Readings in Russian Civilization 9780226718460, 0226718468

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Readings in Russian Civilization

VOLUME III

SOVIET RUSSIA, 1917-PRESENT

|R]

C | lL | [ 1 EDITED, WITH INTRODUCTORY NOTES, BY

THOMAS RIHA

SECOND EDITION, REVISED | THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS CHICAGO AND LONDON

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS, CHICAGO 60637 |

The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., London

First published 1964 , Second edition, revised, 1969 ,

© 1964, 1969 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved

Printed in the United States of America

00 99 98 97 96 95 94 93 92 1011121381415 ISBN: 0-226-71856-5 (clothbound); 0-226-71857-3 (paperbound) Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 69-14825

CONTENTS VOLUME III | PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION xi

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION xill

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS XV 44 *TESTIMONY ON THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION | 901 GENERAL SERGEI KHABALOV

45 *THE RUSSIAN VILLAGE, SUMMER 1917 | 507 46 RUSSIA’S ONE-DAY PARLIAMENT Victor CHERNOV 513

47 DAYS WITH LENIN Maxim GorKky 517 48 *DOWN WITH FACTIONALISM! NIKOLAI BUKHARIN 534.

49 THE HISTORY OF A SOVIET COLLECTIVE FARM 542 FEpoR BELOV

50 A DAY IN MAGNITOGORSK 567 JOHN Scott; VALENTIN KATAYEV

51 SOCIALIST GOLD Joun LitTLEPAGE 589

52 THE SOVIET CONSTITUTION 600 *Items added in 2d edition. | V

vl Contents 53. ON THE CONSTITUTION JosepH STALIN 615 54 THE SOVIET SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT = Joun Hazarp 624

55 I SPEAK FOR THE SILENT VLADIMIR TCHERNAVIN 646

56 THE PURGE TRIALS 663 57 *THE BLOCKADE OF LENINGRAD Dmitri PAVLOV 674

58 *THE SECOND WORLD WAR Gricort DEBORIN 685

59 THE PARTY AND THE ARTS 693 ANDREI ZHDANOV; NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV

60 THE ADVENTURES OF AN APE MixkuaiL ZosHCHENKO 709 61 MY WORTHLESS AND VICIOUS FILM = Serce: EIsensTein 715

62 THE DESTRUCTION OF SOVIET GENETICS 718 HERMAN J. MULLER

63 STALIN’S COFFIN 732 64 “PILFERING THE PEOPLE'S WEALTH" 736

65 FROM NEW YORK TO LOS ANGELES 742 | G. Burkov AND V. SHCHETININ . 6 IS THE SOVIET UNION A WELFARE STATE? 756 ALEC Nove

67 *STANDARD BEARERS OF COMMUNIST LABOR 766

Contents Vi 68 *SOVIET NATIONALITY POLICY 774 | BoBopzZHAN GAFUROV; RICHARD PIPES

69 *SOVIET RELIGIOUS POLICY 788 LIUDMILA ANOKHINA AND MARGARITA SHMELEVA;}

Harry WILLETTS

70 *ARE WE FLIRTING WITH CAPITALISM? 803 Evser LIBERMAN

71 *ON THE EVENTS IN CHINA 811 72 *WHITHER THE SOVIET UNION? 82] ZBYGNIEW BRZEZINSKI; FREDERICK BARGHOORN

CHRONOLOGY xvii CORRELATION TABLES XXili

INDEX xxix

re ~ BLANK PAGE |

CONTENTS VOLUME | 1 THE RUSSIAN PRIMARY CHRONICLE 2 MEDIEVAL RUSSIAN LAWS

3 THE CHRONICLE OF NOVGOROD

4. *THE DIG AT NOVGOROD Valentine Yanine

5 RUSSIAN EPICS 6 FEUDALISM IN RUSSIA George Vernadsky; L. V. Cherepnin

7 THE KURBSKY-IVAN THE TERRIBLE oe CORRESPONDENCE

8 IVAN GROZNY — Robert Wipper 9 *THE DEBATE ON IVAN THE TERRIBLE IN 1956

10 THE LIFE OF ST. SERGIUS _ St. Epiphanius 11 AVVAKUM’S AUTOBIOGRAPHY

12 THE RUSSIAN CHURCH SCHISM — Serge Zenkovsky

13 THE LAW CODE OF 1649 14 *MUSCOVITE-WESTERN COMMERCIAL RELATIONS | 15 THE MONGOL IMPACT ON RUSSIA ~— George Vernadsky

16 THE FRONTIER — B.H. Sumner 17. THE PROBLEM OF OLD RUSSIAN CULTURE Georges Florovsky; Nikolay Andreyev; James Billington CHRONOLOGY

CORRELATION TABLES INDEX *Items added in 2d edition. 1x

CONTENTS VOLUME II

18 RUSSIA UNDER PETER THE GREAT John Perry 19 LOMONOSOV _— Boris Menshutkin 20 CATHERINE THE GREAT’S “INSTRUCTIONS”

21 *THE LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION OF 1767 Sergei Solov’ev 22 A JOURNEY FROM ST. PETERSBURG TO MOSCOW

Alexander Radishchev 23 MEMOIR ON ANCIENT AND MODERN RUSSIA

, Nicholas Karamzin

24 THE DECEMBRISTS 25 APOLOGY OF A MADMAN Peter Chaadaev 26 LETTER TO GOGOL Vissarion Belinsky 27 YOUNG MOSCOW Alexander Herzen 28 WHAT IS OBLOMOVISM? Nikolai Dobrolyubov 29 GOING TO THE PEOPLE Katerina Breshkovskaia 30 *FROM A VILLAGE DIARY — Gleb Uspenskii

31 KILLING AN EMPEROR David Footman 32 A SLAVOPHILE STATEMENT Ivan Aksakov 33. THE SLAV ROLE IN WORLD CIVILIZATION

| _ Nikolai Danilevsky 34 THE FALSEHOOD OF DEMOCRACY Konstantin Pobedonostsev 35 RUSSIAN LIBERALS Paul Milyukov 36 *INDUSTRIAL WORKERS IN THE 1880's

37 AN ECONOMIC POLICY FOR THE EMPIRE Sergei Witte 38 THE NATIONAL PROBLEM IN RUSSIA _ Richard Pipes 39 *SPEECH FROM THE THRONE Nicholas II 40 *THE GOVERNMENT’S DECLARATION TO THE FIRST DUMA

41 *WE NEED A GREAT RUSSIA _ Peter Stolypin 42 MEMORANDUM TO NICHOLAS II Peter Durnovo

INDEX |

43 THE NATURE OF IMPERIAL RUSSIAN SOCIETY Cyril Black; Hugh Seton-Watson

CHRONOLOGY

CORRELATION TABLES *Items added in 2d edition.

X

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

This new and enlarged version of Readings in Russian Civilization is the result of fairly extensive revisions. There are now 72 instead of 64 items; 20 of the selections are new. The first volume has undergone the least change with 3 new items, of which 2 appear in English for the first time. In the second volume there are 6 new items; all of them appear in English for the first time. The third volume has undergone the greatest revision, with 11 new items, of which 6 are newly translated from the Russian. It is the editor’s hope that items left out in the new edition will not be sorely missed, and that the new selections will turn out to be useful and illuminating. The aim, throughout, has been to cover areas of knowledge

and periods which had been neglected in the first edition, and to include topics which are important in the study of the Russian past and present. The bibliographical headnotes have been enlarged, with the result that there are now approximately twice as many entries as in the old edition. New citations include not only works which have appeared since 1963, but also older books and articles which have come to the editor’s attention.

The editor would like to thank several persons who have contributed to the improvement of the text. Some sixty professors answered a questionnaire sent out by the University of Chicago Press and suggested changes or improvements in the Readings. Most of these suggestions have been heeded, and the editor is grateful for this generous cooperation by his colleagues. Professor Josef Anderle should be singled out, since he offered particularly detailed comments and had been most helpful in the preparation of the first edition as well. Professors Richard Wortman and Richard Hellie suggested new documents and, in the case of Mr. Hellie, translated them as well. Howard Goldfinger, Sylvia Fain, and Walter Gleason helped with the translations. Once again I should like to dedicate this new version of my work to my students _ at the University of Chicago and at the University of Colorado. They have made this enterprise not only a duty but also a pleasure.

June, 1968 ’ THomas RIHA Bou.per, COLORADO

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PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

In selecting the readings for these volumes, I was guided by several considerations. The selection, first of all, was to be important for the period of Russian history under consideration. Second, it was to lend itself fairly easily to class analysis—if possible, by the discussion method. This meant that polemics were preferable to de-

scriptions, though I could not, and indeed did not wish to, manage without the latter. The selection was to stimulate curiosity to the point where the reader would wish to pursue the subject further.

All things being equal, I tended to lean toward primary sources. Thus, of the final sixty-four items, forty-six, or 70 per cent, are of this nature. Nevertheless, this remains a book of readings, not a collection of documents. I did not want snips

and pieces, no matter how important; each essay is intended to be of sufficient length to develop a point of view or an argument reasonably and sensitively. I wanted my selections to be readable; there is not all that much good writing in this often turgid field, and I made a deliberate attempt to hunt for those authors who took pride in their language and exposition.

At certain crucial points I made a deliberate effort to bring a Soviet point of view into play. This I found to be not only healthy for argument’s sake but sometimes quite enlightening in its own right. I carried this principle into the bibliographies as well. These were intended to provide a few guideposts to those who might wish to investigate an individual problem. Paperback editions were indicated be-

cause they might lead to the building of small private libraries. One could, these days, build quite a respectable collection of paperbacks on Russia. I tried to give each period of Russian history its due. The order of selections will be found to be approximately chronological, though in a few places items are grouped topically for the sake of convenience. Each volume concludes with a general

assessment of the period where more than one point of view is presented. It was my hope that Russian civilization would thus be given certain stages and a definable shape. If the general contours turn out to be approximately accurate, my aim will have been achieved.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS | My thanks are due, to begin with, to the College at the University of Chicago, which conceived of the Russian civilization course and gave it elbow room to de- velop. Donald Meiklejohn, Warner Wick, and Alan Simpson were sympathetic initiators and tolerant supervisors. For a colleague they provided Meyer Isenberg, whose warm participation was essential to the first years of the enterprise and who always reminded me of the aims of general education. Chicago’s Russian specialists —Michael Cherniavsky, Leopold Haimson, Arcadius Kahan, and Hugh McLean— gave their time to make improvements in the selections. Richard Hellie, Jean Laves, and Marianna Tax Choldin acted as able assistants. Elizabeth Ireland and Wells Chamberlin first suggested publication. Michael Petrovich inspected the volumes and made valuable suggestions. Ruth Jensen piloted the manuscript through its many stages over three years and proved to be the ideal secretary. Last, but most important, my students at the University of Chicago supplied the curiosity and enthusiasm which is their valued hallmark. To them these three volumes are dedicated.

Tomas RHA Cuicaco

BLANK PAGE

TESTIMONY ON THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION By General Sergei Khabalov When disorders broke out in Petrograd in late February 1917 no one believed that this was the end of the old regime. The Emperor ordered the suppression of all disorders. But this turned out to be impossible. The street fighting developed into a large-scale rebellion which, in a few days, toppled the emperor and the monarchy itself. In the excerpt below General Khabalov, Commander of the Petrograd Mili-

tary District during these days, recounts his inability to restore order in the capital. He is responding to the questions of the Extraordinary Commission appointed, after the revolution, to investigate the activities of ministers and other high officials of the deposed regime.

There are several histories of the February Revolution. Three paperback ones should be mentioned. Leon Trotsky’s The Russian Revolution is the most famous. The others are Nikolai Sukhanov’s The Russian Revolution, 1917, and William H. Chamberlin’s The Russian Revolution. A recent account is George Katkov’s Russia,

1917: The February Revolution. A large number of documents on the February Revolution is printed in Robert Browder and Alexander Kerensky, The Russian Provisional Government, and in Frank Golder, Documents of Russian History, 1914-1917. For the situation in the army see General Nikolai Golovin, The Russian

Army in the World War, and A. Nikolaieff, “The February Revolution and the Russian Army,” Russian Review, Vol. VI.

Khabalov: On Sunday the 26th the o'clock in the afternoon. . . But I cantroops appeared and, as usual, took up not report to you, gentlemen, where and positions as scheduled. .. It turned out how many were shooting. .. The situathat they had to fire into the crowd _ tion here, it must be said, was ghastly! I at various places. The Volhynians fired myself was in the town governor’s build-

into the crowd at Znamenskii Square ing where a great many people were and on Suvorov Street. Subsequently crowded in. . . I no longer made any the Pavilovsk Regiment! fired into the provisions for the distribution of bread

crowd on Nevskii Avenue near the’ that day. After four o’clock I was inKazan cathedral. Then, about four formed that the Fourth Company of the 1 The Volhynians, the Pavlovsk Regiment: Translated by Walter Gleason from P, Russian military units usually bore geographic Shchegolev (ed.), Padenie Tsarskogo Rez-

names. hima, I (Moscow, 1926), 225-31. o01

502 Testimony on the February Revolution Pavlovsk Regiment household troops, them to swear obedience so that the com-

which was quartered in the Court pany would return to the barracks, and stables’ buildings, and which, as it later hand in their rifles. . . Finally, because turned out, consisted primarily of evacu- of the exhortations of the battalion com-

ated men, upwards of 1,500 men, ran mander and the chaplain, this company out into the street, shooting into the air, returned to its barracks, and the rifles and, shouting various slogans, mustered _were gradually passed in. But not all the on Koniushennyi Square, near the foot rifles; twenty-one had disappeared! Evi-

bridge, not far from the Church of the dently, the people disappeared with

Resurrection of Christ. When I asked for them... The Minister of War continuthe battalion commander over the tele- ously required me to inform him by telephone, I was informed, though not by _ phone of what was happening in the city. him, but by someone else, that this com- I reported to him over the telephone. pany demanded that the troops be with- | When, during the evening report, I told

drawn to the barracks and that there him about this company, he demanded should be no shooting. And it was re- an immediate court-martial and execuported that this company had fired into tion. . . I considered it impossible not a platoon of mounted police. This infor- only to have executions but even to pun-

mation appeared unreliable to me. Why ish a man without hearing his side, at should they shoot at the mounted police? —_least through some simplified court pro-

Subsequently it became clear that this cedure. .. How could one even speak of company had actually revolted; in fact executions! . . . Therefore I asked for

it had not gone out into the streets: it the procurator of the military court, had never been so ordered—the training Mende, to inquire what should be done detachments and other companies had with this company, which initially conbeen called. But this company had not _ sisted of eight hundred men. “Without been called and sat in its barracks. And doubt there should be an inquiry, and

so this company revolted, demanding only then a court-martial,” he told me. that the other companies return to the Well, in that case, I said, eight hundred barracks and that there be no shooting. men—this is a joke! an unthinkable Then I ordered the battalion commander affair: you cannot examine them even to admonish the troops, to keep thiscom- _in a week. I ordered my chief of staff, pany in the barracks, and to make sure General Khlebnikov, or perhaps it was that officers were with the company. Ac- Chizhevskii, to appoint a commission of

cording to my information, there were inquiry: five persons under the chairtwo officers there, but there should have manship of a general were appointed. been not two, but many more. . . And in the meanwhile I gave orders that I instructed Colonel Pavlenkov? that the regiment itself should surrender the he should take steps so that this would culprits in order that they might be not spread, not break out any further... arrested. Initially it was proposed to Besides the battalion commander and arrest the entire battalion and imprison the officers, I also gave orders to the them here—in the Fortress of Peter and regimental chaplain so that he might Paul,’ and so, late in the evening, I inpersuade them, shame them, and induce 3 “Here, in the Fortress of Peter and Paul”: the hearings during which Khabalov testified

2Colonel Vladimir Pavlenkov commanded were held in the Fortress, where the importhe Petrograd military police during the Feb- tant personages of the old regime were kept

ruary days. under arrest.

Testimony on the February Revolution 503 quired whether space could be found for lowing occurred. .. Let me go back a such a mass of people. When it turned _ little bit: it must be stated that this unout that there were actually not eight fortunate order to use rifles was issued

hundred but fifteen hundred men, this in the meantime, and was due to the proved physically impossible, for there fact that the cavalry was exhausted. As were no such accommodations... Then s00n as it scattered one crowd, another I ordered the arrest of at least the most Would gather. In a word, thirsty horses prominent instigators, and ordered them 2nd unfed men jostled and exhausted interrogated; there were nineteen men, themselves, and lost their energy. . . and they were conveyed to the fortress. | During the night we were informed that Chairman: Did the regiment itself sur- the Second Baltic Naval Depot would

render them? raise the standard of revolt during that Khabalov: The regimental command night. . . And that some agitators were turned them over, it was undoubtedly there. This was being conveyed to me the authorities. Forgive me, I speak of a during the night, but they could not regiment, but there were no regiments Teach me, and it was brought to the at-

in this instance, we are talking about tention of my chief of staff. The city reserve battalions. They are so large that 80vernor conveyed this to me early in

they exceed the peacetime numerical the morning—probably about Six OF strength of a regiment three to four seven o'clock. (Remember that I arrived times. .. Thus, there were fifteen hun- during the night at three o’clock: i.e., | dred men in this company, whereas an didn’t get any sleep.) During the night entire regiment during peace time has_ I was informed that the Naval Depot 1,770 men. This company alone repre- was astir, would revolt, and would be at sented the peacetime quota of a regi- the head of the insurgents. I found out ment... And so those who were in the that measures had already been taken

fortress were by no means men who during the night, a search had been would be shot on the morrow, but men made, and it turned out that there had subject to trial... Whether they would been nothing of the kind—all this had be shot or not was still a question; prior been false information. . . During the to this I had never had anyone shot; I first days, and during the disorders in substituted penal servitude of various general, there was a mass of erroneous terms. This development, this revolt of information. There was a whole lot of the Pavlovsk Regiment, showed that all false news!. . . That same morning, at was not well. The following day the about six or seven o'clock, I received a troops were to occupy the same posts... call from the Volhynian regiment. The Chairman: Excuse me! You are now battalion commander told me that the passing to Monday! But, General, did training detachment of this regiment reyou inform Headquarters about the re- fused to leave the barracks; at first I

sults? was told that they had apparently killed

Khabalov: Yes I did inform Head- the commander of the training detachquarters of the following: “I cannot ment; other reports indicated that he carry out Your Majesty's command,” had shot himself in front of the ranks and that the disorders are continu- when they refused to obey him. .. At ing. . .* On Monday morning, the fol- this point I told the battalion command*Khabalov had received a telegram from °"° “Be sure that this does not sp read, Nicholas II ordering him to suppress the dis. does not flare up any further. Return

orders in the capital immediately. the troops to the barracks, and try to

204 Testimony on the February Revolution disarm them: let them stay indoors...” something unbelieveable began to hapI myself went directly to the office of the pen. Namely, the detachment advanced,

city governor. It must be added that under a brave, decisive officer. But it Colonel Pavlenkov was suffering from somehow left the scene, and there were chest spasms (in general all the officers _ no results... But something should have stationed here were ill, for all the healthy happened: if he acted decisively there

ones were at the front, all those evacu- should have been a collision with this ated here were sick). And that morning _ electrified crowd, the troops should have

Colonel Pavlenkov was in no condition dispersed the mob and driven it into a for service. . . I therefore summoned corner toward the Neva, toward the Tauhis deputy, Colonel Mikhailichenko, of rida Gardens. . . But there were no the household troops of the Moscow _ results! I dispatched men, I got no news Regiment, and went there myself. When —I sent three mounted patrols of CosI arrived, it turned out that a com- sacks—of the Cossack troops at my dispany of the Preobrazhenskii Regiment posal. Having sent this detachment, I consisting of evacuated troops had joined —_ remained without troops, and I had to the rebellious Volhynians, who remained — gather another detachment so as to be

on the street and refused to surrender able to oppose any possible further dis-

their rifles; subsequently a unit of the orders. And so I sent these three Lithuanian Regiment did likewise. Fur- mounted patrols, I was informed that

ther information indicated that this the Kutepov detachment had advanced armed crowd, joined by groups of fac- only as. far as Kirochnii Street, that tory workers and others, was moving it was moving along Kirochnii and Spasalong Kirochnii Street, that ithad raided = skii Streets, but was unable to adthe barracks of the gendarmes’ division | vance any further—reinforcements were _ and was looting the barracks of the En- needed. Then I received the news that

gineers’ Academy. I had to think of the Circuit Court building had been pacifying this crowd. I formed a detach- _ burned. Litvinov, the fire chief, informed

ment made up of two companies of the me over the telephone that he and the Keksgol’m Regiment, two companies firemen had arrived to extinguish the of the Preobrazhenskii Regiment, com- fire but that the crowd would not give panies of His Majesty’s Riflemen—in a way, and that he was not able to make

word, those who could be withdrawn them... Then two companies, I don’t from nearby neighborhoods, from Nev- remember which ones, were sent to the skii:Avenue... A machine-gun company Circuit Court to scatter the mob and from the Strel’na area, joined by a __ enable the firemen to put the fire out. . . squadron of dragoons of the 9th Reserve But again these companies, once they Regiment was added by Colonel Mik- had left, disappeared, and were missing!

hailichenko. . . And this force, com- After that information was _ received

posed of six companies, fifteen machine from the Moscow Regiment. The Mosguns, and a troop and a half of cavalry, cow Regiment was deployed thus: part under the command of Colonel Kutepov, of it was deployed along Sampsonevskii an officer decorated by the Order of St. | Avenue near the barracks—this unit was George, was sent against the rebels de- to stop the crowd from gathering on manding that they lay down their Sampsonevskii Avenue near the factories. weapons, and, should they refuse, to take A second unit, the Fourth Company with decisive action against them... Andnow —_ machine guns, was to occupy the Liteinii

Testimony on the February Revolution 505 Bridge and Nizhnii Novgorod Street and Chairman: Did the Minister of Instop the crowd of workers from moving _ terior, Protopopov, demand that a unit in and out of the Liteinii Area, so as to- be sent for his personal security?

control, if possible, the approach to the Khabalov: 1 don’t remember. .-. No, arsenals, Information was received near it seems this was not the case. In fact I midday that the Fourth Company had am sure that this was not the case. At been dispersed by the crowd, that, of the _ that point there were many demands: for

officers who tried to resist, some had example, the Lithuanian Palace rebeen killed, others wounded, that huge ported... .

crowds were blocking Sampsonevskii Chairman: What about the former Avenue, that the remaining companies Chairman of the Council of Ministers,

were standing in the barracks yard, Sturmer? evidently powerless to do anything. The Khabalov: No, there was no demand situation was becoming critical! It was from him either. Of the ministers only becoming difficult to furnish any rein- Prince Golitsyn® made demands; and forcement—wherever I turned I was told there was a demand to send troops to that they did not have any available the Mariinskii Palace, and a detachment companies, that they could not give me ___ was sent there during the evening. Sub-

any... Only toward the evening did it sequently a company was sent to occupy become clear how much the Semenevskii, _ the telephone building, and it defended

Ismailovskii and Chasseur Regiments jt, And so when it became clear that the could offer; but of this number, in the Vyborg side had been seized by the reend, only three companies of the Ismai- volting mob, and subsequently the Li-

lovskii men and three companies of {ejnij section, but that the remaining Chasseurs appeared. The Finnish Regi- areas of the city were relatively calm, I ment could not offer any help. Excuse intended to gather a reserve force under me, I do not know whether this inter- (Colonel Prince Argutinskii-Dolgorukov

ests you. . . _ of the Preobrazhenskii Regiment on Chairman: Please, please!—it is very Palace Square, and I directed the follow-

important. ing: a unit was to be sent to support

Khabalov: Along with this came a Kutepov, who, evidently, could not cope stream of demands: furnish a company with the situation, and another unit was for protection here, supply one there for 4, be sent to the Petersburg side, to-

security—give the Chairman of the gether with the Grenadiers and a comCouncil of Ministers a guard for his per- pany of the Moscow Regiment. They sonal protection. . . I must admit that were to try to force these mutineers back [ wondered how much a few soldiers if possible to the north, toward the sea. . .

_ could help: what are twenty men? The situation was all the worse because _ They cannot provide protection; there 4), Porokhovyi plants for explosives will only be more unnecessary bloodshed. ore in the rear. God forbid! one ex-

It seemed to be better where there was plosion in these plants, and nothing no guard! But in view of the demands would remain of Petrograd. The outlook made, I did send a company which was was becoming more serious. And the

to occupy both ends of Mokhovaia 5 Prince Nikolai Golt Chai F Street, on the Simeonovskii andthe theCouncil Pan-of ee eee as anaiman 9 Ministers from December 27,

teleimonovskii side. Then, when it be- 1916, to February 27, 1917; he was the last

came clear... premier of the old regime.

506 Testimony on the February Revolution task of forming reserves proved very _ schools. | hard, because the third company of the Chairman: Was that on Monday evePreobrazhenskii Regiment arrived with- _ ning?

out cartridges, and to obtain them was Khabalov: It was during the night. . . impossible since the rebellious mob held This revolt of soldiers and workers octhe Vyborg side. There was no place to curred on Monday. Our attempt to ob_ get them. Then it was decided to obtain _tain cartridges failed because they could

these cartridges from other units (Pav- not be delivered; had the shells been lenkov was in charge, but I was present sent, they would have fallen into the as senior commander) of the 18lst In- hands of the mutineers—the revolutionfantry Regiment. But it turned out that, aries... Seeing that I could not collect although the regiment had not actually _ troops here, that we had only a handful, rebelled, the commander was only bare- _I telephoned to the commander at Kron-

ly able to restrain it. And the com- _ shtadt, asking him to send troops, and if mander of the Finnish Reserve Regi- not troops then at least cartridges. . . But ment, asked to send a company of troops, the commander told me that he could replied that his regiment had only two send nothing, since the fortress itself was loyal companies, and only their presence _in danger. Thus, toward the evening the contained the regiment. Then we tried to situation became almost hopeless—in

obtain cartridges from the military terms of an attack... | schools, from the Pavlovsk and Vladimir

THE RUSSIAN VILLAGE, SUMMER 1917

The February Revolution was made in the cities, not in the countryside. At first Russia’s peasants sat by quietly, waiting to see what would happen. When they discovered that the Provisional Government was postponing all major decisions on the land question till the convocation of the Constituent Assembly they took matters into their own hands. They would not wait for any legislative solution, particularly since there was no effective government authority in the countryside. The documents below illustrate the nature of the elemental revolution going on in the Russian villages—a process which no one seemed able to stop and which Lenin and the Bolsheviks would utilize in their drive for power.

There are numerous documents on the agrarian situation in 1917 in Robert Browder and Alexander Kerensky, The Russian Provisional Government. A most interesting government survey of the situation is in C. Vulliamy (ed.), From the

Red Archives, pp. 227-70. For major studies of the Russian land problem see Geroid Robinson, Rural Russia under the Old Regime; G. Pavlovsky, Agricultural Russia on the Eve of the Revolution; and L. Owen, The Russian Peasant Movement, 1906-1917, as well as his “The Russian Agricultural Revolution of 1917.” Slavonic and East European Review, XII, 155-66, 368-86. Victor Chernov, who was Minister

of Agriculture during the summer of 1917, writes on the problem in The Great Russian Revolution.

A. FROM A MEMORANDUM OF penetrate into the countryside soon and KIRSANOV LANDOWNERS ON would at first remain only the demand

THE ACTIVITIES OF THE of the army and the workers. But the reCOMMITTEES AND THE placement of the entire local administraPRESENT SITUATION IN tion, the elimination of the police and KIRSANOV COUNTY, TAMBOV the usual authorities in the villages, and

PROVINCE! the amnesty granted criminals hastened The old men, the sick, and the women the advent of the revolution. Approach remaining in the countryside have ac- Translated by Walter Gleason from “Agrarnoe dvizhenie v 1917 g. po dokumentam Glav-

cepted the overthrow calmly, and con- nogo Zemel’nogo Komiteta,” Krasnyi Arkhiv

sider it to be the result of the Tsar’s XIV (Moscow, 1926), 191-95, 204-5, 218, foolish management of the country. It 1 The memorandum was received by the might have been expected that the de- (Chief Land Committee in Petrograd in June,

mand for a social revolution would not 1917.

907

508 The Russian Village, Summer 1917 | ing the village from without, the revolu- low the fixed price. In many districts

tion found no state institutions there. search and seizures on estates were

This tendency was hastened even more made by the committees, weapons were in Tambov province, specifically in Kir- taken away, and the removal and sale of

sanov county, because of the abdication the estates’ products prohibited. All of the provincial and county commissars. business transactions were inspected by

In Kirsanov a Committee of Public the district committees which could Safety was formed, chosen not on the alter the price and conditions of such basis of universal suffrage, which was transactions. All activity on the estates technically impossible, but by a random was hampered by demands and _ perselection of individuals. Through its mits. It became impossible to run the initiative committees were formed in the estates, and many landowners gave up

districts. A section of the population and left for the cities. protested the illegal election of these At the height of the sowing season the committees and the destruction and re- district committee permitted the rural placement of the district and village committees to release war prisoners at authorities, but found no support any- their discretion.? The sowing suffered, where. This made the population think and production in various branches of that under the new regime the will of the village economy ceased because of the people, as embodied in the commit- _ the impossibility of finding replacements,

tees, was the highest law of the land and_ all the more so since Russian workers

that there was no control over the were also laid off. It was forbidden decisions of the popular will. The peas- to hire workers from nearby districts. ants concluded this from the fact that The committees charged extremely high none of the decrees of the committees, prices for day laborers. no matter how illegal, was annulled by The county committee decided to audit the authorities. Not once did the authori- the records of financial institutions and ties leave Kirsanov to settle the misun- their method of distributing money. It derstandings which had arisen in the decided to charge the expenses for the villages. The villages were left entirely upkeep of the committees only to the to themselves. Here are some examples landlords and church properties. It inof certain excesses of the peasants and terfered with the allocation of zemstvo

the committees. funds. It reduced the fixed prices on

On Count Perovskii’s estate peasants grain announced by the government by dismissed the manager, V. Ia. Khovelko, one-third, thus halting the transport of a provincial and county zemstvo deputy, grain to the city and obstructing governwith whose assistance the owner and his ment purchases. father sold 16,000 of the 24,000 desiatins The committees conferred upon themto the peasants at a price significantly selves the right to levy all taxes, duties, below market value. The managers on and payments; they assumed jurisdiction the estates of Senator Martynov and _ over business transactions by imposing Mrs. Goriainova were also dismissed, conditions, for example, prohibiting the while Count Nosov’s manager was ar-- inhabitants of other districts to attend

rested. _ |

The Kurdiukovsk District Committee ,, 7 During the war many German and Austro; ; Hungarian prisoners of war were put to work seized the landowners’ oats for seed and in Russian fields and factories to replace the

sold it to the peasants considerably be- men at the front.

The Russian Village, Summer 1917 ~ §09

sales. the landlords for sowing decreased on The county committee destroyed the the average by 80 per cent. right to property, the right to the man- The committees were eager to distribagement and use of one’s belongings, ute land allotments among poorly landed contractual rights, without first consult- peasants, according to a labor norm.

ing the landowners. Thus the county This aspiration met opposition in the committee lowered rental prices on land very advantageous rents which each tried

by 25 per cent compared to the preced- _to receive. In addition, it ran against ing year’s price. The district committee the tendency to divide the land equally,

went even further and lowered prices per soul. In some localities the rich by 60 per cent. In some localities the peasants seized much of the land and peasants seized the land free. The follow- are now seeking storage space for the ing account reveals the confiscatory na- grain grown on seized land. In some

ture of such rental fees. With the price places the low land rents produced a of rye fixed at 2 rubles 40 kopecks, and land rush and speculation.

an average harvest in Kirsanov county It should be noted that in the past of 80 puds per desiatina,’ a desiatina of thirty years, and especially before the rye should provide a gross income of _ revolution of 1905, the landlords sold 184 rubles in grain and 25 rubles in half their land to the peasants—150,000 straw. Allowing 70 rubles to cover the desiatins. These lands fell into the hands _ cost of harvesting and processing, a net only of the former manorial peasants, profit of 140 rubles remains. In view of | who lived near the liquidated estates. this income, the rental fee of 9-20 rubles, Thus this group of peasants became rela-

which was the price of the rented land, tively prosperous, as opposed to the was quite minimal, all the more so since former state peasants, who lived at a the tenants put down only a very in- distance and received nothing from the significant deposit, leaving the balance sales made by the landowners. This year until next year. This rent was even more when the peasants imposed their will insignificant with regard to the leasing upon the landowners, all the landowners’

of meadows. Irrigated and sown mead- arable Jand was again turned over to ows were rented for 10-25 rubles. Count- _ peasants living nearby, since the latter ing a harvest of hay in such meadows as__ did not let peasants of other villages near 200 puds per desiatina, and the price of _ these lands.

hay at 1 ruble 50 kopecks, the income The new socialists, dreaming of the turns out to be 300 rubles per desiatina, socialization of the land, continued to the expense of harvesting the grass be- _live under the influence of serfdom and ing no more than 25 rubles per desiatina. were firmly convinced that the right to

The peasants jumped at such cheap Ownership of the land leased by them rents, and with the help of the commit- from landowners could be obtained only tees forced the landowners to rent al- by those who had formerly been serfs of most all their land. In some localities these landowners. In this way the former

the peasants seized so much land that manorial peasants are, for the second they were forced to plow hurriedly and time, overloaded with land, while the carelessly. In many places the fallow former state peasants again obtained was not plowed, and it is now too late nothing. And the first attempt at the sofor such plowing. The land available to cial task sought by the land reform, the 3 A pud is 36 pounds, a desiatina 2.7 acres. just distribution of Jand according to a

510 The Russian Village, Summer 1917 labor norm, failed because ot the an- they had no mgnt to change them. They

archy of Russian life. only repeated: liquidate your estates.

Under another directive of the county This encouraged the arbitrary actions of committee general pasturage rights were the peasants. To the charge that the de-

granted for all meadow lands after the crees were illegal, the peasants would harvest. As a result great masses of peas- respond that they were probably legal, ants overran and destroyed in a few days since the government had not opposed all pastures the landowners had prepared _ their implementation. It would have been

for milk cows, pedigree cattle, and easy to direct the current of arbitrary

horses. The manorial cattle farms will actions into normal channels at the outbe completely ruined. The peasants set. Now it is of course more difficult to worsened the situation by invading the do as some sections of the peasantry are landowners’ pastures during the spring, convinced that the people have already

thus ruining the seeded meadows, fod- transferred the lands into their own

der, and clover. hands, the people meaning the closest

A third land measure of the county village. In any case the intention of the committee was even more decisive: it government to forbid any seizures until handed all the lands which had been the meeting of the Constituent Assembly fully sown to the peasants. In one sec- has failed. The seizures have been comtion of the county fully sown land is pleted, and the government itself, timid fairly widespread, since there are land- in the face of the committees’ actions, is owners who, for lack of equipment and _ guilty of this.

money, rent out all their land. This One should conclude from what has measure deprived them of all their sown _ been said that organizations which were

land, but it also should have penalized either formed arbitrarily or appointed some peasants. Soldiers’ wives and some by the government, such as the Prowell-to-do peasants also rent out all their visioning and Land Committees, are in lands. By a unique logic this transfer of need of supervisory control, which would

land was applied only in the case of review their decrees and annul the illeestates. This measure clearly represents gal ones. This function could be transthe seizure of the landowners’ sown ferred to the temporary judges, who are lands. It violates the government’s order _ now left without any real duties. In addi-

guaranteeing this land. Nonetheless the tion the commissars should snap out of transfer of land was completed, to the their inactivity and become active agents bewilderment of the peasants themselves. of the government, implementing its In other decrees the committees also policies. They should not be subservient forbade the cutting of trees. If the land- to arbitrary public organizations which owners sought permission to cut down must be controlled, because our democ-

a tree or two for domestic needs, they acy is not yet used to the exercise of

had to petition the committees, who did POW: ,

not always grant these petitions. B. MEMORANDUM OF THE In vain did the Jandowners beseech DIRECTOR OF THE the county and provincial commissars CHISTOPOL’SK BRANCH OF with requests that the decrees ruining THE STATE BANK OF their livelihood be changed. The com- JULY 2, 1917 missars acknowledged the complete ille- ... The destructive consequences of the

gality of these decrees but stated that authorities’ laxity are already evident

The Russian Village, Summer 1917 ol] here. All the land, meadows, and forests _ly listen to this type of agitation, as they have passed from the hands of the own- did in case of the land (the land should

ers to the peasants. For this reason we be yours, don’t delay, seize it now and cannot, in the coming year, expect either don’t wait for the Constituent Assemthe usual quantity (since much of the bly). Our villages are again preoccupied land will have been left fallow) or qual- with idle musing and discussions about ity of grain (the plowing has been quite new windfalls.

shallow—worse than the peasants’ usual 7

plowing). Pedigreed horned cattle have ©. TELEGRAM OF THE COMMISSAR

been seized and in some cases slaugh- OF SIMBIRSK PROVINCE,

tered for meat, the rest sold and led AUGUST 28, 1917 away. Stables have been destroyed, Petrograd. Central Militia Board. Copies trotters and racing horses put behind to the Chairman of the Council of Minisstolen plows, harrows, seeding machines, ters and the Ministers of Justice and and rollers, most of which are already on Agriculture.

the verge of ruination owing to the On August 20 in the village of lack of experienced hands. Cultivated Chipikovo, Sengileev county, the popula-

orchards underwent reckless ravaging, tion beat up a member of the Cheryoung trees were torn up at the roots, tanovskii supply board, Lobanov, while while the bark was stripped off old trees. he was going about his official duties. Forests were mercilessly cut down for An inquiry is being conducted. Accordfirewood and household needs; in some _ ing to the information received, the citilocalities they were burned down. The zens of the village of Kliukovka, in Korowners are not permitted to take with sun county, undertook arbitrary seizures them their furniture and other household of timber and cut down trees as well.

fixtures, including wardrobes. They The district commissar was advised to themselves, and their managers or bai- take extraordinary measures, together liffs, are being expelled. “You have lived with the land council, to put an end to on our labor and drunk our blood long _ the seizures. According to information enough; now our time has come,” they _received, in the village of Atiashevo, are told. In the cities small groups of Ardatov county, the soldiers Froklin and men, women, and youngsters, taking a Rezkin are agitating against the grain soldier with them, break into apartments monopoly and hindering the requisitionand make arbitrary searches, pretending ing process. They were arrested. An into act on the orders of the Committee of | quiry is being conducted. In the village

Soldiers’ and Workers’ Deputies or the of Maliachkino, Syzran county, the Committee of Public Safety. Innocent population refused to submit to the people are arrested without cause and grain estimates and threatened the memput in prison, as was the case in Chis- bers of the supply board. The district topol’ with the chairman of the zemstvo commissar was advised to take the most

board, the mayor, the military com- decisive measures immediately. The supmander, and others. Now there is talk ply board of the Timoshkin district, Senin the countryside of renewed agitation; _gileev county, telegraphed that the local the peasants are urged not to take their inhabitants Abdriazikov, Baimashev, and

grain into the city for the fixed price, Absaliamov agitated against the district but to demand 5 to 10 rubles or more supply board. This agitation had a harmfor a pud of rye. The peasants will glad- ful influence on the population, inter-

312 The Russian Village, Summer 1917 fering with its work. Board members committee that soldiers led by the garare resigning. The workers are starving. rison commander arrived in the vilMeasures are being taken to eliminate lage of Ishcheevka at the request of the agitators’ activities. According to a the committee to enforce the regulations __ communiqué from the Syzran county on the grain monopoly. However, the supply board, the population of that soldiers not only did not assist in the county is refusing to surrender its grain transfer of the grain supplies from the at the established prices, considering government warehauses to the Aratskii them too low. The situation in the city factory but went over to the peasants’ and in the rural areas is critical, The side and, brandishing their rifles, dedistrict commissar was advised to take clared that the grain will not leave the the most energetic steps to enforce the warehouses. I am instructing the gargrain monopoly regulations, using mili- rison commander to take the strictest

tary force if need be. The chairman measures and to call the offenders to of the Simbirsk county supply board account. There were no other outstandreported to the provincial executive ing events during the past week. _

RUSSIA’S ONE-DAY PARLIAMENT By Victor Chernov The Bolsheviks had used the demand for the convocation of the Constituent Assem-

bly as a major slogan in their rise to power. But when free elections gave them only a minority in that body, they liquidated the institution. Chernov (1873-1952) was the Assembly’s freely elected chairman, representing its non-Bolshevik majority. Born a peasant, he had become the leader of rejuvenated populism. In 1901 he

was one of the leaders of the Socialist Revolutionary organization (the 5.R.’s), Russia’s largest political party representing the peasantry. In 1917 he became minister of agriculture in the Provisional Government. Hunted by the Soviet police, he left Russia in 1920; he came to New York in 1941. He wrote the brief account below on the thirtieth anniversary of the Constituent Assembly’s brutal dissolution. Chernov’s memoirs, in an abridged English translation, are entitled The Great Russian Revolution. For documents on the Assembly, see the relevant portions of the three-volume collection, The Russian Provisional Government, edited by Rob-

ert Browder and Alexander Kerensky. For a brief history of the Assembly, see Oliver Radkey’s The Elections to the Russian Constituent Assembly of 1917. For a history of the S.R. party, see the same author’s The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism and The Sickle under the Hammer. There are chapters on the Constituent Assembly

in Karl Kautsky’s The Dictatorship of the Proletariat (paperback), and Ariadna Tyrkova-Williams, From Liberty to Brest Litovsk. Boris Sokoloff, in The White Nights, recounts the ill-fated attempt to defend the Assembly. There is a section on the Assembly in James Bunyan and Harold Fisher, The Bolshevik Revolution, 19171918. Lenin’s theses on the Assembly are in Volume XXVI of his Collected Works. See also Truman Cross, “Chernov and 1917,” Russian Review, October, 1967.

When we, the newly elected members of _ that “This guy should get a bayonet be-

the Constituent Assembly, entered the tween his ribs” or “It wouldn’t be bad to Tauride Palace, the seat of the Assembly _ put some lead into this one.” When we in Petrograd, on January 18, 1918, we entered the large hall, it was still empty. found that the corridors were full of The Bolshevik deputies had not yet aparmed guards. They were masters of the _ peared. building, crude and brazen. At first they

did not address us directly, and only ex- Reprinted from The New Leader (New changed casual observations to the effect York), January 31, 1948.

o13

914 Russia’s One-Day. Parliament A tank division billeted in Petrograd custom, the first sitting should be preremained faithful to the Assembly. It in- sided over by the senior deputy. The tended to demonstrate this faithfulness senior was S. P. Shvetsov, an old Socialby participating in the march to the Pal- _ ist Revolutionary (SR). ace which was to pass on its way the bar- — As _soon as Shvetsov’s imposing figracks of the Preobrazhenski and Seme- ure appeared on the dais, somebody gave novski Regiments, the two best units of a signal, and a deafening uproar broke

the Petrograd garrison. At the meetings yt, The stamping of feet, hammering held by these regiments, resolutions were on the desks and howling made an ininvariably adopted demanding the trans- fernal noise. The public in the gallery fer of state power to the Constituent As- and the Bolshevik allies, the Left Socialsembly. Thus a prospect was open for ist Revolutionaries, joined in the tumult. the consolidation of democratic forces. The guards clapped their rifle butts on But the Bolsheviks were not caught off the floor. From various sides guns were

guard. They attacked the columns of trained on Shvetsov. He took the Presidemonstrators converging on the Tau- dent’s bell, but the tinkling was drowned ride Palace from various parts of Petro- jn the noise. He put it back on the table,

grad. Whenever the unarmed crowd and somebody immediately grabbed it could not be dispersed immediately, the 4.4 handed it over, like a trophy, to the street was blocked by troops or Bolshe- representative of the Sovnarkom (Soviet vik units would shoot into the crowd. ¢ Commissars), Sverdlov. Taking adThe demonstrators threw themselves on vantage of a moment of comparative the pavement and waited until the rattle ............ 5.4 6.2 13.6 23 ..1¢ Total social security. ..............{ 22.0 22.8 52.8 88 .2 Total social insurance ............. 12.7 16.2 23.5 Lecce eee

Total maternity assistance.......... 1.2 4.5 5.2 5.5 Total, social-cultural.........| 116.7 128.8 200.5 232 .0

® Includes kindergarten and adult education. b As most all-union expenditures for science and research are kept secret, no complete breakdown

of this item is given in the budget, but nuclear research is doubtless a major element. The item as a whole has practically no relevance for “welfare’’ in any sense. ¢ Part of the big increase in 1959 is accounted for by a change in definition hinted at in Zverev’s budget speech.

resistible force of circumstance or popu- as wage rates and consumer goods prolar pressure. It is but a short step from duction. It is an acknowledged fact that this view to the conclusion that such real wages in the Soviet Union have been measures are, in themselves, proof of rising slowly but steadily, that peasant

158 Is the Soviet Union a Welfare State? incomes and retail trade turnover have United Kingdom (1951). . . 8.8 gone up, and that the present Soviet West Germany (1955) . . . 18.5 leadership has declared its intention to continue this process through the period Thus, while the 1957 and 1959 budget of the Seven-Year Plan (1958-65). It is figures show relatively sharp increases also true that the upward trend in these in health expenditures, it is clear that areas is highly relevant to welfare in the _ these are not a new departure in Soviet general sense and should be duly noted. __ policy, but rather a continuation of past In the present paper, however, attention _ trends.

will be concentrated rather on activities It is true that the equipment of many

of a more direct “public welfare’ Soviet hospitals is antiquated, that nature, i.e., on the various social serv- drugs are often scarce, and that the genices (health, education, etc.), on hous- eral level of health facilities is not up to

ing, and such other state measures as the best Western standards. Nevertheaffect the everyday life of Soviet citi- less, a great deal has certainly been

zens. done to spread hygiene, combat epi| demics, and reduce infant mortality.

A LOOK AT'THE RECORD The services of state doctors and hos-

Before inquiring into the question of pitals are free, although most medicines motivation, it is also necessary to set have to be bought by the patient. forth a few facts showing what actually Education. Here again, recent Soviet has been done, or is being done, by the __ policy has not basically altered Stalin’s

Soviet Union in the area of welfare. approach insofar as the latter aimed at Such a survey of the record may best a large-scale expansion of the educationbegin with a look at budget allocations al system, but there have been important for social and cultural expenditures dur- changes in emphasis and direction.

ing the 1950-59 period, presented in Thus, the decision of the 20th CPSU Table 1. Keeping the general trend to- Congress (February 1956) to extend ward increased outlays in mind, the in- _ full-time secondary education to all has

dividual categories of welfare listed are since been modified in favor of partreviewed below with particular attention time education after the age of 15, and as to whether or not there has been any Khrushchev’s reform of higher educa-

recent change of policy. tion also seems likely to result in a re-

Health. There is no evidence that duction of the number of full-time uniSoviet policy in this field has undergone versity students. It is not, of course,

any basic change in recent years. Vigor- _ within the scope of the present article to ous efforts to expand medical and health discuss the detailed causes and conse-

services were already a feature of quences of Khrushchev’s reforms of SoStalin’s reign, and the progress that was _ viet education. Regardless of the effect achieved is clearly indicated by the fact they may have on academic standards, that the Soviet Union, as the following however, it can be stated that these refigures attest, has since 1951 boasted a forms are unlikely to result in any modlarger number of doctors per thousand _ ification of the upward trend in Soviet

inhabitants than most Western coun- educational expenditures (except for a

tries: _ possible large saving in student sti-

U.S.S.R. (1951) . . . . . 189 pends). ,

U.S.S.R. (1957) . . . . . 16.9 One notable reason for this assumpUnited States (1954). . . . 12.7 tion is the evident rise in the school

Is the Soviet Union a Welfare State? 799 building program, partly asa result of _ pensions. Sick-pay benefits in the Soviet

an overdue effort to remedy the over- Union have long been on a relatively crowding which at present necessitates generous scale, and there have been no a two-shift, and sometimes even three- significant changes in rates of payment shift, system of attendance, and partly in recent years, although over-all exto set up the new-type boarding schools __ penditures for this purpose have inin which Khrushchev plans to train the _ creased as a result of the upward trend “new Soviet man.” It is only fair to add _in total numbers of employed and in the that, in contrast to the continuing short- average wage. As part of the campaign

age of physical facilities, the situation launched in the 1930’s to reduce the of Soviet schools with regard to the high rate of labor turnover, full rates of ratio of teachers to pupils compares very _— sick pay were made conditional upon a

favorably with that in many other coun- minimum period of work in the same tries including the United States, as enterprise or office, except in cases where

evidenced by the following figures: workers had transferred under official USS.R.

Pouring) Teacuers Pup!ts Per (In Thousands) TEACHER

(1956-57)........ 30,127 1,811 16.6

United States

(1955)........... 30,531 1,185 26.9

United Kingdom

(1956)........... 7,981 $09 25.8

Mention should also be made of the — orders. These rules remain in force, alKhrushchev leadership’s action in 1956 —_ though with some modifications in favor

to abolish all fees in schools and uni- of the worker. versities, which reversed one of Stalin’s Provided he is a trade-union member, counter-reforms. It will be recalled that | a worker who falls ill is paid the followfree education had been a feature of the ing proportions of his actual earnings

Soviet regime from the beginning and (non-members receive one-half these was explicitly guaranteed by the 1936 rates, subject to the minima referred to Stalin constitution. Despite the constitu- below) :

tional guarantee, however, educational Per Cent

os ‘ : 3-5 . 2. 2... «60 cil of Ministers in 1940. Although the ee

charges were imposed in the top three Law of Service of Farnings

grades of secondary schools and in uni- essthanS . . . . . . 50

versities by a simple decree of the Coun- 5-8 70

. .ys. Morethani2? . 8-12. . 2. . ww. . .. . 80 .9

action did not have such a serious effect

on university students because of the

fact that the large majority were re- Present regulations provide for miniceiving stipends from which the fees mum monthly payments of 300 rubles in simply were deducted, its impact on towns and 270 rubles in rural areas, and children of poor families enrolled in sec- | a maximum payment of 100 rubles per ondary schools, where stipends were not _— day. Those who are injured at work or

payable, was much more severe. With- suffer from diseases caused by their out doubt the restoration of free edu- 1 To give the reader an idea of the purchas-

cation was a highly popular act. ing power of the ruble, here are the Soviet Social insurance, social security, and prices (in rubles) of a few commodities (per

760 Is the Soviet Union a Welfare State? work are entitled to sickness benefits at lations nominally entitled a worker the rate of 100 per cent of their earnings qualifying for an old-age pension by regardless of length of service. Where a _ length of service to receive payments at

worker leaves his job of his own voli- the rate of two-thirds of his final wage. tion, he is not entitled to sickness pay This looked extremely generous until for ordinary illness until a period of six one noticed the proviso, often omitted months has elapsed, but this limitation from propaganda statements, that the does not apply (since February 1957) two-thirds was to be calculated on the to cases of accident or disease caused by _ basis of a maximum “reckonable” wage

a person’s work. Of course, the social of 300 rubles per month, meaning an insurance rates described here apply _ effective maximum pension of 200 ruonly to disability for a limited period of | bles per month. This figure, when orig-

time, permanent disablement being inally fixed some 25 years earlier, was dealt with under pension regulations. quite legitimate, but wages and prices The maternity benefit rate itself also | subsequently multiplied without any up-

has not been changed in recent years, ward revision of the allowable maxibut in 1956 the period of paid mater- mum. The result was considerable hardnity leave was lengthened to 112 days, ship for ordinary workers, while on the This was, in effect, a return to the regu- other hand exceptional treatment was latiori which had been in force up until granted to certain categories including

1938, when the period of maternity not only the professional and official leave was reduced from 112 to 70 days. classes but also workers in some priorThe biggest improvements in this gen- _ity occupations. For example, coal mineral area recently have been in the field _ ers, steel workers, and those engaged in

of old-age and permanent disability electricity generation were allotted a pensions. Their effect, according to Fi- much higher reckonable maximum. Simnance Minister Zverev, was to raise the _ ilar discriminatory rules applied also to

average rate of all pensions by 81 per pension benefits for surviving dependcent, but certain groups of workers who _ ents and victims of industrial accidents

had fared relatively worse under the and the like. pre-1956 pension regulations secured The reform of 1956, while reducing much bigger gains than this, for the certain very high pensions, established following reasons: The previous regu- an all-round minimum old-age pension of 300 rubles per month for those qualikilogram, unless otherwise stated): chicken, fied by length of service, an advance of 16.5; beef (stewing), 12; pork, 19.5; average great importance. In addition, it put

(a0) oP utter, 28 me 22 per ters e868 into effect a new scale of payments bene15-2; coffee, 40; cotton print dress, 200; wooi iting lower-paid workers, so that those dress, 475; man’s overcoat, 720; man’s all-wool €4rning up to 350 rubles per month now

; motorcycle, 4,200; , ; wash- . . .

suit, 2.0005 shoes (adequate), 200; picyele receive pensions amounting to 100 per ing machine, 2.250: family divan, 1,300; toilet cent of earnings; with progressively soap (bar), 2.2. Source: Lynn Turgeon, “Levels smaller percentages for those with highof Living, Wages and Prices in the Soviet and er earnings, and with a maximum overUnited States Economies,” Comparisons of the all ceiling of 1,200 rubles per month. United States and Soviet Economies, Joint Eco- An average worker earnin g, say, 750 Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., rubles per month qualifies for a pension

nomic Committee of the U.S. Congress, U.S. . .

1959, pp. 335-36.—Eb. of 487 rubles under the new rules, as

Is the Soviet Union a Welfare State? 761 against probably only 200 under the is steadily growing, and the extensive old. One offsetting feature of the reform _ publicity given to them in the Soviet is that working pensioners are no longer _ press indicates that the new system is permitted to receive full pensions on top _ officially regarded as a desirable develof their wages. (This provision, together | opment. It must be noted that, at preswith the better pension rates, has very ent, all such payments are made out of probably encouraged many old people __ the resources of each farm, and that the to retire.) On balance, however, the net state has no responsibility, financial or gain to Soviet pensioners can readily be otherwise. However, as the regime’s polmeasured by the increase in pension ex- _icy toward the peasants is, in principle, penditures shown in the following table to reward regular collective work with

(in billions of rubles) : regular pay, and to bring the status of 1957 1958 1950 1956 (Prelim.) (Plan)

Total pensions. ............. 30.1 36.5 59.9 66.0

Non-working pensioners. . . . 8.7 12.6 27.6 34.2 Ex-military and families. ... 15.6 17.5 23.5 23 .4

Working pensioners........ 4.7 5.1 5.3 5.8 The improvement in old-age pension _ the peasant gradually closer to that of benefits was accompanied by substantial — the industrial worker, it seems to follow

increases in pensions for those suffering that the state eventually will have to permanent disability of varying degrees accept some responsibility for at least and for dependents, the increases re- ensuring that the collective farms have ported amounting to 50-65 per cent. now absorbed the workers of the disFurther sizable increases in minimum banded Machine Tractor Stations, who pension rates have also been promised = were promised the continuation of the under the Seven-Year Plan, along with benefits they formerly enjoyed as state a raising of minimum wages. No doubt employed workers. It is too soon, howexists regarding the general popularity ever, to say how the problem will be

of these measures. tackled.

There has also been a good deal of talk about extending social insurance OTHER WELFARE BENEFITS and pension rights to collective farmers, Holidays. Turning to other kinds of who have thus far never enjoyed them. _ social welfare benefits for state-employed Some farms are reported to have adopted _ persons, there appears to have been no

a system of paying fixed amounts of appreciable change in the rules governmoney and produce to their sick and ing paid holidays, which already were aged members, which represents a step _—on a fairly generous scale under Stalin. forward from the normal collective farm | These regulations compare favorably

practice of extending relief to such with those of West European countries,

members out of a small fund set aside especially for workers in what are for this purpose. Cases where fixed pay- | deemed to be arduous or unhealthy oc-

ments have been instituted are still the | cupations. For example, miners, steel exception since the vast majority of col- | workers, and bus drivers are allowed up lective farms do not yet have sufficient to four weeks of paid vacation per year.

revenues for this purpose, but it is a Over-all statistics showing the distribufact that the number of such exceptions _ tion of the total working force accord-

762 Is the Soviet Union a Welfare State? ing to numbers of paid (working-day) hour week (and a 35-hour week in un-

holidays per years are as follows: healthy occupations) by no later than

> _ 1962, with further reductions to follow

yoo rien Sent =o later in the decade. There was even talk Wee. wk 48 of achieving “the shortest working week

I... www in the world” by 1967. The promises

Ww... . de have been so definite and attended by

21... 2. www. 8 such great publicity that it will be hard

rs ©!) indeed for the leadership to go back on

Over%. . . . . . . its word, except in the event of dire 100 emergency. Reduced hours are in fact

already being put into effect in several A less desirable feature of the Soviet key industries. A statement jointly isholiday system is the practice of spread- sued by the CPSU Central Committee, ing vacations over the whole year, so the Council of Ministers, and the central

that many are on vacation when the trade union organization, and published weather is unfavorable. There is also a in the Soviet press on September 20, grave shortage of holiday accommoda- 1959, announced a detailed time sched-

tions: despite the existence of much- ule for the gradual extension of the publicized trade-union rest homes charg- _ seven-hour day to “all workers and eming low prices, these can accommodate ployees in the national economy.” (With

only a small fraction of the workers. six-hour Saturdays, this will reduce the Working time. There has been sig- standard working week to 41 hours.) nificant improvement in respect to hours The process began October 1, 1959, and of labor, although here again the.reform _is to be completed in the fourth quarter effected by the present leadership so far of 1960.

represents, in large part, a return to the Some Western critics, pointing to the more liberal regulations which prevailed fact that planned productivity increases prior to Stalin’s oppressive labor legis- are greater than would be necessary to lation of 1938-40. A 1940 decree length- compensate for the reduction of working

ened the standard workday from seven hours, conclude from this that the reto eight hours, increasing total hours form is in some way not genuine since for the six-day work week to 48. This there will have to be greater intensity of remained unchanged until 1956 when _ effort in the shortened work period. Such

the Khrushchev leadership, implement- a view hardly seems justifiable. It is ing its promise at the 20th Party Con- obvious, in the first place, that a shorter gress to reduce working hours, took an working week requires greater work ininitial step to cut down Saturday work _ tensity and higher productivity not only

to six hours, leaving most of the after- in Russia but in the United States or noon free and thus creating the begin- any other country. If output per hour

nings of a Soviet “weekend.” remained the same while hours were During 1957-58 further reductions of | reduced by 15 per cent, the—other working hours were made effective in things being equal—total output would certain industries, notably mining and go down by 15 per cent and everyone metallurgy. These were followed by still | would be correspondingly poorer, a sit-

greater promises at the 21st Party Con- uation which no one could possibly gress in January 1959, when the leader- _ want. Nor is it true that the Soviet Union

ship explicitly pledged a standard 40- intends to increase productivity solely,

Is the Soviet Union a Welfare State? 763 or even mainly, by imposing heavier to change his occupation, while not exphysical burdens on labor. This is quite _plicitly recognized, has been made more

evident from the great attention being _real by the present regime’s abolition, paid to the mechanization of labor-in- in 1957, of criminal penalties for leavtensive processes, especially in auxiliary ing one’s job without permission. These

occupations (loading, moving of ma- penalties, as well as others for worker

terials, etc.). absenteeism and unpunctuality, had The charge that weekly wages are be- _— been instituted by decree in 1940. Aling cut as part of the reduction in work- _— though the decree gradually became a ing hours is equally untenable. The fact —_ dead letter under Stalin’s successors and that a major reform of the Soviet wage —_—_ was no longer mentioned in Soviet legal

system has coincided with the reduction _ textbooks from 1954 on, it apparently of the working week makes it difficult survived on the statute books until 1957.

to determine the precise effect of either In still another reversal of Stalinist change, but average wages appear in policy, the 1936 decree which required any event to be displaying their usual the rural population to give six days’ tendency to rise slowly. Thus, the cut in unpaid labor per year for working on the working week is as genuine as these _— roads was repealed by the present lead-

things can be in an imperfect world. ership in November 1958. Instead, reThose who assert the contrary are guilty | sponsibility for building and repairing of using against the Soviet Union the local roads has been placed on the “col-

very same—quite unfounded—argu- lective farms, state farms, industrial, ments by which Soviet propagandists transport, building and other enterprises seek to explain away the reduction of and organizations.” Of course, the job the working week in the United States. still has to be done, but presumably the Other employment reforms. Brief individual is now entitled to be paid for mention should also be made of recent doing it. steps extending the special privileges of Wage questions. Although wages as juvenile workers. Since May 1956 work- such are outside the province of this ers between the ages of 16 and 18 have _—_ discussion, it may be useful to refer brief-

enjoyed a working day shortened to six _ly to changes in this field insofar as they hours, with extra piecework pay to make are indicative of political attitudes. The

up any loss in earnings. In addition practice of the Stalin period was to maxthey are allowed a full month’s vacation imize wage differentials, which indeed each year and special facilities for study. reached record dimensions; on the conThese privileges have, indeed, caused trary, the trend in recent years has been

many managers to try to avoid employ- _in the opposite direction. In 1956, a ing juveniles—a tendency which has minimum wage law was adopted, fixing aroused official criticism and contrib- a floor of 300-350 rubles per month in uted to the difficulties experienced by urban areas and 270 rubles in the counhigh school graduates in seeking em- try. The measure particularly benefited ployment. The compulsory drafting of | the appallingly underpaid groups of young people into labor reserve schools, auxiliary personnel (janitors, cleaners, introduced in October 1940, had already messengers, etc.) and the lowest grades been terminated by a decree of March of shop assistants, railroad workers, and 18, 1955, and has been replaced by vol- others. This process of raising the level

untary recruitment. of the lowest-paid workers is to continue. For another thing, the worker’s right The decree on the Seven-Year Plan pro-

764 Is the Soviet Union a Welfare State? vides for increasing the minimum wage __ tifies treating it as a social service rather

to 400-450 rubles monthly during _ than as a species of commercial transac1959-62, and to 500-600 rubles during tion. At 1.32 rubles per square meter 1963-65, as well as for a consequential per month (somewhat higher for new

(but smaller) upward revision of the apartments in some cities), rents are pay of middle-grade workers. Since the _ generally insufficient even to cover bare

average increase in all money wages is maintenance, which may explain why to be only 26 per cent, it is evident that this is so often neglected. At the same the spread between top and bottom will time, the miseries caused by the short-

be sharply reduced. age of housing and consequent overThis policy is reflected in other aspects crowding are too well known to require of wage reform now in progress. Apart comment here. Khrushchev has declared from introducing smaller differentials in that his aim is eventually to provide a basic rates, the reforms are tending to Separate apartment for every Soviet fam-

eliminate the more exaggerated forms ily instead of the single room which is of progressive piecework bonuses, which the usual situation today. It is evident will cut down disparities in actual earn- from the housing provisions of the ings. The gap between skilled and un- Seven-Year Plan, however, that the sepskilled workers’ pay on collective farms rate apartments will be very small by is also being significantly reduced. There Western standards: the plan calls for have apparently been cuts in very high the construction of 15 million apartment salaries, such as those of government = Units with a total floor space (including ministers and university professors. CO! idors, bathr oom, and kitchen) of

(Though no statement to this effect 650-60 million square meters—or, at seems to have appeared in print, the ™ost, 44 square meters (430 square cuts are apparently a matter of general feet) per apar tment. A British workingknowledge in the Soviet Union and have class family would be shocked at having

been confirmed to the writer several] © live in so little space. Still, no one times.) The relative position of the low- can doubt that Soviet citizens will be est-paid has also been improved as a much happier if and when each family

result of a decree of March 23, 1957, can have its own front door and no reducing direct taxation on incomes be- longer have to share the kitchen with low 450 rubles per month. All this cer- several neighbors. tainly does not indicate that the Soviets There is no question about the sharp are embracing hitherto-condemned “pet- _ acceleration of housing construction un-

ty-bourgeois egalitarianism,” but it does der the post-Stalin leadership. This is show that the excessive inequalities of fully evident from the following figures

the Stalin era are being corrected. showing housing space (excluding priHousing. Something must also be said vate rural housing) completed in four about housing, since the fact that rents different years from 1950 to 1958, and in the Soviet Union are far too low to the Seven-Year Plan goals:

bear any relation to housing costs jus- Despite the sharply-increased effort

| Tota STATE Urspan PRIvatTe 1950... 0. ee 24.2 17.8 6.4 19538. .0..02.0 00. cee eee ee 30.8 23.2 76 1957... eee 52.0 38 45.6 .5 13.5 1958............... Lae 70.1 24.5 (In Million Square Meters of Total Space)

1959 (plan). .......0........ 80.0 Lea -

Is the Soviet Union a Welfare State? 765 1960 (plan).......... 0... 0. 101.0 - eee 1959-65

Plan, total........ ..... 650-60.0 a

Plan, annual average ........ 93.0 Le since Stalin’s death, it is clear that there by the collective farms.

is still a very long way to go before Services. Finally, brief mention must tolerable housing conditions will be be made of improvements in badly achieved, since a large part of new con- _—needed consumer services—restaurants,

struction is necessary merely to keep cafes, shops, repair facilities, and the pace with urban population growth. It like. This is a very backward sector of has been pointed out that the Soviet per Soviet life. To cite just one example, an

capita rate of house-building, even al- article in Pravda (March 14, 1959) eslowing generously for peasant construc- __ timated the total capacity of shoe-repair

tion, remains below that of the (West) establishments in the Russian republic German Federal Republic. Nonetheless, (R.S.F.S.R.) at 15 million pairs annuthe facts reveal considerable progress in _ ally, although 100 million pairs of new the U.S.S.R. The ambitious plans for re- shoes are sold each year, and may be

building villages in connection with presumed to require repair at least once Khrushchev’s contemplated revival of | annually. A recent decree embodied the agrogorod? necessarily call for a still plans for increasing the turnover of greater expansion of housing construc- service and repair shops of all kinds to tion in rural areas, although the finan- 10.3 billion rubles in 1961, as against cial burden involved is to be shouldered 6.2 million rubles in 1958. There have also been measures to increase the num-

2 An agricultural city. ber of shops and restaurants. . . .

STANDARD BEARERS OF

COMMUNIST LABOR | The Yugoslav writer Mihajlo Mihajlov, who visited Moscow in 1964 and wrote Moscow Summer, reports in his book: “In restaurants, shops, buses, museums, railway stations and airports—everywhere, everywhere there are red bill-boards with two kinds of signs. One, “Here Works a Brigade of Communist Labor,” the other, “Here Works a Brigade Fighting for the Title of a Brigade of Communist Labor.” What is this phenomenon called Communist Labor? The pages below will illustrate it. They are taken from a Soviet work describing Communist Labor Brigades and intended as a kind of textbook of the movement which began about 1960. It is the latest in a long line of Soviet experiments in building labor enthusiasm and fostering a collective spirit. Earlier names for the same phenomenon were “socialist competition,” and “Stakhanovism,” after the miner Stakhanov, still alive, who in the 1930’s dug up, in one day, an enormous amount of coal, thus setting precedents for his fellow workers.

For a description of Soviet goals for labor see the 1961 Communist Party Program printed in Jan Triska, Soviet Communism (paperback). Additional Soviet

views are in G. Osipov, Industry and Labor in the USSR; the Soviet journal Problems of Economics; and 1 Dvornikov and V. Nikitinsky, How Labor Disputes Are Settled in the Soviet Union. See also the section on workers in Harry Shaffer, The Soviet Economy (paperback). For a comparison with the United States see Walter Galenson, Labor Productivity in Soviet and American Industry. The fullest

recent work on Soviet labor is Emily Brown, Soviet Trade Unions and Labor Relations. For a general study of the Soviet economy in the 1960’s see Harry Schwartz, The Soviet Economy since Stalin (paperback). See also the article by Jerzy Glicksman, “Recent Trends in Soviet Labor Policy,” Problems of Communism, July-August, 1956, and the chapter on workers in Abraham Brumberg, Russia under Khrushchev (paperback). There are occasional articles on Soviet

labor in the Industrial and Labor Relations Review, and in the International Labour Review.

A. “LABOR IS LIFE’S PRIMARY Can you find a man who has not pon-

NEED” dered over the question of what is the

By N. Minaev, Chief of a Communist Translated by Walter Gleason from ZnameLabor Brigade and Foreman of the nonostsy Komunisticheskogo Truda (Moscow,

Red Proletariat Plant 1961), pp. 190-92, 234-37, 252-58. 766

Standard Bearers of Communist Labor 167 meaning of his life, or what is the signif- | ers, in which community self-governicance of his work? I recently read the ment will establish itself. Labor for the views of a French worker, George No- good of society will become the primary vel. He writes: “Thousands of modern- _ requirement of everyone's life, a recog-

day workers are slaves of serial pro- nized necessity; the abilities of each duction and the conveyor system. The — will be employed for the greatest good

work you do in the factory is of no of the people.” |

interest, sapping your energy, fresh I will use my brigade to illustrate.

strength, and imagination. Sadness and Comprising seven men, it operated an a sense of despondency are daily com- automatic line for machining gears. At panions of modern labor. The main de- _first glance what we produce is not comfect of contemporary labor is this lack __ plicated, gears for screw-cutting lathes. of interest.” Undoubtedly Novel is sin- But if you speculate over where it goes, cere, but his feelings and sentiments are you unwittingly experience pride at the

alien to us. Of course work is not all results of your labor. The factory’s infun and games for a Soviet worker signia, “Red Proletariat,” is quite fa-

either; it demands a great deal of mous in our country. General purpose strength and persistence. But if you screw-cutting lathes, produced by the talked with any of our men at the “Red _ factory, can be found in practically Proletariat” plant, you would not find a every enterprise producing metal obsingle one who would be indifferent to jects. And everywhere—in the Donbass his labor, regardless of what it might be. _ or the Urals, in Siberia or Central Asia “I’ve worked at the ‘Red Proletariat? —they benefit workers like ourselves.

for thirty years,” says our metal-fitter, Truly we work for one another, for Victor Vasil’evich Ermilov. “Our plant society, and, in the last analysis, for took me into the working class and ourselves. taught me about life and my trade. Here The labor of the members of our I have found my calling and have real- brigade and the other workers in the ized the incomparable romance and joy _ factory flows like little streams into the of creative work.” Why do our workers common labor of our people. The same

view their work differently from the hands which grow grain, create space French workers, or the workers of any capsules and wondrous machines, footother capitalist country? The Soviet | wear and clothes, also build villages and worker is interested in his labor pri- cities, factories and plants. Our labor is marily because he performs for himself useful to those laboring in the fraternal and for a society of laborers like him- socialist countries. We not only send

self. It is this feeling which links his them machines but we also share our labor with the labor of the entire people experiences. A trainer in our factory, who have made up their mind to build V. Shumilin, worked in factories in the brightest, most just society on earth | Czechosiovakia; an assistant to the fore—communism. Communism! How long _man of the thermal department, A. Kurhave the working people dreamt of it, | nakov, in China. I was fortunate enough

and now it is becoming a reality. We to visit the German Democratic Repubshall build it over the next twenty years. _ lic. And everywhere our people were Today we already see its concrete fea- greeted joyously, as brothers in labor, tures. “Communism is a highly orga- as unselfish friends. nized society of free and conscious toil- When you ponder these facts, you be-

768 Standard Bearers of Communist Labor come convinced that your labor is need- example we had the following experied by people. And is it not a joy to be ence. Zinaida Podkopova, a_ reserve needed by a laboring collective? I think worker, was sent to us in exchange for that a worker in a capitalist country an ailing mechanic. Owing to inexpericannot derive pleasure from his work, ence she sewed the pattern on the flap

above all because a lion’s share of of the back pocket incorrectly. Liusia his labor goes toward the enrichment Natalina and Tamara Tikhanova, vetof the capitalists, because his heart eran members of our brigade, noticed and mind are always prey to the worm the mistake while doing later operaof doubts and anxieties about the tions, but permitted the item to continue

future. ... along the conveyor. The foreman, Alexandra Ivanova Luk’yanova, noticed the B. “ALL FOR ONE AND ONE FOR _ defective quality of the stitching. And

ALL” so an entire lot of trousers was taken

By T. Ivanova, Chief of a Communist ‘rom Leriinan lled. Not only th

Labor Brigade in the “Bolshevik” briead ‘ ° th “s - d mony

Textile Plat | rigade, but upset the over en Natalina’s ire epartment was and Tikhanova’s

. . » How do we in our brigade live up conduct. In a collective competing for to the principle of “all for one and one Communist Labor this was a glaring for all?” Before speaking of this, I will fault which might have been prevented. briefly discuss the organization of pro- Everyone was interested in why Natalina

duction and labor in our plant. Our and Tikhanova had acted in this way. “Bolshevik” is a highly mechanized en- It turned out that they had simply deterprise. For example there are eighteen cided that it was none of their business. machines for the twenty-two people who They did not consider the honor of the

make up our brigade. Only one opera-_ collective at all. Then a discussion tion, sorting of sewn cutouts from among us tumed to consciousness, the pieces of cloth, is done by hand. I per- labor honor of each person. We all form this task. The sorter must be well knew one little-noticed, yet far from un-

acquainted with the entire process of important, peculiarity in the character preparing this or that operation. She of these workers—they both lived decannot be mistaken, since even a hardly tached from the collective, withdrawn noticeable error on her part leads to a_ into their own little, philistine world, stoppage in the production line. There thinking only about their own wellis mass conveyor-line production at the being. [t was of no concern to them

factory in the basic sewing depart- that a comrade was making mistakes ments, including our own. This is un- and needed their help. They had less imaginable without a clear-cut division labor consciousness than anyone in the of labor. The success of this type of | brigade, or the department. production depends on the cooperation But why did the collective, knowing and coordination of the workers’ activi- all the failings of these workers, remain

ties, and on their ability to fill in for silent until they committed this error?

one another. _ Because we were occupied solely with Of course this does not come by it- striving to overfill the quota. Undoubtself, but is the result of a great deal of edly, this must be striven for. However, educational work with the people. For our every step should be a reflection of

Standard Bearers of Communist Labor 769 our high, ideological consciousness. One _ predetermined operation. And our bri-

can learn a great deal, be thoroughly gade decided that each worker should familiar with the whole process of sew- know no less than ten operations. Then ing clothes, handle the quota perfectly, it is possible easily to replace the absent

and yet have no comprehension of the comrade. If need be any of us can acgoals which face our society. But one complish, instead of one operation, one must live and work for the sake of its and a half or two. That is how we work

interests. it. And when Roza Sitdekova did not The feeling of collectivism can be de- come to work one day, Usacheva took

veloped in various ways. We in our her place. She even accomplished her brigade, for example, began by ac- own operation at the same time. quainting ourselves with the lives of People who have just joined the brieach worker. Each of us sees and knows = gade must be helped. Of course we do

what a worker does in the production not leave them unattended. Recently line and how she acts in the depart- Olia Kuznetskaia began to work with ment. But what becomes of the worker us. She was entrusted with operating a beyond the factory’s gates? This is not special machine which demands crafts-

a matter of indifference for a brigade manship and skill. Tanya Esavkina is competing for Communist Labor, led thoroughly acquainted with this maby the principle of “one for all and chine. She helped Olia to master the all for one.” We commissioned Liuba assigned work quickly. We are fully Borisova and Zhenia Usacheva to visit aware that labor consciousness and all the workers’ homes and discover standards of training are intimately how they lived. Familiarity with their connected with each other. Consciousmode of life facilitates the education of | ness depends on the individual’s educapeople in the production line, it affords tion, his frame of mind, and ideological opportunities to help one’s comrades. conviction. This means that everyone Thus Roza Sitdekova’s husband became should study. We in the brigade also

ill at a time when there was no one came to that conclusion. I enrolled in a

with whom to leave the child. The bri- | technical school. Valia Vasil’eva, Zhenia gade came to her aid. Its members went Usacheva, and Liuba Borisova are busy

to Roza’s home several times. They in a school for working youth. Lena helped out around the house, sat with Motileva is studying to prepare herself the child, went shopping, and so forth. for admission to an institute. The reSuch help ennobles a person, inspires maining workers attend circles, the unifaith in the collective, strengthens com- versity of culture. They are trying to prehension of one’s public duties, and do more reading on their own.

alters a person’s relationship to the Exchanges of views on questions of

collective. public life, literature, art, arguments on This principle of “all for one and one what the modern young person should for all” forces us to think about im- _ be like, and what constitutes beauty and proving our professional mastery, and the worth of the individual, all are inour educational and cultural standards. creasingly replacing pointless conversaSometimes one of us, for a valid reason, tions. The striving to find answers to does not show up for work. This neces- troublesome questions, to enrich one’s sitates quick modifications, since each inner life, attracts our interest in visit-_ person in the brigade accomplishes a ing theaters, movies, and museums. Our

770 Standard Bearers of Communist Labor group often goes in a body. Then, as a__ nological innovations in large-scale panrule, we discuss what we saw. Our bri- _ eled buildings. |

gade is actively engaged in all social Life itself suggested an idea to us. events. Some of the girls work as volun- Working under the existing techniques, teer militia aids. We perform voluntary we were literally overwhelmed by buildlabor on Saturdays and Sundays and __ ing parts. Our floor reminded one then stay together in one-day holiday homes of a storehouse for prefabricated con-

and tourist centers. .. . structions. This made work very difh| cult. In addition, analyzing the fitting C. “OUR EXPERIENCE IN process, we came to the conclusion that COMPETING FOR COMMUNIST _ it was far from perfect. Parts were in-

LABOR IN CONSTRUCTION” stalled without a predetermined plan, without strict sequence. It was clear By G. 5 he ocnhin, Chel h, f ales that, if we worked by the tried methods, Pla No, rigaae at the Mosstrov- = we would not be able to obtain success

nt No. I and catch up with the other brigades.

Our brigade was organized in Febru- The technique had somehow to be ary, 1960. At that time we were build- changed and improved. I shared my ing large-scale paneled buildings in the thoughts on this matter with a section Volkhonka region. And it must be said chief, Dikman. He supported my opinthat things went badly at the beginning. ions, and together we worked out the The workers were drawn from various details of a new technique for fitting sectors, did not know each other, and large-scale panel homes. Our idea con-

did not coordinate their tasks, but, sisted in the following: first, work not more importantly, the majority had no on one section but on the fitting from experience in construction on this scale. both ends of two ‘sections, using the Among the twenty-seven men only Iurii crane according to the pendulum prinShikalov and I were fitters, the others ciple; that is, while one brigade of fitspecialized in bricklaying, rigging or ters installs one section with the help of

carpentry, or were simply auxiliary the crane, the other brigade prepares workers. Thus we needed to do much __ the work space, and then they exchange

and overcome a great deal if we were roles. Second, during one of the shifts, to unify the collective, master the art work on the fittings of only one type of fitting, and gain the necessary knowl- of part and only in a definite sequence. edge and experience. And the first step For example, install only wall blocks in this direction was our brigade’s entry at the beginning, and in another shift

into the competition for the title of a install the main internal partitions, and collective of Communist Labor. We so forth. fully understood the responsibility we This procedure permitted more effecwere assuming and did not want to fall tive use of the crane and made it conbehind the other brigades. Being “lag- venient for the fitters, who did not have gards,” this was quite a bold step, but to shift their positions continually. In it was just this which somehow brought addition the new method enabled (and us together, gave us strength, forced us_ this is very important) an hourly labor to ponder over things which earlier schedule to be worked out for not only would have seemed too daring to us, the fitters but also those supplying the about new methods of labor, new tech- parts, who would know exactly when

Standard Bearers of Communist Labor 71 and what kind of parts should be put cided to place at our disposal for the on the platform. In this way we could final elaboration of technological charts work directly “from the supply base.” and hourly schedules the service of the The crane delivers the parts to the exact Scientific Research Institute of the Chief

spot where they are to be installed, Moscow Construction Trust. without overloading the building plat- This was the first victory. But if it

form with material. was to become final, a great deal of

Estimates indicated that this proce- work was necessary. The main obstacle dure reduced the assembly time for one to the introduction of the new building floor from seven to five days. Initially method was the suppliers. They did not there were those who did not believe in want to rearrange their work at all, and the realization of our idea. Several this is understandable. An hourly schedcomrades in other brigades who found ule for delivering parts to the building out about our plans frankly said that platform involved a great deal of trounothing would come of it. But this only ble. The most efficient coordination of egged us on. No matter what, we wanted all departments had to be arranged, a to prove to the doubting Thomases that strict sequence between sections obit was not they, but we, who were right. served, and many others. But we reBut we understood that we had not lentlessly persisted, reminding, seeking, undertaken an easy task. In order to demanding, sending our delegations to introduce the new technique, many dif- the suppliers’ offices, and turning to the ferent agreements and permissions were Party’s city committee for aid. And required; it was necessary to coordinate finally things began to roll. We bewith the factory suppliers. And all this gan to receive parts according to our was not easy because they had to dis- schedule.

rupt fixed schedules and rearrange their Work done by the new method at own work. For this reason we decided | once showed results. Our estimates were

from the outset to work not only fully justified—we could assemble a through our management and the trust, story not in seven days, as the plan which at once supported us and were projected, but in five. The new method ready to render any kind of assistance, justified itself and began to spread not but also through the community, espe- only in our offices but in other Moscow

cially the press. } buildings. The elaboration of the new Our brigade addressed an open letter technique and the struggle for its inin the newspaper Moskovskaia Pravda troduction was a good experience for to all organizations on whom the intro- us. After a few months our brigade had duction of the new technique depended _ turned into a friendly and cohesive col-

with a plea that they help us. After the lective, where each member was fully letter was published, our offer was dis- acquainted with his duties and at any cussed and approved at a meeting of moment was ready to come to the aid

the praesidium of the city’s union of of a comrade. construction workers. Those attending While elaborating the schedules and the meeting for the management ad- holding conversations with the supmitted that the new method of erecting pliers, we did not waste any time. It large-scale paneled buildings was pro- was decided that each brigade member gressive and committed themselves to should master no less than two to three hastenirg its introduction. It was de- construction skills, with fitting required

772 Standard Bearers of Communist Labor of everyone. This was necessary if com- edge of varied specialties broadens a plete coordination were to be achieved. man’s opportunities, his professional With this goal in mind all the comrades outlook, and makes work more interattended special courses for fitters in esting. And you know that this is also our department. In addition Jurii Shika- important. When an individual likes his

lov and I, as the most experienced fit- work and derives moral satisfaction ters, tried to transmit to them our ex- from it, he works differently, putting a perience. Special consideration was nat- part of himself into it. In addition to urally given by the department to Vic- his knowledge and experience, he wants

tor Rybakov, Sergei Karpukhin, and to bring to his work something of his Pavel Iudovskii, who, under the new own, something new. Such was the case

organization, would be in charge of in our brigade. small four-man groups of fitters. When |§ Having acquired the art of fitting, they had mastered the art of fitting they the people began to think of ways to began to transfer the accumulated ex- speed up the process, to offer rational

perience to other comrades. suggestions. For example, Ivan Parshin, Thus, over a very short period, an electric welder, suggested that rethanks to the cooperation and the hardy inforcing the wall blocks would hasten encouragement of all to study, all of us_ their installation and make the tower in the brigade, except the plasterers, crane more quickly available. A pattern

became fitters. Incidentally many did for installing internal partitions was not stop at this point and began to mas- suggested by Iurii Shikalov, freeing the

ter other specialties. At the present fitters from being occupied each time time the majority of the brigade mem- with the room partitions, which always bers are proficient in three skills, and absorbed so much time. A great deal some have acquired four. For example can be drawn from such examples. fitter Bezuchko can now do competent There now is not one person in the work as a bricklayer, steel reinforcer, brigade who has not made some imand carpenter. But even this is not provement, however small, in our work. enough for him. Recently Bezuchko en- The following rule has been established

rolled in a course for electric welders. among us: all innovations in construcWe support this desire to gain new tion methods that any of us discovers

skills. It is not just that additional from the technical literature, the exknowledge and experience never hurt, perience of other brigades, or has but the broad specialization of the bri- worked out for himself at once become

gade members helps a great deal at the general property of the collective. work, allowing us to shift their skills And if the novelty deserves attention, around. In addition to fitting walls, we try to get the ball rolling immediceilings, and so forth, we ourselves ately. It has become a habit for us to make door and window frames, and think continually about the perfection rough plaster. For this reason not only of construction methods. fitters and bricklayers join the brigade, | When our management switched to but also carpenters and plasterers. Un- constructing large-scale block homes, der these conditions the flexibility of we also began to introduce our method the brigade members is one of the most here. And again the workers of the decisive sources of successful work. But Moscow Construction Trust, with whom

the advantage in broad specialization we were in constant contact, came to is not confined to this alone. A knowl- our assistance. With their help we

Standard Bearers of Communist Labor 773 worked out a new technique and sched- often appeared at work with a headules. The efficiency gained in this case ache, or he failed to come altogether. was not minor. The time for assembling This showed in the work of the brigade. one floor was successfully cut from nine We talked about this with him many

to seven days. times. We warned him. He gave his

Our - persistent work to perfect our word, but after a while he again broke professional skills through learning re- loose. After one meeting, at which the lated skills did not go in vain. After comrades gave him such a scolding that several months we were able to advance _—ithe lad did not know where to turn, into the vanguard and in August, 1960, Lebedev did not again break a promise six months after entering our collective given to the collective. We had failures

in the competition for the rank of a too. Maria Merkulova, a young but Communist Labor brigade, we were vic- spoiled girl, worked as an auxiliary torious. It was not only our production _ laborer in the brigade. She often loafed, success that allowed us to win the right —_ took her time, acted arrogantly with her to bear this high rank. From the outset comrades. We talked to her many times. we tried not only in words, but in deeds She repeatedly promised the collective

as well, to live up to the precept of to reform, but could not find the Communist brigades—to learn to live strength to do it. She finally left the and work the Communist way. Above _ brigade. all we declared war on everything super- In order better to acquaint ourselves ficial and negative in ourselves: on foul with the members of the brigade, to language and rudeness to one another, _find out how they spend their free time,

on habits of celebrating payday at a how they live after work, we began to bar, on violation of the discipline at visit one another, to arrange collective

work. trips to the theaters and movies. Once Of course, since it is difficult to over- almost the whole brigade went to Lenin-

come personal habits, we try to help grad. There we became acquainted not one another. If anyone swears or of- only with the museums and the other fends a comrade, we immediately stop sights of the hero city, but also with him and remind him that he has lapsed. _the advanced labor methods of the LenSwearing has now become rare. It was _ingrad builders. We visited the brigade more difficult to overcome other hab- of the well-known builder, Shapovalov.

its, so closely tied to “the green ser- A warm friendship ties us to this bri-

pent.” Ivan Lebedev, a rigger, especially gade.... | sinned in this way. After Sunday he

SOVIET NATIONALITY POLICY By Bobodzhan Gafurov; Richard Pipes We saw in chapter 38 that the national problem had never been solved in the Russian Empire, and contributed to its downfall. The Soviet regime claims to have solved the problem and to have set an example to other nations on how to live together on the basis of equality and respect for each other. Our first author, Mr. Gafurov, is a prominent Soviet historian and Orientalist, a Corresponding Member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. He is a Tadzhik by birth, and from 1946 to 1956 was the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Tadzhikistan. Richard Pipes is Professor of Russian History at Harvard. His essay is part of a symposium the rest of which appears in the same issue of Problems of Communist. The same journal devoted a special issue in September— October, 1967, to the nationality problem. For Soviet views on the subject see Joseph Stalin, Marxism and the National

Question; the relevant sections of the Soviet Constitution reprinted above as chapter 52; E. Bagramov, “Lenin’s Teachings on the National Question and the Situation Today,” Reprints from ihe Soviet Press, December 15, 1966; I. Groshev,

A Fraternal Family of Nations (published in Moscow); and “One Family Undivided,” Soviet Life, September, 1967. See also Alfred Low, Lenin on the Question of Nationality. For Western books on the subject see Eric Goldhagen (ed.), Ethnic Minorities in the Sovidt Union; Allen Kassof (ed.), Prospects for Soviet Society; Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, The Communist Party Apparatus (paperback) ; Robert Con-

quest, Soviet Nationalities Policy in Practice and The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities; Frederick Barghoorn, Soviet Russian Nationalism; Walter Kolarz, Russia and Her Colonies; Rudolpf Schlesinger, The Nationalities Problem and Soviet Administration; and Roman Smal-Stocki, The Captive Nations. A quarterly journal devoted to Soviet nationalities and printed in Munich since 1958 is Problems of the Peoples of the USSR. There are a number of studies dealing with individual areas and peoples. On

| The first essay is translated by the editor from B. Gafurov, “Uspekhi natsional’noi polli_ tiki KPSS i nekotorye voprosy internatsiona’nogo vospitaniia,” Kommunist (Moscow), August, 1958, pp. 10-24. The second essay is from R. Pipes, “The Forces of Nationalism,”

| Problems of Communism, January-February, 1964, pp. 1-6. Published with permission of the United States Information Agency.

T14

| Soviet Nationality Policy 79 the Ukraine see John Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, as well as the Ukrainian

Quarterly and the Digest of the Ukrainian Soviet Press (monthly since 1956). On Central Asia see Lawrence Krader, Peoples of Soviet Central Asia; Michael Rywkin, Russia in Central Asia (paperback) ; George Wheeler, The Modern History

of Soviet Central Asia; Edward Allworth, Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule, 1865-1965; Alexander Bennigsen, Islam in the Soviet Union; Alec Nove, The Soviet Middle East; and the Central Asian Review (quarterly since 1953). On other nationalities see David Lang, The Modern History of Soviet Georgia; E. Vardys, Lithuania under the Soviets; Nicholas Vakar, Belorussia; and Salo Baron, The Russian Jews under Tsars and Soviets. On the last subject see also Solomon Rabinovich, Jews in the Soviet Union (published in Moscow). See also “Brezhnev in Tbilisi,” Current Digest of the Soviet Press, November 23,

1966, and “Delimitation of Competence between USSR Agencies and Republic Agencies,” Soviet Law and Government, Winter, 1966-67.

GAFUROV: ACHIEVEMENTS OF helped them to develop their statehood, THE NATIONAL POLICY OF THE = economy, and culture.

COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE This example of the Russian nation,

SOVIET UNION whose revolutionary vigor and readi-

. .. The greatest accomplishment in the ness to fight for the victory of Comsolution of the national question is the munism received universal acclaim, had

establishment of brotherly friendship a favorable influence on all the other and collaboration of all the nationali- socialist nations of the Soviet Union. ties of the USSR in place of the former ... The great accomplishments of the national prejudices and hatred. History USSR in the solution of the national knows other examples of the peaceful question serve as the source of hope coexistence of nations, of the establish- and inspiration for all peoples strugment among them of various kinds of gling against imperialism and for indeunions; but the unity of Soviet socialist pendent development. This is why im-

nations is in principle different from perialist propaganda is forced to resort such precedents. The objective basis of to shameless lies and monstrous inventhe union of Soviet peoples is the ex- tions in order to represent the relations

istence and dominance in our country between nationalities in the Soviet

of socialist ownership of the means of Union in a perverted way... . All these production which results in the collabo- dirty concoctions do not deserve refu-

ration and mutual help of men free tation, since they are invented from befrom exploitation. It was also histori- ginning to end, based on false testimony

cally significant that the largest, and of traitors to the Motherland, and all economically and culturally most de- the “statistics” are simply manufacveloped, Russian nation, having played tured. Really, who in our country could

the role of the dominant nation in pre- believe that we “persecute” national revolutionary conditions, decisively and languages, that we “do not advance but

selflessly renounced its former privi- oppress” cadres, that we “destroy” Isleged position. Moreover, this nation !amic culture, etc.? We cite these exexpended much energy and made many amples to show that the imperialists, sacrifices in order to help the former- helpless in their fury against the USSR, ly oppressed nationalities consolidate resort to the lowest forms of slander, themselves into independent nations; it prevert facts, manufacture false “testi-

776 Soviet Nationality Policy monials,” in order to lie about the pose cadres of the local nationality to

USSR and deceive the American reader. the cadres of other nationalities. Such But as an Eastern proverb has it: “The an approach to the problem is excepdog barks, but the caravan moves on.” tionally harmful. True, these are only The American apologists for imperial- individual instances, and no generalizaism wish to promote distrust and strife tions can be made on their basis. But among the peoples of our great coun-_ if a decisive struggle is not waged with try, and to hide their own nationality even the most insignificant violations of policy. But their efforts are in vain. The the Party’s national policy, they may

brotherly solidarity of the peoples of grow stronger, and this may do harm

the USSR is firm and unshakable. The to the interests of Communist construc-

imperialists will not succeed in hiding tion. There is no doubt that in the

their low aims. .. . | future the growth of national cadres

The successful solution of the nation- _will move in an ever faster tempo; this al question in the USSR is based on the does not mean, however, that we may

fact that the Party has always con- permit any limitations on the rights of ducted a determined struggle both with other nationalities. The selection and great-power chauvinism and with local placement of cadres cannot be connationalism, whatever forms these might ducted merely in conformity with their

take. As a result of the victory of so- national origin. This contradicts the cialism and the Party’s vast educational principles of our internationalist world

work, the ideology of proletarian inter- view and the firm traditions of the nationalism and the friendship of peo- Communist Party. The selection and ples have come to prevail in our coun- placement of cadres must be governed try. In the USSR, where the social basis above all by the Leninist principle of

of national strife has been liquidated, judging people by their political and there are no nationalist aims or groups. businesslike qualities. A closer union of But we still find some nationalist prej- the peoples of our country will be real-

udices and examples of nationalist ized not only as ‘a result of strengthennarrow-mindedness. Nationalist preju- ing economic and cultural ties between dices are sometimes observed in the them, but also in the course of a brothfields of economy and ideology, in the erly exchange of cadres of workers, matter of selecting cadres. Correcting scholars, representatives of culture, in the mistakes connected with the cult of the process of an exchange of cultural personality our Party ‘has, in recent achievements, of all the best which each years, promoted a fuller and more cor- republic and each nationality possesses. rect realization of the principle of dem- At the present time, when the system ocratic centralism. The rights of Union of managing the economy has been reRepublics in the fields of planning, the organized, and regional economic coundistribution of revenues, and the man-_ cils have been created, national narrowagement of the economy and of cultural mindedness in some districts takes the affairs have been widened. These mea- form of localist tendencies, which exsures have already played an enormous press themselves in the non-fulfilment

positive role. | of cooperative plans; there are attempts Nevertheless some comrades interpret by individual leaders to “seize” more

these decisions of the Party and the for their locality at the expense of the government incorrectly. In some locali- country as a whole. Recently the Party’s

ties a tendency has appeared to juxta- Central Committee condemned the ac-

| Soviet Nationality Policy on tions of certain leaders who had incor- Some scholars are attempting to justify rectly utilized the revenues reserved for the activities of reactionary bourgeoisthe development of undertakings of all- _ nationalist organizations in Central Asia

Union significance; these leaders had and the Transcaucasus, motivating this used the revenues for local needs, which by the allegation that the Twentieth are secondary in importance. Some- Party Congress corrected the dogmatic times localism is accompanied by in- errors in the assessment of the role of

vented exaggerations of the national the national bourgeoisie in the counpeculiarities of one or another republic, _ tries of Asia and Africa. . . . It is neces-

which gives rise to unreasonable de- sary to dwell on another important mands for particular advantages and question. The Soviet government has large investments from the all-Union corrected the violations of socialist lebudget into the republican economies. — gality which took place in the past and Tendencies which cannot be called _ rehabilitated those unjustly sentenced.

other than nationalist also appear in In this lies the great merit of the Party the efforts of some leaders to juxtapose and the government. This does not the interests of their republic to the in- | mean, however, that we must make con-

terests of Communist construction in cessions to ideological errors which our country as a whole. At one time the were made in the past by some of the Kazakh Party organization condemned _ now rehabilitated persons. The Commu-

the incorrect behavior of certain leaders nist Party has fought and will always who took a negative attitude toward the fight against expressions of bourgeois question of the virgin lands. Now, when _ nationalism in our socialist society. tens of millions of hectares of virgin Communists see their prime obligation

soil have been plowed, and Kazakhstan in this.

gives the country a million puds of In recent years the Western reactiongrain, this promotes our country’s ary press has published a number of might and makes possible the further articles devoted to the republics of the flowering of the economy and culture Soviet East. These articles allege that of the Kazakh SSR; it has become clear national traditions are being destroyed how wise were the decisions of the Cen- _in the Soviet Union. This, of course, is

tral Committee of the CPSU on the lie and slander. We Soviet people are plowing of the virgin lands, and how _ the heirs of the best traditions of our wrong and blind were those persons ancestors. We shall promote all that is who did not understand the significance _ best in the national treasure house, we

of this question. The Party cannot be shall cultivate love for our rich past, indifferent even to the slightest attempts for our classical literature and art, for to juxtapose the incorrectly understood _ the best traditions of the peoples of the

interests of a given republic to the in- USSR. But we shall fight against surterests of the entire Soviet Union. vivals of the exploiting society such as

In the field of ideology nationalist the cases, still found in the Soviet survivals find their expression in an Union, of limiting the rights of women idealization of the historical past, in an and harmful clan and other customs; uncritical attitude toward various na- we shall fight against backwardness and

tional movements, in forgetting the lack of culture. party principle in the discussion of Not for a moment must we forget questions of culture, literature, and art. that imperialist circles, the U.S.A. above

178 Soviet Nationality Policy all, are fighting against an internation- chev said at the jubilee session of the alist ideology, banking on the as yet un- Supreme Soviet in 1957: “The oppoconquered nationalist survivals in the nents of socialism are hoping that the people’s consciousness. Speaking of the Communists will start to elaborate some attempt of American imperialists to uti- sort of entirely “new” artificial roads lize the survivals of bourgeois ideology to socialism for each country in par-

in the struggle against the socialist ticular, and will abandon the great excamp, one cannot.but dwell on one of perience of socialist construction availthe methods which clearly illustrate the able in the Soviet Union, China, and principles of American policy. The rul- other countries.”

ing circles of the U.S.A., when address- What is the basic teaching of coning themselves to their allies in the temporary revisionism on the national capitalist camp and to the nonsocialist question? The revisionists reduce their countries in general, stress cosmopoli- conception of internationalism to mere tan slogans. Under the aegis of a fight coexistence, on the basis of which counagainst the danger of “international tries with differing social systems can communism” they urge these countries operate. But relations in the spirit of to give up their national sovereignty to proletarian internationalism inevitably a “union” into aggressive blocs under presuppose mutual collaboration, a rathe leadership of the U.S.A. On the _ tional division of labor, and joint resisother hand, they attempt to arouse na-_ tance to the attempts of the imperialists.

tionalist tendencies in the countries of Proletarian internationalism reprethe socialist camp. These apparently sents the solidarity and mutual help of contradictory goals are in fact aimed at the toilers of all lands in their common one result—the ideological disarmament struggle for the victory of socialism of countries which will facilitate Ameri- against imperialism; it signifies above

can rule over them and enforce the all the support of the world socialist domination of this imperialist power. system—the USSR, the Chinese PeoThe imperialists’ faithful ally in the ple’s Republic, and the other countries spreading of bourgeois nationalism is of socialism, the unity of the internacontemporary revisionism which op- tional communist movement, solidarity poses Marxism-Leninism, the genuine with the national liberation movement. internationalist teaching of the toilers. It is firmly connected with patriotism, One of the theses of contemporary re- because the genuine patriotism of a provisionists, which they took over bodily letarian of any country represents the from the bourgeois politicians of the strengthening of the forces of progress Dulles type, is the proposition about so- and democracy in their fight against called national communism. Reaction- the exploitation of the ruling classes, ary imperialist propaganda supports against national oppression, etc. In exthis thesis willingly and generously. The pressing love for their Motherland and

enemies of the toilers hope, with the attempting to turn it into an advanced help of this slogan, to break up the socialist country, the workers and _toilsocialist camp, and to turn its countries ers become genuine patriots. By this against each other. And yet it is clear very act they also fulfil their internato every genuine Marxist that there is tional obligation. To counterpose the not and cannot be any specific “nation- national tasks of the proletariat to its al” communism. Comrade N. S. Krush- international duties means to condemn

Soviet Nationality Policy 779 the fulfilment of national tasks to fail- into a dictatorship of the proletariat ure, to bring harm to the cause of social of several advanced countries capable

progress, to the cause of socialism. of having a decisive influence on world The revisionists deny the meaning for _affairs).” ... other countries of the experience of the Despite the libelous assertions of our Soviet Union in the building of social- enemies, a thorough study of the Rusism. Rejecting such views Comrade sian language and a mastery of the richMao Tse-tung remarked at the jubilee est accomplishments of Russian culture session of the Supreme Soviet of the have an enormous significance for the USSR in November, 1957: “The people _ peoples of our country because this will,

of all countries see their future more to a considerable extent, facilitate the clearly every day in the successes of the exchange of cultural riches between the Soviet people. The path of the Soviet peoples of the USSR. The Russian lanUnion, the path of the October Revolu- guage is a mighty means of communition is, in its fundamentals, the chief cation between the peoples of the USSR; road for the development of all man- thanks to it, the accomplishments in the

kind.” field of science, technology, and culture We cannot underestimate the dangers of the Russian people, as well as those of revisionism for the socialist camp of every national republic, become the and the entire international labor move- _ property of all the peoples of our coun-

ment, because it attempts to break the try. This is why the Russian language unity of the peoples of the socialist is justly regarded as the second native camp, to weaken the struggle of the language of all the nationalities inhabitCommunist and workers’ parties for ing the country of socialism. This does peace and socialism. It is therefore not mean, however, that the enormous the first international duty of the Com- role of the languages and cultures of munists of all lands to struggle relent- the fraternal peoples of our Motherland lessly against all the manifestations of | should be uriderestimated in the slight-

revisionism. est. The practice of our cadres in learn-

With characteristic foresight Lenin ing the language of the people among showed that the struggle with national- | whom they live and work has justified ism, with deeply rooted petty bourgeois itself and deserves all support. The most

nationalist prejudices, will grow ever thorough study of the languages, litera-

more important as the dictatorship of tures, and of the remarkable cultural the proletariat becomes established in a _ heritage of all nations and nationalities

number of countries, outgrowing the remains an important task of Soviet boundaries of one state and exercising scholars. a decisive influence on world politics. The publication of books criticizing “The struggle with this evil,” wrote the theory and practice of imperialism Lenin, “with the most deeply rooted on the national question has the greatest petty bourgeois national prejudices, will _ significance in the task of educating the

come to the forefront as the goal be- peoples in the spirit of socialist intercomes to turn the dictatorship of the nationalism and patriotism. The racist proletariat from a national to an inter- and neo-fascist theories, fabricated in national one (that is, a dictatorship of | the U.S.A. and other capitalist counthe proletariat in one country unable _ tries, must be ruthlessly combatted. This

to influence world policy will change will aid the progressive forces of all

780 Soviet Nationality Policy mankind in sharpening the struggle sense of patriotism, or of urban intellecagainst imperialist reaction and racist tuals, who simply had no experience of dogmatism. Our scholarly and popular it: they knew of an agrarian problem, _ literature must propagandize the great of a labor problem, of a constitutional accomplishments of the countries of the problem, even of a Jewish problem, but socialist camp more widely and deeply; not of, say, a Ukrainian or a Moslem we must describe the mutual help of the national problem. The latter they were peoples of these countries. At the same _ inclined to regard as phantoms raised time we must continue exposing con- by German and Austrian propagandists temporary revisionism which opposes during the First World War in an effort the Leninist principles of proletarian in- to weaken and dismember the Russian

ternationalism and the unity and col- Empire. laboration of the countries in the camp The American attitude was, and con-

of socialism. tinues to be, inspired by other considThere is no question that we have as__ erations. First, there is the unsophisti-

yet a too weakly developed fraterniza- cated approach which takes at face tion between the youth of a number of value Soviet assertions that the abolition

Union and autonomous republics and of private property in means of prothe youth of the RSFSR, the Ukrainian duction and the constitutional guaranSSR, etc. We must develop this fraterni- tee of equality have in fact done away zation. In particular, we must stress the with national discrimination and anifurther and broader development of mosities. Behind this kind of reasoning

economic, cultural, sport, and tourist lie many uncritical and largely false ties of the youth of all nationalities in| assumptions about the nature of na-

our country. tionalism. Is nationalism really a “func-

The task of constructing Commu- tion” of economics? Do constitutional nism, of educating the toilers, also de- guarantees of equality assure actual mands a decisive struggle against all equality--in Russia any more than in survivals of medieval and patriarchal the United States? And would equality, practices, against religious prejudices, even if realized, neutralize nationalism? against improper attitudes toward wom- Such questions are rarely asked by en which occur in some localities. Only _ those who believe in what may be called

the best national traditions and customs a manipulative solution of the national

must be supported... . question.

PIPES: THE FORCES OF The more sophisticated and at the NATIONALISM same time more prevalent attitude rests There was a time—and not so long on a more or less conscious equation of ago—when merely to assert the exis- the American and Russian experiences tence in Russia of a “national problem” with national minorities. It assumes evoked skepticism. This was a reaction that in Russia, as in the United States, common to both émigrés of pre-World gradual assimilation of the minorities is War II vintage and Americans knowl- both progressive and inevitable: proedgeable in Russian affairs. The ma- gressive because it tends toward the jority of Russian émigrés consisted establishment of true equality, inevitaeither of nobles, officials, and officers, ble because it is backed by superior who denied the existence of this prob- culture and economic power. How perlem on principle, from a misguided suasive such considerations can be is

Soviet Nationality Policy | 781 best illustrated by the example of an roots. For all their differences—and eminent American jurist who was they are very profound—the American shocked to find upon visiting Soviet and Russian cultures are young cultures Central Asia that native children were having been essentially molded in the attending separate schools instead of past 250 years, that is, in an era when Russian ones! Still fresh in memory are the prevailing intellectual tendencies comparisons equating the Ukraine with have been antitraditionalist and scienPennsylvania, and Georgians with the tific. They are forward-looking, more

Welsh or Scots. concerned with the life to be built than It is safe to say that such attitudes with the life that has. been inherited. no longer prevail today, or at least are Both are imbued by a strong millennial encountered less frequently than a de- spirit. Having given up many of their cade ago. The national problem in the own traditions for the sake of moderniSoviet Union is widely recognized as a zation, Americans and Russians are not true and valid problem: it exists. But inclined to show undue respect for the

if one probes behind this admission, traditionalism of other nations, espeone still finds a very pronounced reluc- cially when this traditionalism runs tance to concede that the problem is contrary to the requirements of modern really something important and endur- life. So they tend to deprecate nationing. Men of good will are against na- alism and advocate assimilation—and tionalism, because nationalism has been sometimes, to assume that the desirable

responsible for so much bloodshed, is also the inevitable. :

hatred, and various other forms of Now, if we try to take a more disirrational behavior. And because men passionate look at the problems of naof good will, like men of bad will, so tionalism and nationality in the modern often allow wishes (or fears) to inter- world, we must acknowledge that they fere with their judgment of facts, they show no sign whatever of becoming less sometimes think that to recognize the urgent, let alone of disappearing. This reality of something one does not ap- is in some respects puzzling, because prove is tantamount to approving it; nationalism runs contrary to the needs hence they are inclined to deny reality of economic development which exert to that which they disapprove. Thus, such a powerful influence on contempothough they may concede that the na-_ rary life. Certainly, the maximal use of tional problem exists, they like to think economic resources requires a degree

it will disappear. of rationalization that cannot brook in-

, terference from traditionalism. Nation-

NATIONALISM AND MODERNIZATION al barriers must be broken, and the It is quite striking that in this respect 1 It is curious that in spite of all the propathe attitudes of very many Russians and ganda value which the Soviet Union has deAmericans fully coincide. When the _ rived from discrimination against Negroes in issue is raised, one can hear quite simi- the United States, one often encounters scorn lar responses from intellectuals in Mos- for the wholeMany “Negro question” among citizens. Russian have not muchSoviet sym-

cow or Leningrad and New York or pathy either for the economic plight of the Washington. Why should this be so? American Negro, which is less acute than their

It may well be thet behind it lies a very ovo forthe Negros national spiratons fundamental factor linking . American intolerance matches the indifference of some and Russian cultures: an impatience Americans toward the Russians’ maltreatment with, and underestimation of, historical of their national minorities.

782 Soviet Nationality Policy ground must be cleared of the old the old class-stratified social structure. vegetation—sometimes luxuriant, some- This push and pull exerted on natimes merely disorderly and lifeless— tionalism by the process of modernizawhich centuries of spontaneous cultural tion has been the essence of the “nagrowth have produced. The discipline tional problem” of our time. On the one of the clock, the techniques of a money hand, modernization demands cultural economy, and all the other complex fea- leveling; on the other, it releases social tures of modern industrial life are not forces that are least prone to such levelcompatible with national traditions that ing. Since the latter tendency is often

are usually rooted in agricultural or stronger than the former, because it commercial mores. An ideal economic represents real pressures as against ideal arrangement would be one in which all considerations, nationalism has made

states would merge into one world remarkable headway and is likely to union, and all mankind dissolve into continue to do so.

one_ nation. — ..,.. AMERICAN vs. SOVIET EXPERIENCE

If, in fact, such an amalgamation is not taking place, it is because the proc- The relentless assimilation of the ethnic ess of modernization has a reverse side groups residing in the United States is

which preserves and even intensifies certainly a unique instance which neinational allegiances and distinctions. ther vitiates these general consideraThis is the social aspect of moderniza- _ tions nor has any bearing on the situation, which finds expression in the level- tion in the Soviet Union. ing of class differences and the involve- (I leave aside the question of wheth-

ment of the entire population in the er the American population is really as national life. The rational organization much assimilated and culturally inteof life requires that the whole citizenry grated as it is often assumed to be.) be treated as one vast reservoir of Some nine-tenths of American citizens manpower; consequently, it calls for are descendants of immigrants who voldemocratization (in the social, if not untarily severed their native roots and necessarily the political, sense). Now, migrated to the United States to start a by pulling into national life the mass of | completely new life. Moreover, because previously isolated and passive popula- many of them belonged to underprivi-

tion groups, the process of moderniza- leged groups of the population in their tion inadvertently promotes nationalism countries of origin, their ties to their and national differences, because na- national cultures were quite tenuous in tional identity is most deeply rooted any event. What occurred in American among these very groups. To cite but history was a mass-scale renunciation one example, in the days of mercenary of one nationality in favor of a new one. armies nationalism was no factor in the —_ Nothing of the sort happened in Rus-

maintenance of military morale, but it sia. The national minorities of that has become one with the introduction country consist largely of historic peoof the modern nonprofessional mass ples who came or were brought under army. Mass education and mass literacy Russian sovereignty between the sixalso promote national distinctions by teenth and nineteenth centuries. While institutionalizing local languages, his- some of these nationalities passed under tories, literatures, etc. So does the in- Russian rule more or less voluntarily, telligentsia, whose emergence every- they did so in order to secure Russian where accompanies the breakdown of protection against hostile neighbors,

Soviet Nationality Policy 783 and not with any idea of surrendering the national question. The fate of the their right to self-rule. Today, each has _ national minorities and of the “national an intelligentsia and an officialdom of problem” depends in large measure on

its own; they receive much of their edu- them, or, more specifically, on their cation in native languages; they reside ability or inability to resist Russifion their historic territories, surrounded cation and to evolve viable national by places and monuments with strong cultures. national associations. The differences

minority groups cou e iurther elabo- . . . . rated upon, but this is scarcely neces- is Russification has een carried oul sary. It seems obvious that the two situ. "Y & great variety of methods, some . . , crude, some subtle. Thedifferent: most effective ations are fundamentally in ; between Soviet and America national Tue ASSIMILATION PROCESS

. ; have been with connected with the semione case, we; oficial are dealing a new ; . , policy of elevating the Great

nation created, as it towere, through a .leading im . | me multinational , Russians the position of the voluntary effort; in the ,a : ; : ethnic group in the Soviet Union. ;This other, with an ordinary empire of many . .

, policy,by formulated by Stalin, not nations m dominated It is mean. : has In , beenone. repudiated by his successors. a ingful to speak of an American nation, |. .try where personal relations pla because the inhabitants of the United ‘ . > pe ; S play f h “A meri so important a function, serving as States "i er to themse vk as Fi mer something of a substitute for the weakly

+ abi of he Se ee ear fe ie developed legal system, such an attitude abitant © it e “So *> nm reer © on the part of the rulers has a direct

his nationality as “Soviet : bearing on the life of all the citizens. One of the reasons why the national Jt means, above all, that the road to

problem in the Soviet Union is difficult prestige, power, and material benefits to grasp is the confusion that surrounds entails adaptation to Russian culture: the number of nationalities involved. i, the party, in the army, in the higher The figures of 175, 188, or over 200 — educational establishment.

nationalities which are sometimes The message of Russian primacy is

cited are quite misleading, because they conveyed to the minorities in a variety confuse the term “nationality” as under- og ways, among which one may mention stood by the ethnographer and anthro- the linguistic (imposition of the Cyrillic pologist with the term as it is used by alphabet on the Muslim minority), the

the historian or political scientist. To historiographic (emphasis on the prothe former, any group displaying cer- gressive role of conquest by Tsarist tain common ethnic characteristics may Russia), and the religious (more acute well be a nationality—the six hundred persecution of religious bodies other

Tofalars as much as the six million than the Orthodox church). That the Uzbeks. To the historian and political ultimate intent of all these measures is scientist, on the other hand, a “nation- the Russification of all the various ethality” all of whose members reside in nic groups is made quite clear by the one medium-sized Caucasian aul or Si- statement in the new party program berian settlement is of no interest what- that “full-scale communist construction ever. Actually, there are in the Soviet constitutes a new stage in the develop-

Union only a dozen or so national ment of national relations in which the groups of significance to the student of nations will draw still closer together

784 Soviet Nationality Policy until complete unity is achieved.” It is formation is more significant than the fair to assume that the language and figures which tell, black on white, what culture of the eventual “completely uni- has happened to the linguistic habits of fied” nation will not be Komi-Zyrian, the minorities. In considering these fig-

Chukchi, or even Uzbek. ures, one must bear in mind that the There are many ways in which the inter-census period (1926-59) coin-

reaction of the national minorities can cided with the most intense Russificabe studied, some quantitative, others tion effort in modern Russian history.

not. Useful indexes can be obtained What we now have is, as it were, the from population censuses, which fur- fruits of that gigantic and ruthless ef-

nish data on such vital matters as popu- fort. What do we find? lation movement, fertility, intermar-

riage, and linguistic habits. Informa- LiNcurstic Trenps tion of a different kind, less measurable In 1926 Russians constituted 54 per but equally important, can be derived cent of the total population of the USSR from literary sources, from ethnograph- by nationality, but 58.5 per cent by lanic data, and from political intelligence. guage. In other words, in 1926, 4.5 per

Only when both these types of data— cent of the total population may be the quantitative and nonquantitative— said to have been linguistically Russiare juxtaposed and placed against the fied. In 1959, the corresponding figures

historic background of the national are 54.3 and 59.3 per cent, giving 4.8 groups concerned is it possible to draw per cent as the proportion of those linmeaningful and more or less scientific guistically Russified. The net gain of conclusions about the situation of Soviet 0.7 per cent represents approximately

minorities.” 600,000 citizens. But even this minute

The publication by the Soviet Central gain disappears if we recall that in Statistical Administration of the ab- the intervening period the Nazis had stract of the 1959 population census, slaughtered some two million Yiddishimperfect as this volume is, permits for speaking Jews on Soviet soil, reducing

the first time in a quarter-century a the number of Jewish Soviet citizens study of the vital statistics bearing on who consider Yiddish their native lanthe Soviet national minorities. The data guage from 1.8 million (1926) to less it supplies, when compared with those — than one-half million (1959). Thus, the

given in the 1926 census, give a better proportion of linguistically Russified picture than we have ever had of the non-Russians has actually decreased various nationalities’ actual tendencies somewhat. In absolute terms, of course, of development.’ And none of this in- the number of citizens who speak their national languages has grown far more 2 The author tried to apply both these meth- shan the number of those who have beods to Central Asia and Transcaucasia in the rae a . following articles: “Muslims of Soviet Central come linguistically assimilated. While Asia: Trends and Prospects,” Middle East the number of Soviet citizens who have

Journal, 2 and 3, 1955, andIn“Demorapnic Nos. an nograpnic anges iranscaucasia, 1897-1956,” ibid, Winter, 1959. FT tener Oka Pouulation of mpi dig picse 3 Tsentralnoe statisticheskoe upravlenie pri Union: History and Prospects (Geneva, 1946), Sovete Ministrov SSSR, Itogi vsesoiuznoi pere- supplemented by R. Pipes, Formation of the pist naseleniia 1959 goda: SSSR (Svodnyi Soviet Union (Cambridge: Harvard Universitv tom) (Moscow, 1962), pp. 184-243. The data Press, 1954), pp. 289-99.

Soviet Nationality Policy 85 abandoned their native language in consequently see no reason to aspire to favor of Russian has grown from 6.4 national self-preservation. Mutatis mumillion (1926) to 10 million (1959), tandis, the same may be said of the the number of those who adhere to their Jews, four-fifths of whom acknowledge

native language has increased in the Russian as their native tongue—at any

same period from 60 to 85 million. rate to the census taker. More than Such, in its broadest aspect, is the one-quarter of all the Russified nonimpact of thirty years of Russification Russians belong to this category.

carried out with all the instruments at The nationalities with a medium the disposal of the totalitarian state. ‘“Russification index” may also be diBut if we delve deeper into the statisti- vided into two groups. One consists of cal material and break down the figures the two largest minorities, the Ukraifor over-all linguistic assimilation into nians and Belorussians, both closely refigures for each of the various national lated to Great Russians in terms of origroups, and, within these, for different} gin and culture. If we compare the age-groups, we discover even more sur- _ linguistic data for these two nationali-

prising facts. ties in the 1926 and 1959 census reLinguistic assimilation has always ports, we find that the proportion of been and continues to be most rapid those who consider Ukrainian and Beloamong ethnic groups that enjoy a high russian their native tongues has actually level of culture, but whose historic increased. In 1926, 87.1 per cent of the roots, and often ethnic centers, are lo- Ukrainians spoke their native language; cated outside the Soviet Union. In this in 1959, 87.7 per cent. In the case of category belong, first of all, the groups _ Belorussians, the increase has been even

of Europeans, such as Poles, Germans, more significant: from 71.9 to 84.2 per or Greeks, between one-quarter and one- cent. Figures by age groups indicate, half of whom have become linguisti- moreover, that Ukrainians and Beloruscally denationalized.* It also includes sians under 20 years of age (i.e., those the groups representing ancient Orien- educated between approximately the tal cultures, such as Koreans, Chinese, end of the war and the year of Stalin’s or Persians. In all these groups linguis- death) are more loyal to their native

tic Russification is proceeding apace. languages than those of middle age The reason for it is not far to seek. (who had been educated in the 1920’s Members of these nationalities in the and 1930’s—an indication that there has Soviet Union regard themselves as iso- been no progressive de-nationalization

lated fragments of their nations and of youth. + It must not be assumed, however, that all . The other group mn this category conlinguistic denationalization benefits Russifica- SISts of nationalities inhabiting the tion. Among Soviet Poles, for example, more Volga-Ural region, including both Turthan half (756,000) had given up Polish, but kice Moslems (Tatars and Bashkirs) and

of two-thirds opted for forRussian. Ukranian Finnic Christi Mordvi Ch h andthese, Belorussian, onlyhad one-third HNIC ristians (Mordvins, uvasn, (Undoubtedly, many of these Poles preferred etc.). These nationalities have for sevto deny their mother tongue for political ree eral centuries been under Russian rule.

sr ih cae ofthe Basis of ths Tn fact, they were the fst minorities had adopted Tatar. Among the 94,000 linguiss be conquered by Russians in the sixtically denationalized Uzbeks, twice as many teenth and seventeenth centuries. They declared Tajik their native tongue as Russian. now find themselves in the midst of

186 Soviet Nationality Policy Russian population centers, cut off from to 89.9 in 1959) has occurred among the main body of their Turkic and Fin- Armenians residing outside the Armenic relatives, and consequently have a nian republic. Among the Baltic peodifficult time preserving their identity. ples, the proportion of those who adhere Among them the proportion of those [to their native languages varies between who are shifting to Russian is growing, 95 and 97 per cent. though not dramatically (e.g., Tatar- IarpricaTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

speaking Tatars have declined from

98.9 to 92.0 per cent, Chuvash-speaking The principal conclusion which emerges

Chuvash from 97.7 to 90.0 per cent, from these statistics may be formulated with the Mordvins showing the greatest as follows: both on territories predomi-

decline, from 94 to 78 per cent). nantly occupied by Russians (RSFSR) If we next turn to the minorities with and on those predominantly occupied

distinct cultures, living in borderland by major minority groups, the lines areas, and with historic roots on their separating the Russians from the napresent territories, we find that Russifi- tionalities in matters of language are cation either has made little or no prog- becoming sharper and more distinct. ress or has lost ground. The Turkic in- The Russians as well as the national habitants, who constitute the single most minorities are gaining linguistic hegenumerous minority bloc after the Ukrai- mony in the areas where they enjoy nians, show an astounding loyalty to numerical and administrative prepontheir native languages. Except for the derance. What is occurring may be deVolga Tatars, whom we have discussed scribed as a process of the emergence above, they show between 97 and 99 per of modern nations within the Soviet cent adherence to their own languages. Union. The smaller nationalities are In some cases (e.g., the Azeri Turks and slowly giving ground by dissolving Turkmens) the percentage of native- either among the Russians or among the speaking citizens is up a bit compared ethnic groups whose language and cul-

to 1926, in others (e.g., the Kazakhs ture are most closely related to their and Kirghiz) it is a bit down, but in own. The major nationalities, on the general no linguistic assimilation has other hand, among whom one must intaken place. Of the 20 million Moslems clude the Ukrainians, Georgians, and

(Volga Tatars excepted) in the Soviet Turkic peoples of Central Asia, are Union, only 200,000, or 1 per cent, gaining in cohesion. have become linguistically Russified. Language, of course, is only one of The same situation prevails in the Cau- several criteria of national viability, casus. The percentage of Georgians who and it would not be sound to base one’s

consider Georgian their native tongue whole evaluation on the pattern of linhas increased from 96.5 (1926) to 98.6 guistic development. But it is a most (1959). This also holds true of the important criterion. The transition from Azeri Turks (from 93.8 per cent in one language to another is, perhaps, the 1926 to 97.6 per cent in 1959). The single most dramatic manifestation of Armenians, on the other hand, seem to a shift in national allegiance. The fact be slowly Russifying, though it is more _ that it is not occurring among the mathan probable that the decrease in per- jor peripheral nationalities gives some centage of those who consider Armenian ground for arguing that the burden of their native tongue (from 92.4 in 1926 proof in discussing the fate of Soviet

Soviet Nationality Policy 187 nationalities lies on those who foresee well-being and power depend, and for the imminent dissolution in a single the national sentiments and_ loyalties

Soviet nationality. which rationalization brings to the surThe practical conclusions which this face. Such has been the experience of

evidence suggests have bearing not Western Europe and of all the great merely on the Soviet Union but on all multinational states and empires. In those areas where a nascent sense of Russia, the breakdown of empire almost national identity emerges simultaneous- _ occurred in the course of the Revolution

ly with a drive for modernization. It is and Civil War. It was averted partly difficult to conceive how the contrary _ by force of arms and partly by the crea-

pulls implicit in modernization, to tion of a novel political system which which reference has been made above, combined outward decentralization with can be reconciled in any other way than _ unprecedented inner centralization. But

through the establishment of indepen- from the long-term historical point of dent national states. The national state view, there is no reason to assume that alone provides within its confines out- this solution was anything but a tempo-

lets for both economic and other forms rary one. , of rationalization on which material

SOVIET RELIGIOUS POLICY By Liudmila Anokhina and Margarita Shmeleva; Harry Willetts

After half a century of Soviet rule religion remains a viable force in the Soviet Union. Despite repeated waves of persecution and endless subtle pressure some Soviet citizens (we do not know how many because the Soviet census dos not ask questions about religious belief and no statistics on religious affiliation are

published) continue to profess and practice various forms of religion, both Christian and other. The regime is clearly both annoyed and embarrassed by all this, but has never found any clear-cut solution to the problem. For decades, however, it has spoken with great assurance about the ultimate disappearance of all religious belief among Soviet citizens. This conviction animates the small piece which we reprint as the first selection below; written by two Soviet lady anthropologists and sociologists, it is based, they write, on extensive field trips of 1956-60 during which a questionnaire was administered to over five hundred

families totaling 2,162 persons. The reader will note, however, that the two investigators again fail to give any figures concerning the number of believers among those questioned. It should be added that the piece deals only with one part of European Russia, and only with the Russian Orthodox Church. The author of our second selection is a recognized British expert on the Soviet: Union and

is on the faculty of St. Antony’s College at Oxford. It should be noted that his

article (and a companion piece on Judaism in the USSR which we omit) is richly illustrated by samples of Soviet antireligious propaganda. For a general study of church-state relations in the USSR see John Curtiss, The Russian Church and the Soviet State, 1917-1950; Walter Kolarz, Religion in the Soviet Union; Matthew Spinka, The Church in Soviet Russia; Nikita Struve, Christians in Contemporary Russia; Michael Bordeaux, Religious Ferment in Russia: Protestant Opposition to Soviet Religious Policy; William Stroyen, Communist Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church, 1943-1962; William Fletcher and Anthony Strover, Religion and the Search for New Ideals in the USSR. For .

Life, September 14, 1959.

superb photographs see Patricia Blake, “Russian Orthodoxy: A Captive Splendor,”

Important articles include the following: Vladimir Gsovski, “The Legal Status of the Church in Soviet Russia,” in Sidney Harcave (ed.), Readings in Russian History, Vol. Il (paperback); Paul Anderson, “The Orthodox Church in Soviet

788 |

Russia,” Foreign Affairs, January, 1961; Ethel and Stephen Dunn, “Religion

Soviet Religious Policy 189 as an Instrument of Cultural Change,” Slavic Review, September, 1964; “The Results of the Persecution of the Orthodox Church,” as_well as “Further Proof of the Incontrovertible,” Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR, May, 1965, and July, 1966; Michael Bourdeaux, “Reform and Schism,” Problems of Communism, October-November, 1967; Joshua Rothenberg, “The Status of

Cults,” ibid.; and St. Vladimir’s Seminary Quarterly, December, 1965, for the full text of letters by two Soviet priests on the actual state of the Russian Orthodox Church today. For Soviet writing on the subject see U.S. Joint Publications Research Service,

The Atheist’s Handbook (a translation of a Soviet manual for atheists); The Russian Orthodox Church: Organization, Situation, Activity (published in Moscow

in 1959); an article in Atlas, April, 1967; and “Atheist Agitation Weakness,” Current Digest of the Soviet Press, February 28, 1968.

Rel icleus SUR ELENA: old-fashioned and generally do not observe them. The rupture between re-

The most harmful survivals of the past ligious and political beliefs is further are those connected with the ideology evidence of religious decline. Religious

of religion. These continue to poison faith retains its reactionary character, the minds and affect the actions of a but the faithful are patriots and, like part of the rural population. At present the rest of the Soviet people, are dethe bulk of the population of the Soviet voted to the construction of commucountryside hold atheist views, and an- nism. The danger of religious influence

other substantial group, made up of on some elements of the population is, people now wavering in their faith, is, nevertheless, real. The Kalinin country-

in fact, on the road to atheism. The side is no exception in this regard. rejection of religion is a broader move- As a rule, believers are collective ment now than it was in the twenties farmers of the older generation, among and thirties when it attained an increas- whom there are those who carry the ingly popular character. And the mean- system of religious ideas more or less ing of religious faith is a far cry from intact, though their beliefs have been

what it was earlier. Today most be- seriously shaken by socialism and the lievers have, typically, a vague idea of accomplishments of science. An old colsome kind of supreme power, to which _ lective farmer of the village of Ignatovo, they turn in the face of difficulties “just Kalinin District, expressed his ambiva-

in case.” This fundamentally utilitarian lence this way: “I believe and don’t approach is a sure sign of the grad- believe in God. For a long while I stuck ual withering of the religious attitude to my religion, but now I don’t know: among even those collective farmers Sputniks go off—but where is God?

who think of themselves as believers. . ,

. . : yoldfinger from L. Anokhina and M. Shmel-

Similarly indicative is the drop dur- P The first selection is translated by Howard ing the Soviet period of regular church eva, Kul’tura i Byt Kolkhoznikov Kalininskoi attendance, daily prayers, the worship Oblasti (Moscow, 1964), pp. 313-18. The sec-

of icons, and the keeping of fasts— ond secction is from fh Wars De Opiating rules that spring from the heart of Or- vember—-December, 1964. F ootnotes have been

thodoxy. For the most part, believers omitted. Published with the permission of the today find such rules bothersome and United States Information Agency.

790 Soviet Religious Policy Why would God let man do whatever bone of rural society and the working he wants to?” These uncertainties and collectives. The steady, vitalizing effect

second thoughts are confined to the of Soviet reality acts on these people men of this generation. By and large, first of all. Even the believers among the women of the older group hold them perceive the incongruity of their strictly to their religious views. They outworn beliefs with their real interests are unable to overcome prejudices in- and the demands of society.

stilled by the old family under the old K., a collective farmer of the IIich social system. But even they failed to farm, Bezhetsky District, and one of resist the general movement away from its best flax workers, made a most rele-

religious ceremonial. vant comment. By her own word, she In regard to religion, the collective _ still clings to religion, but she finds farmers of forty-five to sixty years of something definitely awkward about it: age are even more heterogeneous. A “In the collective farm I am always in variety of historical conditions shaped the public eye. People look to me as an their attitudes (the Revolutionary years, example. How could I go to church? the twenties and thirties) and this mani- 1 don’t even especially want to.” fests itself, for example, in the ideas of The men of the middle generation do the women. Unlike the women of the not believe in God, a believer being a older generation, there are many con- rarity in this group. At the same time, vinced atheists among the women of - not all the men are militant atheists,

thirty to forty, though there are be- and many are indifferent about relilievers as well. The latter, however, rare- gious survivals.

ly have had any religious training and Collective farmers of the younger know next to nothing about prayers, generation (20-35 years of age) grew holidays, and rites. They are unable to up during the period of a mass rejecexplain what they believe in and often tion of religion. They formed atheist fall back on the saving authority of views without the internal doubts and their elders: “The old ones say so....” struggle that their elders experienced. The faithful of this generation are But this “inborn” quality of their athecharacterized by blind adherence to ism contains its special weakness, and

tradition. not all of the young fully understand Lack of general culture explains the real harmfulness of religious sur-

much of this clinging to religion among __Vivals, and this allows the church to inthe middle-generation women. Without fluence some of them through believers the knowledge necessary to handle ques- _in their families. At the urging of par-

tions of meaning and value on their ents, some of the youth (especially own, they rely on the old religious ex- girls) go to church, participate in the planations and customs. The young gen- _ services, sometimes as principal per-

eration is being damaged by the at- formers (e.g., marrying in church), tempts of some older members of the and attach no significance to their acfamily to maintain religious traditions tions. The outward, decorative aspect

at home. of religious ceremonies captivates some It must be said, however, that the of these youths. Bound materially and

majority of those who have broken with spiritually to parents and family, they

religious superstitions belong to the are hard-pressed to stay independent. middle generation, which is the back- When a young married woman sets out

Soviet Religious Policy 791 to accommodate herself to her hus- to the development of socialist habits band’s family (her mother-in-law chief- in the rural areas. The individual who ly), she can easily be swayed by the neglects the unwritten village law runs believers. She takes up religious duties the risk of the judgment of his relaas her relatives insist, though she had tives. Newly married youth, just setting not earlier given religion a thought. To up their own household, feel this factor exemplify this, there is an incident that keenly, as they try to attach themselves occurred on the “Awakening” Collec- to the middle generation with whom tive Farm, Bezhetsky District, in 1957. they have common interests.

Several schoolchildren refused to be- Real Soviet public opinion wages an come Pioneers. They had been forbid- irreconcilable struggle with philistine den to do so by their parents. As the views, and in many localities, thanks to teacher found out, the mothers (women its penetration not only into productive

of 30-35 years) were under the influ- collectives but also into family life, it ence of the old believing women. The has fully paralyzed the influence of ininfluence of believers on youth should, dividual believers. of course, not be exaggerated. The in- A new phase in the religious struggle fected youth are an insignificant minor- on the collective farms became sharply ity among a collective-farm youth pop- evident in 1960, when Party and public

ulation completely free of religious organizations began to develop more

superstitions. flexible forms of educational work and More solidly entrenched survivals are antireligious propaganda on the basis the religious beliefs and rituals which of the resolution of the Central Comare woven into the very lives of the mittee of the Communist Party of the people and are seen as inseparable parts Soviet Union on party propaganda in of it. Such religious acts as baptism, modern conditions. Without curtailing funeral and memorial services, the wor- lecture programs, agitators and propaship of icons, name days, and marriage gandists made the most of opportunities

(to a lesser extent) are part of numer- for informal, impromptu discussions ous and varied traditions surrounding with individual collective farmers or the chief events in the life of a peasant with small groups during meal breaks, family. Thus, despite the undoubted vic- or, after hours, in homes. Similarly a tory of the atheist world view in our vanguard of atheists formed a club in country, some religious survivals are Maksatikhinsky District, outfitted a apparent in segments of the collective- planetarium, and organized lectures farm population. The backward influ- from among the local intelligentsia to ence at times overcomes unbelievers, visit the collective farms on a regular who have to cope with the bearers of _ basis. At the discretion of the lecturers,

superstitions. Often, they are pushed specially selected films are shown. At into compromise by that philistine sub- the antireligious gatherings, the local stitute for public opinion which con- teachers of biology, chemistry, and tinues to exist in the countryside, a physics conduct experiments or give renetwork of family, relatives, and neigh- ports. Atheist clubs now exist in nearly bors—indeed, every resident of this or every village with a church in its vicinthat village—which is the pipeline of all ity. Lecture topics vary: “The Harm of kinds of conservative attitudes and cus- Religion,” “Religion and Children,” toms and constitutes a genuine obstacle “Recent Achievements in the Conquest

792 Soviet Religious Policy of Space,” “The Origins of Religious tral Committee’s Academy of Social Holidays,” and so-on. Atheist club pro- Sciences, would coordinate all antiductions have become very popular _ religious research and teaching; a reguamong the collective farm population. lar quota of university students would The atheist theme is central to the be trained as professional atheists, and programs of collective-farm clubs, agi- all students in universities and medical

tation and propaganda centers, and Red schools would be required to take Reading Rooms. It is also part of the courses in atheism; a number of learned curriculum of the people’s universities and political journals would publish of culture. The university in Bezhets is regular antireligious features; and the one among several that have created a radio and television networks would department of scientific atheism. The put on more antireligious programs. newly created Soviet holidays and festi- Finally, at the local level, party organivals for collective farmers, imbued with zations were to set up councils or sec-

meaning and celebrated happily, play tions “on atheistic work” whose task their important role in the liquidation would be to draw all interested bodies

of religion. and the public at large into the struggle. The development of the Communist There have been more savage attacks

world view among the toilers is impos-__ on religion in the Soviet Union in the sible without a struggle against religion _past, but never has the regime mounted

and other survivals of the past. This such a massive and heavily equipped was reiterated by the plenum on ideol- campaign. How should we understand ogy of the Central Committee in June, this apparently disproportionate effort 1963. Peaceful coexistence of the world to deal with what is nowadays supposed

views of socialism and hostile capitalism to be a minor and rapidly dwindling

is inconceivable. nuisance? If it is true that “the overThe comprehensive work of building whelming majority of the Soviet people

communism is creating all the condi- have broken with religion” and “betions for the complete victory over old come conscious atheists,” that the reideas and ways, including religion. The _ligious are for the most part elderly leading collective farms already are people, peasants in remote rural areas, using their opportunities in this regard unskilled laborers, semiliterates, and to the maximum. Gradually, comradely housebound women, and if it is true. criticism of antisocial behavior is be- moreover, that most believers, in spite coming the chief means of extirpating of their religion, are loyal to the regime bourgeois ideas. The influence of So- and accept its social ideals, that educa-

viet public opinion grows ever more tion, the reclamation of rural slums,

powerful. and the emancipation of still mote wom| en will in time dispel the lingering rem-

WILLETS: DE-OPIATING THE nants of religious belief and practice,

MASSES then why need the party do more than

In the autumn of 1963, the Ideological _ patiently exhibit the truths which, it in-

Commission of the CPSU Central Com- sists, all mature human beings must mittee reviewed the progress of the war acknowledge?

on religion and decided to throw in re- There are, of course, believers whose inforcements, A new Institute of Scien- hopes of salvation depend on defiance tific Atheism, to be attached to the Cen- of Soviet laws and norms of social be-

Soviet Religious Policy 193 havior. The “True Orthodox Church,” and more especially to the professional for instance, considers that Anti-Christ agitprop man, religion is often very

was enthroned in Russia in 1917, and irritating. It inevitably makes its adit continues to deal with the Soviet au- herents less amenable to the purposes thorities as if they were his representa- of the regime. No matter how lawtives. A variety of sects—among them abiding and loyal to the state, the beJehovah’s Witnesses and the numerous _ liever shudders when his child puts on

Adventists and Baptists who refuse obe- the red kerchief of the Komsomol

| dience to the leaders in Moscow—do (though he may not go so far as the their best to seamp the demands made Baptists and call it “the Devil’s mark’’) ,

on them by Soviet society. There are and he certainly will try to keep the sectarians who refuse to perform mili- child out of an organization which tary service, sectarians who will pay no would want him to disown his religious

taxes, sectarians who withhold their upbringing. But it is not just that rechildren from the “Godless” Soviet ligton, even in its least challenging schools, sectarians who think it wicked forms, cannot help impinging on the to keep body and soul together, sec- authority of the regime; its prevalence tarians who condemn all secular read- also shows up the failure of the regime ing and entertainment, sectarians who to fulfill for many of its subjects the reject medical aid in favor of prayer, promise on which its authority is supand sectarians who try to avoid all in- posed to rest—the promise to provide tercourse whatsoever with the profane. them with the good life. Millions of Nor is it surprising that the Soviet au- people still look to religion for the help thorities relentlessly pursue the orgi- and solace and reassurance that they astic sects—the Molokane with their cannot obtain, or think they cannot obhysterogenic “jumping,” the “shaking” tain, from the state or the “collective.” and glossolalian Pentecostalists, the In- For many people everywhere, religion nocentians and Murashkovites, who re-_ is a refuge from “the world,” from a putedly practice self-mutilation and society which they, for whatever reasometimes fast unto death. But these son, dislike. It is, of course, infuriating intractable enthusiasts are few in num- to an exorbitant temporal power that

ber compared, for instance, with the some of its subjects find comfort in Orthodox, who live orderly lives, render meditating on its transience, in squint-

unto Caesar, and are regularly assured ing at its pretensions in the light of by their clergy that the Soviet system, eternity. The theologians of present-day

far from contradicting Christ’s mes- Orthodoxy “affirm that there are no sage, is in some sense a fulfilment of it. contradictions between communism and

Why, then, should the party want to Orthodoxy,” but at the same time they bully these and other sedate church. “reduce communism to a matter of the goers into renouncing their faith before ‘external structure’ of human existence,”

it evaporates, as the party claims it thus making it “an insignificant social

will? factor in comparison with the absolute

For one thing, the Soviet state is by and eternal teaching of Christ.” Pernature irritable. Any foreign body sets haps the attitude of the tiny splinter up in it an intolerable itch which sooner group calling itself “True Orthodox,”

or later must be relieved by a violent which teaches outright hatred of the scratch. To Soviet officialdom generally, Communists, is less annoying to the

194, Soviet Religious Policy party than that of the powerful parent correlation in the Soviet Union between church, which teaches that the Commu- the number of believers in a locality

nists are not too bad but should not and the number of places of worship.

be taken too seriously. | The Orthodox Christian whose church The religious denominations are the has been padlocked against him or des-

only large and fairly coherent opposi- ecrated by being turned into a storetion groups in the Soviet Union offering house, stable, or workshop, may convarying degrees of resistance to certain tinue to worship surreptitiously in a official policies and openly preaching private house together with his coreli-

rival philosophies and sets of values. gionists, or quite often with the secI once heard a leading Soviet ideologist tarians, who are well skilled in organiztell a foreign scholar that there existed ing such activities. Even if he no longer

in the Soviet Union a “flourishing joins in congregational worship, he will school of idealist philosophers’ whom very often continue to light the lamp he identified, on request, as “the Ortho- before his icons and will impart to his dox Church.” He was joking, but the children what he can remember of the jest underlines the fact that only the church’s teaching. And all the while he religious now make any sustained pub- will feel insulted and deprived and will

lic challenge to the official ideology. resent the brutality of the state.

Perhaps this would matter less, from Besides these secret worshippers, the official point of view, if religion there are very many Soviet citizens for were confined to the uneducated. But whom vestigial religious trappings and while it is frequently stressed that “the observances—ikons, mezuzahs, ritual vast majority of believers are semi- foods, christening or circumcision, reliterates,” we learn on occasion that ligious weddings and burials, excur“there are also intellectuals among sions to local shrines—have a nostalgic

them.” — and semireligious charm even when

These, then, are some of the reasons they have ceased to be imperatives of why L. F. Ilichev, head of the Ideologi- conscience. Frequently one reads of “incal Commission, believes that “we can- _ tellectuals,” officials, even party mem-

not and do not have the right to wait bers who, though they may think the for [religious] survivals to vanish with- teachings of religion ridiculous, conout the action on them of our practical nive at or even attend religious ceresuccesses.” And it is quite clear that monies, and who tolerate the accessories the official strategists now believe some of religion in their homes as though of their past efforts to have been mis- they were just traditional domestic orconceived. Often they have lopped off naments. As long as there are such peoall of the plant that shows, but left the ple—i.e., those who remain believers roots to grow again, sometimes freak- even though they have no place of worishly. The province of Kostroma had ship, those who are in the “mixed and 800 churches before the Revolution and middle state” between belief and unnow has only 80. At first sight, this belief, and the Laodicean atheists who seems a famous victory for militant neither believe in nor fight against reatheism, but most of the dead churches _ligion—the Communist educator’s work

were put out of action by force in the is obviously far from done. Hence Ili1920’s or by administrative harrassment chev’s declaration that “the formation

in later years. There is, moreover, no of a scientific outlook is our most ur-

Soviet Religious Policy 795 gent task. Its fulfillment demands, in versity a project for the foundation of a particular, the furtherance of atheistic new religion. He argues that since “all education by all possible means.” things develop triadically,” “we cannot Many of the excesses of Soviet agit- Stop at atheism, which is “only the an-

, . tithesis of theism,” and that therefore a

prop campaigns are surely traceable to _,, hes; hining thei d atheism

the feeling. that whatever ideas people edelight eie aRof . must be thought up.”halle ... ame in the

are abandoning, or half-abandoning, dialectical materialism. God should be unthey are not firmly adopting a consistent derstood as a man living on some planet, Marxist-Leninist world view instead. but with milliards of years of evolutionary

To encounter in a work of anti- development behind him which have enreligious propaganda the chapter head- sured him the attributes of omnipotence, ing “Agnosticism in the Service of Mod- omniscience, etc. Grigoriey accompanies ern Orthodoxy” is to be reminded that his project for an “atheistic religion” with nothing less than total mental surrender %°™e absurd speculations on the mystical can satisfy the Communist ideologue. Properties of numbers.

Looking around him, he finds not only The cranky—or possibly humorous— that religion is still vigorous, but that Grigoriev is worth mentioning for two where it has been cut down a degenerate _ reasons. One is that Shakhnovich’s degrowth has sometimes sprung up in the _ liberate choice of a particularly absurd same soil. The Soviet pundits are not the example of religio-philosophic speculafirst to find that when traditional faiths tion leads one to wonder whether other are shown the door superstition flies in such exercises, more intelligently con-

at the window. ceived and rigorously conducted, are At a more sophisticated level, im- not quite common. If they are, they ported religious fads or homegrown would obviously testify to a serious religio-scientific fantasies may move in- speculative interest in religion among to minds emptied of their old faith. Thus _ the Soviet intelligentsia. But whether the

Yoga, spiritualism, and white magic answer to this question is yes or no, one have been heard of lately in Leningrad. other observation needs to be made, One well-known antireligious profession- namely, that this sort of thing surely al, reporting these phenomena, also cannot be of the slightest real concern to views with alarm the recent currency of the Soviet authorities. Shakhnovich is stories about “flying saucers,” of the plainly making work for himself. Piety, hypothesis that biblical accounts of mi- ideological vacillations, and mere crankiraculous ascents to and descents from ness may, as I have suggested, genuinely

heaven are in fact garbled records of irritate the professional zealot. But we visits from outer space, and even of “the can be sure, too, that for professional legend of the Abominable Snowman.” reasons he will exaggerate his irritation. “In our circumstances,” writes Shakhno- The Ideological Commission, once estab-

vich, “such myths, although they may lished, had to justify its existence by themselves contain no element of mys- doughty deeds on all the well-trampled ticism, nonetheless clear the way for it.” ideological fronts, including that of The same writer goes on to report an scientific atheism. This, of coure, does extraordinary example of religio-scien- not make the onslaught any easier for

tific speculation: the religious to bear. But no one should

In 1962 A. I. Grigoriev . . . sent to the infer from the violence of the campaign Philosophical Faculty of Leningrad Uni- that religion is in fact a serious political

796 Soviet Religious Policy or social problem from the point of view _ practice the rules have been loosely inof Soviet officialdom—with the exception _terpreted. The Soviet press has publi-

perhaps of some inquisitors. cized a large number of cases in which This, however, is not to suggest that a local antireligious drive was climaxed the war on religion has no serious polit- _ by the closing of a place of worship and ical objective. It may be,as much asany- the flight of its discomfited incumbents. thing, a way of generating and channel- The following shows the process at its ing support for an officially decreed pur- most democratic and “spontaneous”: pose and thus encouraging feelings of The synagogue ceased its activity, and its identification with the regime. Young premises were turned into a recreation people in particular have become rather hall. This was preceded by extensive exbored with the regime’s exhortations to planatory work among the believers. We

workaday virtue, with its stereotyped began from the leadership, the ruling self-congratulation and its nebulous ‘wenty elders. After the members of the promises, and it may be hoped that they ruins group had been persuaded that the will respond better if they are shown an further existence of the congregation was

. inexpedient, we used some of them to in-

enemy-—~a picturesque one at that—and fluence the rest of the believers. The whole a host of benighted fellow beings to be congregation was then divided into groups,

rescued. (For while religion is to be and each group was taken care of by agi| crushed, the religious are to be cher- tators. As soon as the ruling twenty had ished—or, according to some sources, signed an announcement of their resig-

the religious rank-and-file are to be nation, it was comparatively easy to cherished, but not the incorrigible fana- convince the rank-and-file of the congre-

tics. We shall see below that there is ation. cause for misgiving as to how this works There is no need to spell out the many

in practice. ) questions that this narrative raises. But

Some Western readers of the egregious it should perhaps be made clear that if T. K. Kichko have wondered for whom the members of a congregation which exactly his book was intended, since, as had been disbanded in this fashion were one commentator observes, very few to continue worshiping together in some Jews read Ukrainian. But the Soviet other place, they might be charged with press has often told us that believers do breaking the law since “ministers of renot go to antireligious lectures, and we _ligion do not have the right to open may suppose that they are not major churches, mosques or houses of prayer consumers of antireligious literature on their own initiative, without the exeither. Some 70,000 “agitator-conversa- press permission of the organs of state tionalists” were recently mobilized in power, nor... to hold prayer meetings the Ukraine; and Kichko’s book was _ in buildings not specifically designed for published in 12,000 copies. There can be that purpose.” Nor would it be safe little doubt where most of them were in- for the priest, presbyter, rabbi, or mul-

tended to go. lah to canvass for support. If he were to The principle was laid down long ago visit members of his flock in their homes —and re-emphasized in “Khrushchev’s for this purpose, he would be infringing

Decree” of 1954—that the fight against the law against conducting religious religion must be conducted by education propaganda outside places of worship, and persuasion, without crude adminis- for which the penalty might be severe.

trative pressures and without offense to Although in theory only moral presthe susceptibilities of believers. But in sures may be brought to bear on the re-

Soviet Religious Policy 197 ligious, the press occasionally refers, no one can be allowed to cripple children disapprovingly, to strong-arm methods spiritually, to exert pressure on their imwhich have miscarried. For instance, the mature minds.” The authorities, said the Krasnograd Ispolkom, after highhanded- Komsomol’s official organ, must “step ly ordering the demolition of a prayer in” to protect children who become the house in the interests of urban develop- “victims of spiritual and moral violence ment, was criticized for “trying to ex- at the hands of their parents.”

tinguish a fire with petrol.” Its hasty It is, of course, a crime under existing action had only made the believers Soviet legislation for a priest to give “more fanatical,” it was stated, and the religious instruction to children, or to government had had to restore (for how recruit them as choristers. Technically

long?) their place of worship. In an- parents are still allowed to take their other case of premature closure, the be- children to a place of worship, but the lievers were said to have “greatly ob- Ideological Commission’s 1963 decisions structed us, and though we succeeded in called for “intensified measures of contaking away the furniture more or less trol to protect children and adolescents peacefully, the last truck got away only from the influence of churchmen and after certain difficulties. The activist be- from coercion at the hands of their par-— lievers, more than sixty of them, began ents to perform religious rites.” Various to shower the raiispolkom with demands practical steps in this direction have - . . and what scurrilities did they not heen reported, including Komsomol pa-

utter!” trolling of places of worship in order to There is also evidence that adminis- dissuade children from attending sertrative and social pressures are exerted vices, or to report those attending to the on individuals as well as on com- school authorities for special indoctrinamunities. Thus, the Soviet periodical tion. In some cases (usually involving Nauka i Religia has on various occa- sectarians), children may even be taken sions condemned the practice of dis- away from their parents. One such case missing workers for their religious be- came to light when a young Leningrad liefs, but its disapproval was apparently worker named Malozemov was combased on expediency rather than elemen- mended by Ilichev and others for acting tary justice or humanity since it pointed to remove six of his younger brothers out in one issue that an employed person and sisters from the care of their par-

“can be worked on at a meeting and ents, who were charged with nothing threatened with dismissal.” We learn worse than being Baptists. (The Ideologelsewhere that collectives contending for ical Commission, however, did think that

the title of “Brigade of Communist a Minsk court had been overhasty in Labor” can earn marks by taking be- awarding custody of three children to lievers into their bosom and converting their drunken father rather than their

them. Baptist mother. ) Ruthless interference in the family Among the gentler methods of per-

lives of believers is not only permitted suasion, formal public lectures are now but officially encouraged for the purpose regarded as unprofitable, but atheistic of “saving” children from pernicious re- films, amateur comedy acts ridiculing ligious influences. “Freedom of con- the clergy and their ways, and evenings science,” a high Komsomol official de- of “unmiraculous miracles” (in which

clared, “applies only to adult citizens the performer utterly discredits the who are responsible for their acts. But thaumaturges of all time with such mar-

798 Soviet Religious Policy | velous tricks as the apparent conversion seethe a kid in his mother’s milk”), and of water into boiling milk) are all high- that its best offering should be a piece ly recommended. But perhaps the method by Orchansky (died 1875) on Hassidwhich the authorities would like to see ism. Antireligious classics are copiously most widely adopted is that of tactful reprinted. No doubt the poetic power of house-to-house agitation, working from a__ Lucretius can still help to create a god(tactfully compiled) local register of be- less mood, however quaint his arguments lievers. The agitator should proceed cau- seem; but could anyone except a protiously, showing sympathy for the be- fessional historian of ideas endure, for liever, giving him material help and _ instance, Holbach? moral support if necessary, not thrusting Similarly, Soviet critiques of the Jewatheistic tracts on him too soon, but try- ish, Christian, and Moslem scriptures ing first to interest him in unprovocative are largely parasitical on foreign—and

secular literature and then gradually sometimes, from the scientific rational-

sowing doubt in his mind. ist’s point of view, obsolete—sources. A The literature on which the atheist better than average example of the genagitator relies breaks down broadly into re, I. Kryvelev’s Kniga o Biblii (Book three levels—“scientific,” semipopular, about the Bible), is based almost enand popular. The authorities are begin- tirely on Western (rationalist or modern ning to recognize that much of it is too Christian) biblical scholarship, ranging general and too old-fashioned. In the from Spinoza through Robertson, Wellpragmatic manner characteristic of the hausen, and Delitsch to Holscher and Khrushchevian era, they now call for “a C. H. Dodd. Such studies follow wellclear view of the extent and nature of _ established lines, setting out to show the religious beliefs in each particular area,” relatively late origin, purely human and also for attention to “contemporary authorship, and all-too-human motivation

religious literature” and (more impor- of the scriptures, with a glance at the tant) to “the actual form in which belief indebtedness of Jewish—and hence of in God manifests itself in the conscious- Moslem and Christian—tradition to earness and behavior of the masses of be- lier Eastern systems of belief. Many Bri-

lievers.” tons will find much of Kryvelev noIt is unlikely, however, that these stalgically familiar, having first heard it

practical needs will be satisfactorily met in boyhood from a teacher in holy orders

unless there is first a great improvement as part of a course in religious knowlin the techniques of the scientific study edge. of religion and a considerable broaden- At the semipopular and popular levels, ing of its scope. There has been, in the poking fun at the Old Testament is a Soviet period, very little original anthro- flourishing industry. The seminal work pological research in the field of religion, is E. Yaroslavski’s Biblia dlya Veruwyush-

and no inquiry at all, it seems, into the chikh i Neveruyushchikh (Bible for bepsychology of belief. Learned Soviet lievers and unbelievers), originally writ-

symposia on religion often resurrect ten in 1922 and reprinted again in an works old enough to be museum pieces: eleventh edition of 850,000 copies in

it is surely rather remarkable that a 1962. There was undoubtedly a time fairly ambitious recent publication of when Yaroslavski’s jokes about the dis-

the Academy of Sciences on Judaism crepancies in the Old Testament, the should include Sir James Frazer’s mus- comicality of its cosmogony, the eccenings on Exodus 34 (“Thou shalt not tricities of its deity, and the uncouthness

Soviet Religious Policy (99 of its leading personages would have easy for the propagandist to maintain scandalized most pious Jews and Chris- the pretense of distinguishing between

tians and reinforced any free-thinking the “professional religious” and _ the velleity. But, for want of information on _ rank-and-file. Some sectarians, the Bap-

the “beliefs actually held” in the Soviet tists for instance, with their doctrine of Union, we can have no idea who, except universal priesthood, pose a_ problem. atheists, would be affected one way or And the special: character of the Jewish another by, let us say, “the sacred his- religious community is one reason why tory of the Jewish priest and his con- anti-Judaic literature often attacks not cubine who was cut into twelve pieces just the rabbinate and the synagogue and was the occasion of the almost total servants, but all practicing Jews.

destruction of the tribe of Benjamin.” Beyond question the most vicious As a rule, the most offensive anti- anti-religious book of recent years is T. religious literature of the “scientific” K. Kichko’s Judaizm bez Prikras (Juand semipopular varieties is that directed daism without embellishment), published against Roman Catholicism. There are in 1963. Even its outer cover administers

perhaps two reasons for this. First, the a physical shock, illustrated as it is by Soviet writings in this field draw heavily _ the first of a profusion of “anti-Judaic” upon—though they do not outdo—west- or, more accurately, anti-Semitic carica-

ern European anticlerical literature, me- tures undistinguishable in many cases dieval and modern. Second, we should be from those produced by the Nazi Jewevading an unpleasant truth if we did baiters of the 1930’s. This seems to be not note the persistence of anti-Catholic an unusual feature in specialized antianimus which in Russia antedates com- religious literature, although precedents munism. The typical anti-Catholic tract can easily be found in the Soviet pro(Sheinman’s brochure is a good ex- vincial press. ample) dwells lovingly on the decadence Kichko’s points are drawn from the of the papal court in the Middle Ages professional atheist’s common stock: reand its alleged corruption in our own _ligion is, above all, a ruthless swindle, times, on the Inquisition, the church’s and its ministers are greedy charlatans; “persecution of science,” witch hunts, the religion degrades women, sets up bartraffic in indulgences, the “fabrication of _ riers of prejudice and hatred between saints, miracles and holy relics,” the peoples, and so on. Kichko does not add “usurious commercial activities of the an original stroke to the conventional Holy See,” the “alliance of the Vatican picture; he merely lays on his colors a with fascism,” and so on. It also plays _ little thicker. Thus, inspired no doubt by upon Russian patriotic themes, such as the press treatment of ‘economic crimes” the “subversive activity” of the Vatican involving Jews, he represents the synain Russia in the late sixteenth and early _gogue as, above all, a thieves’ kitchen. seventeenth centuries and “the Papacy’s And writing on the doctrine of “The

alliance with the Turkish sultans.” Chosen People,” he is not content with The official Soviet view, no doubt, is referring to the usual locus classicus in that such works are offensive only to the Exodus, but distorts a Talmudic gloss to clergy, but of course devout laymen must mean that the Jews have a divine right also be hurt by attacks on institutions to exploit and rob other peoples.

and persons whom they feel bound to To an outsider, some of the simpler respect. In any case, it is not always popular literature looks shrewder and

800 Soviet Religious Policy more telling than the heavy-handed sand rubles (old currency) a month.” “scientific” works. There are, for in- “Father Joann uses the money he gets stance, a number of cleverly written like a real businessman. . . . Not content pamphlets and articles which gently and _— with one house, he soon acquires another

humorously quiz the believer about his at a cost of 35,000 rubles. . . . God’s ser-

funny, old-fashioned and illogical re- vant Ioann laughs at such ‘behests’ of ligious practices. Those addressed to the Christ as ‘Lay up no treasure in this Jews are particularly interesting and world’—his whole faith consists in his seem to owe a good deal to Yiddish liter- urge to get rich by fraud.” [Father] ary tradition. Propaganda of this kind Pavel Ivanov said to me, “I don’t believe is no doubt intended mainly for the semi- in God because he does not exist, but believer who may be fairly easily teased for money I am prepared to serve the into breaking with religion altogether. devil.” “He had a capacious pocket sewn

A favorite genre with popular anti- inside his vestments . . . and during religious writers is scandal-mongering ‘divine’ service surreptitiously tucked about the clergy. Much of the material away money from the collection plate.” is provided—and a good deal of it writ- “Teper [chairman of a Jewish communten up—by former priests, pastors, rab- ity] demanded from the grief-stricken

bis, and mullahs. It is surprising how husband 3,000 rubles for burying her these high-minded citizens managed to [his deceased wife].” “The priests, ‘noth-

endure, in some cases for many years ing doubting,’ take the offerings [in and very profitably, their association kind] of the faithful, which they themwith colleagues who “lead a shut-in life selves have sanctified with prayer and bounded by food, drink, church services, the smoke of incense, and feed them to scandal and money-grubbing,” who “in- their pigs.” And so on without end.

stead of increasing their knowledge .. . For the benefit of Soviet Catholics strive to “outspit” one another [by boast- (mostly Lithuanians and Poles), the Ro-

ing] about the sums they earn”; who man curia is subjected to the same sort try to outdo each other not in the num- of vilification. Lavretski’s Kardinaly Idut ber of books they read but in the “num- __v Ad (Cardinals go to hell) is the most

ber of tots they drink.” The clergy (of striking recent example and should be all denominations) are accused of pro- noted particularly for its no-nonsense fligate habits. “In every new parish he treatment of Pope John XXIII (at a time set himself up with mistresses.” The Bis- | when the Communist press generally was

hop of Astrakhan and Stalingrad has showing a certain cautious friendliness figured frequently in antireligious writ- toward him) and also for its illustraings since 1959, when he was accused in _ tions, which are a more skillful applica-

the press of cohabiting with “adopted tion of the visual shock tactics used by daughters” and “nieces” especially re- | Kichko. cruited by a local monk. Sodomy is said |= We may be sure that persistent denito’ be rife in Catholic and Orthodox gration of this sort has its effect, at least

monasteries, on those of feeble faith. Some of the “un-

The most lovingly elaborated tales, maskings” reported are probably quite however, are of rapacity and cynicism. genuine, since no religious denominaTo quote a few examples: “I will not tion, any more than any other human hide from my readers that I [an ex- institution, can keep itself entirely free priest] got from two to fourteen thou- of rogues and charlatans. But the whole-

Soviet Religious Policy 801 sale denunciations which we find in So- attempt to validate, by argument or viet antireligious literature would tax the demonstration, the conviction casually credulity of most Hardened secularists. adopted by millions of laymen that sciThose attacked are, of course, given no ence has somehow demolished religion. chance to defend themselves. Perhaps The scientific atheist in the Soviet Union the more thoughtful Soviet citizen, adept is nowadays often guilty of crudities

in judicious reading, often gives them scarcely distinguishable from those the benefit of the doubt, but against this which he could previously impute to we may suppose that the very blatancy some clergymen. A Moscow churchman, of the professional apostates helps to for instance, once opposed the construcbring religion into disrepute. Whether tion of an underground railway for fear

the reader of Yakushevich, for ex- that it might debouch on the corridors ample, thinks, “What scoundrels Ortho- of hell, but this is really no sillier than

dox priests are!” or merely, “So this the triumphant conclusions drawn by wretch was an Orthodox priest,” Hichev militant atheists from the fact that Soviet

has scored a small victory. cosmonauts have found no “firmament” No popular antireligious work is com- and met no angels.

plete without charges of treason, past Much the same can be said of some and present. Some denominations—nota- Western well-wishers of the Soviet rebly the Catholics and Jehovah’s Wit- gime, whose views have perhaps caused nesses—are represented in current So- even their Soviet friends a littlke—though

viet propaganda as instruments of probably purely literary—embarrassimperialist subversion. Most religious ment. The former Dean of Canterbury, groups (including, in Kichko’s farrago, for instance, is quoted as holding that even the Jews) are accused of collabora- “if the Soviet regime rejects the name tion with the Nazi invaders during the of Christianity, it is only because in

Second World War. Tsarist Russia this name had become the

The religious cannot, of course, enter antithesis of the teaching and ideas of into detailed polemics with their assail- Christ.” The ordinary Soviet believer, no

ants even if they wished to do so. The doubt, will consult his experience and Baptists, it is true, are reported to have _ his conscience, rather than the Dean or experimented with the presentation, in his critics, as to whether religious bedramatized form, of an argument be- lief is compatible with good citizenship. tween a believer and an atheist critic of The efforts of the religious to reach a the Bible, but this seems to have been an modus vivendi, or rather a truce, with isolated counterpropaganda enterprise. Soviet science and Soviet social ideals, As a rule, the religious can reply only and their modifications of certain pracindirectly and in general terms. They, or tices (for instance, in the case of the at any rate the denominations which Orthodox Church, the relaxation of rules deign to argue, tirelessly insist that there concerning fasts and holidays of obligais no incompatibility between religious tion, the acceptance of group confession,

belief on the one hand and modern sci- and the admission of women to the ence or Soviet social ideals on the other. altar), are represented as signs of conIlichev has called for special efforts to scious weakness, desperate concessions to

refute these contentions. modernity, and renunciations of posi-

It will probably not be the most tions previously regarded as sacrosanct. rigorous Soviet thinkers, however. who But it is, perhaps, not in itself a very

802 Soviet Religious Policy good argument against religion that, like —_ religious work were not always counter-

everything else, it evolves. _ | productive. For the Soviet Union, on the The Soviet atheistic literature of re- evidence of its antireligious literature, is cent years suggests a wistful preference still a long, long way from that de-

for religion in its older and cruder liverance, promised in Das Kapital, forms, together with an awareness that when religion will vanish because “the the older and cruder forms of atheistic practical relationships of everyday life propaganda are no longer adequate. In- _ express themselves in clear and rational deed, militant atheists might ask them- connections between people, and between selves whether the old forms of anti- people and nature.”

ARE WE FLIRTING WITH CAPITALISM? By Evsei Liberman During the last decade the Soviets have begun to experiment with various economic reforms which are changing the more rigid aspects of economic life in the USSR. These reforms have been debated both in the Soviet Union and abroad, and there is no agreement on their ultimate significance. The Soviets claim that the reforms

have nothing to do with any basic change in their economic system, but are designed to rationalize the socialist economy. The author of the piece below is professor of economics at Kharkov University, and is the man most often associated with the initiation of economic reforms. It should be noted that he is only one of many Soviet planners who, in the past years and even today, continue to debate the reforms. For more by Liberman in English see the following: “Plan, Direct Contacts,

and Profitability,” Reprints from the Soviet Press, December 30, 1965; “The Truth Always Prevails,” ibid., December 2, 1965; “Liberman Offers Cure for Queues,” Current Digest of the Soviet Press, April 10, 1968; “Liberman Proposes Modifications to the Reform,” ibid., April 17, 1968; “The Soviet Economic Reform,” Foreign Affairs, October, 1967. For further Soviet views see “On Increasing

Economic Incentives to Industrial Production,” Reprints from the Soviet Press, October 21, 1965; L. Leontyev, “Plan and Economic Initiative,” ibid., June 9, 1966; “The Implications of Economic Reform in Construction,” Current Digest of the Soviet Press, August 9, 1967; “Fedorenko Weighs Criteria of Reform’s Effectiveness,” ibid., May 31, 1967; The Soviet Economic Reforms: Main Features and Aims (published in Moscow) ; and a special section on the reforms in Harry Shaffer, The Soviet Economy: A Collection of Soviet and Western Views. For Western studies of Libermanism see Jan Prybyla, “From Libermanism to Liberalism?” Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR, July, 1966; Alec Nove, “The Liberman Proposals,” Survey, April, 1963; Alfred Zauberman, “Liberman’s Rules of the Game for Soviet Industry,” Slavic Review, December, 1963;

Ernst Halperin, “Beyond Libermanism,” Problems of Communism, JanuaryFebruary, 1967; and Egon Neuberger, “Libermanism, Computopia, and the Visible Hand,” American Economic Review, May, 1966. For general studies on the reforms see Margaret Miller, The Rise of the Russian Consumer; George Feiwel, The Soviet Quest for Economic Efficiency; Jere Felker, Soviet Economic Controversies; Eugene Zaleski, Planning Reforms in the Soviet Reprinted from Evsei Liberman, “Are We Flirting with Capitalism?” Soviet Life, July, 1965, pp. 37-39.

803 ,

804. Are We Flirting with Capitalism? Union, 1962-1966; Alexander Balinky et al., Planning and the Market in the USSR: The 1960’s; and Myron Sharpe, Planning, Profit, and Incentives in

the USSR. |

For articles see Morris Bornstein, “The Soviet Price Reform Discussion,”

Quarterly Journal of Economics, February, 1964; Theodor Frankel, “Economic Reform: A Tentative Appraisal,” Problems of Communism, May-June, 1967; Alfred Zauberman, “Changes in Economic Thought,” Survey, July, 1967; “Soviet Economic Performance and Reform,” Slavic Review, June, 1966; Robert Campbell, “Marx, Kantorovich and Novozhilov,” ibid., October, 1961; Marshall Goldman, “Economic Controversy in the Soviet Union,” Foreign Affairs, April, 1963; and Jan Tinbergen, “Do Communist and Free Economies Show a Convergent Pattern,” Soviet Studies, April, 1961. See also “The Politics of Libermanism,” Soviet Studies, April, 1968.

In its February 12 issue this year Time source of means essential for the develmagazine carried my picture on its cov- opment of society. That applied to feuer, with the prominent caption, “The dal and capitalist society, and it applies

Communist Flirtation with Profits.” to socialism and communism. The cover story, entitled “Borrowing Under socialism, products and _ serfrom the Capitalists,’ made many ref- vices are also produced as commodities erences to my writings and statements, and also sold chiefly for money. Thereand drew conclusions vastly different fore, the surplus product inevitably as-

from those I make. I therefore asked sumes the monetary form of profits. the editors of Soviet Life and Ekonom- But since profits in our country are icheskaya Gazeta to permit me to com- _ used in the interests of society, they be-

ment on the Time article in their pub- come less and less an expression of surlications. To do a proper job, I shall plus (unpaid) labor and come more and have to go rather deeply into the essen- more to express socially necessary labor.

tial character of profits. What is the difference between capith talist and socialist profits? Profits are the monetary form of the 3

surplus product, that is, the product BONUS "FOR RISKS which working people produce over The difference is not, of course, that

and above their personal needs. The private enterprise stands for profit surplus product is, therefore, an ex- while socialism “denounces” it, as econpression of the productivity of labor. omists in the West often claim. To make Primitive man ate or used up what he _ the difference clear, let us examine (1) produced. As civilization and technol- how profit is formed, (2) what it signi-

ogy progressed, labor began to create fies, and (3) for what purposes it is not only the equivalent of the working spent. people’s means of subsistence but some- From the private entrepreneur’s viewthing more. This something more was point, all profit belongs to the capitalist. the surplus product, the very same sur- To support this view, economists built plus product that supports the entire the theory of the three factors that crenonproductive sphere, from the watch- ate value: capital, land, and labor. In man to the banker and cabinet minister. The Theory of Economic Development But the surplus product is also the Joseph A. Schumpeter says that profit

Are We Flirting with Capitalism? 805 is everything above cost. But his “cost” peror Vespasian decided to impose a tax

includes “wages” for the labor of the on public toilets when he saw that his entrepreneur, land rent, interest on cap- treasury was running low. His son ital, as well as a bonus “for risks.” On Titus, who later succeeded to the throne, top of that, the entrepreneur reaps a waxed indignant at such an evil-smelling profit if he succeeds, by a new combina- source of revenue. Vespasian then held tion of production elements, in reducing up to his son’s nose the first receipts

the cost to below the existing price from the toilet tax. “Non olet!” (“It

level. doesn’t smell!) Titus exclaimed in surWhat kind of “combination of ele- prise. Ever since then the view that

ments” this is can be seen from the fact “money doesn’t smell” has been gospel that the main part of the profit under in the commodity world. Indeed, under the private enterprise system now comes private enterprise nobody really cares

not so much from production as from how money is made. The important the process of exchange. For instance, thing is to make it, the important thing high profits come most readily from ad- is how much of it you can make. vantageous buying of raw materials, the But in the Soviet Union “money does raising of retail prices, the tendency of smell.” That will be seen if we look into

unemployment to lower wages, non- the nature of profit. In our country equivalent exchange with developing profit testifies, in principle, only to the countries, the export of capital to coun- level of production efficiency. Profit is tries where wages are low, the system of the difference between the selling price preferential tariffs and customs duties, of articles and their cost. But since our raising the prices of stocks on the stock _ prices, in principle, express the norms exchange, and so-called Grunder (spec- of expenditure of socially necessary la-

ulator’s) profits. , bor, the difference is an indicator of the comparative economy with which

DOES MONEY SMELL IN THE an item is produced. Behind Soviet

SOVIET UNION? profits there is nothing except hours of

All these sources of profit are ruled out Working time, tons of raw and other in the Soviet Union owing to the very materials and fuel, and kilowatt-hours nature of socialism, under which there of electrical energy that have been is neither private ownership of the saved. Our profits cannot “smell” of anymeans of production nor stock capital thing but that. We do not justify profits and, consequently, no stock market. The obtained through accidental circumlevel of payment for labor depends on stances—for example, excessive prices its productivity and is regulated by law. —and we do not consider such profit The prices of raw and other materials a credit to the factory or other enterare planned; market conditions that prise which makes it. We look on such could be taken advantage of in purchas- profits, rather, as the result of an ining raw materials or hiring labor do sufficiently flexible practice of price fixnot exist. Nor can the prices of finished ing. All such profits go into the state articles be raised by taking advantage budget, without any bonus to the enterof market conditions. Exchange with prise concerned. other countries is conducted on the basis Capitalist profit is a different matter of equality and long-term agreements. altogether. As the reader knows very Legend has it that the Roman Em. well, profits in the West can indicate

806 Are We Flirting with Capitalism? anything under the sun over and above Why has the question of profits been purely technical and organized effi- so widely discussed in the Soviet Union ciency. Commercial dexterity, success- lately? Not because profits did not exist

ful advertising, profitable orders for before and are only now being intromilitary production—that is what the duced. The reason is that profit was not, history of present-day big capital testi- and still is not, used as the major overfies to sooner than to anything else. all indicator of the efficient operation of Surely it must be clear that in essence our enterprises. Besides profit, we have and origin profit under socialism bears been using a fairly large number of only a superficial resemblance to profit obligatory indicators—among others, under private enterprise, while by its gross output, assortment, lower costs, nature and by the factors to which it number of employees, size of payroll,

testifies it is fundamentally different output per employee, and average

from capitalist profit. wages. The multiplicity of indicators

Where do profits go in the Soviet hamstrung the initiative of the enterUnion? First of all, neither a single in- prises. Their main concern often was dividual nor a single enterprise can ap- to turn out as great a volume of goods propriate profits. Profits are not arbi- as possible, since they would be rated

trarily invested by any persons or chiefly on gross output. Furthermore, groups for the sake of private income. enterprises did not pay. much attention Profits belong to those to whom the _ to how they used their assets. Trying to means of production belong, that is, to meet their output quotas in the easiest all the citizens, to society. Profits go, way for themselves, they asked for, and first and foremost, for the planned ex- received free from the state, a great deal pansion and improvement of produc- of plant, which they did not always use tion and scientific research, and to pro- efficiently or to full capacity. vide free social services for the people: How do we explain that? education, health, pensions, scholarships. Part is spent on the management VIRTUE BECOMES VICE aarge paratus and,goes unfortunately, a rather needs. For a longWe timeye the Soviet Union was part for defense

. | . the only socialist country. We stood

would gladly give up this last expendi- ded b ld in which ture if a program of general disarma- here, surroun od 3 ted m \ °

ment were a dopt ed. there wereour many who wanted to change social system by force. We had to build up our own industries and secure

INDICATORS IN INDUSTRY our defenses at all costs and in the There is nothing new in that use ot — shortest possible time. Such consideraprofits in the Soviet Union. Our enter- tions as the quality and appearance of prises have been making profits in goods, or even their cost, did not count. money form for more than forty years, This policy completely justified itself. ever since 1921. It is with these profits The Soviet Union not only held its own that we have built up our giant indus- in the war of 1941-45 but played the trial potential, thanks to which we have _— decisive role in saving the world from

moved to a leading position in world fascism. That was worth any price. And science and technology. And we have _ that was our “profit” then. accomplished this without major long- But, as Lenin often said, our virtues,

term credits from other countries. if exaggerated, can turn into vices. And

Are We Flirting with Capitalism? 807 that is what happened when we held to _ profits, enterprises should have to pay the same administrative methods of eco- into the state budget a certain percentnomic management after we entered the age of the value of their assets as “paystage of peaceful economic competition ment for use of plant.” The purpose

with the industrial countries of the would be to spur enterprises to make the

West. most productive use of their assets. Part

We want to give every citizen, not of the remaining share of the profits only the well-to-do, a high standard of would go into incentive pay system living, in the intellectual as well as in funds, the amount depending on the the material sense. In other words, we level of profitability. The rest of the

want everyone to have the fullest oppor- profits would accrue to the state budget tunity to develop his mental and physi- to finance the expansion of production cal capacities and his individual (I em- and to satisfy the welfare needs of the

phasize individual, and not group) in- population. clinations and interests. We want every

person in our country to be able todo py an prRoFIT AND BONUS

the work he wants most to do. We want , — to reach the point where it will not be Why do I choose profit as the indi-

possible to draw a hard and fast line cator?

between a person’s vocation and his Because profit generalizes all aspects

avocation. of operation, including quality of outBefore we can bring people’s intellec- Put. The prices of better articles have tual capacities to full flower, we must © be correspondingly higher than those satisfy their material needs, place goods Of articles that are outmoded and not

and services of high quality within properly suited to their purpose. It is

; h. Th ds must be i™Portant to note, however, that profit everyones Feat with eer in is neither nor satishied, moreover, the thi lowest pos- in thisthe casesole is nelt er .the

sible produ y ; pe to meet the needs of the people and of ‘ble production outlays and the fullest chief aim of production. We are inter-

ssible utilization of all assets. ested above all in products with which

WHAT IS THE WAY OUT? industry. Profit is used merely as the

main generalizing and stimulating indiAll that cannot be done through the old _ cator of efficiency, as a device for rating

methods of administrative direction and the operation of enterprises.

highly centralized management. We Yet Western press comments on my must change over to a system whereby writings blare away about the term the enterprises themselves have a mate- “profit,” very often ignoring the fact

rial incentive to provide the best pos- that the title of my Pravda article of sible service to the consumer. It is clear September 9, 1962, was “The Plan, that to do this we must free the enter- Profits and Bonuses.” They make a lot

prises from the excessive number of of noise about profit but say nothing obligatory indicators. In my opinion, about planning. the criteria for rating the work of en- Actually, my point is to encourage terprises should be, first, how well they enterprises, by means of bonuses from

carry out their plans of deliveries (in profits, to draw up good plans, that is, actual products); and, if these plans plans which are advantageous both to are fulfilled, then, second, their level of | themselves and to society. And not only

profitability. I believe that out of their to draw them up but to carry them out,

808 Are We Flirting with Capitalism? — with encouragement from profits. It is of “waste, mismanagement, inefficiency

not a question of relaxing (or reject- and planning gone berserk,” and so on ing) planning but, on the contrary, of and so forth. improving it by drawing the enterprises There are, of course, no few instances themselves, first and foremost, into the of waste and mismanagement in the planning process, for the enterprises al- Soviet economy, just as there are in ways know their real potentialities best private enterprise; think of the thouand should study and know the demands sands of firms that go bankrupt every

of their customers. year. But in the Soviet Union we focus

The contractual relations with con- public attention on instances of waste sumers or customers that we are now and mismanagement. We publicize and starting to introduce in several branches criticize them openly. Some Western of light industry by no means signify commentators take advantage of that that we are going over to regulation by fact. What better way can there be of the market. We have better ways of pre- distorting an over-all picture than to dicting consumer demand because we _ pick haphazard details and offer them know the wage fund of the urban popu- as representative of the whole? The lation and the incomes of the collective over-all picture shows that the Soviet farmers. Therefore, we can draw up Union increased its output by 7.1 per scientific patterns of the population’s cent in 1964. Time admits that this is a income and expenditure. In our country very good growth rate for a highly deconsumer demand, in terms of total vol- veloped economy. It is not good enough ume, is a factor that lends itself to plan- for us, however. We are used to growth ning. However, the various elements of rates expressed in two digits, Time does that volume—for instance, the colors of not mention that the reason for this 7.1 sweaters or the styles of suits factories per cent growth rate, a relatively mod-

should produce, or how best to organize est one for us, was the 1963 crop their production—need not be the pre- failure. rogatives of centralized planning but We are turning to profits not because matters on which the stores and the fac- we need a “sheet anchor.” We are not tories concerned come to terms. Thus, in any danger. The fact remains, howthe consideration of consumer demand _ ever, that we have to improve our meth-

and the planning of production are not ods of economic management. This is only compatible in the Soviet Union but the substance of our debates and our can strongly substantiate and supple- searches.

ment each other. THE MAIN FUNCTION OF PROFITS THE SUBSTANCE OF OUR Under socialism, profits can be a yard-

DEBATES stick of production efficiency to a far

The Time cover story is full of contra- greater degree than in the West, for in dictions. It admits that the Soviet people the Soviet Union profits follow, in prin-

now have more money and that there ciple, only from technological and oris a growing demand for better and ganizational improvement. This also more fashionable clothing and for pri- means that profits here will play an imvate cars. One would think that pointed _ portant but subsidiary role, like money

to an improving economy, yet the arti- in general, not the main role. After cle claims that the switch to profits providing a yardstick of production is a result of “unsettling prospects,” | achievement and a means of encour-

Are We Flirting with Capitalism? 809 aging such achievement, profits in the THE GOAL AND THE MEANS Soviet Union are used wholly for the The significance of profit in the Soviet

needs of society. They are returned Union was underestimated owing to a to the population in the form of so- certain disregard of the law of value. cial services and expanded production, Some Soviet economists incorrectly inwhich guarantees full employment and terpreted that law as an unpleasant left-

better and easier working conditions over from capitalism and said we had

for everyone. : to get rid of it as quickly as possible. In the Soviet Union nobody accumu- Shelving the law of value led to arbi-

lates profits in money form—neither trary fixing of planned prices and to the state nor enterprises. This is an prices that operated over too long a important point to grasp. If, for in- period. As a result, prices became distance, at the end of the year the state vorced from the real value of goods, as a whole has a surplus of budget while profits fluctuated greatly from enrevenue over expenditure, the surplus terprise to enterprise, even on compara-

does not stay in the form of accumu- ble articles. Under those conditions lated currency but is immediately used profits were poor reflections of the acfor two purposes: (1) to increase State tual achievements in production. Be-

Bank credits for material stocks; in cause of this, many economists and other words, the surplus takes the mate- economic managers began to consider rial form of”expanding inventories in profit as something completely indeproduction”: or trade, while money only pendent of production and, hence, as a

measures this increase; and (2) to poor guide in matters of economic manwithdraw paper money from circula- agement. This is the delusion many Sotion, that is, to increase the purchasing viet economists, among them the present power of the ruble on the free collective author, are now trying to expose. We farm markets, where prices are deter- do not intend to go back to private en-

mined by supply and demand. terprise but, on the contrary, to permit Consequently, profits cannot become the economic laws of socialism to opereither capital or hoarded treasure in the ate. Centralized planning is wholly comSoviet Union. They are not, therefore, patible with the initiative of enterprises.

a social goal or a motive-force in pro- This is as far from private enterprise duction as a whole. The motive force as private enterprise is from feudalism. in production under socialism is the sat- The law of value is not a law of capiisfaction of the steadily growing mate- talism but a law of all commodity prorial and cultural needs of the popula- duction, including planned commodity . tion. However, profit can be, and should production under socialism. The differ-

be, an indicator (and the key indicator, ence from capitalism is that the goal moreover) of production efficiency. It and the means have changed places. should serve to encourage workers to Under capitalism, profit is the goal, and raise their efficiency. But it should be the satisfaction of the needs of the popunderstood that encouragement from ulation is the means. Under socialism profits is not distribution of the results it is just the other way around. Satisof production on the basis of capital. faction of the needs of the population Distribution is still on the basis of is the goal, and profit is the means. The work; it is work that rules distribution difference is not one of terms but of

under socialism. substance.

810 Are We Flirting with Capitalism? TIME AND THE SOVIET ECONOMY manufacture and finishing of the articles. The only thing they showed is that

Soviet economists can only smile when ‘“deviationism” is it if the “deviation”

they read how Time interprets the so- was made in conformity with instruccialist planning system. It says: “A knit- _ tions issued by the Economic Council

wear plant ordered to produce 80,000 of the USSR in March, 1964—without caps and sweaters naturally produced any direct participation by Professor only caps: they were smaller and thus Liberman, whom the Western press cheaper and quicker to make.” In other _ cites, without having sufficient grounds

words, the factory had freedom of when given the right to plan their outchoice. But elsewhere the same article put on the basis of orders from stores, says that factories are tied hand and they can make good suits of wool and foot by the plan, and that the plans ac- man-made fiber mixtures at a lower count for each nail and electric bulb. _ price. Customers readily buy these suits.

Where is the logic? - In the second place, what kind of Another example: “Taxi drivers were for doing so, on every occasion when put on a bonus system based on mile- steps are taken to improve the Soviet age, and soon the Moscow suburbs were economy. My modest role, like that of

full of empty taxis barreling down the many other of our economists, is to boulevards to fatten their bonuses.” But study methods of impr oving economic

every Moscow schoolboy knows that management on the basis of the printhe bonus of taxi drivers is based on Ciples and economic laws of socialism. the amount they collect in fares. Empty

runs are a disadvantage. As a matter of pryERS DON’T FLOW BACKWARD fact, there is a restriction on the mileage of empty runs. Taxis in Moscow Soviet economists have no intention of

and many other cities are radio dis- testing the economic methods of private patched, the purpose being to reduce enterprise. We expect to get along with empty runs. Such lack of knowledge on —gyr own methods, sharpening the tried

the part of the Time staff can hardly and _ tested instrument of material inmake for an objective appraisal of the — centive on the grindstone of profit. This

Soviet economy. has been one of our instruments for a The magazine’s statements on more Jong time, but it has grown dull, chiefly

serious matters are just as informed. pecause we didn’t use it enough. Now Experimental garment factories, it says, we are sharpening it and it will, we “showed a resounding improvement in hope, serve socialism well. But this does

efficiency—and such ‘deviationism’— ot mean that we are either giving up that many Kremlinologists assumed they —q_planned economy or turning toward

had contributed to Nikita’s downfall.” the system of private enterprise. Rivers In the first place, these factories did do not flow backward. And if, at high not show any “resounding” improve- water, rivers make turns, they are simment in efficiency. On the contrary, _ ply cutting better and shorter channels their output dropped owing to a greater for themselves. They are not looking

outlay of labor for more painstaking for a way to go back.

ON THE EVENTS IN CHINA “Pravda,” November 27, 1966

For some years now the Sino-Soviet split has been a major fact of international life. Beginning with the 1950’s the two great Communist powers found it increasingly

impossible to agree on anything. The split is now at its most bitter, and it is difficult to foresee what the future holds in store. As Pravda wrote on February 16, 1967: “On more than one occasion in the past half-century our Party and our people have had to endure the fierce attacks of hostile forces. But except for periods of direct armed aggression against the Soviet Union it can be said that never be-

fore has such a furious campaign been carried on against it as the one China’s present leaders have launched.” The Soviet statement on the situation reprinted below was chosen for its moderate tone, and because it summarizes the long-range trends of the relations between the two giants. For another recent Soviet piece see “The Anti-Soviet Policy of Mao Tse-tung and

His Group,” Reprints from the Soviet Press, March 23, 1967. There are three Soviet journals in English which specialize in problems of foreign policy: the weekly Moscow News, and the monthly New Times and International Affairs. For a collection of Soviet documents on foreign policy which include China see Alvin Rubinstein, The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union (paperback). For a chapter on “Stalin

and China,” see George Kennan, Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin (paperback). The literature on the Sino-Soviet split is growing daily; only a sample can be included here. See Morton Halperin, Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control; the same author’s China and the Bomb; Raymond Garthoff, Sino-Soviet Military Relations; Clement Zablocki, Sino-Soviet Rivalry: Implications for U.S. Policy; Donald Treadgold, Soviet and Chinese Communism; M. Klochko, Soviet

Scientist in Red China; David Floyd, Mao against Khrushchev (paperback) ; Donald Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961; Edward Crankshaw, The New Cold War: Moscow vs. Peking; W. A. Jackson, The Russo-Chinese Borderlands; D. Doolin, Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict; and Klaus Mehnert, Peking and Moscow (paperback).

The events in China are causing ever The press has published and is publishgreater anxiety in the world communist ing information on what is going on in movement, in the countries of the socialist community, and amidst the pro- From Moscow News, Supplement, Decempressive public throughout the world. _ ber 3, 1966, pp. 2-14.

Sl]

812 On the Events in China China, and also on the reaction of the Soviet people. world communist movement to the de- The international communist movecisions taken by the 11th Plenary Meet- ment highly appraises in its documents

ing of the Central Committee of the the policy of our Party, and _ stresses Communist Party of China, which ap- _ that the Soviet Union is shouldering the proved the so-called cultural revolution main burden of the struggle against im-

and the “hung wei ping” (“Red perialism, that the Soviet people have Guards”) movement launched on direc- achieved history-making victories for tives from Mao Tse-tung. The Central socialism and are successfully building a Committee of the Communist Party of | communist society, and giving trementhe Soviet Union has duly published a dous support to all the revolutionary statement appraising those decisions. forces in the world. But in defiance of

The events that have taken place in the truth the decisions of the Plenary China since the 1lth Plenary Meeting of Meeting of the CPC Central Committee the CPC make it necessary to consider slanderously allege that the CPSU line

the problem once again. , is “a line directed at preserving the This article is not concerned with the domination of imperialism and_ colointerpolitical problems of China men- nialism in the capitalist world and at tioned in the decisions of the Plenary restoring capitalism in the socialist Meeting of the CPC Central Committee. world.” As for the foreign policy aspects of those The CPSU and the Soviet state serve decisions, there is good reason to say as the main bulwark for nations in their that the Plenary Meeting had given its resistance to the expansion of U.S. imofficial blessing to the great-power anti- _ perialism, and the imperialists are spearLeninist course of Mao Tse-tung and his __ heading their struggle and their ageresgroup, directed against the unity of the sive plans against the land of the Soviets, countries of socialism, against the entire but the authors of the Chinese document

world communist movement. - go to the length of alleging that our

The Plenary Meeting of the Central Party “has joined forces with imperialCommittee of the CPC declared that the ism, led by the U.S.A. and world reacmain aim of the CPR foreign policy is tion, and is knocking together an antito combat “three enemies”—“imperial- communist counter-revolutionary union

ism, world reaction, and modern re-directed against the people, an anti visionism.” The further context shows Chinese new holy alliance.’ The CPC that imperialism is mentioned merely as _ leaders need all these ridiculous concoc-

a matter of form. Under the guise of tions only to be able, under cover of the fighting the “revisionists” all the fire is _ slogan of struggle against “modern releveled against the CPSU and the Soviet _ visionism,” to declare the CPSU and the

Union, the “rout” of which has been Soviet Union “enemy No. 1,” against declared to be a precondition for the | whom they intend “to struggle to the

strugele against imperialism. Simul- end.” |

taneously, a course is followed openly at Concentrating their fire on the CPSU

splitting the international communist and _and _ the Soviet Union, the leaders of the the entire liberation movement. The de- | CPC at the same time make no secret of cisions of the Plenary Meeting abound in _ their hostility for the communist parties concoctions about our Party and its Cen- _ of other countries of socialism, which are tral Committee which are insulting to all following the general line of the world

On the Events in China 813 communist movement. They are labeling which urge unity of action.

the overwhelming majority of the Com- The Communist Party of the Soviet munist parties of socialist countries and Union considers the strengthening of the communist and workers’ parties through- unity of the world communist movement

out the world as so-called modern re- and the promotion of its international

visionists. influence to be a sacred cause. Marxist-

The forces which took the upper hand _Leninist parties all over the world have at the 11th Plenary Meeting are openly highly assessed the efforts of the CPSU

proclaiming that the CPC rejects the directed at overcoming the difficulties general line of the world communist which have lately arisen in the commovement and will intensify the struggle munist movement and at consolidating

against all communist parties consistently it on the principled basis of Marxismupholding this line in their activity. As Leninism. But the authors of the resoludistinct from the previous documents of tion adopted at the Plenary Meeting of the Communist Party of China, which, the CPC Central Committee dare to at least in words, declared that it sup- slander the CPSU and declare openly

ported the 1957 Declaration and the that “there is no place in the united 1960 Statement, the decisions of the 11th front’ for the USSR.

Plenary Meeting do not even mention The Plenary Meeting endorsed the those documents. They state bluntly: campaign launched by the Chinese lead“The ‘Proposal on the General Line of ership against the CPSU and the other the International Communist Movement’ fraternal parties and declared that it put forward by the CPC Central Com- would be continued in the future, too. mittee on June 14, 1963, isa programme Thus, the anti-Soviet line, the line to split document.” In this document, evolved the ranks of world communism and ununder the guidance of Mao Tse-tung, in dermine the international solidarity of nine editorial articles of the newspaper the working class, is being made official Jen Min Jih Pao and the Hungchi maga- policy. zine in connection with the Open Letter Today, the views of Mao Tse-tung are of the CPSU Central Committee, in the being put forward in China as an official article “On the March Meeting in Mos- ideology underlying the entire policy of cow’ and in other articles, the line of the the Party and the country. A special world communist movement is being section of the decisions of the 11th Plenopenly replaced by a special course laid ary Meeting reads: “The study on a down by Mao Tse-tung and his group. broad scale by the entire Party and the The leaders of the CPC—contrary to entire country of the works of Comrade the genuine interests of the struggle Mao Tse-tung is an event of outstanding against U.S. imperialism in Vietnam— historic significance.” have rejected all the proposals made by The arrogant attempt of the Chinese the communist and workers’ parties, leadership to proclaim the views of Mao aimed at strengthening international Tse-tung as the acme of Marxism-Leninsolidarity in defence of the Vietnamese ism and to impose them on the world people and the revolutionary cause the communist movement cannot but evoke world over. The Plenary Meeting’s de- legitimate protest on the part of Comcisions underscore that “there can be no munists everywhere in the world. talk about any kind of joint action” with Lin Piao, Minister of Defense of the the CPSU and other communist parties CPR and Mao Tse-tung’s closest assist-

814 On the Events in China ant, declared that “Chairman Maostands CPC Central Committee is quite openly much higher than Marx, Engels, Lenin,” directed against the basic principles of and that his ideas “are Marxism-Lenin- Marxism-Leninism, against the Soviet ism of the highest standard.” Lin Piao —_ Union, against the CPSU and other com-

went on to allege that a study of the _munist parties, against international uniclassics of Marxism-Leninism should by __ ty in the ranks of the communist move99 per cent consist of learning the works —_— ment and the political line it has evolved of Mao Tse-tung. And in point of fact all _—_ cannot fail to evoke legitimate anxiety.

this “mastering of theory” boils down Lately, the communist and workers’ to a study of the “works of Chairman parties have deemed it necessary to issue

Mao.” , statements on the current policy of In the past, Mao Tse-tung disguised the CPC leadership. These’ statements

his personal participation in the struggle thoroughly censured the policy directed against the CPSU and the other Marxist- = against the Soviet Union and the other Leninist parties. Now it is being stressed _ socialist countries, a policy which imthat the anti-Leninist and anti-Soviet pedes unification of the forces for a colcourse has been evolved by Mao Tse-tung _ lective rebuff to imperialist aggression and leaders closest to him. The greetings in Vietnam. Fraternal parties the world to the Fifth Congress of the Albanian _ over have arrived at the conclusion that Party of Labor, signed by Mao Tse-tung, the events taking place in China under expressed in a concentrated way the sub- __ the guise of a cultural revolution conflict

stance of China’s present anti-Soviet | with Marxism-Leninism, are detrimental

course. to the cause of socialism, and can only Thus, the decisions taken by the 11th | compromise the ideas of scientific com-

Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central munism. Committee, which on the surface are de- It should be stressed that the CPC voted to the problems of the so-called _ leaders are insistently trying to aggracultural revolution, actually concern vate relations with the Soviet Union, decardinal problems of the policies pursued _spite the tireless efforts of the CPSU and

by the CPC in the international arena, the Soviet government to normalize relain the socialist community and the world tions with the CPC and People’s China.

communist movement. Our Party has displayed maximum paThe Chinese press makes no secret of __ tience and profound and sincere interest

the fact that according to the plans of — in overcoming existing difficulties and

the organizers of the “cultural revolu- differences, in consolidating unity of tion” it must transcend the borders of action with the Communist Party of the country. “The cultural revolution” is China, the unity of the entire communist

“a great cause affecting the destinies of | movement on the basis of Marxismthe Chinese people and, speaking on a _— Leninism and the principles of prolebroad plane, is a great cause affecting _ tarian internationalism.

the destinies of all nations in the world,” The principled course taken by our

writes Jen-Min Jih Pao. Party in respect to the Chinese People’s And, indeed, the events in China con- Republic and the Communist Party of cern not only that country but the whole = China is well known. It is a course of of world socialism, all Communists, but unity and solidarity of the CPSU and not in the sense as is thought in Peking. the CPC, of the USSR and China, a The fact that the entire policy of the course of strengthening friendship and

On the Events in China 815 cooperation between the Soviet and the in support of the struggle of the VietnaChinese peoples. The CPSU considers mese people against U.S. aggression. the Chinese Revolution an important in- This idea was supported by the over-

tegral part of the world revolutionary whelming majority of communist and process and does its utmost to promote workers’ parties, but the leading group its success. Ever since the emergence of of the CPC Central Committee came up the Chinese People’s Republic, the Soviet in arms against it. Union has constantly rendered assistance Qn November 28, 1965, the CPSU in building up a new life in China, and Central Committee addressed a letter to in strengthening its positions in the in- the CPC Central Committee which also ternational arena. The line followed by proposed improving Soviet-Chinese relathe CPSU Central Committee and the tions. The CPC Central Committee reSoviet government in the sphere of So- jected that proposal too. The Chinese viet-Chinese relations conforms to the in- leaders refused to send a delegation to terests not only of our two parties and the 23d Congress of the CPSU. Despite countries, but also of the whole socialist that, our Party declared at the Congress community and the international com- that it was prepared at any moment to

munist movement. consider, together with the CPC leader-

The Communist Party of the Soviet ship, the existing differences, so as to Union las invariably made efforts to find ways to overcome them on the prinstrengthen unity with the Communist ciples of Marxism-Leninism. The CPC Party of China and find ways of over- Central Committee ignored the construccoming the difficulties that have cropped __ tive proposals of our Party Congress and

up. The efforts of our Party were attacked its decisions. especially persistent and consistent after A systematic anti-Soviet brainwashing the October Plenary Meeting of the of the Chinese population is today going CPSU Central Committee. For over two on, on an unprecedented scale. Hostile

years, our Party has not engaged in demonstrations of “hung wei ping” outpolemics, notwithstanding that anti- side the Soviet Embassy in Peking and Soviet propaganda in China did not provocative outbursts against Soviet peocease for a single day, for a single hour. ple arriving in China have become a

Immediately after the October Plen- system. |

ary Meeting of the CPSU Central Com- The Chinese leaders are trying to mittee, our Party put forward a broad spread their anti-Soviet activities onto program for normalizing Soviet-Chinese the territory of our country. Dozens of relations. This program, however, has_ radio stations are incessantly broadcastbeen rejected by the leaders of the CPC. ing hostile slanderous propaganda to the We took another step to improve rela- Soviet Union.

tions between our two parties and coun- The continuous curtailment of ecotries during the meeting between the nomic, scientific, and engineering coSoviet delegation and the Chinese leader- operation between the CPR and _ the ship in February, 1965, in Peking. But USSR is another practical outcome of that meeting, too, brought no success. the anti-Soviet course followed by the The participants in the Consultative CPC leadership. Today, the sole form of Meeting of nineteen parties in March, economic contact between our two coun1965, made an important proposal to act tries is trade. The Soviet share in the jointly, despite the existing differences, CPR foreign trade has dropped from 50

816 On the Events in China per cent in 1959 to 15 per cent in 1965. | Workers’ Party came forward with an Meanwhile the CPR trade turnover with important initiative aimed at achieving the capitalist countries has been growing _agreed action of the socialist countries in

year by year. The volume of Soviet- rendering assistance to the DRV, and Chinese cultural exchanges has been re- _ proposed to the fraternal parties that a duced to an extreme minimum because summit meeting on the problem be conof the inimical stand taken by the CPC _ vened. But our proposals, just as the pro-

leadership. posals of the PUWP and the other

Such are the facts. They provide irre- fraternal parties, were turned down by futable evidence that the Communist the CPC leadership. Party of the Soviet Union and its Central Had there been united action on the Committee have done everything possible part of the entire mighty socialist comto achieve stronger unity and cohesion munity, the assistance given the Vietnabetween the CPSU and the CPC on the _mese people would have been immeasurprincipled basis of Marxism-Leninism, ably more telling and effective. Instead with an eye to normalizing relations be- of rallying in a united front with all tween the USSR and China. And if no socialist countries in the struggle against success was achieved, the blame rests the U.S. aggressors, the leaders of the

squarely with the leadership of the CPC are stubbornly continuing their

Chinese Communist Party. splitting policies.

The Soviet press has on more than one The Chinese leadership is making no occasion informed our public about the _little effort to smear the effective aid and specific trends and aims which today un- _— support rendered to the Vietnamese derlie China’s foreign policy. This is people by the Soviet Union and the other

especially evident in the matter of sup- socialist countries. By calling for “disporting the Vietnamese people. The in- association” from the CPSU and other tervention of the U.S.A. in South Viet- fraternal parties, the Chinese leaders, nam and its aggression against the essentially speaking, are demanding that Democratic Republic of Vietnam tendto __ the nations waging a just struggle for the increase international tensions and jeop- _ national independence of their countries ardize peace not only in Southeast Asia, should reject assistance from the Soviet

but throughout the world. Union and other socialist countries and The CPSU and the other fraternal should be guided solely by the aims and parties hold that joint action by the so- objectives of Peking.

cialist states is needed to support the It may be asked—with whom then Vietnamese people effectively in their does the Chinese leadership which destruggle for freedom and independence. _ clares of the need of “the broadest united

At its 23d Congress our Party again front of struggle against U.S. imperialappealed to the Communists of all coun- _ism,” wish to join forces, if it rejects all

tries to close their ranks still more in the proposals on joint action with the the face of the expanding aggressive forces that are shouldering the brunt of machinations of imperialism. The other the struggle against imperialism? All fraternal parties have also implemented that is in fact helping escalation of measures to strengthen the unity of the U.S. aggression against the Vietnamese

socialist countries in rebuffing American people. |

ageression. In November last year, the The double-faced policy pursued by

Central Committee of the Polish United the Chinese leaders in the international

On the Events in China 817 arena is becoming ever more pro-_ present course of the Chinese leaders nounced. On the one hand, they are try- has also been tested in practice. There

ing to foist on the fraternal parties a can be no two opinions on the results course which would lead to a continuous of this test. aggravation of the international situation International developments in recent and, in the long run, to war, allegedly in years have affirmed anew the complete the name of world revolution. The Pe- validity, realism, and effectiveness of the king leaders themselves are, however, fol- course taken by the Marxist-Leninist lowing a course calculated to keep clear parties, which stand for peace, national

of the struggle against imperialism. freedom, democracy, and socialism. The While declaring that all contacts the socialist countries which in their develop-

Soviet Union has with the U.S.A. are ment are guided by Marxism-Leninism “collusion” with imperialism, the Chi- and are following a course of all-round nese leaders miss no opportunity to de- advancement of their economy, of streng-

velop relations with capitalist countries, thening their defense potential and of including the U.S.A. Chen Yi, China’s_ consistently applying Leninist principles Foreign Minister, according to the Japa- of economic management, have achieved nese agency Kyodo Tsushin, declared in major successes. That is an irrefutable

a talk with the representatives of the fact. At the same time the policy based Japanese Liberal-Democratic Party, that on the concepts of Mao Tse-tung has led

Peking was maintaining contacts with to grave failures in China’s economy. Washington in Warsaw, and “did not Suffice it to say that this policy has renecessarily exclude the idea of talks with sulted in a sharp decline in China’s the U.S.A.” This is not the first time industrial and agricultural production Chen Yi has made such declarations. It which has only now attained the 1957— is noteworthy that the Western press is 58 level. repeatedly stressing that Peking’s noisy © The communist and workers’ parties

campaign against the U.S.A. bears the which are truly struggling against imimprint of a purely verbose “escalation.” perialism have still more consolidated Meanwhile this selfsame press is per- their ranks, strengthened still more their sistently harping on the subject of ten- alliance with all the peace-loving forces, sions on the Soviet-Chinese border re- and further enhanced the prestige of sosulting from Chinese territorial claims. cialism. They are actively and effectively No wonder that today the bourgeois supporting the heroic Vietnamese people press is disseminating information on a_ in their just struggle against the aggrestacit agreement between China and the sion of U.S. imperialism. They are putU.S.A. and other capitalist countries, ting up a united front in the struggle for which are quite content with China’s European security and are rebuffing the

present-day policies. machinations of American and West Ger-

Quite a few important events have man imperialism. The socialist countries taken place in the international arena which abide by the line expressed in the ever since the CPC Central Committee 1957 Declaration and 1960 Statement, came forward with its own platform. Life have consolidated even more their forces

has more than once put to the test the with the national-liberation movement correctness of the course evolved by the and are furthering its successes. world communist movement at the Mos- _ At this same time the Chinese leaders

cow meetings in 1957 and 1960. The have launched an unprecedented cam-

818 | On the Events in China paign aimed at splitting the international _tional-liberation movement, and the fail-

communist movement, hampering in fact ures of those leaders who had blindly the fight waged by the anti-imperialist supported it, seriously alerted the pro-

front. , pressive forces in the young national _ Guided by the principle “the end jus- states, in the revolutionary-democratic tifies the means,” the CPC leaders are parties, and helped them to discern the resorting to the most underhand means danger of the Peking leaders’ course. As of political struggle. They are feverishly a result, instead of achieving hegemony recruiting supporters. Peking writes that in the Asian, African, and Latin Amer“the revolutionary peoples of the world ican countries, which the CPC leaders are closely rallied around Chairman sought, there took place a sharp decline Mao.” But the facts show that the utter jn the prestige of the CPR.

majority of fraternal parties have reso- Aware of the obvious fact that the lutely rejected the present platform of the CPC leadership is becoming more and

Chinese leaders. more isolated in the international comThe repeated appeals made by the munist and liberation movement, Mao

CPC leadership to “disassociate organi- Tse-tung, as if challenging the entire so-

zationally” from the Marxist-Leninist cialist world, declared in his greetings parties aimed at setting up a bloc of _ to the Congress of the Albanian Party of parties and groups headed by the CPC. _ Labor: “We have no fear of isolation.”

But the further events develop, the But this course of isolating the CPR and clearer one sees that they have no one the CPC shows most strikingly that the to align with within the communist basic demands of proletarian internamovement. The pro-Chinese splitter fac- _tionalism are being ignored. It also contions which preach borrowed ideas alien _flicts with the interests of the Chinese to the working class were not destined to _ people. Marxist-Leninists cannot be in-

become organizations with any sizable terested in the isolation of any socialist following and to win a position for them- _ country, for that would mean taking the selves within the working-class move- line of severing it from the socialist comments of their countries. Lately strife munity, of disunity among the countries started in the splitter organizations and _ of socialism.

many of them are falling apart. , The struggle of the Chinese leaders Nor did the Chinese leaders meet with against the Soviet Union and the other success in their attempts to establish con- _ socialist countries, their splitting activtrol over international democratic organ- _ities in the communist movement, and

izations—the World Council of Peace, their failures in internal and foreign the World Federation of Trade Unions, _ policies could not pass without consethe women’s, youth, and other associa- quence, and, as the Chinese press admits, tions. The attempts to make those organi- _ caused mounting discontent among Party

zations operate on a narrow sectarian cadres, intellectuals, in the army, and basis, and to foist on them slogans and among broad sections of the Chinese forms of activity absolutely alien to them, population.

were rejected. In these circumstances, Mao Tse-tung The hopes the Chinese leadership and his group, instead of heeding the

pinned on the national-liberation move- opinions of the Party masses and amendment also fell through. The major fiascos _ing their erroneous course, took the road suffered by the Chinese policy in the na- _ of taking this line still further, of carry-

On the Events in China 819 ing it to extremes. They considered the scientific and engineering personnel. The Party activists, the Party cadres to bethe work of raising the cultural standards of

main obstacle along this path. all people, the training of personnel Mao Tse-tung and those who surround necessary for managing the economy, him could not but take into account the constitutes one of the most important fact that the Party cadres, who had gone aspects of a party’s ideological work.

through the school of revolution, were Lenin wrote that it was necessary to beginning more and more to understand, “take the entire culture that capitalism despite the anti-Soviet campaign of re- left behind and build socialism with it. cent years, the harm which the policy of We must take all its science, technolsplitting with the Soviet Union and the ogy, knowledge, and art. Without these other socialist countries was bringing to we shall be unable to build a commuChina itself. It is hard to fool them with nist society” (Collected Works, Russian inventions about some sort of “collusion” ed., Vol. 38, p. 55). He never tired of of the Soviet Union with the U.S.A. or repeating that the Party alone, as the about the “restoration of capitalism” in most advanced and conscious detachour country. That is why Mao Tse-tung ment of society, can lead and imple-

and his group have taken the line of de- ment this. As for the campaign in faming and attacking the Party cadres China, it directly conflicts with Lenin’s and the best representatives of the work- teaching, in both content and methods.

ing class and intelligentsia, employing In the past few months many of the for this purpose some of the school- Party committees in the provinces, children and students as well as the cities, industrial enterprises, and higher military-administrative apparatus. educational establishments, and the ediMeeting with resistance to their torial offices of national and provincial course, Mao Tse-tung and his adherents newspapers and magazines were either did not even stop short of jeopardizing “reorganized” or dispersed altogether the leading role of the Party in the state. in China! At present, Party organizaThey want to turn the Communist Party tions are ‘quite often replaced by “workfrom an organization of people united by ing groups” and “cultural revolution a common ideology, of conscious, prin- committees.” Numerous Party workers cipled fighters for the implementation of and government officials, workers in ideas of socialism, into an obedient, un- science, literature, and the arts have

thinking tool for fulfilling the will of been dubbed “black bandits,” “rightist Mao Tse-tung. Those who attempt to elements,” and “revisionists.” These lastruggle for the principles of Marxism. els are designed to conceal the true Leninism and for Leninist norms of meaning of the charges brought against inter-Party life are hounded from the them, but from the Chinese press it is

Party. becoming evident that it is mainly a

_ The things going on in China under question of many Communists and culthe guise of a “cultural revolution” have tural workers disagreeing with the nothing in common with it. The cultural course of Mao Tse-tung which is being revolution is one of the most important implemented, and the grave consetasks facing any country building so- quences of which they are well aware.

cialism. It is a dire necessity for China, It is characteristic that people are too, for that country still has millions of | subjected to repressions for the slightilliterates and is in great need of skilled est expression of sympathy for the So-

820 On the Events in China viet Union. China’s reckless actions in foreign polIn order to make the purge appear icy. All this is damaging to the Chinese

to be a mass movement instigated from __ people themselves.

below, the so-called Red Guards—14— The interests of unity of all the rev-

18-year-old youngsters brought up in olutionary forces in their struggle a spirit of unbridled lauding of Mao against imperialism demand the overTse-tung’s personality, arbitrariness, coming of the nationalistic, anti-Soviet nationalism, and anti-Sovietism—have _ policies, the ‘overcoming of the attempts

been employed. But actually behind to distort Marxism-Leninism and to rethem stands the leadership of the army place it by the ideology and the prac-

and the state security bodies. tices of Maoism.

The events in China are very com- As for the CPSU it is fully resolved

plicated and contradictory. But it is al- | to do everything necessary to surmount

ready clear that the nationalistic and the difficulties created by the policies great-power course of Mao Tse-tung and _— pursued by the CPC leadership in the his group is inflicting great harm to the © communist movement and the socialist

people of China and jeopardizing many community. The CPSU, like the other of the gains of the revolution in the communist and workers’ parties, is fully country, that it has seriously damaged _resolved to defend unflinchingly the _ the unity of the entire communist move- ideas of Marxism-Leninism, of prole-

ment and the cause of the struggle arian internationalism. against imperialism. This cannot but — --- The Soviet people entertain feelprofoundly grieve and cause anxiety ngs of profound respect for the Chinese among those who had welcomed the People, for the Chinese Communists. great Chinese revolution, who had con- We are full of the feeling of solidarity sidered it their most urgent duty to help Mi ith the heroic Chinese people, who the Chinese people in the struggle "#V° preat experience in revolutionary

against imperialism and in_ socialist ©. , ae we hold eing true ee internationalists,

construction, and who had always as- = gear the gains of the Chinese Revolupired toward unity and friendship with tion. We are firmly convinced that ul-

the Chinese Communists. timately our parties and our peoples

China is a great country, and it is will be marching in the same ranks in clear that the weakening of the posi- the struggle for the common and great tions of socialism in that country could revolutionary cause. adversely affect the interests of the The world communist movement has international revolutionary movement. more than once met with grave trials. Bourgeois propaganda is utilizing the It is strong and viable enough to defend negative processes in China to dis- the great banner of Marxism-Leninism credit the ideas of socialism throughout in the name of new victories of comthe world. Particularly dangerous are munism.

WHITHER THE SOVIET UNION? By Zbygniew Brzezinski; Frederick Barghoorn , The Soviet regime is now fifty years old. It has survived many crises and has undergone substantial changes, and yet some of its features appear rather permanent. In the jubilee year of 1967 countless observers, both Soviet and foreign, have been casting a horoscope for the first socialist country in the world, and the

oldest one. What is the future of the Soviet system? What is the nature of the changes which have taken place since the death of Stalin? Is Russia still a revolutionary society or is she deeply conservative in her own way? Is Soviet communism a model for the underdeveloped world, or are Soviet methods not applicable else-

where? These are some of the questions which are being asked and answered. The two essays below are part of a series of articles printed in Problems of Communism in 1966 and 1967; many scholars took part in the debate. We reproduce only the leading article and one of the comments upon it. Professor Brzezinski teaches at Columbia University and is at present (1968) Special Assistant to President Johnson; Professor Barghoorn teaches political science at Yale University. Both are authors of numerous books and articles. For alternate interpretations which appeared in 1967 see Isaac Deutscher, The Unfinished Revolution, 1917~1967 (paperback); Y. Marin, “The USSR in the Jubilee Year,” Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR, August, 1967; a series of articles in Foreign Affairs, September, 1967; “The Soviet Revolution, 1917-1967: A Balance Sheet,” Survey, July, 1967; and Bertram Wolfe, “Reflections on the Future of the Soviet System,” Russian Review, April, 1967. For Soviet views see all the 1967 issues of the Soviet monthly, Soviet Life; “The 50th Anni-

versary of the October Revolution,” International Affairs, 1967, No. 8; “Fifty Heroic Years,” New Times, July 5, 1967; and “Historic Significance of the Great October Socialist Revolution,” World Marxist Review, August, 1967. See also The Impact of the Russian Revolution, 1917-1967 (paperback) by Arnold Toynbee and others. From Z. Brzezinski, “The Soviet Political Russia: The Need for Perspective,” ibid., System: Transformation or Degeneration?” May-June, 1966, pp. 39-42. Published by perProblems of Communism, January-February, mission of -the United States Information 1966, pp. 1-15; F. Barghoorn, “Changes in Agency.

821

822 Whither the Soviet Union? BRZEZINSKI: THE SOVIET pattern of singular depravity.

POLITICAL SYSTEM While Soviet criticism of former par-

The Soviet Union will soon celebrate ty leaders is saad abundant, little intel-

its 50th anniversary. In this turbulent en ef on is ire ended on analyzing and rapidly changing world, for any ' hin’ Vor th. ° \ "le Te th mn ae political system to survive half a cen- ership. *et at, far Ys “th © ImPor tury is an accomplishment in its own fant question ved. as the political

right and obvious testimony to its dura- yen : bicorao, 4 hat h

bility. There are not many major politi- enin's biographers agree that here

cal structures in the world today that ve oe seuariniet? by total politican boast of such longevity. The ap- cal commitment, by self-righteou 5 con proaching anniversary, however, pro- viction, by tenacious determination and vides an appropriate moment for a crit- by an outstanding a bility to formulate ical review of the changes that have intellectually appealing principles of potaken place in the Soviet system, par- litical action as well as popular slogans ticularly in regard to such critical mat- suitable for mass consumption. He was ters as the character of its top leader- * typically revolutionary figure, a man ship, the methods by which its leaders whose genius can be consummated only acquire power, and the relationship of at that critical juncture in history when the Communist Party to society. Fur- the new breaks off—and not just evolves thermore, the time is also ripe to in- —from the old. Had he lived a genera-

quire into the implications of these "on earlier, he probably would have changes, especially in regard to the died in a Siberian taiga; a generation stability and vitality of the system. —_later, he probably would have been shot

THe LEADERS by Stalin.

Today Soviet spokesmen would have us Lenin was a rare type of political believe that the quality of the top Com. leader, fusing in his person several munist leadership in the USSR has been functions of key importance to the abysmal. Of the forty-five years since working of a political system: he acted Lenin, according to official Soviet his- as the chief ideologist of the system, the

tory, power was exercised for approxi- principal organizer of the party (inmately five years by leaders subsequent- deed, the founder of the movement), ly unmasked as traitors (although later and the top administrator of the state. the charge of treason was retroactively It may be added that such personal reduced to that of deviation); for al- fusion is typical of early revolutionary most twenty years it was wielded by a_leaderships, and today it is exemplified paranoiac mass-murderer who irration- by Mao Tse-tung. To his followers, ally slew his best comrades and igno- Lenin was clearly a charismatic leader, rantly guided Soviet war strategy by and his power (like Hitler’s or Mao pointing his finger at a globe; and, most recently, . for almost ten Yeats, by a 1 Angelica Balabanoff, Impressions of Lenin harebrained” schemer given to tan- (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,

trums and with a propensity for wild 1964). Louis Fischer, Life of Lenin (New

organizational experimentation. On the he Commute Reh ite 5 eee Lenin,

asis of that record, the present leader- | j064). B 7 ee

ship lays claim to representing a re- Made «Revolution ( New York: Dial Press,

markable departure from a historical 1948).

Whither the Soviet Union? 823 Tse-tung’s) depended less on institu- ciding who should participate in which tions than on the force of his personal- subgroup and _ personally providing ity and intellect. Even after the Revolu- (and monopolizing) the function of tion, it was his personal authority that integration. gave him enormous power, while the If historical parallels for Lenin are to progressive institutionalization of Len- be found among the revolutionary triin’s rule (the Cheka, the appearance of bunes, for Stalin they are to be sought the apparat, etc.) reflected more the among the Oriental despots.’ Thriving transformation of a revolutionary party on intrigue, shielded in mystery, and - into a ruling one than any significant isolated from society, his immense powchange in the character of his leader- er reflected the immense tasks he suc-

ship. ceeded in imposing on his followers Under Stalin, the fusion of leadership and subjects. Capitalizing on the revofunctions was continued, but this was lutionary momentum and the ideologi-

due less to his personal qualities as cal impetus inherited from Leninism, such than to the fact that, with the pas- and wedding it to a systematic institu-

sage of time and the growing toll of tionalization of bureaucratic rule, he victims, his power became nearly total could set in motion a social and _politiand was gradually translated also into cal revolution which weakened all expersonal authority. Only a mediocre isting institutions save Stalin’s own secideologist—and certainly inferior in retariat and his chief executive arm, the that respect to his chief rivals for power secret police. His power grew in pro—Stalin became institutionally, the ide- portion to the degree to which the major ologue of the system. A dull speaker, established institutions declined in vitalhe eventually acquired the “routinized ity and homogeneity.‘ charisma”? which, after Lenin’s death, The war, however, as well as the postbecame invested in the Communist Par- war reconstruction, produced a_paraty as a whole (much as the Pope at one dox. While Stalin’s personal prestige

time had acquired the infallibility that and authority were further enhanced, for a long time had rested in the col- his institutional supremacy relatively lective church). But his power was in- declined. The military establishment creasingly institutionalized bureaucrat- naturally grew in importance; the enorically, with decision-making centralized mous effort to transfer, reinstall, and at the apex within his own secretariat, later reconstruct the industrial economy and its exercise involved a subtle balancing of the principal institutions of 3 Compare the types discussed by J. L. Talthe political system: the secret police, mon in his Political Messianism: The Roman-

the party, the state, and the army tic Phase (New York, Praeger, 1960), with (roughly +n that order of impo rtance). Barrington Moore, Jr., Political Power and Social Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Uni

Even the ostensibly pr incipal organ of versity Press, 1958), especially Chapter 2, power, the Politburo, was split into _Totalitarian Elements in Pre Industrial Socie-

‘ ¢ . ies,’ or Kar ittfogel, Oriental Despotism

ters.” en a reth Stalin nan lly. de. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957). It seems that these considerations are as

important to the understanding of the Stalinist

2 For a discussion of “routinized charisma,” system as the psycho-pathological traits of see Amitai Etzioni, 4 Comparative Analysis Stalin that Robert C. Tucker rightly emphaof Complex Organizations (Glencoe, Ill.: Free sizes in his “The Dictator and Totalitarian-

Press, 1961), pp. 26 ff. ism,” World Politics, July, 1965.

824 Whither the Soviet Union? invigorated the state machinery; the thus, perhaps inadvertently, restored party apparat began to perform again much of the institutional balance that the key functions of social mobilization had existed under Stalin, but without and political integration. But the aging ever acquiring the full powers of the tyrant was neither unaware of this de- balancer. velopment nor apparently resigned to it. Khrushchev lacked the authority of The Byzantine intrigues resulting in the Lenin to generate personal power, or liquidation of the Leningrad leadership the power of Stalin to create personal and Voznesenski, the “doctors’ plot’ authority—and the Soviet leadership with its ominous implications for some under him became increasingly differ-

top party, military and police chiefs, entiated. The top leader was no longer clearly augured an effort to weaken any the top ideologist, in spite of occasional institutional limits on Stalin’s personal efforts to present Khrushchev’s elabora-

supremacy. , tions as “a creative contribution to Khrushchev came to power ostensibly Marxism-Leninism.” The ruling body to save Stalinism, which he defined as now contained at least one professional safeguarding the traditional priority of specialist in ideological matters, and it

heavy industry and restoring the pri- was no secret that the presence of the macy of the party. In fact, he presided professional ideologue was required beover the dismantling of Stalinism. He cause someone had to give professional rode to power by restoring the predom- ideological advice to the party’s top inant position of the party apparat. But leader. Similarly, technical-administrathe complexities of governing (as con- tive specialization differentiated some

trasted to the priorities of the power top leaders from others. Increasingly struggle) caused him to dilute the par- Khrushchev’s function—and presumably

ty’s position. While initially he suc- the primary source of his still considceeded in diminishing the political role erable power—was that of providing inof the secret police and in weakening tegration and impetus for new domestic the state machinery, the military estab- or foreign initiatives in a political sys-

lishment grew in importance with the tem otherwise too complex to be dicontinuing tensions of the cold war.’ rected and administered by one man. By the time Khrushchev was removed, The differentiation of functions also the economic priorities had become made it more difficult for the top leader blurred because of pressures in agri- io inherit even the “routinized charisculture and the consumer sector, while ma” that Stalin had eventually transhis own reorganization of the party ferred to himself from the party as a into two separate industrial and rural whole. Acquiring charisma was more hierarchies in November, 1962, went difficult for a leader who (even apart far toward undermining the party’s from a personal style and vulgar appearhomogeneity of outlook, apart from ance that did not lend themselves to splitting it institutionally. Consequent'y, “image building”) had neither the the state bureaucracy recouped, almost great “theoretical” flare valued by a by default, some of its integrative and movement that still prided itself on beadministrative functions. Khrushchev ing the embodiment of a messianic ideology nor the technical expertise highly ’ For a good treatment of Soviet military yesarded in a state which equated techdebates, see Thomas Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at ; ‘ the Crossroads (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard nological advance with human progress.

University Press, 1964). _ Moreover, occupying the posts of First

Whither the Soviet Union? 825 Secretary and Chairman of the Council young bureaucrats, initially promoted of Ministers was not enough to develop during the purges, they could observe— a charismatic appeal, since neither post but not suffer from—the debilitating has been sufficiently institutionalized to | consequences of political extremism and

endow its occupant with the special unpredictable personal rule. To this new prestige and aura that, for example, the _ generation of clerks, bureaucratic stabil-

President of the United States auto- ity—indeed, bureaucratic dictatorship— matically gains on assuming office. must seem to be the only solid foundaTrying to cope with this lack of char- tion for effective government.

ismatic appeal, Khrushchev replaced Differentiation of functions to these Stalin’s former colleagues. In the pro- bureaucrats is a norm, while personal cess, he gradually came to rely on charisma is ground for suspicion. The a younger generation of bureaucratic new Soviet leadership, therefore, is both leaders to whom. orderliness of proce- bureaucratic in style and _ essentially

dure was instinctively preferable to impersonal in form. The curious emcrash campaigns. Administratively, how- phasis on kollektivnost rukovodstva ever, Khrushchev was a true product of (collectivity of leadership) instead of the Stalinist school, with its marked the traditional kollektivnoe rukovodstvo

proclivity for just such campaigns at (collective leadership)—-a change in the cost of all other considerations. In formulation used immediately after striving to develop his own style of Khrushchev’s fall—suggests a deliberleadership, Khrushchev tried to emu- ate effort at achieving not only a perlate Lenin in stimulating new fervor, sonal but also an institutional collective and Stalin in mobilizing energies, but leadership, designed to prevent any one without the personal and institutional Jeader from using a particular instituassets that each had commanded. By tion as a vehicle for obtaining political the time he was removed, Khrushchev supremacy. had become an anachronism in the new The question arises, however, whethpolitical context he himself had helped 4, this kind of leadership can prove

to create. effective in guiding the destiny of a Brezhnev and Kosygin mark the com- major state. The Soviet system is now

ing to power of a new generation of Jed by a bureaucratic leadership from

leaders, irrespective of whether they the very top to the bottom. In that will for long retain their present posi- respect, it is unique. Even political tions.© Lenin’s, Stalin’s, and Khrush- systems with highly developed and skillchev’s formative experience was the un- fy] professional political bureaucracies, settled period of conspiratorial activity, such as the British, the French, or that revolution, and—in Khrushchev’s case of the Catholic Church, have reserved

—civil war and the early phase of com- some top policy-making and hence munism. The new leaders, beneficiaries power-wielding positions for mnonbuof the revolution but no longer revolu- reaucratic professional politicians, pretionaries themselves, have matured in sumably on the assumption that a freean established political setting in which wheeling, generalizing, and competitive the truly large issues of policy and lead- political experience is of decisive im-

ership have been decided. Aspiring portance in shaping effective national 6 See S. Bialer, “An Unstable Leadership,” leadership.

Problems of Communism, July-August, 1965. To be sure, some top Soviet leaders

826 Whither the Soviet Union? do acquire such experience, even in the ability of creative individuals, but on course of rising up the bureaucratic the existence of clusters of creators who party ladder, especially when assigned collectively promote social innovation. to provincial or republican executive “The ability of any gifted individual to responsibilities. There they acquire the exert leverage within a society . . . is skills of initiative, direction, integra- partly a function of the exact composition, as well as accommodation, com- tion of the group of those on whom he promise, and delegation of authority, depends for day-to-day interaction and which are the basic prerequisites for ex- for the execution of his plans.”* The ecutive management of any complex revolutionary milieu of the 1920’s and

organization. even the fanatical Stalinist commitment Nonetheless, even when occuping ter- of the 1930’s fostered such clusters of

ritorial positions of responsibility, the intellectual and political talent. It is apparatchiki are still part of an ex- doubtful that the CPSU party schools tremely centralized and rigidly hier- and the Central Committee personnel archical bureaucratic organization, in- department encourage, in Margaret creasingly set in its ways, politically Mead’s terms, the growth of clusters of corrupted by years of unchallenged creativity, and that is why the transipower, and made even more confined tion from Lenin to Stalin to Khrushchev in its outlook than is normally the case to Brezhnev probably cannot be charted with a ruling body by its lingering and by an ascending line.

increasingly ritualized doctrinaire tra- This has serious implications for the dition. It is relevant to note here (from Soviet system as a whole. It is doubtful observations made in Soviet universi- that any organization can long remain

ties) that the young men who become vital if it is so structured that in its active in the Komsomol organization personnel policy it becomes, almost unand are presumably embarking on a_ knowingly, inimical to talent and hosprofessional political career are gener- tile to political innovation. Decay is ally the dull conformists. Clearly, in a bound to set in, while the stability of highly bureaucratized political setting, the political system may be endangered, conformity, caution and currying favor if other social institutions suceed in with superiors count for more in ad- attracting the society’s talent and begin vancing a political career than personal to chafe under the restraints imposed

courage and individual initiative.’ by the ruling but increasingly mediocre Such a condition poses a long-range @pparatchikt.

danger to the vitality of any political Pie SrruccLE FoR PowER _ system. Social evolution, it has been The struggle for power in the Soviet noted, depends not only on the avail- political system has certainly become 7 Writing about modern bureaucracy, V. A. less violent. The question 38s however: Thompson (Modern Organization [New York, Has it become less debilitating for the

1961], p. 91) observed: “In the formally political system? Has it become a more structured group, the idea man is doubly dan- regularized process, capable of infusing

gerous. He endangers the established distri- 10 Jeader ship with fresh blood? A

bution of power and status, and he is a competitive threat to his peers. Consequently, he has to be suppressed.” For a breezy treatment 8 Margaret Mead, Continuities in Cultural of some analogous experience, see also E. G. volution (New Haven: Yale University Press, Hegarty, How to Succeed in Company Poli- 1964), p. 181. See also the introduction, espe-

ties (New York, 1963). cially p. xx.

Whither the Soviet Union? — B27 closer look at the changes in the char- backward country surrounded by neighacter of the competition for power may bors that were generally hostile to the

guide us to the answer. Soviet experiment, and increasingly deBoth Stalin and Khrushchev rode to ‘iving its own membership strength

power by skillfully manipulating issues from first-generation proletarians with as well as by taking full advantage of all their susceptibility to simple explanathe organizational opportunities arising tions and dogmatic truths, the ruling from their tenure of the post of party party easily plunged down the path of First Secretary. It must be stressed that increasing brutality. The leader both the manipulation of issues was at least rode the crest of that violence and conas important to their success as the or- trolled it. The terror never degenerated ganizational factor, which generally into simple anarchy, and Stalin’s power tends to receive priority in Western his- grew immeasurably because he effec-

torical treatments. In Stalin’s time, the tively practiced the art of leadership issues facing the party were, indeed, on according to his own definition: a grand scale: world revolution vs. socialism in one country; domestic evo- The art of leadership is a serious matter. lution vs. social revolution; a faction. One must not lag behind the movement,

alized vs. a monolithic party. Stalin because to do so is to become isolated succeeded because he instinctively per- from the masses. But neither must one ceived that the new apparatchiki for to He rushwho aheadwants is to loseto , . contact were withrush theahead, masses. not prepared to sacrifice themselves in lead a movement and at the same time futile efforts to promote foreign revolu- keep in touch with the vast masses must tions but—being for the most part genu- wage a fight on two fronts—against those inely committed to revolutionary ideals who lag behind and those who run ahead.®

—were becoming eager to get on with .

the job of creating a socialist society. Khrushchev, too, succeeded in hbe(Moreover, had the NEP endured an- Ming the top leader because he perother ten years, would the Soviet Union ceived the elite’s predominant interests.

be a Communist dictatorship today?) Restoration of the primary position of Stalin’s choice of socialism in one the party, decapitation of the sceret pocountry was a brilliant solution. It cap- _ lice, reduction of the privileges of the tivated, at least in part, the revolution- state bureaucrats while maintaining the aries; and it satisfied, at least partially, traditional emphasis on heavy industrial the accommodators. It split the opposi- development (which pleased both the

tion, polarized it, and prepared the industrial elite and the military estabground for the eventual liquidation of _ lishment)—these were the issues which each segment with the other’s support. Khrushchev successfully utilized in the The violence, the terror, and finally the mid-1950’s to mobilize the support of Great Purges of 1936-38 followed logi- officials and accomplish the gradual isocally. Imbued with the Leninist tradi. /ation and eventual defeat of Malenkov. tion of intolerance for dissent, engaged But the analogy ends right there. The in a vast undertaking of social revolu- social and even the political system in

tion that taxed both the resources and Which Khrushchev came to rule was the nerves of party members, guided by relatively settled. Indeed, in some rean unscrupulous and paranoiac but also 9J. V. Stalin, Problems of Leninism (Mos: reassuringly calm leader, governing a cow, 1940), p. 338.

828 Whither the Soviet Union? spects, it was stagnating, and Khrush- case of Stalin, they involved basic conchev’s key problem, once he reached ceptions of historical development. Comthe political apex (but before he had pare the post-Stalin debates about the had time to consolidate his position allocation of resources among different there) was how to get the country mov- _ branches of the economy, for example, ing again. The effort to-infuse new so- with the debates of the 1920’s about the cial and political dynamism into Soviet character and pace of Soviet industriali-

society, even while consolidating his zation; or Khrushchev’s homilies on the power, led him to a public repudiation merits of corn—and even his undeniaof Stalinism which certainly shocked bly bold and controversial virgin lands some officials; to sweeping economic re- campaign—with the dilemma of whethforms which disgruntled many adminis- er to collectivize a hundred million reti-

trators; to a dramatic reorganization of cent peasants, at what pace, and with

the party which appalled the apparat- what intensity in terms of resort to chiki; and even to an attempt to circum- violence.

vent the policy-making authority of the It is only in the realm of foreign party Presidium by means of direct affairs that one can perhaps argue appeals to interested groups, which that grand dilemmas still impose themmust have both outraged and frightened selves on the Soviet political scene. his colleagues. The elimination of vio- The nuclear-war-or-peace debate of the lence as the decisive instrumentality of 1950’s and early 1960’s is comparable political competition—a move that was in many respects to the earlier conflict perhaps prompted by the greater insti- over “permanent revolution” or “socialtutional maturity of Soviet society, and ism in one country.” Molotov’s removal which was in any case made inevitable and Kozlov’s political demise were to a by the downgrading of the secret police large extent related to disagreements and the public disavowals of Stalinism concerning foreign affairs; nonetheless, —meant that Khrushchev, unlike Stalin, in spite of such occasional rumblings, it could not achieve both social dynamism would appear that on the peace-or-war and the stability of his power. Stalin issue there is today more of a consensus

magnified his power as he strove to among the Soviet elite than there was change society; to change society Khru- on the issue of permanent revolution in

shchev had to risk his power. the 1920’s. Although a wide spectrum The range of domestic disagreement of opinion does indeed exist in the ininvolved in the post-Stalin struggles has ternational Communist movement on also narrowed with the maturing of the crucial questions of war and peace, social commitments made earlier. For this situation, as far as one can judge, the moment, the era of grand alterna- obtains to a considerably lesser degree tives is over in Soviet society. Even in the USSR itself. Bukharin vs. Trotsky though any struggle tends to exaggerate can be compared to Togliatti vs. Mao differences, the issues that divided Tse-tung, but hardly to Khrushchev vs.

Khrushchev from his opponents, though Kozlov. ,

of «.eat import, appear pedestrian in The narrowing of the range of dis-

comparison to those over which Stalin agreement is reflected in the changed and his enemies crossed swords. In character of the cast. In the earlier part Khrushchev’s case, they pertained pri- of this discussion, some comparative

marily to policy alternatives; in the comments were made about Stalin,

Whither the Soviet Union? 829

, ev 8 8

Khrushchev, and Brezhnev. It is even thing which might be described as a more revealing, however, to examine regularly available “counter-elite.” Aftheir principal rivals. Take the men who ter Khrushchev’s fall, his successors opposed Stalin: Trotsky, Zinoviev, and moved quickly to restore to important Bukharin. What a range of political, positions a number of individuals whom historical, economic, and intellectual Khrushchev had purged,’? while some creativity, what talent, what a diversity of Khrushchev’s supporters were deof personal characteristics and back- moted and transferred. Already for a grounds! Compare this diversity with number of years now, it has been fairly the strikingly uniform personal train- common practice to appoint party offing, narrowness of perspective, and pov- cials demoted from high office either erty of intellect of Malenkov, Kozlov to diplomatic posts abroad or to some and Suslov.1° A regime of the clerks obscure, out-of-the-way assignments at cannot help but clash over clerical home. The total effect of this has been

issues. to create a growing body of official The narrowing of the range of dis- “outs” who are biding their time on agreement and the cooling of ideologi- the sidelines and presumably hoping cal passions mean also the wane of po- someday to become the “ins” again. litical violence. The struggle tends to Moreover, they may not only hope; if

become less a matter of life or death, sufficiently numerous, young, and vigand more one in which the price of orous, they may gradually begin to redefeat is simply retirement and some semble something of a political alternapersonal disgrace. In turn, with the rou- tive to those in power, and eventually tinization of conflict, the political system to think and even act as such. This develops even a body of precedents for could be the starting point of informal handling fallen leaders. By now there factional activity, of intrigues and conmust be a regular procedure, probably spiracies when things go badly for those even some office, for handling pensions in power, and of organized efforts to and apartments for former Presidium seduce some part of the ruling elite in members, as well as a developing social order to stage an internal change of etiquette for dealing with them publicly guard.’ In addition, the availability of and privately."

° . 12F, D, Kulakov, apparently blamed by

More tmpe rtant 8 the apparent de- Khrushchev in 1960 for agricultural failings

velopment in the Soviet system of some- in the RSF SR, was appointed in 1965 to direct

10Oneees the Soviet Union’s new agricultural programs; could hardly expect a historian to V. V. Matskevich was restored as Minister of work any enthusiasm for undertaking to . . . of ; , weup Agriculture and appointed Deputy Premier write, say, Malenkov’s biography: The Ap- the RSFSR in ch f agriculture: Marshal

paratchik Promoted, The Apparatchik Trium- . in charge OF agricubure; arena . . M.Apparatchik V. Zakharov was reappointed as Chief of phant, The Pensioned! . 11 Can Mikoyan, for example, invite Khrush- Staff of the Armed Forces; even L. G. Melni-

1 he Thi . P ' vial tion kov reemerged from total obscurity as chair-

chev to tunch: 1s 18 not a Srivial questioMs man of the industrial work safety committee for social mores and political style are inter- of the RSFSR

woven. After all, Voroshilov, who had been °

publicly branded as a military idiot and a 13 Molotov’s letter to the Central Committee political sycophant, was susbequently invited on the eve of the 22d Party Congress of Octoto a Kremlin reception. Zhukov, against whom __ ber, 196], which bluntly and directly charged the Bonapartist charge still stands, appeared | Khrushchev’s program with revisionism, Was

in full regalia at the twentieth anniversary PYF esumably designed to stir up the apparatcelebration of the Soviet victory in World chiki against the First Secretary. It may be a

War II. portent of things to come.

830 Whither the Soviet Union? , an increasingly secure “counter-elite” is leadership and higher bureaucratic effilikely to make it more difficult for a ciency. Khrushchev’s removal, however, leader to consolidate his power. This in also means that personal intrigues and turn might tend to promote more fre- cabals can work, that subordinate mem-

quent changes in the top leadership, bers of the leadership—or possibly, with policy failures affecting the power someday, a group of ex-leaders—can of incumbents instead of affecting— effectively conspire against a principal only retroactively—the reputation of leader, with the result that any future former leaders, as has hitherto been the First Secretary is bound to feel far less

case. secure than Khrushchev must have felt The cumulative effect of these devel- at the beginning of October, 1964.

opments has been wide-ranging. First | The absence of an institutionalized of all, the reduced importance of both top executive officer in the Soviet politi-

ideological issues and personalities and cal system, in conjunction with the

the increasing weight of institutional jncreased difficulties in the way of interests in the periodic struggles for achieving personal dictatorship and the power—a phenomenon which reflects decreased personal cost of defeat in a the more structured quality of present- political conflict, create a ready-made day Soviet life as compared with the situation for group pressures and instisituation under Stalin—tends to deper- tutional clashes. In fact, although the sonalize political conflict and to make range of disagreement may have narit a protracted bureaucratic struggle. rowed, the scope of elite participation Second, the curbing of violence makes jn power conflicts has already widened. it more likely that conflicts will be ree Much of Khrushchev‘s exercise of powsolved by patched-up compromises rath- er was preoccupied with mediating the er than by drastic institutional redistri- demands of key institutions such as the butions of power and the reappearance army, or with overcoming the opposiof personal tyranny. Finally, the in- tion of others, such as the objections of creasingly bureaucratic character of the the administrators to economic decenstruggle for power tends to transform tralization or of the heavy industrial it into a contest among high-level clerks managers to nonindustrial priorities. and is therefore not conducive to at- These interests were heavily involved tracting creative and innovating talent jin the Khrushchev-Malenkov conflict

into the top leadership. and in the “anti-party” episode of 1957. Khrushchev’s fall provides a good At the present time, these pressures illustration of the points made above, and clashes take place in an almost enas well as an important precedent for tirely amorphous context, without conthe future. For the first time in Soviet stitutional definition and_ established history, the First Secretary has been procedures. The somewhat greater role toppled from power by his associates. played by the Central Committee in reThis was done not in order to replace cent years still does not suffice to give him with an alternative personal leader this process of bureaucratic conflict a or to pursue genuinely alternative goals, stable institutional expression. As far but in order to depersonalize the leader- as we know from existing evidence, the

ship and to pursue more effectively Central Committee still acted during many of the previous policies. In a the 1957 and 1964 crises primarily as word, the objectives were impersonal a ratifying body, giving formal sanction

Whither the Soviet Union? 831 to decisions already fought out in the he therefore noted that “a strong party Kremlin’s corridors of power.’‘ It did is in the Soviet public interest” because not act as either the arbiter or the su- it provides a stable institutional frame-

preme legislative body. work,’®

The competition for power, then, is The Soviet political system has cerchanging from a death struggle among tainly achieved a high index of instituthe few into a contest played by many _ tionalization. For almost five decades

more. But the decline of violence does the ruling party has maintained unnot, as is often assumed, automatically questioned supremacy over the society, benefit the Soviet political system; imposing its ideology at will. Tradition-

something more effective and stable ally, the Communist system has comhas to take the place of violence. The bined its high institutionalization with “game” of politics that has replaced the high pseudo-participation of individformer mafia-style struggles for power uals.!”7 But a difficulty could arise if is no longer murderous, but it is still division within the top leadership of not a stable game played within an the political system weakened political established arena, according to accepted ‘“‘institutionalization” while simultanerules, and involving more or less formal ously stimulating genuine public par-

teams. It resembles more the anarchistic ticipation by groups and institutions. free-for-all of the playground and there- Could this new condition be given an fore could become, in some respects, effective and stable institutional frameeven more debilitating to the system. work and, if so, with what implications Stalin encouraged institutional conflict for the “strong” party?

below him so that he could wield his Today the Soviet political system is power with less restraint. Institutional again oligarchic, but its socio-economic conflict combined with mediocre and _ setting is now quite different. Soviet sounstable personal leadership makes for ciety is far more developed and stable,

ineffective and precarious power. far less malleable and atomized. In the

ast, the key groups that had to be con-

PaRTY AND Group INTERESTS sidered as ” potential political particiIn a stimulating study of political de- pants were relatively few. Today, in advelopment and decay, Samuel Hunting- dition to the vastly more entrenched

ton has argued that stable political institutional interests, such as the pogrowth requires a balance between lice, the military, and the state bureau-

political “institutionalization” and po- cen ass

tical “participation”: that merely ine gg™ Semel F Manian, Pelical Dev creasing popular mobilization and par- (Princeton, N.J.), April, 1965. ticipation in politics without achieving 16 Jbid., p. 414. a corresponding degree of “institution- 17 The massive campaigns launching “pubalization of political organization and lic discussions” that involve millions of peoprocedures” results not in political de- ple, the periodic “elections” that decide nothvelopment but in political decay.® Come iMG, ete designed to develop paricipation menting in passing on the Soviet system, organization and procedures. The official theory held that, as Communist consciousness 14 Roger Pethybridge, A Key to Soviet Poli- | developed and new forms of social and public

tics (New York: Praeger, 1962). See also relations took root, political participation

Myron Rush, The Rise of Khrushchev (Wash- would become more meaningful and the pubington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1958). lic would come to govern itself.

832 | Whither the Soviet Union? cracy, the youth could become a source there is bound to be some corresponof ferment, the consumers could become dence between their respective stances more restless, the collective farmers and those of the top leaders. This specmore recalcitrant, the scientists more trum is represented in simplified fash-

outspoken, the non-Russian nationali- ion by the chart on this page, which ties more demanding. Prolonged com- takes cumulative account of the principetition among the oligarchs would cer- pal divisions, both on external and on tainly accelerate the assertiveness of domestic issues, that have perplexed So-

such groups. viet political life during the last decade By now some of these groups have a_ or so.?° Obviously, the table is some-

degree of institutional cohesion, and what arbitrary and also highly specuoccasionally they act in concert on lative. Individuals and groups cannot some issues.4* They certainly can lob- be categorized so simply, and some, by and, in turn, be courted by ambi- clearly, could be shifted left or right tious and opportunistic oligarchs. Some with equal cause, as indeed they often groups, because of institutional cohe- shift themselves. Nonetheless, the chart sion, advantageous location, easy access illustrates the range of opinion that exto the top leadership, and ability to ar- ists in the Soviet system and suggests ticulate their goals and interests, can be the kind of alliances, group competiquite influential.'® Taken together, they tion, and political courtship that probrepresent a wide spectrum of opinion, ably prevail, cutting vertically through and in the setting of oligarchical rule the party organization. 18 A schematic distribution of these groups is indicated by the following approximate fig- 19 An obvious example is the military comures: (A) amorphous social forces that in the mand, bureaucratically cohesive and with a main express passively broad social aspira- specific esprit de corps, located in Moscow, tions: workers and peasants, about 88 mil- necessarily in frequent contact with the top lion; white collar and technical intelligentsia, leaders, and possessing its own journals of about 21 million. (B) specific interest groups opinion (where strategic and hence also—inthat promote their own particular interests: directly—budgetary, foreign, and other issues the literary and artistic community, about 75 can be discussed). thousand; higher-level scientists, about 150 20 The categories “systemic left,” etc., are thousand; physicians, about 380 thousand. adapted from R. R. Levine’s book, The Arms (C) policy groups whose interests necessarily Debate (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Universpill over into broad matters of national pol- sity Press, 1963), which contains a suggestive icy: industrial managers, about 200 thousand; chart of American opinion on_ international state and collective farm chairmen, about 45 issues. By “systemic left” is meant here a thousand; commanding military personnel, radical reformist outlook, challenging the preabout 80 thousand; higher-level state bureau- dominant values of the existing system; by crats, about 250 thousand. These groups are “systemic right” is meant an almost reaction-

integrated by the professional apparatchiki, ary return to past values; the other three who number about 150-200 thousand. All of categories designate differences of degree these groups in turn could be broken down within a dominant “mainstream.” into sub-units; e.g., the literary community, In the chart below (unlike Levine’s), the institutionally built around several journals, center position serves as a dividing line, and

can be divided into hard-liners, the centrists, hence no one is listed directly under it. and the progressives, etc. Similarly, the mili- Malenkov is listed as “systemic left” because tary. On some issues, there may be cross- his proposals represented at the time a drastic interlocking of sub-groups, as well as more or departure from established positions. Molotov

less temporary coalitions of groups. See Z. is labeled “systemic right” because of his inBrzezinski and S. Huntington, Political Pow- clination to defend the essentials of the Staer: USA-USSR (New York: Viking Press, linist system in a setting which had changed

1964), Chap. 4, for further discussion. profoundly since Stalin’s death.

Whither the Soviet Union? 833 TABLE 2

Policy Spectrum USSR

a Marginalist as Systemic Systemic Left Left Centrist Right Right

'Industry I Voronov i 5'Regional t Central i Agit- i" GoodsIndustry Light ,i tHeavy Industry

Malenkov Khrushchev Kosygin ¢ Brezhnev Kozlov Molotov ' Podgorny Mikoyan ! Shelepin Suslov Kaganovich

Consumer 3 Apparat , Apparat 1 prop |

t' ’tists Inno-: |5' 1!

1, 1a “es , Conventional Military Army i'

t Agronovatorst Bureaucrats Ministerial Secret Scien- mists Police Moscow-Reformers Economict Computators a Economic’§t Leningrad

Intellectuals (Liberman) f (Nemchinov) ' t

Not just Western but also Commu- Traditionally, this function of intenist (although not as yet Soviet) politi- gration has been monopolized by the cal thinkers are coming to recognize party, resorting—since the discard of more and more openly the existence of terror—to the means of bureaucratic group conflict even in a Communist- arbitration. In the words of the author dominated society. A Slovak jurist re- just cited, “the party as the leading and

cently observed: directing political force fulfills its functas . tions byinresolving intra-class and interThe social interest our society can be . 9 . . , class interests.” In doing so, the party democratically formed only by the integra- lly h ferred to deal with tion of group interests; in the process of anh y ba pre i h ob cal wi

this integration, the interest groups pro- ©¢M group bilaterally, thereby preventtect their own economic and other social ing the formation of coalitions and ininterests: this is in no way altered by the formal group consensus. In this way the

fact that everything appears on the sur- unity of political direction as well as

face as a unity of interests.” the political supremacy of the ruling

The author went on to stress that the anal have ° ven maintained. oe party key political problem facing the Com- ' as ‘tie ays been ati Jea at th Ns tran

munist system is that of achieving inte. “