek to demonstrate or deny that these authors were the precursors of the Austrian school and to what extent they were founders of economic liberal thinking2. *

Full Professor of Philosophy at the Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos (UNISINOS); Av. Unisinos 950, 93.022-750, São Leopoldo / RS, Brasil. culleton@ unisinos.br 1 See J. SCHUMPETER, History of Economic Analysis, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1954 (History of Economic Analysis, with a New Introduction, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1996). 2 For a better understanding of this nomenclature in the history of economy see O. LANGHOLM, Economics in the Medieval Schools: Wealth, Exchange, Value,

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But it is not this aspect that interests us from a philosophical standpoint. What we seek to show in this article is how the Greek theoretical instruments, especially the concept of justice developed by Aristotle, is used to provide solutions to the problems formulated by scholastic thinkers regarding the economy seen as political economy. In this article we shall study two consecutive authors, Tomás de Mercado (1523-1575) and Juan de Lugo (1583-1660), two classics, either for the influence they had, or for the erudite value of their works, to demonstrate how their economic ideas, rather than abstract theories on the functioning of the economy, were attempts to approach economy and morality through politics, considering the project of Christendom. Since the text is short, I will limit the work to analyzing the concept of just price, which is sufficiently objective for our purpose. What the texts of both authors show is that their main concern was not how the prices were generated or determined as an abstract issue, but, on the contrary, to identify how the prices, which can be considered a mechanism to rectify the disparities in the distribution of goods, i.e. the just price, can be established and used. The intention of these thinkers in the analysis of price formation was to sharpen their perception regarding the injustices inherent to the pure economic forces in forming the prices, which led them to design ethical adjustment mechanisms for the economy. The economy, more precisely the price of something, takes place between someone who has a given good and another who wants it, and it is who needs it most who will possibly be disfavored. If on the one hand it is necessary to ensure access to the basic goods for those who need them, it is equally fair to reward the provider for their costs. The two authors then seek a means of reducing the inequalities by looking for a balance between the temptation of immediate gain and the unattainable perfection of charity. For this they use the ideas of justice developed by the Money and Usury According to the Paris Theological Tradition, 1200-1350, Brill, Leiden 1992, pp. 191-193; B. GORDON, Economic Analysis before Adam Smith: Hesiod to Lessius, Macmillan, London 1975, pp. 162-166; D. WOOD, Medieval Economic Thought, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2002, pp. 72-73. See also R. DE ROOVER, La Pensée économique des scolastiques: doctrines et méthodes, Institut d’Études Médiévales, Montréal 1971, p. 45; E. FUENTES QUINTANA, Economía y economistas españoles, Galaxia Gutenberg, Madrid 2000, pp. 96-101.

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Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition to formulate economics in a sense that is adequate to the historical time in which they live3. Clearly, contracts and trade relationships between men are in the realm of commutative justice. As a consequence, this and its implementation are a matter of concern to thinkers of Second Scholasticism and will lead them to study economic reality. Thus the treatises De iustitia et iure, the main depository of economic ideas of the Late Scholasticism, are nothing but an intention to analyze the different types of existing contracts and to find out under which conditions, empirically, commutative justice was respected and under which it was not, namely, under which conditions one of the parties would lose or gain. Essential concepts of the scholastic economic order (just price, restitution, unlawful usury, loss of profits and consequent damage) make sense only if we take into account the ideas of justice emphasized here. Scholastic doctors demand respect for commutative justice as an imperative of morality but also, and above all, as a requirement of rationality, that is, the intelligibility of analysis. What has been agreed for the benefit of everybody (life in common and cooperation for mutual satisfaction of needs) must not benefit or damage some more than others. The moral assumption in the scholastic scheme requires the support of reason4. It is never sufficiently clear for most people that economy and trade is a matter of relation between people and as such, a matter of morality dependent on justice as a natural rational result and not a fact to be accepted and to which we adapt to survive. There are a series of assumptions especially, but not only, in areas unconnected with philosophy, as in law or economics which consider that scholastic thought would take an intransigent or prohibitive view regarding trade practices. This is not true. Since Thomas Aquinas scholastic thinkers never condemned trading, but its abuse. Firstly, unfair practices are not sentenced a priori, but a posteriori. According to its advocates, trading is not inherently bad, but depends on the attitude and performance of traders. The absence of justice, and not trade in itself, will determine lawfulness or unlawfulness. Secondly, trading is necessary for politics. It is the will of 3

See R. ROOVER, «The Concept of the Just Price: Theory and Economic Policy», The Journal of Economic History, 18:4 (1958) 418-434. 4 See J. NOOMAN. The Scholastic Analysis of Usury, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1957, pp. 47 sqq.

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the people that corrupts trading, which in itself is neither good nor bad, it is just necessary. Moreover, if it is necessary for the republic, circulation of money and profits from trade will have to be accepted, since it is the result of the effort to bring these goods from afar, storing and distributing them. Scholastic renewal in the 16th century is largely due to the teaching and intellectual work of Spanish doctors who, from their chairs, sought a way to understand science and the relationships with the surrounding political, economic and legal reality5. Several authors played an important role here: Francisco de Vitoria’s Thomism and large dose of what was known as the Nominalist school, were so important that Second Scholasticism was not an update of Thomas Aquinas to the Latin American reality of the 16th century as some claim, but a new synthesis with the Aristotelian philosophy developed by the Nominalist tradition of the 14th and 15th centuries, including within this tradition its best-known exponent William of Ockham, and some of his followers, such as Jean Gerson, Pierre d’Ailly, Gabriel Biel and John Mair6. This new way created profound concern among scholastic doctors because of the empiricist line of knowledge as a complement of logical reasoning. On the other hand nominalism assumed that special attention would be dedicated to strictly economic problems; problems that were approached from the perspective of analysis of reality and not from a priori positions. Thus, it is not surprising that a large amount of material on economic topics is found among the writings of these authors. On the other hand, the moral concern that guided Spanish doctors also affected interest in the study of economic practices in order to be able to opine regarding their lawfulness and unlawfulness. The most important contributions of these authors to economic analysis, within all this material, have been to establish the relationship between the increase in the amount of money, prices and the subjective theory of value-utility.

5 See what SCHUMPETER, History of Economic Analysis, pp. 19-20, wrote: «The doctrine of natural law that in the sixteen century grew into an independent discipline is of still great importance to us. It is very difficult to give an adequate idea of the extent of the scientific progress made within this framework». 6 See A. CULLETON, Ockham e a lei natural, Editora da UFSC, Florianópolis 2011, pp. 153-167.

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1. Tomás de Mercado (1523-1575) This Dominican theologian is famous for combining his intellectual formation with a direct experience of trade with America on both sides of the Atlantic. Little is known about his life in Seville where he was born in 1523, except that, at a very early age, he went to Mexico where he joined the Order of Preachers in 1551. He studied Arts and Theology at the newly founded Universidad de Nueva España, where he later became a Professor holding the Chair of Prima Theologiae. In 1558 he was ordained a priest and from then on taught at the Convent of Santo Domingo. In 1562 he was sent to Spain to complete his studies in Salamanca, where he graduated with a Master’s Degree in Theology. Subsequently, he lived for a time in Seville and died at sea during his return voyage to Mexico. His best known work is Suma de tratos y contratos (Seville, 1571), a second version of his Tratos y contratos de mercaderes y tratantes (Salamanca, 1569), originally written to help the moral discernment need by traders and businessmen in Mexico and Seville. Following the same path as his brother in religious life Bartolomé de Las Casas, he offers a guide of practical solutions for radically new times. In his writings he describes a new quantitative theory of money, analyzing the effect that the import of American metals was having on prices and markets in Spain and Europe. The text is written in Spanish, with plain, direct prose for a public that knows nothing about quotations and academic authorities. We can see clearly in the dedication «to the notable and famous consulate of merchants of Seville»7 that it is not destined to the academic disputes that the author knew well, but to a specific demand of the new class of Iberian traders. Likewise, he does a careful analysis of the capital market, currency and just price, as well as a study of the Medina del Campo, Villalón and Medina de Rioseco fairs, the biggest trading and capital centers of those times in the peninsula. He also writes about the slave trade and banking activity, he criticizes the rates and system of port monopolies. These are the main topics of his work, all of them of high conceptual and historical value.

7

See Tomás de Mercado, Suma de tratos y contratos, in six volumes, Fernando Díaz, Sevilla 1587, Prologue, p. 7.

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1.1 The Theory of the Just Price Our main purpose is to analyze what the author considers just price. We will base our analysis in his work Summa de tratos y contratos in the edition of Casa de Fernando Diaz, printed in Seville in 1587, which is divided into six books with a total of 583 pages8. Mercado’s purpose is not to expound a theory but to analyze and express a moral opinion about certain practices concerning transactions and sale contracts. Throughout the text definitions are limited and the most abstract concepts will have to be extracted from the long arguments and reflections. Even if a historian of the ideas like Alejandro Chafuen9 may suggest that Mercado’s conception of just price is not considered to be the dominant view of the theory of just price, rather he is taken as the authority in the question of theory of money, we do think that his just price theory is significantly and admirably clear for merchants and that he never meant to argue with the scholars in Salamanca. It was therefore necessary for Tomás de Mercado to write a new edition of his first version of Tratos y contratos de mercaderes y tratantes 8

There were several editions of the Suma de tratos y contratos already in the 16th century, and a first translation even into Italian in 1591. In the 19th century, in the catalogue of M. COLMEIRO, Biblioteca de los economistas españoles de los siglos XVI, XVII y XVIII [1889], ed. by L. PERDICES, Real Academia de Ciencias Morales y Políticas, Madrid 2005, he stresses that, among the economic writings of the 16th century, «Tomas de Mercado’s treatise must be placed in the forefront». J. SCHUMPETER quotes him on several occasions in his History of Economic Analysis, 1954, based on information that he had read in B. DEMPSEY, Interest and Usury, D. Dobson, London 1948. The pioneering translation into English of a fragment of his work by M. GRICE-HUTCHINSON, The School of Salamanca: Readings in Spanish Monetary Theory, 1544-1605, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009, is particularly interesting. Now we have two accessible publications of his works: one incomplete, Tomás de Mercado, Suma de tratos y contratos, edición y estudio introductorio de R. SIERRA BRAVO, Editora Nacional, Madrid 1975, and another in two volumes, Tomás de Mercado, Suma de tratos y contratos, edición y estudio preliminar de N. SÁNCHEZALBORNOZ, Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, Madrid, 2 Vols., 1977. More recent reference works that can be consulted are L. PERDICES, Diccionario del pensamiento económico en España (1500-2000), Editorial Síntesis, Madrid 2004; E. FUENTES QUINTANA (ed.), Economía y economistas españoles, Galaxia Gutemberg-Círculo de Lectores, Barcelona 2000, F. GÓMEZ CAMACHO, Economía y filosofía moral: la formación del pensamiento económico europeo de la Escolástica española, Síntesis, Madrid 1998. 9 See A. CHAFUEN, Faith and Liberty: The Economic Thought of the Late Scholastics, Lexington, Maryland 2003, pp. 63-66.

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first published in Salamanca in 1569, and to offer a more philosophically founded exposition which resulted in the definitive Suma de tratos y contratos, published in Seville in 1571, to which he adds a considerable first book, composed by three chapters, that deals with the law and the natural reasoning. He does this by recommendation of the «great scholar» who considered that an adequate philosophical foundation was necessary even though the book was meant for merchants and not for academicians. The objective of his Treatise is clearly stated in the Prologue and is: «[…] to show with clarity how merchants would exercise their art lawfully, with the rest of the annexed businesses and consequential changes and usury […] conscience among dealers must be built with such doctrine and the treasury must take advantage of everyone, because, by showing equity and justice that have to the above mentioned in their contracts, people will not be offended»10.

There seems to be a concern with being direct, practical and as clear as possible in order to help merchants to practice their art avoiding two extremes: scruples and abuse. In order to attack the scruples of those who considered trade unworthy, Tomás de Mercado dedicated a major part of his work to legitimating the exercise of that activity. At the same time, he placed clear limits on abuse. Everything was presented in direct language, with examples, avoiding erudition and «everything that for adornment and beauty of the work could be said […] because nothing is more necessary in any work than to be understood by those to whom it is written»11. The main topic of the book is trading relationships and criteria to ensure that these relations will be fair. Price is one of the components of this relation. Another component is who can practice this activity, what can be sold, under which conditions, companies, monopolies, laws ruling trade, taxes, compensation, money, values, markets, loans, usury interest, currency exchange and leasing. None of these topics are discussed from technical perspective of economics but from a moral concern not in a theological sense but in the interest of the republic. As an argument for life in common he says that «nobody can live well for themselves; everybody has a need to live with others with whom they would never stay under any 10 11

See Tomás de Mercado, Suma de tratos y contratos, 1587, Prologue, p. 8. Ibid.

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circumstances if they offended him, or he offended the others»12, and he compares the necessity of food for individual life with the necessity of justice for good life. Our aim in this article is limited to the topic of just price and although it is a topic that cuts across all the others, we will limit ourselves to the sections in which the author most clearly spells out distinctions and conceptualizations. According to Mercado, justice must rule all social relations and, in trade, society will need a just price. Mercado recalls Thomas Aquinas, whom he calls the Prince and to whom he attributes the sentence: It pertains to justice to establish equality in human contracts13. However, the challenge is to make two dissimilar things equal, such as a horse and a hundred ducats. These are essentially different things which must be equaled by an object that is price, with the aggravating factor that it must be just. This is the justice that grants each one what belongs to him with equality: to the buyer, his horse; to the seller, the hundred ducats, granting equality to both buyer and seller. When this equality is absent, there appears what is known as injustice. «In such a way that a contract demands equality in order to be just, not in the persons who contract, who may be and usually are very different, but in the objects that are contracted, not in nature but in value and respect»14.

In Mercado’s opinion, dealing with justice, in the sense of making agreements, trade or business is to create equality and equity in contracts. This is mandated by natural law, founded on reason itself, which says that no one must lose by it and its observance is binding on all universally. This is the first premise of Tomás de Mercado’s syllogism. Justice is an imperative founded on natural law; that is, in the reason that determines the search for justice and avoiding injustice. Thus, evidence of an injustice in all conscience obliges one to avoid such a deal, indiscriminately, as though it were the explicit will of God Himself. Mercado advocates a close 12

Ibid., p. 9. The author does not provide exact citations of his references which are not always literal. Approaches are found in Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas, Thomas More Press, Westminster, 16 Vols., 1981, II-II, qq. 57-122, especially as regards our topic in qq. 77-78. 14 See Tomás de Mercado, Suma de tratos y contratos, 1587, p. 10. 13

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relationship between trade and justice mediated by the natural light of reason in favor of equality with one’s neighbor. The second premise is the most difficult one because it deals with the determination of specific cases. The second book Del arte y trato de mercaderes begins with the origin of trade and its evolution since the fall of Adam. What matters to us here is that it identifies two forms of trade, one known as exchange or barter where things are exchanged and whose scope is very limited and not very useful, and another, the result of ingenuity and politics, in which money helps stipulate a more just price because it can be fractionated and preserved. Thus, «they invented trading and selling for a just price, appreciating and evaluating each thing for itself, according to what could be useful for men»15. Here, a major element appears how useful the object is to its buyer. What characterizes trade as art and legitimates it is dedicating oneself to buying and selling, adding some objective value to the thing that was purchased. Thus the person who plants and sells what he harvests is a farmer, not a trader. The person who buys and sells the same product without any other aim than to increase its value is a person who exploits it. The real trader adds value to the product because he transports, stores, distributes or offers it in a way that makes it easier for the public to obtain. Therefore it is fair that he obtain his sustenance from this sale. What appears to be behind this distinction is usury and speculation which is nothing but a form of usury. This practice is condemned in the Jewish and Christian tradition since the Old Testament and it was extended prejudicially to all trade. Mercado seeks to demystify this practice and to grant it legitimacy through certain clear and rational conceptual limits.

1.2 The Legal Just Price In chapter VI of the same book II, he specifically begins to discuss just price and identifies two types: Legal just price and just price which we will call consensual, natural or accidental. When dealing with the legal just price, Mercado identifies a conflict which he describes as follows: The merchant’s desire is to buy at a low price and sell at a high price. On the other hand, the republic’s desire is that 15

Ibid., p. 17.

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things be sold as cheaply as possible because «it is its duty to stimulate usefulness and benefit of the neighbors»16. From this, the author concludes that the republic would have the authority for three things. Firstly, to protect the domestic market from foreign traders, assuming that they do not have any filial esteem or commitment to the city, and leaving trade to local people responsible for the best prices. Secondly, the republic would have authority to, in furtherance of common good, import and sell some important goods so that they will not depend on certain interests and monopolies that will raise prices. Thirdly, and this is a determinant factor concerning the price that will be considered just, the authority of the republic consists of «[…] valuing and pricing clothes, which they [traders] are all obliged to sell consciously, because their duty is to appreciate and assign value to all the things that are useful for human life»17. The republic has an objective criterion of just price because it knows the value of things and value, in this sense, «[…] is the use and benefit of the citizen for whom they were produced and are now preserved»18. At this point he presents the relative values, which have nothing to do with their natural objectivity but with their usefulness. He uses the example of gold and silver which, objectively, from a natural point of view, are simply different types of compacted soil and rock, that the republic converted into value and price of all things, while a horse or an ox, which would naturally be more valuable because they are living beings, are not, nor could they be, because, according to Mercado, what creates value is the relationship with the citizen’s sustenance and not their nature. From this it can be inferred that in society the conventional values of currency are greater than those of things because of their usefulness in supplying our needs, and their value depends on the republic. Mercado refers to Aristotle in the Book V of Ethics where the latter provides a general concept saying that value and price of all terrestrial things are given by our need, and this is «the measure and price of their value». Without need, nothing would be traded or appreciated19. Mercado says that «the thing by its nature has never been appreciated in any nation but by our 16

Ibid., p. 24. Ibid., p. 25. 18 Ibid. 19 See Aristotle, The Nichomachean Ethics, ed. by L. BROWN – D. ROSS, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009, V, 7, p. 121. 17

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need and use»20. He then shows the relativity of gold and silver and how they can be worthless among New Spain natives. With this relativity in the natural value of goods the author is aiming at two objectives: on the one hand, to attack a certain essentialist tradition which claimed an objective value for things involving an order of being and the work accumulated in the manufactured product which would be part of its final price21, and on the other, to legitimize the republic’s intervention in pricing. Our author says that if dignity and the natural being of creatures are not followed in the price but the benefit and comfort that come from them, nobody better than the republic and its prince, who rules everyone to perform this appreciation. It is understood that everybody is consciously obliged to sell each thing for what it is worth, this being a natural ruling of reason, and this is why it does not need positive law nor human or divine authority to be evident and imperative. The problem is in determining the just price of each thing as nature does not have nor indicate it. According to Mercado, nature creates all things, but does not place a price on them because, from a theological point of view, they were not made to be compared and sold but to be used by all. It seems that the fall of men privatized natural goods, and the ingeniousness of the same men created the power to buy and sell, and especially to transform gold and silver into objective values for all other things. Now, if men have the need of certain things to live and their price is relative to that need and to the authority of men, then it is the duty of the republic, whose purpose is to watch over the common good of its citizens, to value the goods, balancing the tension between those who have them available, and those who need them, where greater need will always be at a disadvantage, the equitable relationship of justice. Let us remember that buying and selling are acts of commutative justice. This is a virtue that consists of maintaining equality in contracts, that is, to give as much as one receives, not in substance (which is naturally impossible) but in value and price. Following the example the author has used from the beginning, the equality that exists between a horse and one hundred ducats which, it should be stressed, satisfies the parties involved, is the authority of public 20

See Tomás de Mercado, Suma de tratos y contratos, 1587, II, vi, p. 48. See O. HAMOUDA – B. PRICE, «The Justice of the Just Price», The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 4:2 (1997) 191-216. 21

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power. The equality between the horse and the hundred ducats is artificial; it is the equality between an animal and a little bit of soil that can only be fairly postulated by an authority that watches over the republic’s wealth. This commutative justice, that is, the equality between the horse and the hundred ducats stipulated by the authority is a limit that must be observed by everybody without exception where its failure to comply will remove the prince’s authority. In this sense, the prince’s authority is absolute. On the other hand, Mercado says that «[…] commutative justice is maintained by giving what was stipulated, by consent of all parties involved […]»22. How is this consent understood? If the price is established by the authority of the republic (the transaction is not), it requires the consent of all parties to be produced. This is not mandatory, and possibly will not take place. In this case the buyer’s need will not be met, and consequently the purpose of the authority of the republic, which is to watch over the citizen’s well-being, will be jeopardized and dissolved. This is where the circle of equality finds its point of correspondence among all the interested parties. It is the prince’s responsibility to value the prices of things which are necessary for the citizens’ life, such as bread, wine, meat, fish, fruits, cloths, silks, linens, servants, houses, things that are used and often wear out. An objective price avoids possible offenses. For things such as jewelry and other superfluous objects it is not as necessary to establish prices. They can be left to agreements, given that no needs are involved. Thus, «[…] it is fair and very necessary that things that are most necessary to life, and wear out, be evaluated by the republic: time will take care of the rest»23.

1.3 Variability Criteria Once it has been stipulated who will set the price and their legitimacy, let’s see the variables that condition it. If the laws of God are eternal and immutable, human rules are definitely so, especially the rates that, to be fair, must always be updated. Once the price has been set, in order to increase it or decrease it, it only needs one of the following circumstances or the three of them to do it: (a) if there is now much more merchandise 22 23

See Tomás de Mercado, Suma de tratos y contratos, 1587, II, vi, p. 32. Ibid., II, vi, p. 32b.

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or much less than when they were originally appreciated; (b) if there are many or few buyers; (c) or more or less money for goods that are usually sold in cash. «Any of these reasons should be enough for governors, faithful performers, to change their attitude»24; and it should be stressed that in such things or markets where they have no influence, any of these is enough, «[…] without anybody ordering or admonishing […]»25, to change the price. Here, we can find certain indications of natural rules regulating the economy that are independent of the will of buyers, sellers and princes, where adjustments are required. This is why it is necessary that just prices, that is, valuations of the goods needed to live in the city, made by the republic, be constantly updated. This requires more work and more dedication from the leaders, but has two immediate benefits that the author highlights as beneficial virtues for the city. First of all, that common people understand the extent of their obligation to take care of what the leaders have provided to them with such diligence, care and concern. Secondly, the government would have greater legitimacy to punish lawbreakers because it is closer to the process and because when the republic becomes distant from the trade relations that it must govern, the traders themselves impose their adjustments to the detriment of citizens, especially of the least protected ones. The author identifies this as a strange rule given that, in general, laws are good because they are stable and not the contrary, but in this case it is necessary in favor of the common good; the omission of the republic would be negligence. In essential merchandise, it is necessary to respect mainly the common good and also, secondarily, the merchants’ earnings. From the merchant’s point of view, it is the prince’s duty to take their earnings into account, when stipulating the just price, so that they will do their best to supply the city. According to Mercado, it must be considered how difficult it is for them to acquire goods, the costs of transport, the risk to which they are exposed, by sea and by land, how long their money will be tied up until they recover it. It is legitimate to add to this a moderate interest as a reward to get to the just price and to ensure that the trader will not stop offering his products to the city. 24 25

Ibid., II, vi, p. 37. Ibid.

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Tomás de Mercado distinguishes two types of just price26. One legal, which is established and enforced by the republic, and the other natural or accidental, which is introduced by use and is the current value in the marketplace. The author draws a very strict distinction and highlights that when the rates have been established, it is a serious infraction to charge more for something, and this requires restitution. Owing to the fact that rates are a mechanism to limit the seller’s ambition, something may be sold at a lower price than the one stipulated, so that it does not prevent the luck of the buyer if he can buy something for a lower price. Thus, the just price established by the republic is nothing more than a maximum price that can be charged for a product, it is not the only price. The just price is a price which is theoretically distinguished by Mercado in three ways: merciful, average and strict. It is the fluctuation between the rated price, which is the rigorous one, and the merciful, which is the one the seller may want to apply to gain liquidity or sell out his stock. Mercado finishes this sixth chapter of Book II by advocating this just price, the rated just price for the republic, with occasional exceptions that some clerks allowed a few traders, alleging that they would only be infringing a civil law, breaking a civil law which does not lead to divine damnation. He says that «[…] the obligation of saving the republic’s rate pertains to everyone and is more important than we think»27. To sell at the established price is not only the king’s law (which if it were, one might doubt whether it was or not binding), but a divine and natural law, which is the strongest, which binds all and exempts no one. Even the clergy who would be exempt from secular law is not exempt from it, not because they are subject to the king’s law, but because they are subject to natural law. «Natural law is that one always sells at a just price, and that the same natural law also says that a just price is the one established by the republic, mostly its principals, the ruling or prince»28. As a consequence, exceeding the rates they impose, selling for a higher price is not so much to disobey a royal order, but to violate and go beyond the divine one, and offending other people to whom the duty of justice is assigned. 26 For this he refers to Aristotle in his Book V of Nicomachean Ethics. The frequent references to Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas give him enough authority in his theoretical references, and he does not need to or does not go into details about the disputes that took place about this subject among the Salamanca scholars. 27 See Tomás de Mercado, Suma de tratos y contratos, 1587, II, vi, p. 37b. 28 Ibid.

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1.4 Accidental Just Price In some distant places or where the authority of the republic does not exert an influence, another kind of just price should guide one, called natural or accidental. «This just price is the one that matters as cash publicly, and it is used this week and this time, as is said in the market, without any force or deception, although, according to what is taught by experience, it is more variable than the wind»29. The author relates the volatility of this price to variations of the international market giving as an example that «[…] what yesterday cost fifty ducats, for instance cochineal, today is worth thirty, either because a lot arrived from Mexico, or because there was a letter from Florence saying that there was no way to travel to Turkey […]»30. He identifies the dependence of markets in a world that has been globalized by communication. The most important aspect in the paragraph that we have just quoted is the expression without any deception and this is part that worries him most when it is a matter of accidental or natural just price. He highlights two major vices that threaten this just price. On the one hand deceptions regarding merchandising that may be vitiated, past its sell-by date, with a current or imminent defect, or not be exactly what the client thinks he is buying. Tomás de Mercado is very careful when determining that it is the seller’s responsibility to be very clear with respect to the product that he is selling, its estate, origin and nature. Any liability for possible misinformation will fall on the merchant and requires restitution. It has to be taken into account that what is in Tomás de Mercado’s mind is Thomas Aquinas’s idea that «it is a characteristic of justice to make equality in human contracts»31 and that trade corresponds to distributive justice exposed by Aristotle in Book V of the Nichomachean Ethics where nobody can lose nor be injured in a trading operation. Thus, the rule is to not be deceived32. Another just price rule that Mercado states as a metaphysical truth, in the sense of being universal and independent of any circumstance, and that 29

Ibid., II, viii, p. 45. Ibid., II, viii, p. 45b. 31 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, Madrid, 16 Vols., 1981, II-II, q. 57, a. 1, p. 446. 32 See Aristotle, The Nichomachean Ethics, V, 7, p. 121. 30

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is economic evidence, is the rule that a same product with a defect must be sold at a lower price than the same product with no defect. «This rule is so general and true that it has no exception whatsoever. On the contrary, it must be incorruptibly saved, even when there are rates, according to what has been said before. It is worth knowing that: all attitudes are understood when the notions’ store is well supplied. Indeed one leaves to natural dictates and sound conscience that it is worth so much the less the more ruined it is»33.

Discounts have no limits and spelling out the defect is not necessary if the discount assumes it, but the sale is not legal, even at a discount, if this may be harmful or detrimental to the buyer. Here we have another rule for unregulated trade, a natural law for a free and consensual activity. Mercado is explicit when he says that the identification of a defect in a product is not the buyer’s liability even though he does not know about the defect at the time of sale but which existed before. Likewise, he highlights the possibility that the seller be deceived in the case of the person who buys for less than its true value because of the seller’s ignorance. The author presents the example of a rustic, who finds a precious stone and, not knowing that it is valuable, asks a very low price for it. The buyer has the obligation to pay this man what it is worth or to alert him to the product he is selling. If on the one hand the object of the deception may be the merchandising, on the other it may be the astuteness of the seller who may deceive with his speech, or stimulating monopolies or cartels with other traders. Tomás de Mercado writes at length about the different types of illegal agreements, that is, agreements between associated for illegal purposes, and this can happen between traders, producers, buyers and even service providers. All of these can stimulate cartels for the purpose of speculating with other people’s needs, and thus determine the price artificially. This may be the case of someone who products stored somewhere and is not allowed to renew the rent in order to oblige him to sell. Even service providers can join together not to work for someone for the purpose of getting this person to raise their pay, or even start a construction and interrupt it with the same intention. 33

See Tomás de Mercado, Suma de tratos y contratos, 1587, II, viii, p. 46.

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2. Juan de Lugo Juan de Lugo was a Spanish Jesuit, born in Madrid, in 1583. He studied law in Salamanca and taught philosophy at Medina del Campo and theology in Valladolid and later in Rome, where he died in 1660. Lugo’s work is dedicated mainly to moral and dogmatic theology, but, of his many writings, the outstanding – which was acknowledged not only ecclesiastically, leading to the title of Cardinal, but also academically in several latitudes, with many translations – and chronologically most mature work is his Disputationes de iustitia et iure, published for the first time in Lyon in 164234. In Lugo’s work, the theory of just price is basically developed in Dispute XXVI of the treatise De iustitia et iure35, which deals with buying and selling. Just as in the case of Mercado, Lugo’s intention is not to expound a theory, but to analyze and issue a moral judgment about certain practices in relation to the operation and contract of buying and selling. Juan de Lugo, like the other scholastic doctors, did not ignore these economic problems and did a lot of work involving them. Further, the need for justice in the buying and selling contract made it mandatory to discuss the problem of valuing the exchanged goods, since none of the parties could benefit at the expense of the other36. Knowing the value, the just price of goods, was the only course that, a posteriori, would allow determining whether the contract was just or unjust, whether two equivalent things were really exchanged, whether an adequate price was paid for the good. Consequently, according to good logic, the analysis of the value must precede the analysis of the existence of equivalence in the transaction. In other words, it is necessary to first answer the question ‘What is the value of a good?’ to be able to answer later the questions ‘Is there equality in the transaction?’, ‘Is commutative justice respected?’.

34 See E. OLIVARES, «Juan de Lugo (1583-1660): datos biográficos, sus escritos, estudios sobre su doctrina y bibliografía», Archivo Teológico Granadino, 7 (1984) 5-129. 35 See Ioannes de Lugo, Disputationes de iustitia et iure, Sumptibus Nicolai Pezzana, Venetiis 1670, Disputatio XXVI (De emptione, et venditione), pp. 198-231. 36 See O. LANGHOLM, Price and Value in the Aristotelian Tradition, Universitetsforlaget, Bergen 1979, pp. 29 sqq.

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«The justice of the buying and selling contract depends basically on the justice of the price, since equality among the parties to a contract, which is the object of justice, is not maintained when the price is higher or lower than the just price. One must, thus, explain what is the just price that the purchaser must pay and the seller demand»37.

In the scholastic tradition there are two theories about the problem of valuing goods. The first of them is the theory that considers work as the source of the value of something, linking the cost of a good to the cost of production. According to Langholm, in its medieval origin this theory is associated with the figure of Albert the Great38. The second is the theory of value based on usefulness. Here value depends on the relative usefulness that one ascribes to a particular good. The advocacy of this position is associated with Thomas Aquinas. Of these two approaches to the problem of value, the second found greater prestige among the Spanish doctors of the 16th and 17th centuries. Lugo, like Mercado, was also favorable to the subjective theory of value based on usefulness. As he puts it, «[...] the variation of the vulgar or natural price is due to very different circumstances and certainly not to the intrinsic and substantial perfection of the object that one appreciates, but to its usefulness for human needs; not only for this particular usefulness, but to the esteem in which one holds [this usefulness]»39.

It should be noted how in this citation Lugo distinguishes expressly the usefulness of the good to satisfy human needs and the esteem in which people hold this usefulness. Among these two concepts, it is the second, not the first, which is the true source of the value of goods; that is why it 37

Ioannes de Lugo, Disputationes de iustitia et iure, op. cit., XXVI, q. 38, p. 204: «Iustitia hujus contractus dependet majori ex parte ex justitia pretii, sive enim excedat sive deficiat, non servatur aequalitas inter contraentes, quam justitia intendit. Videndum ergo est, quod sit pretium justum, quod ab emptore exigi et dari debet». 38 See LANGHOLM, Price and Value in the Aristotelian Tradition, pp. 61 sqq. 39 See Ioannes de Lugo, Disputationes de iustitia et iure, op. cit., XXVI, q. 42, p. 204. «[...] variationem quoad augmentum vel diminutionem pretii vulgaris justi dessumi ex variis circunstantiis. Non quidem ex rerum perfectione intrínseca et substantiali, perfectiores enim sunt mures quam triticum, et minus valente; sed ex utilitate in ordine ad usus humanos».

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is called a subjective, not an objective theory of value as usefulness. The Doctor from Seville emphasizes not the intrinsic usefulness of the good – the objective capacity to meet to a given need – but the value people ascribe to this usefulness. Lugo speaks in the same sense and acknowledges as just an exchange that in principle might appear to be unequal: «This is what happens with our games and glasses, that the Ethiopians exchange precisely for gold, since commonly they esteem such things very much, and also the Japanese, who buy at a high price a few old things and of potter’s clay that are valueless among us»40.

According to Lugo, based on the subjectivity and different estimations that individuals give to things about their usefulness, the Europeans justly and without abuse exchange cheap junk for gold with the Africans. The justice of the exchange does not leave any doubts, since both people hold in high esteem what they get – the Africans the cheap junk and the Europeans gold – and in low esteem what they deliver – gold the Africans and cheap junk the Europeans – regardless of the fact that according to the cultural standards of the other, the situation is radically the opposite. Lugo rejects the theory of value based on work advocated by some scholastics. He explicitly disagrees with Scotus and Mair, who were of the opinion that the merchants could include in the sales price of the good the expenses they incurred in developing their business, as well as a reward for their ability, work and risks. For Lugo this rule has its flaws41. Opening up this possibility would imply that in the market there is no single just price, but many, depending on the cost of work associated with each good. In this way, in Lugo’s view, if the merchant suffers specific losses – shipwreck, theft, etc. – he could unilaterally raise the price and establish one that is higher than the just price. This situation would make it extremely difficult to establish equivalence in the transaction, insofar as one of the parties, viz. the seller, would have the right to establish the prices and it is not clear that he would always sell at a just price. 40 Ibid.: «Unde mostra jocalia et vitrum juste apud Aethiopes pro auro commutantur, quia pluris apud eos communiter aestimantur, sicut apud Japonenses res aliquae ferreae, et testaceae veteres nullius apud nos valoris, propter antiquitatem maximo ab illis pretio emuntur». 41 Ibid., XXVI, q. 41, p. 204.

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«[Charging according to the cost of production is wrong] because if some merchant had suffered greater damage or loss due to a shipwreck or to theft while transporting the merchandise, he could legitimately demand a higher price, even if others sold it at a lower price, which is wrong when the good involved is not commonly estimated at this higher price and can be obtained at a lower price»42.

To deny the possibility of a unilateral determination of the price by the merchant does not imply that Lugo does not recognize the importance and usefulness of the merchant’s work for the republic. Merchants are necessary to the nation and negotiating is not only in itself licit, but also necessary to the nation43. But the licit earning to which the merchants have a right – for their ingeniousness in improving the good, for the transport, for the difference in prices between centers of trade, etc. – is already taken into account in determining the current price, and therefore they must adjust to it and not sell according to their costs. Lugo advocates that the value of a good depends on how people estimate the usefulness of this good to satisfy human needs. Likewise he rejects the view that the merchant can unilaterally include in the price of the good the costs of work or production. The key word here is communis aestimatio, «common estimation». He claims that «[...] the value of the goods, when not established by law, rises or diminishes depending on the common estimation, not on that of one or the other of the subjects»44. This common estimation is simultaneously opposed to two extremes: on the one hand, although straight reason plays an outstanding role in determining the price, it does not establish it univocally, since it is not possible to know in a determinate manner, considering the distinct appreciations, what would be the mathematically just value of the good45. On the other hand, there is the aspect of the moral impossibility of 42

Ibid., XXVI, q. 42, p. 204: «[...] quia, si mercator aliquis majus damnum passus fuisset propter naufragium, vel furta merces asportando, posset licite majus pretium pro illis exigere, quando ab aliis vilius venderentur: quod est falsum, cum res illa communiter non tanti aestimatur, sed viliori pretio haberi possit». 43 Ibid., XXVI, q. 22, p. 201: «Negotiatio enim de se non solum licita est, sed utilis et necessaria republicae». 44 Ibid., XXVI, q. 47, p. 205: «valor enim [...] non ex unius vel alterius sed ex communi aestimatione crescit vel decrescit, quando lege taxatus non est». 45 Ibid., XXVI, q. 40, p. 204: «[...] non sciamus determinate, atento illo gradu affectuum diversorum, vel uniformium, quantus sit valor justus mathematicus rei».

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individuals to sell according to their own estimation. Common estimation is opposed to these two extremes which are clearly rooted in the concept of commutative justice so common among the scholastics at that time, as we saw previously. If justice demands equivalence in the transactions and that no one be in a better or worse situation than the other after trading, it does not make sense that one of the parties enjoy a privileged situation compared to the other, as would be the case if, for instance, the merchant were able to set the price taking into account his expenses and individual gains. To accept individual estimation as a way of valuing the goods would privilege one of the parties, which is incompatible with the principle of commutative justice. In the scholastic paradigm, the situation of privilege associated with individual estimation is not compatible with a contractual logic based on the symmetry of the negotiating positions and on the equivalence of the exchanges performed. Common estimation is the necessary condition for the price at which merchandises are sold to be a just price.

Conclusion In the eyes of the contemporary economic philosophy this view of Tomás de Mercado and Juan de Lugo may, at first sight, appear liberal or statist, but this is not our point. What we are trying to show by discussing these two authors is that price is a human construction, that it can be just and how public policy can interfere and whitin what limits. Even if Mercado still relies more on the prince’s agility in update prices, Lugo gives a vote of confidence to the subjectivity of valuation and self-regulation of the communities. Both agree that it is necessary, in view of the common good and of the principle of justice, some regulation on the part of the state so as to avoid speculative and greedy abuse. They also recognize that there is a kind of a commom sense of estimation (communis aestimatio) that balances the interests, attracting supply and ensuring the parties involved certain guarantees of justice that the prince cannot enforce because of the dynamics of the market.

LUIS E. BACIGALUPO* THE REASONABLE WAYS OF PROBABILISM – A BRIEFING ON ITS ESSENTIALS 1. «The marriage between rhetoric and casuistry comes to light from the epistemological foundations of the Ciceronian rhetoric – the theory of probability»1.

I strongly agree with Maryks’ thesis. From that point of view, Jesuit spirituality should be characterized by its epistemological foundations, as well as by a certain anthropology, which I would also like to discuss, but not on this occasion. One of the main points of its epistemology is the application of the rhetorical principle that all discourse should be prudently adjusted to circumstances, also known as ‘decorum’. ‘Casuistry’ is a word that has a rather negative connotation, but in its plainest sense it only refers to a morally neutral accommodation of the mind to concrete circumstances. As educators of youth and missionaries, the Jesuits made it a milestone of their ministry to make their students and listeners familiar with the main purpose of their teaching. They based their strategies on Greco-Roman culture, and gave particular importance in their lessons and sermons to Cicero’s concepts of ‘humanitas’ and ‘civilitas’. The study of rhetoric was hence indispensable for their ministry, through which the Jesuits and their pupils learned the shrewd art of accommodation. This was neither new nor exclusive to the Jesuits. Although the Scholastics in the Middle Ages preferred dialectical distinctions to make their points in academic discussions, they did master the art of rhetoric and its techniques of persuasion, and they used them extensively. But the * Full Professor of Philosophy at the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, Centro de Estudios Filosoficos, Av. Universitaria 1801, San Miguel, Lima, Perú. [email protected] 1 Cf. R. A. MARYKS, Saint Cicero and the Jesuits. The Influence of the Liberal Arts on the Adoption of Moral Probabilism, Ashgate Publishing Limited, Hampshire 2008, p. 112.

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Jesuits, living in a time already influenced by humanism, seem to have rescued rhetoric from the rather servile role assigned to it by the medieval scholasticism. But whatever the reason they had for doing so, in the ‘Ratio Studiorum’ (1599) rhetoric was given pride of place as a feature of the Jesuit education program. Let me now turn to the theory of probability. If we follow its presentation in Ad Herennium II, II, 32, it will be clear that it finds its origin in jurisprudence, where the division of what was called the «conjectural cause» (causa coniecturalis) establishes its epistemological framework on a foundation of six parts: probability, comparison, sign, presumptive proof, subsequent behaviour, and confirmatory proof. Here I will only discuss the first of these. What is probability? Cicero (or whoever the author of Ad Herennium was) defines it by its function. Through probability, a conjecture about a deed is proven by persuasively showing a motive and the way of life of the person who carried out the deed. So what we are concerned with here is the quality of the conjecture. But in matters outside the legal sphere a conjecture is described as ‘probable’ by the same epistemological principle. There has to be a motive for sustaining one opinion and not another with regard to an action, and that motive is sought in the willingness of certain authorities to sustain it (‘bonis auctoribus munita’). Their willingness in turn implies that it has intrinsic probability or reasonableness. When considering opinions it is easy to see that they are the stuff beliefs are made of. Therefore if any school-master or preacher were interested in persuading somebody of the soundness of certain beliefs, he would need to make a careful study of the opinions for and against them. This is the educators’ and preachers’ mission: to persuade, using the truth when possible, but if they need to use conjecture, then they have to use probable arguments, and in all events arguments capable of inspiring confidence where there is doubt. Since opinions rather than knowledge are generally at the core of day-to-day decisions – as the Sceptics wisely suggested – probability appears to underpin human conduct. Rhetoric is the art of persuading people to embrace and follow a probable opinion against the probability of the opposite or the contradictory. In this epistemological framework, persuasion does not produce 2

Cf. Cicero, Rhetorica ad Herennium, with an English Translation by H. CAPLAN, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts – London 2004.

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knowledge, or the truth – i.e. the scientifically acquired understanding of a fact. Persuasion produces only rhetorical understanding at best, i.e. it is incapable of determining the qualities of things or deeds in an apodictic manner. It only produces beliefs and it makes sound suggestions by means of rhetorical proof of what things are probably made of, or what motives or habits probably lay behind certain deeds.

2. «Probabile autem genus est orationis […] si est auctoritas et pondus in verbis, si sententiae vel graves vel aptae opinionibus hominum et moribus»3.

What does it mean to persuade someone of the probability of a moral conjecture? It involves achieving an understanding of the quality of the action, or in other words, producing a belief about whether such an action is right or wrong, and should be carried out or avoided. Persuasion produces moral beliefs, and can only be achieved through sound rhetorical proof. Actions are found to be right or wrong depending on the motives or habits that underlie the will to carry commit or avoid them. Nevertheless, these beliefs are probable, that is to say, they are not genuine knowledge. ‘Probable’ means that they can be proven in their proper epistemological field, and when this is so, they can be embraced with practical certainty. Practical, not theoretical means, in other words, without the apodictic demonstration, which governs scientific knowledge. Jesuits were priests after all, which means that they had to listen to confession. With rhetoric as a pillar of their schooling, they had learned casuistry guided by the astute advice of Cicero, and they had therefore assimilated the logic of probability. Together with the penitent, the confessor had to find a motive and the habits sustaining the sin confessed. Once identified, the conversation should consider how the action had benefited the penitent and if it was due to longstanding vices. As we can see, this is purely contingent reasoning. After all, morality is not a science. Because of its contingency, nobody could scientifically prove the truth of the statements agreed in such conversations. The only 3

Cf. Cicero, De partitione oratoria, with an English Translation by H. RACKHAM, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts – London 1942, p. 326.

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reasonable proof to be given for moral beliefs will inevitably consist of probable arguments. This is pure Ciceronian doctrine. The so-called extrinsic proof exists in the form of testimony. To evaluate this, the judge (who in the Jesuit confessional is the penitent himor herself) will bear in mind the quality of the source, in other words, who is speaking and the quality of the argument, i.e. what is expressed and in what way. In the exercise of introspection, ‘what is being said’ will always be a moral proposition, which we will call, for the purposes of this analysis, ‘p’. (I will not focus on the confessional, because this would mean analysing actions committed, but rather on a matter which may have been discussed with a spiritual director, which means that it is a possible action). Let ‘p’ be: If a whole nation of infidels does not wish to hear the Gospel, and its political authorities prevent me from preaching in their jurisdiction, it is my duty to try to use some form of coercion to announce the Word of God to them. The question is if ‘p’ is a probable opinion. Three conditions must be met for this to be so: 1. That the action described as ‘p’ be in accordance with the person, the time and the place, in other words, that the whole nation does not want to hear and that this person is indeed prevented from preaching, here and now. 2. That the causes of the action be evident or agreed, in other words, that any observer would understand that it is the preacher’s duty to find ways to overcome those barriers. 3. That the possible coercive action does not contradict the law, morality or religion, in other words, it does not face any legal or moral prohibition. Now, let ‘-p’ mean: If a whole nation of infidels does not wish to hear the Gospel, and its political authorities prevent me from preaching in their jurisdiction, neither myself not any other person may oblige those people to hear it. For this analysis, we shall call our central character ‘Peter’. There are three basic epistemic statuses, which are entailed by this counter position of opinions: Opinion: Peter believes that ‘p’ is probable, meaning he gives rational assent to ‘p’, but he knows that ‘–p’ (‘not p’) is also probable. Doubt: Peter believes that ‘p’ is probable, meaning he is inclined to give assent to ‘p’, but he still fears ‘p’ may not be the case.

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Certainty: Peter believes that ‘p’ is probable, meaning he gives rational assent to ‘p’ with total adherence and without any fear of ‘p’ not being the case. We may describe the extrinsic probability of ‘p’ as follows: Peter believes that ‘p’ is probable because many wise people, authorities, the beliefs of ordinary people and accepted behaviour, all support ‘p’. And this should illustrate the intrinsic probability of ‘p’: Peter believes that ‘p’ is probable, because there is strong logical support for ‘p’, meaning the probability of ‘p’ is rationally defendable. However – and this is crucial for the whole story – if Peter believes with all certainty that ‘p’ is probable, he must nevertheless concede that, in a speculative sense, it’s also probable that ‘–p’. Thus it seems we have to admit that doubt does not totally disappear when certainty obtains. Some doubt must remain when it makes sense to say: Peter believes that ‘p’ is probable but he also concedes that, in the speculative level, it is also probable that ‘–p’. So the troublesome word here is ‘speculative’. It derives from the epistemological nature of opinions. Since they are not knowledge, they do not eliminate their contraries. Which means that ‘p’ coexists with ‘–p’. Therefore, if Peter becomes certain of the probability of ‘p’, then he believes that, attending the circumstances of the case, ‘p’ is probable and ‘–p’ is practically improbable. Accordingly, Peter and the confessor were handling a practical subject that did not belong to the realm of true conscience, where knowledge supposedly decides what ought to be done. They were stepping instead onto the instable ground of ethical doubt, were belief is the only guide of action. Deontic logic would put it like this: ‘If Peter believes that ‘p’ is probable, then ‘p’ is permitted’. Assuming that there is no clear moral nor civil legislation for ‘p’, if Peter’s confessor – called John for this purpose – says that ‘p’ is nonetheless forbidden, he is nevertheless in the same logical condition as Peter, i.e. both are assuming the hypothesis of the good (value), both are in the need of a theory concerning the goodness or evil of ‘p’ (reasoning), and both will eventually obtain a norm of action concerning ‘p’ (a belief free from practical doubt). None of them however should expect that their reasoning would suffice for turning those beliefs into true knowledge, because it is impossible to have true knowledge of the will of an entire nation. If there

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is no explicit legislation on the action of ‘using the support of coercion to preach where one is unwelcome’, the opinions for and against the action remain probable. From this point on we can understand why probabilism had such an impact in seventeenth and eighteenth century European politics. The system thoroughly promoted liberation from the yoke of law; it encouraged people to follow a less secure, more risky opinion, and allowed them to do this even with a good conscience. But let us not be distracted by history. Let us stick with logic for a while yet.

3. «The heart of the probabilist debate is conscience, conceived of as moral judgement. More precisely it is the last, concrete, part of a moral decision process modeled as a meta-ethical argument whose conclusion ‘dictates’ the performance or non-performance of a possible future action»4.

The basic steps of deontic probabilistic logic would function like this: Step 1: It is obligatory or permissible to do good, and it is forbidden to do evil (this we may call the ‘synderesis’ hypothesis). Step 2: An action has ethical value when it is performed with good intention and under certain circumstances that give it its legitimacy (this is the thesis of ‘scientia moralis’). Step 3: The application of ‘synderesis’ and ‘scientia moralis’ to an uncertain moral case generates a probable opinion of which we are certain (this is the conclusion). If we come back now to casuistry we must introduce in it a new feature, namely invention. The ‘inventio’ is the ability of producing the argument’s precise conclusion that resolves any practical uncertainty into a compelling mandate. This is clearly ‘ad hoc’ reasoning. For the penitent it is the casuistic result of all his hopes, the tranquillity of his conscience. For the probabilist confessor it is the rational production of practical certainty as goal of his ministry. 4

Cf. W. REDMOND, «Conscience as Moral Judgement. The Probabilist Blending of the Logics of Knowledge and Responsibility», Journal of Religious Ethics, 26.2 (1998) 392 (389-405).

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Let us consider that Peter and John have conflicting certainties as to the imperative ‘p’ must be performed’. Now, ‘p’ is clearly a possible action. It is placed in the future, as not yet performed. In its possibility it is absolutely neutral, i.e. neither morally good nor morally bad. In its probability, on the other hand, assuming that Peter and John are good Christians, it is clear that ‘p’ is a possible action that has not been clearly legislated upon, which means that true knowledge of its moral value is not to be obtained anywhere outside one’s own conscience. Therefore, since Peter cannot decide to perform ‘p’ on a true conscience basis, he has legitimate doubts of conscience concerning the probability of ‘p’. If he does not decide himself to perform ‘p’ on the basis of his own moral judgement (synderesis), nor on the basis of the authority of people wiser than himself, because there is some kind of intuition telling him not to withdraw, he desperately needs a Jesuit confessor, or one who understands and masters ‘scientia moralis’ as casuistry. The Jesuits were well known for their moral doctrine, which stated something of this sort: ‘If it is licit to follow a probable opinion that has been speculatively conceived as probable without risking any logical error, it may also be licit to follow in practice a solidly probable opinion without risking mortal sin’. I need not stress the fact that we are talking about people who believe in eternal life. For them, there is no salvation outside the Church (‘extra Ecclesiam nulla salus’), and salvation will only be achieved by means of the sacraments. The sacrament of confession in particular played an important role when the threat of death was imminent. Stressed by doubts in your last hours, if you were lucky enough a Jesuit confessor was called in. And his difficult task was that of dodging the possibility of both formal and material sin before the penitent left this world. It is here that the Jesuit confessor recalls the teachings of the great Salamanca Master Bartolomé de Medina (1527-1581), although he was a Dominican: «Possumus opinionem probabile sequire licta probabiliori». A new understanding of ethics arose from this single statement. It had a seismic effect on the relationship between law and freedom. Every authentic moral problem confronts opinions that favour the law, i.e. that stand for the non-licit status of the possible action presented as ‘p’, and opinions that favour freedom, i.e. that stand for the licit status of that same action.

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Medina and most of the Jesuits took the path of freedom. They always sought for a liberal solution to the problem of moral uncertainty, speculative and practical. The main thesis of the new system stated: «if any reasonable doubt obtains on the licit or non-licit status of a possible action, a solidly probable opinion may be followed, disdaining the most probable». I hope I have by this point presented matters in a way that clearly shows that the Jesuits were able to enhance Medina’s thesis due to their rhetorical training. In fact, the solidity mentioned as a sort of guarantee for the probable opinion is a rhetorical concept. Solidity means an opinion held in good conscience, with good will. There is no need to point out here the transcendence of this ethical principle in modern philosophy. It should be stressed, however, that it is also the foundation of this very modern moral system that we known as probabilism. Good will is the principle of morality itself, and it implies the exclusion of malice in the evaluation of conflicting opinions. Even more precisely, a solidly probable opinion is based on the following requisites: 1. It must rely on sound reasoning, i.e. logical foundation. 2. It must not imply any absurdity. 3. It must not contradict scripture, tradition, the Church Fathers, or Church definitions. Thus, at the time Peter and John were chatting, the spectrum of doubtful opinions was far less wide than supposed by the common reader of our time.

4. «Si el rey y el reino ponen resistencia al mismo tiempo, yo creo que pueden ser obligados a que permitan entrar en su territorio a los predicadores del Evangelio»5. Speculative uncertainty is motivated by the epistemological persuasion – Ciceronian in its medieval and early modern instances – that moral decisions are based on probable arguments and not on speculative 5

Cf. Francisco Suárez S.J., Selección de Defensio Fidei y otras obras, Estudio, selección y traducción de L. PEREÑA, Ediciones De Palma, Buenos Aires 1966, p. 380.

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certainties. The Jesuit Escobar y Mendoza (1589-1669) believed that speculative uncertainty in morality was to be hailed because it made the yoke of the Lord tolerable. The Dominicans Domingo de Soto (14941560) and Thomas de Vio Caietanus (1469-1534) distinguished between speculative and practical uncertainty in order to emphasize the same point. And it was clear for them that there is no sin in speculative uncertainty. But here I would like to point out that that was not in fact the problem. Confessors of all sorts knew that in a number of cases there was no hope of reaching scientific knowledge of what is good and what is evil. So the real trouble for the Jesuits was to reach practical certainty despite the persistence of speculative uncertainty. Maryks has convincingly shown that John Alfonso de Polanco’s Directorio de Confesores (1553) faced this problem. When Peter sat next to his confessor with a dubious conscience, John – who as a confessor had certainly read the Directorio – would recall that Polanco appeals to his heart. From the bottom of his heart the confessor should encourage the penitent to follow ‘the most human course of action’ when speculative uncertainty arises, the only conditions being respect for equality and accommodation to the circumstances of person, time and place. It is well known that Polanco was the personal secretary of Ignatius of Loyola. So, we may confidently say that from the very beginning there was a sense of humanism in the Jesuit ministry that makes an overwhelming difference when compared to the moral rigor of Calvinists, Jansenists and the sort, who were obsessed by the desire of avoiding any risk of sin whatsoever. But what on earth does ‘the most human course of action’ exactly mean? My only clue to deciphering that crucial point is the hypothesis of a preferential option for freedom: ‘In dubio pro libertate’ or as the famous axiom holds ‘lex dubia non obligat’. This means that for a considerable number of Jesuits of those glorious days it was far better to run the risk of wrong-doing than to limit the freedom of conscience of the penitent. This was not done out of temerity but out of utter respect for the moral implications of Ignatius’ understanding of Jesus’ conversation with the Christian soul. «If the king and the kingdom – affirms the quote from Suárez at the top of this section – offer resistance at the same time, I believe that they may be obliged to allow the preachers of the Gospel into their lands». This, in his own words, is the probable opinion ‘p’ of our analysis, and Suárez continues,

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«It is a concession of natural law and may not be denied without just cause. They can also be obliged to allow the preachers to announce the Word of God, without coercion or deceit, to all who wish to hear it; because in moral terms, there will never fail to be some who hear it by their own will».

There can be no contention more liberal or more akin to the subsequent development of international law than agreement with ‘p’: If an entire nation of infidels does not wish to hear the Gospel, and their political authorities prevent me from preaching it in their jurisdiction, it is my duty to find some way to announce the Word of God to them through coercion. In the choice taken by Suárez, coercion need not be applied with harquebus and cannons, but must have a just cause. Freedom, which for Suárez is derived from natural law, prevents the human person from being reduced to servitude with no legitimate title: «Natural law does not stipulate that all men must remain free always […] but only prohibits this being done without the free consent of the man or without just motive and power»6. In the case of ‘p’, people’s freedom is not restricted by obliging them to accept a faith that they do not like, it only restricts the kingdom that is preventing them hear the Gospel message freely. «The perfect political community is free by natural law and is not subject to any man outside it, but the community itself in its entirety has political power that is democratic, unless it changes. However, [a kingdom] can be deprived of such power either by its own will or by whomever has a legitimate and just power to do so»7.

The aim of ‘p’ is not to coerce people but only states, so that they permit the free circulation of beliefs. In this sense, the soundness of the probable opinion ‘p’ agrees fully with natural law, which for Suárez is the freedom and consent of good will8. Now, I would like to add one last point to my appreciation of these interesting topics of ethics and epistemology. At least two great figures of Jesuit probabilism were trained as lawyers. This means that their minds were modelled in that very influential juridical tradition of thought that 6

Ibid., p. 366. Ibid. 8 Ibid., p. 167. 7

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flourished during the so-called Baroque Scholasticism. One of those figures was John Azor, professor of Moral Theology at the Colegio Romano, who took charge of the final version of the Ratio Studiorum (1599) and distinguished between the external jurisdiction of the law and the internal jurisdiction of conscience. The other was Francisco Suárez, who explicitly used well-established external juridical standards for defining the internal rules of probabilism, and in doing so set a pattern of moral reasoning for centuries to come. All of which leads me to conclude that probabilism is a moral system that works itself out of all possible moral uncertainties – and if I may use Kantian language – entirely within the forms of «Legalität», i.e. using heteronomous external maxims, expecting reward and punishment, but nevertheless constantly reminding the moral agent of the unavoidable principle of «Moralität», i.e. reminding the person that the ultimate internal golden rule, the one and only rule that may ultimately assure one of one’s right and duty to perform or to avoid ‘p’, in spite of all other opinions, is the will to do good for the sake of good itself. This would be impossible for anyone unless guided by the grace of freedom. I believe probabilism was a moral system very well designed for coping with the moral doubts of the faithful of his / her own time, but that the Jesuits proved themselves not clever enough in weighing and coping with the dangers of their political environment. I am not sure, however, if probabilism was in fact the main source of the suppression of the Society of Jesus. But this again is history, and therefore not my concern. Finally, from a philosophical point of view, I believe that probabilism may be very well fitted to serve as a rational guide for our troubled times, and this in a manner capable of overcoming the sterile dichotomy of moral absolutism and relativism in which Catholics nowadays seem to be entangled. The system needs to be fully understood, made applicable to current moral debate and palatable to the aesthetics of our time, in order to help reconfiguring the sense and meaning of a Christian good life.

LUÍS EVANDRO HINRICHSEN* THE ART OF HOMILETICS ACCORDING TO ANTÓNIO VIEIRA – A STUDY OF HIS SEXAGESIMA SERMON OR ON THE POWER AND THE REACH OF THE WORD

Introduction A Portuguese-Brazilian Jesuit and diplomat, missionary and political articulator, a brilliant intellectual and incomparable speaker as well as a remarkable rhetorician who was versed in many languages of his time, António Vieira was one of the founders of the modern Portuguese language. This papal and royal preacher granted the Portuguese language a status of maturity, in addition to standing up for Brazilian people and black enslaved populations. Through his letters and sermons, the Portuguese language found its expression and set its identity. In the Sexagesima Sermon, Vieira focuses on the power of the word, describing the structure of a homily and its elements and revealing the root of their effectiveness: Christ, the living Word. He also discusses the reasons for which preaching was no longer effective, especially taking into consideration that he lived in a time teeming with pulpits and devoted preachers. Why then was preaching, including his own, ineffective? Why was it not able to convert hearts and minds, leading to the transformation of morals? These important issues motivated Vieira to reflect and invited many to take steps towards genuine conversion. The Sexagesima Sermon is the sermon on the art of homiletics, the Sermon about the Sermon, and therefore, an excellent starting point for the study of the sermons of this Portuguese-Brazilian scholar.

*

Associate Professor of Philosophy at the Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul, Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Av. Ipiranga 6681, Bairro Partenon, CEP: 90.619 - 900, Porto Alegre / RS, Brasil. luis.hinrichsen@ pucrs.br

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1. Background Information on Vieira António Vieira was born in Lisbon, Portugal, on February 6, 1608; he was the oldest of the seven children of Cristovão Vieira Ravasco and Maria de Azevedo1. In 1623, he joined the novitiate of the Jesuits and went to live in Bahia, Brazil; in 1634, he received the priestly orders. In 1640, John IV was proclaimed King of Portugal, and three years later Vieira submitted a proposal to the King for the Jewish merchants to be admitted in the Kingdom. In 1643, he was appointed Regal Preacher, initiating his diplomatic missions in Europe three years later. In 1649, the Holy Office received the first accusations against Vieira in relation to his heretical ideas and he ran the risk of being expelled from the Holy Church; similar accusations would be made in 1656. In 1653, Vieira is appointed Superior of the Jesuit Missions in Maranhão and Grão-Pará2. Further, in 1656, the demise of Dom João IV and the beggining of the regency of D. Luis de Gusmão, coincide with a new complain against Vieira in the Portuguese Holy Seat. At the end of this period, Vieira ends his tenure as Superior. In 1661, Vieira returned to Portugal and was sent from Lisbon to Porto at first, and then from Porto to Coimbra. He answered the questions asked by the inquisitors and prepared for his defense. During this time he was not allowed to return to Brazil. In 1674, the Pontifical Brief suspended the court of the Portuguese Holy Office, and Dom Pedro II summoned Vieira to come to Lisbon. Then, in 1681, he left for Bahia as the acts of faith had been discontinued. In 1688, Vieira was appointed to visit the Vice-Royalties of Brazil and Maranhão. In 1694, Vieira became blind and partially deaf due to a fall from the stairways in the convent where he lived; from then on, he would have to dictate his letters in order to bring his work to conclusion. In 1697, he submitted the second collection of his Sermons to publication and, probably on July 10, he dictated his last letter. He died on July 18, 1697, at the age of 89.

1 Cf. J. A. HANSEN, Cartas do Brasil, Hedra, São Paulo 1994, pp. 673-675 (Cronologia). 2 At that time there were two Viceroyalties in the Brazilian continent: (i) Viceroyalties of Maranhão Grão Pará and (ii) Viceroyalties of Brazil, constituting two overseas territories belonging to Portugal.

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2. The Sexagesima Sermon3, the Sermon of Sermons After being at the Maranhão Grão-Pará Missions, where he would meet several hardships, António Vieira himself chose the Sexagesima Sermon as the homiletic piece to be preached at the Royal Chapel in 16554. The Royal Chapel was built under the orders of Dom Manoel and was located in the west of the Terreiro do Paço, which would be destroyed in an earthquake in 1755. The preacher explained the reason for his coming to the court: to defend the natives and set them free. The subheading of the Sermon was Semen est verbum Dei5. Although Vieira fought against the then contemporary Enlightenment theories, he believed in the effectiveness of the word, whenever enunciated in a simple and straightforward manner and followed by an attestation, notwithstanding that God would be the one to reap the rewards of the conversion. Vieira’s baroque style is evidenced in his wide use of strategic imagery and metaphors, which he believed were necessary for true understanding. Words can be real, fictitious and concrete, yet polysemous and likely to convey multiple meanings. «They depend on how they are referred to and on how they misrepresent. Reality is the word of reality»6. In other words, as João Adolfo Hansen explains, «According to the tripartite scholastic doctrine, the body, the soul, and reason – images that represent the topics obtained through the 3

Why «Sexagesima» Sermon? Sexagesima, liturgically, indicates the second Sunday of the liturgical period that precedes Lent, i.e., the Sunday fifteen days before the first Sunday of Lent and is, in this case, about the sixtieth day before Easter. Lent indicates the forty days of fasting, which start on Ash Wednesday and extend until Easter Sunday. The title of António Vieira’s sermon does not refer to the subject in question, at least apparently, but to the time it was delivered. Its basic theme is to reveal the Sermon on the sermon, or, rather, a general and formal theory of the sermon, being itself a sermon. This is not just any sermon, but it is the sermon from which all other sermons should be developed or explained. 4 Cf. L. F. NEVES, Vieira e a imaginação jesuítica. Maranhão e Grão Pará no século XVIII, TopBooks, Rio de Janeiro 1997, p. 81. 5 Cf. António Vieira, Sermões I, scientific coordination by A. DO ESPÍRITO SANTO, CEFI – Centro de Estudos de Filosofia – Imprensa Nacional da Casa de Moeda, Lisboa 2008, p. 21 (cf. footnote 2). 6 Cf. NEVES, Vieira e a imaginação jesuítica, p. 95: «Dependem de como a elas se referir, o que nelas se desvirtualiza. A realidade é a palavra da realidade».

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anatomy of materials – are articulated in fantasy as a thought image that embodies and therefore views the concept as an emblem. In other words, discourse as a whole is not substantially different from the way metaphors work. By a process of condensation and hybridization of analogous ghosts, the concept is formed in the mind as a result of relationships of similarity between ideas. The process presupposes pre-existing images, such as matter, and this is ratified by Hobbes: the concept does not arise from an automated imagination; because it is an image, it repeats or emulates images stored in the memory of the author as authorized uses, while the imagination is simply a rearrangement of them»7.

Hence, in the fantastic body of language, mental configurations are presented as interchangeable or permeable to one another, without a clear separation between sign and idea or image and concept. Thus, the speaker drifts via the word from the plane of images and metaphors to the plane of meaning, by creating images through discourse or by making it possible to see through the power of the words, thus making due sense through sounds that build images and metaphors. And he does it profusely. This fact can be noticed in the Sermon which is under study. 3. One Needs to Listen to the Gospel, and Listen to All of It! «What if God wished such distinguished and large audience to be deceived by this preaching today, as they have been by the preacher! Let us listen to the whole Gospel, which is what has led me and brought me so far»8. 7 Cf. HANSEN, Cartas do Brasil, p. 25: «Conforme a tripartição da doutrina escolástica, corpo, alma, razão, as imagens com que representa os temas obtidos pela anatomia das matérias – articulam-se na sua fantasia como um pensamento imagem que encarna e por isso visualiza o conceito como um emblema. Dito doutro modo, o funcionamento do seu discurso como um todo não difere substancialmente do funcionamento da metáfora. Por um processo de condensação e hibridização de fantasmas análogos o conceito se forma na sua mente como resultado de relações de semelhança entre ideias. O processo supõe imagens preexistentes, como matéria, ratificando Hobbes: o conceito não decorre de uma imaginação automizada, pois sendo imagem, repete ou emula imagens armazenadas na memória do autor como usos autorizados, sendo a imaginação, simplesmente, um rearranjo delas». 8 Cf. António Vieira, Sermões I, op. cit., p. 21: «E se quisesse Deus quês este tão ilustre, e tão numeroso auditório saísse hoje tão enganado da pregação, como vem

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Vieira was a missionary coming from the provinces of Maranhão GrãoPará, as well as the Regal preacher at Capela do Paço; he was faithful to the Gospel and wished all would listen to it, to all of it. This was a strategy that invited listeners to really pay attention, not to the one who spoke, but to the message, because he believed the Gospel was worth for its own sake. At the Paço, Vieira preached on Ecce exiit, chi seminat, seminare (Mt 13:3). Christ says that the evangelical preacher came to sow the Word of God. The text on the divine word did not mention only the sowing, but also the coming out to sow (Exiit). The preachers came out, some stayed on the Land of the Mission and did not return. Others returned with fruit a few times, but not always. At the Paço, Vieira spoke about the steps of those who come out to sow. Having to choose between coming back and staying, it is better to stay as it is best to give one’s life to the mission. When wheat is sown, the seeds scatter among stones (insensitive beings), thorns (sensitive beings), and good earth; they can be eaten by birds (living beings) or they can be trampled down by men. If the seed falls on good land, the possibilities are great. Yet, paradoxically, it may sprout, but not grow and bear fruit. There are thorny people, there are stiffened people: the seed has been sown in their hearts, but it does not grow and bear fruit in their numb hearts. Everything these wheat seeds go through was also experienced by the sowers who went to Maranhão, because many had to face hardships, and some never managed to return. Just as there is withered corn, which is eaten, drowned and trampled over, there are also the missionaries of Maranhão who returned from that place stunted from hunger and disease, others drowned while others were devoured by one another. For the sowers, this was glorious because they were withered, drowned, or eaten up, but it was for the sake of God. They were persecuted and trodden down, but for the love of God and His Kingdom. This was the context of the Sexagesima Sermon, delivered at the Paço on the steps taken by the preachers of the Gospel who questioned the passivity of those who do not come out, while they should take steps toward conversion, as in the example of those who gave all to the people, spreading the word at the cost of their lives.

enganado com o pregador! Ouçamos o Evangelho e o ouçamo-lo todo; que todo é o caso que me levou e trouxe de tão longe».

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4. Semen est Verbum Dei (Lc 8:11) «The wheat sowed by the Gospel Preacher says that Christ is the Word of God. The thorns, the Stones, the Path, the Good Earth the wheat fell on, these are the various hearts of men. The thorns are the hearts entangled with cares, riches, and delights where the Word of God drowns. The stones are the hard, obstinate hearts which dry up the word of God, allowing it to sprout yet not to become rooted. The paths are the restless hearts, disturbed by the passage the clatter of the things of the world, those that go, others that come, and still others that come across; all of them pass, and as they do, they trample over the word of God because they disregard or despise it. Finally, the Good Earth are the good hearts or the hearts of good men, and these apprehend and justify the divine word with such fertility and abundance that it is reaped hundredfold: fructum et fecit centuplum (and multiplied by a hundred)»9.

Formerly, when the seed fell on good soil, it would multiply by a hundred; at the time of Vieira, if out of one hundred seeds one sprouted, it would be a reason for rejoicing. There was so much preaching, but so little conversion. Why did preaching yield so little fruit? Would it be caused by God? By the listener? By the preacher? God always dispensed grace; hence the cause would not be God. Neither would it be the listener, because a seed always sprouts, even if it does not develop or yield fruit. Would then this be the preacher’s fault? If there was light (grace) thanks to God, if the doctrine was the mirror, if the subject matter was the word, preaching should be the bridge between the word we understand by grace and the doctrine. But the words of the one who preached affected the listeners’ hearing, which would awaken their views. These views would bear witness 9

Ibid., pp. 27-28: «O trigo que semeou o Pregador do Evangelho, diz Cristo que é a Palavra de Deus. Os espinhos, as Pedras, o Caminho, e a Terra Boa, em que o trigo caiu, são os diversos corações dos homens. Os espinhos são os corações embaraçados com cuidados, riquezas, com delícias; e nestes afoga-se a Palavra de Deus. As pedras são os corações duros, e obstinados; e nestes seca-se a palavra de Deus, e nasce, não cria raízes. Os caminhos são os corações inquietos, e perturbados com a passagem, e tropel das cousas do mundo, umas que vão, outras que vêm, outras que atravessam e outras que atravessam, e todas passam; e nestes é pisada a palavra de Deus, porque a desatendem, ou a desprezam. Finalmente a Terra Boa são os corações bons ou os homens de bom coração; e nestes prende e justifica a palavra divina com tanta fecundidade, e abundância que se colhe cento por um: et fructum fecit centuplum (e multiplicou cento por um)».

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to what was preached. Would the preacher fail to allow the fruit to abound? This hypothesis should be examined. It should be kept in mind that the Word of God shone among us inasmuch as He did all that He said He would do, and He did it until the Passion, His death and resurrection (Ecce homo heard / Ecce homo seen). The word that does not evolve into action and produce fruit is not God’s word. The definition for the word preacher is ‘word’ and ‘example’. This will be further examined below. 5. Structural Elements of the Sermon: the Person, the Knowledge, the Subject Matter, the Style and the Voice Five different circumstances are to be considered in relation to the preacher, namely, the Person, the Knowledge, the Subject Matter, the Style and the Voice, as «The person he is, the knowledge he has, the subject matter he preaches; the style he uses, the voice he projects. All these aspects are in the Gospel. Let us examine one by one as we look for the cause»10. 5.1 The Person What defines a preacher is his life and example, as Christ in the Gospel was not compared to the sower, but to the one who sows, not because the preacher went out to sow, but the one who sows went out to sow11. The sower and the one who sows are different things, as are the preacher and the one who preaches. What do the sower and the preacher sow? It is action. According to Vieira, «Which do you think is the best conception the preacher takes to the pulpit? It is the conception that their life has listeners. Previously, one converted the world; why does one not convert anyone today? This is because words and thoughts are preached today; formerly, words and deeds were preached. Words without work are blank shots; they reverberate but hurt no one»12. 10 Ibid., p. 34: «A pessoa que é; a ciência que tem; a matéria que trata; o estilo que segue; a voz que fala. Todas essas circunstâncias temos no Evangelho. Vamos examinando uma por uma e buscando a causa». 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid., p. 35: «O melhor conceito, que o pregador leva ao púlpito, qual cuidais que é? É o conceito que de sua vida tem os ouvintes. Antigamente, convertia-se o mundo,

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Vieira goes on to say that the very Son of God was both the Word and the Work of God. At that moment in the sermon, our sacred orator displays his baroque style of arguing by resorting to a visual narrative with oppositions between hearing and seeing, and Biblical examples of how the unblemished Preacher was effective in preaching.

5.2 Preaching Style The message, the Word of God, was conveyed by someone, but what was the style used in the pulpit in Vieira’s time? He condemned it as being excessively complex and unnatural as opposed to what would be recommended. The preacher should preach with simplicity, clarity, and spontaneity, thus allowing the seeds to fall and sprout. What are the modes of the sermon? If they consist of letting the seeds fall and sprout, then how should a sermon sprout? «Although four of the sower’s wheat seeds fell, only three of them sprouted: for the sermon to sprout, it must fall in three different modes, namely, the fall itself, the inflection and the story. They must fall with the fall, there must be a pace, and they must fall as a case. The fall is for things, the pace is for the words, the case is for a purpose. The fall is for those things to come in a good way, and they will really fall where they belong; the pace is for the words, because they will not be harsh or dissonant: they will have a rhythm; the case is for the layout, because they are to be so natural and disaffected that it will seem it is a story not a study. Cecidit, cecidit, cecidit»13.

hoje não se converte ninguém? Porque hoje pregam-se palavras, e pensamentos: antigamente, pregavam-se palavras, e obras. Palavras sem obra são tiros sem bala; atroam, mas não ferem». 13 Ibid., p. 40: «O trigo do semeador, ainda que caiu quatro vezes, só de três nasceu: para o sermão vir nascendo, há de ter três modos de cair. Há de cair com a queda, há de cair com cadência, há de cair com caso. A queda para as cousas, a cadência para as palavras, o caso para a disposição. A queda é para as cousas, porque hão-de vir bem trazidas, e em seu lugar: hão de ter queda; a cadência é para as palavras, porque não hão-de ser escabrosas, nem dissonantes: hão-de ter cadência; o caso é para a disposição, porque há de ser tão natural, e tão desafetada, que pareça caso e não estudo. Cecidit, cecidit, cecidit».

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According to our sacred preacher, the sky is the first preacher and consequently there must be sermons and there must be words, for «the heavens proclaim the glory of God and the skies proclaim the work of His hands» (Psalm 18:2). And what are these sermons and these words from heaven? The words are the stars while the sermons are the composition, the order, the harmony and their rhythm14. Therefore, the very cosmic order is paramount, expressing the beauty of the divine Word. The sermon should follow the vocabulary of the pulpit, since it is known that the Purple of Bethlehem is Jerome, not Herod; that the eagle of Africa is Augustine, not Cyprian; and the golden mouth is Chrysostom, not Midas. The sequence of antonomasias, which Vieira deconstructed, is based on the Biblical and Patristic Tradition. When preaching, the preacher must announce the Word without exaggeration, with simplicity and clarity, in accordance with the tradition. This is what Vieira teaches. 5.3 The Subject Matter of the Preaching One topic and one subject matter alone should be dealt with. No extra comments, because the Gospel touches upon a large number of issues, and those who aim at too many targets end up with nothing. By avoiding the use of glossing, the speaker selects a single subject, which is explained in various ways in order to be understood. Imagine a crop in which wheat is sown over wheat, rye over rye, barley over barley, and also maize, for example. What will there be for the harvest? Just an area of wild growth15. Hence, the sermon should have one single color, one single object, one single subject matter, because «the preacher is to choose one subject, to make it known, to break it down, to come up with evidence from the Scripture, to substantiate it through reasoning and examples, to multiply it with the causes, the effects, the circumstances and conveniences [...]»16. 14

Ibid. Ibid., p. 44. 16 Ibid., p. 45: «Há-de tomar o pregador uma só matéria; há de defini-la para que se conheça; há de dividi-la para que se distinga; há que prová-la com a Escritura; há-de confirmá-la com a razão; há de confirmá-la com o exemplo; há-de multiplicá-la com as causas, os efeitos, com as circunstâncias, com as conveniências [...]». 15

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The master of the art of homiletics hereby provides the key to the correct composition of the sermon, syllogistically displayed, proven through the Scripture and confirmed with life. The roots of the Sermon are in the Gospel, the trunk is the subject of the Sermon, and from the trunk the twigs, branches, flowers and fruit sprout. As said earlier in this text, this is because the announcement is effective when the subject is chosen from and nourished by the trunk of the Gospel, according to Vieira.

5.4 The Knowledge of the Gospel Are a number of preachers by any chance lacking in knowledge? If they live on what they do not know, as it seems they do, they sow what they are not familiar with. When they acclaim temperance but do not put any effort into becoming virtuous, they preach what they are unaware of. There is knowledge when they preach with their own weapons. As we cannot fish with the nets of others, we must preach with our life. Preaching is not to recite, since reasons spring from understanding, which promotes life and resides in the heart17.

5.5 Speak Smoothly, Close to the Ear The preacher should argue but not shout, even though the Baptist did it – we must take his, and our own, audience into consideration. The preacher is not to bawl, but will speak with a voice so mild that it will not be heard from the outside. The preacher will argue, explain, clarify, and move, leaving doubts for those who hear to wonder and by wondering to be transformed. In conclusion, the preachers should not be «the cause for today’s preaching the words of God not to yield fruit, nor the Person’s condition: Qui Seminat; nor the style: seminare; nor the subject matter: semen; nor the science: suum; nor the voice: Clamabat. Moses had a weak voice; Amos had a coarse style; Salomon multiplied and varied the topics; Balaam had no examples 17

Ibid., pp. 47-50.

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of life: his energy had no science; nevertheless, all of them persuaded and convinced people by talking to them»18.

But if none of these reasons presented above – individually or jointly – is the main cause, which is then the real reason for people not to hear the Word of God in Vieira’s time?

6. Vieira’s Answers «The words that I have chosen as the topic say: Semen est verbum Dei. Do you know, Christians, the reason why there is so little fruit with so many sermons today? It is because words are the words of preachers, but they are not the words of God»19. «Let us preach, and let us arm ourselves against sin, against arrogance, against hatred, against ambition, against envy, against greed, against sensualities. View Heaven on Earth, such as those who are integrated in it. Know that there is still hell on earth those who will make war with the Word of God, and know that the same Earth is still in a state to flourish and bear much fruit: Et fecit fructum centuplum»20.

By sowing wind, by preaching vanity, by refusing to preach the Word, the Church of God will reap storm instead of fruit. Words of God are preached, but not the Word of God. Even Satan knows the Scriptures, 18

Ibid., p. 53: «que a causa de não fazerem hoje fruto os pregadores com as palavras de Deus, nem é a circunstância da Pessoa: Qui Seminat; nem a do estilo: seminare, nem a da matéria: semen; nem a da ciência: suum; nem a da voz: Clamabat. Moisés tinha fraca voz; Amós tinha grosseiro estilo; Salomão multiplicava e variava os assuntos; Balaão não tinha exemplos de vida; o seu animo não tinha ciência; e, contudo, todos esses falando, e persuadiam e convenciam». 19 Ibid.: «As palavras que tomei por tema o dizem: Semen est verbum Dei. Sabeis, cristãos, a causa por que hoje faz tão pouco fruto com tantas pregações? É porque as palavras dos pregadores são palavras, mas não são Palavras de Deus». 20 Ibid., p. 62: «Preguemos, e armemo-nos contra os pecados, contra as soberbas, contra os ódios, contra as ambições, contra as envejas, contra as cobiças, contra as sensualidades. Veja o céu que ainda tem na Terra quem se põe da sua parte. Saiba o inferno que ainda há na Terra quem lhe faça guerra com a Palavra de Deus: e saiba a mesma Terra que ainda está em estado de reverdecer, e dar muito fruto: Et fecit fructum centuplum».

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but they were distorted before Jesus, tempting Him. If the words of the Scriptures are distorted, they become weapons of the devil21. We must take the words for what they mean and not according to our interests. And in case of perjury, attributing things not found in the Scriptures to God, the Word is denied. If our imagination, our vanity and fable prevail, the Word of God is forgotten. It does not suffice to wear coarse outfits or do penance since, if the preacher preaches to please others, to be acknowledged, to display vanity, one goes from the theater to the pulpit, forgetting the reason for being there, neither fulfilling his mission nor announcing the Word22. The preaching that builds, the preaching that bears fruit, the preaching that is effective, this is the kind of preaching that brings about changes, that raises questions leading people to think23. With their sermons, the preachers should not intend to make people feel happy when they leave, but for them to feel unhappy about themselves; not for them to find the ideas being preached good, but for them to find fault in their habits, in their lives, their ambitions, i.e., their sins24, Vieira concludes. However, the effectiveness of the preaching depends on God’s gift, on God’s grace. Yet the preacher must collaborate, witnessing what they believe in, announcing not words, but The Word, The Word of God, our Lord Jesus Christ.

Concluding Remarks: Thinking with Vieira The propaedeutical aim of this study was to follow Vieira’s text, learning from his outlook. Starting from the Sexagesima seemed appropriate as it deals with the Art of Homiletics: the Sermon of Sermons. We believe we have learned something useful in this short journey. At the Paço, Vieira invited members of the assembly to take steps towards conversion, following the example of the missionaries in Maranhão. Within this framework, the answer is practical, because what is at stake is the cause of the natives, routinely enslaved, dispossessed, acculturated. 21 22 23 24

Ibid., p. 54. Ibid., p. 57. Ibid., p. 61. Ibid.

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Vieira has built vivid and generous images, through which we can better understand what reaches our ears. The repertoire consisted of images, metaphors and meanings with a narrative of baroque style which places Vieira in his time. Vieira was familiar with the ars rhetorica of Aristotle and Seneca, and mentioned the Church Fathers thoroughly. He was also fluent in several languages, both Classical and Biblical, and displayed a careful and erudite command of Portuguese. He read the Biblical texts through the Fathers of the Church, including Augustine; however, he made it knowingly, since he had read the Christian Doctrine. Was this Sermon influenced by Suárez? Was Vieira eclectic? What are the methods he used to interpret the Holy Scripture? These questions require further investigation. There are symbols in the Gospel that need to be interpreted. We read verses and pericopes in their contexts not to betray or exaggerate the meanings in the text; therefore, we must read the sacred text with renewed care and attention. In these recommendations, Vieira indicates elements of exegesis and hermeneutics that were neglected in his time because unthinkable things were attributed to God. We cannot justify our arbitrariness simply by referring our reasoning to God through clumsy interpretation of the Sacred Scripture. And Vieira experienced that before the Inquisition, when he was arrested in Coimbra. What was the preacher missing? Was it the style? Was it the voice? Was it a subject? Was it science? What lacked was sowing the Word of God and not thoughts and words or words and thoughts. Does this mean that we should not use intelligence at the service of constructing? It does not seem to be the case. Yet, it is not enough to have just a well built sermon which is dissonant in relation to life, in which the Word of God (The Word) is put aside. However, despite the qualities or the faults of the preacher, despite his courage or weakness, the Spirit wafts anywhere. The fruit of the preaching depends essentially on the Word of God, on His Will. Vieira was born in Portugal, a man of his time who wanted to evangelize the natives of Maranhão and Grão Pará in their own languages; he wished they could maintain their territories and wanted to protect them and link them to the Kingdom of Portugal; he dreamed of the temporal and eschatological greatness of Portugal. He lived a longer life than he expected, up to the age of 89. He wrote profusely and dictated until the end of his life. Due to the beauty and truthfulness of his texts, he has outlived

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his days and has been appreciated to present time. His Portuguese writing is beautiful, unparalleled. I believe one’s language is one’s country; hence, Vieira has given us our country. Nowadays we relish the language Vieira has helped to construct, a language that we have received from this Lisbonborn Brazilian.

ÉMILIEN VILAS BOAS REIS* THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL FORMATION OF ANTÓNIO VIEIRA

Introduction Fernando Pessoa (1888-1935), the greatest modern poet of the Portuguese language has said that the Luso-Brazilian Jesuit António Vieira (1608-1697) was «the great writer of the Portuguese language». In his work «Mensagem», in «O encoberto: III – Os avisos – Antônio Vieira» Pessoa declaims his admiration in calling upon Vieira’s excellence as a reference to all Portuguese poetry: «O céu ‘strella o azul e tem grandeza./ Este, que teve a fama e à gloria tem,/ Imperador da língua portuguesa,/ Foi-nos um céu também». It is known that Vieira was born in Portugal and lived 40 of his 89 years in Europe, but it is also clear that he was educated in Brazil and spent half his life, including his last years, in the colony. This justifies the choice of the term «Luso-Brazilian» to identify the author. Vieira is an interesting case in the difficult and debated question of the existence of an original Brazilian philosophical thought, which will not be discussed in this paper. António Vieira was not a theologian or a philosopher by profession, but the thesis that will be defended is that throughout his writings it is possible to identify some philosophical and theological insights. There have been several attempts to label Vieira as a philosopher. Some interpretations posit Vieira as a representative of the Portuguese Aristotelianism, particularly Cerqueira1. Another interesting suggestion is Paulo Margutti’s interpretations2, associating Vieira to an eclectic thought, *

Associate Professor of Philosophy at the Escola Superior de Ensino Dom Helder Câmara (ESDHC), Rua Álvares Maciel 628, Santa Efigênia, CEP: 30.150 - 250, Belo Horizonte / MG, Brasil. [email protected] 1 Cf. L. A. CERQUEIRA, A filosofia brasileira como superação do aristotelismo português, disponível em . Access in October, 2015. 2 Cf. P. R. MARGUTTI PINTO, «O Padre Antônio Vieira e o pensamento filosófico brasileiro», Síntese, 35:112 (2008) 167-188.

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which aggregates skepticism, stoicism and salvationism. Finally, Manuel Candido Pimentel3, proposes a prophetic thought in a philosophical and theological sense, mainly based on the works História do futuro and Clavis Prophetarum. Such interpretations are important in trying to check a philosophical and theological thinking in Vieira. But the the hypothesis advanced here is that one needs to look more closely at his sermons in order to find a philosophical and theological thought, as Vieira did not intend to write treatises. In his prophetic works, it is easier to detect a thought that is meant to be original, but there is enough unexplored material in his Sermons, which must be treated as true mosaics. However, in order to get into an interpretation of the author’s thought it is necessary to historically contextualize our endeavour. In this sense, it is interesting to study the Society of Jesus, its foundation and its founder, Ignatius of Loyola, as the educational mission is one of the most striking aspects of this religious Order to which António Vieira belonged. Thus, an explanation about the Jesuit teaching method becomes quite relevant, as this method is, in fact, Vieira’s educational background. At this particular point, it is important to mention the Ratio Studiorum, the official document of the Jesuits for teaching. Once the historical context wherein Vieira appears is clear, it will be possible to note, in two of the many sermons written by Vieira, the way in which the orator builds his reasoning in dialogue with the philosophical tradition and Christian theology, verifying philosophical and theological thoughts and insigths.

1. Saint Ignatius of Loyola and the Society of Jesus The importance of Ignatius of Loyola can be measured by Menéndez y Pelayo’s words: «That gentleman viscount, hurt by God, as Israel, whom God called upon to raise against the Reform an army more powerful than all the armies of Charles V. [...] it is the most vivid embodiment of the 3

Cf. M. C. PIMENTEL, De Chronos a Kairós: caminhos filosóficos de Padre Antônio Vieira, Ideias e Letras, Aparecida 2008, p. 102.

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Spanish spirit in its Golden Age. No military commander, no wise man had a more powerful influence in the world. If half of Europe is not Protestant, its mainly due to the Society of Jesus»4.

Even if there is some hyperbole in the extract above, one can not fail to notice that Ignatius was a man of his time. He was Spanish, a former military and creator of the Society of Jesus, which will greatly influence Western culture. Some emblematic features are presented in this enigmatic figure: «courtier and nobleman, soldier and commander, student and teacher, ascetic and mystic»5. The last child among 13, his parents were Beltrán Yánez and Marina Sáenz. He was named Íñigo López de Loyola and born in the mountains of Guipúzcoa, in the Loyola’s castle in the Basque region in Spain, probably in 14916. It is known that his father «Beltrán was a generous knight, a great soldier, and he served briliantly to King Henry IV, of the Catholic Kings, and also the King of Navarre (and Aragon) D. Juan II, father of the Catholic»7. The name Íñigo is a common Spanish name widely used in the Middle Ages. According to García-Villoslada, Íñigo, «during university studies in Paris, latinized his name [...]. It is a strange fact, because Ignatius is not the translation of Íñigo, nor the name Ignatius was common in Europe of his time. His preference may be explained due to a devotion to S. Ignatius of Antioch»8. 4

Cf. R. GARCÍA-VILLOSLADA, Santo Inácio de Loyola, Edições Loyola, São Paulo 1991, p. 37: «Aquele fidalgo vascongado, ferido por Deus como Israel, e a quem Deus suscitou para levantar contra a Reforma um exército mais poderoso do que todos os exércitos de Carlos V [...] é a mais viva personificação do espírito espanhol na sua Idade de Ouro. Nenhum chefe militar, nenhum sábio influiu mais poderosamente no mundo. Se meia Europa não é protestante, deve-o principalmente à Companhia de Jesus». 5 Cf. W. V. BANGERT, História da Companhia de Jesus, trad. J. dos S. ABRANCHES – A. M. LAGO DA SILVA, Edições Loyola, São Paulo 1985, p. 11: «cortesão e fidalgo, soldado e comandante, estudante e mestre, asceta e místico». 6 Cf. GARCÍA-VILLOSLADA, Santo Inácio de Loyola, p. 37: «Nem o dia nem o ano nos são conhecidos de ciência certa; mas dispomos de alguns indícios que nos movem a aceitar como data assaz segura o ano de 1491 (1º de junho?)». 7 «De Henao» apud GARCÍA-VILLOSLADA, Santo Inácio de Loyola, p. 57: «Beltrán foi cavaleiro generoso, grande soldado, e militou esforçadamente alguns anos a serviço do rei D. Henrique IV, dos Reis Católicos, e também do rei de Navarra (e Aragão) D. Juan II, pai do Católico». 8 Ibid., p. 72: «[...] durante os estudos universitários em Paris, latinizará este nome [...] Fato estranho, pois Ignatius não é a tradução de Íñigo, nem o nome Inácio

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In 1506, shortly after the death of his wife, D. Beltrán had received an offer from an old friend named D. Juan Velázquez de Cuéllar, a wealthy and benevolent man. The friend decides to take Ignatius, who at the time was 15 years old. Velázquez offers him shelter and education in Arévalo9. Thus, Ignatius had a few options to regarding his future fate: He could be a priest, a knight, or work in a public office. He chose for the third option. For 11 years Ignatius had a formal education which allowed him to have good habits and, through the influence of his teacher, to be nominated to some important places in the government10. The sudden death of Velázquez, however, forces Ignatius to change his plans. The young Spaniard loses an important tutor that could have sent him for a bureaucratic career. The solution was to follow knighthood. Velázquez’s wife, Maria Velasco, suggests that Loyola should serve the Duke of Nájera11. Loyola participates in various conflicts on behalf of the Duke. The most important will be the one where he fell severely wounded, decisively changing his fate: On June 20, 1521 in a conflict against the French in the region of Pamplona, the border between Spain and France, after falling under heavy artillery, Loyola suffered serious physical injuries: a cannon shot hits one of his legs, breaking it in several parts. Defeated and outnumbered, he surrenders his troops to the French12. According to Bangert, «The French treated the wounded opponent with the delicate courtesy that his bravery deserved, offering to carry him into a litter to Loyola. But the delicacy does not include the surgery, which miserably failed when they tried to join the bones of his leg»13. Arriving at Loyola, because of the first botched surgery, which left a huge lump on his leg, Ignatius requested further surgery, more painful than the first. In era comum na Europa de seu tempo. Buscou-se a explicação desta preferência pela forma Ignatius na devoção a Sto. Inácio de Antioquia». 9 Ibid., p. 82. 10 Ibid., p. 99. 11 Ibid., p. 118. 12 Ibid., p. 158. 13 Cf. BANGERT, História da Companhia de Jesus, p. 14: «Os franceses trataram o adversário ferido com a delicada cortesia que a sua bravura lhe mereceu, prontificandose a transportá-lo em liteira para Loyola. Mas não estava a par dessa delicadeza a competência cirúrgica; que lastimosamente faltou quando tratou de unir os ossos da perna».

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Loyola’s own words: «It was a carnage»14. Despite the suffering, he had a slow but good recovery. During his recovery, he reads the work Vita Christi of Ludolph of Saxony, translated by Ambrose Montesino. The work has such impact on his imagination that it forever changes his life. In this work, Christ is presented as a Captain and his followers as knights. In this work, we will also find the name that will be the sake of the order: Jesuits. Thus said Ludolph: «The name Christ is the name of grace, but the name of Jesus is the name of glory, because, as in this present life, by grace, Christians are called by this name of Christ, so also in celestial glory will be the saints called Jesuits, which means saved by virtue of the Savior»15.

In the same period, Ignatius had found a very popular medieval edition of the life of many saints, called Legenda aurea, written by the Dominican Iacobus de Voragine16. Ignatius now understands the saints as «Knights of God», and seeks to join their ranks as a warrior of God. As Ignatius said himself: «Christ is King; Saints are their riders, and the human soul is a hard fought battle between God and Satan»17. Loyola decides to become a religious man. After donating all his personal property, he will make a pilgrimage to the holy land. Finally, he decides to go back to Barcelona to study Latin with the humanist Jerome Ardèvol. Schooling will then become paramount to Inácio’s worldview18, and play a major role in the religious order he will found. After two years, Loyola goes to Alcalá, to the University of Jiménez de Cisneros, to advance his studies in grammar. However, at the beginning of 14

Ibid. «Ludolph of Saxony» apud GARCÍA-VILLOSLADA, Santo Inácio de Loyola, p. 167: «O nome Christo é nome de graça; mas o nome Jesus é nome de glória; porque, assim como nesta vida presente, pela graça, os cristãos são chamados com este nome de Cristo, assim também na glória celestial serão os santos chamados jesuítas, que quer dizer salvos por virtude do salvador». 16 Ibid., p. 168. 17 «S. Ignatius of Loyola» apud BANGERT, História da Companhia de Jesus, p. 15: «Cristo é Rei; os Santos são os seus cavaleiros, e a alma humana é o campo de batalha renhido entre Deus e Satanás». 18 Cf. GARCÍA-VILLOSLADA, Santo Inácio de Loyola, p. 261. 15

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his studies he did not give academia so much importance, his attitude was clearly not one of a student. He criticized Albert the Great, Peter Lombard and other masters19. His way of life begins to draw the attention of the population and the authorities20, causig some trouble with the Inquisition and Loyola decides to leave Spain and move to study in Paris. This occurred in 1528. Upon arriving in France, he studies Latin, grammar and humanities. He attends Montaigu College, where it also studied the reformer John Calvin. He will write in his «Rule for students»: «And consider that the studies, embraced with all truths [...] require a sense of the whole man: and at the same time understand that devoting themselves to the study of the pure intent of the divine service will not be less grateful, Before Our Lord in their time, the mortifications, prayers and necessary meditations»21.

After great preparation, Loyola enters the School of Arts at 38. He chooses Juan de La Peña as master and has as friends and as order’s brothers Pedro Faber and Francisco Xavier. In 1529, it is known that Loyola studied the Summulae, a text on logic attributed to Peter of Spain, which contained extracts from the works of Aristotle and Porphyry. In the following two years, it was necessary to study other works: «Now, instead of Summulae, it was studied the Aristotelian logic in its Latin version: Ars vetus, which consisted of Porphyry’s Isagoge, 19

Cf. BANGERT, História da Companhia de Jesus, p. 22. Then explain J. W. O’MALLEY, Os primeiros jesuítas, transl. by D. A. DONIDA, Editora Unisinos – EDUSC, São Leopoldo – Bauru 1993, p. 51: «Rumores logo se espalharam de que esses homens vestidos de ‘roupas de saco’ eram alumbrados. Os ‘iluminados’, adeptos de um movimento especialmente difundido em Castilha, que exaltava a procura da perfeição espiritual por meio da iluminação interna, foram perseguidos pelas autoridades temerosas desses pseudomísticos, que desprezavam as expressões mais tradicionais de piedade. Os rumores acerca de Inigo e seus amigos chamaram, dessa maneira, a atenção muitas vezes da Inquisição de Toledo, que levou Inigo a passar 42 dias na prisão enquanto esperava um veredito. Embora fossem considerados inocentes, ele e seus companheiros foram admoestados a se vestir como os outros estudantes e a não falar em público sobre assuntos religiosos antes de ter completado mais quatro anos de estudo». 21 «Iparraguire» apud GARCÍA-VILLOSLADA, Santo Inácio de Loyola, p. 300. 20

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beyond the Categories and the Perihermeneias of the Stagirite; the new Logica included Aristotle’s books not known in the time of Abelard (Topics, The Casts, First Analytics and Second Analytics) and, finally, De anima»22.

It should be noted that Aristotle was the greatest philosophical authority in universities. The same authoritative status will remain in Loyola’s formation. After completing his studies in philosophy, Ignatius began his theological studies. The studies took place in the convent of the Jacobites. According to García-Villoslada: «The teachers whose lessons he could follow for some time would be Mateo Ory O.P, John Benoit and Thomas Laurency O.P. The doctrine taught was St. Thomas, sticking faithfully to the Summa theologica, according to the tradition of that convent since the times of Peter Crockaert and Francisco de Vitoria».

There is a fact that is not related to academic training, but very important for Loyola. In this era of studies in Paris, Íñigo, as we said above, changes his name permanently. «Master Peña signed up on his list the name of the new student of ‘Sainte-Barbe’. He put the date as ‘feast of St. Remigius’ (1st October 1529). But how did he write the name? Not Iñigo, because they did not tolerate the vernacular: latinization was mandatory. Inicus, Enecus, Ennecus were medieval forms unfit at the time of the Renaissance. Loyola decided to call himself Ignatius, pronounced Inhacius, which offered some resemblance to his baptismal name»23.

The devotion to S. Ignatius of Antioch may also justify the change of name to Ignatius. In 1537, after the end of the philosophical and theological studies, Ignatius named «Society of Jesus» the new order he created with his peers. He wanted to denote friendship with Jesus, which they wished to possess. He was the captain of this new company.

22 23

Ibid., p. 326. Ibid., p. 320.

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2. The Jesuit Training and Education The education is in the foundation of Society of Jesus. In the Constitutions of the Society of Jesus (1547) written by Ignatius of Loyola, one of the first documents of the Company, divided into 10 parts, there is a Fourth Part called: «Del instruir en letras y en otros medios de ayudar a los prójimos los que se retienen en la Compañía», a program of instructions for the formal training of students. García-Villoslada summarizes this Fourth Part as it follows: «Here Ignatius determines everything that regards the rules of Colleges and Universities, and the moral, literary, philosophical and theological formation of the students»24. Leonel Franca, also commenting on the Fourth Part, states that: «In it the founder wrote the guidelines of didactic organization and especially underlined the spirit that should animate all the pedagogical activity of the order»25. The reach of such doctrine over the entire order should be definitive, as the same Leonel Franca said: «It is easy to predict the decisive influence that a document of such nature, coming from S. Ignatius’s own pen, will exercise in any future development of Jesuit education»26. The stress given to education by the founder of the new order was primarly practical: how would those venturing into the Society of Jesus be formed? Ignatius will accept the suggestion of Diego Laínez, one of his companions, creating housing in university towns for students of the Company. In 1544, there were seven homes in Europe: Paris, Louvain, Cologne, Padua, Alcalá, Valencia and Coimbra27. At first the training would be restricted to those who entered the order, but an event in Spain involving the Duke of Gandia, Francisco de Borja, called the attention of the secular public to the newly created Jesuit schools. «In 1545, Francisco de Borja founded in that city a college for the training of Jesuit scholastics. The dean organized some public acts of philosophical debates, which would impress the families of the city, which sought permission for their children to attend the 24 25

Ibid., p. 483. Cf. L. FRANCA, O método pedagógico dos jesuítas, Agir, Rio de Janeiro 1952,

p. 16. 26 27

Ibid. Cf. O’MALLEY, Os primeiros jesuítas, p. 317.

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classes. Borja recomended the claim, and in 1546 the Founder gave consent. Two years later, the College opened a humanities course for the youth in Gandia»28.

Another remarkable event on the creation of schools for the lay occurred in Messina, Sicily. «[...] the Vice King John of Veja, a personal friend of Ignatius, in the desire to raise the religious and cultural life of the island, urged with the City Council who asked the General Company of the founding of a school for the youth of the city. Ignatius, responded immediately by sending ten carefully chosen Jesuits [...] With this formal inauguration of the college of Messina in October 1548, the Company opened its first school in Europe, primarily intended for lay students»29.

The number of schools will increase rapidly. Between 1540 and 1556 nearly 50 colleges were founded. Ignatius and the Company could not leave aside this new apostolate. They saw the opportunity to serve through education, «on December 01, 1551 he wrote a circular letter to the entire Company, recommending the establishment of colleges in Europe». Turning to the Fourth Part of the «Constitutions of the Society of Jesus», in Chapter V entitled: «De lo que los escolares de la Compañía han de Estudiar» there is the following contents for graduation: [351] «las Letras de Humanidad de diversas lenguas y la Lógica y Filosofía Natural y Moral, Metafísica y Teología escolástica y positiva, y la Escritura Sacra». The several languages that could be studied in Logic and Natural Philosophy were Latin, Greek and Hebrew. Such document, however, was an embryo for the one that would become the official document of the order on an educational level: the Ratio Studiorum (1599). In the year of its creation, the Jesuits counted with 293 colleges, 37 of which were in the provinces30. It is important to return a few years before the end of the document. In 1581, Father Claudius Acquaviva becomes the 5th Superior General of the Society of Jesus. He thought of a plan for a draft that would make a 28 29 30

Cf. BANGERT, História da Companhia de Jesus, p. 39. Ibid., p. 40. Cf. FRANCA, O método pedagógico dos jesuítas, p. 12.

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universal teaching plan for the order, but only in 1584 he was able to put his idea into practice. He appointed a committee of six members to prepare it. The committee took nine months to comply with the determination. In 1586, Acquaviva sent the document to the superiors of all the provinces, in order to receive an opinion on the text. The received comments were compiled in the form of a single document called Juditia et observationes. Two points raised by the document regarded sent about the ambiguity and redundancy of the text31. In 1591 the Superior General brings together a number of distinguished men, among them Roberto Bellarmino and Francisco Suárez, to improve the document. Between 1594 and 1598, new comments were sent on the text. After several adjustments, in January 1599, Father Acquaviva through «a document communicate to all provinces of the definitive edition of Ratio atque Institutio Studiorum Societatis Jesu»32. Some observations about the Ratio Studiorum should be made now. The analysis begins with the most basic formations towards the upper formations. The first study area corresponded to the «humanistic curriculum» called «lower classes», a kind of elementary and high school. There were five subjects: (1) Rhetoric, (2) Humanities, (3) Superior Grammar, (4) Average Grammar, and (5) Lower Grammar. The order of studies occurred in the number 5 to number 1. In order to advance to the next level the student should have studied the discipline before as a requirement. The objective of (5) «Lower Grammar» was to develop the «perfect knowledge of the elements of grammar, and initial syntax. It begins with the declinations and goes to the construction of common verbs». The students should translate small texts from Latin into the vernacular and vice and versa. Easy texts by Cicero were used. The purpose of the (4) «Average Grammar» is «knowledge, even if imperfect, of all grammar.» At this level, the study of Greek begins. Texts by Cicero and Ovid were used, as well as the Greek Catechism and the tabula of Cebes. The purpose of the (3) «Advanced Grammar» is «perfect knowledge of Grammar» and a breakthrough in the study of Greek. At this point, 31 32

Ibid., p. 18-20. Ibid., p. 22.

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some works are studied, among others, from Cicero and Virgil for the improvement of the Latin language, and contact with the works of St. Chrysostom and Aesop, for example, are provided to establish familiarity with the Greek language. The «Humanities» preparing the «land of eloquence.» The Latin authors that served as support were Cicero, with his morals treatises, Virgil with his Aeneid, and Horace, among others. Easier speeches from Socrates, Plato, Plutarch, St. John Chrysostom and St. Basil were used as well. The «Rhetoric» had as its main purpose the «perfect training for eloquence which embraces the two highest faculties, oratory and poetic [...] and it answers not only to what is useful but also the beauty of expression. In general, however, it can be said that it covers three main points: rules of oratory, style and erudition.» The paradigmatic authors were Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian. The second major area for training is the philosophical area. It covered three subareas: (1) Philosophy, (2) Moral Philosophy and (3) Mathematics. Philosophy was a preparation for theology. The main author was Aristotle, up to the point when his thinking enters conflict with the Christian «true faith». With this conflict, the student should base their view in the Lateran Council. Interpretation of Aristotle who were contrary to the Christian faith, such as Averroes, should not be studied. Aquinas should be studied with respect and followed up when his opinion is acceptable. The Philosophy course was divided in three years. In the first year it should be studied (A) Logic by Francisco de Toledo (1532-1596) and Pedro da Fonseca (1528-1599). The scientific status and the object of study of logic, the universals and the predicates in Aristotle, as well as a study of the First analytics, were the main topics of research. In the second year of Philosophy the study was about (B) Physics. The studied books were «the eight books of Physicorum, the books of De Caelo and the First Book of De generatione». In De caelo issues were related to the substance and the influence of the sky. In this year, math classes were also taught. The last year of philosophy was a study on Book II of De generatione, a study on the De anima, and a study on the work Metaphysics, mainly Books VII and XII, without entering on the question of God and the minds, which would depend on the revealed truths. The moral philosophy should be taught in the third year. The basic texts are Aristotle’s works on the Ethics.

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The last four years of training were devoted to theological studies, considered the most important. The studies were divided into: (a) Scripture, (b) Hebrew Language, (c) Scholastic Theology and (d) Moral Theology. The study of Sacred Scriptures taught reading methods and recommendations for interpretation. The study of the Hebrew language aimed to allow the reading of the original large part of the Sacred Scriptures. Scholastic Theology was taught with its lead author, Thomas Aquinas. However, that did not mean the impossibility of opposition. In these cases, it was allowed to follow other Catholic authors. The core book for the course was the Summa theologica. Regarding Moral Theology, its purpose was good training of the clergy. The Sacraments, the Decalogue, Canon Law, and other topics were studied. The return of classical studies and the thought of Thomas Aquinas is a hallmark of the Jesuit study method: «The Ratio Studiorum tried to christianize ancient Greek and Latin, especially Cicero and Virgil, prefering St. Thomas Aquinas over the Books of the Sentences by Peter Lombard until then the official manual, which was seen as a very limiting scholastic»33. As well remembered by Chacon citing Serafim Leite: «It was this method that both contributed to form Corneille, Molière, Descartes, Montesquieu and Voltaire in France, Cervantes, Calderón de La Barca and Lope de Vega in Spain, in Italy Tasso and Vico, and many more worldwide, including in Brazil since the first century of colonization up with master thesis defenses in Arts, humanities, in schools, in the sense of the medieval college, and not mere secondary schools in Salvador, Bahia and Olinda, Pernambuco, later in Rio de Janeiro»34.

It is this Jesuit pedagogy which will form the future Jesuit Father António Vieira.

33

Cf. V. CHACON, «Ratio Studiorum: Contra-reforma ilustrada», in L. A. CERQUEIRA (org.), Aristotelismo, antiaristotelismo – Ensino de filosofia, Editora Ágora da Ilha, Rio de Janeiro 2000, p. 29. 34 Ibid., pp. 30-31.

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3. The Figure of António Vieira António Vieira was born in Lisbon on 6 February 1608. At six Vieira and his family depart to Brazil, more specifically to Bahia. It will be in Brazil that Vieira will receive his first formal instruction. According to biographer João Lúcio de Azevedo: «The Jesuit College was the main if not the only focus of intellectual life in the state. There Antônio Vieira received his literary education. Besides the school of first letters for children, and theological education for students, which he had already received in the Order, he had preparatory classes for arts and humanities to the outsiders. Among these were elected priests by vocation, talent, fortune or social position judged valuable to acquire such knowledge [...] This was the case of Antônio Vieira, who one night left home to school, where he was received by the dean, Father Fernão Cardim [...]. This was May 5, 1623; Vieira was then fifteen. The next day he started the novitiate»35.

It is interesting to perceive that the excellent future speaker was not a brilliant student. On the contrary, he «misunderstood, found memorization to be hard, had difficulties to write compositions, he was a mediocre student [...]»36. However, with the passage of time, Vieira’s skills started to appear and were soon noticed by his preceptors. On May 6, 1625, after two years of novitiate, Vieira made vows of poverty, obedience and chastity, as required by Loyola, effectively becoming a student. Together with these three votes, he was also entrusted the duty to support the education of young people. He went to the college of Olinda to teach rhetoric. Superior Priests, realizing the mastery of word of the young novice, commission him to write annual reports, called «Carta ânua»37. Little is known about Vieira’s life in the following years, but it is possible to deduce that he remained the next eight years studying philosophy and theology in accordance to the guidelines of the Ratio Studiorum, until the 35

Cf. J. LÚCIO DE AZEVEDO, História de Antônio Vieira, Alameda Casa Editorial, São Paulo, Vol. I, 2008, p. 22. 36 Ibid., p. 23. 37 Ibid., p. 43.

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end of 1634. According to João Lúcio de Azevedo, he was a distinguished student in the study of philosophy38. The logical classes were disputes in Latin language. According to Caramuel, a student at Vieira’s time, the disputes were divided in schools «Zenonians, Platonists, Aristarchians, Aristotelians, and also Dionysians, Ambrosians, Augustinians, Bernardines or Thomists, Scotists and more [...]»39. This list provides a coverage that the Ratio enables to be studied. The authors and participants of these schools will be used to exhaustion by Vieira in his writings. The study of so many subjects will shape the author’s argumentative shrewdness. Without any pretense of originality, Vieira used the classics as a starting point for his reflections. Azevedo draws attention to the lack of study of Greek and Hebrew at the College of Bahia. Quotes of Greek texts probably had as source Latin translations, rather than the original texts40. Before starting to participate in missions, Vieira exercised the preachings he would be eventually famous for performing. The first sermons were issued in the final years of his theological training. Such sermons have contained the qualities and defects that characterize Vieira’s homilies at all times: «Erudition, grand style, number, remarkable property of language, elegance and purity, and, on the other hand the abuse of allegories, of antithesis, the subtleties, puns, mannerisms, which inflamed the literature of the time, and mainly the eloquence»41. On December 19, 1634, he is ordained. In subsequent years, he will experience the great questions of his time in Brazil: the Portuguese government and Portugal, Brazil, the Dutch invasions, and the Protestants. These were all objects of comments in sermons. On February 27, 1640, Vieira leaves Bahia towards Portugal. On April 30, he finds Dom João IV. The Portuguese monarch who will develop a real friendship with the Jesuit. In European lands he will remain for 12 years playing a diplomatic role for Portugal. On January 16, 1653, he comes to São Luís, where he will experience a missionary life for 10 years. In the year 1663, he returns to Portugal and has to sit with the Holy Office, who accused him of heresy for writing about the resurrection of Dom João IV, 38

Ibid., p. 44. «Caramuel» apud LÚCIO DE AZEVEDO, op. cit., p. 45. 40 Ibid., p. 47. 41 Ibid., p. 48. 39

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who died while he was still in Brazil. In 1667, the tired Jesuit is obliged to recant his prophetic writings that did not occur. Only in 1675, Father Vieira gets rid of the Portuguese inquisitors. In 1681, he decided to return to Brazil to Bahia. Vieira died there on July 18, 1697.

4. Reflections on the Thought of António Vieira A simple bibliographic review shows a surprising lack of academic works on Vieira’s philosophical and theological thought. Though Vieira was not a philosopher or theologian by profession, one could argue that the most obvious analysis of such elements in his ouvre would have to focus on the works History of the Future or Clavis Prophetarum, which refer to an interpretation of history, a sense of history, containing within it a prophetic philosophy. The intention from now on is to analyze some occasional sermons from Vieira and verify the issues raised in them, which served as authors of influence, and how he builds his argument over their exposure.

4.1 Sermão da quarta-feira de cinzas (Sermon on the Ash Wednesday) (1672) This sermon was preached in Ash Wednesday of 1672 in Rome, at the Church of Santo António dos Portugueses. This period corresponds to the time he spent in Rome after four years of dispute with the inquisition concerning some passages from his works. The verse that inspires the sermon is «Memento homo, quia pulvis est, et in pulverem reverteris» that is, «Remember man that you are dust, and to dust you shall convert». The mortality is one of the most dramatic facts for every Christian. The sermon illustrates the tragic existential human condition. In the day devoted to ashes, Vieira raises two questions: (a) a present question, corresponding to the statement «you are dust»42, and other future matter, represented by the sentence «you will be dust». The present condition is perceived by all living beings. It is a phenomenal condition, or, as stated by the Portuguese priest: «one does not need faith nor understanding in order to believe it»43. 42 43

Cf. Padre Antônio Vieira, Sermões, Edelbra, Erechim, Vol. I, 1998, p. 55. Ibid.

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Every men carries in his life the condition of dust, and realize this condition in all existing things. The authority of Aristotle is present when Vieira says that human being is a «living, sensitive, and rational substance»44. He is a living being. Clearly, his reference is the classic work De anima by Aristotle. The question that arises in the eyes of Vieira is wheater a living being can also be called at the same time «dust». The Scriptures themselves report God as saying to Adam: «Man is dust», and the scriptures also provide Vieira with the main philosophical key to explain this situation. However, before speaking of man and other creatures he must speak of God, in order to contrast God to other beings. Following the tradition that the French medievalist Étienne Gilson calls the metaphysics of Exodus, Vieira appropriates the verse from the Book of Exodus 3.14, which explains the passage where God speaks to Moses the famous sentence, «Ego sum qui sum» («I am what I am»): Everything that exists in the world is nothing; God is just what it is45. The existence of God is not an attribute, but it is part of His essence. The reference here is to the medieval tradition, more specifically St. Thomas Aquinas, who claims that the existence and the divine essence are the same. Interestingly, the philosophers of the patristic period will be present in the arguments of Vieira. Even in a matter where the first scholarly is a reference, the Jesuit author makes an explicit allusion to the Fathers of the Church, which is a constant in his writings, such as the reference to St. Jerome in this sermon: «Excelentemente São Jerônimo, respondendo com as palavras do Apocalipse: Qui est, et qui erat, et qui venturus est (Aquele que é, e que era, e que há de vir – Ap. 1,4), Sabeis por que diz Deus: Ego sum qui sum. Sabeis por que só Deus é o que é? Porque só Deus é o que foi e o que há de ser. Deus é Deus, e foi Deus e há de ser Deus; e só quem é o que foi e o que há de ser, é o que é: Qui est, et qui erat, et qui venturus est. Ego sum qui sum. De maneira que quem é o que foi e o que há de ser, é o que é, e este é só Deus»46.

The conclusion is that God is the only perpetual and immutable being. Now it is possible to characterize human beings and other beings. In the 44

Ibid., p. 56. Ibid., p. 58. 46 Ibid. 45

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words of Vieira: «Quem não é o que foi e o que há de ser, não é o que é: é o que foi e o que há de ser: e esses somos nós. Olhemos para trás: que é o que fomos? Pó. Olhemos para diante: que é o que havemos de ser? Pó. Fomos pó e havemos de ser pó? Pois isso é o que somos: Pulvis es»47. God is eternal, unchangable and being par excellence. Man was dust, made from dust, and it will become dust because it is a perishable being. It is understood why the things are nothing: they are not «being» as God. In the midst of philosophical arguments in his sermon, the relationship with other passages of Scripture is also present in Vieira’s Oratory. Both Job and Abraham speak of human beings as dust, and each one speaks of a «moment» in which human being is understood as «dust». In Job there is the following passage: “Remember that you made me from clay; are you going to crush me back to dust?” (Job 10.9), and Abraham in Genesis says: «Lord, I am but dust and ashes» (Genesis 18.27). For Vieira, Job explains the situation of humans as mortals: the return to the condition of dust. Abraham takes the word «dust» as a constitutive element of the current condition of human beings. The two biblical sources corroborate to what is the human nature. Vieira with disillusionment toasts our ears with a tragic and beautiful speech at the same time. Tragic by its subject and beautiful by its rhetoric: «Notai: Esta nossa chamada vida não é mais que um círculo que fazemos de pó a pó: do pó que fomos ao pó que havemos de ser. Uns fazem o círculo maior, outros menor, outros mais pequeno, outros mínimo: De utero translatus ad tumulum (Desde o ventre trasladado para a sepultura – Jó 10, 19). Mas, ou o caminho seja largo, ou breve, ou brevíssimo, como é círculo de pó a pó, sempre e em qualquer parte da vida somos pó. Quem vai circularmente de um ponto para o mesmo ponto, quanto mais se aparta dele tanto mais se chega para ele; e quem quanto mais se aparta mais se chega, não se aparta»48.

The idea of life as a circle illustrates the tragedy of the human condition to get out of nowhere and return to nowhere. The trajectories for human beings may be different, but the purpose is the same for everyone: the dust returns to dust. This descrition resembles Augustine for whom human being 47 48

Ibid. Ibid., p. 60.

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begins to die the moment he is born. Human being was dust for we come out of nowhere. Human being is powder for we carry mortality within our limbs. Men will be dust for in the end of our journey dust is all that remains. For Vieira life is like wind, as Job says (7. 7): «The wind is our life». However, if living and death are dust, which are the differences between them? To Vieira the first is raised dust who walks, the second is lying dust. Here begins the moral part of the sermon, which, indeed, is its purpose49. Those who are alive, raised, powder should remember that they will necessarily be dust lying. Human being, as raised dust, besides having the wind of life, has the wind of fortune50. This fortune could be understood as material goods and tranquility in this life. Death, the eternal gray companion of human being, will be opposed to colorful life51. Life is faced with death no matter fortune, vanity, goods, political or any role that someone has exercised in life. Death takes all the things into its arms, making all powder lifeless. At this point of his sermon, the authority of Augustine serves to illustrate the permanence and extinction of all things: «Abri aquelas sepulturas, diz Agostinho, e vede qual é ali o senhor e qual o servo; qual é ali o pobre e qual é o rico? [...] distingui-me ali, se podeis, o valente do fraco, o formoso do feio, o rei coroado de ouro do escravo de Argel carregado de ferros? Distingui-los? Conhecei-los? Não por certo. O grande e o pequeno, o rico e o pobre, o sábio e o ignorante, o senhor e o escravo, o príncipe e o cavador, o alemão e o etíope, todos ali são da mesma cor [...] Onde estão os cônsules romanos? Onde estão aqueles imperadores e capitais famosos, que desde o capitólio mandavam o mundo? Que se fez dos Césares e dos Pompeus, dos Mários e dos Silas, dos Cipiões e dos Emilios? Os Augustos, os Cláudios, os Tibérios, os Vespasianos, os Titos, os Trajanos, que é deles? Nunc omnia pulvis: tudo pó; Nunc omnia favillae: tudo cinza»52.

The example of the Roman Empire was paradigmatic because it was the largest empire in the world. And what remains of it now? Dust. Rome, s stated by Vieira53, is just a pile of ruins and corpses. 49

Ibid., p. 61. Ibid., p. 63. 51 Ibid., p. 64. 52 «Augustine» apud Padre Antônio Vieira, op. cit., p. 64-65. 53 Ibid., p. 65. 50

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The tragedy of the world is given for Christians and non-Christians, believers and non-believers, theists or atheists. The reassessment of renowned authors by Vieira illustrates that death has always been a Christian question. Nevertheless, it is in this miserable condition of the human being that Vieira will seek, in the entire Christian tradition, a way to write about and make sense of itself. So the sermon which until then had a tragic air continues and proposes something beyond death. For the Christian, death is not the end, and this has implications for their ethical conduct. The dead are in a lethargic state, they cannot change their old positions. However, for the living it makes a difference knowing that death is not the end because «everyone will come back to the final judgment. It is not any human being who says this, but the very wisdom and eternal truth»54. God grants human beings resurrection, moving from life to death and from death to resurrection. This is the complete cycle. Vieira writes that this is a belief in which to believe or not believe, even some ancient philosophers have come to this understanding. The reason for faith is irrelevant. Thus, Vieira takes this truth of the Christian faith to relate this event with the acts of life, so there is an inversion of logic exposed. It is not death that one should fear, but the ressurrection, in which human beings will spend eternity in heaven or hell55. Eternity seems to be something distant from mortal life. Eternal life itself is forgotten. The justification for such negligence is the condition of injustice and discordance in which human beings live. To explain this condition it is necessary to bring up another truth of the Christian faith: the original sin. This event infects all human life, making human beings miserable. To explain this situation Vieira says that if God created two Adams, and if the second did not commit the first sin, his descendants would, since falling in sin is part of human life: «[...] cidades e palácios, quintas, jardins, fontes, delícias, banquetes, representações, músicas, festas, e tudo aquilo que pudesse formar uma vida alegre e deleitosa. Não é isto o que nós fazemos? E muito mais do que eles haviam de fazer com justiça, razão, com modéstia, com temperança; sem luxo, sem soberba, sem ambição, sem inveja; e com concórdia, com caridade, com humanidade! Mas como se 54 55

Ibid., p. 67. Ibid., p. 68-69.

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ririam de nós, e como pasmariam de nós aqueles homens imortais! Como se ririam das nossas loucuras, como pasmariam da nossa cegueira, vendo-nos tão ocupados, tão solícitos, tão desvelados pela nossa vidazinha de dois dias e tão esquecidos, e descuidados da morte, como se fôramos tão imortais como eles! Eles sem dor; nem enfermidade; nós enfermos e gemendo; eles vivendo sempre, nós morrendo; eles não sabendo o nome à sepultura, nós enterrando uns a outros; eles gozando o mundo em paz, e nós fazendo demandas e guerras pelo que não havemos de gozar»56.

Without the consequences of original sin human beings would do the same things that the children of the fallen Adam had done, but the intention of these is not benevolent. They are proud, ambitious and envious. They are in everyday life entertained with war and in search of meaning. The eyes of those fallen human beings would remain as «miserable little men» who live as immortal, as recalled Vieira referring to Seneca «we die as we are immortal, and we live as though we are immortal»57. Death is a result of original sin. It is a necessary passage from the miserable human condition. For Vieira if death was the end of life, Aristotle was right when he affirmed that death is the most terrible thing to human being, however, to Christian belief, more terrible than death is the eternity58, which no human being can escape. Vieira ends the sermon giving advice to his listeners to make a reflection of their own life while they are alive. Vieira’s goal is to deal with the moral aspect. The suggested questions for reflection are: (a) how much I have lived?, (b) how have I lived, (c) how can I live, (d) how to live well? Thus, more than despair, the human condition suggests constant reflection.

4.2 Sermão de Santo Agostinho (Sermon of Saint Augustine) (1648) Now we proceed to analyse the Sermon of St. Augustine, which was preached in the Church of St. Augustine, in the convent of São Vicente de Fora in Lisbon in 1648. The verse that serves as inspiration is Matthew 5. 16: «Sic luceat lux vestra hominibus, ut videant operates vestra bona, et 56

Ibid., p. 69. «Seneca» apud Padre Antônio Vieira, op. cit., p. 70. 58 Ibid. 57

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glorificent Patrem vestrum, qui est in Caelis,» that is, «Let your light shine before men, that they may see your good works and glorify your Father who is in heaven». The preaching in the Church of St. Augustine serves as inspiration to Vieira as he associates the preached verse with the Holy figure of Augustine, who will be called the «light that shine to men». The sermon will illustrate all the appreciation of Vieira to the greatest thinker of Christian history. We will note that Vieira offers original scholarship regarding the interpretation of Augustine. The reading suggests that the authority in the apostolic Church must take into account science and virtue. In this sense, for a human being to be an authority it is necessary for him to be learned and holy. However, it is obvious that these virtues do not mean to own honor and glory for oneself, but for God59. Nevertheless, science and virtue in Augustine are explained in an unconventional way, through ignorance and sins. For Vieira such features will be illustrated in the two major works of Augustine: Confessions and Retractations. In Retractations Augustine declares his error and ignorance, and in the Confessions he illustrates his sins. In the words of Vieira: «Faz Santo Agostinho os dois livros de suas retratações e de suas confissões, e estes foram os que pôs no rosto de todas as suas obras. Na primeira folha dos livros, se costumam pôr as erratas do impressor, e Agostinho, com nova e não imitada invenção, pôs as erratas do autor: no Livro das Confissões, as erratas da vida; no das Retratações, as da doutrina. Eu chamara-lhe Index rerum notabilium (Índice das coisas mais notáveis), porque, sendo as coisas que se lêem em todos os livros de Santo Agostinho tão altas, tão sublimes, tão divinas, estas duas são as mais notáveis de todas»60.

In the most renowned author of the Church, we see modesty and humility, and that, in the view of Vieira, makes Augustine become even greater. Not because of sin in itself, for it is ugly, or ignorance in itself, for that is indecent, but for having the courage to show his ugliness and nastiness to others. As a man, God became too miserable, that is, too subject to pains and sorrows that every man passes. Nevertheless, Christ 59 60

Cf. Padre Antônio Vieira, Sermões, Edelbra, Erechim, Vol. II, 1998, p. 362. Ibid., p. 363.

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was not subject to sin and ignorance because He was also God. All men are miserable, so they suffer, but not all open wide their sins and errors, and that Augustine did. The greatness of Augustine is not to be a sinner and subject to error, or defend his sins and his mistakes, as every men does, but his greatness is to confess his sins and mistakes and publish them for all to know61. Augustine could be taken as the light of the world only by his science and his holiness. That his writings are of great wisdom and that his life is marked by holiness there is no doubt. Nevertheless, that’s not what Vieira emphasizes in Augustine. For the Portuguese the African is the light to the world, because in addition to his science and sanctity Augustine amplifies the gospel with his ignorance and sin. The gospel commands human beings to be holy and virtuous and this is not denied by Augustine to expose his sins and errors, but it serves as an example and teaching to other human beings not to follow such actions. With his own sins and errors, Augustine will make light. Light is an important symbolic element in Scripture. The Apostles were sent by Christ to be the light of the world. Such was Augustine excellence that he was able to shine a light out of darkness. Vieira, influenced by the authority of Augustine and Peter Damian, takes the example of Christ’s life. When Christ was born, the star that symbolizes the light shined. When Christ was crucified, the sun, which also represents the light, faded. Here we have two forms of testimony represented in the life of Christ: the testimony of the light (star) and the testimony of darkness (without the sun). Vieira cites the following extract from Peter Damian to illustrate this symbolism: «the sky lit a torch and another erased when Christ came and went saved this world, that the Lord, in glory and abandonment of his divinity, not only had the testimony of light, but also the testimony of darkness». Vieira continues with his own words: «Pois as trevas, cujo efeito é escurecer, também pode alumiar e dar testemunho? Também, e tanto mais qualificado, quando o sujeito que se escurece for mais luminoso, como é o sol. A estrela testemunhou luzindo, o sol testemunhou escurecendo-se, e foi tanto mais eficaz o testemunho do sol que o da estrela, que a estrela, luzindo, alumiou três homens, e o sol escurecendo-se, alumiou o mundo»62. 61 62

Ibid., p. 365. Ibid., p. 367.

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The symbolism used is that the effect of darkness (the sun hid itself in Christ’s death) had a longer range than the effect of light (the guiding star for the three wise men). In this sense, Augustine can also be associated with light and darkness, or rather a lit torch and a torch off. Associated with his science, his virtue and his way of life, Augustine was a lit torch, and has shown the world its ignorance and its sin. Augustine was an unlit torch. Surely, all the saints and doctors also were lights of the world in their own right, but Augustine was the only holy doctor to testify with his sins and errors. This is his greatness63. Vieira will then explain what is the greatness of Augustine in his Confessions and Retractations. The first work elucidates the vices and sins of Augustine. The second shows the errors and ignorance of the Bishop of Hippo. How is it possible that the vices and sins, mistakes and ignorances of Augustine will be the light to vicious and sinful, as well as wrong and ignorant human beings? For Vieira through the examples of the sins and errors of doctrine, those human beings will not make the same mistakes64. Again, we can perceive a pedagogical aspect within the sermon. The doctrine of original sin is an important vision for the Christian thinker to justify the fall of humanity. Vieira points out that it is part of human nature to hide the sins and errors. This action is a consequence of the first sin, illustrated by Adam that after committing sin hid himself and covered himself up under the eyes of God65. After sin, every human being will follow the example of Adam. The Luso-Brazilian thinker cites the Roman orator Quintilian who stated: «No one is so bad that want to look bad». That human beings commit wrong acts and seek to hide them, this is part of human nature. Augustine was an exception among human beings. While others are ashamed of their mistakes and want to hide them, the African thinker narrated his sins and thereby encouraged other persons also to confess theirs. The pedagogical sense of the sermon is clearly based on the example of St. Augustine: human beings should confess their sins. It is a fact that they will sin. That human beings will try to cover their sins up, perfoming in a way that is not consistent with their own acts, is also something perceived, but the remedy in the fight against sin comes externally. Christ institutes 63

Ibid., p. 368. Ibid., p. 370. 65 Ibid., pp. 370-371. 64

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the confession as a remedy for sin, and Augustine writes his sins as a way of remedy for the others66. According to Vieira, Augustine wrote the book Confessions as an example of confession to other persons. This is what will happen in the final judgment: every human being will expose his good and bad deeds. However, Augustine illustrates just their vices, and as he has written, he is perpetually judged by those who read the book and by God67. Vieira will take the words of St. Gregory on Job to illustrate his appreciation by Augustine: «Augustine may seem to others great in his virtues, but to me he seems greatest by his sins». He adds stating his appreciation for the work Confessions: «Nas virtudes que exercitou e que retratou nos outros seus livros, foi Agostinho grande; mas no livro de suas Confissões, em que manifestou os seus pecados a todo mundo, sem dúvida foi muito maior. E se este livro se comparar com os outros seus, este foi a coroa de todos»68.

The book Retractations is a commentary by Augustine about extracts from his extensive work, i.e. about opinions that he believed later in his life to be mistaken. As well as the book Confessions, the Retractations is a unique book of antiquity. Vieira was surprised with the work because, for him, every wise human being tends to hide his or her mistakes69. Origen, Tertullian and St. Apollinaris, for example, were men who were wrong in some of their doctrines, but they never wrote a work like that. This elucidates how understanding, even in good persons, can be polluted because of pride, a result of the first sin. Augustine was also the highest among doctors, because he wrote his mistakes of the understanding so the wise persons of all ages could follow his example. As Vieira says: «E como é tão natural aos homens doutos e sábios a pertinácia de persistir em seus erros, e o orgulho de os sustentar e defender a todo o risco, para alumiar esta segunda e maior cegueira, que não 66

Ibid., pp. 372-373. Ibid., pp. 374-376. 68 Ibid., p. 377. 69 Ibid., p. 378. 67

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só perde seus autores, senão a muitos com eles, saiu Agostinho à luz com o Livro de suas Retratações, em que confessou seus erros e emendou suas ignorâncias, dando a todos os sábios e doutos – como mais sábio e douto que todos – a que nenhum se envergonhasse de ter errado, nem de confessar que errou, pois Agostinho o fazia declaradamente»70.

Again, the pedagogical aspect of Augustine is emphasized. Men who have understanding should now follow the example. Augustine wrote 118 writings that were published at the end of his life. As an example of Christian thinker, all the great thinkers who sought to further learn from his writings studied Augustine. Augustine in its turn studied his writings for the purpose of condemn his errors71. As a controversial man, Augustine faced numerous opponents, but the big battle was against himself72. Succinctly Vieira concludes that Augustine was the greatest of all saints and scholars, because as a saint, he made the greatest book, Confessions, where he published his sins, and as man he made the Retractations, in which published his ignorance73.

4.3 Further Philosophical and Theological Questions in António Vieira’s Sermons The analysis of the two sermons Vieira illustrates the potential of finding a philosophical and theological thought, even if not completely original. After a study in volumes of sermons, it was possible to detect some texts, which generate a great interest for philosophy and theology. In this sense, some suggestions for sermons and their themes are given: (a) Sermão de Santo Antônio (1654): sermon on St. Anthony of Padua and an analysis of Portugal. (b) Sermão de Santa Catarina (1663): sermon on the pagan and Christian wisdom (the true wisdom). (c) Sermão do Mandato (1643): sermon on love (a true treatise on love). 70

Ibid., pp. 381-382. Ibid., p. 386. 72 Ibid., p. 387. 73 Ibid., p. 393. 71

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(d) Sermão do Espírito Santo (in São Luis): sermon on a religious mission, which contains a discourse on language. (e) Sermão pelo bom sucesso das armas de Portugal contra as de Holanda (1640): exceptional sermon about Brazil’s place in the divine plan. (f) Sermão do Quarto Sábado da Quaresma (1644): great sermon, which deals with the question of sin. (g) Sermão da Primeira Sexta-Feira da Quaresma (1644): sermon which is about the verse «love your enemies» to explain the two main human emotions: love and hate. (h) Sermão XIV (1633), Sermão XX and Sermão XXVII do Rosário «Maria Rosa Mística»: sermons which can be read together concerning the subjects of black people and slavery. (i) Sermão da Terceira Dominga do Advento na Capela Real (1644): about the Kingdom of Portugal. (j) Sermão da Segunda Oitava da Páscoa: about peace in society. (h) Sermão da Terceira Dominga Post Epiphaniam: an analysis of the «will» and «power» in God and in man. (i) Sermão da Visitação de Nossa Senhora: very interesting sermon that raises the infirmities of Brazil. (j) Sermão da Quarta Dominga Depois da Páscoa: about sadness. (h) As Cinco Pedras da Funda de Davi – Discurso II: about the types of goods, the loss of these goods and the pain caused by it. Besides the specific Sermons suggested above is possible to find references to the authorities in most sermons. The most cited thinkers in chronological order are: (a) the Greeks Plato and Aristotle. (b) the Roman Seneca. (c) the Fathers of the Church: Gregory, Jerome, Ambrose, for example, and especially St. Augustine («single sun of the Church»). (d) St. Anthony of Padua. (e) The Scholastics, especially St. Thomas Aquinas («beacon to follow»), and some references to Duns Scotus. (f) Several Jesuits: Ignatius of Loyola and St. Francisco Xavier, for example.

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Concluding Remarks Vieira had never wanted to be a professional philosopher or theologian. This essay aimed to illustrate how it is possible to stress his philosophical and theological insights. Vieira had the great merit of spreading through his sermons the classical thought, the Greek and Latin patristic and scholastic theology. More than a great Stoic or Aristotelian influence, Vieira is a follower of Augustine, Ambrose, Jerome, and other patristic thinkers. Maybe the nickname that fits over the Luso-Brazilian speaker is «moralist». The concern for what people do in their daily life is a constant in his sermons. His great uneasiness is the salvation of his hearers.

LUIZ FERNANDO MEDEIROS RODRIGUES* THE «SUBTERRANEAN UNIVERSITY» OF THE JESUITS IMPRISONED IN SÃO JULIÃO DA BARRA AND THE (PHILOSOPHICAL) FORMATION OF THE SOCIETY OF JESUS’ MISSIONARIES IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY1

Introduction The «Suppression of the Society of Jesus» was a process which occurred for about fifteen years. It was an event that happened all over Europe and whose effects and repercussions reached the most remote missions of the colonies overseas. Moreover, the increasing accusations of culpability against the Society in general and against some Jesuits in particular, which were more or less vague, became more efficient where the anti-Jesuit imaginary, which was until then imperceptible, had taken shape through the «public and notorious» of the accusations from the civil and ecclesiastical authorities. The process of successive expulsions of Jesuit missionaries did not stem only from arguments of political nature or matters of ecclesiastical discipline, but it was also strongly connected to a collective image that was spread through what the pamphlet «Sur la Destruction des Jésuites en France» by the encyclopedist D’Alembert, called «esprit de vertige»2. It *

Associate Professor at the Graduate Program in History of the Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos (UNISINOS), Av. Unisinos 950, CEP: 93.022-000, São Leopoldo / RS, Brasil. [email protected] 1 This article is the result of studies carried out in the scope of the project «The Contribution of the Expelled Jesuits in 1759 for the Knowledge of the Culture of Indigenous People from the Grão-Pará and Maranhão Missions», which is supported by a research grant from PqG/FAPERGS. 2 See J. de R. D’ALEMBERT, Sur la Destrucion des Jésuites en France, s.n., s.l. 1765, pp. 218-219: «L’esprit de vertige, […] qui a causé le malheur des Jésuites en France, semble leer annoncer un pareil sort dans le reste de l’Europe […]; ils ont tout lieu de craindre que la bombe qui a crevé en Portugal & en France, ne lance des éclats coutr’eux dans toutes les parties de l’Europe». See R. REICHARDT, «L’imaginaire social des Jésuites bannis et expulsée (1758-1773): Aux origines de la polarisation ideologique entre Lumières et Anti-Lumières», in M. TIETZ (ed.), Los jesuítas españoles expulsos. Su imagen y su contribuición a saber sobre el mundo hispánico en

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concretely and socially expressed it was against the Society in a very skillful manner, through pamphlets and satirical engravings, thereby giving rise to an anti-Jesuit spirit among the European public. A significant example of this is the engraving published in the «Arme Istoriata de Gesuiti cagione de misfatti in ogni genere di cui sono colpevoli»3. Many images published in that same period reflect a true anti-Jesuit campaign that would have no frontiers and whose culmination would be the suppression of the Society of Jesus according to the Bull Dominus ac Redemptor (signed by Clement XIV, on July 21, 1773, but only published in August 17). Such considerations are the point of the departure for the present essay. Acknowledging that anti-Jesuit measures adopted by the European sovereigns between 1755 and 1773 were often grounded on undoubtedly verified material facts, whose political and economic motives have been increasingly investigated by recent research, there was a «resistance process» by the Jesuits themselves to this anti-Jesuit «collective imaginary» that spread all over Europe and overseas. This Jesuit resistance occurred mainly by means of apologetic writings and the publishing of memoirs and journals. The main purpose of this paper is to analyse the «resistance process» of the Jesuits to the defamatory anti-Jesuit campaign promoted by the European courts in general and the intellectual society. In particular, we aim to illustrate the «resistance» of the imprisoned Jesuits in São Julião da Barra, who «founded» a Jesuit subterranean university in prison, which showed at the same time the solid formation of the Society’s missionaries in the eighteenth century. The manuscript of Lourenço Kaulen, Relação de algumas causas que succederão aos Religiosos da Companhia de Jesus [...], was chosen to illustrate this «resistance process»4. la Europa del Siglo XVIII. Actas del coloquio internacional de Berlin (April 7th-10th 1999), Iberoamericana – Vervuert, Madrid – Frankfurt 2001, pp. 473-500. 3 See appendix. 4 Cf. L. KAULEN, Relação de algumas causas que succederão aos Religiosos da Companhia de Jesus no reyno de Portugal, nas sua prisões, desterros e carceres, em que estiverão por tempo de 18 annos, isto he do anno 1759 athe o anno 1777, no reinado del Rey D. José I sendo Primeiro Ministro [...] Marquez do Pombal. Manuscrito, obra feita pelo Padre Lourenço Kaulen Allemão da cidade de Colonia a borda do Rheno, e companheiro dos de que escrevo, Missionario que foi no Brasil na Provincia de Para nos rios de Tocantins, Amazonas e Xingu [Some Accounts of what the Religious

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Kaulen thoroughly describes the prison cells of the Jesuits of the Portuguese Assistance in São Julião da Barra, writes extensive memoirs of the everyday life, hardships and the way Jesuits adapted to imprisonment and resisted to it. He started from the «news» about the events involving the Jesuits of Grão-Pará and Maranhão, since for him this was the place where the «fire to the ruin and extermination of all» took place5. As part of this resistance process, teachers and masters devoted themselves to continuing the education process of the scholars who were imprisoned with them, as if the rupture caused by life in prison had not interrupted the formation of the Society’s students, mainly in regard to philosophy studies. This manuscript was written in 1784, after the release of the Jesuits from the Portuguese prisons6. 1. The Prison of the Jesuits and the Exile to Portugal Kaulen reports the facts that happened to the Jesuits of the Vice-Province of Grão-Pará and Maranhão from 1759 on, when there were still 39 Jesuits in Pará7. The expulsion of all superiors and some other influent Jesuits in the Province did not seem to show this was a general movement of expulsion of all the Jesuits. It was commonly thought that the Portuguese authorities would only drastically decrease the number of members of the Society in Pará and Maranhão, which in the future and after overcoming tensions with the Portuguese government would serve as ground for the return of Jesuit Members of the Society of Jesus Went Through in the Kingdom of Portugal in their Arrests, Exiles and Incarceration, which Lasted for 18 Years, from 1759 to 1777, in the Kingdom of John I of Portugal with the Marquis of Pombal as Prime Minister [...]. Manuscript, Work Done by German Priest Lourenço Kaulen from the City of Cologne at the Rhine Riverbank and Companion of Those Who I’m Writing About, and Who was a Missionary in the Province of Para in Brazil in the Tocantins, Amazonas and Xingu Rivers], BNL, Lisboa, Manuscript-Microfilm, Reserved F 2945/ Fg 7997, [s.l.] [1784]. 5 Cf. KAULEN, Some Accounts, f. 1. 6 There is another piece of writing by Lourenço Kaulen, the account of his own exile in 1757. Cf. L. KAULEN, Relação das coisas notáveis da nossa viagem do desterro do Pará para Lisboa, a qual fizeram dez religiosos da Companhia, Padre Domingos Antônio, Reitor do colégio do Pará, Luiz Álvares, Manuel Afonso, Manuel dos Santos, Joaquim de Carvalho, Antônio Meisterburg, Lourenço Kaulen, João Daniel, Joaquim de Barros, Anselmo Eckart; e alguns dez religiosos de São Francisco, na nau chamada Nossa Senhora do Atalaia, no ano de 1757, [Account of Remarkable Things of our Trip in Exile from Pará to Lisbon...] IHGB, Rio de Janeiro, Archive 2-3-13. 7 Cf. KAULEN, Some Accounts, f. 33. «Colégio» means «school» in Portuguese.

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missionaries. Thus, the possessions they had delivered to the Royal officials in the villages were not regarded as confiscated but simply as in consignment, as all Jesuits were persuaded that the Company would make an appeal to the justice of the Monarch. It was thought that the king, after having ascertained the innocence of the Order, would restore the former ministries to Jesuits. But events did not confirm the hopes of the Jesuits. In June 1760, a warship that landed at the port of São Luís do Maranhão was ordered to send Jesuits into exile. Only two captains disembarked to send these orders to the Governor Francisco Xavier de Mendonça Furtado. After the orders were opened and the usual solemnities were observed, the governor gave orders to sound regatte, as if the city were being invaded by land. The detachment of soldiers, who were already on call, began the siege of the school where most of the Jesuits expelled from Pará villages were being housed. At the same time, an identical order was followed in Maranhão. Detachments were sent to all places where there could be other Jesuits in order to escort them to the residence of home imprisonment at the Colégio de São Luís. After the Jesuits were arrested, the authorities proceeded to the confiscation of the Society’s possessions. When the situation in Belém of Pará was under control, the ship that was anchored to the backshore of the São Luís Port left for Belém do Pará where the same order would be followed with identical procedures. The prison to where all the Jesuits in Pará were sent was the residence of the Colégio de Santo Alexandre. Father Antonio Batista’s8 imprisonment, who was in the Gibrié9 farm, illustrates the application of the arrest warrant of Jesuits dispersed all 8

Born in Lameiras (or Lameiro), in Coimbra, on March 8th 1708. Before joining the Society of Jesus, went by the name of Antônio Lourenço. Joined the Society on December 7th 1728. In 1731 went to Maranhão and Pará where he arrived on May 25th. Took his last vows on August 15th 1742. After completing his studies, he worked in indigenous villages and farms. He was the last Jesuit missionary in the Maracanã indigenous village. He was in Gibrié (Gibyri) when arrested (he was found at the river where he was searched by the soldiers who were after him) and exiled to the Kingdom in 1760 and from there to Rome. Kaulen states that he was Gibrié’s farmer. Not to be confused with the other Father Antônio Baptista, Procurator from the Province of Brazil who died in St. Julien on December 21st 1772. This could have been Father Antônio Baptista, who died in the Imperiale Village, Pésaro, at 84 and who was helped by Father Bessa (dates seem to match). Died on November 22nd 1792. Cf. S. LEITE, História da Companhia de Jesus no Brasil, Instituto Nacional – Livr. Portugália, Rio de Janeiro – Lisboa, Vol. III, 1943, p. 85. 9 The Gibirié (Gibiré, Gibrié) mission was a bit distant from Mortiguara. It was a farm given to the College of Pará before 1709 by Francisco Rodrigues Pimenta on

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over the Pará countryside. A detachment of soldiers that were going to his direction met him halfway to the river when he was going down to the school. They examined his canoe and confiscated a tobacco box from him, as they suspected there was some money hidden in it10. Being more than a mere register of events, Kaulen’s account aims to witness the Jesuits’ quiet acceptance of their arrest warrant without rebelling, loyal to the spirit of obedience and submission to the Monarch, as they had always done. While the embarkation of all the arrested Jesuits was being prepared on Saint Ignatius Day, the superior of the group gathered in the residence of the Colégio de Santo Alexandre asked the Bishop of Pará, Dom Miguel de Bulhões, if they could celebrate the eve of their patron Saint’s day at the church and allow the participation of the population. After a first consent, D. Bulhões consulted the governor and then backed down by forbidding any public events, even ones of religious nature. But as the celebration of eve of Saint Ignatius Day had already begun, the Jesuits were compelled to interrupt the ceremony and return to their prison rooms. Orders were given for them to be guarded and, most importantly prevented from communicating with the external world. During this period of home imprisonment, the Jesuits endured and «resisted» to the military control by keeping as much as possible the routine of religious life in a community of the Society. After a month, the Fathers were transfered onto a merchantman at midnight in Maranhão, surrounded by soldiers holding fixed bayonets, which was a usual treatment to persons accused of grave crimes. It was totally uncomfortable for them to be shut away in the ship’s hold with little air flow. In that place, according to Kaulen’s words, they «transpired blood», as they were in such a tight space in which they could not all fit in, even the condition of never being sold (Lisboa, [Brotéria] Arq. Prov. Port., Pasta 176, doc. 27). In 1730 there were 87 indigenous people (Roma, ARSI, BRAS. 10-II, f. 338r). It consisted of three leagues of land, two cacao plantations and two large fields. There was a locksmith shop, a lumber mill and two looms, as well as a canoe house. The priests’ house was small, but had the necessary tools and no lack of bookshelves. The church was 55 by 60 palmos [37x40 feet] in length and 25 palmos [16.8 feet] wide. The patron Saint was Saint Francisco Xavier. Apart from this image, there were others and several panels. Cf. LEITE, História da Companhia de Jesus no Brasil, Vol. III, pp. 300-301. 10 Cf. KAULEN, Some Accounts, f. 38.

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if they were sitting on each other’s feet with no other air entrance than the hatches11. Kaulen’s account continues with a thorough register of the precautions taken by the army concerning the prisoners’ security and isolation. Though they were given a somewhat respectful treatment, this was the same one given to dangerous criminals12. After being one day on board, the Jesuits were starving but could only eat when the ship finally weighed anchor towards Pará. Even locked, they were guarded on sight by armed sentries and tension increased in every change of the guard. The author of «Relação» abundantly describes the terrible hygiene conditions to which the prisoners were subject. Prisoners were given such a small space that it was not possible for them to be all sitting at the same time. Thus, they took turns in groups to sit, stand and sleep. The stink, breath and habits of so many people confined in the same place increasingly caused sickness and diseases among the prisoners13. Their usual food consisted of bread crumbs, meat and rice, which came from a caldron hung down by a rope and was shared as it could be, in a way that it got to each one’s plate. These rations, in addition to being scarce and not often well prepared, were usually eaten with disgust and repugnance, especially during supper when the toilet bowls all over the place were cleaned14. During the trip, two Jesuits fell ill: one had swollen legs and the other suffered from urinary retention. For the Jesuit with swollen legs, the ship’s doctor advised exercise, at which all laughed as there was not enough space for a single step. Thus he was bathed a couple of times. But during the treatment, the medications were switched by mistake; the one with swollen 11

Ibid., ff. 34-35. Ibid. 13 In the account he wrote about his own expulsion, Lourenço Kaulen gives details that abundantly illustrate the scarcity of the exiled Jesuits who were condemned to forcefully retreat to Portugal. See KAULEN, Account of Remarkable Things; this account was studied by Prof. P. D. W. CARDOSO and presented under the title «O diário de Bordo de um Jesuíta Expulso do Estado do Grão-Pará e Maranhão, 1757-1758» [«The Logbook of a Jesuit Cast Out from the Grão-Pará State and Maranhão, 17571758»], in 26th Annual Meeting of the Brazilian Society of History Research, in July 2006, XXVI Reunião Anual da SBPH, Rio de Janeiro 2006. 14 Cf. KAULEN, Some Accounts, f. 35. 12

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legs was given the medication for urinary retention and vice-versa. As a result, both were cured. With the arrival of the prison ship in Pará, the authorities immediately ordered the vice-provincial, the rector and the procurator to hand in their account books. The vice-provincial and another father were arrested at the school, each one in a different cell and they had their door guarded day and night. According to Kaulen, the imprisonment of the Jesuits did not aim at the intended reform announced by the Bull of intervention in the Company, nor was it interested in the persons or in the Society Institute, but it only aimed at the Society’s accounts. The authorities’ insistence to know about the Society’s possessions was such that, in the Jesuits’ view, these intended to strip them of their temporalities. Therefore, the viceprovince’s bursar burned his books, «so they would not have the pleasure to see them»15. Though the vice-provincial was ill, he was taken to trial carried by other people from the interior of the ship, at dusk. Food and access to the toilet bowls were always controlled to the prisoners. After the other Jesuits were disembarked and imprisoned in the Pará School, they were separated into groups of professed and non-professed members. They were individually interrogated many times. The nonprofessed ones, mainly the youngest were repeatedly coerced into disowning the Society, being sometimes threatened sometimes praised, but only few ones accepted the proposals made by the governor and the bishop of Pará. The most usual form of persuasion was sending the youngest to the asylum of the Santo Antônio Fathers, in São Boaventura in the Tição, in Belém do Pará, where they were away from the hardships of prison. The students’ mothers and relatives were brought there to convince them to disown the Society. Kaulen describes the case of the rhetoric scholar named Manuel da Nóbrega16, suggesting that he was an example of resistance. In an extreme 15

Ibid. Born in Lisbon on March 7th 1740 [Court of Accounts Archives, Lisboa, «Union of Conspiracy, List of Portuguese Ex-Jesuits Who Were Assistants in the Pontiff’s State, 4/1777», s/l, Bundle 267, f. 15]. Joined the Society of Jesus on May 21st 1755. He came to Brazil in 1756 as a scholastic. Lived in the Anandiba residency («Appendix to the Portuguese Catalogue of 1906, Residência Anandiba», No 12). At the time of 16

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attempt of persuasion, the governor took the young Jesuit student to his palace, where he was kept for eight days and was well treated and tempted with many promises including marriage. But most of them refused and returned to the prison-school17. After two months, the Jesuits were again embarked on a warship, which always happened in the evening. They were escorted by two soldiers per prisoner after being rigorously searched. They remained anchored there for eight more days before leaving for Portugal, and they had to sleep in any corner of the ship, on hen houses and cables18. There were scarce and poor edibles during this trip and the prisoners starved. Most of the food they were given was rotten. Among the four Jesuits who died during this trip one died from starvation, the Neapolitan Sebastião Fusco, who was a burly 70-year-old man. The sea trip to Portugal lasted about three months. The vessel arrived in Cascais, where it was anchored and an announcement was sent to shore19. Before prisoners were disembarked, the authorities still tried to convince some of the young students to leave the Company. After that, they silently divided the prisoners into three groups. The foreigners were taken to the prison of the Tower of São Julião da Barra. This one was known as a prison where prisoners did not live long due to the terrible treatment they received and poor hygiene conditions. According to Kaulen, this was done so as to prevent foreigners from leaving Portugal and let the other European courts know about what was happening in Portugal. From the remaining group, some were sent to the jails of Azeitão and most of them were embarked toward Civitavecchia, Rome.

the expulsion he was a student of Rhetoric. According to the author of Compendio Istorico (F. R. OLIVEIRA, Compendio Istorico dell’espulsione dei Gesuiti dai Regni di Portogallo, e da tutti i suoi dominj. Diviso in tre parti, nelle quali si racconta tutto ciò d’interessante, e sostanziale, che precedette, accompagnò, e seguì questo fatto sì memorabile, s.ed., Nizza 1791, pp. 253-254), having met this Jesuit in Lisbon, Bulhões tried to persuade him to leave the Society, separating him from the other Jesuits who came from Maranhão. He persisted, however, and died in Italy, probably in the town of Cascia. 17 Cf. KAULEN, Some Accounts, ff. 36-37. 18 Ibid., ff. 41-42. 19 Ibid., ff. 42-43.

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2. The Final Prison: The Tower of São Julião da Barra The Jesuits who were designated to the Tower of São Julião da Barra20, on the Lisbon coast, got there on December 3rd, 1760. Kaulen notes that they arrived there at 10 p.m., time when they still had not had supper. They were led along the prison maze so they did not have any idea of where they were. Kaulen reported that the prisoners were taken to a kind of a subterranean tube (or entrance) that went up the way to the aforesaid Tower so that they could never recall the way through which they had entered it. The prisoners were kept standing next to the oil lamps of the subterranean cells, where they waited to be called by the officer who led the way. A warder called them one by one and after leading each one to their appointed cell, opened it and said: «have the courtesy to come in». When the cell door was locked, the prisoner stayed in the dark and could not know where he was. Sometime after that, the warder gave them a tallow candle which after being consumed left the prisoner in the dark again. After being forced into the cell, Kaulen reports that he stood still in the same place and did not move as he did not know if there was a trapdoor, a hole or an animal in that place. He got tired of remaining in such a manner for a long time, and as he did not hear any sound, stretched his arms to verify if he could touch anything. When he found a thing made of wood that was firm and touched it with his feet, he sat down on it as it felt safe, and he prayed the Act of Resignation until very late when the warder came holding a little candlestick to bring him some lentils for supper. On that night the imprisoned Jesuits slept on planks, in such humid cells that water flowed from everywhere and the floor was covered with mud21. As there was nothing in these cells, Kaulen took off his clothes and made a bundle with them and his hat and used these as a headboard, then he lay down on the bunk before the light was over. They stayed in the dark for eight days because the candles had burned up. In Kaulen’s cell the candle had lasted only six hours. After that he received an oil lamp for day and night. After fifteen days, the prisoners were thoroughly searched again and asked if they had gold or silver, then the warder returned to them some of the few things they had brought when they entered. 20 21

Ibid., ff. 14-16. Ibid., ff. 44-45.

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Later, Kaulen was given back his breviary and few things he had brought with him, and also a whole candle and other staples, but he was not given a bed or straw, so he slept on planks for a long time. Kaulen noted that this was very difficult for him as he had already arrived weak and exhausted due to his first imprisonment and the trip. After some days, the imprisoned priests asked permission to celebrate the Mass, confess or receive Holy Communion at least during Lent, but they were not allowed to. After nineteen months of imprisonment they were allowed to shave22. Kaulen’s manuscript also describes the imprisonment of Jesuits in the Province of Salcete of Goa, India23. He follows with his account by narrating about the prison, abduction and expulsion of the Jesuits in Macau, China and Japan, from 1762 on24. As Kaulen reported facts about the imprisonment of the Portuguese Jesuits, he made a kind of analogy between the suffering and humiliation imposed on the Jesuits and the sufferings of Christ when he was taken to the Calvary. A less severe treatment was given to the Jesuits who were concentrated in the jails of Almeida. Though their custody was equally severe, the treatment given to them was more respectful and humane. The jails of Almeida had previously been soldier barracks. These dungeons were directly built on the ground almost in the middle of a fortress25. They were made of a very strong stone as well as the floor. The ceiling was vaulted. On the top of these jails and behind them soldiers lived in their barracks. Therefore, these prisons had maximum security. This was the place where the Jesuits arrested from all the houses of the Portugal province were gathered. After the war between Spain and Portugal was declared in 1762, they were taken to Lisbon and then to the Tower of São Julião da Barra26.

22

Ibid., f. 45. Ibid., ff. 302-305. 24 Ibid., ff. 204-224. 25 Ibid., ff. 47-50. 26 Ibid., ff. 61-63. 23

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3. Life in the Tower of São Julião da Barra Kaulen roughly drew a map of the jails in São Julião showing the cells of the Jesuits’ subterranean world. In addition to the jails on the ground floor in the Tower of São Julião da Barra, where there was light and air flow, there were also 26 subterranean cells. Some were so small that the prisoner could barely stand up in it. The cells had no access to one another. None of them had light except the one from the oil lamp. And in some of them practically no air could enter, even if the walls had a crack that was 4 dedos wide27 and 2 palmos long28. Nothing could pass through these cracks as the walls were 8 to 10 palmos thick, the doors were closed and the skylights, through which some air could enter, were shut. There was also an iron railing in the middle of these cracks. In the entrance to these places there was a heavy and thick gate where the sentry stood, and 30 steps from it there was a long aisle where there were jails in both sides, and going from one side to the other there was a long aisle in the shape of a semicircle with jails to the left of the gate and three narrow paths. There were also some jails which were more hidden and isolated with other doors. On the bottom left were the large cisterns of the fortress (which had no wells), with their valves. In the end of this aisle another long aisle began and it also had jails. In the first years, only one of the skylights was open to light the way of the warder to the cells. Before these places were used as cells for the Jesuits, they had mainly served as a place for the sewage of the Tower. Besides being dark, the cells were humid because the water that formed puddles on top of the fortress slid down through the cracks and holes of the old dome over the prisoners. As the cisterns were above some of the jails, the prisoners from the cells below them lived in a permanently muddy place29. For this reason, Kaulen would say that the walls became dark and greasy as tallow, which one could not touch without being disgusted. In cold weather these created large «beards» of a white saltpeter which was so corrosive that consumed iron. 27

In Lisbon, 1 «dedo» was equal to 4 «gões» or 8 «linhas», i.e., 1.4 inches. One «palmo de craveiro» in the units of measurement from Lisbon was equal to 8 inches. 29 One «pipa» for liquids in Lisbon was equal to 26 «almudes», or 430 liters. 28

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Clothing and shoes that were not worn would corrode and rot within few weeks. For this reason, the locksmiths used to say that everything around there would rot except the priests. There were disgusting and dirty insects around, which were born from that rotten and muddy floor. The fleas were so many that the prisoners seemed to have transpired blood. In addition, mosquito swarms tormented the prisoners in an unbearable manner. They buzzed and their biting at night caused the prisoner’s hand and face to swell, so that it was necessary to sleep with their whole bodies covered, which would make breathing even more difficult. The stench from the wet floor was caused by extreme filth. A bad odour came from the dirty toilet bowls that were usually uncovered (as in the beginning they were not allowed to cover them), along with body odour, sick persons and poor hygiene all over the place. The stench was so strong that it disoriented the prisoners. In addition, there was the smell from the lamp oil, which sometimes was merely a thick and dark dreg. When lit in the closed cells these lamps caused asthma and pain in the chest as well as headaches. In the main aisle that was underground, in front of the jails, there was a dirty drain where the prisoners’ filthy bowls were poured into. When it rained, the drain would overflow and fill the jails with waste and the whole floor would become muddy. Finally, under the lighthouse tower there were some small jails called Magazine Storehouse (a former gunpower storehouse); the prisoners who were locked into them for a long time would become lethargic or paralysed. More people had died in these jails than in all the other ones in this prison. In the lower part, there was an underground jail (which after entering the door was the first to the left, almost in the end of the aisle) that was called the hell, because it was the darkest, muddiest, most horrible, humid, disgusting and fetid place. Its walls resembled the skin of a leper, covered with tallow and pieces of wounds that it seemed impossible for people to live in them for a long time. Kaulen always narrates the everyday life of the prisons and the prisoners’ precarious situation in a very detailed manner; about the way they were treated by the warder, who took every opportunity to steal their scarce resources from them, even their food.

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As for the ill prisoners, those languished more than all other prisoners, as they were not assisted in the first 10 or more years of imprisonment30. A professional doctor never came into the prison31. There was a leech instead of a doctor, who, according to the facts that Kaulen could gather, was a glazier in Marquis of Pombal’s house when he was in Oeyras, thirty minutes away from the Tower of jails. In regard to the dead, Kaulen accurately listed their names and origin, thus forming an «elenchus defunctorum» that would serve later as a memoir for the survivors of the prison.

4. Means of Resistance The treatment given to the Jesuit prisoners was the same of the accused of «crime de primeira cabeça» (treason), which means sentenced to death32. They were not allowed to place their hands or feet out of the cell because the warder hurried up and reprimanded them if they did. When the warder caught any prisoner who walked two or three steps to see who their neighbors were, they locked him for eight days or more and deprived them from the hours of fresh air at open doors. The warder intended to prevent them from communicating and receiving news, not only from outside but also from the interior. Thus, the prisoners ignored who their cell neighbors were for a long time. But little by little, the prisoners communicated with the young men who helped the warder, though it took Jesuits two years to finally know who their fellow prisoners were and how many. As time went by, the Jesuits started writing little notes to be sent from one cell to the other, on pieces of books and pieces of paper that the warders’ assistants brought to them, and instead of a pen they used a piece of bread toasted in the fire of the oil lamp. Later, the young assistants also brought feathers for them to write, which they removed from the turkeys that were around the fortress. Instead of ink, they used a mixture of water and grinded coal. As the prisoners acquired more experience, some used the fume from the oil lamps, which they trapped with a piece of pottery or 30

Cf. KAULEN, Some Acoounts, ff. 121-124. Ibid., ff. 124-131. 32 Ibid., ff. 142-146. 31

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with a jug with water hung over the light, which did not go out. This ink was enough to write entire books. Even tablets were made from this fume, which resembled Indian ink, which some of them called «tôuxe».

5. The Secret Communication Code among Prisoners Because there were mathematicians among the prisoners, some of the fathers created a ciphered writing system by changing the meaning of pictures or using algorithms. This was the way through which Jesuits started to get information about each other, as well as about everyone’s needs and illnesses. They purchased medicine and staples from outside the prison with effort and the help of a corrupt locksmith. The warder caught many of these notes and got angry because they could not understand them. They usually tried to hinder any communication in that place, so their assistants were frequently searched and forbidden from coming near the cell doors. However, the prisoners always found a new way of sending their messages. Sometimes they put their notes in some dark corner of the cell or into the handles of dirty jugs so the young men took those when they came in to collect the jugs. Therefore, even if they entered the cells with the warder, those could not notice the exchange of messages. They also exchanged messages by putting notes into the straw mattresses that were moved from one cell to the other. The most skilled prisoners tied notes to stones and threw them into their companions’ cells. When the young men were not around, a hungry and trained cat which ate in two different cells was very useful. If it was kept in a cell with no food for some time and then released, it would run to another cell with a note tied to his neck. Once the cat got used to this, simple gestures were enough to make it change cells and carry a message. The warder did not notice anything because it happened in the dark. However, one day this cat was chased after by the warders’ dogs and disappeared. After a couple of days though, when the fathers were really afraid of having their note caught, the cat returned safe and sound and with the intact message. But as the searches had become more rigorous, communicating had also become more difficult. Thus the prisoners started communicating to one another by using a new method, knocking on the walls. They also invented a very ingenious and easy way of communicating with which

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they also amused themselves after supper. However, as knocking on walls would echo underground, the warder suspected that the prisoners were digging a tunnel to escape, so they intensified searches and seriously forbid this activity. As searches were the worst thing that could happen to a prisoner, these invented an even better means of communication that was «talking» through whistles made of cane. Since the whistles could be clearly heard from a long distance, knowing the different sounds they produced would make it possible for prisoners to identify who «talked» and which cell they were in. For a long time, the warder thought that most prisoners had simply gone mad because they whistled as boys who played a game, and they did not notice these sounds served as a means of communication. After some time though, some warders’ assistants began to suspect that the whistles really were a means of communication among the prisoners, but they could not decipher that whistle code33. The locksmiths became more suspicious when they noticed that Jesuits somehow knew about certain things that happened in the Tower. Suspicions about the young warders’ assistant led to a more rigorous watch, which made these prisoners’ life almost unbearable. Most of the cells that used to be open for around an hour when food was brought, so as to let some fresh air come in, started to be immediately shut afterwards. For this reason, some Jesuit fathers tried ways of opening the doors themselves in order to breathe better, at least in the evening. One of them was able to open the door of his cell by using a nail and small iron bars taken from the clothing trunk, which he heated in the flame of the oil lamp and sharpened on the stones of the cells. Other prisoners had gotten a piece of file from the young men. When these were in front of the cells, they taught prisoners to open doors and helped them so that finally more than half of the cells could be open by the prisoners themselves. Before this took place, some warders happened to forget that some of the doors were still open, which allowed prisoners to check their circumstances and location since some of the skylights were open. Some prisoners noticed that one hasty locksmith did not totally lock the cell doors. Sometimes, as soon as he closed the doors, he removed the key from them and went away, so the spring of the locks would not shut. 33

Ibid., ff. 146-150.

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Some prisoners took advantage of it to close the door without locking it, by putting some wax around a small stick which was tied to a thread. This was pulled when the door was closed and thus it remained unlocked. They also learned how to lock it again so that no one would notice it on the next day. Many ways of opening doors without making noise and shutting them easily and fast were invented. The prisoners usually lifted the spring with a piece of iron and moving the tongue of the lock with another. The jingle of the keys could tell the prisoners that the warders were coming, so they entered their cells in time. When it happened, all of them ran into their cells. As some prisoners had cats in their cells, these did the same when they saw their owners running away because of the sound of the keys. After some time, when the cats heard the warders’ keys, they went to their cells, which served was a warning sign to the prisoners who were out of their cells and had not noticed the warders’ coming. Because of this, many were not caught. But the cats’ warning sign was only useful during day time. The evening spy was a dog that walked along the aisles with the prisoners, which warned them of the warders’ coming, for a bone they gave it from time to time (and that never lacked). In the evenings, when this dog heard the keys or any other unusual move, it entered a cell and warned the prisoners by making noise, so that they had time to enter the cells and close their doors. Nevertheless, it did not take long until the warders hunted the dog and killed it, separating prisoners from their loyal evening sentry.

6. The Subterranean University and the Students’ Defense Examinations In order to make most of their time some Jesuits started to write memoirs and treatises, others translated pieces of writings from one language to the other or studied philosophy, mathematics, theology and any other disciplines for which there was a scholar among them. Even being in prison, the teachers who were there suggested studies and exams to students that were done when the doors were open in the evening. Thus, they would not lose years of study when they left prison34. 34

Ibid., ff. 155-157.

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On a previously arranged date, the examinations were performed with all the possible academic solemnities. The prisoners cleaned a cell that was converted into a classroom. For this event, they brought their stools and organized them in a way they formed «subselios»35. Their blankets were used as curtains and carpets. One very cheerful brother would have the role of the bedel, holding a staff. The arguments were solemnly introduced. The president sat on his chair and the examinee stood. The cell was lit up with the oil lamps brought from the other cells. At the beginning this resembled more of a humorous scene, but as soon as the professors animatedly presented their propositions, the examinee was impelled to defend his ideas very skillfully during the examination, as no mistake was forgiven. Students were given certificates which could be presented in any schools if they were released before the suppression of the Society of Jesus, as they really were. According to Kaulen, these certificates were really useful to them afterwards. In addition, there were some prisoners who applied themselves to learning many languages. Since there were Jesuits from many parts of Europe, who had been in indigenous villages as well as in more civilized countries, there was a large number of teachers who were available to anyone who wished to study languages. Besides, since all of them were used to studying, there were all kinds of science, arts and skills in that subterranean «university». There were plenty of good doctors and pharmacists, and among these was the famous Father Johann Koffler36 of the Japan Province. Among the mathematicians was the astronomer Fr. Ignacije Szentmártonyi37. But 35

From the Latin word «sublelium», in other words, «benches» («inferior seats»). Johann Koffler was born on June 19th 1711 in Bohemia (Prague). Joined the Society of Jesus in Brno (Moravia, Czech Republic). He studied Philosophy and Theology in Olomouc and Prague. In 1738 he was assigned to the mission in Japan. He took his last vows on August 15th 1749. Died on January 8th 1785 in Sibiu (Romania). Cf. J. RUIZ DE MEDINA, «Johann Koffler», in Ch. E. O’NEILL – J. M. DOMÍNGUEZ, Diccionario Histórico de la Compañía de Jesús. Biográfico-temático, IHSI – Comillas, Roma – Madrid, Vol. III, 2001, p. 2209. 37 Born in Kotoriba (Croatia) on October 28th 1718. His father was Hungarian and his mother Croatian. Joined the Society in Zagreb on October 17th (August 27th?) 1735. At 20 he was already a mathematics professor at the Varazdin Lyceum (17381741) and in Zagreb (1741). He studied in Graz and subsequently in Vienna where he graduated in Philosophy (1739-1741), Mathematics and Physics (1744-1745), 36

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there were also painters, sculptors and draftsmen, and among these was the excellent brother Antônio Camici, of the Province of Goa. The prisoners could make two complete nativity scenes since there were some of them who could make figures and statues out of clay. They even made many dozens of flower bouquets out of paper and wax for the chapel-cell to decorate altars and oratories. The imprisoned Jesuits’ endeavor to keep their routine and religious life in São Julião da Barra shows that they resisted and claimed their status of Jesuit Fathers even in prison. They were and continued to be Jesuits. The reason for such resistance was closely connected to the formation of the Society.

7. The Philosophical Education of the Jesuit Scholars in Brazil António Vieira38, in one of his exhortations, described Grão-Pará and all the territory of the Amazon River as an immense «university of souls». and Theology (1746-1749) in Vienna. He was ordained in 1748 in Vienna and took his last vows on February 2nd 1753 in Lisbon. He was a Mathematics and Astronomy professor in the College of Graz (Austria). He taught geometry of the Pythagorean Theorem to Jesuit scholastics, as well as principles of integral calculus. John V of Portugal invited him to take part in the expedition of engineers and cartographers of the demarcations between the Crowns of Portugal and Spain. In the spring of the same year he went to Genoa going to Lisbon afterwards. However, after a misunderstanding with the governor of Pará, he fell ill and went to the Ibyrajuba residency. He was arrested on October 18th 1760 in the College of Pará. Sent to Lisbon, he was kept in jail, first in the Azeitão prison, later on in São Julião da Barra (1769). In São Julião he was kept in jail Number 8, the biggest one in the Tower, with another 4 religious people; he was a Mathematics professor for younger priests, jail companions who wanted to continue learning. While subject to the Empress Maria Theresa, he was claimed by her from São Julião. In July 1777 went to Croatia. Lived in Medimurje where he performed some discontinued jobs. Lived in the seminar of Varazdin where he wrote a grammar of the Croatian dialect «kaj». Died in 1793. Cf. L. F. M. RODRIGUES, «O matemático e astrônomo jesuíta Ignacije Szentmártonyi e o Tratado de Limites no Norte do Brasil» [«The Jesuit Mathematician and Astronomer Ignacije Szentmártonyi and the Boundaries Treaty in Northern Brazil»], study published in IV Encontro Internacional de História Colonial, Paka-Tatu, Belém do Grão Pará, Vol. 1, 2012, pp. 164-178. 38 Born on February 6th 1608 in Lisbon went to Brazil as a boy. Studied in the College of Bahia when he got into the novitiate of the Society of Jesus in Salvador on

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Through this theoretical analogy, the visitor had somehow predicted the beginning of the College of Arts in the State of Maranhão and Pará with the scholars of the Province of Brazil who had gone to the reinforcement of the Vice-Province of the North in 1688 and some natives. This course in Maranhão started after failed attempts to found a Jesuit university in Brazil. The course of the Arts of Grão-Pará and Maranhão were subject to the legislation of the Northern state, which was different from the one in Brazil. However, this course was subject to the same internal rules of the Ratio Studiorum and the external rules of the Statutes of the University of Coimbra. This was the legal arrangement employed so that the Philosophy course made progress until it reached a certain maturity with the Philosophical Conclusions in the golden period of 1730, with the help of the master Fr. Bento da Fonseca39 (who afterwards became the procurator of the missions in Lisbon until the Suppression). They consist of four-page theses May 5th 1623. Taught Humanities and Rhetoric in the colleges of Bahia and Pernambuco. Completed his Philosophy and Theology studies in Bahia with a master of arts degree. He was ordained in Salvador on December 10th 1634 and took the solemn vows in St. Roque (Lisbon) on January 21st 1646. Stood out in the resistance against the Dutch occupation. Due to his gift as a preacher, he was appointed Royal preacher by John IV of Portugal and served in several embassies in France, England, Holland and Rome. In many occasions he defended the new Christians. In 1652 he embarked on the mission to Maranhão and Pará as the head and visitor. As a defender of the law for the freedom of the indigenous people he was expelled from the mission in the riot of 1661. Due to political matters, he was charged and arrested by the Inquisition in Coimbra in 1665, until he could prove his innocence in 1668. Went back to Lisbon and from there to Rome while standing out due to his proficient sermons. In 1681 he went back to the Province of Brazil where in the College of Bahia and in the «Quinta do Tanque» («Tank’s Farm»), near Salvador, he spent the rest of his life. Diplomat, politician, reformer, missionary and professor, he died on July 18th 1697 in the College of Bahia. Cf. LEITE, História da Companhia de Jesus no Brasil, Vol. IX, pp. 192-363. 39 Professor, administrator and chronicler. Born on April 16th 1702 in Almada, near Anadia (Portugal). Son of an apothecary joined the Society of Jesus on March 4th 1718 and two years later embarked on the missions to Maranhão and Pará where he studied and taught Philosophy and Theology. He took his last vows in Maranhão on August 15th 1735. He actively worked against the slavery of indigenous people and was a general procurator in Lisbon. When expelled from the Society of Portugal, he was arrested in Almeida and São Julião da Barra. After his release, he went back to Anadia where he died on May 27th (or 21st) 1781. Cf. LEITE, História da Companhia de Jesus no Brasil, Vol. VIII, pp. 243-262.

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from which three are printed and the last is blank. These pages bring the manuscript and autographic licenses of the College of Arts of the Coimbra University: «Cohaerent suo originali. Conimbricae. In Colegio Societatis Jesu, die 17 Martii 1730. Matheus Gião. You may defend; Coimbra, in judgement, March 20th 1730. Paes. Abreu»40. The theses of the Colégio do Maranhão were usually printed at the typograph of the Coimbra College of Arts, but two were printed in Lisbon, one in the Music typograph and the other by Mathias Rodrigues. The other three «Conclusiones Philosophicae» by the master Rodrigo Homem41 are attached to the former. They were defended in Maranhão, two of them were printed in Lisbon (1721-1722) and one at the University of Évora (1723). The «Conclusiones Philosophicae» by Manuel da Silva are bound in the same codex of Évora and were defended in Maranhão in 173142. As well as the «Conclusiones Philosophicae» of the Colégio do Maranhão, the other ones from schools of the Society in Brazil were printed, mainly the ones from the Colégio da Bahia. Unfortunately, as we have already mentioned in our previous article43, many theses are lost because on the occasion of the expulsion in 1760, they were either stolen or sold by weight to the chemists and storekeepers that used them to pack fertilizers and ointments. Master Fr. Francisco de Faria’s44 «Conclusiones Philosophicae», printed in Rio and defended in the Colégio do Rio de Janeiro, were preserved. 40

Cf. Évora, ADEVR/District Archive of Évora/ ex-Public Archive of Évora. Code. CXVIII/1-1. 41 Born on August 1st 1685 in São Pedro do Sul. Joined the Society of Jesus on May 11th 1702 and went to Maranhão in 1720 to «read» the Cursus philosophicus. Taught one year of Theology in Pará and returned to Portugal in 1725. Cf. LEITE, História da Companhia de Jesus no Brasil, Vol. VIII, p. 300. 42 Ibid., Vol. VII, pp. 209-210. 43 Cf. L. F. M. RODRIGUES, «As «livrarias» dos jesuítas no Brasil colonial, segundo os documentos do Archivum Romano Societatis Iesu», Cauriensia, VI (2011) 275-302. 44 Born on September 12th 1708 in Goiana (Pernambuco). At 15 he joined the novitiate of the Society of Jesus on November 19th 1723. For some time he was the head at the house of S. Catarina (1748) standing out at teaching. Being proficient in letters he was the president of the «Academia dos Seletos», which was formed in Rio de Janeiro in honor of Gomes Freire de Andrade. Taught Humanities and Philosophy and was the head of the First Chair in Theology in Bahia in 1757. He was cast out of Bahia into Lisbon and Rome in 1760 and joined the Order of «São João de Deus» («Saint John of God») on July 1st 1766. Died in Villetri on March 3rd 1769. Cf. LEITE, História da Companhia de Jesus no Brasil, Vol. VIII, pp. 216-217.

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The dependence of colleges of Brazil on the Portuguese Colleges’ legislation contributed to the prevalence of the scholarly philosophy developed by the Conimbricenses45, which had Pedro da Fonseca46 as its main representative. The philosophical ideas of the Conimbricenses reached not only Europe, but also Portuguese America and Asia. Therefore, the scholasticism taught in the Colleges of the Society in the colonial Brazil reflected the one which was current in the metropolitan Jesuit institutes. The scholastic philosophy taught in the Portuguese religious institutions, especially in the colleges and universities of the Society, were based on the method and ideas of the Conimbricenses and subject to the norms of the Ratio Studiorum. This was practically the only source of philosophical education in Brazil at that time. Pedro da Fonseca’s commentaries allowed for the foundation of the «Curso Conimbricense». Besides him, there were two other important names in this period: Francisco Suárez47 and Francisco Sanches48. Suárez 45 In the history of philosophy the term «conimbricenses» refers to the authors of the Conimbricenses course, published in the end of the 16th century under the general title Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu in octo libros Physicorum Aristoteles Stagyritae (A Mariz, Coimbra 1592; Lyon 1594), whose volumes were published from 1592 to 1606 and that were used by the students of the Philosophy Course in the College of Arts of Coimbra and in the University of Évora. More generally it refers to the Jesuits professors of Philosophy from Coimbra and Évora in the second half of the 16th century and in the first decades of the 17th century (among them: Fathers Manuel de Góis, Cosme de Magalhães and Baltasar Álvares). The conimbricense course was applied in the colleges of the Society of Jesus, firstly in Europe and subsequently in America and Asia (India, China and Japan). 46 Pedro da Fonseca was born in Proença-a-Nova (Cortiçada, 1528) and died in Lisbon on November 4th 1599. Proficient in Greek and Arabic he developed philosophical themes addressed by Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle. Due to his knowledge in the field of philosophy, especially regarding logics and metaphysics, he was nicknamed «The Portuguese Aristotle». Cf. M. B. PEREIRA, Ser e Pessoa. Pedro da Fonseca I. O método da Filosofia, Inst. de Estudos Filos. Coimbra, Coimbra 1967. 47 Born on January 5th 1548 in Granada (Spain). Joined the Society of Jesus on June 16th 1564 in Salamanca. He was ordained on March 25th 1572 in Segovia and took his last vows on December 11th 1571. He was a proficient philosopher, theologian and jurist. Died on September 25th 1617 in Lisbon (Portugal). Cf. E. ELORDUY, «Francisco Suárez», in Ch. E. O’NEILL – J. M. DOMÍNGUEZ, Diccionario Histórico de la Compañía de Jesús, op.cit., pp. 3654-3656. 48 Born in 1550/1551 in the diocese of Braga, studied in Portugal until he was 12, going afterwards to Bordaux in order to continue his studies in the College of Guyenne

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applied himself to devising a system of the metaphysics of being, while Sanches engaged in a controversy with the medieval scholasticism and aimed at the direct examination of objects. These new approaches to the study of philosophy contributed to the ending of the (medieval) scholasticism around the seventeenth century. The Society of Jesus facilitated the diffusion of scholasticism in Portugal, as it practically monopolized high schools in Portugal between 1539 and 1725, and subjected them to the humanist philosophical trends of the University of Évora and the College of Arts. In 1639, the first generations of Jesuits’ attempts of proposing a more autonomous metaphysics were totally aborted, due to the obligation of following the doctrine of the Doctor Angelicus. The consequence of this orientation was the adoption of the Cursus philosophicus according to the principles of the religious and pure thomism of João de Santo Tomás49. For a long time, students in Coimbra had been lacking means for their studies, including a general course of philosophy. The didactic method at that time implied that the professors dictated their lessons, which students tried to copy from one another in the way it was done in the medieval universities. In 1561, on the occasion of Fr. Nadal’s50 visit, it was decided where he studied until 1569. In 1569, at 19, Sanches began his medicine studies in Italy. After returning to France, he enrolled in the Faculty of Medicine in Montpellier. He was a doctor, mathematician and eminent philosopher. In 1575 fixed residence in Toulouse where he lived until his death in 1623. Cf. F. REIS, «Francisco Sánchez», , [accessed on December 2nd 2016]. 49 João Poinsot was born in Lisbon in July 1589. When joining the Dominicans he took up the name of João de Santo Tomás (John of Saint Thomas). He was a philosopher and theologian of sixteenth century second scholastic. Between 1625 and 1630 taught Philosophy and Theology in the Dominican Complutense College. Took over the chair in the University of Alcalá de Henares, where he published the Cursus philosophicus and the monumental Cursus theologicus. Left the university in 1643 and died on June 6th 1644. Cf. P. O. SILVA, «Frei João de Santo Tomás», < http://cvc. instituto-camoes.pt/filosofia/ren16.html >, [accessed on December 2nd 2016]. 50 Born on August 1st 1507 in Palma de Mallorca (Spain). When his scrivener father, Antonio Nadal, died, he went under the guardianship of his uncle Jaume Morey, deacon and college professor. At 20, when his first studies were completed, he enrolled in the University of Alcalá de Henares, where he studied Arts. Later he transferred himself to the University of Paris where he enrolled in Sorbonne to study Mathematics and Theology between 1532 and 1533. In Paris he met Ignatius of Loyola with whom he did the spiritual exercises. In 1536, he went to Avignon where he was ordained a priest and took his doctorate degree in Theology. While returning to Mallorca he decided to

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that Pedro da Fonseca and some other masters of Coimbra (Fathers Marcos Jorge51, Cipriano Soares52 and Pedro Gomes53) met the aforesaid needs of the university. Therefore the Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis, were created. Fonseca commented the Aristotelian texts as it used to be done until then. But his commentaries consisted of an edition, translation and exegesis of the Stagiran’s texts in only one work. While he commented on the texts, he also presented a Latin translation. He explained the Aristotelian text by means of «explanationes». Fonseca also presented «quaestiones», of metaphysics to his students, which added a new perspective typical of his philosophy to the subject studied. go to Rome where he arrived in July 1545 to join the Society of Jesus in which he was accepted on November 29th 1545. He was the right-hand and secretary of Ignatius of Loyola. Among other positions he was the Rector of the first college of the Society in Messina (1548) in which the new method promoted by the Jesuits was applied, based on the Humanistic studies and on the Parisian discipline. He was the author of the rules that ruled the college and served as basis for the Ratio Studiorum Societatis Iesu. He was general vicar of the Society in 1554. As a pontifical delegate he participated in the Diet of Augsburgo and of the Council of Trent. Went around a good part of Europe proclaiming the Constitutions of the Society of Jesus assigned by its own founder. Died in Rome on April 3rd 1580. Cf. M. R. JURADO, «Jerónimo Nadal», in Ch. E. O’NEILL – J. M. DOMÍNGUEZ, Diccionario Histórico de la Compañía de Jesús, op. cit., pp. 2703-2726. 51 Born circa 1524 in Nogueira (Oliveira do Hospital, Portugal). Joined the Society on March 15th 1548 in Coimbra. He was ordained in January 1555 where he also took his last vows on April 9th 1564. Died on December 10th 1571 in Évora (Portugal). Cf. J. VAZ DE CARVALHO, «Marcos Jorge», in Ch. E. O’NEILL – J. M. DOMÍNGUEZ, Diccionario Histórico de la Compañía de Jesús, op. cit., pp. 2153-2154. 52 Born in 1524 in Ocaña (Toledo, Spain). Joined the Society of Jesus on September 21st 1549 in Lisbon (Portugal). In 1553 he was ordained in Coimbra where he also took his last vows on April 9th 1564. Inaugurated the rhetoric chair in the College of Lisbon and in Coimbra. Accompanied Nadal in the renovation of the colleges according to the model of Coimbra. Died on August 19th 1593 in Plasencia (Cärceres, Spain). Cf. J. ESCALERA, «Cipriano Soares», in Ch. E. O’NEILL – J. M. DOMÍNGUEZ, Diccionario Histórico de la Compañía de Jesús, op. cit., p. 3593. 53 Born in 1535 in Antequera (Málaga, Spain). Joined the Society on December 21st 1553 in Alcalá de Henares (Madrid). He was ordained in the Summer of 1559 in Coimbra, where he also took his solemn vows on January 25th 1568. On the initiative of Jerónimo Nadal, he collaborated with Pedro da Fonseca in the writing of a «cursus» of Philosophy and Theology. Died on February 21st 1660 in Nagasaki (?), Japan. Cf. J. LÓPEZ-GAY, «Pedro Gómez», in Ch. E. O’NEILL – J. M. DOMÍNGUEZ, Diccionario Histórico de la Compañía de Jesús, op. cit., p. 1774.

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The commentaries were divided into two parts: the first had the Greek text and the Latin translation and a literal comment, discussions and the resolutions of the textual difficulties and the meaning of the words. In the second part there were the usual metaphysical «quaestiones» of the philosophy teaching at that time. Thus, the many commentaries represented the «explanatio» of Aristotelian thought, according to the doctrinal and systematic point of view of the metaphysical themes. Therefore, Fonseca’s «quaestiones» concerned the object of metaphysics and science, universals, objects, prime matter, substantial forms, theory of being, analogy, concept, contingency, future contingents, act and potency, among other topics. This new approach to metaphysics regarded the Scholastic thought as a doctrine. The bachelors and licentiates were examined at the college in the course of the Coimbra College of Arts. The examination for the degrees took place in the larger schools, according to the royal resolution established on February 1st, 1558. For the degrees, the committee of examiners was composed of three masters: two priests of the Society, appointed by the rector of the College of Arts, and one of the doctors of the university, elected according to the Statutes. For the licentiates’ examination, the committee consisted of five members: three of the Society and two of the University. In Brazil, where there were not universities, the guest examiners were elected among the most competent and respected masters in Arts, such as Fr. António de Oliveira, of the «habit of St. Peter» (i.e. of the Secular clergy), who was a «Master in Arts and theologian of the General Studies of the Society of Jesus in the city of Bahia, in which he was an examiner in philosophy»54. On the occasion of his visit to the Province of Brazil in 1688, Father Antão Gonçalves55, professor of the University of Évora, recommended in his memorials that these examiners should have knowledge, authority 54

Cf. LEITE, História da Companhia de Jesus no Brasil, Vol. VII, p. 211. He was a professor and administrator. Born circa 1600 in Extremoz (Portugal). Started his novitiate in the Society in Évora on Mach 25th 1615. He was a professor of Philosophy and Theology in the University of Évora. Went to Brazil in 1665 as a visitor and general commissioner. After completing his visit, went back to Portugal in 1668 where he was provincial. He was appointed general assistant in Rome in 1673. He left the Roman position due to illness and died on August 1st 1680. Cf. LEITE, História da Companhia de Jesus no Brasil, Vol. IX, pp. 117-118. 55

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and sensibility, and that they should be appointed according to reliable information56. On the other hand, the visitor Fr. José de Seixas57, who was a professor at the University of Évora and rector of the College of Arts in Coimbra, wrote about his discontentment with the scholastics’ decadence, in courses like Letters or Theology in his memorial of 1677. António Vieira himself began his visitation in 1688 with the same rigour, by noting that the examination of the philosophy scholastics should occur with all the formalities required by the Constitution, and that the provincial Alexandre de Gusmão58 should avoid naming examiners in a hurried manner59. The public acts were usually watched by high authorities as the bishop and the governor, sometimes even by the vice-king or the general governor. In the beginning of the eighteenth century, other authorities were invited to join the committee of examiners. In the theology examinations the guests sat first and were followed by the superiors and two masters, and finally the prefect of studies (in 1711 the Dean of Studies) and another professor. 56

Cf. Roma, ARSI, BRAS. 9, ff. 219v: Visitando o P. Antão Gonçalves, comissário geral e visitador da Província do Brasil, ordenou as cousas seguintes, anno 1668 [Visiting Father Antão Gonçalves, general commissioner and visitor of the Province of Brazil, ordained the following accounts, year 1668]. 57 Born circa 1612 in Lisbon. Began his novitiate in the Society of Jesus in Lisbon on April 9th 1627. Taught Latim, Philosophy and Theology. Doctor and Professor of the First Chair in the University of Évora, he was the Rector in the colleges of Braga and Coimbra. Went to Brazil in 1675, as provincial, and as a visitor in 1678. After completing his provincial period, he went back to Portugal where he took over the position of governor of provincial. Participated in the General Congregation of 1682 after which he went back to Coimbra as a Rector where he died on February 9th 1691. Cf. LEITE, História da Companhia de Jesus no Brasil, Vol. IX, pp. 117-118. 58 Born on August 14th 1629 in Lisbon. Embarked with his family to Brazil in 1644. He was a student in the College of Rio de Janeiro when he joined the Society on October 27th 1646. In Rio, he took his last vows on February 2nd 1664. He was a master of novices, Rector in the colleges of Espírito Santo and Bahia and twice provincial. He founded the College of Belém da Cachoeira where he was also the Rector. He had a misunderstanding with Father António Vieira on administration matters of the indigenous people. He died on March 15th 1724. Cf. LEITE, História da Companhia de Jesus no Brasil, Vol. VIII, pp. 289-298. 59 Cf. Roma, ARSI, BRAS. 3 (2), f. 262r: Carta do P. António Vieira ao Padre Geral [Letter from Father António Vieira to the General Father], Bahia, August 4th 1688.

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The School of the Society in Bahia was founded in 1556 and was the first school of philosophy in the sixteenth century60. The College of Rio de Janeiro (founded in 1567) was the first college of philosophy in Rio. In 1638, the teaching of philosophy began and was soon compared to the philosophy course in Coimbra, receiving the title of «Royal College of Arts». Likewise, some if not all the philosophy disciplines were taught in the other following colleges of the Society: in Nossa Senhora da Luz, in São Luís do Maranhão (founded in 1567), in the Escola de Santo Alexandre, in Belém do Pará (founded in 1652), where Gabriel Malagrida61 taught, in Colégio de Santo Inácio, in São Paulo (founded in 1554), in the Colégio de Santiago, in Vitória do Espírito Santo (founded in 1654), in the Colégio de São Miguel, in the village of Santos (founded in 1642), in the Colégio de Nossa Senhora do Terço, in Paranaguá (founded in 1754), and finally in the Colégio de Nossa Senhora do Ó, in Recife (founded in 1678). In these schools, Jesuits taught the following subjects according to the principles of the Ratio Studiorum: physics, metaphysics, morality, mathematics, which were all the disciplines of philosophy. These, in turn, 60

Born circa 1594 in Alenquer (Lisbon). Joined the Society of Jesus in Bahia in 1612 when he had already studied two years of grammar. According to the catalogues of the Society in 1621, Paulo da Costa was in the third year of the Arts course. Despite the lack of previous catalogues from 1631, it is known that in this year he was already a master in the Arts, priest and professor in the College of Bahia; preacher and expert in the Brazilian language. Among his students were Francisco Avelar and António Vieira. In 1646, he reportedly taught Humaine letters, Philosophy and Theology and was the procurator in Portugal and, in this position, he died in Lisbon before December 30th 1649. Cf. LEITE, História da Companhia de Jesus no Brasil, Vol. VIII, pp. 181-182. 61 Born on December 5th 1689 in Menaggio (Italy). Joined the Society of Jesus in Genoa on October 23rd 1711. Taught Humanities in the Colleges of Italy (Nizza, Bastia and Vercelli) and completed Theology in Genoa. He embarked from Lisbon to the missions in Maranhão and Pará in 1721. He pronounced his last vows in Maranhão on December 26th 1725. He was professor of Humanities and Theology and spiritual Father in the colleges. Active missionary in the indigenous villages he was a proficient preacher who was popular in the villages and cities from Pará to Bahia. He founded seminars and homes for women. In 1750, famous for being the Apostle of Maranhão, he went to the court of John V of Portugal to whom he preached spiritual exercises. In 1755, due to the earthquake of Lisbon, he published writings that caused the rage of Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo, Royal Minister. He was involved in the «conspiracy of the noblemen» and charged with promoting it. Arrested in the prison of Junqueira, he was executed in Lisbon at Rossio square on September 20th 1761. Cf. LEITE, História da Companhia de Jesus no Brasil, Vol. VIII, pp. 340-350.

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were applicable not only the study of the scholastic and the speculative theology, but also to the practical and positive theology with the study of the Sacred Scripture and the canon law. According to the requirements of the Ratio, the study of Letters was divided into grammar, humanities and rhetoric. The first discipline was taught by three teachers and each of the two last by one teacher. The philosophy course should last no less than three years and theology, four years. The didactic method was based on the pedagogy of the Ratio, which consisted of daily and weekly repetitions that happened from master to student, and public or private discussions about the most difficult arguments. Time, manners and pedagogy of teaching and learning were all meticulously explained in the Ratio, and strictly followed in the colleges of the Society. The prefects of studies, the rectors and the provincial himself (the main responsible), were commited to ensure that students followed the method and the doctrines of the Conimbricenses. According to Serafim Leite, the Cursus conimbricensis, was the textbook of the Colégio da Bahia62. The first philosophical treatise written in Brazil was António Vieira’s lost course. Another important textbook writer was Baltazar Teles who dedicated the fourth edition of the Summa universae philosophiae to the Jesuits in Brazil in 165263. In addition, there was Domingo Ramos’64 Cursus philosophicus, printed in Lyon in 1687, António de Andrade’s Cursus philosophicus and 62

Ibid., Vol. VII, p. 220. Cf. Balthazar Telles, Summa universae philosophiæ cum quaestionibus theologicis quae hodie inter philosophos agitantur, apud Paulum Craesbeeck, et eius sumptibus, Ulyssipone 1641 (ex Officina Laurentij de Anveres, Ulyssipone, 2 t. in 1 Vol., 1642). Baltazar Teles was born on January 11th 1596 in Lisbon. He joined the novitiate of the Society of Jesus in Coimbra on March 24th 1610. There he also took his last vows on September 28th 1631. He was a professor of Humanities and Rhetoric in the colleges of Braga, Évora, Lisbon and Coimbra; later on he taught Philosophy and Theology in Coimbra and Lisbon. He was the Rector in the Seminar of the Irish and in the College of Santo Antão in Lisbon, and head of the residency in Lisbon. He died on April 20th 1675 in Lisbon. Cf. A. LEITE, «Baltasar Teles», in Ch. E. O’NEILL – J. M. DOMÍNGUEZ, Diccionario Histórico de la Compañía de Jesús, op. cit., p. 3718. 64 This work of Father Domingo Ramos (1653-1728) was in the «nihil obstat» of Rome that was never given. Cf. Roma, ARSI, BRAS. 1, f. 19r: Registo da Carta Soli do P. Alexandre de Gusmão [Record of the Soli Letter from Father Alexandre de Gusmão], Bahia, February 8th 1687. 63

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Luís de Carvalho’s65 Quaestiones selectiores de philosophia problematice expositae. Because these many books were written, some superiors of the Society insinuated that the publishing of new treatises should be avoided so as not to banalise the Conimbricenses masters’ authority. The teaching followed the model of the College of Arts by presenting the scholastic philosophy in the manner of the Conimbricenses, through commentaries and texts about aristotelic physics and logic, but not about morality. This was done so as to preserve the purity of the aristotelic doctrines from interpretations which were debated or condemned by the masters of the thirteenth century. Thus, students should only have access to Aquinas’ Summa theologica and the Stagirian’s philosophical works, as well as to the approved and selected commentaries and the books chosen by the humanities teachers. The Aristotelian views which were contrary to the orthodoxy of faith should be refuted according to the decrees of the Lateran Council. And the interpreters of Aristotle who were contrary to the Catholic Church should not be mentioned to students. The theology professors should strictly follow the scholastic theology, according to the Aquinate’s doctrine. If the masters did not agree with the doctrine of the Doctor Angelicus, they should make an effort to present Saint Thomas’ arguments without omitting them. The first academic degrees were conferred in the Courses of the State of Brazil in 1575, and in the Maranhão and Pará State, in 168866. There was a transfer after which the old formula «Escolas Gerais» (General Schools) or «Estudos Gerais da Universidade» (University General Studies), previously used in the Universities of Lisbon and Coimbra, stopped being used to name the schools of the Company in Portugal. But in Brazil, the schools of Bahia, and soon afterwards, the schools of Rio de Janeiro and Olinda (these three of royal foundation), started to use these titles due to the absence of a Brazilian university. By the middle of the eighteenth century, the students of the Course of Arts, who were around 300, and the ones in Bahia, who were around 100, started to quit due to the limitations imposed on the studies of the 65 Cf. S. LEITE, «O curso de Filosofia e tentativas para se criar a Universidade do Brasil no século XVII» [«The Course of Philosophy and Attempts to Create the University of Brazil in the 17th century»], Verbum, 5 (1948) 137. 66 See the Bachelor letter from 1730, published by S. LEITE, História da Companhia de Jesus no Brasil, op. cit., Vol. VII, p. 215, with the names of the examiners.

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Society (the situation between the Jesuits and Oratorians began to have effects on the Jesuit teaching). But in Rio, due to the influx of the «Minas Gerais» students were more frequent, as well as in São Paulo and Pará. The increasing population of the colony and the consequent economic development brought about the need of institutes for the education of the tradesmen’s children in Brazil. In the middle of the eighteenth century, this resulted in a movement in favor of the creation of universities, promoted by the candidates to the ecclesiastical career and the students who intended to pursue the military career or study law. However, this movement was not successful. Unfortunately, on the occasion of the expulsion, the «livros de matrícula» (enrollment books) and «livros de aprovação ou livros dos graduados» (book of approved students or book of graduates) were lost. However, in the biographical notes of some documents, it is still possible to find about the alumni of the Society Colleges who had Master degrees in Arts.

8. Conclusion The formation of the Jesuit missionaries went through a radical change when Inácio de Azevedo, who had been named the visitor of Brazil by the Superior General Francisco de Borgia, had the task of getting human and material resources for the mission in the «Terra de Santa Cruz» (Land of the Holy Cross). Having verified the weaknesses of the formation of the Jesuits sent to Brazil, Inácio de Azevedo wrote to the Portugal provincial saying he had had enough of the least competent persons who were sent from the colleges of Portugal to Brazil. As he already knew the country and its needs, Inácio de Azevedo got material help from Lisbon and also a large pastoral faculty granted by the Pope Pius V. He visited houses and colleges of the Society of Jesus and gathered 73 Jesuits, among priests, students and brothers, many of which were mechanics and experts in other services. They were 100 persons in total. Father Azevedo decided to lead this group to the Quinta de Val Rosal, out of Lisbon, not only to train and prepare them but also to keep them away from the plague that was spreading in the kingdom’s capital. It took the group 5 months of intense preparation for this mission. Since then, the missionary and cultural formation of the Jesuits in Brazil has only grown stronger, despite a significant lack of resources.

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The lively account of the facts lived by Kaulen and his fellows is more than a mere report of events, dates and names. On the one hand, Kaulen’s report is in the «apologetic-nostalgic» style. On the other hand, his «Relação» witnesses the imprisoned Jesuit’s hard and continuous struggle to overcome the limits imposed by confinement. These prisoners tried every way to maintain the «normality» of life in community and according to the norms of religious life. Not only they resisted to all the forms of «suppression» of the Society, but also claimed their status of religious men and Jesuits. They continued to wear their habits, elected a superior for the «community» in prison, secretly send epistles to the Spanish Jesuits to inform them that they were still living according to the rules of the Society. Also, they kept a pace of life which was adequate to the Sociey. They even established a «subterranean university» so that the scholar prisoners who survived confinement could restore the Society when they were released. In its schools and «colleges», the Society of Jesus adopted a scholastic system which reflected the Aristotelian-Thomistic studies in the manner of the Conimbricenses, by presenting a content of dogmatic nature. This was done so as to meet the need of well-educated Jesuits in colonial Brazil and mitigate an insufficient formation of the regular and the diocesan clergy in the colony. The Society gradually stopped being a reference for the philosophicaltheological and humanist studies in the metropolis due to the onset of the Oratory of Saint Philip Neri in the eighteenth century, whose main exponent was Luís Antônio Verney with its «O Verdadeiro Metodo de Estudar»67. In Brazil, Thomism was also influenced by spurious doctrines, which were a combination of trends unrelated to Saint Thomas Aquinas and to scholasticism itself. These doctrines were not as strong as the major syntheses of the thirteenth century, showing signs of decadence and illuminist influence. However, while the Society was influent in the education and formation of laypersons, of the secular clergy and the scholastics of the 67 Cf. Luís António Verney, Verdadeiro metodo de estudar : para ser util à Republica, e à Igreja : proporcionado ao estilo, e necesidade de Portugal. / Exposto em varias cartas, escritas polo[sic] R. P. * * * Barbadinho da Congregasam de Italia, ao R. P. * * * Doutor na Universidade de Coimbra; Tomo primeiro [- segundo], na oficina de Antonio Balle [– Genaro e Vicenzo Muzio], Valensa [– Nápoles], 2 Vols., 1746.

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Society themselves, the Jesuits aimed to set the basis for a new priestly identity of the colonial clergy, based on their special concept of priesthood and according to the Ratio Studiorum pedagogy and the manuals of the Cursus conimbricensis. The Jesuits in Brazil aimed to surpass the magisterial classes and convey active assimilation by means of the subjects presented according to quaestiones and disputationes as the Conimbricences masters did. This pedagogical model when added to contents that were open but orthodox to faith, helped laypersons and the secular clergy to awaken to the model of the man according to the Ignatian anthropology of the Spiritual Exercises. This man had a complete formation and excelled at the balanced development of all his intellectual and moral capacities. This was the reason why Jesuits grounded theology on a solid but more open philosophy, thus integrating its more valid elements with the Ratio system, which gave strength to the doctrine that was taught. The Jesuit’s purpose was to educate priests and laypersons who would be connected with the society of their time and willing to defend faith in the progress of the souls in life as well as in the Christian doctrine. A priest should be able to «help souls», and be far from the frivolity of the mundane life, immorality, concupiscence and passions of the «seculum». These priests should also be strongly conscious of the doctrine and able to discern God’s will in every moment and any situation.

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Appendix

Roma, ARSI, Arme Istoriata de Gesuiti cagione de misfatti in ogni genere di cui sono colpevoli, s.l., s.d.

PAULA OLIVEIRA E SILVA* SUÁREZ’S CRITICISM OF AQUINAS’ TAXONOMY ON EMOTIONS: A STEP TO MODERNITY?

1. Some Notes on the Concept of Iberian Scholasticism We commonly name as Second Scholasticism, Iberian Scholasticism or Baroque Scholasticism the intellectual movement structured around the School of Salamanca in the early sixteenth century which disseminated to other Spanish universities and the Portuguese universities of Coimbra and Évora in the second half of the same century. The doctrines explained by these scholars and flourished from this academic context are preserved either in printed or manuscript form, being its influence crucial in the outlining of the European forma mentis of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. However the designation «Second Scholasticism» is far from being agreed on among scholars, due to the lack of adaptability between the word and the reality it refers to. In fact, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, we can notice discontinuity to a certain extent in the scholastic teaching modelled in the universities of the thirteenth century on which it is based. Such remoteness from the medieval model is due to a complex set of factors and to the emergence of the movement designated as Renaissance Humanism. Nevertheless, even if this movement affected the European forma mentis, the medieval Scholastic paradigm did not disappear. In fact, it persisted throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, alongside the Renaissance Humanism1, being influenced by it to the point that the concept *

Associate Professor at the Universidade do Porto and Researcher at the Instituto de Filosofia da Universidade do Porto. [email protected] 1 Ch. NAUERT points out the continuity between the medieval age and the Renaissance, touching on more radical interpretations on the innovative character of the movement known as Renaissance Humanism, arising mainly in the late nineteenth century and existing along the twentieth century. This expert on the Renaissance acknowledges having had to change perspective, given the evidence of documentary sources for the study of this period: «The medievalists are at least partly right: the Renaissance is not the beginning of the cultural dynamism of Western society, but rather a highly significant reorientation of an advanced civilization already two or three centuries old. […] The

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of Scholastic Humanism, apparently contradictory, can be introduced while also recognizing, in documents, that the exact characterization of the semantic content of the concept is still to be defined2. The use of the history of thought on the basis of commentary structure is a feature of the medieval scholastic teaching, and keeps, along with over three centuries of intellectual work, on the teaching of the period denominated as the Second Scholasticism. In fact, the great review of the history of philosophy produced in peninsular universities in the sixteenth century reveal that their authors have a profuse knowledge of the past, now including quotations of late medieval scholastic authors and of works by Humanists, as well as quotations from classical authors harvested either in written content closer to philosophy, as happens for example with Cicero’s Tusculanae disputationes, or in the works in the domain of poetry, as that of the writings of Virgil or Horace. Indeed, one is surprised by the immense heritage of scholarship that these works reveal. This is a typical feature of this period’s works, either printed or preserved in manuscript form. It is likely that these authors had the intention of producing a doctrinal synthesis which each topic or philosophical question gathers all that was said both east and west, by both pagan and Christian philosophers, during the patristic and scholastic revival and medieval age. The above mentioned sequence is common among the quotations of these authors while analyzing particular issues. This can be verified, for example, in the Commentary on Aristotle’s De anima, produced in Coimbra3. This humanistic culture did not produce a new philosophy to replace scholasticism, which continued not only to exist but also to develop along lines that were intellectually sound and philosophically fruitful». See Ch. NAUERT, Humanism and the Culture of Renaissance Europe, Cambridge University Press, New York 20062, p. 3. 2 R. PASNAU emphasizes the obscurity which still involves our knowledge of what occurred in the philosophical domain in 14th-17th centuries: «The human mind tends to suppose that what it does not know about does not exist, and for our four centuries this fallacy is especially misleading. The almost unknown era of philosophy between 1400 and 1600 gave rise to vast quantities of material, much of which still survives. Although the fifteen century is practically terra incognita to modern scholars, we have more philosophical texts from that century than from the previous two centuries combined, and more studies of Aristotle from the sixteenth century than we have from the whole prior history of Latin Aristotelianism, all the way back to Boethius». See R. PASNAU, Metaphysical Themes, 1274-1671, Oxford University Press, Oxford – New York 2011, p. 3. 3 See Comentário do Colégio Conimbricense da Companhia de Jesus. Sobre os Três Livros do Tratado da Alma, de Aristóteles Estagirita, translated by M. C. CAMPS,

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Commentary is assumed as the completion of a corporate project, hence, that of Conimbricenses, to whom the Curia General of the Jesuits ordered the preparation of a doctrinal synthesis, as complete as possible, concerning philosophical matters, where it adequately met their propaedeutic function to serve the study of philosophy in the Jesuit universities then expanding worldwide. However, even in this work, generated by its specific context and its specific purpose, underlies an intention of fidelity to the Thomistic doctrine, one notes the presence of the literature by authors of the Humanism, even in such innovative aspects such as that of the fields of optical or medical science4. The fact indicates that the existence of a corporate teaching, with a common doctrinal aim, does not invalidate the free use and organization of sources, and even a process of thought to some extent free. Concerning Suárez’s philosophy and theology, one cannot forget the criticism of anti-Thomism that was targeted by its members and his own defense by insisting on his personal way of teaching, not as a commentator but as someone who exposes his own way of thinking5. Introduction, Appendix and Bibliography by M. SANTIAGO DE CARVALHO, Sílabo, Lisboa 2010. For different reasons, both contextual and related to the history of the dissemination of this work, this one is the most famous Commentary on Aristotle’s De anima produced in the 16th century’s Portuguese universities and is part of the work known as Cursus Conimbricensis, which contains the whole commentaries corresponding of the philosophical study in Coimbra’s Faculty of Arts, edited in five volumes, some of them in Lisbon others in Coimbra, between 1552 and 1606. However, there are other complete Commentaries on Aristotle’s De anima of the same period, remaining in manuscript form in Portuguese libraries. For a better understand of the 16th century debate on the relation between the body, the soul and mind in the definition of what is human in humans, it is important to analyze these commentaries, especially those written by prominent philosophy and theology teachers as Pedro da Fonseca (dated 1559, the commentary is not signed, but there is strong arguments for its attribution to Fonseca; it subsists in codex BGUC 2399 from University of Coimbra Library) and Cristóvão Gil (dated 1591 and subsisting in codices 2516 and 2518, from de Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal). These commentaries are now being analyzed by a research team led by Paula Oliveira e Silva in the Instituto de Filosofia da Universidade do Porto. 4 For the influence of renaissance humanism in the University of Coimbra and particularly in its Faculty of Arts, see M. SANTIAGO DE CARVALHO, «Introdução», in Comentário do Colégio Conimbricense da Companhia de Jesus. Sobre os Três Livros do Tratado da Alma, de Aristóteles Estagirita, op. cit, pp. 34-39. 5 The basis of the charge would be the commentary by Suárez on Part I of the Summa theologiae, on divine predestination. Suárez’s excuse can be read in the letter addressed to

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From contact with the texts and authorities of this period arises our belief of the urgent necessity not only to find the correct name for that which in this period of the history of Western philosophy and culture is produced, namely in Portugal and Spain (or in transboundary but by authors that somehow intersect with this geographic area), but rather the urgency to show, through a systematic study of the works and doctrines produced, the identity of the worldliness conveyed by the sources, as well as their membership to the culture of its time, deeply marked by humanist movement and specifically the new contributions of science in this period. The present study intends to be a contribution in this direction, demystifying texts and authors, showing ways of reading that disassociate themselves from preconceived mental structures. Dennis Des Chene refers to these Jesuit authors – Manuel de Góis, Francisco Suárez, Rodrigues de Arriaga, among others – using the expression belonging, as he says, to Stephen Menn as “liberal Jesuit Scholastics”6, and highlights something that is now a common-place, namely the fact that the philosophical and theological doctrines taught in Jesuit schools and particularly in the Iberian Peninsula, were later propagated throughout Europe. Therefore they are to some extent at the origin of European framework, even if suddenly by criticism and rejection of the contents as in the case of the novatores. Albeit a movement of rejection or of assimilation, even significant – as occurs, for example, in the case of the reception of works like Suárez’s Disputationes metaphysicae, in the seventeenth century in German universities – the influence of the doctrinal corpus produced by Jesuit schools in the sixteenth century is undeniable, either in the field of philosophy or in theology. By contrast, if a movement of critical assimilation or rejection of these doctrines is found in the European context, regarding the New World, a movement of translatio studii can be verified in the sixteenth century. In fact, it is the Jesuit model of teaching, forged in the Iberian Peninsula that will be exported, in the mentality and in the books of the missionaries to the then newly discovered territories in America, and even further, to Asia. These historiographical factors increase in our days the acquaintance to the Everando Mercurial, the General of the Company (Valladolid, 2 de Julio 1579), in defense of the visitor Diego de Avellaneda’s charge of anti-thomism. Cf. Á. PONCELA, Francisco Suárez Lector of Metaphysics Γ y Λ, Celarayn, León 2000, n. 149, p. 101. 6 See D. DES CHENE, Life’s Form. Late Aristotelian Conceptions of the Soul, Cornell University Press, Ithaca – New York 2000, p. 3.

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doctrinal corpus produced in the universities of Spain and Portugal in the sixteenth century, both to better understand the European’s forma mentis, as to understand the influence of the Western culture in the outlining of the people from the New World’s mentality. And if the enormous force given to medieval studies mainly along the twentieth century allow in our times that the human community has a better understanding of its own intellectual itinerary, the gap in relation to the period between the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries, as Pasnau pointed out7, is still overwhelming, due to, among other factors, the volume of the textual legacy produced all through them and whose knowledge eludes us. Part of this legacy inhabits in Portuguese libraries and results from the teaching in the Portuguese universities of Coimbra and Évora, in the sixteenth century, which closely depends to the one spread in the Spanish Universities of Salamanca and Alcalá, only to mention the most distinguished and most vigorous universities at the time. As it is well-known, F. Stegmüller8 recorded the material available, printed or manuscript, related to the university’s teachings of philosophy and theology in Portugal in the sixteenth century, and Lohr reunited and completed this information in the context of Renaissance Aristotelianism9. Nevertheless, this is practically untouched ground in the scientific community. Although merely exploratory, the studies we have conducted based on this manuscript textual legacy in the field of political philosophy and law have proven to be fruitful, as they allow us to monitor the flow of ideas and their textual sources, the erosion of concepts and the freedom of thinking, that to some extent can be verified in the commentaries by the teachers therein involved. By applying the same comparative method we used for the textual legacy where there are doctrines of philosophy of law, a project in Salamanca on the commentaries to Aquinas’ Summa theologiae, by authors whose names are associated to the salmantino university’s teaching period, was developed and placed in disagreement Bartolomé de Medina and Francisco Suárez’s comments on S. Th. I.IIae, qq. 2248, on the doctrine of emotions. More recently, we extended this study 7

See above, footnote 2. See F. STEGMÜLLER, Filosofia e Teologia nas Universidades de Coimbra e Évora no séc. XVI, Universidade de Coimbra, Coimbra 1959. 9 See Ch. LOHR, Latin Aristotle Commentaries II – Renaissance Authors, Leo Olschki, Firenze 1988. 8

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to the Commentaries on De anima of Aristotle, produced in Portuguese universities, hoping to continue to contribute to a better understanding of the doctrinal project of the corporate Jesuit schools in such fundamental issues as those pertaining to the continuation of discussions in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries about the nature of the soul, its relation to the body, the possibility to prove by reason its immortality, or the possibility of man to achieve his ultimate natural or supernatural end. Here, we are going to expose the partial result of the study carried out on F. Suárez’s De passionibus, which is part of his commentary on Aquinas’ Summa thelogiae, I-IIae, qq. 22-48. The treatise by Suárez is not in itself highly revealing, particularly when compared with other major works by the same author and in the case of philosophical works about human psychology when confronted with his Commentary on Aristotle’s De anima, now translated into Spanish and subject of numerous excellent studies. However, there are a few notes worth highlighting, in Suárez’s De passionibus and serve above all to confirm the doctrines of the Doctor Eximius on human nature, namely his exhaustive review on Aquinas’ taxonomy on emotions and his clear choice for the division proposed by the Scotistic tradition. At the base of this option is the understanding of the structure of life based on the idea of force or trend for action, supported by Suárez in the literature of his time, either by philosophical commentaries, as is the case in his reference to Luis Vives’ De anima, or by medical literature of his time, such is the text by Frascatoro.

2. Archeology of Emotions in Suárez’s De passionibus If we wanted, in our days, to make a genealogy of the passions in the West, perhaps we start by quoting Plato, or Aristotle indeed, being paradigmatic for the theme, the first two books of Aristotle’s Rhetoric. However, this genealogy is available today in the fairly complete analysis done by Simo Knuuttila, specifically in his book Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy10. Undeniably, this work is currently considered a necessary reference in the study of the passions, especially regarding that of the history of Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. 10

See S. KNUUTTILA, Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004.

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Consequently, our goal here is confined to closely review Suárez’s comment in his De passionibus, Disputation I, Sections I to III, in order to establish which are the authorities on which grounds he exposures and what their doctrine is on the nature of emotions. Therefore, being a controlled purpose and seemingly unambitious, it is however certain that both the above text of Suárez and his doctrine about emotions have not been the subject of particular attention from scholars, despite it being a rather interesting and enlightening theme, both for suarezian anthropology, and the understanding of how the expert discourses with tradition, as well as to identify elements that to some extent anticipate in his work doctrines later developed by the novatores. Suárez’s treatise De passionibus is part of his broader treatise on human acts. It corresponds to the content that results from his teaching on moral theology, which, according to this period’s curriculum of theology, should comment Thomas Aquinas’ Summa theologiae. In fact, Suárez’s De passionibus proposes to review Summa theologiae, I-IIa, qq. 22-48, in which Aquinas exposes his doctrine about the passions of the soul, bringing together the main theories available in the previous tradition and justifying his own doctrine based in Aristotelian hylomorphism. However, despite Suárez closely follows the external model of the Thomistic treatise on emotions, it turns out that he clearly distances himself in many aspects and especially in the crucial question about the nature of emotions. The issues that are inherent to the question relate to this set of problems: what they are, in fact, this type of movements or affections, designated emotions? Are they acts of the soul? So why are they called passions, given its active condition? Perhaps because are they referred to our body’s passivity which undergoes the shocks from the outside world in its sensitive structure? In this case, the soul is passive with respect to body’s movement. But if so, in what way does the body transmit to the soul such clashes? Is it in fact the passive and the active soul in the face of external conditions? The answer to these questions founds, on the one hand, an anthropology, especially the way in which one will assume the relation between the body and the soul, matter and spirit, in the human compound, and secondly, a moral doctrine, where the border of human activity can be set, between the domains of rational and irrational activity, between that which is involuntary and that which is consented. It is for this reason that Suárez’s treatise on emotions is part of his broader treatise on human acts.

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As our goal here is to draw an archeology on emotions, indicating Suárez’ historical and doctrinal position, followed by his commentary, particular attention will be given to the authorities he cites and the position he assumes with the tradition that he comments. Once we understand Suárez’s position regarding the cited authors, we will identify his doctrine and we will verify that, denying the Thomistic doctrine on emotions, it approaches itself to the doctrines espoused by the Scotistic school. However, from the analysis of Suárez’s text one can deduce that he adds something more to the medieval dispute between schools, Thomist and Scotistic on emotions, specifically by enhancing the medical literature of his time and by introducing, in his notion of the nature of emotions, some elements found there. In the historiographical revision that he makes on the classic doctrines of emotions, Suárez closely follows Thomas Aquinas, reporting, such as Aquinas, to the Stoics and the Greek and Latin fathers. Regarding the stoic sources, Aquinas’ source is mostly the De civitate dei, by Augustine, both for Cicero’s definition of passions as «perturbationes animae»11, as for the exposure of the subject of the passions, taking as reference Book XIV of De civitate dei. Suárez refers to the same sources, but adds a rich set of references to the stoic sources, citing especially Cicero, in Book IV of Tusculanae disputationes, and Seneca, in Epistle 119, to Lucilius, as well as the treatise De ira, to Novato, and De finibus. Again in the wake of Aquinas’, Suárez cites the Holy Scripture, namely S. Paul’s text, in the Epistle to the Romans 7,35, some Bible commentaries of the Latin fathers, Jerome and Augustine, and finally the Greek fathers, in particular the reference to De fide orthodoxa II, 22, by John Damascene. In fact, this latter text is in itself a historiographical recompilation of the classical doctrines, Greek and Latin, on the passions, while it exposes a true doctrine on the subject. Paradigmatic for the treatment of the passions, it will be an obligatory reference for medieval 11

Suárez discusses the issue on the nature of the passions in Sections I to III of Disputations I from his De passionibus. See Francisco Suárez, De actibus, qui vocantur passiones, tum etiam de habitus, praesertim studiosis, ac vitiosis, in Opera Omnia, Editio Nova a D. M. ANDRÉ, iuxta editionem venetianam, Tomo IV, Ed. Vivès, Paris 1861, pp. 456-478. We shall refer to this work as De passionibus [DP], Disputatio I, Sectiones 1-3. Thomas Aquinas, S. Th., I-IIae, q. 22, aa. 1-3 serves as a reference. See Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, Summa theologiae, I-IIae, q. 22, aa. 1, 2 et 3, BAC, Madrid 19844, pp. 157-161.

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scholastics authors, having become a canonical text in the debate about the nature of emotions. Suárez pays particular attention to De fide orthodoxa II, 22, in which John Damascene refers to emotions where the perception factor intervenes, hence the internal senses’ activity, namely imagination and memory. Suárez holds from this tradition the fact that emotions are acts of the sensitive appetite, specific to the living being, standing thus at the boundary between the material body and the rational soul. Since in animals there is the union between body and sensitive soul, emotions give up, Suárez would admit, in this intermediate reality: it is a vital movement of the spirit, which has consequences on the body12. Thus we arrive at the first definition given by Suárez on the nature of emotions: «Every act of the sensible appetite is called emotion and this is indeed what emotion is»13. This vital motion is an act of the sensible appetite which receives the impact of the representation produced by the internal senses. Therefore, although the Fathers and the Stoics sometimes claim for emotions a negative function, emphasizing that they are an irrational motion, according to Suárez this is not their main characteristic. Exactly because emotions result from a movement localized in the sensible appetite of living beings, they are produced in a first level of perception, absent from deliberation and decision. Hence, emotions as passions or affections of the soul do not have immediate nor evident moral implication, as Suárez writes: «There is no reason to always use the term emotions in a negative sense, since even when it is in agreement with reason, the movement of the appetite may cause changes in the body»14. In the same first Disputation, Section I, 3, Suárez clearly explains the nature of emotions, always localizing them in the sensitive appetite: «Emotions are not to be found in cognitive potency, nor even in the voluntary 12

In the introduction of Disputatio I from De passionibus, Suárez affirms he is going to cover the «de actibus mediis, id est, de affectibus animi seu passionibus», adding that, although their study belongs to natural philosophy and doctors greatly deal with it, they too belong to moral science. See DP I Proemio, p. 455, col. 2. 13 See DP I, I, 2, p. 456, col. 1: «[…] omnes actus appetitus sensitivi est, et dicitur animae passio». 14 See DP I, I, 2, p. 456, col. 1, in finem: «[…] non est cur passionis nomen sempre in malam partem usurpemos, quia omnis appetitus motio, etsi rationi consuetanea sit, potest in corpore alterationem excitari, sicque dic passio».

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one, although they suppose some degree of desire»15. This thesis is based on the distinction made by Suárez between the function of cognitive potency, which receives representations and produces the act of knowledge, and the appetitive potency, which is merely receptive regarding the act of the appetite. From this explanation, Suárez grasps the following distinction: so far as the act of knowledge presupposes cognitive potency, and regarding the general definition of potency, knowledge can be considered also as passio. However, in the proper sense, the movement caused in the body by the changes of corporal humors is what is properly called emotions and it is originated by the vital appetite, this movement is not necessarily linked with the act of apprehending: «The changes of corporal humors and movements, from which derives the term emotions, properly and per se are originated in the acts of the appetite, and not just from the apprehension and imagination»16. Suárez considers that there is an appetitive tension of the soul toward the object of its appetite. This tension happens with no intervention of knowledge and will, and even with no intervention of internal sensitive potencies. Emotions are these kinds of movements: «motiones et instinctus dicuntur passiones». Therefore, they are radically distinguished from the activity of rational potencies, insofar that the activity of these latter is spiritual. By contrast, the activity of the appetite is material and corporeal, as Suárez says: «[…] appetites are material and corporeal. Hence, properly and per se, they cause movements and changes in the body»17. Although Suárez claims he is commenting on Aquinas’s Summa theologiae, he puts forward a doctrine on emotions which decisively deviates him from Aquinas’ doctrine on the subject. The explanation Aquinas gives on emotions is based on the Aristotelian notion of the movement of the bodies in the physical world. So, it is based on the Aristotelian notions of act and potency, and Aquinas applies it in an analogical way to grasp the movement of the living bodies. 15

See DP I, I, 3, p. 456, col. 2: «[…] has passiones neque in potentia cognoscente, neque in appetitu rationali reperiri». Suárez refers to Aristotle’s De Anima, without indicating the specific place. 16 See DP I, I, 3, p. 456, col. 1: «Dicendum est has passiones neque in potentia cognoscentem neque in appetitu rationale reperiri». 17 See DP I, I, 3, p. 456, col. 1: «[…] advertendum est actus quosdam reperiri in voluntate, qui similes sunt illis, qui in appetitu sensitivo passiones dicuntur, ut ex dicendis constabit; differunt tamen, quia actus voluntatis sunt spirituales omnino, et absque corporali organo perficiuntur: at vero appetitus materiales sunt et corporei».

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3. Suárez Against Aquinas, on the Nature of Emotions After analyzing the nature and definition of emotions (DPI, I) and discussing whether these vital movements are good or bad (DP I, II), in Section III Disputatio I, Suárez establishes the general division of emotions and states what distinguishes emotions from the appetite. The taxonomy of emotions is at the core of Suárez’s disagreement with Aquinas. He stands out mainly in two features. First, he rejects Aquinas’ arguments on the real distinction between concupiscible and irascible appetite. Then, he rejects the taxonomy of emotions stated by Thomas Aquinas, and only accepts it for its functional feature18. Suárez recognizes it is commonly accepted that emotions are divided into two types of movements of the soul: the concupiscible and the irascible. However, not all authors explain this division according to the same ratio. Thomas Aquinas states that there are two types of appetite, one tending toward good, and the other toward arduous good, which is apprehended as noxious. Like the author he refers to, Suárez’ criticism on Aquinas’ division of the appetite is based on the definition of arduous good. Suárez focuses on Aquinas’ S. Th. I-IIae, q. 25, art. 3, ad 2 and states that Aquinas’ notion of arduous good introduces badness in its ratio. Doing so, Aquinas’ assumes that the emotions of the irascible appetite are originated by the apprehension of a noxious good, which would be the cause of the movement of rejection. Therefore, emotions originated by the irascible appetite would be the various features resulting from that rejection. Aquinas introduces hope within the division of emotions originated by irascible appetite19, and Suárez completely rejects this fact. He considers 18 The Thomistic classification is as follows: passions of the concupiscible appetite: (love / hate, desire / aversion, pleasure / pain); passions of the irascible appetite: hope / despair, courage / fear, and anger. On the subject see S. KNUUTTILA, «Medieval Theories of the Passions of the Soul», in H. LAGERLUND – M. YRJÖNSUURI (eds.), Emotions and Choice from Boethius to Descartes, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht – Boston – London 2002, pp. 49-83. 19 See Cf. Thomas Aquinas, S. Th., I-IIae, q. 25, a. 3, resp., p. 162: «[…] sic ergo patet quod spes est prima inter omnes passiones irascibilis». See also ibid., p. 174. There are passions whose object is good and passions whose object is bad. And this happens in two appetites, irascible and concupiscible. See S. Th., I-IIae, q. 23, a. 1, resp., p. 162: «[…] obiectum potentiae concupiscibilis est bonum vel malum sensibile simpliciter acceptum, quod est delectabile vel dolorosum; […] ipsum bonum vel malum, secundum quod habet rationem ardui vel difficilis, est obiectum irrascibilis».

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that, doing so, Aquinas introduces ambiguity in the notion of arduous good, as he claims: «[…] with the term arduous we refer to the good which is to some extent arduous, for instance, the good which is excellent and just because of its excellency; or the good which must be loved above all other goods, or the absent good, or the good which cannot be achieved without effort/pain, or that in which some ratio of badness is involved. And whatever the solution, it seems absolutely necessary that concupiscible good also intends on arduous good, since all love and desire refers to concupiscible appetite»20.

The crucial point of Suárez’ criticism is that he states that all appetite is appetite for good, and that the difference between concupiscible and irascible appetite is on the twofold way of the perception of that good. Good can be perceived as a desirable, or it can be perceived as a good of its achievement hindered by an obstacle. In the first case, the concupiscible appetite is put in evidence, as the movement of the soul tending toward the loved good; in the second case, the same appetite is put in evidence, but «hindered by an obstacle». In this latter case, the appetite toward good is put in evidence by means of a difficulty which distances the achievement of the loved good. Therefore, in this case, the same appetite is in action, that is, the concupiscible one, as it tends toward good, but this good is aimed by hindrance of an obstacle». As Suárez says, «two features can be considered in the object of the appetite. One is the good itself as desirable and what contributes to its achievement. The other is what prevents the achievement of that good and deprives from the loved good; therefore, the appetite is called concupiscible, insofar as it desires the good; and it is called irascible, insofar as it rises up against what removes the achievement of the good»21. 20

See DP I, III, 1, p. 458, col. 2: «Nam vel ardui nomine intelligitur bonum aliquod arduum, scilicet excellens, ut excellens: vel bonum absens, vel quod non sine labore comparari potest aut cujus acquisitio habet aliquam rationem mali: at quidquid horum significetur, necessarium omnino videtur concupiscibilem in bonis etiam ardui versari, omnis enim amor et desiderium ad concupiscibilem spectat». 21 See DP I, III, 1, p. 458, col. 2: «[…] in objecto enim appetitus duo considerari possunt. Primum ipsum bonum appetibile, et quae ad illud consequendum per se conferunt: alterum est id quod impedit talis boni consecutionem, et bono nos privat

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And Suárez concludes: «Therefore, we can explain in a different way the terms irascible and concupiscible. And in fact I state that they are not two opposite appetites but they are one and the same notion, which can be understood in different manners, since we can consider two appetites in the object of desire. There is the desirable good itself, and what per se can opposite to its achievement. This latter is what impedes the achievement of the loved good and removes us from it. Therefore, the appetite insofar as it is appetite toward good is called concupiscible; and insofar as it is based on that which prevents the achievement of that good, and protects that good as desirable for us, is called irascible»22.

In conclusion, Suárez’s doctrine regards emotions as a movement of the living being, stating that there is no real distinction between concupiscible and irascible appetite. There is one and the same movement toward the loved good which is twofold: either it is easily achieved, and in this case, this movement is followed by pleasure, or it is achieved by means of difficulty, and in this case it is followed by pain. According to this doctrine, Suárez considers that the different taxonomies on emotions are to some extent only functional, since they depend on the definition given by each author on the nature of the vital appetite of living beings. What he has just explained, in these first three sections of his De passionibus, Disputatio I, is at the core of his notion on the nature of emotions and is the basis for the correct understanding of their nature. According to this doctrine, he will analyze each of the traditional lists of emotions on the other sections of this first Disputatio of his De passionibus23. amato: appetitus ergo quatenus bonum appetit concupiscibilis dicitur, quatenus vero insurgit in eum, qui huismodi bonum impedit, ut suum bonum tueatur, irascibilis dicitur». 22 See DP I, III, 3, p. 458, col. 2: «Aliter ergo possumus rationes nominum irascibilis et concupiscibilis explicare, opinor enim non duos appetitus, sed eumdem diverso modo conceptum significari, in objecto enim appetitus duo considerari possunt. Primum ipsum bonum appetibile, et quae ad illud consequendum per se conferunt: alterum est id, quod impedit talis boni consecutionem, et bono nos privat amato: appetitus ergo quatenus bonum appetit concupiscibilis dicitur, quatenus vero insurgit in eum, qui hujusmodi bonum impedit, ut suum bonum tueatur, irascibilis dicitur». 23 In his own classification Suárez proposes the reduction to six passions: love, desire, delight, anger, fear and sadness. See DP I, XII, 2, p. 475, col. 1.

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4. Suárez’s Use of Medical Literature Suárez’s criticisms regarding the Thomistic doctrine on the nature and taxonomy of emotions have its historical background in the fourteenth century’s criticism between Scotistics and Thomistics on the same subject. In Disputatio I, Section I to III of his De passionibus, Suárez gives and account on the main doctrines of both schools. Against the thomistic real distinction between concupiscible and irascible appetites – from which derives, among other consequences, the fact that it establishes a link between the virtue of hope and the irascible appetite – Suárez puts forward another statement which goes back to Albert the Great, followed by Scotus and Gabriel Biel. These theologians state that the tendency which originates emotions is only one and the same: the appetite towards good. In consequence, hope is nothing more than this appetite when it faces an obstacle for the good to be achieved. Suárez clearly adopts this doctrine. In a first glance, what Suárez is discussing in his De passionibus is the definition of the place of emotions within human actions, in order to understand both their moral value, their place in the way to Christian perfection and their influence in the practice of theological virtues, as is the case of hope. Suárez’s aim in the debate is undoubtedly focused on human moral perfection. However, in his explanation there are some interesting elements in the text denoting novelty regarding the medieval tradition, in Suárez’s statement of emotions. These data are the preference and praise made by Suárez to the works of philosophers and doctors linked with the humanistic movement. Suárez explicitly refers to Luis Vives’ De anima and to some books of medical literature, particular quoting Galean’s De symptomatum causis libri tres and De affectorum locorum notitia libri sex24, as well as the work of Girolamo Frascatoro (1476/1478-1553), De 24

According to D. CAMPBELL, Arabian Medicine and its influence on the Middle Age, Routledge, Abingdon 2001 (reed. of the edition by Trubner’s Oriental, London 1926), pp. 62, 77, where a catalog of Latin translations of printed works Galen is published, the work Galeni affectorum locorum notitia libririas was published in Latin translation, in Venice in 1510, and successively reprinted (Paris 1513, Paris 1520, Paris 1539, Venice (only Books 1-3) 1557), Lyon 1562. It is possible that, given the precision of the quote and exact chapter indication, Suárez has used directly this source. Likewise with the other work of Galen, cited by Suárez, namely Symptomatum causis libri tres. A first edition is given in London in 1524, followed by an edition in Paris, and in 1528 an edition in Venice, 1548.

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Sympathia et antipathia rerum, liber unus25. Concerning this latter he quotes «Book II, chapter on cognition, in the middle». The aforementioned work by Frascatoro was first edited in 1546, in Venice, where De contagione et contagiosis morbus et eorum curatione libri tres was also published. However, Book II of the De sympathia does not exist since there is only one Book. Nevertheless, in De sympathia there is a chapter Suárez refers to and that is chapter 13, De sympathiis animae cognitricis. Because of this inaccuracy, lies the doubt whether Suárez used the work directly. According to Suárez’s statements on the nature of emotions, and to the texts from the philosophical tradition, as well as from the medical literature of his time it is possible to draw some features of his doctrine on emotions. On one hand, he clearly claims the failure of the Thomistic doctrine on emotions and of its consequences in moral theology. On the other hand, Suárez strongly awards the contribution medical science giving way a better understanding both of the nature of the human body and of its physiological movements, as well as on the body-soul natural frame. Although this study remains in an exploratory stage and still requires deeper research to verify to what extent Suárez integrates those features in his moral theology, the results of our analysis allow us to approach his thought on the nature of emotions from the theoretical position adopted by the seventeenth century philosophers towards the same subject. Suárez considers emotions as actions of a vital tendency of the living being. Therefore they are out of the scope and control of human superior potencies as cognition and will. Hence, the physicians, better than the theologians, can give a more suitable explanation on the nature of emotions. Therefore, this knowledge should be applied by those latter in the deliberation of the morality of human acts. It is true that Suárez does not put forward this argument with such evidence, but it is also true that his definition of emotions, as vital movements of the body-soul human frame, and the 25

The quotation referred to by Suárez is as follows: «[…] est igitur anima quoddamodo una natura, quoddamodo non una. Una quidem quatenus membrum simpliciter mixtum est, cuius est forma: ac talis quidem unius factiva est, aut plurimum ad unum; non una autem est quatenus cognoscens. Sic enim cum ad diversis movetur, diversa enim sit, aut saltem non eodem modo se habet». See Hieronymus Frascatorius, De Sympathia et antipathia rerum, liber unus, Apud heredes Lucantonii luntae, Venetiis 1546, p. 15. This work of Frascatoro contains his philosophy of nature, where all phenomena, from the most elementary to the complex physics of human nature, are explained from the motion of attraction or repulsion – sympathia or antiphatia.

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position he undertakes regarding the contribution of medical science gives in the description of the movements of vital appetite, bring him into line with the attitude modernity will adopt concerning the place of the corporeal structure in human nature and of its relationship with the superior faculties of man.

ÁNGEL PONCELA GONZÁLEZ* METAPHYSICA SIVE THEOLOGIA NATURALIS – THE EVIDENCE FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD BY FRANCISCO SUÁREZ

Introduction One of the most frequented places by contemporary historiography close to medieval thought, and neo-scholastic thought in particular, is that moment when God was conceived by Suárez as primum ac summum ens and included in the object of the metaphysics. The reason for criticism does not rest on the attributed content or the legitimacy of the enterprise, but in the entitative character of the conceived, and as a result, the actual place where the first entity is located1. Achieving a satisfactory answer on these questions inevitably passes through the trance of dealing with the study of each of the 54 Disputationes metaphysicae, with the aim of forging an independent and adequate understanding of the reason for the objectivity of the entity and its mode of attribution to the first entity2. Therefore, the present study is based on the purpose of facilitating the transition to those quaestiones disputatae, presenting some of its proemial moments. We will follow the conducting thread of the Suarecian conception of metaphysics *

Prof. Dr. Ángel Poncela González, Departamento de Filosofía, Lógica y Estética, Campus Miguel de Unamuno, Edificio F.E.S., despacho 509, Universidad de Salamanca. [email protected]. This essay is a result of the Research Project I + D + I, granted by the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad, with the title: “Pensamiento y tradición jesuita y su influencia en la Modernidad desde las perspectivas de la Historia, la Traductología y la Filosofía Jurídica, Moral y Política” (Ref. FFI2015-64451-R). 1 For an approach to the problems of contemporary Suarecian historiography, cf. Á. PONCELA GONZÁLEZ, Francisco Suárez, lector de metafísica Γ y Λ [gamma] y [lambda]: posibilidad y límite de la aplicación de la tesis Onto-teológica a las disputaciones metafísicas, Celarayn, León 2010. 2 We quote the Disputationes metaphysicae, via the bilingual Latin-Spanish edition. Cf. Francisco Suárez, Disputaciones metafísicas, Ed. Gredos, Madrid, 7. Vols., 1960-1966. We use accepted nomenclature: «DM», followed by the number of disputation in Romans, «s» per section and its number in Arabic, «a» per item and its number in Arabic, and finally, page number in Arabic.

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as natural theology, in order to know the reasons, beyond the strictly theological ones, that persuaded Suárez to include God in the metaphysical orbit. The answer will lead to the study of the evidence for the existence of God. Throughout this paper we will keep pointing out the theories of Suárez that substantiate such proofs and provide the subject for discussion. The metaphysical study of God raises at the same time the question about the limits and possibilities of human knowledge.

1. Justification of Metaphysical Study of God Expanding the popular Aristotelian motto, Suárez said that man, besides having a natural inclination to knowledge in general, presents a determined direction towards God3. This belief is confirmed by the experience of introspection that is described in the following terms: «If man thinks about himself realizes that he does not exists by himself and there is not enough in him to his own perfection, nor he will feel satisfied by all the creatures to whom his experience is extended; even more, he realizes that he possesses a more perfect nature that they do, though imperfect in its degree, because he realizes that he is weak and needed, both to know the truth as to love the good»4.

The innate knowledge of God is mainly due to «human beliefs, especially those of common men, rather than objective evidence»5. The belief as a source of knowledge comes from education, formal and informal, but it becomes evident when the truth is presented properly to reason through the method used by metaphysics6. 3

This point is clear. Suárez writes about it like this: «knowledge of God that has been naturally infused into us». Cf. DM XXIX, s. 3 a. 36, p. 338. 4 DM XXIX, s. 3, a. 36, p. 338. 5 Cf. DM XXIX, s. 3, a. 36, p. 338.

Suárez hints at the existence of two pathways to reach the truth: the belief, appropriated for the «ordinary people», and the philosophical demonstration, of which «not everyone is able», reserved for members of the select club of the metaphysicians. A sense that refers directly to the theories of al-Farabi’s Ideal City, and Averroes’s Decisive Doctrine. Cf. DM XXIX, s. 3 a. 36, p. 337; a. 37, p. 338. 6

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Suárez distinguishes natural wisdom, which Aristotle spoke of, from supernatural and divine wisdom, which is reserved for the blessed ones and depends on grace7. According to Suárez, the individual, with his natural strengths alone, can achieve, consolidating the metaphysical habit, natural wisdom, cultivating metaphysics, as this science «gives perfection to man in what has more value to him, and in which his natural happiness is mainly founded, as is in the contemplation of higher things», as Aristotle noted in the aforementioned place8. Supernatural theology, according to Suárez, studies God from «the light of divine revelation of faith», while natural theology considers him only from «natural light»9. Aided by faith, theology is dedicated to the study of God considered as the «ultimate end of all», and at the same time draws the conclusions from the revealed principles. It is a theoretical or speculative science, and at the same time practical, insofar as for the same reason reveals the first principles of morals and sanctions the means available to man to reach the end. Metaphysics as natural theology considers God under the same reason but only «as it is in itself», conforming to the natural limits of reason, «and more on the question of its existence that on its essence»10. Natural theology, unlike the supernatural, finally, is a speculative science, so it cannot deduct, in keeping with its potentiality, normative principles of practical nature. So, by natural theology, divine science and first philosophy, it should be understood the study of God and the intelligences. It is called universal science and metaphysics, when it is dealing with its own object, that is being as such, and its principles and attributes. Finally, it is called wisdom, in that it includes all the above considerations, and also examines the first principles and ultimate causes of all entities. For Suárez, the study of God and the intelligences, that is, metaphysics as natural theology, is the «highest» of the human sciences11. Natural theology is the metaphysical study of God and of divine things using only natural reason with precision of matter according to being and devoid of the light of revelation. 7

Cf. DM Index, I, 2, 19, p. 26. Cf. DM I, s. 2. 9 Cf. DM I, s. 5, a. 5, p. 294. 10 Cf. DM I, s. 5, a. 5, p. 295. 11 Cf. DM I, s. 3, a. 10, p. 263. 8

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Suárez considers not only that the rational study of God is legitimate, but that it is the duty for man to devote all his strengths to that end, for it is precisely one of the contingent ways that he has to resemble God, and at the same time to achieve happiness12. God will not consider this action as an act of pride, because, as Aristotle said elsewhere13, it is consubstantial to man to live according to the most sublime part of his nature, that is the soul, and those who take this path and cultivate wisdom prudently, that is, with moderation, enjoy divine favor14. The study of natural theology or metaphysics is to Suárez, therefore, a necessary condition to fill the natural desire of knowledge proper of man, or to escape from ignorance searching for truth by itself, without any further order to its usefulness. And this is possible by observing its object: the study of the first causes, principles and immaterial beings, under the common reason of being15. Since metaphysics deals with the study of these things that fall under the reason of being that are the noblest in reality, it perfects with its study the more «divine» part of man, which is his understanding, directing it to «the supreme contemplation, in which consists man’s natural happiness»16. Finally, the practice of metaphysics forges the habit towards speculation, facilitating access to and the knowledge of the remaining theoretical and practical sciences17, providing easiness of application of the first principles and agility to rational discourse18. Being committed the natural happiness of human being in the way of metaphysics, it would be temerarious not trying to deepen in the rational study of God, on which it depends essentially as final cause and that is its nearest object in the order of ends, as Suárez probed and will be shown later on19. 12

Cf. DM Index I, 2, 19, p. 25. Ética X, c. 7. 14 Ética X, c. 7. 15 Cf. DM I, s. 4, aa. 2-3, pp. 266-267. 16 Cf. DM I, s. 4, a. 6, p. 269. 17 Cf. DM I, s. 4, a. 4, p. 267. 18 Cf. DM I, s. 4, a. 20, p. 278. 19 Only from the perspective of causality. God, considered from the point of view of the entity or perfection, is the most distant object from human nature. Cf. DM I, s. 5, a. 27, p. 309. From the point of view of the ends, God is «absolutely the ultimate end regarding all things and their particular purposes and the coordination of them». Cf. DM XXIV, s. 1 a. 9, p. 14. 13

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2. A Form of Including God in the Metaphysics Suárez wrote his Disputationes metaphysicae aiming to «restore to metaphysical doctrine its rightful place»20. Without going into other considerations, which we have shown elsewhere, this said purpose of the DM amounts to emphasize the mutual dependence that Suárez established between supernatural theology and metaphysics, as noted above21. This link, as well as the interpretation of metaphysics as natural theology, is based on the reading of the first metaphysical book. According to Aristotle, the dignity of a science is derived from the object that studies, and, as fundamental science, metaphysics will deal with the main object of reality that is the first cause or the divine. By undertaking this analysis, metaphysics properly may be designated: theology or science of the divine. Scholastic thought, first Islamic and then Christian, did not hesitate to include God in the field of problems studied by metaphysics. Suárez shared this view but at the same time disagreed with those philosophers that reduced the object of metaphysics to the study of God alone. After noting al-Farabi, Ibn Siná22, Thomas Aquinas and Cajetan23 as defenders of this opinion, he pinpointed the basis of this reading on the twelfth of the metaphysical books, where the Philosopher said that the entire cast of problems studied by this science refers to God as the main conclusion. From here, those scholastics proceeded to say that the study of metaphysics has a purely extrinsic interest insofar as that only provides a natural approach to the knowledge of God, and therefore God is the proper object of metaphysics. This opinion is refuted by Suárez, attending to the distinction that Avicenna introduced in his Kitab al-Sifá between the principal object (the given) and the appropriate object (the sought) of science24. For Suárez, God 20

Cf. DM Proem., p. 17: «Motive and plan of the whole work. To the reader». Cf. PONCELA GONZÁLEZ, Francisco Suárez, lector de metafísica Γ y Λ, pp. 301-331. 22 Cf. DM I, s. 1, a. 8. 23 Cf. Saint Thomas Aquinas, Suma de teología, BAC, Madrid 1989, I-II, q. 56, a.2; apud DM I, s. 1, a. 10, p. 216. 24 Avicenna, in the book devoted to metaphysics (The Science of Divine Things, al-Ilahiyyat) from his philosophical encyclopedia (Kitab al-Sifá), joined the traditional alfarabian interpretation of Metaphysics, in particular, on the defense of the impossibility to identify metaphysics with theology. This will be only one of the parts of science. In the book of the first, Avicenna explained that God was not the main object of metaphysics. Following Aristotelian scientific axioms (a science cannot prove either the existence 21

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does not constitute the proper object of metaphysics but its principal object. From the point of view of the dignity of a discipline, which must always be qualified by reason of the object studied, we can say that God is the object «first and foremost, but not as the adequate object» of metaphysics25. It is the first object in the sense in which metaphysics considers God as sought after or the natural tendency of knowledge. Suárez demonstrates his position arguing first from the range of problems studied by metaphysics. He analyzes the reason specified by abstraction of entity and from here he comes down to all the perfections of entity that in reality may have the being and do not require matter, and thus, considers God as the infinite being, shown before the division of entity in one and multiple26. Suárez added a priori reason to show that God is not the proper object of metaphysics based on the natural limitation of understanding. Neither metaphysics nor human sciences can come to know God in his own essence or reason but only through other reasons, such as being, common to God and creatures, and using imperfect analogies, attributions or negations27. Metaphysics as natural theology comprises two major regions: the study of being and God. From this relationship, Suárez raised the issue of of its object or its principles) he stated that in any science it must be distinguished between «that that is laid on» by it, and «that that is searched for» it. The «laid on» (or presupposed) is the possibility for the development of science, and therefore, what constitutes its proper object. The «searched for», however, are the whole set of issues that are related to the object, but that can only be rigorously determined once the object of science is established. God cannot be the object of metaphysics because its existence cannot be presupposed, but it should be probed. Physics cannot account for the existence of God, because as it deals with the being in motion it can only prove the existence of a Prime Mover, but the God of avicennian metaphysics is only the principle of being, and therefore cannot be demonstrated empirically. And the other sciences, as they are of less dignity than these, also cannot have God as their object. From the comparison with the other sciences, it follows that although it is not its object, metaphysics deals with God as «objective», that is, as «something that should be sought». Cf. Avicenna (Ibn Siná), Metaphysics. La scienzia delle cose divine (dal libro della guarigione), trad. O. LIZZINI, Preface by P. PORRO, Bompiani, Milan 2002, I, s. 1, pp. 17-29. The object of metaphysics, according to Avicenna, it has to meet three conditions: absolute evidence, universality, and transcendence, in the sense that it can contain under it all beings that have an essence realized and actualized. According to Avicenna, these three conditions are fulfilled by only being as being. Cf. ibid. I, s. 2, pp. 30-43. 25 Cf. DM I, s. I, a. 11, p. 217. 26 Cf. DM IV, s. 4, aa. 4-5, pp. 528-531. 27 Ibid.

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the sufficiency of metaphysics as a science independent and diverse from natural theology. An ontological metaphysics, concentrating on the study of the common reason of being, its attributes and principles, would be devoid of the real foundation of the reason of its object. We read: «the being, as a being, considered exclusively, even though under the reason of knowable object can be sufficiently perfect by virtue of its abstraction, subtlety and transcendence, however, as a real entity, it has a minimal perfection as this is higher in the determined beings, and for the reason of wisdom is not enough the dignity of knowable object if the dignity of known things is missing»28.

Second, it could be assumed that in a theological metaphysics, which would prescind of studying the entity and consider God as suitable object, it could be said with truth that it would participate of greater nobility than that of ontology for the dignity of its object. Anyway, God would have the same degree of abstraction that being and therefore, «such accurate and demonstrative knowledge of God, cannot be obtained by natural theology, if it is not known first the common reasons of being, substance, cause and others, because we cannot know God except by his effects, and through common reasons, from which is excluded the imperfection, by adding negations»29.

We could conceive, ultimately, an onto-theological metaphysics, in which God came into consideration but only under the common reason of being, but not in the reason of cause. This type of metaphysics is nothing but «a very imperfect and defective wisdom that necessarily should ignore many things about God or would have them imperfectly known, and since God can be known only by his effects, the ignorance of his main effects necessarily would bring the reduction of the very knowledge of God»30. God’s entry into the metaphysical consideration introduces the more general division in reality that should be drawn between the infinite being 28

Cf. DM I, s. 5, a. 15, p. 300. Cf. DM I, s. 5, a. 15, pp. 300-301. 30 Cf. DM I, s. 5, a. 15, p. 301. 29

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(in itself necessary, by essence, uncreated and pure act) and the finite being (by another, by participation, created and potential). This division, in Suárez’s opinion, is «the best and most necessary» to understand the entitative reality being studied by metaphysics31. The terms infinite / finite, set the boundaries of real entity, as out of them it cannot be thought any entity without contradiction. The tendency to the knowledge of God as infinite being, inclines human understanding to admit that it is impossible to form a simple and proper concept of God and thus it should be attempted by the negative way, denying from God the nature and all the attributes in which creatures converge. Thus, from the study of the entity and its attributes we arrive to the common reason of being, and this becomes a medium for demonstrating the existence of a similar reason between creatures and God32. Conversely, metaphysical investigation on the finite being, progresses from the relationship with the infinite being. According to Suárez, we can know the attributes of the finite being in all its extension, when referring them to the infinite being through a relationship of attribution, inherently founded on its own being as ens reale, and that relates to God in the mode of essential participation or dependence33. In conclusion, God enters into metaphysics as principal object but not as adequate object. Metaphysics as natural theology studies God under the common reason for being. Secondly, it can be noticed that the dependence of metaphysics in relation to theology is higher than that of the latter with respect to the first in the approach of Suárez. Lastly, we can see that this subordination is specified in the category of cause. A first, formal cause, which acts as the real foundation of the object of metaphysics, and other efficient, which places the being in terms of finitude.

3. The Unity of the Metaphysics An approach in recto to the metaphysical books generally leads the reader to assume an aporetic conception of the discipline. As is well known, Aristotle called this science, indistinctly: wisdom, first philosophy 31

Cf. DM XXVIII, s. 1, a. 3, p. 193. Cf. DM XXVIII, s. 3, a. 15, p. 232. 33 Cf. DM XXVIII, s. 3, a. 16, pp. 233-234. 32

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and natural theology34. The darkness was growing with the passage of time, when their interpreters added new denominations to those already existing such as «supreme science», «sovereign science» or «universal science»35. According to Suárez, such aporetic reading is not justified since Aristotle always considered metaphysics as a unique science «in kind»36. The various designations are taken from the diversity of the objects that this science deals with. Of the many properties and species of being studied by metaphysics, it cannot be concluded the diversity of metaphysics as a science, since all the special investigations that metaphysics can do, are united under a common understanding of science. This generic unity can be easily probed paying attention to the degree of abstraction of which each of the sciences participates: physics, metaphysics and logic37. But the unity of 34

The various denominations used by Aristotle to refer to metaphysics are: (1) first philosophy (próte philosophia): study of the «immobile substance», of the «being as being, its quiddity and the things that are inherent to it as an entity» (cf. Metaphysica VI, 1, 1026a23-32); (2) first science (próte epistéme): «It deals with these [entities] to the extent that subjects are beings, and not are something else» (cf. Metaphysica XI, 4, 1061b30-32); (3) divine science (episteme ton theíon): «The [science] diviner is also the most worthy of appreciation. And in two senses is that it alone, as it will be divine among the sciences the one which would have mainly God, and the one that deals on the divine. And this only meets both conditions, for God seems to all to be one of the causes and a certain principle, and this science can have it or God alone or him principally. So, all the sciences are more necessary than these, but better is none» (cf. Metaphysica I, 2, 983 through 6-11); (4) theological philosophy (philosophía theologiké): «Thus there will be three speculative philosophies, namely, mathematics, physics, and theology, for no one can miss the point that, if somewhere is the divine, it is in such a nature [separate and motionless] and it is precise that the most valuable one must take care of the most valuable genre» (cf. Metaphysica VI, 1, 1026 through 18-23); (5) philosophy (philosophía): «The philosophy, however, does not address the particular things, as such as each of them has some accident, but the being, as each of these things is being» (cf. Metaphysica XI, 4, 1061b25-27; (6) wisdom (sophía): «The so-called wisdom deals, in the opinion of all, on the first causes and principles» (Metaphysica I, 2, 981b27-29). Cf. DM I, Proem., p. 207. 35 Ibid. 36 Cf. DM I, s. 3, a. 9, p. 261. 37 Cf. DA IX, c. 3, a. 22, pp. 143-145. We work with the bilingual Latin-Spanish edition of Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libris Aristotelis De anima by Francisco Suárez, ed. by S. CASTELLOTE, transl. by L. BACIERO – C. BACIERO, Xavier Zubiri Foundation, Madrid, Vol. I, 1978; Vol. II, 1981; Vol. III, 1991. We refer to this work with the nomenclature used in the Suarecian studies (DA) followed by the

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metaphysics is not only generic, but also specific, as in the other sciences, and the doctrine of the degrees of abstraction does not explain this unity in a convenient manner38. The problem of the unity of metaphysics arises at the moment of determining the kind of specificity that it has. Suárez admits that metaphysics does not participate of a unity of «perfect simplicity»39, but the «connection or convenience of things» studied show the existence of some kind of lesser unity40. If the unity is not simple, necessarily it would have to be composite, as a result of the coordination of several simple qualities. This coordination is to be understood, in the first place, as the effective subordination (huius connexionis) present in logical deduction: from the terms to the principles, from the terms to the conclusion, and from the further deducted to the first. And equally as coordination by «attribution or relationship to the same total object» (attributio seu respectus ad idem obiectum totale)41. The first type of coordination, the deduction, is founded on the order that results from the application of the principles of logic or from the principles of knowledge. In the second mode, the qualities are not linked to each other and cannot therefore be directly subdued to natural reasoning. In any case, the qualities will receive the order of reason or essence of the same object in which they are interwoven through a reference to the object. The unity of metaphysics by means of this second type of coordination in order to the essence of its proper object, the ens in quantum ens reale, demands its justification42. Suárez recognized at this point that the study of the explanations provided by the tradition did not find «a rule certain and general» of application that might explain the unity of the object43. Having said that, his solution is based on an interpretation of the comment made by Cajetan to the first question of the Summa theologica, where he said that unity is founded on the proper specificity of the object, not the material, but the formal one, and not in his real self, but in its knowable being (unitatem specificam obiecti, non materialis, sed formalis, neque in esse rei sed number of the dispute in Romans. After stating the place, the number of the page of the cited edition in Arabic numerals. 38 Cf. DM XLIV, s. 11, a. 69, p. 468. 39 Cf. DM XLIV, s. 11, a. 56, p. 460. 40 Cf. DM XLIV, s. 11, a. 55, p. 459. 41 Cf. DM XLIV, s. 11, a. 63, p. 464. 42 Cf. DM I, 1, 26, p. 230. 43 Cf. DM XLIV, s. 11, a. 64, p. 465.

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in esse scibilis)44. If it is said that the unity of the object is founded by extrinsic denomination in the knowable being of the object, then science would not receive its unity through the object but rather science itself would be the foundation of the object. To escape this petitio principii, the knowable being would have to be considered as a presupposal, by order of nature, both from the proper unity of science, as from the proper self of the object, and of every denomination which is made based on the own science. Thus, the knowable being may be, by means of a relation of reason, the foundation of the unity of science. But still, it remains to be resolved what is that reason that comes from things, object of study of science, and by virtue of which it can be claimed that they are convenient by reason of their cognoscibility. Arguably, this said reason is founded on the specific unity of the thing itself per se as the object of study quod of science. Thus, the object could be considered in its knowable character, and a proper science would be originated for each of the substantial species known up to its final differences, that would demonstrate later on a priori, and from them, the properties of each one of the ultimate species. According to Suárez, this does not solve the problem in the first place, because it would admit the existence of a science of being as such, apart from the substance, and so on for each one of the degrees of abstraction. Second, because given the imperfect nature of human understanding, it is impossible for it to reach the ultimate species of all things. Suárez’s solution consists first in founding the unity of science in the unity of the knowable object, not by an extrinsic denomination taken from science, but through a relation of reason founded on that denomination. Thus, being knowable would mean: «as a close aptitude» or «some convenience» presupposed in the things themselves which could serve as reason for which the object becomes so constituted in a «quasi specific» way and «do cause» the cohesion of all the problems considered by science thus conferring unity45. The real entity, or entity taken in its knowable being, like everything that can be thought without contradiction, is the formal reason quae that «somehow connects and contains virtually all things» in metaphysics46. Starting from the essential reason of the object, which is one, specific and indivisible, it is possible to consider any species 44

Ibid. Cf. DM XLIV, s. 11, a. 64, pp. 465-466; DM XLIV, s. 11, a. 69, p. 469. 46 Cf. DM XLIV, s. 11, a. 69, p. 468. 45

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in its formal reason, or «taken as an abstraction according to its actuality (its condition as an act)» or in its aptitude47. Although Suárez concludes by recognizing that the unity of metaphysics «is not exact and perfect, but quasi artificial», he defended its adequacy to address formally the study of immaterial substances48. In conclusion, the formal conception of God in the reason of entity transforms it into a thinkable object without contradiction, allowing overcoming the epistemic gap established between human understanding and divine nature. The differences are settled on the formality of the entity, and the respective properties are deduced and demonstrated through reasoning.

4. The Metaphysical Approach to the Existence of God The diverse problems studied by metaphysics as natural theology or «supreme natural science» listed by Suárez are the following49: the being or reasoning of being or commons of immaterial substance, of primary substance or uncreated substance, of spirit created and all of its species50; the essence and properties of the intelligences51; the reason of cause that is God and the reason of effect that are the angels, and their causal influence on the remaining entities; all the created entities conceived as being finite52; and finally the first and exemplary cause that is God, and the reasons that are attached to the first cause, that are the reason of efficient and final cause53. Metaphysics holds the claim to study all aspects of reality to the extent of the possibilities of human understanding, and in this sense, following Aristotle, is called wisdom, as we have seen54. The study of God as the main object of metaphysics will take place mainly confusedly and in common, and from the notion of cause. Under the first form, it will study God under the reason of being that is common to all substances and 47

Cf. DM XLIV, s. 11, a. 64, pp. 465-466. Cf. DM XLIV, s. 11, a. 69, p. 469. 49 Cf. DM I, s. 2, a. 17. p. 247. 50 Cf. DM I, s. 2, a. 16, p. 245. 51 Cf. DM I, s. 2, a. 16, p. 246. 52 Cf. DM I, s. 2, a. 17, p. 246. 53 Cf. DM I, s. 2, aa. 17-18, pp. 247-248. 54 Cf. DM I, s. 5, a. 8, p. 297. 48

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accidents. By the second, and from the effects, it will go back to the First Cause55. But there is the following doubt: If, in the above consideration of the unity of the object and of metaphysics, it has been seen that the being as such, and God, considered under that reason, are simple concepts, they cannot possess causes of their own that may be subject to demonstration. If God is in being with no cause, the entity as such which includes itself God cannot possess causes either. But it is necessary to note that all those entities that are below being as such, as are the created beings or the intelligences, do possess efficient causes which exert their influence on reality. At the opposite extreme, we find the insistence which Suárez stresses that metaphysics is a science propter quid, not a science quia56. The method of metaphysics does not follow the induction from experience, but the a priori deduction from first principles. Sense experience is presented as a necessary but not sufficient condition for science, and that comes from the essential limitation of human understanding. Doubt is, therefore, twofold. We wonder if metaphysics uses causes in order to achieve demonstrations, and if so, we should examine the means used by Suárez to reconcile causation with the aprioristic character of science. The answer is taken from Aristotle’s Metaphysics, which Suárez reformulated as follows: «science a priori proves things by their causes»57. Suárez, following the commentary of Thomas Aquinas to Book VI of Metaphysics, distinguished between the actual physical cause and the a priori cause of knowledge, that are the reasons or demonstrable properties of a subject. Within the genre of the a priori causes for knowledge it is true that if the object of metaphysics is considered on the highest level of abstraction, both from the point of view of understanding, which is the entity as such, and from the field of reality, which is first being or being itself, it does not present proper causes by which it can be shown any object property. Now, according to the way to conceive the object, it presents reasons and means that are different from the extremes; these conditions do allow an 55

Cf. DM I, s. 5, a. 14, p. 299. Sometimes, metaphysics descends to the sensible things, applying metaphysical reasons and means to reach the transcendental predicates. 56 Cf. DM I, s. 6, a. 24, p. 348. 57 Cf. DM I, s. 5, a. 44, p. 322.

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a priori demonstration. It is sufficient that the concepts can be conceived, with some basis in reality, and that the known property acts as the reason for the other attribute to be demonstrated. So, in the sense of the a priori cause of knowledge, it is probed the transcendent property of truth from the unity, good from the truth, and, likewise, the perfection of God from its intrinsic necessity58. Regarding the physical cause, as has been said, the lower entities or parts that are covered under the concept of entity, as the created entity, do posses proper causes that affect reality and therefore can serve as means for the demonstration. Suárez concludes with the affirmation that metaphysics demonstrates by the four Aristotelian genres of cause. The final cause can achieve significant benefits for the demonstration of both the created entities as for the progress in the study of the remaining causes, as it is the first and main cause of its genre, and that in the field of metaphysics as natural theology it is identified with God. This belief is sufficient to sustain that metaphysics demonstrates also by the genre of efficiency and matter. It is true that efficient causation is applied in the field of existence and metaphysics studies things, not in their materiality or in their existence, but in their abstraction or as entities. However, Suárez says that metaphysics uses the efficient cause and the material cause as means of investigation for a number of reasons. First, because these causes considered in its full extent by no means are limited neither to the realm of the quantifiable nor to the contingent, but embrace also the spiritual entities. Second, even if the efficiency and material entities considered in themselves are the object of physical science, its study helps metaphysical investigation in demonstrating the possible existence, the individuality of the created entity, and to distinguish the act of potentiality and finitude in the created entity. Finally, the weight of theological reason is imposed on natural reason. Once asserted that the study of efficiency is not of the competence of metaphysics, however, it is admitted that «the intrinsic relationship to the efficient cause, mainly to the first cause, is necessary and is the object of science, being possible to deduct from it many properties»59. For the alluded reasons, it is concluded that metaphysics is an a priori science, and sometimes, as in the proofs of the existence of God, it deduces 58 59

Cf. DM I, s. 5, a. 38, p. 318. Ibid.

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from all of the causes60. Suárez does not believe this as blurring the lines between experimental and speculative science. Metaphysics, as it can demonstrate the principles of reality and knowledge upon which depend all the sciences for its operations, continues to be the main human science. To which must be added, in the Suarecian conception of metaphysics, provided that it does incorporate the study of God as its principal object. Only in this way, it can be argued that metaphysics is theology or «natural wisdom»61; without the incorporation of the cause, or what is the same, without the rational study of God from the effects, metaphysics as ontotheology, as it has been said, is nothing but «a wisdom very imperfect and defective»62. The dignity of metaphysics is granted by its object, the real entity, which includes, principally, God. The priority of metaphysics over the remaining speculative sciences, the occasional employment of the experience that it does perform, its aprioristic character, and the elimination of residual animism that subsisted in the scholastic tradition by appropriation of the Aristotelian idea of the Unmoved Mover, are the reasons that moved Suárez to refute the demonstration of the existence of God, based on purely physical means, employed by Averroes and Thomas Aquinas63. Suárez admits the difficulty to deduct from the exemplary cause, since this would presuppose to be already in possession of the ideas, something that is «rare and impossible» in the state of nature, as this supposes the contemplation of God in himself. Cf. DM I, s. 5, a. 41, p. 320. 60

61

Cf. DM I, s. 5, a. 6, p. 295. Cf. DM I, s. 5, a. 15, p. 301. 63 It is significant to note the silence kept by Suárez in the refutation of the way of movement, in regard to Thomas Aquinas, who is not quoted on any occasion. Averroes’s position is summed by Suárez as follows, cf. DM XXIX, s. 1 a. 3, p. 245: «His foundation lies on that only from the eternal movement of the sky can be inferred that there is some eternal substance separate from matter». The main source taken by Averroes in this matter, as it is known, is the Physics and the Metaphysics by Aristotle. According to Suárez, the theory of the Cordovan philosopher errs as it previously makes it the elect foundation. Aristotle, cf. DM XXIX, s. 1 a. 42, p. 274, «does not demonstrates enough in his Physics the existence of God or the proper attributes of Him by physical movement only [...] but in there demonstrates with great probability the existence of an unmoved first mover». On the role played by the Summa theologiae in the Society of Jesus and in particular in Suárez, cf. Á. PONCELA GONZÁLEZ, «Aristóteles y los Jesuitas. La génesis corporativa de los Cursus Philosphicus», in R. H. PICH – M. LÁZARO PULIDO – A. S. CULLETON (eds.), Ideas sin fronteras en los límites de las 62

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But, as the argument based on the local motion of the heavens proposed by Aristotle in different places64, and that is contained in the principle «everything that moves is moved by another» (omne quod movetur ab alio movetur), is a purely physical cause, it is not possible to conclude the existence of an uncreated entity65. Local motion, or any of its effects, shows the existence of a proximate cause that does not demand the perfections particular to the first entity: immateriality and the fact of being uncreated. Nor is it possible to know from that first mover if this is one or many. If it was claimed that are many, it could not be explained the way in which they are ordered, and in which one movement is originated. The way of movement only shows the capacity that the engine has to move, but to know if it does have the property for itself or by another cannot be obtained proceeding through physical principles but by metaphysical principles66. In a similar way, Suárez thought about the analysis of the operations that the rational soul performs, as proof of the existence of God. It is necessary, as in the previous case, to add a metaphysical assumption: that the rational soul has been created by a first cause that «we name first being or God»67. If we add yet another even more general principle, the one that says that the qualities that can be found in a effect, in this case in the rational soul, are found with higher degree of excellence in the first cause, it will be possible to transcend from the character free, intellectual, immaterial and immortal of the rational soul to the higher grade of perfection that is only found in the divine reason. And finally, from the immateriality of the rational soul as the form of the body, it could be possible to demonstrate, as the most, its own immateriality, but never the character absolutely immaterial of God. In conclusion, to Suárez, rational proof of the existence and the essence of God by physical means is insufficient to demonstrate some first and uncreated entity, if it is not always founded on metaphysical assumptions. Although physics shows some of the places for the proof, it «always ideas. Scholastica Colonialis: status quaestionis, Instituto Teológico «San Pedro de Alcántara» de Cáceres, Cáceres 2012, pp. 73-111. 64 Cf. Aristotle, Physica VIII and Metaphysica XII; apud DM XXIX, s. 1, a. 20, p. 257. 65 Cf. DM XXIX, s. 1, a. 20, p. 257. 66 Cf. DM XXIX, s. 1, a. 17, p. 256. 67 Cf. DM XXIX, s. 1, a. 19, p. 256.

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corresponds to the metaphysical» to undertake rational demonstrations68. Physics does not offer evidence but «very probable reasoning» of the movement and the effects which are used afterwards by metaphysics to analyze the reasons of cause and effect. From the dependence of entities from movement, the metaphysician ascends to the study of their dependence on the order of being and the origin of the entities and from there, to the demonstration of the existence of a first entity uncreated, as we shall see69. The rational proof of the existence of God, in conclusion, «belongs to the metaphysician and not to the natural philosopher»70.

5. Rational Demonstration of the Existence of God To prove the existence of God rationally requires first to demonstrate the existence of an uncreated being that can be taken as foundation of creation. The fact of not having been produced, the fact of «exist by itself and without the efficiency of another» is the first of the essential attributes of God and the first rational principle and the most important, and «all others», in both regarding the existence and the essence divine, can be «proved almost exclusively as they do have connection to this one»71. The demonstration of the existence of God that Suárez tries to implement consists of the following moments: (i) Proof a posteriori of the existence of an uncreated being; (ii) proof a posteriori of the existence of a single uncreated being; (iii) proof a priori of the existence of God. The first two show the existence of a necessary being and in itself («Deum esse ens necessarium et a se») and they are based on the denial of the concept of eternity, and an extension of the Aristotelian idea of 68

Cf. DM XXIX, s. 1, a. 19, p. 257. Cf. DM XXIX, s. 1, a. 41, p. 274. Of the divine essence is possible to do a posteriori demonstrations, studying the effects to form the concept of an attribute. Reached the property of divine perfection, it proceeds a priori, and infers the remaining attributes in a successive way: infinity, simplicity, immensity, immutability, uniqueness, invisibility, incomprehensibility, ineffability, science, will and omnipotence to the fullest extent that the imperfect human reason can conceive them. Cf. also DM XXX, pp. 345-736. 70 Cf. DM XXIX, s. 1, a. 41, p. 274. 71 Ibid. 69

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infinity72. At this point, it is demonstrated a priori, that apart from this being it does not exist another alike, in order to affirm, to the contrary, the existence of God.

5.1. Proofs a posteriori 5.1.1. The Existence of a not Produced Entity The first step of the demonstration is to prove the existence of some entity not produced. To do this, Suárez starts from the following metaphysical principle: «all that is done −or produced− is done −or produced− by another» (omne quod producitur fit −sive producitor−, ab alio fit −sive producitur−) as this is more evident than that physical one, «everything that moves, is moved by another», refuted for not being a sufficient principle for the demonstration, as it has been said73. The proof of movement, in the entity that moves, was conceived through the assumption of to be included in it, which endowed it with the ability of movement. On the physical principle it is not assumed the existence of a thing before it is produced; on the contrary, it is supposed that it does not exist before it is made, being impossible that its non-being does include the ability to autogenerate. The principle is demonstrated because no reality is the object of its own production74. The formulation of the conclusion is as follows: (a) Any entity or is created or is not created; (b) All entities cannot be created; (c) It is necessary that an uncreated being does exist. The major premise of the syllogism is self-evident and requires no demonstration, as the fact of being created and the fact of being uncreated are contradictory members covering all ontological levels. It is not possible to find some entity that cannot be included in any one of these two possibilities, or that it does not belong to any of them, or that does belong simultaneously to both. 72

Cf. DM XXIX, s. 3, a. 2, p. 307. Cf. DM XXIX, s. 1, a. 20, p. 257. 74 Suárez, cf. DM XXIX, s. 1 a. 20, p. 257, said that the principle is evident regardless of the type of production that involves: generation, creation or any other means. In order to clarity, we will classify the production, from now onwards, as creation. 73

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For the minor premise it is affirmed that every entity created is produced by another; this agent has been, in turn, necessarily created or not; if it is stated the latter, it is confirm the existence of an uncreated entity. But if it is maintained that the agent has been in turn created, it will have to been produced by another second agent; then, it would be necessary to ask again for the cause of its production, until the moment to stop the process in an uncreated entity or to assume that the production process does extend to infinity, incurring therefore the reasoning in a vicious circle. As neither of these two possibilities are admissible, it is then probed the necessity of having to stop on an uncreated entity75. Falling into this vicious circle, are the explanations of the process that defend the transmission of the existence by a chain of successive generations, based on the belief of the transmigration of the self or the soul to the body. Suárez mentions the Pythagorean School as representative of this theory76. To admit the theory of creation by the succession of generations, supposes at the same time to admit their progressus ad infinitum. As in the continuous motion of return and generation it is admitted the existence of a first Author who in an absolute way produces, and that has not been begotten, either the conclusion is accepted, or it is admitted that he too has been produced by another, continuing the process to infinity. To defend an infinite production process, supposes to deny the existence of a first cause of production. Suárez proves the impossibility of an infinite process in the emanation from a first entity to one last. The emanative descending process, from the higher cause to the immediate one, nor makes the case nor does present any difficulty, because there will necessarily be stopped or in an ultimate cause or in the proximate to produce the effect. The reasoning is based on the rational impossibility (nec enim intelligi potest) of a self-generation of the effect, which leads to the necessary affirmation of the existence of a proximate cause of this said effect77. The problem arises therefore, in 75

On the difficulty of this procedure, Suárez, cf. DM II, s. 6, a. 5, p. 445, said: «the mind rejects immediately the process followed to infinity, since otherwise, there would be no measure or limit of resolution to conceive something distinctly, nor the mind could initiate or carry out such an abstraction and determination, unless stationing always on a concept still solvable in two other concepts, and starting with another similar. Therefore, all authors sought to avoid this process». 76 Cf. DM XXIX, s. 1, a. 23, p. 259. 77 Cf. DM XXIX, s. 1, a. 25, p. 260.

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the ascending production process, from the inferior cause to the superior; in short, from the effect to the cause. In this ascending production, it can be made a distinction between causes accidentally subordinate and causes essentially subordinate. The former ones have no problem, in the first place, because they do not need nor the concurrence in time nor the simultaneity of causes in the production of the effect, rather, the succession. This is clear, in the common way to explain how a child comes from their parents. It is the route used by Aristotle in the defense of the idea of the eternity of the world, for which the production process to infinity is not contradictory. Suárez proves that there cannot be an infinite process in efficient causes and their effects. Suárez sustains the burden of proof in the Aristotelian idea of infinity, introducing it into the field of essential subordination: among the causes which concur to the effect simultaneously, each one in its order, immediately and without contradiction78. He notes that the property of the Aristotelian concept of infinity, the impossibility of exhausting it rationally («infinitum non posse per transiri») only applies to the idea of succession but not for the idea of simultaneity. It is true that in a successive way there is no possibility to exhaust infinity, as an endless numeric progression will continue between causes and their effects. But in a multitude of causes, even if they are infinite, if they concur simultaneously to the same effect, it is possible to determine the effect without contradicting the idea of infinity. The admission of the infinite subordination of the causes implies the negation of the dependence of all of them to a first one. However, Aristotle supposes the opposite; then, he affirmed the impossibility that an infinite process could result in the emanation from an entity to another. Based on this idea, Suárez finally proves the need for the existence of a first cause in the series of subordinated causes, in its being and in its action or in its efficiency. The argument used by Suárez is as follows: Since it is impossible for a series of efficient causes to be essentially dependent, it will be required that one of the causes would 78 Cf. DM XXIX, s. 1 a. 42, p. 274. Suárez clearly exposes the Aristotelian foundation on which it rests the entire proof: «In the second book of Metaphysics he rightly defended and proved the non existence of a process to infinity in efficient causes, principle from which obviously it is reached the conclusion that there must be some entity not produced».

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be independent. The general principle of the demonstration, «everything that is produced, is produced by another» is convertible with this other one: «everything that depends, depends on other» (omne quod dependet, ab alio dependet)79. It is impossible to think of a succession of efficient causes with dependency to a real cause that is outside of the series themselves, because there is not such a reality, before the production itself, and it does not make sense to think that one of the intermediate causes could exercise as a total cause of the entire series because again we would have to ask for the source of its efficiency. As it is not possible to proceed in this succession to infinity, it concludes stating the existence of a non produced and efficient entity. Thus, it is not conceivable, without circularity or contradiction, in any process that follows from the effects to the causes and from the immediate causes to other remote causes, without previously postulating the existence of an unproduced cause. From the own reasoning it can be deduced the need for this cause uncreated to be a substance. First, it is not conceivable that efficiency in the order of being and acting without thinking of it in relation to some entity. Since the substance is prior to the accident, as the accident can only be based on a substance, it can be assumed that the uncreated entity is a substance, as it is in possession of the being itself without have been caused or to be dependent on another. As we have seen, from the introduction of the idea of subordination in the Aristotelian infinite, it was possible for Suárez to prove the non-existence of a process to infinity in the order of efficient causality. And from this principle, he concluded the necessary existence of an entity not produced.

5.1.2. The Existence of a Single Uncreated Entity The previous reasoning has served the purpose of proving the existence of some non-produced being, its aseity, but remains to be proven that this would be one, its uniqueness. The unity of the being to its self is not demonstrated with new arguments deduced from a new beginning, but Suárez, instead, expands the traditional proof of the existence inferred from the perfection of the world. With this return to an old idea, Suárez sought first, to frame his proof in the context 79

Cf. DM XXIX, s. 1, a. 26, p. 262.

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of the Christian tradition and scholasticism. Within this context, he said secondly that the traditional proof to refute the various types of polytheism which Christianity had to position itself against from its origins is insufficient. Indeed, between unity and multiplicity, there is not a middle ground: or it is declared that God is one, or then it is accepted that there is a god of wine, a god of wheat, a god for good and one for evil, etc. This proof from the effects, presents therefore in Suárez an intention not only metaphysic but apologetic, to the extent that it tries to present both to polytheist heretics (haereticis) as to the incredulous («evil man or badly predisposed»), a rational argument that can rid them of their error80. Thus, we find Suárez in this part of the proof acting more as a theologian than as a philosopher, since he did not tried to rationally prove the uniqueness of the uncreated being, but sought only the assent to a truth founded on religious belief. Indeed, once proven the existence of a single uncreated entity, «it will clearly sprout», in his opinion, that the uncreated and necessary in essence being, is the only first cause of all beings, existing and potential, and «that, therefore, is God, and therefore is the true God»81. Of this way of assent to truth not based on rational judgment, we will discuss in the conclusion. Theological-philosophical tradition has attempted to prove the existence of God from assumptions not yet probed. Thus, the properties predicated of the term «God», in its common usage, like dignity, nobility, perfection, etc., have been seen as a proof in itself82. At the opposite extreme stood Pierre d’Ailly or Rabbi Mose, who considered that from the demonstration of aseity it could not be concluded neither the uniqueness nor the existence of God83. In other sense, Saint Anselm, Saint Hieronymus and the Damascene argued that the proof was not necessary as it was an obvious truth for all men, having been created in the knowledge about the existence of God84. For Suárez, it is necessary to demonstrate the uniqueness of the uncreated entity in order to demonstrate the existence of God, because linguistic usage is not a proof, nor the truths expressed in the Scriptures are immediately apparent to understanding. Rather what 80

Cf. DM XXIX, s. 2, a. 1, p. 275; s. 3, a. 32, p. 333. Cf. DM XXIX, s. 2, a. 1, p. 275. 82 Cf. DM XXIX, s. 2, a. 5, p. 278. 83 Cf. DM XXIX, s. 2, a. 2, p. 276. 84 Cf. DM XXIX, s. 2, a. 3, p. 277. 81

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readers will find in many places are invitations to find the truth, increasing knowledge of God85. In this spirit, the fathers of the Church, its doctors, the Areopagite and Aristotle, deployed rational instruments to prove the existence of God, based solely from the effects. The most used was the argument of the perfection of nature, to conclude by stating the government of the world by an author. Suárez argued that this «completely a posteriori» argument is insufficient to prove the uniqueness of the being uncreated and therefore, it is necessary to seek a demonstration a priori that can dissolve the four objections that can be raised to the traditional proof. The first objection, that from the affirmation of the governor of the world, it does not follow that it is its author. Second, it is not proved the uniqueness of the creator, as it could be assumed that the world is the result of a pact between several artificers. Third, the proof is not valid for spiritual realities. And fourth, it could suggest the existence of another possible world produced by another uncreated being86. As a preamble to the a priori proof, Suárez extended the prior proof to the dissolution of these objections. The first one is solved by recurring to the testimony of the patristic, and in the last two, he acknowledges that the argument a posteriori is not strong enough to get absolutely rid of the objection87. We consider therefore the a posteriori reasoning developed about the second objection to prove the uniqueness of the uncreated being. Traditional demonstration was founded on the experience of the perfection of the world, considered as a unique effect, from which it can be inferred its obedience to the government or intention of a single agent. According to Suárez, the proof does not demonstrate sufficiently that the world has been created by a cause that presents a unity «natural and simple», since the conclusion is also compatible with the idea of a creation of the world resulting from the aggregation of various partial causes, and therefore, without cause unity. To refute this assumption and thus, demonstrate the unity of the agent, it is necessary to assume that this cause is an «intellectual being» (esse intelectualem), something which will be demonstrated a priori later on, inducing it from the experience of man himself, conceived as one of its 85

Cf. DM XXIX, s. 2, a. 6, p. 279. Cf. DM XXIX, s. 2, a. 6, p. 280. 87 Cf. DM XXIX, s. 2, a. 37, p. 306. 86

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effects88. This assumption is also required for the same «fiction» that is the object of the rectification, as two partial causes of diverse nature and devoid of knowledge by themselves could not concur intentionally to the production of a single effect89. The intentional concurrence therefore requires that partial causes are considered as instruments of a higher cause of an intellectual nature. Such coincidence of partial causes in the production of an effect can be considered in two ways: that there is a subordination of the partial causes to a superior cause, or that there is not. The first possibility does not offer any difficulty, as indirectly supports the existence of a first cause of which it may be proved to be the uncreated entity itself. The refutation extends to the second case stated: the world has been created by a series of causes unsubordinated between each other, and equal among them in order of efficiency, in action and in being. In this assumption of creation it is necessary to admit that the reason for the concurrence was due to the impotence displayed by each of the causes to produce the world, or being sufficient, agreed to share production. If the answer is by impotence, then it does follow the imperfection or limitation of each of the causes considered individually, and at the same time, the limitation and determination of the potency to produce the world. But it was demonstrated earlier that the creation requires that the first cause do possess infinite power or ability to create anything that can be creatable. It is concluded, then, stating the need for the existence of a first cause endowed with such perfect capability. The consequence is explained from the limited capacity that the particular causes present. From the concurrence of imperfect partial causes it does not sprout an infinite potency of doing, requiring not quantitative but qualitative perfection; it is perfection not of multitude but of intensity90. One might suppose that the partial causes are infinite in multitude. But this is not permissible, since the partial causes that actually have produced realities in the world, are finite in number. If it is added to prove this assumption, that to the production of a reality concurred many or infinite causes, it incurs into absurdity. 88

Cf. DM XXIX, s. 2, a. 22, p. 293. Ibid. 90 Ibid. 89

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5.2. The Demonstration a priori by Causality of the End In God the divine existence is its very essence. However, due to the imperfection of the human understanding, it is demanded for the comprehension of God to be able to distinguish the essence from the existence, and conceive that its existence is prior in time to its essence. For this reason, and speaking in absolute terms, it cannot be proved a priori the existence of God from the first cause, since it is the uncaused entity, and even assuming that it did have it, understanding could not reach such cause in its principles. But according to the proper method of metaphysics, is possible, once it has been demonstrated a posteriori the existence of a being necessary by itself, reached through the denial of due process to infinity and its effects, taking one of the attributes and demonstrate from it the other, and in the opinion of Suárez: «to reason a priori in a humane way it is enough the distinction of reason of the attributes»91. A property that in reality belongs to the essence of God is conceived abstractly as a form of the uncaused entity and from that form is deduced another, until concluding that such a being is God. The method of deduction of properties requires, as Suárez notes, to be cautious when doing the attribution of predicates to a subject. There are two ways of stating that a property is convenient to many others. The convenience will be real when a real efficient causality operates. For example, it can be declared that enlightenment is an attribute that convenes primarily and essentially to the sun among all the planets of our system. The metaphysic convenience is not real, but artificial insofar as it is an operation of reason, which prescinds of existence, subsuming reality under the reason of being. This is conceived as an intrinsic property and common to all entities. Thus, it is abstracted from the existence of man, the property of «risibility», and as a concept, it is predicated the objective concept, the essence, the risibility conceived, either in Pablo or in Pedro. The convenience is real, as the risibility is a property that convenes real, essentially or intrinsically to those two existent92. In this same assumption, it is found the entity and its properties, and is applicable to the a priori proofs of the existence. It is not proved the attributes of a subject considered in its reality, in this case God, but of a subject, in its abstraction of existence and under the general reason of being. And despite the idea that «actually 91 92

Cf. DM XXIX, s. 3, a. 1, p. 307. Cf. DM XXIX, s. 3, a. 5, p. 310.

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is the same thing to ask the question for the uncreated being that for God», metaphysics considers it abstractly, under the first reason93. That is why the metaphysical consideration of God requires first to omit the properties that are attributed to it by the common conception, because they are precisely the objects of the proof. Secondly, it does consider all the attributes of the «most perfect of all beings» that are to be proved, from the maximum degree of eminence that the human intellect can conceive94. Advancing with the proposed method, Suárez proves the existence of a unique necessary being, deducting from the unity the essential perfection of the first being95. We consider briefly the last of the reasons given, which will serve as a prologue to our conclusion. In previous disputes, Suárez has been demonstrating that the first being, from the point of view of the entity, is the further object to created entities. But it is also true that from the point of view of causality, the first being is the nearest object in the order of ends96. From this framework, Suárez establish the a priori proof from the order of the causality of the ultimate end. 93

Cf. DM XXIX, s. 1, a. 1, p. 245. Cf. DM XXIX, s. 2, a. 4, p. 277. 95 The reasons given by Suárez present a more controversial than probative character, and can be read as a declaration of independence from the Thomistic School. This is clear in the first four proofs. Thus, the first reason aims to demonstrate that the being by itself can only be one. To do this, Suárez analyzes the proof that the Dominican Soncinas (Paulus Barbus) presented in his commentary on Book XII of the Metaphysics. Suárez refutes this proof, from his conception of the convenience in being. For the Jesuit, this is intrinsic, and is the foundation of the precision of reason that makes possible the preaching of the reason of being through an analogy of intrinsic attribution or based on the way of being that is present in all analogized terms. Cf. DM II, s. 1, a. 14, p. 373. With the introduction into the proof of the analogy of being, that «is something of a thing in itself sufficient to undermine the strength of the argument», and Soncinas incurs in a petitio principii, since it implies the existence of a necessary emanation of all reality from the unique entity; cf. DM XXIX, s. 3, a. 7, p. 312. For Suárez, id. ibid., «it is not proved that from the analogy is deducted the emanation, but only inequality». Regarding Thomas Aquinas, Suárez, DM XXIX, s. 3 a. 8, p. 314, acknowledges that his metaphysical arguments, «although they are very subtle and of real metaphysical level, and suitable for bringing to persuasion a willing understanding», when considered as reasons from which to prove the existence of God, «they are, however, difficult to convince the wicked and persistent». 96 Cf. DM I, s. 5, a. 27, p. 309; DM XXIV, s. 1, a. 9, p. 14. 94

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From the affirmation of the existence of a perfect being as the ultimate end of all entities, it is stated its position as the efficient first principle. This confirms that the antecedent is valid to be applied to any type of entity. So intellectual entities, for example, tend to imitate the first and perfect being and try to reach it, believing that in it rest their happiness, and therefore they do not rest until they find it. He adds an argument from the order and perfection of nature. It would be a trait of imperfection and cause confusion, that among the entities would not be established a sort of subordination. It is concluded, therefore, affirming the need for the reference of all entities to an ultimate end, which is «the first and supreme being» (primum ac summum ens)97. The conclusion is proved, from the Aristotelian theory of change, stating that the end is the principle of the efficiency, or the reason by which an operational potency passes to act. Any entity which has a final cause has also an efficient cause; then there is a final reason which is the first principle of his actions. Conclusion Suárez, in his Disputationes metaphysicae, offered a religious dogmatic alternative against Pyrrhonism, academic or atheist solutions on existence, presented to human consciousness in the post-Tridentine period. Faced with the consolidation of doubt, as a response to the relative and illusory nature of truth, he reminded again the consolation that the certainty of Christian truth has brought to human being for centuries. The individual is naturally inclined to truth, and metaphysics as natural theology offers to reason the proof for its existence. This science, to the extent that satisfies the innate desire for the knowledge of truth, is convertible with natural happiness98. Suárez founded on the natural inclination of man to the knowledge of God the main task of metaphysics as natural theology. Natural theology is founded 97

Cf. DM XXIV, s. 3, a. 28, p. 330. Cf. DM I, s. 6, a. 34, pp. 355-356: «Man’s wholesale appetite tends to his natural happiness; now, this is acquired through this science, or better yet, it consists on the perfect possession of it [...], natural happiness, is set on the contemplation of God and the separate substances, contemplation that is the act proper and principal of this science». 98

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on the persuadable character of reason, offering it rational arguments which support the belief in God99. The speculative method developed by metaphysics points the way most suitable for the development of reason as the perfection most specific to man. Only the judgment or assent to truth shown to reason in its intellectual language could ensure human happiness. The end of metaphysics as natural theology is the rational contemplation of the absolute truth that is God, on which the soul rests. The method used to prove that the truth or God exists, confirms that concerns only to the metaphysician its study, as this is the main object of this science. It demonstrates on the first place, the existence of a necessary being. And although it might seem that the proofs a posteriori do have a physical basis as they progress from the effects, the reason for the demonstration, the unity of purpose and the connection or subordination that all entities do present on reality, is exclusively metaphysical. In a second stage, it demonstrates, founding on the perfection of being itself that the entity has not been produced, and is one and that is the beginning of all existing entities. Finally the metaphysician concludes, identifying the principle with God. Metaphysics, in the Suarecian approach, derives its dignity from its own principal object, to which it is possible to access metaphysically or rationally, through the right concept. The principal object specified under the common reason of being, expresses a formal concept but it alludes to a reality objectified in the concept, which is God. Metaphysics does not deal with the signs or formal concepts employed in speculation; it properly studies reality, which is signified by the sign in its objective conception. The real foundation of conception is always true, and therefore, evident. The representational nature of understanding causes that, although reality, as presented to the subject, presents an immediate connection with reality, the formal concept with which reality is denominated, does not properly appreciate said connection, and therefore, truth is not evident and is not adequately known. The non-obvious character of truth, as well as the ease of incurring in error, justify the need to show to reason the truth and 99 Tilting to knowledge of God is a belief; cf. DM XXIX, s. 3 a. 34, p. 336: «this knowledge – God – is due primarily to human belief, especially in the vulgar people, rather than immediate evidence». Because of this character as a belief, cf. DM XXIX, s. 3 a. 36, p. 338, is «why man is very easily persuaded that it is in need of a higher nature to which he owes its origin and by which he is ruled and governed».

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its ground in reality. Traditional proofs of existence, as the ontological argument of Anselm of Canterbury, founded on the obvious character of the formal concept of the epistemologically supreme entity from the point of view of the subject, do not offer, in the opinion of Suárez, the degree of necessary evidence to obtain the assent to truth100. Suárez maintained the belief of having given with his proofs enough arguments (efficacissimae) to dissuade the «wicked man», or the «predisposed to find evasive ways», or the man who doubts the existence of God. He also acknowledged that the proofs, considered independently, can fail to enforce assent to truth, but he was convinced none the less that truth will emerge strongly (sumptae suffcientissime) when all of the proofs be considered as a whole, in those intellects well disposed towards demonstration101. Metaphysics as natural theology is understood by Suárez, at the end, as an artificial auxiliary to the consolidation of religious belief. And in the accomplishment of this function, it is founded the Suarecian metaphysics, that must be «Christian and server of the divine Theology» (debere christianam esse, ac divinae Theologiae ministram)102.

100

Suárez, cf. DM XXIX, s. 3 a. 35, pp. 336-337, stated in the following terms on relation to the ontological proof: «Even if we concede that with the name of God it is signified the being essentially necessary, which greater than it nothing can be thought of, as Saint Anselm purports, having taken it from Saint Augustine, De Doctrina christi. I, 7, however, is not of an immediate evidence if the meaning of this word is a true reality or it is just something invented or thought by us». 101 Cf. DM XXIX, s. 3, a. 32, p. 324; a. 36, p. 337. 102 Cf. DM, Proem., p. 17.

SANDRO R. D’ONOFRIO* NOTES CONCERNING THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF THE OBJECTIVE CONCEPT OF THE ENS RATIONIS IN ANTONIO RUBIO’S TEACHING

Introduction When reading Descartes, the usual question asked by historians of philosophy is: Why does Descartes attribute a mental status to all his ideas – based on their content – regardless of their possible correspondence to extramental reality? If we take into account Suárez’s epistemology, the question can be reformulated in the following way: How is it possible for Suárez’s «objective concepts», i.e. intramental entities that are dependent on what is known, match with the «objective realities» of Cartesian ideas that are ontologically independent mental entities1? Does this mean that in Suárez’s work there is an implicit doctrine that leads the way to the foundation of the ontological status of Cartesian ideas? As Jorge Gracia puts it: Does Suárez open the door to a mentalist ontology (one which, at last, overthrows the basis of realistic epistemology, setting off idealism)2? In order to answer these questions about the mental reality of our ideas, independently of whether they are known, we must examine the issue of the entia rationis (beings of reason), in a manner that perhaps would not have made sense to Suárez though it would have to Descartes. In other words, the ontological status of «real» extramental beings is one thing whereas the status of concepts that tend to extramental reality, whether actual or not, is something else3. We should examine the being of *

Associate Professor of Philosophy at the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, Centro de Estudios Filosóficos, Av. Universitaria 1801, San Miguel, Lima, Perú. [email protected] 1 From the point of view of their represented mental content and not their «material» production by our spirit, e.g., the idea of absolute perfection; see the discussion of objective concept below. 2 See J. E. GRACIA, «Suárez’s Conception of Metaphysics: A Step in the Direction of Mentalism?», The American Philosophical Quarterly, 45:3 (1991) 287-309. 3 As B. J. CANTEÑS, «Suárez on Beings of Reason: What Kind of Being (entia) are Beings of Reason, and What Kind of Being (esse) Do they Have?», American Catholic

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reason because previous studies, such as Cronin’s4, affirmed the similarity between objective concepts and the objective reality of ideas with reference to their character as mental objects, omitting both their marked differences and their possible condition as actual essences. The ontological status of the entia rationis was a central question during the Middle Ages and the Second Scholastic period. The concern of the thinkers of the time was the possible existential (substantial) predication of entia rationis. Nevertheless, one cannot find any special interest in the ontological status of the contents of mental concepts when, after taking into account how the mind thinks objective concepts of the entia rationis, they conceive of them as being entities of a «certain kind». Their fundamental concern was concentrated on how it was possible for these nonexistent beings or essences to become the subjects of thought and to be predicated as if they were real essences. Nonetheless, there was no detailed work on the reality of objective concepts linked to these unreal essences. In general terms, the study of the concepts of beings of reason remained epistemologically and ontologically neglected because of the focus on the beings of reason themselves. Accordingly, what were usually called «shadows of beings» or «minimal entities», i.e. «almost beings», are entia rationis but never their mental concepts5. It is interesting to note that there was no specialized ontology of Philosophical Quarterly, 77 (2003) 173 (171-187), points out the objective concept not only refers to a represented actual extramental known entity, but also to a possible «conceived» essence, i.e. an eternal truth. See, in order to compare the ontological status of the essences previous to their «real existence», N. J. WELLS, «Descartes’ Uncreated Eternal Truths», The New Scholasticism, 56:2 (1982) 185-199, and «Suarez on the Eternal Truths», The Modern Schoolman, 58:2 (1981) 73-104.

See T. J. CRONIN, «Objective Reality in Human Thought: Descartes and Suárez», in V. F. DAUES – M. R. HOLLWAY – L. SWEENEY (eds.), Wisdom in Depth: Essays in Honor of Henri Renard, S.J., Bruce Publishing Co., Milwaukee 1966, pp. 68-79 (especially the conclusions of the article). Nevertheless, Cronin believes that the only difference between Suárez and Descartes lies in the origin of their ideas and dismisses the fact that Descartes conferred an independent mental reality with a subjective content (intramental dependent) to these ideas. The analysis of the reality of the ideas of beings of reason reveals this transcendental ontological difference between the two positions that goes beyond the origin of the mental concepts given that, for Descartes, the objective reality of ideas has converted them in «subjective» realities or formal concepts (of the essences themselves). 4

5

«Shadow of beings» by Francisco Suárez, Disputationes metaphysicae [DM], ed. and transl. by S. RÁBADE – S. CABALLERO – A. PUIGCEVER, Gredos, Madrid 1960,

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the possible objective concepts of the entia rationis but rather a specialized ontology of whatever was represented by them. Descartes, on the other hand, was more interested in the ontological status of ideas in general no matter whether these were the result of the representations of actual beings or not. For an ontological realist such as Suárez, entia rationis are merely a kind of forged mental «pointer», without any real ontological foundation, without a real concept in the mind (i.e., without an essence known inhesively, existing in the soul accidentally). Therefore, any objective concept is reduced to a mere reflection of the thing represented by the real concept, that is, the so-called «formal concept»6. Because of this, according to Suárez, entia rationis cannot produce real beings «in» the mind, since, lacking formal (real) concepts, they are not accidents (real beings) in the soul. In general, objective concepts of real essences (actual or not) are a mere reflection of formal (real) concepts: the former are only represented by the latter; they are their pointers and nothing else7. Disp. II, p. 360 [transl. by S. PENNER, web page: July, 2013]. «Minimal beings» by Antonius Rubius, Commentarii in universam Aristotelis Dialecticam una cum dubiis et quaestionibus hac tempestate agitari solitis, Ex Officina Iusti Sanchez Crespo, Compluti 1603, p. 263/151 [Numbers correspond to the original Latin text / the PDF text that can be found at: ]. We sought support in Walter Redmond’s unpublished translation to Spanish whenever we could. 6 See DM, 2, 1, 1, p. 1: «The act itself or the word (which is the same thing) by which the intellect conceives some thing or common nature is called ‘formal concept’ […] But the human known and represented by that act is called ‘objective concept’, conceived indeed through extrinsic denomination by the formal concept (through which its object is said to be conceived) and therefore rightly called ‘objective’. For the concept is not conceived as a form intrinsically terminating, but as an object and matter to which the formal concept is directed and to which the eye of the mind directly extends. For this reason it is named ‘intellectual intention’ [intentio intellecta] by some, according to Averroes, and by others is called ‘objective concept’ [ratio obiectiva]». English translation on Suarezian paragraph by S. PENNER, webpage: , p. 1; Latin text from http://homepage.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/Michael.Renemann/suarez/index.html. Retrieved: July, 2013. 7 For objective concept as mere pointers, see our previous note, as well as our note 15, a commentary of Martin Tweedale. Later we explain what occurs with their objective concepts of real beings and beings of reason.

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Thus, the question is: how does Descartes come to say that our ideas, objectively considered, are not a «mere nothing», especially when considered as contents, essences, or as what is represented by them, independently of their actual or possible reality8? The thesis expounded here is that the answer lies in the slowly increasing concern of philosophers of the Second Scholastic period in finding a more adequate explanation for the mental conception of beings of reason. Additionally, it is argued that the majority of contemporary scholars, who continue to be centrally preoccupied with the ontology of beings of reason instead of concentrating on their respective objective concepts, have not offered a suitable answer to this question9. Norman Wells, who is interested in both Suarezian and Cartesian mental ontology, has argued for the position discussed above, for the See René Descartes, «Meditations on First Philosophy», in J. COTTINGHAM – R. STOOTHOFF – D. MURDOCH (eds.), The Philosophical Works of Descartes, Cambrid8

ge University Press, Cambridge, Vol. II, 1984, Meditation V, p. 44 (C. ADAM – P. TANNERY, Œuvres de René Descartes 1596-1650, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Paris, 11 t. (13 Vols.), 1974-1978, henceforward AT VII, p. 64): «But I think the most important consideration at this point is that I find within me countless ideas of things which even though they may not exist anywhere outside me still cannot be called nothing; for although in a sense they can be thought of at will, they are not my invention but have their own true and immutable natures». Although Descartes denies the actual reality of entia rationis, he is willing to admit that they could be conceived in mind with objective reality if its existence does not imply contradiction (i.e., the «impossible beings», such as chimera are only fictitious intramental dependant beings). See René Descartes, Metaphysical Meditations, Second Set of Objections, Seventh Answer (AT IX, p. 119; COTTINGHAM et alii, op. cit., p. 108). The key is what Descartes understands by being of reason or impossible beings (see below note 48). 9 See GRACIA, «Suárez’s Conception of Metaphysics», pp. 287-309, and his reply to Wells in ID., «Suárez and the Metaphysical Mentalism: The Last Visit», Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 67:3 (1993) 349-354. In addition see CANTEÑS, «Suárez on Beings of Reason», pp. 171-187; D. D. NOVOTNY, «Rubio and Suarez: A Comparative Study on the Nature of Entia Rationis», Bohemia Jesuitica, 14:46 (2009) 477-490; J. P. DOYLE, «Suárez on Beings of Reason and Truth I», Vivarium, 25:1 (1987) 47-75; ID., «Suárez on Beings of Reason and Truth II», 26 (1988) 51-72; J. L. FERNÁNDEZ RODRÍGUEZ, «Tipología del ente de razón», Anuario Filosófico, 30 (1997) 361-394; ID., «El ente de razón», in F. FERNÁNDEZ LABASTIDA – J. A. MERCADO (eds.), Philosophica: Enciclopedia filosófica on line, URL: ; C. SHIELDS, «Shadows of Beings: Suárez’ entia rationis», in H. LAGERLUND – B. HILL (eds.), The Philosophy of Francisco Suarez, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012, pp. 57-74; Ó. BARROSO FERNÁNDEZ, «Los entes

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reason that he has studied the notion of the objective concept in depth. Nevertheless, he underlines that there is a Scholastic influence, but not continuity, in the formation of Cartesian objective realities10. Conversely, E. J. Ashworth, who has studied the philosophical works of both Suárez and Antonio Rubio11, has argued that the foundation of the objective reality of the Cartesian ideas can be found in the ontology developed by Rubio12. Although Ashworth also does not concentrate in detail on the ontology of mental concepts, when analyzing Rubio’s conception of ens rationis, she poses the question of how its objective mental representation takes place, leaving open the possibility that a being of reason is a mind-dependent entity, although with the ontological reality of a real (subiective) concept: «We now need to ask what this represented object is. Is it the actual thing in the world which is thought about, is it a common nature or some other kind of intermediary entity which is distinct from the external object without being mind-dependent, or is it some special kind of mind-dependent object which has only the being of being though?»13. de razón en Suárez. Una concepción barroca de la realidad», Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía, 28 (2011) 135-161 (taken from Plataforma Open Access de Revistas Científicas Electrónicas Españolas y Latinoamericanas e-Revistas, Sunday, 06 May 2012 6:34, URL: ). Canteñs, for example, recognizes that they are mental entities, but mental entities are not real entities (see CANTEÑS, «Suárez on Beings of Reason», p. 174). 10 See N. J. WELLS, «Esse Cognitum and Suárez Revisited», Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 67:3 (1993) 339-348; ID., «Descartes’ Idea and its Sources», American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 47:4 (1994) 513-535; ID., «Objective Reality of Ideas in Descartes, Caterus and Suárez», Journal of the History of Philosophy, 28:1 (1993) 33-61. 11 For a brief description of Rubio’s work see D. D. NOVOTNY, «Rubio and Suarez: A Comparative Study on the Nature of Entia Rationis», 477-490. In addition, the importance of Rubio is clear because Descartes mentions him in his letter to Mersenne; see René Descartes, Correspondance, op. cit., AT III, p. 185. NOVOTNY, «Rubio and Suarez: A Comparative Study », p. 477, provides even more information on the fact that Rubio was commonly read in La Flèche. 12 See E. J. ASHWORTH, «Antonius Rubius on Objective Being and Analogy: One of the Routes from Early Fourteenth-Century Discussions to Descartes’s Third Meditation», in S. BROWN, Meeting of the Minds: The Relation between Medieval and Classical Modern European Philosophy, Brepols, Turnhout 1998, pp. 42-62. 13 Ibid., p. 57.

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Thus, following Ashworth’s clue, this paper will analyze the mental concept of ens rationis as formulated by the Jesuit Antonio Rubio, who, in his teachings, seems to follow – prima facie – the same Suarezian philosophical position and explanations14. Rubio understands the existence of the mental concepts of all beings (actual or not) as mental beings – formal concepts – dependent on real essences while their respective objective concepts are mere pointers but not mental beings ontologically independent because of their content15. Nevertheless, in contrast to Suárez, he declares that the ontological reality of objective concepts in certain beings of reason are founded in real (formal or subjective) concepts. The intention of this paper is not to solve the ontological problem of Antonio Rubio’s beings of reason nor even less those of Suárez. The aim is to suggest that the objective concepts of Rubio’s beings of reason constitute a plausible foundation for explaining the so-called «objective reality» that Descartes conceives and attributes to all his ideas.

1. Mental Concepts and Beings of Reason Rubio starts from the same distinction made by Suárez regarding the types of beings of reason (negations, privations and impossibles)16 as well as the same mental distinction made by Suárez regarding the objective concept and the formal concept. Nevertheless, this story is much older: in accordance with traditional Aristotelian-Thomistic theory, when an extramental entity becomes known, a «concept» (conceptus) is produced in the mind by the 14 See NOVOTNY, «Rubio and Suarez: A Comparative Study», p. 478, who thinks that, despite the fact that the works were written almost at the same time, the description of the being of reason by both authors does not differ substantially. Nevertheless, we have found that Rubio cites Suárez in his text; see Antonius Rubius, Commentarii, p. 288 / 163. 15 See M. TWEEDALE, «Mental Representation in Later Medieval Scholasticism», in J.-C. SMITH (ed.), Historical Foundations on Cognitive Sciences, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht 1990, p. 48 (pp. 35-49): «[…] Intentional existences or meanings cannot exist by their own. They have to be carried by other something that is a real thing in the world and that interact with other real things […] the soul, its faculties, its states, its acts are real entities […] In modern terms, the actual mechanics of the mind depends on the form of the representations rather than their content». 16 In Suárez, there are also considered the ficta and the relations of reason, and even the universals.

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agent intellect that, «illuminating» the «image» (phantasma) produced by the fantasy (which originated in common sense), allows passage – being an instrumental cause – of the essential notes that will permit the union of the cognitive with the known in the mental conception. According to Thomas Aquinas, this act has a positive foundation in the soul: the known thing presents itself as an accident in the soul and is a similitude to the known extramental essence. This known reality that is dependent on the mind is called «species intelligibilis», and this and the concept are the same reality, extensionally considered, that is, the fruit and the content of the intellect17. This concept intentionally «tends» (intendet) to the known extramental thing and, thus, represents it. The contents of this representation is what occurs in the human mind as the object of thought: this is what medievals called «obiectum» in opposition to both the extramental reality in itself, «subiectum» or «substantia», existing in the sensible extramental reality. The explanation of the intentionality of the concepts is intrinsically related with the existence of these as «objective concepts»18. According to Ashworth, the origin of the distinction formal concept / objective concept was developed because the notion of concept can be understood as a verb (concipere), as an actualization of the soul, and also as the result of the operation (conceptus), that is, as the thing conceived19. Following a tradition developed after Aquinas, which prevailed during the Second Scholastic period, Suárez, like Rubio, thinks that every extramental entity generates a formal concept which is equivalent to the «material» part of our thought – to what was called the intelligible species – and that represents a known thing20, and also an objective concept that is only the 17 Intensionally they are also distinguished from the expression of the known, as «verbum mentis». See B. LONERGAN, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan - Volume 2: Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, ed. by F. E. CROWE – R. M. DORAN, University of Toronto Press, Toronto 1997. 18 A more complete explanation of these terms can be found in M. FORLIVESI, «La distinction entre concept formel et concept objectif: Suárez, Pasqualigo, Mastri», Les études philosophiques, 60:1 (2002) 3-30. DOI: 10.3917/ leph.021. 0003 webpage: , June 2011. 19 ASHWORTH, «Antonius Rubius on Objective Being and Analogy», pp. 56-57, provides also a detailed history of this transformation. 20 Obviously, it is not material in a physical or sensible sense but rather an accident of a «spiritual» nature in the soul and, in this sense, is the material, the constitutive, the «real» existence in the act of conceiving.

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expression of that represented by the formal concept21. As can be seen, from the beginning, the objective concept was considered not as a real concept but only as that which is represented by the formal concept (the «real concept»). The objective concept only is the «object» (obiectum) toward which the mind turns when it knows or represents the extramental thing22. Degl’Innocenti, who examines the problem of the origin of an idealistic mental ontology, is mistaken when he attributes to Suárez an erroneous opinion, because he believes that Suárez, like some modern Scholastics, equated the cognitive realism of Thomas Aquinas – «adequatio intellectus cum re» – as the correspondence between the formal and the objective concepts23. According to this author, the identification of the objective concept with the extramental thing had made possible an epistemology that distorted Thomistic cognitive theory though he is not wrong when he states the preferable posture is to view both concepts as two aspects of the same thing24. Nevertheless, we can see that both Suárez and Thomas Aquinas believed that the identification of the species intelligibilis or the formal concept, respectively, is not with the extramental thing but rather with its essence25. Thus, Thomistic realism identifies species with the essence, and 21

See Francisco Suárez, DM II, I, 1, pp. 360-361; English by PENNER, op. cit., p. 1. For more information about this explanation, see also above our note 6. FORLIVESI, «La distinction entre concept formel et concept objectif», p. 6, believes that the terms originate in Duns Scotus, although not explicitly: «[Scot] ne fait pas usage des syntagmes conceptus formalis et conceptus obiectivus. Il n’est pourtant pas difficile de trouver dans les expressions conceptus ut forma et conceptus ut obiectum actu intellectum les avant-coureurs de la formule en question»; on the other hand, A. LALANDE, Vocabulaire Technique et critique de la Philosophie, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris 1947, p. 678, states that Scotus was the first in using the term. 22 See below our note 38. 23 See U. DEGL’INNOCENTI, «Concetto formale e concetto ogettivo», Aquinas, 13 (1970) 438 (436-446). Suárez is mentioned together with others philosophers sustaining this position. In addition, this author denies the evolution of the substantive «object» and its adjective «objective», equating the positions of philosophers from Second Scholasticism with those of Neo-Scholasticism, as well as with scholars from post-Cartesian era. Even the term «idea» is inadvertently mentioned without any attention to the permutation of this notion before and after Descartes. 24 Ibid., p. 443. 25 DEGL’INNOCENTI, who identifies the objective concept with the impressed species, cites Aquinas in Summa contra gentiles, stating that the intelligible is the form for «its own form».

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the image (phantasma) with the concrete mental object26, and we did not find a variant of this affirmation in Suárez’s Disputationes metaphysicae so far. In any case, since we are dealing with the knowledge of an extramental entity, no problem arises, because the corresponding objective concept is only a reflection of the known formal concept, that which does exists really, positively and inhesively in our soul. The problem emerges when we deal with objects that do not exist in reality such as the entia rationis. Furthermore, Suárez considers that the objective concept does not strictly correspond to the extramental entity known and represented by the formal concept, since «to be an object for reason is extrinsic and accidental to it»27. Rubio is of the same opinion, using the term «intellectual being» in reference to the esse cognitum of Suárez or the objective concept in general28. «[Aristotle] does not call this entity [real extramental, whether substance or accident] an intellectual being [but rather one that is] made [efficitur] directly and in itself by the intellect and inheres in it. Such are the intelligible species through which the intelligible things themselves become present and the concepts expressed by virtue of the intellection; and they are formed in [apud] it by the actual intellection of the things themselves, since all these real entities, by themselves, and simple beings, pertaining to specific predication, i.e. to the quality»29. 26

See Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae – Suma teológica, edición español-latín, intr. y notas por una comisión de PP. Dominicos presidida por Fr. Francisco Barbado Viejo O.P.; intr. gen. por el R.P. Mtro. Santiago Ramírez O.P., Editorial Católica, Madrid, 16 t. – 15 Vols., 1964. Webpage: http://biblioteca.campusdominicano.org/; English: The Summa Theologica, transl. by Fathers of the English Dominican Province: http://www. ccel.org/aquinas/summa/ home.html (Benzinger Bros. Ed., 1947). Webpage: Christian Classics Etheral Library. http://www.ccel.org.; Latin: Corpus Thomisticum [archivo de Internet]. Subsidia studii ab Enrique Alarcón collecta et edita, Fundación Tomás de Aquino, Pampilonae ad Universitatis Studiorum Navarrensi 2000-2007. Webpage: January 23, 2008; IaIae, q. 85, a. 1, resp. et ad. 1, for the representation of the images; ad. 4 for the representation of the «naturae». Ibid., a. 2, and in the objections, as well as many other following passages. 27 See Francisco Suárez, DM XLIV, I, 1, 6, p. 393 (transl. by J. P. DOYLE, On Beings of Reason, Marquette University Press, Milwaukee 1995, p. 62). 28 This, as will be shown below, implies that the objective concept corresponds properly to beings of reason. 29 See Antonius Rubius, Commentarii, p. 264 / 151: «Ens autem intellectuale non vocat illud, quod ab intellectu directe, & per se efficitur in illoque inhæret, huis

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The purely (intellectual) being or being of reason is that which exclusively has only an objective concept according to Suárez30. The question that arises is how this is possible: how something can have only esse obiective, if the objective concept has been described as the simple expression of that represented by the formal concept. The reasons offered by Suárez, like Rubio’s, do not take into account the context of mental ontology but rather discusses the «lack of reality» that the being of reason possesses. That is, it is no more than a pure objective concept because it does not possess transcendental unity, its ratio is quasi-transcendental, does not have essence, etc. All this means that this entity cannot be included in the common reason of being (and thus receives special treatment by both thinkers – as an annex to metaphysics)31. It is not, as Rubio argues, a real being: «The thing that we are discussing, because it is so meager [exigua] and enjoys an entity so minimal[32], runs the risk of brutally perishing at all, overwhelmed by multiple arguments or at least disappearing»33.

Thus, Rubio also does not hesitate to immediately identify the intellectual being «which exists only in the intellect» with the «being of reason» of the Scholastics. Nevertheless, isn’t its intellectual existence as an objective concept guaranteed by being in the intellect? Since the viewpoint adopted always refers to the ontology of the extramental entity neither Aristotle nor Suárez nor Rubio himself see any problem with the existence of dependent intramental «reality» which the objective concept of ens rationis enjoys since it lacks the numerical unity of the real being (which «real» formal concepts do possess). modi sunt species intelligibiles, quibus medis sibi res intelligibiles sunt preasentes, & conceptus intellectionis virtute expressi atque; apud se formati in earundem rerum actuali intellectione cum isthaec omnia vere sint entia realia, per ſe, & simplicia, ad speciale praedicamentum spectantia, nempe ad qualitatem». 30 See Francisco Suárez, DM XLIV, I, 1, 6, p. 393 (transl. DOYLE, op. cit., p. 62). 31 See Francisco Suárez, DM I, 1, 9, p. 396. 32 W. B. REDMOND, in his unpublished translation of Rubio’s Commentarii, indicates that he reads «minimae», but if we read «minime» we will have «[…] it is so meager that it is not an entity of any kind […]». 33 Antonius Rubius, Commentarii, p. 263 / 151: «Ac, rursus cum res ipsa, de qua agimus usque adeo sit exigua, minimique entitatis, periculum est ne argumentorum multitudine o bruta penitus pereat, vel certe dispareat».

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For us, it is obvious that the intramental existence of the objective concept of the being of reason, since it is not the mere reflection of knowledge of reality but rather a being with content (whatever may be represented in each case), requires a real mental existence34. Gracia makes this objection to Well’s argument, when Wells tries to defend Suárez’s doctrine against what Wells considers a Gracia’s faulty reasoning in seeking to negate Suárez’s participation as an involuntary founder of mentalism35. In a similar way, Canteñs defends the anti-mentalist position: «by accepting […] that there are such things as beings of reason, Suárez creates an apparent contradiction that needs to be explained». Then again, Canteñs (as well as Suárez) is not concerned with the acceptance of the existence of objective concepts but rather the entia rationis themselves36. Wells’s explanation is better developed in a previous article: Suárez, like Caterus and Gassendi, following the Thomistic tradition reinterpreted in the light of the divine ideas according to Duns Scotus, has no problem in attributing an objective concept to known extramental realities or to the possible real essences of them since, in this case, the «unsuitable» objective concept would be the «obiectum» of the Scholastics, that is, the referent of what is thought (currently existing or not) since it is an objective concept of something that can truly be thought: of a real essence37. That is, if the referent is a real essence, the objective concept is nothing but a reflection of the real concept (the «subjective» formal). It is only that represented 34

This position is generally accepted precisely because we are all heirs of the ontology that was developed with Cartesian ideas according to which mental concepts «enjoy» the ontological status of «mental beings» irrespective of their possible reality. In the words of TWEEDALE, «Mental Representation in Later Medieval Scholasticism», p. 44: «Here we ask a question the scholastic never posed, because they did not really have a category of the mental that exactly corresponds to ours… the intentional content of a mental state or act can be read off that the state or act itself without considering its relation to other things». 35 See GRACIA, «Suárez and the Metaphysical Mentalism», pp. 352-353. 36 See CANTEÑS, «Suárez on Beings of Reason», p. 177. When he asks «what sort of being (esse) do they have» (178-180), Canteñs by no means suggests that they can be mental entities as does ASHWORTH, «Antonius Rubius on Objective Being and Analogy», p. 57. 37 See WELLS, «Esse Cognitum and Suárez Revisited», p. 347, note 31, where he explains that Suárez, in DM 25, 1, 32, identifies the «esse cognitum» with the «res denominata»; this esse cognitum / res denominata is the objective concept in as much as it is the thing represented by the formal concept which matches with the known thing, whether it is actual or not.

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by this and nothing more: it is the referent of what was really thought38. Forlivesi think that both positions are plausible because Suárez uses the term “objective concept” to explain extramental beings and the entia rationis, without clarifying the ontological status of the objective concept: «Suárez ne réussit pas à isoler la nature du concept objectif de quelque chose en tant que concept objectif de la nature du concept objectif de cette chose en tant que concept de la chose. Il ne réussit pas à distinguer clairement la nature du concept objectif de quelque chose saisi comme manifestation de cette chose de la nature du concept objectif de quelque chose saisi dans son être objectif, saisi dans son être de manifestation»39.

In any case, the dilemma of Suárez and of the Scholastic tradition thus becomes clear: the objective concept is a problem when it represents or seems to «tend» (intendet) toward an ens rationis, to something known without a formal (subjective) concept that provides a foundation for its status as a referent, of being «that which is represented». And it is for this reason that the Scholastics, like contemporary thinkers, have concentrated as much on the ontology of the being of reason as on its possible causes instead of asking themselves what it means to have a mental being of an ens rationis (an impossible essence) as an objective concept. Suárez’s insistence that the objective concept of the ens rationis takes place in the intellect without a real concept (without a formal concept), is constantly defended under the premise that only known extramental beings (or real essences, to be more exact) have an ontological correlate in the soul (as accidents of our mind which thinks them and becomes one with them)40. 38 See WELLS, «Objective Reality of Ideas», pp. 52-53. In the words of FORLIVESI, «La distinction entre concept formel et concept objectif», p. 14, «le concept formel est le terme réel de l’opération réelle qu’est l’intellection, le concept objectif est ce que la connaissance rend présent». 39 Ibid., 15. 40 See Francisco Suárez, DM XLIV, 1, 10 (transl. DOYLE, op. cit., pp. 65-66): «Hence, the usual description, as it can be given with respect to the common concept of being, namely, that which has being (esse), does not in fact fit beings of reason. Therefore, they cannot be said to have an essence. For an essence, said without qualification, entails a relation (habitudo) to being, or a capacity to that. But a being of reason is such that being cannot belong to it. From this there also arises the difference between an accident and a being of reason».

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Suárez does not see any contradiction when he states that the being of reason only exists in the understanding as an objective concept without a formal concept. On the contrary, a contradiction would arise if we grant them some kind of existence: «For when we said there are given or there are beings of reason, we do not understand them to be given or to be with real existence in [extramental] reality; otherwise, we would be involved in a contradiction in terms»41. As Shields argues, the existence of an objective concept of a being of reason is parasitic of real concepts (formal concepts of real essences): «Although a thought needs content, it need not therefore be related to an existing entity as its object even if the thought is about that object»42. This explains why the mental contents in themselves are not an objective reality, as Descartes would later complain when he said that they are «not pure nothing». Therefore, there has to be something which is not present in the teachings of Suárez that permitted Descartes to produce the notion of objective reality. From another perspective, for Jorge Gracia, the Suarezian explication does not lead to a contradiction precisely because it is necessary to distinguish the esse obiectivum of all the intramental concepts produced by our intellect from those that also have esse cognitum, that is, those that have a referent in the extramental world and that have passed through our sense and our intellection43. In this manner, the objective concepts of beings of reason do not possess a real concept in the soul, and would not be, for this reason, an independent mental reality (because of their content). Otherwise, there would be reason to be concerned that Suárez had opened the door to a mentalist ontology. Wells, however, notes that this can only be true when the esse cognitum refers to a known extramental entity. But Suárez confers the same designation esse cognitum and / or esse obiectivum to other intramental realities such as real non-actual essences, to our reflected knowledge (of things and of our ideas), and even to the entia rationis44. In contrast, for Wells, the answer is that all objective concepts lack being despite the fact that they are called «esse obiectivum» and the distinction is between objective concepts of real essences (as a reflection of formal 41

See Francisco Suárez, DM XLIV, 1, 7 (transl. DOYLE, op. cit., p. 63). See SHIELDS, «Shadows of Beings: Suárez’ entia rationis», p. 59. 43 See GRACIA, «Suárez’s Conception of Metaphysics», pp. 306-307. 44 See WELLS «Esse Cognitum and Suárez Revisited», p. 347. 42

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concepts) and beings of reason, although all esse obiective are not, in any case, a type of being. Thus, Wells attributes the Cartesian creation of the objective reality of ideas to a rejection of the metaphysics of divine ideas usually sustained by the Suarecian-Scotus Scholastic tradition45. Although this may explain why Suárez, the late Scholastics, and those who study entia rationis are more concerned with the ontology of the being of reason than the ontology of their objective concepts (in themselves), this does not justify the neglect of the mental contents of these concepts. One example is Shields, when he refers to the unreality of the being of reason because it is an extrinsic denomination: «Taking all together, then, a proper ens rationis has only objective being, that is the being bestowed upon it by its being thought. It, the ens rationis, is not itself the extrinsic denomination, but is rather that to which the extrinsic denomination is conjoined»46.

And thus, the objective concept, or its objective being, is not even taken into account because its origin is not a real being. The discussion keeps returning to the being of reason without paying attention to the «of reason» part (the mental) which this being is. What is happening here is that the reality of these essences is not viewed as «existences» in Suarecian metaphysics. They do not have a true objective reality due to their content itself (because of that which is thought, that which is represented) rather it is granted by the being of which it is a reflection (of which it is an objective concept). According to Wells, the Cartesian creation of the objective reality is a result of an explicit rejection of this Suarezian-Scotistic metaphysics in that the ideas exist in the mind (according to their content) because they have been caused by God: «In Descartes’ view, this is where Caterus and the late Scholastic tradition represented by Suarez, has failed to do justice to what they have insisted is ‘something real’ (reale aliquid) and a ‘real essence’ (essential realis). As a genuine instance of ‘a being’ (ens), taken, not participally, but nominally (non ut participium sed ut nomen), it cannot be divested of a relationship to the actual efficient cause of every ens. Otherwise, we would have an anomaly of a tertium quid, 45 46

See ID., «Objective Reality of Ideas», pp. 52-53. See SHIELDS, «Shadows of Beings: Suárez’ entia rationis», p. 66.

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something other than the Creator and other than the creatura, and this has no place in the Judeo-Christian scheme of things. What is not God is a creature. What is no creature is God»47.

Although the explanation of why these ideas have a formal reality as explained by Wells is plausible, it remains unclear how it occurs to Descartes to jump from the objective concept (that in no case was an independent reality due to its content) to the Cartesian objective reality of ideas, a new ontological status that results in all the conceptions in our mind enjoying an existence as mental beings independent of whether the essence is known or not48. What is it that allows Descartes to say that the idea has the capacity of representation (as formal concept) but that, in addition, it possesses an objective reality due to the contents of that which is represented by that idea, independently of whether it is known as true or real? Moreover, what makes him think that the greater the essential perfection (content), the greater the objective reality, when in the Scholastic tradition there is no exploration concerning of how formal or objective concepts increase their reality according to the quality of the object represented? The answers to these questions are directly related to the fact that the explanation neglects to provide a more solid doctrine regarding the possible mental reality of objective concepts.

2. The Subjective (Formal) Reality of Beings of Reason Like Suárez, Rubio also has no problem in attributing subjective being (this is a formal concept) to the known being or to the possible essence since these are conceived as intramental beings in that they «tend» to the 47

See WELLS, «Objective Reality of Ideas», p. 58. Descartes also does not believe that the entia rationis can exist although one would have to inquire what Descartes considers an impossible essence in contrast to the Scholastic tradition. Nevertheless, it is possible to have ideas of entia rationis, although these do not become real (true). That is why they are «individuals» in accordance with their content. See René Descartes, Metaphysical Meditations, AT VII, p. 40 (transl. by COTTINGHAM et alii, op. cit., pp. 27-28): «In so far as the ideas are ‹considered› simply ‹as› modes of thought, there is not recognizable inequality among them: they all appear to come from within me in the same fashion. But so far as different ideas ‹are considered as images which› represent different things, it is clear that they differ widely». 48

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real essences themselves. In the terminology used by Rubio, the known being turns out to be more than a mere mental being because its reality goes beyond the simple objective concept or the intellectual entity (which is how he designates objective concepts): «Then, after being known as such it is not a being of reason […] because the being of reason is nowhere but only objectively in the intellect. But the denomination of «known» is of a real form that exists somewhere, such as the other extreme, and it must exist in it, before it is known by the intellect»49.

On the other hand, the objective concept of the ens rationis cannot enjoy this status because it does not exist essentially anywhere. The ens rationis, properly speaking, would not be a known being since «this meager entity that does not reach [pertingere] the real [essence]»50. The bases of this distinction lie in the intentional capacity of formal concepts. Rubio distinguishes between the intention of the will, whose movement leads to one end and the intention of understanding where «the intellectual intention means something like [quasi] the attention or consideration by which the object is grasped […]»51. Up to this point, Suárez and Rubio, as Novotný pointed out, do not differ in regard to the objective concepts of the entia rationis. However, when referring to the second logical intentions or to metaphysical notions, this distinction of intellectual intentionality leads to a double distinction: that which really is (for example, an extramentalactual rational animal) or that which the intellect considers a base of its nature or real being («animal» as a universal being). In this vein, Rubio states that there is a prima intentio formalis which is the formal concept, which he calls the «real concept» or represented image of the extramental

49

Antonius Rubius, Commentarii, p. 270 / 154: «Ergo, esse cognitum ut sic non est ens rationis […] quia ens rationis nullibi est, nisi obiective in intellectu, sed denominatio cognitione est a forma reali alicubi existenti, nempe in altero extremo, & habet esse in illo, prius quam ab intelectu cognoscatur». See also ibid., p. 274 / 156, where this condition is repeated. 50 Ibid., p. 271 / 155: «[…] Huius exiguæ entitatis, quae realem non pertingit [ratio]». 51 Ibid.: «Intentio intellectus […] quasi attentionem, vel considerationem eius significat, per quam obiectum percipit […]».

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thing while the prima intentio obiectiva corresponds to the real being of man represented in this concept. In the second intention, an analogous division takes place, where the secunda intentio formalis is the real (subjective) conception of the consideration made by the intellect and the secunda intentio obiectiva which is, correspondingly, the denomination of the [formal] concept – of what is «thought»52. These distinctions are made by Rubio because he is speaking of a certain type of being of reason, namely, logical intentions (he states that this is sufficient for now and promises to explain later the other entia rationis)53. And in fact, for us, it is also enough that this explanation has been made with only these entia rationis of logical intentions since Rubio (inadvertently?) has given the status of reality to some objective concepts which previously was not conferred upon them: being known entities and having formal concepts. That is, unlike Suárez54 the universal «animal» is not a mere essence that, as an objective concept, does not have a formal concept – despite being closely linked to the formal concept of «man» which proceeds from an actual and concrete human. For Rubio, the «animal» essence cannot be a mere ens rationis – such as blindness or a chimera. The objective concept of «animal», in as much as it is part of our ontology, must have a real foundation, as it is closer to real essences (whether actual or not). To paraphrase Descartes, there must be more ontological reality in «human» than in blindness55. 52

See the whole text written by Rubio at ibid., p. 272 / 155. Conversely, for Suárez and most of the Scholastic tradition of the time, all logical intentions are seen as mere beings of reason, but cum fundamento in re. 54 See Francisco Suárez, DM LIV, 6, 9 (transl. DOYLE, op. cit., p. 121): «For these relations belongs to things not in themselves but as denominated from some operation of the intellect. Accordingly, they are always relation of reason, and not real, even though they may be employed at times among existing and distinct things. These relations, however, are fabricated not gratuitously, but with some foundation taken from reality. Such is either a real agreement, on which abstraction of a universal is founded, which is modified also into a genus, a species, etc., insofar as the agreement is more or less». 55 It is true that Suárez does not consider that universals have the same ontological status as ficta. See Francisco Suárez, DM VI, 7, 2, 2 (transl. J. F. ROSS, On Formal and Universal Unity, Marquette University Press, Milwaukee 1964, p. 84): «hence, it is rightly said that those universals are real beings which can be abstracted through a direct operation of the understanding. If, however, the discussion turns on universality itself, the common universality is no to be a real being but to be a being of reason , which 53

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One could argue that Rubio only wants to concede reality to logical intention because his secunda intentio formalis (as a respective formal concept) reaches the prima intentio formalis (a real relationship) while the relation of reason (a non-real relationship) does not constitute an essential factor to really determine the objective concept of ens rationis56. The problem is, however, that Rubio, in his mental ontology, considers secunda intentio obiectiva as possessing (real) formal concepts (despite being beings of reason): «Thus, it also happens sometimes, especially in those predicables that are also second intentions understood in a material way, that they are denominated from other second intentions and, in this case, enjoy the condition [of the original ones]»57.

If this is the case, therefore, either all beings of reason would have a kind of (real) formal concept or there are beings of reason that are «more» real than others, a consequence that is highly undesirable for any ontological taxonomy, even if it is to safeguard the irregularity by opposing the objective concept of some beings of reasons that are closer to real essences with respect to other58. Nevertheless, as we stated above, the second intentions are not known directly as real beings but as real relations with a foundation in real forms; this is by reflection of the first intentions: is true in this sense, namely, that it is not some property, or something intrinsically and really inherent in the nature which is denominated universal, according to what we have said». Nevertheless, he ultimately considers universals as beings of reason. 56 See Antonius Rubius, Commentarii, p. 275 / 157, Corollary I: «Ex quibus primo inferred licet, eiusmodi entia rationis, vel secundas intentiones, non esse apellandas ficta entia, vel nomina, quia fictum proprie loquendo illud vocatur, quod absque fundamento positum est, vel excogitatum, aut etiam nuncupatum […]. Colorarium atque hoc es de solis entibus rationis habentibus in re fundamentum intelligo, quæ propterea ficta non propie vocari affero, nam cętera, quę nullum habeant fundamentum, iure vocantur ab intellectu conficta, cum non ſolum non habet aliud esse, quam ab intellectu excogitari, sed neque aliud fundamentum, unde pro libito potest fingere, & absque». In ibid., p. 280 / 159, he allows for this distinction between beings of reason with «in re fundamentum» and those that do not have a foundation. 57 Ibid., p. 272 / 155: «Esto aliquando etiam contingant, præsertim in prædicabilibus, intentiones etiam secundas materiali modo acceptas, ab alii secundis intentionibus denominari, & in casu conditionem primarum induere». 58 Because we are not speaking of the ontology of the being of reason but rather of the ontology of its intellectual mental beings, i.e. their objective concepts.

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«[…] This is a quasi direct cognition of itself [of the being of reason] by which it is known not as a principal object but rather as something that follows [consequens] the primary known object, because it is nature itself, which is compared and denominated by it»59.

For us, the point is not whether the second intentions are well-founded beings of reason or not, but rather that if we follow Rubio’s description cited above, the relations of reason have a secunda intentio formalis that constitutes a real formal concept according to which certain beings of reason would already have a mental reality – still dependent of their inexistent real essential correlation. What is important here, we insist, is not reality or the degree of reality that second intentions can possess. What is important is the conception of the intellect regarding the beings of reason: «And even when such denominations are not real at all, nevertheless, the natures can be regarded in such a way by the understanding that they can be denominated as such […]»60. In fact, it is never discussed if the being of reason (in this case, the second intention or the logical intention) is something real but only made explicit that it is the fruit of the resemblance or the comparison of the mind based on real things or relations: «If then the second intentions enjoy the mode of relations, it follows they the mode inherent forms»61. This is where its status lies as a «produced being» and as existing only «objectively in the understanding»62, but not without lacking an inherent form in the intellect (a formal concept, an accident in the soul). In this sense, Rubio compares the logical intentions – admitting that they are pure beings of reason though possessing a real foundation – with the nature proper to 59 See Antonius Rubius, Commentarii, p. 274 / 156: «(Duobus autem modis cognosci potest ens rationis, vel eodem actu, vel cognitione, qua natura, comparatur ad inferiora, &) hæc est quasi directa cognitio ipsius, per quam, non tanquam principale obiectum cognoscitur; sed tanquam quid consequens ad principale cognitum, quod est natura ipsa, quæ comparatur, ac denominatur ab eo […]». 60 See ibid., p. 276 / 157: «[...] & quanquam nihil reale sint eiusmodi denominationes, reales tamen naturas talis modo consideratas ab intellectu denominare possunt […]». 61 Ibid., p. 274 / 156: «si ergo secundae intentiones modum relationum habent, sequitur habere modum formarum inherentium». 62 Ibid.: «ab intellectu produci» and «hoc est obiective dumtaxat esse in intellectu» respectively.

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accidents, contradicting Suárez as well as the majority of the Scholastic tradition. He states: «That the being of reason is a relation or second intention implies a similarity with accident, and it is understood as an accidental form that denominates relativity [something relative] […]. Therefore, it implies a contradiction that second intention can be understood as an accidental form that denominates, but lacking substratum or concretion, and it is less rational [a ratione alienum] that it is nothing, because the denominate nature by it is more often than not a real one»63.

To this point and especially with this last quote, we think we have established that Rubio considers that objective concepts of certain beings of reason have the capacity to exist as real intramental beings by means of the existence of (real) formal concepts with the same ontological reality that any other mental concept with real (actual or not) essence enjoys. And that this reality is due to the essence known or represented in the respective objective concepts of the so-called logical intentions. According to Ashworth’s conclusion, every objective concept is produced in the same manner as formal concepts64, all are mental production. But still more 63 See Antonius Rubius, Commentarii, p. 276 / 157: «[…] quia cum ens rationis sit relatio, aut secunda intentio, cum accidenti habet similitude, & tanquam forma accidentalis relativa denominas intelligitur [...] implicat ergo contradictionem, secundam intentionem intelligi per modum formæ accidentalis denominantis, & substrato vel concreto carere, nec minus a ratione alienum est, illud esse nihil, cum sit natura denominate plerumque realis». Francisco Suárez, DM XLIV, 1, 10 (transl. DOYLE, op. cit., p. 66), in contrast, affirms that «from this there also arises the difference between an accident and a being of reason. For an accident, absolutely and without addition can be called a being, since although it is analogically a being, it is still properly and intrinsically a being. A being of reason, however, cannot be called being absolutely, but only with some addition, which makes it plain that it is not a true being, but rather thought in the manner of a being». 64 See ASHWORTH, «Antonius Rubius on Objective Being and Analogy», p. 62 (quoting Antonio Rubio’s Commentarii, p. 155b): «Conceptus, quem format intellectus de aliquo: duplex est [...] formalis, et objectivus». The edition used by E. J. Ashworth is Antonius Rubius, Logica Mexicana sive Commentarii in Universam Aristotelis Logicam. Pars Prior. Pars Posterior, Sumptibus Arnoldi Mylii Birckmanni, Coloniae Agrippinae 1605. This copy is in the Bodleian Library, Oxford, and her references to the Logica mexicana are from the same copy.

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importantly, she believes that the objective concept of Rubio is not a simple referent (to the essence, actual or not) but rather something intermediate between the mind and the extramental world: and to her, this sounds much like the language used by Descartes to refer to these ideas65. One could insist again that Rubio makes this classification of beings of reason only to describe them as relations of reason cum fundamento in re (the logical intentions)66; after them follow those that are relatively based on something real, such as privations and negations, and those that are totally fabricated (fingunt) by the intellect such as the impossible or prohibited beings (chimera, square-circle, etc.). One might think that this division would undermine our conclusions since only the first (the logical intentions) would have a real concept in the mind (a formal concept) while the other groups would lack this foundation67. Nevertheless, what we should underline is that, with respect to logical intentions, Rubio is talking about the term of these relations of reason and thus he is continuing in the tradition of approaching this issue from the perspective of the ontology of the being of reason and not from the perspective of the ontological foundations of the objective concept as any kind of being. In this sense, like Suárez, Rubio inadvertently leaves open the possibility of the intramental reality of objective concepts though not with the ontological status of independent beings due to their content but rather more deterministically as if possessing an ontological status founded on the mental-real, because they are objective concepts of the formal second intentions, comparing their real mental existence with that of the accidents. Wells has demonstrated that Descartes (and Suárez) have in mind a realist ontology based on the real essences and not necessarily only on extramental things68, according to which the content of the objective concept acquires importance regardless of its actual existence. The objective reality of Cartesian ideas is tied to this essentialist ontology. Yet, 65

See ASHWORTH, «Antonius Rubius on Objective Being and Analogy», p. 62. See Antonius Rubius, Commentarii, pp. 277 / 158 – 282 / 160. 67 For Suárez, logical intentions also «are more approximate» to reality since, thanks to them, we can speak of metaphysics and of theology. Thus, a ranking of objective concepts occurs, from the most real to the impossible, only that, in this case, all are relations founded on an extrinsic relation, that is, not real (or with its own formal concept). See SHIELDS, «Shadows of Beings: Suárez’ entia rationis», p. 63. 68 See WELLS, «Esse Cognitum and Suárez Revisited», p. 344 sqq. 66

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in Rubio, the gradation of the objective concepts of beings of reason due to the (essential) content of these, favors the notion of objective reality which Descartes employs, especially in his third Metaphysical Meditation for the proof of God, since Cartesian ideas not only enjoy representative character of possible essences (as the formal concepts) but also content, and because of the diversity of contents a diversity of objective reality supervenes them too69. We think that the gradual objective reality of the ideas of which Descartes speaks, which is considered in relation to their contents, is founded on the progressive reality granted by Rubio to objective concepts in their dependence on the intramental existence of formal concepts. Thus, according to Rubio, of all the beings of reason, the logical intentions have a real concept (the second formal intentions); then, the privations and negations are closer to the real beings because of their mental «function» (in order to be able to think what is perceived, although in reality, it does not exist as such); finally, the impossible beings such as the chimera are a pure fiction since they «practically» do not have a foundation or a function in our thought: for this reason, the latter are completely fabricated. Rubio is concerned to emphasize the contrast between the different epistemological modalities of objective concepts as either clear and distinct or undiscriminating and implicit. He seems to picture the human mind as presented with an array of natures and quasi-natures which can be explored by a process of clarification70. In the mental metaphysics of Suárez and Rubio, objective concepts are not considered as beings with any reality independent of what is represented. But that which is represented is «more» really founded if it refers to a real essence instead of a logical intention, a privation or a negation, until it declines to a total «lack» of foundation as to the impossible beings. Regardless of the metaphysical worldviews of Rubio and Suárez, Descartes thus would have had all the available ontological elements at his disposition in order to justify that his ideas enjoy an objective reality, irrespective of whether they were known or not. Descartes, after having 69 See J. L. FERNÁNDEZ RODRÍGUEZ, «La Idea en Descartes», Anuario Filosófico, 9 (1976) 110-161. See especially 124 sqq., where a very detailed explanation is provided regarding the double character of ideas, previously made up of objective and formal concepts. Only, in this case, the objective is that which is represented with an autonomous ontology founded on its content. 70 See ASHWORTH, «Antonius Rubius on Objective Being and Analogy», p. 62.

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united the representational property of the formal concept with the contents of that represented in the objective concept, took the notion of objective reality of this ever more «real» character of the ontological foundations of Rubio’s the objective concepts. Thus, for his proof of God’s existence, Descartes assumes that He can «produce» all the ideas that are eminently found in His nature (as much as are formal concepts) with their respective essentially possible contents (the objective contents) with exception of the idea of absolute perfection. It is only then that Cartesian ideas enjoyed a new quality – that of objective reality – which, as Wells states, is causally justified by the rejection of Suarezian-Scotistic metaphysics of divine ideas and by granting them their creational cause to the divine being itself71. Thus, both Descartes and Rubio are granted to say about ideas and some objective concepts that they are not mere nothing.

71 FORLIVESI, «La distinction entre concept formel et concept objectif», pp. 2829, believes, in contrast to Gilson, that the necessary cause for existence as an idea is granted by its own spirit in as much as it is the cause of formal concepts; it is also from here that, in the case of ideas, the notion of objective reality is derived. Wells’ opinion seems more convincing to us, but this matter is beside the point to this paper. See WELLS, «Esse Cognitum and Suárez Revisited», p. 344 sqq.

ROBERTO HOFMEISTER PICH* JERÓNIMO VALERA (1568-1625) AND HIS SCOTIST ACCOUNT OF UNIVERSALS

Not only did the Peruvian Franciscan master of arts, Jerónimo Valera (1568-1625), write a work called Summulae dialecticae on the subjects of logic touched by the three fundamental operations of the intellect – namely, conception, judgment, and reasoning –1, but also very lucid commentaries ad mentem Scoti on the Isagoge by Porphyrius2 and the first book traditionally contained in the Aristotelian Organon, that is the Categories3. Once again, as a professor of logic in the Convent of San Francisco de Lima4, starting in 1588, and for the next 16 years, Valera wrote not only a «Scotist logic», where the visions of John Duns Scotus on the subjects of logics5 – and in many cases of metaphysics6 – are explained, systematized, *

Associate Professor of Philosophy at the Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS), PPG em Filosofia, Av. Ipiranga 6681 Bairro Partenon, CEP: 90.619-900, Porto Alegre / RS, Brasil. [email protected] 1 Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, Commentarii ac quaestiones in universam Aristotelis ac Subtilissimi Doctoris Ioannis Duns Scoti logicam, Apud Franciscum a Canto, Lima 1610, pp. 1-36 («Artis dialecticae compendium vulgo Summulae dialecticae»). 2 Ibid., Liber I («Liber Primus de Introductione ad Logicam Aristotelis, ubi de natura praedicabilium, et de eorum proprietatibus ex Porphirio una cum quaestionibus subtilissimi D. Scoti»), pp. 1-202. 3 Ibid., Liber II («Liber Secundus in quo Praedicamenta Aristotelis Stagiritae expenduntur, una cum quaestionibus subtilissimi Doctoris Scoti»), pp. 203-384. 4 The Convent belongs to the Província Franciscana de los Doce Apóstolos, which was founded in 1553. 5 On Valera’s account of logic, cf. R. H. PICH, «Notas sobre Jerónimo Valera e suas obras sobre lógica», in R. H. PICH – A. S. CULLETON – M. LÁZARO PULIDO (orgs.), Ideas sin fronteras en los límites de las ideas – Scholastica colonialis: status quaestionis, Imprenta Kadmos – Ed. Cáceres, Salamanca – Cáceres 2012, pp. 179-212; R. H. PICH, «Jerónimo Valera’s (1568-1625) Scotistic Account on the Nature and Properties of Logic», Mediaevalia – Textos e Estudos, 31 (2012) 187-234. 6 On Valera’s account of metaphysics, cf. R. H. PICH, «Jerónimo Valera (1568-1625) sobre ente infinito, infinitude e quantidade», in C. D’AMICO – A. TURSI (orgs.), Studium Philosophiae: Textos en homenaje a Silvia Magnavacca, Editorial Rhesis, Buenos Aires 2014, pp. 243-263; R. H. PICH, «The Account of Transcendental Concepts by Jerónimo Valera (1568-1625) in His Summulae dialecticae (1610)», Quaestio, 14 (2014) 273-288.

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and developed in close connection and dialogue with the Scotist tradition of the 14th-16th centuries, but also was able to offer, from the spirit of this tradition, his own philosophical contributions as well7. He did this in a sole work, i.e. Commentarii ac quaestiones in universam Aristotelis ac Subtilissimi Doctoris Ioannis Duns Scoti logicam (1610), which happens to be the first philosophical book published in South America8. Although focused on logic, the volume actually treats subjects from the fields of metaphysics, mind, and language, with a special perspective of interpretation: as a series of commentaries – especially in Books I and II – on Scotus’s logicalia9 Valera formulates his distintions, articles, and questions having the privilege of discussing any proposed subject in the perspective of the entire work of the Subtle Doctor, that is of discussing topics that originally and systematically appeared in Scotus’s early works on logic having now a much broader conceptual and theoretical apparatus inside Scotus’s own opera omnia10. Thus, what might be considered at a first – and superficial glance – as only paraphrasic commentaries on the Quaestiones in librum Porphyrii Isagoge or the Quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristotelis by Scotus11 is in reality an 7

On Valera’s life and work, cf. R. H. PICH, «Notas sobre a Scholastica colonialis e Jerónimo Valera (1568-1625)», in A. BAVARESCO – M. G. VILLANOVA – T. V. RODRIGUES (orgs.), Projetos de filosofia II, Edipucrs, Porto Alegre 2012, pp. 172-203; R. H. PICH, «Scholastica colonialis: Notes on Jerónimo Valera’s (1568-1625) Life, Work, and Logic», Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale, 54 (2012) 65-107. 8 Cf. PICH, «Scholastica colonialis: Notes on Jerónimo Valera’s (1568-1625) Life, Work, and Logic», pp. 65-66. On a bibliography of Latin-American Scholastic works, cf. the seminal work done by W. B. REDMOND, Bibliography of the Philosophy in the Iberian Colonies of America, Nijhoff, The Hague 1972. 9 On Scotus’s logicalia, as well as contributions to logic more generally, cf. the illuminating expositions by A. VOS, The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 2006, pp. 124-129, 151-195. 10 Truly, the present study can be viewed, within the field of logical matters, as an example of this methodology and of the possible theoretical gain that it promotes. Cf. also footnote 6, above. 11 Cf. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in librum Porphyrii Isagoge et Quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristotelis, in Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera Philosophica 1, The Franciscan Institute – St. Bonaventure University, St. Bonaventure NY 1999. A Table of Correspondences between Valera’s Books I and II of his Commentarii ac quaestiones and Scotus’s Quaestiones in librum Porphyrii Isagoge and Quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristotelis was attempted by PICH, «Scholastica colonialis: Notes on Jerónimo Valera’s (1568-1625) Life, Work, and Logic», Section IV.

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opportunity to work out logical-metaphysical problems of philosophy for which knowledge of the whole Scotist corpus is presupposed, above all Ordinatio I-II, as well as In libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis. In what follows, I want to briefly explore one topic of the long Distinction II of the Liber Primus of Valera’s Commentarii ac quaestiones... – a Book which is in reality a newly structured commentary on Scotus’s Quaestiones in librum Porphyrii Isagoge12. In Distinction II Valera deals with «The nature of the universal in common»13. Without a doubt, it is a quaestio famosa to be found in the Introduction by Porphyrius14 and of the entire generation of commentaries on it15. In the case of Valera’s volume, it is fundamental to realize that the treatment of such a topic illustrates his systematic and methodological innovations, that is of visualizing Scotus’s works as a whole when writing on logic, of creating a room for reviewing characteristic traces of Scotism in the period from the 14th to the 17th centuries, and of making efforts to critically present Scotistic positions in philosophy by means of separating them from views of Aquinas and Thomism16. Although there is of course a purely logical treatment of the nature of universals as such, namely as concepts and words that can – either as first or second intentions – be predicated of several individual items17, I will put the focus on the metaphysical aspect of the discussion 12 The themes of Valera’s Commentarii ac quaestiones, Liber Primus, d. 1, i.e. the nature and the object of logic, were explored in PICH, «Jerónimo Valera’s (1568-1625) Scotistic Account», pp. 187-234. 13 Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, Commentarii ac quaestiones, Liber Primus, d. 2 («De natura universalis in communi»), aa. 1-5, pp. 33-105. 14 Cf. for example P. AUBENQUE (ed.), Concepts et catégories dans la pensée antique, Vrin, Paris 1980; Ch. EVANGELIU, Aristotle’s Categories and Porphyry, E. J. Brill, Leiden – New York – Köln 1988; P. LEITE JÚNIOR, O problema dos universais. A perspectiva de Boécio, Abelardo e Ockham, Edipucrs, Porto Alegre 2001, pp. 1530. Cf. also Porphyre, Isagoge. Textes grecs et latins, trad. par A. DE LIBERA – A. Ph. SEGONDS, Vrin, Paris 1998. 15 Cf. again LEITE JÚNIOR, O problema dos universais, pp. 31-81. Cf. also (and especially) A. DE LIBERA, La querelle des universaux, de Platon à la fin du Moyen Âge, Le Seuil, Paris 1996; ID., L’art des généralités, Aubier, Paris 1999. 16 Cf. again the studies by R. H PICH mentioned in footnotes 5 and 6, above. Of course, the present study is a further example of these debates and ways of systematizing and furthering Scotism. 17 Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, Commentarii ac quaestiones, Liber Primus, d. 2, aa. 2-5, pp. 52-105.

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about (any kind of) universals. This focus already appears in the first of the five articles of Distinction II, where Valera explores the notion of the «real universal» or rather the «common nature» (natura communis). More narrowly, in Article 1 of Distinction II Valera reveals the metaphysical issue that is the background of the discussion: he wants to know about the nature that is «fundament» and «subject» of universality, that is «the universal in the existing material thing»18. 1. «The Universal in the Existing Material Thing» Valera assumes that Porphyrius was the one who first proposed a logical-metaphysical treatment of the «universal in common», and this is something he did before his specific account of five «predicables». «Predicables» are taken by Porphyrius as «elements out of which a predicament grows», for a predicament is just «a given coordination of predicables», and this coordination is done «according to a due function as a subject and function as a predicate», i.e. acording to functions that terms as long as they refer to genera, species, and individuals can play in propositions19. In his logicalia, Scotus had offered an account of the universal as well, in at least nine questions of his Quaestiones in Librum Porphyrii Isagoge20. In the beginning of his Commentarium, Valera affirms that some metaphysical knowledge will be necessary concerning this 18

Ibid., d. 2, Commentarium, p. 34: «[...]. In primo articulo agemus de natura quae fundamentum est, et subiectum universalitatis, seu de universali pro materiali. [...]». Cf. ibid., d. 2, a. 1 («De universali pro materiali»), p. 34: «Articulum istum in quo universalis pro materiali cognitionem tradimus in aliquas quaestiones dividemus, in quibus inquirendum erit, an detur in rebus universale pro materiali, et quid illud sit? An aliquo modo a singularibus distinguatur? Habeat ne aliquam unitatem formalem, unitate numerali minorem? Sit ne in natura verum fundamentum universalitatis? An habeat aptitudinem et indifferentiam ad singularia? Possit ne talis natura dici vere universalis? Quae natura sit capax universalitatis?». 19 Ibid., d. 2, p. 33: «Cum praedicabilia sint quaedam veluti elementa ex quibus praedicamentum coalescit (est enim praedicamentum quaedam praedicabilium coordinatio, secundum debitam subiectionem, et praedicationem, atque adeo series quaedam generum, specierum, et individuorum). Ideo merito praedicabilium cognitionem, quam Porphirius natione Phoenix edidit, ante praedicamentorum doctrinam doctores omnes tam antiqui, quam moderni praemittunt, quem morem sequtus Noster Doctor Subtilis, disserit de eisdem; [...]». 20 Ibid., d. 2, pp. 33-34.

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matter, though only in a modest degree, since he thinks that «in nostra Metaphysica» there would be room for more thoroughly disputing this point21. Interestingly enough, inspite of this important statement by the Peruvian master, there is no trace of a still existing Cursus metaphysicus left by Valera – possibly, then, only in manuscript form22. He divides Distinction II in five articles. The reason for such a division in five articles lies in the existence of a «concrete universal», which admits two senses: (i) as a nature «pro materiali» or in the existing material thing, which is then called a «universal [nature]»; (2) as a nature «pro formali» or in the formal aspect, according to the «intention of universality», which refers to the way how a nature is called «formally» a universal, that is as a form of and in the mind or as a conceptual item able to be predicated of many23. Valera explains in Article 1 of Distinction II the universal in the existing material thing, which is both the «fundament» and the «subject of universality» – i.e. of universality both as a property of real concepts and of concepts that are just kinds of concepts24. The first of eight questions touches two fundamental metaphysical issues, that is: «Whether there is in the things the universal in the material, and what it is». Our author mentions 21

Ibid., d. 2, Commentarium, p. 34: «Materia haec [De natura universalis in communi] difficilis est, et diffusa, nos tamen ut clariori methodo procedamus, brevitatem amplectentes quaestiones Metaphysicas summis tantum (ut dicunt) labiis degustabimus, ut mediocri illarum cognitione instructi, quae necessaria sunt ad universalium intelligentiam percipiamus, sicque pedetentim tyrones nostri procedant ad ea, quae in nostra Metaphysica latius sumus disputaturi». 22 On a full account of works left by Valera, cf. PICH, «Scholastica colonialis: Notes on Jerónimo Valera’s (1568-1625) Life, Work, and Logic», pp. 65-107. 23 Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, Commentarii ac quaestiones, Liber Primus, d. 2, Commentarium, p. 34: «Gratia ergo claritatis distinctionem hanc in quinque articulos dividemus, cum enim universale concretum quoddam sit, duo dicit, pro materiali naturam, quae universalis denominatur; pro formali secundam intentionem universalitatis, quae se habet ut forma a qua formaliter natura universalis dicitur». 24 This is the division of questions: Articulus I – De universali pro materiali: Quaestio I – Utrum detur in rebus universale pro materiali, et quid illud sit; Quaestio II – Num naturae quae universales denominantur sint aliquo modo a singularibus in quibus sunt distincta; Quaestio III – Utrum natura in re habeat unitatem formalem minorem unitati numerali; Quaestio IV – Utrum in natura prout est in re sit fundamentum universalitatis; Quaestio V – Quod sit hoc fundamentum universalitatis; Quaestio VI – Num natura in re actu sit ac formaliter universalis; Quaestio VII – Quae natu[ra] sit capax universalitatis; Quaestio VIII – Quem modum essendi debeat habere in rebus ut fiat universales. Cf. ibid., d. 2, a. 1, qq. 1-8, pp. 34-52.

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several opinions: (a) there are Ancient philosophers, such as Epicurus, Cratylus, and Heraclitus, who denied that universals exist, affirming that there are only singulars; (b) the «nominales» – such as Ockham – believe that there are no universal natures in things as well, and more particularly they affirm that universals are only words or names, and as a consequence they exist as such only «by signifying», not «in essendo». (c) According to a third opinion, it is asserted that the universals are only the «formal concepts» of the intellect themselves; since universals are what is predicated of many, what is predicated of many is a concept, and only our concepts – not things – are in the intellect, it follows that universals are not things or anything in the material thing. (d) Finally, a fourth opinion, going in the contrary direction, is mentioned by Valera, according to which there are universal natures in things; these natures are really abstracted or separated, they exist in another world and are really independent of place and time. Valera affirms that the disciples of the Stoics and of Plato held this view, and Aristotle relates it to Plato – although our author seems to make an attempt to move Plato away from that view, by mentioning that serious men understood that Plato attributed those traces to divine ideas alone25. Structurally, more relevant than a mere description of the (partially traditional and well known) arguments to each of these four views is the fact that Valera presents a series of «notabilia» before his conclusions or determination of the question – a textual structure that we repeatedly find in his volume. Valera makes clear that he analyzes not the universal proposition, but rather the «incomplex» universal, which is one and so «it says an order to many». The relation the universal has to many can be of four kinds: (i) as it says an order (actual or potential) towards many effects, that is the universal «in causando»; (ii) as it says an order to many things that it signifies, that is the universal «in significando», just like an equivocal word such as «canis» can signify many different things (a dog or a constellation of stars, etc.); (iii) as it says an order towards many things that it represents and of which it is «a similarity and an image», that is the universal «in repraesentando» (where the examples are both (iii’) the idea in the artist’s mind, which is the model to several things deviced, and (iii’’) the species or concept in someone’s mind, which represents «a nature common to many»); (iv) as it says «an order of predication and of being in many», 25

About these four arguments, cf. ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 1, pp. 34-35.

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that is the universal «in essendo» or «in praedicando», just like «man» is predicated of Peter and Paul and is in them, or «living being» is said of «man» and «lion» and it is in them in each individual item as well. The eight questions that compose Jerónimo Valera’s Distinction II Article 1 have always this fourth meaning in view26, and those questions are the major concern of the descriptions that follow. In the conclusions of Question 1, Jerónimo Valera summarizes four views concerning universals that will be important in order to understand his whole account of them: (i) first he believes that, beyond singulars, there is the universal «pro materiali in things». One of the reasons he gives is that individuals such as Peter and Paul agree a parte rei in the «human nature», and a universal is exactly that on which many individual items agree. (ii) Second, he affirms that universals «in essendo» and «in praedicando» are not mere words nor concepts of the intellect, but rather natures on which things equally agree27. It seems to be important to Valera to add that this is the opinion both of John Duns Scotus and Thomas Aquinas. The second determination basically amounts to saying that what is predicated of some thing is one with the thing of which it is predicated; clearly, a mere word 26

Cf. ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 1, p. 35: «Sed ne in aequivoco versemur, universale aliud est complexum, propositio scilicet universalis, cuius veritas ex multarum propositionum singularium veritate consurgit; ut haec omnis homo est animal, omnis homo currit. Aliud est universale incomplexum illud scilicet, quod cum unum sit, dicit ordinem ad plura, quia autem iste respectus ad plura, potest esse quadruplex, ideo quadruplex est universale incomplexum: vel enim aliquid dicit ordinem ad plures effectus, quos causat, vel potest causare, et hoc dicitur universale in causando, ut Deus et virtutes coelorum. Vel aliquid dicit ordinem ad plura, quae significat, et hoc dicitur universale in significando, ut vox ista canis significat plura. Vel aliquid dicit ordinem ad plura quae repraesentat, et quorum est similitudo, et imago, ut idea et imago existens in mente artificis exemplar est et similitudo multorum exteriorum artificiorum, vel etiam species aut conceptus repraesentans unam rationem vel naturam communem pluribus, et hoc est universale in repraesentando, vel tandem est unum aliquid dicens ordinem praedicationis et essendi in multis, ut homo, qui de Petro et Paulo praedicatur, in quibus est, et hoc dicitur universale in essendo, vel in praedicando. Praesens autem quaestio de hoc universali procedit». 27 Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 1, pp. 35-36: «Prima Conclusio sit in hac re. Praeter res singulares datur universale pro materiali in rebus. [...]. Tandem quia Petrus, et Paulus v. g. a parte rei conveniunt in natura humana; illud autem in quo plura conveniunt universale est. Secunda Conclusio. Universalia in essendo et praedicando non sunt voces, nec conceptus nostri intellectus, sed natura, in qua plura aequaliter conveniunt. In hac conveniunt omnes cum subtili, et Angelico Docto.».

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or concept is not identical with the things itself, but «word-concept» and «thing» differ really and essentially; as a result, what is predicated of several things and is called «universal» is neither (mere) word nor (mere) concept, but more than that28. A chrystal-clear and complete definition of «universal» (for the current metaphysical and logical purposes) is that the universal is that which is in many and is predicated of many; every nature in which many agree is in them and can be affirmed of them; therefore, it is «universal». This fine definition by Valera fundamentally connects to the «universality» of some item both the meaning of this something being universal in essendo and being universal in praedicando29 – in fact, exactly in this metaphysicallogical order of grounding the «universality» of some item. (iii) Third, Valera will establish that it is absurd to affirm that the universals are natures really separated from the singulars. After all, such natures are quiddities of the singulars; therefore, they are not separated from them, because no quiddity is separated from that of which it is a quiddity. But there is more to say about the way how natures as quiddities are in the singulars or not separated from them. Since every thing that exists is singular and individual, and since the nature (or quiddity) of, say, «man» is both distinct from the singulars and exists in particular things, we should conclude that such a nature is singular in the way it exists30. (iv) As a fourth conclusion, our author establishes that, not even through the absolute potency of God – a logical tool for understanding metaphysical possibilities as well, which was tipyfied by John Duns Scotus31 and later 28

Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 1, p. 36: «Prima pars patet, quia id, quod praedicatur a nobis de aliqua re, est unum cum ipsa re de qua praedicatur: sed vox aut conceptus non identificatur cum ipsa re, sed potius ab illa realiter, et essentialiter distinguuntur: ergo id quod praedicatur de aliqua re, quod universale dicitur, non est vox, aut conceptus. [...]». 29 Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 1, p. 36: «Secunda pars probatur ex dictis, universale est id, quod est in multis et de multis praedicatur, sed quaelibet natura, in qua plura conveniunt, est in illis, et potest de illis affirmari ergo est universalis». 30 Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 1, p. 36: «Tertia conclusio omnino abhortet ab ipso lumine naturae asserere universalia esse naturas a singularibus realiter separatas, et probatur. Quia tales naturae sunt quidditates singularium; ergo non sunt ab eis separatae quia nulla quidditas est separata ab eo, cuius est quidditas, et natura, imo quod omnis res quae existit, est necessario singularis et individua: ergo illa natura hominis sic separata a singularibus, existit in rerum natura: ergo est singularis». 31 On that subject in Scotus, cf. R. H. PICH, «Onipotência e conhecimento científico», in C. A. LÉRTORA MENDOZA (coord.), XII Congreso Latino-Americano

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by William of Ockham32 – such a universal item can, in reality, be made separated from the singulars in which it exists. In fact, in such a situation there is a contradiction that not even an absolute power can undo: such a separate form would be at the same time universal and singular (in its way of existing)33. Truly, no thesis so far advanced and supported by Jerónimo Valera seems to be particularly controversial.

2. On the Distinction between the Universal Nature and the Singular in Which It Is However, in Question 2, «Whether the natures which are called universals are somehow distinct from the singulars in which they are», we begin to realize that some metaphysical disputes among schools are made explicit by Valera and are still vivid in his times. In order to restate a Scotist view on the nature of universals that exist in singular things, Valera contrasts it with the view by the «Thomists». After all, the «Thomists» seem to say that in no way the natures really distinguish from the singulars in which they are, but they distinguish always and only through reason (sola ratione)34. (i) In one argument, it is said that, if it were not a distinction of reason alone, the superiors items (words and concepts) would not be predicated of the inferior items (individuals). After all, when two things distinguish «a parte rei» one de Filosofía Medieval – Juan Duns Escoto, FEPAI, Buenos Aires 2008, pp. 74-90; ID., «Scotus on Absolute Power and Knowledge», Patristica et Mediaevalia, 31 (2010) 2-27; ID., «Scotus on Absolute Power and Knowledge (Continuation and End)», Patristica et Mediaevalia, 32 (2011) 15-37; ID., «Scotus sobre o conceito de onipotência – Um estudo sobre o Quodlibet VII», Thaumazein, 4 (2011) 3-28. 32 On that subject in Ockham, cf. H. SCHRÖCKER, Das Verhältnis der Allmacht Gottes zum Kontradiktionsprinzip nach Wilhelm von Ockham, Akademie-Verlag, Berlin 2003. 33 Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, Commentarii ac quaestiones, Liber Primus, d. 2, a. 1, q. 1, p. 36: «Quarta conclusio. Nec de potentia absoluta Dei possunt fieri talia universalia separata. Et probatur, quia id involvit contradictionem, illa enim forma separata esset universalis, ut supponitur, et simul singularis, ut probatum est, et multae aliae implicationes videantur apud Doctores». 34 Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 2, p. 36: «Opinio est Thomisti asserens naturas nullo pacto in re sed sola ratione a singularibus in quibus sunt secerni, ex variis argumentis, quae pro hac stabilienda ascisci possunt praetermissis ea dumtaxat proferamus quibus solet a dialecticis comprobari».

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cannot be predicated of the other. (ii) In another argument, we are told that a parte rei the same is «to be man» and «to be this man»; (iv) still in a fourth argument, it is affirmed that, in order to have a universal, an abstraction by the intellect is just required. As a conclusion, it is only «through reason» (ratione) that the nature distinguishes from the individual35. For Valera, it is important to explain what a «distinction» (distinctio) is. A distinction is a «property of being» (passio entis) – a doctrine that will be further explained decades after Valera by the Chilean Franciscan master Alphonsus Briceño (1587-1668)36. As a (convertible?) property of being, distinctio bears a division that ens also has in its «most broad division» (in latissima sua divisione). This note remains here without any further explanation, which would nevertheless be very much desirable, since that division probably cannot be explained under the assumption of a univocal sense of «being»37: just like «being» is divided into «real being» and «being of reason», so «distinction» divides into «real» and «of reason»38. These are the definitions put forward by Valera: There is a real distinction when, without any participation of the intellect, there is a difference (between items) in the thing; there is a distinction of reason where the intellect (alone) makes a separation in something, in which there is really no distinction39. Again, the real distinction itself is of double 35 Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 2, pp. 36-37; cf. ibid.: «Quartum. Ad hoc quod universale fiat, requiritur abstractio intellectus, sola ergo ratione natura ab individuo distinguitur». 36 Cf. Alphonsus Briceño O.F.M., Prima Pars Celebriorum Controversiarum in Primum Sententiarum Ioannis Scoti Doctoris Subtilis, Typographia Regia, Madrid 1639 (1642), Vol. I, «Ad Controversiam secundam de unitate Dei Metaphysica appendix – De distinctione entis in genere, et specie», nn. 15, 22, pp. 171-172. 37 For the account of the sense of “being” as common to real being and being of reason, cf. Hyeronimus Valera, Commentarii ac quaestiones, Liber Primus, d. 2, a. 2, q. 1 (Quid ens rationis sit?), pp. 52-56. The topic will appear again, in a fairly articulated way, in Ioannes de Fuica O.F.M., Commentaria in universam Aristotelis metaphysicam una cum distinctionibus, et quaestionibus iuxta mentem, et doctrinam Nostri Subtilis Doctoris Fratris Ioannis Duns Scoti Theologorum facile Principis, Santiago de Chile 1688, d. 1, qq. 1-3. 38 Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, Commentarii ac quaestiones, Liber Primus, d. 2, a. 1, q. 2, p. 37: «Pro nostra statuenda sententia observare licet: quod cum distinctio sit passio entis sicut ens in latissima sua divisione in ens reale, et ens rationis dividitur, ita etiam et distinctio». 39 Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 2, p. 37: «Una ergo est realis, alia rationis; realis est, quae nulla interveniente intellectus functione, in re datur; rationis vero, quam facit intellectus in aliqua re, in qua realiter non est talis distinctio».

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kind: (a) There is a real distinction that is given between two things which are mutually separable, just like a distinction between two individuals to whom we give a different name, e.g. «Thomas Aquinas» and «John Duns Scotus» (my example). Valera affirms that this is the real distinction «in the strict sense» (stricto modo). Moreover, (b) there is the real distinction that is the «formal distinction» (it is clearly taken as the second kind of real distinction!), which is so that in the same entity there is distinciton between «two formal reasons». Building on the example offered by Valera, we can say that in the individual thing «John Duns Scotus» there are the «formality» (formalitas) «rational» and the «formality» «animal», which are distinct from each other and, however, «are identically the same entity» of, say, «John Duns Scotus». In fact, we get very much the impression that Valera is ready to say that the distinction between those two formal items in the individual is real, although formal, and the identity between those two items and the individual is real as well, although not formal40. He criticizes explicitly the Spanish Master of Arts active at the University of Alcalá, i.e. Francisco Murcia de la Llana (? -1639)41, for not having taken the formal distinction as a real distinction, but rather just as a kind of «middle» distinction, to be placed between the real distinction and the distinction of reason42. 40 Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 2, p. 37: «Ad argumenta respondetur. Ad. 1. quod cum distinctione formali stat realis identitas, sunt enim eadem entitas et haec sufficit ad praedicationem essentialem». 41 According to V. S. CÉSPEDES AGÜERO, «La filosofía escotista de Jerónimo de Valera (1568-1625)», in J. C. BALLÓN VARGAS (ed. y coord.), La complicada historia del pensamiento filosófico peruano, siglos XVII y XVIII (Selección de textos, notas y estudios), Universidad Científica del Sur – Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos / Ediciones del Vicerrectorado Académico, Lima, Tomo I, 2011, p. 448, the fourth most mentioned author by Valera is Francisco Murcia de la Llana, author of Selecta circa Aristotelis dialecticam subtilioris doctrinae, quae in Complutensi academia versatur, miro quodam ordine disposita, et in dilucidam methodum redacta, Apud Ludovicum Sanchez, Madrid 1604. This is then a publication on logic quite contemporary to Valera. 42 Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, Commentarii ac quaestiones, Liber Primus, d. 2, a. 1, q. 2, p. 37: «Distinctio autem realis est dupplex; una quae datur inter duas res ad invicem separabiles ut inter Petrum et Paulum, et haec nomen generis sibi retinet, distinctioque realis stricto modo sumpta appellatur. Alia vero formalis, quae in eadem entitate reperitur inter duas rationes formales illius, ut in eadem entitate Petri, reperitur formalitas rationalis, formalitas animalis etc., quae tamen identice sunt eadem entitas Petri. Quod si bene percepisset, Murcia non ita perperam hoc falsum imposuisset

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The assumptions explained above allow the formulation of two conclusions against the Thomists, where the second one plays a major role. Jerónimo Valera affirms (i) first that, if we discuss in terms of «real distinction», the nature (in the singular thing) that we call «universal» and the «singular» thing (in which the nature is) do not distinguish, but they are really the same entity43 – the implicit reason, as we have seen above, is that nature-universal and singular thing in which it is are not (or actually are never) mutually separable. (ii) But, as a second conclusion, Valera affirms that nature «as such of itself is not singular». A given nature in a given thing is singular only through a «singularity» that is further added to it. This additional aspect of singularity (which is expressed by our author as a «quid superadditum») is formally distinct from the nature itself. So, Valera’s point is that between nature and additional aspect or singularity there is already a formal distinction – as there is, say, a formal distinction between one formal aspect and another (for instance, «rational» and «animal») in the same singular thing as well. His textual support for that point is John Duns Scotus’s Ordinatio II, d. 3, q. 144, and the Peruvian master emphasizes the argument according to which, without that formal distinction, it would not be possible to conceive any given nature without singularity, what is clearly false. The only exception to this metaphysical stance is the divine nature, which is taken to be both a nature and of itself singular, that is the divine being is taken to be de se and essentialiter «this undivided singular», and accordingly both the multiplication or repetition of divine essence is impossible and the (perfect) conception of it «without this individuation» should not be a possibility as well45. Scoto, quod dixerit distinctionem formalem, nec esse realem nec rationis, sed mediam inter illas». 43 Ibid., d. 2 a. 1 q. 2 p. 37: «Prima Conclusio. Si de distinctione reali loquamur, natura, quae universalis denominatur, et singularis, non distinguuntur realiter, sed sunt idem, seu eadem entitas realiter. Haec apud omnes est certa, et patet, quia natura est de essentia singularis, ergo sunt idem realiter». 44 Cf. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Opera omnia VII. Ordinatio – Liber secundus: a distictione prima ad tertiam, Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, Civitas Vaticana 1973, II, d. 3, p. 1 (De principio individuationis), q. 1 (Utrum substantia materialis ex se sive ex natura sua sit individua vel singularis), nn. 1-42, pp. 391-410 (n. 29-40, pp. 402-408). 45 Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, Commentarii ac quaestiones, Liber Primus, d. 2, a. 1, q. 2, p. 37: «Secunda Conclusio. Natura ut sic de se non est singularis, sed hoc provenit illi a singularitate, quae est quid superadditum ipsi naturae, ab ipsa natura formaliter distinctum. Sic noster Doctor in 2. Senten. d. 3. q. 1. §. ad quaestionem igitur, ubi

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Valera brings some more reasons to accept the notion that because we can of course conceive a given nature without conceiving a singularity we should accept the formal distinction between identical real items. Following Scotus, he affirms that a parte rei the singularity of Peter does not belong to the intrinsic reason and essence of human nature (that is in him or elsewhere), and vice-versa. As a consequence, a parte rei the formal reason of the singularity of the human being «Peter» and the formal reason of the essence of human nature – as it would be of course in any further case of singularity and nature – are not mutually included in each other, and this is what to distinguish formally a parte rei means46. There are still further arguments for the formal separability, in conception, of nature and singularity: one can argue that every nature such as «humanity» or, to repeat the conceptual example made famous by Avicenna, «equinity» is not intrinsically and essentially individual, though in fact it turns to be individual, what amounts to say that something beyond its essence has to be added on it; moreover, in reality several things can agree in nature, just like all individual horses of the world, but not in singularity, just like John Duns Scotus and Thomas Aquinas would be as such totally different individuals and therefore uncapable of being any kind of fundament of universality or of being equally common to more than one or many47. In all further sic ait. Substantia materialis ex natura sua non est de se haec. Et cum eo omnes eius discipuli. Probatur autem ratione nostri Doctoris, quam ibi subdit. Quia non posset intellectus intelligere ipsam (scilicet naturam) sub opposito. Quae ratio sic formatur: alias non posset natura concipi sine singularitate, quod est falsum, cum possit homo distincte concipi, imo et essentialiter diffiniri, sine aliqua singularitate. Quia enim Deus de se, et essentialiter est hoc singulare indivisum, ideo nec potest in pluribus singularibus multiplicari, nec concipi sine hac individuatione». 46 Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 2, p. 37: «Secunda pars probatur pro nunc ratione fundamentali nostri Doct. pro hac distinctione. A parte rei singularitas Petri non est de intrinseca ratione, et essentia naturae humanae nec e contra, alias enim unum sine alio non posset concipi, ergo a parte unum est extra rationem formalem alterius: ergo a parte rei distinguuntur formaliter». 47 Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 2, p. 37: «Tum etiam omnis natura v. g. humana non est intrinsece et essentialiter individua, cum ergo fit individua, additur ei aliquid extra illius essentiam. Tandem qui multa in re conveniunt naturae, quae non conveniunt singularitati, ut esse principium convenientiae, fundamentum universalitatis, constitutivum in esse essentiali et specifico, principium proprietatum; ergo distinguuntur formaliter, hoc enim est manifestum signum distinctionis a parte rei». The mention to Avicenna’s doctrine at this point is done by me, not by Valera himself. But cf. also footnote 114 below!

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reasonings Valera pursues the same conclusion, i.e. that independently of any operation of the intellect «formal reasons» (rationes formales) such as the «singularity» of a given thing and the «essential nature» of and in a singular thing must distinguish really48, although their separation is not such as to the point of being able to exist independently.

3. On the Unity of the “Nature in the Thing” and the “Nature in the Thing” as a Fundament of Universality Granted the distinction of formal items or «formal reasons» in the singular thing, the next step in Valera systematic approach is to offer an account of how something that is of itself really not singular, i.e. the «nature», has unity – or in this case «formal unity» (unitas formalis) –, what amounts to offering an explanation of how it has reality, for everything that has reality is necessarily «one». Valera informs us that Question 3 of Article 1 will deal with the first kind of formal unity, (i) the unity through which a thing is called «one in itself formally», and Question 4 of Article 1 will deal with the second kind of formal unity, that is (ii) the unity through which a thing is called «one formally, common to many»49. Focusing on the first kind of formal unity a «nature» is supposed to have in the thing, Jerónimo Valera emphasizes that the position on this matter both by Thomas Aquinas and several Thomists, such as Thomas de Vio (Cardinalis) Caietanus O.P. 48

Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 2, p. 37: «Praeterea fundamentum et subiectum similitudinis inter duo individua, non est tota entitas cuiuslibet individui; sicut nec fundamentum et subiectum diversitatis, alias enim secundum totam suam entitatem essent similia et dissimilia, atque adeo essent primo diversa et non primo diversa, quod contradictionem involvit: ergo istae rationes formales, seclusa operatione intellectus, distinguuntur, [...]». 49 Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 3, p. 38: «Cum unitas formalis sit dupplex, una per quam res aliqua dicitur una in se formaliter, alia per quam dicitir res una formaliter multis communis. Quaestio praesens de prima unitate formali procedit, de secunda vero postea. De illa ergo Angelicus Doctor variis in locis, nunc hanc unitatem formalem concedere, nunc illam negare videtur. Opusculo enim de natura generis c. 7. ait naturam de se habere unitatem propriam. c. autem. 4 de ente et essentia ait quod natura de se, nec est una nec plures, ideo eius discipuli fuerunt varii in hac re: quidam enim illorum talem unitatem admittunt ut Caietanus de ente, et essentia c. 4. Suarez tomo. 2. disputat. 6. Sectione. 1 eam esse dicit communem inter Thomistas, et omnes fere dialecticos in hoc loco Masius, Rubio, Murcia, Oña, et alii».

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(1469-1534), Franciscus Suarez S.J. (1548-1617), Didacus Masius O.P. (1553-1608), Antonius Rubius Rodensis S.J. (1548-1616), Franciscus Murcia de la Llana, Petrus de Oña O. Merc. (ca. 1560-1626), Paulus Barbus (sive Paulus Soncinas) O.P. (? -1494), and Chrysostomus Iavellus O.P. (1470-1538), is uncertain – e.g. Tommaso de Vio seems to concede to «nature» (i) the formal unity in itself50, whereas Francisco Suárez concedes to it (ii) only the formal unity common to many51. But Valera is interested in stressing the point that some Thomists, such as Crisostomo Javelli and other «modern» authors, deny that nature has a formal unity in itself. Essentially, they affirm that whatever is in the thing is singular, and has in the thing a «singular and material unity», and this is a consequence of taking «being» and «one» both as convertible and proportionate52. So, to be in a (material, substantial) thing implies to have numerical unity; if it is contrary («repugnant») to a formal unity such as the alleged formal unity of «animal» to be one in number, then the consequence must be that such a unity is not in the real singular thing – but only in the mind. If that were not the case, principles as different as «to be able to be divided through material principles» (respective to formal unity) and «to be unable to be divided through material principles» (respective to numerical unity) would apply to the same items, but that is not possible. As it usually happens, Valera first advances a notabile on the debated issue53. The notabile is important, for it contains Valera’s theory of «division». As «other» opposes to «one», «division» opposes to «unity», and it can be taken in two ways: (i) First, there is a «material» division, which 50

Cf. Thomas de Vio (Cardinalis) Caietanus, Commentaria in opus De ente et essentia, Simon de Luere, Venetiis 1506, c. 4, pp. 15-22. 51 Cf. Franciscus Suarez, Metaphysicae disputationes, Apud Petrum Mariam Bertanum, Venetiis 1619, disput. 6 (De unitate formali, et universali), sect. 1 (Utrum sit in rebus aliqua unitas formalis distincta a numerali, et minor illa), pp. 127-130. 52 Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, Commentarii ac quaestiones, Liber Primus, d. 2, a. 1, q. 3, p. 38: «Alii autem eam negant: sic Iavellus 8. meth. q. 13. et nonnulli moderni quorum sententia sic potest suaderi. Primo. Quidquid est in re est singulare: ergo quidquid est in re est unum unitate singulari, et materiali; ens enim et unum convertuntur, et proportionantur. Confirmatur. Quidquid est in re, est singulare atque adeo unum numero; repugnat autem quod unitas formalis sit una numero; alias enim contradictoria haec, posse dividi per principia materialia, quod est proprium unitatis formalis, et non posse dividi per principia materialia, quod est proprium unitatis numericae, de eodem verificarentur». 53 Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 3, p. 38.

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happens «through material principles», «through singular properties», as for example «human nature» is divided in, say, individuals such as «Thomas Aquinas» and «John Duns Scotus» «through their singularities». (ii) Second, there is a «formal» division, which happens «through essential principles» or through «formal or essential differences». According to this second kind of division, a formal item such as a generic nature, e.g. «animal», is divided into several species such as «man» and «horse» by means of essential differences such as «rational» and «inhibile», etc. It is only after this account of «division» that Valera will be able to explain the nature of «unity», for although he affirms that the «unity» which is subject to division – be it «material» or «formal» – is something «positive», he also stresses that following Duns Scotus’s doctrine «unity» must be explained «through negation»54. Truly, any kind of unity says a negation of a division; accordingly, «material unity» says «a negation of material division». An example is a «numerical and singular unity» just like, say, «Thomas Aquinas» and «John Duns Scotus» as individual human beings, which as numerical unities «cannot be divided through other singularities and individuations». Moreover, a «formal unity» is «a negation of formal division»55. Since «negation» is an intrinsic component of the definition of both material and formal unity, Jerónimo Valera offers also an explanation of how this negation must conceptually be understood. (1) The negation in that case «is not properly a privation» (privatio), for it does not occur in a subject which is capable or apt to have such a division and does not have it – just like it would be regarding an expected «form» that is not actualized. (2) The negation in debate is also not properly a «negation» (negatio), for 54 Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 3, p. 38: «[...], quod cum tot modis dicatur unum oppositum, quot modis et alterum, divisio cui unitas opponitur est duplex, materialis quae fit per principia materialia per proprietates scilicet singulares, ut natura specifica qualis humana, divisa est in Petro et Paulo per singularitates ipsorum: divisio vero formalis, quae fit per principia essentialia, seu formalia, differentias ut essentiales, et haec convenit naturae genericae, ut animal dividitur in homine, et equo per rationale, et inhibile. Totidem modis sumitur unitas quae licet positivum dicat, secundum verissimam sententiam nostri Doctoris, explicatur tamen per negationem, quam importat, sicut contingit in multis aliis positivis». 55 Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 3, p. 38: «Unitas materialis erit, quae dicit negationem divisionis materialis, ut unitas numerica, et singularis, quae non potest dividi per alias singularitates et individuationes: unitas vero formalis dicit negationem divisionis formalis, [...]».

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a negation properly speaking is respective to two characteristics, namely (a) it does not determine a subject (for it just takes aways a «form») and (b) it does not say any given aptness in it56. (3) There is, however, another kind of «negation» (negatio), which stays between privatio and the first sense of negatio, and this is what unity «signifies» (importat) or brings in its definition: there is a negation that is partially privation, for it brings determination to a subject, and is partially negation as well, for «it does not say a potency in the subject towards the form that it [= the negation] takes away»57. Such a negation is just an absence of something that the thing is not expected to possess or be. Granted that this presentation of kinds of unity makes sense, Jerónimo Valera concludes first that there is in singular things a «formal unity» that is smaller than «numerical unity»: this is the unity that «nature» has, also as long as it is in the «individual» – it is, thus, the unity that «animal” or «human-being» has as such, also as long as they are in individuals, such as «Thomas Aquinas» and «John Duns Scotus». Although Valera made the explicit point that the Dominican Crisostomo Javelli denied the doctrine of the formal unity of the nature in the singular thing, he emphasizes again the Scotist basis of his own view, the defense of it by Franciscan interpreters such as Antonius Andreas (ca. 1280-1320) and Franciscus Lychetus (ca. 1465-1520), as well as by most of the Thomists themselves58. In fact, there 56

Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 3, p. 38: «[...], negatio autem haec, quam unitas importat, nec est proprie privatio, cum non sit in subiecto apto habere talem divisionem. Privatio autem proprie sumpta determinat subiectum aptum ad talem formam, qua privat. Unde duo dicit, subiectum determinatum, et potentiam aptitudinemque in eo. Nec est proprie negatio, haec enim tollit totam formam non determinando subiectum aptum ad talem formam: unde duo etiam habet scilicet non determinare subiectum, nec dicere aptitudinem in illo». 57 Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 3, p. 38: «Datur autem aliud genus negationis, quale est quod importat unitas; medium inter utramque, quia partim accipit a privatione, scilicet determinare subiectum, et partim a negatione, quod scilicet non dicit potentiam in subiecto ad formam, quam tollit». 58 Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 3, p. 38: «Prima Conclusio. In rebus datur vere unitas formalis minor unitate numerali, quae convenit naturae, etiam prout est in individuis. Sic noster Doctor in 2. d. 3. q. 1. ubi sic ait, aliqua est unitas realis in re absque omni operatione intellectus, quae unitas est naturae secundum se, et 7 Meth. q. 16. et omnes eius discipuli Antonius Andreas, Lichetus et alii. Estque modo communis inter Thomistas, quam multis rationibus probant, atque adeo in re tam aperta sufficit nobis una vel altera». Cf. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1, n. 30, p. 402;

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is no doubt that a nature such as «human nature» or humanitas is of itself a «real being», and as a consequence it is a real «one» (unum), for unum, so the implicit theory of transcendental convertible properties by Valera, follows necessarily «the nature of being». We have to conclude that such a nature has a formal, not a numerical unity, which is just a way to say that there is some one quid in the thing that is not formally the same as the singular thing, it is really-formally different from the singularity of the thing in which it is and, as a consequence, can also be conceived without being conceived the singularity of the thing in which it is59. Valera concludes second that the formal unity that the «nature» in the thing is is distinct «formally» ex natura rei from the «numerical unity» or the singular thing; after all, «formal unity» follows nature itself, and this one distinguishes ex natura rei from singularity or numerical unity60. In a third conclusion, close to Duns Scotus’s In metaphysicorum VII, q. 13, our author says that the «formal unity» is a parte rei «divided and mutiplied» in the singular things, so that in each singular there is (the same) formal unity. The formal unity or real nature in the thing turns to be distinct numerically (from other formal unities or real natures in other individual things) only through a singular property each time – an added singularity, as we have seen already61 –, with which it has, however, each time a real identity, and so cannot exist separately from it62. Fourth, Valera affirms that each perhaps Valera would also have in view a passage such as Ioannes Duns Scotus, Opera Philosophica IV – Quaestiones super libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis Libri VI-IX, ed. by R. ANDREWS – G. ETZKORN – G. GÁL – R. GREEN – F. KELLEY – G. MARCIL – T. NOONE – R. WOOD, Franciscan Institute Publications, St. Bonaventure 1997, VII, q. 16, n. 46, pp. 325-326. 59 Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, Commentarii ac quaestiones, Liber Primus, d. 2, a. 1, q. 3, p. 38: «Probatur ergo sic. Natura humana de se est ens reale, ergo de se est quid unum reale; cum unum necessario consequatur naturam entis, habet ergo de se unitatem, non numericam, quia alias natura humana non posset concipi, nisi ut una numero: ergo formalem». 60 Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 3, p. 39: «Secunda Conclusio. Haec unitas formalis est distincta formaliter; et ex nature rei ab unitate numerali. [...]». 61 Cf. footnote 45 above. 62 Cf. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Opera Philosophica IV – Quaestiones super libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis Libri VI-IX, VII, q. 13, nn. 60-83, 141-150, pp. 238-246, 266-269. Cf. Hyeronimus de Valera, Commentarii ac quaestiones, Liber Primus, d. 2, a. 1, q. 3, p. 39: «Tertia Conclusio. Haec unitas formalis est a parte rei divisa et multiplicata in singularibus, ita ut in unoquoque singulari sit sua unitas formalis;

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formal predicate – which says an essential-natural aspect of the thing – has a formal unity as well, and so there are as many formal unities in a singular thing as there are essential predicates valid of it, and accordingly several formal unities in an individual thing can have formal distinction to each other63. A further reflection concerning this fourth conclusion is that, among the – possibly several – formal unities in a same individual thing, it makes sense to affirm that there are smaller and greater unities or a scale of formal unities. The formal unity of the «specific nature» (such as «homo») is greater than the formal unity of the genus (such as «animal»). There is an explanation for this scale of unities: the formal unity of the specific nature (such as «homo») excludes «every formal and essential division», for it divides only into individuals, which are no longer formal unities. But the generic unity (such as «animal»), in spite of being an essential unity, says also a division into specific natures through specific differences, which are still formal unities. The generic unity stays, thus, more distant from singularity; it has smaller unity and greater division64. We had been told before that, after having dealt with the formal unity «in itself» of the «nature in the thing» (Question 3), Valera would explore the formal unity the nature in the thing has and is «common to many» (Question 4). In fact, in Article 1 Question 4 itself Valera presents this second kind of formal unity of the «nature in the thing» as the very distincta numero per proprietatem singularem, cum qua identificatur realiter, estque eadem entitas realiter. Haec probatur ex nostro Doctore lib. 7. Meth. q. 13. [...]. Tum sic quotiescumque duo ad invicem convertuntur multiplicato uno, et alterum multiplicari necesse est, ut multiplicata natura hominis, multiplicatur risibilitas, sed natura humana v. g. et unitas formalis se habent convertibiliter; ergo ad multiplicationem illius multiplicatur haec; sicut ergo tot sunt humanitates, quot sunt individui homines, ita tot sunt unitates formales, quot numerales». 63 Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 3, p. 39: «Quarta Conclusio. Quodlibet praedicatum essentiale habet suam unitatem formalem; unde quot sunt praedicata essentialia in uno individuo, tot sunt unitates formales, et sicut praedicata essentialia quae sunt in uno individuo distinguuntur formaliter, sic et illorum unitates formales; [...]». 64 Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 3, p. 39: «Ex quo sequitur, quod inter unitates formales, datur maior, et minor unitas, ut maior est unitas formalis naturae specificae quam genericae; quia excludit omnem divisionem formalem, et essentialem, generica vero, ut natura v. g. animalis, licet dicat indivisionem alicuius praedicati essentialis, dicit tamen divisionem per differentias specificas et quo praedicatum est superius, et remotius ab ipsa singularitate eo habet minorem unitatem formalem quia dicit maiorem divisionem per plura scilicet principia essentialia».

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fundament of universality – granted that for Valera «universality» is to be found strictly speaking in the concepts of the mind or in the intellectual operation of predicating or of being significantly said, in act, of many things65. After all, establishing that there is a non-numerical unity in the real thing still does not explain why and whether that nature works as a fundament of universality indeed. There are several opinions that would rather affirm that the «nature», as long as it is «in the thing», «does not have any aptness in order to become formally universal through the intellect»66. Valera will defend the view that the nature in the thing has the required aptness to become formally universal through an act of the intellect. Accordingly, the predication of a first intention has a fundament in the thing or in the «nature in the thing». The explanation he offers has a particular metaphysical taste. After all, Valera assumes that «the intelligible» (intelligibile) follows «being» (ens), in fact he even affirms that it is a «property» (passio) of being. As a consequence, there are as as many «degrees of intelligibility» as there are «degrees of being». Valera explains the «degrees of being» by affirming that in the individual, such as, say, «John Duns Scotus», there are several «essential predicates» – which express what the individual «is» –, such as «the ratio of being», «of substance», «of body», «of living [being]», «of animal», «of man», as well as «of the singular». Each degree is «ex natura rei» distinct from the other (at least formally), and from that a proper formal intelligibility follows that 65

Although I am not going to explore that point here, in Commentarii ac quaestiones, Liber Primus, d. 2, a. 1, q. 7 («Quae natu[ra] sit capax universalitatis») Valera will explicitely affirm that only a nature or a ratio in which several items univocally agree – be it an incomplete nature (accident) or a complete nature (substance) according to the position in the predicamental line, be it a real being or a being of reason – can be properly speaking subject of universality; thus, at the conceptual level we can expect that Valera would be ready to link univocity of concepts to universality. Cf., for example, ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 7, p. 50: «Secunda conc. Naturae analogae, illae scilicet; quae non eodem modo participantur a pluribus (sicut pes dicitur analogice de pede hominis, et de pede mensae, quia non eodem modo participatur ab illis) ut suo loco explicabitur, non sunt universalitatis capaces, nisi largo modo”. Cf. also ibid.: «Tertia Conc. Quaecumq; natura, sive ratio in qua univoce conveniunt plura, fundamentali convenientia, sive illa sit completa, sive incompleta, sive ens reale, sive rationis, potest proprie esse subiectum universalitatis, et ab illa denominabilis est». 66 Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 4, pp. 39-40.

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is different from every other intelligibility67. Here at least Jerónimo Valera uses the occasion to criticize, in general terms, the stance by the Thomists, who assume that grounded on each intelligibility (dependent first on the act of the intellect) an individual such as Peter is (already) constituted in the thing as an «intelligible» in all other several different formal reasons as well, such as «being», «living [being]», etc. Valera argues that, if that stance were correct, no reason (of intelligibility in a singular) could be understood or conceived without the other reason (of intelligibility in a singular) being understood or conceived as well, what is clearly not the case as already stated above68. Our author wants to maintain the notion that it is rather because those several determinations or formal aspects distinguish themselves objectively or «ex natura rei» that we can conclude, as a result, that what a given intelligibility such as «body» – through an act of the intellect – effects, that aspect another intelligilibity such as «living [being]» cannot effect69. For the relationship between the metaphysical formal being or «nature in the thing» and the logical formal first (or even second) intentional concept, the conclusions drawn by Valera are very important: He affirms first that the «nature in the thing» has a «potency» for being the universal of logic. The «nature in the thing» is, thus, «the fundament of universality». Advancing the major and polemical topic of Question 5, Valera affirms that the «logical universal» (universale logicum) says both a «negation» (negatio) and a «precision» or «separation» (praecisio) from singularity. It is exactly to this universal that «the nature in the thing» has a potency to, and this status can be further explained by the fact the «nature in the thing» 67 Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 4, p. 40: «Supposito quod intelligibile sequitur ens, ut passio illius, tot erunt gradus intelligibilitatis, quot sunt gradus entis; et cum in uno singulari, ut in Petro v. g. dentur plura praedicata essentialia, ut ratio entis, substantiae, corporis, viventis, animalis, hominis, denique singularis; quemlibet gradum ex his, sua propria intelligibilitas consequitur formaliter, et ex natura rei ab alia distincta, sicut et ipse gradus». 68 Cf. footnote 45, above. 69 Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, Commentarii ac quaestiones, Liber Primus, d. 2, a. 1, q. 4, p. 40: «Unde falsum est, quod Thomistae asserunt, ex vi cuiusdam intelligibilitatis constitui Petrum in re intelligibilem in ratione entis, viventis, etc. alias enim nulla ratio sine alia posset intelligi; quia ergo ex natura rei distinguuntur, ideo effectum, quem una intelligibilitas efficit, non potest alia efficere; intelligibilitas ergo, quae ex ratione hominis procedit, constituit Petrum intelligibilem tantum prout homo est, et ex vi illius, natura humana, quae est in Petro est sine sua singularitate, intelligibilis».

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is abstractable and intelligible without the singularity, and therefore it is also known without the singularity. So, the intrinsic aspects of the «logical universal», i.e. its «negation» and «precision» from singularity relies on the formal unity or nature that exists in the singular thing. It is useless to affirm that this separate knowability of nature has origin in knowledge itself; after all, so Jerónimo Valera argues, through the act of knowledge the nature as such receives only the status of (actually) «known», but this does not mean that the act of the intellect itself causes its status of knowability without taking singularity into consideration70. Moreover, Valera clearly assures that the status of the «nature in the thing» as the aptness for or the fundament of universality or «formal universal» has only a «remote» scale; after all, the nature in the thing does not receive «universality» «precisely because of its property», but rather through an external act of the intellect71.

4. More on the «Fundament of Universality»: «Negation» and «Separation» We now proceed to explain how the «logical universal» says a «negation» and «separation» of singularity, and how these intrinsic aspects are explained by the «nature in the thing» itself. In the metaphysical groundwork of universality offered by Valera in Book I Article 1, no other question has such a degree of controversy – a controversy that can be indeed reissued as a debate between the Scotistic and the Thomistic schools. Both the Scotistic and the Thomistic school agree that there is in the things some kind of fundament of actual universality, and in reason of 70 Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 4, p. 40: «Prima Conclusio. Natura in re habet potentiam ad esse universalis logici, et est fundamentum universalitatis. [...]. Primo. Universale logicum [...] dicit negationem, et praecissionem singularitatis: sed natura in re habet fundamentum, et potentiam ad hoc; quia natura in re, est intelligibilis sine singularitate, seu abstrahibilis a singularitate; sic enim de facto sine singularitate cognoscitur: ergo erat sic cognoscibilis ante cognitionem. Nec valebit dicere hanc cognoscibilitatem, ab ipsa cognitione oriri, quia ab actuali cognitione, tantum habet natura, quod actu sit cognita, non vero, quod sit cognoscibilis, sine singularitate. [...]». 71 Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 4, p. 40: «Secunda Conclusio. In re tantum est aptitudo, seu fundamentum remotum ad esse universale formale. Sic expresse noster Doctor multis locis 7. meth. q. 18. ad quaestionem, ait est ergo natura in potentia remota ad interminationem universalis, et aliis locis infra citandis».

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that fundament – whatever it may be – the nature can be properly called «universal in potency» (universalis in potentia). But the controversy lies on the difficulties of understanding that fundament and arguing for it. Saying it in Valera’s own terms, the dispute between the schools is whether the fundament of logical universality is a remote «aptness» (aptitudo) that the nature in the things has or an «indifference» (indifferentia) that the nature has previous to any operation of the intellect, because of which the intellect is moved to causing the «actual universality»72. The point of disagreement is whether such an aptness or indifference is to be found in the nature in the thing independently of any intellectual operation. Valera takes as a common opinion by Thomists that the fundament of universality that the nature has is not an aptness that belongs to it as long as it exists a parte rei. In order to stress that point, we just mention two of the five arguments advanced by the Thomists: (2) they affirm that nature never attributes an «aptness» to a totally impossible act, for a potency which is not brought into act would be in vain. It is an impossible thing that a nature that is in an individual, such as, say, the «humanity» (humanitas) which is in «John Duns Scotus», moves away from this singularity and requires another, such as the singularity of «Thomas Aquinas», «either at the same time or in sequence». After all, the humanity to be found in «John Duns Scotus» is (really) identical with him, and it is affirmed that not even through «divine power» can such a nature in the thing lose that metaphysical status of singularity and be shared simul or successive by another individual item73. (3) Moreover, we are told that when something 72

Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, Commentarii ac quaestiones, Liber Primus, d. 2, a. 1, q. 5 («Quod sit hoc fundamentum universalitatis»), p. 41: «Quaestio haec celebris est duas habens satis pugnantes opiniones, unam Angelici, alteram subtilis Doctoris, et in hoc (meo videri) totum dissidium possitum est inter hos insignes Doctores. Conveniunt enim in hoc, quod in rebus datur fundamentum aliquod universalitatis actualis, ratione cuius fundamenti natura dicatur universalis in potentia, ut vidimus quaestione praecedenti. Consistit ergo tota difficultas in assignando hoc fundamento: an scilicet sit aptitudo aliqua remota, aut indifferentia saltim, quam habet natura in re, ante intellectus operationem, ratione cuius moveatur intellectus ad causandam hanc actualem universalitatem; an vero aliquid aliud; et hoc est quod in schola Scotistarum solet inquiri, an natura secundum id quod habet ex se, habeat aptitudinem, et indifferentiam, ut per hanc, vel illam singularitatem contrahatur?». 73 Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 5, p. 41: «Secundo. Nunquam natura tribuit aptitudinem ad actum omnino impossibilem, cum frustra sit potentia, quae non reducitur ad actum, sed est impossibile, quod natura, quae est in uno individuo, ut humanitas, quae est in Petro

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belongs per se to something, the «negative opposite» of it cannot belong to it neither per se nor «accidentally» (per accidens); as an example, if it belongs per se to «man» to be «rational», then not to be rational cannot belong to «man» not even «accidentally»; applied to the case in dispute, if it belongs per se to the «nature in the thing» to be «communicable», then not even «accidentally» it would be able to be «singular»74. In a kind of corollary Valera affirms that all Thomists agree that there is nothing in the nature in the (singular) thing that corresponds to that «aptness» or «indifference», «proximate or remote», «positive or negative», which is explained – now he declares it – through a «non-repugnance» (non-repugnantia) to «universality». Their view is that such an «aptness» belongs to nature only by means of the operation of the intellect, which is able to consider nature without the individuals. The Thomists prove that thesis through the fact that, from the «separation» (praecisio) of nature and individuals by an act of the intellect, nature obtains indifference as a consequence, and that indifference so effected cannot have place in the singular thing just because of a contraction and determination of the nature, which is incompatible with such an indifference. But the Thomists do not simply state that the indifference is just «invented» by the intellect. Up to a certain degree there is some fundament to universality in the thing75. What is it? amittat hanc singularitatem, et acquirat aliam scilicet Pauli, vel simul; vel successive ut constat, cum humanitas quae est in Petro sit iddentificata cum illo; unde nec per Divinam potentiam potest hoc fieri». 74 Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 5, p. 41: «Tertio. Quando aliquid convenit alicui per se, eius oppositum negativum, nec per se, nec per accidens potest convenire; ut si homini per se competit esse rationalem; non esse rationalem per accidens potest illi convenire si ergo naturae convenit per se esse communicabile, nec accidens poterit esse singulare». 75 Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, Commentarii ac quaestiones, Liber Primus, d. 2, a. 1, q. 5, pp. 41-42: «Hoc ergo inter omnes Thomistas convenit, nullam in natura, prout est in singularibus esse aptitudinem, vel indifferentiam, sive proximam, sive remotam, sive positivam, sive negativam, quae per non repugnantiam declaratur. Praedictae enim rationes, quamcumque aptitudinem in re, seu indifferentiam refellunt, sed illam convenire naturae sola vi operationis intellectus considerantis naturam sine individuis, probant ex qua praescissione sequitur indifferentiam in natura, quam in re nequit habere propter omnimodam contractionem et determinationem naturae, tali indifferentiae repugnantem. Ne autem illam indifferentiam fictam esse asseverare cogantur, constituunt aliquod fundamentum illius in re. Si autem ab eis exigas, quod ergo est hoc fundamentum? Varie tibi respondebunt».

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Particularly at this point, the descriptions of opinions within the «Thomist school» multiply. (1) There are, thus, authors such as Petrus Fonseca S.J. (1528-1599)76 that say that the fundament of universality is «the unity of universality» with a «real aptness», since several natures have several distinct aptnesses to be found in «these» and not in «those» singular items, independently of any act of the intellect – as the nature «animal» is in several singular «animals», but it is not to be found in any singular «plant». Accordingly, Fonseca believes that that aptness is real. Fonseca also seems to develop the argument that nature is of itself communicable to many, otherwise it would be unable to be found in several singular items: it is as such communicable and it opposes contradictorily to singularity, which is incommunicable. Pedro da Fonseca even seems to affirm that nature as communicable to many is as such prior in an order of nature to the contraction that is added to it in the singular item. Truly, the act of being in many is the fundament of a «praedicatio de pluribus» and it is a parte rei, without any operation of the intellect, an aptness; such an aptness is, according to a priority of nature, previous to any contraction into singularity77. Jerónimo Valera is conscious that this explanation of the universality of a nature is quite unusual among Thomistic authors, and in fact «displeases» them. After all, what a nature has through and of 76 Valera seems to refer, here, to Petrus Fonseca S.J., Commentariorum Petri Fonsecae Lusitani D. Theologi Societatis Iesu in libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae, Tomus Secundus, Continet hic Tomus Quinti libri explicationem, Ex Officina Iacobi Tornerii, Romae 1589, V, Cap. VI, q. 3 («Num res omnes sint ex se individuae»), pp. 318-322 et q. 4 («Num materia signata sit principium individuationis»), pp. 323332. 77 Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, Commentarii ac quaestiones, Liber Primus, d. 2, a. 1, q. 5, p. 42: «Fonseca lib. 5. Metaph. q. 3 et 4 asserit fundamentum hoc esse unitatem universalitatis, cum aptitudine reali; cum diversae naturae diversas habeant aptitudines, ut sint in his, et non in illis singularibus seclusa operatione intellectus, ut natura animalis, quod sit in animalibus, non vero in plantis. Fit subinde ut aptitudo haec realis sit. Tum etiam quia natura de se non est incommunicabilis multis, alias multiplicari non posset in singularibus; de se ergo est communicabilis, quia communicabile, et incommunicabile sunt contradictorie opposita, [...]; sed quatenus ordine naturae praecedit contractionem sui ad particularia, antequam existat; in illo ergo solo statu talem aptitudinem sortitur natura, quia actus essendi in pluribus, qui est fundamentum praedicationis de pluribus, est a parte rei seclusa operatione intellectus ergo aptitudo ad talem actum, prioritate naturae praecedit hunc actum contractionis. Seclusa operatione intellectus, illam autem ammittit dum contrahitur, quia homo ut iam contractus ad singularitatem Petri, non est aptus ut dividatur in Petrum, et Ioannem».

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itself, this is inseparable of it in any possible state. So, if that aptness to actually being in many belongs per se and de se to nature, it should have that real aptness in the singular (contracted) thing as well, what amounts to a realistic conclusion on aptness to universality not welcome by Thomists and also by Fonseca himself in other contexts78. (2) Other authors would say that the fundament of the universality a nature has is nothing else than the «being intelligible» (esse intelligibile) «without the singularity», or the being «abstractable without singularity». In order to a nature to have universality it suffices «a potential distinction in the thing», taken from several intellectual operations on the thing itself79. (3) As a third different point of view, other authors see the fundament of universality in the fact that each individual, for example, of a specific kind such as «humanbeing», is in such a condition that it has only finite or limited perfection; therefore, none of them includes all perfections possible to the species. Or that each individual of a given species is in such a condition that it belongs to a material nature that it is not contradictory to it there to be another specifically similar individual, on which basis the real similarity in essence among many individuals has its origin, which is then conceived in the way of «unity» and «identity», i.e. in something «common to many». Following this third theory to be allegedly found in Thomistic authors we would conclude that a «common» nature can be multiplied in reality indeed, but this is only the status of an acquired «similarity» or the assimilatio among several individuals items. Thus, the aptness that a «common nature» has from the part of the thing amounts to a «non-repugnance» of the individual items to be essentially similar to other individual items. On the Thomistic side, this seems to be the closest possible position towards the doctrine 78 Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 5, p. 42: «Sed modus hic explicandi hoc fundamentum displicet fere omnibus Thomistis, et merito sane. Tum quia quod naturae per se, et de se convenit, est ab illa inseparabile, et in quovis statu illud retinet; habet ergo natura illam realem aptitudinem etiam in singularibus; [...]. Tum etiam quia non est aliquid ens reale, nisi in ordine ad existentiam talem, vel actualem, vel aptitudinalem: unde id cui repugnat in re existere, quo pacto ens reale erit? Sed ex ipso Fonseca aptitudo haec nunquam existit in re, imo repugnat ei existere; implicat enim naturam existere sine contractione ad singulare[m], [...]». 79 Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 5, p. 42: «Alii dicunt fundamentum hoc nihil aliud esse, quam esse intelligibile sine singularitate, seu abstrahibile a singularitate, ad quam sufficit distinctio potentialis in re, quae sumitur ex diversis operationibus quae reperiuntur in ipsa re».

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– shared by (most of) Scotistic thinkers – that there is a fundamental aptness in nature «from the part of the thing» to the universality in act80. The importance of this topic to Valera’s account of the universality of first (and second) intentions, and thus, to his account of the nature of logical concepts, grounded on the «indifferent» nature in the thing itself, can be seen also in the fact that, in order to establish the Scotist determination of the topic, he writes four notabilia. The first metaphysical assumption offers a reasoning based on the notion of «physical composition” and «metaphysical composition», where a metaphysical composition such as «genus and difference» and «species and individual difference» is supposed to bear some similarity to a «physical composition» such as «matter and form». Valera affirms that in a «physical composition» prime matter, which is potency towards a form, can be taken in two ways: in a «remote» and in a «proximate» way. As an example, the matter of a piece of wood, although it exists in the form of the wood, is in «remote» potency towards other forms, such as the form of fire. But it is only after the removal of the form of, say, the «wood» – that plays here the role of an «impediment» to another form – that the there is a «proximate» potency towards the form of fire. Applying such a reasoning to a case of metaphysical composition, we are told that «human nature», existing in a given individual such as «Thomas Aquinas», has of itself an «aptness» to be communicated to another individual such as «John Duns Scotus». We call this a «remote» aptness, which is blocked by the singularity of «Thomas Aquinas», and it turns to a «proximate» aptness only when, «through the intellect», that human nature in the thing is «undressed» of the singularity in which it exists in a contracted way81. Since nature can be compared to universality 80 Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 5, p. 42: «Alii dicunt hoc fundamentum in eo consistere quod unumquodque individuum v. g. naturae humanae talis est conditionis, sive quia est finitae et limitatae perfectionis, et quodlibet illorum non includit totam perfectionem possibilem speciei, sive quia est materialis naturae, ut non repugnet illi habere aliud individuum simile in specie, ex quo provenit similitudo realis in essentia inter plura individua, quae a nobis concipitur ad modum unitatis, et identitatis, in aliqua re multis communi. Naturam ergo communem posse multiplicari in re; nihil aliud est, quam assimilatio inter ipsa individua, et aptitudo naturae communis a parte rei nihil aliud est, quam non repugnantia ipsorum individuorum, ut habeant alia sibi similia in essentia; in quo sensu datur aptitudo fundamentalis in natura a parte rei, ut conditio, et proprietas quaedam naturalis ipsius naturae». 81 Ibid., d. 2 a. 1, q. 5, p. 42: «Ut autem nostri subtilis Doctoris sententiam statuamus. Primo observare oportet, quod ex his, quae in compositione physica

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in the same way as matter stays in a given order to form, Valera suggests a double classification of a nature’s potentiality to «universality»: (i) nature has a «remote» potency to universality, which is the potency that nature, existing under singularity, has to universality, for it can be reduced to the act of universality, and such an act, in order to have place, requires the remotion of singularity through the operation of the intellect. (ii) Nature has also a «proximate» potency to universality, which is the potency that it has as long as it says a «separation» (praecisio) from singularity. Again, the nature has such a proximate potency to universality only «by means of the [effected] abstraction» through a given intellect82. Second, we should note, however, that with such discourse about «common natures»83 in the thing, and with such remarks on «singularities», reperiuntur manu ducimur ad intelligenda ea quae sunt in compositione metaphysica, inter rationes superiores et inferiores: genus enim et differentia, species et differentia individualis, similitudinem quandam materiae et formae habent, quatenus inter se, ut duae partes ad unam constituendam vel speciem, vel individuum coeunt, ut recte Porphyrius, c. de differentia». 82 Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 5, pp. 42-43: «Sicut ergo in composito physico duppliciter dicitur materia prima in potentia ad formam aliquam: primo remote, secundo proxime: haec enim materia v. g. ligni, adhuc sub forma ligni existens est in potentia ad alias formas, ut ad formam ignis etc. Sed talis potentia remota est cum sit impedita per formam ligni; si vero expellatur talis forma erit in potentia proxima ad formam ignis; potentia ergo remota dicitur, quae aliquo impedimento est ligata; proxima vero, quae ab omni impedimento libera est, [...]. Ex quo provenit quod cum natura comparetur ad universalitatem, sicut materia in ordine ad formam duplex potest in illa constitui potentia ad essendum universalia: una remota, quam scilicet habet natura existens sub singularitate, quia ea supposita ad actum universalitatis reduci nequit; cum talis actus ad sui quasi introductionem expulsionem singularitatis, cum qua repugnat, praerequirat. Alia vero proxima, quam nempe habet natura, ut dicit praescissionem a singularitate, quam habet ex vi abstractionis per intellectum». 83 Truly, the famous Scotist expression and concept «natura communis» is explained in details by Valera in d. 2, a. 1, q. 6, pp. 46-47 (see also below, in the main text). Although the «indetermination» to singularity or universality helps to understand the «communitas» that a nature has previous to any action of the intellect, Valera is able to find quite proper analytic aspects in the «communis» that qualifies «natura» (ibid., p. 47): «Praeterea notandum est. Dupliciter posse dici commune aliquid vel positive, vel negative. Illa res dicitur communis positive, quae una et eadem indivisa in pluribus reperitur, et hac ratione sola essentia Divina dicitur communis tribus Divinis personis; illa vero dicitur communis negative, quando scilicet plura dicuntur convenire, non quia conveniunt in aliqua natura indivisa in illis, sed quia non distinguuntur per principia formalia: et totidem modis dicitur aliquid unum; vel positive quando scilicet

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we have not come to entities that are separable from each other, such as matter and form in the case of physical composition, but rather to certain «realities» (realitates) alone, also called by Jerónimo Valera «formal reasons» or «conceivabilities» (conceptibilitates) that, being formally different in the singular thing itself, are the same entity as this last one and cannot exist separately of it. In a common nature in the thing – an expression which Valera uses expressly in his Question 6 of Article 1 – we also find a «reason» (ratio) of receptive potency only similitudinarie, not in a proper and true sense, as we do in «physical matter» towards a given form. Accordingly, in a nature contracted in the singular thing there is no true «in-formation» (informatio), but only a unity in identity (i.e. of singularity and common nature). Thus, the aptness of a nature to be in many and to be predicated of many is just «indetermination», «indifference» or «non-repugnance»84. But now we come back, in a third step, to that consideration of the very internal contents of the metaphysical universality of the nature in the thing, which is «indifference» or «non-repugnance» and, accordingly, a «negation» and a «separation» from singularity. In order to bring an explanation of those contents, Valera calls the authorities of Franciscan masters such as Franciscus Lychetus, Ioannes Bassolis († 1347), Nicolaus de Nisa [or Nise] († end of the 15th century) and, especially, Ioannes de Rada (ca. 1545-1608), a Professor of the University of Salamanca whose interpretations of Scotus in the literary gender of «controversies»85 were plura participant aliquid reale, quod unum et indivisum manet in participantibus, vel negative per praedictam non distinctionem; unitas enim positiva, per positivum aliquod constituitur, unde non meram negationem pro formali importat». 84 Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 5, p. 43: «Secundo est observandum. Quod cum istae rationes superiores, et inferiores non sint entitates ad invicem separabiles, sicut materia et forma; sed tantum quaedam realitates, rationesve formales, aut conceptibilitates, eiusdem entitatis, nec in illis reperitur vera et propria ratio potentiae receptivae, sicut in materia physica; sed tantum secundum quid, et similitudinarie, atque adeo in illis non datur vera, et propria causatio receptionis, et informationis; sed coeunt in unum per identitatem, unde aptitudo haec indeterminatio, indifferentia, aut non repugnantia appellatur». 85 Valera himself mentions Ioannes de Rada, Controversiae theologicae inter S. Thomam et Scotum secunda pars dicatur, Ioannes Ferdinandus: Salmanticae 1599, Controversia 3 («An principium individuationis substantiae materialis sit materia»), a. 1, n. 2, pp. 58-59.

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very much admired by Valera himself86 and the next generations of South American Scotists87. Having the Thomistic challenge in view, Valera points out to a double meaning of the «indetermination» or «non-repugnance» that the nature in the things possesses: It can be understood (i) either «privatively» (privative), or (ii) «positively» (positive). (ii) A positive indetermination is something that a nature has only through the operation of the intellect; it says an abstraction from singularity, and for that reason a nature relates «indifferently» to every singular and respects them all «equally». (i) Although the point as such is central in the debate of Question 5, of the «privative indetermination» as such Valera does not say much; he only affirms that it is the one according to which the «nature from itself is not determinate» (say, either to singularity or to universality). Thus, we can complement the reflection remembering that if the «logical universal», that is the concept in the intelectual act of signifying and predicating it of some particular thing, as such says a «negation» and «separation» from singularity, the «formal unity» that a given nature is says, irrespective to the contraction of it in the singular item or its actualization as universal in the mind, just a form of privation88. In another words: universality of a 86

As an example of this see what Valera says on Rada’s view that formally speaking the universal is a work of the intellect; cf. Hyeronimus Valera, Commentarii ac quaestiones, Liber Primus, d. 2, a. 1, q. 6 («Num natura in re actu sit, ac formaliter universalis»), p. 46: «Quarta. Tandem Sententia universale formaliter intellectus opificio fieri fatetur, et quidem re bene perpensa ut erudite noster Rada novissimus ac fidelissimus Scoti interpreter in 2. controv. 3. animadvertit cum aliis Sapientissimis Scotistis nulla est inter Doctores Angelicum et Subtilem dissentio». Truly, Valera emphasizes that the Scotist answer to the question, based more directly on the interpretation of Ordinatio II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1, namely that the negative unity that the nature actually has in the thing is not the same unity of the universal in act, which is a positive unity of indifference to many (cf. ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 6, pp. 48-49), is clearly and correctly interpreted by Juan de Rada; cf. ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 6, p. 48: «Ecce quam aperte noster Doctor asserit unitatem quam natura habet in re non esse talem, qualis est in universali in actu: haec enim ut ipse ait, est quae constituit naturam unam, et eandem de multis praedicabilem, ut bene explicat magister Rada loco supra citato; naturae ergo existenti in singulari secundum quid et remote non repugnat esse sub hac vel illa singularitate, absolute tamen, et simpliciter repugnat, propter identitatem, cum hac singularitate». 87 Cf., for example, Ioannes de Fuica, Commentaria in universam Aristotelis metaphysicam una cum distinctionibus, d. 1, q. 6; d. 7, q. 4. 88 Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, Commentarii ac quaestiones, Liber Primus, d. 2, a. 1, q. 5, p. 43: «Tertio nota. Cum omnibus Scotistis, Licheto, Basoli, Nisa et aliis in

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nature says a negation, its indifference says a privation. In fact, this third notabile on the «indifference as such» of the «nature in the thing» connects very well with the fourth presupposition, namely that the nature has some properties that belong to it ex se «in the second mode of perseity», that is not according to the essential definition of the nature (as subject), and yet (by means of strict demonstration) necessary89. The nature has some properties insofar as it communicates to many individuals, and these are «indifferent» both with respect to the nature (as such) and to the individuals; but the nature taken as such has also properties, i.e. according to the ratio that distinguishes it, like for instance to be the fundament of similarity and agreement of many towards a nature, or more simply «communicability», which does not belong to an individual as such. There are properties, thus, that belong to the nature «as such» and, nonetheless, do not belong to the individual «as such»90. The first important conclusion that Valera draws from the earlier notabilia is that the nature that exists in particulars has «an indifference», 2. sent. d. 3. q. 1. Doctissimo ac Reverendissimo Magistro D. Ioanne de Rada tomo. 2. controversi. controver. 3. art. 1. notab. 2. Indeterminationem hanc naturae posse dupliciter sumi, vel privative, vel positive; de indeterminatione positiva, postea erit sermo, hanc enim habet natura per operationem intellectus, estque contraria determinationi singularitatis, quia dicit abstractionem ab omni singularitate, atque adeo se habet ad quodcumque singulare indifferenter, et omnia aequaliter respicit. Indeterminatio privativa est secundum quam natura ex se non est determinata». 89 Cf. Aristoteles, Erste Analytik / Zweite Analytik, hrsg. H. G. ZEKL, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg 1998, I 4, 73a35-73b7, pp. 326-327; R. D. MCKIRAHAN, JR., Principles and Proofs. Aristotle’s Theory of Demonstrative Science, Princeton University Press: Princeton 1992, pp. 99-100 (90 sqq.). 90 Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, Commentarii ac quaestiones, Liber Primus, d. 2, a. 1, q. 5, p. 43: «Quarto. Tandem notandum est proprietates convenientes naturae ex se in secundo scilicet modo perseitatis, esse in dupplici discrimine, quaedam conveniunt illi secundum id, quod individuis communicat, et haec indifferenter se habent, tam respectu naturae, quam respectu individuorum, et de utrisque praedicantur; aliae vero conveniunt naturae, scilicet ut natura est, non secundum ud quod communicat individui, sed secundum id, sub cuius ratione distinguitur, et quodammodo repugnat individuo ut sic, ut esse fundamentum similitudinis, et convenientiae; sicut etiam quaedam conveniunt individuo ut sic, quae repugnant naturae, ut esse incommunicabile habemusque aliqualem exemplum in Divinis: essentiae enim Divinae convenit communicabilitas, quae non convenit personae, inquantum persona est: cum potius ut sic, sit incommunicabilis: potest ergo intelligi aliquid convenire naturae, ut sic quod tamen non convenit individuo ut sic».

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which enables it to be determined to this or that particular item. He can restate now Scotus’s famous stance, provided first by Avicenna, that the nature of itself is neither particular nor universal, but nature alone91. As already mentioned in the earlier clarification, the indetermination the nature has is «privative», and Valera is certain to have the support of the whole legion of Scotists, such as Franciscus Lychetus, Ioannes Bassolis, Iacobinus Bargius (16th century), Nicolaus de Nisa [or Nise], Ioannes de Rada, Franciscus de Herrera (1551-1609), Antonius Andreas, Ioannes Canonicus (†1329), and Franciscus de Marchia (ca. 1290 - ca. 1344)92. In fact, in order to obtain his first conclusion Valera applies some theoretical devices he advanced earlier, after all the «indifference» he sees in «nature» taken as such is also explained on the basis of the «formal unity» – in contrast to the «numerical unity» – that a nature has: because the formal unity of nature is of itself not individual, nature, «also in the thing itself», is not incommunicable. Because of the formal unity, a «nature» as such has «indifference» or «non-repugnance», so that it can be determined to this or that singularity whatever. But still more theoretical devices are at hand: The indifference of the «nature in the thing» towards any singularity presupposes a kind of distinction between it and singularity itself, and this can possibly be only the formal distinction ex natura rei93. Valera also 91 Cf. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Opera Philosophica IV – Quaestiones super libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis Libri VI-IX, VII q. 13, nn. 60-83, 118-124, 141-144, pp. 238-246, 258-262, 266-267; VII, q. 18, nn. 46-49, pp. 350-352; Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1, nn. 31-34, pp. 402-405. 92 Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, Commentarii ac quaestiones, Liber Primus, d. 2, a. 1, q. 5, p. 43: «Prima Conclusio sit. Natura etiam in particularibus existens, habet indifferentiam, ut possit per hanc, vel illam rationem particularem determinari; quae conclusio de quacumque ratione superiori respectu differentiae, sive essentialis, sive numericae procedit. Haec est sententia expressa nostri Doctoris, multis in locis [...]. Tenet cum Scoto omnes eius discipuli Lichetus, Basolis, Bargius, Nicolaus de Nisa, Rada, Herrera, ibi Antonius Andreas 7. Meth. q. 16. Ioannes Canonicus fidelissimus Scoti interpres libr. 1 Physic. q. 6. artic. 3. et Franciscus de Marchia in expositione huius q.». 93 Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 5, pp. 43-44: «Probatur autem Conclusio hac ratione desumpta ex nostro Doctore: unitas formalis naturae, non est de se individua (ut supra probatum est) ergo etiam in re ipsa ex vi suae unitatis formalis, natura non est incommunicabilis; cum hoc habeat ex vi unitatis individualis: ergo ex vi unitatis formalis habet hanc indifferentiam, seu non repugnantiam, ut determinetur, quantum est ex vi suae rationis formalis per hanc, vel illam singularitatem, et haec ratio maiorem vim habet supposita distinctione formali, et ex natura rei inter naturam, et rationem individualem, [...]».

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calls that formal aptness or indifference to be in many or to universality – which he affirms to be a thesis that many «Thomists» would concede about material beings – a «natural condition» (conditio naturalis), a «property of such a nature» (proprietas talis naturae), and, again, nature has this property not because of the individual difference, since individuals «formally as such» (formaliter ut talia) are repugnant to be in many and are primary diverse, but it possesses that aptness or non-repugnance simply because of itself: it belongs to nature as long as it is nature, it is in it in reason of its formal unity. This is a last explanation94. The second important conclusion of Article I Question 5, which again is an exercise of application of theoretical devices worked out with the support of the Scotist tradition, is that the indifference or «nonrepugnance» that the nature has in the individuals themselves in which it exists is not, there, «absolutely» (simpliciter), but «in a qualified sense» (secundum quid). Once more a distinction of kinds of indifferentia is 94 Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 5, p. 44: «[...]. Praeterea, in ipisis individuis per vos [= Thomistas] datur aptitudo essendi in multis fundamentaliter et remote, seu fundamentum remotum formalis aptitudinis essendi in multis; et illud est condicio naturalis, seu proprietas talis naturae, ratione cuius non repugnat tali naturae esse in multis sed hoc non convenit naturae, ratione individualis differentiae, cum in individuius ut sic, potius reperiatur fundamentum oppositae repugnantiae essendi in multis: individua enim formaliter ut talis sunt, sunt primo diversa; ergo illis ut sic repugnat habere aliud simile in specie; tale ergo fundamentum indifferentiae, seu non repugnantiae convenit naturae, ut natura est, ex vi scilicet suae unitatis formalis, ratione cuius licet natura sit (ut subtiliter docet Scotus) determinata in quolibet individuo ad illud tantum, ita tamen est in isto ut ex vi sua non repugnet esse in alio, atque adeo ex vi sua dicit hanc indeterminationem, et non repugnantiam». It is interesting that in ibid., I, d. 2, a. 1, q. 8 («Quem modum essendi debeat habere in rebus ut fiat universales»), first conclusion, Valera insists that what is proper and peculiar to the «act of being» of the universal nature is an absolute act of being, irrespective of this (universal) nature being (in the thing) «per identitatem» or «per inhaerentiam» (as it would be the case with a substantial or essential item and an accidental item, respectively): what its act of being necessarily requires is being «through multiplication in many». That the nature called «universal» inheres or identifies with the thing, this is accidental; that is can be multiplied, this is necessary. Cf. ibid., I, d. 2, a. 1, q. 8, p. 52: «Prim. Concl. Actus essendi proprius, et peculiaris naturae, quae universalis dicitur, est actus essendi absolute, sive per identitatem, sive per inhaerentiam, prout scilicet abstrahit utroque; actus autem essendi quem absolute ut sic requirit necessario est per multiplicationem in pluribus. Naturae ergo, quae universalis dicitur, ut sic, accidit quod inhaereat, vel identificetur; quod vero possit multiplicari necessario requiritur. Haec autem conclusio sic».

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welcomed, and it has two parts: (i) there is an «indifference» secundum quid, which in the case of the «nature» means that, although on the one side it is not contradictory to nature to be communicated to many individuals, on the other side it is contradictory to nature to be communicated to many, for it always exists in the individual thing. (ii) Moreover, there is an «indifference» simpliciter, which in the case of the «nature» means that in no sense at all it is contradictory to it to agree with many95. This is a fine explanation by Valera about the consideration of nature, since the first indifference concerns the metaphysical and the second indifference the logical aspect of taking «nature» into consideration. After all, the indifference secundum quid is the one possessed by the nature contracted in the individual thing – as we say that the «humanity» in John Duns Scotus can on the one side be as such communicated to many, but on the other side, since it exists in him with the addition of the individual difference, with which it is really identical, it is contradictory to it to be as such in other individuals. And it is obvious that the indifference simpliciter is something that «nature» can have in the intellect alone, for it is only in the intellect, i.e. on the purely conceptual dimension and in the act of equally signifying formal aspects of several individual things in predication, that an absolute abstraction from individuals can have place96. In this second meaning we would have the so-called «proximate» aptness to universality (also called by Jerónimo Valera «complete indifference», following John Duns Scotus’s own words, i.e. «completa indeterminatio» in In Metaphysicorum VII q. 1897), whereas in the first 95

Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 5, p. 44: «Secunda Conclusio. Haec indifferentia quam natura habet in ipsis individuis, non est simpliciter, sed secundum quid, haec sic explicatur. Indifferentia potest sumi duppliciter, vel secundum quid, quando licet ex una parte non repugnet natura communicari individuis, ex alia tamen parte illi repugnat; indifferentia vero, seu non repugnantia simpliciter, quando ex nulla parte pluribus convenire repugnat naturae, neque ex se, neque ex individuis». 96 Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 5, p. 44: «Primam habet natura in quolibet individuo contracta, quia naturae humanae in Petro licet secundum suam essentiam, non repugnet multis communicari, ex parte tamen differentiae individualis, cum qua identificatur, repugnat illi talis communicatio. Secundam vero indifferentiam habet natura in solo intellectu, cum in solo illo habeat abstractionem ab individuis. Et in hoc sensu intelligendo est, quod diximus, aptitudinem essendi in multis, quam natura habet a parte rei in individuis esse remotam; proximam vero in intellectu». 97 Cf. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Opera Philosophica IV – Quaestiones super libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis Libri VI-IX, VII, q. 18, nn. 38-43, 44-49, pp. 347-352.

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case of «indifference» we would have the so-called «remote» aptness to universality98. Moreover, as a third conclusion, Valera interprets Scotus in In Metaphysicorum VII, q. 18 as giving him support in proposing the view that «nature» has a «negative» indifference or non-repugnance to «universality», already explained above, i.e. a third sense of negatio that is partially privation and partially negation99.

Concluding Remarks In fact, it is not necessary to the present purposes to get into deeper details of Questions 6-8 of Article 1, Distinction 2 in Book I of Valera’s commentary on the Isagoge to ground his conviction on the indifference of a nature as such to singularity and universality and to defend the view that there is in “the nature in the thing” the very basis to the logical status of the nature in the universality generally speaking and, more narrowly, in the categorial universality of the concept too. Truly, this is the real metaphysical basis for the logical treatment of universals in the rest of Book I of Jerónimo Valera’s Commentarii100. And, again, the most important metaphysical tenets on universals that Valera developed in the previous Questions of Article 1 are fully confirmed in Question 6 (“Whether the nature in the thing is actually and formally universal”), for he says that “universality” contains in its definition (a) a proper “unity” and (b) “the aptness to be in many”, remaining to be discussed only the issue about the reality or the existence of “universality” – so defined – in the thing (that is, 98 Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, Commentarii ac quaestiones, Liber Primus, d. 2, a. 1, q. 5, p. 44: «Quod autem hic fuerit sensus nostris Doctoris, ipse manifestis indicat verbis, quaestione illa citata 18 libr. 7 Metaph. § ad quaestionem quaerens quae sit causa illius indeterminationis quam habet natura in intellectu? [...]. Ecce quomodo indifferentiam quam habet natura in intellectu, vocat completam, quia ex utraque ratione non est repugnantia; ut dictum est». 99 Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 5, p. 44: «Tertia Conclusio. Consimilem indeterminationem, indifferentiam, seu non repugnantiam negativam habet natura respectu universalitatis. Sic noster Doctor loco citato 2 lib. Sent. [...]. Et in quaestione illa. 18. 7. Methaphy. [...]». 100 Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 6, p. 45: «Cum duo claudat universalitas in sua ratione unitatem nimirum, ac essendi in multis aptitudinem, idem sane est pervestigare, sit ne natura in re universalitate praedicta, ac num illam habeat unitatem ac aptitudinem ex quibus universalitas essentialiter coalescit».

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of the nature in that universal “form” before any operation of the mind)101. This is a transition question in Jerónimo Valera’s exposition towards the logical treatment of the universal. Valera relentlessly explicitates his metaphysical apparatus about «unity». First, he affirms that a thing can be called «unum» in two ways: on the one side, it can be «one» «absolutely in itself» (as «human nature» properly is, which is neither «singular» nor «universal», although it always exists under one of those accidental forms (either singularly in the thing or universally in the intellect)102. On the other side, a thing can be called «one» as long as it assembles with another – the verb is «confero» –, just like Thomas Aquinas assembles with John Duns Scotus in the human nature; accordingly, there is a nature that is «common» to both of them, and that unity is common to individuals103. This is the first time in Article 1 of Distinction 2 that Valera mentions the notion of «natura communis» in order to explain the unity the nature in the thing has. Second, there are also two ways of explaining «commune» (or «communis»), i.e. either «positively» (positive) or «negatively» (negative). A thing is «common» positively when, one and undivided, it is repeated in several – so the divine essence is «common» to the divine persons; a thing is «common» negatively when several items agree because they «are not distinguished through formal principles». The essential point is that in both ways a thing is «unum»; especially according to the second way, a thing (like a nature in different particular things) has (negative) unity through a nondistinction104. 101

Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 6, pp. 45-46 (Opinio 1). Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 6, pp. 46-47: «Ut autem dilucidam proferamus huiusce rei veritatem serio adnotare oportet, bifariam posse aliquid dici unum, uno modo absolute in se, quia nempe in se est indivisum, sic vidimus iam naturam v. g. humanam in se spectatam, suam unitatem formalem habere in quolibet individuo, de qua est verum, quod dixit noster Doctor de ipsa natura, de se neque esse singularem, nec universalem, sed utrumque advenire illi per accidens, licet numquam sit sine aliquo istorum; atque adeo non esse hanc unitatem propriam rei singularis in quantum singularis, nec propriam rei universalis ut sic, sed esse propriam ipsius naturae, quae vel est singularis in re, vel universalis in intellectu; [...]». 103 Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 6, p. 47: «[...]; alio modo quatenus cum alio confertur, et sic quaeri potest an scilicet quatenus Petrus cum Paulo confertur detur aliqua natura illis communis, unitate communi utrique individuo». 104 Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 6, p. 47. See footnote 83, above. 102

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Based on these two doctrinal notabilia, Valera believes to be following other Scotists by concluding that what is correct about the status of a nature – such as «human nature» – in the thing before any operation of the intellect is that it has a community and unity through which, although existing in one individual, compared to another nature of same formal kind in another individual, both agree and are «one». This is the second meaning of «common» and «unity» explained above, which was proposed by Scotus as «specific unity» and defended by Scotists such as Petrus Tartaretus (? -1522) and Lychetus (here at least) not as «formal unity» alone, but as «agreement» (convenientia) that singularized natures have among themselves105. Second, based on the same previous account of community and unity, Valera concludes that a nature in the thing before the activity of the intellect has only a «negative agreement» and «unity», that is, a unity «through a non-distinction», which seems to be called by Scotists such as Ioannes Canonicus and Francis of Marchia «fundamental», also «virtual unity and community»106. It is very important to Valera to stress – as something certissimum – that both Scotists denied that Scotus would have considered such a unity a «common positive unity»107; it is rather, 105

Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 6, p. 47: «Prima conclusio: Ante omnem operationem intellectus datur aliqua communitas, et unitas, qua una natura v.g. humana quae est in individuo, comparata cum alia, quae est in alio, dicuntur convenire, et esse unum. Haec est nostri Doctoris locis citatis, quam probat in 2. d. 3. q. 1. quinque rationibus, quas optime explicant ipsius discipuli ibidem Tataretus, Lichetus, et alii: quae si bene expendantur, non procedunt de sola illa unitate formali, quam, quaelibet natura habet in suo individuo, sed de unitate et convenientia, quam habent illae naturae singularizatae inter se, quam unitatem, specificam vocat noster Doctor, [...]». Cf. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1, nn. 36-39, 42, pp. 406408, 410. 106 Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, Commentarii ac quaestiones, Liber Primus, d. 2, a. 1, q. 6, p. 47: «Secunda Conclusio. Haec convenientia, et unitas non est positiva in aliqua scilicet natura positiva, quae eadem sit indivisa in individuis, sed negativa per non distinctionem, quae ab aliquibus unitas, et communitas fundamentalis, seu virtualis appelatur; hanc tenent multi Scotistae, sic Ioannes Canonicus fidelissimus Scoti interpretes [...] et Franciscus de Marchia in expositione huius quaestionis qui affirmant nullibi Scotum voluisse aliquam unitatem positivam communem ponere, quod ego certissimum reputo ut est videre in omnibus locis, in quibus de universali disserit noster Doctor. [...]». 107 Cf. the previous footnote. Cf. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Opera Philosophica III – Quaestiones super libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis Libri I-V, ed. by R. ANDREWS – G. ETZKORN – G. GÁL – R. GREEN – F. KELLEY – G. MARCIL – T. NOONE – R. WOOD,

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and essentially, the negation of difference or simply «indifference»108. But that same unity, although it is the real fundament of the unity of «the universal in act», is distinguished from it. The «fundamental unity» Valera has in view is the unity a given nature has, according to Scotus, before any intellectual operation «in many» or «divided in many», although it is not an undivided unity that can positively predicated «of many»109 – that sense of unity, possessed by a given nature by means of predication, would necessarily presuppose an intellectual activity. It is, thus, clear enough that, according to Valera’s interpretation of Scotus’s passages, the Subtle Doctor believes that the unity which a given nature – such as «human nature» – has in reality or in the thing is not the same unity it has in the actual universal or in the nature as long as it is actually thought by the intellect and said of things to which it applies. A nature exists absolute and simpliciter in a given singular thing, but it is not repugnant to it secundum quid and remote to be under one and another singular thing110; it is possible, thus, to affirm that there is a real (metaphysical) basis for the universal as being common to many through the act of predication; after all, nature can be in many. It is not surprising that Valera concludes, third, that a parte rei there is not actually and formally the universal (or the nature as universal). Valera is happy to call the attention of Thomistic authors to passages in which Scotus explicitly comes to this account of formal universality. The message is, in a nutshell, that nature is made (formally) «one» (able to be said) «of many» through the intellect alone: this is the universal. Only then there is the so-called «complete universal», which is in many singulars Franciscan Institute Publications, St. Bonaventure 1997, I, q. 6 («Utrum actus sint circa singularia»), nn. 22-63, pp. 140-151. 108 Valera relies explicitely on Ioannes Duns Scotus, Opera Philosophica III – Quaestiones super libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis Libri I-V, I, q. 6, nn. 25-32, pp. 142-143; Ioannes Duns Scotus, Opera Philosophica IV – Quaestiones super libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis Libri VI-IX, VII, q. 13, nn. 60-83, 118-124, 141-144, pp. 238-246, 258-262, 266-267; Ordinatio II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1, nn. 34-40, pp. 404-408. 109 Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, Commentarii ac quaestiones, Liber Primus, d. 2, a. 1, q. 6, pp. 47-48: «[...]. Ecce quomodo hanc unitatem ait esse distinctam ab unitate universalis in actu, fundamentum tamen illius. Est ergo secundum Doctorem unitas fundamentalis, et illam dicit esse unam in multis, id est divisam in multis, non tamen de multis id est, non esse unam indivisam positive de multis praedicabilem, sed hoc fit per intellectum, ut se magis explicat locis conclusione sequenti citandis, [...]. et in 7. Meth. q. 3 hanc unitatem in negatione differentiae consistere docet. [...]». 110 Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 6, p. 48. Cf. footnote 86, above.

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indeed through indifference and non-distinction, but also actually made «of many», and so detached from any singularity, through the consideration of the intellect111. In «proximate potency» – i.e. in the singular thing – nature is not to be said «of many», although universality is there as it were in the «possible intellect». After all, and so Valera clearly emphasizes the real basis for making a nature universal through the intellect, in the thing nature is already «commune», meaning here not being «de se» this or that singular item. A parte rei it does not contradict any nature to be «not this». But, again: such a common nature is not universal in act, it still lacks the «indifference» according to which it is completive universal: «Universality does not agree with the thing ex se»112. By means of a further demonstration, Valera reveals that he has achieved the essence of the universal as such ad mentem Scoti, i.e. by explaining Aristotle’s definition in Analytica posteriora I – «the universal is what is one [unum] in many [in multis]». The two aspects which have to be said of the universal as such are (i) its «positive unity» (of being indifferent to many) under a separation from any individuating conditions and (ii) its «proximate aptness» (in the intellectual act) to be in many. Clearly, this last unity is not given «in the thing», and in the thing it exists in «remote potency» alone, since the nature or «the common real» exists in the thing as contracted to singularity113. It is quite sensible to formulate now a «corollary» that should 111

Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 6, pp. 48-49: «Tertia Conclusio a parte rei non datur actu, et formaliter universale, atque adeo nec formalis universalitas. Haec est expraessa mens nostri Doctoris innumeris in locis, quae si Thomistae legissent, nunquam oppositum subtili Doctori imposuissent. [...]». Cf. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Opera Philosophica III – Quaestiones super libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis Libri I-V, I, q. 6, nn. 22-44, pp. 140-146; Ioannes Duns Scotus, Opera Philosophica IV – Quaestiones super libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis Libri VI-IX, VII, q. 13, nn. 131, 181, pp. 263, 279-280; VII, q. 18, nn. 38-69, pp. 347-356. 112 Cf. Hyeronimus Valera, Commentarii ac quaestiones, Liber Primus, d. 2, a. 1, q. 6, p. 49: «[...]; et in responsione ad I. obiectionem littera G. et H. et in fine eiusdem. q. in responsione ad confirma. sic [ait Scotus]: universalitas non convenit rei ex se, quae omnia verba nostri Doctoris retulimus, ut manifeste compraehendatur, quantum distet Doctor ab illo placito constituente in re, ante omnem intellectus operationem actu universale». 113 Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 6, p. 49: «Probatur autem conclusio ratione hac nostri Doctoris. Universale est illud, quod est unum indifferens positive ad plura, ex illo Arist. I. Poster. Universale est, quod est unum in multis; quam difinitionem in propria quaestione explicabimus: ubi de ratione universalis actu duo sunt, scilicet unitas

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express Scotus’s view about how many kinds of unity there are in the nature in the thing apart from the numerical unity of the individual substance. (1) The nature in the thing has a «formal unity», which says the «formal being» of the nature which de se is neither singular nor universal, but rather – as we learnt through Avicenna’s proposition «Equinity is equinity alone» – indifferent to both. Such a unity belongs to nature as such, whatever «state» it exists in. It is here that we find Scotus’s «community» and «nonrepugnance» to being in another, which is not «universality», and thus it is not the «logical universal» (universale logicum) yet114. Moreover, (2) nature has a unity that is a «negative community»; this unity the nature has, as explained above in the doctrine of convenientia, when compared with another (nature) in (another) thing, for they are undistinguished according to their formal principles each time – this is the way how, for example, the «humanity» in Thomas Aquinas and the «humanity» in John Duns Scotus agree under the real basis of a common nature singularized115. Finally, (3) there is the «unity of reason», which according to Valera formally makes up positiva, et aptitudo unde de ratione universalis est, aptitudo proxima ad essendum in multis, et unitas positiva praecissa a conditionibus individuantibus, indivisa et aequaliter participabilis a pluribus; sed non datur in re talis unitas: cum natura sic divisa in inferioribus, sed tantum fundamentalis ut diximus; nec est potentia proxima sed remota, cum in re sit contracta, atque adeo quidquid est commune reale in creaturis, est determinatum, et in uno secundum Scotum: ergo». 114 Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 6, p. 49: «Ex dictis sequitur secundum nostrum Doctorem triplicem unitatem, l. communitatem posse considerari, a numerali distinctam, in natura; quarum una fundatur in alia. Prima est formalis, quae pro materiali tantum dicit ens formale, quae de se nec est singularis, nec universalis, sed per accidens, ut ait noster Doctor, utrumque illi advenit, et ad utrumque est indifferens, de qua verificatur quod dicit Avicena, quod equinitas, tantum est equinitas, nec ex se una, nec plures, nec universalis, nec particularis; et talis unitas sequitur naturam ut natura est, et eam habet in quocumque statu consideretur, habetque quamdam communitatem, seu non repugnantiam supra dictam; quae communitas non est universalitatis, cum haec sit per modum totius, quod in recto de pluribus praedicatur: illa vero per modum partis Metaphysicae quae simul cum differentia constituit compositum metaphysicum ut humanitas etc. Sicut materia prima proportionaliter loquendo, dicitur communis, et indifferens ad formas, non tamen universale logicum, ut subtiliter docuit noster Doctor cum dixit. 7. Metaph. q. 13 [...]». 115 Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 6, p. 49: «[...]: alia est unitas, et communitas negativa, quam habet natura comparata cum alia in re, cuius fundamentum est prima unitas: ex eo enim quod humanitas in Petro constat ex principiis essentialibus naturae humanae, similiter humanitas Pauli sequitur quod mutuo ad invicem non distinguantur essentialiter, sed habeant similitudinem inter se: [...]».

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the the universal: this logical unity of nature after an intellectual operation is grounded on unities (1) and (2), it adds a special reason upon them – namely the being «of many» – and presupposes a given «separation» (praecissio) of the nature from any singular item116. Truly, in the fourth opinion previous to his discussion in Article 1 Question 6, Valera had invoked Juan de Rada’s view that the universal as such is «formally an invention of the intellect [intellectus opificio]»117. Valera subscribed to Rada’s account. And he confirmed the opinion that the nature in the thing only has remotely an aptness or «positive potency» to universality118. There is an undeniable merit in Valera’s exposition concerning the goal of systematically presenting what is supposed to be Scotus’s doctrine of common nature and universality, further Scotus’s account of the metaphysical basis of the form of nature in the mind, i.e. the universal as such. As a remarkable example of the intellectual merits of colonial Scholasticism, Valera reveals a capacity of solving problems and dissipating doubts in the interpretation of Scotus. This is particularly due to his sophisticated methodology of studying Scotistic themes in philosophy by means of considering Scotus’s entire corpus, a careful reading of fourteenth to seventeenth century «Scotists» and reproducing and correcting misinterpretations and accusations by historical and contemporary opponents, above all «Thomists». By making use of three hundred years of Scotistic commentaries and facing the challenges of Thomistic metaphysics, Valera was able to produce a new literature in logic, language, and metaphysics, which is both «Scotist» (as fare presentations of the Subtle Doctor’s thought) and «Scotistic» (by providing views of his own, always ad mentem Scoti). It is remarkable how technical, richly argued and conceptually deep that literature is, and how many solutions to real and apparent problems between the schools can be offered. It is surely better to read it than not, the outcome is a matter of clarity in philosophy. 116

Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 6, p. 49: «[...]: alia vero est unitas rationis, quae constituit formaliter universale, fundata in praedictis, quae specialem rationem addit ad illas, et fundatur in praecissione de qua postea». 117 Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 6, p. 46. Cf. footnote 86, above. Cf. also Ioannes de Rada, Controversiae theologicae inter S. Thomam et Scotum secunda pars dicatur, Controversia 2 («De potentia crreandi»), a. 3, pp. 40-46. 118 Ibid., d. 2, a. 1, q. 6, p. 50: «Ad quartum illam aptitudinem in re esse remotam, et contractam et secundum quid, et dato quod in natura sit aptitudo, et potentia positiva, illa est per modum partis, non vero per modum totius».

MANUEL LÁZARO PULIDO* NOTES ON SCOTISM IN THE IBERIAN PENINSULA: THE CASE OF FR. MATEO DE SOSA O.F.M. (17th CENTURY)

1. Fr. Mateo de Sosa in the Horizon of Iberian Scotism Our reflection will focus on one of the Scotist figures in the Iberian Peninsula in the beginning of the 17th century1. We will deal with a Franciscan *

Professor of Philosophy at the Universidade Católica Portuguesa – CEFi, CEDEU – Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, and Universidad Bernardo O’Higgins. Rua de Diogo Botelho 1327, 4169-005 Porto, Portugal. [email protected] 1 On 17th century scotism, see D. DE CAYLUS, «Merveilleux epanouissement de l’école scotiste au XVIIe siècle», Études Franciscaines, 24 (1910) 5-21; U. SMEETS, Lineamenta bibliographiae Scotisticae, Commissio Scotistica, Roma 1942. On Scotism in the Iberian Peninsula, see I. VÁZQUEZ, «La enseñanza del escotismo en España», in Doctrina Ioannis Scoti, Acta Congressus Scotistici Internationalis Oxonii et Edimburgi, 11-17 sept. 1966 celebrati, Societas Internationalis Scotistica, Roma, vol. IV, 1968, pp. 207-211; M. DE CASTRO, «Notas de bio-biografía franciscana», Archivo Ibero-Americano, 28 (1968) 448-454; V. SÁNCHEZ, «Teología y teólogos franciscanos españoles en el siglo de la Ilustración», Archivo Ibero-Americano, 42 (1982) 703-750; M. DE CASTRO, «Bibliografía de franciscanos escotistas españoles», in C. BÉRUBÉ (ed.), Homo et Mundus, Acta Quinti Congressus Scotistici Internationalis Salmanticae, 2126 septembris 1981, Societas Internationalis Scotistica, Roma 1984, pp. 435-458; G. ZAMORA, «Jaque mate al escotismo en la Universidad de Valladolid», in C. BÉRUBÉ (ed.), Homo et Mundus, op. cit., pp. 459-473; D. CARBAJO, «La provincia franciscana de Cartagena y el escotismo», in C. BÉRUBÉ (ed.), Homo et Mundus, op. cit., pp. 475483; F. CHAVERO BLANCO, «Sobre el escotismo en la Provincia Bética. El ocaso de una tradición», in L. SILEO (ed.), Via Scoti. Methodologica ad mentem Ioannis Duns Scoti, Atti del Congresso Scotistico Internazionale Roma 9-11 marzo 1993, Edizioni PAA, Rome 1995, pp. 1171-1191; E. RIVERA DE VENTOSA, «Der Scotismus», in J.-P. SCHOBINGER (ed.), Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. Die Philosophie des 17. Jahrhunderts Band I: Allgemeine Themen – Iberische Halbinsel – Italien, Schwabe Verlag, Basel 1998, pp. 378-383. On the Lusitan part of the Iberian Peninsula see F. F. LOPES, «As doutrinas escotistas na cultura e escolas de Portugal», Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia, 23 (1967) 17-45; ID., «Franciscanos portugueses predentinos – Escritores, mestres e leitores», in Repertorio de Historia de las Ciencias Eclesiasticas en España VII (Siglos III-XVI), Instituto de Historia de la Teología Española, Salamanca 1979, pp. 451-508; M. C. FREITAS, «Escotismo em Portugal», in Logos. Enciclopédia Luso-Brasileira de Filosofia, Ed. Verbo, Lisboa, vol. II, 1990, col. 184-189; J. F. MEIRINHOS, «Escotistas

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from the province of Santiago, who is also often reported to be from Galicia2, but since Fr. Mateo de Sosa self-proclaims as Lisbon-borned3, as evidenced by the note on his work on Scotus where one reads «Auctor Fratre Mathaeo de Sosa, Olyssiponensi». Fr. Mateo de Sosa, or Sousa (Mathaeo de Sosa), known for his ministerial functions in the Franciscan Order as a Provincial, joint governor of the province of Santiago, and for his theological tenure in Salamanca, as a Titular Professor in Holy Theology, as well as a recognition for his revitalization and renewal of perspective of the works and thoughts of Scotus. Currently, one work of Mateo de Sosa is known: a work of edition of the Subtle Doctor entitled Articulatio et illustratio libri primi Sententiarum Doctoris Subtilissimi I. D. Scoti4. Fr. Mateo de Sosa is situated in the 17th century, a period of expansion of Scotism, of a flourishing of the Subtle Doctor’s thought, which is, without a doubt, motivated by the need, within the Franciscan Order, to avoid losing its theological identity. Fr. Mateo de Sosa has done nothing less than anticipating one of the major intellectual events of the 18th century, that is, the recovery of the Scotist school which will flourish in the baroque period5. portugueses dos séculos XIV e XV», in L. A. DE BONI – R. H. PICH – Th. S. LEITE – J. B. DA COSTA – C. E. S. DIAS (orgs.), João Duns Scotus (1308-2008). Homenagem dos scotistas lusófonos, EST Edições, Porto Alegre 2008, pp. 330-347. 2 «Franciscain galicien» in the words of J. SCHMUTZ. See ID., «Sosa, Mateo de», in Nomenclator. Shcolasticon, http://www.scholasticon.fr/Database/Scholastiques_ fr.php?ID=1194. Access in September 24, 2016. M. de Castro lists him as a Spanish Scotist, which nevertheless does not clarify matters as Jerónimo Sosa y Meneses, who was also from the province of Castilla but born in Freixo de Nemão in Portugal is also included in the list; see DE CASTRO, «Bibliografía de franciscanos escotistas españoles», p. 450. 3 See «Mateo de Sosa», in Biografía eclesiástica completa: Vida de los personajes del Antiguo y Nuevo Testamento, de todos los santos que venera la Iglesia, papas y eclesiásticos célebres por su virtudes y talentos en orden alfabético, Imprenta de Alejandro Gómez, Madrid, t. 13, 1862, p. 490. He is born in Lisbon, according to A. LÓPEZ, «Notas de bibliografía franciscana», Archivo Ibero-Americano, 27 (1927) 55-58. 4 Fr. Mattheo de Sosa, Optata diu articulatio et illustratio Oxoniensis Libri Primi Sententiarum Doctoris Subtilissimi P. F. Ioannis Duns Scoti, Sacratissimi ordinis Minorum ac Theologorum Principis cum fidelissima integritate et puritate litterae textuali seiusdem ad articulorum praeclarum D. Thomae modum redactae cum cuiuslibet articuli commentariis ac disputatis difficultatibus, nec non et controuersiis, quae circa textum Scoti cum excitantur, Opus in tres tomos divisum, Salamanca, Diego de Cusio, 2 Vols., 1629. 5 On the Scotist tradition as a school and the first and pioneer study of the Subtle Doctor’s disciples we should mention the catalog made by A. BERTONI in his Le

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This is indeed a period of renewed splendor, coinciding with the return to the study of the Franciscan observance – not an easy path to follow. In 1565 the General Chapter of the Franciscan Order had effectively established that the Franciscan Rule mandated the study as one of the main occupations of a Minor friar. This rule is a confirmation of a previous decision in the General Chapter of Terni in October 11th, 1500, where it was signed that the author to be followed in theological studies, as a main master, was John Duns Scotus, with the support of the study of Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Francis of Mayronis and Richard of Mediaevilla, thus pointing at a certain eclecticism6 which points, on the one hand, at a tentative decision of study according to Scotus’ identity, and, on the other hand, the unmistakable Franciscan freedom, and the diversity of perspective based on the theological interpretation of the will and on the free reading of Aristotle. This general tendency will reflect in the University of Salamanca, not without controversy. There are several accounts confirming the teaching of Scotist doctrine in the respective chair on Scotus in the Salamancan University. In 1561 the new Salamancan dispositions confirm such accounts7. The problem in Scotus’ chair is a result of the estrangement of Franciscan friars from Franciscan chairs, which cause these chairs to be occupied by people alienated from the Order, without any knowledge or appreciation of the fair points of Scotist bienheureux Jean Duns Scot, sa vie, sa doctrine, ses discipules, Tip. dell’Immacolata, Levanto 1917, pp. 446-580. See also A. GHISALBERTI, «Giovanni Duns Scoto e la scuola scotista», in G. D’ONOFRIO (ed.), Storia della teologia nel medioevo III – La teologia delle scuole, Piemme, Casale Monferrato 1996, pp. 325-374; M. J. F. M. HOENEN, «Scotus and the Scotist School. The Tradition of Scotist Thought in the Medieval and Early Modern Period», in E. P. BOS (ed.), John Duns Scotus (1265/6-1308). Renewal of Philosophy, Acts of the Third Symposium Organized by the Dutch Society for Medieval Philosophy Medium Aevum, Rodopi, Amsterdam 1998, pp. 197-210. On the Franciscan tradition, see L. VEUTHEY, Scuola francescana. Filosofia, teologia, spiritualità, ed. by L. DI FONZO, Miscellanea Francescana, Roma 1996; M. LÁZARO PULIDO, «La escuela franciscana: tradición medieval y transición a la modernidad», in I. MURILLO (ed.), Actualidad de la Tradición Filosófica, Ed. Diálogo Filosófico – Publicaciones Claretianas, Colmenar Viejo (Madrid) 2010, pp. 617-633; ID., «La tradición franciscana, lugar de construcción de las bases filosóficas en la Península», Carthaginensia, 26 (2010) 247-292. 6 See M. DE CASTRO, San Francisco de Salamanca y su Studium Generale, Burgos 1998, pp. 165-168. 7 See E. ESPERABÉ, Historia interna y pragmática de la Universidad de Salamanca, Imp. y Lib. de Francisco Núñez Izquierdo, Salamanca, Vol. 1, 1917, p. 257.

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doctrine. This further entices the understanding of Scotus chair in Salamanca as an accident, as it is evidenced by the office sent to Philip III in October 2nd, 1604, requesting clarifications from the University Dean on these matters8; this reports us to challenges that were faced already in 1504, when the bachelor Pedro de Pajares takes seat on the before mentioned chair ad experimentum due to his lack of experience but, also, due to the impossibility of finding someone with the proper profile for the chair in question. What one can perceive is an environment in which, on the one hand, the Franciscan Order has distanced from its university classrooms, facing instead the return to its Studies, in which the pursuit of the Scotist tradition is stressed (a pursuit that will, on its turn, include the Study as a paramount part of the Order, internally and externally re-structuring it and eventually providing its return it to the University). On the other hand, in the University, particularly in the Salamancan context, there is the need to fill Scotus’ chair, but there are no well prepared scholars for the position, a situation that will remain throughout the 16th century. By lack of competence, or due to it, scholars in charge of teaching Scotist doctrine do not appreciate it. Cristóban Vela, titular professor for the Scotist chair proposes that the chair should be kept in name only, with a renewal focus on more fitting material than the teaching of the Master of Sentences. In fact, his request is for the waiving of the requirements for teaching Scotus’ doctrine, at least in everyday scholar activity, since it is impossible to do it formally, as he «ha muchos años que sirve a la universidad leyendo la cátedra de Escoto, la cual lectura es doctrina que se ha recibido y recibe muy poco fruto de los oyentes por ser como es materia muy escabrosa y de poco provecho, pues, que solamente aprovecha a los frailes que en esta universidad había franciscanos claustrales, los cuales ya no hay». The teaching of Scotus in the city of Tormes faces a situation which is further complicated by the statute reforms of 1627 which aim at imposing to professors and bachelors an oath to the doctrines of Saint Augustine and Thomas Aquinas in the university statutes («leeremos y enseñaremos en la teología escolástica las doctrinas de san Agustín y las conclusiones de santo Tomás que se contienen en la Suma de teología que comúnmente se llaman partes»9). This is done after almost a decade of a different decision in which the University of Salamanca, in 1618, had invested, even requiring the 8

Ibid., p. 656. Oath found in A. PÉREZ, «Un episodio de la historia de la teología española», Razón y fe, 34 (1912) 435-444. 9

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faculty to swear obedience, in favor of teaching the immaculate doctrines, which are closely related to Scotist doctrine10. Franciscans will oppose that oath. Fr. Pedro de Urbina addresses Philip IV with the collaboration of other Franciscans (Fr. Esteban Pérez, Provincial, Fr. José Vázquez, Fr. Francisco de Ocaña, Fr. Miguel de Avellán and Fr. Francisco de Sosa) a letter opposing such oath, as it is clear in a judgment from February 8th, 162811. The so-called Memorial de la religión de San Francisco en defensa de San Buenaventura12, was followed by other writings of members of the Company of Jesus: Respuesta al Memorial de un Maestro13 in which collaborate the priests Jerónimo de Vera, Luis Roa and the priests from the College of Salamanca: Romero, Ripalda, Chacón y Pimentel; along with these the jesuit Juan Bautista Poza writes his Respuesta por la Compañía de Jesús14. But this seemingly hostile environment signals at the beginning of a new scholastic hermeneutics (as one can see in the Jesuit response), a paradigm that forwards the recognition of the via Scoti. It is easy to conclude that in this contest the 18th century is a golden moment for the Convent of Saint Francis the Royal of Salamanca, where the General Study was held. Already in the 16th century, four friars that had participated in the Council of Trent will attend classes in the Convent (Andrés de Vega, Alfonso de Castro, Francisco Salazar and Antonio de Ulloa). The 10 See F. MARCOS, «La Universidad de Salamanca y la Inmaculada», Salmanticensis, 1 (1954) 539-605; M. DE CASTRO, «Impresos inmaculistas del siglo XVII», Archivo Ibero-Americano, 39 (1979) 243-252. 11 L. Wadding reports such judgment. 12 See Memorial de la religión de San Francisco en defensa de San Buenaventura, el subtílísimo Dr. Escoto y otros doctores clásicos de la misma religión, sobre el Juramento que hizo la Universidad de Salamanca de leer y enseñar tan solamente la doctrina de San Agustín, viuda de Luis Sánchez, Madrid 1628. See M. DE CASTRO, «La enseñanza de san Buenaventura en las universidades españolas», in M. DE CASTRO – Á. HUERGA – M. ANDRÉS, San Buenaventura, Conferencias pronunciadas en la Fundación Universitaria Española los días 4 de febrero y 11 y 13 de marzo de 1975 con motivo del centenario del gran teólogo, Fundación Universitaria Española, Madrid 1976, pp. 51-56. 13 See Respuesta al Memorial de un Maestro, con nombre de la Universidad de Salamanca y de las sagradas religiones de Santo Domingo y San Agustín, sobre la concesión del estatuto y juramento de enseñar y leer las doctrinas de San Agustín y Santo Tomás, y no contra ellas. 14 See A. ASTRAIN, Historia de la Compañía de Jesús en la Asistencia de España, Razón y fe, Madrid, Vol. 5, 1916, pp. 180-181.

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17th century will be important for its numbers but even more important if we realize that the participants in the intellectual formation of the Convent (writers, philosophers, preachers and theologians) took an active part in the classes in the University and, because of it, had a more important role within it. Without a doubt, the revitalization of the internal studies is fundamental for its projection in the classroom, and this process acquires even more importance in the Colegio de Alba de Tormes, where Fr. Mateo de Sosa appears. From start, Fr. Mateo de Sosa has an important role in the return to the studies in the Province of Santiago, which will, after his provincial ministry, reorganize the Colegio de Pasantes de Santo Domingo de Silos, known as the Colegio de Alba de Tormes, which is its final dedication. As a provincial, and in the exercise of this function and its responsibilities within the Order, according to the orders of the Provincial Chapter presided by Priest Bernardino de Siena (General Minister of the Order) in Benavente, in January 10th, 1627, Mateo de Sosa is named the first Regent of the prestigious College after the opening of its doors in 162715. In this school, according to the ruling (Constituiciones) given by Fr. Mateo de Sosa as Provincial Minister the Scotist doctrine was taught. Accordingly, students entering the College were administered the Immactulate Oath in obedience to the internal statute, promising, freely, to follow the teaching of Scotus: «[…] seguirán en todo la doctrina de Escoto, según están asentadas sus conclusiones y recibidas comúnmente por la mayor parte de los escritores antiguos que han impreso, sin torcer su mente, puesto que en el modo de defenderlas, se deja a cada uno a su libertad, para que las utilice y formalice con su ingenio, y que protestan que, yendo contra este estatuto, quieren ser privados de sus lectorías o colegiaturas […]. Y porque no haya confusión en arbitrar cada uno cuáles son las opiniones de Escoto, se pondrá un catálogo de todas ellas en cuadernos aparte, que esté en el archivo del colegio, porque se vayan criando sujetos lúcidos que enseñen y defiendan en la Religión la sutilísima y verdadera, y a lo menos probabilísima doctrina de nuestro Sutil Doctor, que ya tantos de otras profesiones públicamente siguen en las Escuelas y con ello se honran y acreditan»16. 15 See Libro de Juras del Colegio de Alba de Tormes, II, ff. 1r-3r, mentioned in M. R. PAZOS, Los estudios franciscanos en la Provincia de Santiago (tratado histórico), Ed. Escuelas Profesionales Sagrado Corazón de Jesús, Madrid 1967, p. 109. 16 Ibid., pp. 118-119. See Ordenaciones y estatutos de la santa provincia de Santiago… ordenados y en mejor modo dispuestos en el capítulo de Benavente, celebrado

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This quote is from the rules of the Colegio de Alba de Tormes and it shows us a clear effort in the direction of a resurgence of Scotist doctrine. It indicates the creation and the consolidation of libraries, as well as the importance of the establishment of a doctrinal corpus regarding the thought of the Subtle Doctor, a corpus based on interpretations born out of a serious and well-ordered ministry. We therefore see that the Scotist effort has a counterpoint in the difficulties that Scotism in Salamanca goes through and the firmly decided renewal of the teaching of it by the Franciscan Order. The internal paramount character of Scotus inside the Franciscan Order is directly opposed to its anecdotal presence in the university classes and in the weak resources available to properly teaching the doctrine of Scotus with competence. This explains, without a doubt, the strong impulse in the thought and doctrine of the Subtle Doctor in the 17th century, as well as the efforts of Fr. Mateo de Sosa in revitalizing the Scotist work. It is no surprise that years later, after the demise of Fr. Mateo de Sosa, during the General Chapter of Toledo, in May 4th, 1633, the primacy of Scotus’ doctrine is unequivocally established. These efforts allowed Scotist doctrine to remain at full strength throughout the 17th century, revitalizing in such a way that when Fr. Alfonso Briceño travels through Spain he is able to note the teaching of Scotus in the Salamancan classrooms. Fr. Mateo de Sosa will then give us an edition of Scotus’ work. This activity is not only noted for its institutional context, but also by an editorial context marked by a development in printing that also affects the texts of the Subtle Doctor. This allowed, during Fr. Mateo de Sosa’s time, a clear flowering in the production of texts that is in reciprocal consonance with the Scotism of the century, as the investment in Scotus’ doctrine needs proper support to make its study possible. Such written, printed, support helps in the advancement of the Subtle Doctor’s thought and in the formation of a structure to the thought ad mentem Scoti, as it will be exemplarily shown in the volume written by Ioannes Poncius17. This moment in the 17th century reedits the effort of extension of the currently known works of Scotus. C. el año del Señor de 1627…, Salamanca, Diego de Cusio 1627, pp. 70-82, apud M. R. PAZOS, «Provinciales compostelanos (siglos XVI-XIX)», Archivo Ibero-Americano, 26 (1966) 182-188. About the constitution see M. DE CASTRO, «Estudio bibliográfico de las Constituciones franciscanas», Archivo Ibero-Americano, 25 (1965) 302-303. 17 See Ioannes Poncius, Integer philosophiae cursus ad mentem Scoti, Roma 1642.

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Balič notes that thirty editions of the Opus oxoniense were printed between 1472 and 168018. Such impulse has its highest point in the edition of the Opera omnia directed by the Franciscan L. Wadding in 163919. In the Iberian Peninsula, the Valencian Damián Giner published in 1598 (and a second edition in 1603) an edition entitled Scriptum oxoniense in quatuor libros sententiarum Ioannis Duns Scoti20. It is also worth mentioning the work of Juan de Rada, a professor in Salamanca and a friar in the province of Santiago, in the 16th century and who, without a doubt, will be in Fr. Mateo de Sosa’s mind, particularly regarding the supernatural thematic21. We can perceive this Scotist environment in the beginning of the work Articulatio et illustratio libri primi Sententiarum Doctoris Subtilissimi. A biographical reference of the Subtle Doctor is brought forth by the work, conducting a panorama of Scotism, recollecting the number of disciples, teachers and doctors in the Scotist tradition in several universities: Paris, Cologne, Oxford, Bologne, and «otras que no conocemos, en el norte». Obvioulsy, the panorama does not forget the «preclarísima universidad de Salamanca»22, where it is noted the existence of chairs for Scotus in Philosophy 18

See C. BALIČ, «Disquisitio historica-critiqua de ordinatione I. Duns Scoti», in Ioannes Duns Scotus, Opera omnia I – Ordinatio: prologus, Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, Civitas Vaticana 1950, pp. 127-130. 19 See J. A. O’SHEA, The Life of Father Luke Wadding, Founder of St. Isidore’s College, M. H. Gill, Dublin 1885; G. CLEARLY, Father Luke Wadding and St. Isidore’s College, Rome. Biographical and Historical Notes and Documents by Gregory Cleary, O.F.M., A Contribution to the Tercentenary Celebrations 1625-1925, Tipografia del Senato di G. Bardi, Roma 1925; F. CASOLINI, Luca Wadding O. F. M., l’annalista dei francescani, Vita Pensiero, Milano 1936; B. JENNINGS (Irish Manuscripts Commission), Wadding Papers, 1614-38, Stationery Office, Dublin 1953; L. MCCLEAN, Father Luke Wadding, Irishman & Franciscan, Assisi Press, Dublin 1956; Franciscan House of Studies (ed.), Father Luke Wadding. Commemorative Volume, Clonmore and Reynolds, Dublin 1957; C. MOONEY, «The Writings of Father Luke Wadding, OFM», Franciscan Studies, 18 (1958) 225-239. Also B. MILLETT, The Irish Franciscans 16511665, Analecta Gregoriana, Roma 1964. 20 See Damián Giner, Scriptum oxoniense in quatuor libros sententiarum Ioannis Duns Scoti ordinis, nunc denuo in commodiorem formam redactum, Álvaro Franci, Valencia 1598 (16032). 21 See B. DE ARMELLADA, «Dos teólogos franciscanos del siglo XVI ante el problema del sobrenatural: Francisco Liqueto y Juan de Rada», Revista Española de Teología, 19 (1959) 373-422. 22 See Mattheo de Sosa, Optata diu articulatio et illustratio, vol. I, § 8 (Vita Scoti, De Scoti discipulis).

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and Theology, as well as the attachment and provision of professors of the University in the Convento Salamantino de San Francisco. Several known authors appear as recognized Scotist scholars such as Pedro Tomás, Álvaro Pelágio, the so called «escoto español» Antonio Andrés, just to mention a few Iberian authors. Some other authors are mentioned, also in the Peninsula, and whom we could call «eclectic», such as Alfonso de Castro, as well as several other authors that could be recognized as having a certain affinity to or at least mention Scotist sources, such as William of Ockham, unsuspect of adherence to Scotism, although the Scotist chair did not remain untouched by nominalistic approaches. It is also interesting to note the mentioning of Scotists from the Santiago province, whom the author highlights by their epitets, the «Sapientísimo maestro Juan de Herrera», a great theologian from Burgos who studied in the convent of San Francisco in Salamanca and who, according to the author, has written «tres libros muy actuales» and who is also reviewing a «cuarto libro escrito en lengua vulgar de doctrina de Escoto»23. He also salutes his professors Juan de Ovando and, above all, the «Ilustrísimo Juan de Rada», a noted Scotist who eventually became archbishop of Trani (1605) and author of «cuatro libros de controversia entre Escoto y el Divino Tomás»24. 2. On the Natural Character of the Knowledge of God: The Context of a Question Articulatio et illustratio libri primi Sententiarum Doctoris Subtilissimi I. D. Scoti, the known work of Fr. Mateo de Sosa, is composed of two 23 DE CASTRO, «Bibliografía de franciscanos escotistas españoles», p. 443, reports the following ones: Disputationes theologicae et commentaria in primum librum Sententiarum subtilis doctoris Scoti, Juan y Andrés Renaut, Salamanca 1589; Disputationes theologicae… in II librum Sententiarum…, Juan y Andrés Renaut, Salamanca 1595 (16002); Manuale theologicum, seu resolutissima dilucidatio principalium quaestionum uae communiter in quattuor libros Sententiarum disputantur, cum principalibus fundamentis opinionum subtilissimi doctoris Scoti et doctoris angelici divi Thomae, Guillemus Facciatus, Roma 1607 (up to seven editions are mentioned). 24 He refers to the work Controversiae theologicae inter S. Thomam et Scotum in quibus pugnantes sententiae referentur, potiores difficultates elucidantur et responsiones ad argumenta Scoti reiiciuntur – Pars I, Juan Fernández, Salamanca 1586; Pars II, Juan Fernández, Salamanca 1599; Pars III, ed. Roderici de Portillo, Ioannes Paulus Profilus, Roma 1614; Pars IV, ed. Bartholomaei Cimarelli, Ioannes Guerilius, Venecia 1617. See I. VÁZQUEZ, «El arzobispo Juan de Rada y el molinismo», Verdad y vida, 20 (1962) 351-396.

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volumes (and is seemingly unfinished or not completely published) in which the thought of Scotus is presented «de forma fiel» but without the articulated and clear form of Thomas Aquinas. It is clear the pedagogical intention in the written style, probably in order to avoid the criticism of the professors in charge of Scotus’ chair whom had seen only vagueness in Scotus’ presentation. The thinking of Scotus, as his accolade indicates, is «subtle, elegant», and this one cannot change notwithstanding changes in the weight of the doctrinal presuppositions of the work with a clear exposition. The first volume of Fr. Mateo de Sosa’s work, as the author himself notes in an epitome, deals with the canonic books, the necessity of theology, the ultimate end of human being, the beatific vision, the fruition, use and other acts of will, the existence and infinitude of God. The complexity of the 871 pages of the volume is evident and motivates a look into the state of affairs of Scotist studies question in the first quarter of the 17th century. We are interested in, more than disclosing a question (an ever-present temptation in this work that invites us to do so), seeing throughout the development of the text a reflex of the Scotism of Fr. Mateo de Sosa in context – as an evidence of Iberian Scotism. In order to do so, we will use as a starting point the small, but nevertheless important, question about «if God may be known by man as his ultimate end» and the further developments of the question25. In what follows we will attempt to point at the thematic and aim superficially to the given formal treatment of the questions. The theme in itself is not new, and is, as a matter of fact, an everpresent theme in theology and in the Franciscan School. The question is about the human nature and the possibility of its encounter with God. This is to ask, in fact, if we are dealing with a natural or supernatural faculty. The question thus affects, in turn, the gratuity of God and seeds the paradox of the natural capacity of contingent human beings having a knowledge of God, given the gratuity of any supernatural divine gift. In short, the paradox supposes the understanding of a natural capacity of perfecting character to reach its end, an end that, on the other hand, exceeds human nature itself and that needs a gratuitous divine gift. An equivalence between natural and supernatural is thus produced, motivating the theologian to consider whether the human capacity of knowledge of its end belongs to one or another position, that is, whether it is natural or supernatural. 25

See Mattheo de Sosa, Optata diu articulatio et illustratio, Vol. I, q. 1, a. 3 sqq., f. 12 sqq.: «Utrum homo possit naturaliter cognoscere Deum finem suum».

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God may be known by human beings through the vision of His presence or through his works. The knowledge of God through his works is the most natural way to reach His knowledge, particularly in the Franciscan attitude. Knowing God in Himself leads us to know Him in His unity and trinity, or through the divine nature of Christ. This knowledge of God is theological knowledge, a supernatural science. Thus is the question of the supernatural science placed in the Franciscan context by Saint Bonaventure, in line with his Masters, particularly Alexander of Hales. The question, considered according to the human capacity, supposes a look into the desire of human beings for their supernatural end. The Seraphic Doctor underlined the desire and the fruition, of anthropological nature, of the supernatural happiness in the good which is God26. Human nature in its Christian perfection, in the Word made flesh, in its supernaturality, has been able to reach the plenitude of its fulfillment, signaling the effective realization of the contingent human aspirations. But although a human being, through his intellective soul, which is created in God’s image and likeness, is capax Dei, he has compromised, because of his vanitas, such a capacity in its fullness. Human being’s gazing to the highest good reveals an aspect of fruition, which is the desire that has its origin in faith as the primordial element of ascension in the order of knowledge and, finally, in contemplation the culmination of the end of human being. It is necessary to believe in order to understand, hence allowing God’s gratuitous influence to supplement the insufficiency of human nature27. The natural human capacity and the supernatural divine gratuity are balanced in the theological explanations. Matthew of Acquasparta and Peter John Olivi are inclined towards preserving divine gratuity, underlining that the capacity of God does not imply a demand of nature. Along with these lines, at the end of the 13th century and beginnings of the 14th, the disputation between philosophers and theologians is ultimately between the natural and supernatural capacities and their role in reaching the ultimate object of knowledge, and, in this sense, the challenge posed by Henry of Ghent leads Scotus’ genius to perform an original turn towards a Franciscan theology, affirming the anthropological possibility of the clear and intuitive knowledge of God 26 See Bonaventura, Opera theologica selecta – Tomus IV: Liber IV Sententiarum, iussu et auctoritate R.mi P. Leonardi M. BELLO, editio minor, Cura PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Acquas (Florentia) 1949, d. 49, p. 1, a. un., q. 2, c. 27 See Bonaventura, Opera theologica selecta – Tomus I: Liber I Sententiarum, iussu et auctoritate R.mi P. Leonardi M. BELLO, editio minor, Cura PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Acquas (Florentia) 1934, d. 8, p. 1, q. 2 (161b).

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outside the parameters of a metaphysical position. Such position might reach knowledge of all knowable things in their abstract forms as theoretical objects («las ciencias especulativas abarcan todas las materias especulables, pero no se extienden a todas las realidades»28); but understanding of the personal character is an object proper of theology. This is so due to divine nature itself. Scotus discharges the tension between the nature of human being and the supernatural gifts, approaching these from a view of freedom. On the one hand, the state of passage, the condition of homo viator present in the aforementioned theories of Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas, in which human beings are attached to the condition of falling into original sin, is in Duns Scotus perspective of a human being pro statu isto released from the guilty complexity of such a condition of the fallen, which, not being denied, has no interference in the consideration of human nature and its natural condition for knowledge, that is, for actualizing its cognitive potency in a way such that human being can satisfy his desire of being able to reach the beatific object of his will. Thus Scotus will write that «El hombre apetece naturalmente el fin que, según piensas es sobrenatural; luego el hombre está naturalmente ordenado al fin sobrenatural; por lo que, conocida esta ordenación, puede demostrarse ese mismo fin, como del conocimiento de la naturaleza puede concluirse el fin al que se ordena»29. In human terms, this is to say that the institution of a natural and a supernatural realm allows us to see the rational boundary of the «natural light of the intellect», that is, to establish the limit of the natural knowledge about supernatural objects, that is, to what point may human nature be called to complement, and to perfect itself in a nature that surpasses it. Seeing whether the natural aspiration of human being, his natural desire of the object which is proper of supernatural nature, may be truly and naturally fulfilled, in a way that will not prevent the development of human being’s proper characteristics as human being, nor prevents, on the side of the object of fruition, the development of its absolute gratuity and freedom. In last analysis, this is about underlining that the supernatural is not understood as counternatural. In order to clarify this anthropological question, Scotus presents us another perspective, accounting and deriving from the distinction between the fulfillment contra naturam or against reason and the actualization of any possible intellect, and properly supra naturam, that is, according to the 28

See Ioannes Duns Scotus, Opera omnia I – Ordinatio: prologus, Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, Civitas Vaticana 1950, p. 1, q. un., n. 82, p. 50. 29 Ibid., p. 1, q. un., n. 23, p. 15.

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perfection of nature. The vanishing point of the theological argument is not situated in human nature, but in the absolutely free nature of God and God’s gifts, and consequently, in the proper characteristics of the aforementioned divinity, that is, the freedom and gratuity that will color the supernatural, exposed in revelation as the perfection of the subject that receives them, as «si se compara el entendimiento posible a la noticia o la intelección actual, no hay respecto del mismo y en sí mismo conocimiento sobrenatural alguno, pues el entendimiento posible se perfecciona naturalmente con todo conocimiento y si inclina naturalmente a todo conocimiento»30. Accordingly, the supernatural appears in the generation of the agent. The perfective potentiality of knowledge is increased in freedom as one desires that end. Such natural desire is inclination of a being towards its perfection31. Such perfection rests in the intuitive vision of God as a natural end of human being. This is happiness that will rest in the immediate union with God, as the desire of a fruition anointed by God, in an ordered will that shall present itself in a free and natural form, as it is released of all necessity born of the evidence of the object and that appears in the reasons of the intellect. Such question is too complex to be exposed here. But it is clear that Scotus had to re-equilibrate those positions in a moment of interpretation of Augustinism since the presuppositions of Aristotelian thought and the tradition that supposes the necessitarianism of the «pagan» philosophy that contrasts to Christian freedom. The natural-supernatural question philosophically affects the epistemological questioning of the faculties of knowledge, theologically affects the attachment of human being and God and anthropologically (in the sense of a philosophical and theological completeness) poses the problem of the radical defence of freedom as a principle of charity which is God Himself. Such context reappears in the 17th century, with a different set of presuppositions, but with the same fundamental urgencies. In Fr. Mateo de Sosa’s time the question on the knowledge of God as an ultimate end reaches a special moment, as the Scotist position on these matters had not always been well received, particularly among nonFranciscan authors, and that stance was strengthened by the controversies around the doctrine of the De auxiliis and the presence of a theology of 30

Ibid., p. 1, q. un., n. 60, p. 37. See Ioannes Duns Scotus, Opera omnia X: Ordinatio IV d. 43 – Ordinatio IV d. 50, Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, Hildesheim 1968 (Reprografischer Nachdruck der Wadding-Ausgabe Lyon 1639), d. 49, q. 10, n. 3. 31

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anthropological pessimism incarnated in Miguel Bayo – who underlines the impossibility of non-baptized individuals in performing good deeds –, and Jansenism, which denied the existence of a pure human nature as well as the statement of a delectatio terrestris proper of human condition and the possibility of a delectatio coelestis reachable through pure faith. The overvaluation of the redeeming grace breaks apart any equilibrium between the natural and the supernatural. This is, therefore, a question that crosses over different schools, and in which the great masters seem to be in agreement regarding the fundamentals. This is, in part, the opinion of Sosa, who follows Scotus and sees in his comments the accordance of Thomas Aquinas, in a didactical and appeasing attempt, in case his master Rada was really capable of underlining the several positions (Thomist and Scotist) on those matters aiming at a conceptual enrichment. Our master will attempt to find common grounds aiming at the importance of underlining a pure human nature in contrast to the one found in Jansenism, thus making possible the fruition of God and its reflection in the natural perfectionability of human being, aiming at the equilibrium between divine gratuity and human freedom, the total freedom of God and the receptivity of human being to be perfected in love. Problems derived from Jansenism and Bayanism added to the polemics around De auxiliis provoke a diversity of opinions between Scotists and non-Scotists and also among Scotists themselves. Scotists are dedicated in maintaining «the metaphysical anthropology and the doctrine of grace without compromising the gratuity and transcendence of the supernatural order»32. It is this effort of reflection on the metaphysical structure of God’s desire on human being’s part (understanding) and its orientation to the immediate union with Him (will), which was approached by Scouts, the main theme for the master Fr. Mateo de Sosa. According to him, and it could not have been put otherwise, human being may naturally understand God as a final end. This interestingly produces a number of articles related to the theme of the natural knowledge of God as the end of human being. The Franciscan follows the exposition of Duns Scotus since a detailed approach unveiled in questions and articulated according to the doctrine of Scotus, and making comments and commenting difficulties in the matters. The questions about the end of 32

See B. DE ARMELLADA, «El problema del sobrenatural en la escuela escotista del siglo XVII», in De doctrina Ioannis Duns Scoti, Acta Congressus Scotistici Internationalis, Oxonii et Edimburgi 11-17 sept. 1966 celebrati, Commissio Scotistica, Roma, Vol. IV, 1968, p. 421.

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human being that are inscribed within the problematic are thus announced: if human being can have knowledge of God (a. 3)33; whether natural reason can know that which is necessary and sufficient for the fulfillment of its end (a. 4)34; whether human being can have knowledge, in a natural form, of separated substances (a. 5)35; whether human being in his current state needs to be inspired in any supernatural doctrine (a. 6)36 – this question assuming two difficulties related to the natural knowledge of human being (dif. 1)37 and the need of salvation in the habit of faith (dif. 2)38; whether the supernatural doctrine simplifies the need for salvation (a. 7)39, which brings up the difficulty of the inclusion of articles of acquired faith by an individual adult without theological knowledge (dif. 3)40; whether the revealed doctrine is supernatural to the intellect, when compared to the proper inclination of the understanding (a. 8)41 – a central question in the theme concerning the relation between natural and supernatural and in which the following difficulties arise: (dif. 4)42 whether the supernatural forms have in themselves supernatural forms, (dif. 5)43; whether the natural potency naturally inclines towards the reception of the supernatural form; (dif. 6)44 whether the clear vision of God is the natural end of the human being, one to which he is naturally inclined. Each article and each answer to the difficulties presupposes a lesson of Scotism and the history of theology. Scotism because the solution offered by the Franciscan friar follows the master faithfully and according to the presuppositions that are identified among the authors in theological alliance to Scotus, since the undisputable affirmation of the fundamental thesis in a particular point: that human being as a perfectible being has a natural relation to the cause of such perfection. Granted that such cause is God, according to the supernatural revelation of the Holy Book, human beings are capax Dei naturally. However, since God 33 See Mattheo de Sosa, Optata diu articulatio et illustratio, vol. I, q. 1, a. 3, ff. 12-18. 34 Ibid., a. 4, ff. 18-21. 35 Ibid., a. 5, ff. 21-27. 36 Ibid., a. 6, ff. 27-47. 37 Ibid., a. 6, dif. 1, ff. 32-40. 38 Ibid., a. 6, dif. 2, ff. 40-47. 39 Ibid., a. 7, ff. 47-49. 40 Ibid., a. 7, dif. 3, ff. 50-62. 41 Ibid., a. 8, ff. 62-97. 42 Ibid., a. 8, dif. 4, ff. 65-71. 43 Ibid., a. 8, dif. 5, ff. 72-81. 44 Ibid., a. 8, dif. 6, ff. 81-97.

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is absolutely transcendent and, paradoxically – though not in contradiction – an absolutely gratuitous gift for human being and, therefore, naturally unreachable, his natural end is only fulfilled supernaturally. Human being in his actual condition has as a natural end God, the cause of his perfection which is realized in the beatific vision and the blessed life. Scotists, including Fr. Mateo de Sosa, will struggle to underline the natural appetite of human beings towards the supernatural without reducing its passive naturality to the potency of obedience according to Thomas Aquinas, which, by refering to the effects or acts that can only be made and received in the thing or subject by means of a supernatural force, turns distant of the natural potency and splits both realms. The inclination of nature, which is pure nature, is an intrinsic principle of effective ordination. Very well, as we have previously mentioned, our author does not properly address the difficulties that pure nature brings with itself to our understanding of the natural appetite45. Concluding Remarks In spite of the difficulties and limitations, Fr. Mateo de Sosa was present in a fundamental time for the development of Scholasticism in its new “flowering” period. The metaphysical potentiality of the Scotist doctrine can now in a new philosophical, metaphysical and theological context recover the profound significance of its principles and further its extension to the anthropological problem of grace. The theological echoes of such discussions by Fr. Mateo de Sosa are still actual, and the penetrating philosophical debates within his works invites the actualization of such topics. His comments are without a doubt yet another episode of a legacy that deserves to be recovered if we indeed wish to build a true and complete history of thinking, and not a mere ideological collage disguised as history of philosophy. A history of thinking that has reflexes, approximations, and also distances in the extension of the extra-peninsular Iberian world and that underline that a new academic structure also implies new hermeneutics, new problems and a symbolic problem that deserves to be studied comparatively, as the mark of reflection of the scholastica colonialis46. 45

See DE ARMELLADA, «El problema del sobrenatural», p. 428. See R. H. PICH – M. LÁZARO PULIDO – A. S. CULLETON (eds.), Ideas sin fronteras en los límites de las ideas – Ideias sem fronteiras nos limites das ideias. Scholastica colonialis: status quaestionis, Instituto Teológico «San Pedro de Alcántara» de Cáceres (UPSA) – Diócesis de Coria-Cáceres, Cáceres 2012. 46

ROBERTO JUAN KATAYAMA OMURA* LORDS OF THE SKY: THE CHIEF COSMOGRAPHERS AND THE WORLD SYSTEM IN PERUVIAN VICE-ROYALTY

Introduction: The Chief Cosmographer When the Spaniards arrived on the American coast and started their conquest of the continent, deep sea voyaging played a role not only in exploration and territorial control but also in relation to navigation, safety, dominion of the seas and interconnection between Spanish America and the Iberian Peninsula. In this context, navigation charts and the study of the sky played an important role in an era when the stars were the only guides at sea and when the lives of passengers and the development of overseas trade depended on the skills of navigators. Aware of the strategic importance of having competent navigators, the position of «Chief Navigator» was created by royal decree in Spain, Americo Vespucio being the first to be appointed, on March 22, 1507. The main functions of the «Chief Navigator» were «to assess and promote navigators, approve charts and instruments, predict the phases of the moon, calculate eclipses and organize cosmographical charts»1. As explorations increased, so did the importance of maps of the new territories and charts of the sea routes to reach them, in 1519 the position of “Master of Charts” was created, being assigned to Nuño García de Torres. The main function of this position was to make geographical maps of the new territories and to draw up navigation charts. Over time, both positions were unified thus creating the position of “Chief Cosmographer and Master of Charts”, with Diego Ribero being the first to hold this office. As overseas navigation increased, requiring more staff to be trained specifically for the job, an Art of Navigation and Cosmography Course was created in Seville in 1552 to train and then assess future navigators2. * Professor of Philosophy at the Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, Av. Universitaria / Calle Germán Amézaga 375, Edificio Jorge Basadre, Ciudad Universitaria Lima, Perú. [email protected] 1 Cf. J. ORTIZ SOTELO, «Los cosmógrafos mayores del Perú en el siglo XVII», Boletín del Instituto Riva Agüero, 24 (1997) 310 (369-389). 2 Ibid.

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1. The Chief Cosmographers of the Vice-Royalty of Peru Because of the increase in overseas traffic, the demand for navigators grew so much (especially in America) that not enough were graduating in Spain to satisfy it; this is why most of the time navigators were recruited from our continent without the proper skills, causing shipwrecks due to their inexperience. For this reason, during the government of the Prince of Esquilache (1615-1621) in the Vice-Royalty of Peru, the position of «Chief Cosmographer of the Kingdom» was created, having the same purpose as its Hispanic counterpart: training and assessing deep sea navigators as well as making maps, drawing up charts and making astronomical observations, etc. In the 17th century, there were five Chief Cosmographers of the Kingdom: Lucas de Quirós (1618-1634), Francisco de Quirós (16191645), Diego de León (1645-1661), Francisco Ruiz Lozano (1662-1677) and Juan Ramón Conning (1678-1708)3. During the time of Ruiz Lozano, the position of Chief Cosmographer of the Kingdom was incorporated into that of Principal Professor of Mathematics, because navigation, astronomy and mathematical calculation were related and both positions complemented each other. Federico Schwab, in his famous article «Los Almanaques Peruanos» («Peruvian Almanacs»)4, mentioned that during the remaining colonial period (the 18th century and the first two decades of the 19th century) the cosmographers were: Pedro de Peralta Barnuevo (1709-1743), José de Mosquera y Villarroel (17441749), Juan Rer (1750-1756), Cosme Bueno (1757-1798), Gabriel Moreno (1799-1809), José Gregorio Paredes (1809-1810), Francisco Romero (1811-1813) and, again, José Gregorio Paredes (1814-1825).

2. Sources There are no extant publications about cosmography that mention the first three Chief Cosmographers in the Peruvian Kingdom, Lucas de Quirós (1618-1634), Francisco de Quirós (1619-1645) and Diego de León (16453

Ibid. Cf. F. SCHWAB, «Los almanaques peruanos ¿1680?-1874», Separata del Boletín Bibliográfico, 21:19 (1948) 1-2, 84-86. 4

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1661). In 1665, Francisco Ruiz Lozano published a work about astronomy and astrology in the aftermath of what was believed to be a comet that was observed in Lima between late 1664 and early 1665. That work is known as Tratado de Cometas (A Treatise on Comets)5. However, after Conning’s appointment as Cosmographer an annual paper was published in which the Chief Cosmographer of the Kingdom reported on the weather during the year (maximum and minimum temperatures, rainfall, etc.), forecasted the phases of the moon, eclipses and other astronomical phenomena, and published astronomical charts calculated for the Lima meridian, among other duties. During the Conning period it was called «Lunario: Pronostico de temporales, y accidentes particulares de los astros» («Lunar Phases: Forecast of storms and particular accidents of the stars»6. When Pedro de Peralta was appointed as Cosmographer, this publication changed its name to «El conocimiento de los tiempos» («The Knowledge of the Weather»), keeping this title up to 1798. From 1799 and during the remaining colonial period, it was called «Almanaque peruano y guía de forasteros» («Peruvian Almanac and Foreigners Guide»)7. The following sections will mainly address the Tratado de cometas by Ruiz Lozano as well as different copies of El Conocimiento de los tiempos and Almanaque peruano y guía de forasteros.

3. The World System a. Francisco Ruiz Lozano (1662-1677) An analysis of his book Tratado de cometas has enabled us to show that the astronomical paradigm followed by Ruiz Lozano was that proposed by Tycho Brahe as an alternative to Copernicanism, in order to explain observed phenomena and solve the serious anomalies observed in the traditional Ptolemaic system. 5 The full title of the book by Francisco Ruiz Lozano is Tratado de cometas, observacion, y ivivio del que se vio en esta civdad de los Reyes, y generalmente en todo el Mundo, por los fines del año de 1664. Y principios deste de 1665. Compuesto por el Capitan Francisco Rviz Lozano Cosmografo mayor deste Reyno, y Cathedratico de Prima de Mathematicas en esta Ciudad, Lima. 6 Cf. ORTIZ SOTELO, «Los cosmógrafos mayores del Perú», p. 382. 7 Cf. SCHWAB, «Los almanaques peruanos», p. 84.

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Brahe’s system was geocentric, as was the Ptolemaic one, except that in the Ptolemaic system all the planets (including the Sun) revolved around the Earth in circular orbits; in the Tychonic system the five planets then known (Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn) revolved around the Sun in circular orbits while the Sun also revolved in a circular orbit around the Earth. Two crucial paragraphs allow us to establish that the world system that Francisco Ruiz Lozano is using is Tycho Brahe’s. In the first paragraph he mentioned that planets orbit close to, or far from, the center of the Earth: «The first move is of the Apogee and Perigee of the Planets that move according to the succession of Signs by means of speed or delay of movement, moving from one place to another; sometimes they are so high and far from the Earth and others they are so close in different Signs of the Zodiac»8.

In the second one, he mentions that all the planets are connected to the Sun and move in relation to it. «[…] the movement of the Sun’s eccentricity in relation to which not only Venus and Mercury, whose movements are the same of the Sun, but also the other Planets, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars and the Moon, move their eccentricities to the same point because in accordance with the current Theory of Planetary Systems they are linked to the Sun in such a way that they only move in relation to it»9.

Planets coming closer to, or moving away from, the Earth while moving around their orbits and being simultaneously related to the Sun orbiting around it, is only possible in Brahe’s geocentric system. b. Juan Ramón Conning (1678-1708) We have not being able to find any of Conning’s Lunarios, but taking into consideration his biographical data, his academic training, the fact that his predecessor and successor as Cosmographers were followers of Tycho Brahe and, finally, a famous letter to the Jesuit astronomer 8 9

Cf. Francisco Ruiz Lozano, Tratado de cometas, p. 14. Ibid., p. 16.

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Atanacio Kircher, it is quite probable that he was also a follower of Tycho Brahe. However, we would have to find the works of Conning to confirm that. c. Pedro de Peralta Barnuevo (1709-1743) As a disciple of Conning, Pedro de Peralta was also a follower of Tycho Brahe. In the book El conocimiento de los tiempos written in 1742 for 1743 and therefore published in the year of his death, he described himself as geocentric when he held that the Earth «is the only thing immobile in the Universe»10. With that in mind, we have yet to establish which of the two big geocentric systems of the Universe was followed by Peralta Barnuevo: that of the Alexandrian astronomer Claudius Ptolemy or that of the Danish nobleman Tycho Brahe. Two paragraphs of his work offer the key to the issue. In the first one, he mentions that the Sun’s orbit is smaller than Jupiter’s and Saturn’s orbits: «These are great aspects since they are related to greater Planets, higher than the Sun and slow moving […]»11. However, this paragraph itself is not enough, since in the Ptolemaic system the Sun’s orbit is also smaller than orbit of the the planets mentioned. The second paragraph showed below gives us a better notion. In it Peralta holds that the Earth is not the center of the planetary orbits: «The center of the Circles or Orbits formed by the Planets own movements is not the Earth; therefore they are called Eccentric […]»12. In which of these geocentric systems can the Earth be the center of the universe but not necessarily the center of the planetary orbits at the same time? Of the two existing geocentric systems, only the Tychonic system does this, since the center of the planetary orbits is the Sun itself, which should orbit around the Earth. d. José de Mosquera y Villarroel (1744-1749) Just like his predecessor, he was also a follower of Brahe. In the book El conocimiento de los tiempos for 1745 but written at the end of 1744, he defends geocentrism and criticizes Copernicus: «The immense machine of Skies, the magnificent masses of stars […] they move unceasingly fast 10

Cf. Pedro de Peralta Barnuevo, El conocimiento de los tiempos, Lima 1742. Ibid. 12 Cf. Pedro de Peralta Barnuevo, Lima fundada, Lima 1732, pp. 351-352. 11

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[…]. Even in the Earth itself, despite the immobility of its position (denied by Copernicus)»13. On the other hand, in the same book when referring to weather, he says that planets are sometimes near the Earth and sometimes far from it: «It will be during the moderate summer and the excessively cold winter because all Planets are at their apogee or far from the Earth»14. And this is only possible in the Tychonic geocentrism where, as planets orbit around the sun and this orbits the Earth, sometimes their orbits take them closer to it or further from it. e. Juan Rer (1750-1756) In the book El conocimiento de los tiempos for 1752 but written at the end of 1751, he makes his geocentrism obvious when he holds that the Earth is the last sphere and is in the center of the universe: «[…] I also wanted to wander sometimes from the greater to this very small sphere […] since heavy bodies fall down quickly seeking their center in that of the Earth»15. In this book he also mentions the problems associated with calculating the planets’ positions from a geocentric point of view and quotes Vicente Tosca, a follower of Brahe: «The work of finding out the orbits of planets was not easy […] it has several anomalies or inequalities; sometimes they are slow and at others they are fast, sometimes they go in a straight line according to the signs sometimes they do not […] I beg you to see what Doctor Vicente Tosca has to say […]»16. The work of Brahe, contrary to what is believed now, was widely accepted at the time since he incorporated the latest measurements and observations but kept the old geocentric structure: «[…] A Danish nobleman and one of the world’s greatest Astronomers […] he followed this latest opinion and, seeing that the Ptolemaic system cannot be true because it does not correspond to observations, he created a new one that is known as the Tychonic system, being well accepted throughout Europe»17. 13

Cf. José de Mosquera y Villarroel, El conocimiento de los tiempos, Lima 1744. Ibid. 15 Cf. Juan Rer, El conocimiento de los tiempos, Lima 1751. 16 Ibid. 17 Cf. Jorge Juan, Observaciones astronómicas, y phisicas hechas de orden de S. Mag. en los Reynos del Perú por D. Jorge Juan. Comendador de Aliaga en el Orden de S. Juan, Socio Correspondiente de la R. Acaddemia de las Ciencias de París, y 14

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Jorge Juan, one of the two Spanish army officers who accompanied the French physicist and astronomer Charles de la Condamine in his expedition to America, wrote the above paragraph about Tycho Brahe. It seems that at the time Jorge Juan and Antonio Ulloa published their Observaciones astronómicas, the famous Copernican revolution was not yet completely over, because in its prologue they insist that observations by them during their stay in America demonstrate the accuracy of the heliocentric system: «Among the geometrical experiences and demonstrations exhibited in this Work, there are some that favor the System generally known as Copernican»18. f. Cosme Bueno (1757-1798) It seems that in this period would see a slow change in the world’s prevailing thinking about astronomy in Vice-Royalty of Peru because of the influence of Newton, which can be observed in some of his own texts and his pupils’ testimony. Thus, for example, he agrees with the thesis of the Newtonian David Gregori in relation to the negative effects that comets may have on the Earth: «If these vapors, adds David Gregori the famous Newtonian, diffused by those large spaces reach us, they may alter the Air […] causing much damage to the plant and animal kingdoms […]»19. On the other hand, Gabriel Moreno, a disciple of Cosme Bueno and his successor as cosmographer would support the influence of Newton’s Theory of Universal Gravitation in his master’s thinking: «When talking about Newton’s physicists, he said that the Members of the Paris Academy sent to Peru were apostles of the English physicist, familiar with what they would preach in favor of attraction»20. On the other hand, Moreno himself held that Cosme Bueno was the first Newtonian astronomer in the Vice-Royalty of Peru: «The first proselyte of Newton in Peru who acquired the rule and accuracy of his spirit by studying it»21. However, despite these references from his pupils, the textual evidence found in Cosme Bueno’s own books is not as strong as it seems, as in some paragraphs he seems to disagree with the Newtonians; D. Antonio de Ullo, de la R. Sociedad de Londres, amos Capitanes de Fragata de la R. Armada. De las quales se deduce la figura y magnitud de la Tierra, y se aplica a la navegación, Juan de Zúñiga, Madrid 1748, f. 2. 18 Ibid., f. 1. 19 Cf. Cosme Bueno, El conocimiento de los tiempos, Lima 1756. 20 Cf. José Gabriel Moreno, Almanaque peruano y guía de forasteros, Lima 1798. 21 Ibid.

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for example, in El Conocimiento de los tiempos, of 1758 (written in 1757) he quotes a famous Newtonian astronomer while expressing some doubts about the calculation of comet orbits made using Newton’s system: «Three comets are predicted to return more than 50 years hence; those are the ones that appeared in 1531, in 1660 and in 1680. The first one, according to the Newtonian calculation, should return this year, 1758 […]. I do not guarantee the accuracy of his calculations for reasons that have been discussed many times»22.

In one passage of the same book, where he discusses how a comet could have a negative effect on our planet, he holds that this can happen especially if the comet passes between the Sun and the Earth because it would be closer to us: «From what we have said so far, it can be deduced that if the prediction is verified, we may expect thereafter some alterations resulting from its malignant influence, especially if it passes between the Sun and the Earth, and as we are closer, we will be further affected […]»23.

This is not possible in the Ptolemaic system since we find the orbits of the Moon, Mercury and Venus between the Sun and the Earth. Neither is it possible in the heliocentric system since the orbits of Mercury and Venus lie between the Sun and the Earth. However, in Tycho Brahe’s system it is possible for a comet to pass between the Sun and the Earth and for it to be closer to us than to the other planets because in this system, the Earth is the center of the universe around which the Sun orbits first, the other planets orbiting around the Sun. Therefore in this system, if a comet passes between the Sun and us it is obviously closer to the Earth. With this, Bueno declares himself to be a follower of Tychonic geocentrism. Thus, it seems that there is widespread eclecticism in relation to Bueno (as in Rer); he appears to accept some aspects of the modern Newtonian’s thesis but for others, such as the world system, he seems to be a follower of Brahe. As his own pupil Gabriel said, «When D. Cosme was old he laughed at all the systems»24. 22

Cf. Cosme Bueno, El conocimiento de los tiempos, 1757. Ibid. 24 Cf. José Gabriel Moreno, Almanaque peruano y guía de forasteros. 23

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In relation to this, we could argue that a heterodox reading of Newton’s Principia could find the basis for this cosmological eclecticism, for example in Book III, in the chapter called «The Phaenomena», Newton says: «The fixed stars being supposedly at rest, the periodic times of the five primary planets and of the Sun around the Earth or of the Earth around the Sun, are in the 3/2 proportion of their mean distances from the Sun»25. Newton then explains this with the following phrase: «this proportion found by Kepler is well-known by all of us for the periodic times are the same and the dimensions of orbits are the same whether the Sun revolves around the Earth or the Earth revolves around the Sun»26. Hence the correctness of Kepler’s position as well as Brahe’s position can apparently be inferred for the purposes of pure calculation. Cosme Bueno appears to have followed Newton in some aspects but in others, especially in relation to cosmic ontology, he still seemed to be a follower of classic tradition. In this regard, Carlos Carcelén, a historian from San Marcos University, has found a text – the topic of his next doctoral dissertation – about the subjects discussed in the Mathematics Prime Course of 1753, it was written by Cosme Bueno and it refers to Descartes’, Newton’s and Leibniz’s calculations. g. Gabriel Moreno (1799-1809) This disciple of Bueno was definitely a follower of Newton, in the light of what we have found out. Thus, in the book Almanaque peruano y guía de forasteros published at the end of 1799 and corresponding to 1800, he holds that in relation to astronomy, during the last two centuries a revolution had occurred that ended with Newton’s law of universal gravitation: «In the last two centuries progress has been so fast due to the accuracy of Newton’s observations and the application of his principles to Kepler’s laws»27. Furthermore, the relevance of the Kepler-Newton system, in the words of Moreno, is because «today it is the accepted system in Astronomy, which fortunately explains all celestial phenomena»28. This leads to Moreno 25 Cf. Isaac Newton, Principios matemáticos de la filosofía natural, Alianza Editorial, Lima 2011, p. 622. 26 Ibid., p. 623. 27 Cf. José Gabriel Moreno, Almanaque peruano y guía de forasteros, Lima 1799. 28 Ibid.

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recognizing the contributions of Descartes, Kepler, Leibniz and Newton to the development of mathematics and astronomy29 . h. Francisco Romero (1811-1813) Romero was Cosmographer from 1811 to 1813, being responsible for drafting the copies of Almanaque peruano y guía de forasteros for 1812, 1813 and 1814 (again, we have to remember that, as it was explained before, the copies of this book used to be written the year before, so that the exemplar for 1814 was written in 1813). However, we could only find and review the text written in 1813, for 1814, and unfortunately this text, found in the National Library in Lima, is incomplete and badly damaged by fire. The text suggests that he was a follower of Newton because, when talking about the different movements of the moon, he quotes Copernicus, Newton, Halley and other authors and agrees with them30. However, as we have explained before, we cannot say definitely that this is so. i. José Gregorio Paredes (end of 1809 - end of 1810; 1814-1825) Paredes was the last cosmographer of the Vice-Royalty and the first of the Republic of Peru because, although he held the office the first time only for a year (end of 1809 - end of 1810), he returned as cosmographer in 1814 and remained as such until his death in 1825. In the book Almanaque peruano y guía de forasteros written in 1809 for 1810, he praised the Law of Universal Gravitation: «[…] Astronomy […] is divided into the geometric and physical: the first studies the movements themselves, so to speak; the other […] is known as celestial mechanics and is but the development of the immortal discovery of universal gravitation»31. On the other hand, the text of Almanaque peruano y guía de forasteros for 1821, the last year of the Vice-Royalty period, holds that the Earth is not more than a «wandering spot in space»32. He also says that to explain seasons and the diversity of the weather, it is a mistake to consider only terrestrial causes, but the mutations of solar mass, «first principle of heat 29 30 31

Cf. José Gabriel Moreno, Almanaque peruano y guía de forasteros, Lima 1805. Cf. Francisco Romero, Almanaque peruano y guía de forasteros, Lima 1813. Cf. José Gregorio Paredes, Almanaque peruano y guía de forasteros, Lima

1809. 32

1820.

Cf. José Gregorio Paredes, Almanaque peruano y guía de forasteros, Lima

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and seasonal constitution», should also be included33. Thus he also declares himself to be a Newtonian.

4. Why Does Classic Astronomical Tradition Persist? Some Clues Why, while in Europe the Copernican revolution had triumphed by the first half of the 18th century, did it take a fifty years more to become accepted in the Vice-Royalty of Peru? We believe this is so because of at least the following four reasons. We thought at first that this was so because debates on science and astronomy provoked only a utilitarian interest in Peru as astronomy had arrived from Europe and developed in Peru from a pragmatic or practical point of view. Thus, if the old geocentric paradigm still worked for deep sea navigation, why should it be changed? Secondly, a heterodox reading of Newton’s own book made possible a geocentric interpretation of some of his theses; therefore, as we have already seen, American readers could adopt the most accurate measurements and calculation tools provided by the Principia without necessarily having to ascribe to his heliocentrism. Thirdly, the education offered both at higher schools and San Marcos University was strongly influenced by classic science. Fourthly, the change from geocentrism to heliocentrism was not only a change in position or readjustment of the stars. Moving the Earth from the center of the universe meant not only placing the Sun in it, but also meant changing the very concept of «planet» and at the same time the appearance of a new «star» concept (different from the fixed «stars» of the last sphere). This meant renouncing the natural order of things and the four terrestrial elements. As a result, we think that Brahe’s thesis was widely accepted in the Vice-Royalty of Peru. Brahe’s solution made it possible to save the phenomena, adapt a paradigm in crisis such that it explained anomalies never anticipated by him, but which, in spite of that, remained in force, if not in its original form – the Ptolemaic scheme is different from Brahe’s – at least in its spirit. Perhaps that is why Galileo, in his Dialogue concerning the Two Chief World Systems assimilated Brahe into Ptolemy’s traditional concept. Otherwise it would have meant giving up almost two millennia of science. 33

Ibid.

ANDRÉS VIAL* THE PHILOSOPHICAL ECLECTICISM OF JUAN EGAÑA RISCO (1768-1836): A COMMENT TO HIS TRACTATUS DE RE LOGICA

Introduction The figure of Juan Egaña Risco (1768-1836) is fundamental and essential in the process of independence of Chile in the early nineteenth century. It is essential, we believe, in two senses: first, because he had an active participation in politics during the early years of the newly founded Republic of Chile and, on the other, because he played an important role in the development of new ideas and projects in a country that was beginning to take its first steps. As the British historian Simon Collier1 says, «[…] the distinctive qualities of Juan Egaña’s political outlook made him the great original of the Chilean revolution, and one of the more interesting Latin American theorists of the period of independence». Egaña not only had an active political participation in the process of independence of Chile, he also was an enlightened person who wrote extensively on various topics, including philosophy. Among those philosophical works, Egaña wrote a Treatise on Logic that was aimed at students of the newly founded National Institute. This work, written in Latin and published in 1827 in Chile, had by title Tractatus de re logica, metaphysica et morali2, and is, according to the Chilean historian Ivan Jaksic3, «the first text written in Chile after the Independence».

*

Ph.D. student, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. [email protected] Cf. S. COLLIER, Ideas and Politics of Chilean Independence 1808-1833, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1967, p. 285. 2 Cf. Juan Egaña, Tractatus de re logica, metaphisica, et morali: pro filiis et alumnis Instituti Nacionalis Jacobo Politanae Erudiendis, Tipus Raymundi Rengifo, Santiago 1827. 3 Cf. I. JAKSIC, «Racionalismo y fe: la filosofía en Chile en la época de Andrés Bello», Historia, 29 (1995-1996) 95 (89-123). 1

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Except for a comment from the Jesuit priest and historian Walter Hanisch4 of no more than four pages, along with a couple of mentions of some few other authors, this work has remained quite forgotten, despite its obvious historical importance. The following paper seeks, in that sense, to bring into light such philosophical work, which, together with its aforementioned historical significance, can also illuminate us a little bit more about the philosophical ideas that prevailed in Chile at the time of the Independence. From the analysis of the text in itself, we’ll try to clarify the fundamental characteristics of the work of Egaña, and, as we shall try to show, the Tractatus de re logica of Juan Egaña may be identified within a philosophical movement that emerged in Latin America during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, called eclecticism. I divided the paper in two major parts or sections. In the first part I present the historical and philosophical background of Egaña’s thought, which stresses the influence of the catholic enlightenment in his thought, as well as the philosophical eclecticism. In the second part, in turn, I present an analysis of the Tractatus de re logica of Juan Egaña, following the natural division of the work. 1. First Part: Historical and Philosophical Background Juan Egaña Risco wasn’t only an active politician in the sphere of praxis; he also played an important role in the sphere of ideas during the period of the Independence of Chile. He participated actively, for example, in the creation of a government plan commissioned by Don Mateo de Toro y Zambrano. He also developed several constitutional projects, including the famous moralist Constitution of 1823. The intellectual relevance of Egaña on these issues is once again reflected in the words of Collier5, stating that «the exponents of the revolutionary ideology were patriotic propagandists rather than speculative thinkers, but even on this level the Chileans produced nothing to compare with Common Sense or The Federalist. An exception in some respects to this general tendency – as to so many others – was Juan Egaña». 4

Cf. W. HANISCH, La filosofía de don Juan Egaña, Universidad Católica de Chile – Instituto de Historia, Santiago de Chile 1964. 5 Cf. COLLIER, Ideas and Politics, p. 130.

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According to the Chilean historian Mario Góngora, in some of the writings of Juan Egaña it is possible to identify certain elements that would reflect the influence of the catholic enlightenment on the author6. He mentions, for instance, that in his Reflections on the Best System of Education that Can Be Given to the Youth of Chile (1811), Egaña conceives religion not as a speculative theology, but much more as a moral. This moralistic accent, says Góngora7, «is marked on the condemnation, as repeated so many times by Pascal, against the lax moral theologians». Another example of the influence of the catholic enlightenment on Egaña’s work, says Góngora, is his Constitutional Project of the State of Chile that he wrote in 1811. In this project, Egaña develops different dispositions «regalistas» that were characteristic of the catholic enlightenment. A third and last example that also Góngora mentions is the foundation of the National Institute together with the Seminary of Santiago. Egaña played an important role in the foundation of the National Institute, and the union of both establishments reflects, according to Góngora8, the spirit of Egaña «that education was uniform and did not intervene difference between the priesthood and the State». Another feature that characterizes the catholic enlightenment is its philosophical eclecticism. The ideal of the eclectic philosophy is to seek the truth avoiding any bias about the different ways of thinking. The title of eclectic is given, says María del Carmen Rovira9, «or what is the same of philosophers free of sectarianism and prejudices, to those who wanted to seek the truth and accept it there where it was offered to the right understanding and mind». This way of understanding philosophy made that the philosophical eclecticism could emerge throughout history in times of changes and ideological transformations. That is why this form of doing philosophy can also be identified among certain authors during the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, not only in the Iberian Peninsula but also in Latin America. 6

The «catholic enlightenment», according to Mario Góngora, was a kind of thought that appeared mainly in France in the seventeenth century, and where the basic ideas were «a Cartesian philosophy, a criticism of the Maurists, Jansenism and Gallicanism»; cf. M. GÓNGORA, Estudios de historia de las ideas y de historia social, Ediciones Universitarias, Valparaíso 1980, p. 110. 7 Ibid., p. 187. 8 Ibid., p. 191. 9 Cf. M. ROVIRA, Eclécticos portugueses del siglo XVIII y algunas de sus influencias en América, El Colegio de México, México 1958, p. 12.

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Within this movement, the Portuguese eclectics played an important role, and its influence spread not only in the Iberian Peninsula but also in Latin America. Among such authors we should mention the Portuguese Luis Antonio Verney (known as the Barbadiño). Several Latin Americans authors were very much influenced by him, including, for instance, the Mexican Benito Díaz de Gamarra. In his Elementa philosophiae recentioris, Gamarra «transcribes complete paragraphs» of the logic10 and metaphysics of the Barbadiño, says Bravo11. Another who displays his admiration for Verney is Francisco Eugenio de Santa Cruz y Espejo from Ecuador who, being one of the main representatives of the Enlightenment in America, shares many features with Verney. As Bravo12 says, Verney’s influence in Latin America is «almost comparable to that of Benito Jerónimo Feijoo». Juan Egaña also seems to be a great admirer of the Portuguese; not only the True Method but also the De re logica of Verney were in Egaña’s personal library13.

2. Analysis of the Tractatus de re logica of Juan Egaña The full name of Egaña’s course of logic is Treatise of Logic, Metaphysics and Moral, in Order to Educate the Children and Students of the National Institute of Santiago. Just a quick look to the title is needed to notice the influence of the Barbadiño on Egaña’s work. Although the title promises a metaphysic and a moral, the final edition of the book only considered the logic. The Tractatus de re logica of Egaña can be divided into three main sections, depending on the topics covered. The first part consists, as was customary among eclectic writers, in a little history of logic. This story has no more than seven pages and it follows quite literally the story of Verney’s treatise. In the second section, and which seems to be the principal 10 Cf. Luis Antonio Verney, De re logica ad usum lusitanorum adolescentium, In officina Viduae Josephi de Orga, Valentiae Hedetanorum 1768. 11 Cf. B. BRAVO, «Verney y la ilustración católica y nacional en el mundo de habla castellana y portuguesa», Historia, 21 (1986) 103 (55-109). 12 Ibid., p. 107. 13 Cf. C. SALINAS, «La biblioteca de don Mariano Egaña, con especial referencia a sus libros de Derecho», Revista de estudios históricos-jurídicos, 7 (1982) 389-540.

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part of the Tractatus, Egaña «happens to treat logic in itself»14. Here, although the plan that Egaña uses is the one of the Logic of Port Royal, he focuses, however, on the problem of the origin of ideas, a critical issue for such authors. Finally, in the third and final section, Egaña introduces a set of definitions and scholastic terms «adapted for the use in school»15. Remarkably, a significant number of these definitions and terms seem to have been taken from the work of the Jesuit Miguel de Viñas (1642-1718), Philosophia scholastica. For the eclectic philosophers, says Rovira16, «every book of philosophy, every document which treated any kind of study, should carry on its front pages, as a necessary introduction, a historical record of the matter in question». Following this idea, Egaña also begins his treatise in the first part, just like the Lusitanian Verney, with a little history of logic. It is divided in two chapters: the first called A Brief History of Logic, and the second Logic of the Arabs and the Christians. The first part is basically about Greek logic or dialectic, which takes no more than two and a half pages. In the second part, in turn, Egaña mentions scholastic philosophers in a very tangential way, focusing afterwards in some Renaissance authors like Valla, Agricola, the Spanish Vives and the Italian Nizolius, because they, says Egaña, «condemned the inadequacies of the Scholastics». Then he rescues the French Petrus Ramus because he had challenged Aristotle’s philosophy. He names afterwards Bacon, Gassendi and the clarissimus Descartes, and also mentions the school of Port Royal and his famous treatise on Logic, Malebranche, John Locke and finally the French Condillac, to whom Egaña offers several compliments. In the History of Logic that Egaña develops, one can clearly see the influence of the Lusitanian Verney. If we make a comparative analysis of the texts, we’ll see that the similarities among them are evident or obvious. Egaña cites, for example, in the same order as the Barbadiño, the different philosophical schools of the antiquity. Though Egaña is more synthetic than Verney, one can see that the first is quoting the second one. Despite the similarities between both authors, however, Egaña does not copy literally from Verney’s text, a practice quite common at that time. Unlike what Díaz Gamarra makes, for example, who copied complete paragraphs of the 14

Cf. HANISCH, La filosofía de don Juan Egaña, p. 41. Cf. Juan Egaña, Tractatus de re logica, p. 36. 16 Cf. ROVIRA, Eclécticos portugueses, p. 91. 15

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Lusitanian author, Egaña did modifications and synthesis of De re logica of Verney, in order to produce a suitable compendium for students of the National Institute. In the second part of the Treatise of Logic, and which seems to be the principal part of the text, the general division follows the plan of the Logic of Port Royal, namely that in addition to the three chapters traditionally developed, corresponding to the three acts of the mind (perception, judgment and reasoning), a fourth chapter is added in relation to the method. Both in form and in content there are significant similarities between this part of Egaña’s work and others Hispanic American authors of that era, such as the Peruvian Isidoro de Celis. The existence of such similarities between these authors, admittedly eclectic, together with the influence of authors as different as Descartes on the one hand, and Locke and Condillac on the other, confirm, once again, the argument in favor of Egaña’s eclecticism in his Tractatus de re logica. «The idea or perception is the first thought of the mind» (Idea, sive perceptio, est prima cogitatio intellectus); that is how Egaña begins his comment of the first operation of the soul. Just as the empiricist tradition, perception is the first operation of the mind, without which no later thought would be possible. As noted before, Egaña talks indifferently between perception and idea. Though Egaña does not make a distinction between both concepts, it is important to have in mind that perception corresponds to the action or faculty of the soul that knows, and idea is rather the representation of what is perceived in the mind or in the intellect. Isidoro de Celis explains this difference better, when he says: «It is called perception the knowledge of anything, and as the knowledge expresses and represents the image of the thing perceived, it is also called idea. But there is a difference. Perception involves the action of the soul that knows, and idea connotes more especially the thing perceived, because it is the representation of the thing in the mind» 17.

17 Cf. Isidoro de Celis, Elementa philosophiae, quibus accedunt principia mathematica verae physicae prorsus necessaria, ad usus academicos scholaris, ac religiosae juventutis collegii Limani Sanctae Mariae Bonae Mortis, Apud Isidorum a Hernandez Pacheco, Typogr. et Bibliop in via vulgo de los Tudescos, Matriti [Madrid] 1787, p. 322.

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In the third and last part of the Tractatus, Egaña placed a set of exercises, which we could categorize as inheritance of scholasticism. This practice apparently was common among the eclectic authors of this period. For instance, Gamarra presents, after his logic, four exercises developed by disputations. The same happens in the case of the Cuban José Agustín Caballero, who performs certain exercises with scholastic style at the end of his work. Something similar, says Redmond18, happens in the case of Celis, who «brings together under this title (scholastic exercises) a number of issues on logic, which he developed in the scholastic manner». Something similar happens in the case of Egaña, who placed at the end of his Tractatus de re logica, morali et metaphysica a set of issues that could be called scholastic. However, unlike the previous authors, Egaña does not present them as disputations, but rather in the form of axioms and theorems. What is relevant and interesting in this third and final part is that Egaña seems to have been based on the work of the Jesuit Miguel de Viñas, Philosophia scholastica, to develop this section of his treatise. This is particuarly interesting, because it would confirm somehow the thesis that Hanisch19 proposes, that is, that the work of de Viñas «enjoyed a great prestige as some teachers expressed in their writings».

Conclusion The Tractatus of Egaña, as we have tried to show, presented both in structure and content, significant similarities with the works of contemporary eclectic authors. In general, all Hispanic eclectic authors of the period divided their work into three main sections, similar to how Egaña does it. The first section included a history of the logic, the second, the contents of the logic, and the third and last, some scholastic exercises. Gamarra, Celis and Caballero presented also that structure. The history of logic in the case of Egaña, as we saw, is influenced by Verney, main eclectic author of that period. In the second and main part of the work, 18 Cf. W. REDMOND, La lógica en el Virreinato del Perú: a través de las obras de Juan Espinoza Medrano (1688) e Isidoro de Celis (1787), Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, Lima 1998, p. 358. 19 Cf. W. HANISCH, En torno a la filosofía en Chile: 1594-1810, Universidad Católica, Santiago de Chile 1963, p. 43.

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Egaña presents the same issues that other authors of his time used to present. They develop, following more or less the structure of the Logic of Port Royal, the four operations of the mind. Finally, in the last section, Egaña includes some axioms and scholastic terms, in a similar way as the rest of his contemporaries did. In this sense, it can be said then that the work of Egaña resembles to the ones of various Hispanic authors. Thus, we believe that Egaña can be considered within an eclectic Hispano American philosophical tradition, together with authors like Gamarra, Santa Cruz y Espejo, Celis and Caballero.

INDEX NOMINUM ANTIQUORUM ET MEDIAEVALIUM Aesopus: 111 Albertus Magnus: 70, 106, 174 Alexander Halensis: 275, 283 Alfarabi: 179, 181 Ambrosius Mediolanensis: 126, 127 Anselmus Cantuariensis: 198, 205 Antonius Andreas: 247, 262 Apollinarius Laodicenus: 124 Aristoteles: 12, 47, 48, 54, 62, 66, 67, 99, 106, 107, 111, 116, 120, 126, 149, 156, 162, 163, 166, 170, 179, 180, 181, 185, 188, 189, 191, 192, 196, 199, 215, 216, 236, 261, 269, 275, 305 Augustinus Hipponensis: 48, 95, 99, 117, 118, 120-127, 168, 205, 276 Averroes: 111, 179, 191, 209 Avicenna: 181, 182, 243, 262, 270 Basilius Caesariensis: 111 Boethius, A. M. T. Severinus: 162, 171, 233 Bonaventura (a Bagnorea): 275, 283, 284 Cicero (Marcus Tullius): 26, 27, 75, 76, 77, 110, 111, 112, 162, 168 Cratylus: 236 Cyprian (Thascius Caecilius): 95 Dionysius Areopagita (pseudo-): 199 Dominicus de Flandria: 19 Epicurus: 236

Franciscus de Marchia: 262, 267 Franciscus de Mayronis: 275 Franciscus Lychetus: 247, 259, 262, 267 Gabriel Biel: 56, 174 Galenus (Claudius): 174 Gregorius Magnus (Gregorius Papa I): 124, 126 Guillelmus de Ockham: 56, 233, 236, 239, 281 Henricus de Gandavo: 283 Heraclitus: 236 Hieronymus (Eusebius Sophronius sive Stridonensis): 95, 116, 126, 127, 168, 198 Horatius (Quintus Flaccus): 111, 162 Iacobus de Voragine: 105 Ioannes Bassolis: 259, 262 Ioannes Canonicus: 262, 267 Ioannes Chrysostomus: 95, 111, 245 Ioannes Damascenus: 168, 169, 198 Ioannes Duns Scotus : 12, 13, 31, 32, 71, 126, 174, 214, 217, 220, 231, 232, 233, 234, 237, 238, 239, 241, 242, 243, 246, 247, 248, 250, 253, 257, 259, 262-271, 274, 275, 276, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 284, 285, 286, 287 Ioannes Gerson: 56 Ioannes Maior: 10, 56, 71 Lorenzo Valla: 305

310

INDEX NOMINUM ANTIQUORUM ET MEDIAEVALIUM

Ludolphus de Saxonia: 105 Maimonides: 198 Matthaeus de Acquasparta: 283 Nicolaus de Nisa [sive Nise]: 259, 260, 262 Origenes: 124 Ovidius (Publius Naso): 110 Petrus Damianus: 122 Petrus de Alliaco: 56, 198 Petrus Hispanus (Ioannes Papa XXI): 12 Petrus Ioannis Olivi: 283 Petrus Lombardus: 3, 106, 112 Petrus Tartaretus: 267 Plato: 111, 126, 166, 236 Plutarchus: 111 Porphyrius: 12, 31, 106, 231, 233, 234, 258 Ptolemaeus (Claudius): 293

Quintilianus (Marcus Fabius): 111, 123 Ricardus de Mediaevilla: 275 Seneca (Lucius Annaeus): 99, 120, 126, 168 Socrates: 111 Tertullianus (Quintus Septimius Florens): 124 Thomas de Aquino: 3, 8, 12, 13, 19, 29, 31, 38, 40, 47, 48, 55, 56, 60, 66, 67, 70, 111, 112, 116, 126, 149, 156, 158, 161, 166, 167, 168, 170, 171, 172, 181, 189, 191, 202, 213, 214, 215, 233, 237, 241, 243, 244, 246, 253, 257, 266, 270, 276, 282, 284, 286, 288 Vergilius (Publius Maro): 111, 112, 162

INDEX NOMINUM SECUNDAE SCHOLASTICAE Alexandre de Gusmão S.J.: 153, 155 Alfonso Briceño O.F.M.: 13, 240, 279 Alfonso de Castro O.F.M.: 277, 281 Alonso de Montúfar: 38, 39 Alonso de Sandoval S. J.: 7 Alonso de Veracruz o Alonso de la Vera Cruz O.S.A.: 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 25, 26, 35-44, 48, 49, 50, 51 Alonso Peñafiel S.J.: 17 Álvaro Pelágio O.F.M.: 281 Ambrose de Montesino O.F.M.: 105 Andrés de Vega O.F.M.: 277 Antão Gonçalves S.J.: 152 Antonio Andrés O.F.M.: 281 António de Andrade S.J.: 155 Antonio de la Rueda Rubio S.J.: 11, 15, 16, 23, 30, 207, 210, 211, 212, 213, 215, 216, 221229, 244 António de Oliveira S.J.: 152 Antonio de Ulloa O.F.M.: 277 Antonio Escobar y Mendoza S.J.: 83 António Vieira S.J.: 22, 27, 28, 87102, 112-127, 146, 153, 154, 155 Atanasius Kircher S.J.: 293 Baltasar Álvares S.J.: 149 Baltasar Teles S.J.: 155 Bartolomé de Las Casas O.P.: 4, 6, 7, 10, 25, 35, 36, 37, 39, 45, 47, 48, 49, 57

Bartolomé de Medina O.P.: 29, 81, 82, 165 Bento da Fonseca S.J.: 28, 147 Bernardino de Siena O.F.M.: 278 Cipriano Soares (master of Coimbra): 151 Claudius Acquaviva S.J.: 109, 110 Cosme de Magalhães S.J.: 149 Crisostomo Javelli O.P.: 245, 247 Cristóban Vela: 276 Cristóvão Gil S.J.: 163 Damián Giner O.F.M.: 280 Diego de Avellaneda: 164 Diego Laínez S.J.: 108 Diego Más O.P.: 244, 245 Domingo Báñez O.P.: 3 Domingo de la Cruz O.P.: 43 Domingo de Soto O.P.: 14, 83 Domingo Ramos S.J.: 155 Esteban Pérez O.F.M.: 277 Everando Mercurial S.J.: 164 Francisco Avelar S.J.: 154 Francisco de Borgia S.J.: 157 Francisco de Faria S.J.: 148 Francisco de Herrera O.F.M: 262 Francisco de Ocaña O.F.M.: 277 Francisco de Quirós: 290 Francisco de Sosa O.F.M.: 277 Francisco de Toledo S.J.: 111 Francisco de Vitoria O.P.: 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 14, 22, 37, 41, 49, 56, 107 Francisco Jiménez de Cisneros O.F.M.: 105 Francisco Luís Leal: 23

312

INDEX NOMINUM SECUNDAE SCHOLASTICAE

Francisco Murcia de la Llana: 241, 244, 245 Francisco Salazar O.F.M.: 278 Francisco Sanches: 149, 150 Francisco Suárez S.J.: 13, 21, 29, 30, 82, 83, 84, 85, 110, 149, 161, 163, 164, 165, 166, 168175, 177-199, 201, 202, 203, 205, 207-223, 226, 227, 228, 229, 244, 245 Francisco Tello de Sándoval: 43 Francisco Xavier S.J.: 106, 126, 133 Gabriel Malagrida S.J.: 154 Giacomino Malafossa da Barge O.F.M. Conv.: 262 Girolamo Frascatoro, Hieronymus Frascatorius: 29, 166, 174, 175 Gomes Freire de Andrade: 148 Hernando de Oviedo O.P.: 43 Ignácio de Loyola S.J.: 28, 83, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 113, 126, 150, 151 Inácio de Azevedo S.J.: 157 Isidoro de Celis: 11, 306, 307, 308 Jerónimo de Vera: 277 Jerónimo Nadal S.J.: 151 Jerónimo Valera O.F.M.: 17, 31, 32, 231-271 João de Santo Tomás O.P.: 150 Johan Caterus: 211, 217, 220 John Punch (John Ponce) O.F.M.: 279 José Agustín Caballero: 307, 308 José de Aguilar S.J.: 17 José de Anchieta S.J.: 22 José de Seixas S.J.: 153 José Elias del Carmen Pereira O.F.M.: 23, 24

José Vázquez O.F.M.: 277 Juan Alfonso de Polanco S.J.: 83 Juan Azor S.J. 84 Juan Bautista Poza S.J.: 277 Juan de Espinoza Medrano S.J.: 8, 11, 12, 18, 19, 307 Juan de Fuica O.F.M.: 240, 260 Juan de Herrera O.F.M.: 281 Juan de La Peña O.P.: 106 Juan de Lugo S.J.: 26, 53, 54, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73 Juan de Mariana S.J.: 53 Juan de Matienzo: 53 Juan de Ovando O.F.M.: 281 Juan de Rada O.F.M.: 259, 260, 261, 262, 271, 280, 281, 286 Juan de Zumárraga: 44 Juan Egaña Risco: 33, 34, 301-308 Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda: 6, 10 Juan Luis Vives: 29, 166, 174 Juana Inés de la Cruz: 5 Luís de Carvalho S.J.: 156 Luis de León, Fray O.S.A.: 39 Luis de Molina S.J.: 21, 53 Luis Roa: 277 Luke Wadding O.F.M.: 277, 280 Manuel da Nóbrega S.J.: 22, 135 Manuel de Góis S.J.: 149, 164 Manuel da Silva S.J.: 148 Marcos Jorge (master of Coimbra): 151 Mario Nizzoli: 305 Martín de Azpilcueta Navarro: 53 Mateus de Sousa O.F.M.: 32, 273, 274, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 285, 286, 288 Miguel Bayo: 33, 286 Miguel de Avellán O.F.M.: 277

INDEX NOMINUM SECUNDAE SCHOLASTICAE

Miguel de Viñas S.J.: 305, 307 Nicolás de Olea S.J.: 17 Nuno Marques Pereira: 22 Paulo Barbo (Paulo Soncinas) O.P.: 202, 245 Pedro da Fonseca S.J.: 21, 111, 149, 151, 152, 163, 255, 256 Pedro Faber: 106 Pedro Gomes (master of Coimbra): 151 Pedro de Oña O. Merc.: 245 Pedro de Pajares: 276 Pedro de Urbina O.F.M.: 277 Pedro Tomás O.F.M.: 281 Petrus Ramus, Pierre de la Ramée: 305 Pieter Crockaert O.P.: 107

313

Roberto Bellarmino S.J.: 110 Rodolphus Agricola, Roelof Huusman: 305 Rodrigo Homem S.J.: 148 Rodrigues de Arriaga, Rodrigo de Arriaga S.J.: 164 Silvestro (Sylvester) Mazzolini da Prierio O.P.: 3 Tomás de Mercado O.P.: 26, 53, 54, 57-70, 73 Tomaz Antônio Gonzaga: 23 Tommaso de Vio (Cardinale) Caetano O.P.: 3, 83, 244, 245 Vasco de Quiroga: 5, 6, 10, 38

INDEX NOMINUM MODERNORUM Abellán. J. L.: 2 Abranches, J. dos S.: 103 Afonso, M.: 131 Álvares, Luiz: 131 André, D. M.: 168 Andrés, M.: 277 Andrews, R.: 248, 267 Angelelli, I.: 8, 9 Argote, G. M.: 17 Armellada, B. de: 280, 286, 288 Ashworth, E. J.: 30, 211, 212, 213, 217, 226, 227, 228 Aspell, M.: 23 Astrain, A.: 277 Aubenque, P.: 233 Baciero, C.: 185 Baciero, L.: 185 Bacigalupo, L. E.: 26, 75-85 Bacon, Francis: 305 Balić, C.: 280 Ballón Vargas, J. C.: 24, 241 Bangert, W. V.: 103, 104, 105, 106, 109 Barros, J. de: 131 Batista, A.: 132 Bavaresco, A.: 17, 232 Bayle, Pierre: 3 Bello, L. M.: 283 Bertoni, A.: 274 Bérubé, C.: 273 Beuchot, M.: 7, 8, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 24 Bos, E. P.: 275 Brahe, Tycho: 291-297, 299 Bravo, B.: 304

Brown, L.: 62 Brown, S.: 211 Bueno, O.: 5, 6 Burrus, E.: 35, 38 Calderón de la Barca, Pedro: 112 Calvin, Jean: 106 Camici, A.: 146 Campbell, D.: 174 Camps, M. C.: 162 Canteñs, B. J.: 6, 21, 207, 210, 211, 217 Caplan, H.: 76 Carbajo, D.: 273 Carcelén, C.: 297 Cardoso, P. D. W.: 134 Carrillo Cázares, A.: 43 Carvalho, J. de: 131 Carvalho, M. S. de: 21, 163 Casolini, F.: 280 Castellote, S.: 185 Castro, M. de: 273, 274, 275, 277, 279 Caylus, D. de: 273 Cenci, M. P.: 13 Cerqueira, L. A.: 101, 112 Cerutti-Guldberg, H.: 5, 14 Cervantes, Miguel de: 112 Céspedes Agüero, V. S.: 17, 241 Chacon, V.: 112 Chafuen, A.: 58 Charles V, Emperor (Carlos V, Imperador): 6, 17, 45, 102 Chavero Blanco, F.: 273 Clearly, G.: 280

316

INDEX NOMINUM MODERNORUM

Clemens Papa XIV (Giovanni Vincenzo Antonio Ganganelli), 130 Collier, S.: 301, 302 Colmeiro, M.: 58 Condillac, Étienne Bonnot de: 305, 306 Copernicus, Nicolaus: 293, 294, 298 Corneille, Pierre: 112 Cosme Bueno: 290, 295, 296, 297 Cottingham, J.: 210, 221 Craig, E.: 2, 5, 12, 14, 21, 23 Cronin, T. J.: 208 Crowe, F. E.: 213 Cruz Cruz, J.: 3 Culleton, A. S.: 1-34, 61-73, 192, 231, 288 d’Alembert, Jean de Rond: 129 d’Onofrio, G.: 275 d’Onofrio, S. R.: 207-229 D’Amico, C.: 231 Daniel, J. : 131 Daues, V. F.: 208 De Boni, L. A.: 3, 274 de la Condamine, Charles: 295 Degl’Innocenti, U.: 214 Dempsey, B.: 58 Des Chene, D.: 164 Descartes, René: 3, 23, 30, 31, 112, 171, 207-212, 214, 219, 220, 221, 223, 227, 228, 229, 297, 305, 306 di Fonzo, L.: 275 Díaz de Gamarra, Benito: 304, 305, 307, 308 Domínguez, J. M.: 145, 149, 151, 155 Donida, D. A.: 106 Doran, R. M.: 213

Doyle, J. P.: 210, 215, 216, 218, 219, 223, 226 Dussel, E. D.: 6 Eckart, A.: 131 Elorduy, E.: 149 Escalera, J.: 151 Esperabé, E.: 275 Espírito Santo, A.: 89 Estrada, J. C. T.: 23 Etzkorn, G.: 248, 267 Evangeliu, Chr.: 233 Feijoo, Benito Jerónimo: 304 Fernández Rodríguez, J. L.: 210 Fernández, G.: 7 Fernández, O. B.: 210 Forlivesi, M.: 213, 214, 218, 229 Franca, L.: 108, 109 Francisco de Borja, Duke of Gandia: 108, 109 Francisco Eugenio de Santa Cruz y Espejo: 304, 308 Francisco Romero: 290, 298 Francisco Ruiz Lozano: 290, 291, 292 Freitas, M. C.: 273 Fuentes Quintana, E.: 54, 58 Fuertes Herreros, J. L.: 14 Fusco, S.: 136 Gál, G.: 248, 267 Galilei, Galileo: 299 García-Villoslada, R.: 103, 105, 106, 107, 108 Gassendi, P.: 217, 305 Ghisalberti, A.: 275 Gilson, É.: 116, 229 Gómez Camacho, F.: 58 Gomez Robledo, A.: 13 Góngora, M.: 303

INDEX NOMINUM MODERNORUM

Gordon, B.: 54 Gracia, J. E.: 207, 210, 217, 219 Green, R.: 248, 267 Gregori, D.: 295 Grice-Hutchinson, M.: 58 Halley, E.: 298 Hamouda, O.: 63 Hanisch, W.: 302, 305, 307 Hansen, J. A.: 88, 89, 90 Henry IV (King): 103 Heredia Correa, R.: 40 Hill, B.: 210 Hinrichsen, L. E.: 22, 27, 87-100 Hobbes, Thomas, 90 Hoenen, M. J. F. M.: 275 Höffner, J.: 6 Huerga, Á.: 277 Jaime, J.: 21 Jaksic, I.: 301 Jennings, B.: 200 John IV, King (João IV, Rei): 88, 147 John V, King (João V, Rei): 146, 154 José de Mosquera y Villarroel: 290, 293, 294 José Gabriel Moreno: 290, 295, 296, 297 José Gregorio Paredes: 290, 298 Juan, J.: 295 Juan Ramón Conning: 290, 291, 292, 293 Juan Rer: 290, 294, 296 Juan Velázquez de Cuéllar, Don: 104 Jurado, M. R.: 151 Katayama Omura, R. J.: 33, 289299

317

Kaufmann, M.: 4 Kaulen, Lourenço: 130-141, 145, 158 Kelley, F.: 248, 267 Kenny, A.: 1 Kepler, Johannes: 297 Knuuttila, S.: 166, 171 Koffler, Johann: 145 Kretzmann, N.: 1 Labastida, F. F.: 210 Lagerlund, H.: 171, 210 Lago da Silva, A. M.: 103 Lalande, A.: 214 Langholm, O.: 53, 69, 70 Lázaro Pulido, M.: 24, 25, 32, 192, 231, 273-288 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm: 297 Leite Júnior, P.: 233 Leite, A.: 155 Leite, S.: 20, 112, 132, 133, 147, 148, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156 León, Diego de: 290 Lértora Mendoza, C. A.: 23, 24, 238 Libera, A. de: 233 Lizzini, O.: 182 Locke, John: 305, 306 Lohr, Ch.: 165 Lonergan, B.: 213 Lope de Vega, Félix: 112 Lopes, F. F.: 273 López, A.: 274 Lopez-Gay, J.: 151 Lúcio de Azevedo, J.: 113-114 Luis de Gusmão, Dom: 88 Lucas de Quirós: 290 Málaga Medina, A.: 46 Malebranche, Nicolas: 305

318

INDEX NOMINUM MODERNORUM

Marcil, G.: 248, 267 Marcos, F.: 277 Margutti Pinto, P. R.: 20, 101 Maria Theresa (Empress): 146 Marques, L. Á.: 2 Maryks, R. A.: 26, 75, 83 McClean, L.: 280 McKirahan, Jr., R. D.: 261 Meirinhos, J. F.: 273 Meisterburg, A.: 131 Mendonça Furtado, F. X. de: 132 Menn, S.: 164 Mercado, J. A.: 210 Miguel de Bulhões, Dom: 133 Millett, B.: 280 Molière (Jean-Baptiste Poquelin): 112 Mooney, C.: 280 More, Thomas: 6, 38 Morey, J.: 150 Murillo, I.: 7, 275 Nauert, Ch.: 161, 162 Neves, L. F.: 89 Newton, Isaac: 295, 296, 297, 298, 299 Nooman, J.: 55 Noone, T.: 248, 267 Novotný, D. D.: 210, 211, 212, 222 Nuccetelli, S.: 5, 6 Nuño García de Torres: 289 O’Gorman, E.: 47 O’Malley, J. W.: 106, 108 O’Neill, Ch. E.: 145, 149, 151, 155 O’Shea, J. A.: 280 Olivares, E.: 69 Oliveira e Silva, P.: 29, 161-176 Oliveira, F. R.: 136 Oliver, A. A.: 5

Orrego Sánchez, S.: 8 Ortiz Sotelo, J.: 289, 291 Page, C. A.: 23 Paim, A.: 21 Pasnau, R.: 162, 165 Pazos, M. R.: 278, 279 Pedro II, Dom: 88 Pedro de Peralta Barnuevo: 290, 291, 293 Penner, S.: 209, 214 Perdices, L.: 58 Pereira, M. B.: 149 Pereña, L.: 82 Pérez, A.: 276 Pessoa, Fernando: 101 Philip II, Emperor (Felipe II, Imperador): 14 Philip Neri C.O. (Filippo di Neri C.O.), Saint: 158 Pich, R. H.: 1-34, 192, 231-271, 288 Pimenta, F. R.: 132 Pimentel, M. C.: 101, 102 Pinborg, J.: 1 Pius V, Papa: 39 Podetti, J. R.: 25, 26, 35-51 Ponce, H. C.: 39 Poncela González, Á.: 14, 29, 30, 164, 177-205 Porro, P.: 182 Price, B.: 63 Puigcever, A.: 208 Rábade, S.: 208 Rackham, H.: 77 Ramírez Trejo, A. E.: 39 Rand Parish, H.: 7 Raup Wagner, H.: 7 Redmond, W. B.: 1, 8-19, 23, 24, 80, 209, 216, 232, 307

INDEX NOMINUM MODERNORUM

Reichardt, R.: 129 Reis, É. V. B.: 22, 28, 101-127 Reis, F.: 150 Restrepo, L. F.: 5, 12, 13, 24 Ribero, Diego: 289 Rivera de Ventosa, E.: 273 Rodrigues, L. F. M.: 20, 28, 129160 Rodrigues, T. V.: 17, 232 Roover, R.: 54, 55 Ross, D.: 62 Rosse, J. F.: 223 Rovira, M. del C.: 303, 305 Ruiz de Medina, J.: 145 Sáenz, M.: 103 Sales, A. P. de: 7 Salinas, C.: 305 Sánchez, V.: 273 Sánchez-Albornoz, N.: 58 Santos, M. dos: 131 Schmutz, J.: 274 Schnepf, R.: 4 Schobinger, J.-P.: 273 Schumpeter, J.: 53, 56, 58 Schutte, O.: 5, 6 Schwab, F.: 290, 291 Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo, Marquis of Pombal: 130, 131, 141 Segonds, A. Ph.: 233 Shields, Ch.: 210, 219, 220, 227 Sierra Bravo, R.: 58 Sigüenza y Góngora, Carlos de: 5 Sileo, L.: 273 Smeets, U.: 273 Smith, Adam: 53 Smith, J.-C.: 212 Solano, F. de: 46, 47

319

Souza, J. B. A. de: 7 Stegmüller, F.: 165 Storck, A. C.: 22 Sturm, F. G.: 21 Szentmártonyi, I.: 145, 146 Tietz, M.: 129 Toro y Zambrano, Don Mateo de: 302 Tosca, V.: 294 Tosi, G.: 4, 7 Trentmann, J. A.: 1 Tursi, A.: 231 Tweedale, M.: 209, 212, 217 Ulloa, A.: 295 Urdanoz, T.: 4, 6 Van Liere, K. E.: 3 Vaz de Carvalho, J.: 151 Vázquez, I.: 273, 281 Verney, Luís Antonio: 158, 304, 305, 306, 307 Vespucio, Americo: 33, 289 Veuthey, L.: 275 Vial, A.: 33, 34, 301-308 Vico, Giambattista: 112 Villanova, M. G.: 17, 232 Voltaire (François Marie Arouet): 112 Vos, A.: 232 Weidman, H.: 7 Wells, N. J.: 208, 210, 211, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 227, 229 Wood, D.: 54 Wood, R.: 248, 267 Yánez, B.: 103 Yrjönsuuri, M.: 171 Zamora, G.: 273 Zekl, H. G.: 261 Zuretti, J. C.: 23

INDEX RERUM abstract entities: 19 acquisition: 41 action, possible: 78, 80, 81, 82 action, quality of: 77, 78 acts, human: 167 agreements: 60, 64, 68 Alcalá, Alcalá de Henares: 3, 14, 15, 24, 37, 105, 108, 150, 151, 165, 241 allegories, abuse of: 114 Almanaques Peruanos: 290, 291 Almeida, jails of: 138, 147 analogy, analogies: 28, 138, 147, 152, 202, 211 animism: 191 anti-Jesuit campaign: 28, 130 appetite: 169-174, 176, 288 appetite, concupiscible: 172 appetite, irascible: 171, 173, 174 appetite, natural: 288 appetite, sensible: 169 appetite, vital: 170, 176 apprehension: 170, 171 aptness: 247, 250, 252, 254, 255, 259, 271 aptness, proximate: 257, 264, 269 aptness, remote: 253, 257, 265 argument, ontological: 205 argument, theological: 285 arguments, probable: 76, 78, 80, 82 Aristotelianism, Portuguese: 101, 165 Art of Navigation: 21, 33, 289, 290, 299 aseity, demonstration of: 197, 198 astrology: 291

astronomical charts: 290, 291 astronomical phenomena: 291, 299 astronomy: 33, 146, 290, 291, 295, 297, 298, 299 Augustinian convents: 38 Augustinian Order: 14, 38, 39, 114 Augustinism: 285 Authority: 50, 58, 62, 63, 64, 66, 67, 81, 107, 116, 118, 121, 122, 152, 156 authority, of the prince: 64 autonomy, economic: 49 banking activity: 57 baroque style: 89, 94, 99 basic goods: 54 Bayanism: 286 beatific vision: 282, 288 being, degrees of: 250 being, finite: 184, 188, 256 being, formal: 251, 270 being, immaterial: 180, 188, 192 being, infinite: 182, 184 being, mental: 30, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 216, 217, 219, 220, 221, 222, 224, 225, 226, 230 being, metaphysics of: 150, 152 being, necessary: 201, 202, 204 being, of reason (ens rationis, entia rationis): 208, 210, 212, 216, 217, 219, 220, 222-228, 240 being, order of: 63, 193, 197 being, perfection of: 182, 183, 202, 203, 204 being, properties of: 185, 188, 201, 202, 248

322

INDEX RERUM

being, real (ens reale, entia realia): 183, 184, 186, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 215, 216, 218, 219, 220, 222, 223, 224, 226, 227, 228, 229, 240, 248, 250, 259, 268, 270 being, science of: 152, 182, 183, 187, 189 being, uncreated: 184, 188, 192, 193, 194, 197, 198, 199, 200, 202 beings, living: 62, 91, 115, 116, 169, 173 Belém do Pará: 132, 135, 146, 153, 154 belief, religious: 198, 205 beliefs, moral: 27, 77, 78 beliefs, probable: 27, 76, 77, 78, 79, 84 benefit: 43, 55, 62, 63, 65 bodies, movement of the: 170 body, human: 167, 175 Bourbon Reforms: 48 Brahe’s system: 291-297, 299 Brazil, Scholastic thinkers in: 10, 11, 20 Brazil, scholasticism in: 10, 11, 20, 21, 22, 149, 158 business: 57, 59, 60, 71 buyer, buyers: 60, 61, 64, 65, 66, 68 buying: 61, 63, 67, 69, 70 cacicazgos: 36, 45, 46 caciques: 36, 46 cannibalism: 22 capacities, supernatural: 290 capital market: 54, 57 cartels: 68

casuistry: 26, 75, 77, 80, 81 causality, efficient: 197, 201 cause, efficient: 184, 188, 189, 190, 196, 197, 201, 203 cause, exemplary: 188, 191 cause, final: 188, 190, 203 cause, first: 180, 181, 188, 189, 192, 193, 195, 196, 198, 200, 201 cause, material: 190 cause, physical: 189, 190, 192 causes, immediate: 197, 204 causes, infinite: 196, 197, 200 causes, remote: 197, 252 causes, simultaneity of: 196 certainty: 79, 82, 83, 203 certainty, practical: 77, 80, 82, 83 certainty, speculative: 83 change, Aristotelian theory of: 203 charity, perfection of: 54, 285 Chief Cosmographer, Chief Cosmographers: 33, 289, 290 Chief Navigator: 33, 289, 290 Chile: 2, 8, 10, 25, 33, 301, 302, 303 Chilean revolution: 33, 34, 301, 302, 303 chimera: 200, 223, 227, 228 Christendom, project of: 54 Christian rhetorics, theory of: 27, 28 Church Fathers: 82, 99, 118, 126, 199 circularity: 197 citizenship: 37 clarity: 59, 94, 95 clergy, colonial: 29, 38, 159 clergy, secular: 29, 66, 112, 152, 158, 159

INDEX RERUM

coercion: 78, 80, 84 cognition: 175, 225 cognitive theory, Thomistic: 214 Coimbra: 3, 20, 21, 23, 28, 88, 99, 108, 132, 147-156, 158, 161, 162, 163, 165 Colégio de Santo Alexandre: 132, 154 Colégio de São Luís: 132, 154 College of Arts, in Coimbra: 152, 153, 154 College of Arts, in Maranhão and Pará: 112, 113, 147, 148, 149, 150, 152, 153, 154, 156, 157 colonization, of America: 4, 7, 112 common good: 62, 63, 65, 72, 73 common nature: 32, 209, 211, 233, 234, 236, 244, 253, 256, 258, 259, 266-271 common wealth: 45, 47 commune, communis: 266, 269 communicability: 261 communis aestimatio, common estimation: 72, 73 community: 267, 270 community, negative: 270 companies: 59 Company of Jesus, Society of Jesus: 21, 22, 28, 102, 103, 107, 108, 109, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 135, 145-158, 191 comparison: 76 compensation: 59 composition, metaphysical: 257 composition, physical: 257 conceivability, conceivabilities: 259 concept, objective: 30, 201, 204, 207, 208-224, 226, 227, 228, 229

323

concept, real: 209, 211, 212, 213, 214, 217, 218, 219, 222, 224, 227, 228, 229 conception: 231, 243 conception, mental: 210, 213, 221, 223, 225 concept(s), formal: 188, 204, 205, 208, 209, 212-219, 221-229, 235, 236, 243, 259, 264 concepts, logical: 223, 224, 226, 227, 228, 257 concepts, mental: 30, 31, 207-214, 217, 219, 222, 224, 226, 227 concepts, simple : 189 Conclusiones Philosophicae, of the Colégio do Maranhão: 28, 148 concupiscence: 159 concurrence, intentional: 196, 200 conduct, human: 27, 76, 119 confession: 77, 78, 81, 124 confessor: 45, 77, 79, 80, 81, 83 confirmatory proof: 76 confiscation, of the Society’s possessions: 132 Conimbricenses: 29, 149, 155, 156, 158, 163 conjectural cause: 27, 76 conjecture: 27, 76, 77 conquest, of America: 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 26, 43, 47, 49, 289 conquest, Spanish: 3, 6, 26 conscience: 59, 60, 68,79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 85 conscience, doubts of: 81, 83 Consejo de Indias, Council of the Indias: 39 contemplation: 179, 180, 191, 203, 204, 283

324

INDEX RERUM

contents, mental: 30, 207, 208, 210, 212, 213, 217, 219, 220, 221, 228 contents, of mental concepts: 30, 31, 207, 208 contingency: 77, 152 contracts: 55, 56, 59, 60, 63, 67 convenientia, doctrine of: 267, 270 conversion: 87, 89, 91, 92, 98 Copernican revolution: 291, 295, 299 cosmographical charts: 290, 291 cosmography: 289, 290 Cosmography Course: 289 Council of Trent: 38, 151, 277 criollos: 49 currency: 57, 59, 62 Cursus Conimbricensis: 20, 21, 155, 159, 163 cursus philosophicus: 18, 31, 148, 150, 155 cursus philosophicus, Scotist: 31 cursus theologicus: 150 damage : 55, 72 De auxiliis: 32, 285 De iustitia et iure: 3, 55, 69, 70 death: 81, 93, 104, 118, 119, 120, 123, 141 Decalogue: 112 deception: 67, 68 decision: 27, 76, 80, 82, 169 deduction of properties, method of: 201 deduction, a priori: 189 deduction, logical: 186 defect, in a product: 68 degrees of abstraction, doctrine of: 186, 187

deliberation: 42, 169, 175 demonstration, a posteriori: 194, 195, 196, 197 demonstration, a priori: 190, 199, 201 demonstration, apodictic: 77, 261 denomination, extrinsic: 187, 209, 220 desire, natural: 180, 283, 284, 285, 286 desire, object of: 170, 172, 180, 284, 285 difference, individual: 246, 249, 257, 263, 264 differences, cultural: 5 dignity: 63, 183, 191, 198 discount: 68 distinction, formal: 241, 242, 243, 244, 249, 262, 263 distinction, of reason: 201, 224, 240, 241, 242 distinction, potential: 256 distinction, real: 171, 173, 174, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244 distribution, of goods: 54 diversity, cultural: 49 divine ideas, the metaphysics of: 217, 220, 229, 236 division: 182, 184, 223, 227, 240, 245, 246, 249 doctrine, moral: 78, 81 doctrine, Scotist: 32, 168, 174, 247, 271, 274-280, 288 doctrine, supernatural: 286, 287 doctrine, Thomistic: 18, 29, 158, 163, 167, 168, 174, 175, 207, 256 Dominicans, Order of Preachers: 3, 12, 83, 87

INDEX RERUM

dominion, legitimate: 36, 41, 49 Dominus ac Redemptor, Bull: 130 doubt: 39, 40, 47, 66, 71, 76, 78, 79, 81, 82, 85, 96, 203, 205 dust, the condition of: 115, 116, 117, 118 earning, licit: 65, 72 eclectic authors, Hispanic: 281, 307, 308 eclectic philosophy: 305 eclecticism, philosophical: 33, 34, 275, 296, 301-308 eclectics, Portuguese: 99, 101, 304 economic analysis: 53, 54 economic ideas: 54, 55 economic liberal thinking: 53 economic practices, study of: 56, 58, 69 economics: 26, 53-73 economics, Austrian school of: 53 economics, philosophy of: 26, 55, 73 economy, political: 53, 54 education: 14, 21, 22, 23, 27, 32, 33 education program, Jesuit: 27, 29, 76, 108, 109, 131, 146, 149, 157, 158 efficient causality, order of: 197, 201 efficient causes, infinite process in: 189, 196, 197, 201 eloquence: 111, 114 emanation: 195, 196, 202 emotion, emotions: 29, 126, 161176 emotions, nature of: 167, 169, 175 emotions, taxonomy of: 161-176

325

emotions, Thomistic doctrine on: 163, 167, 168, 174, 175 encomienda: 7, 36, 41, 42, 43, 45, 49 end, supernatural: 166, 179, 281288 enlightenment, catholic: 33, 302, 303 entities, intramental: 207, 208, 217 entities, mental: 30, 207, 208, 211, 212, 215, 217 entities, spiritual: 190 entitlements, just: 4 entity, concept of: 184, 188, 189, 190, 191 entity, created and uncreated: 184, 190, 192, 193, 194, 195, 197, 198, 200, 202 entity, division of: 182 entity, extramental: 208, 212, 213, 215, 216, 219, 222 entity, first: 29, 30, 177, 189, 192, 193, 194, 195, 198, 200, 201, 202, 203 entity, intellectual: 200, 203 entity, mind-dependent: 211, 212 entity, objectivity of: 29, 177 entity, real: 183, 184, 187, 191, 215, 216 epistemology, realistic: 30, 207 equality: 22, 60, 61, 63, 64, 67, 69, 70, 83 equity: 59, 60 equivalence, in transactions: 69, 71, 73 esse obiectivum: 219 essence, divine: 116, 188, 193, 201, 242, 266

326

INDEX RERUM

essence, extramental: 208, 212, 213, 214, 216, 217 essence, impossible: 218, 227, 228, 242 essence, possible: 193, 201, 208, 217, 228 essence, real: 212, 217, 218, 219, 222 essence, unreal: 208, 220 estimation of prices, individual: 71, 73 estimation, common: 72, 73 eternity, concept of: 119, 120, 193, 196 ethical principle: 82 ethics, juridical: 3, 28, 84 ethics, natural basis of: 22 evidence: 5, 40, 60, 68, 95, 161, 172, 175, 177, 178, 182, 193, 204, 205, 274, 285, 295 evidence, absolute: 182 evidence, objective: 178 Évora: 3, 20, 148-153, 155, 161, 165 exchange: 59, 61, 69, 71, 73 exegesis: 12, 19, 99, 151 exercises, spiritual: 150, 159 existence, actual: 200, 201, 210, 216, 219, 220 existence, mental: 30, 208, 210, 212, 213, 216, 217, 219, 220, 221, 228 existence, necessary: 184, 190, 192, 193, 194, 195, 197, 202, 204 Exodus, metaphysics of: 116 expenses: 71, 73 experiences, geometrical: 295

explanation, theological: 283 expropriation: 40, 41 faith: 84, 86, 112, 115, 119, 156, 159, 179, 283, 286, 287 faith, habit of: 287 Fathers of the Church: 82, 99, 116, 126, 168, 169, 199 finitude: 184, 190 formal reasons: 188, 204, 209, 212, 219, 223, 224, 225, 241, 242, 243, 244, 251, 259, 270 formality: 188, 241 forms: 224, 257, 284 forms, accidental: 266 forms, substantial: 152 forms, supernatural: 287 Franciscan observance: 275 Franciscan Order: 32, 274, 275, 276, 279 Franciscan Rule: 275 Franciscan School: 282 Franciscan theology: 275, 283 freedom: 46, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 147, 165, 284, 285, 286 freedom, Christian: 285 fruition: 282, 283, 284, 285, 286 gains, individual: 73 Gallicanism: 303 geocentric system, geocentric systems: 292, 293, 294, 299 gifts, supernatural: 284, 285 global community, concept of: 49 God, absolute potency of: 238, 239 God, as exemplary cause: 188 God, essence of: 19, 116, 182, 184, 201 God, essential attributes of: 184, 193, 201, 202

INDEX RERUM

God, eternal and unchangeable being: 64, 117, 119, 191 God, existence of: 30, 116, 177205 God, formal conception of: 188 God, freedom of: 284, 285, 286 God, immensity of: 193 God, immutability of: 193 God, incomprehensibility of: 193 God, ineffability of: 193 God, infinity of: 193, 194 God, invisibility of: 193 God, metaphysical study of: 30, 178 God, omnipotence of: 193 God, perfection of: 178, 179, 180, 182, 183, 190, 202 God, simple and proper concept of: 184 God, the rational study of: 180, 191 God, union with: 285, 286 God, uniqueness of: 193, 198, 199 God’s desire, metaphysical structure of: 286 good will: 82, 85 good, arduous: 171 good, noxious: 171 goods, natural: 22, 40, 54, 56, 62, 65, 69, 70, 73, 118 goods, natural value of: 62, 63, 66, 70 Gospel: 28, 78, 83, 84, 90, 91, 92, 93, 95, 96, 99, 122 government: 6, 37, 38, 39, 65, 104, 114, 131, 199, 290, 302 grace, redeeming: 286 grammar: 14, 105, 106, 154, 155 Grammar, Advanced: 110

327

Grammar, Average: 110 Grammar, Lower: 110 Grammar, Superior: 110 Grão-Pará and Maranhão, ViceProvince of: 28, 88, 89, 91, 98, 99, 129, 131, 132, 133, 134, 136, 147, 148, 154, 156 gratuity, divine: 282, 283, 284, 285, 286 gravitation, universal: 295, 297, 298 happiness: 179, 180, 203, 204, 283, 285 happiness, natural: 179, 180, 203, 204 happiness, supernatural: 283, 285 heliocentric system: 295, 296 heliocentrism: 299 hermeneutics: 99, 277, 288 historiography, suarecian: 29, 177 history, interpretation of: 115, 121 history, sense of: 115, 121 holiness: 122 homiletics, art of: 27, 87-100 homilies, Vieira’s: 27, 114 hope, virtue of: 174 human being, natural perfectionability of: 286 human nature, pure: 286, 288 human needs: 47, 62, 64, 70, 72 humanism: 21, 75, 83, 161, 162, 163 Humanities: 21, 106, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 147, 148, 154, 155, 156 humors, corporal: 170 hylomorphism: 167 idealism: 30, 207 idea(s): 30, 31, 207-224, 226, 227, 228, 229

328

INDEX RERUM

ideas, Cartesian: 30, 207, 211, 221, 227, 228, 229 ideas, objective reality of: 30, 31, 207, 208, 210, 211, 212, 213, 215-224, 226, 227, 228, 229 ideas, ontological status of: 30, 207, 208, 209, 218, 221 ideas, origin of: 213, 214, 220 identity: 14, 15, 241, 248, 256 ignorance: 68, 121, 122, 123, 125 imagery: 89 imaginary, anti-Jesuit: 129, 130 imagination: 90, 98, 105, 169, 170 immateriality: 192 immorality: 159 impossible things, impossibilia: 210, 212, 227 Independence, of Chile: 33, 34, 301, 302 Indians, rights of: 6, 7, 22, 36 indifference: 253, 254, 259-265, 268, 269 indifference, complete: 264, 268 indigenous society: 22, 46, 49, 132, 133 individual, individuals: 4, 7, 37, 71, 73, 179, 203, 221, 234, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 243, 246-251, 253, 254, 256, 257, 261, 262, 263, 264, 266, 267, 270 infinite subordination, of causes: 196, 197, 200 infinity, Aristotelian concept of: 196, 197 infinity, concept of: 193, 194, 195, 197 infinity, in multitude: 196, 200

injustice: 7, 54, 60, 119 Inquisition: 38, 99, 106, 115, 147 inquisitors, Portuguese: 88, 115 institutions, native: 49 intellect, agent: 213 intellect, possible: 269, 284 intelligences, the: 179, 188, 189 intelligibility, degrees of: 250 intelligibility, formal: 251 intensity: 200 intention(s), first: 250 intention(s), intellectual: 209, 222 intention(s), logical: 222, 223, 224, 226, 227 intention(s), of the will: 222 intention(s), second: 16, 223-228, 233, 251, 257 intentionality, intellectual: 222 intentionality, of concepts: 213, 217, 222 interest(s): 58, 59, 62, 65, 73 internal senses: 169, 170 international law: 3, 84 introspection: 78 introspection, exercise of: 178 intuitive knowledge, of God: 283 intuitive vision, of God: 285 invention, inventio: 80, 210, 271 irascible, the: 171, 172, 173, 174 Isagoge: 12, 31, 106, 231, 232, 233, 234, 265 Jansenism: 33, 286, 303 Jesuit College, in Belém da Cachoeira: 153 Jesuit College, in Belém do Pará: 132, 133, 146, 154 Jesuit College, in Espírito Santo: 153, 154

INDEX RERUM

Jesuit College, in Nossa Senhora da Luz: 154 Jesuit College, in Paranaguá: 154 Jesuit College, in Recife: 154 Jesuit College, in Rio de Janeiro: 154 Jesuit College, in Santos: 154 Jesuit College, in São Luís do Maranhão: 132, 154 Jesuit College, in São Paulo: 154, 157 Jesuit Colleges: 20, 108, 109, 147, 149, 154, 155, 157, 158 Jesuit missionaries, expulsion of: 23, 129, 131, 134, 138, 148, 157 Jesuit missionaries, formation of: 28, 29, 101-127 Jesuit prisoners: 134, 135, 136, 137, 139-146, 158 Jesuit university, in Brazil: 28, 146, 147, 149, 151, 155, 157, 159 Jesuits, imprisonment of: 131, 132, 133, 135, 138, 141 Jesuits, in colonial Brazil: 20, 21, 22, 146-157 Jesuits, in Macau, China and Japan: 138 Jesuits, resistance process of: 28, 130, 131, 135, 141, 146 judgment: 198, 204, 231, 306 judgment, moral: 69 Junta Magna de las Indias: 39 Jurisdiction: 84, 85 jurisdiction, internal: 85 jurisprudence: 10, 27, 76 justice: 8, 42, 45, 48, 49, 54, 59, 60, 61, 63, 69, 70, 71, 220

329

justice, commutative: 40, 55, 63, 64, 66, 67, 69, 73 justice, distributive: 67 justice, principle of: 73 knighthood: 104 knowable object, unity of: 183, 187 knowledge: 10, 79, 81, 180, 182, 191, 198, 199, 200, 203, 215, 217, 219, 252, 282, 284, 285, 287 knowledge of God, contingent: 181, 182, 184, 282, 283, 285, 286, 287 knowledge, faculties of: 285 knowledge, human capacity of: 30, 178, 283 knowledge, natural: 287 knowledge, scientific: 77, 79, 83 knowledge, theological: 283 knowledge, ultimate object of: 283 labor regime: 41 language, Hebrew: 109, 112, 114 law, canon: 112, 155 law, civil: 66 law, international public: 4 law, natural: 4, 22, 38, 45, 50, 56, 60, 68, 84 law, of peoples: 4, 5, 6 law, positive: 63 lawfulness: 55, 56 lawyer, lawyers: 3, 84 laypersons: 158, 159 leasing: 59 Legenda aurea: 105 legislation, civil: 42, 79, 147, 149 legislation, explicit: 80 Leyes Nuevas: 36, 42, 43, 45, 49 Liberal Arts: 35, 75

330

INDEX RERUM

libraries, Portuguese: 20, 163, 165 life, political: 37, 47, 118 Lima, National Library: 298 linage, human: 47, 48 loans: 46, 59 logic: 12, 14, 15, 17, 79, 80, 207229, 231-271, 305 logic, deontic: 79, 80, 305 logic, deontic probabilistic: 80 logic, study of: 12, 15, 17 logic, terministic: 12, 14, 15 logical entities: 16, 223 lordship: 26, 36, 37, 46, 49 malice: 82 maps, geographical: 289 market, markets: 57, 59, 62, 65, 66, 67, 71, 73 market, international: 67 marketplace: 66 marriage: 38, 41, 136 Master of Charts: 289 mathematical calculation: 33, 289, 296, 297, 299 mathematics: 9, 111, 144, 145, 146, 150, 154, 185 Mathematics, Principal Professor of: 33, 290, 297 matter, prime: 152, 257 Maurists: 303 mechanics, celestial: 306 medical literature: 29, 163, 166, 168, 174, 175 memory: 90, 169 merchandise, merchandising: 64, 65, 67, 68, 72, 73 merchants: 57, 58, 65, 66, 72, 88 metaphors: 89, 90, 99

metaphysics: 3, 10, 16, 17, 29, 30, 31, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 177-205, 216, 220, 228, 229, 231, 232, 271, 304 metaphysics, as a science: 30, 152, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 185, 186, 188, 189, 190, 191, 193, 204 metaphysics, as onto-theology: 183, 191 metaphysics, dignity of: 181, 182, 183, 191 metaphysics, interpretation of: 181 metaphysics, mental: 207, 210, 216, 219, 220, 227, 228 metaphysics, object of: 152, 177183, 185, 186, 189, 190, 191, 204, 220, 229 metaphysics, study of: 17, 30, 150, 177, 180, 181, 185, 188, 191 metaphysics, suarecian: 178, 191, 204, 205, 220 metaphysics, sufficiency of: 183 metaphysics, theological: 183 metaphysics, unity of: 185, 186, 188, 189, 190, 204 method, in metaphysics: 178, 189, 202, 202, 204 method, of Bible interpretation: 112 method, of Jesuit teaching: 102, 149, 150, 151, 155, 165 Mexico, University of: 13, 14, 15, 25, 38 modernity: 29, 161, 176 modernity, early political: 50 money: 56-61, 65 money, circulation of: 56

INDEX RERUM

monopoly, monopolies: 57, 59, 62, 68 monopolies, port: 57 moral absolutism: 85 moral agent: 85 moral conduct: 27 moral decision process: 27, 80, 82 moral doubts: 71, 81, 85 moral problem: 69, 81, 82, 83 moral reasoning: 79, 80, 82, 85 moral relativism: 85 moral system: 80, 82, 85 moral system, modern: 82 moral theology: 26, 57, 69, 111, 112, 167, 175, 179, 303 moral uncertainty: 82, 83 morality: 26, 53, 54, 55, 77, 78, 82, 83, 156, 175 morals, first principles of: 82, 179 mortality: 115, 118 motion, irrational: 167, 169 motion, local: 192 movement, way of: 191, 192, 193, 194 multicultural political organization: 26, 36, 37, 49, 50, 51 native lords: 7, 26, 36, 37, 41, 46, 49 natural knowledge, of God: 178, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 186, 190, 203, 204, 205, 281-287 natural rights, of peoples: 5, 6, 7, 22 nature, common: 31, 32, 209, 211, 234, 240, 243, 244, 245, 258, 259, 266-271 nature, complete: 250 nature, divine: 188, 283, 284

331

nature, human: 48, 117, 166, 176, 237, 243, 246, 248, 266, 267, 268, 270, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286 nature, incomplete: 250 nature, order and perfection of: 199, 200, 203, 285 nature, pure: 286, 288 navigation: 21, 33, 289, 290, 299 navigation charts: 33, 289, 290, 291 navigation technique: 21, 33 navigation, overseas: 289, 290 navigators: 33, 289, 290 navigators, deep sea: 290 necessitarianism: 285 necessity, intrinsic: 190 needs, satisfaction of: 55 negation, negations: 182, 183, 196, 212, 227, 228, 246, 247, 251, 252, 259, 260, 261, 265, 268 New Spain: 13, 15, 16, 38, 45, 47, 63 New World: 5, 10, 14, 22, 33, 165 nobility: 183, 198 nomadism: 22 nominalism: 56 non-repugnance: 254, 256, 259, 260, 262, 263, 265, 270 object, beatific: 284 object, essential reason of: 188, 189 object, mind-dependent: 208, 211, 212, 213, 225 object, unity of: 187, 188, 189, 190 objects, mental: 208, 215 Old Testament: 61 ontology: 30, 183, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 214, 216, 217, 218,

332

INDEX RERUM

219, 220, 223, 224, 227, 228, 297 ontology, essentialist: 227 opinion, opinions: 75-85 opinion, probable: 27, 76, 78-84 opinions, conflicting: 81-82 oratory: 111 Oratory, Vieira’s: 117 oratory faculty: 111 orbits, dimensions of: 292, 293, 294, 296, 297 Ordenanzas: 43, 44 ordination, effective: 186, 288 partial causes, coincidence of: 200 partial causes, imperfect: 199, 200 partial causes, subordination of: 199, 200 participation, essential: 184 passions: 159, 166, 167, 168, 169, 171, 173 payment, means of: 41 pedagogy, Jesuit: 112, 155, 159 pedagogy, of teaching and learning: 155 perception: 169, 172, 306 perfect being, existence of a: 202, 203, 204, 205 perfection: 54, 70, 178, 179, 180, 182, 183, 190, 197, 198, 199, 204, 221, 256, 285, 287, 288 perfection, absolute: 192, 193, 207, 229 perfection, Christian: 283 perfection, moral: 174 perfection, qualitative: 200 persuasion, persuading: 75, 76, 77, 82, 135, 136, 202 persuasion, epistemological: 82

persuasion, techniques of: 75, 76, 77, 82 pessimism, anthropological: 33, 286 phenomena, celestial: 297 philosophical thought, Brazilian: 19, 20, 21, 22 philosophical treatises, written in Brazil: 19, 20 philosophy, first: 185 philosophy, modern: 3, 4, 5, 9, 11, 12, 21, 23, 29, 82, 176 philosophy, moral: 55, 56, 69, 73, 82, 109, 111, 154, 156, 159, 179, 301, 303 philosophy, natural: 11, 14, 15, 17, 21, 109, 169 philosophy, prophetic: 115 philosophy, scholastic: 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 17, 19, 20, 21, 23, 25, 26, 55, 56, 73, 149, 150, 152, 153, 156, 162, 164, 169, 211, 271, 288, 305 physician, physicians: 175 physics, study of: 11, 12 planetary orbits: 293 poetic faculty: 111 policy, public: 73 political communities: 6, 10, 49, 51, 73 political community, perfect: 84 political thought, modern: 25, 50 politics: 10, 18, 25, 35-51, 54, 55, 61, 80, 301, 302 polity, human: 48 polytheism, various types of: 198 population, native: 38, 46 Port Royal, logic of: 305, 306, 308

INDEX RERUM

Portuguese philosophy: 20, 21, 149, 165, 166, 303, 305 possibility, possibilities: 81, 166, 194, 195, 200, 211, 227, 238, 242, 282, 283 potencies, human superior: 175, 176 potencies, internal sensitive: 169, 170 potencies, rational: 170 potency, appetitive: 170 potency, cognitive: 169, 170, 284 potency, general definition of: 170 potency, positive: 254, 260, 266, 271 potency, proximate: 192, 195, 254, 257, 258, 269 potency, remote: 252, 253, 254, 257, 258, 265, 269 potentiality of knowledge, perfective: 285 power, absolute: 64, 239 power, infinite: 200 power, political: 36, 50, 84 practical belief, practical beliefs: 77, 79 preacher, preachers: 18, 27, 76, 78, 83, 84, 87-100, 147, 154 preaching: 78, 84, 87, 90, 92, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 114, 121, 202 preaching style: 94, 95 preaching, science of: 27 precision, separation: 180, 202, 251, 252 predicables: 232, 234 predicamental line: 250 predicate(s), essential: 201, 238, 249, 250, 268

333

predicates, transcendental: 189 price, prices: 26, 54-73 price formation: 54, 58 price, current: 66, 67, 72 price, determination of: 72 price, higher: 66, 70, 71, 72 price, just: 26, 54, 55, 57, 58, 60, 61, 62, 63, 65, 66, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73 price, lower: 66, 68, 72 pricing: 62, 63 priesthood: 159, 303 princes: 65 principles, first: 180, 186, 189 principles, metaphysical: 180, 183, 191, 192 principles, normative: 179, 201 principles, physical: 192 principles, revealed: 179 privation, privations: 212, 227, 228, 246, 247, 260, 261, 265 probabilism: 26, 75-85 probability: 26, 27, 75, 76, 77, 79, 81 probability, internal: 27, 76 probability, logic of: 79, 80, 81 probability, theory of: 26, 75, 76 probable, the most: 82, 83 problem of grace, anthropological: 286, 288 producers: 68 production process, infinite: 194, 195, 196, 197, 200 production, cost of: 70, 72 profit: 55, 56 prohibition, moral: 78 proof, a posteriori: 193-204 proof, extrinsic: 78

334

INDEX RERUM

proof, presumptive: 76 proof, reasonable: 76, 78 proof, rhetorical: 77 property: 40, 41, 105 prophetic writings, Vieira’s: 102, 115 proposition, moral: 78 Ptolemaic system: 291, 292, 293, 294, 296, 299 public power, the authority of: 63, 64 pueblos: 38, 40, 41, 46, 47, 48, 50 pueblos de indios: 26, 36, 45 Pythagorean School: 195 Ratio Studiorum: 28, 76, 85, 102, 109, 110, 112, 113, 147, 149, 151, 154, 159 realism: 18 realism, cognitive: 214 realism, Thomistic: 214 realities, spiritual: 199 reality, economic: 26, 53, 55 reality, entitative: 184 reality, extramental: 18, 30, 207, 213 reality, formal: 221 reality, intramental: 216, 227 reality, main object of: 181, 189 reality, mental: 219, 225 reality, objective: 31, 208, 211, 212, 219, 220, 221, 227, 228, 229 reality, sensible extramental: 213 reason, divine: 192 reason, natural: 55, 59, 61, 63, 166, 179, 180, 186, 287 reason, natural limits of: 179, 182 reasonableness: 27, 76 reasoning: 48, 56, 59, 79, 80, 82,

85, 95, 99, 102, 186, 188, 193, 195, 197, 199, 217, 231, 306 reasoning, contingent: 77 reducciones: 6 Reinos de Indias: 26, 36 relation(s), of reason: 224, 225, 226, 227 relation(s), real: 224, 225, 226 relations, social: 60 religion, critique of: 3 religious institutions, Portuguese: 149 Renaissance Aristotelianism: 165 Renaissance authors: 305 Renaissance Humanism: 161, 163 republic: 26, 36, 37, 39, 45-51, 56, 59, 61-67, 72 republic, authority of: 62, 66, 67 República de Españoles: 26, 36, 46 República de Indios: 26, 36, 37, 45, 46, 47 republican model, Hispanic: 46 republican organization, municipal: 46, 47, 48, 49, 51 restitution: 40, 45, 55, 66, 67 resurrection: 93, 114, 119 revelation, divine: 179, 285, 287 revelation, the light of: 180 rhetoric: 14, 26, 27, 28, 75, 76, 77, 82, 87, 99, 110, 111, 113, 117, 135, 136, 147, 151, 155, 166 rhetoric, Ciceronian: 26, 75, 78, 82 rhetorical concept: 82 rhetorical principle, rhetorical principles: 26, 75 rhetorical proof: 77 rhetorical training: 82 rhetorics, Christian: 27, 28

INDEX RERUM

rights, human: 4, 5, 6, 7, 22, 36 Sacraments: 81, 112 Sacred Scripture, Holy Scripture: 7, 38, 82, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 112, 116, 117, 122, 155, 168, 198 Salamanca: 3, 21, 24, 32, 49, 57, 58, 59, 69, 81, 161, 274, 276 Salamanca, University of: 14, 29, 37, 165, 259, 275, 276, 277, 279, 280, 281 sale contracts: 58 salvation: 40, 81, 127, 287 salvationism: 101 São Julião da Barra: 28, 129, 130, 131, 136, 137, 138, 139, 146 Scholastic Humanism: 21, 75, 83, 161, 162, 163 scholastica colonialis, Colonial Scholasticism: 1, 20, 24, 288 Scholasticism, Baroque: 1, 3, 5, 19, 20, 21, 22, 26, 84, 161 Scholasticism, Iberian: 3, 20, 22, 23, 27, 29, 161 scholasticism, in Portugal: 2, 3, 20, 21, 24, 149, 150, 158 Scholasticism, Late: 14, 33, 55, 150 scholasticism, medieval: 76, 150, 162 scholasticism, modern: 9, 33, 214 Scholasticism, Spanish: 21, 161 school-master: 76 science, divine: 179, 181, 182, 185, 283 science, medical: 163, 175, 176 science, object of: 181, 182, 183, 185-191, 204

335

science, speculative: 82, 83, 179, 185, 191, 204 science, supernatural: 179, 181, 283 science, unity of: 185-190, 204 sciences, human: 179, 182, 191 sciences, natural: 9, 21, 33, 179, 180, 182, 185 sciences, practical: 180 scientia moralis: 80, 81 Scotism: 31, 32, 233, 274, 279, 280, 281, 282, 287 Scotism, Iberian: 32, 273-288 Scotist school, Scotistic school: 114, 168, 174, 252, 274, 278, 282, 286 Scotist tenure: 274 Scotist tradition: 31, 166, 168, 174, 220, 231, 263, 275, 276, 280, 285 Second Scholasticism: 19, 20, 22, 24, 25, 53, 55, 56, 161, 162, 198, 208, 214 self-government: 37 self-organization: 37, 46 self-regulation: 46, 73 sellers: 65 sellers, responsibility of: 64, 67 selling: 61, 63, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70 señoríos: 36 sermon, sermons: 27, 28, 75, 87, 88, 90, 91, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 102, 114-121, 123, 125, 126, 127 sermon, composition of: 96 sermon, elements of: 93, 94 service providers: 46, 68, 99 servitude: 36, 37, 45, 47, 49, 84

336

INDEX RERUM

Sexagesima Sermon: 27, 87-100 sign: 90, 204, 292, 296 similarity, real: 30, 90, 208, 236, 256, 261 simplicity: 186, 193 simultaneity, idea of: 196 sin, formal: 81 sin, material: 81 sin, mortal: 40, 119, 120 sin, original: 119, 120, 123 singularity: 242, 243, 244, 248, 249, 253, 255, 257, 259, 260, 262, 265, 269 singularity, remotion of: 251, 252, 256, 257, 258, 260 skepticism: 101 slavery: 7, 22, 49, 126 slaves, African: 7, 43, 44 soul: 22, 28, 42, 48, 83, 89, 105, 146, 159, 163, 164, 166, 167, 169, 170, 171, 172, 175, 180, 192, 195, 204, 209, 213, 215, 283, 306 soul, immortality of: 166 soul, progress of: 159 soul, rational: 48, 167, 169, 170, 180, 192, 195, 204 soul, sensitive: 167, 169, 170 sovereignty: 22 species, intelligible: 213, 214, 215, 256 spiritual director: 78 spirituality, Jesuit: 26, 75 spontaneity: 94 status, human: 3, 4, 6, 7 stoicism: 101 studies, classical: 3, 99, 112, 162 Studium generale: 38, 275

subject, demonstrable properties of a: 189 subjectivity: 71, 73 Sublimis Deus: 22 substance, eternal: 191 supernatural order: 166, 286, 287 supernatural, supernaturality: 166, 179, 181, 280-288 supernatural, the: 280, 283-288 symbolism: 122, 123 synderesis: 80, 81 taxation: 40, 41, 47 taxes: 59 teaching, Jesuit model of: 28, 75, 102, 110, 152, 154, 155, 156, 157, 161-167 theology, moral: 26, 84, 111, 112, 154, 167, 175, 179, 301 theology, natural: 30, 178, 179, 180, 181, 183, 184, 185, 188, 190, 191, 203, 204, 205 theology, necessity of: 282 theology, practical and positive: 155 theology, scholastic: 112, 127, 155, 156 theology, speculative: 155, 303 theology, supernatural: 179, 181, 282, 283, 284, 286, 288 Theory of Universal Gravitation: 295, 297, 298 Thomism: 31, 56, 150, 158, 233 Thomism, pure: 150 titles: 41, 156 trade, trading: 48, 56, 57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 65, 67, 68, 72, 289 trade relationships: 55, 65 traders: 61, 62, 65, 66, 157

INDEX RERUM

tradition: 49, 51, 82, 84, 95, 107, 119 traditions, political: 49 traffic, overseas: 289, 290 transactions: 58, 73 transcendence: 182, 183, 286 tribute: 40, 41, 42, 46, 47, 50 truth: 76, 77, 111, 119, 178, 180, 183, 190, 198, 199, 203, 204, 205, 208, 210 truth, eternal: 119, 208 truth, metaphysical: 67, 204, 178 truth, transcendent property of: 190 Tychonic geocentrism: 294, 296 Tychonic system: 292, 293 tyranny: 41, 49, 50 uncertainty, practical: 82, 83 uncertainty, speculative: 82, 83 understanding, human: 184, 187, 188, 189, 201, 202, 282, 284, 286, 287, 288 understanding, rhetorical: 77 unity: 244, 245, 246, 147, 249, 258, 266, 267, 268, 270 unity, common positive: 267, 269 unity, essential: 249 unity, formal: 244-249, 252, 260, 262, 263, 270 unity, generic: 249 unity, material: 245, 246 unity, numerical: 245, 247, 248, 262, 270 unity, transcendental: 216 universal, universals: 19, 238, 250, 268 universal, complete: 238, 250, 268 universal, concrete: 235 universal, formal: 268

337

universal, in common: 233, 234, 268 universal, in potency: 253, 268 universal, logical: 233, 252, 260, 270 universal, real: 32, 234 universality: 32, 182, 223, 235, 238, 258, 263, 264, 265, 266, 268, 269, 270, 271 universality, actual: 253, 257, 258, 259 universality, formal: 259, 268 universality, fundament of: 234, 243, 244, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 257 universality, logical: 253 Universidad de San Marcos, Perú: 17, 297, 299 universities, colonial: 3, 8, 12, 13, 17, 20, 21, 23, 25, 149 universities, history of: 3, 8, 13, 20, 21, 23, 25, 149, 162, 163, 164, 166 universities, Jesuit: 20, 21, 23, 149, 150, 157, 163, 164, 166 universities, Portuguese: 156, 161, 165 universities, Spanish: 2, 3, 21, 32, 161 university, Jesuit subterranean: 28, 129-160 unlawfulness: 55, 56 Unmoved Mover: 191 unum: 248, 266, 269 urbanity: 47 urbanization: 46 usefulness: 62, 70, 71, 72 usury: 54, 55, 58, 59, 61 valuation, subjectivity of: 65, 73 value, values: 26, 45, 53, 54, 56,

338

INDEX RERUM

57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64, 66, 69, 71, 72 value, current: 26, 66 value, objective: 61, 63 value, theory of: 53, 69, 71 value-utility, subjective theory of: 56 valuing, problem of: 62, 69, 70, 73 vassalage: 37 virtue: 63, 65, 121, 123, 124, 174 virtues, theological: 121, 174 vision, of God: 282, 283, 285, 287 Visitador Real: 43 vital movements: 170, 171, 175, 176 vital tendency: 175

voyaging, deep sea: 289 war, just: 6, 8, 44, 47, 49 wind, of fortune: 118 wind, of life: 118 wisdom: 119, 122, 125, 179, 180, 183, 185, 188, 191 wisdom, divine: 179, 180, 185 wisdom, natural: 179, 180, 183, 185, 188, 191 work, costs of: 54, 65, 72 world system: 33, 289, 291, 292, 294, 295, 296, 299 world, creation of: 200 world, extramental: 219, 227 world, perfection of: 199, 199, 204 world, possible: 199

Collection « Textes et Études du Moyen Âge » publiée par la Fédération Internationale des Instituts d’Études Médiévales

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Filosofia e Teologia nel Trecento. Studi in ricordo di Eugenio Randi a cura di L. BIANCHI, Louvain-la-Neuve 1995. VII + 575 p. 54 Euros

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Pratiques de la culture écrite en France au XVe siècle, Actes du Colloque international du CNRS (Paris, 16-18 mai 1992) organisé en l’honneur de Gilbert Ouy par l’unité de recherche « Culture écrite du Moyen Âge tardif », édités par M. ORNATO et N. PONS, Louvain-la-Neuve 1995. XV + 592 p. et 50 ill. h.-t. 67 Euros

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Bilan et perspectives des études médiévales en Europe, Actes du premier Congrès européen d’études médiévales (Spoleto, 27-29 mai 1993), édités par J. HAMESSE, 54 Euros Louvain-la-Neuve 1995. XIII + 522 p. et 32 ill. h.-t.

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Les manuscrits des lexiques et glossaires de l’Antiquité tardive à la fin du Moyen Âge, Actes du Colloque international organisé par le «Ettore Majorana Centre for Scientific Culture» (Erice, 23-30 septembre 1994), édités par J. HAMESSE, Louvain67 Euros la-Neuve 1996. XIII + 723 p.

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Models of Holiness in Medieval Studies, Proceedings of the International Symposium (Kalamazoo, 4-7 May 1995), edited by B.M. KIENZLE, E. WILKS DOLNIKOWSKI, R. DRAGE HALE, D. PRYDS, A.T. THAYER, Louvain-la-Neuve 1996. XX + 402 p. 49 Euros

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P.-A. BURTON, Bibliotheca Aelrediana secunda (1962-1996). Ouvrage publié avec le concours de la Fondation Universitaire de Belgique et de la Fondation Francqui, Louvain-la-Neuve 1997. 208 p. 27 Euros

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Aux origines du lexique philosophique européen. L’influence de la « latinitas », Actes du Colloque international de Rome (23-25 mai 1996) édités par J. HAMESSE, 34 Euros Louvain-la-Neuve 1997. XIV + 298 p.

9.

Medieval Sermons and Society : Cloisters, City, University, Proceedings of International Symposia at Kalamazoo and New York, edited by J. HAMESSE, B.M. KIENZLE, D.L. STOUDT, A.T. THAYER, Louvain-la-Neuve 1998. VIII + 414 p. et 7 ill. h.-t. 54 Euros

10. Roma, magistra mundi. Itineraria culturae medievalis. Mélanges offerts au Père L.E. Boyle à l’occasion de son 75e anniversaire, édités par J. HAMESSE. Ouvrage publié avec le concours de la Homeland Foundation (New York), Louvain-la-Neuve épuisé 1998. vol. I-II : XII + 1030 p. ; vol. III : VI + 406 p. 11. Filosofia e scienza classica, arabo-latina medievale e l’età moderna. Ciclo di seminari internazionali (26-27 gennaio 1996) a cura di G. FEDERICI VESCOVINI, 39 Euros Louvain-la-Neuve 1999. VIII + 331 p. 12. J.L. JANSSENS, An annotated Bibliography of Ibn Sînæ. First Supplement (1990-1994), uitgegeven met steun van de Universitaire Stichting van België en het Francqui26 Euros Fonds, Louvain-la-Neuve 1999. XXI + 218 p. 13. L.E. BOYLE, O.P., Facing history: A different Thomas Aquinas, with an introduction by J.-P. TORRELL, O.P., Louvain-la-Neuve 2000. XXXIV + 170 p. et 2 ill. h.- t. 33 Euros

14. Lexiques bilingues dans les domaines philosophique et scientifique (Moyen Âge – Renaissance), Actes du Colloque international organisé par l’École Pratique des Hautes Etudes – IVe Section et l’Institut Supérieur de Philosophie de l’Université Catholique de Louvain (Paris, 12-14 juin 1997) édités par J. HAMESSE et D. JACQUART, Turnhout 2001. XII + 240 p., ISBN 978-2-503-51176-4 35 Euros 15. Les prologues médiévaux, Actes du Colloque international organisé par l’Academia Belgica et l’École française de Rome avec le concours de la F.I.D.E.M. (Rome, 26-28 mars 1998) édités par J. HAMESSE, Turnhout 2000. 716 p., ISBN 978-2-503-51124-5 75 Euros 16. L.E. BOYLE, O.P., Integral Palaeography, with an introduction by F. TRONCARELLI, Turnhout 2001. 174 p. et 9 ill. h.-t., ISBN 978-2-503-51177-1 33 Euros 17. La figura di San Pietro nelle fonti del Medioevo, Atti del convegno tenutosi in occasione dello Studiorum universitatum docentium congressus (Viterbo e Roma, 5-8 settembre 2000) a cura di L. LAZZARI e A.M. VALENTE BACCI, Louvain-la-Neuve 2001. 708 p. et 153 ill. h.-t. 85 Euros 18. Les Traducteurs au travail. Leurs manuscrits et leurs méthodes. Actes du Colloque international organisé par le « Ettore Majorana Centre for Scientific Culture » (Erice, 30 septembre – 6 octobre 1999) édités par J. HAMESSE, Turnhout 2001. XVIII + 455 p., ISBN 978-2-503-51219-8 55 Euros 19. Metaphysics in the Twelfth Century. Proceedings of the International Colloquium (Frankfurt, june 2001) edited by M. LUTZ-BACHMANN et al., Turnhout 2003. XIV + 220 p., ISBN 978-2-503-52202-9 43 Euros 20. Chemins de la pensée médiévale. Études offertes à Zénon Kaluza éditées par P.J.J.M. BAKKER avec la collaboration de E. FAYE et Ch. GRELLARD, Turnhout 2002. XXIX + 778 p., ISBN 978-2-503-51178-8 68 Euros 21. Filosofia in volgare nel medioevo. Atti del Colloquio Internazionale de la S.I.S.P.M. (Lecce, 27-28 settembre 2002) a cura di L. STURLESE, Louvain-la-Neuve 2003. 540 p., ISBN 978-2-503-51503-8 43 Euros 22. Bilan et perspectives des études médiévales en Europe (1993-1998). Actes du deuxième Congrès européen d’études médiévales (Euroconference, Barcelone, 8-12 juin 1999), édités par J. HAMESSE, Turnhout 2003. XXXII + 656 p., ISBN 978-2-503-51615-865 Euros 23. Lexiques et glossaires philosophiques de la Renaissance. Actes du Colloque International organisé en collaboration à Rome (3-4 novembre 2000) par l’Academia Belgica, le projet « Le corrispondenze scientifiche, letterarie ed erudite dal Rinascimento all’ età moderna » et l’Università degli studi di Roma « La Sapienza », édités par J. HAMESSE et M. FATTORI, Louvain-la-Neuve 2003. IX + 321 p., ISBN 978-2-503-51535-9 39 Euros 24. Ratio et superstitio. Essays in Honor of Graziella Federici Vescovini edited by G. MARCHETTI, V. SORGE and O. RIGNANI, Louvain-la-Neuve 2003. XXX + 676 p. – 5 ill. h.-t., ISBN 978-2-503-51523-6 54 Euros 25. « In principio erat verbum » . Mélanges offerts à Paul Tombeur par ses anciens élèves édités par B.-M. TOCK, Turnhout 2004. 450 p., ISBN 978-2-503-51672-6 54 Euros 26. Duns Scot à Paris, 1302-2002. Actes du colloque de Paris, 2-4 septembre 2002, édités par O. BOULNOIS, E. KARGER, J.-L. SOLÈRE et G. SONDAG, Turnhout 2005. XXIV + 683 p., ISBN 2-503-51810-9 54 Euros 27. Medieval Memory. Image and text, edited by F. WILLAERT, Turnhout 2004. XXV + 265 p., ISBN 2-503-51683-1 54 Euros 28. La Vie culturelle, intellectuelle et scientifique à la Cour des Papes d’Avignon. Volume en collaboration internationale édité par J. HAMESSE, Turnhout 2006. XI + 413 p. – 16 ill. h.t., ISBN 2-503-51877-X 43 Euros

29. G. MURANO, Opere diffuse per «exemplar» e pecia, Turnhout 2005. 897 p., ISBN 2-503-51922-9 75 Euros 30. Corpo e anima, sensi interni e intelletto dai secoli XIII-XIV ai post-cartesiani e spinoziani. Atti del Colloquio internazionale (Firenze, 18-20 settembre 2003) a cura di G. FEDERICI VESCOVINI, V. SORGE e C. VINTI, Turnhout 2005. 576 p., ISBN 2-503-51988-1 54 Euros 31. Le felicità nel medioevo. Atti del Convegno della Società Italiana per lo Studio del Pensiero Medievale (S.I.S.P.M.) (Milano, 12-13 settembre 2003), a cura di M. BETTETINI e F. D. PAPARELLA, Louvain-la-Neuve 2005. XVI + 464 p., ISBN 2-503-51875-3 43 Euros 32. Itinéraires de la raison. Études de philosophie médiévale offertes à Maria Cândida Pacheco, éditées par J. MEIRINHOS, Louvain-la-Neuve 2005. XXVIII + 444 p., ISBN 2-503-51987-3 43 Euros 33. Testi cosmografici, geografici e odeporici del medioevo germanico. Atti del XXXI Convegno dell’Associazione italiana di filologia germanica (A.I.F.G.), Lecce, 26-28 maggio 2004, a cura di D. GOTTSCHALL, Louvain-la-Neuve 2005. XV + 276 p., ISBN 2-503-52271-8 34 Euros 34. Écriture et réécriture des textes philosophiques médiévaux. Mélanges offerts à C. Sirat édités par J. HAMESSE et O. WEIJERS, Turnhout 2006. XXVI + 499 p., ISBN 2-503-52424-9 54 Euros 35. Frontiers in the Middle Ages. Proceedings of the Third European Congress of the FIDEM (Jyväskylä, june 2003), edited by O. MERISALO and P. PAHTA, Louvain-laNeuve 2006. XII + 761p., ISBN 2-503-52420-6 65 Euros 36. Classica et beneventana. Essays presented to Virginia Brown on the Occasion of her 65th Birthday edited by F.T. COULSON and A. A. GROTANS, Turnhout 2006. XXIV + 444 p. – 20 ill. h.t., ISBN 978-2-503-2434-4 54 Euros 37. G. MURANO, Copisti a Bologna (1265-1270), Turnhout 2006. 214 p., ISBN 2-50352468-9 44 Euros 38. «Ad ingenii acuitionem». Studies in honour of Alfonso Maierù, edited by S. CAROTI, R. IMBACH, Z. KALUZA, G. STABILE and L. STURLESE. Louvain-la-Neuve 2006. VIII + 590 p., ISBN 978-2-503-52532-7 54 Euros 39. Form and Content of Instruction in Anglo-saxon England in the Light of Contemporary Manuscript Evidence. Papers from the International Conference (Udine, April 6th-8th 2006) edited by P. LENDINARA, L. LAZZARI, M.A. D’ARONCO, Turnhout 2007. XIII + 552 p., ISBN 978-2-503-52591-0 65 Euros 40. Averroès et les averroïsmes latin et juif. Actes du Colloque International (Paris, juin 2005) édités par J.-B. BRENET, Turnhout 2007. 367 p., ISBN 978-2-503-52742-0 54 Euros 41. P. LUCENTINI, Platonismo, ermetismo, eresia nel medioevo. Introduzione di L. STURLESE. Volume publié en co-édition et avec le concours de l’Università degli Studi di Napoli « l’Orientale » (Dipartimento di Filosofia e Politica). Louvain-laNeuve 2007. XVI + 517 p., ISBN 978-2-503-52726-0 54 Euros 42.1. Repertorium initiorum manuscriptorum Latinorum Medii Aevi curante J. HAMESSE, auxiliante S. SZYLLER. Tome I : A-C. Louvain-la-Neuve 2007. XXXIV + 697 p., ISBN 978-2-503-52727-7 59 Euros 42.2. Repertorium initiorum manuscriptorum Latinorum Medii Aevi curante J. HAMESSE, auxiliante S. SZYLLER. Tome II : D-O. Louvain-la-Neuve 2008. 802 p., ISBN 978-2503-53045-1 59 Euros

42.3. Repertorium initiorum manuscriptorum Latinorum Medii Aevi curante J. HAMESSE, auxiliante S. SZYLLER. Tome III : P-Z. Louvain-la-Neuve 2009, 792 p., ISBN 978-2503-53321-6 59 Euros 42.4. Repertorium initiorum manuscriptorum Latinorum Medii Aevi curante J. HAMESSE, auxiliante S. SZYLLER. Tome IV : Supplementum. Indices. Louvain-la-Neuve 2010. 597 p., ISBN 978-2-503-53603-3 59 Euros 43. New Essays on Metaphysics as «Scientia Transcendens». Proceedings of the Second International Conference of Medieval Philosophy, held at the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS), Porto Alegre / Brazil, 15-18 August 2006, ed. R. H. PICH. Louvain-la-Neuve 2007. 388 p., ISBN 978-2-503-52787-1 43 Euros 44. A.-M. VALENTE, San Pietro nella letteratura tedesca medievale, Louvain-la-Neuve 2008. 240 p., ISBN 978-2-503-52846-5 43 Euros 45. B. FERNÁNDEZ DE LA CUESTA GONZÁLEZ, En la senda del «Florilegium Gallicum». Edición y estudio del florilegio del manuscrito Córdoba, Archivo Capitular 150, Louvain-la-Neuve 2008. 542 p., ISBN 978-2-503-52879-3 54 Euros 46. Cosmogonie e cosmologie nel Medioevo. Atti del convegno della Società italiana per lo studio del pensiero medievale (S.I.S.P.M.), Catania, 22-24 settembre 2006. A cura di C. MARTELLO, C. MILITELLO, A. VELLA, Louvain-la-Neuve 2008. XVI + 526 p., ISBN 978-2-503-52951-6 54 Euros 47. M. J. MUÑOZ JIMÉNEZ, Un florilegio de biografías latinas: edición y estudio del manuscrito 7805 de la Biblioteca Nacional de Madrid, Louvain-la-Neuve 2008. 317 p., ISBN 978-2-503-52983-7 43 Euros 48. Continuities and Disruptions Between the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Proceedings of the colloquium held at the Warburg Institute, 15-16 June 2007, jointly organised by the Warburg Institute and the Gabinete de Filosofia Medieval. Ed. by C. BURNETT, J. MEIRINHOS, J. HAMESSE, Louvain-la-Neuve 2008. X + 181 p., ISBN 9782-503-53014-7 43 Euros 50. Florilegium mediaevale. Études offertes à Jacqueline Hamesse à l’occasion de son éméritat. Éditées par J. MEIRINHOS et O. WEIJERS, Louvain-la-Neuve 2009. XXXIV + 636 p., ISBN 978-2-503-53146-5 60 Euros 51. Immaginario e immaginazione nel Medioevo. Atti del convegno della Società Italiana per lo Studio del Pensiero Medievale (S.I.S.P.M.), Milano, 25-27 settembre 2008. A cura di M. BETTETINI e F. PAPARELLA, con la collaborazione di R. FURLAN. Louvainla-Neuve 2009. 428 p., ISBN 978-2-503-53150-2 55 Euros 52. Lo scotismo nel Mezzogiorno d’Italia. Atti del Congresso Internazionale (Bitonto 25-28 marzo 2008), in occasione del VII Centenario della morte di del beato Giovanni Duns Scoto. A cura di F. FIORENTINO, Porto 2010. 514 p., ISBN 978-2-50353448-0 55 Euros 53. E. MONTERO CARTELLE, Tipología de la literatura médica latina: Antigüedad, Edad Media, Renacimiento, Porto 2010. 243 p., ISBN 978-2-503-53513-5 43 Euros 54. Rethinking and Recontextualizing Glosses: New Perspectives in the Study of Late Anglo-Saxon Glossography, edited by P. LENDINARA, L. LAZZARI, C. DI SCIACCA, 60 Euros Porto 2011. XX + 564 p. + XVI ill., ISBN 978-2-503-54253-9 55. I beni di questo mondo. Teorie etico-economiche nel laboratorio dell’Europa medievale. Atti del convegno della Società italiana per lo studio del pensiero medievale (S.I.S.P.M.) Roma, 19-21 settembre 2005. A cura di R. LAMBERTINI e 49 Euros L. SILEO, Porto 2010. 367 p., ISBN 978-2-503-53528-9 56. Medicina y filología. Estudios de léxico médico latino en la Edad Media, edición de A. I. MARTÍN FERREIRA, Porto 2010. 256 p., ISBN 978-2-503-53895-2 49 Euros

57. Mots médiévaux offerts à Ruedi Imbach, édité par I. ATUCHA, D. CALMA, C. KONIGPRALONG, I. ZAVATTERO, Porto 2011. 797 p., ISBN 978-2-503-53528-9 75 Euros 58. El florilegio, espacio de encuentro de los autores antiguos y medievales, editado por M. J. MUÑOZ JIMÉNEZ, Porto 2011. 289 p., ISBN 978-2-503-53596-8 45 Euros 59. Glossaires et lexiques médiévaux inédits. Bilan et perspectives. Actes du Colloque de Paris (7 mai 2010), Édités par J. HAMESSE et J. MEIRINHOS, Porto 2011. XII + 291 p., ISBN 978-2-503-54175-4 45 Euros 60. Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109): Philosophical Theology and Ethics. Proceedings of the Third International Conference of Medieval Philosophy, held at the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre / Brazil (02-04 September 2009), Edited by R. Hofmeister PICH, Porto 2011. XVI + 244 p., ISBN 978-2-50354265-2 45 Euros 61. L’antichità classica nel pensiero medievale. Atti del Convegno de la Società italiana per lo studio del pensiero medievale (S.I.S.P.M.), Trento, 27-29 settembre 2010. A cura 59 Euros di A. PALAZZO. Porto 2011. VI + 492, p., ISBN 978-2-503-54289-8 62. M. C. DE BONIS, The Interlinear Glosses to the Regula Sancti Benedicti in London, British Library, Cotton Tiberius A. III. ISBN 978-2-503-54266-9 (en préparation) 63. J. P. BARRAGÁN NIETO, El «De secretis mulierum» atribuido a Alberto Magno: Estudio, edición crítica y traducción. I Premio Internacional de Tesis Doctorales Fundación Ana María Aldama Roy de Estudios Latinos, Porto 2012. 600 p., ISBN 978-2-503-54392-5 65 Euros 64. Tolerancia: teoría y práctica en la Edad Media. Actas del Coloquio de Mendoza (1518 de Junio de 2011), editadas por R. PERETÓ RIVAS, Porto 2012. XXI + 295 p., ISBN 978-2-503-54553-0 49 Euros 65. Portraits de maîtres offerts à Olga Weijers, édité par C. ANGOTTI, M. BRÎNZEI, 65 Euros M. TEEUWEN, Porto 2012. 521 p., ISBN 978-2-503-54801-2 66. L. TROMBONI, Inter omnes Plato et Aristoteles: Gli appunti filosofici di Girolamo Savonarola. Introduzione, edizione critica e comento, Prefazione di G. C. 55 Euros GARFAGNINI, Porto 2012. XV + 326 p., ISBN 978-2-503-54803-6 67. M. MARCHIARO, La biblioteca di Pietro Crinito. Manoscritti e libri a stampa della raccolta libraria di un umanista fiorentino. II Premio de la Fundación Ana María Aldama Roy de Estudios Latinos, Porto 2013. 342 p., ISBN 978-2-503-54949-1 55 Euros 68. Phronêsis – Prudentia – Klugheit. Das Wissen des Klugen in Mittelalter, Renaissance und Neuzeit. Il sapere del saggio nel Medioevo, nel Rinascimento e nell’Età Moderna. Herausgegeben von / A cura di A. FIDORA, A. NIEDERBERGER, M. SCATTOLA, Porto 2013. 348 p., ISBN 978-2-503-54989-7 59 Euros 69. La compilación del saber en la Edad Media. La Compilation du savoir au Moyen Âge. The Compilation of Knowledge in the Middle Ages. Editado por M. J. MUÑOZ, P. CAÑIZARES y C. MARTÍN, Porto 2013. 632 p., ISBN 978-2-50355034-3 65 Euros 70. W. CHILDS, Trade and Shipping in the Medieval West: Portugal, Castile and England, Porto 2013. 187 p., ISBN 978-2-503-55128-9 35 Euros 71. L. LANZA, «Ei autem qui de politia considerat ...» Aristotele nel pensiero politico medievale, Barcelona – Madrid 2013. 305 p., ISBN 978-2-503-55127-2 49 Euros 72. «Scholastica colonialis». Reception and Development of Baroque Scholasticism in Latin America, 16th-18th Centuries, Edited by R. H. PICH and A. S. CULLETON, 49 Euros Barcelona – Roma 2016. VIII + 338 p., ISBN 978-2-503-55200-2

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